M' 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 ^^\ 
 
 ^-^> 
 
 
 
 5* 
 
 K
 
 WOMAN AND THE LAW
 
 WOMAN 
 AND THE LAW 
 
 1/3 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE JAMES BAYLES, Ph.D. 
 
 PRIZE LECTURER IN THE SCHOOL OP POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 PROFESSOR I. F. RUSSELL 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 THE CENTURY CO. 
 
 1901
 
 Copyright, 1901, by 
 The Century Co. 
 
 Pullished October, 1901 
 
 The DeVinne Press.
 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THIS work is designed to serve the pur- 
 poses of a general view of the legal con- 
 dition of the women of the United States at 
 the present time, and is more especially for 
 the reading of women. It is a general state- 
 ment and not an exhaustive analysis ; it is not 
 designed for the practising lawyer, man or 
 woman, for though it deals with legal prin- 
 ciples, it does not apply them to concrete 
 cases ; and least of all is it an attempt to make 
 every woman her own lawyer. 
 
 American women, whether studying alone 
 or in clubs, are coming more and more to take 
 an appreciative interest in the sociological 
 development of the nation, and naturally a 
 subject to engage their attention is the con- 
 dition of their fellow-women viewed from 
 all standpoints. Perhaps the most difficult 
 branch of the general subject to be handled 
 by women in a comprehensive way is the pos- 
 itive law, both because the material is not 
 easily accessible and because some experi- 
 ence is needed to make use of the material 
 when found. A law library is both a 
 mine of raw material and a laboratoiy
 
 vi PREFACE 
 
 for the work of analysis and comparison, 
 but unless one knows what to expect and 
 how to look for it, such a library seems 
 nothing more than an accumulation of tire- 
 some volumes. Within these dreary-looking 
 books, however, is written a large portion 
 of the life history of the nation. Read into 
 the laws the efforts and hopes of generations 
 of earnest men and women, and the study be- 
 comes one of living organism— human 
 society. 
 
 The subject-matter that is here dealt with 
 is divided into three parts: domestic rela- 
 tions, which are of the greatest importance 
 to every woman; property relations; and 
 what have been designated as public rela- 
 tions. The domestic relations show, first, the 
 elements of social integration— that is, the 
 institution of marriage and the family,— and 
 then the elements of disintegration, the sep- 
 aration of husband and wife and divorce. 
 The property relations are the most difficult 
 to describe in general statements, but they 
 are well worth study, for they reveal the de- 
 velopment in the legal individuality of wo- 
 man. The public relations, on the other hand, 
 are much more simple, and have the value of 
 showing the political status of women in the 
 modern state. 
 
 While every effort at accuracy has been 
 made, errors there probably are, more likely
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 in the statute law resulting from amendments 
 by implication. If, however, in the course of 
 careful study such errors are discovered, one 
 of the main objects of this small work will 
 have been accomplished, for there will have 
 been more study by American women of their 
 legal condition. 
 
 G. J. B. 
 
 Columbia University, 
 
 New York, May, 1901.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface ..." v 
 
 Introduction xi 
 
 Part I 
 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
 
 The Contract to Marry 3 
 
 Marriage 7 
 
 Plural Marriages of the Mormons ... 24 
 
 Husband and Wife 28 
 
 Torts of a Personal Nature 34 
 
 The Right of a Wife to Support .... 40 
 The Guardianship of Children .... 45 
 
 The Adoption of Children 50 
 
 Divorce 55 
 
 Limited Divorce 105 
 
 Divorces among the Mormons 109 
 
 Alimony 113 
 
 Change of Name after Divorce .... 116 
 Uniform Divorce Law 117 
 
 Paet II 
 
 PROPERTY RELATIONS 
 
 Marriage Settlements 123 
 
 Dower 128 
 
 A Married Woman's Separate Estate , . 143 
 ix
 
 X CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Property Rights of Married Women . 159 
 The Contracts op Married Women . . . 200 
 
 Deeds by Married Women 210 
 
 Wills by Married Women 217 
 
 Married Women as Sole Traders .... 219 
 Women and the Homestead Laws .... 228 
 
 Part III 
 PUBLIC RELATIONS 
 
 Citizen Women 237 
 
 Alien Women 241 
 
 Woman Suffrage 246 
 
 Women as Attorneys 249 
 
 Married Women as Witnesses 252 
 
 The Employment of Women 257 
 
 The Protection op Women 261 
 
 Table op Statutes 268 
 
 Index 271
 
 THE STUDY OF LAW FOR WOMEN 
 
 THE non-professional study of the law is 
 not altogether a new thing. Sir William 
 Blackstone,whose Commentaries are soworld- 
 famed that the name of the author easily 
 passes as a synonym for the law itself, lec- 
 tured not to i^trofessional aspirants at the 
 Inns of Court in London, but to the gen- 
 tlemen of England who were undergraduates 
 at Oxford, and who had little thought, per- 
 haps, of a career at the bar. Similarly, 
 Chancellor Kent read his immortal Lectures 
 not at the School of Law, but under the Fac- 
 ulty of Arts at Columbia College in New York 
 City. 
 
 The place of law in a schedule of studies 
 framed with a view to a polite and general 
 culture has been nobly exhibited by Black- 
 stone in his introductory lecture. But what 
 was true a century and a half ago of England 
 under the rule of its landed gentry, is doubly 
 true of America, with its more popular in- 
 stitutions of government and its traditions of 
 equality before the law. 
 
 The law is stubbornly viewed by the lay 
 public as a body of rules regulating the pro-
 
 xii THE STUDY OF LAW FOR WOMEN 
 
 cedure and sittings of courts, the language 
 of written instruments, and the order of 
 judicial inquiry and determination, thus pre- 
 senting a most uninviting field for explor- 
 ation. The substantive law, so called, the 
 law of primaiy rights, as distinguished from 
 practice and remedial justice, is too often 
 hidden deep down under a weight of forms 
 and technicalities, and sustains a terrible 
 burden of pedantic erudition and recondite 
 and mystic learning, bewildering and dis- 
 heartening to the student. Women especially 
 have no interest in a mere war of words. 
 But when once the law properly appears in 
 its scientific and philosophical relations, as 
 akin to ethics, as affecting conduct, as in- 
 culcating a lofty morality and exhibiting a 
 noble standard of right, as teaching us to look 
 into the face and hear the voice of God, then 
 the dignity and the nobility, or we may even 
 say the divine nature, of jurisprudence 
 evokes the reverent contemplation of all in- 
 telligent men and women. We must there- 
 fore contend that some considerable know- 
 ledge of the law should be sought by every 
 human being who aspires to real education. 
 A common fallacy regarding the law is 
 that it issues as a perfect product from some 
 legislative hall, and is imposed upon a sub- 
 ject people by external authority. The truth 
 is, however, that it has its origin in the neces-
 
 THE STUDY OF LAW FOR WOMEN xiii 
 
 sities of mankind, and its first authoritative 
 expression in some judicial decision; it is 
 never finished and ideal, but always seeking 
 a higher perfection; and finally, under the 
 free jjolitical institutions of our western 
 world, it is never imposed by the arms of a 
 conqueror, but always enacted by the vol- 
 untary action of the people. 
 
 The range and variety of legal rules are 
 limited only by the activities and relations 
 of human society. The law has its message 
 of authority, its sharp rebuke, its word of 
 counsel, its threatened vengeance, as well as 
 its bulwarks of defense, its munificent endow- 
 ments, and its inalienable rights; and these 
 must be read by the intelligent citizen be- 
 tween the lines of history, romance, and finan- 
 cial quotations, and should be seen in all the 
 encounters of violence and crime, the in- 
 trigues of passion, and the battles of markets 
 and exchanges. The bride at the altar, the 
 widow in her quarantine, and the babe un- 
 born are all within the merciful protection 
 of the law. The desperate may not take his 
 own life, the gambler may not stake his lib- 
 erty, and the prodigal may not waste his in- 
 heritance. 
 
 The leadership of America in matters alike 
 of money, mind, and morals may be ascribed 
 in large part to the influence of her women. 
 In the Eastern countries at the present time,
 
 xiv THE STUDY OF LAW FOR WOMEN 
 
 and in primitive antiquity everywhere, we 
 find woman in the position of a slave and 
 household drudge. Even to-day the German 
 Emperor is said to limit woman's si)here to 
 the kitchen, the nursery, and the church ; and 
 the divorce law of England at the present 
 time has one rule of right conduct for a man 
 and quite another rule for his wife. 
 
 But in the United States the law has 
 reached that lofty elevation of ethical senti- 
 ment which enables it to announce that jus- 
 tice knows no distinction of sex. In this 
 country, a])art from voting and holding office, 
 woman labors under no legal disabilities. 
 A wife's control of her real property is 
 greater than her husband 's control of his ; for 
 the statutes of New York and many other 
 States forbid a man to dispose of his lands 
 and tenements, by deed or will, in disregard of 
 his wife's right of dower, whereas the fullest 
 liberty of transfer is enjoyed by the married 
 woman. Moreover, husbands and fathers 
 seem to covet, if not for their wives, most 
 certainly for their daughters, the fullest 
 measure of immunity from masculine inter- 
 ference and domination. Tendencies appar- 
 ently irresistible are making for the exten- 
 sion of these rights throughout all the centers 
 of civilization. The just and safe endow- 
 ment of widows and ori)hans, and the protec- 
 tion of inherited estates from the rapacious
 
 THE STUDY OF LAW FOR WOMEN xv 
 
 raids of greedy creditors and unscrupulous 
 attorneys, necessitate the financial indepen- 
 dence of woman, whether maid or matron, 
 r^ The education of woman must be commen- 
 surate with the splendor of her new heritage 
 (of rights and responsibilities, and should be 
 (such as to qualify her for the duties of ex- 
 ecutor, guardian, and trustee, as well as for 
 'the responsibilities of the ownership of lands 
 ! or the stocks and bonds of incor]Dorated com- 
 panies. 
 
 Woman is thus in need of instruction in 
 the law, not to enable her to be her own 
 lawyer, but to qualify her to appreciate and 
 act upon legal counsel understandingly. If 
 she is to continue to figure as a capitalist, tax- 
 payer, litigant, and, perhaps, voter, on a more 
 and more liberal scale, she ought certainly to 
 make herself master of the rudiments of legal 
 science. 
 
 I. F. R. 
 
 New York University Law School, 
 June 10, 1901.
 
 Paet I 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS
 
 WOMA]S^ AND THE LAW 
 
 THE CONTRACT TO MARRY 
 
 THIS contract is in its nature a mutual 
 agreement between a man and a woman 
 to marry each other or to become husband 
 and wife at a future time, and must satisfy 
 all the legal requirements the same as other 
 contracts. When a man and a woman have 
 promised to marry each other and one of 
 them refuses to carry out the agreement, the 
 other may bring a suit for damages, as in 
 the case of other contracts. 
 
 To sustain such a suit, however, there must 
 \have been a definite offer of marriage, or a 
 I promise to marry, by one party that has been 
 < made known to the other. A mere intention 
 \ to marry communicated to third persons not 
 I in the presence of the other party is no otf er 
 kor promise at all. Such a valid offer may, 
 however, be made through a friend or an 
 agent. No express form of words is re- 
 quired, as it need only appear that both the
 
 4 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 man and the woman understood it to be an 
 offer of marriage. 
 
 Another essential feature of this contract 
 is that tliere is a definite acceptance of the 
 offer or promise. The acceptance, like the 
 offer, may be made through a third person, 
 and need not be in express words, but may 
 be inferred from the conduct of the one who 
 accepts the offer or promise. It must ap- 
 pear that the acceptance was made known 
 to the other party, and that it was made 
 within a reasonable time after the offer was 
 made. The promise of a man to marry a 
 (woman "if he married any one" has been 
 held void both because it is too indefinite and 
 because it operates virtually as a restraint 
 I upon marriage, and is for that reason against 
 ( the public policy. 
 
 If the parties to a contract to marry do 
 not themselves make the contract definite as 
 to time and place, the law in a suit for breach 
 of promise will presume that a promise to 
 marry is a promise to marry within a rea- 
 sonable time and at the residence of the 
 woman. The consideration in a contract of 
 this kind is the mutual promise. There may, 
 however, be some otlier consideration, in ad- 
 dition, which will neither add to nor detract 
 from the validity of the contract, unless such 
 a consideration is immoral in its nature. 
 
 This contract must be made between com-
 
 THE CONTRACT TO MARRY 5 
 
 petent parties, as will be seen in the consid- 
 eration of marriage, and in order to bind 
 himself by a promise of marriage the person 
 must be capable both of making a binding 
 contract and of entering into a valid and 
 legal marriage. Thus, a minor who is 
 not capable of making ordinary contracts, 
 though he is old enough to marry, is not 
 bound by a promise of marriage. The fact 
 that a party has already promised to marry 
 some one— that is, is engaged to be married 
 —does not affect his capacity to promise to 
 marry some one else. 
 
 r The use of any form of force, or any con- 
 cealment with intent to deceive, or any false 
 representations may invalidate contracts to 
 (marry just as they may invalidate other con- 
 [ tracts. So a promise to marry made at the 
 point of a pistol or to get away from actual 
 confinement cannot be made a ground for 
 damages. While a woman is not bound to dis- 
 close anything concerning herself, except her 
 previous unchastity or her physical unfitness 
 for marriage, yet any false representations 
 made by her, or on her behalf with her know- 
 ledge, for the purpose of deceiving the man, 
 will constitute a fraud, and the man's prom- 
 ise is not binding, whether such false repre- 
 sentations relate to the woman's social posi- 
 tion and fortune or to her character. 
 
 It is not possible to bring a suit for the
 
 6 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 siDecific performance of a contract to marry, 
 but an action for damages will lie for a 
 breach of such a contract. Such an action 
 is allowed by the coiiimon law independently 
 of statute, and it may be brought either by 
 a man or a woman. In such actions, based 
 upon a breach of promise to marry, the dam- 
 ages have not been limited by the courts to 
 the general rules governing actions upon 
 simple contracts for the payment of money, 
 but rest with the discretion of the jury con- 
 sidering the circumstances of each particular 
 case.
 
 MARRIAGE 
 
 PERHAPS the best general definition of 
 marriage is that it is the legal status or 
 condition of husbands and wives. It denotes 
 the legal conditions under which a man and 
 a woman may lawfully cohabit and have le- 
 gitimate children. Marriage is constantly 
 referred to in American legislation as a civil 
 contract; but, strictly speaking, marriage is 
 not a contract, nor is the relation of husband 
 and wife a contractual relation, although 
 there are many contracts that are connected 
 with the marriage relation. Where this 
 phrase ''civil contract" is used the design 
 is to place the emphasis upon the word civil, 
 and not upon the word contract, in order to 
 denote the fact that under modern law mar- 
 riage is not controlled by the canonical pro- 
 visions of ecclesiastical organizations. In 
 this sense marriage is declared by the laws of 
 many of the States to be a civil contract. All 
 of the American States have legislated with 
 reference to the institution of marriage, and 
 some of them have enacted elaborate pro- 
 visions of procedure. According to the gen- 
 eral policy of the State, marriages are to be 
 
 7
 
 8 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 encouraged, and all that is done in restraint 
 of marriage is regarded as against public 
 policy. It is so expressly declared in the 
 laws of two of the States— Pennsylvania and 
 Georgia— that all marriages are to be en- 
 couraged, while the common policy of all the 
 States is to look at every effort to restrain or 
 to discourage marriage by contract, condi- 
 tion, limitation, or otherwise as invalid and 
 void. It was once declared in the British 
 House of Lords that to try to prevent mar- 
 riage was the blackest of all political sins. 
 The laws of all the States, therefore, sanc- 
 tion all those marriages where the man and 
 the woman at the time of the marriage were 
 willing to enter into this relation, were able 
 to contract, and did so contract according to 
 the forms prescribed by law. 
 
 There are in fact and in law four elements 
 that are everywhere regarded as essential to 
 a valid marriage; these elements are, first, 
 competent parties. Each of the parties to 
 i marriage must have the capacity to marry 
 the other. Thus, a woman may not be able 
 to marry a certain man either because she is 
 too nearly related to him or because she is 
 not of the same race. The second element 
 may be described as the contract of mar- 
 riage. The parties must mutually agree to 
 be thence fortli husband and wife. No one 
 can be married without his or her consent,
 
 MARRIAGE 9 
 
 no matter how competent the parties may 
 be, and no matter what formalities they go 
 through. The third essential element is a 
 solemnization of marriage. The parties 
 must go through a certain formality, some- 
 times religious and sometimes civil. The 
 State, for the protection of all the people and 
 the preservation of social institutions, as a 
 rule prescribes formalities, and does not al- 
 low people to enter marriage as they would 
 an ordinary partnership. The fourth ele- 
 ment of the status of marriage is a consum- 
 mation. The parties are expected to become 
 husband and wife in fact, and assume the 
 marriage rights, duties, and obligations. 
 Now, the absence of one or more of these 
 elements may not render a marriage invalid, 
 and as a general rule the absence of a cere- 
 mony or of any consummation of a marriage 
 will not prevent the parties from being re- 
 garded as man and wife, whatever other re- 
 sults may be entailed upon them. For a 
 marriage which is valid may be invalid irt 
 certain respects, or it may be a prohibited 
 or voidable marriage. A legal marriage is 
 one with respect to which all the provisions 
 of the law have been complied with, but 
 there are many provisions of the statutes re- 
 lating to marriages which may be disre- 
 garded without preventing the parties from 
 becoming by the marriage completely hus-
 
 10 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 band and wife. For example, a license is 
 usually required by law, but failure to secure 
 a license will not, as a rule, prevent the par- 
 ties from becoming husband and wife if they 
 are otherwise properly married. An attempt 
 at marriage that is invalid for all intents and 
 purposes is called a void marriage, and needs 
 no proceeding of a court to declare it such. 
 So if a woman, being already married, mar- 
 ries another man, her marriage is invalid 
 without any judgment or decree, simply be- 
 es, use the State will not allow her to be the 
 wife of two men at the same time. Unfor- 
 tunately, it is possible, through the diversity 
 of legislation in this matter, for a marriage 
 to be valid in one State and not in another. 
 A voidable marriage is one which is valid to 
 all intents and purposes unless and until it is 
 duly avoided, or which is valid for all intents 
 and purposes unless and until duly con- 
 firmed, and so becomes unavoidable. 
 
 There have developed certain rules of con- 
 struction which are useful when a study is 
 made of the statutes of the various States 
 relating to this subject. In the first place, 
 unless by the use of express words a statute 
 goes to the validity of a marriage— that is, 
 unless there are express words of nullity- 
 it will be held to affect only the legality or 
 the regularity of the marriage. Thus, in the 
 State of Maryland a statute providing sim-
 
 MARRIAGE 11 
 
 ply that a white person and a negro shall 
 not intermarry has been held not to render 
 such a marriage invalid. So, again, statutes 
 that prescribe certain formalities in connec- 
 tion with marriage, but not providing that if 
 such formalities are not followed the mar- 
 riage shall be void, have been held to be di- 
 rectory only. Another rule of construction 
 is that a statute referring to the formation 
 of marriage will be made to harmonize as far 
 as possible with the preexisting law. Thus, 
 a statute declaring a marriage void, but not 
 expressing any intention of changing the 
 preexisting law, will not be held to render a 
 marriage formerly voidable absolutely void. 
 A woman may be generally incapable of 
 marrying or incapable of forming a particu- 
 lar marriage because of want of age, or lack 
 of mental capacity to understand the nature 
 of the act, or want of physical capacity to 
 consummate the marriage, or relationship by 
 blood (consanguinity), or by marriage (affin- 
 ity), with the man, or by being of a different 
 race from the man, or having been married 
 before and that marriage not being at an 
 end. As to want of age. At common law the 
 marriage of a party under seven years of age 
 was void. The marriage of a female between 
 seven and twelve years of age was voidable, 
 while the marriage of a male over fourteen 
 years and a female over twelve was valid.
 
 12 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 The common-law rule requiring twelve years 
 for the woman has been retained by statute 
 in the States of New Hamjjshire, Virginia, 
 West Virginia, Kentucky, and Louisiana. 
 Fourteen years for the woman is re<iuired by 
 the laws of the States of Alabama, Arkansas. 
 Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, New York, North 
 Carolina, and Texas. Fifteen years for the 
 woman is required in California, Minnesota, 
 Oregon, and Wisconsin. Sixteen years is 
 required in the States of Idaho, Indiana, 
 Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and 
 Wyoming. Eighteen years is required in 
 the States of Montana and Washington. 
 
 The mental capacity that is necessary to 
 enable a woman to marry or to confirm her 
 marriage is such as renders her capable of 
 understanding the nature of the act and its 
 consequences, of entering into ordinary con- 
 tracts, of managing herself, her property 
 and alTairs. The want of capacity must ex- 
 ist at the time of the marriage, so periods 
 of insanity before the marriage, or the devel- 
 opment of insanity aftei'ward, will not be con- 
 clusive of mental incapacity. The marriage 
 of an insane woman during a lucid interval, 
 in the absence of statute, has been held valid, 
 but the burden of proof lies on the party 
 alleging the lucid interval. Physical inca- 
 pacity, or impotence, is not an im])ediment 
 to marriage in the absence of a statute or
 
 MARRIAGE 13 
 
 ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Under the eccle- 
 siastical law impotence rendered a marriage 
 voidable, and in nearly all of the States at 
 the present time there is some statutory pro- 
 vision rendering impotence an impediment 
 to marriage or a cause for divorce. The 
 marriage of a man and a woman related by 
 blood or by marriage within certain specified 
 degrees may be under the provisions of the 
 criminal law regarded as incest, or under the 
 ecclesiastical law as voidable, or by express 
 statutes void. As affecting the capacity of 
 a woman to marry, relationship of consan- 
 guinity and affinity is dependent on statute 
 in all the American States at the present 
 time. This form of incapacity is based pri- 
 marily on the laws of Moses, contained in 
 the eighteenth chapter of the book Leviticus, 
 but more directly upon a statute passed in 
 the thirty-second year of the reign of King 
 Henry VIII. This statute confined the in- 
 capacity^ to all related in the ascending or 
 descending line, and to collaterals including 
 the third degree, civil reckoning— that is, all 
 nearer than first cousins— and by construc- 
 tion the statute applied whether the relation- 
 ship was by blood or marriage, whether by 
 whole blood or half blood, whether legiti- 
 mate or not. 
 
 Nowhere in this country is a marriage 
 with a deceased wife's sister invalid, except
 
 14 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 in the State of Virginia. The general rule 
 is that no woman may marry her lineal an- 
 cestor or descendant, or her brother of the 
 half or whole blood, nor can there be a mar- 
 riage between a woman and her uncle or a 
 woman and her nephew by blood. A woman 
 may not marry her mother's husband nor 
 lier husband's son, nor her grandmother's 
 husband. By the law of the State of Loui- 
 siana a woman cannot marry a second time 
 until ten months after the dissolution of the 
 preceding marriage. 
 
 As to difference of race. In some of the 
 States the marriage of persons of different 
 race, as white persons and negroes, or white 
 ]3ersons and Indians, is forbidden and made 
 a crime, which is called miscegenation, and 
 the statutes sometimes render such mar- 
 riages void. Under the rules of construction 
 already given, such marriages between per- 
 sons of different races will be regarded as 
 illegal only when expressly declared to be 
 void. On account of the considerable inter- 
 mingling of races that has occurred in cer- 
 tain sections of the country, it is often diffi- 
 cult to determine whether a person is a white 
 or a negro, and as a rule this is made to de- 
 pend upon the terms of tlie statute. A mu- 
 latto is not usually a negro, but is the child 
 of a negro and a white person, not the child 
 of a mulatto and a white. It has been de-
 
 MARRIAGE 15 
 
 cided in Virginia that where a negro must 
 have one fourth negro blood, one drop less 
 will make him a white. In North Carolina, 
 however, a person with one eighth, and even 
 with one sixteenth, negro blood has been held 
 to be a negro. 
 
 As to a former marriage. A woman can- 
 not have two husbands at the same time ; and 
 one who has been married once cannot marry 
 again unless such first marriage was void, 
 or voidable and has been duly avoided by 
 judicial decree, or, if valid, has been dis- 
 solved by death or by a decree of divorce or 
 by a legal presumption of death. In most 
 of the States there are statutes providing 
 that where a person has been absent, un- 
 heard from, or beyond the seas for a period 
 of five or seven years, the other party to a 
 marriage shall not be punishable for marry- 
 ing again. As a legal rule, life is presumed 
 to continue for a period of seven years after 
 the person has disappeared ; but if a woman, 
 supposing her husband to be dead, marries 
 within seven years and the husband is never 
 heard of afterward, it will generally be pre- 
 sumed not only that he is dead, but that he 
 died before the woman marries again. The 
 statutes which provide that under certain 
 circumstances a bona-fide second marriage 
 will be void only from the time that it is so 
 decreed have been variously construed, but
 
 16 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 the courts will avoid, if possible, a construc- 
 tion that would give a person two spouses at 
 the same time. According to the Spanish 
 law, a woman who enters into matrimony in 
 ignorance that her husband has a wife liv- 
 ing, or that there is any other impediment 
 to the marriage, is in law not only innocent 
 of crime, but is entitled to all the rights, in- 
 cidents, and privileges that pertain to law- 
 ful marriage, and these are continued so long 
 as there is ignorance as to the second mar- 
 riage. 
 
 When a woman who is already married 
 goes through the form of a second marriage 
 she may be guilty of the crime of bigamy 
 or polygamy. Bigamy was not a felony at 
 the common law, nor was it a crime of which 
 the ordinary common-law tribunals took 
 cognizance at all. It was originally consid- 
 ered as being exclusively within ecclesias- 
 tical jurisdiction. At the present time, gen- 
 erally throughout the United States bigamy 
 and polygamy are crimes by statute. 
 
 The section of the Revised Statutes of the 
 United States which defines bigamy, omit- 
 ting the exceptions, reads as follows : 
 
 Every person having a husband or wife liv- 
 ing, who marries another, whether married or 
 single, in a territory or other place over which 
 the United States have exchisive jurisdiction, is 
 guihy of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine
 
 MARRIAGE 17 
 
 of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for 
 a term of not more than five years. 
 
 A decree of a court may be obtained where 
 a marriage is void or only voidable. In the 
 case of a void marriage, the parties not being 
 thereby incapacitated for marriage, they 
 may marry again even before and without 
 a decree of nullity. In the case of a voidable 
 marriage, it being void ah initio if duly 
 avoided, the parties may marry again after 
 a decree of nullity. But a marriage where 
 there has been a voidable marriage which 
 has not been avoided is both invalid and 
 bigamous. 
 
 An absolute divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, 
 or from the bonds of matrimony, dissolves 
 the relation of husband and wife, as will be 
 seen more fully in a later chapter, and either 
 party to the marriage may marry again, ex- 
 cept where the statute contains a special pro- 
 hibition. On the other hand, a limited di- 
 vorce, o, mensa et thoro, does not of itself 
 dissolve the relation of husband and wife, 
 and neither party can marry again. Such 
 a second marriage, however, although it is 
 invalid, does not constitute bigamy. A pro- 
 hibition against the marriage after divorce 
 of the guilty party, for a certain time or ex- 
 cept under certain conditions, is sometimes 
 contained in a statute, as in the State of New 
 
 2
 
 18 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 York, and is sometimes entered by a court as 
 a part of a decree of divorce under the au- 
 thority of a statute, as in Maryland. The 
 effect is the same in either case. In some 
 of the States, as in Massachusetts, New 
 York, and North Carolina, the court has been 
 given the power to annul the decree of pro- 
 hibition and allow the person to marry after 
 the lapse of a certain time, provided that 
 the conduct of the person during that time 
 has been good. 
 
 As to the consent of the parties to a mar- 
 riage. Consent is the very essence of a mar- 
 riage, and there can be no real marriage 
 without it. A mere ceremony of marriage 
 cannot make a man and a woman husband 
 and wife where they go through the forms of 
 marriage in jest, or regard them as mere pre- 
 liminaries. Neither does acting as husband 
 and wife toward each other constitute a mar- 
 riage. Consent to a marriage may be absent 
 owing to error, fraud, or duress. It should 
 be noted that a mistake of person, but of 
 nothing else, affects the validity of marriage, 
 as mistakes as to character, fortune, and 
 health make no difference, the parties taking 
 each other for better or for worse. 
 
 The practice of any deceit or false repre- 
 sentations which induce consent, especially 
 where the deceived person is weak in mind 
 or young, will invalidate a marriage. The
 
 MARRIAGE 19 
 
 fact that a person marries under actual com- 
 pulsion will also invalidate a marriage. It 
 is not sufficient that a woman marry unwill- 
 ingly, she must have been forced by a fear 
 of bodily harm. 
 
 The meeting of the minds that is essential to 
 a valid marriage may be expressed in words, 
 written or oral, or by signs or implied from 
 conduct. No technical words are necessary, 
 even where the statute requires a solemniza- 
 tion. It need only apx)ear that the man and 
 the woman intend to live together as husband 
 and wife and to produce children under the 
 sanction of the law. It is doubtful whether 
 persons can actually marry by letter, and 
 an attempted marriage by telephone would 
 probably stand on the same footing as at- 
 tempted marriages by letter. If a legal 
 marriage is the object of the persons, any 
 stipulations that they may make that are in- 
 consistent with the law are simply void. The 
 apparent contract is not affected by a mental 
 reservation of one of the parties. The agree- 
 ment must be to be husband and wife thence- 
 forth; it must contemplate the present as- 
 sumption of the marriage state. 
 
 As to the ceremonies of marriages: The 
 celebration of marriage was necessary by the 
 canon law prior to the Council of Trent, but 
 was not necessary by the civil law or by the 
 law of Scotland. A ceremony has been de-
 
 20 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 clared necessary by the common law of Eng- 
 land in Maryland, Massachusetts, and North 
 Carolina. Tlie contrary has been held by 
 the Supreme Court of the United States in 
 a case arising in Tennessee, and in Alabama, 
 California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Ken- 
 tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
 Missouri, New York, Ohio, Kliode Island, 
 and Pennsylvania. A celebration is neces- 
 sary by the law of Mexico. All of the Ameri- 
 can States at the present time have statutes 
 providing for the celebration of marriages, 
 what permission or license must be gotten or 
 notice given before the marriage, who must 
 perform the ceremony, and what record of 
 the marriage must be made. As a rule, such 
 provisions do not aifect the validity, but only 
 ihe legality of a marriage. Whether or not 
 any of such provisions must be complied 
 with in order that a marriage may be valid 
 depends, in the first place, ujoon whether by 
 the preexisting common law any such for- 
 mality was necessary, and, in the second 
 place, whether it were or not, there is a pro- 
 vision in the statute stating that non-com- 
 pliance with it shall render a marriage void. 
 The necessity of the celebration depends 
 upon the law of a place where the parties 
 marry. ^IMms, if the parties desire to marry 
 within the State of Maryland, they must not 
 only have a celebration, but a religious one.
 
 MARRIAGE 21 
 
 In England, before the Reformation, there 
 could have been no valid marriage without 
 the presence of a priest ordained by a bishop, 
 or afterward without the presence of a priest 
 or deacon. The modern statutes have ex- 
 tended the right to celebrate marriages to 
 the regularly ordained ministers of any reli- 
 gious denomination, and in most of the 
 American States to judges, chancellors, and 
 magistrates. Special provisions have been 
 made for marriages of Friends or Quakers. 
 The parties cannot marry themselves with 
 a ceremony when a celebration is required, 
 as there must be a celebrant. The celebrant 
 must be a third party; a minister cannot 
 marry himself. Wherever the law requires 
 a marriage to be recorded, such a record, or 
 a copy, is direct evidence of the marriage, 
 both in civil and criminal cases; but such a 
 record proves only what is required to be 
 recorded, and is not conclusive. Any person 
 present at the marriage may testify concern- 
 ing it, whether a third party or the celebrant, 
 and, in general, even the parties themselves. 
 
 In asserting a marriage which took place 
 in another country or state, it is customary 
 to prove first the foreign law and then a mar- 
 riage by contract or by celebration as re- 
 quired by such a law. If the fact of a cele- 
 bration is proved, it will be presumed to be 
 in conformity with the foreign law.
 
 22 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 What is known as a nullity suit is one that 
 is brought for the purpose of having a void 
 marriage judicially declared to be void, or 
 of having a voidable marriage judicially 
 made void. Nullity suits are frequently in 
 the statutes spoken of as divorce suits, but 
 properly a divorce suit is a suit for the pur- 
 pose of dissolving a marriage, and the con- 
 sequences of a divorce are very different 
 from those of a decree of nullity, as the lat- 
 ter does not destroy marriage rights, but de- 
 clares that they never existed. Jurisdiction 
 in the United States to declare void a mar- 
 riage that is otherwise valid, as is the case 
 with jurisdiction to grant a divorce, depends 
 entirely upon statute. 
 
 A voidable marriage may, in general, be 
 avoided on the application of either party, 
 but the decree must be passed during the 
 lifetime of both of the parties, or the mar- 
 riage will be binding. 
 
 On and after the first day of January, 1902, 
 what is known as a common-law marriage 
 will not be recognized in the State of New 
 York, unless entered into through a written 
 contract of marriage, signed by both parties, 
 and at least two witnesses who shall sub- 
 scribe to the same, stating the place of resi- 
 dence of each of the parties and witnesses, 
 and the date and place of marriage. The 
 contract must be acknowledged by the par-
 
 MARRIAGE 23 
 
 ties and witnesses in the manner required for 
 the acknowledgment of a conveyance of real 
 estate to entitle such a convej^ance to be re- 
 corded. Such a contract must be filed, within 
 six months after its execution, in the office of 
 the clerk of the town or city in which the 
 marriage was solemnized. Such a contract, 
 or a certified copy, shall be presumptive evi- 
 dence of the marriage. 
 
 This law further provides that no mar- 
 riage claimed to have been contracted within 
 the State on or after January 1, 1902, other- 
 wise than as therein provided, shall be valid 
 for any purpose whatever; provided, how- 
 ever, that no such marriage shall be deemed 
 or adjudged to be invalid, nor shall the valid- 
 ity thereof be in any way affected, on ac- 
 count of any want of authority in any person 
 solemnizing the marriage, if consummated 
 with the full belief on the part of the persons 
 so married, or either of them, that they were 
 lawfully joined in marriage, or on account of 
 any mistake in the date or place of marriage, 
 or in the residence of either of the parties. 
 This law does away with the so-called com- 
 mon-law marriage which has been recog- 
 nized in the State of New York since the 
 year 1809.
 
 PLURAL MARRIAGES OF THE 
 MORMONS 
 
 IT is evident that the institution of polyg- 
 amy among our Mormon population is 
 declining. The anti-polygamy enactments 
 of Congress are now being rigidly enforced, 
 and there is also developing within the Mor- 
 mon C'hurch a desire for a more liberal in- 
 terpretation of the dogma of celestial mar- 
 riage. Yet, while polygamy is dying out as 
 a social institution, it cannot be said to be 
 extinct, and plural marriages are still legal 
 factors in the lives of a number of women, 
 and for this reason, if for no other, they 
 should be included in a study of the legal 
 condition of American women. The Mor- 
 mon Church, or, more correctly, according to 
 its legal title, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
 Latter-Day Saints, recognizes two kinds of 
 marriage— the temporal and the spiritual. 
 With the first kind of marriage a man and a 
 woman are united for this world only, while 
 with the spiritual marriage the union is eter- 
 nal. Marriage for eternity is regarded as 
 an everlasting covenant to be husband and 
 wife, and is looked upon as a religious ordi- 
 
 24
 
 PLURAL MARRIAGES OF MORMONS 25 
 
 nauce of a most sacred character. Temporal 
 marriage is a joining, the spiritual marriage 
 is a sealing process. Temporal marriages 
 are permitted by the church, but they are 
 not encouraged, because persons marrying in 
 this way are considered as performing only 
 half their duty. It is said to be practised 
 chiefly by lukewarm adherents of the faith, 
 by widowers desiring only one wife in hea- 
 ven, and by widows who were previously 
 joined for eternity to their departed hus- 
 bands. The church discourages temporal 
 marriage by teaching that the children born 
 of such a marriage by one who has been a 
 widow belong in the next world not to their 
 earthly father, but to the man to whom their 
 mother was sealed eternally— that is, to her 
 first husband. Those who are unsealed, com- 
 prising those who never marry and those 
 who marry only for their natural lives, oc- 
 cupy an inferior status in heaven. They are 
 only allowed to become angels— that is, min- 
 istering spirits to those who are fully re- 
 deemed and glorified. They can have no 
 part in the extension of God's kingdom by 
 helping to people new worlds. 
 
 In the marriage code of the Mormon 
 Church there is nothing to prevent a person 
 being married to one party for this world 
 and to another for the next, no matter 
 whether the latter is already married to still
 
 26 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 another person for this life. When this oc- 
 curs, it is not lawful to assume marital rela- 
 tions on earth, for such relations must be 
 postponed until after the resurrection. A 
 woman can be sealed to only one man, but 
 the same man may be sealed eternally to 
 many women if he so desire and the presi- 
 dent of the church approve. The Book of 
 Mormon forbids a man to have more than 
 one wife, but it also states that if the Lord 
 should at any time wish otherwise he would 
 command his people. A subsequent revela- 
 tion on the eternity of the marriage covenant, 
 including plurality of wives, is said to have 
 been given through Joseph Smith, the pro- 
 phet, at Nauvoo, Hancock County, Illinois, 
 July 12, 1843. This revelation has consti- 
 tuted the theological sanction for plural mar- 
 riages. 
 
 If a man felt called upon to take the ordi- 
 nance of ]:)lural marriage, he was required 
 to consult the president of the church, whose 
 duty it was to look into the affairs of the can- 
 didate and to inquire of the Lord if the step 
 would be pleasing to him. In the event of a 
 favorable response, he was not at liberty to 
 consummate his desire until he had sought 
 the consent of his first wife. If she offered 
 no objection all was well, but if she withheld 
 her sanction, and he failed to win her to his 
 way of thinking after due effort, he was at
 
 PLURAL MARRIAGES OF MORMONS 27 
 
 liberty to proceed against her will. When 
 these preliminaries had been gone through, 
 he consulted the woman of his choice, and at 
 the ceremony his first wife, when favorably 
 disposed to the second marriage, presented 
 the new bride to her husband. The ground 
 upon which a man was permitted in this mat- 
 ter to act contrary to the wishes of his first 
 wife was that her obstinacy should not deter 
 him from the performance of a religious ob- 
 ligation. 
 
