.HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. . JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M.D., LL.D., (%. PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY IX THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK ; AUTHOR OF "a TREATISE ON HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY," "a HISTORY OF THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE," ETC., ETC. IN THREE VOLUMES. Vol. II. CONTAINING THE EVENTS FROM THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN TO THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION OF THE SLAVES. • oCji • NEW YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE. 1868. 7<5-/o Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, by HARPER & BROTHERS, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York. INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND VOLUME. The events considered in this volume occurred between the ac- cession of Mr. Lincoln and the Proclamation of Freedom to the Slaves. Chronologically they range from the 4th of March, 1861, to the 1st of January, 1863, inclusive. An examination of these events shows that they may be conven- iently grouped under certain sections or heads. By that means they are more easily borne in mind, and their relation to each other more clearly understood. The secession movement exhibited the character of a conspiracy for some time after the accession of Lincoln. There may be a dif- ference of opinion as to the exact epoch at which it lost that char- acter, but, for reasons subsequently mentioned, I have placed the limit at the battle of Bull Run, which also coincides with the translation of the Confederate seat of power to Richmond, mani- fested by the assembly of a Congress in that city on July 20th, 1861. The battle of Bull Run satisfied both the national government and its antagonist that the results sought by each could not be at- tained by the tumultuary levies which the people, then unacquaint- ed with war, had up tp that time supposed would be sufficient. It had become plain that real armies must be called into existence. The period during which the resources on both sides were organ- ized is closed by Lincoln's general War Order of the 27th of Jan- uary, 1862, commanding an advance of the national forces. Meantime, however, certain small military afiairs had been taking place. These, though they excited public attention very much at the time, exerted, in reality, little or no influence on the general re- sult. We may therefore regard the actions at Bethel, Ball's Bluff, lY INTRODUCTION. and even the campaign in Northwestern Virginia, in the light of personal encounters, constituting in their aggregate a mere prelude to the true war. Thousrh the battle of Bull Run had the effect of convincinor the nation that its military operations must be intrusted to professional soldiers, in contradistinction to politicians, it was not possible, con- stituted as the government is, but that political ideas should have c CREATION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. The Army at the Beginning and End of the War, 186. — Change in the Morale of the Army, 187. — Progi-ess of Enlistments and Armaments, 188. — Regulars and Volunteers, 189. — Loyalty of the West Point Academy, 190. — Oath taken by the Graduates, 191. — McClellan's Report, 191.— His Views on the Conduct of the War, 192. — Proposed Composition of the Army, 193. — Subordinate Movements, 194. — increase in the Strength of the Army, 195. — Organization of the Infantr}', 195; of the Cavalry and Artillery, 196; of Corps d'Arme'c, 197.— The Potomac and Western Armies, 198. — Actual Strength of the Armies, 199, 200. V X CONTENTS, CHAPTER XLV. CREATION OF THE NATIONAL NAVY. Duties required of tlie Navy, 201. — The Navy and Dock Yards at the Opening of the War, 202.— Requirements of the Blockade, 203.— Of the Sea Navy, 204.— Peculiarities of American Construction and Armament, 205. — The small Gun- boats, 205. — The Kearsarge Class, 205. — The Double-ender and the Lackawan- na Class, 206.— The Wampanoag Class, 207.— The Armored Ships, 207.— The Monitors, 208.— The Monitor Frigates, 209.— Of the River Navy, 210.— The Eivcr Gun-boats, 211.— Energy in building them, 212.— River Monitors, Tin- clads, Mortar Boats, 213. — American Ordnance, 214, 2157 SECTION IX. PRELUDE TO THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS. CHAPTER XLVI. TRANSACTIONS CIVIL AND MILITARY IN KENTUCKY. Minor Military Affairs of 1861. — Early War Movements incorrect, 217. — The Bor- der States, 218. — Their Geographical and Political Position, 219. — Their Opin- ions and Interests, 220. — Effect of their Neutrality, 221. — Movements in Ken- tucky, 222. — Political Action in that State, 223. — Attempts of her Governor, 224. — The Confederates invade Kentucky, 225. — They blockade the Mississippi, 226. — Grant attacks them at Belmont, 226. CHAPTER XLVir. ^TSAKaA CTIONg CIVIL A»D MI LlTJ nSTTir HISIOURI. Internal Dissensions in Missouri, 227. — The State Convention and the Governor, 228. — He seizes the Arsenal at Liberty, 228. — Lyon captures his Camp ; Harney makes a Compact with him, 229. — The Governor's Proclamation, 230. — Lyon defeats him at Booneville, 231. — The Governor declares that the state has se- ceded, 231. — Fremont in Command of the Department, 232. — Battle of Wilson's Creek and Death of Lyon, 233. — Capture of Lexington and Removal of Fremont, 234. — Retreat of the National Army ; Halleck takes Command, 235. — His Slave Order, 236 ; Curtis's Advance and Battle of Pea Ridge, 237, 238.— Indian Allies of the Confederates, 239. — The March of Curtis to Helena, 240. CHAPTER XLVIII. TRANSACTIONS CIVIL AND MILITARY IN VIRGINIA. Western Virginia adheres to the Union, 241. — McClellan crosses the Ohio, 242, — Affair at Romney, 243. — Johnston evades Patterson ; Affair at Rich Mountain, 244.— Carrick's Ford, 245.— Cross Lanes ; Carnifex Ferry, 246.— General R. E. Lee in Command, 246. — Lee and McClellan, 247. — Butler at Fortress Monroe, 248.— Affair at Bethel, 249.— Defeat of the National Troops, 250.— Tragedy at Ball's Bluff, 251, 252. CONTENTS. xi SECTION X. CAMPAIGN FOE OPENING THE MISSISSIPPI AND PIERCING THE GREAT EAST AND WEST LINE OF THE CONFEDERACY. CHAPTER XLIX. FORCING OF THE FIRST CONFEDERATK LINE. CAPTURE OP FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON, AND OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI TO MEMPHIS. Effect of the Battle of Bull Run, 254. — McClellan Commander-in-Chief, 255. — Im- mobility of the Potomac Army, 256. — The President's General War Order, 257. — Commencement of the War, 258. — The First Line of Confederate Defense, 258.— Halleck's War Plan, 259.— Operations on the TennesseS, 260.— Strength of the opposing Armies, 261. — Operations against Fort Henry, 262. — Capture of. that Fort, 263. — Operations against Fort Donelson, 264. — The premature As- . sault, 265.— Defeat of the Gun-boats, 266.— Sortie of the Garrison, 267.— Suc- cess of the Sortie, 268.— The Confederates forced back, 269.— Floyd's Night Council, 270. — Surrender of Donelson, 271. — Fall of Nashville, 272. — Mill Spring, 273. — Pope's Attack on New Madrid, 274. — The Confederates evacuate it, 275. — Canal of Island No. 10, 276. — Pope's Passage of the Mississippi, 277. — Surrender of the Island, 277. — Destruction of the Confederate Fleet, 278. — Fort Pillow and Memphis, 279.— Fall of Memphis, 280. CHAPTER L. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. FORCING OF THE SECOND CONFEDERATE LINE. Grant's Visit to Nashville, 281, is disapproved of by Halleck, 282. — Sherman's Reconnoissance up the Tennessee, 283. — The Topography around Shiloh, 284. — Posting of the Troops, 285. — Grant restored to Command, 286. — Concentra- tion of the Armies, 287. — Beauregard's Plan of Campaign, 288. — The Field of Shiloh, 289. — Position of Grant's Army, 290. — Confederate Attack expected, 291.— The Battle of Shiloh, 292.— Resistance of Sherman, 293.— Grant's Line forced back, 294.— Death of Johnston, 295.— The final Confederate Charge, 296. — Preparations for renewing the Battle, 297. — Beauregard's Report, 298. — Ar- rival of Buell, 299.— The second Day's Battle, 300.— Aid rendered by Buell, 301. —Retreat of the Confederates, 302, 303.— Comments on the Battle, 304.— Sher- man breaks the Railroad, 305. — Halleck's Advance to Corinth, 306. — The Fall of Corinth, and unjust Disgrace of Beauregard, 307. — Mitchell's Expedition, 308. — His Transfer to South Carolina and Death, 309. CHAPTER LL CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. THE FIRST VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. Results of the Shiloh Campaign, 310.— The Marches of Buell and Bragg, 311.— Removal of Halleck to Washington, 311. — Position of Grant's Forces, 312. — The Confederate Attempts on Corinth; Affair at luka, 313. — Escape of Price and Van Dorn, 314.— Assault on Corinth, 315. — Gallant Conduct of the Confeder- ates, 316. — R^ecfans's Report of the Battle, 317. — The first Vicksburg Cam- paign, 318.— Capture of Holly Springs, 319.— Arrest of Grant's March, 320.— The, Chmkasaw Bayou, 321, 322.— Sherman's Attempt at Chickasaw, 323; its •^4. Failur tlTctnfet ^"^ ^^ Montgomery, and also an agreement giv- eracy. ^^^ ^^ ^j^^^ govemmeut the whole military resources of the state, and turning over to it whatever public property Virginia might seize from the United States. These were passed, however, upon condition that the vote of the people upon the ordinance of secession should sustain it, and that vote was directed to be taken one month subsequently (May 23d). With a view of enabling the people to come to a suitable conclusion, some minor points were enacted, as that any Means used to se- -^-j^. .. ^--,. cure the popular Virsimian holdin^: omce under the United States after the 31st of July should be ban- ished from the state and declared an alien enemy, and any Virginian undertaking to represent the state in the Congress of the United States should, in addition to the above penalties, be considered guilty of treason, and his property be liable to confiscation. But this submission to the people was insincere. The allotted month had scarcely begun, before the affair had passed out of their control. Without a moment's delay, the leaders of the movement made war on the Union ; they attempted to seize the United States Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and took possession of the navy yard at Norfolk. Indeed, they actually commenced obstructing the channel to the latter place on April 16th, the night Qhap. XXXVIII.] CAPTURES HARPER'S FERRY. g^ f before tie ordinance was passed. And wlien tlie popu- lar vote for secession was taken, a large part of it came from soldiers of the Confederate army who liad just ar- rived from other states. Through all the subsequent years of the war it was a Her failure to seize s^urce of profouud rcgret in the Confeder- Fortress Monroe. ^^^ that Virginia had acted so tardily, and that she had not at this time secured the great national work— Portress Monroe. It would have been of incal- culable advantage to her, and have changed the whole current of events. Her governor had contemplated the possibility of seizing it even before the state had seceded, but had been less resolute than the South Carolinians. In his annual message to the Legislature of the state (De- cember 31st, 1861), he regretted that it was not in his possession. He stated that he had " consulted with a per- son of experience whose position enabled him to know all about the fortress," and that he had been discouraged, by reason of the strength of the place, from attempting its capture ; that at no time previously to secession had Vir- ginia a military organization powerful enough for that purpose. The attack on Harper's Ferry was made on the 18th of April. The officer in charge of that es- She captures the,,,., ,iti t /» arsenajatHar- tablishmcut had, howcvcr, become aware oi per 8 Ferry. ^ ' ' what was intended. He blew up or set on fire the various workshops and the arsenal, and effected a safe retreat into Pennsylvania. Though many arms were in this manner destroyed, much of the machinery was saved by the assailants, and subsequently carried to Richmond. . Simultaneously with the attack on Harper's Perry, Vir- vaiue of ihe naval ghiia accomplishcd the seizure of the great station at Norfolk. ^^^^^ statiou, thc Gosport uavy yard, near •Norfolk. It contained founderies, ship-yards, docks, ma- 84 THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD. [Sect. VII. chine shops. There were in it at least two thousand can- non, three hundred of them being Dahlgren guns. In connection with it, too, were magazines containing more than a quarter of a million pounds of gunpowder, and great quantities of shot and shell. There were twelve war ships, of various rates. Among them may particular- ly be mentioned the Merrimack, a very fine steam frigate of 40 guns. The value of the entire establishment was estimated at more than ten millions of dollars. No measures had been taken for the protection of this Its inefficient de- g^cat dcpot bcyoud general instructions to fense. Captalu M^Caulcy, the officer in command, to "put the shipping and public property in condition to be moved and placed beyond danger, but in doing so to take no steps that could give needless alarm " In Nor- folk the militia was defiantly paraded, and threats made that if any action were taken by the government for the protection of the yard, it should be attacked. On the night of April 16th, the entrance to the harbor was ob- Chap. XXXVIIL] THE NORFOLK NAVY YAKD. §5 structed by sinking two liglit-sliips. Captain M^Cauley suffered himself to be overpersuaded by the sinister ad- vice of his junior officers, and acted with irresolution. Or- ders had been received from Washington on April 12th to have the Merrimack instantly removed to Philadel- phia, the chief engineer being sent down to Norfolk ex- pressly for that purpose. Yet when her steam was up, and she was ready to leave, Captain M^Cauley directed her to be detained, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the engineer. Indeed, it was not imtil many of his officers, who were from: the Slave States, had resigned, and the The officers in com- r^ n i , imTj> tt • ■^ mand destroy or Contedcrate g-eneral ialiaierro had arrived abandon it, -r»'iii from Kichmond, that he seemed to compre- hend the condition of things. On the 19th he made prep- arations for abandoning the place, and commenced 'spik- ing the guns, doing it, for the most part, ineffectually, with cut nails. Next day. he promised the insurgents that none of the vessels should be taken away, nor a shot fired except in defense. He then ordered all the ships, except the Cumberland, of 24 guns, to be scuttled. That ship, with a full armament and crew on board, thongh they had , . _ , , ' ftTdefens?""^ ^'''" ^^^ ^^ ^^ - ^ positiou as to commaud thc entire harbor, the cities of Norfolk and Ports- mouth, the navy yard, and the approaches to it. The mere threat of her broadside Avould have , quelled the trouble. The whole militia force of the place was not ^ve hundred men, inadequately armed, and with only eight or ten little field-pieces. The government, now becoming alarmed, sent Captain Paulding from Washington with orders to take command of all the naval forces afloat at Norfolk, and defend the property of the United States, repelling force by force. He had fully 1000 men, among whom were 350 Massa- chusetts troops obtained at Fortress Monroe. But, in his gl THE NORFOLK NAVY YARD. [Sect. VII. judgment, notliiDg remained except to complete tlie work of destruction, and abandon tlie place. The scuttled ships were in the act of settling under the water. He there- fore gave directions to fire the yard and what remained of the ships. The ships, which might have been removed, were accordingly destroyed, but the shops in the yard were unaccountably spared, and were subsequently of great use to the Confederacy. A large amount of war ma- terial fell into the hands of the insurgents. A commis- sioner of the State of Virginia, subsequently Report of the Vir- ,i ■ ' - t , , i • , (* ,^ ginia commissioner authoRzed to takc au luveutorv 01 the prop- on its acquisition. i •! tit t ertj thus seized, reports : "1 had purposed some remarks upon the vast importance to Virginia, and to the entire South, of the timely acquisition of this ex- tensive naval depot, with its immense supplies of muni- tions of war, and to notice briefly the damaging effects of its loss to the government at Washington ; but I deem it unnecessary, since the presences', at almost every exposed point on the whole Southern coast, and at numerous in- land intrenched camps in the several states, of heavy pieces of ordnance, with their equipments and fixed am- munition, all supplied from this establishment, fully at- tests the one, while the unwillingness of the enemy to at- tempt demonstrations at any point, from which he is ob- viously' deterred by the knowledge of its well-fortified Tjondition; abundantly proves the other, especially when it is considered that both he and we are wholly indebted for our means of resistance to his loss and our acquisition of the Gosport navy yard." This great national disaster, which, as thus affirmed, in reality armed the South, and gave it the Disastrons conse- n * i i 1 1 . i. i. quences to the mcaus 01 rcsistaucc to the s:overnment, must nation. , . , . 4^^ -, be imputed paxtly to irresolution at Wash- ington, and partly to the indecision of the commanding officer. The money loss to the government was great, Chap. XXXVIII.] THE 'NORFOLK NAVY YARD. gy but.it was a totally inadequate measure of the intrinsic value of the war material at that moment. The South was armed and the North disarmed. The indirect con- sequences were of incalculable importance. When Cap- tain JVrCauley gave orders that the frigate Merrimack should not sail, and thereby left her to be raised and con- verted into an iron-clad ram, he closed the James River, and prepared unspeakable disasters for the subsequent peninsular campaign. A select committee of the Senate of the United States, directed to inquire into these subjects, re- at?coinmittle oS" portcd that, lu thclr judgmcut, (1.) The ad- ministration of Mr. Buchanan was guilty of neglect in not taking extraordinary care and employing every possible means to protect and defend the Norfolk navy yard after indications of danger had manifested themselves ; (2.) The administration of Mr. Lincoln can not be held blameless for suffering thirty-seven days to elapse after he came into power before making a move- ment for the defense of the yard ; (3.) Captain M'Cauley was highly censurable for neglecting to send the Merri- mack from the yard as he was ordered, and also for scut- tling the ships and preparing to abandon the yard before any attack was made or seriously threatened, when he should have defended it and the property intrusted to him, repelling force by force, as he was instructed to do if the occasion should present itself Captain Paulding was likewise considered by the committee to be censura- ble for ordering the property to be burned and the yard abandoned before taking proper means to satisfy himself that any necessity for such measures existed. Thus Virginia severed her connection with that repub- lic which her great men of the former generation had g3 RICHMOND THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL. [Sect. VII. done so mucli to establish, and wMcli she had so long ruled. She accepted a measure leading at once to civil war, to public calamity, and domestic sorrow. Few social lessons can be more instructive than her ex- Eichmond as the . • ,i /» t* ^^ ' i •! Confederate cap- pericuces lu the lour lollowmg years while Richmond had the vain glory of being the capital of the new Confederacy — experiences which have been recorded by her own people. Let us listen to what one of her daughters relates — the serpent beguiled her and she did eat — in a very instructive little volume she tells us how the apple of secession tasted. She says that during the Secession Convention the hall of meeting; became the favorite place of re- The delight of its , n ,t • i • ii ^ inhahitauts at se- sort 01 the womcn, who occasionally ens-acred cession. ' •/ o o in political discussions in the intervals of the meetings of the members. Every woman in Richmond was a politician. On the ordinance of secession being passed, the people were in a delirium of joy ; the cannon were saluting, the bells ringing, neigbbors shaking hands with each otker, the ladies waving their handkerchiefs. In the evening there was an illumination, the favorite form being the Southern cross ; the sky was alive with Roman candles and variegated rockets. At this time Richmond was in a very prosperous condition ; its trade was flourishing, articles of food and clothing were very cheap, and pauperism was actually unknown. All this was, however, considered as nothing in comparison with the prosperity which it was expected that secession would bring. The clergy, forgetting the terrible denunciation that Jefferson had formerly pronounced against slavery, declared that the smiles of God were upon the cause ; and it was thought to be more than a mere omen that on the Sunday following the passai^e of the ordi- Secession Sunday. ,, t'iii n ji nance there occurred m the lesson tor the day, as read in the Episcopal churches, the words " I will Chap. XXXVIII.] SOCIAL CONDITION OF RICHMOND. "gg remove far off from you tlie JSTorthern army, and v^ill drive him into a land barren and desolate, witli his face toward the east sea, and his hinder parts to the utmost sea, and his stink shall come up, and his ill savor shall come up, because he hath done great things." Soon, however, the population began to change, and Gradual changes in strauge faccs appeared in the streets. Sol- Eichmoud society, ^-^^.g ^^^^ ^-^^ Cottou States Were pouring in. They were followed by that loose society, male and female, which always hovers round armies. The first regiments that appeared were from South Carolina. They received a hearty welcome. The gay throng who had lately crowded the halls of the Secession Convention was now wandering through the camps. But the pride of the young ladies was touched to the quick by the gas- conade of their new friends. "We have come here to fight the battles of you Virginians." Estrangement was embittered by the reflection that the blows so wantonly provoked by South Carolina must fall first on Virginia. But, though the Carolinians gave no offense, save that arising from their conceit, it was not so with the troops of the Southwest. The New Orleans Zouaves stole what- ever they could lay their hands upon, robbed and insult- ed citizens in the public streets, caroused riotously.in the restaurants and hotels, and told the proprietors to charge the bills to the Confederate government. An elegant establishment w^as provided for President The president and T^^vls. RcceptioUS llkc thoSC lu thc WMtO Richmond life. jj^^^^ ^^ Washiugtou wcrc held. It was necessary that every man should appear in the streets in a military garb. There was the reveille in the morning and taps at night. In the autumn of that first year of the war the weather was more beautiful than for a long time had been known ; the Indian summer brought an exquisite dreamy haze; the gorgeous foliage of the forest ff^ SOCIAL CONDITION OF EICHMOND. [Sect. VII. was Absolutely magnificent. This was Avhile M^Clellan was holding his great army at Washington waiting for the weather to improve. The president of the Confed- eracy was often seen riding on horseback through . the city with one of his children before him. It was thought to: be an affecting sight. By , degrees, however, things changed. Speculators, Decline of patriotic g^mblcrs, aud pci'sons of bad character sentiment. flocked iuto the ucw mctropolis. The blockade began to be felt The vilest extortions were practiced by dealers in provisions. They ran up the price of coffee to fifty dollars per pound. Dried leaves of the, sage, willow, currant, were substituted for tea. The president declined in public esteem ; his arbitrary control of military affairs irritated the chief generals. It was remarked that the first anniversary of the fall of Sumter was signalized by the fall of Pulaski. Then came M^Clellan's peninsular campaign, and trouble in Difficulties in do- the domcstlc economy of Eichmond. It mestic economy, ^^^g, ^^^ -j^^^^^ ^^^ fair iuformaut plaintive- ly says, to procure a dinner at all. Then followed the Chickahominy battles. " The month of July can never be forgotten; we lived in one immense hospital; we breathed the vapors of a charnel-house." The Confeder- ate Congress, on M'Clellan's approach, had run away; when the members returned in August after he was gone, they were unmercifully twitted for their flight by the women. The chief magistrate, embittered by the course of events, had now become a stern autocrat ; he kept both houses of Congress in mortal terror. A public The president be- clamor arosc that his cabinet should be comes unpopular, ^haugcd. Hc tumcd a deaf ear to it. It was said that his obstinacy was strengthened by the flat- tery of the parasites around him — the dependents on his will. In his first report to the permanent Congress he Chap. XXXVm.] RICHMOND AS A CAPITAL. ^ had represented the financial condition as one of safety ; " in less than twelve months the currency, was at a dis- count of a thousand per cent." There was a pitiable a.d necessary nrti- scarcity of the most ueccssary articles; for cies very scarce, instauce, paper could hardly be had. The old and respectable residents, who had long lived in eas6 on their competent resources, were now reduced to dire necessities. The women turned their well-worn dresses upside down and inside out to pass them off as new, and grimly jested at the seedy aspect of their male friends, whose garb was incapable of that device. De- cayed gentility saw with indignation the splendid car- A gloom settles on I'lagcs of upstart spccuktors rolling through theci^y. the streets, and listened perhaps with too much credulity to stories of the vast fortunes wrung by contractors out of the impoverished state. The > cheerful sounds of the piano became less frequent in the houses ; they were replaced by the hum of the spinning-wheel. Not without curiosity, mingled with sympathy, do we Extravagant prices ^^^^ ^^^ declaration of our fair Confederate of clothing. £j,j^^^^ that "the wardrobe of a lady be- came enormously expensive at last." . "For an ordinary calico, for which we formerly paid 12 J cents a yard, we were forced to pay from' thirty to thirty-five dollars ; for an English or French chintz the price was fifty dollars a yard. A nice French merino or mohair dress was from eight hundred to a thousand dollars. A cloak of fine cloth was worth from one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars. A pair of Balmoral boots for ladies, two hun- dred and fifty dollars. French gloves sold at from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and seventy-five dollars per pair. Irish linen commanded from fifty to one hundred dollars per yard." But it is needless to continue this catalogue of feminine sorrows : something infinitely sadder was coming. 92 SURRENDER OF PENSACOLA. [Sect. VII. The inevitable hour struck at last. Kichmond, aban- doned and defenseless, stood alone in pres- Richmon/Sa euce of the Great Power it had defied. The Confederate authorities had fled, and had given orders to set it on fire. In vain the inhabitants, pallid with terror, implored to be spared that atrocity. .It is fired by these- With exquisite wickedness, the hose of the cession officers. fire-engiucs had been cut. There was noth- ing to stop the devouring flames. An unparalleled con- flagration was the result. Kichmond, once the great mart of the internal slave-trade, was entered by conquer- ing regiments of negro troops. They came through the smoke, amidst blazing houses, bursting shells, and explod- ing magazines, singing " Old John Brown." They came, not to revenge, but to protect. And the republic founded by Washington, a Virgin- ian, for2:ettin2: in a moment the long; asrony and its people saved -, ^ -, t -, , t 7, it from famine by the suc had Dceu made to endure, stretched United States. n i i t i t t i forth both her hands to succor and sustam bleeding and fainting Virginia. Men, women, and chil- dren who were famishing in Richmond, were fed by the merciful conqueror. In connection with the capture of the navy yard at Surrender of the Norfolk may bc mcutioued the disgraceful pensacoiayard. g^rreudcr of that at Pensacola, in Florida, by the officers having charge of it, and the honorable de- fense of Fort Pickens. Florida, purchased from Spain by the money of the Union, had seceded on January 12th, and immediately made a demand for the yard. Of the works guarding it the most important was Fort Pickens, a stone casemated structure on Santa Eosa Island. On the shore opposite to it there was a smaller work. Fort M'Rea; and a third, Fort Barrancas, about a couple of miles distant. At the Chap. XXXVIII. ] DEFENSE OF , FORT PICKENS. 93 Pensac Q^NiVY ov \K\.^\^Ci THE DEFENSES OF PENSACOLA. time when the American flag was hauled down at the navy yard, and the stores, guns, and munitions turned over to the insurgents, Fort Barrancas was abandoned. But this scene of military disgrace was not consum- Defense of Fort ^uatcd. The little Fort M'Eea was in charge Pickens. ^£ ^ young officer. Lieutenant Slemmer. He collected together what force he could, and, obtaining some marines from the steamer Wyandotte, in all about eighty men, he spiked the guns of M^Kea, and threw himself into Fort Pickens, holding that important, work, which was one of the keys of the Gulf of Mexico, until the middle of April, when it was effectually garrisoned and provisioned by the government. CHAPTEE XXXIX. SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE SOUTH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFLICT. HER MILITARY AND POLITICAL PREPARATIONS. The South secured her sea-coast line by seizing the national fortresses ; her north- ern line by asserting the rights of neutrality of the Border States. On the West she blockaded the Mississippi. Shut up thus within herself, she established* throughout her territory an iron des- potism. Inhere were four classes in her population. Their condition became that of a state of siege. . t Comparison of the political value of Richmond, the metropolis of the Confederacy, ^' with that of Washington. I .Though assuraviices were perpetually given by the lead- watpreparationsia ers of secessioH that their design would, sue- the confederacy. ^^^^ wlthout difficulty, and perhaps with- put a resort to war, they made every preparation to ob- tain military security for their new . Confederacy. They commenced by seizing all the fortresses and depots estab- lished in their limits by the United States for the defense of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Some of these had been very costly; several were very powerful works— a cor- don along the shore Judged to be amply sufficient to give security to that part of the republic in case of European war, but capable of being appropriated without difficulty by the people it was intended to defend, since it was vir- tually ungarrisoned. The sea and Gulf fronts of the new Confederacy thus protected, it was supposed that the land- The coast front and t, /it. ,t i , t ,-• t-i SadeTafe^''"''^ ^^""^ irout, lookiug uorthward toward the ±"ree States, might be made secure by resorting to the apparently peaceable measure of playing off the Chap. XXXIX.] DEFENSES OF THE CONFEDERACy. 95 Constitution against itself. No pains were spared to se- cure in the Border States — the tier of states intervening between the cotton region and the free North — reliable governors and Legislatures. These states, by assuming a position of neutrality, might ward off the forces of the republic under the plea that they had done nothing to justify invasion by it. Meantime their military popula- tion was individually, and therefore, it might be said, im- perceptibly, able to re-enforce the armies of the Confeder- acy, and their military resources could be quietly added to its strength. Under the protection of this vast breastwork, this tier of ostensibly peaceable and neutral states, reaching from beyond the Mississippi eastward to the Atlantic Ocean, the people who had revolted from the republic expected to organize their political institutions in security; and that, even should war break out, its shock would not fall trpon them. The Border States must be the battle-field of the Confederacy. Distance, and the impracticability of carrying on mili- the west front inac- ^^^J opcratlous iu a sparscly peopled country cessibie, — ^ country v^ithout good roads and with- out available resources, seemed to give ample security on the western frontier. The Mississippi Eiver, as a central and the Mississippi avcuuc to the iutcrlor rcccsscs of the Con- federacy, might be. closed without difficulty against all adventurers. The forts at New Orleans pror- hibited any ascent, and batteries could easily be construct- ed below the junction of the Ohio at Cairo that would bar all descent down the stream. If such was the encouraging prospect when the de- The national army feuscs of thc Confederate territory were con- andna^y dispersed. gi(Jepg(^^ ;qq^ jggg gatisfactory was thc condi- tion of its expected assailant. With provident care for the success of the conspiracy, Floyd had dispatched the 96 DEFENSES OF THE CONFEDERACY. [Sect. VII. mass of the United States army to tlie frontier. The Secretary of the Navy had sent the national ships to dis- tant parts of the world. History lent no countenance to the supposition that it would be possible to put a shore- line of many thousand miles under a valid blockade. When Lincoln came into power he had only forty-two national ships with which to do that and meet all other naval requirements. It was, therefore, not without reason, expected that the The Confederacy cultlvatlou of tobacco aud cottou, thosc great go'^od'^vSeVS? sources of wealth, could be carried on as ''^''^^' heretofore; that unrestrained access to the ocean on the one side, and the urgent necessities of Eu- rope on the other, would continue the profitable com- merce which for so many years past had enriched the South. So clear did this appear, that it was not consid- ered necessary by the leaders of secession to resort to any measures for the immediate transportation of the great stock of those staples on hand to Europe, it being con- cluded that, should the government undertake any such measures as a closure of the ports or the establishment of a blockade, the western powers of Europe would at once interfere. Behind the impregnable rampart of the Border States Life in the Cotton ^^^^^ would thus cxist, iu pcacc and secu- Pdradise. j.-^.^^ ^ Cottou Paradisc, its free inhabitant relieved from the primeval curse, and gaining his bread by the sweat of another man's brow. Should the African trade be reopened, every one of the ruling race might have as many laborers as he pleased. It was not very material what terms were contained in the written Consti- tution of the new nation, since the recognized right of peaceable secession covered every difficul- dyfor^aii political ty. Should South Carolina, in the course of events, readopt the policy she had at the Chap. XXXIX.] THE EIGHT OF SECESSION. 97 close of the last English war, aided in imposing on the old Union — the tariff policy — and should, as probably might be the case, her associates object to her proceed- ings, what more would be needful for her, if determined to gratify her own willfulness, than to retire from the Confederacy, as she had formerly retired from the Union. Or, should Florida, recalling her traditions, and remem- bering that on her soil the African first set his foot on this continent, desire a reopening of the profitable Guinea trade, and make ready her depots at Pensacola and St. Augustine, in vain would the slave-breeding states of the Confederacy exert their opposition. Falling back on her sovereign rights, it was only for her to secede from her associates and carry out her intent. But the founders of the Confederacy never seriously contemplated the recognition of such a po- the^'ieadeys of se- Htical absurdltv as the rig-ht of secession ; it cession. *^ . . , was too slippery a principle; they never practically accepted its kindred delusion of individual state rights as against the united whole ; they never be- lieved that a powerful dominion could be constructed out of disconnected communities. They were too astute to attempt to build a tower whose top was to reach to the sky, with nothing but slime for mortar. They knew that when something of that kind was formerly tried, it led to a confusion of tongues and the dispersion of the projectors. On the contrary, once in possession of power, they sub- They institute a J^ctcd everything to a despotism of iron. despotism. Instead of a garden of Eden, in which every one might gratify his own will, the South became a vast intrenched camp, and instant obedience was exacted to the orders of a military sujDerior. The poor white, who had innocently amused himself with a day-dream of an- ticipated idleness, riches, pleasure, and liberty to the verge IL— G 98 CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. [Sect. VIL of license, was aghast wlien lie found that he was torn from his home, and even from his state, and compelled to march to the battle front by order of a central authority at Eichmond. The population of the proposed Confederacy may be considered as havins: presented four distinct- The population of, tit«' .... the Confederacy ly marked divisious or groups, constituting, socially and intellectually, a descending se- ries. (1.) The planters, or great land and slave owners ; (2.) Persons constrained by their circumstances, more or less narrow, to occupy themselves in certain industrial pursuits — professional politicians, clergymen, lawyers, merchants, mechanics, farmers, laborers; (3.) Domestic slaves; (4.) Field slaves. It is not necessary to add to these the free negroes, for they, in truth, were of little po- litical importance. (1.) The planters were a true aristocracy — a ruling class. They were educated, wealthy, hos- The- first class. > *i i pitable. Foreseeing that, under the opera- tion of the existing Constitution, the North must neces- sarily take from them that control of the national govern- ment, which they had so long enjoyed, they had become alienated from it. Accustomed to command, impatient of any control, a civil government of the representative type suited them far less than a purely military rule — one readily adapting itself to actual occurrences, and able to enforce its laws and resolves promptly and emphatic- ally. As forming what might be termed a section of this group were its young men. Brave, splendid riders, cap- ital shots, bold to rashness, they held labor in absolute contempt, and pined for the maddening excitements of war. (2.) The small farmers, mechanics, merchants, profes- sional men. This group probably numbered three fourths Chap. XXXIX.] CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. 99 of the white population. They had no real The SGPond cIrss x a •/ interest in the establishment of a Southern Confederacy. Some were led, and some driven to take the risk of war ; they hoped to be benefited by it some- how, but they knew not how. Guided by the opinions of the great slaveholding planters, they had become intol- erant supporters of the overshadowing institution. One portion of this group — the clergy — has still to The course of the render to the world an account of its con- ^^®'^^' duct. At the bar of civilization it has yet to explain or to defend its support of slavery. It took the responsibility of training the women of the South in the belief that that institution is authorized by Chris- tianity. (3.) Of the slave groups, the domestic slaves had gained The third class, do- ^ ccrtalu dcgrco of intellectual culture from mestic slaves, ' ^^^^^ ^j^^^^ assoclatiou with the whites. When it is said that the proportion of mulattoes to the whole slave population had risen in 1860 to one eighth, the statement does not convey the whole truth. It was on the class of domestic slaves that the adulteration chief ly fell. Persons who were extensively and familiarly ac- quainted with Southern society were disposed to believe that more than a majority of this group showed unmis- takable traces of white blood. The women of it, from their necessary connection with the household, were more exposed to their masters, and perhaps they were not less attractive from the fact that many of them possessed lin- eaments of a European cast, and had lost the repulsive features of the African. As a general thing, they were treated with kindness ; but, from the political knowledge they incidentally acquired ; from their comparative physi- ological elevation above the true black, aris- ing from the white constituent of their blood ; from the bitterness awakened in them against the IQO CONVERSION OF THE NEGRO. [Sect. VII. whites througli the trivial daily incidents of their lives, they constituted emphatically the dangerous class of the South. (4.) As for the field slave, every thing tended to em- The fourth class, fitter him. On him fell heavily all the field slaves. hardships of the plantation — yet not on him alone, for the female field slaves shared all the toils of the men. It was the intention of the slave system to keep these people in animal-like ignorance ; it considered them in the light of machines, useful for the gains they could create. And yet, even under these most disad- vantaojeous conditions, human nature would often assert its power. There were many of this class who manifest- ed no uncertain tokens of a capacity for better things ; who endeavored, with what intelligence they had, to act faithfully in the station in which Providence had placed them, and who found a consolation for the sorrows of the present life in the religious hope of a happier future be- yond the grave. Justice has not yet been done to the white women of the South for their conduct to the slave slaves to Chris- poDulatlou. Throuo-li their benevolent in- tianity. -'•■'• *^ fluence, and not through any ecclesiastical agency, was the Christianization of this African race ac- complished — a conversion which was neither superficial nor nominal, but universal and complete. The paganism of the indigenous negro had absolutely disappeared from the land. Nor must it be supposed that this wonderful change was accomplished merely by the passive example of the virtues which adorn the white woman ; she took an active interest in the eternal well-being of those who were thus cast upon her hands, administering consolation to the aged, the sick, and the dying, and imparting relig- ious instruction to the young. The annals of modern missionary exertion offer no parallel success. Chap. XXXIX.] CONDUCT OF THE SLAVES. IQl " Our clergy and our women are the real leaders of se- cession" — sucli was tlie declaration of Southern political writers, and such was unquestionably the truth. We can not fail to remark that there was hardly a war order is- sued by a Southern general which did not contain a ref- erence to, or derive inspiration from, the women. It will ever remain a psychological paradox that they who were, in a moral point of view, most outraged by slavery, should not have been its bitterest enemies; that the Southern matron, recognizing the lineaments of her own children in the young slaves playing round her door, should not have regarded it with the most implacable jealousy and hatred. It was impossible to foresee what would be the rela- tions between these white and black races Doubtful position • ■ i • t i-r t , ofthe slaves be- lu the impeudmg War. Very contradictory opinions were held. , In the North slavery was looked upon as a source of weakness to the Confed- eracy; it was believed that an insurrection was inevita- ble. On the contrary, in the South the institution was considered as imparting great strength. The fidelity of the neo-roes to their masters in the wars of the Revolu- tion and of 1812 was often cited as indicating what would now take place. In this sanguine expectation, it was perhaps forgotten that a great mental change had, during the last thirty years, happened to the slaves. They had gathered hopes of freedom, and were univer- sally expecting that the North would be their deliverer. Their conduct during the war was above all praise. Their conauctdur- ^^ cxtortcd tho admlratlou of even their iug the war. mastcrs. The plantations were left at their mercy; the women and children were almost without protection. And yet the slaves took no advantage of their opportunity; no j)assion was gratified, no wrong avenged. In regions at a distance from military move- 102 CONDUCT OF THE SLAVES. [Sect. VII. ments, they continued peaceably tlieir accustomed agri- cultural labors ; in those near which the national armies passed, they merely escaped to freedom. But if, on the one hand, they nobly abstained from retaliation, on the other they exhibited fidelity to their friends. The na- tional officers, many of them reluctantly, but all in the end, frankly bore testimony to the invaluable services they rendered. The information they gave was uniform- ly found to be true — so true that great army movements sometimes depended on it. They never deceived and never betrayed the Yankee. Many very affecting narratives have been published of the escape of national prisoners of war from their Confed- erate guards. In all these it is the same story ; the fugi- tive is passed on from one negro cabin to another; he is hidden by day and guided by night; he is fed, and clothed, and comforted. But, if thus the negro, by abstaining from riot, insur- rection, and the perpetration of private atrocities, in part repaid to the female society of the South in its hour of des- olation and distress, the deep obligation he was under for his conversion from a pagan to a Christian life, he showed that he could vindicate himself as a man when publicly called upon by the authority of his country, and clothed in the uniform of her soldiery. Then he met his former master in open wairfare face to i^ce, and on many a blood- stained field made good his title to freedom. By the blockade, and the armies gathered on the fron- tier, the slave power was shut out from the world. It was encircled with a wall of fire. Far from being the paradise predicted by the authors of secession, that in closure was a scene of Actual condition of -, ^^ .,, • ii the South during tyrauuv and woe. JMo one will ever lustly the war. ^ *> •ii'i measure the desperate energy with which Chap. XXXIX.] THE SOUTH IN A STATE OF SIEGE. IQ^ its inhabitants tried to burst througli tlie investing line ; no one will ever fully know the agony they endured. As soon as military operations assumed a determinate fof. .f character, the Southern States stood in the It was a state of ^ ' ^^^°^- attitude of a beleaguered fortress — the war was, in truth, a vast siege ; that fortress covered an area of more than 700,000 square miles ; the lines of invest- ment around it extended over more than 10,500 miles. Eight millions of people of European descent, their men second to none on earth in those virtues which insure military glory, and yielding only to their own women in fervid patriotism, were shut up with four millions of Af rican slaves. It was a siege, but such a siege as had never been witnessed before. In two particulars the South had at the outset of the movement great advantage. Her lead- Advantages pos- in I T • 1 1 • sessed by its rui- ers wcrc mcu who, from their long connection with the United States government, had be- come familiar with the methods of administration. The president of the Confederacy, Davis, had for many years been the national Secretary of War. In this respect he stood in signal contrast to his antagonist, Lincoln; the one had a practical knowledge of all the requirements and all the details of military life, but the wordy warfare of country law-courts, the noisy disputations of contested elections, were the only preparation of the other. In a second particular the South had a great advant- age. She entered upon the conflict not only manner of arm- armcd, but armcd at the cost of her enemy. The warlike munitions she obtained throusrh the acts of Twiggs in Texas, and Floyd in Washington ; through the seizure of so many forts upon the coast, and of dock-yards, armories, and other places of depot, gave her all that at the outset she required. The value of these acquisitions was not to be measured merely by 104 CONSTRUCTION OF ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM. [Sect.VII. their money worth, though that was very great, amount- ing to many millions of dollars. Their opportuneness was of equal moment. The South, Minerva-like, sprang to the contest ready both in head and hand. To Europeans, by whom these great advantages were at first imperfectly understood, the South Rapid construction , -, . . ^ of their political prcseutcd a very imposmg spectacle. Even to those who regarded her movement with unfriendly eyes, the sudden completion of her political fabric appeared very surprising. In the Old World rev- olutionary movements have been commonly undertaken, not by those who have been all their lives habituated to public office, who are familiar with every state secret, who have had for years an opportunity of shaping the course of things to suit their own ends, who are in a position to seize a large part of the material means of the state, but by persons whose position is unfavorable, and whose means often inadequate. The organization of an efficient i government by the Confederates loses much of its impos- ing appearance when it is remembered that Davis did no more than is done by any new President of the United States on his accession. Lincoln, in fact, had much more formidable difficulties to encounter. He had to make provision against treachery. I have already related the facts connected with the formation of the Confederate government at Montgomery (vol. i., p. 528, etc.), and in a subsequent chapter shall speak of its more important special acts. Of these, however, there is one which it is needful now to bring into prominence: it is the transference of Richmond made the , , , n , n ht i i capital, to allure the tuc scat 01 2:overnment irom Monteromery to Border states. -r,.i ttt t • Tin Richmond. It has been mentioned that, all things considered, this offers perhaps the most suitable point of division between the secession consjDiracy and the establishment of an organized government. Chap. XXXIX.] RICHMOND MADE THE CAPITAL. 1Q5 The Conspiracy had no intention originally of establish- ing its seat of government at Richmond. That was a part of the price exacted by Virginia for her secession, and it was not paid without reluctance. It is to be remember- ed that at that time every thing seemed to turn on what the Border States would do. Lincoln spared no exertion to induce them to retain their allegiance : it was that con- sideration alone that caused him to deal so reluctantly with the slave question. On the other hand, Davis, both by promises and by violence, sought to draw That measure was , t , -, » -, tx i n • i i due to political ne- thcm ovcr to his sidc. Had a Southern town, as Montgomery, been selected for a capital, measures like those which were actually carried into ef- fect for the defense of Richmond must have been resort- ed to. Virginia, the most powerful of the Southern States, must have been stripped of her troops for the defense of a distant point, as Florida and Arkansas were, and there- by left an unresisting prey to the devastation of Northern armies; but by establishing the seat of government at Richmond, it became certain that the most powerful of the Southern armies would always be present in Virginia. If Virginia had been abandoned, all the Border States would have gone with the North. So far as the permanent interests of the Confederacy were concerned, the views of those who look- Richmond was not 1 ',1 T o ,1 1 ' 1 • i? -r»' 1 the seat of power to CQ With disiavor ou thc selection oi Ricn- the Confederacy. t t i t^ • ^ mond were doubtless correct. But, m fact, in such movements as that of secession, the seat of power lies not in any territorial locality; it is in the army. Richmond might have been taken, as Nashville was, and that without producing any definite result. Had M'Clel- lan crowned his Peninsular campaign with its capture, it would have availed nothing so long as there were power- That was in the f^l armics still in the field. The overthrow ^''"'^* of the Confederacy could be accomplished 106 WASHINGTON AND EICHMOND. [Sect. VII. only, and, indeed, was accomplished only, by tlie destruc- tion or surrender of those armies. Very different was it with Washington ; that was rec- ognized all over the world as the lon2:-estab- But Washington is , . , , j p , i a • t the seat of power of iisJiecl scat 01 the Amcricau erovernment. Its the nation. *-' fall would have been to the North an irrep- arable loss. There is now but little doubt that, had the Confederacy been able to seize it, European recognition would at once have followed. It was the clear percep- tion of this relative value that controlled Lincoln's move- ments in the Peninsular campaign: he perceived that Richmond was no equivalent for Washington. And, on the other hand, there never was a moment at which Davis would not have been glad that Richmond should have been wrested from him, if, at the same time, he could have secured Washington. It may, perhaps, not be inappropriate here to remark that the reasons which ori2;inally led to the Coincidence of the , . ^^^-, , . ^, *' ^. metropolis with the sclcctiou 01 Washins^ton as the metropolitan centre of power. , . ^ r Site have m the course of events lost their weight. So long as the republic consisted of the colonial settlements on the Atlantic border, Washington was cen- trally situated. But what might answer for a narrow coast border does not apply to a continent. Washington has been captured by a foreign army once, and has been in imminent peril of capture again and again during the Civil War. It has ceased to be the appropriate site for the metropolis of the great continental republic. During the recent strife its defense not only cost many thousands of lives and many millions of money : it also paralyzed some of the most important movements of the war. But as the old colonial states decline in relative political sig- nificance, and the weight of power settles in the West, it Possible transfer- is uot improbable that Western influence Bissippi Valley. predominating will draw the capital into the f Chap. XXXIX.] WASHINGTON AND EIGHMOND. 107 Mississippi Valley, in absolute security from all foreign attack, and territorially central. The Confederates having determined on the transfer of their seat of government to Eichmond, the Opening of the Con- , . t i i ^ federate Congress in ucccssary preparations vs^ere completed, and their Congress opened its first session in that city on the 20th of July, 1861. CHAPTER XL. THE ATTEMPTED SEIZURE OF THE CAPITAL AND MEXICANIZA- TION OF THE REPUBLIC. BATTLE OF BULL RUN. The Confederate authorities concentrated troops at Manassas for the purpose of capturing Washington and Mexicanizing the republic. Lincoln was compelled, by their encroachments upon him, to invade Virginia, and to construct fortifications for the defense of Washington. He was constrained to use the three-months' men, obtained by the proclamation, to attack the Confederates on the line of Bull Run. The Battle op Bull Run. The South was dissatisfied that its great victory was not crowned by the capture of Washington. Political interpretation of the battle. When the news of the fall of Fort Sumter reached Montgomery, the Confederate Secretary of expect to seize War, Mr. Walker, declared I "No man can Washiugton, n i t> t foretell the events of the war now inausru- rated ; but this I will venture to predict, that the Con- federate flag will, before the 1st of May, float over the dome of the Capitol at Washington." That minister had reasons for his prophecy. He knew and engage in plots that " a formidable organization had existed for that purpose. ^^^ ^^^ ^j^^^^ -^ Baltimore, and in the coun- ties adjacent to Washington, having for its object the cap- ture of that city, the seizure of the government oflicers, and the inauguration of a provisional government in the interests of the South. The conspirators expected by this step to obtain control of the Army, Navy, and Treasury. Their forces were under the orders of two leading South- ern men — one from Texas, who was subsequently slain in battle ; the other from Virginia." In a speech delivered at Atlanta, Alexander H. Ste- Chap. XL.] PROPOSED CAPTURE OP WASHINGTON. 109 phens declared that, " if Maryland secedes, the District of Columbia falls to her by reversionary right, as Sumter fell to South Carolina. When we have that right we will demand the surrender of Washington just as we did in other cases, and will enforce our demand at every haz- ard and at whatever cost." This desperate scheme, originally plotted in secrecy, was soon publicly hailed with transport. In all direc- tions the Southern newspapers urged that it should be instantly carried into effect. They declared that it was the unanimous resolution of the Southern ra?sed"for its cap- pcoplc, aud that Prcsidcnt Davis would soon march an army through North Carolina and Virginia to Washington. They recommended volunteers to hold themselves in readiness to join the expedition. Accordingly, as soon as Virginia had resolved to join the Confederacy, and had placed her military resources at its command, the most strenuous exertions were made to accomplish this great object. Troops from all parts of the South were hurried to Troops concentra- Mauassas Juuctiou, a poiut ou the railroad ted at Manassas, ^^^^r^^^ Washiugtou aud Eichmoud, whcro a branch comes in from the Shenandoah Valley. It was no especial prevision of military science which led to the selection of that position. It was no perception that the Confederacy must be first defended at its outworks, for, so far from supposing that it would be put into a state of siege, the universal belief was that the war on which it was entering was to be an expedition of invasion, an of- fensive movement against the North. Manassas Junction was selected, not because it covered Eichmond, but be- cause it threatened Washington. It is about thirty miles from the latter city. This important point secured, the next step would have been the occupation of Arlington Heights, which over- 110 PROPOSED CAPTURE OF WASmNGTON. [Sect. VII. look Waslaington, and command it. Could Batteries to be con- .t » ^ -, tit tt-« t structed on Ariing- this liave been accomplished, and Lincoln ex- ton Heights. -"■ ' pelled before the fourth of July, the day on which Congress was summoned to meet, the nation would have been Mexicanized, and European recognition of the Confederate authorities as the de facto government of the United States, or recognition of the separation and inde- pendence of the Confederacy probably insured. If Washington was to be retained, or rather preserved — for the Confederate authorities had no intention of holding it as their permanent capital, which obviously must be in a more central position in the South — there was no time to be lost. Already their outposts were oc- cupying the heights, and their engineers selecting suita- ble positions for batteries. But if Southern soldiers had been pressing forward to Meanwhile national Mauassas, Northem soldici's had been press- I3yrnwash"hfg-" ing forward to Washington. As we have related, on the first note of alarm the militia of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts had quick- ly found their way to the capital. They were merely the advance-guard of a vast body making ready to concen- trate at the threatened point. Soon there was no danger that the republic would have to endure the ignominy of having its capital seized by the coup de main of an insig- nificant band of conspirators, headed by a desperado; its capture could be accomplished now only by the rush of a large and formidable mass. At this moment the opinions of both contending par- ■ ,,.,,, ties was that the difference between them Expectation that bauTe,Tuuiota would bc quicHy settled. They saw that "'''''• there would inevitably be a battle, but no one had risen to the belief that there would be a war. It was universally supposed by each that the overthrow of its antagonist in the struggle at hand would be an end Chap. XL.] DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. m of the strife. No one as yet compreliended that that would be attained only after many years, by the absolute military exhaustion of whichever should prove to be the weaker. But, even at this early stage, one of the cardinal condi- The defense of ^^^^^ ^^ ^^® coutest had become obvious. Sme^sa^pa?a?^" The defguse of Washington was instinctive- mountduty. ^j recoguized by the loyal Atlantic States as their incumbent duty, just as the forcing open of the Mississippi became the battle-object of the Northwest. And this — the safety of the metropolis — was never lost sight of in all the subsequent changing fortunes of the war. All the great movements of the Army of the Poto- mac were predicated on an absolute recognition of that condition. It was in accordance with these ideas of a sharp and It was thought that couclusive strffc that President Liucolu had, molZ would be''" ^s we havc seen, on April 15th, called forth enough. seventy-five thousand of the militia for a period of three months, unless sooner discharged. A force was thus speedily made available for the protection of the seat of government ; but not without the utmost re- luctance was any thins: beyond that under- The government is , ^. "^ ^ K the'sSTth*'' '''^'''^^ taken. Lmcoln was unwillmg to be the first to cross what had now apparently be- come the boundary-line ; he did not wish to incur the re- sponsibility of invading Virginia. But, though he was thus circumspectly unwilling to press upon his antag-onist, his antao-onist but the Confeder- •/» T" t t •n« fnvlde^ the'^Nortl *° mamtested no such unwillmgness to press upon him. From his residence, the White House, Lincoln might see the Confederate flag flying on the other side of the Potomac : with his field-glass he might observe Confederate engineers busy selecting suit- able points for the establishment of batteries to expel 112 INVASION OF VIRGINIA. [Sect. VII. him from the city. There was truth in what he so sol- emnly remarked subsequently : " I have not controlled events, but events have controlled me ;" and accordingly now he found himself compelled to invade in self-defense to in- Vii's-ima. If hc failed to do that, he must be vade Virginia. , . ° . . . I . driven ignominiously irom Washington. On the night of May 23d national troops were there- The national troops ^^^^ throwu aci'oss the Potomac into Vir- cross the Potomac. ^-^-^^ rpj^^^ ^^^^ pOSSCSSioU of the city of Alexandria, on the Potomac, nine miles below Washing- ton. Without delay, earthworks were constructed on Ar- and defenses for the lingtou Hcights aud lu thc vicluity, aud the city thiowu up. capital made safe from the Confederate troops threatening it at Manassas Junction. The com- mand of the forces thus thrown into Virginia was given McDowell assigned ^o Gcucral McDowcll. Gciieral Scott, the to the command. T'l*/? i ii !•/» commander-m-chiei, was too old and mnrm to take the field himself, and, from the patriotic motive of setting an example of loyalty, was unwilling to resign his position to another. In this determination he was sustained by many political aspirants, who supposed that in case of his brilliant military success he would not stand in their way for the next presidency. In taking possession of Alexandria, an incident occur- The tragedy at Ai- 1'^^ which at thc time gave rise to a deep sensation. Such sad events, however, be- came common enough in the Border States before the summer was over. A Confederate flag had been seen from the President's residence in Washington flying over an inn, the Marshall House, kept by a person of the name of Jackson. This flag Colonel Ellsworth, of the New York Fire Zouave regiment, accompanied by three or four of his soldiers, removed, and, on coming down the stairs of the house, was shot by Jackson, who was him- Chap. XL. ] THE CONFEDERATES AT MANASSAS. 1 1 3 self instantly killed by one of Ellsworth's companions. THe colonel's body was carried to tbe President's house, where funeral services were performed, Mr. Lincoln him- self being one of the mourners. Throughout the South Jackson was regarded as a patriotic martyr who had lost his life in the defense of his fireside. Batteries were constructed by the Confederates on the Virginia bank of the Potomac below Alex- The Confederates ^ . -, ^^ n* 1 • n blockade the Po- audria, and small aiirays were contmually tOIUEC 7 « V occurring between them and the national shipping on the river. Eventually these works proved to be not only a troublesome inconvenience, but also a public indignity. They kept the river approaches to Washington under blockade. The term for which the three-months' troops had en- gaged would end about the close of July. th??hree-monthl A clamor had arisen in the North that some- troops, thing should be done to obtain an advan- tage from the large army which, at so much expense, had been collected, before it should spontaneously dissolve. It was of course impossible to permit that to take place while the Confederates still remained intrenched and un- touched at Manassas. The passive resistance of the troops in Washington was not enough. Unless something more were done, the enemy had only to bide his time quietly in his camp, and when the national army had dispersed by the limitation of its own enlistments, to move forward and take possession of the coveted city. That the conflict would end in " three months or soon- er" was already discovered to be a delusion. the Confederates Evideutlv the csscutial thing; to be done at Manassas. •^ titt 'n could not be accomplished by an idle en- campment round Washington. A vigorous blow must be struck at the force which lay at Manassas. That force, IL— H 114 FORCES ON EACH SIDE. [Sect. VII. gathered for the capture of Washington, must be dispersed before Washington could be considered safe. In addition to this paramount consideration, there were others- of se- rious weight which called for such active operations. The Confederate Congress was to assemble in Richmond on the 20th of July. It was necessary to avoid the national discredit that must arise from the undisturbed organiza- tion of an insurgent government in its newly-selected cap- ital. The force under McDowell in front of Washington was about 45,000 men. It extended from Alex- Disposition and strength of McDowell's force. strength of audrfa to the Chain Bridge. At Martins- burg, toward the northwest, there were 18,000 more, under the command of Patterson. On the other hand, the Confederates had a force of 20,000, under the command of Beauregard, Disposition and ---- ^-,, •!• ,i» .i strength of the Con- near Mauassas. Considenns; this as the cen- fgrtftratG lOrCG tre of their army, their right rested on the ^^j THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Potomac below Alexandria, and held the batteries that were blockading the river. Their left, about 8000 strong, Chap. XL.] THE MARCH OF McDOWELL. 115 under Joseph E. Jolinston, lay at Wincliester, in the Shen- andoah Valley. Patterson and Johnston, therefore, confronted each oth- patterson enjoined ^r. Thc former was strlctly cnjomed to hoM to hold Johnston. ^^^ Confedcratcs at Winchester, and prevent their joining Beauregard at Manassas. Orders were given on July 15th for McDowell to move McDowell ordered ^^^ attack the Confederate position at Ma- to attack Manassas, j^g^gg^g Juuctiou. Hc couimenced canylug them into effect on the following day. ' His marching force was about 30,000, nearly all of them being three- months' men. Among them were, however, 800 regulars. Fifteen thousand, Runyon's division, had been left for the defense of Washington, and the remainder, in four divi- sions, under Brigadier General Tyler, and Colonels Hunt- er, Heintzelman, and Miles, advanced. The forward movement from the Potomac was executed ^ ' in four columns, con vereinsr to Fairfax Court- Order of his march, '' , i . t . t house. On nearmg that pomt, barricades were encountered, but they were eithel* removed or passed round without difficulty. It had been expected that the Confederates would have m^tde a stand here, but it was found that they had retired through Centreville to Bull Run, a stream flowing in front of their position at Ma- nassas Junction. Much difficulty had been experienced in obtaining a and its disorderly reliable map of the country in which opera- character. tious wcrc uow to bc canicd on, though it was so near to Washington. McDowell commenced his movement with very imperfect information in that re- spect. Neither the soldiers nor their officers knew any thing about marching ; the army was little better than a picturesque mob in gay uniform. Under a burning sun, for the weather was excessively hot, the men moved along through roads, in the woods, or by the zigzag fences 115 FIRST PLAN OF THE BATTLE. [Sect. VIL of maize-fields, singing and joking as they went. They stopped to pick blackberries, stepped aside to avoid mud-puddles, and refilled their canteens at every stream. Many of the houses by the wayside had been deserted, except by negroes, who were here and there peeping at the window-corners or at the half closed doors. McDowell's first intention, on finding that his enemy had evacuated Centreville, was, under cover McDowell's first « . -^ i , • , i • r» . plan of the bat- 01 a visTorous demonstration on their front, tie. ^ to turn their right. A personal reconnois- sance, however, satisfied him that this was impracticable. The country was too densely wooded and too difficult. He therefore now changed his plan, and made prepara- tion for turning the Confederate left, so as to seize the railroad in their rear. But, while McDowell was exploring the Confederate right, Tyler, supposing that he might march attack, and is worst- without much difficulty directly on Manas- sas, moved down from Centreville into Bull Bun Valley. He opened an artillery fire on the forest bank opposite, and deployed his infantry along the stream. When too late, he saw the twinkling of the en- emy's bayonets in the woods, and found himself exposed to their artillery and musketry. They were so concealed that he could only fire at the flash of their guns. He at- tempted to dislodge them by sending several regiments into the wood ; but, though he brought up Sherman with the third brigade, he was compelled to fall back, having suffered in this imprudent affair a loss of nearly oiie hundred. The Confederate loss was about seventy. This check was an admonition to the military politicians who were swarming into the army that the harvest of glory they were expecting would not be easily reaped. By parading their doings in the newspapers, they had hoped to create election and office capital. Chap. XL.] SECOND PLAN OF THE BATTLE. 117 McDowell now made ready to carry into effect Ms at- McDoweirs second ^^^P^ ^^ ^^^'^ ^^^ Confederate left, and had plan of the battle. , ^j^g necessary reconnoissance made on Fri- day, the 19th. Bull Eun, opposite Centreville, and equi- 4 ? begiuniug, on the to be cousidcrcd m this chapter — the form of the war. It needed but little penetration to perceive that the South had already intuitively discov- ered her inevitable position in the coming contest. What- ever her wishes, her passions might be, in the momentous conflict she had provoked ske was compelled to take the defensive. It is the autumn after Bull Eun. Let us scale, in any View of the interior placo that WO may, the rampart of the Bor- of the Confederacy, j^j, States, aud pcer iuto the recesses of the Confederacy beydbd. Confederacy of states ! is that what we see ? Are there governors, and Senates, and Houses of Representatives enacting and executing independent laws ? No ! but sitting in Richmond there is one man who is holding the telegraphs and railroads. Along the former he is sending forth his mandates which no one A despotism is ai- ^^y disobcy ; along the latter he is drawing ready inaugurated, ^j,^^ ^J^^^g ^^^^ ^^. dlstaut their rcluctaut men and bounteous means. The aristocracy that lords it Chap.xll] interior of the confederacy. 135 over those white cotton lands, those fields of tobacco and maize, has engendered its natural, its inevitable product. It is no political confederacy that we look upon — it is a Despotism. Along the sea-coast, on every fort a flag is flying — - not those of the various sovereign states. It is the flag of a central power, every where the same. Men are con- structing fortifications in all directions — some in the in- terior, some on the line of the Mississippi, some along the sea. Cannon, the spoils of Norfolk Navy Yard, are being dragged to these works. In every town, and court-house, and hamlet, men are drilling ; their uniform clothing in gray ^swers to the uniform flag. The pursuits of peace are turned over to slaves. The factories that are busy are armories, machine-shops, founderies for shot and shell, gunpowder laboratories. White tents that are dotting it all over tell us that this is not the agricultural country it used to be. It is a vast military camp. A despotism and a military camp ! No matter under what name things may be passing, that is the reality to which they have come ! To the eye of the national military critic, looking from Miiitarytopography tho North, thc couutry it is uow proposcd of the Confederacy. ^^ assail prcscuts thrcc dlstiuctly marked regions, to which he gives the designations of the right, the central, the left, respectively. They are not bounded by merely imaginary lines, but parted by grand geograph- ical objects. The right region is all that portion of the insurgent territory west of the Mississippi River ; the Its three regions, or ccutral rcgiou IS thc couutry lying between ^°''^^' the Mississippi and the Alleghany Mount- ains ; the left is that lying between those mountains and -the Atlantic Ocean. The great natural lines of separa- tion thus dividing the Confederacy are the Mississippi River and the Alleghany Mountains. 136 INTERIOR OF THE CONFEDERACY. [Sect. VIII. These three military regions are not of equal impor- tance. The risrht, or trans-Mississippi, is nec- Their relative value. t ^ . . . \ n essarily weaker, since it is separated from the others by a broad and difficult river, across which com- munication may be interrupted : it is intrinsically of lit- tle military value, sparsely peopled, unhealthy, its resour- ces comparatively little developed, its roads and lines of transportation imperfect. On the other hand, in the left The left zone the TCgiou, or that iucludcd bctwceu the Alle- mostimportaut. ^^^^^ Mouutaius aud the Atlantic Ocean, are many great cities, among them the capital of the Confederacy. This region has a dense population, many lines of locomotion, and abundant facilities for transporta- tion. Virginia, which is its most northerly portion, stands like a vast bastion to the Confederacy, its flanked angle projecting toward the Free States. The upheaval of the Alleghanies in former ages (vol. i., p. 68) has given her a system of longitudinal valleys running to the north- Miiitarytopoc^raphy ^^st : hcT mouutalu rauges consist of majes- of Virginia. '^ ^-^ £^^^g ^£ ^^^ ^^^^1^,^ ^^^^^^ ^..^j^ ^-^^^^ ^^_ pressions between them. Here and there transversal and secondary valleys cross through the mountain lines — gaps, in the country language. Screened from observation, through the main valleys as through sally-ports the forces of the Confederacy may securely move. Such was the general aspect of the South. Her capaci- ty for war lay in the staple products she had on hand and those that her slaves might be found willing to raise. Her financial strength, which was the meas- The financial capac- /»t i ,t i t /i ity of the Cotton urc 01 hcr war-strenertn, turned on the pos- States for war. -i -t n • i t • sibility of converting those products into gold. None but desperate gamesters would undertake to conduct vast military movements by an unlimited is- sue of paper based upon nothing ; but the rattle of dice Chap. XLL] INVESTMENT OF THE CONFEDERACY. ^37 was already audible in tlie council chamber at Eichmond. There were, however, many able and patriotic men in the seceding states, who, accepting as an accomplished fact the calamity into which their country had been plunged, and willing to make the best of it, unceasingly urged upon the Confederate government the seizure of the cot- ton and its rapid shipment to Europe. As Mistake in noi send- . i 1 1 • j i r> i ^ lug the cotton to Eu- IS commouly tne case m the uproar or rebel- lions and revolutions, the voice of wisdom was not heard. And now arose before the national government the question how it should reduce this insurgent population —a population brave enough and numerous enough to accomplish its intention, if only it were rich enough. But this population had never clothed itself, never fed itself. It depended on foreign sources. If such had The South must de- t t • i t i • • , , n pend on foreign sup- always Deeu its couditiou m a state oi peace, much more must it be so now in a state of war : rifles, cannon, munitions of every kind must be brought from abroad. Three million bales of cotton might, perhaps, be raised by the slave force : this would go far to meet these wants if it had an unobstructed transit across the sea. Such considerations, therefore, settled the question as to what, for the national government, was the proper form of war. A closure of the Southern ports or their block- ade was the correct antagonism. In the ur- ports determined gcucy ofthc momeut a blockadc was adopt- ed. Perhaps it had been better (p. 29) had a simple closure been preferred. Practically, however, so far as the government and its opponent were concerned, the same force must be resorted to in either case. Thus the character or aspect which the war must needs Conditions of a assume was quickly manifested. The issue complete blockade, (^^^^i^^giy ^umed ou this : Had the govern- 1^8 INVESTMENT OF THE CONFEDERACY, [Sect. VIII. ment sufficient physical power to enforce and maintain such a beleaguering ? Could it make the Atlantic an im- penetrable sea? But more — it must arrest ingress and egress along the , north front of the Border States, and along the west front of the trans-Mississippi regions. To accomplish all this, it must call into existence powerful navies and vast armies. It must shut up hermetically an area of 733,144 square The vast extent of Hiilcs ; it must guard by armies an interior country shut up. ]boundary-line 7031 miles in length, and by ships a coast-line of 3523 miles, a shore-line of 25,414 miles — that is, actually more than the entire circumfer- ence of the earth (24,895 miles). What — viewed as a military operation — was all this ? Was it not a vast siege, throwing into nothingness all pre- vious sieges in the world's history ? We may, then, excuse the incredulity with which for- eign nations regarded the attempt of the re- Apparent impossi- IT, ii 'ji* n -I ' biiity of such au public to carrv out her intention ol reducms; investment. tt i mt t* i« to obedience twelve millions ot people in- trenched in what seemed to be impregnable works. Es- pecially may we do this when we recall the fact that the initial military force by which it was to be accomplished was an army of 16,000 men, and a navy of 42 ships. But it was not merely a passive encircling of the Character of the ag- Coufedcracy which was needed ; there must gressive operations, ^jg^ ^^^ offeusivo aud aggrcsslvc movemeuts. Hence it was necessary to determine what were the proper points of the application of force, and which the correct lines of its direction. At this time the military topography of the country Preliminary mis- "was little kuowu, aud many mistakes were takes committed, ^ladc lu dealing with this proMcm. It was •long before those generals who had true professional Chap.xll] the necessary military operations. 139 views on the subject could secure their adoption, and ac- complish a separation of crude political intentions from scientific military movements. In the inexperience of the times, instead of one grand and overwhelming plan of op- erations, a dozen little ones were resorted to. Wherever there was political influence there was a political clamor, and to that point a military force must be sent. In the beginning of 1862, the period we have now more partic- ularly under consideration, "there were not less than ten different national armies, and as many different lines of operation, all acting more or less concentrically on the theatre of war. Not one was so strong but that the Con- federates might have concentrated a stronger against it." The ablest military critics were loudly declaiming against such a violation of the rules of their art. In deciding on warlike operations, two things must be considered : 1st. The political object proposed to be at- tained. 2d. The military movements necessary for its ac- complishment. Not unfrequently these seem to involve contradictions. The opening of the Mississippi was the political object The political objects of the Wcst ; the capture of Rlchmoud that proposed. ^£ ^]^g j^^g^ . ^^^^ -^ ^ military sense, neither of these could in itself be decisive, and, so far as they might be made the ultimate object of the warlike opera- tions, they could be considered only as mistakes. At first it was supposed that the opening of the Mis- sissippi must be accomplished by operations Se MissiS'"'?^ ^^ ^^® waters, an opinion much strengthened by the brilliant success of Farragut in the capture of New Orleans ; but that great officer himself was destined to furnish a proof of the inadequacy of this method. In the attack he made on Vicksburg, though many hundred shot and shell were thrown into the place, no impression whatever was made upon it ; not a single 140 THE EAST-WEST LINE. [Sect. VHI. gun was dismounted ; only seven men were killed, and fif- teen wounded. Once more let us reconnoitre the recesses of the Con- view of the military ^deracy, examining not its political, but its condition. military condition. What do we see ? There is one long line of railroad- reaching from Mem- The great west^ast P^^^, ou thc Mississippi, to Charleston, on line.. ,_. ^^Q Atlantic. It is the only complete east and west bond connecting the Confederacy through its breadth. What if this vital line were snapped ? It would be the severing of the Confederacy. The Atlantic por- tion would be parted from the Mississippi portion. The unity of the Confederacy hangs on a very slender thread. The Richmond government plainly discerns how much is depending on this line. Slender though Means prepared by . , -.,,,, -f, , , , the Confederates it mav 06, it IS indispeusablv necessary to for its (iGfCDSC v ' J. •/ •/ them. For its protection, for the avoid- ance of the catastrophe which must follow its rupture, they have established parallel to it, and one hundred and fiffy miles to the north of it, a military line consist- ing; of: fortresses, armies, an intrenched camp. That mil- itary line extends from Columbus, on the Mississippi, through Forts Henry and Donelson, to Bowling Green. The work of an assailant is, therefore, manifestly to burst through the military line, and break the railroad line beyond. But, furthermore, there is a navigable river, the Ten- nessee, flowing: perpendicularly throu2:h the Availability of the n . n .^ 1' 1 • Vl 1 x Tennessee for first 01 thcse Imcs, aud runumfi^ parallel to breaking it. . , , t i the second. That is the invader s true path. Plainly along it, and not down the iftipregnably fortified and impassable Mississippi, blows fatal to the Confed- eracy may be delivered. The Mississippi itself is. not the true line of attack. Even if it were seized, the great rail- Chap. XLL] EFFECTS OF BREAKING IT. 141 THE EAST AND WEST CONFEDERATE RAILROADS. road is not necessarily touclied. Moreover, it is a mili- tary consequence that the strong fortresses on the Missis- sippi must be surrendered on the passage of an army in their rear. Two great events will therefore necessarily follow the passage of an army strong enough to main- lowing that opera- taiu itsclf aloug thc Tennessce. They are : 1st. The bisection of the Confederacy, its eastern and western portions being severed. 2d. The gratification of the popular demand that the Mississippi should be opened. 142 OPPOSING EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDEKATES. [Sect. VIII. Witli the railroad untouclied, the Confederate govern- ment can rapidly mass its troops on the Atlantic or on the Mississippi region, and hurl them at pleasure, right or left, on its antagonist. With the railroad broken, such movements becomQ very difficult, perhaps even imprac- ticable. If the eye follows the line of this road from Memphis, Military importance ^^ ^hc Mississippi, eastwardly, it is seen to of Chattanooga. (Jiyi(Je whcu it rcachcs the great strategical position Chattanooga: its upper branch runs northeast- wardly to the capital of the Confederacy, Eichmond ; its lower branch runs southeast wardly to the important cities Savannah and Charleston. Chattanooga and its im- mediate environs present, therefore^a vital military point. To General Halleck must be given the credit of the Correct solution of solutiou of the Mlsslssippi problcm. He optn^if'irthe M?8^ showed that the correct movement was a sissippi. march on the line of the Tennessee. The truth of this principle was strikingly exemplified by the event. The victories on that river opened the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis, and, in the opinion of a very great military authority, had Halleck's army at that time pos- sessed the tenacity of Sherman's in 1864, he could have completed the opening by continuing his march south from Corinth to Mobile. . Such were the views taken by the national generals Opposing efforts of who succcssfully solvcd the problem of the the confederates, ^^i^^^^^ dcstructiou of the Confederacy. On the other hand, their antagonists, thrown from the begin- ning on the defensive, recognized with equal precision the correctness of these principles. When one military line was broken through, they attempted to establish a sec- ond in a parallel direction. When the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was effectually severed, they made haste to construct a parallel one by completing the more Chap. XLI.] OBJECTIVE OF THE ATLANTIC EEGIOK I43 southerly line from Meridian to Selma. This likewise 'was, in its turn, destroyed. Considered thus, so far as military topography is con- cerned, it was plain that decisive operations General course of . • j i 1 1 * • x i the correct military must commcuce lu tuc ccutral rcgiou with a view to the destruction of the east and west line of communication, and securing possession of the strategic point Chattanooga. The opening of the Missis- sippi followed as a corollary upon their successful issue. The great result, however, would be the partition of the Confederacy. Whatever armed force the Confederacy might have in the Atlantic region would now be placed between two antagonists, one threatening it from the north of Rich- mond, the other through the portal of Chattanooga. The whole male population of the Confederacy being in the armies, there could be no resistance except where those armies were. The decisive result could alone be reached by their destruction. In the Atlantic region of the Confederacy, to the cor- rect military eye, the proper obiective was The propet object- ,, ^ ,,*' *^ ' ^ ■^„^^. ^ . ^. , ive of the Atlantic therefore the g-reat armv of Vir^rmia. Kich- region ^ »/ o mond and Charleston were in themselves nothing. The Confederacy could afford to- lose one, or both, or a dozen such, and would not be weakened there- by. And that these views were correct the event showed. Charleston fell by the march of Sherman, who never took the trouble to go to it ; and Richmond fell by the opera- tions of Grant, who disdained to enter it. The military object to be aimed at was, therefore, not the political object proposed. It was not is the extermination ,-, ,. « ., , ., 1 , .■, of the Virginia thc occupatiou 01 a citv or territorv, but the extermination oi the opposing army. Battles conducted by generals of not unequal skill, and 144 EFFECT OF ATTRITION. [Sect. VIIL ending without a signal catastrophe, usually exhibit losses not far from equal on the opposing sides. In armies of equal strength, and operating in a similar region, the waste of life in the hospitals may also be considered as equal. A general who is acting upon these principles, and is Effect of incessant aiming, uot at the seizure of territory, but at the life of the antagonist army, will foresee an inevitable issue to his campaign. If he can bring into play during the whole operation two hundred thousand men, and his antagonist only one hundred and fifty thou- sand, he will certainly secure his result when, by this process of attrition, each side has lost one hundred and twenty-five thousand. Now the available military force of the South was never numerically equal to that of the North, and the disparity became still greater when the slayes were armed by the North. Military errors or catastrophes were there- fore of far more serious moment to the insurgents than to the government. There was danger that exhaustion would ensue. It actually did at last occur. Doubtless there is something very dreadful in a meth- od which looks with indifference on the issue of battles, whether there has been a victory or a defeat, but inquires with earnestness how many of the enemy have been de- stroj^ed, and discerns with a frigid, a Machiavelian sat- isfaction the mathematically inevitable superiority of the greater mass after equal attrition of both conflict- ing bodies. The duration of resistance of the weaker party in this process of attrition or extermination will necessarily turn on the magnitude of the political object at stake, and the facility or possibility of effecting an ostensible compro- mise. But it is politically impossible that an aggressive Aristocracy and an aggressive Democracy should coexist in the same nation after they have once been in open con- Chap. XLL] EEACTION OF THE SLAVERY WAR-CRY. . I45 flict. And tliat was tlie real character of tlie contending antagonists of this Civil War. Moreover, though the South, at the beginning, derived most important advan- tages in accomplishing the unifying of her entire popula- tion by putting forth the preservation of Slavery as the Reaction of the graud objcct of the war, it led eventually to • ^'^'''^ ^"'^•''•^- a fatal result. The slave became at last, not fictitiously, but in reality, the stake played for. The South could not lose him without absolute ruin. It was the loss of her labor-force, without which her lands were worth nothing. Persons who thus considered the subject perceived that the war would be no affair of ninety days, but that it would go on until the weakerparty was utterly exhaust- ed and the great stake woju^ By those skillful officers who brought the war to a close, these principles were clearly recog- Application of these •1 -% n 1 1 . 1 principles by Grant mzcd, as mav 06 secu irom the stratesrv and Sherman. ^ i rrn t t t n they adopted. Ihey looked upon all oper- ations in the right region as without effect ; they consid- ered it as incorrect to have many converging lines of op- eration ; they perceived the true function of the central region, and the inevitable effect of a powerful movement through it. They did not fall a second time into the blunder of making the main operation in the left region a combined one of the army and navy, as was done in the Peninsular campaign. Coast operations and expeditions they regarded in the light of mere indecisive adventures. They raised no cry for the capture of Kichmond ; they did not even deign to enter it in triumph when it was spontaneously falling, but pursued the fugitive remnant of the ruined army with inexorable energy, applying the military principle that had been inaugurated in the Wil- derness, until Appomattox Court-house was reached. II.— K 146 CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF THE ARIMIES. [Sect. VIII. Viewed in tlie manner thus presented, tlie various op- erations of the war stand in their proper The events of the ... t tip • . . war interpreted positiou, snid are Capable 01 easy mterpreta- on these ideas. ■*- . ' /»T-»n-r» i tion. Ihe battle of Bull Run, as we have seen, was nearly without military significance ; politically, it meant the failure of that portion of the plan of the Con- spiracy which had reference to the capture of Washing- ton. Nor is there any importance to be attached to the affairs of Big Bethel, Ball's Bluff, Drainesville. They were merely personal encounters. In fact, true warlike operations can not be said to have begun until the issue of Lincoln's order di- commencement of rectinsT the movemcuts of the armies on Feb- the war. ^ ruary 22d, 1862. The issue of that order followed the appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War, and was due to his suggestions. Though the completion of the organization of the Army The changes in its ^^ ^^^ Potomac by General McClellan marks conduct. ^i^g ^i^gg ^£ ^^Q preparatory period and the commencement of military movements properly speaking, these movements still continued to be of a mixed kind — not purely military, but influenced also by political con- siderations. There may be discerned on the part of the government an intention to give to certain ofl[icers the op- portunity of acquiring military reputation. But this can not be regarded as altogether blameworthy. A govern- ment influenced by profound convictions that the princi- ples on which it is acting are those most certain to insure the welfare of the nation is entitled to bring into fitting prominence men who will carry those principles into effect. The quality of the armies themselves by degrees under- went an observable change. It is a great ally reacl"ecFby "' stcp from McDowcll's army of Bull Run to the armies. ■•■ . *^ , . . McClellan's of the Penmsula, but it is a still Chap. XLI.] POWER OF THE NORTH. 14»^ greater to Grant's army of the final Virginia campaign. The cohesion, mobility, and co-ordination of all its parts, which makes an army like a beautiful machine, is only slowly attained. "Not until after Vicksburg did the armies begin to assume the form and consistency of real armies ; not until after that can their generals be held to a closer criticism." Halleck's campaign, ending in the breaking of the Memphis and Charleston Eailroad, is the transition to the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman, which were conducted with purely military intentions, and on purely military principles. * The possibility of putting the Confederacy in a state of siege demonstrated, in the most unmis- Predominating , t -i ^ , i t • . • power of the takaolc mauucr, the predominating power of the North ; but that predominance w^as not to be measured by the relative population of the two sections. It was commonly said that the population of the insurgent states was twelve millions; that of the loyal states eighteen; but the disparity between them was vastly greater than is indicated by those numbers. The machine power of the South bore no appreciable pro- portion to the machine powder of the North; and more par- ticularly was this true of marine machinery ; but it was upon that form that the capability of maintaining an ef- fective blockade depended. The South was thus thrown upon the defensive from Sorties of the ^^^ beginning of the struggle, and very soon South. effectually beleaguered. Her four great mil- itary movements, culminating at Antietam, Murfreesbor- ough, Gettysburg, and Nashville, present the aspect of sorties. There was another fact which manifestly and seriously Eventual influence diminished thc intrfusic powcr of the South, of the slave force. Qf thc cstimatcd twclvc milHous of her pop- ulation, one third was negro slaves. As long as her an- 148 INFLUENCE OF THE SLAVE FORCE. [Sect. VIII. tagonist, from political motives, refrained from touching tliis element, it added a delusive strength to the Confed- eracy. The slave prepared food and forage in the fields while the master and his sons were in the army. It was, however, impossible that such a condition of things should continue long. Legitimately as a measure of war, the government might detach that dangerous class from the side of the South — a measure w^hich, under the cir- cumstances, could not fail to be decisive of the strife. CHAPTEE XLIL ACTS OF THE PROVISIONAL AND PERMANENT CONFEDERATE CONGRESSES. The important measures of the Confederate Congresses were transacted in secret sessions. At the meeting specially summoned by Davis for the 29th of April, 18G1, he gave an exposition of the causes which had led to secession. The provisional Congress ended its sessions on the 15th of February, 1862, and was succeeded by the permanent Congress. The chief public acts of each related. The government of the Confederacy became so despotic in its conduct, and secret in its proceedings, as to give rise to great dissatisfaction. The public acts of the Confederate Congress present a very imperfect view of the measures adopted by the Con- federate government. Before hostilities commenced, it was found expedient that all the more important of those meas- The important ses- t t i i j i • -r>i- • sions of Congress urcs should be matuTcd m secrecy. Durma: secret. • ^ i • ■^ the war the necessity of this course became more and more urgent. A standing resolution required that all war business should be transacted in secret ses- sion, and by degrees this included every thing of general interest. Attempts were repeatedly made by different members of Congress to bring about a change ; but they were unavailing. The war operations controlled all oth- er movements ; they were determined, perhaps too often, by the Confederate President himself. The The President con- ,i«, n i_i r\ (* i • , , trois all military sccrct history 01 the Coniederacy is not to operations. i i t i r» • i • be looked for m the secret sessions of its Congress — not even in the councils of the cabinet. On the President rests the responsibility of what was done. 150 ^CTS OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS. [Sect. VIII. In vain all over tlie Soutli a cry was raised against this secret despotism. Even thoughtful men were constrained to submit because they saw it was unavoidable. In the Confederate Congress, after the inauguration of Various congres- ^ provisioual President (February 18th, sionai acts. 1861), a rcsolutlou was offered touching the expediency of laying a duty on exported cotton, there be- ing a very general opinion that such a course would aid very much in compelling the powers of Europe to ac- knowledge the independence of the Confederacy. ' It was one of the delusions of the South that the great military monarchies of Europe could be coerced by trade consid- erations. Her politicians, who had so often succeeded in carrying their point in domestic legislation by the exer- cise of pressure, persuaded themselves that similar princi- ples might with impunity be resorted to in foreign affairs. When financial provision was made for fhe war by au- thorizing the borrowing of fifteen millions of dollars, an export duty was at length laid on cotton, but it was with the intention of creating a fund to liquidate the principal and interest. An act was passed in reference to the navigation of the Mississippi, declaring it free, and one defining the punish- ment of persons engaged in the African slave-trade. The postal system was organized, and the privilege of frank- ing abolished, except so far as concerned the business of the post-office itself. Breadstuffs, provisions, munitions of war, and merchandise imj)orted from the United States before the 14th of March, were admitted duty free. With a view of exerting a salutary pressure upon Northern creditors, a bill was reported to the effect that, so long as the United States refused to acknowledge the independence of the Confederate States, no court of the latter should have cognizance of civil cases in which citi- zens of the former were concerned. To conciliate the lit- Chap.XLII.] abstract OF MR. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. I5I Authority conceded erapj iiifluence of Europe, the President was to the President, auttorized to negotiate international copy right treaties. Four days before the inauguration of Lin coin, the provisional Congress authorized Davis to as sume control of the military operations in every Confed erate state. Subsequently (March 6th) he was author ized to accept the services of one hundred thousand vol unteers for twelve months. Anticipating but little diffi culty in obtaining European recognition, commissioners were appointed to various foreign governments. On the 11th of March the permanent Constitution was adopted, and the Congress* adjourned. When it became obvious that the administration of Extra session of Llucolu was about to takc a more resolute Congress. actiou than that of Buchanan, Davis sum- moned (April 12 th) the Congress to meet on the 29th of April. In the interval between its summons and its session Lincoln had called for 75,000 militia (April 15th), and had announced the blockade of the Southern ports (April 19th). The message sent by Davis to the Congress on this oc- The message of the caslou is pcrhaps thc ablcst of his state President. papcrs. Hc bcgau by congratulating that body on the ratification of the permanent Constitution by Conventions of the states concerned, and expressed his belief that at no distant day the other Slave States would join the Confederacy. It was not, however, for the purpose of mating this an- nouncement that he had summoned the mem- unifed'stltes\ave bcrs togcthcr, but bccausc the Presidei^fc of the United States had made a declaration of war against the Confederacy, and thereby had render- ed it necessary to devise measures for the defense of the country. That mankind might pass an impartial judg- ment on the motives and objects of the Confederates, he 152 ABSTRACT OF MK. DAVIS'S MESSAGK [Sect. VIII. briefly reviewed tlie relations between the contending parties. He stated that, during the war between the colonies and England, the former entered into a con- and describes the « -, . . . , , -, , , r» i i • origin of state sov- lederation with each other tor their common defense ; and, that there might be no mis- construction of their compact, they, in a distinct article, made an explicit declaration that each state retained its sovereignty, and every power and right not expressly del- egated to the United States by this contract. He added that in the treaty of peace in 1783, the sev- eral states wxre by name recognized to' be independent. He then drew attention strongly to the marked caution with which the states endeavored, in every possible man- ner, to exclude the idea that the separate and independ- ent sovereignty of each was merged in one common gov- ernment or nation. The states, when invited to ratify the Constitution, refused to be satisfied until amendments were added to it placing beyond doubt their reservation of their sovereign rights not expressly delegated to the United States in that instrument. In spite of all this care, a political school had arisen in The centralizing the North claiming that the government is ideas of the North. ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ Gxaltlug the crcaturc above its creator, and making the principals subordinate to the agent appointed by themselves. The people of the Southern States^ devoted to agricul- ture, early perceived a tendency in the Northern States to render a common government subservient to their pur- pose by imposing burdens on commerce as protection to their manufacturing and shipping interests. Controver- sies grew out of those attempts to benefit one section at the expense of the other, and the dangers of disruption were enhanced by the fact that the population of the North was increasing more rapidly than that of the Chap. XLIL] ABSTRACT OF ME. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. ^53 Soutli. By degrees, as the Northern States gained pre- ponderance in Congress, self-interest taught their people to assert their right as a majority to govern ernmSby m|oV- tho minorltv. President Lincoln had de- ities. clared, at length, that the theory of the Con- stitution requires that in all cases the majority shall gov- ern. He likens the relations between states and the United States to those between a county and the state in which it is situated. On this lamentable error rests the policy which has culminated in his declaration of war against the Confederate States. Mr. Davis pointed out that, in addition to the deep- The obnoxious char- scatcd rescntmeut felt by the South at the acteroftariffiaws. ^j^rfching of thc North through thc tariff laws, there was another subject of discord, involving in- terests of such transcendent magnitude as to create an apprehension that the permanence of the Union was im- possible. He then gave a brief history of American negro slav- The story of Amer- ^ry, affirming that originally it existed in icau slavery. ^^^j^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ . ^^^ ^j^^^ of property in slaves was protected by law, recognized in the Constitution, and provision made against loss by the escape of the slave ; that, to secure a due slave supply, Congress was forbidden to prohibit the African slave- trade before a certain date, and no power was given to it to legislate disadvantageously against that species of property. The climate of the Northern States being unpropi- Anti-siavery con- tlous to slavc labor, they sold their slaves duct of the North. ^^ ^^^ g^^^^j^^ ^^^ ^-^^^^ prohibited skvcry in their own limits. The South purchased this property willingly, not suspecting that quiet possession of it was to be disturbed by those who not only were in want of constitutional authority, but prevented by good faith as 154 ABSTRACT OF MR. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. [Sect. VIII. vendors from disquieting a title emanating from them- selves. This done, as soon as the Northern States had gained a control in Congress, they commenced an organized sys- tem of hostile measures against the institution. They de- vised plans for making slave property insecure ; they sup- plied fanatical organizations with money to excite the slaves to discontent and revolt ; they enticed them to ab- scond ; they neutralized and denounced the fugitive slave law ; they mobbed and murdered slave-owners in pursuit of their fugitive slaves ; they passed laws punishing by fine and imprisonment Southern citizens seeking the re- covery of their property; they sent senators and repre- sentatives to Congress whose chief title to that distinc- tion was their ultra-fanaticism, and whose business was to awaken the bitterest hatred against the South by vio- lent denunciations of its institutions. A great party was then organized for obtaining the Organization of the admiuistratiou of the government, its object Anti-slavery party. ^^^^^ ^^ CXCludc thc SlaVC StatCS from thc public domain, to surround them by states in which slav- ery should be prohibited, and thereby annihilate slave property worth thousands of millions of dollars. This party succeeded, in November last, in the election of its candidate for the presidency of the United States. Mr. Davis then proceeded to show that, on the other hand, under the genial climate of the South- gaveryiuthe em Statcs, and owing to the care for their well-being, w^hich had been dictated alike by interest and humanity, the slaves had augmented from six hundred thousand at the adoption of the Constitution to upward of four millions ; that, by careful religious in- struction, they had been elevated from brutahsavages into docile, intelligent, civilized laborers, whose toil had been directed to the conversion of a vast wilderness into culti- Chap. XLII.] ABSTRACT OF MR. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. I55 vated lands covered with a prosperous people. During the same period the white slaveholding population had increased from one million and a quarter to more than eight millions and a half; and the productions of the South, to which slave labor v^a's and is indispensable, formed three fourths of the exports of the whole United States, and had become absolutely necessary to the wants of civilized man. With interests of such overwhelming magnitude im- perii arisingt. the perllcd, thc South had been driven to protect slave institution, '^.g^i^ Convcutions had been held to deter- mine how best it might meet such an alarming crisis in its history. Ever since 1798 there had existed a party, almost un- interruptedly in the maiority, based upon The Slave states ,, i ,i , i ; , • • x i i x determine to se- thc crccd that cacu statc IS lu the last re- sort the sole judge, as well of its wrongs as of the mode and measures of redress. The Democratic party of the United States had again and again affirmed its adhesion to those principles. In the exercise of that right, the people of the Confederate States, in their Con- ventions, determined that it was necessary for them to re- voke their delegation of powers to the federal govern- ment. They therefore passed ordinances resuming their sovereign rights, and dissolving their connection with the Union. They then entered into a new compact, by new articles of confederation with each other, and organized a new government, complete in all its parts. Mr. Davis continued — that one of his first desires and acts had been to endeavor to obtain a just peaTeabil'^Sm-^ aud cqultablc Settlement between the Con- federacy and the United States, and that he had therefore selected three distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. He affirmed that the crooked paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so 156 ABSTRACT OF MR. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. [Sect. VIII. wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness as was the It is perfidiously ^^^^^^e of the United States government repelled. toward thcse commissioners. While they were assured, through an intermediary of high position, of the peaceful intentions of that government, it was in secrecy preparing an expedition for hostile operations against South Carolina; that at length they were in- formed that the President of the United States had de- termined to hold no interview with them whatever — to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make. Mr. Davis then related the circumstances under which South Carolina cap- ^^^^ Sumtcr had bceu reduced, describing in tures Fort Sumter, ^^^^j^ ^-^^ trcachcrous maucBuvre of which he declared the United States government had been guilty. He paid a tribute of respect to that noble state — South Carolina — the eminent soldierly qualities of whose people had been conspicuously displayed. He showed how that, for months, they had refrained from capturing the fortress, and how they had evinced a chiv- alrous regard for the brave but unfortunate officer who had been compelled by them to lower his flag. Scarcely had the President of the United States learned and war is declared ^^ ^^^ failurc of his schcmcs iu rclatiou to against them. p^^^ Sumtcr, wheu hc issued a declaration of war against the Confederacy. This it was which had prompted Mr. Davis to convoke the Congress. Not with- out a sentiment of contempt he proceeded to analyze that " extraordinary production," that " singular document," se- lecting from it such expressions as were likely to wound the pride of the South, and particularly drawing atten- tion to the fact that Lincoln had called " for an army of 75,000 men, whose first service was to capture our forts;" that, though this was a usurpation of a power exclusive- ly granted to the Congress of that country by its Consti- tution, it was not for the executive of the Confederacy Chap. XLII.] ABSTRACT OF MR. DAVIS'S MESSAGE. 157 The south obliged ^^ qnestioH that point, but to prepare for de- to defend itself. f^nse. He therefore had called on the Con- federated States for volunteers, and had issued a procla- mation inviting applications for letters of marque and re- prisal ; and though the authority of Congress was neces- sary to these measures, he entertained no doubt that that body would concur in his opinion of their advantage. Referring to the proclamation of the President of the Its ports are block- United States announcing the blockade of ^^^^' the Southern ports, he almost doubted its authenticity, and inferred that, if it had been issued at all, it could only have been under the sudden influence of passion. He denounced it as a mere paper blockade, so manifestly a violation of the law of nations that it would seem incredible that it could have been issued by author- ity. Its threat to punish as pirates all persons who should molest a vessel of the United States under letters of marque issued by the Confederate government, he be- lieved, would not be sanctioned by the people of the Uni- ted States. He then informed the Congress that commissioners had It seeks foreign rec- ^^^u scut to various Europcau govcrnmeuts ogm ion, asking for recognition. He offered congrat- ulations on the fact that Virginia had at length joined the Confederacy. He could not doubt that " ere you shall have been many weeks in session, the slaveholding states of the late Union will respond to the call of honor and affection, and, by uniting their fortunes with ours, promote our common interests, and secure our common safety." Directing attention then to the reports of the Secretary of War and of the Navy, and coligratulating the Confed- eracy on the patriotic devotion of its people, assuring them of the smiles of Providence on their efforts, Mr. Davis concludes with these remarks : " All we ask is to be let alone — that those who never 158 TREATMENT OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION. [Sect. VIII. and desires to be let ^leM powcr over US shall not now attempt ^'°''^* our subjugation by arms. This we will — we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually bene- ficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-gov- ernment." Such is the purport of this long and very able state Davis's shorter ex- p^per. Davls, howcver, on a subsequent oc- position. casion, and with much more brevity, forcibly declared, in a dozen words, the motives of the Confeder- ates : " We left the Union simply to get rid of the rule of majorities." It has been mentioned (vol. i., p. 533) that, in his inau- gural address, Davis made no allusion to He is obliged to deal ^ -, . i,i, •• , r> t n vvitii the slave ques- slavcTy, hopmg by that omission to nnd la- vor in the eyes of Europe ; and, in truth, he succeeded in that. But the Southern people, who had been taught by their clergy to regard the institution of slavery as "just and holy," thought that such silence im- plied shame. They looked upon his precaution as need- less, and were far from being satisfied with his course. On this occasion he therefore brought the slave question into its proper and prominent position. But the commissioners, or other diplomatic agents who were sent to Europe, were careful not to provoke the religious or political disfavor of the governments from whom they sought recognition. Thus Messrs. Yancey, Mann, and Eost, in communications had coZnission'Jrfdeai wlth Lord Johu RusscU (Ausrust, 1861), as- with that question. -, -, . •, -, i U • sured him that the real cause oi secession Chap. XLII.] TREATMENT OF STATE RIGHTS. 159 was not Slavery, but the Tariff, wLicli kept out Englisli goods. He stated this in a dispatch to Lord Lyons, the English minister at Washington. In other communica- tions they threw the odium of the protection of slavery on the United States government. They declared that " the object of the war (on the part of the North), as of- ficially announced, was, not to free the slave, but to keep him in subjection to his owner, and to control his labor, through the legislative channels which the Lincoln gov- ernment designed to force upon the master." The obvi- They fail to impose ous iusinccrity of such declarations doubt- on England. jggg incited Lord Eussell to express his ap- prehensions that it was the intention of the Confederacy to reopen the African slave-trade ; and the offense which these audacious misrepresentations offered to his under- standings perhaps, led him eventually to reply, "Lord Rus- sell presents his compliments to Mr. Yancey, Mr. Rost, and Mr. Mann. He had the honor to receive their letters and inclosures of the 27th and 30th of November, but in the present state of affairs he must decline to enter into any official communication with them." Davis, in his message, thus found a justification for se- cession and civil war in the principle of Treatment of state • i i -xt • t • • rights in the Con- statc rio;hts. JNot without curiosity may federacy. cd ^ . . . *^ we examine how that anarchical principle was dealt with by him in his subsequent acts of govern- ment. It is the testimony of a member of the Confeder- ate Congress, Mr. Foote, that " Posterity will hardly be- lieve the statement, and yet it is absolutely true, that the ultra-secessionists, who professed to have brought on the war chiefly to maintain the right of separate state seces- sion, were the first to deny the existence of any such right when certain movements were understood to be in prog- ress in North Carolina looking to peaceful secession from the Confederate States themselves; and these persons IQQ TREATMENT OF STATE RIGHTS. [Sect. VIII. urged most veliemently tlie putting of the whole country under military law, in order to counteract all such at- tempts at withdrawal." The same authority says " that state rights and state sovereignty no longer exist south of the Potomac Eiver ; that in that once happy but now forlorn region, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of jury trial, and, in fact, all the muniments of civil liberty most highly prized in countries actually free, are completely prostrated; that corruption and imbecility sit grimly enthroned where it was once hoped that vir- tue and ability would exercise supreme sway ; and that a selfish, hypocritical, and tyrannical executive chief, un- blushingly sanctioned and sustained by a servile and in- competent Congress, has well-nigh deprived a high-spirit- ed and eminently chivalrous people of all ground of hope as to their own future safety and happiness." In theory the Confederacy was founded upon state sov- ereignty, and its consequence state rights; Necessity of a cen- i , t t ^ ,-, • ,i trai power in the but scarcclv had the secession movement be- Confederacy. / gun when it was discovered, as had been dis- covered eighty-five years before, in the war of the colonies with England, that the object in view could never be gained by a feebly-joined league of quarrelsome states. It demanded a central — a national power. Even " in Richmond itself, as soon as the ordinance of secession was passed, many persons had come to the conclusion that it was best to obliterate state lines, and merge all the South into one indivisible nation or empire. They thought the old, cumbrous, complicated machinery could not be main- tained. It was said, state rights gave us the right to se- cede ; but what is in a name ?" It was not possible that the government should be any thing else than a military despotism, and accordingly that it forthwith became. The plea of state necessity over- rode every thing, and justified every thing. Chap.xlil] the confederate extea session. 151 This session of tlie Cojifederate Congress lasted from Acts of the extra the 29th of April to the 22d of May, much session. ^^ -^^ business being transacted in secret. Among its more important public acts may be mentioned a recognition that war with the United States was ex- isting, and an authorization of the issue of letters of marque. A patent-office was established, and a bill pass- ed for the issue of fifty millions of dollars in bonds. Cit- izens of the Confederate States were prohibited paying to citizens of the United States any debt due. Those owing such debts were directed to pay them into the Confeder- ate treasury. When the Congress adjourned, it adjourned to meet in Richmond on the 20th of July. But this transfer did not meet with unanimous ap- proval in the South. Davis himself, in the Opposition to the />,•, t'iTi*, i transfer to Eich- iirst mstaucc, oDiected to it, and vetoed the bill authorizing it. A strong opposition to it existed in the Gulf States, founded on an apprehension that it would enable the Virginians to do as they had done in the Union, and engross too much of office and pa- tronage. However, like the provision in the Constitu- tion against the reopening of the slave-trade, it was one of the stipulated conditions on whicb the secession of Vir- ginia was obtained, and there can be no doubt that, by many who were not completely informed of the intentions of the master-minds who were projecting a great slave- emi)ire, the establishment of the Confederate government at Richmond was regarded as a temporary affair. The Congress assembled at Richmond transacted much Acts of the Con- of Its buslucss lYi sccrct scssiou. Rccoguiz- gress at Richmond. ^^^^ ^^ ^-^ ^|^^^ ^^ ^-^^ ^^.^^^ g^^^^^^ ^^^^ .^ had a great war on its hands, it, immediately after the battle of Bull Run, authorized the raising of 400,000 men. It provided for the issue of one hundred millions of dol- lars in treasury notes, payable six months after the ratifi- II.— L 1^2 THE CONGRESS AT RICHMOND. . [Sect. Vlll. cation of peace ; and the same amount in bonds, bearing eight per cent, interest, and payable in twenty years; the imposition of a war tax of half of one per cent, on all real and personal property, including slaves, but except- ing persons whose property was less than four hundred dollars. It authorized the seizure of all telegraphic lines ; the appointment by the President of agents to supervise all communications passing over them; the forbidding of communications in cipher, or such as were of an enig- matical character ; the banishment of all alien enemies ; the confiscation of their property, with the exception of debts due to th^m from the Confederacy or a confeder- ated state. Every male thus liable to banishment, if above fourteen years of age, was required to leave the Confederacy within forty days; if he lingered beyond that time he was to be imprisoned, and then removed ; if he returned, he was to be dealt with as a spy or pris- oner of war. In retaliation for the Confiscation Act of the United States, measures of the strictest kind for the dis- covery of property of alien enemies were enacted. Every citizen in the Confederacy was required to tell all he knew about such matters, and that voluntarily, and with- out being specially interrogated. Should he fail of this, he was to be held guilty of a misdemeanor, to be fined not more than $5000, imprisoned not more than six months, and be liable to pay double the value of the prop- erty in question. It was anticipated that these measures would bring three hundred millions of dollars into the Confederate treasury. That result, however, was not at- tained. The Sequestration Bill was passed on August 6th, 1861, and the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury reported that, up to September 30th, 1863, the treasury had received from sequestration less than two millions of dollars ($1,862,650). ■ In this, its first session at Richmond, an act was also I Chap.XLIL] , THE PERMANEISfT CONGRESS. 1^3 passed directing tlie form under whicli evidence should be taken respecting abducted slaves, witli a viev^ to tlie exaction of indemnity subsequently from tlie United States ; and an act to aid the State of Missouri in repel- ling invasion. The adjournment was to the 18th of Nor vember. From the beginning the Confederate government had constituted itself a Committee of Public onhJcoi^federate Safctv. No commlttce in the French Revo- government. 1 ,. . T .. , •! 1 • lution was more vindictive, more terrible m its acts. In its eyes neutrality was the highest crime. Nothing was sacred ; nothing was spared that stood be- tween it and its purposes. * The session commencing on the 18th of November* pro- c • f.T, icfi, videdfor the increase of the naval force and Session of the IStn of November. ^j^^ eulistmeut of 2000 seamen. It made ap- propriations of sixty millions for the army and four mill- ions for the navy; but all its important measures were transacted in secret. The permanent Congress succeeded the provisional on The permanent *^^ ^^^^ of February, 1862. Mr. Davis was Congress. iuauguratcd as permanent President four days subsequently. The day was very rainy, and the fes- tivities, as described by an eye-witness, lugubrious. "The permanent government had its birth in a storm." The state of the army was the first object of the atten- Legisiation respect- ^ou of Cougrcss. The scsslous wcre for the ing the army ^^^^^ ^^^^^ sccrct. lu hls mcssagc the Pres- ident had said, " Events have demonstrated that the gov- ernment has attempted more than it had the power suc- cessfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect by our arms the whole territory of the Confederate States, sea-board and inland, we have been so exposed as recent- ly to suffer great disasters." But, in truth, it was not the diffusion of the military force that gave disquiet ; it was 104 WAR LEGISLATION. [Sect. VIIL the too plainly recognized decline of tlie military spirit tliat caused the alarm. The term of those soldiers who had enlisted for a year was about to expire. They. had found, by fearful experience, that each Southerner was not equal to five Yankees. The first enthusiasm had alto- gether died out. The delusion that there would be no war had passed away. Every one now knew that there would be a long and dreadful war, and that instead of pageantry and pomp there would be hardships, mutila- tion, and death. The want of military success to which Davis alluded and the conduct of ^as attributed by many to the faulty man- the war. ^^j. -^ which the war was carried on. There was a clamor that the Confederacy, instead of remaining on the defensive, should throw its armies into the ene- my's country. Scarcely had the session oj)ened when a resolution (February 20th) was offered to that effect, and complaint made that some one was imposing defensive war on the country. A bill was reported to indemnify owners of cotton, tobacco, and other produce destroyed to prevent its capture by the enemy. The Senate adopted a resolution (February 27th) to the effect that no peace propositions should be entertained which surrendered any portion of the Confederate States, and that war must be continued until the enemy was expelled from Confederate territory. In the House a resolution was passed advising the non-cultivation of cotton and tobacco, and the raising of provisions in their stead. After the disaster of Fort Donelson, a message was received from the President to the effect that he had suspended Generals Floyd and Pil- low ; the former officer was, however, subsequently rein- stated at the request of the Legislature of Virginia. A re- The Conscription Hiorselcss couscriptiou law was now (April ^''^' 16th) passed. It annulled all previous con- tracts with volunteers; it took every man between the Chap.xlil] war legislation. 105 ages of eigliteen and thirty-five, not legally exempt, from state control, and placed him absolutely under the orders of the Confederate President during the war. Was it to this that state rights had come ? Not a little was added to the bitterness now felt when it was found that many of the states thus stripped of their able-bodied men were to be left to the mercy of the invader. "Arkansas," said her governor in his address, " severed her connection with the United States upon the doctrine of state sovereignty. She has lavished her blood in support of the Confeder- acy: she did this because she believed that when the Disappointment of ^vil hour Came upou hcr the Confederate the states. ^^^ w^ould bc fouud floating upon her bat- tlements, defying the invader, and giving succor to her people. Arkansas — lost, abandoned, subjugated — is not that Arkansas who entered the Confederacy, nor will she remain Arkansas — a Confederate state, as desolate as a wilderness. It was for liberty she struck, and not for subordination to any created secondary power North or South." Hard as it was, this conscription law was thoroughly executed. It accomplished its purpose. For the time it was the salvation of the Confederacy. The reluctant con- scripts were hurried into Virginia to confront McClellan, and, raw as they were, they hurled him out of the Penin- sula. They saved Richmond, put Washington in immi- nent peril, invaded Maryland, and watered their horses in the rivers of Pennsylvania. But this was not enough. Conscription had again to Renewed conscrip- ^^ prcssed uutil tlic vcry briilk of social ex- ^^''"^" haustion was reached. The first body of 100,000 volunteers had been exhausted; a second body of 400,000 volunteers had proved to be insufficient. At this period there were not fewer than 210,000 men in the Confederate service. Volunteering was at an end. Pro- IQ^ THE CONSCEIPT SOLDIERS. [Sect. VIII. crastinated independence and disappointment were break- ing tlie spirit of the South. Compulsion must take what enthusiasm could no longer give. The product of the first conscription bill was being fast devoured by cannon, or melting away with fearful rapidity in the hospitals. An- other conscription was actually enacted in the following year. It demanded all men between eighteen and forty- five years of age, except those legally exempted. They were ordered by proclamation to repair voluntarily to the conscript camps. They were to be punished as de- serters if they did not comply. Troops from the same state were brigaded together — a last, a grim recognition of state rights. Torn from their firesides, deported from their native The conscript sol- statcs, thcsc couscrlpts fo'rmcd that incom- parable infantry which the South will never remember without affectionate emotion, and whose mili- tary deeds the North will never recall without a secret pride. A lady: — an eye-witness — writing to a friend about the prisoners who were taken at Shiloh, and brought to Camp Douglas at Chicago, says : " But I have not told you how awfully they were dressed. They had old carpets, new carpets, rag carpets, old bed-quilts, new bed- quilts, and ladies' quilts for blankets. They had slouch hats, children's hats, little girls' hats, but not one soldier had a soldier's cap on his head. One man had two old hats tied to his feet instead of shoes. They were the most ragged, torn, and worn, and weary-looking set I ever saw. Every one felt sorry for them, and no one was dis- posed to speak unkindly to them." Yet this was that infantry ^ — that magnificent infantry, which had nearly wrenched victory from Grant on the blood-stained field of Shiloh. It had faced, without flinching, famine, naked- ness, the hospital, and the sword. Would to God that it had had a different enemy and a different cause ! Its various war measures. chap.xlil] the august session. 1^7 On the 21st of April Congress adjourned to the third The August session Monday in August. When it met (August of Congress. j^Sth), the couditiou of the army was a sub- ject of deep concern. This was manifested by the fact that hardly had Congress entered on its duties when a resolution was offered inquiring into the expediency of compelling the Commissary Department to furnish more and better food to the soldiers. Much of the public leg- islation had immediate reference to questions arising from the war. Among war measures, bills were submitted for the treatment of captives ; one to retaliate for the seizure of citizens ; and one for the pun- ishment of negroes in arms : it provided that Federal ar- mies, incongruously composed of whites and blacks, should not be entitled to the privileges of war, or to be taken prisoners; the negroes, if captured, to be returned to their masters, or publicly sold ; their commanders to be hanged or shot, as might be most convenient. Another bill was introduced declaring that Federal soldiers taken with counterfeit Confederate notes in their possession should be put to death. When Lincoln's proclamation of Sep- tember 2 2d respecting slavery was received, retaliatory measures were at once contemplated. ' It was proposed that every man taken in arms against the Confederacy, upon its soil, should be put to death, and that the black flag should be hoisted. These motions were disposed of on the last day of the session by a resolution declar- ing that Congress would sustain any retaliatory meas- ures which the President might adopt. There was a growing, an irrepressible dissatisfaction Dissatisfaction ^vitlx ^^i^^ ^^^^ management of the armies, an in- the state of affairs, ccssaut dcmaud to Carry the war into the enemy's country. " If," said a member from South Caro- lina, "you will give Stonewall Jackson half our armies, he will drive the whole 600,000 of the enemy into the I^orthern States." 108 THE OPPOSITION. [Sect. VII. It must not be supposed that Davis, and those who act- opposition to the ^^ ^Ith him, Carried their measures without President. seiious oppositiou ill their Congress. The member of that body whose testimony I have quoted (p. 159) remarks that even in the provisional Congress a tendency to centralization was apparent, and that " Mr. Davis vetoed more bills during that provisional regime than all the presidents of the United States, from Wash- ington to Lincoln inclusive." In vain a few independent members attempted to pre- Avbitrary course of ^^^^ ^^^ passage of laws suspcudiug the the government. ^^^^ ^£ habcas corpus ,' coufiscating the es- tates of all who could not conscientiously range them- selves in opposition to the flag of their fathers ; putting under conscription all male citizens capable of bearing arms, whether they were friendly or hostile to the Con- federate cause ; forcibly impressing private property, wheresoever situated, at the discretion of men endowed temporarily with military authority; declaring and enforc- ing martial law. In spite of them, inefficient and mis- chievous officials were appointed, to the exclusion of the capable and virtuous; able military commanders were displaced to make way for others despised by the army, and hated and distrusted by the citizens. These, measures, and others of a like character, were carried against all opposition. A single member, by mov- ing it, could force the House to sit with closed doors, and thus in secret session, and under what was known as the ten minutes' rule, measures the most dangerous and doubtful might be passed. It was thus with the Erlanger loan, a shameless speculation introduced under the auspi- ces of Messrs. Slidell and Benjamin ; thus, too, with the Confiscation Act. As it became more and more apparent that the prom- ises Davis had made of a short and successful war were Chap.XLIL] decline OF THE INFLUENCE OF DAVIS. I59 Decline of the infiu- ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ realized, his popukrity de- ence of Davis. clined. All influential newspaper declared that he had been " hastily and unfortunately inflicted on the Confederacy at Montgomery, and, when fixed in posi- tion, banished from his presence the head and brain of the South, denying all participation in the affairs of the gov- ernment to the great men who were the authors of seces- sion." Elsewhere it was affirmed that " the great men of the pa&t and their families are proscribed as if this gov- ernment was the property of a few who haj)pen to wield power at present." It was declared that Neglect of the lead- ,, ,-, -, i , , ii ers of the move- " the pcoplc cau uo longer get access to tne President ; he is surrounded by officers like an imperial court." Nor were these accusations ground- less ; the ablest writers of the South — such as Fitzhugh, De Bow, Fisher — whose Avorks had in reality formed pub- lic opinion, and who were entitled to the most prominent positions, were treated with contumely ; one was offered a low clerkship, which he spurned with contempt ; an- other died of a broken heart. " He has notions of imperial greatness ;" " his head is Accnsations against Completely tumcd by his sudden elevation ;" the President, a ^^ 'g ^^^ victiui of the wcakest weakness, vanity ;" " he is the dupe of the intriguing machinations of cunning and unscrupulous managers, whose true char- acter he has never penetrated"— such were the bitter ob- jurgations of those who had recently been Davis's friends. One pointed out in detail that all the military reverses of the Confederacy might be directly traced to his unhap- py interventions ; another sneeringly recalled that when McClellan was in sight of Eichmond, the President was being baptized at home, and then privately confirmed in St. Paul's Church ; that, during the battle of June 28th, "he was in the lanes and orchards, near the field of ac- tion praying for abundant success." 170 ^ EEIGN OF TERROR. [Sect. VIII. These bitter animosities were not restricted to tlie Pres- and against his ideiit ; his Cabinet bore their share. The , chief officers. ignorance of one; the incompetence of an- other; the want of ordinary honesty in a third, were openly proclaimed. It was affirmed that a person who had pursued the empirical practice of a vegetarian quack- doctor was intrusted with one of the most important mil- itary offices. " His manners were coarse, overbearing, and insulting; he was utterly ignorant of the duties of the post assigned to him, and was not at all solicitous to make himself acquainted with them. He exhibited a brutal indifference to the sufferings of the Confederate soldiery, by all of whonf he was most cordially detested." Mr. Foote declares : " As chairman of a special com- imprisonment of Hiittce of the Confederate Congress, OTgan- suspectedper^ns. -^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^.^^^ ^^^ ^^^ pUrpOSe of inquiring into cases of illegal imprisonment, I obtained from the superintendent of the prison-house in Eichmond, under the official sanction of the Department of War it- self, a grim and shocking catalogue of several hundred persons then in confinement therein, not one of whom was charged with any thing but suspected political infi- delity, and this, too, not upon oath in a single instance. Before I could take proper steps to procure the discharge of these unhappy men, the second suspension of the writ of liberty occurred, and I presume that such of them as did not die in jail remained there until the fall of Eich- mond into the bands of the Federal forces." These imprisonments were very far from being restrict- Barbaiities prac- ^d to pcrsous little kuowu or lu the humbler ticed upon them. ^^^j^^ ^^ j • ^^^ rj.^^^^ ^^ g^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^, ^^^^ years had been one of the most prominent men in polit- ical life in Virginia, says that he was arrested in March, 1862, sent to a filthy negro jail, and kept there in solitary confinement for eight weeks ; not even a chair or table Chap. XLIL] A REIGN. OF TERROR. 171 was furnislied him; no one was permitted to speak to him. He adds " that more than one hundred and fifty persons were in like manner confined. Many of them were subsequently sent to Salisbury, in North Carolina, where some went crazy, and many died. In the Rich- mond Prison they had the naked floor for a pallet, a log of wood for a pillow, the ceiling for a blanket. At Salis- bury it was still worse. They were exposed to all the weather — cold rains and burning suns alternately." " But the object was effected by my arrest and imprisonment and that of others. It effectually sealed every man's lips. All were afraid to express their opinions under the reign of terror and despotism that had been established in Rich- mond. Every man felt that his personal liberty and safe- ty required silent submission to the tyranny of the Con- federacy." It was this Mr. Botts who first uttered th^t sentiment, which became eventually so current among the brave and much-enduring, the shoeless, ragged, famished, noble con- scripts — " It's the rich man's war^ and the poor man's fight." ,,Things were fast going from bad to worse in domestic life in the Confederacy. A clerk in the War Deplorable condi- ^^-^ . -,. Pi'i? m /a»* in tiou of domestic af- Omce, lu a diary oi his lamily airairs, tells us : " The shadow of gaunt Famine is upon us. All the patriotism is in the army ; out of it the de- mon Avarice rages supreme. Every one is mad with speculation." By the middle of November, 1862, salt was selling in Richmond at more than a dollar a pound ; boots at fifty dollars a pair ; clothing was almost unattainable. The city was full of accusations, of speculations, extortion, cheating the government. It was found, from an exam- ination of the accounts of disbursing agents, that nearly seventy millions of dollars were not accounted for. Th^ remorseless pressure of the blockade had reached the re- ]^^2 EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC LIFE. [Sect. VIII. cesses of private life. "Pins are now so rare tliat we pick them up with avidity in the streets." Enthusiasm had died out. Blank despair was settling on multitudes to whom pride had been a temporary support. The la- dies were no longer seen sewing uniforms in the churches as in the first days of secession, and boasting that they had postponed all engagements until their lovers had fouo^ht with the Yankees. But, faithful to the end, as they will always be, they were watching by their wound- ed in the hospitals, or decorating with flowers the graves of their dead. CHAPTER XLHI. THE EXTRA SESSION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS. The Republican party had a majority in Congress, and was sustained by the mass of the Democratic party in all measures needful for the support of the govern- ment. President Lincoln, in his message, gave an exposition of the state of- affairs, and of the causes which had led to the existing crisis. Congress in its acts exceeded his recommendations, pledging itself to bring into op- eration the whole power of the nation for the suppression of the rebellion. The Thirty-seventli Congress met on the 4tli of July, 1861, in extra session, in accordance with the President's proclamation of the 15th of April. The Republican party had a majority in both houses. Party composition ^^ ^^^ Senate it had thirty-one votes out of of the houses, forty-eight ; in the House of Representatives, one hundred and six out of one hundred and seventy- eight. Of the House of Representatives, a large number of the compared with the members were new men who had never been preceding session. -^ Qougress beforc. Though the Republic- an party had in this three representatives less than in the last session, it had, through the non-representation of the seceding states, the above-mentioned majority. The last Senate had consisted of sixty-six members ; in this there were but forty-eight. In the former case the Democratic party had a majority over the Republican in the proportion of three to two. This gave to the South a control of the Senate, and through it a control of the government. 174 THE EXTEA SESSION. [Sect. VIII.. The control tlius maintained "by the slave power is in- dicated by the distribution of the chairmanships of the standing committees. The important ones were held by the South. Thus Mississippi had that of Military Affairs ; Florida, Naval Affairs and the Post-office ; Delaware, the Justiciary; Virginia, Foreign Eelations, and also Finance ; Alabama, Commerce; Arkansas, Public Lands; Louisiana, Public Land Claims. Of twenty-two such committees, the slave power controlled sixteen. These chairmanships were in the hands of persons soon to be found in open opposition to the government. To the North had been assigned the more insignificant, such as Printing, Patents, Public Buildings. As in the House, so in the Senate, the non-representa- tion of the seceding states threw the power Effect of the with- •,,ii i n ,1 -n> it t» drawai of South- mto tuo uauds 01 the Kepublicans, and, m em members. t t • n addition, many senators, as well as many rep- resentatives who had heretofore acted with the Democrat- ic party, joined cordially in support of the administration as soon as they plainly perceived that the life of the na- tion was in peril. The sentiments animating a very large portion of the Democratic party were well expressed by eSSent by the^°^' Mr. Dousflas, who had been its candidate Democratic party. ^ ,^ -i • •,• j.t' t for the presidency m opposition to Lincoln. They occur in a letter to the chairman of the Democratic Committee of his state, written but a short time before his death : " I am neither the supporter of the partisan policy, nor Views expressed by ^^^ apologist of thc ClTOrS of this admiuis- Mr. Douglas. tratiou. My prcvious rclatlous to it remain unchanged. But I trust the time will never come when I shall not be willing to mak^ any needful sacrifice of personal feeling and party policy for the honor and in- tegrity of my country. I know of no mode by which a Chap. XLIII.] MR. DOUGLAS'S LETTER. 175 loyal citizen may so well demonstrate his devotion to his country as by sustaining the flag, the Constitution, and the Union against all assailants, at home and abroad." "The hope (of a compromise) was cherished by Union men North and South, and was never abandoned until actual war was levied at Charleston, and the authoritative an- nouncement made by the revolutionary government at Monto-omery that the. secession flag should be planted on the walls of the Capitol at Washington, and a proclama- tion issued inviting the pirates of the world to prey upon the commerce of the United States." " There was then but one path of duty left open to patriotic men. It was not a party question, nor a question involving partisan policy. It w^as a question of government or no govern- ment — country or no country ; and hence it became the duty of every friend of constitutional liberty to rally to the support of our common country, its government and flag, as the only means of checking the progress of revo- lution, and of preserving the union of the states." . On the day after the organization of Congress, the Pres- ident transmitted to it his message. He stated that, since the beginning of his term, the func- tions of the government, with the exception of those of the Post-office Department, had been suspended in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mis- sissippi, Louisiana, and Florida ; that forts, arsenals, dock- yards, and other property had been seized, strengthened, and armed, and were held in open hostility to the govern- ment ; that a disproportionate quantity of national mus- specifying the acts ^^^^ ^^^ riflcs had lu somc mauucr found of the insurgents, ^^g ^^y ^^ thosc statcs, aud was about to be used against the government ; that accumulations of revenue, had in like manner been taken ; that the navy had been scattered to distant seas ; that officers both of the army and navy had resigned in great numbers, and The President's message, 176 ABSTRACT OF LINCOLN'S MESSAGE. [Sect.VIIL many of them were in arms against the government ; that ordinances of secession had been passed by each of the states designated, and an illegal organization established which, in the character of a confederation, was seeking the intervention of foreign powers. That, recognizing it to be his imperative duty to arrest this attempt at the destruction of the Union, capture of Fort hc had at first resorted to peaceful meas- Sumter. iiii it ures, seekmg only to hold the public prop- erty, collect the revenue, and continue, at the government expense, the mails to the very people who were resisting; that he had notified the Governor of South Carolina of an attem]3t about to be made to provision Fort Sumter, and had also informed him that, unless this were resist- ed, there would be no effort to send re-enforcements. Thereupon the fort was bombarded and captured, with- out even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expe- dition. From this it might be seen that the assault on Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self de- That they had made ^ , , ty ,i m j 'j i • war on the govern- feuse ou tho part 01 thc assailauts, it bemo^ impossible that the garrison could commit any aggression upon them ; that their object was to drive out the visible authority of the Union ; that there were no guns in the fort save those sent to that harbor many years before for the protection of the assailants them- selves. In doing this they had forced upon the country the distinct issue — " immediate dissolution of the Union or blood." This issue presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control the adminis- tration according to law, may, upon pretenses made arbi- trarily or not at all, break up the government. It forces us to ask, " Is there in all republics an inherent and fatal weakness ?" " Must a government, of necessity, be too Chap. XLIIL] ABSTRACT OF LINCOLN'S MESSAGE. l^^ strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence ?" Under these circumstances, the government was com- pelled to resist the force employed for its The government ij.x'T.i» 1 1 n ' i^ had been compelled dcstruction Dj lorco employed for its pres- to r6sist« ^ ervation. The President then proceeded to say that the response The course that vir- of thc country had bcen most gratifying, yet ginia had taken. ^|^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ gj^^^ g^^^^^ ^^^^^^ jy^^^ ware had furnished a reo;iment. He drew attention to the course that Virginia had taken. A Convention, of whom a large majority were professed Unionists, had been elected by the people of that state for the purpose of considering secession ; on the fall of Sumter, many of them went over to the secession party, and undertook to withdraw the state from the Union, but, though they submitted their ordinance for ratification to a vote of the people, to be taken a month subsequently, they, without any delay, commenced warlike operations against the Union. They seized the government armory at Harper's Ferry and the Norfolk navy yard ; they received, per- haps invited, large bodies of troops from the other seced- ing states; they madd a treaty with the Confederate States, and sent representatives to their Congress; they permitted the installation of the insurrectionary govern- ment at Richmond. In the other Border Slave States there had been an at- tempt to assume a position which they called and the armed neu- -. ; t , rm it • iraiity of the Border armed neutrality, ihey would permit nei- ther the insurgents nor the government to cross their soil. -Under this guise of neutrality they gave protection to and screened the insurgents, securing dis- union without a struggle. He then stated the circumstances under which the gov- ernment had called out seventy-five thousand militia, and H.— M 178 ABSTRACT OF LINCOLN'S MESSAGE. [Sect. VIII. instituted a blockade of the insurrection- ssre- the ad- ministration. War measures re- t i • i , i • j • • j i sorted to by the ad- arv Qistricts, tuc lusurrectionists havinp; an- nounced their purpose of entering on the practice of privateering. Other calls had been made for volunteers, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures had been ventured upon under what appeared to be a public necessity, and in the trust that Congress would readily ratify them. He had also authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, so that dangerous persons might be arrested or detained. He presented the considerations which had led him to regard this step not only as justifiable, but obligatory. In view of the existing condition of things, he then m recommenda- callcd upou Cougrcss to glvc thc legal means tions to congress. ^^^ making this coutcst short aud decisive. He asked for 400,000 men, and $400,000,000. The President also pointed out the manner in which the people of the Slave States had been be- specting state sov- gullcd luto trcasou. Thc Icadcrs of the movement had for more than thirty years been laboring to persuade them that any state of the Union, by virtue of its supremacy or sovereignty as a state, might constitutionally, and therefore peacefully and legally, withdraw at its pleasure from the Union. But, with the exception of Texas, not one of them had ever been a state out of the Union. The original ones passed into the Union before they had cast off British colonial dependence. Not one of the states, save Texas, had ever been sovereign. The Union gave each of them whatever independence and liberty it had. It is* older than any of them, and created them as states. Not one of them ever had a state Constitution independent of the Union. Even if they had reserved powers, they certainly had not a power to destroy the government. Kecalling the fact Chap. XLIII.] ABSTRACT OF LINCOLN'S MESSAGE. 179 that the nation had purchased with its money several of the seceding states, he asked, Is it just that they should separate without its permission ? Florida, for instance, had cost $100,000,000. The nation is actually now in debt for moneys it has thus paid. A part of the existing national debt was contracted to pay the debts of Texas. Is it just that she should secede, and pay no portion of it herself? After showing the constitutional absurdities of seces- sion, and questioning whether in any state, with perhaps the exception of South Carolina, a majority of the voters was in favor of secession, he referred to the the seutimentTof great blcssiugs that the nation had derived from free institutions, affirming his belief that the " plain people" understood that this was essen- tially a people's contest. He drew attention to the fact that, while so many of the officers of the army and navy had proved false, not one common soldier or common sail- or was known to have deserted his flag. " This is the patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand, with- out any argument, that the destruction of the government made by Washington means no good to them." Alluding to his purposes in the event of the suppres- sion of the rebellion, and expressing his deep concern that he had been compelled to resort to the war power, he felt that he had done what he believed to be his duty, know- ing that he had no moral right to shrink, or even to count the chances of his own life in what might follow. Coin- mending, therefore, to Congress wjiat he had done under a deep sense of his great responsibilities, he sincerely He invokes the sup- hopcd that Its vicws aud actions might so port of congress. ^^^^^^ ^^-^^ j^.^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^jj faithful blockade it completely. From that point to Bowling Green there was railroad connection. Here, in the oj)inion of the Confederate en- gineers, must be established their outer line of defense. The occupation of Kentucky was correctly viewed by them as a military necessity. The Governor of Kentucky had been elected as a Dem- poiicyofit-sgov- ^^^^^ ^^ 1^^^5 te was thoroughly devoted ^^°^- to the secession cause. He denounced the policy of President Lincoln, and refused the state's quota of troops (p. 27). Chap. XLVI.] POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN KENTUCKY. 223 All extra session of the Legislature had been sumnion- Hisraessa e to the ^^ (January 18th, 1861) for the purpose of Legislature, calHug a State Convention. In his message to it the governor declared that the people of the Unit- ed States are already effectively sundered, and that the Union exists only as an abstraction ; that, in fact, it was dissolving into its original integral elements; that a bloody revolution, already commencing in South Caro- lina, was inevitable. He directed attention to the suc- cessful establishment of the Southern Confederacy, and inquired in what attitude Kentucky should stand, and by what authority her external relations should be regu- ,. , , , ,, lated. But the Leo-islature refused to call which refuses to call O aconventiou. ^ Statc Convcution, preferring that there should be a National or Peace Conference at Washington. The intentions of the Unionists of Kentucky were ex- Quaimedioyaityof P^^s^ed at a mcctiug hcld in Louisville the Unionists. (April 18th) immediately after the capture of Fort Sumter. It was resolved that the sympathies of Kentucky are with those who have an interest in the pro- tection of slavery, but that she acknowledges her fealty to the United States until its government becomes re- gardless of her rights in slave property. The use of co- ercive measures to bring back the seceded states was con- demned, and the Kentucky State Guard was admonished to remember that its fidelity was pledged equally to the Union and the state. ^ . The governor ^gain summoned an extra session of the Legislature (April 28th). It refused once Second extra ses- , ^^ /-i , i' i • t • sion oftheLegis- luorc to Call a Cotfveution, or to errant him lature. • • three millions of dollars which he had re- quired for arming the state. , It even amended the militia law so as to require the State Guard to take an oath of allegiance to the Union. He then issued a proclamation of neutrality (May 20th), denouncing the war as horrid, 224 POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN KENTUCKY. [Sect. IX. and forbidding tlie United States and the Confederate States invading Kentucky. This the Legislature refused to indorse. The intention of the people was doubtless truly expressed by a resolution of their Senate, that the state " should not sever its connection with the national It inclines toward govemment, uor take up arms for either the Union. belligerent' party, but arm herself for the preservation of peace on her borders." Her attitude was that of conditional Unionism. The loyalty of her people was shown at the election for delegates to the Peace Con- vention (May 4th). They gave a Union majority of fifty thousand votes, and the insincerity of those who would have forced her out of the Union was manifested by the fact that, though they had declared that allegiance and loyalty compelled them to go with their state, they did not consider themselves under any obligation to remain with their state. Kentucky had thus, by very large majorities, refused to join in the secession movement; but her governor, like those of Virginia and Missouri, was not unwilling to make her a screen behind which the purposes of the in- surgents in the Cotton States could be carried on. In a letter to President Lincoln (August 19), he ernof to theVrel- dcclarcd that her people earnestly desire to ident. avoid being involved in the war ; that they have rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolu- tion, and have done nothing to provoke the presence of a military force. He therefore urged that the national troops be removed. In his reply, setting forth the reasons which compelled The President's ^im to dcclinc gratifying the governor in reply. "^-g rcqucst, siucc the troops in question con- sisted entirely of Kentuckians, Lincoln, in a very charac- teristic manner, remarks, " I most cordially sympathize with your excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native state, Kentucky ; but it is with regret Chap.XLVI.] the confederates invade KENTUCKY. 225 I searcL. for and can not find in your not very short letter any declaration or intimation that you entertain any de- sire for the preservation of the Federal Union." . In a message to the Legislature which shortly after- ward convened (September 3d), the 2:0V- Message of the gov- . i • i r» i i • , • ernor to the Legis- emor agaiu complaiued 01 the mtrusive ag- gression of the North, and declared his opin- ion that Kentucky would never renounce her sympathy with her aggrieved sister Southern States ; but that body resolved that the neutrality of Kentucky had been vio- The Legislature ^^^^^ ^J ^^^ Confederate forces, requested coSliS'fnva.^^ the governor to call out the militia to expel ^'''°' them, and invoked the United States to give aid and assistance. The governor vetoed these resolu- tions. The Legislature at once passed them over his veto by very large majorities. The Confederate authorities perceived that it was ab- solutely necessary for them to take military possession of Kentucky, no matter what the wishes of its people might be. If it could not be used as a bulwark, it must be used The Confederate ^s a battle-field. They therefore assigned General Polk. (j^ncral Polk to the commaud of a depart- ment extending from the mouth of the Arkansas north- ward on both sides of the Mississippi. He had been the bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Louisiana, but now, as far as it was possible for him to do so, had exchanged ecclesiastical for military life. Like some of the bishop-generals of the Middle Ages, he drew forth well-tried weapons from the spiritual armory, as well as those of a carnal kind, in his first general order, declar- ing that " the invasion of the South by the Federal armies had brought with it a contempt for constitutional liberty, ** and the withering influences of the infidelity of New En- gland and of Germany combined." • IL— P 226 THE MISSISSIPPI BLOCKADED— BELMONT. [Sect. IX. General Polk at once occupied Columbus and fortified it. Hereupon General Grant, who was in The Confederate j nil >• ii? j. r\ • xn troops occupy command oi the national forces at Cairo, took possession of Paducah (September 16tli),at the junction of the Tennessee and Ohio. It was about this time and in reference to these Confederate forces that the Legislature passed the resolution above referred to requiring their removal from the state. Simultaneously with the invasion of Kentucky by Gen- eral Polk on the west, General ZoUikoffer The Confederates , i • i 1 1 j. i i • x i j xi • invade East Ken- entcrcd it ou the cast, aeclaring: that this tacky. / o step was necessary for the safety of Tennes- see; and to meet his forces, national troops were intro- duced from Indiana, Ohio, etc. The seizure and fortifying of Columbus by Polk block- BiockadeoftheMis- ^dcd thc Misslssippi. The position was sissippiestabiished. eventually made very strong, being defend- ed by more than 120 heavy guns. Opposite Columbus, on the Missouri side of the river, is Belmont, a steam-boat landing, at which a small Con- federate force was encamped. On the 7th of November, Grant attacks Bel- Gcucr al Grant, wlth 3114 men , attacked this mont. force. He succeeded in destroying their camp and driving them down to the brink of the river. But, the place being commanded by Columbus, General Polk was able to bring several of his guns to bear on the national troops, and dispatched as quickly as he could a re-enforcement of 5000 men across the river. Discipline in the armies was at that time very lax. The national soldiers indulged themselves in plundering, the officers in making stump speeches glorifying the Union and magnifying themselves. While this was going on Polk's troops appeared. Grant, however, successfully cut his way through them, bringing off his own guns and some of those of the enemy. He lost 480 men in killed, wound- ed, and missing. Polk's loss was 642. CHAPTER XLVII. TRANSACTIONS CIVIL AND MILITARY IN MISSOURI. In Missouri the governor and Legislature were in favor of secession ; the State Con- vention averse to it. The governor inaugurated hostilities by seizing a national arsenal. In his subse- quent movements he was defeated at the battle of Booneville. He then pro- claimed the secession of the state. Battle of Wilson's Creek, and death of General Lyon. General Fremont assigned to the command of the district. Causes of his sudden removal. Battle of Pea Ridge, and march of General Curtis to Helena. In Missouri the separation of tlie people into two par- internai dissensions ties at oHce occupred. The slaveholders in Missouri. ^^^^ numerically in the minority, but their inferiority in Jhat respect was compensated for by their social influence and w^ealth. They were mostly settled in the rich river valleys, and had no intention of yielding to the New Englanders and German immigrants with whom the chief towns were thronged. The governor was a supporter of the secession party, and the Legislature had similar inclinations. A State Convention was called by the Legislature. It The state conven- ^ict February 28th. A commissioner from ^'''"' Georgia was permitted to address it. He was, however, respectfully dismis-sed with the informa- tion that his views were not considered acceptable, and that it was to be regretted that he had no plan of recon- ciliation to offer. The Committee of the Convention on Federal Relations presented its report on March 9th. It offered resolutions declaring that there was no adequate cause for Missouri to leave the Union; that she would 228 POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MISSOURI. [Sect. IX. It desires an ami- la"bor foi Its perpetuatloii ; tliat the people cable adjustment, ^f ^i^^t state earnestly desired an amicable adjustment of all difficulties; it suggested the Crittenden Compromise as a satisfactory basis, and a Convention of the states for the purpose of suitably amending the Con- stitution ; it equally denounced coercion of the seceding states by the government, and assaults by those states on the government, and entreated both not to bring on the nation the horrors of civil war. An amendment was add- ed to this report, before its adoption by the Convention, recommending the national government to withdraw its troops from the forts in the seceded states, where there might be danger of a collision with state troops. The Convention then adjourned to the following December. Though the Convention had thus determined against The governor de- secesslon, the govcmor at once proceeded to Sate^ovSo^the render its action abortive. To President Confederacy. Llucolu's rcquisltiou for troops he returned a refusal, and called an extra session of the Legislature (May 2d) to authorize the military organization of the state. In his message on that occasion, he declared that the sympathies of Missouri were with the Slave States, and that it was necessary for her interests to unite her destiny with theirs: In his views the Legislature con- curred. The governor had already (April 20th) seized the He seizes the arse- Uultcd Statcs Arscual at Liberty, and had nai at Liberty. (Jistributcd amoug his friends the arms it contained ; he had attempted to obtain control of the city of St. Louis by establishing in it an armed force under the guise of a metropolitan police ; he had ordefed the mili- tia to go into encampment under pretense of drilling, but, in reality, to be ready to secure the state. His intention was to seize the national arsenal at St. Louis, at that time in charge of Captain Lyon, who had a garrison of about Chap. XLVII.] MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN MISSOURI. 229 The arms at St. 500 legulars. That officer, wLile the gov- Louis removed, qyhoy was maturing his plans, had the arms secretly transferred to Springfield, in the adjoining Free State Illinois. Meantime permission had been received from Washington to raise troops, and, notwithstanding the refusal of the governor to comply with the President's requisition, several regiments had been raised by Colonel P.P.Blair. Captain Lyon, finding that the state troops encamped . ,^ in the vicinity of St. Louis were receivinor Lyon surprises the «/ O secession camp. canuou, shot, aud shcU taken from the na- tional arsenal at Baton Rouge, in Louisiana, and sent up the Mississippi in boxes marked " marble," resolved not to wait for their assault on the arsenal in his charge. With 6000 troops, he suddenly surrounded their camp and compelled them to surrender. He took fr(5m them , , 20 cannon, 1200 new rifles, several chests and captures many 7 ' munitions. ^£ small-arms, and large quantities of ammu- nition. As the last of the prisoners were leaving their camp, some persons from the city fired on his German combats between regimcuts, who, retumiug the fire, killed and the opponents. wouudcd more than twenty of their assail- ants. As might have been expected, the city was a scene of conflict between the two parties for several days sub- sequently. General Harney, now arriving in St. Louis, took com- mand of the national forces,' and entered into Harney makes a j • , i , i • j i j compact with the a compact with the s-overnor, a2:reein2: thai; governor. ;^ i i i i -t no military movements should be made so long as the state authorities would preserve order. The national government, however, disapproved of this com- Lyon assigned to P^ct, rclievcd Hamcy of his command, and the command. coufcrred it ou Captain Lyon, who was com- missioned a brigadier general. But the governor did not d^st from his attempt to 230 POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN MISSOUEI. [Sect. IX. force the state into the Confederacy. The The governor de- J S^fThfnauraT Leglskture had placed the whole military troops. power in his hands ; it had made every able- bodied man subject to military duty, and. had provided money for war purposes. He demanded of General Lyon, as a preliminary to pacification, that no national troops should be permitted to remain in Missouri, and that his volunteers should be disbanded. This being refused, he Heissuesaprocia- i^^ued a proclamation calling into service mation, 50,000 militia for the purpose of repelling invasion, declaring to the people that their first allegiance was due ^o their own state ; that they were under no ob- ligation whatever to obey the unconstitutional edicts of the military despotism that had enthroned itself at Washington, nor to submit to the infamous and degrad- ing sway of its minions. He had railroad and commences t«t i t t/t -t * , ■^ warlike opera- bridsfes Dumed and tele2:raph wires cut, and commenced a civil strife for the purpose of forcing Missouri into the Confederacy, though so large a majority of the people were avowedly averse to that course. By the Kansas conflicts (vol. i., p. 416), Missouri had been prepared for fierce civil dissensions. The Leprislatare . , ,, ''iitt t, places funds at As uot a smsflc secessiouist had been elect- his disposal. i r^ ed to the Convention, the governor gave up all hope of attaching the state to the Confederacy through an action, real or ostensible, of the people, and, thoroughly committed to the slave interest, he carried on his opera- tions through the Legislature. This body had placed at his disposal more than $3,000,000, derived from funds intended for purposes altogether different, such as the school fund, the interest on the state debt, etc. With these means he proceeded to attempt the military organi- zation of the state, and concentrated his militia at Boone- ville and Lexington. -, chap.xlvil] political movements in MISSOUEI. 231 He endeavored at first to renew the agreement pre- He expects troops viouslj made with General Harney, and to from the South, gecure the removal of the national troops. In whatever promises he gave of neutrality, he was, how- ever, insincere, for he knew that a body of Texan troops were coming across the Southern frontier to his aid. General Lyon at once determined to attack the troops Lyon attacks him at ^^ Booncville before they were re-enforeed. Booneviiie. jj^ movcd with such celcrity that he came upon theni (June 17th) unprepared. In an affair of twen- ty minutes he totally routed them. The governor fled to the Southwest, to meet re-enforcements which were hur- rying to him from other parts of the state, and the ex- pected Texan troops. To prevent this junction. Colonel Sigel had been sent with a national force from St. Louis. He advanced from Eolla to beyond Carthage, but was too late to accomplish his purpose. After some severe fighting he was forced back to Springfield, where he was joined by Lyon. While things were in this condition the State Conven- tion reassembled at Jefferson City (July points uew state of- 20th). It dcclarcd thc offices of srovernor, lieutenant governor, etc., vacant, and pro- nounced all the anti-national legislation that had taken place null and void. It apj^^ointed a new governor until, on a subsequent day of election, the people should ex- press their choice. On his part, the governor, in retaliation, issued a dec- laration that, by the act of the people and ciaferthluhe state govcmment of the Northern States of the late Union, the political connection of Mis- souri with the United States was dissolved. In conformi- ty with the plan elsewhere followed, he proceeded to con- tract an alliance with the. Confederacy, turning over to it the military means of the state. The formal secession of 232 MILITAEY MOVEMENTS IN MISSOURI. [Sect. IX. Missouri was tlius the act of one man, and herein is seen the wisdom of the original movers of secession, in hav- ing persons who could be relied upon for their purposes as governors in all the Border States. MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS. The month of August came, and found General Lyon at Springfield, hoping to receive re-enforcements ; but the battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impos- Fremont takes com- slblc to scud him aid. Major General Fre- mandofthedistrict. ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ appointed to thc commaud of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they were advancing upon him in two columns, de- termined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed 5500, his antagonist had Lyon's skirmish at niorc tliau 12,000. A skirmish occurred at Dug Spring. p^^ Spring (August 1st), in which he had Chap. XLVII.] BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 233 the advantage ; but lie could not prevent the junction of the two columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield: His position had now become one of great difficulty. Po- litical as well as military considerations rendered it al- most impossible for him to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving out of Springfield on a very dark night (xlugust 9, 10), and having ordered Sigel, with 1200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, to make an attack on their front. But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was Battle of Wilson's Overwhelmed. He lost &ve out of his six ^^''^^' guns, and more than half his men. The at- tack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel was at that moment severely wound- Death of Lyon. , *', ed, " Come on, I will lead you," and in so do- ing was shot through the heart. After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on; It was executed without difficulty. In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed. Results of the bat- ^^1 wouudcd, 292 mlsslug, ou the national side ; and, as may be inferred from the de- termined character of the assault, the loss of the Confed- erates was very great. They had been so severely han- dled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the re- treat was continued by the national troops, who, on the 19th, had fallen back to Rolla. -After this action, the Confederate commanders McCul- 234 CAPTURE OF LEXINGTON. [Sect. IX. Quarrel of the Con- l<^cli and PHce quarreling with each other federate generals. ^^^ nusihle to agree upon a plan for their campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter ad- vanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national force of about three thousand (2780) under Colonel Mulligan. Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assail- ing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the position, and cut off the beleaguer- ed troops from water. They made repeated assaults with- out success until August 20th, when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled be- captureofLexing- f^re them as they advanced, and compelled ^'*"' Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender unconditionally. On receiving the news of this disaster, Fremont at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Fremont marches t^. i,,i, i«i it i .t against the confed- Trice, but that gcueral instantly retreated, making his way back to the southwest cor- ner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his Confederate troops. Fremont continued the pursuit, his army amounting to 30,000 men, of whom 5000 were cav- alry ; he had 86 guns. But, on reaching Tipton, he was overtaken by the Secretary of War, who had come from Washington for the purpose of having an interview with He is suddenly re- t™. Ou Novcmbcr 2d au order was re- lieved. ceived at Springfield removing Fremont from his command. He was directed to turn it over to General Hunter, who was soon after superseded by Gen- eral Halleck. Among the avowed reasons for the removal of Fremont, Causes of his re- thus chcckcd iu thc outsct of his career, were his permitting the disaster that had befallen moval. Chap.XLVII.] FREMONT REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 235 Colonel Mulligan, and the extravagance of Hs military preparations at St. Louis ; but from his correspondence Causes of his re- witli President Lincoln it may be seen that movai. the true reason lay in the view he took of the general policy on which the war should be conduct- ed. At that time the administration was extremely so- licitous to do nothing that might alienate the Border Slave States ; the President, as he himself has told us, was not unwilling to spare slavery, if by that means the Union could be saved ; and McClellan, who had now the chief military command, was perhaps ready to go even farther than that. Such being the intention of the au- thorities at Washington, it was plain that the general or- der issued by Fremont immediately on taking command of the Western Department was incompatible therewith. In this he had declared that " the property, real and per- sonal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall be di- rectly proven to have taken active part with their ene- mies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the pub- lic use, and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby de- clared to be free men." After the removal of Fremont the national army was Retreat of the na: ordcrcd to retire upon Kolla. There had, tionai army. thercforc, bceu two military advances from St. Louis across the state toward its southwest corner, the first under Lyon, the second under Fremont. In each case the subsequent retreat was followed by unhappy consequences, in exposing those individuals and families who had ventured to sustain the national cause to the vengeance of their opponents. On the 18th of November General Halleck arrived at St. Louis, and took command of the West- Halleck takes com- -|->. . , a i ii • i' ii r^ n t mand of the depart- cm Department. At this time the Confed- erates under Price were intending to aj)- ^gg HALLECK TAKES COMMAND. [Sect. IX. proach Kansas and destroy the Northern Eailroad. But before Christmas Halleck had compelled him to retreat into Arkansas, and for a short time military operations closed during the severity of the winter. Price had dis- played no small skill in his movements, and it was be- lieved in Eichmond that if he had been properly sup- ported he would have secured Missouri to the Confed- eracy. Price himself attributed his want of success to the fail- ure of McCulloch to sustain him. These Van Dom takes /v, i i t j ' it i command of the omcers wcrc on such bad terms with each Confederates. i • t other that it became necessary to put a su- perior over them. Accordingly (January 29th, 1862), General Van Dorn was ordered to take command of the Mississippi District. He had his headquarters at Little Rock. Three days after General Halleck had taken command General Haiieck's ^^ ^^^ Wcstcm Department, he issued an slave order. ^^dev (Novcmbcr 21st) that no fugitive slaves should be permitted to enter the lines of any camp, nor of any forces on the march. The reason assigned for this measure was that such persons had conveyed to the enemy important information respecting the numbers and condition of his forces. He thus brought the slave policy of his department more nearly into correspondence with the slave policy of the administration, and corrected the error into which it was assumed that General Fremont had fallen. The national forces were now combined under General Curtis, who (February 11th) moved forward from Lebanon with the intention of operat- ing: ao^ainst Price. As he advanced the Confederates re- tired into Arkansas, falling back fifty miles beyond the Boston Mountain. This retreat, if such it could be call- ed, was a falling back on re-enforcements, which were Curtis's advance. Chap. XLVII.] BATTLE OF PEA EIDGE. 237 daily increased in strength ; the national advance was at- tended by a continual enfeeblement. Under these circumstances, Curtis, foreseeing that he would soon be attacked at a disadvantage, took post on Sugar Creek. His first and second divisons, under General Sigel, were four miles PEA RIDGE. southwest of Bentonville ; his third, under Colonel J. C, Davis, was on Pea Kidge, north of Sugar Creek; his fourth, under Colonel Carr, was at Cross Hollows. The entire force was 10,500, with 49 guns. The encHiy, under General Van Dorn, now advancing upon him, numbered more than 20,000 men. On March 5th, a cold, snowy day, Curtis received no- tice that the Confederates were approaching. He there- upon sent orders to Sigel and Carr to fall back at once on Sugar Creek ; the former accomplished that movement with considerable difficulty, but with very great skill, in- cessantly fighting and repelling the enemy; but, in spite of the weather and. the dreadful condition of the roads, 238 BATf LE OF PEA RID^E. [Sect. IX. he made good his junction with Curtis on the west end of Pea Eidge. Meantime General Curtis had made preparations for receiving the enemy on the southwest, along the Fayette- ville Road. They, however, passed round to the north of Pea Ridge, and on the morning of the 7th Curtis found them prepared to attack him from that quarter ; he was thus compelled to make a corresponding change of front, his position being perilous; for, if he were defeated, the en- emy would occupy his line of retreat. Sigel held his left, Davis his centre, Carr his right. The attack commenced on the 7th, and was chiefly directed by the Confederates against Carr's division, which was forced back in the course of the day nearly h mile, though not disorganized. McCulloch, who confronted Sigel on Curtis's left, at- tempted, by a movement of his force to the east, to join Van Dorn and Price in their attack on Curtis's right. To arrest this, Sigel sent forward three pieces of artillery, with a supporting force of cavalry, but they were speed- ily overwhelmed and the guns captured. Sigel, however, being re-enforced by Davis, a desperate struggle ensued, which ended in a complete rout of the Confederate right, its generals, McCulloch and Mcintosh, being killed. At the close of the day Price was on the Fayetteville Road, in Curtis's rear. Elkhorn Tavern was Van Dorn's head-quarters. The national army had been defeated on the right ; its line of communication had been taken ; it was nearly without food. The Confederates had been defeated on their right. During the night the Confeder- ate forces formed a junction on the ground held. by. their left wing. The national line had also changed ; Davis was on the right, Carr at the centre, Sigel on the left. The battle was renewed at sunrise, Sigel opening a heavy dannonade and advancing round the enemy's right, Davis turning their left as Sigel advanced. The Confederates Chap.xlvil] battle of pea ridge. 239 Defeat of the Con- could Hot staiid the CIO ss fire to which they federates. were exposed, and were compelled in two hours to retreat through the defiles of Cross Timber Hol- low. The national loss was 1351. The Confederate loss was heavier. After the battle General Curtis fell back into Missouri, and Van Dorn into Arkansas. In this battle there appeared on the side of the Confed- indian allies of the erates four or ^ve thousand Indians. Some Confederates. ^£ them asslsted lu taking a battery, but, for the most part, they were so amazed at the evolutions and noise of the artillery that General Van Dorn, in his report, does not mention that they had been of service to him. These Indians had been brought over to the Con- federacy by emissaries who had been sent among them, representing that the Union had been destroyed, and that, if they desired to retain their slaves — for many slaves were held by them — it was best for them to join the Con- federate side, with which, in that particular, they had an interest in common. The Creeks and Cherokees had long been-disafi*ected to the Union on account of their removal to this region from the East ; and the vacillating military movements that had been taking place in Missouri for the establishment of the national authority, the death of Gen- eral Lyon, and other facts which they had learned, and the bearing of which they could comprehend, were used with success to draw many of them over to the Confeder- ate side. A minority, however, still remained attached to the Union. The expedition into Arkansas was shortly afterward The march of Curtis Tcsumcd by Gcucral Curtis. He reached to Helena. Batcsville (scc map, p. 232), on the White River (May 6th), where he expected to meet supplies and the co-operation of gun-boats coming up the river. In this he was disappointed, partly owing to the lowness of the river, and partly to the difficulty of passing the ob- 240 MAKCH OE CUKTIS TO HELENA. [Sect. IX. structing batteries of tlie enemy. In making such an at- tempt, one of tlie boats — the Mound City — had been blown lip. It was Curtis's intention to march to Little Kock, the capital of Arkansas ; but ten regiments were taken from him and sent to Corinth, thus occasioning the abandonment of the Little Eock campaign. The Confed- erates were in like manner weakened, their Arkansas troops being sent into Tennessee. Curtis remained at Batesville until June 26th, when he resumed his march, passing down between the White and the Cache Eivers until he reached Clarendon (July 9th). Two days pre- viously his advance had been attacked by some Texan cavalry, 1500 strong, who had been repulsed with heavy loss. On reaching Clarendon, Curtis found that the gun- boats and transports had returned down the river the day before. He was therefore compelled to cross over to Helena, on the Mississippi. At the close of September he was appointed to the command of the Department of Missouri, with his head-quarters at St. Louis. The subsequent military operations in Arkansas were Minor military op- ^^^ of much momeut. Thcrc wcre affairs at erations. ^^^^^ HoUows aud Cauc Hill, which ended adversely to the Confederates. A more important en- gagement took place at Prairie Grove (December 7th), by which the farther advance of the Confederate troops into Missouri was checked. CHAPTEE XLVm. TRANSACTIONS, CIVIL AND MILITAEY, IN VIRGINIA. Western Virginia disapproved of the secession of the state and adhered to the Union. General McClellan crossed the Ohio, and conducted operations so successfully against the secession generals who were occupying Western Virginia that the Confederate government was eventually constrained to abandon the campaign in that region. General Butler, in command at Fortress Monroe, sent an expedition against the Confederate posts at Bethel. Failure of that expedition. An expedition sent toward Leesburg was enveloped by the Confederates on Ball's Bluff. The national troops were forced into the Potomac with very severe loss. The macliinations of the secession conspirators in Vir- ginia were very far from commanding ap- adheiTtotoe'"'^ proval throughout the state. Especially was this the case with the inhabitants of the northwestern counties, who had but few slaves. At a Convention held at Wheeling, in which delegates from about forty counties were present, the action of the cabal at Kichmond was repudiated, and it was determined that West Virginia should adhere to the Union. A governor and lieutenant governor were appointed. A Legislature, clainjing to be that of loyal Virginia, assembled ; the western part of the state was separated from the eastern. Eventually Congress assented to and ratified this action. The view taken of these proceedings by the inhabit- ants of Western Virginia was that their relations with the Union simply remained intact; but in the eastern portions of the state, which were under the control of the secessionists of Eichmond, they were regarded in the light of a secession from the state itself. Partly for the II.-Q 242 CAJMPAIGNS OF WESTERN VIRGINIA. [Sect. IX. sake of repressing tHs, and partly from tlie military con- sideration that Northwestern Virginia, advancing with- in a short distance of Lake Erie, almost bisects the Free States, troops were without delay dispatch- other parts of the ed into it to enforce its adhesion to the Con- state. federacy. The Eichmond authorities had seized Harper's Ferry immediately upon the passage of the ordinance of seces- sion (p. 83). Occupying it as strongly as they could, they cut off all communication between Western Virginia •and Washington along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. CAMPAIGNS OF WESTERN VIRGINIA. No movement was made by the national government until after the day (May 23d) appointed for the election to ratify or reject the ordinance of secession, it being thought expedient to do nothing that might be inter- Mccieiian ordered prctcd as au interference with the Border to cross theohio. g^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ elcctiou, howcvcr, Gen- eral George B. McClellan, who had been assigned to the Chap. XLVIIL] McCLELLAN CEOSSES THE OHIO. 243 command of the Department of the Ohio, including West- ern Virginia, received orders to cross the Ohio and ad- vance along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad to Harper's Ferry. He issued addresses to the people and to his soldiers, in the former denouncing the " infa- mous attempt of the traitorous conspiracy dignified by the name of the Southern Confederacy." He then pro- ceeded to occupy Parkersburg, the terminus of the rail- road on the Ohio River. A secession force lying at Graf- ton, the place of junction of the two branches of the road to Parkersburg and to Wheeling respective- He forces the seces- -, i»irv»Ji t ji Tj eionists from the ly, was lorced Oil the road southward to Philippi. Here its commander. Colonel Por- terfield, issued an address to the people urging them not to allow the people of other states to govern them. McClellan, however, ordering an advance to Philippi, Porterfield had to retreat, first to Beverley, and then to Huttonsville, where he was joined by re-enforcements un- der Governor Wise, who assumed command. An Indiana regiment, under Colonel Lewis Wallace, had been directed to join General Robert Affair at Romney. -p. ,, ^ . J i? xT, T^ Patterson, who was m command oi the JJe- partment of Pennsylvania, and who was preparing to at- tack Maryland Heights, which command Harper's Ferry. On approaching the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, in the direction of Cumberland (June 9th),Wallace learned that there was a force of 1200 Confederates at Romney. Mak- ing a march of eighty -four miles, of which forty-six were on foot, in twenty-four hours, he drove the Confederates from their post, and so alarmed General Joseph E. John- ston, who was holding Harper's Ferry, that he evacuated that place (June 15th), after having burned Evacuation of Har- ,■, .^ i t * i j_i t> j m t per's Ferry by the railroad bridge over the Potomac, spiked the guns he could not carry away, and blown down rocks so as to obstruct the railroad and canal. Pat- 244 EICH MOUNTAIN. [Sect. IX. terson at once crossed the river in pursuit of liim, but was speedily compelled to return, General Scott having or- dered him to send all his regulars and Burnside's regi- ment to Washington. Patterson, however, renewed his attempt under instruc- who is pursued by ^ous from Scott (Julj 2d), and at Falling Patterson. Watcrs, encountcring Johnston's advance under Stonewall Jackson, forced it back to Bunker Hill. On the 15th of July Patterson moved forward on that place, occupying it without resistance. On the 17th he suddenly turned to the left, and moved away from his en- emy toward Charlestown ; Johnston at once gave him the slip, and, joining Beauregard at Manassas, BeauJeg^daT wou the battle of Bull Kun (p. 126). Little Bull Run. . y. suspecting the consequences of his negli- gence, Patterson remained at Charlestown until the 22d. A few days after he was superseded by General Banks. While these events were taking place on the Potomac, the Confederate troops were operating on tJ'checkMccfil^ ^ the south of the Baltimore and Ohio Kail- road, in Northwestern Virginia, their inten- tion being to prevent McClellan from coming through any of the mountain gaps into the Shenandoah Valley, and joining Patterson. Porteriield had been succeeded in his command by General Garnett, who had distin- guished himself in the Mexican War. The forces of General McClellan, who still remained at Affair at Rich Graftou, had increased, by the 4th of July, Mountain. ^^ 20,000 mcu. As his antagonists could scarcely muster one third of that strength, he directed an advance upon them. Their main force under Garnett was at Laurel Hill, near Beverley, having a detachment under Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain. Colonel Rose- crans, with 1800 men, attacked this detachment, which was about 900 strong, on the 11th of July. His march Chap. XLVIIL] CARRICK'S FORD. 245 had been through mountain paths and trackless forests, in a heavy rain. Pegram was put to flight, and lost nearly half his men. McClellan now coming up with his main army, Garnett, who had been joined by some remnants of Pegram's force, and whose rear was exposed to Eose- crans, was compelled to abandon his camp and cannon, and move toward Beverley. McClellan had, however, en- tered that place before him, and drove him into a precip- itate flight northwardly. Pegram, cut off from support, Surrender of Pe- ^^^ wlthout food for two days, was obliged, gram. ^^j^]^ QQQ ^^j^^ j.^ surreudcr, and Garnett, after throwing away every thing that could impede his flight, was overtaken by General Morris, who was conducting the pursuit, at Carrick's Ford. Here the Confederates, Affair at carrick's ^^^ir ammuuitiou exhausted, were finally ^""'^ dispersed. Their General Garnett, attempt- ing in vain to rally them, was killed. The fugitives wandered over the Alleghany Mountains, and eventually joined Stonewall Jackson at Monterey. In a dispatch to the government. General McClellan says, " We have completely annihilated the McClellan's dis- . -^^7- , ~^j. , * ^^ -, patch to the gov- encmv m Western Vir^rmia. Our loss is about 13 killed, and not more than 40 wounded, while the enemy's loss is not far from 200 killed, and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least 1000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in all." Another national force was meantime advancing from Operations on the Guyaudottc up thc KauawhaVallcy. It met Kanawha. somc rcslstauce at Scarytown, but pressed forward with a view of attacking General Wise. He, however, having learned of the disaster that had befallen Garnett, retreated, burning the bridge over the Gauley Kiver to delay pursuit, and made his way successfully to Lewisburg. At this place he was joined by General 246 CARNIPEX FERRY. ^ [Sect. IX. Junction ofwise Flojd, the former Secretary of War, who, out- and Floyd. ranking him, took the command, and at once assumed the offensive. He surprised and routed an Ohio regiment at Cross Lanes, and, moving southwardly, en- deavored to gain the rear of the national general Cox; but, while attempting this, was suddenly attacked by Eose- crans, who had come down from Clarksbur^r, Lanes and carnifex at Camifcx Fcrry (August 10th). The at- tack began at three o'clock in the afternoon. Floyd, outnumbered, acted on the defensive. He had ordered Wise to come up to his support, but that officer failing him, he was compelled to abandon his position during the night, retreating to Big Sewell Mountain. Floyd now complained to the Confederate government Arrival of General of what he regarded as Wise's neglect in the R.E.Lee. affair of Carnifex Ferry, and General Eobert E. Lee, destined to future celebrity, who, upon the retreat of Gamett from Kich Mountain, had been appointed to succeed him, arriving with large re-enforcements, and out- ranking both of the disputants, took the command. Previously to this junction being effected. General Lee had attempted unsuccessfully to dislodge er?t?on?atTiieSt Rosecraus's forces, under command of Gen- Mountaiu. eral Reynolds, from Cheat Mountain. The attack miscarried through the failure of an expected com- bination. This want of success brought upon Lee the Dissatisfaction with disapprobation of the Confederate govern- him at Richmond. ^^^^^ j^ ^^^ ^^.^ -^ RichmOud that " hc might have achieved a glorious success, opening the whole Northwestern country, and enabling Floyd and Wise to drive Cox with ease out of the Kanawha Valley. Re- grets, however, are unavailing now. General Lee's plan, finished drawings of which were sent to the War Depart- ment at Richmond, was said to have been one of the best- laid plans that ever illustrated the rules of strategy, or Chap. XL VIII.] OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LEE. 247 ever went awry on account of practical failures in its ex- ecution." Having failed in this plan for dislodging his enemy from Cheat Mountain and relieving Northwestern Vir- ginia, Lee determined to go into the Kanawha region, and help Floyd and Wise. He ordered back Floyd's troops to a position that had been fortified by Wise, and named Camp Defiance, strengthening the works by a breastwork four miles long. He had now under his command nearly 20,000 men. Here he lay making preparations to attack Eosecrans, who was in front of him. Eosecrans, however, suddenly retired by night, and was not pursued; and again a clamor rose in Eichmond that " a second oppor- tunity for a decisive battle in Virginia had been lost." Some unimportant operations now took place at New Eiver, Eomney, Alleghany Summit, Hunt- The Confederates .^i ii'j n i i» abandon the cam- ersvillc ; Dut wiutcr was last approachiug, and the Confederate government, greatly dis- appointed at the course of events, determined to abandon the campaign. Lee was recalled, and sent to take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina. Wise was or- dered to report at Eichmond. Floyd was sent to the West. On the Confederate side, the failure of this campaign was attributed to the incapacity of General Lee andMcClellan. .-*•*' Lee; on the national side, the success was ascribed to the talents of General McClellan. The for- mer officer was greatly blamed by the government at Eichmond ; the latter still more greatly rewarded by that at Washington. How different the judgment passed upon these soldiers a few months subsequently, at the close of the Peninsular campaign ! In view of the scale on which it was soon found that Insignificance of Warlike operatious must be carried on for these affairs. ^-^^ ovcrthrow of the Coufcdcracy, we may 248 BUTLER AT FORTRESS MONROE. [Sect. IX. see how insignificant were tlie combats of this campaign, and how unimportant the result. Yet, coming at a time when the nation was deeply depressed, the moral effect was great. Though McClellan had not in person com- manded on any of these battle-fields, he gathered the en- tire honor. In consequence of his services at Bull Eun, Stonewall Jackson had been made a major general in the Confed- erate service and assigned command at Winchester. On the 1st of January, 1862, he marched westward, capturing Bath and Komney, but was obliged to return. The^weath- er was so severe and the roads so dreadful that General Lander, in command of the national troops, could not move more than a mile and a quarter an hour ; he him- self suffered so much from hardship and anxiety that shortly afterward he died. Nevertheless, he had succeed- ed in clearing his department of the Confederates. Fortress Monroe, commanding Chesapeake Bay and - ^ ,, James River, is the lar^iest and most power- Fortrees Monroe, ^t-t .Y it t lul military work in the republic. It was built at a cost of two and a half millions of dollars. It covers an area of nearly seventy acres. General Butler, whose successful restoration of order in General Butler in Baltimore had not met with the approval command. ^£ Gcucral Scott, had been ordered to the command of this work. Soon after his arrival (May 2 2d), he found himself, at the head of 12,000 troops, confronted by 8000 Confederates under General Magruder. He at once caused a reconnoissance to be made in the direction of Hampton, and drove the Confederates out of that town. On the return of the expedition some negroes joined it, and having informed Butler that they had been engaged in the building of fortifications, he declared them " con- Chap. XL VIII.] EXPEDITION AGAINST BETHEL. 249 Origin of tlie term "contrabands." Magruder's force at Yorktown. BETHEL AND FORTRESS MONROE. traband of war." The government subse- quently approving of his course, fugitive slaves thereafter passed in the army under the designa- tion of contrabands. The main body of the Con- federates under Magruderlay at Yorktown, but they had out- posts at Big Bethel and Little Bethel. With a view of ex- pelling them from these po- sitions and rendering secure some works which he had constructed at Hampton and Newport I^ews, Butler direct- ed (June 10th) Duryea's Zou- His outposts at ^v^s and Townsend's Third New York to Bethel. g^-^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^£ Little Bethel, while a Ver- mont battalion and Bendix's New York regiment were to attack it in front. The expedition was under the com- mand of General Pierce, and had with it only three guns. Townsend's troops moved along the road from Hampton, Bendix's along that from Newport News. They simulta- neously reached the junction of the roads before day- break, when Bendix, mistaking Townsend for the enemy, opened fire upon him, which was instantly returned by Townsend, who supposed he had fallen into an ambush. Expedition against That portlou of the cxpeditiou which had ^^^°'* already passed beyond the junction of the roads toward Little Bethel, hearing the firing, supposed that an attack was being made on its rear. Every thing was for the moment in confusion, and the Confederates in Little Bethel, taking alarm, at once fell back on Big Beth- el, where Magruder, with 1800 men, was posted. Thither, after destroying the abandoned camp, Pierce 250 DEFEAT OF THE NATIONAL TEOOPS. [Sect. IX. advanced. , The position occupied by the Confederates They fall back to was strong. It had in front a branch of the Big Bethel. Back Eivcr, crossed by a bridge, the stream above and below the place of crossing widening, so as to forni-a difficult morass. On each side of the road from the bridge was an earthwork, and on their right, facing the stream, the Confederates had a line of intrenchments. Their works were defended by twenty guns. The national troops advanced at once under, a heavy Attack by the na- ^^^y intending to rush across the stream and tionaitroops. ^^^^^ ^|^^ ^^^^^^^ j^ ^-^^^^ howcvcr, they were; checked. After a pause of two hours the attempt was renewed, the troops on the left crossed the morass, the enemy was driven out of the battery Its failure. Death ijii'i i i ii n i i ofwinthrop and ueai'cst the bridge, but the nre became too hot, and the assailants were again repulsed. In this affair the loss of the Confederates was insignifi- cant ; that of the national troops was fifty-five, of whom sixteen were killed. Among the latter, deeply regretted, was Major Theodore Winthrop. He had already distin- guished himself in literary life, and when leading his men to the attack, within thirty or forty yards of one of the batteries, was shot through the head by a North Caro- lina drummer -boy. Lieutenant Greble, who had been in command of the three guns, was killed in attempting to withdraw them. He was the first officer of the regu- lar army who fell in the Civil War. " This is an ill advised and badly arranged movement. I am afraid no good will come of it ; and as for myself, I do not think I shall come off the field alive" — so Greble had said to one of his friends before starting. In this condemnation of the expedition the nation universally Joined. The national and Confederate forces were confronting CHAP.XLvm.] BALL'S bluff: ' "251 The tragedy at ^^^ otlier Oil oppo&ite sides of the Potomac, Ball's Bluff. between Washiiigtoii and Harper's Ferry. General McGlellan, about tlie middle of October, con- sidered it desirable to ascertain the strength of his an- tagonists in the vicinity of Dranesville, and accordingly caused a reconnoissance to be made by General McCall, on the 19th of that month. He likewise desired General Stone, who was at Poolesville, to keep a look-out upon Leesburg, and suggested that a " slight demonstration" on his part might have the effect of moving the enemy. He did not, however, contemplate making an attack upon them, or the crossing of the river in force by any portion of Stone's command. Hereupon. Colonel Devins was ordered by Stone to Devins's reconnois- "^ring two flat-boats froiu the Chesapeake sauce. ^^^ Ohio Caual into the river opposite Har- rison's Island, and ferry some troops over to it. This done, Devins sent a detachment to the Virginia shore to make an exploration toward Leesburg, which had been reported to be evacuated. They discovered, as they sup- posed, a small camp about a mile from the town. Stone thereupon ordered Devins to land on Ball's Bluff, oppo- site the island. It is an eminence from 50 to 150 feet high. He was to surprise the discovered camp, destroy it, examine the country, and return, unless he should find a good place on which to establish himself, in which case An expedition sets rc-enforcemeuts would be sent him. He set °''*' out about midnight; the clayey bluff was very wet and slippery ; he reached the top of it by day- light (October 22d). Advancing within a mile of Lees- burg, he could find no enemy ; the reported camp proved to be an illusion due to openings among the trees. He therefore halted and sent to Stone for further orders. At seven o'clock, perceiving that the enemy's cavalry were gathering around him, he fell back toward the bluff, and 252 BALL'S BLLTFF. [Sect. IX. stood in an open field surrounded by woods. Here lie itis enveloped by ^ecelved orders to remain. He liad about the Confederates. Q^Q mejij aud a re-euforcement was prom- ised. About noon, the Confederates, having occupied the woods on three sides of him, began to attack him, com- pelling him to fall back toward the edge of the bluff. At length re-enforcements under Colonel Baker arrived. They had orders either to support Devins or to with- draw, as Baker, who outranked Devins, might judge best. But at once it was plain that there was no option. Dev- ins was in the act of being assaulted, and there was noth- ing to do but to support him. Baker accordingly took that course. The entire national force was now about 1900 men. They were in an open field; their assailants in the surrounding woods ; the bluff down which they must retreat was steep and slippery, and only two wretched scows were there to carry them across to Harrison's Island. coioneiBakeris Coloncl Bakcr, whilc bravcly holding his kuied. ground at the head of his troops, was killed. The fire was becoming momentarily more and more severe, and the enemy receiving re-enforcements. The national troops were forced over the edge of the bluff, The national troops t ,i r^ r- i i i.±* • /y forced over the aud the Confederates siettms: possession of bluff. . 1 ,1 , T it, a massacre ensued among the struggling men below. Of the boats, one had disappeared ; the oth- er was quickly swamped. Some tried to reach the isl- and by swimming, some by floating on logs; they were de- An^assacreoftheru H^erately shot by their antagonists above. ensues. Coloucl Coggswcll, who had succeeded to the command, tried to force his way to Edwards's Ferry, but was driven back by a Mississippi regiment. The loss was in killed, either by shooting or drowning, 300 ; in wounded and prisoners, more than 700. Stone had thrown a small force across the river at Ed- wards's Ferry. They advanced about three miles toward Chap.XLVIII.] BALL'S bluff. 253 Leesburg and returned. He then threw over General Gorman's entire brigade. Had this been done earlier, the movements of the Confederates would have been arrested, and the tragedy at Ball's Bluff would not have occurred. SECTION X. CAMPAIGNS FOR OPENING THE MISSISSIPPI, AND PIER- CING THE GREAT EAST AND WEST LINE OF THE CONFEDERACY. CHAPTEE XLIX. FORCING OF THE FIRST CONFEDERATE LINE. CAPTURE OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON, AND OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI TO MEMPHIS. The President issued a general War Order, directing all the armies to advance on the 22d of February, 1862. The Tennessee Rivei' was selected by General Halleck as the correct line of opera- tion for the armies of the central region. Under his orders, Fort Henry was. captured by Foote, and Fort Donelson by Grant. The Confederate line being thus broken at its centre, Nashville was evacuated on its right, and Columbus on its left. Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow were sur- rendered, and the Mississippi opened to Memphis, the Confederate fleet at that place being destroyed. The battle of Bull Eun manifested to the Nortliern Effect of the battle people tko real nature of the struggle in of Bull Run., ^Hch they were engaged — that they must accept a wasting war, or consent to the destruction of rejD- resentative government in the land. They did not delay in making their choice. It was evident that more vigor must be infused into their move- ments. Lieutenant General Scott, who was at the head of the army, and who thus far had directed all the mili- tary operations, was, in consideration of his age and great bodily infirmities, relieved (July loth) from the more act- ive portion of his duties. A new military department, CSAP.XLIX.J McCLELLAN COMMA]J^DEIl-IN-CHIEF. 