Th--: .'-,♦ ''^"W'^ H ' SOUTHERN BRANCH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LIBRARY, \LOS ANGELES, CALIF. THE HISTOKY OF GKEECE THE HISTORY OF GREECE FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GEEEK NATION BY ADOLF HOLM TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN IN FOUR VOLUMES VOL. Ill The FoTTRxn Centuby b,c. up to the Death of Alexander iLontion MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1896 All rights reserved 60325 PREFl'ci The present volume deals with a period of Greek history which derives its special interest from the much -contested importance of a few prominent men. I have endeavoured to substantiate the vieAv which I take of them. For Demosthenes and Philip the chief requisite was a detailed investigation of their careers, based upon the authorities, an investigation which in the case of the former has not led me to the favour- able results which historians generally arrive at. For Alex- ander, on the other hand, the main thing Avas his position in Greek history in general. In repeatedly pointing out that he must be regarded not only as the founder of a new epoch, but also as the fulfiller of hopes which had long been cherished by the best men in Greece, and as a genuine Greek himself, I believe I am only doing him justice. As regards the narrative in general, in this, as in the preceding volumes, I have aimed at conveying an idea of the real character of the Greeks. This involved utilizing the results of special studies, and that I have mostly attempted with numismatics in the present volume also. In such matters, of course, details are all-important. But nowadays HISTORY OF GREECE they predominate almost too much, and the result not un- frequently is that antiquity itself disappears in the mass of antiquities. To guard against this, I have always tried to emphasize what is characteristic, and at the end of the volume I have added a few brief notes on Greek public law, which are intended to be an attempt to pave the way in the case of Greece for what has been accomplished in such bril- liant fashion for Rome. Hitherto the real knowledge of the Greek state-system has not nearly kept pace with the study of state antiquities. There will be no lack of mistakes and inequalities in this volume also. The criticisms which have appeared on the second volume, the kindly tone of which I gratefully acknowledge, I have tried to profit by as much as possible in the third. A. H. NOTE The translators wish to express their obligation to the Author for some corrections and additions, and they have also to thank Mr. Frederick Clarke, late Taylorian Scholar in the University of Oxford, for thoroughly revising the MS. of their translation, and correcting the proofs. CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE The Supremacy of Sparta — Cyrus and the Tex Thousand — War between Sparta and Persia — Agesilaus in Asia (403-395) ...... 1 Notes ........ 14 CHAPTER II Internal Condition of the other Greek State.s, especi- ally OF Athen.s — Condemnation of Socrates . . 23 Notes ........ 32 CHAPTER III Persia assists the Enemies of Sparta — The War in the Isthmus of Corinth and at Sea — Haliartus — Cnidus — Coronea— Lechaeum— Iphicrates (395-392) . . 35 Notes ........ 46 CHAPTER IV Sparta courts the favour of Persia— Expedition of Age- siPOLis against Argos — EvAGORAs — Death of Thrasy- BULUS— Antalcidas— The King's Peace (392-386) . 51 Notes ........ 60 HISTORY OF GREECE CHAPTER V PAGE Arrogance of Sparta — Mantinba, Phlius, Olynthus, Thebes (385-379) ...... 63 Notes ........ 70 CHAPTER VI Boeotia — The Emancipation of Thebes— Sphodrias (379, 378) 74 Notes ........ 81 CHAPTER VII Rise of Athens by means of Formation of a new League — Thebes maintains her Position against Sparta — Chabrias— Timotheus — Jason of Pherae (377-374) . 84 Notes ........ 91 CHAPTER VIII The Rise of Thfbes up to thr Battle of Leuctra — Epa- MiNONDAs (374-371) ..... 93 Notes ........ 103 CHAPTER IX Thebes interferes in the Affairs of the Peloponnese and Macedonia — Megalopolis — Messene (371-367) . . 105 Notes ........ 115 CHAPTER X The Closing Years ok Theban Supremacy— Pelopidas in SusA — AiKiADiA and Elis — Battle of Mantinea (367-362) ....... 118 Notes ........ 128 CONTENTS CHAPTER XI PAGE Sicily and Italy in the first half of the Fourth Century — Parallel between the Eastern and Western Divisions of the Greek World . . 130 Notes ........ 142 CHAPTER XII Literature and Art in the first half of the Fourth Century b.c. , . . . .152 Notes ........ 171 CHAPTER XIII Athens about the year 360 ..... 176 Notes ........ 191 CHAPTER XIV The Macedonians ....... 200 Notes ........ 206 CHAPTER XV Philip of Macedon — Athens at war with her Allies (359-353) ....... 208 Notes ........ 214 CHAPTER XVI The Sacred War — Beginning of Demosthene.s' Career (356-352) ....... 228 Notes ........ 240 xil HISTORY OF GREECE CHAPTER XVIT PAGE Philip and the Greeks to the Peace of Philocrates and THE Capitulation of Phocis (352-346) . . . 245 Notes ........ 254 CHAPTER XVIII Philip and the Greeks to the Battle of Chaeronea (346-338) ....... 263 Notes . . • . . . . . . 274 CHAPTER XIX Philip's La.st Years (338-336 ) . . .281 Notes ........ 286 CHAPTER XX Alexander up to the Expedition into Asia . . . 291 Notes ........ 297 CHAPTER XXI The Persian Empire — The Three Groups of the Eastern Greek World ...... 301 Notes ........ 311 CHAPTER XXII Alexander in Anterior Asia — Battle of the Granicus (334-333) ....... 321 Notes ........ 327 CONTENTS CHAPTER XXIII PAGE Issiis—Tyiie— Egypt (333-331) . . . . .329 Notes ........ 336 CHAPTER XXIV Gatjgamela — March to the Jaxaktes (331-329) . . 338 Notes ........ 343 CHAPTER XXV Alexander's Campaign to the Hyphasis (329-326) . . 347 Notes ........ 354 CHAPTER XXVI Concluding Years of Alexander's Reign — Acis— Harpalus (326-323) ....... 358 Notes ....... 368 CHAPTER XXVII Character, Achievements, and Historical Importance of Alexander ....... 374 Notes ........ 391 CHAPTER XXVIII Sicily and Italy ....... 398 Notes ........ 410 CHAPTER XXIX The Civilization of the Age ..... 421 Notes ........ 439 Oreek Public Law ...... 447 CHAPTER I THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA — CYRUS AND THE TEN THOUSAND — WAR BETWEEN SPARTA AND PERSIA — AGESILAUS IN ASIA. 403-395 In the preceding volume we traced the history of Athens np to the time of her liberation from the yoke of the oligarchs and of Sparta ; we must now see how the city, which brought the Peloponnesian War to so brilliant a close, used her considerable power in a wider sj^hcre of action. As a matter of course Sparta did what was necessary to secure the fruits of her victory. But she did more, she tyrannized over her allies. As early as 403 the Thebans and Corinthians refused to follow the lead of Sparta, which Avould not put up with the influence of Thebes or Corinth either in Greece itself or in the colonies. At the outset this Avas mainly the fault of Lysander, who had not only brought about the victory but was the first to direct the policy of Sparta after it was won.^ As we have seen, he established executive bodies in the places which had been wrested from Athens ; these bodies were devoted to him and to Spartan interests, and in most instances consisted of ten men. They generally received a Lacedaemonian division under the com- mand of a Harmost by way of support. They governed in the same fashion as the Thirty in Athens and, like the latter, made themselves and Sparta objects of detestation. VOL. Ill ^ B HISTORY OF GREECE This in the long run was to the detriment of Sparta; but Lysander was the first to suffer from it. For his own fellow- countrymen, who approved of his system as such and acted in much the same way after his fall, grew jealous of him. They did not forget that he had accepted honours which should only have been paid to a god. The oligarchy instituted by him in Samos had actually given his name to festivals which had hitherto been held in honour of Hera. In comparison with this the regular court which he held in Samos and his patronage of writers who flattered him, such as the Epic poet Choerilus, attracted little notice. The authorities at Sparta had reason for thinking him a second Pausanias, and it was natural that they should try to oppose him in every way. A military colony planted by him in Sestos was withdrawn ; his friend Thorax, who commanded in Samos, was put to death on a charge of embezzlement, and he himself was recalled to Sparta. He made his appearance there with what purported to be a letter of recommendation from Pharnabazus, but when it was opened it proved to be an accusation which the satrap had cleverly substituted for the laudatory letter read to Lysander, the wily Spartiate being thus outwitted by the still wilier Persian and made an object of ridicule to his fellow-citizens. This convinced him that he must bow to the storm for the present, and he applied for permission to go on a pilgrimage to Zeus Amnion which he had vowed to under- take. His request was granted and he left Sparta. Sparta was thus freed for the moment from a man who under existing circumstances could only be a source of danger to his native city. We have no information as to the date of his return ; at any rate he took no ostensible part in the events which followed, although they concerned his old friend Cyrus. The latter desired the support of Sparta to enable him to overthrow his brother, King Artaxerxes. On the death of her husband Darius, their mother Parysatis had tried to make C-yrus king, who CYRUS ENLISTS GREEK MERCENARIES was her favourite and the younger of the brothers ; but this was frustrated hy Tissaphernes, who afterwards poisoned Artaxerxes' mind with the suspicion tliat Cyrus was plotting against his life. The king wanted to put his brother to death, and on one occasion was with dilficulty prevented by Parysatis from slaying him with his own hands. In spite of this Cyrus had returned to Asia Minor as governor, but Tissaphernes followed him thither in order to watch over his actions. Cyrus now aspired to the throne, and with this object began to enlist mercenaries as the nucleus of a large army. In consequence of the numerous domestic revolutions that had taken place there were at that time numljers of able-bodied Greeks in search of employment, and 13,000 of them took service with Cyrus. His chief recruiting officer and leader was the Spartiate Clearchus, a man of the stamp of Lysander, an old admii'al and harmost of Sparta (see vol. ii. p. 499). He had established himself as tyrant in Byzantium in spite of the veto of the Ephors, but was afterwards expelled from this important city by the Spartans themselves, who could not tolerate such misconduct. Cyrus, however, was not content with mercenaries, who had flocked to his standard, with the connivance of Sparta but on their own account, from Greece, especially from Arcadia and Achaia ; he Avanted official sup- port from the government of Sparta, which owed him such a large debt of gratitude. The Spartans were not prepared to consent to this, but as they were bound to fulfil their obliga- tions to Cyrus, and besides might count on great advantages in the event of his success, they helped him in secret as much as they could. They despatched 700 hoplitos under Cheirisophus, who were nominally to co-operate with Cyrus in an expedition directed against some pirates, but could after- wards of course be used by him at his discretion. In the spring of 401 Cyrus took the field with his army," 100,000 Asiatics and 13,000 Greek mercenaries, among them 11,000 hoplites. No one knew whither they were going. HISTORY OF GREECE The mercenaries, who .at first were deceived by the route taken, which pointed to a northerly destination, became reconciled to the hazardous undertaking when the real desti- nation was revealed, better terms being promised them than before. The force marched from Sardis, at first in an easterly direction to Celaenae, then in a large semicircle to the north and south-east through Phrygia and Lycaonia to Tyana in Cappadocia, and finally due south through the passes of Cilicia to Tarsus. From here Cyrus skirted the Gulf of Issus, by the route which Alexander afterwards followed, and then proceeded through the desert to the Euphrates, which he crossed at Thapsacus. He then followed the left bank of the Euphrates southwards to the suburbs of Babylon. Up to this point Artaxerxes had allowed his enemy to approach unmolested, but he now attacked him in the plain between the Euphrates and Tigris, near Cunaxa, with vastly superior forces — 400,000 to 900,000 men, according to various sources. In spite of this Cyrus might have won the day if he had advanced with less impetuosity and had been more ably supported by Clearchus. The latter, however, who should have supported Cyrus' attack on the centre, where Artaxerxes was stationed, instead of this defeated the enemy's wing which confronted him and pursued it too far. Consequently he was not on the spot at the decisive moment when Cyrus charged Artaxerxes, whom he intended to kill with his own hand, and Cyrus lost his life. Thereupon his Asiatic troops took to flight; but the Greeks stood firm, repulsed the royal army once more, and were so conscious of their power that they even attempted to dispose of the Persian throne. But the Persian Ariaeus, to whom they off'cred it, declined the proposal. They then compelled the Persians to make an agreement as to their return march, and did not lose heart even when their generals were put to death by the craft of Tissapherncs. The wise counsels of one of them, the Athenian Xenophon, a jiupil of Socrates, restored their RETREAT OF THE TEN TH0U8AXD coiifideuce. They selected Cheirisophus as general, and began their retreat amidst a swarm of foes, Xenophon acting as adviser and doing his best to maintain their courage and discipline. They could not return by the way they had come, as they would have been overwhelmed in the vast plains by the superior force of the enemy. They had to march north- wards across mountain ranges to the Black Sea, through a hostile country, the roads of which were entirely unknown to them. And the retreat was one which had no resemblance to that of Napoleon from Russia or that of the Athenians from Syracuse. But that this was the result, that it was not a march to destruction but to victory, was due not to chance but to the merit of the men who accomplished it. Even granting that in the two instances quoted exposure to heat and cold was more fatal than in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and that the Syracusans and Russians were more formidable opponents than the Persians, yet the country which the Ten Thousand had to traverse was more unknown to them than Russia was to the French, and the march was a longer one. It lasted eight months. Their route led them first along the left bank of the Tigris, northwards through the mountains of the Carduchi (Kurds). Then, harassed by the wild and warlike Carduchi in the rear, and by the troops of Orontes in front, they crossed the Centrites (now Buhtan- schatt), the boundary river between the Carduchi country and Armenia, and made their way, amid severe privations and hardships, through the snow -clad mountains of this district west of Lake Van, till in the month of February or March, 400, they arrived at Trapezus, and greeted the long looked-for sea with the joyous cry of " dakarra, OakaTTa ! " This march perhaps shows the character of the race in its most favourable light, more than any other exploit of the Greeks. Although they had joined the standard in the hope of gain, they obeyed freely-chosen leaders ; they remained loyal to their nationality, even in their religious HISTORY OF GREECE ceremonies, which they continued to perform as if they were in Greece. They presented a firm and united front, and so triumphed over every obstacle. It is worthy of note that, although they were commanded by a Spartan, an Athenian kept them together ; and he did it in genuine Greek fashion, by the example of his own personal bravery and by a proper use of the art of speech. Hence the retreat of the Ten Thousand proves that in the year 400 the Greeks were just as little degenerated as a hundred years previously. These mercenaries were by no means the moral flower of the nation ; and if a chance collection of men like this behaved in such an exemplary manner, Avhat might not be expected from the Greeks as a whole, if they were well led ? The retreat is also a proof that democracy was after all the best constitution for the Greeks ; for freely-rendered obedience, secured by the oratorical power of an energetic man, was the salvation of the Ten Thousand. When the force, to the number of over 9000, reached the sea, the real dangers which had threatened them from the barbarians were succeeded by petty but all the more vexatious annoyances from the country folk and nominal friends. For the Spartans, who at this time were powerful in the country round the Bosporus, put every possible obstacle in their way in order not to wholly lose the favour of the victorious Artaxerxes. They were dragged hither and thither in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, under all kinds of pretexts, with the result that they marched from place to place, first on their own account, and then in the service of the Thracian Prince Seuthes, until finally they once more turned their arms against Persia. The reason for this was that war had after all at last broken out between Sparta and Persia. Tissaphernes, by v/ay of reward for his achievements, had been sent to Asia Minor again as satrap of Greater Phrygia and Ionia, and as Karanos of Fiu'thcr Asia. He now undertook to incorporate all the SPARTAN CAMPAIGN IN ASIA MINOR Greek cities on the coast into the Persian empire, and Avith this object began by laying siege to Cyme. The Greeks of Asia Minor thereupon asked the Spartans, as the leaders of the whole of Greece, for help. Like Croesus on a former occa- sion, the lonians now recognized the Spartan supremacy over Greece. The Spartans took the lonians under their protec- tion. Persia had behaved in too contemptible a manner ; an empire which 10,000 foreigners had been able to march through would not, thought the Spartans, be in a position to offer resistance. They therefore sent orders to Tissaphernes, as they had formerly done to Cyrus, to leave the Greeks alone, and when this injunction was of course disregarded they despatched Thimbron to Asia with an army consisting of Lacedaemonians, some other Peloponnesians and Athenians. About 8000 men of the Cyrus expedition who joined them were valuable auxiliaries. Some successes were actually achieved. Part of Aeolis was conquered, and the descendants of Demaratus and Gongylus who were settled there joined the Greeks. But on the whole the result did not correspond to their anticipations. What had been achieved under the stress of necessity and by freely elected leaders could not be attained under the command of a Thimbron, who besides allowed his troops to ill-treat their own allies. His successor Dercyllidas (after the autumn of 399), who was called Sisyphus on account of his wiliness, accomplished somewhat more. He disarmed Tissaphernes by means of a treaty, and wrested the whole of Aeolis from Pharnaljazus in eight days, whereupon the latter also concluded a truce with him. He protected the Thracian Chersonese by erecting a wall, captured the city of Atarneus, and finally, by his resolute attitude at the meeting of the rival armies in the valley of the Maeander, induced Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to conclude a longer truce with him (397). The idea was to negotiate quietly for a peace in which the Greek cities of Asia Minor shoidd be recognized as independent.^ This was a good beginning, but it was not HISTORY OF GREECE maintained in the same spirit. The Spartans did not put forth all their strength against Persia. They wanted to use their power to obtain absolute control of Greece ; they de- sired, in other words, to carry out Lysander's system without Lysander. They thought that they were strong enough to oppose Persia and their own adversaries in Greece with success at the same time. They began by paying off an old score. The Eleans had thwarted them in many ways in the course of the Peloponnesian War. They were now to receive chastisement for this. They were called upon to set their Perioeci at liberty, and when this was refused the Spartans invaded Elis. The Eleans sought aid from Sparta's enemies. But no one stirred, while their subjects as well as their neighbours in Arcadia and Achaia took advantage of this excellent oppor- tunity to join in the attack. For two years (398-397) King Agis devastated the Elean territory with Lacedaemonians and allies, among whom were Athenians, and at last Elis, which was torn by internal conflicts into the bargain, had to make \i]) her mind to surrender not only Lepreum, which had always resisted her rule, but also Triphylia, the coast line including Pheia and Cyllene, and the district of Acrorea on the Arcadian frontier. The Eleans, however, did not lose their presidency of the Olympian games (397).'* Agis did not long survive these successes. After oflering a tenth of the spoil at DeliDhi he died in the year 397 b.c. A dispute noAV arose in Sparta as to who should succeed him, whether it should be Leotychides, a youth of fifteen, who called himself his son, but was regarded by many as the child of Alcil)iades, or Agesilaus, brother of Agis and son of Archi- damus, who was about forty-four years of age. Xcnophon has concentrated the points of the controversy into a short dialogue. No one appears to have believed in the legitimacy of Leotychides. But clever people might have used him as a means of gaining ^^ower for themselves, and conscrpiently there was a party which favoured his claims. Besides this AGESILAUS Agesilaus' kmieness was against liim, a defect which was con- sidered unbecoming in a king of Sparta. Diopithes therefore, who was versed in the science of omens, urged that an oracle of Apollo had declared against a halting reign in Sparta. But Agesilaus had a powerful supporter in the still influential Lysander, Avho replied that Apollo was right in referring to the disadvantages of a halting reign, but that he did not mean a king with a lame foot, but a king who Avas illegitimate and not of royal extraction. This carried the day, and the Spartans elected Agesilaus. Agesilaus was a brave, simple and affable man, who had always behaved in the way expected of a genuine Spartiate. And he maintained this blameless conduct throughout his whole life. So far as we know he never came into conflict with the Ephors, who were the real political leaders of the city. If he influenced the policy of Sparta, he managed to do it without giving off"ence to anybody. Lysander no doubt had only supported him because he thought he would find him a pliant tool. But the wily Spartan was as completely deceived in Agesilaus as he had been in Pharnabazus. Agesi- laus possessed the important characteristic of being always equal to the situation. A capable and unassuming citizen in private life, as king he did not relax in his obedience to the Ephors, but with every one else he upheld the royal dignity, and this Lysander was soon destined to experience, to the great satisfaction of the Spartans. Soon after his election Sparta was menaced by a great danger. As the king was off"ering sacrifice, all the omens pointed to a great calamity, and shortly afterwards a man came to the Ephors and informed them that a certain Cinadon, a Spartiate, but not one of the ofiocoi or peers, consequently a man Avho was probably too poor to pay his contriljution to the Syssitia, was at the head of a conspiracy. He said that Cinadon had told him to count the enemies in the market- place of Sparta when it was full of people ; the appellation 10 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. of enemy he gave to the kings, the Ephors, the Gerontes, and other members of the privileged class. They amounted alto- gether to about forty out of the 4000 present, consequently to one in a hundred. He added that Cinadon had used similar language to many people. All the Helots and Perioeci, he had said, would be glad to get rid of the handful of Spartan leaders, and were even ready to eat them alive. When he was asked where the arms would come from for carrying out the rebellion, he replied that the conspirators possessed arms, that they were to be had in all the ironworkers' shops, and that every workman had his iron tools. The Ephors deter- mined to get rid of this dangerous individual. They knew him well, for they had often employed him on confidential missions. They therefore sent him out of the city with a Scytale, but gave him an escort which took him prisoner on the road and brought him back to Sparta ; an arrest in Sparta itself would have been too hazardous a proceeding. He was brought to trial, scourged through the streets of the city in order to inspire the disaffected with terror, and put to death with his fellow conspirators.^ We have lost sight of affairs in Asia for the space of a year and must now return to them. There had been a pause in the war between Sparta and Persia at the end of the year 397 and the beginning of 396 ; but in the summer of 396 it broke out afresh. Xenophon gives the following account of it. A Syracusan named Herodas came to Sparta with the story that he had heard and seen in Phoenicia, that a Persian fleet of 300 triremes was being equipped, but that its destination was unknown. It was naturally assumed that these prepara- tions were aimed at Sparta. This turned out to be the case, and the following was the chain of causes which led up to it. After the battle of Aegospotami the Athenian Conon had fled to Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, a potentate who was very friendly to the Greeks, and from there he offered his services to Artaxerxes when the latter became involved in war I EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS TO ASIA MINOR 11 with Sparta. Sparta liaving su]jported Cyrus, it was natural for an Athenian to side with Artaxerxes. Through the agency of Pharnabazus he received a commission to collect a fleet for the Persians in Caria and Lycia. The information brought by Herodas threw the Spartans into a state of considerable excitement. On the whole a patriotic feeling prevailed in the Peloponnese. The poet and musician Timotheus was at that time arousing the enthusiasm of the Greeks by his Persae. Lysander proposed to send Agesilaus with thirty Spartiates, 2000 Neodamodes, and about 6000 allies to Asia. He hoped to regain his own influence abroad and to reinstate the decarchies Avhich had been abolished by the Spartans, for he thought that Agesilaus, Avho owed him so much, would follow his advice. It was fortunate that Egypt had just revolted ; this prevented the Persians from making such a display of power in Asia Minor as would have been possible under other circumstances. Agesilaus set out and took Lysander with him among the thirty Spartiates. Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos sent no contingents. The king was desirous of beginning his campaign in a specially solemn manner. He went to Aulis and intended, like a second Aga- memnon, to offer a sacrifice there for a prosperous voyage to Asia. The Boeotarchs, however, had heard of his intentions, and as he would not sacrifice according to the customs of Boeotia, they had the offerings thrown from the altar in his presence. The king protested and sailed for Asia in an angry mood and anxious about the issue of an expedition com- menced under such bad auspices. An army inferior in numbers to the body of mercenaries which had accompanied Cyrus was not calculated to inspire Persia with terror, or worthy of claiming to succeed Agamemnon.^ Tissaphernes, who was not prepared for a regular war, now declared his readiness to allow the Greek cities of Asia Minor to retain their autonomy, if the Persian king would permit it. The truce was to continue until an answer was received 12 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. from him. Meanwhile he sent to Susu for reinforcements. Agesihxus agreed to the armistice and took up his residence in Ephesus (396). Here matters came to a rupture between him and Lysander. The latter became an object of general attention ; everything centred round him, as he was so well known in Asia, and no one paid any heed to Agesilaus. The king put an end to this rather humiliating state of affairs in a very simple manner. He decided every case against the views expressed by Lysander, with the result that the latter began to feel uncomfortable and asked to be employed on other service. His request was granted, and he gave proof of his capacity by inducing a lieutenant of Pharnabazus, one Spithridates, to revolt from Persia. Meanwhile Tissaphernes on the arrival of his reinforcements threw off the mask and ordered Agesilaus to leave Asia. Thus war broke out afresh. Tissaphernes thought that Agesilaus would move in the direction of Caria, and he collected the main body of his army there, leaving his cavalry in the valley of the Maeander, in the hope that he would be able, in case of need, to crush Agesilaus with this arm alone. The latter, however, did not advance against him immediately. After a reconnaissance in a northerly direction, which convinced him that he must have cavalry if he wished to win the day, he procured them by a device which Avas afterwards imitated by the elder Scipio in Sicily. He allowed the natives to furnish substitutes and horses in lieu of the personal service which had at first been demanded of them. Ephesus, where he spent the end of the winter of 396-5, resembled a camp, somewhat like Syracuse a short time previously, when Dionysius was preparing for his great campaign (see Chapter xi.) Such of the enemy as w^ere captured he exposed naked, in order that their white skins might show how effeminate and little to be dreaded these Asiatics w^ere. In the spring he took the field and gained a complete victory over the Persian cavalry on the Pactolus. This victory, it is true, did not place the neighbouring Sardis r DEATH OF TISSAPHERXES— NAVAL OrERATIOXS 13 in his power, but was the cause of the death of Tissaphernes. For Parysatis, the implacable persecutor of every enemy of her beloved Cyrus, made the king believe that Tissaphernes was a traitor, and the king consequently sent his Chiliarchus or Vizier Tithraustes with orders to remove him. The order was carried out ; Tissaphernes was arrested and executed at Celaenae (395). Tithraustes now thought, with truly oriental naivete, examples of which have also been seen in Europe, that as the disturber of the peace had been removed, the Greeks might go home, they having done their duty. Sparta's wishes, he announced, would be complied with ; the cities were to retain their autonomy, provided they paid their tribute to the king. Agesilaus gave the proper answer, that he must await orders from Sparta. Tithraustes then suggested that he should spend the time in Pharnabazus' province. Tithraustes of course was not sorry that his colleague should have this advantage. Agesilaus fell in with the proposal and marched northwards. Meanwhile the fleet also was increased and placed under his command, and he entrusted it to his brother-in-law Pisander. It had been of considerable size before, but had accomplished nothing of importance. In 396 the Spartan Pharax had left Rhodes with 120 ships and surprised Conon, who at that time had only forty ships in the port of Caunus. Conon, however, fought his way out. After this Pharax was not even allowed to re-enter Rhodes, the island revolted from Sparta, and Conon captured a convoy on its way to the Spartans from Egypt. The Spartan naval force under Pisander was now reinforced by 120 more ships. '^ Thus the Spartans began to take up a threatening attitude towards the Persians both by land and sea. Tithraustes accordingly came to the conclusion that Persia M'ould be in a better position if she could stir up their own countrymen against the Spartans. Sparta had but few friends left in Greece. If the numerous Greek states, which had been insulted and humiliated by Sparta, and were willing and 14 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. ready to rise against her, could be placed in a position to do so by subsidies of money, it was more than doubtful whether the Spartans, who had to contend with conspiracies at home into the bargain, could continue the war in Asia. NOTES Authorities for the period 403-362. The principal one is the Hellenica of Xenophon, Books 3-7. This historical work has been comjDreliensively and accurately criticized by Breitenbach in the introduction and notes to his edition, 2 vols. Berl. 1874 ; for the second half of this period (387-362) the researches of von Stern, in his Geschichte der spartan, und theban. Hegemonie, Dorp. 1884, are important for the prominence given to Xenophon's merit as well as for other reasons. In these books Xenophon is as impartial as is possible for a writer who had taken part in the events narrated. For his life cf. A. Roquette, De Xen. vita, Königs. 1884. Xeno- phon, however, according to many critics is supposed to display partiality, and two alleged sins of omission are in particular quoted as proof of it ; (1) He does not mention Epaminondas and Pelopidas often enoi;gh or early enough, the former not till 7, 1, 41, the latter only in 7, 1, 33 ; (2) he does not refer to the founding of Megalopolis and Messene. But these omissions are not the result of partiality. The scanty reference to the two Thebans is due to the fact that Xenophon, with his old-fashioned republican feeling, which finds expression, for instance, in Demo- sthenes (c. Aristocr. 198), prefers to mention the community (ot QyßaloL) rather than their generals, and also to the i^eculiarity that he never gives any prominence to persons unless he has to describe individual traits of their character from his own experience. In narrating the preservation of Sparta (6, 5, 30-32), where later writers, even opponents of Sparta, are full of praise of Agesilaus, he does not mention him at all ; he does not even mention his own son on the occasion of the hitter's death, which was so famous in antiquity. This being the case, it is quite possible for him to say " the Thebans" without wishing to disparage Epaminondas. In omitting the exploits of Pelopidas in the north he has at all events not injured the fame of Thebes. His non-mention of the founding of Megalopolis and Messene is certainly a defect, but it is not caused by partiality. Xenophon had no gift for universal history, and only related events of which he believed he had some special knowledge. But many passages in his history prove that he was impartial : (1) As regards Thebes, his splendid eulogy of I XENOPIION—DIODORUS 15 Epaininondas, 7, 5, 8, 18 seq. (2) As regards Athens, bis recognition of the ability of Ipliicrates. (3) As regards Sparta, iiis blame of the oppression of Thebes, which an enemy of Sparta could not have expressed better, 5, 4, 1 ; the description of the inglorious march of Agesilaus through the Peloponnese, 4, 5, 18 ; the account of the intrigues Avhich, owing to Agesilaus' weakness of character, brought about the acquittal of Sphodrias, 5, 4, 25-3-i ; his description of the feebleness of Sparta, when the Thessalians ap- pealed for aid, 6, 1, 2 seq. ; his repetition of the truths which Autocles tells the Spartans, who can make no reply to them, 6, 3, 7, — and many other instances. See also Chapter xii. Xenophon is a candid, amiable writer, who as a genuine Socratic eschews all phrase-making, and his critics themselves recognize his ex- cellence by reproducing his best narratives at length. The next authority in point of importance is Diodorus, whose books Nos. 14 and 15 deal with this period. Diodorus, whom I have already discussed in vol. ii. p. 106 seq., aimed at writing a general history in annalistic form. But his chronology is often useless (in these two books among others) for the following reasons: (1) His year is an impossible one, because he heads it with the names of Athenian archons and Eoman consuls who did not hold office during the same period. If, as sometimes happens, the year begins nine months before the archon's entrance into office (vol. ii. p. 110) the confusion is still greater. If he had only adopted a rule and begun and ended his year always at the same time, it would not have been so bad. But he has not done this ; his norainnl years embrace every possible division of time, months or years indiscriminately (cf. notes to Chapter v.), and we can never conclude from the fact that he relates a definite event in a definite year that it hapjiened at that date, even in his own opinion. (2) What, however, makes his year such a chronological monstrosity is that he never really tried to write as an annalist, but on a distinct system, that is, in accordance with the internal connection of events. This is why he often brings the history of several years into one year, and the heading of archons and consuls often has no internal connection with what is narrated under it. It merely marks divisions in his books.— This criticism of Diodorus' deceptive chronology leads us to his merits as a writer, to his endeavour to grasp the hidden relations of things. But we must go a step farther. He not only pursued a system, he was also an artist — a point which does not seem to have been hitherto noticed. He was guided in his choice and arrangement of materials by artistic principles. His division into books is regulated by their contents. Euch possesses an internal unity, which is produced by the pro- 16 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. iiiiiience given to one or more personalities or incidents. Events which have but sliglit connection with these are treated with greater brevity, because each book must not exceed a certain length. And as the world, the history of vvliich Diodorus relates, is divided into three parts, the East, Greece Proper, and the West, of which the first and second are closely connected, and as first the one and then the other assumes greater prominence, it follows that the events of the section which happens to be less prominent at the moment are treated in less detail by him than they really deserve. Of the books which describe the fourth century, the 14th (404-387) centres in the history of the elder Dionysius ; the 15tli (386-361) relates the rivalry of Thebes, Sparta, and Athens; in the 16th (361-336) Philip is the chief character ; in the 17th (335-324) Alexander predominates to such an extent that during these twelve years the general history of Italy and Sicily is omitted. This circumstance has given rise to the conjecture that we have not the complete text of Diodorus' l7th book ; cf. Droysen, Hellenismus, 1, 2, 369, and Grosser, Croton, 1, 64. Even if this be so, the principle to which I have referred would still hold good. There cannot be much missing from Bk. 17, and in other books the omissions are perceptible enough. The special attention paid by Diodorus to Dionysius in the 14th book makes him pass over the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, which after all was a noteworthy event. Because Greece proper chiefly occupies him in Bk. 1 5, he has no space to say much of Dionysius, who must, however, have done a good deal at that time, wliile as regards Dionysius the younger he reserves everything for Bk. 16, and does not mention him till the year 359, when he had been nine years on the throne. Even the number of the chapters devoted to the great divisions of the world is instructive as to the character of Diodorus' work. In the 14th book the West takes up sixty-eight chapters, and Greece and Asia only forty-nine, of which moreover thirteen are devoted to the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. In the 15th book, on the other hand, the West receives only ten chapters to the eighty-four on the East. In Bk. 16 the West obtains thirty-one to the sixty-seven given to the East, Hence in many years neither East nor West are mentioned at all, not because nothing happened in that i^art of the world to interest Diodorus, but because he cannot spare the space for it. In the 14th book nothing happens for four years in the East (398, 397, 389, 388), while in the 15th book this section of the world is only unnoticed for two years (384, 379) and the West, on the other hand, has twenty years disregarded out of twenty-six. In ßk. 16 the West is not mentioned in twelve years out of twenty-four, the East in only two. Whether these considera- DIODORUS 17 tions increase the value of Diodorus as a historical authority is another question. The selection and arrangement of material in the 14th book, with whicli we are concerned in chaps. 1-4 and 11, present a kind of artistic balance in the compai'isons of similar phenomena in the East and in the "West — tj-rants in both quarters, wars with Persia in the East, with Carthage in the West. The conclusion of the book is written for effect. Three important events, which mark the success of the barbarians and tyrants, are described in the same year : the King's Peace, Dionysius' victory over Ehegium (immediately after he had been derided at Olympia, so that he should not be successful at every point), and the sacking of Rome by the Gauls (cc. 110-117). The 14th is the despots' book. Many of the details in Bk. 14 are wrong, e.(j. the date of the rule of the Thirty, and particulars of the Boeotian and Corinthian "Wars, the battle of Coronea for instance. According to c. 35 Anytus and Meletus were put to death aKpiroi ! For Diodorus' mistakes in Bk. 15 see notes to Chapter v. In the 14th book, apart from the history of Sicily, the accounts of events in Asia and the north are useful (cc. 39, 79, 82). There remains the question of the authorities which Diodorus himself used. The answer to it is certainly of very little practical use, since we know too little of Ephorus and Theopompus, who are the princip.al writers in question, to be able to say that this or that is to be received or rejected because it comes from Theopompus or Ephorus. But science cannot accept these considerations of utility as decisive. The proof of the existence of a lost author in an extant one is a scientific problem. But in this investigation of sources critics should have proceeded from the known to the unknown, and should have begun by ascertaining the methods of Diodorus himself. His choice of language and mode of describ- ing certain facts wdiich are repeated should have been examined, and if differences in these respects were discovered in diiferent parts of his work, the origin of such differences should have been inquired into, and then perhaps diversity in the authorities used by him would have become apparent. But this plan has hitherto been too little pursued. A noteworthy beginning, however, has been made by L. Brücker, Untersuchungen über Diodor, Gütersl. 1879, and Moderne Quellenforscher und antike Geschichtsschreiber, Innsbr. 1882. Stern, Theopompus eine Hauptquelle Diodors, Strassb. 1889, proceeds in a more one-sided fashion. Cf. generally Bauer's Jahresb. iiber Griech. Geschichte, Calvary, 1889. In the following remarks, by taking a subject frequently treated by Diodorus, the description of battles, I will endeavour to show in what way he workeil. The result will be of value for tlie use of VOL. Ill C 18 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Diodorus. I take as a basis the descriptions of the battles of Plataea and Leuctra, which some writers have pronounced to be alike and others very different. The truth is that the two battles have been described by Diodorus in such a way that the different progress of each is clearly discernible, but that he has embellished them both with the same flowers of speech, which convey the impression that the course of events in each was similar. In this respect the following passages from cc. 11, 31, 32 (Plataea) and 15, 55, 56 (Leuctra) correspond. At first the two armies fight bravely: yevvutws aywvt^o/xevos (11, 31); eKdvixois djxfliorepwv dywi'i^o/Aevcüv (15, 55) ; then comes the change brought about by the deaths of Mardonius and Cleombrotus : ews fiev ovv crvveßaivi. Tov M. — TrpoKivSwci'etv, evipv'x^u)^ vTrejJievov to Sslvov (11, 31); ews fJ.6V ovv 6 ßacnXevs e^rj — aSv^Aos 7]v r} poTrr; (15, 55) ; kirti 8' 6 re M. aywFt^o/xei'OS ckOi'/xcus eVecre — Trpos (jivyijv wp/jirjcrav (11, 31) ; e7re6 8' ovros Travra Kti'Sin'ov vwojiiVMv — lypwiKws jia^ojievos — eTeXevTrjcre — veKpiov ttAtJÖos iaopevO^^ (15, 55) j i.TriK€i[ikviiiv Se tmv 'EAAiyvwi' (11, 31) ; iiriKeipievoi, tois (f^evyovcri (15, 56). The plan is the same. Similar phrases, however, occur in most of the battles described by Diodorus in Bks. 11-17, of those used for Leuctra the following two especially: (1) that for a long time aSrjX.o's ■^v 17 poTrr) rrjs vtK?;s, and (2) that at first at' re craATrtyyes la-qixaivov Trap dfx elvai. Piety, military exercises, and obedience to orders are the foundations of a sound state. CHAPTER II INTERNAL CONDITION OF THE OTHER GREEK STATES, ESPE- CIALLY OF ATHENS — CONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES Among the rivals of Sparta in Greece Athens held the first place. She was by no means so Aveak as might have been exj)ected after the severe defeat she had suffered. Her commerce, the basis of her strength, had taken a fresh start. For a long time the trade of the Aegean Sea had centred in Athens, and although the monopoly Avhich had brought so much life into the Piraeus no longer existed, and the en- franchised cities and islands could trade with whom they liked, still many of the inhabitants from force of habit took their wares to Athens, Avhere they were still sure of finding a good market. The Athenians were thus able gradually to recover from the injuries which they had received. The influx of people set in motion by Lysander in order to compel the city to capitulate, had been followed by as decided an emigration. There being few cleruchies left, all those who had STifficient strength went as mercenaries to Asia or other countries, wherever war happened to be going on. Conon had shown them the way. By this means Athens was purged of many dubious elements, and the condition of those who remained behind was materially improved. It was a great advantage that the oligarchic party, which had so long been the source of the greatest difficulties, had destroyed itself by the bad use which it had made of its •24 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. power. In the fourth century we find no trace in Athens of the fear of falling into the hands of the oligarchs or of the Spartans, of the apprehension which from the time of Cimon to that of Critias had kept the minds of the Athenians in a state of perpetual agitation. The Hetairiae have disappeared. Everybody is either content with the democracy or at all events takes good care not to let his dislike appear in action. The democratic constitution is never called in question. It also conduced to internal i^eace that Alcibiades, the man whose restless ambition had caused the worst complications, was no longer alive. He had been assassinated during the rule of the Thirty at Melissa in Phrygia by order of Pharna- bazus, as he was on his way to the Persian king. The men who were sent on this errand set fire to the house in which he was living and shot him from a distance when he was escaping from it. Accounts differ considerably as to the immediate cause of his assassination, as is natural in an event of this kind. This much is certain, that every power at that time, the Spartans and the Persians, Agis and Lysander, the Thirty and Cyrus, hated the man who had played fast and loose with every one of them, and so he was bound to fall. The only place where his life would have been in safety was Susa, at the court of the king, the protector of all Greek renegades, and that is why he wanted to take refuge there. His death was a loss to no one, and a positive gain to Athens. For otherwise he might perhaps have returned there once more, and he could only have brought confusion in his train. What Athens needed now was hard work, and not adventurous I)lunges into the unknown, such as appealed to the l)rilliant genius of an Alcibiades.^ As a matter of fact it was no easy task to set their house in order, especially to settle the legal questions relating to the possession of property. The victims of the Thirty had not only been injured in their civil rights but had also lost some of their property. The same })oint arose in Athens as in all II REFORMS AT ATHENS 25 Greek states to which fugitive citizens returned. The latter demanded compensation for their losses. If, however, their property had been purchased in the meanwhile by others, were these bound to restore it without receiving an in- demnity 1 If all the acts of the oligarchs were to be declared null and void, the discontent would have only become still more general. This state of things has given rise to diffi- culties in all countries and in all ages. It is therefore greatly to the credit of Athens that she extricated herself from this embarrassment more successfully than many other Greek cities. The new measures adopted in Athens did not fan the flame of discontent. The actual credit of keeping the peace belongs to the democratic leaders of the State, to Thrasybulus and his colleagues, who personally set an excellent example by abandoning all claim to comjjensation for the property of which they had been deprived by the Thirty. By this means the zeal of others in asserting their rights was moderated and the way was paved for friendly compromise. The statute law also required examination. It was easy enough to say that the old enactments were to come into force again, but here too the practical difficulties were considerable. Legislation had often been effected by psephismata, many of which were in conflict with each other. It was therefore high time to take in hand a revision of them. On the motion of Tisamenus the nomothetae were appointed for this purpose. To arrive at a proper decision they availed themselves of the assistance of a small number of persons who were speciall}' versed in such matters. Among these was a certain Nico- machus, a man unworthy of the confidence reposed in him, who unduly delayed the completion of the task. j\Iany foreigners had crept into the register of citizens. The old law of Solon was therefore enacted, which prescribed that only those who belonged to the communit}' on the father's and mother's side should be Athenian citizens. These reforms were carried in the year of the Archon 26 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Euclides (01. 92, 4 or 403-2 b.c.), which consequently forms an important epoch in Athenian history. It is also remarkable as the year in which the official use of the Ionic alphabet was commenced on the motion of Archinus ; this alphabet had special letters for long vowels and double consonants, which the old Attic alphabet did not possess. About this time too the old payments to citizens for attendance in the theatre and for serving in the law-courts and on the Council were re-introduced, and soon afterwards payment for attendance in the Assembly was enacted by Agyrrhius. All this" proves that the finances of Athens were once more in a satisfactory condition." In the period immediately subsequent to Euclides political influence was mainly in the hands of Thrasybulus, who had rendered most signal service in the liberation of the city. Next to him Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, Agyrrhius, to Avhom we have just referred, and lastly Cephalus and Epicrates, are mentioned as popular leaders. Cephalus was a first-rate orator and always deliberate in action ; he was able to boast at the close of his political career that he had never even been accused of bringing forward an unconstitutional measure. Epicrates was distinguished by a Spartan simplicity of dress and manner.