LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Class PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BY JOHN R. COMMONS PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY NEW YORK: 46 EAST MTH STREET THOMAS Y. CROWELL & COMPANY BOSTON: 100 PURCHASE STREET COPYRIGHT, 1896, THOMAS Y. CROWELL & COMPANY. C. J. PETHRS & SON, TYPOGRAPHERS. PREFACE. IT is intended in this book to show the his- torical significance of the recent movement for Proportional Representation, and a detailed appli- cation of the reform to American politics. Spe- cial consideration is given to city government, where, at present, other reforms are being tried, and where, it is believed, this one, if it were un- derstood, would also be heartily accepted. I am grateful for expert criticism on the proof, received from Professor J. W. Jenks of Cornell University, and Mr. Stoughton Cooley, Secretary of the American Proportional Representation League ; and for helpful suggestions from Pro- fessor Richard T. Ely, the editor of this series. JOHN R. COMMONS. SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, January, 1896. 1 LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D. NUMBER EIGHT. 3Lthrarg OF Economics anti politics* Vol. I. The Independent Treasury System of the United States $1.50 By DAVID KINLEY, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Illinois. Vol. II. Repudiation of State Debts in the United States $1.50 By WILLIAM A. SCOTT, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Economy in the University of Wisconsin. Vol. III. Socialism and Social Reform . . $1.50 By RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Political Economy, and Director of the School of Economics, Political Science, and History in the University of Wisconsin. Vol. IV. American Charities. A Study in Philanthro- py and Economics $1.75 By AMOS G. WARNER, Ph.D., Professor of Eco- nomics and Social Science in the Leland Stan- ford, Jr., University. Vol. V. Hull-House Maps and Papers. By RESIDENTS OF HULL-HOUSE, Chicago, III. Illustrated with Colored Maps. 8vo . . $2.50 Special Edition with Maps mounted on Cloth. 8vo $3.50 Vol. VI. Punishment and Reformation. An Historical Sketch of the Rise of the Penitentiary System $1.75 By FREDERICK H. WINES, LL.D. Vol. VII. Social Theory. A grouping of Social Facts and Principles $1.75 By JOHN BASCOM, Professor of Political Economy and Political Science, Williams College. Vol. VIII. Proportional Presentation . . . $1.75 By JOHN R. Ct /lONS, Professor of Sociology in Syracuse Ui ersity. CONTENTS. CHAPTER. PAGE. I. THE FAILUKE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES . 1 II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF REPRE- SENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 10 III. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK 36 IY. THE GENERAL TICKET, THE LIMITED VOTE, THE CUMULATIVE VOTE 86 \ Y. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 99 VI. APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY 132 VII. " PARTY' RESPONSIBILITY " 163 VIII. CITY GOVERNMENT 197 IX. SOCIAL REFORM 223 X. THE PROGRESS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRE- SENTATION S2j&' APPENDIX. I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS 271 II. THE HARE PREFERENTIAL PLAN 279 III. THE GOVE BILL. LEGISLATIVE REPRESEN- TATION 285 IV. BOOKS, PERIODICALS, AND SOCIETIES . . . 292 ..'' y PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER I. THE FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. THE American people are fairly content with their executive and judicial departments of gov- ernment, but they feel that their law-making bodies have painfully failed. This conviction per- tains to all grades of legislatures, municipal, State, and Federal. The newspapers speak what the peo- ple feel; and, judging therefrom, it is popular to denounce aldermen, legislators, and congressmen. When Congress is in session, the business interests are reported to be in agony until it adjourns. The cry that rises towards the end of a legislature's session is humiliating. The San Francisco Bulle- tin is quoted as saying : "It is not possible to speak in measured terms of the thing that goes by the name of legislature in this State. It has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the world. The assemblage has become one of bandits instead of law-makers. Everything within its grasp for years has been for sale. The commissions to high office which it con- fers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than of careful and wise selection." I 2 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Every State in the Union can furnish examples more or less approaching to this. Statements almost as extreme are made regarding Congress. Great corporations and syndicates seeking legis- lative favors are known to control the acts of both branches. The patriotic ability and even the per- sonal character of members are widely distrusted and denounced. These outcries are not made only in a spirit of partisanship, but respectable party papers denounce unsparingly legislatures and councils whose ma- jorities are of their own political complexion. The people at large join in the attack. When statements so extreme as that given above are made by reputable papers and citizens, it is not surprising that the people at large have come thoroughly to distrust their law-makers. Charges of corruption and bribery are so abundant as to be taken as a matter of course. The honored historical name of alderman has frequently become a stigma of suspicion and disgrace. As might be expected, this distrust has shown itself in far-reaching constitutional changes. The powers of State and city legislatures have been clipped and trimmed until they offer no induce- ments for ambition. The powers of governors, mayors, judges, and administrative boards have been correspondingly increased. The growing popularity of the executive veto is one of the FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 3 startling facts of the times. President Hayes vetoed more congressional bills than any prede- cessor, and his record has been excelled by Presi- dent Cleveland. A city has been known to turn out in mass-meetings, and to illuminate the heav- ens with bonfires, in honor of a mayor's veto which rescued it from outrages and robberies perpetrated by its own lawfully elected u city fathers." The prevailing reform in municipal government is the transfer of legislative functions, and even legis- lative discretion, from the city council to the mayor. Our municipal institutions were transplanted from England. As in the English system, the municipal council was supreme. It engrossed all the legislative and administrative powers of local government. It elected the mayor and heads of departments. It governed its appointees through its own committees. New York was the first city to break from this simplicity, as it has since gone farthest in stripping the council of power. Uni- versal distrust led first to the mayor's appoint- ment by the governor, then to his popular election, and later to popular election of heads of depart- ments. Again, the control of finances was taken from the council and placed in an ex-officio Board of Estimate and Apportionment. The council still retained the right to confirm or reject the mayor's appointees. Thus the unity of govern- 4 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. ment was lost. Responsibility was ravelled out into scores of aimless threads. Mr. A. H. Green, a few years ago, found "eighty different boards or individuals who could create debt indepen- dently of each other." l Here was the oppor- tunity of the " boss " and the party machine. Unity must somehow be secured. The "boss," a mere private citizen, gathered! into his hands these scattered threads, -and centralized the gov- ernment of the city in himself. He controlled nominations and elections. He appointed and re- moved officers. He pitted council against mayor, boards against council, subordinates against chiefs, making them all responsible to him. But he was responsible to no one. The latest movement in municipal reform is to legalize the boss in the person of the mayor, to give him sole power to appoint and remove all heads of departments, but to elect him by popular vote and make him re- sponsible to the people. The movement is not yet completed. The council remains a shrivelled and vicious relic. Logically, it should be abol- ished or reformed. A similar movement, though later in time, is affecting State legislatures. The governor has been considerably exalted, but the movement is as yet mainly in the stage of independent boards, clothed with certain legislative and administrative 1 L. Williams, Arena, vol. ix., p. 644. FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 5 authority. Where the governor at first appointed these boards, as in the case of the Railway Com- missioners of Iowa, popular election is substituted. The Constitutions of the new States of North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, may be considered as stating the thought of the American people at the present time regarding their legisla- tures. 1 Several administrative boards are created in these new States, all filled by popular elec- tion. Among these are commissions to supervise and regulate insurance, railroads, agriculture and labor, prisons, and public lands. These commis- sions absorb, in various degrees, the powers of legislatures, executives, and judges. They are the nondescript, many-headed agents of the people distrusting the legislature, but not yet ready to confide everything to the governor's autocracy. If it be inferred that these commissions are created not to belittle, but to enlighten, the legislature, and to act as its agents, we need only notice the maze of constitutional restrictions thrown about all legislative acts. "The articles in the new State Constitutions on the 'legislative department 'are long and detailed. They seem to be composed by the framers in order to declare what the respective State legislatures cannot be permitted to do. ... [They declare] by what 1 See article by F. N. Thorpe in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 1891. 6 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. procedure the legislature shall act, on what it shall not act, and to what extent it may act. The chief limitations on the legislature are with respect to special or private legislation, corpora- tions, political corruption among members, taxa- tion, and power to use the credit of the State." l These constitutional restrictions, extending to legislatures and municipal councils, have forced another branch of government, the judiciary, to the front. Conscious of popular approval, judges have steadily encroached upon the field of legisla- tive discretion, and reluctantly, it may be, have more and more assumed the right to set aside legislative statutes. This interference, however justifiable the reasons, is fraught with danger to the judiciary. It is thereby, at the expense of its integrity in the field of administration and justice, forced into the political arena, where are the heated questions of political expediency. Popular election of judges, short terms, and partisanship will result. " The executive," says Judge Horace Davis, 2 " all-powerful at the beginning [of colonial history], was reduced to a mere shadow of its former glory, and in these later days is regaining some of its lost power. The legislature, at first weak, afterwards absorbed the powers of the other 1 Thorpe, as above, p. 17. 2 "American Constitutions," "Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Politics," 3d series, pp. 55, 59. FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 7 departments, but is now much reduced again. Throughout all these changes the dignity and power of the judges have steadily increased. . . . Their greatest power, most amazing to Europeans, is the authority to set aside a statute which they hold to be in conflict with the written Constitu- tion. No other courts in the world possess this unique power. . . . The scope of this power is much broadened by the modern tendency to limit legislation. The early Constitutions were very brief, containing usually little more than a bill of rights and a skeleton of the government, leaving all details to the discretion of the legisla- ture. Now all this is changed ; the bounds of the different' departments are carefully denned, and the power of the legislature is jealously curbed, particularly in the domain of special legislation. It will be seen at a glance that this enlarges the relative power of the courts. It limits the legisla- ture and widens the field of the judiciary at one stroke." Not only do the judges pretend to override the legislatures, but their exalted position renders them confidently autocratic in other directions. They are learning to dispense with juries, to dan- gerously widen the scope of injunctions, and to punish for contempt in cases not contemplated in our Constitutions. The legislatures and Congress, which are legally in a position to check these usur- 8 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. pations, are practically helpless from their lack of ability and their loss of popular confidence. This demoralization of legislative bodies, these tendencies to restrict legislation, must be viewed as a profoundly alarming feature of American politics. Just as the duties of legislation are in- creasing as never before, in order to meet the vital wants of a complex civilization, the essential or- gans for performing those duties are felt to be in a state of collapse. The legislature controls the purse, the very life-blood of the city, the State, the nation. It can block every other depart- ment. It ought to stand nearest to the lives, the wishes, the wisdom, of the people. It is their necessary organ for creating, guiding, watching, and supporting all the departments of govern- jment. Above them all, then, it ought to be j eminently representative. But it is the least rep- f resentative of all. Surely, then, for the American people beyond all others, and in a high degree, too, for all peoples who are developing popular government, it is pertinent to inquire carefully into the fundamental nature of these representa- tive institutions, the causes of their failures, and the means, if any can be found, to adapt them to the exigencies of modern times. Why is it that a legislative assembly, which in our country's infancy summoned to its halls a Madison or a Hamilton to achieve the liberties FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 9 of the people, has now fallen so low that our public spirited men hesitate to approach it ? The municipal council in early times, as now in Eng- land and Germany, comprised the stanchest men of the community. The American Congress was once the arena for a Webster, a Clay, a Calhoun, whose debates a nation followed. If it can be shown by what means representative assemblies formerly enrolled the honored leaders of the peo- ple, and met precisely the problems of the day, we may be able to see how the social and political conditions of to-day, resulting from changes of the past fifty years, have outgrown those early institu- tions, and rendered their original fitness a dis- astrous encumbrance. 10 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OP . REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. A STRIKING feature of social evolution is the decay and obstruction of institutions which in their day were essential to progress. The funda- mental changes in society are unobtrusive. The increase of wealth and intelligence, the rise of cor- porations, the combinations of labor, the spread of democracy, the deepening of religion, the unfold- ing of new ideals and hopes, these are the fun- damental motives and objects of social growth. Laws, legislatures, commissions, courts, are the machinery and devices whereby the people work out their ideals. If the work to be done changes, the machinery becomes obsolete. It may be aban- doned altogether, as was slavery ; or it may be re- vised and readapted, as when the king, an heredi- tary executive, was displaced by the president, an elected executive provided always that the good fruits of the past be not jeopardized. Representative assemblies were devised to meet certain social ends; they sprang from historical conditions. It is in the changing character of these ends and conditions that the modern prob- lems of representation have arisen. EEPEESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 11 1. The original object which produced repre- sentative assemblies was nationalization. This is shown in the twofold aspect of the union of local governments into a nation, and the coalescence of social classes in a single representative assembly. (1.) The English nation, from which our repre- sentative institutions were inherited, was formed by welding together independent local communi- ties into a central organization, without destroy- ing the local governments. Previous experiments in nationalization had resulted in the tyranny of the capital city and the slavery of the provinces. The reason is plain to every historical student, and the same forces were working to the same outcome In England. But the principle of rep- resentation, almost unknown to the ancients, was discovered ; and it permitted the unity of a nation, while preserving the freedom of the localities. The primitive idea of a law-making body was the primary assembly of all the warriors. The king and his chief adviser sagreed on resolutions, and offered them to a simple yea and nay vote of the army. Every freeman had the right to appear in his own person in the national assembly. After the Norman conquest this right was retained in theory, but abandoned in practice. Gradually only the wealthy land-owners, the tenants in chief, and the higher clergy appeared. The distances were too great, the expense too heavy, and their 12 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. influence too slight, for the small land-owners to continue attendance. And as for the serfs and the town merchants and artisans, they never had the right. Thus the king and his council of magnates became the sole government of Eng- land. They enacted the laws and controlled their enforcement. The people had no voice, neither were they represented. Slowly two forces were at work. The king gave away his private estates, upon which he was supposed to support himself and his administra- tion, and was therefore compelled to look else- where for funds. During the same time the unrepresented classes of small farmers and town merchants and workmen were acquiring wealth. The king was forced to ask them for contribu- tions, or "subsidies," to help him in his wars. Experience showed that these aids could not be secured by compulsion. The king must obtain the consent of his subjects. Neither could their hearty consent and co-operation be obtained when they were approached privately and individually. They must have the king's affairs laid before them in assembly, and the state of his exchequer ex- plained. But a national primary assembly of all the people was impossible. However, there was in existence the more or less well-organized county government, with a history running far back into Anglo-Saxon times. Here was a convenient pri- REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 13 mary assembly of all the landowners, twice a year at the county seat, when the king's justices made their circuit. Here the germs of representation had appeared in the practice of electing juries to present the criminal matters of the county before the king's judges, and of electing assessors to levy the king's taxes upon the county. 1 Also there was a true legislative representation in the prac- tice of the rural towns and the boroughs, which sent delegates to the county courts. Very natu- rally, it occurred to the king to ask this county primary to elect " two good and discreet knights," who should represent the land-owners before him, and hear and act upon his demands. 2 In the towns, also, had quietly grown up the merchant and craft guilds, compact organizations of tradesmen and manufacturers, with mutual in- terests mutually protected. When the king could no longer wring from them money by coercion, he invited them to send their two accredited dele- gates for a national gathering of guild represen- tatives. What is the significance of these devices? In ancient Rome the tax collectors swarmed from the imperial city with proconsuls and armies at their backs, to exact arbitrary tribute from the prov- 1 Stubbs, "Constitutional History," vol. i., p. 586. 2 These were first summoned in 1254, by Henry III., on occa- sion of a military campaign into Gascony. 14 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. inces. Provincial self-government, and with it liberty and rights of property, were destroyed. In England the provinces joined with the central government, through their elected representatives, in determining the rate of taxation and in assess- ing it to individuals. * Concessions in turn were made by the king, grievances were redressed, local self-government, and with it liberty and rights of property, were maintained. (2) The union of localities alone does not form a nation ; there must be added the union of classes. The first was the work of the thirteenth century, the second of the fourteenth. At the end of the thirteenth century there were at least four legislative assemblies, each representing a distinct class. They hardly deserved the name of legislatures ; they were rather conventions of different social classes, negotiating with the king at separate times and places, regarding their own particular class interests. They did not meet to- gether. Each convention separately enacted laws with the consent of the king. In 1336,aj^uncil of merchants from twenty-one cities agreed with the king "to increase customs on wool, to extend monopolies, and enlarge the privileges of trade." l Such matters were considered to affect only mer- chants and townsmen. In the thirteenth century .military jtermnts anrl lanrj-owners^ncluding the i Stubbs, "Constitutional History," vol. ii., p. 379. EEPEESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 15 representatives from the counties, enacted the great statutes, De Donis, Quia Emptores, and others, regulating the holding of real property, without consulting the burgesses and clergy. The clergy also managed their large estates and voted taxes thereon without reference to other assemblies ; and the laws of a political nature, such as those affecting Ireland and Wales, or foreign relations, which were not supposed to affect clergy, knights, or burgesses, were enacted by the jlieat Council without consulting these popular bodies. 1 By the end of the fourteenth century, these as- semblies were combined in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Here were the steps: The clergy were gradually deprived of their power to legislate. The higher clergy then simply retained the place they had always held in the Great Council, and this became the modern House of Lords. The lower clergy were merged into the electorate of the counties and towns. Again, the representatives from the small land- owners of the counties, and those from the guilds of the towns, were drawn together by common interests against king and nobility. They elected a "speaker" to present their petitions to the king, and thus, in time, became the House of Com- mons. This legislative assembly, therefore, was based 1 Hearn, " Government of England," pp. 423-428. 16 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. upon two principles, the representation of local- ities and the representation of the two organized social classes, town capitalists and country farm- ers, which governed those localities. This was the original problem of representation. How different is it now ! Not only the kingdom of England, but the " United Kingdom " of Eng- land, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, has become a nation. Localities have lost their significance and their sanctity. Certain sections, like Ireland, retain apparently local, but really class, griev- ances. On the whole, railways, telegraph, the press, internal trade, and representation itself, have brought the people together. Foreign rela- tions, a world-wide system of colonies, national armies and navies, have exalted a national flag and inspired a national patriotism. No longer would it be tolerable to leave the laws upon the tariff to merchants and importers, land-laws to real-estate owners, foreign relations to the nobil- ity, or church taxation to the clergy. The repre- sentative to-day is therefore not a mere agent of a close corporation or a social class. After five centuries, Edmund Burke could say, " Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates ; but Parliament is a deliber- ative assembly of our nation, with one interest, EEPEESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 17 that of the whole, where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament." 1 In America, too, the problem of representative government has been that of nationalization. It has passed three stages. First, counties and towns were united into colonies ; second, colonies united in the Confederation ; third, States formed the na- tion. By the first, the State legislatures arose; by the third, the national Congress. Just as the physical child, according to the biologists, repeats in a brief time its ancestral history of geological ages, so did the colonies, the children of English political institutions, re- peat in a few years the slow and painful evolution of centuries. The stages are best recorded in Maryland. 2 Originally the Constitution, as framed by the proprietor, consisted of the governor, ap- pointed by the proprietor, a council, appointed by the governor, and a primary assembly of all the freemen. At first all could attend. But settle- ments expanded over a wide area. At the second assembly, in 1638, those who could not attend 1 Address to the electors of Bristol, " Collected Works," Londoii, 1854. Bonn, vol. i., p. 447. 2 See Doyle, " English Colonies in America. Virginia, Mary- land, and the Carol inas," p. 286 ff. 18 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. in person were allowed to send proxies. But proxies were apparently bought up by the governor and his council in order to override the popular wish. In 1639 the third assembly met. On this occasion the various " hundreds " were instructed to elect representatives. Yet, after the election, one person, at least, came forward and claimed the right of appearing in person, on the ground that he had voted in the minority and so was not represented. The claim was allowed. In 1642 the assembly became typically representative by excluding the proxies and those appearing in their own right, and limiting its membership to those elected by the localities. Thus the linger- ing hope of doing justice to the unrepresented minority was abandoned. But the colony was united on the basis of local interests. In the colony of Massachusetts Bay we find again similar conditions and a similar outcome. " The growth of fresh settlements brought with it an expansion of the constitutional machinery of the colony. . . . The Constitution of Massachusetts was older than the existence of the colony. The legislature of the colony was simply the general court of the company transferred across the At- lantic. At the same time the dispersal of the settlers at once unfitted that body for the work of legislation. The remedy first applied to this difficulty was, not to substitute a representative REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 19 assembly for a primary one, but to limit the func- tions of the court. It is clear that there was an oligarchical temper at work among the leading men in Massachusetts. The action of this was plainly shown by the transfer of all legislative rights from the court of freemen to the governor, deputy-governor, and assistants. At the same time the election of the governor was handed over from the freemen to the assistants. . . . " True to English precedent, Massachusetts found the salvation of her constitutional liberties in a question of taxation. When the governor had intended to change his abode to Newtown, the assembly resolved to fortify that settlement at public charge. ... To meet the cost a rate was levied on each town by order of the governor and assistants. Against this the men of Watertown protested. . . . Though the men of Watertown gave way on the main issue, their protest seems to have borne fruit. In the next year the powers of the governor were formally denned by an act. It was also enacted by the General Court, in the following May, that the whole body of freemen should choose the governor, deputy-governor, and assistants. A farther step towards self-govern- ment was taken in the resolution that every town should appoint two representatives to advise the governor and assistants on the question of taxa- tion. We can hardly err in supposing that this 20 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. was the direct result of the protest made by the men of Watertown." 1 It was in Connecticut that the origin of repre- sentative government first appears as a federation of independent towns, rather than a local repre- sentation to resist a central authority. The three towns which had been settled along the Connecti- cut River united in 1638, and " formally declared themselves a commonwealth with a Constitution of their own. ... A system of representation was adopted at once, instead of being slowly worked out through a series of expedients and compromises. The legislature was to consist of a governor, six assistants, and deputies. The gov- ernor and assistants were to be elected annually by the whole body of freemen, met in a gei^ral court for that purpose. The deputies were to be elected by the three existing towns, four from each. As fresh towns were formed, their number of repre- sentatives was to be fixed by the government." 2 Other colonies passed through similar experi- ences. A common form of representation was developed in them all. It was exactly suited to the needs of an independent, but busy and scat- tered farming and land-owning constituency, in their efforts to combine and resist the royal and oligarchical tendencies of the times. 1 Doyle, " The Puritan Colonies," vol. i., pp. 103-106. 2 Ibid., pp. 159, 160. REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 21 The Confederation was a temporary experiment in nationalization which served the purposes of revolt against England, but failed in peace. In the Constitution of the United States two principles are recognized, representation of States in the Senate, representation of the people in the House. But in both cases representation is based on residence. Pre-eminently, sections are repre- sented. The problem of nationalization has been solved, not by Congress, however, which proved inade- quate, but by civil war. The days of the bright- est glory of Congress were those preceding the war, when the question of the Union was de- bated. Sections have yet their claims in a nation as %dde as ours, but social and economic and class questions have overshadowed them. Foreign re- lations, currency, customs duties, are national questions. The war amendments have brought citizenship and rights of property under Federal protection. Federal control has reached out for the two most important business interests, banking and railways. Federal interference has grown into marvellous ramifications ; and, with the consolida- tion of national trusts and syndicates, we may expect to see it still further extended. The sig- nificance of these momentous changes will appear when we proceed to the development of modern political parties. 22 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. It has appeared from the preceding pages that the origin of representative assemblies in State and national governments depended upon the pre- vious existence of organized local governments separated by wide territorial areas. This neces- sitated the adoption of what has become the district system of electing single delegates to represent semi-autonomous governments. Such a system has still its justification in many re- spects, especially in a country as extended as the United States, with its sectional differences of climate, resources, products, and people. But why this system should survive to the present day in the election of city legislatures is one of the enigmas of politics, to be solved by reference to the traditions and inertia of mankind. In the United States and new countries there are not even historical reasons for the growth of this system. Here the transition from primary assem- blies was made simply by way of imitation. It was to England that the framers of our municipal constitutions turned when our cities had advanced beyond a size convenient for the ancient popular assembly. It is, therefore, in the origin of Eng- lish cities that we shall find the explanation of the origin of the district system. The earliest records seem to indicate that Eng- lish cities were simply concentrated hundreds and counties. In Norman times, the larger cities were EEPEE8ENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 23 organized like counties, with their sheriff, their county court, composed of all the freeholders of the county, and the historical representatives from the townships. Here we have the origin of coun- cilmen elected from the wards, the condensed townships. But the city was not at all an or- ganic body, with recognized common interests. It was a curious mixture of all the different in- terests which happened to be thrown together in the neighborhood. In primitive London 1 there were the original military tenants of the crown, with their independent manors and courts and their agricultural serfs; there were the parishes, governed by the bishop and the chapter and the monasteries; and there were the guilds, admin- istered by their own officers and administering their own property. Over all these jarring inter- ests the sheriff presided as the representative of the king. But the circumstances of the times and the needs of defence drew the residents nearer to- gether in common interests. This appears first in the development of the guilds of merchants. Through commerce they gained wealth ; this brought political power; and soon the merchant guild absorbed the law-making power of the en- tire city, its charter became the city charter, and its maire the city mayor. i See Stubbs, vol. i., p. 407. 24 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. In still later times, when manufactures arose into prominence alongside merchandizing, new guilds were organized, representing different trades. There were the weavers, the shoema- kers, the goldsmiths, the butchers, and many others. Each of these craft-guilds had its own president, the alderman. They soon demanded a share in the city government, which was finally granted ; and their aldermen were given the right to sit together as a law-making body, each rep- resenting his own guild. In the reign of Ed- ward II., "all the citizens were obliged to be enrolled among the trade-guilds, and in the reign of Edward III. the election of the city magis- trates was transferred from the representatives of the ward-moots to the trading companies." l Thus, to-day, " London, and the municipal system generally, has in the mayor a relic of the com- munal idea, in the alderman the representative of the guild, and in the councillors of the wards the successors to the rights of the most ancient township system." 2 The question arises, How came it that so ra- tional a system as the election of aldermen by the different organized interests of the cities should have been displaced by the arbitrary system of election by territorial districts or wards ? The 1 Stubbs, vol. i., p. 419. 2 Ibid., p. 424. REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 25 answer is brief. The ancient system itself was practically an election by wards, because the dif- ferent trades were grouped together, each in its own district of the city. And when the federa- tion of guilds was abolished and elections thrown open to a widened suffrage, it seemed wholly nat- ural to continue that district system which was seen to be in vogue in the counties and in the election of councilmen. When American cities adopted representative government, they adopted the English district system. The transition is vividly portrayed in the history of Boston. 1 Until the year 1822 the government of Boston had been a primary as- sembly/ On the 1st of May, 1822, the popula- tion had grown to 45,000, the qualified voters to 7,000 or 8,000, too many for a primary assembly. In that year the General Court of Massachusetts drew up a charter entitled " An Act establishing the City of Boston." It was presented to the voters of Boston, and accepted by a vote of 2,797 to 1,881. " ... As authorizing the first depart- ure from the system of local government which had been in operation nearly two centuries, it was regarded as a measure of the very highest impor- tance. Not a few of the old residents, who had 1 J. M. Bugbee, " The City Government of Boston," in " Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science," 5th series, p. 95. 26 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. fought under the eyes of Washington in the field, and under the eyes of Samuel Adams in the town meetings, looked upon the act which divided their great folk-mote into twelve separate and silent gatherings, where men delegated their rights to others, as the beginning of the end of democratic government." Little need be said about the differences be- tween the original problems of representation in cities, and those of their present development. The city is, above all political organizations, a unit in itself. Aldermen and councillors should not represent wards, they should represent the city. The ward has no place in city politics except, perhaps, as an administrative division. It is well recognized that cities present the most aggravated failures of American politics ; and, so far as the legislative branch is concerned, the failure lies mainly in this unnatural partition into petty dis- tricts. 2. Proceeding from these historical conditions, we can perceive the impressive significance of the modern growth of national political parties. Be- fore there were national questions there were no national parties, and even the early development of party divisions was on territorial lines. The Whigs were almost unknown in the counties, and the Tories unknown in the cities. Consequently, there was no important minority in either division REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 27 which was unrepresented. Cities were unanimous on national questions, and so were the counties, because the only important question they had to meet was the demand of the king for additional subsidies. More or less, the distinction between city and county continues in England to the present day. The original representatives of the agricultural and the capitalist classes, whose co- alescence formed the nation, have carried their different interests into the House of Commons. And now that the king is only a figurehead, and the House of Lords an occasional check, the House of Commons has become almost supreme; Social and economic questions divide its members ; and they group themselves in national parties, to contend, not against king and lords, but among themselves. In the United States, on the other hand, the corporate, autonomous character of local govern- ments is scarcely recognized in the creation of representative districts. District lines are fre- quently changed ; cities have grown up, and have been grouped with rural areas ; the apportion- ment of representatives is wholly territorial. Con- sequently, in the country at large the national parties which have grown up are often evenly di- vided in the territorial districts, and a representa- tive of the majority, therefore, does not represent the opinions and wishes of the mass of his con- 28 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. stituency. The minority is simply discarded for the time being. In the United States the power of political parties has reached a vigor unattained by those of any other country. This power is the growth of not more than fifty years. It has made its greatest advances since the period of the civil war. The peculiar feature of this development has been the supremacy of that new force in polit- ical parties, the "machine." Party organization is an essential element of party government ; but the extent, perfection, and detail of this organiza- tion in the United States are bewildering. It con- trols both candidates and voters with an iron-like grip, and they glory in their subjection. These parties are not divided on territorial lines. They are divided mainly on national questions. In colonial times parties were unknown. Or rather, we might say, there was a court party, or a party of prerogative, represented by the gov- ernor and his council, while the legislatures, the representative bodies, stood practically for a united people. The upper house being appointed by the governor, the lower house was drawn together as a single unit, representing all the people. No matter from what county a representative was returned, he was the ablest man in the county, for the people were unanimous in their wishes to withstand the party of prerogative. Furthermore, REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 29 the districts were all alike, being exclusively agri- cultural, and the representative from one was in harmony with the people of the others. There was no minority in any district to be unrepre- sented by a delegate chosen by the majority. But to-day the legislature, whether in city, State, or nation, instead of being the organized representatives of those who protest against the government, is itself the government. Within its walls occur the struggles for the control of the fortunes and destinies of the people. There is no outside enemy whose constant presence enforces harmony and mutual help. Two national parties stand face to face in constant conflict, and which- ever masters the legislature masters the people. 3. Furthermore, from the earliest times, the suf- frage, both in England and the United States, was narrowly limited. The masses of the people were not considered as citizens, or entitled to politi- cal weight. In the counties, serfs, copyholders, and the lesser freemen were excluded from the suffrage. Only the freehold knights were voters. The cities were close corporations, made up of the mayor and aldermen, and a few of the leading men of the guilds. Altogether, perhaps not one- fifth of the adult male population was entitled to vote for representatives to Parliament. As a re- sult, on the few questions of national interest on which they were required to select representatives, 30 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the ruling classes in their respective districts were practically unanimous. The trial of representa- tive government in England on a democratic basis did not really begin until after the years 1867 and 1884, when the town and country laborers were enfranchised. And if the failure of these institu- tions is more complete in the United States than in England, it is mainly because we have been longer trying to solve the problems of democracy with an aristocratic and capitalistic form of repre- sentation. For it must be remembered, as already shown, that the local government and liberty which representation preserved to Englishmen was the government and liberty of .-land-owners and capitalists, and not primarily of serfs and laborers. In colonial times, also, the local governments were close corporations, and the representation by districts suited their purposes. In the South a few aristocratic slave-holding families, united by ties of blood and marriage, controlled each county government. They could come together often in social and business meetings, and, like the di- rectors of a modern business corporation, could choose their agents and attorneys to conduct the county government and to represent them in the State and national legislatures. They selected the ablest men they could find. They wanted their property and their independence well pro- REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 31 tected. And in New England the church mem- bers alone, that is, the wealthy and educated classes of the community, held the suffrage. In Massachusetts, in 1780, only 4 per cent of the population were voters; in 1890, 29.7 per cent. 1 In the United States, to-day, not only the origi-^ nal Anglo-Saxon is admitted to the suffrage, but also millions frorfi antagonistic^races. Especially is this true of theTargecities, where 50 per cent to 80 per cent of the voters are foreign-born and children of foreigners. 2 If England is threatened by the widening of the suffrage, far more is the Republic of America. The great political ques- tions of to-day are those which grow out of the citizenship of the manual laborers, the former serfs. These questions have to do directly or re- motely with the profound problem of the owner- ship of wealth and the betterment of the social 1 See A. B. Hart, " Practical Essays on American Govern- ment," pp. 35, 54. A representative assembly may be seen to-day emerging in the Empire of India, and the methods of election there to be observed illustrate precisely the advantages of limited suffrage and viva voce voting in primitive English and colonial constitu- encies. The natives are unrepresented in the British government of the empire, but they have recently instituted representative assemblies to consult and petition the India Council and the Crown. The delegates to these assemblies are voted for in the various localities by only the high-caste, educated, and wealthy classes, numbering, perhaps, 15 per cent of the population, and they are elected by acclamation. They are in all cases the most distinguished men of their constituencies, 2 Hart, as above, pp. 196, 198. .32 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. conditions of the lowest classes. These classes are distributed throughout all districts. They form the wide foundation structure of every community, upon which the other classes are built. They compose the majority of__the voters. They feel that they have-not heretofore been represented in the councils of the city, the State, or the nation. They are unaccustomed to political control, and therefore they are the fertile soil for demagogues and partisans. They hold the balance of power. They must be placated and pacified. The party or candidate who presents to them the most spe- cious appeals wins the day. They themselves are not allowed to combine according to their natural divisions, and elect their acknowledged leaders to the council, the legislature, and Congress. Could they combine throughout the nation, the labor unions, scattered as they are through a hundred districts, would unite, and the more intelligent of the laborers would have influence in selecting those who represent them as a body, just as they select their national presidents and secretaries. As it is, they are forced into artificial territorial di- visions, and are compelled, along with the whole of the electorate, to submit to the candidates who appeal to the more ignorant, thoughtless, preju- diced and easily influenced masses. 1 It is in the wide extension of suffrage that we 1 On this point see also below, Chapter VIII. EEPBESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 33 find the underlying cause of the " machine " and the "boss." Close organization, with its minute attention to details, and personal supervision of the rank and file, is the secret for wielding great armies of unthinking men. The Catholic and Methodist churches and the Salvation Army are striking triumphs of organizing ability dealing with the unprivileged and disorganized masses. The party machine does the same for the neg- lected, isolated, ignorant voters. 4. Again, legislation in the olden times was very limited, both in the number of subjects dis- cussed and the details of the regulations. The people were satisfied to live according to the cus- toms of their ancestors. Government was simply a matter of administration. The king, his council, his officers, and his judges were not called upon to make new laws, but to learn what were the customs of the land, and then to act accordingly. But to-day legislation is the most intricate of arts, depending upon the profoundest sciences, and dom- inating the most vital of human interests. There are hundreds of pressing problems, requiring legis- lative direction, which the assemblies of Edward I., or even the parliaments of George III., never dreamed to be of social importance. "Time was," says Woodrow Wilson, 1 "in the infancy of na- tional representative bodies, -when the representa- i " The State," New York, 1890, page 583. 34 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. tives of the people were called upon simply to give or to refuse their assent to laws prepared by a king or by a privileged class in the state ; but that time is far passed. The modern representa- tive has to judge of the gravest affairs of govern- ment, and has to judge as an originator of policies. It is his duty to adjust every weighty plan, pre- side over every important reform, provide for every passing need of the state. All the motive power of government rests with him. His task, therefore, is as complex as the task of governing, and the task of governing is as complex as is the play of economic and social forces over which it has to preside. Law-making now moves with a freedom, now sweeps through a field, unknown to any ancient legislator; it no longer provides for the simple needs of small city-states, but for the necessities of vast nations, numbering their tens of millions." The modern legislator must, therefore, be well equipped. He must give the greater part of his time to parliamentary duties, and, above all, must have a long experience in his particular art. No more striking evidence of obsolescence can be cited than this, that, while the duties of legislation have increased as never before, the law-makers them- selves have sunken into incompetence and obloquy, 5. There is one external influence on modern legislation so extremely important as to demand REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 35 special notice. This is the private corporation, with its professional lobby. Corporations are as recent as party machines, and both have grown up together like Siamese twins. The professional lobbyists are nearly always the managers of the political machine. They carry in their pockets the political fortunes of the legislators. The " third house " is the modern legislature, at least in the United States. Corporations, from their very inception and in their daily activities, are the creatures of government. Their life is legislation. They cannot, if they would, dispense with their lobby. This is an entirely new feature in the constitu- tion of representative assemblies. The first general corporation laws in the United States were enacted in the '50's, following the rapid extension of rail- ways and the organization of banks. A legislature that may have sufficed for simple duties in the days of isolated individual industries, is almost su^e to wither in an era of private corporations \v th public functions and fabulous resources. 36 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER III. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. IN the preceding chapter the main differences have been shown between the ancient and the modern problems, constituencies, and conditions of representation. We have now to inquire into the actual workings of this primitive institution in the midst of modern surroundings. The position of the American voter who attempts independence is well known to be unenviable. When he comes to the polls to cast his ballot, he finds but one candidate to be chosen for any given office. He finds that, through the machinery of the political party with which he has acted, there is one candidate offered to him. There are practi- cally but two candidates in the field, those of the two great parties. If the voter is dissatisfied with the nominee of his own party, there are three courses open to him, to vote for the opposing can- didate, to vote for a third candidate, or to stay at home. It is likely that his dissatisfaction with the opposing candidate is more intense than with his own. Only in times of exceptional unrest, or as a protest against an exceptionally corrupt nomina- tion, do large numbers of voters so radically revolt as to go entirely over to the enemy. The majority THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 37 of the dissatisfied simply stay at home. This is their only comfortable way to condemn their party's nominee. But should they be intensely exasper- ated, or should they be of an uncompromising turn of mind, they may go to the extreme of nominating and voting for a third candidate. In this case their offence is even worse than if they vote for the principal opposing candidate. They indeed give him a half vote, just as they do when they stay at home ; and they gain the opprobrium of "crank," and the scorn of having " thrown their votes away." In this way the party machine is the master of the situation. It alone can name the candidate; the only ' check upon it is the fear of a "bolt" on the part of the voters. This fear is reduced to a minimum. Though there may be loud protests and a vigorous show of independence, it is well known that most of the protesters will fall into line on election day, rather than see the other side win. Add to the foregoing the fact that wards and election districts are bounded more or less arbi- trarily, that they include a heterogeneous and poly- glot population, and that boundaries are frequently changed, and we have an additional reason for the supremacy of the party organization. The voters have very few interests in common. They see little of each other; they have few of those so- 38 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. cial and business relations that would accustom them to join and work together. They do not meet in mass-meeting, as in the New England town-meeting, where individuals of all parties come together and discuss in public the affairs of their district and the qualifications of candi- dates, before the candidates are nominated. They must, therefore, look to their party organization for the dictation of a policy and the designation of a candidate. It is in the party that they find their common meeting-place. The strength of Tammany Hall, with its affiliated saloons, is in the social and fraternal life which it furnishes to the thousands of neglected voters who have no home, no church, no club. The party organization is a more or less close corporation, composed of a series of practically self-perpetuating committees, the committees cor- responding to the different election areas. The party primary of the smallest division precinct, township, or ward is the foundation of the sys- tem ; but the primary is in the hands of its stand- ing committee. A very small percentage of the party voters, for one reason or another, attend the primaries. In cities the percentage ranges from two to ten, 1 in the townships from ten to forty. A majority of the voters in these primaries elect 1 A. C. Bernheim, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. iii., p. 99. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 39 delegates to the nominating conventions, or they nominate ward or township candidates. This is the case with both the ruling parties. These candidates are the only ones between whom the voters can choose at the elections. The primaries and the nominating conventions, controlled by the party managers, are therefore practically the elect- ing conventions. I do not mean that the party managers who have this power can use it autocratically. They must keep before themselves always the qualities of their candidate which would promote or mar his popu- larity. They must nominate a man who, as they say, is "available." But within this limit, unless the popular interest has been aroused by some unusual emergency, they have a wide field of autocracy. Such a system results in the selection of weak and inefficient representatives. They are not necessarily corrupt, but they are tools and figure- heads. In the first place, the area of choice is arbitrarily limited. It is a principle in elective constituencies that the larger the area over which a district ex- tends, the more distinguished and capable are the candidates of all parties. In all districts repre- sentatives can be elected only from the ranks of the party which happens to have the majority. It is wholly improbable that the able men of a 40 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. party will be distributed about, one by one, in the small districts where the party has its majorities. But, even were they so benevolently scattered, the conditions are against their nomination. The po- litical managers must have men who will do their bidding. At the same time, with only one to nominate and elect, the selection of candidates is subject to the dictation of cliques. In wards where the party has a safe or overwhelming ma- jority, the party managers often flagrantly override the honesty and decency of the community by nominating the basest of men. And, in close districts and wards, a compact faction, bent on its own aggrandizement and threatening to help the other party, can often name a candidate, or, at least prevent the nomination of an outspoken and capable one. The influence of saloon-keepers in city and State politics is well known to depend on the power which close organization and unscrupu- lous methods give them over party leaders in the primaries and conventions. Besides operating within the party lines, these same factions, as well as other classes of voters, hold the balance of power between parties. Hence candidates must placate them. Now, it is char- acteristic of the greatest of party leaders that they raise up about themselves a body of strong ad- mirers, and a body of equally vigorous haters. Consequently, we seldom find in American politics THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 41 that a great party leader can be elected repeatedly in a close district. This principle comes out dis- tinctly in the election of the President of the United States. Those men who have achieved the highest honors in the leadership of their party in the halls of Congress and in political battles, are seldom elected to that high office. They are not often even nominated ; and, if nominated, they are almost destined to be defeated. Unknown and obscure men, or men whose record has been made entirely apart from leadership in political debate, are hunted out and given the place that in the affection and admiration of the party voters be- longed to others. The true leaders must be con- tent with appointive positions. In congressional and legislative elections, also, it is well known that, when a party leader has achieved prominence, the entire resources of the opposite party throughout the nation or State are thrown into his limited district to compass his defeat. And these extraordinary exertions are usually successful, if the district be in any way a close one. Several leaders in Congress, after serving a few terms and acquiring familiarity with the rules, and then becoming the recognized leaders of their parties, have been defeated in their districts. In this way the Democrats lost the services of their leader, William R. Morrison, and the Republicans lost also their tariff leader, William 42 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. McKinley, Jr. Only in the case of a man like Elaine or Garfield, who happened to live in over- whelming Republican districts, could the leaders be kept in the public stations where their services would redound to their party and their country. In the case of Mr. McKinley, a Democratic legis- lature had used the gerrymander to create for him a strong Democratic district. The same forces operate still more inexorably the further down we go to the lesser and lesser districts ; until, when we come to ward politics, we reach the very narrowest area of choice, with, con- sequently, the lowest extreme of ability and the highest power of greedy factions and combines. This is the main reason why our legislative bodies are composed of inexperienced men. A careful analysis of State legislatures will probably show that, in the average election, one-half the representatives are new men, with no legislative experience. An actual count of the Indiana legis- lature of 1893 shows that, in a house of one hundred representatives, there were 63 men who were there for the first time, 16 men who were serving their second term, 12 men their third term, one man his fourth term, and one man his fifth term. And this was not the result of a "landslide," bringing a new party into power; but the legislature was of the same political complexion which it had borne for several years. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WO BIT. 43 Professor Hart asserts l that in Connecticut, in the year 1790, 64 per cent of the members of the legislature had sat in it before, while in 1889 the number was only 5 per cent. It is well known that the American House of Representatives is becoming more and more a body of one and two term men. In the Fifty-third Congress (not a "landslide" Congress), out of a membership of 353, there were 133 new men, 78 men serving their second term, and only 142 i.e., 40 per cent - who were serving their third term and upwards. And everywhere the aldermen have learned to be content with one or two terms, but meanwhile to make a heavy " strike," and then give way to another of " the boys." Throughout the country it may be asserted, as a general rule, that the laws of the people are enacted by a majority who have had no previous experience in law-making. This is the explanation of two significant facts in American legislation, the power of the speaker of the House, and the power of the lobby. The American speaker, unlike the English and Canadian, is a man of dictatorial power. In the national government he is ranked next to the President. He appoints the committees, lays down the rules, and controls legislation. He has a similar position in all State legislatures, and in many municipal councils. The reason for this 1 " Practical Essays on American Government," p. 90. 44 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. dictatorship is the same as that which explains the power of a tribal chieftain or an imperial Caesar the ignorance, incapacity, and faction of his subjects. Leadership is essential wherever a body of men are compelled to act in concert. But there are two kinds of leadership. One is that of debate, argument, and statesmanship, depend- ing upon ability and enthusiasm, where the fol- lowers have confidence in their chief, and accept his leadership, and act in concert with him volun- tarily. This is the leadership of Gladstone in the House of Commons. The other is that of coer- cion, growing out of necessity and circumstance, where followers distrust the ability of any leader they may choose, where they distrust their own ability to follow, and- therefore they consent to the abdication of self-government and the elevation of a tyrant. This is the leadership of the American party speaker. It proceeds from the lack of ac- quaintance among the members of the legislative bodies, and from their mutual incompetency. They serve short terms, they come together for the first time knowing little of the qualifications of each. If they should keep the control of affairs in their own hands, there would be wrangling and wire-pulling over the appointments of committees, and then factions and mutiny on account of their final disposition. The only escape from this evil is in the power of the speaker. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 45 If our representative bodies were composed of able men, if their terms of service were longer and their legislative acquaintance wider, if the natural party leaders were not excluded from their midst by a petty district system of election, then the representatives would claim for themselves the power which they bestow upon their autocrat. They would appoint their own committees, as in the United States Senate, control their own rules, make their own laws, and the speaker would be simply a moderator instead of a dictator. Though the speaker has a unique dominion, there is another power in American councils, legis- latures, and Congress, still more ominous the lobby. It is the lobby which controls legislatures to-day. If any law demanded by the people at large, or even by a majority of the law-making body, is defeated or emasculated, its fate can be traced to the dominating influence of the lobby. The lobby is a new feature of representative government. It is coincident with the very re- cent growth of large private corporations. It is organized by them. They have such immense interests at stake on the turn of legislation, that their lobby, with unlimited resources at its dis- posal, is almost irresistible. But the lobby could not have acquired its pow- erful influence were it not for certain qualities in the legislative bodies themselves which place them 46 PBOPOET1ONAL REPRESENTATION. at its mercy. Corruption is not the only explana- tion. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists largely because of inexperience and incapacity. The lobbyists themselves are the shrewdest, brightest, and most influential men of the State or nation. They often control the party spoils, and an ambitious legislator cannot afford to antag- onize them. The lobby is organized as well as the legislature itself. It has its chiefs, who band together. All of the corporations and enterprises interested in legislation practically combine as a unit. Then these able and honorable chiefs em- ploy their resources of argument and suggestion with individual legislators and before committees. They take the dimensions of every individual who comes in their way. But if their honorable methods are inadequate, they then turn the legis- lator in question over to the petty lobbyist who carries the pocket-book. Their own hands are clean. The power of the lobby is found mainly in the fact of the party machine. The lobbyists are usually the managers of the machine. They control State and national party spoils and offices. They have the political fate of individual law- makers in their hands. They are the actual leaders in party politics. The wealth of a Tam- many " boss " comes from his employment as a corporation lobbyist. There must be leadership THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 47 somewhere. The only question is, Shall the leaders be elected to the legislature by the people, or shall they control the legislature from outside as mere irresponsible private citizens ? As long as the people are prevented from electing their leaders to positions of responsibility, there will surely arise these self-constituted leaders, whose shrewdness gives them control over the weaklings and hirelings who are actually elected. The absence of true leadership and the opportu- nity of the lobby are shown in the fruitless bick- erings and factious combinations which so often prevent a legislature from accomplishing anything good. A party in the majority needs to be held together through confidence in some leader or leaders. But their forces are often scattered, and legislation is blocked. The opportunity of the lobby is of most value in the election of a speaker, who, when once elected, becomes the instrument of those who created him. It is not to be inferred that the lobby alone is responsible for corrupt legislatures and councils. It is equally true that corrupt legislatures are re- sponsible for the lobby. Law-makers introduce bills attacking corporations for the express pur- pose of forcing a bribe. This is called a "strike," and has become a recognized feature of American legislation, to meet which the corporations are compelled to organize their lobby. 48 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. A very apparent weakness and injustice of the district system is the opportunity it gives a ma- jority party to crush out and disfranchise the minority. This is seen flagrantly in the "gerry- mander." But, even where the system is not thus abused, it is almost wholly a matter of chance whether the opinions of the people are justly expressed or not. This danger was not imminent under the earlier conditions of representation, as has already been shown, when electoral districts were natural units and the problem of represen- tation was the federation of local communities. But now that party lines are drawn through the midst of every community, it nearly always hap- pens that one party gains in the elections an un- just proportion of representatives at the expense of others. From the theory of the matter it is pos- sible to exolude minority parties altogether, and to give the entire legislative body to the majority. Suppose a legislature to be composed of forty members elected from forty districts, and that the popular vote of the political parties stands respec- tively 120,000 and 100,000. If the districts are so arranged as to have 5,500 votes each, and the parties happen to be divided in the districts in the same proportion as at large, we should have in each district a vote respectively of 3,000 and 2,500. All of the forty candidates of the ma- jority would be elected, and the minority wholly THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 49 excluded. An extreme result like this seems improbable, but it sometimes occurs. Again, it may happen, and often does, that a minority of the popular vote obtains a majority of the representatives. In the case assumed, parties may have been divided in the several districts as follows : 4 PARTY A. Majority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,800 X 25 = 70,000 votes. Minority of 1,500 in 15 districts, 2,000 X 15 = 30,000 votes. TOTAL, 100,000 PARTY B. Minority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,700 X 25 = 67,500 votes. Majority of 1,500 in 15 districts, 3,500 X 15 = 52,500 votes. TOTAL, 120,000 In this assumed case, Party A, with a total of 100,000 votes, obtains twenty-five representatives; while Party B, with a total of 120,000 votes, obtains only fifteen representatives. Where a system offers in theory such fruitful opportunities, it is too much to expect party man- agers to refrain from using them. Consequently, the district system, combined with party politics, has resulted in the universal spread of the gerry- mander. It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not appre- ciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not repro- bated, providing it be fought according to the 50 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. rules. Both political parties practise it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply do what is natural: make the most of their oppor- tunities as far as permitted by the constitution and system under which both are working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If representatives are elected in this way, there must be some public authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge to say where the line shall be drawn ? Exact equality is impossible, and who shall set the limits beyond which inequality shall not be pressed? Every apportionment act ( that has been passed in this or any other country has involved inequality ; and it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such an act, and give the advantage of the ine- quality to the opposite party. Consequently, every apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely " scientific " boundary, and the joining together of distant and unrelated locali- ties into a single district; such was the case in THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK' 51 the famous original act of Governor Gerry of Massachusetts, whence the practice obtained its amphibian name. 1 But it is not always necessary that districts be cut into distorted shapes in order to accomplish these unjust results. A map of all the congres- 1 The term " Gerrymander," though not the practice, origi- nated with the Democratic party in Massachusetts in 1811, when Elbridge Gerry was elected governor. Says Professor Ware, in The American Law Review, January, 1872, from whose article the accompanying ill; Oration is taken: " In order to secure tLeniselves in the possession of the government, 52 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. sional and legislative districts of the United States would by no means indicate the location of all the outrageous gerrymanders. In fact, many of the worst ones have been so well designed that they come close within all constitutional requirements. The truth is, the district system itself is so faulty that constitutional restrictions cannot correct it. The national Congress, has attempted to do so by requiring the districts for congressional elections to be compact and of contiguous territory, and of nearly equal population. But the law is every- where disregarded. Parties are compelled to dis- regard it, for a gerrymander in a Democratic State can be nullified only by a gerrymander in a Re- publican State. f As a result of the district system, the national House of Representatives is scarcely a representa- i^._tive body. In the Fifty-first Congress, which enacted the McKinley tariff law, a majority of the representatives were elected by a minority of the voters. the party in power passed the famous law of Feb. 11, 1812, providing for a new division of the State into senatorial districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the Federalists should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all natural and customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the State, particularly the counties of Worcester and Essex, presented singular examples of political geogra- phy. It is said that Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian Centinel an outline of the Essex outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the county, added with his pencil a beak .to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, as shown in the engraving, exclaim- ing, 'There, that will do for a salamander.' ' Salamander,' said Mr. Russell, the editor, ' I call it a Gerry-mander.' " THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 53 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. a ** JMORGANl , OWEN { 1 '* T" THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 55 FIFTY-FIRST CONGRESS ELECTION, 1888. PARTIES. CONGRESSIONAL VOTE. ELECTED. P] IOPORTK Republican . . 5,348,379 164 158 Democrat . . . 5,502,581 161 162 Prohibition . . 184,937 5 Scattering . . 56,889 11,092,786 325 325 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1890. An illustration of " compact and contiguous territory. 56 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. The Republicans, instead of having a majority of three, should have been in a minority of four, as against the Democrats. The Republicans, with 48.2 per cent of the votes, elected 50.4 per cent of the representatives; and the Democrats, with 49.6 per cent of the votes, elected 49.6 per cent of the congressmen. That this Congress did not represent the people, is emphasized by the "avalanche " of 1890. FIFTY-SECOND CONGRESS ELECTION, 1890.1 RTIES. VOTE. ELECTED. PER CENT PER CENT OF REP- OF VOTE. RESENTATION. Republican 4,217,266 88 42.9 Democrat 4,974,450 235 50.6 Populist 354,217 9 3.7 Prohibition 207,814 2.1 Independent 76,788 .7 26.5 71.1 2.4 9,830,535 332 100 100 This election again displays the fortuitous results of the system. The Democratic minority of 49.6 per cent of the congressmen in the Fifty-first Con- gress was changed to a Democratic majority of 71.1 per cent in the Fifty-second Congress, while in the popular vote the Democratic proportion of 49.6 per cent of the total was increased only 1 per cent. The Republicans, with 42.9 per cent of the vote, secured only 26.5 per cent of the representatives. 1 Calculations for the Fifty-second, Fifty-third, and Fifty- fourth Congresses are made by Mr. Stoughton Coolcy in Propor- tional Representation Review, March, 1894, based upon vcturns in the Chicago Daily News Almanac. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 57 The Republican vote fell off 4.9 per cent of the total; their representation decreased 24.1 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect a Republican, 44,276 votes to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a Democrat. The Democratic majority of 147 over the Republicans, and 138 over all, should have been a Democratic majority of 2. For the Fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, the total vote polled for congressmen was 12,032,203, of which the Republicans polled 5,031,360; the Democrats, 5,670,148 ; the Populists, 1,046,392 ; the Prohibitionists, 244,726; and 39,577 were scat- tering. The result of this poll was that the Repub- licans elected 131, the Democrats 213, and the Populists- 12 congressmen. This is to say, the Republicans, with 41.9 per cent of the total vote, (a decrease of 1 per cent below that of the pre- vious election), secured 36.8 per cent of the repre- sentatives, an increase of 10.3 per cent; the Democrats, with 47.2 per cent of the vote (a de- crease of 3.4 per cent), got 59.8 per cent of the representatives ; the 8.7 per cent of the Populists obtained 3.4 per cent of the representatives ; the Prohibitionists' 2 per cent secured nothing." In- stead of a Democratic majority of 79 in Congress, there should have been a Democratic minority of 10, as against all other parties. The stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was equally illusory. The total vote cast for congress- 58 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. men was 11,288,135. Of this number the Repub- licans cast 5,461,202; the Democrats, 4,295,748; the Populists, 1,323,644; the Prohibitionists, 182,- 679; and 24,862 were scattering. The result was the election of 245 Republican, 104 Democrat, and 7 Populist congressmen. Or, in other words, the Republicans, with 48.4 per cent of the total vote (an increase of 6.2 per cent), elected 68.8 per cent of the congressmen ; the Democrats, with 38.1 per cent of the vote (a decrease of 9.1 per cent), se- cured 29.2 per cent of the representatives; the 11.7 per cent of the Populists obtained 2 per cent of the representatives; and the 1.6 per cent of the Prohibitionists failed of recognition. The Repub- lican majority of 134 in the present Congress should be a minority of 7, as against all other parties. The injustice of the district system is extreme in its effects on new parties. Such parties suffer for two reasons. In the case of the dominant par- ties there is a rough equality, because a Democratic gerrymander in one State is likely to be balanced in another by a Republican gerrymander. But a new party cannot establish a gerrymander to suit itself until it gets control of a State government. Also, a new party is usually scattered throughout a large number of districts and States, and the dis- trict system prevents its members from combining to elect their fair share of representatives. For THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 59 example, in the Fifty-first Congress, the Prohibi- tionists should have had 5 representatives, they received none; in the Fifty-third Congress the People's party should have had 31 instead of 8, and the Prohibitionists should have received 8 instead of none ; and in the Fifty-fourth Congress the Populists were entitled to 42 votes instead of 7. Many examples might be given from individual States to show the unrepresentative character of congressional representation. Those States which are close in their majorities, and whose legislatures alternate frequently, show an endless seesaw of gerrymanders. Ohio has, perhaps, had more of these partisan displays than any other State. It was during the war that the first Republican legis- lature overthrew a long-standing Democratic ap- portionment act. The results were brought out forcibly by Mr. Garfield in a speech in Congress in 1870. He said :- " When I was first elected to Congress, in the fall of 1862, the State of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 25,000 ; but, by the adjustment and distribution of political power in the State, there were 14 Democratic representa- tives upon this floor, and only 5 Republicans. The State that cast a majority of nearly 25,000 Republican votes was represented in the proportion of one Republican arid three Democrats. In the next Congress there was no great politi- cal change in the popular vote of Ohio a change of only 20,000 but the result was that seventeen Republican mem- 60 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. bers were sent here from Ohio, and only two Democrats. We find that only so small a change as 20,000 changed their representatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and five Republicans, to seventeen Republicans and two Demo- crats. " Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system that may in theory, and frequently does in practice, produce such results as these." The Republicans retained power in the Ohio legislature from 1862 to 1876, with a consequent unfair advantage in the distribution of congres- sional seats. In the latter year a Democratic legis- lature passed a new apportionment act. Since that time there have been eight such acts, the results of which upon the fortunes of the two parties are de- picted by the following statistical analysis : REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE OF OHIO IN CONGRESS. $ REPRESENTATIVES. ID CzJ CONGRESSION- ACCORDING TO 3 o g AL VOTE. ACTUAL. PROPOR- ACTUAL i 3 TIONAL. REPRESENTATION. 8 w >< Rep. | Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. 45th, 1877-79 314,529 310,434 12 8 10 10 1 Rep. = 1 Dem. 46th, 1879-81 277,875 264,737 9 11 10 10 1 Dem. =1 Rep. 47th, 1881-83 405,042 340,572 15 5 11 9 1 Rep. = 2 Dem. 48th, 1883-85 306,674 268,785 8 13 11 10 1 Dem. = 2 Rep. 49th, 1885-87 395,596 380,934 10 11 11 10 1 Dem. = l\ Rep. 50th, 1887-89 336,063 325,629 15 6 11 10 IRep. =2^ Dem. 51st, 1889-91 412,520 395,639 16 5 11 10 1 Rep. = 3 Dem. 52d, 1891-93 362,624 350,528 7 14 11 10 1 1 Dem. = 2^ Rep. 53d, 1893-95 397,320 407,120 9 12 10 10 1 Dem. = 1 Rep. 54th, 1895-97 407,371 274,670 19 2 12 8 2 1 Rep. = 6 Dem. 1 One Prohibitionist. 2 One Populist. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 61 It will be seen that the Democrats in Ohio have never, since 1862, had a majority of the popular vote on national questions, except in 1892 ; yet in four elections they have returned a majority of the congressmen. Neither are party calculations al- ways realized. In the Forty-fifth Congress the Democratic gerrymander returned a Republican majority of the congressmen, and in the Fifty- third Congress a Republican gerrymander returned a Democratic majority, although in the Fifty-fourth Congress the same gerrymander responded well to the Republican designs. In Indiana, in 1892, under a Democratic gerry- mander, the Democrats cast for congressmen 259,- 190 votes, and elected eleven congressmen; the Republicans cast only 5,522 less votes, namely, 253,668, but elected only two congressmen. It required 126,834 Republican votes to elect one con- gressman, against only 23,565 Democratic votes ; in other words, one Democratic vote was worth 5.4 Republican votes. The Democrats, casting 47.2 per cent of the total vote, secured 85 per cent of the representatives ; and the Republicans, with 46. 2 per cent of the vote, secured only 15 per cent of the representatives. The smallest majority re- ceived by any Democratic candidate was 42, the largest was 3,081 ; whereas the smallest majority received by a Republican candidate was 4,125, and the largest was 8,724. To see that the gerryman- 62 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. der, though the apparent, is not the essential, evil of the district system, it needs only to be noted that in the election of 1894, in Indiana, with the same gerrymandered districts as in 1892, the Re- publicans elected the entire delegation of 13 members ; yet the total Republican vote for con- gressmen in the State was only 50.5 per cent (284,447) of the total vote, and the Democratic vote was 42 per cent (238,371) of the total. 1 The Republicans are entitled to only 7, instead of 13 representatives in the present Congress, and the Democrats of the State, who should have elected 6 congressmen, are wholly unrepresented. The inequalities of the district system are not confined to the United States. They appear in all parliamentary countries. Some interesting results from England are given by Sir John Lubbock in his tract on "Representation." 2 In the parliamen- tary elections of 1886, there were contested 460 seats. " The total number of votes given were 2,756,900, of which 1,423,500 were for Unionist, 1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a major- ity of 90,000 votes for maintaining the Union. According to the votes polled, the number of mem- bers returned should have been 238 Unionists and 221 Home Rulers, which, adding the members re- turned without a contest, viz., Ill Unionists and 1 8.5 per cent going to Populists and Prohibitionists. 2 The Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1890. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WOEK. 63 99 Home Rulers, would have given 349 Union- ists and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of 29. The actual numbers, however, were 394 Union- ists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, there- fore, obtained 45 seats more, and the Home Rulers 45 fewer .seats, than they were entitled to from the votes polled, making, of course, 90 on a divis- ion. Thus, then, in 1874 the Conservatives ob- tained 38 seats more than their votes entitled them to, counting 76 on a division. In 1880, on the contrary, the Liberals had 44 too many, count- ing 88 on a division. . . . Thus, whatever side has the majority, we are confronted with a violent contrast between the voting strength in the con- stituencies', and the voting strength in the House of Commons." " In my own county of Kent," continues Sir John Lubbock, " the Liberals polled in the three divisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes, against 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet the latter had all the six seats. Taking all the contested seats in the county, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conserva- tives carried sixteen members and the Liberals only two." l "At the general election (in Ireland) in 1880, 86 seats were contested. Of these the Home Rulers secured 52, the Liberals and Conservatives together only 34. Yet the Home Rule electors i Page 17. 62 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. der, though the apparent, is not the essential, evil of the district system, it needs only to be noted that in the election of 1894, in Indiana, with the same gerrymandered districts as in 1892, the Re- publicans elected the entire delegation of 13 members ; yet the total Republican vote for con- gressmen in the State was only 50.5 per cent (284,447) of the total vote, and the Democratic vote was 42 per cent (238,371) of the total. 1 The Republicans are entitled to only 7, instead of 13 representatives in the present Congress, and the Democrats of the State, who should have elected 6 congressmen, are wholly unrepresented. The inequalities of the district system are not confined to the United States. They appear in all parliamentary countries. Some interesting results from England are given by Sir John Lubbock in his tract on "Representation." 2 In the parliamen- tary elections of 1886, there were contested 460 seats. " The total number of votes given were 2,756,900, of which 1,423,500 were for Unionist, 1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a major- ity of 90,000 votes for maintaining the Union. According to the votes polled, the number of mem- bers returned should have been 238 Unionists and 221 Home Rulers, which, adding the members re- turned without a contest, viz., Ill Unionists and 1 8.5 per cent going to Populists and Prohibitionists. 2 The Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1890. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 63 99 Home Rulers, would have given 349 Union- ists and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of 29. The actual numbers, however, were 394 Union- ists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, there- fore, obtained 45 seats more, and the Home Rulers 45 fewer .seats, than they were entitled to from the votes polled, making, of course, 90 on a divis- ion. Thus, then, in 1874 the Conservatives ob- tained 38 seats more than their votes entitled them to, counting 76 on a division. In 1880, on the contrary, the Liberals had 44 too many, count- ing 88 on a division. . . . Thus, whatever side has the majority, we are confronted with a violent contrast between the voting strength in the con- stituencies, and the voting strength in the House of Commons." "In my own county of Kent," continues Sir John Lubbock, " the Liberals polled in the three divisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes, against 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet the latter had all the six seats. Taking all the contested seats in the county, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conserva- tives carried sixteen members and the Liberals only two." l "At the general election (in Ireland) in 1880, 86 seats were contested. Of these the Home Rulers secured 52, the Liberals and Conservatives together only 34. Yet the Home Rule electors i Page 17. 66 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. basis of the vote for Secretary of State, the Re- publicans should have had 50 State representa- tives, the Democrats 43, the Populists 5, and the Prohibitionists 2. Instead, the Republicans had 82, and the Democrats 18. Ohio elected 72 Republicans, 35 Democrats, to the lower house in 1892. Had the people been truly represented, there would have been 51 Re- publicans, 51 Democrats, 3 Prohibitionists, and 2 Populists. Michigan in 1894, with a popular vote for governor of 237,215 Republicans, 130,823 Demo- crats, 30,002 Populists, and 18,788 Prohibitionists, elected to the lower house of the State legislature 99 Republicans and 1 Democrat. The repre- sentation should have been 57 Republicans, 31 Democrats, 7 Populists, and 5 Prohibitionists. For members of the lower house of the New York legislature in the last three elections, the vote and actual elections, contrasted with what would have been the proportionate elections, were as follows : NEW YORK ASSEMBLY, 128 MEMBERS. 1892. PARTIES. VOTE. ELECTED. PROPORTIONAL. Republican .... 598,012 54 60 Democrat ...... 644,988 74 65 Prohibition .... 33,012 . . 3 Socialist Labor . . . 8,472 Scattering 16,463 1,301,947 128 128 THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 67 1893. Republican .... 538,471 74 65 Democrat 510,608 54 60 Prohibition .... 21,525 . . 2 Socialist Labor . . . 8,631 . . 1 Scattering 32,357 1,111,592 128 1*28 1894. Republican .... 665,857 105 71 Democrat 501,015 23 53 Prohibition .... 21,626 . . 2 Socialist Labor . . . 9,575 . . 1 Populist 6,914 . . 1 Scattering 9,339 1,214,326 128 128 The table on the following page is compiled by Mr. Geo. H. Haynes, 1 in order to show the con- trast between the popular vote and the represen- tation in the New England legislatures. In the four States, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, representation in the Senate must, according to the Constitution, be pro- portioned to population, and the partisan gerry- mander is therefore responsible for its distortion. In two of these states, Maine and Vermont, it will be noticed that the theory of the gerrymander has been perfected in practice. In Rhode Island and Connecticut, representation is fixed by the 1 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 1895. " Representation in New England Legislatures." 68 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. NEW ENGLAND LEGISLATURES. 1894. PER CT. OF PER CT. PER CT. STATE. PARTY. YOTE FOR IN IN GOVERNOR. SENATE. HOUSE. C Republican 64.3 100 96.7 MAINE J em crat | Prohibition 28.3 2.5 3.3 [ People's 4.9 ( Republican 56.0 87.5 72.7 NEW HAMPSHIRE j Democrat 40.9 12.5 27.3 [ Prohibition 2.1 (Republican 73.5 100 94.6 VERMONT Democrat 24.4 4.6 People's 1.3 0.4 Prohibition 0.8 0.4 ' Republican 56.5 90 81.3 Democrat 36.9 10 18.7 MASSACHUSETTS - People's 2.7 Prohibition 3.0 Labor 0.9 /"Republican RHODE ISLAND J Democrat 1 Prohibition 53.1 41.3 4.1 94.6 5.4 95.8 4.2 Labor 1.1 f Republican 53.5 91.7 81.3 1 Democrat CONNECTICUT -f j Prohibition 43.3 1.5 8.3 18.3 ( People's 1.3 0.4 Constitution for towns and cities, regardless of population. In the lower houses of these States both towns and population are represented, and the gerrymander is not responsible for misrepre- sentation as it is in the other States where popu- lation alone is considered. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 69 LA CROSSE CO. IS 0, 8D 70 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Municipal elections give results equally dispro- portionate. Three aldermanic elections in Chicago were as follows : ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. CHICAGO. VOTE. ELECTED. PROPOR- TIONAL. 1893. Republican 89,162 20 15 Democrat 88,280 12 14 Independent Democrat . 17,118 1 3 Independent 12,466 1 2 Socialist Labor .... 168 207,194 34 34 1894. Republican 100,647 22 18 Democrat 83,008 12 14 People's 3,557 . . 1 Socialist Labor .... 572 Independent 6,452 194,236 34 34 1895. Republican 136,233 28 19 Democrat 86,287 5 12 People's 17,199 . . 2 Prohibition 942 Independent 10,649 . . 1 251,310 ~34 ~34 In St. Paul, a minority party elects a majority of the board. ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. ST. PAUL. 1894. VOTE. ELECTED. Republican .... 12,180 4 Democrat 11,327 7 People's 1,117 Prohibition .... 477 Independent .... 444 25,545 ~n U '" THE mSTRlCT^WTMl^AT WORK. 71 In this election, six aldermen, a majority of the board, received 4,879 votes, less than one-fifth of the votes polled. The Minneapolis election was as follows : ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. MINNEAPOLIS. 1894. ELECTED. Republican ...... 17,705 9 6 Democrat ...... 13,378 3 4 People's ....... 2,132 . . 1 Prohibition ...... 1,484 . . 1 Scattering ...... 4 34,703 "l2 12 The most startling and seemingly impossible results ar,e found in New York City, where, in 1892, Tammany Hall, with 59 per cent of the votes, elected every one of the thirty aldermen. This election is to be compared with the State senates in Maine and Vermont. 1 ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. NEW YORK CITY, 1892. VOTTT WT TiTTTi-n PROPOB- VOTE. ELECTED. TIOXAL . Tammany ...... 166,693 30 19 County Democracy . . . 4,384 Republican ...... 99,463 . . 12 Prohibition ...... 2,105 Populist and Socialist . . 7,359 ^ 1 280,007 30 30 In the election of 1894, strangely enough, the results were nearly proportionate. i See p. 68, 72 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION- ELECTION OF ALDEKMEN. NE W YORK CITY, 1894. VOTE. ELECTED. PROPOR- TIONAL. Republican 112,316 14 13 Tammany 106,238 14 13 State Democracy .... 33,900 2 4 Socialist Labor .... 5,296 Scattering 7,861 265,611 30 30 In the foregoing statistical exhibits, political parties have been treated as corporate entities ; and the revelations of inequality have been based upon the total number of votes cast for each, re- gardless of the variety of opinions and interests within the party. This comparison does not re- veal the extent of a still more serious evil, the fact that nearly one-half the votes are cast for unsuccessful candidates. The candidates who are actually elected, while they may be said to repre- sent their parties, do not represent all the voters within the parties. They are elected only in the strongholds. Parties tend to become fecfcional- ized, and their antagonisms are thereby intensi- fied. Of the 105 Democratic representatives in the Fifty-fourth Congress, only 14 are from the Northern States, while only 28 of the 241 Repub- licans come from the South. As the following table will show, there are 3,062,383 Democratic voters in the Union who are not represented by congressmen in whose nomination and election THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 73 they have had a voice. The large majority of them are from the Northern States ; and they must be content to have their views on national ques- tions represented by men from an entirely dis- similar section of country, with different interests and prejudices. The same is true of Southern Republicans. The table on pp. 74 and 75 shows that 44 1 per cent of the voters are in this way unrepresented in Congress. This table shows the percentage of unrepre- sented voters in a " landslide " Congress, and might therefore be considered as an extreme case. Mr. Salem Butcher, in his work on minority representation, published in 1872, made similar calculations for three congressional elections in which there were only two political parties con- cerned, and the representation was fairly propor- tionate (see Table, p. 76). In the Assembly of New York State, as shown by the table on p. 76, the voters are misrepre- sented, not only in the numerical proportion, but also in the personnel of assemblymen. Only 23 assemblymen represent 501,000 Democrats, and 13 of these, constituting a caucus majority, are elected by 47,700 Tammany votes; 352,000 Democrats in the State at large have no spokes- men whom they can truly acknowledge as their own. Republican voters of the city, too, must depend upon rural Republicans for the protec- 74 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 3sg M > Ss S 3 ^ CO b- O CO C5 --H rH TH CO o 8 8 co" of co" co" . O b- -fl CO CO OCOb-rHb^CirHb- CO O rH O1 CO TH O O C^l O O 1O o" o" oo" co" rn" b-T -rtT cT oT co" CM" co" OCOCOTHt-rHCNTHrHrHfr- fc w P ^ H fc 2 o s^* t- Ci O C5 C5 CO 00 CO t- O t- CO o" o" cT CN" (M rH TH CO - * ' rH 8H . .8 00 b- rH sa:isi 0! -K3K OOCOrH '(MrH -0 *4 COCO COCOrHb-rHCOrHTflCM 'rH^JIrHrH (NGO ^CO-Ttl(MCXj COCOrH-* nT cxT oT o" o" rH O CO O rH 76 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. VOTES FOR CONGRESSMEN. BEPBESENTED. UHBEPBE- SENTED. VOTES. MEMBERS. PEB CENT. VOTES. PEB CENT. Fortieth Congress. Republican . . . Democrat. . . . 1,751,804 583,813 142 49 427,841 1,242,115 TOTAL .... 2,335,617 191 58 1,669,956 42 Forty-first Congress. Republican . . . Democrat. . . . 2,356,421 1,167,914 159 83 820,824 1,731,254 TOTAL .... 3,524,335 242 58 2,552,078 42 Forty-second Congress. Republican . . . Democrat. . . . 1,826,338 1,360,170 136 106 960,209 1,366,330 TOTAL .... 3,186,508 242 58 5,513,539 42 tion of their interests. Altogether, 44.4 per cent of the voters who actually cast their ballots are unrepresented. VOTES FOR ASSEMBLYMEN, NEW YORK, 1894. PABTY. BEPBESENTED. TJNBEPBE- SENTED. VOTES. MEMBEBS. PEB CENT. VOTES. PEB CENT. Republican . . Democrat . . . Tammany . . . Socialist Labor . 585,937 40,840 47,701 105 10 13 79,920 352,838 59,636 9,575 6,914 21,626 9,339 Prohibition . . . . . TOTAL . . . 674,478 128 55.6 539,848 44.4 THE DISTBICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 77 In the Board of Aldermen of New York City, in 1894, although the parties are represented in nearly numerical proportion, yet 52 per cent of the voters are actually unrepresented. VOTES FOB ALDERMEN, NEW YORK CITY, 1894. PARTY. REPRESENTED. UNREPRE- SENTED. VOTES. MEMBEBS. PEB CENT. VOTES. PEB CENT. Republican . . . Tammany . . . State Democracy . Socialist Labor Scattering . . 66,683 52,679 8,702 14 14 2 45,633 53,559 25,198 5,296 7,861 TOTAL .... 128,064 30 48.1 137,547 51.9 These exhibits for New York State and City are, of course, typical for all assemblies elected by single districts. Nearly one-half the voters are without personal representation in the law-making bodies. The significance of this fact is not readily perceived. It is one phase of the conditions which give the local machines their hold upon the parties. In the strongholds the machines are supreme because they have no fear of independent movements, and where the minority is hopeless the machines are left in control from sheer indif- ference of the voters. The party conventions, therefore, which nominate general officers for city, State, and nation, are entirely controlled by the local machines. In the legislatures, however, the 78 PROPORTIONAL EEPEESENTATION. machines frogoa the strongholds control the situa- tion, and give character to the party as a whole. In either case, the rank and file of the voters have but little direct influence in politics. The significant feature of the district system is not only the fact that voters have a choice only between the candidates of the dominant political parties ; it is also significant that a very small proportion of voters hold the balance of power between these two parties. In the congressional election of 1890, which substituted a Democratic majority of 127 for a Republican majority of 3, this result was brought about by a change of only 5 per cent of the total vote, 1 the Republicans losing that proportion, and the Democrats gaining only 2 per cent. On the other hand, the election of 1894, which turned a Democratic majority of 79 into a Republican majority of 134, was the work of 9.1 per cent of the voters, who aban- doned the Democratic party. In Indiana the remarkable overthrow, in 1894, of a Democratic delegation of eleven members, and two Republicans, Ijjprtsolid delegation of thir- teen Republicans, was effected by only 5.2 per cent of the voters who left the Democrats, while the Republican vote was increased by only 4.3 per cent of the total. 2 In the Massachusetts Senate, elected in 1891, 1 See pp. 56, 57. 2 See p. 62. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WO a change of less than 5 per cent fj$m the vote of those elected to the candidates in'rheir respect- ive districts who received the next highest vote would have defeated every member of the senate, and a change of less than lj per cent of the vote in twenty-one districts would have made the State Senate Democratic instead of Republican. 1 Professor Giddings 2 asserts that "the total possible gain or loss to a political party through strictly independent voting does not exceed, under the most favorable circumstances, 5 per cent of the maximum total vote of a presidential year." This statement is sustained by even the unprece- dented "landslides" of the past six years. It is in the exaggerated weight of small factions holding the balance of power between the two parties that is to be found the secret of the cor- rupt influences already described. The great majority of the voters are conservative, and do not readily change their party. Especially in close districts, therefore, interested elements can dictate terms to both parties. This, too, gives the bribable vote an infhtence far in excess of its proportions. Professor J. J. McCook 3 finds in twenty-one towns of Connecticut that 15.9 per 1 J. M. Berry, "Proportional Representation," Worcester, 1892. 2 Political Science Quarterly, vol. viii., p. 117 ff., "The Na- ture and Conduct of Political Majorities." 8 Forum, September, 1892. "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters," 80 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. cent of the voters are venal. The proportion ranges from 3 per cent to 50 per cent. The aver- age for the city and county is about 12i per cent. The proportion in other States is doubtless much less ; but even then it is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the balance of power between the parties. The single-mem- I bered district, therefore, places a magnificent pre- 1 ' mium upon bribery. We have seen how unequally parties are rep- resented in the city, State, and nation. Our repre- sentative system was contrived to represent not parties, but sections. The efforts toward its im- provement have been directed not toward equality of party representation, but equality of district representation. Congressional statutes and State constitutions require the districts to be of "equal" population. But this is not enforced. South Carolina has a "white " district as low as 134,369 (Census, 1890) ; but the sole "black " and Repub- lican district, the seventh, 1 contains 216,512 popu- lation. In Texas the districts range from 102,000 to 210,000; in Kansas from 167,000 to 278,000; and in Pennsylvania from 131,000 to 310,000 (both extremes in the city of Philadelphia). In Illinois in 1892 the four Chicago districts had an average population of 297,980, while the sixteen country districts averaged only 164,914. 1 See Diagram, p. 55. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 81 State and municipal representation is still more unequal. In New York City the State assembly districts are identical with the aldermanic dis- tricts. Says the Report of the New York Senate Committee on cities: 1 "In the common council, as well as in the legislature, a voting constituency of 7,000 has the same representation as a like constituency of 24,000. The principle of numer- ical equality, therefore, finds no application what- ever in the common council of New York City. The same may be said of the principle of locality representation. The interests of the first and sec- ond districts are in all things practically alike ; the total vote of the two districts is 14,498. The interests of the twenty-third district are in many regards distinct from those of the first and second. The territorial area of the first and second com- bined is 634 acres, that of the twenty-third is 1,881 acres; and yet the twenty-third, with almost twice the population of the first and second, and three times the area as well, has but one vote as against the two accorded to both the smaller area and the smaller constituency." These statistics prove the excessive inequality and minority domination of the present system wherever applied. But we have not yet reached the end of the story. We must enter the legis- lative halls in order to see the final chapter. To 1 P. 92. 82 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. say nothing further of the rule by the speaker of the House and by the legislative committees, through which power is taken out of the hands of the assembly itself, there is on all party ques- tions the imperium in imperio of the party caucus. If one party in a legislature has 60 representa- tives out of 100, the policy of the legislature is not dictated by an open conference of the 60 with the 40 ; but the majority party withdraws, and in secret conclave determines by a majority vote what shall be its united action. Thus 31 members a majority of the 60, but a minority of the whole may determine the policy of the legislature, and enact the laws of the people. This is no fanciful sketch. The power of the party caucus is well known. A man who " bolts " the caucus can have no influence whatever in legislation. He has meas- ures of his own, which he wishes to see enacted into laws. These may be appropriations of money for improvements, or for State or national institu- tions in his own district. They may be good measures, or they may be bad. But he knows that, in order to carry them, he cannot afford to stand against the wishes of his fellow-partisans on other measures. Thus every representative is in the power of his party caucus. He cannot stay out of the caucus, and when he enters he must abide by its decisions. To say that legislatures are deliberative assemblies, under such circumstances, THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 83 is ironical. They are rather war-camps. Delib- eration involves consultation between opposing in- terests and opinions, and the development of a compromise policy, which will be modified more or less by all who have a voice. But the caucus rule, dominated in the interests of the party rather than of the people, based on an electoral system which usually gives a political party a clear ma- jority, begets intolerance and the overriding of minorities. The party emerges from its caucus like an army from its fortress, runs upon the enemy, listens to no cry for quarter or compro- mise, beheads its own deserters, and then carouses over its victory. We have now been able to follow the various evil phases of recent American political life di- rectly or remotely to their root in the system of electing single representatives from limited dis- tricts, a system which we have inherited un- changed through six centuries of political and social evolution. At the present time, when political parties based on social questions divide the people and seek representation, we are using a system of representation based_onjocality. The political parties inevitably seize upon this machin- ery and use it for party ends. Thus violently 1 distorted, it represents neither sections nor parties, j Instead, it has divided the' people in every district 84 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. into two camps, each dictated by its own party machine and spoilsmen. These two machines are often leagued together. Professor Bryce has pointed out the community of interests which exists between them on occasion of independent reform movements, when they actually combine against the reformers. 1 They are also in a more or less permanent coalition. Men who are jointly interested in corporations which seek legislation and franchises are osten- sibly opposed to each other as prominent managers of the different political organizations. Though differing in politics, they unite the two machines in the promotion of their own corporate interests. The perfection of this unity of interests seems to have been reached in various cities where, as in Cincinnati, the same man is reported to be the " boss " of both political organizations. 2 This coalition extends to Federal politics. Recently a leading national manager has been publicly ac- cused, by a reputable member of his own party, of affording campaign assistance to the manager of the opposing party in return for congressional aid to a corporation client. Both machines in nation, State, and city are the tools of the corporations and speculators who plunder the public, Conse- 1 See Bryce, " American Commonwealth," vol. ii., p. 111. 2 See " Proceedings of the Cleveland Conference for Good City Government," p. 318, Philadelphia, National Municipal League, 1895. THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 85 quently, those voters who would be independent, and would gladly revolt against ring rule, have no place. They cannot elect an independent candi- date unless they carry a majority of their petty ward or district. This is almost impossible in the face of the party organizations. They can do nothing but combine with one machine against another. Hence come hopelessness and apathy of the better classes of citizens. Hence also come \ those violent explosions and hysterics of reform, those popular uprisings, which occasionally break down the barriers of machine rule, but relapse again, like a mob in contest with troops. The gerrymander and inequality in the representation of parties are bad enough; but the deadly evil of the system is the expulsion of ability and public spirit from politics, and the consequent dictator- ship of bosses and private corporations. 86 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER IV. THE GENERAL TICKET, THE LIMITED VOTE, THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. ENOUGH has been said to show the array of evils which spring from the single-membered district system. These evils have not escaped observation, and various attempts have been made to remedy them. Especially in France have interesting ex- periments been made by the substitution of " scru- tin de liste" or the general ticket. Under this method each constituency elects several members, each elector has as many votes as there are mem- bers to be elected, and those candidates are de- clared successful whose votes stand at the head of the list. In this way the majority party gets the en- tire list and the minority is wholly unrepresented. There are two applications of this system which lead to important differences in the final results. The first is that adopted in several instances in the United States in the election of boards of county commissioners arid boards of education, where the entire assembly is elected on a single ticket. With such a system, the question of equal representation plays no part whatever. The mi- nority parties are without a single representative. But the system usually results in the election of THE GENERAL TICKET. 87 abler men than the district system. This would naturally be expected from the fact that a party, in making nominations for a large area, cannot afford to nominate obscure men. For example, the city of Cleveland, Ohio, recently introduced, with the sanction of the State legislature, a far- reaching reform in its system of public schools, one feature of which is the election of a school-board of seven members on a general ticket. In the first elec- tion under this plan the vote stood as follows : - REPUBLICAN. DEMOCRAT. Buss .... 15,714 Dodge . . 13,661 Boutell . . . 15,595 Goulden . . 13,551 Backus . . . 15,385 Pollner . . 13,306 House. . . . 15,860 Ryan . . . 12,851 Daykin . . . 16,198 Burke. . . 12,814 McMillan . . 15,690 Hoffman. . 12,777 Ford .... 16,036 Plent . . . 12,804 TOTAL 110,518 TOTAL 91,764 It will be seen that the Republicans obtained the entire board ; but had there been a change of only 1,000 to 2,000 votes from Republicans to Democrats, the Democrats would have carried their entire list. The Cook County (Illinois) commissioners are elected on a general ticket, with the result that in 1892 the Democrats, with a vote of 133,000, elected their entire list of 10 candidates, and the Republicans, with 100,000 voters, were unrepre- sented. In 1893 the Republicans, with votes ranging from 70,926 to 72,554, elected 9, and the 88 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. Democrats, with votes ranging from 69,305 to 70,980, elected one. This was the first election in many years when both parties had representa- tion on the board. The second application of the general ticket is a compromise between the single-membered district and the general ticket. Districts are retained, but they are enlarged, the number is lessened, and a solid delegation to the legislature of from five to twenty representatives is elected on a general ticket for each district, by a majority or plurality vote. For example, the county of Cuyahoga (including the city of Cleveland) sends repeatedly a solid delegation of six Republican representatives to the Ohio State legislature, and not one Democrat. The county of Hamilton (in- cluding the city of Cincinnati) sends a solid dele- gation of nine Democrats. Representatives to Congress in the first half century of our constitutional history were elected by this system. Each State sent to Congress a solid delegation of one party 0r another, elected either by the State legislature or by popular vote. So unjust did the method prove to be that gradu- ally the single-member district was substituted by individual State action, and finally Congress, in 1842, made the latter obligatory in all States. Presidential electors are still chosen by this t system, though the State of Michiga\i made, in the THE LIMITED VOTE. 89 election of 1892, a notable departure, by substitut- ing the district system. The legislature of 1893, however, controlled by an opposing party, repealed the law, and returned to the general ticket. It will, of course, be observed that a legislative body elected upon this basis will not wholly ex- clude a minority party. Indeed, the experience of France seems to show that as far as equality of representation is concerned, the general ticket scrutin de liste is as equitable as the single district ticket scrutin d' arrondissement. In the election of members to the Chamber of Deputies in 1885, conducted according to scrutin de liste, the Repub- licans, with 4,300,000 votes, obtained 366 seats, whereas their numbers entitled them to only 311; while the Conservative-Monarchists, with 3,550,- 000 votes, obtained 202 seats against their rightful proportion of 257, a result not materially differ- ent from that of the district system in the United States. The general ticket was abandoned in 1889, after the trial at this one election ; and the French method at present is the same as that of other countries. The general ticket presents exactly the same fault as the single-membered district it divides the voters into two camps with no representation of the minority, and commits the control of elec- tions to the party machines. Its only difference is ^ that it makes 'the area* of election larger. 90 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. A modification of the general ticket, intended to give the minority party a limited, though not necessarily proportional, representation, is the so-called Limited Vote. This was used for nine years in the election of aldermen in New York by "three-cornered" constituencies, where, with three to be elected, each voter had but two votes instead of three. The majority party therefore could usually elect only two candidates. In Bos- ton since 1893 there have been elected annually twelve aldermen at large, but each voter has only seven votes. The majority party therefore elects seven, and the minority five. Following is the election return for 1894. The two principal par- ties nominated but seven candidates each, while minor parties nominated a smaller number. The candidates elected are those twelve who receive the highest number of votes, as indicated below. VOTES CAST FOR ALDERMEN, BOSTON, 1894. REPUBLICAN. DEMOCRAT. INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN. Pettier, 10,894 Hallstrom, 12,976 Allen, 31,276 Barry, 28,592 Bryant, 28,630- Dever, 27,642 Dyar, 24,945 Flood, 30,718 Folsom, 29,534 Lee, 26,115 Presho, 26,479 Lomasney, 26,657 Sanford, 26,062 McClellan, 24,069 Witt, 25,836 O'Brien, 24,587 192,762 188,380 23,870 Independent Democrat, Dolan, 10,234 ; scattering, 19,667. Total vote for all parties, 434,913. Republicans elect seven; Democrats elect five, THE CUMUL^VE VOTE. 91 It will be seen froiivithe above return that the limited vote creates an artificial representation of the two dominant parties, and permits no repre- sentation whatever of minor parties and indepen^/ dent movements. Parties are not represented in proportion to this popular vote, else the above election wgrtild have returned but six Republicans, one indej^fident Republican, and five Democrats. The fact 6iat the dominant parties nominate only seven candidates makes a nomination almost equiv- alent to an election, the voters of the majority party having no choice whatever, and the voters of the minority having only a possible choice of two out. of the seven. The limited vote is an interesting example of the way in which the very classes against whom a reform movement is aimed may divert it to their profit. This method of election does not permit independence ; it rather tightens the hold of the party organizations, and is in harmony with those well-known developments of municipal poli- tics where the two party machines agree to divide the spoils. It is paralleled by the " bi-partisan " commissions, which, instead of being non-partisan, are all-partisan. And it is a long step in the di- rection of that highest development of machine politics referred to in the preceding chapter, where one man is the "boss" of both political^ organizations. The limited vote in Boston has 92 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. not appreciably improved the type of aldermen, and cannot be said to have accomplished any result except a permanent alliance of the two machines. In New York the law was repealed after a trial of nine years. The general ticket has been shown to be crude, even barbarous, in its destruction of minorities. The limited vote is less barbarous, but it does not widen the field for independence. The Cumu- lative Vote is a further modification of the gen- eral ticket in the direction, apparently, of freedom for the voter. According to this plan, the elector has as many votes as there are representatives to be elected, but he may dispose of them as he pleases. Not only may he distribute them one by one among the candidates of one or all parties, as in the general ticket or limited vote, but he*- may cumulate them upon one or more candi-, dates. In this way a small minority, which would' have no opportunity in the limited vote, may elect a small number of candidates by cumulating all its votes on one or more. For example, in the election of Boston aldermen, given above, if the Independent Republicans could have cumulated their 23,870 votes upon one of their candidates, instead of dividing them singly between two, and being compelled to vote presumably for five regu- lar Republicans in order to use all their lawful THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 93 number of votes, they could have elected that one by a vote as large as that received by any other candidate. With the cumulative vote, very much depends upon the size of the districts. If they are small, as in the election of representatives to the lower branch of the Illinois legislature, the result differs but little from the limited vote. In Illinois each district elects on a general ticket three members of the State House of Representatives ; but the voter may cumulate or divide his votes, giving one vote to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each of two candidates, or three votes to one candidate (called "plumping"). This system was adopted in 1870, and has therefore had a trial of twenty- five years. Testimony as to its practical workings will throw light upon the problem before us. Mr. M. N. Forney has published answers from Illinois editors to inquiries which he submitted to them. 1 From these replies and other sources, the follow- ing conclusions are drawn. 1. It appears that representatives of third parties in Illinois do not, as a rule, secure election. In 1892 the Prohibitionists in the State mustered for representatives 24,684 voters (not votes) ; the Peo- ple's Party, 20,108, out of a total of 872,948. If these parties could have concentrated their votes, 1 See " Political Reform by the Representation of Minorities," New York, 1894. 94 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. they would have elected four and three members respectively, out of a total of 153. In the elec- tion of 1894, the results were as follows: ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE, 1894. VOTE FOR ___ _____ REPRESEK- OF TOTAL TATIVES. 101AI* 57 3 11 Republicans . . 1,332,488 53.4 92 Democrats . . . 914,735 37.2 61 Prohibitionists . 43,402 1.7 . . People's Party 174,465 7.1 Independent . . 6,323 .2 . . Ind. Democrats . 1,407 . . , , Ind. Republicans . 8,867 .3 . . Amer. Citizen . . 2,585 .1 . . Scattering . . . 2,575 .1 TOTAL . . . 2.48fi.847 100 1S3 153 The elections are therefore confined, as in the limited vote, to the candidates of the two domi- nant parties. Unlike the single-membered district system, however, both parties have representatives from every part of the State instead of from the strongholds only, and there are no hopeless minori- ties of the two main parties. Every citizen who has business before the legislature has some mem- ber of his own party to transact that business. The vote in the legislature is close, requiring the constant attendance of all members. By the elec- tion of 1892 it stood 75 to 78. 2. Votes are wasted whenever a popular candi- date receives " plumpers " beyond the numb gi? ^? THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 95 necessary to elect him. "A candidate who runs too far ahead is just as dangerous to his party as the man who runs far behind. Under the old system, the man who runs ahead does so at the expense of his adversary, but under the cumula- tive system it is at the expense of his col- leagues." l For example, in the election of 1894 the vote of the forty-fifth district was as follows: Callahan . . . Republican .... 11,140 Black Democrat .... 9,793 Tiptit .... Democrat .... 9,699 Lathrop .... Republican .... 9,628 Palmer .... People's Party . . . 2,92l Smith .... Prohibition .... 960 The^total Republican votes were 20,768, repre- senting approximately 6,923 voters ; the Demo- cratic votes were 19,493, representing 6,498 voters. Yet the Democratic minority elected two representatives, and the Republican plurality only one, because Callahan, Republican, received at least 1,400 votes more than he needed ; but his colleague, Lathrop, lacked at least 75. This re- sult occurred in one district in 1892, and in three districts in 1894. 3. In order to obviate this waste, all the re- sources of the party managers are enlisted, and the party machine becomes even more indispensa- ble than under the old system. In the first place, the managers determine how many candidates, 1 See Forney, above. 96 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. shall be nominated. Only where the parties are close, as in the forty-fifth district above cited, do both parties nominate two candidates. In other cases, the minority nominates but one, and a nomi- nation is equivalent to an election. For example, the vote in the thirty-sixth district was : Kitzmiller . . . Republican .... 16,525 Mounts .... Democrat .... 9,013j| Jones .... Democrat .... 9,059 Winters .... People's Party . . . 2,360 Kelly Prohibition .... 1,117 The Republicans, though lacking but 1,500 of the Democratic vote, nominated but one candidate. Again, in close districts, the managers must exer- cise great care in selecting good " running mates," as did the Democrats in the forty-fifth and thirty- sixth districts. For these reasons the party or- ganization is greatly strengthened, there is a strong opposition to " plumping," and voters are careful not to disobey the party instructions. 4. The quality and ability of representatives are no better than under the old system. In close districts, where four candidates are nominated, there may be a slight improvement; but in other districts, where a nomination is equivalent to elec- tion, the worst elements get control, and bid de- fiance to the people. There are frequent " deals " between parties, the minority agreeing to put up one man, and the " gang " in both parties control- ling the primaries. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 97 If districts are larger, electing five to fifteen members, the cumulative vote gives a decided advantage to very small parties, both from the smaller quota necessary to elect a single candi- date, and from the increased waste of the larger parties. In England the school boards are elected on the cumulative plan by districts returning four or more members. A correspondent of the New York World, report- ing the first election held in Manchester under this system, wrote : 1 In Manchester there were fifteen members of the school board to be elected, and each voter had fifteen votes at his disposal. * Forty-four candidates went to the polls, and over 390,000 votes were given by 26, 513 voters. . . . Manchester is famous for two things, first, the fervor of its Protes- tantism ; second, the number, organization, and strength of its working-classes. But at this election the two Roman Catholics were brought in at the head of the poll, one of them receiving nearly 20,000 more votes than any Protes- tant candidate, and no working-class candidate, of whom there were seven, being elected at all, the highest vote any of them received being 3,854, while one of them got only 166. Here is the list of the successful candidates, with the votes given to each : Rev. Canon Toole, Roman Catholic .... 54,560 George Richardson, Roman Catholic .... 36,308 Wm. Birch, " Philanthropist " 35,415 Herbert Birley, Episcopalian 34,026 Wm. B. Callender, Episcopalian 31,824 1 Quoted by Dutcher, " Minority or Proportional Representa- tion," New York, 1872, p. 72. 98 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Robert Gladstone, Episcopalian 24,237 Thos. Dale, Episcopalian 20,688 Joseph Lainb, Episcopalian 22,987 Lydia Becker, " No Religion " 15,249 Richard Haworth, Wesleyan 13,137 Rev. W. McKerrow, Presbyterian 9,919 Robert Rumuey, Presbyterian 9,510 Dr. John Watts, Unsectarian 8,861 John Cooper, Wesleyan 8,020 Oliver Heywood, Secularist 7,902 The 90,868 votes given to the Roman Catholic can- didates were polled by about 7,000 voters, who either " plumped " for the reverend gentleman who heads the list, or split their votes between him and the lawyer who foUows him. The 133,762 votes given to the five Church of England candidates were polled by about 9,000 voters ; so that it seems that in Manchester the relative strength of the Church of England and the Church of Rome is as nine to seven. It is quite clear that under the old system the former could have elected all the candidates, while the lat- ter would have been unrepresented ; but it is equally clear that these two parties underestimated their own strength, and that between them they might have elected all the can- didates but one. The Catholics might have had six in- stead of two candidates, and given each of them 15,144 votes ; the Episcopalians might have had eight candidates, and given each of them 16,720 votes ; while all that the other parties could have done would have been to elect the remaining candidate. J f s: The cumulative vote, therefore, whether in small or large constituencies, must involve either / waste and guesswork, or extreme dictatorship of (/party machinery. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 99 CHAPTER V. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. THE cumulative vote makes it possible for the elector, entitled to vote for a number of candi- dates, to concentrate his entire voting strength upon a single candidate. This is the advantage to minority parties which it gives, as compared with the general ticket. It compels all parties, there- fore, to cumulate in order to prevent a waste of votes.- Now, suppose every elector were required to "plump" all of his votes on a single candidate. Every one would then be equally well provided for, if he had but one vote on a general ticket, instead of as many votes as there are candidates. Ten votes given to one candidate count no more than one vote given to that candidate, provided every other elector has but one vote. It has, in- deed, been proposed 1 that representatives should be elected on general ticket, but that each elector should be entitled to vote for but one candidate, the candidates who stand highest on the poll up to the required number being declared elected. This would be in effect a compulsory "plumping." The 1 L. C. F. Garvin, "How to effect Municipal Reform," Arena, September, 1894. 100 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. same objections would apply as against the cumu- lative vote. It would waste the elector's voting strength by giving surplus votes to popular candi- dates, which the electors, could they know before- hand, would wish to give to others representing the same views. The party organization would therefore decide for the electors exactly how their votes should be cast. But this dictation could be avoided and the voter's freedom guaranteed, if he were permitted to indicate on his ballot his second and third choices, for whom his single vote should be counted, if it were not needed to elect his first choice, or if it were given for a candidate who could not be elected. ' This is ' the " single trans- ferable vote," which, as its name would indicate, allows each elector to vote for but one candidate, instead of the entire number to be elected, but permits him to indicate second and third choices. The total number of votes cast is therefore the same as the number of valid ballots, which, divided by the number of members to be elected (or number of members plus one), gives the unit or quota of representation necessary to elect a single representative. Each voter marks his ballot with the figures, 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names of candidates in the order of his preference. In counting the ballots, at first only the first choices are counted, and as soon as a candidate has PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 101 received a number of first choices equal to the quota, he is declared elected. After that no more votes are counted for'tdm, but remaining ballots which give him first choice are counted for the candidates marked second choice, or if the second choice be declared elected, then for the third choice, and so on. After the ballots have been gone over once in this way, and it is found that the full number of members is not elected, as would usually be the case, then candidates whose total vote, either by way of first or secondary choices is less than a quota, are declared " out " in the inverse order of their vote, and their ballots are transferred to the successive choices indicated thereon, until the complete number of members is declared elected. This method of election has been exhibited by Miss C. H. Spence of South Australia, in some fifty public meetings. By massing together the results of these several elections, she has presented the following scrutiny of 3,824 votes for the elec- tion of six parliamentary representatives. There were twelve names of candidates on her voting- papers, arranged in alphabetical order. 1 " The instructions to voters were that they should mark with figures, in the order of their preference, the candidates 1 "Report of meeting on Proportional Representation, or effective voting, held at River House, Chelsea, London." John Bale & Sons, 18 1 od * 64 CO W ia Angas (Capital) .... Baker (Do.) 419 262 361 190 682 1 11 2 2 2 4 1 4 11 10 10 2 2 7 6 31 72 44 47 17 11 12 15 64 139 27 637 517 637 615 ^637 637 144 Birks (Single Tax) . . . Buttery (Labor) .... Charlston (Do.) . . Fowler (Capital) .... Glynn (Irish Catholic) . . Guthrie (Labor) . . . . Harrold (Capital) .... Magarey (Prohibition) . . 167 320 136 ,,$} 4 8. 18 1 1 1 6 36 1 37 11 2 9 32 28 88 127 Robinson (Labor) .... Stirling (Wom.'s Suff rage), Null ' 466 _4 ~4 13 17 t 21 22 63 6 216 31 80 49 6)3,824 637- 45 -1 19 lot, ** ^ 92 187 290 342 3,834 as far as six or fewer. This is all the voter has to do. His vote is to be counted for one, and that one the first on his list who needs his vote and can use it. If his first choice has already reached the quota, or has too few votes even with his aid to do so, the vote is transferred to his next, as shown by his number, and used and not wasted. " The quota is found by Mr. Hare's original method, by dividing the whole number of votes by the number of rep- resentatives needed, in this instance six. The votes should be first mixed thoroughly together, and then taken out one by one and numbered, and allotted according to first choice, as shown in the first vertical column of the table appended. The votes are found to be 3,824, which, divided by six, gives as a quotient or quota 637, leaving out the fraction. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 103 " This shows that only Charlston and Magarey had any surplus; and, after cutting the pile of votes once, like a pack of cards, so that there might be no arrangement of preferred second choices, the 45 and the 19 unneeded votes were taken from the top, and allotted according to second choice, as seen by columns two and three. " Next, the returning officer declares Robinson, the lowest on the poll, not elected, and proceeds to distribute his original and transferred votes by second choice, or third, if second is already elected. (See column 3.) Next, Har- rold is declared not elected, and his votes dealt with sim- ilarly. Thus, step by step, six of the twelve candidates are eliminated from the contest, leaving six elected. " Of these, two have quotas of first choice votes, two have quotas of first and transferred votes, and two have what Mr. Hare calls approximate quotas sufficient for returning them. . . . -The appropriation of transferred votes may be followed in the horizontal lines. At the foot we see a line marked ' Null ; ' these were ineffective apparently more than in reality. These 144 voting papers could not be used because the voters had marked the names of men who had already obtained the full quota of 637 votes, or who had been eliminated as hopeless. " But I believe that there were only two unrepresented ; one who had marked one name, and that one of the unsuc- cessful candidates, while the other voter had ingeniously picked out the six who failed to make a quota." The single transferable vote has become the | classical form of proportional representation, i from the great ability with which it was presented I . by its author, Mr. Thomas Hare, and advocated by John Stuart Mill. 1 It was also devised inde- i See Chapter X. and Appendix IV. 104 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. pendently by the Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and introduced by him into the election of a portion of the members of the " Rigsraad " in 1855, and for the " Landsthing " in 1867. It is advo- cated by the English Proportional Representation Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is president. There is a practical difficulty, almost insur- mountable, in the application of this system to large constituencies,/!! the fact that all the votes of the entire constituency must be brought to- gether to the central bureau for counting. They cannot be counted by the various precinct officials, leaving only the totals to be handled by the cen- tral board. ^The Hare system doubtless works well in a constituency of a thousand voters, as in the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco, where it has been successfully employed in three elections, I or -in constituencies electing only three to seven / I candidates by a restricted suffrage, as in the * Danish law of M. Andrae ; but when ten thousand, or a hundred thousand, or a half million votes are to be counted, and a large number of the ballots must be recounted to make the proper transfers, the task is too heavy.^) j The Hare system is "advocated by those who, in /a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political j parties. They apparently do not realize the im- possibility of acting in politics without large groupings of individuals, nor do they perceive that PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 105 the Hare system itself, thcSpi apparently a system of personal representation, would, nevertheless, result in party representation. And this from the fact that voters who act rationally, and wish to see their own views most strongly represented in legislation, would always transfer their secondary choices to candidates of the same party as the ones who receive their first choices. The only way in which the system could lessen party cohesion would be to require the names of candidates to be printed in alphabetical order, as in the present Massachusetts and California ballot laws, and not by party tickets, so that the voters would be com- pelled to search through the entire ballot for the candidates of their own party. This would doubt- less encourage independent voting, but would by no means abolish parties. A study of the scru- tiny of votes taken by Miss Spence, as given above, shows that the " surplus " votes, and votes of "eliminated" candidates, have been transferred r as far as possible within party lines. In an actual instead of a trial election the adherence to party would be closer. With the present organization of parties in the United States, and with the customary method of printing party tickets on the so-called Australian ballot, there is reason to believe that the Hare system would be forced into the service of par- ties. There is a general agreement among the 106 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. leading advocates ^1 ftportibnal representation that a system of e^^Ri is needed which will do as little violence as possible to existing prejudices and habits, a system which will fit in with the methods of voting and the political traditions of the people, and yet will utilize these traditions and methods in such a way as to free the voter from the tyranny of the single-membered district system. It must also be a system in which the ballots can be counted at the precincts where they are cast. VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS, INDIANA, 1892. DEMOCRAT. REPUBLICAN. PEOPLE'S. PROHIB. I. 262,270* 255,615* 22,208* 13,050 II. 260,661 * 253,878* 21,861 12,830 III. 260,600* 253,836* 21,883 12,827 IV. 260,586 253,815* 21,876 12,824 V. 260,580 253,799* 21,873 12,823 VI. 260,560 253,807 * 21,873 12,821 VII. 260,588 * 253,793 21,873 12,821 VIII. 260,547 253,808* 21,865 12,820 IX. 260,575 253,787 21,873 12,819 X. 260,600* 253,792 21,873 12,813 XI. 260,591 * 253,777 21,871 12,820 XII. 260,590* 253,767 21,867 12,819 XIII. 260,581 253,767 21,867 12,815 XIV. 260,538 253,770 21,865 12,816 XV. 260,533 253,770 21,864 12,815^ 3,910,390 3,808,791 328,392 192,533 In order to approach the solution of our prob- lem from a standpoint familiar to Americans, we may examine the principles involved in a vote for PEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 107 presidential electors, 'arfl A^ possible modifica- tions necessary to make iPB^an election propor- tional. Take, for example, the vote in the State of Indiana in 1892, as shown on p. 106. The particular candidates are indicated by Roman nu- merals, in the order in which they stood on the respective tickets. Of course, under the existing system of majority (or rather plurality) rule, the fifteen Democratic nominees are declared the successful candidates, seeing that individually each one receives more votes than any Republican candidate. But with proportional representation, parties, rather than in- dividuals, must receive their just deserts. There- fore the following calculation is made : Democrats 3,910,390 Republicans 3,808,791 People's Party . ; 328,392 Prohibitionists . .' 192,533 8,240,106 8,240,106 -r 15 = 549,340 = unit of representation. Since there are fifteen representatives to be elected, it would appear that every party should be entitled to one representative for every fif- teenth part which it receives of the total vote for all parties. This quotient would be 549,340, which would be the unit of representation. Di- viding, now, the several party votes by the unit of representation, we have, 108 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. REMAINDER. ELECTING. Democrats, 3,910,390^549,340 = 7 + 165,010 7 Republicans, 3,808,791 - 549,340 = 7 + 63,411 7 People's Party, 328,392 549,340 = + 328,392 1 Prohibitionists, 192,533 - 549,340 = <0_+ 192,533 _0_ Total, 14 IT The People's party, having the largest remainder above a full quotient, would be entitled to the odd delegate, making the complete representation con- sist of seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and one Populist. It now remains to select the individual candi- dates on the several tickets. This is done by taking the seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and one Populist, who show the highest number of individual votes. I have indicated the success- ful candidates by an asterisk. Here we have the simplest modification possible of the existing general ticket with which Ameri- cans are familiar, (it secures justice between parties, obviates the waste of cumulative voting, breaks the monopoly of the dominant parties, and elects the most popular and representative men in each party. \ But as a practical instrument for a scheme of proportional representation, it presents serious dif- ficulties. Like all of the plans for minority rep- resentation that have been examined, as well as the existing single-membered district, it is based, primarily, upon the theory that the voter casts PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 109 his ballot for individual candidates and not for a political party. This is the primitive theory of representation, which, as we have seen, emerged from the primary assembly through the instru- mentality of proxies. Based, however, upon this earlier theory, the modern voter approaches the election with the idea of his political party upper- most in his mind. He votes for persons because they are the nominees of his party. The person- ality of the candidates is a secondary considera- tion. This is seen in an extreme case in the general ticket of a presidential election. Each political party nominates a list of candidates equal to the total number to be elected ; and the voters of the majority party, by voting individually for each candidate on their party ticket, elect the en- tire ticket. For this reason the plan is not suited to proportional representation, under which the political parties could not hope to elect an entire delegation, and would naturally not wish to nomi- nate a larger number of candidates than they could expect to elect. At the same time there is a very prevalent modification in the method of voting the general ticket in the United States, which will suggest a way out of this difficulty. The voter is usually given the privilege of voting a straight ticket by placing a single mark opposite the title of the party of his choice. In this way he gives a vote 110 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. individually for each candidate on the ticket, although not required to check the individual names. Plainly, if all the votes are cast in this way, the final result as between parties is the same as though each voter cast but one vote for a party instead of his ten or fifteen or more votes for the individual candidates of that party. Con- siderations of this kind influenced Mr. Thomas Gilpin of Philadelphia, who in the year 1844 published his pamphlet " On the Representation of Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies." l This was probably the "earliest attempt to find a philosophical solution for the problem of presentation." 2 Mr. Gilpin proposed that voters should have but one vote, which they should cast, not for a candidate, but for a party. The constituencies were to be en- larged, and each party committee or convention was to present one list of candidates. The voter was to hand in to the election officers his party ticket which might contain " as candidates the whole number of representatives to be voted for in the district; and these should be placed in preferences highest on the list, in order that those set first on it may be chosen according as the number of votes given may entitle the ticket to one or more of its candidates." The total number 1 Philadelphia, John C. Clark, printer, 1844. 2 Professor Wm. R. "Ware, in American Law Review, Jan- uary, 1872. PEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Ill of tickets voted divided by the number of persons to be elected, gives the electoral quota, which, in turn, used as a divisor, determines the number of candidates who are elected on each list. No pro- vision was made whereby the elector could indi- cate his preferences among the candidates on his party ticket, the rule being that, as already quoted from Gilpin, if a given list was entitled to, say, three quotas of votes, the first three candidates were to be the elected deputies. In 1846 M. Victor Considerant published at Geneva, Switzerland, a plan similar to that of Gilpin, but independently originated. 1 He did not contemplate a full list of candidates on all party tickets, but only partial lists, as the nomi- nating agencies might choose. Each list was to be published before election and given an official number. Each elector was to vote for a ticket by writing on his ballot the number, " No. 1," " No. 2," etc., and then also to name the candidates of his own ticket whom he wished. 2 In 1870 M. Borely of Nimes, France, proposed that each elector should himself indicate his pref- erences by numbering the candidates 1, 2, 3, etc. 1 "De la Sincerite du gouvernement representatif, ou Exposi- tion de 1'Election Veridique." Reprinted by Karl Biirkli, Zurich, 1892. 2 " D'e'crire sur son bulletin le nurnero de sa section, et au-des- sous, la liste des noms qu'il aura choisis panni les candidats de sa section," p. 12, 112 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. In this form the plan was adopted in 1871 by the Association Reformiste of Geneva, Switzerland, and became known as the liste libre, or "free ticket." While recognizing political parties as primarily entitled to representation, it was again soon per- ceived that the restriction of the elector to one vote for a single party did not permit him to vote for individual candidates on other party tickets whom he may have preferred; and his freedom of choice within his own party would not be great, seeing that his party managers would nom- inate no more candidates than they hoped to elect. In 1875 the Swiss Association, therefore, abandoned the double vote for party and for can- didates within the party, and advocated a combi- nation of the cumulative vote and the free ticket. The voter was to have as many votes as there were deputies to elect, and he might cumulate them as he saw fit. However, to avoid the wasted votes of the' crude cumulation, the free list feature was added; and it was provided that the total number of votes given to individual candi- dates on the respective tickets were to be added together to determine the share of representation which the parties as such should b&ye. ' Much can be said in favor of this plan, espe- cially in connection with the Australian system of voting, where all the party tickets appear upon PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 113 the same " blanket ballot." It is also well adapted to the Massachusetts and California ballots, where candidates are named alphabetically, and not ac- cording to parties. By it the voters may plump their votes without regard to the instructions of the party managers, yet with the assurance that no votes are wasted. For example, in the election in the forty-fifth Illinois district, as given on page 95, where the Republican Callahan ran so far ahead of his ticket that his colleague was de- feated and two Democrats were elected, the " free ticket " amendment would have given the follow- ing result: REPUBLICAN. DEMOCRAT. PEOPLE'S AND PROHIBITION. Callahan, 11,140 Tiptit, 9,793 Lathrop, 9,628 Black, 9,699 Total, 20,768 19,493 3,88l Republican, 20,768 Democrat, 19,493 People's, 2,92Ji Prohibition, 960 Total, 44,142 3 = 14,714 = unit of representation. Republican, 20,768 14,714 = 1 + 6,054, electing 2 Democrat, 19,493 14,714 = 1 + 4,779, electing 1 People's, 2,921 14,714 = + 2,0214, electing Prohibition, 960 14,714 = 0+ 930, electing ~2 ~3 In the crude cumulation, where candidates and not parties are considered, as in the Illinois method, the Republicans with a majority of the votes 114 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. elected only one candidate, who received 1,400 votes more than he needed. But with the free ticket modification, these 1,400 wasted votes are counted for the party to which this leading candi- date belongs and are in effect transferred to his colleague. Thus that party secures its rightful proportion of two representatives instead of one, and the candidate running ahead of his ticket becomes a help instead of a danger. A bill based upon this combination was intro- duced by Hon. Tom Johnson in the Fifty-second Congress, and is given herewith : 52d CONGRESS, IST SESSION. H. R. 9222. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. June 15, 1892. Referred to the Committee on Election of President and Vice-President, and ordered to be printed. Mr. Johnson of Ohio introduced the following bill : A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That members of the House of Representatives shall be voted for at large in their respective States. SEC. 2. That any body of electors in any State may, in convention, nominate any number of candidates not to ex- PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 115 ceed the number of seats to which such State is entitled in the House, and cause their names to be printed on its ballot. SEC. 3. That every elector shall be entitled on his ballot to one vote each for as many persons as the State whereof he is a resident is entitled to seats in the House, and he may cumulate his votes on a less number of persons in such manner as he may choose. SEC. 4. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the candidates in any State shall be divided by the number of seats to which such State is entitled, and the quotient to the nearest unit shall be known as the unit of representation. SEC. 5. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, and the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the number of representatives to which each such body of electors is entitled ; and if the sum of such quotients be less than the number of seats to be filled, the body of elec- tors having the largest remainder after division of the sum of all the votes cast for all its candidates by the quota of representation, as herein specified, shall be entitled to the first vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled. SEC. 6. That the candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates and found entitled to representation under the foregoing rules, shall receive certificates of elec- tion in the order of the vote received, the candidate receiv- ing the highest number of votes the first certificate, and so on ; but in case of a tie, with but one vacancy to be filled, the matter shall be determined by lot between the candi- dates so tied. This combination of the cumulative vote and/ the "free ticket" answers in most respects the/' ideal of electoral reform. It gives to the voter 116 PROPORTIONAL EEPEESENTATION. the widest freedom of choice between all the indi- vidual candidates on all the tickets, avoids the waste and the consequent "machine " supremacy of the simple cumulative vote, and opens the way for independent movements within and without the dominant parties. There are, however, two minor objections. If voters are allowed to write on their ballots the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., against individual candidates, it becomes easy to make those " distinguishing marks " which the laws against bribery seek to prohibit. This objection would not hold against a plan by which the voter gives but one vote to a candidate or one to a ticket. Again, the cumulation involves a waste of votes between the groups or factions within the party corresponding to the waste which the sim- ple cumulation permits between parties. Voters of a given faction who cumulate on their own first choices of their party candidates, and who fail to distribute their votes so as to aid the secondary candidates of the same faction, would be at a dis- advantage, and minor but shrewder factions would secure disproportionate influence in the party repre- sentation. This objection, however, is not a serious one, provided the several factions nominate sepa- rate tickets, as they could easily do. The cumulative vote, with the "free ticket" amendment, has been adopted by the Canton Zug in Switzerland, and is favored by Professor Ernest PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 117 Naville, the leading advocate of proportional rep- resentation in that country. It is simpler than the plan finally agreed upon by the Swiss and American advocates of the reform, and would per- haps secure all the advantages of the latter. It could be adopted in Illinois by a slight amend- ment to the cumulative vote, though the small size of the constituencies would prevent the best results. It is the only form, too, which could conveniently be adopted in States like Massachu- setts, and California, whose ballot laws require that candidates' names be printed in alphabetical order, and not by party groupings. In these- States, the voter could cumulate his votes on in- dividual candidates, and it would be the duty of the returning officers ' to separate out the candi- dates by parties and add up the individual votes in order to find the several party votes. The simple rule of three would then determine the party representation, and the individual candi- dates who stood highest on the party lists would be declared elected. It is evident, however, that the advantages of cumulation will be secured to the party, though not to favored candidates, if voters, being allowed to cast but one vote for individual candidates on any of the party tickets, are permitted to cast all the unused votes to which they are entitled for a single party, by merely making the legal mark 118 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. against the title of the party. Thus if a voter in a constituency electing twenty candidates chooses to give single votes to five candidates on one or more tickets, he may, instead of cumulating the remaining fifteen on a single candidate, by writing the figures " 15 " against the candidate's name, be permitted to " bunch " them directly for the party ticket to which his favorite candidate belongs by making the simple cross against the party emblem. His fifteen votes would go for the party thus indi- cated ; and his remaining five would count both as preferences for individual candidates within the parties, and as votes for the parties to which those candidates belong. This is the plan finally agreed upon by the Swiss Association, and recently incorporated into the electoral laws of Neuchatel and Geneva. It was also adopted by the American Proportional Representation League at Saratoga in 1895, as most nearly suited to American habits. A bill drawn up by a committee of the League 1 appointed for the purpose is given herewith, together with an introductory statement by the committee : " The accompanying bill is provided with especial refer- ence to the election of boards of aldermen in cities; but 1 Professor J. R. Commons, Syracuse University ; Mr. Stough- ton Cooley, Secretary American Proportional Representation League; Professor J. W. Jenks, Cornell University. This bill has not been officially adopted by the League. It is simply the recommendation of the committee. PEOPOETIONAL EEPEE8ENTATION. 119 the same provisions may be adapted, with simple verbal changes, to the election of members of a legislature, or congressmen, or any board consisting of a number of representatives with equal powers. The number of candi- dates on any ticket ought ordinarily not to exceed fifteen, and may well-be as small as five. In case of large bodies, therefore, the city or State can be divided into large terri- torial districts, and the proportional system applied to each. " It has been presumed that the general laws of the State provide for the nominations by parties and by petition; follow the general plan of the Australian system of voting ; provide for election inspectors, canvassers, etc. ; lay down principles determining the validity of votes ; and in gene- ral provide for the carrying out of elections, so that this bill provides only the specific requirements needed for the proportional system." BILL TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA- TION IN CITIES. SEC. I. The members of the board of aldermen to be chosen at any election shall be chosen by all the voters of the city on a general ticket, and not by separate districts. SEC. II. Any party or body of voters which polled at the last preceding city election one per centum of the total vote cast for the principal office filled at said election, or which shall present a nomination paper signed by voters equal in number to such percentage [or by the number specified in the law of the State concerned], may nominate a ticket or list of any number of candidates for said board of aldermen not to exceed the total number of persons to be elected to said board ; and the names of the persons thus nominated shall be printed on the official ballot, but so that or 120 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the list of candidates nominated by each party or body of voters shall be printed separately. SEC. III. A candidate may be placed upon several party tickets, but he may choose in favor of one of them. All the votes cast for him are then counted for the ticket chosen. In default of a choice by him, the ticket to which he shall be assigned is determined five days before the election by lot, by the proper officer, in the presence of the official representatives of the parties or petitioners con- cerned, if they wish to appear. A candidate's name cannot be placed on any ticket if he makes objection in writing to the proper officer five days before the election. SEC. IV. Each voter shall have as many votes as there are persons to be elected, which he may distribute as he chooses among the candidatts, giving not more than one vote to any one candidate, votes thus specifically given to be known as " individual votes ; " and each such vote shall count individually for the candidate receiving the same and for the ticket to which the candidate belongs. In case a voter does not use the total number of votes to which he is entitled by specifying that number of candidates, the re- mainder of his votes, to be known as " ticket votes," shall be counted for any ticket as a whole, provided^ that he designate such ticket by title ; otherwise only the " indi- vidual votes " shall be counted. His entire ballot will be void if more than one ticket is designated by title. The voter casts his " individual votes " by marking in the space provided by law opposite the names of the sepa- rate candidates ; he casts his " ticket votes " by marking in the space provided at the head of the ticket. SEC. V. Judges and inspectors of election shall deter- mine for each precinct, and the central canvassing board for the city, the following : PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 121 1. The number of votes invalidated for any cause. 2. The number of valid "individual votes" cast for each candidate. 3. The number of valid "individual votes" cast for each party or ticket. 4. The number of " ticket votes " cast for each ticket. 5. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket, including " individual votes " and " ticket votes." 6. The total number of all valid votes cast. SEC. VI. In determining the results of the election, 1. The total number of valid votes cast for all tickets shall be divided by the number of candidates to be elected; the quotient, ignoring fractions, to be known as the " unit of representation." 2. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket shall be severally divided by the unit of represen- tation', and each such ticket shall be entitled to a number of aldermen equal to the quotient thus obtained, ignoring fractions. 3. If the sum of such quotients be less than the number of persons to be elected, the ticket having the largest remainder after the division aforesaid shall be entitled to an additional alderman ; thereafter, the ticket having the second largest remainder; and so on, until the whole number is chosen. SEC. VII. When the number of representatives to which each ticket is entitled shall have been determined as pro- vided in Section VI., the candidates upon such tickets who shall have received the highest number of votes (not exceed- ing the number of representatives to which such ticket is entitled) shall receive certificates of election. In case of a tie between tickets or candidates, the lot decides. SEC. VIII. If a ticket obtains more representatives than it has presented candidates, the number of seats remaining 122 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. to be filled is distributed among the other tickets in pro- portion to the votes cast for each. SEC. IX. When there is a vacancy in any seat, the candi- date who has received in the general election the greatest number of votes after the last one elected, in the party or group within which the vacancy has occurred, is chosen to fill it. In order to illustrate the practical operation of this measure if enacted into law, I give herewith an abstract of the report of a special commission to the Belgian Parliament appointed for the pur- pose of holding a trial ballot in Brussels, Nov. 19, 1893. The report is published in full in La Representation Proportionelle, Brussels, Decem- ber, 1893. It gives a detailed and careful ex- hibit of all the steps in proportional voting. To Americans it is especially useful ; since, although the Belgian bill differs in some points from the American, yet it is an application of the Swiss plan to the Australian ballot a ballot not used in Switzerland. The Belgian parliament, having in hand the re- vision of the constitution, determined to test the claims of the advocates of proportional representa- tion by a trial election of the eighteen represen- tatives from Brussels in parliament ; and although parliament finally rejected the reform, yet the object lesson has attracted international attention. The commission having the matter in charge PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 123 placed in nomination six different tickets, a larger number than would usually have been pre- sented, since the Catholics and Independents, and the Socialists and Progressists, would usually nominate fusion tickets. Although there were eighteen seats to be filled from the Brussels district, the committee did not place full tickets in nomination, the largest being that of the Socialists, containing ten names. As no party could hope to secure all the seats, no party would nominate a full list of candidates unless required by law to do so. Each party would nominate one or two more than it hoped to elect. On page 124 is given the form of ballot used in this election, with initials for the names of the candidates. These candidates were men who had retired from active politics, but whose polit- ical reputation made them well known in the city. The instructions given to voters were as fol- lows: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTORS. A. The elector may stamp the white spot in the square placed at the head of a list of candidates. By voting in this way he gives eighteen votes to the ticket, no matter how many candidates there are upon it. (" Ticket votes.") B. He can, after having stamped the square at the head of the ticket, also stamp the white spot in one or more squares placed at the right of the names of those can- didates who figure on the same ticket. By doing this he 124 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA TION. UJ a. V LU Q Q 0) 2 LU I * LU cc cyS te T 1 ^Ul g 5 Q z UJ O 00 3 1 a Q_ (S> <: o iH (M CO ^ 10 co b- oo PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 125 gives eighteen votes to that ticket and one vote of prefer- ence (" individual votes ") to each of the candidates whom he has thus designated. C. The elector who has not voted at the head of any ticket can stamp the white spot of one or more squares placed at the right of the names of candidates on whatever ticket the candidate may appear. In this way he gives for each square stamped one vote of preference to the candidate des- ignated, and one vote to the ticket to which this candidate belongs. (Mixed ballots.) (This differs from the American bill and from the Swiss laws, in which the elector gives " individual votes " on as many tickets as he pleases, and then gives the remainder of the number to which he is entitled to any ticket, even though his " individual votes " are on both tickets.) D. The following ballots are void : 1. Ballots having more than one vote at the head of tickets. 2. Ballots upon which the elector has stamped the white spot placed at the head of a ticket, and has voted at the same time for candidates on the other tickets. (Not void in American bill and Swiss laws.) 3. Ballots in which the elector has voted for more than eighteen candidates." The people of Brussels took a lively interest in the experiment. Meetings were held in various parts of the city, and the method of voting was explained. About 12,000 electors cast their bal- lots. The voting-booths were open from 9 A.M. to 4 P. M. The counting of ballots was begun at once, and completed in all the precincts in three- quarters of an hour to four hours' time for from 126 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 300 to 1,940 ballots each. This work was found to be not at all complicated, and was done as easily and rapidly as in the ordinary elections. The work of the central bureau began at 5.30 P.M. ; and the returns from the several precincts were added up as rapidly as they came in. The first results were as follows: Number of votes 12,192 Blank or void ballots 333 Valid ballots 11,859 A large number of the void ballots had been purposely annulled by the voters, who had cov- ered them with fantastic inscriptions. The party votes were the following : PARTY. TICKET TICKET MIXED TOTAL BALLOTS. VOTES. VOTES. VOTES. Moderates 546 X 18 = 9,828 + 1,865 = 11,693 Progressists 2,013 X 18 = 36,234 + 3,278 = 39,512 Socialists 5,748 X 18 = 103,464 + 3,217 = 106,681 Flemish Democrats 1,127X18 = 20,286 + 1,427 = 21,713 Independents 411 X 18 = 7,398 + 1,027 = 8,425 Catholics 972 X 18 = 17,496 + 1,909 = 19,405 TOTAL 10,817 X 18 = 194,706 + 12,723 = 207,429 A very small number of the ballots contained " mixed votes," only 1,042 out of 11,859, the great majority, 10,817, being cast for "tickets." With the American law there would doubtless be a larger proportion of mixed or scattering votes, since the voter who has marked the head of his PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 127 ticket is not prohibited from scattering a portion of his votes for candidates on other tickets. In the Belgian law, of course, each " ticket vote " counts eighteen votes for the party ; in the Amer- ican bill it counts only the surplus remaining after the " individual votes " have been counted for those several tickets in which the individually designated candidates appear. The 1,042 mixed ballots contained 12,723 votes, an average of twelve to the ballot, whereas the voter was entitled to eighteen. This may be ex- plained. The elector who scatters his votes is embarrassed in finding eighteen individuals who satisfy him, and on the average, therefore, loses one-third of his party-voting strength. He finds it easier to vote for tickets than for candidates. The modified " ticket vote " of the American bill, therefore, again assists those who wish to vote mixed tickets, and in so far promotes the inde- pendence of the voter. It allows him to use all the votes to which he is entitled after he has scat- tered his individual votes among various tickets by merely " bunching " the remaining votes on a single ticket. For the distribution of seats among the political parties the Belgian reformers have indorsed a plan drawn up by Professor D'Hondt, and explained in Appendix I. to this book. It is a complicated plan, and does not secure better results than the 128 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. simple rule of three adopted in Geneva and Neu- chatel and by the American League. Accord- ing to this latter simple division, the distribution would be the following: The total number of votes, 207,429, divided by eighteen, gives 11,523 as the unit of representation. Dividing the party votes by this unit provides for fifteen representa- tives; the remaining three are assigned to the parties having the largest remainders. TOTAL VOTE. REPRESENTATION. DER. AT Moderates .... 11,693 - - 11,523 = 1 + 170 = 1 Progressists . . . 39,512 - - 11,523 = 3 + 4,943 = 3 Socialists .... 106,681 - - 11,523 = 9 + 2,974 = 9 Flemish Democrats 21,713 - - 11,523 = 1 + 10,190 = 2 Independents . . 8,425 - - 11,523 = + 8,425 = 1 Catholics .... 19,405 - - 11,523 = 1 + 7,882 = 2 TOTAL 15 18 It is impossible under any plan yet devised to find an exactly proportionate representation. 1 Representatives are living units, -and cannot be parcelled into fractions for the accommodation of unfortunate remainders. But taking the above distribution, we find that the Moderates get one representative for 11,693 votes. Progressists get one representative for 13,170 votes. Socialists get one representative for 11,853 votes. Flemish Democrats get one representative for 10,856 votes. Independents get one representative for 8,425 votes. Catholics get one representative for 9,702 votes. 1 In Appendix I. will be found a comparison of different plans proposed for the distribution of seats. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 129 After determining the number of representatives to which each party is entitled, the next step is to designate the individual candidates actually elected. The vote for candidates on the Progress- ist ticket is here given, the others being similar. This ticket is entitled to three seats, and the indi- viduals chosen are those having the three highest votes, as indicated below. INDIVIDUAL VOTES ON PROGRESSIST TICKET. VOTES OF PREF- VOTES OF PREF- ERENCE ON ERENCE ON TOTAL. TICKET BALLOTS. MIXED BALLOTS. DA 738 459 1,197* DEM . ^ . . . 1,012 495 1,507* GEN 394 442 836 LAB 228 349 577 LAV 282 365 647 SCA 616 428 1,044* SP 388 367 755 CA 393 373 766 The report of the commission states that the most important men of each party lead the tickets in the number of their votes. In this connection should be noted the small number of preferences given on ticket ballots. Of the 10,817 ticket bal- lots only 6,317 indicated preferences for candi- dates, the remaining 4,500 voting straight tickets with only the single mark against the title. The 6,317 "ticket votes," which contained also indi- vidual votes of preference on the same ticket, in- dicated only 21,105 such preferences, an average 130 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. slightly exceeding three, as against the average of twelve individual votes 011 the 1,042 mixed bal- lots. It would seem, therefore, that the mixed ballots, which do not throw their entire weight for one party against others, and so have little influence upon the share of party representation, have, nevertheless, a disproportionately large in- fluence in designating the candidates upon each ticket who shall be elected. This might occur; but in the above election, as a matter of fact, the candidates who received the largest number of votes of preference on ticket ballots generally re- ceived a similar advantage on the mixed ballots. In this connection the objection is made against the Swiss system that a strong party with surplus votes might defeat the leader of another party by giving ^preference votes to a weak candidate on the ticket of the latter. That this objection has but little weight can be seen by examining the above table of individual votes on the Progressist ticket. Not often would a party be so strong as willingly to transfer votes to an opposing party which would be liable to swell the latter's repre- sentation at the expense of its own. It could jeopardize only one of the candidates on the lat- ter's ticket, and this would not affect the leader unless the party were so small as to be entitled to only one representative. In the Progressist ticket, it will be seen, 209 votes would have been needed PROPORTIONAL PEPRESENTAT10N. 131 to displace S.C.A., the lowest successful candidate on the ticket, by G. E. N., the next in order, while the leader of the party, D. E. M., exceeds S. C. A. by nearly 500 votes. The principal leader of a party may always be expected to run considerably ahead of his ticket. As between the larger par- ties, therefore, which are entitled to more than one representative, the objection has no weight, while with a party barely entitled to but one representative it assumes an improbable waste of votes by the larger parties. It might be added, however, that in *the cumulative variety of the free ticket as proposed in the Johnson bill and adopted in Canton Zug, the principal leaders of a party would be further removed from such risk than in the single-vote variety. 132 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER VI. APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. IN stating the advantages of proportional repre- sentation there are two lines of discussion, a theo- retical and a practical. The theoretical principle involves the goal towards which electoral reform should be directed. But to reach this goal a plan of action must be devised. In the latter case the discussion is practical, dealing with the various methods which have been proposed. In a Democratic form of government, unlike an absolute monarchy, methods are as important as measures. If a practicable and effective method of proportional representation cannot be discov- ered, the theoretical principle is a mere dream. We shall therefore best perceive the general prin- ciple and the practical method by examining them together. In the first place, proportional representation recognizes the nature of modern political parties as based, not altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems of national scope. There is in various quarters a disposition to decry and resist any recognition of parties. It is pointed out, for example, that the very essence of civil APPLICATION OF TBS REMEDY. 138 service reform lies in taking the offices " out of politics," and that the evils of municipal govern- ment proceed from political parties. The contention is mainly one of definition. Possibly a new definition is needed of "party," as well as "politics." The latter has come to mean a base, underhanded manipulation and diplo- macy. But there is also an honorable and neces- sary politics. All action by government, whether city, State, or nation, is political action. And all action by individuals towards incorporating their views in laws and public policy must be through associations or groupings of individuals under their chosen leadership. These groups are politi- cal parties, and this action is the genuine, educational, vital function of parties in popular government. But where there is freedom and intelligence, such groupings are not rigidly permanent. They turn on political questions, and as questions change there come new alignments of individuals. If the electoral machinery prevents this, and forti- fies the dominant parties against inroads, compel- ling alignment, on new questions the same as on old, and forcing the same alignment on municipal and State questions which exists on national ques- tions, the party becomes a machine, sustained by spoils and plunder, and there is no freedom for the voter. If, however, the electoral machinery 184 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. be modified so as to permit the representation of new elements within the old parties, or to facili- tate the representation of new parties, then we should have, not rigidity and corruption, but natural and wholesome political growth, whether in city, State, or nation. *! Proportional representation, therefore, is based nipon a frank recognition of parties as indispensable '(in free government. This very recognition, in- stead of making partisan government all-powerful, is the necessary condition for subordinating parties to the public good. To control social forces, as well as physical forces, we must acknowledge their existence and strength, must understand them, and then must shape our machinery in accordance with their laws. We conquer nature by obeying her. At the same time, though recognizing political parties based on social questions, yet, in a nation of such vast territory as the United States, sec- tional differences also demand recognition. These are amply provided for in our Federal Constitution. The Senate of the United States represents the States, without regard to population or parties. It is not proposed to criticise this practice. It is an important feature of our Federal system. Yet it does not seem that the Senate should have the same weight in legislation as the House of Representatives. It ought to sink to the level APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 135 of a revisory board like the House of Lords, or the upper chambers of the Canadian and Provincial parliaments. Such would become its status, if the House truly represented the people, and furnished a lifelong arena for their political leaders. As it is, the Senate shines, not by ability, but by comparison. The House is supposed to represent the people. A combination of sectional and party representa- tion would be secured in this branch by elect- ing State delegations on the proportional basis. Congress has power to provide without Constitu- tional amendment for this plan of election. The gerrymander has destroyed whatever unity of local representation the present system may retain in theory. Districts are frequently changed ; agri- cultural, manufacturing, mining areas are thrown together. The State, however, is a truly organic unit, accustomed to act as such ; and State election of national representatives would harmonize with this unity, and would permit the free play of sec- tional as well as national interests. In State legislatures a similar distinction might be made. In the lower house the county, or a small group of counties, electing ten or twelve representatives, could be made the unit. In a House of one hundred members, there would be eight or ten districts, each sending its delegation elected on the proportional basis. 136 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. The State senate should be elected on a general ticket for the State at large, one-half perhaps at each election. It is difficult to describe the prin- ciple upon which senates at present are chosen. Their membership is small, ranging from, thirty- five to fifty. Hence senators cannot stand for counties. Only nine of the fifty-two Indiana senators represent single counties, and two of these are from one county. The others represent the most arbitrary combinations of two, three, and four counties each, arranged only for partisan pur- poses. May not the senate be given a distinctive place and character, elected on the broad basis of the State, representing the whole people, thereby attracting to its halls the recognized leaders of thought and action throughout the common- wealth? At the same time local interests would have their influence. A political party with only meagre sagacity would distribute its nominees either for Congress or for a State senate as widely as possible over the State. Only in this way could it appeal to the voters of all classes and in- terests. Even now we see this distribution in the nomination of tickets of State candidates, from the governor to the chief of statistics. If sec- tional differences are decisive, political parties may be trusted to provide for them. The canton of Geneva, with a single legislative APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 137 assembly of one hundred members, elects them on the proportional plan, in three nearly equal groups ; one group of thirty-four from the city of Geneva, one group from the right and another from the left bank of the river. In municipal elections the unity of the city would be recognized by abolishing the wards alto- gether, and by electing only one legislative assem- bly instead of two. With a single chamber also, as in foreign cities, responsibility will be central- ized, and the honor of the position enhanced. The board of aldermen or common council might consist of thirty members, ten of them to be elected each year. There might, indeed, be cities of extensive area, or with sections of opposing interests, where two or three general tickets could be elected. But as a rule this would not be neces- sary, for the parties would be careful to distribute candidates among the sections. N * The significance of proportional representation, as far as it affects popular elections, consists in the fact that it prohibits the exaggerated influ- ence of small factions holding the balance of power between two parties. For this reason it will remove the incentives to bribery and extrava- gant use of money in elections. The secret bal- lot has made bribery difficult and dangerous, but it has not touched the inducements to bribery. 138 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. The number of close districts is so large that ma- jorities in the legislatures and Congress, as well as popular majorities for executive and judicial officers, turn on narrow margins. The bribable vote is as large as, or even larger than, the shifting vote, 1 and is therefore adequate to decide elec- tions, and to turn the control of legislative bodies with large majorities from one party to the other. But with proportional representation there is no^ faction or group which holds the balance of power. * A change of the entire venal vote, should it equal the Connecticut average of 12J per cent, would affect only 12^ per cent of the result. But as the changes of this kind are more or less offset by both parties, they could not disturb more than one per cent to three per cent of the total vote. It can therefore be seen how diminutive would be the briber's influence. Successful bribery would endanger only one candidate out of a party's representation. And this, unless the legislature were minutely close, would not be worth the briber's expense. A legislature elected by bribery- could be of no service unless it contained a ma- jority for the bribers. The only cases in which bribery might be expected to give a political party such a clear majority, would be in those States where the party vote is very close, as in New York and Indiana, where the two parties often i See pp. 79, 80, APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 139 differ by less than 1 per cent of the total vote. But even in such cases, it must be remembered, there are third and fourth parties, which, if repre- sented, would hold the balance, and would prevent a clear majority for either of the great parties. The same is true of the Federal Congress. In other States, where one party has a heavy major- ity, the bribable vote is not large enough to over- come it. The secret ballot makes bribery difficult ; proportional representation makes it fruitless. >^ - Proportional representation based upon political opinions, rather than territorial areas, is a " specif- ic " for the gerrymander. As already shown, the gerrymander is an inevitable result of the district system. It is merely a phase of the attempt to outline the districts or the wards. If there are no districts, there can be no gerrymander. Other remedies must fail. The courts in various States have recently taken upon themselves the right to overrule certain redistricting acts contrived for the election of State legislators. This policy is dan- gerous to the integrity of the courts, as well as fruitless. The courts are not empowered to sub- stitute an apportionment of their own creation ; and therefore, by declaring an existing gerry- mander unconstitutional, they merely call back a previous one of another party, usually their own, and equally vicious with the one condemned. But 140 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. proportional representation, by abolishing districts altogether, wipes out the very substance of the gerrymander. It relieves the courts and the le- gislatures of an onerous burden and a dangerous power. So inevitable and self-evident is this remedy for the troublesome gerrymander that to add more words in explanation of it could only weaken the force of the simple statement. Not only are parties primarily represented, they are represented with mathematical accuracy in proportion to their strength. Justice and equal- ity become realities. Instead of the flagrantly distorted assemblies, which by way of rhetoric we call representative, we should have a true reflec- tion of the people. And this equal representation is elastic. It conforms to all the movements of population. If cities increase in size, their repre- sentation increases in legislatures and Congress. Even more significant than unequal representa- tion as between parties, is the large number of voters who under the district system are wholly unrepresented. The tables given in Chapter III. 1 show for certain elections of congressmen, of mem- bers of the New York Assembly, and of aldermen of New York City, the number of electors who voted for successful candidates, and are therefore represented by men of their choice, and the num- 1 See pp. 74-77. APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 141 ber who voted for unsuccessful candidates, and are therefore unrepresented. By reference to those tables it will be seen that, by the congres- sional election of 1894, 44.5 per cent of the voters are unrepresented in Congress by men of their own choosing. That this is the usual proportion is shown by the fact that for the Fortieth, Forty- first, and Forty-second Congresses, elected more than twenty years earlier, the proportion of unrep- resented voters was 42 per cent. In the New York Assembly elected in 1894, 44.4 per cent of the voters are unrepresented ; and in the Board of Aldermen of New York City 51.9 per cent are unrepresented. The theory by which it is sought to justify the present system in its denial of representation to nearly half the voters, is based on the assertion that a minority party in one district will be a majority party in another ; and that, therefore, the minority voters whose particular candidates are not successful will, nevertheless, be represented, because legislators in other districts will be elected by voters of the same political faith. That such an argument should be generally ac- cepted as adequate is striking evidence of the hold which political parties as corporate entities have gained upon the popular imagination. So unques- tioned is the notion of the solidarity and the com- munity of interests of men of the same party, no 142 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. matter how far apart they may live in different sections of the nation, the State, or the city, that one-half the people are willing to forego the right of personal representation, and to permit distant and often antagonistic interests to choose for them their own representatives. It is assumed that the Negroes and Republicans of the Southern States are represented by Republicans chosen in the North, and that Northern Democrats can find their spokesmen in the Democrats from the South. In the present New York Assembly, 13 of the 23 Democratic assemblymen were elected by 47,700 Tammany voters of New York City. Can it be said that the 350,000 Democrats of the remainder of the State will find their views expressed by these Tammany assemblymen from the city? Are the Republican merchants of the city repre- sented by the farmers from the country? These voters for defeated candidates have no voice in the selection of the standard-bearers of their own party. In this important sense they are unrepresented. Unable to affect elections within their own party, they leave the machine in control. The present influence of Tammany Hall would be much lessened in State and Federal politics, did not the district systetn make its leaders spokesmen, not only for its own following, but also for the unrepresented Democracy of the State at large. Proportional representation would increase the representation APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 143 of the latter while reducing the representation of Tammany, and so lessen its autocratic power. Candidates, too, are not nominated on one issue alone, but on several. It is this tempering and modulation of the representative body so as to correspond with all phases of opinion and policy throughout the country or the State that propor- tional representation guarantees. It is to be noted that, in this discussion, we are not concerned directly with the basis of suffrage. We are not inquiring whether it shall be wide or limited, plural or singular, male or female, old or young, white or black, intimidated or free. We take the suffrage for granted, and inquire only whether, such as it is, it is effective ; whether, with the show of representation, there is essential dis- franchisement, and what are the remedies therefor. > Proportional representation promises, above all, the independence of the voter, and freedom from the rule of the party machine. It will not abolish parties, it recognizes them. But it permits new alignments and groupings of individuals within and without existing parties at the expense of the iron-bound classification imposed by the modern highly developed party machine. The secret of machine rule lies in the control of nominations, and the rigid alignment of voters in two camps. Freedom from the machine, then, 144 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. means, first, power on the part of the voters to con- trol the nominations of their party; and second, power to defeat obnoxious candidates without en- dangering the success of the party. Both of these advantages are provided for in the proposed bill. First, as to influencing nominations. In many of the cities of this country, where representative institutions have most signally failed, the public alarm is showing itself in spirited independent movements of the best classes of citizens from all political parties. But these municipal leagues and civic federations can act only indirectly upon the city authorities. They have very little influence upon the nominations of the two parties for mu- nicipal officers. They do not attempt independent political action, their only resource being to enter into combination with one of the machines in order to defeat the other. But suppose, in such a situa- tion, proportional representation were adopted. The Municipal League could then nominate an independent ticket by petition signed by one per cent of the voters at the last general election. Let this ticket be nominated in advance 6f the nominations by the dominant parties. Let it con- tain names of the best citizens of both parties, men whose ability, public spirit, and integrity are every- where acknowledged. The two dominant parties would be almost forced to indorse these candi- dates. In that case the candidates would select APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 145 the party for which their individual votes should be counted. If it should happen that the entire ticket of the Municipal League were indorsed by the various parties, the League's ticket would wholly disappear ; but the members and friends of the League would scatter their votes among the other tickets, voting individually for their own original candidates. The following will illustrate the process. Suppose there are ten aldermen to elect, and that the League can muster 300 voters, the Re- publicans 500, the Democrats 400, and the Labor party 100. Each voter being entitled to ten votes, there would be 13,000 votes in all, requir- ing 1,300 to elect a single candidate. Suppose the League to place in nomination the following ticket, consisting of three Republicans, three Dem- ocrats, and one Labor candidate. TICKET OF MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. REPUBLICANS < B.... DEMOCRATS LABOR \ G... If, now, the character of their nominees is so distinguished that the existing parties would be constrained to indorse them all, and, being thus 146 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. indorsed, the candidates should indicate the ex- isting parties as the beneficiaries of their votes (in accordance with section 3 of the bill), the tickets to be voted at the election would be as follows : REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. A *A *D *G B *B *E N C *C *F O DHL E I M K Each party, unless required by law, would nom- inate, not a complete list, but only about as many as each expected to elect. If, now, the 300 voters of the League should distribute their votes indi- vidually for the seven League candidates, as indi- cated above, while all others should vote straight tickets for their respective parties, the result would be : Republicans, 5,000 + 900 = 5,900 votes, electing 5 aldermen. Democrats, 4,000 -f 900 = 4,900 votes, electing 4 aldermen. Labor, 1,000 + 300 = 1,300 votes, electing 1 alderman. TOTAL, 12,100 10 In this extreme case the League has seen its own ticket disappear, but has dictated the nomina- tions of the other parties, and, by adding its votes to theirs, has elected its own nominees. The five Republicans elected would include A, B, C, who APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 147 receive 800 individual votes each, against 500 each for H, I, and K. The four Democrats would include D, E, F, who receive 700 individual votes each, against 400 each for L and M. The Labor candidate, G, receives 400, against 100 for N and O. Of course it is not expected that in actual practice the 500 Republicans, for example, would all vote straight tickets. Many of them might give preferences for H, I, and K, but many more would give their preferences for A, B, and C, while the entire weight of the League would be thrcrwu for A, B, and C. And so for the other parties. What reason have we to suppose that other parties would swallow the League ticket, as above indicated? Simply the fact that their voters are perfectly free to abandon their party nominees, and to vote for the League candidates of their own political stripe, yet not nominated by their own machine. For example, if the other parties declined to indorse the League candidates, the tickets now to be voted would be : - MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. REPUBLICANS -X DEMOCRATS. LABOR. rAx H L N Republican j B x I MO 1C x K R /-DPS Democrat] E Q T (F u Labor j G 148 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. I have indicated the vote of a supposed Repub- lican who gives one vote each to the Republicans on the League ticket, and his other seven votes to his own ticket straight. Supposing all the Repub- licans, Democrats, and Laborites to do the same (of course an extreme case), we should have the fol- lowing result : MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. 3,000 straight 1,500 Repub. 1,200 Demo. 100 Labor 5,800 Electing 4 REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. 5,000 1,500 4,000 1,200 1,000 100 900 1 The extent to which the Municipal League could go in electing its candidates would, of course, depend upon the ripeness of voters for revolt from their parties. In a case like that above, where the parties declined to indorse any of the League can- didates, we might expect a much larger disaffec- tion than above supposed, and the election of a larger number of League candidates. It will be noticed that the Republicans, by " bolting " their party, have succeeded in electing six Republicans instead of the five to which their proportions origi- nally entitled them. But three of these six are nominees of the League, A, B, and C, who get 800 votes each (300 from the League and 500 from the Republicans). One of the League Dem- ocrats is elected with 700 votes. APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 149 I have given two extreme variations out of the several combinations possible. Many others might be suggested and worked out. I will conclude with one more. Suppose the Republicans and Democrats each nominate one of the League candidates. The tick- ets would be : MUNICIPAL LEAGUE.X REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. LABOR. A Ax Dx N B H L O C I M D K R E PS F Q T - G- I have indicated the vote of a Leaguer who gives one vote to each of his nominees on the Republican and Democratic tickets, and eight to his League ticket. Supposing the others to vote likewise, and the other parties to vote straight, we should have : League, Republicans, Democrats, Labor, 2,400 votes, 5,300 votes, 4,300 votes, 1,000 votes, electing electing electing electing 2 aldermen. 4 aldermen. 3 aldermen. 1 alderman. 13,000 votes, electing 10 aldermen. In this case the League has elected two men on its own ticket, and two of its own nominees on other tickets. So much for the influence of voters upon the 150 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. nominations of candidates. The second element of strength in proportional representation is the power it gives to voters to defeat obnoxious can- didates of their own party without endangering the success of the party as a whole. This may be illustrated by another example, such as may often be found in a State at large, where there is no in- dependent organization like the Municipal League, ready to anticipate the party nominations. Sup- pose in such a case that the parties with the rela- tive strength of 500 Republicans, 400 Democrats, 100 Laborites, place the following tickets in nomination : REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. LABOR. A D N B E O C F H L I M K R If the voting were as usual, the Republicans would have 5,000 votes, electing five candidates ; the Democrats 4,000, electing four ; and the La- borites 1,000 votes, electing one. But suppose the party organization of the Republicans has fla- grantly disregarded the wishes of 200 Republicans, and nominated no candidate representing them. Under the present system of plurality election, these 200 Republicans know that to put up an in- APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 151 dependent ticket means both their own defeat and that of the Republican party as a whole, with the election of the Democrat. But with proportional representation they could safely nominate an inde- pendent ticket. The tickets would be as fol- lows : REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. LABOR. A D N AA B E O BB C F CO H L I M K K The result of the election would be : Independent Repub., 2,000 votes, electing 2 representatives. Republicans, 3,000 votes, electing 3 representatives. Democrats, 4,000 votes, electing 4 representatives. Labor, 1,000 votes, electing 1 representative. We see here a striking advantage of .proportional representation. An independent movement takes place in the ranks of a plurality party, and does not in the least endanger the success of the party as a whole. The Republicans elect as many repre- sentatives as before the division, so that on party questions they retain their original strength in the legislature; but the individuals elected are by no means the same. Two of the five are wholly inde- pendent of the machine organization. Of course, if the independent movement increased, as it could 152 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. readily do, if the candidates of the regular organiza- tion were objectionable, the number of independent representatives would be increased proportionally at the expense of the regular nominees. It is easily seen that this increased power to reject the nominees of a party must react strongly upon the character of the nominees. The latter are nominated to be elected. Under the present system very inferior men may be elected, because the voters have no other choice. Let them have, however, the wide freedom of choice which pro- portional representation gives, and the party mana- gers will be forced to place before them a much higher grade of candidates, who will be suited to their wishes. Thus proportional representation gives the voters power against the influence of the machine to control nominations, not only di- rectly, by nominating early their own candidates for a later indorsement by the regular organiza- tion, but also indirectly, by their increased power to "bolt," and defeat obnoxious candidates who have been "regularly" nominated. The secret of these combinations and recombi- nations, of this unparalleled freedom of the voter, springs from two facts: first, instead of requiring a majority or plurality to elect a candidate, a much smaller fraction can do so; and second, a wide territorial area is given for combinations of voters of the same opinions. Instead of a ward we have APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 153 a city; instead of a district we have a State. Under the present system, independent voters who actually place a ticket in the field are usually in the minority. If, however, we count those who stay at home, as we should do to a large extent, the number of independents is very great. But they have only a choice between two machines. They are penned up in narrow districts under the whip of the party bosses. But proportional representation breaks down the fences, and en- ables them to combine throughout the city or State. And, furthermore, it allows them to com- bine within their own party organization without promoting the success of the opposing party's machine. That this feature of proportional representation strikes at the radical evil of present-day politics, is shown abundantly by current literature. We may notice absenteeism and the primaries. Surely it is an alarming condition when the in- telligent and business classes everywhere leave the primaries and the elections to the " heelers," the loafers, and the ignorant. The extent of this evil is in recent years well understood, but its causes are unexplained. Says a writer in an article favor- ing compulsory voting: 1 u ln the State of New York 300,375 persons who voted in 1888 remained 1 F. \Y. Holls, in Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, April, 1891, pp. 589, 590. 154 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. away from the polls in 1889; and 286,278 did so in 1890. In the last mayoralty election in New York City (1890), over 35,000 men who had even registered abstained from voting, with the result that the city was once more turned over to an organized band of plunderers. A more deliberate and extensive betrayal of trust would be difficult to find. In Massachusetts -the total vote of 328,- 588 in 1888 fell to 260,798 in 1890, a difference of 67,790. In Chicago the figures are even more startling. In the spring election of 1887 less than 72,000 out of a possible 138,000 were cast, 66,000 citizens failing in their duty, while in June of the same year, at the judiciary election for the choice of judges for a city of almost a mil- lion of souls, the total vote was 44,074, less than one-third of the number of qualified voters." Pro- fessor A. B. Hart 1 affirms that the voting popula- tion is one-fourth of the total population, and that in the presidential elections five-sixths of this vote is cast. In New York, in 1880, the vote was 1,104,605, being 23 per cent of the population, and 95 per cent of the legal voters; but in 1891 it was only 259,425. In New York City in 1888, the vote was 18 per cent of the population; in 1890 it was 11 per cent, and in 1891 it was 13| per cent. In Massachusetts the census of 1885 showed 1 "Practical Essays on American Government," pp. 24, 30. New York, 1893, APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 155 442,616 voters; but the vote for governor in that year was only 209,668, and in 1894 it was 13 per cent of the population. For president in 1888 in that State it was 344,243. In Boston, says Mr. S. B. Capen, President of the Municipal League, the assessed polls in January, 1895, were 143,435. Of these but 88,214 were registered, and only 70,191 less than one-half of the eligibles took the trouble to vote. Ward 11, the home of the rich, shows the lowest proportion of actual votes, as compared with registered citizens. The full figures are: assessed polls, 7,809; registered, 4,807: votes cast, 3,533. Ward 9, the Beacon Hill ward, shows assessed polls, 3,838 ; registered, 2,260; votes cast, 1,687. And at a party primary held in Ward 11, there were but 81 votes cast in four precincts out of 800 entitled to vote. Up to the present time the greater part of the agitation for better government consists in bitterly criticising the intelligent voters who stay at home, and beseeching them to meet their political duties. It is assumed that their only reasons are bad weather, dirty politics, business engagements, and lack of public spirit. Indeed, such reasons come to the surface ; but even when these classes are aroused, as at the present time, and ready to do their share of work, no one can fail to see that they are cowed and silenced by their utter help- lessness and the hopelessness of their cause. Sep- 156 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. arated by arbitrary ward lines in narrow districts, they cannot get together throughout the city. If they have a record of independence, the party pri- mary excludes them; and, if admitted, they are not a match against the party organization. Poli- tics is a business. It requires time and strength. The politician does the least of his work in the primary. The real work is done beforehand, and the primary registers the " cut-and-dried " decrees. America has no leisured citizens who can afford to give themselves to this work. They must leave it to the professionals. With proportional representation the party pri- mary loses much of its significance. Nominations can be made by petition. Municipal leagues, civic federations, business men's associations, chambers of commerce, labor unions, have their completed organizations. These can nominate their tickets by petition, or can indorse those already nominated. As in English cities, where it requires but eight signatures to nominate a candidate for the municipal council, the matter would adjust itself, and there would be no danger from a multiplicity of candidates and tickets. With such facility in the nomination of indepen- dent tickets, and with independent parties holding the balance of power, the party primaries would fall into disuse. Politicians would not struggle to control them, seeing that even if successful, yet their APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 157 party could not elect a majority of the assembly, and so make it worth while for them to control the primaries. They would learn also to nominate by petition, as is the practice in other countries. At the same time the primaries and conventions must be recognized at present as the sources of power. The most serious evil connected with them, and the one which gives the machine its control, is the practice of exclusive majority rule. Committees and delegates are elected by a major- ity vote on the principle of the general ticket, or else the chairman is authorized to appoint them, and he is the product of a majority vote. The true purpose of a primary or convention, as repre- senting all sections of a party, is defeated. It is proper that the majority should elect the chairman, or nominate single candidates ; but why should the majority be alone represented on committees, dele- gations, and general tickets ? Plainly, here is need for a further application of the proportional rule. Mr. D. S. Remsen of the New York bar, in his essay on "Primary Elections," has made a careful study of the rules governing party organ- izations, and the management of primaries and conventions in the United States. He advocates a plan of primary election similar to Mr. Hare's single transferable vote already described in these pages. It is probable that the complexity in- volved in counting the votes according to that 158 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. plan would cause it to break down in the confu- sion of a mass-meeting and in the hands of tellers who are inexpert. A plan is required which will be simple and quickly worked. Such a one has been proposed by Dr. L. B. Tucker- man of Cleveland, Ohio, and is described by its author under the title, "Election by Preponder- ance of Choice." 1 "1. Each voter writes on his ballot as many names as there are persons to be chosen, writing the names in the order of his choice, first choice first, second choice second, and so on. When nominations are made before balloting, it is more convenient to write them on a board where all can read them. "2. In, tallying the vote, the tellers read the last name on each ballot first, crediting the name with one tally ; the name next to the last, second, crediting the same with two tallies; and so on, always crediting the name written first on each ballot with as many tallies as there are names written on that ballot. Thus a ballot written : SMITH BROWN JONES FETZER COLEMAN Proportional Representation Review, September, 1893. APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 159 would be read, Coleman 1, Fetzer 2, Jones 3, Brown 4, Smith 5. "3. The person receiving the highest number of tallies is first declared elected ; the person re- ceiving the next highest, next; and so on, until all the vacancies are filled. In case of a tie with but one vacancy to be filled, the incumbent is deter- mined by lot. " The practical working of this rule is that every element in the electing body large enough to have a quota, finds itself proportionately repre- sented, and by its own first choice or choices. Suppose, for instance, a caucus in a ward contain- ing one hundred voters. They are to choose delegates to a convention. Suppose there are two factions, one counting on fifty-five voters, the other on forty-five, and the contest so lively that a full vote is polled. Suppose, further, that the first faction decides to support A, B, C, D, and E, in the order named, and the second F, G, H, I, and K, the resulting ballot will tally as follows : A 55 x 5 = 275 F 45 x 5 = 225 B 55 x 4 = 220 G 45 x 4 = 180 C 55 x 3 = 165 H 45 x 3 = 135 D 55 x 2 = 110 I 45 x 2 = 90 E 55 x 1 = 55 K 45 x 1 = 45 The five highest are A, F, B, G, and C, three of the majority faction and two of the minority 160 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the first choices, the representative men of both parties. The advantage of this method in a caucus or convention is that it reaches the result certainly, directly, and quickly; there is no count- ing the number of ballots cast, and dividing by the number of persons to be chosen, to find what the quota is." This plan is simple and effective, and can be applied to primaries and conventions. It could be introduced into the bill proposed in these pages, by providing that conventions making nominations of congressmen or aldermen should be required to adopt the plan, and that the presidents and secre- taries of such conventions, in presenting their tickets to election commissioners, should certify that the nominations have been made in accord- ance with the law. They should certify, too, that primaries and other conventions sending delegates to the nominating convention had also complied with the law. With a rule of this kind governing primaries and conventions, we should accomplish within party lines results similar to those to be ac- complished by the proposed bill between parties. All classes within a party would be represented, " packed " conventions would be unknown, the party machine would be shorn of much of its undeserved power, tickets would be nominated with candidates acceptable to all ranks of the APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 161 party, the necessity for independent tickets would be largely obviated, and citizens would be more inclined to attend their party primaries, knowing that their wishes would find expression. When finally we come to the elections, propor- tional representation would go far towards bring- ing out a full vote. There would be none of the present hopelessness. " It is only the fear of wasting their votes on good men who have no chance of winning which deters the people from voting against the bad candidates who are forced upon them by the regular machine." 1 So crude a measure as compulsory voting could not change the results of the present system. In two recent elections in the Swiss canton of Zu- rich, with a compulsory voting law applying to two communes, 21 per cent to 24 per cent of the ballots were blanks, while in the communes with- out the compulsory law, 17 per cent and 20 per cent were blanks. 2 Compulsory voting does not furnish an outlet for independence. It would rather tighten the control of the party managers. 3 We have seen that the margin of mobile voters who change from one party to another is seldom more than 5 per cent of the maximum total vote in a presidential year. Compulsory voting might 1 Chas. Richardson in Annals of American Academy of Politi- cal and Social Science, March, 1892, p. 86. 2 See Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894, p. 63. s See Hart, " Practical Essays," p. 51. 162 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. possibly change this proportion slightly, but it could do no more than substitute one machine for another. The real problem is not how to compel unwilling electors to vote, but how to give effect to the votes of those who are willing. " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 168 CHAPTER VII. " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." THE ideal of democratic government in the United States has centred about the principle of rule by the majority of the people. Its aim is Bentham's aphorism, "the greatest good of the greatest number." The means whereby in practi- cal politics this greatest good is to be secured is to divide the people into two political parties based on numbers alone, and to give to one of these parties entire control of government in at least its legislative and executive departments. If the people happen not to be divided in such a way as to gather a majority into a single party, then a plurality is to be permitted to choose the govern- ing officials. By this process it is maintained that the rule of the majority is secured through the device of what is known as " party respon- sibility." It must be noticed that the word "party" in this connection has a double meaning. The argu- ment begins with the conception of a popular party composed of a mass of voters ; it ends with a party of office-holders and law-makers who are elected by the voters. These officials are commis- 164 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. sioned as a kind of extra-legal corporation to con- duct the government, and are required to appeal often to the voters for continuance in power. One thing overlooked in this form of govern- ment is the quality of the individual men who constitute the governing corporation. Individual statesmen do not stand out as leaders of the party or the people. They all are merged in a corporate mediocrity. The bosses who actually control the corporation by no means represent the popular party, much less can they command a majority of the popular vote. They are irresponsible. A party and not a man becomes responsible. Proportional representation is advocated as a means for supplementing party responsibility with the individual responsibility of law-makers to the people. It will do this, first, by bringing into legislative assemblies able and experienced men, the true leaders of their parties and the people. The assertion is often made that our public of- ficers and representatives are as good as the people who elect them; that they are representative in the sense of possessing the average ability, intelli- gence, and integrity, of the community ; and there- fore the failures of our governments are to be found, not in the machinery, but in the voters. It is questionable whether this assertion is true. Very often the legislative body is below the aver- age citizenship of the community. But the ques- "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY" 165 tion comes, Do we want only average men to govern us and make our laws ? We do not select average physicians to save our lives, average law- yers to protect our rights, average ministers to interpret the gospel, nor average tailors, bakers, and carpenters to clothe, feed, and shelter us. We select men of exceptional native ability, who through training have become experts and profes- sionals, men versed in their callings. So in this most important of our delegated services, this re- vising and framing our laws which regulate the very structure of society, and make our lives, our rights, our religion, and our enjoyments possible, in this supreme service, why should we not select men far above the average? Should they not be men who are grounded in jurisprudence, sociology, politi- cal economy, comparative legislation, besides pos- sessing that infinite tact known as statesmanship ? Indeed, the American people do desire such men. They have long been dissatisfied with their law-making bodies. They have been persistently depriving them of power because they are both unrepresentative and inefficient. The people sin- cerely wish to have capable legislators, but have not been able to enforce their wishes. The reason is that social and legal institutions of themselves possess a certain capacity of natural selection. They are the framework, the environment, within which individuals and classes co-operate. As in 166 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the biological world, those individuals survive and prosper who are best able to utilize the passions, customs, and legal regulations of their fellow-men. But society, unlike the animals, can change its customs and laws within certain limits, and thereby can change the environment of individ- uals. New and different qualities are now neces- sary for survival and power. Such a change is the secret ballot, which handicaps bribery; or civil service reform, which evicts spoilsmen; or hundreds of those political devices whereby gov- ernment has been for centuries slowly perfected. The same will hold for legislatures. If the people wish to bring to their legislatures intelligence, ex- perience, ability, probity, and sympathy with pop- ular aims, they should first develop those forms of government and that political machinery which will insure adequate security, support, and dignity to such qualities. Proportional representation would be an im- provement of this kind. In the first place, it would secure all the advantages of the English and Canadian practice of non-residency. Five- sixths of the members of parliament do not live in the districts they represent. This enables a polit- ical party to keep its leaders always in power, by selecting for them a sure district in which to make their canvass. With proportional representation, as with a general ticket, representatives could be " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 167 selected from an entire State or city without refer- ence to their residence in a limited district or ward. The area of choice is widened. ' A party leader, like McKinley or Morrison, need no longer be ex- cluded from Congress because he happens to live in a district where his party is a minority. Gerry- manders could not be constructed to exclude him. All the money and influence of a wealthy opposing party could effect nothing. His party might be a minority in the State, yet, if it could poll only a single quota of the votes, he would be sure of election. Nothing could exclude him except the disaffection of his own followers. Neither could factions and interests holding the balance of power dictate nominations, and thus put unknown and opinionless men before the voters. Every faction, every party, every interest, could place its own strongest men in the legislature ; and compromise candidates, " dark horses," would be unknown. Mr. Albert Stickney has found in frequent elec- tions and short terms the root of corrupt politics and machine rule. 1 There is truth in his conten- tion. A representative must indeed give his time to carrying elections. He must placate and har- monize factions. He must properly distribute the spoils, and must not break with the machine. Little time is left to study legislation. 1 See " A True Republic," New York, 1879. 168 PEOPOETIONAL EEP RESENT ATION. But with proportional representation, frequent elections would be combined with life-long service, provided the representative retained the confidence of a single quota of the voters. The manipulation of elections would not engross him. His only thought would be to know that in his legislative duties he truly represented his quota of supporters. Frequent elections, on the other hand, would give the people power quietly to drop him if he ceased to represent them. They would simply give their preferences to others on their party ticket, or would nominate a new ticket which would draw from him. Frequent elections under the district system are dangerous to both the good and the bad. Under proportional representation they would endanger only the bad. The representatives therefore will not only be capable ; they will be responsible directly to the people. The objection against proportional repre- sentation on the ground that it abandons what is called " party responsibility," proceeds from the assertion that it gives no party a clear majority in the legislature ; that ours is a government by political parties, and parties must therefore be permitted to make a record in the legislature or Congress, upon which they can go before the people for approval or rejection. This objection will be considered later when speaking of minority parties, In this place let "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 169 us notice the nature of "party responsibility." It is multiple and corporate. The people can select no individual upon whom to centre respon- sibility. A party, like a corporation, can be held accountable only through its individual agents. For this reason, cities in the United States are transferring legislative and administrative func- tions from boards and councils to the mayor. Thus responsibility is fixed. But when a national party of four hundred representatives and sena- tors, besides hundreds of State and local officers, is defeated at the polls, both the good and the bad are defeated together. Why should a representa- tive rise above party expediency when he knows that the deeds of his colleagues will drag him down with them? There are two features of proportional repre- sentation which permit the voters to hold individual representatives, instead of parties, responsible. The first is the fact that parties, if defeated, would lose but a small proportion of their representatives. No matter how close the votes of parties in any State, a popular rebuke would usually lessen its vote not more than five per cent, except in cases where disaffection within the party has brought out an independent ticket. A party having eight repre- sentatives in a delegation of fifteen would thereby lose not more than one. Under the district system, as has been shown, a reversal of five per cent is 170 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. catastrophic ; and an entire party, good and bad, go down together. Thus the idea is unduly promi- nent that the people reject the party as a whole, and the fiction is fostered of " party responsibility." But with proportional representation only a very few of the party candidates would be defeated. Now, if the voters have the power to select those candidates who are to be doieated, and to continue the others, shall we not have the essence of individual responsibility ? The second feature of proportional representation gives them this power. Not only may electors vote for " tick- ets," they may also indicate their preferences for individual candidates upon their party ticket. Thus, in the case of a party expecting to elect eight representatives, and therefore nominating nine, but in the final count electing only seven, the voters by their preferences will have dropped at least two who have not met their responsibility. And, again, in the provisions for nominating inde- pendent tickets, and thus drawing off from a polit- ical party all those voters who are dissatisfied with the candidates it has nominated, and in the pro- visions for scattering individual votes among can- didates of several tickets, the electors have the widest freedom for distinguishing between can- didates, and holding each one personally respon- sible. Consequently, bad candidates cannot ride into power on a wave of party prosperity, nor can "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 171 good candidates be swamped in the ebb of party adversity. Each candidate stands upon his own merits and record, and by these is he judged, apart from the judgment upon his party as a whole. With all parties fairly represented by their ablest leaders, legislatures would become delibera- tive assemblies, instead of arenas for party strife. The objection against proportional representation has just been cited, that it would nullify party responsibility. It is said that it would do this by giving a small minority the balance of power and enabling it to dictate legislation. This would weake'n the government and prevent a consistent policy. We have frequently noticed the very- close popular vote as between the two great par- ties, neither of them receiving a majority. Third and fourth parties, therefore, if given their propor- tionate weight in legislation, would often hold the balance. Of course, with the existing system they already often have this advantage, but with pro- portional representation the same would more frequently happen. The weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against proportional representation, varies in different grades of government. Polit- ical parties are divided on national questions. City and State politics do not (or should not) follow the same alignment. Leaving the consid- 172 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. eration of city politics to another chapter, we may at this point examine the objection as applied to Congress (and incidentally to the State legisla- tures), where it has its greatest force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be ex- pected to be decisive. In the first place, the objection overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It may prove here, as elsewhere, that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democ- racy, that a people who insist on universal suf- frage, and who go to ludicrous limits in granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor political parties whose existence is the nat- ural fruit of this suffrage. The argument against proportional representation is made that it would enable the degraded and corrupt elements of the community to keep a bad man in the legislature against the wishes of all the honest and patriotic classes; that it would give saloon-keepers and gamblers representation ; that it would give too great influence to the socialists and other "dan- gerous " elements. Possibly universal suffrage is unwise, and the franchise should be restricted ; but, having granted lit, the dangerous elements become more danger- vous if they are denied that hearing which the suffrage promises. Vice and corruption thrive by "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 173 secrecy. Nothing is so mortal to them as expo- sure. It is suicidal to come out in the open, and defend themselves in their nakedness. The seri- ous fault with the present system is its rich oppor- tunities for under-handed work on the part of the corrupt classes. They alone have no political principles, and can therefore take sharp advantage of the party divisions of the people. By their very corruption they have far more than their pro- portionate representation. ]~~Itis a serious evil of the existing system that the two industries most largely represented in municipal councils are those of the saloon-keepers and the gamblers. Far bet- ter would be a system which reduces their rep- resentation to the same proportions which their numbers bear to the whole community. The corrupt and dangerous classes are a very small minority of the people, but by their well-chosen methods they get majorities in our legislative bodies. Proportional representation would give them a hearing, for they are entitled to it, but it would deny them supremacy. ! The argument, however, of those who fear that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the reformers, " faddists " and " cranks " so-called. They would retain ex- clusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the disproportionate influence of 1T4 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. these petty groups. They overlook, of course, the weight of the argument already made, that individual responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate responsibility of parties. They overlook also other considerations. A significant fact in American national politics is the actual break-down of this presumed party responsibility. In our system of co-ordinate pow- ers, there can be no party responsibility for legis- lation unless the Senate, the House, and the Pres- ident agree in politics. Yet since the election of 1876 there have been but six years of such agreement, namely, in the Forty-seventh, Fifty- first, and Fifty-third Congresses. And in the Forty-seventh Congress the Senate was tied, and in the Fifty-third the Senate, with a Democratic majority, was constantly opposed to the Demo- cratic House and President. For less than one- third of the time, therefore, can we be said to enjoy party responsibility. Only where a single party for a long series of years has possession of government, as was the case during and follow- ing the Civil War, is it likely to get control of all branches, so that party responsibility can be located. And even in such a period internal dis- sensions between the President and Congress con- fuse the public. Again, a strong government, so-called, is needed mainly in the administration of foreign affairs. " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 11 175 In the American and German systems, as distin- guished from the English and French, in which the executive is independent of the legislature, such a government is secured regardless of party revolutions. If this were not so, the deadlocks of the past twenty years would have rendered our system intolerable. At the same time there is no public question which so thoroughly extinguishes party lines as a serious foreign complication. But there are deeper reasons than these for believing that a just representation of the people by their recognized leaders would guarantee an efficient and stable government, freed from the dictation of extremists who hold the balance of power. There are but two classes of questions in American politics which are characteristically party questions, these are questions of the suf- frage, such as force bills and gerrymanders, which threaten to deprive one party of its votes ; and questions of legislative election or civil service appointment to office. It must be admitted that on these two classes of questions a clear party majority is necessary. But other questions can be compromised. The legislature of Nebraska of 1893 adjourned with probably the best record achieved by any State legislature in several years. Yet it was composed of three parties about equally divided. The legislature spent six weeks out of 176 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. the legal twelve in a deadlock over the election of United States senator. Such a matter cannot be compromised except by electing an unknown man. This the legislature did, and then pro- ceeded to law-making. It enacted good laws on important matters, such as railways and indebted- ness, which were exciting popular feeling at the time ; but these laws were neither confiscatory nor reactionary. They were just to all concerned. There were no deadlocks. Every measure was a fair compromise. Proportional representation could not exist with a spoils system, and probably not with the elec- tion of United States senators by legislatures. It would end in deadlocks and incapacity. But this surely cannot be a serious objection to the reform. On other grounds the country would gain if merit were substituted for spoils, and senators elected by the people. With these two occasions of difference removed from legislative halls, the possibilities of compro- mise would soon appear. They proceed from the fact that the majority of the people are not ex- tremists. They will not consent to radical depar- tures from existing institutions. The points of agreement between political parties on principles and measures are therefore far more numerous than those of divergence. Parties differ only on the fringe of policies. Their battles are usually "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 177 mock battles inspired by spoils instead of policies. When the outs come ^X they do not radically re- verse the policy of their predecessors. Even the tariff, on which they fight their battles, resolves iself into a matter of a very high tariff, or one not quite so high. The country will not permit a return to no-tariff. Other questions, such as free silver and anti-options, are settled by divisions which run across party lines. Upon pensions both parties bring out emulous majorities. River and harbor bills are bargained through by individual " log-rolling," and exchange of favors. On so many of the vital questions do representatives in Congress disregard party lines, that one is led to suspect that the tariff is merely a " war scare " to keep the voters in line. The fundamental nature of legislation is not party victory, but compromise. Compromise is expediency. Expediency is nothing more nor less than ideal principles and institutions in process of realization. Compromise rests on the fact of growth. Society is developing out of a primitive barbaric state, where human rights were unknown, towards an era when the ideal rights of man shall be recognized and obtained for every individual. One by one the burdens of the past are being discarded in the march towards the goal. And this is expediency compromise. Enthusiasts appeal to the higher law, and demand that all 178 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. obstructions be overthrown at once. This is im- possible. These obstructions are not mere coats of mail and trunks and luggage. They are human beliefs, habits, passions, prejudices, necessities. They exist in the very souls of men. It requires time and death to remove them. No more can the physical body separate itself suddenly from immature childhood, and, omitting the period of youth, suddenly leap into ripened manhood, than can the social body abruptly break from its past. But the social body grows through modifi- cations of social institutions. The family, the church, the State, private property, are all being changed in the direction of social ideals. These changes are made unconsciously, as in primitive times, also consciously, as in modern times by legislation. Here arise the two primary divisions of society, which, shifting slightly, according to the issues in hand, appear in general as the con- servative and liberal parties, the former holding to the things already achieved, the latter /urging change. These different classes and interests come to- gether in the legislative halls. The circumstances of the time compel change. The radicals demand extreme measures. The conservatives resist. If, now, the system of representation is such that neither has a majority in the legislature, but the "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 179 overwhelming majority of the people who hold moderate views is adequately represented and holds the balance of power, compromises will result. Measures will be examined, debated, amended, until they reach the shape which will command a majority of the votes. There is no measure in politics which cannot be thus modified. Even the question of slavery could have been compounded. There are a hun- dred intermediate positions between immediate emancipation and permanent slavery. Had a law been enacted in the '40's or '50's providing for gradual emancipation, even upon the basis pro- posed by Abraham Lincoln, of a hundred years, the Civil War might have been averted. But the district system had excluded from Congress Demo- crats from the North, and Whigs from the South, men who occupied a middle ground, and the antag- onism between the sections was thereby exagger- ated. Especially was it affirmed by a committee of the United States Senate in 1869, and it is well known to students of history that the South was not fairly represented in Congress. A large mi- nority of the whites were in favor of the Union, and doubtless they could have been brought to gradual emancipation. But they were excluded from the State legislatures and from the halls of Congress. The slave-holding oligarchy precipi- tated the South into rebellion ; and when the 180 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. die was cast, the people were forced to follow. 1 Would not compromise have been better than war? Would not the Negroes to-day be in a better con- dition? Compromise seems to compound with evil. " No question is settled until it is settled right." True indeed. There is a base compromise born of pusil- lanimity. It fortifies and strengthens the evil. But true expediency plans for the ultimate extinc- tion of hoary wrong. It recognizes, however, that right is not all on one side. Historical conditions, inherited privileges, legal enactments, of them- selves create rights. Slave-owners should have been compensated, as in the West Indies, or else been granted time to prepare for emancipation, as in Brazil. The district system prevents this kind of compromise. It keeps new parties out of rep- resentation. Their leaders have no influence on legislation, whereby they might force a compro- mise looking to the future. Thus the anti-slavery movement had no strength in Congress commen- surate with its strength among the people. It was choked and suppressed until it became irrepres- sible. It ended in civil war, immediate emancipa- tion, and no compensation. It must not be supposed, therefore, that pro- 1 See Report of the Select Committee of the United States Senate, on Representative Reform, Senate Document Fortieth Congress, Third Session, No. 271, March, 1869. "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 181 portional representation, by increasing compromise, would prevent reform. Indeed, it would bring for- ward the day of genuine reform. And this not by erratic jumps or civil war, but like the steady pro- cesses of nature. Reform movements would have a hearing in their beginnings. Legislation would prepare for them. The minds of men would ripen for them. Only in this way could they prevent reactions. Those anti-slavery agitators who saw in Lincoln's proclamation the final triumph of their work, and those extremists who gave the new- fledged freeman the ballot, may well to-day look back with chagrin on those exultant measures. The slave is not yet free. He was not ready for the ballot. He has even been openly disfran- chised. And the South is a land of smothered anarchy. Surely gradual emancipation and pro- gressive enfranchisement would not have been slower in final results than were those uncom- promising reforms. So it is with present-day reforms. By means of proportional representation they would show themselves inside party organizations. At present our parties are grown over with a crust of tradi- tion. They do not respond to the growing body within. There is a false feeling of security on the part of managers. New movements being un- represented, the leaders run to extremes. These have not the advantages of responsibility, of con- 182 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. ference and friction with the representatives of existing conditions. Hence they become visiona- ries instead of practical reformers, and the public learns to distrust them. Mr. Wm. Dudley Foulke, president of the Pro- portional Representation League, has said : 1 " The result of nearly all political action is compromise. In the present system this compromise is made when the great parties are organized. It is made amid the excite- ment of a political convention. When proportional repre- sentation is adopted those compromises will be made in the legislative body, where all can see more clearly the strong and the weak points of every claim. Suppose you are in favor of some particular reform civil service reform, for instance will you Have a better chance of success when you urge your claims upon one of the two great parties in the turmoil of a political contest, or where these claims can be freely presented by your own representatives in the legislative body? Let us suppose, for instance, that we have a number of prohibitionists in a legislative body, suf- ficient perhaps to control the balance of power, what will be the probable result of legislation ? A prohibitory law will hardly be adopted for this would be in opposition to the great majority ; but stronger temperance legislation will be enacted local option, for instance, or more strin- gent excise laws. It is by such compromises as these that civilization makes its safest and most effective strides. Small factions which control the balance of power may occasionally get more than they are entitled to, but this will only be the case where there is some greater issue between the larger parties which compels the relinquish- 1 Proportional Representation Review, December, 1895. "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 183 ment of something for the sake of obtaining something of greater importance. Compromise is of the essence of pop- ular government, and the fairest compromises are most likely to be made when all phases of popular thought are proportionally represented." The first effects of every innovation are always viewed with alarm. So accustomed are we to the workings of existing institutions, that, though we acknowledge their imperfections and injustice, we rather cling to them than risk the imagined incidental results that may flow from the triumph of justice and fairness. Our principal difficulty is our failure to perceive that a far-reaching re- form, which strikes at the root of existing evils, brings' with it a series of changes which harmonize with it. We assume that under the new system all conditions, except the mere mechanical im- provement, will remain the same as they are before. At first, indeed, the people might not fully understand the innovation, and shrewd schemers might take advantage of their ignorance ; but soon they will comprehend it, and will adjust their actions to it. It does not follow that, with proportional representation, third parties, composed of so-called "cranks," "faddists," impracticables, " anti-vaccinationists," repudiationists, or what not, would increase in size, and continuously hold the balance of power. A few able men of noble humanitarian, though "visionary," ideas, in every 184 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. assembly, would be an actual gain. But if their views are truly impracticable and unjust, nothing will so demonstrate the fact to them and their followers as the responsibility for practicable legis- lation, and the hard contact with other views upheld by men of ability in legislative halls. Idealist reformers would send their ablest spokes- men. Other parties in self-defence would be compelled to do the same. The representative assembly would become the great forum of the people. Its debates would command attention. It would educate the nation. Reformers would see that their cause is strengthened, not by send- ing eccentrics to Congress, but by sending ca- pable, all-round men. At present, having no representation whatever, only their extremists can attract attention. The very nature of reform movements would change. There are many sen- sible citizens who to-day would gladly see politi- cal and industrial conditions improved, but who find no place in the dominant party organizations, and are distrustful of the extreme reform organ- izations, and are therefore enrolled in that army of often nearly half the voters who stay at home. These men would take an active interest in poli- tics, and would modify by their new-found influ- ence the personnel of both the new parties and the old. In these ways the balance of power would be held, not by "faddists," but by the " PAETT RESPONSIBILITY. 1 185 solid, patriotic, disinterested citizenship of the country. Proportional representation was advocated thirty years ago in the interests of the minority. It was thought to be a promising corrective of the newly widened suffrage. The franchise in England was extended in 1867 to the artisans, and in 1884 to the agricultural laborers. In the United States it was granted in 1869 to the Negroes. Conserva- tives thought minority representation was neces- sary to protect the rich against the confiscation of these mobs. This was partly the thought of John Stuart Mill, in his classical work, " On Represen- tative Government." But to-day it is advocated in the interests of the masses. John Stuart Mill knew nothing of the power of the lobby as against an extended franchise. One man of wealth has the influence of a thousand farmers, storekeepers, arid laborers. But the lobby is a dangerous ma- chine in legislation. It protects the unscrupulous for a while, but stirs those vindictive passions which finally lead to indiscriminate spoliation. Far better for one and all would be fair and open compromise ! If legislatures were deliberative assemblies, bringing together the leaders of all classes and interests, this would be secured; arid the progress of enduring social and industrial reform would be quickened. These considerations have a bearing upon the 186 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. arguments far the so-called "Direct Legislation" by the peopb. Direct legislation exists at present in various forms in every canton of Switzerland. Three of them have no legislature, retaining the primitive primary assembly of all the voters. Di- rect legislation applies to cantonal and municipal questions, and has been extended to federal legis- lation. It exists in two principal forms, the Initi- ative and Referendum. The Referendum is the right of the people to vote upon a law which originates in the legisla- ture. This exists in two forms, the optional and the obligatory. In the optional referendum the proposed law is referred to the people only when a certain proportion of the citizens, usually one- sixth to one-fourth, demand it by formal petition. It exists in eight cantons, and in the federal legis- lature. The obligatory referendum permits no law to be passed, or expenditures beyond a stip- ulated sum to be made, by the legislature, without a vote of the people. It exists in eight cantons, including the two most populous Zurich and Berne. The tendency in Switzerland has been to pass to the initiative and the obligatory referen- dum as the complete and only satisfactory form of " legislation by the people." As applied in America, the referendum prom- ises decided advantages over delegated legislation. It would take important questions out of party 44 PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 1 187 politics. Legislatures already use it for this pur- pose, especially in liquor and local-option legis- lation. It would educate the people on public questions. The press in Switzerland to-day " has a rdle more preponderant than formerly." But its principal advantage is as a check upon corrupt, incapable, and unrepresentative legislatures. It utterly deprives them of power. It has banished the lobby from Swiss legislation. Representatives cannot sell out, simply because they cannot " de- liver the goods." The people alone decide. The referendum is a club of Hercules in the hands of the people. But it does not create ; it destroys. This is shown in various ways. The people can vote only on certain, large, simple, well-defined measures, such as loans, public improvements, saloon license, etc. The details of legislation in these days are far more important than ever be- fore. This gives abundant opportunity in the legislatures to introduce "ambiguous phraseology or provisions which would neutralize the purpose of the bill, or make it unconstitutional or obnox- ious." l Consequently the people are better able to vote for men than for measures. This is shown by the following examples : - In New York, in 1894, the vote on the revised Constitution was only 57 per cent of the vote cast for governor at the same election; the vote on i Alfred Cridge, in "Hope and Homo." 188 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. apportionment (gerrymander) was 59 per cent ; and the vote on canal improvement was 60 per cent. In California, in 1892, the vote on five amend- ments to the Constitution and four propositions ranged from 53 per cent to 80 per cent of the votes cast at the same election for members of the assembly. (Popular election of senators 80 per cent; educational voting qualification 77 per cent.) In Ohio a Constitutional amendment to tax fran- chises of corporations was lost three times, although the majorities in its favor were large, simply be- cause the total vote on the question was less than 75 per cent of the total vote cast at the same elections for state officers, as required by the Con- stitution. In Switzerland, of the twenty federal referenda during 1879-1891, the average vote was 58.5 per cent of the total number of voters, ranging from 40 per cent to 67 per cent. Upon the "Right to Employment" it was 56 per cent. 1 In Zurich a larger percentage of votes is cast, owing to the compulsory voting law ; the average on 133 cantonal propositions of all kinds being 74 per cent of the eligible voters. 26 per cent of the votes were blanks, while in two recent elec- tions of candidates 21 per cent and 24 per cent were blanks. 2 1 A. B. Hart, "The Referendum in Switzerland," in The Nation, September 14, 1894. 2 J. W. Sullivan, Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894. " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 189 In Switzerland it turns out that many bills are approved or rejected in the referendum not on their merits, but on the questions "Confidence" or " No Confidence " in the legislature which sub- mitted them. In federal legislation, twenty-seven laws and constitutional amendments were sub- mitted to the referendum (optional) during the years 1874 to 1894 ; and of these fifteen were re- jected and twelve approved. In Zurich, with the compulsory referendum, there were 128 legislative acts voted upon between 1869 and 1893. The people ratified ninety-seven, and rejected thirty- one. 1 A few laws at first rejected by the people wereJater adopted; and although Zurich is en- gaged in manufacturing and has a large working- class vote, it has rejected laws reducing the period of work in factories to twelve hours a day, pro- tecting female operatives, making employers liable for accidents to employees, increasing the amount of education in the public schools, and providing free text-books. 2 These votes do not mean always that the people are more conservative than their representatives, but that the particular form in which the legislature drew up the measures and the personnel of the legislature itself were not satisfactory to the people. These adverse votes 1 See A. Lawrence Lowell, " The Referendum and Initia- tive," International Journal of Ethics, October, 1895. 2 See Lowell as above. 190 PEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. on advanced measures should be compared with the votes when the referendum was first estab- lished in 1869. Says Herr Burkli, "The Father of the Referendum : " l " The plutocratic govern- ment and the Grand Council of Zurich, which had connived with the private banks and railroads, were pulled down in one great voting swoop. The people had grown tired of being beheaded by the office-holders after every election." The unrepresentative character of the legisla- tures has led to the Initiative, whereby the people purpose to draw up their own measures, and have them voted upon without the interference of the legislature. A petition signed by six to eight per cent of the voting constituency submits the bill to the legislature, which must in turn promptly submit it unchanged to the people, though it may express an opinion or submit also an alternative proposition, if it wishes. The cantonal initiative exists in fourteen of the twenty-two cantons, and was introduced into federal legislation in 1891. But the initiative is almost valueless as a means of legislation. It, indeed, educates the people and shows the weakness of extremists, as when the in- itiative federal bill, guaranteeing " right of em- ployment " to every citizen, was rejected by a vote of four to one; but it does not enact good laws. In Zurich, from 1869 to 1893, nineteen initiatives 1 Quoted by Sullivan, "Direct Legislation," New York, 1893. " PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 191 were voted upon. " Four of them the legislature advised the people to adopt, and of these two were ratified at the popular vote, and two were rejected ; but of the other fifteen proposals which were dis- approved by the legislature, only three were en- acted by the people. One of these set up houses of correction for tramps, a measure the wisdom of which was much doubted ; a second re-established the death penalty, but this came to nothing, for the people rejected, at the referendum, the law which was prepared to carry it into effect; the third abolished compulsory vaccination." 1 The initiative is weak for the reasons already given as to the true nature of legislation. It pre- vents compromise and mutual concession. Meas- ures are drawn up, not by a body representing all interests, which would therefore be fair to all, but by a faction or group of extremists. It by no means embodies the joint wisdom and sense of jus- tice of the community. It therefore cannot often command a majority of the votes ; and if it does, the animus is likely to be not a generous spirit of tolerance, but a petty hatred of a small minor- ity. This is shown by the recent federal refer- endum forbidding the slaughter of animals by bleeding, which was adopted mainly to persecute the Jews* The referendum, on the other hand, exhibits i See Lowell, as above. 192 PEOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. strikingly the unrepresentative character of the legislatures. The people reject both measures patently vicious and others whose details they sus- pect, merely on the question of confidence in the legislature. Unquestionably direct legislation in the form of the referendum would serve an important pur- pose in the present condition of American politics. It would promptly bring all legislative assemblies to a standstill. But, as in Switzerland, it would make them no more attractive than now to the ability and statesmanship of the country. They would be simply advisory committees on legisla- tion, with no responsibility, attracting neither the political leaders, nor enlisting the popular vote at elections. But the political atmosphere would be cleared. The people would have relief from the surfeit of partisanship and corrupt influences. They could calmly contemplate the obstacles to popular government. In Switzerland, direct legis- lation is being followed by proportional represen- tation. Five cantons have adopted it since 1891, through the referendum. Four have rejected it by referendum, in some cases because it was con- fused by partisan legislatures with other issues. 1 But in two cases an initiative is demanding a new vote. The opinion is expressed that " in less than 1 See Bulletin des Schweiz. Wahlreform-Vereins fur Propor- tionate, Volksvertretung, No. 8 and 9, Mai, 1894. "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 193 ten years the whole of Switzerland will have pro- portional representation carried out peaceably, with- out revolution and bloodshed." 1 Thus direct legislation proves to be an efficient instrument, not so much for legislation, as for reforming the legislatures. If the arguments presented in the foregoing pages are valid, and proportional repre- sentation brings into the legislatures the political leaders of the people, transforming them from par- tisan organs into deliberative bodies accurately representing the public, we may expect that the referendum and the initiative in Switzerland will be gradually discontinued, but not until they have made J possible a genuinely representative democ- racy. The preceding discussion is concerned only with the legislative department of government. How- ever the executive may be chosen, he is properly only the agent of the legislature. As such he is not called upon to exercise discretion, which is the prerogative of legislators, but to execute laws exactly as their framers contemplated. He is therefore, strictly speaking, not a party official, but a non-partisan agent. As a matter of effi- ciency, he should be in sympathy with the ruling policy of the legislature. There is therefore no reason why minority representation should be 1 Charles Burkli, in Proportional Representation Review, Sep- tember, 1895. 194 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. introduced in the executive department. Where it has been attempted, as in the executive boards of Switzerland, the results are unsatisfactory. Practical efficiency also requires that the execu- tive head be a single officer, and this excludes the principle of minority representation. The case is somewhat different with the judi- ciary. This branch of government interprets the laws, and applies them to particular cases. To a considerable extent it creates new laws through its application of recognized principles to new conditions. In the United States it has also an important political function through its control over the legislature. Whether, therefore, judges should be appointed or elected is a debatable question. Undoubtedly, if the courts further extend their powers over legislation, they must, like the legislatures, be made elective. Any other policy would be destructive to democratic ten- dencies. But if the courts are to come under the control of machine politics through popular elections on party tickets, they, too, must sooner or later become degraded. Already supreme court and inferior judges in various States are known to be nominated and elected by saloon and cor- porate interests with a view to their action on the constitutionality of important statutes. Possibly proportional representation will solve the enigma of an elective judiciary. Police magis- "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY." 195 trates in Philadelphia and supreme court judges in Pennsylvania are elected by the " limited vote," a form of minority representation, which, as al- ready explained, makes them directly the agents of party politics. The principle, however, might be employed with a better form of proportional representation, which would tend to remove the bench from partisan control. The problems of the executive and judiciary are subsidiary ones. They have appeared im- portant only because the failure of legislatures has imposed heavy obligations on the co-ordinate branches of government. The legislatures have been -unrepresentative in character because the theory of party responsibility has prevented re- form of electoral machinery. More important than party responsibility is such a perfection of methods as will maintain individual responsibility of all officials directly to the people. By propor- tional representation this would be secured, arid with it would appear in legislative assemblies the leading men of the city, State, and nation men who would possess that spirit and capacity of just compromise which proceed only from wide experience, distinguished ability, and patriotism. With such men in power it would no longer be necessary to hold a majority of the legislature together by the party machine, but new majori- ties could be trusted to be formed on every ques- 196 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. tion in harmony with, the wishes and interests of all the people. And instead of idealizing the rule of a mere numerical majority on the plea of the greatest good of the greatest number, we should promote mutual concession for the sake of a broader ideal, the greatest good of all the people. V or TH: UXIVER? or fO cirr GOVERNMENT. 197 CHAPTER VIII. CITY GOVERNMENT. IT is admitted that a portion of the arguments in the preceding chapter is in advance of what the public is ready to accept. Jeremy Bentham is' quoted as saying that a reform may be so en- tirely just that all classes will forthwith join together to defeat it. Not only must it be just, it must be practicable; and it must not run counter to public prejudice. We as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential for safety; and even in our State governments the election of senators by State legislatures, and the congressional gerrymanders, force us to decide State questions by Federal parties. But in city affairs it is different. ; The think- ing and practical public is consenting, even in- sisting, that city politics must be separated from State and Federal politics ; that a man's views on the tariff have nothing to do with his views on special assessments, health administration, fran- chise-stealing, or police. It is also agreed that third parties in cities are not composed of vision- aries and irresponsibles, but of the intelligent and 198 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. well-to-do classes. Consequently, reformers are appealing to citizens to abandon their political parties in city elections, and to vote for the best man on business principles. Independence in city politics is coming to be dignified and respected. Public prejudice may soon permit the necessary political machinery for promoting this indepen- dence. But up to the present time what has been done ? The city is looked upon as a business corpora- tion, instead of a political corporation, to be man- aged in a business manner. It must therefore have its general manager, who shall appoint all heads of departments, and become clearly responsi- ble for its administration. Power must be taken from the council and from boards, and be concen- trated in the mayor. The mayor must be elected by popular vote. Mr. James Bryce calls this a "cure or kill" method of government. 1 It places tremendous interests at stake in every election upon the turn of a few votes. When the people are thoroughly aroused they may elect a good mayor. But how ? Usually, as recently in New York City, one of the two political party machines must be recognized in the nomination. A compromise candidate must be agreed upon, and the other elective officials must be properly distributed so that this machine, 1 "American Commonwealth," vol. i., p. 617. CITY GOVERNMENT. 199 usually in the minority, may get a share of the spoils. But in case such a patchwork ticket can- not be arranged, the independents v are forced to nominate a ticket of their own. Here the result is familiar. Three candidates are in the field for one office. The great majority of the voters ad- here to their party. The independents cannot elect their man ; they can only draw from one machine to the success of the other. And it is usually found that the two machines have an agreement both to keep the field as a lesson to the reformers, and afterwards to share the offices. Thus the one-man system compels the very thing Avhich the reformers deprecate, the intro- duction of Federal politics. It does not permit the introduction of a third element wholly disen- tangled from any alliances with the two dominant parties. To ascribe the failure of mayoralty des- potism to the indifference of the intelligent and business classes is to overlook the fact that the system of majority election, all the way from primaries and conventions up to the mayor, rigidly excludes those classes. They may be aroused for a time, may abandon their Federal politics, and may join in a popular uprising. In that case the independent movement may show considerable strength, and in isolated cases may control the election. But popular uprising is not the normal condition. It is rebellion, it requires 200 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. unusual exertions and great expenditures of time and money by the few who take the (lad. ft depends upon impromptu organization, and soon exhausts itself. One or two mayors may be elected through its influence ; but the politicians know that, by quietly waiting, their turn will come again. This explains why the advocates of one-man power, in looking about for the failure of their remedy, are beginning to ascribe it to the short term of the mayor, which prevents him from developing a " policy." This last explanation of failure shows tus a fault not only in the practice, but also in trie theory, of one-man rule. The city is not merely a voluntary business corporation organized to economize the taxes of the stockholders ; it is a compulsory corporation, into which men are born. It is a branch of the State, and exercises the sovereign functions of eminent domain, taxation, ordinance- making, based on compulsion rather than on free cojitract. In a private corporation the interests of the stockholders are all in one direction the increase of dividends. In a political corporation different classes of citizens have often different interests. Therefore all interests and classes should be represented in its administration. In what direction its sovereign powers shall be em- ployed is a political question, involving justice and expediency as well as business. Shall taxes CITY GOVERNMENT. 201 be levied to protect health, to extend free schools, to cleanse the slums, to buy water-works or street- car lines ? these are a few of the political ques- tions which cities must consider. Upon these questions there is room for an alignment of politi- cal parties, of conservatives, and progressists, as much as in Federal politics, but not corresponding to the Federal alignment. The mayor represents only the majority. If he has a " policy," it should affect nothing more nor less than the execution of the laws and ordinances; and these a representa- tive body must determine if not the municipal council, y then the State legislature. They are not matters of free contract to be agreed upon by pri- vate individuals ; they are coercive enactments to be executed by the mayor and the police. They cannot be determined except to a limited extent by the initiative and referendum, for reasons already given ; and if municipal home rule is to be extended or even retained, they must be deter- mined by local legislation. But " the council," says Mr. Seth Low, " is the great unsolved organic problem in connection with city government in the United States." Origi- nally given complete control of city affairs, it has been forced to share its power with other branches. To its incapacity and gradual subsidence are to be ascribed the miserable plight of our cities. German and English cities retain the council as 202 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the all-important and only elective body of city officials. But it is doubtful whether American cities can learn from them. European cities do not have a heterogeneous population of foreigners and foreign extraction furnishing one-half the votes or more. Neither do they have universal suffrage. In New York one person in six is a voter; in Glasgow, one in nine; in Berlin, one in eleven. In Berlin the voting age is twenty-five; and non-taxpayers, numbering 10 to 15 per cent of the men of voting age, have no vote whatever. The council is elected by an ingenious "three- class " system, in such a way that 10 to 15 per cent of those who vote including only the very wealthiest citizens, numbering not more than 7 or 8 per cent of the total male population above twenty-one years elect two-thirds of the coun- cil. 1 In Glasgow, 25,000 adult males equal to one-fourth of the population are disfranchised; while the influence of property is still further emphasized by the provisions that women may vote provided they are taxpayers, and also sub- urban merchants and property owners who live within seven miles of the city. The restrictions in all British cities on regis- tration, the requirements of two years' residence in the same precinct, and the exclusion of those 1 See Albert Shaw, "Municipal Government in Continental Europe," p. 307, ff. CITY GOVERNMENT. 203 who receive public relief, disfranchises many thousands of the poorest classes who freely vote in America. 1 France, with a wider municipal suffrage than Germany or England, nevertheless disfranchises habitual drunkards, recipients of public poor relief, and those convicted of crime. It is significant that France, with her comparatively wide muni- cipal suffrage, elects municipal councilmen below the ability of those in England and Germany, and that city government in that country has been centralized in the hands of the mayor who appoints all subordinates. He is elected by the council, but can be removed by the prefect of the depart- ment. In Paris there is almost no home rule; the two prefects who govern the city being ap- pointed by the president of the Republic. 2 It is generally agreed that the government of English and German cities is superior to that of American cities. Public officials are renowned for their honesty, efficiency, and the economy of their administration. The municipal councils in- clude the best and most intelligent citizens, who serve without salary. And yet they who thus represent the wealth of the community have pro- moted much further than American cities many public services for the wants of the unrepresented 1 See Albert Shaw, " Municipal Government in Great Britain." 2 ibid., p. 23 ff. 204 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. masses, such as parks, baths, gas and water supply, cheap car-fares, and many others. The reason for this is probably to be found in the very purity and efficiency of their administration, which en- courages the citizens to intrust to their munici- palities many functions which the corruption of American cities forces them to remand to private corporations. In German cities, also, the com- pulsory enlistment of private citizens of wealth and influence in unpaid co-operation with city authorities in the details of administration, ac- quaints them thoroughly with the needs of the people and stimulates a public spirit. In Berlin 10,000 taxpayers are thus enrolled, nearly 2,500 being in the department of charities. That a restricted suffrage would bring similar results in American cities is not to be expected. In the words of Mr. Seth Low, " In a country where wealth has no hereditary sense of obligation to its neighbors, it is hard to conceive what would be the condition of society if universal suffrage did not compel every one having property ( to con- sider, to some extent at least, the well-being of the whole community." Yet it must be acknowledged that the failure of American cities is in some way connected with universal suffrage. The fault, however, lies, not with the extension of the suffrage, but with an obsolete system of election devised for aristo- CITY GOVERNMENT. 205 cratic and capitalistic representation. The wealthy classes of Berlin, who elect two-thirds of the coun- cil, are more amenable to business considerations than are the masses of the voters. Just as little as railway stockholders would consider the Fed- eral politics or the religious belief or any other quality of their directors, attorneys, and managers, except their business capacity, so little would a capitalistic suffrage allow these qualities to in- fluence the selection of councilman. Were the suffrage restricted to any other single class in the community, little difficulty would be met by such class in selecting its ablest and typical represen- tatives' for important positions. School-teachers and professors, if they alone held the franchise, would select the leading men of their calling. Ministers of the gospel would select the leading minister, physicians the leading physician, mer- chants the most successful merchant, manufac- turers the best organizer of industry, and so on. But when the suffrage is extended to all these classes, and they are thrown together in a mis- cellaneous grouping, and instructed to elect a sin- gle representative who stands for them all, they cannot do it. The typical physician does not represent the merchants, nor the most successful merchant the ministers. Compromise candidates must be selected who do not stand out typically as the leaders of any class. Far more difficult is 20(5 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the problem when the manual working classes, with new and opposing interests, receive the fran- chise. Not only are the business classes them- selves, under such conditions, unable to elect their own typical representatives and councilmen, but the propertyless laborers and the small home-own- ers are likewise handicapped. The ward lines separate them all into artificial groupings, and pre- vent those natural combinations based on business and social interests which they would readily adopt could they join together throughout the city, ir- respective of residence. Neighborhood, though more compacted, is less united in the city than in the country. Friendship, business alliances, religious co-operation, social enjoyments, bind to- gether people of different wards instead of those of the same ward. The ward system, separating politically those whom interest would join, and so preventing their natural representation, ends in- evitably in the party machine, with its military and fraternal organization of the voters who are otherwise separated. It is useful, therefore, only to the astute schemer and wire-puller, the repre- sentative and " boss " of the machine, who bal- ances skilfully interest against interest, faction against faction, party against party. He repre- sents nothing but his own shrewd manipulation of the separated fragments of the body politic. His success is that of Napoleon, " divide and conquer." CITY GOVERNMENT. 207 It is admitted that government by the mayor in American cities is better than government by the common council elected by wards. It centralizes the administration in one head, which is more easily decapitated by a popular uprising than the hydra- headed council. But its limitations and dangerous tendencies have been indicated. The council, how- ever, elected upon the proportional basis, promises more for municipal reform than the mayor. In the first place it would soon remove the govern- ment from Federal politics, simply because it would introduce representation of business interests, good citizenship interests, labor interests, and various interests other than partisan, which would hold the balance of power, and prevent every partisan action. The appeal to voters to abandon their Federal politics in city elections must in the long run be fruitless under a system of majority or plurality rule, where one party by the election of a mayor can capture the entire city government. ' The prize is too great to be neglected by partisan inter- ests. Party machinery must be constantly active, or else be weakened. To exert influence on na- tional issues, the local organization must find co- hesion in local issues. Local victory strengthens its hold on the State and national organizations. The only way to prevent national parties from struggling to control city politics is to introduce a 208 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. system which prevents any one party from securing majority control of the city government. If third or fourth parties hold the balance of power, they can check the domination of either national party in city affairs, and so reduce them both to a mini- mum. And here again, since the public looks on third parties in city affairs with a favor which it does not vouchsafe to third parties in Federal affairs, the time is ripe for a system of city government with proportional representation which will frankly give these third parties the balance of power, and, indeed, encourage them to increase in numbers, variety, and vigor. At the same time, by electing a council of, say, thirty, in annual groups of ten, the quota of representation would be large enough to exclude petty and factious interests, but small enough to represent all interests of municipal sig- nificance. Proportional representation would bring able and public-spirited men into the service of the city. As a legislative body meeting once a week or fortnight, and supervising through their commit- tees, but not administering the city departments, the councilmen would receive no ^salaries, as in German and English cities ; but they would be glad to serve. It is a mistake to assume that the best business men are so engrossed with their pri- vate affairs that they would not act as councilmen. Such men already give their unpaid services as CITY GOVERNMENT. 209 trustees of institutions, as members of State boards of charities, as school, park, and sinking-fund com- missioners, and in many public positions where they are not compelled to seek appointment by questionable means. So would they serve in the city council if chosen on the proportional plan in such a way as to be free from humiliating bar- gains. " Elected in this way," says Charles Fran- cis Adams, 1 " who could refuse to serve ? Consider the prestige, the weight of authority and influence, with which any man could walk into a council chamber, who entered it at the head of the poll under such a system as this. No citizen, whether in New York or Boston, so elected, could or would refuse to obey the mandate of his fellow-citizens. And so it would be in the power of any consider- able body of voters to lay a hand on the shoulder of any man, no matter how eminent or how busy he might be, and call upon him to perform his tour of municipal duty." Such citizens, too, would be elected from the different sections of the city. Proportional repre- sentation in cities would not abolish local repre- sentation. In some cases where a river or a railway system divides the city into two widely different sections, it might be well to provide for two tickets, one for each section. But even with- out such provision, the parties nominating candi- i "Proportional Representation Review," March, 1894. 210 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. dates could bring out a full vote for their tickets only on condition that they distributed the candi- dates among the sections. And if the voters as a matter of fact attach weight to sectional repre- sentation, they can readily cast that weight in their ballots by voting for such candidates as repre- sent their sections. Thus sectional interest must come forward under such a system in its true proportions along with other interests, though it is prevented from becoming the exclusive in- terest. With a reformed city council removed from Federal politics, the city administration would as- sume a new efficiency. The council is not only a legislative body ; if it truly represents the people, it must be also an administrative body. Therein it differs from the State and Federal legislatures in that the latter are sovereign in every regard over their respective fields. But the city govern- ment is only a branch of the State government, its powers are delegated, and it possesses only those granted by the legislature or the Constitution of the State. Matters of general legislation, such as health, administration of justice, property, and personal rights, in all their manifold forms, are withheld from it. The council, representing the delegated sovereignty of the city, has but limited legislative duties, even under the most generous grant of home rule. It remains, therefore, to in- CITY GOVERNMENT. 211 quire how far it should be intrusted with adminis- trative duties. At the present time, civil service reform in the United States has advanced no farther than the control of subordinate positions. It is not even proposed by the ardent advocates of this reform that either in city, State, or nation, it should in- clude the heads of departments. The conse- quence is that, in the cities where civil service rules apply, there is a double head to each depart- ment ; . a political head, appointed by the mayor for his own term of office, and a professional or expert head, holding under civil service rules during efficiency. The latter has the entire administra- tion of the details of the service, and the super- vision of subordinates ; he is an expert who has usually come up from the ranks, and is thoroughly acquainted with every feature of his department. The political head comes and goes with the mayor, and is supposed to represent his "policy." The actual administration, however, he is compelled from very inefficiency to leave to the expert head. Now, civil service reform comes in as a mechan- ical arrangement to prevent the political heads of departments from applying to subordinates the same rules of appointment and removal as those which are applied to themselves. So far it has best accomplished its aim when administered by a commission appointed independently of the city 212 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. authorities, as in Massachusetts by the governor. This commission, after competitive and non-com- petitive examinations, can alone " certify " candi- dates for subordinate appointments to the heads of departments, upon requisitions from the latter. Usually, when one appointment is to be made, the three candidates who stand highest on examina- tion are certified, and the head of the department must select one of these. Promotions, too, must be made according to fixed rules of precedence. The object here is to restrict the freedom of the political heads of departments, so that they will not dismiss subordinates in order to appoint their own political adherents. Undoubtedly, with the existing methods of se- lecting heads, these rules are indispensable. They give employees security of tenure, they promote efficiency and economy, but above all they prevent the demoralization of the voters, a surprisingly large number of whom are controlled by the hope of office for themselves or their friends. But civil service reform as thus administered is strikingly inadequate in municipal government. The general testimony is that it succeeds well when the heads of departments are in sympathy with it; but if they are not, they can defeat its aims. On the other hand, if the heads are perma- nent expert officials, as is often the case in the fire department, they do not need the services of an CITY GOVERNMENT. 213 outside commission, and are awkwardly hampered by it. The appointment and promotion of subor- dinates is not a mere mechanical matter of ex- aminations, measurements and averages, which can be done by a commission having no profes- sional and expert knowledge of the services re- quired. Rather is it a work of tact and insight into character, a work requiring that sound judg- ment, that thorough experience in the service, and that full knowledge of those subtle qualities which bring success in the particular duties required, a judgment, an experience, and a knowledge which can be found only in the resourceful head of a department, who has served in subordinate positions, and who has at heart the success and honor of his department. The weakness of civil service reform is that it does not reach the foun- tain and source of efficient civil service, the heads of departments. A thorough reform of the civil service in city affairs cannot be expected until the political heads of departments are abolished altogether, and the entire administration intrusted to the expert pro- fessional headsj In German and English cities the civil service commission as an independent organization is unknown. Heads of departments are selected by the council, sometimes from the subordinates by promotion, but usually from the lists of those who have achieved success and 214 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. reputation as heads in smaller cities, having be- gun their careers as subordinates in both large and small ones. Upon these heads is laid the complete responsibility for the administration of their departments, and, as an indispensable con- dition of such responsibility, the unrestricted ap- pointment and removal of all subordinates. 1 The council, of course, legally and formally ratines the action of its heads of departments through its own committees, though not interfering in the election of subordinates. In the United States an essential feature of government by the mayor, both as practised and advocated, is his unchecked freedom in appoint- ing his so-called "cabinet," the heads of depart- ments. They are his personal representatives in the city administration. But the mayor, as al- ready shown, must necessarily be elected, except in sporadic cases, on the basis of Federal politics. His personal representatives, therefore, must re- flect his political complexion. They must come and go with him. They are appointed and removed, not on account of their intimate knowl- edge of the departments and their eminently suc- cessful administration therein, but solely for those political reasons which may, for the time being, 1 Illustrations of this and other statements regarding foreign cities are found in Albert Shaw's " Municipal Government in Great Britain " and " Municipal Government in Continental Europe," New York, 1895. CITY GOVERNMENT. 215 strengthen the popular hold of the mayor. As long as the mayor, elected by popular vote, ap- points them, such must be their character. They are at the best a useless encumbrance, and in all cases a serious danger to the administration of city affairs. On the other hand, if a reformed and strictly non-partisan council of the foremost citizens, wherein no single political party held the major- ity, should appoint the heads of departments, these would not be chosen for political reasons, but simply to carry out the wishes of the council. The latter would determine its own " policy," as far as the city government is empowered to do so; and the heads of departments would be its professional, expert administrators for developing that policy. The civil service commission could be abolished as a wasteful obstruction; and the department chiefs, whose only claim to perma- nency would be the efficiency of their administra- tion, could be intrusted with entire responsibility in all the details of appointments, promotions, and removals. Thus it will be seen that proportional represen- tation in American cities will achieve its marked success not merely in the legislative field, but in the more important administrative field. There is, in fact, no half-way position between rule by ( mayor and rule by council. If Americans accept 216 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the present tendency, they cannot stop short of the abolition of the council. Following that must come longer terms for the mayor; next, removal from office by the governor, not only for mal- feasance, but for political reasons, as in France. Home rule, democratic self-government, civic pride, municipal patriotism, must gradually dis- appear in the face of advancing centralization. On the other hand, a council elected from the best citizens by the free choice of the voters, as guaranteed by proportional representation, would gradually absorb into its hands the control of city administration. Beginning with the control of taxation, the legislature would remove from it those restrictions against granting franchises and making loans, and those financial limitations im- posed by independent boards of estimate and apportionment, which now render even the legis- lative functions of the council in our large cities a mere formality. Then the council would be able to control the mayor, and to state the terms of financial support. And finally, proceeding from one success to another, the mayor would again be reduced to the position of chairman and dignitary, while the grand committee of the people, representing them wholly and in part, freed from machines, bosses, and spoilsmen, would restore to our cities a genuine representative democracy. CITY GOVERNMENT. 217 Practical illustrations of the line of reasoning pursued in the foregoing pages might be found in any American city. I will select the campaign of 1895 for the election of mayor and council- men in the city of Syracuse. The Republican or- ganization had been in control of the city for several years. After both the Republican and Democratic parties had made their nominations for mayor, there was considerable dissatisfaction. A Citizens' Reform party was organized, com- posed mainly of Republicans. This party offered the mayoralty nomination successively to three well-known and capable citizens, two of whom declined, and the third accepted. Thus three candidates were in the field. As a result, the Democrats elected their nominee on the follow- ing vote : Democrats, 9,184 ; Citizens, 6,018 ; Republicans, 5,831. At the same election 19 councilmen were elected by wards. Had the councilmanic election been based on proportional representation, according to the vote for mayor, the council would have stood, 8 Democrats, 6 Citizens, 5 Republicans. Neither party would have secured a majority. At the same time the Citizens' party would have met no difficulty in finding eminent candidates. The two men who refused to run for mayor would willingly have accepted a place on a proportional ticket, be- cause a nomination would have been equivalent 218 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. to an election. They would not have been forced to undergo the bitter personal attacks which spring from the supreme importance of a single candidate, upon whom depend all the ap- pointments and the distribution of patronage. There would have been no fight whatever over the four or five principal candidates nominated by the Citizens' party. Then, when elected, such men would not have been compelled to drop their private business, at great loss to themselves, their partners, and their families, only to return to it after two years of harassing struggle with spoils- men. Serving without salaries, meeting once a week, supervising through committees the heads of departments, to whom the actual administration is intrusted, they would have time for their pri- vate affairs. Under such conditions, there is no reason why the best men of American cities, as of European cities, should not find the honor and opportunities of an aldermanic seat greatly to be desired. When once elected, and their records made, they would be returned again and again to the council, with no effort, no political wire- pulling, simply through nomination by petition and the untrammelled suffrage of their fellow- citizens. In the council they would hold the balance of power between the two dominant parties. They would prevent all partisan legis- lation and appointments, would be the spokes- CITY GOVERNMENT. 219 men for the public opinion of the community, and a rallying-point against corruption in the city affairs. Here the objection naturally arises, granting that the Citizens' Reform party would be able to guarantee election to its principal candidates, would not the same be true for the regular parties and their nominees ? Therefore, would not the proportional plan strengthen instead of weaken' the hold of the machines ? Could they not elect the very worst candidates whom they might choose? And when elected, could not these rep- resentatives of both party organizations combine to defeat the Citizens' party and then divide the appointments and share the corruption funds be- tween themselves ? After all, does not muni- cipal reform depend solely upon the renewed interest and independence of citizens in municipal affairs rather than in any mere revision of political machinery ? Unquestionably, the first requisite of any reform is the public spirit, intelligence, and independence of the voters. A corrupt and ignorant electorate can never produce good government. At the same time, the history of the secret ballot legislation in the United States the past five years demon- strates beyond doubt the importance of reform in political machinery. The ballot laws did not create patriotism, public spirit, intelligence, inde- 220 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. pendence ; but they have given these qualities an advantage which they never before possessed in the electoral contest with bribers. Proportional representation goes farther in the same direction. It offers to would-be independent voters the guar- anty that they will not throw their votes away if they cast them for third-party candidates. In the Syracuse election hundreds of voters were influ- enced by this consideration. A bolt from the Republican ticket to the Citizens' ticket on the mayoralty election was quite generally understood to be simply a vote for the Democratic candidate. But with proportional representation every 1,100 votes turned over to the Citizens' ticket carries the assurance of electing one candidate on that ticket ; whereas in the election of mayor it would have required nearly 10,000 votes. So easy and safe is the bolting from the regular nominees under the proportional plan that the political or- ganizations would see the necessity of nominating at least prominent men instead of mere tools and figure-heads. Otherwise the Citizens' ticket could easily increase its share of representation from a third to a half or more of the aldermen. In either case there would be a decided gain. If only the men who engineer the political machines, but who usually hold no offices, could be placed in the municipal council, they would be in a position where the people could condemn them. CITY GOVERNMENT. 221 And succeeding elections, with the habit of in- dependence encouraged among the voters, would gradually weed out even the least corrupt of aldermen. The voters in American cities are already independent enough to bring about these results. Our cities are not now in need of greater independence among the citizens, but of better machinery for expressing their actual independence. City government in the United States is at once . the direst failure and the brightest hope of our r politics. It is based upon the ward, the pettiest extreme of the district system of representation, and wa'rd politics is recognized as the worst pol- itics. This is the hopeful feature, that the people acknowledge the failure, and are looking for rem- edies. What these remedies shall be is not yet clear nor agreed. A great many must be tried and tested, and their defects noted, and finally by experimental selection the fittest will survive. With three thousand cities and villages, America has the widest variety of municipal experiments in the world. Small governments can be reformed more readily than large ones. To experiment upon Congress jeopardizes the nation; to exper- iment upon cities risks but a fraction. And no experiment scarcely can aggravate the actual sit- uation. From one city to another the successful reform will extend, and finally, like other reforms 222 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. in America, proceed to State and national adop- tion. If proportional representation can be fairly introduced and tested, it is believed that the fore- going pages have indicated the hope of its uni- versal success. SOCIAL REFORM. 223 CHAPTER IX. SOCIAL REFORM. THE motive of political reform is not a mere academic delight in symmetrical and clean govern- ment. It goes much farther. Political reform is only the preliminary to social reform. The most serious objections urged against the interference of the State or the city in promoting social welfare are grounded on the incapacity of administrative officials.' The experience of foreign cities has demonstrated the value of municipal ownership and operation of all public services, such as water, gas, electric lighting, and street railways. The efficient municipal governments of Europe have done much more. They have erected municipal dwellings with the best equipments, to be leased at moderate rentals to working people. They have conducted municipal farms, slaughter-houses, savings banks, pawnshops, baths, laundries, ball- grounds, technical schools, with the purpose to improve the condition of the poorest working pop- ulation, and to elevate the life of every class. In American cities it would seem absurd to in- trust such important enterprises to the authorities as at present constituted. Generally, where watei> 224 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. works, gas, or electric lighting is taken up by a municipality, it is placed in the hands, not of the council, but of a board or commission newly cre- ated for the purpose, and elected by the people or appointed by the mayor. This does not bring satisfactory results. It unnecessarily splits the government, divides responsibility, involves waste- ful administration. Yet, where the council cannot be trusted, it is the only practicable plan. At the same time, it is so objectionable that it affords little encouragement to those who desire the exten- sion of municipal functions. With a reformed council, however, the way would be open to a business-like administration of all new enterprises which the public might wish the municipality to undertake. The reform of the government of London, through the County Government Act of 1888, which created a council of able and repre- sentative citizens, was followed immediately by energetic work in the direction of municipal dwell- ings, street and dock improvements, abolition of contract work, and purchase of street-railway lines. The latter, throughout the whole area of London, will be owned and operated by the council, and consolidated into a single system within fifteen years. The people who suffer most from inefficient and corrupt government in the United States are the wage-earning classes. Their streets are ill kept ; SOCIAL EEFOEM. 225 sanitary and building regulations are unenf orced ; heavy charges are imposed for car-fares and gas; parks, playgrounds, and schools are inadequate. So little does the city do for the classes who have no property, that they lose their interest in muni- cipal government, and readily follow the politician who appeals to their prejudices. This becomes a serious matter as these classes grow in self-con- sciousness, as they begin to learn their political power, and to feel that the motive of municipal government is not to promote their welfare, but to restrict their liberty. They have a majority of the votes, and they tend to combine under machine leadership for what they consider their class inter- ests. Municipal reform must consider the welfare^ of the masses of the working classes. But it is a mistake to suppose that their welfare will be pro-| moted by giving them exclusive majority rule, as with the present system. ; Tammany Hall secures their votes, but neglects their homes and schools. A corrupt government, with weak officials, managed by private bosses, can never introduce social re- forms. It must first have a share of the business integrity and leadership of the community. There are many men of this type in every city who would gladly enter upon reforms for the people could they be placed in power. If the working classes were free to vote as they pleased, they would soon learn to stand by such men and to keep them in 226 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. the municipal council against all the influences of machines and corporations. At present these men are excluded by the very qualities which would make them of service. Proportional representa- tion is the only political reform yet proposed which will guarantee them continued election, and thereby bring about that interest of the working classes in good city government and that harmony of all classes which is becoming indispensable. Thoughtful persons who contemplate the social conditions of to-day are oppressed by anxiety. So suddenly have a multitude of strange evils sprung into sight that the observer is bewildered, on one side, an unprecedented concentration of wealth in the control of a few syndicates ; on the other, a growing restlessness and frantic attempts at organ- ization on the part of the wage-earning classes. As phases of these changes, there are also the rapid rise of cities where capital and labor meet face to face in secret and open battle ; the mobilization of the army near these cities, and the equipment of armories; the increase of the unemployed, of crime, intemperance, and vice ; the purchase of legislation and the degradation of politics. But more serious than all is the cynical recognition of these facts in the club-room, the bitter emphasis of them in the back alley and the tenement and among the small farmers, and the hopelessness of SOCIAL REFORM. 227 millions of workers. Forty years ago the farmer and his sons worked early and late, opening up the wilderness, but they went and came with songs. To-day they cannot endure it; sons abandon the farms for the cities, work is irksome and a curse ; they hurry through it to reach the saloon. Have the people become individually and severally de- generate, or are they distorted by social condi- tions ? Whatever the causes, the problems are here. And the array of solutions is more bewildering than the multitude of problems. Here are iso- lated groups of visionaries and enthusiasts, ready to sacrifice themselves for their several panaceas. Here are timid souls anxious to smooth the ele- ments by charity, and beseeching competitors to show brotherly kindness. Here are hard intellects, demanding the police. The situation cannot remain. It rests on a pro- found contradiction. On one side is a religion quoted and invoked at school, in the pulpit, by the press, by socialists, even by atheists, which ex- alts an ideal of human brotherhood and equality; on the other side, an industrial condition fast so- lidifying class distinctions, and a political philoso- phy teaching the infallibility of the majority. The conviction is growing that in some way the government, as city, State, or nation, is to have an important place in solving these contradictions. It 228 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. is seen that the church has lost its hold in the Middle Ages it might have sufficed. Education is not enough it, with religion, intensifies the unrest. Public opinion grows and accomplishes much, but it is limited. Feelings of brotherhood and a spirit of concession soften antagonism in individual cases, but they are not comprehensive. The state alone includes all the other elements ; it alone is coterminous with society. Without it education is not universal. Religion and brother- hood do not reach criminals, degenerates, nor tyrants, but the state lays its hand upon them. Society acts through the state it is society's organ. Public opinion, as modified by religion, education, and brotherhood, effects its main pur- poses through legislation. But the state is too much considered as merely coercive. It is primarily co-operative. Coercion is needed only for anti-social individuals and emer- gencies. The state seems to be coercive because it does not represent all the people ; it is not yet a perfect organ for expressing their wishes. Many who are not truly anti-social are crushed by it. Were its laws and administration accurately just to all classes, and did it promote the general rather than influential private welfare, public opinion would exact such close obedience that coercion would almost disappear. SOCIAL REFORM. 229 No social doctrine can long be held by a consid- erable body of people if it does not include a side of truth. It may not be intelligently held, nor be intelligible to others, and may be grounded mainly on feelings; but it is the expression of feelings which are themselves products of social conditions, and so has a place in social organization. Such are the profound conservative instincts which sus- tain private property, the family, political parties, and the state. Less so, and modified more or less by intelligence, are the instincts which demand change, such as abolition of slavery and the sa- loon, or which seek socialism, anarchism, single tax, co-operation, or other innovations. Out of the proper and just balancing of all these interests and doctrines, and their proportionate realization in social structure, proceeds that " moving equilib- rium " which is the life of society. It is the province of the science of sociology to discover what is this just balancing of social forces which will harmonize antagonisms and make for progress. Science should indicate those lines of development and social experiment which will economize the life of society, and secure the good of every individual. But science alone is inadequate. It is merely academic and preliminary. Its honor is that it leads to invention, and invention in society is legislation. Legislation, comprehending the en- 230 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. tire range of human social existence, lays the foundation for individual development and pri- vate co-operation. Law-makers, then, are socio- logical inventors, and require the aid of sociology as electricians require the aid of physics. 1 Social invention, however, differs from mechan- ical invention in one most important character. Society is not dead matter to be ruthlessly ad- justed. It is a vital, historical growth, composed of human lives, feelings, and interests. These interests must be consulted. Monarchy was abol- ished because royal inventors did not consult social classes. Likewise every system of govern- ment which is partial and unrepresentative will be left behind, w r hether it be conducted by aristoc- racy, plutocracy, or political machines. But if a system of government can be perfected where all classes and interests shall be represented by their leading spokesmen, social invention will proceed, not by the coercive arm of the state, but by mutual concession. Labor and capital to-day have no recognized common ground or meeting- place, neither in shop, factory, church, college, nor state. It is left for demagogues, the representa- tives of neither, to bring them together. But a city council, having the responsibility of the city in its hands, and containing in its membership the acknowledged leaders of capital and labor, would 1 See Ward, " Dynamic Sociology," 2 vols. New York, 1886. /"- SOCIAL REFORM 231 be, within its jurisdiction, the most efficient in- strument yet discovered for harmonizing the two. It would be a perpetual board of arbitration, pos- sessing many powers of sovereignty, but not com- pelled to use them. Strikes and boycotts would be settled by mutual agreement between author- ized negotiators. And for the wider interests of States and nation the legislatures and Congress would fill the same office. Such a representative assembly would be com- posed of moderate, sensible, earnest men, because the people are moderate and earnest. There would be extremists and idealists, but their vis- ions would be controlled by hard contact with the practical difficulties of ideal legislation and with the overwhelming majority of moderates. And the latter, too, would be forced to see that ideal conditions must have consideration as well as the rude facts of the present. From such assemblies of leaders in all the cities and States and the Congress of the Union would proceed such well-considered, straightforward, and simple laws, without the coercion of partisan ma- jorities or the injustice of partial representation, that the people would learn to respect their gov- ernment, and to fall in line heartily with its laws and ordinances. Such assemblies, instead of shoot- ing back and forth between revolution and re- / action, would march steadily forward in the line I 232 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. of social reform^] They would call science and comparative' legislation and history to their aid. They would establish by mutual concession the essential conditions for the brpthjerhaoji,_ol^aLpitai and labor, and with these conditions would lay ^the foundations for the gradual solution of the main problems of social organization. And the state, instead of being a coercive policeman to force degenerates into line, would become the honored instrument of social co-operation. It might then be expected that the legislature would resume its rightful place as the sovereign branch of government. Unquestionably, its posi- tion is such that, no matter how degraded its character, unless restricted by the Constitution, it gradually absorbs supreme control of the other departments. It alone can grant and withhold financial support; and sooner or later this power subordinates the executive, the judicial, and the administrative branches. The national Congress, notwithstanding presidential vetoes and popular distrust, has drawn to itself the management of the details of administration. State legislatures and municipal councils would have done the same but for the increasing constitutional restrictions which have subordinated their financial powers to the judiciary and the executive. Could the Federal Constitution be readily amended, doubtless similar restrictions would be imposed upon Congress. SOCIAL REFORM. 233 If government is to be an agent for social re- form, it must have first the confidence of the peo- ple. This can come only as it commands the best ability of the community, and is representative in character. The executives and judges do not answer these requisites. They cannot represent all the people. They are single officers elected by a majority, or appointed by the agent of the majority, and they do not inspire universal confi- dence. Generally, indeed, they do not represent even a majority of the people, but only a plu- rality ; and even in that plurality a small faction of astute politicians and influential capitalists in- terested in legislation or contracts and franchises, has dictated the nominations and the appoint ments. It cannot be expected that the people, who are only awaiting a new election to bring in a new executive hostile to the incumbent one, will trust such a government with the delicate and portentous problems of social reform. In the legislature, however, elected upon the propor- tional basis, by the free choice of all classes of voters, and uncontrolled by a partisan majority, the people would find that ability, that extended experience, that representative character, and that continuous policy, which would command their confidence. With the confidence of the people assured, the legislature must become solely responsible for the 234 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. policy and administration of government. It is becoming plain that, in times of urgency, the American idea of " checks and balances " is falla- cious. A government in which departments are pitted against each other cannot be consistent and harmonious, much less efficient. The idea is al- ready nearly abandoned in municipal government, where the mayor is made alone responsible for the administration. There must, indeed, be checks and balances in government, else one class will override the others. But these checks should not be founded upon the antagonism of independent departments ; rather should they be provided for within a single sovereign department. By a pro- portional election of law-makers this is secured. Within the legislative body itself, controlling all other departments, would be found such a bal- ancing of interests and classes that, on the one hand, the despotism which our constitution-makers feared would be obviated, and, on the other, the indispensable harmony and unity of government would be guaranteed. The legislature could then safely be made the sovereign organ of the government and the promo- ter of social reform. The executive would sink to its true position, that of an agent for carrying out the policy of legislation ; and the judiciary, instead of annulling the laws, would simply apply them to concrete cases. SOCIAL REFORM. 235 All this, of course, involves a change in the character of our representative assemblies difficult for the American citizen to comprehend. It im- plies not merely a constitutional supremacy of the law-making body over the other departments, but primarily a popular supremacy in the hearts of the people. Proportional representation is not ad- vocated only to give the minority a hearing, but mainly to give all the people confidence in their rulers and in one another. And unless the rising demand for social reform now urging forward all classes can bring them all together into harmoni- ous, progressive, and just legal relations through the law-making agencies, the outlook for these movements is indeed ominous. 236 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. CHAPTER X. THE PROGRESS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA- TION. IN its English and colonial origins, representa- tive government was an almost unconscious growth. No philosophical dissertations preceded it. The masses- of the people, with slavery and serfdom their lot, were ignorant and without voice in the government. Representation at that time was an instrument in the contest between mon- archy on the one hand, and aristocracy and wealth on the other. The first outcome was the success of representation and the limitation of monarchy. The problems of government which attracted at- tention down to the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury turned upon the relative weight of the monarchical as against the representative principle. Consequently, the philosophical works of the eighteenth century, and the written constitutions from 178T to 1848, were concerned with the dis- tribution of powers, and the balancing of execu- tive, legislative, and judicial branches. In all of these discussions, the unpropertied classes had no immediate interest, and were not consulted. The final result of this constitution-making has been the destruction or the constitutional limitation of ITS PROGRESS. 237 monarchy and aristocracy based on birth, and the increased influence of plutocracy based upon prop- erty. In the third and fourth decades of the present century, a remarkable wave of democracy culmi- nated in our Western civilization. In the United States, property and educational qualifications were very generally removed from the suffrage. In France, and more especially in Switzerland, the franchise was made nearly universal . In England and Germany, while the suffrage was not extended to the wage-receiving classes, yet the spirit of the times liberalized the constitutions through the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1854 in England, and the representative parliaments of 1848 in Ger- many. The modern political parties date from those decades. Popular suffrage introduced a radical change in the nature of the representative system. Politicians began to bid for the labor vote. A few pioneering minds saw the inevitable outcome, and set about a philosophical study of the founda- tions of representation. It was not accidental that the years 1844 in America and 1846 in Switzerland mark the first attempts of individual minds to inquire into the true basis of representa- tion. Mr. Thomas Gilpin published at Philadel- phia, in the former year, his prophetic work, of which little notice was then taken, "On the 238 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. Representation of Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies." In 1846 Victor Considerant, the distinguished leader of the socialist school of Fourier, addressed an open letter to the Grand Council of Geneva, en- titled, " De la Siiicerite du Gouvernement Re- presentatif, ou Exposition de 1'Election Veridique." In this brochure M. Considerant proposed inde- pendently a plan of election almost identical with that of Thomas Gilpin. Each voter was to cast one vote for a party, and then to indicate the names of the candidates of his party whom he preferred. The proportion of representatives to which each party should be entitled was to be determined by the rule of three, and the success- ful candidates by the order of their preferences. Something akin to this plan had been suggested some twelve years before by Considerant's master, Charles Fourier; and its publication in 1846 pre- ceded by one year the wide extension of the suf- frage in Geneva. There was as yet no feeling of serious need for it, and it therefore lay dormant for fifteen years. In 1861 it was revived by M. Antoin Morin in two pamphlets. 1 In 1864, at the August election, the city of Gen- eva was the scene of violent outbreaks and blood- shed, resulting from the political strife of the i Un Nouveau Systeme Electoral. Geneve, 1861. De la Repre- sentation des Minorites. Geneve, 1862. ITS PROGRESS. 239 Conservative and Radical parties. The following September, Professor Ernest Naville published his first brochure 1 addressed to the federal council and the Swiss people, showing that the violence of the elections which threatened the stability of Swiss institutions, and inspired throughout Europe a dread of the new democracy of 1848, was but the natural outcome of the general ticket and ex- clusive majority rule. Professor Naville from that date has been the recognized leader of the re- form in Switzerland; and his numerous publica- tions, besides presenting cogent arguments, afford a complete history of proportional representation to the present time. In 1867 was formed 1' Association reformiste de Geneve, composed of Professor Naville and six associates. But the time was not yet ripe for a popular appreciation of the principles of propor- tional representation ; nor, indeed, had a plan been perfected which would appeal to the public. The movement for the referendum and initiative as a decidedly practical and thorough-going deadlock upon their unrepresentative assemblies absorbed the thought of the people. Another twenty-five years passed without appreciable advance in popu- lar approAial. A small group of students contin- ued at work improving the plan of reform which 1 Les Elections de Geneve, Memoire prcsente au Conseil fe'de'ral et au Peuple Suisse, par Ernest Naville ; Lausanne et Geneve, 1864, p. 59. Y> 240 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. they would present to the people. In the year 1876 the national Association Suisse pour la Re- presentation Proportionelle was organized, with branches at Berne and Geneva. Hearings were obtained from time to time before legislative and constitutional assemblies. But it required a crisis to force public attention upon the reform. The crisis came in 1890 in the Italian canton of Ticino. The Conservative party in 1889, with 12,653 votes, elected 77 of the 112 members of the Grand Council, while the Liberals, with 12,008 (a handful less), elected only 35. Out of a total vote of 24,671, it was calculated that 9,157 were unrepresented. 1 Finally, in 1890, an insurrec- tion broke out. The Liberals seized upon the arse- nal, and overthrew the Conservative government. Federal troops were despatched to put down the revolt. Then it was that the federal government recommended to the canton the adoption of pro- portional representation. The suggestion was acted upon, a commission was created, and in 1891 the Free List was adopted in the form approved by the Swiss Association. Says Professor Louis Wuarin of the University of Geneva: 2 " Had not the system of proportional representation been carefully worked out by men who, believing in the correct- 1 W. D. McCracken, Proportional Representation Review, September, 1893, p. 12. 2 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1895, ITS PROGRESS 241 ness of the principle, were desirous of changing the basis of the electoral law, the great achievement in the cause of justice and peace we now rejoice at, in Switzerland, would not have been effected. Is not this an eloquent encourage- ment to every man to look for the truth and prepare its advent, no matter if the feeling of the people should even be strongly adverse or sceptical at the beginning? The reformers, a small handful of workers, met with but little encouragement at first ; they were opposed by almost all the men playing some part in politics, and who enjoyed the reputation of being practical. But an hour came when the stone intended to be put at the corner of the edifice of democracy was found useful, and was used. In the organ- ization of free government, there is something which is left to the brain and the spirit of research. The power of thought is a living force, and no department of the world can prosper where it is stagnant." From Ticino the reform has spread rapidly to other cantons. The initiative and referendum have helped it very much. The French Protestant can- ton Neuchatel adopted it in 1891 ; the large canton of Geneva in 1892; the Catholic Fribourg, for mu- nicipal elections, in 1894; the German Catholic Zug in 1894, which combined the "free ticket" with cumulative voting ; finally the German Catholic Soluthurn in March, 1895, the first to introduce the Droop quota (the votes divided by the number of representatives increased ly one). In a few cantons and cities the reform has^been rejected by referendum. The city of Basle rejected it a few years ago, but the people are now demanding it 242 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. anew by initiative. The German Catholic Lucerne and St. Gall rejected it, though large minorities were for it. It is expected that " they will soon follow, and take it up like Basle ; so that in less than ten years the whole of Switzerland will have proportional representation carried out without revolution and bloodshed." * In a small decentralized country, like Switzer- land, a political reform is more readily accomplished than in a large one. England and America, how- ever, have actually preceded Switzerland by twenty to twenty-five years in the adoption of certain forms of minority representation. Doubtless the crudity and comparative failure of those primitive forms were important factors in blocking their pro- gress and prejudicing the public against mere doc- trinaire tinkering without a practicable basis. Similar conditions, however, and similar problems, suggest similar solutions. In 1854, in the discus- sion of the second Reform Bill, Lord John Russell moved in Parliament, on the suggestion of Profes- sor Fawcett, that, in the newly created electoral districts returning three members, no elector should vote for more than two candidates. He said : "Now it appears to me that many advantages would attend the enabling the minority to have a part in these re- turns. In the first place, there is apt to be a feeling of sore- 1 See article by Charles Burkli, " Free List vs. the Hare Sys- tem," in Proportional Representation Review, September, 1895. JTS PROGRESS. 243 ness when a considerable number of electors, such as I have mentioned, are completely shut out from a share in the representation of one place. . . . But, in the next place, I think that the more you have your representation confined to large populations, the more ought you to take care that there should be some kind of balance, and that the large places sending members to this House should send those who rep- resent the community at large. But when there is a very large body excluded, it cannot be said that the community is fairly represented." l In 1854 Mr. James Garth Marshall published at London his " Majorities and Minorities ; Their Relative Rights," wherein he proposed for the first time the cumulative vote which has been so popu- lar hr English and American reforms. The limited vote of Lord Russell, however, did not find legis- lative enactment until twenty-three years after its first proposal; and the cumulative vote was first employed in 1870. Two events prepared the way for this adoption. The first was the discussion inaugurated by Mr. Thomas Hare in 1859, when he published his volume entitled " The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal," which was followed in 1862 by John Stuart Mill's profoundly philosophical " Considerations on Rep- resentative Government." Mr. Mill speaks of Thomas Hare as " a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general views and for the contri- 1 Quoted by Salem Butcher, " Minority or Proportional Rep- resentation," New York, 1872, p. 38. 244 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. vance of practical details ; " and of his plan as " among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government." l Certainly no discussions have equalled these treatises of Mill and Hare in placing before the thinking people of all countries the true nature of representation under universal suffrage and politi- cal parties. The very extreme to which Mr. Hare carried his plan, proposing as he did to abolish all districts, and to make one great constituency, en- abled him and Mr. Mill to develop fully the philo- sophical principles underlying personal rather than party or sectional representation./^The unit of representation was to be determined by dividing the whole number of votes in the entire kingdom by the number of seats in the House. Every can- didate who obtained a quota would be returned, from however great a number of local constitu- encies his votes might be gathered. The elector would indicate his first and second choices, and so on ; so that his single vote might be transferred from elected or defeated candidates to some one whom it might assist in electing. 2 The mechanical details for counting, calculating the quota, and 1 " Considerations on Representative Government," American edition, New York, 1875, pp. 153, 156. 2 In Appendix II. will be found a bill drawn up according to Mr. Hare's plan for municipal councils, and in Appendix III. a modification of the Hare plan devised by Mr. "W. H. Gove, of Sale*m, Mass. ITS PROGRESS. 245 transferring the votes, are given by Mr. Hare in great detail. So complicated did the plan appear when presented on a national scale, yet so power- ful were the considerations urged in favor of its underlying principle, that for ten years in England and America the simpler forms of the limited and the cumulative votes received earnest attention and occasional enactment into law. At the same time the suffrage was again being widely extended in both countries. In 1867, when the Reform Bill which granted the ballot to the artisans in towns was being adopted by Parliament, Mr. Mill, as member for Westminster, moved an amendment embodying the essential features of Mr. Hare's scheme. The motion did not prevail ; but at a later session the limited vote of Lord John Russell was adopted for all parliamentary constitu- encies returning three members, known as " three- cornered constituencies." It will not be surprising to the reader who has followed the description of the limited and cumulative votes in the foregoing pages to learn that it was the manipulation of this limited vote which first introduced into England the American political machine. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and the Liberals of Birmingham pro- ceeded to organize thoroughly their following, in order to secure not merely two but the three can- didates of their constituency. In 1870, when the English government began 246 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. its wide extension of free schools, the cumulative vote was introduced in the election of the new local boards of education. This was by way of concession to the supporters of private and secta- rian schools, who wished to retain their hold in~ the distribution of public funds, and in the admin- istration of their schools. With this Act the progress of proportional representation in England ceased. When the suffrage was extended in 1884 to agricultural laborers, an attempt was again made to introduce the reform, but after considerable discussion the amendment was defeated. The next year was organized the English Proportional Representa- tion Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is presi- dent, and several of the members of Parliament are members. The society advocates the Hare system in constituencies electing five to fifteen representatives. yXjn the United States, the work of Thomas Gil- pin followed close upon the Act of Congress of 1842, which for the first time took the control of elections for congressmen from the several States, and provided, among other things, that the single-membered district should be universal. This was an attempt to give representation in Congress to the minority, who were practically dis- franchised by the laws of certain States wherein congressmen were elected on a general ticket. ITS PEOGBESS. 247 Gnpm s essay grew out of the discussion upon this measure. 1 Not until the period following the Civil War was public opinion ready to discuss the principles of representation, nor, indeed, was there any press- ing occasioniL, The writings of Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill were widely read in the United States ; and the pending reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion, and the agitation for the enfranchise- ment of the freedmen, brought the problems of rep- resentation suddenly to a focus. There were only two plans which reached practical adoption, the limited vote and the cumulative vote. The legis- lature of New York, in 1867, in providing for a constitutional convention, required that thirty-two of the delegates to be chosen should be from the State at large ; no voter to vote for more than six- teen candidates. In this way, though the political bias of the delegates elected to the convention from single districts stood 81 Republicans to 47 Democrats, the delegates from the State at large stood 16 to 16. 2 In the same year the Congress of the .United States considered a supplementary reconstruction bill, to which Hon. C. R. Buckalew, the Democratic senator from Pennsylvania, offered an amendment providing for the cumulative vote. A sub-com- mittee, of which Senator Buckalew was chairman, 1 Dutcher, p. 41. 2 jbid., p. 42. 248 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. reported to the Senate in 1869 a bill providing for the cumulative vote. Senator Buckalew sup- ported his amendment with great ability. Two extended debates occurred in the House in 1870 and 1871, on the motion of Mr. Marshall of Illi- nois to apply the cumulative vote to the new members of Congress, provided for in the new apportionment Act of those years. But both in the Senate and in the House the amendments were defeated. Congress was in no mood to grant this concession to the minority. The significance of proportional representation in the event of Negro enfranchisement, and the reasons why it did not at that time appeal to the party in control of Congress, are strikingly por- trayed by the proceedings of a convention of tax- payers of South Carolina, assembled at Columbia in May, 1871X The convention adopted the re- port of a committee favoring the cumulative vote for the State legislature. Among the speakers was Mr. D. H. Chamberlain, attorney-general of the State, who said : " In the first place, gentlemen, it is necessary to modify the absolute control which a mere numerical majority has obtained over the State, and to secure for intelligence and property a proper representation in the affairs of the gov- ernment. And looking about for some device which, with- out violence to the fundamental principle on which our government rests, will bring relief from the grievances ITS PROGRESS. 249 which afflict our people, I have fixed upon this system of cumulative voting, because it is not only just in its theory, but it will prove itself right in its results. It takes noth- ing from the rights of the majority. It gives them a pre- dominating control, but not an absolute disposition of the entire fortunes of the State. Do you believe for a moment, then, when you put into an ignorant assembly, many of whom can neither read nor write, forty-seven gentlemen whom I might select in this body, that you would not shame them into decency, or frighten them from crime? Who does not know that the presence of one honest man puts to flight a band of robbers ? Now, according to this system, you deny nothing which belongs to the majority, but from the moment you place in the lower house forty-seven of your ablest citizens, bad legislation will cease, and good legislatiqn will begin." J Although rejected by Congress, the cumulative or limited vote was adopted, to a greater or less extent, in various States. The most important action was that taken by the constitutional con- vention of the State of Illinois, which met Decem- ber, 1869. The convention adopted the report of a committee of which Mr. James Medill was chairman, dividing the State into 51 senatorial districts, each electing a single senator, but creat- ing a lower house of 153 members, to be elected in the senatorial districts by threes by the cumu- lative vote. This section was voted upon sepa- rately by the people, July 2, 1870, and carried by a vote 99,022 in favor, and 70,080 against. 1 Dutcher, p. 62, s/r 250 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. High expectations were entertained of the re- form. Mr. Medill in convention said : "Perhaps no proposition has come before this conven- tion that has more fully taken possession of my mind, be- cause I believe it is one of the greatest and most valuable improvements in a free government ever devised by the wisdom of man since representative government has been established. I believe it is only a question of time when the principle of minority representation will be applied to all legislative elections in Europe and America, from Par- liament or Congress down, to village aldermen, and in all other cases when two or more officers are to be voted upon at the same time, for the same office. By this plan, and this only, can the democratic equality of the citizen be asserted, and carried into practice in public life. . . . The whole people, instead of a plurality or majority, will be represented by this plan ; and it is as much superior to the old method of representation as the whole is greater than the half. It does not attempt to take away any of the rights of the majority. The majority, under this system, will still rule, having full and ample control, and still being responsible for the laws made. But this gives the dis- franchised minority, who may amount to almost one-half the community, some voice, some representation in govern- ment, some chance to be heard. It secures representation with taxation, which the existing one-sided system does not. It gives the minority some opportunity to present their views, and defend their principles and interests, in the halls of legislation. What can be more just than that, or more correct in principle ? " 1 How these bright hopes have been disappointed is shown by the previous discussions of this book. i Dutcher, p. 55. ITS PROGRESS. 251 The action of the New York legislature and the veto by Governor Hoffman in April, 1872, of the bill providing for the cumulative vote in the election of aldermen in New York City, mark the highest point attained in America in the discussion of minority representation. The Personal Representation Society of New York had appeared before the constitutional conven- tion of 186T, to urge the adoption of the Hare plan. Mr. Horace Greeley, as a member of that convention, had moved an amendment requiring the cumulative vote in the election of senators and representatives. After considerable discussion it was defeated by a vote of 93 to 20. Later an amendment requiring minority representation in the election of directors of private corporations was defeated by 71 to 32. It remained for a Republican legislature, desirous of breaking the hitherto impregnable Tammany majority in New York City, in 1872 to provide, in an Act creating a new charter for that city, that the board of al- dermen should be elected by the cumulative vote in five districts of nine aldermen each. The dis- cussion in the legislature and in the press attracted national attention. Without previous experience, it was impossible to foresee all its consequences. Yet with districts as large as the bill provided for, there would have been opportunity for the rep- resentation of minor parties, though the waste of 252 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. votes would have prevented their greatest influ- ence. The arguments of Governor Hoffman in his veto message present such a mixture of spe- cious falsity and shrewd knowledge of the situa- tion, and the document is of so great historic importance in the movement for true representa- tion, that it is here given in full : l " EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, ALBANY, April 30, 1872. " To the Assembly, I return, without approval, Assembly Bill No. 118, entitled, * An Act to reorganize the Local Government of the City of New York.' The bill provides a new charter for the City of New York, the main features of which are these : One board of forty-five aldermen, elected nine in each senate district, by a novel method called the cumulative vote, under which one man may vote nine times for one candidate, and whereby a minority can elect its candidate or candidates, against the will of the majority in the district ; this board of aldermen to appoint (by the same vote) four out of the five heads which are given to each of the administrative departments. . . . The remedy which is relied on against the evils of mis- government under this charter is the cumulative system of voting, which it introduces in order to secure fuller repre- sentation of the minority. It is claimed that this will re- sult, not only in a better class of representatives, but in greater power on the part of the minority to restrain the majority. Nine aldermen are to be elected in each district ; and every elector is authorized, instead of voting once for each of nine candidates, to cast, if he chooses so to do, nine votes for any one candidate, or to cast three votes each for 1 Quoted by Dutcher, pp. 158-161. ITS PBOGKESS. 253 any three candidates, and so on. This plan seeks to let the party which is in a minority in any political subdivision put into office its candidate, in spite of the opposition of the political majority. Experiments are now being tried in one or two of the other States, of this cumulative method of voting as to some of their local elections ; but these have been inaugurated so recently that they afford us no guide to sound judgment derived from actual practice and expe- rience. It is proposed by this bill that we shall try the ex- periment in the chief city of the continent, with its vast and complicated interests exposed to great injury if this new theory prove to be a failure. A city of a million in- habitants is not the place for trying experiments in govern- ment, especially an experiment which many of the most thoughtful of our people believe to be visionary, impracti- cable, and unconstitutional. It would be much wiser for us to await the result of the trials now going on elsewhere. This would not be the first time that a scheme to allow the minority to put men into office, in spite of the opposition of the majority, has been tried in this State. For many years the Board of Supervisors in New York was elected upon this principle. In that instance the minority were allowed, practically, to choose just half the Board. This experiment, warmly and earnestly advocated at its intro- duction as a valuable improvement, resulted, as all admit now, in a disastrous failure, and was abandoned with gen- eral consent. There is this difference between that instance and the method now proposed that there the minority were secured an equal share of power, while here it is ex- pected that they will obtain only a share proportioned to their actual numbers. A very serious question arises whether this method of voting is in conformity with the provisions of the Con- stitution. Many of the ablest lawyers of the State have 254 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. not hesitated to express their convictions that it must be held to be unconstitutional. It is said, and with great force, that the election, as regulated by this charter, is not an election in the sense in which that word was understood at the time the Constitution was made, and in the sense in which it has always been understood among us. An elec- tion is the choice of a public officer by his receiving a larger number of votes than any other candidate in the district entitled to fill the office, all the electors being en- titled to vote once at such election for a candidate for the place to be filled. It is suggested also that the Con- stitution guarantees that all electors shall be entitled to vote for all officers who are to be elected by the people, and that if any elector exercises his right to vote once for each of the nine aldermen to be chosen for his dis- trict, his single vote as to any one of the candidates can- not be overridden by one of his neighbors voting nine times for some one man for the same place without an in- fraction of his equal right of suffrage as an elector under the Constitution. . . . The fundamental principle of our government, familiar to the people, is that elective officers shall be chosen by a majority of the votes of the people entitled to take part in the choice. In all cases submitted to the people, the major- ity decides. When any other principle is sought to be in- troduced, a revolutionary change of great magnitude is proposed, which ought not to be tried under the sanction of an Act of the legislature only; if so great a change is to be made at all, it should be done only with the careful de- liberation which pertains to revisions of the Constitution. Independent of the constitutional question is that of the expediency of this change in the method of choosing repre- sentatives. I am not disposed to take the ground that some form of minority representation may not prove to be ITS PROGRESS. 255 an improvement. This has nowhere been tried long enough to prove anything. In all free government the people divide themselves into two great parties. This tendency is so universal that it is not statesmanship to ignore it. Enactments will not over- come it. It is a natural, useful, and wholesome division ; it insures a large body of men among the people interested in and intent upon fault finding with the party in power, and struggling by means of exposure of their errors to bring over to the side of the minority enough of the elec- tors to convert it into a majority, and so to take over the government. In politics, as in other things, it is agitation which purifies. Under this proposed new system of voting, the minority carry in their candidates without effort. The majority do the same. In a district where it is known that the political majority usually casts about two-thirds of the whole vote, there being nine aldermen to be elected, the caucus or nominating convention of the political majority will naturally concentrate all their votes upon six can- didates ; the caucus of the minority will concentrate on three. There will be no actual contest before the people. The decrees of the party caucus will be absolute. Neither side will be in fear, lest, by putting forward unfit candi- dates, it may lose the election. For the two parties will be acting at the polls, not against each other, but independent each of the other. This condition of things, where the de- crees of the party caucuses on both sides are final, naturally gives rise to secret combinations between the leaders on both sides for an agreed-upon division of power, against which combinations the mass of the voters might, under this system, struggle in vain. It is true that there is an opportunity for a combination in favor of one or two candi- dates of independent voters, who may be regardless of party associations. But when the power of the regular party or* 256 PROPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. ganization is considered, will not this influence of combina- tions of independent voters make itself felt to a very limited extent, and very rarely? Will it be equal to the power which voters, disposed to disregard their party associations on any occasion, can now exert, by temporarily voting with the opposing party, by way of rebuke to their own ? It may be a fatal mistake for us to be overconfident that the effect of this method of voting will be merely to add to the influence and power in politics of the more unselfish and more virtuous among the electors. The professional politicians may use it more skilfully and effectually than others, and it may intrench them in power beyond the reach of the popular majority or of popular condemnation. This system must tend to increase very largely the power in politics of men who have a personal following, in the shape of clubs and associations, formed to promote the suc- cess of one man in local politics. The weight of a club of this kind will be increased ninefold, a club of 1,000 wield- ing 9,000 votes. NOT is it to be overlooked that this cumu- lative method of voting confers a higher money value on the ballot of any man who is corrupt enough to sell it. He can make his vote worth to any one candidate nine times as much as it is now. The inducement to pay and the inducement to take bribes will both be greater than now. The legislature must itself have looked upon this method of voting as nothing better than an experiment. If it had been satisfied of its merits, and had had confidence in its working well, it would have applied the principle generally, wherever it could be applied, to local elections at least, throughout the State. It is right that the minority should be represented in all public deliberative bodies ; and the American system of gov- ernment makes provision for its representation. Every ITS PROGRESS. 257 political subdivision sends a representative of its own choice to the general representative body, congressional districts to Congress, assembly districts to the Assembly, towns to the boards of supervisors, wards to village and city coun- cils ; and thus the minority in the State at large, being nevertheless the majority in many of the political subdi- visions of the State, is able to secure its approximate share in the public councils. I have dwelt at so much length upon this question of minority representation, because it is the distinguishing feature of the charter, both in the election of the legisla- tive branch of the city government and in the choice by it of heads of executive departments ; and this feature its advocates claim as its chief merit. The bill does not limit itself in applying the minority doctrine, so-called, to the election of representatives of the people in the public councils. It proposes to give the mi- nority of the members of the common council the same power of selecting, independent of the majority in that body, a portion of the men who are to administer the gov- ernment of the city in its various departments. THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY. The minority ought to be represented as fully as pos- sible, in proportion to its numbers, in the public councils. But the minority has not the right to govern. It is not wise that it should share in any degree in the actual ad- ministration of affairs. The majority must govern. The useful sphere of duty for the minority is to watch the gov- erning party, to expose its wrong-doing, if any, to restrain it by this vigilance and exposure. Just so far as the mi- nority is admitted to a share in the actual administration of government, to a share in executive duties, just so far 258 PEOPOETIONAL BEPKESENTATION. ] is it weakened for the performance of its proper duty, that of vigilance over those in authority, just so far is its inclination to be vigilant lessened. It is only a minority out of power that will be faithful to the duties of a minor- ity. Every member of the minority who is admitted to take part in the actual administration of public affairs, and all of his party whom he can influence, naturally acquire a tendency to defend the administration of which he forms a part ; and where they ought to be exercising a restrain- ing power by their vigilance, they are often found helping to cover up things that need exposure. An administration that has its corps of defenders in both political parties will be much more likely to continue improper practices than if it relies for its defence only on its own party friends, and feels that the opposite party is ready, in solid ranks, promptly to assail it if guilty of wrong-doing. I believe the clear, complete, and undivided responsibility of one oi other of the political parties into which people in all free communities divide themselves, is essential to good govern ment. For vigilance on the part of the people themselves, this bill proposes to substitute the services of a few indi- viduals put into partial power by the minority as watchers, which will tend to make the people rely on these few, and indifferent to their own duty of vigilance in their own affairs. These few hired watchers may become screens for errors and neglect of duty on the part of their associates and themselves. The government of the majority is the only govern- ment recognized by the Constitution of the United States and of the State. The majority controls, and must con- trol, in legislation, and ought to be solely responsible for administration. When its representatives prove recreant to the trusts committed to them, a vigilant minority is quick to take advantage of the fact, and in turn it becomes 259 the majority. The existence of a strong, vigilant minor- ity, which, not being a sharer of power, has no motive to defend those in power, but every motive to expose them when doing wrong, is quite as essential to honest and faith- ful administration of the affairs of the republic, as is the existence of the majority in whose hands the actual. manage- ment of public affairs is placed. This cumulative method for appointing heads of departments may have the effect of fatally lessening at once the sense of responsibility on the part of the majority and the vigilance of the minority." There are three features of the foregoing mes- sage which will be noticed here, the others having been mainly anticipated in the preceding chapters. It is a patent fallacy to assert that, by giving to every voter nine votes instead of one, thereby the influence of venal voters and bad politicians with a personal following is increased ninefold. If the votes of the corrupt are multiplied by nine, so also are the votes of the good, and relatively they all retain the same influence. Again, the provision for constituencies electing nine aldermen makes possible the representation of third and fourth parties of independents and good citizens, though with a great waste of their votes. They could not be entirely excluded as in the Illinois " three-cornered " constituencies. The arguments of Governor Hoffman against minority representation in the board of aldermen are not altogether invalid, and his objections to a similar representation in the administrative 260 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. departments are well considered. Later experi- ence has shown that administrative boards are incompetent as compared with single heads of de- partments, and that bi-partisan .boards are not superior to those composed of members of a single party. Minority representation in an executive department dissipates the energy and responsibil- ity of administration ; but minority representation in the legislative branch is necessary to enable the minority " to watch the governing body, to expose its wrong-doing, if any, to restrain it by this vigi- lance and exposure." The crude cumulation in constituencies elect- ing as many as nine members might possibly have been of some advantage to good government in New York City; but the limited vote, which was successfully adopted a year later, was no better than the single district. This law, enacted in 1873, provided for the election of aldermen in nine districts of three members each, no voter to cast more than two votes. The limited vote is apparently in contradiction to the State Consti- tution, by which every elector is entitled to vote " for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people." At any rate, it of course proved unsatisfactory, and was repealed in 1882. The State of Pennsylvania has experimented with the cumulative and limited votes in various directions. ITS PROGRESS. 261 On March 4, 1870, the legislature provided by special act for the cumulative vote in the town of Bloomsburg, the home of Senator Buckalew, for all offices of two or more incumbents. In June, 1871, the act was extended to all elections of members of town councils throughout the State. This was repealed in 1873. By a provision of the Constitution of 1874, the limited vote is applied in the city of Philadelphia to the election of police magistrates. The legis- lature in 1875 created twenty-four courts with the same number of magistrates, who are elected on a general ticket; but no voter can vote for more than two-thirds of the number to be chosen at a single election. The same Constitution requires the limited vote in the election of judges of the supreme court of the State. There are seven judges elected, and the elector votes for six. These various experiments with crude forms of minority representation furnish in part an expla- nation of the entire subsidence of the movement since 1874. To have extended the cumulative or limited vote after the exhibitions of their short- comings in three States was not to be expected. Indeed, the only places where minority representa- tion now remains are in the States of Illinois and Pennsylvania, where it is incorporated in the Con- stitutions. Doubtless at the first general revision of these Constitutions it will be dropped. 262 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. There are also other reasons why the speculative political thought of the country has not turned to the problems of representation. Other pressing subjects, growing out of the war, such as the tariff, the greenback, specie payments, have engrossed the public mind. The attention of speculative reform- ers has been occupied with the civil service, and the protection of those subordinate offices which are the spoils of party victory and the demoraliza- tion of the people. It is probable, indeed, that, in the practical sequence, civil service reform was necessary to prepare the way for proportional rep- resentation. The American people needed educa- tion upon the matter of rotation in office, and, indeed, upon the very nature of government. They did not want a system of bureaucracy, with officials holding for life. They felt that public offices were " common property ; that the right to hold them, like the right to pre-empt government land, is a natural incident of citizenship," and that government service is an asylum for the unfortu- nate. They lacked "confidence in expert knowl- edge of every kind." 1 Correct views on these points could practically be first impressed upon the public only in con- nection with those minor civil service offices of a routine character which do not carry political 1 A. B. Hart, "Practical Essays on American Government," p. 91. ITS PROGRESS. 263 responsibility. With the ground clearrecTm this way, the nature of other higher offices can more plainly come to view, and thus the way be pre- pared for substituting appointive heads of depart- ments for elective heads. Finally, with the administrative branches of government accurately comprehended, the people are beginning to concen- trate thought upon the legislative branch, to in- quire into the principles of representation, and to perceive the need of abler and more experienced men with life-long service in legislative halls. Even now the weightiest popular objection to pro- portional representation springs from that partisan sympathy with the spoils system which denies the right of representation to minor groups of voters not included in the two dominant parties. ./Another political reform which has cleared the way for proportional representation is the secret ballot, with all the party tickets printed on a single large sheet. This encourages independence, and facilitates that choice of individual candidates on various tickets which is an important feature of the bill recommended by the American committee. After these important preliminary reforms are accomplished, it can be more clearly seen that the very citadel of political power, the legislative as- sembly, is the source of the degradation of Ameri- can politics, and that with a reformed legislature all other reforms can be perfected, A revival of 264 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. interest in proportional representation has begun within the past five years. The civil service reformers of the country with unanimity have espoused it. This interest took definite shape in 1893, through the organization at Chicago of the American Proportional Representation League, and the launching of the Proportional Representation Review. Magazine articles have appeared, two or three books have been published, bills have been introduced into legislatures and Congress, and an enthusiastic and capable agitation has been inaug- urate d.X. / w In 1891 the people of South Dakota voted upon a minority representation clause to their Constitu- tion, copied after the Illinois system, which they rejected by a vote of 46,200 against 24,161. The cumulative vote has been applied by the Constitutions of the eleven States of Illinois, Ne- braska, California, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Missouri, Mississippi, Idaho, Kentucky, North Da- kota, and Montana, to the election of directors of private corporations. I shall not enter at length into this and other minor phases of its application, but shall only observe that, among the evils at- tending the rise of corporations in the United States, has been prominent the practice known as "freezing out" the minority stockholders. Says a well-informed * writer : * 1 Isaac F. Rice, Forum, vol. xiv., p. 206, ITS PKOGRESS. 265 " All our public affairs having become permeated with the poison of dishonesty, it necessarily has affected our quasi-public relations as well. Indeed, our great public cor- porations, such as railroads, are in themselves species of communities, of which the security holders are the citizens, and in these communities the right to steal under certain legal forms and sanctions has in certain directions become fully recognized. Whatever frauds are perpetrated under advice of counsel, or by resolutions duly passed by a majority vote, at a regu- larly constituted meeting, security holders have long since come to regard as unobjectionable, or at least beyond the reach of successful attack.^. . Indeed, quite frequently, as soon as a board of directors is elected, it considers itself the absolute owners of the property, to manage or mismanage, as its private interests may dictate. These private interests are sometimes in such direct conflict with the interests of the corporation as to involve it in bankruptcy." 'Proportional representation in private corpora- tions would partially meet the evils above described, though of course many other factors are involved in the problem. There remains to be noticed the constitutional aspects of proportional representation. Of course, just as in Switzerland, the American people can adopt the reform by a referendum vote, by way of amendment to their Constitutions ; and possibly in many States a constitutional amendment would be required; but the machinery of amendment is so very cumbersome and dilatory that direct 1 266 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. action of the legislature is preferable whenever legal. Congress unquestionably has power, with- out constitutional amendment, to adopt the system for congressional elections. Indeed, it is only the Act of Congress of 1842, prescribing the present district system, which legally prevents individual States from adopting iWk^ In the election of State legislatures, there are serious difficulties in the interpretation of Con- stitutions. So strict are the courts in holding legislatures to the terms of the Constitution, that amendments would be required, probably, in nearly every State. Yet the following considerations are offered. The first condition for proportional representa- tion is a consolidation of the present single- membered districts into a smaller number, each electing several members. The Constitutions of all the States require that State senators shall be elected by districts. In only nineteen States, 1 however, is it -specifically asserted in one way or another, that but one senator shall be elected in each district. In each of these States a Consti- tutional Amendment would be required for the Senate. In the other twenty-five States, so far as a fair interpretation is concerned, counties can 1 Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro- lina, South Dakota, Vermont, Texas, Wisconsin, ITS PHOGEE88. 2G7 be grouped together, and two or more senators elected from each district. Furthermore, there would seem to be no constitutional inhibition against enlarging these groupings, even to the extent of dividing the State into only two districts. These could then either elect their senators at the same election or in alternate elections, as the larger number of Constitutions require. As regards the lower house, seven State Consti- tutions l require that members shall be elected by single districts. Counties which are entitled to more than one representative are to be divided into districts by either the legislature or the county supervisors. 2 Thirty Constitutions guarantee at least one representative to each county or town, but permit counties entitled to more than one to elect them on a general ticket. In these States, the proportional plan could be adopted without consti- tutional amendment only in the counties electing more than one member. There remain six States, not counting Illinois, in which the system could probably be adopted over the entire State without amendment. Dela- ware allots seven representatives to each county, and the legislature is free to prescribe either the general ticket or the single district. Indiana, 1 California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Wisconsin. 2 New York and Michigan. 268 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington permit their legislatures to create districts as they may see fit, only requiring that representatives shall be pro- portional to the population. 1 Iowa permits four counties to be combined into a single district. Whenever, as in the above cases, a general ticket is permitted, proportional representation may be adopted by the legislature. There is a second condition, namely, that each voter may be permitted to cast as many votes as there are candi- dates to be elected, which he may also distribute as he pleases. Five Constitutions actually require this condition in the provision that every elector shall be entitled to vote " for all the officers that are now or hereafter may be elective by the people." 2 It would seem that this provision ex- cludes the Hare system and the limited vote, but does not stand in the way of the Swiss "free list " or the cumulative vote. Other Constitutions merely provide that persons of the proper age, etc., shall be "entitled to vote at all elections." The third condition is that the legislature must be free to provide rules for the canvass of the votes and the apportionment between political parties. Nearly all the States have adopted in their Constitutions the plurality rule, by which 1 In the apportionment Act of 1895, Indiana has actually com- bined various counties into districts electing two representatives on a general ticket. 2 New York, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey. ITS PfiOGfiESS. 269 candidates having the highest number of votes are declared elected. Applied to a general ticket, this rule would exclude minority representation, except in the case of the simple cumulative vote. In twenty-seven States, however, the Constitutions do not apply this rule to the election of members of the legislature. 1 The legislatures of these States are, therefore, free to change their plurality rule, and to adopt the proportional plan of the addition and transference of votes within party lines, and the selection of candidates according to their standing on their respective party tickets. In the matter of local government, all of the Constitutions give the legislature almost complete power to provide for the organization of counties, cities, incorporated villages. The only restrictions are of a general nature, imposed either by the prohibition of special legislation, or by the collat- eral articles of the Constitution. This sovereign power of the legislature carries the right to create, define, and abolish offices, and to determine the method of selection, either by appointment or elec- tion, at large or by wards. Where election is determined upon, the collateral provisions of the 1 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illi- nois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, California, Nevada, Colo- rado, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia. See Stimson, American " Statue Law," vol. i., p. 56. 270 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Constitution hold, which set forth the qualifica- tions and rights of voters, and the manner of conducting elections and canvassing the returns. These provisions have just been referred to. As they apply in the same manner to city and county as to legislative elections, they leave all the legis- latures free to apply the Swiss system or the cumu- lative vote to the municipal council. APPENDIX I. 271 APPENDIX I. THE DISTRIBUTION OP SEATS. THE significance of proportional representation in the United States consists not so much in a mathe- matically accurate assignment of representatives to the several parties, as in the freedom of the voter from machine rule, and the introduction of leader- ship into legislative assemblies. Yet the mathe- matical calculations are important. Several plans have been suggested for a just distribution of seats, but fault can be found in every one. The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that, when the several party votes are divided by the unit of representation, the sum of the quotients does not equal the number of representatives to be elected, and consequently the remaining representa- tives must be assigned to parties 011 the basis of remainders. Now, these remainders may be scat- tered about in such a way as to destroy the sym- metry of the result, especially where they fall to minor parties. For example, in the Belgian election, described on page 127, the unit of representation, found by dividing the number of votes by the num- ber of representatives, is 11,523. This unit pro- vides for but fifteen seats, and the other three are assigned to the Flemish Democrats, the Indepen- 272 PEOPOETIONAL BEPBESENTATION. dents, and the Catholics, on remainders. The result is an advantage to the smaller parties, and a disad- vantage to the larger. The Independents, for ex- ample, who did not have even a single unit, secured their only seat on a remainder, giving one represen- tative for 8,425 votes, whereas the Socialists, who receive no seat on a remainder, have but one repre- sentative for 13,170 votes. 1 It will be seen that, the smaller the unit of repre- sentation, the less probability will there be of re- mainders. If, instead of dividing the total vote by the exact number of representatives to be elected, we divide by that number plus one, our proceeding would be more accurately mathematical, and would produce a smaller unit. In the Belgian election, instead of 11,523, it would be 10,917. The princi- ple here involved is the evident one that, if one can- didate is to be elected, he will require only one-half the votes plus one; if two are to be elected, each one will require but one-third plus one, and so on. That is to say, the denominator of the fraction which elects is a unit larger than the number to be elected. This was the rule adopted by the Swiss canton of Solothurn in 1895, and is known as the " Droop " 1 Socialists 106,687 Progressists 39,512 Flemish Democrats 21,713 Catholics 19,405 Moderates 11,693 Independents 8,425 207,429 -f 18 = 11,523 APPENDIX I. 2T3 quota, having been proposed by Mr. H. R. Droop of London, in 1869. 1 In the Belgian election it happens that the result would be the same as in the division by the exact number of representatives, although but two candidates are assigned on remainders instead of three. The chances, however, would be in favor of a fairer representation for the larger parties. Still another plan of distribution, which finds a unit of representation so small that it does away with remainders entirely, is that of Professor V. D'Hondt of Brussels. This is the plan actually employed in the Belgian election, and is explained by the Commis- sion as follows : " We write, in the order of their importance from left to right, the electoral vote of the six tickets, Socialists, Progress- ists, Flemish Democrats, Catholics, Moderates, and Indepen- dents, and then proceed to reduce the unit of representation by successive divisions, until a unit is found small enough to be contained eighteen times into the party votes. SOCIAL- PRO- FLEMISH CATHO- MODEB- IKDE- IST. GRES8IST. DEM. UC. ATE. PENDENT. 8,425 1. 106,681 39,512 21,713 19,405 11,693 2. 53,000 19,000 10,000 9,700 5,000 3. 35,000 13,000 7,000 4. 26,000 9,878 5. 21,000 6. 17,000 7. 15,000 8. 13,000 9. 11,000 10. 10,000 11. 9,600 1 " On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representatives," London, 1869, 274 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. We then reason as follows : If there had been only one seat to fill, it would have fallen to the largest party, the Socialists ; we therefore write down the figure 106,681, which assigns the first seat. For the second we find what would be the number of votes required of the Socialists if the two seats were distrib- uted equally. This would require 53,000 votes for each seat, more than that obtained by any other party. We write down the 53,000, which assigns the second seat. Next, 106,681 divided by three gives only 35,000, a figure less than that of the Progressists, 39,512, and the latter figure is therefore en- titled to the third seat. We write down this figure, and then determine^ that if the Progressists had a second seat they would have had only 19,000 votes to each seat. The fourth and fifth, therefore, go to the Socialists, who have 26,000 votes for each of four candidates elected. The sixth and seventh seats go to the Flemish Democrats and Socialists, the unit of rep- resentation now descending to 21,000 votes for each seat. The eighth and ninth go to the Progressists and Catholics, who would still have 19,000 votes for each candidate to be elected. The tenth and eleventh go to the Socialists; the twelfth and thirteenth to the Socialists and Progressists (13,000 votes to the seat) ; the fourteenth and fifteenth to the Moderate Liberals and Socialists (11,000 votes per seat); the sixteenth and seventeenth to the Flemish Democrats and Socialists (10,000 votes per seat) ; and, lastly, the eigh- teenth to the Progressists, who thereby secure one seat for 9,878 votes. The Socialists have now obtained ten representatives, the Progressists four, Flemish Democrats two, Catholics one, and Moderate Liberals one, total eighteen ; and 9,878 is the unit of representation, which obviates the assignment of representa- tives to any party on the basis of a remainder. This number is contained ten times in the vote of the Socialists, four times in that of the Progressists, two times in that of the Flemish Democrats, and one time in that of the Catholics and Moderate Liberals, and it is not contained in the vote of the Indepen- dents." APPENDIX I 275 The main difficulty in the distribution of seats, it will be noticed, springs from the fact that a small party, whose vote is not equal to a single unit of repre- sentation, may, nevertheless, secure a representative on the score of having a remainder larger than the re- mainders in other parties. To meet this difficulty, 1 proposed, in the Proportional Representation Review, March, 1894, that every party whose total vote is less than, say, 85 per cent of the unit of representation, be excluded altogether from the apportionment, and that a new unit be found on the basis of the remaining votes. In the Belgian election the Independent vote is only 73 per cent of the unit 11,523 ; and if it be excluded, the total number of votes of other parties would be 199,004 (207,429 minus 8,425). Dividing this by eighteen, we have a second, or effective unit of representation, 11,055, which provides for sixteen full quotients, and gives the Catholics and Flemish Democrats each one additional on remainders. The same result could be reached in a simpler way. The legislature could fix specifically the fraction or percentum of the aggregate vote, falling below which, no party should be granted a representative. For ex- ample, in the above election, one-eighteenth would be 5.55 per cent of the aggregate vote. Let all parties be excluded (where eighteen are to be elected) whose total vote is less than one-twentieth, 5 per cent, of the aggregate vote (in this case 10,371). If ten are to be elected, the parties to be excluded would be those casting less than 9 per cent of the aggregate vote. And, supposing ten to be elected, Sec. VI. of the law, 276 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION as given on p. 121, could be amended so as to read : " Sec. VI. In determining the results of the election, 1. From the aggregate number of valid votes cast for all tickets, shall be deducted the votes of all parties whose total vote is less than 9 per cent of the aggre- gate, such parties to be excluded altogether from representation. The remainder shall be divided by the number of candidates to be elected ; the quotient, ignoring fractions, to be known as the " unit of repre sentation," etc. If fifteen representatives are to be elected, the parties excluded would be those receiving less than, say, 6 per cent of the aggregate vote. With such a distribution the election returns given on page 107, where fifteen presidential electors are chosen, 1 would have excluded the People's party, whose total vote, 328,392, was less than 494,406 (6 per cent of the aggre- gate, 8,240,106), and the result would have been eight Democrats and seven Republicans, instead of seven Democrats, seven Eepublicans, and one Populist. Returning to the application of these four plans to the Belgian election, we should have the following units of representation in the order of size : UNITS OF REPRESENTATION. 1. Dividing by number of candidates . . . 11,523 2. Droop (number of candidates plus one) . . 10,917 3. Excluding parties less than 5 per cent . . 11,055 4. D'Hondt 9,878 i Republican . . 3,910,390 People's .... 328,392 Democrat . . 3,808,791 Prohibition . . 192,533 8,240,106 Simple unit = 549,340. Effective unit = 514,612. APPENDIX I. 277 The comparative distribution among the several parties would be as follows : SIMPLE DIVISION. DROOP. D'HON Moderates 1 1 1 Progressists 3 3 4 Socialists 9 9 10 Flemish Democrats 2 2 2 Independents 1 1 Catholics 2 2 1 EXCLUDING PARTIES LESS THAN 5 T. PER CENT. 1 3 10 2 2 As exhibiting the difficulty in securing accurate proportional representation, the following table shows the number of votes in each party required to secure one representative, under the various plans : J SIMPLE DIVISION AND DROOP. D'HONDT. EXCLUDING PARTIES LESS THAN 5 PER CENT. Moderates . . Progressists Socialist . . . Flemish Dem., Independent . Catholics . . 1 seat for 11,693 votes 4 ' 13,170 ' ' ' 11,853 ' ' ' 10,856 ' ' ' 8,425 ' ' ' 9,702 ' 1 for 11,693 1 ' 9,878 1 ' 10,668 1 ' 10,856 ' 8,425 1 ' 19,405 If or 11, 693 1 " 13,170 1 " 10,668 1 " 10,856 " 8,425 1 " 9,702 It will be seen that, in this particular election, M. D'Hondt's highly complicated plan, though dis- pensing with remainders, is yet the most unequal of all, seeing that the Progressists get one representa- tive for 9,878 votes, while the Catholics get only one for nearly twice as many (19,405). Considering the complexity of all plans except the simple division, and the practical objections against overloading the reform with too many explanations, 278 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. besides the impossibility in any case of an absolutely perfect result, it is probable that the bill as pre- sented by the American committee will appeal most strongly to the public. However, it seems that a feasible plan, which would obviate too great influ- ence of such parties as are too insignificant to com- mand a single unit of representation, would be just and expedient. APPENDIX II. 279 APPENDIX II. THE HARE PREFERENTIAL PLAN. A Form of Law for the Election of Municipal Boards in California. BY ALFRED CRIDGE. ALL county, municipal, and school district boards, including school trustees, supervisors of counties and of cities and counties, city and town councils, or other municipal or county body, board, or commission, shall hereafter, be elected by the proportional and preferen- tial plan, in the manner following : Every qualified voter shall be entitled to vote for as many members of such bodies, boards, or commissions as are to be elected in the whole of the city, town, county, or school district, without regard to district or ward lines ; and no members of such boards or bodies shall hold over, but all the members shall be elected at every election hereafter held for such officers. The elector shall prepare his ballot by marking the figure 1 (one) opposite the name of the candidate who is his first choice for such board. He shall, in like manner, mark the figure 2 (two) opposite the name of the candidate who is second choice for such board, and the figure 3 (three) opposite the name of the can- didate who is his third choice, and so on in regular numerical order, All marking of the names of candi- 280 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. dates beyond the number required by law to be elected shall be void and of no effect. The number of votes required to elect a member of such board shall be called the Quota. The quota for each membership shall be ascertained by dividing the whole number of votes cast at a given election by the number of candidates to be elected at such election for such board, omitting the fraction in the quotient, if there be any. All the ballots cast for such boards shall be taken to the place provided by law for can- vassing election returns for the purpose of counting. Every candidate for such boards, whose name is printed on the official ballot, shall have a separate file prepared for the reception of the ballots cast in his favor. As each ballot is opened the words "Fig- ure One" shall be announced, followed by the name of the candidate opposite to which the figure 1 (one) is marked. The ballot shall then be placed on the file belonging to such candidate, without calling off any other names on the ballot. This process of dis- tribution shall be continued till all the ballots are distributed. When all the ballots have thus been distributed to the files of those candidates designated thereon as first choice, any candidate or candidates having a full quota shall be declared elected. If any candidate has more than a quota, the surplus shall be taken from the top of the file, and transferred to the files of those not having a quota, as follows : Commencing with the file having the highest sur- plus, the ballots shall be severally distributed to the APPENDIX II. 281 files of the other candidates designated thereon as second choice ; but if the candidate designated as second choice has been elected, then the ballot shall be transferred to the file of the candidate designated thereon as third choice ; and so on, until a candidate has been reached who has not received a quota, or until the legally marked names on the ballot are ex- hausted. Whenever during the distribution of surplus ballots any candidate obtains a quota, he shall be de- clared elected, and no more ballots shall be counted for him. When the distribution of the surplus ballots has been completed, if the number of candidates having votes recorded in their favor is greater than the num- ber of members to be elected, then the candidate having the least number of votes shall be declared out of the count, and the ballots belonging to, or filed for, such candidate, shall be redistributed among the remaining candidates. In redistributing the ballots of a candidate who has been declared out of the count, the figure marked opposite the name of such candi- date on each ballot shall be first announced, followed by the name of the candidate, followed by the word "Out." Then the next higher figure in numerical order shall be announced, followed by the name of the candidate to which such higher figure stands oppo- site, and the ballot shall be placed on the file belong- ing to such candidate, unless such candidate shall have been declared elected, or declared out of the count, in which case the second higher figure shall be announced, together with the name of the candidate opposite 282 PROPORTIONAL EEPEESENTATION. thereto. This process shall continue in regular nu- merical order until the ballot is placed on the file of some candidate who has not been declared elected, or not been declared out of the count, or until the list of legally marked names on the ballot is exhausted. When the ballots belonging to the candidate having the lowest number of votes shall have been redistrib- uted, then, if necessary, the candidate having the next lowest number of votes shall also be declared out of the count, and the ballots belonging to such candidate shall be redistributed in like manner. Whenever, during the redistribution of the ballots, it shall be found that a candidate has received his quota of votes, he shall immediately be declared elected, and no further ballots shall be placed on his file or counted in his favor. Candidates having the lowest number of votes shall be successively declared out of the count, and their ballots redistributed until the number of remaining candidates shall be so reduced that the number of candidates already declared, added to the number of remaining candidates who have not been declared out of the count, shall be equal to the number of members to be elected. Then all remaining candi- dates who have not been declared out of the count shall also be declared elected. If, in the process of declaring candidates out of the count, it shall be found that two or more of the candidates having the lowest number of votes have a tie vote, or an equal number of votes, then, if each of such candidates shall have less than one per. cent of the total vote cast at the election, they shall all be declared out of APPENDIX It 283 the count at the same time ; but if each of such can- didates has more than one per cent of the total vote cast at the election, then that one of such candidates shall be declared out of the count against whose name on his ballots the figure 1 is marked the least number of times ; and if the figure 1 (one) is marked an equal number of times on the ballots of two or more such candidates, then that candidate shall be declared out of the count against whose name the fig- ure 2 (two) is marked the least number of times, and so on in regular numerical order. If the position of any member of such board shall become vacant, the candidate who was last declared out of the count shall succeed to the vacant position. This form of law was prepared as a constitutional amendment to enable the eighteen assemblymen and nine senators from the city and county of San Fran- cisco to be so elected, and the modification is adapted to States where the legislature has power to make general laws (as it has in this State) for the govern- ment of counties and municipalities. It has no power to make special laws or to permit local option, other- wise than in connection with a vote for or against a city or town charter as a whole. The provision for San Francisco specially had, therefore, to be made as a constitutional amendment. In some State or States the legislature might have such power. The phraseology used in the Mechanics' Institute amendment, under which a third election has just been held, of its trustees, is much shorter ; but for a 284 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. State law it was deemed advisable to make it petti- fogger tight, even at the cost of a few hundred more words. If once in use as regards any organization in a State, all subsequent legislation to extend it could be comprised in a very few words, by reference to it as the "proportional and preferential vote in the manner now in force and used for the election of " (adding the requisite designations). Perhaps a better expression could be devised than the words " our board " or " such boards," which I have substituted for the words " senators " and " as- semblymen" in the constitutional amendment. It might be advisable in some parts to designate in de- tail the class of officials to be elected, such as alder- men, councilmen, school trustees, etc. That is a matter to be considered according to time and place. APPENDIX III. 285 APPENDIX III. THE GOVB BILL. -LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION. COMMONWEALTH OP MASSACHUSETTS, \ In the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred j and Ninety-one. RESOLVE. To amend the Constitution relative to the Election of Senators and Representatives. Resolved, by both houses, that it is expedient to alter the Constitution of this Commonwealth by the adoption of the subjoined article of amendment ; and that the said article, being agreed to by a majority of the senators and two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives present and voting thereon, be entered on the journals of both houses, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the General Court next to be chosen; and that the said article be published, to the end that, if agreed to in the manner provided by the Constitution by the Gene- eral Court next to be chosen, it may be submitted to the people for their approval and ratification, in order that it may become a part of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT. SEC. I. In order to provide for a representation of the citizens of this Commonwealth, founded upon 286 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. the principle of equality, any resident of this Com- monwealth, eligible under the Constitution to the office of senator, may be nominated as a candidate for said office by any person. No such nomination shall be valid unless the fol- lowing conditions are complied with : 1. The nomination shall be in writing, signed by the person making it, and shall contain the name and place of residence of the candidate. 2. An acceptance of the nomination signed by the candidate shall be indorsed thereon. 3. It shall be deposited in the office of the secretary of the Commonwealth not more than three months nor less than five weeks before the day of election. 4. There shall be deposited with the nomina- tion the sum of fifty dollars, or such other sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, as the legislature may hereafter by law direct. SEC. II. Not less than four weeks before the day of election, the secretary of the Commonwealth shall furnish to each candidate and to every voter who shall request it, a printed list containing the names of all the candidates in alphabetical order with the place of residence of each, and the name of the person by whom each was nominated. SEC. III. At any time after his nomination and not less than three weeks before the day of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the secretary of the Commonwealth a statement in writing, signed by himself and acknowledged before any magistrate APPENDIX III. 287 authorized to take acknowledgment of deeas, which statement shall contain the names of one or more others of said candidates with whom he believes him- self to be in accord upon the most important public questions, and to one or more of whom he wishes to transfer any ineffective votes cast for himself. SEC. IV. The secretary shall prepare a new list of candidates similar to that named in Sec. II. of this article, but containing also against the name of each candidate the names in alphabetical order of all can- didates named in the list, if any, furnished by that candidate, as provided in Sec. III. ; and he shall, not less than two weeks before the day of election, furnish to the clerk of every city or town a sufficient number of copies of said new list. Every such clerk shall, im- mediately upon the receipt thereof, post conspicu- ously, and open to the inspection of the public, one copy of said list at each and every place in his city or town where votes are to be received at said elec- tion, and shall also immediately furnish one copy to every legal voter resident in said city or town who shall demand the same. SEC. V. Every legal voter, wherever resident, shall be entitled to cast his vote for senator in favor of any person whose name appears in the aforesaid list of candidates ; but no person shall vote for more than one candidate, nor for any person whose name does not appear upon the aforesaid list of candidates. But whenever a candidate duly nominated is omitted from the list published by the secretary of the Commonwealth, votes may be cast for him 288 PEOPOBTIONAL EEPEESENTATION. with the same effect as if his name appeared on said list. If the secretary shall make such omission inten- tionally or through wilful neglect of duty, he shall, upon conviction thereof, be ever after incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the Com- monwealth. SEC. VI. The returns of votes having been trans- mitted to the secretary of the Commonwealth as pro- vided by the Constitution, the secretary shall make a list of all candidates voted for, with the vote received by each candidate in each precinct or voting place, and his total vote, and said list shall be transmitted, published, and distributed in the same manner pro- vided in Sec. IV., concerning the list therein named ; and after the secretary shall have ascertained who are the persons who appear to be elected, he shall make a list of the successful candidates, with the computa- tion by which their election has been ascertained, and shall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each candidate and also to every voter who shall request it. SBC. VII. Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate for whom they were originally cast, to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate as provided by Sec. III. The forty candidates then having the highest num- ber of votes shall be declared elected, and the secre- tary shall issue certificates of election to them. In case two or more candidates have the same number of votes, the candidates residing at the great- APPENDIX III. 289 est distance from the state-house shall be deemed, for the purpose of election, to have the highest number. SEC. VIII. The following shall be deemed ineffec- tive votes, and shall be transferred in the order named : 1. Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of one-fortieth of the entire vote cast, beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceed- ing to the one next highest, and so on. In the case of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer shall be from each alternately, in alphabetical order. 2. Votes cast for candidates who have since their nomination died or become ineligible in the same order; 3. Original votes cast for candidates who fail of election, beginning with the candidate receiving the smallest total vote, and proceeding to the one next lowest, and so on ; in case of two or more receiving the same vote the transfer to be made from each alternately in alphabetical order. No votes shall be transferred from any candidate who has not furnished the statement named in Sec. III. SEC. IX. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate named in his said list, living and eligible at the time of counting the vote, for whom the largest number of votes were originally cast, and whose vote by transfer or otherwise does not equal one-fortieth of the whole vote cast, until all are transferred as far as possible. 290 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. If the same number of votes were originally cast for two or more candidates named in said list, the candidate residing nearest the one from whom the votes are to be transferred shall be preferred. SEC. X. The secretary shall at once transmit to the treasurer and receiver-general all sums of money received as provided in Sec. I. Immediately after declaring the names of the persons elected senators, he shall draw on the treas- urer and receiver-general a warrant for the payment of the sum received with one nomination, and issue the same to the person nominating each candidate who shall appear by the returns to have received one thousand or more original votes, and all such war- rants shall be paid by the treasurer and receiver-gen- eral on presentation. The remainder of the sum paid under Sec. I. shall be and remain the property of the Commonwealth. SEC. XL In case a vacancy shall occur in the sen- ate after the declaration of election provided in Sec. VII., the votes cast for the member whose seat shall have become vacant, together with any ineffective votes assigned to him, shall be redistributed in the same manner as if he had died or become ineligible before the canvassing of the votes, and the candidate not before elected, who, after returning to him any votes originally cast for him, shall then appear to have the largest number of votes shall be declared elected. SEC. XII. The supreme judicial court, upon the petition of twenty-five legal voters, shall have jurisdic- APPENDIX III. 291 tion to enforce by mandamus the correction of any erroneous or improper issue of such certificate of elec- tion, when such error can be made to appear from the face of the returns issued by the secretary as provided in Sec. VI., upon canvassing said returns in the man- ner provided in Sections VII., VIII., and IX. But the senate shall continue to be the final judge of the election of its members. SEC. XIII. The legislature may at any time provide by law that representatives be elected in substantially the same manner as is herein provided for senators, and by such law may, if it so decides, divide the Com- monwealth into not exceeding six electoral districts, from each of which the candidates voted for in that district, must be taken, and by voters within which such candidates must be nominated. The number of voters in each of these districts to be as nearly equal as possible. 292 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. APPENDIX IV. BOOKS, PERIODICALS, AND SOCIETIES. FOLLOWING is a list of the more important books and periodicals devoted to proportional representa- tion. The reader is referred, for more complete lists, to the Proportional Representation Review, De- cember, 1893; to Mr. M. N. Forney's "Political Ee- form by the Representation of Minorities," 47 Cedar Street, New York, 1894, where magazine references are also given ; and to " Poole's Index." GILPIN, THOMAS. " The Kepresentation of Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," Philadelphia, 1844. This is believed to be the first publi- cation on the subject of proportional representation in any language. It is to be reprinted in the Annals of the Ameri- can Academy of Political and Social Science. CONSIDEBANT, ViCTOB. " De la Sincerite du Gouvernement Representatif, ou Exposition de 1' Ejection veridique," Geneve, 1846. The first brochure on the subject published in Switzerland. Keprinted in 1892 by Charles Burkli, Zurich. Fifteen centimes. HARE, THOMAS. " The Machinery of Representation," Lon- don, 1857. Mr. Hare's first publication. " The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." Third edi- tion. Philadelphia, 1867, 350 pages. The classical treatise. MILL, JOHN STUABT." "Considerations on Representative Government," New York, 1882, 365 pages. Chapter vii. is an enthusiastic argument for the Hare system. BUCKALEW, C. R. " Proportional Representation," Philadel- APPENDIX IV. 293 phia, 1872. Senatoi Buckalew was a member of the Senate committee which reported in favor of the cumulative vote in the " reconstruction" of the Southern States. The committee's report is given in this book. The original is, " Report of the Select Committee of the United States Senate on Representative Reform," Senate document, 40th Congress, 3d session, No. 271, March 2, 1869. STERNE, SIMON. "Representative Reform and Personal Rep- resentation," Philadelphia, 1871. An able presentation of the Hare system, simplified and adapted to American insti- tutions. Mr. Sterne at present advocates the Swiss system. LUBBOCK, SIB JOHN. "Representation," sixth edition, Lon- don, 1890, 88 pages. Favors the single transferable vote. Author is president of the English Proportional Represen- tation Society. CRIDGE, ALFRED. "Proportional Representation: includ- ing its Relations to the Initiative and Referendum," San Francisco, 1893. Published by the author, 429 Montgom- ery Street. Ten cents. Favors the Hare system. REMSEN, D. S. " Primary Elections : a Study of Methods for Improving the Basis of Party Representation," New York, 1894. Application of proportional representation to primaries. FOKNEY, M. N. "Political Reform by the Representation of Minorities." Published by the author, 47 Cedar Street, New York, 1894. Favors Burnitz system, similar to "pre- ponderance of choice." Contains extensive bibliography, and references to magazine articles. SULLIVAN, J. W. " Direct Legislation through the Initiative and Referendum," New York, 1893. Paper, tweny-five cents. The best presentation of direct legislation, with occasional references to proportional representation. La Representation Proportioned, Paris, F. Pichon, 1888, 524 pages. Ten francs. Published by the Socie'te' pour 1'lStude de la Representation Proportionelle. Contains the most complete account of the reform in all countries. La Representation Proportionate, Revue Mensuelle, Bruxelles, 294 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Belgium. Published by L' Association Reformiste beige pour la Representation Proportionelle, since 1883. Five francs yearly. Favors D'Hondt system. The volume for 1885 contains a full account of the international congress at Anvers. Bulletin de la Societe Suisse pour la Representation Propor- tionelle. Geneve et Bale since 1885. Prix du numero, 50 centimes. Printed in French and German. A complete record of progress in Switzerland. Hope and Home, Alfred Cridge, editor, San Francisco. Twenty-five cents a year. Devoted to direct legislation and proportional representation. Favors Hare system. Proportional Representation Review, published quarterly by the American Proportional Representation League, Stough- ton Cooley, secretary, Chicago. Fifty cents a year. The American League was organized at Chicago in 1893. The files ofrthe Review (2 vols., fifty cents each) contain dis- cussions by European and American advocates. Direct Legislation Record, Newark, New Jersey, Eltweed Pomeroy, editor. Monthly, twenty-five cents a year. INDEX. Ability of representatives, 39-43, 152-162, 164-167, 183-184, 195, 208- 209, 217-218, 231, 233. Absenteeism, 153-162. Adams, Charles Francis, quoted, 209. Administration, boards, 5; muni- cipal council, 210 ff. Aldermen, origin, 24; elections, 70-72, 77 ; single board, 137. American Proportional Represen- tation League'bill, 119-122. Andrae, M., Danish statesman, 104. Arbitration, 231. Balance of power, 40. Ballot laws, 112, 219, 220. Basle, city, 241. Belgium, trial election, 122-130. Berlin, 202. Berne, Swiss canton, 186. Berry, J. M., cited, 65. Bibliography, 293 ff. Borely, M., cited, 111. Boston, original government, 5 ff ; limited vote, 90; absenteeism, 155. Bribery, 79-80, 138 ff., 166. Bryce, James, cited, 84, 198. Buckalew, Senator, C. R., 247. Burke, Edmund, quoted, 16, 17. Burkli, Charles, cited, 193. Burkli, "Father of the Referen- dum," 190. California ballot law, 117 ; refer- endum vote, 187. Canada, parliament, 133 ; non-resi- dency, 166. Capen, S. B., cited, 155. Capitalist, representation of, 13 ff. Caucus, legislative, 81-82. Chamberlain, D. H., quoted, 247. Chamberlain, Joseph, 245. Checks and balances, 234. Chicago, aldermanic elections, 70; absenteeism, 153. Cities, origin of council, 3, 4, 22- 26 ; government of, 197 ff . ; con- stitutionality of proportional representation, 268-270. Civil Service Reform, 166, 175-176, 211-216, 262. Confederation, 21. Congress, origin, 21 ; elections, 55 ff . ; constitutionality of pro- portional representation, 266. Connecticut, bribery, 138 ; colonial legislature, 20. Considdrant, Victor, cited, 111, 238. Constitutional restrictions on le- gislatures, 5 ff. Constitutionality of proportional representation, 265-270. Corporations and lobby, 34, 35 ; and machine, 84 ; proportional elec- tion of directors, 264, 265. Corruption, 47. County Commissioners , election of, 87. Cridge, Alfred, bill for Hare sys- tem, 279 ff. Cumulative vote, 92-98 ; and free list, 113 ff . 296 INDEX. Denmark, parliament, 104. D'Hondt, Professor V., distribu- tion of seats, 127, 273 if. Distribution of seats, 128, 271 ff. Direct legislation, 186 ff. Droop, H. Pv., quota, 241, 272. Dutcher, Salem, cited, 73. Elections, Congress, 16, 55 ff. ; Le- gislatures, 65 ff. ; British Parlia- ment, 62, 64 ; Italian Parliament, 64 ; aldermen, 70 ff. England, elections, 62, 64; school boards, 97; non-residency, 166; party responsibility, 174; cities, 202, 213 ; suffrage, 237. Executive department, 193 ff. Fawcett, Professor, cited, 242. Forney, M. N., cited, 93. Foulke, Wm. D., quoted, 182. Fourier, Chas., cited, 238. France, Chamber of Deputies, 89 ; party responsibility, 174; muni- cipal suffrage, 203, 237. Fribourg, Swiss canton, 241. Geneva, Swiss canton, 118, 136. General ticket, 86-89. Germany, party responsibility, 174; cities, 201, 213 ; suffrage, 237. Gerrymander, 48-81, 135, 139, 140, 167, 175 ; original, 51. Giddings, Professor F. H., cited, 79. Gilpin, Thomas, 110, 237. Gladstone, party leader, 44. Glasgow, suffrage, 202. Gove, W. H., bill for legislative representation, 285 ff. Greeley, Horace, cited, 251. Guilds, representation of, 13, 14, 24,25. Hare system, 100-105, 243 ; bill pro- posed by Alfred Cridge, 279 ff. Hart, Professor A. B., cited, 43, 154, 262. Hoffman, Governor, veto, 252 ff. Holls, F. W., quoted, 153, 154. House of Lords, 135. Illinois, gerrymander, 80 ; cumula- tive vote, 93-96, 113, 249, 259. Independence of voters, 143-153. Indiana, congressional elections, 78 ; legislature, 42, 65, 66 ; presi- dential electors, 106, 276; close state, 138. Initiative, 185 ff. Italian election, 64. Johnson, Hon. Tom, bill for con- gressional elections, 114, 115. Judiciary, increased power, 17, 194, 261. Kansas gerrymander, 80. Labor and capital, 230. Labor unions, representation of, 32. Legislatures, failure, 4 ff., 135, 232, 266. Legislation formerly limited, 33,34. Limited vote, 90-92. Lincoln, Abraham, cited, 179. Lobby and corporations, 34, 35; and the machine, 45-47. London, original government, 24; reformed council, 224. Low, President Seth, cited, 201, 203. Lowell, A. Lawrence, cited, 189 ff. Lubbock, Sir John, 62-64, 104, 245. Lucerne, Swiss canton, 242. Machine, 4, 28 ; based on universal suffrage, 33 ; its power, 37 ; de- scribed, 38, 142, 173, 198 ; coalition of both parties, 84. Marshall, James Garth, cited, 243. Maryland, colonial legislature, 17. Massachusetts, colonial legisla- ture, 18-20 ; senate, 78, 79 ; ballot law, 117; absenteeism, 153-154; civil service, 212, INDEX. 297 Mayor, origin, 23-24; government by, 198 ff., 207, 234. McCook, Professor J. J., cited, 79, 80. McKinley, Wm., 42, 167. Medill, Joseph, quoted, 250. Mill, John Stuart, cited, 103, 185, 243. Michigan legislature, 66. Minneapolis aldermen, 71. Morin, Antoin, cited, 237. Morrison, Win., 41, 167. Municipal elections, 137, 144-149 ; enterprises, 223 ; government, 197 ff. Nationalization, original problem of representation, 11-21. Naville, Professor Ernest, cited, 117, 239. Nebraska legislature, 175. Neuchatel, S,wiss canton, 118, 241. New York City, 3, 4, 198 ; alder- men, 71, 72 ; gerrymander, 80 ; limited vote, 90 ; absenteeism, 153 ; suffrage, 202. New York, State Assembly, 66, 67, 76 ; close State, 138 ; referendum vote, 186. Nominations, 144, 156. Non-residency, 166. Ohio, Congressional election, 59-61. legislature, 66 ; referendum vote, 187. Paris, suffrage, 203. Parliament, British, 16, 17, 27; elections, 62-64 ; Italian, 64. Parties, rise of, 26-28 ; denned, 133 ; " responsibility " of, 163 ff.; third ana minor, 173 ff., 183, 184, 271 ff. Pennsylvania gerrymander, 80 ; limited vote, 260, 261. Philadelphia, limited vote, 261. Politics, denned, 133. Preponderance of choice, 158, 159. President, veto, 3 ; not a party leader, 41. Presidential electors, 88. Primaries, 38, 39, 153-162. Referendum, 186 ff. Remsen, S. D., cited, 157. Representation of social classes, 14-16. Representative assemblies in col- onies, 30, 31 ; in India, 31 note. Represented and unrepresented voters, 72-78 ; 140-143, 179. Responsibility of respresentatives, 168-171. Rice, Isaac F., cited, 264. Richardson, Chas., cited, 161. Russell, Lord John, quoted, 242. Saloons, 38, 40. School board elections, 87, 97, 98. Sections represented, 209, 210. Senate, United States, 134-135; State, 136. Shaw, Albert, cited, 202, 214. Silver question, 177. Single transferable vote, 100-105. Slavery question, 179, 181. Social classes, representation of, 14-16. Social reform, 223 ff. Societies for Proportional Repre- sentation, 293, 294. Soluthurn, Swiss canton, 240. South unrepresented in Congress, 179. South Carolina, 80, 248 ; map of gerrymander, 55. South Dakota, 264. Speaker of the House, 15, 43-45. Spence, Miss C. H., cited, 101-103. Stickney, Albert, cited, 167. St. Gall, Swiss canton, 242. St. Paul, aldermanic election, 70. Suffrage, 29-33, 1-13, 172, 185, 202 ff., 224, 236, 237, 246. Sullivan, J. W., cited, 190. 298 INDEX. Switzerland, Association Re"for- miste, 112 ; referendum, 185 ff. ; suffrage, 237. Syracuse, municipal election, 217 ff. Tammany Hall, 38, 46, 71, 72, 141, 225,251. Tariff, 177. Taxation and representation, 12. Texas gerrymander, 80. Ticino, Swiss canton, 240. Tuckerman, L. B., quoted, 158, 159. Unrepresented voters, 72-78, 140- 143, 179. Veto, executive, 3. Wage-earning classes, 224. "Ward, Lester F., cited, 230 note. Ward system, 24, 25, 42. Wilson, Woodrow, cited, 33, 34. Zug, Swiss canton, 116, 131, 241. Zurich, 161, 186-190. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. 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