UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY VOLUME I UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY 1914 s/.l 5534 Bancroft Library STUDIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY lancroft Library CONTENTS PAGES No. 1. COLONIAL OPPOSITION TO IMPERIAL AUTHORITY DURING THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR, BY EUGENE IRVING McCoRMAC 1- 98 I. General View 1- 17 II. New England 17- 26 Massachusetts 17- 20 Connecticut 20- 22 Ehode Island 22- 24 New Hampshire 24- 26 III. The Middle Colonies 26- 74 New York 26- 31 New Jersey 31- 34 Pennsylvania 34- 63 Maryland 63- 74 IV. The Southern Colonies 74- 92 Virginia 74- 85 North Carolina 85- 88 South Carolina 88- 89 Georgia 89- 92 Conclusion 92- 98 Bibliography 97- 98 No. 2. THE VICEROY OP NEW SPAIN, BY DONALD E. SMITH 98-293 I. Historical Introduction 98-122 II. The Relations of the Viceroy with the Home Gov- ernment 123-158 III. The Viceroy as Governor 159-192 IV. The Viceroy as Captain-General 193-228 V. The Viceroy as Vice-Patron 229-247 VI. The Eeforms of Galvez 248-275 VII. Conclusion 276-284 Bibliographical Note 284-287 Bibliography 288-293 PAGES No. 3. THE BEGINNINGS OF SPANISH SETTLEMENT IN THE EL PASO DISTRICT, BY ANNE E. HUGHES 295-392 I. Introductory: Spanish Expansion into New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya 295-302 Bibliographical Note 301-302 II. Early Missions and Settlers in the El Paso District, 1659-1680 303-314 III. The Coming of the Eefugees from Santa Fe, 1680 315-323 IV. The Founding of the Presidio and the Reorganization of the Settlements, 1683 324-333 V. The Eevolt of the Mansos and their Neighbors 334-364 VI. The Consolidation of the Settlements in 1684 365-370 VII. Efforts to Abandon El Paso, 1684-1685 371-381 VIII. The Quarrel with Nueva Vizcaya over Jurisdiction. 382-387 IX. Conclusion: Summary of Settlement in the El Paso District, 1659-1685 388-392 INDEX TO THE VOLUME ... .. 393-406 THE VICEROY OF NEW SPAIN DONALD E. SMITH CHAPTEE I HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Although it is no longer necessary to show why the history and institutions of Spanish America should be studied with the same interest and care as are bestowed upon those of English North America or of Europe, nevertheless a change in the emphasis of the particular phases of Spanish American history to be inves- tigated must be insisted upon. It is today recognized practically everywhere that the history of the Americas south of the United States has a dignity of its own, and we are now in a period in which there is evidence of an increasing attention to historical studies relating to Spanish America. This revival of interest in the working of what is, in some respects, an old field of history should, however, be turned in a direction which will enable us to realize the best results with the rich materials now available. 1 We must no longer suffer a preoccupation with the romantic i The unusual facilities, compared with the past, which are now enjoyed by the investigators in the field of Spanish and Spanish American history are due principally to three facts. The first is the more liberal policy adopted in recent years by the officials of the Spanish archives in throw- ing open to foreign students and allowing them to work without subject- ing the materials they take out to a censorship. These favorable con- ditions exist now in the great repositories of documents at Simancas, Madrid, and Seville. The second is the systematic study which is now being made of the archives of Mexico under the auspices of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The third is the conversion of the great library of Mr. H. H. Bancroft from a private collection into a public one, ac- cessible to all qualified students. It perhaps ought to be said that an additional aid is being offered to scholars by the action of the Mexican government in publishing so many documents of the highest value dealing with the history of the country. On the other hand, the great series of Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de Espana reaches only to the seven- teenth century. 100 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 age of the early conquerers and explorers, after the fashion of Irving and Prescott, or a concentration of interest on the wrongs of the native races, as with Las Casas and Sir Arthur Helps, or even an exclusively economic point of view, such as was so bril- liantly held by Alexander von Humboldt. That which is of present urgency is a clear understanding of the general adminis- trative system of the Spaniard in his dominions overseas. At the very outset, any such endeavor to understand what the Spanish colonial government really was, is confronted by the necessity of finding out and stating unambiguously the duties of the viceroy, how they were performed, and what were their historical con- sequences. One could scarcely devise a more instructive study in comparative institutions than that presented by the somewhat parallel development of the English rule in India and the Spanish rule in America, the whole centering in the office of the viceroy ; but our interests are for the present restricted to the narrower view of the viceroy as a colonial officer in New Spain, and only an occasional comparison between him and similar officials of other European colonizing nations can be made. The reasons for restricting this thesis to a consideration of the viceroy of New Spain in the eighteenth century are fourfold. In the first place, the viceregal office attained to its fullest devel- opment in Mexico, or New Spain, rather than in Peru, under the special guidance of the greatest of Spain's experts in colonial affairs, Jose de Galvez, Minister General of the Indies (Ministro Universal de Indias). In the second place, in the eighteenth cen- tury, notably during the last thirty years of it, New Spain shared in those far-reaching reforms of the enlightened despot, Charles III, 2 which makes its history during that reforming epoch pecu- liarly important. The transformation which the Spanish colonial system underwent at this time can be studied to best advantage, as far as America is concerned, in the history of the viceroyalty of 2 In many ways the clearest statement, in a small compass, of the scope and meaning of the reforms of Charles III in Spain is to be found in the little Stanhope essay, by Joseph Addison. The larger Spanish general histories of this reign, such as the one by Danvila y Collado, and the older work of Ferrer del Rio, are very weak on matters relating to America and to the colonies. 1913 ] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 101 Mexico. In the third place, this period, the last third of the eighteenth century, was not only a reforming epoch, when Spain was again one of the great powers of Europe, but it was also the time in Spanish American history which may be called the eve of the war of independence. It is therefore the period when there can be studied to the best advantage those political and social forces which eventually lost for Spain the most splendid colonial empire known at that time, as a consequence of which this era is attractive to the historical student as a period of preparation for the subsequent secession of Spanish America. In the fourth place, as a final reason and one sufficient in itself, the historical materials available on the Pacific Coast, and par- ticularly in the collection belonging to the University of Cali- fornia, are of more value for the great viceroyalty, of which the Pacific Coast was a part, than for the more distant ones of South America. From the point of view of time, also, the documents in the Bancroft Library are much more significant for the eighteenth century than for any other period. The first question which presents itself in regard to the vice- roy of New Spain, let us say in the year 1770, before the new reforms had been inaugurated, is, What was his position in the general scheme of the government of the viceroyalty, and what were his duties with reference, on the one hand, to his superiors in Spain, and on the other, to his subordinates in the dominions over which he was expected to rule ? 3 Any answer to this ques- tion must begin with the statement that the viceroy was supposed, as the derivation of his title indicates, to be in the place of the king, to be the king's alter ego, to have all the powers and pre- rogatives which the king would have were he there in person, but subject, of course, to those checks and restrictions on his abso- lute power which the king had seen fit to throw about him. As was to be expected, these limitations on the exercise by the vice- s The best existing account of Spanish institutions as they were in the latter half of the eighteenth century is given by Desdevises du Dezert, referred to in the appended bibliographical note. What is said there about the viceroy in Spain, and incidentally in the colonies, is by no means exhaustive, but makes a clear and accurate introduction to the sub- ject. Such a book as the Historia de Legislation Espanola, by Antequera, is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it is too brief. 102 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 roy of plenary royal authority were very considerable and varied at different times, but there was left, even at this time of the greatest abasement of the viceregal government, a residuum of powers which made their possessor a real potentate. The viceroy of New Spain was the highest colonial official in all the territory from the Isthmus of Panama on the south, northward to and in- cluding New Mexico, Texas and California, and embracing those lands between Louisiana and the Pacific Ocean which now constitute the southwestern portion of the United States. The Spanish islands of the West Indies, the two Floridas, and from 1762 to 1800 Louisiana, together with the region which we call Central America, organized by the Spaniards as the Cap- taincy-General of Guatemala, were all within the sphere of in- fluence of the viceroy without being directly subordinate to him. 4 In times of war these neighboring provinces looked to Mexico for military and financial aid, but in ordinary matters of internal and peaceful administration they were practically independent. The viceroyalty of New Spain proper, therefore, may be said to have extended from Guatemala to Louisiana and Oregon. Over this vast but not very accurately defined territory the viceroy exercised a threefold authority. Just what this authority was and just how it was exercised, the secondary historians have never made clear, but a careful reading of our primary sources makes it possible so to state it that it is intelligible to even our American modes of thought. There is almost never discernible in the duties of a Spanish high official in the colonies that dis- tinction between civil and military, or between executive and judicial functions which are so fundamental with us. This gen- eral statement is made at the beginning in order to anticipate those confusions and contradictions which are inevitably en- countered by the student who is accustomed only to English in- 4 The discussion of the very complicated question of the official relation of the viceroy to the neighboring captains-general is taken up very briefly in a later chapter, as is also the equally perplexing question of territorial divisions. The complicated arrangement regarding the Prov- incias Internas and the relation of this new territorial circumscription the rest of the viceroyalty, together with the whole matter of the tweb new intendancies, will be taken up with the other reforms of Galvez. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 103 stitutions. Taking the viceroy's great variety of functions and separating out and classifying together those that would seem to lend themselves to any sort of classification under familiar terms, a result something like the following is reached: 1. The great variety of duties which are by us commonly termed civil were exercised by the viceroy in his capacity of gobernador, or governor. But, as the reader has just been warned, no very fine distinctions between the civil, the military, and the ecclesiastical were observed by the legislators for New Spain, and an endless variety of duties which an American would call civil were performed by the viceroys in other capacities than as governors. However, as chief in a general way of the civil admin- istration, it cannot be a matter of surprise to find the gobernador held accountable for the collection of taxes of all kinds, whether for local purposes or for the satisfaction of the rights (derechos) of the king of Spain. Naturally, it made no difference from what sources these taxes were derived, whether upon real or personal property, or incomes, or movable goods. Included in the above were the duties of all sorts levied on commerce, exterior and interior, and the tribute or capitation tax paid by both whites and civilized Indians. Under this heading also came the admin- istration of the numerous mines, with its own special code of laws. 5 With the responsibility for collecting the revenues there went a responsibility for their expenditure, and this covered disbursements of all kinds, whether for local or imperial pur- poses, such as the subsidies to the mother country and the neigh- boring colonies, the appropriations for the military and civil service, and the carrying out of public improvements. This appropriation of money for public improvements meant nothing less than the entire direction of the building and maintenance of all public works, from roads, bridges, fortifications, and drain- age canals, to the creation of new town sites, public markets, s For everything relating to the revenue system, recourse should be had the first instance to vol. iii, chap. 28, of Bancroft's History of Mexico, ind in the second, for detailed information, to the Historia General de Seal Hacienda, by Fonseca and Urrutia. The most interesting code of mining laws, known as the Beales Ordenansas de la Mineria, contains a complete ligest of the laws relating to mines and mining. 104 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 granaries, and foundling asylums. The viceroy as governor was further expected to increase the revenue and at the same time to encourage industries and generally promote his people's wel- fare by strict control and administration of the numerous royal monopolies, which, though perhaps primarily revenue-producing, covered a great many of the leading industries of the country, from the production of precious metals, mentioned above, and the tobacco industry, to such minor activities as the manufacture of playing cards and the licensing of cock fights and the venders of snow. From this statement of the viceroy's civil functions it would seem necessary to assume that he would regulate rather strictly all matters relating to commerce and trade, but this was by no means the case. For the general movement of internal trade he was indeed responsible, but so minute was the oversight main- tained by the home government in this all-important branch of colonial affairs that the viceroy was left comparatively little dis- cretion. 6 The Madrid government, acting through the Casa de Contratacion, or India House, at Cadiz, relieved the viceroy of everything but a very general supervision of the Mexican end of the trade with Spain. 7 He was obliged, it is true, to attend more carefully to the commerce of the Philippine Islands, passing through the port of Acapulco, but all things considered, matters of p-^terpfll |rdp did not loom very large on the horizon of the viceroy 's responsibilities. There were, however, even after this enumeration, a number of civil duties left to the viceroy-governor, of which only two e As the subject of colonial trade, its regulation by the mother country, and the mutual effects upon both, have been topics of perennial interest, a number of good secondary accounts have been written. A partial list is as follows: Bourne, Spain in America, chap. 19; Moses, South America on the Eve of the Emancipation, chap. 13 ; and Moses, The Establishment of Spanish Bule in America, chap. 3. 7 The general reader will find the Casa de Contratacion briefly but clearly treated in Moses, Spanish Eule in America, chap. 3, while reference may still be made to Veitia Linage, Norte de la Contratacion de las Indias Occidentales (1672). For the most recent statement of the place of the Casa de Contratacion in Spanish history, see the essay of J. Piernas Hurtado. The laws defining the viceroy's duties during the earlier period are conveniently assembled in Solorzano, Politica Indiana, vol. ii. There is no satisfactory treatment of the above points in any secondary work. For references to primary sources, see chapters iii and vi of this thesis. 1913 J Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 105 can come in for mention here. The appointment of a small army of subordinates in the civil service was one of his opportunities for good or evil, though this power was fenced about with restric- tions. Last of all, the governor was also a judge. This side of his activities had undergone many changes during the three centuries of viceregal government, and was to be subjected to still more notable modifications before the eighteenth century was over. But before the reforms of Charles III, the viceroy was president of the supreme court, or audiencia, and possessed of a variety of ways of interfering with the administration of justice. As will be pointed out further on, there was a great difference of opinion as to how far these judicial powers should extend, and the viceroys often complained of their diminution as hampering their influence and usefulness. The deep-seated historic rivalry between the chief executive of Mexico and the supreme court found partial vent in a struggle over just this point. Evidently the kings of Spain had become persuaded to take the side of the audiencia, and convinced that the viceroys had abused their judicial office, for the latter, gradually stripped of all real power as judges, were ultimately left as mere ex-officio presidents of the audiencia. 2. It was in his second capacity, as captain-general, that the viceroy possessed some of his most distinctive powers in the administrative hierarchy of New Spain. The supreme military command over all the military and naval forces, 8 the militia of the provinces, and the police of the capital, was vested in the vice- roy as captain-general, and so extensive and important were these functions that some writers have asserted that they quite over- shadowed the civil ones of the viceroy as governor. It is cer- s There was really no navy or considerable collection of naval vessels in the colonies independent of the control of the minister of marine at Madrid. In this respect the viceroy of New Spain was saved some of the responsibility attached to the office of governor-general in India, though this statement requires some qualification. There was under the direction of the Mexican government a number of coast-guard vessels and revenue cutters, and on the Pacific coast, at different times, a few larger vessels. The hospital at Vera Cruz was for sailors as well as soldiers, and was maintained out of Mexican revenues. See Eevilla Gigedo, Instruction Eeservada, art. 683. For a discussion of the viceroy and the navy of New Spain, see chap, iv of this thesis, where likewise will be found references to the primary sources. 106 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 tainly undeniable that the viceroy's responsibility for national defense against a foreign enemy and for internal order against hostile natives or disaffected citizens was at times the most serious one he had to bear, but it may be asserted with equal positiveness that this pre-eminence of the military over the civil operated in the main as an impediment to the highest peaceful development of the country. In the early days, in the sixteenth century, be- fore the rule of the Spaniard had been fully established, the viceroy was in effect the commanding general of an army of occupation, so that there was little room for anything else but the rule of a soldier. The earlier viceroys, and their predecessors, the adelantados, were therefore, of necessity, military chiefs first and civil administrators afterward, and right down to the war of independence an overwhelming majority of the viceroys were essentially military men, very often with little else than a mili- tary education and experience. It was a very common thing for the road to the palace in Mexico to lead from a lieuten- ancy-general in the army, through the post of captain-general of Cuba, as a preliminary to the viceregal dignity. It would seem that a purely civil training was a bar to high preferment in the colonial service, and such a condition of affairs could not, without a miracle, but have impaired the civil administration. It is not possible to go quite so far as to say that the distinctly military viceroys, during the period under consideration, gave direct evidence of incapacity for office because of their military antecedents. There was no real civilian viceroy with whom they could be compared, and the man who is generally looked upon as the ablest of them, the younger Revilla Gigedo, was a soldier, while the great Galvez himself was an intendant in the royal army before he entered upon his career as the reforming states- man of New Spain. 9 One cannot avoid instituting a comparison Villarroel, vol. i, part ii, p. 23, in his comments on the military char- acter of the Mexican viceroys, speaks of their capacity as captains-general as their "primitive function": .... "que es la primitiva de los Exmos. Sres. Vireyes en calidad de Capitanes Generales. " Throughout, Villarroel gives the impression that the military viceroys were not very expert in overcoming the difficulties that arose from trying to administer a civil office. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 107 between the history of the British in India and the Spaniards in America and reflecting upon what the India service would have lost had there never been at the head of affairs any but strictly military men, and if Clive and Hastings had been barred from office because they were civilians. A disposition to condemn the Spanish practice in this regard must be strengthened by the knowledge that the non-military viceroys of New Spain were archbishops. From the point of view of viceregal authority, how- ever, the office of captain-general was a gain, and tended toward that unity of command which has not always been secured in India. 3. In addition to being head of the civil administration as governor and commander-in-chief of all branches of the military service as captain-general, the viceroy enjoyed the position of the king's direct representative as the civil head of the church with the title of vice-patrono, 10 or vice-patron. This side of the vice- roy's activities had been developed as early as the sixteenth cen- tury, in fact as early as the days when the conquistadores and adelantados ceased to be mere soldiers and seekers after gold, and began to take on the character of heads of a civilized state. The relations of church and state had been settled in Spain, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, during the reign of the Catholic rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella, and had been settled in nearly every important particular to the advantage of the state. Succeeding struggles between the kings of Spain and the popes had brought about only minor changes, so that very little can be said about any development or decrease of ecclesiastical privileges during the rule of the Spaniard in America. The relative posi- tions of king and pope in Europe had been carried to Mexico by their respective representatives, the viceroy and the archbishop, with a minimum of friction or difficulties of any kind. Thus it was that the rights of patronage which belonged to the Spanish 10 The works of Bancroft contain rather more than an introduction to the history and constitution of the church in Mexico, as may be seen in the History of Mexico, iii, 681-731. See also Moses, Spanish Eule in America, chap, x, and his South America on the Eve of Emancipation, chap. vi. 108 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l kings came to be connected naturally enough with their repre- sentatives in the New Spain, the Mexican viceroys. It is not necessary to explain in detail, in this historical introduction, how the viceroy administered the real patronato, but it may be stated that these matters reached their final form by the time of the vice- roys Flores and Revilla Gigedo, 1787 to 1794. These additional ecclesiastical responsibilities added, of course, to the difficulties of the viceregal office, and were only partially compensated for by the enhancement of the viceroy's dignity and prestige. As a matter of common practice, the Mexican authorities interfered as little as possible with the affairs of the church, and the great exception, the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, was entirely the result of orders from the home government. When it comes to considering the changes which were made in the powers of the viceroys, from the very beginning to the out- break of the War of Mexican Independence, one must be pre- pared to believe that the changes were considerable both in num- bers and effect. During the two hundred and fifty years of Span- ish rule before the days of Charles III, it had been found neces- sary to impose some sort of check upon the king's chief repre- sentative in the colonies, who had at the beginning of this period such vast and indefinite powers. A more careful consideration of this large question will be taken up in chapters II and VII, but a preliminary word or two must be said in this connection. The whole system of checks and balances directed against the vice- roys happens to be one of the better known aspects of the Mexican colonial government, but, contrary to what is commonly under- stood, this system was in its completed form the result of long experience and a great number of changes. 11 The perfectly normal and obvious thing to do, when it is desired to tie the hands of a governor or viceroy, is to impose upon that official a body of responsible colleagues, which English- 11 The numerous changes in the relations of the principal officials of a Spanish dependency and the various kinds of remedial legislation enacted by the mother country indicated that the Spanish system was not utterly rigid and unadaptable. It is probable that the viceroy's powers were changed as much by attempted reforms as those of any similar official in the colonies of other European nations. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 109 speaking people call a cpunei|. Such a body was imposed upon the viceroy of New Spain early in the sixteenth century, under the name of an audiencia, and in order to guarantee the independ- ence of this body it was allowed to correspond directly with the home government without the viceroy as an intermediary. As a further means of holding the viceroy to his duty, the well-known method of taking official account of his administration was ac- complished through the institution known as a residencies. This was in substance a trial conducted by the crown with the intent of bringing to light any malpractices of which the retiring vice- roy might have been guilty during his official term. It was not only a means of setting right any wrongdoing or injustice which could be remedied after such a lapse of time, but it was also re- garded as giving a significant warning to possible future violators of the law. This combination of the audiencia and the residencia constituted the approved method of keeping the viceroy well in hand; but they had broken down utterly by the middle of the eighteenth century, when the reforms inaugurated by Galvez 12 brought about a complete readjustment of the relations of the viceroy to his superiors in Madrid and to his colleagues and subordinates in Mexico. It now seems appropriate to recount in the briefest possible compass the history of the viceregal government from its estab- lishment in 1535, under the great Mendoza, to the position in which it was found in the reign of Charles III. In the beginning, it was an easy transition when looking about for a suitable repre- sentative of the king for his American possessions, simply to transplant thither that officer so well known in Spain, the viceroy. The Kingdom of Spain was really composed of a number of independent sovereignties, united by the historical accident that they all had the same individual for king. This theory of the personal union of states was transferred to America, and in the 12 There is a certain assumption in constantly attributing these reforms so exclusively to Galvez. It has never been shown satisfactorily just who was responsible for many of the measures generally credited to Galvez 's administration of the department of the Indies. Florida Blanca, in his celebrated Instruction Beservada, implies that Galvez was the man. 110 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l same manner as the king of Spain had a personal representative called a viceroy, in each of his kingdoms of Valencia, Aragon, Navarre, and the others, he appointed a similar representative with the same title for his kingdom of the Indies. This vast territory had later to be broken up into separate kingdoms, as the Spaniards called them, such as New Spain or Mexico, Peru, New Granada, and finally in ITTS^JRio de la Plata, or Argentina, but this subdivision of the American territory had no constitu- tional bearings on the relation of these dependencies to the crown. These first great royal agents had been sent out with very ill- defined authority, and although they abused it, in distant America the office was found to be indispensable and could not be abolished as it had been in Spain proper. These shorter dis- tances had made it possible for the kings to develop an autocratic and highly centralized administration, and to put themselves in a position to dispense with their all too powerful vice-kings. 13 In the American kingdoms the viceroys were retained, but went through an evolution which constitutes the staple of the adminis- trative history of Spanish America. Thus it came about that, by the end of the eighteenth century, while there remained in Spain itself only the viceroy of Navarre, occupying a position highly ornamental and dignified, but actually without political power, there had developed in the New World four distinct viceroyalties, each with an elaborate machinery of government and tending more and more to come under the direct control and guidance of the king and his department of the Indies. The earliest agents of the Spanish king in America who had administrative duties proper, in contradistinction to those of the mere explorers and conquerors, were not hampered by any ingenious system of checks and balances such as was soon to be is The most helpful secondary account of the general position of the viceroy and his place in the history of Spanish institutions is that of the brilliant French scholar, Desdevises du Dezert. In vol. ii, chap. 3, is his discussion of the provincial administration in Spain and America, and though it is lucid and well arranged it is not sufficiently detailed to enable one to rest satisfied with this treatment. All the secondary writers have something to say on the subject, but no others deserve special mention. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 111 invented to keep their successors properly under the control of the Madrid government. They were not only far removed from Madrid by distance expressed in geographical miles, but they were also separated by the long and uncertain time required to exchange despatches. This excessive difficulty of communication placed these adelantados so far beyond anything like direct super- vision that they got out of hand and became in consequence a source of endless anxiety to their distant European superiors. 14 Desperate adventurers of the Cortes-Pizarro type did not lend themselves readily to the role of civil administrators obediently taking orders from a remote Council of the Indies. That cele- brated council had been created in the reign of Isabella, but re- quired a long period of years to gain experience and capacity for the great work expected of it, and it is not surprising that this body of elderly grandees, bureau clerks, and ecclesiastics found it difficult to command the respect and obedience of the first conquerors of America. Although these conditions were bound not to be permanent, and were succeeded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by an era of orderly government and internal peace, certain other evils developed which made clear the necessity of restraining the viceroys from ruling their territories like independent kings. By the eighteenth century the danger was passed that the vice- roys would attempt to cut out for themselves independent states in defiance of the king, but a new set of conditions had grown up which called for interference on the part of such an en- lightened despot as Charles III, quite as imperatively as the violence of the sixteenth century might have done. This greatest of the Spanish Bourbons came to the throne in 1759, after a long apprenticeship as King of Naples, and very early surrounded him- self with capable ministers such as Aranda, Campomanes, and Florida Blanca. Before very long he was in the full tide of that i* As an illustration of the anarchy which was so common during the first period of conquest, and of the insubordination so often shown by the conquerors, it is sufficient to point to the difficulties arising between Cortes and Velasquez, and the open war which was waged for a time between Almagro and the brothers Pizarro. 112 University of California Publications in History [V<> L - 1 reform legislation which attacked not only all sorts of abuses and medieval survivals in Spain proper, but also those evil con- ditions in the colonies that were brought to his notice. These conditions were not of the kind which present any peculiar difficulties, as far as their intelligibility is concerned, to an American of the present day. The Spanish colonial adminis- tration was honeycombed with what is now familiarly called "graft." In spite of the best intentioned legislation on the part of the mother country, so flagrant had become the abuses of the Spanish domination that a fresh attack upon the powers of the viceroy, as the central figure of that domination, was bound to come. Probably no more scathing indictment of the work of any government has ever been printed than the one drawn up by Admirals Juan and Ulloa in 1736, and handed to Philip V, in the innocent form of a report of a tour of inspection of the military and naval establishments of Peru. 15 These Noticias Secretas, or secret memoranda, were in effect an expose of the worst features of the Spanish rule. This celebrated report, writ- ten for the most part in a caustic, censorious tone, particularly when dealing with the clergy, exhibited a dreary picture of a country afflicted with an administrative dry rot, which left the native population cruelly oppressed by the very public officials who were designed to be their protectors, and which left the administration of justice, for native and Spaniard alike, corrupt and incredibly dilatory. Furthermore, if the mass of evidence bearing on this point is to be believed, the administration was everywhere, when not actually dishonest, antiquated and ineffi- cient to a superlative degree. Apparently the officials of the home government were too interested in the continuation of abuses or too lethargic to be aroused even by such a recital as that of Juan and Ulloa, and the 10 The very important question of the degree of credibility due the Noticias Secretas has not, as far as I know, yet been raised. It is not to be doubted that there were specific examples in Peru of every abuse attacked by Juan and Ulloa, but the general picture drawn by them may reasonably excite suspicion from its extremely dismal tone. The discus- sion of the government by the corregidors (part ii, pp. 230-265) suggests many analogous conditions in Mexico. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 113 king himself permitted their report to slumber unheeded for the rest of his reign. But after the accession of Charles III, a greater sensitiveness to various forms of misgovernment was observable. Only two years after his coming to the throne, in the year 1761, there was sent to New Spain in an inquisitorial capacity one Jose de Galvez, with the title of visitador general. A visitor-general, it may be explained in passing, was a direct personal representative of the king, a kind of legatus a latere, clothed with extraordinary powers, limited only by the particular instructions which were given him with his commission. 16 He was, in civil and military, what the grand inquisitor was in ecclesiastical affairs, except that the visitor-general was not restricted in his investigations by any vain distinctions between the temporal and spiritual domains. The office of visitor-general had been used in Spanish America back in the days of the earliest viceroys, and the early records are filled with evidences of the conflict between these two high offices. The traditional enmity was to be seen again as soon as Galvez arrived on the scene, and, owing to a dispute over the extent of his powers, he was not able to begin work until 1764. Galvez was expected to see things, as it were, with the eyes of the king, to investigate all sorts of men and conditions even to the viceroy himself, and to report back what he actually saw. Such a commission was not likely to make him a popular per- sonage in the viceroyalty, and contemporaries were singularly unanimous in declaring that he saw everything that could pos- sibly be construed to be bad. His rancorous disposition and in- tolerance toward everything which was inefficient, combined to make him the proper antidote for the maladministrators of Mexico. In his series of informes, or reports to the king, and in his instructions to the viceroys we have evidence of the thorough- ness of his probings into political, economic, and social abuses. It must have been made apparent to the Madrid government, as is There does not exist any work upon the nature and operation of the office of the visitor-general, nor even a chapter in any of the general his- tories which can be regarded as in any sense satisfactory. This whole subject must be worked up de novo from the sources. Occasionally, also, an ecclesiastical visitor-general was sent out to inspect the affairs of the church. 