^ With the exception of Thrasybulus all these men were without genius, quite average individuals, but acceptable to the people for that very reason. Under the circumstances this was as it shoiild be. The problem set before the Athenians was not to create new institutions, but simply to restore such of the old ones as were serviceable, and for this purpose genius was not so much needed as industry and love of order. The finances had to be carefully administered if the debts left by the oligarchs (100 talents) were to be met, ships of war Imilt, the arsenal put in proper order, and the people paid as well. And the leaders of the Athenian democracy achieved all this. They ruled in a spirit of moderation. It would II PROSECUTION OF SOCRATES 27 have been well if they had observed this moderation in the ideal sphere also. But the enemies of the political aristocracy- extended their persecution to the aristocracy of the intellect, as is proved by the prosecution of Socrates.^ Socrates had spent many years wandering about his native city, a statuary by profession but also a self-constituted ad- monisher of his fellow-men, who urged them to reflect on their daily life, devoid of ambition and self-seeldng himself, per- forming his duties as a citizen loyally and fearlessly, ugly in person but attached to all that Avas beautiful, surrounded by enthusiastic friends, most of them young men, stared at by the crowd as an eccentric individual, and regarded with some suspicion, as if his behaviour were not so innocent as it appeared to be. He certainly was extremely obnoxious to many Athenians. He stood about in the streets and cross- examined people, not on the news of the day or city gossip, which would have been acceptable to most of them, but on their conception of the duty of man, and if in so doing he administered an indirect reproof to them, they thought it unseemly in the highest degree. It also happened occasionally that he proved to a citizen that he was bringing up his children badly, and when the father afterwards saw that his son was following the advice of Socrates in preference to his own, he became enraged with the tiresome busy-body, who pretended to know nothing himself. His worst crime, however, was his reputed hostilitj^ to the democracy. Hitherto he had passed through all the political revolutions of Athens unscathed ; now that the democracy was re-instated, he was accused by Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus of introducing new gods and corru2)ting the Athenian youth. The jury of more than 500 who were impanelled for the trial found him guilty by the small majority of five votes. His accusers had demanded the punishment of death in case of a verdict of guilty. A con- demned person, however, was entitled to make a counter- proposal Avith regard to his sentence ; and it is supposed, 28 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. looking to the smallness of the majority which had returned the verdict, that if he had demanded a lighter punishment, the jury would have consented to it. Instead of this he asked to be entertained in the Prytaneum — the highest honour which could be paid to an Athenian citizen. This was regarded as an insult to authority, and although in the end he intimated his willingness to pay a fine of thirty minae, sentence of death was voted by a larger majority than the verdict of guilty. The sentence, however, could not be carried out at once, because the sacred ship had just started for Delos for the festival of Apollo, and no execution could take place in Athens until it returned. The consequence was that Socrates remained in prison for thirty days. He refused all offers of assistance to escape, declaring that he considered it wrong to withdraw from the jurisdiction of his native city. He enjoyed his usual intercourse with his friends, and shortly before his death conducted the sublime dialogue on the immortality of the soul which is recorded by Plato in his Fhaedo (396). There is not a shadow of proof that the charges preferred by his accusers had any foundation. It is true that Socrates often referred to a daimonion, or divine voice, which frequently WTirned him what to avoid ; but as he never tried to convert any one to a belief in his daimonion, it is not true that he introduced new divinities. On the contrary, he was a zealous worshipper of the Athenian gods. Nor could any reasonable being assert that he corrupted young men ; as a matter of fact he only did them good service. The narrow-mindedness of the reigning democrats, who made Socrates responsible for the crimes of his brilliant pupils, Alcibiades and Critias, cost him his life. Intrinsically his execution was an act of absolute injustice. Externally, from the point of view of formal law, it is beyond the reach of criticism, for the reason that the Athenian Heliasts were bound to decide solely in accordance with their own convictions, and the life of every individual was in the hands of the Athenian state. Socrates also proved II THE CONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES 29 by his refusal to escape that he was, according to ancient ideas, just as good a citizen as his accusers. It is clear that the latter prosecuted him because they considered him a dangerous enemy of the democracy. Anytus was one of the chiefs of their party. Among the 550 or so jurymen, hoAvever, besides the zealous democrats and pious folk who were made to believe that Socrates really wished to introduce a new deity, there may also have been many persons to whom the philosopher had become obnoxious by reason of his inter- ference in their family affairs. It Avas also of no use to Socrates that the Delphic oracle had some time previously, at the instance of Chaerephon, declared him to be the wisest of the Hellenes. When it did not fall in with their views, the Athenians paid as little attention to the Delphic oracle as the other Greeks ; and no one was entirely wrong in disregarding it, for it had occasion- ally made religion the tool of self-interest. Besides this, wisdom and piety are not the same thing. As a result we find that men of widely opposite views united in condemning Socrates to death. In spite of this the popular conscience might have been aroused in good time, if his character had been rightly known. But this was not the case. The caricature of him presented by the comedy was better known than his real worth. He was out of the common nin, and men of this stamp had become objects of detestation to the democrats of Athens since the days of Alcibiades and Critias. During the next few decades no man of genius enjoyed any permanent influence in Athens. The execution of Socrates is regrettable for the sake of Athens, Avhich was incapable of taking full advantage of the virtues of her great citizen ; it is not regrettable in the interests of mankind, who cannot but gain by the death of a martyr, and still less is it so in the interests of the great man himself, who could not have met with a nobler end. He died true to his duty, as he had lived. His life and teaching have 30 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. borne splendid fruit. His disciples made varied use of the stimulus which they derived from him and of the instruction which he imparted to them, some of them being influenced by its practical and others l)y its theoretical side. His life has ever been a model of virtuous conduct. He is the true type, as conceived by Kant, of the man who without pride in his own knowledge follows the monitions of the voice within him. The daimonion of Socrates is a precursor of Kant's categorical imperative. It is usually asserted that the Athenians repented their treatment of Socrates. But there is no indisputable proof of this. It is possible that many persons may have changed their minds ; but on the whole it is probable that in Athens, M'here executions were not unusual occurrences, the same im- portance was not attached to the incident which we rightly assign to it. The attention of the Athenians at that time was chiefly directed towards restoring the peace and prosperity of the city. They Avere successful in restoring its prosperity, although a commercial city rose to power at this juncture which proved a serious rival to Athens. This was Rhodes, which was colonised jointly from Lindus, lalysus, and Camirus in 410, after the revolt of the island from the Athenians. But the position of Rhodes made it devote its energies in the first instance to intercourse with the south-eastern part of the Mediterranean and the interior of south-western Asia Minor. Circumstances produced a considerable development of traffic in this quarter, and consequently a new centre of commerce could be formed here without the older ones losing much at first.^ Later on a diff"erent state of things prevailed, and the trade of Rhodes in time far outgrew that of Athens. But at the period of which we are writing Athens was still a commercial city of the first rank, and besides this its ever-increasing celebrity as an intellectual centre of Greece continued to attract well-to-do foreigners, and in so doing promoted the prosperity of its citizens. On the whole we may say that a II CORINTH, AKGOS, AND THEP.ES 31 community has luiidly ever recovered so quickly from crusliing defeats or effaced the traces of them so speedily as Athens did after the year 400 B.C. Very different was the position of the city vhich had most contributed to the downfall of Athens. Corinth had helped Sparta to humiliate Athens and had counted on the gratitude of the Spartans in return. But the latter complied with none of the wishes of the Corinthians. Corinth claimed supremacy in the western seas, but Sparta took it for herself. Corinth wanted to rule in Corcyra, and to hold a position of importance in Syracuse, but Sparta would not permit either the one or the other. For Corcyra retained her independence, while in Syracuse Sparta protected the tj^-ant opposed by Corinth. Thereupon the Corinthians sided with the opponents of Sparta and, as we shall shortly see, actually gave up their political independence for the sole purpose of being able to inflict all the more injury on Sparta. Their commerce, however, whicli was chiefly with the west, did not suffer in these luisettled times, as is shown by the wide diffusion of the Corinthian types of coinage even in that period.^ Of the other more important Greek communities Argos retained its old position as the leading state of the second rank. On the other hand Thebes rose to unexpected eminence. We have already seen on several occasions that she was in process of vigorous development. She had joined in the hatred of the Spartans and Corinthians against the Athenians, and even wished to annihilate Athens. But now such a revulsion of feeling had taken place among the Thebans that they resisted Sparta when she seemed to be growing too powerful, and unhesitatingly and openly opposed the ablest of the Spartans, Lysander and Agesilaus. This rupture with Sparta was due, as in the case of Corinth, to chagrin bred of disappointed hopes. Thebes had expected to be rewarded for her support by receiving the absolute hegemony of Boeotia, and Sparta in her arrogance refused to consent. The result 32 HISTORY OF GREECE chaf. was that in the year 400 parties once more fell into the old grouping of the period subsequent to the Peace of Nicias. The reason, however, why Thebes was able to make such a display of power as she shortly afterwards did was that she developed an intellectual aristocracy and placed her destiny in its hands. Athens maintained her former position by abstaining from everything out of the common. Thebes on the other hand became greater than she had ever been because she implicitly followed the lead of men of genius. The three Greek states which henceforward take the front rank may be thus characterized : Sparta is an oligarchy, which continues to possess able statesmen ; Athens is a democracy with an enterprising people bent on managing their own affairs and averse to following the advice of the same men for any length of time, however capable they may be ; finally Thebes is also a democracy, but animated with an entirely different spirit, a democracy which obediently carries out the measures proposed by a few admittedly able men.''' NOTES The authorities for the condition of Athens at the beginning of the 4tli century include the orators, especially Lysias, for whom cf. Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, I., and the exhaustive introduction and commentary in Frohberger's edition, Leipz. 1871. — Of modern writers, see Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, Vol. I. Bk. I. and J. Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Perikles, Leipz. 1884. 1. For the death of Alcibiades, Nepos, Ale. 10, Plut. Ale. 38, and Just. 5, 8, who perliaps follow Theoiiompus ; Diod. 14, 11, perhaps following Ephorus. The celebrity of Alcibiades is attested by the fact that the Romans erected a statue to him by the side of one of Pythagoras, Plut. Num. 8. For his personal appearance see Baumeister, Denkm. p. 46. 2. The refusal of Thrasybulus and Anytus to accept compensa- tion, Isocr. c. Callim. 23. — For Nicomachus Lys. or. xxx. and Frohberger's introduction. — For the reforms made in Euclides' year of office, Gilbert, Staatsalt. 1, 151 ; Curtius, G. G. ?/\ 45 seq.; TRIAL OF SOCRATES 33 735, 73(i ; HL-niianii, Staatshalt. § 168. Payiiiout of citizens, Gilbert, 1, 325 seq. Tayment for attendance in Assembly, intro- duced by Agyrrliius, Scliol. Ar. Eccl. 102. Classification of the Heliasts, Wuelismutli, Stadl Atben, 2, 377. 3. For the po])ular leaders in Athens after 400 B.c., Beloch, cap. vii., esp. p. 116 seq. 4. Condemnation of Socrates. A powerful stimulus to its discussion was given by Forclihamnier, Die Athener und Socrates, die Gesetzlichen und der Eevolutionär, Berl. 1837. The latest work on the subject is G. Sorel, Le proces de Socrate, Par. 1889. Windelband, Gesch. d. alten Philos. p. 191, sums up the case briefly and correctly. — The trial of Socrates turned on questions of fact. Had he introduced new gods, or corrujjted young men 1 He had done neither. Consequently the most that the supporters of the mnjority of the Athenian Heliasts could say was that the jury had d(jubtless taken a wrong view of the facts, but that they had yielded to an instinctive feeling that the importance claimed for personal j udgment by Socrates constituted a danger to the State. As a matter of fact he was an advocate of inqiersonal judgment, and besides it is not likely that the jury had any idea of either the one or the other. The following is an important point not noticed by other writers in connection with this trial. The verdict of the Athenian Heliasts in Socrates' case was not attended with the dangerous consequences which a similar verdict would have in modern societies. It formed no precedent, becaiise the Athenians did not recognize precedents in their legal system. They had no legal science. Jurisprudence is a creation of the Roman aristocracy. In Greece the judges decided each case by a short syllogism, they never gave reasons for their decisions, and excluded advocacy on principle if not in practice. Every accused person is not a legal specialist. Non-admission of advocates as a matter of principle is therefore equivalent to individual treatment of each case, accom- panied by a disregard of all legal principles which are not inscribed in the heart of every man. This is also the reason why there was no court of appeal or revision. I cannot here go further into the importance of this fact in the history of civilization. In the case of Socrates and his condemnation its significance is this, that no Athenian came to the conclusion that because Socrates was con- demned to death people who acted in a similar way should receive similar treatment. — On the other hand, it must be admitted that when he had once been found guilty, there was nothing unusual in the punishment of death. The penal code in Greece was in the embryonic condition of self-defence on the part of the State, and a self-defence conducted with weapons the simplicity of which VOL. Ill D 34 HISTORY 0¥ GREECE chap, ii rivalled their severity. There were only two forms of punishment, death or money fine ; imprisonment was simply a means of extorting the latter. The only state in which exile apj^ears to have been recognized by law as a substitute for capital punishment was Sparta, especially in the case of kings (Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 25). This accounts for the enormous number of political executions in Athens, of course of responsible leaders, one good result of which was that there were none of the wholesale butcheries which we find elsewhere, in Corcyra and Argos for instance. In Athens the ordinary citizen and subject was after all better protected by law than in any other large Greek state. Enemies no doubt were badly treated. 5. Rhodes, of. vol. ii. p. 486. Synoecismus Diod. 13, 75 ; Str. 14, 654, 655 ; Arist. Or. 43. The new city was located 80 Stades from lalysus, and was on such a large scale that according to Arist. the citadel was TreStwv Kal aXa-Qv {xecrTi']. Cf. Kuhn, Ensteh. der Städte der Alten, pj). 209-221 ; Schumacher, De republ. Rhodiorum, Heidelb. 1886. — ^The importance of Rhodes as a commercial city is shown by the introduction of a Rhodian standard of coinage, for which cf. Chapter iii. note 11, and Chapter xxi. 6. The Corinthian coins, the so-called Pcgasi, were minted as early as the fifth century in the Corinthian dependencies of Anactorium, Leucas, and Ambracia (cf. vol. ii. p. 323), but without the Koppa, which was the mark of Corinth itself. In the fourth century they were coined in other Acarnanian localities, in Corcyra (after 338), some places in Epirus, Illyria, Bruttiura, and Sicily, the place of coinage being denoted by the addition of difterent letters of the alphabet. Cf. Indioof-Blumer, Münzen Akarnaniens, Vienna, 1878, and Head, H. N. 341. 7. The state of feeling in Thebes can be gathered from Plut. Lys. 27, where her ideal aspirations are expressed in the ^v/} (rojf^poi'eorar)/ Trpoßah'ei, as Xenophon (Ages. 6, 7) neatly remarks. 6. Naval battle off Cnidus, Xen. 4, 3, 11, 12. Diod. 14, 83 is confused ; cf. Breitenbach on Xen. ibid. 7. Struggle for the Isthmus ; changes in Corinth, Xen. 4, 4 seq. ; Diod. 14, 92. According to Xen. 4, 6, 1, the Achaeans took Calydon at this time : TroAtras imrotrjjxkvoi tous KaAvSwvtov?. 8. For Iphicrates see Rehdantz, Vitae Iphicratis, Chabriae, Tiraothei, Berol. 1844 ; Bauer, Griech. Kriegsalterth. in I. Miiller's Handbuch, 4, § 49. 9. Alliance of Athens with Eretria probably at this time, Köhler, Mitth. 2, 212; Ditt. 52. — Conon honoured by the Erythraeans as evepyerrjs, Ditt. 53. The relations of Athens with Phaselis were arranged on the model of those with Cliios, C. I. A. 2, 11 = Ditt. 57. Conon's great achievements, Isocr. Phil. 63, 64. 10. For the building of the Atlienian walls, see fragments of an inscription of the t(.i,\ottolol, Köhler, Mitth. 3, 50 seq. Cf. Wachsuiuth, Die Stadt Athen, 1, 579 seq., 2, 187 seq. and 2, 11. Relations between Athens and Dionysius, Lys. de bon. 48 HISTORY OF GREECE Aristocr. 19 seq., C. I. A. 2, 8 = Ditt. 54. In consequence of tbe rise of Greece against Sparta and of the battle off Cnidus, a league was concluded by several Greek cities, the existence of which is only known to us through coins. Waddington was tlie first to deal with the subject in the Revue Numisraatiipxe, 1863 ; he was followed by Head in his treatise on the Coins of Ephesus, 1880 ; and by Inihoof- Blumer, Monnaies grecques, 1883, p. 311, who made known the coin of lasos in question ; see Head, Hist. Num. in various passages and other writers. That Rhodes, Cnidus, lasos, Samos, and Ephesus belonged to a league is i:iroved by the inscription 2YN on these coins. They all have on the one side the infant Heracles strangling the serpents, and on the other the tokens of the various cities, a rose for Rhodes (H. 540), a head of Aphrodite for Cnidus (H. 524), a head of Apollo for lasos (H. 528), a lion's mask for Samos (H. 516), and a bee for Ephesus (H. 495). AVaddiiigton has expressed the opinion that the o-vyu/xax'« was probably formed after the battle off Cnidus, and in point of fact Epliesus, lasos, and Cnidus would hardly have been in a position to join a o-vfi[ia)(^La of this kind after the King's Peace, i.e. about 377. But there are other similar coins, only without tlie 2YN. In what relation do these stand to the former ? Tliey are as follows : — Thebes ; silver coins with the Boeotian shield, and electrum coins with the head of Dionysus (Head, 297, and his Coins of Boeotia, pp. 40, 41). Croton ; silver coins (H. 28). Zacynthus (H. 360); also silver. Lampsacus; gold coins (Gardner, Types of Greek Coins, pi. xvi. 8). Cyzicus ; electrum (Wadd. Rev. Num. 1863, pi. 10, 6). Of these the Theban are extremely im- portant, as they disclose a state of facts hitherto imperfectly noticed by historians. The type of the serpent-strangling Heracles is an ancient Theban one which occurs as early as the fifth century, Br. Mus. Central Greece, pi. xii. 7. The Synmiachia therefore borrowed it from Thebes. This point has been noticed. But an examina- tion of the weight of the coins reveals more. The silver coins of the league are, as Head tells us in the above passages, Rhodian tridrachmae, which weigh as much as 178 grains, but they are also, as Herr Six informs me (cf. Six, Monn. grecques ined. Num. Chron. 1888, p. 107) of the Boeotian standard, as being Aeginetan didrachmae into the bargain (cf. vol. ii. of this history, p. 227, and Head, Boeot. p. 41 ; 186 '8 grs.) The remarkable coinage of a tridrachma is therefore explained by the close connection of the league with Thel)es. This also accounts for Thebes coining electrum pieces at this period, which as a rule was only the custom in Asia Minor. Thebes, it is evident, used Persian gold for turning out coins which made her name and badge better known in Asia, and Ill COINACxE OF LEAGUE OF CITIES 49 the Ehodian Timocrates, Avho brought the gokl, was the agent between Thebes and Rliodes. I go a step further and thus expkiin the origin of the Ehodian standard. The Rhodians came to the conclusion that it would be a good thing to have closer relations with continental Greece, where the Aeginetan standard was in force, and they introduced a coin which could be adapted to this standard. Lastly, the existence of relations of a very intimate kind between Thebes and Rhodes after the year 394 enables us to understand how it was that Epaminondas was able to apply to the Rhodians at a later j^eriod (Diod. 15, 79). Under the circumstances the idea of a Theban maritime supremacy was not quite so absurd as it appears intrinsically. — We now come to Lampsacus, Cyzicus, Croton, and Zacynthus. It is quite possible for the coins of Lampsacus to belong to the category which we have been discussing. Of the rest, Herr Six informs me that Cyzicus probably adopted the Heracles type at a later period, but with the addition of Ijjhicles, consequently with a distinction. In the coins of Zacynthus the attitude of the serpent-strangling Heracles is different. I would point out that at all events the adoption of this type may be considered as an indication that the cities in question wished to make known to the world at large their aspirations towards freedom, and that if we are to look for a later period which would be consistent with such a state of things, it must be that subsequent to 377, when a league was also formed against Sparta. And this league, according to the document discussed in Chapter xvii (C.I.A. 2, l7 = Ditt. 63), was also joined by ZaKwOtuiv 6 Sq/xos 6 iv tm N';y/\Aw. Thus our Zacynthian coin may be a coin of this separate Zacynthian community. There remains Croton. In this connection it is remarkable that according to Tlieocr. 4, 32, relations of an unexplained nature existed between Croton and Zacynthus. True, Croton, as I shall exj^lain in the notes to Cliapter xi., had probably lost its independence by 377. But my object is simply to establish the intimate relations existing between Croton and Zacynthus, and I believe that the Heracles coin of Croton may have been minted at a somewhat earlier date, about 390, when Croton was beginning to be on its guard against Dionysius and an Italian league was being formed against him. — In the first half of the fourth century a strong movement in the direction of liberty passed over the Hellenic world, and tlie diffusion of the symbol of the serpent- strangling Heracles from Rhodes to Croton is an interesting trace of it. Just as the barbarians assisted each other from Susa to Carthage, so the Greek lovers of freedom gave each other mutual support ; and symbols like the serpent -strangling Heracles and the Heracles fighting the lion, to which I shall refer in tlie notes VOL. Ill E 50 HISTORY OF GREECE to Chapter xi., are indications of it. — It is well known tliat there was a painting by Zeuxis representing Heracles strangling the serj^ents. But there were other figures in it, and the painting cannot have had any influence on the design of these coins, for the reason that the Theban coin (Centr. Gr. xii. 7) is older than Zeuxis. There is a bronze in Naples which resembles the type of these coins : Baumeister, Abbild, p. 721, and see notes to Chapter vi. — According to Head (p. 314), the Athenian gold coinage also begins about the year 394, another trace perhaps of the gold of Tithraustes, of Timocrates and of Conon. — There is a great charm in making use of the science of numismatics to enrich the history of Greece, and if eminent numismatists like Waddington, Imhoof, Six, and Head take the lead with ascertained facts and trustworthy combinations of facts, it is permissible for others to try and com- plete their discoveries by the addition of further historical data, and make them more accessible to non-experts. There is more history in these studies than in many a laborious criticism of authorities. CHAPTER IV SPARTA COURTS THE FAVOUR OF PERSIA — EXPEDITION OF AGESIPOLIS AGAINST ARGOS — EVAGORAS — DEATH OF THRASYBULUS — ANTALCIDAS — THE KINg's PEACE. 392-386 The Spartans had fared badly, as they thought, only because their enemies in Greece had formed an alliance with Persia and taken money from the king. It was therefore necessary to detach this ally. They determined to make peace with Persia, provided the latter woiüd ensure them the supremacy of Greece. The liberty of the Greeks of Asia Minor was an admirable and desirable thing, but it was more important for the Spartans that they should themselves retain their control of the European Greeks. In return for this they were ready to surrender their Asiatic kinsmen to Persia. They made overtures to this effect in 392, to Tiribazus, Karanos of Further Asia, through their envoy Antalcidas. The Athenians despatched Conon to counteract his mission, and envoys also came from Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas declared that Sparta had no objection to the Greeks of Asia being subject to the king of Persia, but that the islands and all other Greek communities must be independent. The old friends of Persia could make no objection to the first proposi- tion, biit the second was bound to displease them, for in the mouth of a Spartan it meant for Thebes the loss of her supremacy over Boeotia, for Argos her separation from 52 HISTORY OF GREECE Corinth, for Athens the abandonment of her newly-recovered allies, perhaps even of her ancient possessions of Lemnos, Irabros, and Scyros. Tiribazus met the efforts of the Greeks with an attitude of apparent indifference, saying that he would report thereon to the king; he, however, gave Antalcidas money, and threw Conon into prison. The latter's career was now at an end, and he died soon afterwards in Cyprus.^ The king listened to the report of Tiribazus, but did not decide in accordance with Sparta's wishes. Instead of doing so he sent Struthas, who favoured Athens, to Further Asia in place of Tiribazus. The Spartans therefore once more resorted to intimidation; Thibron again proceeded to Asia and devastated the valley of the Maeander. He was, however, surprised and slain by Struthas in the year 391. It was probably a little before this that the Athenians, when they saw that Persia and Sparta were drawing nearer to each other, had attempted to come to an understanding with the Spartans themselves, the orator Andocides having gone to Sparta with this object. An agreement had actually been arranged there on the following conditions : Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, her long walls and her fleet ; Thebes was to give up Orchomenus and Argos to abandon Corinth. But the Athenian people did not ratify this agreement, which was also displeasing to the Argives. Shortly afterwards, however, they were obliged to submit to these very terms.^ The war therefore continued, although we cannot fix the dates of its various incidents with accuracy. The Spartans endeavoured to uphold their prestige as much as possible, Agesilaus and Agesipolis giving active help. At the request of the Achaeans, who had occupied Calydon, Agesilaus marched thither to defend it against the Acarnanians, and took a large quantity of booty, with the result that the Acarnanians joined the Spartan league when he threatened to return. Agesipolis took the field against Argos. He was IV OrERATIONS OF AGESIPOLIS 53 inspired with a keen ambition to do as much for Sparta as his famous colleague, and he executed a very clever amp. The Argives had adopted the peculiar custom of beginning the celebration of the month Carneus whenever they wore engaged in a war with the Dorians for which they were not prepared, because it was not lawful for a Dorian to go to war in that month. The result was that the side which took the offensive was seized with qualms of conscience and withdrew. The Greek religion, which was essentially a state-religion, made tricks of this kind possible (see vol. ii. p. 403). Agesij)olis, suspecting that the same practice would be resorted to in this campaign, if he carried out his intention of attacking the Argives unexpectedly, procured a declaration beforehand from Zeus at Olympia to the effect that arbitrary postponements of sacred months were not entitled to con- sideration from other states, and obtained a confirmation of it from the son of Zeus, the god of Delphi. His previsions were justified, for on invading Argolis he was met by two heralds with wreaths on their heads who notified to him the sacred truce of the Carneus. But to their dismay he replied that he was not bound to pay any attention to it and continued his advance. He did not, hoAvever, accomplish much. The omens were unfavourable. He tried to interpret an earthquake in his camp as a sign of encouragement from Zeus, but afterwards when the sacrificial victims were found to have no lobes to their livers, he marched out of Argolis without even garrisoning any fortified place, as Sparta had always done on other occasions. The Spartans never achieved much against Argos, even when everything appeared favour- able at the start (see vol. i. p. 430). They must have had a superstitious respect for the eldest son of Aristomachus.^ In Asia too and on the Aegean Sparta at first fought without much success. We saAv that Rhodes had revolted from Sparta as early as the battle off Cnidus (see p. 13 of this volume), but the discontented aristocrats applied to Sparta, 54 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. and she sent eight ships under Ecdicus and Diphridas, who also took with them Thibron's troops, but in spite of this they were unsuccessful. The democrats held their own. There- upon the Spartans despatched Teleutias, who had hitherto been in command in the Gulf of Corinth, with his twelve ships to Asia. He took reinforcements with him from Samos, relieved Ecdicus of the chief command, and had the good fortune to capture ten Athenian vessels under Philocrates, which were to have reinforced the troops of Evagoi'as of Cyprus. Evagoras, however, happened to be at war with the Persian king at that moment, with the singular result that the Athenians, who were allies of the king, aided his enemy, while the Spartans, who were at war with Persia, did their opponent a good turn by weakening his other antagonists. This must have been an inducement to the king to take a more favourable view of Sparta's proposals.^ The change in the relations of Evagoras with Persia had arisen out of the following circumstances. He was recognised as king of Salamis, but endeavoured to extend his rule over other cities in Cyprus. Thereupon the inhabitants of Amathus, Soli, and Citium complained of him to the king, who commissioned Hecatomnus, the suzerain of Caria, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, to make war on him. He noAv asked the Athenians for help, and the latter granted it without reflecting that, in so doing, they were bound to forfeit the goodwill of their protector, the Persian king. But after losing their fleet under Philocrates, they gave up the idea of assisting Evagoras, and devoted themselves to extending their own power. They despatched a fleet of 40 ships under Thrasybulus, with the ostensible ol)jcct of reliev- ing their friends in Rhodes. But Thrasybulus engaged in an enterprise of more profit to Athens. He sailed (probably in the year 389) to regions which were of greater importance to Athens than Rhodes, — to Thrace and the Hellespont. He brought over Thasos, Samothrace, the Thracian Chersonese, IV DEATH OF THRASYBULUS 55 Tenedos, Byzantium, and Chalcedon to the Athenian side, and farmed out the tolls taken in the Bosporus on exports from the Pontus to the advantage of Athens (of. vol. ii. p. 498). After doing this he proceeded southwards again. In Lesbos Mytilene was friendly to Athens, while the other places in the island were attached to Sparta, who had installed Theri- machus as harmost there. Thrasybulus defeated him and thus established the supremacy of Athens in Lesbos. After having won over Clazomenae and Halicarnassus, he was in a position to sail for Khodes. But before doing so he wanted to raise money on the coast of Asia Minor. This brought him to Pamphylia, a country in which his friend Alcibiades had resided in the year 411 (see vol. ii. p. 495). Here he was surprised at night by the Aspendians and slain in his tent. Such was the inglorious end of the man who had liberated Athens and was endeavouring with skill and success to restore her to her former greatness. In spite of his brilliant achievements the Athenians had eventually become dissatisfied with Thrasybulus. His op- ponents took offence at his self-assertion and accused him of aiming at a tyravnis — the charge, it is true, being confined in the first instance to a tyrannis abroad. When his camjiaign came to such a melancholy termination, his friend and col- league Ergock's was recalled and accused of embezzlement of the money which had been collected. Suspicion easily attached to the proceedings in the somewhat adventurous expedition to Pamphylia. He was condemned and executed. The money in question, however, was not found in his pos- session, and consequently another of his friends, the trierarch Philocrates, was prosecuted. Agyrrhius, a democrat of a more radical type, was despatched to the scene of action in place of Thrasybulus.^ The Athenians had now recovered the command of the Hellespont, the basis of their maritime supremacy. This boded ill for Sparta, who, while continuing her endeavours to gain 56 HISTORY OF GREECE cuap. Persia to lier side, desired to put an end to this state of things by her own efforts. The Ephors accordingly sent another harmost named Anaxibius to the theatre of war. He was a man who had behaved badly to the Ten Thousand, but was now in favour with the Spartan authorities. He did a good deal of damage to the Athenians from his base of opera- tions at Abydos, and they sent Iphicrates to oppose him, who carried out one of those stratagems of which he was a master. Iphicrates was stationed in the Thracian Chersonese, Anaxi- bius in Asia. The Spartan had made an expedition from Abydos to Antandros, and was returning thence in careless security. Iphicrates, however, had secretly crossed over to Asia and placed himself in an ambuscade. From it he fell upon Anaxibius, who met his death fighting like a brave Spartiate, and thereby enabled some of his troops to escape to Abydos. The result was that the Spartans accomplished but little in Asia. But to make up for it they harassed Athens all the more effectively from Aegina with the assistance of the Aeginetans. The Athenians therefore made a descent upon Aegina and built a fort there. Afterwards, however, Avhen the Spartiate Gorgopas came to Aegina and assumed the command, the Athenians evacuated the island. This took place in 389. In the year 388 the fighting on the Hellespont and on the coast of Attica continued in the old way, the Athenians gain- ing the advantage in the former district, and the Spartans in the latter. Antalcidas was now admiral -in -chief on the Hellespont, but he seems to have paid more attention to diplomacy than to warfare, and his lieutenant Nicolochus was blockaded in Abydos by the Athenians. Gorgopas, however, followed the Athenian commander Eunomus from Aegina to the coast of Attica, and even took four of his ships. There- upon the Athenian Chabrias, who here appears for the first time, defeated the Spartans by means of a cleverly-planned ambush, and killed Gorgopas. It was the new kind of war- fare which, inaugurated by Demosthenes in the fifth century. DirLOMACY OF SPARTA and now systematically developed by Iphicrates, once more proved successful. It now comes more and more into vogue and for a time quite ousts the old mode of fighting with hoplites, in which the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Athen- ians had formerly shown such skill. The new style, in which stratagem played the chief part, was eventually learnt by the Spartans, whose attempts in this direction at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War did not meet with success (see vol. ii. p. 339). Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, came to Aegina in person, and played the Athenians a trick which was worthy of Iphicrates. He persuaded his soldiers to make a sudden attack on the Piraeus, which was prepared at night time and carried out at daybreak. The Spartans actually forced their way into the harbour of Athens, destroyed as much material of war as they could, took some triremes in tow and captured some fishing-boats on the coast, the crews taking the Spartan ships, as they sailed leisurely out of the Piraeus, for an Athenian fleet, and quietly allowing them to approach.^ But all these operations would not have brought matters to an issue. This result was obtained, just as in the Peloponnesian war (see vol. ii. p. 500), by the diplomatic activity of Sparta, who had secured two powerful friends, the one in the East and the other in the West, and with their support inspired all the other Greeks with so much apprehension that they accepted the terms she demanded. These allies were the king of Persia and the tyrant of Syracuse. The Spartans had relations of old standing with both powers ; those with Dionysius had never been disturbed, those Avith the Persian monarch were now placed on their former footing. Antalcidas returned from Susa with Tiribazus, bringing a message from the king, the purport of which we shall soon hear. The royal command, however, would have been futile had not the Spartans gained a certain superiority in the war at the last moment. And they were indebted for this state of things to the Persians and to Dionysius. True, Antalcidas 58 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. on his arrival at Abydos took eight Athenian ships without resistance, but he was then joined by some Persian vessels and 20 Sicilian shijis, and was able to blockade the naval force of Athens in the Hellespont with a fleet of more than 80 sail. The Athenian fleet could not come to the assist- ance of Athens if she required it. This placed the Athenians in an embarrassing position, and they resolved, no doubt recollecting their sufferings after the battle of Aegospotami, to accept the terms which they had refused a few years before. We may presume that many Athenians had grown weary of the war, which they had undertaken at the insti- gation of Thebes, and which had been more trouljlesome to them than to the Thebans. Argos also submitted, and con- sequently the success of the king's message was assured (386). It ran as follows : — " King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to him, bi;t that the other Hellenic cities, small and great, should be independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to belong to the Athenians as before. The king and his allies will make war on all those who refuse to accept this peace." All the Greeks took the oath to maintain the peace. The Thebans, it is true, asked to be allowed to swear to it on behalf of the Boeotians, that is to say, Thebes wished to have the other Boeotians recognized as her subjects. But one of the main reasons why Sparta had invoked the assistance of Persia was in order to deprive Thebes of her supremacy over Boeotia. Thebes had begun the Corinthian war, and Sparta was determined that Thebes should pay for it. Agesilaus made preparations for a campaign against Thebes, whereupon the Thebans gave way and declared that they Avould respect the independ- ence of the Boeotian cities. The Argives gave up Corinth. This peace, which Avas called the King's Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas, remained the basis of Hellenic unity up to the time when the Macedonians introduced a complete change.' IV THE KING'S PEACE 59 The King's Peace may be regarded as a faithful reflection of the balance of power in Greece during the first half of the fourth century B.C. The idea of liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor had been abandoned. In Greece itself there Avas no state superior to all the rest ; consequently the peace said that all should be independent. But next to Sparta Athens was the most powerful, and she might have been able to oppose the peace ; this is vouched for by the privileged position accorded to Athens alone. Athens was the only state allowed to have foreign possessions. Including these it was the largest state next to Sparta in territorial area. For Lemnos has an area of about 300 square miles, Imbros of ICO, and Scyros of 120, which, added to the 1500 of Attica, gives Athens a territory of about 2000 square miles. Of the more important Greek states Sparta alone had more than this ; excluding Messenia, she had over 2500 square miles, and including Messenia more than 3750, almost double the total of Athens. Argolis, it is true, is reckoned at about 2500 square miles, but this estimate includes the territory of Corinth and that of the independent cities of the Acte. Thebes, if she had possessed the whole of Boeotia, would have had only IGOO square miles, and without Orchomenus, etc., much less. The feeling of the citizens of Athens corresponded to her position. They were conscious of considerable strength, and soon set to work to reconstruct their league, which was by no means prohibited by the terms of the peace. For independent cities were at liberty to conclude such alliances as they liked, and Sparta did so to a considerable extent. The head of the league had only to declare that its members were absolutely free ; Sparta always said this, and indeed allowed her allies a certain degree of autonomy. From a superficial point of view, however, the peace was a reverse for Athens, and they punished some of their political leaders severely for it. From henceforward Callistratus was the most influential man in Athens. He Avas a nephew of the strong democrat Agyrrhius, and no doubt a 60 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. democrat by conviction into the bargain. But he proved complaisant to Sparta because circumstances demanded it, and Sparta in return improved tlie position of Atliens with regard to Boeotia by letting the Athenians have the city of Oropus.^ It was a great pity that the peace was carried and dictated by Persia, by a state whose power had long consisted solely in its money. As a matter of fact, Persia had imposed the peace only by withhohling money from Thebes, Argos, and Athens, and continuing to give it to Sparta. This was equivalent to saying that the Greek state which received the largest presents of money from Persia should control the others, which was a humiliation for Greece in two ways. For it gave a monarch who had been unable to defeat ten thousand Greeks a right to interfere in the affairs of Greece on the appeal of one Greek state or even without it, and Persian money counted for more in the eyes of the Greeks themselves than their own strength. Sparta was a decided gainer by the King's Peace, and Thebes the greatest loser. The next step was that Thebes received positive ill-treatment at the hands of Sparta, and this gave rise to fresh changes of paramount importance, NOTES 1. Antalcidas' mission, Xen. 4, 8, 12 seq. — Conon had made himself very popular in Athens. He had presented the Athenians with 50 talents, Nep. Con. 4 ; entertained all the citizens, Athen. 1, 5 ; built a temple to Aphrodite in the Piraeus to commemorate the victory off Cnidus, Paus. 1, 1, 3 ; its site is now established, Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen. 2, 1 20. The Athenians put up a bronze statue to him and to Evagoras, near the Zeus Eleutherios and the o-roa ßacrlXeios, Demosth. 20, 70 ; Isocr. 9, 57 ; Paus. 1, 3, 1. — Tiribazus no doubt opposed Conon from jealousy of Pharnabazus. — For the subsequent history of Conon see Diod. 14, 85 ; Nep. Con. 5 ; Isocr. 4, 154 ; Lys. 19, 39, 41. — Struthas and Thibruu, Xeu. 4, 8, 17-19. IV NOTES 61 2. For the so-called Peace of Andocides, which historians, with the exception of Philochorus, do not mention, and which is placed in 392, 391, or 300, cf. Kirchner, De Andocidea tert. orat., Berol. 1861 ; Blass, Griech. Bereds. 1, 281 seq., 319 seq.; Beloch, Att. Pol. 123, 124 ; von Stern, 8. 3. Campaigns of Agesilaus in Acarnania, Xen. 4, 6 and 7, 1 ; cf. Breitenbach's edition of Xen. Hell. vol. 2, Ixxxiv. — For these countries cf. the recent comprehensive work, Oberhummer, Akar- nanien, Ambrakia u. s. w. im Alterthum, München, 1887. — Cam- paign of Agesipolis against Argos, Xen. 4, 7, 2-7. It took place in 390 or 389. 4. Rhodes, Teleutias, etc., Xen. 4, 8, 20-24. 5. For Evagoras see Scharfe, De Euag. rebus gestis, Monac. 1866 ; Erich, De Euag. Cyprio, Berol. 1872. See also Chapter xxi. of this volume. — Exploits of Thrasybulus, Xen. 4, 8, 25-30 ; Diod. 14, 94-99 ; he wins over Thasos, Dem. 20, 59, the Helles- pont, ibid. 10, 60. Cf. also the Inscr. C. I. A. 2, 92 ; 2, 14 ; Swoboda in the Mittheilungen, 7, 174; Kühler, in the same, 7, 313 ; von Stern, 11 ; Beloch, 345, 346. — The proceedings of the Athenians against the friends of Thrasybulus are gathered from the speeches of Lysias against Ergocles and Philocrates. Cf. also Hermann, St. A. § 169. 6. Anaxibius, Xen. 4, 8, 31-39. Events in Aegina, Xen. 5, 1. Nicolochiis, Xen. 5, 1, 6, 7. — Chabrias' earlier achievements, Diod. 14, 98 ; 15, 2 ; Theop. fr. Ill ; Dem. 20, 76 ; Nep. Chabr. 2 ; brief summary by Breitenbach in his notes on Xen. 5, 1, 10. Chabrias had done Evagoras good service. 7. Events in Athens before the acceptance of the King's Peace, Xen. 5, 1, 25-30. It was at this time that the Athenians com- mended the Parian Phanocritus, who reported to them the enemy's movements on the Hellespont : inscription discussed by Foucart, Rev. Archeol. 18,399; C. I. A. 2, 38 = Ditt. 58. An alliance concluded between Athens and Chios immediately after the peace, C. I. A. 2, 15 = Ditt. 99. — The peace is called 7) /iJao-tAeojs elfyji'i] or rj vTTo ßacr. KaTa7re/xpovpLov Lagaria, a suj)posed colony of Epeus and the Phocians. At all events no Greek com- munity of any importance arose here. The Greeks preferred the 148 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. low country, and founded Heraclea (mod. Policoro) to make up for Siris, the city of ancient renown. According to Str. 6, 280 the place of the -7ravi]yvpih ^^ ^ time when this opinion was shared by only a few, he undoubtedly gives proof of a vigorous and lofty character. 3. For Xenophon see pp. 14, 15 of this volume. Xenophon is in such bad odour with many writers that Sittl, for instance, (2, 439) actually makes him a moral reproach out of his Themis- togenes (Hell. 3, 1, 2), and on p. 442, note 1, quotes two passages from the Hellenica (2, 1, 31 and 2, 3, 21) stating what is repre- hensible in them, although neither contains a word of what Sittl finds in them. There is no defence of Lysander in the first, nor of the Spartans in the second. According to von Stern, Ge- schichte, etc. p. 47, Vater (Leben des Pelopidas, p. 357) jjronounces Xenophon to be simply " disgusting." People praise Socrates, but the writer who has applied the principles of Socrates, truth and abhorrence of rhetoric and sophistry, to history, is supposed to have written a book (the Hellenica) wliich does not even do credit to his character (Sittl, l.L 441). 4. Plato is a world in himself and the books about him would fill 174 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. a library. The latest discussions of Plato, which also notice tlie earlier works on the subject, are in the writings of Windelband, Sittl and Christ. How widely careful investigations differ in regard to the chronological order of Plato's writings is shown by the fact that the Phaedo, which Christ (p. 343) places about 388, was, according to Windelband (p. 226), written about 361. — It is curious though little noticed that Plato, just like Pythagoras in former days, was brought into connection with Apollo ; people pretended that he was Apollo's son, Vit. Plat. West. 382 quoted by Koscher, Lex. 2535. — For the student of Greek history the Politeia naturally has a special significance among Plato's writings, because it was in- tended to show what the institutions of the Greek communities ought to have been in his opinion. His model is the idealized Spartan state, which becomes a sheer impossibility through still greater restrictions on freedom. In Plato's Republic, as in the Gorgias with regard to Pericles (vol. ii. p. 210), the principles of cattle- breeding as applicable to the training of human beings (5, 459) once more come under discussion, and the obliging Glaucon, who manages to say yes to every question in a hundred different ways without wearying Socrates or, owing to the delicate variety of Attic expres- sion, even the modern reader, never asks where these beings are to be found who are so superior to the ap^ovres and cf^vkaKes as to be able to superintend their develoiDment in the same way as men do that of animals. In spite of similar writings of modern times, such as Thomas More's Utopia, Bacon's Atlantis, Harrington's Oceana, Campanella's Citta del Sole, and the teachings of a Fourier and S. Simon, Cabet was not able to make a practical success of a state of this kind with Europeans in his Icaria ; it has only been done by Jesuits with Indians in Paraguay. — A discussion has arisen as to whether the Academy really lent its aid to the support of monarchy, especially of the Macedonian monarchy, in practical politics. J. Bernays (Phokion und seine neueren Beurtheiler, Berlin, 1881) assumes that it did, Gomj)ertz (Die Akademie und ihr vermeinter Philomacedonismus, Wiener Studien, 4, 1882) has pronounced against the theory, and corrected some details in Bernays' work. The tendency of the school was naturally in accordance with the master's principles, in favour of a strong government. But clear-headed academicians might after all be in favour of the republic for this reason. Of reiniblicans the Academy produced Phocion and the Byzantine Leon ; Dion and Aristonymus were doubtful (v. chap, ix.) ; Chaeron became a tyrant (Ath. 1 1, 509). In Heraclea both the tyrant Clearchus and his murderers had been pupils of Plato ; Blass, Tyrannis, 1, 257, 259. According to Dem. Aristocr. 