 In 1895, Wilford Woodruff, president of 
 the church, made public a revelation amend- 
 ing the earlier revelation with reference to 
 the celestial order of marriage, and prohibit- 
 ing the contracting of further polygamous 
 marriages.
 
 T 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
 
 HE course of modern legislation has 
 I JL tended very generally to do away in its 
 \ strictness with the fiction of the common 
 / law tliat by marriage a husband and wife be- 
 (^come one legal person. By that legal fic- 
 tion, a woman by marriage was regarded as 
 having lost all legal identity; she became 
 civiliter mortua, she was covered by or 
 merged in her husband, and she was called 
 ''feme covert," and her condition was called 
 V ' coverture. " Such a fiction was unknown 
 to the civil law, and in the development of 
 the law of equity the fiction of unity was 
 largely ignored. American legislation has 
 tended ever more and more to preserve the 
 legal identity of woman in the married state 
 and to develop her legal personality. 
 
 Concerning the general relation of hus- 
 band and w^ife there are some interesting 
 declarations to be found in the constitutions 
 and statutes of the several States and Terri- 
 tories. Thus, it is declared in California, 
 Georgia, and New Mexico that the husband 
 is the head of the family, and that the wife 
 is subject to him. It is further declared in 
 
 28
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE 29 
 
 Georgia tliat the wife's legal existence is 
 merged in that of her husband, following the 
 rule of the common law, except so far as the 
 law recognizes her separately, either for her 
 own protection, her own benefit, or the pres- 
 ervation of public order. The law of New 
 Mexico is even more declarative; the hus- 
 band owes the wife ' ' fidelity, favor, and pro- 
 tection." "He should make her a partici- 
 pant in all the conveniences he enjoys." 
 "He should show her the utmost and every 
 attention in case of sickness, misfortune, or 
 accident, and provide for her the necessaries 
 of life according to his condition or ability. ' ' 
 It is also declared that the wife owes fidelity 
 and obedience to the husband, and that she is 
 obliged to live with him. In California and 
 Louisiana it is declared that the husband 
 and wife contract toward each other obliga- 
 tions of mutual respect, assistance, fidelity, 
 and support. In California and the Dakotas 
 it is declared that the husband may choose 
 any reasonable place or mode of living, and 
 the wife must conform thereto; while Loui- 
 siana declares that the wife is bound to live 
 with her husband, and to follow him wher- 
 ever he chooses to reside; also that the hus- 
 band is obliged to receive her, and to furnish 
 her with whatever is required for the con- 
 venience of life, in proportion to his means 
 and condition. In Louisiana a wife cannot
 
 30 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 appear in court without the authority of her 
 husband, although she may be in trade as a 
 merchant, or possess her property separate 
 from her husband. The States of California, 
 Nevada, and the Dakotas have declared that 
 the wife must support the husband, when he 
 has not deserted her, out of her sei)arate 
 property when he has no separate property 
 and there is no community property and lie 
 is unable from infirmity to support himself. 
 
 In New Mexico both the husband and the 
 wife have a process in the courts to com- 
 pel the other to perform such duties as are 
 specified. 
 
 It is a very general rule of the statute law 
 in the United States that a husband or his 
 separate property is not liable for the debts 
 of the wife contracted before her marriage, 
 and in many of the States the husband is not 
 liable on any cause of action against the wife 
 which originated prior to the marriage. But 
 in a few States the husband is liable for such 
 debts to the extent of any property acquired 
 from the wife by any agreement made before 
 marriage, as in New York and West Vir- 
 ginia; or to the extent of any property re- 
 ceived by him from or through the wife, as 
 in the States of Indiana, Kentucl^, Missouri, 
 Colorado, and Georgia. As a general prin- 
 ciple of law, the husband is not liable on his
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE 31 
 
 wife's contracts in respect to her separate 
 property, trade, business, labor, or services, 
 and so it is expressed in the States of Massa- 
 chusetts, Connecticut, New York, Indiana, 
 Michigan, Arkansas, and the Territory of 
 Arizona. In Massachusetts and Arkansas 
 the husband is not liable on any judgment 
 recovered against the wife alone. In Geor- 
 gia it is declared that the husband's consent 
 is to be presumed to the wife's agency in all 
 purchases of necessaries suitable for her con- 
 dition, made for the use of herself and her 
 family; such a presumption, however, may be 
 rebutted by proof. The code of California 
 in this matter reads: "If the husband neg- 
 lects to make adequate provision for the sup- 
 port of his wife, any other person may in 
 good faith supply her with articles necessary 
 for her support, and recover, the reasonable 
 value thereof from the husband. ' ' The Con- 
 necticut law declares that the husband's 
 property is to be first applied to satisfy any 
 joint liability of the husband and the wife 
 for the support of the family, and that the 
 wife is entitled in equity to an indemnity 
 for property of her own taken for such a 
 purpose. 
 
 As a general rule, a husband is not liable 
 for the torts— that is, for the actionable 
 wrongs— committed by his wife, except when
 
 32 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 committed under his actual coercion, or when 
 he would be liable if the relation of marriage 
 did not exist. 
 
 On the other hand, a wife is not generally 
 made liable, nor is her separate property 
 liable, for the debts of her husband. It is de- 
 clared that the separate property of the wife 
 is not bound by any judgment or execution 
 against the husband in the States of Mas- 
 sachusetts, Vermont, Maryland, Kentucky, 
 Missouri, the Dakotas, and Montana. But it 
 is declared that both the husband and the 
 wife are equally liable for the expenses of 
 the family and for the education of the chil- 
 dren, and either or both may be sued in Con- 
 necticut, Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, Washington, 
 Alabama, and New Mexico. In the State of 
 Montana a wife is liable for all necessaries 
 procured for the use and benefit of herself 
 and of her children under eighteen years of 
 age. In the States of Pennsylvania and Ala- 
 bama a debt for necessaries furnished to the 
 family may be enforced against the property 
 of the wife, after an execution against the 
 husband is returned unsatisfied. 
 
 It is the general rule that the debts of a 
 wife contracted before marriage may be en- 
 forced against her and against her separate 
 property after marriage. Also the debts of 
 a wife contracted by her after marriage may 
 be enforced against her and her separate
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE 33 
 
 property. A judgment may be recovered 
 against the wife in her own name in Maine, 
 Rhode Island, and Ohio ; or she may be sued 
 jointly with her husband in Maine, Rhode 
 Island, Maryland, and Alabama. 
 
 A married woman, with her separate prop- 
 erty, is liable for torts committed by her, and 
 the statutes so declare in the States of Maine, 
 Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minne- 
 sota, Washington, and in the Territory of 
 New Mexico.
 
 TORTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE 
 
 AT the common law, as a general rule, 
 JlJL. where an injury to the rights of the 
 person, such as injuries to health, reputation, 
 or liberty, is inflicted upon a married woman, 
 an action may be maintained in the name of 
 the husband and wife for damages where the 
 ground of the action is the wife's personal 
 pain or suffering, either physical or mental, 
 or both. Such an action would be legarded 
 at the common law as the action of the wife, 
 subject to a right on the })art of the defen- 
 dant of insisting on having the husband 
 joined. But at the common law, if the dam- 
 ages are collected during the cov^erture they 
 become the absolute i)roi)erty of the husband. 
 If, however, the husband should die before 
 or during the ]jendency of the suit, the dam- 
 ages will belong to the wife, and will not go 
 to the administrator of the husband's estate; 
 so, also, the cause of action survives to the 
 wife, and she may prosecute the suit to judg- 
 ment and to execution. But upon the death 
 of the wife the action will not, at connnon 
 law, survive to the husband, nor even to the 
 wife's administrator. By force of statutes, 
 
 34
 
 TORTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE 35 
 
 however, as in the States of Maine and Ver- 
 mont, such an action survives to the wife's 
 administrator. 
 
 Under the statutes of the various States 
 relating to married women, usually the sole 
 right of action is given to the wife for torts 
 committed against her, and it is the prevail- 
 ing rule that she is required to bring suit in 
 her own name. In the States of Louisiana 
 and Texas, under statutes, the cause of ac- 
 tion for the recovery of damages for injury 
 to the person of the wife is regarded as com- 
 munity estate, and such estate being repre- 
 sented by the husband, the right to sue for 
 such injuries is vested in him, and must be 
 asserted by him, unless there is evidence of 
 exceptional facts indicating that the wife's 
 rights and necessities require that she should 
 receive the aid of the court. But a mere sep- 
 aration of the husband and wife, and his 
 refusal to join her in the action, is not suffi- 
 cient to change the rule. In California, al- 
 though the right of action and the damages 
 recovered are community property, both the 
 husband and wife are necessary parties. 
 Where the injury to the wife is such that the 
 husband sustains a separate loss or damage, 
 as, for example, where he is put to expense 
 or is deprived of the society or the services 
 of his wife, he is entitled to recover damages, 
 and he may bring a separate action in his
 
 36 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 own name, but unless based upon a statute 
 no sucli damages can be recovered in an ac- 
 tion b}^ the wife alone or by the husband and 
 wife jointly. Usually the husband has no 
 right of action for damages for the death of 
 the wife as the result of an injury, except as 
 the executor or administrator of her estate. 
 It has been held, however, in New York and 
 Indiana that where a cause of action would 
 exist if the wife had lived, if she survives the 
 injury even for a few days the husband may 
 maintain an action for the loss of the society 
 and services of the wife during that time. 
 
 In general, a husband is entitled to the so- 
 ciety, comfort, and assistance of his wife, 
 and whoever, by the alienation of her affec- 
 tions, deprives him thereof commits a tort 
 against the husband for which damages may 
 be recovered, and this is so although the 
 wrong is done by a parent of the wife. What 
 is known as the "loss of consortium" is the 
 main basis for all actions of this kind, and 
 by this term is understood the loss of the con- 
 genial society, affection, and assistance of the 
 wife. There is a right of action to the hus- 
 band even for the partial alienation of his 
 wife's affections, and it has been said that 
 even if a wife has no affection for her hus- 
 band another person has no right to inter- 
 fere and prevent any chance of its springing 
 up in the future, and a person so interfering
 
 TORTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE 37 
 
 is liable ou an action for damages. It is fre- 
 quently charged in actions for alienation of 
 affections that the defendant has either har- 
 bored the wife, or enticed her away, or in- 
 duced her to abandon her husband, but the 
 alienation of affections for which the law 
 gives a redress may be accomplished not- 
 withstanding the continuous residence of the 
 wife under the husband's roof. Indeed, it 
 would seem that such a continued residence 
 only contributes an aggravation to the in- 
 jury, where an elopement might be an alle- 
 viation. Nor is it necessary, in order to 
 maintain such an action, that it be shown 
 that the defendant has debauched the wife. 
 It is, of course, a general principle of law 
 that no one can maintain an action for a 
 wrong when he consents or contributes to the 
 acts which cause the loss. Under this prin- 
 ciple the consent of the husband to the acts 
 of the wife will act as a bar to an action for 
 the alienation of the wife's affections. 
 
 As a general rule, the measure of damages 
 in an action for the alienation of a wife's 
 affections is the value of her conjugal so- 
 ciety, affection, and assistance, less the value 
 of the husband 's duty to support, clothe, and 
 care for her when this duty has not been dis- 
 charged by the husband, as in a case where 
 the wife is living apart from the husband. 
 It is sometimes held, also, that the husband
 
 38 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 may recover for the injury done to his feel- 
 ings, and for the disgrace and dishonor 
 brought upon him and upon his family. In 
 a case where the defendant wilfully and ma- 
 liciously committed the injury, the plaintiff, 
 in addition to compensating damages, is en- 
 titled to damages as a punishment to the de- 
 fendant and as an example to others. Such 
 are called exemplary damages. Proper evi- 
 dence which tends to show that the plaintiff 
 has suffered, as a matter of fact, less injury 
 than might be inferred from the act com- 
 plained of will be received in mitigation or 
 reduction of damages. 
 
 Whether at the common law a married 
 woman has the right to maintain an action 
 for the alienation of her husband 's affections 
 seems to be disputed. She often is allowed 
 this right under married womens' acts, as 
 in the States of Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, 
 Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Ohio. As 
 in the case of actions for the alienation of 
 wives' aff'ections, the wife's right of action 
 rests upon the ' ' loss of consortium. " In an 
 action of this kind by a married woman it is 
 necessary to prove, in addition to the fact of 
 alienation or the fact of the husband's in- 
 fatuation for the defendant, that there has 
 been a direct interference on the part of the 
 defendant, and the burden of proof is on the 
 plaintiff to show such interference. There
 
 TORTS OF A PERSONAL NATURE 39 
 
 seems to be a distinction drawn between an 
 action against a stranger and an action 
 against the parents of the husband. Parents 
 are regarded as under an obligation by the 
 law of nature to relieve their children when 
 in distress; accordingly, it appears that al- 
 though a parent directly interferes, the wife 
 will have no cause of action against the pa- 
 rent, although the result of the parent's ac- 
 tion is the alienation of the husband's affec- 
 tions, if he acts in good faith, and the motive 
 of the parent in such a case is presumed to 
 be good until the contrary is shown. 
 
 In an action for the alienation of the hus- 
 band's affections the plaintitf may recover 
 for the loss of the husband's support, affec- 
 tion, society, and protection, and for anxiety, 
 mortification, and injury to her feelings. 
 The amount of damages is to be determined 
 by the jury in their sound discretion, inas- 
 much as actual measurement is not possible.
 
 THE RIGHT OF A WIFE TO 
 SUPPORT 
 
 A NORMAL feature of the contract of 
 marriage is the support of the wife by 
 the husband during marriage. Such a right 
 to a support results naturally from the more 
 dependent position of a woman in married 
 life, removed as she is, to a greater or less 
 extent, from the opportunities of earning a 
 livelihood by her own exertions. As, how- 
 ever, the obligations arising from the mar- 
 riage contract are not sufficiently realized by 
 men to produce always this normal relation, a 
 body of legislation has developed that is in a 
 way supplementary to the recognition by the 
 law of the institution of marriage, and which 
 defines with greater or less detail the legal 
 right which a wife possesses of su])])ort from 
 her husband during marriage. Such legis- 
 lation is but a |)art of a general develop- 
 ment of American statute law during the 
 nineteenth century, having for its object the 
 recognition of the greater legal individuality 
 of women. 
 
 Very nearly all of the States at the pres- 
 ent time have embodied in the statute law 
 
 40
 
 THE RIGHT OF A WIFE TO SUPPORT 41 
 
 some specific recognition of the right of a 
 married woman to some support out of the 
 property of her husband, and the exceptions 
 in this respect appear to be the States of 
 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Mis- 
 sissippi, Tennessee, and Wyoming, and the 
 Territory of New Mexico. 
 
 The provision of the law of the State of 
 Colorado may be taken as indicative of the 
 general spirit of legislation in this matter. 
 It is declared to be unlawful for any man 
 residing in that State wilfully to neglect, fail, 
 or refuse to provide a reasonable support 
 and maintenance for his wife and minor 
 children, and any person guilty of such neg- 
 lect, upon the complaint either of the wife, 
 the chairman of tlie Board of County Com- 
 missioners, or the agent of the Humane So- 
 ciety, and upon a conviction thereof, shall 
 be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and 
 shall be committed to the county jail for not 
 longer than a period of sixty days, unless it 
 shall appear that, owing to physical or other 
 cause, he is unable to furnish such support. 
 (Session I^aws, 1883, p. 126.) 
 
 In Connecticut it is provided that if a hus- 
 band neglect to support his wife he may be 
 committed to the workhouse or county jail 
 and sentenced to hard labor for not longer 
 than sixty days, unless he can show good 
 cause why he is unable to furnish such sup-
 
 42 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 130 rt, or unless he can furnish a bond or such 
 a sum toward such support as the court may 
 require, for a term of six months after the 
 date of conviction. If the husband neglects 
 to comply with the terms of his bond the 
 selectmen of the town shall furnish support 
 to the wife and children to the extent pro- 
 vided for in such bond. 
 
 In the State of Delaware, for failure to 
 support his wife and minor children a man 
 may be fined from ten to one hundred dol- 
 lars. By another law the husband may be 
 arrested and required to give bail of not 
 more than five hundred dollars. The court 
 may order him to pay to his wife a reason- 
 able support, not exceeding one hundred 
 dollars a month, and to give security to the 
 State for the performance of this duty. 
 
 In Florida, if any husband having the 
 ability to maintain or to contribute to the 
 maintenance of his wife or minor child shall 
 fail to do so, the wife, living with him or 
 a]3art from him through his fault, may ob- 
 tain such a maintenance or contribution upon 
 a bill being filed and a suit prosecuted as in 
 other chancery causes. In Georgia the hus- 
 band nmst furnish the necessaries suitable to 
 his condition in life. The same is true in the 
 State of Illinois. In this State, however, the 
 husband has the same right of support out of 
 the wife's property. A failure to support
 
 THE RIGHT OF A WIFE TO SUPPORT 43 
 
 wife and children under twelve years of age 
 is a misdemeanor, and may be punished 
 by a "fine not less than one hundred nor 
 more than five hundred dollars, or imprison- 
 ment in the county jail, house of correction, 
 or workhouse not less than one month or 
 more than twelve months, or both such fine 
 and imprisonment. ' ' 
 
 In the State of Indiana a wife may sue 
 for support, first, if deserted by her husband 
 and left without means of support ; second, if 
 he has been convicted of a felony and put in 
 State's prison; third, when he is a habitual 
 drunkard ; and, fourth, if he joins a religious 
 society prohibiting marriage. The court may 
 award necessary support to the wife accord- 
 ing to circumstances; it may order the sale 
 of the husband's lands, or it may allow the 
 wife to sell her lands without her husband 
 joining. 
 
 The State of Iowa has declared that the 
 support and education of the family are 
 chargeable equally on the husband and wife 's 
 property. In Kansas the husband is obliged 
 by law to support his wife according to his 
 means. If he fails to support her she may 
 have alimony decreed to her by the court 
 where the cause exists for which a divorce 
 may be granted. In Kentucky, while the hus- 
 band is expected to furnish the necessaries 
 according to his condition in life, yet if he
 
 44 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 has no property except his wages there does 
 not appear to be any legal provision whereby 
 he can be punished for non-support. The law 
 of Louisiana obliges a husband to furnish 
 his wife with whatever is required for the 
 convenience of life in proportion to his 
 means and condition. By the Maine law, if 
 the husband lives apart from his wife and 
 children, and if the separation was without 
 fault of the wife, the court may order him 
 to make reasonable contribution toward the 
 support of his wife and family, and enforce 
 obedience by appropriate decrees. In Mary- 
 land non-support is a misdemeanor, and can 
 be punished by a fine of not more than one 
 hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the 
 county jail.
 
 THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN 
 
 THE use of mothers equally with fathers 
 in the guardianship of minor children 
 is seen, by a study of American legislation, 
 to be a recent development, and the use ob- 
 tains at the present time in only seven of the 
 States— namely, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, 
 Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
 Rhode Island. In the remaining States the 
 preference is given to the father. 
 
 In Colorado both parents are declared to 
 be joint guardians, with equal powers. In 
 Kansas the father and mother are declared 
 the natural guardians, and if either dies or 
 is incapable of acting in such a capacity, 
 the natural guardianshii^ devolves upon the 
 other parent. In case of the death, absence, 
 or incapacity of the father, the mother may 
 appoint a guardian of the property of a 
 minor child, if deemed suitable by the court. 
 In Nebraska the last surviving parent may 
 be by will appointed a guardian for any of 
 the children, whether born at the time of the 
 making of the will or afterward. In New 
 York the conditions of guardianship were 
 made equal in the year 1860; the law was 
 repealed in 1862, and was reenacted in 1893. 
 
 45
 
 46 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 In Pennsylvania, since 1895, the mother is 
 made equal guardian of a minor child if she 
 contributes by her labor or otherwise to its 
 support. 
 
 Among the other States there is the usual 
 diversity of provisions creating unequal 
 rights of guardianship between father and 
 mother. 
 
 In Alabama the father may by will ap- 
 point a guardian for a minor child, but such 
 an appointment must be claimed within six 
 months after the will is admitted to probate. 
 Otherwise the mother is entitled to the cus- 
 tody of the person of the ward, if a girl, 
 until she is eighteen years of age; if a boy, 
 until he is fourteen years. In Arkansas the 
 mother is entitled to the guardianship of a 
 minor child only if the father is not living, 
 having custody of both the person and the 
 property of the ward, unless the proi)ert>^ is 
 derived elsewhere than from the mother. 
 
 The law in Arizona is remarkable. The 
 father, if living,— if not, the mother while 
 she remains unmarried and if suitable,— is 
 entitled to the guardianship of a child. A 
 guardian of the person or property, or both, 
 of a child born, or likely to be born, may be 
 nominated by will or deed to take effect upon 
 the deatli of the parent so nominating: first, 
 if the child is legitimate, by the father with 
 the written consent of the mother, or by
 
 THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN 47 
 
 either parent if the other is dead or incapable 
 of acting ; second, if the child is illegitimate, 
 by the mother. In California, if the father is 
 not living, the mother, while she remains un- 
 married and if suitable, is entitled to the 
 guardianship of the child. In Connecticut, 
 if the father is not living, the mother may be 
 appointed guardian; also if she has been 
 abandoned by her husband. The parents 
 may appoint a guardian by will who would 
 be entitled to the guardianship if living, but 
 if the custody of a child has been given to 
 the mother by the Supreme Court or the 
 General Assembly, she alone has the power 
 of appointing a guardian by will. 
 
 In Delaware the father alone may appoint 
 a guardian by his will. The same is the rule 
 in Florida. In Georgia the mother is the 
 guardian only if the father is dead. He may 
 appoint by will, and so may the mother if 
 widowed, but only for such children as have 
 no guardian and as to such property as they 
 may inherit from her. In Idaho the law is 
 the same as in Arizona. In Illinois the fa- 
 ther may appoint a guardian by his will for 
 a child born, or likely to be born, provided 
 that no such appointment shall deprive the 
 mother of the custody and tuition of the 
 child without her consent, if she be a fit per- 
 son to have such a charge. The mother, if 
 widowed and sane, may appoint a guardian
 
 48 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 by her will. In Kentucky, the father may 
 appoint a guardian by his will for his infant 
 child, and may select a different one for the 
 estate and for the nurture and education. 
 The court, in making the appointment, shall 
 choose the father, or his testamentary ap- 
 pointee ; then the mother, if unmarried ; then 
 the next of kin, giving preference to the 
 males. By the code of Louisiana, the mother 
 only becomes a guardian upon the death of 
 the father. If the mother marries again, her 
 second husband becomes guardian, and the 
 mother loses all right to appoint any other 
 guardian by her will. A mother in Mary- 
 land is the guardian only if the father is 
 dead and did not appoint a guardian by his 
 will. In Massachusetts the mother is guar- 
 dian only if she is so appointed by the court 
 in the case of a legal separation or a divorce. 
 In Michigan, the father is guardian, if liv- 
 ing. He may also appoint a guardian by 
 will, but if the mother is living she may pre- 
 sent objections before the appointment is 
 confirmed by the judge of probate, and such 
 an appointment may be appealed. The 
 mother may ap]:)oint a guardian by her will, 
 if the father did not do so by his. 
 
 The law of Montana declares that as be- 
 tween parents claiming guardianship, "nei- 
 ther parent is entitled to it as of right," but, 
 other things being equal, if the child be of
 
 THE GUARDIANSHIP OP CHILDREN 49 
 
 tender years it should be given to the mother, 
 and if it be of an age to require education 
 and preparation for labor or business, then 
 to the father. 
 
 In New Jersey the father is guardian of 
 the estate of a minor, but he cannot convey 
 any portion of the estate without the moth- 
 er's consent. In the case of a separation, 
 and no misconduct on either side, the rights 
 of father and mother are held to be equal 
 after a child is seven years of age. If a 
 widow, the mother is guardian. In South 
 Dakota the father is guardian, and has the 
 custody of the person and services of a 
 minor child, but he cannot transfer such a 
 custody to any one except the mother with- 
 out her written consent, unless she has de- 
 serted him or is living apart from him by 
 an agreement. In Texas, if the parents live 
 together the father is the natural guardian 
 of the persons of the minor children, and is 
 entitled to be appointed the guardian of their 
 estates. If the parents do not live together, 
 their rights of guardianship are equal, and 
 may be assigned to either parent for the good 
 of the children.
 
 THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 
 
 BY far the larger number of adoptions of 
 children in the United States are under- 
 taken by married and single women. The 
 legal aspects, therefore, of this institution 
 come properly within a study of the legal 
 rights and obligations of American women, 
 and are of no less practical importance than 
 many other themes. 
 
 Adoption is the act by which relations of 
 maternity or paternity and affiliation are 
 recognized as legally existing between per- 
 sons not so related by nature. The legal 
 institution of adoption is not recognized by 
 the common law, and exists in the United 
 States only by force of special statutes. 
 Statutes providing for adoption have been en- 
 acted in almost all of the States of the Union. 
 Generally, any woman being an inhabitant 
 of the State and twenty-one years of age may 
 adopt. The adoptor must be forty years of 
 age in Louisiana ; competent to make a will, 
 in Iowa. If tlie adoptor has a wife or hus- 
 band, he or she must consent or join in the 
 petition or other instrument, if comi^etent, in 
 the States of New Hampshire, Massachu- 
 
 50
 
 THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 51 
 
 setts, Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, Con- 
 necticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, 
 Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
 Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, California, 
 Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, Washington, the 
 Dakotas, Idaho, Utah, and Louisiana. In 
 Massachusetts and Louisiana the person 
 adopted must l^e younger than the person 
 adopting ; and it must be a child in the States 
 of New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, 
 Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minne- 
 sota, Nebraska, Delaware, Missouri, Oregon, 
 Nevada, Colorado, Utah, Alabama, Florida, 
 Louisiana, and the Territory of New Mexico. 
 No w^oman can adopt her own husband in 
 Massachusetts ; or her own child in Illinois, 
 Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Washing- 
 ton; or a brother or sister, whether of the 
 whole or half blood, or an uncle or aunt in 
 Massachusetts; nor a man his illegitimate 
 children, whom the law prohibits him from 
 acknowledging, in Louisiana. By the law of 
 the State of Nevada no Mongolian can either 
 adopt or be adopted. It would seem by the 
 law of Illinois that only an orphan can be 
 adopted, or a child both of whose parents 
 have deserted it for at least one year. In 
 New Jersey, Idaho, and Louisiana the per- 
 son adopting must be at least fifteen years 
 older than the person adopted, and at least 
 ten years older in California, Nevada, and
 
 52 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 the Dakotas. In North Carolina an adoption 
 may be made either for life or during the 
 minority of the child. 
 
 The mode of adoption provided by statute 
 in most of the States is by petition to the 
 probate or other like court, reciting the ne- 
 cessary facts. A decree is made by the court, 
 based upon these facts, which judicially con- 
 fers upon the child the capacity to inherit, 
 and all other incidents of the status author- 
 ized by the statute of the particular State. 
 This is distinctly a judicial procedure, in- 
 volving the rendering of a judgment by the 
 court by which the new status of the child is 
 determined. In any case, whether a judgment 
 of adoption be granted is discretionary with 
 the court. In some of the States adoption is 
 effected by a mere deed stating the fact of 
 adoption, signed and sealed, acknowledged 
 before a judge, and recorded with the clerk 
 of probate or register of deeds for the county 
 where the person adopting resides. This is 
 the law in the States of Pennsylvania, Mis- 
 souri, Wyoming, and Alabama, and in the 
 Territory of New Mexico. 
 
 The consent of the child or other person 
 to be adopted must in most of the States be 
 obtained if such ])erson be over fourteen 
 years of age, or over twelve years of age in 
 the States of New York, California, Nevada, 
 the Dakotas, Idaho, and Arizona. In order
 
 THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 53 
 
 to constitute a valid adoption under the stat- 
 utes, the written consent of a child's natural 
 parents must be obtained, if living, or the 
 consent of the survivor, if one is dead, pro- 
 vided that they are known and not hopelessly 
 intemperate or insane, and have not aban- 
 doned the child. In the State of New York 
 the necessity for consent or notice to a pa- 
 rent is dispensed with if such parent has 
 been deprived of civil rights; and the same 
 rule holds in Rhode Island and Oregon, 
 where such parent is put in prison for more 
 than three years. Many of the statutes, 
 while requiring the consent of one spouse to 
 the adoption of a child by the other, fail to 
 authorize expressly the joint adoption by 
 husband and wife. But wherever adoption 
 proceedings have been attacked on the 
 ground of being an attempt at joint adop- 
 tion, a proceeding that the statute did not 
 authorize, such an adoption has been held 
 valid. A child adopted by a woman in one 
 State in accordance with the laws of that 
 State while she was domiciled there, will 
 after removal into another be recognized as 
 the legal child of the adopting parent in the 
 latter State for the purpose of inheriting 
 property there. 
 
 As a rule, the name of the person adopted 
 may be changed by the decree, deed, or other 
 instrument to that of the person adopting,
 
 54 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 and the general effect of adoption is to put 
 the parties in the relation of parent and child, 
 with all of the legal consequences. The nat- 
 ural parents are so divested of all their legal 
 rights in respect to the child. In many of 
 the States the adopting parent, or the person 
 adopted, by his next friend may appeal to 
 the Superior or Supreme Court to have the 
 decree of adoption set aside. The statutes 
 of some of the States provide that a parent 
 who has not given his or her consent to adop- 
 tion proceedings and was not served with a 
 notice may appeal from the decree of adop- 
 tion within a specified time. It has been 
 ruled that where the mother of the child is a 
 party to adoption proceedings, and gives her 
 consent to the same, the father who has aban- 
 doned the child is not entitled to notice of 
 the proceedings, nor is his consent to the 
 adoption necessary.
 
 DIVORCE 
 
 BY a divorce is understood an action at 
 law by which the parties to a marriage 
 are put back into the position of single per- 
 sons, except so far as their rights of prop- 
 erty, remarriage, etc., may be affected, 
 without necessarily rendering their children 
 illegitimate or their marriage invalid while it 
 lasted. An absolute divorce is in most of the 
 States termed a divorce a vinculo, or from the 
 ' ' bond ' ' of marriage, or simply a divorce in 
 those States in which no action for a limited 
 divorce is recognized. The State of South 
 Carolina has no divorce laws, although in a 
 few cases marriages may be annulled. There 
 are at the present time in the aggregate of 
 the legislation of the several States a total 
 of forty-two recognized causes for which an 
 absolute divo'rce may be granted, although 
 no one State happily recognizes even one 
 half of this number. In many of the States 
 divorces may be obtained for causes that in 
 other States are recognized as grounds for 
 having a marriage annulled or declared void. 
 If we omit such causes, there appear to be 
 
 55
 
 56 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 six grounds that are generally recognized as 
 causes for a divorce— namely, adultery, cru- 
 elty, desertion, drunkenness, imprisonment 
 on conviction of crime, and neglect to pro- 
 vide. 
 
 So varied and confusing is the legislation 
 of the several States with reference to di- 
 vorce that any general grouping of the States 
 on a classification of causes is unsatisfac- 
 tory, and a consideration of the condition of 
 the law in each State becomes necessary to 
 a proper treatment of this subject. 
 
 ALABAMA 
 
 In this State a divorce may be granted to 
 either the husband or the wife for the causes 
 of adultery, impotency, voluntary abandon- 
 ment for a period of two years, imprison- 
 ment for a x^eriod of two years in a State 
 penitentiary, the sentence being for a term 
 of seven years or longer, and crimes against 
 nature, committed either before or after mar- 
 riage. To a husband a divorce may be granted 
 because of the pregnancy of the wife at the 
 time of the marriage without either his 
 agency or his knowledge. To a wife a di- 
 vorce may be granted because of the habitual 
 drunkenness of tlie husband, if the habit did 
 not exist at the time of the marriage to the 
 wife's knowledge, and also for actual vio-
 
 DIVORCE 57 
 
 lence committed upon her by the husband 
 sufficient to cause danger to life or health, 
 or for conduct that causes a reasonable ap- 
 prehension of such violence. 
 
 If the defendant to an action for a divorce 
 is not a resident of the State, the plaintiff 
 must have resided within the State for a 
 period of one year. 
 
 TEEKITORY OF AEIZONA 
 
 A DivoECE may be granted to either a hus- 
 band or a wife for the causes of adultery, 
 voluntary abandonment for six months, ex- 
 cesses, cruel treatment or outrages toward 
 the other by personal violence or by any 
 other means, and a conviction, after mar- 
 riage, of a felony and imprisonment in any 
 prison. No suit for divorce, however, can 
 be begun until six months after a final judg- 
 ment of conviction, and neither party shall 
 have been convicted upon the testimony of 
 the other, and no pardon subsequently 
 granted shall interfere with a right to secure 
 a divorce. 
 
 A divorce may be granted to a wife be- 
 cause of the husband's habitual intemper- 
 ance for a period of six months, or because 
 of the husband's wilful neglect to provide 
 for his wife the necessaries and comforts of 
 life for a period of six months, when he has
 
 58 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 the ability to provide the same, or fails to do 
 so b}^ reason of his idleness, profligacy, or 
 dissipation. The plaintiff must have been a 
 bona-fide resident of the Territory, and a 
 resident for six months next i)reeeding in the 
 county where the suit is brought. Marriage 
 may be declared void for impotency, or for 
 any other impediment that renders the mar- 
 riage contract invalid from the beginning. 
 
 ABKANSAS 
 
 A DIVORCE may be granted to either a hus- 
 band or a wife for the causes of adultery, 
 bigamy, impotency, wilful desertion for a 
 period of one year without reasonable cause, 
 conviction of a felony or other infamous 
 crime, habitual drunkenness for a period of 
 one year, and barbarous treatment that en- 
 dangers life, or such personal indignities as 
 to render the condition of the applicant in- 
 tolerable. In 1895, insanity developing after 
 marriage as a ground for a divorce was re- 
 pealed. 
 
 The plaintiff in an action for a divorce 
 must have resided within the State for a 
 period of one year. The cause for divorce 
 must have occurred within the State, or, if 
 without the State, it must have been a legal 
 ground for a divorce where it did occur, or 
 the residence of the plaintiff must then have
 
 DIVORCE 59 
 
 been in that other State. In any case, the 
 cause must have occurred within five years 
 of the time the action is brought. 
 
 We note also that in this State five years' 
 absence, unheard from, be^^ond the limits of 
 the State is a legal justification for a second 
 marriage. Marriages are declared to be void 
 for consanguinity, and also when contracted 
 between persons of the white and black races. 
 Marriages may be declared null and void for 
 consent obtained by force, for lack of legal 
 age, for lack of understanding, or for physi- 
 cal incapacity. 
 
 CALIFORNIA 
 
 In this State the causes for a divorce are 
 adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion or 
 wilful neglect for a period of one year, and 
 conviction of a felony. A wife who has been 
 deserted may bring an action against her 
 husband for the separate maintenance of her- 
 self and her children, without seeking a di- 
 vorce, if she prefers to do so. 
 
 The plaintiff must have been a resident of 
 the State for a period of one year, and of the 
 county in which the action is brought three 
 months next preceding the commencement 
 of the suit. Fraud on the part of the wife 
 regarding her pregnancy cannot be made a 
 ground for a divorce ; neither can any false
 
 60 WOMAN AND THE LAAV 
 
 representations on the part of the husband as 
 to his character or property. A marriage 
 may be annulled for bigamy, for impotency, 
 or for unsoundness of mind at the time of 
 the marriage; also for a want of legal con- 
 sent to the marriage, and for a consent ob- 
 tained by force or fraud. 
 
 COLORADO 
 
 The causes for a divorce in this State are 
 adultery, bigamy, impotency, wilful deser- 
 tion for a period of one year without a rea- 
 sonable cause, wilful desertion and departure 
 from the State without an intention of re- 
 turning, habitual drunkenness for a period 
 of one year, conviction of a felony or other 
 infamous crime, extreme cruelty, the failure 
 of the husband for a period of one year, 
 being in good bodily health, to make a rea- 
 sonable provision for the support of his 
 family. 
 
 The plaintitf must have resided for a pe- 
 riod of one year within the State, except 
 when the grounds for the divorce are adul- 
 tery or extreme cruelty when committed 
 within the State, providing that the suit shall 
 be brought within the county in which such 
 plaintiff or defendant resided or in which the 
 defendant last resided. 
 
 The court may in its discretion reopen a
 
 DIVORCE 61 
 
 case within a period of one year upon good 
 reason shown by a defeated party. Neither 
 party can remarry before the expiration of 
 one year. 
 
 CONNECTICUT 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, 
 fraud in the contract of marriage, a wilful 
 desertion and total neglect for a period of 
 three years, a seven years' absence unheard 
 from, intolerable cruelty, habitual intemper- 
 ance, a sentence of imprisonment for life, 
 and any infamous crime involving a viola- 
 tion of conjugal duty and punishable by im- 
 prisonment in the State prison. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided for a pe- 
 riod of three years within the State unless 
 the cause for the divorce shall have arisen 
 subsequently to the removal into the State or 
 unless the defendant shall have continuously 
 resided within the State for a period of three 
 years next before the date of the complaint, 
 and actual service shall have been made upon 
 him, or unless the cause is habitual intem- 
 perance or intolerable cruelty, and the plain- 
 tiff was domiciled within the State at the 
 time of the marriage and before bringing the 
 complaint has returned to this State with an 
 intention of permanently remaining. 
 
 Whenever, for any cause, a marriage is 
 void, the Superior Court may, upon com-
 
 62 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 plaint, issue a decree declaring such a mar- 
 riage void, and may take such order regard- 
 ing the care of any children and alimony as 
 it may make in a suit for divorce. 
 
 DELAWARE 
 
 In this State the causes for an absolute di- 
 vorce are adultery, desertion for a period 
 of three years, habitual drunkenness, impo- 
 tency, extreme cruelty, a conviction either in 
 or out of the State, after marriage, of a crime 
 that is classed as a felony by the laws of the 
 State of Delaware, whether such a crime 
 shall have been perpetrated before or after 
 marriage. An absolute or a limited divorce 
 may be granted, in the discretion of the court, 
 if in the procurement of a marriage there 
 was a lack of sufiicient age of either party, 
 if such a marriage has not been voluntarily 
 ratified after both of the parties have attained 
 the legal age, or for a wilful neglect on the 
 part of the husband, for a period of three 
 years, to provide the wife with the neces- 
 saries of life suitable to her condition. 
 