255 to be known as that of Washington and McClellan in com mand at Washing- jN ortheastem Virginia, was lormed, and (ren- eral McClellan was placed in command of it. As has been already related in detail (Chapter XLIV.), ArmyofthePoto- Grcneral McClellan at once commenced the mac organized. organization of the great army authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and ap- propriate military conduct were, for the most part, ac- cepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the Army of the Potomac had reached (p. 195), on Oc- tober 27th, a strength of nearly one hundred and seventy thousand men (168,318). It was the general's opinion that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a let- tires from com- ter to the Secretary of War requesting: to be mand. ,*' , \ ^ ^ placed on the retired list. With every cir- cumstance that could indicate an appreciation of the bril- liant services which the aged chief had rendered the re- public, his desire was granted. An order was simultane- ously issued appointing General McClellan commander- in-chief under the President. This change in his position at once produced a change chan-e in General ^^ Gcucral McClellau's vicws. Hithcrto he Mccieiian's views. -^^^ undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West. He had desired the West- ern armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to in- stitute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nash- ville contemporaneously with Eichmond. This, in his military administration, implied another long delay to 256 ' STANTON SECRETARY OF WAR. [Sect. X. bring up the organization of the armies of the West to an equality with that of the Army of the Potomac. In preparation for this, the Department of the West was reorganized. On the day foUowins: Comniand of the , oiiir r^i n i • -r^ departmmits re- that 01 McClellan s promotion, i^remont was removed from his command (p. 234). His department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mex- ico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby ; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter; (3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Kosecrans that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and still the Army Immobility 6f the of the Potomac had not moved. The weath- Potomac army. ^^ ^^^ magnificeut, the roads excellent. One excuse after another was alleged. The Confederate army in front was magnified to thrice its actual strength. Ex- penses were accumulating frightfully. Winter at last came, and nothing had been done. So wore away day after day and month after month. The clicking telegraph in the War Ojffice eatSSSnwith' had nothinQT to say but "all quiet on the McClellan. _^ ° ^ ^ Potomac." Not alone among ttie people, who had only imperfect information, but even among officials in prominent positions, the inquiry became more and more urgent, " When will McClellan move ? What is he going to do ?" " Sir," said an eminent statesman, to whom Lincoln addressed that now painful interrogatory, " I declare to you my firm belief that to this day he has no plan." It seemed as if the army he had organized was a coat of mail he could not carry. The sword he had caused to be forged was too heavy for him to lift. Mr. Stanton had succeeded Mr. Cameron as Secretary Stanton made sec- of War (Jauuary 1 3th, 1862). He had been retaryofwar. attomcy general in the latter part of Bu- chanan's administration, and had acted with conspicuous Chap. XLIX.] THE GENERAL WAR ORDER. 257 energy in preserving Washington from seizure by the conspirators (p. 47). To him Lincoln spontaneously turned, satisfied that by him the great duties of the War Department would be energetically and faithfully dis- charged. Others, who had aspired to the position thus unexpectedly imposed upon Stanton, declared that he was unsuited to the office; that he was a man of only one idea. " It is true," WTote a very observant foreigner at that time residing in Washington, " he is a man of one idea, but his enemies abstain from saying that his one idea is the grandeur and immortality of the Republic." At Stanton's suggestion, the President, whose patience He infnses energv ^as Completely wom out by McClellan's in- in the department, activity, Issucd au ordcr that on the 2 2d day of February a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent states should take place ; that " especially the army at or about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Ken- ^ tucky, the army and flotilla near Cairo, and genera^^waror-^ thc uaval force lu the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective com- manders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the generals in chief, with all other commanders and subor- dinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execu- tion of this order." A special war order was issued January 31st, " that all Special order as to ^hc disposablc forcc of the Army of the Po- the Potomac Army. ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ providlng safcly for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im- II.— R 258 CONFEDERATE LINE OF DEFENSE. [Sect. X. mediate object of seizing upon tlie railroad soutliwest- ward of wliat is known as Manassas Junction ; all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 2 2d day of Febru- ary next." This order was, however, subsequently modi- fied. These orders carried upon their face the distrust which the administration had conceived of General McClellan, a distrust fast spreading all over the country. It was felt not alone in the council chamber of the cabinet, but among all grades of society. With the President's order of January 27th the war may be said to have begun systematically. The rivers of Kentucky and Tennessee show by their Commencement of course that thoso statcs prcscut a topograph- "'®^*''* ical incline to the northwest, the Cumber- land Mountains being its culminating ridge. Down the gentle slope thus afforded, the Tennessee and its affluent the Duck, the Cumberland, the Green, the Kentucky, the Big Sandy, empty into the Ohio. Beyond the ridge the rivers flow southward into the Gulf of Mexico. Political as well as military considerations, already de- Thefirstiineofcon- scrlbcd (p. 219), had led the Confederate federate defense, (jg^^ers to cstablish upou this iucliue their first line of defense. Commencing at Columbus, a little below the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Kivers at Cairo, it crossed the Tennessee and Cumberland, having on the '.former Fort Henry, on the latter Fort Donelson. Eastward of the latter post there was an intrenched camp at Bowling Green. The Confederate left, therefore, rest- ed on the Mississippi, their right on the intrenched camp at Bowling Green, which was at the junction of the Mem- phis and Ohio with the Louisville and N"ashville Kailroad. A railroad connection between the ends of the line gave Chap. XLIX.] HALLECK'S WAR-PLAN. 259 facilities for military movements. The intrenched camp covered the city of Nashville. In November, 1861, General Halleck was directed to General Haiieck in ^^^^ command of the Department of Mis- command. g^^^'^ j^ includcd Mlssourl, lowa, Minne- sota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and Kentucky west of the Cumberland Mountains. He divided it into districts, assigning to General U. S. Grant the District of Cairo, which also included Paducah, in Kentucky. Cairo, at the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi, is a place of great strategic importance. I THE CAMPAIGN OP THE TENNESSEE. Halleck saw at once that the military operations which His views on the l^^d bccu cariicd on in Missouri by Gener- correct war-plan. ^^^ j^^^^^ ^^^^.^^ ^^^ FrCmOUt (Chapter XL VII.) were in reality without significance, so far as 260 OPERATIONS ON THE TENNESSEE. [Sect.X. the overthrow of the Confederacy was concerned, and that the proper movement was the forcing of the Confed- erate line just described as reaching from the Mississippi to Bowling Green. He therefore, on the removal of Fre- He withdraws from Hiont, causcd the army in Missouri to retire to RoUa (p. 235), his course in this respect meeting with much condemnation among those who only looked at the consequences it brought on the inhabitants of that country, and did not comprehend the character of the movement about to be put into execution. One evening late in December (1861), Generals Hal- leck, Sherman, and CuUum were conversing sionastothetrue to^cther at thc Plautcrs' Hotel, in St. Louis, Ime of operation. ^ , , ' ^ on the proper Ime of invasion. They saw^ clearly that the Confederates meant to stand on the de- fensive, and Halleck asked, " Where is their line ?" Sher- man replied, " Why, from Bowling Green to Columbus." "Well, then, where is the true point of attack?" "Nat- urally the centre." "Then let us see what is the direc- tion in which it should be made." A map lay on the table, and, with a blue pencil, Hal- leck drew a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, past Donelson and Henry, and another perpendicular to its centre, which happened to coincide nearly with the Ten- nessee River. " There," said he, " that is the true line of attack." This forcing of the Confederate line would bring the important states Kentucky and Tennessee Effect of operations -, ,. -, . •, •,* tiji* on the line of the uudcr uatioual control ; it would take m re- Tgdugssgg verse the strong works on the Mississippi, which could not be reduced by a mere naval attack ; it would open that great river ; it would permit the pas- sage of a national army into the recesses of the Cotton States, and expose Georgia, South Carolina, North Caro- lina, and even Virginia, to attack on an unj^rotected flank. chap.xlix.] the opposing armies. 261 In determining the mode in whicli this movement Conditions of that should be camed into execution, it was evi- movement. ^^^^ ^-^^^ ^j^^ essential point was the seiz- ure of the Tennessee and Cumberland Eivers. This im- plied the reduction of the two forts Henry and Donelson, on which the Confederates were relying for the protection of those rivers. The Confederate line of defense had been intrusted to The Confederate Greueral Albert Sydney Johnston. He was post at Columbus. ^^ Bowliug Grceu, confronting General Buell. The fortified post at Columbus, on which the left flank of the Confederates rested, was considered by them to be the Gibraltar of America. They believed that it would close the Mississippi until their independence w^as ac- knowledged. It was in charge of General Polk (p. 226). The . strength of the entire force holding the line was about 60,000 men. To execute the proposed operation two national armies were available. One lay at Cairo, under The national armies ^-^ i r^ i rm •,! 'i t at Cairo and Louis- {xeueYSii Graut. Incrc was with it a naval ville. , . force, having some iron-clad gun-boats un- der Commodore Foote. The second army was at Louis- ville. It was under command of General Buell, and was 40,000 strong. It had been intended originally that Grant's force should operate directly on the Mississippi River, forcing it open, and that Buell's army should strike at the in- trenched camp at Bowling Green. If the force there were disposed of, Nashville, in its rear, must necessarily be abandoned. In Halleck's view, the operation on the line of the Tennessee River would accomplish all these results. If the army and the gun-boats could force their way up that stream, Columbus and Bowling Green, no matter how strong they might be, must both at once fall, and Nash- ville must share their fate. 262 OPEEATIONS AGAINST FORT HENRY. [Sect. X. Fort Henry, on tlie east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the Operations com- r^ t -i ^ ii* t .i ■^ menced against (Jumberland, were bastioned earthworks. Fort Henry. ' t n t twelve miles apart, connected by a road. Immediately after the issue of the President's war order (January 27th, 1862) commanding a general movement, operations were undertaken against Fort Henry. Of the FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. fleet of gun-boats employed, four were iron-clad and three wooden. They were under Commodore Foote. The land force was under General Grant. The garrison of the fort, commanded by General Tilghman, was 2734 strong; the armament was seventeen guns. Halleck gave the necessary orders for the expedition Condition of that ^^ ^^^ 30th of Jauuary, and Grant left Cairo ^"^^- with 17,000 men. The Confederates had works on both sides of the river. Fort Henry being on the east bank and Fort Heiman on the west, the latter commanding the former. The country was all under water, the river overflowing, the rain still falling in tor- rents. Though Tilghman was receiving re-enforcements and hastening the completion of his works, he found that he must withdraw from Fort Heiman and defend Fort Henry alone. Chap. XLIX.] CAPTURE OE FORT HENRY. 263 It was understood between Foote and Grant that the Bombardment of ^^^^^ ^as to reduce the fort, the latter to the fort. Q^^ ^^ ^]^Q retreat of the garrison. The at- tack was to begin at twelve o'clock (February 6th). Foote thought he could reduce the work in an hour, and Grant, whose forces were three miles below, allowed him- self two hours to accomplish his march. The gun-boats commenced their fire at a thousand yards, approaching gradually within six hundred. Tilghman returned the fire at first very vigorously, but Intentions of Gen- ^ serfcs of accldeuts lu succcsslou befell him erai Tilghman. _^ ^.'^^^ 24-pounder burst, killing and wounding a number of his men ; a premature discharge of a 42-pounder killed three of its gunners. From the beginning he had foreseen that he could not hold the place. In his report he says, " My object was to save the main body by delaying matters as long as possible. I therefore ordered Colonel Ileiman to join his command and keep up the retreat in good order, while I would fight the guns as long as one was left, and sacrifice my- self to save the main body of my troops." He had given orders for the garrison to retire to Fort Donelson before the firing began. He worked one of the guns himself At the end of little more than an hour, he, with his staif and sixty men, surrendered unconditionally to Foote. His loss in killed and wounded was twenty-one. As the land forces under Grant had been delayed by He withdraws the *^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ roads lougcr than had been garrison, anticipated, the Confederate garrison under Heiman made their escape safely. On the national side, the chief casualty occurred on board the iron-clad Essex, which received a shot in her boiler, in consequence of which twenty-nine ofiicers and men were scalded. The conduct of General Tilghman in this affair stands in very striking contrast with that of Floyd and Pillow 264 • ^ORT DONELSON. [Sect. X. and then surrenders the work. Position of Donel- son. at Donelson. For the sake of giving time for his garrison to make good its escape, lie continued his hopeless resistance, and surrendered him- self prisoner along with his artillerists. Fort Henry thus secured, General Halleck next turned his attention to Fort Donelson. Re-enforce- tacking Fort Donei- mcuts wcre therefore rapidly brousrht from Buell's army, and also from St. Louis, Cairo, Cincinnati, and Kansas. The Tennessee and Cumberland, as they approach the Ohio, run northward and nearly parallel to each other. Fort Donelson was about forty miles above the mouth of the Cumberland, and on its west bank. It was a large field-work of a hundred acres, near the town of Dover, on a bluff rising by a gentle slope from the river, at the point where the stream turns from its westerly course. The height of the bluff is about 100 feet. The strength of the work was directed toward the river, which it effectually commanded ; on the land side it was comparatively weak. The entire artillery, in- cluding light batteries, was 65 pieces. The strength oflhe evcutual Strength of the garrison was 2 1 ,000. The surrounding country was rugged, hilly, and heavily wooded. Round the works timber had been felled, and small, trees half chopped off formed an aba- tis. Two creeks, flooded by the rains, formed defenses on the right and left. As soon as it became clear that the fort was about to be attacked from the land side, the Confederate com- manders exerted themselves to strengthen it. A fortified line two miles and a half in length, inclosing the town of Dover, was drawn along the commanding high grounds. Re-enforcements were sent from Bowling Green by the railroad, and the work pushed on day and night. The gaiTison of Fort Henry came in on the 7th, the command Chap.xlix.] operations against fort DONELSON. 265 of Pillow arrived on the lOth, that of Buckner on the 11th, that of Floyd on the 13th. Floyd, as the senior officer, was in command. Grant moved from Fort Henry upon Donelsoh, with „ - • about 15,000 men, on Wednesday, the 12th. Grant prepares to ^ ' •^ ' attack it. jjg ]^a(j 'h^^n obliged to submit to this de- lay to give time for preparing the gun -boats, though every hour of it was strengthening the enemy. His fore- most brigade went by the telegraph road ; the others by the Dover Eoad. He was before the fort in the after- noon of that day, and spent the remaining daylight in bringing his troops into position. Batteries were posted and the movement completed in the night. It was his intention, if the gun-boats should arrive, to make an at- tack next morning. His force consisted of the division of McClernand, containing the four brigades of Oglesby, W. H. L. Wallace, McArthur, Morrison ; the division of C. F. Smith, containing the three brigades of Cook, Lau- man, and M. L. Smith. The division of Lewis Wallace did not arrive until the 14th. Smith's division was to be on the left, Lewis Wallace's at the centre, McClernand's on the right. He formed his first line opposite the ene- my's centre, his left resting on Hickman Creek, his right reaching not quite round to Dover. The advance was very difficult on account of a growth of dwarf oaks. Though the gun-boats had not arrived, a cannonade McClernand's pre- ^^^^ opcued. McClcmand made an attack mature assault. ^^ ^ battcTy Commanding the ridge road on which Grant moved. He met with a repulse in his attempt to carry it. There was a bitter storm of hail and snow after dark, yet the troops bivouacked in line of battle. They had no tents and no fires ; many of them were without blankets. The cries of the wounded call- ing for water were heard all that night. At midnight six gun-boats and fourteen transports had 250 DEFEAT OF THE GUN-BOATS. [Sect. X. Arrival of the gun- amved, the latter bringing Lewis Wallace's •^''**^' division, and giving Grant a superiority of force. Up to this time he had not been as strong as the Confederates. It took longer than had been anticipated to get these troops into position, and the consequence was that the attack on Friday had to be mainly carried on by the boats. Of the gun-boats four were iron-clad, the remaining two wooden. The former opened their fire and advanced un- til they were within three hundred yards of the Confed- erate batteries, which, up to this time silent, were now vigorously worked. Their plunging fire, for they were elevated about thirty feet, soon told heavily on the boats. For an hour and a half the contest was maintained, when the steering apparatus of two was disabled, and they drifted down the stream. The others were compelled to withdraw. They had a loss of 54 killed They are defeated. "^ ^^ and wounded; among the latter was Com- modore Foote. In the Confederate batteries no one was killed, and the works were uninjured. Thus the attack from the river, as well as McClernand's partial attempt from the land side, had failed, and appar- ently it had become necessary for the national command- ers to have re-enforcements. But Floyd had taken alarm. He had seen that heavy Floyd becomes rc - cnforccments, Lewis Wallace's division, alarmed. ^^^ ^|^^^ ^^^ arrlvcd ; he considered that, notwithstanding his success in beating off the gun-boats, there was no place within his intrenchments that could not be reached by the enemies' artillery fire from their boats or their batteries, and that there was nothing to prevent them from passing a column above him on the river, and thus cutting off his only remaining communica- iie summons a tlou — that by watcr— aud preventing the council. possibility of egress. He therefore summon- Chap. XLIX.] SORTIE OF THE GARRISON. 267 ed a council that evening, at wliicli it was determined to abandon the fort, force a way past Grant's right, and es- cape to Nashville. At that time, owing to the high water of the river, there was but one practicable road — Wynn's Ferry Eoad. Between it and the river lay the division of McClernand, the national right wing. The Confederate operation. It determines to therefore, was to throw their left, Pillow's make a sortie. ^ivisiou, agalust tho uatloual right flank, McClernand' s, and, with Buckner's division drawn from their right, and leaving there only a weak force, to attack the right of the national centre, which was upon the Wynn's Ferry Eoad. If Pillow could force back the na- tional right upon the centre, and Buckner take the disor- dered mass in flank, it was expected that the whole would be rolled back on the left — McClernand upon Wallace, and both upon Smith — and that the Wynn's Ferry Eoad would be opened. f On Wednesday night the air had been warm and ge- nial ; the sky was cloudless, the moon at full. On the night of Thursday the weather changed ; there was a storm of sleet and snow. On Friday night it was in- tensely cold ; the thermometer had fallen to 10° Fahr- enheit. Nevertheless, the Confederates got ready to ex- ecute their desperate undertaking on Saturday morning at five o'clock, an hour before day. At first fortune favored the boldly conceived and brave- it is at first sue- ty exccutcd attciupt. The Confederates' left cessfui. forced from their position the two national right brigades. Meantime Buckner, who had brought his troops over from the Confederate right, assaulted the third right national brigade, at first ineffectually, but at length, stimulated by Pillow's results, successfully. Nev- The national right Grthclcss, McClcmand's troops did not re- wmg forced back. ^j.q^j. ^ntil their ammunition was exhausted. 268 SUCCESS OF THE SORTIE. [Sect. X. At nine o'clock Grant's riglit wing Lad been completely pressed from its ground and the Wynn's Ferry Road opened. The Confederates might now have escaped. All this occurred during the absence of Grant. He had gone on board a gun-boat at 2 A.M. to consult with Commodore Foote, who had been wounded, and had asked for this consultation. Already Lewis Wallace, who was holding Grant's centre, had sent one of his brigades to the assistance of the defeated right wing, but with no other result than to participate in their disaster. With his remaining brigade, however, he presented a firm front at right angles to his former one, and behind this the de- feated troops of the right wing rallied and reformed. Against this the Confederates, flushed with success, but not altogether without confusion, advanced. They were received with such a fire that they instantly broke, and, on making a second attempt, broke again. This time they could not be rallied. Grant had now come on the field. It was about nine ^ . . ,^ , o'clock. Thousrh the battle had lulled, ev- Decision of Grant ^ ^ , ^ ery thing was in confusion. The troops were scattered in knots. At a glance he appreciated the disaster and took his resolve. " On riding upon the field, I saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. I took the opportunity, and order- ed an advance of the whole line." Smith, with the left wing, was to storm the enemy's works in his front, Wal- lace to recover the ground that had been lost on the right. A request was sent to the gun-boats to make a vigorous demonstration. The removal of Buckner from Smith's front for the early attack in the morning had greatly weakened the right of the Confederate line. Buckner, therefore, was now ordered back. But it was too late. The storming column, with Smith at its head, was steadily and irresist- Chap. XLIX.] THE CONFEDERATES FORCED BACK. 2^C^ Successful assault iblj advancing. It forced its way np the of Smith. g^^^p l^-|l^ ^g Buckner's troops came on, they encountered such a fire as hurled them out of the way. The abatis was torn aside, the key-point of the fort was seized ; the Confederates fled into the work. Smith had gained possession of the high ground from which the entire right of the defenses of Donelson might be enfi- laded. Buckner's withdrawal from the ground that had been conquered in the morning now weakened forced'backhfto^ aud demoralized the Confederate left. At this instant Wallace made his attack on that front. It was impossible to resist him. The Confeder- ates here also recoiled to their own works. The oppor- tunity they had won at one moment was lost. Not only was the line of investment renewed, but the fort had be- come imtenable: had daylight lasted half an hour longer it would have been taken. The losses on each side amount- ed to about two thousand killed and wounded. Darkness fell upon Donelson. The cold was more than twenty degrees below the freezing point. The woods were covered with a sleety incrustation of ice ; they sway- ed and crackled in the night air. Grant fell asleep in a negro hut. Smith on the hard -frozen ground. On the battle-field there lay four thousand Americans, many of them dead, many freezing to death. Wallace, whose troops were nearest the scene of agony, employed his men until " far in the morning in ministering to our own wounded, but we did not forget those of the enemy." A piteous wail for water was heard in all directions, for the cannon were now silent. It smote on the ears of Floyd. The arms that he had scattered all over the South had been used! He called a council of war at Pillow's head-quarters. It was concluded that any attempt to renew the sortie 270- ESCAPE OF FLOYD AND PILLOW. [Sect. X. They hold a night would be absolutelj disastrous. Buckner council. declared that lie could not liold the position for half an hour after daylight. In his opinion there was no escape from a surrender. " There is nothing for us but to capitulate " exclaimed Floyd determines to Floyd ; " yct I cau uot surreudcr— I can not escape. surrcudcr. You know the position in which I stand." He asked advice of his subordinates, some of whom did not hesitate to express very plainly disappro- bation of his intention of escaping from the fort. -Buck- ner, thinking it dishonorable not to share the fate of the men, said, "You must judge for yourself" "General," said Floyd to him, "if we put you in command, will you let me take away my brigade V Floyd now turned the command over to Pillow, who •He carries off the tumcd it ovcr to Buckucr. Pillow then Virginia troops. ^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^iver iu a SCOW. Floyd escaped with his Virginia brigade. By the light of lanterns they went on board a steam-boat at the wharf, many of the men half tipsily staggering under their knapsacks, all shivering with the cold. A crowd was cursing and hissing at the fugitives. But in this her hour of dire humiliation Virginia was not without soldiers who vindicated her honor. There were those who disdained to follow such a shameful example, who chose to remain and share the fate of Buckner and his men. At daylight Grant was ready to make the assault. He Grant ready for the ^^^ ^OW 27,000 UieU, but OUly eight light assault. batteries of artillery. A white flag was seen on Donelson, and a note was received from Buckner, to which Grant at once replied : " Sir, — Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appoint- ment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just re- ceived. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate sur- render can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works. I am, sir, very respectfullv, your obedient servant, "U.S.Grant." Chap. XLIX.] THE SURRENDER OF DONELSON. 271 To this Buckner replied : " SiE, — The distribution of the forces under my command, inci- Surrender of the ^^^^ t^ an unexpected change of commanders, and ^^^^' the overwhelming force under your command, com- pel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, "S.B.BUCKNEK." Hereupon Grant rode over to Buckner's head-quarters, Generous terms ^^^^ spontaueouslj couseuted that the offi- giveu by Grant. ^^^^ should keep their side-arms, and both officers and men their personal baggage. He desired to do nothing that might have the appearance of inflicting humiliation. Nearly 15,000 prisoners, 17,600 small-arms, and 65 guns The spoils of the wcre takcu. That such was the number of victory. prisoners was shown by the fact that rations were issued at Cairo to 14,623. Grant's losses were 2041, of whom 425 were killed. In his congratulatory order to his troops, Grant tells them that " for four successive ni^rhts, with- Grant's cougratula- iiiii* i ., tory order to his out sncltcr durinp; the most inclement weath- troops. c5 er known in this latitude, they had faced an enemy in large force, and in a position chosen by him- self, and had. compelled him to surrender without con- ditions, the victory achieved being not only great in the effect it must have in breaking down the rebellion, but also in this, that it had secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this con- tinent." The inauguration of Davis as permanent President of the Confederate States occurred simultane- ^^^^'H^^'^^y^'"'' ously with- the reception of the news of the and riUow. n -^t n-t-\ -t ' ■ -r fall of Donelson. In a special message which he was constrained to send to the Confederate ConQ:ress, 27-2 FALL OF NASHVILLE. [Sect. X. Davis. characterizes the report lie had received as incom- plete and unsatisfactory. "It is not stated that re-en- forcements were at any time asked for ; nor is it demon- strated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is it known by what means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender ; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior generals abandoned responsibility by transferring the command to a junior officer." The delinquent generals were required to give information on the point " why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army, and also what were the precise means by which each had effected his escape from the fort, and what dangers were encountered in the retreat, and upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of General Floyd's brigade." Notwithstanding the great obligations the Confederate They are relieved govemmeut was uudcr to Floyd, he and from command, pi^o^ ^q^q rclicved of their commands. The investment of Donelson was followed by the im- mediate evacuation of Bowling Green ; its render'of dobIk''' fall by thc abandonment of Nashville, which eon. *' , ' was at once occupied by Buell. Nashville was so central and so important to the South The fall of Nash- that at oue time it was a competitor with Richmond . for . the honor of becoming the metropolis of the Confederacy. A dispatch had been re- ceived on Saturday night by Johnston from Pillow, con- gratulating him on a great Confederate victory won by the garrison of Fort Donelson. The city was in a deliri- um of delight. But on Sunday morning, while the peo- ple were at church engaged in returning thanks, news came that the fort had fallen. The surrender of Nash- Chap. XLIX.] MILL SPKING. 273 ville was inevitable. A scene of hideous confusion at once ensued. The congregations rushed into the streets. Every conveyance at hand was seized for the purpose of escaping from the place. Trunks and valuables were thrown from upper windows ; women in mortal, but very needless terror, fled away, and a mob hastened to plunder the abandoned Confederate stores. But the disaster did not end here. The Confederate and evacuation of General Polk had at once to evacuate Co- coiumbus. lumbus and fall back to Island No. 10. Co- lumbus — the so styled Gibraltar of the West — was occu- pied by national troops. , It was not only on the west, but also on the east of Nashville that misfortunes befell the Con- federate cause. General Zollicoffer, with a force of about 5000 men, was encamped on the south side of the Cumberland, at Mill Spring, in Wayne County. In front of him lay General Schoepf, inactive, with a force of about 8000, at Somerset. General Thomas had been ordered to take command of this force (January I7th, 1862), and had scarcely done so, when four regiments that he had near Somerset were attacked by General Crit- tenden, who had superseded Zollicoffer. The attack M^as made at night, and intended to be a surprise. In this, however, it proved a failure, Thomas having strongly picketed the roads between himself and the enemy. The pickets having been driven in, the Confederates made a desperate charge, and the battle was continued for two hours ; a bayonet charge by an Ohio regiment decided it, the Confederates escaping to an intrenched camp they had near the river, Zollicoffer being killed. The loss on the Confederate side was 300 killed and wounded, and 50 prisoners ;' on the national, 39 killed, and 207 wound- ed. Pursued to their camp, the Confederates were shelled IL— S 2^4: NEW MADRID. [Sect. X. until nigM. Sclioepf s brigade coming up, it was hoped that their entire force would have been captured. Dur- ing the darkness, however, it escaped, leaving ten guns, 1200 horses and mules, and a large quantity of clothing. At the time of the . evacuation of Columbus, prepara- tions had been made to capture it by an attack from the river, under Commodore Foote and General W. T. Sher- man. On this expedition appearing before the works, it was ascertained that they had been abandoned, and that in very great haste. The cannon had been spiked and pushed over the bluff into the river. The garrison had retreated to New Madrid and Island No. 10. The Mississippi, approaching that island, leaves its southerly course, and, making a bend to the northwest, reaches New Madrid, which is on the Missouri bank. Following the course of the river. New Madrid is there- fore below the island. Strong works had been established at New Madrid. The position at It.was also defended by six gun-boats, the New Madrid. cauuou of wMch commanded the adjacent country ; for the river at the time was very high. Halleck dispatched General Pope from St. Louis to make an attack on New Madrid. The troops were land- ed on the Missouri bank from transports on February 24th, and found great difficulty in approaching the town March of General ^^ accouut of thc swampy statc of thc COUU- pope to that place. ^^^^ rpj^^ ^^^^ dcckrcd that they "waded in mud, slept in mud, ate in mud, and were as completely surrounded by mud as St. Helena is by the ocean." They reached their destination, however, on the 3d of March. Finding the place stronger than he expected. Pope was obliged to send to Cairo for siege guns. To prevent the Confederates being re-enforced from below, he established a sunken battery at Point Pleasant. The siege gims were Chap. XLIX.] EVACUATION OF NEW MADRID. 275 THE MISSISSIPPI FROM CAIRO TO MEMPHIS. placed in position before the town immediately on their arrival. Three of the Confederate gun-boats were speed- ily disabled, and it was soon apparent that the place must The Confederates ^^ evacuated. The garrison fled at mid- . eyacuateit. ^^^^^ ^^ Msnid No. 10, Icaviug their supper untouched and candles burning in their tents. They aban- doned thirty-three cannon, several thousand stand of small- arms, hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges, and tents for an army of 10,000 men. 276 CANAL OF ISLAND No. 10. [Sect. X. ' On the 15tli of March, Commodore Foote, who had brought down from Cairo seven armored gun-boats, one not armored, and ten mortar-boats capable of throwing 13-inch shell, appeared before Island No. 10, and at once ' Bombardment of commcuccd its sicgc. Though the bombard- ment was vigorously maintained and con- tinued for nearly three weeks, ifc proved to be very inef- fective. Beauregard reported that the enemy's guns had thrown into the works three thousand shells and burned fifty tons of gunpowder without doing any damage to the batteries, and only killing one of the men. On the other hand. Commodore Poote reported to his government that "Island No. 10 is harder to conquer than Columbus, its shores being lined with forts, each fort commanding the one above it." Pope, who was on the Missouri side of the river, could give but little assistance unless he should cross over to the Tennessee side and come upon the rear of the island. It was impossible for him to do this unless some of the gun- boats could be brought down to New Madrid, as the op- posite shore was crowned with batteries. To accomplish this, General Schuyler Hamilton proposed Cutting of a canal. _ ' t i i i i , ta t t that a canal should be cut across Donald- son's Point, between Island No. 8 and New Madrid. This work was actually accomplished in nineteen days. The canal was twelve miles long ; for a part of the distance, however, it passed through two ponds. The width was about fifty feet. To make the cut, it was necessary to re- move about a thousand trees varying from six inches to three feet in diameter. They had to. be sawn off by liand in many places four feet under water. When the rivei^ was admitted into the canal it flowed through with great force. By the aid of this canal, transports could be passed be- low the island, and Pope's troops taken across the Missis- Flight of the Con^ federates. Ghap.XLIX.] POPE'S passage of the MISSISSIPPI. 277 Thegun-hoatsrun sippi to the Teniiessee side. To cover the the batteries. passage wheii it should be made, the gun- boat Carondelet ran down the river, past the island, dur- ing a thunder-storm on the night of the 4th of April : she was protected on her exposed side by a barge laden with hay. Though the soot in her chimney caught fire as she approached the batteries, and, revealing her, brought on her a hail of cannon-shot, she escaped safely. On the 6th, another gun -boat in like manner ran past. The bombardment was now vigorously kept up; the trans- ports were brought out of their concealment through the canal ; the Carondelet and her consort silenced the bat- teries at the proposed place of landing, and in a furious rain - storm Pope's troops accomplished the brilliant op- eration of a forced passage across the Mississippi. The defenders of the batteries fled in confusion. They were pursued so vigorously by Pope that during the following night they were driven back on the swamps, and compelled to surrender before day- light* (April 8th). The garrison in the island, learning what had taken place, sent a flag of truce to Commodore surrender of the ^^^^^^ offcriug to surrcudcr. Nearly seven island. thousand prisoners (6700), including three generals, 273 field and company officers, were taken. The spoils were a floating battery, 100 heavy siege-guns, 24 pieces of field artillery, an immense quantity of ammuni^ tion and supplies, several thousand stand of small-armsj and a great number of tents, horses, and wagons. The surrender was conducted with so much confusion that many important papers and documents were left; among others, drawings of the works of Fort Pillow. On the national side not a single life was lost. . The fall of the island was like a thunderbolt in Eich- ■'Moral effectonthe ^^^^' " ^6 have saved uouc of our cau- confederacy. j^^^ qj. muuitions ; wc havc lost our boats ; 278 SUKRENDER OF ISLAND No. 10. [Sect. X. our sick tave been abandoned ; there can be no excuse for the wretched mismanagement and infamous scenes that attended the evacuation ; our transports have been scattered ; the floating battery, formerly the Pelican dock at New Orleans, with sixteen heavy guns, has been sent adrift. In one or the hospital boats were a hundred poor wretches, half dead with disease and neglect. On the shore are crowds of our men wandering about, some trying to construct rafts with which to float down the river ; some lost in the cane-brakes, and without food. No single battle-field has yet afforded to the North such visible fruits of victory as have been gathered at Island No. 10." The capture of Island No. 10 opened the river as far as Fort Pillow-its Fort Pillow. This work was a short dis- strength. taucc abovc Memphis ; it had 40 heavy guns in position, nine gun-boats, and about 6000 troops. Gen- eral Pope's army of 20,000 reached its vicinity on April 13th, and preparations were immediately made for an attack. Unexpectedly, however (April 17th), Pope's troops were withdrawn, and ordered to join Halleck's army, then advancing on Corinth. The Confederates, having a fleet, of which eight vessels Destruction of the wcrc irou-clads, Came out from under the confederate fleet. ^^^^ ^^ j.^^^ p- jj^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ -^ ^^^ ^^^^ of surprising some of the national mortar-boats which lay above. In less than an hour half the Confederate flotilla had been disabled or destroyed. Some had their boilers shot through ; others had been butted and sunk. None of them, however, were captured. The steam power of the national gun-boats was too small to stem the stream of the river. It was feared that if they grappled the disabled vessels, they- might be dragged under the guns of the batteries. Their victory was due to the suj^eri- ority of their construction-^-for they were more heavily I • Chap. XLIX.] FORT PILLOW AND MEMPHIS. 279 mailed than their antagonists — and the heavier weight of their fire. Fort Pillow was, however, soon after abandoned, in Abandonment of consequence of the operations on the line the fort. ^£^^^ Tennessee Kiver. The troops were * Avith drawn to Corinth, and the remnant of the Confeder- ate fleet went down to Memphis. From its railroad connections Memphis is the most im- strategicai import- portant citj on thc Mlssisslppi between 'New ance of Memphis. Qrlcans and St. Louis. It is the western • terminus of the great line communicating with the At- lantic cities. By its branches it connects with the Gulf on the south, and the Cumberland Valley and Ohio on the north. Along the great artery of the Memphis and Charleston Road the Confederacy brought supplies from regions drained by the affluents of the Mississippi River, and from Texas and Arkansas. This system of railroads enabled them to distribute troops and munitions of war in all directions. Considering that its proper protection was the strong forts on the river above and below, the Confederates had not fortified the town. Its only defense was its flotilla. On the 5th of June Commodore Davis left Fort Pil- Navai attack on l^w with hls guu-boats aud came down to Memphis. Memphis. The Confederate fleet was at the levee. It consisted of eight vessels. Four ram -boats, under Colonel Ellet, had joined the national squadron. Soon after daybreak the next morning the action began. In many particulars it recalled the naval combats of an- cient times. One of EUet's rams, the Queen, butted a Confederate ram, sinking her immediately ; the Queen, in her turn, was struck by an antagonist and disabled ; that ram, in her turn, was struck by the Monarch, and instant- ly sunk. But among these reminiscences of old warfare 280 FALL OF MEMPHIS. [Sect. X. there were realities of a more modern kind. Hot water was scattered on boarders ; some of the vessels had their boilers shot through, and their crews scalded with steam. One Confederate gun-boat received a shell that set her on fire ; she burned to the water's edge, and then blew up. One was captured; and of all the Confederate flotilla, one only, the Van Dorn, escaped. There were many thousand persons on the river banks Destruction of the survcylug the battle with intense interest. Confederate fleet. Qut of the deuse smoke cnvelopiug it came the roar of boilers exploding, the crashing of the rams, the bursting of shells, the rattle of musketry, the inces- sant thunder of the cannon. In half an hour the uproar ceased, and when the smoke blew aside, it was found that the Confederate flotilla had been destroyed, and Mem- phis, left defenseless. CHAPTER L. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.— FORCING OF THE SECOND CONFED- ERATE LINE. The Confederates, forced back from their first line, established a second along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, its strong point being at Corinth, where they concentrated their armies. General Halleck, using the Tennessee River as his line of attack, landed his army near Shiloh, and placed it under command of Grant. . - . . • It was Halleck's intention to join the army of Buell to that of Grant, and attack his antagonists at Corinth. It was their intention to attack Grant before he was joined by Buell. They gained the initiative. Battle of Shiloh. The Confederates, after making a very, brilliant attack, were compelled to retreat. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad was severed by Sherman and by Mitchell, the campaign closing successfully on. the nationalpart by the capture of Corinth. After Grant had captured Donelson, he received a message from Buell asking an interview with him. Ac- cordingly, on the 27th of February, he went for that, pur- pose to Nashville. In the mean time Hal- leck had ordered him to ascend rapidly the Tennessee, then in full water, and make a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston Kailroad about Florence or Tus- cumbia, or perhaps Corinth. There was a telegraph from Paducah to Fort Henry, but the secessionists were daily breaking the wires, and communication was continually interrupted. On the 1st of March Halleck had ordered Grant to fall back from the Cumberland to the Tennes- see, with the view of carrying his intention into effect. It was at this moment supposed that the Confederates had retreated to Chattanooga. Orders were likewise transmitted to Sherman to seize all steam-boats passing Paducah, and send them up the Tennessee for the transportation of Grant's army. As Grant's visit to Nashville 282 THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. . [Sect. X. soon as Halleck heard that Grant had gone up the Cum- land instead of the Tennessee, he was very much displeas- disapproved of ^d, and telegraphed to him, " Why don't you by Halleck. ^^^^ ^^^ orders ? "Why don't you answer my letters ? Turn over the command of the Tennessee expedition to General C. F. Smith, and remain yourself at Fort Henry." He also complained to McClellan at Washington that he could get no reports from Grant, whose troops were demoralized by their victory. To Grant he wrote that his neglect of repeated orders to report his strength had created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with the military plans ; that his going to Nashville when he should have beem with his troops had been a matter of so much complaint at Washington that it had been con- sidered advisable to arrest him on his return. At length came Grant's answer that he had not re- Grant's expiana- ccivcd Hallcck's ordcrs in time ; that he had ^'''''^* not gone to Nashville to gratify any desire of his own, but for the good of the service ; that he had reported every day, and had written on an average more than once a day, and had done his best to obey orders ; that, instead of being worthy of censure for permitting his troops to maraud, he had sent the marauders to St. Louis. He asked to be relieved, and turned over the com- Generai Smith put Hiand to General Smith, who at once com- ia command. nieuced thc cmbarkatlou of the troops to the Upper Tennessee. Halleck was so far satisfied with these explanations that he requested the authorities at Washington to drop the matter. The order assigning Smith to the command was, however, not recalled. Halleck, in this perpendicular movement upon the Con- Advanta-es of the federate line, derived at once singular advan- Tennessee River. ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Teuuessee Kivcr. It gavc Chap.L.] SHERMAN'S expedition. 283 him ready communication by his transports and gun- boats ; the latter, as we shall see, successfully intervened at the very moment of the crisis of the battle of Shiloh. Early in March, Sherman was ordered by Halleck to The expedition j^^^ ^^^ Teuuessee expedition and report to passes up it. gmith. The whole army steamed up to Savannah, where the depot of supplies was established. There were nearly seventy transports, carrying more than thirty thousand troops. The bands were playing, flags flying ; it was , a splendid pageant of war. Lewis Wal- lace's division disembarked on the west bank of the river and took post on the road to Purdy. He was ordered to destroy the railroad bridge in the vicinity of that place. A train with Confederate troops narrowly escaped cap- ture ; it approached while the bridge was burning. An- other division (C. F. Smith's) occupied the town and country beyond ; and Sherman was ordered by Smith to take his own division, and the two gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, to proceed farther up the river, and break the Memphis and. Charleston Kailroad. It vv^as now known that the Confederate army was concentrating at Corinth, and that it had a battery at Eastport, and another just above the mouth of Bear Creek. On passing " Pittsburg Landing," Sherman learn- ed that there was a road thence to Corinth. A Confed- erate regiment lying there had fired on the gun-boats. Hereupon he wrote to Smith that he thought it impor- tant to occupy " Pittsburg Landing." This was accord- ingly done, and the place became, in consequence, immor- tal in American history. Meantime Sherman passed forward on his expedition for cutting the railroad, but was thwarted by a deluge of rain^ which so flooded the country as to render it imprac- ticable, many men and horses being drowned in the swol- len streams. With great difficulty he got back to his Sherman's recon- noissance. 284 PITTSBURG LANDING AND SHILOH. [Sect. X. boats., . The time had passed to make a lodgment on the railroad by a dash : whatever was to be done now must be done deliberately and systematically. ; On the receipt of Sherman's letter, Smith reconnoitred Occupation 6f Pitts- Pittsburg Landing in pcrson, and found that urg an :ng. it was wcU adapted as a base for a large army operating inland. He therefore ordered Hurlbut's division to occupy it ; and then directed Sherman to move his division there, and take a position out from" the river, so as to leave room for a large army behind- — room enough, he said, "for a hundred thousand men." I am particular in relating these details of the manner in which Pittsburg Landing came to be occupied, because Grant hias not only been criticised, but severely blamed for what he is supposed to have done in the matter. That great soldier has made no reply, justly expecting that his- tory would eventually vindicate him. The bluff at Pittsburg Landing extended about half a The topograpiiy Hiilc aloug thc Hvcr : the road to the top was in a ravine, at the foot of which lay four or five steam-boats of Hurlbut's division. As this road was not more than sufficient for their accommodation, Sherman caused two more to be cut up through the bluff, which was a high plateau inclining from the west, and in- tersected with ravines right and left. A country road led from the landing to Corinth. At a distance upon it of about two and a (Quarter miles stood a little log building embowered in trees, known as Shiloh Church. It had nei- ther doors nor windows, and was only half floored. When first visited there was a pile of corn in the husk on the floor. It was simply a place where Methodist camp-meet- ings were occasionally held, and had of late been used as a Confederate picket station. The greater part of the pla- teau, a space of four miles by two and a half or three, was covered with heavy oaks, and an underbrush of hick- Chap.l.] posting of the troops. 285 cry and scrub ; near to the landing, however, it Was clear- ed. Sherman carefully reconnoitred the ground, and put two of his brigades on the Corinth Road, on the right and left of the meeting-house ; another brigade he put more to the right ♦and somewhat refused, to command the Pur- dy Road at the Owl Creek Grossing, and the other (Stew- postingofthe art's) to cover the Lick Creek Ford. Thus troops. -^-g ^[yJLgiQn^ 8000 strong, was an outlying force to cover all the main roads leading to the landing. There was a short gap between his centre and right, and a wide one, of nearly tAVO and a half miles, between his centre and left brigade (Stewart's), partially covered by Hurlbut. V . w . . . As soon as these camps were selected, Sherman and McPherson examined all the country on the front and flanks, moving out ten miles toward Corinth as far as Monterey. McPherson had been sent, by order of Smith, to post the army as it arrived. Hurlbut's division was put in line to the left of the main Corinth Road, his right where the Hamburg Road branches to the left, and Smith's own division (then commanded by General W. H. L. Wallace) was on Hurlbut's right. McPherson placed McClernand's division about a mil6 in front of W. H. L. Wallace, and Prentiss's to his left, Lewis Wallace's division still remaining on the road to Purdy. It communicated with the main army by an old bridge which was over Snake Creek. These dispo- sitions were made between the 20th of March and the 6th of April.- In the mean time General Smith had fallen seriously ill. He had received what appeared' to be an insignificant injury — a mere scratch on his leg, in stepping into a- boat; Gangrene came on, and he died on the 25th of April. His health had been ruined by exposure and fatigue at Fort Donelson. Death of General Smith. 286 GRANT RESTORED TO COMMAND. [Sect. X. It is to be remarked that most of the arrangements thus far made were not by order of Grant, Grlnuo com- for it was not until the illness of Smith that Halleck restored him to command. At this moment the Tennessee River was separating the army. In an hour after taking command Grant had ordered his forces to be concentrated. He established his head-quar- ters at Savannah (March 17th), where he could commu- nicate with Buell, who was coming from Nashville, and with Lewis Wallace, who was at Crump's Landing. It is also to be borne in mind that these movements were un- der the supreme direction of Halleck, who was at St. Louis, and whose intention was to make a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. All the landings except the bluffs were at this time flooded. The first ob- ject was to secure positions commanding the Tennessee and bases for future operations. The west bank of the river was preferred, because it rendered unnecessary pon- toons and transports for crossing. The first line of Confederate defense having been swept Beauregard's army away by the capturc of Fort Donelson, Beau- regard, who had been sent by the Richmond authorities to supervise the movements in the Mississippi Valley, established a second along the line of the Mem- phis and Charleston Railroad. The army immediately under his command was at Corinth, about 30 miles from Pittsburg Landing. His views of the measures to be re- sorted to for the defense of the valley were far more cor- rect than those hitherto adopted by the Confederate gov- ernment. His intention was not to divide, but to concen- trate all the available Confederate forces; and this he would' have done previously had he arrived in time to prevent the disaster at Donelson. He therefore, as rapidly as he could, withdrew the Chap. L.] CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMIES. 287 forces from every outlying position. He Concentration of ••tt-t* t* t» it the Confederate was jomeci by -Bragg, irom rensacola, by Polk, from the Mississippi, and Johnston's army was brought from Murfreesborough. The whole force was concentrated at Corinth, where the two great railroads connecting the Gulf of Mexico and the Missis- sippi Eiver with the Atlantic Ocean come together. That place is the key of the railroad system of Mississippi and Tennessee. Beauregard issued the customary and char- acteristic address to his troops: "Our mothers and wives, our sisters and children, expect us to do our duty. Our cause is as just and sacred as ever animated men to take up arms." Corinth was thus selected not only because of its rela- tion to the railroads, but also because it was necessary to hold it for the protection of Memphis. The national army, advancing on the line of the Tennessee Eiver, would strike the second Confederate line perpendicularly. It had been Halleck's expectation to intervene between the Ten- nessee army under Johnston at Murfreesborough, and^the Mississippi army under Beauregard at Corinth. Through the delay that had occurred after the fall of Donelson, the junction of those armies had, however, taken place. As soon as it was discovered that Johnston had dis- concentration of appeared from Murfreesborough at Buell's the national armies. ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ a jUUCtloU wlth Beauregard, Halleck, whose command now embraced Bu- ell's, ordered that officer to join Grant, with a view to counteract the Confederate concentration at Corinth. Bu- ell's force was about 40,000. He accordingly at once set out on his march, and reached Columbia on the 20th ; but, though he pushed forward as quickly as he could, so bad were the roads and so dreadful the weather that it took seventeen days to accomplish the rest of the distance to Pittsburg Landing — about ninety miles. Nelson's divis- 288 BEAUREGARD'S PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. [Sect.X. ion was in advance ; it was followed by the divisions of Crittenden, McCook, Wood, and Thomas. The concentration of the Confederate army, which had begun early in March, went on with great rapidity. In three weeks its strength had risen from 11,000 to 45,000 men. Van Dorn and Price were coming from Arkansas v^ith 30,000 more. After the junction with Johnston* took place, that general had assumed the chief command, Beauregard's'pian Bcaurcgard bciug secoud. The conception of the campaign. ^£ ^-^^ eusuiug mo vemcuts was, however, due to the latter. As Halleck had intended to destroy him before Johnston could come to his aid, so now he proposed to destroy Grant before Buell could arrive. He knew from the country people every thing about Grant's move- ments, but it was little that Grant could find out from them about him. The question for him to decide was, Should he wait for Van Dorn and Price to come up, or strike Grant at once? At this time Breckenridge was on his right, at Burnsville with 11,000 men ; Hardee and Brigg, with more than 20,000, formed his centre at Cor- inth; Polk and Hindman were on his left with 10,000 north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Grant overthrown, Buell was next to be attacked, the victorious army then taking up its line of march to the north. On Johnston's assuming the chief command, he issued an ad- dress, such as was at that time customary in the Confed- erate armies : " You are expected to show yourselves wor- thy of your valor and courage, worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time." Pittsburg Landing is a steam-boat station on the wegt bank of the Tennessee River, 219 miles dis- tant from its mouth, and near to the inter- section of the state lines of Alabama, Mississippi, and Ten- nessee. On the north of the landing. Snake Creek, and Chap. L.] THE FIELD OP SIIILOH. 289 on the south, another stream, Lick Creek, fall into the Tennessee, the former having received a branch known as Owl Creek. ' These rivulets rise near each other, beyond Shiloh Church, and inclose between them a plateau, about eighty feet high, on which took place the great battle now to be described. THE EATTLK OF SHiLOH. The two creeks formed the right and left defenses of the national array, obliging the enemy to make a front attack. When first occupied the country was flooded, aiid many of the streams impassable. In Snake Creek the water was so high that a horse would have to swim II.— T 290 POSITION OF GRANT'S AEMY. [Sect. X. to reacli the bridge. Lick Creek, ordinarily fordable, liad become quite a river. Grant largely depended on tbese overflows for protection. They were among the reasons which induced him to throw up no defenses. On this platiau (Saturday, April 5th) ^ve divisions Position of Grant's of Grant' s army were encamped in the order ^^^^' just described (p. 285). Sherman and Pren- tiss were therefore in front, McClernand on the left and rear of Sherman. Still nearer to the Landing was Hurl- but, with W. H. L.Wallace on his right. Lewis Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, five miles below. Grant's army thus lay with the Tennessee River at its back, without available transportation to the other bank, and no defensive preparations on its front. The changes that Halleck had made in its command operated to its disadvantage in unsettling its purposes and impairing its unity of action. It was not understood at first that the Confederates were concentrating so rapidly at Corinth; on the contrary, it was supposed that they had a force of only about 10,000 ; and hence there was at that time no apprehension of being attacked. Even after it was known that Johnston had withdrawn from Murfreesbor- ough, it was expected that Buell's re-enforcements would join Grant in time. When the battle began, Buell's lead- ing division, Nelson's, was at Savannah, nine miles down the river,- and on its other bank, but the rear of that army stretched off for thirty miles beyond. The Confederate generals intended to fall by surprise Johnston rnarches on Graut's army, encamped thus at Pitts- from Corinth. burg Landing, bcforc Buell should have joined it. Accordingly, on the Sd of April, their avail- able strength being about 40,000, they commenced their march. The dreadful condition of the roads, and a rain^ storm which fell on the afternoon of the 5th, delayed the proposed attack. That night they had advanced within Chap. L.] THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK EXPECTED. 291 three quarters of a mile of the national pickets. No fires were allowed, though the air was cheerless and cold. Hardee's corps was in front ; Bragg's in a second line be- hind; Polk's corps formed the third, with Breckenridge's division on its right rear. On Friday, April 4th, an infantry picket belonging to Colonel Buckland's brigade having been captured, Sher- man had taken that brigade and some cavalry, and driven back the Confederate cavalry six miles from the front of the camps. On the evening of that day several cannon Grant expects wcrc fircd aud plainly heard by the whole au attack. army. Grant was at this time at Sherman's lines. On coming back, his horse slipped over a log and lamed him. On the same day, Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments of infantry and 1200 cavalry at Purdy, and an equal force at Bethel. Grant gave the necessary orders to Lewis Wallace in case they should attack him. The Confederate attack was therefore not unexpected, and, properly speaking, there was no surprise. Prentiss had doubled his grand guards the night before, and had pickets out one and a half miles. Sherman ordered his troops to breakfast early, and got them at once into line. Grant was perfectly aware of what had been going on. He was in doubt, however, from what directioli the blow would be delivered: whether the Confederates would attack his main camp, or cross over Snake Creek to the north and west of him, falling on Lewis Wallace's division so as to force it back, and make a lodgment on the Ten- nessee below, compelling Grant either to attack them and- drive them away, or to cross over to the east bank of the Tennessee and give up his boats. It was better for him to risk a battle on the ground on which he stood. For the Confederates, the attack on Wallace would have been the proper movement. , For want of engineer officers, Beauregard had been un- 292 THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. [Sect. X. able to acquire correct information of the terrain of tlie battle-field. The Richmond authorities had become alien- ated from him. On this, as on other points, tliey either conceded his demands reluctantly or were indisposed to adopt his recommendations. As scon as it was dawn on Sunday, April 6th, Hardee's The battle of corps passcd silently across the ravine of the ^^^^°''- pebbly Lick Creek, and through the short distance separating it from the outlying divisions of Grant. The fallen leaves, soaked with rain and deprived of their crispness, emitted no rustling sound under the footsteps of the men. Grant's outposts were driven in. Out of a cloud of sulphury smoke with which the woods were instantly filled came the yell of charging regiments, shells crashing against the trees, and the whir of glan- cing bullets. It was a summons to the battle jpf Shiloh. . Grant had received a request from Buell to wait for him at Savannah, that they might have an interview. Ac- cordingly, he was at that place at breakfast when the first guns were heard. His horse was standing ready saddled. He perceived at once that a serious attack was being made. Leaving a letter for Buell, he ordered Nelson to hurry up, and took a steam-boat for Pittsburg. On his way he stopped at Crump's Landing, giving directions to Lewis Wallace to follow at once — or, if the cannonading they heard should prove to be a feint, and the real attack was about to be made on him, to defend himself to the utmost, telling him that he should have re-enforcements as quickly as possible. Grant reached the field of Shiloh at eight o'clock. He saw that he had to deal with the combined Confederate armies, and that he must fight without Buell. At this moment his entire available force was 33,000. Lewis Wallace had 5000 more. Beauregard's force was 40,355. Hardee's centre and left had fallen upon Sherman, Chap. L.] . EESISTANCE OF SHERMAN, 293 his riglit upon Prentiss, wlio resisted as best lie could, Bragg's corps, which had been stationed immediately be- hind Hardee's, now came up, re-enforcing wherever was necessary the thinned attacking line. The steadiness of Sherman threw the weight on Prentiss, the assailants Early successes of wcdgiug thclr Way bctwccn the two. Be- the confederates. ^^^.^ ^^-^^ ^,^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ forCCd PreutisS from his ground and captured and plundered his camp. He himself was separated from his division. It fell into confusion. Of his defeated troops many had no car- tridges. They had been organized only eleven days. Sherman, regarding his position as covering the roads, Resistance of chcckcd tlic cucmy loug cuough to enable Sherman, ^-j^^ ^^^^ ^£ ^j^^ army to prepare for battle. McClernand, who was in his rear, had sent three regi- ments and three batteries to strengthen his left. To the same point Hurlbut had sent four regiments. If deter- mination and energy could have saved the line, Sherman would have held his ground : he personally attended to the details of the moment, directed the fire of his batter- ies, and infused his own spirit into his men. But grad- ually the Confederates worked their way through the in- terval between him and Prentiss, though siiffering dread- fully in so doing. They had brought up re-enforcements from their third or Polk's line, and at length were turn-, ing Sherman's left. A part of his division at that point had broken and fled to the rear. Hereupon he swung on his right as on a pivot, and came round at a right angle. His right projected forward, holding so tenacious- ly that the Confederates could not get round it. It was now ten o'clock. They had seized two of his batteries and had captured his camp. Here he made a firm resistance, and it was not until between two and four o'clock in the afternoon that, with McClernand, who had also been forced from his camp and 29^ GRANT'S LINE FORCED BACK. [Sect. X.- lost many of Lis guns, lie moved back slowly and delib- erately to a better position in front of and covering the bridge across Snake Creek, over wbich tbey were mo- mentarily expecting tliat Lewis Wallace would come. It was in reference to tbis that General Grant wrote to the War Department : " Sherman held with raw troops the key-point of the Landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say that I do not believe there was another division commander on the field who had the skill and enterprise to have done it. To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of the battle." At ten o'clock the battle was fiercest. It went on, however, with little intermission, until two. At the for- mer hour Grant was at Sherman's front. Finding that for such a desperate contest the supply of cartridges would be insufficient, he had organized a train of ammu- nition wagons from the Landing to that point. With dif- ficulty it forced its way through the narrow road filled with fugitives. Meantime Sherman, though wounded, was holding his ground tenaciously on the right. On the left Stewart's brigade was in the utmost danger, until The national line W. H. L. Wallaco dispatchcd Mc Arthur to forced back. -^-^ ^^^^ Stcwart was then able securely to fall back. His camp was taken. The Confederates were now ready to assail Hurlbut, and push him into the river. He, however, retired from the open ground on which he had been standing to the woods in his rear. His camp was captured, but then being joined by W. H. L. Wallace, they, from ten o'clock to three, resisted a succession of desperate charges. In one of these Wallace was killed. Grant's army had now been forced into a space of not more than 400 acres on the very verge of ed to the%?r^e^Sf ' thc rivcr. He was impatiently expecting to hear Lewis Wallace's guns on the Confed- erate flank. He dispatched one messenger after another Chap.L.] death of JOHNSTON. 295 to hasten that general up to the critical point, but still he waited in vain. It subsequently appeared that Wal- Lewis Wallace fails l^ce had obcycd the first orders given to to come up. Mm" to jolu the right of the army, but he had not been told that it had fallen back. He consumed in a fruitless march all the momentous afternoon. In Grant's army all seemed to be hopeless. Five camps had been carried, many prisoners taken, and Apparently hope- t , t> • ** j. i i ' less state of Grant's mauy guus lost. Kegimcuts, breaking up into individuals, had been driven in confu- sion toward the Landing. There was the impassable river. Thousands of fugitives were fleeing through the woods down the bank. It was a rout of horses, and wagons, and demoralized men. But, if Grant's army was in confusion through its de- feat, the Confederate army was scarcely less so by its suc- cess. Its organization had been broken up by the wood- ed nature of the ground, and by the course that had been followed of detaching re-enforcements indiscriminately from its corps or divisions wherever they were required at the moment. Nevertheless, about two o'clock, the Confederates had strong hopes that they would be able to turn the national left and seize the Landing. Their general-in-chief, Johnston, was vigorously pushing forward Death of General ^^^^ opcratlou, whcu he was struck by a rifle Johnston. ^^12^ ^^^ quickly bled to death— a very se- vere misfortune to them. The battle at once lulled. In the confusion, it was some time before Beauregard could be found, and almost two hours elapsed before he could get his army well in hand. The pressure on the national left then increased. There was no time to lose, for night and Buell were coming. Before the Confederates could reach the Landing they must cross a deep ravine, impassable for artillery or cav- alry, and very difficult for infantry. Grant had thrown 296 THE FINAL CONFEDERATE CHARGE. [Sect.X. up hastily some slight earthworks, in the form of a half moon, on the brow of his side of the ravine; and General Grant masses his Webster, hls chicf of staff, by adding to sev- artiiiery. ^^^^ siege-guHS which were parked there the fragments of many light batteries, secured a semicircular defense of about fifty cannon. It reached nearly round to the Corinth Road. But with so much difficulty were artillerists obtained, that the services of the surgeon of the First Missouri Artillery were accepted, and he aid- ed efficiently in working the guns. The Confederate as- sault was made by Chalmers, Withers, Cheatham, Rug- gles, Anderson, Stuart, Pond, and Stevens. Meantime the two gun-boats, Tyler and Lexington, had The gun-boats come couie rouud toward the mouth of the ravine into action. -^ ^^^-^ ^ posltlou as to bc able to reach the advancing Confederates with their eight-inch shells. From the Confederate bank of the ravine, the view ob- liquely across the Tennessee River is very beautiful. The bank gently descends as a grassy lawn dotted with fine old red oaks, and presenting a park-like appearance — a tranquil landscape on the verge of a stormy battle-field. One grand effort more, and the Confederates might per- The final charges of haps rcach thc Landing. Down the ravine the confederates. ^^^^^ rushcd ; its bottom .was full of watcr. They strove to get across and force their way up the op- posite slippery side. But the blaze of Webster's guns was in their front, the Lexington and Tyler were furi- ously shelling their flank, and national troops, fast rally- ing, were pouring forth from their rifles into the battle- cloud and din below a sheet of fire. The Confederates melted away under the roar of the cannon and the vol- leys of musketry. The ravine had become a hell of hu- Grantsnccessfuiiy ^lau agouy aud passiou, hlddcu in smoke, resists them. ^^^^ gj^-^^ ^.^|^ ^^^^^ J^ ^,^g ^ ^^^lej of the shadow of death. Few gained a foothold on the op- Chap. L.] PREPARATIONS FOR RENEWING THE BATTLE. 297 posite bank, and that only for a moment. The crisis was soon past ; the onset of the Confederates was over. They gave up the struggle, and Grant was left master of the ground. The firing had hardly ceased when Grant went across to Sherman, and had an interview with him. rene"wiro?the hat- They agrccd in opinion that the Confeder- ate army was exhausted. Grant gave Sher- man orders to be ready to attack it early in the morning, informing him that Lewis Wallace was near at hand, and would cross the bridge and take post on his right; that Buell's troops were arriving, and would get over the river during the night, and come up on the general left. Grant then visited every division commander, giving to each special directions. He slept on the ground, with his head against the stumj) of a tree, though it w^as raining heavily. Buell, who, with his staff, soon afterward came on the Exhausted condi- field, aud had also an interview with Sher- tion of the armies. ^^^^^^ ^^^ heeii uufavorably impressed by the sight of the broken troops near the Landing; but he found that, after all the losses, there must be nearly 20,000 still left for battle, and that the Confederates had prob- ably not more than 25,000. They had, in fact, suffered quite as much as Grant's army. Bragg says that they were very much shattered : " Li a dark, stormy night, the commanders found it impossible to find and assemble their troops, each body or fragment bivouacking where the night overtook them." Buell made himself acquaint- ed with the battle-ground by the aid of a manuscript map lent him by Sherman. Night came, and brought with it new horrors. The The gun-boats set guu-boats kept up au iuccssaut cannonad- the woods on fire. -^^ . ^^^.^, ^-^^-^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^.^^^^ ^^ g^^^ jj^^^ the damp leaves were smouldering; there, dried by the 298 BEAUREGARD REPORTS HIS SUCCESS. [Sect. X. heat, they and the underbrush were bursting into flame. The fire crept up the bark of old trees. Wounded men, both those in blue and those in gray, were vainly trying to escape a common torment. Happily, however, the heavy rain that fell extinguished the flames. Beauregard thus reports his position on Sunday night : Beanre-ard's report " ^^ ^ o'clock P.M. WC Were lU- pOSSeSSloU of of his successes. ^^^ hls- eucampmeuts between Owl and Lick Creeks but one. Nearly all of his field artillery, about thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Pren- tiss) and several brigade commanders, thousands of small- arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and muni- tions of war, and a large amount of means of transporta- tion^all the substantial fruits of a complete victory — such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles; for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy. " The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gun-boats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, ad- mirably provided cantonments, after over twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sus- tained onset of all the means we could bring into ac- tion." It has been sometimes said that the arrival of Buell Bueii had not yet savcd Graut's army. But it was not so. arrived. Grant, though severely pressed, was not beaten. General Nelson, with Buell's advance, did not reach the point on the Tennessee opposite the Landing until 5 P.M. ; it was ^4 P.M. before Ammen's brigade was over. The Thirty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Grose, support- Chap.l.] arrival of buell. 290 ed by the Sixth Ohio, was the first to touch the enemy .; The resistance it met. with shows, however, that the ac- tion had really ended. Colonel Grose reported only one man killed in the firing, and one after he had got np two hundred yards in the rear of the battery ; he had also one man wounded. - Nelson completed the crossing of his division at 9 P.M. Crittenden's division came up Buell comes on the "^y boat from Savauuah after that hour; ^^^' McCook's at five the next morning, in the boats sent back by Crittenden. Lewis Wallace at last also arrived on the extreme right, where he had been ex- pected for so many hours. These re-enforcements added to Grant's strength about 27,000. men. The morning of the 7th came in with a drizzling rain,- and the Confederates showed no signs of advancing.* Beauregard had ascertained that, from destruction, ex- haustion, and fatigue, he could, not bring 20,000 men into battle on his side. It was only now that he learned that Buell had come on the field. Lewis Wallace, who was on the national right, was in action soon after daylight. Eeuewaiofthebat- Graut ordcrcd him to press his attack on tie next xnorning. ^^^ Confederate Mt, which was commanded by Bragg. Accordingly, Wallace and McClernand moved forward and recovered the ground' lost the day before, up to McClernand's original camp on the right of the Corinth Road. There they waited with Sherman, who sat patiently on his horse, under fire, until after 10 A.M., by which time Buell's troops were abreast of them. Buell's forces. constituted the centre and left of Grant's Buell's troops come newliuc. Thc divlslous of Nelson and Crit- into action. teudcu ouly wcrc ready at dawn. When they heard Wallace's guns on the extreme right they moved forward. Their artillery had not yet got up, but Buell sent them Mendenhall's and Terrill's, of the regu- lar . army. Nelson moved half a mile before touching 300 THE. SECOND DAY'S BATTLE. [Sect. X. the Confederates. He pushed them for a while before him, but at length he was checked. There was then an artillery conflict for two hours, the Confederates event- The second day's ually waveHng. Crittenden was on Nel- son's right; and when McCook got up, he went on the right of Crittenden, and Buell took com- mand. Sherman's captured camp was at this time in the Confederate rear, and to that as an objective the national line advanced, though resisted with the utmost resolu- tion. Meantime Lewis Wallace M^as so pressing the Confed- erate left that Beaureo-ard was constrained to re-enforce it from his right, notwithstanding that he had found that Grant, with Buell, was too strong for him on that wing. Nelson, having now less pressure ujDon him, be- gan again to move forward, though not without severe fighting and alternations of success. On the other wing, Wallace and Sherman were steadily advancing toward Shiloh meeting-house against a furious fire. McCook's division had also forced back the Confeder- erate centre. In front, of this division Beauregard made his last decided stand. He had given up all hope of forcing the national left. Sherman describes the musket- ry fire arising in these movements as the severest he ever heard. Wallace says, " Step by step, from tree to tree, position to position, the rebel lines went back, never stop- ping again — infantry, horses, artillery, all went back. The firing was grand and terrific. To and fro, now in my front, then in Sherman's, rode General Beauregard, incit- ing his troops, and fighting for his fading prestige of in- vincibility. Far along the lines to the left the contest was raging with equal obstinacy. As indicated by the sounds, the enemy were retirins: every where. Beaurejrard at last ^ "^ tit i jJ2Jpe"ed to re- Cheer after cheer rang through the woods, and every man felt that the day was ours." chap.l.] aid kendered by buell. 301 Beauregard now found that nothing more could be done, and ordered a retreat. To Breckinridge, who had com- mand of the rear -guard, he exclaimed, " Don't let this be converted into a rout." Grant's captured tents were recovered, but no pursuit The Confederate could be made uutil the next day. The losses. Confederate losses in this dreadful battle were 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, 959 missing — total, 10,699. As there has been much controversy respecting the actual share of the armies of Grant and of Buell in the operations of the two days (April 6th and 7th), I give the subjoined tables, which may enable the reader to form an opinion. In Grant's army there were six divisions. The national losses. ;^,., .!;^ Their losses, m killed and wounded, were : 1st, McClernand — loss both days . 1861 2d, W. H. L. Wallace— loss both days . . . 2424 3d, Lewis Wallace — loss second day. . . 305 ■ 4th, Huiibut — loss both days ....... . 1985 5 th, Sherman — loss both days . 2031 6th, Prentiss (no report) — loss estimated . . 2000 Aersrreerate loss . 10,606 Of Buell's army, four divisions had marched to Grant's aid. Of these three were engaged: 2d, McCook's loss 881 4th, Nelson's " 693 5th, Crittenden's" 390 Aggregate loss 1964 In view of all the facts, it appears that Grant was not How far Grant was indebted to Bucll for physlcal aid on the indebted to Buell. ^^^^ ^^^ . ^^ j^^^ himsclf rcpulscd the final Confederate attack, and believed that as soon as Lewis Wallace joined him he could renew and win the battle. 302 BEAUREGARD'S RETREAT; [Sect. X. So obstinate was tlie resistance he had made, that he had inflicted on his antagonist as severe a loss as he had him- self sustained. The well-known approach of Buell doubt- less did give him moral assistance. . In the battle of that day Sherman stands forth as the central figure: the in- comparable tenacity with which he held the national right against the enemy's utmost efforts, gave Grant the means of staying the disaster that was befalling the left. Not without reason, therefore, did Halleck say, " It is the Sherman had se- unauiuious opiulou hcrc that Brigadier Gen- cured the victory. ^^^^ W. T. Shermau savcd the fortunes of the day on the 6th, and contributed largely to the glori^ ous victory of the 7th." Fortune had denied to Beauregard victory. He was Beauregard's re- Compelled to rctrcat. Au eye-witness, an cormth. i^ppgggg(j New-Yorker, says : " I made a de- tour from the road on which the army was retreating, that I might travel faster and get ahead of the main body. In a ride of twelve miles alongside of the routed army I saw more of human agony and woe than I trust I shall ever be called again to witness. The retreating host wound along a narrow and almost impassable road, ex- tending some seven or eight miles in length. Here was a long line of wagons loaded with wounded, groaning and cursing, and piled in like bags of grain ; while the mules plunged on in mud and water belly-deep, the wa- ter sometimes coming into the wagons. Next came a straggling regiment of infantry, pressing on past the train ; then a stretcher borne upon the shoulders of four men, carrying a wounded officer; then soldiers strag- gling along with an arm broken and hanging down, or other fearful wounds which were enough to destroy life. And to add to the horrors of the scene, the elements of heaven marshaled their forces, a fitting accompaniment of the tempest of human desolation and passion which was Chap. L.] THE RETREAT TO CORINTH. 303 raging. A cold drizzling rain commenced about night- fall, and soon came harder and faster. It turned to piti- less blinding hail. This storm raged with unrelenting violence for three hours. I passed long wagon trains fill- ed with wounded and dying soldiers, without even a blanket to shield them from the driving sleet and hail, which fell in stones as large as partridge eggs, until it lay- on the ground two inches deep. "Three hundred men died during this awful retreat. Their bodies were thrown out to make room for others, who, although wounded, had struggled on through the storm, hoping to find shelter, rest, and medical care." Was this the triumphant invasion of the North ? Was it for this that Beauregard had issued forth from the for- tifications of Corinth ? The following day (April 8th) Sherman was sent for- sherman's pursuit Ward wlth two brfgadcs to foUow ou the of the Confederates, -(^pg^^jgg ^^f ^\^q eucmy, aud asccrtalu what they were doing. On reaching the Confederate hospital at the White House he was attacked by Forrest's cavalry, but repulsed it. He then learned that Beauregard had re- treated to Corinth. All along were evidences of the great discomfiture— the dead scattered on the road-sides unburied, the farm-houses full of wounded, abandoned wagons, caissons, ammunition, and tents. As soon as Beauregard reached Corinth, he telegraphed Beauregard's report to Richmoud that he " had galucd a great to Richmond. ^^^ glorlous victory ; had taken from eight to ten thousand prisoners and thirty-six guns, but that Buell having re-enforced Grant, the Confederate army had retired to Corinth." He had sent a flag of truce to Grant asking permission to bury his dead, but Grant in- formed him that that had been already done. The battle of Shiloh was thus a conflict in which, dur- 3Q4 COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE. [Sect. X. Character of the ^^g ^^0 dajs, 0116 hundred thousand men battle of shiioh. j^^^ ^^^^ engaged— engaged in the heart of a forest. From that circumstance it presented no brilliant military evolutions. It may be said to have been a gi- gantic and bloody bush-fight. Tha twenty thousand kill- ed and wounded men bore testimony to its severity. On the side of the Confederates it was simply a vigorous ef- fort to push straight down to Pittsburg Landing ; on the national side it was a determined effort to resist. The confusion into which both armies fell was the necessary consequence of the wooded and broken field. The brave Confederate General Johnston, who, in such an untimely manner, lost his life in the front of the battle, saw from the beginning that his duty was to act, not as the com- mander, but as the leader of his men. The mixed-up con- dition, the inextricable confusion into which, as related by Bragg, that army had fallen at the close of the first day, had more than its counterpart on the national side. In the very crisis of the battle, the guns with which Grant checked the last rush of the Confederates w^ere brought from all quarters, and were worked by chance volunteers, soldiers, artillerists, and a doctor. In some remarks which he published on this battle, Sherman has pointed out how strikingly it displayed the characteristic qualities of the two armies. Opposed to the energy, vigor, vivacity of the South was the inflexible de- termination of the North. On the national right Sher- man himself had been hammered by main force from his camps of the morning until he had been brought to the bridge at Snake Creek. It was then of no use to hammer at him any longer ; he could be driven in no more ; the hammer merely rebounded from its own blows. Grant, at the ravine on the national left, had not been conquered, but only compressed. He was certain to recoil the more violently in proportion as the pressure was more severe. Chap. L.] SHEKMAN BKEAKS THE RAILROAD. 3Q5 This battle was made the subject of the most extraor- Misrepresentations dliiary misrepresentations. Eeporters who of the battle. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ plateau, but on board the steam-boats, or down at the Landing, gathered from the raw troops who had fled many false statements. Thus Prentiss, who fought desperately until four o'clock in the afternoon, and was then taken prisoner, with four regi- ments, because he would not recede when Hurlbut and Wallace were forced back, was said to have been sur- prised in bed in the morning, and captured in his shirt ; Grant, whose movements from daybreak we have related, was said to have been absent from the army ; Buell was said to have purposely delayed his march out of jealousy. From such authorities Beauregard received credit for having taken Grant by surprise, and so completely over- thrown him that he was rescued from total ruin only by the arrival of Buell. ]S"o resolute pursuit, however, having been made by the national army from SKiloh, Beauregard occupied himself in strengthening the works of Corinth, his fortifications extending more than fifteen miles. He destroyed the roads and bridges of approach, and made every thing ready for the reception of Halleck, who, leaving St. Louis on the news of the great battle, had arrived at Pittsburg The national army Landing. The uatloual army was rapidly re-enforced. re-cuforced. Popc brought to it from Mis- souri 25,000 men; eventually it became more than 100,000 strong. A few days after he had reached Shiloh, Halleck or- dered Sherman to take some fresh troops from Buell's army, ascend the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear Creek, Sherman breaks the ^ud thcrc break thc Memphis and Charles- great railroad. ^^^ Eailroad, which crosses the creek by a bridge of two spans and about five hundred feet of tres- tle-work. Accordingly, Sherman burnt that bridge on H.— U 306 HALLECK'S ADVANCE TO CORINTH. [Sect. X. the 14tli of April, and effectually severed tlie line of com- munication. Halleck, on joining the army, put Grant as " second in command," without any real duty. Grant had fallen un- der his displeasure, being blamed for the manner in which Halleck reorgan- the battle of Shiloh had been fought. The • ^'^^^ ^^^ ^''°'^' army was now completely reorganized, and slowly advanced on Corinth during the month of May. As if to indicate the cause of the reproach that had been cast upon Grant, Halleck intrenched himself incessantly as he moved forward. As Grant had been blamed for want of precaution, so now Halleck was blamed for over- precaution. His adversaries affirmed that it took him six weeks to march fifteen miles. They abstained, how- ever, from giving weight to the fact that, though his army and advances very had wou a great battle, it was still a raw slowly on Corinth. ^^^^^ ncedlug drill and time for cementing. In the opinion of the best officers in it, it was not fit for marches or for military risks. He had before him two grand operations which demanded great efficiency — a march southward for the complete opening of the Missis- sippi, and a march eastward for the seizure of Chattanooga. Halleck determined to conduct his operations against Corinth by regular approaches. On the 21st of May his nearest batteries were three miles distant from that place. He had become persuaded that the works were exceed- ingly strong, adequately garrisoned, and that an energetic resistance would be made. Beauregard had, however, concluded that it was impossible for him to resist such an army as that which was approaching. Accordingly, he commenced secretly evacuating; the place The fall of Corinth. , ^^,- ^^^ ^^ ^ . ,, ^ ^ •*•, -^ on the 26th of May, and m three days had removed or destroyed every thing of value. He then re- treated by the southern road to Tupelo. On the morn- ing of the 30th the national troops entered the town. Chap. L.] FALL OF CORINTH. 3Q^ They found that they might have taken it long before. The fortifications were substantially a counterfeit ; no ad- equate garrison had ever been present ; in some of the batteries there were wooden or " Quaker" guns. Halleck now dispatched Pope and Buell in pursuit of the retreat- ing Confederates, but they were unable to overtake them. Beauregard left his army when at Tupelo, on the 15th of June, relieving himself from duty on the plea of ill health. He went into retirement at Mobile and Bladon Springs, having turned over the command temporarily to Beauregard unjust- Grcneral Bragg. No sooner did Davis hear ly disgraced. ^£ ^j^-^ ^^^^ j^^ Ordered Bragg to assume permanent command, passionately declaring that he would not reinstate Beauregard though the whole world should urge him to the measure. From the second line, thus broken, the Confederates had to fall back on the third, of which the strategic points were Vicksburg, Jackson, Meridian, and Selma. In view of the whole campaign, from the attack on Fort Summary of the Hcury to the occupatlou of Corfuth, it must shiioh campaign. ^^ regarded as a complete success for the national cause. The objects originally proposed — the breaking through the Confederate lines of defense, the fall of the powerful blockading works on the Mississippi, the opening of that river down to Memphis, the forcing of the enemy from their camp at Bowling Green, the oc- cupation of Nashville, the severing of the Memphis and Charle^on Road, and the capture of Corinth — all these objects were attained. Doubtless more might have been accomplished had there been more celerity in the advance on Corinth. Had Halleck acted energetically with his left, he might, per- haps, have crowned his triumph with the destruction of Beauregard's army. On the part of the Confederates, the rapidity of their 3QS MITCHELL'S EXPEDITION. [Sect. X. concentration at Corinth, their plan of cam- piaTedVy'the '^' DaisTn, their conduct on the field of Shiloh, Coufcdcr&tss. X o / 7 were very brilliant ; and, considering how near he came to success with the imperfect means he had, Beauregard was justified in his reproaches of the Rich- mond authorities. He did his part of the duty fully. They failed in giving him support. At the time when Buell set out from Nashville to re- enforce Grant at Shiloh, he dispatched Mitch- • Mitcheu to break ell southward to dcstrov, as far as mio:ht be the railroad. . . possible, the Memphis and Charleston Road, Negley being left in command of the reserves at Nash- ville. Mitchell reached Shelby ville on the 4th of April, and thence made forced marches to Huntsville, which he seized by a night attack on the 11th, getting possession of 17 locomotives and more than 100 passenger cars. From Huntsville he proceeded to destroy the road east- ward as far as Stevenson, and westward as far as Decatur and Tuscumbia, over a distance of one hundred miles. From the latter place he was driven by a Confederate force coming from Corinth, but in his retreat he burned His complete sue- the bridge over the Tennessee at Decatur. c^^^- It was his intention to move eastward as far as Chattanooga, and destroy the railroads there, es- pecially that to Atlanta, and to burn the founderies and machine shops at Rome. To accomplish the destruction of the Atlanta Road, he sent out a secret expedition of twenty-two picked men. They rendezvoused at Marietta, Georgia. At Big Shan- ty, a short distance from Great Kenesaw Mountain, they surreptitiously uncoupled from a train a locomotive, with a few box cars, giving out that it was a powder-train for Beauregard's supply. Then, moving away with all speed, they destroyed the telegraph and pulled up the rails. Chap. L.] MITCHELL'S EXPEDITION. 309 They were, however, pursued by a Confederate train so closely that the brass journals of their engine melted. When about fifteen miles from Chattanooga they were compelled to jump from the cars and take refuge in the woods. Here they were all hunted down ; eight of them were hanged. Mitchell used every exertion to capture Chattanooga, but the force under Kirby Smith was too strong to permit success. The operations of this energetic and able general show what might have been done by Buell had there been more celerity in his march and more vigor in his pro- ceedings. The contrast between these commanders was so striking that it was impossible for them to act in uni- son. The subsequent movements of Bragg would prob- ably have had a very different issue if Mitchell had been his antagonist. In an evil hour Mitchell His transfer to t /. .-, pi • i '-i-i* i South Carolina and was rcmovcd irom the scene or nis brilliant expedition to South Carolina, where, unhap- pily, he died — a loss to the nation and to science, for pre- viously to the war he had distinguished himself by his devotion to practical astronomy. The Memphis and Charleston Kailroad was thorough- ly broken by this burning of bridges and tearing up of rails. The Confederate communications between the At- lantic States and the Mississippi by this route were sev- ered. CHAPTEE LI. CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. THE FIRST VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. In continuation of the general plan of the campaign, the army at Corinth was di- vided. One portion of it, under Buell, marched eastward toward Chattanooga, to seize that strategic point. To the other, under Grant, was assigned the duty of moving southward to open the Mississippi. The Confederate armies were greatly strengthened by conscription, and inspirited by their victories in Virginia. Grant's army was weakened to strengthen Buell. He was compelled to defer his southward march. The Confederate generals in front of him were tempted to endeavor to retake Corinth, but were not successful. Grant, having received re-enforcements, commenced the first campaign against Vicksburg, but was forced back. Sherman, having passed down the Mississippi with the same intention, was repulsed at Chickasaw Bayou. Capture of Arkansas Post. Beaueegaed had thrown the die and lost. In the for- Eesuits of the Shi- ^sts of SMloh the fate not only of the Upper loh campaign. Misslsslppi, but also apparently that of the great states Kentucky and Tennessee, had been decided. A vast space of many thousand square miles, the entire northwest of the Confederacy, had been wrenched away. Not without reason, then, was there consternation in Eichmond. The anger of Davis when he ordered Beau- regard into retirement seemed to be almost justified. Halleck, however, had entered Corinth, not with the military pomp he had expected. There had been no bril- liant operations, no triumphant assault. His wily antag- onist had simply given him the slip. Corinth gained, Halleck prepared to execute the re- The march of Buell maiudcr of hls plan. He had now to de- eastward. ^^^-^ Bucll castward to Chattanooga, while he himself marched southward to Mobile, opening the Mississippi on his right as he went. Farragut had al- Chap. LI.] THE AEMY AT CORINTH. 311 ready secured its moutli by the capture of New Orleans in April. Halleck's army was more than 100,000 strong. He detached Buell on his eastward march to Chattanoo- ga on the 10th of June. But the terrible energy of the Eichmond government chano;ed the expected course of events. A Effects of the Con- ^ _ ... , t , ^,, , federate conscrip- rcmorsclcss couscriptiou had not only nlled the thinned ranks of the armies, but had greatly increased their strength. The conscripts had con- verted McClellan's peninsular campaign into an awful na- tional disaster. They were contemplating a march upon Washington. As soon as Bragg, the Confederate general, found that The countermarch BucU was movlug toward Chattauooga, fore- ^'^^^' seeing the disastrous military consequences which must follow the occupation of that important point by a national army, he set out, and, marching with the greatest celerity, reached Chattanooga before his adversa- ry, and solidly established himself in it. His army was now greatly re-enforced by conscription. Under these circumstances, the national government Removal of Haiieck was coustraiucd to take Halleck from his towabhington. victorious Wcstcm campaign, and, bringing him to Washington, commit to him, as commander-in- chief, a duty of more momentous importance — the resist- ing of the triumphant Confederates in their march upon the capital — the heart of the nation. Halleck left Cor- inth, and the charge of the great Western campaign fell to Grant, his second in command. But this was not all. The army whose duty it was to Grant's army complctc the opcuiug of thc Mlssisslppi lost weakened, ^^^ ^^^j jts gcucral — it was Hkewisc de- pleted of its strength. Bragg, whose strong point was at Chattanooga, had, as just mentioned, been greatly re-en- forced. Buell was compelled by him to make a rapid re- 312 POSITION OF GRANT'S EORCES. [Sect. X. treat to the Ohio. It seemed as if a Confederate march northward, on the west flank of the Cumberland Mount- ains, would undo all that Halleck had done in his south- ward march along the Tennessee. At all hazards, Bragg must be checked. Troops which had now become vet- erans were withdrawn from Grant. They were hurried up the Mississippi and the Ohio to strengthen Buell, and Grant was left weakened in presence of his Confederate antagonists. The expectation which had been entertained in Rich- mond that Bragg's march on Louisville would compel Grant to relax his grip on the Mississippi was doomed but he still ciipgs to disappointment. Now came into view to the Mississippi. ^^^ ^f ^^^ striking lineaments of that gener- al's character — his unconquerable tenacity. Weakened though he was, he stood fast, combating his opponents, and not yielding an inch that he could hold. He patient- ly waited until he was re-enforced, and then resumed his southward march. I have now to relate his temporary operations against his antagonists Price and Van Dorn, and his resumption of the march toward Vicksburg. After the departure of Halleck, the Shiloh army, under Position of Grant's commaud of Graut, was stationed from Mem- forces. pi^.g ^^ Bridgeport, Tennessee, along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Grant had Mem- phis, Grand Junction, and Corinth as his strong posts, with his head-quarters at Jackson, Tennessee, a point in the rear, where the Central Mississippi Railroad unites with the Mobile and Ohio. It was necessary for him to hold the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar north to Co- lumbus, which, owing to the low water in the Tennessee, had been made his base of supplies. In front of Grant lay the Confederate forces under Price Chap. LI.] THE CONFEDERATE ATTEMPTS ON CORINTH. 313 and Van Dorn. They could concentrate so pricranrvan^ as to tlircatcn any one of Hs strong points. Encouraged by the fact that a part of his troops had been sent into Kentucky to aid Buell in re- sisting Bragg, every man who could be spared having been thus taken, and Grant thrown on the defensive, they thought that they might execute a successful ma-* noeuvre for the recovery of Corinth. Price therefore moved to luka, seemingly with the inten- They attempt to , . p • j • t> Tj_ ± j take coriath by tiou 01 assistius; Btslq'q^. it was expected stratagem. i >-i i i i t p r>i • ,1 that Grrant would be tempted irom Oormtn, and an opportunity thus be given to Van Dorn ' of seiz- ing it. It was the key to the military possession of Ten- nessee. Van Dorn being at Holly Springs and Price at luka, Grant thought it possible to destroy the latter and get back to Corinth before the former could interfere. He therefore directed Kosecrans, who was at Counter attempt of rn i • 1 t t i t y^ t 1 Grant to destroy luscumDia, to advauce on iuka, and Urd to Price. . ' . .11. move m combination with him, attacking from the west and north. At noon (September 19th), Kosecrans, who had 9000 men, was within seven miles of luka, moving slowly for- ward. Ord had been directed to approach the place, but not to attack until he heard the sound of Kose- Affair at luka ^I'^i^s's guus. Ho was, howcvcr, prevcutcd by a strong northwest wind from hearing any sound at all. Meantime Kosecrans, who was delay- ing beyond Grant's expectations, came up to a -point with- in two miles of luka, and there, about 4 P.M., encounter- ed the Confederates in force. A severe conflict ensued, in which he lost a battery and 730 men killed and wounded. It was continued until dark. The men lay down on their arms, expecting to renew the engagement in the morning. 314 PRICE AND VAN DORN. [Sect. X. FROM MEMPHIS TO VICKSBURG. When inornino: came, Ord, who had never heard the sound of the battle, but had learned from some negroes that it had taken place, moved into luka, and found that the Confederates had abandoned it. They had es- Escape of Price caped by the Fulton Koad, which Eose- to Van Dorn. ^raus was to have occupied. Kosecrans pur- sued, but could not overtake them. They had checked him on one road while they had escaped by the other. Their loss, however, had been 1438. In these operations, Grant was very far from being satisfied with what Eose- crans had done. The two Confederate generals, finding that their at- Attempttotake tcmpt to gct posscsslou of CoHuth by strat- corinth by force. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^-^^^^ determined to take it by force. They therefore concentrated at Eipley. Eosecrans was in command at Corinth with a force of about 20,000 men. Ord was at Bolivar, and Grant at Jackson. Chap.LL] attack on CORINTH. 