119, 127, Python and Ileraclides, pupils of Plato, mur- XII PARALLEL WITH FRANCE 175 dered Cotys ; but Python afterwards joined Philip. Plato no doubt learnt much from the Pythagoreans ; but he did not, like them, create a political party intended to intervene actively as such. His aim was merely a propaganda of ideas. Of course it may be said that these ideas were of political importance in Phocion's case ; but their application to politics was after all the consequence of Phocion's position in general. Co-operation in the Academy was a very pale imitation of that of the Pythagoreans, who moreover do not seem to have formed such a strictly organized political party in the fourth century as they did in the sixth. — We have styled the fourth century the age of 23rose in literature, as contrasted with the fifth, the age of poetry. The development of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries presents a resemblance. As in Greece the poets — Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes — take the lead in the fifth century, and the prose-writers — Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes — in the fourth ; so in France we have Corneille, Racine, Moliere in the seventeenth century, and Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Mirabeau in the eighteenth. The drama is continued in Greece in the fourth century, and in France in the eighteenth, but in a con- ventional way (Crebillon, Regnard), until the new comedy in Greece and the comedie bourgeoise and Beaumarchais in France create a new departure. Prose was of importance in France as early as the seventeenth century, and in Greece in the fifth (Pascal, Bossuet — Herodotus, Thucydides), but the prose of world-wide influence does not appear until the following century in both countries. 5. Researches in the history of Greek art crowd so fast on one another nowadays, owing to the numerous discoveries, that even the best specialists cannot always undertake to make use of them wliere it would seem desirable. I have therefore been obliged to confine myself to what is strictly necessary in the text. The history of painters has been recently treated in detail by W. Klein, Studien zur griech. Künstlergeschichte, Archäolog.-epigraph. Mittheil, aus Oesterreich xi. and xii. For Agatharchus, cf. Klein, 12, 87, where the explanation of the words " scenam fecit " in Vitr. 7, praef. 11 is to be noted. For Apollodorus, cf. Klein, 12, 101, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, ibid. 103 seq. Klein shows it to be probable that Zeuxis came from Heraclea on the Pontus. For Timanthes, ibid. 11, 212. — The Crotoniates and Helena, Cic. de in v. 2, 1 ; Plin. 35,64. The story had evidently originated in popular gossip, to which the rhetoric of later writers added details. Cf. for this chapter and chap. xxix. the minute references in S. Reinach's Manuel de Philologie Classique, vol. ii., Paris, 1884. CHAPTER XIII ATHENS ABOUT THE YEAR 360 We now return to political events. After the death of Epaminondas Athens became once more the capital of Greece. The greatness of Thebes had been chiefly due to her great men, while Sparta had ceased to be her old self since the battle of Leuctra. Athens alone had maintained her position, and now commanded general respect. It was Athens who now took up the impending struggle with the northern king, and who continued it even when the conduct of Thebes had led to Philip's invasion of Greece. We must therefore, before dealing with Macedonia, make ourselves acquainted with the condition of affairs at Athens during the period when a colli- sion with that kingdom was in course of preparation. We will first take a retrospect of the events which have been already narrated.^ At the time of the liberation of Thebes (379) Callistratus was at the head of affairs in Athens, and although his sym- 2)a,thies were more in favour of Sparta, he remained in power. He helped to found the new league. He co-operated with Chabrias and Timotheus, and then brought about the fall of the latter and put Iphicrates in his place. When Thebes had destroyed Plataea and the peace-congress at Sparta had mis- carried, Athens again took the side of Sparta, at the outset with good wishes only, and afterwards with deeds. After the battle of Leuctra the Athenian sympathy for Sparta grew fHAP. XIII POSITIOX OF ATHENS 177 Stronger and stronger, and when Epaminondas marched into the Peloponnese Athens sent Iphicrates to the aid of the Spartans. In 369 the terms of the alliance Avith Sparta were formally settled. Subsequently when Pelopidas had brought over the Persians to the Theban side, the Thebans took more vigorous measures against Athens. First they captured Oropus, which led to the impeachment of Callistratus and Chabrias for neglect of duty ; they were, however, acquitted. Then matters grew more serious. The Thebans actually contested the maritime supremacy of the Athenians, and Epaminondas conducted a successful naval expedition in per- son, the consequence of which was that Timotheus returned to public life, and served Athens in Thrace. The extraordi- nary boldness of Epaminondas shook the belief of the Athenians in the capacity of Callistratus, and after an unsuccessful attempt to enlist the Arcadians decisively on the side of Athens, his prestige completely declined. He was not, how- ever, ousted from power until after the battle of Mantinea, which satisfied no one in Greece. The particular occasion of his fall cannot be ascertained, but it would appear to have been chiefly owing to the disasters of Athens in the north, lung Cotys established himself in the Thracian Chersonese; the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Cyzicenes prevented the despatch of grain to Athens, and the Athenians had to con- clude a disadvantageous peace with Perdiccas. The greatest annoyance, however, Avas caused them by Alexander of Pherae. He had created a fleet which carried on piracy in the Cyclades. He occupied the island of Peparethos, and when the Athenians sent Leosthenes thither, Alexander surprised and defeated his fleet. The tyrant actually repeated the coup of the Spartan Teleutias by surprising the Piraeus, and making a rich booty in the Deigma, and at the money-changers' tables. This seems to have turned the scale against the popular leaders. The Athenians were determined to be masters of the sea at all events. Leosthenes was condemned to death, VOL. Ill N 178 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. and fled the country. Callistratus himself shared the same fate. His place was probably taken by Aristophon, an elderly man, who had the reputation of being a friend of the Boeotians. Wc pause at this point to consider the political condition of Athens. The constitution of the city was the same as in the time of Pericles. The Council, the Heliasts, and the people had the same powers as then ; the only change was in the presidency of the Assembly. This was no longer in the hands of the Prytanes, but a Proedros Avas chosen by lot from each of the Phylae which were not holding office, and from these Proedri again an Epistates, and he acted as president of the Assembly. The object therefore was to limit the influence of the Council. The popular distrust of leading men and fear of their possible violations of the law had increased owing to the oligarchical intrigues from which the city had had to suffer in the fifth century ; hence the responsibility of movers of resolutions and of the generals was more strongly accentuated. The number of prosecutions for maladministration and unconstitu- tional motions increased. We know that there had never been any lack of instances of popular severity against states- men ; Miltiades, Antiphon, and the generals in the battle off the Arginusae Avere cases in point. But in the fourth century prosecutions and sentences of this kind became more frequent. Even Thrasybulus was in the end on the point of being impeached ; Timotheus only escaped sentence of death in 373 through the intercession of powerful foreign friends ; Callistratus, who imprudently returned from exile to Athens, was executed. Thrasybulus' friend, Ergocles, was put to death. After the King's Peace, Dionysius and several other generals or envoys were condemned to death, as were sub- sequently the two generals who had marched to the assist- ance of Thebes in 379, Antimachus, Timotheus' colleague, Timagoras, the envoy to Susa, and the general Callisthenes, before the battle of Mantinea. At this time it was more XIII POLITICAL CONDITION OF ATHENS 179 dangerous than ever to serve the Athenian state as adviser or general ; Aristophon had to defend himself against seventy- five prosecutions for illegal motions. He was, however, never condemned, and this at all events shows that the accusations were not always successful. It is said that they were often made merely to fill the public treasury by means of convictions ; but that is an exaggeration. For it was generally a case of a party question, in which the object was more the downfall of a hated rival than the enriching of the exchequer. The assertion that sycophants often started accu- sations of this kind to enrich themselves is just as wide of the mark. No doubt there were men of this stamp, who played upon the fear which quiet citizens had of prosecutions, but it must be borne in mind that in public matters the accuser ran the risk of incurring a money fine of 1000 drachmae if he did not obtain a fifth of the votes, and that deterred many from bringing forward unfounded complaints of this nature. On the whole, the evils connected wdth public impeachments for violation of the constitution do not seem to have been so great as to outweigh the benefit derived from them, which consisted of keeping the responsibility of movers of resolutions constantly before the public mind. The meetings of the Assembly were by no means so disorderly as to invite com- parison with the sittings of certain modern Chambers of Deputies. Of course the proceedings were stormy at times, and a speaker was shouted down when the Assembly did not want to hear him ; but as a rule the people were strongly imbued with the feeling that they had to be advised by those who were wiser than themselves, and in times of danger they invariably folloAved the advice of the man whom they looked up to. Besides, there is no instance of any scandalous act of injustice, like that which followed the battle off" the Arginusae, in the fourth century up to the time of the Diadochi. Only those who are ignorant of the Athenian constitution can talk of mob-rule in Athens. How little the mob pushed itself 180 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. forward in Athens is shown by the deliberation held after the capture of Elatea by Philip. But we must not overlook the dark side of the Athenian constitution. It lay in this, that there was no permanent government in existence to ensure consistency in the decisions taken. In Athens the people themselves ruled. Every mea- sure had to l)e approved by them ; no power on earth could prevent the people from undoing one day what they had done the day before ; no power on earth could compel them to weigh the consequences of their resolutions. The decision rested permanently with them, and with them alone. One day they would declare that any one who killed Philip should be given up to justice, and the next day, if it so pleased them, they decreed honours for his murderers — always on the motion and responsibility of one individual. They declared war, and fixed the number of soldiers and ships to be sent to the scene of action, and if they did not assign the requisite money out of definite revenues for this definite object, the resolution could not be carried out, and no one was responsible for its non-execution, as no one could take money out of a fund not set apart for the particular object. Or, again, they sent fleets to sea and armies on campaigns, and after a time ceased to vote them supplies, because there was no money in hand. In that case it might happen that no one would feel under an obligation to press for the supply of funds, for every resolution, even if it was only the necessary consequence of another, required a responsible mover, and no Athenian citizen could be compelled to bring forward a motion. In this way it was possible for the governmental machine to come to a standstill at critical moments, and it occasionally did so, as we shall see from the protests of Demosthenes. These evils were less pronounced when a man who commanded universal respect was leader of the State both in council and in action, and more marked when the statesman who had the most influ- ence at home could not take the command in the field. And xiii WEAK POINTS OF ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 181 this was mostly the case iu the foui'th century. The people never really trusted the great generals, Chabrias, Timotheus and Iphicrates ; they considered them dangerous to the liberty of the citizens, and hence important proposals generally ema- nated from others. Phocion, it is true, was almost continually strategus, just like Pericles, and statesman at the same time ; but Phocion was not followed as Pericles had been. He always served the people, and hardly ever led them. The strategi had ceased to hold the position which the people accorded them in the fifth century (vol. ii. pp. 201, 202). The duty discharged originally by the archon and afterwards by the strategus, — of making important proposals, — was now performed by the orator, who held no ofiice either at home or in the field. But we may describe the malady from which the Athenian people was sufiering in another way. The inspiration of the moment was too jjowerful. This was the case in the law-courts as well as in politics. In the courts the decision rested "with the Heliasts, whose verdict was final and required no reasons ; in politics the Assembly controlled every detail. In the legal sphere there was no appeal to a higher tribunal, in politics there was no body empowered to decide details in accordance with the views of the people. Law and politics thus became a series of isolated measures, which at times lacked all reasonable consistency. The draw- backs of this state of things were most marked in foreign policy, which was often conducted by the Athenian statesmen of the time in a grasping spirit and by sophistical means, with the result that the mistakes committed came home with redoubled force. A defective foreign policy caused the fall of Athens.^ The finances of the State were not in such a good posi- tion as in the time of Pericles. True, there were still allies who contributed sums of money ; but these contributions could never reach the total of the old ones, and the expendi- ture was if anything larger than in those early days, as now 182 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. war was almost always going on in some quarter or another. Hence the direct tax first levied in the year of the Archon Nausinicus (378-7) had become a permanent institution. As a certain period was always bound to elapse before the tax- payers' contributions fell in, it was convenient to have inter- mediaries who were responsible to the State in the first instance — groups consisting of a moderate number of contri- butors, each of which had to collect a certain amount of the whole sum, and in which each stood security for the other. In this way the citizens themselves had an interest in seeing that no one evaded the tax, while the government received the money more quickly, and in a smaller number of pay- ments. These associations, known by the name of Symmoriae, had been instituted in 378-7 for taxation purposes. A similar course was soon pursued with regard to the Trier- archia. As early as the Peloponnesian War two citizens had been allowed to equip a trireme instead of one, because even then there were not so many wealthy people as formerly. In 357-6 real Symmoriae, consisting of more than two members, were also created for the Trierarchia.^ Symmoriae, however, were not so useful for the Trierarchia as for the collection of taxes. The trierarch had had to discharge two obligations : he provided the equipment of the trireme, and commanded it in person. He took pride in his trireme. Under the Sym- moriae system the trierarchy became mostly a question of money, for the command could only be held by one of the trierarchs, who was appointed by the association and who was consequently responsible not only to the State but also to his colleagues. He had the disposal of the property of others, who, if the ship distinguished itself but was damaged, shared the expense but not the glory. This was calculated to discourage patriotic zeal, and it really seems to have done so. Changes were also made in the administration of the finances at this period. Since the disappearance of the Hellenotamiae, there had been no supreme financial controlling office what- xiii FINANCIAL CONTROL 183 ever, although it would have been of great service. A depart- ment of this kind is mentioned in the second half of the fourth century by writers and in documents, under different names it is true, but they must refer to the same office. When was it established 1 Various conjectures have been put forward on this point. As, however, the most important period in finance is the year of Nausinicus (378-7), in which the league was reorganized and changes made in the system of taxation, it is very natural to conjecture that this high finance official was apjDointed for the first time on that occa- sion or soon afterwards."^ In one instance he is called " ad- ministrator of the common revenues," which is an excellent title for an official who among other things had to receive the contributions of the members of the league. This official was always appointed for a term of four years. An Athenian empire, of the kind which existed in the fifth century, is not to be found in the fourth. Since the time of Nausinicus the members of the league held a much more in- dependent position as regards Athens by means of the Synedri. They had a legal means of coming to an understanding among themselves, if occasion arose therefore against Athens as well. Besides this the existence of the league was of a very fluctuating kind. Hardly a year can have passed with- out some city withdra^ving from it, in a formal or informal manner, Thebes setting the example in the latter respect, while the old contention so uncompromisingly maintained in the fifth century, that secession was unlawful, was even now reasserted by Athens. This led to conflicts, just as in the fifth century. In one respect Athens acted very wrongly. In the treaty she had })romised not to hold any property in the terri- tory of the aUies : the detested cleruchies were not to be reintroduced. But although this provision may have been observed as a general rule and in point of form, 3'et in one important place Athens did actually found a cleruchy, and one of the greatest value.^ Samos had joined Athens after 184 HISTORY OF GREECE CHAr. the battle off Cnidus, as is proved by its coinage, but had deserted to Sparta in 390. Subsequently it had even received a Persian garrison. But Timotheus conquered the island in 365, whereupon Athenian cleruchs came there and drove out the old inhabitants, who took refuge in various districts of Greece. When after a long interval, as late as 322, the Samians were brought back to their homes by Perdiccas, this proceeding was regarded as a restitution of rights. Apart from this illegal possession Athens was still la^vful owner of Scyros, Imbros and Lemnos, which gave her an open route to the Hellespont. In 357 she recovered the Chersonese, with the exception of Cardia. In the Pontus, however, the regions round the Bosporus were on very friendly terms with Athens, and thus the trade with the Pontus, one of her vital resources, was still in her hands. On the Thracian coast-line she pos- sessed but few places, but the whole country was closely bound up with Athenian interests. Pydna and Methone were her allies, and she asserted her claim to Amphipolis with pertinacity, but never obtained it. Her relations with the northern princes of Thrace and Macedonia varied as in the fifth century. Thus Athens still remained one of the great powers of the East. The number of her triremes was con- siderable. The official figure was 400, and although this was of course never reached, yet no eastern state could boast of a similar naval power. Her best generals were the three Avhose names have often recurred in this history : Iphicrates the military reformer, Chabrias the victor off Naxos, and the wealthy and amiable Timotheus, Conon's son, who had brought over man}' communities to the side of Athens. The campaigns, however, were conducted more with mercenaries than Avith Athenian citizens.*^ There were two reasons for this, one of a technical, the other of a more general kind. The technical reason was that war had become an art not only for the generals but also for the individual soldier. This is invariably overlooked, and reproaches are heaped upon the xiii ATHENIAN MILITARY SYSTEM 185 citizens of Athens, which they do not deserve. If the Athenians wanted to have an Iphicrates for a general, it was necessary to provide him with a serviceable supply of good soldiers, otherwise even he could do nothing. This made mercenaries a necessity to Athens from a technical jDoint of view. The more general reason was that the citizens, who after all had other occupations besides campaigning, could not stand the constant Avars. Idling in the market-place Avas not the exclusive occupation of all the Athenians ; most of them had land which they had to look after. The Athenian Avas quite ready to defend his native city, but for a long cam- paign in a foreign country he had neither inclination nor capa- city. The Athenians were in the same position as the colonial powers of the present day, whom nobody blames for using mercenaries to guard their colonies. A standing army of mercenaries Avas therefore necessary to Athens for a two-fold reason, and those Avho blame her for it nowadays are simply echoing the speeches of orators Avho took no heed of circum- stances Avhen it suited the object which they had in view for the moment. To serve as oarsmen — Avhich the Athenians had been in the fifth century — was even now much easier for the citizens than to be soldiers. It is true that the employment of mercenaries and their leaders, Avhich had become a necessity, entailed all kinds of drawbacks. The generals felt that they were indispensable and acted more independently than the people liked ; the main object of the mercenaries, who served for money, Avas to be ahvays provided with a good meal. If no money was forthcoming from Athens, they raised compul- sory loans from friends. But at the close of the Peloponnesian War much the same state of things prevailed ; money had been collected, that is to say extorted, in every available quarter. It seems that potentates who wished to keep a standing army not unfrequently applied to Athens for the loan of a general, a practice Avhich increased, if not the power, at all events the prestige of Athens. 186 HISTORY OF GREECE «tap. If the Athenians of those days were ready to follow their generals only in war, and not in times of peace, yet they honoured them in a manner which must have appealed to an ambitious soldier. Of the few statues of men who had done good service to the State erected in the Athenian market- place about the middle of the fourth century B.c., besides those of the tyrannicides, of Solon and of Evagoras, only Conon, Chabrias and Timotheus are mentioned. The statue of Iphi- crates was placed in front of the Parthenon in 371. The great generals were to enjoy honours but not influence. The small number of statues of this kind shows also that at that time hero-worship had not spread to the extent which pre- vailed fifty years later. The private life of the Athenians of the fourth century is as well known to us through the orators as that of the fifth cen- tury through Aristophanes. We are unable on the strength of this knowledge to agree with those who consider the fourth century a period of decay. Immorality was not more general in the fourth than in the fifth century, nor was luxury. As regards the mode of life of young Athenians there was no difterence between the age of Hypereides, who defended Phryne in coiu't, and that of Alcibiades. Luxury if anything had rather decreased, owing to the fact that Athens had ceased to have the great political importance which she possessed in the fifth century. Everything was more in the petit bourgeois style than in those days. This fact is generally overlooked. Writers no doubt inveigh against the luxury of this period, but what is quoted in proof of its existence? Alcibiades' establishment and Midias' style of living. But Alcibiades' furniture was sold as early as 415, and the worst that even his enemy Demosthenes can say of Midias is that, besides his house in Athens, he had another fine one at Eleusis, that his wife drove about -with white horses, and that he used a silver- mounted saddle. There is no trace of large fortunes. That the Athenians had not lost their moral energy is proved, XIII ALLEGED DECLINE OF ATHENS 187 according to a general consensus of opinion, by their conduct both before and after the battle of Chaeronea. I refer to this subject in a note.^ True, one cause of deterioration of morals had arisen since the close of the century — the increase of sophistry. But the harm done was not so great as it might have been, because Socrates and his school had countei'acted the teaching of sophistry. Profound reflections, like those of Plato, and practical instruction, such as Xenophon conveyed in his writings, must after all have exercised a beneficial influ- ence. A people which recognized the lofty principles paraded in Demosthenes' De Corona as its own, could hardly have been in a state of moral decay. ^ That the decline of Athens, of which we hear so much, is little better than a fable, is also proved by a careful study of her domestic institutions as they appear, for instance, in Haussoul- lier's, Foucart's and other writers' works on the municipal life and religious associations of Attica, based on the orators, the inscriptions and other sources.*^ These researches reveal the significant fact that a healthy system of self-government had penetrated into the smallest circles of society and held its own in every department, to the good of the State, which, owing to the practice in the Avork of administration thus obtained by its citizens, could perfectly well exist and to a certain extent flourish as a democratic community. This independence appears especially in the government of the Denies, which formed an excellent school for that of the State. The Deme has its property which it administers itself ; its revenues are derived from lands, buildings and taxation. They are spent chiefly on objects connected with public worship. The assembly of the Demotae is supreme ; the officials, with the Demarch at their head, are only representatives of the Deme and not its rulers ; they are elected or chosen by lot every year. The whole financial administration of the Deme is conducted in the assembly of the Demotae, down to the smallest detail. The habit which each citizen thus acquired 188 HISTORY OF GREECE ' chap. of personally deciding the aflairs of the community must have materially facilitated the self-government of the Polls. This makes the possibility of the Athenian democracy intelligible to us. The success attending the administration of the Demes had convinced the Athenians that the Polls also could be governed in the same way. The habit of self-government found further expression in the many societies which met for definite purposes, and were corporations which could hold property. This had already been settled by Solon's legislation. These societies had, as a rule, a religious centre, like the whole community ; the mem- bers were united by some worship or sacrifice. They were formed for burials, for navigation and trade, for working mines, even for piracy. Social gatherings also existed. There was a club of wits, which met regularly in the sanctuary of Heracles in the district of Diomea, and was so famous that Philip of Macedon offered a large sum for the minutes of its meetings. Of growing importance were the guilds of actors, who styled themselves artists of Dionysus, or simply artists, and were spread over the whole of Greece. There were travelling companies of actors, and permanent ones in the larger cities. They occur in Athens as early as the naval supremacy of this city, in the fifth century. Since that period their importance appears to have continuously in- creased. A communication, dated about the end of the fourth century B.C., from the Amphictyonic Council to the Athenian Demos, has come down to us, in which the highest privileges are conceded to these artists : personal inviolability, exemption from taxation, immunity from military service, everything to enable them to perform their sacred ofiice ; even for debt actors could only be thrown into prison in certain cases. If any injury is done to a Dionysian artist, the whole city in which it occurs is held responsible. Even in the present day actors and singers are not so privileged as they were then in Greece. Just as actors took Dionysus for LEARNED SOCIETIES — FOREIGN WORSHIPS 189 their patron, so the philosophers placed themselves under the protection of the Muses. Plato's Academy, Avhich paid special honour to the Muses and was granted corporate rights, set the example of a permanent association of philosophers. In later times the Museum at Alexandria became the model for societies of learned men. These associations were not founded exclusively for common study ; common meals were also specified as an object, and hence the social unions of the present day known as "Museen" are based on Greek models. Of course men joined associations for purposes of divine worship without any ulterior object. The religious need was keenly felt and was not fully satisfied by the official cults, whether of the State or of the Phyle, the Deme and the Phratry. As the Greeks regarded religion as a State affair, it was the province of the State, if it thought fit, to allow foreigners to worship the gods in their own fashion. The result of course was that natives also took part in this worship. As early as the fifth century Thracian cults had become common in Athens, owing to the constant intercourse with Thrace, among others that of the goddess Cotytto, whose worshippers were called Baptae. The comic poets made fun of this cult as it were something highly immoral. The worship of Adonis was also widely spread in Athens as early as the time of the Peloponnesian War, and the whole city took part in its celebration. The worship of the Mother of the Gods, which was introduced from Phrygia, was one of the most popular in Athens and the Piraeus. There were metroa in both cities. The public documents were preserved in the Athenian metroum. At the beginning of the fourth century we find mention of the assembly (Olacro^;) of the worshippers of Sabazios, who was connected with the Mother of the Gods. Demosthenes ridiculed this cult in the course of his invectives against Aeschines' mother. The foreign worships were mostly settled in the Piraeus. An inscription has been discovered there of the year 333, giving permission to some people 190 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. of Citium in Cyprus to build a temple to the Cyprian Aphrodite, and, by way of justification of the permission, reference is made to the fact that a temple of Isis already existed in the Piraeus. The foreign cults — of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt — had this element in common, that their exciting ceremonies threw men into a state of ecstasy, in which the worshipper imagined that he was in closer touch with the deity. The Greeks permitted the public propaganda of such religions. The travelling Metra- gyrtac, a sort of mendicant friars of low character, Avho propagated the worship of the Mother of the Gods, were notorious in this respect. The popularity of all these foreign cults was due to the fact that the Greek religion, which consisted essentially of ceremonies, could no longer satisfy the needs of the people. This was the case everywhere in Greece. The Eleusinian mysteries, which were supposed to offer something of a deeper kind, were of course a State institution in Athens ; but even these were insufficient for many persons, perhaps for the very reason that the State conducted them. People wanted per- sonal relations with the deity. The result was that there were all kinds of religious communities in Athens. There were simple adherents of the State religion, very many of Avhom had an external connection with it through the numerous priesthoods ; all the good families belonged to this category. Then there were many, especially in the lower classes, whose spiritual needs ^yere not satisfied by the reli- gious services of the State ; they took part in foreign worships. Finally there Avere many who believed that man could attain to comforting truths by personal inquiry. These joined one of the schools of philosoph}^, of which the Socratic was the most important, A proof that a healthy state of things prevailed is that the Athenian citizen still lived a great deal in the country. His property was there. He retained his legal connection xui ATHENS THE REAL CAPITAL OF GREECE 191 with the Deme in which he was registered, even if he lived and had property elsewhere. He frequently had to associate and do business with his fellow Demotae, and for this pur- pose certain places in Athens were used as a rendezvous for members of the same Deme, such as a barber's shop in the neighbourhood of the market-place. The city of Athens Avas the seat of government and of the principal worships, the point of union of all the citizens : the Piraeus was the centre of trade with foreign parts, the home of the merchants, the metoeci and foreigners ; Eleusis was a religious centre, where well-to-do Athenians had houses of their own. Finally, there were small fortified outposts in Attica, in which the young men performed their military serWce. They were the scene of an active garrison life, of which the young soldiers were the most conspicuous element. Although as regards many aspects of civilized life other Greek cities, even in the East, possessed great importance in those days — such as Byzantium for trade, Ephesus for painting and sculpture, Teos for dramatic art, Halicarnassus, Rhodes and Cos for art, trade and eloquence generally — although the stream of culture, which seemed to flow rather from east to west in the fifth century, now ebbed eastwards again ; yet Athens still remains the civil, military and intellectual capital and the true strength of Greece, and is generally recognized as the intellectual centre of the Greek world. At this point, however, the Athenian republic is confronted by a state of an entirely different character, by one of the king- doms of the north. NOTES 1. For the internal development of Athens and the state of jiarties from 379-361 cf. the first volume of Schaefer's Demosthenes, 2nd ed. Leipz. 1885, also BelocL's Attische Politik, Leipz. 1884. — Attic statesmen of this and the preceding age hurled from power and executed (I quote Beloch for the sake of brevity) : 388, Ergocles, a friend of Thrasybulus, Bel. 138; tlien the men men- 192 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. tioned in chapter iv., note 8 ; 379, the generals who went to Boeotia on their own account, B. 138 ; 373, Antimachus, the friend of Timotheus, B. 145 ; 368, Timagoras, envoy to Susa, B. 153 ; 362, Callisthenes, B. 159. — Aristophon was impeached seventy- five times and never condemned, Cephalus was never accused of TrapavojUMv, Aesch. Ctes. 194. In the year 359 there were prose- cutions about the proceedings in Thrace, Sch. D. 1, 160. — For the Oropian prosecution and the raids of Alexander of Pherae cf Curtius, 3^, 779. — For Aristophon see Dem. Cor. 162; Aesch. Ctes. 139 ; cf. Schaefer, Dem. 1, 138 seq. 2. Bribery of the Heliasts (Se/ca^etv) is said to have been intro- duced by Anytus, Hut. Cor. 14. Cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 2, 374. The venality of the Athenians is placed in its true light by L. Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen, 2, 240 seq. — aTTio-Tta, i.e. suspicion, is recommended to the Athenians as a useful quality by Demosthenes, Phil. 2, 24, and Aristocr. 111. They had a tendency in that direction without this. — It is not democracy in itself which is the cause of the many misfortunes of Athens, but the kind of democracy which the Athenian people wanted and maintained, the ' immittelbare ' democracy, as Schäffle (Encyklopädie der Staatslehre, p. 310) calls it, i.e. a democracy with no government apart from the people, and in which the people decides every detail as far as possible. Hence it could never develop into what the English call party government, that is a government with each party alternately in power, a system wdiich presents this advantage, that each party can successively satisfy the various re- quirements of the State, as is the custom in England. In Athens there never was such a thing as a united coherent party responsible for government measures, but only one individual. The con- sequence is that in Athens the individual is confronted by the unorganized state, and the result of this is that when there is no commanding personality who possesses the confidence of the people for a consideral)le period of time, like Pericles or Demosthenes, decisions are apt to proceed from the impulse of the moment, as is shown by the concluding period of the Peloponnesian War. I emphasize this fact because it is generally ignored or not grasped with precision in Germany. Thus Westerraann-Rosenberg, com- menting on Demosth. 1, 244, say that the examples of Olynthus, etc. ought to have induced the Athenians " to finally exclude this party from the government." A government in the sense of a parliamentary ministry, which could have been turned out of office, did not exist in Athens. Government was carried on by psejyhismata ; any citizen who was not aTijxo)v twv aTroSeKrwF, — kol (T^^eSov TTjv öXy]v Slolkijo-iv ei^ov rrys TroAews. This means that the administrators of the Theoricon also united in their hands the other chief financial offices ; but it is construed to mean that Eubulus spent more money on festivals than he ought to have done, although nothing is said to that eftect. Besides, people forget that the same office with the same jjowers was administered by Demosthenes, at the time when Ctesiphon brought forward the motion for bestowing the wreath on him, by Demosthenes, who is paraded as the opponent of Eubulus' financial policy ! In future therefore when we read in Schaefer that Eubulus " increased the number of holidays" (Dem. 1, 201), that he bought "popularity" by "distri- buting money from the treasury " (1, 204), we shall know that these are not facts, bitt only the writer's views. On the other hand, what facts are attested about Eubulus ? According to Schaefer, Dem. 1, 204, he built ehijjs, organized the cavalry, raised land and sea forces, erected storehouses and adorned the Acropolis (Dem. 1, 96). How can it be said in the face of this that he used the public funds for " purposes of entertainment " instead of for military equipments 1 He provided for the festivals, as he was bound to do, and as probably Demosthenes himself did, who tried to screen him- self in the Harpalus affair by asserting that he had advanced 20 talents to the Theoricon (vide infra). Demosthenes therefore may boast that he advanced 20 talents for festivals when there was no money in the treasury, and no one blames him for it, while Eubulus is reproached for having spent the Trepiovra on the amusements of the people, although there is no record of it. Besides, in reference to tlie Theoricon, we may quote Grote's appropriate remark (Lond. 1888, vol. ix. p. 343), that 'amusement' was a religious duty for the Greeks (Trat'^'eti', Herod. 9, 7). The way in which everything is turned against Eubulus is shown by Schaefer's remark, Dem. 1, 213 : " It is characteristic of the spirit of this administration (of Eubulus) that none of the great public works which it undertook were com- EUBULUS 225 pleted. It was reserved for tlie indefatigable activity of Lycurgus to finiifli the naval arsenal and other important buildings." But we find in Schaefer himself, Dem. 2, 528, that in the year 399 the building of the docks and the naval arsenal was interruj^ted for a time " on the motion of Demosthenes," and at least ten talents a year saved thereby. And yet Eubulus is to blame if the buildings are not completed ! When it actually turns out that Eubulus' administration was so careful that timber for ship-building purchased by him appears for a long time in the public accounts, this is pronounced to be "almost strange" (Sch. Dem. 1, 213). No doubt it is so of the imaginary Eubulus who has been constructed ; but it is essentiall}'- in keeping with, the real man. — (3) We now come to the other proceedings of Eubulus. He supported the expedition to Euboea, which cost Athens money and citizens. This proves that Eubulus spent money on other objects besides festivals. Demosthenes was opposed to this undertaking, and his sujjporters approve of this (Schaefer, Dem. 2, 79): "His object must have been that the Athenians should not make common cause with the tyrant, but with the inhabitants of Chalcis." But the men of Chalcis had originally agreed to the expedition (Sch. Dem. 3, 80), and if the interest of Athens demanded it, no blame attached to it. Eubulus' administration, however, was marked by the most success- ful exploit which the Athenians ever achieved against Philip, the despatch of the fleet to Thermopylae in 352, which compelled Philip to halt at the gates of Greece, and delayed his victory for six years. Demosthenes never did anything of the kind. It is now pretty clear that Eubulus initiated this expedition, for he was the leader of Athens at the time, and Beloch (218) assumes it as a matter of course. Schaefer, however, ascribes the merit to a certain Diophantus, whom Dem. ircpl irapairp. 297, calls an i(r\vp6s, together with Callistratus and Aristoj)hon, a passage which, accord- ing to Schaefer, 1, 205, "no doubt" refers to that expedition, for which Diophantus moved for a vote of thanks. But why sliould not Eubulus have originated it ? Schaefer thinks that Eubulus could " scarcely " have agreed to it, " for the cost of the undertaking amounted to a large sum," and "fresh complications might have arisen from it." Tliat would apply to the imaginary, but not to the real Eubulus. Eubulus also endeavoured to get on good terms with Cersobleptes, while Demosthenes was then opposed to him. But on Thracian questions it was permissible to hold different views, and Demosthenes himself changed his. Hence Eubulus' preference for Cersobleptes at that time is no reason why we should blame him. Lastly, Eubulus endeavoured to bring about a league against Philip in 348. Now, one would think, his critics will allow that VOL. Ill Q 226 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. he beliavcd well for once in his life. But no ; the deed may have been good, but the motives were certainly bad. According to Sell. Dem. 2, 169, Eubulus only wanted "to drag the rest of the Greeks into a war, the burden of which had become intolerable to the Atlienians, and the issne of which became more and more serious." And that is not high-mindedness, but egoism. Granted that it was so, yet Eubulus was perfectly right. Why do we want help, except that we do not feel strong enough to stand alone 1 Demosthenes, at all events, is of this opinion {De Corona, 301). The conclusion is that Eubulus behaved like a patriotic citizen on this occasion as well. Nothing more is known of him, except that he was on the side of Aeschines in the prosecution of the envoys, and that in spite of this Demosthenes himself afterwards treated him with respect (De Corona, 162). I believe that I have proved tlie following propositions in the preceding remarks : (1) Eubulus did nothing worse with the Theoricon, which was the KoAAa of the democracy, than any other leader of the democracy, Demosthenes not excepted. — (2) In military preparations Eubulus did just as much as Demosthenes. — (3) Eubulus struck the only effective blow against Philip, in preventing the king from penetrating into Greece in 352. — (4) Eubulus also in other respects worked energetically for Athens and against Philip. Eubulus must not be used as a foil for the brilliant Demosthenes. If Beloch and others have shown that the policy of Eubulus was on the whole judicious, a policy of restraint and economy (Plut. praec. polit. 15), yet not without a certain dignity and vigour in defence, I believe I have proved that the accusers of Eubulus have not brought any well-founded charge against him, and in discussing details of history for this purpose, which could be given only in the notes, I also believe that I have presented a picture of the times which may claim to possess independent value. 6. For Olj'nthus cf. Demosthenes' speeches and the introduction of Libanius and the commentaries of modern writers, especially that of Weil, also Schaefer, Dem. 2, 23, and others. 7. There are coins of Lycceius which have been discussed by Six, Lycceios, Num. Chron. Lend. 1875. Aw Attic inscription (Eph. arch. 1874, p. 451) calls him Lyppeius. Six fixes the dates of Lycceius and his Paeonian successors thus : Lycceius about 359- 340, Patraus about 339-315, Audoleon about 315-286. For Cetriporis see Sch. Dem. 2, 27 ; Dittenberger in the Hermes, 14, 298, C. LA. 2, 66^^ = Ditt. 89, and Plead, H.N. 241.— For the capture of Potidaea by Philip and the gift of it to the Olynthians, cf. the passages quoted by Sch. Dem. 2, 24, 25. Pseudo-Dem. Halonn. 10, complains that in the year 342 Philip took away their XV NOTES 227 KTi'i/iuTa from the Athenians living in Potidaea. Otherwise, as ydiaefer (1.1.) admits, he treated them well. See also note 2 to chap, xvii. — For the founding of Philipjn, Steph. Byz. s.v. ^lXlttttol, Diod. 16, 8, and the other quotations made by Sch. Dem. 2, 25. For the piracy carried on by Philip, his occupation of Halonessus, etc., see Sch. Dem. 2, 28, 29. For Maronea, Dem. Aristocr. 183. For Methone, Diod. 16, 31, 34 ; Sch. Dem. 2, 30. — The Athenians and Philip in Thrace, Hoeck, 1.1. p. 47 seq. CHAPTER XVI THE SACRED WAR — BEGINNING OF DEMOSTHENES' CAREER (356-352) Even before the close of the Social War a fresh complication had ajDpeared which was destined to have the worst consequences for the freedom of the Greeks, as it gave Philip an opportunity of interfering in the internal affairs of Greece. The events which have to be narrated in this chapter are, to a certain extent, simultaneous with those related in the preceding one. The death of Epaminondas had not made the Thebans abandon their ambitious designs. It was, of course, impossible for them to be aware that they owed their extraordinary success mainly to their two great leaders. Thebes still commanded respect ; the vigour of the Theban soldiers was unimpaired ; why should they then cease to regard themselves as the heaven-sent rulers of Greece? As early as the j^ear 361 they showed that they were not disposed to give up their influence even in the Peloponnese. A number of the Arcadians who were living together in Megalopolis wished to return to their old homes, but the Thebans would not consent to it. They despatched their general Pammenes to the spot, and he forced the Mega- politans to remain united. After this display of power in the Peloponnese, Thebes was little disposed to tolerate opposition in her immediate neighbourhood. The Thebans detested the Phocians, who almost always disagreed with them, and had CHAP. XVI THEBES AND THE PHOCIANS 229 declined to join in the last expedition of Epaminondas to the Peloponnese. The Thehans wanted to punish them for this, and as the refractoriness of the Phocians on that occasion had been legally unassailable, the Thel»ans were obliged to find some other handle, and this was easily supplied by the attitude of the Phocians at Delphi. From the earliest times the priests of Delphi had wished to form an independent religious state, and the Phocians had always desired to control Delphi. There was always land belonging to the temple somewhere or other which, according to the assertion of the priests, was being illegally used by somebody. Disputes of this kind could be utilized for international purposes as occasion required. The Athenians had acted in this way against Megara in 432 (vol. ii. p, 313), and now the Thebans seized on the same pretext in order to injure the Phocians. For this purpose they made use of the appropriate instrument — the Amphictyones.