 A divorce obtained by an inhabitant of 
 the State of Delaware in another State, but 
 for a cause that occurred in Delaware or for 
 a cause which would not be a ground for a 
 divorce in Delaware, is of no effect within 
 that State. Nor can a divorce be decreed if
 
 DIVORCE 63 
 
 the cause arose out of the State and at the 
 time the petitioner was not a resident of 
 Delaware, unless for the same or a like cause 
 a divorce would be granted in the State or 
 country where it occurred. 
 
 A husband or a wife divorced for adul- 
 tery may not marry the person with whom 
 the crime was committed. Marriages may 
 be annulled for consanguinity or affinity, or 
 when between whites and negroes or mulat- 
 toes, or for bigamy, or when either party at 
 the time of the marriage was insane. 
 
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 An absolute divorce may be granted for big- 
 amy, lunacy, or impotency at the time of 
 marriage, for adultery, habitual drunken- 
 ness for a period of three years, extreme cru- 
 elty endangering life or health, and for wil- 
 ful desertion and abandonment for a period 
 of two years. Either a limited or an abso- 
 lute divorce may be granted for cruelty or 
 upon evidence to the satisfaction of the court 
 of a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. 
 If the cause for divorce occurred outside of 
 the District, the plaintiff must have lived 
 within the District for a period of two years 
 next preceding the bringing of the suit. 
 Marriages are void within the prohibited de- 
 grees of relationship and because of lunacy.
 
 64 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 FLORIDA 
 
 No limited divorce may be granted in this 
 State. A wife may sue for alimony, without 
 a divorce, if any cause for a divorce other 
 than bigamy exists, and she, at the time, is 
 living apart from her husband. 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, big- 
 amy, impotency, desertion for a period of 
 one year that is obstinate and wilful, ex- 
 treme cruelty, habitual intemperance, habit- 
 ual indulgence in a violent and ungovernable 
 temper, where the parties are within the pro- 
 hibited degrees of relationship, and also 
 where the defendant has obtained a divorce 
 in any other State. The plaintiff must have 
 resided within the State for a period of two 
 years next prior to the commencement of the 
 suit. 
 
 GEORGIA 
 
 In this State the causes for an absolute di- 
 vorce are adultery, wilful desertion for a 
 period of three years, cruel treatment, habit- 
 ual intoxication, the marriage of persons who 
 are within the prohibited degrees of rela- 
 tionship, mental incapacity, impotency at the 
 time of the marriage, any fraud, force, men- 
 ace, or duress in obtaining the marriage, a 
 conviction and an imprisonment for a term 
 of two years or more for a crime involving
 
 DIVORCE 65 
 
 moral turpitude, and also the pregnancy of 
 the wife at the time of the marriage without 
 the husband's agency or knowledge. 
 
 One year's residence within the State is 
 necessary for the petitioner. The trial of a 
 suit for a divorce is by a jury, and the ver- 
 dict may be for either a total or a limited 
 divorce. A total divorce, however, can be 
 secured only if two juries, at different terms 
 of the court, unite in a verdict in favor of it. 
 The second jury, by its verdict, settles the 
 division of property. 
 
 The marriage of persons who are legally 
 unable to contract may be declared void on 
 grounds of consanguinity, impotency, lu- 
 nacy, lack of age, force, or fraud. 
 
 IDAHO 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, ex- 
 treme cruelty, a wilful desertion for a period 
 of one year, wilful neglect or habitual in- 
 temperance for a period of one year, a con- 
 viction of felony, and permanent insanity, 
 provided that the defendant has been regu- 
 larly confined in an asylum for the insane 
 for a period of at least six years next pre- 
 ceding the suit, and that the plaintiff shall 
 have been an actual resident of the State 
 for six years. For the other causes a resi- 
 dence of six months within the State is suffi- 
 cient, 
 
 5
 
 66 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Marriages may be annulled for want of 
 age, for bigamy, mental unsoundness, for 
 consent obtained by force or fraud, and for 
 impotency existing at the time of the mar- 
 riage. 
 
 ILLINOIS 
 
 Divorce may be obtained for adultery, big- 
 amy, impotency, extreme and repeated cru- 
 elty, a conviction of felony or other infamous 
 crime, desertion for a period of two years 
 without any reasonable excuse, or an attempt 
 on the life of the plaintiff by poison or other 
 means showing malice. The plaintiff must 
 have resided within the State for one year, 
 unless the cause occurred within the State or 
 while one or both of the parties resided there. 
 A wife may sue for a separate maintenance 
 without a divorce, and if poor she may sue 
 without cost. Marriages are to be declared 
 void between those within the ])rohibited de- 
 grees of kinship, including first cousins, and 
 because of insanity or idiocy at the time of 
 the marriage. 
 
 INDIANA 
 
 The causes for a divorce in this State are 
 adultery, impotency, cruel and inhuman 
 treatment, abandonment for a period of two 
 years, conviction after marriage of infamous 
 crime, habitual drunkenness, and the failure
 
 DIVORCE 67 
 
 of the husband for two years to make reason- 
 able provision for his family. 
 
 The plaintiff must have been a resident of 
 the State for a period of two years and of 
 the county for six months next preceding the 
 suit. 
 
 The man or woman obtaining a divorce 
 cannot marry again for two years, during 
 which time the defendant, for a just cause, 
 may reopen the case. Adultery is declared 
 not to be a sufficient ground for a divorce, 
 unless the petition is filed within two years 
 after a knowledge of the fault. 
 
 Marriages that are prohibited by law for 
 consanguinity, for racial differences, or mar- 
 riages that are bigamous, are void, without 
 a divorce proceeding, if they are solemnized 
 within the State. 
 
 If a wife is deserted and her husband has 
 property she may sue and obtain support ; so 
 also if her husband has been convicted of a 
 felony and been put in a State prison, or if 
 he is an habitual drunkard, or if he joins a 
 religious sect the creed of which prohibits 
 marriage. 
 
 IOWA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, inhu- 
 man treatment that endangers life, desertion 
 for a period of two years without a reason- 
 able cause, a conviction of a felony after mar-
 
 68 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 riage, and the pregnancy of the wife at the 
 time of the marriage unknown to the hus- 
 band, unless he also had an illegitimate child 
 living at the time of the marriage unknown 
 to the wife. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided for one 
 continuous year within the State, unless the 
 defendant is also a resident and has been 
 served with a personal notice of the peti- 
 tion. Marriages may be annulled for impo- 
 tency, bigamy, insanity and idiocy, and if 
 prohibited by law as being within the for- 
 bidden degrees of relationship. In the case 
 of a bigamous marriage, if the husband and 
 wife live together after the death of the for- 
 mer wife or husband the marriage then be- 
 comes valid. 
 
 KANSAS 
 
 In this State a divorce may be obtained for 
 the causes of adultery, bigamy, impotency, 
 an abandonment for a period of one year, 
 extreme cruelty, a conviction of a felony and 
 an imprisonment in the penitentiary there- 
 for, habitual drunkenness, gross neglect of 
 duty, fraud in the marriage contract, and the 
 pregnancy of the wife at the time of the mar- 
 riage unknown to the husband. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided within the 
 State for a period of one year. Neither the 
 husband nor the wife can marry again until 
 six months after the decree of divorce is pro-
 
 DIVORCE 69 
 
 nounced, during which period, and for suffi- 
 cient reason, tlie case may be opened again. 
 A wife may sue for alimony without a di- 
 vorce. A marriage may be declared void if 
 either party is incapable, from want of age 
 or understanding, of contracting a marriage. 
 Marriages are prohibited between the 
 white and the colored races, also if bigamous, 
 for consanguinity, also with idiots or luna- 
 tics, if either of the parties is under the legal 
 age, and also when not solemnized in the 
 presence of an authorized person or society. 
 
 KENTUCKY 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, an abandonment for a period of one 
 year, a conviction of a felony either in or out 
 of the State, force, duress, or fraud in the 
 marriage contract, a loathsome disease con- 
 cealed at the time of the marriage or con- 
 tracted afterward, and uniting with a reli- 
 gious society' whose creed forbids marriage. 
 A divorce may be obtained by the wife, 
 when not in a like fault, for a confirmed habit 
 of drunkenness continuing for a period of 
 one year, coupled with a wasting of his estate 
 by the husband and a failure to provide a 
 suitable maintenance for his wife and chil- 
 dren; for such an habitual and cruel treat- 
 ment for a period of six months as indicates 
 a settled aversion toward her and that tends
 
 70 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 to destroy permanently her peace and happi- 
 ness; also for cruel beating or injury or at- 
 tempt at injury, indicating an ungovernable 
 temper, and involving a probable danger to 
 her life. 
 
 A divorce may be obtained by the husband 
 for the pregnancy of the wife at the time of 
 the marriage unknown to him, for such lewd 
 behavior as proves the wife to be unchaste 
 "without actual proof of an act of adul- 
 tery," and, when the husband is not in like 
 fault, habitual drunkenness for a period of 
 one year. The plaintiff must have resided 
 within the State for a period of one year. 
 If the act complained of occurred outside of 
 the State, the plaintiff must have been an ac- 
 tual resident of the State of Kentucky at 
 the time of its occurrence, unless the act was 
 also a cause for divorce in the country where 
 it occurred. In any case, an action must be 
 begun within five years of the occurrence of 
 the offense. 
 
 The court may grant a limited divorce for 
 any cause that it may deem sufficient. Mar- 
 riages are void and are prohibited if they 
 are bigamous. 
 
 LOUISIANA 
 
 An immediate and absolute divorce may be 
 granted for the two causes of adultery and 
 a sentence to an infamous punishment.
 
 DIVORCE 71 
 
 For the other causes— which are abandon- 
 ment for a ])eriod of five years, habitual 
 intem])erance, excess, cruel treatment, or out- 
 rages such as render living together insup- 
 portable, public defamation, or attempts on 
 the life of the other— a decree of temporary- 
 separation may be given, which may be fol- 
 lowed by a decree of absolute divorce one 
 year later if no reconciliation has in the 
 meantime taken place. 
 
 When the ground for a divorce is adultery, 
 the guilty one cannot many his or her ac- 
 complice, under penalty of the crime of big- 
 amy and of a decree of nullity upon the new 
 marriage. Marriages between white persons 
 and negroes to the third generation are void. 
 An absence of ten years unheard from is a 
 justification in law for contracting a second 
 marriage. 
 
 MAINE 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, impo- 
 tency, extreme cruelty, an utter desertion for 
 three consecutive years next prior to the fil- 
 ing of the bill, gross and confirmed habits 
 of intoxication, and cruel and abusive treat- 
 ment. 
 
 There is a cause to the wife where the hus- 
 band, being of sufficient ability, grossly or 
 wantonly or cruelly refuses or neglects to 
 provide a suitable maintenance for her. The
 
 72 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 parties must have been married in the State 
 or lived there after their marriage, or the 
 plaintiff must have lived there when the 
 cause occurred, or must have resided within 
 the State for one full year before bringing 
 suit. The marriage of persons within the 
 prohibited degrees of relationship, marriage 
 with an insane person or an idiot, and also 
 bigamous marriages, if solemnized in the 
 State, are void. 
 
 Marriages between a white person and a 
 negro, mulatto, or Indian may be annulled, 
 and also for the grounds of bigamy, want of 
 legal age, and insanity or idiocy existing at 
 the time of the marriage. 
 
 MARYLAND 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, any cause which by the laws of the 
 State renders a marriage null and void, an 
 abandonment for a period of three years, 
 and illicit intercourse by the wife before the 
 marriage, unknown to the husband at the 
 time of the marriage. 
 
 A limited divorce may be granted for ex- 
 cessively vicious conduct, cruelty, abandon- 
 ment, and desertion. If the cause occurred 
 out of the State, the plaintiff or the defen- 
 dant must have resided within the State for 
 a period of two years prior to the beginning 
 of the suit.
 
 DIVORCE 73 
 
 A wife may sue for alimony, without a 
 divorce. Marriages may be declared null for 
 the causes of consanguinity and bigamy. 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 A DivoKCE may be granted for adultery, im- 
 potency, extreme cruelty, cruel and abusive 
 treatment, an utter desertion for a period of 
 three consecutive years next prior to the fil- 
 ing of the bill, gross and confinned habits of 
 intoxication, a sentence to imprisonment at 
 hard labor for a term of five years or more, 
 notwithstanding any pardon if granted, and 
 uniting with any religious society whose 
 rules forbid marriage and continuing with 
 such a society for a j^eriod of three years 
 without the consent of the other party. 
 
 A divorce may also be granted on the libel 
 of the wife when the husband, being of suffi- 
 cient ability, grossly or wantonly and cruelly 
 refuses or neglects to provide suitable main- 
 tenance for her. All decrees of divorce are 
 nisi in the first instance, but they may be- 
 come absolute at the expiration of six months 
 on the apY-)lication of either party if no rec- 
 onciliation has taken place and if no cause 
 is shown by any one why the absolute decree 
 should not be granted. The parties must 
 have lived together as man and wife within 
 the State, or, if the cause occurred elsewhere,
 
 74 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 they must have lived together in the State 
 previously, and one of them must have been 
 a resident of the State at the time of the mar- 
 riage, and the plaintiff must have lived 
 within tlie State for a period of three years 
 next prior to the action, unless it can be 
 shown that he or she moved into the common- 
 wealth for this purpose. Marriages may be 
 declared null for the consanguinity or affin- 
 ity of the parties, for nonage, insanity, 
 idiocy, and for bigamy. 
 
 MICHIGAN 
 
 The causes for an absolute divorce are adul- 
 tery, impotency, desertion for a period of 
 two years, habitual drunkenness, imprison- 
 ment for a term of three years, and a divorce 
 obtained in another State by the other party. 
 
 A limited or an absolute divorce, in the 
 discretion of the court, may be granted for 
 extreme cruelty, whether from personal vio- 
 lence, desertion, or otherwise, also for deser- 
 tion for a period of two years, and, to the 
 wife, where the husband, being of sufficient 
 ability, grossly or wantonly and cruelly re- 
 fuses or neglects to provide a suitable main- 
 tenance for her. 
 
 A sentence to im]irisonment for life abso- 
 lutely and of itself dissolves a marriage with- 
 out any decree of divorce. The plaintiff
 
 DIVORCE 75 
 
 must have resided within the State for a pe- 
 riod of one year next preceding the action, 
 unless the marriage took place within the 
 State and one of the parties had resided there 
 ever since. If the cause for divorce occurred 
 outside of the State, one of the parties must 
 have resided within the vState for a period of 
 two j^ears next prior to the action. 
 
 The court may in its discretion decree that 
 the guilty party may not marry again for a 
 stated time, not to exceed two years. Mar- 
 riages may be declared null for nonage, if 
 not ratified by the ]3arties after they have 
 obtained full legal age, and for consent ob- 
 tained by force or fraud if never ratified 
 voluntarily. 
 
 Marriages are void without a divorce if 
 they are bigamous, or if the parties are within 
 the prohibited degrees of relationship, or if 
 performed during the insanity or idiocy of 
 one of the parties. The decree of divorce 
 can be granted unless the defendant is domi- 
 ciled in the State or was at the time that the 
 cause for divorce arose, or unless the de- 
 fendant shall have been personally served 
 with process in the State or with a copy of 
 the order of publication in the cause, or has 
 voluntarily appeared in the action. If the 
 defendant did not live within the State at 
 the time the plaintiff must prove that the 
 parties have lived together as man and wife,
 
 76 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 or that the ]3laintiff has resided in the State 
 for at least a period of one year, in good 
 faith, next preceding the action. 
 
 MINNESOTA 
 
 The causes for an absolute divorce are adul- 
 tery, impotency, cruel and inhuman treat- 
 ment, wilful desertion for a period of one 
 year next preceding the filing of the bill, 
 habitual drunkenness for a period of one 
 year next preceding the action, and a sen- 
 tence of imprisonment in a State prison. 
 The plaintiff must have resided within the 
 State for a period of one year, except in case 
 of adultery committed while a resident of 
 the State. 
 
 A limited divorce may be given to the wife 
 for cruel and inhuman treatment, or such 
 conduct on the part of the husband as may 
 render it unsafe or improper for the wife to 
 live with him, and for his abandonment of 
 the wife and his refusal or neglect to pro- 
 vide for her. For such a cause both of the 
 pai'ties must be residents of the State, or the 
 marriage must have taken place in the State, 
 and the wife be an actual resident at the time 
 of the comi)laint. If a divorce be sought for 
 the adultery of the wife, her own real estate 
 may bo withhold from her. 
 
 Marriages between persons within the pro-
 
 DIVORCE 77 
 
 liibited degrees of relationship and bigamous 
 marriages are absolutely void. Marriages 
 may be pronounced void by the court on ac- 
 count of the absence for a period of five years 
 of one of the parties, or for lack of legal 
 age, or when secured by force or fraud. 
 
 MISSISSIPPI 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, big- 
 amy, impotency, habitual, cruel, and inhu- 
 man treatment accompanied by personal 
 violence, wilful continuous and obstinate de- 
 sertion for a period of two years, habitual 
 drunkenness, a sentence of imprisonment in 
 the penitentiary, the pregnancy of the wife 
 at the time of the marriage unknown to the 
 husband, insanity or idiocy at the time of the 
 marriage, and the relationship of the parties 
 within the degrees of consanguinity and af- 
 finity' prohibited by law. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided within the 
 State for a period of one year before filing a 
 bill for divorce. If the cause is desertion, 
 a bona-fide residence for a period of two 
 years is required. If in the case of a person 
 being sentenced to serve a term of imj^ris- 
 onment in a penitentiary a pardon is secured 
 before the person is sent to the penitentiary, 
 there is no ground then for a divorce. In 
 case the ground is adultery, the court may
 
 78 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 forbid the offender to marry again. Mar- 
 riages are void because of consanguinity, and 
 also if contracted between white persons and 
 negroes of one fourth or more of negro blood. 
 
 MISSOURI 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adulterj'^, big- 
 amy, impotency, such cruel and barbarous 
 treatment as endangers the life of the other, 
 an absence without a reasonable cause for a 
 period of one year, habitual drunkenness for 
 a period of one year, such indignities as ren- 
 der the life of the other intolerable, a con- 
 viction of felony or other infamous crime 
 after marriage, or before marriage if un- 
 known to the other party, and the pregnancy 
 of the wife at the time of the marriage un- 
 known to the husband. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided within 
 the State for a ])eriod of one j^ear next prior 
 to the action, unless the offense or the injury 
 complained of was committed within the 
 State or while one or both of the parties 
 resided within the State. If a husband un- 
 justly deserts his wife and the wife does not 
 wish to apply for a divorce, she may be 
 granted a decree of the court providing her 
 with a maintenance out of the husband's 
 propert}'', and also authorizing her to sell her 
 real property without securing his signature,
 
 DIVORCE 79 
 
 and ' ' ordering any person holding money or 
 other personal estate to which the husband is 
 entitled in her right to pay and deliver the 
 same to the wife. ' ' 
 
 Marriages are void for bigamy and for 
 relationship within the prohibited degrees of 
 consanguinity and between persons of the 
 white and colored races. 
 
 MONTANA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, ex- 
 treme cruelty, wilful desertion, wilful neg- 
 lect and habitual intemperance, each con- 
 tinued for a period of one year, and also 
 conviction of a felony. The plaintiff must 
 have resided in Montana for a period of one 
 year, unless the offense was committed while 
 one or the other of the parties resided within 
 the State. Unless the parties to a divorce 
 remarry each other, the innocent part}^ can- 
 not marry again within a period of two 
 years, nor the guilty party before three years. 
 A poor woman may prosecute a suit for a 
 divorce without costs. Although a decree of 
 divorce may be denied, the court may award 
 a maintenance to the wife and her children. 
 Marriages may be annulled for bigamy, im- 
 potency, and for want of legal age if the mar- 
 riage is not ratified after the obtaining of 
 full age. Marriages may be annulled also
 
 80 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 for consent obtained by force or fraud, if not 
 voluntarily ratified after the discovery of the 
 fraud. 
 
 NEBRASKA 
 
 The grounds for an absolute divorce are 
 adultery, impotency, a wilful abandonment 
 for a period of two years, habitual drunken- 
 ness, and imprisonment for a term of three 
 years or for life. 
 
 An absolute or a limited divorce, in the 
 discretion of the court, may be granted for 
 extreme cruelty, desertion for a period of 
 two years, or when the husband, being of suf- 
 ficient ability to maintain his wife, grossly 
 or wantonly and cruelly refuses or neglects 
 to do so. The plaintiff must have resided 
 within the State for a period of six months, 
 except where the marriage was performed in 
 the State and the plaintiff has resided within 
 the State from that time until the time of the 
 action. Neither party to an action for a di- 
 vorce can marry before six months has ex- 
 pired, during which time the proceedings 
 may be opened again. Marriages may be 
 declared void for bigamy, nonage, insanity 
 or idiocy at the time of the marriage, for 
 consent obtained by force or fraud, for rela- 
 tionship within the prohibited degrees of 
 consanguinity, and if between a white per- 
 son and a negro of one fourth or more colored
 
 DIVORCE 81 
 
 blood. If a decree of divorce is granted on 
 the ground of the wife's adultery, "the hus- 
 band may hold such of her personal estate 
 as the court shall deem just and reasonable. ' ' 
 
 NEVADA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, impo- 
 tency, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion for 
 a period of one year, habitual gross drunken- 
 ness contracted since the marriage and inca- 
 pacitating the person from contributing to 
 the support of the family, a conviction of a 
 felony or infamous crime, and the neglect of 
 the husband to provide the common neces- 
 saries of life for a period of one year, when 
 such a neglect could be avoided by ordinary 
 industry on the part of the husband and is 
 not the result of his poverty. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided within the 
 State and the county for a period of six 
 months, unless the action is brought in the 
 county where the defendant resides or where 
 the cause of action occurred. 
 
 Marriages are prohibited between white 
 and colored people, mulattoes, Indians, and 
 Chinese; they are void without any legal ac- 
 tion on account of consanguinity and big- 
 amy, and may be declared void for lack of 
 age or understanding, if not subsequently 
 ratified. 
 
 6
 
 82 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, extreme cruelty, treatment seriously 
 injuring health, treatment endangering the 
 reason, habitual drunkenness for a continu- 
 ous period of three years, a conviction of a 
 crime punishable in the State by imprison- 
 ment for more than one year and actual im- 
 prisonment under such a conviction, absence 
 unheard from for a period of three years, 
 the wilful absence of the husband for three 
 years without making provision for his wife, 
 the wilful absence of the wife from the State 
 and an entire separation from the husband 
 and without his consent for ten years, resi- 
 dence for three years in the State of a wife 
 whose husband has left the United States in- 
 tending to become a citizen of another coun- 
 try and during such a time has not furnished 
 his wife with a support and has lived entirely 
 separate from her, when either the husband 
 or the wife, without sufficient cause and with- 
 out the consent of the other, has abandoned 
 and refused for a period of three jeavs to 
 cohabit with the other, and also joining any 
 religious sect that forbids marriage to its 
 members, and a refusal to cohabit for a pe- 
 riod of six months. 
 
 Both of the parties to any action for a 
 divorce must reside in the State, or the plain-
 
 DIVORCE 83 
 
 tiff must reside there, and personal service 
 must have been made on the defendant 
 within the State, or one of the parties must 
 reside within the State and one of them must 
 have resided in the State one year next prior 
 to the action. 
 
 NEW MEXICO 
 
 The grounds for a divorce in this Territory- 
 are adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment, 
 and abandonment. The plaintiff must have 
 resided in the Territory for a period of six 
 months next prior to beginning the suit. 
 Marriages are void between persons within 
 the prohibited degrees of relationship and 
 for lack of age. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 The single cause for an absolute divorce in 
 this State is adultery. Both the man and the 
 woman must have resided in the State when 
 the olf ense was committed, or they must have 
 been married in the State, or the plaintiff 
 must have been resident in the State when 
 the offense was committed and when the ac- 
 tion is begun. 
 
 The plaintiff can marry again, but the de- 
 fendant cannot marry within the State dur- 
 ing the life of the plaintiff, except to the 
 plaintiff, unless the court, after a period of 
 five years, modifies the decree and allows the
 
 84 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 defendant to many, which it may do if the 
 plaintiff has in the meantime married again 
 and the conduct of the defendant has been 
 uniformly good. The defendant may re- 
 marry in another State, and if such a mar- 
 riage is valid there it will be valid in the 
 State of New York. 
 
 Bigamous marriages and those of persons 
 within the prohibited degrees are void with- 
 out legal process. 
 
 NEW JERSEY 
 
 The causes for an absolute divorce are adul- 
 teiy, bigamy, impotency, wilful continued 
 and obstinate desertion for a period of two 
 years, and the marriage of persons within 
 the prohibited degrees of relationship. 
 
 A limited divorce may be granted on the 
 ground of extreme cruelty. One of the par- 
 ties must have been an inhabitant of the 
 State at the time the cause occurred, or the 
 marriage must have taken place in the State 
 and the plaintiff have been an actual resident 
 iDoth when the cause occurred and when 
 bringing suit, or one of the parties must be 
 an inhabitant of the State at the time of 
 bringing the action, and one of them a resi- 
 dent during the period of two years in which 
 the desertion was continued. 
 
 If the cause is adultery, and it was com-
 
 DIVORCE 85 
 
 mitted in the State, one or both of the parties 
 must have resided there at the time of bring- 
 ing the action; if committed outside the 
 State, one of the parties must have lived in 
 the State for a period of three years preced- 
 ing the beginning of the action. AVhen im- 
 potency or bigamy exists at the time of the 
 marriage, ''all such marriages shall be in- 
 valid from the beginning and absolutely 
 void." A poor person may sue without 
 costs. 
 
 A limited divorce may be given for cruel 
 and inhuman treatment, abandonment, con- 
 duct rendering it unsafe and improper to 
 live with the defendant, or for a refusal or 
 neglect on the part of the husband to provide 
 for the wife. A marriage may be declared 
 null for nonage, bigamy, impotency, idiocy, 
 insanity, and for consent obtained by fraud 
 or duress. An annulment of a marriage on 
 the ground of impotency, which must be in- 
 curable, must be made within five years of 
 the time of the marriage. 
 
 NOETH CAROLINA 
 
 The grounds for an absolute divorce are the 
 separation of the husband from the wife and 
 open living in adultery, the adultery of the 
 wife either with or without a separation, im- 
 potency, the pregnancy of the wife at the
 
 86 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 time of the marriage unknown to the hus- 
 band, and an indictment of the husband for 
 a felony and his flight from the State and 
 his non-return within one year. 
 
 The grounds for a limited divorce are 
 abandonment, cruel or barbarous treatment 
 endangering life, such indignities to the per- 
 son of the other as render his or her condi- 
 tion intolerable and life burdensome, habitual 
 drunkenness, and maliciously turning the 
 other out of doors. The cause must have ex- 
 isted for at least six months, and the plain- 
 tiff must have resided in the State for a 
 period of two years next preceding the filing 
 of the bill. 
 
 A wife may give notice that she intends to 
 sue for a divorce before the expiration of six 
 months. Marriages may be declared void 
 for consanguinity, affinity, ])igamy, because 
 between white x^ersons and negroes or In- 
 dians, for lack of age, impotency, or mental 
 incapacity at the time of the marriage. 
 
 NOBTH DAKOTA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, ex- 
 treme cruelty, wilful desertion or wilful neg- 
 lect for a period of one year, habitual intem- 
 perance for one year, and a conviction of a 
 felony. 
 
 The plaintiff must have been a resident in
 
 DIVORCE 87 
 
 good faith in the State for a period of ninety 
 days next preceding the commencement of 
 the action. 
 
 A divorce can be denied if an unreasonable 
 length of time has elapsed between the cause 
 assigned and the beginning of the suit. Mar- 
 riages may be annulled for bigamy, unsound 
 mind, lack of age, force, fraud, or physical 
 incapacity. 
 
 When a divorce is granted on the ground 
 of adultery, the innocent party may marry 
 again, but the guilty one can marry only the 
 innocent party during the lifetime of that 
 person. 
 
 OHIO 
 
 The causes for divorce are adultery, bigamy, 
 impotency, extreme cruelty, wilful absence 
 for a period of three years, a sentence and an 
 imprisonment in a penitentiary if the divorce 
 is asked for during the imprisonment, a 
 fraudulent contract, and a divorce procured 
 in another State by the other party, the effect 
 of which is to leave the defendant free and 
 the plaintiff still bound. The plaintiff must 
 have been a resident of the State for one 
 year. 
 
 A wife may sue for alimony and the cus- 
 tody of her children without a divorce, in 
 which case a residence for a year is not ne- 
 cessary.
 
 88 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Marriages are prohibited between those 
 who are nearer than second cousins and if 
 bigamous. 
 
 OKLAHOMA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, big- 
 amy, impotenc}^, extreme cruelty, abandon- 
 ment for a period of one year, habitual 
 drunkenness, gross neglect of duty, convic- 
 tion of a felony and imprisonment in a peni- 
 tentiary subsequent to the marriage, a fraud- 
 ulent contract of marriage, and the pregnancy 
 of the wife unknown to the husband at the 
 time of the marriage. 
 
 The plaintiff must have been an actual 
 resident in good faith in the Territory for 
 ninety days next preceding the filing of the 
 bill, and a resident of the county in which the 
 action is brought at the time the petition is 
 filed. Neither party to a suit for divorce 
 can remarry within six months, nor before 
 thirty days after judgment is rendered by 
 the final court of appeals. 
 
 A wife may sue for alimony alone if any 
 cause exists that would entitle her to a di- 
 vorce. If the parties appear to the court to 
 be equally at fault, the court may refuse a 
 divorce; but in any case where a divorce is 
 refused the court may, for good cause shown, 
 take such order as will be proper for the cus- 
 tody and maintenance of the children and the
 
 DIVORCE 89 
 
 equitable division of the property. Mar- 
 riages may be declared void for physical in- 
 capacity, bigamy, consent obtained by the 
 use of force or fraud, and if within the pro- 
 hibited degrees of relationship; also for a 
 lack of age or understanding, if not ratified 
 after such an incapacity ceases. 
 
 OKEGON 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, cruel and inhuman treatment or 
 personal indignities that render life burden- 
 some, a habit of gross drunkenness con- 
 tracted after marriage and continued for a 
 period of one year prior to the suit, a con- 
 viction of a felony, and wilful desertion for 
 a period of one year. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided in the 
 State for one year. Marriages may be de- 
 clared void because of bigamy, consanguin- 
 ity, if either party to a marriage is incapable 
 of assenting thereto either for want of legal 
 age or because of insufficient understanding, 
 if one party has a fourth or more of negro 
 blood while the other is white, and if the 
 consent has been obtained by the use of force 
 or fraud and the contract of marriage has 
 not been subsequently ratified. Marriages 
 are void between first cousins of the whole 
 or half blood.
 
 90 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 The causes for an absolute divorce are adul- 
 tery, bigamy, impotency, wilful desertion 
 without a reasonable cause for a period of 
 two years, barbarous treatment by the hus- 
 band endangering the life of the wife, or 
 such indignities to her person as to render 
 her condition intolerable and her life bur- 
 densome, thereby forcing her to withdraw 
 from the house and family, a marriage on a 
 false rumor of the death of the husband or 
 wife within six months of the return of the 
 same, or an action to establish the lunacy of 
 a wife by a relation or best friend of the 
 wife, marriage procured by force, fraud, or 
 coercion and not subsequently confirmed, 
 marriage within the prohil)ited degrees of 
 consanguinity or affinity, cruel and barbar- 
 ous treatment by the wife rendering the con- 
 dition of the husband intolerable and his life 
 burdensome, conviction of a forgery or any 
 infamous crime within or without the State, 
 and sentence to imprisonment for a teim of 
 two years, providing that the husband or the 
 wife makes such an application for a divorce 
 and that the crime is one that would be pun- 
 ished by imprisonment for a term of two 
 years or more in Pennsylvania. 
 
 The i)laintiff must have resided for a ]:)eriod 
 of one year in the State. An application for
 
 DIVORCE 91 
 
 a divorce may be made six months after de- 
 sertion, although a decree of divorce cannot 
 be granted until the desertion has continued 
 for a period of two years. If a divorce is 
 secured in another State and the defendant 
 remains in the State of Pennsylvania, the di- 
 vorce is not valid in this State. 
 
 A limited divorce may be secured for the 
 causes of adultery, the abandonment of the 
 wife by the husband for a period of two 
 years, turning the wife out of doors, cruel 
 treatment, and personal indignities. 
 
 A limited divorce may also be secured by 
 a woman who has formerly lived in the State 
 and has subsequently married elsewhere, and 
 where the cause for divorce has since oc- 
 curred in that other State or country, pro- 
 vided that notice is given to the husband 
 either by a ]:)ersonal service or a registered 
 letter to his last known address, and that the 
 wife has lived within the State for a period 
 of one year next prior to filing her bill. 
 
 An appeal from a decision granting a de- 
 cree of divorce must be taken within one 
 year. 
 
 The party found guilty of adultery can- 
 not marry the corespondent during the life- 
 time of the other party. If any divorced 
 woman, who shall have been found guilt^^ of 
 adultery, shall afterward openly cohabit with 
 the person proved to have been the partaker
 
 92 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 of her crime, she is rendered incapable of 
 alienating either directly or indirectly any 
 of her lands, tenements, or hereditaments, 
 and all wills, deeds, and other instruments of 
 conveyance therefor are absolutely void, and 
 after her death her property descends and is 
 subject to distribution according to law in 
 like manner as if she had died intestate. 
 Marriages are declared void if the persons 
 are within the prohibited degrees of consan- 
 guinity and if bigamous. 
 
 RHODE ISLAND 
 
 The causes either for an absolute or a lim- 
 ited divorce are adultery, im potency, extreme 
 cruelt^% a wilful desertion for a period of 
 five years— or for a shorter period, in the 
 discretion of the court— living entirely apart 
 for a period of ten years, continued drunken- 
 ness, the habitual, excessive, and intemperate 
 use of opium, morphine, or chloral, a con- 
 viction for the crime of murder or arson by 
 which the person convicted is deemed to be 
 civilly dead, such an absence or other cir- 
 cumstance as raises the presumption of natu- 
 ral death, the neglect or refusal of the hus- 
 band, being of sufficient ability, to provide 
 necessaries for the wife, any gross misbe- 
 havior and wickedness repugnant to and in 
 violation of the marriage contract, a mar-
 
 DIVORCE 93 
 
 riage void or voidable at law from the time 
 of its celebration. 
 
 A limited divorce may be given for such 
 other causes as may seem to require the same. 
 A residence in the State for a period of one 
 year next prior to the filing of the bill is 
 necessary. Marriages are void for consan- 
 guinit}^ bigamy, idiocy, and limacy. 
 
 SOUTH CAKOLINA 
 
 The State of South Carolina does not grant 
 a divorce. Marriages are void between per- 
 sons of the white and colored races, for con- 
 sanguinity, idiocy, lunacy, want of consent 
 if the contract is not subsequently ratified, 
 and for bigamy, unless the person has been 
 absent unheard from for a period of seven 
 years. 
 
 SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, ex- 
 treme cruelty, wilful desertion or wilful neg- 
 lect for a period of one year, habitual intem- 
 perance for a period of one year, and a 
 conviction of felony. The plaintiff must 
 have been a resident of the State in good 
 faith for a period of ninety days next pre- 
 ceding the beginning of the suit. Marriages 
 may be annulled for bigamy, unsound mind, 
 lack of age, force, fraud, or physical inca-
 
 94 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 pacity. If a divorce is granted for the cause 
 of adultery, the guilty one cannot marry any 
 one except the other while the other lives. 
 
 TENNESSEE 
 
 The causes for an absolute divorce are adul- 
 tery, bigamy, impotency, a wilful or a mali- 
 cious desertion without a reasonable cause 
 for a period of two years, a conviction of an 
 infamous crime or felony, with sentence of 
 confinement in a penitentiary, an attempt by 
 one on the life of the other bj^ poison or 
 other means showing malice, the refusal of 
 the wife to remove with her husband to this 
 State without a reasonable cause and wilfully 
 absenting herself from him for a period of 
 two years, habitual drunkenness contracted 
 after marriage, and the pregnancy of the 
 wife at the time of the marriage unknown to 
 the husband. 
 
 A limited or an absolute divorce, in the 
 discretion of the court, may be granted to 
 the wife for such cruel and inhuman treat- 
 ment toward her as renders it unsafe and 
 improper for her to remain under the domin- 
 ion and control of her husband, or such indig- 
 nities to her person as render her condition 
 intolerable, thereby forcing her to leave him, 
 01' al)andoning or turning her out of doors 
 and refusing or neglecting to provide for her.
 
 DIVORCE 95 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided in the 
 State for a period of two years next prior 
 to the suit. Marriages are void for consan- 
 guinity, also when between white and colored 
 persons, or if either party was incapable of 
 consenting to the contract for lack of age or 
 mental incapacity, or if consent to the mar- 
 riage was obtained by force or fraud, or if 
 it was a bigamous marriage. 
 
 A second marriage is not bigamous if the 
 former husband or wife has been absent for 
 a period of five years and not known to the 
 other to be living. If a divorce is granted 
 on the ground of a wife's adultery, she can- 
 not alienate her lands if she lives openly with 
 her accomplice, and at her death they descend 
 as if she died intestate. 
 
 TEXAS 
 
 Theke are causes for divorce in favor of the 
 husband if the wife commits adultery, or if 
 she has voluntarily left him for a period of 
 three years with an intention of abandon- 
 ment. There are causes for divorce in favor 
 of the wife when the husband has abandoned 
 her and lived in adultery with another, or if 
 he leaves her for a period of three years, with 
 intent to abandon. 
 
 A divorce in favor of either party may be 
 granted for such excesses, cruel treatment,
 
 96 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 or outrages as render living- together insup- 
 portable, a conviction of a felony after mar- 
 riage, except when the conviction was ob- 
 tained on the testimony of the plaintiff and 
 unless a pardon was secured within twelve 
 months of the date of the conviction. The 
 plaintiff must be an actual resident of the 
 State, and for six months a resident of the 
 county where the suit is brought. 
 
