BANCROFT LIBRARY 
 
 
BATTLE 
 
 OF 
 
 BUENA VISTA 
 
 
 FROM THE "SOUTHERN QUARTERLY REVIEW," FOR JANUARY, 1851. 
 
 CHARLESTON, S. C. : 
 
 STEAM POWER -PRESS OF WALKER <fc JAMES, NO. 101 EAST -BAY. 
 
 1851. 
 
BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA. 
 
 1. The Battle of Buena Vista, with the Operations of the 
 Army of Occupation, for one month. By JAMES HENRY 
 CARLETON, Capt. First Regiment of Dragoons. New- 
 York: Harper & Brothers. 1848. 
 
 2. The War with Mexico ; by R. S. RIPLEY, Brevet Ma 
 jor in the United States Army, First Lieutenant of the 
 Second Regiment of Artillery, etc. In 2 vols. New- 
 York: Harper & Brothers, publishers. 1849. 
 
 3. Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico ; by 
 Capt. W. S. HENRY, U. S. Army. With engravings. 
 New- York: Harper & Brothers. 1847. 
 
 4. The Mexican War ; a history of its origin, and a 
 detailed account of the victories, which terminated 
 in the surrender of the capital, etc.; to which is added 
 the treaty of peace, and valuable tables, etc. By 
 EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, Graduate of the United States 
 Military Academy. New- York : Published by A. S. 
 Barnes & Co. 1850. 
 
 5. Congressional Documents, 18489. 
 
 IN a preceding number, the campaign of Gen. Taylor 
 has been traced to the capitulation of Monterey. The 
 limited space allowed us prevented the full discussion of 
 our subject in a single paper, and excluded many minor 
 views and illustrations, relating to the operations and 
 battles that were criticised. Compelled to divide the 
 Mexican career of Taylor into two periods, which, for 
 symmetry and force, should have been included in a sin 
 gle representation, \ve sought the most natural point of 
 separation, and drew our first conclusion, at the temporary 
 suspension of arms, after the conquest of Monterey. Other 
 reasons conduced to this selection. To that time, Taylor 
 had been our sole commander in Mexico he had battled 
 entirely, or in a large proportion, with regulars he had' 
 enjoyed the implicit confidence of his government, and 
 had regulated his movements according to his own judg 
 ment, and on his own responsibility, with little, if any 
 interference, on the part of his superiors in authority ; and, 
 as we have seen, his success was complete, under innu 
 merable adverse circumstances. Subsequently, however, 
 there was a change in all these particulars, except the 
 last. The reliance of his government was somewhat 
 
4 9 
 
 Battle of Buena Vista. 3 
 
 weakened by the armistice at Monterey by differing 
 with him on the policy of establishing a defensive line, 
 as urged by Taylor, and advocated by Mr. Calhoun and 
 others and perhaps, also, by political considerations, since 
 it was then first intimated that Taylor might become a 
 successful candidate for the presidency. Another chief, 
 and of higher rank, was ordered into the field, and, al 
 though operating on a different line, (not so directed defi 
 nitely,* however,) Taylor was thus subjected to a double 
 supervision, which was, to a degree, exercised ; and nearly 
 all his veteran troops were taken from him those whom 
 he had taught to conquer, against every odds, and between 
 whom and their leader existed that ardent attachment 
 which bound the tenth legion to Caesar. Yet his advice, 
 here, was partially adopted. On the 15th of October, 
 1846, he recommended, for a decisive blow on Mexico, 
 through Vera Cruz, 25,000 men,f of which 10,000 should 
 be regulars, when, at that time, he had but 3,000 regulars 
 with his army ; and, on the 12th of November, for the 
 reduction of Vera Cruz and the Castle only, he advised 
 10,000 men,! of which 4,000 should be regulars, and pro 
 mised to hold 3,000 regulars in readiness, to meet the re 
 mainder from the States. In thus volunteering to deprive 
 himself of the sure means of victory, and to incur the ex 
 posure to disaster and defeat, with inexperienced soldiers, 
 or compelling himself to inactivity and a defensive attitude, 
 he made an offering to patriotism, without a parallel in 
 military history ; but it beautifully illustrates the maxim, 
 that "he never errs who sacrifices self," by placing to his 
 military career the crown of imperishable glory. The 
 after achievement was more important, and certainly 
 more brilliant, than any that preceded it ; which may be 
 ascribed to the vaster crisis of his position, and to the 
 higher energy, the superior courage, and the more deter 
 mined will, that it awakened and developed. 
 
 Our topic, therefore, will commence with the resumption 
 of hostilities, in Nov., 1846 ; and Gen. Taylor's progress 
 will be briefly presented, to the consummation of his splen 
 did victory of Buena Vista. But, before proceeding to 
 its consideration, it is proper that we should allude, how- 
 
 * Letter of Secretary Marcy to General Scott, Nov. 23d, 188. Ex. Doc. 
 number 60, p. 836. 
 
 f Letter General Taylor, Ex. Doc. number 60, p. 361. 
 | Ibid, p. 374. 
 
4 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 ever briefly, to some of our authorities. It was designed 
 to do this, before the completion of our original plan ; but 
 this completion may be long postponed, possibly never 
 executed, and, as it neither accords with our inclination, 
 nor with our regard for the truth and impartiality of his 
 tory, to omit all notice of the writers on the war, we will 
 delay it no longer. Of the many who have contributed 
 letters touching the events, or sketches of battles, or cam 
 paigns, or full military and political histories of the times, 
 and bearing on our subject, we will, on this occasion, 
 name only four. It has been remarked that, in reading a 
 historical work, it is a desideratum to know the character 
 of the author, his situation in society, his political and 
 domestic relations, and the important circumstances ol 
 his life, as capable of furnishing a key to his writings, or 
 a ground of confidence in his statements. We are fortu 
 nate in possessing this knowledge of three of our authors 
 these are all officers of the army, distinguished for merit, 
 as their brevets indicate, and, as they have demonstrated, 
 each competent to give an accurate and perspicuouus 
 account of both the campaigns in Mexico. We will 
 take them up in the order of rank. 
 
 Captain (now Brevet Major) Henry, in his " Campaign 
 Sketches," has given a narrative of the operations of 
 Taylor's army, to which he was attached, from the land 
 ing at Corpus Christi to the battle of Buena Vista. He 
 is not comprehensive in details, nor does he aim at com 
 pleteness. He omits the discussion of the plans of cam 
 paign, and makes little if any scientific criticism, either 
 on plans or battles. His descriptions of the last are clear 
 and correct, and all his facts are reliable. But the espe 
 cial interest of his volumes consists in presenting, in easy 
 and flowing language, in a diary form, graphic delinea 
 tions of the country traversed incidents of the various 
 marches anecdotes and chit-chat of camp the manner of 
 death, in battle, of many officers becoming notices of the 
 author's comrades, and touching eulogiums on his friends, 
 who were slain. Devoid of pretension and malice, and exhi 
 biting often his own lively and joyous disposition, spirited, 
 humorous, pathetic, as the scene required, the work affords 
 very pleasant reading, and is highly creditable to its wri 
 ter. 
 
 Captain (now Brevet Major) Carleton wrote an account 
 of the battle of Buena Vista, including the operations of 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 5 
 
 the " army of occupation " for one month. We esteem 
 this quite a brilliant performance. It contains some errors 
 and omissions, demanding revision and correction, and a 
 few redundancies, to which the pruning knife could be 
 judiciously applied. Thus perfected, it would present the 
 most full, forcible and finished description of this great 
 battle, and would survive all the partial and more ephe 
 meral indeed, all the sketches yet written. The impor 
 tant events are prominently exhibited, in the gorgeous 
 style of a rich imagination, yet generally with correct 
 taste. He participated in the scenes he describes an 
 important advantage over others he witnessed what he 
 depicts, with some of the colouring, but more than the 
 truth of poetry, and, impressed with the grandeur of the 
 achievement, he often rises into eloquence. The book is 
 a monument to his ability, beyond any of his deeds in 
 arms will live when they shall be forgotten, whatever 
 they may be and is worthy of permanent place in the 
 American library. 
 
 Lieutenant (and Brevet Major, also,) Ripley has offered 
 the only complete history yet written of the entire war. 
 He is a younger man, a younger officer, and less familiar 
 with the pen, than the others. The task he assumed was 
 a bold and ambitious one ; but indefatigable energy, a 
 characteristic of the man, has accomplished it. We are 
 surprised that he should have entered so fully into the 
 political discussions of the day. But it is more to be 
 wondered at, that he should have adopted with enthusiasm 
 his political creed right, as we are constrained to say it 
 is, and have permitted it to bias his judgment upon mili 
 tary operations, and military achievements, when accom 
 plished by leaders professing an antagonist political 
 faith. This is certainly an error on the part of a soldier. 
 Like other citizens, he is entitled to his opinions ; and 
 when the State law, wherever his station may be, autho 
 rizes, he may vote accordingly. And, on all suitable oc 
 casions, he is at liberty, temperately and judiciously, to 
 express his convictions. But it is not his province to be 
 an active partisan, nor is it consistent with his position. 
 He is commissioned for life, and owes subordination to 
 existing power. His superiors in the government are 
 liable to change ; not so with himself. The exponents of 
 his principles may continue at the head of affairs but for 
 a brief period ; the opponents may attain the ascendancy, 
 and, with too much political ardour, carried away by 
 
6 Battle of Bucna Vista. 
 
 strong adherence to the one, and bitter dislike of the other, 
 he may reluctantly and negligently perform what the last 
 might require of him. In a General, it might, in war. lead 
 to disaster and national disgrace ; in peace, to endless 
 orders and evasions, and consequent detriment to the pub 
 lic interest. In a junior officer, the proclivity would exist, 
 yet the evil not occur, only through failure of the power 
 and the opportunity. A military writer of a military his 
 tory and Napier, whom our author admires, is an excellent 
 example should deal with politics in general, rather than 
 in detail ; without ever descending into minute analyses of 
 political questions, or denunciations of political parties, 
 or sarcasms on political leaders. He should present a 
 clear, accurate atid comprehensive narrative of military 
 events, with lucid and applicable professional criticism, 
 and with allusions to State affairs, and such only, as may 
 be essential to a proper understanding of the military 
 operations. But, a military work, vindicating one set of 
 political principles, and one political sect, with ex parte 
 earnestness, and correspondingly depreciating their oppo- 
 sites, whatever may be its pretensions, cannot be received 
 as impartial history, and, whatever its literary merit, is 
 not becoming to the dignity of a gallant soldier. 
 
 It has been said that Major Ripley did not write the 
 book that bears his name. The army, generally, enter 
 tain this opinion, and some have even asserted that he 
 never saw it until published ! A member of the military 
 family of a certair distinguished general in the war, it 
 has been said that the chief dictated and arranged, and 
 the subordinate (aide) adopted and fathered the history. 
 It is affirmed that the last possessed neither the political 
 experience and knowledge, nor the partisan rancour, exhi 
 bited in its pages; nor could he have wielded the contro 
 versial pen which defends the administration and depre 
 ciates the (supposed) opposition generals. Suspicion has 
 even gone so far as to intimate that two political writers 
 are implicated in its production one having been a con 
 spicuous member of Mr. Folk's cabinet. From our peru 
 sal, we did not derive these impressions, and we regard 
 the criticism as unduly harsh. That the military portion 
 of the book may be mainly attributed to Ripley we have 
 no doubt. The military terms, the tactical phraseology, 
 the quotations from Napier, interspersed through the de 
 scriptions of the combats, and elsewhere, and the air 01 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 7 
 
 assumed authority, in giving utterance to oracular military 
 dicta, are certainty Ripley's. A difference, perhaps, in 
 style more terse, more pointed, and barbed with personal 
 venom, of wider grasp, and more equally sustained may 
 indicate the work of an older and more interested head, 
 in some, if not all, of the controversial chapters. And, in 
 corroboration, without quoting many pages equally con 
 vincing, we refer to the second volume, pp. 222, 363 and 
 629, in which the writer speaks like one in power, and 
 almost assumes the first person. But, without distinguish 
 ing the authors, and their several parts, we will regard 
 the book^^as a whole, and remark upon it as a truthful 
 and " impartial " history, as professed to be in its preface. 
 The work is quite well written, and is printed and pub 
 lished in the usually good style of the Harpers. In dic 
 tion, it is, in places, diffusive and somewhat heavy, and 
 new expressions, such as "adulous," vol. i., p. 62, are 
 occasionally coined. Here and there, are manifested 
 more of the smartness of special pleading, than of the 
 grave analysis and deliberate judgment of historical wri 
 ting. Yet there is much vivid and forcible narrative 
 the combats are depicted with warmth and correctness, 
 and the manner, in general, is direct and perspicuous. 
 The sources of information have been thoroughly ran 
 sacked much industry of research, and much labour of 
 investigation, and an able sifting of documents, are ob 
 vious. The Mexican authorities were also attentively 
 examined their State matters well discussed their civil 
 and military dissensions, the purposes and policy of their 
 leaders and parties ; and the influences exerted on all, by 
 the progress of the war, are strongly presented. And in 
 this respect the book will be highly valuable for future 
 reference, since it is very doubtful if the same data can 
 be again collected. It was scarcely necessary, however, 
 to give the Mexican statements prominence over our 
 own, and least of all was it proper to base upon them 
 censures of our generals, as in vol. i., p. 441, in which 
 blame is cast on Taylor for not acting at Buena Vista as 
 a Mexican officer subsequently said that he might have 
 done with success ! The introductory history of Mexico 
 is summary and satisfactory. The account of Kearney's 
 march to Santa Fe of the conquest of New Mexico of 
 the civil government erected, with its defence, is well 
 written; temperate, truthful and sufficiently copious. No 
 prejudice is betrayed here ; ample justice is done to all 
 
8 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 concerned, and the narrative is without redundancies. 
 Were the entire history penned in the same spirit of can 
 dour with this chapter, it would be a valuable record of 
 our achievements a standard authority and worthy a 
 permanent place in every library. Wool's expedition, 
 destined for Chihuahua, is similarly handled, and merits 
 similar praise. And we will include, likewise, the sketch 
 es of naval operations. The recital of events in Califor 
 nia is made with great minuteness, and the comments 
 on the difficulties that arose among the American lead 
 ers* are liberal, and, we think, just. 
 