3I5 On the 2d of October, Van Dorn moved from Chewalla toward Corinth. Its defenses had been much changed since Beauregard had originally fortified it. Halleck had constructed works inside of those of Beauregard, and Grant, who had been eight weeks in the place, had made others inside of those of Halleck. Corinth now required a much smaller force for its defense. Learning of the Confederate advance, Kosecrans was at first in doubt whether the real attack was to be made on himself, or on Grant, or. Ord. At first he suspected that the movement upon him was nothing more than a feint. " ,^ ^ . ^^ But early on the morniner of the 3d Van Assault on Corinth. m i i • Dorn assailed him strongly. The engage- ment soon became very warm, and General Mc Arthur, who had been sent to the front and presently afterward re-enforced, was compelled to fall back, with the loss of two guns. Eosecrans, now perceiving the enemy's intention, made suitable preparations to receive him. Hamilton's divis- ion held the right, Davies the centre, McKean the left. Stanley was in echelon witb McKean and nearer to Cor- inth. Just before dark the pressure upon Davies was so severe that he was compelled to give ground. On the Confederate side, their left, under Price, was upon the Mobile and Ohio Eailroad, north of Corinth ; then came Van Dorn, more westwardly, on the Chewalla Koad, their right being held by Lovell. The attack was therefore made on the northwest side of Corinth, on which Van Dorn had been informed by a female spy that it was weakest. But the works which Grant had constructed, consisting of four redoubts, had materially changed the condition of things. These works command- ed the roads along which the Confederates must now pass. Some cannonading occurred early in the morning (Oc- 316 ATTACK ON CORINTH. [Sect. X. Gallant conduct of tobei 4tli). At half past nine Price's col- the Confederates. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Eosecpans's Centre witli a force so overpowering as to compel it to yield and fall back The column advanced in the form of a wedge, and was received by the fire of the batteries, which tore it through and through. It was swept by a direct, cross, and enfilading fire. Undismayed, as it came on it opened out like two great wings right and left, " the men bend- ing their necks downward, with their faces averted like those who strive to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail." Davies's division, on which it was com-, ing, began to give way, but was rallied by Rosecrans in person. The storming columns carried Fort Richardson, and even captured Rosecrans's head-quarters. The fort was, however, almost immediately retaken, and, Hamil- ton's division on the right now advancing. Price's column was irretrievably broken, and fled. Van Dorn should have made his attack on Rosecrans simultaneously with that of Price, but he was delayed by the difficulties of the ground. About twenty min- utes after Price's attack he advanced in four columns, their line of march being under the guns of two forts, Williams and Robinette. With an audacity that extort- ed the admiration of the national troops, the Texas and Mississippi soldiers came forward. They advanced until they were within fifty yards of Fort Robinette, receiving Failure of their at- without fliuchiug a showcr of grape and ^^^^ canister, when " the Ohio brigade arose and gave them such a murderous fire of musketry that they reeled and fell back to the woods. They, however, gal- lantly re-formed and advanced again to the charge, led by Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas. This time they reached the edge of » the ditch, but the deadly musketry fire of the Ohio brigade again broke them ; and at the word " Charge !" the Eleventh Missouri and Twenty-sev- of the battle Chap. LI.] ROSECRANS'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE. 317 enth OMo sprang up and forward at them, chasing their broken fragments back to the woods." The desperation of their attack was shown by the fact that the Ohio Six- ty-third lost one half of its number, killed and wounded, in resisting them. The guns of Eobinette, double shot- ted, poured forth a fire-storm on the fugitives, and by noon the battle was over. The Texan Colonel Eogers, who was killed at the edge of the ditch, was carefully buried by his victorious and admiring enemies. They neatly rounded off the little mound that marked his grave. The assault on Corinth was very sanguinary, and en- tailed on the Confederates a heavy loss. In an order issued to his troops, October 25th, Rose- Eosecrans's account fi'^us says! Tho cucmy ^^^ numbered, accord- ing to their own authorities, nearly 40,000 men — almost double your own numbers. You fought them 4n the position we desired on the 3d, punishing them terribly, and on the 4th, in three hours after the in- fantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four officers and men. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two hun- dred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom are one hun- dred and thirty-seven field officers, captains, and subal- terns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, six- teen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thir- teen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty stand of small-arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force with infantry, and sixty miles with cavalry." The national loss in the battle and pursuit was 315 killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 taken prisoners. 318 THE FIRST VICKSBURG CAI^IPAIGN. [Sect. X. Grant was greatly dissatisfied that Kosecrans did not press the pursuit witli energy, believing that if he had done so, Van Dorn might have been destroyed ; but the opportunity was lost. Grant now prepared to carry out the original intention The first vicksburg ^^ ^he Campaign inaugurated at Donelson, campaign. ^^^^ which had been brought into abeyance by the abstraction of troops from him, and by the trans- fer of Halleck to his higher command at Washington. His plan was to move along the Mississippi Central and reduce Vicksburg, the chief obstacle to the reopening of the river. He had 72,000 men at his disposal, of whom 18,000 were at Memphis; but he commenced the march south- hls southward march with only 30,000. He ward. %j > summoned Sherman, who was at Memphis, to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, and in the interview which there took place gave him the necessary orders. In the mean time. General Pemberton, who had been sent from Kichmond to command the Confederate forces, took post behind the Tallahatchie to prevent Grant from moving south along the Central Mississippi Eailroad. But in November he did move down that road to Holly Springs, Sherman by his orders marching out of Memphis to Tchulahoma, and forming his right. Grant simultane- ously ordered General Washburne, with a small force of infantry and cavalry, to move from Helena, Arkansas, east- ward, so as to strike the Central Mississippi about Gre- nada, in the rear of Pemberton. As soon as Pemberton Pemberton recedes ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ hastily abaudoucd his before him. stroug posltiou bchiud the Tallahatchie, the national forces concentrating and forming a junction near Oxford, Mississippi. Vicksburg was now the next step. Grant's cavalry pushed as far as Coffeeville, and there ascertained, that Chap. LI.] CAPTURE OF HOLLY SPRINGS. 319 Pemberton had halted at Grenada, and adopted the Yal- abusha as his line for defense. At Oxford, on Decem- ber 8th, Grant, in an interview with Sherman, gave him his final orders, which were to leave three pL^s'SowS'^fhe m£^ out of his four brigades and march back to bissippi. Memphis, distant about one hundred miles, and there organize, as quickly as he could, some new troops which had come from the North, and proceed to attack Vicksburg by way of the river. Sherman was au- thorized to take from the force at Helena as many men as could be spared. Accordingly, he obtained there about 6000, under General Steele. He had already organized three divisions at Memphis, under A. J. Smith, Morgan, and M. L. Smith. These four divisions, embarking about the middle of December, were convoyed by the gun-boat fleet under Admiral Porter, and proceeded straight for Vicksburg. Grant's plan was, that while Sherman moved rapidly by the river against Vicksburg, he would himself attack Pemberton very vigorously and advance to the rear of the city by land — or, while he was holding the enemy, Sherman might seize the place. At that date no army had cast loose from a river or railroad as a base of sup- ply, and Grant intended to make use of the Central Mis- sissippi, which had been repaired up to Oxford. Holly Springs was therefore retained as a grand depot and hos- pital. While Sherman was moving down the river, Van Dorn, with the Confederate cavalry, executed a brilliant operation, which proved fatal to the expedition of Grant. He passed round Grant to the east, and sud- Hcll^spriugs^ denly captured Holly Springs (December 20th), then guarded only by a single regi- ment commanded by Colonel Murphy. " The surprised camp surrendered 1800 men and 150 officers, who were immediately paroled. The extensive buildings of the 320 CAPTURE OF HOLLY SPRINGS. [Sect. X. Mississippi Central Depot, the station-house, the engine- house, and immense store-houses filled with supplies of clothing and commissary stores, were burned. Up town, the court-house and public buildings, livery-stables, and all capacious establishments, were filled ceiling-high with medical and ordnance stores. These were all fired, and the explosion of one of the buildings, in which was stored one hundred barrels of powder, knocked down nearly all the houses on the south side of the square." The value of the property destroyed was more than two millions of dollars. Grant had warned Murphy by telegraph that he was about to be attacked, and had dispatched re-en- forcements to him. In an order issued December 23d, Grant says, " It is with pain and mortification that the general commanding reflects upon the disgraceful surren- der of this place, with all the valuable stores it contained, on the 20th instant, and that without any resistance, ex- cept by a few men who form an honorable exception; and this, too, after warning had been given of the advance of the enemy northward the evening previous. With all the cotton, public stores, and substantial buildings about the depot, it would have been perfectly practicable to have made, in a few hours, defenses sufficient to resist with a small garrison all the cavalry brought against them, until the re-enforcements which the commanding officer was notified were marching to his relief could have reached him." This serious loss compelled Grant to restore his com- munications and to send to Memphis for wm™aronce''S- ucw suppUcs. Coucluding that, with the Confederates superior to him in cavalry, and the country full of hostile people, he could not rely safely on the railroad, he determined to give up that line of at- tack, and move his whole army to Vicksburg down the Mississippi River. Chap. LI.] CHICKASAW BAYOU. 321 Slierman, in the mean time, ignorant of what hadtrans- sherman reaches pi^ed at Holly Springs and Oxford, had the Yazoo River, p^g^^^ ^n and landed up the Yazoo River, and had made an attack at Chickasaw Bayou, on the bluffs between Vicksburg and Haines's Bluff. The high range of land lying between the Big Black and the Yazoo is known as Walnut Hills. These are about two hundred feet above the average height of the river. The Mississippi impinges against them, making The topography ^ steep bluff at Vlcksburg, and for about near Vicksburg. ^^^ miles above and several below on the east bank; but all the ground on the west is alluvium. ,^^ ^iii i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiuiiiiiiv.'nwiimiiini THE CHICKASAW BAYOU. I The present Yazoo leaves the hills at a point about twen- ty-three miles above its existing mouth, at a place known as Haines's Bluff. That mouth is about ten miles above n.— X 322 CHICKASAW BAYOU. [Sect.x: Vicksburg, so that an irregular triangle of alluvium lies between the Yazoo and the Walnut Hills. The Yazoo in old times evidently clung to these hills, and has left old channels or bayous of deep stagnant water or mud, and the whole triangle is cut into every imaginable form by these bayous. The present river and the old bayous are air leveed against high water, and the lands are very fer- tile. The levees vary in height from four to fourteen feet ; their shape is the same as that of a military parapet ; in- terior slope 45°, superior slope from twelve to fourteen feet for a roadway, exterior slope about one in four. These levees entered largely into the Confederate system of defenses. Where the levee is continuous, as along the Mississippi Eiver, and along the bayou from Vicksburg to Haines's Bluff, a separate roadway is made behind it. Along such a road masses of infantry and artillery could move per- fectly under cover. The face of the hills between Vicksburg and Haines's Bluff is very abrupt, and cut up by numerous valleys and ravines. On the ridge behind, out of sight, is a road, with numerous paths cut down to it. Every hill-top had its telegraph station, and signal corps could be seen tele- graphing the movements of the boats and troops. The Chickasaw Bayou is a small stream flowing be- The Chickasaw twccu the bluffs and the river. These clay Bayou. bluffs, which arc here more than two hun- dred feet high, are very steep ; the alluvial swamp be- tween them and the river, with its quicksands and boggy bayous, is covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a dense growth of tangled vines. On reconnoitring the ground, Sherman found that im- mediately in his front was the bayou, passable only at two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, com- manded by the enemy's sharp-shooters on the opposite Chap.LL] SHERMAN'S attempt at CHICKASAW. 323 bank. BeMnd this was an irregular strip of beach, or table-land, on which were rifle-pits and batteries, and be- hind that a high, abrupt range of hills, scarred with rifle- trenches and crowned with heavy batteries. The coun- try road from Vicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot of these hills, and served the enemy as a covered way along which he moved his artillery and infantry prompt- ly, to meet the national forces at any point where they might try to cross the bayou. The attack was rendered exceedingly difficult by the The difficulties of sw^ampy nature of the country. A fortified Sherman's attempt. -^-^^^ ^^^^^^ ^-j^^ -^ length, had bcCU COU- structed by the Confederates. Through this it was Sher- man's intention to pierce. He determined to make the real attempt at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, and at another place where the bayou is barely passable by in- fantry in single file ; but, at the same time, feints were to be made at Haines's Bluff, Vicksburg, and as many inter- mediate points as possible. Morgan's. division moved The battle of Chick- ^loug thc Huc of Chlckasaw Bayou, M.L. asaw Bayou. g^-^j^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ j^j^ ^ight, A. J. Smith still farther to the right, and Steele on the north, or farther side of the bayou ; but before the real assault Steele had reported that it was absolutely impossible for him to reach the foot of the bluff, by reason of the swamp and submerged ground. He was therefore recalled, and sent to re-enforce Morgan. As soon as Steele's leading brigade (F. P. Blair's) had reached the ground, Morgan being ready, the assault was ordered. Under a severe fire from the enemy, Blair's brigade and De Courcy's of Morgan's division crossed the bayou, drove the Confederates from their first rifle-pits, and pushed to the country road that runs along the base of the hills. There, being unsupported, they were sub- jected to a heavy cross-fire from batteries on the hill, and 324 FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT. ^[Sect. X. the enemy, rallying, attacked in turn, and captured many prisoners. Had Morgan energetically supported his lead- ing brigades, he might have secured a lodgment and oc- cupied the face of the hill. At that moment Sherman was superintending the movement at the other point of real attack, where M. L. Smith's division was to cross. There the water was so deep that the men could only cross in single file at great hazard, as the enemy occupied the levee on the opposite side. The Sixth Missouri, how- ever, did cross and get so close under the bank that they were comparatively safe, but they could not get up it. By the time Sherman could reach Morgan, the broken fragments of Blair's and De Courcy's brigades had come back. The enemy had detected the real points of attack, and had rallied to them. The ground was very blind and difficult on the na- tional side, but the Confederates could look th^e confederate ^ dowu ffom their bluff, and detect every movement. Though the attempt had thus been most resolutely made, it failed. The enemy's line had not been forced. The national loss was 191 killed, 982 wounded, 756 missing. Total, 1929. Of the missing a majority were probably taken prisoners. Sherman now ordered all the positions to be strength- sherman prepares eued, aud, lu au iutcrvicw with Admiral to renewthe attack, ^^^^q^, arranged to embark Steele's divis- ion, to make a strong attack on Haines's Bluff, while he should renew the attack at Chickasaw, and effect a lodg- ment. The movement was intended for night. Steele's troops were accordingly all embarked, but so heavy a fog settled that, just before daylight. Porter sent a mes- sage that he could not see to steer the boats, and, as the movement would have to be made by daylight, he doubt- ed its success. Chap. LI.] ARKANSAS POST. 325 The Confederates were now fast receiving re-enforce- ments. Not without reason did they triumph in their double success. They had forced Grant back, and had defeated Sherman. Trains of cars could be heard coming in almost every hour, and fresh troops could be seen on the bluffs. It was plain that they were either from Haines's Bluff or from Pemberton's army. At this time, notwithstanding every precaution, the na- tional camp was full of spies. From these Pemberton had heard of Sherman's movements and of Grant's change of plan. He was enabled by his railroads to throw into Vicksburg a force too great to be overcome. Sherman had just concluded that he could not break tlie enemy's lines when General McClernand arrived. To him, as the senior officer, Sherman reported at the mouth of the Yazoo, explaining the state of affairs, and receiving a confirma- tion of his order for abandoninej the attempt on Vicksburg. McClernand brought down the river the first authentic news of Grant's abandon- ment of the other line of attack, and the return to Mem- phis of the advance of his army. It happened that Sher- man had left Memphis in so much haste that he had not a full supply of ammunition suited to his guns. It had been sent down the Mississippi after him on a boat, which was captured by the Confederates as it passed by the mouth of the Arkansas Eiver. This circumstance satis- fied Sherman that before operations could be conducted against Vicksburg by the Mississippi Kiver it would be necessary to reduce Arkansas Post (Fort Hindman), a well-constructed fort forty miles up the Arkansas, behind which the Confederates kept several steam-boats for the purpose of sallying forth from that river and molesting the line of supply. The fort was on the site of an old French settlement of 1685. Sherman represented the matter to McClernand, who was then in command, in the 326 CAPTURE OF ARKANSAS POST. • [Sect. X. presence of Admiral Porter, and, with great difficulty, pre- vailed on Mm to consent to the expedition. On the 10th of January the gun-boats shelled the Confederate sharp- shooters out of their rifle-pits, and, under their fire, the troops pushed up through the half-frozen, miry swamps. In the cold wintry night, without fires, they made ready for an assault the next day, when, encountering a heavy fire and suffering severely, the troops advanced within musket range of the defenses. The guns of the fort had been silenced, and, as the men were moving to the as- The capture of Ar- sault, a whlte flag was hoisted on the place, ansas Post. ^^^ -^ ^^^ Surrendered. Sherman himself was the second person to ride over the parapet. 5000 prisoners, 17 guns, 3000 small-arms, and a large quantity of stores were taken. The national loss was 977 men. The expedition then dropped back to Milliken's Bend, where Grant joined it, and from that time till July 4th he commanded the army in person. The Mississippi thus became the great artery of his supply until the final cam- paign. CHAPTER LIL THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS AND FIRST FORCING OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER BY FARRAGUT. The national government determined on a naval expedition for the capture of New Orleans, and assigned Farragut to its command. An auxiliary land force was placed under the command of Butler. Farragut, with a fleet of wooden ships, forced his way past the forts defending New Orleans. He destroyed the Confederate fleet, which had several armored ships, and captured the city. He then sent a squadron up the Mississippi, reducing the chief towns upon it. He subjected Vicksburg to an inefi*ectual bombardment, forced his way past its bat- teries, and made a junction with the fleet from Cairo. Again passing the batteries, he descended the river and reduced the chief places on the Texan coast. The government of New Orleans as administered by Butler. Whoever is strong enough to hold New Orleans is jnaster of the Mississippi Valley. New Orleans was not only the largest, but also the most important city of the Confederacy. The charge of it was at first committed to General Twiggs, as a reward for his having surrendered the United States army under his command in Texas (vol. i., p. 544). But a more ener- getic officer being required, General Lovell had been ap- pointed in his stead. In the autumn of 1861, the national government re- solved upon the capture and occupation of Preparations for the ,,. ., -^1 * i ^ ti capture of New Or- tuis citv. It was cousidercd expedient not to wait for the progress of the military com- binations then in preparation for a forcible passage down the river, but to accomplish the object by a special naval expedition fitted out from the Atlantic ports. The command of this expedition was assigned to Cap- 328 FAREAGUT'S ATTACK ON NEW ORLEANS. [Sect. X. Thefleetundercom- tain D. G. Fairagut, an officer of great skill xnandofFarragut. ^nd daring. In addition to the squadron employed in enforcing tlie blockade on the western portions of the Gulf, a large fleet of armed steamers and a bomb flotilla was ordered to join the expedition. This flotilla of mortar vessels, twenty-one in number, and capable of throwing 13-inch shells, was under the orders of Commander Porter. Though General McClellan admitted that the capture of New Orleans would be followed by important results, he would not permit troops to be taken from his already unmanageable Army of the Potomac. A force was, how- ever, sent to Ship Island before the close of 1861, but it was not until Stanton was appointed to the War Depart- ment that vigor was infused into the undertaking. An The land force unr army of eighteen thousand men was then der Butler. fumishcd. Major General Butler was as- signed to its command. He was to assist the expedition, and hold New Orleans after it was taken. On the 25th of February, 1862, Butler sailed from Hampton Koads/ Farragut had already (February 20th) reached Ship Isl- and, in Mississippi Sound. The Mississippi Eiver, continuing the work in which it Topography of the ^^^ bceu engaged for many thousand years, Mississippi, jg steadily encroaching on the waters of the Gul£ Its long watery arm, gauntlet ed in swamps and mud, spreads out, as it were, into a grasping hand, of which the fingers are the Pass a I'Outre, Northeast Pass, South- east Pass, South Pass, Southwest Pass. At a bend about thirty miles up, where the river flows east wardly, the United States had formerly built two powerful works. Fort Jackson on the south bank, and Fort St. Philip on and defenses of New ^^^ uorth. Thcso barrcd tho approach to Orleans. ^|^^ ^-^^ £^^^ ^l^^ Qulf, aud had been armed by the Confederates with 126 guns of long range and large Chap. LII.] DEFENSES OF NEW ORLEANS. 329 ^f/ssis^^^ THE MISSISSIPPI BELOW NEW ORLEANS. ealibre. At this point, too, a chain had been stretched across the river ; it was sustained upon eight hulks, the intervals between them permitting driftwood to pass. From each hulk a spar trailed astern, so that boats could not easily pass from one to another. A fleet of thirteen armed steamers, the steam-battery Louisiana, of sixteen guns, and the ram Manassas, constituted the chief defense afloat ; but, in addition, several rafts and fire-ships had been provided. Lovell had applied to the governor of the state for a re-enforcement of 10,000 men, but it was found impossible to spare him more than 3000 in addi- tion to those he had, so many having been sent to the armies in the Border States. On the 8th of April the national fleet, consisting of four sloops of war, seventeen gun -boats, twenty -one bomb- 330 FAREAGUT'S PLAN OF ATTACK. [Sect. X. schooners, and two sailing-vessels, but having no iron- clads, had, after great labor, been carried over the bar. The Brooklyn had been forcibly dragged through the mud of the Southwest Pass. Since the blockade the wa- ter had been becoming shoaler because of the non-pas- sage of vessels, and at this time there were but fifteen feet at the shallowest part of the channel. The intended plan of operations w^as for Porter to bom- Farragut'8 plan of bard the forts, aud if he failed to reduce attack. them, Farragut was to attempt to run past them. That succeeding, Butler was to land his troops in the rear of St. Philip, and carry it by assault. THE FORTS OP THE MISSISSIPPI. For eight miles below Fort Jackson the south bank of the river has a skirt of woods, the trees being thickly in- terlaced with vines. Through this an opening had been cut by the Confederates to permit their guns to have Arrangement of the ^^uge ou asccudiug vcsscls. Under the mortar vessels. g^^,^^^ ^£ ^-^^^^ ^^^^^ fourtCCU of thc UlOrtar vessels were placed, the remainder being on the other side of the river. It being found, however, that the latter were too much exposed, they also were brought over un- der the covert of the woods. For more effectual conceal- ment, the masts of all the vessels were dressed with leafy Chap.lil] bombardment of the forts. 331 brandies. Careful surveys were made, so that the borabs might be thrown with accuracy, though the forts could not be seen. The chief uncertainty then arose from the varia- ble pressure of the wind on the projectiles in their flight. On the 17th of April the Confederates sent down a fire-raft with the intention of burning the ships, which lay about four miles below. This and others which fol lowed were, however, easily towed by the national sail ors out of the way, and did no harm. On the follow- Bombardment of ^^g momiug the bombardmeut commenced thefoks. During that day 1400 shells were thrown This was continued with but slight interruption during six days and nights. Notwithstanding the assurances of the commandant that " God was certainly protecting them," the garrisons became very much demoralized. In Fort Jackson the barracks had been set on fire soon after the bombardment opened. Its guns were repeatedly si- lenced. As many of the shells burst in the air, owing to the badness of the fuses, the fuses were put in full length, to delay the explosion until the shells had entered the ground. They " penetrated into it eighteen or twenty feet, and, exploding after a time, lifted the earth up, and let it fall back into its place again, demoralizing the men who knew not what the consequences were going to be The effect was like that of an earthquake." The return fire from the forts was, however, at times, very severe shot and rifle shell came crashing through the woodg, tear ing trees up by the roots. The bombardment went stead ily on, fifteen hundred bombs being thrown at the forts ev ery twenty-four hours. " Overcome with fatigue, the com manders and crews of the bomb-vessels might be seen ly ing fast asleep on deck, with a mortar on board the vessel next to them thundering away. The windows were bro- ken at the Balize, thirty miles distant." Fish, stunned by the explosions, were floating about in all directions. 332 PREPARATIONS FOR PASSING THE FORTS. [Sect. X. On the third day of the bombardment Farragut held a Farragut resolves council. He determined to cut the barricade, to pass the forts. ^^^ carry the fleet past the forts to New Orleans. Two gun-boats went up in the darkness of the ensuing night to break the obstruction. One of them at- tempted, but unsuccessfully, to blow up a hulk by means Cutting of the chain of a petard. The other, more successful, arrica e. boardcd thc ccutral hulk. A rocket from Fort Jackson revealed what was going forward, and fire was opened on them, but, with a cold chisel and hammer, the chain was cut. The current at once swept aside the gun-boat and the hulk, which had been lashed together. After much difficulty the former was extricated, and, fa- vored by the darkness, returned with her consort safely to the fleet. Preparations for the passage were now made. Five ' , ships and twelve 2:un-boats, carryino* nearly The order of battle. ^ ^ -, , '^ ^ *^ 300 guns, were arranged m two columns : LEFT COLUMN. EIGHT COLUMN. 1st Division of Ships. 2d Division of Ships. Hartford. Pensacola. Brooklyn. Richmond. Mississippi. d Division of Gun-boats. Is^ Division of Gun-boats. Sciota. Iroquois. Cayuga. Oneida. Kennebec. Varuna. Pinola. Katahdin. Itasca. Kineo. . Winona. Wissahickon. The ships of the left column, led by Farragut, were to attack Fort Jackson ; the second division of gun-boats in that column was to keep the middle of the river, disre- gard the forts, and attack the Confederate fleet above. The right column, under Bailey, was to attack Fort St. Philip. Six small steamers, belonging to Porter's flotilla, Chap^LU.] the battle of the MISSISSIPPI. 333 were to silence the water battery below Fort Jackson, but not to pass it. Eacli ship was got ready for battle. The chain cables The ships prepared wcro loopcd ovcr the sidcs in two layers, to for action. ^-^^ ^^ iron-clad protection. The decks and gnn-carriages of some were whitewashed — an expedient that was found to be of very great service in making things visible at night. Bags of sand, coal, and other suitable materials were so placed as to protect the en- gines. At five minutes before two o'clock in the morning of Signal for the at- the 24th of April two red lights were hung ^*^^* out. It was the signal to go into action. In little more than an hour the fleet w^as all fairly under way. Porter's mortar -boats redoubled their fire, and made the air alive with shells. Care had been previ- ously taken to get accurate range for them. They kept up their work with unceasing vigor until after the last vessels ofFarragut's columns were in the heat of the bat- tle. The night was very close, hazy, and dark ; the smoke of the cannonading lay heavily on the river. A rain of bombs was falling into the forts. Dark as it was, every ship, spar, and rope soon became visible^ — visible through the smoke in the red light of the battle. The waning crescent of the moon rose just at the time that Farragut was going into action. Struggling against the current of the river, Farragut passa-eofFarra-ut cariied his ship, thc Hartford, safely through in his'-flag-ship. ° ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^.^^ -Q^^^ ^-^^ ^^^^g ^^^^ g^.^^ on him. He reserved his guns for fifteen minutes, until he could bear fairly on Fort Jackson ; then he poured forth such broadsides of grape and canister that nothing living could stand before them. The cannoniers in the fort fled from their guns. The Confederate ram Manas- sas, which had been hidden from sight by the smoke. 334 THE BATTLE OF THE MISSISSIPPI. [Sect. X. pushed a fire-raft upon him. The Hartford was soon in flames half way up to her tops. In the struggle she was forced ashore. But while she was on fire her cannonading never ceased. Her crew extinguished the flames; she was backed oflP, and again headed up the stream. A Confederate steamer rushed at her with the intention of boarding her. One shell from the Hartford blew her up. Farragut was now passing St. Philip. He gave it such broadsides as he had given Fort Jackson, and silenced it. Half an hour more carried him through the fiery storm of iron, and his part of the work was thoroughly done. In passing the barricade, the Brooklyn, whose place Passage of the was astem of the Hartford, missed the open- yn. • j^^^ grated on a hulk, and became entangled. She received the fire of St. Philip. The iron-clad Manas- sas, when within ten feet of her, gave her a shot at her steam-drum, and then attempted to butt her ; but the dis- tance between them being only a few feet, speed could not be got up, and the blow was ineffectual. While under the fire of Fort Jackson this ship encountered an- other steamer. "Our port broadside (11 9-inch shells), at the short distance of fifty or sixty yards, completely finished her, setting her on fire almost instantaneously." As the Brooklyn, enveloped in a black cloud of smoke from a fire-raft, passed St. Philip in only thirteen feet of water, her grape and canister drove the men from their guns, and for a time completely silenced the fort. The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half In the same manner, Bailey, who headed the right col- passage of the right umu, weut iu the Cayuga through the bar- ricade, both forts opening upon him and striking him repeatedly. He gave his fire of grape and canister at short range as he passed St. Philip, and found himself, owing to the speed of his ship, ahead of his friends, and alone in the midst of the Confederate fleet. Chap. LII.] FARRAGUT'S VICTORY. 335 He beat off two that tried to board him. In the quaint phraseology of a sailor, he says that "an 11 -inch Dahl- gren, at thirty yards, quieted a third, who thereupon shoved off for shore, ran aground, and burned himself up." The Cayuga was struck forty-two times. Boggs, in the Varuna, following her, " got into a nest of rebel steam- ers." He " worked both his sides, loaded with grape," on his antagonists ; exploded the boiler of one of them — she drifted ashore. Three others were driven after her in flames. The Varuna was now raked by the fire of an iron-clad, which killed four and wounded nine of her men. The iron-clad then butted her twice ; but, while she was so doing, Boggs " managed to get into her three 8-inch shell and several shot from his rifle, thereby dis- abling her." Again another iron-clad twice butted him, but, happening to go ahead after the concussion, he was able to put through her unarmored stern ^ve 8-inch shells, " that settled her, and she went ashore in flames." The side of the Varuna had been crushed, but she kept up her fire until the water was over her gun-trucks. In M- Sinking of the va- "t^en mluutcs from the time she was butted ^''''^' she sank, her top-gallant forecastle only be- ing out of the water. She went to the bottom as she " settled" her antagonist. The Mississippi, one of the ships of this column, was shot through and through eight times ; her mizzen-mast was shattered. The ram Manassas struck her on the port quarters, making a hole seven feet long and four inches wide. Through the same fiery ordeal the other steam-ships The fleet forces its ^ud guu-boats passed, three only excepted— way past the forts. ^-^^ itasca, whlch had becu shot in her boil- er ; the Kennebec, caught in the chain ; and the Winona, The Confederate flo- forccd back. The Confederate flotilla was tiiia destroyed. ^^^^^j^ dcstroyed. Its chicf reliaucc, the 336 NIGHT-SCENE ON THE RIVER. [Sect. X. iron-clad Manassas, liad been run ashore, and riddled by the broadsides of the Mississippi. Her crew escaped to the land ; she was boarded, set on fire, drifted down the river, and blew up. Twelve of the Confederate flotilla had been sunk or burned. Commander Porter, who kept up the mortar fire while Farragut was forcing his way, says of the conclusion of the battle : " It was reported to me that the celebrated ram Manassas was coming out to attack us, and, sure enough, there she was, apparently steaming along shore, ready to pounce upon the defenseless mortar vessels ; but I soon discovered that she could harm no one again. She was beginning to emit smoke from her ports or holes; she was on fire, and sinking. Her pipes were twisted and riddled with shot ; her hull was well cut up. She had evidently been used up by the squadron as they passed along. I tried to save her as a curiosity by getting a hawser round her and securing her to the mored ram Manas- bank, but just after doiug SO she faintly ex- ploded. Her only gun went off, and, emit- ting flames through her bow-port, like some huge animal, she gave a plunge and disappeared under the water. " Next came a steamer on fire ; after her two others, burning and floating down the stream. ofth" S?er befoS Flrcs sccmcd to be rac^ino; all along; the ' up daybreak. • , i it -, river, and we supposed that our squadron was burning and destroying the vessels as they passed along. The sight of this night attack was awfully grand. The river was lit up by rafts filled with pine knots, and the ships seemed to be literally fighting among flames and smoke." At five o'clock the Cayuga discovered the encampment of the Chalmette regiment on the right bank towarlNew or-^^ of thc rivcr, and compelled it to surrender. The telegraph wires ahead were cut, the fleet [ Chap. LII.] THE FLEET KEACHES NEW ORLEANS. 337 proceeding up toward New Orleans, encountering cotton- loaded ships on fire. Three miles below the city, the Chalmette batteries, mounting twenty guns, were reached. The Cayuga, leading, sustained their cross-fire for some time alone ; but the Hartford, Pensacola, Brooklyn, and other ships coming up, gave the batteries such a storm of shells, shrapnel, and grape as drove the men from their guns. " The forts were silenced, and those who could run were running in every direction." Farragut reports that, " owing to the slowness of some of the vessels, and our want of knowledge set fire to their cot- of thc rlvcr, we did not reach the En2:lish ton and ships. .^ .^ ■, .--, ,, Turn until about 10.30 A.M. on the 25th, but all the morning I had seen abundant evidence of the panic which had seized the people in New Orleans. Cot- ton-loaded ships on fire came floating down, and working instruments of every kind, such as are used in ship-yards. The destruction of property was awful. The levee in New Orleans was one scene of desolation. Ships, steam- ers, cotton, coal, were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was much taxed to avoid the floating confla- gration." Lovell, seeing what had taken place at the forts, gal- loped to New Orleans. He ordered the land defenses to resist to the utmost ; but the water in the river was so high that the ships could command all the earth-works. After a brief and angry consultation with the terror-strick- en municipality, he sent off his munitions, disbanded his troops, and turned the city over to the mayor. In the midst of a thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his ' The squadron anch- squadrou off Ncw Orlcaus at 1 P.M. The ors off the city. populacc, who had believed that the defenses of the city were impregnable, were astounded, and in an impotent frenzy. The sailors in the national ships were cheering, the crowd ashore was cursing. Some were n.— Y 338 SURRENDER OF NEW ORLEANS DEMAOT)ED. [Sect. X. clamoring for tlie blood of the commandant of tlie forts; some were invoking vengeance on Lovell ; ^some, ragged and raging, but with nothing to lose, insisted that the city- should be burned. A demand was now made by Farragut for a surrender, Farrac^ut demands ^^^ tho displaj of thc United Statcs flag on itssuiWer. ^^^ p^^^.^ buildings. So suddculy and so unexpectedly had the blow fallen on them that the may- or and municipal authorities hardly knew what to do. On one side they had an unreflecting and turbulent pop- ulace to deal with; on the other, a clement conqueror. Farragut, as merciful in victory as he was brave in action, appreciated their hour of bitterness, and listened with generosity to the mayor's querulous protestations. Upon his arrival before the city, Farragut had sent Captain Bailey, his second in command, to the mayor with the demand for the surrender, and to inform that func- tionary that no flag but that of the United States would be permitted to fly in presence of the national fleet. To this the mayor replied, " transmitting the answer which the universal sentiment of my con- Reply of the mayor. "^ stituency, no less than the promptings oi my own heart dictate to me on this sad and solemn oc- casion." It was to the effect that the city was utterly defenseless; that he was no military man ; that he knew neither how to command an army nor to surrender an undefended place. " As to the hoisting of any flag than the flag of our own adoption and allegiance, let me say to you that the man lives not in our midst whose hand and heart would not be palsied by the mere thought of such an act; nor could I find in my entire constituency so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspira- tions. Sir, you have manifested sentiments which would become one engaged in a better cause than that to which Chap. LIIJ THE NATIONAL FLAG INSULTED. 339 you have devoted your sword. I doubt not that they spring from a noble though deluded nature, and I know how to appreciate the motives that inspire them. You will have a gallant people to administer — a people sen- sitive of all that can in the least affect its dignity and self-a:espect." > In this refusal of the mayor to hoist the United States flag on the national buildings — the Custom- the public buijd- house, Post-office, Mint — the Common Coun- ings. , ' . ' , cil of the city united. Hereupon Farragut sent a party on shore to perform that duty. ^^They were insulted in the grossest manner, and the flag that had been hoisted by his orders on the Mint It is insulted. nii tt was pulled down and dragged through the streets." He therefore notified the mayor to remove the w^omen and children from the city within forty-eight hours, as the fire of the fleet might be drawn upon it, and an amount of distress ensue to the innocent population which he had heretofore declared that he desired by all means to avoid. To this the mayor replied, addressing his communica- The mayor express- ^i^u to ^^ Mr. Farragut," as hc ventured to r^tVif bemSeii' dcsiguate the United States officer, that the ^''^^* interference of the United States forces while negotiations were pending between him and the con- queror " could not be viewed by him otherwise than as a flagrant violation of those courtesies, if not of the absolute rights which prevail between belligerents under such cir- cumstances," and that his " views and sentiments in rela- tion to such conduct remain unchanged;" that the notifi- cation to remove the women and children was an " utter inanity." " They can not escape from your shells if it be your pleasure to murder them on a question of mere eti* quette. Even if they could, there are but few among them who would consent to desert their families, and home^, 340 SURRENDER OF THE CITY. [Sect. X. and the graves of their relatives in so awful a moment. They vs^ould bravely stand the sight of your shells rolling over the bones of those who were once dear to them, and would deem that they had not died ingloriously by the side of the tombs erected by their piety to the memory of departed relatives." ^ Farragut now raised the United States flag upon the Custom-house, and sent a letter to the mayor requiring him to " see that it was respected with all the civil pow- er of the city." History may be searched in vain for another such cor- respondence as this between a city taken by Singular character , ,., 'ii/iip* of tBis correspond- storm aud its conqueror m the flush oi vic- tory. It is impossible not to see that the recalcitrant civic authorities w^ere implicitly putting their trust in the forbearance of that Great and Clement Power which they w^ere ostensibly defying. They knew that it would do them no wrong. General Butler, who had witnessed the passage of the forts by Farragut, now proceeded to execute his part of the duty. He brought his forces into the rear of St. Philip, Porter keeping up a bombardment. On the 27th of April the garrison had become so demoralized as to Surrender of the r^fusc to fight auy lougcr. Thc forts were two forts. therefore surrendered on the next day. While the terms were being adjusted, the ofiicers of the Confederate ram Louisiana towed her out into the cur- rent and set her on fire, with her guns all shotted, ex- pecting that she would drift down and explode in the midst of Porter's fleet. For this they were sent close prisoners to the North. On the 1st of May New Orleans was formally occu- pied by United States troops. The loss on the national side in achieving this great victory was 40 killed and 177 wounded. It was not Chap. LIL] BATON ROUGE. 341 alone tlie capture of the city that was accomplished, but the destruction of iron-clads which Would shortly have become very formidable. Bailey, the captain who had led the right column, truly described the battle: "It was a contest between iron hearts in wooden vessels and iron-clads with iron beaks, and the iron hearts won." Among naval authorities, the battle of the Mississip- pi caused, if not a reversal, at least a suspen- The value of wood- . ^.-i .. ^ tp ,, en against iron siou 01 the opinious lormed irom the corn- ships. ■*• bats of the Merrimack in Hampton Eoads. Farragut, an officer equal to Nelson in audacity, without hesitation took all odds. He fought walls of stone and a fleet of iron-clads with a wooden fleet, and actually won the battle. New Orleans having thus been occupied, a part of the The fleet moves up ^^^^ was scut by Farragut up the Missis- the Mississippi. gj^p.^ capturing without resistance Baton Rouge, the capital of the state. On taking possession a correspondence ensued with the mayor, the counterpart of that which had taken place with the Mayor of New The Mayor of Baton Orlcaus. That officcr dcclarcd that his city ^''"^^' would not be surrendered voluntarily to any power on earth, and declined to " offend the sensibilities of his people by hoisting the flag of the United States." Captain Palmer, the commander of the Iroquois, hoisted over the arsenal the flag, and, in reply to the mayor, re- marked that "war is a sad calamity, and often inflicts se- verer wounds than those upon the sensibilities." In a letter reporting the state of affairs to Farragut he said, " Here is the capital of a state, with 7000 inhabitants, ac- knowledging itself defenseless, and yet assuming an arro- gant tone, trusting to our forbearance. I was determined to submit to no such nonsense, and accordingly weighed anchor and steamed up abreast the arsenal, landed a 342 OPERATIONS AGAINST VICKSBURG. [Sect. X. force, and took possession of the public property of tHe United States, and hoisted over it our flag. No resist- ance was offered." The Iroquois left Baton Eouge (May 13), and, pro- captureof ceediug up to Natchez, took possession of ^^^^^^^ that city. On the 18th of May the advance steamers of the squadron had reached Vicksbur^r. A de- Demand for the ;i i? xl, i _f» xi j -T surrender of vicks- maud lOT the surrcndcr 01 that citv was at burg. 1 • 1 once made, to which the military governor replied, " I have to state that Mississippians don't know and refuse to learn how to surrender to an enemy. If Commodore Farragut or Brigadier General Butler can teach them, let them come and try." Porter's mortar -boats had to be towed up to Vicks- burg. It was not until the 28th of June, when sixteen of them had arrived, that Farragut was ready. The ac- tion commenced at 4 P.M. by a bombardment. Farra- Farragut attacks g^t's flag-shlp, thc Hartford, with six other the place. vcsscls, thcu passcd the batteries. She was under fire about one hour and a half, going at her slow- est speed, and even stopping to silence a battery as she passed. The loss in all the ships was 15 killed and 30 wounded. A junction was made with the forces which had come down the river from Cairo. The United States flag had been carried in triumph throughout the whole length of the Mississippi. Further operations against Vicksburg having been for the time abandoned under orders from Wash- yfcksbm^\¥an°^ iusfton, thcrc beinsr no sufficient land force to doned. ~ ' , ~ , co-operate, and the ships being unable to maker any impression on the Confederate works, Farragut once more steamed past the batteries, and, as the river was now falling fast, went down to New Orleans (July 28), and thence to Pensacola ; the latter place, having Chap. LII.] BUTLER IN NEW ORLEANS. 343 been evacuated by the Confederates, had been made the depot of the Western Gulf squadron, its advantages be- ing superior to those of Ship Island. While a part of the squadron lay off Baton Eouge, an attack was made by the Confederates on the Confederate attack i n r^ i tttmt on General wii- commaud 01 (xenerai Williams, occupying that place. In the action that officer was killed. The . gun-boats could not be brought into posi- tion until late in the day, when they compelled the. Con- federate left wing to make a precipitate retreat. A Con- federate ram, the Arkansas, which was to have taken part in the engagement, remained a short distance above. Next morning the Essex encountered her, and, after a short engagement, blew her up. During September, detachments sent by Admiral Far- captnreofGai- YSLgut took possesslou of Corpus Chrfsti aud veston. Sabine City ; and in October, the defenses of the harbor and city of Galveston were captured, there having been only a feeble resistance. General Butler now entered on the difficult task of The rule of Butler govcming Ncw Oiicans. Its population, in New Orleans. ^^^^^^ grcatty diminished to strengthen the Confederate armies in the Border States — a cause of bitter complaint to the inhabitants — still numbered about 140,000. Almost one half of it was of foreign birth. Perhaps no city in the world had in its lower classes a more dangerous and desperate population. There was a widespread hope that a French force would soon come to their help. By firmness, strict yet considerate, he controlled the municipal authorities ; by severity he put down the mob. He was a terror to tricky tradesmen, a benefactor to the starving poor. He cleaned the streets, enforced sanitary regulations, and kept out yellow fever. He put an ef- 344 THE WOMAN OKDEE. [Sect. X. fectual stop to the operations of Confederate agents, who were illicitly obtaining supplies for their cause. New Or- leans found that " Butler was no sham, but a most thor- ough proconsular reality." He arrested Mumford, the person who had hauled down Execution of the uatloual flag at the Mint, brought him Mumford. before a military commission, convicted and executed him. On this the Confederate President issued the following proclamation (December 23d, 1862) : "I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States ofAmer- Butier proclaimed a ^^^j ^^ their name, do pronounce and declare ^he felon by Davis. g^id Benjamin F. Butler a felon deserving capital punishment. I do order that he be no longer considered or treat- ed simply as a public enemy of the Confederate States of America, but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind ; and that, in the event of his capture, the officer in command of the capturing force do cause him to be immediately executed by hanging ; and I do further order that no commissioned officer of the United States taken captive shall be released on parole before exchange until the said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crimes. All commissioned officers in the command of the said Benjamin F. Butler are declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers en- gaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals deserving death, and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, re- served for execution." Some women of New Orleans, relying on the immunity National officers in- of their sex, gratified their animosity by in- suited by women, g^^^tiug uatloual officcrs lu publlc places. One of them ventured so far as to spit in the face of an officer who was quietly walking in the street. Hereupon was issued " General OfeDER "No. 28. — As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subjected to repeated in- sults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on oifr part, it is ordered that hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and Chap.LIL] the FRENCH consul. 345 held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avoca- tion." Finding tliat it was impossible to co-ordinate tlie na- tional authority, of whicH he was the repre- Butler suspends the 1 1 • • ^i j i • • i ,^ • 1 • muuicipai authori- sentative, With the municipal authorities, who openly sustained the Confederate cause, he suspended them. A French war ship, supposed to be the precursor of a French fleet, having come into the riv- er, and the Common Council having presumed to offer the hospitalities of the port, Butler, considering the dis- ease of the French position which the French government had warship. manifested to intermeddle in American af- fairs, ordered the Council to revise its action, and gave it to understand that the United States authorities were the only ones in New Orleans capable of dealing with foreign nations. His dealings with the numerous and insubordinate Accusations against foreigu popuktiou of Ncw Orlcaus brought the French consul, j^-^ -^^^ COllisioU with thc forcigU COUSuls. " Count Mejan" (the French consul), Butler declared," has connived at the delivery of clothing for the Confederate army since the occupation of New Orleans by the Federal forces ; he has taken away nearly half a million of specie to aid the Confederates. His flag has been made to cov- er all manner of illegal and hostile transactions, and the booty arising. therefrom." The feeling of personal hatred to Butler grew daily Counter-accusations i^ore aud morc liitense. He was accused against Butler. ^£ impropcr tampering with the banks, spec- ulating in sequestrated property, and, through the agency of his brother, carrying on illegal but profitable transac- tions in sugar and cotton — in short, prostituting his office for personal gain. In South Carolina a reward of $10,000 had been offered for his assassination. Throughout the Confederacy he received an ignominious surname, and 346 THE GOVERNMENT RECALLS BUTLER. [Sect. X. was known as " Butler the Beast." The government felt Investigation of his constralned to send a commissioner to New transactions. Orleans to investigate his transactions. Its conclusion was that he had evidently acted " under a mis- apprehension, to be referred. to the patriotic zeal which governs him, to the circumstances encircling his command at the time, so well calculated to excite suspicion, and to an earnest desire to punish, to the extent of his supposed power, all who had contributed, or were contributing, to the aid of a rebellion the most unjustifiable and wicked that insane or bad men were ever engaged in." The French government recalled its consul ; the Amer- The French consul ^^^^ rccallcd Butlcr, Gcucral Banks arriving Zi^d WNew in New Orleans (December 14th) to take Orleans. -j^j^ place. lu a farewcll address to the peo- ple of that city. General Butler said : " Commanding the Army of the Gulf, I found you cap- Butier's farewell ^urcd, but uot Surrendered ; conquered, but address. uot Orderly; relieved from the pressure of an army, but incapable of taking care of yourselves. I re- stored order, punished crime, opened commerce, brought provisions to your starving people, reformed your current cy, and gave you protection such as you had He states what he , . -, p -ttti i haddone for the uot eujoyed lor many years. Whoever has quietly remained about his business, afford- ing neither aid nor comfort to the enemies of the United States, has never been interfered with by the soldiers of the United States. " Some of your women flouted at the presence of those who came to protect them. By a simple He defends his con- TTnn it n ii * duct to their worn- Order, 1 callcd upon every soldier ot this army to treat the women of New Orleans as gentlemen should deal with the sex, with such effect that and appeals to their ^ ^^^ Call UpOU the just-miudcd kdicS of just-minded ladies. ]^g^ Orlcaus to Say whcthcp they ever en- Chap. LII.] BUTLBR'S PAREWELL ADDEESS. 347 joyed so complete protection and calm quiet for them- selves and their families as since the advent of the Unit- ed States troops. "I hold that rebellion is treason, and that rebellion Theprincipiesofhis P^rsistcd in Is deatli, and any punishment administration. gj^^^j.^ ^f ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ traitor glvcs SO much clear gain to him from the clemency of the government. Upon this thesis have I administered the authority of the United States. I might have regaled you with the amen- ities of British civilization, and yet been within the sup- posed rules of civilized warfare. Your property could have been turned over to indiscriminate " loot," like the palace of the Emperor of China; works of art which adorned your buildings might have been sent away like I the paintings of the Vatican ; your sons might have been blown from the mouths of cannon like the Sepoys of Delhi, and yet all this would have been from'author'ized wlthlu thc rulcs of clvlUzed warfare as prac- barbarities, , . ' ticed by the most polished and the most hypocritical nations of Europe. But I have not so con- ducted. On the contrary, the worst punishment inflicted, except for criminal acts, punishable by every law, has been banishment, with labor, to a barren island where I encamped my own soldiers before marching here." " I have levied upon the wealthy rebels and paid out and has fed the ^^arly half a million of dollars to feed 40,000 starving poor. ^£ ^^ starving poor of all nations assembled here, made so by this war. I saw that this rebellion was a war of the aristocrats against the middling men — of the rich against the poor — a war of the landowner against the laborer ; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the hands of the few against the many, and I found no conclusion to it save in the subjugation of the few and disenthralment of the many. I therefore felt no hesitation in taking the substance of the wealthy, who 348 BUTLER'S FAREWELL ABDRESS. [Sect. X. had caused the war, to feed the innocent poor who suf- fered by it ; and I shall now leave you with the proud consciousness that I carry wdth me the blessings of the humble and loyal under the roof of the cottage and in the cabin of the slave, and so am quite content to incur the sneers of the salon or the curses of the rich. " I found you trembling at the terror of servile insur- rection ; all danger of this I have prevented slaves may be gov- bv SO treatiuo; the slave that he had no erned by kiuduess, *' ^ cause. to rebel. I found the dungeon, the chain, and the lash your only means of enforcing obedi- ence on your servants. I leave them peaceful, laborious, controlled by the laws of kindness and justice. ; " I have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept from your borders; I have added a million may be kept out of of dollars to vour wcalth in the form of new the city. *' land from the batture of the Mississippi. I have cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and public squares, and opened new avenues to unoccupied land. I have given you freedom of election greater than you ever enjoyed before. I have caused He has adminis- ... , i t . . , -x . , • tt tered impartial justicc to bc administered so impartially that your own advocates have unanimously complimented the judges of my appointment. " You have seen, therefore, the benefits of the law- s and He appeals to the justice of the govcrnmeut against which you P''P^'' have rebelled. Why, then, will you not all return to your allegiance to that government, not with lip service, but wdth that of the heart ? " There is but one thing that at this hour stands be- tween you and the government, and that is slavery. The institution, cursed of God, which has taken its last refuge here, in His providence will be rooted out as the tares from the wheat, although the wheat be torn up with it. " I came among you by teachings, by habit of mind, by Chap. LIL] BUTLER'S FAREWELL ADDRESS. 349 im lorin them to P^^li^i^^^l positloii, by soclal affinity, inclined abandon slavery, ^^ sustain y ouF domestic laws, if by possibil- ity it could be done witli safety to the Union. Months of experience and observation have forced the conclusion on me that the existence of slavery is incompatible with the safety either of yourselves or of the Union. As the system has gradually grown to its present huge dimen- sions, it w^ere best if it could be gradually removed ; but it is better, far better that it should be taken out at once, than that it should vitiate the social, political, and family relations of your country. I am speaking with no phil- anthropic views as regards the slave, but simply of the ef- fect of slavery on the master. See for yourselves ; look around you, and say whether this saddening, deadening influence has not all but destroyed the very frame-work of your society. I am speaking the farewell words of one who has shown his devotion to his country at the peril of his life and fortune, who in these words can Kave neither hope nor interest save the good of those whom he addresses. " Come, then, to the unconditional support of the gov- and return to their emmcut. Take luto your own hands your allegiance. ^^^^ iustitutious. Ecmodel them according to the laws of nations and of God, and thus attain that great prosperity assured to you by geographical position, only a portion of which was heretofore yours." CHAPTER LIII. THE SORTIE OF BRAGG AND ITS REPULSE. BATTLES OF PERRY- VILLE AND MURFREESBOROUGH. Encouraged by its successes in Virginia, the Confederate government ordered Gen- eral Bragg to advance from Chattanooga northward. He executed his orders, compelling Buell to retreat to the Ohio. He then attempt- ed to establish a Confederate government in Kentucky. Buell was re-enforced ; the Battle of Perryville was fought ; and Bragg, car- rying away immense plunder, reti^ated. Rosecrans was ordered to take com- mand of Buell's army. Bragg, marching northward again, was overthrown by Rosecrans at the Battle of MuRFREESBOROUGH ; and the Confederates, giving up all hope of crossing the Ohio, retired to TuUahoma. The sortie of Bragg had failed. The Civil War had already assumed its characteristic aspect. The Confederate States were completely belea- guered and besieged. They were encircled by the blockade of the sea-coast, . . ^y hostile armies on the north of Virginia tion oftheconfed- aiid alous* the entire line of the Ohio, bv eracy. *-" , 'J a patrol of national gun-boats on the Mis- sissippi as far as Memphis, and by Farragut's ships from New Orleans to Vicksburg. I have now to relate how they made convulsive efforts to break through this line of investment, the stringency of which was daily increasing. The campaigns of Bragg and of Lee stand in the attitude of gigantic sorties — gigantic, yet only in proportion to the vastness of the siege. The Confederate government was not without causes of encouragement. Conscription had re-enforced its ar- mies; victory had rewarded its efforts. McClellan had Chap. LIII.] THE SORTIE OF BRAGG. 351 been driven from Eichmond; his peninsular campaign had totally failed. It seemed as if the time had now come for gratifying Determination to thc clamor SO importunately raised through- make offensive war. ^^^ ^^^ g^^^|^ ^^^^ ^-^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^_ ger be canied on defensively, but that vigorous offensive operations should be instituted in the Free States. The demand had become irresistible — "Carry the war into the enemy's country, and relieve us from its intolerable burdens." Accordingly, as the proper initiatory steps, Lee was di- The sorties of Bragg Tcctcd to move iuto Maryland and Bragg and Lee. -^^^ Kcutucky. It was supposcd that those slaveholding states, thus far lost to the Confederacy, would be easily reclaimed; that from them the North might be invaded, and peace wrung from it in one of its great cities. Lee's movement to the North we shall have to consider in a subsequent chapter. In this we have to speak of Bragg's. Bragg was at Chattanooga. In his march to it from Tupelo he had outstripped the tardy Buell, who, as we have seen (p. 311), had been dispatched by Hsilleck on the 10th of June. It was clear that very great incidental advantages would arise from the march of Brasfor's army Advantages of , ., _ ^ , i i Bragg's northward uorthward irom Chattanooo;a alons: the west marcn. o o flank of the Cumberland Mountains, for not only might he recover the two states Tennessee and Ken- tucky, and threaten Louisville and Cincinnati, but he might compel the detachment of a large part of the force from the army of Grant near Corinth. The projected march of that general southward toward New Orleans might be half paralyzed by the march of Bragg north- ward to Louisville. The event more than justified these 352 OSTENSIBLE MOTIVE EOR BKAGG'S SORTIE. [Sect. X. C//VC//V/VAT/ OHIO E H G I A ALTON THE SORTIE OF BRAGG. expectations, for Buell himself was at once thrown from the confines of Alabama to the Ohio Eiver, a distance of three hundred miles. The Confederate authorities had considered it expe- An ostensible mo- ^icut to havc au ostcnsiblc as well as a real assigned. motive for the Northern campaign in which tive chap.liii.] the confederates march northward. 353. Bragg was about to engage. While their real objects were such as have been just described, they gave out that they were undertaking a foray into Kentucky. It was affirmed that in that state there were more provisions and live-stock than in all the rest of the South. Bragg might fail in destroying the national forces, in driving them north of the Ohio, in capturing Louisville and Cin- cinnati, in detaching the Northwest from the Union, in arresting Grant's march to the South, but it was hardly possible for him to fail in securing a vast supply of pro- visions ; and it was supposed that the Southern people, expecting no more, would be content with that. The conscription had raised Bragg's army to 50,000 Brag- commences ^^^' ^ was orgaulzcd iu three corps. hism-arch. rj.^^^^ ^^ Hardcc and Polk were with him at Chattanooga ; that of Kirby Smith was at Knoxville. With the former Bragg commenced moving northward from Chattanooga, having his antagonist Buell on his left flank. He directed his march toward the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad, and reached it at Mumfordsville, en- countering there a national force, which he compelled to surrender. Meantime Kirby Smith left Knoxville with the inten- Kirby Smith com- tlou of joiulug Bragg, aud marched as rapid- menceshismarch. ly aS hc COuld thrOUgh Big CrCck Gap. At Eichmond, Kentucky, he routed a national force under Brigadier General Manson, their loss being, according to his statement, 1000 killed and wounded, 5000 prisoners, 9 guns, 10,000 small-arms, and a large quantity of pro- visions and ammunition. He then passed through Lex- ington, and advanced northward as far as Cynthiana. On his part, Buell, forestalled in the occupation of Buell is obliged to Chattauooga, was depending on Louisville rollback. £^j. gi^pplies, and hence had to guard near- ly 300 miles of railroad. As Bragg marched northward, H.— Z 354 BUELL FAIJ.S BACK TO LOUISVILLE. [Sect.X. Buell was compelled to execute a parallel march, and fall back upon Nashville. From Mumfordsville Bragg moved to Frankfort, and Bragg and Smith ^t that place Kirbj Smith, coming down '^'*^' from Cynthiana, made a junction with him. He had been pretending to attack Nashville while his colleague Smith had been pretending to attack Cincin- nati. Buell had, however, detected, from dispatches he had intercepted, that their true object was Louisville, Their movements had been too slow. It had taken Bragg six weeks to march from Chattanooga to Frankfort ; and Buell, leaving a* garrison for the protection of Nashville, reached Louisville first (September 25th). He found the Buell forced north- cltj lu a pauic. Had it uot becu that Bragg ^^""^ was detained by a burnt bridge near Bards- town, the Confederates would have captured the place. , At Louisville Buell was powerfully re- enforced, not He is re-enforced at Oulj loj UeW IcvicS aud by his jUUCtloU with Louisville. General Nelson, but also by veteran troops sent up the Mississippi and Ohio from the army of Grant. Buell's estimated force was 100,000 men. But the gov- ernment, fearing, from what had occurred on his march from Corinth toward Chattanooga, that he would conduct the campaign on the principles that had guided McClel- lan, transmitted an order to Louisville relieving him from command. This was, however, revoked at the urgent re- quest of General Thomas, who had been appointed in his stead. Bragg now commenced carrying out his orders for re- Bra g commences Organizing Kentucky on Confederate prim SinizatlS? o?^^ °^- ciples. He issued a proclamation in which lentucky. -^^ ^^^^^^ ^-^^ objccts of his cxpcditiou. " Kentuckians, we have come with joyful hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal Chap. LIII.] BRAGG'S POLITICAL PROCEEDINGS. 355' rule, show it by your frowns, and we shall return whence we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds of our brotherhood, then cheer ns with the smiles of your women, and lend your willing hands to secure yourselves in your heritage of liberty. Women of Kentucky ! your persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ear." "Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the ar- mor of your kindred, your husbands, sons, and brothers, and scoff to shame him who would prove recreant in his duty to you, his country, and his God." He also gave it to be understood that the object of his expedition was to secure peace, and the abandonment by the United States of their pretensions to govern a people who had never been their subjects, and who preferred self-government to union with them. He declared that the Confederate government would guarantee the free navigation of all the Western rivers, and that the Northwest and the South have a common interest, and can not exist in separation ; that it was from the meddlesome, grasping, and fanatical disposition of the people of the East that all the trouble had come. The Kichmond authorities had been indulging in a day-dream. They had fallen into the belief alliance with the that the Northwestcm Free States misrht be Northwest. • t i • mduced to jom them. On the same day that Bragg issued his proclamation, the Committee on Foreign Affairs made a majority and a minority report to the Confederate Congress respecting the propriety of a proclamation with a view of influencing the Northwest- ern States : this was to touch on the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the markets of the South to the inhabitants of the Northwest- ern States. On the one hand there were thus induce- ments held out, and on the other there was the threaten- ing presence of Bragg with his 60,000 men. The people 356 BRAGG RETREATS WITH LARGE SUPPLIES. [Sect. X. of the Northwest had, however, already definitively made up their minds. Denying the right of any one to obstruct the great rivers, they had no intention of accepting their free navigation as a boon, either from the Confederate government or any other power. They had determined to force open those streams, and whoever attempted an obstruction must do it at his peril As a part of the political movement, Bragg and Kirby Smith, while at Frankfort (October 4th), Bragg inaugurates . ± J ' • 1 i? j.1 a governor of Ken- inaugurated a provisioual govcmor oi the state. But, while this was being done, Bragg was not un- mindful of the ostensible object which had m'ainofjectwiii brouglit him thus far into Northern Ken- tucky. His guerrillas and foraging parties were scouring every portion of the country to which they could find access, and carrying off live-stock, bacon, bread- he collects sup- stuffs. Shops and storcs were broken open ; plies. every thing that was wanted was taken away and paid for in Confederate money ; and as the state was now assumed to be part of the Confederacy, the Con- scription Act was enforced, and men compelled to join the army. 'As soon as Bragg found that Buell had anticipated him He commences his ^'^ ^hc occupatlou of LouisviUc, and that the retreat, maiu objcct of the campaign was lost, he pre- pared to retreat with the booty he had collected. On the 1st of October, Buell, having re-enforced and reorganized his army, set out from Louisville to take the offensive and pursue his antagonist. He directed his march upon Bardstown. While he had been lingering in Louisville, is pursued by Bu- tho Confederates h-ad been devastating the eii'8 troops, country. Though he moved only ten miles a day, he reached Bardstown just as they left it, for Bragg was retreating as slowly as possible, to give time for his 'Chap. LIII.] THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE. 357 trains to escape. Finding, however (October 7tli), that Buell's leading corps, under McCook and Gilbert, who formed the left and the centre respectively, had out- marched Crittenden, whose corps formed Buell's right, he and turns upon tumcd ficrcelj upou his pursucrs, in hopes *^^'°' of defeating them before Crittenden could get up ; then he might fall upon Crittenden, or retreat be- fore his arrival. Gilbert's corps first overtook Bragg, but McCook came The battle of Per- ^V about 1 1 A.M. (Octobcr 8th), having suf ryvi e. fered much on the march for want of water. He took post on Gilbert's left. Soon afterward, in the early part of the afternoon, Bragg assailed them furiously. The shock fell on McCook's corps, and for several hours he had to sustain it alone. General Jackson, one of the division commanders, was killed at the first fire. He was struck by a fragment of shell on the breast. Terrill's bri- gade was panic-stricken, and he himself killed. McCook's left was thus driven back. Meantime, on his right, Rous- seau had also been forced back. It was late in the day before any re-enforcements were sent them. Colonel Gooding was at length ordered by Gilbert, with the thir- tieth brigade, to the extreme left. He maintained a des- perate encounter for two hours ; his horse was shot under him, and he was made prisoner. This brigade, out of 1923 men, lost 549. McCook's corps had thus been as- saulted on both flanks, and nearly overwhelmed. This had brought the Confederates on the left flank of Gil- bert's, the centre corps. There, however, they were not only successfully resisted, but driven back by Generals E. B. Mitchell and Philip H. Sheridan, through Perry ville, as night came on. Bragg, knowing that Crittenden would now come up, took advantage of the darkness and retreated. He had lost in the battle 2500. Buell's losses, as reported by himself, were 916 killed, 2943 wounded. 358 FAILURE OF BRAGG'S SORTIE. [Sect. X: 489 missing, and 10 guns taken. Bragg left behind him more than 1000 wounded, and eight of the captured guns. Continued retreat He withdrew to Harrodsbui'g, and thence, ''^''''' with Kirby Smith, to Camp Dick Kobinson. They then hastened back to Chattanooga through Cum- berland Gap. Buell followed them as far as London, but at that point gave up the pursuit and returned to Bowl- ing Green. His movements had been so languid that the government, dissatisfied with the very inadequate use Buell is removed ^^ ^^^ made of his large army, removed him from command. (Qctober 30fch) fi'om its commaud, and as signed Eosecrans to it in his stead. So far as gaining a firm foothold in Kentucky was con- cerned, the Confederate expedition had proved a failure In the other particular, the gathering of supplies, its sue cess had been better. The Eichmond newspapers boast- The supplies ob- ^d that " the wagon-train of supplies brought tained ty Bragg. ^^^^ ^^ Kcutucky by Kirby Smith was forty miles long. It brought a million yards of jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots and shoes, and 200 wag- on-loads of bacon, 6000 barrels of pork, 1500 mules and horses, 8000 beeves, and a large lot of swine." Bragg had thus retreated from Kentucky, his main ob- FaiiureofBragg's j^^^^ uuaccomplished. Hc had gained no operations. brilliant victory; he had not taken either Louisville or Cincinnati; the Northwestern States had not sought an alliance with the Confederacy ; but few Ken- tuckians had voluntarily joined his army. The number of those whom he had seized by conscription was exceeded by those he had lost through desertion. Persons of sub- stance throughout the state not only felt outraged by the seizure of their property paid for in Confederate money, but indignant at the needless destruction and devastation he had committed. Instead of able-bodied volunteers, crowds of refugees accompanied his retreat, carrying with Chap.liii.] he is ordered to renew his attempt. 359 them their negroes, whose emancipation they foresaw was at hand. - Bragg's expedition into Kentucky had, however, occa- Evacuationofcum- sioned the evacuatioH of Cumberland Gap beriandGap. ^^ ^j^^ uatioual forccs uuder General Mor- gan. His supplies were cut off. On September I7th he blew up the magazine, burnt his tents, wagons, gun-car- i riages, and whatever he could not withdraw. He then retreated 250 miles to the Ohio, incessantly skirmishing with the enemy, foraging on the country, and often suf- fering for want of water. He reached the Ohio on Octo- ber 4th. The force which he had brought from the Gap was more than 10,000, with 20 pieces of artillery and 400 wagons. The Confederate government was greatly disappointed Bra-c ordered to with thc issuc of Bragg's Campaign. Scarce- renewhis attempt, j^ ^^^ ^^ Tcachcd Chattauooga wheu he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on assuming the command of Buell's army, Roeecrans succeeds ^^ow kuowu as the 14th Army Corps, found Bueiim command. -^ j^ ^ ^^^^ dilapidated couditiou ; but, re- ceiving large re-enforcements from the new levy of 600,000 men called out by the government, he reorganized it rap- idly, and, having repaired the railroad from Louisville to Nashville, which had been greatly injured, he concentrat- ed his forces at Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. This was necessary to be done before he could safely move southward to confront Brag^, reorganizes the for hc could uot rclv OH the couutrv which army. " *' had been wasted by the movements of two armies, and the Confederate cavalry could easily sever the railroad in his rear. Bragg had already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march from Chattanooga. Eosecrans 360 ROSECKANS'S ADVANCE. [Sect.X. Bragg returns to ^^^ glveii out that it was Hs intention to Murfreesborough. ^^^^ ^^ j^-^ ^.^^^^ quarters at Nashville, and Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong detachments of cavalry under Morgan and For- rest, the former being ordered to break Kosecrans's com- munications. As it was about the season of Christmas, Winter festivities Murfreesborough was the scene of much *^^'^* gayety. Davis, the President of the Con- federacy, had come from Richmond to counsel — perhaps to invigorate — Bragg. There were wedding festivities, at one of which the Bishop-general Polk officiated, and the giddy Confederates danced on floors carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of December, Eosecrans moved. Rosecrans suddenly His march commeuccd in a heavy rain. The moves on Bragg. Confederate outposts retired before his ad- vance, the pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which was 43,000 Position of Rose- stroug ou the eveulug of that day, was on crans'sarmy. ^^^ ^^^^ ^j^^ ^^ g^^^^^ j^-^^^^,^ ^ sluggish stream fringed with cedar brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four miles in length. Crit- tenden was on its left, with three divisions. Wood, Van- cleve. Palmer ; Thomas in the centre, with two divisions, IsTegley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve ; McCook on the right, with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The left wing touched the river, the right stretched a little be- yond the Franklin Road. Bragg's army, 62,000 strong, stood between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough, ranged, for the most part, parallel Chap. LIII.] POSITION OF THE CONFEDEKATE ARMY. 361 ]^^--ll^ BATTLE OF MURFREESBOROUGH. Position ^f the Con- to tlic national line; his right, however, federate army. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ Breckimidge's division formed his right ; in his centre, under Polk, were two di- visions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, un- der Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confed- erate army. Eosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on Rosecrans'spianof ^^^ l^ft. His iutcntion was that his right the battle. wlug, staudlug ou the defensive, should sim- ply hold its ground ; but his extreme left, the divisions of "Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone Eiver, should as- 362 THE BATTLE OF MURFREESBOROUGH. [Sect. X. sail Breckinridge's division, exposed there, and seize the heights, from which an artillery fire would not only take in reverse the works in front of the enemy's centre, but also enable the national centre, with the remainder of the left wing, to overthrow ifc. Meantime the assailing divi- sions of the left would swing into Murfreesborough, and, continuing their movement, cpme round to the Franklin Eoad, thereby forcing the Confederates from their line of retreat. It was a disadvantage to the national general that in this movement the river must be crossed. On his part, also, Bragg had determined to take the of Bragg'spianofthe feusive, aud with his left to strike Eose- ^^" ^* crans's right. There was thus a similar in- tention on the two sides, and not a dissimilar disposi- tion of force. Both intended to strike with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that wing. Bragg's plan was to wheel his attacking force on Polk's extreme right, as on a pivot, and, pressing his antagonist back to Stone River, seize the turnpike and railroad to Nashville, his lines of communication in the rear. In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while The battle of Mur- Eosccraus's left was rapidly crossing Stone freesborough. Riyer to make its expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the battle-field, he fell furi- ously upon Johnson's division, and so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a gun could be Bragg obtains the fif^d. Thc Confederate success was de- mitiative. clsivc. Johusou's divislou, which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the Rosecrans's right is s^iock was too great; he was compelled to overthrown. ^-^^^ wsijj with the loss of many guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also com- Chap. LIII.] OVERTHROW OF THE NATIONAL RIGHT WING. 353 ing into play, rushed upon the next division — but that was commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was already para- He has to abandon lyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. his movement. jjg ]jg^^ ^q wlthdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and defending his communications. He must establish a new line. The possibility of doing this — the fate of the battle — rested on Sheridan. He was furiously as- The Confederates mt* /» , ^ ii n o i 1 !••• checked by sheri- Sailed m irout by the Coniederate division of Withers ; on his flank, uncovered by the overthrow of Johnson and Davis, he was attacked by their victors, McCown and Cleburne. The front attack he received with such an artillery and musketry fire that the Confederates were not only checked and broken, but were pursued across the field to their intrenchments. Then, by retiring his right and reserves, he swung his line round so as to -come perpendicularly to its former direc- tion. He faced now south instead of east, and stood par- allel to the Wilkinson Turnpike. The Confederate di- visions in front of him, and greatly overlapping him in this his new position, were at once held in check. Before they could advance to the N'ashville roads, and so seize Rosecrans's communications, Sheridan must be put out of the way. , But it took an hour to do that. As his antagonists pressed on his flank, he changed his front ?ompSild trill again. Pivoting on the right flank of Neg- ley's division, he wheeled round his line so as to face to the west, thereby covering the rear of Neg- ley's line. With Negley he was now forming a wedge- shaped mass, with his batteries at the point of the wedge. Here he withstood an impetuous attack of Cheatham's division and of other heavy masses. All three of his brigade commanders had been killed, his ammunition 364 KOSECEANS RENEWS HIS LINE. [Sect. X. train tad been captured; lie could not resist mucli lon- ger, for tlie cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayo- nets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket to- ward the Nashville Road. In this memorable and most glorious resistance he had lost 1630 men. "Here's all that are left," he said to Rosecrans, w^hom he had saved and now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was noth- Resistance of Neg- l^g for Ncglcy but tO follow. Hc did SO, ley and Rousseau. g^^^^pj^g ]^|g y^^j agalust all rCSistaUCe. lu vain had Thomas sent his other division under Rousseau to the front of the battle. It too, after a desperate strug- gle, was forced out of the cedar grove. Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these di- Rosecrans estab- vlslous had rcccdcd, Rosccraus had massed lishesanewiine. j^-^ artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville Turnpike on its rear. In the critical moment of establishing this new formation, every thing depended on the resistance of Hazen's brigade, which was on the left of Palmer's division. Of that division the two right brigades had been forced away, but Hazen stood firm, de- livering such a fire as to sweep his assailants back, though losing one third of his numbers. While thus he held firm, Rosecrans had adjusted his new front, and was ready for the final Confederate charge. On that new line the gray-coated Confederates came Final charge of the forth from the ccdar thickets they had won. Confederates. advauclug ovcr tlic ]3lain, a magnificent col- umn of attack. Their advance was but for a moment. In- stantly in front of them sprang up a cloud- wall of sul- phury smoke that shut out Rosecrans's line from their Chap. LIII.] RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 3^5 view. There burst fortli from tlie cannon hidden in it a double-shotted iron-fire, from the musketry a sirocco of lead. Four times the Southern soldiers tried to face the tempest. A horrible slaughter ensued. The momentum of the fire hurled them back into the dark green shade of the cedars. One of Cleburne's brigades was in an in- stant almost destroyed. It was all over in front ; but Bragg, unwilling to be foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on Eosecrans's left flank with 7000 fresh men. His first at- tack was repulsed ; he made a second ; it shared the same fate. So stood affairs when night came — a clear and beauti- ful starlight night — the closing night of 1862. On New Year's Day nothing was done ; the two armies, breathless with their death - struggle, stood looking at each other. Kosecrans holds his Ou Jauuary 2d Eosecrans was found, not grouud. retreating, but busily engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made his position impregnable ; he had thrown a force across Stone Eiver, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Here- Renewaiofthe ^pou Bragg brought BrecMnridgc back to battle. j^ig ^2(1 position, ordering him to drive the enemy across the river — a task which that officer brave- ly tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artil- lery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In twenty minutes he lost two thousand men. A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on Brag^retreats to tho 3d. Ou that ulght Bragg, dcspairiug of TuiiaTioma. succcss, wlthdrcw from Murfreesborough, re- treating to Tullahoma, and Eosecrans at last grasped his blood-clotted prize, so crippled, however, that it was im- possible for him to make any pursuit. 366 ^^^ BATTLE LOSSES. [Sect. X. In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 Losses in the ^^^n. On the national side there were kill- batties. ^^ ^gg3^ wounded more than 7000, prison- ers more than 3000 ; more than one third of its artillery and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio Eiver. Two desperate but unsuccessful attempts had convinced them that they could not break through the line of investment between the Cumberland Mountains and the Free States. SECTION XL CAMPAIGN FOR THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND. CHAPTER LIV. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. FIRST PERIOD. THE ADVANCE. The national government undertook a campaign for the capture of Richmond. It was based on incorrect principles, and carried out with irresolution by General McClellan. The movement of the army was so much procrastinated that the government was constrained to order an advance. Scarcely had the expedition departed for the Peninsula when it was found that Washington had been left unprotected. General McClellan besieged Yorktown, captured it, and slowly advanced up the Peninsula. The battles of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. From the West we have now to turn to the East — from the Mississippi Valley to the Atlantic border. If in the West there was a popular war-object univer- sally adopted — the opening of the Missis- The war-cry of the • • "d* • ,i ta , xl X. Eastwas the capture sippi Kivcr, lu thc Last thcrc was a war-ob- of Richmond. , ^ ^ t t ject not less distinctly accepted — the cap- ture of Eichmond. " On to Eichmond" became a war-cry. This was not because Eichmond was a source of strength to the Confederacy; not because it offered any historical recollections; not because it was the emblem of a nationality, but because in the eyes of the loyal Americans it was a token of defiance to the republic. We have already seen (p. 143) that the strength of the Confederacy lay not in the possession of any Incorrectness of the , -I'lii**. • tt Eichmond cam- locality, Dut lu its armics, and hence, m a military point of view, campaigns directed to the capture of Eichmond were not based upon a cor- 308 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XL rect principle. The operations now to be described, dis- astrous to the nation, but glorious to the Confederacy, were not decisive of the contest, nor would they have been so had their result been reversed. Military operations having the city of Kichmond for their objective once determined upon, the The problem of the , . • i j ,^ t , Kichmond cam- qucstiou arose m what manner they ought to be conducted. In solving that problem there was a special condition to be steadfastly borne in mind. A paramount con- '^^ movemcut was admissiblc which ^'^'''''' would risk the capture of Washington by the enemy. That condition accepted, it implied an adequate force covering Washington, and if to act offensively, acting on the direct line between that city and Richmond. Military authorities declare that the fewer the lines of Effect of many lines opcratlou thc bcttcr. It is better to have of operation. ^^^ Hnes of opcratlou than.iive; better one than two. . The more numerous the lines o^ operation, the more must the force for disposal upon them be divided, and therefore the weaker it must be on each. Such lines are exterior to an enemy holding a central position, and there- fore at his choice able to deliver overwhelming blows in succession against each. Still more dangerous is this division if the lines are not purely military, but naval and military Effect of mixed . ^ rrt-, . . t ,• r» i • • i • lines, naval and mixed. Ihc lutroductiou 01 shippins; brings an extraneous, perhaps an independent com- mand; precision and punctuality of movement are endan- gered, for even since the introduction of steam naval op- erations are greatly controlled by the weather. In such a mixed movement a general must necessarily feel that his army is not in hand. Chap. LIV.] MILITARY PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN IT. 359 However, at this epoch of the war, and by the advice Course determined of Ge^eral McClellan, though, as we shall uponbyMccieiian. gge, agaiiist the judgment of the President, two lines of operation were determined on for the pro- posed campaign. The primary line was from the sea- coast to Kichmond ; it was the offensive. The secondary line was from Washington to Richmond ; it was the de- fensive. The offensive line presented the serious inconveniences Imperfection of his ^^^^ hsLVQ bccu m^tioucd as appertaining offensive line. ^^ combiued uaval and military operations. It involved necessarily a prodigious expense. Military critics have shown that, considering the Atlantic region as being divided into two portions, an east and a west, operations conducted in the former against Richmond could not be decisive against the Confederates. In the latter they might be. Such considerations, arising from the general topog- raphy of the country, were, however, disregarded; the re- sult being that 100,000 men, with their material, were transported 180 miles by water at a cost of nineteen days of time and an enormous expenditure of money, to avoid one day's march by land ; for they had already marched to Centre ville, were thence marched back to Alexandria, and had subsequently to march the entire length of the Peninsula. In one week the Confederates could march from the front of McClellan at Washington to confront him again in the Peninsula. President Lincoln was therefore justi- fied in his remark that, by the Peninsular movement, " nothing had been gained, but much had been lost ; that the difficulty had been shifted, not surmounted." Moreover, the great Army of the Potomac was by this determination brought into a narrow peninsula, where it might be obstructed by a comparatively insignificant II.— A A 370 ERRORS OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XL force. It could hardly liope that flanking op- SSfJfSiTpenin- cratlons would be possible; its movements must be executed by attacks in front. Espe- cially must this be the case, as the lateral waters were sealed— that on the south by the armored ship Merri- mack, that on the north by the works of Yorktown. The topography of the Peninsula seemed to deny the oppor- tunity of getting at the enemy's communications. If, under such circumstances, success was to be obtain- ed, it could only be by i^pidity of movement and resolu- tion in attack ; any sluggishness, any wavering, would render the .case hopeless. In the preceding paragraphs I have reproduced pro- spectively the criticisms which have been made on the Peninsular campaign by military writers subsequently to its disastrous issue. The reader, in possession of these principles, has a guide in the study of the actual details, and on the many interesting questions arising can form for himself a correct opinion. Should that opinion be adverse to General McClellan's decision of the plan of the campaign, it must ment was relpoSi- uot bc forsiotteu that thc mistake was very ble for the error. ° , . largely concurred m by the government it- self For, though the President gave a most reluctant consent to the Peninsular campaign, he did not object to other movements the principle of which was equally in- correct. It has just been stated that there were two lines of operation against Kichmond, meaning by that two under the more immediate contemplation of McClel- lan; but, in fact, there were not fewer than SiVe; for Banks was operating on a third in the Shenandoah Val- ley, Fremont on a fourth in the Alleghanies, and Burn- side on a fifth at Koanoke. It was the misfortune of operations conducted in the proximity of Washington Chap. LIV.] INACTIVITY OF THE POTOMAC AEMY. 371 that they were under political influences. Lincoln, in Effect of political ^ Icttcr to McClcUan, declares that he had influences. ^^^^^ uuable to rcsist such influences: he was alluding to his having detached Blenker's division. No more striking confirmation of this need be giveii than the fact that, in the very crisis of the war, General Meade was appointed to command the army marching to Get- tysburg, not because he was a good soldier, but because he was a Pennsylvanian. However, he won that immor- tal victory, not because he was a Pennsylvanian, but be- cause he was a good soldier. These influences were less felt in the campaigns con- ducted between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. Af- fairs were intrusted to professional generals, not to polit- ical aspirants. Eventually it was found absolutely nec- essary to bring those professional generals into the At- lantic region, and there they made an end of the war. In the winter of 1861-2, the epoch with which this Position of the two chaptcr bcgius, the Confederate army, still armies. iuspirltcd by its victory of the preceding summer at Bull Eun, lay round Manassas, in front of the great Army of the Potomac, which, under General McClel- lan, lay at Washington. Tired of the inactivity which McClellan displayed, the Mccieiian's inac- govemmeut was perpetually urging upon ^'''''^" him the necessity of doing something with the great army that had been placed under his command. For some time after his promotion to his high position, McClellan undoubtedly contemplated vigorous opera- tions — " a crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manas- sas, not to be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it." By degrees it became apparent that his movements were guided not only by military, but also by political 372 STEENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. [Sect. XL Effect of political in- consideratioiis. In the latter respect lie look- fluences on him. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^.^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ tion of tlie Democratic party (p. 36), becoming eventu- ally its candidate for tlie Presidency. In common with many* other good men, he hoped that the extremities of war might be avoided by some compromise with the leaders of the South — a benevolent sentiment truly, but inappropriate in an officer who had been appointed to wield the armed force of the nation. He was unwilling to do any thing which might jeopardize the institution of slavery. . McClellan, as we have seen, had been apj)ointed, July, strength of the two 18^1, to the commaud of the Army of the armies. Potomac. Ou the 1st of November he was appointed to the chief command of the armies of the United States. At the latter date the Potomac Army had an effective strength of 134,285 men, with nearly 300 guns. The Confederate force in front of him did not exceed 55,000. On the 1st of February the aggregate strength of his army had risen to 222,196; present for duty, 190,806 (p. 195). The autumn and the winter passed by, and brought McClellan's excuses HOthlug but CXCUSCS for iuactioU. It WaS for not moving. ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ . ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ leaves on the trees, or the roads too miry. In reality, however, up to Christmas, the weather had been superb ; not once in twenty years had the roads been in as good a condition at that season. Expenses were accumulating. The public was begin- ning to be alarmed. Newspaper correspondents and pri- vate letter- writers at Washington were spreading not only dissatisfaction, but consternation. They, said andpJopiTS-^dis- that the aered General Scott, stretched upon satisfied. /»-,t tti his sofa, had commanded to better purpose ; that the army was as much organized in October as it Chap. LIV.] PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION. 373 ever would be, or as it needed to be ; th%t it was en- camped in shameful inactivity; that imposing reviews were given for the gratification of women, but not a recon- noissance was made to disturb the enemy ; that the gen- eral could now find nothing better to do than to send to the War Department the project of a splendid uniform for himself and staff; that he was enveloped in an omi- nous reserve ; that cabinet ministers had waited in his an- techambers ; and that even the President of the United States had been detained there unnoticed. Non-military men, not without some show of reason, criticised and censured the prevailing military ideas. A rebellion, they said, can never be put down by standing on the defensive; the Confederacy can not be overthrown by building fortifications at Washington. There were officers who were acting as though they supposed that nothing more would be requisite; some who affirmed, with General Scott, that railroads would exert but little influence, and, like that veteran — unconscious of a coming Sheridan — declared that cavalry would be of no use. There were some who expected that the war would be nothing more than an artillery duel. During the dreary winter that followed, Washington Washington block- was au lusultcd city. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was broken on one side, the Potomac blockaded by batteries on the other ; the Con- federate flag was flying in actual sight of the Capitol. The heart of the nation was sinking. Every thing that the young general had asked for had not only been grant- ed, but lavishly given — and there was nothing in return but reviews, and parades, and procrastination. Perhaps without duly considering the effect which might be produced in the sentiments of the French princes Empcror of the Freuch, the proffered serv- ices of the Orleans princes were accepted. 374 McCLELLAN'S INTENTIONS. [Sect. XL They were received into General McClellan's confidence. The Prince de Joinville, defending the general's course, has since that time imparted some interesting explana- tions. He says : " We have the right, we viue explains think, to sav that McClellan never intend- McClellan's coarse. ' *' ed to advance upon Centreville. His long- determined purpose was to make Washington safe by means of a strong garrison, and then to use the great nav- igable waters and immense naval resources of the North to transport the army by sea to a point near Richmond. For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had been secret- ly maturing. Secrecy, as well as promptness, it will be understood, was indispensable here to success. To keep the secret it had been necessary to confine it to few per- sons, and hence had arisen the long ill feeling to the un- communicative general. " Be this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those who suspected the general's project and were angry at not being informed of it, those whom his promotion had excited to envy, his political enemies (who is without them in America ?) — in short, all those beneath or beside him who wished him ill, broke out into a chorus of accu- sations of slowness, inaction, incapacity. McClellan, with a patriotic courage which I have always admired, dis- dained these accusations and made no reply. He satis- fied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwithstand- ing the loyal support given him by the President, that functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A coun- cil of war of all the divisional generals was held ; a plan of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and dis- cussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his pro- jects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. Informed, no doubt, by one of those female spies who keep up his communications in the domestic circles of the Fed- Chap.LIV.] the confederates evacuate MANASSAS. 375 era! enemy, Jolinston evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skillful manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the offensive, threatened with attack either at Centreville, where defense would be useless if successful, or at Rich- mond, the loss of which would be a great check, and uii- able to cover both positions at once, Johnston threw his whole force before the latter of the two." The mere rumor that McClellan was about to move led to the instant evacuation of Manassas (March eva^cuate Manas- 9th). Ou the eusuiug momlug McClellan put the Army of the Potomac in motion, advancing toward the deserted position. His object in doing this was stated to be "to verify the evacuation, to take the chance of cutting, off the enemy's rear-guard, to deceive him, if possible, as to the general's real inten- tions, and to gain the opportunity of cutting The Army of the t ^ t i i t 1 i ' Potomac verifies loose irom all uscless bas^sfasre, and to erive the evacuatiou. °^.°.,.