114 University of California Publications in History ["VOL. 1 a result of these reports, that some drastic changes were neces- sary, and that an audiencia during a viceroy's incumbency and a residencia at the end of it were no longer guarantees of either an honest or an efficient rule. The demands for reforms which had been made timidly and infrequently by some of the preceding viceroys, and the earnest insistence for the same reforms now made in Spain by Campomanes and Jovellanos, fortified by the influence of Galvez, resulted in a general attack all along the line. The decrees of 1765 and 1768 began the downfall of the Spanish mercantile system, and the great free-trade decree of 1778 revolutionized the trade relations between Spain and her colonies. 17 The general statement that in modern times there has been a constant tendency of the work of civilized governments to be- come greater and more complicated is certainly applicable to Mexico in the eighteenth century. The evidence from the sources is conclusive that the viceroys in the days of Galvez were over- worked, and that their responsibilities were too numerous for any one man to bear. 18 The idea of the older and simpler days of the viceregal government, of the concentration of all forms of governmental activity in the hands of one chief executive, might do very well for a Philip II in the sixteenth century, or a Napoleon even in the nineteenth century, but was most certainly found wanting for the average viceroy who was trained in the i? It is a noteworthy fact that these first great reforms were directed against that system of commercial restrictions which had borne most severely on the economic development of the colonies. The exact history of the decree of October 12, 1778, has never been unravelled. There is reason to believe that Cevallos, in Buenos Aires, was the first provincial ruler to put in effect the provisions later embodied in this act. A clear, brief account of these commercial reforms is in De Lannoy and Vander Linden, pp. 389-403. is Villarroel discusses the unnecessary demands upon the viceroy's time and strength in his Enfermedades Politicas, i, part ii, p. 23: "Las mas grave y pesada carga de los Senores Vireyes, la de gastar diariamente quatro 6 seis horas en el Despacho de los Expedientes contenciosos, que la ponen de manifiesto los dos Secretarios de Gobierno, llebando regular- mente puestos las Decretas, que ellos creen, que corresponden, reducidas a pase al Senor Fiscal . . . . y pase al Asesor." He urged that the asesor general be given the duty of first examining these despatches, and reducing them in numbers, so that when only the most important ones remained they be submitted to the viceroy himself. 1 913 J Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 115 camp, and found himself, past middle life, in a maze of admin- istrative duties. The changes which were now soon to be intro- duced and which we must, from the point of view of the present, regard as the keynote of Spanish American administrative his- tory on the eve of independence, were devised primarily to relieve the viceroy of his excessive official burdens, and incidentally to secure more immediate control, by the home government, of cer- tain branches of the administration. It is easy for us to under- stand that the chief executive of New Spain, who was obliged to spend one-third of his time in holidays and ceremonies, and four hours of each working day in the drudgery of examining and signing despatches, could not keep a firm grip on all depart- ments for which he was responsible. The change which most profoundly affected the position of the viceroy, both in respect to his actual direction of the govern- ment in Mexico and to his relation to the king in Spain, was embodied in the Decree of the Intendants, of the year 1786. An intendant was originally a kind of provincial governor in France, under the old regime, and had been carried to Spain along with the Bourbon dynasty during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. The office had been suppressed in Spain in 1718, only to be revived in 1749, by a decree which formed the basis of the before-mentioned decree of 1786. It was reserved for Charles III to attempt to transplant this office, with certain modifications, to the colonies, and intendants were first heard of there in the , year 1782, as playing a very significant part in the new govern- 1 ment of the Rio de la Plata. 19 The trying of the intendants in the smallest and youngest of the viceroyalties may have been regarded as a sort of political laboratory experiment. Four years later they were brought to Mexico with the double purpose of relieving and regulating the viceroy. is There is reason to believe that intendants were employed in Cuba even earlier than in Argentina. 116 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 It must be explained in this connection that previous to this time New Spain 20 had been divided into a number of provinces, in the main governed by corregidores, who were responsible direct- ly to their immediate chief, the viceroy. Under these corregidores were the leading local magistrates, the alcaldes mayores, whose functions were mainly judicial. Now it so happened that in those famous Noticias Secretas, not to mention a large number of lesser known authorities on conditions in Spanish America, these corregidores, and of course to a certain extent their subordinate alcaldes mayores, received most of the blame. A corregidor was supposed to be, among other things, a kind of Indian commis- sioner with a large responsibility for the welfare of these wards of the Spanish nation, but the chance to make money out of their official position proved to be too alluring, so that they were singled out for an early sacrifice when the real reforms began. Evidently the first-hand personal investigation of the clear- sighted visitor-general officially confirmed what had long been common knowledge, and the effect of the new decree bringing in the intendants was to sweep out of existence all the corregidores and alcaldes mayores and to substitute for them governors with general executive and judicial duties, but chiefly designed to exercise complete control over provincial finances. Furthermore, these intendants, 21 as the new provincial governors were called, were to be almost entirely independent of the viceroy and, unlike the corregidores, were to report directly to a general superintend- ent of finances, superintendent e de real hacienda, who was in turn directly subordinate to the king and the Council of the Indies. 20 It is next to impossible to be consistent in the geographical nomen- clature of Mexico. Throughout this thesis New Spain and Mexico are used synonymously, and as including the whole territory over which the viceroy ruled. Strictly speaking, the Spaniards meant by New Spain only the kernel, as it were, of what is now included in the Mexican Eepublic, and referred loosely to the districts outside of this kernel as New Galicia, New Biscay, and so forth. "El reino de Mexico se llamaba Nueva Espana (estrietamente dicha) cuando se hablaba de 61 en contra - posicion de la Nueva Galicia o la Nueva Viscaya o Nueva Leon u otro territorio seme j ante" (Eivera, i, 70). 21 The introduction of the intendants was warmly resented by the viceroys, who could not but feel themselves deprived of one of their chief powers. See Eevilla Gigedo, Instruccidn Beservada, pp. 1-3. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 117 Under this new regime, by the removal of the whole matter of finance from the viceroy 's jurisdiction, there was also removed the chief temptation and opportunity for corruption, besides im- mensely relieving the conscientious viceroy from a state of being chronically overworked. A new council, officially termed the j junta general de real hacienda, was established at the capital I with the superintendent-general as its president. This new chief of the financial end of the government became, not an official sub- ordinate to the viceroy, but a co-ordinate ruler over what was in some ways the most important branch of the government. From the foregoing remarks it is apparent that the control of all financial matters was by this decree of the intendants taken from the viceroy, but such a bald statement gives no idea of the real loss of power involved in the transfer. The Spanish word hacienda signifies a great deal more than our word finance. It included not merely all revenues, but in many cases the sources of revenue as well, so that the king's property and the royal monopolies were henceforth to be administered by the intendants and not by the subordinates of the viceroy. From now on, Mexico was to be divided territorially into twelve intendancies, while the old corregimientos, districts ruled by corregidores, dis- appeared. In some cases this apparently simple dividing up of the country was complicated by the retention of the corregidor alongside of the intendant, or by having both offices held by one man, but that was an exceptional survival of the old state of things. 22 To give some notion of the importance of the intendants under this new system, it is only necessary to mention the four grand departments, or ramos, over which they presided. The first one enumerated in the law defining the duties of the intend- ants was that all-important causa de hacienda, which has been defined above as the whole department of revenue and finance, 22 It is as yet impossible to find anything like a satisfactory account of the intendants without going to the primary material. The most important single source is the text of the decree itself, though the com- ments of Bancroft and Villarroel are of some help. For the results in Argentina, consult Quesada. 118 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 in the most comprehensive sense. The second was the causa de justicia, or department of justice, which included within its limits all the lower courts, in the cities and small towns, in fact everything below the two supreme courts, or audiencias, at Mex- ico City and Guadalajara. The third was the causa de guerra, or war department, which must not be understood, however, to mean that the intendants were charged merely with what we would regard as the civil duties of recruiting and maintaining soldiers in time of peace, or of making only those preparations which would make field operations possible on the outbreak of war, but that they were also responsible, according to the new law, for the equipment, drill and discipline of all the troops, regular and militia, stationed in the intendancy. The fourth was the causa de policia, or general police, which was generously made to include not only policing the districts and preserving good morals, but also poor relief, repair of roads and fortifications, and in- numerable similar duties. The intendant was perhaps the perfect representation of all that must seem to us chaotic and amorphous in the Spanish method of governing men. He was presumed to be the expert financial officer of the crown, capable of understanding the prob- lems of the incidence of taxation and the best method of tapping the public wealth. As a magistrate, he was empowered to issue administrative orders with the force of the law, and he was, of course, president of the council, or ayuntamiento, of his capital city. His judicial functions were considerable and he had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In some cases he was authorized to sit with other judges in the hearing of suits in admiralty. On the military side, he was a sort of secretary of war on a small scale, and a line and staff officer as well. Nearly everything about his office seems to involve a contradiction, and possibly nothing more than the mixture of military and financial matters. Nevertheless, this was not peculiar to the intendants in Mexico. In Spain itself finance and war were very often regarded as a perfectly proper combination, so that there seemed nothing offen- sive to the Spanish mind in the commingling of these divers 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 119 functions. 23 In fact, the intendants of Spain were the models on which those of the New World were constructed, and a thor- ough trial of this officer had been carried on in Spain before his introduction to the colonies was attempted. Enough has surely been said to indicate what a diminution of power the viceregal office suffered as a result of the establish- ment of the new. intendant system, but, although this was the most important of the losses sustained by the viceroy, it was by no means all. An inroad was made even on his dignity as captain- general, so that this " primitive function," as Villarroel called it, did not escape the antagonism of Galvez. There was during this period a loosening of the bonds which connected the viceroy with the military commanders on the frontiers, and the captain- general of Guatemala and the commandant-general of the Prov- incias Internas became rather less dependent in a military way on the great proconsul in Mexico. It is scarcely believable, in the light of all we know of three centuries of Spanish rule, that there should have come eventually such a separation of the civil and military in Spanish America as there is with the British in India. However, there were certainly some indications at this time that there was a beginning of such a splitting up of the various duties of the viceroy that there might have developed ultimately a viceroy and commander-in-chief in one person, with the chief civil duties in the hands of another. The beginning of an attack on the viceroy 's judicial functions was made by the creation of a new officer called the regente, who / was to displace the viceroy as the presiding officer of the audien- cia. This position, which was somewhat analogous to that of our Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was complained of bitterly as an infringement of viceregal prerogatives, but it was retained just the same. Along the same line and indicating a similar ten- dency was the denying to the viceroys of the privilege of grant- 23 For a clear and interesting summary of the relation of the various royal ministers and their portfolios to one another, there is nothing better in English than Addison, Charles the Third of Spain, pp. 104-130. 120 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 ing pensions and other rewards to any persons whatsoever. Some of these changes may seem of minor consequence, but their sum total was sufficient to modify in a very serious manner the char- acter of the highest office in New Spain. In other words, these reforms of Galvez and Charles III set up a dual system of administration in place of a single, autocratic one, and in such a way that collusion between the two elements of that dual system to oppress the natives or defraud the home government was well nigh impossible. But even after all these serious reductions of the powers of the viceroy of Mexico, there still remained a residuum of authority which easily prevented his lapsing into a mere passive spectator of what was going on in his dominions. It would be a serious mistake to regard viceroys like Revilla Gigedo as a sort of southern counterpart of the gov- ernor-general of Canada, a political dignitary selected for his engaging personal qualities and expected to concern himself prin- cipally with the laying of corner-stones and reviewing of troops. The viceroy did indeed live in a palace and continued to be the victim of many elaborate ceremonials, but he remained to the last a hard-worked official, charged with the general responsibility for the good government of his people. In many ways his occu- pation had tended to become rather more supervisory and less actually administrative, but this result was almost certain to be brought about because of the growing difficulty and complexity of his functions. He was still charged with the highest military command, the exercise of the royal patronage in matters eccle- siastical, and he was still the highest civil officer in the country. Moreover, it was discovered after a few years' trial that the process of decentralization and division of responsibility had gone too far and the pendulum began to swing back. Before the end of the Spanish rule in Mexico, the viceroys had recovered a part of their control over the intendants and also the whole depart- ment of the real hacienda, but there were not enough years of peace left to them to give this second change a fair trial, and the fateful year 1810 began a new epoch of wars and revolutions. 1913 ] Smith : The Viceroy of New Spain 121 Haying concluded what is in the nature of an historical intro- duction, with a general survey of the main points in the govern- ment of New Spain, it may be well to state here what is attempted in the body of the thesis. In the next chapter, dealing with the relations of the viceroy to the home government, an attempt will be made to exhibit the viceroy as the agent of the Spanish monarchy in the government of its American dependencies. To understand this, it will be necessary to describe very briefly the machinery of Spain's col- onial administration and to point out the relation of the various officials, particularly the viceroy, to it and to one another. In chapter m the viceroy will be studied in situ, but only in his capacity as governor. His relation to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, his appointing power and relation to the civil service, and the specific problems and acts of certain viceroys during the Galvez period, will be dealt with. In chapter iv the viceroy as captain-general will be treated after the same manner as in chapter m, except that this chapter concerns his military instead of his civil position. The organiza- tion of the military departments, the captain-general's staff, the number, character, and disposition of the armed forces, the for- tified places, and so forth, will be described. In chapter v, the viceroy as vice-patron will receive a some- what less extended treatment than he is given in his capacities as governor or as captain-general, but the manner in which the vice- roys managed to get along with the church in the eighteenth cen- tury, their relation to the prelates, the councils, and the inquisi- tion will come in for some explanation. Chapter vi, although entitled the reforms of Galvez, will not only treat of the administrative changes initiated by that minis- ter, but will also explain the duties of the superintendent-gen- eral of the real hacienda. As this office was held, except for a short time, by the viceroy, a description of the duties pertaining to it will show the position of the viceroy as the chief financial officer of the realm. As this is described rather minutely in the 122 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l law of 1786, creating the intendants, it seems advisable to make a somewhat extended analysis of that law. Also, as the other great piece of reform legislation of the period was the free-trade decree of 1778, that law, like the decree of the intendants, will be given careful examination. 1913 J Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 123 CHAPTER II THE RELATIONS OF THE VICEROY WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT Before the position of the viceroy, in any of its bearings, can be understood adequately, and particularly his position in ref- erence to his superiors in Spain, it is necessary to get a general view of that complex body of administrative machinery of which he was so important a part. Like practically every other political institution, Spain's devices for governing her colonies were not suddenly created in one day in their complete form, but were the result of slow historical processes which added a bit here and there and which were still going on even after three hundred years of change and improvement. 1 It is doubtless true that Spam's colonial institutions were the result of too much a priori theorizing, rather than of experience, but that is a question for the student of political theory, and all that need be said in this connection is that these institutions were provided, one after an- i The subject-matter of the first three or four pages of this chapter may be found discussed in a large number of secondary works. The best critical writings on the general question of the relationship of Spain to her American colonies, and consequently on the place of the viceroys, are those of the Mexican historians themselves. The leader of that school of historians that exalts the rule of the viceroys and looks back upon the latter half of the eighteenth century as the golden age of Mexican history was Lucas Alaman. In 1852, he wrote: " .... no ha quedado, mas que la sombra de un nombre en otro tiempo .... ilustre. ' ' The leading representative of that other school of historians, which regarded independent Mexico as a sort of legitimate successor of the empire of Montezuma, was Carlos M. Bustamante. The writers of this school regarded the Spanish domination as a violent subversion of the rights of the natives and always seemed inclined to take a harsh view of the Spanish regime. The leading modern critic who fairly succeeded in avoiding these two extremes was Augustin Eivera. His Principios Criticos Sobre el Vireinato de la Nueva Espana, in three volumes, is too philosophical, but it is interesting for its point of view. 124 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l other, as the exigencies of the case seemed to demand, and they were not extemporized as soon as the voyages of the first explorers and conquerors had given Spain colonies to rule over. When the difficulties and novelty of the problems confront- ing them are considered, it would have been perhaps utterly un T reasonable to expect the Spaniards to avoid most of the mistakes in government and their resultant evils. There were practically no historical precedents to guide the first European states in their handling of colonial questions, and it is easy to understand how Spain came to transplant her own political system, as it had been worked out in Europe, directly to her American dependencies with only those modifications which experience from time to time suggested. It is, however, remarkable that the newly acquired dependencies should have been given immediately and without a struggle the same constitutional position within the empire that was demanded in vain two hundred years later by the English colonies in North America. Even during the lifetime of Columbus the necessity of pro- viding for a permanent, civilized government, in contradistinction to fitting out exploring and military expeditions, was recognized by the Catholic kings, and various civil magistrates were sent to the West Indies, the first lands occupied by the Spaniards, to administer the law, to supervise the granting of lands to the European settlers, and to regulate the relations between these settlers and the natives. Theoretically, the king had absolute power in America even if such were not still the case in Spain, for there were no traditional checks on the royal power in the Indies such as had survived in Spain itself from the Middle Ages ; but in the matter of actual administration neither such an inter- national figure as Charles V, nor even such a born administrator as Philip II, could actually direct American affairs in detail. There arose immediately a need for a body of men who were experienced in American affairs, not only to advise the king but to take actual control of these new and little known dominions. 2 Such a com- 2 Bancroft, History of Central America, i, 280-282, footnote. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 125 mittee or council was legally constituted in the year 1524, after many years of experimenting with various makeshifts. This Council of the Indies, or Consejo de Indias, has often been compared to the famous Council of Castile and referred to by writers as a kind of counterpart in American affairs of the older council in the affairs of Castile, but such a comparison is misleading. 3 The Council of the Indies had considerably greater authority within its own jurisdiction than any of the councils of Spain proper and was supreme, not only in civil and military affairs, but also in the domain of the church, excepting, of course, questions of faith. For the Kingdom of the Indies, which in- cluded all Spanish America and the Philippine Islands, it had authority to legislate on every subject with which a government could be concerned, and the only superior power was the king himself. All the laws in force in the colonies were not only prepared by this council but all the officers of any importance, who were to enforce these laws, were appointed by and respon- sible to this same council. The viceroys themselves, though stand- ing in a position of peculiar dignity as the personal represen- tatives of the king, were really creatures of the council and re- ported to it along with the other subordinate officials. The pos- sibility of always appealing from the council to the king as a last resort was finally done away with in the eighteenth century, and by the royal decree of July 29, 1773, the decisions of the council were declared final. Powerful and efficient as was this council, its eight members made it too large and unwieldly actually to superintend the vice- roys and the other officials in America, and in consequence the chief mouthpiece of the home government in the later days of Spanish rule came to be the minister of the Indies. It is im- possible in the space allotted here even to attempt an explanation of the Spanish cabinet system under the Bourbons, but from November, 1714, till well into the nineteenth century, there ex- isted a ministry of the Indies. 4 It was usually combined with s Desdevises du Dezert, ii, 95-102, 132-133. * Novisima Recopilacion, in, vi, 4. 126 University of California Publications in History the ministry of marine, in the hands of one person, though it was subject to numerous rearrangements in the course of the eighteenth century. 5 In 1787, 6 toward the very close of the Galvez regime, Charles III divided the portfolio of the Indies between two of- ficials, one to have the department of justice, and the other the departments of war and finance. This new arrangement had been in force only about three years when the government went back to the old basis, but the minister of the Indies, whether he held one or two cabinet offices, was, throughout the period here treated, in many ways the direct superior of the viceroys in America. As would appear from what has been said above, appointments were made to the viceregal office by the king with the advice of the Council of the Indies. Such appointments were among the very highest at the disposal of the king and were exceeded in honor and profit by only a few positions in the government at Madrid. From the very first, it seems to have been a determined policy of the Spanish rulers to appoint only grandees and persons of the highest social ranks as viceroys in the new world. At home it was the policy of Charles V and Philip II to employ occa- sionally secretaries of humble birth in the central administration, but only the great nobles were appointed to high commands be- yond the frontiers. This course was pursued even to the end of the eighteenth century. 7 Perhaps it would be inconsistent with Spanish notions of honor to have allowed the king to be represented by any but one of the bluest blood and of high military rank, but whatever the reason may have been, the vice- roys of New Spain and of Peru were in the main aristocrats and soldiers. There seemed to be no place at the top of the American administration for a civil official who had begun in the lower grades and had worked his way by talent alone as high as the audiencia. Kivera, i, pp. 75-80. *Novlsima Becopilacidn, in, vi, 12-15. 7 Of all the viceroys, one only, Casafuerte, was a Creole or of American birth. Contrast this with the English practice in North America, where four of the ten royal governors of Massachusetts were colonists; and this was typical. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 127 Despite certain warnings directed against a viceroy's assum- ing too royal a style, there was a distinct encouragement of a certain magnificence in dress and public deportment, which might be regarded as becoming a representative of the Spanish king. 8 The viceroy was expected to live in a palace, surround himself with a bodyguard, 9 be received in his capital on his first arrival with considerable pomp, and in general demand for himself such an outward recognition of his place and dignity as would properly impress the king's subjects. The head of the viceregal government was appointed for a / term of three years, though as a matter of fact he served at the pleasure of the king and might be continued in office indefinitely. There were never cases of appointments for life as there were occasionally in British North America, but it was no uncommon thing for ill-health or too great an accumulation of responsi- bilities to force the viceroy to resign. 10 In spite of the unsur- passed climate of the Mexican plateau, hygienic conditions were generally bad. The pictures which Humboldt has given us of the various elements which were unfavorable to public health make it clear that though New Spain was no India, it was an excellent place for an overworked viceroy, past middle life, to break down. The elder Kevilla Gigedo was in office for nine years, 1746 to 1755, but this was an unusually long term, and a number of his successors served only for a year or two. An average term for the eighteenth century would not be more than s " .... representen nuestra real persona, hagan y administren justicia igualmente a todos nuestros subditos y vasallos, y entiendan en todo lo que eonviene al sosiego, quietud, ennobleeimiento y pacificacion de aquellas provincias. " Ley I, tit. iii, lib. 3, Laws of the Indies. Eevilla Gigedo, art. 533, after discussing the military honors due the viceroy, speaks of the bodyguard as follows: "La compania de Ala- barderos destinada para la guardia inmediata de los Vireyes, debe con- siderarse como el primer cuerpo de este Eeino, asi por el objeto de su institute, como por su antiguedad, pues fu6 formada en el ano de 1568, se compone un Capitan, un Subteniente, tres Cabos y veinte Alabarderos. ' ' 10 In spite of the constant rivalry of the viceroy and the audiencia, political agitation was not as vigorous in Mexico as it was in New York or Massachusetts, and it was not possible to force a viceroy out of office by political pressure applied in the colony. 128 University of California Publications in History [ V L - 1 four years. 11 The fact that most of the viceroys either died in office or retired broken-down or discredited men, did not allow their position to be regarded as a stepping-stone to higher places at home, as some writers have implied. The colonial official who was most distinguished by his sovereign with titles and promo- tion, Jose de Galvez, was never viceroy at all, and so can scarcely be taken as an exception to the rule just stated. The salary of the viceroy of New Spain was intended to be high enough to raise him above the reach of the ordinary tempta- tions to peculate, and the general tendency was for salaries to be increased with the progress of time. Toward the close of the period of Spanish rule the salary of the viceroy rose to sixty thousand pesos (perhaps $60,000), besides a number of per- quisites and fees, varying with the royal pleasure, but always so considerable in amount as to secure to the holder a princely in- come. It can never be known how much this income from salary and fees combined was increased by dishonest officials through illicit means. There was always a general impression current that corrupt practices were both extensive and frequent. The law was intended to prevent all indirect profit by forbidding nepotism and the sale of favors of all kinds, and yet it cannot be believed that it always succeeded. 12 Humboldt certainly held the opinion that many of the viceroys made the most of their positions in a 11 It is a general opinion that the English colonial governors had a very uncertain tenure of office, but their terms were long compared with those of the Spanish viceroys. According to Greene, The Colonial Governor, p. 51, "Massachusetts, during the eighty-two years, from 1692 to 1774, the period of the Province charter, had ten governors with an average term of eight years. North Carolina, during the thirty-four years of the royal government up to the passage of the Stamp Act, had only three governors with an average term of eleven years. ' ' 12 In the matter of salary, the viceroy of New Spain was incomparably better off than the English colonial governors, and the annual income of Revilla Gigedo was something like six or eight times as great as that of the best paid of the governors of the North American colonies. The governor of Virginia, just before the revolution, received 2000 sterling, and some fees besides, but in the other colonies, the average was no higher than 1000 sterling. Moreover, in all but four of our American colonies the governors' salaries were not on a fixed basis, but were dependent on the good will of the assemblies. Greene, pp. 59-64. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 129 financial way, 13 in spite of all the safeguards with which the home government sought to surround their office, and in this opinion many of the most intelligent contemporaries concurred. 14 However, an examination of the means employed by the Spanish government to control their agents in America shows the way to an understanding of the means actually employed in the efforts to keep the viceroys honest and efficient, and likewise shows to what extent these measures were successful. The control which the home government exercised over the rulers of the American provinces, whether viceroys, captains- general, or governors, was accomplished in a great variety of ways. On the one hand, it was direct, since it was brought to bear upon the colonial rulers during the time they actually held office, and on the other hand was indirect, in that penalties were provided for offending officers when they had concluded their term of office. The direct control was effected by means of orders and despatches in the form of royal decrees sent to the viceroy from the Council of the Indies or the Minister of the Indies at Madrid. This was also supplemented through the action of the co-ordinate officials in Mexico, who could act independently and even in opposition to the viceroy himself. The indirect control, which was to be secured by the punishing of a corrupt magis- trate at the close of his term of office, was accomplished through the residencia, referred to in chapter i. A brief consideration of these three features of the viceroy's relation to the home gov- ernment will now be given in the above order. In trying to decide upon the nature and effectiveness of the direct control maintained over the viceroy by the Madrid gov- ernment, the investigator is puzzled by two opposing considera- is Although it is impossible to know with any exactness how much was stolen directly or indirectly by the Spanish pro-consuls of New Spain, it may be interesting to cite some opinions. Desdevises du Dezert, ii, 132 and 133, following Humboldt, takes a very pessimistic view: "There were some very avaricious, and some were veritable pillagers. One is said to have stolen eight million livres in a few years." Bancroft, Mexico, iii, 537-538, shows how the viceroys could add to their fixed income. i* Allowing for considerable corruption under the Spanish system, it does not look- so bad when compared with what went on under the English rule. For an introduction to this subject, see Greene, pp. 46-48. 130 University of California Publications in History tions. There is no doubt that a great number of orders and in- structions, of the most detailed character, were sent from Spain to Mexico every yeaj. It is equally certain that the widest latitude was allowed to the viceroys in the matter of their obedience to these instructions, or at least in the matter of decid- ing when they should be put into operation and how they should be interpreted. In the language of the Laws of the Indies, the viceroys were: 16 " .... in all the matters and business that came before them to do what seemed to them right, and carry out everything which We would be able to carry out and per- form, of whatever quality and condition it may be, in the prov- inces under their rule, and they are to govern for our royal person, in all things where there is not a special prohibition." It was generally conceded that a viceroy had wide discretion in the matter of enforcing these royal orders and the famous saying, "I obey but do not execute," (obedezco pero no cumplo) is always remembered as one of the characteristic anomolies of the Spanish colonial administration. While it is difficult to decide at times which was the more likely to prevail, the detailed and reiterated commands from Spain or the procrastinations and evasions of the vice-kings in America, it is safe to say that by the middle of the eighteenth century the tendency was all in favor of the former. 