 * Several errors are committed, for one of which Ripley is not blameable, 
 since he adopted the official report of Com. Sloat ; but two of them demand 
 of us some notice. A pretty thorough account of this conquest may be found 
 in the Review, of July, 1849, and, to fortify asseverations there, we are con 
 strained to take issue with Ripley and his authorities. He says that Com. 
 Sloat received information at Mazatlan, on 7th June, 1846, that induced him 
 to make a descent on California, and Sloat's letter, of 31st July, 1846, justifies 
 him. To the assertion, we offer the following, in contradiction. On the 31st 
 of May, the Commodore wrote, that he had "received such intelligence as 
 would justify his acting." On th 6th of June, (Cong. Doc., 1st session 30th 
 Cong. Report Senate Com., number 75,) he said that, on reflection, he could 
 not act. and that it was humiliating, etc., because to all the world it appeared 
 " that we were actually at war on the other (Gulf ) coast." For this timidity 
 he was afterwards rebuked by Secretary Bancroft. Now, we ask what more 
 could he have learned next day, (the 7th June,) to determine him, than that 
 hostilities existed between the two countries ? As stated on the 6th, he was, 
 at all events, going to California. He arrived on the 2d July, and, hearing of 
 Fremont's movements, who had revolutionized the province, presumed they 
 were authorized, and on the 7th he took the town of Monterey. On 6th July 
 he had written to Capt. Montgomery, at San Francisco, that he " preferred 
 being sacrificed for doing too much, rather than too little." (same Document,) 
 Why sacrificed at all, if he received news on 7th June, to justify him, under 
 bis orders of 24th of June, 1845 ? But Fremont clinches the matter, when he 
 deposes thus before the above named committee : " He (Sloat, at Monterey, 
 on Fremont's arrival there, 19th July,) then inquired to know under what 
 instructions I had acted, in taking up arms under the Mexican authorities. I 
 informed him that I had acted on my own responsibility, and without any 
 authority from the government, to justify hostilities. Commodore Sloat ap 
 peared greatly disturbed with this information, and gave me distinctly to un 
 derstand, that, in raising the flag at Monterey, he had acted upon the faith of 
 our operations in the North" 
 
 Ripley says, again, that Fre'mont reported to Gen. Kearney, as command 
 ing the ft-rces," at Los Angelos, and intimates, on this account, more severe 
 censure for his subsequent disobedience. Now, Fre'mont did not report to 
 Kearney at all. He wrote a private letter, in reply to several notes of the 
 same character. When the convention of Cowenga was sent to Angelos, the 
 bearer, Col. Russell, was directed tc ascertain who was in command, and to 
 deliver it accordingly. (Testimony of Col. Russell, Fremont's Court Martial, 
 p. 321.) By the testimony of both Russell and Kearney, pp. 321, 324, the 
 last acknowledged Stockton to be supreme, advised the delivery of the paper 
 to him, and it was done. It was never offered to Kearney. These items are 
 of no great importance, but we cite and refute them to establish truth, and to 
 prove what we had previously writtea 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 9 
 
 Little more may be said in praise of the work. The 
 remainder is composed in a reprehensible spirit of parti- 
 zanship. The views it offers are altogether one-sided ; 
 the arguments in support are too shallow, to impose 
 either on the student of history or on those who are fami 
 liar with the matters in dispute. The ordinary reader, 
 however, of which class the masses consist, is liable to be 
 warped into prejudice, and induced to look with cold ad 
 miration on the glorious deeds of some of the greatest 
 soldiers in our annals, and to learn, in the end, to regard 
 those deeds as due, not in any degree, to the high qualities 
 of these chiefs, but to the mere chances of fortune. To 
 aid in dispelling such delusions, and in averting somewhat 
 the ill consequences of such impressions, we will briefly 
 dissect a portion of the book not to make an exposure 
 of even a large part of its unfair reasoning and false 
 conclusions, but sufficiently so to disclose the animus of 
 the author. 
 
 An elaborate vindication of the administration is at 
 tempted, upon every point that has been brought into con 
 troversy. Discredit or error is not allowed, in any in 
 stance. The country had pronounced judgment, and Mr. 
 Polk and his minister received liberal commendation, for 
 the generally able discharge of their duties. The conduct 
 of the war was in striking contrast with that of 1812, and 
 the credit was awarded where it was merited. But these 
 officers possessed neither omniscience nor ubiquity ; their 
 judgments were human, and therefore fallible, and, in the 
 management of a foreign war, waged 1500 to 2000 miles 
 from the seat of government, it was not only natural, but 
 inevitable, that blunders should be sometimes committed 
 That there were such, every candid mind, however in 
 clined to the existing authorities, must acknowledge. Foi 
 some, there are valid excuses ; for others, depending upon 
 political party aims, rather than purely patriotic impulses 
 and objects, there can be none and the discriminating 
 writer, honestly endeavouring to establish truth, must 
 censure or condemn, as the case requires. 
 
 At p. 250-1, vol. i., Ripley makes a warm defence of 
 the authorities at Washington. At 355, he vindicates the 
 Secretary for issuing an order directly to Gen. Patterson, 
 instead of transmitting it through Taylor, to prepare for 
 an attack on Tampico. He says, the violation of this 
 great principle, can ordinarily " lead to nothing but evil,'* 
 
10 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 and, in the next breath, remarks, that it was not " very 
 flagrant" in this case. If the military principle is of 
 the prominence he gives it, and we fully concur, any vio 
 lation, under any circumstances, must inevitably terminate 
 in immediate or remote evil. It strikes at the very root 
 of subordination, and a single exercise of such power, by 
 an authority like the head, of the war department, would 
 be a precedent and a sanction for its exercise through all 
 the grades of service, tending to subvert all order and 
 discipline. There is no military rule, perhaps, of greater 
 force, than to preserve " the chain of communication (of 
 orders) which binds the military compact,"* and it is for 
 tunate that occasions arise at intervals for its practical 
 assertion and general recognition. Gen. Jackson was 
 similarly interfered with, in 1817, (see letter, Nashville, 
 Tenn., April 22d, 1817,) and did not hesitate to resent 
 it in the strongest terms, although at a period of profound 
 peace, when little of the detriment might have accrued 
 which was calculated to affect Taylor, engaged in a for 
 eign war. The principle, however, existed at all times, 
 and its assertion was equally necessary, in peace and war. 
 Taylor protested, in a manly letter, and the Secretary 
 returned some sort of an apology. Yet Ripley justifies 
 it, on grounds quite flimsy to military men, and declares 
 the departure from a fundamental maxim not " very fla 
 grant." But, a soldier himself, we do not regard this as 
 his opinion, and we offer it as one proof of his strong 
 political bias. At p. 503, vol. i., the President is sustained 
 in the most wanton and indefensible of all his acts the 
 recommendation to create the office of Lieutenant Gene 
 ral, with the intimation that Benton was to fill it. The 
 friends of Mr. Polk regarded the measure as ill advised, 
 since a majority of them, we believe, united in rejecting 
 the bill to authorize it. And the good faith of Mr. Polk, 
 as an officer and a man, is seriously implicated. The 
 President and Scott became reconciled in Nov., 1846. 
 They had "many long personal interviews"! the pro 
 gress of the war, the plans for its prosecution, including 
 the Vera Cruz expedition, were discussed mutual confi 
 dence appeared to be restored Scott was unrcservedly 
 entrusted with the command in Mexico, and left for the 
 
 * Gen. Jackson's letter, 22d April, 1817- 
 f Scott's letter, 24th Feb., 1848. 
 
(h 
 
 Battle of Buena Vista. 1 1 
 
 seat of war, with expressions of " fervent gratitude" for the 
 " confidence and kindness " of the President. Yet, Ripley 
 -isays, Mansfield &teg and Benton stated it publicly, that this 
 same President, eVen then, had resolved to supersede Scott 
 in command of the army in the field ! The Secretary 
 wrote to Scott, 23d Nov., 1846, "It is not proposed to con 
 trol your operations by definite and positive instructions. 
 * # * rpjjg WO rk is before you, and the means provided 
 are committed to you, in the full confidence that you will 
 use them to the best advantage." This looks very much 
 like yielding entire control to Scott, and must have in 
 spired him with the belief, that he was to command the 
 army to the conquest of peace. And we know that such 
 was his opinion, for, when informed that a Lieutenant 
 General was to be created, (he then at the Brazos,) so 
 impressed was he with the confidence of the President, 
 that he said, " Mr. Polk must appoint me." Yet, Ripley 
 says, there is not a trace of the pen to show that the Pre 
 sident ever designed that Gen. Scott should do more than 
 capture Vera Cruz and the Castle ! And we are com 
 pelled by this, and the statements of others, to believe it. 
 Thus Scott was to incur the labour of organizing an 
 army the hazard of landing on the coast of Mexico, op 
 posite the highway to the capital endure the drudgery 
 of bombarding, and occupying works incapable of a pro 
 longed resistance, attended with fatigue and comparatively 
 little glory and, when the vista of true military renown 
 was opened before him, and all his toils were to be amply 
 rewarded, at this moment he was to be superseded and de 
 graded ! The General-in-chief of the United States Ar 
 my of high military reputation, and of unsurpassed 
 military attainments to be over-rode by a civilian a 
 man not " baptized in fire," and eminent only as a politi 
 cian ! This is one of the strongest instances of the predo 
 minance of party feeling and party designs, over both 
 justice and patriotism, in the President ; and as Ripley, an 
 educated officer, defends the measure, we cannot offer a 
 more forcible example of his own party feeling against 
 Scott, nor of his political bias. 
 
 We are of those who firmly believe and all history 
 bears us out that mere theoretical military knowledge 
 does not constitute, and cannot create, the great com 
 mander. The high traits essential to success to unvaried 
 success, under all circumstances may be educated and 
 
12 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 perfected ; but they are born with the man, and are de 
 veloped by events. Hannibal had no experience of war, 
 when associated in the chief command in Spain, and had 
 acquired but little when elevated to the supreme control % 
 and his hatred of Rome induced an evasion or disruption 
 of all treaty stipulations ; yet, for sixteen years, his career 
 was a series of splendid triumphs. Caesar made his first 
 campaign at 41 years of age, and, from the outset, he was 
 General-in-chief his first advent into Spain being civil, 
 rather than military, and for the purpose of filling his 
 coffers, rather than extending his military reputation; and 
 his early affair with the pirates only a daring and chival 
 rous adventure of at the moment in exile a reckless 
 youth. Hampden and Cromwell were great leaders, 
 without theoretic information. Lord Clive and Jackson 
 were extraordinary soldiers, without any military attain 
 ment. And Prince Eugene said, " The greatest generals 
 have commonly been those who have been at once raised 
 to command, and introduced to the great operations of 
 war, without being occupied in the petty calculations and 
 manoeuvres which employ the time of inferior officers." 
 We will not say that Col. Benton might not have 
 risen at once to the summit of military renown, by the 
 force of exalted genius ; and, with such belief, necessity 
 would have justified the President in giving him supreme 
 command in the war. But while Scott lived, and aspired 
 to new laurels in his profession, we maintain that this 
 necessity did not exist. Scott was no unfledged and un 
 tried soldier. His past career guaranteed the accomplish 
 ment of brilliant operations. The war of 1812 proved 
 his abilities, and his reputation for courage and skill was 
 at least co-extensive with the country. Not a slur had 
 ever been cast upon his untarnished escutcheon as a great 
 captain. 
 