° the troops a tew days experience m bivouac and on the march." Not without surprise and mortifica- tion did the soldiers of that great army see the insignifi- cant earthworks and Quaker guns — logs of wood shaped in the form of cannon — by which an enemy not much more than one fourth of their number had held them so long at bay. There can be.no doubt that by these events the Presi- Corps commanders dcut's coufidcuce IB. McClellau had beeu appointed. ^^^^ seriously affected. It had become ob- vious that the administration must be in more reliable contact with the army. The President therefore issued (March 8th) a general war-order, directing the organiza- tion of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be commanded by Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzel- man, and Keyes respectively ; a fifth corps was under the command of General Banks, formed from his own and General Shields's divisions. This establishment of "army 376 THE APPOINTMENT OF CORPS COMMANDERS. [Sect. XL corps" was very mucli in opposition to tlie wislies of McClellan ; not but that lie recognized tlie necessity of having a higlier unit in an army of 200,000 men than the "division;" his objection, as stated by the Prince de Join- ville, being rather against the time than the principle : it "would throw into subaltern positions some young generals of division who had his personal confidence." Doubtless it was in part to reach this very object that the change was insisted on by the government. On the return of the army from its promenade to Ma- nassas (March 11th), the President issued McClellan restricted ,-, -^ -,. . -nT/-^in jy ii to the Potomac de- auotbcr ordcr, relieving McOlellan irom the command of all the military departments except that of the Potomac. The ostensible cause of this was the consideration that the campaign on which the Potomac Army was about to enter would require all the resources and all the attention of its commander ; the real cause was a decline of confidence in his ability. If, as current events were apparently showing, the army un- der his immediate charge was more than he could wield, it was out of the question to add to it many other armies operating at distances of many hundred miles. A movement determined upon, the question had next arisen. In what direction should it be ? So Difference between -, ht /-^t ^^ ^^ 1j t the President and ionQ!' as McClcllan adhered to an advance McClellan. ° , upon the enemy m such a manner as not to uncover Washington and thereby risk its capture, he was in accord with the President ; but when it appeared that his plan was to attack Richmond by way either of Ur- bana or Fortress Monroe, there was a serious difference between them. McClellan seems not to have appreciated distinctly the momentous consequences of the capture of Lincoln requires that Washington shall be secure. "Washington by the Confederates, the expul- sion of the national government, the seizure I chap.liv.] their opinions. S77 of the public edifices and arcMves of the nation. It would have instantly brought, though it would not have justified, European recognition of the Confederate power, and that, perhaps, not only as a Southern, but as the na- tional government. The President clearly perceived that the capture of Kichmond, no matter with what brilliant military operations it might be attended, could not bal- ance for a moment that dreadful catastrophe. He there- fore correctly and firmly took the ground that, whatever the movements of the Army of the Potomac might be, the city of Washington must be left absolutely secure. And now appeared that incidental advantage of the Opinions of the appoiutmcut of corps commanders to which corps commanders, reference has just been made. To McClel- lan and to them the President referred the question. In the conference which accordingly took place they con- sented to the movement by the Peninsula, among other conditions, however, expressly stipulating unanimously " that the forces to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace." Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell agreed " that, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suiBSice." In Sumner's opinion, " a total force of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice." Hereupon the Secretary of War addressed the follow- ing: "War Department, March 13th, 1862.. "To Major General George B. McClellan : " The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed Orders to General ^P^n by yourself and the commanders of army McClellan. corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution : " 1st. Leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 378 DEPARTURE OF THE PENINSULAR EXPEDITION. [Sect. XI. " 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. " 3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choos- ing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and there ; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. "Edwin M. Stantoi^, Secretary of War." The movement by Fortress Monroe being determined The Peninsular tipon, there Were chartered 113 steamers, 188 expedition sails, g^hooners, 88 barges, with which, in 37 days, there were transported to Fortress Monroe 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides a vast quantity of equipage. Scarcely had McClellan set out from Washington when McDowell's corps 1^ was discovered that the entire force about detained. ^^ ^^ ^q^^ for the protectiou of that city was only 1 9,022 men. The President was therefore constrained to withhold McDowell's army corps from the force under McClellan, and detain it for the security of the capital. Against this detention McClellan earnestly protested. McClellan protests Ho scemed to havo forgotten that the pro- against that deten- ... r* ttt i • j i t t t tion. tection ot Washington had been made an imperative part of his duty, and that all his calculations must be on that condition. A letter written to him at the time by the President not only justifies completely the course that had been taken, but also ex- hibits Mr. Lincoln's firmness and courteous forbearance, his views respecting the campaign now undertaken, to which he had given a most reluctant consent, and his ap- prehension that, instead of action, there Avould be an in- vention of new delays. "Washington, April 9th, 18<)2. " Major General McClellan : " My dear Sir, — Your dispatches, complaining that you are not The President's let- Properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do ter to him. p^^jj j^q ygj,y much. Blcnkcr's division was with- drawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure Chap. LIV.] LINCOLN AND McCLELI^AN. 379 under which I did it (p. 371), and, as I thought, acquiesced in it— certainly not without reluctance. After you left I ascertained that less. than 20,000 unorganized. men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Win- chester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again expos- ing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rap- pahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washing- ton should, by the judgment of all the commanders of the army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. " I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction ; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was con- strained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask. Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what re- sistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade — "And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. 7" am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas was only shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty — that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note— is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. " I beg to assure you that I have never written to you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. Yours very truly, " A. Lincoln." The Army of the Potomac was now fairly landed on Siege of Yorktcvn ^^^ Peninsuk, and there lay before it, under commences. General Magruder, a Confederate force of 8000 men, defending a line of thirteen miles from York- 3 so SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. [Sect. XI. town across the Peninsula. " To my utter surprise," says that general, " he (McClellan) permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and in the open fields, earthworks began to appear." The whole month of April was consumed in these operations. The troops were not triumphantly marching on Eichmond,but, unac- climated, were busily digging their own graves. A re- quest was sent to Washington to have siege-guns taken out of the works of that city and brought to Yorktown ; miles of corduroy road were constructed; miles of trench- es and batteries were mad^. It was expected that on the morning of May 6th fire would be opened. Two days previously, however, the Confederates quiet- The Confederates % abandon the Iv abaudoucd thclr works and retired up the Peninsula. " With 5000 men," says Ma- gruder, " exclusive of the garrisons, we had stopped and held in check over 100,000 of the enemy." Disease, con- tracted in the swamps and trenches of Yorktown, had taken a fearful hold on the army, as its chief engineer re- ported, and " toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excite- ment of combat, had impaired its morale." As soon as it was discovered that the Confederates had The battle of wii- withdrawu, a column was sent in pursuit. liamsburg. j^ camc up wlth the retreating rear-guard at Williamsburg, now re-enforced from Johnston's army. Longstreet's division, which had already passed beyond the town, retraced its steps to aid in resisting the attack, and for nine hours Hooker's division alone made head against the whole Confederate force. That general says, "History will not be believed when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaid- ed, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades Chap. LIV.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 381 THE PENINSULMl CAMPAIGN. with arms in their hands ; nevertheless, it is true." The entire loss during the day was 2228, of whom 456 were killed. General Hooker was justified in this bitter complaint. It has been reported that he was relieved Hooker complains -, -, , -. ■, ■, -^t ^ i that he was not bv a Davonet charfi^e made by Hancock : but sustained. *' *' ^ , , , there must have been an error m this asser- tion. The troops by whom it was said to have been made first encountered the enemy about 4 P.M. of the preceding afternoon. It was a drizzly day, and the men marched forward in no small confusion, over leaves in the woods, slippery with the rain, over fallen trees, and across ravines, so that it was impossible to preserve an align- ment of a company, much more of a brigade. The night came on pitch-dark; the 43d New York fired by mis- chance into a Pennsylvania regiment. Next day the for- 382 EETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. [Sect. XL mer had to "be withdrawn and another New York and a Maine regiment put in its stead. All the morning heavy firing was heard. It was that which Hooker was encoun- tering. Hancock's troops lay in line of battle from 1 P.M.- to 4 P.M., when they receded before a front attack of a North Carolina regiment, aided by a flank attack of the Twenty-fourth Virginia. There was no bayonet charge. At ten o'clock at night McClellan sent a dispatch to Washington that Johnston was in front of him with a force very much greater than the national, and very strongly intrenched ; that it was the intention of the en- contiuued retreat of ^my to dlsputo cvcry stcp to Richmoud. the Confederates. r\ ±l • • i • i On the ensuing morning, however, it was found that Williamsburg was evacuated, and the enemy gone. From Williamsburg to Richmond the distance is about fifty miles. The national army resumed its march on the 8th of May, but in a manner so dilatory that it might al- most be characterized as disastrous. Not less than eleven days were consumed in what ought to have been accom- plished in three — a lingering, a fatal delay. It was not thus that Caesar and Napoleon trod the path to victory. While thus the national army showed hesitation and in- Their admirable dccisloU, ItS autagOulst displayed good gen- conduct, eralship. If the maintenance of a bold front by Magruder at Yorktown elicits our admiration — for he stood his ground against prodigious odds — not with less praise can we speak of his timely evacuation and perfect- ly-conducted retreat. The manner in which the Confed- erate rear-guard turned upon its pursuers at Williams- burg, and gave them a bloody check, will ever exact the applause of military critics. The movement of the national army up the Peninsula Surrender of Nor- l^d at ouce to thc withdrawal of the Con- ^°^^' federate force from Norfolk, the surrender i Chap.LIV.] surrender of NORFOLK. 383 of that place, tlie destruction of the iron-clad frigate Mer- rimack, and the opening of James River. An expedi- tion under General Wool set out from Fortress Monroe (May 10th), and found that Norfolk was abandoned by the enemy. It was surrendered by its mayor. The Con- federates had destroyed the navy yard as completely as Destruction of the they could, aud on tlfe morning of May 1 1th Merrimack. "blew up the Mcrrlmack. So much dissatis- faction was expressed in the Confederacy respecting this latter act that a court of inquiry was ordered. It was decided that her destruction had been unnecessary. These events left James River open to General McClel- lan, and upon its bank, had he pleased, he might have established his base of supply. He preferred, disastrous- ly, as will be eventually seen, to have it on the York River. Meantime Franklin's division had passed up York Riv- er from Yorktown to West Point. Communication was opened with him. The advance had reached White House on the loth. At this place the railroad from West Point to Richmond crossed the Pamunkey River. Locomotives and cars were at once put on the track, it The new base of bclng intended to make this the line for fur- earmy. nlshiug the army supplies. On the 22d the army began to cross the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. The next da}i the advance was within seven miles of Richmond. General Fitz John Porter was now (May 24) ordered Affair at Hanover to uiovc to Hauovcr Court-housc to facill- court-house. ^^^^ ^^^ juuctiou with McDowcll's corps, expected from Fredericksburg. He was attacked near that place by the Confederates, but defeated them, their loss being about 1000, his being nearly 400. He cap- tured and destroyed their camp. But McDowell was withheld, and not only did. the two armies not unite, but 384 THE CHICIiAHOMINY. [Sect. XL orders came from Washington to burn the bridges that had been seized. The principal bridge burnt was that over the South Anna. On the 29th Porter returned to his original camp. . The national army, advancing toward Richmond, found crosaiug of the that the brldgcs over the Chickahominy had chickahommy. ^^^^ destK)yed by the Confederates in their retreat. The stream flows through a swampy and wood- ed country, liable to be overflowed when freshets occur. Keyes's corps crossed it about the 24th of May, having re- paired Bottom's Bridge. Casey's division of this corps advanced as far as Fair Oaks Station; Couch's lay at Seven Pines ; and Heintzelman's corps, following Keyes's over the river, took up a position in its rear. His left rested on Whiteoak Swamp. The strength of these two corps was about 30,000 men. Sumner's corps was on the other side of the Chickahominy. At this moment McClellan's army was in a most dan- Dangerous position gerous position. One of its wings was on the right, the other on the left of the creek of the army. BATTLE or FAIR OAKS. AND SEVEN PINES. Chap. LIV.] POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. 335 — creek it could hardly be called, for it was about to be swollen to tbe dimensions of a river. The only availa- ble connection was at Bottom's Bridge. The position of the army was like the letter V, Bottom's Bridge being at the point. The left wing, in four divisions, lay in eche- lon along the York Eiver Eailroad. It answered to the left branch of the V. The right wing, consisting of ^ve divisions, and the reserves, answered to the other branch. From the extremity of one wing to that of the other, by way of Bottom's Bridge, was a distance of more than twelve miles, though by an air-line they were not very far apart. Through the midst of the V flowed the Chicka- hominy. The outposts of the left wing were, as just stated, at Fair Oaks Station, on the York Eiver Eailroad, and at Seven Pines, on the Williamsburg Eoad. Under such circumstances, the Confederates could of course as- sail one of the two wings separately. As we are now to see, they accordingly attacked the left wing, the action being known aa the battle of Fair Oaks. A heavy rain, described as being like a tropical deluge, ^, ^ , occurred round Eichmond on the nierht of The thunder-storm. -«--,-, ~ May 30th, and, foreseeing that the Chicka- hominy would rise, and that Keyes's corps, which was on the Eichmond side of the stream, would be isolated from the rest of McClellan's army, Johnston, who commanded the Confederates, determined to attempt to destroy it. He seems not to have known that Heintzelman had The Confederate ^Iso crosscd. Hc therefore (May 31st) di- attack. rected Longstreet and D. H. Hill to attack it in front upon the Williamsburg Eoad, Huger to gain its left flank by passing down the Charles City Eoad, and Gustavus Smith its right flank by the New Bridge and Nine-mile Eoads. He expected to overwhelm the isolated corps — two fifths of the force of his adver- H.— B B 386 ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ SEVEN PINES. [Sect. XI. sary — by throwing upon it the whole Confederate army. As the country was all under water with the rains — , ,^ . ^ , in some places a couple of feet deep — Ca- Battle of Fair Oaks. , ,. . . i • i • sey s division, which was m the front, was altogether unprepared for an attack, except by siich indi- cations as the sound of the running of railroad ears all night from Eichmond. Casey resisted the Confederate shock, which occurred at about 1 P.M., very resolutely. The day was dark and gloomy, and from an air-balloon it was seen that the entire Confederate army was ad- vancing. Casey was outnumbered and overwhelmed. He was ^ . . .^ driven back, after a three-hours' struererle, Defeat of Casey. m i i • ? i • more than a mile ; he lost six guns, and his camp was taken. He was compelled to retire upon Couch. Couch, who had been sending forward regiments to Battle of Seven thc support of Cascy, ficrccly attempted to ^'°^^' maintain himself at Seven Pines, Heintzel- man coming up to his help. The battle had now been going on from 1 P.M. to 4J P.M., Longstreet not only pressing the line in front, but also on its right and left flanks. McClellan, who was ill in bed at New Bridge, on the other side of the Chickahominy, ordered Sumner's advance. i t p i • bumner to send reliei across the river to the hard-pressed troops. Sedgwick's division of Sum- ner's corps crossed the swollen stream over the upper one of two tottering bridges that he had constructed about half way down the V. Tottering as it was, it proved to be the salvation of the national army. Sumner, listening as he went through the woods, guided his march by the roar of the battle. The Confederates had found that they could not turn Chap. LIV.] FAIR OAKS AND SEVEN PINES. 387 the left of the national left wing, for it rested on the Whiteoak Swamp. In the most determined manner they were trying to pass down between the right of that wing and the Chickahominy, and force their way to Bottom's Bridge. If this could be done, nothing remain- ed for the entire left wing but to surrender. It had no retreat. Steadily the Confederates forced their way. The even- ing was coming on dark and gloomy — dark and gloomy was the prospect for Heintzelman and Keyes. Sumner had got Sedgwick's division across the rickety He checks the Con- bridge, aud with it had dragged over a bat- federate advance. ^^^^ ^^ tWCUty-foUr ISTapolcOU gUUS, which he had planted in a clearing of the woods. The Con- federate column, pressing on victoriously for Bottom's Bridge, must show its flank to this battery. The flanker was outflanked. No man could pass the fire-storm from this battery. The South Carolina troops rushed at it in vain ; the march of the Confederate column was checked- — it wa- vered. Volleys of musketry were poured into it. Ter- ror-stricken, and with fearful slaughter, it w^as hurled back upon Fair Oaks Station. About sunset, General Johnston, the Confederate com- wonndingof maudcr, was severely wounded by a frag- johnston. ^^^^ ^^ ^ gj^^^^ ^^^ General Smith took the command. What now — asks the Prince de Joinville, who was an Mismana-^eraent of cye-witucss of thc battle — what now would the natioSai troops, j^^^,^ happened if, iustcad of fifteen thou- sand men whom Sumner had brought over, the whole right wing — fifty thousand — had crossed ? It was not until seven o'clock that evening that the The flood in the i^ca of throwiug brfdgcs across the stream chickahominy. ^^^ crossing the whole army. was entertain- 333 EEPULSE OF THE CONFEDERATES. [Sect. XI. ed. It was then too late — tlie water was fast rising ; in the course of the night it flooded Sumner's bridges, and by morning filled the entire valley. In the morning the Confederates renewed the attack Repulse of the bravclj, but without ordcr. The wounding Confederates. ^£ Johustou was a scrious mischauce to them. They were finally repulsed about noon, and recoiled in in- extricable confusion. They carried off as trophies the spoils of the camps of Casey and Couch, which they had captured; but McClellan made no attempt to follow them. Importunately and incessantly he had called on the gov- ernment for more troops — here, at this critical moment, he had thirty-five thousand men doing nothing. It is now known that the fugitives might have been Losses in the foUowcd luto Eichmoud, so great was the battles. disorganization and dismay following this Confederate repulse. Their loss in the battle had been 4233 ; the national, 5739, of whom 890 were killed. McClellan recovered shortly after, without resistance, the posts of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, the two armies resuming substantially their former positions. On the second day after the battle of Fair Oaks Gen- eral Hooker advanced within four miles of Eichmond, but was ordered to withdraw by McClellan, to whom the government dispatched a di- vision from McDowell's corps and whatever re-enforce- ments they could collect. Still, however, the telegraph brought the staple excuses — the dreadful state of the roads, the weather, the overwhelming number of the ene- my in front — still the same cry for re-enforcements. Day after day the great army lay idle and chafing at its lot. It heard with amazement and indignation that the Con- stnart rides round federate GcneralJ. E. B. Stuart, with 1500 the arrny. cavalry, had ridden round its right flank (June 12, 13) and gained its rear without resistance, de- Chap. LIV.] LEE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 339 stroying forage and supplies, capturing prisoners, and re- turning with impunity to Richmond. The middle of June (14th) came. It brought nothing but the telegram "All quiet in every direction." McClellan's force was now 156,838, of whom 115,102 were present for duty. -General Johnston having been disabled at Fair Oaks, the command of the Confederate army had Lee assigned to the -• tit /^ i "r» i t^ t Confederate com- becu dcvolved ou (jeueral Kobert h,. Lee. mand. He had been appointed in March general in chief, an office specially created for him. His plan was to construct fortifications for Richmond, so that the city might be defended by a minimum of men, and then, tak- ing the mass of the army, to operate with it on the north of the Chickahominy, and break McClellan's communica- tions with York River. He therefore began at once to strengthen his army in front of Richmond by rapidly drawing to it all the forces within reach. He intended Lee's plan of to Strike a dcclslve blow against the dilato- campaign. ^^ ^^^ hcsitatiug McClcllan. For this pur- pose, among other re-enforcements, Stonewall Jackson was brought from the Valley, every means being used to de- ceive McClellan as to what was going on, and with so much success that he was led to believe that the move- ment was in the other direction, and that re-enforcements were being sent from Richmond to Jackson. It was not until June 24th that McClellan discovered the truth — Jackson being then close upon him, making ready to at- Mccieiian's ground- tiick hls rear. At once McClellan took less alarms. alarm, telegraphing to Washington^hat he was about to be assailed by 200,000 men — that if his army should be destroyed by such overwhelming num- bers, it was his purpose to die with it and share its fate. But, in truth, the force of his antagonist was but little more than half his own : it amounted to about 80,000 men. CHAPTEH LV. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. SECOND PERIOD— THE RETREAT. StonewallJackson, after throwing the North into consternation by a brilliant offens- ive movement in the Shenandoah Valley, made good his junction with the army of Lee in front of Richmond. The Confederates, taking the initiative, compelled McClellan to change his base. He retreated, during a week of fighting, to James River. The Peninsular campaign ended in a complete triumph for the Confederacy. The national government withdrew the Army of the Potomac to the front of Wash- ington. For a clear comprehension of the second period of the stone^yallJackson's Peninsular Campaign, it is necessary to re- campaign. j^^.^ ^^^ opcrations of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley : they constitute a brilliant por- tion of the military annals of the Confederacy. In the autumn of 1861, after the battle of Bull Eun, Jackson had been assigned to the command of the Con- federate forces in the Shenandoah Valley. Two days (February 24th, 1862) after the time desig- nated by the President's order for the simul- Banks's movement . , r> I'l * • t • on the Confederate taueous movcmcnt 01 thc uatioual armies, left. Banks took possession of Harper's Ferry, partly with a view to the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and partly for the purpose of threat- ening ik^ Confederate left flank. This movement, togeth- er with advices received from female spies in Washington that McClellan was about to advance on Richmond, led to the evacuation ofManassas, Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces there, falling back toward Rich- mond. Under these circumstances, Jackson also retired up the Chap.lv.] stonewall JACKSON'S campaign. 39I , , ,. Valley, so as to be in easy communication Jackson retires up •/ ' «/ the Valley. with Jolinston ; lie evacuated Winchester on the 11th of March. Learning, however, that Shields, of Banks's corps, who was following him, had been weak- ened by the withdrawal of a part of his force, he deter- mined to turn upon him. Shields feigned to retreat, and concealed his true strength. In an action which took place (March 23d) at Winchester, the Confederates ac- cordingly suffered a severe defeat. They were compelled to resume their retreat up the Valley, and remained in communication with Johnston until he went to the Pen- insula to confront McClellan. At that time Ewell's di- vision was sent to Jackson, increasing his force by about 10,000 men. The purpose of the Confederate government in retain- ing this large force in the Valley was to threaten Wash- ington and embarrass the movements of McClellan in the Peninsula. ♦ Jackson was therefore now confronting three national ^ .,. ^,^ armies — that of Fremont, on his left; that of Position of the na- ' ' tionai armies. Bauks, bcfore him ; that of McDowell, on his right. Fremont had been ordered by the President to come Jackson Checks ^^^11 to Fraukliu aud Harrisonburg, con- Fremont, verging toward Banks. Jackson, learning this, determined to strike at them in succession. Leav- ing Ewell to confront Banks, he himself rapidly moved against Fremont's advance, compelling it to retreat to Franklin. Then, quickly crossing the Shenandoah Mount- ains, he rejoined Ewell at Newmarket, and, moving up the Valley between the Blue Kidge and the Masanutten range to Front Boyal, he accomplished a double object; he created a panic in Washington, and, indeed, as we shall and attacks Kenly ^^^^ ^"^ thrOUghout thc IN'orth, aud fell iu at Front Royal. ovcrwhelmiug forcc ou Colonel Kenly, who 392 THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. [Sect. XI. THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. was at Front Koyal, capturing many prisoners and guns, and a large amount of stores. This was on the 23d of May. About a week "before this time (May 17th), the nation- al government, desirous of re-enforcing McClellan in the Chap.lv.] the retreat of banks. 393 Detachments sent Peniiisula, had Ordered Shields to leave toMccieiian. Banks's coips and jolii that of McDowell, which was on its march to McClellan, Banks being or- dered to fall back to Strasburg and there fortify himself. He was thus left with about 6000 men to defend the valley. Banks heard of the disaster at Front Eoyal on the evening of its occurrence. He saw his peril. at^tSckedby jJck-'^ He retreated instantly from Strasburg (May 24th), the Confederate advance already ap- pearing. His losses in this forced march were great, but he gained Winchester by midnight. He was unable to rest there more than a couple of hours, for Jackson was fast enveloping him. He resumed his flight, turning upon his pursuers whenever he could, in order to give time for his trains to escape. As he passed through Winchester, the women threw from the windows hot water and mis- siles of every description on his troops. In the course of the afternoon he reached Martinsburg, a treat precipi- march of 22 miles, and, resting his footsore troops only two hours and a half, marched again twelve miles, and gained the Potomac opposite Wil- liamsport the same night. In this pursuit Jackson captured two guns, more than 9000 small-arms, and more than 3000 prisoners. Banks's loss in killed and wounded was about 200. " Never," says that general — not a very soldierly confession— "were there more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when at midday, on the 26th, we stood on the oppo- site shore" of the Potomac. " The scene on the river when the rear-guard arrived escapes across the was of the most animated and exciting de- poto|iac. scription. A thousand camp-fires were burn- ing on the hill-side, a thousand carriages of all sorts were crowded upon the banks of the broad stream between 394 CONSTERNATION IN WASHINGTON. [Sect. XI. the exhausted troops and their coveted rest. The ford was too deep for the teams to cross in regular succession ; only the strongest horses, after a few experiments, were allowed to essay the passage over before morning. The single ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains, the ford by the wagons. The cavalry was secure ; the troops only had no transportation. No enemy appeared in sight. Fortunately, there were several boats belonging to the pontoon train brought from Strasburg, which were launch- ed and devoted exclusively to the soldiers." A rush like that of Stonewall Jackson through the Val- ley in pursuit of Banks was what the nation expected of McClellan when Magruder attempted to stop him in the Peninsula. The attack at Front Eoyal and on Strasburg produced Consternation in constcmation iu Washiugtou. McDowell Washington. ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ordcrcd to fall back ; he was within fifteen miles of Hanover Court-house, and on the point of making a junction with McClellan. In letters to the Secretary of War and to the President McClellan's re-en- , i i • , • i t i forceraents ordered hc expresscQ his rcgrct lu a soldierJy man- ner. He at once proceeded to execute his orders, which were to aid in intercepting Jackson and cut off his retreat in the Valley. On the same day (May 24) Fremont was ordered by telegraph to march instant- ly in aid of the same attempt. By the route he was or- dered to take he might have intercepted Jackson, but he assumed the responsibility of going by another, which permitted Jackson to escape. It had been hoped that, between McDowell and Fremont, Jackson's retreat would be stopped. In the consternation of the moment, in addition to these military orders, dispatches were #ent Northern gov- to thc sfovcmors of thc Northern. States. 6rnors • They were of the following tenor : Chap. LV.] JACKSON'S RETREAT. 395 " Washington, May 25th, 1862. "To the Governor of Massachusetts : " Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the en- emy in great force are marching on Washington. You will please organize and forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your state. " EpwiN M. Stanton, Secretary of War." On the same day (May 25th) the President took mili- The -overnment taiy possesslon of all the railroads in the seized the railroads, -jj^-^^^ g^^^^^^ Ordering their officers and servants to hold themselves in readiness for the trans- portation of troops and munitions of war, to the exclu- sion of all other business. It w^as now high time for Stonewall Jackson to retreat from the front of Harper's Ferry. Accord- son fro™ Harp-" ingly he did so (May 29), leaving Ewell as a rear-guard. That officer made some ener- getic demonstrations on the night of the 30th. "The night was intensely dark; the hills around were alive with signal lights ; the rain descended in torrents ; vivid flashes of lightning illuminated at intervals the green and magnificent scenery, while the crash of the thunder echo- ing among the mountains threw into comparative insig- nificance the roar of the artillery." Next morning it was found that Ewell had disappeared. To overtake Jackson, he marched thirty-four miles on that day ! We have seen that Fremont changed his prescribed line of march. He did this with a view of finding a readier passage over the Shenandoah Mountains from Franklin, where he had concentrated. He went north- ward forty miles to Moorfield ; then, crossing the ridge — though he had stripped his men even of their knapsacks, and marched as expeditiously as he could over roads made almost impassable by the incessant rain — he reach- Faiiure of Fremont ^d Strasburg (Juuc Ist) just after Jacksou to intercept him. ^^^ ^^^^^^ thrOUgh it. Shiclds, who WaS 396 JACKSON'S EETREAT* [Sect. XL moving along the South Fork of the Shenandoah, on the east of the Masanutten range, while Fremont was thus moving on the west, attempted to intercept Jackson far- ther south. But that general retarded the pursuit of Fremont and delayed Shields by burning the bridges as he passed them. Marching rapidly through Harrisonburg, he made his way through the South Fork of the Shenan- doah at Port Kepublic, repulsing (June 5) an attack of the national cavalry on his rear, but losing in the combat .Gen- eral Ashby, a very brave officer, who was in command of Affair at Port ^^^ cavalry. At Port Kepublic the river di- Repubhc. vides ; the larger of its branches is crossed by a wooden bridge, the smaller by a ford. Here Fre- mont at length brought him to bay (June 8), near a ham- let known as Cross Keys, but in vain, for he repulsed the attack. While he was thus engaged with Fremont, who had come down from the northwest, Shields was converging upon him from the northeast. The advance cavalry and artillery of that officer dashed into Port Kepublic, expect- ing to seize Jackson's train, but in a few minutes they were driven out and compelled to fall back on their ad- vancing infantry. The infantry, in its turn, was over- whelmed. A battery was captured and recaptured. Jack- son, in his report, says, " Three times was this battery lost and won in the desperate effi^rts to capture and recover Jackson makes it." Aftcr a determined contest, Jackson good his re'treat. £^^^^^ ^^^^ j^.g ^ssailauts, pursulug thcm nearly five miles, making good his retreat across the riv- er, and setting fire to the bridge. He had lost a thou- sand men (1167) and one gun since he left Winchester, and had captured about a thousand men (975) and sev- en guns. Jackson had thus dexterously slipped between McDow- ell on one side, and Fremont on the other, at Strasburg. Chap. LV.] INACTIVITY OF THE POTOMAC ARMY. 39^ The results he had He liad been pursued in vain by three major achieved. geuerals, and, turning upon his pursuers at every opportunity, had made good his retreat. He had diverted large re-enforcements from McClellan, had neu- tralized a national force of 60,000 men, and given to the Southern armies the prestige of victory. He was now ready to join the army in front of Kichmond opposing McClellan's advance. • The battle of Fair Oaks was fought on the 31st of May, Inactivity of the Po- ^^^ ^^^ almost a mouth General McClellan's tomacArmy. army lay inactive in its position on the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond gradually re- covered from its terror, and the Confederate army from its repulse. Opportunity was given, in the welcome res- pite thus afforded, to obtain re-enforcements through the Conscription Act, to bring detachments from the West, to reorganize under General Lee, the new commander, and to enable Jackson, after his brilliant campaign in the Valley, to take part in the contemplated proceedings. During the long period of mortal inactivity — mortal so far as the peninsular campaign of the Potomac Army was concerned — McClellan had fortified himself strongly on the Chickahominy. His left wing was on the south of that stream, between Whiteoak Swamp and New Bridge; the roads towarf Kichmond were commanded by heavy guns. His right wing was north of the Chicka- hominy, extending beyond Mechanicsville. He had sol- idly constructed several bridges over the stream, thereby bringing the two wings of his army, into easier communi- cation. The reason he assigned for delay in his move- ments was the state of the roads and the want of these bridges. Meantime, as has been mentioned (p. 388), General J. E. B. Stuart, with 1500 Confederate cavalry, had shown 398 THE POTOMAC ARMY ORDERED TO ADVANCE. [Sect. XL Stuart rides round ^i^w caslly McClelkn's commuiiicatioiis with ^^ his base of supplies at "White House might be severed. He defeated two squadrons of national cav- alry at Hanover Old Church, then rode round the army by way of Tunstall's Station, capturing supplies and pris- oners. He rested three hours at Talleysville, crossed the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, and returned next morn- ing to Kichmond unassailed — an ominous warning by which the national general would have done well to profit. At length, on the 25th of June, the army, having 115,102 It is at length order- prcscut for duty, Icamed with transport that ed to advance. -^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^-^ ^^^^^ ^^^ pestilcutial swamps in which it had been spell-bound. Hooker had received orders to advance beyond Fair Oaks on the road to Eichmond. After a sharp struggle, he secured the ground which he had been ordered to occupy. That very night, however, the unwelcome tidings ar- rived that the same apparition which had scared Banks from Strasburg was approaching the national communi- cations with the York Kiver. Stonewall Jackson had come out of the Shenandoah Valley, and was at Hanover Court-house. Hooker was at once recalled. The advance on Kich- The advance coun- moud was abaudoucd. For the army on termanded. ^-^^ Chickahomiuy there was something else to do than to march in triumph to the Confederate cap- ital. A Confederate council of war was held on the same day (25th) in Eichmond. The defensive The Confederates ,. t ,t • i i i 'i. resolve on offensive liucs rouud the citv Were uow complctc ; it operations. "^ _ ^ -z was thought that a small part ot the army would be sufficient to hold them. Jackson had been brought out of the Valley to aid in the proposed move- ment. It was concluded that the time had come for the Chap. LV.] ITS PERILOUS POSITION. 399 mass of the army to cross to tlie nortli of the Chicka- hominy, to sweep down the river on that side, and threat- en McClellan's communications with York Eiver. It was perceived that he must either retreat, or give battle out of his intrenchments. McClellan had now to determine what he would do. Position of Mcciei- The peuiusular campaign had culminated in Ian at this time. ^-^^ withdrawal of Hooker from his advance. The bridges over the Chickahominy gave opportunity to throw either wing to the assistance of the other. But it was very clear that the communications with He resolves on a WMto House could uo lougcT be safcly held. Change of base. ^^^ ^-^^^ ^j^^ capturo of Norfolk aud the de- struction of the Merrimack, Jam6s Eiver had been opened. Some transports had already found their way to City Point. If McClellan concentrated on the north bank of the Chickahominy, it was a public abandonment of the cap- ture of Richmond ; it implied a disastrous and unsup- ported retreat to Yorktown. If he concentrated on the south bank, he lost his communications with White House, and must execute the perilous operation of a change of base by a flank movement. It was seventeen miles from Fair Oaks to James River; there was only one road on which the movement could be executed, and that was exposed to many roads radiating from Richmond. The movement to James River being determined upon, the mode of its execution admitted of little Mode in which it , . ^, • i , • j1 jy ii • i was to be accom- choicc. ihc iie^ht wmsT, ou the farther side plished. of the Chickahominy, must oppose the best resistance it could to the enemy ; its^trains must be sent over the bridges across that stream. It was not to be ex- pected that that wing should gain a victory ; all tliat it was called upon to do was to resist stoutly. The trains, 400 THE SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XI. once over and well on their way on tlie opposite — the south — side toward James Kiver, the right wing must slowly follow them, passing the bridges, which then must be destroyed. The only bridges in possession of the Con- federates were ten miles above, at Mechanicsville ; they therefore would have to make a long march to go round by that way. With the start so secured, the national army might retreat securely to James River, and there come under shelter of the gun-boats which had already reached Harrison's Landing. Military critics have regarded the execution of this movement — for, as we are now to see, it was executed — as a very brilliant operation. But the historian can not for- get that it was not for the purpose of exhibiting the spec- tacle of a retreat, no matter how splendid it might be, that the Army of the Potomac had advanced to the Chickahominy. The campaign now instituted by Lee against McClel- The seven days' ^^^ ^^J ^^ convemeutly dlvidcd according campaign. ^^ ^^^^^ rpj^^y ^^.^ ^^ folloWS I 1st Day, Thursday, 26th of June — Mechanicsville. 2d " Friday, 27th " —The Chickahominy, Gaines's Mill, or Cold Harbor. 3d " Saturday, 28th " —The Retreat. 4th " Sunday, 29th " —Savage's Station. 5th " Monday, 30th " — Frazier's Farm. 6th " Tuesday, 1st of July— Malvern Hill. 7th " Wednesday, 2d " — Retreat to Harrison's Land- ing. TJie first Day^ Thursday^ June 2QtIi. Mechanicsville. Assault at Mechan- —^^^ Confederate General A.P.Hill was icsviiie. ordered to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy and move on Mechanicsville. Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to support him. It was expected that Jackson would arrive in time to join them. They Chap. LV.] BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE. 401 were to sweep down to the York Eiver Eailroad. Hill waited for Jackson until nearly three o'clock in the after- noon, and then determined to act without him. The na- tional advance retired to a stronger position about a mile distant, across Beaver Dam Creek. As it was very for- midable in front, the Confederates attempted to turn it first on the right, then on the left, but at both points met with a disastrous repulse, their loss being about 1500. The second Day, Friday, June 2^tK Battle of the Battle of the Chick- Ghiclaliominy .—Ki daybreak Jackson was ahominy. crossiug Bcaver Dam Creek, some distance up that stream, and coming down toward the national right. The bridges at Mechanicsville were soon repaired, and the Confederate troops, finding their enemy gone, fol- lowed after them. D. H. Hill bore to the left to unite with Jackson ; A. P. Hill and Longstreet kept near the Chickahominy. On the national side, McClellan was withdrawing his trains to the south bank of the Chickahominy. Before daybreak he had sent as many guns and wagons as pos- sible over that river, and prepared to retire the troops to a position on its north bank stretching round the bridges, so that their flanks would be secure. In his opinion it was not advisable to bring them across, as that would have enabled Jackson to interrupt the proposed retreat by passing the Chickahominy at some of the lower bridges before the national army, with its trains, could reach Mal- vern. Porter's train crossed successfully over the bridges, and had joined the trains of the troops on the south side in their movement to James Kiver. The upper bridge. New Bridge, had been destroyed. Stoneman had been sent with a column of cavalry to evacuate the depot at White House, and to destroy there, and along the York Eiver Eailroad, whatever could not be removed. The 2;reater part of the heavy guns and wagons having thus H.— C c DIAGRAM OF THE KETREAT. Chap. LV.] BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY. 4()3 been removed, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops which had been engaged at Mechanicsville was commenced about dawn. They were retired about five milesj to Gaines's Mill. The new position occupied by Porter was an arc of a Position of the na- circlc, coverfng the approaches to the bridges tionai forces. ^^^^^ couuccted the right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river. The troops were arranged in two parallel lines, those which had been engaged on the day before being in the rear of the first. They were all in position by noon. They were to defend the bridges in their rear, to cross them in the evening, and then to destroy them. Shortly after noon the Confederates were discovered Advance of the Con- approachiug iu force under A. P. Hill, and federates. vcry soou the firing became heavy. The ground over which they were advancing was an open field, about a quarter of a mile wide, traversed by a stream, the sides of which were morasses. Hill crossed the plain and the swamp, but was repulsed when he at- tempted to ascend the hill beyond, on which the national troops were posted. At 2 P.M. Porter asked for re-en- forcements, and Slocum's division was sent across the riv- er to him. At 3 the engagement became so severe that the second line and reserves had to be moved forward to sustain the first against repeated and desperate as- saults. The contest on the left was for a strip of woods run- ning almost at right angles to the Chickahominy. The Confederates charged up to this wood several times, but were driven back with heavy loss, notwithstanding that Longstreet had advanced to the aid of Hill. The na- tional loss also was very great, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were.be- coming exhausted. 404 BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY. [Sect. XL , Thougli Slocum's division had increased Porter's streDgtli to 35,000, tlie national line was strongly pressed in several points. About 4 P.M. Jackson had reached the ground, and the Confederates then made a general assault. It was commenced by an attack on the national right by D. H. Hill. He pushed up the slope in front, but was forced back. Ewell attempted the same movement, and met with a like repulse. The battle swayed doubtfully as the whole line became involved, attack after attack being repeatedly repelled. Of the assailants large numbers were conscripts who had never been under fire until the day before. They soon showed what kind of soldiers they were. With a shrill yell they forced their way across the intervening swamp, and came up to the very muzzles of Porter's guns. Under the fire they received they went down like grass before the scythe. At 5 o'clock Porter reported his position as critical. His as- sailants had now double his strength. The brigades of French and Meagher were therefore ordered to cross the Chickahominy to his support. They got up just in time The national lines ^o prcvcut a total rout, for thc Confederates, broken. ^-^^ £^^ ^^^ houY aud a half had been mak- ing the most desperate charges, had finally carried the woods on the left. This reverse, aided by the confusion which followed an unsuccessful charge by four compa- nies of national cavalry, caused a general retreat toward the bridges. French's and Meagher's brigades advanced boldly, dashing to the front through a crowd of fugitives who were rushing to the bridges over the swamp and river. The hurrahs with which these brigades were greeted warned the Confederates that re-enforcements had ar- rived. Under a canopy of smoke, through which the set- ting sun, crimson in color, sent his diminished rays, the chap.lv.] results of the battle. 405 national troops rallied. The Confederates paused, and did not follow np the advantage they had gained. Porter had thus accomplished the object of this des- perate struggle. He had held the front of the bridges, and given time for the operation of retreat on the other bank. When night came he crossed, and then destroy- • .. u ... ^^ them. The Confederate loss had been Losses in the battle. very great. In Jackson's corps alone 589 were killed and 2671 wounded. McClellan had lost about 9000 men and 22 guns. But, heavy as were their losses, the Confederates thought they had cheaply purchased the advantages they supposed they had gained. They believed that McClel- lan was cut off from his communications and isolated, and that his supplies at White House would fall an un- resisting prey. Not without bitter disappointment did they learn, on the following afternoon, that White House had been evacuated, and the stores which could not be Mccieiian's actual Carried away destroyed ; that McClellan, in- condition. stead of being cut off, had concentrated his troops on the other side of the Chickahominy, and with five thousand wagons, a siege train, a herd of twenty-five hundred oxen, and vast quantities of material in advance of him, had actually, in their faces, accomplished a change of base, and was marching to a junction with the nation- al fleet at James River. In a dispatch to the Secretary of War (June 28), McClellan declared that his soldiers had His accusations , i i i i 1 1 against the govern- becu overwuelmed by vastly superior num- bers, but that even now, with 10,000 addi- tional men, he could take Richmond to-morrow; that, however, as it was, he should be glad to cover his retreat and save the personneJy of his army. With truth he de- clared that no one need blush for the Army of the Poto- mac. Asserting .that the government had not sustained ^QQ THE RETREAT. [Sect. XI. Mm, he so far forgot Mmself as to say to the Secretary of War, " If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Wash- ington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." The third Day, Saturday, June ^%th. The Retreat, — The retreat to Immediately after the battle of the Chicka- jamcs River. iioj^ij^y^ McClellau assembled his corps com- manders. He seemed even at this moment to be vacil- lating, and half inclined to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy and renew the contest. Heintzelman ad- vised him against that step. Then he finally determined on a change of base, and informed his generals of his method of executing it. Ominous whispers were already passing through the ranks that the campaign had failed, and that a retreat was in prospect. When, during the night, the bridges were blown up, the officers tried to close their eyes to what they perceived but too plainly was about to come to pass. A few hours more, and the fact could no longer be concealed. Malvern was distant a dozen or fifteen miles. There Topography of the was uo cucmy iu frout to obstruct the march, lyxe of retreat. rpj^^ ^^^^^ difficulty lay iu the couutry. The Whiteoak Creek, a branch of the Chickahominy, passes through the midst of a swamp, which stretches in a north- westerly direction toward Eichmond for about eight miles. Near Eichmond the swamp is about four miles wide. At its more distant extremity it narrows down to a few hun- dred yards. This swamp McClellan had to cross in his retreat. Southward of the Eichmond and York Eiver Eailway four roads diverge from Eichmond toward the east ; they are: (1.) The Williamsburg Eoad; (2.) the Charles City Eoad ; (3.) the Central Eoad ; (4.) the Newmarket Eoad. The first runs in a general manner parallel to the rail- way; the other three cross almost perpendicularly the chap.lv.] the BETREAT. • 407 Quaker Eoad wliicli comes from the swamp down to- ward Malvern Hill. Through the swamp and down the Quaker Road was the line of McClellan's retreat. On the morning of the 28th, Lee was in doubt as to Movements of the the course McClellau had taken. Cavalry Confederates, recounoissances, however, satisfied him that he was not crossing the lower bridges of the Chickahom- iny with an intention of passing down the peninsula, but was on his way to James River. Thereupon Lee deter- mined by forced marches to intercept him. Longstreet and A. P. Hill crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, which had been already repaired. They were to move past Richmond and then along the Central Road. Ma- gruder was on the Williamsburg, and Huger marched along the Charles City Road. These movements would bring them on the flank of McClellan's retreat. Jackson, crossing the Chickahominy at the Grapevine Bridge, was to follow the retreating columns and press upon their rear. McClellan ordered Keyes to move his corps across and of the na- Whitcoak Crcck and seize strong positions tionai troops. ^^ ^-^^ opposlte sldc, to cover the troops and trains, and guard their retreat. Franklin and Porter followed by the same route. Heintzelman and Sumner were to fall back to Savage's Station from the works in front, and then cross the swamp and unite with the rest of the army. The rear-guard of the retreating column was to keep a bold front toward its pursuers, and special directions were given to guard against flank attacks on the three roads radiating from Richmond. The day was hot and stifling. The vast caravan, with less confusion than might have been anticipated, pursued its dusty way. At 11 A.M. the telegraph wires to White House ceased to work ; the enemy had cut them. Whatever munitions or supplies could not be car- 408 • SAVAGE'S STATION. [Sect. XI. ried away were destroyed. Under the bushes in the woods by the roadside many a sick and wounded man was left, casting imploring looks on the receding column as it passed by. The fourth Day, Sunday, June ^^th. Savage^ s Station, — The morning was' suffocating and hot. Magruder, mov- ing along the Williamsburg Road, found the works at Fair Sumner at sav- Oaks abandoucd. Sumner and Heintzelman age's station. ^ere retiring toward Savage's Station, which they reached in the afternoon. Their orders were to hold that point until night, but, through some misunderstand- ing, Heintzelman retired before the appointed time, and crossed the swamp, having first destroyed the stores and ammunition which could not be carried away. A loco- motive, with a train of cars heaped up with supplies and shells, was turned loose on the railroad, and sent headlong over the broken bridge into the Chickahominy. The train had been set on fire before it started, and the shells were exploding as it went. Magruder made an attack on Sumner's corps about half past 5 P.M. It was still in front of Savage's Sta- tion. The action continued until dark, Sumner maintain- ing his ground. During the night he passed into the Abandonment of Whltcoak Swamp, leaviug 2500 sick and the hospitals. mounded in the hospital at the station. Ma- gruder now received orders to leave the Williamsburg Road and cross over to the Newmarket. Before sunrise the national troops had passed Whiteoak Bridge, which was then destroyed. The fifth Day, Monday, June 2>0th. Frazier''s Farm. — The day was exceedingly hot, but the Confederate general vigorously pursued McClellan's retreating army. Longstreet and A. P. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and, having moved round the head of the swamp, marched rapidly down the Central Road, in ex- Chap. LV.] BATTLE OF FRAZIER'S FARM. 409 pectation of striking McCleUan's flank. They hoped to Battle of rrazier's pi^rce Hs line and throw the rear of his dol- Farm, or Glendale. ^^^ ^^^-^ ^^^^ JacksOn and D. H. Hill, who had crossed over Grapevine Bridge, and were approach- ing on his track. On all sides Jackson encountered a vast wreck of military stores. Blue overcoats in count- less numbers had been thrown into the bushes or trod- den under foot in the decaying, leaves or in the dust of the roads. To aid in piercing McClellan's line, which was more than eight miles long, Magruder and Huger were now marching parallel to Longstreet. A brigade was also brought over the James Kiver from Fort Darling. It was expected that 80,000 men would be brought to bear on the national line. Jefferson Davis came from Rich- mond to witness the apparently inevitable national ca- tastrophe. Longstreet and Hill encountered the retreating line vicorofthecon- about 4 P.M. at Frazier's Farm. It was federate attack. j^^CaU's divisiou which happened to be passing their front. They threw upon it brigade after brigade, and tried to break and pierce through it. McCall, in his report of this portion of the battle, says, " Randall's battery was charged upon by the enemy in great force, with a reckless impetuosity I never saw equaled. They advanced at a run over six hundred yards of open ground. The guns of the battery mowed them down, yet they nev- er paused. A volley of musketry was poured into them at a short distance by the Fourth Regiment, in support of this battery, but it did not check them for an instant ; they dashed on, and pistoled and bayoneted the cannon- iers at their guns." Notwithstanding these determined efforts, the attack The national col- failed) the uatioual line was not pierced. umn unbroken, ^agrudcr aud Hugcr did not get up; the ^^Q BATTLE OF FRAZIER'S FARM. [Sect. XI. troops from Fort Darling were driven back by shells from tlie gun-boats. Jackson, who was to have attacked the rear-gnard of Jackson in check at the retreating army, reached Whiteoak Whiteoak Bridge. ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ jj^ f^^^^ ^^^ ^^.^^^^ over it destroyed, and Franklin barring his passage. In spite of his utmost efforts, he was kept at bay the whole afternoon. The contest continued until after dark; the advance of -theX^onfederates was checked; the national army se- curely fell back during the night to Malvern Hill. The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery had reached that point on the previous afternoon. Of McCall's division, nearly one fourth had been killed or wounded. He himself, riding out after Losses in the battle. .-i.ati, •, , i nightfall to reconnoitre, was taken prisoner. General Meade had been severely wounded. On the part of the Confederates, the losses had, been awful ; for in- stance. General Pryor, of the fifth brigade of Longstreet's corps, speaking of the Fourteenth Alabama, says it was nearly annihilated. He adds : " I crossed the Chickahom- iny on the 26th with 1400 men ; in the fights that fol- lowed I suffered a loss of 849 killed and wounded, and 11 missing. Sixth Day, Tuesday , July 1st. Malvern Hill. — Mal- BattieofMai- ^em Hill, to whlch the national army had vern Hill. ^^^ rctreatcd, and on which it prepared to make a stand against its pursuers, is " an elevated plateau, cleared of timber, about a mile and a half long by three fourths of a mile wide, with several converging roads fun- ning over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, the ground sloping gradually toward the north and east Topography of to the woodlaud, giving clear ranges for ar- the field. • tillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly to a ravine. Chap.lv.] MALVERN hill. 411 wMcli extends to James Eiver. From tlie position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack were from the di- rection of Eichmond and Whiteoak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike the national army on its left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery." On this formidable position McClellan's wayworn Position of the na- troops, weary with marching by night and tionai army. . gg^j^^jj^g ^^j ^^j^ overwhclmcd with the mid- summer heat, and sickened with the pestiferous miasma, were at last concentrated. Both flanks of the army rest- ed on James River, under the protection of the gun-boats. The order in which the troops lay, from their left to their right, was. Porter, Heintzelman, Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. The approaches to the position were commanded by about seventy guns, several of them heavy siege cannon. As soon as Franklin had withdrawn from the White- oak Creek, Jackson crossed over, following the retreating columns to Malvern. Between 9 and 10 A.M., the Con- federates commenced feeling along the national left wing with artillery and skirmishers. Their fire, however, soon died away. They perceived the difficulties before them. There were crouching cannon waiting for them, and strength of the Tcady to dcfeud all the approaches. Shel- position. tered by fences, ditches, ravines, were swarms of infantry. There were horsemen picturesquely career- ing over the noontide and sun-seared field. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible upon the slope, which rose- in the form of an amphitheatre. With a fan-shaped sheet of fire they could sweep the incline, a sort of natu- ral glacis up which the assailants must advance. A crown of cannon was on the brow of the hill. The first line of batteries could only be reached by traversing an open space of from three to four hundred yards, exposed 4][2 BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. [Sect. XI. to grape and canister from tHe artillery, and musketry from the infantry. If that were»carried, another, and still another more difficult remained in the rear. Not without reason did Hill express to Lee his disap- The Confederates pi'<^^^l of the attack about to be made ; nev- ordeiedto carry it. ertheless, Lce Ordered the position to be car- ried. During the afternoon the Confederate artillery opened, but it was only in feeble force and in detail. It was at once silenced by the national guns. Magrudey had come up, and was ordered to take post on the right of Hill, who was on the right of their line. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward columns of attack. ^'Brigade after brigade," says McClellan in his report, " formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field." Lee, who was momentarily expecting that his batteries would break the national lines, had ordered his division commanders to advance as soon as they should hear Ar- mistead, who was in position to see the effect of the fire, charging with a yell. Hill thought he heard the signal Failure of their as- about au hour and a half before sunset, and ^^''^'' at once advanced, but soon found that he Chap. LV.] BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 413 could not stand before tlie tempest. Magruder, on his right, was making a desperate attack. It was the noise of his advance that was mistaken by Hill for the signal yell. Magruder also found that it was utterly impossi- ble to rush through the sheet of fire. No impression whatever could be made. Malvern Hill absolutely quiv- ered under the concussions of the cannonade. Shells from the gun-boats in the river were bursting overhead. The Confederate general was uselessly and unjustifiably send- ing his men to be massacred. Until dark he persisted in his efforts to seize the position, but every one of his attacks was repulsed with horrible loss. Not until after nine o'clock did he give up his attempt, and the artillery cease its fire. The battle was followed by a dark and stormy night, Awfai night after hiding the agouy of thousands who lay on the battle. ^^^ blood-stalucd slopcs of Malvcm Hill, and in the copses and woodlands beyond. The rain came down in torrents. Neither Jackson, nor Longstreet, nor A. P. Hill had taken part in this attack. It was made by D. H. Hill and Magruder. Some of their men slept through the tempestuous night within one hundred yards of the na- tional batteries. With inexpressible astonishment, when day broke, they cast their eyes on the hill from which they had been so fearfully repulsed. Their enemy had vanished — the volcano was silent. . Among the Confederates every thing was in the most dreadful confusion. One of their generals, says : " The next morning, by dawn, I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thou- sands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for their regiments ; ambulances, wagons, and artillery ob- structing every road, and all together in a drenching rain, presenting, a scene of the most woeful and heart-rending confusion." 414 RETEEAT TO HAERISON'S LAm>ING. [Sect. XI. Seventh Day^ Wednesday^ July 2d The Retreat to HarrisoriJs Landing.— 'Eot even in tlie awful night that ^ ^ followed this awful battle was rest allotted McClellan retreats to^Harrison's Land- to the national armj. In less than two hours after the roar of the conflict had ceased, or- ders wer6 given to resume the retreat, and march to Har- rison's Landing. At midnight the utterly exhausted sol- diers were groping their staggering way along a road de- scribed as desperate, in all the confusion of a fleeing and routed army. There was but one narrow pass through which the army could retreat, and though the distance was only seven miles^ it was not until the middle of the next day that Harrison's Landing was reached. The mud was actually ankle-deep all over the ground. The last of the wagons did not reach the selected site until after dark on the 3d of July. The rear-guard then moved into their camp, and every thing was secure. The paralyzed Con- federates made a feeble pursuit, and on the 8th went back to Richmond. Not without profound reluctance was the order to Indignation in the coutiuue the rctrcat to Harrison's Landing , national army. ^i^^j^^^ Gcncral Kcamy, thau whom there was not a more noble soldier in the whole army, ex- claimed, in a group of indignant ofiicers, " I, Philip Kear- ny, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this order to retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy and take Eichmond. And, in full view of all the responsibility of such a declaration, I say to you all that such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason." The French princes left the army early the next morn- The French princes i^g. Its couditlou was, to all appcarauccs, abandon the army, ^esperate. They went on board a steamer, and soon after departed for the North. The Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, Ghap.lv.] the contedekate triumph. ^ 415 referring to these events, declare, ^' The re- Perilous condition , , p , i r» hit t a. tt of the national treat 01 the armv from Malvern to Harri- army. __,^ son's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army, being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the heights which com- manded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from de- struction." There had been. sent to the Peninsula about one hun- dred and sixty thousand men (159,500). ciosTSf the^am- ^ Ou the 3d of July, after this great army had reached the protection of the gun-boats at Harrison's Landing, McClellan telegraphed to the Secre- tary of War that he presumed he had not " over 50,000 men left with their colors." Hereupon President Lin- coln (July 7) went to Harrison's Landing, and found that there were about 86,000 men there. Lee, in his report, says : " The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaisrn, which Lee's report of the i-ir j. ^ n, l^ i* Confederate tri- had Dcen prosccutcd alter months of prep- aration, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upward of 35,000 stand of small - arms, were cap- tured. The stores and supplies of every description which fell into our hands were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the sur- vivors reached the protection to which they fled." 416 CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XI. General McClellan remained at Harrison's Landing until the 4th of August, when he received Withdrawal of the -, , • , i i i • , a national array from au Order to Withdraw his army to Acquia the Peuinsula. , , , *' -•■ Creek, to aid in repelling the Confederate movement toward Washington. Most reluctantly did he comply with this order. The bulk of the army moved by land to Fortress Monroe. The general left that place on the 23d of August, and reached Acquia Creek the next day. Thus ended the great, the ill-starred, the melancholy Peninsular expedition. It had no presiding Total failure of . , it • t mi the Peninsular p;enius, uo coutrollmg mmd. ihere was an campaign. y • t • ^ t incredible sluggishness m the advance; it actually gave the Confederates time to pass their con- scription law and bring their conscripts into the field. The magnificent army, which had been organized with so much pageantry at Washington, and moved down Ches- apeake Bay with so much pomp, had sickened in the dismal trenches of Yorktown, and left thousands upon thousands in the dark glades and glooniy marshes of the blood-stained Chickahominy. It is the testimony of the corps commanders that they were left as best they might to conduct the fatal retreat. The general was importu- nately demanding of the government more troops — never using all that he had. Countless millions of money had been wasted, tens of thousands of men had been de- stroyed. From the inception of the campaign to its end, milita- ry audacity was pitted against military timidity, prompt- ness against procrastination, and the result could not be other than it was. The Confederates at Centreville, in inferior numbers and in contemptible works, held McClel- lan at bay. They did the same* at Yorktown, though he had much more than ten times their strength. Their au- dacity culminated in their march to the north bank of the Chap. LV.] CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 417 CHckahominy, wlien they actually divided their army in his presence, putting the mass of it on the more distant side of a river which he might have rendered impassable, and leaving nothing between him and Eichmond but a body of troops which he might have overwhelmed with- out difficulty. II.— Dd CHAPTER LVL THE BATTLE OF THE IRON SHIPS. The steam frigate Merrimack was converted bj the Confederates into an armored ship. Coming out of Norfolk, she destroyed the wooden war-ships Cumberland and Con- gress. Ericsson's armored turret-ship, the Monitor, built expressly for the purpose, ob- tained a victory over her, and disabled her. Importance of this battle to naval powers. "When the navy yard at Norfolk was seized "by Vir- srinia, amonsr tlie ships partly destroyed was The Merrimack con- f, \ ?• x n/ • i i» p 1 verted into an iron- tho steanL irigate MerrimacK, 01 forty guns (p. 84). She was one of the finest vessels in the navy, and was worth, when equipped, nearly a million and a quarter of dollars. She had been set on fire, and also scuttled by the offi- cers who had charge of the yard. Her upper works alone, therefore, had suffered. Her hull and machinery were comparatively uninjured. The Confederate government caused her to be raised Particulars of her ^^^ tumcd luto aU extcmporaneOUS iron- construction, ^i^^^ ^g mentioned (p. 207), her hull was cut down, and a stout timber roof built upon it. This was then strongly plated with three layers of iron, each one inch and a quarter thick, the first layer being placed horizontally, the second obliquely, the third perpendicu- larly. The armature reached two feet below the water- line, and rose ten feet above. The ends were constructed in the same manner. A false bow was added for the pur- pose of dividing the water, and beyond it projected an iron beak. Outwardly she presented the appearance of Chap. LVI.] THE AKMORED FRIGATE MERRIMACK. 419 Her armament. .an iron roof or ark. It was expected that, from her slop- ing armature, shots striking would glance away. Her armament consisted of eight 11 -inch guns, four on each side, and a 100 -pound rifled Armstrong gun at each end. As the fact of her construction could not be concealed, the Confederate authorities purposely circulated rumors to her disadvantage. It was said that her iron was so heavy that she could hardly float ; that her hull had been seriously injured, and that she could not be steered. Of course they could have no certain knowledge of her capa- bilities as a w^eapon of war, and, as was the case with many officers of the national navy, perhaps they held her in light esteem. About midday on Saturday, March 8th, she came down She comes out from the Elizabeth Kiver, under the command of Norfolk. Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had aban- doned the national navy. She was attended by two armed steam -boats, and was afterward joined by two HAMPTOX ROADS. 420 SINKING OF THE CUMBERLAND. [Sect. XI. otiiers. Passing the sailing frigate Congress, and receiv-. ing from her her fire, she made her way to the sloop of war Cumberland, of 24 guns and 376 men. This ship had been placed across the channel to bring her broad- side to bear, and, as the Merrimack approached, she re- ceived her with a rapid fire. At once one of the prob- lems presented by the Merrimack's construction was solved ; the shot of the Cumberland, from thirteen 9 and 10 inch guns, glanced from her armature She attacks and // ti hat • •,! in sinks the Cum- " like SO mauy peas. Advancing with all the speed she had, and receiving six or eight broadsides while so doing, she struck her antagonist with her iron beak just forward of the main chains, and instant- ly opened her fire of shells from every gun she could bring to bear. The battle was already decided. Through the hole she had made, large enough for a man to enter, the water poured in. In vain Lieutenant Morris, who com- manded the Cumberland, worked the pumps to keep her afloat a few moments more, hoping that a lucky shot might find some weaker place.- He. only abandoned his guns as one after another the settling of the sinking ship swamped them in the water. The last shot was. fired by Matthew Tenney, from a gun on a level with the water. That brave man then attempted to escape through the port-hole, but was borne back by the incoming rush, and went down with the ship. With him went down nearly 100 dead, sick, wounded, and those who, like him, could not extricate themselves. The Cumberland sank in 54 feet of water. The commander of her assailant saw the flag of the unconquered but sunken ship still flying above the surface. He was not a Virginian, but a Marylander by birth, and had served under that flag for thirty-five years. The sailing frigate Congress, which had fired at the Merrimack as she passed, and exchanged shots with the Chap, LYI.] THE CONGRESS DESTROYED. 421 armed steam-boats, had been run aground by her com- mander with the assistance of a tug. The Merrimack now came up, and, taking a position about 150 yards and sets the Con- from hcr stcm, fircd shell into her. One gressonflre. ghcll killed 17 mcu at ouc of thc guus. Of the only two guns with which she could reply, one was quickly dismounted, and the muzzle of the other knock- ed off. The Merrimack ranged slowly backward and for- ward at less than 100 yards. In her helpless condition, the Congress took fire in several places, and nearly half her crew were killed or wounded. Among the former was her commander. The flag was therefore hauled down, and a tug came alongside to take possession of her. But fire being opened upon the tug by some sol- diers on shore, the Merrimack recommenced shelling, do- ing the same again later in the day, after the crew of the Congress had abandoned her. The Congress was set thoroughly on fire. About midnight she blew up. Out of her crew of 434 men, only 218 survived. In little more than two hours Buchanan had killed or drowned more than 300 of his old comrades. When the Merrimack first came out, the commander of the steam frigate Minnesota got his ship under way, intending to butt the iron-clad and run her down. As he passed Sewall's Point, he received the fire of a rifle battery there, and had his mainmast injured. It was ebb tide; the Minnesota drew 23 feet water; at one part of the channel the depth was less, but, as the bottom was soft, it was hoped that the ship could be forced over. She, however, took the ground, and, in spite She commences an ^ i* i • i i rr\i attack on the Min- 01 cvcry cxcrtion, becamo immovable, ihe Merrimack, having destroyed the Cumber- land and Congress, now came down upon the Minneso- ta. Her draft, however, prevented her coming nearer to her intended victim than a mile, and the fire on both 422 ARKIVAL OF THE MONITOR. [SECf. XI. sides was comparatively ineffective. But the armed steam-boats ventured nearer, and, with their rifled guns, killed and wounded several men on board the Minneso- ta. On her part, she sent a shot through the boiler of but retires as night ouc of them. Night was coming on; the comes on. MciTimack did not venture to lie out in the Roads; so, expecting another easy victory in the morn- ing, she retired at 7 P.M., with her consorts, behind Sew- all's Point. The Minnesota still lay fast on the mud-bank. The re- coil of her own firin2f had forced her harder Night attempts to ... , t,i'1;«t t release the Minne- ou. Attempts wcrc made at high tide, and, indeed, all through the night, to get her off, but in vain. The steam frigate Eoanoke, disabled some months previously by the breaking of her shaft, and the sailing frigate St. Lawrence, had both likewise been aground, but had now gone down the Roads. At nine o'clock that night Ericsson's new iron-clad tur- Arrivaiofthetur- Tct-ship, the Mouitor, rcachcd Fortress Mon- ret-ship Monitor. ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ york. Evcry cxcrtiou had been made by her inventor to get her out in time to meet the Merrimack ; and the Confederates, finding from their spies in JSTew York that she would probably be ready, put a double force on their frigate, and worked night and day. It is said that this extra labor. gained that one day in which the Merrimack destroyed the Cumberland and the Congress. The Monitor was commanded by Lieutenant John L. Her dreadful sea- Wordcu. A drcadf ul passagc of thi'cc days voyage. -^^^ almost wom out her crew. The sea had swept over her decks ; the turret was often the only part above water. The tiller-rope was at one time thrown off the wheel. The draft-pipe had been choked by the pouring down of the waves. The men were half suf focated. The fires had been repeatedly extinguished. Chap. LVI.] THE MEERIMACK AND MONITOR. 423 Ventilation had, however, been obtained through the tur- ret. Throughout the previous afternoon Worden had heard the sound of the cannonading. He delayed but a few minutes at the Fortress, and soon after midnight had anchored the Monitor alongside the Minnesota (March 9). Day broke — a clear and beautiful Sunday. The flag The Merrimack re- of the Cumberland was still flying; the 8umes her attack, ^^j,^^^^ ^f ^^^ defcuders werc floating about on the water. The Merrimack approached to renew her attack. She ran down toward the Fortress, and then came up the channel through which the Minnesota had passed. Worden at once took his station at the peep- holes of his pilot-house, laid the Monitor before her ene- she is assailed by ^y, aud gave the fire of his two 11-inch the Monitor. ^^^^ rj.j^^ ^-^^^ of cach was 168 pouuds' weight. Catesby Jones, who had taken command of the Merrimack, Buchanan having been wounded the previ- ous day, saw at once that he had on his hands a very dif- ferent antagonist from those of yesterday. The turret was but a very small mark to fire at, nine feet by twenty ; the shot that struck it glanced off. One bolt only from a rifle-gun struck squarely, penetrating into the iron ; " it then broke short off, and left its head sticking in." For the most part, the shot flew over the low deck, missing their aim. Five times the Merrimack tried to run the Monitor Attempts to mn the dowu, and at each time received, at a few Monitor down. ' ^^^^ dlstauce, tho fire of the 11-inch guns. In her movements at one moment she got aground, and the light-drawing Monitor, steaming round her, tried at every promising point to get a shot into her. Her ar- mor at last began to start and bend. Unable to shake off the Monitor or to do her any in- ner conflict with jury, the Merrimack now renewed her at- the Minnesota. ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^j^^^^ Minuesota, rcceiviug 424 BATTLE OF THE IRON SHIPS. [Sect. XI, from her a, whole "broadside whicli struck squarely. " It was enougli/' said Captain Van Brunt, who commanded the frigate, " to have. blown out of the water any wooden ship in the world." In her turn, she sent from her rifled bow -gun a shell through the Minnesota's side: it ex- ploded within her, tearing four of her rooms into one, and setting her on fire. Another shell burst the boiler of the tug-boat Dragon, which lay alongside the Minnesota. The frigate was firing on the iron-clad solid shot as fast as she could. Once more the Monitor intervened between them, com- pelling her antagonist to change position, in doing which the Merrimack again grounded, and again received a whole broadside from the Minnesota. The blows she was receiving were beginning to tell upon her. As soon sheretreats, pursued ^s sho could get clcar, sho rau dowu the bay, by the Monitor. fon^wed by the Mouitor. Suddenly she turned round, and attempted to run her tormentor down. Her beak grated on the Monitor's deck, and was wrench- ed. The turret -ship stood unharmed a blow like that which had sent the Cumberland to the bottom ; she mere- ly glided out from under her antagonist, and in the act of so doing gave her a shot while almost in contact. It seemed to crush in her armor. The Monitor now hauled off for the purpose of hoist- The Monitor gains i^g Hioro shot iuto hcr tuiTet. Catcsby the victory. Joues thought he had silenced her, and that he might make another attempt on the Minnesota. He, however, changed his course as the Monitor steamed up, and it was seen that the Merrimack was sagging down at her stern. She made the best of her way to Craney Island. The battle was over ; the turreted Monitor had driven her from the field and won the victory. The Minnesota had fired 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and more than ten tons of powder. The Monitor fired 41 chap.lvl] the monitor gains the victory. 425 The last shot sliot, and was struck 22 times. The last shell wounds worden. ^^^^ -^^ ^^^ Merrimact at her struck her pilot-house opposite the peep-hole, through which Wor- den at that moment was looking. He was knocked down senseless, and blinded by the ex]3losion. When conscious- ness returned, the first question this brave officer asked was, " Did we save the Minnesota ?' The shattering of the pilot-house was the greatest in- rnjuries received by jurj that the Mouitor reccivcd. One of the the Monitor. irou logs, ulue iuchcs by twelve inches thick, was broken in two. On board the Merrimack two were killed and nineteen Injuries of the 'wouudcd. Shc lost her iron prow, her star- Mernmack. l^oard auchor, and all her boats ; her armor was dislocated and damaged; she leaked considerably; her steam-pipe and smoke-stack were riddled; the muz- zles of two of her guns were shot away ; the woodwork round one of the ports was set on fire at every discharge. In his report on the battle, Buchanan states that in fifteen minutes after the action began he Buchanan's report. , ^ .in l. 1 J 1 xl. x i T had run the Cumberland down ; that he dis- tinctly heard the crash when she was struck, and that the fire his ship received did her some injury; that there was great difficulty in managing the Merrimack when she was near the mud, and that this was particularly the case in getting into position to attack the Congress. It was while firing the red-hot shot and incendiary shell by which that ship was burnt that he was him- self wounded. This engagement excited the most profound interest Important results throughout thc civilizcd world. It seemed of this battle. ^g .£ ^-^^ ^^y of wooden navies was over. Nor was it alone the superiority of iron as against wood that was settled by this combat; it showed that a monitor was a better construction than a mailed broad- 426 END OF THE MERRIMACK AND MONITOR. [Sect. XL • side ship, and tLat inclined armor was inferior to a turret. On the invasion of the Peninsula by McClellan, the Destruction of the Confederate government determined on the Merrimack. abaudoumeut of Norfolk (p. 383), and the Merrimack was blown up by them (May 11th). A few days subsequently, the Monitor, with the Galena and Naugatuck, made an ineffectual attack on Fort Darling, Att.ack on Fort lt>ut it was fouud that the turret guns could Darling. ^^^ ^^ elcvatcd sufficiently to be of advan- tage. Toward the close of the year she was ordered to Beaufort, South Carolina, and foundered in a storm off Cape Hatteras. CHAPTEE LVn. THE SORTIE OF LEE. FORCING OF THE NATIONAL ARMY UNDER POPE INTO THE DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON. General Pope was placed in command of an army concentrating in front of Wash- ington. The Confederate government, flushed with its overthrow of McClellan, and its ar- mies being greatly strengthened by the conscription, resolved on a sortie under Lee, the counterpart of that under Bragg. It hoped to capture Philadelphia, and there dictate peace. The first portion of these operations was completely successful. Pope was forced into the fortifications of Washington, and the way through Maryland opened by the Confederates. Military events showed tliat it was necessary to cor- rect the false distribution of the forces in the vicinity of Washington. The armies that had been under the com- mand of Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell were consolidated into one, which was desi2:nated Formation of the .-, . ^^y. . . p i • t .i national Army of thc Army 01 Virginia, 01 which those armies formed the First, Second, and Third Corps respectively. Major General Pope was called from the Pope placed in Wcst, aud, by ordcr of the President, took command. commaud (Juue 26, 1862). Fremont was shortly after relieved at his own request, and the com- mand of his corps given to Sigel. In addition, Burnside was brought from Koanoke Island to Alexandria. At this time McClellan was occupying a position on both sides of the Chickahominy. It was hoped that his long-delayed operations against Richmond might be fa- cilitated by the vigorous use of the newly-consolidated He proposes to ^Huy. For this purpose. Pope intended to advance by way of Charlottesville upon propc aid McClellan. 428 THE SORTIE OF LEE. [Sect. XL James Eiver, above Riclimond, thereby compelling Lee to detach a part of his army from the front of Richmond, and thus enable McClellan to complete his movement successfully. Scarcely, hov^ever, had the march begun, when McClellan commenced his disastrous retreat to Harrison's Landing. That changed at once the v^hole plan of the campaign. A meeting of the cabinet was held, and Pope called before it. It was plain that some- thing must be done for the relief of the Potomac Army, by a direct march ^ud that Speedily. Pope offered to march upon Richmond. ^^^^ Frcdcricksburg direct upon Richmond with his whole force — notwithstanding that Lee would be between him and McClellan, and could strike in suc- cession at both — on condition that peremptory orders should be sent to McClellan, and such measures taken in advance that it would not be possible for him to evade on any pretext making a vigorous attack upon the enemy with his whole army the moment he heard that Pope was engaged. At this time Pope's force was forty-three thou- sand men. On assuming command, Pope issued an order to his army, in which there occurred certain expressions sup- posed to cast reflections on McClellan : " I have come to you from the West, where we have Pope's offensive always sceu the backs of our enemies — from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found — whose poli- cy has been attack, and not defense. I desire you to dis- miss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and holding them — of lines of re- treat, and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occup}^ is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our Chap. LVII.] POPE AND McCLELLAN. 429 opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before, and not behind." If the appointment of Pope to his new command was Its unhappy con- distasteful to McClellau and his military sequences. eutouragc, such iusinuatious could not fail to engender a bitter animosity. With reluctance does the historian allude to these personal differences, and find himself constrained to draw his reader's attention to them, since there is reason to suppose that they had an influence in producing the disasters of the ensuing cam- paign. It was the desire of the government (1) that Pope Duties assigned to shouM covcr Washiugtou ; (2), that he ^°^^' should assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah ; (3), that he should so operate as to draw a part of Lee's army from Richmond, and thereby facilitate McClellan's movements. It seemed to Pope that the security of the Shenandoah Valley was not best obtained by posting troops in the Valley itself, but by concentrating his forces at some point from which, if any attempt were made to enter the Valley, he should be able to interpose and cut off the retreat of the force making such attempt. Accordingly, he gave orders to that effect. But, while the movements were in progress, McClellan McClellan's i"e-'° rctrcatcd to Harrlsou's Landing. When it was first known in Washington that this re- treat was contemplated, Pope suggested to the President its impolicy, and urged that orders should be sent to McClellan to mass his whole force on the north side of the Chickahominy, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court-house. He added that to retreat to James River was to go away from re-enforce- ments, so far as his army was concerned, and to give the enemy the privilege and power of exchanging Richmond 430 HALLECK APPOINTED GENERAL IN CHIEF. [Sect. XI. for Washington; that to them the loss of Eichmond would be trifling, while the loss of Washington would be conclusive, or nearly so, in its results upon the war. Deeply impressed with these views, he addressed a letter to McClellan at Harrison's Landing, earnestly asking his views and offering him co-operation. To this he received a lukewarm reply. It became apparent that, considering the situation in which the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia were placed in relation to each other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between them, some military superior, both of McClellan and Pope, ought to be called poTutin/naifedc to Washin^tou and placed in 2:eneral com- general in chief. '-' ^ ■"■ V mand. It was under these circumstances that Halleck was brought from the West and appointed general in chief Pope, now believing that the interests of the nation would be best subserved by his so doing, requested to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to the West. But this was not complied with. Encouraged by the extraordinary good fortune that had befallen it in the complete failure of tiou o?the Con-' McClcllan's campaie^n, the Confederate 0:0 v- federates. . ^ . °. ernment detei^mmed on resorting to offensive operations. The conscription had so greatly re-enforced its armies, they had become so invigorated by victory, that nothing seemed impossible. The troops before whom the Peninsular expedition had recoiled might well expect to force their way through all resistance, and break every investing line. A triumphant march through Maryland would be followed by the fall of Washington, and the in- dependence of the Confederacy might be secured by a treaty of peace exacted in Philadelphia. A sortie through Maryland was therefore resolved Chap. LVII.] THE CONFEDERATES ON THE RAPIDAN. 43 1 They resolve upon ^P^^' Such WRs the military strengtli de- a sortie rivcd from the conscription that a simulta- neous movement with a similar object was ordered on the other side of the AUeghanies. Bragg was to force his way to Louisville and Cincinnati, Lee to Philadelphia. In Chapter LIIL we have described the fortune that befell Bragg's sortie ; in this and the suc- the sortie of '^ ceedinsT chapter we have to consider that Bragg. /»x 01 Lee. Early in August the divisions of Ewell, Hill, and Jack- Their advance to SOU had advauccd to the Rapidan, and the the Rapidan. natloual govcmment, having ascertained the intention of its antagonist, made preparation for resist- ance. All farther thoughts of an advance against Eich- mond were abandoned ; it was determined to accomplish the junction of McClellan's forces with those of Pope on the Rappahannock by bringing them to Acquia Creek. McClellan earnestly entreated that the order for the with- drawal of the Potomac Army might be rescinded, and even took the responsibility of delaying the evacuation of Harrison's Landing for several days. On the 14th of August the movement was commenced. As the corps reached Alexandria and Acquia Creek, they The Potomac Army ,1111,1 in brou|ht to Acquia wcrc to DC placcQ uudcr the command oi Pope. The forces heretofore in Western Virginia were also drawn toward Washington, and an or- der was issued by the President calling for 300,000 men by draft (August 4th, 1862). The principles upon which Pope proposed to conduct Pope's principles thc Campaign were in strong contrast with of the campaign. ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ obscrvcd by McClellau. Among other things, he ordered his troops to subsist on the country, giving vouchers for the supplies they took ; contributions for the subsistence of the cavalry were to be laid on villages and neigtborhoods ; the inhabitants 432 PRINCIPLES OF THE CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XI. along railroad and telegraph lines were teld responsible for damages done to them otherwise than by the Confed- erate army; if a soldier was fired at from a house, the house was to be razed to the ground. Disloyal citizens were to be arrested, and, if they refused to give security for good conduct, were to be sent South, beyond the ex- treme pickets ; should they return, they were to be treat- ed as spies. As the Confederate army largely counted on the aid it expected to receive from the inhabitants of the country through which it intended to pass, these or- ders were received witli indignation at Kichmond. A retaliatory order was issued, declarinsf that Eetaliatory raeas- -pj -, , . • • t ^ tires of the Con- roDe snio. uis commissioucd omcers were not federates. • i t i entitled to be considered as soldiers ; that^ in the event of his capture, he should be placed in close confinement. His ofiicers were to be dealt with in the same manner; and if any Confederate citizen was exe- cuted under his order, a prisoner selected from the na- tional commissioned officers should in retaliation be hung. In a letter from Lee to Halleck (August 2d) in rela- tion to these retaliations, the former so far forgot himself as to extort from Halleck the rebuke, " As these letters are couched in language exceedingly insulting to the gov- ernment of the United States, I must respectfully decline to receive them. They are returned herewith." As a guide to the reader through what he might other- Generai sketch of wlsc fiud coufusiug aud pcrhaps unintelligi- Lee's campaign. ^^^ dctails, it may bc statcd that, at the out- set of the campaign. Pope's front was perpendicular to the Potomac, his left wing resting against that river. Writers on military affairs insist that, when an army points thus with one wing against an insurmountable object, the other wing being "in the air," it is always to be attacked on this last wing and pressed against the obstacle, when it will be forced to surrender. The Confederate general accord- chap.lvii.] cedar mountain. 433 ingly followed tliat precept. It was his intention to have defeated Pope before the Potomac Army could come to his support, but delays taking place rendered that impracti- cable ; he then proceeded to turn the right wing of the national army by sending Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap, apd afterward again he outflanked it at Centreville. This brought Pope into the fortifications of Washington. Not that these movements were executed without er- Miiitary mistakes ^or. Whcu Lce dlvldcd his army in front on both Bides. of }iig autagouist, he committed a serious mistake. He gave Pope an opportunity of dealing him a fatal blow. On the other hand, it was a grave mistake that Pope was not sufliciently re-enforced to take advan- tage of that opportunity, and the persistence with which the left wing of his army retained its position was also a serious fault. Burnside ought to have been brought from Fredericksburg. For these things, however. Pope can hardly be held responsible, since he was under injunc- tions from Washington — injunctions arising from reasons connected with the movements of the Potomac Army. The first contact of the opposing armies took place The affair at Cedar (August 9th) at Ccdar Mouutaiu, half a doz- Mountam. ^^ milcs south of Culpcppcr Court-house, where Pope had established his head-quarters, and was threatening Gordonsville with a view to facilitate the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. A contest ensued between the divisions of Ewell and Jackson on the Confederate side, and the corps of Banks on the na- tional. After a severe struggle the latter was defeated. Jackson held his position on the mountain for the two following days, and then, finding that his communications were endangered, retired across the Eapidan. From an autograph letter of Lee which fell into Pope's hands (August 16th), it was ascertained that that com- II.— E E THE SORTIE OF LEE. Chap. LVII.] THE TURNING OF POPE'S RIGHT. 435 mander was moving by forced marches, with the whole Confederate army, to attack Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the Potomac Army, and to outnumber and destroy him. Under instructions from Pope retires from Hallcck, Popc thcrcforc abstalucd from cross- theRapidan. -^^ ^j^^ Eapldau, aud, . retiring, took post behind the North Fork of the Kappahannock (August 19th). On the same day, Lee, with a large force, crossed the Kapidan. Finding himself about to be overmatched, and yet or- dered to maintain his communications with Fredericks- burg, Pope telegraphed again and again to Washington that he must either be re-enforced or retreat ; that the en- emy was moving toward his right, and that it was impos- sible for him to extend his lines to resist it without aban- doning Fredericksburg. He was instructed to hold his ground for two days longer, when he should be re-en- forced: he did so for four days, and'had then only re- ceived about 7000 men. On the night of the 2 2d the Con- federate General Stuart, having the previous day crossed the river at Waterloo Bridge with some cavalry, sur- Hig head-quarters prlscd Popc's hcad-quartcrs at Catlett's Sta- captured. ^-^^ duriug tho darkucss of a violent storm, Pope himself being at the time near Kappahannock Sta- tion. Stuart captured his personal baggage, with his dis- patch-book, and destroyed several wagons. It was not Lee's intention to force a passage of the Lee turns Pope's i*iver. Hls objcct was, by a flank movement, "^^^" to turn Pope's right, get in his rear, and cut off his supplies from Washington, and place the Confed- erate army in such a position that it could either move upon that city or through Leesburg into Maryland. While Jackson was executing this movement on the national right, Longstreet was operating on Pope's front to engage his attention. Jackson passed through Thor- 436 POPE FALLS BACK. [Sect. XI. oughfare Gap, reaching (August 26tli) Bristow's Station on tlie Orange and Alexandria Railroad. through Thor-^ Witliout dclav lie sent a detachment under oughfare Gap. -n r t • Stuart to Manassas Junction, and captured it that night, taking 8 guns, 10 locomotives, 7 trains, and immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary stores. Pope was thus attempting to hold at bay the entire Pope waiting for Confederate army, anxiously expecting the the Potomac Army, pj^^mised re - euforccmcnts from the Army of the Potomac. He had assigned those troops as they should come up to suitable positions, directing, among other things, that the first division which should reach Manassas Junction should take post in the works of that place, and that its cavalry should be pushed forward to watch Thoroughfare Gap. On the day. following the capture of Manassas Junc- tion, an attempt was made by some troops stationed on the other side of Bull Run to recover it ; but they were unsuccessful, and the Confederate cavalry, passing the Run, advanced beyond Fairfax Station. Jackson had now brought up from Bristow his own and Hill's divis- ions ; but, finding that Pope's army was converging upon him, he abandoned Manassas, having de- Jackson destroys , tt .... p -,. ir»n supplies at Ma- stroycd large quantities ot supplies, and tell back toward Longstreet, who was to come through Thoroughfare Gap. When Pope discovered the Confederate movement on Pope again falls ^^^ Tight flauk, and fouud that he was dis- ^^""^ appointed in the re-enforcements from the Potomac Army, he fell back, in three columns, from War- renton and Warrenton Junction. His force, as estimated by himself, was at this moment about forty thousand, that of the Confederates at least eighty thousand. He was, however, now joined by Heintzelman's corps of ten Chap. LVII.] POPE AND JACKSON. 437 thousand, but it came without artillery wagons, or horses for the field and general officers. Porter's division ar- rived broken down with fatigue. Under such circum- stances, it was not possible for Pope to maintain his front after a suitable body had been detached to defeat Jack- son on his flank. In his report he says : " The movement of General Jackson in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sul- phur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, was well known to Is still expecting re- ^^, ^^^ I ^^^ rclled Confidently upon the enforcements. forccs wHch I had bccu assurcd would be sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which I had ordered to take post on the works at Manassas Junction. I was entirely under the belief that these would be there, and it was not until I found my com- munication intercepted that I was undeceived. I knew that this movement was no raid, and that it was made by not less than 25,000 men." Of Pope's retreating columns, that under Hooker en- Hooker defeats couutcred the Confederates, under Ewell, on ^^^'"- the 27th, driving him from the field with considerable loss. Hooker's division went into this ac- tion with only forty rounds of ammunition, and when the work was done had only ^ve rounds to each man left. It was this defeat of Ewell that compelled Jackson to evac- uate Manassas. His position had become perilous. K Pope could have blocked Thoroughfare Gap, and pre- vented the passage of Longstreet, he might have fallen with an overwhelming force on Jackson. To aid in this movement, Pope sent explicit orders to Porter, but they were not executed. Jackson, seeing his danger, fell back from Manassas, Jackson retires ^ot loj the route through which he had from Manassas, qqj^q^ whlch would have brought him upon McDowell and Sigel, who were west of him, but across 438 POPE AND JACKSON. [Sect. XL Bull Run by Centreville. Pope readied Manassas about midday on the 28tli, in less tlian an hour after Jackson and is followed by ^'^ persou had left it. He pushed forward Pope. Hooker,Kearny, and Eeno upon Centreville, ordering Porter to come to the Junction, and McDowell to move upon Centreville. McDowell had detached Rick- etts's division toward Thoroughfare Gap, so that it was no longer available in this movement. In the evening of the 28th Kearny drove the enemy's rear-guard out of Centreville. One portion of it took the road to Sudley's Spring, the other the Warrenton Turnpike toward Gainesville, destroying the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run. The corps of McDowell and Sigel, with Reynolds's division, now marching toward Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force, retreating to- ward Thoroughfare Gap, about six o'clock that evening. An action took place which was indecisive, and was ter- minated by the darkness. On learning this. Pope, who was now at Centreville, felt that there was Expectation that r* t i \ T i i Jackson would be uo escapo lor JacKSon. Accorclinsrly, he enveloped. ^ o c/ / sent orders to McDowell to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the West. He intended that at daylight the entire national forces from Centreville and Manassas should attack the enemy, who must be crushed between them. He sent orders to Kearny to move cautiously, after midnight, from Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, to keep close to the enemy, and at daylight to assault him vigor- ously with his right advance. Hooker and Reno would support him very soon after dawn. He ordered Porter, who he supposed was at Manassas Junction, to move upon Centreville as soon as it was light. Pope's forces were therefore so disposed that McDowell, Pope's arrangements Slgcl, aud RcyUoMs, whoSC COnjolut StrCUgth for that purpose. ^^^ 25,000, wcrc immediately west of Jack- Chap.LVII.] the battle OF GAINESVILLE. 