-'^ It is a peculiar sign of the times that Thebes was willing and able to do this. Her Avillingness to do it shows that her ambition had not declined, but that her moral force was impaired, for she had recourse to indirect paths which an Epaminondas would perhaps have disdained. But that she could make use of the Amphictyonic League to further her grudges, proves that she controlled it, i.e. that Athens and Sparta were for the moment not represented in it. We are familiar with the peculiar composition of this League, which corresponded to the position of affairs in the time previous to the Dorian migration. Things had been left as they were because no change could be eifected and because in addition to this it was supposed that the Council had ceased to be of political importance and that it might continue to perform its functions in religious matters. Thus it came about that the Dolopians could attend the meetings with the same rights as Dorians and lonians. Consequently, when Sparta and Athens Avere spokesmen for the Dorians and lonians, majority resolu- tions of political importance were out of the C|uestion ; their 230 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. rej^resent'itives prevented them by drawing attention to the consequences at the proper moment. But if they were not represented in the Council, then tribes which had i}erha})s been powerful 600 years before but now lived in a couple of villages might come forward as religious and consequently as political arbiters of Greece. The Amphictyonic Council, acting under the influence of the Thebans and the Thessalians, who were always hostile to Phocis, did in fact condemn the Phocians to pay a very heavy fine (356) and at the same time increased a penalty formerly imposed on Sparta on account of the occupa- tion of the Cadmea. The Council also had a dispute with Athens at that time. The two last facts explain the first. Sparta which was condemned and Athens which was quarrelling with the League, were of course not represented in the Council for the moment, and, therefore, Thebes could have things all her own way as soon as she had got the Thessalians on her side, as the small tribes were puppets in the hands of the Boeotians and Thessalians who surrounded and oppressed them. True, there were various parties among the Thessalians, and Thebes was not on friendly terras with the tyrants of Pherae ; but the internal arrangements of the Amphictyonic League, the nature of which we are obliged to conjecture, doubt- less allowed the majority to regard any chance persons as representatives of those members who possessed a vote, and thus the nobles may have been recognized as empowered to nominate the Hieromnemones for the Thessalians. As a general rule the excluded parties did not suffer from being put in the background. But on this occasion things turned out differently, and the result showed what harm ambitious men could do by the abuse of ancient observances. Diodorus says that the allies of the Thebans in the impending war were the Locrians, the Thessalians, the Perrhaebi, the Dorians, the Dolopians, the Athamanes, the Magnotes, the Achaeans, and a few others, while the side of the Phocians was espoused by the Spartans, the Athenians, and a few Peloponnesians. There XVI THEBES AND THE AMTHICTYONIC COUNCIL 231 is no question of a vote here, but the list shows that the peoples named are considered in their capacity of members of the Amphictyonic League, not as states of military importance, for in that case the mention of the Dolopians would have been meaningless. We have, therefore, the actual grouping of parties in the Amphictyonic Council handed dov/n to us in Diodorus. And it is remarkable that it presents an almost exact repetition of the part which the Amphictyones played in the year 480. At that time the same states were for Persia which were now for Thebes. In 480 as in 356 the states which are not led astray by political and religious considerations of a base character are Sparta, Athens, and Phocis. If the Dorians are cited as favourable to Thebes in 356, that means that Thebes had managed to transfer the votes belonging to the Spartans or Argives to the three villages in the valley of the Cephisus, the inhabitants of which were bound to vote as their pow-erful neighbours, the Boeotians, wished and ordered. In this way the Thebans, if the Thessalians w^ere on their side, had the preponderance in the Amphictyonic Council, and it may there- fore be regarded as probable that, immediately after their victory at Leuctra, they set to work to drive the Spartans out of the Amphictyonic League for the moment by the im- position of a fine, which was impossible immediately after the coup of Phoebidas, and that they did the same thing with Athens soon afterwards. By this means it was possible for them, if warlike measures were inadequate, to attain their object by the aid of religion, the practical application of which to worldly ends was familiar to them (see vol. ii. p. 379, and p. 38 of this volume). The expedient did not actually come into operation until after the death of Epaminondas. In 480 the unpatriotic endeavours of the Thebans and their allies wei'e defeated by the energy of the Spartans and the Athenians ; in 356 the result was different. The evil consequences of Theban cunning were revealed to their full extent, w^hen Philip made use of the weapon which the Thebans had taken 232 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. out of the sacred armoury for their own benefit. Then it was that Thebes herself had to pay most dearly of all for having trifled with religion. In spite of all the fair promises they received, most of which came from Athens, the Phocians were really left in the lurch. The assistance sent by Sparta was insignificant, and the Athenians only helped them by naval operations. That the Phocians, under these circumstances, took up the struggle and continued it with pertinacity, is however not to be wondered at. It was the age in which the Greek states which had hitherto stood in the second rank began to assert themselves. In the north the Thessalians attempted it, but failed (p. 112); next the Macedonians tried it with brilliant success ; in the interior of Greece the Arcadians rise in arms. All this was a natural consequence of the progressive development of Greece. These races were fresher than the old leading races of the Greeks. Subsequently the Achaeans and after them the Aetolians came to the front. The Phocians, therefore, tried their luck like the rest. Upon the advice of Philomelus they resolved to refuse payment of this exorbitant fine, and to usurp the protectorate over Delphi by force. Philomelus was elected general, and Avith him Onymarchus, a man whose family had contributed to the outbreak of the quarrel in a way that is not exactly known. Philomelus secured the approval of King Archidamus of Sparta, recruited mercenaries and occupied Delphi in 355 B.C. On the other side the Locrians, the proUgSs of Thebes, under- took the defence of the Amphictyones, marched against the Phocians and were defeated. The Phocians then expunged the resolutions passed against themselves from the sacred records, and the Pythia approved their proceedings. Each party had thus religious authority for its actions, the Phocians even a better one than the Amphictyones, because the Pythia Avas on their side, and it now remained to maintain their rights by force of arms. The Thebans and Tlicssalians prevailed upon XVI THE rnOCIANS AXD THE DELPHIC TREASURY 233 the Amphictyonic Council to decree a sacred war against the Phocians, which resulted in the above-mentioned division of the Greeks into two camps. If Sparta, Athens, and the other Greek communities which had the courage to declare for the Phocians had given them eflective assistance, the Phocians would no doubt have held their own and Greece would have been none the worse. But Sparta alone sent troops, and only 1000 men ; Athens sent none : her opinion was that the Phocians would be able to give a good account of the Thebans without help, and that the despatch of a fleet to the neighbour- hood of Thermopylae, which Avould prevent the Thessalians from invading Phocis, was an adequate performance on her part. The Phocians therefore helped themselves after the fashion of those days by collecting a larger and larger force of merce- naries. To pay them they laid claim to the Delphic treasury, at the outset evidently in the form of a loan. This their enemies declared to be a crime against religion. In Greece it was possible for opinions to differ on this question. Temple treasures Avere always regarded by the Greeks as available for civil purposes. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War the pious Spartans and Corinthians openly announced that they intended to use the treasures of Olympia and Delphi against Athens, and even the Athenian Thucydides does not stigmatize this as impiety. The Phocians therefore had only to be victorious by the help of the sacred treasures to be also regarded as pious Greeks in the future. But their position was a difficult one ; they had to fight simultaneously against Thessalians and Thebans. Philomelus marched alternately northwards and eastwards, the Athenians evidently helping him in these operations by keeping open the pass of Thermopylae. He routed the Thessalians, but was defeated by the Thebans (354), and to avoid falling into their hands threw himself down a cliff on Parnassus. His successor Onymarchus took what treasure still remained in the temple and coined money with it or gave it away. The enemies of 234 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. the Phociaiis related terrible tales of the employment of this treasure, how Archidamiis, the Athenian Hegesippus, and the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Pitholaus, had received large sums of money and how common persons had decked themselves with the sacred golden ornaments, and no doubt all this is true enough. At first the Thebans were so im- pressed with a sense of their own superiority, that in the year 353 they sent 5000 mercenaries under Pammenes to the assistance of Artabazus, Avho had rebelled against the Persian king. Pammenes marched by land to the Hellespont, escorted by Philip, who on this occasion took Abdera and Maronea. Thus the understanding between Thebes and Philip became a public matter. After a short time, however, the Thebans saw that they might require their mercenaries themselves, for in 353 Onymarchus defeated the Locrians, and made Orchomenus independent again — a real humiliation for Thebes. The Phocians then had a series of successes and reverses. They were defeated by the Thebans at Chaeronea, but were successful in Thessaly, even against Philip of Macedon, who had been summoned to the rescue by the Aleuadae and who now for the first time, soon after the capture of Methone (p. 214), interferes in the affairs of the Greeks at their own request (353). The Phocians were also victorious over the Thebans, and took Coronea from them (352). But now the reaction set in. Lycophron was unable to make headway against Philip, and recalled Onymarchus with the mercenaries to Thessaly. A great battle was fought on the coast of the ]\Iagnetes country between Onymarchus and Philip, and the latter won the day. Of the defeated troops some took refuge on board an Athenian fleet commanded by Chares which was sailing near the shore, while about 3000 fell into the hands of the Macedonian king, who had them thrown into the sea as guilty of sacrilege. Onymarchus himself was murdered by his own people during the flight. Philip had his corpse nailed to a cross XVI WITHDRAWAL OF PHILIP '235 (352). The victorious king then liberated Pherae, captured Pagasae, the important harbour of Pherae, and prepared to push forward through Therinopyhie to the south. It seems to have been a question even then whether he would exercise a decisive influence on Greece. At this juncture, however, an Athenian fleet made its appearance near the pass with, it was said, 4000 infantry and 400 cavalry on board, and Philip deemed it advisable to withdraw. He retained, however, the territory of the Magnetes and Pagasae and was virtually master of the whole of Thessaly as far as the harbour of Halus on the Pagasaean Gulf. The Athenians exchanged congratulations and tokens of honour with Phayllus, the suc- cessor of Onymarchus. Thus the timely intervention of the Athenians under the command of Eubulus on this occasion saved that part of Greece which lay south of Thermopylae. The Phocians were now confined to the southern field of action, and as the Thel>ans and Locrians were unaljle to subdue them, the Sacred War dragged on for some years, Philip put an end to it, but not until six years later, after he had concluded peace with Athens. We must devote our attention again to the position of aflfairs in this city, where the most zealous opponent of the king of Macedon now made his appearance. In the year preceding that in which the Athenians at Thermopylae had checked Philip's victorious career for a brief space, they had been invited to interfere in the affairs of the Peloponnese (353). The ruling parties in Megalopolis besought Athens to support them against the Spartans, who wanted to break up the new city afresh. From Megalopolis proceeded a call for help first from one and then from the other side, according as the position of affairs changed. On this occasion, at the beginning of 352, there came forward in the Athenian Assembly as adviser of the people the man who for the space of two decades was destined to exercise the greatest influence on the fortunes of Athens and of Greece — • 236 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Demosthenes. It Avas not his first political speech which he now delivered, but the first which dealt with matters of con- siderable importance.^ Demosthenes was born in 384, and was the son of a well- to-do armourer, who died when the boy was eight years old. His guardians managed his property so badly, that Demo- sthenes, who had early developed a taste for oratory and had studied it with extraordinary energy and perseverance, chiefly under the direction of the orator Tsaeus, was obliged to luring an action against them for what they had embezzled. He first of all, in 364, sued one of them, named Aphobus, and won the case, without however, as it appears, receiving the amount of his claim in full, because the defendant had recourse to sub- terfuges. The success of the young man caused a sensation in Athens, and on his devoting himself to regular professional work he found plenty of clients. He adopted the profession of a logographer. It was the rule in Athens that every man should conduct his own case in person before the courts. Any one who could not compose a speech himself had it written for him by another person and then recited it. The judges however might, when a man had spoken in his own cause, allow a friend to make a second speech (deuterologia) on his behalf, as synegoriLS, and this permission was as a matter of fact probably never refused. Demosthenes soon set up as a synegm-us of this kind, that is as a regular advocate, and his fame as an orator constantly increased. Later on he gradually gave up speaking and composing speeches for others, and devoted himself especially to political work as adviser, symhulus, of the people. Of the speeches delivered for others at the beginning of his career that against Leptines in 354 is of great value, as it throws light on an interesting aspect of public life in Athens. Leptines had carried a law, according to which, in the interests of the State and of eqiiality, all exemptions from providing choruses and the like which the people had granted to the descendants of men who XVI EARLY CAREER OF DEMOSTHENES 237 had rendered good service to the state, were, with a few exceptions, to be abolished ; personal merit was henceforth to be alone considered in Athens. This law was attacked as un- constitutional and illegal by Apsephion and Ctesippus, and Demosthenes Avas retained as synegorus for Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias, a young man who objected to the loss of his privilege. Ctesippus was a dissolute fellow, and Demosthenes was probably induced to appear for him mainly by his friend- ship for the widow of Chabrias. But he contrived to present the case from the point of view of principle, of the obligation of the State to keep its promises, and he spoke with ability and vigour. "Whether he was successful or not, we do not know. This speech was delivered in court. Demosthenes made his first appearance in the Assembly also in 354. The Persian empire, which had been for a time on the verge of dissolution, was to a certain extent reinvigorated by Arta- xerxes Ochus, who had been on the throne since 358, and had also turned his attention to the confusion prevailing in Asia Minor. Chares, who assisted the rebellious Artabazus, was compelled, as we have seen (p. 212), to leave Asia, and Artaxerxes made great military preparations. This led to the opinion in Greece that a campaign against the Greeks of Europe was on foot, and the excitement reached a great pitch, somewhat as in 396, when Herodas came to Sparta (p. 10). Many people, even in Athens, thought that now was the time to form a league against Persia and perhaps actually attack her. In 354 Demosthenes pronounced against this policy in a speech entitled De Sijmmoriis, because the gist of it consists of a proposal for the better organization of these associations of citizens for collecting the money for the fleet, which had been introduced three years previously (p. 211). Demosthenes was of opinion that Athens ought to be in a good state of preparation before she could think of waging war against Persia, and that the existing organization of the Symmoriae was inadecjuate. His proposals Avere 238 HISTORY OF GREECE ciiAr. excellent, but they were not carried into effect at that time. In the meanwhile the warlike zeal of the people abated, and this was evidently one of Demosthenes' objects when he delivered the speech.^ When, therefore, the above-mentioned request for help from the Megapolitans reached Athens in 352, Demosthenes expressed himself in favoiu' of complying with it, especially emphasizing the necessity of not allowing Sparta to become too powerful."* He laid down as a principle of sound Athenian policy that both Sparta and Thebes must be kept in a weak state. Nevertheless no treaty was concluded with Mega- lopolis, and in 351 Thebes herself gave protection to the Arcadian city which she had helped to call into being. The political principles enounced in this speech are commended, but wrongly so if we consider the most important of them, that which gives its character to the speech. The proposition (§ 4) that the Spartans and Thebans must be weak if Athens is to thrive, gives clear expression to the old traditional jealousy prevailing among the Greeks which became the cause of their ruin. It is called the maintenance of the sj^stem of balance of power. Such a system may be good if there is no enemy threatening from outside. But in the present case its appli- cation, which found expression in a hostile attitude towards Sparta, was wrong simply for this reason, that Sparta and Athens were not only living in peace with one another, but had really common interests in the Phocian question, and it was not wise to oppose a friend in a matter indifferent in itself merely to prevent him from becoming too poAverful in general. Demosthenes and the Athenians had no interest in Megalopolis itself ; Sparta was not to have the power of breaking up this city solely in order that she might not become so strong as to be able to attack Messene as well afterwards. But Avas there any prospect of that 1 In 362 Athens had fought by the side of Sparta at Mantinea against the Megapolitans ; had Sparta become so much stronger since XVI MISTAKEN POLICY OF DEMOSTHENES 230 then ? And lastly, Demosthenes' proposal had no prospect of success -with the Megapolitans themselves, for he so far identified himself with the mood then prevailing in Athens as to state that ]\Iegalopolis would be supported by Athens if it would pull down the pillars on which the treaties betAveen Megalopolis and Thebes Avere recorded. He therefore de- manded that the Megapolitans should leave their tried friends, the Thebans, in the lurch, in the hope of being supported by the Athenians, who admittedly had no interest in them. The Megapolitans preferred to rely on Thebes, and had no reason to regret it. Demosthenes' mistake was that he encouraged the self- importance of the Athenians too much even in questions where greater sympathy with the feelings of their allies would have been more appropriate, and that he awakened in his fellow-citizens the belief that they could still be the arbiters in Greece. He thus offended Sparta in the Mega- politan affair without good reason. The result was that the Spartans would never become the allies of Athens against Macedonia, although they were enemies of Philip. They probably thought that Athens was still seeking only her own advantage, and that Demosthenes was still pursuing his policy of 352. They held almost entirely aloof from the most important negotiations and events of the years 360-338; all they did was to try to help the Phocians. This absence of Sparta from the political stage is as characteristic a feature of the age as it was, considering the peculiar worth of the Spartans, a regrettable circumstance for Greece (cf. vol. i. p. 1 84). Hitherto it had never happened that the vital interests of Greece had been decided without the co-operation of Sparta. Even in 350 Sparta was not so Aveak but that she might have thrown considerable weight into the scale. But she refrained, and the Athenian leaders AA^ere not able to induce her to adopt a more public-spirited policy. The events Avhich Ave have narrated in this chapter shoAv 240 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. that the danger threatening the Greeks from the side of Macedonia was considerably increased by the internal condi- tion of Greece. The old causes of disunion among the Greeks are reinforced by new ones, and particularism increases rather than diminishes. Thebes tries to recover her old position by intrigues, and thus gives the signal for civil war. In this crisis Sparta proves lukewarm, while in Athens we have a man who has begun his career as an " old hand " at oratory — this is what an admirer calls the young man of one-and-twenty — - and who continues even as a statesman to write speeches for money, acquiring, although he has no practical knowledge of war, a great influence on public affairs, and using it to fan the old jealousy entertained by the Athenians towards Sparta, at a time when Sj^arta could only be of ser^äce and could no longer do harm. On the other hand, Macedonia, in the aftairs of which Athens had interfered in her usual fashion (vol. ii. p. 311), is ruled by an able statesman, who is at the same time a great general, a statesman who not only dislodges Athenian influence on the coast of Macedonia, but who is also drawn by the disunited Greeks into their quarrels, and invited by them to play a decisive part in purely Greek affairs. The fate which awaited Greece under such circumstances, if no special events supervened, could be foreseen even then by experienced observers.^ NOTES 1. For the Sacred War Dioel. 16, 23-40, 56-60 ; he makes it last from 355-346. Also Ar. Pol. 5, 3, 4 ; Duris (fr. 2) quoted in Ath. 13, 560. The Sacred War Lad been narrated by Theo- pompns, by Demophilos, son of Epbonis, as a continuer of liis father's work, and by Diyllus. Cf. Curtius, 3, 776. Cf. also Holzapfel, Ueber die Abfassungszeit der dem Xenophon zuge- schriebenen TTopot, Philol. Bd. 41. Holzapfel places this treatise in 346, others in 357 or 355 ; see also Schaefer, Dem. 1, 193 and Flathe, Gesch. des Phok. Krieges 1854. — The Phocians for a long time lived so simply that they kejat no slaves ; Ath. 6, 264. Sparta and the Anq^hictyones, Diod. 16, 29. Athens had a quarrel xvr SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES 241 witli thera in 363, when Athens declared a decree of theirs not to be binding, C. I. A. 2, 54 = Ditt. 78; Sch. Dem. 1, 490. That the maxim " principiis obsta " hekl good in Amphictyonic affairs, was overlooked by the Athenians both in 355 and in 339, to their own detriment and that of Greece. For the state of things in 480 see vol. ii. of this work, p. 45. Instead of the Athamanes mentioned by Diod. 16, 29, Herod. 7, 132 has the Aenianes, who are proljably meant in the passage cited of Diodorus. — Theban inscription on the occasion of the Sacred War 'AOji'aLov 3, 479 = Ditt. 95 (the Byzantines contribute money to the Thebans for the Sacred War). Death of Philomelus, Pans. 10, 2, 4 ; of Ony- niarchup, 10, 2, 5. Philip occu^jics Thessah'', Dem. 01. 1, 12. Phalaecus designated as rvpavvo's in Aeschines 2, 130 seq. Isoer. Phil. 53 has some good remarks on the conduct of the Thebans. Philip had once stayed with Pammenes in Tliebes ; Pint. Pel. 26 ; cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 442, and Hoeck, p. 48, for the march of Pammenes through Thrace. — Athens safe from Thebes owing to the Phocians, Dem." 7rep6 Trapairp. 83. — Phocian coins of the date of the Sacred War, Head, H. N. 288 ; silver coins with $i2 and the head of Apollo ; copper coins with ONYMAPXOY or ^AAAIKOY. Head quotes Plut. Pyth. orat. 16. He assumes (p. 289) that some fine silver coins with a Demeter head on the obverse and the Omphalos and AMIKTI0NI2N on the reverse were minted in 346 on the occasion of the peace festival. 2. For the A'arious speeches of Demosthenes I refer the reader to the works quoted in the preceding chapter. I draw attention only to matters which are generally not much noticed. 3. It is a peculiarity of the political speeches of Demosthenes that they seldom culminate in definite proposals on the matter directly in hand. This applies to the Olynthian speeches, which deal only in generalities (hence the well-known difficulties of determining their dates), to the Philippics with the exception of the first, to those for the Megapolitans, for the Rhodians, and for the Chersonese. Blass (2, 276, 277) refers to this peculiarity in Isocrates, in whom it is easier of explanation. This deficiency is especially striking in the speech delivered in 351 (or was it earlier ? cf. Butcher, p. 43, and Judeich, p. 43) in favour of the indejiendence of the Rhodians, in which Demosthenes (§ 9) advises ToStoi's eXevOepetv, but does not say how, which no doubt was difficult enough. It seems as if in this case Demosthenes was endeavour- ing to moderate the zeal of a large party by agreeing with their views. 4. In the speech for tlie Megapolitans (353 B.c.) Demosthenes says (§ 8) that Athens could leave Megalopolis to the Spartans, but VOL. Ill R 242 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. tliat it would not be politic to do so for the reason that Sjiarta would again Lecouie strong and proceed eVi Meo-o-iyr?;!/ (§ 4), which would be had for Athens. In the year 344, on the other hand, he acknowledges, Phil. 2, 13, the rights of the Spartans to Messene. Tins was because in 344 he wanted to make all the Peloponnesians, even the Spartans, side against Philip. In 344 (Phil. 2, 13) he contests, following the traditional policy of Athens, the right of Thebes to Orchonienus ; in 338 he gives it up with the whole of Boeotia to the Thebans. The reason was that he had need of the Thebans in 338. Demosthenes is, as a rule, a thorough oppor- tunist in politics. In the speech for the Megapolitans (§ 4), he says that to Athens, tru/xc^epet kol AaKeSat/xovtovs dcrdeveLOTepovs a vvv e'xoDcriv. The attempt was now made in Athens to obtain the following altera- tions in the terms : — the inclusion of the Phocians in the peace as the allies of Athens, and instead of ä e'xovo-iv the insertion of the words TO, lavTuSv. But Philip's envoys refused to accept these alterations. The second demand of Athens, ra eavrQv, involved a claim which in a treaty of peace is either meaningless, or is designed to upset the treaty indirectly, which makes it surpris- ing that so many historians favourable to Demosthenes should regard this demand not only as susceptible of discussion but even as a reasonable one. It was intended to mean (Sch. 2, 228) : each party shall have what he is lawfully entitled to. But on this point, what each was lawfully entitled to, dispute and war were going on ; consequently a treaty which merely stated that each side was to have what legally belonged to him, would have no power to terminate the war. It is for this very object that combatants enter the region of facts and determine what is henceforth to belong to each party, and this can be done in two ways, by ex- pressly assigning the various subjects in dispute to one of the two parties, or by saying " each party has to keep what he has now got." The latter method was chosen with the words a e^ova-iv. On the other hand, a clause to this effect : " Each party is to have what he is legally entitled to," has never been accepted by any one in a treaty of peace, except when a court of arbitration is simultaneously appointed, with power to decide the point without appeal. But this is precisely what the Athenians did not want {vide infra chap, xviii.) That in spite of this they wished for the clause, was due to the fact that their orators left them in ignorance of its practical value and kept before them only the lofty sentiment that right was to be the basis of the settlement. People in Athens were XVII THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES 259 alwaj's very susceptible to lofty principles. The Athenians, how- ever, perceived that they would not succeed with demands of this kind and they accepted the terms of peace offered by Philip, with the words a e'xovo-tv and without the Phocians. They ratified the peace by oath. Philip did the same but only after a consider- able interval, after he had captured some strong places in Thrace, which he trusted to retain by virtue of the a e^ovcriv clause and did retain. He then marched against the Phocians and subdued them. The impartial observer comes to the following conclusion : in keeping the Thracian fortresses Philip possibly wrongly interpreted the treaty in his own favour, since a e-x^ovcrtv might mean : what each side had at the moment the peace was sworn to by one of the contracting parties ; but Philip was justified in making war upon the Phocians, for he had declared that he did not recognize them as allies of Athens. But what was said by Demosthenes, with whom his modern supporters partly agree ? As regards the Phocians, he said that Philip had acted illegally in attacking them, as they were friends of Athens. And Schaefer (Dem. 2, 213, 214) therefore says that Demosthenes believed that the offer of peace and alliance was honestly meant, but that he was disappointed in his belief and for that reason became Philip's enemy. He writes to the same effect on p. 505. But Philip had expressly declared that he reserved to himself the right to make war on the Phocians ; the Athenians therefore knew how he would act, and when Demosthenes says in Phil. 3, 11 that Philip marched against the Phocians ws tt^os o-v/x/xa^ovs, even Westermann-Rosen- berg consider this " not quite hone.«t." Philip was in the right in treating the Phocians as enemies, and the Athenians could expect nothing else. More than this, when Demosthenes demanded that Philip, in spite of his declaration that he would treat the Phocians as enemies, ought rather to protect them, he was asking the king to be disloyal to his allies, the Amphictyones, a disloyalty which could not be excused by other obligations. Philip had obtained admittance into Greece as an enemy of the Phocians ; now he was suddenly to change sides and pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Athens ! That Philip was believed capable of such conduct in Athens is shown by Aesch. 2, 136 : ov Travres TrpocreSoKare ^cXiinrov TaTreivwcreiev QqßaLovs; cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 270. According to Demosthenes (cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 271) Aeschines deluded the people into the belief that Philip intended to change sides, whereas he never thought of going over to the Phocians. From Aeschines —ept —apairp. we certainly get another impression, viz. that the Athenians might really have been able to persuade Philip to take the side of the Phocians if the Theban proxenus Demosthenes had 260 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. not prevented it (§ 143). This makes out Demosthenes to have been a secret enemy of the Phocians, of whom he was ostensibly such a zealous supporter. In the year 338 he had certainly, as we shall see, worked in the interests of the Locrians and Thebans, the enemies of the Phocians, and in 330 he says (Cor. 18) that the Phocians were in the wrong. But whether he had adopted this view by 346 we do not know. At any rate it is a fact that intrigue was then rife on all sides and that speculation was going on as to the treachery of others, which aj)pears also from Just. 8, 4. But whatever may have been the truth as to the possibility of alienating Philip from the Thebans, it is certain that Athens could not reproach liim if he conquered Phocis, and that Demosthenes was the least justified in bringing such a charge. True, he says in Trept Tvapairp. 23, 34, 45 that he had noticed that Aeschines was lying and that he himself wished to warn the Athenians, but that they would not give any one a hearing. This is evidently an untruth ; in the days of the democracy the Athenians allowed everyone to speak, and Demo- sthenes, who gave utterance to the proud boast v/xets e/^iot, w avSpes 'A8r]vaL0i-, a-vjxßovXio fj-ev, koLv fiv] OkXifTe, xpi'jcrearOe, crvKocfidvTr] 8' ovS av öeA7/re (Pint. Dem. 14), could obtain a hearing whenever he liked. A man of his stamp ought to have spoken at the right moment or kept silence afterwards. We must now consider the retention of the Thracian fortresses by Philip. Did the uti possidetis apply to the first or the second oath 1 This might be doubtful in itself. But it was not doubtful to Demosthenes ; he reckoned its operation from the date of Philip's oath, although he subsequently maintained the contrary. For in the first place he urged that the oath should be administered to Philip with all speed (rrepl -nrapa-n-p. 164), in which he was perfectly right ; and secondly — and this is the best proof — he (Phil. 3, 15) invented the lie that Philip had taken the oath when he captured the fortresses, so clear was it to him that Athens could only make out a claim to these fortresses if Philip had taken them after he had sworn the oath. (I may add that this is irrespective of the fact noticed by Eohrmoser (1.1., p. 799), that the Athenians held these fortresses not as owners but only as allies of Cersobleptes, with whom Philip was not at peace. Athens therefore could lay no claim whatever to them herself.) The legal question therefore being beyond dispute, it is surprising to observe how Demosthenes, with the approval of his modern supporters, has obscured the real state of aifairs. He states {irepX Tvapairp. 150-153) that if the envoys could not bring about in Pella the surrender of the places taken by Philip in Thrace after the taking of the oath by the Athenians, this would be regarded as a joroof of Philip's untrust- XVII THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES 261 worthiness ; in tliat case they ought to have reported this at once to Athens, in order that she might protect the Phocians, whom Philip would probably attack too. Demosthenes wanted, so he said, to report it, but Philip would not let him go. But how could Philip's doing what he had a right to do be evidence of untrustworthiness 1 How could the Athenians be apprehensive now for the first time about the Phocians, who had long been in difficulties 1 Lastly, how could they protect the Phocians at all at this stage 1 Statements of this kind might be made in a popular assembly, where almost anything can be said about foreign affairs, but they are out of place in history. Demosthenes therefore unjustly accused Philip of breach of faith in carrying out the Peace of Philocrates, and did so in the teeth of his own knowledge to the contrary. Why did he deceive the Athenians in this way ? Weidner (Aesch. Ctes. p. 34) and Beloch (Att. PoL p. 176) have expressed different views. Beloch thinks that Demosthenes only wanted a truce, and therefore needed a pretext for accusing Philip of breach of faith ; "Weidner says : " Demosthenes wanted to outwit his opponent, and was outwitted himself." A minute consideration of the circumstances would be necessary to arrive at a decision ; but cf. chap. xvi. note 5. — The sort of stuff that Demosthenes ventured to impose on his audience is shown inter alia in Cor. 19, where he states that the Thebans had already been obliged to appeal to Athens, and that Philip, in order to prevent this, had offered peace to the Athenians and ßoi]6eiav to the Thebans. In point of fact, Thebes had long been in alliance with Philip, and had not the slightest reason to ask Athens for aid just at that time. These were the fables which Demosthenes told the Athenians in the year 330 about the events of 346 ! 4. Demosthenes' verdict on the treatment of the Phocians by Philip (irepl Trapairp. 64) is endorsed by Schaefer, Dem. 2, 189. In point of fact, there had seldom been such lenity shown after so embittered a struggle in Greece. No executions, no selling into slavery. The Phocians as a peasant people were less injured economically by being transplanted into villages than the Arcadian peasants had been by their compulsory settlement in Megalopolis. We need only recall Athens' treatment of Melos, Scione (Thuc. 5, 22), Mytilene and Sestos (Diod. 16, 34), and the behaviour of Thebes to Plataea, Orchomenus (Diod. 15, 79), and the Lacedae- monians in Heraclea (Diod. 14, 82). Schaefer (Dem. 2, 287) himself acknowledges Philip's leniency. 5. For Demosthenes' S2:)eech on the Peace cf. Schaefer, Dem. 2, 296 seq. — The policy of Athens in the year 346 and shortly before that year was defective, firstly, in not giving Phocis vigorous 262 HISTORY OF GREECE chap, xvii support at a time when it might have been saved, simply because they imagined that Phocis would dispose of Thebes without assist- ance, and that both woiild thus remain weak, to the advantage of Athens. As a matter of fact, Phocis would not have fallen but for the intervention of Philip. But in that case Athens, if she really cared for the Phocians, ought to have made an express stipulation for their security in the Peace of Philocrates. Her failure to do this was a second mistake. True, Demosthenes and his friends asserted that in this connection Athens relied on unofficial assur- ances of Philip conveyed by Aeschines, and that if these were false, the good faith of Athens had been abused. In putting forward this plea Demosthenes convicts himself and the Athenians of political incapacity. In the year 357 Athens had been, it was alleged, deceived by similar unofficial promises on the part of Philip, and had been deprived of Amphipolis. What then are we to think of statesmen who allow themselves to be led by the nose for the second time by the same man in the same manner. Assuredly they were not in their right place. If these statesmen had invariably practised loyalty and honesty themselves, we might, on the assumption that their blind confidence had been abused, regret that the bad had dealt hardly with the good. If, however? they were not very particular about the truth themselves, as was the case with Demosthenes, it is merely a question of crafty men who have to deal with an opponent of superior cunning. Finally, it is clear that the Athenians were themselves to blame if Philip was unable to be civil to them, although he had wished to be so for some time. He requested them to join him, their new ally, with an army. They refused, because they pretended to be afraid that he would take the army prisoners. (For the way in which Greeks behaved under such circumstances, see vol. ii. p. 68.) A state which thinks and acts in such an unfriendly spirit, cannot cry out about treachery when the offended ally falls back upon the text of his treaty and shows no civility to the ofifending party. — For the moral responsibility of Demosthenes for the defeat at Chaeronea see chap. xxix. note 1. CHAPTER XVIII PHILIP AND THE GREEKS TO THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA (346-338) The Peace of Philocrates was only a temporary cessation of hostilities for the statesmen who Avere most listened to in Athens. Demosthenes stated pretty plainly in his speech De Pace that he only wanted peace in order that Athens might subsequently carry on the war against Philip with greater success. In fact, it was unmistakeable that the king wished to obtain possession of part of Thrace and influence the rest, and in that case the historical position of Athens, which , rested on the control, maintained or claimed for the space of two centuries, of the entrance to the Pontus, would be seriously endangered. The Chersonese no doubt might be kept by means of friendship with Philip. But the position of Athens would be still safer, if Philip were overthrown. This was the policy of Demosthenes. The final aim of this party was therefore a perfectly justifiable one in the interests of Athens. And we may go further and say that as occasion- ally presented by Demosthenes, viz. that Athens should be powerful for protecting but not for domineering over the Greeks,^ the aim was also an advantageous one for the whole of Greece. But unfortunately Athens' pursuit of it involved the abandonment of another ideal, the maintenance of the dignity of Greece, while Philip found in his avowed object of making war on Persia a justification for his conquests in 264 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Thrace. Of leading Athenians the following belonged to the anti-Macedonian party led by Demosthenes : Hyperides, a man of the world, a brilliant orator and an enthusiastic patriot ; Hegesippus and Timarchus, whom we shall soon see at work ; and Lycurgus, who belonged to the old nobility, an honest financier and a pathetic champion of the good old days.^ At the head of the Macedonian party, that is, of the party which wished to see Athens an ally of Macedonia, because it believed that this was the best security for Athenian interests, was Philocrates, a man of indifferent reputation, and Aeschines, who has been already mentioned.^ Aeschines came of an old but impoverished Athenian family ; his father Atrometus had been obliged to make his living as a mer- cenary, and appears to have returned home with some wealth. Aeschines had enjoyed a good education, had become an actor and afterwards a public scribe, and had since devoted himself to politics. Of his brothers one was strategus several times ; another administered the highest financial office of the city for four years, as successor and adherent of Eubulus. Another leader of the peace-party, Demades, did not become famous till after the battle of Chaeronea. The ornament of this party was Phocion, alike statesman and soldier, a rare com- bination in those days, but Avith no genius in either department, a pupil of Plato, as an orator distinguished for his cutting brevity, a man who, although highly esteemed as general and always re-elected, was nevertheless in favour of peace with Philip, and who in an age when, according to general assertion and that of Demosthenes in particular, corruption was a widely diffused vice, set a splendid example of honesty and dis- interestedness.* Demosthenes opened the party fight by accusing Aeschines of having been bribed by Philip when he was envoy to the king and of having neglected his duty. But he made the mistake of taking Timarchus as his fellow-signatory of the act of accusation ; Aeschines brought a charge of immorality XVIII PARTY CONFLICTS IN ATHENS 265 against Tiraarchus, in consequence of which the latter was condemned and lost his civic rights. Thus the attack on Aeschines was repulsed for the moment. In the meantime Philip made further progress in Thrace and in Thessal}^, and the Athenians exerted themselves in vain to obtain from him better security for their claims in the former country. He also interfered in Peloponnesian affairs, taking Argos, Arcadia, and Messene under his protection ; Avhereupon Demosthenes went to the Pelopbnnese himself and counteracted his policy there, thus giving the king an opportunity of complaining to the Athenians of him. On this occasion Demosthenes defended his conduct with eloquence in the Second Philippic, and represented Philip as the implacable enemy of Athens. The party struggle was continued by an attack on Philocrates, against whom Hyperides brought a similar accusation to that which was pending against Aeschines. The anti-Macedonian current had now become so strong in Athens that no one would take up the defence of the accused, Avho escaped certain condemnation by flight. In Athens therefore charges were openly preferred against the king, with whom peace and alliance had just been contracted. Philip, who was not prepared to witness proceedings of this kind without a protest, complained once more to the Athenians by means of a special embassy conducted by Python, and requested them to put forward definite demands, in order that he might know what they wanted of him and be in a position to meet their wishes. Hegesippus now went to Philip and stated to him the two following demands on behalf of the Athenians, that the king should restore to Athens the island of Halonnessus which he had occupied and alter the terms of peace by inserting the words that each party should have "what he was lawfully entitled to." This embassy proved abortive. The alteration in the treaty demanded by Athens Philip was bound to refuse as a serious statesman, as appears from our remarks in the notes to the preceding chapter on the Peace of Philocrates. 266 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. This of course aroused the indignation of the Athenian people, which otherwise might have calmed down, and the object of the war-party was attained. The prosecution of Aeschines for the "falsa legatio," which at last came on for trial, ended in his acquittal (343). He had called Phocion and Eubulus as witnesses to his integrity. Philip meanwhile made further progress at various points. He established his brother-in-law, Alexander, king in Epirus, he threatened Acarnania, concluded an alliance with the Aetolians, and he installed a tetrarch over each of the four provinces of Thessaly. Three of these governors were Aleuadae. Henceforth the forces of Thessaly were at the absolute and prompt disposal of Macedonia.^ In Euboea Eretria and Oreus obeyed Philip; Chalcis, on the other hand, remained loyal to Athens, and even in the Peloponnese the Athenians maintained their old position. Philip now prepared for a campaign in Thrace ; bu.t before setting out he made a fresh attempt (342) to come to an understanding with Athens. He promised to surrender Halonnessus and declared himself ready to abide by the decision of a court of arbitration in regard to the points in dispute, including the Thracian fortresses, and in return he asked for the privilege of sharing in the protection of trade against piracy aiforded by Athens, ie. of maintaining a fleet on the Aegean Sea. The way in which Athens received these proposals is known to us from an extant speech which was delivered at this time and is ascribed to Demosthenes, but of which Hegesippus is no doubt the author. It submits Philip's concessions to a severe criticism.^ The Athenians declined the offer of arbitration on the pretext that impartial judges could not be found. Of course they could have been found. This refusal shows what Demosthenes' party was aiming at. When one of two opponents demands that each shall receive what it is lawfully entitled to, but, as soon as the other side meets this demand and proposes arbitra- tion, refuses the proposal on the alleged ground that impartial XVIII PHILIP IN THRACE— THIRD PHILIPPIC 267 arbitrators cannot be found, then that party means Avar. Athens might have secured a guarantee for her rights in Thrace by an honourable peace with Philip, but Demosthenes and his party prevented it, because they hoped that Athens might after all be successful in a vi^ar waged at the right moment and under favourable circumstances. The king now started for Thrace (342). He left his son Alexander, then fifteen years of age, at home as his repre- sentative.'^ He defeated the Thracians and advanced to the Pontus, where Greek cities, such as Apollonia and Odessus (Varna), submitted to him. Meanwhile the Athenians had despatched fresh cleruchies to the Chersonese under Diopithes, who collected contributions from merchant vessels of other states, began a quarrel with Cardia, a free city but under Philip's protection, the possession of which would have been extremely advantageous to Athens, and even plundered places in Thrace which belonged to Philip. When the latter complained to Athens of this, Demosthenes by his speech on the Chersonese managed to secure Diopithes immunity from punishment (341).^ Soon afterwards he delivered the Third Philippic, in which he adroitly and vigorously branded Philip as the cause of all the misfortunes of the Greeks, but drew a caricature of his military ability which must have lulled the Athenians into a delusive security.^ He also journeyed into Thrace, Illyria, Thessaly and the Peloponnese to work against the king, and actually succeeded in getting the important city of Byzantium, then in alliance with Philip, as well as Chios and PJiodes, to join Athens once more.^° To the king of Persia he sent a request for money. The latter would not give anything to the city of Athens, but is said to have made presents to individual Athenians. Demosthenes, it was reported, received 3000 darics, and Diopithes certainly accepted Persian money. The latter was allowed to continue his hostilities against Philip. The king now turned against Byzantium. ^^ He brought 268 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. his fleet into the Propontis, and began by attacking Perinthus, an alley of Byzantium. He laid siege to it according to all the rules of art ; but it resisted him, and was saved by aid from Persia. The Athenians now, on the advice of Demo- sthenes, deemed it expedient to declare that Philip had broken the peace, and that he and Athens were at war with each other (340). Philip hoped to capture Byzantium in any event, but in this he was disappointed. The Athenians sent Chares and then Phocion to the assistance of the beleaguered city, and the Byzantine Leon, a pupil of Plato, conducted the defence in concert with Phocion in a masterly manner. Philip at last raised the siege and brought his small fleet back to Macedonia, in spite of the Athenians who were watching the Hellespont with their naval force. Anxiety naturally prevailed as to the king's next movements. He took a step which was quite unexpected, and which pleased the Athenians greatly : he undertook an expedition against the Scythians, whose king Ateas was said to have offended him. He might meet with disaster in this quarter, and the Athenians hoped that he would. He Avas successful, however, in the battles which he fought, but prudently refrained from crossing the Danube and returned to Macedonia through the country of the Triballi, where he was wounded, at the end of the summer of 339. He had evidently undertaken this campaign in order to Avipe out the recollection of his reverses before Byzantium and Perinthus by military successes, and in this, it would seem, he completely succeeded. In the meanwhile Demosthenes had completed the military preparations of Athens. The symmoriae for the trierarchies were now so well organized that in the following years no complaints were heard regarding this branch of the admini- stration.^^ The construction of docks and other naval works begun by Eubulus was interrupted in order to apply the money voted for them to other purposes, probably to the xviii AESCHINES AND AMPIIISSA 269 payment of the troops. In 338 Lycurgus was placed at the head of the Athenian financial department and administered it for twelve years with great ability, first under his own name and subsequently under that of others. But with all this expenditure of money and energy nothing was really done beyond laying waste the coasts of Macedonia. Philip pursued a more successful policy. Even at a distance he never lost sight of Greece, and circumstances as well as the peculiar policy of Demosthenes provided him with a good opportunity for inter- fering in Greek aftairs at the close of his northern campaign. In 340 B.c. Midias, the enemy of Demosthenes {v. supra pp. 255, 256), and Aeschines were appointed Pylagorae (assessors) for Athens in the Amphictyonic Assembly. When we consider the great importance which this assembly had recently assumed, it is surprising that the leading statesman in Athens should have allowed his enemies to get into such a position. And in fact Aeschines acted at Delphi in a manner which must at first have been very unpleasant to Demosthenes, but which the latter after- wards turned to account for his own purposes.^^ Aeschines learned that the Amphissaeans, who were particular friends of the Thebans, intended to lodge a complaint against Athens about the rehanging of an old Delphic offering, in which the Thebans were described as enemies of the Greeks, and he prepared his defence. When the charge was brought before the Amphictyonic Council, he answered it in Greek fashion by counter-accusations of Amphissa, which was supposed to have cultivated a field sacred to Apollo. There was always material ready to hand for charges of this kind. After a brilliant speech by Aeschines, the Amphictyones decreed execution against Amphissa, and on the Amphissaeans resisting, a League war was declared against them under the presidency of the Thessalian Cottyphus. This decision shows that the change in the constitution of the Amphictyonic League which we have pointed out was making itself felt. Thebes was no longer supreme in it as in 356. She had been so as long as 270 HISTORY OF GREECE chap the Thessalians were her friends ; now Philip was master by means of his own vote and those of the Thessalians, Magnetes, Achaeans, and others, who were devoted to him. The result was that the interests of Thebes and the interests of the Amphictyones were no longer identical, and the Amphictyones did not scruple to offend Thebes by an attack upon the Locrians. Religion, which had been abused by Thebes in 356 for political purposes, was now made use of with just as much right against Thebes. Athens might have conducted this Amphictyonic war against Amphissa. In so doing she would have alike satisfied the Amphictyones, preserved her own honour and furthered her own interests. If she had taken this course, Philip would not have come to Greece. But she refrained from all participation in the affair, on the advice of Demosthenes, who was favourably disposed towards Thebes and Amphissa, and who could have been led into this otherwise incomprehensible policy only by the desire to be obliging to Thebes in order to secure that city on the first opportunity as an ally of Athens against Philip. The League war against Amphissa therefore was carried on by others, and in a very lukewarm fashion, which made the Amphictyones appoint Philip, who in the meanwhile had returned from the north, general of the League, probably in the autumn of 339. It was the inevitable consequence of the policy of Demosthenes, who had aggravated the conflict and had now come to the point of risking everything upon a single throw. The summons came very opportunely for the king. He immediately marched southwards and occupied the city of Elatea, which was situated in Phocis on the northern side of the valley of the Cephisus. He thereby threatened first the Thebans, the friends of the Amphissaeans, and indirectly of course the rest of Greece, which viewed the decision of the Amphictyones with disfavour, and above all Athens, the secret friend of Amphissa and the open enemy of Macedonia. ^^ XVIII PHILIP AT ELATEA— PROCEEDINGS IN ATHENS 271 At this point comes in the famous narrative of Demosthenes, the passage of the De Corona in which he relates in vivid lan- guage how the occupation of Elatea became known in Athens one evening, and caiised universal consternation, how on the following morning the people assembled for deliberation, but no one ventured to make any proposal until Demosthenes rose and explained the position of affairs. This occupation, he said, was of course a menace to Athens, as she was at war with Philip, but it was especially a menace to Thebes. The Athenians must therefore advance under arms to the Boeotian frontier and send envoys to Thebes to offer their aid to the Thebans. As no one had any other suggestion to make, the people adopted this proposal, which was a dignified continua- tion of the policy latterly followed, and besides, in its offer of assistance to Thebes, which had not always been a friend to Athens, had a magnanimous character which entirely corre- sponded with the sentiments of the Athenians. Demosthenes with nine others was entrusted with the conduct of the matter. He proceeded to Thebes, where Macedonian envoys also put in an appearance. The latter demanded, as Demo- sthenes relates, that the Thebans should at all events allow the Macedonian army to march through their territory, and held out to them the prospect of sharing in the booty, if they would make common cause with them against Athens. In other words, not only Athens but Philip also was suing for Theban support. It might have seemed to the Thebans that the fate of Greece was in their hands. And, in point of fact, this was the case. But we may go farther. They had been the cause of the whole confusion and now they brought it to a pitch. Thebes had instigated the Phocian war ; in 353 Thebes had encouraged Philip's progress in Thrace and, in concert with the nobles of Thessaly, had invited him into Greece, and now the Thebans would not submit to be ousted themselves from their position in Greece by Philip. To secure their power they accepted the alliance offered them by 272 HISTORY OF GREECE Athens. But they managed to word their acceptance as if they were making a great sacrifice, and obtained a heavy price for their support from Athens. The Athenians declared their readiness to pay two-thirds of the cost of the war, to recognize Thebes as having equal rights with them at sea, to place themselves under the supreme command of Thebes by land, and lastly to concede to Thebes the supremacy over Boeotia, which had so long been stigmatized as unjust. They thus gave way on the most important questions of practice and principle. The alliance between Thebes and Athens made an excellent nucleus, and if the rest of Greece had joined these two states, Philip would in all probability have had to retreat. But the most important Greek states, Sparta, Messenia, Elis, Arcadia, and Argos, held aloof, and only Euboea, Megara, Corinth, Achaea, Acarnania, Leucas and Corcyra sent soldiers. The allies at first obtained some successes over the Macedonian troops. But the despatch of 10,000 mercenaries to the assistance of the Amphissaeans was a dangerous division of forces, and the honour of a golden wreath conferred by the citizens of Athens on Demo- sthenes as a reward for his zeal in the spring of 338 shows that the crisis was not considered as serious as it really was. Events took a different course from what had been expected. Philip misled Chares into abandoning the passes leading to Amphissa, defeated him and captured Amphissa and Nau- pactus into the bargain. The king now once more attempted to induce Thebes and Athens to conclude peace, but Demosthenes managed to persuade both cities to continue the war. Thereupon Philip, by a fresh piece of strategy, effected an unopposed march into the plain of Boeotia ; his army was now close to Thebes. The decisive battle was fought near Chaeronea in August or September 338.^^ Philip's army consisted of 30,000 foot and at least 2000 cavalry. The allies were somewhat more numerous. Philip's troops w^ere inured to warfare and led by a single will, that of a man who was a master in XVIII BATTLE OF CHAERONEA 273 the art of war and had able generals under him, among them his son Alexander. The allies were citizens, warlike and in- spired by an ardent love of liberty ; the Thebans above all were distinguished for their bravery, and among them again was the famous and valiant Sacred Band of the Three Hundred, who were determined to conquer or to die. The Thebans were commanded by Theagenes, the Athenians by Stratocles, Chares and Lysicles. Of these Athenian generals the first was probably an able soldier, the second hardly more than an ordinary leader of mercenaries, the thii^d was false to his duty, if the court which condemned him after the loss of the battle pronounced a just sentence. The opposing forces in the decisive struggle were equal, but the higher ideal enthusiasm of the allies succumbed to the incomparably superior generalship of the Macedonians. At first the Athe- nians on the left wing defeated Philip, who was opposed to them, but on the right the Thebans were routed by Alexander. Theagenes fell ; the Sacred Band, fighting bravely to the last, was cut to pieces; and then the whole army took to flight Of the Athenians about 1000 are said to have been killed and 2000 taken prisoners. Demosthenes, who had taken part in the battle as a simple hoplite, was among the fugitives. The drama was now at an end. Philip had accomplished his purpose. For the first time since the Greeks became a nation, free states of the first rank had succumbed on Greek soil to a hereditary monarch, and this first defeat decided the destiny of Greece. But the defeat was not less glorious for the vanquished than for the conquerors. Over the graves of the fallen Thebans and their allies there was afterwards erected on the battle-field, as an eloquent monument to Greek honour, the figure of a lion hewn out of marble, the remains of which have survived to this day. Well does this battle deserve an imperishable external record, for success is not the true criterion of greatness. ^^ VOL. Ill T 274 HISTORY OF GREECE NOTES 1. In the De Corona speech (305) Demosthenes holds up to Athens the noble aim of protecting the Greek states in such way that all shall be eXevOepoi and avrovofxoi. In the speech De Pace ^14 seq. he points out that Athens might find other reasons for renewing the war with Philip. 2. For Hyjierides, Hegesippus, Timarchus cf. Schaefer, Dem. 2, 32 seq. For Lycurgus ibid. 317 seq. ; the edition of the speech against Leocrates by Rehdantz, Leipzig, 1876 ; Blass ; and Droege, De Lycurgo Athen., Bonn, 1880. 3. For Aeschines cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 215-258, the edition of the speech against Ctesiphon by Weidner, Berl. 1878, and Blass, 3, Abth. 2. The stories of Demosthenes about Aeschines' parents are now accepted as true by no one, and it is significant for the esteem in which Demosthenes is held by his own supporters, that they explain that he has much more scandal to fling at Aeschines in the De Corona speech than in the speech De Fals. Leg. It is pointed out (Sch. Dem. 1, 226) that Demosthenes had the last word in the Corona, and therefore could say what he liked, whereas his assertions in the De Fals. Leg. could be refuted by Aeschines who spoke after him. — His ridicule of the TptTaywi'io-T?)? Aeschines is well known. It is not generally noticed that this was all the more amusing to the Athenians, because Demosthenes himself wished to be and was a genuine Trpwraytuvto-r^/s as orator. We know that his reply to the question, what is the most important (pality in an orator 1 was : viroKpLo-is ; and to the further question what is the second and third important quality 1 also viroKpicn^. How completely the rpaywSiav vTroKpa'icrOat engrossed him, is shown by his behaviour after Philip's death and by his remarks just before his own death, Plut. Dem. 29. 4. For Demades cf. Sch. Dem. 3, 20 seq. For Phocion see the article in Pauly's E. E. 5, and Bernays, Phokion, Berl. 1881. There are some excellent anecdotes in Plutarch's Phocion. Phocion was, according to Demosthenes himself, the kottis of his speeches. Demosthenes was piyrcop apbCTTos, etVeii' Se Setvoraros o ^(i)K cwv. He was strategus forty-five times. 5. For the Trapairpea-ßeia we have the two speeches of Demo- sthenes and Aeschines, of which the latter is business-like, the former sophistical ; cf chap. xvii. note 3. Demosthenes' attempt to prove the SwpoooKLa of Aeschines is a complete failure. The solitary fact which Demosthenes brings forward in his long state- xviii NOTES 275 ment is the possession of an estate, the situation of which he does not indicate, and as to which he does not maintain that Philip made a present of it to Aeschines. As Demosthenes wishes to call witnesses from Olynthus, it is presumed that it was in the neighbour- hood of that city ; according to Schol. Aesch. Tim. 3, it is said to have been near Pydna. That a charge of this kind has no signi- ficance is beyond a doubt ; and when we see that from § 98 to § 146 Demosthenes exerts himself to show that Aeschines must have been bribed, we conclude that he could not prove that he was so. — For Thessaly, Sch. Dem. 2, 430. 6. According to Beloch, Att. Pol. 211, Demosthenes had suc- ceeded as early as 343-342 in bringing about a regular league against Philip. — The speech De Halonneso gives us special informa- tion as to Philip's communication to the Athenians before his expedition to Thrace ; cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 431 seq. ; Blass, 3, 2, 113- 121. 7. For the Thracian War, Diod. 16, 71, 74-77; Theop. fr. 244-248, 249* ; Anaxim. fr. 11-13 ; cf. Hoeck page 61 seq., who also discusses the authorities. In Thrace Philip founded the cities of Philippopolis, Calybe (Poneropolis) and Bine. The two last are now considered to have been penal settlements, on account of their names ; this seems to me impossible on the face of it. Why should not Bine be a Thracian name, and Poneropolis a Greek witticism on Philip 1 For Diopithes cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 451 ; Cardia, Dem. Ar. 182. 8. In the speech De Chersoneso expediency is the guiding prin- ciple. In §§ 44, 45 Demosthenes wrongly presumes that Philip wishes to conquer Athens. In § 42 Demosthenes says to the Athenians : ia-Te yap {yxets ovk aTJToi TrAeoveKTvycrat kol Kara- crx^^v ^PX^^ ^^ 7r€(^i'K0T£s, in § 60 on the other hand : apx^w yap eiwöare. In contrast to Demosthenes, who defended Diopithes, the idealist Burke, in oratory the Demosthenes of modern times, impeached Warren Hastings, who secured the English supremacy in India, because he had acted unjustly in doing so. 9. For the Third Philippic Schaefer, Dem. 2, 469 seq. and Blass, 3, 1, 336. — In Phil. 3, 48, 49 Demosthenes makes an interesting remark to the effect that Philip did not conduct the war in the old Greek fashion. An examination of this statement, which the commentators have not discussed, is of value for history ; I therefore make it here as a pendant to my remarks in vol. ii. p. 395. Demosthenes says that Philip did not suspend operations in winter or deliver open battle, but that he fought with light troops and conquered by means of bribery. The facts are as follows. The Greeks had originally a peculiar conception of war ; cf. also Polyb. 13, 3. It was a religious ordeal, conducted in accordance 276 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. witli definite rules ; the hoplites were the deciding element ; cavalry and \J/i\oi were only accessories. Argos and Sparta on one occasion even entrusted the decision to 300 picked combatants. An unannounced invasion of a country, even when a state of war existed, was not quite ew r^gle ; the Argives defended themselves against it by the expedient of suddenly beginning the month Carneus, which was equivalent to saying : It is not lawful for us to fight, so stop your plundering. Fortified places were not taken by storm ; the attacking party tried to make a breach in the walls ; if this failed, the inhabitants were reduced by famine ; if they surrendered in consequence they might be killed or sold as slaves. In the winter there was a suspension of hostilities ; the citizens could not take the field the whole year round. All these practices were due to the fact that the Greeks regarded war as a duel, which might be fought out under certain circumstances with great bitterness, but always according to certain definite rules. Croesus, who never expected a winter campaign, also had similar Greek ideas (Herod. 1, 77); but Cyrus had more practical views. Demo- sthenes in Phil. 3, 48, 49 starts with the correct perception that Philip did not wage war in the old Greek Avay. In his eyes war was not a duel, but a rough means of attaining practical ends. But Demosthenes has in the first place neglected to observe that the Greeks themselves, and especially the Athenians, had long ceased to entertain this old conception of war, and in the second place he has completely misrepresented Philip's method of warfare. As regards the first point, the use of light troops and the employ- ment of stratagems was introduced by Demosthenes the elder and Iphicrates, who were Athenians ; and Syracuse was blockaded in the winter. It may be true that Philip bribed many Greeks, but even in this he was no innovator ; Themistocles and Pericles, who were Athenians, were accused long before his time of achieving successes by means of bribery, and no one can have any doubt after reading Thuc. 7, 86 that Nicias made friends for himself in Syracuse by means of money. It is taking a petty view of great events to hold that corruption by Philip had the enormous influence on the decline of Greek liberty which Demosthenes, to whom money dealings were a sort of hobby, attributes to it. Strange to say, the acceptance of bribes from Persia and Harpalus is proved only of Athenian not of Macedonian patriots ; Philocrates was condemned in contumaciam. Demosthenes is so lavish in his charges of bribery that he even accuses his wealthy fellow-citizens of trying to bribe him {De Cor. 103). Consequently Philip was not the only off'ender in this respect. But he goes so hastily to work with Philip that he accuses him (De Gor. 18, 19) of Travras rapda-creiv xviii NOTES 277 in the Peloponnese by money after having said a couple of lines before that epts and Tapa)('q were there already. According to this Philip must have spent his money there from pure love of spending it. The scenting of bribery was a fashionable complaint in certain Athenian circles of those days, just as that of espionage is else- where. So much for the first point. With regard to the second, the best proof that Demosthenes has given an entirely wrong description of Philip's method of warfare, is supplied by the battle of Chaeronea. It was not bribery, nor the employment of light troops which decided this battle ; the Athenians and Thebans were defeated in a fair fight of hoplites. Demosthenes never grasped the real character of the Macedonian king, and always misrepresented him to the Athenians — a thousand pities for Athens, which followed him, and for the whole of Greece. It is significant that in the year 341 Demosthenes could speak to the Athenians of Philip, the creator of the Macedonian phalanx, as follows : d/covere 8e ^iXlttttov ov)(l t(j) ;8ecrTat of Artabazus, Dem. contra Aristocr. 157. According to Plut. Al. 21 Memnon's wife was daughter of Artabazus. — A good description of the confusion in Asia Minor about 380 is given in Isocr. Paneg. 160 seq., where the following passage occurs (162) : diro KviSov fJ^^XP'- 2tvcü7r?/s "EAAr^ves T7)v 'Acrtav irapoLKOvcrtv. An idea of the variety of political conditions in the western sections of the Persian empire is given by the coinage of those regions, which exhibits a great independence of a number of small groups. It is generally supposed that in the Persian empire the king kept the gold coinage in his own hands (Lampsacus, for which vide infra, belonged to the category of frontier cities which were more Persian in appearance than in reality) ; he minted the coins called darics, of about 130 grs. English = 8424 gramm., which present the Persian king armed with a bow on the obverse. The king also coined silver, the Sigloi, of 84*37 grs. English weight, in value about 7^ Attic obols ; Head, H. N. 698, 699. Besides this imperial coinage, however, money was coined in the west, and there only, by cities, potentates, or satraps. In the following notes I give a restime of these coinages, remark- ing that the standards mentioned in vol. ii. p. 227 are now su23plemented by the Ehodian standard (v. supra, chap, iii.), the stater of which was a reduced Attic one, of only 115-120 grains, and which was connected with the Aeginetan standard by the fact that three Rhodian drachmae might be considered equal to two Aeginetan drachmae. I begin with the north and include the neighbouring islands, although the King's Peace declared them independent. Cf. Babelon, 1.1. p. xxi. Besides the king, coins were minted by (1) cities (a narrow strip along the sea from Trapezus to the mouth of the Nile) ; (2) local rulers ; COINAGE OF AVESTERN PERSIA 315 (3) hereditary satraps ; (4) satraps invested with extraordinary powers. In the Troad we find coins in the following cities : in Abydos (Head, 468) of tlie Phoenician standard, with more than twenty different names of magistrates established by Imhoof ; in Gergis, the home of the Sibyl, who is portrayed on one side of the snmli coins with the Sphinx on the reverse ; in Neandria, Ophrynium Ehoeteum, Scamandria (Head, pp. 473, 474) ; in Sigeum, with the head of Pallas— Sigeum was an old Athenian settlement— silver coins of Attic weight and hectae of electrum. The island of Tenedos has fine coins with the double head and the double axe, of the Phoenician standard. In Mysia (Head, 446-60), Antandros evidently coined on the Persian standard ; Apollonia on the Rhyndacus (Six and Imhoof) on the Persian standard ; Astacus and Assos the same ; Cyzicus, which continues its electrum coinage for a short time (probably Pharnabazus minted a Daric there, Head, 453), and then coins silver on the Ehodian standard ; before this, however (cf. Babelon, p. XXXV.), in the year 410, comes a stater of 212 grains, with the head of Pharnabazus and the inscription *AP(N)ABA Gargara • Lampsacus, where the electrum coinage is gradually replaced \y a gold coinage corresponding to and competing with it. For these splendid coins cf. Head, 457 ; here also a head of Pharnabazus is conjectured, but wrongly ; it is Orontes according to von Sallit Six and Babelon, 1.1. p. Lxxiii. For Orontes cf. Judeich, p 221 seq. following the researches of Th. Reinach. Silver was coined in Lampsacus on the Persian standard ; in Parium on the Persian standard ; Pergamum had small coins ; the city was as yet of no importance. For information as to the coins of the ruling families of Teuthrania (successors of Demaratus), for those of the descendants Ol Gongylus m Gambeum and Myiina and the coins of Themis- tocles m Magnesia cf. Babelon, 1.1. p. Ixviii. seq. In BiTHYNiA Chalcedon coins on the Attic standard up to about 400 ; on the Persian standard up to about 350, and after- wards on the Phoenician standard (according to Head, 438) The coinage of Heraclea Pontica, wliich was constantly increasing in power entirely follows that of Sinope ; the dates of the tyrants Clearchus (364-353), Satyrus (353-347), Timotheus and Dionysius (347-338), who belong to the same family, are distinguished Some of tlie coins of the Aeginetan standard are very fine ; Time theus and Dionysius have put their names on the coins ; Head 441.^ Cf. for the history of this city, Plass, Tyrannis, 1, 258 seq.' In Paphlagonia the powerful city of Sinope belongs to this 316 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. category ; it minted on a reduced Plioenician standard, from about 364-333, liowever, with names of satraps, which are first written in Greek and afterwards in Aramaic characters ; we find the names of Datames, Abdemon and Ariarathes ; Head, 434. We may regard these coins as minted also for Cappadocia, where coins of three Ivinds belonging to the second successor of Datames, Ariarathes I. (dr. 350-322), are still in existence ; Head, 631. In PoNTUS we have Amisus (Head, 424) with the Persian standard. The city, according to Strabo 12, 547, was re-colonized by Athenians (when, is unknown) under the name Piraeus, and we have, besides coins of Amisus with Aramaic letters, some stamped nEIPAlI2N ; Head, 424. Coins of Trapezus on the Persian standard of the fourth century also occur. Lesbos in general is credited by Head (485) with electronhectae at the beginning of the fourth century ; Methymna with silver coins of Phoenician (?) standard for the same period ; Mytilene the same with the Persian standard ; even the little island of Pordosilene close to Lesbos appears to have had a coinage at that date ; Head, 489. Of Aeolian places on the mainland Head (500) ascribes coins of the Phoenician standard of this date to the little town of Gambrium in the valley of the Caycus. In Ionia, we have electrum coins in Phocaea up to about 350 B.c. ; Head, 507. Clazomenae has fine gold coins which Head (491) places after 387, although Clazomenae was assigned to Persia in the King's Peace ; Lamj)sacene coins are, it is true, also placed in this period. Clazomenae also minted silver coins on the Attic standard, among which some beautiful tetradrachmae are conspicu- ous, with the name of an artist, Theodotus — a great rarity in the East ; Head, 491. Coins of the satrap Orontes are assigned to Clazomenae or to Tarsus ; other coins of the same satrap to lolla in the neighbourhood of Adramyttium, or to Lampsacus ; Head, 455, 491. Leuca, in the neighbourhood of Clazomenae, founded in 352 by Tachus, and subsequently coming under the jurisdiction of Clazomenae, has small coins with a picture of a swan, the emblem of Clazomenae. According to Head (499), the coins of Erythrae do not begin till 330 and are of the Rhodian standard. Teos has coins of the Phoenician standard. Colophon adopts the Rhodian standard ; a beautiful coin with a fine Persian head is worthy of notice; Head, 493, fig. 207, Imhoof, Porträtköpfe, III. 1 ; it is usually assigned to Colophon ; Six (Monnaies grecques inedites, Lond. 1888) assigns it to lassus, and agrees with de Luynes in thinking that the head is a portrait of the famous Tissaphernes. The Ephesian coins of the Rhodian standard with the letters 2YN have been referred to above (p. 48). Of the little town of Pygela or XXI COINAGE OF WESTEEN PERSIA 317 Phygela, south of Epliesiis, we have extant coins (Head, 508). Miletus coined in the fourth century on her own standard, but prob- ably borrowed from the Phoenician (Head, 504), if we may judge from a coin which bears the iuscrii:)tion EF AIAYM12N lEPH, where Spay^/jLij is to be supplied, and which is a Phoenician half- drachma. Other coins of the Attic and Samian standards belong- ing to Miletus are ascribed to the period in which the potentates Hecatomnus and Mausolus ruled there ; Head, 503. After that Head (504) assumes that the Phoenician standard prevailed in Miletus from 350-330 B.c. Magnesia on the Maeander has coins of the Phoenician and Persian standard from the middle of the fourth century; Head, 501. Chios has the Rhodian or Phoenician standard ; Head, 514. In Samos we have first coins of the so- called Samian standard (see vol. ii. 231), then the league coins of the Rhodian standard (v. supra, p. 48). In 365, when Athens obtains possession of the island, the coinage ceases imtil the return of the Samians in 322. Coins with a picture of the Persian king kneeling to shoot and the name IIYBArOPHS belong to some Ionian city or other (probably Ej^hesus, cf. Babelon, 1.1. p. Ixxviii., and Six, who assumes that this coin was minted from 335-334 in Ephesus through the influence of Memnon and the co-ojjeration of the Ejjhesian magistrate Pythagoras). The name is no doubt that of a tyrant, like others with 21116? ; there were two Spithridates' in the fourth century, Xen. Hell. 3, 4, 10 and Arr. 1, 12, 8 ; cf. Babelon, l.L p. Ixxvi., according to whom Spithridates is the latter, the tyrant of Sardis. These coins are of the Rhodian standard. In Caria we have the coins with 2YN of the Rhodian standard {v. siqira, p. 48) in Cnidus, in Halicarnassus coins of the Phoenician standard. Head, 526; the coins of the Carian sovereigns minted there, I shall refer to immediately. lassus (Head, 528) has coins with 2YN, according to Head perhaps of the Persian standard ; but might not the coin of 166 grs. be a Rhodian tridrachma — properly of 175 grs. ? The Carian rulers (Head, 533) Hecatomnus (about 391-377) in Mylasa, Mausolus (377-351, cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 486) in Halicarnassus, Hidrieus (-341), Ada (-340), Pixodarus (-335), Rhoontopates (-334), Ada for the second time (-334) (cf. Babelon, p. Ixxxv. seq., also Krumbholz, De Asiae min. satrapis, Lips. 1883, p. 83) minted coins of the Rhodian standard ; it is remarkable that a Pixodarus was worshipped as a hero in Ephesus ; cf. Roscher, Lex. Sp. 2529. Of the Carian islands Calymna coins on the Rhodian standard. Head, 534, as does Cos, Head, 535, Nisyrus with a rose referring to Rhodes, but its drachma is of 47 grains. True, this does not prevent the island of Megiste, which was subject to 318 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Rhodes and where a drachma of 46 grains occurs (Head, 537), from also coining on the Rhodian standard, althoiigh that would give a tridrachma of 140 grains instead of the normal one of 180. Rhodes, which introduced a special standard for its silver coinage, has gold coins of the Euboic standard. Head, 539. All the coins of Rhodes are distinguished for their beauty. The Lydian coinage ceased with the Persian conquest ; Phrygian do not aj^pear until the second century B.c. Lycian coins occur after 400 b.c. ; but Head (574) is of opinion that they do not go down to the time of Alexander, but that the Carian sovereigns had previously introduced their coins into Lycia. Otherwise it would be very strange that the Lycians should not coin under Alexander, as they had voluntarily submitted to the king, and therefore might expect every consideration from him. In conformity with this we may assume that Lycia was under the rule of the Carian princes, which would also be of interest for the history of art in that period ; v. infra, chap. xxix. The Lycian coins had the Babylonian standard. Head, 571, yet we have a stater of the city of Phaselis, dated 153, weighing 7 grains. • Cf. for the Lycian princes and their coins, Babelon, pp. Ixxxix.-cxiii. On the South Coast op Asia Minor and a short way into the interior communities of a semi-Greek character extend as far as the eastern corner of the Mediterranean. Thus the hellenizing of the whole of Asia Minor by Alexander and his successors is more easily accounted for. In Pamphylia we have coins of the Persian standard in Asjiendos and Side, the former mostly with the in- scription ESTFENAIIY2, the latter with 2IAHTIK0N, or an inscription in characters resembling the Aramaic ; cf. Head, 581 and 586. Beyond Pamphylia, in Pisidia, the city of Selge, on the river Eurymedon, has, like Aspendus, coins of the Persian standard, mostly with the inscription 2TAEriY2. On the coins of both cities is portrayed a slinger, because Aspendus recalls cr^erSovi; ; those of Selge have also two wrestlers on the reverse ; the inscription o-rAeyiis recalls o-rAeyyts, strigil, a wrestler's instrument ; the real name of the city must therefore have recalled the word stlengis still more than Selge, the hellenized form. Cilicia too had coins with Greek inscriptions under Persian supremacy ; thus Celenderis, supposed to be a colony from Samos, had coins of the Persian standard. Head, 600 ; also Mallos, on which Imhoof has published a treatise mentioned above ; cf. Head, 605. The coins of Mallos indicate gradually increasing political influence on the part of Persia, but at the same time growing influence of Greek civilization, the figure of the Persian king and certain Greek deities, such as Heracles, Demeter and others, replacing a XXI COINAGE OF WESTERN TERSIA 319 winged figure and a swan. Nagidus has tine coins of the Persian standard with Bacchus and Aphrodite, Head, 608 ; cf. Imhoof, Monn. gr. ji. 372 seq., and Babelon, p. xxxvii. Soli also has coins of the Persian standard ; Issus the same with Greek and Aramaic inscriptions (Head, 604). In Tarsus the following satrajjs coined in the fourth century : — Tiribazus, Orontas (?), Pharnabazus, Tar- camus (so he is called by Six, Babelon prefers to call him Da- tames), Mazaeus (Head, 613-616) with inscriptions of their names in Aramaic characters ; Tiribazus also coined in Soli. For the widely diffused activity of Mazaeus cf. the above-quoted treatise by Six, and Babelon, pp. xliii.-xlix. In Cyprus, for which cf. Six's treatise and Head 620 seq., we have coins at first of the Aeginetan standard (or Persian, Head, 665), which passes into the Rhodian standard in the first half of the fourth century. Salamis has the most important coinage. Some of the inscriptions are in Cypriote, others from about 368 onwards in Greek characters. In tlie same way the coins of Paphos change from the Cypriote to the Greek characters, cf. Head, 623, who follows Six. For the coins of Soli, cf. Head, 626. On the other hand, the coins of Citium have Phoenician inscrip- tions ; Head, 621 : in the fourth century we find coins of this kind with the names Baabram, Demonicus (?), INIeleciathon, Pumia- thon. Cf. Babelon, cxiv.-cliii. In Phoenicia the Phoenician standard continues to exist(drachma of 56 grains); only A rados adopted the Persian standard. We have coins of Byblos (Head, 668), of Sidon (Head, 670), although Six, who treats this coinage in detail, conjectures that the latter may have been minted in Tripolis instead of Sidon ; of Tyre (Head, 674). For the coins of Phoenicia cf. Babelon, p. cliv. seq. ; for those of the lords of Hierapolis-Bambyce, and of Gaza and Arabia, ibid. xlix. seq. In these districts there were a large number of Greek mercenaries, and this accounts for the frequent imitation of Athenian coins with the Pallas head and owls, although in a very rude style, ibid. p. lix. seq. I may add that Head (739) assumes that gold and electrum coins of the Phoenician standard may have been issued in Car- thage, which otherwise had no coinage, after the time of Timoleon. If we arrange these issues according to their standards, we find that the Aeginetan standard (194 grs.) was followed by Heraclea Pontica and perhaps Cyprus ; the Persian (177 grs.) by Amisus, Trapezus, Chalcedon (and Bj'zantium), Antandrus, Apollonia on the Rhyndacus, Lampsacus, Parium, Mytilene, lasus (?), Aspendus, Sige, Selge, Celenderis, Mallos, Tarsus, Nagidus, Soli, that is to say, the north-western corner and the south coast of Asia Minor, 320 HISTORY OF GREECE chap, xxi perhaps also Cyprus ; the Babylonian (169 grs.) by Lycia ; the Attic (135 grs.) by Chalcedon, Sigeum, Clazomenae, Miletus (rulers) ; the Rhodian (120-125 grs.) by Rhodes, Cos, Cnidus, the Carian sovereigns, Samos, Chios, Ionian satraps, Erythrae, Ephesus, Colojjhon, Cyzicus, lassus, Cyprus ; the Phoenician (112 grs.) by Halicarnassus, Miletus, Teos, Phygela, Magnesia, Gambrium, Methymna, Tenedos, Chalcedon, Sinope, Phoenicia and perhaps Carthage. It is remarkable that Miletus follows Phoenicia ; we involuntarily recall the old relations between that city and this country shown by the name Cadmus, which is borne in Phoenicia by a hero, in Miletus by a somewhat mythical early historian. Some beautiful and characteristic coins of Asia Minor belonging to the fourth century are reproduced in Gardner's Types of Greek Coins, PI. X., and discussed on pp. 169-176. 6. The embarrassments of the reign of Artaxerxes II. are arranged by Spiegel (2, 458 seq.) under the four following heads : (1) Relations with Greece (pp. 459-466). (2) The war with Cyprus (pp. 466-469). (3) The war against the Cadusii, a wild mountain people of Gilan, south of the Caspian Sea (pp.- 469, 470). Plutarch (Art. 24) and Diodorus (15, 8, 10) refer to this war. Artaxerxes is said to have marched with 300,000 foot and 10,000 cavalry into this inaccessible country, in which tropical rains de- stroyed the roads and bred fevers. Tiribazus saved the king, who was within an ace of being lost, by stratagem ; he persuaded each of the two Cadusian potentates to conclude a special treaty with the king without the knowledge of the other. In consequence of this Tiribazus was again received into favour. (4) The Egyptian War (pp. 470-474). CHAPTER XXII ALEXANDER IN ANTERIOR ASIA — BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS (334-333) In the spring of 334 Alexander set out from Macedonia with about 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, of whom not half were real Macedonians.^ The rest came partly from the northern races and partly from Thessaly and other districts of Greece. The main body of the army was formed by the heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. The former composed the famous phalanx with its squares sixteen men deep, the lances (Sarissae), sixteen feet in length, of the first five ranks projecting be- yond the front rank. ]\Iost of the cavalry too wore armour, riders as well as horses. When the phalanx could not be brought into action, the lighter-armed Macedonian Hypaspistae, corresponding to the peltasts, came into play. The troops destined for skirmishing and for covering the line of march were taken mainly from the northern tribes, such as the Thracians, the Paeonians and the Agrianes. In twenty days the king had reached Sestos, w^hence the army was conveyed on 160 triremes and a number of transports to Abydos. While on board ship he sacrificed to Poseidon and the Nereidae, and on the Asiatic shore to Zeus, Athene and Heracles. In Ilium too he offered sacrifice as a descendant of Achilles, and laid a wreath upon the grave of that hero, as did his friend Hephaestion upon the grave of Patroclus. He pronounced Achilles fortunate in having found a Homer. He then continued his march in an easterly direction, and VOL. Ill Y 322 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. encountered a hostile tirmy commanded by Persian nol)les on the river Granicus.^ It consisted of about 20,000 Persian cavalry and the same number of foreign infantry, mostly Greek mercenaries. Memnon had advised the generals not to offer battle, but to lay waste the country ; in a pitched battle the presence of the Macedonian king, coupled with the absence of the king of Persia, would give the Macedonians too great a superiority. But the Persian generals thought this advice reflected on their honour, and resolved to fight. With their cavalry they occupied the steep bank of the river, which the Macedonians had to cross under their fire. Parmenio was opposed to an immediate attack, but Alexander declared that after having crossed the Hellespont he could not be kept back by a little river like the Granicus. He had the gift, so valu- able to a sovereign and a general, of saying the right thing in a few words ; in this respect there was something of the Spartan in him. He ordered his army to cross the river in face of the enemy's cavalry and storm the opposite bank. The cavalry, in accordance Avith Macedonian as well as Greek practice, was stationed on the wings, the phalanx in the centre. Alexander himself commanded the right wing. Easily recog- nizable by his brilliant accoutrements and his white plume, he threw himself into the midst of the enemy and made for the Persian generals. His lance was shattered to pieces ; his groom's, which he then took, was soon broken in the combat ; whereupon one of his hetairi, the Corinthian Demaratus, gave him his. With it Alexander bore down Mithridates, the son- in-law of Darius, and then Eoesaces, who had cut off a piece of the king's helmet ; and just as another Persian noble, Spithridates, was on the point of dealing Alexander a blow from behind, the Macedonian Clitus, surnamed the Black, cut off his hand, and so saved the king's life. Of the Persian cavalry about 1000 were slain, the rest fled. There remained the mercenaries, who were drawn up on one side, the generals having forgotten to use them against the enemy. They were xxn BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS 323 cut to pieces by the Macedonians, witli the excei^tion of some 2000 who were taken prisoners. Of the Macedonian army twenty-five hetairi had fallen. Bronze statues were erected to them in Dion by Alexander's orders, as a lasting memorial of their valour. Of the other cavalry about sixty had perished, of the infantry about thirty. That the battle cost the victors so little bloodshed was due, apart from Alexander's excellent generalship, to the fact that they were better armed. They had complete suits of armour and long spears of hardened wood ; the Persians had only short javelins. The Persian army at the battle of the Granicus was a mob without a leader, in which each man probably fought to the best of his ability, but without the slightest result. As in 490 and 480, better arma- ment, better leadership and a better spirit won the day. Alexander gave the fallen soldiers an honourable burial ; the families of his own men were granted immunity from taxation and from personal service; the wounded he took under his own care. The Clreek prisoners were sent to Macedonia for compulsory labour. Alexander sent 300 suits of armour oiU. of the booty to Athens, where they were set up on the Acropolis with the inscription: "Won by Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedaemonians) from the barbarians in Asia." To the Greeks therefore he wanted only to be commander-in-chief, and he still hoped and wished to win Athens in particular to his side. One would certainly have thought that the feeling, that with Alexander a new spirit was moving over the face of the Greek world, would have made some impression on the Athenians. After all there was something novel and grand in the spectacle of a high- minded soldier-king, luitrammelled by republican obstacles, waging awar Avhich had so long floated before the imagination of the Greeks as a desirable aim, conducting it with vigour to the honour of Greece and displaying clemency after his glorious victory. One would have thought that the personality of the general, a young man full of enthusiasm for the beautiful. 324 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. would have made it possible for the Atlienians to waive their objections for the nonce and at last admire grand deeds instead of grand words. But the majority of them could not do so. The victory on the Granicus was attended with a result which was unprecedented in the history of the struggles between Greeks and Persians. Sardes tendered its submis- sion ; the governor himself surrendered. The Asiatics felt the importance of Alexander. The king repaired to the ancient capital of Lydia, restored to the Lydians, as Arrian expresses it, their old laws, and looked for a site for a temple to the Olympian Zeus on the acropolis. At that moment a thunder- shower wetted the spot, and that spot only, on which the royal citadel of Lydia had once stood ; the site for the temple was found. ^ Alexander introduced a new administration in Lydia, which became a model for that of the other provinces, the military and financial business being entrusted to different officials, whereas under the Persians the satrap had combined all the powers of government of the province in his own person. He then marched to Ephesus, where he re-established the democratic constitution. His next object was Miletus, which had been left in charge of Greek mercenaries. Their leader Hegesistratus at first thought of surrender, and then changed his mind ; the Persian fleet was not far off and might help Miletus. But Alexander managed to bring up his fleet of 160 ships first, and his vigorous assault compelled the garrison to surrender. After repulsing a feeble attack of the large Persian fleet, the king sent his own ships home ; he did not wish to divide his forces. He now marched against Hali- carnassus, where Memnon was in command of barbarians and Hellenes. This time the defence was worthy of the attack. After a fruitless attempt upon Myndus Alexander attacked Halicarnassus itself. The moat, which was thirty yards broad, was filled up and the sorties of the garrison repulsed ; a por- tion of the walls was destroyed by battering-engines. The defenders held out for a time behind a newly-erected crescent- XXII ALEXANDER IN ASIA MINOR 325 shaped wall ; they then retreated, abandoning the city and taking refuge in the two citadels, where Alexander left them vindisturbed for the moment. He installed Ada, daughter of Hecatomnus and wife of Idrieus, as ruler of Caria, and sent home a number of Macedonian soldiers, who had married before starting on the expedition, with orders to return later on with fresh troops to Asia. Alexander now marched in a northerly direction through Lycia, which joined him, the inhabitants of Phaselis presenting him with a golden wreath. The Aspendians, who at first had intended to submit, but had afterwards changed their mind, were now compelled to pay a fine of 100 talents instead of the 50 originally imposed. His farther progress was impeded by the mountainous nature of the coimtry. The capture of the fortified Telmessus would have delayed him too long. He, therefore, marched by way of Sagalassus and Celaenae to Gordium, the capital of Phrygia, in the winter of 334-333.'* That Alexander did not march at once into the interior of Asia Minor after the battle on the Granicus, was due to several reasons. The first was that he had to cripple the power of Persia in south-western Asia Minor before he advanced farther eastwards. But that this was not the only reason is shown by the fact that he neglected to take measures against the Persian naval force, which afterwards did him some harm. For Memnon took Chios by treachery and then attacked Mytilene, but died while besieging this city, to the detriment of the Persian cause. Mytilene surrendered, and was put under the rule of a tyrant. Tenedos, as Arrian expresses it, was compelled to recognize the Peace of Antalcidas. Thus, while Alexander was establishing de- mocracies, the Persians, the hope of Demosthenes, were installing tyrannies and bringing Antalcidas once more into honour. Ten Persian ships even came as far as Siphnos, but fifteen Macedonian vessels sailed out from Chalcis to meet them, captured eight of them, and drove the other two back 326 HISTORY OF GREECE to Asia. If Alexander thus neglected the Persian fleet, the existence of Persian troops in Miletus and Halicarnassus could not have been the only reason why he did not march into the interior from Sardes. His special motive for following the coast southwards was that the Greeks lived there, whose liberation had been the immediate object of his expedition. Not till this was accomplished could he proceed eastwards. And his turning aside now in a northerly direction into the interior of Asia Minor, where there were no armies to be conquered, at the risk of giving Darius time to collect a larger force to oppose him, was not due simply to the fact that the rugged coast line of Cilicia was difficult for an army to traverse. The heart of Asia Minor was Phrygia, a region closely connected with Greek civilization in the earliest ages ; if this country readily acknowledged him as ruler, much would be gained, not perhaps for the moment, but certainly for the future. In this he was aided by a circumstance which showed his character in a new aspect. Gordium, the capital of Phrygia, contained the chariot in which Gordius, the first king of the country, had made his entry into the city. Its yoke was fastened to the shaft by a complicated knot, and the legend ran that whoever loosened it was destined to be master of Asia. Alexander, not being able to untie it, cut it asunder with his sword, thus showing that action as well as speech did not fail him at the right moment. From Gordium Alexander crossed the passes of Cilicia to Tarsus, which the Persian governor made over to him. Cilicia too was still half Greek. Here he contracted a violent fever by bathing in the river Cydnus. His physician, Philip of Acarnania, gave him a purgative medicine ; but just as he was about to swallow it a letter was delivered to him in which he Avas warned against treachery on Philip's part. He read it, handed it to the physician, and drank the medicine without hesitation. In this way he proved that he was fearless and unsuspecting — a fresh manifestation of his lofty and kingly character, XXII ALEXANDER IN CILICIA 327 especially when contrasted with the perpetual suspicion displayed by Orientals. He made another deviation from his route to Anchialus, where the tomb of Sardanapalus was to be seen, who was said to have built Anchialus and Tarsus in one day, and whose epitaph bade men enjoy life, as the other world Avas not worth troubling about — another marked con- trast to Alexander. From Soli he subdued the mountain tribes of Cilicia. He now learned that Caria had joined him, notably Cos, Triopium and Caunus. This was of importance, for the Carians were a brave people and these were places of ancient renown. In the semi-barbarian countries in which he was now staying he always laid stress on Greek manners and customs. Thus at Soli he celebrated Greek festivals and gave the inhabitants a democratic constitution : in Mallus he sacrificed to the hero Araphilochus, son of Amphiaraus, who was said to have visited these regions, and he released the Malli, who claimed to be Argives, from the tribute which they had paid to Persia. At this point he was informed that Darius was close at hand with his army in an easterly direction, in the level country on the other side of the mountains, and he therefore set out to do battle with him. NOTES 1. Composition of Alexander's army, Diod. IV, 17. There were not many Greeks in it ; of the 7000 o-i'/x/xa^ot infantry some were Thessalians ; the Hellenic cavalry besides 1500 Thessalians numbered only 600. According to Diod. 16, 89 and Plut. Phoc. 16 Philip had settled the contingents which the Greeks were to contribute to the campaign ; Alexander evidently did not insist strongly on his rights. For the very different way in which Napoleon I., who for a time was compared with the Macedonian kings, got the most out of his German and other allies, see a characteristic remark of his cj^uoted in Onckeii, Zeitalter der Revolution und des Kaiserreiches, 2, 498, Berl. 1886. The character of Alexander's army is described by Droysen, 1, 1, 165-179. Cf. also Beloch, Bevölkerung der griech.-rüin. Weif, 328 HISTORY OF GREECE chap, xxii Leipz. 1886, pp. 215-222, who proves that there is nothing to be said against Diodorus' statements. 2. Alexander up to the battle of Issus, Arr. ], 11 — 2, 6. — For his march through Cilicia cf. Th. Bent in the Athenaeum of July 19, 1890, pp. 104, 105. — For the sacrifice (1, 11, 6) cf. the notes on the coins in chap, xxvii. — As early as the battle on the Granicus Alexander adopted the proper tactics for defeating Asiatics, viz. by bringing the cavalry to bear. The East has never varied in this respect ; its strength lies in its cavalry. Persians, Parthians, Arabs, Huns, Magyars, Turks were all horsemen. It is worthy of note that certain Asiatic methods of warfare have also remained the same, e.g. the cray^jveveLv, which the Persians, according to Herod. 6, 31, practised in the islands of Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos, in these cases with infantry ; in open country they of course used cavalry. According to App. Mith. 67, this was done by Tigranes, who surrounded and captured 300,000 men in Cappadocia ; and subsequently by Avars, Crim Tartars and Turkomans, the latter even in the nineteenth century ; cf. Penz, Beil. 167 of the Allgemeine Zeitung, 1889; on one occasion they captured 50,000 persons in the sjmce of a fortnight. 3. So the church of S. Maria Maggiore in Rome is said to have been built on the spot where snow had fallen on the 5th of August. 4. The sites of Telraessus and Sagalassus are described by Count Lanckoronski in the Beilage of the AUg. Zeitung, 1890, April 14. But why does he say that Alexander took Telmessus^ cf. Arr. 1, 28, 2. For the site of Telmessus (Termissoi) cf. Murray's Handbook for Asia Minor, p. 1 20, for that of Sagalassus, ibid. p. 150. CHAPTER XXIII ISSUS — TYRE — EGYPT (333-331) Darius was so impatient to conquer Alexander that he would not await his attack in the flat country east of the mountains, but marched towards the sea-coast to meet him (Nov. 333). The result was that at the same time that the Persian king advanced by the shortest route across the mountains to the point on the coast Avhere he supposed Alexander to be, the latter proceeded by the easier but longer route southwards to the city of Myriandrus, which was on the sea, so that Alexander on his arrival there learned that Darius was behind him. He immediately faced about. He pointed out to his generals that the vigour of their own soldiers and the feeble- ness of the Asiatics would secure them a victory over the latter, and that the Greeks in Darius' service would not fight as bravely in their capacity of mercenaries as the Greeks in the ^Macedonian army. He reminded tliem that the Ten Thousand had conquered the Persians, although they had not the splendid cavalry which the Macedonians now possessed. The Persian army was drawn up in a plain on the shore about three miles broad outside the city of Issu.s ; their front (to the east) was protected by the river Pinarus, and they were about GOO, 000 strong.^ The main body of their army consisted of mercenaries, 30,000 Greeks and G0,000 barbarians, called Cardaces, who formed the first line, the Greeks on the right, the barbarians on the left. Behind these the rest of 330 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. the army was crowded together in uselessly deep formation. Most of the cavalry were on the right wing close to the sea. Darius made part of the left wing deploy on the hills to the eastward, so that these troops might have fallen on the Macedonian rear, if there had been any generalship on the Persian side. Darius was in the centre of his army in his chariot. Alexander used his centre and right wing for the attack, his left under Parmenio had to remain on the de- fensive. A few hundred Macedonian soldiers sufficed to hold in check the large force Avhich was making the flank move- ment on the hills. As at the Granicus, Alexander crossed the stream in full view of the enemy, hurled himself at once with all his force on their centre and broke it up. The enemy's left wing fled immediately ; nearer the sea the Greek mercenaries made a better stand, and they would not have been routed so soon, at any rate not Avithout great loss on Alexander's side, had not Darius, as soon as he saw his left wing in full flight, given the signal for the rest to flee. There- upon the Persian cavalry on the right wing, which had gained some advantages, fled as well. The whole Persian army became a confused mass of fugitives. About 100,000 men, among them some 10,000 cavalry, were cut down. Arrian does not give the number of losses on the Macedonian side. According to Diodorus they were 300 infantry and 150 cavalry. Darius fled at first on his chariot ; he then threw away his shield and continued his flight on horseback; it was asserted that relays of mares, which in their anxiety to get back to their foals would gallop faster than horses, had been stationed ready for this purpose. With what contempt must stories of this kind, when they were circulated and apparently confirmed by the actual cowardice of the king, have inspired the Macedonians for everything Persian. The most remarkable part of the booty was the tent of Darius with his mother, wife, two daughters and a young son, whom the king had exposed to danger and then left in the lurch. XXIII ALEXANDER IN PHOENICIA 331 An Asiatic conqueror would at once have placed the women in his harem ; Alexander treated them with a consideration which recalls the age of chivalry. From the battlefield he proceeded to Phoenicia, where Aradus and Marathus sur- rendered to him. In the latter city he received a letter from Darius, demanding the restoration of his family and declaring his readiness to form an alliance with the king. Alexander replied that Darius must acknowledge him as master of Asia, the rest would then be arranged ; if not, it was open to him to try another battle. Parmenio now marched to Damascus, where he captured much treasure and took prisoners some Greeks who had joined the Persian side. These were a Spartiate, two Thebans and an Athenian, Iphicrates, son of the famous general Alexander spared them all. The Thebans he released out of pity for the fate of their city, the Athenian for the sake of his name ; the Spartiate he at first kept prisoner, but gave him his liberty too after he had gained some more factories. His plan now was to occupy Egypt as soon as possible, but this was prevented by the resistance of Tyre.- This city had become richer than ever after the fall of Sidon, and imagined it could defy Alexander. The Tyrians had at first sent word to the king that they would obey his orders ; but when Alexander replied that he would enter their city to sacrifice to his ancestor Heracles, they declared that they could not admit foreigners into it, that even Persians had not been granted admittance. Alexander could not put up with this, for in that case Tyre would remain independent, and do what she liked with her ships. No doubt he had hitherto neglected the Persian fleet, but to permit its basis and origin, the capital of Phoenicia, to remain independent, was equivalent to allowing the enemy's fleet to exist for an unlimited period, and that this would not do was proved by Avhat had hap- pened meanwhile in the Aegean. True, the result of the battle of Issus was that the Persian fleet, which had once more 332 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. appeared at Siphnos, on this occasion with 100 sail, withdrew to Chios ; but its leaders had given the Spartan king Agis 300 talents, with which his brother Agesilaus made a descent upon Crete from the promontory of Taenarum, a rendezvous for mercenaries. In itself this was not serious, for Crete was a remote point, and Antipater held Greece proper in check by means of Chalcis and Corinth. But even here the Persian fleet might eventually create disturbances, as the dislike of Macedonia was increasing rather than diminishing among the Greeks. What they expected from the Persians, and what close relations were maintained with the latter, especially in Athens, is shown by the fact that before the battle of Issus it was fully believed there that the moment had come for the Persians to ' trample on ' the Macedonians. Alexander Avas therefore obliged to take Tyre, and this was no easy matter, for the city lay on an island and possessed ships of war, while Alexander had none ready to hand. Besides, the Persian fleet cruising in the Aegean might come to Tyre's assistance. But Alexander followed the example of Dionysius at Motye ; he built a mole from the mainland to the island. That had been easy enough for Dionysius, for he had a fleet and the water round Motye was quite shallow ; but Tyro was surrounded by deep sea. When in spite of this the mole approached the city walls, the Tyrians interrupted the works and even destroyed the besieging towers placed on the dam by means of fire-ships. Meanwhile, however, Alex- ander collected a fleet of 80 Phoenician, 120 Cypriote, 10 Rhodian, and 14 other vessels, which enabled him to attack from the side of the sea as well. The Tyrians at first wanted to have a naval battle, but when they saw the number of Alexander's ships they kept theirs in their two harbours, which faced north and south. Alexander's ships, however, could not get close to the walls of the city, because large blocks of stone were lying in the water in front of them. They had to be dragged out of their place, which entailed much trouble and SIEGE OF TY-RE 333 fighting. The Tyrians at last attempted another sortie by attacking with tlieir nortliern fleet the portion of the Mace- donian fleet which hiy opposite the northern harbour at a time when Alexander happened to be in the south. They had of course the advantage of being able to survey the whole scene of conflict from the city. But although they Avarned their fleet from the walls in good time, yet Alexander came so quickly to the aid of the threatened squadron that the Tyrian vessels were driven back with loss into the harbour. After this the Tyrians were obliged to confine themselves to the defence of the walls, and these were at last attacked from all sides. On the south the wall had been demolished to such an extent at one point that it was possible to get on w^hat was left of it from the ships by means of ladders. Alexander decided to force his way into the city at this place. But to divert the attention of the inhabitants, he ordered a general attack upon the whole line of wall and upon both the harbours, and while his ships forced the defence of the southern harbour, and penetrated into the northern one, which was left o^jen, he himself with a picked body of men scaled the wall at the point in question and was soon in the city. The butchery was great. The Macedonians were specially incensed, because the Phoenicians had killed some prisoners on the top of the walls and then thrown their bodies into the sea. Eight thousand Tyrians perished; the Macedonians lost four hundred men during the whole siege, among |them Admetus, the captain of the Hypaspistae, who had penetrated into the city first by the side of his king. Alexander pardoned those who had taken refuge in the temple of Heracles, among whom were King Azemilcus and some Carthaginian envoys. The Carthaginians had behaved differently at the conquest of Acragas ; they had put every one to the sword. Thirty thousand Tyrians were sold as slaves. Alexander now celebrated the festival of his ancestor Heracles, and set up the engine which had made the fatal breach as a votive oflcring in the temple (Aug. 332). 334 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. During the siege of Tyre a fresh message arrived from Darius,^ offering Alexander 10,000 talents as ransom for his family, his daughter in marriage, and Asia as far as the Euphrates. " I would accept it if I were Alexander," said Parmenio. "And so would I," retorted Alexander, "if I were Parmenio." He sent back word that it was unnecessary to offer him territory and money ; that he would marry Darius' daughter if it so pleased him ; and that if Darius wanted anything of him, he could come to him. The route to Egypt now seemed open, and it was so if Alexander did not halt at Gaza, which refused to surrender."* But the fall of Gaza was necessary for his prestige. The city lay on rising ground some twenty furlongs from the sea, which was shallow there ; its walls were lofty and strongly built. The engineers declared that it was impossible to build engines of sufficient height to demolish walls of that kind. The king thereupon threw up an enbankment against the wall and began the attack there ; but it was repulsed, and Alexander himself was wounded. He now surrounded the whole city with a mound of earth, 250 feet high and 1200 feet broad, but at the same time undermined the wall of the city, presumably at a spot where no embankment had been thrown up. Then the city was stormed, and the fourth assault was successful. The men of Gaza were put to the sword, the women and children made slaves (Nov. 332). Alexander now marched to Egypt, which the governor Mazaces handed over to him because he could not help himself. The Egyptians always had an antipathy to the Persians ; some of the Greek mercenaries who had fled to Egypt from Issus had behaved badly ; the satrap had no Persian troops ; hence there was nothing left to him but to surrender. Alexander sacrificed to Apis and the Egyptian gods in Memphis, and thus at once secured the affection of the people. But he also paid honours to the Greek deities, by holding an athletic and ' musical ' comi^etition. A ' musical ' competition consisted xxiii ALEXANDER AND THE ORACLE OF AMMON 335 mainly of the performance of dramas. Thus Greek poetry was introduced into the East under Alexander's auspices. He now sailed down the Nile to the sea and noted a spot on the coast near the town of Canopus which seemed to him suitable for a large city. He immediately marked out the streets and squares, and as his men ran short of chalk they used flour to trace the lines, which gave the soothsayers an opportunity of prophesying the future wealth of the city, which was called Alexandria. From there he journeyed to the oracle of Ammon (Egyptian Amon) in the desert (in the spring of 331). The route must have been perfectly well known, as many had travelled by it for years past ; but two serpents are said to have glided in front of Alexander as messengers from the god. He questioned the oracle without witnesses, and, according to Arrian, it gave him the answer which he wished. A rumour spread that it had recognized him as the son of Zeus. Alexander had inherited a good deal of religious mysticism from his mother. The Greeks had long regarded Egypt as the source of profound wisdom, and the oracle of Ammon, which represented the Greek religion in its connection with Egypt, enjoyed great repute throughout the whole of Greece. Was it not natural that the career of Alexander, which seemed to furnish ocular demonstration of what had hitherto been only related of demi-gods, should have suggested to the priests of Ammon the idea that here was a son of the gods come down among men 1 And was it not just as natural that Alexander himself should be penetrated with the belief that it was as the priests stated 1 Henceforth he hardly regarded himself as the general of the Greeks, who indeed would have nothing to do with him, but rather as the king destined to be master of the world. Upon his return to Memphis, he reorganized the government of Egypt. He put the civil aflfairs of the province first under two and then under one nomarch ; the troops were placed under several separate commanders. Clcomenes of Naucratis, whom he 336 HISTORY OF GREECE appointed administrator of the adjoining districts of Arabia, was entrusted with the collection of the revenues of the pro- vince. Arrian considers that this method of governing Egypt foreshadows the system of the Romans, who treated this province with special care.^ In Tyre, whither he now returned, he also held an athletic and a ' musical ' competition. Envoys from Athens arrived here on the state vessel Paralus, and begged for the liberation of the Athenians taken prisoners on the Granicus. He granted this and all their other requests. He then despatched 100 ships to the Peloponnese, where there were still some disturb- ances. Harpalus, one of his oldest adherents, whom he had appointed treasurer on account of his military incapacity, had fled with the treasure-chest shortly before the battle of Issus ; Alexander pardoned him and reappointed him treasurer. Harpalus subsequently made off a second time with a large amount of treasure and created great trouble in Greece. "^ A move was now made towards the interior of the Persian empire. So far every country which had ever had relations with Greece — Asia Minor, Phoenicia, Egypt — had fallen into his hands. It Avas now the turn of the regions which the Greeks were acquainted with only as travellers or as soldiers. Alexander was obliged to go on, as Darius Avas not reconciled to his defeat. NOTES 1. The battle of Issiis, Arr. 2, 6-11. For the surrounding dis- trict, see Neumann, Zur Landeskunde und Gesch. Kilikiens, IV, Jahrb. f. Phil. Bd. 127. Treatment of the women, Arr. 2, 12 ; Plut. Alex. 22.— Of the Greek mercenaries in the Persian army 8000 under Amyntas and other generals escaped by way of Cyprus to Egypt, where Amyntas TroXvirpayixoviov ri diroßviljo-Ket vTTo TMv ky^iap'njiv^ Arr. 2, 1.3 ; Diod. 17, 48. Correspondence with Darius, Arr. 2, 14. The Greeks in Damascus, Arr. 2, 15. Doings of the Persian fleet in the Aegean, Arr. 2, 13, 4-6. State of public feeling in Athens, Aesch. Ctes. 164, where the word XXIII NOTES 337 KaTaTraTeij/ corresponds to tlie expectation of the Persians (Arr. 2, 6, 5) before tlie battle of Issus. KaTaTraretv is a technical expression : Xen. Hell. 3, 4, 12, The Pompeiian mosaic presents the critical moment in the battle of Issus. 2. Siege of Tyre, Arr. 2, 16-24. Glück, De Tyro ab AI. M. oppugnata, Königsb. 1886, is valuable as a criticism of the authori- ties. For the topography cf. Pietschmann, Gesch. der Phönicier, Berl. 1889, p. 64 seq., who makes use of the works of Movers, Renan (Mission de Ph(5nicie) and Prutz (Aus Phünicien). It is probable that the so-called Egyptian harbour in Tyre was more to the south-east, near the mole, yet Kenan's remark quoted by Pietschmann (p. 66) as to the impossibility of reconciling a southern harbour with Arrian's account of the siege, is not very clear. 3. Overtures for peace by Darius, Arr. 2, 25. 4. Siege of Gaza, Arr. 2, 26, 27. Alexander's unworthy treat- ment of Batis, who had defended Gaza, was related by the rhetori- cian Hegesias. Grote (Lond. 1888, X, 92) believes it, Droysendoes not. A rhetorician is not a safe authority. 5. Alexander in Egypt, Arr. 3, 1-5. Droysen, 1, 1, 304 seq. — Founding of Alexandria, Arr. 3, 1, 2 ; according to Erdmann, Zur Kunde der hellenistischen Städtegründungen, Strassb. 1883, the date should be Jan. 20, 331. — Doings of the Persian fleet, Arr. 3, 2, 3-7 ; cf. Droysen 1, 1, 313-316. — March to the oasis of Zeus Amnion, Arr. 3, 3, 4'; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 316-323. Droysen assumes that the esoteric doctrine of the priests of Ammon rested on the certainty of a future life and the connection of the idea of the priesthood with that of the monarchy. If the priests recog- nized Alexander as son of Amon Ea (cf. Meyer, Gesch. Aegyptens, pp. 252-327, 398) it is possible that Alexander may have honestly accepted it ; mysticism of this kind was part of his character. Government of Egypt, Arr. 3, 5 ; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 324. 6. Alexander's march to the Euphrates, Arr. 3, 6. VOL. Ill CHAPTER XXIV GAUGAMELA — MARCH TO THE JAXARTES (331-329) Alexander crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus without being attacked by the troops stationed there nnder Mazaeus.^ He then marched some distance in a northerly direction, turned eastwards when near the mountains, crossed the Tigris and continued his route to the south. At Gaugamela, close to the ancient Nineveh, he fell in with Darius' enormous army, which was composed of the various tribes dwelling between the Jaxartes and the Euphrates. There are said to have been a million infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 scythed chariots and 15 elephants ; even now there were still Greek mercenaries among them. Darius had selected the field of battle — an open plain, on Avhich the spaces reserved for the scythed chariots had been specially levelled.^ Arrived in sight of the foe Alexander first gave his army a rest — if the enemy had chosen the spot, he would choose the time — but he examined the ground to see if ditches or stakes had been dug or placed on it, and then he knew the battle- field as well as the man who had chosen it. Parmenio advised him to make a night attack on the enemy, but Alexander replied : " I do not steal a victory." In his eyes a battle was a contest in the old Greek sense of the word. While Alex- ander was preparing for battle Darius wearied his troops with constant sentinel duty. He occupied the centre of the line and was surrounded by Persians of the highest rank and CHAP. XXIV BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA 339 by the Greek mercenaries, on whom he rightlj' most relied. Bearing in mind that he was outnumbered in the pro- portion of twenty to one, Alexander formed, in addition to his main line of battle, the left wing of which was again led by Parmenio, a second line, which, drawn up in rear of the first, could, if occasion arose, check any attempted outflanking movement of the enemy. He then began his advance (Oct. 1, 331), bearing to the right along the enemy's front, and looking for a suitable point to break through. There- upon Darius, who on this occasion really exerted himself to the utmost, made his attack, first sending his chariots against the enemy, and when they did the Macedonians no harm, ordering up his infantry. But this was fatal to him. For as they advanced gaps arose in their ranks, and into these Alexander hurled himself with his mounted lancers and his phalanx. The Macedonians aimed at the faces of the Persian nobles, who were as terrified at this as the Eomau aristocrats at Pharsalus. Darius behaved as he had done at Issus, and was the first to fly. This decided the battle. Alexander had still to look after his left wing, which was being rather hard pressed ; when, however, the enemy was repulsed in this quarter also, he engaged in pursuit. The battle cost the Macedonians 100 men and over 1000 horses ; the Persians are said to have had 30,000 killed and a still larger number made prisoners. After this Darius was unable to collect another army. He fled across the mountains to Media, where he was safe for the moment, for Alexander had first to subdue Babylonia. It was uncertain whether he would not have to fight for the city of Babylon, but it surrendered ; the Babylonians came out to do him homage — a scene depicted in Thorwaldsen's famous relief.^ Alexander rebuilt the shrines in Babylon Avhich had been destroyed by Xerxes and offered sacrifice to Bel in the way prescribed by the Chaldaeans. The government of the province was entrusted to three persons, a satrap, a general, 340 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. and an officer of finance. The ancient centre of Asiatic civili- zation was henceforth devoted to Alexander. He now marched to Susa, where he found 50,000 talents of silver, and some works of art which Xerxes had brought from Greece, among them the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which Alexander sent back to Athens. In Susa he held a genuine Greek festival, an athletic contest and a torch-race, and then pushed on eastwards (Dec. 331). To reach the high plateau of Iran he had to pass through a wild mountainous region, and to scale several terraces accessible only by narrow passes."* He first forced a passage through the country of the Uxii, and then, following the road which leads from Babehan to Kalah-i-Sefid, came to a narrow mountain pass fortified by a wall, and defended by 40,000 infantry and 700 cavalry. It could not be carried by a direct assault. But Alexander, with a portion of the army, got to the rear of it by a difficult route, while the rest of the force under Craterus attacked the enemy in front ; they were dispersed, and the road to Persae or Persepolis, the capital of the province of Persis, lay open. Here the king found immense treasures — 120,000 talents according to Diodorus. Alexander burnt the royal citadel to the ground ; by this he evidently wished to signify to the whole of Asia that the splendour and power of Persia were at an end, and that the world now had another master.^ After a stay of some length in Persis Alexander proceeded to Media (in the spring of 330). He had heard that Darius wanted to fight another battle with him. But this was not so ; the king fled farther north, and Alexander pursued him thither after making some arrangements in Ecbatana (Hama- dan). His route lay through the Caspian Passes.*^ This is a narrow road not leading to the Caspian Sea, but skirting the edge of the plateau of Iran on the southern side of the Elburz range, a chain which runs parallel with the southern shore of the Caspian. Pie had thus come into the country east of Teheran, the modern capital of Persia. There he XXIV DEATH OF DARIUS 341 learned that Darius had been deserted by many of his troops and was a prisoner in the hands of some satraps, who wished to make use of his name to continue the resistance to the conqueror, to whom otherwise the Persian king would prob- ably have submitted. The most active of these satraps was Bessus of Bactria. It was of great importance to Alexander to get Darius into his own hands. He therefore accelerated his march, and eventually hurried on with a small force. Bessus had made himself king and was dragging Darius along with him ; the Greek mercenaries had withdrawn. At last Alexander overtook the fugitives, who offered resistance for a moment, and then continued their flight after mortally wounding Darius. Darius died before Alexander came up with him (July 330). The conqueror sent his body to Perse- polis, where it was buried with royal honours. Hyrcania and Parthia, provinces at the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea, now surrendered to Alexander, who, since the death of Darius, might be considered the lawful king of Persia. He marched somewhat farther westwards into the country of the Mardi (now Gilan), a damp forest region on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. When the last of the Greek mercenaries of Darius, to the number of about 1500, surrendered, he took them into his service, and gave them the same pay which they had received from Darius ; some Spartan envoys, however, who were with them, he retained as prisoners. After a fortnight's stay in Zadracarta, the capital of Hyrcania, where he held an athletic contest, he marched farther eastwards. At first he stopped close to the range between Iran and the desert, in the district around Meshed, the sacred city of the Mahommedans, watered by an arm of the river Heri-rud. Here Alexander was in the most northerly part of the province of Aria, the satrap of which was Satibarzanes. The latter submitted and received forty Macedonian Hypaspistae as a guard. The king had decided to march to Bactria against Bessus, when he was 342 HISTORY OF GREECE informed that Satibarzanes had put his forty guards to death. He had therefore to subdue the whole province of Aria first, otherwise it would have become the rendezvous of his enemies. This is the most important part of the modern Afghanistan, the position of which between Persia, Turkestan and India gives it such prominence. Alexander hoped to have captured Satibarzanes in Artacoana (in the neighbourhood of Herat), but the satrap escaped to Bactria. Alexander then marched farther southward into the country of the Zarangi, Drangiana, the satrap of which, Barsaentes, one of the murderers of Darius, had fled to the Indians, but was given up by them. Alexander put him to death. This region, on the river Hilmend, in the district of Seistan, famous in later Persian legends, was inhabited in Alexander's time by the Ariaspae, called by the Greeks Euergetae, who gave Alexander a friendly reception. Here the king learned (in the autumn of 330) that one of his most trusted companions, Philot as, the son of Parmenio, had known of a conspiracy against him and had not reported it. In accordance with Macedonian custom he brought him before the court of the army, which con- demned him to death. ^ Alexander, however, was not content with having him killed, he also put Parmenio to death in Ecbatana, although no treason had been proved against him. Meanwhile Satibarzanes, who had appeared on Alexander's rear, was conquered and slain. The king now marched through Arachosia (Candahar) to the north-east, crossed the mountain chain which bounds the valley of the Cophen (Cabul river) on the south, and had now reached, in mid- winter, the southern spurs of the great range of the Caucasus (Hindu- Kush) which separates Iran from Turkestan. About the end of 330 or the beginning of 329 he crossed this chain by a snowy pass at an altitude of 13,200 feet — a march compar- able to that of Hannibal over the Alps. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of Anderab he reached the northern country of Turkestan, the western part of which was then as now a XXIV ALEXANDER IN TURKESTAN 343 desert traversed only by nomad tribes, whereas the eastern part, on the Oxus and on the Jaxartes, contained more extensive tracts of fertile land than now. These regions were at that time inhabited by highly civilized tribes, Bactrians and Sacae, who held the nomads in check. This country was one of the principal seats of the Persian religion, and Alexander was bound to subdue it if he wished to have a firm hold of Persia. He soon reached the city of Bactra (Balkh), and captured a rocky stronghold which the Greeks called Aornus. After crossing the Oxus he was informed that Spitamenes and Dataphernes were prepared to give up Bessus to him, and Alexander sent Pto lemaeu s, the son of Lagus, to fetch him. But the latter had to use force to take Bessus prisoner. Bessus was asked by the king why he had behaved so badly to his master, and he replied : "To gain Alexander's favour." He was scourged and afterwards executed. Alexander next marched by way of Maracanda (probablj^ Samarcand) to the Jaxartes or Tanais, the farthest point he reached in the north, where he founded a city, probably the modern Khojend. His return southwards was hastened l>y the fact that Spitamenes had attempted to seize Maracanda in his absence. In this Spitamenes was unsuccessful, but he succeeded in destroy- ing a Macedonian division on the Polytimetus (Sarafschan). Alexander's return to Maracanda drove him into the desert. It was not till he reached these northern regions and India that Alexander had serious difficulties to overcome. Here he had to deal with tribes which were not degraded by despotism, whether as rulers or as subjects. NOTES 1. Alexander from the Euphrates to the battle of Gaugamela, Arr. 3, 7-10. Al. and Parmenio : ala-)(oi' elvai KX'expai rrjv viKrjv, Arr. 3, 10. Alexander regarded a battle in the old Greek fashion as an dyu)v ; he was not a leader of mercenaries like Ipliicrates. 344 HISTORY OF GREECE 2. The battle of Gaugamela, Arr. 3, 11-25. They struck at the faces of the Persians with the ^dotois ; in the battle of Pharsalus too the conquered general was the first to flee. Alexander sees after Plataea, sends booty to Croton, Plut. Al. 34. 3. Alexander in Bal)ylon, Arr. 3, 16. The remains at Susa have now been described by Dieulafoy, L'acropole de Suse, vol. i. Par. 1889. 4. For the roads which led to the plateau of Iran, cf. Grote, Lond. 1888, X. 116 seq.; Droysen, 1, 1, 354 seq. ; Spiegel, Eran. Alterthumskunde, 2, 622 seq. ; Stolze, Verh. der Ges. f. Erdkunde, Berlin, 1883. 5. Persepolis and Pasargadae have sometimes been regarded as one and the same place ; those who consider Pasargadae to be a distinct city, which is more probable, place it either in the neigh- bourhood of Persepolis or near Fasa, to the south-west of Shiraz ; cf. Spiegel, Eran. Alterthumskunde, 2, 616-621, and Nöldeke, Aufs, z. pers. Geschichte, Leipz. 1887, pp. 135-146 ; maps in Justi's Geschichte des alten Persiens, Berl. 1879, and in Spruner-Menke IV., where however the scale appears to be wrong. At all events Persepolis can be recognized in the ruins called Tachti Dschamschid, and belonging to buildings dating from the time of the Achaemenid kings. Some distance to the north of these often-described palace ruins are four royal tombs called Nakschi Rustem, and still farther to the north-west, near the modern Murgab, is a building, which from the descriptions of the ancients must be regarded as the tomb of Cyrus. Nöldeke and others consider this the site of Pasargadae, which appears to have been the original capital of the Persians, until Darius I. made Persepolis the capital, which, however, in earlier times was called by the Greeks Persae only ; the name Persepolis Avas probably first introduced by Plutarch. The Greeks first heard of the place through Alexander, which is explained by the fact that Susa was generally the seat of government and of the court. ^ — -Alexander's exploit in Persepolis has been much embellished by legend. According to Diod. 17, 70 and Curtius, 5, 6, 6, a massacre took place at the conquest of Persepolis. 6. For the Caspian Passes see Spiegel, Eran. Alt. 1, 63 and 2, 532. Mordtmann assumes Semnan to have been the scene of Darius' capture and Dauletäbäd that of his murder. Zadracarta is Asterabad or was in its neighbourhood, Spiegel, 2, 537. For Hyrcania (Verkana) and the river Gurgan, Sp. 1, 60 ; for Parthia, Sp. 2, 630 seq. The capital of Parthia was Hecatompylus, which is either Dameghän or Shahriid, Sp. 2, 536. For the country of the Mardi, Sp. 2, 538 ; it is in the neighbourhood of Demavend. For Gilan and Masanderan, see Sp. 1, 66, 67. — Alexander marched XXIV TRIAL OF PHILOTAS 345 up the Ettrek into the valley of Meshed. Drangiana, Sp. 2, 541 ; according to Spiegel the Ariaspae are a part of the Drangiani. For the mythical dynasty of the Caianidae in Segestan, especially Zal and Rustem, cf. Spiegel, 1, 565 seq. Arachotus, Sp. 2, 543. Alexandria ad Caucasum, Sp. 2, 543 ; the city of Drapsaca may perhaps have been the modern Anderäb, Sp. 2, 544 ; cf. Sp. 1, 11, and 46. — For the direction of Alexander's march to the north cf. also Droysen, 1, 2, 35 seq. The Bactrians and the Sogdiani, Dr. 1, 2, 38 ; according to Sp. 1, 403, the Bactrians and Sogdiani spoke an Iranian dialect, and the merchants and farmers in these provinces were also of Iranian descent ; they were, however, surrounded by nomads for the most part of foreign extraction, who were called "EaKat by the Persians. They are a 'EkvOlkuv yevos according to Arrian, 3, 8, 3 (according to Herod. 7, 64, the Persians call all Scythians 2aKat) ; but they are allies of Darius, Arr. 1.1. Genuine Turanians, however, are only the peoples designated by the name of '^KvOai, with whom Alexander fought in the country of the Jaxartes. — The identity of Maracanda with Samarcand is doubted by Spiegel, 2, 546. — Alexander builds seven cities, Sp. 3, 548. / — "^ 7. Alexander's conduct at the trial of Hiilota ^is strongly con- demned by Grote (Lond. 1888), X, 128. ' He considers Philotas innocent. Of course we cannot say now whether he really was concerned in a conspiracy against Alexander or not. Indications of such complicity are recorded, but they may be exaggerated. There is, however, no intrinsic improbability of his guilt. It is a known fact that many well-born Macedonians were dissatisfied with Alexander, and, moreover, that conspiracies and attempts at murder were not out of keeping with the manners and customs of the Macedonian nobility. Consequently if a military court found Philotas guilty, what right have we to say that its verdict was unjust? Grote is so biassed that he never mentions the fact that another general, Amyntas, who was charged with the same offence, was acquitted (Arr. 3, 27), although this shows that the court did not act with precipitation or blindness. Moreover Alexander's system- atic decriers have omitted to mention a circumstance which in itself justifies the condemnation of Philotas. Philotas had not discharged the duty accepted by him of reporting the existence of any conspiracy to the king, which even Grote (X, 136) admits to be the case. We have therefore a general in the suite of the king, who is also his commander-in-chief, undertaking to report any conspiracy against him but not doing so, which of course consider- ably increases the possibility of a successful attempt on the king's life. If conduct of this kind in war time is not to be brought 346 HISTORY OF GREECE (,hai'. xxiv before a military court, and if a general who acts in this way is not punished, there is an end to all discipline in the army. It is impossible for us to say what punishment ought to have been meted out to Philotas ; at all events the Athenians executed generals for less cause. The death of Philotas, therefore, has nothing exceptional about it. On the other hand, the murder of Parmenio was an act of sheer despotism. — For the camjiaign of Alexander in Bactria and Sogdiana cf. F. von Schwarz, Alexanders des Gr. Feldzüge in Turkestan, München, 1893, with maps. It is a very good com- mentary to Arrian and Curtius. CHAPTER XXV Alexander's cajmpaign to the hyphasis (329-326) Towards the close of the year 329, Alexander proceeded to Zariaspa, which was in the neighbourhood of Balkh, and went into winter quarters there. ^ Here he was \asited by Scythian envoys, who offered him their king's daughter in marriage, and by Pharasmanes, king of the Chorasmians near the Sea of Aral, who begged him to march westwards.^ Alexander, however, declared that he would not do so until he had conquered India. While at Zariaspa he adopted several measures for the pacification of the pro\änces on the northern frontier. In this quarter the resistance was more obstinate than in any other district, and was due not only to the vigorous character of the inhabitants and their attachment to their old religion, but also to the large number of isolated and almost inaccessible mountain fortresses, and to the proximity of the desert, to which the fugitives could escape. Alexander despatched detachments in various directions and also led some of these expeditions in person. At last the Massagetae, with whom Spitamenes had taken refuge, grew tired of the war, and to put an end to it, cut off the head of Spitamenes and sent it to Alexander. The king remained in these regions until the summer of the year 327. He spent the winter of 328-327 in Nautaca beyond the right bank of the Oxus.^ It was here that two remarkable exents occurred, the murder of "Clitu^aud the marriage with Roxana. 348 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. The former is one of the saddest incidents of Alexander's life.^ It is one of the outward signs of the change which had taken place in his character, a change which can be fully accounted for by the influence of circumstances upon his peculiar nature. His rapid conquest of the greatest empire in the world must have increased his amour propre. If this was wounded, then his wrath boiled up. He had long been chang- ing from a Macedonian king and a Greek general into a Persian monarch, the god-like position of which must have had a special attraction for a man who declared himself a son of Zeus. After the encouragement given to this frame of mind by the flattery of servile Asiatics and crafty Greeks, contradiction from Macedonian nobles seemed insupportable to him. And these magnates were not inclined to become mere courtiers ; they held all the more firmly to their own view. The result was that at a drinking-bout in Maracanda, Clitus, who had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus, not only refused to admit a comparison between the king and the Dioscuri and Heracles, but even praised Alexander's father, King Philip, to his face, declared that Alexander could not be a god, because the gods did everything of themselves, whereas Alexander had won his victories by the aid of the Macedonians, and finally exclaimed that he himself had been Alexander's preserver. Thereupon the king's rage burst forth. Clitus was removed but came back again, and Alexander ran him through with a spear. He was seized with remorse at once and wanted to take his own life, and when prevented from doing this remained without food and drink for three days. He never committed an outrage of this kind again. He had acted in a sadden outburst of passion, and his remorse was so strong that his first step in the path of violence was also his last. But this did not make him relax in his endeavour to rule Asia in Asiatic fashion, which led to many ^dolent collisions with the Macedonians and the Greeks who resisted it. His partial adoption of Asiatic costume was repugnant enough to XXV ALEXANDER'S POLICY IN ASIA 349 the Macedonians. But a far greater grievance was the low- obeisance (prosJcynesis), customary with the Persian monarchs, which he demanded of all, including the Macedonians. This was intolerable to the Macedonians. Modern admirers of Alexander have urged that the adoption of Persian court /'^ ceremonial was necessary from a political point of view. No doubt it was a good thing that Alexander should not meet Orientals as a foreigner ; but it was very doubtful policy to make the approach to their ways consist of giving up the Greek and playing the despot. It would have been better to have had nothing to do with ceremonies which have never prevented an Oriental from murdering his sovereign, and which consequently were of no real use to Alexander. After all, it was a Greek — Lysander — who had first claimed to be regarded as a god, and it was Greeks who led Alexander in the wrong direction. A bad influence was exercised especially by the sophist Anaxarchus, who when summoned to tranquillize the king after the murder of Clitus, declared that everything which so god-like a being as he did was good. The Olynthian */ Callisthenes, a relative of Aristotle, who had been sent by his kinsman to the king to write his history, also behaved if not badly at any rate injudiciously. He performed his task in such an extravagant manner as to gain the reputation rather of a panegyrist of the king than of a historian. But he was still more pleased with himself ; he, he asserted, was the man without whom the hero could not go down to posterity, and he therefore regarded himself as Alexander's Homer. Callis- thenes disapproved of the vanity of the king in wishing to be worshipped, and on one occasion, at a festival, when the others made the genuflection proposed by the Persians present, and were rewarded by a kiss from the king, Callisthenes refused to pay this tribute of respect, and remarked when he received no kiss: "Then I am poorer by a kiss." This annoyed Alexander, and on the discovery soon afterwards of a con- spiracy of the royal pages against his life, in which Callisthenes 350 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. was supposed to be implicated, he was condemned with the rest and carried about with the army in a cage and died soon afterwards. The second important event, the marriage with an Asiatic, arose in this way. Alexander was besieging a mountain stronghold in Sogdiana, held by the satrap Oxyartes with his family. It was considered impregnable, and the defenders sent word to the Macedonians that they must learn how to fly if they wanted to get up to it. By the offer of enormous rewards — twelve talents to the first man up, eleven to the second, and so on to the twelfth — the king persuaded a numl)er of soldiers to risk the climb. A few actually reached a point above the fortress itself. Thereupon Oxyartes sur- rendered. Alexander was so charmed with the beauty of his daughter Roxana that he married her. This was a great step towards the reconciliation, of conquerors and conquered.^ The marriage has been celebrated by the art of the painter (Sodoma's picture in the Farnesina at Rome). All that is known besides of Roxana in history is that she had a son by Alexander, of the same name, born in 323, that after her consort's death she put to death his other wife, the daughter of Darius, and that she was killed with her son by Cassander in the year 311. When the northern provinces appeared to be pacified,^ Alexander turned in the direction of India (in the spring of 327). There was no strategical reason for undertaking this expedition, and no political one in the proper sense of the word. It was a passion for new and unheard-of exploits' which urged the king onwards. He wanted to show that he was really a hero, a new Dionysus or Heracles. He wanted to conquer a country which was sure to be rich in marvels of all kinds. He began his march to India with about 120,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.''' In the valley of the Cophen (Cabul) he divided his army, sending Hephaestion and Perdiccas direct to the Indus to secure the passage of the DEFEAT OF PORUS 351 river, and proceeding himself through the valleys of the northern afiluents of the Cophen. Here he captured a fortress called Aornus, which even Heracles was supposed not to have been able to take, and visited Nysa, said to have been founded by Dionysus near Mount Meros. This was the first place at which they found ivy, laurel, and vines, and festivals were held to Dionysus. The reunited army crossed the Indus, l^robably at Attock. To the east of this place, between the Indus and the Hydaspes (the modern Jhelum) lay the terri- tory ruled over by Taxilas, who joined Alexander. But on the Hydaspes fighting began again, for this was the kingdom of Porus, who was not inclined to submit. Porus had occupied the eastern bank of the Hydaspes with his army. Alexander could not repeat the exploits of the Granicus and of Issus here. The Hydaspes was not a Pinarus, and Porus was not a Darius. Alexander was obliged after all to ' steal ' his victory for once. He misled Porus by marching with the larger part of his army to a distant point where he could cross the river without being seen, and left the di\dsion under Craterus opposite Porus, who thought it was the whole Macedonian army, and therefore did not keep an eye on the farther bank. He did not see what had happened till Alexander had crossed ; then he sent a division of his army accompanied by his son against Alexander, Alexander defeated it, and Porus's son was slain. He then attacked Porus himself. He was superior to his enemy in cavalry, but there was great danger to the Macedonians in the 180 elephants of the Indian king, owing to the terror which these animals inspired in horses. If Porus had taken the offensive, he would probably have won the day, but he awaited Alexander's attack. Alexander first charged the Indian cavalry near the river and routed them. The elephants were now brought into play and pressed the Macedonian phalanx. But the cavalry outfianked the Indians and drove them into a narrow space, where the maddened elephants became the ruin of their own army. The Indians sustained a 352 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. complete defeat, 20,000 men and 100 elephants were killed, the rest became the property of the Macedonians. Porus fled last of all, wounded, upon his elephant. Alexander, who had admired his bravery and gallant bearing during the battle, sent Taxilas after him, to induce him to surrender ; but Porus hurled his spear at his pursuer. He would not surrender until he dropped from exhaustion. Alexander asked him what he wanted. " To be treated like a king," replied Porus. "That I will do for my own sake," said Alexander, "what else ? " " That includes everything," was the Indian's answer. Alexander, who always respected courage and like pointed replies, restored him his dominions with additional territory, and Porus henceforth remained a loyal ally of Alexander. Alexander now marched farther eastwards and crossed the Acesines (Chenab) and the Hyraotes (Ravi). Here he was opposed by the Cathaeans, whose fortified city Sangala he took. This brought him to the river Hyphasis (Beas) which now joins the last river of the Punjab, the Sutlej, but which then flowed in a separate bed. Alexander never reached the Sutlej ; he wanted to cross it, but at this point the instrument of his power broke in his hands ; his soldiers would go no farther. They had probably heard that this was a natural boundary, that farther north near the mountains there was a continuation of fertile country, but that southwards lay a great desert, and when this was crossed that they would find new kingdoms and new peoples with whom there would be endless fighting. They no longer had any inclination for this. Well- nigh eight years of constant warfare was quite enough, and those who had joined the army late, in Bactria for instance, had not even made much booty. It Avas a wonder that things had gone smoothly so far. Now they were a hundred times farther from Macedonia than Athens was from Thebes. Alexander endeavoured to change their mind by a personal appeal. He pointed out that hitherto they had been always victorious and that they would be so in the future ; he appealed ALEXANDER'S RETURN to their sense of honour. For a man of lofty mind, he said, j the end of a task can only be prescribed by the nature of -^ it. He then explained his ideas as to future campaigns. They would reach the Ganges, which flowed into the Hyrcanian Sea ; after this came the Indian and then the Persian Ocean ; then they would come from Libya to the pillars of Hercules, and would thus have conquered the whole of Asia and Libya ; if this were not done, the previous conquests would never be quite secure. Alexander waited to see if any one would reply. But no answer came for a long while. What were the soldiers to say to his geographical disquisitions 1 They kneAV nothing of these matters and probably suspected that Alex- ander was in the same predicament, but they could not tell him so. At last one of the chief officers, Coenus, addressed him. He simply said that the army could not go farther. He might have mentioned that seventy days of tropical rain had exhausted the strength of the troops.^ When they all exclaimed that they agreed with Coenus, Alexander declared that he would continue his march with volunteers, and with- drew into his tent, where he remained for three days. He hoped that they would yet give way. But they did not. He then consulted the gods, but on the sacrifices which he had performed turning out unfavourable he resolved to return. There was great joy in the camp ; the invincible had yielded to his own soldiers. He had twelve altars as hfgh as towers built to mark the limit of his advance, held a gymnastic and hippie competition, and recrossed the Acesines to the Hydaspes, where he completed the building of the cities of Nicaea and Bucephala which had been already begun. Of the Indian world with its strange character and civil- ization, of the land of the Sacred Ganges with its shady groves in which the ascetic led a life of contemplation, the land which had produced the A^aried lore of the Vedas and the long epics of the heroes, which was destined more than two thousand years later to enrich European knowledge with VOL. Ill 2 A 354 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. new and fruitful views — of this Alexander saw only the fringe, the country of the Five Eivers, the Punjab. How keenly must the intrepid and inquiring hero have regretted that he had to turn back at the threshold of what seemed to him a mysterious sanctuary. Who knows whether in India the conqueror might not for a time have given place to the student. He was not permitted to see the wondrous land of Brahma and Buddha, and had to be content with controlling four distinct spheres of civilization, so far as this could be done by a single man : the Hellenic, the Semitic, the Egyptian and the Iranian. And that was more than any one did before him or after him. An emjjire which embraced these four important groups to the extent that his did was unique in the history of the world, and even for the mighty Alexander the burden of this dominion was too great. NOTES 1. Cf. Geiger, Alex. Felilziige in Sogdiana, Neust, a. d. H. 1884. It is doubtful whether Zariappa and Bactra are identical. Grote and Kiepert (§ 59) assume it ; Droysen (1, 263) thinks other- wise ; he considers Zariaspa to be Audscliui, to the west of Balkh (Bactra) ; Spiegel (2, 553) leaves the point undecided. The in- trinsic difference between eastern and western Iran must not be overlooked ; the latter was much more infected with despotism than the former ; cf. Kiej^ert, Geographie, §§ 56, 57. 2. Pharasmanes mentions the Colchians and Amazons to Alex- ander as peoples whom he ought to visit. For Chorasmia (Chvarizm, i.e. lowlands), the country on the lower Oxus, cf. Sp. 1, 47 ; Kiepert, Lehrb. d. alten Geogr. § 60. 3. According to Spiegel 2, 544 the site of Nautaca cannot be exactly determined ; it is usually supposed to be Neksheb or Karslii, to the S.E. of Bokhara. — As regards the stubborn re- sistance of the Sogdianians Spiegel (3, 49) says : " It is not unlikely that religious motives had something to do with the obstinate resistance of the Sogdianians, for Spitamenes probably was of the bouse of Zarathustra and held priestly offices." 4. Murder of Clitus, Arr. 4, 8, 9 ; Curt. 8, 1, 2 ; Pint. Alex. 50-52 ; Droysen, 1, 2, 70 seq. — Fate of Callisthenes and the TrarSes, Arr. 4, 10-14 ; Curt. 8, 5-8 ; Plut. Alex. 53-55 ; Dr. 1, 2, XXV ALEXANDER AND THE PROSKYNESIS 355 88 seq. — I cannot agree with Droysen (several passages, esp. 1, 2, 17-19; 63; 90; 273) in thinking that Alexander's wish to be reverenced in Oriental fashion by the Macedonians and Greeks was justifiable. Droysen starts with the assumption that these marks of royal dignity were so necessary in the eyes of the Orientals that Alexander was obliged to demand them from the Macedonians and Greeks as well, to prevent invidious distinctions among his subjects. The mistake in this view is that it is a moral depreciation of Alexander's State, for the position of the Macedonians and Greeks in relation to their king was of a loftier and more dignified character than that of the Persians. Con- sequently if the former had to be degraded to the position of the latter for the sake of the unity of the empire, then this empire had no raison d'etre for the outside world. The most that we can do is to make allowances for Alexander's human tendency to err. Droysen says (1, 2, 273 and elsewhere) that his recognition by the Greeks as a god was "the first and most important step towards accustoming the Greeks to the belief in liis majesty whicli was held by the Asiatics, and which he regarded as the main foundation of his sovereignty." This contains the admission in the first place that adoration was indispensable only for Alexander's view, whicli does not prove that this view was correct. In tlie second place, Droysen's remark is based on an error with regard to the Greeks. They must have been singular Greeks who would have imbibed a ' belief ' in the divinity of Alexander by this means. To the Greeks the proshjnesis involved no question of belief, but was simply a ridiculous ceremony. dvrjTov [xev avSpa irpoa-Kvvovvres, says Isocrates (Paneg. 151) disparagingly of the Persians. And the Greeks were now expected to pay this mark of respect to the king of Macedonia ! As a matter of fact these external ceremonies were of no use even in Asia, as is shown by the cases of Bagoas and Bessus. Alexander must have known this perfectly well, and if he ignored it the reason was that he was blinded by an exaggerated idea of his own importance. He might also have reflected that two races of diflferent civilization cannot be blended by degrading the higher and more independent one to the level of the other, and depriving it of the privileges to which it is accustomed. Of course we must not forget that the unprecedented success of Alexander's career may have turned his head, and this may account for his infatuation. That conflicts with the more independent oatures broke out so quickly was due to the fact that there were two sides to Alexander's nature ; he was not content with being simply a god, he was also a human being who liked to amuse himself with human beings in a human wav. He did not 356 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. want liis divinity to stand in the way of the pleasures of Greek and Macedonian social life ; and the two things were incomj)atible with each other. A monarch who wishes to be regarded as a god must not carouse with those from whom he demands adoration. The Persian kings were aware of this ; Alexander disregarded it. The murder of Clitus and the degradation of Callisthenes both took place at drinking-bouts, when the king''s boon com- panions presumed more in their cups than they would have ventured to do when sober. Droysen (1, 2, 15 seq.) combats Aristotle's view that Hellenes ought to rule over barbarians ; he does not approve of the Greeks "being able to exploit and im- poverish Asia in its defenceless state with their refined selfishness and audacious cleverness," by means of Alexander (16). The Macedonians come off quite as badly, many of them having become "Asiatics in the worst sense of the word" (19). But the proshynesis was no remedy for this, either in the case of Greeks or of Macedonians, and those who share Droysen's views on the Greeks and Macedonians would wish that Alexander had never set foot in Asia at all. Droysen has thoroughly grasped the profound meaning of Alexander's efforts, viz. the blending of East and West, but is wrong in defending all the methods employed by Alexander for this purpose. If one nationality invades and conquers another, it does not do so because it considers the other nobler than itself. Consequently the ascendancy of the Greeks over the Orientals was necessary for a time at any rate in Alexander's empire. Alexander in his youthful enthusiasm wanted to be in advance of his age. — For his costume, cf. Plut. de AI. M. Fort. 1, 6. 5. Spiegel (2, 556) says of the stronghold of Oxyartes : "There is a pretty general consensus of opinion that this citadel was near the narrow pass which was afterwards called Derbend Kaluga, east of Kesh. For Kesh see Droysen, 3, 2, 324 ; cf. also Dr. 1, 2, 77. It is the district south-east of Bokhara, on the southern slope of the range. For the various mountain strongholds conquered by Alexander, cf. Niese, p. 122, n. I. 6. Droysen (1, 2, 28) assumes that Sogdiana and the Trans- Oxus border territory were left almost independent by Alexander. In the same way he created a kind of Indian border - country. Many Greek cities in these northern regions, Dr. 1, 2, 83. In Persepolis Alexander chastises the Persians ; in Bactria and Sogdiana he favours the natives, and he continues this policy in the future. 7. For the march to India cf. Lassen, Ind. Alterthumskunde, Bk. 2, the geographical conclusions of which are summarized by ^^^ NOTES 357 Spiegel 2 562 seq. ; A. Cunningham, Ancient Geography of India, Lond. 1871 ; Lefmann, Geschichte des alten Indiens, Beil • Grote (Onckensche Weltgesch.), pp. 743-755; Lezius, De AI m' ?il' 1 ««r' ?r^'- l^^'^ ' ^^^"^^^■^' ^^- ^- G^r. ind. Feldzug: Colb. 1886. Alexander's march from Bactria to the Cabul valle? Droysen, 1, 2, 101 seq. Droysen is uncertain as to which pass Alexander chose; Spiegel (2, 562) thinks it was the Pass of Kawak. For Nysa (Arr. 5, 1), Dr. 1, 2, 109, 110. The Kafirs (unbelievers) who live in these mountains cultivate the vine • cf. Sp. 1,396 seq.; 3, 51 ; and the coins of King Agathocles with Bacchic attributes may refer to this people (Head, H N 704) For the countries north of the Cabul Eiver cf Sp. 2, 564* Aornus IS Avarana according to Lefmann 745, according to Droysen, 1, 2, I Ln '' ^'''''S^'^'^ ^^'^^ t^ie mouth of the Cabul River ; cf Sp 2, 565. At Taxila the army saw "the Indian ascetics for the first time," Dr. 1, 2, 123. Taxila (Takshasila) and Porus (Paura Paurava, successors of Puru) are names of dynasties, Spiegel, 2 566 ; Kleiner Lehrb. d. alten Geogr. § 36 ; Lefm. p. 746. F«; Uie site of the battle with Porus cf Dr. 1, 2, 129 following Elphinstone, Kabul, 1, 132; Sp. 2, 567: Lefm. 746 ; Cunning- ham, 159 seq. 'Cathaean' is probably Indian for 'warrior' Sangala according to Lassen is Amritsir ; cf. Lefmann, 749 For the names of the rivers cf. Sp. 2, 570; Kiep. § 36 ; Lefm. 750 Hydaspes is the Sanscrit Vitastä, «the swiftly-flowing'; th^ gandrabhaga which sounded like 2av8po<ßdyo,, was renamed by the Greeks AK.a.vv;?, 'healer.' Hyraotes is the Sanscrit Iravati ™f- ^''^'7; Hyphasis is Vipusa, 'unfettered.' Then came the gatadru 'huiiclred running,' mod. Sutlej, into which flows the Vipasa (mod. Beas), the old bed of which is now dry 8. The rains, Arr. 5, 94; Diod. 17, 94. In Arr. 5, 26 1 Alexander does not say, as Droysen (1, 2, 157) and Sintenis assume that work exists for its oVn sakk Vo oie would have believed him if he had. He says that every task has its own measure ^... must be completed, ^^pa, in Arrian means end To aim. Niese p. 139) thinks that Alexander did not want to penetrate ar into India, and that his speech to the sold' rs as EriciL''' '"'"""^' '^ "^' S^^^'^^' ^^^ --"t^d ^y -n ÜHAPTEE, XXVI CONCLUDING YEARS OF ALEXANDER'S REIGN — AGIS — HARPALUS (326-323) A RETURN being unavoidable, Alexander determined to turn it to account by exploring and occupying hitherto unknown regions (326). He wanted to see the mouth of the Indus, which he had at first thought was identical Avith the Nile. He himself with a portion of his troops embarked on the Hydaspes ; the rest of the army had to accompany him on both banks. ^ Nearchus was in command of the fleet. Arrian relates that the unwonted spectacle and the noise of the pass- ing ships attracted the neighbouring tribes, and that they struck up their songs as they stood on the banks. Alexander sailed with all speed, as he wished to surprise the Oxydracae and Malli who lived farther down the river. After passing the narrow channel at the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Acesines, he sent on the fleet to the point where the Hyraotes flows into the Hydaspes, and marched through the desert into the country of the Malli. In trying to capture a city here he got into a critical position. The Indians withdrew into the citadel, and Alexander hurried after them with a handful of men and climbed the wall. The ladder then broke and Alexander with a few companions was cut off. Instead of waiting he jumped down and was at first exposed for a time to the enemy's attacks quite alone, and afterwards with those who had followed him, CH. XXVI ALEXANDER'S RETURN MARCH 359 especially Peucestas, Abreas and Leonnatns. He was wounded in the breast and sank to the ground, whereupon Peucestas held over him the sacred shield taken from the temple of Athene at Ilium, of which he was the bearer. At last some other Macedonians penetrated into the citadel and all its defenders were cut down. The dart had to l)e cut out of the king's breast. While he was being removed he fainted a second time from loss of blood. The ai'my thought he was dead ; great was the joy of the soldiers when he came to them on the Hyraotes, and they saw him wave his hand to show them that it was not a corpse which was being brought to them ; and when he reached the shore and actually mounted a horse, the shouts of delight seemed endless. They touched his knees, his hands, his clothes, and threw ribbons and flowers at him. He now descended the Indus into the country of King Musicanus, who submitted, but afterwards revolted and was hanged. Alexander then sent a third of the army under Craterus westwards through Iran and proceeded with the rest by way of Patala, where the Indus divides into two arms, to the sea, in which he observed the phenomenon of the rise and fall of the tide. He now undertook an unprecedented journey (325). He despatched the fleet by the ocean on a voyage of discovery to the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris, and took the route through Gedrosia himself with the army, keeping as close to the coast as possible in order to maintain his communications with the fleet. This was a terrible march, as it led through the sandy deserts of Beloochistan, one of the hottest regions on the face of the earth." It took him sixty days to reach Pura, the capital of Gedrosia, a distance of 500 miles, and the army suffered unspeakable hardships. It was a consolation that this march quite eclipsed the exploits of Semiramis and of Cyrus, the only potentates who according to tradition had taken the route with an army, and the result showed that Alexander was more fortunate than they, for Semiramis was 360 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. said to have reached her destination Avith only twenty soldiers, and Cyrus with only seven, whereas Alexander lost only three-fourths of his troops. It was on this march that some soldiers brought Alexander the only water which could be found in a helmet; he poured it into the sand before the whole army, to show that he did not intend to fare better than his soldiers. On one occasion Alexander himself discovered the path which the guides, who were supposed to know the countr}»^, Avere unable to find. From Pura he marched to Carmania, where Craterus joined him.^ Alexander here offered thanksgiving sacrifices, and took his preserver Peu- cestas into his body-guard, Avhich had hitherto numbered only seven : Leonnatus, Hephaestion, Lysimachiis, Aristonous, Perdiccas, Ptolemaeus, son of Lagus, and Peithon. Nearchus, too, put in an appearance and reported the incidents of his voyage.^ From Carmania Alexander proceeded to Pasargadae, where he resumed the government of the empire, Avhich, OAving to his long absence, had lost all unity. Gross abuses had crept in. A Mede, named Baryaxes, had proclaimed himself king; the satrap of Persis, Orxines, had plundered some sanctuaries. Both were put to death. Orxines' post was given to Peucestas, Avho adopted Oriental dress to please the king. The satrap of Susa and his son were also executed for maladministration. ^ If oflfenders AA^ere punished, the loyal AA'ere to be reAvarded, and the population of the vast empire made to sec that the king valued Asia as highly as Europe. A formal union of these two sections of the globe AA^as carried out on a grand scale at Susa.*" Alexander married the eldest daughter of Darius, Barsine (by some called Statira), and also Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Ochus. Another daughter of Darius he bestoAved on his friend Hephaestion ; Craterus, Perdiccas, Ptolemaeus, Eumenes, Nearchus, Seleucus, and many others, eighty in all, Avere given Persian ladies of rank for Avives. The Aveddings Avere celebrated together in one great festival. XXVI DISCONTENT OF THE MACEDONIANS 361 Ten thousand Macedonians, who had also married Asiatic women, received rich presents. The people of Asia were thus able to see that Alexander did not despise them. The Macedonians, however, were gratified in another way as Avell. Alexander heard that many of his soldiers were greatly in debt in spite of all the booty they had made. He ordered all Avho were in this position to report themselves, stating that he would pay their debts. At first only a few came, because they were afraid of a vexatious enquiry ; but when they saw that the king's sole object Avas to help his followers, all dis- closed the amount of their debts, and 20,000 talents were distributed for this purpose, without even a record being made of the names of the recipients. Peucestas, Hephaestion, Nearchus and Onesicritus, the pilot of the royal ship, received golden wreaths. On the other hand, the introduction of Oriental elements into the army created indignation among the Macedonians. There was already an Oriental division in the cavalry of the Hetairi, consisting of Bactrians, Sogdiani, and members of other eastern races, while the Agema, the flower of the army, contained a number of Asiatics armed with Macedonian spears. On this occasion 30,000 Asiatic youths were besides selected for admittance into the Macedonian army. This the old soldiers would not tolerate. The discontent broke out at Opis, where the king had gone from Susa by a circuitous route, in July 324. When he informed them in person that he Avould send the veterans home with rich presents, they all cried out that he might send the whole army home.^ Alex- ander arrested and put to death the loudest of them and endeavoured to pacify the army. He reminded them of the condition in which his father Philip had found Macedonia, and what he had done for it, how he himself had led them to victory in Asia, that he took nothing for himself but shared everything with them, and had undergone more hardships than any of them. " And now j^ou all want to go and leave 362 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. your king among the vanquished barbarians ! Go, then ! " He then withdrew into his tent and remained there for two days. On the third day he summoned some leading Persians on whom he could depend, and declared that they were his kinsmen. The Macedonians had remained on the spot in a state of indecision and perplexity, and had not been able to make up their minds afterwards. When they heard that the king had declared that the Persians were his kinsmen, they gave way to despair, laid down their arms in front of his tent, and announced that they would not leave the threshold until he had taken compassion on them. The king came out of his tent and was addressed by Callines, a noted leader of cavalry : " What distresses us, king, is that you call Persians your kinsmen, whereas you have never vouchsafed this honour to us." Alexander replied: "You are all my kinsmen, and so will I henceforth call you." At this the soldiers uttered shouts of approval, and a great festival was held with a banquet at which the Macedonians sat next to the king, the Asiatics coming after them. The Greek soothsayers and the Magi poured libations to the gods, and prayers were offered for unity and mutual trust. Nine thousand men are said to have made the drink-offering and raised the hymn of praise together. On this day a reconciliation between Europe and Asia on the basis of mutual respect seemed to be in course of formation. About ten thousand Macedonians, who were too old or otherwise incapacitated for service, now returned home. They each received a present of one talent. The children which had been born to them in Asia were to be brought up in Asia and sent to their fathers subsequently. These veterans were led by Craterus, who was to replace Antipater as governor of Europe. It was supposed that Antipater had fallen into disfavour, and yet in the year 330 he had rendered the Macedonian kingdom a signal service. Sparta had taken up arms under Agis, and was menacing Megalopolis.^ As Athens XXVI DEATH OF HEPHAESTION 363 also threatened to revolt, the Macedonian supremacy in Greece was in a bad way. Thereupon Antipater hastened to the Peloponnese and defeated Agis, who fell in the battle. He had thus saved the position of Macedonia in Europe. But he was continually quarrelling with Olympias and preferring complaints against her, just as she was always complaining of him. Alexander could not decide against his mother. He once said : " Antipater does not know that one tear from my mother outweighs a thousand of his letters." A change in the government of Macedonia was therefore in the interest of the State. Alexander now pro- ceeded to Ecbatana, where he held a gymnastic and ' musical ' competition, and had a drinking-bout with his friends. At this point Hephaestion died so suddenly that the king, who hurried to him on hearing that he was ill, did not find him alive. His grief was unbounded, he could scarcely tear himself away from the corpse. The body was removed to Babylon, and burnt there upon a funeral pile which is said to have cost 10,000 talents. After Alexander had made a winter campaign (324-323) against the Cossaeans, who lived above Susa, he set out for Babylon, there to prepare for new and greater expeditions. As he approached the city the Chaldean priests came out to meet him, and begged him not to enter the city, as it would not be well for him.'^ When he refused to believe them, they begged him at any rate to make his entry from the west and not from the east. But he paid no heed to this ; he thought that the priests did not want him to enter Babylon at all, because they had neglected his orders to restore the temple of Bel and were afraid of being punished. In Babylon Alexander found envoys from neighbouring and remote peoples, a brilliant tribute of homage so short a time before his death. There were Greek, Ethiopian, Scythian, Celtic, Iberian, Libyan, Brettian, Lucanian, Car- thaginian, Tyrrhenian, i.e. Etruscan, perhaps even Roman 364 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. embassies. Arrian does not believe that Roman envoj's were among the number, because neither Ptolemaeus nor Aristo- bulus had mentioned it ; but it is possible, as is supposed, that these historians included them in the Tyrrhenian depu- tation. It is clear that the man who had conquered the whole of the Persian empire and more in such an incredibly short sjDace of time, must have been an object of wonder and curiosity to every nation which paid heed to Avhat was going on in the world. What might not tlie young sovereign yet achieve ! Alexander had originally turned his attention to naval enterprises. He had built ships on the Hyrcanian Sea, which were to explore its limits. In Babylon he found a Phoenician fleet, the ships of which had been transported by land to the Euphrates. Other ships were built in Babylon, and a harbour constructed, capable of containing 1000 vessels. Alexander wanted to conquer Arabia with this fleet, a country the valuable products of which were the subject of exaggerated ideas in antiquity. He first sent three vessels on a voyage of discovery, but none of them carried out the order to circumnavigate Arabia. Alexander himself sailed by the canal Pallacopas to the sea, near which he founded a city. There his turban, the emblem of royal dignity, blew off into the water, and the man who brought it to him tied it round his own head and swam back with it in this position. This was an evil omen for the king ; afterwards it was said that this was Seleucus, who subsequently became king of Syria. Alexander's last scheme was a proposed reorganiza- tion of his army ; the three first ranks and the last rank in the phalanx were to consist of Macedonians with long spears, the twelve inner ranks of Persians with bows and javelins. He evidently wanted to increase the strength of the different corps. The project was not put into execution, nor his plan, conceived about the same time, for bringing Asiatics to Europe.-^'' ALEXANDER AND THE GREEKS 365 Alexander had already, in 324, made two demands on the Greeks which created great excitement among them. The first was that they should recognize his divinity.^^ In what form the request was made is unknown to us, but the re- cognition was to be an act of state, which was possible in Greece. The Greeks complied; Sparta exjjressed her con- sent in truly Laconic fashion as follows: "AVc permit Alexander to call himself a god if he likes to do so." It is difficult to prove that a thing of this kind was necessary in Alexander's interests ; in any case he descended from the first rank among men to the lowest among the gods, and after all he was shrewd enough to know that such a divinity lasts only so long as the power of the man who aspires to it. The second demand was that the Greeks should allow all exiles to return home.^^ ^his was communicated to them by Xicanor at the Olympic Games of 324. It of course pro- duced great rejoicing among the exiles, of whom there were 20,000 present at Olympia, but it created great discon- tent in many states. The order was just in itself, but its technical legal basis was more than doubtful, because Alex- ander was only commander-in-chief and defender of the Greeks, not their law-giver. Hence the execution of it met with difficulties, especially in Aetolia and at Athens, both of which had stolen property in their hands which they would have had to surrender, as the return of the exiles was equiva- lent to an encouragement to them to demand the property of which they had been deprived. The Aetolians were in posses- sion of the Acarnanian Oeniadae, which they had wrested from its inhabitants about the year 330, while Athens had Samos, which she had occupied by founding cleruchies in 365, 361 and 352, and banishing the lawful owners. On this point, where the interests of 4000 Athenians, who had become landowners in Samos, were at stake, Athens showed more tenacity than in the matter of raising Alexander to the rank of a god. She refused her consent, and an incident occurred 366 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. to inspii"e the Athenians with a belief that Alexander's good fortune was on the wane, and that he might perhaps after all be resisted. Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, had decamped a second time, on this occasion with 5000 talents (about £1,200,000). He had collected thirty ships and 6000 mercenaries, and had made his appearance with them in the Piraeus in the spring of 324, with the request to be received in Athens ; he relied on the fact that he was an Athenian citizen. But the Athenians had rejected his proposal. He had then be- taken himself to the rendezvous of rabble of all kinds, the promontory of Taenarum, and there got rid of a good deal of his treasure and of many of his ships as well as of his mer- cenaries. At this point came the announcement of the return of the exiles, and Harpalus saw that the growing discontent of many Greeks, and especially of the Athenians, was likely to improve his prospects. He went back to Athens and was actually received there, because he now had no troops but only money with him. Another of Alexander's treasurers, Philoxenus, demanded the surrender of Harpalus, but the Athenians refused for the moment and decided, on the advice of Demosthenes, to take him and his treasures into custody until some one was specially commissioned by Alexander to fetch him. They were thus acting within their legal rights and yet doing a clever thing ; for Avhat might not happen in the meanwhile 1 The money was removed to the Acropolis, and Harpalus was placed under surveillance. But one day he disappeared. He went to Taenarum again and thence to Crete, where he was murdered by a confederate of the same stamp as himself. And in the meanwhile the money which was being taken care of in Athens had dwindled in a surprising Avay. Harpalus had told Demosthenes as member, perhaps president of the special commission for the custody of his treasure, that he still had 700 talents (over £150,000), and the rumour of this spread forthwith ; but how much was XXVI THE HARPALUS PROSECUTION 367 really taken to the Acropolis, Demosthenes did not at once make public. It soon transpired that the sum Avas much less, and finally it turned out that only 350 talents were really there. When and how had the balance, about £75,000, dis- appeared 1 Demosthenes, as he was bound to do, demanded an inquiry by the Areopagus ; he was ready to die, he is reported to have said, if he could be proved to have stolen anything. The Areopagus, which was composed of elderly men of high standing, held its sittings in secret ; they wished to avoid a public discussion of the city's dis- grace. One of the grounds of the inquiry was Harpalus' account-book, which his slave cash-keeper had handed over to Philoxenus, and the latter had sent to the Athenians. This dealt with the expenditure up to the delivery of the money into the Acropolis, and showed how much had been deposited there. Many Athenians were noted in it as having received money from Harpalus, but Demosthenes' name was not among them. The slave's account-book could of course give no in- formation as to what had been done with the money in the Acropolis, and why it had dwindled from 700 to 350 talents. On this point the Areopagus was obliged to obtain informa- tion from other sources. It did so and made its report, with the result that Demosthenes figured with the sum of 20 talents on the list of those who had taken money from Harpalus. Those who had incurred suspicion through this prelimi- nary investigation now came before the popular court, which for the reasons above mentioned did not enter into any fresh individual inquiry, but merely heard those who came forward as public prosecutors and the counsel for the defendants. The charge against Demosthenes was preferred not only by the philo- Macedonian Dinarchus, but also by Hyperides, a member of Demosthenes' party. Demosthenes admitted that he had taken 20 talents (about £4500) of Harpalus' money, but only as repayment of an advance he had made to the Theoricon, of which he was president. Twenty talents was 368 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. enough to supply all the Athenian citizens with festival-money for nearly a whole year. He was found guilty of- having been bribed to neglect his duty as custodian of the money, and condemned to pay a fine of 50 talents. On his declaring that he was not in a position to pay, he was thrown into prison, from which he made his escape. Other persons were condemned as well.^^ The Athenians then begged Alexander not to insist upon his demand for the return of the exiles as far as they were concerned, and the king, who always treated Athens with the utmost consideration, granted their request. It was not until after his death, after the unsuccessful struggle with Macedonia in the Lamian War, that Athens had to give up Samos. Up to that time the Athenians remained in a better position than the rest of the Greeks. Alexander was not able to carry out any of the great designs which he was still meditating. Soon after Hephaes- tion's costly pyre had sunk into ashes (May 323) he fell ill of a fever; he died in thirteen days (on the 28th of the month Daisios), after having seen his soldiers defile before his couch on the previous day, and feebly waved them his farewell greeting. ^'^ With him disappeared the most brilliant personality which the Greek people ever produced. NOTES 1. Alexander's voyage to the sea, Arr. 6, 1 seq. Alexander wounded, Arr. 6, 6-12. — The Oxydracae and the Malli are the Xudraka and Malava of the Indian Ej)os, Spiegel, 2, 569, Lefmann 749. The city of the Malli, in which Alexander was wounded, was perhaps Multan, according to Cunningham ; of. Droysen, 1, 2, 183-185. — The Xathrae in Arr. 6, 15 are regarded by some as the Sodrae in Diod. 17, 102 ; but the former name recalls the Ksha- tryas (warriors), the latter the Sudras, whom others again identify with the Sogdiana, Dr. 1, 2, 190; all this is uncertain. The site of the Sogdian Alexandria is unknown. Dr. 1, 2, 190, Lefm. 752. XXVI NOTES 369 Musicauus is a word derived from the name of the country called Mushika. The tribes in tlie south were more hostile to Alexander because they were more under the influence of the Brahmins, Dr. 1, 2, 194 seq. The site of Pattala is uncertain, according to Sp. 2, 572 ; according to Lefmann, 753, it is perhaps Hyderabad. For the eastern mouth of the Indus, by which Alexander sailed, cf. Lefm. 753, who follows Cunningham. 2. March through the desert, Arr. 6, 21 seq. ; Dr. 1, 2, 213 seq.; the river Arabius is the modern Purali, cf. Sp. 2, 572. The town of Rambakia, on the site of which Alexander founded Alex- andria, cannot be exactly determined, Sp. 573. For Gedrosia, ibid. 573. The name Pura is Indian. — Alexander throws aw\ay the water, Arr. 6, 26, 3. 3. March of Craterus, Arr. 6, 15, 5 ; Dr. 1, 2, 199. Craterus evidently marched through the Bolan Pass to Candahar. The im- portance of this route in the present day is so great that the Eng- lish have secured it by a railway, and by occupying the fortress of Quettah ; a tunnel is now completed west of Quettah, and English troops can be thrown into Candahar at any moment. 4. Voyage of Nearchus, Dr. 1, 2, 225-228 and Niese, p. 152. 5. For the way in which Alexander's ostentatious march through Carmania and his punishment of some satraps can be turned against him, see Grote (X, ISO). In Grote's eyes, everything which tells against Alexander is good. 6. The festivities at Susa are discussed by Droysen, 1, 2, 243 seq. 7. Opis = Tell Mandschur, Arr. 1, 2, 257. Alexander's speech in Arr. 7, 9, 10 is pronounced by Grote (X, 184) to be " teeming with exorbitant self-exaltation." Is there an incorrect statement in the speech 1 If not, the self-exaltation must consist of his having spoken about himself, for he states nothing but facts. — The (Tvyyeveis, Arr. 7, 9, 6. This word was used afterwards to denote men of high rank at the king's court. Cf. Reinach, Mithridatt, p. 253. 8. Agis' undertaking is not related by Arrian, but by Curtius 6, 1, by the universal historian Diod. 17, 62-63, and by Just. 12, 1 ; there are detached references to it besides ; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 395, also 1, 2, 266 seq. The battle of Megalopolis is placed by Niese (I, 497 seq.) in the year 331. 9. The warning of the Babylonian priests (Arr. 7, 16, 5), /j.r] Trpbs dyaGov ol elvai t7)v TrdpoSov, is quite in the Greek style ; thus the oracles said that it were better something did not happen, e.g. jxt^ KLV€L Kafiapcvav, aKti/T^TOS yap dfieivoDV. 10. The transformation of the army proposed by Alexander VOL. Ill 2 B 370 HISTORY OF GUEECE chap. would have deprived the phalanx of its peculiar chaiacter ; cf. Dr. 1, 2, 232 seq. 11. ^vyx^Mpov/xev 'AAe^ai'8/5w iav ^^Ai; öeos KaXeicrOai, Plut. Apoph. Lac. 12. For the return of the exiles see Dr. 1, 2, 274 seq. As regards the Samians the inscription in Ditt. 119 states that Alex- ander 2u/xtoi/ aTToStSot 2a/xto6s. How could the commander-in- chief of the Greeks make an order of this kind ? cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 99. — The Aetolians in Oeniadae, Plut. Al. 49 ; Dr. 1, 1, 396. 13. The Harpalus trial. The facts are put together by Schaefei', Dem. 3, 320 seq., and by A. Cartault, De causa Harpalica, Par, 1881. I confine myself to a consideration of the most essential points. (I) Did Demosthenes take any of Harpalus' money? He did, because he admitted it himself, and his defenders also admit it, e.g. Sch. Dem. 3, 323. The sum was 20 talents. It is there- fore of no consequence that Harpalus' clerk did not enter Demo- sthenes' name upon the list of recipients. Demosthenes took the 20 talents when the money was handed over to the Athenian commissioners. (2) The so-called justification of Demosthenes. According to Hyp. Dem. 10, he said : KaraK^^prjcrOai avTo. I'/xtv (the Athenians) TrpoSeSareicr/xevos ets to OewpiKov — Sch. D. 3, 323 — i.e. he had advanced 20 talents to the Theoricon, and had repaid himself out of the Harpalus money. But it is incompre- hensible how this can be styled a justification. The Harpalus money belonged to Alexander and was being guarded for him by Atlicnian commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one (Sch. D. 3, 310) ; how could one of these commissioners satisfy a claim which he professed to have on the Athenian state by secretly ab- stracting the sum in question from that money ? It is, however, not even likely that Demosthenes ever made such an advance to the Theoricon, for apart from the fact that 20 talents was such an enormous sum for those days that it is diificult to see how Demo- sthenes himself could have disposed of it with such secrecy, an advance of this kind could have been proved from the accounts of the Theoricon, and in that case the Theoricon would have owed the Harpalus treasure the 20 talents, which consequently would not have been lost. The loan to the Theoricon is therefore a mere subterfuge. The fact remains that Demosthenes approjiriated 20 talents which did not belong to him. (3) Why did Hyperides, a patriot, join in the charge against Demosthenes, who belonged to his own party ? Demosthenes' defenders say that Hyperides knew that Demosthenes was innocent, but was incensed against him for not acting with sufficient vigour against Alexander. But if Demosthenes himself admitted having taken the money, how XXVI THE HARPALUS TRIAL 371 can Hyperides have regarded liim as innocent ? The reason why Hyperides took steps against Demosthenes is very simple. It woukl not do to let it be said that the party had committed theft. Demosthenes had probably taken the money for the sake of the party. It had done it no good ; and the party could not well leave the defence of its honesty to the philo - Mace- donians ; Demosthenes had to sacrifice himself, and he did so. And this did not lead to a split between him and Hy2)erides. Besides, the theory of a false charge of embezzlement against Demosthenes places his character in a very bad light. For if you want to ruin a man by means of a false charge you must take care that it is psychologically justifiable. To accuse Phocion of embezzlement would have been ridiculous. But Demosthenes ? (4) In discussing the guilt of Demosthenes only half the accu- sation is generally taken into consideration. The full charge is (Vitae X or. 846) : alrtav ecrxev 6 A. SojpoSoKtas koc Slol tovto jx-qTe Tov dpLdfj,ov Twv avaKOjXKrdkvTCjiv /jt€/x7yvt)Kws /i.'^Te ti]V twv ^vAacrcrovTwv dfxkXeiav (Sch. D. 3, 322). He was therefore accused of having taken money and of having neglected his duty by not saying how much of Harpalus' treasure was deposited in the Acropolis or that its custodians were not guarding it carefully. And for this breach of duty, which cost the state 350 talents, he was bound to be condemned, even if he had not committed the oftence of taking the money himself — which, however, he admitted ha-vdng done — but had only erred through negligenco. Even Schaefer (Dem. 3, 311) can only put forward the following as an apology for him : " We do not know why Demosthenes put oft' giving this information (how much was really deposited) ; perhaps he wanted to spare those who had taken presents and make it easier for them to escape public animadversion and punishment by restoring the money." Excuses of this kind show that Demosthenes' conduct cannot be justified. In that case we should have an official honoured by the confidence of the people, aware of the em- bezzlement of sums entrusted to him and others (there were only 350 talents forthcoming instead of 700) and not denouncing the offence out of pity for the oftenders, who are to have time to replace what they have stolon. If this was his intention, he could not help letting the thieves know of it, and in so doing wov;ld have become their accomplice. Of course this object would not have been attained, for if the thieves had had an oflicial for their accomplice, they would have taken good care not to disgorge their plunder — as in fact was the case. Demosthenes' alleged good nature would therefore have led only to this result, viz. that thieving would have been cai'ried on more thoroughly. It is quite clear tliat the wih' 372 HISTORY OF GREECE cuap. Demosthenes did not witlihold the information in question out of good nature. This also disposes of Grote's objection (X, 241) that the charge against Demosthenes cannot have been founded on fact, because 350 talents in golvXov'i]y)](7iv rov 'AXe^dvSpov. To this category also belong the cities in the territory of the Cossaeans, the Uxii and the Mardi, mentioned by Arr. Ind. 40. — Heraclea near Rhagae, Str. 11, 514 ; Dr. 212. — Alexandropolis in Parthia, Plin. 6, 113. — Alexandria- Antiochia Plin. 6, 46 is no doubt ]\Ierw-Schahidschan, the most important city on the lower Murghab, in a very fertile region, the oldest city of the district, founded according to the legend by a King Tahmurat ; it served as a defence against the Turanian nomads, Sp. 3, 10. — Prophthasia, St. U.S. v. ^pdSa, renamed by Alexander, Dr. 216 : according to Spiegel, 2, 541, it was some- where in the neighbourhood of Farah, as to which see Sp. 1, 34. — Farther to the N.E. Candahar (Dr. 217 seq.) was probably founded by Alexander, Sp. 1, 28. — The site of Alexandria in the Caucasus is not qiiite certain ; it is not Bamian, and is at any rate to the north of Cabul, Sp. 2, 543. — Twelve cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, Just. 12, 5 ; eight according to Str. 12, 517. According to Arr. 4, 16, 3, Alexander dispatched Hephaestion ras ei' ^oy8. iroXeis crvvoi- Ki^eiv. — Alexandria Eschate, Arr. 4, 4, 1, Plin. 6, 46, probably Khojend, Sp. 2, 548. — At the time of the Emperor Heraclius, Theophylactus 7, 9 refers to two cities founded by Alexander, named Taugast and Chubdan, in discussing which Dr. 224 follows Schott. Stories of Alexander in these regions, Ritter, Asien, 5, 821 seq. — Nicaea, Arr. 4. 22, probably one of the cities which 394 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Alexander founded a day's journey from one another according to Diod. 17, 83 ; its site is unknown, north of the Cahul river according to Dr. 229. — The exact site of Nicaea and of Bucephala on the Hydaspes unknown, Dr. 230. — Alexandria on the Acesines most likely Wusirabad, Dr. 230. — Alexandria on the Indus, Arr. 6, 15, 2, Dr. 230. — The Sogdian Alexandria, Arr. 6, 16, 4, near the city of Bakkar, where the road to tlie Bolan Pass begins, Dr. 230. Cities founded at the mouth of the Indus, those in Gedrosia and Carmania, Dr. 231-236.— City near Babylon, Arr. 7, 21, 7, Dr. 237. — Alexandria at the mouth of the Tigris, Dr. 237. — In found- ing these cities, Alexander fulfilled the justifiable wish expressed by Isocrates (Phil. 120-123). This passage appears to have escaped Grote's notice, otherwise he would not have thrown doubt (X, 206) on the founding of so many colonies by Alexander. Cf. the article in Pauly - \yissowa I. on the cities wdiich bear the name of Alexandria, pp. 1376-1397. Besides tlie article by Puch- stein on the Egyptian Alexandria, we may note that by Andreas on the Alexandria at the mouth of the Tigris, pp. 1390-1395. 6. Chians transported to Egypt, Arr. 3, 2, 7. Soldiers from Samaria to Egypt, Jos. Ant. 11, 8, 6 ; Dr. 249. Military colonists were called koltoikol, garrisons TrapeTrtST^/xovvres, the native troops cyx^ptoi. 7. Alexander wished the barbarians to dwell in cities, that they might become agriculturists instead of nomads and 4'xeii' virep wr Set/xati'oi'Te? [x^] KaKa dXXi^Xov's epyacrwi'Tat, Arr. Ind. 40. This was a truly humane and Hellenic aspiration. For the organization of the new cities see Dr. 3, 1, 32 seq. " It was not the old here- ditary monarchy of Macedon, but Greek polity which Alexander introduced into the East," Mommsen, R. G. 5, 450. The question of the land which the settlers must have received is discussed by Droysen, 1, 2, 291. Alexander ofi'ered cities to Phocion, Plut. Phoc. 18. As regards natural products, I would point out that Stade, in his Geschichte des Volkes Israel, 2, 276, speaks of sup- plies of oil which the inhabitants of the cities of Syria received from the 'cities,' i.e. the cities had land, the produce of which was shared in by the Greeks who had been received into them. 8. Alexander re-established democracy in many cities of Asia, e.g. in Ephesus, Arr. 1, 17, 10-12 (by which he very much tp'SoKifiet) ; in Soli, 2, 5, 8. For Alexandria see Dr. 3, 1, 34. 9. Greek mercenaries : at the Granicus, Dr. 1, 1, 194 ; at Issus, Dr. 1.1. 258 ; 8000 Greek mercenaries escape to Greece and enter the service of Agis, Diod. 17, 48 ; Curt. 4, 1, 39. Greek mercen- aries with Darius and Bessus, Dr. 1.1. 374 ; in Zadracarta, Dr. 1.1. 386. xxvii COIXAGE OF ALEXANDER 395 10. According to Strabo 1, 66, some persons advised Alexander to treat the Hellenes as friends and the barbarians as enemies ; Aristotle is supposed to have been, one of these rtves. 11. According to E. Meyer, Gesch. Aegyptens, p. 58, the Egyp- tians regarded their kings as gods. For the worship of monarchs, see 0. Hirschfeld, Zur Gesch. des römischen Kaiserkultus, Sitzungs- ber. der Berl. Akad. 1888, July 19lh. 12. I now discuss Alexander's coinage. Of. esp. L. Müller, Numismatique d' Alexandre le Grand, Copenh. 1855 ; Imhoof- Blumer, Monnaies grecques, 1883, esp. pp. 118-123; lastly as a short summary. Head, H. N. pp. 197 seq. Philip, Alexander's father, had already to a certain extent struck out a new line in coinage. As possessor of the gold mines of Philippi he minted gold coins which at first bore the inscription 4>IAinni2X and replaced the earlier coins of this jjlace, which were stamped with 0A2ION HIIEIPO, and competed with the darics, but afterwards the name of the city was dropped, and they became imperial coins. Head, H. N. 192. Silver coins, however, were coined by Philip on the Phoenician standard (1 tetradrachma= 224 grains), so that 30 drachmae had the vahie of one gold stater, in the ratio of silver to gold of 1 :12| ; Head, H. N. 196. On Philip's coins we find the head of Zeus, of Apollo and of Heracles, and on the reverse mostly types of the games (teams of horses). Alexander on his accession at first left the coinage untouched ; he had not enough of the precious metals to turn out many new coins. When he was in a position to do so, he began, as Imhoof has shown, by striking silver coins with the head of Zeus on one side, and the eagle and thunder- bolt with the inscription AAEHANAPOY on the other. The tetradrachmae which belong to this category are also of the Phoe- nician standard (327 grains), but the drachmae, triobols, diobols and obols are of the Attic standard, which Alexander subsequently followed entirely. This Avas his chief innovation, the adoption throughout of the Attic standard, for the tetradrachmae as well as the others. There are an immense number of so-called Alexandrian coins, i.e. coins with the inscription AAEHANAPOY, and with various types : tetradrachmae mostly with the youthful head of Heracles in the lion's skin, rev. Zeus sitting on his throne ; gold coins with head of Pallas, rev. a standing Nike ; but how many of these Alexandrian coins were minted by Alexander himself, and how many not till the time of his successors, is still an open question with experts. As a rule it is assumed that most of them originated with his successors. During his period of conquest Alexander had at first so many coins of cities at his disposal, and had obtained so many darics as booty, that it was not till later that a 396 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. coinage of his own seemed necessary. As regards the tj'pes, Gardner's remarks (Tj'pes, jx 51) are interesting: "Abandoning Ares and Apollo, the hereditary deities, who appear on previous coins of Macedon, he had selected for his gold pieces Pallas and her servant Nike, and for his silver coin Heracles and the Zeus of Olympia. It looks as if he had wished to enlist in his army of invasion all the gi'eatest gods of Greece who had favoured the Hellenes in those expeditions against Ilium, which he regarded as the proto- types of his own expedition. Pallas had been the chief patroness of the host of Agamemnon, Zeus had awarded it the victory, Heracles had in a previous generation sacked the Trojan city." It may be noted here that Alexander on landing in Asia sacrificed to Zeus, Athene, and Heracles, according to Arr. 1, 11, 6 — an excellent example of history and numismatics illustrating each other, which, it appears, has not yet been noticed. " These gods then Alexander placed on his coins, which circulated through the whole extent of Europe and Asia, and these gods the marshals of Alexander inherited from him, as they inherited his military tactics and the lands he had conquered." Alexander's new coinage did not prevent the old coinage of the cities and even of satraps (Mazaeus in Babylon according to Six) from being continued. In this direction too Alexander interfered as little as possible with the status quo. Of. also Droysen, 1.1. 302-304, also 233, 234 ; the cities were not boimd down to Alexander's standard of coinage. Alexander did not issue bronze coins for the whole empire ; his bronze issues were only coined in and for Macedonia ; cf. Babelon, Rois de Syrie, 'p. xiii. 13. The results of the conquest of Persia were favourable forthat country, according to Spiegel, 2, 581. 14. For the stories of Alexander, cf. Sp. 2, 582 seq. The pseudo- Callisthenes has been edited by C. Müller, after the Didot Arrian, Paris, 1846, and by I. Zacher, Pseudo-Kallisthenes, Halle, 1867. See also the Life and Exjiloits of Alexander the Great by E. A. N. Budge, Camb. Univ. Press. 1896, a series of Ethiopic texts edited from manuscripts in the British Museum and in the Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris, with English translation and notes, a splendid work, the publication of which is due to the munificence of Lady Meux ; these histories, as the editor remarks, " ai'e not mere translations of the Arabic texts which the scribes had before them, but reflect largely the Christian Ethiopian idea of what manner of man an all-p)0werful king and conqueror would be." Cf. P. Meyer, Alexandre le Grand dans la litterature frangaise du moyen age, 2 vols. Par. 1886. It is remarkable that in pseudo-Callisthenes Demosthenes delivers a speech in Athens in favour of Alexander. XXVII ALEXANDER'S TOSITION IX HISTORY 397 " In India all recollection of the Macedonian conqueror has dis- appeared ; not a trace of his rule is left in the country," Lefmann, Gesch. Indiens, p. 754. Of. finally the fine passage of Gervinus on the stoi'ies of Alexander in his Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung, 1, 211-231. An advocate of democratic views, he yet expresses himself in the following remarkable way on the importance of Alexander (p. 213): "It is only lately that people have begun to place this extraordinary man in his true light, and we have still to wait for a historian who will form a proper estimate of his relation to history in general. In the East as well as in the West he opened out a new world, and in their poetic creations both have coveted the honour of his birth and of his career, they have associated his name with all that is great, and Christian and heathen poets have thrown open the gates of Paradise to him. Long before Christ appeared, Alexander smoothed the path for the Christian doctrines of the equality of mankind by the way in which he destroyed the prejudices of his Greeks and Macedonians on the subject of a hierarchy of mankind, of Hellene and barbarian, and without the introduction of Greek civilization into the East Christianity would never have been able to take root." In the text of this volume I have been obliged to confine myself to an estimate of Alexander's personal achievements ; the last point raised by Gervinus as well as the question of the darker aspects of the imperialism introduced by Alexander belong to the next volume. Alexander the Great was an anomaly in the fourth century b.c. His was an age of talk, he acted. It was of a sceptical turn and ready to appeal to the petty side of human nature ; he had faith, he relied on the noble element in mankind and had no reason to regret it. The combination of almost childlike trust with manly energy, of acute reflection with extraordinary rapidity of action, of perfect intellectual development and love of art and science with a passion for military life and great administrative talent, makes him an unique personality not only in Greek but in all history. He is, as it were, a poetical embodiment of the whole Greek character. He represents the whole course of Greek life, for he has as much of Achilles as of Epaminondas ; he has even some- thing of the spirit of Pericles, viz. jiolitical insight and love of beauty and truth. In him even more than in Alcibiades nature showed her power, and he did not waste her gifts like Alcibiades ; fortified by a good education, which Alcibiades did not enjoy, he was able to devote these gifts to great tasks, and in his short life he did little harm, and much good. Even Mommsen (Rom. Geschichte, V, 446) says that Hellenic civilization reached "its highest point" in Alexander. CHAPTER XXVIII SICILY AND ITALY Hellenism did not make such a brilliant display in the West as in the East ; in Sicily it held its ground with difficulty ; in Italy it had to beat a retreat.^ We saw in chapter xi. that Dion, after his banishment from Sicily, was requested by many persons to return to Syracuse to liberate the city ; Speusippus, a pupil of Plato, who had also been in Syracuse, conveyed him the invitation of a number of Syracusans. Plato himself did not advise him to go. Dion undertook the expedition, but did not go alone as many had desired ; he took with him mercenaries, any number of whom could be obtained at that time (about 360 B.c.) for money. The treasures of Dionysius were a tempting bait for men in quest of booty. In the year 357 he sailed with 800 mercenaries for Zacynthus on board three transports and two thirty-oared ships, with a large store of provisions and arms. He was at first driven out of his course to the great Syrtis, and afterwards landed on the south coast of Sicily near Minoa, a city belonging to the Carthaginians, the governor of which however was a Greek on friendly terms with Dion. The governor did not seriously oppose Dion's landing, and even helped him on his march to Syracuse, which he commenced at once, on hearing that Dionj^sius happened to be in Italy just then. On the way his army increased to 20,000 men. He entered Syracuse amid the CHAP, xxviii DION IX SICILY 399 jubilation of tlie people ; but the citadel, i.e. the island of Ortygia and the adjacent portions of the mainland, was still held by the mercenaries of Diomsius. The latter returned and opened negotiations with Dion, but only for the purpose of attemj)ting a surprise, which was repulsed. He now endeavoured to accomplish his object b}^ other means. Dion of course was his near relative, and the tyrant succeeded in making the people believe that Dion Avas at heart not a friend of liberty, but a supporter of the tyrannis, only on his own account. A Syracusan, named Heraclides, who came to Syracuse with a fleet and mercenaries to take part in the war against Dionysius, became a greater favourite Avith the people than Dion. A contest for supremacy arose between Dion and Heraclides, while Dionysius Avas still unconquered. In 356, hoAvever, Dionysius sustained a great bloAv by a defeat at sea, in Avhich Philistus, the Avell-knoAvn historian and a rela- tive of the tyrant, lost his life. Dionysius then fled to Italy, leaving his mercenaries under the command of one of his sons. The Syracusans noAv thought they could do Avithout Dion and deposed him ; he retired to Leontini. But Avhen a cap- tain of mercenaries named Nypsius, Avho had come from Naples, made a successful sally from the citadel into the city of Syracuse, the citizens, Avho had no other resource, invoked Dion's aid once more, and he drove the troops back into the citadel. In spite of this, hoAA^ever, the public mind Avas not set at rest. Dion Avas not popular Avith all classes, not even Avhen Apollocrates, the son of Dionysius, surrendered the citadel to him in 355. Xow Avas an oj^portunity for displaying his talents as a statesman. He ought to haA'e pulled doAvn the citadel, and reintroduced a democratic constitution. But he Avas a disciple of Plato, had a poor opinion of democracy, and Avanted to found an ideal constitution, for Avhich purpose he aAvaited the arrival of some advisers from Corinth, AA^ho never made their appearance. On Heraclides becoming more and more obnoxious to him, he alloAved him to be put to death. 