 The court cannot compel either party to a 
 suit for divorce to transfer real estate to the 
 other part}^ Marriages are null because of 
 impotency at the time of the marriage, or 
 because of any other impediment that ren- 
 ders the contract of marriage void, and also 
 if between white persons and negroes. 
 
 UTAH 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, impo- 
 tency, extreme cruelty, a wilful desertion for 
 a longer period than one year, habitual 
 drunkenness, a conviction of a felony, and a 
 wilful neglect to provide the wife with the 
 connnon necessaries of life. An actual resi- 
 dence for a period of one year in the State 
 and county is required. 
 
 Marriages are void for consanguinity, big- 
 amy, idiocy, lunacy, lack of age, or if be- 
 tween a person of the white race and a negro 
 or Mongolian. The court may declare a mar-
 
 DIVORCE 97 
 
 riage void if obtained by force or fraud and 
 the man was under sixteen years of age and 
 the woman under fourteen years, the parents ' 
 consent not being secured and the marriage 
 not being ratified after the legal ages have 
 been attained. 
 
 VERMONT 
 
 The causes for a divorce are adultery, intol- 
 erable severity, confinement at hard labor in 
 State prison for a term of three years or 
 more, or for life, when actually so confined at 
 the time of an action for a divorce, a wilful 
 desertion for three consecutive years, absence 
 unheard from for a period of seven years, and 
 gross and wanton and cruel neglect or re- 
 fusal to provide suitable maintenance for the 
 wife, the husband having sufficient pecuniary 
 or physical ability to make such a provision. 
 The parties must have lived together in 
 the State, and the plaintiff must have resided 
 within the State for one full year next prior 
 to bringing suit. No divorce will be granted 
 for a cause which occurred in another State 
 or country before the parties lived together 
 in the State of Vermont as husband and wife, 
 and while neither party was a resident of 
 the State, unless the libellant shall have re- 
 sided in the State at least one year and in 
 the county when the libel is preferred for at 
 least three months.
 
 98 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 The defendant to a suit for a divorce 
 cannot marry again until three years have 
 elapsed after a divorce is granted, if the 
 plaintiff is still living, unless he or she remar- 
 ries the plaintiff, without making herself or 
 himself liable to imprisonment at hard labor 
 in a State prison for a term of from one to 
 five years. 
 
 Marriages may be annulled for bigamy, 
 impotency, consanguinity, nonage, idiocy, 
 lunacy, and for consent obtained by the use 
 of force or fraud. 
 
 VIRGINIA 
 
 The grounds for an absolute divorce are 
 adultery, impotency, a sentence to the peni- 
 tentiary, without regard to a subsequent par- 
 don, a conviction of either party of an infa- 
 mous offense before marriage unknown to 
 the other, when either is charged with an 
 offense punishable with death or imprison- 
 ment and is a fugitive from justice and has 
 been absent for a period of two years, or if 
 the wife has been a prostitute or was preg- 
 nant before marriage unknown to the hus- 
 band, provided that in these last two cases 
 and in that of a conviction of an infamous 
 offense the injured party leaves the other im- 
 mediately upon discovery of the facts. 
 A limited divorce may be granted for cru-
 
 DIVORCE 99 
 
 elty, a reasonable apprehension of bodily 
 hurt, and abandonment. 
 
 One of the parties must have lived in the 
 State for at least one year prior to the action, 
 and one must be domiciled in the State at 
 the time of bringing suit. Marriages may 
 be annulled for bigamy, impotency, consan- 
 guinity or affinity, lack of age, insanity at 
 the time of the marriage, and if between per- 
 sons of the white and colored races. The 
 court in its discretion may prohibit a party 
 guilty of adultery from marrying again. 
 The court may follow a decree of limited 
 divorce by one of absolute divorce when the 
 desertion has existed for a period of three 
 years and there is no probability of recon- 
 ciliation. 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, cruel treatment of either by the 
 other, or personal indignities rendering life 
 burdensome, abandonment for a period of 
 one year, the habitual drunkenness of either 
 party, or the neglect or refusal of the hus- 
 band to make suitable provision for his fam- 
 ily, the imprisonment of either party in a 
 penitentiary if the complaint is filed during 
 the term of such imprisonment, when the con- 
 sent to the marriage was obtained by force or 
 fraud and the marriage was not voluntarily
 
 100 AVOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 ratified afterward, or if an incurable chronic 
 mania or dementia has existed for a period of 
 ten years or more the court in its discretion 
 may grant a divorce, and a divorce may also 
 be granted upon the application of either 
 party for any other cause deemed by the 
 court sufficient, and the court is satisfied that 
 the parties can no longer live together. On 
 the ground of adultery application for a di- 
 vorce must be made within one year of know- 
 ledge of the offense. The plaintiif must have 
 lived in the State for one year. 
 
 A new marriage cannot be contracted until 
 six months after the decree of divorce is 
 granted, or, if an appeal is taken, until judg- 
 ment is rendered upon the appeal. If a mar- 
 riage is contracted either within or without 
 the State in violation of these provisions, it 
 is void. When there is any doubt as to the 
 facts rendering a marriage void, either party 
 may apply for, and upon proof shown obtain, 
 a decree of nullity. 
 
 Marriages that would be bigamous or be- 
 tween persons within the forbidden degrees 
 of relationship are prohibited. 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA 
 
 The grounds for an absolute divorce are 
 adultery, impotency, a wilful abandonment 
 for a period of three years, a sentence to
 
 DIVORCE 101 
 
 confinement in a penitentiary, a conviction 
 of an infamous offense before marriage un- 
 known to the other party, the pregnancy of 
 the wife at the time of the marriage without 
 the husband's agency or knowledge, when 
 the wife prior to the marriage has been noto- 
 riously a prostitute unknown to the husband, 
 or where the husband, unknown to the wife, 
 has been a notoriously licentious person. 
 
 A limited divorce may be granted for cruel 
 or inhuman treatment, a reasonable appre- 
 hension of bodily hurt, desertion, and the 
 habit of drunkenness formed since marriage. 
 In a case where a limited divorce has been 
 granted and a period of two years has elapsed 
 since the beginning of the suit without a 
 reconciliation being effected, the court, upon 
 the application of the injured party and sat- 
 isfactory evidence submitted, may decree an 
 absolute divorce from the bonds of matri- 
 mony, if in the opinion of the court no recon- 
 ciliation is probable. 
 
 One of the parties to an action for a di- 
 vorce must have been a resident of the State 
 for at least one year, and the action must be 
 brought in the county where the parties last 
 lived or in the county where one of the par- 
 ties resides. 
 
 Adultery cannot be made a ground for a 
 divorce unless action is taken within five 
 years of the time the offense was committed.
 
 102 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Marriages performed witliiu the State may 
 be amiuUed for consanguinity or affinitj^, big- 
 amy, impotency, insanity, nonage, or misce- 
 genation. 
 
 WISCONSIN 
 
 The grounds for an absolute divorce are 
 adultery, impotency, cruel and inhuman 
 treatment, wilful desertion for a period of 
 one year next preceding the bringing of the 
 suit, a voluntary separation for a period of 
 five years, habitual drunkenness for one year 
 next preceding the bringing of the suit, when 
 a wife is given to intoxication, and also a sen- 
 tence to imprisonment for a term of three 
 years or more. 
 
 A limited divorce may be granted for a 
 wilful desertion for a period of one year, or 
 habitual drunkenness for the same length of 
 time, when the wife is given to intoxication, 
 cruel and inhuman treatment, extreme cru- 
 elty, refusal or neglect on the part of the hus- 
 band, being of sufficient ability, to provide 
 for his wife, such conduct on the part of the 
 husband toward the wife as may render it 
 unsafe or imjiroper for her to live with him. 
 
 The plaintiff must have resided within the 
 State for one year immediately before bring- 
 ing the suit, unless the ground is adultery 
 committed while the plaintiff resided in the 
 State, or unless the marriage was performed
 
 DIVORCE 103 
 
 in the State and the plaintitf has resided 
 there from that time until the action is 
 brought by tlie wife, and the husband shall 
 have resided in the State for one year next 
 preceding the commencement of the action. 
 
 Marriages of persons who are within the 
 prohibited degrees of consanguinity^ and also 
 bigamous marriages, if solemnized in the 
 State, are absolutely void without any legal 
 action. A decree of nullity may be secured 
 for lack of age or mental capacity, also when 
 a marriage was obtained by force or fraud 
 and has not been voluntarily ratified, and 
 when either party to a marriage is impris- 
 oned on a life sentence. 
 
 WYOMING 
 
 The grounds for a divorce are adultery, im- 
 potency, extreme cruelty, a wilful desertion 
 for a period of one year, habitual drunken- 
 ness, a conviction of felony and sentence to 
 imprisonment after marriage, a conviction of 
 felony before marriage unknown to the other 
 party, the neglect of the husband for a period 
 of one year to provide his wife with the com- 
 mon necessaries of life, he being able to do 
 so by ordinary industry, intolerable indig- 
 nities, the vagrancy of the husband, and the 
 pregnancy of the wife at the time of the mar- 
 riage unknown to the husband and without
 
 104 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 his agency. The plaintiff must have resided 
 six months in the State, unless the marriage 
 was performed in the State and the plaintiff 
 has resided there from that time until bring- 
 ing suit. 
 
 A marriage is void without a decree of 
 nullity on account of bigamy, consanguinity, 
 or mental incapacity at the time of its cele- 
 bration. A marriage may be decreed void 
 for lack of age if the parties separate before 
 arriving at the legal age and do not live to- 
 gether afterward, also if the marriage was 
 obtained by the use of force or fraud and 
 has not been voluntarily ratified. Adultery 
 will not serve as a ground for a divorce 
 unless the suit is begun within three years 
 of the discovery of the offense.
 
 LIMITED DIVORCE 
 
 OUR policy in legislation with reference 
 to domestic relations allows of a limited 
 divorce which effects the separation of the 
 parties to a marriage without, however, ac- 
 knowledging a right of remarriage to either 
 party during the lifetime of the other party. 
 
 Limited divorce is allowed in the following 
 States : Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Geor- 
 gia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michi- 
 gan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
 York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
 Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, 
 Wisconsin, and also in the District of Colum- 
 bia. It is to be noted, however, that in the 
 States of Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Ten- 
 nessee this right to a limited divorce exists 
 in favor of the wife only. The list of causes 
 for which a limited divorce may be secured 
 is very nearly as long as the list of causes 
 for absolute divorce. 
 
 Adultery is a cause in the States of Ala- 
 bama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Penn- 
 sylvania, and Rhode Island. The pregnancy 
 of the wife at the time of the marriage and 
 unknown to the husband is cause in the 
 
 105
 
 106 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 States of Alabama and Kentucky. The 
 lewd and lascivious behavior of the wife is 
 cause also in Kentucky. Gross misbehavior 
 and wickedness in violation of the marriage 
 covenant is a cause in the State of Rhode 
 Island. Crime against nature is a cause in 
 the State of Alabama. The concealment of 
 a loathsome disease existing at the time of 
 the marriage is a cause in the State of Ken- 
 tucky. Excessively vicious conduct is a cause 
 in the State of ]\[aryland. Impotency or 
 physical incapacity at the time of the mar- 
 riage is a cause in the States of Alabama, 
 Arkansas, Kentucky, and Rhode Island. 
 
 Abandonment, desertion, or wilful absence 
 are causes for a limited divorce in the States 
 of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
 Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota (coupled 
 with refusal or neglect to provide for the 
 wife), Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, 
 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 
 Disappearance— that is, such an absence 
 as will cause the presumption of death— is 
 a cause also in the State of Rhode Island; 
 living apart or voluntary separation is a 
 cause in the State of Kentucky, where also 
 there is a cause when either the man or the 
 woman has joined a religious sect in which it 
 is a tenet of faith that marriage is unlawful. 
 
 Cruelty, actual violence, or an apprehen-
 
 LIMITED DIVORCE 107 
 
 sion thereof, inlmman treatment, etc., is a 
 cause in the States of Alabama, Arkansas, 
 Georgia, Kentucky (in favor of the wife 
 only), Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Min- 
 nesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
 North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
 Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
 Wisconsin. 
 
 Indignities rendering the condition of mar- 
 riage intolerable or life in general burden- 
 some is a cause in Arkansas, North Carolina, 
 Pennsylvania, and Tennessee; in the last 
 State, however, this cause must be coupled 
 with the husband's refusal or neglect to pro- 
 vide for the wife. Conduct rendering it un- 
 safe or improper for the parties to a mar- 
 riage to live together is a cause in the States 
 of Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, and 
 Wisconsin, where, however, it is a cause to 
 the wife only. The failure or neglect of the 
 husband to provide for the wife is a cause 
 in the States of Delaware, Michigan, Minne- 
 sota (coupled with an abandonment of the 
 wife), Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. 
 
 Drunkenness, intemperance, or intoxication, 
 when it is habitual, is a cause in the States 
 of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
 Louisiana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, 
 West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The State 
 of AVisconsin has also a cause to the husband 
 when the wife is given to intoxication.
 
 108 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 A conviction for a felony or an infamous 
 crime and imprisonment is a cause in the 
 States of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, 
 Louisiana, and Khode Island. An insanity 
 that is permanent and incurable occurring 
 subsequent to the marriage is a cause in the 
 State of Arkansas, in which State, also, there 
 is a cause when either party had a former 
 husband or wife living. 
 
 In the State of Rhode Island a limited di- 
 vorce may be secured for any cause render- 
 ing the marriage originally void or voidable. 
 The procurement of the marriage by means 
 of force or fraud is a cause in the State 
 of Kentucky. The procurement of the mar- 
 riage when either party was under the age 
 of consent is a cause in the State of Delaware. 
 
 An attempt by either the man or the 
 woman upon the life of the other is a cause 
 in the State of Louisiana, where, also, public 
 defamation is regarded as a cause. 
 
 The State of Georgia still preserves the 
 historic causes on any ground which was held 
 sufficient in the English courts prior to the 
 fourth day of ]\ray, 1784. 
 
 The States of Khode Island and Kentucky 
 vest a large discretion in the court, allowing 
 in Kentucky ''such other cause as the court 
 may deem sufficient," and in Rhode Island 
 "such otlier causes as may seem to require 
 the same."
 
 DIVORCES AMONG THE MORMONS 
 
 THERE are two kinds of divorce recog- 
 nized among the Latter-Day Saints or 
 Mormons, one separating the man and the 
 woman for the period of this life, and the 
 other for the future life also. In cases where 
 divorces a mensa et thoro are sought from 
 first wives or from legal husbands, the 
 ordinary civil courts of the State are used. 
 Where, however, plural wives are the suitors, 
 either as plaintitfs or defendants, inasmuch 
 as they cannot appeal to the civil courts, hav- 
 ing no legal status therein, resource is had 
 by an appeal to the power which bound them 
 to set them free. The President of the 
 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
 being invested with the supreme authority to 
 bind in marriage, can also unloose. 
 
 The decree of divorce granted to its mem- 
 bers by the Mormon Church is an outgrowth 
 of the doctrine of plural and of eternal mar- 
 riage, without which a plural wife would be 
 without a remedy for a condition that might 
 become intolerable. As the jurisdiction of 
 the civil courts extends to this world only, 
 the relief afforded by such a court in the 
 
 109
 
 110 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 event of an ill-assorted spiritual marriage 
 would be very inadequate, as a decree of 
 divorce granted by such a court would, ac- 
 cording to the belief of the Latter-Day Saints, 
 leave the marriage still in force for the fu- 
 ture life. So men and women who have been 
 sealed to each other for eternity, and have 
 been divorced by a decree of a civil court, 
 must, if they desire to live separate from 
 each other in the world to come, have their 
 eternal covenant subsequently unsealed by 
 ecclesiastical authority. The practical bear- 
 ing of these church divorces on the lives 
 of Mormon women is therefore apparent. 
 When men and women spiritually married 
 have been divorced by the civil courts or by 
 the church for this world only, they are free 
 to marry, but only for this world ; when, how- 
 ever, they are divorced by the church for 
 eternity as well, thej are wholly freed from 
 each other. The causes for which a man may 
 obtain a church divorce from his wife, either 
 for time or eternity, or for both, are murder, 
 adultery, infanticide, feticide— a crime that 
 is considered even more heinous than the vio- 
 lation of marriage vows— and incompatibil- 
 ity of temper rendering it impossible to live 
 together harmoniously. A woman may be 
 divorced from her husband for any of these 
 causes, and, in addition, for impotency exist- 
 ing at the time of the marriage or contracted
 
 DIVORCES AMONG THE MORMONS 111 
 
 subsequent thereto, cruel treatment, refusal 
 or neglect to support her and her children, 
 or injuries of any kind repeated until her 
 love is turned to loathing. The Mormon 
 Church has further provided that should a 
 proof of crime come to light after the death 
 of one of the parties to a sealed marriage, 
 the survivor may procure a church divorce. 
 
 The ecclesiastical divorces can be granted 
 only by the president of the church. This 
 official grants divorces upon the application 
 of one or both of the parties interested and 
 the recommendation of the bishop of the 
 ward where they reside. It is the duty of 
 the bishop to investigate the case thoroughly, 
 and to make every effort to bring about a 
 settlement of the difficulties. 
 
 It is always necessary, of course, for a first 
 wife of a Mormon to be divorced by the civil 
 courts, if at all; but, according to the law 
 of the church, permission from a religious 
 teacher must be obtained before a suit is 
 begun, no matter whether the husband or the 
 wife is the plaintiff. If a woman thinks that 
 she is not fairly treated in the settlement of 
 property affairs, she may complain to the 
 teacher of the ward where she lives, and if 
 the teacher thinks that her complaint is well 
 founded he lays the question before the 
 bishop who, with his counselors, tries the 
 case. Should this court find in favor of the
 
 112 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 woman, it revises the property settlements 
 made in the civil court. The defeated party 
 has a right of appeal to the high council of 
 the church and afterward to the president 
 of the church, but if he or she loses the case 
 on the final appeal excommunication will 
 follow any further resistance. 
 
 The decrees of divorce granted by the 
 church are in the form of a covenant between 
 the parties, and read as follows : 
 
 Know all Persons by these presents: 
 
 That we the undersigned, and 
 
 his wife (before her marriage to him ), 
 
 do hereby mutually covenant, promise, and agree 
 to dissolve all the relations which have hitherto 
 existed between us as husband and wife, and to 
 keep ourselves separate and apart from each other 
 from this time forth. 
 
 (Acknowledged.)
 
 ALIMONY 
 
 ALIMONY is the allowance which a hus- 
 . band pays, by an order of court, to his 
 wife for her maintenance while living apart 
 from her, or it is a provision that is or- 
 dered for the maintenance of a woman who 
 is divorced from the bond of matrimony out 
 of the estate of the man who was her hus- 
 band. Where alimony is granted in connec- 
 tion with a decree of divorce, the court which 
 has jurisdiction to decree the divorce has also 
 the power to grant alimony, provided that 
 it has obtained jurisdiction of both the par- 
 ties to the suit ; but if the defendant is domi- 
 ciled in another State and does not appear, 
 no alimony can be granted unless he has 
 been sued with process within the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court or appears and defends. 
 When a wife has obtained a decree of divorce 
 in one State, with w^hich no alimony was 
 granted, she has, in some cases, been per- 
 mitted to obtain from the court having juris- 
 diction at the domicile of the husband a 
 decree allowing alimony. If after alimony 
 has been decreed by the court the husband 
 moves to another jurisdiction, the decree can 
 
 8 113
 
 114 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 be enforced by the courts of the latter juris- 
 diction or by the United States courts. A 
 legislature, in granting a divorce, cannot give 
 alimony, but the jurisdiction to do so has 
 been given by statutes or assumed by the 
 courts in a large number of the States. In 
 those States in which jurisdiction is given to 
 the courts to decree this maintenance the stat- 
 ute which grants the powder as a rule defines 
 the circumstances under which the court may 
 grant it. But in those States in which the 
 courts have assumed the jurisdiction as one 
 of their equitable powers the circumstances 
 that are regarded as necessary to entitle a 
 woman to receive alimony are not clearly 
 defined. Desertion, leaving the wife with- 
 out means of support, is very generally rec- 
 ognized as a sufficient cause. 
 
 Where alimony is decreed to a wife during 
 the pendency of a suit for a divorce, it is 
 called alimony pendente lite. This form of 
 alimony is also regulated by statute in most 
 of the States at the present time. The mere 
 pendency of the suit where the wife has no 
 se])arate means sufficient for her support en- 
 titles lier, whether she is plaintiff or defen- 
 dant, to alimony so long as the litigation con- 
 tinues. This form of alimony is usually 
 made up of a sum to sup|Jort the wife and to 
 pay her counsel fees and the other expenses 
 of the suit, and this the court will allow, upon
 
 ALIMONY 115 
 
 having fhe necessary facts presented to it, al- 
 most as a matter of course. The amount is 
 determined by no fixed rule, being in the dis- 
 cretion of the court in view of the circum- 
 stances of each case. Within the jurisdiction 
 in which the decree of alimony was granted, 
 the court which granted it is the proper court 
 to enforce it, yet if the j^arties reside in dif- 
 ferent States it may be enforced by the 
 United States courts.
 
 CHANGE OF NAME AFTER 
 DIVORCE 
 
 IN the States and District named below the 
 court may change the name of any woman 
 to whom a divorce is granted: Arizona, Ar- 
 kansas, Connecticut, Georgia (by the jury), 
 Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
 Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, 
 Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wash- 
 ington, and the District of Columbia. 
 
 In Arizona, the District of Columbia, Ore- 
 gon, Texas, and Washington the name of the 
 woman may be changed whether the divorce 
 is granted on the application of the wife or 
 not. In Arizona and Texas the court, upon 
 a final disposition of the case, may make a 
 decree changing the name of either party, if 
 such a change is specially prayed for. In 
 Vermont the court may change the names of 
 the minor children of divorced parents when 
 such a change is prayed for in the petition 
 for divorce. 
 
 116
 
 UNIFORM DIVORCE LAW 
 
 FOR the many social evils that arise be- 
 cause of the very great diversity of the 
 divorce laws of the several States many reme- 
 dies have been suggested, and among the 
 most practical of these suggestions is one for 
 the adoption by as many as possible of the 
 States of a uniform divorce law. 
 
 The National Commissioners on Uniform 
 Laws, a body in which many if not all of the 
 States are represented, have prepared a gen- 
 eral law upon the subject of divorce which 
 every State in the Union will be asked to 
 adopt. As very possibly law in the near fu- 
 ture this suggested statute is worthy of note 
 in the study of the legal status of American 
 women. The proposed law is as follows: 
 
 Section 1. No divorce shall be granted for any 
 cause arising prior to the residence of the peti- 
 tioner or defendant in this State which was not a 
 ground for divorce in the State in which the cause 
 arose. 
 
 Sec. 2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce 
 
 for any cause arising in this State who has not 
 
 had actual residence in this State for at least one 
 
 year next before bringing suit for divorce, with 
 
 117
 
 118 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 a bona-iide intention of making this State his or 
 her permanent home. 
 
 Sec. 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce 
 for any cause arising out of this State unless the 
 petitioner or defendant shall have resided within 
 this State for at least two years next before 
 bi'inging suit for divorce, with a bona-fide inten- 
 tion of making this State his or her permanent 
 home. 
 
 Sec. 4. No person shall be entitled to a divorce 
 unless the defendant shall have been personally 
 served with process if within this State, or with 
 personal notice, duly authenticated, if out of this 
 State, or unless the defendant shall have entered 
 an appearance in the case ; but if it shall appear 
 to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner 
 does not know the address nor the residence of 
 the defendant, and has not been able to ascertain 
 either after reasonable and due inquiry and search 
 continued for one year, the court, or judge in 
 vacation, may authorize notice by publication of 
 the pendency of the petition for divorce, to be 
 given in the manner provided by law. 
 
 Sec. 5. No divorce shall be granted solely upon 
 default, nor solely upon admissions by the plead- 
 ings, nor except upon trial before the court in 
 open session. 
 
 Sec. 6. After divorce either party may marry 
 again, but in cases where notice has been given by 
 publication only, and the defendant has not ap- 
 peared, no decree for divorce shall become final 
 or operative until six months after trial and de- 
 cision. 
 
 Sec. 7. Wherever the word "divorce" occurs 
 in this act it shall be deemed to mean divorce from 
 the bond of marriage.
 
 UNIFORM DIVORCE LAW 119 
 
 Divorce from tlie bond of marriage shall 
 be granted for the following causes arising 
 after marriage: Adultery, extreme cruelty, 
 habitual drunkenness or the confirmed habit 
 of intoxication, whether arising from the use 
 of alcoholic drinks or drugs, conviction of 
 felony with sentence to State prison or peni- 
 tentiary, and continuous desertion for at 
 least — years ; divorce from the bond of mar- 
 riage shall not be granted for any other cause 
 arising after marriage.
 
 Pakt II 
 PROPERTY RELATIONS
 
 MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 
 
 A MARRIAGE settlement is an agreement 
 _ made by the parties in contemplation 
 of marriage, by which the title to certain 
 property is vested and the property to some 
 extent becomes inalienable. In most of the 
 States a man and a woman may by a mar- 
 riage contract made before marriage stipu- 
 late what rights each shall have in the estate 
 of the other during marriage and after its 
 dissolution by death, and bar each other of 
 all rights not so secured. No agreement 
 made before marriage can, of course, destroy 
 the personal rights and liabilities of the 
 status of husband and wife. So, although 
 before his marriage a husband may agree to 
 live in a certain place, he can after marriage, 
 in the exercise of his marriage rights, decide 
 without regard to his agreement upon an- 
 other place of residence for himself and his 
 wife. In no case can a husband and wife 
 enter into any agreement to alter the legal 
 orders of descent, either with respect to them- 
 selves or in what concerns the inheritance of 
 their children or posterity which either may 
 have by any other person, or in respect to 
 
 123
 
 124 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 their common children. Nor can they make 
 a valid agreement to impair the legal rights 
 of the husband over the person of the wife 
 or the persons of their common children. 
 
 But a man and a woman who are about to 
 become husband and wife can, by contract, 
 settle the precise rights they shall respec- 
 tively have in their own and each other's 
 property during their married life. So, also, 
 third persons may settle property on them, 
 in consideration of their marriage, which 
 they will hold when married, subject to the 
 terms of the contract they have made and not 
 according to the ordinary laws of the mar- 
 riage estate. 
 
 A marriage settlement must in all States 
 be in writing, and in the States of Maine, 
 Georgia, Texas, and Ijouisiana it must have 
 at least two witnesses. It need not contain 
 technical words, and it need only appear that 
 there is an enforceable promise in regard to 
 marriage rights to or over pro])erty or in 
 consideration of marriage, but it is subject 
 to the operation of all the general laws as 
 to the recording of instruments affecting 
 rights in real estate or in personal property. 
 
 The capacity of the parties, with certain 
 exceptions as to age, is that required for the 
 execution of any other contract. In Massa- 
 chusetts female minors of the age of eighteen 
 years may join with their guardians in mak-
 
 MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 125 
 
 ing a marriage contract. So in Texas, Idaho, 
 Louisiana, and Arizona any minor legally 
 capable of marrying may join in such a con- 
 tract with the written consent of both parents 
 or the guardian, while in the States of Cali- 
 fornia, Nevada, and Georgia any minor ca- 
 pable of contracting marriage may make a 
 valid marriage contract or settlement. 
 
 Any fraud or concealment by one party as 
 to the value of his or her property will in 
 all the States render a marriage settlement 
 relating thereto voidable. In this connection 
 it has been well said that persons about to 
 marry "do not, like buyer and seller, deal at 
 arm's length, but stand in a confidential rela- 
 tion requiring the exercise of the greatest 
 good faith." 
 
 The law of the State of Louisiana provides 
 also for marriage settlements or contracts in 
 contemplation of marriage. Married per- 
 sons can by contract make to each other re- 
 ciprocally, or the one to the other, what dona- 
 tions they may think proper, under certain 
 conditions. A donation of property in future 
 or of property present and in future made 
 between married persons by contract is not 
 transmissive to the children, the issue of the 
 marriage, in case of the death of the donee 
 before the donor. Either of the married cou- 
 ple may, either by a marriage contract or 
 during the marriage, give to the other in full
 
 126 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 property all that lie or she might give to a 
 stranger. A minor, if not emancipated, can 
 give only with the consent of the relations 
 whose consent is requisite for the validity of 
 the marriage, but with that consent he or she 
 can give all that the law permits a married 
 person of full age to give to his or her con- 
 sort. If the relations whose consent is neces- 
 sary be dead, then the authorization of a 
 court of justice is required. All donations 
 made between married persons during mar- 
 riage may be revoked. Such a revocation 
 may be made by the wife without her being 
 authorized to that effect by her husband or 
 by a court of justice. Such donations are not 
 revoked by the birth of children, provided 
 that they do not exceed the amount which 
 married persons are permitted to dispose of 
 to each other, to the prejudice of their chil- 
 dren or their legitimate descendants. 
 
 A man or a woman who contracts a second 
 or a subsequent marriage, having children 
 by a former marriage, can give to his wife, 
 or she to her husband, only the least child's 
 portion, and that only as a usufruct— that is, 
 the right of enjoying the profit without im- 
 pairing the substance— and in no case can 
 the portion of which the donee is to have the 
 usufruct exceed a fifth part of the donor's 
 estate. If a person who marries a second 
 time has children of his or her preceding
 
 MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 127 
 
 marriage, he or she cannot dispose of the 
 property given to him or her by the deceased 
 spouse, or which came to him or her from 
 a brother or sister of any of the children 
 which remain. This property becomes by 
 the second marriage the property of the chil- 
 dren of the preceding marriage, and the 
 spouse who marries again has only the usu- 
 fruct of it. All donations disguised in any 
 way or made to persons interposed shall be 
 null and void.
 
 DOWER 
 
 IN the general acceptance of the word, 
 * ' dower" means a certain estate of a wife 
 in the real property of her husband. The 
 law entitling a wife to an estate of dower in 
 the lands of her husband had for its object 
 a sure and competent sustenance for the 
 widow, and to further this object of the law 
 the courts have always highly favored a 
 widow's claims for dower, for, as the great 
 Lord Coke says, "There be three things 
 highly favored in law— life, liberty, and 
 dower. ' ' 
 
 At an early period in the development of 
 the common law, dower is said to have con- 
 sisted of personal property, but later it be- 
 came solely an interest in lands, and is now 
 understood in connection with that form of 
 property exclusively. A more complete defi- 
 nition of dower is that it is a life estate of a 
 wife in one third of all the legal estates of 
 inheritance of which her husband is seized 
 at any time during coverture, "of a sole, 
 beneficial, and immediate seizing," and 
 which any issue of theirs might directly in- 
 herit. Under the statutes of the American 
 
 128
 
 DOWER 129 
 
 States, dower has become more or less differ- 
 ent from the estate that was known by that 
 name at the common law, and in some of the 
 States dower is the old common-law estate 
 only in name, and in some States even the 
 name has been done away with. 
 
 The common-law estate of dower is recog- 
 nized in a more or less modified form in the 
 following States: Alabama, Arkansas, Con- 
 necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
 Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
 Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp- 
 shire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro- 
 lina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
 Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, 
 Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 This estate has either never existed or has 
 been abolished or other estates have been 
 substituted for it in the following States: 
 Arizona, California, Colorado, the Dakotas, 
 Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
 Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, Utah, Wash- 
 ington, and Wyoming. In the States of Ken- 
 tucky, Missouri, Virginia, and West Virginia 
 a wife has dower in real estate although there 
 may have been no actual possession or re- 
 covery of possession by the husband in his 
 lifetime, and also in the State of Missouri, 
 although the property is held by the husband 
 as a joint tenant, common tenant, or copar- 
 cener. In the State of Ohio a wife is also 
 
 9
 
 130 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 endowed of all real estate of which her hus- 
 band at his decease held the fee in remainder 
 or reversion, but not until after the particu- 
 lar estate has determined. In some of the 
 States there is a general provision that a 
 widow is entitled to dower in equitable es- 
 tates, as in Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Ten- 
 nessee, and Alabama. 
 
 At the common law, and where there is 
 no special enactment to the contrary, a widow 
 is entitled to dower in the whole of land mort- 
 gaged or encumbered by the husband after 
 marriage by a conveyance in which the wife 
 has not joined and when she has not been 
 otherwise barred. There is special provision 
 in a number of States that if lands were pur- 
 chased by the husband during marriage, and 
 at the same time mortgaged to secure the 
 purchase money, the widow has dower only 
 in the equity even if she did not join in the 
 mortgage, as in the States of New York, 
 Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Ne- 
 braska, West Virginia, Oregon, and Georgia. 
 In the case of lands mortgaged before mar- 
 riage, it is evident that the widow has dower, 
 if at all, only in the equity" of redemption, 
 and the mortgagee has a good title. In some 
 States there is a special provision to this 
 effect, and the widow has dower as against 
 every person but the mortgagee, as in the
 
 DOWER 131 
 
 States of Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, 
 New York, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
 Nebraska, Virginia, West Virginia, Arkan- 
 sas, and Oregon. In the States of New York, 
 Illinois, and Arkansas it is provided that a 
 widow is not endowed of lands mortgaged to 
 her husband unless he acquires an absolute 
 estate therein during marriage. As to lands 
 mortgaged by the husband before marriage 
 or after marriage to secure the purchase 
 money, the widow, if the lands are sold by 
 the mortgagee, has dower in the proceeds re- 
 maining after satisfying the mortgage in the 
 States of Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, 
 New York, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
 Nebraska, Virginia, West Virginia, Ken- 
 tucky, Arkansas, and Oregon. It is provided 
 in the States of Massachusetts, Maine, Ver- 
 mont, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and 
 Oregon that if the heir or other person claim- 
 ing under the husband pay or satisfy the 
 mortgage, this amount so paid shall be de- 
 ducted from the value of the land, and the 
 widow shall have set apart for her as dower 
 the value of one third of the residue. In 
 New Jersey it is specially provided that there 
 shall be no dower for the widow of a trustee 
 in the trust estate. 
 
 In several of the States, if a husband ex- 
 changes one estate for another during mar- 
 riage the widow cannot have dower in both
 
 132 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 estates, and shall be deemed to take dower 
 in the lands so received in exchange if she 
 does not commence proceedings to recover 
 dower in the lands given within one year of 
 the death of her husband, and so it is in the 
 States of New York, Illinois, Michigan, Wis- 
 consin, Nebraska, Arkansas, and Oregon. In 
 the New England States a widow is not gen- 
 erally entitled to dower in wild land, nor in 
 wild land conveyed by the husband and after- 
 ward cleared, except wood lots or other land 
 used with a farm or dwelling-house. 
 
 The rights of a doweress are, as a rule, 
 well defined in the statutes. Generally, if a 
 doweress commits waste herself or suffers 
 waste to be committed by another she is liable 
 to the owner of the next estate of inheritance 
 for damages. And it would seem to follow 
 from the mere prohibition of permissive 
 waste that the doweress, in all the States, 
 must keep the estate in sufficient repair, and 
 in the States of New Hampshire, Vermont, 
 Rhode Island, Connecticut, Illinois, Michi- 
 gan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Oregon it is 
 so expressed s])ecifically. 
 
 In the United States three ways by which 
 dower may be barred are very generally rec- 
 ognized: first, by a jointure or settlement; 
 second, by a devise or bequest; and third, 
 by a deed. An estate of dower may also be 
 forfeited bv adultery and divorce. In most
 
 DOWER 133 
 
 of the States at the present time dower may 
 be barred by a conveyance, gift, or devise of 
 real property made by any person to, or in 
 trust for, an intended wife, before marriage, 
 by way of jointure or with the intention of 
 barring dower. This may be done in the 
 States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachu- 
 setts, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
 New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Illi- 
 nois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Dela- 
 ware, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, 
 Missouri, Arkansas, Oregon, South Carolina, 
 and Georgia. In the State of Maryland a 
 widow is barred from dower only by an es- 
 tate so settled before her marriage by her 
 husband. 
 
 There are certain conditions upon which 
 such a substitute for dower can be made. 
 The conveyance must in several States be 
 made with the assent of the intended wife, 
 and so it is in the States of Massachusetts, 
 Maine, New York, Indiana, Illinois, Michi- 
 gan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Delaware, Vir- 
 ginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, 
 Nebraska, Oregon, and Georgia. In Ver- 
 mont there is an express provision that such 
 a conveyance will bar a claim to dower 
 whether the intended wife has consented to 
 it or not. In some of the States her assent 
 must be evidenced by her becoming a party 
 to such a conveyance, as in Maine, Massa-
 
 134 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 chusetts, New York, Illinois, Michigan, Wis- 
 consin, Nebraska, Arkansas, and Oregon. If 
 the intended wife be under age, her father 
 or other guardian may give such assent for 
 her in New York and Indiana; or she must 
 join with her father or guardian in the con- 
 veyance in the States of Maine, Massachu- 
 setts, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Ne- 
 braska, Arkansas, and Oregon. In a number 
 of States if such a conveyance is made with- 
 out her consent she may make a choice of the 
 estate so conveyed or of dower, but she is not 
 entitled to both, and this is the rule in the 
 States of Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
 New York, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wis- 
 consin, Nebraska, Virginia, W^est Virginia, 
 Kentucky, Arkansas, and Oregon. The wo- 
 man 's interest in such a conveyance, in order 
 to bar dower, must take effect immediately 
 upon the death of her husband in the States 
 of Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, Rhode 
 Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, In- 
 diana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Dela- 
 ware, Missouri, and Oregon. 
 
 In very many of the States a widow's 
 dower may be barred in the same way by a 
 pecuniary provision settled on or made to the 
 intended wife before marriage in lieu of 
 dower, and the widow must exercise an elec- 
 tion. But a widow is entitled to dower in 
 addition to the devises or pecuniary provi-
 
 DOWER 135 
 
 sions in a will if such plainly appear to have 
 been the intention of the testator in Maine, 
 Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, In- 
 diana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Vir- 
 ginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, and 
 Oregon, Generally, the intestate share of a 
 widow in personalty is barred if she does not 
 waive the will, just as dower would be. 
 The State of Maryland is an exception in 
 this respect, for a devise of lands to the 
 widow is construed to be in addition to any 
 jointure or settlement made before marriage 
 by the husband, and she is entitled to re- 
 ceive both. 
 
 A woman may generally bar her right to 
 claim dower by a deed that she may execute, 
 either jointly with her husband, as in the 
 States of Maine, Massachusetts, Indiana, Illi- 
 nois, Michigan, Kansas, Nebraska, North 
 Carolina, Missouri, x\rkansas, Oregon, Geor- 
 gia, Alabama, and Florida; or separately in 
 Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Michi- 
 gan, Nebraska, Oregon, Alabama, and Flor- 
 ida; or jointly after the conveyance by the 
 husband in Maine, Massachusetts, and Ne- 
 braska; or by a deed executed like ordinary 
 deeds of a wife's separate real estate in 
 Rhode Island and New Jersey. 
 
 In many of the States a wife who willingly 
 leaves her husband and dwells with another 
 man in adultery forfeits her right to dower.
 
 136 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 and this is the rule in New Jersey, Ohio, In- 
 diana, Illinois, Delaware, Virginia, West Vir- 
 ginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, 
 and South Carolina. In Georgia this pro- 
 vision is expressed, that dower is barred by 
 adultery of the wife that is unpardoned by 
 the husband. In Connecticut a wife forfeits 
 her right to dower who has abandoned her 
 husband without his consent and not by his 
 fault. In other States the woman is not en- 
 titled to dower in any case of absolute di- 
 vorce, and this is the rule in Massachusetts, 
 Connecticut, North Carolina, Kentuck^^, and 
 Missouri, except when the divorce was for 
 cause of adultery by the husband, or for 
 cause of sentence of the husband to prison, 
 or when, after a decree nisi of divorce on 
 the wife's libel, the husband dies before the 
 decree is made absolute, in Massachusetts, 
 or when the wife has been divorced without 
 alimony, she being the innocent party, in 
 Connecticut. Generally, a wife will forfeit 
 her jointure, settlement, intestate share, or 
 the provisions of her husband 's will made in 
 lieu of dower, by the same acts or in all cases 
 whore she would lose dower. And, as a rule, 
 if a widow is lawfully evicted (without fraud 
 on her part) from the jointure or the estate 
 settled or devised in lieu of dower, she may 
 still claim dower. Generally, also, a wife 
 can lose her estate of dower by no act of her
 
 DOWER 137 
 
 husband. This would seem to result from 
 the common law as adopted in the United 
 States, although in many States there is stat- 
 ute law to this effect. 
 
 Dower is in many States to be assigned 
 either by the heir, remainder-man, rever- 
 sioner, or devisee entitled to the land subject 
 to dower. The heir or other person must 
 assign it within forty days after the death 
 of the husband in New Jersey; as soon as 
 possible in Illinois, Arkansas, and Florida; 
 within thirty days after the widow's demand 
 in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maine, 
 and Rhode Island; or she may apply at 
 any time not before twenty days from the 
 husband's death in Iowa and Kansas; or 
 within one year after such death, or three 
 months after demand, in Arkansas ; or within 
 two years after the husband's death in Mis- 
 souri; or within two months in Florida; or 
 after the expiration of three months from 
 the husband's death in Georgia. 
 
 The widow must sue for or claim dower 
 within five years after the husband's death 
 in Kansas, within ten 3^ears in Iowa, within 
 twenty years in Massachusetts and New 
 York, within seven years in Georgia, within 
 three years, when the rights of alienees of the 
 husband are involved, in Alabama. In many 
 of the States dower may also be assigned by 
 the probate court in which the husband's es-
 
 138 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 tate is being settled, aud this is the rule 
 in Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode 
 Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
 vania, Michigan, AVisconsin, Nebraska, Mary- 
 land, Delaware, Virginia, Kentucky, Ten- 
 nessee, Arkansas, Oregon, South Carolina, 
 Alabama, and Florida. In cases of the as- 
 signment of dower by a court, the actual divi- 
 sion or computation is made by either three 
 or five disinterested commissioners appointed 
 by the court, subject, as a rule, to the court's 
 approval and confirmation. Usually, dower 
 is assigned by metes and bounds, but when 
 this cannot be fairly or conveniently done 
 without injury, the widow may have dower 
 assigned in a special manner, as in many 
 States in one third of the rents and profits. 
 In many States the usual place of residence, 
 with out-buildings, is or may be, if the widow 
 desire, included in the land assigned as 
 dower. 
 
 When a widow is entitled to dower in the 
 lands of her husband she may continue to 
 occupy the same with the children and the 
 other heirs, so long as they do not object, 
 without having dower assigned, and so in 
 ]\[assachusetts, Vermont, Michigan, Wiscon- 
 sin, Nebraska, and Oregon; or she may re- 
 ceive one third of the rents, issues, and prof- 
 its of the same in "Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 Wisconsin, Virginia, West Virginia, and
 
 DOWER 139 
 
 Oregon ; or she may remain in the mansion- 
 house free of rent until dower is assigned in 
 Rhode Island, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, 
 West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkan- 
 sas, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. When- 
 ever in any action for the purpose a widow 
 recovers her dower in land of which her hus- 
 band died seized she is entitled also to re- 
 cover damages for the withholding of such 
 dower in Maine, New Hampshire, Massachu- 
 setts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, 
 Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, 
 Delaware, Virginia, W^est Virginia, Missouri, 
 and Oregon. Such damages are one-third 
 part of the rents and profits of the land in 
 which the widow recovers dower in the States 
 of New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Wis- 
 consin, and Nebraska. In others of the States 
 a widow is entitled to receive one undivided 
 net third part of the rents and profits of the 
 estate of which her husband died seized until 
 her dower is assigned, and this is the law in 
 the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massa- 
 chusetts, Vermont, Ohio, Kentucky, Missouri, 
 Arkansas, and Oregon. 
 
 By the law of the State of New York, when 
 a widow shall recover her dower in any lands 
 alienated by the heir of her husband she 
 shall be entitled to the recovery of damages 
 for the withholding of such dower from the 
 time of the death of her husband to the time
 
 140 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 of the alienation by the heir, not exceeding 
 six years in all, and the amount which she 
 shall be entitled to recover from such heir 
 shall be deducted from the amount she would 
 otherwise be entitled to recover from such 
 grantee, and any amount recovered as dam- 
 ages from such grantee shall be deducted 
 from the amount she would otherwise be en- 
 titled to recover of such heir. Such is the 
 law in the States of Michigan, Wisconsin, 
 Nebraska, and Oregon also. Dower in land 
 that has been aliened by the husband is to 
 be determined as against the purchaser ac- 
 cording to the value of the land at the time 
 of the alienation in the States of Michigan, 
 Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kentucky, Oregon, 
 South Carolina, or at the time that the widow 
 recovers dower in Missouri. 
 
 In a number of States if, during the minor- 
 it>^ of an heir, dower is assigned to a widow 
 who is not entitled thereto, or if a widow re- 
 covers dower by the default, fraud, or collu- 
 sion of the guardian, such heir has an action 
 against the widow to recover such lands on 
 coming of age, and this is the law in New 
 York, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, AViscon- 
 sin, Nebraska, Virginia, West Virginia, Mis- 
 souri, and Oregon. In New Jersey and Ken- 
 tucky it is declared that an heir is not ])ound 
 by any collusive or ex-parte assignment of 
 dower excei)t so far as the widow shows her-
 
 DOWER 141 
 
 self to be justly entitled thereto. So also in 
 New Jersey, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
 Kentucky the widow shall not be barred by 
 reason of any judgment rendered by default 
 or collusion against the husband if she would 
 be entitled to dower had there been no such 
 judgment. 
 
 As a general rule, an assignment of dower 
 once made and accepted by the widow is a 
 bar to her further claim of dower, and it is 
 so declared in the States of New York, Miclii- 
 gan, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkan- 
 sas, and Oregon.
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S SEPARATE 
 ESTATE 
 
 IT is a general rule throughout the United 
 States at the present time that a married 
 woman may receive, receipt for, hold, man- 
 age, dispose of, lease, sell and convey, devise, 
 or bequeath her separate property, both real 
 and personal, as if sole, without joining with 
 or receiving the consent of her husband. She 
 may generally make contracts and incur lia- 
 bilities as if sole in the greater number of 
 States. There are, however, certain limita- 
 tions defined in the statute law. So, in the 
 State of Georgia any restriction upon such 
 powers of the wife made in a marriage con- 
 tract must be complied with, and no contract 
 of sale by a wife as to her separate estate 
 with her husband or trustee is valid without 
 an order of court. In the State of Maine a 
 married woman cannot, without the joinder 
 of the husband, convey real estate that has 
 been directly or indirectly conveyed to her 
 by him, or paid for by him, or given or de- 
 vised to her by his relatives, except such 
 property was conveyed to her as security or 
 
 142
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 143 
 
 in payment of a bona-fide debt actually due 
 to her from him. 
 
 By the Louisiana law a wife, even when 
 she is separate in estate, cannot alienate, 
 grant, or mortgage her property unless her 
 husband concurs in the act or yields his con- 
 sent in writing. If a husband refuses to em- 
 power his wife to contract she may cause him 
 to be cited to appear before the proper judge, 
 who may authorize her to make the contract 
 or refuse to empower her after the husband 
 has been heard or has made default. In car- 
 rying out the power to borrow money or to 
 contract debts, a wife, in order to bind herself 
 or her separate property, must be examined 
 at chambers by the judge of the district or 
 parish in which she resides, apart from her 
 husband, concerning the objects for which 
 the money is to be borrowed or the debt con- 
 tracted, and if the judge discovers that either 
 the one or the other is for her husband's 
 debts, or for his separate benefit, the judge 
 shall not give his sanction. If satisfied, the 
 judge shall furnish the woman with a certifi- 
 cate which, presented to a notary, shall be his 
 authority for drawing an act of mortgage. 
 In the States of Oregon and Washington all 
 laws which impose or recognize civil disa- 
 bilities upon a wife which are not imposed 
 or recognized as existing on the husband, ex- 
 cept as to voting and holding public oflBce,
 
 144 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 have been repealed. The State of Missis- 
 sippi has enacted "'that the common law as 
 to the disabilities of married women, and its 
 effect on the rights and property of the wife, 
 is totally abrogated, and marriage shall not 
 be held to impose any disability or incapacity 
 on a woman, as to the ownership, acquisition 
 or disposition of property of any sort, or as 
 to her ca]:)acity to make contracts and do all 
 acts which she could do, in reference to prop- 
 erty, if unmarried. " It is a general rule that 
 a receipt by a husband of the rents and prof- 
 its of the wife's separate property is a suffi- 
 cient discharge, unless previous notice in 
 writing is given by the wife. The States of 
 Delaware, West Virginia, Kentucky^ Arkan- 
 sas, Alabama, and Florida have enacted that 
 when a deposit of earnings in a savings-bank 
 is made by a woman then or thereafter mar- 
 ried, the bank may pay it out on receiving 
 her i^ersonal receipt. 
 
 A married woman may, in most States, 
 prosecute and defend suits concerning her 
 own property as if sole. In the States of 
 Maine, Delaware, and Texas she may sue 
 jointly with her husband. But in the States 
 of lihode Island, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and 
 Virginia a married woman must sue or be 
 sued jointly with her husband. In Texas a 
 wife, if her husband fails to sue, may have 
 an order of court to sue in her own name.
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 145 
 
 In Maine and Delaware a husband acting- 
 alone cannot maintain an action concerning 
 the property of his wife. 
 
 In the States of Massachusetts, New Jer- 
 sey, and Louisiana suits between husband 
 and wife are not allowed, except, of course, 
 for divorce, separation, etc., and in Louisiana 
 for property with the permission of the court. 
 
 In the States of Indiana, Wisconsin, West 
 Virginia, North (/arolina, Kentucky, Mis- 
 souri, Arkansas, California, Oregon, Nevada, 
 Colorado, Washington, Idaho, the Dakotas, 
 Montana, AVyoming, Utah, South Carolina, 
 Georgia, Mississippi, and the Territory of 
 Arizona a wife may prosecute an action 
 against her husband, or defend one brought 
 by him. In North Carolina, in all actions 
 against a married woman, the husband must 
 be served with the suit, and may with her 
 consent be allowed to defend in her name. It 
 is provided in Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, Wash- 
 ington, and Louisiana that if either a hus- 
 band or a wife unlawfully obtains or retains 
 possession or control of property belonging 
 to the other, either before or after marriage, 
 the owner may sue therefor as if they were 
 unmarried. In Louisiana the husbands have 
 in their control all of the personal and pos- 
 sessory actions to which wives are entitled, 
 and may sue in their own names. But ac- 
 tions that relate to the dotal or paraphernal 
 
 10
 
 146 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 property" must be brought by the wife, duly 
 authorized by the husband or by the judge if 
 the husband fails to do so. A suit against a 
 married woman for a cause relative to her 
 separate interest must be brought both 
 against her and the husband. In the States 
 of Maine, Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, 
 and Washington it is specifically provided 
 that a married woman may sue for her earn- 
 ings in her own name. A married woman 
 maj'' sue in her own name for an injury to 
 her iDerson and character as if sole in Maine, 
 Indiana, AVisconsin, Delaware, Arkansas, 
 Oregon, Colorado, and Wyoming. 
 
 In a number of States, if the husband and 
 wife are sued together the wife may defend 
 for her own right, and so it is declared in 
 the States of Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
 Nebraska, Kentucky, Arkansas, California, 
 Nevada, Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Mon- 
 tana, Wyoming, Utah, and in the Territory 
 of Arizona. 
 
 A married woman owning stock in an in- 
 corporated company may vote at an election 
 of officers by proxy or otherwise, except in 
 the case of mutual fire-insurance companies, 
 by the laws of New York and West Virginia. 
 In Pennsylvania a married woman may sell 
 and transfer shares of railroad stock as if 
 sole, and so of stock in any com]iany in Ala- 
 bama. By the civil codes of California and
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 147 
 
 the Dakotas shares of stock in corporations 
 held or owned by a married woman may be 
 transferred by her, her agent or attorney, 
 without the signature of her husband, in the 
 same manner as if such married woman were 
 a feme sole; and any proxy or power given 
 by a married woman touching any shares of 
 stock of any corporation is valid and binding 
 without the signature of her husband, the 
 same as if she were unmarried. So also all 
 dividends payable upon any shares of stock 
 of a corporation held by a married woman 
 may be paid to her, her agent or attorney, as 
 if she were unmarried, and it is unnecessary 
 for her husband to join in a receipt therefor. 
 
 The statutes of Colorado provide that a 
 married woman may become a special part- 
 ner either with her husband or with any 
 other person ; she may also contract with him 
 or any other person as if sole, and in all suits 
 arising from such a partnership she may be 
 a witness against her husband. 
 
 An attorney who has acted on behalf of a 
 married woman may look for his fee either 
 to her husband or to her trustee, or to her 
 property or to herself. As a wife at common 
 law always sues and is sued jointly with her 
 husband, and since he employs counsel for 
 them both, the pa:^Tnent of the fees naturally 
 falls upon him. But when he, by his con- 
 duct, makes it necessary for her to take pro-
 
 148 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 ceedings against him, the question arises 
 whether he is not liable for the expenses of 
 the suit as for necessaries. It has been held 
 that when a wife sues out a peace warrant 
 against her husband, or defends herself 
 against a similar proceeding by him, or when 
 she sues for a separate maintenance, her 
 legal expenses are necessaries for which her 
 husband is liable. The expenses of a wife 
 in bringing or defending a divorce suit have 
 been held to be necessaries in the States of 
 Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, and Maryland, while 
 the contrary is the rule in the States of Ala- 
 bama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Ken- 
 tucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
 Tennessee, and Vermont. Even where such 
 legal expenses may be considered as neces- 
 saries they are not of necessity so, for there 
 must exist a reasonable ground for bringing 
 the suit, or some real defense in resisting it. 
 Besides this, the courts usually provide for 
 counsel fees in divorce cases under their 
 jurisdiction to award alimony. 
 
 The trustee of the separate property of a 
 married woman may employ an attoi'uey, and 
 although he binds himself personally to com- 
 pensate the attorney, he has a right to repay 
 himself out of the estate. 
 
 At the common law a married woman 
 could not appear by an attorney in a suit 
 unless he were appointed to serve by her
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 149 
 
 husband, and therefore her contract to pay 
 counsel fees was absolutely void. 
 
 Under the usual statutes, however, that 
 authorize a married woman to enter into con- 
 tracts generally, there seems to be no reason 
 why slie should not contract for counsel fees, 
 and when by a statute a married woman is 
 authorized to contract with respect to her 
 property, a contract for legal services relating 
 to such property would be valid. Whether 
 when she may employ legal counsel she binds 
 herself personally or binds only her property 
 seems to be an unsettled question. When a 
 wife is liable for family expenses, whether 
 or not counsel fees are a family expense must 
 depend on the particular circumstances of 
 the case. 
 
 In the States of New York and West Vir- 
 ginia the law declares that every woman resi- 
 dent in the State who shall receive a patent 
 for her own inventions, under the laws of 
 the United States, may hold and enjoy the 
 same and all proceeds therefrom to her sepa- 
 rate use, and transfer and dispose of the 
 same as if unmarried. But in New York 
 this provision does not authorize her to con- 
 tract any pecuniary obligations to be dis- 
 charged at a future time. In New Hamp- 
 shire if a husband becomes insane the wife 
 may hold to her own use the earnings of 
 their minor children during such insanity.
 
 150 WOxMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 The proceeds of anj^ part of a wife's sepa- 
 rate property that has been sold are declared 
 to be her separate property in the States 
 of Vermont, Connecticut, Kansas, Nebraska, 
 Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
 Missouri, Arkansas, and Alabama. The Ken- 
 tucky law provides that any corporate stock 
 in the name of a female, and expressed on 
 the face of the certificate to be for her use, 
 belongs to her free from all claims on the 
 part of the husband, and passes by her will 
 or by descent to her heirs, and she may re- 
 ceive dividends and give receipts as if un- 
 married, but may not anticii)ate the same or 
 give orders in advance therefor. 
 
 There is a certain kind of i)roperty of a 
 woman which in Georgia is called ''para- 
 phernalia," and which in the States of Rhode 
 Island, Colorado, Georgia, and Louisiana is 
 not subject to the debts nor the control of 
 the husband. Such property consists, first, 
 of her wearing apparel (in Colorado and 
 Georgia) ; second, the wearing a]:)parel of her 
 children (in Georgia) ; and, third, of her or- 
 naments suitable to her condition in life (in 
 Georgia) ; so especially her watch (in Colo- 
 rado and Georgia) ; her jewelry (in Rhode 
 Island and Colorado) ; silver and tableware 
 (in Colorado) ; and plate (in Rhode Island), 
 and, generally, all such articles as have been 
 given to her for her own use and comfort.
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 151 
 
 By the law of Louisiana, all property 
 which is not declared to be brought in mar- 
 riage by the wife or to be given to her in 
 consideration of her marriage or to belong 
 to her at the time of the marriage is regarded 
 as paraphernalia. Such property the wife 
 has a right to administer personally, with- 
 out the assistance of her husband; but all 
 of the paraphernal jDroperts^ which is not 
 administered by the wife alone is considered 
 to be under the management of the husband. 
 When the paraphernal property is adminis- 
 tered by the husband, or by him and the wife 
 indifferently, the fruits of such property, 
 whether natural or the result of labor, belong 
 to the conjugal partnership if there exist a 
 community of gains. If such a community 
 does not exist, each party enjoys that which 
 comes to his hand. A wife who has left to 
 her husband the administration of her para- 
 phernal properties may aftei'ward withdraw 
 it from him. The husband who administers 
 the paraphernal properties of his wife is ac- 
 countable to her for all the profits. If all 
 the property of the wife is paraphernal in its 
 legal nature, and she has reserved to herself 
 the administration of it, she may be required 
 to bear a part of the expenses of the estab- 
 lishment maintained by herself and her hus- 
 band equal, if necessary, to one half of her 
 income. The wife may alienate her para-
 
 152 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 phernal properties, with the assent of her 
 husband, or, in case of the refusal of the hus- 
 band to give his sanction, or of his absence 
 from home, then with the sanction of the 
 judge. In the event of its being proved that 
 the husband has received the amount of the 
 paraphernal property thus alienated by his 
 wife, or has otherwise disposed of the same 
 for his individual interest, the wife has a 
 legal mortgage on all of the property of her 
 husband, in order that she may be reim- 
 bursed. The wife has, even during marriage, 
 a right of action against her husband for the 
 restitution of her paraphernal effects and 
 their profits. 
 
 According to the law of the State of Loui- 
 siana, based upon the civil law, the separate 
 property of a wife is regarded as being of 
 two kinds— dotal and extradotal. Dotal 
 property is that which a wife brings to her 
 husband to assist him in bearing the expenses 
 of the marriage establishment. Extradotal 
 property, which is otherwise called para- 
 phernal property, is that which forms no 
 part of the dowry. 
 
 Whatever in the marriage contract is de- 
 clared to belong to the wife, or to be given 
 to her on account of the marriage by other 
 persons than the husband, constitutes the 
 dowry, unless there be an express stipulation 
 to the contvary. The settlement of the dowry
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 153 
 
 may include all the present and future effects 
 of the wife, or her present effects only, or, 
 again, a part of her present and future ef- 
 fects, or even an individual object. Dowiy 
 cannot be settled nor can it be increased dur- 
 ing the marriage. It can be settled either by 
 the wife herself or by her father or mother 
 or other ascendants, or by strangers. If the 
 father and the mother jointly settle a dowry, 
 without distinguishing the portion that each 
 settles, it is supposed to be constituted of 
 equal portions. If, however, the dowry is 
 settled by the father alone, the mother, al- 
 though present at the making of the con- 
 tract, is not bound, but the father alone is 
 liable for the whole amount of the dowry. 
 If a surviving father or mother settle a 
 dowry without specifying the portions, the 
 dowry shall be first taken out of the rights 
 of the future wife in the succession of the 
 deceased father or mother, and the rest out 
 of the estate of the person who settled the 
 dowry. 
 
 The interests of the dowry begin of right 
 from the day of the marriage against those 
 who have promised it, although there may be 
 time given for the payment, unless there is 
 an express stipulation to the contrarj^ A 
 dowrj^ is given to a husband to enjoy as long 
 as the marriage shall last. The income or 
 proceeds of the dowry belong to the husband,
 
 154 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 and are intended to help him support the 
 marriage establishment. The husband alone 
 has the administration of the dowry, and the 
 wife cannot deprive him of it, and he may 
 act alone in a court of law for the preserva- 
 tion or recovery of the dowry against any 
 persons who either owe or detain the same, 
 but this does not prevent the wife from re- 
 maining the owner of the effects which she 
 brought as her dowry. In case, however, of 
 the husband's absence or his neglect to sue 
 for the dowry of his wife, she may sue for 
 it herself, having first received permission 
 from the proper judge. The husband can- 
 not be required to give security upon his 
 receiving the dowry, unless he is bound to 
 do so according to the terms of the marriage 
 contract. 
 
 A wife may, with the consent of her hus- 
 band, or, upon his refusal, with the authori- 
 zation of the judge, give her dotal effects 
 for the establishment of the children she may 
 have by a former marriage, but if her only 
 authority is her permission obtained from 
 the judge she is required to reserve the en- 
 joyment of the property to her husband dur- 
 ing his lifetime. With her husband's con- 
 sent, the wife may make such a settlement 
 on their common children. 
 
 If immovable effects have been settled as 
 dowry, they may be alienated with the con-
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 155 
 
 sent of the wife, if such an alienation has been 
 allowed by the terms of the marriage con- 
 tract, but the value of such immovables must 
 be reinvested in other forms of immovable 
 property. The wife may also mortgage her 
 dotal property. 
 
 If a dowry is in danger of being lost, the 
 wife may sue for a separation of property. 
 If any of the immovables the ownership of 
 which is vested in the wife have been de- 
 stroyed or have grown less valuable by use, 
 and this without any neglect on the part of 
 the husband, he is bound to restore at the 
 dissolution of the marriage only such as may 
 remain; nevertheless, the wife may on the 
 dissolution of the marriage take back her 
 linen, clothing, and jewels in her actual use. 
 If the dowry includes bonds or credits which 
 could not be recovered owing to the insol- 
 vency of the debtors or otherwise, but not 
 owing to the fault or neglect of the husband, 
 he is not answerable at a dissolution of the 
 marriage for the condition of the dowry, but 
 is bound only to restore the instruments or 
 vouchers upon which the credits are founded. 
 If a dowry consists of a usufruct, the hus- 
 band or his heirs, at the time of the dissolu- 
 tion of the marriage, are required only to 
 return the right of usufruct, and not the 
 profits which accrued during the marriage. 
 Where there are herds or flocks as part of a
 
 156 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 dowry, not valued in the marriage contract 
 or valued with a declaration that the esti- 
 mated ^'alue does not deprive the wife of her 
 property in the same, the husband is bound 
 only to deliver such proportion of the in- 
 crease or young proceeding from such flocks 
 and herds during the period of the marriage 
 as shall be necessary to complete the whole 
 number of head of cattle that he originally 
 received. 
 
 If the marriage is dissolved by the death 
 of the wife, the interests and profits of the 
 dowry go to the benefit of her heirs from the 
 day of her death. If, however, the marriage 
 is dissolved by the death of the husband, the 
 wife has her choice either to claim the in- 
 terests of her dowry during the year of 
 mourning or to claim a maintenance, to be 
 taken out of the succession of her husband. 
 But in both cases the wife has the right dur- 
 ing the year of mourning to be supplied with 
 a home and with mourning clothes out of 
 the succession, which charges must not be 
 deducted out of the interests due to her. 
 
 A wife has a legal mortgage on the un- 
 movable property, and a privilege on the 
 movable propert}^ of her husband, first, for 
 the restitution of her dowry, as well as for 
 the replacing of her dotal effects which she 
 brought at the time of her marriage, and 
 which were alienated by her husband; sec-
 
 A MARRIED WOMAN'S ESTATE 157 
 
 ond, for the restitution or the replacing of the 
 dotal effects which she acquired during the 
 marriage, either by succession or by do- 
 nation. 
 
 During the marriage the husband may, 
 with the consent of the wife, if she be of 
 age, be authorized by the judge, with the ad- 
 vice of five of the nearest relatives of the 
 wife, or friends, for want of relations, to 
 mortgage, specially for the preservation of 
 his wife's rights, the immovable property 
 which he shall designate, and in that event 
 the surplus of his property is free from any 
 legal mortgage in favor of his wife. If the 
 wife be a minor, the judge may still grant 
 this permission, provided that it has the as- 
 sent of a family meeting and of a curator 
 ad hoc appointed to the wife. 
 
 If a wife has not brought any dowry, or 
 when what she has brought as a dowry is 
 very inconsiderable in respect to the condi- 
 tion of the husband, if either the husband 
 or the wife die rich, leaving the survivor in 
 need, the latter has the right to take out of 
 the succession of the deceased what is called 
 the marital portion— ihsii is, a fourth of the 
 succession in full property— if there be no 
 children, and the same proportion in usu- 
 fruct only when there are but three or a 
 smaller number of children; and if there 
 be more than three children, the survivor,
 
 158 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 whether husband or wife, shall receive only 
 a child's share in usufruct, and he is re- 
 quired to include in this portion what has 
 been left to him as a legacy by the husband 
 or wife who died first.
 
 THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF 
 MARRIED WOMEN 
 
 ALABAMA 
 
 IN the State of Alabama the right of a 
 married woman in the estate of her hus- 
 band is that of dower only. If there are no 
 lineal descendants, and the estate is solvent, 
 the dower interest is one half of the real es- 
 tate during the life of the widow, but if the 
 estate is insolvent then one third only. If 
 there are lineal descendants, then the dower 
 right is one third, whether the estate is sol- 
 vent or not. If a husband dies intestate his 
 widow, if there are no children, is entitled 
 to all of his personal estate; if there is but 
 one child, she is entitled to one half ; if there 
 are more than one child and not more than 
 four children, then the widow is entitled to 
 one child's portion; and if there are more 
 than four children, then she is entitled to 
 one fifth. 
 
 If any woman having a separate estate sur- 
 vive the husband, and such separate estate, 
 exclusive of the rents, incomes, and profits, is 
 equal to or greater in value than her dower 
 
 159
 
 160 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 interest and distributive share in her hus- 
 band's estate, estimating her dower interest 
 in his lands at seven years' rent, she shall 
 be entitled to dower in or a distributive share 
 of her husband's estate. If her separate es- 
 tate be less in value than her dower, so much 
 must be allowed her as with her separate 
 estate would be equal to her dower and dis- 
 tributive share in her husband 's estate if she 
 had no separate estate. If a wife dies intes- 
 tate, her husband is entitled to one half of 
 the personal property of her separate estate 
 absolutely, and to the use of the real prop- 
 erty during his life, unless he has been legally 
 divested of all control over it by a decree of 
 a court of chancery. 
 
 ARIZONA 
 
 Both the rights of dower and of curtesy 
 have been abolished by territorial legislation, 
 but Congress in 1887 passed a law, operative 
 in all of the Territories, giving dower to a 
 widow. If either the husband or the wife 
 dies intestate, leaving descendants of the sep- 
 arate property of either, the survivor has one 
 third of the personal property and one third 
 for life of the real property. If there are 
 no descendants, the survivor has all of the 
 personal estate and one half of the real estate 
 for life : and if there are neither descendants
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 161 
 
 nor a father or mother of the decedent, the 
 survivor takes the whole of the estate. The 
 community estate goes complete to the sur- 
 vivor if there are no descendants ; otherwise, 
 one half of such property goes to the sur- 
 vivor, charged, however, in either case with 
 the community debts. 
 
 The code of 1887 (Section 1099) reads: 
 ''If the widow has a maintenance, derived 
 from her own property, equal to the portion 
 set apart to her by the preceding sections of 
 this article (two thousand dollars), the whole 
 of the property so set apart other than her 
 half of the homestead must go to the minor 
 children. " If a homestead was selected from 
 the community property it vests absolutely 
 in the survivor. If, however, it was selected 
 from the separate property of either, it rests 
 in that one or his heirs. A homestead can- 
 not exceed five thousand dollars in value. 
 
 ARKANSAS 
 
 In this state both of the rights of dower and 
 curtesy exist, but curtesy only if the wife 
 dies intestate and there has been issue of the 
 marriage born alive. If there are children 
 the wife is entitled to one third of the real 
 property for her life and one third of the 
 personal property absolutely. If there are 
 no children living, the widow is invested in 
 11
 
 162 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 fee simple of one half of the real estate where 
 it is a new acquisition and not an estate of 
 inheritance, and one half of the personal es- 
 tate absolutely as against the collateral heirs ; 
 but as against creditors, she shall be endowed 
 of one third of the real estate in fee simple, 
 if a new acquisition and not ancestral, and 
 one third of the personal property absolutely. 
 Provided, however, if the real estate of the 
 husband is an ancestral estate, the widow 
 shall be endowed of a life estate of one half 
 of such estate as against collateral heirs, and 
 one third as against creditors. If either the 
 husband or the wife dies intestate and there 
 are no descendants, father, mother, nor their 
 descendants, nor any paternal or maternal 
 kindred capable of inheriting, the whole es- 
 tate goes to the surviving wife or husband 
 both as to real and personal property. 
 
 CALIFOENIA 
 
 In this State neither the right of curtesy nor 
 dower obtains. If the decedent leaves a sur- 
 viving wife or husband and only one child, 
 or the lawful issue of one child, the separate 
 estate goes in equal shares to the surviving 
 wife or husband and the child, or the issue of 
 such child. If tliere is a surviving wife or 
 husband and more than one child living, or 
 one child living and the lawful issue of one
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 168 
 
 or more deceased children, then one third of 
 the separate estate goes to the surviving wife 
 or husband. 
 
 If there is a surviving wife or husband, 
 but neither issue, father, mother, brother, 
 nor sister, the whole of the estate goes to 
 the surviving wife or husband. Upon the 
 death of the wife all of the community prop- 
 erty, without administration, goes to the hus- 
 band, except such a part as may have been 
 set aside for her support by a judicial de- 
 cree, which part is subject to testamentary 
 disposition or passes on to her heirs, exclu- 
 sive of her husband, if she leaves no will. 
 Upon the death of the husband, one half of 
 all the community property goes to the wife, 
 subject to one half of the debts. 
 
 COLOBADO 
 
 In this State neither the right of curtesy nor 
 of dower obtains. The surviving husband or 
 wife, if there are children or the descen- 
 dants of children living, receives, subject to 
 the payment of debts, one half of the entire 
 estate, both real and personal. If there is no 
 child nor the descendants of any child liv- 
 ing, the entii-e estate goes to the survivor. A 
 homestead in value not exceeding two thou- 
 sand dollars may be retained by the surviv- 
 ing husband or wife or the minor children.
 
 164 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 CONNECTICUT 
 
 To a woman married before the twentieth 
 day of April, 1877, who with her husband 
 has not accepted the conditions of the Con- 
 necticut law of the date mentioned, there be- 
 longs the common-law right of dower— that 
 is, a life interest in one third of the real 
 property of which her husband died pos- 
 sessed, and one third absolutely of the per- 
 sonal estate if there is no issue living, other- 
 wise one half. The husband, under the same 
 conditions, can claim as a tenant by curtesy 
 the whole of the wife's personal estate, and 
 if she dies intestate the use for his life of her 
 real estate. 
 
 By the provisions of the law of June 22, 
 1895, the interest of the surviving husband 
 or wife in the estate of the other is the same 
 —namely, if there is no will, one third abso- 
 lutely of the whole estate, and if there are no 
 children or their representatives, all of the 
 estate of the decedent absolutely to the ex- 
 tent of two thousand dollars and one half 
 absolutely of the remainder of such estate. 
 
 DELAWARE 
 
 The rights both of dower and curtesy exist 
 in this State. If there is a child or the lawful 
 issue of a child living, the widow has a life
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 1G5 
 
 interest in one tliird of tlie real estate and 
 one tliird absolutely of the personal prop- 
 erty. If there is no child nor the descendants 
 of any child living, the widow has a life in- 
 terest in one half of the real estate and one 
 half absolutely of the personal estate. If 
 there are neither descendants nor kin— bro- 
 thers, sisters, their descendants, father, and 
 mother— the widow has the entire real estate 
 for her life and the personal estate abso- 
 lutely. If a child of the marriage was born 
 alive, whether living or dead at the death of 
 the wife, the husband surviving, as tenant 
 by the curtesy, has her entire real estate dur- 
 ing his life, and the whole of her personal 
 estate absolutely, subject to all legal claims. 
 If there has not been a child born alive, the 
 husband has a life interest in one half of her 
 real estate, but the whole of the personal 
 estate also. 
 
 THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 In the District both dower and curtesy ob- 
 tain. The dower of the widow is one third 
 of the real estate for her life and one third 
 of the personal property absolutely if there 
 is a child or if there are any descendants 
 living. If there is no issue nor the descen- 
 dants of any, but father, mother, brother, sis- 
 ter, or the descendants of any, the widow re-
 
 1G6 WOMAN AND THE LAW ' 
 
 ceives one half of the personal estate. If 
 there are none of these, the widow may have 
 all the personal estate and all of the real 
 estate if there is no kindred. 
 
 FLORIDA 
 
 In this State dower only obtains. The law 
 is that if a husband dies intestate or the will 
 makes no provision for his widow, or a pro- 
 vision that is not satisfactory to her, she may 
 have dower in one third of the real estate 
 for her life, and if there are no children, or 
 but one child, the widow may have one half 
 of the personal estate absolutely and free 
 from liability for the debts of the husband. 
 If there are no children and the husband dies 
 intestate, the wife may take the whole estate 
 or dower, at her election. If a wife dies in- 
 testate and the lms})and but no descendants 
 survives her, the whole of her estate goes to 
 the husband; but if there are children or 
 their descendants, the estate, both real and 
 personal, descends in distribution to them. 
 
 GEORGIA 
 
 In the State of Georgia the right of dower 
 obtains, but not that of curtesy. If a hus- 
 band dies intestate, leaving a wife and issue 
 also, the wife may elect to take dower— that
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 167 
 
 is, a life interest in one third of the real 
 estate— or she may elect to take a child's 
 share of the whole estate absolutely, unless 
 the shares exceed ti^^e in number, in which 
 case she is entitled to one fifth of the estate. 
 If there are no lineal descendants and the 
 wife dies intestate, the husband is the sole 
 heir. If there is a surviving child or chil- 
 dren, or the descendants of any child, the 
 husband and the children have equal shares 
 of the estate. 
 
 IDAHO 
 
 In this State neither the right of dower nor 
 of curtesy obtains. If either the wife or the 
 husband dies intestate, the surviving hus- 
 band or wife has one half of the separate 
 estate of the other if there is but one child 
 or the lawful issue of one child living. If 
 there be more than one child living, and the 
 lawful issue of one or more deceased chil- 
 dren, the surviving wife or husband receives 
 one third of such an estate. If the decedent 
 leaves a surviving wife or husband but nei- 
 ther issue, father, mother, brother, nor sister, 
 the whole of the estate goes to the survivor. 
 Upon the death of the wife the entire com- 
 munity property belongs to the husband, 
 without an administration, except any por- 
 tion that a judicial decree may have set apart 
 for the wife 's maintenance, and which, in the
 
 168 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 absence of any will made by her, descends 
 to ber heirs, exclusive of her husband. Upon 
 the death of the husband, one half of the com- 
 jnunity property goes to the wife, while the 
 other half is subject to his testamentary dis- 
 position, or, in the absence of such disposi- 
 tion, goes equally to his descendants. If, 
 however, the husband leaves neither a will 
 nor descendants, this portion of the commu- 
 nity property is subject to distribution in the 
 same manner as his separate estate. 
 
 ILLINOIS 
 
 In the State of Illinois the right of curtesy 
 was abolished by the law of July 1, 1874. 
 A surviving wife or husband is endowed of 
 a third part of all the real estate of which the 
 other dies possessed. If a wife or husband 
 dies intestate, leaving a surviving child or 
 children, or descendants of such a child or 
 children, the surviving wife or husband re- 
 ceives, in addition, one third of the personal 
 estate absolutely. If, however, there are no 
 lineal descendants, the widow or widower re- 
 ceives absolutely one half of the real estate 
 and the whole of the personal estate. If 
 tliere are no descendants and no kindred, the 
 whole estate goes to the surviving widow or 
 widower.
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 169 
 
 INDIANA 
 
 The rights of both dower and curtesy have 
 been abolished in this State. If a husband 
 die, either testate or intestate, and leaves a 
 widow, one third of his real estate descends 
 to her in fee simple, free from all the claims 
 of creditors— provided, however, that where 
 such real estate exceeds in value ten thou- 
 sand dollars the widow is entitled to a one- 
 fourth part only, and where such real estate 
 exceeds in value twenty thousand dollars the 
 widow is entitled to a one-fifth part only as 
 against creditors. If a husband dies intes- 
 tate and leaves a widow and one child, the 
 real estate is divided equally between them 
 and the personal estate is divided equally if 
 there are not more than two children. If, 
 however, there are more than two children, 
 the widow is still entitled to one third of the 
 personal estate. 
 