 Ripley exhibits some very decided military prejudices. 
 The tone of his book is adverse to both our generals 
 Scott and Taylor. Few things achieved by them are 
 heartily approved indeed, none, we believe, without some 
 grain of qualification. Neither in the operations nor in 
 the combats, has full justice been awarded. These are 
 narrated with general accuracy, and described with full 
 ness and much force. But, in his " observations " and 
 running commentaries, with some judicious remarks, 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 13 
 
 there is a great deal of depreciating criticism, some sar 
 casm, and many sneers. 
 
 His maxims are carelessly scanned, or, for effect ; parts 
 are quoted to sustain the author's views ; while the whole 
 would, in some instances, have contradicted him, or have 
 modified his conclusions. At p. 95, vol. 1, is a fling at all 
 the generals of the army, for their imbecility, with "hardly 
 an exception." At p. 160 is an illiberal allusion to Gen. 
 Taylor, who, it appears, in his dispatch of 1st Aug., 1846, 
 presented, as a consideration, in his march to Monterey, 
 the question of subsistence, and said, in this respect, it 
 would be somewhat of an " experiment," since he could 
 acquire from the Mexicans themselves no definite infor 
 mation on the subject, and it was utterly impracticable, 
 with his limited means of transportation, to carry supplies 
 in a rapid movement on Saltillo. Ripley designates it as 
 an " experimental expedition," and positively asserts that 
 Taylor urged no other reason for his advance, than to 
 ascertain the subsistence resources of that region. Yet, 
 in a previous letter, (July 2d, 1846,) Taylor speaks of an 
 ulterior object, of no less importance than cutting off the 
 northern provinces of Mexico ; and, some time after, in a 
 letter to Wool, he remarked that he expected to be at 
 Saltillo on the 1st of October. Unjust and uncalled for 
 originally, what will be thought of the repetition of the 
 charge always with a sneer at least seven times in the 
 same volume, and when, in p. 161, he actually quotes the 
 passage containing Taylor's ulterior views. At p. J69, 
 he says, " without any definite object, other than to ascer 
 tain the capacity of a certain region, in subsistence," etc. 
 At p. 248, " the expedition was treated of as one of expe 
 riment upon the agricultural capacity of the valley of the 
 San Juan," etc. At p. 252, " as the whole expedition had 
 been experimental," etc. At p. 315, "had enjoyed two 
 weeks observation upon the agricultural capacity of the 
 country." At p. 355, " information respecting the capacity 
 of the country to support 6000 men, or more, had been 
 the avowed object in marching upon that town." (Monte 
 rey.) At p. 503, " Gen. Taylor's plan, which, after his 
 experiment at Monterey." And at p. 313, " and as the 
 General had been unable to extend his views beyond the 
 experimental march to Monterey," etc. Here the word 
 unable betrays conclusively the tincture of bitterness 
 
14 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 which prompted all the allusions. At p. 355, he is cap 
 tious with Taylor on other grounds. Again, at p. 304, in 
 regard to his orders to Wool. At p. 257, harsh concerning 
 the battle of Monterey. At 434, severe on Taylor, and 
 ardent in defence of the administration. He is also unjust 
 respecting Buena Vista, and the preliminary operations, 
 and particularly so in alluding to the withdrawal of troops 
 from Taylor, by Scott. 
 
 At p. 155, vol. 1, is a sarcasm on Scott, for his letter to 
 the Secretary of War, in which he speaks of conquering 
 a peace, by "regular, incessant, and forward movements" 
 against the enemy, and these words are quoted, TrSN^emg 
 riorcuieu&^ We wonder how else Major Ripley would 
 have subdued Mexico, and, as a consequence, have "con 
 quered peace ?" How else was it accomplished at last T* 
 Two pages previously are slighting remarks. At pp. 11, 
 12, vol. 2, the same. At p. 82, vol. 2, he blames Scott for 
 the attack and failure of Pillow at Cerro Gordo, end did 
 not see '* the necessity of attacking them (the lines) se 
 riously, in front." Yet the ground had been reconnoitered 
 by Pillow himself. Scott relied upon his knowledge, and, 
 at his own desire, we believe, ordered him to the post. 
 The works proved stronger than either general had sup 
 posed, although battery no. 1, which was assailed or, 
 more properly, the angle between nos. 1 and 2 had been 
 seen in reverse from the opposite side of Plan del Rio, 
 (p. 31, vol. 2.) In the same page, and previously, are 
 strictures on Scott's report, that his order for the battle 
 had been " executed," and some deviations are given. 
 Why not publish the " order," and permit the public judg 
 ment on its execution ? We regard it as a masterly pro 
 gramme ! No other battle had so detailed a sketch in 
 advance, and few, in history, were so exactly executed, 
 according to the design. At p. 87, vol. 2, he censures 
 Scott, in a "however," for taking Quitman along with 
 the army, instead of Pillow, when both were made Major 
 Generals, and there were not, indeed, troops enough for 
 the command of one, the Georgia and other regiments 
 having been sent home. This course, on the part of 
 Scott, was within his discretion, and his motives are his 
 own. The service suffered no injury by the decision. 
 Pillow returned in season for the operations in the valley, 
 and, while absent, had the opportunity, at New-Orleans, 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 15 
 
 of vindicating himself from the charges of Col. Haskell. 
 At p. 96, the government* would not intrust Scott with 
 the power to negotiate, because it was " aware of his cha 
 racter and feelings." This is a very grave insinuation. 
 Was Scott partial to the Mexicans ? Were his political 
 feelings bitter against the administration ? Did he carry 
 party schemes to the head of an invading army ? Would 
 he have destroyed his reputation, and -have sacrificed his 
 patriotism, by assenting to a treaty that, though momen 
 tarily elevating his party, would injure permanently the 
 interest of his country and impair its honour ? All this, 
 if anything, may be legitimately inferred, and the hero of 
 Niagara was as far removed from such a " character," 
 and such " feelings," as light is from darkness. The two 
 powers, of war and diplomacy, have often been united. 
 Napoleon, in Italy, is a famous example. The great sol 
 dier necessarily possesses many of the high qualities of 
 the statesman. Were this the occasion, and space per 
 mitted, the propriety of uniting the powers could be 
 demonstrated. Scott had already acted successfully in 
 both capacities ; and, withholding the one, and conferring 
 it upon Chief Clerk Trist, betrayed a design to injure 
 Scott, or a want of confidence in his integrity or ability, 
 deeply wounding to his sensibility as a man, to his pride 
 as a soldier in chief command, and was well calculated 
 to sour him against the existing authority at Washington. 
 At p. 150, Scott's motives none tjie^best are divined, for 
 the reconciliation with Trist. Ana! finally, at p. 432, Rip- 
 ley exults that Scott's name had been dropped, as a can 
 didate for the presidency, in consequence of the proceed 
 ings of the celebrated Court of Inquiry ! We cannot now 
 discuss this matter, nor can we afford room for other cita 
 tions of Ripley's prejudices. The 2d volume is replete 
 with disparagement of Scott all that he did, when present, 
 was suggested to him ; all that was done, when he was 
 not on the ground, was the sole work of others ! We 
 have, however, exposed enough, we trust, to illustrate the 
 controlling sentiment of the book, and will improve, if 
 need be, other occasions to discuss our differences with 
 the author on other points. In the mean time, we sin- 
 
 * The President and his cabinet are not the government ; but the term, -with 
 that meaning, has crept into all the official correspondence, and we continue it 
 for brevity, as well as for euphony. 
 
16 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 cerely recommend to him a critical revision of his work, 
 the suppression of many illiberal passages, the assumption 
 of a more elevated and impartial tone, and an appendix, 
 containing the official papers relating to controverted 
 points. This accomplished, it will do him great credit 
 it will afford interesting and instructive reading, and be 
 come a standard authority in our collections. Did it not 
 possess some decided features of merit, we assure him, 
 even this much time would not have been spared to the 
 consideration of its errors. 
 
 The volume of E. D. Mansfield, " a graduate of the 
 United States Military Academy," and the last we propose 
 to notice, purports to be a history of the war, but we 
 regard it rather as a general review of the war. It gives 
 the principal events, in order, but enters into no discus 
 sions of moment avoids all details of description, and 
 all analyses of political or military action, and is not very 
 particular about dates. It aims to be just, as far as it 
 goes, and we do not think it unduly partial. The vindi 
 cation of Gen. Scott, throughout, indicates an ardent 
 friendship or admiration for that officer ; yet he is not 
 lauded extravagantly nor improperly, at the expense of 
 others. It is well enough written, without any special 
 claim to commendation, for style or arrangement. The 
 high praise awarded to West Point graduates, both here 
 and in Ripley's book, does not emanate with grace or 
 delicacy from eleves of that institution.* The services of 
 those gentlemen were too conspicuous to be overlooked 
 by the country they constituted a majority of the regular 
 officers, and were freely distributed among the volunteer 
 troops and other writers could have displayed their me 
 rits, and the high character and eminent value of that 
 academy, without any sacrifice of modesty or good taste. 
 We are sure that so high a mark could never be omitted 
 or disregarded in any comppehensive and fair representa 
 tion of our Mexican operations and none other will be 
 
 * A writer of South-Carolina, signing " Marlborough," to a series of highly 
 interesting and valuable sketches of the battles and manoeuvres in which the 
 Palmetto Regiment was engaged, remarks : " Let others gainsay, but it is our 
 opinion, that the scenes of glory and success, which have so constantly attended 
 our arms in Mexico, are attributable to the admirable stamina to be found 
 among the officers of the regular army. They are, in the main, the effects of 
 West Point intelligence and West Point discipline !" Such compliments are 
 appreciated, and they have an influence. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 17 
 
 generally received f<Tr-pe*^maaejatly-f)^se*d. Claiming 
 the same alma mater, we feel justified in making these 
 remarks, which another, through fear of the charge of 
 invidiousness, however appropriate they may be, would 
 hesitate to offer. The book of Mansfield, as a general 
 guide, giving a succinct account of the operations of the 
 war, is very useful, and the original tables, in the appen 
 dix, are highly interesting and valuable. 
 
 After this, in a measure, digression, much longer than 
 was anticipated, we turn to the main subject of this pa 
 per the battle of Buena Vista, with a summary notice 
 of the preliminary operations. 
 
 The armistice at Monterey was disapproved by the 
 President, and, according to its terms, he sent instructions 
 to Taylor, on the 13th October, that it should cease at 
 x once. On the 6th of November, Taylor dispatched an 
 officer, to communicate to Santa Anna the decision of our 
 government. On the 1 3th of the same month, Worth was 
 directed to occupy Saltillo Taylor accompanying the 
 column, and it was effected, without resistance, tin the 
 16th. Wool had reached Monclova on the &9th of Octo 
 ber, en route for Chihuahua, and, in a letter to Taylor, 
 pertinently inquired what was to be gained by the move 
 ment on that place. In reply, he was instructed to aban 
 don the original enterprize, and march his forces to Par- 
 ras, 70 miles south-west of Saltillo. The expedition was 
 a misdirected one, and proved a failure. Had it been 
 accomplished, the result would not have been at all com 
 mensurate with the labour employed, and the suffering 
 and expense incurred, in organizing an army in the inte 
 rior of Western Texas, and transporting its supplies, and 
 moving the troops, through a desert prairie, on this side 
 the Rio Grande, and a comparatively barren and difficult 
 country beyond. Victoria was taken by our troops, under 
 Quitman, on the 29th of December, and Tampico having 
 been seized by the navy, 011 the 14th of November, the 
 country, from the Rio Grande and the coast, down to 
 Tampico, westward to the Sierra Madre, was in our pos 
 session. And, as Kearney had subdued New Mexico, and 
 Stockton and Fremont had subjugated California, the 
 scheme, as far as contemplated and desirable, of severing 
 from Mexico her northern provinces, was executed. The 
 position of the army, however, is regarded by Ripley and 
 others as having been vicious, and, in a militEiry point of 
 2 
 
18 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 view, untenable. Under some circumstances, we might 
 concur in the opinion ; but, considering those that actually 
 existed, we cannot hesitate to approve the proceedings of 
 Taylor, and we think substantial reasons may be offered 
 in vindication. Taylor's letter, of the 8th of December, 
 1846, explains fully his objects, and establishes conclu 
 sively the justness of his measures. If it were intended 
 to occupy and maintain a defensive line, it would run 
 from Parras to Tampico. Victoria and Saltillo would be 
 intermediate points, and the latter of greater importance 
 than any, since it covers the only accessible route for 
 artillery, from San Louis through the pass of La Angos 
 tura. With a strong garrison, and fortified by works 
 here, the plan would be consummated. As Taylor es 
 teemed the Mexicans not at all formidable, and having 
 little confidence in themselves, without artillery, the other 
 points could be readily held, with moderate forces, sup 
 plied with that arm. The Tula passes debouched no 
 great way from Victoria. They were practicable for 
 cavalry and infantry ; but, as Ripley suspects,* if for ar 
 tillery also, to secure the line, it would only have been 
 necessary to render this place as strong as that near Sal 
 tillo certainly the only dangerous points. Victoria was 
 near the port of Soto la Marina, whence all requisite 
 stores could be drawn. Parras was in a productive re 
 gion, affording supplies and guarding the right flank. 
 Tampico, near the Gulf coast, was equally important, for 
 similar reasons, on our left. The objection, therefore, of 
 spreading the troops over a line of " 600 miles," would 
 have been obviated, and likewise, that of the equidistance 
 of all the parts from San Louis, by which, it is true, in an 
 open country, the enemy could have attacked and over 
 whelmed our detachments in detail. Now, early in Jan 
 uary, Taylor had ample forces at Victoria to hold that 
 place and the adjacent defiles. At Saltillo, including 
 Wool's command, he had more than he carried into action 
 on the 23d of February, with which he resisted the army 
 of Santa Anna. But had Wool continued at Parras, there 
 were other reinforcements, intended by Taylor (see letter 
 of the 8th of December,) for Saltillo, and as Wool per- 
 
 * Lieut. Meade had examined some of these passes, and found them im 
 practicable. Henry's " Sketches," vol. 2d, p. 290. And Capt. Limard, es 
 corted by May's dragoons, had reconnoitcred others, with like result 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 19 
 
 formed the march between the places in less than two 
 days, (his cavalry and artillery 40 miles a day,) he was 
 within striking distance, in case of alarm. For a defen 
 sive line, Taylor's plan was consequently wise, and in 
 every way calculated to effect his purposes. Additionally, 
 his reserves were posted at Monterey, nearest the Angos 
 tura pass, which he regarded the only dangerous point of 
 the line. On the contrary, if, instead of defence, it were 
 designed to advance on San Louis, his operations were 
 equally judicious, since it was necessary to cover all the 
 country that was essential to the security of his army 
 and of his line of communication. It is really hypercri- 
 ticism to denounce these arrangements ; it is like advan 
 cing certain rules of war that are entirely inapplicable to 
 the case, and reminds us of the charge against General 
 Scott, in 1836, that he introduced all the parade and the 
 grand evolutions of European armies, in his operations 
 against the Seminole Indians, and about as reasonably 
 advanced, in this instance, as would have been such ope 
 rations. 
 
 The President, however, determined upon a different 
 policy. He would not desist from all effort, on occupying 
 a section, not vital, of the enemy's country he aimed not 
 at a quasi-peace, liable to be broken monthly, and requi 
 ring large expenditure, without adequate, or indeed, any 
 return, for hostilities would not have ceased ; but he de 
 manded a firm treaty, negotiated and fixed by legitimate 
 governmental authorities, and, to procure it, resorted to 
 other, and more vigorous and compulsory measures, than 
 a defensive line. 
 
 Several events occurred, about this period, which en 
 tirely deranged Taylor's contemplated schemes. One was 
 an alarm at Saltillo, on the 19th of December. Worth 
 was there with 1200 men (fewer effectives) and 8 guns. 
 The enemy, within the town, conceived the conquest of 
 them easy, and the governor of the state (province ?) ex 
 pressed his hopes, in a dispatch to the Mexican command 
 er, whose cavalry was within 60 miles, requested an attack 
 on us, and promised the co-operation of the citizens of 
 the place, numbering in population from 15 to 20,000.* 
 The courier one at least was captured, and his papers 
 sent to Worth, who, apprehending a serious movement 
 
 * Henry, vol. 2d, p. 245. 
 
20 Battle of Bucna Vista. 
 
 against his small command, called for reinforcements. 
 Wool marched his forces, with praiseworthy expedition, 
 to Worth's assistance. Twiggs' division, on the march to 
 Victoria, was recalled, and returned to Monterey. Butler, 
 with two regiments of volunteers, advanced rapidly from 
 the last place, and the 2d Kentucky regiment made a cre 
 ditable march, from Camargo to Monterey. With this 
 concentration of troops, the alarm was dispelled. As a 
 consequence, however, Parras was definitely abandoned, 
 and Wool was retained in the vicinity of Saltillo. Tay 
 lor, in the mean time, retraced his way towards Victoria. 
 Other occurrences were, that Gen. Scott arrived at the 
 Brazos on the 28th of December, began his preparations 
 for the descent on Vera Cruz, made a requisition on Tay 
 lor for nearly all his regular, and a large portion of his 
 volunteer troops, and advised him to fall back on Monte 
 rey and assume the defensive. In a letter to Scott, of the 
 4th of January, Ib47, the Secretary of War made a simi 
 lar recommendation. Worth, under orders from Scott, of 
 the 3d January, received through Butler, marched his 
 division from Saltillo on the 9th. It numbered, by his 
 own report, including those to be attached en route, in the 
 aggregate, 2,666. Twiggs' division, of 1,465, followed, 
 the next day, by 3,268 volunteers under Patterson, moved 
 from Victoria for Tampico, on the 14th. Ripley makes, 
 at this point, another of his unfair allusions to Taylor, 
 vol. 1, p. 340. Opposed to the propriety of occupying 
 Victoria, he remarks that Taylor was forced, by the "state 
 of his supplies," to evacuate the " newly occupied town." 
 The fact is as given, but there was a reason for it, which 
 a candid historian would have offered ; but, not desiring 
 to do justice, it was withheld, since we will not suppose 
 him ignorant. Taylor had concentrated at Victoria, on 
 the 4th of January, and, learning from Scott's letter, of 
 the 25th November, from New- York, received 21th of 
 December, that a portion of his troops were to be taken 
 from him, he suspended his operations, in a good degree, 
 and awaited farther instructions. He was thus in statu 
 until the 14th of January, when Scott's orders of the 3d 
 arrived. On that day his troops moved for Tampico, an 
 excellent position for Scott's designs. The "state of sup 
 plies " was an element in this decision, because he looked 
 daily for an order to divide his army, and, accordingly, 
 had neither continued arrangements for the defensive line, 
 
Battle of Buena. Vista. 21 
 
 nor established his depot, of provisions, etc., at Soto la 
 Marina, as previously contemplated. It is plain that he 
 could not have acted more judiciously, and, indeed, any 
 different course might have proved unwise. 
 
 Other troops joined Scott, from the Rio Grande, and 
 Taylor was left with 1000 regulars,* and a volunteer 
 force of some 6000 men, partly new levies, to protect his 
 extensive line, threatened by Santa Anna and 20,000 or 
 more men in front. 
 
 Ripley sneers at the complaint, made by Taylor to 
 Scott, for this large withdrawal of force, and charges 
 inconsistency, because the former said, subsequently the 
 27th of January, at Monterey that the troops "left him 
 in that quarter would doubtless enable him to hold the 
 positions then occupied." And he gives the noble old 
 soldier no credit whatever for his previous offer, sponta 
 neously made, to place a large portion of the army at 
 Scott's command, for the coast expedition. The truth is, 
 he objected at last, less to the deprivation of force, than 
 to the number of his veterans taken, and the manner of 
 the act having been kept in ignorance of the plans of 
 the government, and deeming it preposterous, as intimated 
 in the letter of 25th of November, (Ex. Doc. number 60, 
 p. 373,) that he should be expected to take the offensive, 
 in the month of March, with his impaired and diminished 
 army. And is it strange that, at the first view when 
 almost in despair at his position, and speaking heroically 
 of carrying " out, in good faith, the views of the govern 
 ment, though he may be sacrificed in the effort," and feel 
 ing that he had lost its confidence that he should fear 
 the inadequacy of his means to maintain himself? And 
 when, a fortnight later, he had looked around acquired 
 new resolution conceived that Santa Anna and the main 
 body of the enemy would move against Scott rather than 
 himself and perceived that he was only expected to de 
 fend his line as far as Monterey, is it very absurd, that, 
 like an undaunted soldier, as he was, he should express 
 
 * Taylor's letter to Scott, January 15th, 1847. Ex. Doc. number 60, page 
 863. We will say, of this document, that it is most vilely compiled. Scarcely 
 half a dozen letters ever occur successively, according to dates. To search 
 for those required, through a disarray of 1277 pages, demands as much time, 
 and much more patience, than to have written them all. Scott, in his letter of 
 the 3d of January, supposes that Taylor would still have 2000 regulars an 
 error to be attributed to the want of returns. 
 
22 Battle, of Buena Vista. 
 
 the hope that he could hold his ground ? Instead of blame, 
 we would accord to him high praise. And we want terms 
 to convey our admiration, at the grand effort of self-con 
 trol, which prompted and qualified his letter to Scott, of 
 the 15th January, when he learned the full extent of the 
 reduction of his forces. Napoleon threw up his commis 
 sion in Italy for a less cause ! Away with the denuncia 
 tory opinions, based upon a bitter prejudice, that fancies 
 " no good can come out of Nazareth !" 
 
 Taylor evacuated Victoria, restricted his line to the 
 river, and, from Camargo, via Monterey, to Saltillo, and, 
 on the 24th of January, established his head quarters at 
 Monterey. He disregarded the advice of Scott and the 
 Secretary of War, to abandon Saltillo, for the following 
 reasons, given in his letter of the 7th of February, 1847 : 
 " Not to speak of the pernicious moral effect, upon volun 
 teer troops, of falling back from points which we have 
 gained, there are powerful military reasons for occupying 
 this extreme of the pass rather than the other. The 
 scarcity of water and supplies, for a long distance in 
 front, compels the enemy either to risk an engagement in 
 the field, or hold himself aloof from us ; while, if we fall 
 back on Monterey, he could establish himself strongly at 
 Saltillo, and be in position to annoy more effectually our 
 flanks and communications." It may be added, that, hold 
 ing the Angostura, through which, alone, artillery could 
 move towards the Rio Grande, the line of communication 
 was comparatively secure. And also, if defeated in this 
 position, there were almost impregnable passes to fall 
 back on, in the retreat to Monterey, where the struggle, 
 with reinforcements from the rear, might be again and 
 again renewed ; and the enemy would be kept longer 
 engaged in the north, while Scott would more surely find 
 an open highway to the capital. 
 
 News arrived, on the 30th of January, that Majors 
 Borland and Games' command, of 70 aggregate, had been 
 captured by the enemy's cavalry, at Encarcacion, 55 miles 
 south of Saltillo, on the 20th, while reconnoitering ; and 
 also, that Capt. Hardy and 17 men had been taken by 
 rancheros, in the same direction, on the 27th. Taylor the 
 next day hastened from Monterey to his advanced posts, 
 and, on the 5th of February, fixed his head quarters at 
 Aqua Nueva, beyond the pass of Angostura or Buena 
 Vista, and 18 miles south of Saltillo." By the 14th, his 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 23 
 
 forces were assembled in that quarter, and he was rapidly 
 procuring ample supplies for his army. Yet, even at that 
 date, notwithstanding the capture of his parties indicated 
 the presence of the enemy in considerable force, Taylor 
 did not anticipate an advance, on their part, and was an 
 ticipating (see official letter) the arrival of new regiments, 
 to enable him to make a diversion, to favour Scott. It 
 was not until the 21st that he was confident there would 
 be an attack upon him, and he ordered up Gen. Mar 
 shall's* troops, including Capt. Prentiss' battery of eigh 
 teen pounders, from the Rinconada. 
 
 The question, whether Santa Anna should have march 
 ed against Scott or Taylor, has been a good deal discussed, 
 and we will offer our views in this place. On the 13th 
 of January, Lieut. Richey, while bearing Scott's letter of 
 the 3d, among others, from Monterey, to Taylor, at Vic 
 toria, was lassoed and murdered at Villa Gran. His pa 
 pers, including this requisition for troops, and the plan of 
 the descent on Vera Cruz, were seized, and conveyed 
 promptly to Santa Anna, at San Louis. The enemy thus 
 became early acquainted with our designs, and Scott 
 fully expected to be met by him, in great force, at Vera 
 Cruz ; while, as late as the 14th of February, Taylor did 
 not contemplate a battle near Saltillo. Both Generals 
 were deceived ; and both our historians (Ripley and Mans 
 field) argue that they should have penetrated the inten 
 tions of Santa Anna in other words, that the latter acted 
 with wisdom in the course he pursued. With due defe 
 rence, we disagree to their conclusion, and concur in the 
 justness of the conceptions of our Generals not only as 
 the circumstances then appeared to them, but judging also 
 after the event. And, while our limits do not permit a 
 full survey, with illustrations, of the points at issue, we 
 will yet offer concisely a few considerations, which are 
 conclusive to our mind. 
 
 1. Santa Anna, at San Louis, was about equi-distant 
 from Saltillo. Vera Cruz and Mexico. He commanded 
 over 20,000 men including Minon and Urrea, nearer 
 30,000 leaving 5 or 6,000 in observation of Taylor, he 
 could have reached Vera Cruz by the middle of February, 
 and, on the w r ay, have recruited as many more. Having 
 
 . * These troops arrived early on the 24th, and were in readiness for Santa 
 Anna, had he renewed the battle on that day. 
 
24 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 40,000 troops, or even fewer, he could have easily supplied 
 and strengthened both city and castle, and, in all proba 
 bility, have repulsed Worth and his 5,000 men, when they 
 landed on the beach. 
 
 2. Scott had the larger American army, and aimed to 
 reduce Vera Cruz the high road to the capital would be 
 open to him, as a consequence the conquest of the city 
 of Mexico would destroy the morale of the people and 
 soldiery, and the subjugation of the country must inevita 
 bly follow. It was Santa Anna's first duty to protect the 
 more vital interest, to insure safety to the capital, and 
 meet the invader at the coast, rather than move the flower 
 of the Mexican army in the opposite direction, and attack 
 in a remote and comparatively insignificant province. 
 
 3. The morale of the Mexicans would have been greatly 
 more elevated by defeating at Vera Cruz than Saltillo, for 
 obvious reasons it would have been known and felt im 
 mediately in the richest and most populous parts of the 
 State the fact would have been indisputable, because 
 the scene was near enough for it to be known absolutely 
 and the grand army would have been crippled and driven 
 to sea. 
 
 4. If Santa Anna had money and supplies to march 
 against Taylor, the same would have enabled him to 
 operate, to the same distance, against Scott, and, arriving 
 among a wealthier population, near his own home, and 
 nearer the capital, where Congress, in December, had 
 been unanimous for the continuance of war, he could 
 largely have increased both. 
 
 5. Had Santa Anna forced back Taylor, it would not 
 have been a Plassey overthrow the latter would have 
 rallied at the Rinconada, again at Monterey, where the 
 siege would have been protracted, or better fortune have 
 raised it, by a victory. Santa Anna could not neglect 
 and pass it by. New regiments would have been on the 
 line, in season to aid in defence against detachments, and 
 the movement would have failed of important results ; 
 while Scott would have encountered little resistance in 
 his march to the capital. 
 
 6. A few thousand troops, to manoeuvre in front of 
 Taylor, were sufficient. The route to San Louis was full 
 of difficulties the water tanks were already destroyed 
 and the knowledge of Taylor's diminished command 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 25 
 
 should have induced the belief that no advance was con 
 templated on his part. -x^-~ 
 
 7. Santa Anna did no/reason from the past. Arista, in 
 his chosen position, with odds of 4 to 1, and having fine 
 troops, too, was disastrously defeated. He knew, through 
 his spies at Saltillo, that Taylor's force was about in the 
 same proportion knew the Angostura, where he might 
 be met to advantage from sad experience with the Tex- 
 ans, should have known that he could not annihilate Tay 
 lor, and therefore, could not promptly control his commu 
 nications, and threaten an advance to the Rio Grande 
 and he should have calculated the effect, to his country, of 
 the failure of his operation. 
 
 The Mexican historians, after the event, it is true, but 
 with knowledge of Santa Anna's means and designs, de 
 nounce his course without qualification. At p. Ill, they 
 say, " Considering these things, under this point of view, 
 the battle of the Angostura was for us the loss of the 
 capital, and would also have been, even if a victory had 
 been the result of that action. Its importance to the 
 Americans was great, and would have been great, what 
 ever had been its issue." 
 
 Even up to the 20th of February, there was no certain 
 knowledge of the approach of Santa Anna ; but, on that 
 day, Col. May, with 400 men and 2 guns, was serft to La 
 Hedionda, to reconnoitre the valley around Potosi ha- 
 -cienda, at which, it was supposed that Minon and his 
 2000 cavalry were posted, and ascertain if the enemy 
 were advancing through the Palomas pass, which de 
 bouched to the north of Saltillo. And Major McCulloch, 
 with his Texan spies, was ordered, on similar duty, to 
 Encarnacion. May saw none of the enemy, but a Mexi 
 can informed him, at night, that Santa Anna was moving 
 from the latter place, to attack Taylor on the following 
 day. To be in at the fight, May marched all night, with 
 great celerity, making 60 miles in less than 21 hours, and 
 at dawn communicated his intelligence to Taylor. Mc 
 Culloch returned the same morning, and confirmed its 
 truth, excepting the probability of Santa Anna's* having 
 marched forward. Both these officers conducted their 
 commands with consummate prudence and skill. 
 
 * Col. Jefferson Davis, in his speech of 5th of August, 1850, in the Senate, 
 says, that the movement to Buena Vista was determined upon, and commenced 
 before the return of McCulloch. 
 
26 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 It was determined immediately to withdraw from Aqua 
 Nueva, and take position near the hacienda of Buena 
 Vista. The former place offered the advantage of receiv 
 ing the enemy, after a long march, without water ; but 
 this was more than counterbalanced by the possibility of 
 its being turned, by either flank, and our communication 
 intercepted. The face of the pass, near Buena Vista, 
 presented serious obstacles to the efficient action of the 
 Mexican cavalry and artillery his favourite arms and 
 enclosed between mountains, was highly favourable to 
 the resistance of a small to a large force. Accordingly, 
 on the same day, our army retired there and encamped.* 
 The stores remaining were guarded, and to be removed 
 as promptly as practicable, by Yell and his regiment, with 
 orders to burn the hacienda and all within, in case there 
 was danger of being cut off. His picquets were fired on 
 the same night. He set fire to the buildings, dispatched 
 his wagons at great speed, saw the stores destroyed, (those 
 not carried to the rear,) and proceeded to the main body, 
 near the Angostura. Santa Anna had anticipated a sur 
 prise. Disappointed in this, he construed our retirement 
 into a precipitate retreat, and, without permitting his 
 troops to recover from the fatigue of a forced march, or 
 even to satisfy their thirst, pressed forward eagerly, with 
 the full* expectation of cutting us to pieces. He thus 
 rushed, by elated hopes, into the Thermopylae, from which, 
 had he desired, he could not withdraw honourably, with 
 out risking a battle. Minon moved, the same day, (22d,) 
 through the pass of Palomas Adentro, opening near Sal- 
 tillo, to the east of which he posted his 2000 cavalry, to 
 obstruct our retreat, after being forced. 1000 rancheros, 
 armed with long knives, were stationed on the west of 
 the road, to aid in the butchery ; and Urrea, with his bri 
 gade, had traversed the defiles of Tula, and was in the 
 vicinity of Monterey. Taylor had hastened to Saltillo, on 
 the 21st, to place it in a proper state of defence, and the 
 command was left with Wool. The glorious 22d of Feb 
 ruary, the birth-day of the illustrious Washington, broke 
 upon the hostile array. Under a national air, and amid 
 the high inspiration, to the army, of the day and the oc 
 casion, Wool advanced the troops to the field of combat. 
 
 * Except Hardin's Illinois regiment, which halted at La Angostura, one 
 mile and a half south of Buena Vista. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 27 
 
 With the aid of Inspector Churchill, an estimable officer, 
 and perhaps under general directions from Taylor, they 
 were arranged in order of battle. Before these disposi 
 tions were completed, the Mexicans made their appear 
 ance halted beyond the range of our fire perceived our 
 resolution to face the music of war and prepared at once 
 for the conflict. Taylor, learning their arrival without 
 finishing his preparations at Saltillo returned to meet 
 the greater danger. He approved the positions of the 
 troops received Santa Anna's audacious summons, to 
 surrender at discretion, only allowed because " his parti 
 cular esteem was deserved" and returned the celebrated 
 answer, brief, simple, modest, yet calm with undaunted 
 resolution, and firm as the base of the Sierra Madre. 
 
 The scene of the mighty struggle which followed lies 
 at a point of the pass a mile and a half south of Buena 
 Vista, and near seven miles from Saltillo. This pass, 
 varying in width from one and a half to four miles, and 
 just here about three miles across, extended from Saltillo 
 to La Encantada, some 12 or 14 miles. The stream flow 
 ing between these places was, at this point, nearly equi 
 distant from the mountains, rising 2 or 3000 feet, on either 
 hand, and the road ran not far from its border. La An 
 gostura, " the Narrows," is formed by a high bluff, the 
 jutting extremity of the spur of the mountain, on one 
 side, and the stream, with steep banks, on the other, which 
 restricted the pass to the width of an ordinary highway. 
 Our right flank was protected by a net-work of gullies, 
 washed by the stream, over 20 feet deep, with precipitous 
 sides, which extended nearly to the mountain, and was 
 deemed impassable, certainly by artillery, if not for all 
 arms. After a movement of observation on their part, 
 which was checked, the enemy made no attempts over 
 this lower level, and the battle ground, greatly to our 
 advantage, was limited to the eastern level, a mile and a 
 half across, and about sixty feet higher. There were 
 several spurs of the mountain on this side, running down 
 to the road, with intervening ravines, difficult of passage. 
 The principal one, terminating in a narrow ridge at An 
 gostura, difficult of ascent there, and commanding the 
 road for a good distance, widened, towards its base, in a 
 south-eastern direction, into a plateau the plateau some 
 four hundred yards across, nearest the road, and two 
 hundred at the mountain. This plateau was broken, or 
 
28 Battle of Bucna Vista. 
 
 scalloped, as you proceeded south, by three gorges, open 
 ing upon the road, and increasing in length as you ad 
 vanced. Beyond, were a ridge, and another broad ravine 
 or valley, the head of which could be turned and still 
 another succeeded. In the rear, there was one extending 
 to the mountain, behind which were two others, succes 
 sively, with numerous minor branches. These constitute 
 the striking features of the field,* and may enable the 
 reader to derive a tolerable idea of the battle, from a 
 general description. 
 
 Taylor's force consisted of, aggregate,! 3,406 volunteer 
 infantry, including 368 Mississippi riflemen: 809 volunteer 
 cavalry, and 209 U. S. dragoons, in all, 1018 cavalry, and 
 16 field pieces of artillery, Washington's horse battery, 8 
 guns, Sherman's and Bragg's, each 4 guns, and 267 officers 
 and men to work them ! Total, 4691, J without a single 
 regular infantry soldier, and with an aggregate of regular 
 troops, of 476 ! 
 
 Santa Anna's army was composed of 17,600 infantry, 
 artillerymen, etc. 4338 cavalry, excluding Minon's 2000 
 cavalry, at Saltillo, and his 1000 rancheros butchers and 
 20 guns, ranging from 8 to 24 pounders. Total, 21,338, 
 and, simply to be mentioned, 3000 seven miles in our rear. 
 The Mexican historians, calculated by their translator, 
 place the number at 20,553, including the 23 GENERALS 
 which the bearer of Santa A! ma's summons impressed 
 upon those who received him and 39 guns. 
 
 * There was some discussion about the claimants to the selection of this 
 field. Butler, Wool, and Capt. Hughes, T. E , each (or through friends) pre 
 ferred their right to the honour. At length, however, the weight of evidence 
 confers it upon Wool But it is of little consequence. Taylor approved it, if 
 he did not know of it before the crisis arrived. He determined to hold Sal 
 tillo it was natural to choose, having the time, that position, at or in the vici 
 nity of the town, upon which the enemy could be received to most advantage, 
 and we imagine that no military eye would have glanced over the ground, 
 without perceiving its strong points, and other advantages for battle. Yet, if 
 any special credit is due to General Wool, let it be fully rendered. 
 
 f Aggregate the word includes officers. It is technical. 
 
 J Henry says 4,425 men and 334 officers total, 4,759. Ripley says, 4,425 
 bayonets and sabres, and 15 light guns. He, perhaps, excludes the 6 pounder 
 captured at Monterey, attached to Washington's company, and lost by O'Brien. 
 Mansfield, who is always general, says about 5,000 men. All are nr:> 
 mark. We have chosen Carleton's statement, who had equal access to all the 
 returns, and seems exceedingly careful in his figures. Yet, in none of the 
 reports have we seen a return of the Texas mounted company, which, on the 
 23d, took post to the right, and in rear of S teen's dragoons. 
 
 Carleton. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 29 
 
 Washington's battery was stationed at La Angostura, 
 which was our extreme right, on the 23d. Hardin's regi 
 ment supported it a portion behind a parapet, on the 
 tongue of land above, and the remainder entrenched near 
 the guns. It was also supported by McKee's Kentuck- 
 ians,~k^the crest of a knoll in the rear. Bissell was on 
 the plateau, with his 2d Illinois regiment, and an associa 
 ted company of Texan foot. At the base of the moun 
 tain, the farther side of the plateau, was posted the volun 
 teer cavalry. The other troops were in reserve, on a 
 ridge in rear of that which Hardin occupied. Santa 
 Anna's forces were drawn up in two lines of infantry, 
 with batteries on their flanks, the cavalry behind them, 
 and the general park in rear, guarded by lancers, and 
 posted on a ridge in our front, with a higher one interve 
 ning. His first aim was to occupy the slope of the moun 
 tain, ascending from the plateau, on our left, and, for the 
 purpose, dispatched Ampudia, with his four battalions of 
 light infantry. Perceiving the design, Taylor directed a 
 portion of the cavalry to dismount, and, reinforced by some 
 Indiana troops, all armed with rifles, and commanded by 
 Marshall, to ascend the opposite slope (a gorge between) 
 and resist them. O'Brien, with 3 pieces from Washington's 
 battery, sustained by Bowies' regiment, was ordered in sup 
 port. A shell, thrown from a Mexican howitzer, announced, 
 at 3 P. M., the commencement of the combat. Ampudia 
 and Marshall begun, and continued their sharp-shooting 
 and efforts to out-flank each other, until dark, with trifling 
 loss on our side, (4 wounded) but a good deal of slaughter 
 from our marksmen 300 killed and wounded. With this 
 skirmishing, and an occasional cannonade at our troops 
 on the plateau, precluded by the distance from a reply, 
 ended the affair of that day. An apparent intention of 
 Santa Anna looking to our right also, induced Taylor to 
 send Bragg and McKee's regiment to an elevated ground 
 in the rear of the net- work of gullies, where they passed 
 the night. Feeling sure the enemy would postpone his 
 grand attack until morning, the General went again to 
 Saltillo for the night, in order to complete his arrange 
 ments there for security. 
 
 On the 23d our dispositions were slightly altered. Wash 
 ington remained as before. Ampudia having been strength 
 ened by 2000 infantry, a battalion of riflemen (Illinois and 
 Texas) was ordered to join Marshall, still on the moun- 
 
30 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 tain side. Bissell was on the plateau, opposite the head 
 of the second gorge, with a gun on each flank Steen's 
 squadron to the right and rear of them and McCulloch's 
 mounted Texans to their right and rear. Bowies' 2d, and 
 O'Brien's 3 pieces, on the left of the plateau Lane's 3d 
 on the knoll behind Washington while the volunteer 
 cavalry was in the ravine near the plateau, and near the 
 mountain. The others were where the previous night 
 had found them. 
 
 The Mexicans were formed in three columns of attack : 
 the first, under Villamel, to carry La Angostura ; the se 
 cond, under Lombardini, to skirt the mountain and force 
 our left ; the third, under Pacheco, to pass up the third 
 gorge, and unite with the second in its object ; Ampudia 
 was to clear the mountain, and join the others, for a com 
 bined assault in reverse, or upon our rear. The three 
 first were accompanied by strong bodies of cavalry. The 
 12 pounders and howitzer were placed on an eminence, 
 in front of " the Narrows," to aid Villamel ; the 8 pound 
 ers were on a ridge near the mountain, beyond the broad 
 ravine, having a plunging fire on the plateau. Ortega 
 commanded the powerful reserve. 
 
 At the earliest dawn, the mountain forces began their 
 work, and briskly kept it up. Our main body quietly 
 awaited the onset of the formidable columns. On they 
 came, marching as on parade, in beautiful array, and with 
 admirable precision, proving their instruction and their 
 discipline. Pacheco, having fewer obstacles of ground, 
 was in advance. Bowies' regiment and O'Brien's guns 
 were beyond the third gorge, to meet him. The pieces 
 were vigorously served, and, without intermission, vomited 
 forth their destructive hail. To avoid the enfilade of the 
 8 pounder battery, he now facing the road, General Lane* 
 ordered him, with the infantry support, still farther for 
 ward, and again he poured his iron missiles (two canisters 
 at a charge) into the serried masses of the foe. Bowlesf 
 misunderstood the order, and directed his men to " cease 
 firing, and retreat" w r hich they did with all speed, fleeing 
 from the field. O'Brien obeyed Lane, but the enemy con 
 tinued to advance their prostrated platoons were re- 
 
 * There were a General and a Colonel Lane on the field 
 
 f Bowles was a brave man he fought the rest of the day with a musket. 
 
 A court acquitted him of cowardice, but not of dullness. Paymaster Dix 
 
 gallantly rallied some of his men. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 31 
 
 placed their numbers were overwhelming while our 
 artillerists, momently thinned, were too few to resist them. 
 When almost at his muzzles, O'Brien, much crippled in 
 force, retired with two guns, and left to the enemy the 
 third, without an unwounded man or horse to manage it ! 
 Nor, on reaching support, were his others in better plight. 
 During this conflict of 25 minutes, Villamil, with his 4000 
 choice troops, marched upon La Angostura ; but a few 
 rounds from Washington's splendid battery broke the head 
 of their column, and drove the entire mass headlong into 
 the broad ravine, for security, and checked, for that day, 
 any repetition of the attempt upon that point. 
 
 Pacheco reached the plateau and united with Lombar- 
 dini passing near four companies of Arkansans, they too 
 fled the field. His cavalry, pursuing Bowies' Indiana 
 regiment, moved near the base of the mountain, and ex 
 cited in our riflemen there the fear of being cut off, and 
 they, together with the volunteer cavalry, retreated. 
 Pressed by the enemy's cavalry, and Ampudia, who de 
 scended the slope, great loss was sustained, and the Texas 
 company* was nearly destroyed. The masses on the pla 
 teau now maintained their position, against the guns of 
 Sherman, Bragg, Thomas, Garnett and O'Brien, who had 
 exchanged with Washington his two pieces, and promptly 
 appeared again upon the scene. The artillery was formed 
 across the plateau, at the head of the first gorge, and, 
 supported by Hardin, M'Kee and Bissell, sent a storm of 
 iron and lead against the enemy, who replied with un 
 yielding obstinacy. 
 
 At this crisis, our left forced and turned, and the retiring 
 tide moving upon Buena Vista, and our centre opposed by 
 tremendous odds, Taylor returned from Saltillo, (11 A.M.) 
 and assumed a conspicuous place on the plateau, between 
 the north* ravine and the head of the first gorge. At this 
 fearful moment, he was advised to fall back to concen 
 trate and occupy new ground that " all was lost." But the 
 courage of the indomitable chieftain rose with the occasion. 
 Seeing at a glance the condition of affairs, he replied, " No, 
 WE WILL DECIDE THE BATTLE HERE !" His humanity, too, shrank 
 from the butchery of his comrades, strown over the field, 
 and he said also, "I WILL NEVER, ALIVE, LEAVE MY WOUNDED 
 
 * A Texas Lieutenant offered his sword in surrender it was seized and 
 plunged into him. 
 
32 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 BEHIND !" Cheers greeted his arrival new spirit was im 
 parted to the troops confidence was re-awakened by the 
 presence of that brave heart, which had never known 
 defeat, and which scorned a "surrender" and victory 
 was again anticipated, with sanguine hope. 
 
 Davis* saw Ampudia's command, strengthened by ca 
 valry, moving down the second ridge, behind the plateau, 
 elated with conquest, and, asking Wool for Lane's regi 
 ment in support, he turned from the road, with his 368 
 riflemen, to check their progress. Advancing to a minor 
 branch of the ravine, on his right, he hurled a volley into 
 the enemy and staggered him, his cavalry being forced 
 for shelter into the neighbouring ravine. Not satisfied 
 with the distance, he dashed across the branch, met Am- 
 pudia face TO face, and, without aid, put his infantry to 
 flight, in a disorganized and confused multitude. Seeking 
 the cavalry under cover, a few of whom had crossed to 
 charge in reverse, never to return, they fled. Returning 
 along the ridge, to his first position, Davis was joined by 
 Lane and Kilburn's gun, and, forming again in line, await 
 ed events. 
 
 Torrejon'sf brigade of horse, pursuing the retiring for 
 ces farther left, was received by them at Buena Vista. A 
 shock of cavalry ensuedj the enemy were divided one 
 portion traversed the hacienda, worried by the deserters 
 from the battle, and others there, and crossed the western 
 mountain the other retreated rapidly, under a few rounds 
 from Reynolds' gun, to the eastern base. The dragoons, 
 arrived too late to participate in the struggle. 
 
 A fresh body of cavalry, 1500 strong, now dashed 
 down, in splendid style, to overwhelm Davis. Forming 
 an angle, opening to them Lane extending to the ravine, 
 on his right, and he across the plain, in line they awaited 
 the charge of the gaudy lancers. On they cairfc, in per 
 fect order, at an easy gallop, expecting a discharge of our 
 pieces, at long range, and then to cut us up. Disappoint 
 ed, they drew up to a trot not a shot yet at 80 yards 
 
 * Davis' regiment had escorted Taylor from Saltillo, and this was its first 
 appearance that day on the field. This regiment bad fought gallantly at 
 Monterey. 
 
 f This brigade contained about 1000 men. The Kentucky and Arkansas 
 cavalry, in this affair, numbered about 450. 
 
 \ Yell was killed here, and Adjutant Vaughan, of Kentucky, under 24 
 wounds 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 33 
 
 they halted ! Then simultaneously pealed the rifle and 
 the musket, emptying many a saddle, and followed by a 
 deadly "fire by file'' and grape and canister from Sher 
 man, then at hand, the brilliant troopers, and their sup 
 porting infantry, were forced back, in utter confusion. 
 Bragg now appeared, with 3 guns two squadrons of 
 dragoons and one of Arkansans marched upon the ene 
 my's left flank and all advanced, to drive him, pell-mell, 
 against the mountain. 
 
 In the mean time, the conflict on the plateau was going 
 on obstinately, and with doubtful result. At length, Santa 
 Anna, perceiving that his centre column could not carry 
 the ground, against our formidable array of artillery, or 
 dered up the San Patricio battalion, (deserters from our 
 army,) with a battery of 18 and 24 pounders, to mingle 
 in the strife. These heavy pieces swept the entire length 
 of the plateau, and the numerous infantry accompanied 
 them with a rapid fire. Had the reserves been brought 
 forward at this juncture, the day would, in all probability, 
 have been gained. The omission was fatal. At last they 
 gave way their masses retired, broken in the middle 
 one half crossing the north ravine, to aid Ampudia ; the 
 other fell back to the ravine in front, bearing off Santa 
 Anna himself. The heavy battery continued at the head 
 of the plateau, and opposed to them were the guns of 
 O'Brien, Thomas and Garnett/the others having hastened 
 to the aid of Davis, then in the crisis of his daring effort 
 
 to resist cavalry in open plain, in linejand the supporting ^ x 
 
 regiments of infantry, which advanced in pursuit of Santa 
 Anna and his defeated and retreating column. The ene 
 my on our left were now between two fires Davis and 
 the cavalry on their left, with Bragg literally tearing them 
 to pieces, and our troops on the plateau, on their right, 
 and in a few moments 6000 men must have laid down 
 their arms ; but a white flag* appeared, Bearing to Tjayk>r~ 
 the inquiry, what did he want ? Generous old man, jo 
 
 * The Mexican historians make a romantic affair of this flag. They say 
 an officer Mentega became "mived up with the Americans." Objecting to 
 death or capture, he adopted the feint for his own security. Carried to 
 Taylor, he returned with our " two officers of the army," who went for an 
 interview with Santa Anna, and slipped away, unnoticed. The Other Side, 
 page 126. They say, also, that, after O'Brien lost his gun, some persons ap 
 peared before Santa Anna, and, as from Taylor, demanded his surrender. To 
 which " original request," that chief, with dignity, refused to accede." Page 
 ditto. All stuff-tf-the American translator puts it right. 
 3 
 
34 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 respond to such an absurdity ! He silenced all our guns, 
 and sent Wool to confer with the enemy. Effecting their 
 purpose of escape, they would not cease firing, and did not 
 receive him. A happy stratagem, which saved one-third 
 of their army. 
 
 Santa Anna now prepared for his final effort. He wit 
 nessed the failure on our left, and resolved, in the absence 
 of much of our force in that quarter, to throw an ava 
 lanche of troops upon our centre. He moved his 8 pound 
 er battery nearer to the scene he ordered up his reserves, 
 and, under Perez, directed them to the plateau. At first, 
 not seeing his object, O'Brien's and Thomas' guns, and 
 Bissell, McKee and Hardin, were far in front, continuing 
 their advance upon the fugitives ; but orders were sent to 
 those on our left to hurry to the plateau. Perez, with the 
 reserves, increased now to 12,000 men, emerged from the 
 ravine, where they had been organized, encountered our 
 advance who, driving one column, dreamed not of the 
 approach of another more formidable by irresistible 
 numbers forced our infantry to give way,* and finally to 
 seek shelter in the second gorge. Half of their column 
 enveloped the head of the gorge in a few minutes, passed 
 down its sides, and slaughtered many brave men, without 
 the power of resistance, and, when attempting escape by 
 the outlet upon the road, the hostile cavalry were there 
 to hem them in. But Washington, in a moment, dispersed 
 these last, and our unfortunates found protection under 
 his guns. The other half soon joined again by the 
 first pressed across the plain, having only O'Brien and 
 Thomos, with 3 guns, to oppose them the former near a 
 hundred yards in the advance. The pieces were worked 
 with every ability the enemy approached in front as 
 sistance was coming in rear if O'Brien withdrew his 
 guns, they might sweep over the plain before the arrival 
 of succour if he fought until they reached him his guns 
 would be lost, but theV would be temporarily delayed 
 
 * These regiments were Hardin's, Bissell's and McKee's, the last entire, the 
 others respectively of 8 and 6 companies. Two of the former, at Saltillo, and 
 two of the latter there also, with two others, detached in the morning to re 
 inforce Marshall. They were taken rather by surprise one regiment in line, 
 another in column of companies, and a third deploying from column of divi 
 sions. Hardin, McKee and Clay were killed the enemy made no prisoners 
 on that field. The two last were graduates of West Point Academy. The 
 first was not, although the public prints have asserted it. He was a native 
 of Kentucky a resident of, and had been in Congress from, Illinois. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 35 
 
 aid might arrive, and the day might yet be ours ! With 
 generous heroism, he chose the last. He poured into them 
 the iron hail he shot down their leading files ; but on 
 they came ! At length, with four or five wounded men, 
 he loaded again the enemy almost upon him gave a 
 last fire, with marked effect, and abandoned his guns.* 
 At that instant, Bragg, under whip and spur, came dash 
 ing up the ascent, promptly came " to action" and plied 
 that glorious battery of Ringgold's,f with a celerity and 
 skill never surpassed. He asked Taylor, near by, for 
 support. "THERE is NONE," said he, "BUT MAJOR BLISS AND 
 MYSELF. STAND TO YOUR GUNS AND GIVE THEM (the Mexi 
 cans) H !"J And Bragg, like a well-trained soldier, 
 
 obeyed him to the letter ! At only fifty paces the danger 
 imminent Thomas alone by his side, he outdid all his 
 former efforts. He tore down the enemy by numerous 
 lines he annihilated the leading platoons he checked 
 their progress they recoiled. Sherman coming, shoulder 
 to shoulder, opened a hundred other avenues of death 
 they reeled to and fro. Davis and Lane, from the north 
 ravine, appearing upon their right flank, delivered a well- 
 directed fire and the column yielded ground, and finally 
 rushed from the field ! The day was won " victory 
 perched upon our standard !" With the removal of the 
 enemy beyond our fire ended the great combat, and ended, 
 too, in many respects, the most brilliant feat of arms in 
 American history. The enemy's loss was about 2500, 
 
 * O'Brien had three horses shot under him, and was wounded. He demand 
 ed a court of inquiry, to investigate the causes of the loss of his guns: Of 
 course there was but one opinion ; yet it prevented all after controversy. His 
 guns were borne off by the Mexicans, and were re -captured by his own regi 
 ment, at Churubusco. O'Brien wrote a voluminous, and, for reference, a va 
 luable work, on courts martial. He died of cholera, in Texas, in 1850. 
 
 f This battery was carried to Texas by Ringgold, was fought by Ridgely, 
 at Resaca and Monterey, and, at his death, turned over to Bragg, in whose 
 hands its reputation was certainly not diminished. 
 
 \ It was said that Taylor replied, " A little more grape, Captain Bragg." 
 A good catch phrase, but not true. We give the exact, or nearly the exact 
 words spoken, as we heard them from one of the best authorities. 
 
 Some cannonading followed the retreat, and our troops pursued the ene 
 my, though without recovering our lost guns ; but the day was really over. 
 We have omitted many details, but nothing of importance bearing on the 
 current of events. And we omit the affair at Saltillo. Fenr infantry compa 
 nies, under Major Warren, and an artillery company, under Captain Webster, 
 garrisoned the place. Minon made an attempt there, and was -repulsed. 
 Lieut. Shover, with a 6 pounder, and Lieut, Benaldsen, with a hewitser, pur 
 sued him, and did some execution all very gallantly. 
 
36 Battle of Btiena Vista. 
 
 killed and wounded, and several thousand missing. On 
 our side, there were 272 killed, 388 wounded, 6 missing 
 in all, 666. 
 
 On the mere perusal of an account of this battle, the 
 blood courses freer, and all the animal energies are to the 
 utmost aroused. Like Henry Clay, aftex-Mfin^fixey, one 
 feels that he, too, " could slay an enemy." The glory of 
 war is magnified, the daring actors in its scenes of hazard 
 and carnage are exalted in estimation, and we become 
 emulous of their deeds of chivalry. The first thought to 
 Dtrike a reflecting mind is, how was it won ? how could 
 it be won with such disparity of force ? and, more parti 
 cularly, how could four guns of light artillery, whatever 
 the skill of their management, stay the progress of 12,000 
 soldiers ? The result looks like the effect of great mag 
 netic power. All the experience of war, all the rules 
 and maxims of the world's chief warriors, and all the 
 reasoning upon the vast difference of morale between 
 two people and two races, would have argued against 
 the possibility of victory, to sixty men at most, against 
 such immense odds ! How loudly it speaks for the tena 
 cious courage and the unyielding fortitude of the Ameri 
 can soldier, and how much more loudly it speaks for the 
 unsuspected efficiency of the horse artillery, which has 
 been brought to perfection only in our d** service. That 
 all engaged in the conflict save the few deserters dis 
 charged their duty, is not to be doubted ; tKfcreeord dis 
 closes the naked truth. If misfortunes, under fortuitous 
 circumstances, or from inability, beset many of them, it 
 was not their fault. Bravery, enthusiasm, perception of 
 the consequences of defeat, were all present, to impel 
 them to superhuman effort. And ^ureVsj^ are/that it was 
 exerted. A certain arm of service possessed higher 
 power ; yet its success could carry no discredit to the 
 failure of others. 
 
 But we mean, briefly^4t46-tuie, to notice in detail some 
 of the events of Buena Vista, including the dispositions 
 of the parties, and will indulge in few abstract or decla 
 matory remarks. Our limits and design exclude such 
 grateful pastime, and restrict to severe analysis, and dry, 
 but, it is hoped, not useless, military comments. At no 
 period, within -neai4^70 years, has the duty been more 
 urgent on our people to dwell on military topics to dis 
 cuss questions relating to war to acquire and digest the 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 37 
 
 approved maxims, and to set in progress all those military 
 preparations dictated by a wise forecast ; and, if hints 
 are offered, here and there, derived from study of the best 
 authorities, they may not prove untimely nor unprofitable. J^L 
 
 The Romans always formed their artfe^ of battle in the 
 same manner. They encamped in an entrenched square, 
 and, when about to engage in combat, drew out their 
 army in three lines, with intervals of fifty toises (three and 
 a half feet each) between them, and their cavalry on the 
 flanks. From the restoration of the true military system, 
 under Gustavus Adolphus, up to 1792, the principles and 
 the spirit of the Roman organization and line of battle 
 were observed. The experience of subsequent wars, and 
 the constant direction to military studies of so many and 
 such great minds, for a long period, produced some impor 
 tant changes, and tended to perfect military institutions. 
 But throughout this period, of more than 20 centuries, the 
 " orders "* of battle, variable, to a degree, with the gene 
 ral, and somewhat with the position, have undergone little 
 modification, within certain limits, and we find the one 
 most approved at the present day the same that was suc 
 cessful at Sparta and Thebes the oblique order. Napo 
 leon said truly, that " among the moderns there was no 
 natural order," and that " nothing absolute either can or 
 ought to be prescribed ;"f yet, when he said that the 
 oblique order was "une utopie inapplicable," Jomini 
 makes issue with the conqueror, shows that many of his 
 greatest battles were gained under it, and leaves the im 
 pression that the ''line" and the "order" were confounded; 
 and the indiscriminate use of the terms in De Vernon's 
 work, written for the Polytechnic School, under the em 
 pire, and sanctioned by the emperor and a board of his 
 officers, confirms it. " The oblique order is a disposition 
 
 * Jomini draws a very just distinction between lines and orders of battle, 
 and he is, we think, the first military writer who has done it. " I call the 
 line of battle the deployed portion, or composed of battalions in column of 
 attack, which an army will take in occupying a camp and ground upon which 
 to receive battle, without a determined object it is the proper name for 
 troops, formed according to the rules for exercise, in one or many lines. The 
 order of battle on the contrary, is the disposition of troops indicating a deter 
 mined manoeuvre, as the parallel order, the perpendicular, etc." L'Art de la 
 Guerre, page 214. They are confounded in the Tactics for our army at 
 least the names are. 
 
 f Montholon. 
 
M**i 
 
 38 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 tending to unite half the forces, at least, to overwhelm a 
 wing, while holding the other portion beyond reach of the 
 enemy, either in echellons or inclined from the line." 
 Taylor's order resembled this ; but neither he nor Wool, 
 perhaps, thought of any particular disposition, but ar 
 ranged the troops according to the nature of the ground, 
 the Angostura, an essential point to be defended, and the 
 plateau, the probable battle-ground, extending to the left 
 and front. And the centre and left being in echellons. 
 fortifying the remark that " nothing absolute should be 
 prescribed," varied from the system of 12 orders laid down 
 by Jomini, one of which, he supposed, must be inevitably 
 employed in every case. It was an original modification, 
 which he had not conceived. Standing on the defensive,* 
 with less than half his force (efficient) on the plateau. 
 Taylor, in our judgment, should have planted there all his 
 horse artillery, except Washington's. None was required 
 in reserve. A few more pieces, with O'Brien, would 
 have repelled Pacheco at the outset, and, turning upon 
 Lombardini, well supported, would equally have checked 
 his advance. To break our left the weak point, seen at 
 a glance by Santa Anna, and promptly improved would 
 give a reverse fire upon our entire line, when, ordinarily. 
 defeat ensues, and, the communication cut, disaster results. 
 When the flanks are not strengthened, a defensive oblique 
 is liable, therefore, to the above objection. The mountain 
 slope, as Ripley well says, should have been at once oc 
 cupied, and the front slope, which Marshall ascended first 
 and withdrew from, under the belief that he was ordered, 
 which would have kept off Ampudia from the beginning. 
 The cavalry were properly posted, and, with more guns 
 to have cut up the enemy's horse and annoyed Lombar 
 dini, would have proved effective. As it was, there was 
 no alternative but to retire. The strongest point in our 
 
 * Jomini remarks, on defensive combats, " that a general who awaits the 
 enemy like an automaton, without aiming to do more than fight valiantly, 
 will be subdued when he may be attacked. It is not so with him who awaite 
 with the firm resolution to combine decided manoeuvres against his adversa 
 ries, in order to seize the moral advantage of the offensive impulse^ and with 
 the certainty of directing his masges on the most important point ; in the 
 simple defensive this never occurs." page 219. Taylor falsified the first 
 clause. He combined no manoeuvres was on the simple defensive only 
 repelled whed attacked and yet triumphed. We will not pause to explain 
 the causes of it. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 39 
 
 line was the Angostura,* and yet the bulk of our force 
 was concentrated around it. Sanguine as Washington 
 was of repelling all efforts there, his confidence was not 
 shared by his seniors the light artillery, although re 
 nowned, was not supposed as effective as it proved to be. 
 Bissell advanced to O'Brien's relief, and McKee and Bragg 
 quickly crossed the road to assist ; but their efforts were 
 separate had they been together, a simultaneous ad 
 vance might, at that time, have forced back the enemy. 
 And this could have been arranged. The moment the 
 enemy formed his columns, it was perceived that our right, 
 over the gullies, was not threatened, and McKee and Bragg 
 moved away, under the mere advice of Mansfield, and 
 without orders. This was the first crisis of the battle, 
 and, as is seen, it could have been made the last., 
 
 Santa Anna's attack upon our whole line at the same 
 time, was contrary to all the rules of the art, and can 
 never be justified, except with a vast superiority of forces. 
 The experience of Mexican armies against Americans, 
 might have told him, that his real superiority was not so 
 immense, and should have taught him caution. A few 
 guns and a small force to engage Washington were suf 
 ficient ; and a similar or less one should, by all means, 
 have menaced us over the gullies. To carry our entire 
 line simultaneously, was a preposterous conception. He 
 advanced in the parallel order, with his right re-inforced. 
 After forcing O'Brien and then Bissell to give ground, 
 Carleton well says, that had his reserves been promptly 
 brought forward, he would have taken the plateau. 
 Sweeping down it to the road our centre crushed the 
 Angostura inevitably captured and our army scattered, 
 
 * Jomini, page 221, deduces the following truths, from a discussion in one 
 of his chapters : " 1st. The topographical key of a field of battle is not al 
 ways the tactical key. 2d. The decisive point of a battle-field is unquestion 
 ably that which unites the strategic advantage with the most favourable lo 
 calities. 3d. When there are no formidable obstacles of ground about the 
 strategic point, this is ordinarily the most important. 4th. Sometimes the 
 determination of this point depends on the positions of the troops respective 
 ly in lines extended or cut up, the centre is the most essential to be attack 
 ed in close lines, the centre is the strongest," etc. Angostura is called the key 
 of Buena Vista. For us it was. It was the strongest point by nature, and was 
 strengthened by art For the enemy, it was neither the tactical nor topo 
 graphical point to be attacked this was our left, as Santa Anna had the 
 military parts to perceive. And as the strategic aim was probably to seize 
 our communications, and operate on the Rio Grande, it is a question if the 
 point selected for attack did not combine all the three requisites. 
 
40 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 to be taken in detail, the day would have been his beyond 
 recovery. His timidity want of perception or engross 
 ed attention upon a preconceived* manoeuvre, prevented, 
 and it is rarely that a general has two certain opportuni 
 ties of success in the same combat. He, however, judi 
 ciously seized the mountain slope, and with equal judg 
 ment saw and struck at our weak points, forcing our left, 
 and taking us in reverse. But even when this was done, 
 the character of the ground precluded the use of artillery, 
 and folio wing up his success, upon the rear of the plateau 
 the north ravine prevented the last. 
 
 The second crisis was at the arrival of Taylor, when 
 our army, in the main, was forced, and when the brilliant 
 achievement of Davis against Ampudia, rescued it from 
 overthrow. Both of Davis' feats were most remarkable, 
 and of all others, perhaps, on that field, prove the extra 
 ordinary daring of our soldiers. The first, repelling thou 
 sands of infantry and cavalry with 368 riflemen ! And 
 again, assisted by Lane, driving back 1500 cavalry, on 
 open plain and formed only in line ! His own courage 
 and the quality of his troops disclose the secret. He had 
 many gentlemen in his ranks there could be no shrink 
 ing when he led, and they were tolerably disciplined, and 
 had burnt powder before. 
 
 It was contrary to rule for Marshall and Tell to await 
 the charge of cavalry. A maxim says, "-that cavalry, 
 however heavy or firm it may be, must never wait to receive 
 the charge of another body of calvary, not even of light 
 cavalry; for the simplest laws of dynamics show, that 
 it must inevitably be overthrown by the velocity of the 
 charging body."f Our men fired their carbines at 60 
 paces, and the enemy was upon them by the time they 
 could draw their swords. They were not overthrown, 
 because, perhaps, our large horses could sustain the 
 
 * Minon says Santa Anna made no combinations that he believes " a bat 
 tle is no more than the shock of men, with much noise, shouts, and shots, to 
 see who can do the most, each in his own way" and " cannot conceive how it 
 happens that a victory may be gained by wise and well calculated manoj- 
 vres-" Carleton Appendix. We disagree to this. Santa Anna did com 
 bine ; and his strategem of the white flag, at the proper moment, to save 
 one-third of his army, was very creditable. 
 
 f This is sanctioned by Napoleon, if neither in Montholon nor Las Casas. 
 It is said, in the same authority, De Vernon, that when cavalry mean to 
 charge, and are at 600 yards, the first 200 should be in the small trot ; the 
 second 200, full trot ; the next 160 at a full gallop; and the last 50 paces at 
 full speed. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 41 
 
 shock ; and their riders, stout-hearted, would fight under 
 the disadvantage.* 
 
 The last crisis was on the plateau, when O'Brien lost 
 his two pieces, and Bragg and Thomas, with four guns, 
 stopped the career of the reserves. And this was the 
 grandest of all, because the instant fate of our army 
 depended on the successful issue, and for the brilliancy of 
 the achievement. Nothing in the annals of civilized 
 warfare equals this feat nothing occurs to us as at all 
 comparable to it. The rapidity of the fire the short 
 distance the grape and canister the precision of aimf 
 and the contrary in the enemy and the inflexible reso 
 lution to die by the guns, combined to effect it. This has 
 been called a battle of horse artillery on our part ; and 
 while we do not and cannot say that others were not es 
 sentially instrumental in winning the victory, after a ten 
 hours' struggle of all arms, yet certainly without the 
 artillery, the day would have been lost. It was most 
 efficient wherever it was employed. O'Brien, early in 
 the morning, by beautiful firing, drove Ampudia higher 
 up the mountain slope, and beyond his power of eleva 
 tion. Against Pacheco with more men, and a strong in 
 fantry support, he would probably have checked the col 
 umn, and as it was, he made great havoc in its ranks. 
 Again on the plateau, he retarded Perez, and thus enabled 
 assistance to arrive in season to repulse him. His hero 
 ism here merits the highest admiration, and his method of 
 " turning over" guns to the enemy, should never be for 
 gotten. The array of artillery across the plateau, after 
 the retreat of Bowles's regiment, alone prevented the 
 enemy from forcing our centre, with the disastrous conse 
 quences which must have ensued. The artillery practice, 
 more especially Bragg's, which all commend, drove the 
 enemy on the left into the cul de sac, and combined with 
 that from the plateau, would have compelled a surrender, 
 but for the flag. Washington held his important post 
 against vast odds, and rescued hundreds of men in the 
 gorge, from certain destruction. And finally, this arm 
 closed the contest in a halo of glory, which will encircle 
 it forever. 
 
 * At the battle of Sohr, the Austrians awaited the Prussian charge, and 
 the -whole body was destroyed. 
 
 f At Zorndorf, one cannon shot mowed down 42 men ! "Well served artil 
 lery is a most effective arm, and we repeat that the South should encourage 
 the organization of many divisions of the horse artillery. 
 
42 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 With some merit, Buena Vista has also been styled, the 
 battle of volunteers. It is very true, that over nine-tenths 
 of the force were of that description of troops, but it must 
 not be inferred that they were militia. They were supe 
 rior to this last, because, if the men were not picked, the 
 ranks were, at least, filled by adventurous and daring 
 spirits, and fortunately, as a general rule, the leading offi 
 cers were chosen by them, for their merit, and not often 
 from personal or political predilection. Besides, if not 
 " baptized in fire," they were partially disciplined the 
 Illinois regiments had been under most competent and un 
 tiring instructors. All the field officers of the Kentucky 
 infantry were West Pointers ; and Marshall of the cav 
 alry, and Davis of the rifles, were from the same institu 
 tion. For a prompt effort, however hazardous for a 
 sudden grasp at victory, even in the jaws of death, they 
 were inferior to none. Like the Romans of old, they 
 fought more from confidence in individual prowess, than 
 from dependence on the " elbow touch," or the multitude. 
 And the only fear to be apprehended was, that they pos 
 sessed not that unshrinking fortitude, which could patient 
 ly receive the " winged instruments of death," without re 
 tort peculiar to veterans, and which justified the heroic 
 Gen. Michel, in exclaiming at Waterloo, "the guard dies, 
 but never yields /" Yet our untried volunteers exhibited 
 even this highest trait of the soldier, in some instances 
 possibly attributable to the apparently desperate condi 
 tion of affairs, which nerved the intelligent of all grades 
 perhaps, to their little instruction most probably to the 
 presence of that indomitable chieftain a participant of 
 the danger, with the serene aspect of a protected ob 
 server under whose eye they stood, and to win whose 
 approbation, they would have stormed even the Rock of 
 Gibraltar ! 
 
 Col. Davis in the Senate, said, that Buena Vista was 
 tl fought without an erroneous order as to position or 
 time." This may be true, and yet not all the truth. With 
 regard to position* we have briefly spoken. But during 
 the combat, when sudden manoeuvres are often, accord 
 ing to all experience, more effective than the best pre 
 arranged combinations ; General Taylor in several very 
 important movements, gave no orders at all. McKee 
 
 * Col. Davis, it occurs to us, means the placing of troops, and the time of 
 doing so. But we will not alter the text. His speech was delivered Aug. 
 5th, 1850. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 43 
 
 and Bragg left the eminence in rear of the crossing of the 
 gullies, without orders, and arrived timely on the Plateau. 
 Bragg again, in procuring ammunition, perceived Da 
 vis' struggle with the 1500 lancers, and hastened to his 
 assistance. Again, when the enemy retreated along the 
 skirt of the mountain, (under the flag,) tter supposed a re- / fY&t' 
 newed attack would be made on the plateau, and flew 
 there, just at the moment O'Brien abandoned his guns, 
 and without orders ; and Davis himself moved against 
 Ampudia without orders.* But we do not concur with 
 Ripley by any means, in censuring Taylor for the omis 
 sion, or detracting an item from his conduct of the battle, 
 and the high credit that is due to him. We would rather 
 praise those officers, for quick intelligence and responsi 
 ble action, for surveying the entire field perceiving when 
 ther services were required, and hastening promptly to 
 render them in a word, for anticipating orders in a cri 
 sis, rather than supinely resting on their arms, until the 
 General, at a distant point, should direct by positive in 
 struction, through legitimate channels, their every move 
 ment. And, we confidently believe, they only anticipated 
 the orders which would have sent them on the same ser 
 vices which they performed : and that Taylor failed to 
 give the directions, because he saw that they even fore 
 seen, and the proper action begun. 
 
 The Mexican historians assert, that if the chief Mexi 
 can officers had discharged their duty equally with the 
 subalterns, the result would have been different ; and it is 
 possibly true : although, like them, we will not exempt 
 their favorite, Santa Anna, from the imputation. We 
 suspect that he was chary of his person. His horse was 
 shot, it is true, and he was borne along with the retiring 
 column, in the first repulse. But where was he, when the 
 reserves made their grand attack ? Was he at their head ? 
 Was he in their midst ? It strikes us forcibly, that the 
 Mexicans never so much required the lead of Santa An 
 na, as in this charge. An intrepid chief, in whom all had 
 unlimited confidence, could unquestionably have inspired 
 the enthusiasm, to induce 12,000 men to over-run four 
 guns ! A Ney, a Lannes, or a McDonald, as at Wagram, 
 would probably not even have slacked his pace. The 
 
 * Two signal instances of anticipation are found in the defence of Cesar's 
 camp against the Neiwteans, (in 2d Book of Commentaries,) and the march of 
 Dessaix to Marengo, which secured the victory. 
 
 - 
 
44 Battle of Buena Vista. 
 
 The Roman generals were not necessarily exposed, save 
 after defeat, and following the custom of many of them, 
 he remained in the rear, and perhaps beyond the range of 
 our guns. But the Roman armies from incessant drilling 
 during peace! and their exalted morale, from almost inva 
 riable success, rarely required the inspiring example of 
 their leaders. In modern armies the battle fields are 
 much larger, exacting activity in the General the use of 
 fire arms, exposes him more or less at all points, and the 
 danger of leading is not much enhanced ; while the less 
 experience the less training the often diminished mo 
 rale of troops, frequently demand his presence, to insure a 
 victory. Of all periods, over half his forces engaged, and 
 a final effort to overthrow his adversary, this was the one 
 for Santa Anna to appear at their head, and lead them on. 
 Higher, more patriotic interests checked the impulse per 
 haps, and urged to the security of self. What if Taylor 
 had remained at the hacienda Buena Vista, with a glass, 
 could he have directed his troops with sufficient prompt 
 ness ? Had he not occupied a conspicuous point, amid 
 the carnage, near to the '* flashing of his guns," would the 
 volunteers have exhibited the same valor ? Would even 
 his artillery have been served with the same constancy 
 and precision ? Whatever their bravery, it is highly 
 doubtful. The example and participation in hazard, of a 
 beloved chieftain, excite his soldiers to extraordinary 
 exertion. When Alexander's troops were perishing of 
 drought in the desert, a horn of water was brought from 
 afar to the King, who, instead of drinking, poured it upon 
 the sands before all eyes, and^ quenched the thirst of the 
 entire army ! Caesar marched bareheaded before his army 
 in Gaul, in all weathers, and they advanced at his order, 
 in sunshine or in storm. And Hannibal and Napoleon 
 trudged on foot through the snows of the higher Alps, and 
 dispelled both fatigue and cold from their followers. So 
 Taylor in that doubtful crisis amid the horrors of war. 
 and exposed to every shot, neutralized the appalling dan 
 ger to his troops, inspired iti<> them his own fearless re 
 solution, and they won for him his noblest field !* 
 
 Taylor's conduct at Buena Vista was comparatively 
 faultless. The few errors that a severe criticism may de- 
 
 * Our limits exclude many reflections that we should liave been pleased to 
 offer. 
 
Battle of Buena Vista. 45 
 
 tect, are unimportant. Eminent success attended him, as 
 in all the efforts of his career : and invariable success, 
 through a life of vicissitudes and of high responsibilities, 
 marks the enlightened judgment, rather than the favor of 
 inconstant fortune. He displayed the energy, the forti 
 tude, the quick perception and prompt action, and the 
 valor of the great captain ; and, likewise, the ready de 
 cision and iron firmness, when he exclaimed ** we will 
 decide the battle here" It was a rare instance of sublime 
 self-reliance, akin to that " destiny" of exalted genius, 
 which impels it to superhuman trial. With the heroic, 
 he displayed equally the tenderer virtues of the man. His 
 humanity was his crowning grace ; and the illustrious 
 sentiment, " I WILL NEVER, ALIVE, LEAVE MY WOUNDED BE 
 HIND !" should be inscribed upon each chieftains banner, 
 and enshrined in the heart of every soldier. H. 
 

Lithomount 
 Pamphlet 
 
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 Gaylord Bros. 
 
 Makers 
 
 Stockton, Calif. 
 NT. JAN 21, 1908