439 son, between him and Thorouglifare Gap, while Kearny, Hooker, Reno, and Porter, of tlie same strength, were to fall on him from the east at daylight. Longstreet was so far off that, by using the whole force vigorously. Pope could crush Jackson before Longstreet could possibly ar- rive. Before daylight, however. Pope learned that King's Longstreet passes divlsiou, wMch had beeu attempting to bar Thoroughfare Gap. L^^^gstreet's Way, had fallen back from Thor- oughfare Gap toward Manassas Junction. The passage through the Gap was now open. New dispositions had become necessary. Pope therefore at once sent orders to Sigel, supported Pope adopts new ^J Reyuolds, to attack the enemy vigorous- dispositions. 2^ ^g g^^^ ^g ^^ ^^^g light enough to see, and bring him to a stand. He ordered Heintzelman to push forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at the same time with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny. Reno was directed to follow them closely. As soon as they came up with Jackson, they were to attack him with the utmost vigor. Pope also ordered Porter, then at Manas- sas, to move with the greatest rapidity on Gainesville, and turn Jackson's flank at the point where the Warren- ton Turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. > Accordingly, Sigel attacked Jackson at daylight on the 29th, a mile or two east of Groveton. Battle of Gaines- tt i t tt- • t i viiie, or Second Bull MooKer ancl Kcamy quickly coming up, Jackson fell back some distance, but he was so closely pressed that at length he was compelled to make a stand. He accordingly took up a position with his left in the neighborhood of Sudley's Spring, his right a little to the south of Warrenton Turnpike, and his line covered by an old railroad grade which leads from Gaines- ville in the direction of Leesburg. His batteries, which 440 THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. [Sect. XI. THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. were numerous, and some of them of heavy calibre, were posted behind ridges in the open. ground on both sides of Warrenton Turnpike, while the mass of his troops was sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad em- bankment. Pope arrived from Centreville about noon, Pope's report of the ^^^ fouud both armies much cut up by the ^^"^^" action in which they had been already en- gaged. Heintzelman was on the right of the line; Sigel on his left, extending a short distance south of the War- renton Turnpike. The extreme left was occupied by Reynolds. Of Reno's corps, part had gone into action, and part was in reserve in the rear of the centre. Pope now informed the different commanders that Porter and McDowell w^ere coming up from Manassas Junction, and would soon be in position to fall upon Jackson's right flank, and probably upon his rear. From twelve till four o^clock very severe skirmishes constantly occurred when- ever Jackson showed a disposition to retreat. About two o'clock firing was heard in the direction of Jackson's Chap. LVII.] THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. 441 right. Pope now supposed that Porter and McDowell had reached their position, and were coming into action. The firing, however, soon ceased. Information then came that McDowell would be up in a couple of hours. Pope then sent peremptory orders to Porter to attack the ene- my's right, and, if possible, turn his rear. "When a suffi- cient time had elapsed for this to be done, he ordered Heintzelman and Eeno to attack in front. Accordingly, they did so, forcing back Jackson's left toward his centre, and driving it from that part of the field. In this attack, Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, was particularly distinguished by a bayonet charge it made, breaking two of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked. McDowell had now arrived on the field and joined in the battle, but Porter never came; At sunset Longstreet's troops from the Gap were fast Arrival of Long- comiug up to tho re-cnforcemeut of Jackson, street on the field. ^^^ ^^ ^^^-^^ ^^^^ ^^^j^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ each having lost about 7000 men. In his report Pope says : " About 8 P.M. the greater Pope's accusations portlou of tho field of battlc was occupied against Porter. ^^ ^^^ army. Nothiug was heard of Gen- eral Porter up to that time, and his forces took no part whatever in the action, but were suffered by him to lie idle on their arms, within sight and sound of the battle, during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no ef fort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that, if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circum- stances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to eight o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed and captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently re-en- forced to have made an effective resistance. I did not 442 ^OPE IS INADEQUATELY SUSTAINED. [Sect. XI. myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given General Porter an order to march toward the enemy in a particular direction, to send him, in addi- tion, specific orders to attack ; it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action whenever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe — in fact, I am positive — that, at ^ve o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no consider- able body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear ; that, if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces under Long- street, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute farther operations of an aggressive character." On the next morning (30th) the battle was renewed but it was now too late. Pope's horses had been in har ness for ten days — two days they had been without for age. To his urgent appeals for re-enforcements, McClel He could not Ob- l^u, who was uow at Alexandria, had re tain aid. ^^.^^ ^^ ^^^ 27th, ^^ do uot scc that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose ' exact position we do not know." To his entreaty for rations on the 28th, the same officer had an- swered that he should have them " as soon as he would send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the trains." In his report Pope says, " I do not see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful Chap. LVII.] HE FALLS BACK TO CENTKEVILLE. 443 issue to the operations witli whicli I was charged." To Ms request on the 30th for more ammunition, he was an- swered, " I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artille- ry." In a telegram to President Lincoln on the afternoon of August 29th, at the very moment when Pope was hero ically engaged with Jackson, and momentarily expecting the arrival of Longstreet, General McClellan suggested that among the courses that might be adopted there was one — "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." It is said that when President Lincoln read this dispatch he was so horror-stricken that he fell back in his chair. Pope's report of the transactions of the 30th is as fol- lows : " The enemy's heavy re-enforcements having reach- ed him on Friday afternoon and night, he began to mass on his right for the purpose of crushing our left, and oc- cupying the road to Centreville in our rear. His heavi- est assault was made about ^ve o'clock in the afternoon, when, after overwhelming Fitz John Porter and driving his forces back on the centre and left, mass after mass of his forces was pushed against our left. A terrible con- test, with great slaughter, was carried on for several hours, our men behaving with firmness and gallantry, under the immediate command of General McDowell. When night closed our left had been forced back about half a mile, but still remained firm and unshaken, while our right held its ground. General Franklin, with his corps, ar- rived after dark at Centreville, six miles in our rear, while Sumner was four miles behind Franklin. I could have brought up these corps in the morning in time to have renewed the action, but starvation stared both men and horses in the face, and, broken and exhausted as the}^ Is compelled to re- wcrc, they >vere in no condition to bear hun- tire to centreville. ^^^ ^^^^^ j accordiugly retired to Centre- ville that night in perfect order." 444 CHANTILLY. [Sect. XI. On the 31st Lee sent Jackson northward for the pur- pose of again turning Pope's right. Pope, supposing that this attempt would be made, had prepared to resist it, ^^^ ^.„ and on the eveninoj of the foUowins: day a Battle of Chantilly. O ^ ^ & J conflict occurred near Chantilly, in the midst of a terrible thunder-storm. In this General Stevens and General Kearny were killed, but the attack was checked. Pope, now forced back to the works of Washington, re- signed his command, and was succeeded by McClellan. Losses of the His losses iu the campaign were probably campaign. ^^^ j^^^ ^-^^^ 30,000 meu, 30 guns, 20,000 small-arms, and vast quantities of munitions and supplies. Lee's loss during these operations was probably about 15,000 men. Justice has not yet been rendered to General Pope for Pope's conduct in ^^^ couduct lu this Campaign. He had a the campaign. ^^^^ difficult task to accomplish, and had to depend on very unreliable means. Though there never was purer patriotism than that which animated the sol- diers of the Army of the Potomac, that army had been brought, through the influence of ofiicers who surround- conditionofthe ^^ General McClellan, into a most danger- potomacArmy. ^^^ couditlou — daugcrous to the best in- terests of the nation — of having a wish of its own, and that wish in opposition to the convictions of the govern- ment. In armies it is but a very short step from the pos- session of a wish to the expression of a will. Perhaps at no period of the war were thoughtful men more deeply alarmed for the future of the nation than when they heard of the restoration of McClellan to the command, and recognized the unmistakable constraint under which the government had acted. It was in vain for well-mean- ing persons to affirm that the general had never been re- lieved, and that what had now taken place was no more CJhap.LVII.] POPE'S CONDUCT IN THE CAMPAIGN. 445 than an ordinary proceeding : the Peninsular disaster was too recent, the complaints and asseverations of Pope of disobedience to Ms orders among the higher officers too loud for the real state of affairs to be concealed. " Leave Pope to get out of his scrape !" What had Pope done to merit inevitable destruction ? E eufrgVticauT He had gone down to the Rapidan in obe- dience to orders to compel the enemy to re- lease his hold on the army in the Peninsula. He was keeping at bay in the best manner he could — nay, more, he was desperately assailing Lee's ablest lieutenants. For more than a fortnight he was fighting battle after battle against overwhelming forces, first, to prevent the junction of his antaoconists, and then to resist their whole mass. He mio-ht have been indiscreet in his reflections on the generalship of his predecessor, but, had he been ten times more so, this was not the moment of retaliation for such offenses. "Was he not now the soldier of the republic, at the head of her forlorn hope in the very breach ? When, from the midst of the fire converging upon him, he cried out for more ammunition to enable him to keep his foot- hold, how was he a^iswered ? "I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery." The operations of Pope with the Army of Virginia but he received wcre based entirely on the expected junc- lukewarm support. ^-^^ ^^ rc-euforcemeuts from the Army of the Potomac. Not without indignation does he say in his report, "Twenty thousand five hundred men were all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Har- rison's Landing who ever drew trigger under my com- mand, or in any way took part in this campaign." " The complete overthrow of Lee's army, or at least the entire frustration of his movement toward the Potomac, was defeated by the failure of the Army of the Potomac to effect a junction in time with the Army of Virginia on 446 CEITICAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT. [Sect. XI. tte line of the Eappahannock, or even so far back as the line ofBullKun." In his report to the Secretary of War, the general in chief, Halleck, referring to these events, says, " Some of the corps (from the Peninsula) moved with becoming activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable." " Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands straggled away from their commands ; and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled prisoners of war." From the tenor of Pope's complaints, the reader can critical position of ^^^ ^^^^ *^ disccm that the national govern- the government, meut was at this time passing through a serious crisis. The triumphant Confederate army threat- ening Washington w^as by no means the only formidable object before the republic. Individual grievances are of little moment in the eye of history save when they are connected with national interests — they become of su- preme importance when they presage public perils. Enough has been said to enable the reader to perceive that at this momentous period the government was act- ing under constraint. General McClellan Jiimself has told us what were Mr. Lincoln's impressions as to the army at that piores^MccSiaT' tlmc. " Thc Prcsidcut informed me that he to sustain Pope. it had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and sup- porting General Pope, and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to ^ Fitz John Porter, or some other of my friends,' and try to do away with any feeling that might I Chap. LVIL] CRITICAL POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT. 44^ exist, adding that I could rectify tlie evil, and that no one else could." In consequence of this urgent appeal to him,McClellan Mccieiian sends a ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ J^^^ Porter Ms dispatch of Sep- dispatch to Porter, tembcr Ist I " I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all of my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on," etc. Lincoln was ostensibly reconciled to the reinstating of McClellan by the circumstance that he, of to Mccieiian's re- all the 2;enerals, was most familiar with the instatement. -in defenses of Washington. What with fa- tigue, disappointment, and anxiety, Halleck's health was almost broken down. Military critics will doubtless point out professional Position of anxiety ^listakes lu Pope's Campaign. In justice, of Lincoln. howcvcr, they must bear in mind his disap- pointed expectations of support. Well might Lincoln, who, notwithstanding his general buoyancy, was subject to paroxysms of deep dej^ression, almost despair when he saw so much gallantry wasted. Well might his heart sink within him when he was now sardonically told, in allusion to his former solicitude for the seat of govern- ment at the outset of the Peninsular campaign, " at once to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." And well was it for him that he had a cool and coura- geous Secretary of War, who looked beyond the shame and disasters of the passing moment ; who, in their many weary watches together through the night-hours at the War Department, could sustain him in his anxieties, and organize for him victory at last. All things looked auspiciously for the Confederacy. Lee's sortie thus far Thc uatioual army had been thrust from its c3?^ ^ "''"■ ground, and had, after awful losses, sought 448 IEEE'S SUCCESS IN THE CAMPAIGN. [Sect. XI. shelter in the defenses of Washington. The sortie of Lee seemed to be a brilliant success. There was nothing now to prevent him passing into Maryland— apparently noth- ing to prevent his proposed march to the JSForth. Joy was diffused throughout every Southern state ; peace and independence seemed to be close at hand. CHAPTEE LVm. THE SORTIE OF LEE AND ITS REPULSE. THE BATTLE OF AN- TIETAM. THE CONFEDERATES RETIRE TO THE RAPPAHAN- NOCK. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. The Confederate general, entering Maryland, could not induce the people to join him. He was followed in his march by McClellan from Washington, and ventured on dividing his army in presence of that general, detaching one portion of it to cap- ture Harper's Ferry, in which he succeeded. At the same time, McClellan attacked another portion on South Mountain, and drove it before him. Battle of Antietam. The Confederate sortie was repulsed, and Lee forced back again into Virginia. McClellan, failing to press vigorously on the Confederates, was removed by the gov-: ernment from command, Burnside succeeding him. Battle of Fredericksburg. The Confederates repulsed the national army. Hooker was assigned to command in Burnside's stead. The Confederate army had driven its antagonist into the fortifications of Washington, and had opened for it- self a way to the North. On the same day (September 5th) that Bragg, on a Invasion of Mary- similar duty, entered Kentucky, Lee, cross- land by Lee. -^^ ^j^^ Potomac Hear Point of Kocks, enter- ed Maryland, and marched toward Frederick. The general plan for the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns, as conceived in Kichmond, rest- tuck/and Mary- ed OH the QTesit military strens^th which the land sorties. • . . ^ , , . "^ ^ conscription had given. It proposed the reorganization of the governments of those states on Con- federate principles, and a march to tha North for the ex- action of a treaty of peace. Lee had no intention of making a direct attack on Washington. He knew that if a successful issue should IL— F F 450 ^^^ ENTERS MARYLAND. [Sect. XI. crown his campaign, tlie land communica- A direct attack on washineton not tions between the North and that city be- ing cut off, it must necessarily fall of itself. On the 8th of September he issued at Frederick an ad- Lee's address to drcss to the people of Maryland. He de- theMaryianders. ^^^^^^ ^j^^^ ^^^ ^^^^1^ ^^ ^^^ Confederate States had marked with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that had been inflicted on Mary- land — the illegal imprisonment of its citizens, the usurpa- tion of the government of Baltimore, the arbitrary disso- lution of the Legislature, the suppression of the freedom of speech and of the press. Believing that the people of Maryland had too lofty a spirit to submit to a govern- ment guilty of such wrongs, and to aid them in throw- ing off its foreign yoke, he had brought his army among them to assist them in regaining the rights of which they had been unjustly despoiled. The Confederate general had supposed that large re- They decline euforcemeuts would flock to him, but in this joining him. ^^ ^^^ dcstiucd to disappointment. It turn- ed out, as it did with the corresponding movement of Bragg in Kentucky, that the number of volunteers did not compensate for the deserters. It did not amount to five hundred men. At this the whole South was bitterly chagrined. Its popular sentiment had displayed toward this state the most affectionate sympathy. " Maryland, my Maryland," was the burden of the most beautiful lyric composed in the South during the war. It was sung with patriotic rapture, and nowhere more so than at the fire- sides of Virginia. In this lukewarmness of the Marylanders Lee saw at It defeats the ^uce thc failurc of his enterprise. He could campaign. ^^^ commlt hls army to an invasion of Penn- sylvania with Maryland doubtful or hostile at his back. Conscription, though it makes numerous brave, makes also Chap. LVIII.] ALARM lU PENNSYLVANIA. 451 numerous unwilling soldiers. It is one thing to defend one's own fireside, another to engage in a distant, perhaps a Quixotic expedition. Lee saw very plainly the true in- terpretation of the daily increasing desertions from his army. Bragg, in his sortie, had an advantage over Lee. An Ostensible object osteusible objcct had been assigned, and that of the sortie. ^^^^ Satisfactorily and successfully present- ed when it was clear that there would be a failure in ob- taining the true result. Fortune, however, was not un- mindful of Lee. She threw into his way the brilliant in- cident of the capture of the garrison of Harper's Ferry. At once that was put forth as the real object of the whole movement. In truth, however, it was too insignificant a temptation to induce so important a step, and it was im- possible that any such expectation could have been enter- tained at the outset, since the probabilities were that the post would be evacuated long before the Confederates could reach it. It was an accidental stroke of luck, which was made to answer the purpose of covering a deep disap- pointment. The Confederate advance into Maryland was the signal Alarm in pennsyi- f^^ ^u iutcnse excitcmeut lu thc adjoluing ^'^'''''* state, Pennsylvania, and, indeed, throughout the North. The governor notified the mayor of Philadel- phia that he had reliable information of a movement of the Confederate army on Harrisburg, and called upon him to " send 20,000 men to-morrow." On its part, the Confederate army, justly transported with delight at the Boast of the Con- Tcsults of thc Virginia campaign, so glorious federate soldiers. ^^ j^^ ^^^^^^ avowcd its cxpcctation of dic- tating a peace in Philadelphia. The same hall which had witnessed the signing of the Declaration of Independence of the United States was to witness the signing of a treaty acknowledging the independence of the South. 452 McCLELLAN FOLJ^OWS LEE. [Sect. XI. New York and Boston were to be visited witli dire pun- ishment for their misdeeds, and submit to a dread altern- ative — the choice between a ransom and the torch. But in Maryland the Confederate soldiers conducted Their conduct in themsclvcs with marked moderation. So Maryland. £^^, from molcstlug any one, they tried to in- gratiate themselves with the people. It was true that vast droves of cattle and lines of wagons might be seen crossing the Potomac into Virginia, but it was asserted that every thing had been paid for at the option of the seller, either in Confederate or in national money. As soon as it was ascertained with certainty that Lee Mccieiian ordered 1^^^ passed luto Maryland, orders were given to follow Lee. McClelkn to follow him with all the troops not needed for the defense of Washington. On the 12th of September McClellan reached Frederick, which had just been evacuated by the Confederates, and in that place obtained a copy of Lee's order of march. From this it appeared that it was his intention to capture the garrison of Harper's Ferry. To this end he had sent 25,000 men under Jackson across the Potomac, thus di- viding his army in the very face of McClellan, who had it in his power, on the 14th, to have overwhelmed the di- vision of the Confederate General McLaws and relieved Harper's Ferry. Listead of doing this, however, he fol- lowed the main body of the Confederates toward the South Mountain, for they lingered in their march to give time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry. His advance overtook their rear just beyond Middletown, eight miles from Frederick, early that morning. The turnpike to Hagerstown goes through Turner's Gap ; the road from Jefferson to Rohrersville through Crampton's Gap. The battle of South Mountain was opened by an at- The battle of South tcmpt of the Confederates, under D. H. Hill, Mountain. ^^ ^^^-^^ ^^^ passagc ovcr Catoctin Creek. Chap.LVIII.] FORCING OF TURNER'S GAP. 453 KATTLES 0» SOUXH MOUNTAIN. i In this they were not successful. They then retired to a stronger position up the mountain toward Turner's Gap. Eight and left of the main road are country roads. It was upon these that the action chiefly took place. The Confederates had artillery bearing on all the approaches. At 8 A.M. (September 14th), Cox's division of Eeno's Forcing of Tur- corps of Bumsidc's column moved up the left country road and carried the crest in their front. Ke-enforcements were received by the Con- federates, and, Cox's position becoming critical, he too was re-enforced. A very severe conflict was maintained all day, General Reno being killed. Cox, however, held the ground at dark. At 3 P.M., Hooker's corps of Burnside's column moved ner's Gap. 454 rOECING OF CEAMPTON'S gap. [Sect. XI. up the right country road. Meade carried the eminence on one side of that road; Patrick, supported by Double- day and Phelps, the other. Eicketts's division pressed up the mountain about 5 P.M., arriving at the crest in time to participate in the engagement. Thus Hooker carried the mountain sides on the right of the Gap, and Keno those on the left, notv^ithstanding the extreme steepness and difficulty. About 4 P.M. Longstreet came ujp from Hagerstown with r^-enforcements for Hill, and, outranking him, took command. It remained now for the national forces to move up the main or central road. Late in the afternoon Burnside ordered Gibbon's brigade to advance along that road upon the Confederate central position. Though stub- bornly resisted, it forced its way, pressing the enemy be- fore it. After dark it was relieved by one of Sedgwick's brigades. The Confederates, being now outflanked right and left, abandoned their position during the night, leaving also their dead. On the quiet valley — and it is one of the most beautiful valleys in Atlantic America — the morning sun once more shed his welcome beams. Seen from the heights which the national soldiers had w^on, the Catoc- tin lay like a silver thread in the meadows. The turn- pike was crowded with an advancing line of troops and artillery; the green fields in the distance were dotted with white army wagons. Crampton's Gap, six miles to the south of Turner's Forcing of Cramp- Grap, hcld by thc Confederates under How- tonsGap. ^j^ Cobb, was simultaucously carried by Franklin. He drove them from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced them back up the slope, and, after an action of three hours, gained the crest. The Confed- Chap. LVIII.] JACKSON CAPTURES HARPER'S PERRY. 455 efates hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. The national loss at Turner's Gap was 328 killed, 1463 wounded and missing. The loss at Crampton's Gap was 115 killed, and 418 wounded and missing. Lee Object of Lee in had veutured on this resistance merely to these battles. ^^-^ ^- ^^^ £^^ ^^^ completiou of his enter- prise at Harper's Ferry ; and though in the actual en- gagement the victory was with the national side, the suc- cess of the whole operation was with the Confederates. For Jackson appeared at Harper's Ferry on the morn- Harper's Ferry cap- ing of the 13th, the post being in charge of tared by Jackson. Colouel MilcS, who, thoUgh he had bcCU Or- dereci to fortify Maryland Heights, had neglected to do so. Those heights and Loudon Heights were speedily occupied by the Confederates, and Harper's Ferry was at their mercy. Miles had with him at this time about 14,000 men, of whom 2500 were cavalry; the latter cut their way through the enemy's lines on the night of the 14th. On the morning of the 15th Miles surrendered 11,583 men, 73 guns, 13,000 small-arms, 200 wagons, and large quantities of supplies. His object thus accomplished, Jackson did not delay He hastens to An- to rcceive the suiTcnder. He left that to tietam. Hill,* aud, hurryiug across the pontoon bridge into Maryland, marched without stopping until he joined Lee in time to assist him at the battle of An- tietam, which was fought on the 17th of September. McClellan had pushed forward his right wing and cen- Lee'sarmyatAn- ^^^ ^^ pursuit of the Confederates, and had tietam. fouud them on the 15th, along the western bank of Antietam Creek, a sluggish stream entering the Potomac eight miles above Harper's Ferry. The creek was on their front, the Potomac on their rear, behind them and near the midst of their line the little town of 456 ^EE FALLS BACK TO ANTIETAM. [Sect. XL Sharpsburg. It is about a mile from tlie creek. A road leads from it to tlie Shepherdstown ford of the Po- tomac. At this moment Lee's army was divided. A part of his force, tinder Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, was op- erating at Harper's Ferry. The post surrendered, how- ever, on the morning of that day, and Jackson, as we have seen, with all speed hastened his march to Sharpsburg. It had become clear that the detaching of Maryland from the Union, and the 'projected invasion of Pennsylvania, were destined to failure. Forced out of the passes of South Mountain, Lee's hope of escaping the consequences of dividing his army rested on one thing only — the dila- toriness of his antagonist. But he remembered thfe Pen- insula, and took courage. Lee" was constrained, not by military, but by political He is constrained ^casous, to fight the battle of Autictam. The to fight. South would never be satisfied with the bar- ren laurels acquired from Pope; nor was it possible to give up the expedition to the North without a struggle. And yet he did not do well in fighting a merely defensive battle, especially in fighting wdth a river at his back. On the 16th McClellan's army had for the most part Position of the na- ^mved, and. the day was spent in prepara- tionai troops. ^'^j^ f^j, coufrouting the enemy. Hooker's and Sumner's corps were placed on the right. Porter's in the centre, Burnside's on the left. On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on the right, Position of the con- ^ith his right flauk rcstiug on a curve of federate troops. ^^^ Autictam ; D. H. Hill was on the left; but one of Longstreet's divisions (Hood's) was on the left of that. In a general manner, their line stood north and south; but the last-named division made an angle with the rest, and, facing northward, stood across the Hagers- town Eoad. Upon the west side of that road, half a Chap. LVIII.] TOPOGRAPHY OF ANTIETAM. 457 Topography of An- ^^^^ ^^ thereabout from tlie rear of the Con- tietam. federate left was a meeting-house known as the Dunker Church. It was enveloped in a skirt of woods, which, extending in a rudely circular form north- ward, inclosed a cultivated area, across which, like a di- ameter, the Hagerstown Eoad passed. In the woods, near the church, were ledges of limestone, affording an excel- lent breastwork — a rocky citadel. The middle part of the area was a corn-field ; its eastern side had been re- cently plowed. This area, encircled by woods, was the focus of the battle of Antietam. Three stone bridges here cross the Antietam. One, in front of the national left, was therefore opposite Burnside; a second, in front of the centre, was opposite Porter; a third, on the right, was opposite Hook- er : near this there was also a ford. McClellan's plan for the impending en- gagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's; and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharps- burg, and, having carried that position, to press along the crest toward their left, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance his cen- tre with all the forces then disposable. On the afternoon of the 16th Hooker accordingly cross- McClellan's plan of battle. BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 458 '^^^ BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [Sect. XI. Approach of the na- ^d the Aiitietam, and, advancing south west- tionai right wing, ^^^rdlj, Came to the eastern edge of what has been described as the battle-area. He lay there in the woods that night, for the Confederates had sent two brigades across from the Dunker Church, and they were just in front of him. Mansfield's corps had followed Hooker, and lay a little in his rear. Sumner was ready to follow them at daybreak. On the Confederate side, during the night, Hood's division had been relieved by a part of Jackson's corps. As soon as he could see. Hooker made so furious an The battle of attack, supportcd by batteries on the east Autietam. ^-^^ ^^ ^^^ Autlctam, that Jackson's brigades could not retain their hold, but were expelled with severe loss across the corn-field of the battle-area, over the Ha- gerstown Eoad, and into the woods beyond the Dunker Church, in which were their reserves. These, issuing forth, after an infuriated struggle, succeeded in checking Hooker's advance. The antagonists, fighting in a cloud of sulphury smoke, almost exterminated each other. Jack- son says : " The carnage on both sides was terrific — more than half the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third tioSafryht and ^ ofTrimble'si all thclr resiimental command- confederate left. ' • 1 T -n 1 ers, except two, were either killed or wound- ed." It was necessary to withdraw the wreck of regi^ ments to the rear, and replace it by Hood's division. On the other side. Hooker's corps was nearly destroyed. Mansfield's corps had now (7^ A.M.) reached the field, and had made its way down to the Hagerstown Eoad, where it was met by the division of D. H. Hill, which had come out of the woods at the Dunker Church. An- other furious encounter ensued : the valley was filled with smoke. Out of the battle-din— -the yells of the Con- federate, the cheers of the national troops — down in the chap.lviil] the battle of antietam. 459 corn-field, came forth a ghastly procession of wounded men. Mansfield's troops were driven back to the woods Death of Mans- ^^^^ whlch thcj had emerged. Mansfield ^^^^' was killed, and Hooker shot through the foot. In its turn, Sumner's corps had arrived. It was nine o'clock. The Confederates now could neither advance nor hold their position. Their officers saw that to re- main where they were was only useless butchery. Sum- ner's right division, Sedgwick's, followed the retiring but still desperately resisting Confederates across the blood- stained area, forcing their way into the woods beyond the Dunker Church. At that moment the divisions of McLaws and Walker, which had just come Eepeated charges ^ -rr ? tt* i? j. j x i andcouuter- up irom Harpcr s Jjerry, confronted them. charges. -■■ •*• i ihese troops had taken post among the rocky ledges, which formed stone bulwarks waist high. They leaped forth and compelled their antagonists to re- treat, expelling them from the Dunker woods, through the corn-field, and into the woods beyond. But, in their turn, they were driven back by Franklin, who now came up, and compelled them to make the bloody passage to the Dunker Church again. The corn-field was now finally hold by the national troops. Though dreadfully exhausted, the Confederates did not give up their attempt. While Sumner's right was thus engaged with McLaws, his left divisions had advanced halfway from the Antietam to Sharpsburg. A desperate attack was made on the left flank of his left division, but it was foiled. The Confederates then tried to force their way between that and his centre division, but were re- pulsed. His line succeeded eventually in holding the ground it had won. Such were the events on McClellan's right. A battle- wave of blood pulsated back and forth over the contest- 4(30 THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [Sect. XI. ed area. Alternately the national troops advanced, alter- Burnside's attkck lately the Confederates. On his left, Burn- on the left ^-^^ recelved orders at 8 A.M. to force the lower stone bridge and gain the opposite heights. The approach to the bridge formed a kind of defile, which was swept by the enemy's artillery. Delay occurred. It was not until one o'clock that Burnside made the passage. Had this been done earlier in the day, it would have weakened the resistance that Lee was making at the Dunker Church, and probably have given McClellan the victory. It was done too late for that, and, indeed, too late altogether, for by the time it was accom- His success ; but he t» i i a -r» TT*n i i n tt is at last forced plishcd A. r. Hili had come up from Harp- er's Ferry, and, falling on Burnside's left flank, forced him back to the bridge. Porter's corps, which constituted the national centre, was in reserve, and had taken no direct part in the bat- tle. It had been reduced by the sending of detachments to other portions of the field to 4000 men. The battle of Antietam thus closed without those well- marked results which might have been ex- Close of the battle. , t /> , i i /. i pected irom the preponderance ot the na- tional force. The Confederates had made a most gallant defense in their perilous position. The error on McClel- lan's part was characteristic. He had used his troops too much in driblets and detail instead of in an over- whelming mass. His total strength was 87,164, of which 4320 were cavalry. His losses were 2010 killed, 9416 wounded, 1043 missins: ; that is, nearly Losses in the battle. _^^^^ . ,-, /^^.^^>Pt , n 13,000 m all (12,469). Lee's force was about 45,000 at the beginning of the battle, but during the day it was increased to 70,000; of these, 2700 were buried by McClellan, others having been buried by the Confederates themselves. His total loss was about 13,533. As an ojffset to their success at Harper's Ferry, McClellan Chap.lviil] battle-field of antietam. 4^1 says, "13 guns, 39 colors, upward of 15,000 stand of small-arms, and more than 6000 prisoners, were the tro- phies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Turner's Gap, and Antietam. Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles." Not long after the battle of Antietam I visited the The battle-field on ^^l^, aud was au eye-wltucss of some of the next day. those sccues which Captain Noyes has so well described. That officer says: "Through torn -up corn-fields, robbed of their tasseled grain by hungry horses and hungry men, past farm-houses, barns, and out- houses crowded with the wounded, I came to a quiet lit- tle grove near the roadside, and here I found my train. How charming to my jaded senses appeared the scene. At a camp-fire sat the teamsters, cooking their noontide meal of mutton, potatoes, and coffee. The horses stood half asleep, tethered to the wagons. It was a sudden and quick transition from the battle-field, with its con- stant strain of excitement, to a picnic in peaceful woods. " My route carried me over the late battle-field, and I Devastation in the spcut much of thc aftcmoon, part of the 7*"^^' time in company with a friend, in visiting some of the most severely contested points, to be awe- struck, sickened, almost benumbed with its sights of hor- ror. Within this space of little more than a mile square — this spot, once beautiful with handsome residences and well-cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in with verdure, sacred to quiet, calm content, the hottest fury of man's hottest wrath had expended itself, burning residences and well-filled barns, plowing fields of ripened grain with artillery, scattering every where, through corn-field, wood, and valley, the most awful illustrations of war. Not a building about us which was not deserted by its occu- pants, and rent and torn by shot and shell ; not a field 462 BATTLE-FIELD OF ANTIETAM. [Sect. XL wihicli had not witnessed tlie fierce and bloody encoun- ter of armed and desperate men. "Let us first turn off to the left of the Hagerstown The dead in the Tumpike ; but we must ride very slowly and corn-field, carcfully, for lying all through this corn-field are the victims of the hardest contest of our division. Can it be thait these are the bodies of our late antap:o- nists ? Their faces are so absolutely black that I said to myself at first, This must have been a negro regiment. Their eyes are protruding from the sockets; their heads, hands, and limbs are swollen to twice the natural size. "Passing through this corn-field, with the dead lying and in the fields ^^1 through its aislcs, out into an unculti- beyond. vatcd ficM beyoud, I saw bodies attired mainly in rebel gray, lying in ranks so regular that Death, the Eeaper, must have mowed them down in swaths. Our burying parties were already busily engaged, and had put away to rest many of our own men — still here, as every where, I saw them scattered over the fields. The ground was strewn with muskets, knapsacks, cartridge- boxes, and article-s of clothing ; the carcasses of horses, and thousands of shot and shell. And so it was on the other side of the turnpike, nay, in the turnpike itself. Eide where we may, through corn-field, wood, or ravine, and our ride will be among the dead, until the heart grows sick and faint with horror. Here, close to the r©ad, were the haystacks near which our general and staff paused for a while when the division was farthest ad- vanced, and here, at the corner of the barn, lay one of our men, killed by a shell, which had well-nigh proved fatal to them also. " Just in front of these haystacks was the only pleasing picture on this battle-field — a fine horse, struck with death at the instant when, cut down by his wound, he was attempting to rise from the ground. His head was Chap. LVIIL] BATTLE-FIELD OF ANTIETAM. 4^3 half lifted; his neck proudly arched; every muscle seemed replete with animal life. The wound which killed him was wholly concealed from view, so that I had to ride close up before I could believe him dead. Hundreds of his kind lay upon the field, but all were repulsive save himself, and he was the admired of every passer-by. Two weeks afterward I found myself pausing to gaze upon him, and always with the wish that some sculptor would immortalize in stone this magnificent animal, in the exact pose of his death-hour. One would like to see some- thing from a battle-field not wholly terrible. " Over this grave-yard of the unburied dead we reach- The Dunker ^^ a wood, evcry tree pierced with shot or Church. ^^^ ^j^l^ bullets, and came to the little brick Dunker Church on the turnpike. This must have been a focal point in the battle, for a hundred round shot have pierced its walls, while bullets by thousands have scarred and battered it. A little crowd of soldiers was stand- ing about it, and within a few severely-wounded rebels were stretched on the benches, one of whom was raving in his agony. Surgical aid and proper attendance had already been furnished, and we did not join the throng of curious visitors within. Out in the grove behind the little church the dead had been collected in groups wait- ing for burial, some of them wearing our own uniform, but the large majority dressed in gray. No matter in what direction we turned, it was all the same shocking picture, awakening awe rather than pity, benumbing the senses rather than touching the heart, glazing the eye with horror rather than filling it with tears. " I had, however, seen many a poor fellow during my m Bariai of the killed. ^^^^^ something iu whosc positiou or appear- ^m ance had caused me to pause ; and here, ly- ing side by side with three others, I saw a young rebel officer, his face less discolored than the rest, whose feat- 464 BATTLE-FIELD OF ANTIETAM. [Sect. XL ures and expression called fortli my earnest sympathy, not so mucli for Mm as for those who in his Southern home shall see him no more forever. No one among the burying-party knew his name, and before night he was laid in a trench with the rest — no head-stone to mark his resting-place — one of the three thousand rebel dead who fill nameless graves upon this battle-field. So ends the brief madness which sent him hither to fight against a government he knew only by its blessings— against his Northern brothers who never desired to encroach upon a single right or institution of his, who were willing that he should hug to his breast forever the Nessus shirt of slavery, asking only that he should not insist upon for- cing its poison. folds oyer their shoulders also. So dis- appears the beloved of some sad hearts — another victim of that implacable Nemesis, who thus avenges upon the white man the WTongs of the black, and smiles with hor- rid satisfaction as this fearful game of war goes on. " Very slowly, as men move through the burial-places of the dead, we rode through the woods at the back of the church, and reached the rocky citadel behind which crouched the enemy to receive our charging battalions, sweeping their ranks with destruction and compelling their retreat. I was astonished to see how cunningly Nature had laid up this long series of rocky ledges breast high for the protection of the rebel lines. In front of The dead in front of ^hls brcastwork wc fouud a majority of the the rock ledges. ^^^^ drCSSCd iu bluC. At this poiut alsO commenced a long barricade of fence-rails, piled closely to protect the rebel lines, and stretching off toward the north. Here is one more evidence of the use to which the rebel generals put every spare moment of time, and of their admirable choice of position. " One more scene in this battle-picture must be seen, and with a visit to it our ride may end. It is a narrow Chap.lviil] expected renewal of the attack. 455 country lane, hollowed out somewhat be- tween the fields, partially shaded, and now literally crowded with rebel corpses. Here they stood in line of battle, and here, in the length of five hundred feet, I counted more than two hundred of their dead. In every attitude conceivable — some piled in groups of four or six ; some grasping their muskets as if in the act of discharging them ; some, evidently officers, killed while encouraging their men ; some lying in the position of calm repose, all black, and swollen, and ghastly with wounds. This battalion of the dead filled the lane with horror. As we rode beside it — we could not ride in it — I saw the field all about me black with corpses, and they told me that the corn-field beyond was equally crowded. It was a place to see once, to glance at, and then to ride hurried- ly away, for, strong-hearted as was then my mood, I had gazed upon as much horror as I was able to bear." I have quoted in detail Captain Noyes's description of the battle-field of Antietam, partly because of its intrinsic merit, and partly because of the special interest it pre- sents to me. It was within the shell-torn walls of the Dunker Church that those gen- eral intentions to which I have alluded in my Preface took the form of a final resolve to write this book. I leaned, in the melancholy and rainy morning, against the rocky ledges once the breastworks of Confederate sol- diers, and walked throusfh the lane of death, in every Personal visit. ^&" — ^ — ^^ — —y panel of the fences of which there was then a grave. Long before the next day broke, the national troops, rising from their rest on the bare ground, " made ready their cofi*ee, and, eating their siniple breakfast, prepared The army expects to ^r a rcuewal of thc battle." They believed renew the attack. ^-^^^ j^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^ rj.^^ ^.^^^ ^^^ ^^ his back. A re-enforcement of 14,000 men had joined II.— G G 465 LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. [Sect. XI. them. Their strength was far greater than his. The end of the war was at hand. But the sun rose, the morning passed, the sun declined, and evening came — still there was no order for attack Some, who had been in the Peninsula, related to their comrades the dilatory move- ments of those times ; some recalled that it had taken in this campaign seven days to march a distance of forty miles ; some wondered at the generalship which had been sending driblets of troops successively toward the Bun- ker Church, not to carry the position, for they were too Soldiers' criticisms wcak for that, but to a certain massacre. of the battle. There were veterans sunning themselves on the ground, who were telling that, if they had been con- sulted, they should have thrown the right wing of the army in one irresistible mass on the enemy, and, by work- ing the left wing, would have given Lee other occupation than to concentrate his whole strength at the Dunker Church. It is the privilege of veterans to criticise their generals — sometimes they do it very sagaciously — and to demonstrate to their raw comrades how battles that have been lost might easily have been won. A second wearisome night ushered in another morning, and then there was news. Lee had given McClellan the Passage of the po- slip. He had actually crossed the Potomac tgmac by Lee. uumolcstcd, aud cscapcd iuto Virginia. The soldiers' hearts sank within them. Was this all that had come from the horrible carnage of that day ? What if Lee had abandoned 3000 dead, and 2000 too severely wounded to be removed, he had compensated for the loss of a victory by executing a brilliant retreat from the bat- tle-field under the very eye of his antagonist, and had converted the Potomac, from an apparently insuperable obstacle, into a line of defense. In his report. General McClellan states the considera- tions which led him to determine on inactivity. They CHAP.LVni.] STUART'S PENNSYLVANIAN RAID. 457 Mccieiian fails to WGie the fatlguG and exhaustion of his pursue him. tpoops ; the absence of the supply trains ; the losses of the army, and demoralization of some of the corps ; the want of ammunition. President Lincoln, thankful for the expulsion of Lee, but dissatisfied that he Lincoln visits the was uot pursucd, visited the army on the the army. -j^^^ of October, aud remained with it several days. Porter made a reconnoissance in force beyond the Potomac on the 20th, but was driven back. Lee delib- erately retired toward Winchester. A portion of his cav- alry, under Stuart, however, recrossed the river on the 10th of October, at once insulting the national army, and making good the boast of the Confederates by a raid into Stuart's raid into Peunsylvauia. He captured Chambersburg Pennsylvania. -^ ^|^^^ state, aud thcre destroyed a large quantity of supplies. He burned machine shops, trains of cars, and other property. He made a complete circuit round McClellan's army, and returned into Virginia by •crossing the Potomac below him. The Confederates might truly boast that they had at length carried the war into the Free States. So ended Lee's sortie. It had cost him nearly 30,000 Failure of Lee's Toaei!, aud, notwithstanding the capture of expedition.. Harpcr's Ferry, had been a signal failure. Day after day passed on. The Confederates were be- ing re- enforced and reorganized. The government was incessantly urging McClellan to advance. He, on his part, was standing still, and importunately demanding re- enforcements, clothing, shoes, horses. His army became at length 150,000 strong. On October 6th Halleck tel- egraphed to him: "The President directs eramSforM^ccid- that vou cross tile Potomac and orive battle lan's advance. "^ t-ot -x-r to the enemy, or drive him South. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." An- other fortnight elapsed (October 21), and still there was 468 BURNSIDE IN McCLELLAN'S STEAD. [Sect. XL no forward movement. Halleck telegraphed again : " The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted His repeated pro- 1^ iuactivlty." McClellau now fixed upon November 1st as the earliest date at which he should be ready, and about that time crossed the Po- tomac, moving leisurely down the east side of the Blue Kidge, Lee moving parallel to him in the valley on the other side. McClellan's direction w^as toward Gordons- ville. Lee, therefore, to prevent the Confederate com- munications being severed, marched directly and rapidly to that place. It became evident that McClellan's rela- tions with the government were operating very disad- vantageously. On the 7th of November a heavy snow- storm set in ; the approach of winter was betokened. He is removed from Liucolu's forbcarauce at last gave way. At midnight of that day orders arrived from Washington directing McClellan to turn over the com- Burnside succeeds J^^ii^ ^^ ^^^ army to General Burnside. ^'^' McClellan at this time had reached Rector- town. A portion of the Army of the Potomac was now reor- ganized in grand divisions. Burnside, believing that the true line of operations against Richmond was the direct Bumsideresoivesto oue, rcsolvcd ou uioving thc army to Fred- SSck^at^F^-edeSks- clicksburg, masMug his intention by a pre- ^^'^' tended advance on Gordonsville. Lee, how- ever, discovered what the real movement was to be, and while Burnside marched along the north bank of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, he marched along the south bank to Fredericksburg. ^The two armies thus stood confronting each other on the opposite sides of the river. Burnside had hoped to cross the Rappahannock before Lee could resist him successfully. On reaching Falmouth Chap.LVIII.] fkedericksbueg. 469 he found, however, that the passage across the river to Fredericksburg was checked. The bridges had been burned, and the pontoons expected from Washington had not arrived — a delay which gave Lee the opportunity of fortifying the heights behind the town. The national army thus lay on the range of hills on The armies con- the uorth side of the Rappahannock, the fronting each other. Confederates on the range of hills on the south side. Between them was Fredericksburg. The plain on which the city stood was completely commanded by the guns of both sides. Whichever entered it must be destroyed. The national troops, as we are now to see, ventured, and met with a bloody repulse. The Confed- erates did not dare to pursue them. It was not until the night of December 10th that things were ready for throw- ing the pontoons across the river, and in the interval the Confederate cavalry had made an excursion as far as Dumfries, in Burnside's rear. There was a sharp struggle in completing the pontoon The laying of the opposite the city, daylight having come pontoons. bcforc it was finished; the sharp-shooters, from their rifle-pits and from the houses on the edge of the river, made it impossible to continue the work. Through the fog which hung over the city columns of smoke were seen here and there ascending from houses set on fire by the furious bombardment with which Burn- side hoped to drive off the Confederate riflemen. The cannonading was in vain, except as a cover to one hun- dred volunteers who daringly crossed over in boats, and expelled the Confederates from the houses and rifle-pits with the bayonet The bridge was now (4 P.M.) fin- ished, and troops thrown across. A second pontoon, lower do\yn the river, was laid with- passageofthe ^ut interruption, the plain in front of it being commanded by the national artillery. river. 470 FREDERICKSBURG. [Sect. XL and the opposite bank having thus been secured, others were added without delay, and the passage of the Kappa- hannock completed. Sumner's grand division and a sec- tion of Hooker's crossed before dark at the upper bridge; that of Franklin, consisting of the corps of Eeynolds and Smith, at the lower. The movement was continued on the morning of the next day (12th) without intermission. The fortified position of the Confederates on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg consisted of The Confederate ,. n i ,, • i i • ±1 *± army at Freder- two Imcs 01 Dattcries overlookmsT the city. icksburg. , ° . ^^ iheir army, about 80,000 strong, lay m a semicircle from a point a mile above Fredericksburg to one about four miles below. Stonewall Jackson com- manded on their right, Longstreet on their left. On the national side, Franklin was on the left, Hooker occupied the centre, and Sumner the right. Behind Fredericksburg, the plain, gradually ascending, presents many inequalities of surface, and the bounding heights, trending toward the river, not only command the space in front, but also flank it. The Confederates had planted batteries in every available position to sweep this plain. There was a narrow road, skirted by a stone wall about four feet high, which ran along the foot of the heights. Burnside had learned from a prisoner that the Confed- erates had cut another road in the rear of the line of heights, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour through a diffi- cult country. His object, therefore, was to obtain possession of this road by making; a powerful attack with his Plan of the battle. •^ iii ii leit, and, as soon as that had succeeded, to assault the position with his right. He then intended to advance his centre ao-ainst their front and drive them out of their works. These operations would therefore bring Chap.LVIIL] the battle of FREDERICKSBURG. 471 BATTLE OF rilEDERICKSBURG. successively into action Franklin, wlio was on the left, ,Sumner on the ri2:ht, and Hooker at the centre. Frank- lin's force was strengthened by two of Hooker's best di- visions, and was from 55,000 to 60,000 strong. By some alleged misunderstanding, Franklin, instead of making a vigorous — the main — attack, limited his op- erations to a mere reconnoissance, and, as we are now to see, the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker, being un- supported, failed. A dense fog had covered the valley of the Eappahan- The battle of Fred- nock ou the momiug of the 13 th of Decem- ericksburg. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^'^ ^-y^^^^ o'clock it had been dispersed by the rays of the sun. Concealed in its cloudy veil, the Confederate General Longstreet had per- sonally come so near the national lines that he could hear their officers' commands. He found that an attack was to be made on Jackson, and notified him of it. 472 THK battle of rREDERICKSBURG. [Sect. XI. The attack on tlie left by Franklin's grand division was made by General Meade witk about 4500 men. He broke tlirougli the Confed- erate lines, reached the heights they had occupied, and got into the presence of their reserves, but the divisions which were to have sustained him failed to do so, and he was driven back. If he could have held his ground, the evacuation of the works in the rear of Fredericksburg must have taken place. He lost more than one third of his force in this attempt. Sumner, on the right, had been making ready to storm the fortifications on Marye's Heights in his Snmner's attack on n , t-t itt/Tii ptts i the Confederate frout. He had sclectcd the corps 01 r rencn and Hancock for that purpose, and had How- ard's division in readiness to support them. A little be- fore noon, French's corps, preceded by skirmishers, was seen, as a long black line, deploying in the rear of the city, and steadily advancing to the assault. Behind it followed another black line. It was Hancock's corps. The Confederate batteries were silent until their enemy was half way across the plain, when, in »an instant, from the front, the right, the left, they poured forth a tempest of fire. Longstreet says that the gaps made by the artil- lery could be seen half a mile off. The thin line moved through the focus of death, quivering but still advancing, its own batteries in the distance giving it what help they might— a canopy of iron. The line grew thinner and thinner ; becoming too weak to hold together, it halted, and was dispersed. Another attempt was made. The line moved through the rain of grape and canister, and, closing the gaps torn through it, it seemed as if Fortune, unable to re- sist such daring, was about to smile on it. Two thirds of the plain were passed ; a few steps more, and the flam- ing hill itself would give some protection — one moment Hooker's attack. ' Chap. LVIII.] THE BATTLE OF EEEDERICKSBURG. 473 for taking breath, then a bayonet charge up the heights, and the Confederates would be hurled out of their forti- fications. In front was the gray stone wall. The Confederates Attack on the ^^d artillery that raked it right and left. stonewall. j^ ^^ Instaut it was fringed with fire and hidden in smoke. Enfiladed by the batteries, confronted by a mile of rifles, which were securely discharged behind its protecting cover, the surviving assailants were forced back to the shelter of a ravine, within musket-shot of the enemy. Here a line of assault was once more formed, and a bayonet charge made on the Confederate artillery. Thrice was that attack made — thrice vainly. The storm- ing party, almost annihilated, was compelled to retire. Such was the fate of Sumner's attack on the right. That of Hooker on the centre fared no bet- ter. He says : " I proceeded against the bar- rier as I would against a fortification, and endeavored to breach a hole sufficiently large for a ' forlorn hope' to en- ter. Before that, the attack along the line, it seemed to me, had been too general — not sufficiently concentrated. I had two batteries posted on the left of the road, within four hundred yards of the position upon which the attack was to be'made, and I had other parts of batteries posted on the right of the road, at the distance of five hundred or six hundred yards. I had all these batteries playing with great vigor until sunset upon that point, but with no apparent effect upon the rebels or upon their works. "During the last part of the cannonading I had given directions to General Humphreys's division to form, un- der the shelter which a small hill afforded, in column for assault. When the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave di- rections for the enemy's works to be assaulted. General Humphreys's men took off their knapsacks, overcoats, and haversacks. They were ordered to make the assault with 474 BUKNSIDE RECROSSES THE RIVER. [Sect. XI. empty muskets, for there was no time then to load and -fire. When the word was given the men moved forward with great impetuosity. They ran and hurraed, and I was encouraged by the great good feeling that pervaded them. The head of General Humphreys's column advanced to within perhaps fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which was the advanced position held by the rebels, and then they were thrown back as quickly as they had ad- vanced. Probably the whole of the advance and the re- tiring did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, as was reported to me, 1760 of their number out of 4000." In this battle of Fredericksburg the national losses . .0, n .M were 13,771; the Confederate loss was about Losses m the battle. ' ' 5309. It was Burnside's intention to renew the struggle on the Burnside proposes ^^^xt momlug, but finding, upon consulta another movement, ^on, that his chicf officcrs regarded the en emy's lines as impregnable, he countermanded the order On the night of the 15th of December, Burnside vaca But he repasses ^cd Frcdcricksburg, retiring to his former the river. posltiou. He fclt that the position in front could not be carried, and that it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. Another repulse i^ould have been disastrous. The army was withdrawn in the night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men. A fortnight subsequently (December 30th) Burnside made preparations for another advance upon Kichmond, when he was suddenly called to "Washington by the Presi- dent. He there discovered that representations had been surreptitiously made by certain of his subordinate ofiicers to the effect that the temper of the army would not justi- fy the movement, and that it would inevitably end in a great disaster. He soon ascertained that the secessionists Chap. LVin.] HOOKER IN BURNSIDE'S STEAD. 475 in Washington had obtained intelligence of the character of his proposed movement, and was therefore compelled to substitute another for it. The attempt to carry this into effect was, however, arrested by a severe sleet-storm, which turned the roads into quagmires, and rendered movement impossible. The march, scarcely begun, was necessarily abandoned, and the troops were ordered back to their old camps. Discovering that the malign Dissatisfaction influcnce whlch had before paralyzed the mthe army. ^p^iy of the Potomac was again at work, he had prepared a general order dismissing from the service certain officers, but, before issuing it, he submitted it to the President. It was decided, in view of public necessi- ties, that General Burnside himself should be relieved from command, and that the order should take the form that this was at his own request. Against this he remon- strated as unjust, urging that his resignation should be Burnside's noble acccptcd lustcad ; but, with a patriotism that conduct. might have been an example to all the of- ficers of that army, he nobly consented at last that any order whatever might be published respecting him per- sonally, if it were considered conducive to the welfare of the republic, and that, instead of resigning, he would serve wherever he was required. In the same order Ma- jor General Franklin was relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac, as was also Major General Sumner — the latter at his own request. Major General Hooker assigned to -,-t t • t ; -^ • /-^ command in^Burn- Hooker was assi2:nea to command m Gen- side's stead. • T 1 1 eral Burnside s stead. I can not close this history of Lee's sortie more in- structively than by presenting: the followins: Condition of the . , n . . . -fx 1 '1 x1 Confederate extract 01 a statcmcut written while the army. Confederate army lay at Winchester (Sep- tember 26th), after the retreat from Maryland. Certainly nothing can depict more eloquently the military virtues Its battles aud marches. 475 CONDITION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. [Sect. XL of the Southern soldier. It is an appeal to the people of the Confederacy for contributions for the relief of the army. - In this appeal, the sufferings of that army since it left the banks of James River are likened to those endured by the French in their dis- astrous retreat from Moscow. It is not only a plea for help, but an apology for those who had left their colors. " This army proceeded directly to the line of the Rap- pahannock, and, moving out from that river, it fought its way to the Potomac, crossed the stream, and moved on to Frederick and Hagerstown, had a heavy engagement at Boonesborough (Turner's Gap), and another at Cramp- ton's Gap below, fought the greatest pitched battle of the war at Sharpsburg (Antietam), and then recrossed the Potomac back into Virginia. During all this time, cover- ing the full space of a month, the troops rested but four days. And let it be always remembered to their honor, that of the men who performed this wonderful feat, one fifth were barefooted, one half in rags, and the whole half famished. The country from the Rappahannock to the Potomac had been visited by the enemy with fire and sword, and our transportation was insufi&cient to keep the army supplied from so distant a base as Gordonsville, and when provision trains did overtake the army, so pressing were the exigencies of their position that the men seldom had time to cook. Their difficulties were increased by the fact that cooking utensils in many cases had been left behind, as well as every thing else that would impede their movements. It was not unusual to see a company of starving men have a barrel of flour distributed to them which it was utterly impossible for them to convert into bread with the means and in the time allowed them. " Do you wonder, then, that there should have been Chap. LVIIL] CONDITION -OF THE CONFEDERATE AEMY. 477 stragglers from the army? that brave and Its great privations. . ^^ ^ , ^ -. ^ ^t, ,^ , true men should have fallen out irom sheer exhaustion, or in their efforts to obtain a mouthful to eat along the roadsides ? or that many seasoned veterans — the conquerors in the Valley, at Richmond, and at Manas- sas — should have succumbed to disease, and been- for<3ed back to the hospital? I look to hear a great outcry against the stragglers. Already lazy cavalrymen and dainty staff officers and quartermasters, who are mounted and can forage the country for something to eat, are con- demning the w^eary private, who, notwithstanding his body may be covered with dust and perspiration, and his feet with stone-bruises, is expected to trudge along under his knapsack and cartridge-box, on an empty stomach, and never turn aside for a morsel of food to sustain his sinking limbs. Out upon such monstrous injustice ! That there has been unnecessary straggling is readily admitted, but in a large majority of cases the men have only to point to their bleeding feet, tattered garments, and gaunt frames for an answer to the unjust charge. No army on this continent has ever accomplished as much or suffered as much as the Army of Northern Virginia within the last three months. At no period during the first Revo- lutionary War, not even at Valley Forge, did our fore- fathers in arms encounter greater hardships or endure them more uncomplainingly. " But, great as have been the trials to which the army The necessity of ^^^ bccu subjcctcd, they arc hardly worthy sustaining it. ^^ ^^ named in comparison with the suffer- ings in store for it this winter, unless the people of the Confederate States every where, and in whatever circum- stances, come to its immediate relief The men must have clothing and shoes this winter. They must have something to cover themselves when sleeping, and to pro- tect themselves from the driving sleet and snow-storms 478 CONDITION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. [Sect. XL when on duty. This must be done, though our friends at home should have to wear cotton and sit by the fire. The Army of Virginia stands guard this day, as it will stand guard this winter, over every hearthstone through- out the South. The ragged sentinel who may pace his weary rounds this winter on the bleak spurs of the Blue Kidge, or along the frozen valleys of the Shenandoah and Eappahannock, will be your sentinel, my friends, at home. It will be for you and your household that he encounters the wrath of the tempest and the dangers of the night. He suffers, and toils, and fights for you too, brave, true- hearted w^omen of the South. Will you not clothe his nakedness, then ? Will you not put shoes and stockings on his feet ? Is it not enough that he has written down his patriotism in crimson characters from the Rappahan- nock to the Potomac ? And must his bleeding feet also impress the mark of fidelity upon the snows of the com- ing winter ? " It was hoped at one time that we might obtain win- its disappointment ter supplies in Maryland. This hope was aryiand, l^om aftcr thc army left Richmond, and has now miserably perished. The government is unable to furnish the supplies, for they are not to be had in the country." In truth, the condition of the retreating Confederate army was now to the last degree deplorable. It was ragged, barefoot, hatless, and winter was coming on. It had not gathered the expected plunder of Philadelphia, and reduction by ^i^r touchcd the rausoui of Ncw York. De- desertion. sertlou wcut ou without a parallel. The President and other officers of the Confederate and state governments were constrained to appeal to the women to frown on the deserters, and secure their apprehen- sion. In this the Southern press earnestly joined. It was affirmed that half the soldiers from certain por- Chap. LVIII.] END OF LEE'S SORTIE. 479 tions of the states liad escaped to their homes' without leave. Brave as they were, the Confederate troops had failed The end of Lee's ^o break through the investing line. Their ^''''^'^' sortie had culminated at Antietam. Win- ter found them on the southern side of the Eappahan- nock. SECTION XII. THE BLOCKADE, AND OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH IT. CHAPTEE LIX. NAVAL OPERATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE BLOCKADE. On the establishment of the blockade, it was found necessary to have a Southern naval station for the supply and repair of the ships. Port Koyal, in South Caro- lina, was therefore seized for that purpose. From Port Royal an expedition was sent out, which reduced Fort Pulaski and completed the blockade of Georgia. Another expedition, which was also suc- cessful, was dispatched to the coast of Florida. From Fortress Monroe expeditions were sent to the North Carolina coast. One, under Butler, occupied Hatteras ; another, under Burnside, occupied Roanoke Island and places in its vicinity. The Confederate government commissioned privateers. Very soon after the inauguration of Lincoln the proc- lamation of a blockade of the Southern ports was issued (p. 27). In the opinion of foreign nations this blockade was effectually maintained. On its part, the Confederacy resorted to the authoriza- tion of privateers. Some of these sailed from American, some from English ports. A consideration of this portion of the naval transac- ciassiflcation of tlous is thcrcforc, pcrhaps, best conducted naval affairs. -^^ grouping thc various events under two heads: 1st, those in relation to the blockade; 2d, those in relation to privateers. Respecting the former, it is ex- pedient not to relate them in their strict order of occur- rence, but rather, viewing them in the aggregate, to give Chap. LIX.] A SOUTHERN NAVAL STATION NECESSARY. 431 precedence to the more important facts, arranging the others so that their mutual connection maybe perceived. The privateering operations may be more appropriately considered in the next volume. THE HARBOR OF PORT ROYAL. The blockade once established, it was found necessary, for its effective maintenance, to have a large souSZ naval uaval statiou at some point near the centre station. , ... of the line. For the first time in history, a great fleet of steam-ships had been employed for blockad- ing purposes, and, to enable it to keep the sea without long voyages for supplies and repairs, docks and machine shops near at hand were required. All kinds of stores were demanded — munitions of war, powder, shot, shell, provisions, medicines, coal, fresh meats," ice, fresh water. Supply -ships, in a continuous line, were passing from II.— H H 482 THE PORT EOYAL EXPEDITION. [Sect. XII. point to point. Their task would be rendered less oner- ous by the establishment of a central depot. The seizure of Hatteras, which, as we shall, presently see, had been made, did not meet these requisitions. It merely shut a gate to exclude the blockade adventurer, but was not the acquisition of a commodious harbor. It was therefore determined, in the autumn of 1861, to Expedition to occupy Port Royal, in South Carolina — a har- port Royal. -^^^^ sltuated bctwecu Charleston and Savan- nah, and the best upon the Southern Atlantic coast. The fleet assigned for this purpose was the most powerful that had yet been fitted out in America ; it consisted of the frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 34 steamers, and 26 sailing vessels. It was under the command of Commodore Du- pont, and carried more than 15,000 troops, under Major General Thomas W. Sherman. Soon after leaving Hamp- ton Roads it encountered a violent storm, by which the ships were dispersed and several of the transports lost. On the morning of November 4th, however, Dupont reach- ed his destination, with difficulty getting his flag-ship, the Wabash, over the bar; but he was soon after joined by his fleet. On Hilton Head there was a strong earthwork, Fort Walker, mounting 23 guns, Avith an outwork on the sea-front having a rifled gun. The plan of Fort Walk- Defenses of 61' was such that its principal guns were Port Royal. n^ouutcd ou two watcr-faccs so nearly in line as to admit of an enfilading fire from a certain point ; the flanks were much weaker. On the opposite side of the channel, on Phillip's Island, at a distance of 2^ miles, was another earthwork, Fort Beauregard, mounting 20 guns, several of them heavy rifles. It had an outwork mounting five. Two miles above, at the junction of Beau- fort and Broad Rivers, the Confederate Commodore Tatt- nall had a fleet of five or six gun-boats. The works were manned by about 1700 South Carolina troops. Chap. LIX.] DUPONT'S ATTACK AT POET ROYAL. 483 II I LTD a Hea CAPTURE OF THE PORT ROYAL FORTS. ^' It was determined to direct the weight of the attack Dnpont's attack fi^st upoii Fort Walkcr, and then turn to on the forts. y^^^. Bcaurcgard. The plan was for the deet to pass up midway between the forts and engage both at long range, and, when the line reached a point 2^ miles north of the forts, to turn to the south round by the west, and come into close action with Fort Walker, attacking on the weakest flank, while at the same time the shot would enfilade the two water-faces." The ships were to pass the forts at a distance of 800 yards when moving southward; but, when they made the second circuit, they were to come nearer, sighting their guns for 550 yards, so that the gunners in the fort had not only to fire at a moving object, but the ships were some 300 yards nearer than when they passed at first. Of course the range would be lost, and but little damage in- flicted. Each vessel, as it came down, was to send enfi- lading shot from its pivot-guns, and then give the whole 484 CAPTURE OF PORT ROYAL. [Sect. XII. starboard broadside. On its return upward it was to give its port broadside. The necessary preparations having been made, the flag- ship Wabash, followed by the other war- ships, passed up the midst of the channel. Sailing in the designated elliptical track, they delivered their fire as they neared the forts. They made the cir- cuit three times. Meanwhile some of the smaller vessels had taken stations where they could not only prevent the Confederate fleet from giving any assistance, but also maintain a fire upon the left flank of Fort Walker. In the course of three hours the fort was disabled, and its gar- rison had taken to flight, leaving even Avatches and other valuables behind. Simultaneously Fort Beauregard was abandoned. The loss on the national side was, in killed and wounded, 31; the Confederate loss was probably much more. In the forts were found 49 cannon and large quantities of ammunition. The town of Beaufort and the adjoining islands were soon afterward taken pos- session of, and troops were landed on Hilton Head, which was strongly fortified. Port Royal, thus secured, was made abase of operations against South Carolina and Georgia. It became a great depot for munitions and stores of every kind. Savannah, which is situated about fifteen miles from the mouth of the Savannah River and on Expedition for the . , , , , ■, . • t t p t t i blockade of sa- its southem bank, is mamly deiended by a vannah. ' ^ *' "^ , strong casemated brick work. Fort Pulaski, on Cockspur Island. There is also a smaller work. Fort Jackson, nearer to the city. Between Fort Pulaski and Fort Jackson is Jones's Island. It is of a triangular shape, being bounded by Wright River on the east, by Mud River on the north, and by the Savannah itself on the southwest. It is Chap. LIX.] THE BLOCKADE OF SAVANNAH. 485 about five miles long, and two or three broad. Point Venus is on tbe face of it, fronting the Savannah Eiver. Jones's Island is separated from Turtle Island by Wright Eiver. The mouth of this river is about two miles above Fort Pulaski. Information had been given by some negroes that there secret passages ^^.^^ts a passage conuecting Calibogue Sound explored. ^^^^|j ^]^q Savauuah Eiver, through which gun-boats might pass out of reach of Fort Pulaski, and cut off communication between that work and Savan- nah. A reconnoissance of boats with muffled oars success- fully eluded the Confederate pickets, the exploring party hiding themselves in the reeds during the day and con- tinuing their work in the night. They found that through an artificial passage, about 200 yards in length, known as Wall's Cut, access might readily be had to Wright Eiver. This passage or channel was obstructed by three rows of piles, and by a sunken brig. At high water, however, they were able to get over these obsta- cles. They ascertained that gun-boats often feet draught Reconnoissance of ^^^^^^ mako their Way without difficulty. Jones's Island. rpj^^ rccounoitring party passed within hear- ing of the sentinels on Pulaski, and proceeded beyond Point Venus up to the mouth of Mud Eiver. Through that river there was no available passage, the water being too shallow. An expedition was therefore sent out to remove the obstructions in Wall's Cut. The piles were sawn off, the brig turned lengthwise so as to open the passage. The work lasted for three weeks, and was brought to its conclusion without detection. A few runaway negroes, who were hiding in the marsh, and sportsmen shooting wild ducks, were seized. Information was in like manner obtained from some negroes of a similar neglected passage, known as Wil- 486 FORT PULASKI. [Sect. XII. THE DEFENSES OF SAVANNAH. mington Narrows, on the opposite side of the Savannah. Eeconnoissances along it were accordingly made, and it was determined that operations should be commenced here simultaneously with those at Wall's Cut. Access round Fort Pulaski having thus been obtained, Isolation of Fort ^ ^^^^ ^^^ made from Wall's Cut over the puiasku marshes of Jones's Island to Point Venus, where a battery was constructed. Another battery was placed on the extremity of Long Island, and a third on floats at the mouth of Mud Kiver. These cut off commu- nication between Savannah and the fort, and kept the Confederate gun-boats at a distance. For the reduction of Fort Pulaski, eleven batteries were established on the northwest face of Tybee Its bombardment. __- p,» t/» -t-\ !• Island, controntmg the fort. Every thing being in readiness (April 10th, 1862), the fort was sum- moned to surrender. Its commandant refused. Fire was therefore opened upon it ; in fifteen hours it was so much injured, and its magazine in so much danger of being reached by the shells, that it surrendered. The posses- sion of this fort completed the blockade of Savannah. There were some interesting incidents connected with the reduction of Fort Pulaski. Jones's Island is a mere Chap. LIX.] REDUCTION OF FORT PULASKI. 487 marsh, covered witli rank grass, and flooded at liigli wa- Difficnitiesiuits tcr. Ovev this, on a rude corduroy road, reduction. ^^^ soMlcrs dragged cannon weighing three tons -each. The wintry nights were dark and stormy. The men had frequently to work waist-deep in the slushy morass; the guns slipped off the track, sank in the mire, and had to be dragged back again. On Tybee Island the work was even more severe; ten-inch Columbiads had to be dragged two. miles through the sand by hand. Up to this time it had been supposed that walls such as those of Fort Pulaski could not be breached at dis- tances greater than 800 yards. The guns used were 8 and 10 inch Columbiads, rifles from 24 to 42 pounders, and 10 and 13 inch mortars. The nearest batteries were almost a mile Great distances of ^ .-i n , ,1 tji, ^^ the breaching bat- trom tuo lort, the more distant two miles. teries. Though the walls were seven and a half feet thick, they could not withstand the guns. The rifles per- forated them deeply, honeycombing them completely; and the 10-inch solid shot, striking with less velocity, but with what was designated by eye-witnesses as a trip-hammer blow, shook the damaged masonry down. At 1 650 yards, which was the distance of the nearest rifles, the shot pen- etrated to a depth of from twenty to twenty-six inches — an effect so unexpected that General Gillmore, who con- ducted the operation, subsequently reported that, had he been aware of what he now had learned, he might have shortened his preparations from eight weeks to one, and increased the distance of his nearest batteries to even 2500 yards. An expedition was disj)atched from Port Koyal (Feb- ExpeditiontoFer- Tuary 28th, 1862) to the coast of Florida. nandma. q^^ portlou of it appToachcd Fernandina, which is near the Atlantic terminus of the Cedar Keys 488 THE FLORIDA EXPEDITIONS. [Sect. XIL and Fern^ndina Railroad, tlirougli Cumberland Sound, witli a view of turning tlie Confederate works ; tlie re- mainder went down outside of Cumberland Island. On the approach of the ships the Confederates abandoned Repossession of the post. The towu of Femandiua was oc- Fort Clinch. cupied. Fort CHuch was repossessed, and the works garrisoned with national troops. The easy success of this expedition appears to have turned on the previous withdrawal of the Florida troops for service in the Confederate army. In like manner, possession was Expeditions on the taken (March 7th) of Brunswick, the At- lantic terminus of the Brunswick and Pen- Florida coast. THE FLORIDA EXPEDITIONS. sacola Eailroad. It also had been abandoned, as was the case with Darien, on the Altamaha Eiver, whence 1500 troops had been withdrawn. But one white man and one old negro were found in the place. Jacksonville, on the St. John's River, was occupied without resistance (March 11th), and St. Augustine soon after. With it Fort Marion was taken. Chap.LIX.] NOETH CAROLINA COAST EXPEDITIONS. 489 Florida, out of a white population of 77,778, had fur- nished nearly 10,000 men to the Confederate army. Thus stripped, she was unable to make any resistance, or to protect the. works and towns upon her coast. Com- modore Dupont, referring in his report to the condition Sentiments of the of St. Augustlue, says I " I believo there are Fiondians. mauy citlzeus who are earnestly attached to the Union, a large number who are silently opposed to it, and a still larger number who care very little about the matter. There is much violent and pestilent feeling among the women. They have a theatrical desire to fig- ure as heroines. Their minds have doubtless been filled mth the falsehoods so industriously circulated in regard to the lust and hatred of our troops. On the night be- fore our arrival, a party of them assembled in front of the barracks, and cut down the flag-staff, in order that it might not be used to support the old flag. The men seemed anxious to conciliate in every way." The operations on the coast of North Carolina were conducted by expeditions organized at Fort- Objects of the North -,.-- rn-, i • n • . t t Carolina expedi- rcss Mouroe. , iuey were chieiiy intended . for the enforcement of the blockade and the stoppage of privateers going to sea. Subsequently the possession or destruction of the "Weldon Railroad was contemplated, but not forcibly attempted. In fact, when the correct plan of the war came to be understood, it was perceived that these expeditions, except in so far as they aided the blockading fleet, were of no use. The forces of one of them (Burnside's) were eventually withdrawn, and brought on a more correct line of operations. The expeditions now to be referred to are two : (1.) Butler's expedition to Hatteras ; (2.) Burnside's Koanoke expedition. 490 THE HATTERAS EXPEDITION. [Sect. XII. Q. "^ A, ^ THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITIONS. The waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds are con- The expeditiou nected with the interior of North Carolina to Hatteras. ^^ Canal, rfvers, and railroads, giving singu- lar facilities to blockade runners to carry on their opera- tions. Through these, muskets, cannon, and large quanti- ties of munitions of war were introduced into the Con- federacy, and cotton carried out. To guard the main channel of this commerce, two forts had been built on the chap.lix.] the hatteras expedition. 491 southwest point of Hatteras Island, wMcli is between Oregon atfd Hatteras Inlets — Fort Clark, a small water battery, mounting five guns, and Fort Hatteras, a stronger work, covering about 1^ acres, and having ten guns. The island itself is a mere sand-spit, on which here and there are scattered clumps of dwarf oaks: the sea-spray dashes all over it. A miserable population of ^ve hundred per- sons finds occupation in piloting, wrecking, fishing. In the salt marshes, concealed by a rank grass, are swarms of musquitoes. With a view of arresting the traffic through these sounds and enforcing the blockade, an expedition, under General Butler and Commodore Stringham, sailed from Fortress Monroe (August 26, 1861), its immediate object being the capture of the two forts. It consisted of three Its naval and powerful frfgatcs aud half a dozen smaller military force, ycsscls. Carrying in the aggregate 158 guns and about 900 soldiers. It passed through Hatteras Inlet into Pamlico Sound. Much difficulty was experienced in landing the troops through the heavy surf rolling on the beach. One third of the force, 300 men, was, however, got on shore, but without either provisions, water, or am- munition. A bombardment was opened by the shipping upon the smaller work, which replied with but little ef feet, the vessels keeping in continual motion, each steam- ing round on a different circle, so that the range of none Bombardment of thcm could bc got. Ou their part, they threw their shells with so much accuracy as to compel its defenders to abandon Fort Clark in the course of a couple of hours. A rainy and tempestuous night set in, adding not a little to the discomfort of the troops which had been landed; but, as soon as it was day, fire was resumed on the larger fort, Hatteras, and it was speedily reduced. The Confederates, though re-enforced during the operations, found themselves completely over- 492 KOANOKE ISLAND. [Sect. XII. They are sur- matclied, and were compelled to surrender. ren ered. Among tliose who Were thus taken prisoners was Barron, wlio had, at Lincoln's accession, nearly been surreptitiously appointed to one of the most confidential posts in the United States Navy Department (p. 55). There were captured more than 700 prisoners, 25 cannon, and 1000 small-arms. The force left in charge of the posi- tion subsequently undertook an expedition to Chickami- comico, about 20 miles distant, but was chickamicomico compellcd to retire, pursued by the Confed- erates : it destroyed its tents and stores, and lost about 50 prisoners. But one of the light-draught vessels, coming to the rescue, put the pursuers to flight with shells, inflicting on them a considerable loss as they passed along the flat sand-bank, which afforded them no cover or protection. The seizure of these forts was an important step in the Results of these enforcement of the blockadc. It gave access operations. ^^ ^j^ ^-^^ ^^^^^ Carolina sounds, and threat- ened the power of the Confederates in these interior wa- ters. Koanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand- Bumside's expedi- ^^^ that shuts off Upper North Carolina tion to Roanoke. ^^^^^ ^^^ Atlautlc Occau, offci's somc of the most interesting souvenirs of early American history. It was (vol. i., p. 147) the scene of Sir Walter Ealeigh's col- onizing expedition. As stated by General Wise, to whom its defense was Military value of Intrustcd by the Confederate government, it Roanoke Island. ^^^ ^-^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^l thc rcar dcfcnscs of Nor- folk. It unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army there, threatened the Chap. LIX.] EXPEDITION TO EOANOKE ISLAND. 493 navy yard, interrupted the communication between Nor- folk and Richmond, and intervened between both and the South. " It lodges an enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives him a rendezvous, and a large, rich range of supplies. It commands the sea-board from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry." After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August, 1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon com- merce. In the interior, shipping, and even iron-clads, were building. THE EXPEDITION TO ROANOKE ISLAND. The expedition of General Butler, as has been stated (p. 491), had reduced the defensive works at Hatteras In- let and opened Pamlico Sound. The Confederates had retired to Roanoke Island, which, intervening between Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, commands the passage to the latter. The channel on the east of the island is shal- low ; that on the west, known as Croatan Sound, was defended by three earth-works Defenses of the position. 494 EXPEDITION TO ROANOKE ISLAND. [Sect. XII. on the island, one at Pork Point, one at Weir's Point, and a smaller work, Fort Blanchard, between. The larger works were armed with twenty-two guns, some of them 100-pound rifles. On the main land, at Eedstone Point, there was another battery Across the channel, near Pork Point, obstructions of piles and sunken vessels had been placed. On the island itself there were other works, one giving protection toward Nag's Head, on the bar, and an- other near the centre of the island — a redoubt, with a pond on its front and flanks, commanding the road that comes from the south. An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe, capture Newbem, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them carryiner heavy s^uns; 11,500 troops. Naval and military , ^ 7^r x , n . t* T. stjenghoftheex- couvcycd lu 47 tj^ausports ; a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days' supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th, Its misfortunes at ^^^ aiTivcd off Hatteras in two days, as a the outset. storm was coming on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. There were not more than 7i feet of water on the bar. Some dishonest ship- sellers in New Ygrk had, by misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable transport vessels, of which several were lost in that tempestuous sea. The crowded ships were in each other's way. The steamer City of New York, with a cargo valued at nearly a quar- ter of a million of dollars, went to pieces. The clouds seemed to dip down to the vessels' masts ; so violent were Chap. LIX.] EXPEDITION TO ROANOKE ISLAND. 495 the waves that no one could keep tlie deck. It was only by the greatest exertion and perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed, that the entrance to Pam- lico Sound was completed. The villainy that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th) had the reorganized* expedition gained the entrance to Croa- tan Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy pass- es. The weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at night. The gun-boats found a Con- federate fleet drawn up behind the obstructions, across Attack commenced the chauucl, uear Pork Point. They open- by the fleet. ^^ g^^ ^^ ^-^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^j^^^ j^ ^^^ returned both from the works and the shipping. Mean- time troops were being landed at Ashby's, a small force, w^hich was attempting to resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night had set in. It was con- tinued until 10,000 men had been landed on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's Point. Their flag-ship, the Curlew, had been set on fire by a 100-pound shell. When day broke Burnside commenced forcing his way up the island. He moved in three columns, the central one, preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right and left through the woods. The battery The troops carry that obstructcd thls Toad was soon carried, the batteries. ^hough uot wlthout rcsistaucc. The men had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected it. Finding it impossible to flank it, as had been intended, they charged it in front. It was here that Captain Wise, the son of the Confederate commander, was mortally wounded. General Wise himself lay sick at Nag's Head. It added not a little to the bitterness 496 EXPEDITIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA. [Sect. XII. of this needless sacrifice that lie had protested in vain to the Kichmond authorities against what was doing at Ko- anoke Island, and had told them what the result must inevitably be ; but the Secretary of War, Benjamin, turn- ed a deaf ear to him. Toward Nag's Head the Confed- erate force, expelled from the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however, overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the island, 2500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, Capture of Eden- whithcr it had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was burned. A por- tion of the national fleet went into the harbor of Eden- ton, and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan Eiver, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack (March 14th) on l^ew- bern, one of the most important sea-ports of North Caro- lina. As the troops advanced from the place of landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and thereby cleared the way. A march of eighteen miles in a rain-storm, and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the soldiers. They bivouacked at night by pitch-pine fires. Five miles below Newbern they came upon some works, which, after a sharp struggle, were taken by assault, and the enemy pursued toward New- bern. The city had been set on fire in several places, and also of New- ^^^ ^^^ bridge ovcT the Trcut was in flames. Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3 batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores. Burnside's losses wxre 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations were next made for the reduction of Fort Capture of Fort Macou, which commauds the entrance of ^''"^' Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries ; Chap. LIX.] STONE BLOCI^DES. 497 the former, however, in tlie course of an hour and a half, were compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing their attack, silenced the guns of the garri- son, and, in the course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort. In connection with this expedition some operations of minor importance occurred — an affair at South Mills ; the obstructing of the entrance to the Dismal Swamp ; an en- gagement near Pactolus. The chief result, however, was the closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part, withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army of General Pope. Before the close of 1862 a large part of the Atlantic Southern coast had been recovered from the General result of ^ ^ -, ,^, . -. , these coast expe- Coniederacv. ine navy was occupied m ditions. .*' ,*^ Tr»*ni suppressing the batteries and fortified w^orks which had been constructed on the interior water net- work. Many of these, as on Otter Island and up the Coosaw, were found to have been abandoned. This was, perhaps, in part due to the terror of gun-boats inspired by the attack on Port Royal, and in part to the fact that the force of the Confederacy was already declining. Among the methods resorted to for completing the blockade, and preventing: the es^ress of pri- The stone blockade. ^ -^ ^. ° . ^ vateers seeking to commit depredations on commerce, was that of sinking in the channels of some of the ports vessels laden with stone. This was first done at Ocracoke Inlet, on the North Carolina coast. A number of old whale-ships which had become un- seaworthy, having been laden with stone, were sunk, on the 21st of December (1861), at the principal entrance of Charleston Harbor. They were placed in checkered rows across the channel. It was expected that they w^ould form a nucleus for the accumulation of sand, and thus af- II.— 1 1 498 CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS. [Sect. XII. ford the required obstacle. Tlie result, however, proved to be a failure. As the most important privateering operations of the The Confederate Confederacy have to be considered in the privateers. foUowiug volumc, I shall uot, at this point, devote much space to that subject. The incidents that have to be related, or, rather, refen-ed to, were intrinsical- ly of very little importance. They exerted no influence on the general issue, and were wdthout any political re- sult, except in so far as they raised the question of the treatment of privateersmen as pirates. On June 2d., 1861, the Savannah, a schooner of 50 tons, carrying an 18-pound swivel, eluded the blockading squadron off Charleston. Next day she fell in with a Maine brig, laden with sugar, bound to Philadelphia. Having decoyed her within reach by hoisting an Amer- ican flag, the privateer captured her without difficulty. Soon after the Savannah fell in with another brig, and her captain expected to make as easy a prize of it. It was, however, the United States brig of war Perry. Dis- captiireofthe coveriug the mistake when it was too late, Savannah. ^-^^ Savauuah was obliged to surrender. Her crew were sent to New York. It was intended to try them for piracy ; but a threat from the Confederate gov- ernment that it would retaliate, led to their exchange along with other prisoners of w^ar. Still worse fortune befell the Petrel, which likewise Sinking of the ^au out through the blockade of Charleston. Petrel. g^^ ^^^ hardly at sea when she fell in with what geemed to be a large merchant vessel. She accord- ingly gave chase, and fired a shot across the stranger's bow to bring her to. The crew of the Petrel reported that they were at a loss to know what had next happen- Chap. LIX,] CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS. 499 ed to them. They were floating among splinters and wreck ; their vessel had disappeared. They had been chasing the frigate St. Lawrence, which had opened her ports and instantly sent the Petrel to the bottom. Four men were drowned, and thirty-six rescued from the water. Several prizes were, however, made by other vessels The Confederate Sailing Under the Confederate flag. At the ^'''^^^' close of the year (1861) these prizes were fifty-eight in number. The Confederate government car- ried its point that its prisoners captured at sea should be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. Colonel Corcoran, of the New York 69th Kegiment, who had been wounded and captured at the battle of Bull Run, was handcuffed, placed in a solitary cell, and attached to the floor by a chain in the Libby Prison at Richmond. This was done to compel the national government to recede from the position taken by the President in his proc- j|spectiiig priva- lauiatlou of April 19th, that persons thus captured at sea " will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and pun- ishment of piracy," and the measure proved successful. Among other naval operations may be mentioned the Burning of the dcstructiou, lu tho harbor of Pensacola, of the Judah, a privateer. She was boarded early on the morning of September 14th by a party from the flag-ship Colorado, who spiked a 10-inch gun with which she was armed, and set her on fire. Their loss was 15 in killed and wounded. The Confederates, how- ever, shortly after retaliated. On the night of October 9th they sent a force from Pensacola to San- The Confederates i-r>TiT t-tt rout a Zouave ta Kosa island, and surprised the camp of a Zouave regiment stationed near Fort Pick- ens. They were successful ; the camp was destroyed, and the Zouaves lost about 60 killed and wounded. The steamer Sumter, Captain Semmes, had evaded the 500 CONFEDERATE PRIVATEERS. [Sect. XII. Successes of the l^l^^^^^^^^ of the Mississippi about the begin- sumter. nliig of Julj, aiid captui'ed several merchant- men in the West India Seas. She then went to Nassau for supplies. Having made many captures in the Atlan- tic, she was blockaded in the harbor of Gibraltar by the national steamer Tuscarora. Here she was sold, her offi- cers repairing to Liverpool, and being eventually trans- ferred to the Alabama, which had been built for them at that port. The Nashville, which had slipped out of Charleston, Successes of the captuTcd and burnt a valuable merchant- Nashviue. msiJiy the Harvey Birch, near the English coast, and then went into Southampton, where the Tusca- rora happened to be. She, however, escaped from this national ship, as it was detained by the English govern- ment for twenty-four hours after the privateer had sailed. An attempt was made (October 11th) to drive the Attack on a block- "blockadiug squadrou from the mouths of adiug squadron, ^j^^ Misslssippi. For this purpose, a ram, three fire-ships, and ^ve small steamers came down the river. The ram struck the national flag-ship Eichmond, and stove in her side. The other ships slipped their cables and ran down to the Southwest Pass. One of them, the Vincennes, got aground, her captain attempt- ing, without success, to set her on fire. The alarm was, however, veiy quickly over, and the blockade remained unbroken. SECTION XIII. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC. CHAPTER LX. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC. STATE OF' EUROPEAN OPINION ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS. Public opinion in Europe respecting the American Civil War was, to a great ex- tent, founded on the views of the English press. The middle classes in England were brought to coincide with the privileged classes in sentiments unfavorable to the American Union, paitly by appeals to historical recollections, and partly by considerations connected with the revenue legislation of the American Congress. The people of the Confederacy very confidently expect- ed foreign aid, both moral and material, in expected foieig J the establishment of their independence. It was affiimed that promises of that kind had been given before the first public movements of secession in Charleston were undertaken (vol. i., p. 512). The national government also, not without reason, looked for the favorable opinion of that and the national t^ t * a '-r^ t • t government for- powcriul mlluence lu Europe which repre- eign sympathy. ■■- * t n tt t t sents itself as dedicated to the support of law, order, and liberty. Both, however, were disappointed If a French army appeared on the American continent, it was not in avowed support of the Confederacy, but for the carrying out of European purposes in Mexico. The intellectual power of England was engaged, as far as circumstances permit- ted, in promoting a partition of the republic. 