400 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. He had now become a tyrant himself, and the solemn funeral rites which he ordered for the murdered man were only a proof of a weakness of character which utterly unfitted him for such an exalted position. Henceforth he relied more and more on his mercenaries, and very soon on one of them only, his ostensil)lc friend Callippus, an Athenian, who, either of his own accord or at the instigation of others, fostered Dion's suspicions of everybody, isolated him more and more, and finally had him assassinated (in 354). Thus ended the first attempt at reaction against the regime of Dionysius, an attempt which Avas doomed to failure because it was made by the wrong kind of man and on mistaken principles. If the people were to take an interest in the change, they should have been given self-government, i.e. a democracy should have been introduced ; if, however, Dion wished to school them in philosophical ideals and make them happy in that way, he ought at all events to have done something definite and tangible. But to overthrow a tyrant in order to rule as a tyrant himself, and then do nothing but wait, was a policy which seemed incomprehensible and intolerable even to the Syracusans with all their variety of strange experiences. Callippus reigned during 354 and 353, at first under the mask of liberty — for had he not murdered a tyrant 1 — and then as a tyrant. He was deposed by Hipparinus, a step- brother of young Dionysius and nephew of Dion. Callippus occupied Catana and subsequently Ehegium, where he was murdered. On his death in 351 Hipparinus was succeeded by his brother Nysaeus until 346, when Dionysius once more obtained possession of the government. Hipparinus, Nysaens and Dionysius II. were about on a par with each other in incapacity and depravity, and the Syracusans in their despair applied to Hicetas of Leontini, a tyrant, but not so bad in their oj^inion as Dionysius, Before, however, Hicetas could do anything for Syracuse, a new enemy invaded Sicily : the Carthaginian Magon landed with a large army. His object TIMOLEON 401 was the conquest of Syracuse, and Hicetas joined him. The Syracusans therefore had to look about for aid in another quarter and at a greater distance. Sparta was not to be thought of ; she had seldom displayed any interest in republican Syracuse. But Corinth had always done her best for the liberty of the Syracusans, and the latter therefore, in accord- ance with old Greek custom, appealed for help to Corinth, their parent city. Corinth was not strong enough, even in the period of peace which succeeded the Phocian War, to send an army to Sicily ; but she despatched a general, and this one man accomplished more than a large army. When the citizens were asked who was ready to go with troops to Syracuse, a man of about sixty-five years of age volunteered. This was Timoleon, who twenty years previously had been the object of general sym- pathy under the following circumstances. He had been a silent accomplice in the murder of his own brother, Timo- phanes, who had made himself tyrant of Corinth, and on realizing the ghastly nature of the deed afterwards, had withdrawn from public life as having committed too grave a crime to co-operate with honest men in the government of the State. He accepted the post offered to him, hoping that a second and guiltless suppression of a tyrant would wipe out the horror of the first. Hicetas' recjuest to Timoleon not to hurry only increased his zeal ; it was evident that Hicetas was afraid of the Corinthian. Up to that time Hicetas had fought with success, and when Timoleon put to sea with ten ships in 344, he had driven Dionysius into Ortygia and the citadel. When Timoleon was at Ehegium, Hicetas and the Cartha- ginians declared that they "svould not allow him to land in Sicily. But by outwitting the Carthaginian envoys Timoleon was able to embark, and on his arrival in Sicily he met with a friendly reception from Andromachus, the ruler of Tauro- menium. In the meanwhile the Carthaginians occupied the harbour of Syracuse, and thus the city was in a critical posi- VOL. Ill 2 D 402 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. tion. But Timoleon defeated Hicetas at Hadranon, and after this the whole position changed. He now found allies ; even the tyrant of Catana, Mamercus, joined him. When he appeared before the walls of Syracuse, Dionysius, who saw there was no possibility of holding out longer, and who had always pre- ferred idleness to an active life, concluded a treaty with him, by which Dionysius was assured of an asylum in Corinth, and the citadel of Syracuse with its stores of arms handed over to Timoleon. Dionysius lived in Corinth for a long time as a well-known character, and managed to obliterate the memory of his former misdeeds by his eccentricities. In his character of begging priest and schoolmaster he Avas left un- molested. The " king in exile " was allowed not only to wander about the streets, but also to accompany Philip of Macedon when the latter visited Corinth, on which occasion Dionysius showed by his clever replies that his wit at all events made him a worthy counterpart of the other curiosity of Corinth, the Cynic Diogenes. Timoleon, however, was still very far from a complete success. A force of auxiliaries sent from Corinth was detained in Thurii to help the inhabitants against the Bruttians, and Timoleon himself only escaped by a miracle from being assassinated in Hadranon at the instigation of Hicetas, while the citadel of Syracuse was blockaded by Hicetas and the Carthaginians. But as the enemy were attempting to wrest Catana from Timoleon, the Corinthians made a sortie from Ortygia on Achradina and held it. The Corinthian reinforce-, ments now arrived, and Timoleon was able to confront his two enemies, Hicetas and Magon, with more prospect of success (343). Strange to say, Magon now withdrew, probably OAving to the internal affairs of Carthage. His withdrawal made Hicetas' position a critical one. He still held three of the five quarters of Syracuse, but Timoleon by a skilful attack captured them all from him. Timoleon's first task Avas to make Syracuse a free self- xxviii TIMOLEON IN SICILY 403 governing community. The tyrant's citadel was pulled down, and courts of justice were erected on its site. Syracuse and the other Greek cities of Sicily were almost depopulated ; Timoleon took measures to bring the fugitive Siceliots back to their homes. But the organization of domestic affairs had to suffer interruption from formidable wars. First of all, the tyrants of the eastern half of the island were defeated, then operations were directed against the Carthaginians, who in 339 (according to Diodorus' chronology) sent a lai^ge army to Sicily. Timoleon could not oppose them with many Syracusan citizens, he had to rely mainly on mercenaries, some of whom mutinied on the march. He met the Carthaginians on the river Crimisus, and completely defeated them. He himself decided the day by an attack of his heavy armed troops upon those of the Carthaginians, who were in large force and bril- liantly equipped. A thunderstorm rendered him twofold service by driving into the enemy's face and making the ground slipperj^, which Avas a greater drawback to the very heavily armed Carthaginians than to the Greeks. The Car- thaginians also had war-chariots, which however did as little harm to Timoleon's Greeks as the Persian chariots a few years later to Alexander's troops. ^ The booty was enormous. The pursuit of the defeated army was not carried far ; Timoleon had to return to the east of the island, where Hicetas was still holding out, and where Mamercus also rose against him, while Carthage sent a fresh army to Sicily, which defeated some of Timoleon's mercenaries. This mishap, however, was interpreted as a mark of diAane favour, for the mercenaries came from Phocis, and if Timoleon was rid of these temple- robbers, that was a proof that the gods were propitious to him. He had become a saint to the Sicilians, somewhat like Garibaldi in our days. Timoleon concluded peace with the Carthaginians on terms which were not unfavour- able to them : the river Halycus (Platani) was recognized as the eastern boundary of their territory. He then de- 404 HISTORY OF GREECE feated the tyrants, and put Hicetas and Mamercus to death. Timoleon now turned his attention once more to the internal aflfairs, not only of Syracuse, but of the Sicilian communities in general. The ancient and famous cities of Camarina, Gela and Acragas received new inhabitants, some of whom came from Italy, Greece and the islands. Great restlessness prevailed in the Greek world at this time. People journeyed from east to west and from west to east, served as mercenaries, settled in newly-founded or newly-colonized cities. The Leontinians had to migrate to Syracuse. The removal of populations had become such a matter of custom in Sicily that even the best democrats had recourse to it under certain circumstances.^ Timoleon spent the rest of his life in Syracuse, highly honoured, an arbitrator for the Siceliots and still more for the Syracusans. He died as early as 336. As regards the popu- lation and the preservation of Greek civilization in the island, his work had some elements of permanence ; on the other hand, the liberty which he introduced was soon destroyed by Agathocles. His is a heroic figure, Avorthy of a place beside Epaminondas and Alexander. He shared Epaminondas' love of freedom and modesty — he attributed his successes to Automatia, the favour of the gods — and Alexander's successful zeal for the Greek element ; his ability as a general he had in common with both. The fourth century B.C. is extremely rich in interesting characters, Avhich is due to the fact that the questions which cropped up had become more special than formerly, and therefore demanded intellectual power of the most varied kind.* Among the statesmen of that age, however, next to Epaminondas, the noblest representative of the old Greek republics, and Alexander, the most brilliant soldier, Timoleon may be considered the greatest ; ho was the hero of western Greece. We saw in chapter xi. that at the end of the reign of XXVIII THE YOUNGER DIONYSIUS 405 Dionysius the Elder, Dionysius and the Locrians who Avere de- pendent on him ruled over the southern portion of the western extremity of Italy, the modern Calabria, while the northern portion was under the Lucani, who had mostly settled in the district where Philoctetes is said to have taken up his abode, north of Croton, which perhaps belonged to Dionysius. On the Gulf of Taren turn Thurii, Metapontum and Heraclea were still Greek, the latter entirely dependent upon Tarentum. How far the territory of Tarentum extended, and what Messapian communities were subject to it, we do not know. On the Tj'rrhenian Sea Posidonia and probably also Laos had become Lucanian ; the Lucanian rule therefore stretched from one sea to the other. In Campania Naples maintained her independence. The younger Dionysius began his rule in Italy peacefully, as the sons of great warriors generally do. He even restored Rhegium to its old position. He concluded peace Avith the Carthaginians, continued the war against the Lucani without energy, and founded two cities in Apulia. When Dion attacked him he was in Caulonia on the Ionian Sea. But after his expulsion from Syracuse the natural baseness of his disposition asserted itself, and he maltreated the Locrians terribly. He had been on good terms with Tarentum ; this was proved by his gift to the Tarentines of a candelabrum with as many lamps as there are days in the year, and by his granting the request of Archytas to set Plato at liberty. Archytas, who was famous as a Pythagorean philosopher, also stood in good repute as a general and governed the Tarentine state for some time. But after his death the Tarentines ceased to be successful in their wars. They were already notorious for their luxury and effeminacy ; deprived of the wise guidance of the great philosopher and statesman, they gave the rein to their indolence and trusted to their wealth more than to their strength. They thought that money would procure them everything, even victory. About 01. 108, 3 406 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. (346-345) they applied to their parent city, Sparta, for a general, just as the Syracusans appealed to Corinth for help about the same time, and no less a person than King Archi- danius came from Sparta, bringing mercenaries with him just as Timoleon had done. But Archidamus was no Timoleon, and the Tarentines were more effeminate than the Syracusans, and not in such great straits as the latter, so that they did not even give a particularly warm welcome to their new general. Archidamus fought against the Messapii, and fell in the battle of Mandyrium, it is said on the same day that Philip de- feated the Greeks at Chaeronea (338). The conquerors would not even deliver the body of the king to the Tarentines. Tarentum erected a statue to him at Olympia. There were many Phocians too among these mercenaries, and Phalaecus himself came to Italy in quest of booty. Being unsuccessful in this, he went to Crete, the general fighting-ground of ad- venturers, and there perished, like so many others of his stamp. ^ About this time, however, a new foe confronted the Greeks of Lower Italy, the Brettians or Bruttians. The first certain reference to this people in history occurs about the 106th Olympiad (356), and they are generally described as a mixture of the original inhabitants of the country and of foreign slaves. According to others they were a branch of the Lucanians. At any rate they rose against the latter as well as against the Greeks. They plundered Terina, captured Hipponium (both on the Tyrrhenian Sea), and threatened Thurii on the Gulf of Tarentum ; we have seen that a party of Corinthians, who were destined for Sicily, had first to assist the Thurians against these enemies. The date and place of the appearance of the Bruttians show that it was the break- up of Dionysius' empire which enabled them to assert thom- selves. The rule of Dionysius is shaken in 357, and the name of the Bruttians appears in 356. They simjjly take the place of Dionysius in Lower Italy. It is a rise of the native xxviii ALEXANDER OF EPIRUS 407 element as soou as the tyrant, who has destroyed the Greeks of the country, is overthrown, which proves the correctness of the view that they were the original inhabitants. They wanted to conquer Locri, and were unsuccessful; but they probably took Caulonia. Their coins show that they were saturated with Greek civilization, which is intelligible in sub- jects of Dionysius.'^ The Bruttians were too far from the Tarentines to be able to threaten them. The Messapii and Lucanians were con- tinually doing so, and the Tarentines therefore soon after the death of Archidamus obtained assistance from another quarter. The peoples to the north of Greece proper had now become powerful, and Alexander, brother of Olympias and king of the Molossians, proceeded to Italy to found a power in the West, as his nephew was endeavouring to do in the East. In 334 he came to Italy with fifteen ships of war and numerous transports. At first he fought against the Messapii, but afterwards concluded an alliance with them. He also fought with the Lucanians and Bruttians, and captured various cities, among others Consentia (Cosenza) and Sipontum near Mount Garganus. He quarrelled with Tarentum, for the reason among others that he wanted to remove the festivals of the Greeks of Lower Italy, which were then held at Heraclea, into the territory of Thurii. The main influence of the Tarentines had been in Heraclea ; farther south their prestige was not so great. Soon after this Alexander lost his life in the war against the Lucanians and Bruttians at Pandosia near Con- sentia ; some exiled Lucanians, who were serving in his army, treacherously murdered him as he was crossing the river Acheron. His body was brought by Metapontum to Epirus (330). The Lucanians and Bruttians continued to harass the Tarentines and other Greeks of Lower Italy. "^ About the same time Greek civilization received another check in Campania through the Romans, who now for the first time, at the close of this period, interfere in the fortunes of 408 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Greece. When Cyme had become Campanian, i.e. Oscan, in 421, Naples had offered the Greeks of that city an asylum, but soon afterwards she too had been obliged to receive Cam- panians into her community. This involved her in a war with Rome. Rome had accepted Capua and therefore the Campanians as her allies in 343. The result of this was a war between Rome and tlie Samnites, then another between Rome and the Latins, wliicli latter led to the admittance of most of the Latins to the Roman citizenship. About the same time as Capua, the cities of Cyme, Acerrae and Suessula fell into the hands of the Romans, probably Puteoli (Dicaearchia) as well. Thus the power of Rome was brought close to Naples. The Greeks of Naples had no hostile feeling towards the Romans. But when the neighbouring Cam- panian city of Nola, "with which the Campanian portion of the Neapolitan population maintained close relations, became entangled in war with Rome, Naples was drawn into the con- flict and compelled to take the side of Nola, in 328. The Romans advanced against Naples. The city was well fortified, and they besieged it for two years without success. But in the third year they forced an entrance into it with the aid of some leading Neapolitans, and Naples concluded a per- petual alliance with Rome, in which her independence was recognized, with the counter - obligation of supplying the Romans with ships in case of war.^ The year in which Rome attained this important position, 326, was that in which Alexander began his return march on the Hyphasis. Hellas therefore at that time extended, leaving the isolated Massalia out of account, from Naples to the Indus, for this was the area covered by the influence of the Greek spirit and the Greek arms. Li this period too, as in the last (chap, xi.), we can detect analogies in the development of the East and of the West. One of them is obvious. The campaign of the king of Epirus quite corresponds to that of the great Alexander. But it is xxviii GREECE AND THE BARBARIANS 409 not improbable that a still more important resemblance exists. We have already noticed at an earlier date simultaneous attacks by Orientals from the East and the "West, from Persia and from Carthage, upon the Greeks, in 480 and in 409, and at that time an understanding between the Persians and the Carthaginians is indubitable. Is it not likely that this was also the case in 340 1 Is it probable that the Carthaginians made their attack on Syracuse, which Timoleon repulsed, Mathout concerting with the Persians, who were then acting with great energy in Anterior Asia under Mentor and Memnon 1 We conclude with a general consideration of the position and attitude of the Greeks as regards the barbarians. In this period, as in the previous one, Greece was divided into three groups, the western, the eastern and the central. Eastern Greece, like the western group, had been from time imme- morial exposed to great danger from barbarians ; the central group, on the other hand, was protected from them by its position, and its development was so vigorous and bril- liant that it was able to assist eastern and western Greece in case of need. But all this was suddenly changed directly after 360. Then the Greeks of the central group had their oppressors and succumbed to them. Only these oppressors were not mere barbarians, and the same men who placed serious limits on the republican freedom of the central Greeks, preserved eastern Greece from oppression by the barbarians, and, wherever they came, led the Greek cause to glorious victories. How remarkable it would have been if Alexander of Epirus had done in the West what the IMace- donian Alexander accomplished in the East ! ■' 410 HISTORY OF GREECE NOTES 1. For Sicily see Holm, Geschiclite Siciliens im Altertlium, Bd. 2 ; Meltzer, Geschichte der Karthager, Bd. 1, Berl. 1879 ; Cavallari aud Holm, Topografia archeologica di Siracusa, Pal. 1883, with atlas, German version by Lupus, Die Stadt Syrakus im Altertlium, Strassb. 1887. — Special works are mentioned in my Geschichte Siciliens and in Meltzer's Gesch. der Karthager. When the choice lay between Plutarch and Diodorus as authorities, especially in the history of Timoleon, I have preferred the former. This view is disputed by Chr. Glasen in his critical remarks on the history of Timoleon, N. Jahrb. 1886 and 1888 ; he thinks that Diodorus' account, which is based on Theopompus, is preferable to that of Plutarch, which comes from the partisan Timaeus. But is not the exaggerated story in Diodorus about the fear of the Carthaginians at Lilybaeum, mentioned below, taken from Timaeus ? 2. The battle on the Crimisus has this resemblance to Alexander's battles, that Timoleon's victory was decided by a vigorous attack on the enemy's centre. And the Carthaginian hoplites were certainly better soldiers than the Persians. Timoleon's defeat of a peojjle which repeatedly beat the Romans is therefore very creditable, and historians will after all have to admit that Timoleon was a very great general. The difference between Alexander's and Timoleon's tactics consists chiefly in the fact that Timoleon did not win battles with cavalry ; and as his cavalry force was small, he was unable to pursue the defeated Carthagin- ians as vigorously as Alexander did the Persians. This also accounts for the story of the defeated army being so terribly afraid of the wrath of the gods on their arrival at Lilybaeum, that they did not venture to escape by sea (Diod. 16, 81), which, translated out of Timaeus' bombast into plain prose, means that it never occurred to them to escape to Africa, because they saw that they were not molested. 3. The emigration en masse from Greece, which chiefly produces bands of mercenaries, began with the Ten Thousand. Then came the numerous mercenaries in Persia, and afterwards those in Phocis. Side by side with these there are migrations from Thrace and from the islands, e.g. from Samos. From 340-338 crowds pour into Sicily, in 334 and subsequently into Asia ; then those who have served against Alexander in Persia return to Greece, and rendezvous mostly at the promontory of Taenarum and in Crete. In 322 the Samians return to their homes. The Greeks xxviii LEADING FIGURES OF FOURTH CENTURY 411 were originally and always remained a wandering race. Tlie migrations in the earliest times, then the founding of colonies, then the campaigns of the mercenaries, are a manifestation of one and the same peculiarity of character. And as mercenaries they as a rule maintained their integrity ; cf. the conduct of the Ten Thousand and of the mercenaries of Darius when he took to flight. In Phocis too the rank and file seem to have behaved well ; no outrages are attributed to them. — For the crowd of rrXavio- fi€vot in those days, see Isocr. Phil. 96. 4. The leading figures of the fourth century may be divided into three groups : (1) those who were great in their own particular sphere ; (2) those who had greatness accompanied by some glaring defect ; (3) the mediocrities. Among the first I would place the following : Epaminondas, pure in character and great as a general (Pelopidas is to a certain extent the completion of him) ; Timoleon, self-denying and an able general ; Alexander, with ideal tendencies, expiating his faults by public repentance, greatest of generals, great as a statesman ; Plato, a writer and thinker of the first rank ; Xenophon, a lover of truth, devoid of ambition ; Agesilaus, the model of a Spartan ; Isocrates, the first and greatest publicist of antiquity. In the second group : Philip, a great man, but occasionally betraying the semi-barbarian in personal intercourse ; Demosthenes, great as an orator and in his love of Athens, but an arrant sophist and disputant, and, as Weil (Harangues, p. iv.) has well said, a man whose soul " semble avoir perdu I'heureuse faeulte de s'epanouir," without which it is impossible to imagine a great man ; Phocion, not statesman enough ; Dion, a weak idealist ; Dionysius I., great as a ruler, but a bad man. In the third group I would place Aeschines and the rest of the Athenian statesmen and generals, with perhaps a preference for Iphicrates and Tiinotheus : of Conon we know too little ; the same remark applies to Jason of Pherae. 5. For Tarentum cf. Lorentz, Vet. Tar. res gestae, I. Evans' paj)er, The Horsemen of Tarentum, Num. Chron. 1889, vols. I, II, which we shall make use of presently, is an important contribu- tion to the history of Tarentum. Phalaecus, cf. Lorentz, 1.1. 23. Thibron went from Crete to Gyrene. Taenarum, Crete and Cyrene made the Mediterranean a regular hunting-ground for pirates of all kinds. — Archidamus, Diod. 16, 62, 63, 88 ; he gives the death of Archidamus first seemingly in 346, and then actually in 338. Mandonium is mentioned as the place of his death, ^\•hich, according to Liv. 27, 15, should be read Mandyrium. 6. For the Brettians see my Gesch. Sic. 2, 200 and 467 ; Nissen, Ital. Landeskunde, I, 526, 535. At page 526 Nissen 412 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. gives 452 B.c. as the date of the first appearance of the Brettians, relying on Diod. 12, 22. But Diodorus has the following passage for the year 445 : Itti Se tovtuiv Siac^ei^yovres rbv ev rrj inion that he not uufrec|uently tries to deceive. Blass (3, 1, 185) finds this natural, because he is an advocate ; cf. Bl. 3, 1, 137 and 161. He says that Demosthenes "now and then, in small matters, does not adhere strictly to truth, as for instance when he says that Philip took the Thracian fortresses after he had sworn to the peace " . . . " these are secondary matters, which besides are not used for the purpose of proof, but as it were for an oratorical crescendo," Bl. 3, 1, 185. This last remark is certainly not true of the falsehood elpi]vy]v [xkv yap wixoj/JiÖKei (Phil. 3, 15), which Blass has in his mind, for Demosthenes' whole argument in Phil. 3 turns on the j)oint that Philip said that he was at peace, and yet acted as an enemy. And it would be a serious matter if Demosthenes accused an opponent of perjury in spite of his know- ledge to the contrary, simply for the sake of "an oratorical crescendo." At all events Blass (3, 1, 85) says very truly : " Demo- sthenes does not always present the facts as they are ; he does not want to trespass on the province of the historian " (we have taken this hint to the best of our power), " and be an impartial party- man." According to this, Blass' verdict on Aeschines (3, 2, 234), viz. that owing to his attempts at deception he was not a bonus vir, and consequently not a great orator, is also a condemnation of Demosthenes ; and the well-known view of the ancients, that Isaeus and Demosthenes were vTroTrrot even when they were on the right side, comes to the same thing. Demosthenes' masterpiece of sophistry is the third Philippic, so remarkable from a stylistic point of view, with its two glaring untruths about the past (§11 w5 Trpos o-u/x/^ia- Xot's and § 15 elpip'tjv, etc.), and the general one, relating to the present, about the nature of Philip's power ; see above, p. 277. — A very correct estimate of Demosthenes is conveyed by some remarks of John Morley in his Burke, Lond. 1889, p. 184, where he says of 440 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. Burke's last writings against the French Revolution : " We deal no longer with principles and ideals, but with a partizan denunciation of particular acts and a partizan incitement to a given policy. We may appreciate the policy as we choose. But our appreciation of Burke as a thinker and a contributor to political wisdom is at an end. He is now only Demosthenes thundering against Philip, or Cicero shrieking against Mark Antony." The majority of German scholars will be horrified at this, — a Liberal statesman who speaks of " only Demosthenes thundering against Philip," as if this thundering against Philip were not the outcome of the highest morality. Most scholars still believe that when a Greek political orator, whose principles they approve, describes his opponent as a rogue, the latter must have been one ; in the present case they believe all the bad that Demosthenes says of Philip. They should read and inwardly digest what one of the leading statesmen of England, Lord Rosebery, says of these matters, in reference to the struggle between Pitt and Fox, in his Pitt, p. 29 : " It is this force of extremes that makes orators, and for them it is indispensable. Few sublime Parliamentary speeches have perhaps ever been delivered by orators who have been unable to convince themselves, not merely that they are absolutely in the right, but that their opponents are absolutely in the wrong, and the most abandoned of scoundrels to boot, for holding a contrary opinion. No less a force, no feebler flame than this will sway or incense the mixed tempera- ments of mankind." This applies admirably to Demosthenes and Aeschines. Demosthenes was certainly, if not always, at all events occasionally convinced that both Aeschines and Philip were " the most abandoned of scoundrels," and he said so plainly enough of the former ; but it would be rather too naive of us if we were to repeat it after him more than two thousand years later. — The observance by Demosthenes of certain laws of form has been by no means exhaustively discussed, not even from the point of view of pure erudition. And the subject is not merely one of learned interest. According to Lord Brougham (quoted in Blass, 3, 1, 177) the ancient orators were almost as far behind the moderns in matter as they are in advance of them in form. Lord Brougham further says (Bl. 3, 1, 198) that not a word can be added to Demosthenes without weakening or destroying or damaging the sense, but then he was unable to make a proper application of Dionysius' remark about Demosthenes' attempts at rhythm, because at that time it had not been made intelligible by Blass' examples. But this law of rhythm complicates the question a great deal. For either Demosthenes employed this rhythm in his delivered speeches or did not apply it completely until the speech was published. In XXIX FORM OF DEMOSTHENES' SPEECHES 441 the latter case he was not a perfect orator but perhaps a great writer, in tlie former the speech did come up to the ideal of a practical oration. Blass (3, 1, 115) has some warrant for saying : " One would be inclined to assert that there is often less difference between Demosthenes' prose and Pindar's lyrics, than between Pindar and Homer," and this refers to the rhythm. But political orations or speeches in a court of law require different treatment from poetry. You can create a state of feeling by poems (Solon), but you cannot propose measures by them. Blass' remark there- fore implies censure on Demosthenes as a statesman, always assuming that the rhythm was in the spoken oration, and Lord Brougham's praise is consequently of little value. And the observance of the Demosthenic rules might even be a source of weakness from a technical j^oint of view, from that of good rhetoric. If under certain circumstances seven short syllables in succession produce a striking effect (cf. Find. 01. 1, 8), then it is a short-sighted view to forego the possibility of producing a desirable state of feeling by this means. The same observation applies to the avoidance of the hiatus. These refinements came from Isocrates, in whose elaborately polished set speeches they might have been in place, although Isocrates himself at last grew tired of them and wrote in a more unconventional style when he wanted to produce an effect (Phil. 27, 28). But in speeches to a popular assembly or in a court of law rules of this kind are a clog, much as if a modern orator had to deliver a Parliamentary speech in blank verse. The effect which Demosthenes attained was due to other means than the dira- piOfxeiv of words. A complete adoption of the laws of form observed by Isocrates would have brought Demosthenes to the level of the artists who blindly follow rules invented by others for dissimilar conditions {e.g. the classical tragedy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with its three unities), and would have made him far inferior to Plato as a stylist. But it is by no means certain that the strict rhythm which shows itself in periods and cola really goes beyond the introduction, the conclusion, and certain central portions of Demosthenes' speeches ; the Athenians required more variety even in tragedies. The question of Demosthenes' perfection of form is still in an early stage in spite of the researches of Blass, which are excellent but are still, and quite rightly, treated with a certain reserve by scholars. (2) The De Corona. This speech has no logical arrangement like the corresponding one of Aeschines. The greatest trouble has been taken to find one ; cf. the acute book by W. Fox, Die Kranzrede des Demosthenes analysirt, Leipsig, 1880, and the notes on p. 187 of the "Weidmann edition of 1885. These attempts carry so little 442 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. conviction that A. Kirclihoff has actually been able to distinguish two drafts of the same sjDeech mechanically welded together in the De Corona (Bei'l. Akad. 1875). The two speeches are there, but for Demosthenes they are one, because logic was not his object but stir- ring up the feelings of his audience. Not only poets (cf. Boileau : " sou vent un beau desordre est un eft'et de Part ") but orators occasionally attain their object by an apparent want of order, pro- vided the inijiortant points crop up again and again and the discus- sion of them is interrupted by mental pabulum of a lighter kind. This, however, is precisely the case with the De Corona of Demo- sthenes. — After the stately exordium Demosthenes discusses a point which is not touched on by the prosecution^ the Peace of Philo- crates (18-52), and concludes with a sally at Aeschines' expense (/xtcröwTOs). He then comes to the point, to the ypacfiij, and first establishes that he deserved the wreath, in doing which he treats of foreign (60-101) and of domestic politics (101-109). Then comes the legal question (110-125), with interpolated abuse of Aeschines (121). The speech should now end, but as Aeschines has vilified him, he must (Set) also say what is " strictly necessary " about Aeschines. This begins with the famous invective (127-131) ; then Aeschines is taken in hand as a politician (132-140), and the assertion is made that he brought Philip into Greece by his treat- ment of Amphissa (141-159). Demosthenes makes use of this opportunity (o-iyx/Je/^TyKe 160) to revert to himself. He relates what he did when Philip occupied Elatea (169 seq., celebrated climax, 179, ridicule of the play-actor Aeschines, 180) ; interweaves a remark on success, which no one ought to judge by (192 seq.), and says very finely : and even if Athena had known that she would be defeated in the war, she would yet have done her duty and have begun it ! In 208 we have the we plus ultra of noble pathos : [xa tovs M.apa6wvt irpoKbvSvvevcravTas, etc. (" of tremen- dous effect," "a specimen of sublime style": West. -Rosenberg), and immediately afterwards (209) the crowning insult to Aeschines : eVeiT' S Kardpare, etc., on which West. -Rosenberg remark very aptly : " the orator probably felt that the reiDctition of the same ideas was making his audience relax in their attention " (but these ideas were " of tremendous effect " ?), " and wanted an ' Auff'ri- schung ' " (sic). Then the serious narrative continues (211), although some pantomime (232) and a good deal of abuse (awrorpayiKos TTiOrjKos, 242-244) is interpolated for the further freshening up of the audience. He then refers once more to the rvxt], and makes this a pretext for an exhaustive tirade against Aeschines and his parents (256-265) ; in 270, however, he reverts to the kolvol, on which he wishes to say ' something ' more. But in the meanwhile the audi- DEMOSTHENES AND O'CONNELL 443 ence is fresliened up twice again (284 and 313).— Demosthenes' art in this speech does not consist of a logical arrangement of the whole ; every one admits that the speech simply begins over again with § 160. The art consists of this, that the necessary points are repeated, and appropriate episodes inserted between the repetitions ; it consists of keeping the audience fresh and freshening them up by alternation of defence and attack, of pathos and abuse, of tragedy and comedy. Demosthenes is a master of ixeraßoXai, which Isocr. refers to in Phil. 26, and he uses them not only in delivery but .in the subject-matter as well. He is Pericles and Aristophanes in one, and this of course pleased the great mass of Athenians. He feels so sure of victory that he does not even answer all Aeschines' charges, and he also feels so sure of his audience that in 208 and 209 he makes the great leap from pathos to bathos which we referred to above. An orator who can change voice, attitude and gesture as rapidly as Demosthenes did with eVetr' 5 Kardpare immediately after {xa tovs MapaOwvL without breaking down, is unquestionably a genuine Tryowraywvto-rv)? ; cf. Weil's shrewd remark on this passage. — To bring out the full significance of this talent of Demosthenes I refer to an analogous modern case. In his book Fifty Years Ago, Lond. 1892, W. Besant quotes from Grant's Eandom Recollections the following description of O'Connell's oratory (p. 134): "One of the most extraordinary attributes in Mr. O'Connell's oratory is the ease and facility with which he can make a transition from one topic to another. ' From grave to gay, from lively to severe ' never costs him an eff"ort. He seems, indeed, to be himself insensible of the transition. I have seen him begin his speech by alluding to topics of an affecting nature, in such a manner as to excite the deepest sympathy towards the sufferers in the minds of the most unfeeling person present. I have seen the tear literally glistening in the eyes of men altogether unused to the melting mood, and, in a moment afterwards, by a transition from the grave to the humorous, I have seen the whole audience convulsed with laughter. On the other hand, I have often heard him commence his speech in a strain of most exquisite humour, and, by a sudden transition to deep pathos, provoke the stillness of death in a place in which, but one moment before, the air was rent with shouts of laughter. His mastery over the passions is the most perfect I ever witnessed, and his oratory tells with the same effect whether he addresses the ' first assembly of gentlemen in the world,' or the ragged and ignorant rabble of Dublin." Most orators have a certain manner in wliich tliey excel : either pathos, or humour, or perfection of form, or acute logic. Demosthenes, like O'Connell, seems to have been effective 444 HISTORY OF GREECE chap. ia every style, and, like O'Connell, to have known how to pass at once from one tone to the opposite, a feat which very few speakers can accomplish without offending their audience. The above de- scription of O'Connell seems to me to apply exactly to Demosthenes, when he is smashing Aeschines. Aeschines, on the other hand, had only one manner in which he excelled, the dignified manner. — The De Corona speech is, like that vrepi 7rapa7rpecr/3etas, against which the same reproach of want of order is made (cf. Weil's Notice), a great work of art in its psychologically suitable arrangement, the main object being a crushing success with the audience. Faults of dialectic and moral defects take nothing from the value of a work of art of this peculiar kind. The assertion (244) that he (Demo- sthenes) was not responsible for Chaeronea, because he was not the general is a mistake in dialectic. I did, he says, only what a pyTwp can, i.e. make preparations (246). He suppresses the fact that he brought about the war and prevented the peace, without troubling to consider whether Athens possessed generals capable of carrying on the war which he had caused. If this is an excusable piece of special pleading in an advocate, his attempt to conceal the fact that Ctesiphon ought to have been condemned by law is a moral defect in the speech. A democrat should be the last person to make light of any illegality. When Blass (3, 1, 379) holds that the fact that " Aeschines was partly right on the point of law can only seem of importance to the jurist," he under- estimates the value of the law. Demosthenes had a better idea of it in his speech against Aristocrates (100, 101), where he himseK describes what he does in the De Corona as an avatSeta. We can understand that Demosthenes resorted to every device of an advo- cate to win his case, but this is not the proper standard for us. Even if, a point on which we are ignorant, Aeschines was on a lower level than Demostheues as a man as well as a statesman, still it was the true interest of the Athenian and of every other state to see that the courts did not go behind the clear provision of the law. — In the De Corona (280) Demosthenes very skilfully depicts Aeschines as a man who is not in touch with popular feeling. — For Lycurgus, cf. Dürrbach, L'orateur Lycurgue, Par. 1890. 2. For Aristotle cf. inter alia the exhaustive article by Zell in Pauly's R. E. 1, 2, 1634-99.— The fieyaXoxpvxos, Ar. Eth. Nie. 4, 3. — W. Hertz, Aristoteles in den Alexanderdichtungen des Mittelalters, München, 1890 (Akad.), and columns 1012-1055 by Gercke in Pauly-Wissowa, vol. 2. — The recently discovered 'A Ö. ttoA., referred to in vol. ii. p. 463, is undoubtedly the same as the 'A6. TToA. of Aristotle cited by ancient lexicographers and scholiasts. The work bears evident traces of having been written between the XXIX ARISTOTLE'S XEWLY-DISCOVERED TREATISE 445 years 329 and 322. It is of great vak;e for the history and for the machinery of the Athenian constitution, bnt leaves scope for many points of detaih The only question can be whether this treatise is from the pen of the great thinker, or whether it was compiled by him from materials collected by his pupils, in which case Aristotle would of course have expressed his political views and given a character of unity to the work. We must, I think, consider the latter hypothesis as probable, both in the case of the 'AÖ. ttoA. and of the other 157 constitutions of the collection. For how could the philosopher, with his exhaustive study of problems of physical science and philosophy, have found time for collecting the materials for a description of the constitutions of so many cities ? If on this assumption Aristotle is relieved of responsibility for the individual facts, it also accounts for the possibility of errors slipping into the historical part of the work. It is possible, for instance, that the 'AÖ. ttoX. does not take quite a correct view of Dracon's legislation, or of the career of Themistocles. At any rate we must examine and criticise the historical statements in the 'AO. ttoA. just as impartially as those of other writers who were not such great thinkers as Aristotle. The result is that a number of special questions raised by the study of the 'A9. ttoX. have to be decided. The shortest and best summary of the materials for them is now to be found in Busolt, Gr. G., vol. 2, 2nd ed. pp. 14-55. To the editions mentioned there, of which that by Sandys is the most useful, must now be added, as the most recent, the 2nd edition by Blass, Leipz. 1895. 3. Architecture. Durm, Die Baukunst der Griechen, 189-191. The present researches are inadequate for the history of the artists, as appears from Eayet's remarks in Etudes d'Archeologie, 86-169. 4. For the Mausoleum see Baumeister, Denkm. 893 seq. New views on the construction of the Mausoleum have now been put forward by Trendelenburg at a meeting of the Berlin Archaeological Society. For Cnidus see vol. i. p. 153. 5. For Lysippus and Leochares see the articles in Baumeister. — For the monument of the Nereidae, Baumeister, 1013 seq. The account of the war waged by the Lycian Pericles against Telmessus is in Theop. 111. — For the figures of Tanagra cf. A. Eayet, Etudes d'Archeologie, 275-324, Pottier, Les statuettes de terre cuite, Par. 1890, p. 79 seq., and Murray, Handbook of Gr. Archaeol. pp. 310 seq. 0. The best collection of the finest types of coins of the fourth century is to be found in PL v.-x. of Gardner's Types of Greek Coins, Cambr. 1883, with text. For the names of the die-cutters 446 HISTORY OF GREECE chap, xxix see the well-known works of von Sallet and Weil, and especially Sjracusan Medallions and tlieir Engravers, Lond. 1892, by Arthur J. Evans, who has arrived at new and highly important conclusions. 7. Painting. See von Kohden's article in Baumeister, esp. pp. 868 seq. — For Euphranor, Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 1, 588 ; 2, 448. — The vases, von Kohden, Vasenkunde, in Baumeister, esp. pp. 2002 seq.— The Apulian vases are mostly from Tarentum ; that Cyme could still turn out Greek vases even after 420, we see from Strabo, 5, 243. — For vases generally see also Collignon, Manuel d'archeologie grecque, Paris, pp. 294 seq. GEEEK PUBLIC LAW 1. I CONCLUDE this volume with some observations on Greek consti- tutional law, which may not be out of place at the close of the republican period, all the more as this subject has not been ade- quately treated hitherto. The conception of the state — ttoAis — is composed of two factors. The ttoXls is a community of indi- viduals, independent without and organized within. The former is the avTovo/jLia ; the second arises from the existence of an dpx'i], 'i-^- of the possibility of commands being given which the citizens have to obey, consequently of a government. Individuals who conduct the o.p\-q are virevdwoi, accountable for their actions. In the oldest times the kings were the depositaries of the apxrj. Their power was limited only by custom and was therefore of a vague character, but here, too, the idea of responsibility was pre- sent. At a later period the archons took the place of the kings in Athens, the constitution of which is most accurately known to us ; but their powers were gradually much restricted and the sphere of their apx^ became very small. The real apx'; '"'as in fact assumed by the people itself, although it always exercised it through indi- viduals only, who were responsible for the measures, ipqfj^ia-iJLara, proposed by them. Cf. vol. ii. p. 198, where it should only have been stated more clearly that a resolution of the ßovXi) was never regarded as a motion but only as an opinion, and that a \py](^icr [xa. could proceed only from one and never from several persons, for the sake of responsibility. Consequently in Athens any one who liked could govern, provided he could convince the people ; it was a peculiar combination of personal and general government. The apxi) carried out by officials, the Eoman im^jerium, seems to have been reduced to a minimum in Athens after the time of Cleisthenes. The Athenian magistrates had rather a power of removing things, of clearing away obstacles ; positive directions, which imposed 448 HISTORY OF GREECE obligations on the citizens, were not within their province. Only the people could issue these. Of great importance, however, was the fact that only the whole people was convened for this purpose ; there was no representative system, a point specially emphasized by E. Freeman in his History of Federal Government, vol. I, Lond. 1863. Only one exception was allowed by the Greeks : laws were passed without the direct co-operation of the whole peojile ; cf. vol. ii. p. 207. Laws were regarded as an emanation of wisdom, which the people presumed to exist only in individuals and not in every member of the community. 2. The fact that the Greeks were without representation in the exercise of their civil rights constituted the main obstacle to a more extended union of Greece, which consisted of a collection of independent states. The basis of public law was the resolutions of those qualified to vote. How could these be obtained in the interests of a league 1 Were the states to decide ? If one state decided differently from another on affairs of common interest, whose view was to prevail ? The autonomous states would have been obliged to part with certain rights to representatives, and none of them were willing to do this. In many cases alliances were absolutely necessary, especially in cases of war. But how difficult it was even then to establish a vigorous supreme command is shown by history. Obedience was not always rendered even on the field of battle, as at Plataea for instance. But if it was a question of whole compaigns, then each contingent was responsible only to its own city (vol. ii. p. 404). As a rule the authority of the com- mander-in-chief was nil. Hence alliances were generally devoid of power, and the Athenians knew what they were about when they changed their a-v/xfjiax^a into an dpxn]- The Spartans acted towards their allies as dictators whenever they could, and Isocrates (Phil. 47) calls the Spartan leadership a Swaa-reia. Among the Greeks no common undertakings were ever successful without compulsion. Demosthenes ('PoS. iXevO. 29) defines the state of Greek public law as follows : tmv S' 'EAAt^vikcüv St/caiW oi Kparouvres opLcrral Tois I'^TToa-i ytyi'oi/Tat, that is to say, among Greek states the right of the stronger, brute force, prevails. True, the idea of representa- tion was not absolutely unknown in the relations of the TroAets with one another ; this is proved by the second Athenian League. But this league too was not tolerated long, and one member of it, Thebes, probablynever complied with the resolutions of the majority. In the interests of the allies, therefore, an dp)(i] was always to be preferred to a (rvfjLjxax^a. But in the eyes of the Greeks an dp-^'j deprived the states so controlled of their avTovop.ia (Thuc. 1, 139), lowered them. No Greek would put up with this in the long-run. GREEK ALLIANCES 449 3. Tlitre were, however, districts in Greece in wliicli permanent alliances already existed or were much desired. These were terri- tories not possessed by a single ttoXl'?, but by several, which how- ever considered themselves as belonging to a single Wvo] and the just rjyefxovia which Athens can exercise over the Greeks, that he says in conclusion (c. 47) that Athens must relinquish the dpxv in order to obtain the I'lye/xoi'La es tov aTravra xpovov. This rjyejxovia must resemble the royal office at Sparta, which can never do wrong, and for which her citizens are glad to die in battle. The true rjye/xovia consists in icfuSpeveiv, and in readiness rots dSiKov/xevoLS ßoqödv. Athens ought therefore to be TrpocrTdTi]F H75 CoPi 3 1158 00743 6826 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 000 860 344 i « ffNIA,