 If there are children to a man living by a 
 former marriage, and none by a subsequent 
 marriage, the wife in the last marriage re- 
 ceives only a life interest in her share of her 
 husband's estate. 
 
 If a wife die, either testate or intestate, 
 leaving a husband, one third of her real prop- 
 erty descends to him, subject to its propor- 
 tion of her debts contracted before marriage,
 
 170 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 and also one third of her personal estate. 
 If either a husband or a wife die intestate, 
 leaving no child, but a father or a mother, or 
 both, then three fourths of the entire estate 
 goes to the widow or widower, unless it does 
 not exceed one thousand dollars in value, in 
 which case it all goes to the widow or wid- 
 ower. If there are neither children, father, or 
 mother, the entire estate goes in the same 
 way. If a will has been made, either the wife 
 or the husband may elect to take under the 
 will or under the statute, the election to be 
 made within ninety days after the will has 
 been admitted to probate. 
 
 IOWA 
 
 Both of the rights of dower and curtesy have 
 been abolished in this State. The surviving 
 wife or husband is entitled to a one third 
 part in fee simple of both the real and per- 
 sonal estate of the other at her or his death. 
 If either the wife or the husband die intes- 
 tate, leaving no children, one half of the es- 
 tate goes to the survivor and the remainder 
 to her or his parents, one or both ; or if such 
 persons are both dead, then to their descen- 
 dants. If there are no such descendants, the 
 whole estate goes to the surviving wife or 
 husband. If there have been more than one 
 wife or husband, the one-half portion is di-
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 171 
 
 vided equally between the wife or husband 
 living and the heirs of those who are dead. 
 Both the personal and real property follow 
 the same rules. 
 
 KANSAS 
 
 In the year 1868 the rights both of dower and 
 curtesy were abolished in the State of Kan- 
 sas. If either a husband or a wife dies intes- 
 tate, one half of both the real and the per- 
 sonal estate goes to the survivor ; if there is no 
 issue living, the whole goes to the survivor. 
 
 A homestead of one hundred and sixty 
 acres of fann land or a parcel of land one 
 acre in extent within town or city limits may 
 be reserved, free from debts, for the occu- 
 pancy of the survivor. If a widow marries 
 again or when all of the children have at- 
 tained their majority the homestead may be 
 divided, one half passing to the widow and 
 the remainder to the children. If a wife dies 
 before her husband, he has a right of occu- 
 pancy^, but such a right descends to her heirs. 
 
 Neither a wife nor a husband can will more 
 than one half of her or his property away 
 from the other without the other's consent. 
 
 KENTUCKY 
 
 By an act that became law on March 15, 1894, 
 the interest of a surviving husband or wife
 
 172 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 in the estate of the other is made the same— 
 that is, a one-third life interest in tlie real 
 estate, if such a right has not been barred, 
 forfeited, or extinguished, and an absolute 
 right in one half of the personal estate in 
 excess of the amount of debts. If a husband 
 or a wife dies intestate, and leaves neither 
 descendants or kindred, the whole of the es- 
 tate goes to the surviving wife or husband. 
 If either a husband or a wife dies intestate 
 and without descendants that are living, any 
 real estate that was a gift from either the 
 descendant's parents returns by law to that 
 parent, if living. 
 
 LOUISIANA 
 
 In the State of Louisiana there is neither of 
 the rights of curtesy or of dower. The law 
 provides that at the death of either a husband 
 or a wife the survivor is entitled to one half 
 of all the community property absolutely. If 
 there are no descendants or ascendants, the 
 survivor has also a life interest in the other 
 half. If living issue are left the law gives 
 to the survivor tenant for life "so much of 
 the share of the deceased in such commu- 
 nity property as may be inherited by such 
 issue, until a second marriage is contracted." 
 If a widow or a widower marries again, 
 having children, she or he can give to such
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 173 
 
 wife or husband either by will or by gift 
 during life only one third of her or his prop- 
 erty. If a wife brings no dowry, or one that 
 is inconsiderable in respect to the condition 
 of the husband, if either the husband or the 
 wife die rich, leaving the survivor in need, 
 the latter has a right to receive out of the 
 succession of the deceased what is called 
 "the marital portion"— that is, one fourth of 
 the succession in full property if there are 
 no children, and the same portion when there 
 are three or a smaller number of children. 
 If there are more than three children, the 
 husband or wife receives only a child's 
 share, including any legacy left by the de- 
 cedent. 
 
 The separate property of the husband or 
 wife in the care of the husband is also di- 
 vided equall}^, like the community property 
 on the dissolution of the marriage by death. 
 If a husband dies poor, the widow takes pre- 
 cedence over all creditors to the amount of 
 one thousand dollars. A wife may renounce 
 the partnership, and thus free herself of the 
 community debts, but if she takes such action 
 she forfeits her share of such property, and 
 receives instead her dotal and extradotal 
 effects. A wife may petition for a sepa- 
 rate management of her dowry if such ac- 
 tion is considered necessary to ensure its 
 safety.
 
 174 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 MAINE 
 
 By a law of March 26, 1895, the rights of 
 dower and curtesy were abolished in this 
 State. The interest of the husband or wife 
 in the real estate of the other, dying in- 
 testate, is made the same; if there is issue 
 of the marriage living, one third when there 
 is no such issue, then one half; if there is 
 neither issue nor kindred, then the whole of 
 the real estate. The same provisions of law 
 hold regarding the personal estate of each. 
 Both a wife and a husband have the right to 
 claim their statutory share in the estate of 
 the other in preference to any provision that 
 may have been made by a will, provided that 
 such an election is made within a period of 
 six months. 
 
 MARYLAND 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and cur- 
 tesy both obtain. If a husband dies intestate 
 his widow has a life interest in one third of 
 his real estate, unless there are neither de- 
 scendants nor kindred, in which case the 
 widow comes into possession of the entire 
 estate. If there are descendants, the widow 
 is entitled to one third of the personal estate. 
 If, however, there are no descendants but 
 father, mother, brother, or sister of the dece- 
 dent, or any descendants of such brother or
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 175 
 
 sister, the widow is entitled to a portion of 
 one half of the personal property. If there 
 are none of these heirs, a widow is entitled 
 to all of the personal estate. 
 
 If a wife dies intestate, her husband has 
 a life estate in all of her propert}^ and if 
 she leaves no children he has a life estate in 
 the real and personal property. 
 
 MASSACHUSET^TS 
 
 By the law of Massachusetts the rights of 
 dower and curtesy both obtain. If a husband 
 dies intestate and there is no issue living, the 
 widow receives for her life one third of the 
 personal estate. If there is no living issue 
 of the marriage, a widow is entitled to the 
 real estate of her husband absolutely to an 
 amount npt exceeding five thousand dollars 
 in value and to a life interest in one half of 
 the remainder of his real estate, or, at her 
 election, a life interest and, in accordance 
 with the legal requirements, her dower in her 
 husband's real estate other than that taken 
 by her in fee. 
 
 A widow is entitled to all of the personal 
 estate up to the amount of five thousand dol- 
 lars in value, and to one half of the excess 
 of the residue above ten thousand dollars. 
 If there are no kindred of the husband, the 
 widow takes the whole of his real estate in
 
 176 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 fee. If a wife dies witliout leaving a will, 
 and there has been issue of the marriage born 
 alive, the widower has a life estate in her real 
 property. If there has been no issue of the 
 marriage, the widower has an interest for his 
 life in one half of his wife's real estate. If 
 a wife leaves no issue living, the husband 
 takes her real estate absolutely to an amount 
 not exceeding five thousand dollars in value 
 and a life interest in the residue of her real 
 estate. If a wife leaves no kindred, the hus- 
 band takes all of her real estate absolutely. 
 In any case, if a wife dies intestate the hus- 
 band takes all of her personal estate. 
 
 MICHIGAN 
 
 The right of dower obtains in this State, but 
 not that of curtesy. Such dower is a life in- 
 terest in one third of the real estate of the 
 husband. In case there is no issue of the 
 marriage and either the husband or the 
 wife dies intestate, one half of the real es- 
 tate goes to the survivor. If there are no 
 issue of the marriage, nor father, mother, 
 brothers, sisters, or the children of bro- 
 thers or sisters, all of the estate goes to the 
 survivor. 
 
 If a husband dies intestate, one third of his 
 personal property goes to the widow, unless
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 177 
 
 if there is but one child or the issue of one 
 child living, in which case the widow receives 
 one half of such property. If there is no 
 child living, or only the issue of a deceased 
 child, and the personal estate, after the pay- 
 ment of debts, does not exceed one thousand 
 dollars, such estate goes entirely to the 
 widow. If such jjersonal estate exceeds the 
 sum of one thousand dollars, such an excess 
 is to be distributed, one half to the widow 
 and the other half to the father of the de- 
 ceased, if living; otherwise, equally to the 
 mother, brothers, sisters, and the issue of any 
 deceased brother or sister. If there are none 
 of these persons, the widow takes all such 
 property. 
 
 If a wife dies intestate, one third of her 
 personal estate goes to her husband if there 
 are children living. If there is but one child, 
 or the issue of one child deceased, surviving 
 her, the husband has one half of the personal 
 estate. If there is no child or the issue of a 
 deceased child surviving her, one half of such 
 an estate goes to the husband and one half to 
 her father, if living. If her father is not liv- 
 ing, then the one half goes equally to her 
 mother, brothers, sisters, and any children of 
 brothers and sisters deceased. If there are 
 none of these persons, then all of such estate 
 goes to the husband. 
 
 12
 
 178 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 MINNESOTA 
 
 By a law that went in effect on the 9th of 
 March, 1875, the rights of dower and curtesy 
 were both abolished. If either husband or 
 wife dies intestate, the survivor, if there is 
 issue of the marriage living, is entitled to 
 the homestead for the period of her life and 
 one third of the residue of the real estate in 
 fee simple, or by such inferior tenure as the 
 deceased was possessed of, but subject to its 
 just proportion of the debts. If there are 
 no descendants, the entire estate goes abso- 
 lutely to the survivor. A personal estate fol- 
 lows the same rules. 
 
 If either the husband or the wife has wil- 
 fully and without a just cause deserted and 
 lived separately from the other for the entire 
 year next prior to his or her decease, the sur- 
 vivor is not entitled to any estate whatever 
 in any of the lands of the deceased. 
 
 MISSISSIPPI 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy have been 
 abolished in this State. If either the hus- 
 band or the wife dies intestate, without leav- 
 ing children or the descendants of any chil- 
 dren, the entire estate, both real and personal, 
 goes to the survivor. But if there are one or 
 more children or descendants by this or a
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 179 
 
 former marriage, the sur^dving wife or hus- 
 band has the share of a child in both the real 
 and the personal estate. 
 
 MISSOURI 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy both obtain 
 in this State. If there are any descendants 
 living, the dower of a widow is one third of 
 the real estate and the share of a child in the 
 personal estate. If there are no descendants, 
 a widow is entitled to all of the real and per- 
 sonal estate which came to her husband in 
 right of the marriage, and also to all of the 
 undisposed of personal property which by 
 her written consent came into her husband's 
 possession, not subject to the payment of her 
 husband's debts. The wife is also entitled 
 to one half of the real and personal estate of 
 her husband absolutely, and subject to his 
 debts. If there are any descendants by a for- 
 mer marriage, a widow may elect, in lieu of 
 dower, to take in addition to her real estate 
 the personal property in the possession of 
 her husband that came to him in right of the 
 wife by means of the marriage or by her con- 
 sent, subject to her husband's debts. 
 
 If there are no descendants living, the 
 widow may elect to take one third of his real 
 estate for her life, free from liability for his 
 debts, or according to the provisions men-
 
 180 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 tioned if there are no descendants. If there 
 are descendants living, the widow, in lieu of 
 her one-third portion for life, may elect to 
 take the share of a child absolutely, subject 
 to the payment of any debts. If any person 
 dies intestate, leaving neither descendants, 
 father, mother, brothers, sisters, or the de- 
 scendants of brothers or sisters, the entire 
 estate, both real and personal, goes to the 
 surviving husband or wife. A homestead 
 may be reserved for a widow. If a wife dies 
 leaving no descendants, her spouse is entitled 
 to one half of both real and personal estate 
 absolutely, subject to her debts. 
 
 MONTANA 
 
 In this State the right of dower has been 
 retained, but that of curtesy has been abol- 
 ished. The claims of the husband and the 
 wife in the estate of the other are equal. If 
 there is but one child, or the lawful issue of 
 one child, the surviving husband or wife re- 
 ceives one half of the entire estate, both real 
 and personal. If there is more than one 
 child, or one child and the lawful issue of 
 one or more deceased children, the husband 
 or wife receives one third of such estate. If 
 there is no issue living, the surviving hus- 
 band or wife receives one half of the estate, 
 unless there is neither father, mother, bro-
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 181 
 
 ther, sister, or their descendants, in which 
 case the h-usband or wile takes all of the 
 property. 
 
 By an act of March 6, 1891, the provision 
 that "a married woman may be an execu- 
 trix, administratrix, guardian, or trustee, 
 and bind herself and the estate she repre- 
 sents without any act of assent on the part 
 of her husband, ' ' was repealed. 
 
 NEBEASKA 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy both obtain 
 in this State. A widow is entitled to the use 
 for life of one third of the real estate, and 
 in case the husband dies intestate, after the 
 payment of all debts, charges, etc., to the 
 same share of the personal estate that a child 
 receives. If there is no issue living, a widow 
 takes the use for her life of the entire estate, 
 both real and personal. If there is no kin- 
 dred of the husband, the widow comes into 
 possession of the real estate absolutely. If 
 a wife dies, leaving no issue, the husband has 
 the use of her real estate during his lifetime. 
 If, however, a wife leaves issue by a former 
 husband, such issue are entitled to so much 
 of the estate as did not come to her as a gift 
 from her surviving husband. If a wife 
 leaves issue by the surviving husband only, 
 or by both former and surviving husbands.
 
 182 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 then the surviving husband has a life inter- 
 est in one third of the real estate of his de- 
 ceased wife. If a wife dies intestate, after 
 the payment of her debts her personal estate 
 is distributed in the same way as her real 
 estate. 
 
 NEVADA 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy have both 
 been abolished in this State. At the death of 
 a husband one half of the community prop- 
 erty goes to the wife. If the husband dies 
 intestate and leaves no issue, all of the com- 
 munity property goes to the wife, and with- 
 out an administration if she secures the pay- 
 ment of all debts to the satisfaction of the 
 creditors. 
 
 If either the husband or the wife dies in- 
 testate as to their separate estate, and there 
 is one child or the lawful issue of one child 
 living, the surviving wife or husband re- 
 ceives one half of the estate. If there is 
 more than one child living, or one living 
 and the lawful issue of one or more de- 
 ceased children, the survivor takes a third. 
 If there is no issue living, the survivor takes 
 a one-half portion, providing that there is 
 either father, mother, brother, or sister of 
 the decedent living. If there are no such 
 persons living, the surviving wife or hus- 
 band is entitled to the whole estate.
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 183 
 
 The community property is under the con- 
 trol of the husband, and upon the death of 
 the wife belongs to him without an adminis- 
 tration, unless he has abandoned his wife 
 without such a cause as would secure for him 
 a divorce, in which case a half of the commu- 
 nity property is at her disposal by testament, 
 or, in the absence of such disposition, de- 
 scends to her heirs, exclusive of her husband. 
 
 In order that a wife's separate property 
 may not be claimed as a part of the com- 
 munity property it must be kept inventoried 
 and recorded according to law. An interest 
 for life in a homestead not exceeding five 
 thousand dollars in value may be detained 
 by a surviving husband or wife in addition. 
 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and curtesy 
 both obtain. The widow of a man who dies 
 either testate or intestate, by waiving any 
 provision of his will that may be in her 
 favor, is entitled, in addition to her dower 
 and homestead rights, to a portion of his per- 
 sonal estate remaining after the payment of 
 his debts and the expenses of administration, 
 and to one-third part of the real estate if the 
 husband leaves issue by her surviving him, 
 and to all of such estate if he leaves no issue 
 surviving him.
 
 184 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 A liusband of a wife dying either testate 
 or intestate, by waiving any provision of a 
 will in liis favor, is entitled, in addition to his 
 estate by the curtesy and his homestead right, 
 if any, to one-third part of his wife's personal 
 estate remaining after the payment of debts 
 and the expenses of administration if the 
 wife leaves issue surviving her, and to one 
 half of such estate if the wife leaves no issue 
 surviving her. 
 
 If a husband waives the provisions of his 
 wife's will, and foregoes his estate by the 
 curtesy and his homestead right, if any, he 
 is entitled in lieu thereof, after the payment 
 of debts and the expenses of administration, 
 to a one-third part to possess in fee if the 
 wife leaves issue by him surviving her, also 
 a one-third part to hold during his life if the 
 wife leaves issue surviving her but not by 
 him, and if he has no estate by the curtesy 
 in the real estate, then one half to hold in fee 
 if the wife leaves issue surviving her. Such 
 a waiver must in all cases be made in writ- 
 ing and filed in probate office within one year 
 of the decease of the husband or wife. 
 
 NEW JERSEY 
 
 Both dower and curtesy obtain in this State. 
 If either a husband or a wife dies intestate, 
 and there are neither descendants nor kin- 
 dred, the entire estate goes in fee simple to
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 185 
 
 the survivor. If there are children, a widow 
 has one third of the personal estate, and also 
 a life interest in one third of the real estate. 
 If there are no children, the widow is entitled 
 to a one-third portion of the x^ersonal estate. 
 
 THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO 
 
 In this Territory the right of curtesy still 
 obtains. One half of the community prop- 
 erty goes to the wife whether the husband 
 dies testate or intestate. In addition to such 
 a right, a widow is entitled to a one-fourth 
 part of the remainder of the estate of her 
 husband, ' ' provided this deduction shall only 
 be made when said property amounts to five 
 thousand dollars and the heirs be not descen- 
 dants, although it may exceed this sum in 
 the absence of the latter. Also from the 
 property of the wife the fourth shall be de- 
 ducted as the marital right of the husband, 
 and upon the same conditions, should the 
 husband without this aid remain poor." If 
 there are no legitimate children surviving, a 
 widow or widower is heir to all the acquired 
 property of the marriage community. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and curtesy 
 obtain, A widow receives one third of the 
 real estate of her husband for her life, and.
 
 186 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 after the payment of debts, one third of the 
 personal estate, unless there are no descen- 
 dants, in which ease she is entitled to one 
 half of the personal estate if her husband 
 died intestate. If there are neither descen- 
 dants, parent, brother, sister, nephew, or 
 niece, the wife has the whole of the personal 
 estate; but if there is a brother, sister, ne- 
 phew or niece, the widow is entitled to one 
 half of the personal estate, and to the whole 
 of the residue if it does not exceed two thou- 
 sand dollars. If the residue exceeds in value 
 that amount, the widow is entitled to receive 
 two thousand dollars in addition to one 
 half. 
 
 The husband is entitled to the same dis- 
 tributive share in the personal property of 
 his wife as she has in his property. 
 
 NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 In this State both dower and curtesy exist. 
 If there are neither descendants nor kindred, 
 the widow is heir to the entire estate. In 
 case there are not more than two children, 
 and the husband dies without leaving a will, 
 one third of the personal estate goes to the 
 widow. If there are more than two children, 
 the widow shares equally with them. If 
 there is no child nor a legal re]3resentative 
 of a deceased child, one half of the estate
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED M^OMEN 187 
 
 goes to the widow and the other half goes to 
 the kindred of the deceased. 
 
 If a wife dies intestate, her husband has a 
 life estate in her real property if there was 
 issue born alive, and all of her personal es- 
 tate, subject to the payment of her debts. 
 
 NORTH DAKOTA 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy have been 
 abolished in this State. If either a husband 
 or a wife dies intestate, leaving only one 
 child or the lawful issue of one child, the sur- 
 viving wife or husband is entitled to one half 
 of both the real and personal estate. If there 
 is more than one child living, or one child 
 and the lawful issue of one or more children, 
 the survivor receives one third of the estate. 
 If there is no issue living, the survivor re- 
 ceives one half of the estate; and in case 
 there is no issue living, and neither father, 
 mother, brother, nor sister, the whole of the 
 estate goes to the survivor. The survivor is 
 also entitled to retain a homestead. 
 
 OHIO 
 
 In this State the right of dower obtains, but 
 the right of curtesy has been abolished, ex- 
 cept in the case of a man married before the
 
 188 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 year 1887 and in respect to property owned 
 by his wife before that date. Other than in 
 such a case, either a husband or a wife, on 
 the death of the other, is entitled to one third 
 of the real estate for life. If either the hus- 
 band or the wife dies intestate and there are 
 no children nor their legal representatives 
 living, the real estate should all pass to the 
 survivor. If either dies intestate and there 
 are no children, the widow or the widower is 
 entitled to all of the personal property, sub- 
 ject to the payment of debts. If there are 
 children or their legal representatives, the 
 widow or widower is entitled to one half of 
 the first four hundred dollars and to one 
 third of the remainder in distribution. There 
 may be reserved also for a widow an amount 
 not exceeding one thousand dollars' value. 
 
 By a law of June 30, 1899, a married 
 woman may be an executrix or an adminis- 
 tratrix, and by a law of April 18, 1893, a mar- 
 ried woman may be a guardian. 
 
 OKLAHOMA TERRITORY 
 
 The rights of dower and of curtesy have 
 been abolished in this Territory. If either a 
 husband or a wife dies without leaving a 
 will, and leaving only one child or the lawful 
 issue of one child, the survivor is entitled to 
 one half of both the real and personal prop-
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 189 
 
 erty. If there are two or more children, or 
 one child and the descendants of one or more 
 deceased children, the widow or widower re- 
 ceives one third of the estate. If there is no 
 issue living, the survivor receives one half of 
 the estate, and if there is neither issue, fa- 
 ther, mother, brother, or sister, the survivor 
 is entitled to all of the estate. 
 
 The survivor is also entitled to occupy a 
 homestead until the same is otherwise dis- 
 posed of according to law. 
 
 OEEGON 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and of cur- 
 tesy obtain, and curtesy is not made condi- 
 tional upon the birth of a living child. If 
 either a husband or a wife dies intestate, and 
 there are no descendants living, the real es- 
 tate descends to the survivor. If there is 
 issue living, the widow is entitled to one half 
 of the real estate and to one half of the per- 
 sonal estate. If there is no issue living, the 
 widow is entitled to all of the personal prop- 
 erty in addition. A husband is entitled to 
 a life estate in all of the real property of 
 his wife, together with all of the personal 
 estate in case there are no living descen- 
 dants. If there are such descendants, then 
 the husband is entitled to one half of such 
 estate.
 
 190 WOMAN AND THE' LAW 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and curtesy 
 both obtain. If there is no issue living, a 
 widow is entitled to one third of the real es- 
 tate during her life and to one third of the 
 personal ])roperty absolutely. If there is no 
 issue living, but there are collateral heirs, 
 the widow is entitled to one half of the real 
 estate, including a homestead house for her 
 lifetime and one half of the personal estate 
 absolutely. In the event of a wife dying 
 without leaving a will, the husband, whether 
 there has been issue born alive or not, is en- 
 titled to a life estate in the wife's real prop- 
 erty and to all of her personal property abso- 
 lutely. If there is neither issue nor kindred 
 and no will, a surviving husband or wife 
 takes all of the estate. 
 
 KHODE ISLAND 
 
 The rights of dower and of curtesy both ob- 
 tain in this State. A widow is entitled to a 
 one-third portion of the real estate, and also 
 to one third of the personal estate if there is 
 no issue living. In the event of there being 
 no descendants and no paternal or maternal 
 kindred, and a husband or wife dies intes- 
 tate, the wliole of the estate goes to the sur- 
 vivor. If there is no issue surviving, a
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 191 
 
 widow is entitled to one half of the personal 
 estate, and a husband is entitled to all of his 
 wife's personal estate if she dies intestate. 
 
 SOUTH CAEOLINA 
 
 In this State the right of dower obtains, but 
 not that of curtesy. If either a husband or 
 a wife dies intestate, the other has an equal 
 claim on the property. If there are one or 
 more children, the survivor is entitled to one 
 third of the real estate and of the personal 
 estate. In the event of there being no lineal 
 descendants, but collateral heirs, the sur- 
 vivor is entitled to one half of the entire es- 
 tate. If there are no lineal descendants or 
 father, mother, brother, sister, or child of 
 such brother or sister, or brother or sister of 
 the half-blood or lineal ancestor, the survivor 
 is entitled to receive two thirds of the estate, 
 while the remaining third goes to the next of 
 kin. If there are none of these persons or 
 any kin, the survivor is entitled to the whole 
 of the estate. 
 
 SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 Neither the right of dower nor of curtesy 
 obtains in this State. If either a husband or 
 a wife dies without leaving a will, and leav- 
 ing only one child or the lawful issue of one
 
 192 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 child, the estate passes in equal shares to the 
 surviving husband or wife and the child. In 
 the event of there being more than one child, 
 or one child and the lawful issue of one or 
 more deceased children, one third of the es- 
 tate goes to the surviving husband or wife. 
 If there are no children living, one half of 
 the estate goes to the husband or wife, unless 
 there is neither father, mother, brother, nor 
 sister of the decedent living, in which case 
 it all passes to the survivor. 
 
 Either husband or wife is entitled to ad- 
 minister on the estate of the other. There 
 may be reserved also, either for the husband 
 or the wife, a homestead not exceeding one 
 hundred and sixty acres in extent, or one 
 quarter of an acre in a town. 
 
 TENNESSEE 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy obtain in 
 this State. The widow of a man who dies 
 intestate is entitled to receive one third of 
 the real property, unless there are neither 
 descendants nor heirs at law, in which case 
 the widow is entitled to receive the whole es- 
 tate in fee simx)le. The widow takes of the 
 personal estate the share of a child, unless 
 there are no lineal descendants, in which case 
 she is entitled to receive it all. If a wife dies 
 intestate, the husband is entitled to a life es-
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 193 
 
 tate in her real property if there has been 
 issue born alive, and to tlie whole of her per- 
 sonal estate. 
 
 TEXAS 
 
 Neither the right of dower nor of curtesy 
 obtains in this State. If there are any lineal 
 descendants living, a surviving husband or 
 wife is entitled to a life interest in one third 
 of the real estate and to one third of the per- 
 sonal estate. If there are no lineal descen- 
 dants, the survivor is entitled to one half of 
 the real estate and to the whole of the per- 
 sonal estate. If there are neither father, 
 mother, brothers, sisters, nor their descen- 
 dants, the surviving husband or wife is en- 
 titled to the whole estate, both real and per- 
 sonal. 
 
 In addition to such provision, one half of 
 the communit^^ property passes to the widow 
 or widower if there are one or more children, 
 and the whole of such property if there are 
 no such lineal descendants living. A widow 
 is also entitled to retain a homestead not ex- 
 ceeding five thousand dollars in value, and 
 the same right is provided for a widower. If 
 either a husband or a wife dies intestate or 
 becomes insane, and there are no living de- 
 scendants, and the other party to the mar- 
 riage has no separate estate, the community 
 property passes to the survivor without an 
 
 13
 
 194 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 administration, unless there is a guardian- 
 ship by the State of the insane spouse. If, 
 however, there are descendants, the survivor 
 has the exclusive management of the com- 
 munity propert>^, provided that he or she files 
 an application for an appraisement within 
 four years of the death or the establishment 
 of the fact of the insanity. 
 
 But a woman loses the right thus to control 
 the community property if she contracts an- 
 other marriage. In the event of the insane 
 person being restored to a sound mental con- 
 dition, an accounting of such property must 
 be rendered. 
 
 UTAH 
 
 Neither the right of dower nor of curtesy 
 obtains in this State. If either a husband or 
 a wife dies intestate, and there is one child or 
 the issue of one child living, the widow or 
 widower is entitled to receive one half of 
 both the real and the personal property. If 
 there is more than one child living, or one 
 child and the issue of one or more deceased 
 children, one third of the estate goes to the 
 survivor. If there is no issue living, one 
 half of the estate goes to the survivor, unless 
 there is neither father, mother, brother, nor 
 sister living, in which case the widow or 
 widower is entitled to receive the whole of 
 the estate.
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 195 
 
 VERMONT 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy both obtain 
 in this State. If there are one or more chil- 
 dren living, a widow has an interest for her 
 life in one third of the real estate and in one 
 third of the personal estate. The husband 
 has a life use of all of the real estate if there 
 has been issue of the marriage born alive, 
 and the same share of the personal estate that 
 his wife would have had in his estate had she 
 survived him. If there is no surviving issue, 
 either the husband or the wife surviving may 
 elect to waive the right of dower or of cur- 
 tesy respectively, and in that case will be en- 
 titled to the whole of the estate absolutely if 
 it does not exceed two thousand dollars in 
 value. If the estate does exceed that sum, 
 the widow or widower is entitled to receive 
 two thousand dollars and one half of the re- 
 mainder, unless there are no kindred, in 
 which case the entire estate passes to the 
 survivor. 
 
 Married women, by a law of November 1, 
 1894, are empowered to serve as executors, 
 administrators, guardians, and trustees. 
 
 VIRGINIA 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy both obtain 
 in this State. A wife is entitled to only a
 
 196 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 life interest in one third of the real estate, 
 unless there are neither descendants nor pa- 
 ternal nor maternal kindred, in which case 
 she is entitled to receive all of the real estate. 
 Under like circumstances, a husband is en- 
 titled to receive all the real estate of his wife. 
 If there is no living issue, a widow is en- 
 titled to one third of the personal estate. If 
 there is no issue by her, a widow is entitled 
 absolutely to so much of the personal prop- 
 erty, after the payment of all debts and 
 charges, as had been acquired by the intestate 
 by virtue of his marriage with her prior to 
 the fourth day of April, 1877, and which re- 
 mains in kind at the time of his death. 
 
 A widow is also entitled, if the intestate 
 leaves issue by a former marriage, to one 
 third of the residue ; if there are no such 
 issue, then to one half of the residue. 
 
 A widower is entitled to receive all of the 
 personal estate of his intestate wife, together 
 with a use for life of her real estate if there 
 has been issue of the marriage born alive. 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy have been 
 abolished in this State. If either a husband 
 or a wife dies intestate, leaving only one 
 child or the lawful issue of one child, the
 
 PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN 197 
 
 widow or widower is entitled to one half of 
 the real estate. If there is more than one 
 child living, or one child and the lawful issue 
 of one or more children deceased, a widow or 
 widower takes one third of the real estate. 
 If there is no issue living, the widow or wid- 
 ower is entitled to one half of the real estate, 
 unless there is neither father, mother, bro- 
 ther, nor sister of the decedent living, in 
 which ease the survivor is entitled to all of 
 the real estate. 
 
 If there is issue living, the surviving hus- 
 band or wife takes one half of the personal 
 estate, otherwise ail of such estate. The sur- 
 vivor is entitled also to one half of the com- 
 munity property, subject to the community 
 debts; and if the deceased made no disposi- 
 tion by testament of the other half of the 
 community property, it passes to the sur- 
 vivor, unless there are children living. 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and curtesy 
 both obtain. If there are neither descen- 
 dants nor kindred, the entire real property of 
 a husband or wife dying intestate passes to 
 the survivor. If there are children surviv- 
 ing, the widow or widower is entitled to one 
 third of the personal estate, and if there are
 
 198 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 no children then to all of it. The right of a 
 Imsband to a life use of the real estate of his 
 wife does not depend upon their having had 
 issue born alive. 
 
 WISCONSIN 
 
 In this State the rights of dower and curtesy 
 both obtain. A widow is entitled to a life 
 interest in one third of the real estate, and 
 in the event of the husband dying intestate 
 she is entitled to the share of a child in the 
 personal estate. If there is no lawful issue, a 
 widow is entitled to the entire estate, both 
 real and personal. The husband has a life 
 interest in the real estate of his wife that is 
 not disposed of by the will, or in all of the es- 
 tate if the wife died intestate, unless she left 
 issue by a former husband, in which case such 
 issue takes such property, free from the right 
 of the surviving husband to hold the same as 
 tenant by the curtesy. If the wife dies intes- 
 tate and leaves no issue, the widower is en- 
 titled to the entire estate, both real and 
 personal. 
 
 There may also be reserved for a widow 
 a homestead of not more than forty acres of 
 farm land, or one quarter of an acre in a 
 town, whicli at her subsequent marriage or 
 death passes to the heirs of the former hus- 
 band.
 
 PROPERTY OP MARRIED WOMEN 199 
 
 WYOMING 
 
 The rights of dower and curtesy have been 
 abolished in this State. If either a husband 
 or a wife dies intestate, leaving a descendant, 
 one half of the estate, both real and personal, 
 goes to the survivor. If there are no descen- 
 dants, three fourths of the estate goes to the 
 survivor, unless the estate, both real and per- 
 sonal, does not exceed ten thousand dollars, 
 in which case it all passes to the survivor. 
 
 If all of the community property does not 
 exceed fifteen hundred dollars in value, the 
 whole may be assigned to the widow and chil- 
 dren, or to the children if tliere is no widow. 
 But if a widow has a maintenance derived 
 from her own property equal to the portion 
 provided for her by these provisions, then 
 the whole property so provided, other than 
 the homestead, passes to the minor children.
 
 THE CONTRACTS OF MARRIED 
 WOMEN 
 
 THE capacity that married women enjoy 
 at the present time in the United States 
 of entering into contractual relations is due 
 to a development in the principles of equity, 
 and also to the series of statutes that have 
 come to be generally known as the married 
 women's acts. 
 
 As it is of the essence of a contract that 
 there shall be at least two parties capable of 
 giving their consent, and as at the common 
 law husband and wife are one person, we see 
 the chief reason why contracts between hus- 
 band and wife are invalid, and as under that 
 system of law the wife is regarded as having 
 no will of her own, but as being under the 
 power and control of her husband, we see 
 also the chief reason why the contracts of 
 married women with third parties are also 
 invalid at the common law. But in equity 
 the legal fiction of the unity of husband and 
 wife has never been adopted, and, indeed, the 
 trend of development has been in quite the 
 other direction, realizing a greater individu- 
 ality for married women. For many years 
 
 200
 
 CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 201 
 
 legislation in the form of statutes has also 
 been at work breaking down the common-law 
 unity of husband and wife, and giving to 
 married women a large capacity to become a 
 part;^^ to contracts. But the common-law rule 
 that all the contracts, agreements, covenants, 
 promises, and representations of married 
 women are null and void, although for the 
 greater part done away with by the develop- 
 ments of equity and by statutes, still exist to 
 the extent that any capacity of a married 
 woman to contract is regarded as exceptional, 
 and must be asserted and proved. 
 
 There were certain circumstances under 
 which at the connnon law married women 
 had the capacities of unmarried women, and 
 could therefore contract. Such was the case 
 when the husband was an alien residing 
 abroad, or when he had been exiled, or had 
 abjured the realm, or was civilly dead. So 
 in the United States it is a general rule that 
 a permanent departure from the State and a 
 renunciation of his married rights by a hus- 
 band vests his wife with the capacities of 
 feme sole. 
 
 While the present capacity of married 
 women depends largely upon statutes, it is 
 very generall}^ admitted that the various acts 
 providing for the separate estate of a mar- 
 ried woman do not enable her to make per- 
 sonal contracts. There are, however, three of
 
 202 WOMAN AND TllK LAW 
 
 lior conlrnt'ls that luo recognized as binding' 
 on her statntory separate property: first, con- 
 tracts which wonUl bind her oqnitable sepa- 
 rate })ro];)erty ; second, contracts which are 
 expressly anthorized by the statnte, as when a 
 statnte enii)0wers her to make contracts "ve- 
 latiui;- to" or "with reference to" her prop- 
 erty; third, contracts which arc unpliedly 
 antliorized by statnte— that is, contracts 
 wliich are necessary for the ]iossession and 
 enjoyment of licr property which it is in- 
 tended nndcr the statnte she shonld liave. 
 
 \\'c have seen how, according to the com- 
 mon law, contracts between hnsband and 
 wife are void for want of parties and the 
 wife's power to consent, Tn etpiity, liowcver, 
 the dual personality of luisbaml and wife is 
 recognized, so also the capacity of married 
 women to hold, convey, and charge by con- 
 tract property wliich is regarded as their 
 C(pii table se]iarate property. The courts of 
 {Hpiity will enforce a wife's agreement with 
 her husband respecting her separate prop- 
 erty, without by so doing recognizing any 
 personal obligation that she may attempt 
 to asfsume. A contract between a married 
 woman and her husband nmst of course be 
 equitable and valid in all rcsjvcts, else it 
 is void. The statutes of the sc\cral States 
 in regard to this mattei- are confusing. 
 Some of these statutes expressly prohibit
 
 CONTRACTS OT MAK'ini:!) WOMION 20:5 
 
 all coiilrncls or somo coiilracls btMwctMi lius- 
 bniul uiul \\\[\\ \vliil(> oIIum's cxprossly mu- 
 (liori/.(> llu>m. Tlir iiinrruMl wouumi's .-u'ts, 
 wliioli (K> uo\ voW'v lo colli r;u'(s Ih»I\V(>(M1 Iius- 
 baiul and \\\\\\ but i;'i\o a maniod woman 
 ilio capacKy to coiitracl with (ho assonl oi' 
 joimior of boi' liiisbaiul, do nol, as a rul(\ 
 onablo hor lo coiilrai'l ^villl him, as the iv- 
 ^luiroinoiit ol' (ho joindtM- of Iho husband is 
 l>ivsiimed to oxchido Iho idoa ol" an intoiilion 
 to iiu'ludo contracts willi liimsclf. Such of 
 the statutes as do not spccilically ivl'cr to lius- 
 band and wife, but which i>ivo to marri(»d 
 women tlio rigid, to contract generally, have 
 given rise to nuu'h controversy. In some 
 cases, based ou these statutes, (he decisions 
 hold (liat such slalules (io not destroy the 
 uiiil> of husband and wirt\ but sini})ly ve- 
 mo\e tin* disabililies ol" marritHJ women, and 
 liiat, (hererore, the disability of (lie husband 
 and wil'e to contract because of tlieir unity 
 is nol removed, (^n the otiier hand, tlie deci- 
 sions in some cases give such statutes full 
 elTect, holding llial (hey enabl(> husband and 
 wife to contract. 
 
 The Slides of Minnesota, Noi'lh ('aroliua. 
 Nevada, Colorado, and the Terridn y of New 
 Mexico have sjiecitically enacted (hat all con- 
 (racts betwHHMi husband and wife are valid. 
 i>ut Miniu^sota and New Mi^xico have also 
 |>ro\ {(KmI that in all I'ases whtMV the rights of
 
 2U4 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 creditors or purchasers in good faith come in 
 question, the husband is held to have notice 
 of the contracts and debts of his wife, and, 
 vice versa, the wife of the husband's. 
 
 By the law of the State of Louisiana, a 
 contract of sale between husband and wife 
 can be made in three cases only : first, when 
 one of the spouses makes a transfer of prop- 
 erty to the other, who is judicially separated 
 from him or her, in payment of his or her 
 rights; second, when a transfer made by a 
 husband to his wife, even though they are liv- 
 ing together, has a legitimate cause, as, for 
 example, the replacing of her dotal or other 
 effects that had been alienated ; third, when a 
 wife makes a transfer of property to her hus- 
 band in payment of a sum promised to him 
 as a dowry. 
 
 According to the statutes of the States 
 of Maine, Illinois, Iowa, Delaware, Oregon, 
 Washington, and the Territory of New Mex- 
 ico a married woman may constitute her hus- 
 band her attorney, and also release to him 
 the riglit to control her property or any part 
 of it, and to dispose of the income for their 
 mutual benefit, and may also in writing re- 
 voke such an agencj''. 
 
 By statutes which su]3plant the rule of the 
 common law, a married woman may very 
 generally, throughout the United States at 
 the present time, enter into contracts with
 
 CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 205 
 
 third parties, which contracts may be either 
 oral or written, sealed or unsealed. Such 
 statutes are found in the States of New 
 Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, New 
 York, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, 
 Minnesota, Oregon, Colorado, Mississippi, 
 and in the Territory of New Mexico. There 
 are also found, however, certain limitations 
 upon the general capacity of a married wo- 
 man to contract. So, for example, a married 
 woman in the States of New Hampshire, Ver- 
 mont, and Georgia cannot be made liable as 
 an endorser, surety, or guarantor for her hus- 
 band, and in New Jersey, Indiana, and Geor- 
 gia as a surety for any person, and in the 
 State of Illinois a married woman may not 
 enter into a partnership business without the 
 consent of her husband, except when the hus- 
 band has deserted her or is idiotic or insane, 
 or is confined in a penitentiary. Some spe- 
 cial cases are also provided for by statute, 
 as in the State of Pennsylvania, where a mar- 
 ried woman may contract for the purchase of 
 a sewing-machine for her own use, and where 
 she may give a refunding bond for a distrib- 
 utive share or legacy which will bind her 
 estate and release the administrator as if she 
 were a feme sole, and in Indiana, where a 
 married woman may execute an official bond 
 as principal. In the State of Colorado, under 
 the statute a married woman may execute
 
 206 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 any bond, bill, note, or other instrument for 
 the payment of money, and if the considera- 
 tion thereof went to the benefit of her estate 
 she is liable thereon. 
 
 While under the common law a married 
 woman could not lease property, she may do 
 so by statute and be liable for the rent, and 
 if she is able to lease property, she is also 
 liable under an implied jDromise for the use 
 and occupation of the premises which she 
 holds after the expiration of the lease, and 
 this is true thoug^h her husband is living with 
 her. So while under the common law a mar- 
 ried woman was not liable for repairs to her 
 property, yet under the statutes a contract 
 for repairs is regarded as one that is bene- 
 ficial to her estate, and one that she has im- 
 l^lied autho]-it\^ to make. 
 
 In the course of the construction of stat- 
 utes, some general rules have been devel- 
 oped relating to the contracts of married 
 women which will be found of service in a 
 more detailed study of this subject. They 
 may be stated as follows : 
 
 First. The general statutes which relate to 
 contracts, but do not expressly refer to mar- 
 ried women, do not directly affect the valid- 
 ity of married women's contracts, and apply 
 to these only so far as they may be valid 
 under other statutes. 
 
 Second. The statutes that secure to a mar-
 
 CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 207 
 
 ried woman the separate use and enjoyment 
 of her property, and which either do not re- 
 fer to her contracts at all or authorize con- 
 tracts "relating to" or ''with respect to" 
 such property, do not enable her to contract 
 generally, but only in connection with such 
 property. 
 
 Third. The contracts of a married woman 
 which would be binding on her equitable sep- 
 arate property in equity are valid as against 
 her statutory separate property in the same 
 way. 
 
 Fourth. With respect to her statutory 
 property, a married woman is not regarded 
 as a feme sole. She has by implication the 
 capacity to make such contracts, and no 
 others, as are necessary to the exercise of 
 such capacities or to the enjoyment of the 
 rights that are expressly given to her by 
 statute. So, for example, when a statute 
 reads that a married woman may "hold, 
 enjoy, and possess her property as if 
 sole," she may make all contracts that are 
 necessary to such holding and enjoyment. 
 She may contract for legal services in rela- 
 tion to her property, or for manual labor 
 on it, or for the cultivation and sale of 
 crops. 
 
 Fifth. When a statute authorizes a mar- 
 ried woman to contract "with reference to" 
 or "with respect to" her separate property.
 
 208 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 her contracts, to be valid, must come strictly 
 within the meaning of these terms. 
 
 Sixth. A statute that expressly authorizes 
 or prohibits certain specified contracts is 
 strictly construed. 
 
 Seventh. Where a statute expressly en- 
 ables a married woman to contract as if she 
 were unmarried, she may make contracts gen- 
 erally entirely unaffected by her state of cov- 
 erture, but it is doubtful whether she may 
 make such contracts directly with her hus- 
 band. 
 
 Eighth. If a statute which enables a mar- 
 ried woman to contract requires that her con- 
 tracts be executed in a certain way, all such 
 requirements must be substantially complied 
 with to give her contract any validity. If, 
 however, she has the capacity to contract in- 
 dependently of the statute which requires the 
 foraialities, a contract by her which does not 
 comply therewith may still be valid. 
 
 Ninth. The ability of a married woman to 
 contract personally or as to things movable 
 de])ends on the law of the place where the 
 contract is made ; to contract as to immovable 
 things, on the law of the place where such 
 things lie. 
 
 Tenth. The validity of a contract and the 
 rights of the parties under it depend upon 
 the law existing at the time the contract is 
 made, so a statute providing that "all con-
 
 CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 209 
 
 tracts of married women shall be valid ' ' does 
 not affect contracts made prior to the enact- 
 ment of the statute. 
 
 The rights of married women to execute 
 deed of i^roiDerty are considered separately. 
 
 14
 
 DEEDS BY MARRIED WOMEN 
 
 IN many of the States no married woman 
 can convey or encmnber lier separate 
 real estate unless the husband join in the 
 deed. This is the rule in the States of Ver- 
 mont, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Indiana, 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Maryland, Delaware, 
 West Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, 
 Missouri, Texas, Washington, Florida, Loui- 
 siana, and in the Territory of New Mexico. 
 In Maine a married woman cannot convey 
 real estate that has been directly or indi- 
 rectly conveyed to her by her husband, or 
 paid for by him, or given or devised to her 
 by his relatives, without his joinder in the 
 deed, except real property conveyed to her 
 as security or in payment of a bona-fide debt 
 actually due to her from the husband. In 
 Minnesota exceptions are made of mortgages 
 to secure the purchase money, and of leases 
 not exceeding three years in duration. 
 
 In a number of States no separate prop- 
 erty of the wife, either real or personal, can 
 be sold, conveyed, transferred, or encum- 
 bered by the husband without the consent of 
 the wife. This is the rule in the States of 
 
 210
 
 DEEDS BY MARRIED WOMEN 211 
 
 Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut (as to 
 real estate only), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
 Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, West Virginia, Ten- 
 nessee, Missouri, Texas, Nevada, Colorado, 
 Washington, Idaho, AVyoming, Florida, and 
 in the Territory of Arizona. In Pennsyl- 
 vania such consent of a wife to join in a 
 deed must be evidenced by writing, duly ac- 
 knowledged by her before a judge, and also 
 by joinder in the deed itself. 
 
 In a number of the States any married 
 woman of full age may join with her hus- 
 band in conveying any of her real or personal 
 estate, as in the States of New Hampshire, 
 Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Penn- 
 sylvania, Ohio, Indiana (real estate only), 
 Illinois, Iowa (real estate only), Minnesota, 
 Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, West Vir- 
 ginia, North Carolina (real estate only), Ken- 
 tucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, 
 Oregon, Nevada, Idaho, Georgia, Alabama, 
 Florida, the District of Columbia, and in the 
 Territories of Arizona and New Mexico. In 
 Rhode Island and Nevada the husband and 
 wife may convey any real estate of the wife 
 by deeds, signed, sealed, and acknowledged 
 by each of them separately and delivered. 
 In other States the wife may execute and ac- 
 knowledge all deeds, mortgages of her sepa- 
 rate estate, bills of sale, or other conveyances 
 without the joinder of the husband as re-
 
 212 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 quired above, except, probably in all States, 
 as to the husband's curtesy or other rights. 
 Such is the rule in the States of Maine, Mas- 
 sachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kan- 
 sas, Nebraska, Tennessee, Arkansas, Colo- 
 rado, Washington, Wyoming, the Dakotas, 
 Utah, South Carolina, Mississippi, and the 
 Territory of Arizona. 
 
 In most of the States a wife executes a 
 deed, when the husband joins, in the same 
 manner and subject to the same rules as in 
 other cases of deeds by joint grantors. But 
 in other States the wife must acknowledge 
 the deed and her consent be provided for by 
 a separate examination or other formality. 
 Such is the rule in the States of Rhode Is- 
 land, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Dela- 
 ware, Virginia, West Virginia, North Caro- 
 lina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, California, 
 Oregon, Nevada, Washington, Idaho, Mon- 
 tana, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, the District 
 of Columbia, and the Territory of New Mex- 
 ico. In Rhode Island any personal property 
 other than chattels real, household furniture, 
 plate, jewels, stock or shares, money in a bank 
 or secured by a mortgage, may be sold or con- 
 veyed by a married woman as if sole, and she 
 may make such contracts of sale accordingly. 
 But this law does not authorize her to trans- 
 act business as a sole trader. In Connecticut 
 no sale or transfer of a wife's personalty or
 
 DEEDS BY MARRIED WOMEN 213 
 
 any interest therein is valid unless the wife 
 or, if she is dead, those in whom her estate 
 has vested or their guardians join in a writ- 
 ten conveyance thereof, and all reinvestments 
 shall be in the name of the husband as trus- 
 tee. The codes of California and the Da- 
 kotas provide that ''the wife may, without 
 consent of her husband, convey her separate 
 property. ' ' By the law of Louisiana a mar- 
 ried woman cannot make a donation inter 
 vivos without the special consent or concur- 
 rence of her husband or unless authorized 
 by the court. By the laws of Michigan, Ore- 
 gon, and Wyoming a joint deed of land in 
 the State by a wife non-resident with her hus- 
 band has the same effect and may be acknow- 
 ledged or proved as if she were sole. The 
 law of Iowa reads : ' ' Every conveyance made 
 by a husband and wife shall be deemed suffi- 
 cient to pass any and all right of either in 
 the property conveyed, unless the contrary 
 appear in the conveyance." 
 
 In many States a wife must be separately 
 examined apart from her husband as to all 
 conveyances of real estate in which she joins. 
 Thus, "she must be examined privily (apart 
 from her husband) and declare that the in- 
 strument is her voluntary act, and that she 
 does not wish to retract it." So it is pro- 
 vided in the States of Rhode Island, Ohio, 
 Virginia, West Virginia, Texas, California,
 
 214 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and the District of 
 Columbia. In other States the form of ac- 
 knowledgment, so far as it expresses the 
 wife's examination, is as follows: "And the 
 said Mary Smith, being at the same time pri- 
 vately examined by me apart from her hus- 
 band, acknowledged that she executed the 
 said indenture willingly, without compulsion 
 or threat, or fear of her husband's displea- 
 sure. ' ' In the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, 
 Oregon, Washington, and Georgia it is suffi- 
 cient that she acknowledge before the officer, 
 and without private examination, that she 
 joined of her own free will and consent, with- 
 out any compulsion or force used by her hus- 
 band. In Pennsylvania and Ohio the officer 
 must examine the wife separately, read the 
 full contents of the conveyance to her, and 
 she m.ust declare that she executed it volun- 
 tarily and without coercion. In New Jersey, 
 North Carolina, Kentucky, Texas, Idaho, 
 and Louisiana a conveyance must be acknow- 
 ledged by a wife, a]3art from her husband. 
 Statutory forms of the certificate of ac- 
 knowledgment are provided in several of the 
 States. 
 
 In two States, Maryland and Florida, the 
 husband and wife must join in all sales, 
 ti-ansfers, and conveyances of the wife's 
 personal propertj^ Any married woman 
 may release her dower by joinder in the
 
 DEEDS BY MARRIED WOMEN 215 
 
 deed with her husband in the States of 
 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jer- 
 sey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
 Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Ken- 
 tucky, Missouri, Arkansas, W^ashington, 
 South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Loui- 
 siana. By the law of the State of New York, 
 where a husband and wife hold land as ten- 
 ants, joint or in common, ''by entireties," 
 as it is called, they may make valid partition 
 among themselves which will bar dower if 
 so expressed in the instrument. Generally, 
 if the husband and wife are both living, both 
 must join in a deed in order to release a 
 homestead interest belonging to either. In 
 a few States any married woman aged twen- 
 ty-one years may execute and deliver her 
 power of attorney to convey land as if sole, 
 and this is the law in New York, Wisconsin, 
 and Delaware. In most of the States a wife 
 may convey her land by power of attorney, 
 only it must be executed and acknowledged 
 like a deed. By the Louisiana law, a married 
 woman having a mortgage or privilege on the 
 property of her husband may appoint one or 
 more agents with power in her behalf, during 
 her temporary or pennanent absence from the 
 State, to intervene in any contract of mort- 
 gage or sale made by the husband, and sign in 
 her behalf such remuneration of said mort- 
 gage or privilege as the wife herself might do
 
 216 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 if personally present, and such power may be 
 either general or special, and may be exe- 
 cuted in the United States before any judge, 
 and in foreign countries before any consul, 
 vice-consul, or consular or commercial agent 
 of the United States. Every general author- 
 ity, even though stipulated for in the mar- 
 riage contract, is void, except so far as it 
 respects the administration of the property 
 of the wife.
 
 WILLS BY MARRIED WOMEN 
 
 IN nearly all of the States it is expressly 
 enacted that a married woman of full age 
 and sound mind may devise her separate real 
 or personal property by an ordinary will, 
 without the husband's consent, as if sole. 
 Where this is not expressly declared to be 
 the law, it is generally implied if there is 
 no provision to the contrary. There are, 
 however, certain restrictions found in the 
 statutes. Such a will may not, without his 
 written consent or joinder in the will, im- 
 pair the rights of the husband (1) to curtesy 
 in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
 Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary- 
 land, Delaware, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
 Missouri, and Oregon; (2) to the use of one 
 half of her real estate for life, if they had 
 no issue born alive, in Massachusetts; (3) to 
 one half of her personal property in Massa- 
 chusetts and Kansas; (4) to his distributive 
 share, as if she died intestate, in New Hamp- 
 shire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Mary- 
 land; (5) to his right to administer her per- 
 sonalty without account not so bequeathed 
 in Rhode Island; (6) so the wife may not 
 
 217
 
 218 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 by a will devise more than one half of her 
 property, real or personal, away from her 
 husband in Kansas and Colorado ; ( 7 ) the 
 husband must consent and subscribe the will 
 in all cases in Maryland, and also in this 
 vState the wife must be ]Drivately examined, 
 and the will must be made sixty days before 
 her death. In Pennsylvania a husband may 
 not be a witness to such a will. 
 
 In the States of Pennsylvania, North Caro- 
 lina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky 
 a married woman may make a will where an 
 express power to will her separate estate is 
 reserved or granted to her in the instrument 
 creating the same or by marriage contract. 
 
 In Massachusetts a married woman, de- 
 serted by or living apart from her husband 
 for a justifiable cause, when the proper court 
 has entered a decree establishing such fact, 
 may make a will in the same manner and to 
 the same effect as if sole, and by such a will 
 or by a deed executed without her husband's 
 consent dispose of all her estate, both real 
 and personal. In the States of Wisconsin 
 and Maryland a married woman aged eigh- 
 teen years may make a w^ill, although not of 
 age until twenty-one years.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS SOLE 
 TRADERS 
 
 THERE is in many of the States a certain 
 process by which a married woman can 
 become a sole trader, as it is called, and carry 
 on a business entirely apart from her hus- 
 band. She is then called a sole trader in the 
 States of Pennsylvania, California, Idaho, 
 and Montana, a free trader in North Caro- 
 lina and Georgia, a free dealer in Florida, 
 and a public merchant in Louisiana. 
 
 In several of the States some of these privi- 
 leges are extended to her without formalities 
 of any kind. Thus, a woman ma}^ carry on 
 any business or trade or perform any labor 
 or services in her sole and separate account, 
 and her earnings shall be her sole and sepa- 
 rate property, and may be used and invested 
 by her in her own name, by the laws of New 
 York, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Virginia, 
 West Virginia, Arkansas, Colorado, and 
 Wyoming. The law in Vermont provides 
 that if a woman does business in her own 
 name, her earnings, goods, and credits may 
 be attached on trustee process or otherwise, 
 and execution levied on her separate goods; 
 
 219
 
 220 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 and the statutes of Khode Island have a 
 provision that when a husband has been 
 insane for a period of one year the wife 
 may be authorized to do business on her 
 separate account. In North Carolina every 
 wife living a})art from her husband either 
 under a judgment of divorce, absolute or 
 limited, or under a deed of separation exe- 
 cuted by the husband and wife and recorded 
 in the county where she is resident, or when 
 her husband has become an idiot or a luna- 
 tic, is a free trader. So, also, in North 
 Carolina every woman whose husband aban- 
 dons her or maliciously turns her out of 
 doors is a free trader, so far as to be com- 
 petent to control and bind her separate prop- 
 erty, but the liability of the husband for her 
 reasonable support is not thereby impaired. 
 By the law of Connecticut, when a married 
 man is sentenced to and is confined in the 
 penitentiary, his wife, during the period of 
 his confinement, may carry on business as a 
 feme sole, and may sue and be sued accord- 
 ingly. By the law of Louisiana, if a wife 
 is a public merchant she may, without re- 
 ceiving authority from her husband, obligate 
 herself in anything relating to her trade, and 
 in such case her husband is bound also, if 
 there exists a community of property between 
 them. The wife is considered to be a public 
 merchant if she carries on a separate trade,
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS SOLE TRADERS 221 
 
 but not if she retails only the merchandise 
 belonging to the commerce carried on by her 
 husband. 
 
 When a married woman desires to do busi- 
 ness on her separate account she is to record 
 in the clerk's office of the city or town (or, 
 in North Carolina, Montana, and Arizona, in 
 the registry of deeds) a certificate setting 
 forth the names of herself and her husband 
 in Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Mon- 
 tana, and the nature and place of the business 
 in Massachusetts, Montana, and Arizona. 
 In Massachusetts the husband may receive 
 such a certificate if the wife does not. In 
 North Carolina no woman can become a free 
 trader unless twenty-one years of age, and 
 the husband must consent to and sign the 
 certificate. By the laws of Montana and Ari- 
 zona no married woman can become a sole 
 trader when the capital originally invested 
 in her business exceeds the sum of ten thou- 
 sand dollars, unless her declaration contain 
 her oath that the surplus in excess of ten 
 thousand dollars did not come from any 
 funds of the husband. In most of the States 
 it is only by petition to the court that a mar- 
 ried woman may obtain the certificate of a 
 sole trader. 
 
 In a few of the States not every married 
 woman has the legal privilege of becoming 
 a sole trader. Thus, in Pennsylvania a mar-
 
 222 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 ried woman can secure the privilege only 
 when her husband is absent at sea. In Cali- 
 fornia a married woman has this right only 
 when her husband fails to support her or 
 when there is ground for a suit for divorce. 
 
 Wlien a married woman has complied with 
 the legal procedure to qualify as a sole trader 
 the husband is not liable on her contracts, 
 and it is thus expressly stated in the laws of 
 Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, In- 
 diana, Kentucky, Arkansas, California, Ne- 
 vada, Idaho, Montana, and Arizona. In Cali- 
 fornia a married woman as a sole trader is 
 responsible for the maintenance of her chil- 
 dren. 
 
 In North Carolina it is provided that a 
 married woman 's rights as a sole trader may 
 be terminated by an entry on the margin of 
 the record or by a publication for a period 
 of three weeks; but such a cessation of her 
 operations as a free trader will not impair 
 the liabilities that she has already incurred 
 or relieve her from the effects of subsequent 
 fraud on her part. 
 
 In connection with the sole trade of a mar- 
 ried woman, it is to be noted that the term 
 "earnings" means what is earned or gained 
 by labor, services or performances, wages or 
 reward; and the earnings secured to a mar- 
 ried woman by a statute are not confined to 
 the results of her manual labor, such as
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS SOLE TRADERS 223 
 
 wages for washing or sewing, but include the 
 products of her trade also, if such trade is 
 carried on with her separate property used 
 as capital ; and the stock in trade of a mar- 
 ried woman owned at the time of her mar- 
 riage, or afterward bought with her earnings, 
 is included in the term "earnings." 
 
 The phrase ' ' trade and business ' ' means an 
 employment to the carrying on of which the 
 woman devotes a considerable portion of her 
 time, skill, and means. It is a business that 
 is continuing in its nature, and embraces a 
 series of transactions ; engaging in trade and 
 business means not only trading in a com- 
 mercial sense, but also being engaged in the 
 employments which require time, attention, 
 and labor. So a married woman's receipt 
 and disbursement of her rents and profits, 
 though done in a business way, does not con- 
 stitute her a trader. Nor is she regarded as 
 a trader when she is not acting generally 
 with the public, but is simply taking care of 
 her own property or collecting or investing 
 her income. 
 
 When a married woman is recognized as a 
 sole trader she is not confined to any particu- 
 lar trade. She may engage not only in wash- 
 ing, sewing, dressmaking, millinery, in oper- 
 ating a dairy, a boarding-house, a grocery 
 or provision store, and in other pursuits spe- 
 cially adapted to her sex, but she may be a
 
 224 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 farmer, a miller, an army sutler, a saloon- 
 or tavern-keeper, a clothier, a dealer in metal 
 junk, she may work a mine or quarry, or 
 carry on a lumber business. If, however, 
 her trade is unsuited to her, this is a fact to 
 be considered if her husband's creditors are 
 trying to show that her business is really his. 
 A married woman as a sole trader may en- 
 gage in the professions, she may devote her- 
 self to literature, acting, singing, and, in fact, 
 under a general power to trade, she may fol- 
 low any legitimate calling. 
 
 The trade of a married woman is often 
 spoken of as her "separate trade," but the 
 word "separate" used in such a connection 
 refers now rather to her legal status than to 
 the mode in which she trades, and it does not 
 mean that she is to trade alone, or that she 
 shall not live with her husband while carry- 
 ing on her trade, and it does not prevent her 
 from allowing him to join in the business. 
 In the States of Massachusetts and Indiana 
 it has been decided, however, that a sole 
 trader must keep her business separate from 
 her husband, and that their joint earnings 
 are his property. 
 
 In those States where a married woman is 
 a feme sole as to her separate estate in 
 equity, she may use such an estate in trade, 
 and the profits of such trade are equitable 
 separate proi)erty also ; but in such trade she
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS SOLE TRADERS 225 
 
 has no personal capacity, for equity recog- 
 nizes her separate existence only with re- 
 spect to her property, and her contracts, made 
 in the cause of her trade, can be collected 
 only if they have been property charged on 
 such property. A husband cannot by his 
 own motion change the personal status of his 
 wife to enable her to trade with the rights 
 and liabilities of a feme sole. He may, how- 
 ever, allow her, as his agent, to engage in 
 business and give her the profits, or he may 
 arrange before or after marriage that she 
 shall keep her earnings or carry on business 
 for her own use, and give her, if he choose, 
 the necessary capital to start with. While 
 any such gift by a husband to his wife of 
 earnings, profit, or property is good against 
 himself and his heirs, it is not good against 
 his creditors, unless made for a valuable con- 
 sideration. If the consent of the husband to 
 the business conducted by his wife is a mere 
 oral assent, and without consideration, al- 
 though he cannot ask back profits that have 
 been already made and collected by her, he 
 can revoke his consent and claim the business 
 as his own. In all cases where the wife car- 
 ries on a business by the mere assent of the 
 husband, the business is his, and he is liable 
 for its debts and may claim its profits. 
 Whether a business is the husband's or the 
 wife's is a question of fact. If a wife has 
 
 15
 
 226 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 engaged in business without the authority of 
 law, and without her husband's assent, he 
 cannot be held liable for its debts, nor can 
 she in her mere personal contracts. If all 
 the credit is given to her, her husband is not 
 liable, whether she or her property is liable 
 or not. 
 
 The various statutes that have been passed 
 with reference to the separate property of 
 married women do not by implication de- 
 stroy the right of the husband at common 
 law to the earnings of his wife, but they do, 
 as a rule, expressly or by implication, secure 
 to the wife the natural increase of her prop- 
 erty, and since such increase belongs to her, 
 even when largely due to the efforts of her 
 husband, it would seem reasonable that her 
 own services, though these belong to her hus- 
 band, should not injuriously affect her rights. 
 
 Under a statute which enables a married 
 woman to trade with a capital of one thou- 
 sand dollars or less, and creates a special 
 remedy against her property for her trade 
 debts, it has been decided that she has no 
 powers that are not expressly given, and that 
 the naming of one mode of trade is a denial 
 of all other modes. Under statutes which 
 enable a married woman to trade, and which 
 do not limit her capacities, she may trade 
 precisely as if she were unmarried, and may 
 do all things that are usual and proper in 
 the particular trade in which she is engaged.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS SOLE TRADERS 227 
 
 It has been said that the object of these stat- 
 utes is not only to do justice to wives, but 
 also to encourage trade. 
 
 The business creditors of a married woman 
 have, under the statutes generally, the same 
 rights as if she were sole —they may sue her 
 alone and obtain a general judgment against 
 her. If she is a partner, all the partners must 
 be joined. 
 
 At common law, when a man married a 
 woman engaged in trade he took the business, 
 with its assets and liabilities ; but at the pres- 
 ent time, under the various statutes, he is 
 liable only where he is still liable for her 
 antenuptial debts, and has a right to the 
 business only when such property is not se- 
 cured to the wife by settlement or by statute.
 
 WOMEN AND THE HOMESTEAD 
 LAWS 
 
 AS tlie homestead laws of the American 
 /\ States have been enacted with the 
 avowed object of protecting the family, they 
 are a matter of interest to women. 
 
 A homestead is the house and land that 
 constitute a family residence, and in the eyes 
 of the law it is such a family residence ex- 
 empt from enforced sale. The extent of the 
 exemption from forced sale varies in the dif- 
 ferent States under their statutory law, but 
 as a legal term "homestead" implies some 
 degree of exemption in all of the States. 
 
 Sixteen States have by their constitutions 
 made provision for the homestead exemp- 
 tion ; such States are Illinois, Michigan, Kan- 
 sas, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, 
 Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas, California, Ne- 
 vada, Colorado, South Carolina, Georgia, 
 Alabama, and Florida. In the constitutions 
 of the States of Illinois and Colorado there 
 are provisions that the legislature shall pass 
 liberal homestead laws. 
 
 In South Carolina it is provided that a 
 reasonable amount of property, as a liome- 
 
 228
 
 WOMEN AND THE HOMESTEAD LAWS 229 
 
 stead, shall be exempt from seizure or sale 
 for debts. In Michigan the constitution i)ro- 
 vides that every homestead, if not exceeding 
 forty acres of land and the dwelling-house 
 thereon, and the appurtenances to be selected 
 by the owner tliereof, and not included in 
 any town; or instead thereof, at the option 
 of the owner, any lot in any city, village, or 
 recorded town plot, or such parts of lots as 
 shall be equal thereto, and the dwelling- 
 house thereon and its appurtenances, owned 
 and occupied by any resident of the State, 
 not exceeding in value fifteen hundred dol- 
 lars, shall be exempt from sale under legal 
 process. The constitution of the State of 
 Kansas provides that a homestead to the ex- 
 tent of one hundred and sixty acres of farm- 
 ing land, or one acre in a town or city, occu- 
 pied as a residence by the family of the 
 owner, with all improvements, shall be so 
 exempt. In North Carolina it is provided 
 that every homestead and its buildings, 
 owned and occupied by a resident of the 
 State, not exceeding one thousand dollars in 
 value, shall be so exempt; and in Virginia 
 that every householder or head of a family 
 shall be entitled, in addition, to the articles 
 exempt by law from levy or distress for rent, 
 to hold exempt his real or j^ersonal property 
 to the value of two thousand dollars, to be 
 selected by him.
 
 230 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Tu the States of Tennessee, West Virginia, 
 and South Carolina a homestead, in the pos- 
 session of each head of a family, and, in the 
 town, to the value in all of one thousand dol- 
 lars, is exempt. In Alabama every home- 
 stead not exceeding eighty acres in extent, 
 with improvements to be selected by the 
 owner, or, in a town, any lot with improve- 
 ments, not in all exceeding two thousand dol- 
 lars in value, owned and occupied by a 
 resident, is exempt. In Georgia there is ex- 
 emption from levy and sale of the property 
 of every head of a family, or guardian or 
 trustee of a family of minor children, or any 
 aged or infirm person or persons having the 
 care or support of dependent females of any 
 age, who is not the head of a family, real 
 property or personal property, or both, to 
 the aggregate value of sixteen hundred dol- 
 lars. In Florida a homestead to the extent 
 of one hundred and sixty acres of land, or 
 half an acre in a town, and the improvements 
 thereon, owned by a head of a family resid- 
 ing in the State, is exempt. 
 
 In Louisiana every head of a family, or 
 })erson having a mother or father or per- 
 son or persons dependent on him for sup- 
 port, has exem})t the homestead bona fide 
 owned by the debtor and occupied l)y him, 
 consisting of lands, buildings, and appurte- 
 nances, whether rural or urban; also one
 
 WOMEN AND THE HOMESTEAD LAWS 231 
 
 work-horse, one wagon, one yoke of oxen, two 
 cows and calves, twenty-five head of hogs, or 
 one thousand pounds of bacon or its equiva- 
 lent in pork, and, in a farm, the necessaiy 
 corn and fodder for a year, and farming im- 
 plements to the value of two thousand dol- 
 lars ; if the homestead exceeds two thousand 
 dollars in value, the beneficiary is entitled to 
 that amount in case a sale of the homestead 
 under legal process realizes more than that 
 sum; but no husband is entitled to a home- 
 stead whose wife is in the actual enjoyment 
 of property to the value of two thousand 
 dollars. 
 
 By the constitutions of Michigan, Vir- 
 ginia, Nevada, and Alabama, a homestead 
 exemption does not avail as against any 
 mortgage or pledge that is lawfully obtained. 
 Nor, as a general rule, does a homestead ex- 
 emption avail against any obligation or debt 
 contracted for the purchase of the property, 
 nor against a sale for taxes. 
 
 In the States of Michigan, Kansas, North 
 Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Nevada, Ala- 
 bama, and Florida a homestead cannot be 
 alienated or mortgaged without the joint con- 
 sent of husband and wife. 
 
 In the seven States of Michigan, North Car- 
 olina, Tennessee, Arkansas, West Virginia, 
 Alabama, and Louisiana by constitution the 
 homestead estate continues exempt from the
 
 232 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 owner's debts after his death during the 
 minority of any of his children. So it would 
 seem to be implied in Texas, where the con- 
 stitution provides "that in the death of the 
 husband, wife, or both, the homestead de- 
 scends and rests like other real property of 
 the deceased, and shall be governed by the 
 same laws of descent and distribution, but 
 shall not be partitioned among the heirs of 
 the deceased during the lifetime of the hus- 
 band or widow or as long as he or she occupy 
 or use the same as a homestead, or the guar- 
 dian of a minor child be permitted so to do 
 by order of court." 
 
 The States of Michigan and North Caro- 
 lina provide by constitution that the home- 
 stead exemption continues during the life 
 and widowhood of the widow, unless she be 
 the owner of a homestead in her own right. 
 The States of Tennessee, Alabama, and Loui- 
 siana provide in general terms that the home- 
 stead shall inure to the benefit of the widow. 
 So in Arkansas, during her natural life 
 (whether she marry or not), unless she be the 
 owner of a homestead in her own right. It 
 is declared in Vermont that a mechanic's 
 lien may attach to property held as a home- 
 stead; but in Texas, in such a case, to fix a 
 lien there must be a written contract, signed 
 by husband and wife and acknowledged by 
 her, as in the case of the sale of a homestead.
 
 WOMEN AND THE HOMESTEAD LAWS 233 
 
 In case of a divorce in the Dakotas, the 
 court rendering the decree may assign the 
 homestead to the innocent party, either abso- 
 lutely or for a limited period, according to 
 the facts of the case. In California, in such 
 a case, if a homestead has been selected from 
 the community property it may be assigned 
 to the innocent party, either absolutely or for 
 a limited period, or it may be divided, or 
 sold and the proceeds divided. If it has been 
 selected from the separate property of either 
 party, it shall be assigned to the former 
 owner of such property, subject, nevertheless, 
 to the power of the court to assign it for a 
 limited period to the innocent party. In Vir- 
 ginia, if the wife obtains the decree of di- 
 vorce for fault of the husband, the homestead 
 is decreed to her and the minor children as 
 if the former husband was dead.
 
 Pakt III 
 
 PUBLIC KEL.1TI0XS
 
 CITIZEN WOMEN 
 
 A CITIZEN woman is either a native born 
 _or a naturalized member of the State 
 who is entitled to full protection in the exer- 
 cise and enjoyment of private rights. Any 
 woman born in the United States, or one 
 born out of the same who has been natural- 
 ized, who has not lost her right as such, is a 
 citizen. Natural citizenship is created by 
 birth within the jurisdiction of the United 
 States. An Act of Congress of Februarys 10, 
 1885, provides that if any woman who might 
 be lawfully naturalized under the existing 
 laws should marry or should be married to a 
 citizen of the United States, she shall be 
 deemed and taken to be a citizen. This act 
 is construed liberally to mean that the hus- 
 band need not be a citizen at the time of the 
 marriage, but that any free woman already 
 married to an alien becomes a citizen by 
 the naturalization of her husband. Indian 
 women, born members of any of the Indian 
 tribes within the United States which still 
 maintain their tribal relations, are not citi- 
 zens. They are not citizens even if they have 
 
 237
 
 238 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 separated themselves from their tribe and 
 reside among the white citizens of the State 
 but have not been naturalized or taxed or 
 recognized as citizens by the United States 
 or by any of the States. 
 
 The Congress has the exclusive power to 
 establish uniform rules of naturalization. It 
 is competent, however, for the Congress, 
 after establishing uniform rules, to give to 
 the State courts jurisdiction under them. 
 The provisions of the United States statutes 
 as applied to women are that any alien, ex- 
 cept Chinese, may be naturalized and become 
 a citizen of the United States on the follow- 
 ing conditions: 
 
 First. The applicant shall declare by oath 
 or affirmation before some State court of rec- 
 ord, or before a United States district or cir- 
 cuit court, or before a clerk of any such 
 court, two years at least before her admis- 
 sion, that it is her intention to become a citi- 
 zen of the United States, and to renounce 
 forever her allegiance to her own sovereignty, 
 which must be at peace with the United 
 States at the time. 
 
 Second. At her final admission to citizen- 
 ship she shall declare on oath or affirmation 
 before one of the courts mentioned that she 
 will support the Constitution of the United 
 States, and that she renounces all allegiance 
 to any foreign sovereign, and especially to
 
 CITIZEN WOMEN 239 
 
 her own, whereof she was a subject before 
 her application for citizenship. 
 
 Third. She must prove by at least two wit- 
 nesses, who are citizens, that she has resided 
 within the United States for a period of five 
 years at least, and within the State or Ter- 
 ritory where the court is located for at least 
 one year ; that during that time she has been 
 a good moral person, attached to the prin- 
 ciples of this government, and is well dis- 
 posed in this regard. 
 
 Fourth. She must also renounce all titles 
 to nobility, if she has any. 
 
 Fifth. Any alien woman, except a Chinese, 
 who is a minor and who shall have resided 
 within the United States three years next 
 preceding her arriving at her majority, and 
 who shall continue to reside therein to the 
 time of making application for citizenship, 
 may, after reaching her majority, and having 
 resided in the United States at least five 
 years, including the three years of her minor- 
 ity, be given citizenship without any prelim- 
 inary declaration. 
 
 Sixth. The children of parents duly natu- 
 ralized, being under the age of twenty-one 
 years at the time of such naturalization, shall, 
 if residing in the United States, be consid- 
 ered as citizens. 
 
 Seventh. No alien woman who shall be a 
 citizen or subject of any country, state, or
 
 240 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 sovereign with whom the United States shall 
 be at war at the time of her application shall 
 be then admitted to be a citizen of the United 
 States. 
 
 A woman born within the dominion and 
 jurisdiction of the United States of Chinese 
 parents is a citizen, but no alien Chinese 
 woman can become a naturalized citizen of 
 the United States. 
 
 If the several States of the Union see fit 
 to exercise the power of naturalization as an 
 original power, they must comply with the 
 rules laid down by Congress. No State can 
 make or enforce any law which abridges the 
 privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
 United States. 
 
 Every woman citizen of the United States 
 is capable of acquiring and holding title to 
 land by purchase, provided that she is under 
 no disability so that she cannot contract, and 
 all citizens may take by descent or devise. 
 An alien, man or woman, cannot under the 
 common-law rule acquire title to real prop- 
 ertj^ by descent or by other mere operation 
 of law. But this common-law rule as to 
 aliens has been greatly modified or abolished 
 by several States.
 
 ALIEN WOMEN 
 
 THE following is a summary of the vari- 
 ous statutes as to an alien taking by 
 
 purchase or descent and passing on by inher- 
 itance as a native citizen: 
 
 Alabama.— A resident alien is placed on the 
 same footing as a citizen. 
 
 Arkansas.— Resident aliens have been given 
 the same rights as to real property as citi- 
 zens. 
 
 California.— All the restrictions have been 
 removed, except that an alien, man or 
 woman, must make his claim of property 
 within five years of the accrue of his title. 
 
 Colorado.— Aliens have been given the same 
 rights as citizens as to real property. 
 
 Connecticut.— Resident aliens are given the 
 same property rights as citizens. 
 
 The Dakotas.— There are no restrictions as 
 to property rights. 
 
 Delaware.— There are no restrictions as to 
 resident aliens who have made the pre- 
 liminary declaration of intention. 
 
 District op Columbia.— An alien may in- 
 herit from a natural citizen such lands as 
 
 16 241
 
 242 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 she has acquired by deed or will before 
 naturalization. 
 
 Florida.— No property restrictions are im- 
 posed upon aliens. 
 
 Geoegta.— Aliens, except alien enemies, have 
 all the rights of citizens as to real property. 
 
 Illinois. — There are no property restric- 
 tions, aliens being placed on an equal foot- 
 ing with citizens. 
 
 Indiana.— An alien can acquire title to land 
 by descent or devise. If a non-resident, she 
 can hold land acquired by descent five 
 years after the settlement of the inheritable 
 estate. 
 
 Iowa.— Aliens may acquire, inherit, hold, 
 and dispose of real or personal property, 
 and all distinctions between aliens and 
 citizens in this respect are abolished. 
 
 Kansas.— Aliens have the same property 
 rights as citizens. 
 
 Kentucky.— Aliens who are not enemies, 
 after the preliminary^ oath of citizenship, 
 hold property as citizens do. 
 
 Louisiana.— There is no law forbidding 
 aliens holding and transmitting real estate. 
 
 Maine.— No restrictions. 
 
 Maryland.- No restrictions, except to alien 
 enemies. 
 
 Massachusetts.— Aliens may take, hold, and 
 transmit real estate as citizens. 
 
 Michigan.— Aliens have the same rights to 
 realty as citizens.
 
 ALIEN WOMEN 243 
 
 Minnesota.— An alien has the same rights 
 as a citizen to real property. 
 
 Mississippi.— There are no restrictions upon 
 aliens. 
 
 Missouri.- There are no restrictions upon 
 aliens. 
 
 Montana.— There is no law on the subject. 
 
 Nebraska.— There is no distinction between 
 aliens and citizens. 
 
 Nevada.— There are no restrictions, except as 
 to the Chinese. 
 
 New Hampshire.— There are no restrictions 
 as to resident aliens. 
 
 New Jersey. — No restrictions upon alien 
 friends. 
 
 New Mexico.— There are no restrictions. 
 
 New York.— By a law of 1896 (Chapter 
 547) an alien may, after filing in the office 
 of the Secretary of State a deposition of 
 his intention of becoming a citizen of the 
 United States for a term of six years, take, 
 hold, convey, and devise real property. If 
 he dies within the six years, and before he 
 is admitted to citizenship, his widow is en- 
 titled to dower in his real property. The 
 right, title, or interest in or to real prop- 
 erty of any person cannot be questioned 
 or impeached by reason of the alienage of 
 any person through whom such title may 
 have been derived. 
 
 North Carolina.— There are no restrictions 
 upon aliens.
 
 244 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 Ohio.— An alien can inherit and transmit as 
 a citizen. 
 
 Oregon.— No restrictions are imposed. 
 
 Pennsylvania.— Aliens, except enemies, may 
 purchase land not exceeding five thousand 
 acres, nor in net annual income twenty 
 thousand dollars, the same as citizens. 
 Aliens may take and hold, without limit, 
 real property acquired by devise or de- 
 scent. Titles that were derived through 
 aliens prior to April 26, 1869, were con- 
 firmed by an act of that date. 
 
 Rhode Island.— There are no restrictions as 
 to aliens holding real property. 
 
 South Caeolina.— There is no restriction be- 
 tween citizens and aliens as to the pur- 
 chase, enjoyment, or descent of property. 
 
 Tennessee.— Aliens have the same rights as 
 citizens. 
 
 Texas.— Aliens may take and hold real or 
 personal property by devise or descent in 
 the same manner in which citizens of the 
 United States may take and hold real or 
 personal property by devise or descent 
 within the country of such aliens. 
 
 Utah.— Aliens who are residents take by de- 
 scent and inherit as citizens. An alien 
 who is a non-resident must claim an inher- 
 itance in the estate of the deceased within 
 five years after the death of the person 
 from whom she claims succession.
 
 ALIEN WOMEN 245 
 
 Veemont. — There are no restrictions upon 
 aliens holding real property, nor any law 
 for the forfeiture of alien estates. 
 
 Virginia.— Aliens, except enemies, have the 
 same property rights as citizens. 
 
 Washington.— All aliens, except Chinese, 
 have the same property rights as citizens. 
 
 West Virginia.— Aliens, except enemies, 
 have the same property rights as citizens. 
 
 Wisconsin.— No restrictions upon aliens as 
 to property rights.
 
 WOMAN SUFFRAGE 
 
 AT the present time the full or partial suf- 
 r\ I'rage is extended to women in twenty- 
 six of the States of the Union and in two of 
 the Territories. These States are Colorado, 
 Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
 Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
 Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
 Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
 York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South 
 Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyo- 
 ming. The two Territories are Arizona and 
 Oklahoma. 
 
 In four of these States— Colorado, Idaho, 
 Utah, and Wyoming— the suffrage is com- 
 plete, women being able to vote for all public 
 offices and ujion all public questions upon 
 which men may vote, and the qualifications 
 are the same for women as for men. 
 
 By far the most common of all the combi- 
 nations of partial suffrage is that which per- 
 tains to the election of public-school officials. 
 The "school suffrage," as it is called, is now 
 given to women in all of the States men- 
 tioned, with the exception of the State of 
 Mississippi, to a greater or less extent. In 
 
 246
 
 WOMAN SUFFRAGE 247 
 
 all of the States and Territories mentioned, 
 with the exception of Mississippi, women 
 may vote for school trustees or directors 
 whenever such officers are elective. There 
 are, however, some qualifications. In Ari- 
 zona a woman, to be entitled so to vote, must 
 pay taxes or be the mother or guardian of 
 children of school age. In the States of 
 Connecticut and Massachusetts there is the 
 same educational qualifications for women 
 as for men. In the States of Delaware, Ore- 
 gon, and Vermont there is a propertj^ quali- 
 fication. In the State of Kentucky women 
 with children of school age may vote for 
 school trustees, and widows and spinsters 
 who pay taxes may vote on school taxes in 
 the country districts. In the three second- 
 class cities of the State women can hold 
 school offices and vote on the same tenns as 
 men. In the States of Minnesota, New York, 
 and North Dakota women may vote for the 
 county superintendent of schools, with the 
 same qualifications as men. In the State of 
 North Dakota women may vote for the State 
 superintendent of schools. 
 
 In the States of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, 
 Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
 Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Utah, 
 Vermont, and Wyoming women may vote on 
 the question of the issue of school bonds or 
 other forms of school appropriations.
 
 248 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 In the States of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, 
 Utah, and W^'oming, in mnnicipal elections, 
 for city officers, bonds, public improvements, 
 etc., women may vote. Women may vote also 
 in the States of Louisiana and Montana on 
 all questions of public improvements that are 
 submitted to taxpayers.
 
 WOMEN AS ATTORNEYS 
 
 AT the common law, or under the Constitu- 
 x\. tion of the United States, a woman has 
 no right to practise law, and, except in those 
 jurisdictions where special statutory provi- 
 sions have been made rendering her eligible, 
 she cannot be admitted to the bar as an attor- 
 ney. Chief-Justice Gray of Massachusetts 
 said in reference to this matter : ' ' The word 
 'citizen,' when used in its most common 
 and comprehensive sense, doubtless includes 
 women, but a woman is not by virtue of her 
 citizenship vested by the Constitution of the 
 United States or by the constitution of the 
 commonwealth with any absolute right inde- 
 l)endent of legislation to take part in the gov- 
 ernment, either as a voter or as an officer, or 
 to be admitted to practice as an attorney. ' ' 
 
 The legislature of a State has the power to 
 provide for the admission of women to the 
 bar of the State, but until it makes such a 
 provision the rule of the common law will 
 prevail. The denial by a State court of the 
 right to practise law is not an infringement 
 of any right guaranteed to women by the Fed- 
 eral Constitution or by the fourteenth amend- 
 
 249
 
 250 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 ment. So it was decided in Maryland, where 
 the statute provides that applications for ad- 
 mission to practice may be made ''for any 
 free, white male citizen of Maryland above 
 the age of twenty-one years." The statutes 
 authorizing the admission of attorneys gener- 
 ally provide that any "person" or "citi- 
 zen" having certain prescribed qualifications 
 may be admitted on application. The words 
 "person" and "citizen" so used do not in- 
 clude women, even though there may be a 
 general provision in the statute law that 
 words importing the masculine gender shall 
 be construed to include the feminine. 
 
 In several of the States the rule in this 
 matter is contrary to the general doctrine, 
 and women are held to be admissible to prac- 
 tice as attorneys without showing any spe- 
 cific legislative grant of authority. So in 
 Colorado, where the application of a woman 
 for admission to the bar was granted, al- 
 though the constitution of Colorado provided 
 that "no person except a qualified elector 
 shall be elected or appointed to any civil 
 office in the State. ' ' The Connecticut statute 
 provided that "the Superior Court may ad- 
 mit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such 
 persons as are qualified therefor, agreeably 
 to the rules established by the judges of the 
 said court." The court held that this lan- 
 guage was broad enough to authorize the ad-
 
 WOMEN AS ATTORNEYS 251 
 
 mission of womeu, and allowed the applica- 
 tion of a petitioner who was a woman. So 
 in Indiana the courts have held women to 
 be admissible to practice as attorneys even 
 where the constitution provides that "every 
 person of good moral character, being a 
 voter, shall be entitled to admission to prac- 
 tice law in all the courts of justice." In 
 Pennsylvania it has been held by a lower 
 court that women may register as law stu- 
 dents, that a rule of court providing that no 
 person shall be registered as a student of law 
 until "he" has been examined and has pro- 
 duced a certificate of ' ' his ' ' good moral char- 
 acter, etc., does not exclude women, and that 
 women may, under the act of 1834, be ad- 
 mitted to practice. In New Hampshire the 
 doctrine of the Colorado and Indiana courts 
 is followed, and women are held to be eligible. 
 In nearly all of the States at the present 
 time, either by the rule of the courts or by 
 the express sanction of statutes, women are 
 admitted to practice as attorneys in the courts 
 of the State.
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS WITNESSES 
 
 IT is a rule of the common law that nei- 
 ther a husband nor a wife is a compe- 
 tent witness in any action or proceeding, 
 either civil or criminal, to which the other 
 is a party. A reason for this prohibition 
 was found by some of the earlier authorities 
 in the legal unity of husband and wife. Now, 
 generally, this rule is based upon the ground 
 of common interest, which was a disqualifica- 
 tion for a witness at common law. B}^ far 
 the strongest reason, however, is public pol- 
 icy, as it is regarded as being of first impor- 
 tance to society to preserve the privacy and 
 harmony of marital relations. Mr. Green- 
 leaf says, in his work on evidence: ''This 
 exclusion is founded partly in the identity 
 of their legal rights and interests, and partly 
 in principles of public policy, which lie at 
 the basis of civil society. For it is essential 
 to the happiness of social life that the confi- 
 dence subsisting between husband and wife 
 should be sacredly cherished in its most un- 
 limited extent." 
 
 This rule was carried to the extent that 
 an absolute divorce did not render either 
 
 252
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS WITNESSES 253 
 
 spouse competent to testify as to any matter 
 whicli transpired during the continuance of 
 the marriage relation, if such a matter would 
 have been excluded had the marriage relation 
 continued, although after such a divorce 
 either spouse might testify to any matter 
 which did not violate the confidence of their 
 former relation. Nor did the death of one 
 of the spouses remove the seal of secrecy 
 from the lips of the other in regard to con- 
 fidential communications which had taken 
 place between them. It was an early rule of 
 the English law that neither a husband nor a 
 wife ought to be permitted to give any evi- 
 dence in any form of proceeding which would 
 even tend to charge the other with the com- 
 mission of a crime. Later this rule was modi- 
 fied so that in collateral proceedings which 
 did not involve the mutual interests of hus- 
 band and wife either of them might testify 
 to matters which merely tended to incrimi- 
 nate the other, since neither the record of 
 such a collateral proceeding nor the testi- 
 mony given therein could afterward be used 
 as evidence in a direct prosecution against 
 the spouse of the witness. This latter form 
 of the rule has been generally adopted in the 
 United States, though it would seem that tes- 
 timony should not be compelled if the wit- 
 ness declines to give it voluntarily. AVhere 
 a supposed marriage is void, the alleged hus-
 
 254 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 band and wife are competent witnesses for 
 or against each other, even though they in 
 good faith beUeved themselves to have been 
 lawfully married. It has been held that the 
 first and lawful wife of a bigamist is not a 
 competent witness against her husband, and 
 it has been ruled that after prima-facie proof 
 of a valid marriage the first wife is not com- 
 petent to prove such marriage invalid. But 
 after proof of the first marriage the second 
 wife is a competent witness to prove the de- 
 fendant's marriage to her, because such a 
 marriage is void, and she is not his lawful 
 wife. If, however, the second marriage is 
 not disputed, and the question is as to the 
 validity of the first marriage, the alleged sec- 
 ond wife cannot be permitted as a witness, 
 because she is prima facie the lawful wife of 
 the defendant. 
 
 There is an exception to the rule that ex- 
 cludes the testimony of spouses against each 
 other to be found in cases of personal out- 
 rage committed by one upon the other. In 
 all kinds of offenses that involve a personal 
 injury to the wife or affecting her liberty, 
 she has always been allowed to testify di- 
 rectlj^ against her husband as a matter of 
 necessity. And" so where the husband is the 
 injured party, he is allowed to testify against 
 his wife, and they are also allowed to testify 
 in favor of each other. It is only that the
 
 MARRIED WOMEN AS WITNESSES 255 
 
 ends of justice may be attained that this re- 
 laxation of the general rule is made, and it 
 extends no further than necessity requires; 
 therefore the exception is confined to cases 
 of personal violence endangering the bodily 
 safetj^ or liberty of the witness. 
 
 It is now very generally provided through- 
 out the United States, by statute, that where 
 the husband or the wife acts as agent for the 
 other in the course of any business transac- 
 tion, the one that so acts may be a witness 
 for the other with reference to all things that 
 have been done or said within the scope of 
 such an agency. Wherever a wife acts in the 
 presence of her husband she cannot be said 
 generally to act as his agent, and her testi- 
 mony is not, therefore, admissible. The 
 proof of the agency must in such cases be 
 given as a condition precedent to the admis- 
 sion of the testimony of husband or wife, as 
 the case may be, and then such testimony 
 must be confined to matters which properly 
 belong to such agency. Where a wife has 
 kept her husband 's business books of original 
 entry she is a competent witness for him 
 when he sues on a book account. But it is 
 necessary that she has kept the original en- 
 tries, for if she has only made up books from 
 original memoranda made by him from day 
 to day, she is not thereby rendered a compe- 
 tent witness.
 
 256 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 There is another and very useful exception 
 to the rule excluding husband or wife from 
 the witness stand. It is found in eases of 
 actions for damages against railroad com- 
 panies and other common carriers for the loss 
 of luggage. As a wife very commonly packs 
 her husband's trunks and almost always 
 packs her own, and often she alone fully 
 knows the contents of such trunks, her testi- 
 mony is admitted as a matter of necessity. 
 
 In the United States very considerable al- 
 terations of the rules of e^adence have been 
 made, ranging all the way from slight modi- 
 fications of the common-law rule to statutes 
 making husband and wife competent wit- 
 nesses for and against each other in all judi- 
 cial proceedings, subject to the restriction 
 that they are not permitted to testify to mat- 
 ters which come to their knowledge in the 
 confidence of the marriage relation, if objec- 
 tion be made.
 
 THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 
 
 A NOTICEABLE feature of the social de- 
 . velopment of tlie latter half of the nine- 
 teenth century was the giving to women a 
 larger freedom in the choice of occupation 
 and industrial vocation. To a considerable 
 extent, this movement has been reflected in 
 the laws of the several States. The develop- 
 ment of this feature of the civil status of 
 woman is seen, however, to be by no means 
 uniform, but to depend upon local conditions. 
 The law relating to the industrial employ- 
 ment of women is developing along two dis- 
 tinct lines, which may be described as lines 
 of emancipation and limitation. 
 
 The tendency to relieve woman from the 
 restraint which she has labored under in 
 times past in her choice of industrial voca- 
 tions and to place her upon an even footing 
 with man in this respect has been general, 
 but has not everywhere found expression in 
 the law. AATiere such legal expressions have 
 been given, the positions taken are not the 
 same. The radical position in this matter 
 has been taken by those States which have 
 placed in their constitutional or statute law 
 
 17 257
 
 258 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 the bold declaration that sex shall constitute 
 no disqualification for employment. The 
 States of Illinois, California, and Washing- 
 ton have made such declarations, although 
 Illinois and Washington have added restric- 
 tions. The constitution of the State of Cali- 
 fornia is without proviso in this matter, and 
 declares simply that no person shall on ac- 
 count of sex be disqualified from entering or 
 pursuing any lawful business, vocation, or 
 profession. 
 
 The law of both Illinois and Washington 
 contains provisions that are in restraint and 
 also in relief of women. In Illinois it is de- 
 clared that no person shall be precluded or 
 debarred from any occupation, profession, 
 or employment (except military) on account 
 of sex,provided that this act shall not be con- 
 strued to affect the eligibility of any person 
 to an elective office. The same law is also 
 in relief of woman, declaring that it shall 
 not be construed as requiring any female 
 to work on streets or roads or to serve on 
 juries. 
 
 The State of Washington has declared that 
 eveiy avenue of employment shall be open 
 to women, and that any business, vocation, 
 profession, and calling followed and pursued 
 by men may be followed and pursued by 
 women. This law also contains a provision 
 similar to that obtaining in the State of Illi-
 
 THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 259 
 
 nois, that it shall not be construed so as to 
 prevent women from holding public office. 
 
 Legislation in restriction of the employ- 
 ment of women is always addressed to the 
 employers of labor, and in certain cases spe- 
 cifies industries in which women may not be 
 employed, but more often limits the number 
 of hours that shall constitute a legal work- 
 day. 
 
 The prohibited industry is that of mining. 
 The States of Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, 
 Indiana, Pennsylvania, Utah, West Virginia, 
 and W^yoming have so legislated. The States 
 of Alabama and Illinois have forbidden the 
 work of women in any kind of mines, while 
 the States of Colorado, Pennsylvania, and 
 West Virginia forbid the employment of 
 women in coal-mines. The State of Utah, by 
 its constitution, forbids the employment of 
 women in underground mines, and the State 
 of Wyoming forbids their employment in 
 coal, iron, or other dangerous mines. 
 
 The limit set by law upon the number of 
 hours of labor for women is either a simple 
 declaration that so many hours shall consti- 
 tute a legal work-day or a prohibition laid 
 upon the employers of women to allow them 
 to work more than a certain number of hours 
 in a day or week, under the penalty of the 
 employer being found guilty of a misde- 
 meanor. The States of New York and Mas-
 
 260 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 sacliusetts have developed the most detailed 
 mercantile law regulating the emplojanent of 
 women, and the other States are seen to be 
 following in their lead. 
 
 Ten hours of labor is made a legal work- 
 day for women in the States of Connecticut, 
 Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
 New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, 
 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
 and Virginia, and in the Territory of Okla- 
 homa. The shorter work-day of eight hours 
 has been made legal in the States of Illinois 
 and Wisconsin, while the State of New Jer- 
 sey has made fifty-five hours of labor in a 
 week, rendered between seven o'clock in the 
 morning and noon, and between one o'clock 
 and six o'clock in the afternoon, the legal 
 limit. 
 
 Nearly all of the States that have legislated 
 in this matter have made exceptions to the 
 universal application of the legal work-day 
 to all industries. The common exception is 
 farming, where no legal work-day is at- 
 tempted. Another excepted industry is the 
 preserving and canning of perishable fruit 
 and other goods where the exigencies of the 
 season would make a uniform work-day im- 
 practicable. 
 
 By the New York law the work-day for 
 women cannot begin before six o'clock in the 
 morning or continue beyond nine o'clock at 
 night.
 
 THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN 
 
 THE protection of the honor and purity 
 of woman that is afforded by the laws of 
 the several States is not only a feature of 
 her relation to the body politic that is of the 
 highest importance to her, but is also an ab- 
 solutely essential element in the continuous 
 integration and elevation of society. So 
 while the age at which a female is regarded 
 as being able to consent to immorality, and 
 the punishments that are provided by the 
 State in cases of the violation of women, are 
 in their nature matters of the criminal law 
 which lie outside of the limits set for this 
 work, they are so necessary in drawing a 
 general picture of the legal condition of 
 American women that in considering them 
 an exception is rightly made. 
 
 Our laws afford protection to females both 
 by declaring an age under which consent to 
 immorality on the part of the female cannot 
 be presumed in law, and by declaring the 
 violation of a woman to be a misdemeanor or 
 a felony, punishable with greater or lesser 
 penalties. There has been a progression in 
 legislation in both of these matters, and, gen- 
 
 18 261
 
 262 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 erally speaking, while the age of consent has 
 been raised throughout the country, the pen- 
 alty has been reduced from death or impris- 
 onment for life to a more or less limited term 
 of imprisonment or a fine. 
 
 The age under which a girl or young 
 woman will not be regarded by the law as 
 having the capacity to consent to a violation 
 of her person ranges from seven years to 
 eighteen years. In the State of Delaware 
 the age is fixed at seven years. In the States 
 of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
 North Carolina, and South Carolina the age 
 of consent is placed at ten years. Twelve 
 years is the rule in the States of Kentucky, 
 Louisiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 
 New Hampshire has placed the limit at thir- 
 teen years. Fourteen years is the rule in the 
 States of California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
 Maryland, Nevada, Vermont, Virginia, Wis- 
 consin, North Carolina, and the Territory of 
 New Mexico. The two States of Iowa and 
 Texas have placed the age of consent at fif- 
 teen years. Sixteen years is the rule in the 
 States of Arkansas, Connecticut, the District 
 of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min- 
 nesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
 Ohio, the Territory of Oklahoma, Oregon, 
 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
 Washington, and Tennessee. The highest 
 age, that of eighteen years, is the rule in
 
 THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN 2G3 
 
 the Territory of Arizona and in the States 
 of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Ne- 
 braska, New York, Utah, Wyoming. The 
 crime of rape is a misdemeanor between the 
 ages of seven and eighteen in Delaware, be- 
 tween the ages of ten and fourteen in North 
 Carolina, and between the ages of twelve and 
 sixteen years and one day in Tennessee. 
 
 The penalties provided by the statutes of 
 the various States for the crime of rape are 
 so varied that general classification of the 
 States is impossible, and a clear idea of the 
 condition of the law in this respect can be 
 had only by considering the statutes of each 
 State separately. In Alabama the penalty is 
 death or imprisonment for life in the peni- 
 tentiary, at the discretion of the jury. In 
 Arizona it is confinement in the Territorial 
 prison for life or for a term of years not 
 less than five. Arkansas provides imprison- 
 ment in the penitentiary for not less than five 
 years nor for more than twenty-one years. In 
 California the penalty is imprisonment in the 
 penitentiary for not less than five years, in 
 Colorado for not less than one year nor more 
 than twenty years, and in Connecticut impris- 
 onment for not less than three years. In Del- 
 aware the penalty is death, but the offense is 
 only a misdemeanor between seven and eigh- 
 teen years of age, and the offender can only 
 be fined, and for not more than one thousand
 
 264 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 dollars, or imprisonment for a term of years, 
 not more than seven, or both fined and im- 
 prisoned, in the discretion of the court. The 
 law in the District of Columbia provides for 
 the first offense imprisonment at hard labor 
 in the penitentiary for not more than fifteen 
 years, and for each subsequent offense not 
 more than thirty years. In Florida the pen- 
 alty is death or imprisonment for life. In 
 Georgia, also, the penalty is death, unless the 
 defendant is recommended to mercy by the 
 jury, in which case the punishment is hard 
 labor in the penitentiary for not less than 
 one year nor longer than twenty years. Idaho 
 provides imprisonment for five years, and this 
 may be extended to life ; and Illinois for one 
 year, with the same extension. Indiana pro- 
 vides a term of from one to twenty-one years, 
 and Iowa imprisonment for life or any term 
 of years. Kansas provides imprisonment at 
 hard labor for from five to twenty-one years. 
 Kentuclcy inflicts the penalty of death or im- 
 prisonment for life, at the discretion of the 
 jury. Louisiana inflicts the penalty of death. 
 Maine provides imprisonment for life or for 
 any term of years. In Maryland the offen- 
 der, at the discretion of the court, suffers 
 death or imprisonment in the penitentiary 
 for a definite period of not less than eigh- 
 teen months nor more than twenty-one years. 
 Massachusetts provides imprisonment for
 
 THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN 265 
 
 life or any term of years, and Michigan im- 
 prisonment for life or for any such period as 
 the court in its discretion shall direct. 
 
 In Minnesota, if the child is under ten 
 years the penalty is imprisonment for life; 
 if over ten and under fourteen, a term of 
 not less than ten nor more than thirty years ; 
 if over fourteen and under sixteen. State 
 prison for not less than one nor more than 
 seven years, or imprisonment in the county 
 jail for not less than three months nor more 
 than one year. Mississippi provides a pen- 
 alty of death, unless the jury decide upon im- 
 prisonment for life. In Missouri it is imjjris- 
 onment in the penitentiary for two years, or a 
 fine of from one hundred to five hundred dol- 
 lars, or imprisonment in the county jail for 
 from one to six months, or both such fine and 
 imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 
 Montana gives State prison for not less than 
 five years, Nebraska for not less than three 
 nor more than twenty years, and Nevada for 
 not less than five years, which may extend to 
 life. New Hampshire provides a term of im- 
 prisonment not exceeding thirty years. New 
 Jersey inflicts a fine not exceeding one thou- 
 sand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor 
 for any term of years not exceeding fifteen, or 
 both, and New Mexico a term of not less than 
 five nor more than twenty years. In New 
 York, for the first degree, the penalty is a term
 
 266 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 of not more than twenty years, and for tlie 
 second degree not more than ten years. North 
 Carolina, if the victim be under ten years, 
 the penalty of death; if over ten and under 
 fourteen, fine or imprisonment in the State 
 l^rison, at the discretion of the court, if the 
 female was previously chaste. North Dakota 
 provides for the first degree a term of not 
 less than ten years and for the second degree 
 not less than five years, and Ohio provides 
 for a tenn of from three to twenty years. In 
 Oklahoma, for the first degree, when the girl 
 is under fourteen years, a term of not less 
 than ten years; for the second degree, not 
 less than five years, provided that the female 
 is of previous chaste and virtuous character. 
 Oregon provides imprisonment for not less 
 than three nor more than twenty years, and 
 j)rior unchastity of the woman is no defense. 
 Pennsylvania inflicts a fine of not over one 
 thousand dollars and imprisonment by sepa- 
 rate and solitary confinement at hard labor, 
 or simple imprisonment not exceeding fif- 
 teen years, and Rhode Island imprisonment 
 for life or for any term not less than ten 
 years. South Carolina inflicts the death 
 penalty, with privilege of the jury to rec- 
 ommend to mercy, when the penalty may 
 be reduced to imprisonment at hard labor 
 for life. South Dakota gives, for the first 
 degree, a term of not less than ten years,
 
 THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN 2G7 
 
 and for the second degree not less than five 
 years. In Tennessee, if the girl is under 
 twelve years the penalty is death by hanging 
 or, in the discretion of the jury, a life term 
 or not less than ten years. The penalty in 
 Texas is death or imprisonment for not less 
 than five years, in the discretion of the jury, 
 and in Utah the same imprisonment. Ver- 
 mont inflicts a term of not more than twenty 
 years and a fine of not more than two hun- 
 dred dollars, or either penalty, in the discre- 
 tion of the court. Virginia inflicts, in the dis- 
 cretion of the juiy, the death penalty or 
 imprisonment of from five to twenty years, 
 and Washington imprisonment for life or any 
 term of years. West Virginia inflicts the 
 death penalty or, in the discretion of the 
 jury, imprisonment for not less than seven 
 nor more than twenty years. Wisconsin in- 
 flicts a term of from five to thirty-five years, 
 and Wyoming a term of imprisonment of 
 not less than one year, which may extend 
 to life.
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES 
 
 THE following table of constitutional and 
 statute laws relating to the property 
 rights of married women will be found of 
 use to those who may desire to undertake 
 more detailed studies of this subject. This 
 table is not exhaustive, but it affords start- 
 ing-points for the examination of the laws of 
 each State. 
 ALABAMA.-Code of 1843 ; February 28, 1887 ; 
 
 February 18, 1895. 
 Aeizona.— Code, 1864-71 ; Januaiy 22, 1871; 
 
 February 19, 1881. 
 Arkansas. — Constitution of 1874. 
 CALiFOKNiA.-March 9, 1870; March 21, 1872. 
 Colorado. — November 7, 1861. 
 Connecticut. — 1809; April 20, 1877. 
 Delaware.- April 9, 1873; March 17, 1875. 
 District of Columbia.— Code of 1857; April 
 
 10, 1869. 
 Florida. -February 11, 1881; Code of 1891. 
 GEORGiA.-Code of 1882. 
 IDAHO.-Code of 1887. 
 Illinois.— March 3, 1845; February 21 and 
 
 April 24, 1861 ; March 24, 1869. 
 
 268
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES 2G9 
 
 Indiana.— March 3, 1859; May 31, 1879; 
 
 April 16 and September 19, 1881. 
 Iowa.- April 14, 1870; Code of 1873. 
 Kansas.— October 31, 1868. 
 Kentucky.— April 11, 1873; March 15, 1894. 
 Louisiana,— Code of 1889. 
 MAiNE.-March 22, 1844; Code of 1857. 
 Maryland. -June 12, 1860; May 13, 1882. 
 Massachusetts.— May 5, 1855. 
 Michigan.— Constitution of 1850; February 
 
 13, 1855. 
 Minnesota.— March 5 and June 1, 1869. 
 Mississippi. — Code of 1880. 
 Missouri.— March 25, 1875; April 17, 1877; 
 
 June 11, 1889. 
 Montana.— January 12, 1872; February 4, 
 
 1874; March 7, 1887. 
 Nebraska. -March 1, 1871; March 3, 1881. 
 Nevada.— February 27 and March 10, 1873. 
 New Hampshire.— July 4 and August 1, 
 
 1860; July 18, 1876. 
 New Jersey. -March 25, 1852 ; April 2, 1873 ; 
 
 March 27, 1874. 
 New Mexico.— January 12, 1852; April 2, 
 
 1884. 
 New YoRK.-March 20, 1860; April 25, 1867; 
 
 Laws of 1896, chapter 272. 
 North Carolina.— January 29, 1849; Feb- 
 ruary 12, 1872. 
 North Dakota.— January 12, 1866; January 
 
 13, 1871.
 
 270 WOMAN AND THE LAW 
 
 OHio.-Code of 1835; Code of 1880; March 
 
 19, 1887. 
 Oklahoma.— Code of 1893. 
 Oregon.— December 15, 1854; October 21, 
 
 1878. 
 Pennsylvania.— April 11, 1848; April 3, 
 
 1872. 
 Rhode Island.— January, 1856; May 26 and 
 
 June 1, 1833. 
 South Carolina.— January 12, 1866; Janu- 
 ary 13, 1871. 
 TENNESSEE.-March 2, 1870; Code of 1840. 
 Utah.— February 16, 1872; February 18, 
 
 1876; August 1, 1884. 
 Vermont.— November 15, 1847; November 
 
 26, 1884; November 19, 1888. 
 Virginia. -Code of 1849; April 4, 1877. 
 Washington.— November 14, 1879. 
 West Virginia.— March 2, 1868; February 
 
 16, 1883. 
 Wisconsin.— February 1, 1850; March 14, 
 
 1859; March 25, 1872. 
 Wyoming.— December 4, 1869.
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 Actions by married women, 185 
 Adoption of children, 50 
 Age for valid marriage, 11, 12 
 Alien women, 241 et seq. 
 Alienation of affections, 36 
 Alimony, 113 
 
 Attorneys for married women, 
 147 
 
 Bigamy, 16 
 
 Ceremony of marriage, 19 
 Change of name after divorce, 
 
 116 
 
 Citizen women, 237 
 Civil contract of marriage, 7 
 Common-law marriage, 22 
 Consanguinity and afi&nlty, 13 
 Consent to marriage, 18 
 Construction of statutes, 10 
 Contract to marry, 3 
 Contracts between husband and 
 
 wife, 203 
 Contracts of married women, 
 
 200 
 
 Damages for breach of contract 
 to marry, 6 
 
 Debts of wife before marriage, 
 30 
 
 Deeds by married women, 210 
 
 Dissolution of marriage, 17 
 
 Divorce, 55 
 
 Alabama, 55; Arizona, 56; 
 Arkansas, 58; California, 59; 
 Colorado, 60 ; Connecticut, 01 ; 
 Delaware, 62; District of Co- 
 lumbia, 63; Florida, 64; Geor- 
 gia, 64 ; Idaho, 65 ; Illinois, 66 ; 
 Indiana, 66 ; Iowa, 67 ; Kansas, 
 68 ; Kentucky, 69 ; Louisiana, 
 70; Maine, 71; Maryland, 72; 
 Massachusetts, 73; Michigan, 
 74 ; Minnesota, 76 ; Mississippi, 
 
 77 ; Missouri, 78 ; Montana, 79 ; 
 Nebraska, 80 ; Nevada, 81 ; New 
 Hampshire, 82; New Mexico, 
 83; New York, 83; New Jersey, 
 84 ; North Carolina, 85 ; North 
 Dakota, 86; Ohio, 87; Okla- 
 homa, 88 ; Oregon, 89 : Penn- 
 sylvania, 90 ; Rhode Island, 91 ; 
 South Carolina, 93 ; South Da- 
 kota, 93 ; Tennessee, 94 ; Texas, 
 95; Utah, 96; Vermont, 97; 
 Virginia, 98; Washington, 99; 
 West Virginia, 100; Wiscon- 
 sin, 102; Wyoming, 103 
 
 Divorces among the Mormons, 
 109 
 
 Dotal property, Louisiana law, 
 152 
 
 Dower, 128 et seq. 
 Assignment of dower, 137; 
 barring of dower, 132 
 
 Elements of valid marriage, 8, 9 
 Employment of women, 257 
 Encouragement of maiTiage, 8 
 
 Former marriage, 15 
 
 Guardianship of children, 45 
 
 Husband and wife, 28 
 
 License for marriage, 10 
 Limited divorce, 105 
 Loss of consortium, 36 
 
 Marriage, 7 
 
 Marriage settlements, 123 
 
 Married woman's separate es- 
 tate, 142 et seq. 
 
 Married women as sole traders, 
 219 
 
 Married women as special part- 
 ners, 147 
 
 273
 
 274 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Married women as witnesses, 
 
 252 
 Mental capacity, 12 
 Miscegenation, 14 
 
 Nullity suits, 22 
 
 Ownership of patents, 149 
 Ownership of stock, 146 
 
 Paraphernalia, 150 
 
 Plural marriages of the Mor- 
 mons, 24 
 
 Polygamy, 16 
 
 Presumption of life, 15 
 
 Prohibited kinship in marriage, 
 14 
 
 Proof of marriage, 21 
 
 Property rights of married 
 women 
 
 Alabama, 159; Arizona, 160 
 Arkansas, 161 ; California, 162 
 Colorado, 163 ; Delaware, 164 
 District of Columbia, 165 
 Florida, 166; Georgia, 166 
 Idaho, 167; Illinois, 168; In- 
 diana, 169; Iowa, 170; Kansas, 
 171 ; Kentucky, 171 ; Louisi- 
 ana, 172; Maine, 174; Mary- 
 land, 174; Massachusetts, 175 
 Michigan, 176; Minnesota, 178 
 Mississippi, 178; Missouri, 179 
 Montana, 180 ; Nebraska, 181 
 Nevada, 182 ; New Hampshire, 
 183; New Jersey, 184; New 
 Mexico, 185; New York, 185; 
 North Carolina, 186; North 
 Dakota, 187 ; Ohio, 187 ; Okla- 
 
 homa, 188 ; Oregon, 189 ; Penn- 
 sylvania, 190 ; Rhode Island, 
 190; South Carolina, 191; 
 South Dakota, 191 ; Tennessee, 
 192; Texas, 193; Utah, 194; 
 Vermont, 195; Virginia, 195; 
 Washington, 196; West Vir- 
 ginia, 197 ; Wisconsin, 198 ; 
 Wyoming, 199 
 
 Prosecution and defense of 
 suits, 144 
 
 Protection of women, 261 
 
 Record of marriage, 21 
 Restraint of marriage, 8 
 Right of a wife to support, 40 
 et seq. 
 
 Rules of construction of stat- 
 utes, 206 
 
 Separate examination of a wife, 
 213 
 Spanish law, 16 
 
 Table of statutes, 268 
 
 Torts of a personal nature, 34 
 
 Torts of a wife, 31 
 
 Uniform divorce law, 117 
 
 Void and voidable marriages, 17 
 
 WiUs by married women, 217 
 
 Woman suffrage, 246 
 
 Women and the homestead 
 
 laws, 228 
 Women as attorneys, 249
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 Los Angeles 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 
 
 /??/?¥ 5'o 
 
 
 on 
 
 "' MAY 1 ms 
 
 
 m\.m n f«lff' 
 
 A, OCT 16 1995 
 TEB 7 1997 
 
 A 
 
 
 iff 
 ORC 
 
 i 
 
 LD 
 URL 
 
 
 Form L9- 
 
 t 
 
 k 
 
 $1
 
 3 1158 00008 9440 
 
 HQ 
 
 1255 
 B3W 
 
 !!!••• 
 
 ■ o 
 K 
 
 fl