5Q2 PUBLIC OPINION IN J:NGLAND. [Sect. XIII. It is impossible to express the pain felt by loyal and conservative men in America v^hen it was announced that the ministry of Lord Palmerston had determined to con- cede belligerent rights to the South. Eepublican America did not solicit the moral support of Constitutional England as a boon. She expected it as a right. Not without the deepest regret did she find that she must fight the battle of Representative Institu- tions and human freedom alone. Though no one imagined that the privileged classes of • England would look with disfavor on the Course of the priv- ~i n ii (* i • t i iieged classes of downiall 01 a dcmocracy, no one m loyal America supposed that they could regard without horror a resort to conspiracy for the accomplish- ment of political ends, or contemplate without disdain great officers of state, who, with atrocious perfidy, had be- trayed their trust. No one supposed that the religious middle classes of The religious mid- England, who had ever been foremost in die classes. support of humau liberty, could forget their traditions, and lend their influence to those who were attempting, by 'armed force, to perpetuate and extend human slavery. No one supposed that the literature of England, of which it is the glory to have been the cham- pion of Order, Progress, and all that is be- neficent in modern civilization, could view unmoved the resort of a faction to brute violence, insurrection, and the horrors of civil war — still less that it would seek to par- alyze a loyal people in their efforts to uphold a just, a great, a good government. No one supposed that a commercial community would The commercial ^^^ ^^^ pcrilous example of building and classes. equipping war-ships to destroy the com- merce of its friend. Chap. LX.] PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND. 5Q3 Not without profound disappointment did loyal and educated Americans witness the direction of English in- fluence. In their eyes it seemed false to the destinies of our race. Of a conflict which has cost half a million of lives, which in four years has imposed financial burdens and occasioned a destruction of property equal in aggregate value to the public debt of England, what is the result ? Only this — the Confirmation of Free Institutions. The price to be paid was very great, but it has been paid by America without a murmur. Not among the titled — not among the educated — not The plain people ^vcu amoug the rcligious classes of England ofEngian . ^-^ Yvee Amcrlca find favor. Her cause, however, was not without supporters in the ancestral land. The plain people, those who earn their daily bread by honorable industry, who recognized that her cause was their cause, were her friends, and that, too, though they were the chief sufferers by the commercial embar- rassments of the war. One illustrious man there was in England who saw The Prince Consort that thc great iutcrcsts of the Future would Queen. -^^ bcttcr subscrvcd by a sincere friendship with America than by the transitory alliances of Europe. He recognized the bonds of race. His prudent counsels strengthened the determination of the sovereign that the Trent controversy should have an honorable and peace- ful solution. Had the desires of these, the most exalted personages in the Eealm, been more completely fulfilled, the administration of Lord Palmerston would not have cast a disastrous shadow on the future of the Anglo- Saxon race. With the exception of Eussia, the Continent of Europe was greatly influenced by the representations of the En- 504 INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH JOURNALISM. [Sect. XIII. Opinion in Europe gl^sll piCSS, wHcll WaS SUppOSed, for obvioUS onAmericanaffairs. peasoiis, to be Well informed on the state of American affairs. The German settlers in America ex- erted what perhaps may be spoken of as a correcting in- fluence in their native country, but they were not able to neutralize the power of the English press. The appreciation of European opinion on affairs con- it was influenced by nected with the Civil War turns, therefore, Engiishjournaiism egg^^tially ou a study of the views which were taken in England. The material for such a study is very ample. It is to be found in the journalism of the country, in the Parliamentary proceedings, and in the acts of the government. In truth, nothing more for this pur- pose is needed than may be found in the Times newspa- per, that powerful journal which not only reflects, but in no inconsiderable degree forms the public opinion of En- gland On this occasion I shall follow the course I have taken (vol. i., chap, xxvi.) in representing the opinions of the South, simply collecting and arranging together such statements as seem to have an important bearing on the subject, preserving, whenever possible, the language, and always the spiiit, of the sources from which they are de- rived. Perhaps it may not be inappropriate to make the pref- and English histori- ^tory remark that from the outset there ex- cai recollections, j^^^^ -^ Eugkud a dispositiou to bcar iu re- membrance the colonial war. It was said. The Southern States have as much right to assert their independence of the Union as the Colonies had to assert their independ- ence of England. The reasons that justified the latter justify the former. The cases are precisely alike. Amer- ica is suffering no more than she caused England to suf fer. She should be the last of nations to complain. The cases would have been more nearly alike if a sue- Chap. LX.] COLONIAL AND CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS. 505 Parallel between ^^^sioii of American prfiices had for many £MsEe. years sat upon the English throne; if all ™®''*^* the great offices of state, all the places of profit and power, had been largely engrossed by Ameri- cans ; if Parliament had been entirely occupied in legis- lating for American interests, or, more truly, for one inter- est, and that one interest revolting to the conscience of the free Englishman; if there had been a slave-pen in the vicinity of Guildhall, and the cry of the slave-auctioneer echoing from the walls of Westminster Abbey; if the citizens of London had seen the agony of waives parted forever from their husbands, and children, even those at the breast, separated from their parents. The cases would have been more nearly alike if, when under the Constitu- tion of England it became unavoidable that an English prince must displace those who had so long held the reins of government, the cabinet ministers of the retiring dy- nasty had engaged in the most atrocious treason ; if the army had been sent to remote territories for the pur- pose of being entrapped, the navy scattered on fictitious errands in distant seas, so that not more than two or three ships were to be found upon the coast; if large sums of money had been purloined from the treasury for the purposes of the conspiracy ; if every musket that could be secured had been stealthily sent across the At- lantic ; if the great arsenal at Woolwich had been seized and robbed of its thousands of cannon ; if officers of the army and navy had been seduced to resign their commis- sions, and judges had refused to act ; if the House of Lords had become the focus of a conspiracy against the government, and members of the House of Commons had retained their seats for no other purpose than to obstruct legislation; if the new sovereign had gone to his corona- tion in peril of being assassinated; if the malcontents had openly declared that they would either rule or ruin 506 TACTICS OF THE NEWSPAPERS. [Sect. XIII. the nation, then there would have been an analogy be- tween the causes of the War of the American Eevolution and those of the American Civil War. Considered merely as a matter of policy, the ministry Influence of English of Lord Palmerstou regarded it as not unde- newspapers. sirable to promotc a partition of the Amer- ican Union. With very great skill the journalism of England manufactured public opinion, and brought the - middle classes into accord with the privileged. The tra- \ ditions of old dissensions furnished a starting-point, and the dexterous presentation of American revenue legisla- tion accomplished the rest. The manner in which an extensively circulated and pow^erful newspaper can imperceptibly direct public opin- ion, and thereby accomplish its ends, offers one of the most interesting subjects of psychological study. Very strik- ing examples of the kind are occasionally observed in America. Let us notice the successive phases of opinion exhibited by such a foreign j ournal in 1 8 6 1 . It begins The successive .,, ,-t n n • -l^ opinions they wath a sjcnerous sympathy tor a iriendly present. j ± »j */ nation in trouble, and insensibly leads its unsuspecting reader to very different sentiments at last. It says: "The Southern States have sinned more than the Korth- The Southern states ^^^' They have cxhibltcd a passionate ef- in the wrong. frontcry, uot content with the sufferance of slavery, but determined on its extension. They refuse to have any man for President unless he regards a black servant and a black portmanteau as chattels of the same category and description. The right, with all its advan- tages, belongs to the states of the North. The North is for freedom, the South for the tar-brush and pine-fagot. Free and democratic communities have applied them- Chap. LX.] THE SOUTH ALTOGETHER WRONG. 507 selves to the honorable office of breeding slaves to be consumed on the free and democratic plantations of the South; thus replacing the African trade by an internal one of equal atrocity. The South has become enamored of her shame. "If the Slave States be joined by the Border States, they will constitute the real United States ; the North will be a rump. She would have only a coast of a few hundred miles, from the British frontier to the Delaware ; all the sea-line and the great rivers will belong to the South. Vir- ginia pushes a spur of territory to within a hundred miles of Lake Erie, and splits the Free States of the Atlantic from those of the West. It is very well to speculate on Not likely that they ^hc rctum of au crriug sister, but it is the will return. naturc of cracks to widen. In this country there is only one wish — that the Union may survive this terrible trial." Of the declaration by South Carolina of the causes which led to her secession, it is said that "it The South Carolina -, ^ ' n * • i t t i •,, 1 declaration de- looKS as II it had bccn ioiiQ' writtcu, and scribed. • t i ti i carried about, like the redoubtable cane of the ever-to-be-regretted Brooks, ready to be put into re- quisition on the first convenient opportunity. It is not so lively and spirit-stirring a composition as a little more literary skill might have made it, but we can not tell how much a man is allowed to know of the history of the world in that fortunate country without being exposed to the vengeance of the halter and the tar-barrel. Noth- ing can be more frivolous than the grounds of this mani- festo ; its statements are utter falsehoods. Without law, without justice, without delay. South Carolina is treading the path that leads to the downfall of nations and to the misery of families. The hollowness of her cause is seen beneath all the pomp of her labored denunciations. Charleston, without trade, is an animal under an exhaust- 508 SECESSION IS TKEASON. [Sect. XIII. ed receiver. Trade is her very breath. She had better look before she takes the dark leap ; she may light on something worse than the present, or — on nothing at all. It is easy to decide any day in the affirmative the ques- tion whether to cut one's throat or not, but when once one has come to that decision and acted on it, it is not so easy to review the arguments leading to a contrary view of the case. " Time, the Avenger, is doing j ustice between the Amer- ican people and ourselves. With what willingness would they not see their sonorous Fourth of July rhetoric cov- ered by the waters of oblivion ! They have fallen to pieces, but we have shown no joy at secession ; we have given no encouragement to the South; we have turned away from the bait of free trade, and have strengthened them by our sympathy and advice. The secession of South Carolina is to them what the secession of Lanca- secession is nothing sMrc would bc to US — it is trcasou, and bat treason. ^^^^-^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ -g^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^^ of sophists, rhetoricians, logicians, and lawyers ; it has not a man of action. Mr. Seward can tell us what will not save the Union, but not what will. He looks upon se- cession as ideal and impossible. While he is dreaming, the Confederacy is strengthening. The Union seems to be destined to fall without a struggle, without a lament, without an epitaph. Each individual state finds num- berless citizens ready to lay down their lives for its pres- ervation ; but for the Union, the mighty firmament in^ which those stars are set, and which, though dark itself, lends them their peculiar lustre, nothing is done. The Imbecility of the Presidcut says he can do nothing. His countrymen boast of the smallness of his sal- ary, but, according to our estimate, he is the most over- paid of mortals. With provoking inconsistency, he will neither fight nor run away. But perhaps his policy has Chap.LX,] prospective DISASTERS OF THE SOUTH. 5()9 not been unwise. Since the traitors Floyd, and Cobb, and Thompson have departed, he has adopted the best possible course — to stand on the defensive. His message is a greater blow to the American people than all the rants of the Georgia governor or the ordinances of the Charlestonians. He has dissipated the idea that the states which elected him are one people. The federation is not a nationality, it is only a partnership. " Considering the probable action of the Border States, Virginia will be ^^ ^^y be expectcd that Virginia will go ir'SmiglnSr. with the South, for the simple reason that ..^^*^* the South will buy her negroes, and the North will not. The Gulf States know the power which, as the purchasers of slaves, they possess over the specious, but unreal neutrality of the Border States. If Virginia should take that course, the North must find a new cap- ital. Washington w^ill be lost. Every thing now turns on what the Border States will do; but their demands are exorbitant. Our own belief is that the ultimate set- tlement of the question turns on the mutual dependence of the two sections, and the essential identity of the peo- ple. The force of political cohesion will probably be too strong even for the ambition and the sectional hatred of the Charleston demagogues. Though things look so promising for them, it is evident that the secession lead- ers and their too willing followers are at the beginning of terrible disasters. Southern credit does The financial credit , , ii»i •|^ • .i tt • • .i of the South very uot stanci uigu eitJier m the Union or m the world. Capital flies from a land ruled by fanatical demagogues. " At a moment when the destinies of the Union are trembling in the balance, and the republic is menaced with the worst catastrophe of civil war, its Legislature is engaged upon a measure which seems calculated at once to alienate foreign nations and embitter domestic strife. 510 EFFECT OF THE MORRILL TARIFF. [Sect. XIIL The folly of the The MoitIII tariff bill is an act for the estab- Morriii tariff. lishmeiit of protectlve duties on a most ex- travagant scale. It will almost prohibit all imports into the United States from England, France, and Germany. It has been said that slavery does not constitute the es- sence of the quarrel ; that it is a blind, and that the real point of contention is the tariff. We believe that the contest for territory is the real contest between the North and the South; but it is true that free trade is the natural system of the South. It is doubtful, however, if the Southern States have clearly conceived the object of their secession. *Is it the question of slavery or that of free trade ? We have never read a public document so diffi- cult to interpret as the inaugural of the anti-President. He says that divine Providence is on the side of slavery, which, probably from motives of delicacy, he never men- tions by name. It is useless to disguise the fact that, whatever may be thought of Mr. Davis's rhetoric, so long as the Washinsfton Cons^ress adds new re- The North is alien- .... , , ,• t ating the sympathy striCtlOUS tO a protCCtlVC pollCV, it CUtS it- of Its friends, ^ n nt* n i i self off from the sympathy of its friends. It will not be our fault if the inopportune legislation of the !N'orth, combined with the reciprocity of wants between and modifying En- ourselvcs aud the South, should bring about ghsh opimon. ^ considerable modification in our relations with America. The tendencies of trade are inexorable. It may be that the Southern population will now become our best customers. The Free States will long repent an act which brings needless discredit on the intrinsic merits of their cause." It wanted no more than statements of this kind to give currency to the opinion that the manufactur- Scandalous motives . -. -^ t^ i ■^ c^ i t 1,1 of New England mo; JN cw Ensflaiid fetates, and the iron-pro- and Pennsylvania. ~ , "--' / , . ■"• ducing state, Pennsylvania, were willing to push matters to the extremity of civil war, not for the » Chap. LX.] DIVISION OF THE UNION INEVITABLE. qH sake of upholding the Union, but for the incurring of a vast national debt, the interest of which would insure a high tariff in perpetuity. At this time " one sixth of the population of England — four millions of persons — were depending on cotton manufactures for their daily bread, and 77 per cent, of the cotton consumed came from Amer- ica. There was imminent danger that the mills would only work half time." But let us continue our extracts. " It is our duty to point out the tendency of this retro- The trade of the g^^^^ commcrclal pollcy in the North. It S£'iHd to ' will transfer the European trade from Bos- the south. ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ York to Charleston and New Orleans. The warmest friends of the Union can not ex- pect our merchants to celebrate its obsequies by self im- molation. But let the Free States prove themselves ca- pable of postponing sectional interests to a truly national policy, and it will soon become evident on which side En- glish sympathies are engaged. From the commercial point of view, we are not blind enough to suppose that we shall gain by the disintegration of the American Union into such fragments as Mexico and the South American republics. " The Union is effectually divided into two rival confed- The Union com- ©racics. The Southern is tainted by slavery, pieteiy divided, fiiii^^gtering, aud called into existence, it would seem, by a course of deliberate and deep-laid trea-, son on the part of high officers of the government at Washington. In the Northern, the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies of every free and enlightened people. But mankind will not ultimately judge by sympathies and antipathies ; they will be great- ly swayed by their own interests. If the Northern Con- federacy evinces a determination to act in a narrow, ex- clusive, unsocial spirit, it will lose the sympathy and the regard of mankind. Up to this time Congress has done 512 LIBERAL STATESMANSHIP OF THE SOUTH. [Sect. XIIL nothing against tlie rebellion, but has struck The blow struck by,, • , e* , -x tt^*'! the North agaiust a olow asTamst tree trade. In Jiirminsrhani, English trade. ^ i o i • nearly £3,800,000 worth of cutlery is made worthless. Ill will against the North is every where arising. We can only wonder at the madness. Protec- tion was quite as much a cause of the disruption as slav- ery. We warn the government of the United States that in attempting to exclude at one blow .£20,000,000 of ex- ports from their territory, they have undertaken a task quite beyond their power. They can not prevent En- glish manufactures from permeating the United States from one end to the other. The smuggler will redress the errors of the statesman. " In the South we find the most convincing proofs of Superior statesman- forcthought aud deliberation. The leaders sh p of the South. ^^^ hurried away by no momentary impulse. There are strong evidences of a deep-laid and carefully- matured conspiracy — a perfect understanding between the chiefs of the movement and the Federal officials. Ee- union can never be expected. Men do not descend to such depths of treachery and infamy unless they are about to take a step which they believe to be irrevoca- ble. The men who devised and directed the great plot of secession knew that they must appeal for recognition to the world without, but they thought that, as the world ^could not do without cotton, it could not do without them. They have lost that monopoly. The policy of the North has been equally suicidal. By enriching a few manufacturers at the ex]3ense of the whole country, they have played into the hands of the seceders. They have alienated the feelings of Europe. While the North is passing a prohibitory tariff, and speculating on balancing the loss of the cotton regions by annexing Canada, the Liberality of South- Confederates are on their good behavior. em trade views. rpj^^^ ^^.^ frcc-tradcrs. Thc coasting trade Chap.LX.] common interest of ENGLAND AND THE SOUTH. 513 from Charleston to Galveston is thrown open to the Brit- ish flag, but the North interprets. a coasting trade to in- clude a voyage from New England round Cape Horn to California. . It is not for us to sneer when an American community abolishes its navigation laws, declares that duties shall never be levied to foster particular branches of industry, and adopts a resolution for establishing an international copyright. But that is what the South has done. Will the South ever return to a Union in which native manufactures are, by an advantage taken of the absence of Southern representatives, defended by some- ^. thing like a prohibition? The South offers to the Bor- der States a market for their slaves, and a law against the slave-trade to protect their commodity ; the North re- quires them to contribute to New England and Pennsyl- vania. The high price of manufactures and a good mar- ket for slaves will avail more than the con- A common interest ,•■,• ni . o n/r T ' i • i* of England and the stitutioual Iccturcs 01 Mr. Liincoln m nis in- augural. It is for their trade that the South are resolved to fight. They dissolved the Union to create more slave states — that is, to make more cotton. They undertook the war for the very object that we have most at heart." Before Mr. Adams, the minister accredited by Lin- coln's administration to the British court, England admits -, -, i i • ixi "r>'j.*i the belligerent could rcach uis Dost, tuc Jiritisn erovern- rights of the South. . t • i • t ment, m accordance with a pr^i21iS«iiB4er- standing with the French, had admitted the belligerent rights of the Southern Confederacy. It was not possible but that this measure should be regarded by the Amer- ican government as unfriendly, and, considering the haste with which it was taken, as offensive. It made so pro- found and ineffaceable an impression that the conse- II.— Kk 514 CONCESSION OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS. [Sect. XIIL quences of it will doubtless be recognized in tlie foreign policy of the republic for many generations. The neutrality proclamation was issued by the British government on the 13 th of May. It was shortly followed by a circular from the Foreign Office interdicting the arm- ed ships and privateers of! both parties. This was suc- ceeded, on the 11th of June, by a proclama- Neutrality procla- .. ^ if, • it it tt* mations of France tiou 01 neutrality issucd by the JLmperor Napoleon, and still again (June 17th) by a neutrality proclamation of the Queen of Spain. The three governments, Great Britain, France, and Spain, were at this time in perfect accord on American affairs. CHAPTER LXI. THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO MEXICO. ITS INFLUENCE ON THE OPINION OF EUROPE RESPECTING AMERICAN AFFAIRS. The Southern conspirators had intrigued with the Mexicans for a new Union. The • Emperor Napoleon resolved to turn that scheme to his own advantage in his re- lations with the Austrian Empire. He encouraged the disruption of the American Union with a view of neutralizing the power of the republic. He drew England and Spain into a joint expedition to Mexico. After the expedition had reached that country, those powers discov- ered his real intentions and withdrew. His army entered the City of Mexico. He established an empire, and presented its crown to the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, who accepted it. Meantime, to his disappointment, the United States overthrew secession. The American government insisted that he should abandon his Mexican undertaking. Finding that it would be hopeless to contend with the Republic, he ordered the withdrawal of the French army, abandoning to its fate the empire he had cre- ated. For the clear eompreliension of the agreement which I The Mexican expe- ^^^ ^^^^ entered into between England, S^smptS^^^^ France, and Spain, it is necessary to under- the United states. ^^^^^ ^-^^ advcnturous projccts in which they were about to engage, affecting the whole North American continent. The Mexican expedition — a drama the scenes of which were acted in Eome, London, Wash- ington, C harleston, Paris^ Mexic o— was the immediate re- sult of this unhappy coalition, and the basis on which that ill-starred tragedy rested was the breaking of the United St ates into separate confederacies. After the peace,of Villafranca, the Emperor Napoleon I secret intention of I^I- ^as siuccrely dcsirous to heal the polit- [Napoleon, ^^^^ wouuds which had been made by his military operations in Italy — to find some compensation/^ for the injuries he had inflicted on the Emperor of Austria. between em ico. .516 THE FRENCH EXPEDITION. TO MEXICO. [Sect. XIII. There were certain Mexicans of eminence — among them who is informed by Almonte, Gutierrez de Estrada, the ex-Pres- Mexican refugees ^^^^^ Miramon, and La Bastida, the Arch, bishop of Mexico — who were residing in Paris, and car- rying on various political intrigues with the Papal gov- ernment and with the Tuileries. From these the em-*^ peror learned that attempts had been made by leaders of influence in the Southern States to come to an un- derstanding with persons of similar position in Mexico ofapropoeed union ^^^^ ^ ^1^^ tO a political UuioU. Thcse UC- stat'es^andMex- gotiatlous had tateu a serious aspect shortly after Fremont was made the Republican can- didate for the presidency in 1856, when it had become plain that the South must before long inevitably lose its v^ control of the government of the Union. Among the advantages expected by the South from such a scheme were deliverance from the< vantages of that threatened domination of the Free States, SCu6in6 and another period of jDolitical supremacy in a new Union, of which the members would be bound to- gether by a community of interest, and be the dispensers of some of the most valuable products of the New World. Slavery had without difficulty been re-established in Tex- as; it was supposed that the same might be done in other provinces of Mexico. There was, moreover, the al- luring prospect of a future brilliant empire, encircling the West India Seas, and eventually absorbing the West In- dia Islands. To the Mexicans there would be the un- ^ speakable advantage of a stable, a strong, a progressive government. The Mexican refugees in Paris saw in the success of this scheme an end of their influence in their Napoleon tnms that .. . t. i ±i^ j> J^ ±. ^ Bcheme to his own native couutrv. It was better tor them to <. use. •' introduce a French protectorate. The em- peror perceived with satisfaction that an opportunity had Chap. LXL] DIVISION OF THE UNION NECESSARY. 517 now arrived for carrying out his friendly intentions to- ward the house of Austria. Thereupon he determined to ^ encourage the secession of the Southern States with the view of neutralizing the power of the Union, to ove^/ throw, by a military expedition, the existing government of Juarez in Mexico, to establish, by French arms, an em-j pire, and offer its crown to the Austrian Archduke Max-j imilian. Gutierrez de Estrada says the Mexican affair is " exclu- sively confined to the Emperor Napoleon and the arch- duke (Maximilian), with the approbation of the emperor, his brother. This state of things is favorable to Austria, inasmuch as it puts Venetia or any other compensation out of the question." Count Keratry, in his history of these transactions, says " France granted belligerent rights to the Southern rebels, anxious as she was to inaugurate a military dicta- torship, the future head of which, the celebrated Confed- erate general, had commenced negotiations with Mexico itself." Of this complicated intrigue, the first step was the se- cession of the Southern States from the Southern seces- Uuion. A large portion of the population sion I of the South was loyal, but it was rightly judged that political unanimity could be secured by caus- ing the action to turn on the slave question. The elec- tion of a Eepublican president was all that was necessary, and that could be accomplished without difficulty. Without war or with war, the secession might be made good — better the latter than the former, for it would give and the creation of ^ grcat, a wcll-drilled, a veteran, an indis- a Southern army, p^j^s^j^ig army — iudispeusable for the com- pletion of the plan. It would accustom the Southern people to habits of discipline and subordination, and, from the bitterness inevitably produced, it would effectu- 518 FEENCH POLICY TOWARD THE SOUTH. [Sect. XIII. ally alienate them from their recollections of the old Union. The powers who had interests in the West India Seas were not disposed to look with disfavor on o^EuropeaSPpow- tho first portion of this plan. It was for them, as far as they could with propriety, to promote secession. To divide the republic was to rule it. They never regarded the action of the South in se- ceding as having a shadow of justification. In their eyes '^ it was a purely political movement, which, if it failed, would probably entail ruin on the communities who had attempted it. Encouragement was accordingly given to the leaders of secession. It strengthened them greatly belligerent rights iu their actlou. But the momentous hazard to the South, , i t i* of separation once taken, and at Montgomery or Richmond a government apparently able to maintain itself established, it was not the interest of the powers of "Western Europe to permit the carrying out *^ its union witKi ofthc sccoud portlou of the plan. It suited them to have the Cotton States — " an An- glo-Saxon Brazil easily curbed," hemmed in by the fleets of Europe on the south and east, by a strong military government on the west, and on the north by the pow- erful and embittered relict of the old republic. To separate the Union for the purpose of crippling it,^ but not to give such a preponderance to the South as to enable it to consummate its Mexican desio-ns — such was the principle guiding the French government. That prin- ciple was satisfied by the recognition of belligerent rights,< and by avoiding a recognition of independence. Herein we may see clearly the explanation of those Explanation of the •Tin r»i'Tiii half measures of seemino* hall measures tor which that 2rov- the French, ^ ... ^ni ernment was so severely criticised. Thus Keratry says: " Here, too, one can not help being pain- Chap. LXI.] FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THE SOUTH. ^l^ fully impressed with the vacillations of the imperial gov- ernment, which seemed as if it dared not adopt a decided character in its. trans-oceanic policy, and from the com- mencement to the conclusion of the expedition resorted to little else but half measures It is very certain that there was a favorable opportunity in 1862, looking at the secession of the Southern States from those of the North. Then was the time for France to have acted vig- < orously, and to have obtained allies even in the enemy's camp. Two courses were open, and both were practica- ble, but here we shall not pretend to decide between them. Either it was necessary at the first onset to de- cide in good earnest for the cause of the Union, and to restrain the South by a threatening demonstration on the frontier of the Eio Bravo, or, if the belligerent character of the secession party was recognized, it was essential to 2^0 the whole lenejth without hesitation, and ^ who are blamed for ^ • , i in * -, not recognizing the to cousummato tho work of separation by declaring openly for the planters of the<. Southern States, who, fired with the recollections of French glory, waited but the succor of our promise to offer tri- umphantly a helping hand to our expeditionary force which was marching on Mexico. Through an inconsist- ency which one can now, on looking back, hardly con- ceive possible, the imperial policy wandered away from < every logical tradition. The belligerent character which had been accorded to the Southern States served only to prolong to no purpose a sanguinary contest, and our gov- ernment repulsed the reiterated overtures of the South- Uy^ ern planters, whom they had encouraged, as it were, only . yesterday, and then finally abandoned to their fate." In that extraordinary conversation which took place between Marshal Bazaine and Maximilian at the Haci- enda de la Teja, a similar opinion is expressed : " From the moment," said the marshal, " that the United States 520 INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. [Sect. XIII. boldly pronounced their veto against the imperial system, your throne was nothing but a bubble, even if your maj- esty had obtained the help of a hundred thousand French- men. Supposing even that the Americans had observed neutrality during the continuance of the intervention, the ^monarchy itself had no spirit of vitality. A federal com- bination would have been the only system to be attempt- ed in the face of the Union, who would no doubt have acceded to it if the South had been recognized by France ^ at the proper time. My advice is that your majesty should voluntarily retire." The French Mexican expedition was thus based on the disruption of the United States — a disruption the^uS^cmfsid- considered not only by the Spanish court and ered inevitable. i -r, t^t t • • i n i by the Emperor JNapoleon as inevitable, but ^ even by Lord Palmerston, who might have been better in- formed, and who regarded it as a predestined event. In Parliament he remarked, " Any one must have been short- sighted and little capable of anticipating the j)robable course of human affairs who had not for a long time fore- seen events of a similar character to those which we now deplore — the causes of disunion were too deeply seated to make it possible that a separation would not take place." The SjDanish minister in Paris, in November, 1858, had suggested to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Walewski, the advantages that would accrue from the establishment of a strong government in Mexico. Subsequently the views of the English government were ascertained, and in April, 1860, the Spanish Minister for The Western Pow- Forcigu Affairs statcd that France and En- flvofabiy'Xiite?- gl^ud werc looking favorably upon the mat- vention in Mexico. ^^^,^ rpj^^ stumbHug-block iu the Way WaS the opposition which might be expected from the United States. That opposition had for a long time been embod- Chap. LXI.] EXPECTATIONS OF THE THREE POWEKS. 521 led in a formula under tlie designation of the Monroe doctrine, whicli expressed a determination not to permit the interference of European powers on the North Amer- ican continent. In April, 1860, the project having ad- vanced sufficiently. Lord John Russell informed Isturitz, the Spanish minister, that England would require the* protection of the Protestant worship in Mexico. The ob- The advantages ex- j^^ts of the thrco coutractlng partlcs event- pected by each. ^^^^^ bccauie apparent. Sp ^ n expected that a Bourbon prince would be placed on the Mexican throne, and that she would thereby recover her ancient prestige, and find security for her valuable possession, Cuba ; per- haps she might even recover Mexico itself Enjrlan d, remembering the annexation of Texas, saw that it was desirable to limit the ever -threatening progress of the rei)ublic westwardly; to prevent the encircling of the West India Seas by a power which, possibly becoming hostile, might disturb the rich islands she held ; nor was she insensible to the importance of partitioning what seemed to be the cotton -field of the world. Fr || .nr.e Napoleon's osten- anticipated — but the emperor himself, con- sibie reasons. ccaliug his Tcal motivo of compensating Au^ tria for his Italian victories, has given us his ostensible expectations in a letter to General Forey. In this letter (July 3d, 1862) Napoleon III. says: "There His letter to Gen- ^^111 uot be Wanting pcoplc who will ask you erai Forey. ^^^ ^^^ expcud mcu aud moucy to found a regular government in Mexico. In the present state of the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not a matter of indifference to Europe, for it is the coun- try which feeds our manufactures and gives an impulse to our commerce. We have an interest in the republic of the United States being powerful and prosperous, but . not that she should take possession of the whole Gulf o^ Mexico, thence commanding the Antilles as well as SoutM 522 LETTER OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. [Sect. XIIL America, and be the only dispenser of the products of the New World. We now see by sad experience how pre- carious is the lot of a branch of manufactures which is compelled to procure its raw material in a single market, all the vicissitudes of which it has to bear. If, on the contrary, Mexico maintains her independence and the in- tegrity of her territory, if a stable government be there established with the assistance of France, we shall have ^restored to the Latin race on the other side of the Atlan- tic all its strength and prestige ; we shall have guaran- teed security to our West India colonies and to those of Spain ; we shall have established a friendly influence in the centre of America, and that influence, by creating nu- *^merous markets for our commerce, will procure us the raw materials indispensable for our manufactures. Mex- ico, thus regenerated, will always be well disposed to us, not only out of gratitude, but because her interests will be in accord with ours, and because she will find supjDort in £er friendly relations with European powers. At present, therefore, our military honor engaged, the neces- sities of our policy, the interests of our industry and com- merce, all conspire to make it our duty to march on Mex- "^ico, boldly to plant our flag there, and to establish either a monarchy, if not incompatible with the national feeling, or at least a government which may promise some sta- bility." As soon as it was ascertained that the Southern States were sufficiently powerful to resist the na- Secession occurs. ,' ^ , t,i. ,«,• r» The allies mature tioual sfovemment, aud that a partition ot their scheme. P , -,. , ^^r^^ the Union was impending, the chief obstacle in the way of the Mexican movement seemed to be re- moved. Throughout the spring and summer of ISGl,"^ the three contracting powers kept that result steadfastly in mind, and omitted nothing that might tend to its ac- complishment. This was the true reason of the conces- Chap.lxl] the expedition sails. 523 fiion of helligerer^t rights to jthe _ Souikerii-XiMifbi^^ May. The downfall of Juarez was the next business in hand. Affairs had so far progressed that, on November 20th, The convention of 1861, a conveutiou was signed in London London. betweeu France, England, and Spain. In this it was agreed that a joint force should be sent by the three allies to Mexico; that no special advantages should be sought for by them individually, and no in- ternal influence on Mexico exerted. A commission was designated to distribute the indemnity they proposed to exact. The ostensible reason put forth for the move- ment was the decree of the Mexican government, July 17th, 1861, suspending payment on the foreign debt. The allied expedition reached Vera Cruz about the The expedition ^ud of tho ycar. Not without justice did sails to Mexico. ^^^ Mexicau Minister for Foreign Affairs complain of their " friendly but indefinite promises, the real object of which nobody unravels." Although M. Thouvenel was incessantly assuring the British govern- ment, even as late as May, 1862, that France had no in- tention of imposing a government on Mexico, it became obvious that there was no more sincerity in this engage- ^ ment than there had been in imputing the grievances of the invaders to the Mexican decree of the preceding July. The ostensible cause was a mere pretext to get a military ^ foothold in the country. Very soon, however, it became impossible for the French to conceal their discover the inten- iuteutions. Euoiland and Spain withdrew tions of France, Jp , J^ from the expedition, the alleged cause on the part of the former being the presence of Almonte, and other Mexican emigrants of known monarchical opinions, wdth the French, and a resolution not to join in military operations in the interior of the country ; on the part of the latter, the true reason was that not a Spanish prince, 524 THE CITY OF MEXICO SEIZED. [Sect. XIII. but Maximilian, was to be placed on the Mexican throne and abandon the — ^ disappointment to the Spanish com. expedition. niandcp, the Count de Keuss (General Prim), who had pictured for himself a viceroy's coronet. It is not necessary, on the present occasion, to enter into details respecting the French military movements, which besran by a breach of that article of the con- '^ The French break . faith with the Mexi- veutiou of La Solcdad which required that cans. -•- the French, who had been permitted to come into the healthy country, should retire beyond the strong pass of Chiquehuite in case negotiations were broken off. Had the Paris press been free, such events would never have occurred, and, indeed, as has been truly af firmed by the French themselves, this shameful expedi-v^ tion w^ould never have been undertaken. As it was, things were done in Mexico which, could they have been brought to a knowledge of the French, would have thrown that great people into a profound reverie. The French entered the city of Mexico in July, 1863. They seize the city Tho time had uow come for throwing off or exico. the-«msk, and the name of Maximilian was introduced as a candidate for the empire. Commission- ers were appointed to go through Paris and Eome to Miramar with a view of soliciting the consent of that prince. A reg;ency was appointed until he could be heard from. It consisted of Almonte, Salas, and empi?ofMaxi- ^ tho Archblshop La Bastida. Maximilian miliau. iTTT I'liT^ had already covenanted with the Pope to restore to the Mexican Church her mortmain property, estimated at two hundred millions of dollars. In Mex- ico there are but two parties, the Liberal and the Eccle- siastical. The latter was conciliated by that covenant; but as to the national sentiment, the collection of suf- frages in behalf of the new empire was nothing better than a mere farce. Chap.LXI.] the MEXICAN empire. 525 An empire was established in Mexico. Well might the leaders of the Southern Confederacy be find that t^h?y havl thundcrstruck. Was this the fulfillment of been deceived. . i»iiti that promise which had lured them into the gulf of revolt — the promise which had been used with such fatal effect in Charleston? (vol. i., pi 512) Well ^ ^ might it be expected in France, as is stated by Keratry, that " the Confederates proposed to avenge themselves for the overthrow of the secret hopes which had been en- couraged from the very outset of the contest by the cab- inet of the Tuileries, which had accorded to them the bel- ligerent character, and had, after all, abandoned them." Yet no one in America, either of the Northern or the Southern States, imputed blame to the Discrimination be- -p, , i»,i ttt ttt tween the French J^ reucu people - lu thcsc bloodv aud dark and the emperor. 'at transactions. All saw clearly on whom the responsibility rested. And when, in the course of events, it seemed to become necessary that the French army should leave Mexico, it w^as the general desire that noth- ing should be done which might by any possibility touch the sensibilities of France. But the Kepublic of the West ^ was forever alienated from the dynasty of Napoleon. Events showed that the persons who were charged with the administration of the Kichmond government had not ability equal to their task. The South did not select her best men. In the unskillful hands The American gov- ^ , i i i i p • , ernment overthrows 01 tJiose wiio nacl cuar^re 01 it, secession secession. o ' proved to be a failure. The Confederate resources were recklessly squandered, not skillfully used. Euin was provoked. When.it became plain that the American Kepublic was about to triumph over its domestic enemies in the Civil War, and that it was in possession of irresistible mili- tary power, they who in the Tuileries had plotted the 526 REMOVAL OF THE FRENCH. [Sect. XIII. rise of Maximilian in 1861, now plotted Ms ruin. The betrayed emperor found that in that palace Thereupon Napo- , , . leon finds he must two lano;uag:es were spoken. In the aaro- recede. . o o j. o ; TLj of his soul he exclaimed, "I am tricked!" In vain his princess crossed the Atlantic, and, though de- He abandons Maxi- i^i^d acccss, forccd her way into the presence miiian. of Napoleou III., in her frantic grief upbraid- ing herself before him that, in accepting a throne from his hand, she had forgotten that she was a daughter of the race of Orleans — in vain she fell at the feet of the Pope, deliriously imploring his succor. It is questionable whether the United States govern- v4-\ Impolicy of Amer- ^^^ut pui'sued a corrcct policy in pressing ^ , remS of fhe" '^' the removal of the French. It may possi- bly prove to have been a mistake similar to that committed by the English respecting Canada, which hastened, if indeed it did not occasion the separation of the colonies (vol. i., p^l62). During the Civil War very i^ conspicuous advantages accrued to the republic from the circumstance that Canada was a British possession. A foresight of the military consequences which might possi- bly ensue .acted as a restraint on the ministry of Lord Palmerston, and strengthened whatever desire it had to maintain an honorable peace. European establishments on the North American continent can never be a source of disquietude to the republic. To those powers who maintain them they are ever liable to be a source of em- barrassment. Considering the questions which must in- evitably arise with the rapid development of the Pacific States respecting commercial supremacy on the Pacific Ocean, the trade of Eastern Asia, and the British empire ^ in India, a correct policy would probably have indicated \ "^^he encouragement of an exotic French establishment in Mexico. The Russian government recognized the truth Chap.LXL] removal of the FRENCH. 52^ of these political principles in its action in 1867 respect- ing its American possessions, which it disposed of to the United States. Admitting, however, the correctness of the policy of removing the French from Mexico, the firm S?I*sewa?d^on^he but dimlficd couTso takcH by Mr.. Seward subject. in his correspondence entitles him to the highest praise. In him there -was no intrigue, no decep- tion, nothing which his countrymen can condemn, noth- ing at which they need blush. . Even by the French themselves it was said, "The United States tracked French policy step by step ; never had the French gov- ernment been subject to such a tyrannical dictation. The American correspondence is full of a logic never incon- sistent with its purposes." With a courteous audacity, the Secretary of State did not withhold his doubts as to the sincerity and fidelity of the emperor; with inexora- ble persistence he demanded categorically that the French occupation should come to an end. A date once set, he ^ held the French government to its word. " Tell M. Mou^- tier," he says, in a dispatch to the American minister in Paris, " that our government is astonished and distressed at the announcement, now made for the first time, that the promised withdrawal of French troops from Mexico, which ought to have taken place in November (this month), has been put off by the emperor." " You will The American gov- Inform tho cmperor's government that the thedlpartui'ofthe Prcsideut dcslrcs and sincerely hopes that French army. ^^^ evacuatiou of Mcxico will be accom-< plished in conformity with the existing arrangement, so far as the inopportune complication necessitating this dis- patch will permit. On this point Mr. Campbell will re- ceive instructions. Instructions will also be sent to the military forces of the United States, which are placed in\ a post of observation, and are waiting the special orders 528 FAILURE OF THE MEXICAN EMPIRE. [Sect. XUL of the President ; and this will be done with the con- fidence that the telegraph or the courier will bring ns in- telligence of a satisfactory resolution on the part of the emperor in reply to this note. You will assure the French government . that the United States, in wishing to free< Mexico, have nothing so much at heart as preserving jDcace and friendship with France." The French themselves recognized that the position and on the removal ^f the two uatlous had bccomc invcrtcd. -^ aximi lan. ■ ^ rJ^^^ United Statcs now gives orders. For- merly .France had spoken boldly, saying, through M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Mr. Dayton, the American repre- sentative at Paris, ^Do you bring us peace or war?' Now Maximilian is falling in obedience to orders from Washington. He is falling a victim to the weakness of our government in allowing its ^conduct to be dictated by American arrogance. Indeed, before rushing into such perilous contingencies, might not the attitude of the United States have been easily foreseen? Our states- men needed no rare perspicuity to have discovered the dark shadow of the Northern Eepublic looming up on the horizon over the Rio Bravo frontier, and only biding H its time to make its appearance on the scene." " Only one thing was now thought of in Paris, and that was to leave as soon as possible this The Mexican expe- ^ -i n i i i m • i ^ • i j dition ends in a to- laud 01 dcstrovcd illusions and bitter sacri- ■, fices. In this great shipwreck every thing was swallowed up^the re2:e nerati on of the Latin race as w^ell as the hopes of the monarchy, the interests of our countrymen (which had been the pretext for the war) as well as the two French loans which had but served to bring it to this disastrous conclusion. The only thing which swam safe upon the surface was the claim of Jeck- <' er, the Swiss, who had obtained his twelve millions." Chap.LXI.] failure OF THE MEXICAN EMPIRE. 529 Was there ever sucli a catalogue of disappointed ex- The results obtain- pectatioDs as is presented by this Mexican spuEn'seceS^ tragedy? The Soujjiifn secession leaders siomsts ; engaged in it dreaming of a tropical empire which they never realized ; they hoped it would bring a recognition of their independence, and they were betray- ed. The English were beguiled into it as a means of by the English chccMng the growth of a commercial rival, governmeSt; ^^^ ^^ protcctlug their West Indian posses- sions. They were duped into the belief that there was no purpose of interfering with the government of Mexi- co. They consented to the perilous measure of admitting the belligerent rights of the South. They lent what ai( they could to the partition of a nation with which they were at peace. They found that the seci^gj^ intention was the establishment of an empire in the interest of France, the conciliation of Austria for military reverses in Italy, and the curbing of the Anglo-Saxon by the Latin rac( E ngl and expected to destroy a democracy, and has gath- ered her reward by becoming more democratical herself The Pope gave his countenance to the plot, having re- by the Papal gov- ccl vcd a promisc of the elevation of the Mex- ernment; j^^^ Church to her prlstiue splendor, and the restoration of her mortmain estates ; but the Arch- bishop La Bastida, who was one of the three regents rep- resenting her great influence, was insulted and removed from his political office by the French. In impotent re- taliation, he discharged at his assailants the rusty ecclesi- astical blunderbuss of past days — he Excommunicated the French army. The Spaniards did not regain their former colony ; the brow of the Count de Reuss by the Spaniards ; *' t • i was never adorned with a vice-regal coro- net. The noble and devoted wife of Maximilian was made a wanderer in the sight of all Europe, by the Anstrians ; tt ti -i, -, her diadem removed, her reason dethroned. II.— L L 530 FAILURE OF THE MEXICAN EMPIRE. [Sect. XIII. For Maximilian himself there was not reserved the pag- eantry of an imperial court in the Indian palaces of Mon- tezuma, but the death- volley of a grim file of Mexican sol- diers, under the frowning shadow of the heights of Quere- taro. For the Emperor of Austria there was not the hom- Jage of a transatlantic crown ; Mexico sent him across the ocean a coffin and a corpse. For France, ever great and lust, in whose name so many crimes were by France ; *^ . "^ . perpetrated, but who is responsible for none of them, there was a loss of that which in her eyes is of infinitely more value than the six hundred millions of ^ francs which were cast into this Mexican abyss. For the and bv the Emperor Empcror — cau any thing be more terrible Napofeon. ^^^ ^^ dispatch which was sent to Amer- ica at the closing of the great Exposition ? — " There re- main now no sovereigns in Paris except the Emperor Napoleon III. and the spectre of Maximilian at his el- bow." CHAPTEE LXII. STATE OF EUROPEAN OPINION ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS {Continuedy THE TRENT QUESTION. The Mexican expedition led to the propagation in Europe of views unfavorable to the American republic. Some Confederate officials were forcibly taken by an American captain from the Trent, an English mail steam-ship. The British government demanded their restoration and a suitable apology. The American government acceded to that demand. The engagements wLich had been mutually contracted by the French Emperor and the ministry of pean journals on Lord Palmcrstou iu rclatiou to American af- the Union. . it fairs were essentially based on the disrup- tion of the United States. The journalism of both En- gland and France, suitably inspired, spared no labor to accomplish that result. Thus we read : "The ferocity with which this war has been entered on shows that the government of Washing- onheAmJrica'k^ tou A\^ Soou lose all coutrol ovcr events. war. , 1 /» • It is a jnere quarrel tor territory, a struggle for aggrandizement. With the deepest sorrow we see this people precipitating itself into civil war like the half breeds of Mexico. Lord John Russell and his advisers have come to the conclusion that the Southern Confeder- acy must be treated as a belligerent ; it has acquired a cer- tain •degree of force and consistency. The South has not understood the war. It calculated on a war with men holding its own opinions about slavery. Even Mr. Lin- coln declared that he would not meddle with that mat- ter. On the part of the North it is a war to keep South- 532 LITERARY ATTACKS ON THE UNION. [Sect.XIIL ern debtors and their property from going beyond the grasp of Northern merchants. " Stripped of its trappings, it is a mere quarrel for ter- it is a savage quar- Htory. The antagonists are acting like Del- reiaboutterritory. awai'es or Pawnees. War to the knife, push- ed to absolute extermination, is what they have resolved on; government and people breathe language of massa- cre and extermination. Massachusetts is enforcing the doctrines of legitimacy and Toryism. It is a congregation of seceders protesting against a repetition of secession. Mr. Seward has in- Mr. Scward's Icttcr to Ml'. Day tou, the Amer- suited the French. |^^^ representative in Paris, is a message of defiance, if not of insult, to France. " The march of events has made us regard this dispute as a more commonplace quarrel than at first it appeared to be. The South received no provocation and enjoyed AbsnrdityofLin- '^^ sovcrcigu prcrogativcs, and Mr. Liucolu coin's views. -^ jj^y^j^j^g rcsolutious made by one tenth of the present population nearly eighty years ago ; he thinks that by such a document as that all living Amer- icans must be bound. "Lord John Kussell's accordance of belligerent rights to the South is discussed in a tone highly hostile to En- gland ; but what have we done to deserve this American tornado of abuse ? We are neither to have liberty of ac- tion nor of inaction. That people has acquired a habit of petulance and insolence. The grievance is simply this — that we think as they thought six weeks before ; and yet we are expected to join in hounding on the invaders. But the French emperor has followed our France views the , • , i • i p i < • matter in accord examplc wituout a word 01 explanation. with England. ■*■ ti i i The terms he uses are like those that we employed. He places the two on an equality — " one or other of the belligerents." The North has had to take a great moral " cocktail," but it is of its own mixing. Nei- Chap. LXII.] THE NORTH CAN NOT CONQUER THE SOUTH. 533 ther England, nor France, nor any other state supposes there to be any rights or any wrongs about it. It is sim- ply a quarrel. ' This is intensely disagreeable to the North, who thinks that heaven and earth are bound to avenge its cause. People give themselves no con- The war a mere -• . i i • , • i quarrel between cem aoout a Quarrcl between two rival two rival shops. -^ , shops, or are only concerned that there is a breach of the peace and public scandal. For some un- known reason the Northern States empty all their vials of wrath on the English nation. They are wounded be- cause we Jaave not admired their movements sufficiently. Our course, however, has been followed by the French government." On the news of the battle of Bull Run reaching Eu- Derision at the bat- ^oj^e, it was Said, " Thc Noi'th has lost all — tie of Bull Run. ^^^^ military honor; her people were bel- lowing behind the army. It is a complete victory for the South — as complete a victory as Austerlitz. We have been cheated out of our sympathies; we don't like to laugh. They are shaking their knives at each other and their fists at us. But an American battle is not as dan- gerous as an American steam-boat. It is carried on upon strict humanitarian principles. Seventy-five thousand American patriots have fled twenty miles in an agony of fear, though there was nobody pursuing them." The solemn resolution passed by the houses of Con- The gasconading g^^^^s ou thc uatioual dcfcat at Bull Run (p. vote of Congress. ^^^^^ -^ gtigmatizcd as a " gasconading vote." " The two sections of the late republic had better part and be friends. The North is undertaking more than Napo- leon did in his Russian campaign. It is better for it to accept the situation, as we did eighty years mo?e conquerthT ago OU their ow'u soil. Let it consider if it South than Napo- -, i 1 xt t - it . rr-ii leon could conquer cau Qo wuat JN aDolcou could uot. The Russia. TT • T O PA United States of America have ceased to 534 THE SOUTH RISING IN FAVOR. [Sect. XIII. be ; tlie subjugation of tlie South is impossible, and its submission improbable. The almost unanimous opinion in England is that they should part on fair terms. " The Americans should give us credit for fair feeling and honest wishes. At first we regretted their quarrel, and any idea that a partition of the domineering republic would be advantageous was repressed. "We inclined, if at all, to the North. The slavery of the South was an abomination to us ; we thought that it was the cause of the war. Our ideas of fair play were offended; the South had been fairly beaten in an election; it was perhaps their turn to lose. They could not take their beating. Moreover, we attributed the arrogance of the government tQ them. They were identified with the disgraceful sys- tem of repudiation. " But then a change came over us, owing to the conduct of the North ; its behavior was so unwar- Cauee of the South. i ^ i 'i • i j. 'x rising in favor in Tautable ; its mcuaccs so insolent ; its exac- tions so fierce and irrational. We w^ould not stigmatize the South as rebels; they suggested to it to be friends, and together make war on us. They want- ed us to regard, as a worthless rabble, ten millions of people fighting for independence, and not to recognize as belligerents a confederacy holding their government in check with two hundred thousand soldiers. Meantime the South was winning its way to favor. It was not in human nature to consider their Bull Bun achievement without admiration. But the one great fact which swayed English opinion was the decided and multiform antao-onism between the North and the South which events disclosed. Secession had been in contemplation for thirty years, and the South is doing no more than hundreds of other states have previously done. They may be wrong, but they are ten millions. So long as the insurrection seemed only a spiteful rebellion against Chap. LXII.] ADVANTAGES OF SECESSION TO EUROPE. 535 the results of a particular election, we regarded it as ut- terly unjustifiable. But it is not so ; tlie difference is as irreconcilable as that between the Greeks and Turks. If the whole case of the war is to be analyzed, we must needs say the Northerners have the right. on their side, for the Southerners have destroyed, without provocation, a mighty political fabric, and have impaired the glory and strength of the great American republic. But, as they have chosen to do this ; as they have shown themselves hitherto no less powerful than their antagonists ; as the decision of so large a population can not be contemned, and as we can not persuade ourselves that a genuine peace is likely to spring from a protracted war, we should rejoice to see the pacification of America promoted by other means. The secession of the Slave States takes away from the North all the violence, and Secession will be.,,. tttt ii* i , for the benefit of injusticc, auQ blasphemous teachmg about the scriptural sanction of slavery. English- men think that the recognition of the Confederacy will accomplish all that the anti-slavery party has been advo- cating for years. It is perfectly true that the North is only fighting for empire. Separation will take away the horsewhips and revolvers from Northern Legislatures, and the blasphemy from Northern pulpits. It will diminish the power of the slave-owning filibusters, who will no longer have the Union to back them. The beanAng^S-salon South will be 3. Mud of Anfiflo-Saxon Bra- zil, easily curbed. It would have demand- ed the extension of slavery over Mexico, and the North would have conceded it, but now the South will have a rival, and the cause of justice and civilization will gain by the quarrel of these partners in guilt. " Let us review the course we have taken. The Amer- icans allege that we precipitately gave up the Union. We did no such thing. We showed that South Caro- 536 IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONQUERING THE SOUTH. [Sect. XIII. summa of the ^^^^ ^^^ neither right nor reason — no more jBIEily'^ right to secede than Lancashire; that the '*^^^^ Southern resentment about Mr. Lincoln's election was unwarrantable, and that nothing could be gained by breaking the Union. Americans were contem- plating the destruction of their government with indiffer- ence, while Englishmen were protesting against it on such unwarrantable grounds. Then came Sumter, and they changed. They were indignant that we would not denounce their antagonists as pirates. Then one third of the whole population seceded. Numbers make right as well as might. It became superfluous to discuss their arguments ; however, it appeared they had more warrant for disaffection than was at first imagined. The insurrec- tion might be traitorous, unprovoked, unreasonable, wick- ed ; but there stood the insurgents. We did not believe that they could be subdued. At that point of conquering the tho North bccame angry with us; it got in- dignant about our declaration of neutrality ; it rebuked us for our cold-blooded serenity. Up to this time they have not made one step toward subjugation. The seceders are a match for them. The head and front of our offending is that we formed a just estimate. The one great argument with us has been, not the injustice, but the impossibility of the object proposed by the North. . " We are very low in the good graces of the multitudi- nous monarch of the United States. We Contemptuone in- • t , i t • , i r> mi ^ a difference to Amer- miMt havc kuowu it bciorc. ihc' Amcr- loan opinion. , "-^ icans sympathized with the French Cana- dians; th^y held violent language about the Oregon boundary; they refused the right of search in connec- tion with the slave-trade ; they seized the island of St. Juan when in controversy with England. We bore all these things patiently, and do not regret it. We have Chap. LXIL] INDIFFERENCE TO AMERICAN OPINION. 537 got accustomed to their dislike, as we have to Wet sum- mers and foggy autumns — " The American government had desired the people, in view of the great national affliction that Views on the proc- Tii/»n.i . i i n -t lamationofaday had Deiallen tucm, to observe a day oi hu- miliation, and, in their several places of wor- ship, to cast themselves on the goodness of the Almighty. On this it is said, " The republic has betaken itself to mortification on an appointed day, and has sought by mournful litanies to avert its dangers, in the hopes that a rupture may be avoided. Americans are religious even to superstition, and more than usually prone to those ac- cesses of fanaticism which, in their effect on the human frame, approach the confines of madness and epilepsy. In their national capacity they have been sufficiently pagan. Individually they have been miserable sinners; as a people they have l^en the greatest, the most powerful, the most enlightened and virtuous that ever defied the universe. So they prayed yesterday. That great, pow- erful, unscrupulous government, which inspired uneasi- ness among politicians and anger among philanthropists, has not come to its end by means of those it had injured. The class to which it truckled has destroyed it. The Union has burst asunder by explosive forces generated within itself, and now the two republics stand like cliffs which of old were the same rock, but which can never again be united." Such were the views and opinions scattered over En- gland, and, indeed, all over Europe, in the sidious misrepre- summcr aud autumu of 1861. No impartial PPTlt3.tiODS person can now peruse these publications without being shocked. The poison did its w^ork the more effectually since it was doled out in daily doses, a 538 RETALIATIONS OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. [SEcx.XnL little at a time. Europe was drugged before she detect- ed tlie insidious practice perpetrated upon her. Again and again the guilt not only of provoking, but of declaring war, was laid upon Lincoln. He was accused of working upon the pugnacity of an excitable people, and making them fight for a shadow. *' It is only a boyish pati^iotism which regrets to see the great republic rent asunder." Not a measure taken by the government was suffered to pass without misrepresentation and derision. By a profligate press, powerful and persistent attempts were unceasingly made to write down American finance and ruin American credit. Threats of the joint inter- ference of England and France in American affairs be- came more and more frequent as the Mexican understand- ing matured. Such persistent provocation could bring no other re- sult than retaliation. ^When the London Retaliation of , , t • , i n t Americau uevvs- ucwspapcrs protested.in the name of hu- papers. .-•■•'■ ... . manity and civilization, against the closing of Charleston Harbor by the sinking of ships laden with stone, they were answered by the New York newspapers with engravings of Sepoys blown from the mouths of cannon in India. When Earl Eussell stated in the House of Lords that the principle upon which England acted was always to encourage the independence of other countries, he was asked to illustrate his declaration by beginning with Ire- land. Sometimes these bitter repartees occurred in places more responsible than newspaper printing-offices. Ad- vantage had been taken of the "Stone Blockade" to cause a singular excitement in Europe. The French and En- glish journals denounced it in the name of modern civili- zation. Earl Eussell stated to the Liverpool s)iip-owners that Lord Lyons would inform the American govern- Chap. LXII.] CAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN EOREIGN OPINION. 539 ment that England regarded it as unjustifiable even as a measure of war. In his subsequent communication with Earl Eussell, Lord Lyons reported that " Mr. Seward said the best proof he could give me that the harbor of Charleston had not been rendered inaccessible was that, in spite of the sunken vessels and of the blockading squadron, a British steamer, laden with contraband of war, had just gone in." With an air of injured innocence, the London journal- ist raised up his hands and exclaimed,What Injured innocence , y, 'i ii ' -n i j? 1 i of the Loudon jour- Jiavc i Qouc to mci'it this ilood 01 trausat- nalists, , , lantic insolence ? " Like Lord Clive, we are absolutely astonished at our own moderation. We shall probably be driven to give terrible proofs of our strength." It is said by Sallust, " Neither place nor friends pro- tect him whom his own arms have not protected." The conquest of the South — ^a work which, as we have seen, had been declared too great even for the power and ge- nius of Napoleon, transcending immeasurably in difficul- ty his Russian campaign, had been thoroughly completed. American battles, leaving their tens of thousands of dead and wounded on the field, had proved to be, both, in hor- ror and result, something more than " the mere cricket- matches of Cockneys"— something more than the " blow- ing urwof Western steam-boats." A navy of many hun- dred war-ships, some of them, perhaps, not unworthy an- tagonists of the most powerful cuirassed ships of Europe, kept watch and ward on the American coast, from the Bay of Fundy to' the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Re- public had placed in the field,- and for years had main- tained, an army of more than a million of men. Dis- banded without difficulty when their work was done, those soldiers would reassemble at a word. Not even the most profligate journalism could conceal the portent- 540 THE TRENT AFFAIR. [Sect. XIII. ous facts that one of the greatest military monarchies of Europe had been constrained to obey an order from Washington, and that the Power which remembered Se- bastopol had come into firm accord with the Power which had been insulted by the concession of belligerent rights to its domestic assailant. No longer could it be hidden that the Eepublic of the West must inevitably share in the determination of the destinies of Europe. Then who finally modify Hiauy of those whose sentiments we have their opmions. }^qqj^. reading made haste to unsay what they had said. The United States sloop ofwar San Jacinto was return- The affair of the ^^g fr^^i^i thc Afrlcau coast (Octobcr, 1861). Treut. jj^^ commander, Captain Wilkes, learning that the Confederate privateer Sumter was cruising in the West India Seas, sailed from the port of St. Thomas in pursuit. While at Havana he was informed that the Confederate agents, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries, were about to proceed to Europe in the char- acter of embassadors to England and France. They had escaped from Charleston on October 12th, in a small steam-boat, running the blockade successfully on a dark and rainy night. They had taken passage from Havana in the English mail steamer Trent. Captain Wilkes determined to intercept them. He Capture of the wcut out luto the Bahama Channel, two Southern envoys, j^^^j^,^^ ^^^^ fifty j^^q^ from Havaua, aud waited for them. On the approach of the Trent he re- quired her to heave to, and on being disregarded, fired a shell across her bow. A party was sent on board, and the four passengers seized. They were first carried to New York, and then confined at Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. Although the conduct of Captain Wilkes met with Chap. LXII.] EXCITEMENT PRODUCED IN ENGLAND. 541 popular commendation, Lincoln did not ap- SS"'''" prove of it. When the intelligence of it proceeding. ^^^ ^^^^^ brought to him, he said, " Captain Wilkes has undoubtedly meant well in seizing these traitors, but it will never answer. This is the very thing the British captains used to do. They claimed the right of searching American ships and carrying men out of them. That was the cause of the War of 1 8 1 2. Now, we can not abandon our own principles ; we shall have to give these men up, and apologize for what we have done." The news reaching England produced at once a violent excitement. Without waiting to hear from ducecfS^En-^''^" the United States, the government at once made preparations for war. Troops were hurriedly prepared for transportation to Canada; a proc- lamation was issued prohibiting the export of arms and munitions of war ; the shipment of saltpetre was forbid- den. Without delay, a special queen's messenger was dispatched to Washington, directing the British minister. Lord Lyons, to demand the liberation of the prisoners, their restoration to the protection of England, and a suit- able apology for the aggressions which had been com- mitted. " Her majesty's government, bearing in mind the friend- . ,. ly relations which have lons^ existed be- Communication •/ ~ [^SeSS tween Great Britain and the United States, government. ^^^ wilHug to bclicve that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not act- ing in compliance with any authority of his government, or that, if he conceived himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had re- ceived ; for the government of the United States must be fully aware that the British government could not al- low such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty's government are unwil- 542 VIEWS OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. [Sect. XUI. ling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. "Her majesty's government therefore trusts that when this matter shall have been brought under the considera- tion of the government of the United States, that govern- ment will, of its own accord, offer to the British govern- ment such redress as alone could satisfy the British na- tion, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed." At the same time, Earl Russell sent private instruc- tions to Lord Lyons : " In my previous dispatches of this date I have instruct- ed you, by command of her majesty, to make twnsofEariRus- ccrtaiu dcmauds of the government of the United States. " Should Mr. Seward ask for delay, in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately consid- ered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If at the end of that time no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her majesty's government, your lord- ship is instructed to leave Washington, with all the mem- bers of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London. "If, however, you should be of opinion that the re- quirements of her majesty's government are substantially complied with, you may report the fact to her majesty's government, and remain at your post until you receive farther orders." Chap.LXIL] views of the FRENCH government. 543 The French government interposed its offices, its Min- ister for Foreign Affairs writing (December thrFrJncrgover/ 10th) to the Frcnch minister atWashins:- ton, mformmg him that " the arrest had pro- duced in France, if not the same emotion as in England, at least extreme astonishment and sensation. Public sen- timent was' at once engrossed with the unlawfulness and consequences of such an act." He says "the desire to contribute to prevent a conflict, perhaps imminent, be- tween two powers for which the French government is animated by sentiments equally friendly, and the duty of upholding certain principles essential to the security of neutf-als, and of placing the rights of its ow^n flag under shelter from any attack, have, after mature reflection, con- vinced it that it could not, under the circumstances, re- main entirely silent." He concludes : " There remains, therefore, to invoke, in explanation of their capture, only the pretext that they were the bearers of official dispatches from the enemy; but this is the moment to recall a circumstance which governs all this aflfair, and which renders the conduct of the American cruiser unjustifiable. " The Trent w^as not destined to a point belonging to one of the belligerents. She was carrying to a neutral country her cargo and her passengers ; and, moreover, it was from a neutral port that they were taken. "The cabinet at "Washington could noty without strik- ing a blow at the principles which all neutral nations are alike interested in holding in respect, nor wdthout taking the attitude of contradiction of its own course up to this time, give its approbation to the proceedings of the com- mander of the San Jacinto. In this state of things, it evi- dently should not, according to our views, hesitate about the determination to be taken." The Austrian and Prussian governments, in like man- 544 INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. ADAMS. [Sect. XIII. ner, presented their views, wMcli were to the same ef- fect. In England, those journalists who had been occupied during the summer in creating an anti-Amer- Denunciations of . . ,1,11 Captain Wilkes in icau seutiment, exerted themselves to pro- England. ' . -•■ duce as much exasperation as possible. They took it for granted that Captain Wilkes had acted by or- der of his government, and yet assailed him intemperate- ly. " He is, unfortunately, but too faithful a type of the people in whose foul mission he is engaged. He is an ideal Yankee. Swagger and ferocity built up on a foun- dation of vulgarity and cowardice — these are his charac- teristics ; and these are the two most prominent marks by which his countrymen, generally speaking, are known all over the world. To bully the weak, to triumph over the helpless, to trample on every law of country and cus- tom, willfully to violate all the most sacred interests of human nature, to defy as long as danger does not appear, and, as soon as real peril shows itself, to sneak aside and run away — these are the virtues of the race which pre- sumes to oifer itself as the leader of civilization and the prophet of human progress in these latter days. By Cap tain Wilkes let the Yankee breed be judged." On the same day that Earl Russell was writing in Lon- don to Lord Lyons, Mr. Seward was writing Mr. Seward's in- . -^^j- ,, , , -%r at t • i» structious to Mr. lu Washington to Mr. Adams, drawing his attention to the fact that Captain Wilkes had not acted under instructions from his government, and desiring him to read the dispatch to Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell. It is to be regretted that, consider- ing the state of feeling, these facts were not promptly made known in England. The American government had no easy task to per- form in doing its duty. If there- was bitterness of feel- ing in England, there was no less bitterness of feeling in Chap. LXIL] RESTORATION OF THE CAPTIVES. 545 America. Captain Wilkes's act had met Popular opinion of . , , , it r\ the transactiou iu With popular approval-j-iiay, more, the Sec- retary of, the Navy had commended it ; and in the House ofRej)resentatives a motion had been made " tendering the thanks of Congress to Captain Wilkes for his arrest of the traitors Slidell and Mason." In the com- munications whjph ensued, Mr. Seward, in a letter to Mr. Adams, reviewed the whole subject, reiterating that no orders had been given to any one for the arrest of the four persons named, that Captain Wilkes had acted in conformity with the law in relation to neutrals as ex- pounded by English authority, but that he had not exer- cised the right of capture in the manner allowed and rec- ognized by the law of nations, since it was not his busi- ness, but that of a . court of admiralty, to decide on the validity of his prize. It was for him to have carried the Trent into port. " But," wrote Mr. Seward, " if I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disallow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever aban- don its essential policy. Our country can not afford that sacrifice. If I maintain these principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself It will be seen, therefore, that this government can not deny the justice of the claims presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation what we have always insisted all nations ought to do unto us." He therefore declared that the British de- ernment restores maud would bc acccdcd to, aud the four per- sons cheerfully liberated. The Confederate authorities had expected that the t Trent question would lead to war between the sSaTthis'" the United States and Ensrland. Their dis- decision. , . -., appomtment at its ending in the manner it did was very great. After this time all hopes of Euro- pean aid in their affaii's were abandoned. The two agents II.— M M 546 1^0^^ LYONS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS. [Sect. XIII. who had thus been delivered up were personally unpop- ular in England. It was affirmed that they had been in the habit of reviling Great Britain. They were declared to be " most worthless booty," and that " England would have done just as much for two negroes." During the Civil War the views takeiti by the Frenc]i and English governments, and the attitude Mistaken views of , -, -^ -, -, -, . , . England and thcv assumeQ, depenaed on a misconception France. *^ . , , ^ , of the state of affairs in America. They did not understand the patriotic determination of the people, which rose far above all party ties. Lord Lyons, 'the En- glish minister at Washington, though never wanting in a courteous relation to the government to which he was ac- credited, was not, as those who were intimately acquaint- ed with passing events perceived with regret, a friend of the republic. But if he misconceived the patriotism of the American people, he was not without some justifica- tion. They can not peruse his correspondence with his government without pain. In a letter to Earl Russell (November 17th, 1862) he describes the position and intentions of the AmericSTpa?-' Dcmocratlc leaders. He says that several ties. of them had soughtminterviews with him in relation to foreign mediation. They were exulting in their recent successes in the elections, hoping that the s:overnment would be constrained to desist His communica- o ^ Democmtifield^ ^^^^ ^^^ cxtraordluary powers it had as- ^'''' sumed, and that the President would increase their party element in his cabinet, and endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South, and re- nounce the idea of subjugation or extermination. He adds that McClellan had been regarded as the rep- resentative of their principles in the army, and when in- telligence arrived that he had been dismissed from com- Chap. LXII.] LOED LYONS ON THE STATE 0:f AFFAIRS. 547 mand, their hopes were dashed and their irritation very great. Though they seemed to think that foreign media- tion must be resorted to, they deprecated it at present from an apprehension that it would, if proposed now, strengthen their opponents. Lord Lyons stated that he avoided giving any opinion on the subject. But listened attentively to their plans; that he thought he perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether, but it was plain that it was not thought pru- dent to avow that desire. He related what he understood to be the plan of the who desire Euro- Democratlc Icadcrs, and also that of the gov- peau intervention, gmmeut ; that thc kttcr wouM reject any offer of foreign intervention, and it might increase the virulence with which the war was prosecuted ; that, if the Democratic party were in power, they would be dis- posed to accept foreign mediation if it appeared to be the only means of stopping hostilities. They would de- sire that the offer should come from the great powers of Europe conjointly, and, in particular, that as little promi- nence as possible should be given to Great Britain. Lord Lyons therefore inferred that it would bet vain to offer mediation to the government in its existing mood, but that there was a prospect that a change of mood might take place should military reverses occur. He con- cluded that the immediate and obvious interest of Great Britain, as well as of the rest of Europe, was, that peace and prosperity should be restored to America as soon as possible, the point chiefly worthy of consideration ap- pearing to be whether separation or reunion would be the more likely to effect this object. The misapprehension conveyed in this communication consisted in the undue weight which it gave to the 548 LOBD LYONS ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS. [Sect. XIII. wishes of the Democratic leaders referred to. Whatever their former influence might have been, they were now without support. The Democratic party, as a mass, would have rejected such suggestions with indignation. CHAPTEE LXIII. RESOURCES AND DEFENSES OF THE REPUBLIC IN 1862. ITS FI- NANCES, ARMY, AND NAVY. Financial condition of the republic at the outbreak of the war. The measures of Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, for 1861 and 1862. His financial recommendations to Congress. Financial condition of the republic at the close of 1862. The war measures of Mr. Cameron. Accession of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War. His report on the state of the Army and general military condition for 1862. The navy measures of Mr. Welles. Complete enforcement of the blockade. Op- erations against the enemy, and condition of the Navy at the close of 1862. 'No portion of the history of the republic is more wor- thy of attention than that which relates to the financial measures connected with the Civil War. Until the great conspiracy of secession, taxation in The financial bur- Auicrlca for uatloual purposes had been al- densof the republic. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^j, ^^^^^ ^^^^^ .^ rapidly bc- came more and more oppressive, yet it was borne not only submissively, but with cheerfulness. In its unstint- ed appropriations of money, Congress only reflected the determination of the people. There was a resemblance between the attitude assumed Formation of a pub- by Cougrcss aud that exhibited by the Long lie debt in England, parliament iu Eugkud. No political pur- pose was permitted to fail through want of pecuniary suj^plies. The national income under Charles I. had bare- ly amounted to ^ve millions of dollars a year, but, in a period of nineteen years, under the Commonwealth, not less than four hundred millions were levied ; yet it was held that the object gained was a full equivalent for the cost. 550 THE NATIONAL DEBT. [Sect. XIIL Considering tlie population and the resources of En- gland at that time, such a revenue must be regarded as very great ; yet more than half of it was raised by direct taxation, sequestrations and the sales of forfeited land for the most part supplying the rest. It was not until the accession of the Orange dynasty that the government learned the dangerous secret of borrowing money on pub- lic credit, and founding a national debt. Not without curiosity may we compare some of the ar- its supposed poiit- guments used by the American Secretary of icai a vantages. ^|^^ Trcasury lu support of his measures with those offered by English statesmen almost two cen- turies ago. In their opinion, a very great advantage must incidentally arise from the distribution of a public debt among many holders, since an influential body would thus be created, bound by the tie of individual interest to the existing government, and ever ready to defend it against its opponents, whose jirst act would be to disre- gard or repudiate their claims. Nor was it overlooked that, through the means thus acquired by borrowing, the influence of the government might be increased far be- yond what was possible by the restricted supplies of each year. In America, every one could see how powerfully a wide- spread interest in a common institution — the slave system and slavcry — had actcd iu unifyinsT the South. a national debt. ** ^ . It was not discontentment with the govern- ment, for there was no cause of discontent, but apprehen- sions, real or imaginary, of peril to that common interest which had banded together the populations of so many states. If at the South slave property, sometimes valued at three thousand millions of dollars, had been made available as a lever to attempt to overturn the govern- ment, a national debt of three thousand millions, held in portions scattered all over the North, might be made Ghap.lxiil] direct taxation. 551 equally available to sustain it. Should the slave system, in the issues of the w^r, be destroyed, and should, as in- deed was inevitable, a national debt l?e created, the North would succeed the South in the possession of a principle of unification, the efficiency of which would not be im- paired, as was that of slavery, by any moral or conscien- tious scruples. It is true that this principle of unification is not with- But a debt implies ^^^ ^ drawback. By direct or indirect tax- opposition. ation, and, in fact, by both, means must be raised to pay the interest which the debt requires. From this point of view the political effect is therefore to de- compose society into two portions, one of which is an- tagonistic to the debt through the taxation it demands. But if the slaveholders of the South had found it possi- ble to carry with them thoroughly the slaveless whites, so the bondholders of the North might reasonably ex- pect that the influences of capital would draw all ranks of society to a general concord with them. It would be very difficult to resist capital and patriotism combined. Nevertheless, it ought n.ever to be forgotten that there Disadvantages of di- will always bc discoutentnient with direct rect taxation. taxatlou,. aud particularly if it implies espi- onage. Perhaps nothing exerted a more powerful influ- ence in accelerating the fall of the Roman empire than the policy of the Emperor Constantine, who replaced the Experience of the systcm of iudircct taxatiou — the customs Romans. ^^^ dutics of formcr time^ — by the grind- ing direct taxation of Indictions. It was this that, un- der his successors, tore from the emperor the whole of North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor. The tribute de- manded by the Mohammedan Khalif was not one third of that which had been extorted by the emperor, and the provinces were unable to withstand the temptation of the advantages arising from a change of rulers. 552 PROTECTIVE TARIFFS. [Sect. XIII. In America, until the Civil War, indirect taxation had supplied the wants of the national government, and, so far as that purpose *was involved, was not objected to in any part of the country ; but very generally throughout the South, and to no small extent in the North itself, very Political effect of scrious objcctiou was made to the heavy protective tariffs, ^^^^g^^^^ imposcd iu this mauucr for the avowed benefit of a single interest — the manufacturing. New England and Pennsylvania were the chief benefi- ciaries of this dangerous system. The proffer of tariff enactments for the benefit of specified branches of indus- try had become as important an element in the deter- mination of presidential elections as were the donatives to the legions of old in the exaltation of Eoman emper- ors. The cheerful manner in which the American people accepted every form of taxation during the Cheerful assump- , , -, -, , ., . . tion of tax-burdens war must cvcr be reo;arded as a strikmsr m- iu America. , , , . , , ,^r^, . ■,,-,, cident m their history. Their zeal m this respect outran the acts of the government. Not only did they bear these financial burdens with alacrity, but they dedicated large additional sums to secure the accomplish- ment of the purpose they had in view. There never has existed a more splendid example of organized benevo- lence than the " Sanitary Commission," and yet it was only one of many forms which voluntary contribution assumed. For a clear comprehension of the financial condition The finance report ^^^ mcasurcs of thc rcpublic duriug the first for 1860. ^^^ years of the war, it is necessary to pre- sent an abstract of the report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the year ending on the 30th of June, 1860. The American fiscal year commences on the 1st of July and ends on the 30th of the following June. Chap. LXIII.] THE FINANCES IN 1861. 553 In that report the secretaiy, Mr. Cobb, stated that the a2f2rre2:ate means for the service of that year Means for the year. °° o pit were more than eighty-one millions oi dol- lars ($81,091,309 43). The expenditures for that year were more than seven- Expenditures for ty-seven millions ($77,462,102 72). Abal- the year. ^^^^ therefore remained in the treasury of more than three and a half millions ($3,629,206 71). He farther estimated the means for the fiscal year next Estimates for the foUowiug, 1861, at more than eighty-four following year. ^^^^^^^^ ($84,348,996 75), aud the expendi- ture at nearly the same amount ($84,103,105 17). He remarked, however, that in practice, for many years past, the sums drawn from the treasury during any year had been much less than the amounts estimated as required during such year, and, applying such deductions to the case before him, he came to the conclusion that there would probably remain in the treasury on the 1st of July, 1862, a balance of about eight millions of dollars. During the year 1860 the country had been in a very state of the coun- prospcrous coudltiou. The crops had bccu try at that ume. ^^^^ abuudaut aud prfccs vciy remunera- tive. The exports of the preceding year had reached the enormous sum of four hundred millions of dollars ($400,122,296), the imports more than three hundred and sixty-two millions ($362,163,941), the revenue from customs having been fifty-three millions ($53,187,511 87). The exports of domestic produce for the current year, as far as they had been received, indicated an increase fully equal to that of preceding years, and probably surpass- ing it, thus authorizing an estimate of increased revenue from that source. But Mr. Cobb added that a threatened financial revul- An unfavorable fa- siou was impending, which threw uncertain- ture prospect. ^^ ^^ ^-^^ forcgoiug calculatious. The causes 554 THE FINANCES IN 1861. [Sect. XIU. of this were outside of the financial and commercial oper- ations of the country, and were of a political character. Already they had seriously affected the treasury, as shown by the diminished receipts from customs. The permanent public debt, on the 30th of June, 1860, The public debt was $45,079,203 08, and the outstanding ^" ^^'^: treasury .notes at that date $19,690,500. By the act of June 22d, 1860, provision was made for the redemption of treasury notes and payment of the in- terest thereon. This act provided for the issuing of stock for ^an amount not exceeding twenty-one millions of dol- lars, at a rate of interest not exceeding six per cent, per annum, and to be reimbursed within a period not beyond twenty years and not less than ten years. For satisfac- The government ^oiy rcasous spccificd by the secretary, no negotiates a loan, jj^gotiatiou of any portiou of this loan was attempted until the 8th of September, 1860, when pro- posals were invited for ten millions of the loan, which was ample to meet all the treasury notes falling due be- fore January 1st, 1861. The rate of interest was fixed at five per cent, per annum, under the conviction that the loan could be readily negotiated at that rate, for at that time the five per cent, stock of the United States was sell- ing in the market at a premium of three per cent. The result realized the just expectation, and the whole amount offered was taken either at par or a small premium. How- it is disturbed by ever, before the time had arrived for pay- a financial crisis. ^^^^ ^^ ^-^^ p^^,^ ^£ ^}^^ biddcrs, thc finan- cial crisis referred to came. New arrangements, looking to an extension of the term of payment, had been neces- sarily accorded, and even with that some persons still re- mained unable to make their payments. Meantime the necessities of the treasury demanded prompt action. JSTot only were the treasury notes past due rapidly coming in for redemption, but those not due were being paid in for Chap. LXIIL] INTRUSION OF SLAVERY. 555 customs, thereby withdrawing from tlie regular operations of the government its principal source of revenue. To meet the remaining outstanding treasury notes, and An issue of treasury interest thcrcou, thcrc were yet to be nego- notes uecessary. tiatcd elcvcu millious of the stock author- ized by the act of June 22d, 1860. The difficulties at- tending the payment for the stock already sold, in con- nection with the fact that capitalists, in the existing con- dition of the country, seemed unwilling to invest in United States stocks at par, rendered it almost certain that this remainino; eleven millions could not be nes^o- tiated upon terms acceptable to the government. To meet the difficulty, Mr. Cobb therefore recommended a repeal of the act so far as these eleven millions were con- cerned, and the authorization of an issue of treasury notes to that amount, pledging unconditionally the public lands for their ultimate redemption. He also recommended, to relieve the treasury from its present embarrassments, the issuing of an additional amount of treasury notes of not less than ten millions of dollars. Among other matters, such a>^ the revenue marine serv- Intrusion of slavery ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^s, etc, thc sccrctary drcw atten- into these affairs. ^^^^ ^^ ^^ iucideut wMch, though Hot stric<> ly pertaining to the subject of his report, strikingly illus- trates the cause of the political difficulty which had brought so much embarrassment to the treasury, and shows how the influences of slavery were felt every where. Congress had authorized the appointment of del- egates to represent the United States in the International Statistical Congress which met in London, with a view of promoting the establishment of uniform standards of weights and measures, a uniform unit of currency, etc. To this meeting the Hon. Mr. Longstreet, of South Caro- lina, repaired — the only delegate from the United States. His statement is as follows : 556 INTRUSION OF SLAVERY. [Sect. Xill. "At the appointed time, a preliminary meeting was siave-oAvners in- ^^^^^^ ^o appoint officers and arrange the or- suited in London, ^^j, q£ business for the regular meetings. All the foreign delegates were declared to be vice-presi- dents, and, by invitation of the chairman, took their seats as such upon the stand. Lord Brougham was, I think, the last member of the Congress who entered the hall, and was applauded from the first glimpse of him until he took his seat ; it was near, and to the left of the chair. Mr. Dallas (the American minister), appearing as a com- plimentary visitor, was seated to the right, in a rather conspicuous position. Things thus arranged, the assem- bly awaited the presence of his Eoyal Highness the Prince Consort, who was to p^^eside and open the meeting Avith an address. He soon appeared, delivered his address, and took his seat. As soon as ho concluded, and the long- continued plaudits ceased. Lord Brougham rose, compli- mented the speech very highly and deservedly, and re- quested all who approved of it to hold up their right hands. We did so, of course. This done, he turned to Mr. Dallas, and, addressing him across the prince's table, said : " I call the attention of Mr. Dallas to the fact that there is a negro present (or among the delegates), and I hope he will have no scruples on that account. This ajD- peal was received by the delegates with general and en- thusiastic applause. Silence being restored, the negro, who goes by the name of Delany, rose and said: "I thank your Eoyal Highness and Lord Brougham, and have only to say that I am a man." This, too, was applauded warm- ly by the delegates. I regarded this as an ill-timed, un- provoked assault upon our country, a wanton indignity offered to our minister, and a pointed insult offered to me. I immediately withdrew from the body. The propriety of my course is respectfully submitted to my govern- ment." chap.lxiil] Mil. chase secrp:tary of the treasury. 557 The Secretary of tlie Treasury adds ; " It is only neces- sary to say that the withdrawal of Judge Longstreet from the Congress, and his refusal to return to its deliberations, received the entire approval of his government." In conclusion of his report, Mr. Cobb adds: "Until within a short period, I had confidently expected to pre- sent to Copgress, at its present session, a gratifying state- ment of the financial condition of the government. A different result has, however, been brought about by causes which could not be foreseen, and, if foreseen, could not have been averted by any action of the department." The administration of Lincoln had succeeded that of Buchanan, and Mr. Chase had become Secre- Mr. Chase becomes , p 1 1 m mi ^ secretarj ofthe tarv 01 the ircasurv. I he years dunns: Treasui'v- •/ «/ o which he held this most important office were the years of greatest peril that the republic had ever known. His financial measures, which were of a singularly able and decisive kind, not only bore upon the current requirements of the war, but gave a permanent impress to the business relations of the country, and will continue to be felt for a long time to come. On the 9th of December, 1861, Mr. Chase submitted his His report of De- ^fst fomial report to Cougrcss. He had, in cember,i8ci. -(-j^g prcccding July, at the extra session, pre- sented estimates of an aggregate expenditure for the year endmg on the 30th of June, 1862, of nearly three hundred and twenty millions of dollars ($318,519,581 87). Con- gress had made provision, by customs and internal taxes, and by loans, to secure the requisite sums. The acts authorizing loans had provided, (1.) For a national loan of one hundred millions of dollars, or any larger sum not exceeding the Loan provisions ,, i ,^ • i • i t . made at the ex- wholc amouut authorized, m bonds or treas- tra session, . ^ r»/^ ury notes, bearmg 7.30 per cent, mterest. 558 FINANCIAL PROVISIONS, FOR 1862. [Sect. XIIL payable three years after date, and convertible, at or be- fore maturity, into twenty years' six per cent, bonds. (2.) For a loan in Europe or in tlie United States, at tlie discretion of the secretary, of one hundred millions of dollars, payable twenty years after date, and bearing in- terest not exceeding seven per cent. (3.) For the issue, in payments to public creditors or andissueoftreas- ^^ cxchange for coiu, of trcasuiy notes, pay- ury notes. ^^^je oue ycar after date, bearing an interest of 3.65 per cent., and convertible into the three years' 7.30 bonds or treasury notes. (4.) For the issue of notes payable on demand, and re- ceivable for all public dues, to be used as coin in pay- ments and exchanges. The aggregate of notes of the two last descriptions was limited to fifty millions of dollars, in denominations less than fifty, but not less than ^ve dollars. A farther authority was conferred by the act to issue treasury notes of any of the specified denominations, bear- ing six per cent, interest, and payable not over twelve months from date, to an amount not exceeding twenty millions of dollars. To provide for immediate exigencies, the secretary is- sued, under authority conferred by various acts, for pay- ment to public creditors or for advances of cash, $14,019,034 66 in treasury notes, payable in two years, and bearing six per cent, interest, and $12,877,750 in treasury notes bearing the same rate of interest, but pay- able sixty days after date. To provide for the regular and continuous disburse- Negotiations with ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ War, thc sccrctary had inter- the banks. yicws wlth representatives of the banking institutions 'of the three chief commercial cities of the sea- board, who agreed to unite as associates in moneyed sup- port of the government, and to subscribe at once a loan Chap.lxiil] arrangements with the banks. 