16 The establishment of a regular line of 15 " .... en todas las cocas y negocios que se ofreeieren, hagan lo que les parecieren y vieren que conviene, y provean todo aquello que Nos podriamos hacer proveer, de cualquiera calidad y condicion que sea, en las provincias de su cargo, si por nuestra persona se gobernaran, en lo que no tuvieren especial prohibici6n. " i Desdevises du Dezert, ii, 126-138, implies throughout that the vice- roys were practically free from anything like direct control on the part of their sovereigns, and in one place (p. 127) he makes this strangely inaccurate statement: "The great viceroyalties of the Indies were veri- table satrapies on the oriental order, with the only difference that the viceroys were never kept in office longer than six years at most. ' ' There are two difficulties with this statement that are almost too obvious to deserve special notice, and only the reputation and general excellence of Professor Desdevises du DSzert makes such notice justifiable. The American viceroyalties were not satrapies except for purposes of rhetoric; and six years was not the superior limit of the viceroy's tenure of office. In the latter half of this chapter I have shown by a large number of cases taken direct from the correspondence of the viceroys of New Spain with their home government, to what an astonishing degree they were supervised and dictated to by their superiors in Spain. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 131 packet-boats between Europe and America and the general improvement of the means of communication between Vera Cruz and Cadiz in regard both to speed and safety, combined to increase the likelihood of the crown's wishes being carried out. When in addition to this there was occasionally present in New Spain a visitor-general, the colonial official became less inde- pendent and the Council of the Indies better assured that its decrees were being obeyed. The second form of direct control, that by means of inde- pendent colleagues, was from the earliest days performed by the audiencia, a combination of supreme court and governor's coun- cil. The Laws of the Indies prescribed with great exactness the organization, honors, fees, exemptions, and jurisdiction of this exalted body, which eventually came to be invested with sufficient powers and privileges fairly to rival the viceroy. The first audiencia in the New World was that of San Domingo, created before there was such a thing as a viceroy in America, but as an institution the audiencia became most interesting when it reached its highest development on the mainland at a much later date. The relation of the audiencia to the administration of justice will be treated in chapter m, but in this connection it is viewed solely as one of the means of limiting the power of the viceroy and helping the king to keep him in a place of proper subordination. Though the Mexican audiencia was, like the American provincial legislature, a check upon the colonial governor, it must not be thought of as a legislative body in any proper sense whatsoever. From the time of its establishment in New Spain in the year 1528, till it went down in the general ruin of the Spanish domination in the first quarter of the nineteenth cen- tury, it had been a judicial and advisory body. 17 Legislation, strictly speaking, did not exist in the Spanish colonies at all, and all laws were issued in the name of the king by the Council of the Indies. The nearest approach to lawmaking in New Spain was the issuing of proclamations, or bandos, by the viceroys. Moses, Spanish Rule in America, chap, iv, passim. 132 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 The decisions of the audiencia, generally known as autos acordados, were not even ordinances, but merely court decisions which would be followed as precedents by the other courts of the viceroyalty until they were reversed. This power of rendering judicial decisions was the most distinctive government char- acteristic of the audiencia and suggests another comparison with English colonial institutions. Among the English colonies in America the governor's council was not only what the term indicates, a body of advisors to the colonial executive, but was in addition a kind of court of appeals and upper house of the legislature. 18 The Mexican audiencia was primarily a supreme court with appellate jurisdiction, and its functions as an advisory board to check and assist the governor were of secondary im- portance. 19 Though the audiencia might communicate inde- pendently with the government in Spain and might express its views unhindered in regard to all branches of the administration, it was concerned, in the main, with the general direction of the department of justice. 20 "When the audiencia was acting as a council of state, its advice was not obligatory on the viceroy except in a small number of cases. It was naturally assumed, however, that the chief executive took upon himself a rather serious responsibility when he acted contrary to the advice of his council. If he followed his own independent course he might be able to find ample means for justifying it before the Council of the Indies, but such a burden of proof would tend to discourage hasty or ill-considered action. The most effective way at the disposal of the crown of limit- ing the power of the viceroy was secured through the office of the visitador-general. Though this means was used only inter- is Greene, pp. 23-31 and 72-90. is In 1755, the elder Eevilla Gigedo in his instructions to his succcessor declared that the audience of Mexico had for its object: "... conocer de todas las causas, ya sea de las que por caso de corte, privilegio ti otro motivo se radican en primera instancia 6 ya sea de las que suben por apelacion de los jueces de provincia y de todos los ordinarios, y aun del Virey en puntoa de justicia contenciosos entre partes, sin mas recurso en las que determina, que el de la segunda suplicacion al Eeal y Supremo Consejo de las Indias. ' ' Quoted by Eivera, i, 81, footnote. zoDesdevises du Desert, ii, 149-151. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 133 mittently and so, unlike the audiencia, did not bring to bear a constant pressure, it was much more thoroughgoing while it lasted. This is referred to in chapter i, where a few words are devoted to the mission of Jose de Galvez and his reforms, but it must be alluded to again in this connection. 21 The visitor- general was usually given the fullest possible powers and was hampered by the fewest possible restrictions. As his work was bound to conflict more or less with that of the regularly constituted authorities and as he was intended and expected to criticize and investigate, it was unavoidable that he should create antagonism which would prevent any danger of his abus- ing his powers in the direction of independence from the mother country. Though he owed a duty to the Mexican commonwealth like any other officer employed there, he was more keenly alive to his responsibilities at home, whither he was soon to return and where he could expect the only reward for his services. It was apparent that such an office in the hands of a strong man must lead to large results and it so happened that the most important administrative changes in Mexico during the reign of Charles III were accomplished by the visitor-general. Subject to no inter- ference from an audiencia and indifferent to public opinion, the visitor-general had a tremendous advantage over the viceroy and was able with unfettered hands to inaugurate a number of changes and reforms utterly beyond the power of the ablest and most honest viceroy. In some ways the appointment of such a visitor-general as Galvez was like suspending the viceregal office. At the very least it caused a temporary diminution of authority in that office, which showed how effective an agent of imperial control the visitor-general might be. The attitude of the viceroys was not that of approbation, and the following quotation from a letter of Bucareli to his brother reflects some typical contem- porary opinion. 22 "No one can deny that the visitor-general had worked hard, and that he was not lacking in zeal for the service, 21 Bancroft, History of Mexico, iii, 367-368. 22 Desdevises du Dezert, ii, 133, footnote. 134 University of California Publications in History [VOL. or in ability. But he also had his faults ; his friends were alv right, his adversaries were always mistaken, he never pardo an injury, and often in seeking a way to get even, did ham a great many good servants of the king. ' ' After the first irrecon- cilable break with the Viceroy Cruillas, things went rather smoothly, because the succeeding viceroys gave up the attempt to maintain an opposition. The specific reforms introduced by Galvez will be the subject of chapter vi, but it is hoped enough has been said here to indicate the importance of the visitor- general as an instrument of the crown in preventing the viceroys of New Spain from becoming satraps in the meaning of Des- devises du Dezert. The great indirect check on the viceroy to which the home government had recourse, aside from actually divesting him of his office before the normal expiration of his term, was the residential 3 This judicial inquiry into the various acts per- formed by an outgoing official was not limited to the viceroy, but was applicable to any of the higher civil officers. It had always been an unpopular institution, and by the time of Charles III had likewise come to be recognized as ill-adapted to the purposes for which it had originally been designed. It was expensive and vexatious, and owing to the possibility of collusion between the official under examination and those who were his examiners, had fallen into general discredit. In the Noticias Secretas, 24 there is an interesting and almost humorous account of the way residencias were conducted in Peru, just before the middle of the eighteenth century. Unless the viceroy or cor- regidor had offended some person of influence or antagonized some powerful interests, he was practically sure of a vindication as a result of the once dreaded residencia. The much-quoted statement of Humboldt is of direct interest on this point. "If the viceroy is rich," he said, "adroit, supported in America by a courageous asesor and at Madrid by powerful friends, he can 28 Bancroft, History of Central America, i, 250-251 and footnote. 2* Juan y Ulloa, Noticias Secretas, p. 255 et seq. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 135 govern arbitrarily without ever fearing the residencies." 25 It cannot be a matter of surprise that the viceroys themselves were violently prejudiced against so costly and vexatious a proceed- ing, and one which might easily be made the means of petty persecutions against even the most upright official. The younger Revilla Gigedo expressly condemned the residencia as it was employed in New Spain against the intendants as well as the viceroys. His language on this subject was as follows: "The residencias have been considered as a means of avoiding dis- orders in the administration of justice, as a restraint upon the judges; but experience certainly proves how little progress is made by this means, which as a rule is the more burdensome to the good servants of the King, as it obliges them to go to an expense which they cannot support, especially in the case of the subdelegates, for whom judges of the residencies are appointed by the Council, which usually leads to great delays and throws obstacles in the service of the King." 26 However, when the residencia was abolished in 1799 so far as subordinate officials were concerned, it was retained for the viceroys, and this may be taken as evidence that the home government believed in the value of a final accounting when a viceroy surrendered his office. In a general way the measures have been made clear whereby the mother country kept a restraining hand upon the chiefs of the distant American viceroy alties. It is now perhaps in order to discuss certain relations of the viceroy to the king, which have a bearing upon imperial questions. Obviously there was a great number of purely local matters in New Spain which were left almost entirely to the viceroy, and which could not in the nature 25 Humboldt, Political Essay on New Spain, ii, 244. 26 ' ' Las residencias se ban considerado como un medio de evitar desordenes en la administracion de justicia, conteniendo a los Jueces; pero lo cierto es que la experiencia acredita cuan poeo se adelanta por este medio, mas gravoso por lo regular en los buenos servidores del Key, a quienes obliga a un gasto que no pueden soportar, especialmente los subdelegados, a los cuales se deben nombrar los Jueces de residencia por el Consejo, lo que suele tambien retardarse y quedar impedidos en el servicio del Key." Revilla Gigedo, art. 140. "La residencia es un gravamen de la mayor consideracion . . . ." Revilla Gigedo, art. 864. 136 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 of things be understood or provided for even by the most zealous bureaucrat in Madrid. There were at the other extreme many general problems touching more or less directly the interests of Mexico, which nevertheless had to be regarded as of such peculiar concern to the mother country that the viceroy was given no part in determining their policy. Between these extremes there was another large sphere of governmental activity in which the mother country was interested enough to interfere occasionally, though on the other hand, she was willing to listen to the viceroy 's advice and, in a large number of instances, trust to his judgment. The first and last of these categories will be dis- cussed at length in the following chapters, but the second, that relating to what may be called imperial interests, belongs un- doubtedly here. One of the most immediate of all imperial concerns was that which dealt with foreign affairs and the protection of the colonies against the ambitions, commercial or territorial, of rival states. Complementary to this was the necessity of advancing the Spanish frontiers whenever possible, and the anticipating of other nations in the conquering and exploiting of desirable ter- ritory. In the nature of things, a European nation could not rely upon its colonial governors to decide such questions, but the Spanish viceroys were time and again most important agents in carrying out these policies and furnishing information to the Spanish statesmen in Europe as to ways and means of putting a given policy into operation. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the Spaniards were content to maintain a status quo on the continent of North America, and whatever advances were made in the way of terri- torial expansion were defensive in their object. In two famous instances, territorial acquisitions were forced upon Spain by the necessity, real or fancied, of protecting the dominions she already possessed. Louisiana was forced upon Spain by the exigencies of European diplomacy, and was acceptable only because it could not be allowed to fall into the hands of a hostile power like England, not because of its intrinsic worth. Similar considera- 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 137 tions also forced the Spaniards in the days of Viceroy de Croix to forestall the Russians in the possession of California. In all these measures New Spain was the necessary base of operations and the Spanish imperial policy found in the viceroy its proper and necessary agent. Much of the time of Bucareli, successor of de Croix, was taken up in the administration of the frontier province of Upper California, a matter of purely imperial in- terest. 27 Without multiplying examples any further, it may be said that the viceroys of New Spain, like the English viceroys of India at the present day, were constantly embarrassed with questions of international politics. This is constantly impressed upon one who studies the primary material of the period, though the best illustrations are to be found in the instructions which the younger Revilla Gigedo and Branciforte left to their successors. It was as captain-general that the viceroy came into closest relation to Spain's continental projects. As the military and naval representative of the king, he was called upon to cooperate in plans of imperial defense and not merely devote himself to the repelling of attacks upon New Spain proper. He might be called upon at any time to send aid in men and money to such neighboring provinces as Louisiana, the Floridas, or any of the islands of the Antilles. Even the distant Philippines had to be provided for against foreign attack, and in that case it fell to the viceroy of New Spain to supply and organize the necessary 2? The vast amount of manuscript correspondence between Bucareli and Neve, in the California provincial archives, indicates something of the additional responsibility that the occupation of this province brought. "La vecindad de los rusos podria acaso con el tiempo sernos mas per- judicial que la de los ingleses u otras naciones europeas, cuyas disposi- ciones y auxilios debian ser mucho mas tardos y muy difieil que nos perjudicasen. Yo he sido siempre de opinion, y he propuesto a la Corte, que lo conveniente era reducir nuestros limites hasta el Estrecho da Juan de Fuca, que parece ser un termino de demarcacion senalado por la misma naturaleza: y seria lo mas feliz para nuestra nacion el que quedase un termino que a nadie perteneciese y que contuviese el comercio clandestine y motives de disensiones, que es lo que hay mas que temer. . . . Revilla Gigedo, art. 713. Though the viceroys at times found their duties greatly increased, through the government of the Provincias Internas, they were anxious to retain their full authority over them. Branciforte to Paz, August 29, 1796. 138 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l supplies, ships, and men. One of the chief reasons for the creation of the new viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, in 1777, 28 was the protection of that part of the Spanish dominions against the Portuguese who were pressing southward from Brazil. It was not at all unusual for the home government to direct even in great detail all of these expeditions, but in every case the viceroy was the pivot upon which everything turned. These military operations often necessitated the cooperation of con- tiguous, independent provinces, but when this occurred the viceroys still constituted the main part of the machinery by which affairs were managed. In many ways, the best illustrations for the above statements are to be found in the history of the La Plata country where the viceroy was not only vis-a-vis to the hostile Portuguese establishment, but had in addition a special difficulty with the English over the Falkland Islands. 29 The policy pursued by the Spanish government toward the native races is one of the best known as well as one of the most interesting features of its rule in America, and it was in this connection that the viceroy had the most difficult task as the intermediary between the king and his Indian subjects. In these matters the home government seemed to prescribe everything, but held the viceroys responsible for everything. From the very first, it had been recognized in Spain that paternal legislation, throwing various safeguards around the aborigines, was not adequate for their protection. In order that the natives might not be abused by leaving the enforcement of these laws in the hands of the regular officials, whose interests rarely coincided with philanthropic intentions in Madrid, a body of special officers called corregidores was sent out to look after the Indians. These 28 This date has been somewhat in dispute, but the real cedula grant- ing the commission as viceroy to Cevallos, bears the date of August 1, 1777. See Quesada, Vireinato del Eio de la Plata, p. 115. z The royal order of June 26, 1780, directed to Viceroy Vertiz, is a good document to illustrate not only Spanish policy in South America, but the relationship between a viceroy and the crown. It contains instruc- tions to Vertiz regarding the conduct he should pursue in regard to the Falkland Islands, warning him of the designs of the Court of St. James upon the Straits of Magellan, and the South Atlantic coast of South America. Printed in Quesada, pp. 168-169. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 139 corregidores became in effect Indian commissioners, while the viceroys to whom they were responsible were in a position similar to that of the royal superintendent of Indian affairs in British North America. 30 The Indians were politically entirely subordin- ate to the king's representative, though their caciques were recog- nized. However, there was no place in the Spanish system for any great native states such as had been allowed to survive and still exist in British India. 31 On the other hand, the viceroys were especially enjoined to protect the natives from forced labor and other forms of economic serviture. Whatever evasions of these laws occurred, there did not develop anything approaching the rigid and oppressive agricultural system that grew up under the Dutch in Java. The viceroys of New Spain had no oppor- tunity of formulating, still less of putting into effect, any policy of their own dealing with the Indians. The policy of keeping the Europeans and the natives apart had been adopted early by the Spaniard and had been persevered in to the very last, so that in this matter also the viceroys were left no discretion and were powerless to alter these traditions of government. The natives were made to pay their share in the financial support of the real hacienda by a special tax called the tributo. The assessment and collection of this tax was watched over most carefully by the Council of the Indies, as it was evidently felt that if such matters were left to the colonial officials there would be special danger of corruption and abuse. The absence of semi-independent states as in British India, and the desire of the Spanish kings to avoid the half-servile conditions which prevailed in the period just after the conquest and which became a regular characteristic of the Dutch rule in Java, left no alternative but a land or capitation 30 It is interesting to point out that the royal superintendent of Indian affairs was one of the extraordinary members, so called, of the governor 's council in the English colonies. Greene, p. 78. There was a general tendency to abridge the power of the governor by the assembly, so that by the time of the Revolution, Indian affairs were managed either by royal agents directly, or by committees of the assemblies. si The absence of large native states relieved the viceroy of anything like diplomatic duties and prevented the natives having in their posses- sion a nucleus for a possible revolt. 140 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l tax. 32 The latter was adopted as affording a system which caused a maximum of revenue with a minimum of commingling of Europeans and natives. The idea of keeping the white man and the native apart was one of the peculiarities of the Spanish method of protecting the latter. It never seemed to be an object with the crown to build up in America a great Spanish com- munity with as much Spanish blood and as little adulteration as possible. On the contrary, no pains were spared to make immigration from the peninsula extremely difficult. It seemed as if it were the desire of the king to limit the white population in America to the comparatively few persons needed to carry on the government, to defend the country against foreign in- vasion, and direct the exploitation of the mines. As a part of its policy toward the native races, though at first seeming to have no bearing upon it, the African slave trade must be considered. 33 One reason why the Spaniards were able to avoid either the enslavement of the Indians or their subjection to a forced culture system and yet secure a sufficient quan- tity of fairly efficient labor, was the establishment of negro slavery. New Spain was not a densely settled country where population was likely to outrun food supply, so that recourse might easily be had, as the conditions of the labor market seemed to justify, to bringing in laborers from abroad. Originally, however, the African slave trade was turned in the direction of America as the only possible means of saving the Indians from extermination. In carrying out this policy, which was 32 The two books which best enable the English reader to understand the two most interesting parallel colonial administrations, are General Sir George Chesney, Indian Polity, and Clive Day, Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java. Chapter 7 of Mr. Day's book gives a clear outline of the culture system as it worked in Java, while chaps. 8 and 9 show the political features of the administration and the final reforms. The worst side of the Spanish system is of course found in the Noticias Secretas, passim. 33 The general question of negro slavery in Spanish America and its effect upon the native races has been discussed in the general works of Saco and Sir Arthur Helps, but its diplomatic and international aspects have only recently (1906) been treated by G. Scelle. The policy of the home government in regard to the slave trade is here treated very fully, and the ' ' asiento treaty, ' ' or provision of the Treaty of Utrecht, is shown in its proper relations for the first time. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 141 inaugurated back in the days of Las Casas, the viceroys of Mexico had a comparatively small part. The slave trade was strictly regulated from Madrid, either by treaty with a foreign nation, as with England by the Treaty of Utrecht, or by char- tered companies, as was done for a while after the famous asiento had ceased to be in effect. In such matters, then, the viceroy could do little more than execute the orders sent him, like any subordinate official. He was expected to make provision for the receiving and distributing of the slaves and for enforcing the laws protecting them and regulating the institution of chattel slavery. One of the most interesting things about the viceroy of New Spain was his relation to the Mexican civil service. The interest, however, is quite as keen with regard to what he did not do as to what he actually did. In one sense, there was no permanent civil service in Mexico where a man might begin in the lower ranks and have a reasonable hope of promotion to a place near the top, as the result of long and faithful service. All the important offices, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, were filled by appointees of the Council of the Indies and confirmed by the king. The few exceptions were some minor positions filled by the viceroy, such as a number of the alcaldes mayores, and a few f municipal offices which were elective. A rather large number of clerical positions and commissions in the militia were also saleable, being sold at auction in the City of Mexico. Further- more, it was a general rule to give preference whenever possible to the descendants of the early conquerors. The ad interim appointments which the viceroy might make were numerous, but even these were hedged about with innumerable restrictions to prevent favoritism. 34 His real influence in determining the personnel of his large official family could be exerted only by recommendations to Madrid, and the weight of these recommen- dations varied with the influence and personality of the viceroy Bancroft, History of Mexico, iii, chap. 27, 517-551. 142 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l as well as with the character of the persons who dominated the king at home. 35 In order to obtain a definite idea of the real extent of the dependence of the viceroy on the home government, it is neces- sary to exhibit in some detail the correspondence between them ; to study certain cases in which the Council of the Indies insisted upon having its own way ; and to discover the manner in which such cases were actually decided. The treatment of this aspect of the Spanish colonial system in the following pages is by no means exhaustive, but the typical cases presented will show, it is believed, the trend of the policy in this regard and make clear the nature of the control which Charles III retained over his most important agent in the New World. The point of view of the Council of the Indies can be observed by an examina- tion of the cedulas and other communications sent to the viceroys. The opinions of the latter regarding these same cedulas is to be found mainly in the instrucciones which they left to their suc- cessors. 36 These instructions, written by the viceroys for the information of those sent out to take their places, are especially valuable because they go further than a mere statement of the law, and explain, with varying degrees of elaboration, how the laws worked and in what ways they were good or bad in their operations. The specific questions, then, which will be taken up in the following pages are those which are found discussed in the viceregal instrucciones and are therefore presumably matters of more than ordinary concern to the viceroys and to the Spanish government. They are taken principally from the instruccion reservada of Eevilla Gigedo, the younger. as Eevilla Gigedo, art. 2, complains of the viceroy 's inability in this regard. The viceroy could not, he said, ' ' grant any distinction, and thus has no other means of granting rewards and favors, than of making recommendations of them to the sovereign." Further on he adds, "the Viceroy should have more choice in the matter of rewards and punish- ments, in order that he might make himself obeyed and respected as is desirable. ' ' se This writing of an instrucci6n had been made obligatory by the Laws of the Indies, and reenforced by royal order of August 23, 1751. The import of these laws is thus given by Revilla Gigedo, art. 2: "By the two royal orders the viceroy is commanded, on finishing his term, to instruct his successor regarding the most essential things which have taken place during his rule, concerning what he had done and what remained to be done, giving his opinion on all of these points." 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 143 The first illustration of the method of settling questions of state between the viceroys and the home government is the very important dispute as to who was to govern the viceroyalty during the interregnum between the death of one viceroy and the arrival of his successor. It had always been the law that the government at such a time should fall into the hands of the audiencia, at any rate in cases wherein no special provision had been made by the king for the chief command to be assumed by some one designated in a pliego de providencia, or sealed commission. These provisions seemed clear enough, but they had not succeeded in eliminating unseemly dissensions on the death of the ruler of New Spain, so that a special order, March 8, 1785, was thought necessary. Ac- cording to this order there should henceforth always be a pliego de providencia, but if by any unforeseen accident one should be wanting, the command of the troops should be exercised by the civil authorities, in this case the audiencia* 7 This arrangement seemed unwise to the younger Revilla Gigedo, and accordingly he submitted his views to the two ministers of the Indies, January 8, 1790, stating that the audiencia was not a proper institution to possess the military command and that its administration "would be exercised with much less exactitude and inlj^Jligence. " He did not think that the audiencia could understand the evils that might result from such an interference in military affairs by a civilian, and that the utmost confusion might be brought into the military government of the realm. 38 Revilla Gigedo sug- gested further that some military officer should be given the duties of captain-general at such a time, 39 and that a short period it would not be only safe but in every way highly desirable that the civil and military functions be kept separate, as was so often done in Spain. 40 After this representation had been sent to the 3? Eevilla Gigedo, art. 516: " .... prevenia que para evitar disputas en adelante sobre sueesion al mando, se tuviesen siempre anticipados pliegos de providencia, y que cuando en un imprevisto accidente no los hubiese, mandase lasJfcmas el mismo que debia mandar el Eeino. " ss Eevilla Gigedo, all. 517. s Ibid., art. 518. 40 Ibid., art. 519. 144 University of California Publications in History king, Revilla Gigedo received a royal cedula, dated the second of the preceding August, dealing with this same matter of the suc- cession, but leaving it substantially on the same footing as it had been before. Unconvinced by this second cedula, the viceroy wrote an additional memorandum to the crown, setting forth the extreme disadvantage of allowing a body of aged lawyers and ecclesiastics to have charge of so large a military force as that of New Spain. 41 Receiving no answer to these representations, he sent still another, June 29, 1793, stating that no .response had been received, but as no reply came within the next year, the matter was regarded as settled and on the old basis. 42 It is evident from the above brief statement of facts that the viceroys felt free to state their views with great frankness, even when they seemed to be in direct opposition to the will of the sovereign, or of those who were intrusted by him with the chief offices of state. This incident also shows how the most insistent statement of the views of a viceroy could be pigeon-holed and not even given the outward consideration of an answer. Furthermore, the length of time consumed in correspondence of such importance as that just considered made quick decisions impossible and explained a great deal of the dilatoriness every- where observable in the Spanish administration. From the time of the first communication of Revilla Gigedo, January, 1790, till the last one of June, 1793, over three years were taken up in the exchange of views, and this proceeding was not exceptionally slow. If a viceroy remained in office on an average of five years, it is evident that not a great deal could be accomplished where much correspondence with Madrid was necessary. That the king of Spain did not hand over full powers in all things military to his captains-general and simply judge them *i Kevilla Gigedo, art. 521. He did not think that the mando militar could be well administered, "por los decanos y regentes, asi porque sus conoci- mientos y carrera eran distintos, como porque la avanzada edad y achaques con se hallaban por lo regular los sujetos que obtienen estos empleos en todas las Audiencias de Mexico no les permitiria atender al mando vastisimo de las armas, particularmente en este Reino en que habia un eje'rcito de alguna consideracion. ' ' /bid., art. 522. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 145 by results, is evidenced by the interference in the following mat- ters of minor importance. November 30, 1789, Revilla Gigedo proposed the formation of an additional company of artillery, to use a Spanish phrase, and showed the evils of having the only ar- tillerymen of New Spain kept in garrison at the fortified ports of Acapulco and Vera Cruz. 43 It was desired to have an extra com- pany available for miscellaneous duties, wherever and whenever the occasion for their use might arise. This proposal of the viceroy was approved by the royal order of August 3, 1790, and by February 1, 1791, the levy was completed and the first review held. By the royal order of March 23, 1792, the company was ordered to continue on the same footing as that upon which it was formed ; but when the viceroy asked, in a letter of July 30, 1792, that the company be stationed in the City of Mexico, there was no reply forthcoming. This seems a lame and impotent conclu- sion after such an exchange of despatches, but it shows the glar- ing inefficiency of the Madrid government in the days of Godoy. About the same time Revilla Gigedo reduced the pay of a company of one hundred and five men, eight reales a month, with the object of making uniform the pay of all men of equal length of service. 44 The king on being informed of this refused to approve such a diminution in pay. 45 The sub-inspector-general of New Spain thereupon prepared a report, supporting the vice- roy's action and the latter again submitted the whole matter to the king, pointing out what grave inconveniences would result if the pay were not reduced. The desired consent of the crown was finally obtained, August 7, 1792. Again and again the vice- roy is found referring similar questions of detail to the home government for decision, and there is nothing to indicate a ten- dency to leave such matters more and more to the colonial author- ities. 46 The fortifications of Vera Cruz were equipped with both iron and brass cannon, and Revilla Gigedo reported to Madrid that, on account of climatic conditions, iron deteriorated very 43 Revilla Gigedo, art. 545 and 546. ** Ibid., art. 555. 76id., art. 556. *76td., art. 559. 146 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 rapidly so that in such places only brass ordonnance should be used. 47 Accordingly, the royal order of April 16, 1792, brought the reply, not as one would expect, authorizing the viceroy to use his judgment in the whole matter, but instead telling him with great care to see that the guns made of iron be covered up and protected from the elements, and wait for a favorable turn of circumstances to substitute the brass variety altogether. 48 In matters of dispute between Spain and the neighboring provinces it was a very natural thing to appeal to the common master in Europe ; so there can be no surprise over the interfer- ence by the home government in the controversy between Mexico and the various West India Islands over the question of the situados. In the latter years of the reign of Charles III, the subsidies paid by Mexico to the neighboring provinces around the Gulf and the Carribean took up a large part of her surplus revenues, and the viceroys demanded that an accounting for these sums should be made to the Mexican treasury. After some mis- understanding and delays, a royal order of the year 1784 was sent to the governors of Porto Eico and San Domingo, and to the intendants of Havana and Louisiana, commanding them to make a formal and detailed report to Mexico of what they had done with these subsidies. This order further authorized a stop- page of payment in any given year if the report of the preceding year were not received. This was clearly a decision in favor of Mexico, and Eevilla Gigedo welcomed it as a means of diminishing this regular demand on the treasury of his viceroyalty. He stated to his successor, Branciforte, that it would be better to apply this money to internal improvements within their own jurisdiction, or even increase their remittances to Spain, than to go on sending such large sums to the islands. 49 47 Kevilla Gigedo, art. 697. Ibid.., "Becibi contestao n 5e With such views as the above held by the rulers of both the mother country and the colonies, so utterly opposed to permit- ting the untrammelled, natural growth of industry, and so jealous of any prosperity in the colonies at the expense of the metropolis, the constant interference of the Council of the Indies with the viceroy becomes intelligible. There was always a pos- sible danger of a viceroy allowing local industry to grow up opposed to the interests of Spain. It did not matter what his motives were, whether they were corrupt and for personal gain, or for building up a following among the Mexicans, and there- fore treasonable. In any event, it was necessary for the crown to retain its grip upon the administration even at the expense of eternal vigilance. A royal order was required to give final sanction to the changes in the methods of accounting in the central office of the tobacco monopoly, and another one, October 15, 1792, carried the royal approval of a plan of having the administrators of the ramo de tabaco make monthly reports of their sales to the office of the superintendent of hacienda. When the viceroy had worked out a scheme whereby certain sorts of business were to be transacted at certain hours on certain days of the week, an- other royal order, October 2, 1790, overthrew the whole arrange- ment. Although, in the words of Revilla Gigedo, ''the revenue from tobacco is the most complicated by reason of the number of employees, the diversity of the operations in the buying and selling of the various kinds of tobacco, the manufacture of these various kinds into cigarettes, cigars, and the various forms in 56 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 374-376. In the immediately following para- graphs of the instruccidn, the opinion is expressed that in many parts of Mexico the natives had a natural talent for weaving and that It would be possible to build up a considerable industry in the manufacturing of cotton. Reference is made to the favorable experiment made in the neighborhood of Tixtla in this industry, which it was thought possible to extend wherever good cotton lands could be found. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 151 which they were sold and eventually distributed to the public," 57 the home government was undismayed and continued to inter- fere with these matters which required the greatest possible local and special information. 58 "When the tobacco monopoly was es- tablished in Mexico and there resulted a great public clamor over the taking away of the privilege of everyone to roll his puros and cigarillos in the manner which seemed to him best, the whole mat- ter was called up for adjudication in Madrid, by the real orden of January 4, 1789. 59 In the construction of the great public works of various kinds, where large sums of money were involved, the hands of the viceroy were tied more than ever by numberless orders and in- structions from Spain. There was probably no more serious problem of this kind than that presented by the drainage of the valley in which the City of Mexico was situated. The dangers of an inundation of the city were so serious that for over a cen- tury the question of carrying away the surplus waters had been ever present to the Mexican government. In January, 1790, the king officially thanked the consulado of Mexico for its share in the building of the great drainage canal, 60 and after considerable intermediate correspondence another royal order, in the year 1793, ordered a new investigation of the project. 61 As the work progressed, reports from Mexico and new directions from Spain alternated continuously, though the interest taken by the royal government in the great desague de Huehuetoca did not lead to a final completion of the work while Mexico was still a Spanish colony. 62 However, the interest taken by the crown in this en- gineering work was not appreciably greater than that given to 57 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 1170. 58/&td., art. 1171. 59 Ibid., art. 1172. January 4, 1793, a royal order, "muy reservada," directed the viceroy to find out if there were any means of suppressing the tobacco monopoly, without prejudice to the royal treasury and the employees of the renta de tabaco. This project would have left the whole tobacco business to private industry. so Ibid., art. 262. *i Ibid., art. 266. art. 268. 152 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l the drainage of the interior of the City of Mexico, or even the problem of paving a part of the city streets. In May, 1785, the audiencia, which had at that time the control of the government pending the arrival of the new viceroy, Bernardo de Galvez, re- quested the king to grant a slight increase in certain taxes for the purpose of carrying out the work of paving a few main streets. 63 It would hardly seem worth the attention of the Council of the Indies to debate such a question, but this is what happened. By a royal order of November 28, 1785, approval was given to the petition of the audiencia on all points except the increase of the tax on pulque from two to four granos per hundredweight. The viceroy was authorized "to continue the work of paving, if he considered the matter urgent, with the revenue derived from the two granos and the other taxes." 64 After a report on what had been done had been sent back to Spain, a new royal order, dated February 16, 1791, informed the viceroy that the instructions already given settled the question. A fiscal then sent back still more information to the king with the further result of more ordenes reales and more memorials from Mexico, but by the end of the administration of Revilla Gigedo the work was still incomplete and no definite policy had been de- cided upon at Madrid. Even at the risk of making tiresome these details of a more or less useful interference in purely Mexican affairs on the part of the crown, these transactions have been stated in order to show by typical illustrations the character and import of the watch which Spain jealously maintained over her colonies. Spanish paternalism stooped at no detail in the complex political and economic organization of her dependencies, and additional ex- amples of its operation could be given, ad infinitum. The regula- tion of the exact manner in which reports should be submitted in some subordinate government office in California, or the amount of duty that ought to be levied or remitted in order to enable Mexican sugar to supply enough raw material for the rum ea Eevilla Gigedo, art. 274. e* Ibid., art. 275. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 153 industry, were proper subjects for correspondence and inter- change of views between the viceroy and his king. The policy of the Spanish government in looking upon the viceroy and the audiencia as mutual checks upon one another led to the necessity of settling disputes between them in the Coun- cil of the Indies. Sometimes these disputes were grave ones in- volving matters of jurisdiction and sometimes they were mere questions of precedence and etiquette. The most famous of these cases of a prolonged misunderstanding between the viceroy and the audiencia was the one which began in 1789, when Revilla Gigedo began his rule. In his own language we have the fol- lowing account : ' ' On taking possession of this command I found the abuse that the personal guard of the viceroys accorded the honors of a captain-general to the archbishop and the honors of governor of the province to the audiencia when it appeared in a body. Before trying to remedy this abuse, I had a talk with the archbishop and the two representatives of the audiencia, in which I told them I did not wish to violate the military ordinances governing such matters, and accordingly I suspended the rule which related to military honors on the plaza. 65 The archbishop and the audiencia promptly appealed to the king, asking that the military honors formerly shown them on public occasions be con- tinued. They based their claim on the royal order of August 3, 1765, which ordered a continuation of such honors to the audien- cia after they had been suspended by the order of the Viceroy Cruillas. 66 They further declared that unless they were so treated they would suffer a loss of esteem in the eyes of the public. The result of these appeals was a real orden, January 25, 1792, deciding the main contention in favor of the archbishop and the audiencia, and allowing them the same honors which they had enjoyed before the accession of Revilla Gigedo. 67 Another decree of April of the same year, however, saved the face of the viceroy by forbidding his personal guard to give royal honors to 65 Revilla Gigedo, art. 524-525. 66 Ibid., art. 526. 67 Ibid., art. 527. 154 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 anyone but himself and members of the king's family. To soothe the archbishop and the audiencia, it was provided by this same decree that a special palace guard be created to render them the proper military honors. This meant more appeals to the king on the part of the viceroy 's rivals, this time through the secretary of war instead of the Council of the Indies. After considerable delays and two more ordenes reales, a decision was at last reached and Revilla Gigedo was finally sustained in the position he had taken. 68 In the cases described above, the viceroy prevailed signally over his political opponents, but in the most important cases de- cided between them during the latter half of the eighteenth cen- tury, decisions had been the other way. The high court com- posed of lawyers and churchmen must have felt as great a con- tempt for the soldier-politician who had been elevated to the first place, as such an able soldier and statesman as Revilla Gigedo felt for them when they attempted to interfere in military affairs and demand for themselves the highest military honors. The creation of the office of regente, practically excluding the viceroy from his former position as chief justice, and the royal order which forbade his taking any part in judicial affairs, were objected to vehemently by the chief executive but were main- tained in force in spite of his protests to Madrid. 70 This was therefore a victory for the lawyers, and all things considered, their position was stronger relatively to the viceroy toward the close of the Spanish regime than it w r as at the beginning. It is therefore apparent that the home government had suc- ceeded in so shaping the constitution of the viceregal office as to maintain a balance between the audiencia and the viceroy and to keep a close watch on all details of the administration. It was evidently the policy at Madrid to confer upon the viceroy all possible dignity and maintain him in that dignity against all opposition, but never to allow him a disproportionate amount es Revilla Gigedo, art. 529. 69 Ibid., art. 54. Ibid., art. 64. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 155 of power. That no invasions of his dignity were to be allowed can be seen from the history of the struggle for precedence be- tween the viceroy and the audiencia. In the words of Revilla Gigedo himself, 71 ''The presidency of the audiencia places the viceroy at the head of that body but not to give orders to it, as even his acts in matters of justice are subject to it ; and although he is present at its sessions, which is very difficult, considering the grave and continuous occupations which so vast a command im- poses upon him, he does not have a vote in matters which are regularly dealt with there that is, matters of justice. Thus it comes about, that the pre-eminence of the audiencia scarcely con- sists, when the viceroy is not a lawyer, in more than the promin- ence of the place which he occupies when they meet together in public functions. ' ' The ceremonies to be observed on these public occasions, such as the viceroy's riding alone in the state carriage and having the regente walk at his left side, and similar matters, were definitely determined by the real cedula of October 17, 1791. The vote of the viceroy in the audiencia had no more weight than that of any other member and when decisions were rendered contrary to his judgment he did not have the power of rectifying things himself but could only report matters to Spain, giving reasons for the action he proposed. The last example to be given of the correspondence between Mexico and Madrid is that one dealing with the difficult problem of the Provincias Internas. 72 These somewhat misnamed interior provinces were, in 1789, in a most critical condition because of the dissensions among their officers and the attempt of the com- mandant to make himself independent of the Mexican viceroyalty. On account of this trouble, Revilla Gigedo was ordered by the king to visit the districts affected. In consequence of this visit, a report was sent home, February 12, 1790, declaring in sub- stance that the independence of the Provincias Internas was not desirable, and a new plan for their government was submitted Eevilla Gigedo, art. 20. Ibid., art. 719. 156 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 at the same time. 73 In the meanwhile order had been restored there and everything was tranquil when the real orden of Nov. ember 22, 1792, provided for the absolute independence from the viceroyalty of the states of Sonora, Nueva Viscaya, New Mexico, Coahuila, and Texas. In this case, as in so many others, the advice of the colonial governor was not followed, but he was employed freely as a trusted agent in carrying out the wishes of the royal government. Where there was such a dispute over jurisdiction, as in the case of the commandant of the interior provinces who claimed an entirely independent position and ac- tually exercised it in military affairs, the interference of the crown was necessary. This interference was perhaps the more necessary because of the difficulties arising out of the financial relations of the two areas. 74 However, in most of the cases de- scribed above, it would seem as if greater simplicity and con- sistency in the administration would have been secured by giving to the viceroy a greater degree of discretion. 75 From a study of these illustrations of the relations of the viceregal government to that of Spain, it will be possible to make clear the following conclusion. In the first place, there was ap- parently no limit to the scope of the interference of Spain in Mexican affairs. If anything occurred in the Mexican adminis- tration which awakened the slightest degree of suspicion or in- terest in Madrid, the whole matter would be taken up for con- sideration there. Detailed information upon the subject in all its bearings would be ordered from Mexico, and a decision would be reached on the basis of these written reports. If it were not a matter simply to be decided one way or the other, but some new administrative project which had to be thought out care- fully and in great detail, it was a very common thing for the 73 Revilla Gigedo, art. 720. In a letter of February 28, 1793, the vice- roy tried to convince the government of Charles IV of the impossibility of really making the interior provinces independent, at least without great expense, as had been found out during the administration of Bueareli. 74 The head of the Provincias Internas, bearing the military title of commandant, had to rule over a Spanigh frontier community which was too poor to maintain the military establishments necessary for its defense. Hence the financial dependence on the viceroyalty of New Spain. 75 Revilla Gigedo, art. 721. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 157 Council of the Indies to send along with their decisions a most elaborate set of rules to govern the enforcement of the act. Nearly every military unit, or commercial company, or organization of any kind, had its own particular constitution and by-laws. Such corporate bodies as the University, the Academy of Fine Arts, or the Consulado of Mexico, had constitutions many times the length of that of the United States. It very often happened, moreover, that some one of these by-laws or some procedure in pursuance of them, required in itself special interpretations from home, so that in a certain sense no question was ever definitely adjudicated, and there was no limit to the piling up in the archives of official documents and correspondence. In the second place, and this complementary to the statement just made, the viceroy and the audiencia referred all sorts of questions to Madrid. It was evidently understood that nothing but a very temporary or unimportant departure from the usual routine would be tolerated by the crown, so that any measure in the slightest degree novel was usually sent up to the Council of the Indies for final decision. There is no evidence that the home government made any effort to discourage these constant and petty appeals, and it seemed preferable to despatch count- less ordenes reales approving of some act, rather than to allow the possibility of the viceroy's making a mistake independently. In the third place, the vast deal of correspondence and the timidity of the colonial officials in acting alone, resulted in a painfully slow pace in matters of administration. 76 The criticism which has always been made by foreign critics of the Spanish administration everywhere is that of insatiable desire to draw up papers. A mass of documents has always figured as the great cause of the retardation of the course of Spanish justice. It cer- tainly made very cumbersome the routine of colonial government, and the delays caused by collecting information and drawing up reports became proverbial. 7 So much has been said about this feature of the Spanish administra- tion that a similar state of affairs existing in the English colonies should be pointed out as a corrective to the idea that Spain had a monopoly of this kind of inefficiency. Greene, pp. 66-77. 158 University of California Publications in History In the fourth place, by means of the minute supervision which the crown exercised over the viceroys in America, the latter were held to an accountability which could not be secured in any other way without entirely remodelling their system of government. In the Spanish-American viceroyalties there was no such thing as a legislature to restrain the executive through the power of the purse. The English royal governors in North America were by no means dictated to in matters of detail to the same extent as were the Spanish governors in the south, but the English pro- vincial executives were ever watched by a jealous assembly armed with the power of withholding supplies. A Mexican audiencia was perhaps as jealous as the colonial assembly, but there was the all-important difference that the audiencia could not stop the whole governmental machine by its control of appropriations. In the fifth place, it is undeniable that there was no other European power which had in its service, at home, such an ex- perienced and able corps of experts on colonial affairs as was the Council of the Indies. This fact, combined with traditions of an absolute monarchy, doubtless tempted the kings of Spain to rely more on the methods of a highly centralized administra- tion than would have been permissible in Great Britain. All the members of this Council were supposed to be intimately ac- quainted with the details of government in the Kingdom of the Indies, and these very qualifications made it all the easier for them to legislate on fine points where an English parliament would have to be content with laying down broad lines and leav- ing to the colonial officials the working out of the details. 1913J Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 159 CHAPTEE III THE VICEROY AS GOVERNOR 1 Anyone but slightly acquainted with Spanish- American insti- tutions might naturally fall into the error of assuming that the duties of the viceroy could easily and accurately be classified under the heads of civil, military, and ecclesiastical; and that these three grand divisions were administered by the viceroy as governor, as captain-general, and vice-patron, respectively. Doubtless the whole mass of viceregal duties might be appor- tioned off into those three fairly definite compartments, but in the matter of actual administration it will be found that each de- partment was not administered by the viceroy in any strictly well- defined capacity. In a general way, of course, the viceroy's commission as gober- nador, or governor, placed him at the head of the civil adminis- tration, just as the great department of war and military matters belonged to him as captain-general, and as his acts in matters ecclesiastical were performed as vice-patron, but these statements are true only in a general sense. 2 The following important quali- fications of the above statement must be made at the very outset. The civil side of the ramo militar, the work of a modern war de- partment, was performed by the captain-general, and many mat- ters of the nature of organized charity and poor relief, which we 1 In the writing of this chapter little or no help was received from the secondary authorities. These writers, even including Bancroft, are at their worst when handling the civil administration of New Spain. This may be a reflection of the obscurities of the primary sources, for they are by no means clear and are often even contradictory. The instructions of the viceroys are, however, the best material available, and those of the two Revilla Gigedos, of Marquina, and to a less degree, of Branciforte were most used for this chapter. 2 Eevilla Gigedo, the Elder, art. 26. 160 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l now see carried on as one of the functions of the civil govern- ment, were then done by the church or by the vice-patron. More- over, some of the most important activities of the viceroy as a civil administrator were performed, not by the governor, but by the viceroy as superintendent-general of the real hacienda. The regulation of the finances, always one of the most important branches of a modern government, did not then belong to the governor at all, and consequently must be treated independently in a chapter by itself. Though in the eyes of the Spaniards it was the office of captain-general which was the greatest ornament and source of power to the rulers of New Spain, the investigator of the present day must be more interested in the way civil affairs were con- ducted, the way justice was or was not secured, and the way the government touched the every-day matters of industry, com- merce, and the general welfare, than in the purely military prob- lems of the time. The latter were not so vital to the national safety or to the Spanish supremacy in America as the more pro- saic questions of handling the Indians wisely or binding the Creoles to Spain politically, by wise economic and commercial legislation. There was little real danger to Spain of losing her American empire as the French lost Canada, as long as her rule was acceptable to the great mass of the colonial population, and thus the real problems before the viceroys were civil ones, and the governors and superintendents-general of the real hacienda were the most important officials of New Spain, outward show and pomp notwithstanding. In treating of these duties of the viceroy as governor it must be remembered that in this aspect of his rule the viceroy was more of a local official than he was as captain-general, vice-patron, or superintendent of finance. In addition to the three last named positions, the viceroy's authority was as wide as the whole terri- tory of the viceroyalty, but as governor he was only one of a dozen or so governors, with this difference, that the province of Mexico was by all odds the wealthiest, most populous, and most important of them all. As governor of this central prov- 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 161 ince, containing as it did the capital city and the central admin- istrative offices, the viceroy might pitch the tone of the provincial administration for the whole country, and aside from this indirect influence, he was not lacking in actual authority over the other governors. 3 In this matter, then, the governor of Mexico was not the apex of the great administrative hierarchy, but only a sort of primus inter pares. However, the governor of Mexico had an influence on the civil administration disproportionately greater than the size of his province would justify. All the governors, and later the intendants, were constantly receiving directions from the Council of the Indies, and it need not be a matter of surprise to find that the viceroy-governor had far greater oppor- tunities for influencing the Council of the Indies than could pos- sibly be possessed by the other governors. This gave him a posi- tion of advantage, which, combined with the superior personality of the man chosen for this post, usually made the governor of Mexico the central figure in the provincial as well as in the vice- regal government. This same principle was observed after the decree of the intendants was put into effect in 1786, so that the intendant of the province of Mexico was regularly the viceroy himself. According to the laws of the Indies it was provided that the viceroys ''also be governors of the districts under their com- mand, ' ' and they were further ordered to govern their dominions in peace and justice. 4 There were many other royal orders which kept this precept before the minds of the viceroys, and they were made, in a special sense, the guardians of the natives. But about the middle of the eighteenth century serious inroads were made on the judicial powers of the viceroy. Although these judicial functions were gradually taken away, with the exception to be noted later in regard to the natives, one of the most important s Eevilla Gigedo, art. 251. Here the viceroy declares that all the pro- vincial towns follow the example of the capital. 4 76 id., art. 63. "Deben los Vireyes ser tambien Gobernadores en los distritos de su mando, segun la ley quinta del titulo de los Vireyes y Presidentes en la Eecopilacion de Indias, y deben, segun ellas y otras, gobernar los pueblos en paz y en justicia. Hay algunas Eeales Cedulas que repiten este precepto a los Vireyes, y aun les han reconvenido de no haber hecho que se administre justicia y se castiguen los delitos. " 162 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l duties of the governor and the one which will be considered first here, was that of having general charge of the enforcement of the laws. The more recent laws issued by the Spanish crown had had the effect of depriving "the viceroys absolutely of any part in the procedure of the administration of justice, either alone or in company with the other judges, voting with them in the audiencia." 5 By 1794, these changes had been carried so far that the supreme power in matters of justice lay in the audiencia, so that it had the last word in determining all cases appealed to it from inferior tribunals. 6 Though the foregoing statements show clearly enough that the later tendencies of Spanish legislation were to separate all judicial functions from the chief executive in New Spain and to reduce the governor of Mexico to the position of a provincial executive, pure and simple, there remains some- thing to be said on the other side. The governor had still been allowed to remain president of the audiencia and as long as he remained in this position it was practically impossible to prevent his having some influence on the courts of justice. In a great many cases matters of government were so inextricably intermingled with matters of justice that it was not possible to separate them, and in such cases the governor had to use his vote and take a hand in the settlement of such matters, regardless of royal prohibitions. In a land where ad- ministration concerned itself so much with the business and the rights of citizens, there must have been a great many cases on the border-line between justice and politics, and all over this doubtful field the influence of the governor was felt. 7 Inasmuch as the audiencia was continually seeking to extend its jurisdiction at the expense of the other magistrates, the latter were driven in self-defence to assert their power to the uttermost, and thus 6 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 64. Ibid., art. 65. Though the audiencia was in one sense the supreme court of the country, it had little resemblance to such a body as the Supreme Court of the United States. Usually the judges were divided among three groups, or solas, two for civil suits and one for the criminal. It was very seldom that the whole audiencia met as one body. This vice- roy recommended the reduction of the number of oidores from ten to eight. 7 Ibid., art. 84. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 163 the governors were tempted to exercise a part of the judicial functions under the color of administering their political office. In general, however, in the course of this long struggle between the viceroys and the audiencias over the matters that might be appealed to the latter and those that might not, it be- came evident that the audiencias were gaining ground. The vice- roys kept insisting to the last that the crown definitely settle the dispute, 8 but in the meanwhile they held to their prerogatives in a way that must have seemed to the audiencias nothing less than usurpation. The remedy suggested by Revilla Gigedo to Branciforte was, in his words, " .... very simple to preserve the decorum of the viceroy, the authority of the audiencia and of the judges, and the efficiency of the administration of justice to the vassals of His Majesty, and would be to have the decisions appealed from the Viceroy, heard before himself, with two or three of the judges associated with him. ' ' 9 Such an arrangement, he thought, would not embarrass everybody as did the arrangements then in force, and the authority of the viceroy would suffer less in the popular esteem if his decisions were set aside in his own name. 10 This he believed would also tend to expedite questions under adjudication and so relieve one of the worst abuses of Spanish justice, thus frankly making the governor the presiding judge of the highest court of appeals. It is interesting to see a proposal of this kind put forth on the eve of the dissolution of Spain 's rule in America. During this period of war and confusion, which was not to be interrupted by a period of peace until Mexico was independent, there was no opportunity for reforms, and so the struggle between the audiencia and the viceroy was never settled. In spite of the contest with the audiencia and the tendency of the crown to limit the judicial functions of the governor, there were still left to him four distinct situations wherein he was called upon to act as judge. The first, was as judge of the City s Eevilla Gigedo, art. Ibid., art. 90. 10 Ibid., art. 91. 164 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l of Mexico, under the title of corregidor. 11 The corregidor was the chief official of the city and so presents some analogy to a modern mayor, but he was more of a judge and less of an execu- tive than the mayor of an American city. It would seem a patent absurdity to thrust this additional burden upon the ruler of the viceroyalty and at times the two offices were kept separate, but at the end of the eighteenth century the governor and the cor- regidor were one. The second judicial duty of the governor was exercised as chief of the general Indian court, the juzgado gen- eral de indios, which was exclusively for the trial of law-suits involving the natives, and was the highest court of this kind. The third and fourth cases did not belong strictly to the governor, but rather to the viceroy in his other capacities. As subdelegate of the post office department, which meant the chief of that div- ision of the administration for the whole viceroyalty, he was judge in the first instance of all cases growing out of this branch, of the public business, appeals going from him to the national head of this department, the ministro de correos, in Madrid. 12 Also, as captain-general, rather than as governor, he was supreme judge in all cases growing out of the fuero militar. In the light of all this evidence the conclusion must be drawn that the home government did not succeed in establishing any clear line of demarcation between the executive and the judicial divisions of the viceroy's powers. The order from Madrid not to "proceder en punto de administracion de justicia" could not be obeyed even in spirit without a more violent change in the governmental organization than was desired at home, and in con- sequence the order remained practically a dead letter. 13 Nothing has been discovered among the authorities to show why the Council of the Indies sought to divest the executive officers in 11 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 79. The courts of justice for the City of Mexico were eight in number, there being one court for each of the eight cuarteles. Of the eight judges, five were alcaldes de carte, two were alcaldes ordin- arios, and one was the corregidor. In each of the eight districts there were also four inferior alcaldes who had little discretion in legal matters and merely carried out orders of their superiors. This was the same scheme that worked so well in Madrid. There were twenty-eight cities in 1794 that had alcaldes ordinarios. 12 Ibid., art. 106. is Ibid., art. 64. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 165 the New World of their role as judges. 14 There had been, to be sure, plenty of complaint in regard to the amount, the tedious- ness, and the expense of litigation in the colonies. There was, too, the old complaint of corruption, and the Madrid government may have sought to attack this old evil by taking the adminis- trator off the bench. It is possible that the theory of the separation of powers may have been working among Spanish statesmen, but there is no direct evidence that the ideas of Montesquieu were consciously applied in Spanish- America. A much more important work for the governors of Mexico than the administration of justice was the building of public works. The construction of roads, bridges, drainage canals, and public buildings of various kinds was assuredly one of the most engrossing of the governor's duties. In spite of the many dis- advantages under which they labored, these Mexican rulers were able to accomplish much in the way of improving internal com- munications and developing the resources of the country. In the words of one of the viceroys, "In the realm of economics and policy the laws have sought to reserve to the viceroys a wider jurisdiction than in that of justice; nevertheless, very seldom can they exercise their faculties without contradiction and in many points they find themselves restricted by various royal orders, especially in the handling of money derived from certain taxes (la inversion de propios y arbitrios) which funds ought to be used for general public utility inasmuch as they are the general property of the district which pays them." 15 Though the governor had real power in the matter of public improve- ments, both in their initiation and in their superintendence while in the process of construction, there was a lack of re- sources, both in population and money, to permit a great deal being done. 16 Besides the configuration of the country, which Eevilla Gigedo, art. 83. Outside the City of Mexico the intendants and their assessors were the best fitted, in the opinion of the viceroy, to exercise the simplest judicial functions. The subdelegates were such an inferior lot of men and so lacking in independence that they could not be trusted in any judicial capacity. is Ibid., art. 141. art. 142. 166 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l by its roughness and great elevation often converted the building of a carriage road into a veritable feat of engineering, there was always the permanent difficulty of an extremely sparse population. This sparse population was not only of a low average per capita wealth, but was further divided into different races, so that it was not only scattered but disunited. 17 The principal evil that was complained of as standing in the way of the carrying through of the great public improvements was the inefficiency of the local administration and the lack of a concentration of power in the hands of the governor. 18 One of the prominent examples of this weakness of the local authorities, and the consequent difficulties placed in the way of the governor, is to be found in the building of the road from the capital to the town of Toluca. The valley of Toluca was called the granary of Mexico and there was urgent need of easy communication between the two. 19 In 1768 the first survey was made by an engineer named Ailmert. Nine years later they had proceeded as far as drawing up plans. 20 By 1785 the question was again brought to the front and a scheme of operations was prepared. The financing of the project was long and difficult, it being especially hard to get the different localities sufficiently inter- ested to appropriate the necessary money, 21 and it was only through the generosity of a private citizen that this money was secured as a loan. The work was at last begun in the fall of 1793, and seemed to be regarded by Revilla Gigedo as one of the monuments to his administration. 22 IT Revilla Gigedo, art. 143 and 144. According to the census of the year 1790, the population of the viceroyalty was estimated at three and a half millions at the outside. The forbidding of Sapniards to live in the villages of the Indians had, of course, kept the races apart and denied the Indians the advantage of contact with a superior civilization. is Ibid., art. 154. Also, for details of the duties of a provincial gov- ernor see the correspondence in the first volumes of the Provincial State Papers, particularly vols. i-iii. "JfttdL, art. 173. 20 Ibid., art. 174. art. 177. 22 Ibid., art. 185. The status of the project in 1797 may be seen from the letter Branciforte to Paz, Dec. 27, 1796. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 167 Of a similar nature, and equally illustrative of the activities of the governor, was the work on the other great highways, such as the road from Vera Cruz to Mexico, and from Mexico to Acapulco, 23 and the road leading from Mexico in a northeastly direction to the region of Tampico. 24 It is interesting to see how one of the roads proposed to the viceroy at this same time was rejected for political reasons. Though the viceroy admitted that the chief obstacle to internal trade was the absence of roads, the building of the one from Louisiana, through Texas, and down to the City of Mexico was opposed by him because it would interfere with the security of the Spanish domain from an attack from the north. These reasons were stated by Revilla Gigedo in a report to the Ministers to the Indies, April 30, 1793. The substance of his argument was that the inhabitants of New Orleans in particular, and to a less extent the Americans in general, were deserving of suspicion. He even went so far as to recommend the abandonment of the town of Naeogdoches and the giving up of any attempt to encourage trade between Texas and Louisiana. 25 Of greater importance to the City of Mexico than the build- ing of public highways was the proper drainage of the valley in which the City of Mexico was situated. In the language of the instruction to Branciforte, the drainage canal of Huehuetoca was "always and of right ought to be one of the principal cares of the viceroys, as upon that depends the freedom of this capital from a contagion as fearful as that of the inundations, and for which purpose there has been assigned sufficient funds derived from the three taxes which yield twenty thousand pesos an- nually." 26 The direction of the actual construction of this drainage canal, or desague, as well as the providing of sufficient revenues for it, fell to the governor. Prom the earliest days the 23 Eevilla Gigedo. art. 197. Also, Brancif orte to Paz, Sept. 26, 1796. 24 Ibid., art. 196. 25 Ibid., art. 448. 2 Ibid., art. 268. There had not been a serious flood in the City of Mexico since the seventeenth century, but the fear of the recurrence of such an event was never absent. 168 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 problem of disposing of the vast body of surplus water which accumulated in the valley of Mexico during the rainy season had remained most difficult to solve. The city was surrounded by low mountains which shed their waters into the valley from all sides, 27 and some of the floods had caused great damage to prop- erty and great loss of life. Various experiments had been made in the drainage of the valley, but it can scarcely be said that the question had been settled rightly by the end of the eighteenth cen- tury. A special corps of officials had been created to look after this work, at the head of which was placed a superintendent, or juez superintendent e. To assist him there was created a guard, (guarda mayor}, with the proper officers. During the rule of Flores, the consulado of Mexico was given charge of the execution of this work, and the regent of the audiencia was commissioned to examine it and report on what had been done. 28 The home government now took an active interest in the matter, so that the governor henceforth could do little more than offer advice and keep an eye on the consulado. 29 In a sense, however, the governor was never free from worry and responsibility growing out of the fear of an inundation, and the canal of Huehuetoca must be regarded as an expensive make- shift, imperfectly doing the work expected of it till the proper solution was arrived at in the time of Diaz. It is not easy to think of the land of Mexico as peculiarly adapted to internal water communications, but in 1794 we find a viceroy saying that "much more advantageous than the roads, would be the construc- 27 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 255. The drainage of the Valley of Mexico was carried in a northeasterly direction to the Gulf of Mexico, by way of the Tula and Tampico rivers. 28 IUd., art. 256. 2 The consulado of Mexico was created in the sixteenth century on the model of institutions of the same name in various cities of Spain, notably after that of Seville. These consulados were designed to fur- ther trade and industry and to assist in the administration of the com- mercial law of the country. They were at once chambers of commerce, admiralty courts, banks, and business corporations. A large number of new ones were established and several of the old ones given new char- ters during the latter half of the reign of Charles III, and they formed no inconsiderable part of a new commercial system put into force at that time. They were ruined by their large advances of money to the crown during the Napoleonic wars. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of Xew Spain 169 tion of canals, or rendering navigable certain rivers, which could be accomplished at slight cost." 3 * It was believed that, with very little expense, a large part of the viceroyalty, to the sonth and southeast of the City of Mexico, eonld be made tributary to the port of Vera Cruz by means of internal water- ways. 31 In May, 1790. the director of engineers, Miguel del Cor- ral, submitted plans for such an undertaking in pursuance of an order to that effect given him by Revilla Gigedo. In spite of the comparatively low cost of this and similar undertakings, the drain upon the Mexican finances, caused by the remission of funds to Spain, and the confusion brought about by foreign war, pre- vented anything very effective being done. 32 Although little was actually accomplished along these lines, it is interesting to see what attention the Mexican governors were bestowing upon a comprehensive scheme of internal improve- ments. There seems to have been nothing comparable to this anywhere among the English North American colonies. Enough was done by the Mexican governors to illustrate on a modest scale the workings of an enlightened despotism in a Spanish depend- ency. It was proposed to take full advantage of the location of the City of Mexico at the hydrographical center of the vice- royalty. 33 Though the rivers were not large, they flowed in all directions from the central plateau down to the two coasts, and it was proposed to utilize them to convert the capital city into a common center of all the trade routes crossing the country, whether by land or water. It was realized that neither the popu- lation nor the trade at that time justified the immediate carry- ing into effect of all these projects, but the attempt to formulate scientific plans for the carrying through of these internal im- provements as times and conditions justified them, reflects the highest credit on the Spanish rule. According to the viceroy- 3Bevilla Gigedo, art. 199. 3i Ibid., art. 200. It does not appear that any one contemplated at this time the building of a great road over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec or of constructing an interoceanic canal. Ibid., art. 205. 33 Ibid., art. 202. 170 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 governor who ruled from 1789 to 1794, 34 "It was most neces- sary for works of this and other kinds, and to carry them through with complete information, that there be engineers in these dom- inions for that particular object. With this in mind I asked that there be sent over, knowing this lack, two engineers of ability and industry in the work, to prepare a topographical map of the country. ' ' With such a topographical map to throw light on the lay of the land, and a census to answer a similar purpose for the population, there was a most intelligent beginning for all manner of political and economic reforms. One of the most important duties of the governor was the general care and supervision of the public health. Even with the magnificent climate of the central plateau region, there prevailed over the whole viceroyalty a high death rate among people of European birth.. Humboldt's treatment of this subject was so thorough that all that need be said here is in the way of illus- tration of the viceroy's political activities. The unhealthfulness of the coast regions, not only around Vera Cruz on the Gulf coast, but also around San Bias on the western side, was pro- verbial, and as captain-general the viceroy had to wrestle with the problem of keeping the health of the troops garrisoning such places. But the civil population of the country was also exposed to the ravages of various epidemics. 35 One of the causes com- monly assigned for these plagues was the presence of cemeteries in the cities, and it was only after a long fight that the governors succeeded in having new cemeteries established outside the larger centers of population. 36 s-t Eevilla Gigedo, art. 206. 35 Ibid., art. 241. 36 In spite of the fact that the City of Mexico was not as compactly built and crowded as most European cities of the same size, there were certain conditions adverse to public health. Physical uncleanliness was very general, and Eevilla Gigedo 's description of what was visible from the palace windows (art. 244) gives an idea of street life. The lower classes were accustomed to go about with little or no clothing except one garment which answered all purposes. The employees of the government were forced to dress properly, and in one year ten thousand workmen of the tobacco factory and other government shops were made to adopt suit- able garments. In Vera Cruz the problem of the disposal of the dead was especially acute. Bevilla Gigedo, Feb. 9, 1792. Smith : The Viceroy of New Spain 171 It is not easy to assign the exact functions of taking care of the public health to the different officials who had some degree of responsibility for it. The governor had the leading, though not the exclusive, part in this matter, and the full responsibility was not centered in any one office. The general care of the health of the troops belonged naturally to the captain-general, the management of many of the hospitals rested finally with the archbishop, while in financial matters and the providing of neces- sary revenues the intendants had an important share. Such a matter as the providing for suitable cemeteries, referred to above, was not settled without reference to all these officials and some interference from the home government in addition. In all matters relating to public health the governor was assisted by an official called the prolat=nudicato, who not only concerned himself with the examining and licensing of physicians, but also occupied a position not unlike that of a modern health officer. The relation of these officials one to another may per- haps be best exhibited by the following facts. The corregidor of the City of Mexico, in November, 1790, reported that a num- ber of persons had died of tuberculosis and that other persons had afterwards worn the clothing of the deceased. 37 On receiv- ing this information the governor summoned the proio-medicato to assist in working out a number of general hygienic rules re- lating to this question. Cases of violation of these rules were to be reported by physicians and other persons to the authori- ties of the city and suitable penalties were to be imposed upon the offenders. In the drafting of these ordinances the governor was represented by the fiscal de lo civil, who collaborated with the proto-medicato. 3 * The tit/orme, or report, of the latter, on being approved by the fiscal and finally by the governor, was sent around to all the intendants of the viceroyalty. The most im- portant provisions in this general order related to the burning of the clothing of those who had died of infectious diseases and the fumigation of the wards in the hospitals where they had Bevilla Gigedo, art. 228. Ibid., art. 229 and 230. 172 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 died. In a similar way the governor and the proto-medicato took other measures to diminish the danger of epidemics, and pest- houses or lasaretos were established in the places where they were most needed. 39 Medical men were encouraged to write essays on the cure of the most dangerous diseases 40 and the beginning was made of an attempt to collect and tabulate vital statistics with particular reference to the various diseases and their relative mortality. 41 The cleaning of the streets of the City of Mexico, the disposal of filth and debris, which were not only unsightly but also unhygienic, also required the attention of the governor, and were regarded as important enough to deserve considerable space in the instructions Revilla Gigedo prepared for Branciforte in 1794. 42 Duties like these just mentioned in regard to the public health had a close connection with the more general problems of muni- cipal government, and lead up naturally to the discussion of the duties of the governor as head of the administration of the City of Mexico. The governor was sometimes the corregidor and some- times there was a separate official for that post, but at all times the governor was responsible in a general way for the government of the city. 43 When there was a separate corregidor he was directly subordinate to the governor, and so it was a comparatively unimportant matter whether the two offices were single or com- bined. All the Mexican municipalities had their local govern- ment, with numerous elective officers and a town council, or ayuntamiento, but these local officials were overshadowed in the capital by the presence of the viceroy. Reference has been made above to the work of the viceroys and their correspondence with Madrid on the subject of paving 3 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 234. 40 Ibid., art. 241. Of the essays submitted, two were voted acceptable, though one "was very diffuse and both needed considerable corrections." 41 Ibid., art. 238 and 239. 42 Ibid., art. 245 and 246. 43 The opinion stated here is my own, and is an inference from a large number of facts bearing on the relation of the governor with the corregidor. I never have seen an explicit statement that the corregidor was actually subject to the governor. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of -Veir Spain 173 the streets of Mexico City and providing for suitable drainage. These and other activities, which in a modern American city would be performed by a board of public works, were not merely referred to the governor, but were actually initiated by him. As was shown in Chapter n, it was most unusual for anything of consequence to be completed without the interference of the home government, but whatever was done or decided in America had to pass through the hands of the viceroy. Without going too greatly into details, mention can be made of the following measures that were considered important during the first years of the reign of Charles IV. Before 1789, very little had been done toward the illumina- tion of the city or toward making effective provisions for the protection of life and property. In 1776, proclamations had been issued by the governor on the subject of lighting the city streets, and in 1783 persons with property were ordered to keep their houses lighted, as were also those in charge of the various public buildings, shops, stores, and the like. 44 Three years later this was approved by a royal order, but a year after there was no noticeable improvement and so the viceroy ordered the erection of street lamps where there were none before. Although offenses against these ordinances were punishable by banishment, nothing was accomplished by them up to the year 1789. Some of the wealthy merchants and public officials did their share by lighting their residences and offices, but something more drastic was re- quired to secure the general enforcement of the law.* 5 Instead, however, of continuing this attempt to force property-owners to illuminate their own premises, the governor had recourse to the ayuntamitnto to furnish revenue for a system of street lighting at public expense and administered by the city. The new system was installed at a cost of 35,429 pesos, and with an annual cost of maintenance of 24.440 pesos. Revenue for this was found by an ** Bevilla Gigedo, art. 292. The lighting of the streets was done by means of oil lamps. A month was given to the inhabitants to comply with the law. and if any resisted they might be expelled from the cuorteL The enforcement of the law was in the hands of the alcalde de cuartel who decided how each person was to pay. *5 Ibid., art. 293. 174 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l octroi tax on flour, 46 approved by the procurator-general and the sindico and still later by the fiscales de lo civil y de real hacienda. The final approval was given by the junta de propios, or coun- cil of taxation, October 15, 1790, and a special fund for this pur- pose was administered separately. About the same time the problem of fire protection for the city was attacked by the governor, who, in September, 1790, had fire-pumps constructed for the custom-house, the tobacco fac- tory, and other important places. 47 Various rules for the fighting of fires and the safeguarding of the property rights of those who suffered directly or indirectly by them, were embodied in a reg- lamento of twenty-eight articles. 48 A few years later, during the rule of Viceroy Marquina, numerous fires and the problems resulting from them attracted the attention of the governor. Special provision was made for the appointment of a certain judge to try cases growing out of a conflagration; and a rule was put in force that as soon as the fire-bell rang there should assemble at the palace a company of infantry of the guard regi- ment, so that in such a time of confusion there might be special protection, not only for the palace, but for the neighboring public buildings. In addition, a subaltern and twenty men and a de- tachment from the dragoon regiment should be sent to the scene of the fire to preserve order and prevent looting. 49 Because of the irreparable loss that might very well be occa- sioned by a great fire getting beyond control, not only to the city proper, but to the general government of New Spain, on account of the presence there of so many public buildings, it is not a matter for surprise that the governor should take so acute an interest in the protection of the city from danger. Nevertheless, many matters of minor detail relating purely to the municipal * Revilla Gigedo, art. 294. This tax on flour could be collected at the octroi stations at the same time the alcabala was collected. Moreover, as the great mass of the people lived upon maize instead of wheat the tax did not bear especially on the poor. 47 Ibid., art. 298. Ibid., art. 299. 49 Marquina, art. 87. Smith : TJte Viceroy of A'eir Spain 175 government were not settled by the ayuntamifitto bat were solemnly carried up to the chief executive. The city markets even received considerable attention from Viceroy Kevilla Gigedo. He complained on his accession to power that the sale of food stuffs was in an incredibly disordered state. Stalls for the principal markets were first built, and then the corregidor was instructed to draw up a rtglamento to answer for every market in the city. The duties of the judge of the plazas, juts de plazas, usually one of the regidores. were defined, and an administrator to care for the lighting; and cleaning of the public squares was provided. 5 * These measures not only added greatly to the safety and sightliness of the markets. 51 but they increased the city's revenue, as the persons who rented the stalls could afford to pay the increased rental because of the greater security from fire and robbery. In the same way as the policing and regulating of the public markets were regarded as one of the duties of the governor, the furnishing of the city with an adequate supply of pure water became one of his obligations. 32 In 1789 the arrangements for piping the drinking water to the city were in a bad way. The pipes were nearly ruined and the wastefulness of those who had the privileges of using the water was in itself a great eviL 53 Moreover., much water was wasted before reaching the capital or was used for watering gardens and other purposes, so that not only were great quantities of water diverted from their proper use,, but even the streets and roads were at times flooded and seriously damaged. In order to remedy all this, repairs were made in the various conduits and a couple of guards were ap- pointed to patrol the aqueducts so as to warn the jvez de eanerias of any leaks or breakages.** The latter official was expected to prevent individuals from taking more than their rightful share *Rerilla Gigedo, ait. 302. " .... eon el anxflio de dos Goardos Ministros a qmenes se senalo H particular uniform* 6 traje." IfruL, art. 303. " el boen orden, elaridad j segnridad." IWdL, art. 304. art- 305. ait. 306. 176 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l of the water, but owing to the fact that the chief offenders were influential persons, "personas mas poderosas y respectables," it was a difficult matter to enforce the various ordinances. It seemed a small matter for the governor to decide whether the pipes should be laid in the center of the street or along the sides, and whether they should be constructed of tiling or of lead, but these matters had to be settled by him. The ten public fountains were remodelled in order to secure a greater economy and better protect the public health. 55 Even more important than securing the city against the danger of fires or even maintaining a good water supply, was the duty of providing against famines. 56 For a great many years it had been the duty of the authorities to supervise the furnish- ing of the city with its supply of grain and meat, 57 and the policy of maintaining large reserves of grain and flour as a protection against lean years had become permanent. 58 The pub- lic granaries, alhondigas or positos, were receptacles for storing the grain, but in furnishing bread to the populace use was made of a guild or corporation of bakers. A succinct and authoritative statement regarding this organization was given by Viceroy Marquina in 1803. "The purveyance of bread to this very numerous population may be said to be a monopoly here. It does not follow the ordinary rules of freedom of sale. It is confined to a guild, called that of the bakers, which forms a body or organ- ization, and has the duty of supplying this food of primal neces- sity. On some occasions it has been questioned if it would not be more convenient if there were no such guild, nor any special number, as there are, of bakeries ; but without doubt there would have been insuperable difficulties in doing without them and I am convinced that it has always eliminated the risk of any failure of the bread-supply, which would be most serious in a populous city, if the sale of bread were left free, and there were ss Revilla Gigedo, art. 307. 66 md., art. 308. 6T Revilla Gigedo, the Elder, art. 82. 58 Revilla Gigedo, art. 310. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 177 any failure to furnish enough to prevent such a f earful result and its consequences." 5 " The difficulties of administering this branch of the government were increased by the general confusion of the business world resulting from the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. 60 In February, 1797, the crown ordered that the various ordinances for the positos of Spain be made the basis of the regulations for those of Mexico and the matter was submitted to a junta to be put into shape, but in spite of the efforts of Viceroy Marquina no progress was made. The physical difficul- ties of collecting the grain in the big cities were considerable, and the financing of the alhondigas was full of complexities. The millers combined to force the bakers to pay a high price for flour, and in the contest which grew out of this, appeal was taken to the governor. The latter interfered to keep down the price of bread, and forbade the millers to deal in grain and force up its price or to do anything but manufacture flour.* 1 The complexity of these problems would seem to forbid the governor's taking care of them intelligently, but he was expected to keep a firm hand on all these regulations, controversies, and decisions affecting public policy. 62 He was expected to be inter- ested in such questions as whether it would be better to manu- facture a new kind of bread, "medio entre eomun y pan bazo;" to prevent frauds on the part of these various guilds ; and to keep an eye on the various public improvements of the city as welL He was expected to study the problem of the fluctuations in the prices of grain, anticipate shortages in the crops, and buy for the state when the market was most favorable." AH this presupposes a superhuman talent and activity on the part of the governor, who, Marquina, art. 80. Ibid., art. 82. Marquina declares that a combination of the millers and bakers could fix the price of bread to the disadvantage of the public and so constitute a dangerous monopoly. i Bevilla Gigedo, art. 316. Ibid., art. 323. It was evidently the opinion of this viceroy that the business of furnishing flour and bread should not be in the hands of the corporations (gremios). If it were thrown open without restriction to gen- eral competition, persons of small capital would be encouraged to enter the field. **Ibid., art. 319. 178 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 besides other inevitable disqualifications due to overwork and lack of training for the position, was always a foreigner and therefore more or less ignorant of local conditions. One of the chief branches of the administration of the public food supply was that relating to meat, or abasto de earned It was customary in Mexico for the larger towns and cities to grant the monopoly of furnishing the cities with meat to some person or group of persons, because it was generally believed that so much capital was required for the proper conduct of so large a busi- ness that it could not be left to private enterprise and competi- tion among a number of small dealers. 65 The meat supply had to come from a considerable distance and the cities had very gen- erally alienated their public lands so that they could not raise their own animals for slaughter. The contract for this monopoly was sold to the highest bidder by judicial auction. This contract had to be submitted to the viceregal government for approval, though apparently the governor did not have anything else to do with the matter. However, when Revilla Gigedo was gov- ernor he did concern himself with the question of the recovery of the land rightfully belonging to the City of Mexico, which had been usurped by private individuals. Likewise it had long been a problem for the governors how to regulate the bull fights, for a very important by-product of bull fighting was the cheap meat afterwards sold to the poorest consumers of animal food. 68 It would not be worth while to enumerate further the mis- cellaneous occupations which were forced upon the governor as a result of his being the virtual head of the government of the City of Mexico. It is enough to say that practically all the ac- tivities which we now associate with a modern municipality and which are distributed among a great number of different officials and boards, had some connection with the office of the governor. e* Eevilla Gigedo, the Elder, art. 12. 65 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 325 and 326. of t'L^TarV 4 ' , Her S I 8 t0 be f Und an ex P ress condemnation bull fights. He refused to permit such a way of celebrating his mor Y ?r e i b f ause ', amon g other thin g s > "of the injuries both most vigUan't ca?e." ^^ ^^ ** bU " fights > in S P ite of the Smiik: The Viceroy of -Veir Spam 179 The laying oat of streets and boulevards, improving the general plan of the city and increasing its regularity in outline, con- structing aqueducts, fighting the contraband trade, improving primary education,* 7 and seeking to improve the lot of the workingman, were all part of the governor's business, as well as scores of duties not mentioned here. The amount of attention bestowed on these matters by the different governors depended very largely on the vigor and personality of the man. as well as upon the pressure of outside circumstances such as foreign wars and the amount of interference from the home government. From the well-known propensities of the Spaniard toward paternalism, there need be no surprise that the governor was to look after the morals of the people within his jurisdiction. About the middle of the eighteenth century the population of the vieeroyalty was described as forming two general classes, one of the nobility and gentry, of white color, called by the elder Re villa nobles or patricians, and the other, made up of all the various inferior mixed breeds, called the plebeians.** The former were grateful to the mother country for all the advantages they had received, past and present, and were actuated by a deep loyalty to the crown. The latter, divided into various castes, were poor, vicious, and for lack of anything to do, much given to laziness. The same authority tells us that the nobility were docile and submissive, and easy to govern "eon la suavidad."** while the "plebs" were so "vicious and cowardly" that only a few soldiers were necessary to keep them in order and restrain their excesses. The chief protection against the vulgar mob was to be found in its condition of disunion. 7 * It looked to the govern- ment for an ample and cheap supply of corn and meat, with boll fights for the chief amusement, pattern et drcemses. Next to the wide prevalence of IM came theft and drunkenness as the vicios dominant (s of the common people. The governors were therefore obliged to wage a constant war against highway rob- r. Revilla Gigedo, art. 335. e fieri]]* Gigedo, the Elder, an I w/fruL, art. 5. * /ML, art. 10. 180 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 bery and thieving in its various forms, invoking the aid of the Santa Hermandad with its star chamber procedure. 71 The increase of drunkenness and the failure of the ordinary preventives brought that evil to the particular attention of the viceroys and governors. 72 Owing to the ease with which chinguerito could be manufactured and the lack of other employ- ment for so many people, the secret and illicit manufacture of spirituous liquors had grown to be a great evil. Laws and proclamations were directed against the sale and manufacture of the native brandy, but apparently without result. Even a more potent cause of intoxication was the native wine, or pulque, which was not forbidden by law but was even approved of as a medicine. 73 The elder Revilla Gigedo complained that the natives spent more on this beverage than on food stuffs and clothing. Commissions were appointed to cope with the chinguerito evil while a like means was adopted to limit and regulate the pulque traffic. 74 One governor ordered the places where alcoholic liquors from Castile were sold, to be closed at nine o'clock at night, while extra efforts were made to punish with severity the distillers of chinguerito.'' 6 A more rigid inspection of the pulquerias was undertaken with the same general object in view, and judges and other officials were admonished to exert themselves to en- force the law. 76 71 Kevilla Gigedo the Elder, art. 14. 72 Ibid., art. 15. As late as 1791 the problem of the control of the manufacture of spirituous liquors was a pressing one. Eevilla Gigedo to the Conde de Lerene, Sept. 26, 1791. 73 Jbid., art. 16. 74/fttd., art. 19. 75 Ibid., art. 21. 7 Ibid., art. 355-362. In these articles the viceroy discussed the evils growing out of the liquor business in a way which reminds one of the later attempts at regulation and prohibition in the United States. Com- plaints had reached the king in Spain regarding the bad influence of the retail liquor business, and the royal order, March 18, 1778, directed that everything possible be done to remedy them. The alcaldes were ordered to make frequent visits to the pulquerias and to take such measures as "their zeal dictated." A junta, composed of the archbishop, the regent of the audiencia, the senior fiscal, and the superintendent of the custom house, was appointed to meet with the governor to devise remedies for the saloon evil. Laws against drunkenness were issued and the pulquerias were limited to the sale of pulque and were not allowed to furnish pro- visions and other accessories. S i- : : Smith: The Viceroy of Nem Spain 181 The attack which the governors were expected to lead on popular vices was not confined to the liquor traffic. A number of games of chance came under the ban of the law and some at- tempt was made to restrict them. The same cannot be said of the social evil, toward which the governors maintained an attitude of frigid tolerance. In 1775 the viceroy wrote, "Secret incon- tinence, here and in all the world, is not to be remedied entirely, and prudent governors content themselves with avoiding pub- licity, as I have done in my time, famishing and punishing those worst courtesans who give public seandaL m "* Stricter rules were also drawn up at about the same time to limit the excesses in the Paseo de Jamaica, and a company of cavalry from the palace guard was assigned the duty of patrolling the slum district at night. These facts point quite clearly to the generally unrecog- nized truth that the Spanish rulers in New Spain were by no means indifferent to the moral well-being of their subjects, how- ever crude their measures may seem at the present day. The various evils referred to above could not be dealt with adequately by the governors without reference to the question of immigration. It seemed to be a very general belief among the viceroys of the later days of Spanish rule that a great many of the ills afflicting society sprang from an influx of foreigners and that a more careful enforcement of the laws against the undesir- able immigrant was necessary. Among the most explicit declara- tions to be found in the primary material is that of Viceroy \ Marquina, written in the year 1803. He wrote in his instruction to Itnrrigay, that when he first began to inform himself about America, he became persuaded that the laws of the Indies in regard to persons from Europe being admitted to the colonies ought to be put into force rigorously ; TT and that this should apply not only to foreigners, but to those Spaniards who had se- cured passports or licenses. During his incumbency he became aware of the presence of foreigners by seeing them on the streets of the capital, and became more and more convinced that there was a ait. 24. Maiqmna, art. 66. University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 clanger lurking in this non-observance of the laws. 78 Strict orders were thereupon sent to the governor of Vera Cruz, reminding him of his duties in this matter, and ordering him to make every possible effort to check the ingress of all Europeans, particularly those coming from other countries than Spain. 79 Those who were to be admitted were to show whence they came, the motive of their coming, and the proper documents authorizing their voy- age. Additional orders were sent to the judicial officers of the cities between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico to insist that all travelers from Vera Cruz produce passports from the gov- ernor of that place. 80 The alcaldes of the capital were likewise commanded to cooperate in running down unauthorized persons. 81 Of like import were the remarks of Viceroy Branciforte to his successor Azanza, in 1798, but it does not appear that these efforts at restriction were very successful. 82 They are mentioned here, however, rather as illustrations of the duties of the gov- ernor and of the matters of state policy which attracted the atten- tion of the Spanish colonial rulers. 83 Although the organization of charity and poor relief in Mexico during the Spanish regime was mainly in the hands of the church, there were certain aspects of it which could not be ignored by the state. 84 There is sufficient evidence of the inter- est taken in this matter by the governor, derived from the reglamentos and instrucciones of the viceroys, so that a few words are due the subject in this study. The question of poor relief is always as much a matter for statesmen as for philanthropists, and m Mexico especially the question was inseparable from the larger problem of keeping the masses in good order and pro- 78 Marquina, art. 67. their revolutionary writings from Mexico. 80 Ibid., art. 69. 81 Ibid., art. 70. 82 Ibid., art. 71. 83 Branciforte, art. 11. 84 Marquina, art. 104. Smith : The Viceroy of Xeic Spain 183 ductively employed. In every large city there was a kospicio de pob'rcs, or pool-house, but the one in the City of Mexico was, of course, the most important. As one of the viceroys said, "The poorhonse might very well be a seminary where many useful trades and occupations might be learned; ...."' but as a matter of fact, there was not enough money available to hire suitable teachers or to give the proper material equipment. 85 In 1791, there were seven hundred and fifty inmates and the income derived from taxes and gifts amounted to twenty thousand pesos. Much of the work done in the institution was of an inferior kind and almost worthless because of the ignorance or physical weak- ness of many of the inmates. Nevertheless, it kept a certain number of people off the streets though it was not large enough to solve the problem of mendicity even in the capital, and affairs were not so promising in the provincial towns.** The poorhonse of the City of Mexico was in charge of a director, who was sub- ordinate to a committee composed of the archbishop, the regent of the audiencia. the dean of the university, two regidores of the ayuntemtcmto, the prior of the constdado, and the director of the poorhonse. The procurator and the syndic were honorary members without vote, and the corregidor had no connection whatever with the institution.* 7 With a little better manage- ment and more revenue, this kospicio de pobres might have been the place to which the children of the foundling asylum were transferred on reaching the proper age.* 8 The casa de expositos, or foundling asylum was entirely independent of the governor and was managed by a committee selected from the body of its supporters, the Congregation of Charity. These two charities were the ones which came most under the notice of the civil power and so indirectly to the attention of the governor, but neither was in any sense administered by him. One of the institutions of New Spain for which there is scarcely a parallel in the United States at the present time was ** Bevilla Gigedo, art. 350. ** Marqnin*, art. 105-106. Bevilla Gigedo, art. 351. "IfrtdL, art. 352. 184 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 the montepio. The mojaJ&pj^militar, which will be described in chapter iv, was exclusively for officers in the army, while the montepio de oficinas was for the benefit of the officials in the civil administration. A royal decree of May 10, 1776, ordered the governor of Mexico to report on the desirability of such an institution, its objects being similar to those of a modern mutual life-insurance company. 89 The report was favorable to such an institution, and the royal assent was given February 18, 1784. 90 Persons holding royal commissions with salaries above four hun- dred pesos a year were admitted. 91 The organization was per- fected and dated its official beginning July 1, 1784. Its officials were an accountant, a secretary, a treasurer, an usher, and two other officials. 92 The beneficiaries were the widows and the orphans of the deceased, who received one-fourth of the salary of the deceased at the time of his death. 93 The chief officials were nominated by the viceroy, who apportioned them among the representatives of the various government offices. 94 A similar institution was organized for the benefit of the higher officials of the financial department, and bore the name of the montepio de ministros. 96 This was organized in June, 1785, and its general government was the same as that of the montepio de oficinas. Still another form of montepio was organized in Feb- ruary, 1775, and was under the immediate protection of the viceroy. The official title was monte de piedad de dnimas, and its governing body was appointed by the governor. 96 It was an out-and-out charity institution and so differed somewhat from the other forms of montepios. It was founded as the result of a gift of three hundred thousand pesos by the Conde de Regla, for the purpose of lending money on personal property such as 8 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 1385. o Ibid., art. 1386. i Ibid., art. 1387. 92 Ibid., art. 1388. s Ibid., art. 1389. 4 Ibid., art. 1390. 95 Ibid., art. 1392. 96 Ibid., art. 1407. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spam 185 furniture, clothing, and other articles now commonly found in a pawn-shop.* 7 This monte de pit dad did a tremendous busi- ness and has remained till modern times one of the great curiosities of the City of Mexico. Among the many institutions introduced into Mexico from Spain, there was none more characteristic than the consulado. The tribunal of the consulado became the great law court of the country for the decision of all suits growing out of trade and trade relations, or, in the words of one of the viceroys, "between merchants on account of merchandise. ' *** The consulado of Mexico was modelled on that of the city of Seville," and its prior and two consuls constituted the court of original jurisdiction in mer- cantile eases. 100 It had its court of appeals and legal counsels, asesores, the hitter receiving a considerable salary. The great criticism of the consulado was that it held its sessions only at the capital city, which caused obvious disadvantages to the mer- chants living at a distance. 101 Moreover, the consulado strove for the commercial advantage of the City of Mexico to the detri- ment of other cities in the country, as in the case of the alcavala tax. which it sought to have reduced for Mexico but increased in Vera Cruz. It was also true that the tribunal of the con- svlado was less needed in the capital than in almost any other part of the country, because of the presence there of a great number of other high courts. These objections induced the younger Revilla Gigedo to recommend either the complete aboli- tion of the consulado, or the establishment of one in every large city. The only advantage of having the consulado in the capital was the convenience, not to say necessity, to the government in carrying on certain public works like the canal of Huehuetoea. 10 * The large revenue which the consulado enjoyed was derived chiefly from an impost, arena, on all goods passing through the *T Bevilla Gigedo, art. 1408. /WdL, art. 111. art. 461. art. 462. Ibid., art. 463. IfcwL, art. 464. 186 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Mexico. This impost tended to become higher till it reached one and one-half per cent, and was paid by the consumer in the enhanced selling price of the goods. With these revenues the consulado became the great fin- ancial institution of the country, and in the absence of banks afforded to the government a most convenient means of tapping the national wealth. It financed great public undertakings, maintained a regiment of militia, and lent money to the king. These extra-commercial activities alone were sufficient in import- ance to make it one of the great agencies for the government of the viceroyalty, and justify its mention in this place in a study of the viceroy as governor. Of much less interest to the general historian, though import- ant enough in the social and industrial organization of society in the eighteenth century, were the various craft guilds. The viceroy-governor in 1794 held a rather low opinion of the work- men and trades-unions of Mexico. 'This was partly attributable to the lack of education of the laborers, but was also due to the organizations of the workingmen. 103 The capital had fifty dif- ferent gremios, each with its own constitution, in the majority of cases dating from the previous century. 104 They tended to monopolize the various branches of industry and in the main did nothing to advance the arts. 105 The viceroy recommended the suppression of some of these unions, but it is notable that he approved of retaining others as the best means of maintaining the proper relations between the masters, the journeymen, and the apprentices. 106 There is no part of the government of New Spain which has been so inadequately explained or so generally neglected by the secondary historians as that which pertained to the secre- tariat of the viceroy. 107 The Secretaria de Cdmara del Virreynato, los Eevilla Gigedo, art. 337. 104 Ibid., art. 338. 105 Ibid., art. 339. loe Ibid., art. 341. This governor thought that it was footless for the gremios to attempt to prescribe the sizes and designs of the fabrics they turned out. IOT Eevilla Gigedo to the Conde de Lerene, Oct. 29, 1791. 1913] Smith: Tke Viceroy of Aeic Spot* 187 as it was referred to in the documents of the time, constituted a most important part of the government mechanism. It was in the secretariat that a great many of the details of actual administration were worked out, and while it would be too much to say that the members of this official body formed the viceroy's cabinet, it may be said that they formed his civil staff. This body of minor but extremely useful officials appears at first as a part of a great bureaucracy, but if this be true it is only so in a peculiar sense of the term. A modern cabinet officer whose tenure of office is not long, is regularly dependent upon his per- manent under-secretaries for information and direction, for everything except those changes in policy which are the result of the ebb and flow of party politics. The members of the secre- tariat were not ordinarily appointees for life or for long periods of time and were not men seeking a career in this employment. They were not. as a body, men of more than mediocre talent and it seems that their importance arose from their part in the work- ing out of the details of exceedingly complicated administrative rules which no one above them in rank could, or eared to. master. Spanish administrative methods have ever been notorious for a cumbersome procedure resulting from an endless writing and re-writing of rules and regulations governing the minutest details in affairs of government. On its good side these practices made for orderliness, pains-taking methods, definiteness. and a full preservation of records. It was in its very nature opposed to what is careless, and slipshod, and indefinite. In the hands of the average official, however, it proved to be a slow and unwieldly means of getting things done. Masses of papers, made up of reports, opinions, citations of previous law and practice, were likely to accumulate to such an extent that the superior official who was required to examine them in order to reach a conclu- sion was often taxed to the uttermost in his attempt to master their contents. When it is remembered that the viceroys were military men for the most part rnifamiliar with, the law and civil procedure and were almost never allowed to remain in office long enough to become thoroughly acquainted with its duties, it is 188 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l easy to understand their dependence upon the members of the secretariat. Our chief sources of information for the history and organiza- tion of the Mexican Secretaria del Cdmara are the reports and correspondence of the second Revilla Gigedo. Soon after his entering office he sought to improve the efficiency of his sub- ordinates in the secretariat, and his report of January 11, 1790, and the accompanying reglamento are the leading documents to be consulted. His recommendations were never more than par- tially adopted, but they afford an admirable view of the prob- lems and difficulties which this ruler had to meet. He begins his report to Secretary Valdez with a pointed reference to the "general epidemic of ineptitude" from which la primera oficina rel reino was suffering, and he added a statement on the margin of this document to the effect that the secretary then serving and his predecessors had labored to remedy the evil conditions and without result. It seems that in the earliest times there was no legal pro- vision for a secretary and that the viceroys supplied this want voluntarily out of their own income. The salary was 1400 pesos and the other expenses of the office were met out of the revenue accruing from vacan- cies in certain military organizations. This meant that the pay of the under-secretaries and copyists was extremely small and derived from an uncertain source. As the salaries were inadequate the officials were driven to increase their incomes by means at once illicit and undignified. As a result the honor and good name of the viceroys as well as the public service were injured and even state secrets were occasionally sold. Another bad feature was the pernicious rotation in office which every change of viceroy brought about. The chief secretary or oficial mayor was expected to hold office indefinitely, but even his salary was drawn as a member of the tribunal of accounts (tribunal de cuentas). This false economy led to inefficiency because the dependientes were not only underpaid but had no hope of pro- motion and were ever looking forward to the time when they 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain, 189 might find employment elsewhere. The official records were badly kept and the central archives were in confusion. The first attempt at a reorganization of the secretariat was made in the first year of the rule of the Marques de las in 1756. The new arrangements were embodied in the royal Cfdula of August 28, 1757, whereby three salaried positions were created drawing 1500, 1000, and 500 pesos respectively. But already these new provisions were inadequate. The constantly increasing business of these secretaries due to the increasing mili- tary establishments, the administration of the tobacco monopoly, and the growing complexity of other departments of public finance drove the later viceroys to make further demands for men and salaries. The Marques de Croix succeeded in adding two more officials to this department, but in February, 1771, the volume of business had so outrun the office force that the same viceroy was again begging aid from the home government. In January. 1772, and February, 1773, the new viceroy, Bucareli, renewed the demand of his predecessor for a further increase in the personel of the secretariat which resulted in the second re- eonstitution of that department. This was the one actually in force in the time of Revilla Gigedo and was based upon the royal ctduJa and order of June 19, 1773. This royal cldula provided for six officials with salaries ranging from 2000 to 600 pesos, whose duties were primarily the drafting of the various kinds of documents issued from that office. Provision was also made for an archive ro. or keeper of the archives, and six other functionaries who were to serve without pay and were regularly referred to as meritorios. They were expected to have some in- dependent means and to possess the character and talent requisite to promotion and regular salary. The secretary, the six officials, and the archivist were to enjoy such advantages as exemption from the media a not a and admission to the monte pfo de mm- istros. Some further modifications in the direction of a more gen- erous treatment of this office were secured by Bucareli in Feb- ruary, 1778. Two more oficiales, or under-secretaries, were 190 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l granted, together with two copyists and a porter. There were now seventeen employees of all grades subordinate to the secre- tary. By 1790 this number had increased to thirty, and it had been even larger for a while under Viceroy Mayorga. Though this seems a considerable advance over the conditions existing before the secretariat was organized in 1757, yet matters were in a very unsatisfactory condition, as Revilla Gigedo has so clearly set forth. This viceroy was unwilling to continue the employment of the meritorios. He considered them satisfactory for some of the government offices, as for instance in the secre- tariat of the bureau of accounts, but he thought they ought not to be entrusted with the more important and delicate matters relating to the viceroy 's own office. The work of these secretaries or clerks required not only a moderately high degree of intelligence and industry but a special aptitude for finding one's way about in the mazes of previous legislation. The procedure in dealing with an expedients is described by Revilla Gigedo as follows : This minister, either because he has not the necessary information, or because he wishes to protect his office, asks for precedents, or else he submits a report or instruction to other tribunals, magistrates or indi- viduals. These reports are collected in the archivo de secretaria, where they are assembled with other expedientes which are already in the same office or in the copy rooms of the Government, where they have or have not completed their various processes, and in this manner, months or years pass by before they return to the Fiscal (about the same thing happening with the other informes). Because they who have to prepare these informes are already over-burdened with the duties of their respec- tive positions, it is necessary that their ordinary work be neglected as much as their importance will permit, and also the additional work re- quired to prepare the extra reports and opinions. The expediente then comes back to the fiscal in the form of a first draft, or as a problem to be solved, and if he does not repeat his request, for further instruction, with the delays that it implies, it goes to the asesor general or it is carried to the Junta Superior de B. H., which body is like- wise burdened with serious problems of government of divers character, and as this body meets only two days in each week, this work progresses very slowly. Finally the document or report is verified, and if there results its acceptance as an ad interim measure it incurs the new delay arising from the taking of testimony and ultimately from its formulation by the 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 191 secretariat according to the contents of those documents, letters or repre- sentations with which it is submitted for royal consideration. These delays are the ordinary ones incident to a clear and easy expedients, for when difficulties occur, the trials of the procedure are mul- tiplied. Then arise in the midst of the proceeding new and perplexing points, due to remanding the whole question to some other department for discussion, with the result that interminable debates are precipitated; confusion is produced by the accumulation of useless documents, likewise by the complex of contradictory opinions which cause distrust of the wisdom of the decision which have been arrived at. I do not mean by this that important matters are decided without the formalities of law, royal order, ordinances, or reglamentot; but when these laws declare and determine the point which they raise, and do not prescribe the procedure by which they are put into effect, it seems to me that [these formalities] ought to be waived for the sake of the quickest and best service of the "K"g and the public and out of regard for the principal office of the realm, the laboratory in which are produced the laws which govern this vast empire, binding together all the parts which sustain it. This is the science which the officials and the secretariat of the vice- royalties ought to study and know. But how can they master it when all their labors are, as I have just said, arduous, crude and tedious f They draw up the first accurate copy as I pointed out in par. 25. They repeat the same labor in the register book (there is a tedious number of them) relating to this matter, and they make a separate copy which they take to each magistrate for him to state and sign: "received the expedients, marked so and so, No. so and so, Folio so and so," and in the same manner the oficial de la mesa writes: ' ' reprinted on such a day, and returned on such a day." The preparation of these abstracts is prolonged as a result of the in- volved procedure of the expedients; if they require at any stage of their preparation, orders from the king, or viceroy (ardent* snperwres) there are inserted, copied or abridged (sometimes badly) the petitions or de- cisions of the magistrates, and if finally the report is made, to the king, the same labor is repeated in the accompanying testimony, which at times obscures essential points or confuses everything by stupidly ordered clauses and conditions. As a result, the secretaries and ministers of state become disgusted and are obliged to ask for a better abstract of testi- mony, which makes a new operation necessary, postpones royal decisions or suspends them because of the obscurities of the expedientes and of the letters themselves, which are apt to end without any enlightening suggestions.!** So varied were the duties of the viceroy as governor that it seems fntile to attempt any resume of them. There was scarcely " Bevilla Gigedo to Valdez, Jan. 11, 1790. 192 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 a governmental function in the realm of civil affairs that was not in a measure dependent on him at some stage of its operation. Though some of the viceroys complained of the diminution of authority which their office had suffered in its later years, it is hard to see what more could be thrust upon their time and atten- tion. They still had extensive judicial powers in spite of the encroachments of the audiencia, and the number of executive acts which every governor had to perform in a single year was so large that it is not believable that they could all receive due consideration. Of course, the governor of Mexico, who was also the viceroy, was by far the hardest worked of them all and an entirely different set of conditions was presented to the pro- vincial governors. The governor of California, for instance, though a little potentate in his distant territory, had very simple problems to deal with compared to the governor of a populous district with a large city in addition. From the cor- respondence between the governors of California and the viceroys it is clear that the former had only petty difficulties to cope with in comparison with the latter. The governors nearly all dis- appeared after the decree of the intendants was put into effect, but the viceroy was not greatly relieved by the change. The intendency of Mexico was placed under his charge and he ful- filled the same civil duties under a new name. Smith : The Viceroy of Xetc Spain 193 CHAPTER IV THE VICEROY AS CAPTAIN-OENERAL Toward the dose of the period of the Spanish rule, all Spanish America was divided into a number of territorial units ruled over by an .officer called the captain-general, or by a viceroy whose chief source of authority lay in his power as a captain- general. 1 The attributes of this office were those which gave it a peculiarly Spanish character., and it is perhaps not too much to say that it was the most characteristic of all the positions of trust and profit in Spam's system of colonial administration. Other nations hare had their viceroys and other officials who had their Spanish counterparts in the various subordinate ranks, but the captain-general was so distinctly an Iberian institution that the title would seem out of place in an IfrigKsh, French, or Dutch colony. From Chile and the extreme south to Mexico and Cuba on the north, the whole of Spanish America was divided, not into vieeroyalties or provinces, but captaincies-general, and the rulers of these districts had the all-important duty of Tnaiiitam- ing the authority of the Spanish crown by the ultimate logic of military force. From some points of view it was a purely inci- dental matter whether or not certain of these captains-general were further dignified by the title of viceroy. It was the military command, the imperimm. that in the last analysis held down the subject native population, preserved order among the Spaniards The office of captain-general, like practically all other titles, etrO, eedeEiastieal, found in the MAts^ was li Bi>l>"tfi ifcitw^ from. Spain, and the two officers originally had the sane duties attached to them whether in Europe or America. As a strictly military office the grade of captain-general was, in the words of Desdevises du Dezert. the highest in the whole military hierarchy aad the military governors of the most important provinces in Spain took that title, by courtesy as it were, whatever their real rank may have been. The following Spanish prov- inces had captains-general in 1800: Aragom, Qrfy *?-*, Valencia, Majorca, Granada, Amhhnw, Kstremadura, Old Castile, and Gafiria. See Desdevim dn Dezert, ii, 133-134. 194 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 themselves, and defended those most tempting regions from the foreign enemy. It is not difficult to see how the viceroy of New Spain derived most of his importance from the fact that he was captain- general, as well as being governor and head of the ecclesiastical establishment as vice-patron. In the sixteenth century it was scarcely possible to make any distinction whatever between the early conquerors and those who succeeded them as the normal chiefs of the army under another title. From the very beginning the military aspect of things was pre-eminent in the Spanish colonies. After the first conquests were Completed and the work of Cortes, Pizarro, Almagro, and Valdivia was over, there suc- ceeded a period of turbulence which required the presence of a soldier in authority. After the Spaniards were once definitely in the saddle and the period of danger from buccaneers had been weathered, the combination of military traditions with the constant fear of the English and Dutch prevented the evolution in America of the essentially civilian, or English, type of vice- roy. As Villarroel said, the military functions of the viceroy were from the beginning the most important, and he might have added that this primordial condition was never outgrown. No more striking contrast between the Spanish and English ways of governing dependencies could be offered than in the divergent development of the chief executive office in the colonies of these two peoples in America. On the eve of Spanish- American independence the captain-general as the representative of the military side of the administration was, if anything, gaining at the expense of the governor and his civil functions; that is, the viceroy was becoming more and more exclusively a military ruler. 2 In direct opposition to this was quite another tendency observ- 2 Greene, pp. 188-192. The account given in these four pages of the encroachments of the American provincial assemblies on the miltiary powers of the governor is brief, but clear and trustworthy. I am not aware of anything analogous for Spanish America. An examination of the instrucciones of the Spanish viceroys and a comparison of the earliest ones with the latest, would show a striking growth in the amount of space devoted to the department of the captain-general. For example, compare the instruction of Antonio de Mendoza, circa 1544, with that of Marquina, 1803. Smith: Tke Viceroy of New Spain 195 able in the evolution of the English provincial governor. As a result of the steady encroachments of the provincial assemblies upon the powers of the royal governors, even the control over the colonial forces was taken from them, at least in a very large measure, so that the legislative committees and other agents of the assemblies took the actual direction of the forces against the Indians, becoming responsible at times even for the discipline of the troops. Thus it was that a governor of Virginia in the middle of the eighteenth century had practically lost all semb- lance of a military character, while Governor Dinwiddie's con- temporary. Revilla Gigedo, the Elder, was primarily a captain- general and afterwards a governor. These facts explain the con- dition referred to in chapter i, namely, that only military men and, as it turned out in most cases, those woefully deficient in experience or natural aptitude for civil administration., could aspire to the head of a viceroyalty, while in the English colonies the chances of a mere soldier for the governor's post were in- creasingly slight. Another evidence of the importance of the viceroy's position as captain-general may be inferred correctly from the controversy in regard to the succession to these duties when a viceroy died without a pliego de providencia. There could be no difficulty in allowing the audiencia to take over the duties of the governor as well as those of the vice-patron when the viceregal office was vacated, but such a post as that of commander-in-chief could not be turned over lightly to a cumbersome body of inex- perienced civilians. It was with the utmost concern that Kevilla Gigedo, in 1789, contested this whole question along with that of the military honors to the archbishop, fairly importuning the crown to allow a military officer to have control of the troops while the audiencia had charge of all other matters during the ad interim government.' Certain aspects of this question were > Bevilla Gigedo, art. 516-522. From these articles it is easy to per- ceive what peculiar importance the viceroy attached to his military office. He would hare much preferred to have the command of the troops fall upon the subinspector-general or the commandant of Tera Cruz than upon th? avdifncia. Bevilla Gigedo to Yaldez, Jan. 8, 1790. 196 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l discussed in chapter n, illustrating the way the king interfered in the affairs of the viceroyalty, but it is again mentioned here as throwing light upon the relative importance of the civil and military authority in Mexico. The viceroy was particularly op- posed to any diminution of what he regarded as his "funcion primitiva, " and that explains his energetic expression of the views regarding the succession to his command. In the opinion of one of the ablest of viceroys, 4 by the last decade of the eighteenth century the powers which belonged to him as captain-general were not only more distinctive, but more important than those which he possessed as governor, as vice- patron, or as superintendent-general of the real hacienda. In the language of the Instruccion Reservada, they were "of an order much superior and much more extensive than any other.'" 5 It was claimed, furthermore, and this is an interesting argument for centralization, that this greater authority had led to a much more efficient administration. Though it would have been better if the military department of Yucatan 6 had been directly under the control of the viceroy, as were the departments of justice and hacienda, yet there had been such a centralization of power in the hands of the captain-general that he had been able to administer the ramo militar much more successfully than the other branches. According to Revilla Gigedo, "That authority which is commonly believed to reside in the viceroy, to enable him to secure peace and good order in these dominions, would have produced much better results if it had extended to all branches of the government as well as the military, and this is proved by the amount of progress and reform in the time of my command in the army and in the great economies secured in the reforms of the militia, in contrast with the slight progress secured in the administration of justice and the political side of the government." 7 * Eevilla Gigedo, art. 512-513. s Ibid., art. 512. e Ibid., art- 513. ''Ibid., art. 514. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 197 It is not easy to make clear the military administration of New Spain. There did not exist a minister or secretary of war, nor indeed a war department, in any modern sense. There was, of course, no Mexican legislature to provide for the necessary revenue and for the enlistment and provisioning of the troops. All legislation dealing with such matters emanated from Spain, as did that for every other department of the government. There was a certain simplicity in this arrangement, but in the matter of the administration of these laws there are all but insuperable difficulties to our understanding of it. The viceroy as captain-general was, of course, the Command- er-in-chief and also in some respects the civil head of the army, though by no means a regular secretary of war. In time of war he was assisted by a council of military men, consejo supremo de guerra, something akin to an American board of strategy. In times of peace and under normal conditions, the troops stationed outside the province of Mexico were taken care of by the intend- ants 8 and those inside this province were under the eye of the captain-general and under his direct control. There was no regularly organized general staff to assist him, though he had a few aides and orderlies, and a few officers at large which he might summon for advice, and if he chose, send on special missions anywhere in the vieeroyalty. It was the intention of the crown to keep eight engineer officers, oficitdes de ingenieros, in New Spain, but the Viceroy Marquina complained, in 1803, that only four were actually available. 9 These were employed on miscellaneous duties but could be regarded as a part of the viceroy's staff. The first assistant to the captain-general and the highest officer who devoted himself exclusively to military affairs, was the subinspector-generaV an appointee of the crown and in * The duties of the intendanto will be discussed in considerable detail in a later chapter. Marquina, art. 158. i Bevilla Gigedo, art. 515. Here the viceroy argues that, in spite of the excellent service of his subinspeetor, the office ought to be filled in the future by one of the lieutenants of the king, who ought to be ap- pointed in Mexico. ]98 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 some ways a check upon his nominal superior in Mexico. His title, subinspector, implied that he was a subordinate of the inspector-general in Spain, 11 but he seemed to have worked in harmony with the viceroys and without such conflicts as the latter had with the audiencia. At any rate, in the various vice- regal instructions it is made apparent that many of the sugges- tions for reform in the military institutions of New Spain came from the subinspector-generals and that the responsibility for carrying out such reforms was generally committed to them also. General Francisco Crespo prepared a complete scheme for the reorganization of the military forces of the viceroyalty, and this was accepted by the crown October 20, 1788, not indeed in toto, but with rather unimportant modifications. A few years before this, during the rule of Viceroy Cruillas, when a number of military reforms were put through, it was another subinspector, General Villalba, who was sent over to superintend them. These facts are mentioned in this connection to show the importance of the subinspector, who was the nearest approach to a chief of staff that the viceroy had. After the dispute between Villalba and Cruillas had been settled in favor of the latter and it was definitely settled that the subinspector was after all directly sub- ordinate to the viceroy, it was evident that the Spaniards really took an intermediate position on the general question of the degree of control over the military which should be con- ceded to the colonial authorities. King Charles III did not allow the subinspector-generalship to become such an office as 11 There seemed to have been some difference of opinion among the vice- roys themselves regarding the advantages to be derived from having a special officer for the post of subinspeetor-general. For the sake of economy the younger Eevilla Gigedo recommended that the duties of this office be given to one of the generals in the Mexican service and this suggestion was apparently acted upon, for Marquina is found arguing for the re- establishment of the office in 1803. "I have given an idea of my un- alterable opinion, previously, regarding the importance of having a sub- inspector-general for this kingdom. I gave this opinion in a letter to the King of July 27, 1800, to which reply was made, November 28, that it was not necessary, because the comandancias de brigada had been created." Marquina still persisted in his demands for an inspector, but he was relieved of his position before anything was done. Revilla Gigedo, art. 515, and Marquina, art. 285-287. i * I Smith : The Viceroy of Xew Spain 199 is now held by the commander-in-c-hief in India, nor did he send over generals from Spain to monopolize the command of the troops as the English government did in North America. 12 On the other hand, the military powers of the captain-general were not quite as absolute as those of the French viceroys in Canada. The organization of the Spanish forces in Mexico reached practically a complete form at the end of the eighteenth century, during the rule of Viceroys Agmza. and Marquina. Before the middle of the eighteenth century there was scarcely any organization worth mentioning, so small was the armed force maintained in New Spain, consisting of only a few companies of militia and even fewer regulars. The early Spanish con- querors were not really regulars at all. but only bands of adven- turers led by some captains with very indefinite commissions from the king. During the seventeenth century but few soldiers were necessary to hold down the native population, therefore the bulk of the disciplined troops were stationed at the coast towns to keep off the buccaneers. The inroads made during the seven- teenth century upon Spain's American dominions did not lead to any notable increase in the army of New Spain. The pres- ence of the English in Jamaica and of the Dutch in Curacao was disturbing enough in its way, but did not call for a great i* On the face of it, it would seem as though the abolition of the office of subinspeetor would have considerably increased the power of the captain-general by removing a possible rival. Marquina, however, pos- sibly because he was a naval officer and therefore felt more keenly the need of a powerful military chief of staff, could not approve of the alternative scheme then in force- "De eontado no me detengo en asegnrar que mal podran los diez eomandantes de brigada snplir la f alta de snbinspeetor, aim cuando ejerzan sns funeiones, si se atiende solo a la drficultad, 6 mas bien, imposibilidad que debe haber para que tantos gefes coneuerden en el modo pensar; j esto siempre pondra al Yirey en la perplejidad que es eonsigniente a la variedad de opiniones de sugetos situados a mneha distaneia entre at, resultando mi nuevo y ertraordinario trabajo para la combination de los pensamientos, 7 para diseernir despnes 7 deddine par el mejor 7 mis acertado; 7 aun eoando se quisiese no hacer easo de esta reflexion, no puede prescinduse de que los Cnerpos veteranos no reeonoeen en el dia otro inspector que al Yirey, j de que no habra quien en sn interior se lisonjee de poder llenar a un tiempo ambos eneargos eon la propiedad y exactitud que exigen. V. E. vera cuando guste lo que he representado. j sobre todo toeara en breve la reaUdad y fundamento de mis reflexiones." Marquina, art. 287. 200 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 increase of the land forces in the Spanish colonies. The struggle of the maritime powers, France and England, in the next cen- tury, with the overwhelming victory of the latter, made a change for the worse as far as Spain was concerned, and the building up of a British colonial empire bordering on Florida and the West Indies presented a new and dangerous problem. After the experiences of the Seven Years' War, Spain realized the possibilities of serious trouble from the English, who had taken Manila and Havana in 1762, and had generally terrorized the Spanish-American coasts. Accordingly, in 1768, several regi- ments were sent over from Spain for the defense of Mexico and the West Indies. It was at this time that the office of sub- inspector was given additional importance and was conferred upon the Marques de Bubi. During the next few years these seven Spanish regiments were sent back home; nevertheless, from this time till the end of the Spanish rule the viceregal government retained a more decided military character. 13 It was, then, the danger of foreign war and aggressions from the English in particular, that gave a new prominence to the office of captain-general between the years 1760 and 1810. Before examining the actual composition of the army of New Spain at the close of the reign of Charles III, it must be made clear that the crown never attempted to maintain regularly a standing army of royal troops in Mexico, as most European nations did in their colonies and as the English still do in India. The military forces of New Spain were, with the exception of a few officers, recruited in the country and their maintenance was charged against the Mexican treasury. From a military point of view the viceroyalty was intended to be self-supporting, though in case of war or emergency aid from Europe could of course be counted upon. It could never be asserted by the Span- iards that their colonies had been a drain on their military re- sources in any serious way, and it was not till the war of inde- 13 Bancroft, History of Mexico, iii, 405. The British establishments in Honduras were a constant source of anxiety to Spain. Branciforte to Paz, May 31, 1797. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 201 pendenee that there was any occasion for the transportation of troops to America on a large scale, except for the regiments referred to above. "With the exception of the very unusual appearance of Euro- pean regiments in New Spain in time of war and of a compara- tively small number of officers taken from the regular home army for the colonial service, the white men in the Mexican army were Creoles. It was the policy of the crown to limit the total number of effective forces in New Spain, but to encourage the enlistment of recruits of all the different colors represented in the Mexican population. Besides the organizations composed exclusively of whites, there were some made up partly of whites and partly of mestizos; there were companies made up of mestizos alone, with white officers; and there were even several companies of black freedmen, both among the regulars and the militia. Whether the racially miscellaneous character of the Mexican army was due to a desire on the part of the home government not to have it too closely united by an .fespf# de" corps, or to the necessity merely of employing^ in the army anybody who could be induced to enhst, is not clear, but there is ample evidence that the Madrid government was extremely jealous of the provincial troops. Their numbers were not allowed to reach large proportions at any time, though that cannot be charged to opposition from Spain so much as to the inability to get sufficient funds. 14 Viceroy Branciforte was undoubtedly in favor of a larger force in his territory but, as he complains, 15 he was obliged during the two years and eight months of his rule to send away in subsidies on the king's account thirty-two millions of pesos. Such a sum of money as this implied that little or nothing could be done in the way of a comprehensive reorganization of the troops on a peace footing. He even went so far as to state that he did not Bancroft, History of Mexico, iii, 407, note 17. is Braneif orte, art. 23. ' ' Es constante que en los doe afios y poeo mas de ocho meses de mi gobierno en estos dominios, ban salido de ellos, por Veracruz y Acapulco. para Europa. Asia, islas de Barlovento, Loisiana, Florida y pro vine ia de Yucatan, treinte y dos millones de pesos por quenta del Key." 202 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l have enough men under his command to put down popular tumults in a country so large as the one he was called upon to rule over. 16 The various authorities seem unable to agree upon the num- ber of troops actually with the colors. 17 It is possible that no one knew how many there were, though Bancroft claims to know that there were only 4700 regulars between 1789 and 1794. 18 Yet Revilla Gigedo in his instructions to Branciforte claimed that there were more than twice as many. In 1789 the whole army exclusive of the militia and irregulars amounted on paper to about 5600 men. 19 Another authority, cited by Bancroft in a footnote, declared that the total force of all arms, and of all grades of dis- cipline and effectiveness, amounted to over 29,600 men. 20 Within these wide fluctuations there is little use of attempting to fix any definite figures, but it is obvious enough that the whole military establishment was on a small scale compared with the population and even the wealth of the country. The isolation and natural position of Mexico were its chief defences, as at that time its land frontiers were still too far from the English-speaking peoples to the northeast, and its seacoast was so unhealthful as to dis- courage an invasion from that direction. In 1789 the regular army was composed of the following units: four regiments of infantry; two companies called the i Branciforte, art. 13. "... cuando reducidas a la menor expresion las fuerzas de este ej^rcito, no eran suficientes para eontener alborotos populares en un reino tan vasto coino el de Nueva Espana. " IT In the correspondence of Branciforte with his successor, Azanza, is found a document giving in tabular form the composition of the army of New Spain in the spring of 1798. The total force amounted to 31,594 men, distributed as follows: 25,502 in the Army of Occupation; 5,504 in cantonments; 4,816 in garrison; 2,120 at posts not fortified; and 20,819 in the provinces and at home. As some of these figures are mutually in- clusive they are very confusing, but two facts may be gleaned from them. The first is that the total armed force of the country was 31,594; and the other, that the field army numbered 25,502. is Bancroft, History of Mexco, iii, 407. i Eevilla Gigedo, art. 565. ' ' Cotejada la f uerza que debia tener este ejercito de tropa veterana, cuando yo entre en el mando, con el que debe tener en el dia, resulta un aumento de quinientas noventa y siete plazas ef ectivas, pues entonces era su total f uerza de cinco mil seiscientas tres. ' ' 20 Bancroft, History of Mexico, iii, 414, note 35. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 203 Volunteers of Catalonia; and three fixed companies, stationed at Acapulco. San Bias, and the Presidio del Carmen; two com- panies of artillery of a hundred and twenty-five men each; two regiments of dragoons; and two troops, also of dragoons, sta- tioned at the Presidio del Carmen.* 1 One of the regiments was scarcely more than a cadre, and none of the organizations had the full complement of men. As it was hard on any body of troops to be stationed long at such places as Vera Cruz and Acapulco, on account of the climate and the generally unhealthful conditions, therefore it was proposed, in November, 1789, to create another company of artillery. This one was designed to relieve the other two by turns at the unhealthful posts and also to act as a sort of extra force, in cases of emergency. All this was approved by the crown and soon went into effect, along with a number of other minor changes necessitated by the outbreak of war. Among these changes was the sending of a couple of the regiments of infantry to Havana. 22 To make up for the lost services of these regiments, a "fixed." or garrison company, compama fija, was raised for the fortress and city of Vera Cruz, and more atten- tion began to be bestowed upon the various means of making the militia more numerous and efficient. It is needless to say that with a regular army no larger than the one described above and so widely scattered over a large area, it was impossible to have any further organization into larger units. A regiment in the Spanish army was, as elsewhere in Europe, the administrative unit. The new system of grouping together regiments into brigades and brigades into divisions, with two or more divisions united to form an army corps, was not yet (circa, 1794) the practice in Europe; consequently such a thing was not to be thought of with the meager forces in New Spain. Before the century was over, the whole vieeroyalty was divided into ten divisions or departments, each commanded by a briga- 21 Bevilla Gigedo, art. 542. "Ibid., art. 561. "The same circumstances [the outbreak of war] required the dispatching, first of the regiment of Xueva Espafia and afterwards that of Mexico to Havana, and in consequence of that, the creation of the new bataJlo* fi jo of Vera Cruz." 204 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 dier, comandante de brigada, each brigadier acting as inspector- general in his own circumscription, but this was as far as any higher organization of the troops went. 23 The amount of care given by the home government and the viceroys to the organization of the militia would seem to indicate that in the absence of a large standing army this reserve must be the ultimate dependence in case of war. To be sure, it had not yet attained to a very high degree of efficiency by the end of the eighteenth century, and Revilla Gigedo went so far as to say that in ease of serious foreign invasion veteran Spanish troops would be necessary to defend the country. Nevertheless, the reorganization of the reserve force was pushed vigorously and the more important of the viceregal instructions are full of plans and comments on the various schemes. It need surprise no one that an officer trained in the regular Spanish army should have held slightly contemptuous views of the colonial militia. The English generals, before and after Braddock, were not entirely enthusiastic over the colonials they sometimes had to command, even on campaigns against the Indians, where the militia and volunteers appeared to the best advantage, and a similar pre- judice was to be expected among the captains-general w r ith regard to their non-regular soldiers. However, after making all allow- ance for bias in our historical sources, the records must be under- stood to condemn the Mexican militia as untrained and ill- equipped. It would seem impossible to devise a plan of military organ- ization which should be quite as difficult to understand as the organization of the Mexican militia described in the various in- structions of the viceroys. The following statement is an attempt to disentangle the main facts from the confused accounts in as Marquina, art. 257. The real meaning of the Spanish word brigada must not be confused with our brigade. Like their word compania, which is not the English company, brigada was used in the general sense of organization or unit, and apparently did not mean a body of troops of a definite number. The following use of the word in the instruction to Branciforte illustrates my point: "... pero como siempre hay alii una brigada 6 destacamento de artilleria, que es de 28 hombres ..." Revilla Gigedo, art. 554. Also Revilla Gigedo to Conde del Campo de Allange, August 2, 1791. Smith : The Viceroy of New Spain 205 the primary material, and the starting point must be that plan submitted by sobinspeetor Crespo. in 1778. This plan called for four complete regiments of infantry, four separate batallions, two corps of grenadiers and light infantry, gramadores y caza- dort$. all of which were to be Caucasians; two batallions of col- ored troops, and fifty companies of coast guards. There were also to be one hundred and thirty-four companies scattered through the interior provinces. Then there were six complete regiments of cavalry, a squadron of lancers at Vera Cruz, and a regiment of infantry, called the city commercial regiment, and another squadron of cavalry for the City of Mexico. This whole force was to number 35.613 men and was to be maintained at an annual charge of a little over three hundred thousand pesos. 24 Each of the regiments was to have a colonel, two lieuten- ant-colonels, one commandant, twelve sergeant-majors, four com- manders of divisions and brigades, two subinspeetors of colored troops, thirty-nine adjutants, and sixty lieutenants, a total of one hundred and twenty-two commissioned officers and more than four hundred sergeants, corporals, musicians, and others. These officers were, of course, to be veterans, and it was expected that this reorganization would result in a great gain in efficiency. However, the objection to it was that it would be too expensive. 25 and on the recommendation of the younger Bevilla Gigedo a modi- fication of Crespo *s scheme, which will be explained presently, was adopted. The adoption of this modification resulted in a saving to the treasury of nearly two hundred and forty thousand pesos, but this was obtained only at a reduction of the total force from about thirty-five thousand to about twenty thousand men. In the opinion of the viceroy it was not possible to raise a larger force without too great a drain upon the country, and furthermore, he did not believe that it would be possible to use 24 Revilla Gigedo, art. 661. See also Humboldt, voL 1, book ii, chap. 14. for a discussion of the Mexican militi* Ibid., art. 662. Besides the cost involved IB the Crespo scheme, there was the further objection that it would draw too many men from peaceful occupations and furnish more militia than the captain-general would know what to do with. This was discovered by a census, or podnm, one of the innovations of Bevilla Gigedo. 206 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 more than a certain number of militia anyway. If a serious danger came, he believed that the main reliance must be placed upon the regular forces and regiments from Europe, and that the militia would be useful only when they were not permitted to constitute more than a certain proportion of all the national forces. 26 In other words, he did not think it good policy to spend large sums of money on an indefinite expansion of the native forces. Branciforte, though holding no very high opinion of the militia, inclined to the view that the peace footing as established by Revilla Gigedo was not on a generous scale. 27 The modified plan which was finally adopted left the militia forces divided into the main groups the description of which follows. To simplify the matter a classification of these troops will be given along lines slightly different from what is usually found in the documents. What may be called group number one, was composed of the poorest troops in the viceroyalty, namely, the various separate companies, companias sueltas, assigned to guarding the coasts. The second group was composed of the provincial militia distributed throughout the interior districts. The third group was made up of what might be called the " crack" organizations of the country, those organ- izations stationed in the important cities, such as Mexico, Puebla, and Vera Cruz. The most vulnerable point of New Spain, the part most ex- posed to foreign attacks when practically the only enemy was the maritime power of Great Britain, was the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. In the early days this part of the country had been liable to attacks from buccaneers, and it was now recognized that in spite of the heat and fever along the coast, an English invasion 2 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 663. "... pues en un caso de guerra, se necesita siempre eontar conque vengan regimientos europeas y eon la tropa veterana, y solo seran utiles las milicias, teniendo con ellas la debida proporcion. " 27 Branciforte, art. 13. Though there had been no serious uprising of the natives in New Spain, it is not unlikely that Branciforte was affected somewhat by what he knew of the civil war in the Peninsula, which occurred about ten years before. The revolt of Tupac Amaru took place in 1781, and taxed the resources of the viceroy of Peru to the uttermost 1913] Smith: Tke Viceroy of New Spain 207 must be prepared against- Every plan for organizing the militia had taken this into consideration, and the wars of the French Bevolution had made such precautions particularly necessary. Tn the spring and summer of 1793 the following steps were taken to put the Gulf coast in a suitable posture for defense : The coast on both sides of Vera Cruz was divided into four districts, the southernmost reaching to the province of Tabasco and the northernmost reaching to the river Panuco and the city of Tampieo. Throughout this region the old-fashioned militia companies were reorganized, some being suppressed and others being augmented, while all were put in shape for the approach- ing war. Out of the thirty-two original companies, some of them mostly on paper, twenty-two new ones were created with a total effective force of over twenty-two hundred men. 2 * These new companies were composed of both infantry and lancers, and were divided among the four divisions. Skilled veteran officers of the rank of captain were placed at the head of three divisions to take the place of the "comandantes accidentales," men of little in- telligence and inept in everything. Although the southern and western coasts of Mexico were not exposed to the same dangers of invasion as those on the north and east, they could not be left without some provision for their def ense. 2 * It was decided to take such measures in regard to them as would prepare the Spaniards for all eventualities. Special commissioners were sent to examine all the harbors, bays, and places suitable for anchorage, and to report to the viceroy what they thought should be done. The great number of antiquated militia organizations (there were eighty-three different com- panies making claims to existence), were reduced in numbers M Bevilla Gigedo, art. 605. The total number of the militi* in these four divisions, as stated above in the text, is given on the authority of the Yieeroy Bevilla Gigedo. There is some discrepancy in his estimates for the total number of troops in the vieeroyafty when compared with those of Brancif orte. In such eases I am not able to say which is the more reliable, as both were doubt leas tempted to distort the facts slightly, the outgoing viceroy to exaggerate the number of troops he turned over to his suc- cessor and the latter to underestimate their number. Bevilla Gigedo, art. 616. 208 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l and reorganized, leaving out the Indians using bows and arrows, but there still remained companies with few more than twenty- five men. 30 According to this new arrangement five divisions were pro- vided for, similar to the four divisions on the Gulf coast. The first was composed of eight companies of non-white soldiers and one company of Spaniards, and its district was the coast south of Mazatlan and southwest of Zacatecas. There were six hun- dred and eighty men in this division with a captain for its com- mander. 31 The second division, stationed just south of the first, along the coast to the southwest of Guadalajara, had eleven com- panies of infantry and lancers, non-white, and t\vo troops of Spanish cavalry, with a total number of eleven hundred and forty men. The headquarters of this division were at Colima. 32 The third division was that of Acapulco, commanded by the commandant of that place, and composed of three companies of pardos, three hundred in number. 33 The fourth and fifth div- isions were similarly organized and were placed so as to defend the coast between Acapulco and Tehuantepec. To facilitate communications between these various head- quarters and to observe the first approach of an enemy, twelve lookout stations were scattered along between the divisions. This entire force numbered over thirty-five hundred men, and though its effectiveness was never put to a test by an invader, its pres- ence gave a sense of security to the whole Pacific coast region. 34 The second group into which it is convenient to divide the whole Mexican militia was made up of divers organizations not included in those just mentioned, nor among those stationed in the large cities. Throughout the interior of the viceroyalty there were lists drawn up of all persons qualified to serve, according to the ratio of one soldier to every fifteen families of pure blood. so Eevilla Gigeda, art. 617. si Ibid., art. 618. 32/Znd., art. 619. 33/&id., art. 620. id., art. 621-622. '- ' SmUk: Tke Viceroy of Xetc Spain 209 casta limpia. 3 * The companies thus enlisted were gronped so as to form sixteen divisions throughout the whole country. These divisions were not of equal size, numerically, but depended on the extent of the various districts and the density of the popula- tion. 38 There would be no advantage in describing each one of these various divisions, or even locating the separate districts on the map; therefore one will be taken as typical of all This first division comprised the districts to the south of a line drawn between Puebla and Vera Cruz, and was composed of nine com- panies with a total force of seven hundred men. 17 Many of these divisions had only three or four companies with three or four hundred men. and to believe that any of them attained to a very high degree of efficiency would require an exercise of faith. 38 The third group in the division of the Mexican militia was undoubtedly composed of the best troops of the country, and many of the organizations had an interesting and separate his- tory. The city of Guanajuato had a battalion of infantry made up of one company of grenadiers and four companies of fusiliers with an extra company, or troop, of cavalry. 3 * This force was employed not only as the garrison of the city but also as a sort of police for the surrounding country. In the city of Puebla was a company made up exclusively of bakers, butchers, and tanners, the mounts being furnished by those guilds and the other equip- ment by the government. In the same city was also a regtmiento del comercio, founded in 1742. and organized in imitation of the similar but more famous regiment of the capital city. This regiment had only four companies, with two hundred and twenty- is Bevilla Gigedo, art art. 629. art. 630. Braneif orte, art. 47. "The uniforms and mounts have been fur- nished completely and of good quality; but the fire-arms and swords had bee* supplied provisionally from tke old collections which were in the royal armories, with the obligation of famishing new ones when they arrived from Spain . . . . " Bevilla Gigedo, art. 627. 210 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l eight men, but it had all the attachments for parade and cere- mony, each company having six grenadiers to act as color es- cort. 40 The most famous of all the militia units was the Regimiento Urbano del Comercio de Mexico, dating from the seventeenth cen- tury. 41 It was customary for every organization to have its own constitution, but this regiment did not receive its arreglo until the fall of 1793. In 1790 the subinspector-general reviewed this regiment and the next year reported to the viceroy that it had six hundred and eight men distributed among two companies of grenadiers and eight companies of fusiliers, the companies being of unequal size. The grenadier companies were evidently the corps d' elite and were made up of men of wealth and social position, "the best men of New Spain," according to Viceroy Branciforte, writing in 1797. 42 The fusiliers, however, were evi- dently a sorry lot. They were almost all mercenaries, very unprepossessing, both as regards color and physique. Had it not been for the fairly good appearance of the grenadiers, the review might have passed as a ridiculous military farce, "por una farsa militar ridicula." After the review the subinspector gave the regiment a good overhauling, removing among other things the abuse of allowing a member of the consulado to hire a mercenary to act as his substitute in the regiment, while he, the merchant, enjoyed the fuero militar, with all the exemptions which that implied. 43 This account of the Mexican militia, though it may seem suf- ficiently long-drawn-out already, is only a general sketch which leaves out a great many separate organizations and even classes 40 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 614. 41 Ibid., art. 610, 611, 612, et seq. Later on the consulado of Mexico asked to be relieved of the duty of keeping up this regiment. The regi- ment contained over a thousand men in September, 1793. An earlier reference to this matter is found in the letter of Matias Galvez to Jose Galvez, Nov. 30, 1782. 42 Branciforte, art. 40. 48 It was finally decided by the crown that the privileges of the fuero militar could be enjoyed by persons in the militia only when they were actually serving with the colors. Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 211 of organizations. The authorities speak of various mixed com- panies, black companies, and companies of varying shades of color, to say nothing of the different kinds of equipment and maintenance. The military organization of the interior prov- inces, which meant the districts along the northern land frontier exposed to the attacks of Indians, was separate from that of the rest of the viceroyalty.** The comandante general of the Prov- incias Internas was independent of the viceroy in strictly military affairs, but there was a general tendency to abandon the different special corps on the other Indian frontiers. 45 All the infantry companies in the district of Colotlan were given up and only a few dragoons remained in their stead. For a long while there had been no little controversy over the utility of the militia along the Sierra Gorda ; though they were not all entirely abandoned, they were reduced in numbers and those corps which had acted as a special frontier police were withdrawn. 4 * The distribution of all the troops mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs can, of course, be considered only in connection with the purposes which they were designed to filL The forces in the Provincias Internas and along the land frontiers were pri- marily for defence against the natives, while the various urban regiments and companies and the various organizations scat- tered throughout the settled parts of the interior, 47 (the two classes forming the great majority of the militia) were to pre- serve internal order and to act as a reserve in case of foreign invasion. The troops which were specifically designed to repel, if possible, foreign invasion, were placed in certain fortresses commanding the means of ingress into the country. Kevilla Gigedo, ait 719 et *eq. The question of the administration of the Provineeaa Internas was a very delicate one for the viceroys. Bet-ilia Gigedo bitterly resented the independence of these northern frontier states and he argued at great length against their separation from the rest of the viceroyalty. The constant dangers from the warlike Tndiam* in those regions seemed to require the attention of a military man on the spot and so the crown decided against the viceroy. Marquina, art. 290. * Brancif orte, art. 35. This viceroy was disposed to keep up with the militia forces that were stationed along the Sierra Gorda and Colotlan. Ibid., art 38. Also Brancif orte to Alvarez, June 30, 1797. 212 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 Foremost among these fortified places were Vera Cruz at the eastern gateway of New Spain, and Acapulco at the western, with an interior fortress at Perote to serve as a rallying place between Mexico City and the Gulf in case Vera Cruz were cap- tured. The fortress of Vera Cruz really consisted of two dis- tinct places, but as both were close together and commanded the eastern terminus of the Mexieo-Vera Cruz highway, they may be considered together. The first, on a small island lying right before the harbor of Vera Cruz, was the well known castle of San Juan de Ulua. In the year 1789 it was defended by two hundred and thirty-six pieces of artillery. Some of these were out of order, so that the total number of cannon of all calibers, together with the mortars, was something like three hundred pieces. 48 About this time it was the opinion of the commandant that a great many of these were only of moderate utility and that practically all the brass cannon, though in a good enough state of preservation, were of such an old make as to be of very little use. 49 The city of Vera Cruz proper had very little in the way of fortifications, 50 but its chief defence was always its abomin- able climate. 51 Moreover, as Vera Cruz was the only real harbor on the Gulf coast, and even that was exposed to strong north winds at certain seasons, it was the opinion of the viceroy in 1794 that it would be a very difficult thing for a hostile squadron to remain long in that neighborhood. 52 On the south coast, according to the same authority, there was no danger of inva- sion because there was no nation within striking distance strong enough to undertake a regular expedition; and it was hardly conceivable that any of the European powers would send a large expeditionary force around Cape Horn because of any possible 48 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 695. 49 Ibid., art. 696. oo Marquina, art. 173. "La primera [Vera Cruz] se guarnece con la tropa veterana de este ejercito, y es capaz de muy poca defensa: San Juan de Ulua no promote tampoco mucho si los enimigos le cortan los socorros; y su guarnicion se suministra de la de Veracruz." 51 Ibid., art. 213. " .... porque el mal temperamento y la temible enfermedad que alll domina con dolorosos estragos en estos ultimos tiempos, hace los mas prontos y crueles efectos en todos los forasteros . . . ." 02 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 728. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 213 advantage of attacking Mexico by way of Acapuleo. The diifi- culties 'of transportation, the lack of provisions and particularly of water, practically forbade any attempt to invade the vice- royalty by way of Texas, so that the only real point of danger was from a landing at Yera Cruz.** Consequently all efforts of defense were concentrated along the line of the highway leading from Mexico to the Gulf coast and that was what gave the port of Perote its strategic significance.* 4 The fortress itself was not intended as a place capable of withstanding a regular siege, and little or no attempt was made to make of it a fortress of the first class. Its great value lay in that it could be made a safe place to collect military stores as well as a base from which to succor Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulna.* 5 Moreover the superior climate of Perote and its environs made it especially favorable as a point around which to mobilize troops intended to operate in the neighborhood of Vera Cruz. This same advantage was possessed by the town of Jalapa which lay directly northwest of Yera Cruz, and it was immediately thought of as a place for extensive barracks when the news of the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution reached Mexico. 54 "With the nature of this country in mind, it was believed by Revilla Gigedo that with the help of two or three regiments from Spain there would be little to fear from invasions in this direction." The fortress commanding the best harbor on the Pacific coast of Mexico and the one which was used in the Philippine trade, was officially called San Diego de Acapuleo. This was in some ways the most modern of the fortified places in the country and with a little repairs would suffice for the purposes for which it was built. Several additional cannon with other munitions of war were brought to it from Manila in 1794. About the end of the century, one of the viceroys declared that, in spite of those 53 Bevilla Gigedo, ait. 729. x/fruL, art. 699. u Marquina, art. 173. "Perote, que esta sttnado a un lado del eamino real, puede solo servir para un repuesto resgnardado de annas y otros efeetos de gnerra . - . ." M Bevilla Gigedo, art. 730. s? Ibid., art. 733. 214 University of California Publications in History [ VoL - 1 augmentations of its resources, it could hardly be expected to withstand a regular siege of more than eight days. 58 However, such a contingency hardly needed to be provided for. Viceroy Branciforte, who devoted much of his time to purely military problems, had strengthened these various fort- resses, particularly those of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulua, and his predecessor had concentrated a number of additional troops around the eastern coast. 59 The sudden accumulation of a considerable force in that unhealthful region led to a fearful outbreak of disease, which not only nearly destroyed several of the detachments sent there, but created such a panic among the survivors that desertions became incessant and scan- dalous. 60 This caused such a dread of the service that recruit- ing became more difficult than ever, and for some time the mili- tary service had such a hard reputation that not only the actual number of the troops, but the morale and discipline declined grievously. Such an epidemic as this, breaking out among troops habituated to climatic conditions much more closely resembling those of the Vera Cruz coast region than those with which any European troops were familiar, was some indication of the danger to which an English expedition would have been exposed had it attempted a descent upon the same place. There is no question that Branciforte at least took a hopeful view of the situation, and I can do no better than to quote his words : 61 ' ' It is certain that no hostile naval force could arrive on the coast of Vera Cruz and effect a disembarkation of its troops as 68 Marquina, art. 173. " .... el Castillo de Acapulco se reduce a un cuadrado fortificado, que, en mi concepto, podra resistir a lo mas ocho dias si f uere atacado con f uerzas suficientes. ' ' so Branciforte, art. 62. This viceroy prepared the fortress of San Juan de Ulua to withstand a siege of six months. ao Ibid., art. 66. " .... han destruido con enf ermedades y muertes los cuerpos veteranos y provinciales acantonados, causando incesantes y escandalosas deserciones. ' ' 6i Branciforte, art. 67. Branciforte was so optimistic that he was able to write the following: "In such a case our victory would seem to me the more certain and the attempt of any foreign enemy to make himself master of this country the more difficult, even though the attempt be made with a large and veteran army; nevertheless, we ought not to give up or postpone our prudent and opportune precautions." Smiik: The Viceroy of Ar Spain 215 quickly as our forces eould occupy the positions for defense; it ought fo be the policy of the commander of our forces to hold them in reserve until he can attack and rout the enemy with superior numbers of men, healthy, strong, and robust, after the enemy had been weakened by disease due to the plmmt^ the incommoding rigors of the heat, the insects, the rains, and the lack of healthful provisions. '*** It is interesting to see the new importance which the ports of the extreme northwestern coast of the Mexican territory began to assume by the year 1794. In a letter of April li 1793. Revilla Gigedo laid the proposal before the king that the next ports to be fortified should be those of Monterey., San Diego. San Fran- dseo. Bodega, and the mouth of the Ezeta or Columbia River.* 1 With the same purpose in view, the viceroy turned his attention more and more to the building up of the maritime department of San Bias. That station had been established with the object of affording a base of operations for the founding of the missions and presidios in the Californias. All kinds of supplies were shipped from this port, and it was the place regularly used for fitting out ships to carry men and provisions to the ports farther north. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, San Bias was something more than a convenient place for the provisioning of the California posts, and had become "a point of the greatest importance for maintaining us in the rightful possession of those distant and valuable lands which belong to His Majesty in that region."** By this tone those coasts and adjacent waters had begun to be frequented by the ships of different nations and a growing sensitiveness regarding their presence there was discern- ible in the viceregal instructions.* 5 The expenses of the estab- *s Brancif orte, ait. 68. 3 Berilla Gigedo, art. 701. Barilla Gigedo to Aranda, Nov. 30, 1792. *l&uL, ait. 70S. sMarquna, ait. 194. " .... there had visited the coasts of the South Sea various armed "JEgHh vessels cruising or fishing, aad taking several prizes, besides reeonnoitering the Gulf of California or the Sea of Cortes, going as far as the surath of the Colorado, and making small mpo . . . ." 74 Revilla Gigedo, art 683. expediente mi inmediato antecesor, y otro se ha principiado en mi tiempo . . . ." 1913] Smith : The Viceroy of New Spam 219 needed all over the country. One was indeed began at Chihuahua in the spring of 1790, but that was only the merest beginning. 75 Such details as these are necessary to show the actual course of affairs in New Spain, and to show the real nature of the power of the captain-general. The primary authorities abound in evidence of the diverse nature of his task and of the restrictions imposed by the mother country upon the proper fulfilment of it. The captain-general had to attend in a general way to the pay of the troops, their equipment, their housing, and their training. He had to direct the great powder factory at Chapultepec and see that its products were distributed aright. 7 * He was re- sponsible through the subinspector-general for the inspection of the troops and was directly charged with the inspection of the artillery. Viceroy Marquina tells of his drawing up a reglamento governing the securing of goods from the storehouses containing the artillery supplies. 77 Although the financial duties of the viceroy were mainly those which came to him as superintendent-general of the real hacienda, yet, owing to the peculiar methods of financing the military establishments in Mexico, it might even be said that the captain- general had something to do with the raising of revenues. The regular forces, the army, as the Mexicans called them, were maintained out of the viceregal treasury. The urban regi- ment of the City of Mexico was paid for by the consulado of that city, and various funds were tapped for the support of the dif- ferent militia organizations. When the militia was reorganized in 1764. under General Yillalba, it was ordered that a special tax should be levied in each province for that purpose. A com- mittee was appointed to consider the whole matter. This com- mittee was composed of the viceroy, Visitor-General Galvez, and Bevilla Gigedo, ait. 684. Marqnina, art. 191. "IbicL, ait. 190. "La inspection del ramo de artilleria estaba ententes onida al Yireinato, 7 las prineipales provideneias que se habian dietado sobre la materia, se redocian a la formation de on reglamento para el taller de Perote, .... 7 la instruction .... relative al meiodo 7 formaUdades para la .... extraction de efectos en los almatenge del .... ramo de artilleria." 220 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 General Villalba, and as a result there was levied a new tax on pulque of half a real on every cargo, brought into Mexico 78 (Feb- ruary, 1767). There were other taxes on food-stuffs and the like, established in the City of Mexico and in Puebla, but it took a long while to have this movement spread to the other cities. In 1774 it was proposed to increase the dreaded alcabala. About the same time they even proposed to make a government mon- opoly of the native rum (popularly called chinguerito) , which would not compete with Spanish brandies. It was not until tbe rule of Flores, in June, 1788, that much real progress was made. The taxes at that time, in the various intendancies, for the sup- port of the militia, were found to be of the greatest possible varieties, so great that only a few examples can be given here. In Puebla there was a sort of octroi tax on wheat. In Oaxaca they taxed sugar and cocoa, which was sufficient to support twelve soldiers and a corporal. In Guanajuato there was a tax on corn and wheat, but only a part of the income was devoted to the soldiers. In San Luis Potosi and Guadalajara there were no taxes at all for the support of the militia. 80 In February, 1792, the subinspector-general fell back again upon the alcabala to raise the necessary funds, and an addition of one-half per cent was proposed. 81 The directors of this branch of the revenue objected to any further increase of the alcabala and proposed a tax on either tobacco or chinguerito. 82 None of these new taxes was levied, however, but it was the opinion of the viceroy in 1794 that the various taxes formerly established very nearly paid for the militia, and that nothing further was necessary than a somewhat more just apportionment of them. It is thus apparent that the military establishment in New Spain was not supported by any logical and comprehensive scheme of taxation or by regular appropriations from the vice- 78 Revilla Gigedo, art. 665. Ibid., art. 666. zolbid., art. 669. si /&*., art. 671. id., art. 672. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 221 regal treasury, but was kept going by a hand-to-mouth process of raising revenue. It could not be divined from the documents that the viceroys had any very definite ideas on the subject them- selves, so that in this ease the fault cannot be charged to the interference of the crown with the viceroy's plans. The subject of the military organization of New Spain cannot be left without a paragraph on the fuero mHitar. or the special rights enjoyed by persons in the military service, and a para- graph also on the montepio mHitar, modelled on the institution of the same name in Spain. In 1768, while Galvez was in Mexico as visitor-general, there were put into effect those military ordin- ances which constituted the military code of the country. Any military man. or any one who by some means or other secured the fuero mHitar (as was, for instance, possible to the members of the consulado of Mexico when they furnished substitutes for the city regiment) had the right to be tried by a military tribunal. This might in many cases give a great advantage to the member of the favored corporation over the ordinary layman who could plead no exemption, and so was, of course, liable to abuse. Questions arising out of the administration of this fuero had to be settled by the viceroy in his military capacity. As head of the army and responsible for its discipline, the captain- general was the supreme judge of the vieeroyalty in all cases within the military jurisdiction. This was so great a power that some mention of it is due in any treatment of the position enjoyed by the viceroy as captain-generaL The military juris- diction had been gaining toward the end of the eighteenth cen- tury, according to one viceroy, " .... especialmente desde las ultimas declaraciones que ban dado al fuero tanta extension, la tiene grandisima en estos reinos . . . ."* Acting in his capacity as supreme military judge the captain-general was assisted by an auditor de guerre who was also one of the members of the Mexican auditncia. There was no appeal in these cases over the head of the captain-general to the auditncia. so that in such M Bevilla Gigedo, art. 98. 222 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 matters the viceroy acted practically in a sovereign capacity. 84 The montepio militar was established in Spain in the year 1761, probably in imitation of the mont de piete in France. In February, 1765, it was introduced into New Spain as a kind of pension fund for the widows and orphans of the officers dying in the service. This fund was supported by a mesada, or monthly payment which every officer had to give, and a further tax of two and one-half per cent of his pay thereafter, and by an annual subsidy of two thousand pesos. On the death of an officer his widow or children received annually one-fourth of the salary he had at the time of his death. 85 The administration of the montepio militar was in the hands of royal officials. The fund received additions from time to time and by the end of the year 1793 had brought into the treasury over three hundred and sixty thousand pesos and had paid out enough less so that there had been a surplus of over two hundred and eighty thousand pesos. 88 It must be regarded, then, as a means of producing revenue, on a small scale, as well as a public charity and a device for making the military service more attractive. There were a number of general problems confronting every viceroy as captain-general, on which, if he could not decide them, he might at least give advice even on his own authority. Besides, regardless of whether his influence was to have any weight or not, it was impossible for him not to have an opinion and not to ponder over it seriously. It must be helpful, if not necessary, to an understanding of the position of the captain-general to indicate at least in broad outline what these problems were. The first question had to do with the extent of the military preparations which ought to be made by the viceroyalty in antici- s* Eevilla Gigedo, art. 99. ' ' Con este nombre se halla tambien con- decorado el teniente letrado de la intendeneia de Veracruz, pero en realidad no es posible que ejerza las funciones del ofieio, pues aquel gobierno es inde- pendiente de este Capitania general, y asi solo en ella, y en las indepen- dientes de provincias internas y de Merida de Yucatan, puede haber con propiedad Auditor de guerra, y cualesquiera otros que sean nombrados como el de Veracruz, no haran mas funciones que las da un Asesor en asuntos militares. ' ' SB Ibid., art. 734. id., art. 738. 1913] Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 223 pation of a possible foreign war. There could be no doubt in the mind of any intelligent man that there was always danger of an attack npon the Spanish American colonies by the English, and after the experiences of the Seven Years' War, when both Manila and Havana had been captured, there could be no doubt of the danger of leaving the colonies without adequate means of defense. The expedition of the English against Buenos Ayres in 1806 showed that the Court of St. James was in earnest in its designs upon certain parts of the Spanish colonial dominions, while the intrigues with Miranda, probably not clearly under- stood by the Spaniards, afforded plenty of ground for a suspicious attitude toward the English. 87 Viceroy Branciforte in a com- munication to his successor, Azanza, May 28, 1798, speaks of the fact that he had been informed by the Prince of Peace, Manuel Godoy, regarding an expedition which the English were fitting out against Mexico, in which Miranda was to play a considerable part. Such things as this indicate the growing nervousness of the Spaniard with respect to his American pos- sessions, though the viceroys were not all agreed as to the means to be employed in meeting the danger. Those who leaned toward a strong military policy, of which Branciforte was undoubtedly one, thought that the proper course to pursue was to increase as much as possible the military resources of the colonies. Vice- roys like the younger Bevilla Gigedo were just the opposite of alarmists and thought that the natural difficulties involved in any attempt to conquer Mexico were so great that with the aid of a very few Spanish regiments the country could defend itself. Branciforte, in a letter to Azanza, dated May 28, 1798, refers to Miranda, " .... que sirvio de general en Franc ia & los principles de la guerra. v que se halJaba al sneldo de la Ingla terra: asegurandose por ultimo que aquel hombre perfido se habia embarcado eon destine Mexico, donde se suponia tener un partido favorable a las operaeiones de nuestros enemigos; . . . ." It is clear from the Minutes of a Comrt-MartiaJ for ike Trial of Sir Home Popnam, London, 1807, that in 1804 the English government medi- tated an attack on South America in cooperation with Miranda. Bef erred to bj Moses, So*tk America on tJte Eve of Emancipation, p. 255. Consult also Bobertson's Miranda, listed in the bibliography. 224 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l Men who held this view would naturally believe the money was better spent in developing the internal prosperity of the vice- royalty and increasing the loyalty towards Spain, than by laying it out upon new fortresses and new regiments. Though the advocates of a strong military force eventually carried the day, there remained the other great question, which was debated warmly at the time, as to what this force should comprise. The question was, should the chief reliance for the defense of the country be placed upon the Mexican troops, or should the viceroyalty depend more and more upon the regiments from Spain ? The views of those who placed their main reliance upon European troops may be summed as follows : In the first place, owing to the lack of military spirit among the Creoles and the Mexican natives, and the growing sentiment of indifference or disloyalty toward the king, the provincial troops, whether regular or militia, were inferior in quality to the Spaniards proper. The conditions of service were so hard that the recruiting of a sufficient number of regulars was practically out of the question, while as many as there were of them were of inferior quality compared with the Spanish veterans themselves. In the eyes of the professional military men the great majority of the militia were impossibles. The militia officers were mainly individuals lacking in intelligence, training, and even courage, who had purchased their positions to enjoy the dignity of even a humble military command, or else to enjoy the privileges and exemptions of the fuero militar. When called into service where there was a prospect of real fighting, they suddenly took ill or resigned, or in some way shirked their duties. 88 The rank and file had poor and obsolete weapons and did not receive sufficient 88 Villarroel, iii, 158-160. Always an atrabilious critic, Villarroel is at his worst when speaking of the evils of the Mexican militia system. "Without hyperbole, the King has more officers than privates; it being evident that most of the former purchased their places to make a spec- tacle of justice, to escape paying their debts, to gamble, and live a life of libertinage under the protection of their epaulettes. But if there is occasion to march to Vera Cruz to repel an enemy or for any other urgent reason they feign illness and make all pretexts imaginable to avoid the service." Smilk: The Viceroy of -Veir Spain 225 drill even with those that they had. In the face of such facts as these, and they eonld scarcely be disputed, what could be done if some ten thousand British veterans were safely disembarked at Yen Cruz? From the point of view of the statesman there seemed other reasons equally valid for committing the defense of New Spain chiefly to the mother country. The more the captains-general succeeded in making the colonies independent of the crown in a military way, by improving the fighting spirit and discipline of the colonials, the more dangerous it would be to Spain if there should ever occur a serious dispute between her and the colonies. There was already beginning to be observable a strong antag- onism, economically and politically, between the two main divisions of the Spanish empire. With this before them, Spanish statesmen could not ignore the evil political effects of a con- sciousness of military independence among the Spanish Amer- icans. Branciforte in a letter to Aianm refers to the fact that Miranda was counting on a following in the vieeroyalty, if he should be able to land there. In another place the same viceroy speaks of the tumults among the populace that eonld scarcely be taken care of by the forces at his disposaL** Consequently, it was nothing less than dangerous for Spain to try to evade her respon- sibility of garrisoning her dependencies. Moreover, on the selfish side, Mexico could be made to support a great many Spaniards, if they were given good positions in the army, and if the support of that part of the army were charged to the Mexican treasury. Arguments quite as elaborate and perhaps more effective in opposition to those given above were in circulation among think- ing men at the time when everybody was deeply concerned over the wars of the French Revolution. No one denied the lack of military qualities in the troops of New Spain as they existed at the end of the eighteenth century, but it by no means followed that there was any inherent incapacity for war or any innate Braneif orte, ait. 13. 226 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l lack of military virtues in the American population. 90 It was held by a great many that all that was necessary was to spend the same care and money on the native troops as was done upon the Europeans, in order to secure the same degree of efficiency. It would take time, patience, and money, but it was perfectly feasible. From the Mexican point of view there would be the further advantage of spending all this money at home and upon Mexicans, besides developing their own military institutions, and in the long run it would be more economical because the average pay would not be so high in the New World as in the Old. The complaint that there was an excessive amount of idleness and a lack of opportunities for work in the colonies would be partially met by the employment of a few thousand more men in the army. There were, moreover, certain positive objections to the pres- ence of Spanish regiments in the colonies in time of peace. It was the duty of the viceroys to take into consideration something besides merely the superior qualities of the European troops when they first arrived in America. To begin with, they had no sooner been disembarked than they began to deteriorate. Their downhill progress was rapid, if only a part of Villarroel's state- ment is true. The officers gave themselves up to all forms of dissipation and extravagance and the common soldiers imitated them to the extent of their humble means. Disease and desertions thinned the ranks at an appalling rate, while the general morale was depreciated in proportion. According to Villarroel, a Span- ish regiment was worthless after a short sojourn in Mexico, and besides the loss of what would otherwise be valuable troops, there were certain incidental evils of a serious nature. 91 o Villarroel, iii, 139. According to this author, those who held the anti-Spanish views admitted the inferiority of the native as a fighting man but attributed it to the Mexicans' bad breeding and absence of education. ''Man is by nature the same, and what is lacking to the Mexican is only direction, instruction, and subjection to the proper discipline in order to make him the equal of the European, and particu- larly good leaders [are necessary] who by example and energy can over- come their evil inclination, . . . ." i Villarroel, iii, 145 et seq. After pointing out the increased cost of bringing over and maintaining the regulars from Spain, he asked the Smith: The Viceroy of Xetc Spain 227 New Spain at this time was beginning to be afflicted with unwelcome immigration from the Old World, particularly refugees from France. These people very often brought with them "French principles" which did not harmonize with the views on society, religion, and government held by the ruling classes in the viceroyalty. Also, a greater influx of undesirables of all kinds from Spain itself was aided by the bringing over of the Spanish regiments. Deserters from the army became a pest to Spanish American society and there seemed to be no remedy but the rigid exclusion of all immigrants from Spain, excluding even the regulars, and then making things uncomfortable for all the objectionable characters by herding them into the Mexican army. In this way it was hoped to arrange military affairs on a proper basis and at the same time solve the immigration problem. That this aspect of the problem, the question of immi- gration, and that of putting restrictions on the foreign element, had become so important a one to the viceroys, is apparent from the documents." 1 Branciforte was driven to communicate with Madrid on this subject early in his administration and he informed his successor that soon after he assumed command he began to instruct himself T "with serious attention to this grave matter. "** As the preservers of public order the captains-general had to pay attention to these matters incidental to the great military question itself. question. "What good is it to the monarchy to send over these troops for the garrison of this country, if after a few months of residence they are not fit for anything, either officers or soldiers!" The officers give theatserres over to j*ego and eortfjo, while the soldiers go about well dressed and many of them carrying two watches! A further objection was that these troops adopted French manners and dress and made them- selves the laughing-stock of the sober-minded. ** Villarroel, iii, 147-148. There is no definite information in the docu- ments in regard to the number of desertions from the army, though it seems to be agreed that they were quite too numerous. Villarroel, as usual, took the extreme view, that hugely through these desertions the Spanish peninsula was being depopulated and the Mexican vieeroyalty overrun. This condition he declared to have existed in its worst form since the free trade decree of 1778. ** Branciforte, art. 12. 228 University of California Publications in History [VOL. 1 It is now perhaps possible to see quite clearly what sort of capacity was expected of the captain-general, what sort of prob- lems he had to face, and what were the activities which pressed upon his time and attention. These duties were the very heart of the whole body of responsibilities which were imposed upon the viceregal office and were historically and actually the most important things which the viceroy was called upon to do. It was Villarroel who referred to the office of captain-general as the "funcion primitiva" of the viceroy. In the words of Mar- quina, "The army of this realm in its different branches is an object of first importance, because one looks to it as the defense against external enemies, and as the interior reserve for the maintenance of good order and tranquility . . . . " 9 * Because he was commander of the army and navy, the captain-general had to see to the enforcement of the imperial navigation laws, the running down of smugglers, and the preservation of order on the frontiers and the navigable waters. As head of the armed forces he was chief justice for all cases involving a fuero militar, and also the one person in the viceroyalty to whom the troops might accord the royal honors. s* Marquina, art. 147. - -' 1 1 : Smith: The Viceroy of Nem Spam 229 CHAPTER V THE VICEROY AS VICE-PATRON No study of the viceregal office in America would be complete without some reference to the powers exercised over the church by the viceroy as vice-patron. 1 The vast spiritual interests which the church possessed in the conversion and instruction of the native races of America not only made the ecclesiastical establish- ment an important feature in the life of the New World, but it also brought it into close contact with the civil government. Considering the importance of the church, it is not a little sur- prising that there was so little conflict between it and the state, but whatever the reason for this may have been, there can be no question that the relations of the state and church in Spanish America were free from serious conflicts, even if these relations were not always exactly harmonious. 2 It may be that this harmony can be accounted for by the definite settlement of the old controversies between the popes and the icings of Spain before there realty was any church in America; and also by the fact that the nwamg of communication between Rome and America were so inadequate and so indirect that there was little chance or temptation for the popes to interfere in the Spanish colonies. * The two chapters in Bancroft's Hittory of Mexico, vol. iii (chaps. 38 and 33) are so satisfactory that a formal treatment here of the subject of the church of Mexico would only be ax imitation. ' What will be dealt with here under the title of "The viceroy as Vice-Patron" is not the ehnreh of Mexico, but the much narrower subject of the viceroy's con- nection with it * These words of Parkman, with reference to the potitico-ecelesiastieal situation in Canada, would have been true of Spanish America: "After all, the dispute between the errO yd ecclesiastical pumas was not funds- mental Each had need of the otter; both rested on authority, and they differed only as to the boundary fines of their respective hares in it." Parkman, Old Tttgimc in Canada, ii, 135. 230 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l In defining royal patronage it might not be possible to do bet- ter than to reproduce the language of some of the eighteenth cen- tury viceroys. The elder Revilla Gigedo, in his instruction to his successor, the Marques de las Amarillas, referred to it as fol- lows: "The Royal Patronage of the Indies, as it is defined in Law I, title vi, book 1, belongs to His Majesty by many most just titles in order that the Catholic zeal may plant, conserve, and promote in these vast dominions the faith of Jesus Christ and the conversion of the gentiles, by endowing churches and missions for the spread of the Gospel; and this being a matter which has been greatly agitated among writers, and many of the doubts which have influenced the prelates having been settled, the Royal Patronage is now in the care of the viceroy, who has nothing to do but maintain its rights and prerogatives in their present form." 3 Even more striking are the words used by the younger Revilla Gigedo in his instruction to his successor, the Marques de Brancif orte : ' ' The functions of the Royal Patronage which the viceroy exercises as vice-patron are those which most exalt the authority of that office, not so much by the direct authority which they give to the government, as by the indirect influence which is conferred upon the person who rules even in the temple (manda aun dentro del templo) and by the ecclesias- tics who were always an object of veneration among the peoples of all nations." 4 The same authority thought that the kings of Spain who obtained from the pope the patronato universal de las Indias had given no greater evidence of wisdom than the securing of that "richest jewel in the royal diadem." 5 In the same light was viewed the grant of tithes as a partial recompense for the great expense and labor which the crown had been exposed to in the conquest of the country. "... In nothing else has there been better evidence of the generosity, piety, and religious spirit of our Sovereigns than in the use which they made of this large donation, all of which and more, they have employed in the building and endowment of the beautiful temples which 3 Eevilla Gigedo the Elder, art. 143. 4 Eevilla Gigedo, art. 25. : -- Smith: The Viceroy of New Spain 231 now exist in these dominions, and in the propagation of the faith, and the teaching of that doctrine to the Indians."* From soeh statements as the above it can be seen how the viceroys in the eighteenth century looked upon their positions as vice-patrons. It was to them a matter of great importance in that it gave them a certain prestige among the people over whom they were commissioned to role; but not from the fact that they derived from it any great increase of actual political power. It was not even believed that a very great deal had been accom- plished for the religions improvement of the Indians after all these efforts.' In spite of the vast outlay of money on church property and the material side of the church's activity, besides the maintenance of a large body of church officials, the condition of the natives, from a religious point of view, was most discourag- ing even at the end of the Spanish regime. "The most grievous thing about it is. that so great expenditures, care, and zeal, and such wise measures taken during all these times upon this point, have not produced the effect which one ought to expect, and the Indians are still very ignorant and rude in matters of religion, as Your Excellency will discover when you inform yourself regarding their devotions and the way they fulfill their religious duties." 1 Though there is an abundance of evidence that a large pro- portion of the Indians of New Spain remained practically un- affected by the introduction of Christianity, yet this must not be charged to the fault of the viceroys. 8 The actual administration of the affairs of the church, particularly on its purely religious side, was in the hands of the church officials and the influence of * BeriUa Gigedo, art. 26. The words in the quotation narks were not Beviila Gigedo 's but came from RUndown. Bancroft, History of Mexico, in, 684, mate 9. * The one viceroy who unqualifiedly praised the native population was Braneiforte, but he praised everything. Braneiforte, art. 103. Bancroft, History of Mexico, iiL 681, note 1. T Revilla Gigedo, art. 27. * The general directions of the missions was in the hands of the viee- patron, but it was impossible for hint to know all about them- KeviBa Gigedo the Elder, arts. 152-155. 232 University of California Publications in History [VOL. l the viceroys could be only very indirect. In a general way, they were to see that the rights of the king were not infringed upon by too zealous ecclesiastics, and that the latter did not fight among themselves to the detriment of the interest of the government and the people at large. 9 This vague and general authority did not allow of much more than a moderating influence in church affairs, as the following pages of this chapter will make evident, and so from the point of view of this thesis the holding of the real patron- ato was only one of the minor functions of the viceroy. The history of the jffihl patronage in Spain and America is both simple and accessible, there being a number of good accounts in Spanish and a few even in English. As is stated in all the books, the rights which the kings of Spain possessed over the church in America were derived from the numerous papal grants, beginning with the celebrated one of Pope Alexander VI, of the year 1493, and enlarged upon by the bull of Julius II, in 1508. As the popes had little or no machinery for managing their interests in America, at least in the earliest days, and as the Spanish kings seemed disposed to co-operate with rather than to antagonize the popes in purely spiritual affairs, the concession of the tithes and the right to nominate all church officials to the king was obtained without great difficulty. In 1574, 10 Philip II stated explicitly in a royal decree the basis for his claims to the patronage and by that time the exercise of it by his predecessors had given it a sanction which was not to be disputed thereafter. Although the main questions between the church and state had been settled by the middle of the sixteenth century, there remained till the end of the Spanish rule a number of outstand- ing points of friction. 11 The papal nuncio at Madrid was the center of most of these difficulties in the seventeenth century. In the words of Marques de Mancera, 1673, "Some of the apos- e Eevilla Gigedo the Elder, art. 167. Mancera, p. 268. 10 Moses, Spanish Eule in America, pp. 241-242. 11 One of the most sweeping condemnations of the church and its un- worthy servants among the viceregal documents is to be found in the instruction of the Duke of Linares to the Marquis of Valero, pp. 308-309. Smith : Ihe Viceroy of New Spain 233 tolic nnncios resident in Madrid have attempted at different times (either because of instructions or orders from Rome, or because of their own natural desire to extend their authority) to introduce themselves with Italian dexterity into the affairs of the new church of the Indies, and they have ever opposed the measure taken by the Council .... to put into effect the bull of Gregory XII, ordering that ecclesiastical cases be concluded before the royal judges without further appeal.'*" In such matters the viceroys resisted the pretensions of the church and the activities of the nuncios and prelates with such vigor that difficulties of this nature had well nigh disappeared by the end of the eighteenth century. This same Mancera de- clared that "The viceroys and ministers have acted in such cases with that care and vigilance which was needful just in proportion to the resistenee which the prelates offered, due to ignorance or malice." 1 * A case in point was the one growing out of the pro- clamation of a jubilee by Clement X, on his accession to the pontifical throne. The brief which the Pope issued on this occa- sion was sent direct by the nuncio at Madrid to "a certain pre- late" in New Spain, who directly promulgated it, and affixed it to the churches, without waiting to secure the previous ap- proval of the Council of the Indies (which should have been secured before the brief was sent to America at all) or even notifying the government in Mexico. All this irregular proce- dure was condemned by the order of June 10, 1652, and this action may very well be taken as typical of the attitude of the Spanish crown in regard to allowing direct correspondence be- tween the European authorities in the church and the prelates in the Indies. 13 Although it can scarcely be said that there were no points of difference between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities toward the end of the Spanish regime, yet it must be conceded that those points of difference were of distinctly minor importance as com- pared with the issue stated in the above paragraph. The younger 12 Mancera, p. 270. 234 University of California Publications in History [VOL. i Bevilla Gigedo and the archbishop had a little trouble about their relative dignity, and the small question arose whether the arch- bishop should receive from the palace guard the same military honors as were accorded to the captain-general, 14 but the general tone of the relations of the two was amicable. As an illustration of the contrast between the feelings of the heads of the civil and ecclesiastical branches of the government in Mexico in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the following quotations may not be lacking in interest. With the markedly hostile words of Mancera in mind (see above) the following words of the instruc- tion to Cagigal, written in 1760, are striking enough. ' ' The func- tions of the vice-patron, which are among the most extensive privi- leges conceded by the sovereign to his viceroys, are entirely ac- cepted and in use. Your Excellency will find in the most illustrious archbishops and bishops of this realm those dispositions which are to be expected from their positions (las dispositions de que es capaz la piedad de sus dignidades} and the most active zeal for religion and for the service of the king, and without offense to the rest, Your Excellency will immediately find in the most illus- trious prelate of this capital all the admirable qualities which with double advantage for the above cited qualities will make easy for you a close union of the two jurisdictions, and a happy concord of honor and justice ...." It is impossible, with the limits imposed upon the length of this paper, to reproduce here the language of the Viceroy Branciforte, in his characteriza- tion of the multiple virtues of the church and all its servants in his day, but a few sentences will be sufficient to indicate the general trend of his remarks. After paying the highest compli- ment to the piety and loyalty of the Archbishop of Mexico, Bran- ciforte referred to the bishops suffragan as "adorned with the same admirable qualities and .... resplendent virtues which the diocesan prelates of New Spain possessed to an equal i* Eevilla Gigedo, art. 524 et seq. is Marfil, p. 109. 10 Branciforte, art. 98. tfU] Smit*: The Viceroy of JTwc Spain of the Holy Cathedral Churches and the Royal College of Gnada- hipe weU served by distinguished, cultivated, and exemplary priests, dedicated to the fulfilment of their sacred offi< with that decorum, propriety, and apostolic oal and magnifi which induced true sentiments of religion and piety into the hearts of the faithful."" It would be easy to increase the number of citations o kind, if it were worth while, but enough has surely been given to indicate that a great change had come over the **- the viceroys and the archbishops from the earlier to the period. The crushing blow dealt to the Jesuits in 17nox Rraiimair HE TOUDO. /Miramoa one de Ordem del Xey dio el Tiny de Mijico a a Rrteientinmo Semar D. Pedro JTaao Cotoa, Dmqme de Vt (Written October 22, 1673). This is one of the best known and most quoted of the vice- regal instructions, bat of rather too carry a date to be of great aae for this thesis. MAKTIL, JAOXTO. JTotias* Imftrmftiras qme par mmerte del Semar AtmtnUa* dio sm teere- fario D. Jmcmto Mmrft a Bserlrmtitimto, Semar D. Frvmeueo (Done at Mexico, May 4^ 1760). Brief and rather animportant. Some good iHstrmecidm del Semar Marqnmm at Semar Itmrrigany. (Doae at Taca- baya, Jaaaary 1, 1803). Despite the low opinion which has beea geaerallj held of Marqaina is aa adnuaistrator aad as a man, his oae of the clearest aad BMH* aatvfaetorr of them aJL fttafijm, Afmmtmmuemtof y Antat que par Mmmdfdo de 8. M . di ! Sfnor D. Lm* de Feissco, ritorey, y Gobfrmador y Capita* General destm Xmew* Etpmmm. (Not dated). laterestiag as the instruction of the fast rieeroy, bat valae- less, except for comparisons, for the eighteeath eeatary period. 290 University of California Publications in History [ V <> L - ! Novisima Becopilacidn de las Leyes de Indies. (Madrid, 1805.) Generally speaking, more comprehensive, of a later date, and more conveniently arranged than the old Laws of the Indies. Eeal Ordinanza para el Establecimeinto v Instruction de los Intendentes de Ejercito y Provincia en el Eeyno de Nueva Espana. (Madrid, 1786.) This is the largest, and in some ways the most important, single document consulted. The greater part of chapter vi is based almost exclusively upon it and it is absolutely essential to the understanding of the reforms of Galvez. Ordenes y Cedulas Beales. This is merely a binder 's title given to a collection in twelve volumes of miscellaneous royal documents, mainly from the eighteenth century. Nearly all of the several hundred docu- ments contained in this collection have been consulted, but only the following ones have been sieparated out for individual reference: Concordato entre la corte de Boma y la de Espana. Vol. v, pp. 32-46. (Keprint, Latin and Spanish in parallel columns. Madrid. 1756.; Eeal Cedula de S. M., For dirigirse d establecer la buena harmonia que deben observer entre la jurisdiccidn Eeal Ordinaria y Tribunales del Santo officio de la Inquisicidn. Vol. v, pp. 402-411. (Madrid, 1783.) Seal Cedula de S. M. Media- Anata. Vol. m, p. 25. (Madrid, 1787.) Beglamento de comer do libre . . . . de Octubre 12, 1778. Vol. m, pp. 104-245. ( Madrid, 1778.) So much is said about this decree in chapter vi that no par- ticular characterization is needed here. Like the Ordinance of the Intendants, it belongs to a small group of epoch-making laws. Papeles Varios. This is again a binder's title for a great number of volumes made up of all sorts of documents, such as royal decrees, vice- regal proclamations, sermons, charters, and so forth. Only a few of these volumes have been consulted, so there are only the three following citations: Sando de D. Jose Gdlvez. Vol. 35, pp. 1-20. This proclamation or the decree from the visitor-general himself is of great value for the study of the municipal govern- ment of the City of Mexico, and the political relations subsist- ing between the viceroy and the municipality. Ordenama del Consulado. Vol. 35. (Mexico, 1772.) This is the constitution or charter of the Consulado of Mexico, drawn up in close imitation of the one in Seville. Ordenama de la Divisidn de la Nobilisima Cindad de Mexico en quarteles Issued by D. Martin de Mayorga. (Mexico, 1782.) 1913] Smith : Tke Viceroy of New Spain 291 BEVILLA GIGEDO, COXDB DE Imttrvecio* al Seior Morales de las A*anOa*. (Mexico, November 28, 1754.) Cited as "Bevilla Gigedo the Elder." This vieeroy, who was in office about nine years, left an account of his rule which suggests some interesting points in regard to the royal patronage and the social evils of his time. RxmxA GIGKDO, COXDE DE. Ingtnedon Setervada