559 of fifty millions of dollars, of which five millions were to be paid immediately to the assistant treasurers in coin, and the residue also in coin, as needed for disbursement. The secretary, on his part, agreed to issue Particulars of ar- , i ^ r* rv i t i ■ rangemeuts with tlirce ycars Y.oO Douds, or treasury notes, bearing even date with the subscription, and of equal amount ; to cause books of subscription to the national loan to be opened ; to ireimburse the advances of the banks as far as practicable from this national sub- scription, and to deliver to them 7.30 bonds, or treasury notes, for the amount not thus reimbursed. It was far- ther understood that the secretary should issue a limited amount of United States notes, payable on demand, in aid of the operations of the treasury, and that the associated institutions, when the first advance of fifty millions should be expended, would, if practicable, make another, and when that should be exhausted, still another advance to the government, of the same amount, and on shuilar terms. The objects of this arrangement were : (1.) To place Objects secured by ^t thc commaud of the government the large t ese arrangements, g^j^^g immediately nccdcd for the payment of maturing treasury notes, and for other disbursements ordinary or extraordinary ; (2.) To secure to the people equal opportunity with the banks for participation in the loan ; (3.) To avoid competition between the government and the associated institutions in the disposal of bonds ; (4.) To facilitate and secure farther advances to the gov- ernment by the associations if required ; (5.) To insure, if possible, the maintenance of payments in specie, or its actual equivalents or representatives. These objects were accomplished. Fifty millions of Success of the loan dollars wcrc immediately advanced by the subscriptions. fcauks. Subscriptiou - books were opened throughout the country ; the people freely subscribed to 560 AKRANGEMENTS WITH THE BANKS. [Sect. XIII. the loan. The amounts subscribed were reimbursed to the banks, and the sum thus reimbursed, though then covering but little more than half the amount, enabled those institutions, when a second loan was required, to make a second advance of fifty millions. These two loans of fifty millions each were negotia- ted for three years' 7.30 bonds at par. The first was ne- gotiated, and the first iasue of bonds bears date on the 19th of August; the second on the 1st of October, 1861. A third loan was negotiated on the 16th of November 'A third loan nego- wlth the assoclatcd institutions, the secre- tiated, ^^^ issuing to them fifty millions of dollars in six per cent, bonds, at a rate equivalent to par, for the bonds bearing seven per cent, interest, authorized by the act of July 17th. This loan was coupled with no ar- rangement for reimbursement ; and there was an under- standing, in the form of an option to the associations, that, on or after the 1st of January, a fourth advance of fifty millions should be made, on the same terms with the first and second, if practicable, and required by the secretary. In addition to the loan thus made, the secretary issued United States notes, payable on demand, in and additional , •.• n jy , i. ^ i ^ treasury notes is- denominatious ot ilve, tcu, auQ twenty dol- sued. /» 1 . 1 1 • • 1 • lars, of which there were m circulation, on the 30th of November, 1861, $21,165,220, while there remained in the treasury at that date $3,385,105. The amount thus issued, so far as it entered into the circula- tion of the country, might be regarded as a loan from the people, payable on demand, without interest. Eecapitulating the preceding statements, and reducing Aggiegate realized the loau of Novcmbcr 16th to the equiv- fromtSese loans. ^|^^^ ^^ SCVCUS, iucludiug iutcrest, it is SCCU that an aggregate was realized from these various loans of nearly two hundred millions of dollars ($197,242,588 14). Turning next to the receipts of revenue from duties, Chap. LXIII.] THE PROVISIONS PROVE INADEQUATE. 55 1 The receipts from ^^e Secretary had to report a falling otf from famS'etcfSV the estimates. The revenue from customs miuished.' ^^^ ^-^^ ^g^^-j^ ^^^^ -^g^^ ^^^ ^^^^ estimated at fifty-seven millions ; it must be reduced to a little more than thirty-two ($32,198,602 55). So, too, the receipts from lands and miscellaneous sources must be reduced from $3,000,000 to $2,354,062 89. To the foregoing is to be added, as the only remaining FaiiiiKToffinthe source of revcuue, the direct tax of twenty actuaiWnue. ^n^^^^ authorized by Congress. The ag- gregate of revenue is therefore estimated at fifty-four and a half millions ($54,552,665 44), which is less by about twenty-five and a half millions than was estimated in July. A more important fact than this reduction of the rev- inadequacyofesti. ^HUG remained, however, to be dealt with. Seased^army'ex-''' The estlmatcs of expcudlture had been ba^d peaditures. ^^ ^ ^^^^-^ ETmy force of about three hun- dred thousand men. Congress had, however, authorized the employment of a force which, including the existing regular army, would be about four hundred and fifty thousand men. This large increase of men and officers, the liberal addition made by Congress to pay and ra- tions, the increase of the navy, and other objects, must necessarily augment the expenditure far beyond the orig- inal estimates, and make it nearly two hundred and four- teen millions ($213,904,427 68) beyond the estimates of July. To meet the difficulties thus presented, the secretary suggested a rigorous supervision of all contracts, abolition of all unnecessary salaries, reduction of pay, sequestration or confiscation of the property of rebels, and application of the proceeds to the use of the state. Pointing out. Necessity of greatly howcvcr, that, after all this had been done, increased provision, j^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ prOvidcd for, hc iusistcd II.— N N 562 NEW PROVISIONS RECOMMENDED. [Sect. XIII. that adequate provision by taxation for ordinary expend- itures, for the prompt payment of interest on the public debt, and for the gradual extinction of the principal, is indispensable to a sound system of finance. The provision made at the last session of Congress was of two descriptions: (1.) A direct tax of gress had already tweuty millious ; aud, (2.) An internal duty of three per cent, on all annual incomes, with certain exceptions and deductions. The secretary proceeds to consider the expediency of farther provisions of a similar character. In his judgment, it is necessary to increase the direct New proTisions tax SO as to producc from the loyal states recommended, ^^^jj^g ^ revcuue of at Icast twcuty millions, and to lay such duties on stills and distilled liquors, on tobacco, bank-notes, carriages, legacies, evidences of debt, aild instruments for conveyance of property, as will pro- duce an equal additional sum. He supposes that the in- come tax may produce ten millions more, making an ag- gregate of fifty millions of dollars. That sum is large, but there is no probability that the revenue from ordinary sources will exceed forty millions of dollars ; and to meet even economized disbursements, to pay the interest on the debt, and provide a sinking fund for the gradual reduction of the principal, not less than ninety millions will be necessary. But, if the sum be large, the means of the people are also large — the object to be attained price- to miuhese^S ^ Icss. Thc real property of the loyal states is valued in round numbers at seven and a half thousands of millions, the personal property at three and a half thousands of millions, and the annual surplus earnings of the loyal people at not less than three hun- dred millions of dollars. The whole sum proposed to be chap.lxiii.] bank circulation. 553 raised by taxation is little more tlian one sixth of the sur- plus earnings of the country. But the amount to be derived from taxation forms but Necessity of addi- ^ Small proportiou of the sums required for tionai loans. ^^^ expeuses. For the rest reliance must be placed on loans. Already, beyond the expectations of the most sanguine, Cheerful support ^^^ couutry has responded to the appeals of ?hltlnkfand^^ the Secretary. The means adopted for se- peopie. curing the concurrence of all classes- of citi- zens in financial support to the government have been already explained. It remains only to be said here that, while the action of the banking institutions in assuming the immediate responsibility of all the advances hither- to required, as v^ell as the final responsibility of much the largest portion of these merits high eulogium, the prompt patriotism with which citizens of moderate means, and workingmen, and workingwomen, have brought their individual offerings to the service of their country, must command even warmer praise. To enable the government to obtain means for the prosecution of the war without unnecessary cost, the sec- retary offered the following suggestions : The circulation of the banks of the United States on Nature of the bank the Ist day of Jauuary, 1861, was computed circulation. ^^ ^^ ^j^^^^ ^^.^ huudrcd miUious of dol- lars. This constitutes a loan, without interest, from the people to the banks, costing them nothing except the ex- pense of issue and redemption, and the interest on the. specie kept on hand for the latter purpose ; and it de- serves consideration whether sound policy does not re- quire that the advantages of this loan be be%?aSrrirtS^^^ transfciTed, in part at least, from the banks, representing only the interests of the stock- the jrovernment. 564 NATIONAL CIRCULATION. [Sect.XIIL holders, to tlie government, representing the aggregate interests of the whole people. He shows that Congress may constitutionally, and with Methods by which great advantage to the people, exercise the this may be done. j i • i -t • • . . necessary authority, and points out two plans by which the object may be effected : (1.) The grad- ual withdrawal from circulation of the notes of private corporations, and the issue in their stead of United States notes, payable in coin on demand, in amounts sufficient for the useful ends of a representative currency; (2.) The preparation and delivery, to institutions and associations, of notes prepared for circulation under national direction, and to be secured, as to prompt convertibility into coin, by the pledge of United States bonds, and other needful regulations. For reasons considered to be satisfactory, he declines the first of these plans, and examines in detail the second, stating that its principal features are, (1), a circulation of notes bearing a common impression, and authenticated by a common authority ; (2), the redemption of these notes by the associations and institutions to which they may be delivered for issue ; (3), the security of that redemption by the pledge of United States stocks, and an adequate provision of specie. In this plan, the people, in their ordinary business, Advanta-esofana- would find tho advautagcs of uniformity in tionai ciixuiation. ^^^^.^^^^ . ^£ uiiiformity lu sccurity ; of effect- ual safeguard, if effectual safeguard is possible, against de- preciation ; and of protection from losses in discounts and exchanges; while in the operations of the government the people would find the farther advantage of a large de- mand for government securities, of increased facilities for obtaining the loans required by the war, and of some al- leviation of the burdens on industry through a diminu- tion in the rate of interest, or a participation in the profit Chap. LXIII.] ADVANTAGES OF A NATIONAL CIRCULATION. 5^5 of cireulation without risking tlie perils of a great money monopoly. A farther and important advantage to the people may be reasonably expected in the increased secu- rity of the Union springing from the common interest in its preservation, created by the distribution of its stocks as the basis of their circulation to associations through: out the country. The notes thus issued would, in the judgment of the Its advantages to secretary, form the safest currency which the people, j.^^^ couutry has ever enjoyed, while their receivability for all government dues, except customs, would make them, wherever payable, of equal value as a currency in every part of the Union. The large amount of specie now in the United States, reaching a total of not less than two hundred and seventy-five millions of dollars, will easily support payments of duties in coin, while these payments and ordinary demands will aid in retaining this specie in the country as a solid basis both of circulation and loans. The plan thus submitted, if adopted, with the limita- and advantages to tloiis aud Safeguards which the experience the government. ^^^ wlsdom of scuators aud representatives will doubtless suggest, will probably impart such value and stability to government securities that it will not be difficult to obtain the additional loans required for the service of the current and the succeeding year at fair and reasonable rates. The secretary then shows that the amount of loans re- quired for the fiscal year 1862, in addition to the amount already authorized, will not exceed two hundred millions of dollars. Report of Decern- Oil the 4th of Dcccmber, 1862, Mr. Chase ber,i862. again made his customary financial report. From this it apjDeared that the aggregate receipts for 556 FINANCIAL PROVISIONS FOR 1863. [Sect. XIII. the fiscal year 1862, from all sources, were Eeceipts and expen- t , n -, -■-, i ' i > n mt dituresofthepast aoout II ve hundred and eighty-iour millions ^'^' ($583,885,247 06), and the aggregate ex- penditures about ^ye hundred and seventy-one millions ($570,841,700 25), leaving a balance in the treasury, on the 1st of July, 1862, of $13,043,546 81. He estimates that for the fiscal year 1863, the receipts. Estimate of receipts actual and anticipated, uudcr existiug laws, for 18C3, ^'^Yi "be more than ^ve hundred and eleven millions ($511,646,259 96). The aggregate of expendi- andofexpendi- tures he placcd at more than seven hundred ^'''''' and eighty-eight millions ($788,558,777 62): There must therefore be provided by Congress for this The provision re- J^^^^ about two huudrcd and seventy-seven '^'''^' millions ($276,912,517 66), Considering in like manner the probable receipts and expenditures of the next folio winsf fiscal and that for 1SG4. ^ ^^^.,i t ',t ^ ,♦, i year, 1864, though with less certainty, he conjectures that the necessary provision for that year will be upward of six hundred and twenty-two millions ($622,388,183 56), and that therefore the whole amount to be provided by Congress beyond resources available under existing laws will be nearly nine hundred millions ($899,300,701 22). With a view to the necessary provision for the antici- pated expenditures, the secretary had pro- The measures al- -, , ^ ; • i i i > i ready recommended pOSCd tO ColiefreSS at itS last SCSSIOU SUCll to Congress ■*■ ^ • i i r^\^ measures as seemed to be suitable. Ihese were : (1.) An increase of duties on various imports ; (2.) An increase of the direct tax ; (3.) The levying of internal duties ; (4.) A limited emission of United States notes convertible into coin ; (5.) The negotiation of loans, facilitated by the organization of banking associations, whose circulation should consist: only of notes uniform in character, furnished by the government, and secured as Chap. LXIII.] SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS. 5^7 to convertibility into coin by United States bonds de- posited in the treasury. But unexpected military delays increased expenditures, diminished confidence in public securities, quale by military aud madc it Imposslblc for the banks and delays, etc. • t i i i t capitalists who had taken the previous loans to dispose of the bonds held by them except at ruinous loss, and impossible for the government to negotiate new loans except at like or greater loss. These conditions made a suspension of specie payments inevitable. The banks of New York sus- cilp^ymShar pcudcd ou thc 30th of December, 1861. occurred. ^ , ' Their example was followed by most of the banks throughout the country, and the government yield- ed to the same necessity in respect to the United States notes then in circulation. These changed circumstances required a change of measures. The expenditures had already Point to which daily -, , n -, .tt i expenditures had rcachcd au avcras^c oi nearly a million and riseu. o */ a quarter of dollars each secular day, while the revenue from all sources hardly exceeded one tenth of that sum. Careful inquiries had satisfied the secretary that suc- cessive loans could only be had on increas- Difficulty in obtain- . i t t , . rm r> i • ing corresponding lugly disadvautagcous tcrms. 1 he first six- ty millions would require an issue of bonds to the amount of seventy-five millions, and the third sixty millions, if attainable at all, would require one hundred and twenty millions. It was easy to see that, on this road, utter discredit and paralysis would soon be reached. There remained but one way of raising money by the negotiation of bonds in the usual mode. It was to re- ceive in payment of loans the notes or credits of the banks in suspension. The secretary set forth the reasons that led him to discountenance and reject this method. 568 ^ NATIONAIi CIRCULATION. [Sect. XIII. No other mode seemed likely to accomplisli tlie ob- A national circuia- j^^t 111 vjew SO Well as the Issue of United tionrecommended. g^^^^^ ^^^^^ adapted to circulatioii as money, and available therefor immediately in government pay- ments. Things were now in that condition that a choice would have to be made between a currency furnished by numerous and unconnected banks in various states and a currency furnished by the government. The secretary had already declared his unhesitating preference for a cir- culation authorized and issued by national authority. The finance committees of the two houses saw clearly the necessities created by the suspension, and at once adopt- ed the measures required by them. An emission of fifty millions had been authorized by Congress at the July session, 1861, not with How far that system .it. r> n • i ' i had been already the dcsigu 01 lumisning a general currency, but for the purpose of making good any dif ferences between the amounts obtained by loans and the sums required by the public service. Of these notes thir- ty-three and a half millions ($33,460,000) were in circu- lation at the time of the suspension. Up to that date every note presented for payment had been promptly re- deemed in coin. After the suspension an additional emission of ten millions was authorized on the 12th of the previous February. Both these issues, amounting al- together to sixty millions, were made receivable for all public dues, including customs. It now became the duty of Congress not merely to pro- vide the means of meeting the vast demands on the treas- ury, but to create a currency with which, until after the close of the war at least, loans and taxes might be paid to the government, debts to individuals discharged, and the business of the country transacted. This duty Congress partially performed by authorizing an emission of ninety millions in United States notes, in Chap.lxiii.] congeessional financial acts. 559 Successive acts addition to the sixty millions previously is- of Congress. g^ed, making one hundred and fifty millions in all. The ninety millions last issued were made receiv- able for all national loans and dues, except customs, pay- ment of which was required in specie or in notes of the two first issues. At a later period of the session Con- gress authorized a farther issue of one hundred and fifty millions, of which, however, fifty millions were to be re- served from issue until actually required for payment of deposits. Still later Congress authorized the use of post- age and revenue stamps as a fractional currency. These various acts, taken together, authorized the emis- Ag'rregate emission slou of two huudrcd aud fifty milHous in United States notes, and a farther emission, if needed, of fifty millions for the payment of deposits. Of these emissions, the sixty millions receivable for cus- toms were not available as circulation, but might be re- placed, as paid in, by notes of the new issues, which were thus available ; so that, in the end, a total circulation of two hundred and fifty millions might be reached, and, in an improbable contingency, increased by fifty millions more. An emission of fractional currency, as just stated, was also authorized. In aid of these provisions for public payments the sec- retary recommended, and Congress by different enact- ments authorized, the receipt on temporary deposit, at an interest not exceeding ^ve per cent., of such sums as might be offered, not exceeding, in the whole, one hundred mil- lions, and the payment, to such creditors as might choose to receive them, of certificates of indebtedness payable in one year, and bearing six per cent, interest. Congress also authorized the issue of national bonds to the amount Issue of five- <^^ fi^'^ huudrcd millions of dollars, into ^liicli the United States notes issued might be converted at the will of the holder. It was provided 570 KESULTS OF THOSE ACTS. [Sect. XIII. that these bonds should carry an interest of six per cent. in specie, and be redeemable after ^ve and payable in twenty years. They have received the name of five-twen- ties, or five-twenty sixes. Experience show^ed that all these measures worked well. A short statement will exhibit the practical workings of the laws enacted. Up to the 1st day of July, 1862, $57,926,116 57 had Resume of the beeu Tecelved and were remaining on depos- finances. ^^^ United Statcs notes to the amount of $158,591,230 had been issued and were in circulation; $49,881,979 73 had been paid in certificates of indebted- ness, and $208,345,291 86 had been paid in cash. ]N'ot a single requisition from any department upon the treasury All demands on the remained unanswered. Every audited and government paid. ^^^^^^^ ^j^-^ ^^ ^^ govemmeut, aud cvery quartermaster's check for supplies furnished, which had reached the treasury, had been met. And there remain- ed in the treasury a balance of $13,043,546 81. The reverses of June, July, and August affected, of course injuriously, this financial condition. The effect of the ,^, , -.. , • t i , i t military reverses ihe vast expcuditures rcquired by the lar2:e in Virginia. . -^ ^ * -i ^ r-i increase oi the army authorized by Congress and directed by the President made exhausting demands on all available resources. The measures of Congress, however, enabled the secretary to provide, if not fully, yet almost fully, for the constantly increasing disbursements. The actual payments, other than for princi- Congressional pro- in -i t t i i t • ii i i visions thus far ad- pal 01 public dcbt, durmsf the quarter end- equate, t ^ \ ^ ^ mg on the 30th day oi September, were $111,084,446 75; during the month of October they were $49,243,846 04; and during the month of Novem- ber, $59,847,077 34; while the accumulation of requisi- tions beyond resources amounted to less than the fourth of the aggregate of these sums, namely, to $48,354,701 22. Chap. LXIII.] RECEIPTS AND DEFICIENCY FOR THE YEAR. 571 It remains — says the secretary in his report — to con- sider what farther resources for satisfying the debt now existing in the form of requisitions, and meeting other present and prospective demands upon the treasury may be provided under existing legislation, and what addi- tional measures may be most beneficially adopted. The whole power to borrow money under the act of Those of the extra J^ty, 1861, is uow (December, 1862) ex- session exhausted, jj^^g^g^j^ '^jjg ^j^ij available laws are those of the last session. These are of two classes: (1.) Those providing revenue by duties and taxes ; (2.) Those providing it by loans. The laws of the first class are, (1), the several acts Character of those imposiug dutics ou imports ; (2), the act. to now available. • 1 • j. 1 provide internal revenue. The actual and estimated receipts under these laws for the current fiscal year, including the balance of last year, and receipts from all other sources, will amount to $180,495,345 60, leaving, therefore, to be provided by loans in some form, $608,063,432 02. The laws of the second class are, (1), the act authoriz- ing the issue of United States notes and of six per cent, bonds of the United States, redeemable after ^ve, and payable in twenty years, to the amount of ^ve hundred millions of dollars ; (2), the two acts authorizing the is- sue of certificates of indebtedness and the purchase of coin; (3), the act authorizing an additional issue of United States notes ; and, (4), the act authorizing pay- ments in stamps. The secretary then shows in detail that the Eeceipts and defi- , , -t n mit^ ciency for the cur- total 01 Tcsourccs available lor the current rent year. year, under existing laws, is $131,021,197 35. These credit resources, with the actual receipts from like sources added to the revenue in all forms, may sup- ply the treasury with more than five hundred and eleven 572 THE VALUE OF GOLD. [Sect. XIIL millions ($511,646,259 96). There remains a balance of disbursements of nearly two hundred and seventy- seven millions ($276,912,517 66) to be provided for. Considering how this is to be done, the first suggestion Plans for meeting IS au issue of the required amount in United that deficiency. gtates uotes ; but this, on the whole, he re- jects. He does not, however, concur in the opinion en- tertained by some that the currency of the country, now composed of United States notes and notes of corpora- tions, is greatly in excess of legitimate demands for its employment. Much less does he admit that any actual excess is due to the issues of United States notes already in circulation. It is true that gold commands a premium in notes; Variations in the 1^ other words, that to purchase a given value of gold. amouut of gold a greater amount of notes is required. But it is also true that on the suspension of specie payments and the substitution for coin of United States notes, convertible into six per cent, specie bonds, as the legal standard of value, gold became an ar- ticle of merchandise, subject to the ordinary fluctuations of supply and demand, and to the extraordinary fluctua- tions of mere speculation. The ignorant fears of foreign investers in national and state bonds, and other American securities, and the timid alarms of numerous nervous in- dividuals in our own country, prompted large sacrifices upon evidences of public or corporate indebtedness in our markets, and large purchases of coin for remittance abroad or hoarding at home. Taking advantage of these and other circumstances tending to an advance of gold, speculators employed all the arts of the market to stim- ulate that tendency and carry it to the highest point. This point was reached on the 15th of October. Gold sold in the market at a premium of 37| per cent. The secretary then gives reasons sustaining his opinion Chap.LXIIL] effects OF A NATIONAL CIRCULATION. 5^3 that tMs rise was not due wholly nor even in greatest part to the increase of the currency ; that especially it was not attributable to increase of United States notes ; but that any redundancy of circulation, and any depreci- ation of currency, is really due to the increase of bank circulation and deposits. Under these circumstances, the path is very clear. It leads to the support of a national circula- nsSg KtSiaf tion, and to the reduction of the bank-note circulation, the central idea being the estab- lishment of one sound, uniform circulation of equal value throughout the country, upon the foundation of national credit, combined with private capital. It seems difficult to conceive of a note circulation which will combine higher local and general credit than this. Every dollar will represent real capital actually invested in national stocks. It will establish a steady market for the nation- al bonds, and facilitate the nesrotiation of Its financial effect. . .^ them greatly. It will reconcile, as far as practicable, the interests of existing banking institutions with those of the w^hole people. It will supply a firm anchorage to the union of the states. Every banking as- sociation whose bonds are deposited in the treasury of the Union, every individual who holds a dollar of the circulation secured by such deposit, every merchant, every manufacturer, every farmer, every mechanic interested in transactions dependent for success on the credit of that circulation, will feel as an injury every attempt to rend the national unity, with the permanence and Its political effect. , t ... , ^ i • i ii i • • stability ot which all their interests are so closely and vitally connected. Had the system been pos- sible, and had it actually existed two years ago, can it be doubted that the national interests and sentiments en- listed by it for the Union would have so strengthened the motives for adhesion derived from other sources that 574 WEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC. [Sect. XIIL the wild treason of secession would have been impos- sible? With the resources at the disposal of the republic, no Intrinsic wealth oue ueed be alarmed lest the United States of the republic. ^^^ become unable to pay the interest on its own debt, or to reduce the principal to whatever point the public interest may indicate. There still remain im- mense resources w^hich have not yet been called into con- tribution. The gold-bearing region of the United States stretches through nearly eighteen degrees of latitude, from British Columbia on the north to Mexico on the south, and through more than twenty degrees of longitude, from the eastern declivities of the Kocky Mountains to the Pa- cific Ocean. It includes two states, California and Oregon, four entire territories, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington, and parts of three other territories, Colorado, Nebraska, and Dakotah. It forms an area of more than a million of square miles, the whole of which, with com- paratively insignificant exceptions, is the property of the nation. It is rich not only in gold, but in silver, copper, iron, lead, and many other valuable minerals. Its product of gold and silver during the current year will not prob- ably fall very much, if at all short of one hundred millions of dollars, and it must continue gradually, yet rapidly to increase. It has been already stated that the amount to be j^ro- The deficiency of ^Idcd beyoud resourccs available under ex- mc^ be'Sppiied istlug laws is, for the current fiscal year, byfoans. $276,912,517 66, and for the ensuing year, $627,388,183 56. To provide these amounts loans must be negotiated. Without any issues of United States notes beyond the amount now authorized, it seems certain that loans for the whole amount required for the current year may be negotiated at fair rates ; and it may be confident- ly hoped that before its close the resources of the coun- Chap. LXIII.] EESUME OF CHASE'S RECOMMENDATIONS. 575 try will be so well understood, and the restoration of its territorial integrity so well assured, that capitalists will not hesitate to suj)ply whatever may be needed for the subsequent year. In conclusion, therefore, the secretary thus briefly sums up his recommendations — that whatever Eesume of Mr. , n t t 1 i Chase's lecom- amouuts mav be needed beyond the sums supplied by revenue and through other in- dicated modes, be obtained by loans, without increasing the issue of United States notes beyond the amount fixed by law, unless a clear public exigency shall demand it. He recommends also the organization of banking associa- tions for the improvement of the public credit, and for the supply to the people of a safe and uniform currency. And he recommends no change in the law providing for the negotiation of bonds, except the necessary increase of amount, and the repeal of the absolute restriction to mar- ket value and of the clauses authorizing convertibility at AvilL The great ability and power with which the money Financial contrast rcsourccs of the uatlou wcro wicMcd are andM?c?oSeder- sufficicutly manifested by the tone and char- ^^^' acter of the foregoing measures. They stand in very strong contrast with the course that was taken in the Confederacy, which from the beginning descended rapidly down to the inevitable gulf of bankruptcy. But Mr. Chase's success in carrying the affairs of the nation forward was, in an eminent degree, due to the resolute manner in which he w^as seconded by the banking insti- tutions of the country. He has himself rendered to them a well-merited acknowledgment : " The promptitude and zeal with which many of the existing (banking) institu- tions came to the financial support of the government in the dark days which followed the outbreak of the rebel- 576 ^'^^ EEPOET OF 1861. [Sect.XIII. lion is not forgotten. They ventured largely, and boldly, and patriotically on tlie side of tlie Union and the consti- tutional supremacy of the nation over states and citizens. It does not at all detract from the merit of the act that the losses which they feared, but unhesitatingly risked, were transmuted into unexpected gains." That is a very strong government which every citizen, from the humblest laborer to the richest capitalist, is will- ing to risk his whole means to ^stain. From the opinions thus lucidly expressed by this great finance minister we may 2:ather — ^thou^rh The tendency of •/ o ^ o wealth to concen- tho War was as vet not half over — the inev- tration. 'it i n itable tendency of wealth, like power, to concentration. The diffused financial lesources of the na- tion were fast finding a focal point. From the resources of the Eepublic I now turn to its means of defense at the close of 18G2. And, first, of the army. Mr. Cameron was the first Secretary of War in Mr. Lincoln's administration. He held that of State of the army. m i i • • fice until the beginning of 1862, when he was succeeded by Mr. Stanton. In his report, made December 1st, 1861, Mr. Cameron War re ort of 18G1 I'^P^^^euted the total strength of the army at 660,971 men. He says: " In organizing this great army I was effectively aided by the loyal governors of the different states. ... So thoroughly aroused was the national heart, that I have no doubt this force would have been swollen to a million had not the department felt compelled to restrict it. . . . It is said of Napoleon by Jomini that, in the campaign of 1815, that great general had, on the 1st of April, a reg- ular army of 200,000 men. On the 1st of June he had increased this force to 414,000. The like proportion, Chap.LXIIL] MR. CAMERON'S REPORT. 577 adds Jomini, ^had he thought proper to inaugurate a vast system of defense, would have raised it to 700,000 men by the 1st of September.' At the commencement of this streDgthofthe rebellion, inaugurated by the attack upon giSSifgonhl* Fort Sumter, the entire military force at ^^''' the disposal of this government was 16,006 regulars, principally employed in the West to hold in check marauding Indians. In April, 75,000 volunteers were called upon to enlist for three months' service, and responded with such alacrity that 77,875 were immediate- ly obtained. Under the authority of the act of Congress of July 22d, 1861, the states were asked to furnish 500,000 volunteers to serve for three years or during the war, and by the act approved the 29th of the same month the ad- dition of 25,000 men to the regular army of the United States was authorized. The result is that o/the mllfta^ry"^^^ we havc uow au armv of upward of 600,000 power, «/ J. / men. If we add to this the number of the discharged three-months' volunteers, the aggregate force furnished to the government since April last exceeds 700,000 men. ... In view of the alacrity and enthu- siasm that have been displayed, I do riot hesitate to ex- press the belief that no combination of events can arise in which this country will not be able not only to pro- tect itself, but, contrary to its policy, which is peace with all the world, to enter upon aggressive operations against any power which may intermeddle with our domestic af- fairs." This report of the Secretary of War made a profound Effect of this report scusatiou iu Europc. Already the unex- in Europe. pectcd military strength of the republic was a subject of solicitude in the English Parliament, and it was evident that any interference in American affairs would have to be conducted in a very guarded manner. II.— O 578 MR. STANTON'S REPORT. [Sect. XIII. ^ ' ^ ^^^^^ Mr. Stanton, as Secretary of War, made a War report of 1862. ' -, «\, report, JJecemDer 1st, 1862, to tne following effect : He stated tliat tlie armies acting under the authority of the United States in those departments that had been the scene of military operations were, during the past strength of the J^ar (775,336), seven hundred and seventy- army at that date, j^^^ thousaud three huudrcd and thirty-six officers and privates, fully armed and equipped. Since the date of the returns this number had been increased to over eight hundred thousand men. He adds : "When the quotas are filled up, the force will number a million of men, and the estimates for next year are based upon that number. " From a survey of the whole field of operations, it is apparent that, whatever disasters our arms may have suf fered at particular points, a great advance has neverthe- less been made. since the commencement of the war. When it began the enemy were in possession of Norfolk and every part of the Southern coast. They held the Mississippi from Cairo to New Orleans. Now the block- Great mmtary sue- aded ports of Charleston and Mobile alone cesses gained. rcmalu to them on the sea-board, and N^w Orleans and Memphis have been wrested from them. Their possession of Vicksburg obstructs the Mississippi, but it is to them of no commercial use. Their strong- holds on the Tennessee and Cumberland Eivers have been captured. General Andrew Johnson, as Military Governor of Tennessee, holds Nashville. The enemy have been driven from Kentucky, West Tennessee, Mis- souri, part of Arkansas, are fleeing before Grant in Mis- sissippi, and all their hopes in Maryland are cut off. In commercial, political, and strategical points of view, more success has attended the Union cause than was ever w^it- nessed upon so large a theatre in the same brief period Chap. LXIIL] WAR REPORT FOR 1862. 579 against so formidable an enemy. ... A chief hope of Disloyal practices those who Set the Tebellioii on foot was for in the North. ^-^ ^^^ comfort ffom disloyal sympathizers in the Northern States, whose efforts were relied upon to divide and distract the people of the North, and prevent them from putting forth their whole strength to. preserve the national existence. The call for volunteers and a draft of the militia afforded an occasion for disloyal per- sons to accomplish their evil purposes by discouraging enlistments, and encouraging opposition to the war and the draft of soldiers to carry it on. "Anxiety was felt in some states at the probable suc- Measures for their ccss of thcsc disloyal practiccs, aud the gov- suppression. emmcut was urged to adopt some measures of protection by temporary restraint of those engaged in these hostile acts. To that end provost-marshals were appointed in some of the states, upon the nomination of their governors, to act under the direction of the state ex- ecutive, and the writ of habeas corpus was suspended by your (the President's) order. By the order of the depart- ment, arrests were^ forbidden unless authorized by the state executive or by the judge advocate. Some instan- ces of unauthorized arrests have occurred, but when brought to the notice of the department the parties have been immediately discharged. By a recent order, all per- sons arrested for discouraging enlistments, or for disloyal practices in states wkfire the quotas of volunteers or mili- tia are filled up, have been released. Other persons ar- rested by military commanders, and sent from depart- ments where their presence was deemed dangerous to the public safety, have been discharged upon parole to be of good behavior, and do no act of hostility against the gov- ernment of the United States. While military arrests of disloyal persons form the subject of complaint in some states, the discharge of such persons is complained of in 580 MAGNITUDE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. [Sect. XIII. other states. It has been the aim of the department to avoid any encroachment upon individual rights as far as might be consistent with public safety and the preserva- tion of the government. But reflecting minds will per-' ceive that no greater encouragement can be given to the enemy, no more dangerous act of hostility can be perpe- trated in this war, than efforts to prevent recruiting and enlistments for the armies upon whose strength national existence depends. The expectations of the rebel leaders and their sympathizers in loyal states that the call for volunteers would not be answered, and that the draft could not be enforced, have failed, and nothing is left but to clamor at the means by which their hopes were frus- trated, and to strive to disarm the government in future, if in the chances of war another occasion for increasing the military force should arise. " The successful movement of the various expeditions by sea, the transportation of such lar^e Magnitude of the it /». tii* ^ t military opera- Dodies 01 troops aud their regular supply at distant points of the coast, afford striking proofs of the greatness of the military resources of the nation. These movements have been upon a scale of great magnitude. The collection of the vast armies which have been raised, and their transport to the field of operations in so brief a period, would not have been possible but for the extent of our system of steam trans- port by railroad, river, and sea. • ..." In general terms, it may be stated that the issues by the Ordnance Department include 1926 field and siege, and 1206 fortification cannon; 7294 gun-carriages, cais- sons, mortar-beds, traveling forges, and battery wagons ; 1,276,686 small-arms; 987,291 sets of equipments and accoutrements, and 213,991,127 rounds of ammunition for artillery and small-arms, still leaving large supplies of ordnance stores at the arsenals and depots. Chap. LXIIL] THE SLAVE ELEMENT. 53^ ... "It appears from tlie report of the acting paymas- ter general that during the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1862, the sum of $5,560,039 was paid to the regu- lar troops; that $91,116,610 were paid to volunteers; and that $38,597,819 have been paid since the 30th of June, 1862. . . . From this report " it is seen that a force has been Great strength of pl^ccd by thc pcople of thc United States the army. ^^ ^^^ commaud of thc government to main- tain its authority more mighty in all the elements of warfare than was ever before arrayed under one banner. How shall that force be employed? To smite the ene- my on every hand, to attack his armies and strong-holds, to occupy his ports, clear the great rivers of the West from his obstructions, and pause not until he is subdued, is our great duty. Above all, it is our duty to disdain Necessity of usin- no legitimate aid that may save the lives of the slave element: ^^^ ^^^j^^^ SOldicrS, diminish their kbOTS, provide for their want^, and lessen the burdens of our people. No aphorism is more universally received than that ' the sole object of a just war is to make the enemy feel the evils of his injustice, and by his sufferings amend his ways ; he must therefore be attacked in the most ac- cessible quarter.' The power of the rebels rests upon their peculiar system of labor, which keeps laborers on their plantations to support owners who are devoting their time and strength to destroy our armies and de- stroy our government. "Whenever that system is in hos- tility to the government, it is, in my opinion, the duty of those conducting the war to strike down the system, and turn against the rebels the productive power that sup- ports the insurrection. Eightly organized in the recover- Advantages of its ^d territory, the laborers of the rebel states military use. ^j|j ^^^ ^^^^ ^.^ j^ holdiug fortificd posi- tions, but their labor will, as in India, free the white sol- 5S2 EFFECTS OF USING THE SLAVES. [Sect. XIII. diers from the most unwholesome exposnre of the South. They will cultivate the corn and forage, which will feed our cavalry and artillery horses, and save the country a portion of the enormous burden now attending their pur- chase and transportation from the North. This cultiva- tion would have been of greater advantage to us on the southeastern coast than even that of the great staple of the Sea Islands. Probably the people who remained upon these islands, within protection of our armies, could, under wise control, have supplied all the forage needed Its effect on military ^hls year by thc forces in the department transportation; ^^ ^-^^ g^^^j^^ rj.^^ ^^^^i ratioU for a horSe weighs twenty-six pounds, that of a soldier three pounds. An army, well-organized and equipped for active opera- tions, with a due proportion of cavalry, artillery, and bag- gage-trains, will have not less than one horse or mule to every four soldiers, so that the weight of food for the an- imals is more than double that of the rations for the men. How important an aid, how great an economy, in a long contest, therefore, there would be in raising by this cheap labor the greater part of the forage alone for the South- ern department — thus, for a great portion of our wants, transferring the base of supplies, now at New York, to Hilton Head or New Orleans. " The department has found it difficult to transfer this labor from one part of the seat of war to another. Local and family ties seem to be very strong with these peo- ple, and, with all their faith in the power and good- will of our military commanders, it was found difficult to get volunteer laborers to leave Port Eoyal for other depots. "A population of four millions, true to the interests of the Union, with a slight assistance from the army, will, under proper regulation and government, be of the great- est assistance in holding the territory once recovered. The principal staples of the South are the products ex- Chap. LXIII.] EFFECTS OF USING THE SLAVES. 5g3 clusively of their labor. If protected upon the lands they have heretofore cultivated, with some organization, and with support from small detachments of loj^al troops, they would not only produce much of what is needed to feed our armies and their trains, but they would forever cut off from the rebellion the resources of a country thus occupied. " The rebel armies move with ease through portions of the Border States, living upon the country in which our commanders find no supplies. The people bring forth their hoards and offer them to the rebels for sale or gift. Protect the laboring population, who are the ma- jority in the greater part of the South, in the possession of the land and its products, and this great advantage will, for whatever portion of the country we occupy, be transferred to us. As soon as the coast is thoroughly occupied and the people organized, trade will revive. Cotton, rice, sugar, and other products will be exchanged by the prodiicer for what he needs. Their wants will be in restoring indus- suppHcd dircct from the Northern factories, try to the ^outh. ^^^ ^^^ cultivatiou of the great staples will pay for what they use. A perfectly free trade may thus again grow up between the North and the South, and, with greater or less rapidity, it will spread over the whole country as our forces succeed in meeting and dis- persing the rebel armies. "The greater part of the whole country which formerly produced the sea-island cotton is now thoroughly restored to the Union. The laborers are there — the soil and cli- mate. It needs only assurance of protection to revive the cultivation of the staple, as well as to produce vast quantities of corn and forage for our troops. Since this war must be conducted by marches, and battles, and sieges, why neglect the best means to make them success- ful and their results permanent ? It is worthy of notice 584 LOYALTY OF THE SLAVES. [Sect. XHI. that thus far the portions of territory which, once recov- and in hoidin- con- ^red, we have most firmly held, are precisely quered territory. ^^^^^ -^ ^j^ . ^^ ^^^ gPCatCSt proportioU of CoL ored men are found. By their assistance our armies will be able permanently to operate in and occupy the country; and in labor for the army in raising its and their own sup- plies, full occupation can be given them,and with this there will be neither occasion nor temptation to them to emi- grate to a northern and less congenial climate. Judging by experience, no colored man will leave his home in the South if protected in that home. All possibility of com- petition from negro labor in the North is avoided by giv- ing colored men protection and employment thejg masters' upou the soil which they have thus far cul- tivated, and the right to which has been va- cated by the original proprietors, deeply involved in the ci:imes of treason and rebellion. No great territory has been permanently reduced without depriving the leaders of its people of their lands and property. It is these that give power and influence. Few men have the command- ing genius and talent to exercise dangerous influence over their fellow-men without the adventitious aid of money and of property. By striking down this system of com- pulsory labor, which enables the leaders of the rebellion to control the resources of the people, the rebellion would die of itself " Under no circumstances has any disposition to servile Universal loyalty iusurrcctiou bccu exhibited by the colored of the slaves. population iu any Southern State, while a strong lo^^alty to the federal government has been dis- played on every occasion and against every discourage- ment. By the means suggested, the rebellion may be disarmed and subdued swiftly and effectually, and the lives of our own people saved from slaughter on the bat- tle-field. By the occupation of all their ports on the Mis- Chap. LXIII.] WEAKNESS OF THE SOUTH. 585 sissippi and the sea-coast, a market will be opened in every rebel state for the industry of our people to supply the wants of the army, and also of a loyalpopulation, in exchange for the valuable products of their labor. An- other point of attack is by armed settlements upon the vacant government lands in Florida and Texas. Thou- sands in the Northern and Western States are impatient- ly waiting the signal of military movements to plant their homes in the best territory of this continent, and bring it Political weakness back to the Union as loyal states. So far of the south. ^^,^^ ^^^ Southern States being invincible, no enemy was ever so vulnerable, if the means at hand are employed against them. If your (the President's) prop- osition for compensated emancipation and a voluntary re- turn to loyalty be blindly rejected, still the proper appli- cation of the means at command of the government can not fail to accomplish the suppression of the rebellion and a restoration of those peaceful relations which were designed to be establisjied forever on this continent by the Union of the States." As respects the navy. Mr. Welles was the Secretary ,,„ ^ of the Navy durincr the war. He made a Navy report of 1862. / j^ , report of its condition on December 1st, 1862, to the following effect : " Since the commencement of our national difficulties Four great squad- ^^^ powcrful squadrous havc been collect- rons collected. ^^^ orgauized, and stationed for duty on our maritime frontier, with a rapidity and suddenness which finds no approach to a parallel in previous naval history, and which it is believed no country but our own could have achieved. These squadrons have been incessantly maintaining a strict blockade of such gigantic propor- tions that eminent foreign statesmen in the highest scenes of legislation did not hesitate, at its commencement, pub- 58$ NAVY KEPORT FOR 1862. [Sect. XIII. licly to denounce it as a ' material impossibility ;' and yet, after this most imposing naval undertaking liad been for a period of eighteen months in operation, and after its reach had been effectively extended along pietJiy blockaded the entire sweep of our Atlantic and Gulf the South. ^ n ^ r^-i coasts, from the outlet oi the Chesapeake to the mouth of the Eio Grande, the same eminent authori- ties, with a list in their hands of all the vessels which had evaded or escaped the vigilance of our blockading forces, could not refuse, in thfeir official statements, to admit, with reluctant candor, that the proof of the efficiency of the blockade was conspicuous and wholly conclusive, and that in no previous wsly had the ports of an enemy's country been so effectively closed by a naval force. But even such testimony was not needed. The proof of the fact abounds in the current price of our Proofs of the com- o ii i i • j^i j_ • 1 pietenessofthe feouthem staplcs lu the 2:reat commercial blockade. .,111 1 • n • marts of the world, and more especially m the whole industrial and commercial condition of the in- surgent region. It should not be forgotten that no cir- cumstance is wanting to attest the magnitude of this greatest of all naval triumphs. The industrial necessi- ties and the commercial cupidity of all the principal mar- itime nations, armed and empowered as they are by the resources of modern invention, are kept at bay. A mul- titude of island harbors under foreign jurisdiction, look- ing nearly upon our shores, and affording the most con- venient lurking-places from which illicit commerce may leap forth to its prohibited destination and purpose, are so closely watched as to render the peril of all such vent- ures far greater than even their enormous gains when successful. And, finally, a vast line of sea-coast, nearly three thousand miles in extent, much of it with a double shore, and nearly honeycombed with inlets and harbors, has been so beleaguered and locked up that the whole chap.lxiil] success of the naval operations. 587 Southern commerce no longer exists. immense foreign commerce whicli was tlie very life of the industry and opulence of the vast region which it borders has practically ceased to exist." The secretary then reports that the navy has teen or- ganized into, (1), the North Atlantic squadron ; (2), the South Atlantic squadron ; (3), the Eastern Gulf squad- ron ; (4), the Western Gulf squadron. These great squad- rons were on the maritime frontier. Besides them, there were on the interior waters, (5), the Mississippi flotilla ; (6), the Potomac flotilla. A succinct account is then given of the expeditions un- dertaken and operations executed by these squadrons, the remark being premised that these were undertaken in addition to the unrelaxing labors of the blockade; the The Mississippi general result being that the Mississippi, the nearly opened^ ^^^^j^ ^^^^^^, ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^-^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ Union, with its principal tributaries, embracing many thousand miles of inland navigation, which had been in- terrupted, was brought under control, except at Vicks- The Atlantic sea- l>urg. Nearly the entire sea-board of the board nearly seized, ij^g^rgent rcgiou, ou its main points of com- mercial and strategic importance, from Norfolk and the outlet of the Chesapeake, through Roanoke, Newbern, and Beaufort, N. C.,Port Royal, Tybee, Fernandina, Key West, •Pensaeola, to New Orleans and Galveston, is practically in our hands, held fast and irrecoverably under the guns of our navy, or else garrisoned and governed by military force. Referring then to the naval operations of the enemy, Naval operations ^^^ Secretary says : " The rebel armed steam- of the enemy. ^^ Sumter, which, after committing depreda- tions, was, at the date of my last report, fleeing to escape our cruisers, crossed the Atlantic. She was tracked to Gibraltar, where she has since remained, one of our cruisers 588 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVY. [Sect. XIII. vigilantly guarding her from Algeziras. With this ex- ception, no other armed vessel had plundered our com- merce or inflicted injury on our countrymen until within The Alabama, ^ rcceut pcriod, whcu a steamer known as ^' '''• 290, or Alabama, built and fitted out in En- gland, her crew composed almost exclusively of British subjects, w^ent forth to prey on our shipping. She has no register, no record, no regular ship's papers, no evi- dence of transfer. Built in England, she was permitted by the authorities of that country to sail from one of their ports, though informed by the recognized official agents of this government of her character and purposes. As regards the development of the naval force of the Rapid development Ecpubllc, the sccrctary says : "When I enter- of the navy. ^^ upou the discharge of my public duties in March, 1861, there were but 42 vessels in commission, and but 76 then attached to the navy have been made available. Most of those in commission were abroad ; and of the 7600 seamen in pay of the government, there were, on the 10th of March, 1861, but 207 men in all the ports and receiving-ships on the Atlantic coast to man our ships and protect the navy yards and depots, and to aid in suppressing the rising insurrection. "Neither the expiring administration nor Congress, which had been in session until the 4th of March, had taken measures to increase or strengthen our naval power,* notwithstanding the lowering aspect of our public affairs, so that when, a few weeks after the inauguration, I desired Its deficiencies at troops for thc protcctlou of the public prop- the outset. ^^,^^ ^^ Norfolk and Annapolis, or sailors to man and remove the vessels, neither soldiers nor sailors could be procured. There were no men to man our ships, nor were the few ships at our yards in a condition to be put into immediate service. " The proclamation of April, placing our entire coast. Chap. LXIII.] CONDITION OF THE NAVY IN 1862. 539 from the mouth of the Chesapeake to the Kio Grande, under blockade, found us with a naval force, even were every vessel on our coast, inadequate to the work re- quired. I have, in former reports, made full exposition of the steps Avhich were promptly taken to recall our for- eign squadrons, and the progress which had been made in auo^mentinc: our navy by repairinsr and steps takeu to ren- n,,' t,« i mi der the navy for- tittiug, as cxpeditiously as possiblc, every available vessel owned by the government ; by purchasing such others as could be made speedily useful in guarding our shallow and peculiar coast ; and by rapidly constructing as many steamers as could be built at our navy yards, and employing, to the extent that we could procure materials, engines, and machinery, the resources of the country in adding others from pri- vate ship-yards. The result is that we have at this time afloat, or progressing to rapid completion, a naval force Condition of the cousisting of 427 vessels, there having been navy at this time, ^^^j^^j j-^ those of the old uavy, exclusive of those that were lost, 353 vessels, armed in the aggregate with 1577 guns, and of the capacity of 240,028 tons. The annals of the world do not show so great an increase in so brief a period to the naval power of any country. " The appropriations made by Congress for the navy for Financial provi- the fiscal ycar ending June 30, 1862, were . '''"' '"' '"' upward of forty-three and a half millions of dollars ; for the year ending June 30th, 1863, nearly fifty- three millions ; and for the following year, June 30th, 1864, upward of sixty-eight millions." CHAPTER LXIV. PROGRESS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT. The Republican party, attaining to power, was constrained by its position, and in- duced by its political sentiments, to adopt many anti-slavery measures, such as the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and its prohibition in the Territories. President Lincoln, at his accession, considered it his chief duty to save the Union without reference to slavery. Finding, however, that the slave question could not be 'avoided, he proposed plans of colonization and compensated emancipation. JVIilitary events by degrees rendering the abolition of slavery an unavoidable neces- , sity, he at length issued a Proclamation of Emancipation. The anti-slavery measures of tlie government may be Classification of an- coHveniently groiiped Under two heads I 1st. ti-siavery measures, rj.^^^^ originating iu Cougress ; 2d. Tliose originating witli the President. On the retirement of the Southern members from Con- Attitude of the Re- gress, the Eepublican party occupied a posi- pubiican party. ^-^^ ^f irresistiblo influence in that body. In accordance with the principles laid down at its first Convention in Philadelphia (June, 1856), and reaffirmed at its second Convention in Chicago (May, 1860), it was not possible for it, in view of the assaults that the slave power was now making, to do otherwise than enter on a course of legislation aiming at the destruction of its an- tagonist. With President Lincoln it was different. Though he Attitude of the was always true to the principles of the President. party which had placed him in his eminent position, he was compelled, from that very position, to re- gard things from a point of view of his own. With him the restoration of the Union, the integrity of the republic, was the primary, the great object. Chai-.lxiv.] anti-slaveey measures of congress. 591 But, though thus the dominant power in Congress on the one hand, and the President on the other, had each a special intention, there was no conflict, nor even any mis- understanding between them. Each appreciated and strengthened the other. 1st. The Anti-slavery measures of Congress. Among the measures taken by Congress, there are six Congressional anti- to which attention may be particularly di- slavery measures. ^^^^^^^ rpj^^^ ^^^ . (1)^ thc liberation of slaves used for insurrectionary purposes ; (2), the prohi- bition of persons in the army returning fugitive slaves ; (3), the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia ; (4), the prohibition of slavery in the Territories; (5), the employment of colored soldiers ; (6), the Confiscation Act. Mr. Henry Wilson, one of the senators from Massachu- setts, who took a very prominent part in promoting the adoption of these measures, has given a record of them under the title of " History of the Anti-slavery Measures of the Thirty-seventh and Thirty^eighth United States Congresses." To that work I may refer the reader for details. (1.) The liberation of slaves used for iifisnrrectioiiary purposes. , From the commencement of hostilities the Confederates had employed their slaves in aid of military msur^ection made purposcs. Thc batterfcs which rcduccd Fort Sumter were constructed by negro hands; the labor of slaves lightened the toils of the rebel soldiers and augmented the power of rebel armies. On the 6th of August, 1861, a bill was approved by the President making forever free all slaves so used. This was the only anti-slavery act passed at the extra session of Congress. (2.) The proliibition of persons in ilie army returning fugitive slaves. 592; ANTI-SLAVERY MEASURES OF CONGRESS. [Sect. XIII. As the national armies advanced into the slaveliolding districts, many fugitive slaves escaped to Army officers not to., . .-, •, pii»*/» ^ return fiigitive tncm m the hoDC 01 obtammg* ireedom, sljivcs* some coming with a view of offering their services to work or fight; some bringing intelligence; some, such as old persons, and particularly women, with their children, seeking refuge under the national flag. Some officers of the army accorded to these fugitives protection ; some refused to admit them into their lines ; some drove them out ; some even permitted slave-masters to search the camps and carry off their slaves. On the 13th of March, 1862, the President approved a bill enacting an article of war dismissing from the service officers guilty of surrendering such fugitives. (3.) The abolition of slavery in the District of Columhia. About three thousand persons were held in slavery in Slavery aboiishea thc Dlstrlct of Columbia, the seat of the na- in the District. ^-^^^^-^ capital. They were subject to laws and ordinances of great severity, known under the title of the "Black Code." In the City of Washington itself the slave-trade was carried on. On the 16th of April, 1862, a bill was signed by the President abolishing slavery in the District, granting compensation to the owners of slaves, and abrogating the Black Code. On the approval of the act by the President, " the en- franchised bondmen assembled in their churches and offered up the homage and gratitude of their hearts to God for this boon of personal freedom." (4.) The 'prohibition of slavery in the Territories. The political condition of the Territories as to freedom Slavery prohibited or skvcry had been, for many years before in the Territories. ^^^ geccssion of thc Southcm Statcs, a sub- ject of incessant and bitter controversy. In volume i. the reader's attention has been repeatedly chap.lxiv.] anti-slavery measures of congress. 593 drawn to this as one of the most prominent facts in the history of the Eepublic. A bill was passed by Congress after vehement opposi- tion from certain Democratic members and members from the Border States. It was, on June 10th, 1862, approved by the President, and is to the following effect : A7i Act to secure Freedom to all Persons withm the Territories of the United States. "To the end that freedom may be and remain forever the law of the land in all places whatsoever, so far as it lies within the power or depends upon the action of the government of the United States to make it so, therefore, ''''Be it enacted, That, from and after the passage of this act, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the Ter- ritories of the United States now existing, or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the United States, other- wise than in punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." (5.) The employment of colored soldiers. On the failure of McClellan's expedition in the Peninsu- AMcans to be em- 1^, it bccame apparent that the organization ployed in the army, ^f j^^gp^j regimCUtS COuld UOt bc pOStpOUCd. The President was therefore empowered to " receive into the service of the United States, for any military or naval service for which they may be found competent, persons of African descent, who shall be enrolled and organized under such regulations, not inconsistent with the Consti- tution and the laws, as he may prescribe." It was also enacted that any slave of a person in rebel- and certain of their ,. -,. , •inn relatives to be made jiou rendering any such service shall forever thereafter be free, together with his wife, mother, and children, if they also belong to persons in rebellion. The bill was approved July 17th, 1862. (6.) Tlie Confiscation Act It had become plain that, though the Confederate au- thorities abstained from the employment of slaves as sol- II.— P p 594 ANTI-SLAVERY MEASURES OF CONGRESS. [Sect. XIII. The Confiscation di^rs, a vcpy great advantage was derived ^'^^' from tlieir use in civil life. They took charge of all agricultural operations on the plantations and farms, not only thereby furnishing subsistence to the armies, but releasing for military purposes large numbers of white men. Of all the anti-slavery measures of Congress, those in- tended to bear on these points were the most energetic- ally contested, and that not only by members who were considered to be the defenders of slavery, but by some of the Eepublican party. The original propositions un- derwent much modification. There were also differences of opinion between the Senate and House. The shape which the act eventually took was, in effect, a combina- tion of what were known as the Confiscation and Eman- cipation bills. It provided that all slaves of persons who shall give aid and comfort to the rebellion, who shall take refuge within the lines of the army; all slaves cap- tured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government ; and all slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free and not again held as slaves; that fugitive slaves shall not be surrendered to persons who have given aid and comfort to the rebellion; that no person engaged in the military or naval service shall surrender fugitive slaves on pain of being dismissed from the service ; that the President may employ persons of African descent for the suppression of the rebellion, and organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare. This bill passed the House and Senate by large majorities, and was approved by the President July 17th, 1862. These were not all the anti-slavery measures adopt- Chap. LXIV.] ANTI-SLAVERY MEASURES OF CONGRESS. 595 Certain minor anti- ed by Congress I thePG weiG others which, slavery measures. ^^^^^^-^ perhaps of less piessliig liiterest, showed equally the direction of public policy. Among these may be mentioned the admission of colored wit- nesses into the courts of the District of Columbia, the re- striction of the Fugitive Slave Act, except the claimant made oath that he had not given aid and comfort to the rebellion, the concession of the right of search in the case of suspected slave-ships, the recognition of Hayti and Li- beria. From the speeches delivered in both houses, it may be gathered that the !N"orth was resting on an intellectual basis — it was enforcing an idea. The burden of these speeches is the immorality of slavery, the accountability of the nation to God and to the civilized world, the ne- cessity of ending a great wrong and of sustaining the rights of humanity, the enforcement of justice, law, order, the denunciation of domestic tyranny and civil war. A single extract will illustrate their spirit : " Slavery is in itself wrong, and can only be secure in Sentiments of the ^ wroug govemmeut. It knows no laws but Repubucan party, ^j^^^^ of aggrcssiou aud forcc ; being in the habitual exercise of despotic power over an inferior race, it learns to despise and disregard the rights of all races. It has sown the wind — ^let it reap the whirlwind. By the laws of peace it was entitled to protection, and it had it ; by the laws of war it is entitled to annihilation. In God's name, let it have that too." Such being the incentive of the Eepublican orators, Arguments of their their Parliamentary antagonists in the slav- opponents. ^^^ intcrcst IB. the Border States, and their allies still representing themselves as of the Democratic party, declined all appeal to moral considerations, and rested their arguments on the rights which they affirmed they had under the Constitution, and the material advan- 596 ANTI-SLAVERY ACTS OF THE PRESIDENT. [Sect. XIIL tages or disadvantages wMcli would result from the adop- tion or rejection of the measure under consideration. On these occasions we still trace without difficulty the idealistic tendency of the North, the materialistic tend- ency of the South — a tendency displayed throughout all their previous history (vol. i., p. 146). The one was guided by what it conceived to be right, the other by what it conceived to be advantageous. Moreover, it can not be overlooked that some of the Views of the North- ^^^st forcible aud ablest efforts on the Ke- western people. publlcau sido wero made by members from the Northwestern States, who doubtless completely rep- resented the tone of thought of their constituencies. One of the most serious political mistakes made by the Con- federate government was its belief that anti-slavery in- tentions were substantially limited to New England. To a late period of the war it indulged the expectation that the Northwestern States would abandon the Union and join in the secession movement. In* this it overlooked the fact that the population of those states was substan- tially an offshoot from New England, and it did not clear- ly appreciate that the influence of Nature throughout those regions perpetually strengthens the tendency to Teutonic modes of thought. 2d. Anti-slavery acts of the President. At the time of his accession to the Presidency, Lin- coln, in his inaugural address, reiterated a declaration he had formerly made, affirming that he had no purpose, di- rectly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery views on slavery at in tho statcs whcre it exists. "I believe I have no lawful right, and I have no inten- tion to do so." No better exposition of the President's views can be given than that which he himself has furnished in a let- ter to his friend Mr. Greeley, who had addressed to him Chap. LXIV.] LINCOLN'S VIEWS ON SLAVERY. 597 an appeal exhorting him to proclaim the slaves free, and assuring him that " all attempts to put down the rebel- lion, and at the same time to uphold the inciting cause, are preposterous and futile." "My paramount object," says Lincoln (August, 1862), " is to save the Union, and not either to save His paramount ob- , t i t t/» x it ji jectto save the or to desti'oy slavcry. It i could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it ; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it ; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that." " I have here stated my purpose according to my views of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-repeated personal wish that all men every where should be free." He thus acted upon the principle that the preservation He regards slavery <^^ thc Rcpublic was Ms first duty, aud that, as a minor matter. ^J^g^^gygj. Jj]g perSOUal OpiuloUS aud wlshcS in relation to slavery might be, he must regard it as a " minor matter." Very soon, however, he began more clearly to perceive that Unionism and slavery were incompatible, and that the latter Was the instrument by which the leaders of se- cession were destroying the life of the nation. Directing his attention to the Border States, he saw that in Delaware there was but one slave to sixty free persons ; in Maryland, one to seven ; in Western Virginia, one to eighteen ; in Kentucky, one to four ; in Missouri, one to ten. Moreover, the distribution of these slaves Gradnai changes in was vcry uncqual. To a very large extent his views. ^i^^y ^^^^,^ concentrated in limited localities. There were whole counties in these states that had only three or four slaves. And as soon as it was evident that war was unavoidable, the proportion underwent a great change. To prevent their escape to the national armies or into the Free States, the negroes w^ere transferred to- ward the Gulf. 598 COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION. [Sect.XIIL K the Border States could be detached from the He tries to detach Confederacy, its population would be re- the Border states, ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^ quartcr miUions (12,239,996) to less than eight and three quarter mil- lions (8,709,780), and a blow, perhaps fatal, would be struck at it. We have already seen (vol. i., p. 296, 307) that the translation of the black population to the cotton regions was taking place under an irresistible law, and that, had not the Civil War occurred, the Border States must neces- sarily have soon been free. Under these circumstances, it appeared to Lincoln that his sense of duty as regarded the safety of compensated tho Ecpublic, Ms bcHcf that there was a con- emancipation. .., . rt 1 1»T stitutional protection for slavery binding upon the Free States, his personal desire " that all men should be free," might be satisfied by some scheme of emancipation with compensation in the Border States. He would pay the owners of slaves in those states a fair equivalent for their freedom. That done, since the Cotton States can not politically exist without the Border States, the insurgent communities must gravitate back to the Union. So thought Abraham Lincoln, a just and most merciful man. With rectitude of purpose he tried to discharge what he considered to be his obligations to the Constitu- tion, acknowledging, however, that he knew himself to be in the hands of One who tolerates no excuses for wrong, and with whom Justice is paramount. Accordingly the President passed by degrees, which perhaps were insensible to himself, from a denial of his power of interference, to absolute and unconditional emancipation. He has told us of his hesitations and doubts in a letter written not long (1864) before his death : " I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional Chap. LXIV.] LINCOLN'S KELUCTANCE TO ACT. 599 might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed that ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had tried to pre- avoidThlPdeci-^ serve the Constitution, if to save slavery or 8ive measure. any minor matter I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution altogether. When, early in the war, General Fremont attempted mili- tary emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an. indispensable necessity. When, a little later. General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later. General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March, and May, and July, 1862, 1 made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either sur- rendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying a strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss, but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign re- lations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force — no loss by it anyhow or any where. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men, and we could not have had them without the measure. "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess 600 CONTRADICTORY ARMY ORDERS. [Sect. XTTT. plainly that events have controlled me. noi resist, eof events, the force of JSTow, at the end of three vears of strue:- events. _. ' _ "^ o gling, the nation's condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and higher power is wlUs, also, that WO of tho North, as well as compelling him. r» t o you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere his justice and mercy." The army orders and instructions in relation to slaves show in a very interesting manner how im- oTdeSinxeSt^l perfectly the true method of dealing with slaves. 1. »/ o the Confederacy was understood by the na- tional leaders. McClellan would put the slaves down " with an iron hand." Cameron would not surrender any coming within the army lines. Patterson would repress all servile insurrection. Mansfield would harbor none in his camps. Butler looked upon them as contraband. Fremont proclaimed them free in his department. Dix would not interfere between the slave and his master. Wool would give the slaves employment, and regulate their pay and allowances. Halleck would drive them out of his lines ; he prohibited the stealing and conceal- ment of them by his soldiers. Burnside declared that he would not interfere with slavery. Subserviency to the slave interest may be considered as having reached its shameful climax in the American army when Buell and Hooker actually authorized slaveholders to search the national camps for fugitives and carry them away. The major commanding one of the regiments under the latter general reported that so great was the visible dissatisfac- tion and murmuring among the soldiers that he almost feared for the safety of the slaveholders. He added that Chap.lxiv.] colonization and compensation. ^01 "when they were within one hundred yards of our camp, one of their number discharged two pistol-shots at a ne- gro who was running past them, with the evident inten- tion of taking his life. This greatly enraged our men." This surrendering of negroes was positively forbidden by Doubleday, who ordered them to be treated, not as chattels, but as persons. Hunter, in his department, pro- claimed them all free, and the President, in another proc- lamation, rescinded that of Hunter. In his first annual message (December 3d, 1861) Lin- Lincoin proposes colu proposcd colouizatiou, lu some terri- colonization. ^^^^ outsido of the republic, of those ne- groes who through the operations of the war might be- come free. He even suggested that it might be well to consider whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals might de- sire, be included in such colonization. The measure, how- ever, met with no very emphatic approval in Congress. One hundred thousand dollars were appropriated to aid in the colonization of the free blacks of the District of Total failure ColumHa. A fsw werc taken to Cow Island, of that plan. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^f Ilsijti, but thc schcmc speed- ily proved a failure. In the following spring (March 6th, 1862), in a special message to the houses of Congress, Lincoln suggested that they should adopt the following joint resolution : " JResolved, That the United States ought to co-operate with any „ state which may adopt STradiial abolishment of slav- He proposes com- j i » pensated emanci- ery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used ^^ ^"°' by such state, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by such change of sys- tem." " If the proposition contained in the resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the country, there gQ2 COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION. [SECT.Xm. is an end of it; but if it does command such approval,! deem it of importance that the states and people imme- diately interested should be at once distinctly notified of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to accept or reject it. The federal government would find its highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that this govern- ment will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the inde- pendence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all the Slave States north of such part will then say, ' The Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern section.' To de- prive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation has that effect. . . . While it is true that the adoption of the proposed reso- lution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results." In the discussion which ensued in the House, it was apparent that the representatives of the Border States, and the Democratic members generally, were determined Congressional re- ^o Tcslst emancipation, whether compensated sistance to it. ^^ ^^^^ q^^ declarcd that his people were not prepared to enter upon the proposed work of pur- chasing the slaves of other people, and turning them loose in their midst ; another demanded what clause of the Constitution gives power to Congress to appropriate the treasure of the United States to buy negroes and set them free; another did not understand that the House must follow the beck of the President. It had its duties to dis- charge as well as he. Notwithstanding this opposition, the joint resolution The joint resoiixtion passcd both houscs, and was approved by inoperative. ^^ President (April 10th, 1862). It re- Chap.LXIV.] HUNTER'S proclamation. gQg mained, however, practically a dead letter — no Slave State ever claimed its benefits. It was shortly after this that Lincoln felt himself con- strained to issue a proclamation indicating his relations to slavery at the time (May 19th, 1862). Major General Hunter, in command at Hilton Head, South counte?-prodama- Oaroliua, had, as is mentioned (p. 601), is- tion to Hunter. _ ' _V .,^ ^,, ^^^^x t i • sued an order (May 9th, 1862) declaring the states Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina to be un- der martial law ; and that, since slavery and martial law are incompatible in a free country, all persons held as slaves in those states he declares to be henceforth and forever free. President Lincoln, in his proclamation, recites the order of General Hunter, and continues : " And whereas the same is producing some excitement and misunderstanding; therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, proclaim and declare that the government of the United States had no knowledge or belief of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a proclamation, nor has it yet any authentic information that the document is genuine, and, farther, that neither General Hunter nor any other commander or person has been authorized by the government of the United States to make proclamation declaring the slaves of any state free ; and that the supposed proclamation now in question, whether genuine or false, He reserves eman- • t . . i • i /» , i cipation to him- IS altogether void, so lar as respects such declaration. I farther make known that, whether it be competent for me, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of any state or states free, and whether, at any time or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the main- tenance of the government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my, responsibility, I re- ^04 LINCOLN AND THE BORDER STATES. [Sect. XIII. serve to myself, and wHch I can not feel justified in leav- ing: to the decision of commanders in the field. " These are totally different questions from police reg- ulation in armies or in camps." The President then refers to and quotes the joint reso- lution he had recommended to Congress (p. 601), and continues : " The resolution, in the language above quoted, was Heimpioresthe ^doptcd by large majorities in both branch ac°cete%ahff ^'^ ^^ of Cougress, aud now stands an authen views. ^-^^ definite, and solemn proposal of the na tion to the states and people most interested in the sub ject-matter. To the people of those states now I appeal I do not argue. I beseech you to make the arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times — " Notwithstanding this earnest appeal, no response came from the Border States. Yet Lincoln did grefs^ti'^complnsT uot 2:ive up his poHcv. Shortlv before the ted emancipation. tat •! close of the session, he sent a special mes- sage to Congress suggesting the passage of a bill which should provide that, on any state abolishing slavery, bonds of the United States should be delivered to it of a certain sum for every slave, the whole to be paid at once if the emancipation was immediate, or in instal- ments if gradual. No final action was, however, taken by Congress upon it, the general impression being that all such measures were useless. Even the Border States would not hearken to emancipation, whether with com- pensation or not. Still tenaciously clinging to his idea, he now (July 12 th) requested an interview with all the He has an interview , r» /-i (* j i t^ t with the Border del- mcmoers 01 Con2:ress from the Border egations. , *-^ States, in which he urged them to accept his plan. He told them that through the war the slave Chap. LXIV.] LINCOLN'S RELUCTANCE TO ACT. QQ^ property among tliem tad greatly diminislied in value, and before long would altogether disappear; lie asked if it were not best to secure substantial compensation for what would otherwise be wholly lost. On their part, they could not see why they were called upon to make so great a sacrifice. Meantime the Confederate government had brought its Effect of the penin- couscrfpts luto the field. They had termin- suiar disasters. ^^^^ McClellau's Campaign ; they had over- thrown Pope, had threatened Washington, and invaded Maryland. It was clearly perceived throughout the North that th^se disasters, with all the waste of life and money that had attended them, could not have occurred had the poor whites, by whom the Southern armies were recruited, been compelled to remain at home. The slaves were attending to the plantations and raising provisions, while the whites were repairing to the armies. Incited by such considerations, public opinion began to Public opinion in- P^css upou Llucolu, requiring him to bring fiaencedbythem. ^-^^ ^^^^^ element over to the national side by proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves. The im- pression was becoming universal that either that must be done or the Union must be given up. On the occasion of an interview which he had with some religious persons who had come from The President's in- x-^, • ^ , i n • t • terview with certain Chicaffo lor the DurDoso 01 urfirmfij upon him religious persons. *-* , « . . t • i • the necessity oi emancipation, Lincoln, m a simple but clear manner, explained the views he enter- tained of the position of affairs ; among other things, he said: "What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do as we are now situated ? I do not want to issue a document which the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's Bull against the Comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I can ^06 LINCOLN'S POSITION. [Sect.XIIL not even enforce tlie Constitution in tlie rebel states ? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual tliat would be influenced by it there ? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines ? Yet I can not learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us — "Now tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire. Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds ; for, as commander-in- chief of the army and navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy ; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature in view of possible consequences of insurrection and mas- sacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. " I admit that slavery is at the root of the rebellion, or at least its sine qua non. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act, but they would have been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince people there that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant farther that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war; and then, unquestionably, it would weak- en the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance, but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in Chap. LXIV.] HE IS CONSTRAIKED TO EMANCIPATION. ^Q? a few weeks the arms would be in tlie hands of tlie reb- els, and, indeed, tlius far, we have not bad arms enough to equip our white troops. ... "Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned The conclusion to these objectious. They indicate the diffi- which he had come. ^^^^-^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ prevented my ac- tion in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and by night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, that I will do." A depreciated currency, heavy and steadily increasing taxation, the terrors of a coming military draft, the clamor of the peace party, and, above all, a profound disappoint- ment in the result of McClellan's campaign, weighed heav- ily on the spirit of the nation. More and Anti-slavery action , , , t , -, , . . becoming more im- more clcarlv was the stern alternative pre- perative. , "^ , , ^ i m sented to it — ^^emancipation of the ISlave, or destruction of the Eepublic. There is reason to suppose that when Lincoln saw the wreck of McClellan's expedition coming back from the Peninsula, he made up his mind. To repair the dreadful losses of that and Pope's campaign, a vast number of men must be raised. He reflected that the balance would be equally made to incline by putting white men in one scale, or by taking black men out of the other. During that summer he had read at a cabinet meeting a draft of Thepresident'sfh-st ^ proclamatlou of emancipation. The Sec- pSion prodaSr"- Tctary of state, Mr. Seward, though com- ^'°''* pletely approving of its character, thought the time inopportune, and that, instead of coming after a disaster, it ought to come after a victory. In this, on con- sideration, Lincoln agreed. The time for such a proclama- tion was not when Lee was in view of Washington, and 608 LINCOLN'S VOW. [Sect. XHL He still withholds ^^6 expulsion of the national authorities action, £^^^ ^j^^ Capitol itself by no means an im- probability. There was a day on which it seemed more likely that the Confederacy would dictate terms than have to submit to them — a day on which it would have been absurd, indeed, for the vanquished President to tell his antagonists, flushed with victory, that he was going to free their slaves. " I made a solemn vow before God," said Lincoln, sub- • butmakesareiig- scqucutly, " that if General Lee was driven back from Maryland, I would crown the re- sult by a declaration of freedom to the slaves." The battle of Antietam was fought, and Lee, driven across the Potomac, retreated into Virerinia Events call upon , •!, /.,i ^ ^,i ^n . -i rr^i hjm for its fulfill- ou the uight 01 the 1 9th of September. The losses of the South in this sortie had been awful. Mourning w^as sitting in black at every South- ern fireside. And now Lincoln remembered the vow he had made. " Whatever shall appear to be God's will, that I will do." "A PROCLAMATION. " I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, The proclamation of ^"^^ Commander - in - chief of the army and navy the22dofSeptem- thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that here- after, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation be- deciares the object twccn the United States and each of the states, and of the war. ^^^ people thereof, in which states that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. " That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all Slave States so called, the people whereof may not then be in Sr whfchXre''''" rebellion against the United States, and which states satfon^for^sTv^sr ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gfadual abol- ishment of slavery within their respective limits ; and that the ef- CiiAP.LXIV.] PROCLAMATION OF SEPTEMBER 22d. 5Q9 and colonization of foi't to colonize persons of African descent, with thefreedmeu. their conscnt, upon the continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. " That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one He will rociaim thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons emancipation in held as slavcs within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebel- lion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward and for- ever, free ; and the executive government of the United States, in- cluding the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such j^ersons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom. "That the executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, on the first day of by proclamation, designate the states, and parts of the following year, g^^^^g^ if SLiij, in which the people thereof respect- ively shall then be in rebellion against the United States ; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qual- and will then desi'^- ^^^^ voters of such State shall have participated, nate the states in re- shall, in the absence of stronoj countervailinsr testi- bellion. ' , o _ & mony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not in rebellion against the United States. " That attention is hereby called to an act of Congress, entitled He cites certain * An Act to make an additional Article of War,' ap- laws, proved March 13th, 1862, and which act is in the words and figures following : *"^e it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That hereafter the following shall be promul- gated as an additional Article of War for the government of the army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and obsen^ed as such : " * Section I. All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective com- mands for the pui-pose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have es- caped from any persons to whom such service or labor is claimed to be due ; and any officer who shall be found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the senice. *' ' Section IL And be it further enacted, That this act shall take effect from and after its passage.' "Also to the ninth and tenth sections of an act, entitled 'An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize II.— Q Q QIQ PROCLAMATION OF SEPTEMBER 22d. [Sect. XIII. and confiscate property of Rebels, and for other purposes,' approved July 16th, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following: " * Section 9. And be it further enacted, That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto/ escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army, and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them, and coming under the control of the government of the United States, and all slaves of such persons found on, or being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterward occupied by forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be' forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves. . . " ' Section 10. And he it further enacted, That no slave escaping into any state, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any other state, shall be delivered up, or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime or some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming such fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms against the United States in the present rebel- lion, nor in any way given aid or comfort thereto ; and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall, under any pretense whatever, as- sume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the semce.' "And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in . . ., ^ the military and naval service of the United States reqiiu-ing the army •' and navy to observe to obscrvc, obey, and cnforcc, within their respect- ive spheres of service, the act and sections above recited. "And the executive will in due time recommend that all citi- zens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion shall (upon the restoration of the consti- tutional relation between the United States and their respective states and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or dis- turbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves. " In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. " Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh. Abraham Lik^col:n^. " By the President : • "William H. Seward, Secretary of State." In tills considerate manner tlie President earnestly of- Chap.LXIV.] LINCOLN resolves on emancipation. qh fered compensation to those whose slaves he foresaw must inevitably be made free. . " I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Such, as we have just seen, was his solemn declaration a short time before his death. He added, " The condition of the na- tion is not what any party or any man expected or de- vised." With that religious feeling which seemed to pos- sess him more and more thoroughly as he approached his end, he affirmed, " It is the work of God." prltltiof °of ceVSin Sinccrclv believing: that God not only reis^ns, military events. •' ^., . . ^ ^ . but governs, he saw, m the events transpir- ing before him, that there was something more than the wishes and will of man. In every phase of the conflict he perceived the arbitrament of a Higher Power. Not as a delusion of fancy, but as a reality, he recognized the dread alternative presented to his nation — do justice or die. To his surrounding friends he pointed out that, though the North was pouring forth her blood like wa- ter, and squandering treasuries of money, success was de- nied. The rebukes he had given to Fremont and Hunt- er had been confronted by the horrible catastrophe of the Chickahominy, and by the repulse of Pope into the fortifications of Washington. Once more a day of grace had been granted at Antietam, but that only half regard- ed, the stern summons had been again renewed from the cannon that were permitted to sweep off fourteen thou- sand men at Marye's Hill, and hurl Burnside's army across the Eappahannock. " What am I," said Lincoln, " that I should contest the will of God ?' From the rivers of Virginia to the Mexican confines of the Kepublic arose a mournful wail — How long, O Lord ! The slaves expect- ^^w loug ! It Came fi'om the weary labor- ing dehverauce. ^^,^ leaning on his hoe in the cotton-field un- (5J^2 THE SLAVES EXPECTING EREEDOM. [Sect. XIII. der the noontide sun — :it came through the moaning mid- night forests, solemn and clear above their multitudinous inarticulate sounds — it came from children torn from their parents, from wives and husbands j)arted at the auction block, from mothers in despair, from strong men fainting under the lash, from the aged whose heads were frosted by time. In their quaint prayers the Africans talk to' God as a man talks face to face with his friend. Slavery had made Him their friend. By the flickering fires of their cabins they stealthily spelt out the Bible to see what He had promised to them. It was their dreadful lot that had caused Jefferson, himself a slave-owner, to expostulate solemnly with his countrymen, and to dep- recate the wrath of God. For who shall escape when from the hand of Eternal Justice her scales have dropped as useless — when from her brow the bandage has been raised that her uncovered and angry eyes may gaze upon unutterable wrong — when her uplifted arm, quivering with indignation, is ready to strike a blow that shall make a w^hole continent tremble ? On the evening of the last day of the year 1862, many of those Africans, who were living in towns, and who were connected with various Christian denominations, re- paired to their places of worship, and waited for the mid- night clock to strike. Many of those who were living on plantations knelt down in their humble cabins, w^ith their wives and children. Many of those who were alone, and had no friend in the world, went into the woods, in pres- ence of that eye which pierces the darkness as well as the. light. They prayed that Almighty God w^ould take pity upon them, and strengthen the hand of Abraham Lincoln on the coining day. And on that day, being the first day of January, eight- een hundred and sixty-three, there was issued Chap. LXIV. ] THE EMAKCIPATION PROCLAMATION. Qi^ "A PROCLAMATION, "by the president of the united states. " Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year Emancipation of the of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and sixty- ^^'^^'®^' two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit : " ' That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any' state, or designated part of "a state, the peojile whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, . who are henceforth thenceforward and forever, free ; and the executive ^'"^^ government of the United States, includmg the mil- itary and naval authority thereof, wall recognize and niaintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efibrts they may make for their act- ual freedom. " ' That the executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states, and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States ; and the fact that any state, or the peo- ple thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elec- tions wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such states shall have participated, sliall, in the absence of strong countervailing tes- timony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the peo- ple thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.' " !N"ow, therefore, I, Abraham Lincol:n", President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and as a fit and neces- sary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun- dred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the states, and parts of states, wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the folloAving, to wit : in places now in Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of ^«v°^^- St. Bernard, Plaquemine, Jefierson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Or- 514 END OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA. [Sect. XIII. leans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkely, Accomac, North- ampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, includ- ing the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued. " And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said desig- nated states and parts of states are, and henceforth shall be, free ; The armed force of ^^^ *^^^ *^^ executive government of the United the iicotion will main- States, iucludinsj the military and naval authorities taiu their freedom. n ^^^ • thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. " And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to Recommendations abstain from all violence unless in necessary self- to the slaves. defense ; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. "And I further declare and make known that such persons of They may serve in Suitable Condition will be received into the armed the army and navy, geryice of the United States, to garrison forts, posi- tions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. "And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice. Invocation of the warranted by the Constitution upon military neces- favorof God. sity,I iuvokc the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God. " In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. "Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eigh- ty-seventh. Abraham Lincoln. ' ' By the President : "William II. Seward, Secretary of State." END OF VOL. II. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewals only: Tel. No. 642-3405 Renewals may be made 4 days prior to date due. Renewed books are subject to immediate recalL EEC0LO 0CTi6/^.u AM3 i i^f^Kosms RECEIVED S^ BTT ^' SENT ON ILL NOVnq ?0Q1 U- C. BERKELEY LD21A-40m-3,'72 (Qll738l0)476-A-32 General Library University of California Berkeley U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CaDb22bbbO LIBRARY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. THIS BOOK IS DUE BEFORE CLOSING TIME ON LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW