Cv 
 
 c* ^-^ / J)-. 
 
 ^ 
 
 W* 
 
 iq
 
 HEGEL'S 
 
 DOCTRINE OF REFLECTION, 
 
 BEING A PARAPHRASE AND A COMMENTARY INTER- 
 POLATED INTO THE TEXT OF THE SECOND 
 VOLUME OF HEGEL'S LARGER LOGIC, 
 TREATING OF " ESSENCE." 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM T. HARRIS, 
 
 EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL OP SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 D APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 
 1, 3, AND 5 BOND STBEBT. 
 1881.
 
 COPYRIGHT BY 
 
 WILLIAM T. HARRIS,
 
 TO 
 JAMES S. GARLAXD. 
 
 WITH WHOSE UXD ASSZSTASCK THIS WOBK. 
 
 btbitatf 
 
 WILLIAM T. 
 
 2O54073
 
 TO THE READER. 
 
 This translation and paraphrase of the second volume of Hegel's larger 
 Logic is herewith submitted to a small circle of students who sympathize 
 with an attempt to interpret in English the subtle and fruitful thoughts 
 of Hegel on the subject of the categories of Reflection showing their 
 genesis from the experience which the mind makes of the transitoriness 
 of the world of sense-objects, and showing, at the same time, the limits 
 of the validity of those categories. It is by no means a complete elabora- 
 tion of the whole book some parts being less than a fluent translation, 
 and lacking commentary altogether, while others are believed to be fairly 
 adequate. The translator's commentary is included in parentheses. The 
 work was begun and continued under the auspices of the " Kant Club " 
 of St. Louis, Missouri, and has been used as a hand-book by that club. 
 The translator hopes to add, from time to time, more commentary to 
 this volume, and has promised to write for it an introduction which will 
 attempt to deduce the point of view for " Essence," from that of " Being," 
 which Hegel treats in the first volume. A paraphrase of the third vol- 
 ume, treating of the Syllogism, Teleology in Nature, and the absolute 
 Ideal of the World or the Personality of the Absolute which Hegel 
 discusses under the subjects of " Subjectivitat," " Objectivitat," and 
 " Idee " is in progress, and may be given to the same public that this 
 volume reaches. 
 
 The reader will find it profitable to study these pages in connection 
 with the exposition of " Essence " given in the smaller Logic of the 
 Encyclopaedia of Hegel, as found in the elegant and exact rendering of 
 Mr. Wallace of Oxford University. 
 
 It is needless to say that this book will in no wise supply the place of a 
 continuation of the famous " Secret of Hegel " by Dr. Stirling, which gives 
 a translation of, and an exhaustive commentary on, the greater part of the 
 first volume of the larger Logic. This paraphrase undertakes a sort of 
 auxiliary work that will be unnecessary when we receive the continuation 
 of that work from its author. 
 
 May 7, 1881.
 
 ESSENCE. 
 
 The truth (i. c., the outcome) of being is essence. 
 
 Being is the immediate (i? 'e.^The first phase of things), since know- 
 ing ought to recognize the true, that which being is in and for itself , 
 it does not stop with the first phase of things and its determinations 
 (its belongings), but it transcends this with the assumption that 
 behind this first phase (being) there is something else, something 
 deeper than being, that which constitutes the background, the truth 
 of being. This investigation is a process of mediating the knowing ; 
 for it does not find essence as something direct, a first phase, but it 
 begins with something else, with being as a first phase, and has a pre- 
 liminary way or road to travel, namely, to proceed beyond being, or 
 rather to descend into it. First, upon collecting itself, returning within 
 itself (Erinnern, re-collecting itself) from immediate being (first 
 phase of things) through this mediation, it finds essence. Language 
 has in the verb Seyn (being) adopted for the past tense the word 
 gewesen (been) ; ( Wesen denotes essence) ; for Wesen (essence) is 
 past being, bat a timeless past. 
 
 This movement, represented as the progress of the activity of 
 knowing, ma\- appear as an activity that is merely subjective, exter- 
 nal to being as such, and in no wise concerning its real nature; 
 but this beginning from being, and this progress which cancels the 
 same and arrives at essence as a mediated knowing, is an activity ap- 
 pertaining to being itself. It has been already demonstrated (in the 
 first book of this logic) that it (being) re-collects itself (ermnert), 
 and, through this return into itself, becomas essence. (Every form 
 of being every category thereof presents some form of relation 
 to the without or the beyond, which, when traced out, as it has been 
 done by the author in Volume I., relates back to the l>eginning, thus 
 resulting on every hand in the category of self-relation, which is 
 essence.) 
 
 If, therefore, the absolute was defined on a former occasion as 
 
 being (Seyn), now' it is to be defined as essence. The scientific 
 
 knowing (Erkemien) cannot on any account remain at the standpoint 
 
 of the multiplicity of existences (the first phase of particular being, 
 
 1 1
 
 2 Essence. 
 
 Daseyn), nor any more at the standpoint of being (pure abstract 
 being) ; it is impressed with the conviction that this pure being, the 
 negation of everything finite, presupposes (implies) an activity of 
 re-collection, which has, by abstraction, ascended from immediate 
 particular existence to pure being. Being by this process has come 
 to be defined as essence, as such a being from which everything 
 definite and finite has been abstracted (removed by negation). Thus 
 this being is a somewhat devoid of determination (particularity), a 
 simple unity, from which eveiything definite has been removed by an 
 external process (i. e., by the abstract reflection of the thinker) ; to 
 this unity, definiteness or particularity was already something for- 
 eign (external), and it remains as something standing over against it- 
 after this act of abstraction ; for it has not been annulled absolutely, 
 but only in relation to this unity (i. e., the act of reflection has not 
 discovered the nugatoriness in particular things that is, their tran- 
 sitory nature but in this analytic process of arriving at pure 
 being it arbitrarily separates the determinations from being as a sub- 
 strate, and holds them apart). It has already been mentioned above 
 that if the pure essence is defined as the including comprehension of 
 all realities (Inbegriff a Her Realitaten), these realities underlie the na- 
 ture of the determinateness and of the abstracting reflection, and this 
 including comprehension reduces them to an empty simplicity. 
 Essence is, according to this view, only a product, an artificial result. 
 This external negation, which is abstraction, merely removes the de- 
 terminateness of being from it, and what remains is essence; it 
 merely places them somewhere else, and leaves them existing as 
 before. According to such a view, essence would be neither in itself 
 nor for itself (i. e., neither an independent being nor a totality, but 
 merely a phase of something else, or, what is worse, an arbitrary 
 abstraction) ; it would depend on another i, e. , on external, abstract- 
 ing reflection; and it would be for another, namely, for the abstrac- 
 tion, and, besides this, for the particular existence which had been 
 separated from it, and which remained over against it. Taken in 
 this sense essence is, therefore, a dead, empty abstraction from all 
 determinations. 
 
 Essence, however, as we find it here (as a result of the discussion 
 of the categories of being), is what it is, not through an external act of 
 negation (abstraction), but through its own negativity, the infinite 
 movement of being (" infinite : " that is returning into itself, the cate- 
 gories of being have all been traced through relations to others, back 
 into relations to themselves. Dependence always implies self-de-
 
 Introduction. 3 
 
 pendence, which is independence ; because that which depends has 
 its being in another, and really depends on its own being in this other). 
 It is being in and for itself (independent and total) ; absolute being 
 in itself, since it is indifferent towards all determinateness of being 
 (i. e., towards all that belongs to the first phases of things), all other- 
 being (dependence on others), and relation to another, is entirel}' an- 
 nulled ; it is, however, not merely this being in itself, for as such it 
 would be only the abstraction of the pure essence ; but it is likewise 
 essentially being for itself (t. e., a being which realizes itself in others 
 dependent upon it others which manifest it), it is itself the negative 
 activity which performs for itself this cancelling of the other-being, 
 dependence upon others, and the characteristics which it receives 
 through otliers. 
 
 Essence as the perfect return of being into itself (i. e., the first 
 phase of things traced out through its relations into a totality, so that 
 the whole stands in self-relation, is essence) is, at first, undefined, 
 for the determinateuess of being are cancelled in it; it contains 
 them in itself but not in a form in which they are explicitly stated. 
 Absolute essence, in this simplicity, has no particularit\* (Daseyn). 
 But it must pass over into particularity (?'. e., a correct apprehension 
 of it will find particularity belonging to it) ; for it is being in and for 
 itself that is to say, it distinguishes the determinations which it con- 
 tains in itself (for this is an active process whose negative relation to 
 itself is an act of distinguishing), since it is a repulsion of itself from 
 itself, or indifference towards itself, negative relation to itself, it 
 posits itself in self -opposition, and is only infinite being for itself in 
 so far as it is the unity of itself with this its difference. Essence is 
 the absolute unit}* of Being within and for itself; its act of determin- 
 ing remains, therefore, wholly within this unity, and, therefore, is not 
 a BECOMING, nor a TRANSITION, nor are its determinations something 
 other (alien, foreign), nor are its relations directed to another; they 
 are independent but only thus while they are in their unity with 
 each other. Since essence is in its first aspect simple negativity, the 
 determinateness which it contains only in itself, in its sphere, is to be 
 stated so as to give it its particularity, and its being for itself (its 
 realization). 
 
 Essence is, in the entire compass of logic (that is, in relation to 
 the other spheres), the same that quantity was in the sphere of being 
 (quantity as related to qualit}- and to mode). That is to say, essence 
 is absolute indifference toward limits. Quantity is this indifference 
 in its iinmediateuess or first phase, and the limit as regards it is an
 
 4 Essence. 
 
 immediate external determinateness ; this passes over into quantum 
 (i. e., the particularity of quantity is through an entirely external or 
 indifferent limit) ; the external limit is necessary to it, and exists in 
 connection with it. On the contrary, determinateness does not exist 
 over against essence, it is posited only through essence, not free, 
 but only in relation to its unity. The negativity of essence is feflec- 
 tion, and the determinations are all reflected, posited through Essence 
 and remaining in it as cancelled. 
 
 Essence, in the logic, stands between Being and the Idea (Qegrijf), 
 and constitutes the middle term, and its activity is the transition 
 from being to the idea (from unconscious existence to conscious 
 subjectivity). Essence is the being in and for itself, but this rather 
 in the form of the being in itself; for its general characteristic is 
 determined through the fact that it is the first phase after being, or 
 the first negation of being. Its activity consists in this, that it pos- 
 its negation or determination within itself, and through this gives 
 itself particularity, and proceeds toward the state of infinite being for 
 itself, which it is potentially. Thus it attains its particularity, which 
 is identical with its nature, and through this becomes the idea. For 
 the idea is the absolute, realizing its absoluteness in the particular de- 
 terminations which manifest the internal nature or essence of things. 
 The particularity, however, which essence creates, is not yet true par- 
 ticularity, such as it is in and for itself, but it is posited, or dependent 
 on essence ; and therefore, to be carefully distinguished from the 
 particularity of the idea. 
 
 The first phase of essence is appearance, or it is the activity of 
 reflection. Secondly, it is a manifestation or phenomenon. Thirdly, 
 it is self-ievelation. Its activity, therefore, posits the following deter- 
 minations : 
 
 1st. As simple potential essence in its determinations within itself. 
 2d. As emerging into particularity, or into existence, or manifest- 
 ation. 
 
 3d. As essence which is one with its manifestation, as actuality. 
 (The above is a very general statement of the standpoint and con- 
 tents of this second book of the Logic. This book is the most original 
 part of Hegel's Philosophy, formulating as it does the nature of 
 reflection, and exploring its scope and the genesis of it categories. 
 Hegel, in his general statements prefixed to his chapters, does not 
 attempt to demonstrate anythii g, or show the dialectic of its process, 
 although his remarks are made in full view of the entire compass of 
 the treatment which follows. The special treatment begins below 
 with the caption, "Essential and Unessential.")
 
 Reflection. 
 
 FIRST SECTION. 
 
 Essence as Reflection, into Itself. 
 
 Essence comes from being (t. ., a consideration of being finds 
 essence as a necessary presupposition, the totality, the including pro- 
 cess of which being is a phase) ; it is. therefore, not immediately in 
 and for itself (independent), but a result of that movement (t. e., 
 the process in which being has been proved inadequate). In other 
 words, essence, taken as something immediate (that is, as a first phase 
 of things), would be a definite, particular existence (besthnmtes 
 Daseyri) standing in opposition to another particular existence ; it is, 
 in fact, only an essential particular existence opposed to an unessential 
 one. But essence, according to its true definition, is the in and for 
 itself cancelled being (t. e., being which has shown itself to be a first 
 phase of an including process in which it loses its individuality and 
 vanishes in other phases, the total process being the annulment of each 
 particular phase, and, as such, the essence). It (essence) has only 
 appearance opposed to it (i. e., nothing independent or self-existing, 
 nothing standing on an equality with essence, but only appearance, 
 show, seeming). But appearance is the proper activity of essence 
 manifesting itself (dew eigene Setzen des Wesen*). 
 
 Essence is, in the first place, reflection (t. e., it offers, on first con- 
 sideration, this phase of its activity). Reflection determines itself 
 (i. e., it particularizes itself, comes into the form of self -opposition). 
 Its determinations are in the form of posited-being (t. e., dependent 
 phases resulting from a process which transcends them) ; a posited- 
 being which is at the same time reflection into itself (completing itself 
 to a totality, self-dependent) ; its determinations are 
 
 Secondly, Reflected determinations, or essentialities (. e., total 
 processes ; these reflected determinations are phases of essence, hav- 
 ing its form, that is of self-related determination, but each one is a 
 special phase, while essence includes them all). 
 
 Thirdly, Essence, as the reflection of the determining activity into 
 itself, becomes ground (cause or reason), and passes over into ex- 
 istence and phenomenon, or manifestation (X. B. This "becom-
 
 6 Essence. 
 
 ing and passing over " of categories, is objective in the sense that it is 
 demonstrated to be presupposed, as the necessity of things, but it is a 
 becoming and passing-over from subjective illusion, or inadequate 
 ideas, to true and adequate ideas of what must be in the nature of 
 things. ) 
 
 (The above is a mere recapitulation of the contents of this first sec- 
 tion, and in no wise offered as a demonstration by the author. The 
 following three chapters furnish the demonstration.) 
 
 FIRST CHAPTER. 
 
 Appearance. 
 
 Essence, conceived as a result from being as the presupposition 
 of the categories of being seems, at first, to stand in opposition to 
 being ; in which case immediate being is regarded as the unessential. 
 
 But it is, secondly, something more than a mere "unessential," 
 it is essence-less being, it is appearance. 
 
 Thirdly. This appearance is not something external to essence, 
 outside of it, another to essence, but its (essence's) own appearance 
 (or manifestation). The appearing of essence as a part of its own 
 activity ( das Scheinen des Wesens in Him selbsf), is reflection. 
 
 (This, likewise, is a recapitulation, but only of the present chap- 
 ter.) 
 
 A. 
 
 The Essential and the Unessential. 
 
 Essence is cancelled or annulled (aufgehobene) being (see pnge 1 
 of this translation, explanatory of the general standpoint of this brok. 
 This paragraph is the first one in this book which is not a recapitula- 
 tion of what follows it. It takes up the subject where it was left at 
 the close of the first book of this logic, namely : at the doctrine of 
 being. Here it attempts to seize the subject in its immediate or 
 most obvious aspect the first impressions of thought upon what is 
 the true result of the investigation up to this point). It (essence) 
 is simple identity (Gleichheit) with itself, but it is this, in so far 
 as it is the negation of the entire sphere of being (or first phases 
 of things). Essence has, therefore, immediateness opposed to 
 it, as something from whence it has originated, and has proved 
 itself abiding and persistent under the changes of the former (im- 
 mediate being). Essence, itself, regarded in this aspect, is a being
 
 Essential and Unessential. 1 
 
 also, an immediate essence, and the sphere of being opposed 
 to it, is a negative, only in this relation to essence, and not 
 otherwise; essence is, therefore, a particular negation. Being and 
 essence, in this respect, stand in relation to each other as somewhat 
 and other a reappearance of those categories of being for each 
 possesses being, immediateness, indifference towards the other, and 
 equal validity as regards being. (Evidently, a very inadequate notion 
 of the true results of the investigation of the categories of beiug. Es- 
 sence stands in relation to being, not as something else opposed to 
 it, but as its truth, the totality of its process, in which particular 
 phases of being appear and disappear). 
 
 But being, as standing in opposition to essence, according to this 
 point of view, is the unessential; it is that which has been annulled, 
 cancelled, shown to be a phase of a process. And in so far as this 
 stands in relation to essence as another (co-ordinate), it prevents 
 essence from being regarded properly, and reduces its concept to 
 that of another particular being, an "essential" being. 
 
 The distinction between "'essential " and * unessential," therefore, 
 is a distinction wltich treats of essence as though it were JL category 
 of being (and loses sight of the standpoint of essence altogether) ; 
 for essence in this regard is an immediate somewhat, and, hence, only 
 one as opposed to another, namely, to being. The sphere of being is 
 presupposed by this mode of considering it, and what is called being 
 in this relation is an independent somewhat, a further external deter- 
 mination to being, and conversely, what is called essence is also inde- 
 pendent, but only as regards the other, and from a special point of 
 view in so far, therefore, as the phases of "essential " and " unes- 
 sential" are discriminated in a being, this distinction is an external 
 subjective one, one not affecting the being itself, a separation which 
 falls in a third (t. e., in the subject making the distinction, but not in 
 the being thus separated into "essential" and "unessential"). It 
 is left undetermined what belongs to the " essential," or the '* unes- 
 sential; " it is some external mode of consideration (some subjective 
 interest or point of view) which makes this distinction, and at one 
 time looks upon the content as " essential " and, at another, as " un- 
 essential." 
 
 More strictly considered, essence is reduced to the category of 
 ./ual," as opposed to " unessential," only when taken as can- 
 celled being or particularity (Daseyn). Essence is in this manner 
 regarded only as the first or the negation, which is determinateness, 
 through, and by means of which, being becomes particular beiug (Z>a-
 
 8 Essence. 
 
 seyn), or particular being is opposed to "other" as "other." But 
 essence, on the other hand, pfoperly defined, is the absolute negativity 
 of being (i. e., it is not " another," to being, but the total process in 
 which being is utterly swallowed up, and all of its phases annulled 
 nothing of it persisting, as opposed to the negativity of this process, 
 which is essence) ? it (essence) is being itself, but not in the form 
 of particulars, opposed to each other (oZs ein Anderes bestimmt'), but 
 as being, which has been annulled, not only as immediate being, but 
 as immediate negation, that is, as such negation as is involved in the 
 categories of otherness. Being, or particularity, persists consequently 
 not as "another" for essence exists and that which (being) is 
 still an. immediate, to be distinguished from essence, is not merely an 
 unessential being, but an immediate which is utterly nugatory, it is 
 only a no-essence (Unwesen) appearance. 
 
 B. 
 
 Appearance. 
 
 (1.) Being is appearance. The being of appearance consists only 
 in the annulment (the being cancelled) of being in its nugatoriness ; 
 this nugatoriness belongs to essence, and being is appearance in and 
 through this nugatoriness, and, therefore, only in and through essence ; 
 it (appearance) is the negative posited as negative. 
 
 Appearance is the whole of what is left from the sphere of being ; at 
 first, however, it seems as though appearance still possessed a side, or 
 a phase, of independence from essence to be in some respect another 
 to it. The " other " (as a categor}') contains two phases (Momente), 
 particularity and its negation. The " unessential," since it does not 
 possess being, possesses the phase of non-extantness, which belongs 
 to the category of otherness. Appearance is this immediate negation 
 of particular being, regarded as a being, and as only in relation to 
 another, so that it possesses being through the fact that it negates 
 particular being ; the unessential is, therefore, a dependent some- 
 what, which exists only in its negation (throilgh another). There 
 remains for it, therefore, only the pure determinateness of immedi- 
 ateness (the form of it, without the substance), it is reflected imme- 
 diateness : i. e., an immediateness which is only by means of its ne- 
 gation, and which is, outside of this mediation, nothing else than 
 the empty determination of immediateness of the negation of particu- 
 lar being. (Appearance has independence, or immediate validity, 
 not as a mediate being a somewhat but through the negating ac-
 
 Appearance. 9 
 
 tivity which annals ft. This annulling, or negating activity, which 
 triumphs over the phase of being, is itself an immediate, and, in fact, 
 is the true substance of each and every phase of being succes- 
 sively annulled by it ; for each phase of being is the negation, or an- 
 nulment of a relatively previous phase of being. Hegel, in this 
 passage, calls attention to the nature of this immediateness, or inde- 
 pendence, as arising from the activity of negation, which triumphs 
 in reducing phases of being to appearances). 1 
 
 1 Appearance is the "phenomenon" of the skeptics, or the "manifestation" 
 of the Idealists such an immediateness as is no somewhat, and no thing; 
 in fact, no independent being at all, which would hare existence outside of its refa- 
 tion to the subject beholding it, or outside of its apparent substance. If exists, is 
 a predication which skepticism does not allow itself to make. Modern idealism 
 does not allow itself to look upon knowledge as a knowing of the " thing in itself." 
 The mentioned "appearance" is to hare no foundation whatever of being, and 
 the "knowledge" of this idealism is not to be able to attain to the "thing in 
 itself." At the same time, however, skepticism attributes many determinations 
 to its " appearance," or, rather, its " appearance " possesses the entire manifold 
 wealth of the world for its content. ("Appearance " includes all objects of nature 
 and history.) Likewise, the " phenomenon " of idealism includes the entire corn- 
 paw of these determinations. "Appearance" and "phenomenon" are thus con- 
 ceived as manifold in their immediateness. It is true that there may be no being, 
 nothing, or no "thing in itself," lying at the basis of this content; nevertheless, it 
 remains for itself as it is (it manifests independence) ; it has only been transposed 
 from being into appearance ; and appearance possesses within itself those manifold 
 determinations which are immediate existence, and opposed to each other (i. e^ the 
 determinations of appearance have precisely the form of the determinations of 
 being, according to the crude conception of this idealism). Appearance is, there- 
 fore, itself an immediate, particular somewhat. It may have this or that content ; 
 but whatever content it has is not something posited by it (i. e., a result of its ac- 
 tivity), but it has it immediately (L ., not as a result). The idealism of Leibnitz, 
 Kant, or Fichte, has not transcended the category of being, nor its form of immedi- 
 ateness, any more than the other forms of idealism, or than skepticism (i. .. they 
 do not arrive at the concept of process or activity, as underlying immediate things). 
 Skepticism admits the content of its "appearance," it finds it given as an immedi- 
 ate somewhat (not as a manifestation of an essence). The monad of Leibnitz evolves 
 its own representations, but it is not the power which generates and combines 
 these representations they arise in it rather like babbles ; they are independent, 
 indifferent toward each other, and likewise toward the monad itself. So. likewise, 
 the Kantian " phenomenon " (Enehcinung) is a given content of perception, which 
 presupposes affections determinations of the subject independent, as regards 
 each other, and as regards the subject (and hence, no manifestation of an essence). 
 (The infinite occasion (Attstoss) of Fichtian idealism, it is true, may have no " thing 
 in itself" at all for its basis, so that it may be a pure determinateness of the ego, 
 but this determinateness is something independent of the ego, a limit of it, which 
 the ego assimilates and deprives of its externality, and transcends, although it 
 possesses a aide f independence, which remains an immediate negation of the ego 
 throughout the entire process).
 
 10 Essence. 
 
 (2.) Appearance, therefore, contains an immediate presupposi- 
 tion a side of independence as regards essence. But it is impossible 
 to show that appearance, if it is regarded as distinct from essence, is 
 cancelled and returns into essence, (i. e., that it is a phase of an in- 
 cluding process) ; but the standpoint of being has been entirely an- 
 nulled ; appearance is nugatory in itself ; it remains only to show that 
 the determinations which distinguish it from essence, are in fact 
 nothing but determinations of essence, and, moreover, that this de- 
 terminateness of essence, which constitutes appearance, is annulled in 
 essence itself. 
 
 It is the immediateness of non-being which constitutes appearance, 
 (i. e., the reality of appearance is the reality of the destructive pro- 
 cess, a negative activity manifested in the change of things things 
 negated, rendered transitory, are mere appearance) ; this non-being 
 however, is nothing else but the negativity of essence within itself. 
 Being is non-being in the sphere of essence, (. e., immediateness is 
 found only in connection with the negative or destructive phase of the 
 activity of a process). Its nugatoriness is the negative nature of 
 essence itself. But immediateness, or indifference (independence), 
 which contains this non-being, is the absolute self-contained being 
 (A.nsichseyn') , which belongs to essence. The negativity of essence is 
 its identity with itself, or its simple immediateness and independence 
 (i. e., its negativity produces its identity etc., by the form of self- 
 relation, as will be shown later on). Being is retained in essence in 
 so far as the latter comes into identity with itself, through its infinite 
 (i. ., self-related) negativity; through this (in this phase) essence 
 is, itself, being. Immediateness which, in the category of appearance 
 Fias a determinateness opposed to essence, is, therefore, nothing else 
 than the immediateness belonging to essence ; but not the irnmediate- 
 n-ass of particular existence, but the immediateness which is wholly 
 mediated or reflected, namely, as found in the category of appear- 
 ance. Being, therefore, as a phase of essence, is not being in its first 
 phase, but only as a determinateness opposed to mediation ; being has 
 become a moment (i. e., complemental element, or phase, of the pro- 
 cess here called essence-). 
 
 These two moments (phases), the negativity which takes on the 
 form of persistence, -and the being which is only a dependent deter- 
 minateness (moment) in other words, the self-existent negativity, 
 and the reflected immediateness which constitute the elements of 
 appearance, are, therefore, the elements of essence itself: it is not 
 an appearance of being manifested in essence, nor an appearance of 
 essence manifested in being the appearance in essence is not
 
 Appearance. 11 
 
 appearance of something else (than essence), but, it is appearance 
 as such, the appearance of essence itself (. e., the elements of a 
 process are continually vanishing and reappearing, not in and for 
 themselves, but as manifestation of the power acting in the process). 
 Appearance is the essence itself in the determinateness of being. 
 Essence has appearance through the fact that it is determined (par- 
 ticularized), and through this has distinction from itself as abso- 
 lute unitv. But this particularity is likewise annulled. For essence 
 is independent, that which mediates itself, being what it is through 
 its negation; it is, therefore, the unity and identity of absolute 
 negativity and immediateness. Negativity is the negativity in itself 
 is its relation to itself, and, consequently, it is immediateness (because 
 a mediation which does not get beyond itself is no mediation, but is 
 immediateness) ; but it is negative relation to itself, a negation that 
 repels itself, and, therefore, this immediateness is a negative, or a par- 
 ticular opposed to it (i. e., the process of self-determination involves 
 identity the relation of the same to the same and difference, or 
 the negation of the same by the same). But this determinateness is 
 itself the absolute negativity, and this act of determination, which is, 
 as active determination, the annulment of itself and, at the same 
 time, return into itself. 
 
 Appearance is the negative which has a phase of being, but in 
 another, viz : in its negation ; it is dependence which is cancelled and 
 nugatory. It is, therefore, the negative returning into itself, the 
 dependent as dependent on the negative. This relation of the nega- 
 tive, or of dependence, to itself, is its immediateness ; it is another 
 than itself ; it is its determinateness opposed to itself, or it is the 
 negation opposed to the negative. But the negation opposed to the 
 negative is a self-relating negativity, which is an absolute annulment 
 of the determinateness itself. (Relation is negation, self -relation is 
 self- negation, in the sense of self-determination ; and this, as before 
 shown, is both identity and difference. ) 
 
 The determinateness, therefore, of essence, which is " appearance," 
 is infinite (self -related) determinateness ; it is only the negative di- 
 rected against itself ; it is, therefore, determinateness, which, as such, 
 is independence and not determined through another (i. e., not de- 
 terminateuess of another, but self-determination). Conversely, inde- 
 pendence, as self-relating immediateness, is likewise simple determi- 
 uateuess and phase, and negativity only as relating to itself. This 
 negativity, which is identical with immediateness, and the immediate- 
 ness which is identical with negativity, is essence, (essence is the ac-
 
 12 Essence. 
 
 tivity of self-relation). Appearance is, therefore, the essence itself, 
 but essence, in the phase of determinateness in which it manifests 
 itself to itself (the activity of anything manifests its nature, and 
 even the activity directed upon itself musi manifest itself, though in 
 tli form of particularity). 
 
 In the sphere of being the non-being arises, as an immediate in op- 
 position to the immediateness of being, and the truth (the unity) of 
 these two immediates is becoming (transition is the only form of 
 unity in which two immediates may be combined). In the sphere of 
 essence we find, first, the categories of essential and unessential op- 
 posed to each other, and, next afterwards, the categories of essence 
 and appearance ; the unessential and appearance in these antitheses 
 stand for what remains of the categories of being. But both, as well 
 as the difference of essence from them, have no further independent 
 validity than what is given them through the fact that essence is at 
 first taken as an immediate somewhat (an utter misconception) not 
 as it is fh truth, namely, not as that immediateness which arises 
 through pure mediation or absolute negativity, (i. e., self-mediation, 
 or self-negativit}'). That first form of immediateness is consequently 
 only the determinateness of immediateness, (i. e., only a phase of true 
 immediateness, namely, the phase of self-relation, leaving out of sight 
 the self-negation involved in it). The annullment of this determi- 
 nateness of essence consists, therefore, only in this, that the unes- 
 sential is shown to be only appearance, and that essential is shown 
 to contain (as a negative process or activity) appearance in itself as 
 its infinite (self- related) activity, which determines its immediateness 
 as negativity, and its negativity as immediateness (its self-distinction 
 being its identity, and its self-identity being through its negative rela- 
 tion to itself), and, therefore, in this activity is the manifestation of 
 itself in itself. Essence in this its self-activity is reflection. 
 
 c. 
 
 Reflection 
 
 Appearance is the same as reflection ; or rather it is the immediate 
 phase of reflection. We use the word reflection, borrowed from the 
 Latin language for the category of appearance turned back into 
 jtself, and therewith estranged from its immediateness (a foreign word 
 to express the category of self-estrangement, as the author suggests). 
 Essence is reflection, the movement of becoming and transition which 
 remains in itself ; in which the different (the other) is defined as
 
 Reflection. 13 
 
 appearance, as what is simply negative in itself (t. e., not as an inde- 
 pendent other). In the becoming of being, the determinateness 
 of being lies at the basis, and becoming is a relation to another. The 
 movement of reflection, on the contrary, involves otherness only as 
 negation in itself, which has being only as a phase, the self-relation 
 of negation. Or, since this relation to itself is this negating of nega- 
 tion, the negation as negation is present as something which has its 
 being in its being-negated (i. e., appearance). Otherness is, there- 
 fore, in this place, not being with negation or limit, but negation with 
 negation (the form of self-relation involves negation of negation, for 
 relation is negation). The first which corresponds to this other, the 
 immediate somewhat, or being, opposed to it, is only this identity of 
 negation with itself, the negated negation, the absolute negativity. 
 This identity with itself, or immediateness, is, therefore, not a first, a 
 somewhat from which a beginning was made, and from which a 
 transition into its negation was effected (as was the case in the cate- 
 gories of "somewhat" and "other" in the logic of being); nor is 
 it an existent substrate which underlies the activity of reflection, but 
 the immediateness is only this activity itself (i. e., as before explained, 
 the immediateness is a result of self-relation, sustained only through 
 the persistence of the activity of self -negation, it is a phase, and the 
 same phase as identity. 
 
 Becoming, in the sphere of essence, that is, its reflecting movement, 
 is therefore, the movement from nothing to nothing, and through this 
 a return into itself (i. e., negation of negation is self -return). Tran- 
 sition, or becoming, annuls itself in its transition (t. e., it sets out 
 from itself but comes to itself, the from and the to, essential to 
 becoming, are identical in the sphere of essence, hence transition and 
 becoming are said to be annulled) ; the " other" to which a transi- 
 tion is made, is not a non-being, as it was in the logic of being, but 
 it is the nothing of a nothing (negation of negation), and this nega- 
 tion of nothing is what constitutes its being. Being is only the 
 movement from nothing to nothing in the sphere of essence, and 
 essence does not have this movement in itself, but it is this movement 
 as absolute appearance ; pure negativity, which has nothiug outside 
 of it that negated it, but which negates only its negative self, and 
 exists only in this activity of negation. 
 
 This pure absolute reflection which is the movement from nothing 
 'to nothing develops the following phases : 
 
 It is, first, positing reflection. 
 
 Secondly, it begins from a pre-supposed immediate and is, there- 
 fore, external reflection.
 
 14 Essence. . 
 
 Thirdly, it cancels this presupposition, and since it presupposes in 
 the very act of annulling presupposition, it is determining reflection. 
 
 (The foregoing paragraphs, commencing with " C," are in the nature 
 of a general introduction to the subject of " Reflection," treating of 
 its entire scope. The detailed treatment of this subject follows in 
 the subdivisions, 1, 2, and 3, below. The first of which subdivisions 
 begins properly with the results reached at the close of the discussion 
 of Appearance, in Section B. ) 
 
 1. Positing Reflection. 
 
 Appearance is the nugatory (negative), or devoid of essence, (i. 
 e., it has no persistence); but the nugatory, or devoid of essence, 
 does not have its being in another in which it appears, but its being 
 is its own identitj T with itself ; this exchange or relation ( Wechsel} 
 of the negative with itself if defined as the absolute reflection of 
 essence. 
 
 This self-relating negativity is, therefore, the negating of itself. It 
 is, consequently, annulled negativity, so far as it is negativity at all. 
 In other words it is the negative and the simply identity with itself, 
 or immediateness. This, therefore, is involved in it, to be itself and 
 not itself in one unity. 
 
 In the first place, reflection has been defined as the movement 
 from nothing to nothing, and hence, as negation returning to itself. 
 This act of returning to itself is nothing but simple identity with 
 itself, immediateness. But this return is not transition of negation into 
 identity as though into another phase but reflection is transition, 
 as cancelling of transition ; for it is immediate return of negation to 
 itself. The first phase of this return to itself is identity with itself, 
 or immediateness ; but, secondly, this immediateness is the identity 
 resulting from the negation of itself, consequently the negation of 
 identity; immediateness, therefore, which is in itself negative and is 
 the negative of itself it is what it is not. 
 
 The relation of the negative to itself is, therefore, its return into 
 itself ; it is immediateness, as the cancelling of the negative ; but it 
 is immediateness only as this relation, or as a return out of a nega- 
 tive, consequently a self -cancelling immediateness (an immediate- 
 ness which is a result, is a contradiction). This is posited-being 
 (an immediateness which is a result) immediateness only as deter- 
 minateness, or as self-reflecting (result of self- relation). This 
 immediateness, which exists only as a return of the negative into 
 itself, is that immediateness which has already been discussed as 
 that which constitutes the determinateness of appearance, and that
 
 Positing Reflection. 15 
 
 from which the movement of reflection seemed to begin (it would 
 seem by all means necessary that an activity should act upon some- 
 thing imply something, i. e., an immediate, but in the realm of 
 self-determination, of essence, of true being, we find that immedi- 
 ateness is only a phase, or result of the activity of self-relation, and 
 not its substrate. Reflection is, therefore, the activity which, while 
 it is the return, comes to be what it is, first, in the activity which 
 begins or which returns (the beginning and the returning create the 
 form whence the movement started ! ). 
 
 It (reflection) is positing in so far as it is immediateness as a re- 
 turn. There is, in fact, nothing else extant but the activity of reflec- 
 tion ; neither a somewhat from which it returned, nor to which it re- 
 turned ; it is, therefore, nothing but return and thus the negative of 
 itself, but besides this the immediateness is annulled negation, and 
 cancelled return into itself. Reflection, as the annulment of -the nega- 
 tive, is the annulment of its other, namely, of the immediateness. In 
 the fact, therefore, that it is the immediateness as a return, a relating 
 of the negative to itself, it is negation of the negative as negative. 
 Consequently, it is the activity of presupposition. (Implying some- 
 thing already existent as its own condition ; this act of presupposition, 
 here as a phase of self-relation is the second aspect of that activity ; 
 while the positing is the first aspect of self-relation, namely, that in 
 which the phase of identity, or immediate^iess, is seen as the result of 
 the activity, on the other hand, the negativity of the relation produces 
 self-opposition difference ; this dualism, or antithesis, resulting from 
 the negative aspect, is a presupposing activity, because its thought 
 necessarily involves or implies a first phase against which the opposi- 
 tion is directed. The positing activity results in identity, in unity, 
 in immediateness. in the annulment of all before and after the utter 
 collapse of all determination. The prepositing activity results in 
 setting up an antithesis, a dualism, something dependent, something 
 opposed to something else, a sharp distinction, or difference. In a 
 word, contrast presupposes something immediate or self-identical, as 
 the basis of distinction, and this activity of negation, acting upon 
 itself, is just as effective in producing contrast as in producing iden- 
 tity). In other words, immediateness is as return only the negative 
 of itself, the annulment of immediateness ; but reflection, in its ac- 
 tivity, annuls the negative of itself, it comes into self-relation (X. B. 
 the negative of reflection is immediateness) ; it therefore, cancels its 
 positing, and since it is the annulment of positing, in the very activity 
 of positing, it is presupposition (prepositing). In the activity of
 
 16 Essence. 
 
 presupposition, reflection turns the return into itself into the negative 
 of itself, into that whose annulment is essence (N. B. the pre-sup- 
 posing activity also involves the annulment of reflection, and the an- 
 nulment of reflection is the annulment of the activity of the process 
 called essence ; and the annulment of presupposition is essence. It 
 (this activity) is directed towards itself, but to itself as its negative, 
 only in this aspect is it abiding, persistent, negativity relating to 
 itself. Immediateness comes from no other source than return, and 
 is that negative somewhat which is the beginning or substrate of ap- 
 pearance, which is negated through the return. The return of es- 
 sence is, consequently, its repulsion from itself. In other words, re- 
 flection into itself is essentially the presupposition of that from which 
 it is the return. 
 
 It is the annulment of its identity with itself which constitutes the 
 identity of essence with itself. It presupposes itself, and the annul- 
 ment of this presupposition is itself ; conversely, this annulment of 
 its presupposition, is the presupposition itself. Reflection, therefore, 
 finds an immediate already given, beyoud which it proceeds, and 
 from which it is the return. But this return is itself the very pre- 
 supposition of the immediate which it found given. This presup- 
 posed immediate comes to be only through the fact that it is 
 abandoned ; its immediateness is the cancelled immediateness. The 
 cancelled immediateness, conversely, is the return into itself, the 
 arrival of essence at itself, the simple, self-identical being. This 
 arrival at itself, consequently, is the annulment of itself, and the 
 reflection which repels it from itself and presupposes it ; and, on the 
 other hand, its repulsion from itself is the arrival at itself. 
 
 The reflecting movement is, consequently, as here considered, to 
 be taken as the absolute counter-impulse in itself (a pure, self- 
 repulsion, always in opposition to itself, its identity being the product 
 of an activity which proceeds beyond itself into difference, and yet in 
 this difference, or duality, finds again its identity, as shown in the 
 text with some prolixity). For the presupposition of the return 
 into itself, that from whence the essence proceeds and becomes 
 essence through this act of return, is only in the return. The act of 
 transcending the immediate, with which reflection begins, is rather 
 itself a result of this transcending ; and the transcending of the 
 immediate is the arrival at the same. The movement turns itself 
 round (inverts itself) as a forward progress, and is thereby self- 
 movement (self-activity). Activity which proceeds from itself, in so 
 far as the positing reflection, is the prepositing (presupposing), and,
 
 External Reflection. 17 
 
 likewise, the prepositing reflection is precisely identical with the 
 positing reflection. 
 
 Reflection is, therefore, itself and, at the same time, its non-being; 
 and is only itself, while it is the negative of it, for only thus is the 
 annulment of the negative at the same time the return to itself. 
 
 The immediateness which it presupposes as self -cancelling, is noth- 
 ing else than the posited-being, the in-itself-annulled, which is not 
 different from the return into itself, and, in fact, is just this return. 
 But it is, at the same time, determined as negative, as immediately in 
 opposition, and hence producing an antithesis of one and other within 
 itself (self-opposition). Therefore, reflection is determined ; it is 
 in-as-mtieh as, according to this determinateness, it has a presupposi- 
 tion., and begins with an immediate opposed to it, as its other (found 
 already extant) external reflection. 
 
 (The above exposition has developed for us the insight into the 
 ambiguity of reflection ; all relation, when traced out, being found to 
 be self-relation. Relation is transcendence, duality, a from and a to, 
 negation; self-relation, while it bends back the procedure outward 
 to another, and directs it upon itself, differentiates itself, produces 
 duality. Self-determination involves determiner and determined, 
 active and passive, and, hence, difference from itself, within itself ; 
 the negation of itself cancels all otherness, and is pure identity; 
 and yet it determines itself in the form of self-opposition, and is 
 pure difference. The second of these phases, that of self- opposi- 
 tion, or difference, is that of external reflection, now to be consid- 
 ered.) 
 
 2. External Reflection. 
 
 Reflection, as absolute reflection, is the activity of essence in the 
 phase of self-appearance, and presupposes only appearance, posited- 
 being ; it is as presupposing immediately the same as positing reflec- 
 tion. But the external, or real reflection, presupposes itself as 
 annulled, as the negative of itself (reflection, it will be remembered, 
 as self-return, produces identity, immediateness, as a result; this is 
 positing reflection ; the presupposing reflection implies identity, or 
 immediateness, as a pre-existing condition; thus it is said to pre- 
 suppose the positing reflection as annulled). It is in this aspect du- 
 plicated : in the first place, as presupposed, or reflection into itself, 
 which is the immediate. Secondly, it is reflection, as relating nega- 
 tively to itself, and thus to itself as its own non-being. (Thus what 
 is really one activity with two aspects, may be seen as two entirely
 
 18 Essence. 
 
 different activities, independent of each other, and, in fact, the one- 
 succeeding the other in time. This is the maya, or illusion of exter- 
 nal reflection.) 
 
 External reflection, therefore, presupposes a being, and this, too r 
 not in the sense that its immediateness is a mere posited-being, or 
 moment (as it really is, in the positing reflection), but rather, in the 
 sense that this immediateness is the relation to itself (. e., independ- 
 ent not a result of some antecedent activity), and the determinate- 
 ness (produced by this presupposing activity, which is a negative,, 
 determining activity, directed against the immediateness, or identity,. 
 produced by the positing reflection), is looked upon only as moment 
 (i. e., as a modification of an already existent being). It (i. e., ex- 
 ternal reflection) relates to its presupposition (i. e., the result of the 
 positing- reflection, viz: immediateness, identity), as though the lat- 
 ter were the negative of reflection (L e,, an immediate which needs no- 
 antecedent reflecting activity to posit it), and yet this negative were 
 cancelled as negative (i. e., utterly indifferent to antecedent positing). 
 (Again, in other words) Reflection in its positing, annuls immediately 
 its positing, and hence has an immediate presupposition. It, there- 
 fore, finds the same already existent before it, as something with 
 which it begins, and from which it commences the return into itself 
 the negating of this, its negative. But, the fact, that this presupposed 
 is a negative, or posited, is not suspected by it. This determinate- 
 ness (i. e., "negative, or posited,") belongs only to the positing 
 reflection, but in the prepositing reflection it is cancelled (t. e., the 
 immediateness is not a posited, not a result). What the external re- 
 flection determines and posits on the immediate are, therefore, only 
 external determinations (i. e., external to the immediate, which is the 
 result of the positing reflection). An example of this is the category 
 of the infinite, as it is found in the logic of being ; the finite is taken 
 as a real somewhat, already existent before the infinite, and from 
 which one begins as a basis for the infinite, to which he proceeds ; 
 and the infinite, in this connection, is a reflection into itself, standing 
 in opposition to it (i. e., the finite as the limited and particular, ought 
 to be regarded as the dependent, as a phase merely, while the infinite 
 should be the independent, the totality, including the finite as its 
 phase. But the imperfect insight which thinks with the categories of 
 being, looks npon the finite as one independent sphere, and the infi- 
 nite as another, opposed to it. As here pointed out, the only distinc- 
 tion between them is that, in the finite the reflection into itself is 
 annulled, while in the infinite, it is conceived as active. The irnme-
 
 External Refection. 19 
 
 diateness which results from the positing reflection, is regarded by 
 external reflection as sundered from the positing activity, and as inde- 
 pendent this is the finite : the reflection, of self-relation, which 
 results in pure identity, is the activity likewise sundered, by external 
 reflection, and regarded as the infinite). 
 
 External reflection is the syllogism containing the two extremes, 
 the immediate and the reflection into itself ; the middle term is the 
 relation of the two, the determined immediate conceived in such a 
 manner, that the one part of it, viz., the immediateness, belongs ex- 
 clusively to one extreme, and the other part, viz., the determinateness, 
 or negation, belongs exclusively to the other extreme (*". e., our ex- 
 ternal reflection unites the two extremes in a middle term, but it an- 
 nuls its own work in the fact that it regards this unity still as a sub- 
 jective product, and discriminates the two elements, still as belonging 
 to the two extremes, and as not united so as to lose their identity in 
 a third. We can still distinguish in a plum-pudding the various in- 
 gredients, not become identical, although united). 
 
 If we consider the doings of external reflection more critically, we 
 shall find it a positing of the immediate, which, in so far, becomes the 
 negative, or the determined ; but it is immediately also the annulment 
 of this its positing, for it presupposes the immediate ; it is, therefore, 
 a negative activity which negates its own negation (in this critical 
 consideration, we discover why external reflection does not suspect 
 the identity of immediateness and reflection into itself, but holds them 
 asunder as two independent somewhats ; it is itself the positing ac- 
 tivity, or reflection into itself, and through this it is led to regard the 
 positing activity as entirely subjective). It is immediately a positing 
 activity, a cancelling of the immediate which is negative to it, and 
 this immediate with which it supposed itself to begin as a foreign (. 
 e., independent, already existent) somewhat, comes to be in this ac- 
 tivity of beginning. The immediate is thus not only in itself identi- 
 cal with reflection and this would mean for us, subjectively or in ex- 
 ternal reflection but this identity of the immediate and reflection is 
 posited (established through an objective process). It is, namely. 
 determined through reflection, as its negative, or its other, but it is 
 its own activity that negates this very determining. And thus, the ex- 
 ternality of reflection to the immediate is annulled ; its self-negating 
 positing, unites it with its negative, with the immediate, and this unit- 
 ing is the essential immediateness itself. It is, therefore, proved that 
 the external reflection is not external, but the immanent reflection of 
 iminediateness itseif ; or, in other words, that that which is through
 
 20 Essence. 
 
 the positing reflection is the in-and-for-itself existing essence (f. e., 
 tlie total process of essence). Hence it is determining reflection. 
 
 (The demonstration of the nature of external reflection in the above 
 paragraphs, and as supplemented in the next section " determining 
 reflection" forms one of the most wonderful movements of Hegel's 
 philosophy. In it he transcends all mere subjective idealism and all 
 phases of philosophical nescience. The gist of the demonstration is 
 to be found first in his subtle analysis of reflection ; having shown in 
 a former book, that all beings, or categories of being, are valid only 
 in their relation to each other, and that relation is the truth of being, 
 and thus that being is seeming in other words, that particular 
 beings are phases of a total, including process it follows that all 
 relation is self- relation when traced out. Self -relation is reflection 
 and self-negation. Having discovered this he finds by analysis the 
 two aspects in it ; a positing aspect resulting in identity and imtnedi- 
 ateness, the prepositing aspect resulting in self-opposition and differ- 
 ence. The stage of external reflection takes on itself one of these 
 aspects as subjective, and through this the connecting link between 
 immediateness and reflection becomes invisible. To see this as maya, 
 or illusion, is to have an insight into the dialectic of pure thought.) 
 
 Remark. 
 
 Reflection is taken in a subjective sense, by current usage, as the 
 activity of the faculty of judgment, which transcends a given imme- 
 diate representation, and seeks to find general predicates for the 
 same, or to compare it with them. Kant contrasts the reflecting 
 judgment with the determining judgment. He defines judgment as 
 the general faculty which thinks the particular, as contained under 
 the universal. If the universal is given as rule, principle, law 
 the judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determin- 
 ing. But, if only the particular is given, for which the universal is 
 to be found, the judgment is merely reflecting. Reflection is, conse- 
 quently, in the latter instance, the transcending of an immediate, 
 and the attaining of a universal. The immediate is partly defined 
 as particular, and through this defined as relation of the same to its 
 universal ; for and by itself, it is only an individual, or something 
 immediately existent. And, on the other hand, that to which it is 
 related is its universal, its rule, principle, or law ; in any case, it 
 is something reflected into itself, relating to itself essence, or 
 the essential. (A rule, principle, or law, is said to be reflected into 
 itself, because, in its application to a multiplicity of cases, it finds
 
 Remark. 21 
 
 only confirmation ; that which is peculiar, and belongs only to one 
 individual, in contrast with another, relates by that contrast to a 
 beyond, to another ; but, if the characteristic applies not only to the 
 one, but to its other, and to another, and to all others, it is said to be 
 reflected into itself, for it is affirmed, and continued by its others, 
 by its limit). 
 
 But, in this place, we are not treating of the reflection of con- 
 sciousness (consciousness, in general, has the form of reflection 
 it is self-relatiou, self-knowing) ; nor is 'it the narrower sphere of 
 the reflection of the understanding which deals with the categories 
 of particularity and universalitj-. Here we are speaking of reflection 
 in general (objective, as well as subjective). That reflection to which 
 Kant ascribes the function of finding a universal for a given particu- 
 lar, is, evidently, only " external " reflection, which relates to the 
 immediate, as something given. But the idea of absolute reflection 
 is contained in it implicitly ; for the universal the principle, rule, or 
 law which it attains in its determining, is regarded as the essence of 
 that immediate with which it began, and, consequently, the imme- 
 diate is regarded as a nugatory ; and the return from the immediate, 
 the determining of reflection, is regarded as the positing of the imme- 
 diate, in its true being (even external reflection, in finding the 
 essence of an immediate, supposes itself to find the true nature of 
 it) ; therefore, that which reflection predicates of the immediate 
 the determinations which it finds in it is not looked upon as some- 
 thing external to that immediate, but as its real being. 
 
 External reflection, and in fact reflection in general, had the for- 
 tune for a long time to fall under the ban of modern philosophy ; it 
 was the fashion to attribute everything evil to it and to its activity, 
 and it was regarded as the antipode and hereditary enemy of the 
 " absolute " mode of viewing things. In fact the thinking reflection, 
 in so far as it conducts itself externally, sets out from a given some- 
 what an immediate, foreign to it and regards its own activity as 
 a merely formal affair, which receives its content and matter from 
 without, and is for its own part only an activity conditioned through 
 it. Moreover, as we shall learn in the consideration of the determin- 
 ing reflection, reflected determinations are of another kind than the 
 merely immediate determinations of being. The latter are conceded 
 to be transitory, merely relative determinations, standing each in rela- 
 tion to another ; but the reflected determinations have the form of 
 the being in and for itself (i. e., they are independent, because self- 
 related) ; they make themselves valid, therefore, as essential, and,
 
 22 Essence, 
 
 instead of effecting a transition into their opposites, they manifest 
 themselves rather as absolute, free and indifferent towards each other. 
 'They refuse, therefore, stubbornly, to move ; their being is their 
 Identity with themselves, in their determinateness, in which they are 
 held asunder, although they reciprocally presuppose each other. 
 
 (Hegel's "remarks" sometimes are explanatory of the strictly 
 scientific, or dialectic portions of the text, but more frequently they 
 furnish digressions pertaining to matters which have a merely his- 
 torical interest. ) 
 
 3. Determining Reflection. 
 
 The determining reflection is the unity of the positing and the 
 external reflection. This is to be considered more in detail : 
 
 (1). External reflection commences with immediate being; posit- 
 ing reflection commences with nothing. External reflection, which 
 becomes determining reflection, posits another, viz., the essence, in 
 the place of the cancelled being ; but the positing reflection does not 
 posit its determination in the place of another it has no presuppo- 
 sition. But on this account it is not the completed determining reflec- 
 tion ; the determination which it posits, is, therefore, a merely 
 posited (i. e., dependent) ; it is immediate, not, however, as self- 
 identical, but as self-negating ; it has absolute reference to the return 
 into itself, and has existence only in reflection, although it is not this 
 reflection itself. 
 
 That which is posited, is, therefore, another, but in such a manner 
 that the identity of reflection with itself is entirely preserved ; for 
 that which is posited is only annulled relation to the return into 
 itself. 1 
 
 If some one says of anything that "it is only a posited-being," 
 "we may understand this expression in two meanings ; it is this, as 
 
 1 In the sphere of being the category of particular being (Daseyn) was a being 
 which had negation attached to it, and being was the immediate basis and element 
 -of this negation, which, therefore, was itself immediate. To particular being 
 {Daseyn) corresponds posited-being in the sphere of essence; it too is a particular 
 being (Daseyn), but its basis is being as essence, or as pure negativity (pure=self- 
 related); it is a determinateness, or negation, not regarded as existent, but as 
 directly annulled. Particular being is nothing but posited-being ; this is the pro- 
 position (principle or maxim) of essence in regard to particular being (in arriving 
 flt the idea of essence it had been found that particular being was a vanishing 
 phase, something posited through a process of essence). Posited-being, therefore, 
 stands, in one respect, opposed to particular being, and, in another respect, opposed 
 to essence, and is to be looked upon as the middle term which connects particular 
 being with essence, and, conversely, essence with particular being.
 
 Determining Reflection. 23 
 
 opposed to particular being, or, as opposed to essence. In the for- 
 mer meaning, particular being is taken as something higher than the 
 posited-being, and the latter is ascribed to external reflection as some- 
 thing subjective. In fact, however, the posited-being is itself the 
 higher of the two ; for as posited-being, particular being is taken for 
 what it really is in itself as a negative, as something which exists 
 only as a relation to the return into itself. Hence, the expression, 
 ^'it is only a posited-being," should be used in contrast to essence 
 4. e., as the negation of the being- returned-into- itself. 
 
 (2). Posited-being does not contain the full thought expressed by 
 -** determination of reflection " ; it is determinateness merely as nega- 
 tion in general (posited-being expresses mere dependence, that which 
 is, but, as being dependent, its being is in and through another ; hence, 
 it is annulled. The determinations of reflection are not mere phases 
 of reflection like posited-being, but aspects of the totality of reflec- 
 tion, as will be seen below). But positing has been found in unity 
 with external reflection ; the latter is in this unity absolute presuppo- 
 sition, i. e., the repulsion of reflection from itself, or the positing 
 of determinateness as the presupposition itself. Posited-being is, 
 therefore, as such, negation, but as presupposed, it is reflected into 
 itself. In this sense, posited-being is "determination of reflection" 
 .(as above remarked, posited-being taken in the two aspects of 
 reflection). 
 
 Determination (Bestimmung) of reflection is to be discriminated 
 from determinateness (Btstimmtheit} of being, t. e., from quality; 
 quality is immediate relation to another, in general ; posited-being, also, 
 is relation to another, but to being, as reflected into itself. Negation, 
 as quality, is negation as existent ; being constitutes its ground, and 
 element. Determination of reflection, on the contrary, has, as its 
 basis, being reflected into itself. (Categories of being have validity 
 directly in themselves, . e., independently ; or, rather, they have 
 not this validity, but are thought to have it, by the stage of thinking 
 which gives validity to such categories ; but, in essence, every cate- 
 gory, or determination, is a result of a self-related process, called 
 by Hegel, "reflection into itself"; thus, its determinations are 
 posited-being posited by the activity of self-negation; e. gr., 
 identity is the self- relation of negation; so, also, is difference.) 
 Posited-being fixes itself* in the aspect of determination, precisely 
 for this reason, that reflection is identity with itself in its self-nega- 
 tion ; its being negated is, therefore, its very reflection into itself. 
 The determination is effected, not through being, but through
 
 24 Essence. 
 
 identity with itself. Because being, which is the substrate of quality,, 
 is non-identical with negation, it follows that quality is non-identical 
 with itself, and, therefore, transitory, a vanishing phase. (Quality 
 is regarded as consisting of two elements, being and negation, two- 
 non-identical somewhats, which do not produce a stable result; the 
 negation appears in quality as its dependence, the occasion of its 
 dissolution; but the determination of reflection is produced through 
 self- relation, and its elements, therefore, have no subsistence out- 
 side of it it is their subsistence; it is, thus, unlike the determin- 
 ateness of being, whose elements have subsistence apart from it.) 
 On the contrary, the determination of reflection is posited being, as 
 negation negation, which has lying at its basis annulled being, 
 and, therefore, is not non-identical with itself, but is essential, and! 
 not a transitory determinateness. The self-identity of reflection, 
 which has the negative, merely as negative, as cancelled or posited,, 
 is what gives persistence to the same (the negative, as negative, i. e.> 
 not as another being). 
 
 On account of this reflection into itself, the determinations of 
 reflection appear as free essentialities hovering in the empty void, 
 without attraction, or repulsion, towards each other ; in them, deter- 
 minateness has, through relation to itself, been established, and 
 infinitely fixed (a firm basis for imperishable individuality is found 
 in self-relation, while individuality is impossible in the form of 
 being or simple quality) ; it is determination which has subordinated 
 its transition and its mere posited-being, or has bent back its reflec- 
 tion into another into reflection into itself. These determinations 
 constitute, therefore, the particular appearance, which is the "mani- 
 festation" of essence essential appearance. For this reason, deter- 
 mining reflection is reflection which has emerged from itself; the- 
 identity of essence with itself is lost in the negation, which is domi- 
 nant. 
 
 Therefore, in the determination of reflection there are two sides,. 
 which are to be distinguished. First, that of posited-being, negation, 
 as such ; secondly, reflection into itself. According to the posited- 
 being, negation is taken as negation ; this is consequently its unity 
 with itself, but it is this at first only potentially (an sick) ; or it is the 
 immediate as self-annulling, as the other of itself. Reflection into 
 itself is, therefore, an abiding activity of determination ; essence does 
 not transcend itself in that^ activity, its distinctions are merely pos- 
 ited taken back into essence, but, according to the other phase, 
 they are not posited, but reflected into themselves ; negation as nega-
 
 Essentialities or Determination* of Reflection. 25 
 
 lion is reflected into identity with itself, and not into its other 
 not into its non-being. 
 
 (3.) Since now the determination of reflection is both reflected re- 
 lation into itself, as well as posited-being, its nature becomes through 
 this fact immediately evident to ns. As posited-being, namely, it is 
 negation as snch, a non-being opposed to another, namely, opposed 
 to the absolute reflection into itself, or to essence. But as relation 
 to itself it is reflected into itself. This, its reflection, and that, its 
 posited-being, are different; its posited-being is rather its being-an- 
 nulled ; its being reflected into itself is, however, its persistence. 
 In so far as it is the posited-being, which is at the same time reflection 
 into itself, the determinateness of reflection is the relation to its alter- 
 UTO (other-being) within itself. It is not as an existent quiescent de- 
 terminateness, which would be related to another in such a manner, 
 that the related and its relation are different from each other, the 
 former a being in itself, a somewhat, which excludes its other, and its 
 relation to this other from itself. But the determination of reflec- 
 tion, is, in itself, the definite particular side and the relation to this 
 definite particular side as definite, i. ., to its negation. Quality 
 through its relation makes a transition into another, its change begins 
 in its relation. The determination of reflection, on the contrary, has 
 taken up its other-being into itself. It is posited-being, negation 
 which, however, bends back the relation to another into itself, and 
 negation which, as self-identical, is the unity of itself and its other, 
 and through this fact alone, essentiality. It is, therefore, posited- 
 being, negation, but as reflection into itself, it is at the same time, 
 the annulled-being of this posited-being, infinite relation to itself. 
 
 (In this first chapter of Essence, Hegel has exhibited the nature of 
 reflection, relation, negation as totality ; as self-relation, or totality, 
 it has the two phases of identity and difference, of dependence within 
 independence t. e., of posited-being, within reflection into itself; 
 while in the sphere of being, no determinations were found that were 
 persistent, abiding, here in Essence we find abiding determinations 
 which are such through their self-relation). 
 
 SECOND CHAPTER. 
 Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection. 
 
 Reflection is determined reflection, consequently essence is de- 
 termined, or essentiality (by the expression "determined " is meant 
 particularized, since essence is reflection, according to the results of 
 the first chapter, it follows that essence is particularized, . ., ite
 
 26 Essence. 
 
 negative activity determines it, produces self-opposition, gives rise 
 to its differences. " Essentiality " ( Wesenheit ) means the state of 
 being essential ; it refers to the abstract phase, or general aspect of 
 the process to which the term essence is here applied.) 
 
 Reflection is the appearing (Scheinen) of essence in itself. Es- 
 sence, as infinite return into itself, is not immediate simplicity, but 
 negative simplicity. It is a movement containing different phases 
 (durch unterschindene Momente), constituting absolute mediation with 
 itself (''absolute mediation," because it is utterly a product of its 
 own activity). 
 
 These, its phases, are its manifestation (and since it is reflection), 
 therefore, these phases are determinations, which are reflected into 
 themselves. (N. B. If they were not reflected determinations they 
 would not resemble essence would not manifest it.) 
 
 First. Essence is simple relation to itself pure identity. This 
 determination is rather the lack of determinations (pure identity is 
 the void of determinations). 
 
 Secondly. The determination properly so-called is distinction. 
 Distinction, as external or indifferent to the nature of the somewhats 
 distinguised, is called difference ( Verschiedenheit variety, differ- 
 ence between things not essentially related to each other, e. g., a book 
 and a lamp-post). But, as essential difference, it is the difference 
 of contraries, antithesis the difference of opposition (Gegensatz = 
 antithesis a difference or distinction in which the phases distin- 
 guished are dependent upon each other e. 0., sweet and sour, posi- 
 tive and negative, same and different). 
 
 Thirdly. Distinction, as it exists in the form of contradiction 
 { Wider sprucli), reflects (bends back) the antithesis into itself (self- 
 difference, self-negation, self-distinction, self-opposition, are forms 
 of contradiction, i. e., reflected distinctions). With the category of 
 contradiction, distinction passes into that of ground or reason ('. e., 
 self- distinction implies, or presupposes, ground or reason). 
 
 Remark. 
 
 Determinations of reflection are usually given in the form of 
 propositions, in which they are predicated as valid of all things. 
 These propositions are set up as general laws of thought, which lay 
 at the basis of all thinking, which are absolute and indemonstra- 
 ble, but which, at the same time, are assumed and acknowledged as 
 true by every thinking being who can seize their meaning, and this 
 directly and without contradiction. 
 
 Thus the essential determination of identity is expressed in the
 
 Remark. 27 
 
 proposition: Everything is identical with itself: A = A. Or, ex- 
 pressed negatively : A cannot be at the same time A and not- A. 
 
 In the first place,- it is not easy to see why these simple determina- 
 tions of reflection should be the only ones apprehended in this par- 
 ticular form. Why, for instance, should not other categories, say the 
 determinatenesses of the sphere of being, take the form of propo- 
 sitions (and be laws of thought). There would be, for example, 
 such propositions as, everthing is, everything has particular being, 
 etc. ; or, everything has quality \ quantity, etc. For being, particu- 
 larity (Daseyn), etc., are as logical determinations predicates of every- 
 thing whatsoever. A " category " is, according to its etymology 
 and the definition of Aristotle, that which is predicated of existences. 
 But a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its op- 
 posite. The negative of each and every determinateness is as neces- 
 sary as itself. As immediate determinatenesses, each one stands in 
 opposition to some other. If these categories (i. e., of being), 
 therefore, are put in the form of propositions, their corresponding 
 antithetic propositions are suggested ; both offer the same degree of 
 necessity, and have equal validity as immediate assertions. On this 
 account each assertion requires proof as against the other, and hence 
 they do not possess the character of immediately or indisputably 
 true propositions of thought. 
 
 Determinations of reflection, on the contrary, do not possess a 
 qualitative nature (like the categories of being). They are self- 
 relating, and on this account their relation to others has been 
 removed (t. e., they are self-relating, and, therefore, independent). 
 Moreover, since their determinatenesses are self-relations, they 
 contain in this fact the form of propositions already. For a 
 proposition is to be distinguished from a judgment chiefly through 
 this fact, that in the proposition, the content is the relation itself, 
 i. e., it is a particularized relation. But a judgment places all of its 
 content in the predicate as a general determinateness, which is to 
 be distinguished from its relation the simple copula and as pos- 
 sessing independence (fur sic/i). If a proposition is to be changed 
 into a judgment, its particular content e. g., if it lies in a verb, 
 must be changed into a participle, in order, by this means, to sepa- 
 rate the determination itself from its relation to a subject. The 
 determinations of reflection, as before remarked, take the form of 
 the proposition quite naturally, inasmuch as they are posited-being 
 reflected into itself (dependence related to itself). Since they are 
 expressed as general laws of thought, they require a subject of their
 
 28 Essence. 
 
 relation, and this is "All," or "A" denoting each and every 
 being. 
 
 In one respect this form of the proposition is superfluous, for 
 determinations of reflection are to be regarded by themselves (and 
 not as pertaining to a subject) . Moreover, these propositions are 
 incorrect in having being (everything, something) as their subjects. 
 With this they recall the stand-point of being, and therewith they 
 express determinations of reflection, such as identity, etc., in the 
 form of mere quality (as though identity were an immediateness). 
 By such predication in which the subject is posited in a qualit} 7 as 
 existing in it, the determinations of reflection lose their speculative 
 meaning, so that identity, for example, is not predicated as the truth 
 and essence into which the subject has passed over. ("Specula- 
 tive " applies to the comprehension of things as wholes, or totalities. 
 Thus, identity applies to categories of being, viewed in their entire 
 process of change, or their transition from one to another, and their 
 return from each other). 
 
 Finally, however, determinations of reflection have the form of 
 self-identity, and are without relation to each other, and without anti- 
 thesis ; and yet, as we shall see upon consideration more in detail, 
 or, as will become clear in the discussion of identity, difference, and 
 antithesis, they do assume particular forms of opposition to each 
 other, and through their form of reflection are not prevented from 
 transition and contradiction. The several propositions which are set 
 up as absolute laws of thought are, therefore, found, upon examina- 
 tion, to be in opposition to each other ; they contradict and mutually 
 annul each other. If everything is identical with itself, then it is not 
 different, not opposed (within itself), and has, therefore, no ground 
 (it is evident that a ground or identity-in-difference can exist only 
 for what is self-opposed). Or, if it is assumed that there are no two 
 things identical, i. e., everything is different from everything else, 
 it follows, that A is not identical with A, and that A is not in oppo- 
 sition, etc. (?'. e., without identity there is no ground for difference, 
 and without difference there is no basis for the relation which consti- 
 tutes identity). The assumption of universality ("each," "every," 
 "all "), made by these propositions, leaves no room for the assump- 
 tion of the other. The thoughtless consideration of these proposi- 
 tions enumerates them, one after the other, as though they had no 
 relation to each other ; it thinks rarely on their form of reflection 
 (independence), and does not regard the other aspect their posi- 
 ted-being (dependence), i. e., their determinateness, as such,
 
 Remark. 29 
 
 which impels them into transition and into their negation. (The 
 foregoing remark is an " external reflection," or digression, which 
 has nothing to do with the logical treatment of the subject here. 
 It may, of course, incidentally give one a valuable insight into the 
 nature and form of the so-called laws of thought. What precedes 
 the remark is the usual definition and division of the subject placed 
 at the head of the chapter, and is not put forward as scientific 
 demonstration. The demonstration proper begins in the following 
 sections, in which are treated Identity, Difference, etc. It is also to 
 be noted and this is of the greatest importance to the student of 
 Hegel that the first part of the discussion of any and every cate- 
 gory treats only its immediate phases ; hence, only its most shallow 
 and superficial regards. After this succeed paragraphs treating the 
 subject in its forms of antithesis, f. e., of relation, but not yet of 
 self- relation. Here, accordingly, come in the antinomies and nega- 
 tive, or skeptical, modes of viewing the subject. Finally, the third 
 part of the discussion considers the subject in its self-relation, its 
 totality, and this part contains the insight into what is universal and 
 necessar}'. Since each subject, in its totality, involves every other 
 subject in the universe, it follows that in the third part of each dis- 
 cussion, one maj- find a solution identical with the solutions given 
 in the third part of each and every other discussion throughout this 
 logic. The chief difficulty met by the students of Hegel everywhere, 
 and throughout the entire history of Hegelianism, has been the failure 
 to distinguish these three stages in the discussion, and to discrim- 
 inate their degrees of validity. One takes, for example, the first part 
 as presenting a valid result ; he goes forward to the second part, tak- 
 ing for granted that it harmratjzes with what precedes. He soon dis- 
 covers incongruities, and, asnc proceeds, these become more striking 
 and numerous. In the third part he loses all trace of logical con- 
 nection and consistency. His natural conclusion is that the author 
 has, by a high-handed disregard of logical rules, attempted to recon- 
 cile these incongruities, leaving each position in its validity and in its 
 hostile attitude towards the others. For a notable illustration of 
 this procedure see Feuerbach's account of his studies in Hegel's 
 Phenomenology. The various attitudes of consciousness towards the 
 objects of the senses, as there depicted, are taken as entirely valid. 
 Feuerbach attempts to explain them and reconcile them, and failing 
 in this, condemns Hegel's dialectic. Not to continue this comment 
 farther, it may be said that Hegel's logic is a series of refutations, 
 commencing with the emptiest and shallowest category, and refuting
 
 30 Essence. 
 
 it by finding that it presupposes another category opposed to it, and 
 a third one including both. This series of refutations ends, neces- 
 sarily, only when a category is discovered whose opposition is entirely 
 within itself, and which, therefore, is its own totality. Although 
 every category in this logic, except the last one the Idea as con- 
 scious personality, is refuted, yet its refutation is accomplished 
 through an insight into its totality a "speculative" insight, 
 identical in kind with the insight into the category of the Idea. ) 
 
 A. 
 
 Identity. 
 
 (1.) Essence is simple immediateness as cancelled imtnedinteness. 
 Its negativity is its being. It is self-identical in its absolute nega- 
 tivity, and through this, the otherness and relation to another, have 
 utterly vanished in its pure self-identity. Essence is, therefore, 
 simple identity with itself. 
 
 (This category of identity might be considered as the beginning of 
 this second part of the Logic, and all of the previous portion treating 
 of Appearance, Reflection, etc., might be omitted as an investigation 
 belonging to the third part of this Logic. Hegel died just before 
 revising this part of the work. From the extensive alterations and 
 additions made to the first part, it may be supposed that many 
 changes and additions would have been made in this part. In the 
 Logic of the Encyclopaedia, the pai't treating of Essence is relatively 
 much fuller than in this work, ajid it begins properly with the cate- 
 gory of Identity). 
 
 Identity with itself is the immediateness of reflection (the only 
 immediateness that we shall find after transcending the categories of 
 being). It is not that identity with itself which being, or naught, 
 is, but the identity with itself which consists in the restoring of itself 
 to unity ; not a restoration from something else, or by something 
 else, but the pure restoration from, and by, and of, itself. This is 
 essential identity. It is in so far not an abstract identity not an 
 identity that has its origin in a relative, or partial negation a nega- 
 tion which precedes and conditions identity, i. e., separates from it 
 all distinctions, leaving them, however, still extant as they were. 
 But being, and every determination of being (others and otherness), 
 has been annulled, not relatively or partially, but wholly. This 
 simple negativity of being in itself is identity. 
 
 It (identity) is in so far still the same as essence.
 
 Remark. 31 
 
 Remark. 
 
 The thinking activity, which is on the plane of external reflection, 
 and which knows no other kind of thinking than that on this plane, 
 never attains the ability to comprehend identity as it has been above 
 defined, or, which is the same thing, to comprehend essence. Such 
 thinking has alwa3*s before itself abstract identity and difference, and 
 it holds the two thoughts side b}- side, and independent of each other. 
 It supposes that the faculty of reason is nothing but a loom upon 
 which the warp is placed " identity " and then the woof " dif- 
 ference " is introduced and woven, thus making a texture com- 
 posed of different threads (externally combined but still independ- 
 ent i. c., not become one as in a chemical unity, or vital unity in 
 which the identity r individuality of the elements is lost). And so 
 it happens that external reflection analyzing its result may unravel it 
 and draw out first "identity" and afterwards " differeuce," and 
 place them side by side ; finding at one time the identity of objects 
 and at another time their non-identity their identity when one ab- 
 stracts their difference their non-identity when one abstracts their 
 identity. One must forget all these assertions and hypotheses as to 
 what reason does, since they are merely historical in their character 
 ("historical," i. e., descriptive i. e., without characterizing the 
 logical necessity which connects the subject and its determina- 
 tions). A consideration of everything that exists shows that it is in 
 its very identity non-identical and contradictory, and, in its differ- 
 ence, in its contradiction, it is self-identical ; it is within itself this 
 movement of transition from one determination into another, and it 
 is this because each determination is within itself its own opposite. 
 The idea of identitj- its definition according to which it is sim- 
 ple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection, but 
 has arisen in the consideration of being (out of its dialectical inves- 
 tigation). On the contrary, that identity which contains no differ- 
 ence, and that difference which contains no identity, are products of 
 external reflection and abstraction which hold asunder in an arbitrary 
 manner these predicates, and attribute to them independence (ab- 
 stract identity and difference are conceived by external reflection as 
 possessing permanent exclusion toward each other, and, though they 
 mingle in the formation of concrete things, they are still as distinct as 
 the threads iii cloth ; but the speculative idea of identity and differ- 
 ence makes them both to be phases of the same activity of self-ne- 
 gation or self-relation an activity which produces identity in pro- 
 ducing difference, a.ul difference in producing identity).
 
 32 Essence . 
 
 (2.) This identity is in the first place essence itself, and not a 
 determination of it the entire movement of reflection, and not a 
 part of that movement. As absolute negation, it is negation which 
 immediately negates itself a non-being and difference which van- 
 ishes in its beginning, or an act of distinguishing through which 
 nothing is distinguished. The act of distinguishing is the positing of 
 a non-being as the non-being of another. But the non-being of 
 another is the cancelling of another, and consequently of the very 
 act of distinguishing. The act of distinguishing is, therefore, nega- 
 tivity relating to itself a non-being which is the non-being of itself ; 
 a non-being which has its own non-being not in something else, but 
 in itself. It is, therefore, that which relates to itself reflected 
 difference or pure, absolute difference (or " distinction "). 
 
 In other words, identity is reflection into itself, and this is nothing 
 but internal repulsion, and it is this repulsion as reflection into itself, 
 a repulsion which immediately recoils upon itself. It is conse- 
 quently identity as self-identical difference. Difference is, however, 
 identical with itself only in so far as it is not identity, but absolute 
 non-identity. But non-identity is "absolute" only in so far as it 
 contains nothing derived from anything else, but is only itself, i. e. 
 in so far as it is absolute identity with itself. 
 
 Identity is, therefore, in itself (/. e., involves in its definition) 
 absolute non-identity. But it is also the determination of identity 
 (as a contrast to itself as the entire movement, it is the special form 
 of identity). For as reflection into itself it posits itself as its own 
 non-being; it is the entire movement, but as reflection it posits itself 
 in this movement as a single phase of itself, as posited-being 
 (dependent being) from which it returns into itself (dependent 
 being manifests that upon which it depends, and is the appearance 
 of the same. In this it points towards the independent being, and 
 is its reflection; i. e,, the independent being reflects itself in what 
 depends on it, or to use the words of the text, it is the return into 
 itself from what depends on it, or is " posited " by it). Therefore, 
 as a phase of its movement, it is first identity, as such, in the form 
 of simple self-sameness, as opposed to absolute (*'. e., self-related) 
 difference. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 In this remark I will consider more in detail the question of iden- 
 tity, as found in the principle of identity which is set up as the first 
 law of thought. 
 
 This principle in its positive expression, A=:A, is, in the first
 
 Laws of Thought. 33 
 
 place nothing else but the expression of empty tamtology. It has, 
 therefore, been truly said that this law of thought is without a con- 
 tent, and adds nothing to our knowledge. Thus the empty identity 
 to which those adhere who are accustomed to regard it as true, and 
 quote it on all occasions this identity excludes all difference, and is 
 different from difference. The3 T do not see that in this they have 
 already conceived identity as possessing difference ; for they say that 
 identit}' is different from difference. Now, since this must be con- 
 ceded to be the nature of identity, the conclusion must be that iden- 
 tity does not possess difference externally but in its own nature 
 (identity cannot exclude difference without possessing it as its very 
 nature). Moreover, when they conceive it strictly as an unmoved 
 identity (. e., deroid of activity), which is, therefore, the opposite of 
 difference, they do not see that by this they conceive identity as a 
 one-sided determinateness, which as such has no truth ("truth" 
 means here actuality). It is conceded that the principle of identity 
 expresses only a one-sided determinateness, that it contains only 
 formal, abstract, imperfect truth. In this concession, which is cor- 
 rect", is contained the admission that the truth is to be found only in 
 the unit}' of identity and difference. When it is asserted that "iden- 
 tity " (as here conceived) is imperfect, there hovers before the mind 
 this totality (i. e., of identity and difference), compared with which 
 "identity" is something incomplete. The totality is the complete. 
 When, however, identity is separated from difference, and regarded 
 as absolute being held as something essential, valid, and true in 
 this state of isolation there is nothing to be seen in these contra- 
 dictory assumptions but the inability of thought to bring together and 
 reconcile the idea of abstract identity conceived as essential with the 
 idea of its incompleteness, its want of totality, or wholeness. It is 
 an inability of consciousness to grasp identity as a negative activity 
 <'. e., self-relation of the negative), although in these very assertions 
 identity is indirectly assumed to be such an activity; in other words, 
 since identity is expressly stated to be such only as separated from 
 difference, or thai its essence consists in this separation, we have 
 its truth expressed directly as consisting in separation, its essen- 
 tial characteristic is separation, without separation it could not be; 
 therefore, this "identity" is nothing, considered for and by itself, 
 but its existence lies wholly in this relation expressed in its separation 
 from difference. 
 
 As regards that confidence which was expressed in the principle of 
 of identity as absolute truth, it was founded on experience,
 
 34 Essence. 
 
 that is to say, the experience of every conscious being was appealed 
 to, and the assertion made that in this proposition, A is A, or a tree 
 is a tree, there is a direct concession and a complete conviction that 
 the proposition is true and self-evident, and requires no proof what- 
 ever. This appeal to experience, that every conscious being acknowl- 
 edges the truth of the principle of identity, is merely a rhetorical 
 statement. For no one will say that he has ever made the experi- 
 ment of testing every conscious being in regard to the abstract prop- 
 osition that A=A. There is no serious attempt made at an appeal 
 to real experience, but only an assurance that if such an appeal were 
 made a universal assent would be the result. Bat, if the abstract 
 proposition, as such, is not meant, but rather a concrete application 
 of it, from which the abstract proposition could be deduced, then it 
 follows that the assertion of its universal validity for every conscious- 
 being would amount to no more than this: that the principle of iden- 
 tity lies at the basis, implicitly, of every act of predication by a con- 
 scious being. But a concrete application is precisely the relation of 
 simple identity to a multiplicity different from it. (Identity, as it 
 appears in a concrete proposition, is in union with difference: i. e., 
 every proposition expresses in the act of predication a relation of its- 
 subject to some other subject, hence predication in its very nature 
 asserts relation to others, and thus involves difference ; in this predi- 
 cation the fact that the subject is posited as identical with the predi- 
 cate signifies that the subject is dependent upon others. Dependence 
 involves identity and difference. If a concrete proposition is reduced 
 to the form of identity, or simple self-relation, the element of otherness 
 is intentionally ignored, and the subject placed in the form of inde- 
 pendence, or simple self-identity. It is evident in this that the reduc- 
 tion of concrete propositions to identical ones does violence to their 
 nature, what is dependent is stated as independent. "A is B," 
 means that the totality of B involves A, or that A is dependent upon 
 the totality of B ; this is the type of the concrete proposition. To 
 change this to " A is A " is to omit entirely the totality of B, in so 
 far as it transcends A; for the proposition, "A is B," means that A 
 is in a totality consistingof A-}-X, which equals B. " The Earth is a 
 planet," asserts the dependence of the Earth [upon a sun] ; the solar 
 system is the totality, containing this relation of dependence within it. 
 "The Earth is the Earth," although having the form of a proposition, 
 and thus involving difference, really expresses only self-identity and 
 independence. This, in the case of the Earth, is not its truth ; it is 
 partial only. ) Expressed in the form of a proposition, that which is 
 concrete requires a synthetical proposition ; and the abstract propo-
 
 Laws of Thought. 35 
 
 sition of identity may be derived, through analysis, from the con- 
 crete itself, or from its s}'nthetic proposition. But such derivation, 
 through analysis or abstraction, does not leave experience as it found 
 it, but changes it. For experience contains identity in unity with 
 difference, and this fact refutes at once the assertion that abstract 
 identity, as such, is something true (i. e., actually existing), for 
 experience finds exactly the opposite to be true, it finds, viz., 
 identity only in union with difference in every example. 
 
 On the other hand, experience often enough learns the true charac- 
 ter of this proposition of pure identity, and ascertains what truth it 
 has. If, for example, to the question, " What is a plant?" the answer 
 is given, "A plant is a plant," while the truth of such an 
 answer would doubtless be conceded at once by the entire company 
 present, yet there would be an equal unanimity on this point, viz., 
 that such a proposition had said nothing. If one opens his mouth 
 for the purpose of announcing what God is, and says, "God is 
 God," the expectation of the listener finds itself deceived, for it 
 looked for a different predicate. If such a proposition is called 
 " absolute truth," such predications of " absolute " will be held very 
 cheap. Nothing is more tedious and unendurable than a conversa- 
 tion which travels round and round the same point, or than such 
 identity-predication which is offered as truth. 
 
 Upon analyzing the conditions of this tediousness, we find that the 
 beginning of the proposition, "the plant is," leads us to expect 
 something else for a predicate. But when the subject recurs in the 
 predicate, we find the opposite of what we had expected, and noth- 
 ing is the result. Such identity-predication, therefore, contradicts- 
 its own form. Identity, instead of being the absolute truth, is there- 
 fore the opposite of the truth. Instead of being the unmoved sim- 
 ple, it has the form of transcending itself and resulting in self-dissolu- 
 tion. (If it states a dependent being in the form of the proposition 
 of identity, it attributes to it independence ; if it states independent 
 being in the form of the proposition of identity, it puts it in the form 
 of dependence, but does not exhibit its reflection into itself by pre- 
 dicating of the subject its dependent phases ; such dependent phases 
 reflect it into itself, and thus "manifest" the independence of the 
 subject.) 
 
 Therefore, in the form of the proposition in which identity is 
 expressed there is involved something else than simple abstract 
 identity (i. e., the form of the proposition involves difference, anti- 
 thesis, dependence). The form of the proposition involves the move- 
 ment of reflection, in which movement otherness enters only as
 
 36 Essence. 
 
 "appearance," {. e., as a vanishing. "A is " is a beginning, in 
 which difference hovers before the mind as the end to be reached ; 
 but in the identity-proposition we do not arrive at the different: " A 
 is A ; " the difference is only a vanishing, the movement returns to 
 itself. The form of the proposition may be looked upon as a latent 
 necessity to add to the abstract identity something else through its 
 movement. Therefore the predicate adds to the empty form of the 
 subject, which has no meaning on account of its emptiness, an "A," 
 or a "plant," or some substrate; and this addition of the predicate 
 makes the difference to be seemingly an accidental increment. If 
 identity itself is taken as the subject, instead of "A," or any other 
 substrate "identity is identity" still it is conceded that, instead 
 of this, any other substrate may be used. The significance of all this 
 is that difference makes its appearance in the expression of identity ; 
 or, in other words, as shown, this identity is negativity, which is ab- 
 solute distinction from itself. 
 
 The other expression of the principle of identity "A cannot be 
 at the same time A and not-A " is its negative form; it is called 
 the principle of contradiction. It is customary to regard this propo- 
 sition as self-evident, and as requiring no explanation of its connec- 
 tion witli the principle of identity through the form of negation. But 
 the form of the principle of contradiction arises necessarily from the 
 fact that identity, as the pure movement of reflection, is the simple 
 negativity ; and this negativity is expressed more explicitly in the 
 principle of contradiction. There is "A," and "a not-A," the 
 pure other of "A," expressed in this principle, but the difference 
 vanishes as soon as it appears. Identity is, therefore, expressed in 
 this principle as the negation of negation. "A" and " not-A " are 
 distinguished, and these distinct somewhats are related to one and 
 the same "A." Identity is, therefore, exhibited as this distinction 
 of somewhats, which are in one unity, or as the simple distinction 
 in itself (i. e., a distinction of itself from itself through its negative 
 self-relation i. e., through the relation of its negative activity to 
 itself; self-determination is self-negation, or negative self-relation). 
 It is evident, from this, that the principle of identity, and still 
 moi-e the principle of contradiction, is not merely an analytic prin- 
 ciple, but that it possesses a synthetic nature. For the principle of 
 contradiction contains in its very expression not merely the empty, 
 simple identity with itself, nor merely its opposite, but absolute 
 non-identity, contradiction of itself. The principle of identity con- 
 tains, as has been shown, the movement of reflection, identity as 
 the vanishing of otherness.
 
 Distinction. 37 
 
 What, therefore, this investigation establishes, is this: first, the 
 principle of identity, or that of contradiction, held abstractly in 
 order to express truth by separating identity from difference, is no 
 law of thought, but rather the opposite of it ; secondly, that these 
 principles contain more than is intended, viz., their opposite, which 
 is absolute distinction itself. 
 
 B. 
 
 Distinction. 
 1. Absolute Distinction. 
 
 Distinction ( Unterschied) is negativity as found in reflection. It is 
 the "nothing" which is expressed in identity-predication ("the 
 plant is a plant," etc.). The essential movement of identity itself 
 is the negating of itself ; through this it determines itself, and dis- 
 tinguishes itself from difference. 
 
 (1.) This phase of distinction is absolute distinction (i. e., self- 
 distinction), distinction as a phase of Essence. It is distinction in 
 and for itself, not distinction through an external somewhat, but 
 through its relation to itself, and, therefore, simple distinction (i. e., 
 'simple" in the sense of not-involved-with-others). It is essen- 
 tial to apprehend absolute distinction as simple. In the absolute 
 distinction of "A" and "not-A" from each other, it is the sim- 
 ple "not" which constitutes this (absolute distinction). Distinction 
 itself is a simple idea ; one expresses it thus : " two things are to be 
 distinguished in this, that the}-, etc." " In this," that is to say, in 
 one and the same respect, in the same ground of determination. It 
 is distinction as a phase of Reflection, not " otherness " as a category 
 of Being. One particular being and another particular being are 
 posited as excluding each other ; each one of the two has immediate 
 being (i. e., not through each other, or through any other. The 
 category of dependence belongs to the phase of Essence, and not to 
 the phase of Being). The "other" in the sphere of Essence is the 
 "other" of itself, not the "other" as existing independent, outside 
 of it: it (the "other" in Essence) is a simple determinateness in 
 itself (an sick sometimes means "in itself," in the sense of " poten- 
 tial." that which is contained in it implicitly, t. e., in an undeveloped 
 form; at other times an sich means "in itself" in the sense of in- 
 dependence, of not-being-involved-with-others, simple identity 
 with itself). Likewise, in the sphere of Being, "otherness" and 
 determinateness of this character proved to be simple determinate-
 
 38 Essence. 
 
 ness, identity in opposition; but this identity (in the sphere of 
 Being) was only transition from one determinateness into the other. 
 Here, in the sphere of Reflection, distinction enters* as reflected, 
 as that which is posited to be what it is in itself (i. e., distinction is 
 reflected when it is distinction not from another, but distinction from 
 itself, and made by itself, as in human consciousness ; a distinction 
 from another forms only a transition to that other, and shows up 
 the limit or the non-being of the determinatenesses distinguished ; 
 self-distinction, on the contrary, posits the true nature, the "in 
 itself" of the activity, which has the form of reflection). 
 
 (2.) Distinction in itself is distinction in the form of self-relation; 
 hence the negativity of itself, distinction not from another, but of 
 itself from itself. It is not itself, but its other. But that which is 
 distinguished from distinction is identity. ("Distinction " and " dis- 
 tinguished " are used for the German words, Unterschied, unterschie- 
 dene, etc; these might be translated by "difference," "different," 
 etc., but "difference " is reserved as the equivalent of Verschiedenheit, 
 and "distinction" is used as the general category, including the 
 three phases of difference, antithesis, or contrariety, and contradiction; 
 the use of "distinction" in this sense is, of course, at times some- 
 what awkward, and the word " difference " has occasionally been 
 substituted for it.) It (Distinction) is, therefore, itself and identity; 
 the two together constitute Distinction. It (Distinction) is, therefore, 
 the whole and a phase of it (in the "external reflection" it was 
 shown that the presupposing activity included the positing activity, 
 in other words, that the relation of the negative to itself produced 
 identity or immediateness as one result, while at the same time it 
 negated and determined the identity or immediateness as another 
 result; the first result was called " positing," the second result was 
 called " pre-positing ; " the total activity is this process of "distinc- 
 tion," but the pre-positing activity within the total is also the pro- 
 cess of distinction; hence, "Distinction is the whole and a phase 
 of it"). 
 
 It can likewise be said that distinction, as simple, is no distinc- 
 tion. It becomes distinction through relation to identity ; therefore 
 it contains distinction and this relation to identity. Distinction is the 
 whole and one of its own phases. And so, also, identity is the whole 
 and a phase of itself. We must consider this as the essential nature 
 of reflection, and as the primitive source of all activity and self- 
 movement. Both identity and distinction are processes in which each 
 becomes a moment as well as the total movement, and as a moment 
 (reciprocally complemental element) it is a posited-being (. e., a
 
 Distinction. 39 
 
 result, a dependent somewhat) ; inasmuch as identity and distinction 
 both involve the activity of reflection (in fact, are constituted by it as 
 the self-relation makes the identity, and relation being negation, the 
 self-negation makes distinction,) they are both negative relation to 
 themselves. 
 
 Distinction, inasmuch as it is the unity of itself and identity, is 
 -distinction which is particularized within itself (<". e., containing con- 
 trast within itself). It is not transition into another, not a relation 
 to another outside of it. It has its other within itself ; its other, 
 namely, is identity (and identity is a phase of its own movement). 
 And so, likewise, with identity ; while it possesses the determination 
 of distinction, it does not, for that reason, lose itself in distinction as 
 its " other," but it preserves itself in its other, and finds its reflection 
 or return in it: Distinction is a moment of identit}*. ("To pre- 
 serve itself in its other" means that it meets with its own activity in 
 what should be its other or negation. For example, in the action of 
 <;ause and effect, we may turn our attention first to the phase of 
 identity: The cause reappears in the effect, the activity in the cause 
 transplants itself into the effect ; the cause determines or modifies the 
 effect so as to bring it into identit}' with itself, that is, to assimilate 
 the effect to the cause. Turning our attention to the aspect of dis- 
 tinction or difference, we note that the activity of the cause utters 
 itself, expresses itself. Utterance and expression proceed out from 
 the cause, and in obtaining independent subsistence external realiza- 
 tion i n a n effect, they produce distinction. The original unity in the 
 activity of the cause, conceived before its utterance or expression, is 
 dualized, dirempted by its causal activity; and through its self- 
 relnted negation results the distinction or contrast of cause and effect. 
 In the simple, precise, technical language with which Hegel analyzes 
 the categories of reflection, such as cause and effect, force and man- 
 ifestation, identity and distinction, essence and phenomenon, etc., 
 the underlying movement is characterized as negative self-relation, 
 self-relation having two aspects, the first one of identity, the second 
 one of self- negation, contrast, or distinction). 
 
 (3.) Distinction has two moments, identity and distinction (or 
 difference). The two moments are, therefore, posited-being, deter- 
 minateness (". e., as moments each determines the other, and the 
 unity of both is the resultant determinateness). But in this posited- 
 being each is self-relation (as explained in the next sentence, each 
 moment is a self-determining activity, which evolves the other within 
 itself; one activity, A, evolves another activity, viz., B; but the 
 activity B evolves again the activity A; such a process is called
 
 40 Essence. 
 
 self- relation). The one, namely, identity is in its first aspect a. 
 phase of the movement of reflection into itself. In like manner, the 
 other movement, viz., distinction, is distinction within itself (self- 
 distinction), reflected distinction ("reflected," i. e., an activity 
 which produces another, but another which, in Us activity, produces 
 the first activity. For example, the generic process of life: the- 
 activity of reproduction propagates the species ; the vital activity in 
 the parents produces an independent vital activity having the same 
 character. The species is identical in parents and offspring. The in- 
 dividuals are different on the plane of life, " The species lives, and 
 the individual diea." But on a higher plane, that of thinking-activity, 
 for another example, the universal reproduces itself in the same indi- 
 vidual, and not in different individuals. This is consciousness. The 
 ego, as universal subject, is an activity of knowing and willing ; di- 
 rected upon itself, it makes itself its own object; this is the stage of 
 specialization; in its specialization it recognizes itself; hence in its. 
 third phase the activity returns into itself generically just as it did 
 on the plane of life in the propagation of the species and also as 
 particular individual; and this is personal, conscious identity). 
 Distinction, inasmuch as it has two such moments within itself r 
 both of which are reflections into themselves, is Difference (dis-par- 
 ateness, i. e., the reader will have noted that reflection into itself gives 
 independence through the fact that it gives totality ; the activity 
 proceeds to its other, a'id through its other returns to itself; this 
 totality or reflection-into-itself does not stand in contrast to another 
 outside of it, all of its contrast is. within itself as self-distinction ; 
 now [N. B.], the two moments which are each a reflection into itself 
 are necessarily independent of each other, being total processes ; 
 such' independent moments of Distinction are indifferent to each 
 other ; this phase of distinction between independent, indifferent, 
 objects is called "difference," "disparateness," [ Verschiedenheit] 
 "variety." The ordinary consciousness views distinction from this 
 standpoint, but does not know that reflection-into-itself is presup- 
 posed by it). 
 
 2. Difference. 
 
 (1.) Identity is dirempted within itself in the category of differ- 
 ence, inasmuch as it (identity) has absolute distinction within itself, 
 posits itself as the negative of itself, and these its moments, viz., 
 itself and its negative (i. e., identity and distinction), are reflections 
 into themselves, and hence self-identities; in other words, pre- 
 cisely because the identity immediately annuls its negative activity,
 
 Difference. 41 
 
 and is reflected into itself in its determination (f. e., the determina- 
 tion produced upon itself by self-negation). The moments which 
 are distinguished are contrasted with each other as different or dis- 
 parate, because each is identical with itself . e., because identity 
 constitutes the ground and element of each. (N. B. Identity is 
 always to be regarded as the product of self-relation.) In other 
 words, the different or disparate is what it is only in its opposite, 
 i. e., in identity. 
 
 Difference or disparateness constitutes what may be regarded as 
 the otherness (other-being Andersseyn = that phase of a being 
 which exists in it because of external limitation) of reflection. The 
 other, as a category of particular being, has for its ground immediate 
 being and in this immediate being, the negative inheres (*'. e., " the 
 o'.her " is a negative category, but a category to which negativity is 
 only. incidental and not essential; the k ' other, " as opposed to 
 the "somewhat," is itself an independent existence as much as 
 the ''somewhat," and its relation to the ''somewhat" as "other" 
 is a mere external, subjective distinction; the "other" may itself 
 be regarded as the "somewhat," and what was regarded as the 
 "somewhat" may be its "other"). But in Reflection, self-iden- 
 tity reflected immediate ness constitutes the ground in which 
 the negative inheres, and the basis of its indifference. (Self-relation, 
 as the true ground of individuality, is not a relation founded 
 on a being ; being is, rather, founded on self-relation ; being is the 
 result of the process of self- relation or self-negation ; but being is 
 not the only result of this process ; determination, or negation, in its 
 annulling activity is likewise a result of self-negation. In the sphere 
 of Being, in which the mind looks upon objects as essentially inde- 
 pendent of each other, and regards each as having a substrate of 
 being, all relation is considered to be incidental, or an external dis- 
 tinction made by the observer. But the result of the investigation 
 of Being has shewn that every phase of Being that can be conceived 
 is necessarily transitory, and passes away into some other phase 
 equally transitory. The entire system of the categories of Being 
 forms a circular movement. The whole persists, but the parts con- 
 tinually vanish. Any one part, in vanishing into another, is on its way 
 back to itself, just as the movement onward in a circle is a return to 
 the starting-point. The process in which the parts vanish is a negat- 
 ing one ; hence the return, which is self- relation, is self-negation. 
 Self-relation, self-negation, is all that persists in the annulment of 
 the categories of Being. Hence, the mode of view which regards 
 objects as beings gives wa}', in the course of experience, to the view
 
 42 Essence. 
 
 which regards objects as appearances, that is to say, as phases 
 occurring in the course of the activity of a process of self-relation or 
 self-negation. This view is able to understand the being and the 
 annulment of objects. The aspect of the process wherein it is related 
 to itself results in iramecliateness, or phases of being; the aspect 
 wherein the process is negative results in determination, annulment, 
 and transition. Both being and negation are seen as results. They 
 have the same activity for their basis, but neither one of them is an 
 ultimate basis or element itself. Thus the text in this paragraph 
 draws attention again as on former occasions to the difference 
 between Being and Essence, and to the negative as found in cate- 
 gories of Being as contrasted with the negative in the sphere of 
 Essence. "Other" is a category of Being, has a basis of being, 
 and is negative only in a superficial aspect. Difference is a category 
 of Essence, and consists in pure relation, having no being as its 
 basis, but arising in and persisting in self-negation, solely. For 
 difference, whether subjective or objective, is necessarily in the last 
 analysis based on self-distinction ; and self-distinction is identity as 
 well as distinction, and, in fact, all distinction is between identity as 
 the one factor and difference as the other. An illustration in a 
 more concrete sphere is found in the doctrine of the correlation of 
 forces. A "thing" is regarded like "somewhat" in the sphere 
 of Being as an independent existence; science shows the transi- 
 toriness of " things," and finds them to be phases in the activity 
 of "forces;" "forces," like " appeai'ance " in the sphere of 
 Essence, are taken as the abiding, and, being found to constitute 
 phases of a process of I'eturn, i. e., to pass over into each other 
 reciprocally, the entire pi'ocess of force is seized as the persistent. 
 Persistent force is a negative self-relation, producmg particular 
 forces ; these are its distinctions and differences, and through the 
 annulment of these distinctions, the vanishing of the individuality of 
 the particular forces, the Persistent Force comes to identity with 
 itself. Its distinctions as particular forces constituted its "other- 
 ness" [Andersseyn] ; the vanishing of these distinctions constitutes its 
 return into identity with itself. Since the return into identity is at 
 the same time the act of further determination or particularization, it 
 is the occasion for the continuance of the process. In this is found 
 the idea or conception of an eternal activity). 
 
 ("The basis of its indifference " the category of Difference, or 
 Disparateness, is spoken of as possessing " indifference." This re- 
 fers to the fact that " Difference," as an undeveloped, implicit cate- 
 gory of "Distinction," a crude, first phase of distinction,
 
 Difference. 43 
 
 regards the objects between which difference exists as independent 
 of each other, that is to say, as indifferent. For example, it com- 
 pares disparate objects, as a lamp-post and a lead-pencil, and finds 
 ** difference;" the relation is an arbitrary one, the objects are in- 
 different towards each other: On the contrary, sweet is not indiffer- 
 ent to sour, light to dark, nor heat to cold, nor the planet to its sun. 
 The relation of dependence cancels indifference. The thoughtless 
 consideration of objects discovers no dependence, no essential rela- 
 tion. It discovers only difference, variousness, disparateness, '. e., 
 external, "indifferent" distinction. "Indifference," as the char- 
 acteristic of true independence, arises from self-relation. Inasmuch 
 as distinction is a phase of the process of self -relation, indifference 
 appertains to it. There are all degrees of insight ; the degrees of 
 insight which perceive objects as phases of Being are superficial ; 
 the degrees of insight which perceive the processes of Essence are 
 more profound ; but the first or crude phases of each and every 
 category are the results of equally crude and imperfect insight. 
 The category of Difference, e. g., is used by a stage of insight which 
 is unconscious of some of the phases of Distinction implied by the 
 phases included in the term "Difference." To use a figure: identity, 
 difference, antithesis, etc., are portions of the total process of Dis- 
 tinction, above the surface of consciousness ; other portions of the 
 process of Distinction lie below the surface of consciousness, or, 
 -when brought to the surface, are not perceived to be identical with 
 the former. So this phase, viz., the "indifference," which is inci- 
 dental to the self-relation underlying Distinction, is, first of all, 
 above the surface of consciousness, when it begins to reflect on 
 things. "The basis of its indifference" is, therefore, explained in 
 the text to be the general form of self-relation, i. e., of independ- 
 ence, underlying the category of Distinction.) 
 
 (" Indifference " has been predicated of Essence in general. [See 
 above, page 3, line 4.] The same category [indifference] is used in 
 expounding the category of quantity in the sphere of Being. As 
 above explained, indifference is the aspect of independence. Inde- 
 pendence is a predicate applying only to a totality ; hence only to 
 what has the form of self-relation. In the sphere of Being, quality 
 is finitude, . e., transitoriness, change; that which has its being in 
 another finds its quality determined for it by what lies beyond it. 
 The category of quality is transcended by the discovery that determi- 
 nation through another is, in the last analysis, determination through 
 itself -i- because its determinateness being its character, its whatness 
 [quiddity] is its being, and since this is derived from another being
 
 44 Essence. 
 
 lying beyond it, it follows that its being is outside of itself. The 
 being of what is dependent lies in the independent ; the being of that 
 which is determined through another lies in this "other," and that 
 same "other," in the act of determination, determines only itself; 
 that which is dependent is only a determinateness of the independ- 
 ent, or self-determined. With this insight, all particular beings, as- 
 qualitative determinations, must be looked upon as parts of total 
 processes of determination, which total processes are ones identical 
 with each other independent, and hence ''indifferent" towards 
 each other. This conception of indifferent ones is the insight 
 into quantity. Hence the point of view of quantity is directed 
 towards the aspect of indifference. The distinctions of quantity 
 are indifferent as regards quality. Seven oxen are oxen as well ns 
 fourteen oxen ; one house is as much a qualitative being as a mil- 
 lion houses ; the quantitative distinction of multiplicity is indifferent 
 to quality. It has been remarked by acute lexicographers [e. g., 
 Noah Webster in his "Unabridged," 1st edition] that " quantit}' 
 is undefinable ;" that they have been unable to find its genus and 
 differentia. But there will be no difficulty for us here to define 
 "quantity;" "quantity" and "quality" are species of determi- 
 nateness which is the genus; "quality" is the determinateness 
 which is immediately one with being change the quality or " what- 
 ness " of an object, and you change it; "quantity" is the de- 
 terminateness indifferent to being change the quantity of some- 
 thing, and you do not change its being. Hence the transition from 
 quantity to a new category, through the idea of maxima and minima, 
 as limits within which quantitative indifference prevails, and beyond 
 which there results a qualitative change, or change in the being. 
 Indifference appertains universally to the categories of Essence, but 
 chiefly to one category of Being, viz., quantity. All the categories of 
 Essence are founded on self-relation, the form of self-relation 
 being essential to every totality, to every independent being. " Quan- 
 tity" is the second of the three phases of Being, or Immediateness. 
 Essence is the second of the three parts of Logic, or the system of 
 Pure Thought. Being is the first part, and Idea the third part. The 
 second part of any dialectic or exhaustive consideration expounds its 
 subject in the form of self-antitheses. Quantity is the self-antithesis 
 of Being; Essence the self-antithesis of the Idea [personality]. 
 Indifference recurs, therefore, in every second phase of considera- 
 tion in this Logic as an aspect of the categories introduced, but 
 affecting them with various degrees of validity. For instance, even 
 in the category of Becoming, the second phase of its consideration
 
 Difference. 45 
 
 finds two species of it, viz., beginning and ceasing, each of which 
 contains the other as its own moment, and is thus the totality of Be- 
 coming [a reflection-into-itself, in the language of Essence], and 
 thus each is indifferent to the other ; as sundered from the other, 
 excluding it, its lack of the other would annul itself ; but as con- 
 taining the other, it reflects [bends back] its dependence upon an- 
 other, thereby converting it into dependence upon itself, or independ- 
 ence and indifference of others). 
 
 The moments of Distinction are Identity and Distinction itself. 
 They are different, disparate, inasmuch as they are reflected into 
 themselves, self-relating; in the determination (or category) of 
 Identity they are relations exclusively to themselves ; Identity does 
 nut relate to Distinction, nor does Distinction relate to Identity ; for 
 since each one of these moments is exclusively self-related, thej- are 
 not determined in opposition to each other. And since this is the 
 fact the distinction is external to them ; the different moments do 
 not stand in relation to each other as Identity and Distinction, but 
 onl}' as different ones in general, which are indifferent towards each 
 other and towards their determinateness. 
 
 (2.) In the category of Difference (variousness or disparateness) 
 as the phase of indifference, of Distinction, the reflection (which lies 
 at the basis of the category) is " external reflection." Distinction is 
 only a posited-being, or as annulled, but it is also the entire move- 
 ment of reflection. If we take this into careful consideration we 
 shall see that both its moments Identity and distinction, as above 
 determined are reflections. Each one is a unity of itself and of the 
 other each is the total movement. Therefore the exclusiveness of 
 the determinateness of Identity or of Distinction, according to which 
 each was only itself and not the other, is annulled. They are, 
 therefore, no Qualities (quiddities, i. e., particular beings, deter- 
 mined through each other) ; but, on the contrary, their determinate- 
 ness consists solely in reflection into itself, f. e., solely in self- 
 negation. Therefore we have this duplication, viz., reflection into 
 itself as such, and determinateness as negation or posited-being. 
 Posited-being is the self-external reflection. It is negation as nega- 
 tion. Hence, potentially, it is the self-relating negation and reflection 
 into itself, but only potentially ; for it is the relation to it as to an ex- 
 ternal (posited-being is the result of reflection considered as result, 
 and, therefore, as dependent ; dependence is not reflection into itself, 
 but a portion of its cycle. Hence, as it implies reflection, it is poten- 
 tially or implicitly self-relation). 
 
 Reflection into itself and external reflection are consequently the
 
 46 Essence. 
 
 two determinations in which are posited the moments of Distinction 
 t. e., Identity and Distinction. They are these moments just as they 
 are denned here. Reflection into itself is Identity, but defined as- 
 indifferent to Distinction, not as having no distinction at all, but as. 
 standing in relation to it as self -identical ; it is difference or disparate- 
 ness. It is Identity, which has therefore reflected its movement into 
 itself in such a manner that it is really the one reflection of the two- 
 moments into themselves, the two being reflections into themselves. 
 Identity is this one reflection of the two which has distinction within 
 it as an indifferent somewhat, and is difference or disparateness. On 
 the other hand, external reflection is the particularized distinction of 
 the same, not as absolute reflection into itself, but as determination, 
 opposed to which the in-itself-existent reflection is indifferent. Its 
 two moments, Identity and Distinction, are, therefore, posited exter- 
 nally, not as inherent determinations. (It will be noticed that ex- 
 ternal reflection looks upon the distinction between identity and dif- 
 ference as something arising outside of the activity which constitutes 
 them ; in fact, it does not recognize either as an activity ; it looks 
 upon them as dead results.) 
 
 This external identity (as result of external reflection) is equality, 
 likeness, or sameness (Gleichheit), and the external distinction is un- 
 likeness, inequality (or non- identity Ungleichheit). "Sameness" or 
 "likeness" is identity, but only as a posited-being, an identity 
 which is not in-and-for-itself (i. e., not essential, not appertaining to 
 the nature of the things themselves). In like manner, unlikeness or 
 inequality is distinction, but as an external one, not belonging to 
 the objects themselves. It does not concern the objects themselves 
 whether they are like or different (it is only a comparison made by 
 the observer). Each object is self-related, and what it is is its own 
 affair (there is in it no relation to another, and no occasion for the 
 comparison which we make) ; the identity or non-identity, considered 
 as likeness and unlikeness, is the result of an act of comparison, and 
 is an external affair as regards the objects. 
 
 (3.) External reflection compares objects in regard to likeness and 
 difference, and the act of comparison deals with no other categories 
 than these, and it flits to and fro between objects, in order to ascer- 
 tain points of resemblance or of difference. But its flitting to and fro 
 is an external affair, even to these very distinctions. They are not 
 related to themselves, but each only to a third (the observer). Each 
 makes its appearance in this interchange prima facie for itself (inde- 
 pendent). External reflection is, as such, self-external. Particular- 
 ized distinction is absolute distinction as annulled ; it is consequently
 
 Difference. 47 
 
 not simple, not reflection into itself, but external to the reflection into 
 itself. (It is unconscious of the phases of the activity which unite 
 the two sides.) Its elements (or " moments") fall asunder (iden- 
 tity and difference are not seized as the same activity), and they 
 relate, as opposed to each other, to the reflection-into- itself (the ob- 
 jects are regarded as independent, " reflection-into-itself, " and 
 yet are compared with each other to discover likenesses and differ- 
 ences which have nothing to do with the dependence of the objects 
 upon each other). 
 
 To reflection, estranged from itself (producing what is exactly the 
 opposite of its own activity, it being return-to-itself as identity, 
 while its product is a relation of an alien to an alien, and hence no 
 return, but only a going abroad), likeness and difference, therefore, 
 appear as utterly without connection, and it separates them by the use 
 of such categories as "in so far," " sides," and "points of view," 
 when they relate to the same thing. Thus, different things, which 
 are one and the same as regards the fact that likeness and unlikeness 
 are attributed to both, are according to one side like, and according 
 to another side unlike ; and m so far as they are like, they are not 
 unlike. Likeness, therefore, relates only to itself (is not dependent on 
 unlikeness), and unlikeness is, in like manner, only unlikeness. 
 
 Through this separation of the categories of likeness and unlikeness 
 from each other they mutually annul themselves. Precisely the very 
 distinction which has been introduced to prevent them from contra- 
 diction and dissolution, namely, that something is like another in one 
 respect and different from it in another respect this isolation of 
 likeness from unlikeness is their destruction. For both likeness 
 and unlikeness are determinations of distinction. They are rela- 
 tions to each other the one is defined to be what the other is 
 not: Like is not unlike, and unlike is not like. The two have 
 essentially the same relation, and outside of it have no meaning 
 at all. As determinations of distinction (. e., as subordinate 
 phases of the category of Distinction), each one is what it is in 
 distinction from its other. But through their indifference to each 
 other, likeness or equality is only a self-relation, and so also is 
 unlikeness its own "point of view" and a "reflection " (i. e., when 
 likeness and difference are predicated of the same subject, but are 
 explained through different " points of view," the " point of view " 
 belongs essentially to the predication, and must be added to the 
 category predicated ; "likeness" predicated with a " point of view" 
 is thereby conditioned, and its meaning is limited through the impli- 
 cation of unlikeness thereby conveyed ; likewise, " difference " predi-
 
 48 Essence. 
 
 cated in a certain "point of view" implies as its conditioning limit 
 the "likeness," which is not expressly stated. Any category in the 
 form of not-A is dependent wholly upon the extension and compre- 
 hension of A for its signification ; in the separation of likeness and 
 unlikeness by different " points of view," the essential limit is ex- 
 pressed which is common to both, and hence their indissoluble unity 
 is posited). Each one of these categories thus isolated (by 
 " points of view ") is self-identical (in the " point of view " is con- 
 tained its own difference from itself, which really belongs to the 
 totality of its thought; " external reflection " is always trying to save 
 its thoughts from contradiction ; therefore it places their essential 
 self -opposition in something else outside of them, which it regards as 
 subjective and unessential ; " a point of view" for example, is a merely 
 subjective distinction, the self-difference having been removed, 
 nothing but abstract identity remains). The distinction between 
 likeness and unlikeness has vanished, for they have no determinate- 
 ness remaining in which they can be contrasted (all determinateness 
 has been placed in the " point of view " a mere external consider- 
 ation) ; hence each is a mere abstract identity. 
 
 This aspect of indifference in other words, this external distinc- 
 tion annuls itself, therefore, and is the negativity of itself through 
 itself. (This refers to the contradiction involved in placing all of 
 the determinateness in the " points of view," and in holding the same 
 to be subjective and unessential ; the very distinction between likeness 
 and unlikeness which external reflection thinks it necessary to pre- 
 serve from annulment, and, therefore, seeks to prevent self-contra- 
 diction by such devices as "points of view" and "in so far," is 
 annulled by this very procedure ; for the distinction between likeness 
 and unlikeness vanishes when their characteristic determinatenesses 
 are removed and placed in something else. Hence this activity of 
 distinguishing is a self-negating activity.) It is tlTat negativity 
 which, in the act of comparison, belongs to the objects compared. 
 The act of comparing passes to and fro from likeness to unlikeness, 
 and from the latter to the former ; it lets one vanish in the other, 
 and is in fact the negative unity of both. The act of comparison is 
 an external affair a subjective performance outside of the objects 
 compared, and outside of the aspects in which they are compared. 
 But this negative unity is in fact the very nature of likeness and 
 unlikeness, as we have seen above. This independent " point of 
 view," which constitutes the validity of likeness in contrast to unlike- 
 ness, and which in the same manner gives validity to unlikeness, is 
 precisely the respect in which they lose their distinction from each
 
 Difference. 49 
 
 other, and become self-identical and identical with each other. (Their 
 difference is posited in the point of view, and outside of their differ- 
 ence i. e., except wherein they differ they are the same; but 
 their difference is posited in the " point of view," i. e., it is in a 
 unity ; hence this external reflection contradicts itself by doing pre- 
 cisely what it attempts to avoid, viz., it brings together the contra- 
 diction in a " point of view " in order to save likeness and difference 
 from unity and consequent contradiction.) 
 
 Accordingly, likeness and difference as moments of external reflec- 
 tion, and as excluding each other, vanish in their identity. But this 
 negative unity of likeness and difference is posited (explicitly con- 
 tained) in them, namely, the activity of reflection is stated as belong- 
 ing to them, but as external to them ; in other words tbev are the like- 
 ness and difference of a third somewhat i. e., of something differ- 
 ent from them. Thus likeness is not the likeness of itself, nor is 
 unlikeness the nnlikeness of itself, but of a somewhat unlike ft. and 
 the unlike is self-identical. Likeness and uulikeness are, therefore, 
 each a self-contradiction. Each one is cousequentlv an activity of 
 reflection (a return into itself through its opposite), inasmuch as 
 likeness is the identity of itself and uulikeness, and uulikeness is the 
 identity of itself and likeness. 
 
 Likeness and difference were seen to constitute the sides or phases 
 of posited-being, as opposed to the objects compared, i. e., the ob- 
 jects held as different, and these objects were regarded as an objec- 
 tively existent reflection opposed to the distinction of likeness and 
 unlikeness (i. e., the objects were regarded as independent, and their 
 relation to each other only an external act of comparison). But this 
 independence has been lost. Likeness and unlikeness, the deter- 
 minations of external reflection, are determinations of the objectively- 
 existing reflection, which reflection the different objects are supposed 
 to be likeness and uulikeness are only the undefined distinction 
 between the existing objects. The objectively-existing Reflection 
 (an sich seyende Reflexion = implicit or potential reflection ; the 
 expression is used throughout this logic to characterize whatever is 
 apprehended as independently existing, without stating, however, its 
 mediation as return through the annulment of its other), is the relation 
 to itself without negation (". e., without the annulment of its other), 
 the abstract identity with itself. Consequently, it is nothing but the 
 posited-being itself. The mere difference passes over, through 
 posited-being, into the negative reflection (i. e., the " posited-being " 
 
 ; mmeJiateness as a result; hence dependent; hence self-negative);
 
 50 Essence. 
 
 hence that phase of reflection which negates or determines the 
 immediate. Difference is nothing but the posited distinction; hence, 
 distinction which is none ; hence a self-negation of distinction. Thus 
 likeness and difference posited-being return through their indif- 
 ference, or the objectively existing reflection, into negative unity 
 with themselves ; they return into the reflection which is potentially 
 the distinction of likeness and difference. The difference (dispar- 
 ateness) whose indifferent sides are mere moments and also negative 
 unities, is ANTITHESIS. 
 
 Remark, 
 
 Difference, like Identity, has been expressed in a principle of its 
 own ; these two principles are held in a relation of indifference to- 
 wards each other, each one having independent validity. 
 
 "Everything is different from everything else" (Alle Dinge sind 
 veraehiederi), or in another form: " there are no two things which are 
 identical with each other." This principle is, in fact, the opposite of 
 the principle of Identity, for it states that A is something different ; 
 therefore that A is also not-A ; in another form, A is non-identical 
 with another, and therefore it is not A-in-general, but rather a defi- 
 nite, particular A. (" A is something different" i. e. it has no mean- 
 ing except a negative one of dependence upon some other term ; i. e., 
 the predication made of A is limited or conditioned through the other 
 term of the relation posited in the predicate " different; " since dif- 
 ference posits relation and dependence, its predication of A amounts 
 in fact to the predication of not-A, as stated in the text, viz : "There- 
 fore A is also not-A.'" If A were a universal existence, i. e., " true " 
 in the Hegelian sense, it would not stand in opposition to something 
 else, but would possess only self-distinction. Hence, if " A is some- 
 thing different," it is partial and complementary and, as a "definite 
 particular," demands another to complete the totality of its sphere of 
 being). In the place of A in the principle of Identity any other sub- 
 strate may be substituted, but for A in the principle of Difference 
 there can be no such exchange. It is not intended by this principle 
 to affirm of something that it is different from itself, but only that it 
 is different from another; but this difference is (in truth) its own de- 
 termination. As self-identical, A is an indeterminate somewhat; 
 but, as determinate or particular, it is the opposite of this ; it has not 
 only identity with itself, but also negation, and, consequently, differ- 
 ence of itself from itself. 
 
 That everything is different from everything else, is a superfluous
 
 Difference. 51 
 
 principle, for in the plural "things," involving multiplicity, there is 
 implied nnparticularized difference. But the principle : " There are 
 no two things perfectly identical with each other," expresses more 
 than this, to-wit: particularized difference. Two things are not 
 merely two-, numerical multiplicity implies sameness of quality, but 
 the two spoken of are different through a " qualitative " determina- 
 tion. The principle which states, that there are no two things identi- 
 cal with each other, calls to mind the anecdote in which Leibnitz sug- 
 gested to the ladies at the court, the impossibility of finding two leaves- 
 in the forest that were just alike. Those were happy times for meta- 
 physics, when people at court busied themselves with it, and when it 
 needed no greater exertion to prove its principles, than to compare 
 the leaves of trees ! The reason why the mentioned principle at- 
 tracts attention, lies in the explanation given that "two," or num- 
 erical multiplicity, contains no definite, or particularized difference ; 
 and, that difference, as such, in its abstraction, is indifferent as regards 
 likeness and unlikeness. For the imagination, (Vorstellen) since 
 it attains only to qualitative determination, (Bestimmung) these' 
 moments (the "two"), are presented as indifferent towards each 
 other, so that the one or the other the mere likeness of things ob- 
 tains determination without unlikeness, or that things are different if 
 they have mere numerical multiplicity, difference in general, and are 
 not unlike. On the contrary, the principle of difference asserts that 
 things are different through unlikeness, from each other (qualitative 
 opposition)* that the determination of unlikeness belongs to them as- 
 well as the determination of likeness, for it requires the two to make 
 a definite distinction. 
 
 Now, this principle that the determination of unlikeness belong* 
 to each and everything, requires a proof. It cannot be appealed 
 to as a self-evident truth, (iinmittelbarer Salz) ; for the ordinary 
 stage of consciousness demands a proof for every combination of 
 different predicates in a synthetical proposition ; it asks for a third 
 term in which they are mediated. This proof must show the 
 transition of Identity into Difference, and likewise the transition of 
 the latter into particularized (bestimmte qualitatively determined > 
 difference, i. e. into unlikeness. But this is not usually attempted. 
 For it is evident that difference, or external distinction, is, in truth, 
 reflected into itself; it is distinction in itself; the indifferent attitude 
 of the different ones towards each other is a mere posited-being, and 
 hence not an external, indifferent distinction, but one (including} 
 relation of the two moments. 
 
 There is also involved in this, the dissolution and nugatoriness-
 
 52 Essence. 
 
 of the principle of Difference. Two things are perfectly like 
 (equal) : then they are like and unlike at the same time ; like, in the 
 fact that they are both " things," or that they are " two; " for each 
 one is a "thing" and a one of two; each is, therefore, the same as 
 the other ; but they are assumed as unlike. Consequently the two 
 moments, likeness and unlikeness, are different in one and the same 
 respect, or in that their distinction is one and the same relation. 
 Consequently they have passed over into Antithesis (Entgegensetzung 
 = opposition, or contrariety). 
 
 When the two predicates are affirmed at the same time, contradic- 
 tion is prevented by the reservation, "in so far." Two things are 
 like in so far as they are not unlike ; or, they are like according to 
 one side, or respect, and unlike according to another,etc. By such a 
 process the unity of likeness and unlikeness is supposed to be re- 
 moved from the things, and this unity held to be an external reflec- 
 tion. This is, however, a process in which the two sides of likeness 
 and unlikeness are distinguished, although they are contained in one 
 and the same activity, and it is one and the same activity which dis- 
 tinguishes them each one reflects the other, and manifests itself in it. 
 That kind considerateness for the welfare of "things," which 
 sees to it that they are not allowed to contradict themselves, is utterly 
 oblivious here as elsewhere of the fact that it does not do away with 
 the contradiction, but it only places it in another, viz. : in the subject- 
 ive or external reflection, and loaves in this external reflection both 
 moments (of the contradiction) which are expressed by this removal 
 or transposition as mere positei-oeing, as annulled, and as related to 
 each other in one unity (annulled, because posited in one unity be- 
 ing negative toward each other). 
 
 3. Antithesis. 
 
 In Antithesis the particularized reflection as found in the category of 
 Distinction is perfected. It (antithesis) is the unity of identity and 
 difference. Its moments are in one identity, but in this identity are 
 differentiated. Being different and yet identical, they are contraries 
 (opposites antithetic). 
 
 Identity and distinction are the moments of distinction as found 
 within it. They are reflected moments of its unity ("reflected " in 
 that each is a return to itself through the other ; each moment devel- 
 ops its "other" within itself). Likeness and unlikeness (sameness 
 and difference), however, belong to reflection as externalized (*'. e., 
 are a distinction supposed to be subjective and arbitrary). Their 
 identity with themselves is not only the indifference of each towards the
 
 Antithesis. 53 
 
 other, but it is the indifference towards being in-and-for-itself (/. e., 
 towards essence towards the independent being or totality). Their 
 identity is an identity of each as opposed to the identity reflected 
 into itself; it is, therefore, immediateness which is not reflected into 
 itself. The posited-being of the sides (opposite phases) of external 
 reflection is, therefore, a, being while its not-posited-being is a non- 
 being. 
 
 The moments (elements or terms) of Antithesis when examined 
 carefully, prove to be posited-being or determination reflected into 
 itself. The posited-being takes the form of likeness and unlikeness, 
 (sameness and difference). The two, as reflected into themselves. 
 constitute the determinations of antithesis. Their reflection into 
 themselves consists in this, that each is in itself the unity of same- 
 ness and difference. Sameness, for example, is found only in the 
 movement of reflection, which makes comparison of different some- 
 whats ; consequently, sameness is mediated through its other moment, 
 which is indifferent to it (i. e,, not dependent upon it, for difference 
 seems to be independent of sameness). Likewise, also, difference is 
 found only in the same activity of reflection, which makes comparison 
 and involves sameness as one of its results. Each of these moments 
 is, therefore, in its determiaateness the entire process. It is the 
 whole, because it contains its other moment, (its opposite) ; bat this. 
 its other, exists indifferently, or independent of it ; and so each con- 
 tains a relation to its own non-being; and, in fact, is only reflection 
 into itself, or the total process in its relation to its own uou-being. 
 
 This " sameness " (identity) which is reflected into itself which 
 contains within itself relation to difference is the Positive / and, in 
 like manner, difference which contains within itself its relation to its 
 non-being, to sameness, is the Negative. In other words, the two are 
 posited-being. In so far as the detenninateness of distinction is taken 
 as the relation of posited-being to itself, in a particularizing (differ- 
 entiating) form of relation, the antithesis is reflected into its self- 
 sameness as one aspect of its posited-being ; in another aspect it is 
 reflected into self-difference. Thus arises the distinction of positive 
 and negative. The positive is the posited-being, reflected into itself 
 as self-sameness. But what is reflected is the posited-being, . e., 
 negation a* negation; therefore, this reflection into itself contains 
 relation to another as its own determination. The negative, on 
 the other hand, is posited-being, as difference reflected-into-itself. 
 But the posited-being is difference itself ; hence this reflection (in- 
 volved ir the "negative") is the identity of difference with itself, 
 or its absolute self-relation. Therefore, each contains the other ;
 
 54 Essence. 
 
 the posited-being reflected into itself as sameness contains difference ; 
 and reflected into itself as difference contains sameness. 
 
 (The reader must not fail to remember that we are treating here of 
 relation. Sameness is relation, and difference is relation. The dis- 
 tinction of sameness and difference belongs to posited-being. In 
 "posited-being" the distinction made is regarded as an external or 
 arbitrary one. Sameness and difference are distinguished in it, and 
 are referred to independents-existing somewhats between which 
 comparison is instituted. The Maya of reflection the illusion of 
 abstract knowing is found right here. It sees the distinctions of 
 sameness and difference, but sees no essential inter-dependence ex- 
 isting between the objects which it compares. It, therefore, in its 
 impotency, supposes the individuality of the objects compared to be 
 perfect without reference of each to the other. But all distinction 
 which it makes, rests upon, and presupposes objectively-existent dis- 
 tinction. And, in general, every existence possesses individuality and 
 preserves the same through such distinction. But this distinguish- 
 ing is a process of relation, essential to the existence of things, 
 and hence -the arbitrary subjective distinguishing of external reflec- 
 tion, explains no real process of distinguishing, and in so far as it 
 supposes all relations to belong to external reflection, it completely 
 shuts its eyes to the fact that all real existence is such through rela- 
 tion essential relation. Since the individuality of objects depends 
 on distinction, such objects are, in reality, terms of a process ; 
 in relating to another distinguishing itself from another an 
 object is obtaining its own individuality. In this pi'ocess the rela- 
 tion is first an expression of its own dependence: the object seems 
 to depend upon another seems to point out or manifest the 
 other directing us, so to speak, to the other as its essence. But 
 the other in the process manifests the first somewhat, depends upon 
 it in like manner; hence the total process re- affirms our first object. 
 The total process is a reflection into itself made up of two positings 
 the positing of the other by the first, and the positing of the first by 
 the other. The two positings are two manifestations two expres- 
 sions of dependence ; and, hence, the positing phases are negative, 
 and express the nugatoriness, or lack of essentiality of the depend- 
 ent somewhats. A somewhat, regarded as through another, is regarded 
 as a posited-being, a somewhat regarded as positing another is a pre- 
 supposed-being, i. e., presupposed by that which it posits. In the 
 total process which contains two positings or two negations, i. e., 
 expressions of dependence there results identity, self-relation, but 
 self-relation which contains self-distinction, viz., the two-fold nega-
 
 Antithesis. 55 
 
 tire expression contained in the doable-positing. The total process 
 which as a whole, is identity, has been shown to be a two-fold differ- 
 entiation. The differentiation or negative aspect of the process is 
 essential to the identity. Unless the two negative movements are of 
 equal value, the return into itself or reflection is not realized. But 
 if it is realized, the equality of the movements named is presupposed, 
 and with this the validity of the distinction and the independence 
 of its moments. This contradiction has its solution only in the 
 fact pointed out, namely the mutual reflection into themselves 
 of the two moments, each through the other. This reflection into 
 itself makes each moment a total movement, and elevates each 
 one to independence in short, makes each an identity with itself, 
 containing distinction between itself and its other, within itself. This 
 is the idea of Antithesis or self-opposition, the moments whereof are 
 4 i contraries." But; external reflection, while it discovers sameness 
 and difference in objects, and vainly supposes these distinctions to be 
 due to its own exploits, in this conduct does both too much and too 
 little. In one respect, it is modest in regarding its distinctions as un- 
 essential to the existence of things. But in another respect, it is the 
 height of presumption on its part to deny the objectivity of sameness 
 and difference, as essential relations. In other words, to deny that 
 relation has more validity than immediate being has. For relation is 
 the essence of particular things. They exist only as moments of total 
 processes, and whatever identity they have is derived solely from the 
 process of self-relation. But the self-relation, being a process of 
 self-determination, is a process of self-particularization, or self-dis- 
 tinction. In the text, Hegel has shown the implication of this ex- 
 ternal reflection, which treats sameness and difference as subjective 
 distinctions. He has shown that in all cases such distinctions imply 
 each other, and that each contains within itself the contrary of itself. 
 They are distinctions of posited-being, and each involves duality a 
 duality of dependence and independence, of identity and distinction, 
 of self -relation and self-negation.) 
 
 The Positive and the Negative are thus the two extremes of the an- 
 tithesis which have become independent They are independent 
 through this fact, that each one of them is the reflection of the whole, 
 of the totality, into itself, and they belong to the antithesis in so far 
 as it is the determinateness which is reflected into itself as the total- 
 ity (the positive is within itself the antithesis of identity and distinc- 
 tion, i. e., it is itself as the opposite of something which is negative ; 
 so likewise the negative. Hence, since each is the antithesis, each is 
 the totality including the other, and each is reflected into itself through
 
 56 Essence. 
 
 the totality, and the totality is the " determinateness, which is 
 reflected into itself as totality "). On account of their independence 
 they constitute an antithesis which is particularized in itself. Each is 
 itself and its other, and through this each has its determinateness, not 
 in and through another, but in itself. Each relates to itself, and is 
 only self-relation when it relates to its other (for the other relates 
 back to the first, and thereby produces a return or reflection). This 
 has two aspects ; each is relation to its non-being as a cancelling of 
 this other-being in itself ; therefore, its non-being is only an element 
 within it. But, on the other hand, the posited-beinghas here become 
 a being, and possesses an aspect of indifference. Its other, which each 
 contains, is, therefore, the non-being of that in which it is supposed 
 to be contained as a mere element. Each, therefore, is only in so far 
 as its non-being is, and therefore its being as a totality is the being 
 of its non-being (zwar in einer identischen Beziehung). 
 
 The determinations which constitute the positive and negative, sus- 
 tain themselves, therefore, through this fact, that the positive and the 
 negative are, in the first place, absolute moments or elements of the 
 antithesis. Their existence is one undivided reflection ; it is one act 
 of mediation in which each exists through the non-being of its other, 
 and, hence, through its other, or through its own non-being. Therefore 
 they are contraries in general ; in other words, each is only the con- 
 trary of its other, and, in this respect, one is not positive and the other 
 negative, but both are negative to each other. Each, therefore, ex- 
 ists in so far as the other does. It is, through the other through 
 its own non-being what it is ; it is only posited-being. But, on the 
 other hand, it is in so far as the other is not ; it is through the non- 
 being of its other that it exists ; it is reflection into itself. These two 
 phases are, however, the one mediation of the antithesis, and in this 
 they are only posited somewhats. 
 
 But, besides this, the mere posited-being is reflected into itself. 
 The positive and the negative are, in this respect according to ex- 
 ternal reflection indifferent to the first identity in which they are 
 only moments. In other words, since that first reflection belongs to 
 the positive and the negative as their own reflection into themselves, 
 each is within itself its own posited-being, and, therefore, each is in- 
 different towards (independent of) its reflection into its non-being 
 and towards its own posited-being. The two sides are, therefore 
 merely different (i. <?., are distinguished from each other, without rela- 
 tion of dependence), and in so far as their determinateness of posi- 
 tive and negative constitutes their posited-being (relation of mutual 
 dependence), each is not determined in itself in that manner, but is
 
 Antithesis. 57 
 
 only detenninateness in general. To each side belongs, therefore, 
 one of the detenninatenesses of positive and negative ; bat they conk! 
 be interchanged, and each side is of such a kind that it can be taken 
 as positive or as negative. 
 
 But the positive and the negative are in the third place not merely 
 a posited-being, nor merely an indifferent being, bat their posited- 
 being or the relation which each has to the other within one unity 
 which unity neither one is is recalled from each. Each is within 
 itself both positive and negative ; the positive and the negative are 
 determinations of reflection, each per se; in this reflection of the con- 
 traries into themselves they first become positive and negative, prop- 
 erly so called. The positive possesses relation to the other within its 
 own being, in as much as the other contains the ddianmimatemess of 
 the positive. Likewise the negative is not negative, as the opposite 
 of another; bat it has the detenninateness through which it is nega- 
 tive, within itself. 
 
 Therefore, each one is an independent, for-itsetf existing unity 
 with itself. Although the positive is a posited-being. it is this in 
 such a manner, that the posited-being for it is such only as annulled. 
 It is the not-opposed (not in an antithesis, not a contrary), the 
 annulled antithesis, bat as a term of its own antithesis (e. g. the 
 positive, containing as it does identity and distinction, is totality 
 and, therefore, exists as its own element or as part and whole at the 
 same time. So also exists the negative as its own negative and posi- 
 tive, or totality. The nature of this process to be whole and part of 
 itself, is the nature of the universal as a process of self-determination, 
 to be general or generic, and special or particular as a result of its 
 own process, at the same time. All self-activity dirempts or dua- 
 lizes itself in the form of antithesis, and this dualizing process is the 
 origin of all particularity. But the process which produces particu- 
 larity by its self-determination, is the total generic universal). 
 As a positive, something is described as in relation to another bat in 
 such a relation to this other, that it is not a posited (dependent) ; it 
 is within, itself the activity of reflection which negates otherness. 
 Bat its other, the negative, is also no posited-being or dependent ele- 
 ment, bat an independent being. Hence the negating reflection which 
 belongs to the positive, must exclude from itself, tins, its non-being. 
 Therefore the negative as absolute reflection is not the immediate 
 negative, bat the negative as a cancelled posited-being. The nega- 
 tive is hi and for itself, and the positive rests upon itself alone. As 
 reflection into itself it negates its relation to another; its other is the 
 positive, an independent being. Its negative relation to the latter is,
 
 58 Essence. 
 
 therefore, one of exclusion. The negative is an opposite, or contrary, 
 which exists independently, although opposed to the positive which is 
 the determination of the annulled antithesis, the entire antithesis op- 
 posed to the self-identical posited being. 
 
 The positive and the negative are, consequently, not only in them- 
 selves positive and negali've, but in and for themselves positive and 
 negative (t. e., not only by nature, but as realized through the ac- 
 tivtty of a process). "/n themselves " they are positive and nega- 
 tive in so far as their excluding their other is not considered, but each 
 is taken only in its own determination. Something is positive or 
 negative " in itself" when it is thus described as not merely in opposi- 
 tion to another. But the positive or negative not as a posited-being, 
 and, consequently, not as antithetic, would be the immediate being 
 or non-being. But the positive and the negative are the elements of 
 antithesis ; their nature consists only in this form of reflection into 
 themselves. Something is positive "in itself " outside of its relation 
 to the negative, and something is negative in itself outside of its re- 
 lation to the positive. In this predication a close regard is had to the 
 abstract phases of this reflected-being. But the positive or negative, 
 as existing in itself, is understood to be that which is opposed to 
 another, and not merely as dependent moment nor as belonging to 
 the comparison (i. e., objectively relative), but to be the determina- 
 tion which belongs to the sides of the antithesis. They are, therefore, 
 positive or negative in themselves, not outside of the relation to 
 another, but this relation to another constitutes their very nature, or 
 the function of their process, and in fact as excluding. In this pro- 
 cess they are, therefore, positive or negative in and for themselves (i. 
 e., and at the same time independent). 
 
 Remark. 
 
 This is the proper place to refer to the terms " positive and nega- 
 tive," as they are used in mathematics. They are employed as well- 
 known expressions needing no definition. But for the reason that 
 they are not defined accurately, their treatment does not escape inso- 
 luble difficulties. There occur, first, the two concepts of positive and 
 negative as real distinctions apart from their distinction as contra- 
 ries. In this sense, there lies at the basis an immediate particular 
 being, taken thus, in the first place, as mere difference dispar- 
 ateness: the simple reflection into itself is distinguished from its 
 posited-being the relation of opposition. The relation of opposi- 
 tion is, therefore, taken as an arbitrary distinction, as something
 
 Antithesis. 59 
 
 which does not objectively exist, and does not belong to die disparate 
 somewhats. In that case, each one may be regarded as an opposite, 
 or, on the other hand, as existing independent] j. And it is a matter 
 of indifference which of the two things is regarded as positive or as 
 negative. The second view which one may take of the positive and 
 negative, regards each of these terms as essentially antithetic ; the posi- 
 tive as in-itself positive, and the negative as in-iiself negative, in such 
 a manner that the two different somewhats stand in essential relation 
 to each other. These two views of the positive and negative are 
 found in the first definitions given of the positive and negative in 
 
 The -f- a and a are in the first place opposite magnitudes : a lies 
 at the basis of each, and is an independent unity which is indifferent 
 to the antithetic relation ; a lifeless substrate if no further determina- 
 tion is added. The a is characterized as the negative, the -f- a as 
 the positive, and each is treated as antithetic. 
 
 Moreover, a itself is not only the simple unity which lies at the 
 basis, but, as-|-a and a, it is the reflection into-self of these con- 
 traries. There are two different a'*, and it is indifferent which of the 
 two is characterized as positive or as negative. Each has a particular 
 phase of persistence, and is positive- 
 According to the first view, +y y= ; or in the expression 8 
 -|-3, the three is positive, but negative as regards 8. The contra- 
 ries cancel each other in the combination. An hour's journey towards 
 the East and a similar journey back towards the West cancel each 
 other. A given sum of liabilities cancels an equal amount of assets. 
 And whatever assets are on hand balance a like amount of liabilities. 
 The hour's journey towards the East is not positive as regards di- 
 rection, nor the return towards the West negative ; but these direc- 
 tions are indifferent as regards the terms of antithesis ; they become 
 positive and negative only when referred to a third point of view, ex- 
 ternal to them. So, too, the liabilities are not essentially negative ; 
 they are negative only in relation to the debtor; for the creditor they 
 are positive assets ; for him they are equivalent to a sum of money, 
 or a certain definite value which becomes assets or liabilities through 
 an external standpoint. 
 
 Contraries cancel each other, so that the result is zero. But there 
 is a relation of identity in them and in this relation they are indiffer- 
 ent to the antithesis ; this constitutes the unity underlying it. The 
 sum of money mentioned iJbove, which was only one sum, although 
 from one point of view, liabilities, and from the other point, assets, 
 is a unity of this kind ; so, also, the a which is the same in -f- a
 
 60 Essence. 
 
 and a; and the journey which travels over the same road, and not 
 over two roads, one of which extends to the East and the other to 
 the West. In like manner an ordinate y is the same whether taken 
 on this side or that side of the axis ; in this sense -j-y y = y. It 
 is only the ordinate, it is only one determination and its law. 
 
 From another point of view the contraries are not one independent 
 somewhat (i. e., as underlying the antithesis), but they are two inde- 
 pendent somewhats. They are namely as opposed, also reflected 
 into themselves, and they have independent subsistence as dis- 
 parates. 
 
 In the expression 8-J-3, considered in this manner, there are 11 
 units ; -j- y y are ordinates upon opposite sides of the axis. Each 
 one is an independent being opposed to this limit, and opposed to the 
 antithetic relation; therefore, -\-y y = 2 y. Also, the journey to 
 the East and back to the West over the same road is the sum of two 
 exertions, or the sum of two periods of time. Likewise in political 
 economy, a quantity of money, or of value, is not merely this one 
 quantity as a means of subsistence, but it has a two-fold validity: it 
 is means of subsistence both for the creditor and for the debtor. 
 The wealth of the nation includes not merely the cash, and besides 
 this the value of real and personal property in the nation, still less 
 what remains after deducting liabilities from assets ; but its capital,, 
 even if the liabilities and assets balance each other, remains positive 
 capital ; as -|~ a a = a ; but, in the second place, since the capital 
 may be regarded as liabilities over and over again, being loaned re- 
 peatedly, it becomes a multiplied means. 
 
 But the antithetic quantities are not merely contraries j in another 
 respect they are real or independent, and indifferent to each other. 
 But whether a quantity is the particular being with indifferent 
 limits or not, the positive and negative belongs to it potentially. For 
 example, a, in so far as it has no sign of -\- or attached to it, is 
 taken in a positive sense as though the -j- belonged to it. But if it 
 was intended to be a contrary only, it might be taken as a, just as 
 well. But the positive sign is readily given it, because the positive is 
 regarded as somewhat which is identical with itself, and the self-iden- 
 tical is the immediate independent, that which is not in a relation 
 of antithesis to anything. 
 
 Moreover, when positive and negative magnitudes are added or sub- 
 stracted they are taken for such as would be positive or negative by 
 themselves, and not as though this distinction depended upon the oper- 
 ation of addition or subtraction. In the expression, 8 (-^-3), the 
 first minus is opposed to 8, but the second minus, ( 3) is taken as
 
 61 
 
 though the 3 were negative in itself , independent of its relation within 
 the entire expression. 
 
 TUB peculiarity comes out more dearly in multiplication and di- 
 vision: in these operations the positive is essentially not antithetic, 
 bat the negative, on the contrary, is taken as antithetic. The ex- 
 pressions positive and negative are not taken as opposites of each 
 other. While the text-books, in their demonstrations of the mathe- 
 matical operations in which positive and negative occur, treat them in 
 all cases as contraries they mistake their nature, and. therefore, in- 
 volve themselves in contradictions. Pirns and BUN*?, in the operations 
 of multiplication and division, obtain this more specific meaning of 
 positive and negative, for the reason that the relation of the factors 
 (which are that of sum and unity Eimkttg WJM! AxzaJf-,1 i. ?.. moi- 
 tiplier or divisor being the " sum," or the how-many-times, and the 
 multiplicand or quotient being the " unity." or the that- whit Ii- is re- 
 peated), is not a relation of mere increase and diminution, as is found 
 in addition and subtraction, but it is a qualitative relation : where- 
 fore pirns and mimms receive the qualitative meaning of positive and 
 negative. Unless this distinction is kept in mind it is easy to show, 
 on the supposition that these are mere antithetic magnitudes, that if 
 the product of a into -\-a is a *. conversely, the product of -f-a 
 into a wffl be + a*, obviously a false conclusion. When the one 
 factor is taken as sum (how-many-times), and the other factor is 
 taken as unity (the unit of repetition) and the first factor is usually 
 written first in the expression the two expressions ( i) X (-J- a) 
 and (+a) X ( a) differ in this respect: in the former, -|- a is the 
 * unity," and a the " sum," and in the other the converse is true. 
 In explaining the former it is customary to say: * If I take -j-a, a 
 times, then I take + a not merely a times, but at the same time in a 
 negative manner, i. e,, + a times a; hence the -jh a has to be taken 
 
 negatively, and the product is a*. Now, in the second case, if a 
 is to be taken -{-a times, then a ought likewise to be taken not a 
 times, but in the opposite relation, viz.: -j-a times: if the pirns sign 
 indicated antithetic relation, the reasoning which holds good in the 
 case of the negative multiplier would prove here in the case of a posi- 
 tive multiplier that the product should be Hh a 2 . The same remark 
 applies to division. (But Hegel holds, as above shown, that in mul- 
 tiplication and division the mtmm* sign indicates a negative quantity, 
 Hfgatite having the sense of contrary; while the fiux sign does not 
 indicate a positive quantity, i. e., -positive " in the sense of a term of 
 
 This consequence (that a jfo* multiplier should give as product a
 
 62 Essence. 
 
 positive result, while a negative multiplier gives a negative result), is 
 a necessary one, provided that -f- and are 1 taken as indicating 
 antithetic magnitudes (as they are taken in the demonstrations usually 
 found in text-books). To minus is ascribed the power of changing 
 the plus; but, on the other hand, no such power of changing minus 
 is ascribed to plus, notwithstanding plus is looked upon as an anti- 
 thetic quantity just as much as minus is. In fact, plus does not pos- 
 sess this power of changing minus, because it is here taken in its 
 qualitative relation to minus, inasmuch as the factors have a qualitative 
 relation to each other. Hence, in so far as the negative is here taken 
 as antithetic, the positive, on the other hand, is taken as indetermin- 
 ate, indifferent. The plus is, indeed, also, the negative, but the 
 negative of the minus, not the in-itself-negative as the minus is. 
 Hence, the negative effect of changing the sign of the unity (multi- 
 plicand) appertains to the minus and not to the plus. 
 
 Therefore a into a gives -|- a 2 , for the reason that the negative 
 a is not to be taken merely as antithetic (for it would be thus taken 
 if multiplied by minus a) but because it is to be taken negatively. 
 The negation of negation is the positive. 
 
 c. 
 
 Contradiction. 
 
 (I.)' Distinction contains its twosides as moments; in the phase of 
 difference (disparateness) they are sundered and indifferent towards 
 each other ; in the phase of antithesis, these moments are sides, each, 
 one of which is determined through the other, so that they are recip- 
 rocally complemental elements. They are, however, likewise deter- 
 mined in themselves (as well as through each other), and, therefore, 
 indifferent towards each other, and at the same time reciprocally 
 excluding each other. These are the independent determinations of 
 Reflection. 
 
 The one is the positive, the other the negative ; the former, how- 
 ever, as the in-itself positive, the latter as the in-itself negative. 
 Each one possesses this indifference and independence for-and-by- 
 itself through the fact that it has the relation to its other moment, in 
 itself; in this manner it is the entire antithesis including both 
 moments in itself. (It was shown that the identity was a phase of 
 activity of the entire process of self-difference, and that difference 
 was another phase of the same process. The " positive " is this pro- 
 cess looked upon as self-determined in the form of identity, while the 
 negative is the same in the form of difference). Each moment, as-
 
 Contradiction. 63 
 
 this entire process is mediated through its other within itself, and 
 contains the same. But it is mediated, also, through the non-being 
 of its other, within itself ; hence, it is a unity existing for itself (as 
 independent), and it excludes the other from itself. 
 
 Since the independent determination of reflection excludes the other, 
 and in the same respect in which it contains it, and thereby is inde- 
 pendent, it follows that it excludes its independence from itself in the 
 very attitude in which it is independent. For this independence con- 
 sists in the fact that it contains the other determination within itself, 
 and has, through this very circumstance, no relation to an external 
 somewhat ; but, at the same time, this independence consists also 
 in the fact that it is itself, and excludes from itself its negative 
 determination. In this, it is CONTRADICTION. 
 
 Distinction is always contradiction, at least implicitly. For it is 
 the unity of moments which are only in so far as they are not on, 
 and it is the separation of moments which are separated only as exist- 
 ing terms of the same relation. But when distinction develops into 
 positive and negative, we have the contradiction as posited ; because 
 they, as negative unities, are the positing of themselves, and, at the 
 same time, each one of them is the cancelling of itself and the positing 
 of its opposite. They constitute the determining reflection as an exclud- 
 ing reflection ; because the act of exclusion is one of distinguishin?, 
 and each of the terms distinguished, as also excluding, is the entire 
 process of exclusion, and hence each, within its own activity, 
 excludes itself. 
 
 The two independent determinations of reflection, considered by 
 themselves, are the following: (a) the positive is the posited-being 
 as reflected into identity with itself ; and this is the posited- being 
 which is not relation to another, and is, therefore, independent sub- 
 sistence, in so far as the posited-being is cancelled and excluded 
 from it. With this, however, the positive enters into relation to a 
 non-being to a posited-being. It is. therefore, contradiction in that 
 as the positing of identiry-with-itself through the act of excluding 
 the negative, it makes itself into a negative somewhat, and, therefore, 
 into another, which it excludes from itself. This other is, as excluded, 
 posited as independent of that which excludes it ; hence, as reflected 
 into itself and self-excluding. Therefore, the excluding reflection is 
 the positing of the positive as excluding the other, and, therefore, 
 this positing is immediately the positing of its other which excludes 
 it. This is the absolute contradiction of the positive, but it is at the 
 same time, also, the absolute contradiction of the negative, for the 
 one reflection posits both.
 
 64 Essence. 
 
 (b) The negative considered for-and-by itself as the contrary of 
 the positive, is the posited-being as reflected into non-identity with 
 itself, i. e., the negative as negative. But the negative is itself the 
 non-identical, i. e., the non-being of another; consequently the re- 
 flection in its non-identity is rather its relation to itself. Negation in 
 the first place is the negative as quality, or as immediate determinate- 
 ness ; but the negative as negative, is the same, as related to the nega- 
 tive of itself, i. e., to its other. If this negative is taken as identical 
 with the former (qualitative) negative, it is then only an immediate 
 negative, in which case it would not be taken as other opposed to 
 other, consequently not as negative at all ; the negative is not an imme- 
 diate. Furthermore, since each one is the same that the other is, this 
 relation of the non-identical somewhats is at the same time an identi- 
 cal relation. 
 
 This (the negative) is, therefore, the same contradiction that the 
 positive is, namely, posited-being, or negation as relation to itself (i. 
 e., dependence which is dependence on itself). But the positive is 
 only potentially this contradiction ; the negative, on the other hand, 
 is the posited contradiction ; for in its reflection into itself, in which 
 it is for-itself negative, or identical with itself as negative, it is non- 
 identical or the exclusion of identity. While it is in opposition to 
 identity it is identical with itself, and hence, through its excluding- 
 reflection it is the exclusion of itself from itself. 
 
 The negative is, therefore, the entire movement the antithesis 
 which is self-antithesis ; the distinction which does not relate to 
 another but only to itself; it excludes, as antithesis, identity from 
 itself ; and consequently it excludes itself, for as relation to itself it 
 determines itself in the form of identity which it excludes. 
 
 (2) Contradiction cancels itself. 
 
 In the self-excluding reflection which has been considered, the posi- 
 tive and the negative cancel each itself in its independence ; each is 
 nothing but the transition, or rather the translation, of itself into its 
 opposite. This ceaseless vanishing of the opposites is the first unity 
 in which the contradiction results. It is that of zero. 
 
 Contradiction contains, however, not merely the negative, but also 
 the positive ; in other words, the self-excluding reflection is, at the 
 same time, the positing reflection ; hence, the result of the contradic- 
 tion is not merely zero. The positive and negative constitute the 
 posited-being of independence ; their negation through themselves 
 cancels the posited-being of the independence. It is this posited- 
 being which is annulled (geht zu Grund) in contradiction. 
 
 Reflection into itself, through which the sides of the antithesis are
 
 Contradiction. 65 
 
 reduced to independent self-relations, is, in the first place, their inde- 
 pendence as separate moments. They are, therefore, only potentially 
 this independence, for they are still in opposition to each other, and 
 this potential or implicit state which belongs to them is their posited- 
 b?ing. But their excluding reflection cancels this posited-being, and 
 reduces them to independent somewhats f. e., to somewhats that 
 exist, not only in potentia but, to such as through their negative rela- 
 tion to their others, are independent. Their independence becomes 
 posited in this way. But they still reduce themselves to a posited- 
 being through this positing which they have. They cancel them- 
 selves, in that they determine themselves into self-identical some- 
 whats, but in the same, being still negative a self-identity which 
 is a relation to another. 
 
 But this excluding reflection is not merely this formal determina- 
 tion. It is excluding independence, and is the annulling of this 
 posited-being, and through this annulling it becomes for itself, and in 
 fact, a truly independent unity. Through the annulling of the other- 
 being, the posited-being again makes its appearance as the negative of 
 another. But, in fact, this negation is not again a merely first, 
 immediate relation to another, not a posited-being as cancelled 
 .immediateness, but as cancelled posited-being. The excluding reflec- 
 tion which belongs to independence, for the reason that it is exclud- 
 ing, becomes a posited-being, but is at the same time a cancelling of 
 its posited-being. It is a cancelling relation to itself. It annuls in 
 this relation, first, the negative ; secondly, it posits itself as negative, 
 and thereby becomes the very negative which it cancels : in the annul- 
 ling of the negative it posits it and annuls it at the same time. This 
 activity of exclusion is, therefore, the other whose negation it is ; the 
 annulment of this posited-being is, therefore, not again posited-being 
 in the sense that it is a negative of another, but it is the identification 
 with itself, a posited unity with itself. Independence is, therefore, 
 through its own negation, unity which returns into itself through the 
 circumstance that it returns into itself by negating its posited-being. 
 It is the unity of Essence, a unity which arises, not through the nega- 
 tion of another, but through a negation of itself, being through this 
 act self-identical. 
 
 (3.) According to this positive side of the question, and through 
 the fact that the independence which we find in the Antithesis has 
 reduced itself, through its excluding activity of reflection, to posited- 
 being, and at the same time annulled this posited-being, the Antithe- 
 sis has not only been destroyed, but has gone back into its ground. 
 
 5
 
 66 Essence. 
 
 The excluding activity of reflection which appertains to an independ- 
 ent contrary makes it a negative, and therefore a mere posited 
 somewhat. Through this it reduces its determinations, which at first 
 have the phase of independence (the positive and negative), to mere 
 determinations (i. e., to dependence). Since the posited-being 
 is by this means made to become posited-being, it returns into unity 
 with itself (its becoming is a becoming of itself ; herein the circular 
 movement of reflection makes itself manifest) ; it is the simple 
 essence, but the simplicity of essence in this phase is the category of 
 Ground, or Eeason (Grund). Through the annulling of the self-con- 
 tradictory determinations of essence, we have the restoration of the 
 simplicity of essence, but as an excluding unity of reflection. This is 
 a simple unity which determines itself as negative, but in this posited- 
 being is immediately self-identical. 
 
 The independent Antithesis, through its contradiction, is cancelled, 
 and results in a ground which is the first immediate whence issued the 
 antithesis ; the annulled antithesis, or the annulled posited-being, i& 
 itself a posited-being. Hence, essence as ground is a posited-being, a 
 result which has become. But, conversely, only this has resulted : 
 that the antithesis, or the posited-being, is annulled or only as posited- 
 being. Essence is, therefore, as ground, this excluding reflection, 
 which makes itself a posited-being, so that the antithesis with which 
 it began, and which was immediate, is only the posited, definite inde- 
 pendence of essence, and that at the same time it is only the self- 
 annulling ; but essence is reflected into itself in its determinateness. 
 Essence as ground excludes itself from itself, and thereby posits 
 itself. Its posited-being, which is that which is excluded, is only as 
 posited-being, as identity of the negative with itself. This independ- 
 ent somewhat is the negative, posited as negative. It is a self- 
 contradictory which, therefore, remains immediately in essence as its 
 ground. (Posited-being is the immediate being which has shown 
 itself to be transitory or dependent upon something else ; this de- 
 pendence, traced out, is found to be a relation to that wh>ch posits it, 
 again ; so the dependence is a dependence on its own dependence, 
 and this is independence ; or, in the language of the text, the posited- 
 being is an "annulled posited-being," being annulled through this 
 very self-relation ; it is a posited-being which is annulled by being 
 posited, again, as posited-being; i. e., its dependence is cancelled by 
 being made self-dependent. N. B. It is only the tracing out of the 
 entire relation which changes the aspect of the category here in- 
 volved.)
 
 Contradiction. 67 
 
 The annulled contradiction is, therefore, the ground ; it is essence 
 as the unity of positive and negative ; in antithesis, determination at- 
 tains to independence, but its independence is perfected in the cate- 
 gory of Ground. The negative is developed into independent essence 
 in it, but still as negative. Therefore, it is at the same time the posi- 
 tive, while it is self-identical in this negativity. The antithesis aud- 
 its contradiction are, therefore, annulled in the category of Ground, 
 as well as preserved. Ground is essence as positive identity with. 
 itself ; but it at the same time relates to itself as negativity, and, there- 
 fore, determines itself, and becomes the excluded posited-beiu^. 
 This posited-being, however, is the wholly independent essence ; and 
 the essence is ground through the fact that in this, its negation, it is 
 self-identical and positive. The self-contradicting, independent an- 
 tithesis was, therefore, ground already. There was added only the 
 determination of unity with itself. This (unity) made its appearance 
 through the fact that the independent opposites cancelled each itself r 
 and each became its other, and consequently was annulled. But in 
 that annulment each one came into self-identity; and, therefore, 
 proved itself to be self-identical essence, a somewhat reflected into 
 itself, even in its destruction, in its posited-being, or self -negation. 
 
 Remark 1. 
 
 The positive and the negative are the same. This expression 
 belongs to external reflection in so far as it institutes a comparison of 
 these two determinations ; but the question is not what the relation is 
 between two categories, as found by external comparison ; they must 
 be considered in themselves, and their own reflection discovered. And 
 in the case of these two categories, we have seen that each is essen- 
 tially the manifestation of itself in the other, and the positing itself as 
 the other. 
 
 The thinking which deals with images ( Fors/eZZen), does not con- 
 sider the positive and negative in themselves, and has recourse to the 
 act of comparison in order to seize these distinctions, which are evanes- 
 cent, but which it nevertheless holds to be fixed and abiding opposites 
 to each other. A very little experience in the habits of reflecting- 
 thiuking will suffice to convince one that when it defines a somewhat 
 as positive, it will often invert the same into negative upon very 
 slight pretexts ; and, conversely, what it has defined as negative, into 
 positive. The reflecting-thinking falls into confusion and self-con- 
 tradiction hi dealing with these categories. To one who is ignorant 
 of the nature of these categories, it looks as though this confusion 
 were something improper, and which ought not to happen ; it there-
 
 68 Essence. 
 
 fore ascribes it to subjective incompetency. This transition of one 
 contrary into the other does, in fact, produce mere confusion so long 
 as the necessity for the transformation has not been seen. It is, 
 however, even for external reflection, a matter of simple observation 
 that the positive is not a somewhat immediately identical with itself, 
 but it is opposed to a negative, and has significance only in this rela- 
 tion ; therefore, the negative itself is involved in the positive ; and, 
 more than this, the positive is the self-relating negation of the nega- 
 tive, which is the mere posited-being ; therefore, the positive is the 
 absolute negation in itself. Likewise the negative, which is opposed 
 to the positive, has its meaning in this relation to its other. Its 
 totality, therefore, involves the positive. But the negative has also 
 outside of its relation to the positive a subsistence of its own ; it 
 is self-identical. Hence the negative has all that belongs to the defi- 
 nition of the positive. 
 
 The opposition of positive and negative is most commonly under- 
 stood in the sense that the positive is something objective, notwith- 
 standing its very name expresses posited-being. On the contrary, it 
 understands the negative, in a subjective sense, as belonging only to 
 external reflection, which never concerns itself with the objective ; and, 
 indeed, for which the objective does not exist. In fact, if the nega- 
 tive expresses nothing else than an arbitrary abstraction, or the result 
 of an external comparison, then, of course, it has no existence for the 
 objective positive, and the positive is not in itself related to such an 
 empty abstraction. But in that case the determination of " positive" 
 is likewise merely an external and arbitrary designation. For an ex- 
 ample of these fixed contraries of reflection : light is generally taken 
 as the positive, and darkness as the negative. But light has in its 
 infinite expansion, and in the force of its unfolding and vitalizing in- 
 fluences, the nature of absolute negativity. Darkness, on the con- 
 trary, as devoid of multiplicity, or as the womb of productive ac- 
 tivity, in which no distinctions are produced by its own energy, is 
 rather the simple identity with itself, the positive. It is taken as 
 negative in the sense that it, as the mere absence of light, does not ex- 
 ist at all, and has no relation to light ; so that light, inasmuch as it is 
 a self-relation, and is regarded as not depending upon others, but as 
 related purely to itself, should cause darkness to vanish before it. 
 But it is a familiar fact that light may be dimmed through the agency 
 of darkness, so that it becomes gray ; and besides this merely quanti- 
 tative change into gray, it also suffers qualitative changes through 
 relation to darkness, and is modified into color. So, too, for an ex- 
 ample : virtue is not without struggle ; it is rather the highest, most
 
 ;.-:,:: ;;.:"__-, . :- :-:::-. .: -> :.:: M'.J :- ro^tlre, but it i= abso- 
 lote negativity. Virtue, Boreover, B not sncfa nwrely in comparison 
 with Tin-, bat it is in its very nature opposite ai atraggliBg. In 
 other words, vine m not only the atafam of liitnc innocence, too, 
 BthB absence andnotdistinginshedftomTirtne byetjernal Te&ec- 
 ioo^lralilkuiite^^Mlareo|j|ios^U>it; itisw^L EvSeonsists 
 in seff-pecntence in active immiliiB to good; it is the positive 
 : is the ^T"*"f> off good as well as of e viL 
 feAernunations,, and is aaeither positive nor 
 Bat at the sanvs tine Oil lainiii is to be taken also as 
 Onltoonehand,itisto!!:regardeda5 the positive 
 on the other hand, it relates to a contrary ; 
 2 from their in- 
 relation to their 
 
 ; go to destroetaon, or, in the positive sense, go 
 bo is 1t2ae positive, as the knowing 
 i it B only tihis self -identity in so 
 towrards its other, pene- 
 
 ; object, and cancels its negation (for tike object is the nega- 
 of the subject). Error B mnn< Iliiin^, positive, as an opinion 
 
 i does not exist. Ignorance, 
 
 r, is either indifferent towards troth and error, and. conse- 
 poaatiwe nor niflilin, in vMch case the distinction. 
 
 of a person, it is the npulse whieh B dnccted against itself, a nega- 
 
 tiNne which containig a positive duecliuu hi itself. It is one of the 
 most important principle* of philosophy, tMs insagfci into the nature 
 of the determinations of lenection, as here considered ; that their 
 troth consists only m their relation to each other, aaad that each in- 
 dndes (in its totafity) the other. Without tMs princ^plte tSaere can 
 be no tme step Bade 
 
 . , " . ... . . _.'.:.,,.. . _ " ^ ' .. * . : 
 
 BeitherAornott-A; ftereisno 
 
 , in the irst place, the proposition that every- 
 
 (. ., the tottBiy of each inclndes tie
 
 70 Essence. 
 
 But it is not usual to take these determinations in this meaning. 
 Ordinarily, the principle is understood to assert that of the predicates 
 belonging to a thing, a given predicate either does or does not belong 
 to it. The opposite signifies in this case merely absence, or, rather, 
 indeftniteness ; and the principle taken in this sense is so empty of 
 meaning that it is not worth the trouble of quoting. If the qualities 
 siceet, green, square are taken and all predicates are allowable by 
 this principle and predicated of the mind thus : the mind is sweet 
 or not sweet, green or not green, etc. , this would be pronounced trivial, 
 and as leading to nothing. The determinateness contained in the 
 predicate is related to something ; every proposition expresses that 
 something is determined. It ought essentially to contain this : that 
 the determinateness expresses what is essential, in the form of antithe- 
 sis. Instead of that, however, the proposition quoted goes in the 
 opposite direction, back toindeterminateness, in the fact that it predi- 
 cates in a trivial manner the determinateness, or its indefinite non- 
 being. 
 
 The principle of Excluded Middle is further to be distinguished 
 from the principles of Identity and Contradiction, already discussed. 
 It asserts that there is no thing which is neither A nor not- A, no 
 tertium quid indifferent to the antithesis. In fact, however, this very 
 principle gives a tertium quid which is indifferent to the antithesis 
 viz. : A, itself. This A is neither -(- A nor A, and it is equally -j- A 
 and A. That which is to be either -f- A or not-A is hence related 
 to -|- A, as well to not-A; and, again, in the fact that it is related to 
 A it ought not to be related to not-A, nor when it is related to not-A 
 should it be related to A. The somewhat itself is, therefore, the 
 tertium quid which was to be excluded. Since the contraries are 
 both posited and annulled in the somewhat, the tertium quid, which 
 is here a lifeless abstraction, if taken in a more profound meaning, 
 is the unity of reflection into which, as the ground, the Antithesis 
 recedes. 
 
 Remark 3. 
 
 If the first determinations of Reflection, viz., Identity, Difference, 
 and Antithesis (Polarity), can be set up as principles, as has been 
 shown, it is certain that Contradiction ought also to admit of state- 
 ment in the form of a principle ; for contradiction is the result of 
 the mentioned determinations of reflection (. e., the truth or totality 
 of which Identity, Difference, and Antithesis are phases. Contra- 
 diction is their " pre-supposition"), and if stated in the form of a 
 principle would run thus : All things are in themselves contradic-
 
 Contradiction. 71 
 
 tory; and this principle should be understood in the sense that it 
 expresses the truth and essence of things better than the former 
 principles mentioned. Contradiction, which succeeds the category 
 of Antithesis, is only the category of Naught, fully unfolded (become 
 explicit) the category of Naught as contained in the category of 
 Identity; and this was partially seen in the expression that the 
 principle of Identity says nothing (adds nothing in the predicate to 
 the contents of the subject). This negation was further defined in 
 the categories of Difference and Antithesis, and still further in the 
 posited Contradiction. (The principle of Contradiction as here set 
 up by Hegel, is the basis of all relation and of all being. Being has 
 been found to depend upon Relation, and all Relation has been found 
 to be Return or Reflection ; Reflection is a phase of self-relation or of 
 self-negation ; all relation is negation ; self-relation or self-negation 
 is the origin at once of all identity, subsistence, persistence, repose, 
 and individuality, as well as of all distinction, opposition, activity, 
 dependence, and manifestation. Contradiction makes explicit what 
 was implicit in the determinations of Reflection previously discussed. 
 " All things are in themselves contradictory," means nothing more 
 nor less than that all finite or dependent things, when traced out 
 as totalities, will be found to belong to self-relation, self-determina- 
 tion, self-negation. And all independent things are self-determining 
 and totalities.) 
 
 It is, however, one of the fundamental prejudices of the formal 
 logic and of the ordinary mode of viewing things, that Contradiction 
 is not a determination of such essential and immanent character as 
 that possessed by Identity. Yet, if order of rank is the question, 
 and the two determinations are to be compared as separately valid, 
 Contradiction will certainly be found to be the deeper and more 
 essential. For Identity is in comparison with Contradiction only a 
 determination expressing simple immediateness, the immediateness 
 -of dead being ; but Contradiction, on the other hand, is the root of 
 all activity and vitality (self-movement is the basis of all movement, 
 for no thing can move another until it originates movement within 
 itself; but self-movement is self-negation, contradiction). Only in 
 so far as something contains a contradiction within itself, does it 
 move itself, and possess impulse and activity. 
 
 Contradiction is usually held to be excluded from things, from all 
 existence and from all truth. In fact, it is asserted that there is 
 nothing self-contradictory ; on the other hand, regardless of this 
 assertion, Contradiction is thrust into the subjective reflection which 
 posits it through its act of relating and comparing. (The activity of
 
 72 Essence. 
 
 reflection brings disparate objects into relation and compares them ; 
 it thereby unites contradictories.) But it is denied that Contradiction 
 really exists in this subjective activity of reflection ; for it is said that 
 the self-contradictory cannot be conceived or thought. If it were 
 found in reality, or in the thinking reflection, it would pass for an 
 accident or for something abnoi'mal, or a transitory state of delirium. 
 
 Now, as regards the assertion that there is no Contradiction, and 
 that it cannot appertain to reality, we need not give ourselves any 
 concern. A category of Essence will certainly be found in all experi- 
 ence, and in all reality as well. Already, when speaking of the cate- 
 gory of the Infinite, we have made the same remark ; and indeed 
 Contradiction is the category of the Infinite as occurring in the 
 sphere of Being (i. e., Contradiction is self-determination in the 
 category of Essence, and the Infinite is the category of self-determi- 
 nation in the sphere of Being). But even common experience iteelf 
 bears testimony to the fact that there are a multitude of self-contra- 
 dictory things, of self-contradictory plans, and so forth, whose self- 
 contradiction is not merely one of external reflection, but is inherent. 
 And moreover, their self-contradiction is not to be taken as some- 
 thing .abnormal which is found only here and there, and not in a 
 majority of cases ; but it is the negative in its essential characteristic, 
 the principle of all self-activity ; for self-activity is nothing else than 
 an exhibition of self-contradiction. External movement perceptible 
 by the senses is the immediate existence of self-contradiction. Some- 
 thing moves, not through the fact that it is now here, and in the next 
 moment there, but through the fact that in one and the same moment 
 of time it is here and not here through the fact that in this "here" 
 it is and is not, at the same time. It is necessary to acknowledge the 
 contradictions which the ancient philosophers have shown up in the 
 category of movement, but in conceding the validity of the contra- 
 diction shown by their dialectic, we must not adopt their conclusion and 
 deny the existence of movement ; on the contrary, we must affirm 
 that movement is the real existence of contradiction. 
 
 Likewise, the internal, real self-activity, viz., impulse in general 
 (2Vie&) appetite or nisus of the monads (Leibnitz') the Entelechy 
 of absolute, simple essence (Aristotle) is nothing else than this 
 contradiction that something is in itself, and at the same time the lack 
 of itself, its own negative, and this in one and the same respect. 
 (Inslinct, impulse, desire, are manifestations within a being of its 
 dependence upon another ; they express its lack or want of its own 
 true being, that upon which it depends ; and at the same time they 
 express this want as the true nature, the being-in-itself of the thing
 
 Contradiction. 73 
 
 itself. Even gravity in matter is a similar expression of self-contra- 
 diction ; the very essence of matter expresses its own non-being. ) 
 The mere abstract identity is not yet the category of vitality (it is 
 not adequate to it), but the category of vitality demands that the 
 positive shall be the negative in itself, and through this fact issue 
 forth from itself, and thereby posit change within itself. Something 
 is vital, therefore, only so far as it contains the contradiction within 
 itself, and nevertheless is a force sufficient to preserve itself in spite 
 of this contradiction within itself. If, however, an existence does not 
 possess the capacity to retain its positive determination in the face of 
 its negative, and to hold the one in the other, in other words, cannot 
 endure the contradiction within itself, then it is not a vital unity, not 
 a Ground, but the contradiction destroys it. Speculative thinking 
 consists only in this, that the thinking activity grasps firmly the cate- 
 gory of contradiction and holds it within itself, but not as conceived 
 by the ordinary thinking which thinks only in images ; for the picture- 
 making thinking thinks contradiction only as a principle which rules 
 thought and which allows of no other solution for contradictory deter- 
 minations than zero. 
 
 The contradiction contained in movement and in impulse, desire, and 
 the like categories is concealed from the thinking which deals only 
 with images through the appearance of simplicity which belongs to 
 such categories. But, on the other hand, in the categories of Rela- 
 tion the self-contradiction involved becomes immediately manifest. 
 The most trivial examples, those of above and beneath, of right and 
 left, of fatJter and son, etc., etc., contain each the antithesis in unit}-. 
 Above is that which is not beneath; above is thus defined to be only 
 the non-being of beneath, and is only in so far as the beneath is (the 
 totality of its being is one with the totality of the being of the 
 other) ; and vice versa, in each category is contained its opposite. 
 Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each 
 is only as this other of another; and at the same time the one 
 determination exists only in relation to the other; their being is 
 one totality. Father is besides this relation to son also some- 
 thing independent, it is true; but as such he is not father, but 
 only man in general. So also, above and beneath, right and left, 
 reflected into themselves (". e., considered not as terms of relation 
 to another, but in regard to themselves), are something independ- 
 ent outside of this relation, but as such they are only places in 
 general. Contraries (polar opposites) contain self-contradiction in 
 so far as they are in one and the same respect related negatively to 
 another, or reciprocally annulling and at the same time indifferent to
 
 74 Essence. 
 
 each other. The thinking which deals in images, when it passes over 
 to the phase of indifference in categories, forgets their negative unity, 
 and treats them, consequently, only as disparate in general ; and thus 
 regarded, " right " is no longer " right," "left " no longer " left," 
 etc. But when it has right and left really before it, it has these 
 determinations in their self-negating activity, the one existing in the 
 other, and in this unity at the same time not annulling itself, but each 
 one existing indifferent and independent. 
 
 The thinking which deals in images has, therefoi'e, self-contradic- 
 tion always for its content, but is never conscious of this fact. It 
 remains external reflection, therefore, and flits to and fro from like- 
 ness to difference, or from the negative relation of objects distin- 
 guished to their reflection into themselves. It holds these two deter- 
 minations (of negative-relation and of self- relation) apart and opposite 
 to each other, and has in mind only their indifference and not their 
 transition, which is the essential thing, and contains the contradiction. 
 The genial reflection (the speculative form of reflection), if we may 
 mention it here, consists in contrast to the forms of reflection 
 mentioned in the apprehension and expression of contradiction, 
 although it does not express the comprehension (Begriff=z ideal 
 totality) of things and their relations, and has only image-forms of 
 thought for its materials and contents, yet it brings them into a relation 
 which contains their contradiction, and thereby manifests their com- 
 prehension (ideal totality). The thinking reason, however, sharpens, 
 so to speak, the blunted distinction of Difference, the mere multi- 
 plicity of image-thinking, to essential distinction, to antithesis ; multi- 
 plicity when sharpened to the point of contradiction becomes vital 
 and active, each of its individuals manifesting itself against the 
 others, and thus multiplicity obtains for itself the negativity which 
 is the in-dwelling pulsation of self-movement and vitality. 
 
 In speaking of the ontological proof of the existence of God, we 
 have already mentioned that the basis of that proof is the idea of an 
 including totality of all real things. Of this idea it is customary to 
 prove first its possibility ; this being done by showing that it contains 
 no contradiction, because reality merely as reality has no limits. 
 Attention has been called to the fact that with this proof, the men- 
 tioned including totality is reduced to the simple, indeterminate 
 being ; or if the realities are taken in fact as a multiplicity of par- 
 ticulars, then it becomes an including totality of all negations. 
 Critically examined, the distinction of realities passes from the cate- 
 gory of difference to antithesis, and then to contradiction, and the 
 including totality of all realities goes over into absolute self-contra-
 
 Contradiction. 75 
 
 diction. The prevailing horror of contradiction which possesses the 
 thinking that deals with images, but not the speculative thinking 
 a feeling similar to that which nature is said to have for a vacuum 
 objects to this result ; for it holds fast to the one-sided solution of 
 self-contradiction in zero, and ignores the positive side of it, accord- 
 ing to which contradiction becomes absolute activity and absolute 
 ground. 
 
 We have seen from the consideration of the nature of contradic- 
 tion that it is, so to say, no fault, or lack, or failure of a thing to 
 exhibit a contradiction within it. On the contrary, every determina- 
 tion, every concrete thing, every idea, is essentially a unity of distinct, 
 and separable moments, which pass over into contradictory moments 
 through the particular essential distinction in them (forming the basis 
 of their difference). This contradictory unity, of course, resolves 
 itself into a zero it goes back into its negative unity. The thing, 
 the subject, the idea, is precisely this negative unity itself; it is 
 an in-itself-contradictory, but at the same time equally a resolved 
 contradiction ; it is the ground which retains and carries with it its 
 determinations. The thing, subject, or idea is as reflected into itself, 
 as regards its own sphere, its solved contradiction ; but its entire 
 sphere is a particularized one, a " different" as regards some other 
 sphere ; hence it is a finite somewhat, and to be a " finite " is to be 
 a contradiction. Of this higher contradiction, in which its entire 
 sphere is involved, the thing, subject, or idea is not itself the solu- 
 tion ; but there is a still higher sphere as its negative unity, as its 
 ground. Finite things, in their indifferent manifoldness, involve 
 always a contradiction ; for they are within themselves sundered, and 
 exist only in their ground (into which they return through the activity 
 of the process to which they belong). As will be shown further on, 
 the true inference from a finite and contingent to an absolutely nec- 
 essary essence does not consist in this : that the latter is inferred from 
 a finite and contingent being which is an abiding ground underlying 
 it, but rather that the inference is made because contingency implies an 
 in-itself-contradictory being, a merely transitory one. In other words, 
 the inference is based on the fact, that the contingent being returns 
 into its ground necessarily, and therein annuls itself ; and, moreover, 
 that through this return into its ground, it posits that ground (fur- 
 nishes the basis for the inference that it exists) only by exhibiting 
 itself as a posited (4. e., as a dependent being, and thereby positing 
 an independent being). In the ordinary syllogism, the being of the 
 finite appears to be the ground of the absolute : " therefore, because 
 the finite is, it follows that the absolute is." The true inference,
 
 76 Essence. 
 
 however, is this : "Therefore, because the finite is an in-itself-con- 
 tradictory antithesis i. e., because it is not the absolute is." 
 In the former case the conclusion is : The being of the finite is the 
 being of the absolute. In the latter case it is: The noil-being of 
 the finite is the being of the absolute. 
 
 THIRD CHAPTER. 
 Ground or Reason. 
 
 Essence defines itself as ground (or reason). 
 
 As Naught was found (in the dialectic of Immediateness) to be in 
 simple, direct unity with Being, so here is found the immediate unity 
 of the simple Identity of essence with its absolute Negativity (the 
 Identity of Essence attains and preserves itself through its activity of 
 negating ; through its negating arise all particular determinations 
 which constitute the different elements of its content, and through 
 the same determining activity this multiplicity is negated, and disap- 
 pears ; only the process, the negative activity, abiding as ground or 
 essence). Essence is only this negative activity, the same which pure 
 Reflection is. (All proving or demonstration depends upon reflection 
 i. e., on the fact that a finite, or immediate being is a process of mani- 
 festing its dependence ; its incompleteness, its imperfection, its 
 fragmentariness, are all only a manifestation of the independent 
 being, its ground. This reference of a finite somewhat to its ground, 
 as that upon which it essentially depends, is reflection; it comes from 
 the ground, and is a process of return to the ground.) It is this pure 
 negativity, as the return of being into itself. Hence, it is in-itself, 
 or for-us determined as (i. e., seen to esse'ntially consist in or depend 
 upon) ground into which being (immediateness) dissolves. But 
 this determinateness (i. e.. ground) is not posited through itself (i. e., 
 through the immediate being, because the immediate being is only 
 an appearance its essence lies outside of itself, in the ground ; it 
 cannot posit anything, because it possesses no essence to bestow upon 
 another). In other words, the determinateness of immediate being, 
 through which immediate being is cancelled, is a result of the deter- 
 mining activity of ground or essence acting upon immediate being from 
 without; and, therefore, this determinateness is not self-posited. Its 
 reflection consists in this : what the immediate being is, is posited as 
 negative, and thereby determined (i. e., negated by the activity of 
 the ground). The distinction of positive and negative constitutes 
 the essential determination in which it (being) is lost, as in its nega- 
 tion. These independent determinations of reflection cancel each
 
 Ground. 77 
 
 other, and the determination thus annulled gone to the ground 
 is the true determination of essence. 
 
 Ground is, therefore, also one of the determinations of reflection 
 which form the categories of essence ; but it is the final one. and its 
 determination consists rather in being the annulment of determina- 
 tion. The determination of reflection, when it annuls itself, "goes 
 to the ground," obtains its true significance, that of absolute counter- 
 impulse within itself, viz., that the posited-being which belongs to 
 essence is only an annulled posited-being ; and, conversely, only the 
 self-annulling posited-being is the posited-being of essence (pos- 
 ited-being " := the being-established through another ; all categories 
 of essence are categories of mediation, categories posited through 
 another ; but the starting-point in this positing or mediating is. of 
 course, always being or immediateness ; its positing is always due to 
 its self-annulment, to its transitoriness, its evanescence : on the other 
 hand, that which is posited is the totality of its negative process : 
 hence the abiding, the essence, the ground ; but the essence or abid- 
 ing thus posited is posited as the primordial source, the origin whence 
 the evanescent being proceeded ; hence the immediate being which 
 posited the essence, posits rather the being which posited it its 
 positing is rather a presupposing activity, or, in the words of the text, 
 " its positing is only a cancelling or annulment " of its positing ; it is 
 a return movement, or reflection, rather than an origination or posit- 
 ing). Essence, when it defines itself as ground, defines itself as the 
 non-determined, and it is only the annulment of this, its being-deter- 
 mined, which determines it as essence (i.e., the cancelling of its other 
 being the particularized somewhats which have arisen from essence, 
 and stand over against it as immediate being the cancelling of 
 this otherness is the true determination of essence). In this being- 
 determined (of essence), as the self-annulling essence, it is not 
 a derivative somewhat derived from another (originating in im- 
 mediate being), but it is self-identical in and through this negativity 
 (i. ., through this cancelling of all otherness, it exhibits itself as 
 primordial). 
 
 In so far as the category of Ground is reached through the annul- 
 ment of Determination (t*. e. Particular Being), as the first or imme- 
 diate from which we begin, and which proves transitory ( " goes to 
 the ground " ) a result which follows from the very nature of 
 Determination the category of ground is, as such result, condi- 
 tioned through its Origin, and thus a determined somewhat. But this 
 determining is, in the first place, an annulment of determination,
 
 78 Essence. 
 
 and hence only a restored, purified, or revealed identity of 
 Essence it is what the determination of reflection is potentially 
 (and not yet realized). In the second place, this determining is, as 
 annulment of determining, the positing of that determinateness of 
 reflection which was called the Immediate ( on its appearance in the 
 positing reflection), but which is posited only by the self-excluding 
 reflection of Ground, and in this is only as posited or as annulled ( in 
 its independence). Essence, when it is defined as ground in this 
 sense is a self-result. As Ground, therefore, it posits itself as 
 Essence ; and in this fact, that it posits itself as Essence, consists its 
 determination. This positing is the reflection that appertains to 
 Essence a determining that annuls itself in the very act of deter- 
 mining itself being in one respect a positing, and in another re- 
 spect a positing of Essence, and, consequently, both in one act ( the 
 positing of itself, and of Essence which is its own annulment). 
 
 Reflection is pure mediation ; Ground, on the other hand, is real 
 mediation of Essence. Reflection is the movement of Naught to 
 Naught, through itself ; it is its manifestation of another ; but since 
 the antithesis does not attain to independence, as regards its sides 
 (the contraries), it follows that in Reflection the first is not a pos- 
 itive that which appears; nor is the other the negative that 
 in which it appears. The two are mere substrates of the imagina- 
 tion ; they are not purely self-related terms. Pure mediation is only 
 pure relation without any terms that stand in relation. (The rela- 
 tion is that of self-determination, and hence an activity which pro- 
 duces itself through the pure activity, and is not a relation which 
 exists between two already existing somewhats.) The "Deter- 
 mining Reflection" posits such terms as are self-identical, but at 
 the same time are particular (concrete) relations. Ground, on 
 the contrary, is the real mediation, because it contains reflection as 
 annulled reflection ; it is Essence positing itself and returning into it- 
 self, through its non-being. (Ground, thus defined and distin- 
 guished from the activity of reflection, which has been discussed at 
 such length, is here called by Hegel a real mediation, instead of a 
 pure mediation, because its result is a reality, and not simply a nega- 
 tion of something that exhibits itself as a phenomenal or transitory 
 being, or a mere appearance ; in this determination, the real some- 
 what is restored to validity again, so that it finds its explanation and 
 justification, and, in short, is shown to be a well-grounded some- 
 what. Of course, it is only a more entire view that yields us this in- 
 sight. We see the general form of the activity which at first seemed
 
 Ground. 79 
 
 to have only a negative result ; it is seen to have a positive result, 
 and to produce reality, instead of mere annulment. This 
 insight is akin to the insight which sees Law underlying change 
 it sees Return where at first there appeared to be only a vanishing 
 of whatever appeared. But the idea of Law is much more concrete 
 or deeper than this idea of Ground, which here is only the explana- 
 tion of multiplicity by means of the distinction of form and matter. ) 
 According to this phase of annulment of Reflection ( that in which 
 it is found that the vanishing of the immediate being is not into 
 nothing, but into a process which returns again to the being which had 
 before vanished and so the reflection is thereby annulled), the 
 posited somewhat is determined as an immediate as a somewhat that 
 possesses self -identity outside of its relation or outside of its appear- 
 ance (*'. e., outside of its relation of dependence.) This immediate- 
 ness is the phase of Being restored through the process of Essence ; 
 it is the non-being of Reflection, as that through which essence 
 mediates itself. Essence returns into itself as negating ; hence it 
 determines itself in this return, and for the reason that this is 
 a determination arising in the identity of the negative, in its self-rela- 
 tion, which is the annulment of the positing (of the dependence) ; 
 it is, therefore, existing or real; it is the identity of Essence as 
 Ground. 
 
 Ground is first to be considered as Absolute Ground (i. e., 
 because that is its most immediate phase, its most abstract, or empti- 
 est phase). In the phase of Absolute Ground, Essence is regarded 
 as the "Basis" for the distinction; when defined with more atten- 
 tion, it is stated as the distinction of Form and Matter, or as Form 
 and Content. 
 
 In the second place, it becomes a still more definitely seized dis- 
 tinction that of Gronnd of a special content ; and since the relation 
 of Ground is one in which the Essence is regarded as externalizing 
 itself in this distinction of Ground and Content, it becomes Condi- 
 tioning Mediation. 
 
 Thirdly, Ground presupposes a condition, but the condition like- 
 wise presupposes a ground ; the unity of the two is the uncondi- 
 tioned the nature of the thing whereby it realizes itself in the cat- 
 egory of Existence, through its mediation with its conditioning 
 relations. 
 
 ( It will be understood that the preceding is a general charadter- 
 ization of the entire contents of the third chapter of this work ; this 
 chapter concludes the first division of the treatment of Essence, and
 
 80 Essence. 
 
 inducts us into the consideration of more explicit categories of Rela- 
 tion. This introduction to the chapter merely states the general 
 results, which we may expect to see proved in detail in what is to 
 follow.) 
 
 Remark. 
 
 Ground, too, like the other categories of Reflection, has been 
 expressed in the form of a Principle: Everything has a sufficient 
 Ground, or Reason. The general meaning of this principle is 
 nothing more than this : that whatever is, is to be considered, not as 
 a something existing isolatedly for itself, but as a dependent some- 
 thing. It implies, therefore, that we must look beyond that which 
 we see, and seek a ground or explanation for it a ground in 
 which the somewhat is not as it at first seemed, but is annulled as 
 regards its irnmediateness, and is seen as it is in its being-in-and- 
 for itself ( i. e., in its law or in the general type of its process). In 
 the principle of Ground the essentiality of Reflection-into-itself, as 
 compared with mere immediate being, is expressed. 
 
 That the ground must be a "sufficient" ground needs not be 
 added, for it is superfluous ; that for which the ground is not suffi- 
 cient, would not have a ground at all. Leibnitz, who placed a high 
 estimate upon the principle of sufficient reason, and made it the basis 
 of his whole system, attached to it a deeper signification and a more 
 important conception than is ordinarily given to it. Yet even in the 
 ordinary acceptation it has a very important meaning, inasmuch as it 
 implies that being, as such, in its immediateness, is to be taken as 
 untrue, and essentially as a posited (i. e., as a dependent), but its 
 ground is to be taken as the true immediate (i. e., as the true individu- 
 ality). But Leibnitz added the designation " sufficient," in order to 
 distinguish it sharply from the mechanical conception of cause as an 
 external activity or influence. When causality is conceived as a 
 form external to its content, as an activity that produces a determina- 
 tion in an effect that is, after all, a merely external modification 
 superinduced upon the so-called " effect," this category is merely a 
 loose and fortuitous connection of the determinations involved. The 
 fact that the parts belong to the whole is comprehended in causality, 
 but the definite relation of these parts is not stated in the concept of 
 mechanical cause. This relation, the whole as the essential unity of 
 the parts, lies only in the idea (ideal, the totality of its being), or in 
 the final cause. Mechanical causes are not "sufficient" for this 
 unity, because the final cause, as the unity of their determinations,
 
 Absolute Ground. 81 
 
 does not lie at the basis of mechanical causes. Under the concept of 
 sufficient cause, therefore, Leibnitz has conceived a cause that suf- 
 ficed for this unity ; and, therefore, not a mere cause, but the final 
 cause. This definition of ground, as understood by Leibnitz, is not 
 the proper one of ground as it belongs here ; the ideological ground 
 is a category of the Idea (or BegrijT), and its mediation is the Reason. 
 
 The Absolute Ground. 
 
 L, Form and Essence. 
 
 The determination of Reflection, in so far as it returns to a ground 
 (i.e., shows that the idea of ground underlies the immediate being), 
 constitutes only an immediate being in general with which a beginning 
 is to be made. But the immediate being has only the meaning of a 
 posited (dependent) being, and presupposes a ground, of necessity. 
 It presupposes a ground in the sense that it does not posit this ground, 
 but rather that this presupposition on its part is indeed a negation of 
 itself (for it is a confession of its own dependence and consequent 
 lack of individuality) ; the immediate is only the posited, and the 
 ground is the non-posited. As it has been shown, the presupposi- 
 tion, which is a positing that points back to that which posited it, 
 is the ground, but not as undetermined, in the annulment of all 
 determinateness, but the self-determined essence that is undetermined 
 or determined only as cancelled posited-being. It is the essence 
 that is identical with itself in its own negativity. 
 
 The determinateness of essence as ground is therefore duplicate 
 that of ground and grounded. It is, first, essence as ground, deter- 
 mined as essence, as non-posited-being, in opposition to the posited- 
 being. Secondly, it is the grounded, the immediate, which, however, 
 is not in-and-for-itself . but the posited being as posited-being. This 
 is, consequently, self-identical, but the identity of the negative with 
 itself. The negative which is self -identical, and the positive that is 
 self-identical, are one and the same identity. For the ground is iden- 
 tity of the positive, or of itself, and of the posited-being ; and that 
 which is grounded is the posited-being as posited-being, and this 
 reflection-into-itself is the identity of the ground. This simple identity 
 is, therefore, not the ground itself ; for the ground is the essence, 
 posited as the non-posited, in opposition to the posited-being. As 
 this unity of the definite identity of ground and of the negative
 
 82 Essence. 
 
 identity of the grounded it is the essence in general, distin- 
 guished from its mediation. 
 
 This mediation, compared with the reflections that have preceded it, 
 and from which it has originated, is, in the first place (as is obvious), 
 not the pure reflection, as which it is not distinguished from the 
 essence ; nor is it the negative, as which it would possess the independ- 
 ence of the determinations within itself. In the category of Ground 
 as the annulled reflection, however, these determinations have a per- 
 sistence. Moreover, it is not the determining reflection whose deter- 
 minations possess essential independence ; for this independence of 
 determinations has been shown to be groundless when we were demon- 
 strating the category of Ground, and within its unity those deter- 
 minations are as merely " posited " determinations. This mediation 
 of Ground is, therefore, the unity of the pure reflection and the 
 determining reflection. Its determinations, or the posited, have 
 persistence ; and, conversely, the persistence of the same is a posited 
 somewhat. For the reason that this persistence which it has is a 
 posited one, or has determinateness, it follows that its determinations 
 are different from its simple unity, and constitute the form as opposed 
 to the Essence. 
 
 Essence has a form, and determinations of that form. First, as 
 ground it has a fixed immediateness, or is a substratum. Essence 
 is one with its reflection, and its movement is indistinguishable from 
 it. It is, therefore, not the Essence which it penetrates ; and, more- 
 over, it is not that which constitutes its commencement. This 
 circumstance makes the exposition of reflection very difficult; for 
 it is not proper to say that the essence returns into itself, that it 
 appears in itself, because it is not before its movement, nor in its 
 movement, and the movement has no basis which supports it. A re- 
 lated somewhat makes its appearance in the ground according to the 
 moment of annulled reflection. Essence, as the related substratum, 
 is, however, the particularized Essence ; and on account of this posited- 
 being it has the form as essentially belonging to it. The form- 
 determinations, on the other hand, are the determinations as belong- 
 ing to Essence. Essence lies at the basis, as the indeterminate, 
 which in its determination is indifferent towards them. They have 
 in it their reflection into themselves. The determinations of reflection 
 are defined as possessing their subsistence in themselves, and as 
 being independent ; but their independence is their dissolution ; there- 
 fore, they have their independence in another ; but this very dissolu- 
 tion is at the same time their very identity, or the ground of their 
 persistence.
 
 Form and Essence. 83 
 
 Form belongs to everything that is determined (or to all particular 
 being) ; form-determination is distinguished from that whose form it 
 is, and it is always a posited somewhat; the determinateness as. 
 quality is one with its substratum, with immediate being. Being is- 
 that which is immediately determined, that which is not distinct from 
 its determinateness ; it is that which is not reflected into itself, and 
 hence it is an existent, and not a posited. The form-determinations of 
 essence are, moreover, as determinations of reflection and as regards- 
 their definite particularity of content, the moments of reflection that 
 have been considered above. Identity and distinction, the latter 
 partly as difference, partly as antithesis, are these moments of reflec- 
 tion. Besides these, the determination of ground belongs to these 
 form-determinations that is, in so far as it is the annulled determi- 
 nation of reflection, or through this, essence is at the same time a 
 posited. On the contrary, Identity does not belong to form, namely,, 
 that which is contained in the ground, that the posited-being as- 
 annulled, and the posited-being as such the ground and the 
 grounded is one reflection, which constitutes the essence as simple 
 basis that is, the subsistence of the form. But this subsistence is 
 posited in the ground ; in other words, this essence is essentially as 
 determined; consequently, it is also a moment of ground-relation, 
 and of form. This is the absolute reciprocal relation of form and 
 essence : this simple unity of ground and grounded which is in this, 
 at the same time a particular, or a negative, and distinguishes itself 
 from the form, but at the same time is ground itself, and a moment 
 of form. 
 
 Form is, therefore, the complete totality of reflection ; it contains, 
 moreover, this determination of reflection it is annulled. There- 
 fore it is likewise a unity of its determinations, and also related to- 
 their annulment, to another which is not form, but to which the form 
 belongs. As the essential negativity which relates to itself, it is the 
 positing and determining as opposed to this simple negative ; as simple 
 essence, on the other hand, it is the undetermined and non- active basis 
 in which the determinations of form have their inherence or their 
 reflection into themselves. External Reflection takes its stand upon 
 this distinction between essence and form. (It has not the ability 
 to transcend this category). It is necessary to discriminate between 
 matter and form, but this very discrimination is their unity ; and this 
 unity of ground is.essence which repels from itself and reduces what is 
 repelled to a posited-being. Form is the absolute negativity itself, or 
 the negative, absolute self-identity, through which essence is essence, 
 and not mere being. This identity, taken abstractly, is essence as-
 
 84 Essence. 
 
 opposed to form ; just as negativity, taken abstractly as the positcd- 
 being, is the particular determination cf form. This determination, 
 however, as has been shown, is, in its truth, the total self-relating 
 negativity, which is, consequently, as this identity, the simple essence 
 in itself. Form, therefore, has essence as appertaining to its own 
 identity ; so, likewise, essence has as its own negative nature, the 
 absolute form. Therefore, the question cannot be asked : how form 
 is added to essence ; for form is only the manifestation of essence in 
 itself ; it is the inherent reflection of essence. Form likewise is, by 
 itself, the reflection which returns into itself; or, in other words, it is 
 the self-identical essence. In its act of determining, it reduces its 
 determination to posited-being as posited-being. It, therefore, does 
 not determine essence as though it were presupposed, as though it 
 were divided from the essence ; for, as thus existing, it would be the 
 unessential, a mere determination of reflection, restless, and perishing 
 (going into its ground), and with this it would be rather the ground 
 (or result) of its own cancelling, or the identical self-relation of its 
 determinations. Form determines essence, in the sense that form, in 
 its separation from essence, annuls this very separation, and is the 
 self-identity of essence as the persistence of the determination. It 
 is the contradiction which is annulled in its posited-being, and in this 
 being-annulled finds its persistence ; consequently it is ground as 
 essence, which is self-identical in its being determined or negated. 
 
 These distinctions, therefore, of form and essence are mere ele- 
 ments or phases of the simple form-relation itself. But, considered 
 more in detail, the determining form relates to itself as posited- 
 being which has been annulled ; and, therefore, it relates to its iden- 
 tity as though it were another. It posits itself as annulled, hence 
 it presupposes its identity ; essence is, in this phase, the indetermin- 
 ate for which form is its other. Therefore, it is not essence which 
 is the absolute reflection into itself, but this reflection is determined 
 as the formless identity ; it is matter. 
 
 2. Form and Matter. 
 
 Essence becomes matter, in the fact that its reflection determines 
 itself, so that its reflection relates to it as to the formless indeterminate. 
 Matter is, therefore, the simple identity devoid of distinctions, the 
 identity which is essence determined as the other of Form. It is, 
 terefore, the real basis or the substrate of Form ; since it constitutes 
 the reflection into itself of the form-determinations, which reflection 
 is the independent, to which it relates as to its positive subsistence. 
 
 If abstraction is made from all the determinations which belong to
 
 Form and Matter. 85 
 
 the form of a somewhat, there remains nothing but the undetermined 
 matter. Matter is a pure abstraction. One cannot see matter, nor 
 feel it; what one sees or feels is the determinations of matter, . e. t 
 the unity of matter and form. This act of abstraction from which 
 the idea of matter proceeds is, however, not a mere external removal 
 and annulment of form ; but the activity of form (the self-determi- 
 nation which belongs to form) evolves this simple identity of and 
 from itself, as we have already seen in the above consideration. 
 
 Moreover, form presupposes matter to which it relates. But for 
 this reason form and matter are not found as two external categories 
 accidentally opposed to each other ; neither of the two is self-originat- 
 ing, or, in other words, eternal. Matter is indifferent as opposed to 
 form, but this indifference is the determinateness of self-identity into 
 which form returns as into its basis. Form presupposes matter. In 
 this very fact that it posits itself as anulled, and consequently relates 
 to this, its identity (matter), as to another, it presupposes matter. 
 Conversely, form is presupposed by matter. For matter is not the 
 simple essence which is the absolute reflection itself, but it is the 
 same determined as the positive, i. e., that which is only as annulled 
 negation. But, on the other hand, becfause the form posits itself 
 only as matter, in so far as it annuls itself and presupposes mat- 
 ter, matter is also determined to be persistence without a ground. 
 Likewise, matter is not determined as the ground of form ; but 
 since matter posits itself as the abstract identity of the annulled 
 form-determination, it is not identity as gromnd; and form, as 
 opposed to it, is groundless. Form and matter are consequently 
 defined as not posited through each other, and as not the ground 
 of each other. Matter is rather the identity of the ground and 
 the grounded i. ., as the basis (foundation) which stands opposed 
 to this form-relation. This determination of indifference, which 
 belongs in common to form and matter, is the determination of 
 matter as such (i. e., its definition), and constitutes also the 
 relation of the two to each other. And in the same manner the defi- 
 nition of form, that it is the relation of distinct somewhats, is also 
 the other side of the relation of the two to each other. Matter 
 which s defined* as indifferent is the passive opposed to the form as 
 active. And this as the self-related negative is the contradiction 
 within itself, the self-annulling, self-repelling, and self-determining. 
 It relates to mattej, and it is posited to relate to its subsistence as 
 though to another. Matter is, therefore, posited as relating only to 
 itself, and as indifferent towards others ; but it relates to form poten- 
 tially (an sick) ; for it contains annulled negativity, and is matter only
 
 86 Essence. 
 
 because of this characteristic. It relates to matter, therefore, as 
 though matter were another being, because form is not posited as 
 belonging to it i. e., because the same is only potentially attached to 
 it. It contains the form involved within itself, and is the absolute 
 receptivity for it, and only for this reason: that it has the same 
 within it, and that this is its undeveloped nature. Matter must, there- 
 fore, receive form, and form must materialize itself ; in other words, 
 form must come into self-identity, or must reach its reality in matter. 
 
 (2. ) Form, therefore, determines matter, and matter is determined 
 by form ; since form is the absolute self-identity, it follows that it 
 contains matter within itself ; in the same manner, matter possesses in 
 its pure abstraction or absolute negativity the form within itself. 
 Hence the activity of form upon the matter, and the being-determined 
 of the latter through the former is only the annulment of the appar- 
 ent indifference and independence of each as regards the other. 
 This relation of the activity of determining is, therefore, the medi- 
 ation of each with itself, by means of its own non-being. But these 
 two mediations are one activity, and the restoration of their original 
 identity the re-collection from their externalization. 
 
 First. Form and matter presuppose each other reciprocally. As 
 we have seen above, the one essential unity is negative relation to 
 itself, and, therefore, dirempts itself into the essential identity, deter- 
 mined as the indifferent basis, and into the essential distinction or 
 negativity as the determining form. That unity of essence and form 
 which posits form arl matter in opposition to itself is the absolute 
 ground which determines itself. Since it reduces itself to a dis- 
 parate somewhat, the relation, on account of the identity of the dis- 
 parates which lies at the basis, becomes reciprocal presupposition. 
 
 Secondly. Form, as independent, is the self-annulling contradic- 
 tion ; and it is also posited as such inasmuch as it is at the same 
 time both independent and essentially related to another ; it there- 
 fore annuls itself. Since it is ambiguous, this annulment has two 
 aspects : In the first place, it annuls its independence, reduces itself 
 to a posited-being, to a somewhat that belongs to another this, its 
 other, being matter. In the second place, it annuls its distinction 
 from matter, its relation to the same, consequently its posited-being ; 
 and, therefore, attains self -subsistence. Since it cancels its posited- 
 being, the latter is its reflection and its own identity, into which 
 it passes. But since this identity externalizes itself and polarizes 
 against itself as matter, the mentioned reflection of the posited-being 
 into itself is a union with a matter, and as such it obtains its self- 
 subsistence. Therefore, in this union with a matter as with another
 
 Form and Matter. 87 
 
 being, as regards the first aspect in which it reduces itself to a 
 posited-somewhat, it passes into identity with itself. 
 
 Therefore, the activity of form through which matter is determined 
 consists in a negative relation of form to itself. But, conversely, it, 
 too, relates negatively to matter ; but this being-determined of matter 
 is likewise the activity that belongs properly to form itself. Form is 
 free as regards matter (i. e., independent of or indifferent to matter), 
 but it annuls this independence ; however, its independence is matter 
 itself, for to this belongs its essential identity. Since it reduces itself, 
 therefore, to a posited-somewhat, this is one and the same activity 
 which gives particularity to the matter. But, considered from the 
 other point of view, the identity that belongs to form is expressed, 
 and matter is the "other" thus expressed; to that extent matter is 
 not particularized, for the reason that form annuls its (matter's) own 
 independence. But matter is independent only as opposed to form ; 
 since the negative annuls itself, it annuls also the positive ; therefore, 
 since the form annuls itself, the particular determinations of matter 
 fall awa\- those determinations which it has as opposed to form, viz., 
 its indeterminateness and persistence. 
 
 This which seems to be an activity of form is, therefore, likewise 
 the movement which belongs properly to matter itself. The nature 
 of matter, or its ideal destiny (what it should realize) is its absolute 
 negativitj-. Through this, matter relates not only to form as to 
 another, but this external (. e., this relation itself) is the form 
 which it contained in an undeveloped state within itself. Matter is 
 the same contradiction potentially as that which form contains, and 
 this contradiction is like its resolution, only one. Matter, how- 
 ever, is in itself a contradiction, because it is absolute negativity 
 while it is an undetermined self-identity ; it therefore annuls itself 
 within itself, and its identity is dirempted in its negativity, and the 
 latter preserves its independence through the former. While, there- 
 fore, matter is particularized (determined or rendered definite) by 
 form as by somewhat external to it, it by this means realizes itself ; 
 and the externality involved in the relation, as well on the part of 
 form as on the part of matter, consists in this : that each of the two, 
 or rather that their original unity, is in its positing likewise a presup- 
 posing ; whence it follows that the relation to itself is a relation to 
 itself as annulled, and, therefore, a relation to its " other." 
 
 Tliirdly. Through the activity of form and matter their original 
 unity is restored, but as a posited. Matter determines itself, 
 although this determining is, as far as matter is concerned, an exter- 
 nal deed emanating from form. Conversely, form determines only
 
 88 Essence. 
 
 itself, or contains matter that is determined by it within itself, 
 although at the same time this self-determining appears to be a deter- 
 mining of something else. And finally, the two the activity of 
 form and the activity of matter are one and the same ; only that 
 the former is an activity (em T7m, a deed) in which the negative 
 appears as a posited, while the latter is an activity (Bewegung, i. e., 
 & movement) which is a becoming, in which the negativity appears as 
 characteristic of its very nature (i. e., its potentiality, or its ideal). 
 The result is, therefore, the unity of the being-in-itself (its nature, 
 or potentiality, or ideal) and its being-posited (i. e., its dependence 
 upon others, or what it derives from others). Matter, as such, is 
 determined (particularized, made special), or, in other words, has 
 necessarily a form; and form, on the other hand, necessarily implies 
 matter, or is self-subsistent form. 
 
 Form, in so far as it presupposes matter as its other, is finite. It 
 is not Ground, but only activity. So also matter, in so far as it pre- 
 supposes form as its not-being, is finite matter ; it is likewise not the 
 ground of its unity with form, but only the basis or substrate for the 
 form. But this finite matter, as finite form, has no truth ; each of the 
 two relates to the other, and their unity only is their truth. In this 
 unity the two determinations have their return, and in it they annul 
 their independence ; hence this unity is proved to be their ground. 
 Therefore, matter is the ground of its determination of form only in 
 so far as it is not matter as matter, but the absolute unity of essence 
 and form. Form, too, is the ground of the persistence of its deter- 
 minations only in so far as it is the same one unity. But this one 
 unity as the absolute negativity, and more definitely as excluding 
 unity, is in its act of reflection a presupposing somewhat. In other 
 words, it is an activity which, in positing itself as a posited, preserves 
 itself in the unity, and repels itself from itself, i. e., relates to itself 
 as itself, and to itself as though itself were another. Or. again, 
 it may be stated in this way: The particularizing (die Bestimmticer- 
 den) of matter through form is the mediation of Essence as Ground 
 in one unity, through itself and through its own negation. 
 
 Matter which has received a form, or form which has obtained 
 realization on a matter, is not merely that absolute unity of the 
 ground with itself which has been mentioned, but also the posited 
 unity. The movement already considered is that in which the 
 absolute ground has exhibited its movements (or phases) as at the 
 same time self-annulling, and hence as posited. In other words, the 
 restored unity has, in its return to itself, at the same time repelled 
 itself and determined itself (reduced itself to particularity) ; for its.
 
 Form and Content. 89 
 
 i it has come into existence through negation, is 
 also a negative unity. It is, therefore, the unity of form and matter 
 9**tt\*&rt^^am*^*V&*A&^VB6oto*ma*<Kvxfo- 
 strate ; and this matter that has received its form is indifferent to 
 form and *"*ftyr as to something th^t jg annulled and niwasa^Mtial _ 
 It is content. 
 
 X, Form nd GontenL 
 
 Form, in the first place, stands opposed to Essence: hence it is a 
 relation which belongs to the category of Ground, and its determina- 
 tions are the Ground and the grounded. In the next place, it stands 
 opposed to matter; and in this phase it is a " determining reflec- 
 tion," and its determinations are the determination-of-reflection 
 itself and its persistence ("determination of reflection "includes 
 Identity, Difference, Antithesis, and Contradiction ; its persistence 
 is its reality). Thirdly, and finally, it stands opposed to Content 
 (JkAofr); in this phase its determinations are itself (i. e., form) and 
 matter. That which was previously self-identical, to wit, Ground, 
 in the first place, and afterwards its persistence (or reality), and, 
 finally, matter, now comes under the dominion of form, and is again 
 one of its determinations. 
 
 Content has, in the first place, one form and one matter, which 
 belong to it, and are essential; it is their unity. But since this unity 
 is at the same time a particularized or posited unity, it stands 
 opposed to form ; the latter constitutes the posited-being of the unity 
 (i. e., the form is that which comes from the activity of that on 
 which it depends), and is, as regards the content, unessential. The 
 content is, therefore, indifferent to the form ; it comprehends both 
 the form, as such, and also the matter; and it has, therefore, a form 
 and a matter, and it constitutes their basis, and they are for it a mere 
 posited-being (mere result of its activity). 
 
 The Content is, in the second place, that which is identical in the 
 form and matter; and in this respect the difference between form 
 and matter would be a mere indifferent externality. They are noth- 
 ing but posited-being, which, however, has returned to its unity in the 
 content, and thus into its ground. The self-identity of the content 
 is, from one point of view, therefore, the identity which is indifferent 
 to the form; but from the other point of view it is the identity of the 
 ground. Ground has vanished into Content; but content is mean- 
 while the negative reflection of f ornvdeterminations into themselves. 
 Its unity, which in its first aspect is only indifference as regards fora, 
 is, therefore, also the formal unity or ground-relation as such. Con-
 
 90 Essence. 
 
 tent has, therefore, this unity for its essential form ; and the Ground, 
 conversely, a content. 
 
 The content of the Ground is therefore the Ground, which has 
 returned into its unity with itself. Ground, in the first place, is 
 Essence, which is identical with itself in its posited-being ; as distinct 
 from and indifferent towards its posited-being it is the undetermined 
 (the indefinite) matter; but as content, it is the identity which has 
 received form, and this form becomes on this account a ground-rela- 
 tion, because the determinations of its antithesis are posited in the 
 content as also negated. Content is, moreover, determined (defined, 
 particularized) within itself (by its own nature), not only as matter 
 in the phase of indifference in general, but as matter that has received 
 form, so that the determinations of form have a material reality, an 
 indifferent persistence (independence). In one respect the content 
 is the essential identity of the ground with itself in its posited-being. 
 In another respect it is the posited identity as opposed to the ground- 
 relation. This posited-being, which as form-determination belongs 
 to this identity, is opposed to the free posited-being i. e. , it is 
 opposed to the form as the totality of the relation of the Ground and 
 the grounded. This form is the total posited-being which returns 
 into itself. The first-mentioned form, therefore, is only the posited- 
 being as an immediate somewhat determinateness, as such. 
 
 Ground with this has become determined (particularized) ground, 
 and the detei'minateness itself is twofold : First, that of form ; sec- 
 ondly, that of content. The former (the determinateness of form) 
 is the determinateness which is external to the content, the content 
 being indifferent to this relation. The latter is the determinateuess 
 of content that belongs to the ground. 
 
 B. 
 
 The Definite (particular') Ground. 
 I. The Formal Ground. 
 
 Ground has a definite content. The definiteness of the content 
 (its particularity) is, as we have seen, the basis for the form, or the 
 simple immediate that is opposed to the mediation of the form. 
 Ground is identity relating to itself negatively (i. e., annulling its inde- 
 terminateness and proceeding into determinations), and this, there- 
 fore, reduces itself to posited-being (i. e., to dependent somewhats). 
 It relates negatively to itself (determines itself), since it is self- 
 identical, in this its negativity ; this identity is the basis or the con-
 
 The Formal Ground. 91 
 
 or positive unity 
 it. 
 
 In this content the determinateness of ground and grounded, as 
 opposed to each other, has vanished. The mediation is, however, 
 besides this, negative unity. The negative as belonging to the indif- 
 ferent basis is its immediate determinateness, and through it the 
 Around possesses a definite content. But in the next place, the nega- 
 tive is the negative relation of form to itself . On the one hand, the 
 itself and goes back into its ground; but the ground, 
 . independence, relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself 
 to posited-being. This negative mediation of the ground and 
 is the mediation peculiar to form, as such Ae formal 
 The two sides of form now, since they pass over into one 
 another, posit themselves in one common identity as annulled; 
 through tins, at the same time, they presuppose this identity. Itisthe 
 definite, particular content to which, therefore, the formal mediation 
 relates, as the positive act of mediating itself through itself. It 
 is the identical phase of both, and while they are different, each, 
 however, being in its distinction in relation to the other, the content 
 is the persistence (reality) of the same, and of each one as being the 
 
 According to the, it results that the following is present in the par- 
 ticularized ground: In the first place, a particularized content is re- 
 garded from two points of view, viz. : (1) in so far as it is posited as 
 ground; (2) as grounded. The content itself is indifferent as regards 
 thfefoim: it is o^ one determination in both. Secondly, the ground 
 itself is as much an element (JToMcaf) of the form, as it isa somewhat 
 posited by ft; tins is its identity according to the form. It is indif- 
 ferent which of the two determinations are taken as the first from 
 which as the posited to proceed to the other as its ground, or from 
 which as the ground to proceed to the other as the posited. The 
 grounded, considered for and by itself, is the annulling of itself ; with 
 tins it reduces itself on the one hand to a-posited, and is at the same 
 time the positing of the ground. The same movement is the ground 
 as such; it reduces itself to a posited, and through this it becomes a 
 ground of something that is to say, it is present in this as a posited, 
 and also as ground. That a ground exists implies a posited as a 
 ground of tins fact; and, conversely, through this the ground is in so 
 far the poshed. The mediation begins with the one just as wefl as with 
 the other; each side is just as much ground as posited, and each is 
 the entire mediation of the entire form. This entire form is further- 
 more the basis of the determinations as their self-identity, and since
 
 92 Essence. 
 
 the determinations are the two sides of the ground and the grounded, 
 the form and content are thus precisely one and the same identity. 
 
 On account of this identity of the ground and grounded, and as 
 well according to the content as according to the form, the ground is 
 sufficient ("sufficient ground" is an important category used by 
 Leibnitz) the " sufficient " being limited to this relation. There is 
 nothing in the ground which is not in the grounded, and nothing in 
 the grounded which is not in the ground. If one asks for a ground, 
 he expects to see the characteristic which constitutes the content used 
 in a twofold manner : First, in the form of the posited ; secondly, in 
 the form of the reflection into itself of the particular being, i.e., 
 in the form of essentiality. 
 
 In so far as ground and grounded are each the entire form in the 
 category of determined (particularized) ground, and their content is 
 one and the same, although particularized ground is not yet fully 
 determined (i.e., particularized) in its two sides, they have not a dif- 
 ferent content ; the determinateness is first simple, and not a deter- 
 minateness that has passed over into the two sides. We have here 
 the determined (particularized) ground first in its pure form "the 
 formal ground." Since the content is only this simple determinate- 
 ness, to which the form of ground-relation does not belong, it is a 
 self-identical content, indifferent as regards form, and form is 
 external to it ; it is another than the form. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 If reflection goes no further than the consideration of determined 
 ground, as here defined, it follows that to adduce such a ground 
 for any thing is a mere formalism, an empt}' tautology, which expresses 
 over again the same content in the form of reflection-into-itself, or in 
 the form of essentiality, what has already been expressed in the form 
 of an immediate somewhat. Such a mention of grounds for any thing 
 is as empty an affair as the appeal to the principle of identity which 
 has been mentioned. Sciences, and more especially the physical sci- 
 ences, are full of tautologies of this kind, and indeed this seems to 
 constitute a sort of prerogative. For example, it is mentioned as 
 the ground of the fact that the planets move around the sun that 
 there is an attractive force existing between the former and the lat- 
 ter. The content of this statement expresses nothing besides what the 
 phenomenon contains, viz., the relation of these bodies to each other 
 in their movement, but it expresses it in the form of a reflected deter- 
 mination that is, by means of the category of " force." If it be
 
 The Formal Ground. 93 
 
 asked, in reference to this, what kind of a force the attractive force 
 is, the answer given is, that the force is what causes the planets to 
 move around the sun ; in these statements there is the same content 
 throughout: First, as the fact to be explained; secondly, as the 
 ground or reason given for it. The relation of the planets to the 
 sun, as regards movement, is the basis of the ground and the grounded 
 alike. If a ciystalline form is explained by the particular arrange- 
 ment which its molecules have, we have the same tautology ; the fact 
 of the crystallization is this arrangement itself, which is again ex- 
 pressed as the ground. In ordinary life, these aetiologies (methods 
 of causal explanation) which are in vogue in the sciences pass for 
 what they really are for tautology, for empty talk. For example : 
 if to the question, why this man goes to the city, it should be stated, 
 as a reason, that he goes to the city because there is an attractive 
 force which draws him there, such an answer would pass for trivial, 
 although it would have the high sanction of being scientific. Leib- 
 nitz urged, as an objection against the Newtonian force of attraction, 
 that it was an occult quality, similar to those which the scholastics 
 employed for the purposes of explanation ; but one might urge the 
 opposite objection that it is a too well known, too obvious quality, 
 for it has no other content than the phenomenon itself. Precisely 
 what recommends this mode of explanation is its great clearness and 
 intelligibility ; for there is nothing clearer and more intelligible than 
 to say, for example, that a plant is produced by (i. e., has its ground 
 in) a vegetative power, ?'. e., a plant-producing power. It could be 
 called an "occult" quality only when the ground had a different 
 content from that which it is intended to explain. But such grounds 
 are not given. The power which is used as an explanation is an 
 " occult " ground, in so far as it is not such aground as is demanded 
 for explanation (i. e., the ground demanded is not given, but remains 
 "occult"). Through this formalism there is as little explained as 
 there is explained of the nature of a plant when I say of it : It is a 
 plant. Notwithstanding all the clearness of this proposition, or of 
 that other proposition, that it has its ground in a plant-producing 
 power, one might still call this a very " occult" method of explaining 
 things. 
 
 Secondly. As regards form, we find in this mode of explanation the 
 two opposite phases of ground-relation, without recognizing in them 
 their definite relation to each other. Ground is ground, (1) as the 
 into-itself- reflected content of a being of which it is the ground ; (2) 
 it is the posited. It is that by means of which the being is to be com- 
 prehended. But, on the other hand, the ground is an inference from
 
 94 Essence. 
 
 the being ; so that it in turn is comprehended by reference to the 
 being. The chief business of this sort of reflection consists in finding 
 grounds for particular being i. e.,in converting immediate beings 
 into the form of reflection. The ground, instead of being independ- 
 ent, and in and for itself, is, therefore, rather what is posited and 
 deduced. Now, for the reason that this procedure of finding a ground 
 is guided by the phenomenon investigated, and the character of the 
 ground determined by the latter, it follows quite smoothly and pros- 
 perously from its ground. But scientific knowledge has not by this 
 means gone forward a particle ; it has busied itself only with a differ- 
 ence in form, which has been confounded and annulled by this very 
 procedure. One of the chief difficulties met with in the study of 
 the sciences, in which this method prevails, consists in this confound- 
 ing of the positions of the ground and grounded ; placing that 
 beforehand as ground which in fact is deduced, and arriving at a 
 sequence which in fact should have been placed first, as the ground of 
 the alleged ground. In the exposition the beginning is made with 
 the grounds ; they are set up in the air as principles, or first ideas ; they 
 are simple definitions, without any apparent necessity in and for them- 
 selves ; that which follows is deduced from them ; whoever, therefore, 
 would master these sciences must begin with the study of those 
 grounds, a task which reason finds unpleasant, because it has to take 
 that which has no ground as a basis. He will come out best who 
 takes these principles for granted without much reflection, and uses 
 them as the fundamental rules of his intellect. Without this method 
 he cannot make a beginning, and without them he can make no 
 progress. This inconsistency, however, impedes his progress: he 
 contradicts his method by deducing from grounds which have 
 been assumed sequences which contain grounds of the former 
 assumptions. Moreover, since the sequence proves to be the fact from 
 whence the ground was deduced, this method of treating it causes 
 one to distrust the exposition of it; for it is not expressed in its 
 immediateness, but as a result of the ground. Since, however, the 
 ground is likewise deduced from the immediate fact, one demands 
 rather to see the fact in its immediateness, in order to decide upon 
 the validity of its alleged ground. In such an exposition, therefore, 
 in which that which is properly the ground is brought in as a deduc- 
 tion, one knows neither how to regard the ground nor the phenomenon. 
 The uncertainty is increased by this circumstance, especially if the 
 exposition is not strictly consequent, but is given out on authority, 
 viz., that every where in the phenomenon there are traces and con- 
 ditions which point to other and quite different things from those con-
 
 The Real Ground. 95 
 
 tamed in the mere principles. The confusion is, finally, stffl greater 
 when reflected and merely hypothetical determinations are mixed in 
 with immediate determinations of the phenomenon, and the former 
 are spoken of as if they belonged to immediate experience. 
 
 Thus, many who take up the study of these sciences with implicit 
 faith are of the opinion that the molecules, and the void spaces, the 
 repulsion, ether, single beams of light, electric or magnetic matter, 
 and a multitude of the like distinctions, are real things which may be 
 found in actual observation existing in the same manner as described 
 in the sciences. They serve as first grounds for another; are ex- 
 pressed as actuaUties, and confidently appfied. And they are allowed 
 in good faith to pass for realities, before one is aware that they are 
 determinations derived from those things for which they are offered 
 as the grounds, being mere hypotheses formed by an uncritical reflec- 
 tion. In fact, one finds himself in a kind of witch's circle when he 
 uses them, in which determinations of particular being and determina- 
 tions of reflection ground and grounded, phenomena and phan- 
 toms course through each other promiscuously, and are all received 
 as of equal rank and validity. 
 
 In this formal occupation of explaining things bymeansof grounds, 
 one hears again and again, notwithstanding all this explanation by 
 of well-known powers and matters, that we do not know the 
 of these powers and matters. In this, we have only 
 a confession that this activity of explanation is wholly insufficient, 
 and that it demands something quite different from the grounds 
 which it offers; and the only difficult thing that remains for us to 
 understand is, why all this trouble has been taken to make such 
 explanations; why something else has not been sought, or at least 
 that species of explanation dispensed with, and the simple facts 
 themselves accepted without any explanation. 
 
 2. The Bed Ground. 
 
 The determinateness of ground is, as has been shown, in the first 
 place, the determinateness.of bask (substrate) or of the content; in 
 the second place, it is the other-being in the ground-determination 
 itself, viz., the difference between its content and the form. The rela- 
 tion of ground and grounded becomes a mere external form to the 
 content, which is indifferent to these determinations. But in fact the 
 two are not external to each other; for the content is really the setf- 
 identity of the ground in the grounded, and rfoe reran, of the grounded 
 in the ground. The side which belongs to the ground has shown itself 
 to be a posited somewhat, and the side which belongs to the grounded
 
 96 Essence. 
 
 has shown itself to be the ground itself ; each is in itself the identity of 
 the whole, but because they belong at the same time to the form, and 
 constitute its special distinctions, each of them is in its determinate- 
 ness the self-identity of the totality. Each has consequently a sepa- 
 rate content opposed to the other. In other words, considered from 
 the side of content, inasmuch as it is self-identity as ground-relation, 
 it has esssentially this form-distinction in itself, and is, as ground, 
 another than the grounded. 
 
 In this fact, now that ground and grounded have a different con- 
 tent, the ground-relation has really ceased to be a formal distinc- 
 tion. The return into the ground, and the procedure out of it into 
 posited-being, is no longer a mere tautology, and thus the ground is 
 realized. When one asks for a ground, he desires to be answered by 
 the statement of some other content-determination than the very one 
 for which he has asked a ground or sought an explanation. 
 
 This relation can now be defined more accurately. In so far, 
 namely, as its two sides are different in content, they are independ- 
 ent of each other ; each is an immediate self -identical determination. 
 Moreover, as ground and grounded are related to each other, the 
 ground is reflected into itself in the other as in its posited-being ; 
 the content, therefore, which belongs to the side of the ground is 
 likewise in the grounded ; and the grounded, as the posited, has in 
 that content its self-identity and reality. Besides this content of the 
 ground, the grounded has also its proper, peculiar content, and is 
 consequently the unity of a twofold content. Although this unity is, 
 as a unity of contents which differ, their negative unity ; for the 
 reason that these content-determinations are indifferent towards each 
 other, it follows that this unity is only an empty one, a relation devoid 
 of content, and not their mediation ; it is a one or a somewhat as an 
 external bond of union. 
 
 In the real ground-relation, therefore, the twofold content is to be 
 found, in the first instance, as content-determination, which is con- 
 tinued as self-identical in the posited-being, so that it constitutes the 
 simple identity of ground and grounded. The grounded contains, 
 therefore, the ground perfectly within itself ; its relation, therefore, is 
 an essential continuity, without break or^separation. What therefore 
 appertains to the grounded as additional to this simple essence, is, 
 therefore, only an unessential form, external content-determinations 
 which, as such, are independent of the ground, and possess an imme- 
 diate manifoldness. And hence, the mentioned essential relation is not 
 the ground of this unessential (superfluity and immediate manifold- 
 ness) ; it is the ground of the relation of the two to each other in the
 
 The Real Ground. 97 
 
 grounded. It is a positive, identical somewhat which inheres in the 
 grounded ; although it is posited within it, not as in a form-distinction, 
 but as a self-relating content is an indifferent positive basis or principle. 
 Finallj*, that which is externally connected to this basis or principle 
 is an indifferent content as the unessential side. The chief thing is 
 the relation of the basis or substrate to the manifoldness which is 
 regarded as unessential. But this relation, since the determinations 
 which stand in relation constitute the indifferent content, is also not 
 the ground, although the one is essential, and the other is defined 
 as unessential or a posited-content ; but this form is external to both, 
 as self-relating content. The one of the somewhat which constitutes 
 their relation is, therefore, not form-determination, but only an exter- 
 nal bond which contains the unessential manifold content, but not as 
 a posited somewhat ; it is, therefore, only basis or substrate. 
 
 Ground, determined as real on account of the diversity of the con- 
 tent which constitutes its reality, falls asunder, therefore, into external 
 determinations. The two relations on the one hand, the essential 
 content, as the simple immediate identity of grouud and grounded ; 
 and, on the other hand, the somewhat, as the relation of the different 
 elements of the content these two relations are two different sub- 
 strates. The self-identical form of the ground, according to which 
 the same thing is at one time essential and at another time posited, 
 has vanished, and the ground-relation has, therefore, become self- 
 external. 
 
 There is, therefore, now an external ground, which brings into 
 external relation different elements of the content, and determines 
 what is ground and what is posited through the ground ; in the two 
 phases of the content itself, there is not to be found the means for 
 determining this question. The real ground is, therefore, relation- 
 to-other, on the one hand, of content to other content, and, on the 
 other hand, of ground-relation, or form, to something else, viz., to 
 an immediate that is not posited through it. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 The formal ground-relation contains only one content for ground 
 and grounded ; and in this identity of content lies its necessity, but, 
 at the same time, its tautology. The real ground contains a diversity 
 of content, but through this diversity there enters contingency and 
 externality as regards the ground-relation. In the first place, that 
 which is regarded AS essential, and on this account as ground-deter- 
 mination, is not the ground of the other determinations which are 
 connected with it. In the second place, it is not determined which
 
 98 Essence. 
 
 of the several content-determinations of a concrete thing is to be 
 assumed as essential and as ground. The choice between them, there- 
 fore, is left free ; thus, in the first aspect, for example, the ground of 
 a house is its foundation ; wherefore this ground depends upon the 
 gravity inherent in sensuous matter, and gravity is identical in this 
 case in the ground and grounded. The fact that there belongs to- 
 heavy matter such a distinction, viz., that one part should be a sub- 
 strate and the other a modification different from it: this distinction 
 appertaining to a dwelling-house is perfectly indifferent to gravity 
 itself. Its relation to the other content-determinations of the final 
 cause, the arrangement of the house, etc., is external to it; it is 
 therefore a substrate, a foundation, but not a ground or cause of the 
 same. Gravity is the ground or cause to which is to be attributed 
 the fact that a house stands, and, as well, the fact that a stone falls. 
 The stone has this ground, gravity, in itself ; but the fact that it has 
 other determinations of content besides gravity determinations 
 which make it to be a stone is a fact indifferent to gravity. More- 
 over, the stone is a somewhat posited through another somewhat : that 
 it was previously at a distance from the body to which it fell, and also 
 that the time, the space, and their relation, the movement, are another 
 content than gravity, and are capable of being conceived without 
 it to use the ordinary mode of expression and are accordingly 
 not essentially posited through it. They are also the ground that a 
 projectile makes a flight opposed to gravity. It is evident, from the 
 diversity of the determinations whose ground it is, that something 
 else is demanded, which makes it the ground of this or .of another 
 determination. 
 
 If the assertion is made regarding nature, that it is the ground of 
 the woi'ld ; on the one hand, that which is called nature is identical 
 with the world, and the world is nothing but nature itself. And yet 
 they are also different, so that nature is rather the indeterminate, or 
 at least determined only in such general characteristics as natural laws, 
 for example ; so, too, that nature is the self-identical essence of the 
 world, and requires a multitude of determinations to be added to it 
 in order to become the world. But these determinations have their 
 ground not in nature as such ; they are rather to be regarded as 
 contingent and indifferent to it. We have the same relation between 
 God and nature when God is defined as the ground of nature. As 
 ground, He is its essence. Nature contains God within it, and is 
 identical with Him ; but nature has further manifold determinations 
 which are different from the ground itself. Nature is the third term, 
 therefore, in which these two different factors unite. The men-
 
 The Seal Ground. 99" 
 
 tioned ground is neither the ground of the manifoldness different 
 from it, nor for its connection with it. Nature is, therefore, not cog- 
 nized as having its ground in God; for in that case He would only be 
 the general essence of nature, whereas the ground of nature is a defi- 
 
 This producing of real grounds is, therefore, a formalism just as 
 much as the formal ground itself, because of this diversity in the 
 content of the ground, or the difference between the substrate and 
 that which is connected with it in the grounded somewhat. In this. 
 formal ground, the self-identical content is indifferent as regards. 
 the f onn ; in the real ground, the same thing is true. TSuodgli this 
 fact, moreover, it does not contain within itself the ground or reason 
 for deciding which of the many determinations shall be taken as i^e 
 essential one. A somewhat is concrete, and has a manifold of detcr- 
 nunations which show themselves serf-subsistent and abiding. There- 
 fore, one of them as well as another may be taken as ground, and 
 may be held to be essential, and in comparison with it the others are 
 a mere posited. What was formerly mentioned applies here: that if 
 a determination occurs which in one aspect is viewed as the gronad 
 of another, it does not follow that the other is to be regarded as pos- 
 ited by it in any other, or in all aspects. Punishment, for pTampl^ 
 has a variety of aspects in which it may be regarded, that of retri- 
 bution, that of a warning example, deterring from the infraction of 
 law, and also that of the reformation of the criminal. Each of these 
 different aspects has been regarded as the ground or reason of "pun- 
 ishment, because each one is an essential determination; and, viewed 
 in reference to it, the other determinations are defined as contingent. 
 But the one which is assumed as ground is not identical with the 
 total compass of punishment (in an its aspects) ; punishment, as a 
 concrete, contains not only one, but aH of the aspects which are 
 connected with each other, being contained in punishment, but are 
 not the ground of each other. As another example: an officer has 
 fitness for the duties of his office, and as an individual has relations 
 to kindred, and to this and that acquaintance ; he possesses a charac- 
 ter of his own, and has been in these or those circumstances, and 
 has had such and such opportunities to show his capacity, etc. 
 Each one of these tilings may be taken as the ground or reason for 
 his possession of this office ; they constitute a diversified content, 
 whose elements are united in a third. The form, as the essential and 
 as determined, in antithesis to the posited, is external to it. Each of 
 these things is essential to the officer, because as a particular indi-
 
 100 Essence. 
 
 vidnal he needs them for his realization. In so far as his office may 
 be regarded as an external posited determination, each one of the 
 things mentioned may be regarded as the ground of the office ; but, 
 on the contrary, the office could also be regarded as the ground of 
 ach one of them, and in that case they would be the posited. As 
 they actually stand that is to say, considered in an individual 
 ^ase the office is an external determination as regards content and 
 ground. It is a third, which confers upon them the form of ground 
 and grounded. 
 
 Every being may have a variety of grounds ; each one of the 
 determinations of its content, as self-identical, penetrates the concrete 
 totality, and for this reason may be regarded as essential. The 
 various aspects, i. e., determinations which lie outside of the thing 
 itself, have no limit as to number, for the reason that the method of 
 making combinations is a purely arbitrary one. Whether a ground 
 has this or that sequence is, therefore, quite an accidental affair. 
 Moral motives, for example, are essential determinations of an ethical 
 nature ; but what follows from them is an external affair quite differ- 
 ent from them ; it follows, and it does not follow, from them ; it is 
 added to them by the agency of a third somewhat. In fact, when a 
 moral determination is taken for a ground, it is not contingent that 
 it shall have a result or a ground, but it is a contingency whether 
 it shall become a ground or not ; but since the content, which is its 
 result when the moral determination has been taken as a ground, is 
 an externality, it may be annulled through another externality. 
 From one moral motive, therefore, there may or may not result a 
 deed. Conversely, a deed may have a variety of grounds ; it contains 
 as a concrete many essential determinations, each one of which, 
 therefore, may be assigned as the ground. The search for grounds, 
 in which ratiocination principally consists, is, therefore, an endless 
 procedure. Each and every thing may have one or more good 
 grounds assigned for it, and there can be a multitude assigned for a 
 thing without any result following from them. That which Socrates 
 and Plato called sophistry is only ratiocination by means of assign- 
 ing grounds. Plato opposes to this process the consideration of the 
 Idea, i. e., of the necessary nature of things, or their ideal totality 
 (Begriff.) Grounds are selected only from essential determinations 
 of content, essential relations, and aspects ; and each thing, as well 
 as its opposite, possesses several of these. In their form of essen- 
 tiality, one does as well as the other ; and since no one of them con- 
 tains the entire compass of the object, each of them is a one-sided
 
 The Perfect Ground. 101 
 
 ground, which does not exhaust the object which contains all these 
 sides within it; no one of them is a "sufficient" ground, i. e. y 
 ideal totality (Beyrtf). 
 
 3. The Perfect Ground. 
 
 (1.) In the real ground, the ground as content and the ground as 
 relation are contained as mere substrates. Ground as content is only 
 posited as essential and as ground. Ground as relation is the some- 
 what of the grounded, as the indefinite substrate of a diversified con- 
 tent, a connection between the different elements of the content, 
 which is not its own reflection, but something external, and. conse- 
 quently, only a posited. The real ground-relation is, therefore, 
 rather the ground as annulled ; and, therefore, it is rather the side of 
 posited-being or of the grounded. As posited-being, however, the 
 ground has returned into its own ground, and hence is a grounded, 
 and has another ground ; this other ground, therefore, determines 
 itself to be identical, in the first place, with the real ground as 
 grounded through it ; both sides have, therefore, one and the same 
 content ; the two determinations of content, and their union in the 
 somewhat, are therefore contained in a new ground. Secondly, the 
 new ground, in which that merely posited external union (Verknuep- 
 fttng) as been annulled, is, as their reflection into themselves, the 
 absolute relation of the two determinations of content. 
 
 Through this fact that the real ground has returned into its own 
 ground the identity of the ground and grounded, or formal ground, 
 is restored. The ground-relation which has arisen is, therefore, the 
 perfect ground, which contains within itself the formal and the real 
 grounds, and which mediates in the latter, through each other, its 
 immediate content-determinations. 
 
 (2.) The ground-relation has thus far developed the following 
 determinations : First, a somewhat has a ground ; it contains the con- 
 tent-determination, which the ground is, and a second determination 
 posited through the ground. But as indifferent content, the one is 
 not within itself ground, nor the other within itself the grounded of 
 the former ; on the contrary, this relation is, in the immediatencss of 
 the content, annulled or posited, and as such has another somewhat 
 for its ground. This second relation, which differs only in respect 
 to form, has the same content as the former, viz., the two determina- 
 tions of content,, but is the immediate union of the two. Since, 
 however, the different elements of the content, thus united, are con- 
 sequently indifferent as regards each other, the union is not their 
 true, absolute relation, in which the one of the determinations would
 
 102 Essence. 
 
 be self-identical in the posited-being, while the other would be only 
 this posited-being of the same self-identical determination ; but a some- 
 what is their substrate, and constitutes their relation, which is not 
 reflected, but is only an immediate relation, and which, therefore, is 
 only a relative ground as opposed to their union in another some- 
 what. The two somewhats are, therefore, the two different relations 
 of content which we have found ; they stand in the identical ground- 
 .relation of form ; they are one and the same content as a totality, 
 -viz., the two determinations of content and their relation. They are, 
 therefore, distinct only through the nature of this relation, which in 
 the one is an immediate and in the other is a posited relation ; 
 through which the one is distinguished from the other only according 
 to form, as ground and grounded. Secondly, this ground-relation is 
 not only formal, but also real. The formal ground passes over into 
 the real ground, as we have seen. The moments of form are 
 reflected into themselves ; they are an independent content, and the 
 ground-relation contains also a peculiar content of its own as ground, 
 and one as grounded. The content constitutes the immediate iden- 
 tity of the two sides of the formal ground, and hence they have one 
 and the same content. But it has also within itself the form ; hence 
 it is a two-fold content, which stands in the relation of ground and 
 grounded. One of the two determinations of content which belong 
 to the two somewhats is, therefore, defined not as merely common 
 to them, as found by external comparison, but as their identical sub- 
 strate and the basis of their relation. Opposed to the other deter- 
 mination of content it is essential and the ground of it as posited, 
 viz., in the somewhat whose relation the grounded is. In the 
 first somewhat, which is the ground-relation, this second deter- 
 mination of content is also immediately united to the first, and 
 according to its nature. The other somewhat, however, contains 
 only the one potentially, as that in which it is immediately identical 
 with the first somewhat; but it contains the other as a posited 
 within it. The first determination of content is the ground of the 
 same, through this fact: that it is united within the first somewhat 
 primordially to the other determination of content. 
 
 The ground-relation of the determinations of content in the second 
 somewhat is mediated, therefore, through the first self-existent rela- 
 tion of the first somewhat. The conclusion is this : for the reason that 
 within a somewhat the determination B is united with the deter- 
 mination A by nature (cm sich), there is in the second somewhat, to 
 which only the determination A belongs, immediately also united with 
 it the determination B. In the second somewhat this second detemiina-
 
 The Relatively Unconditioned. 103 
 
 tion is contained not only mediately, but also the inference that its 
 immediate ground is, viz., through its immediate relation to B, in the 
 first somewhat. This relation is consequently the ground of the 
 ground A, and die entire ground-relation is in the second somewhat 
 as posited or grounded. 
 
 3. The real ground thus appears as the self-external reflection of 
 ground ; the perfect mediation thereof is the restoration of its self- 
 identity. But since the latter has retained at the same time the 
 externality of the real ground, it follows that the formal ground- 
 relation in this unity of itself and the real ground is self-positing as 
 well as self-cancelling ground. The ground-relation mediates itself 
 through its self-negation. In the first place, the ground, as the orig- 
 inal relation, is the relation of immediate determinations of content. 
 The ground-relation has, as essential form for its sides or terms, such 
 somewhats as have already been cancelled or reduced to moments. 
 Therefore, as form of immediate determinations, it is the self-identi- 
 cal relation, which is at the same time relation of its negation. 
 Hence it is ground not in and for itself (by its own nature), but as a 
 relation to the annulled ground-relation. In the second place, the 
 annulled relation, or the immediate, which is the identical substrate in 
 the original and in the posited relation, is a real ground likewise not 
 in and for itself, but it is posited through that original bond of union 
 to be ground. 
 
 The ground-relation in its totality is, consequently, essentially pre- 
 supposing reflection ; the formal ground presupposes the immediate 
 content-determination; and the latter, as real ground, presupposes 
 the form. The ground is therefore the form, as immediate bond of 
 union, but in such a manner that it repels itself from itself, and pre- 
 supposes the immediateness, and in this relates to itself as to another. 
 This immediate is the determination of content, the simple ground ; 
 but as this simple ground it is repelled from itself, and relates to 
 itself as to another. In this manner the total ground-relation is 
 determined as conditioning mediation. 
 
 c. 
 
 The Condition. 
 1. The Relatively Unconditioned. 
 
 (1.) Ground is the immediate, and the grounded is the mediated. 
 But ground is the positing reflection, and, as such, it reduces itself 
 to posited-being, and is presupposing reflection; it therefore re-
 
 104 Essence. 
 
 lates to itself as annulled, as an immediate through which it, itself,, 
 is mediated. This mediation, as progress from the immediate to the 
 ground, is not an external reflection, but, as has been developed, it 
 is due to the activity of ground itself ; or, what is the same thing, the 
 ground-relation is, as reflection into self-identity, likewise essentially 
 self-externalizing reflection. The immediate to which ground relates 
 as to its essential presupposition is the Condition (i. e., the condi- 
 tioning limits Bedingung) ; the real ground is, therefore, essentially 
 conditioned ; the determinateness which it contains is the otherness of 
 itself. 
 
 The conditioning limit is, therefore, in the first place, an immediate, 
 manifold being. In the second place, this being is related to another, 
 to a somewhat which is ground, not of this being, but of something 
 else ; for the being itself is immediate, and without ground. In this 
 relation it is a posited somewhat ; according to it, the immediate being 
 would be a conditioning limit, not of itself, but of another ; but at 
 the same time this being for another is itself only a posited-being ; 
 that it is a posited-being is annulled in its immediateness. and a beingr 
 is indifferent as regards its function as conditioning limit. In the 
 third place, the conditioning limit is, therefore, an immediate, so that 
 it constitutes the presupposition of the ground. In this phase it is 
 the form-relation of the ground, which has returned into self-iden- 
 tity, and hence it is its content. But the content, as such, is 
 only the indifferent unity of the ground as it is in the form 
 without form, no content. The content frees itself from the 
 form through the fact that the ground-relation in the perfect 
 ground becomes a relation external to its identity ; through this 
 the content preserves its immediateness. In so far, therefore, 
 as the conditioning limit is that in which the ground-relation 
 possesses its self-identity, it constitutes its content ; but for the 
 reason that it is indifferent to this form, it is only potentially its 
 content that is, it ought to be the content, and hence it constitutes 
 the material for the ground. Posited as conditioning limit, the being, 
 according to the second moment (element or phase), possesses this 
 peculiarity ; it loses its indifferent immediateness. and becomes a 
 moment of another being. Through its immediateness, it is indiffer- 
 ent to this relation ; but, in so far as it enters this relation, it consti- 
 tutes the nature (Ansicliseyii) of the ground, and is the uncondi- 
 tioned for it. In order to be conditioning limit, it has its presupposi- 
 tion in the ground, and is itself conditioned, but this characteristic is 
 an external (accidental) one for it. 
 
 (2.) A somewhat is not through its conditioning limit; its condi-
 
 Tke Rdatimly U Conditioned. 
 
 knot its ground. It is the moment (phase) of uncon- 
 mwBMss for the ground, but it is not the activity and the 
 
 positing Inch relates negatrrely 10 itself, and reduces Maplf to a 
 The ground-relaSKML, therefore, fandi opposed to 
 A somewhat has, besides its conditioaing- 
 rhfe is the active movement of reflection, 
 
 it has tfc nm^**K*1mmmm* ^^hM* nf ft as its presupposition. 
 
 But it is the entire form; and the independent activity of mediation 
 for the conditioning nmit, is not te ground. For the reason that this 
 
 as a pouting activity, it is in tins 
 : /. _ .: ; -- 
 iDed positing activity : hence, 
 : to its determination ( Batimmina = destina- 
 .- - 
 
 the identify of 
 
 a pecuBar content, opposed lothe con- 
 it. The former is the content of the 
 an essential form. TLte latter, 
 material, for which the relation to the 
 Destitutes also ite nature. Consequently 
 of the independent content, which possesses no refav 
 ; of ground, with that which goes into iteetf. and as 
 
 of the same. 
 (3.) Thetwotnmsof the totan^ the conditioning fimk and the 
 
 the one, which m Ike non-related, m 
 in which it is conditioning Emit: the other 
 n- which the particularized being of the cco- 
 
 Moreorcr, both are mediated. The conditioning Emit is the being in 
 itself of the ground. It u essential moment of the ground-relation 
 to the extent that it is its simple self-identity. But diis simple self- 
 identity is also annulled; this being in itself, or nature, is only a 
 
 15 mdlffipfPtlt JS TCfinVOS 1AC DBmtHr OI 
 
 ofthebeimj 
 
 in rt/ffli is for the ground, constitutes its phase of 
 
 ,a
 
 106 Essence. 
 
 both in one relation. In other words, the contradiction consists in 
 being an independent self subsistence and a mere element at the 
 same time. 
 
 2. The Absolutely Unconditioned. 
 
 The two relatively unconditioned somewhats manifest themselves 
 each in the other. The conditioning limit, as immediate, manifests 
 itself in the form-relation of the ground, and the latter manifests 
 itself in immediate being as its posited-being (dependence). But 
 each of these relatively unconditioned somewhats is independent of 
 this manifestation of its other within it, and has a proper content of 
 its own. 
 
 In the first place, the conditioning limit is immediate being. Its 
 form has these two phases : the posited-beiug, according to which it 
 is, as conditioning limit, material and element of the ground ; and 
 (the other phase is) being-in-itself (Ansichseyn its own nature, 
 which is through itself, and not a mere "posited-being," or being 
 derived from another, and dependent on it), which constitutes the 
 essentiality of the ground, or its simple reflection-into-itself 
 (" reflection- into-itself," it will be remembered, is always the form 
 of self-relation in its positive aspect of identity, independence, and 
 infinitude). The two sides of form are external to the immediate 
 being, for immediate being is the cancelled ground-relation. But, 
 first, being is by itself only the process of self-annullment in its 
 immediateness, and of ceasing to be (i. e., of " going to the 
 ground"). The sphere of Being (treated in the first part of this 
 logic, and including all categories of immediateness, such as quality, 
 quantity, and measure) is only the becoming of Essence (transi- 
 tion to Essence) ; it is its essential nature to reduce itself to a posited- 
 being, and to an identity which is the immediate, through the nega- 
 tive of it (as a posited). Therefore, the determinations of form, 
 viz., of posited-being, and of self -identical being-in-itself the form 
 through which immediate being is conditioning limit are therefore 
 not external to it, but immediate being is this reflection itself. 
 Secondly, as conditioning limit, what being essentially is, is now also 
 posited ; it is, viz. , a moment, consequently a phase of another, and 
 at the same time likewise the being-in-itself of another ; but it is in 
 itself only through the negation of itself, i. e., through the ground, 
 and through its reflection, which is self-annulling, and consequently 
 presupposing. The being-in-itself of the categories of the sphere of 
 Being is, consequently, only a posited. This being-in-itself of the
 
 The AbmhUdy Unconditioned. 107 
 
 conditioning Kmit has these two aspects: (1) its essentiality as 
 ground, and (2) the immediateness of its particular being. These 
 two are the same. The particular being is an immediate, but the 
 immediateness is essentially what is mediated mediated, viz.. 
 through the self-annulling ground. As this immediateness. which is 
 mediated through the self-annulling mediation, it is the being-in- 
 itself of ground, and at the same time its unconditioned. But this 
 being-in-itself is, at the same time, likewise only a moment or posited 
 being, for it is mediated. The conditioning Kmit is. therefore, the 
 entire form of the ground-relation. It is the presupposed being-in- 
 itsdf of the same. But, as such, IB as a posited-being. and its 
 immediateness reduces it to posited-being; it consequently repels 
 itself from itself, so that it is annulled (goes to the ground) as 
 ground, which reduces itself to posited-being, and consequently to 
 the grounded. And the two are one and the same. 
 
 Being-in-itself is likewise found in connection with the conditioned 
 ground, not merely as manifestation of another upon it. It is 
 independent, and this means that it is the self-relating reflection of 
 the activity of positing. Hence, it is the self -identical i. e., it is 
 its being-in-itself. and its content. But at the same time it is pre- 
 supposing reflection. It relates negatively to itself, and posits its 
 own being-in-itself as something opposed to it in another: and the 
 conditioning limit is the real phase of ground-relation, as well accord- 
 ing to the moment of being-in-itself as according to that of imme- 
 diate being. Immediate being is essentially and solely through its 
 ground, and is a moment of its ground as a presupposing activity ; 
 hence, this presupposing activity is likewise the entire movement. 
 
 For this reason, there is only one totality of form extant, and 
 likewise only one totality of content. For die proper content of the 
 conditioning 1 mit is essential content only in so far as the identity of 
 self -reflection in the form, or in so far as this immediate being is in 
 itself the ground-relation. This immediate being is, moreover, con- 
 ditioning limit only through the presupposing reflection of the 
 ground. It is its self-identity, or its content, posited by it in opposi- 
 tion to itself. Particular being is, therefore, not merely a formless 
 material for the ground-relation, but it is matter that has received 
 form ; for it already possesses this form, and it is content since it is 
 indifferent towards it. while it is in identity with it. Finally, it is the 
 same content which ground has, for it is content precisely in so far 
 as it is the phase of self-identity in the form-relation. 
 
 The two sides of the totality the conditioning limit and the 
 ground are therefore one essential unity, both as content and as
 
 108 Essence. 
 
 form. The} r pass over into each other through their own activity ; 
 or, in other words, since they are movements of reflection, they posit 
 themselves as annulled, and relate to this annulment, which is their 
 negation, and therefore mutually presuppose each other. But this 
 is, at the same time, only one movement of reflection for both ; their 
 mutual presupposition is therefore only one activity ; the antithetic 
 attitude of the two passes over into the phase in which they presup- 
 pose their one identity as their persistence (self-dependence) and as. 
 their substrate. This substrate, which is the one content and form 
 unity of both, is the truly unconditioned ; it is the thing in itself (die 
 Sache an sich selbst). The conditioning limit, as defined above, is- 
 only the relatively unconditioned. It is usually, therefore, regarded 
 as itself conditioned through something else, and a new condition i& 
 asked for ; hence the progress, ad infinitum, from condition to condition, 
 is introduced. Why one asks for the condition which limits another 
 condition means the same thing as the question, why does one assume 
 it as conditioned? The answer to this is, because it is a finite being. 
 But this idea of finite being is something which does not belong to the 
 conception of conditioning limit. The conditioning limit, as such, is 
 therefore itself conditioned through something else, because it is the 
 posited being-in-itself. The conditioning limit is therefore annulled, 
 in the absolutely unconditioned. 
 
 The absolutely unconditioned contains the two moments : ( 1 ) the 
 conditioning limit and (2) the ground. It is the unity into which 
 they have returned. The two together constitute the form or the 
 posited-being of the absolutely unconditioned. The unconditioned 
 thing (Sache) is the conditioning limit of both, but it is the abso- 
 lute that is to say, the conditioning limit, which is ground itself. 
 As ground, it is the negative identity which has repelled itself into 
 the two moments mentioned, viz., (1) into the shape of the annulled 
 ground-relation, i. e., that of an immediate self-external multiplicity, 
 devoid of unity, which relates to its ground as to its other, and at 
 the same time constitutes its being-in-itself; (2) it has repelled it 
 into an internal, simple form, which is ground, but which relates to 
 the self-identical immediate as to another, and determines the same 
 as conditioning limit, i. e., determines its being-in-itself as its own 
 moment. These two sides presuppose the totality, therefore, as 
 that which posits them. Conversely, since they presuppose the 
 totality, the totality seems to be conditioned through them, and the 
 "thing in itself" (Sache) seems to originate from its conditioning 
 limit and from its ground. But since these two sides have shown 
 themselves identical, the relation of conditioning limit and ground
 
 The Thing Emerge* into Existence. 109 
 
 has vanished, and these two categories are reduced to an appearance. 
 The absolutely unconditioned, in its activity of posting and pro- 
 posting, is only the activity in which this appearance annals itself. 
 It is the actirity of the tiling (5adte) which conditions itself, and 
 places itself orer against its conditions as their ground. Its rela- 
 tion as that of conditions and their ground is, however, a manifesta- 
 tion within it. and it stands in relation to them SB its own self- 
 
 i TheTlriBs (&dfcr)Eaei 5 K i 
 
 The absolutely unconditioned is the absolute ground, identical with 
 its conditioning Emit; it is the immediate thing as the truly essential. 
 As ground it relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to posLteJ- 
 being ; hot this posited-being is the reflection which is completed in 
 its two phases or sides, and in them it is self-identical form-relation, 
 as has been ascertained is the f ongoing investigation of its nature 
 
 This posited-being, therefore, is, in the first place, an- 
 ground, or the thing as imtnediatr and without any activity of 
 reflection: this is the side of the conditioning limit. This is the 
 totality of the determinations of the thing the thing itself, but cast 
 forth into the externality of being; it is the restored circle of being. 
 In the conditioning limit, essence sets free the unity of its reflection 
 into itself as an immediatpneim, which, however, has now the charac- 
 teristic of being a presupposition which is a conditioning limit, and 
 of constituting only one of its sides or phaups The conditioning 
 Emits are, therefore, the entire content of the thing, because they are 
 the unconditioned in the form of the formless being (Form des form- 
 lose* Seyms). On account of this form, however, they have also still 
 another aspect: that of the determinations off content as it is in the 
 Thing as such. They manifest thusMthm as a multiplicity without 
 unity, intermingled with non-essential and other circumstances, which 
 do not belong to the sphere of particular being, in so far as it consti- 
 tutes the conditioning nmhs of this particiilarized thing. The sphere 
 of Being is itself the conditioning Emit for the absolute unlimited 
 thing. Ground, which returns into itself, posits it as the primary 
 immediateness to which it rentes as its unconditioned. This imme- 
 djatrnfm as the annulled reflection is reflection in the element of 
 Being. This, therefore, as such completes itself to a totality. The 
 form grows as determinateness of being, and manifests itself as a 
 content different from the determination of reflection, and 
 
 towards it. The non-essential which appertains to the 
 of being, and which it, in so far as it is conditioning limit,
 
 110 Essence. 
 
 excludes, is the determinateness of immediateness into which the form- 
 unity has sunk. This form-unity, as the relation of being, is first 
 the category of Becoming, in this place the transition of one deter- 
 minateness of being into another. But the becoming of Being is its 
 transition into Essence, and hence its return into Ground. Hence 
 particular being, which constitutes the conditioning limits, is in truth 
 not determined to be conditioning limit b}^ another, and is not used as 
 its material ; but it, by its own activity, reduces itself to a moment of 
 another. Its becoming is, moreover, not a beginning with itself, as if 
 it were the true primordial and immediate, but its immediateness is 
 only what is presupposed^ and the activity of its becoming is the 
 activity of reflection itself. The truth of particular being is, there- 
 fore, its realization as conditioning limit. Its immediateness is solely 
 through the reflection of the ground-relation, which posits itself as 
 annulled. The becoming, so far as it is immediateness, is only the 
 appearance of the unconditioned, since the latter presupposes itself, 
 and has in this presupposition its form, and the immediateness of 
 being is therefore only a moment or phase of form. 
 
 The other side or aspect of this appearance of the unconditioned 
 is the ground-relation, as such, which is determined as form in oppo- 
 sition to the immediateness of the conditioning limits and the content. 
 It is the form, however, of the absolute Thing which possesses within 
 itself the unity of its form and itself, or its content ; and, since it de- 
 termines its content to be a conditioning limit, it annuls in this very 
 positing its diversity, and reduces it to a moment; conversely, as 
 form devoid of essence in this self -identity, it takes on the form of 
 immediateness as persistent reality. The reflection of ground annuls 
 the immediateness of conditioning limits, and relates them to mo- 
 ments within the unity of the thing. The conditioning limits, on the 
 other hand, are what is presupposed by the unconditioned thing 
 itself ; it annuls, therefore, its own positing ; or, in other words, its 
 positing reduces itself immediately to a becoming ; the two are, 
 therefore, one unity. The movement of the conditioning limits 
 within themselves is a becoming, a return into the ground, and a posit- 
 ing of the ground. But the ground as posited that is to say, as 
 annulled is the immediate. Ground relates to itself negatively, 
 reduces itself to posited-being, and furnishes a ground for the con- 
 ditioning limits. In the fact, however, that by this the immediate 
 particular being is determined into a posited, the ground annuls it, 
 and becomes ground in that act. This reflection, therefore, is the 
 mediation of the unconditioned thing through its negation. Or, in 
 other words, the reflection of the unconditioned is at first a presup-
 
 The Tkimy 
 
 111 
 
 i:------ 
 
 
 ;:::-: .:*"_.- 
 
 -~ 
 
 - - - 
 B~ deiwi of 
 
 Ti-. : --.:- 
 
 :' -..-. - - - -- '. 
 
 _-.-- 
 
 - i -- :- - - -
 
 112 Essence. 
 
 into existence is an immediate affair only through the fact that its 
 mediation is a vanishing of mediation. 
 
 The thing proceeds from its ground. It is not grounded or posited 
 through it in such a manner that the ground remains standing under 
 it, but the act of positing is the outward movement of ground into 
 itself, and the simple vanishing of itself as ground. It receives 
 external immediateness through its union with the conditioning limits, 
 and thus attains the phase of Being. But it receives external immedi- 
 ateness, not as an external somewhat, nor through an external relation. 
 On the contrary, it reduces itself as ground to posited-being ; its 
 simple essentiality comes into self-identity in the posited-being; in 
 this annulment of itself it is the vanishing of its difference from its 
 posited-being, consequently it is simple, essential immediateness. 
 The ground, therefore, does not remain behind as something different 
 from that which is grounded ; but the truth of that which is grounded 
 lies in the fact that the ground unites itself with itself in this move- 
 ment, and consequently its reflection into another becomes its reflec- 
 tion into itself. The thing, consequently, in so far as it is the uncon- 
 ditioned, is also without ground ; and it issues forth from the ground 
 only in so far as it proves itself perishable ("goes to the ground"), 
 and is no ground; it issues forth from the groundless, i. e., from its 
 own essential negativity, or pure form. 
 
 This immediateness, which is mediated through ground and condi- 
 tion, and is self-identical through the annulment of mediation, is 
 Existence.
 
 SECOND SECTION. 
 
 . . . , 
 
 aotttag efae thaa beiag thai phase of 
 ilr- Hee beiag 
 
 topaaaeof aaajih If ah atil j r i* Bkrwe 
 
 of faefrst section of 
 
 
 
 _.-- - :. : i 
 
 brfo^ to Ul stage of 
 
 to -j pn with Uek I write, b there B K> 
 
 ." in virv of the bet chat the 
 
 enehnrofiBe to be oafr aa are of a circle of
 
 114 Essence. 
 
 Essence," of course does not mean that it is Essence, if Being is 
 taken in its immediateness, or as mere transitory phase, but it means 
 that Being when traced out so that we have found its truth, or the 
 totality of its process, or the true nature of it, is Essence or the abid- 
 ing being that kind of being that abides through all change of par- 
 ticular form or phase. So, too, the second proposition, "Essence is 
 Being," does not mean that Essence is Being no matter how we think it. 
 It means that Essence as this negative self-relation produces and sus- 
 tains itself in immediateness as has been shown in this book in the 
 chapter on " Ground." It may be truly said that if we think of Being 
 as it truly is we must think it as a phase of self-relation ; hence Being 
 is only an aspect of Essence. Again, Essence is a process which has 
 immediateness and self-relation as its result and as its constant 
 product hence Essence is Being, or in the form or phase of Being 
 and is more than Being, for it abides, and is true Being, or existence. 
 It must be I'emarked that Being always has the form of self-relation, 
 or of independence but not an explicit self-relation, or a relation 
 which is in the form of "A relates to B which relates back to A, 
 again "= A determines B and B determines A so that A relates 
 to itself through B, or so that A determines itself through B. This 
 self-mediation through another is not perceived by the thinking which 
 thinks mere Being. And yet this logical investigation finds this self- 
 mediation through another to be the essential presupposition of any 
 or all forms of Being. But the thinking which possesses this insight 
 is the thinking which thinks Essence. The thinking which thinks 
 Essence is able to understand that those categories which it thought 
 as forms of Being, are such arcs of the process of self-relation as 
 include the result of 'the "positing reflection." (See p. 14.) Es- 
 sence as Being here termed " Existence " is the permanent man- 
 ifestation of Essence through its own activity. Hence, "Phenom- 
 enon" means complete manifestation, or essential appearance. This 
 complete manifestation has " emerged from negativity and internal- 
 ity ;" that is to say, we have found that the negativity of the process 
 called Essence does not result in zero, but in a reality which pos- 
 sesses immediateness through the annullment of mediation ; the mere 
 annullment of external mediation results in " internality," but the 
 *' Phenomenon " preserves externality or abiding objectivity]. 
 
 Therefore, Essence manifests itself in a Phenomenon. Reflection 
 is the appearing- to-itself of Essence. The determinations of Re- 
 flection are " posited " or annulled [?'.. dependent] when in the unity 
 of reflection ; in other words, Reflection is Essence as immediately 
 self-identical in its posited-being [its dependence being converted
 
 115 
 
 \j> Bat since- the activity [of reflection, which 
 is self-identical in its ponted-beiag] m Ground, it determines itself 
 m the form of realty, through its aeif-ananffiag or seif-retnrning re- 
 flection. Moreover, since this iirfi immaliim [of itself as real], or 
 the other of the Ground-relation annuls itself in the reflection of 
 
 [*.. it takes up its conditions 
 itself], it follows that the Form-determina- 
 of independent subsistence. 
 ::-; :--= ::-. "..- P - :.: 
 
 .. -- " ' --..-. . 
 composed of existing some- 
 unity of essence 
 - - - :_ - ... - : . -. - 
 of Thing the negativity of reflection 
 but for the reason that the ground of the thing is essen- 
 tially this mimauat of reflection it annub its immediateness : the 
 things reduced to a pasfted-being. fJHegeTs style of writing about the 
 investigation of the caUgutkJB is dramatic; each category is treated 
 as though self-active. Its ill finilinn is taken for its expressed wffl or 
 intention, and then its hehaiim or its implication with others is 
 with this its definition and the contradictions noted, 
 is the famous fci dialectic :" each category is treated as 
 though it expressed independent, 
 of its contradictory behavior, 
 universal, reveals to us the imperfection 
 of the category, its ilijiiadiaM upon other categories wit" i which 
 it forms a whole, and the necessity a evident of a new defini- 
 tion which expresses this relation to others in a new unity. The 
 i of the aew nmlj m a higher, more concrete statement of 
 as it iiajjaatu the ptetkimi statement and corrects 
 its defects. Here, for example. "Existence" is found to involve 
 under the form of particular "things." Furthermore, 
 found to involve the mnnminl of reflection which an- 
 of the -things:" hence "things" exist 
 in a state of transience. Tarn ream* here stated fe the brief 
 of what to be shown in detafl in the first chapter of 
 of Essence.] 
 
 is rhcnomuMm [not merely " existence" 
 their traasrtonness is ** phenomenon "]. The paw* 
 omenoaiswhat the thing in itself Qa its nature], or it B the 
 truth of the thing." Existence, as posited or reflected in the 
 [as a "thing "] B, however, the transcendence of itself,
 
 116 Essence. 
 
 the progress ad infinitum, away from itself ; the world of phenomena 
 places itself in opposition to the reflected world, the world of being- 
 in-itself [i.e. to the internal nature of " things"]. [This is a brief 
 announcement of the contents of the second chapter of this second, 
 division of Essence]. 
 
 But the essential being and the being which is a manifestation or 
 phenomenon, stand in immediate relation to each other [they are 
 mere counterparts or counter movements of one activity]. Hence, 
 thirdly, "Existence" [with which we have to do in this second di- 
 vision of Essence] is Reciprocity or essential relation [or state of 
 relation, or that which exists only in relation] ; the manifestation in 
 a phenomenon (Erscheinende) exhibits the essential, and Essence is 
 [or is completely included] in its phenomenon: Essential relation 
 [Verhaltniss] is the as-yet-imperfect union of reflection in the other- 
 being, [or in externality] and of reflection into itself ; the perfect 
 interpenetration of the two is Actuality. [In this announcement of 
 the contents of the third chapter of this second division of Essence 
 we arrive at the idea of Actuality as the complete realization of the 
 internal nature or essence in outer manifestation. We now proceed 
 to take up the subject in detail.] 
 
 FIRST CHAPTER. 
 
 Existence. 
 
 Since the Proposition or principle of the "Ground" expresses: 
 Everything that is, has a ground or is a posited i.e., a mediated ; the 
 principle of Existence would have to be expressed as follows : Every- 
 thing that is, exists. The truth of Being is not found in a first imme- 
 diate, but rather in the immediateness which has emerged from Es- 
 sence [this immediateness of "Existence"]. 
 
 If, however, the assertion is made that whatever exists has a 
 ground and is conditioned [through that ground] there would need 
 an additional statement [to correct the one-sidedness of the former] : 
 it has no ground and is unconditioned. For Existence is the imme- 
 diateness which has resulted from the annulment of mediation as 
 found in the relation of ground and condition an immediateness 
 which in its production cancels the means that produced it. [An 
 immediateness which results from the cancelling of mediation be- 
 longs to the higher order of immediateness. All self-mediation is of 
 this order. Everything pertaining to the realm of Mind furnishes 
 an illustration. I study Euclid ; I avail myself of his aid, using his
 
 Existence. 117 
 
 demonstration to comprehend the nature of a triangle T bat obtaining 
 insight into the subject I see the truth immediately, and without his 
 aid- At first there was dependence on Euclid, mediation through his 
 labors, but a use of his insight as mediation gives me immediate in- 
 sight, makes me independent of his labors, and therefore annuls the 
 mediation. The history of Mind everywhere furnishes the example 
 of the person who " climbs a ladder and draws the ladder up after 
 him."] 
 
 If the "Proof of the existence of God " is referred to at this point, 
 it must be remembered that beside immediate Being and Existence 
 [the " Being" of Essence] there is a third form of Being resulting 
 from the Idea [ " BegrifF ' ] which is called fc t Objectivity. ' ' [The three 
 parts of the Logic treat respectively, Being, Essence and Idea ; in 
 the first, we have immediate Being, utterly without mediation and 
 hence without persistence and truth ; in the second there is Essence 
 whose immediateness is Existence, persistent and abiding, but imper- 
 fect, because its externality is opposed to internality : in the third, 
 the Idea, or self-determination as completed in thought and will, or 
 conscious personality we have again immediateness, this time as 
 " objectivity." subject- objectivity, or consciousness, the knowing 
 of self, the becoming-completely-objective is REVELATION. Hence 
 if the thought of mere being gives us the appearance of the Abso- 
 lute, the thought of Essence gives us the self-manifestation and the 
 thought of Idea gives us the self -revelation of the Absolute. 1 
 
 The process of proving something is, of course, a mediated know- 
 ing. The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own 
 kinds of mediation ; and so it happens- that the nature of the process 
 of proof varies with each kind of mediation. The ontological proof 
 of the being of God sets out from ideas, it lays down as postulate 
 the idea of the totality of all reality and then subsumes existence 
 under the reality [it argues for the necessity of the existence of 
 the totality] it is therefore the mediation of the syllogism 
 and is not in place for us to consider here. We have already 
 mentioned in another place what Kant has urged against this form 
 of proof, and have called attention to the fact that Kant understands 
 by the term, ki Existence," only particular being, and by the cate- 
 gory of particular being every thing in the total content of our 
 experience is thought as standing in relation to some other thing and 
 as being itself another to something else ; in other words, it falls 
 
 I 3rockmeyera "Letters on Faust" (Journal of Speculative P**/o*op*y, 
 roL 1, page 181} for distinctions between self-manifestation, self-revelation and 
 self-definition- Translator.
 
 118 Essence. 
 
 under the category of "other-being." For example, "somewhat" 
 is as an existing thing mediated through "another," and existence 
 itself is the side of mediation for all things. Now in what Kant calls- 
 the Idea [JBegrr(/f^=Idea or " Notion "*] namely, in the somewhat in 
 so far as it is taken simply, as related to itself merely, or as an 
 *' idea in the mind," its mediation has been omitted; in its abstract 
 identity, its antithetic relation to other things is left out. The onto- 
 logical proof, according to this view would have to show that the 
 absolute Idea, viz. the idea of God comes to particular Being, i. e. to 
 mediation ; in other words, as the simple essence proceeds to self- 
 mediation. This takes place through the mentioned subsumption of 
 existence under a more general term, namely, reality, which is as- 
 sumed as the middle term between God in his Idea, on the one hand, 
 and existence, on the other. Of this mediation so far as it has the 
 form of the syllogism (inference) as remarked before, this is not the 
 place to speak. But with the mediation of Essence with existence 
 its mode and manner the present exposition deals. The nature of 
 the process of demonstration is to be considered in the chapter that 
 treats of the science of cognition [third part of this logic]. Here 
 we are to treat only what concerns the nature of mediation in gen- 
 eral. 
 
 The proof of the existence of God assigns a ground for his exist- 
 ence. This ground, it is understood, cannot be an objective [ex- 
 ternal] ground of the existence of God ; for God exists in and for 
 himself [and without grounds]. Hence this proof assigns merely a 
 ground for the cognition of God's existence. This species of ground 
 [i.e. for knowledge, or subjective convictions] is of such a kind that 
 it vanishes in the object, which is grounded through it [or the ground 
 of proof is a somewhat whose being involves the object proved, and 
 the perception of the object proved as thus involved in the ground 
 of the proof, realizes the demonstration ; but the ground of the proof 
 is rather an object which is grounded in and through the object 
 proved; hence "ground" and "grounded" are used in opposite 
 
 1 English and Scotch writers generally translate the German word Begriff by 
 "Notion." In America the word "notion" is used for vague idea or one-sided 
 apprehension and seldom for the logical concept, or Begriff. The use of the word 
 Begriff by Hegel is different from that of Kunt and others, and misleads Germans 
 as to the tendency of his system. The use of the word " notion " in English 
 makes the matter still worse ; for Begriff like concept may possess an objective 
 meaning without doing violence to the word. "Idea" since Plato's time has pos- 
 sessed an objective as well as subjective meaning, and has signified archetype or 
 pattern as well as subjective " notion." Translator.
 
 Existent*. 119 
 
 i subjective or objective. The 
 ried that we cannot prove the existence of God, 
 became proving is grounding, and that which is grounded through 
 another could not be divine in its nature. Here was a coof osion 
 between subjective ground of knowledge or conviction aud objective 
 ground of existence]. Now the ground of proof which is based on 
 the contingency of the world contains [or involves] the return of 
 the world into the absolute essence [die contingency of the world 
 exhibits its dependence no thing in nature abiding but each pass- 
 ing over into another ; this transitoriness of things is a process of 
 evolving and annulling determinations; the evolution of the deter- 
 minations is the creation of particular beings over against the es- 
 sence ; their annulment is the return into the indeterminate essence :] 
 for the contingent is the in-itself-groundless and self-annulling. The 
 absolute essence, consequently, according to this, proceeds from the 
 groundless; the ground annuls itself; and then the appearance of 
 relativity vanishes ; and in the proof vanishes also this appearance 
 of relativity on the part of God as a being that was grounded 
 through another. This mediation [of the absolute through the re- 
 turn into it of the groundless] is consequently the true one, but that 
 stage of thinking to which the proving reflection " belongs, does 
 not understand the nature of this mediation ; it takes this mediation 
 as a merely subjective affair, and therefore carefully removes it from 
 God iiii*Mlf, but on this account it does not perceive the mediating 
 activitv involved in essence itself. The relation of dependence [*- 
 of the "grounded" upon the "ground"] which the proof involves 
 or contains, consists in this that they are both in one [i.e. " ground "' 
 and' -grounded 1 ' are one being] a mediation which is a self- 
 externality which is self-annulling in its nature [i.e.. the transitory 
 which is posited by the essence is a self -externalizing of the essence, 
 bat the transitory is sett-annulling]. In the mentioned exposition 
 'existence" receives an erroneous construction; it is conceived in 
 the dependent relation of mediated or pished [through the proof 
 the ground being taken as objective instead of subjective]. 
 
 On the other hand Existence may be regarded as something not 
 merely immediate. Taken in the phase of immediateness. the cogni- 
 tion of the existence of God has been expressed as an act of Faith, 
 a knowing which does not rest on proof a knowing by the immedi- 
 ate consciousness. The knowing is said to come to this result, that 
 it knows nothing ; that is to say, that it gives up its mediating activity 
 and the cognitions which it has arrived at through such activity. 
 This result we have seen in what precedes : but it must be added that
 
 120 Essence. 
 
 reflection when it ends with the annulment of itself does not on this 
 account have zero for a result ; so that after this annulment the posi- 
 tive knowing of essence may take place as an immediate relation to 
 the same and entirely separated from the act of reflection and as 
 though the act of reflection had not been as though the immediate 
 knowing were an original act beginning from itself. But this annul- 
 ment of reflection, this " going-to-the-ground " of mediation is itself 
 the "ground" from which the immediate proceeds, or originates. 
 Language [i.e. the German language] unites as above remarked the 
 two meanings of destruction and ground [for "goes to destruction" 
 the German says, "goes to the ground"]. It is said also that the 
 essence of God is the abyss [Abgrund] for the finite reason ; it is 
 this through the fact that the finite reason gives up its finitude and 
 loses its mediating activity in the being of God ; but this abyss, the 
 negative ground, is at the same time the positive ground of the 
 origination of existence, of the essence which is in itself immediate 
 and of which mediation is an essential phase. Mediation through 
 the ground annuls itself, but does not leave the ground lying at the 
 basis so that what originates from it is a " posited," or still depends 
 on that ground, and as though it had its essence elsewhere, viz. in 
 the ground; but this ground is as "abyss" the vanished mediation, 
 and, conversely, it is only the vanished [self -an nulled] mediation 
 which is the ground ; and only through this negation there arises the 
 identical and the immediate. 
 
 Thus "existence" is not to be taken here in the sense of predi- 
 cate or of determination of essence, so that a proposition or principle 
 could be made of it. "Essence exists" or "essence has exist- 
 ence"; but essence has become here existence. Essence has be- 
 come existence in so far forth as essence no longer distinguishes 
 itself into "ground" and "grounded"; the ground has annulled 
 itself. But this negation (the annulment of the ground-relation) is 
 likewise essentially its positing affirmation or absolutely positive 
 continuity with itself; existence is the reflection of ground into 
 itself [this means : something is ground, i.e. it utters itself by pos- 
 iting something else which manifests the ground or is its appearance ; 
 in its transitoriness its determinations are annulled, and thus it re- 
 turns to the ground; ground is a reflection into itself through 
 its process of grounding something, and again annulling what is 
 grounded by it ; existence includes this whole process of the reflec- 
 tion of ground into itself]. Its identity with itself which results 
 from its negation [relating to itself] is therefore the mediation which
 
 121 
 
 posited ifeetf as self-identical and through tins has 
 
 fore it 
 
 ffi*g. [This is the general statement of the contents of this first 
 chapter. It goes over the entire discussion, mentioning only the 
 The closing sentence of this paragraph is 
 of Hegel's most peculiar insight. It involves 
 the passage from the generic to the individual, from the universal to 
 the singular. The first example given in this logic of this insight is 
 found in the treatment of Being, in Volume L, under the head off 
 Quality (pages 113 and 114 c. "fcro*"). He remarks, after the 
 statement that Somewhat (tom*) is the first negation of negation, 
 as simple existing relation to itself, "Being [Ifcuqm], Life, Think- 
 ing, &c_, determine themselves essentially in the form of AerapK. ffr- 
 *], &c. This determination is of the 
 
 in order to escape from the mere universal 
 Being, Life, Thought. &c- ; and so to be able to descend 
 from the general idea -deity" to that of a [concrete, personal] 
 God." Not the abstract universal any more than the abstract par- 
 ticular, is the reality. Hegel here agrees with Aristotle; only the 
 individual has true reality. But the "individual"" must not be un- 
 derstood as mere particular being or phase, but as the self-deter- 
 mining process which we call ego or person. AH eke is mere 
 '"posited being,"" and has its explanation only through the self- 
 totality to which it belongs. Thus in this place Hegel 
 to be "negative unity" t.e. a process which an- 
 i of development, and "returns into itself," 
 being-in-itself : but each and every phase of the 
 reflected into itself: and hence the " return-into-itself " is 
 not by the reduction to zero of the particular stages of development 
 but by the elevation of each particular stage to a totality within itself 
 by adding to it what it lacks of the totality! A, b and c are three mo- 
 ments of a totality, each needs the other two to make its 
 possible, the tota| is the annulment of each, but if the 
 
 total takes the form of * negative unity " it destroys 
 individuality of the moments, a, b and c (think of the annnl- 
 it of acid and alkali in a salt) ; but if the annulment of a, b and
 
 122 Essence. 
 
 c takes place by the addition to each of its complement then each 
 comes to true individuality by the possession of the form of totality. 
 Thus a, b, c, the primary, undeveloped unity, the first entelechy, be- 
 comes abc, bca, cab; each moment annuls itself and becomes its 
 own totality. This is the form of preservation of the individual in 
 the universal and is the especial insight of Hegel, on which he lays 
 most stress. The idea of " reflection-into-itself " is the basis of this 
 preservation of individuality and escape from pantheism or the ab- 
 stract universal as a first principle in the universe. Aristotle, too, 
 seems to have held this concrete principle of reflection-into-itself as 
 the basis of true being and true reality. It was his commentator, 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, who interpreted the Master's thought as a 
 thought of "external reflection." and hence as setting up the ab- 
 stract universal instead of the concrete universal. This interpreta- 
 tion was adopted by the Arabians ; hence Scholasticism arose as the 
 Christian reaction, which in Aquinas finds the concrete universal 
 again. Aristotle's thought of first and second ' k entelechies " and of 
 "energy" and of "active reason" is founded on this insight. Ex- 
 istence is not an abstraction, but, as Hegel remarks, existences or 
 things.] 
 
 A. 
 
 Thing and its Properties. 
 
 Existence as existing somewhat is posited in the form of negative 
 unit}', which it essentially is [a negative unity annuls all of its manifold 
 of determinations, leaving them only a " posited being," just as acid 
 and alkali have a " posited-being " only when they exist in the neg- 
 ative unity of a salt]. But this negative unity is in the first place 
 only immediate determining, and hence it is the oneness of any 
 "somewhat." The existing somewhat is to be distinguished from 
 " somewhat" as a category of Being; the former is essentially such 
 an immediateness as has originated through the reflection of media- 
 tion into itself ["reflection-into-itself" means here a return from 
 mediation, through mediation, back to immediateness ; the mediation 
 is used and then dispensed with ; the ladder has been ascended and 
 now it is drawn up from the ground ; this insight into the use of 
 mediation and its annulment is the key to this whole book of Es- 
 sence]. Hence the existing somewhat is a Thing [" Thing " is the 
 category which expresses a somewhat which is mediated through 
 others, and yet which is re-posited by the others pre-supposed by 
 them and thus established in the form of independence; the de-
 
 V 
 
 US 
 
 [betwen its geaenfitr as existeKe ud Us 
 
 not illy a Deng, but it is m ne- 
 
 .: .= -^- i
 
 124 Essence. 
 
 which, as such, is not considered as existing. The category of pos- 
 sibility [or potentiality], and of the antithesis of the thing, and its 
 existence belongs later in this Logic.) But the thing-in-itself and its 
 mediated Being are both contained within existence, and both are ex- 
 istences themselves ; the thing-in-itself exists and is the essential, 
 while the mediated being is the unessential existence of the Thing. 
 
 The Thing-in-itself as the simple reflected being of existence [the 
 phase of existence as reflected-into-itself, or as annulled mediation] is 
 not the ground of the unessential being; it is the unmoved, undeter- 
 mined unity, for it is only annulled mediation, and therefore it is the 
 basis of the unessential being [Grundlage = basis ; Grund = ground 
 or reason ; ground arises from the self-annullment of contradiction ; 
 contradiction is self-relation in its aspect of self-negation ; this self- 
 negation is self-determination, the positing of determinations within 
 the undetermined subject of the process ; or likewise the presuppos- 
 ing activity which determines a presupposed immediate ; all this ac- 
 tivity is mediating or grounding the laying-of-a-foundation for an- 
 other; thing-in-itself is not a foundation or ground for unessential 
 existence, because all existence is such through the annulment of 
 mediation; and the annulment of mediation is the annulment of the 
 very distinction which the process of ground creates.] For that rea- 
 son, Reflection, as a being mediating itself through another, falls out- 
 side of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is defined as having no 
 particularized manifold within it ; and on this account it receives this 
 manifoldness only when brought into connection with it through the 
 activity of reflection, but even then the thing-in-itself remains indif- 
 ferent to the manifoldness. For example, the thing-in-itself has 
 color on being brought to the eye, smell to the nose, &c. Its diver- 
 sity of properties according to this view is due to the "respects," 
 "points of view," taken by some external observer, particular rela- 
 tions which the outside observer assumes towards the thing-in-itself, 
 and which do not belong to the thing-in-itself as its own determina- 
 tions. 
 
 2. On the other hand, the second phase distinguished within exist- 
 ence is the one containing the activity of reflection, that defined as 
 external, and which is in the first place, self-external and particular- 
 ized manifoldness. In the second place it is external to the essen- 
 tially existing and relates to it as to its absolute presupposition. 
 These two phases or " moments " of external reflection, however, 
 their own manifoldness and their relation to the thing-in-itself op- 
 posed to them as their other, are one and the same. [Note carefully
 
 I 
 
 1:' 
 
 -'*-- 
 
 The 
 
 byiterff; 
 
 itfe attthe 
 fore kit a 
 
 am to tike tAm^wteeif ; tart 
 
 off tite 
 
 r I: r:es :.^_ ] r:^ -..: 
 
 "J. 
 
 : ,i- 
 
 js the other to that whkh is hi itelf [LCL, oppaned twite wnn 
 to] its bea^ n Hif . The 
 
 -: -* 
 
 -.. ; :* 
 6am 
 Far 
 
 ftitakoa 
 
 ft ii m RftvB Hb Hsrff it is C
 
 126 Essence. 
 
 essential existence ; but a consideration of the latter has discovered 
 within it the movement of reflection and hence it is a thing-in-itself 
 like the " mentioned first"]. But this second thing-in-itself is only 
 other in general ; for as self-identical thing it has no further an- 
 tithetic relation to the first [it is only " other," and has no essential 
 relation, no dependence upon the first thing-in-itself] ; it is the reflec- 
 tion into itself of the unessential existence just like the first thing- 
 in-itself. The determinateness of the various things-in-themselves 
 through which they are opposed to each other belongs therefore to 
 external reflection [and not to things-in-themselves]. 
 
 3. This external reflection is a process of relation of the things-in- 
 themselves to each other their reciprocal mediation as mutual 
 others. The things-in-themselves are, therefore, extremes of a syl- 
 logism whose middle term constitutes their external existence the 
 existence through which they are mutually others to each other and 
 different things. This difference of theirs is found only in their re- 
 lation to each other. As far as they stand in relation they have 
 superficial determinations distinguishing them from each other, but 
 these determinations of difference do not appertain to the things-in- 
 themselves except in this relation to each other. The latter, as re- 
 gards these distinctions, are indifferent, reflected into themselves, and 
 absolute [?'. e. things in themselves are held to be independently 
 existent for themselves and as having unessential relation to each 
 other, through which relation the manifold of marks, properties, ac- 
 cidents, &c., which characterize concrete things arise]. This process 
 of relation constitutes the totality of "Existence;" the thing-in- 
 itself stands in relation to an activity of reflection external to it, in 
 which it possesses manifold determinations. In this external reflec- 
 tion it is the repulsion of itself from itself into another thing-in-itself. 
 This repulsion is the counter impulse within itself inasmuch as each 
 of these is another to itself only as reflecting itself from and out of 
 another. It has its posited-being not in itself but in another, and it 
 is determined only through the determinateness of the other, and 
 this other is likewise determined only through the deterrainateness of 
 the former. [N. B. The method by which reflection saves the 
 thing-in-itself from dependence upon beings external to it and pre- 
 serves its self-identity ; the multiplicity of properties and other de- 
 terminations belonging to the Thing which are well known to involve 
 the interrelation of things and their interdependence, is made to be 
 wholly a sphere by itself unessential and contingent as regards the 
 things-in-themselves ; by this device reflection saves the independence
 
 1*7 
 
 appertains only to this sphere of contingent 
 
 says that the posited-bcing and the 
 do not belong to the thing-in-itself but to its otner, 
 mil I In 1.1 fun Ilir lMn L in ihwlf unigi i li illy Ihi iilhn, iiiililT. iml 
 to it.] Bat the two things-in-theassetaes, since according to this 
 ' does not appertain to themnefaes, bat each one's 
 solely in the other, are not different from each other. 
 The thing-in-itsett, since it is defined as relating t* the other extreme 
 thmg-n-itsetf, stands in relation tfo that which is not 
 and the external reflection which constitutes the 
 between the rtlirmi n is a process of relation 
 solely of the thing-in-itseif to itself : in other words, it ts essentially 
 its reflection into itself. Consequently it is in-itseM -extent deter- 
 or the drterminateneas of the thing-in-itself . Tbething- 
 
 not in relation to an 
 thing-in-itself determinate- 
 to the fanner: the determinateness is not one 
 to the surface of the thing-in-itself [to its 
 of relation to others outside of ft], but it k the essential me- 
 of itself with itself as its own other. The two thmgs-in- 
 
 - ' " ^ 
 to 
 [for tins has been placed by the 
 
 : - .' . ': :'- .':--. 
 
 There ooij one thing-in-itself 
 
 in a process of relation to itself : and 
 to itself in which it is its own other that 
 
 of the thug-in-itself the "Property" of 
 
 Quafity i* 
 
 hichBn^is 
 is the negativity of 
 
 The negatirity of reflection, 
 and ft is relation, 
 ^quality
 
 128 Essence. 
 
 unreflected determinateness ; it is relation to itself as its own other ; 
 in other words it is a mediation which is at the same time self -ident- 
 ical. The abstract thing-in-itself, too, is this process of relation 
 which returns from another back into itself ; through this it is de- 
 termined in itself. Its determinateness, however is its nature or 
 constitution [Beschaffenheif] which as such is its own determining 
 j character [Bestimmung determination, destination, vocation, quali- 
 I tative character] and as process of relation to another does not pass 
 
 over into other-being, nor is it subject to change. 
 
 ^i u-r*"* 1 " 1 "/ A thing has properties ; and these are, in the first place, its particu- 
 ^u^'^^Jlar relations to another. Properties have arisen only as modes of 
 4 ^ ii>c ) relation of the things to each other, they belong therefore to the 
 \activity of external reflection and to the sides of posited-being of 
 the thing. But, in the second place, the thing has its being-in-itself 
 in this posited-being ; it preserves itself [as self-identicall in this 
 relation to others ; it is therefore, of course, only a surface of itself 
 which Existence exposes to the vicissitudes of change and becoming ; 
 the Property does not suffer dissolution through this. A thing has a 
 property of influencing another thing in this or that respect ; and of 
 uttering itself in a manner peculiar to itself in its effects upon or 
 relations to another. It manifests this property (only under condi- 
 tions that are adapted to it) in the other thing, but still the property 
 is peculiarly its own and its self -identical basis ; this reflected quality 
 is accordingly called a property ; in this it passes over into an exter- 
 nality but the property still retains its identity in that externality. 
 The thing through its properties becomes a cause and the cause is 
 preserved in its effect. Yet in this place the thing is not yet deter- 
 mined as actual cause ; it is only the quiescent thing with a manifold 
 of properties ; it is only as yet the in-itself existent reflection of its 
 determinations and not its positing reflection. 
 
 The thing-in-itself is therefore, as we have seen, essentially not 
 merely thing-in-itself in the sense that its properties are the posited- 
 being of an external 1'eflection, but they are its own determinations 
 through which it stands in a definite relation to itself. The thing-in- 
 itself is not a basis devoid of determinations existing beyond or be- 
 hind its external existence ; but it is in its properties ; it is present as 
 their ground, which means [i.e. "ground" means] self-identity in 
 its posited-being ; but it is at the same time conditioned ground, and 
 this means that its posited-being is likewise self-external reflection ; 
 it is reflected into itself and self-identical in so far as it is external. 
 Through existence the thing-in-itself enters into external relations. 
 Existence consists in this external^ : it is the iramediateness of
 
 JSzufera. 129 
 
 in thi* tbe thing is exposed to change; bat it is also the 
 of Ground, and die tiling is consequeudy by 
 itself and self-identical in its change. This mention of die groond- 
 reiation most not be taken here in die sense diat die thing *$ such is 
 defined as ground of its properties: die dung-ness itself is as such 
 the determination of Ground die property is not distinct from its 
 ground, nor does it constitute merely die posited-heing. but it has 
 passed over into its externality and therefore is reafly ground reflected 
 Tlie property itself is as such die groaod potted-being 
 by itself ; in other words, die ground constitutes die 
 form of its self identity : its determinateness is die self -external of 
 die ground : and die whole is, in its repulsion and determining, ground 
 to itself in its external immediateness. Tbe ihixLg-in-itseJf 
 therefore essentially and that it exists means, cv.nveisely. that 
 is as external imisj iliilini 1111 at die same time being-in- 
 
 We have already mentioned when considering die phases of partic- 
 ular being [page ISO of dK original of VoL I of tins Logic. 3d ed.] 
 (viz., under die phase of beytg-in-itsetf). die category of - Thing- 
 iu-a.*erf." and in diat place have observed diat die thing-in-itself as 
 such is nothing but the empty abstraction from all detenninatee*s. 
 and concerning which abstraction one of course can know nothing. 
 for he precise reason dot all determination [about which one c*mld 
 know anything] is abstracted. The thing-in-itself is presupposed to 
 be void of determination, hence all determination falls outside of it 
 in a reflection foreign to h. and toward which it is indifferent, this 
 external reflection is die stage of consciousness which belongs to 
 
 idealism attributes aft 
 
 ness of tilings bodi as to form and to content to die con- 
 it follows, according to diat standpoint, diat it is my 
 subjective affair that I see die leaves of die trees not as hlack but as 
 green ; diat die sun appears round and not square : diat sugar tastes 
 sweet and not bitter; and diat I fix die first and second strokes of 
 die hour as in succession and not as simultaneous, nor die first as 
 cause and die second as its effect. This brilliant exhibition of sub- 
 jective idealism is in direct contradiction to the consciousness of 
 freedom, according to which I know myself to be general and unde- 
 termined and distinguish from myself diose manifold and necessary 
 and recognize diem as external to myself and as be-
 
 130 Essence. 
 
 longing to the things alone. The ego is in this consciousness of its 
 freedom that true identity reflected into itself which the thing-in-itself 
 is defined to be. Elsewhere I have shown that this transcendental 
 idealism never transcends the limitation of the ego through the ob- 
 ject, in fact never gets beyond the finite world, but changes only the 
 form of the limitation, which remains for it something absolute, inas- 
 much, namely, as it translates it out of the objective form into the 
 subjective, and makes it into determinatenesses of the ego and 
 thereby transfers what ordinary consciousness knows as change and 
 manifoldness in external things into a wild hurlyburly going on in 
 the ego like that which the ordinary consciousness has supposed to 
 exist in external things. In the present consideration, the thing-in- 
 itself and the reflection which is external to it in its first phase, stand 
 opposed to each other. This phase of reflection has not yet deter- 
 mined itself as consciousness ; nor has the thing-in-itself determined 
 itself as ego. It has become evident from the exposition of the na- 
 ture of the thing-in-itself and of external reflection, that this exter- 
 nal reflection developes into the thing-in-itself, or, conversely, into a 
 determination of the first mentioned thing-in-itself. The essential 
 thing in regard to this insufficiency of the stand-point upon which 
 the mentioned philosophy rests, consists in this, that it sets up the 
 abstract thing-in-itself as an ultimate principle and opposes to this 
 the activity of reflection or the determinateness and manifoldness 
 of properties, while in point of fact the thing-in-itself essentially con- 
 tains that external reflection in itself and developes into a thing with 
 its own determinations a thing endowed with properties and by 
 this means, we find that the abstraction of the thing, viz. the pure 
 thing-in-itself shows itself to be an untrue determination. 
 
 c. Interaction between things. 
 
 The thing-in-itself exists essentially. External immediateness and 
 determinateness belong to its being-in-itself [to its nature] or to its 
 reflection into itself [i.e., to it without reference to its dependence 
 on others]. The thing-in-itself is therefore a thing with properties; 
 and therefore there is a multiplicity of things ; and these things are 
 not distinguished from each other through a point of view external to 
 them as [assumed by the stand-point treated in the previous section, 
 wherein the multiplicity that pertains to the manifold properties of a 
 thing was explained by referring it to the m.-uiifoldness of the subject, 
 i.e., to the five senses or to external things which were brought into 
 relation to it] but they are distinguished from each other through the
 
 form of undetermined ^f-kkrniiij whkh has its *^uaiiioy <o*a!h w no* 
 propertr. If. dicrefore. a thins or dugs an general an* pakircii oif as 
 deftule propeitieB it IB all the &UMC winetSBer >u^ < imunj 
 of ihi ii iKBi H an IMJJI qpMlilrtiM uin E>.:-; <nai3'>er- 
 10 kind. Tkat vfeich i* regarded' as one tfw^ caun Ike *i*r ll 
 
 or the union of utanj d 
 to be an extrmal afbir [dung is a relative 
 
 i in du? dun* is a mura 
 
 ?-" :- 
 iof athiugl 
 
 nund ; he dunks its relations to other things, and 
 of interaction, d* marks which it has ntcesv^l 
 
 dungs; the mere seusuous consciousness e 
 
 0.1 y i. its prapettn. A thing fe 
 
 -
 
 132 Essence. 
 
 erties is nothing but the abstract being in itself, an external aggregate 
 and a non-essential inclusion [i.e., a collection of materials not essen- 
 tially related to each other]. The true being-in-itself is the being-in- 
 itself in its posited-being and this is the property. Hence thing-ness 
 has become for us "property." 
 
 The tiling, according to this, is defined as an in-itself-existent ex- 
 treme standing in relation to the property ; and the property is a 
 middle term between the things which stand thus in relation. But 
 this relation [between the things, and constituting the property or 
 the " middle term] " just mentioned is that in which the things meet 
 as the self-repelling reflection and in which they are distinguished 
 from and related to each other. This distinction and relation of the 
 things is one reflection and one continuity of the same. The things 
 themselves in this aspect of the process are included wholely within 
 the continuity of the property, and they vanish as independent ex- 
 tremes which possess existence outside of this property. 
 
 The property which is denned as constituting the relation between 
 the independent extremes is therefore itself what is independent 
 [and not the things, as was supposed]. The things as opposed to 
 this [property as independent] are the non-essential. Things are es- 
 sential only so far as they have a phase of self-relating reflection 
 which is self-distinguishing [self-repelling] ; but this phase is the 
 " property " [thus the only phase of essentiality belonging to things 
 is their properties]. The property is therefore not an "annulled" 
 phase of the thing, or, in other words, it is not a mere "moment" 
 of the thing; but the thing is in truth only an including surface 
 the non-essential aggregate [" Umfang" i.e., the including unity, 
 containing the properties within it as the only realities ; the thing has 
 thus become a husk, shell, cover, containing the property as its ker- 
 nel] ; although the thing is negative unity, it is only the oneness of 
 a "somewhat," namely, an immediate one [i.e., the "one" of the 
 category of Being]. Although the thing has been defined as non- 
 essential inclusion in a former connection, when it was deprived of 
 its properties by an external act of abstraction, yet here this ab- 
 straction has taken place through the passing over of the thing-in- 
 itself into property. But with contrary results ; for in the former 
 act of abstraction it was the thing, the abstract thing without its 
 properties that was thought to be essential, while the property was 
 thought to be merely an external determination ; now it is the thing 
 as such that is defined to be a mere indifferent, external and [non- 
 essential] form for the properties. The properties are consequently 
 now freed from the indefinite and powerless bond which the unity of
 
 133 
 
 the thing constitutes. It is the properties that constitute the exist- 
 eoce of the thing. Each property is an independent matter or ma- 
 terial. Since the property is a simple self-continuity, its form takes 
 on at first the aspect of variety [diversity or difference]. Therefore 
 there are manifold independent matters [or properties each prop- 
 erty being a matter], and the thing consists of these. 
 
 B. 
 Tke Tkimg etmsufx of Jfoffer*. 
 
 The transition of * property " into a * matter." or into an inde- 
 pendent material [Stop, i.e, stuff, or material] is the well-known 
 transition which the science of chemistry has brought about as re- 
 gards the matter which is perceptible by oar senses. It essays to 
 explain the properties of color, of smell, of taste, dte.. as light-cor- 
 puscles, coloring matter, odor-corpuscles, acid particles and bitter 
 particles, *c.. or it assumes a caloric matter, or an electrical or mag- 
 netic aaura and with these it is convinced that it has the properties in 
 their tangible reality. Thus the expression is current that things 
 consist of ^different materials or kinds of matter. They shrink from 
 calling these, materials or kinds of matter "things," although they 
 would concede that a pigment, for example, is a thing. I do not know 
 whether they would call the matters of light, beat, and electricity, 
 * things." They distinguish things from their constituent parts 
 without accurately stating whether these constituent parts are also 
 things, or whether they are only half things. But at least these 
 
 The necessity of passing over from the stand-point of proper- 
 ties " to that of independent matters, in other words, the fact that 
 properties are in truth matters, has been shown. They are what is 
 essential, and consequently what is truly independent in the Thing. 
 At the same time however the reflection of the property into itself 
 [the phase of its independence or self-subsistence] constitutes only 
 one side of the entire activity of reflection. It constitutes the annul- 
 ment of the distinction and the self-continuity of the property which 
 should be defined as an existence for another. The thingness in its 
 phase of negative reflection into itself in which it is a distinguishing 
 of itself from others and a repukion of others, is [by this one-sided 
 view of the property as mere continuity] reduced to a non-essential 
 moment. But at the same time it has defined itself still further in a 
 different aspect. This negative moment (1) has been preserved:
 
 134 Essence. 
 
 for the property has become self-continuous and an independent mat- 
 matter in so far as it has annulled the distinction between things ; the 
 continuity of the property over into the domain of other things [other- 
 being] contains therefore itself the moment of negativity, and its 
 independence is at the same time as this negative unity the restored 
 "somewhat" of ''thingness" [/.e., since the property includes dif- 
 ferent things in its continuity, the property itself, becomes thingness 
 or an including unity of an included multiplicity] ; it is the negative 
 independence opposed to the positive phase which is called "stuff" 
 or matter. Through this (2) the thing passes out of its former inde- 
 terminateness into perfect determinateness [definiteness, particu- 
 larity]. As thing-in-itself, it is the abstract identit}^,, the simple, 
 negative existence, or it is defined as the undetermined. Secondly, it 
 is determined through its properties through which it is distinguished 
 from others. But since through the property it is in continuity with 
 others instead of separated from them, this imperfect distinction is 
 annulled. The thing through this has therefore gone back into itself, 
 and is now defined as perfectly determinate or particular in itself, it 
 is a this thing." 
 
 (3) But this return into itself is the self-relation of the deter- 
 mination ; notwithstanding this, it is non-essential ; the continuity 
 with itself constitutes the independent matter in which the difference 
 between the tilings i.e. their determinateness existing in and for itself, 
 is annulled and a mere external] affair. The thing as a "this" is 
 therefore perfected determinateness but in the element of non-essen- 
 tiality. 
 
 Looked at from the side of the activity of the "property" the 
 property is not merely external determination but Existence-by-itself . 
 This unity of externality and essentiality repels itself from itself for 
 the reason that it contains within itself the reflection into itself and 
 the reflection into others and thus it is on the one hand determination 
 as simple, self-identical, self-relating and independent, in which the 
 negative unity, i. e. the one of the thing, is annulled ; on the other 
 hand this determination exists in opposition to others but as reflected 
 into itself, a one determined in itself: in the first respect, it is the 
 free matters and in the second it is the "this thing." These are the 
 two moments or phases of the self-identical externality or of the 
 " property " reflected into itself. The property was understood to 
 be that by which the things were distinguished. Since it has freed 
 itself from this its negative side through which it inheres in another, 
 by this means, the thing has at the same time got rid of its side of 
 determinateness through other things, and has returned into itself out
 
 135 
 
 of its relation to others; but at the same time it is only the thing in 
 itself become other to itself; since the manifold properties are inde- 
 pendent of eaca other their negative relation has become annulled in 
 the unity of the thing; it is therefore the self-identical negation only 
 as opposed to the positive continuity of the matter. 
 
 The T&w constitutes therefore the perfected determinateness of the 
 thing in that it is at the same time external. The thing is composed 
 of independent matters which are indifferent as regards then- relation 
 within the thing. This relation is therefore only a non-essential col- 
 lection of these matters and the distinction of one thing from another 
 rate on the number of particular matters that are found in the things 
 respectively. They transcend this particular thing and continue into 
 other things and the fact that they belong to this particular thing is 
 no restraint or limitation. Quite as tittle moreover are they limiting 
 conditions or restraints for each other because their negative relation 
 is only the powerless "This. 1 ' Therefore they do not annul each 
 other, although confined within the thing; being independent they 
 are impenetrable as regards each other : in their determinaiienes* they 
 relate solely to themselves and constitute a manifold of existences 
 indifferent to [independent of] each other : they can have only a 
 quantitative limit. The thing as a "This"" is therefore merely a 
 quantitative relation of the free matters, a mere collection (the 
 mere conjunction --and") of the properties. The thing is composed 
 of a given quantity of one matter amd of a given quantity of another, 
 and so on ; this connection or aggregate of matters is no essential 
 but the thing is just this unity of matters not essentially 
 [The ordinary consciousness arbitrarily selects from the man- 
 ifold of sense-perception an aggregate which it calls "thing/' Each 
 thing may be divided at win into several things or may be concreted 
 with other things into a larger thing; a thing is therefore an arbitrary 
 synthesis of materials. This stage of thinking also isolates properties 
 of a thing analytically; it supposes that the properties within the 
 thing arise, severally, from the materials that compose the thing. Its 
 motto is: "The ingredients taken together will have no attributes 
 that they do not have, taken separately." This phase of conscious- 
 ness wul be shown in this chapter to be a psychological incompetencj. 
 That whole realm of scientific thinking whose activity expfa 
 by means of the category of " things," as for example the 
 simple chemical element is therefore utterly inadeqnal 
 a true theory of the world of nature.]
 
 136 Essence. 
 
 C. 
 The Dissolution of the Thing. 
 
 The " This Thing," as above defined, viz., as the merely quantita- 
 tive aggregate of free matters, is absolutely changeable. Its change 
 consists in this that one or more of its matters may be withdrawn 
 from its aggregate, or that others may be added to this aggregate, or 
 they may be changed in their quantitative relation [relative amount 
 of each] to each other. The origination and dissolution of a "this 
 thing" is a mere external destruction of such external combination 
 or it is the re-combination of elements for which it is indifferent 
 whether they are combined or not. The matters circulate out of and 
 into "this thing" without restraint; the thing itself is the absolute 
 porosity without any principle of measure belonging to it that should 
 limit the kind and amount of the matters it is no form-principle. 
 
 Hence the thing in its absolute particularity of determinateness 
 through which it is a " this thing" is perpetually exposed to dissolu- 
 tion. This dissolution is the effect of external influences just as in fact 
 the being itself of the thing is such an effect. [But its dissolution 
 and the externality of its being are both essential to its nature.] It is 
 only a conjunction " and " [connecting the properties thus, white and 
 acid, &c.] ; it consists only of this externality. But it is also com- 
 posed of its matters, and is not merely an abstract " this " as such 
 the entire "this thing" is self -dissolution. The thing, namely, is 
 defined as an external collection of independent matters ; these mat- 
 ters are not things, they do not possess the negative independence 
 which belongs to the thing; but they are the independent proper- 
 ties determinatenesses reflected into themselves. The matters are 
 therefore, simple and self-related ; but their content is a determin- 
 ateness ; the reflection into itself is only the form of this content 
 which is not as such reflected into itself, but which relates to others 
 as regards its determinateness the relation of the matters as in- 
 different to each other, but it is likewise their negative relation ; by 
 reason of their determinateness [particularity] the matters are them- 
 selves this negative reflection, and this constitutes the punctateness 
 [tendency to isolated singleness, brittleness that breaks up into inde- 
 pendent points, disintegration, individual repulsion] of the thing. 
 Each of the matters is not what the others are and according to the 
 particularity of the content it is opposed to them, and the one is not 
 in so far as the other is according to their phase of independence. 
 
 The thing is, therefore, the relation to each other of the matters of
 
 Thing. 137 
 
 which it consists, in such a manner that each one exists coordinately 
 with the other, but at the same time each one does not exist in so far 
 as the other exists. In so far, therefore, as the one matter is in the 
 thin? the others are annulled by it ; but at the same time the thins is 
 the conjunction " and " [White and sour and round and heavy and 
 hard and smooth and fragrant, etc.], or the independence of the one 
 matter and of the others. In the existence of the one matter, the 
 others, therefore, do not exist, and yet likewise the other matters do 
 exist in the former ; and so reciprocally of all there different mat- 
 ters each one excludes all the others, and at the same time partic- 
 ipates in them. Since, therefore, in the same respect in which the 
 one exists the others also exist and this is the one existence of the 
 matters the punctateness, or the negative unity of the thing thev 
 interpenetrate each other without hindrance : and since the thing is 
 at the same time only their "and"' and the matters are reflected into 
 their determinateness and consequently are indifferent towards each 
 other and do not come in contact with each other even in their mutual 
 interpenetration. The matters are therefore essentially porous so that 
 each one exists in the pores of the other, i.e. in the non-existence of 
 the other [because the pores are the vacuities of the matters wherein 
 their existence ceases] : and this existence of the others is likewise 
 their annulment and the existence of the first [i. e., in the pores of 
 the others]. The thing is therefore the self-contradictory mediation 
 of independent existence through its opposite, viz.. through its nega- 
 tion, or the self-contradictory mediation of one independent matter 
 through the existence and non-existence of another. The category 
 of existence has attained its perfection in the category of " this 
 thing," viz. : it is the unity of indejtendent being or being-in-itself, 
 and of non-essential existence ; the truth of existence is therefore its 
 being- by-itself [i. e., independent self-subsistence], in the realm of 
 non -essentiality, or in other words it is the possession of its self-sub- 
 sistence in another, and even in the absolute other it is the having 
 its own nugatoriness for its foundation. It is therefore PHENOM- 
 ENON. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 It is one of the current notions of common consciousness that 
 a ' thing" is composed of many independent matters. On the one 
 hand the thing is regarded as having properties whose combination is 
 the thing : on the other hand, however, the various determinations are 
 taken as matters whose self-subsistence is not that of the thing, but
 
 138 Essence. 
 
 contrariwise : the thing consists of them and takes its self-subsistence 
 from them the thing being only their external combination and 
 quantitative limit. Both of these points of view, that of the proper- 
 ties as well as that of the free matters, have the same content, the dif- 
 ference being that in one case they regard the moments as having 
 their negative unity in the Thingness, i. e., in the basis different from 
 and other to themselves, and in the other case they regard the moments 
 as different from and independent of each other, each one reflected 
 into itself in its own unity and not in the unity of the Thingness. 
 These matters now are further defined as independent existence, but 
 they are also together in one thing. The " this thing" possesses the 
 two phases : first it is a this [punctate, repelling, atomic, individual] 
 and secondly it is the "and" [the including or aggregating unity]. 
 The "and" is that which occurs in external sense-perception as 
 space-extension ; the " this," on the other hand, is the negative unity, 
 the punctateness [excluding individuality] of the thing. The matters 
 are together within the punctateness and their "and" or the exten- 
 sion is everywhere this punctateness; for the "and" as thingness is 
 essentially a negative unity. Where, therefore, the one of these mat- 
 ters is, there in one and the same point is the other. The thing does 
 not have its properties, the one in one place and another in another 
 for example, its color here, its scent there, its heat in a third place, &c., 
 but in the point in which it is warm, it is also colored, acid, electric, 
 &c. Because now these materials are not external to each other, but 
 are in one "this," they are assumed as porous and as though one ex- 
 isted in the interstices or intervening spaces of the other. Each one 
 which exists in the interstices of the other is however porous itself, 
 and in its pores, therefore, the others exist [and it again within their 
 pores, while within its pores], and this again and again for the third 
 time, or the tenth [and so ad iiifinituni]. All are porous and in the 
 interstices of each are found all of the others, just as each one is in 
 the pores of every other. They are therefore a multiplicity of mat- 
 ters that interpenetrate each other reciprocally, and are interpene- 
 trated, so that each one interpenetrates in turn itself again. Each is 
 posited as its own negation, and this negation is the self-subsistence 
 of another ; but this self-subsistence is likewise the negation of this 
 other and the self-subsistence is the first. 
 
 The subterfuge through which the scientific imagination prevents 
 the contradiction from resulting through the unity of several 
 independent matters in a thing, or preserves their indifference towards 
 each other in their interpenetration is, as is well known, the theory of 
 small particles or atoms and of pores or interstices. Where self-dis-
 
 Thing. 139 
 
 ti notion, contradiction, and negation of negation enter, and in gen- 
 eral where anything is to be comprehended [grasped together in 
 thought] the scientific imagination descends to the use of external, 
 quantitative distinctions. In order to ex plain origination and evanes- 
 cence it has recourse to the conceptions of - gradualness " and - by 
 degrees," and in explaining being it has recourse to the conception of 
 small ness or minuteness [molecules or atomic constituents, etc.], in 
 these conceptions the varnishing is reduced simply to an iinjiervepu- 
 ble gradation and the contradiction is reduced to a c~n fused appear- 
 ance, and the true relation is obscured by conversion inno an indefi- 
 nite product of the imagination, whose indistinctness conceals the 
 process of self-annulment. 
 
 Now. if we examine this indistinctness [and !ring it to a focus] we 
 find it to be nothing at all but the contradiction itself, partly the sub- 
 jective contradiction of the activity of the imagination. partly the ob- 
 jective activity of the thing perceived. 
 
 The activity of mental representation [" scientific imagination "] 
 itself contains all of the elements of this contradiction. The very 
 first aspect of its activity is the contradiction involved in the fact 
 that it proposes to itself to bold fast to simple perception, and 
 to allow only things that actually exist to come into its presence ; 
 and yet, on the other hand, it hastens to identify as sensu- 
 ous beings the products of its own reflection, thoughts which 
 cannot be verified by an appeal to sense-perception. The small 
 particles or atoms and the pores have, according to it, a sensuous ex- 
 istence, and the same kind of reality is predicated of their posited 
 being [i. .. dependent qualities] that is affirmed of color, beat. etc. 
 Moreover if this mental picture or representation [scientific imagina- 
 tion] of the objective indistinctness in which the pores and atoms are 
 conceived is examined attentively, not only a matter and also its 
 negation are recognized, so arranged that the matter and the pore, 
 which is its negation, are arranged side by side and alternately, 
 first the matter and then the pore: but in this particular thing 
 the independent matter and its negation, or porosity and the 
 other independent matter, are found in one and the same point, 
 so that this porosity and the independent existence of matters in each 
 other as in one constitute a mutual negation and interpenetration of 
 interpenetration. The modern expositions of physics in their ex- 
 planation of the* expansion of steam in the atmospheric air, and of the 
 mixing together of the different kinds of gases, furnish a more defin- 
 ite example of the phases of thought here presented. They show 
 that, for example, a certain volume of air will take up a certain quan-
 
 140 Essence. 
 
 tity of steam, and that an equal amount of space empty of air would 
 not contain any more; and that the different kinds of gases are vacua 
 to each other, or at least have no chemical combination with each 
 other, each being self -continuous when it pervades the other and each 
 being indifferent to the other, but in the idea of the thing each mat- 
 ter is found just where the other is; they interpenetrate the same 
 point, the independence of the one is the independence of the other. 
 This is contradictory ; the thing, however, is nothing else than this 
 contradiction, and therefore it is properly called phenomenon. 
 
 A similar application is made of this notion of matters in explain- 
 ing the operations of the mind through the conception of psychic 
 forces or " faculties." The mind is in a much deeper sense [than the 
 thing] a " this particular " somewhat, a negative unity in which its de- 
 terminations interpenetrate each other. But by this image-thinking 
 it is commonly conceived as a kt Thing." Man is commonly said to 
 consist of soul and body, each one passing for something independent 
 of the other ; in the same manner the soul is made to consist of psy- 
 chic forces each one of which possesses independent existence and 
 has an activity that works according to its own nature without refer- 
 ence to the others. For example, they imagine that the understand- 
 ing acts in this place, the imagination in that ; and that the under- 
 standing may be set in activity without the memory, &c. ; or that one 
 faculty may be active while the others lie dormant, &c. Since they 
 are all contained in the psychical thing, the soul, which is a simple 
 material and which as simple is immaterial, these faculties are not 
 represented as particular matters ; but they are represented as powers 
 and as such they have the same character of indifference towards 
 each other that is ascribed to the matters in a thing. But the mind 
 is not that contradiction which a thing is ; it does not annul itself 
 and thereby become phenomenal ; but it is already in itself the con- 
 tradiction which has returned into its absolute unity, the Idea, in 
 which distinctions are to be thought, not as independent existences, 
 but only as particular moments, or phases, in the thinking subject. 
 
 SECOND CHAPTER. 
 
 Phenomenon. 
 
 Existence is the immediateness of being to which essence has 
 again restored itself. This immediateness is potentially [in its nat- 
 ure] the reflection of essence into itself: essence has as existence 
 proceeded from its ground ; ground has become existence. Exist-
 
 Phenomenon. 141 
 
 ence is this reflected iramediateness in so far as it is the absolute 
 negativity in itself. It is now also posited as this reflection of nega- 
 tivity, since it is now defined as phenomenon. 
 
 Phenomenon is therefore, in the first place, essence in its exist- 
 ence ; essence is immediately present in it. The fact that it is not 
 immediate but reflected existence is its phase of essence : but exist- 
 ence as essential existence is phenomenon. 
 
 Somewhat is a mere phenomenon in the sense that existence as 
 such is only a posited existence not in and for itself. Its essen- 
 tiality consists in having within it the negativity of reflection, the 
 nature of essence. This is not a foreign, external reflection, which 
 belongs to essence, and in contrast to which existence might seem to 
 be only phenomenon. But. as has been shown, it is the essentiality 
 of existence to be phenomenon; phenomenon is the truth of exist- 
 ence. The activity of reflection by which existence becomes phenom- 
 enon belongs to existence itself. 
 
 Where it is said that somewhat is only a phenomenon, meaning 
 that it is in contrast to the true existence, the fact is overlooked that 
 the phenomenon is rather the higher truth, for it is existence as 
 essential opposed to existence which is unessential essential exist- 
 ence being phenomenon and non-essential existence being the imme- 
 diate existence [existence non-essential is existence without relations : 
 existence in its relations is the phenomenon ; the present doctrine of 
 " relativity " belongs to the doctrine of the phenomenon. Since the 
 non-essential existence is only one of the phases of phenomenon, 
 viz.. its phase of immediate existence, while the negative reflection is 
 the other phase, it is seen that phenomenon is a totality more essential 
 than existence]. If phenomenon is called non-essential this is done 
 from the supposition that the immediate is something positive and 
 true as opposed to the phase of negativity contained in the phenome- 
 non : but this immediate does not yet contain essential truth [i. e.. it 
 does not yet contain relativity within its definition]. Existence ceases 
 to be non-essential when it becomes phenomenon. 
 
 Essence appears to itself, first in its simple identity : in this phase 
 it is the abstract reflection, it is the pure movement from nothing 
 through nothing back to itself. Essence manifests itself, and in this 
 phase it becomes real appearance, since the phases of appearance have 
 existence in Manifestation or phenomenon. The manifestation or 
 phenomenon is, as lias been shown, the thing in its negative self- medi- 
 al ion : the distinctions which it contains are independent matters. 
 And these independent matters form a contradiction, namely they 
 have an immediate existence of their own, and at the same time have
 
 142 Essence. 
 
 their existence only in others independent of them, mid consequently 
 they exist in the negation of their existence ; and consequently, again 
 they constitute the negation of those other independent ones, or, what 
 is the same thing, the negation of their own negation. Appearance is 
 the same mediation, but its restless phases assume in the mediation 
 of the phenomenon the form of immediate independence. On the 
 other hand, the immediate independence which belongs to existence 
 is reduced to a phase of the former. Phenomenon is therefore the 
 union of appearance and existence. 
 
 Phenomenon defined more accurately is essential existence ; its 
 essentiality is separated from existence as non-essential and these two 
 sides enter into relation to each other. It is therefore in the first 
 place simple self-identity, which at the same time contains multipli- 
 city ; and this as well as its relation remains self-identical within the 
 change that belongs to the phenomenon. This is the law of the 
 phenomenon. 
 
 Secondly, the law which is simple amidst the diversity [of its ap- 
 plication] passes into the antithesis which forms the self-opposition 
 of the essential phase of the phenomenon viz., that of a phenom- 
 enal world over against a noumenal world. 
 
 Thirdly, this antithesis returns into its ground: the noumenal is 
 found in the phenomenal and the phenomenal is taken up into the 
 noumenal, and so the phenomenal becomes essential relation \_Ver- 
 hdltniss=necessavy connection] . 
 
 A. 
 
 The Law of the Phenomenon. 
 
 1. The phenomenon is the existing mediated through its nega- 
 tion which constitutes its independence or self-subsistence. This 
 its negation is however another independent somewhat; but it is like- 
 wise essentially annulled. 
 
 The existing somewhat is therefore the return into itself through 
 its negation and through the negation of its negation ; it has there- 
 fore essential independence ; and at the same time it is a mere pos- 
 ited being [dependent] which lias a ground and has its existence in 
 another. In the first place, therefore, the phenomenon is the existence 
 together with its essentiality the posited-being with its ground; 
 but this ground is the negation ; and the other independent, the 
 around of the first, is likewise onlv a posited-being. In other words 
 the existing somewhat is, as phenomenal, reflected into another,
 
 Phenomenon. 143 
 
 which is its ground, bat this ground is in tarn itself reflected into 
 another. The essential independence which appertains to it, for the 
 reason that it is a return into itself, is on account of the negativity 
 of its moments the return of nought through nought back to itself ; 
 the independence of the existing somewhats is therefore onlv essen- 
 tial appearance. The connection of the existing somewhats which 
 ground each other reciprocally, consists therefore in this mutual nega- 
 tion that the independence of one is not the independence of the 
 other, but its posited-being or dependence : and this relation of the 
 posited-being. or dependence, alone constitutes independence. The 
 ground is now present as it is in its truth, viz.. it is a primary some- 
 what which is only a presupposed. 
 
 Now this constitutes the negative side of the phenomenon. But 
 in this negative mediation there is contained in an immediate form 
 the positive identity of the existing somewhats. For it is not posited- 
 being [dependent] as opposed to an essential ground in other 
 words, it is not an appearance belonging to an independent being. 
 but it is posited-being [dependence] which relates to posited-leing. 
 in other words it is an appearance only within an appearance. Within 
 this its negation or its other, which itself has been annulled, it [tue 
 phenomenon] relates only to itself and is consequently self-identical 
 or positive essentiality. This identity is not the immediateness which 
 appertains to existence as such, and which is only unessential, and 
 has its subsistence in another ; but it is the essential content of the 
 phenomenon, which has two sides : first, in the form of posited-being 
 or of external immediateness ; secondly, the posited-being as self- 
 idt-iitical. According to the first side, it is a particular being, a con- 
 tingent unessential somewhat exposed to change, origination and 
 evanescence by reason of its immediateness. According to the sec- 
 ond side it is the simple content which abides under the mentioned 
 origination and evanescence. 
 
 This content, besides being the simple which underlies the phase of 
 change, is also a definite, particular content, containing variety 
 within itself. It is the reflection [retnrn-into-itself] of the phenom- 
 enon ['. *.. the totality of the phenomenon which presents the complete 
 cycle of the activity of change, and hence its abiding image or form, 
 because the continued activity of the process does nothing but repeat 
 over and over again the cycle of phases which constitute the phe- 
 nomenon; e. g., the year contains a totality of seasons, and a longer 
 period of time than a year does but rej>eat the cycle already contained, 
 as a totality, within the year; the type of the variety of seasons 
 within the year is a permanent under a variable it is. as here called
 
 144 Essence. 
 
 by Hegel, the "law of the phenomenon"]. In this reflection or re- 
 turn into itself the particular existences are negative [ /. e., perishable ; 
 but they form a series which returns into itself] ; this reflection con- 
 sequently contains essentially the determinateness [ i. e., the series of 
 transitory particular existences which form the total cycle or the phe- 
 nomenon, give definite particularity to the cycle or phenomenon, so 
 that one phenomenon is distinguished from another by the series of 
 evanescent existences within it]. The phenomenon however is the 
 manifold variety, existent within it, which runs its course and 
 passes through its succession of phases ; its reflected content on the 
 other hand is its manifoldness reduced to simplicity. The definite 
 particular content which is essential is therefore not merely a single 
 one of the particular phases of the phenomenon, but, being the essen- 
 tial particularity of the phenomenon, it includes the entire particularly 
 or determinateness within the phenomenon, the particularity of each 
 and every one. In the phenomenon then-fore each phase of its suc- 
 cession of phases possesses its self-subsistence in the other phases 
 [i. e., there may be mutual interdependence among these phases] in 
 such a manner that each phase is only in its non-subsistence 
 [i. e., its truth or totality is realized only by the transitoriness of each 
 phase]. This contradiction annuls itself ; and its refleetion-into-it- 
 self is the identity of its twofold self subsistence, namely, that the 
 posited-being or dependence of the one is also the posited being or 
 dependence of the other. [One phase of transitorin/ess has its sub- 
 sistence in another phase of transitoriness; the second phase being 
 transitory and having its phase in another, the first phase has its non- 
 subsistence as well as its subsistence in the second phase ; this is the 
 contradiction spoken of in the text.] They [the two dependent 
 phases] constitute one subsistence, although constituting variety or 
 diversity within the one subsistence. 
 
 In the essential side of the phenomenon, consequently, the nega- 
 tivity of the unessential content through which it annuls itself, has 
 consequently returned into identity ; it is an indifferent subsistence 
 [*. e., a non-related, neither repelling nor attracting distinction, each 
 one independent of the other] which is not the annulled particu- 
 larity, [not the identity of the particularities within the phenome- 
 non with their differences omitted.] but rather the self-subsistence 
 [the positive inclusion of all the differences within the identity] of 
 the other. 
 
 This unity is the Law of the Phenomenon. 
 
 2. The law is therefore what is positive in the mediation which 
 constitutes the phenomenon. The phenomenon is in its first phase.
 
 Phenomenon. 145 
 
 existence as negative self-mediation, so that the existing thing is 
 mediated through its own non-subsistence through another thing 
 and again through the non-subsistence of this other thing this pro- 
 cess constituting its self-mediation [the second part of its mediation, 
 namery, the non-subsistence of Che other into which the first phase 
 passes is as important as the non-subsistence of the first phase ; in 
 finding out the totality of a succession of appearances with intent to 
 find the law or the ideal type which Hegel here calls " Phenomenon " 
 we must trace one phase into another and another again, until the 
 first phase reappears, then we have the totality of phases, the total 
 particularity involved and hence the permanent or the law of the 
 phenomenon]. In this is contained, first, the mere appearance and 
 disappearance of the several phases, and this is the unessential side 
 of the phenomenon ; secondly, it contains also the abiding or the 
 law [that is to say, the necessary recurrence, or repetition of the 
 appearance and disappearance] ; for each of that series of phases in 
 the phenomenon exists through the annulment of the other phases 
 [their annulment posits it] ; and their posited-being [dependence] as 
 their negativity is at the same time the self-identical, positive phase 
 of their dependence [the dependence of each makes the indepen- 
 dence of the others]. 
 
 This abiding subsistence which belongs to the phenomenon and is 
 here called its law is, therefore, as has been shown, at first opposed 
 to the immediateness of being which appertains to existence. This 
 immediateness, it is true, is potentially a reflected immediateness 
 viz., that which is returned into itself as ground ; but in the phenom- 
 enon this simple immediateuess is different from the reflected imme- 
 diateness which showed itself formerly in the category of Thing. 
 The existing thing in its dissolution became this antithesis: what 
 there was positive in its dissolution is the self-identity of the process 
 of the phenomenon as posited-being self-identical in its other posited- 
 being. In the second place, this reflected immediateness has been 
 shown to be opposed as posited-being to the immediateness of 
 existence. This posited-being is now the essential and truly 
 positive. The German expression Gesetz [Gesetz is the German 
 word for " law," from the verb selzen, to posit] contains this thought 
 [t. e., in German, law means the posited ; as understood by Hegel, 
 here, the law states the particularity^ of a series of particular, transi- 
 tory beings passing over into each other and thus constituting a com- 
 plete cycle, so that the mutual dependence or posited-being 
 makes the abiding or the law]. In this posited-being is found the
 
 146 Essence. 
 
 essential relation of the two sides of distinction [that of the one phase 
 to the others] which the law contains ; they constitute a diversity of 
 immediate content [elements independent of each other] and consti- 
 tute this as the reflecting activity of the vanishing content of the phe- 
 nomenon. As essential diversity or variety the phases of the phe- 
 nomenon ate simple self-relating elements. But likewise each ele- 
 ment is essentially dependent and not immediately for itself in 
 other words it is only in so far as the other is. 
 
 Thirdly, phenomenon and law have one and the same content. 
 Law is the phenomenon's reflection into self-identity ; hence the 
 phenomenon stands opposed to that which is reflected into itself as 
 the nugatory immediate, and in this shape they [the law and the 
 phenomenon] 'are contrasted. But the reflection of the phenomenon 
 which causes this contrast is also the essential identity of the phen- 
 omenon itself and of its reflection, and constitutes the nature of reflec- 
 tion. This reflection is self -identical in the posited being, and indif- 
 ferent towards that contrast which constitutes the form or posited 
 being ; therefore it is a content which continues beyond the phenom- 
 enon and into the law, and is the content both of the law and the 
 phenomenon. 
 
 This content constitutes therefore the basis of the phenomenon ;. 
 the law is this basis itself ; the phenomenon is the same content, but 
 it contains something additional, namely, the non-essential content 
 of its immediate being. Moreover the form-determination through 
 which the phenomenon as such differs from the law, is namely a con- 
 tent and likewise a different content from that of the law. For ex- 
 istence is as immediateness, on the whole, a self-identical somewhat in 
 respect to matter and form, and therefore a content, and indifferent 
 towards its form-determinations ; it is the " thingness " possessing 
 properties and free matters. But it is the content whose independent 
 immediateness is at the same time without substantial existence. The 
 self -identity of the same in this its non-subsistence [or lack of " sub- 
 stantial existence "] is, however, the other essential content. This 
 identity, the basis of the phenomenon and which constitutes the law, is 
 its own moment [or the essential element of the phenomenon] ; it is 
 the positive side of essentiality through which existence becomes and is- 
 phenomenon. 
 
 The law is therefore not something beyond the phenomenon or out- 
 side of it or above it, but immediately present in it ; the realm of 
 laws is the quiet image or archetype of the existing or phenomenal 
 world. The two, however, constitute one totality, and the existing
 
 Phenomenon. 1-47 
 
 world is itself the realm of laws, which is the simple self -identical as 
 well as the self-identical in the posited-being, or in the self-annulling 
 independence which belongs to existence. Existence goes back into 
 the law as into its ground [this means that existence is annulled in its 
 process, and loses its immediateness, but by the continuance of the 
 process returns into itself, or its immediateness reappears, just as 
 summer's heat and winter's cold recur in the process of the year ; the 
 law is the general type of the entire movement, and is therefore 
 always in self -identity, although its existences change hence the 
 law is here spoken of as the ground of existence, i. e., the annul- 
 ment of existence is the realization of the ground as law]. The 
 phenomenon contains both the simple ground and the annulling activ- 
 ity of the phenomenal universe of which it is the essentiality [i. e.. the 
 law as ground and the negativity which makes real one of its phases 
 after the other]. 
 
 3. The Law is therefore the essential phenomenon ; it is its reflec- 
 tion in its posited-being [dependence], the identical content of itself 
 and of the non-essential existence. In the first place, now this iden- 
 tity- of the law with its existence is only immediate, simple identity, 
 and the law is indifferent in respect to its existence ; the phenomenon 
 has still another content opposed to the content of the law. That 
 content, however, is the non-essential and the return into the content 
 of the law ; bnt for the law that non-essential is something that already 
 exists for itself and is not caused by it, and hence it is an external con- 
 tent in some way attached to the law. The phenomenon is a collec- 
 tion of determinations in close connection, which belong to " this," 
 or the concrete somewhat, and are not contained in the law, but are 
 derived from some other source. 
 
 In the second place, that which the phenomenon contains besides 
 the law is defined as a positive or as another content ; bnt it is essen- 
 tially a negative somewhat ; it is the form, and its activity as such, 
 which appertains to the phenomenon. The realm of laws is the 
 quiescent content of the phenomenon ; the phenomenon is the same 
 content but exhibiting itself in the restless change and as reflection 
 into another. The phenomenon is the law as the negative self -chang- 
 ing existence, the activity of the transition of contraries into each 
 other, and of their self-annulment and return into one unity. This 
 side of restless form or of negativity does not contain the law ; the 
 phenomenon, therefore, is rather the totality as opposed to the law, 
 for it contains the law and also something additional, namely, the 
 phase of tlie self-active form.
 
 148 Essence. 
 
 This lack or defect, in the third place, is to be found in the law, 
 viz., that its content is something diverse from it, external to it, and 
 indifferent to it ; therefore the identity of its sides with each other is 
 only an immediate and internal one, but not yet a necessary identity. 
 In the law there are two determinations of content connected to- 
 gether as essential for example, in the law of falling bodies, the 
 extent of the space and the time of descent are essentially connected : 
 the space varies as the square of the time. The law states only the 
 connection as an existing fact a mere immediate relation with- 
 out showing the necessity for the same. This relation is therefore 
 likewise a mere posited or dependent something, just as in the phe- 
 nomenon the phase of immediateness has been found to have this 
 meaning of dependence. The essential unity of the two sides of the 
 law would be their negativity. In that negativity, namely, the one 
 would be found to contain in itself the other ; but this essential unity 
 we have not yet found in the law. For example, in the idea of the 
 space passed through by a falling body, we do not find its necessary 
 correspondence to the square of the time occupied in falling. Since 
 the fall of the body is a sensuous movement, it involves a relation of 
 time and space ; but at first it does not appear that the nature of time 
 involves a relation to space, and vice versa; one would say that time 
 could be thought without space, and space without time ; the one 
 stands therefore in external relation to the other, being united with it 
 in movement. 
 
 In the second place, the quantitative relation of space and time to 
 each other is quite indifferent. The law which states this quantita- 
 tive relation is derived from experience, and in so far it is only imme- 
 diate and demands farther proof of its necessity a mediation for the 
 scientific cognition that it is not a mere accident, something that hap- 
 pens, but that it is necessary. The law as such does not contain this 
 proof of its objective necessity. The law is therefore only the posi- 
 tive essentiality of the phenomenon, and not its negative essentiality 
 according to which the determinations of content are "moments," 
 or phases of form, and as such pass over into others and show them- 
 selves to be potentially something else than they are immediately. In 
 the law is therefore its posited-being, on the one side, the same as its 
 posited-being on the other side ; but its content is indifferent to this 
 relation, its content does not contain within it this posited-being. 
 The law is therefore the essential form, but not yet the real form as 
 reflected content in its side or phases of activity.
 
 Phenomenon. 149 
 
 B. 
 The Phenomenal World and the World that exists in itself. 
 
 1. The existing world [i. e., the totality of existences understood 
 as defined in the foregoing} becomes a quiet realm of laws : the nu- 
 gatory content of its manifold particulars has its subsistence in 
 another [i. e., each particular being is dependent on another] its sub- 
 sistence therefore is its dissolution [t*. e., its being in another is annul- 
 ment of its being in itself]. But the phenomenal arrives at self- 
 identitj- in this other; hence the phenomenon in its change is an 
 abiding and its posited-being is law [as the change of seasons finds 
 its abiding form in the year]. The law is this simple self-identity of 
 the phenomenon ; hence its basis and not its ground or substrate ; 
 for the law is not the negative unity of the phenomenon, but, as its 
 simple identity it is the immediate unity as abstract, and. co-ordinate 
 to it, is found also its other content. The content is " this " partic- 
 ular, and coheres within itself, in other words has its negative reflec- 
 tion within itself. It is reflected into another ; and this other is itself 
 an existence of the phenomenon ; the phenomenal things have their 
 grounds [or substrates] and conditions in other phenomenal things. 
 
 In fact however the law is also the other of the phenomenon as 
 such and its negative reflection is into its other. The content of the 
 phenomenon, which is different from the content of the law, is the 
 existing somewhat which has its negativity for its substrate or in 
 other words is reflected into its non-being. But this other which is 
 also an existing somewhat is likewise such an existence reflected into its 
 non-being ; it is therefore the same, and the phenomenal in being 
 reflected into it is not in fact reflected into another but reflected into 
 itself : and this very reflection into itself of the posited-being [de- 
 pendence] is the law. But as phenomenal it is essentially reflected 
 into its non-being, or its identity is likewise essentially its negativity 
 and its other. The reflection into itself of the phenomenon, . e., the 
 law, is therefore not only its identical basis but it has in it its anti- 
 thesis, and the law is its negative unity. 
 
 Therefore the definition of the law in the phenomenon has 
 changed ; at first it was only a varied content and the formal reflec- 
 tion of posited-being into itself [". e., self-dependence] so that the 
 posited-being of one of its sides is the posited-being of the other. 
 But since it is also the negative reflection into itself, its sides stand 
 in relation to each other not as mere indifferent and independent ones 
 but as related to each other negatively. In other words when the
 
 150 Essence. 
 
 law is considered merely by itself the sides of its content are indiffer- 
 ent towards each other; but they are likewise annulled through their 
 identity ; the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the 
 other; therefore the subsistence of each one is also its own non- 
 subsistence. This posited-being or dependence of the one within the 
 other is their negative unity, and each is not only its own posited- 
 being but also that of the other, or each is itself this negative 
 unity. 
 
 The positive identity which they have in the law as such is their in- 
 ternal unit}', now found for the first time, which needs proof and 
 mediation for the reason that this negative unity is not yet posited on 
 them. But since the different sides of the law are now defined as 
 retaining their difference in their negative unity through the fact that 
 each one contains its other within itself and at the same time as inde- 
 pendent repels its otherness from itself, it follows that the identity of 
 the law is now a posited and real one. 
 
 Hence therefore the law has received the element of the negative 
 form of its sides which it heretofore lacked ; the element which here- 
 tofore still belonged to the phenomenon. Consequently existence has 
 now completely returned into itself, and has reflected itself into its 
 absolute other-being which exists in and for itself. That which was 
 law in the previous consideration is therefore no longer merely one 
 side of the totality whose other was the phenomenon as such, but it 
 is itself the totality. It is the essential totality of the phenomenon, so 
 that it now contains also the element of non-essentiality which had hith- 
 erto belonged only to the phenomenon and not to the law. But it 
 contains this element of non-essentiality as reflected, as in itself ex- 
 istent, i. e., as essential negativity. The law is as an immediate con- 
 tent particularized, contradistinguished from the other laws, of which 
 there are an indefinite number. But since it now has the essential 
 negativity belonging to it, it contains no longer a merely indifferent 
 contingent content ; but its content is all determinateness standing in 
 essential relation and thus constituting a totality. Therefore the 
 phenomenon reflected into itself is now a world which reveals itself as 
 in-and-for-itself existent above the phenomenal world. 
 
 The realm of laws contains nothing but the simple, changeless, but 
 still varied content of the existing world ; but now since it is the 
 total reflection of this existing world, it contains also its non-essential 
 manifoldness. This phase of mutability and change as reflected into 
 itself and essential [ i. e., closing together into cycles of change] is 
 the absolute negativity or the form, whose elements have the reality 
 of independent but reflected existence in the world that exists in and
 
 Phenomenon. 151 
 
 for itself. And, conversely, tins reflected independence possesses 
 the form within itself, and through this its content is not a mere man- 
 ifold but essentially connected and interdependent. 
 
 This world which exists in and for itself is called the "supersen- 
 sible world " ; in so far as the existing world is defined as sensuous, 
 viz., as existing for sense-perception, as the direct object of con- 
 sciousness. The supersensible world likewise has immediateness or 
 existence, but it is reflected, essential existence. Essence as yet 
 does not possess particularized being, but it is in a deeper sense than 
 mere being ; the thing is the beginning of reflected existence ; it is an 
 immediateness which is not yet posited as essential or reflected. But 
 the thing is not in truth an existent immediate. 
 
 It is only when the things are posited as things of another, of a 
 supersensible world, that they become true existences and possess 
 truth in contrast to mere beings. It is then recognized that there is 
 another being distinguished from immediate being and that this other 
 being is the true existence. On the one hand in this category of 
 true existence the sensuous conception is laid aside as inadequate, for 
 it ascribes existence only to the immediate being of feeling and sense- 
 perception ; and on the other hand also unconscious reflection is 
 transcended, for though it possesses the idea of things, forces, the 
 internal, &c., yet it does not know that such ideas are not sensuous 
 and do not correspond to immediate beings but are reflected exist- 
 
 2. The world which exists in and for itself is the totality of exist- 
 ence ; there is nothing else outside of it. But since it is in itself the 
 absolute negativity or form, its reflection into itself is negative relation 
 to itself. Therefore it contains within itself the antithesis, on the 
 one hand being an essential world which repels, on the other hand, 
 from itself the world of other-being or the world of phenomenon. 
 Therefore since it is the totality and also one side of the antithesis 
 which it contains, it constitutes an independent world opposed to the 
 world of phenomenon. The phenomenal world has in the essential 
 world its negative unity in which it is annulled and in which it finds 
 its substrate. Moreover, the essential world is the positing substrate 
 or ground of the phenomenal world ; and in the next place since it 
 contains the absolute form in its essentiality it annuls its self-identity, 
 and becomes posited-being and as this posited-immediateuess is the 
 phenomenal world. 
 
 Moreover it is not merely the general ground or substrate of the 
 phenomenal world, but its particular ground. As a realm of laws, it 
 already possesses a manifold content and although it is the essential
 
 152 .Essence. 
 
 of the phenomenal world and a substrate replete with content, it is 
 the particular substrate of others, but only as regards this content ; 
 for the phenomenal world had still a variety of other content than 
 that realm of laws, because the negative element still properly be- 
 longed to it. But now since the realm of laws likewise possesses this 
 moment of negativity it becomes the totality of the content of the 
 phenomenal world and the substrate of all its manifoldness. But it 
 is at the same time the negative of it, and therefore a world in oppo- 
 sition to it. Namely, in the identity of the two worlds and while the 
 one is defined according to form as the essential and the other as 
 non-essential the category of ground of substrate has again made its 
 appearance ; but at the same time it is the ground-relation of the 
 phenomenon, namely, as relation not of an identical content nor of a 
 merely disparate content such as the law is, but as total relation or 
 as negative identity and essential relation of the content as an anti- 
 thesis. 
 
 The realm of laws is not merely a realm in which the posited-being 
 of a content is the posited-being of another but this identity is 
 essentially negative unity, too, as has been seen ; each of the two 
 sides of the law is in the negative unity potentially its other content. 
 The other is therefore not indefinitely another in general, but it is its 
 other or it contains likewise the content of the former ; therefore the 
 two sides are opposed. Since the realm of laws contains this nega- 
 tive moment and the antithesis within it, and consequently, as the 
 totality repels from itself a phenomenal world as opposed to a world 
 existent in and for itself, the identity of the two is the essential re- 
 lation of the antithesis. 
 
 The ground-relation as such is the antithesis which has been an- 
 nulled in its contradiction, and existence is the ground which has 
 gone into self-identity. But existence becomes phenomenon, and 
 ground is annulled in existence ; it restores itself and reappears as 
 the return of the phenomenon into itself, but it does this at the same 
 time in the form of annulled ground, viz., as the ground of opposite 
 determinations ; the identity of such however is essentially becoming 
 and transition, and not the ground-relation in its proper form. 
 
 The world that exists in and for itself is therefore itself a world 
 which is distinguished within itself into the totality of manifold con- 
 tent ; it is identical with the phenomenal or posited, in so far as it is 
 its ground ; but this connection of identity is at the same time de- 
 termined as antithesis, because the form of the phenomenal world is 
 the form of reflection into its other being; hence it has returned into 
 the world which exists in and for itself, and thus has returned trulv
 
 Phenomenon. 153 
 
 into itself, as the latter is its opposite Ft. e., it is self -opposed]. The 
 relation is therefore defined as this, that the in-and-f or- itself existent 
 world is the inverted, phenomenal world. 
 
 C. 
 
 Dissolution of the Phenomennn. 
 
 The world which exists in and for itself is the definite, determined 
 ground of the phenomenal world, and is this only in so far as it is in 
 itself the negative moment and therefore the totality of the determi- 
 nations of content and of their changes the totality of determina- 
 tions of content corresponds to the phenomenal world but at the 
 same time constitutes a side in opposition to it. The two worlds 
 therefore stand in this relation to each other: that whatsoever is pos- 
 itive in the phenomenal world is negative in the for- itself -existent 
 world : and conversely, whatever is negative in the former is positive 
 in the hitter. The north pole in the phenomenal world is the south 
 pole when considered in-and-f or-itself and, conversely ; positive elec- 
 tricity is in-itself negative electricity, &c. Whatever is evil in phe- 
 nomenal existence or misfortune, &c., is in-and-f or-itself good and a 
 happy fortune. 
 
 In fact the difference between these two worlds has vanished in 
 this form of antithetic relation, so that the world which is defined as 
 existing in and for itself is the same as the phenomenal world and 
 the latter is identical with the essential world which exists in itself 
 [it is evident that if the counterpart or opposite of each phase in the 
 one world exists in the other world, that each world will contain all 
 the phases of the other world in an inverted order provided 
 that either world is a totality and contains all phases of existence]. 
 The phenomenal world is first defined as reflection in the form of 
 other-being so that its determinations and existences are regarded 
 as having their ground and subsistence in another; but since this 
 other is likewise such a being reflected into another they are related 
 in such a way that they become self-relation inasmuch as the other 
 to which they relate is a self-annulling other ; the phenomenal world 
 is hence a self-identical law in itself. 
 
 Conversely, the world that exists in-and-for-itself is at first self- 
 identical a content which is elevated above change and otherness; 
 but the latter as perfect reflection of the phenomenal world into itself 
 or for the reason that its difference is reflected into itself and there-
 
 154 Essence. 
 
 fore absolute distinction [i. e., self-distinction] it therefore contains 
 the negative phase and the relation to itself as to its own other ; 
 through this it becomes a self-opposed, a self-inverted, a content 
 devoid of essence. Moreover, this content [i. e., of the self-existent 
 world] has received also the form of immediate existence. For it is, 
 first, the ground of the phenomenal ; but since it contains its opposite 
 within itself it is likewise annulled ground and immediate existence. 
 
 The phenomenal and the essential worlds are consequently totali- 
 ties each within itself the totality of the reflection which is identical 
 with itself and of the reflection into another, or in other words, the 
 totality containing the being-in-and-for-itself and the phenomenon. 
 They thus constitute two independent totalities of existence. The 
 one is defined as merely reflected existence and the other as mere 
 immediate existence, but in fact each continues into its other, and is 
 the identity of itself and the other. What we have therefore 
 before us is this one totality which repels itself into two totalities, the 
 one the reflected totality and the other the immediate totality. Each 
 of these is at first independent but independent only as a totality ; 
 and each is a totality only in so far as it contains essentially the other 
 within itself as a moment [N. B. independence implies totality, and 
 totality implies the inclusion of its other within itself. All develop- 
 ment and becoming consist in the process of unfolding from itself its 
 other-being or of developing its counterpart within itself. At first 
 there is a series of mutually limiting elements ; then growth and 
 development of each element results in each element becoming a 
 totality, so that each is identical with the whole and a reflection of it]. 
 The distinct independence of each the one defined as immediate, 
 distinguished from the other defined as reflected is now posited in 
 such a manner that it is essential relation to its other, and hence this 
 independence is formed only in this unitv of the two. 
 
 It should have proceeded from the law of the phenomenon ; the 
 latter is the identity of a diversified content with another content 
 so that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other. 
 In the law this distinction still exists that the identity of its sides is 
 only an inner identity, and these sides do not possess this identity as 
 yet in themselves ; therefore on the one hand that identity is not yet 
 realized ; the content of the law is not an identical content but an 
 indifferent manifold. On the other hand it is defined as a mere po- 
 tentiality that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the 
 other ; this is not yet present in it. Now however the law is realized ; 
 its inner identity is at the same time externally real ; conversely, the 
 content of the law is elevated into ideality ; for it is annulled in it-
 
 Essential Relation. lib 
 
 self reflected into itself, since each side has within it its other and 
 is consequently identical with it and with itself in very truth. 
 
 The law has therefore become essential relation or " necessary con- 
 nection." The truth of the non-essential world is in the first place 
 a world which exists for its other as an in-and-for-itself-existent, but 
 hence this is the totality, because it is itself and also that former world ; 
 both are immediate existences and consequently reflections in their 
 other-being and therefore true reflections into themselves. The -word 
 *' world " expresses in general the formless totality of multiplicity, of 
 manifold indifferent objects. This world of indifferent multiplicity 
 whether essential or phenomenal has gone to the ground ; its mul- 
 tiplicity has ceased to be a multiplicity of mere indifferent, unrelated 
 beings ; it is now a totality or universum an essential relation. 
 There are two totalities of content in the phenomenon; at first they 
 are defined as mutually indifferent and independent, and they have 
 form each within itself but not as opposed to each other, but this form 
 has shown itself to be their relation and the essential relation is the 
 perfection of their form-unity. 
 
 THIRD CHAPTER. 
 
 Essential Relation. 
 
 The truth of the phenomenon is the essential relation [recipro- 
 cal relation or necessary connection]. Its content has immediate in- 
 dependence, both existing immediateness and reflecting immediate- 
 ness, or reflection that is identical with itself ; at the same time in 
 this independence it is a relative merely reflected into its other or 
 a unity with its other through relation. In this unity the independ- 
 ent content is a posited and annulled ; but this very unit}' constitutes 
 its essentiality and independence ; this reflection into another is re- 
 flection into itself. The relation has sides, since it is reflection into 
 another ; it has self-distinction within it ; and the sides have indepen- 
 dent existence, since in their indifference towards each other the}' are 
 bent back into themselves and disconnected from each other so that 
 the existence of each has its significance only in its relation to the 
 other, or in the negative unity. 
 
 The essential relation is not yet the true tertium quid of Essence 
 and Existence, but it contains already their definite union. Essence 
 is realized in it in such a manner that it has independent existing 
 elements for its reality ; and these have returned from their indiffer- 
 ence into their essential unit}* so that they have this essential unity
 
 156 Essence. 
 
 for their reality. The determinations of reflection the positive and 
 negative are likewise reflected into themselves when they are re- 
 flected into their opposites. But they have no other determination 
 than this their negative unity. The essential relation, on the con- 
 trary, has for its sides two independent totalities. It is the same 
 antithesis as that of positive and negative, but it is at the same time 
 an inverted world. Each side of the essential relation is a totality 
 which, however, as essentially and opposite, has a "beyond" to 
 itself ; it is only phenomenon, its existence is not its own, but rather 
 the existence belonging to its other. It is therefore disconnected or 
 broken within itself. But this self-annulment is, at the same time, 
 the unity of itself and its other, and therefore it is a totality, and 
 on this account it has independent existence, and is essential reflec- 
 tion into itself. 
 
 This is the definition of the " Essential Relation." But in the first 
 place, the identity which it contains is not yet perfect ; the totality 
 which each relative term is in itself is at first only an internal one. 
 Each side of the essential relation is in the first place posited in one 
 determination only of the negative unity, the proper independence of 
 each of the two sides is that which constitutes the form of the essen- 
 tial relation. Its identity, therefore, is only a relation to which their 
 independence is external, namely, in the two sides; the reflected 
 unity of that identity and of the independent existences has not yet 
 been attained substance has not yet been reached. The definition 
 of essential relation as given requires the unity of the reflected and 
 immediate independence. But the first realization of this definition 
 is immediate and its moments are opposed to each other, and their 
 unity is only an essential reference to each other, which becomes 
 afterwards a unity corresponding to the idea or definition, when it i& 
 realized, i. e., when those moments have posited the mentioned unity 
 through their activity. 
 
 The essential relation is therefore at first the relation of the ivhole 
 and the parts, i. e., the relation of the reflected and the immediate in- 
 dependence in which they mutually condition and presuppose each 
 other. 
 
 In this form of essential relation neither of the sides is pos- 
 ited as moment of the other; their identity is therefore itself one 
 side ; in other words their identity is not their negative unity. The 
 second phase of this essential relation is that in which the one side is 
 a moment of the other, and is contained in it as in its ground the 
 true independence of both. This is the relation of force and its man- 
 ifestation.
 
 Essential Relation. 157 
 
 Thirdly, this inequality or non-identity that still remains within the 
 relation annuls itself, and the final form of essential relation appears 
 that of Internal and External. In this form of essential relation 
 which has become entirely formal the essential relation goes to the 
 ground, and there arises true activity or Substance as the absolute 
 unity of immediate and reflected existence. 
 
 The Relation of the Whole and the Parts. 
 
 The essential relation contains in the first place the reflected -into- 
 itself independence of existence ; hence it is the simple form whose 
 determinations are existences but at the same time are posited held 
 as moments in the unit}*. This independence which is reflected into 
 itself is at the same time reflection into its opposite, namely, immediate 
 independence ; and its existence is essentially this identity with its 
 opposite, just as much as it is its own independence. For this reason 
 the other side also is immediately posited ; the immediate independ- 
 ence which is determined as the other and is a diversified manifold 
 within itself but in such a manner that this manifoldness is also essen- 
 tially a relation to the other side is that to which the reflected inde- 
 pendence belongs. The former side, the wholeor totality is the inde- 
 pendence which constitutes the in-and-for-itself-existing world. The 
 other side, the parts, is the immediate existence, which was called the 
 "phenomenal world." In the relation of whole and parts the two 
 sides are these independent worlds each of which, however, reflects 
 the other within itself, and is at the same time only this identity of 
 both. Now since the essential relation is in its first phase only the 
 immediate, it follows that the negative unity and the positive inde- 
 pendence is predicated of it as an additional circumstance ; the two 
 sides are posited as moments and yet likewise as existing independ- 
 ently. That the two are posited as moments means that first the 
 whole, the reflected independence, is an existence which contains the 
 other, the immediate independence as a moment or element of it ; 
 in this the whole constitutes the unity of the two sides, their substrate, 
 and the immediate existence takes the form of posited-being. Con- 
 versely, on the other hand the parts are the immediate the side 
 which contains within itself a manifold existence, an independent 
 substrate ; the reflected unity, on the contrary, the whole, is only 
 an external relation. 
 
 2. This essential relation [of the whole and the parts] contains
 
 158 Essence. 
 
 therefore the independence of the sides, and likewise their annulment, 
 and it contains both absolutely in one relation. The whole is the in- 
 dependent, and the parts are only moments or elements of this unity ; 
 but likewise the parts are also independent, and their reflected unity 
 [the whole] is only a moment or element; and each is in its indepen- 
 dence merely a relative of the other. This essential relation is r 
 therefore, an immediate self-contradiction and annuls itself. 
 
 A closer examination shows that the whole is a reflected unity 
 which has independent existence for itself ; but this its independence 
 is likewise repelled from it ; the whole is a negative unity in negative 
 relation to itself ; consequently it is self-externalized ; it has its exist- 
 ence in its opposite, in the manifold immediateness the parts. The 
 whole, therefore, consists of the parts, has its existence in them, and 
 is nothing without them. It is, therefore, the entire essential relation 
 and the independent totality ; and on precisely this ground it is only 
 a relative somewhat, for that which makes it a totalit} 7 is its other, 
 the parts ; and it has its being not in itself but in its other. 
 
 So also are the parts likewise the entirety of this essential relation. 
 They are the immediate independence opposed to the reflected inde- 
 pendence, and have their being not in the whole, but for themselves. 
 They have, moreover, the whole as an element which belongs to 
 them : it constitutes their relation [to each other] ; without the whole 
 there are no parts. Since they are independent, this relation or neces- 
 sary connection is only an external phase towards which they are 
 iu-and-for-themselves indifferent. At the same -time, however, the 
 parts as manifold existence consolidate into one, for manifold exist- 
 ence is being without reflection ; the parts have their independence 
 only in the reflected unity, which is this unity as well as also the ex- 
 isting manifoldness ; that is to say, they have independence only in 
 the whole, which is at the same time, however, an independence dif- 
 ferent from the parts. 
 
 The whole and the parts, therefore, condition each other recipro- 
 cally ; but the essential relation in the form considered here stands 
 higher than the relation of condition and conditioned, as considered 
 above [as the result of the ground-relation]. This relation is now 
 realized : namely, it is posited that the condition is the essential in- 
 dependence of the conditioned, and is presupposed by it. The con- 
 dition as such is only the immediate and only an implicit presupposi- 
 tion. The whole, however, is the condition of the parts, and yet it 
 contains the immediate implication that it is only in so far as it pre- 
 supposes the parts. Since, therefore, the two sides of the essential 
 relation are posited as mutually conditioning, to each there belongs
 
 Essential Relation. 15i> 
 
 immediate independence, but an independence which is mediated or 
 posited for each through the other. The entire essential relation 
 through this reciprocity becomes a return of the conditioning activity 
 into itself, and hence the not relative, the unconditioned. 
 
 Since the sides of the essential relation possess their independence 
 only through each other, we have only one identity for the two, and 
 in this identity they are only moments or complemental elements ; 
 but since each is independent within itself, there are two independent 
 existences, mutually indifferent. 
 
 In the first respect [of the contradiction just stated] the essential 
 identity of these sides is the whole equal to the parts and the parts 
 equal to the whole. There is nothing in the whole which is not in the 
 parts, and nothing in the parts which is not in the whole. The whole 
 is not abstract unity, but the unity as a diversified multiplicity [of 
 different, independent ones] ; but this unity, within which the mani- 
 fold ones relate to each other, is the determinateness through which 
 each one is a "pai't." The essential relation has, therefore, an in- 
 separable identity and only one independence. 
 
 Moreover the whole is equal to the parts, but it is not the same as 
 the parts ; the whole is the reflected unity, but the parts constitute the 
 particularity or the otherness of the unity, and are the man}' differ- 
 ent ones. The whole is not equal to them when they are regarded as 
 these independent ones, but is equal to them only when taken to- 
 gether. This " together " is nothing else than their unity, the whole 
 as such. The whole is, therefore, in the parts only self-identical, and 
 the identity of the whole and the parts expresses only the tautology 
 that the whole, as whole, is not identical with the parts but with the 
 whole of the parts. 
 
 Conversely, the parts are equal to the whole, but since the}- pos- 
 sess the phase of otherness the}' are not equal to the whole as unity, 
 but only in so far as one of its manifold determinations belongs to 
 each part or the parts are equal to the whole regarded as manifold ; 
 in other words, they are equal to it as a divided whole, that is to say, 
 as divided into parts. Hence we have the same tautology as before ; 
 that the parts, as parts, are not identical with the whole as such, but 
 with the whole considered as the whole of the parts. 
 
 The whole and the parts regarded in this manner are external and 
 indifferent to each other ; each side relates only to itself. And thus 
 held asunder they are destroyed. The whole which is indifferent 
 towards the parts is only the abstract identity, without distinction 
 within itself; it is not a whole except as containing distinctions 
 within itself, and distinctions within itself such as are reflected into
 
 100 Essence. 
 
 themselves as manifold determinations, and have immediate inde- 
 pendence. And the identity of reflection has been shown to have 
 this reflection into its other as its truth. Likewise the parts as in- 
 different towards the unity of the whole are only a multiplicity of 
 ones unrelated towards the other, and are therefore in themselves 
 others, which therefore are self-annulling. This relation to itself of 
 each of the two sides is its independence, but this independence 
 which each possesses is rather its self-negation. Each has therefore 
 its independence not within itself but within the other ; this other 
 which possesses its being is its presupposed immediate which prom- 
 ises to be its first and its beginning. 
 
 The truth of the essential relation consists therefore in the media- 
 tion ; its essence is negative unity in which both the reflected and the 
 existent immediateness is annulled. The essential relation is the 
 contradiction which goes back into its ground, into the unity which 
 as returning is the reflected unity ; but since the reflected unity has 
 also been annulled it relates negatively to itself, annuls itself, and 
 reduces itself to existent immediateness. But this is negative rela- 
 tion in so far as it is a first and immediate or is mediated through 
 another, and on this account a posited. This other existent immedi- 
 ateness is likewise only as annulled; its independence is a first some- 
 what [an immediate] but only to vanish ; and it has a being that is 
 posited and mediated. 
 
 In this determination the essential relation remains no longer whole 
 and parts ; the immediateness which its sides possessed has passed 
 over into posited-being and mediation ; each is posited in so far as 
 it is immediate as self -an nulling and as transition into the other ; and 
 in so far as itself is negative relation it is conditioned through the 
 other as through its positive ; and its immediate transition is likewise 
 an immediate, that is to say an annulment, which is posited through 
 the other. Hence the relation of the Whole and the Parts has gone 
 over into the relation of Force and Manifestation. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 The antinomy of the infinite divisibility of matter has been already 
 discussed in connection with the idea of quantity. Quantity is the 
 unity of continuity and discreteness ; it contains in the independent 
 one its continuity into another and in this identity continued without 
 break it has likewise the negation of that identity. The immediate 
 relation of these moments of quantity are expressed as the essential re- 
 lation of the Whole and the Parts, the One of Quantity being regarded
 
 Essential Relation. 161 
 
 as part, and the continuity of quantity being taken as the Whole which 
 is composed of parts. The antinomy then consists in the contradiction 
 which has been solved in the essential relation of the whole and the 
 parts. Whole and parts are, namely, essentially related to each 
 other and constitute one identity, and they are likewise indifferent 
 to each other and possess independence. The essential relation is 
 therefore this antinomy : when one of the moments frees itself from 
 its other the other at once reappears within it. 
 
 When the existing somewhat is defined as whole it has parts, and 
 the parts constitute its reality; the unity of the whole is only a 
 posited relation an external juxtaposition which does not concern the 
 independently existing somewhats. In so far as the somewkats are 
 parts they are not the whole, not combined, and are accordingly simple. 
 And since the relation to a whole is an external affair it does not 
 concern it ; the independent somewhat is accordingly not a part, for a 
 part is such only in relation to a whole. But since* in this view it is 
 not a part, it is a whole itself already ; for there is only this essential 
 relation of whole and parts, and the independent somewhat is either 
 one or the other of the two. But since it is the whole it follows that it 
 is composed of parts, and its parts as independent wholes are again 
 composed of parts, and so ad in^nilutn. This infinitude consists only 
 in the perennial alternation of the two determinations of the essential 
 relation in which each gives rise immediately to the other, so that 
 the posited-being of each is its own 'vanishing. Hatter defined as 
 whole therefore consists of parts and in these parts the whole be- 
 comes a non-essential relation and vanishes. The part thus f or-and- 
 by-itsetf is not a part but the whole. The antinomy of this syllogism, 
 considered carefully, proves really to be this : since the whole is not 
 the independent, the part is the independent ; but since the part is 
 independent only when not in relation to the whole it is the indepen- 
 dent not as part but rather as the whole. The infinitude of the progress 
 which arises, is the incapacity of uniting the two thoughts which con- 
 tain this mediation so that on this account each of the two determina- 
 tions becomes dependent and passes over into the other just because 
 of its independence and separation. 
 
 The Essential Relation of Force and ft* Manifestation. 
 
 Force is the negative unity in which the contradiction of the whole 
 and parts has resolved itself, as the truth of essential relation, 
 ii
 
 1G2 Essence. 
 
 The whole and parts is the essential relation as it appears when seized 
 in a thoughtless manner, or by mind in its representative thinking or 
 thinking in images, or, considered objectively, it is the dead mechani- 
 cal aggregate which has form-determinations through which the mani- 
 foldness of its independent matters is brought into relation in a unity, 
 but a unity which is after all only external to it. The essential rela- 
 tion [or necessary connection between force and its manifestation] 
 of force is however a higher form of return-into-itself in which the 
 unity of the whole which constituted the relation of the independent 
 others (parts) has ceased to be external and indifferent to this multi- 
 plicity. 
 
 As this essential relation has now been defined, the immediate and 
 the reflected forms of independence are posited in one unity as an- 
 nulled or as moments, while in the preceding form of the essential 
 relation (whole and parts) they were real sides or extremes existing 
 for themselves. In this result, first, we see that the reflected unity 
 and its immediate being, in so far as the two are first and immediate, 
 are by nature self -annulling phases and forms of reciprocal transition. 
 The former, the force, passes into its manifestation, and the mani- 
 festation vanishes and goes back into the force as into its ground 
 and only exists when it is posited by the force and sustained by it. 
 In the second place, this transition is not merely a becoming and a 
 vanishing, but it is a negative self-relation ; in other words, that 
 which changes its determination is while doing so reflected into itself 
 and preserves itself. The movement of force is not so much a trans- 
 ition as a translation or transference of itself which remains self- 
 identical in this transference of itself through its own posited change. 
 In the third place, this reflected unity which relates to itself is also 
 annulled and a moment [or compleraental element] ; it is mediated 
 through its other, and conditioned through it ; its negative relation 
 to itself which is first and begins the movement of transition from 
 itself has likewise a presupposition by which it is solicited to activit}', 
 and another from which it begins. 
 
 a. The Conditioning of Force. 
 
 Considered in its special determinations force has, in the first place, 
 the phase of existent imraediateness belonging to it; opposed to this, 
 it itself is a negative unity. But the latter as a determination of 
 immediate being is an existing somewhat. This somewhat, for the 
 reason that it is the negative unity as an immediate, appears to be a 
 first [presupposed as already existing] a somewhat opposed to the
 
 Essential Relation. 1(53 
 
 force since the force is a reflected existence, a posited-being, and hence 
 it seems to belong to an existing thing or to a matter. This is not 
 understood as though the force were the form of this thing, and the 
 thing were determined through it ; but the thing is conceived to be 
 an immediate and to be a separate existence and indifferent to the 
 force. And according to this view there is no ground or reason in 
 the thing why it should possess a force ; it is the force, on the other 
 hand, as the side of posited being which essentially presupposes the 
 thing. Therefore if the question is asked, how it happens that the 
 thing or matter is endowed with a force, the explanation is given that 
 the force is impressed on it by a foreign power, and that it is only 
 something external to the thing or matter. 
 
 Regarded as this immediate reality, force is a quiescent determin- 
 ateness of the thing ; not as a self-uttering or manifesting, but as an 
 immediate externality. Hence the force is designated as a matter 
 and instead of being called a magnetic force, an electric force, &c., 
 there is assumed a magnetic matter, an electric matter, &c. ; or instead 
 of the well-known attractive force there is conceived a subtle ether 
 which holds all things together. There are matters into which the 
 powerless, inactive negative unity of the thing dissolves, and these 
 have been already considered [in Book II., section 2, B and C]. 
 
 But force contains immediate existence as phase or moment, as 
 such a somewhat as while it is condition, passes into transition and 
 annuls itself ; thei'efore immediate existence as a phase of force is 
 not an existing thing [has not the form of "thing"]. It is more- 
 over not negation as determinateness, but negative unity which is re- 
 flected into itself. The thing to which the force belongs has conse- 
 quently here no further significance ; it is rather the positing of ex- 
 ternality which manifests itself as existence. Therefore it is also not 
 merely a determined matter [a special form of it] ; such independ- 
 ence [as particular matter] has long ago passed over into posited- 
 being and phenomenon. 
 
 Second^', force is the unity of the reflected reality and of imme- 
 diate reality or of the form-unity and of external independence. 
 It is both in one ; it is the contact of such somewhats that the one is 
 in so far as the other is not ; the self-identical positive and the 
 negated reflection. Force is therefore the self-repelling contradic- 
 tion. It is active ; in other words it is self-related negative unity, 
 in which reflected jmmediateness or essential being-in-itself is posited 
 as being only annulled or a phase ; consequently in so far as it dis- 
 tinguishes itself from immediate existence, it passes over into it.
 
 I(j4 Essence. 
 
 Force therefore is posited as the determination of the reflected unity 
 of the whole as the becoming of existing, external multiplicity. 
 
 But, thirdly, force is at first only potential and immediate activity ; 
 it is reflected unity and likewise essentially the negation of essential 
 unity ; and since it is different from these, and onty the identity of 
 itself and its negation, it is related to them essentially as an imme- 
 diateness external to them, and they are consequently its presuppo- 
 sition and condition. 
 
 This presupposition now is not a thing already existing in contrast 
 -with it ; such indifferent independence is annulled in the force ; as 
 its condition the presupposition is an independent other to the force. 
 But since it is not a thing, and since the independent immediateness 
 has here determined itself to be a self-relating negative unity, this 
 presupposition is itself force. The activity of force is therefore 
 conditioned through itself as a self-other, i. e., it is conditioned 
 through a force. 
 
 Force is, according to this, an essential relation in which each side 
 is the same as the other. Forces stand in essential relation to each 
 other [and not forces and things]. In the first place, they are re- 
 garded as indifferent to each other. The unity of their essential 
 relation is at first only an internal, potential unity. The condition- 
 ing of one force through another is, therefore, regarded as the 
 product of the force's own activity ; in other words, is looked upon 
 at first as a prepositing activity, an act of negative self -relation. 
 This other force which conditions the first force lies beyond its posit- 
 ing activity, viz., the reflection which returns into itself immediately 
 in its activity of returning. 
 
 b. The Soliciting Force. 
 
 Force is conditioned because the phase of immediate existence 
 which it contains is a mere posited, but, for the reason that it is at 
 the same time immediate it is a presupposed, in which the force itself 
 is negated. Therefore the externality which force encounters is its 
 own presupposing activity itself, which is posited directly as another 
 force. 
 
 This presupposition is moreover mutual. Each of the two forces 
 contains the unity-reflected-into-itself as annulled, and is therefore 
 presupposing. It posits itself as external ; this externality is its own 
 externality; but since it is likewise unity reflected-into-itself, it 
 posits this externality not within itself, but as another force. 
 
 But the external, as such, is the self-annulling; moreover the self- 
 reflecting activity is essentially related to that external as its other,
 
 Essential Relation. 165 
 
 but likewise as to something nugatory in itself and in identity with 
 it. Since the presupposing activity is likewise reflection into itself, it 
 is the annulment of its mentioned negation, and posits the same as 
 its own external. Therefore the force as conditioning is reciprocally 
 the occasion which excites the activity of the other force against 
 which it is active. It does not stand in the relation of a passivity, a 
 being determined by another force which came into it, but it is an 
 occasion which solicits the other. It is within itself a negativity of 
 itself and the repulsion of itself from itself is its own positing. Its 
 activity therefore consists in this, that it annuls its occasion as an 
 external occasion ; it reduces it to a mere occasion, and posits it as 
 its own repulsion from itself it makes it into its own manifestation 
 [i. e., the force makes the occasion of its activity the utterance of 
 the force itself; it annuls the determination which it finds in the 
 object upon which it, the force, acts, and replaces those determina- 
 tions with its own determinations]. 
 
 The self-externalizing force is therefore the same that was previ- 
 ously defined as the presupposing activity, i. e., that which made itself 
 external. But the force as self-externalizing is at the same time a 
 negating of externality and a positing of it as its own activity. In 
 so far now as we begin with this view of force as a negative unity of 
 itself, and consequently a presupposing reflection, it is all the same 
 as if we began with the view of the soliciting occasion in the pro- 
 cess of manifestation of a force. The force is therefore defined as a 
 self-annulling identity according to its ideal, but as a reality it be- 
 comes one of two forces soliciting or solicited. But the ideal of the 
 force is in general the identitj" of the positing and presupposing re- 
 flection in other words, of the reflected and immediate unity 
 and each of these determinations is only a phase or moment, in one 
 unity, and consequently is mediated through the other. But like- 
 wise there is no way of characterizing which of the two forces that 
 stand in mutual relation is the soliciting or which the solicited ; each 
 of the two form-determinations belongs to the one as much as to the 
 other. But this identity is not merely an external one of comparison, 
 but it is also their essential unity. 
 
 The one force, for instance, is defined as the soliciting and the 
 other as the solicited ; these form-determinations appear thus as im- 
 mediate, as belonging essentially to the forces. But they are. essen- 
 tially mediated. The one force is solicited, the soliciting occasion is 
 a determination posited within it from without. But force is itself 
 the presupposing ; it is essentially reflection into itself, and it annuls 
 the externality of the soliciting occasion and makes it its own solici-
 
 166 Essence. 
 
 tation. The soliciting is therefore its own deed ; in other words, it 
 determines the fact that the other force shall be another and a solicit- 
 ing force. The soliciting relates to its other, negatively, so that it 
 annuls its externality, and is thus so far a positing force ; but it is 
 this only through the presupposition of having another opposed to it, 
 i. e., it is soliciting only so far as it has an externality to it, conse- 
 quently only so far as it is solicited. In other words it is soliciting 
 only in so far as it is solicited to be soliciting. Conversely, also, the 
 former solicits only in so far as the other solicits it to solicit. Each 
 of the two therefore receives its occasion or impulse from the other ; 
 but the occasion which it gives as active consists in this, that it re- 
 ceives from the other an occasion or impulse. The occasion or im- 
 pulse which it receives is solicited by itself. The two, the given and 
 the received occasion, or the active extern alization and the pas- 
 sive externality are therefore not immediate but mediated, and each 
 of the two forces is consequently itself the determinateness which 
 the other has presented to it is mediated through the other, and the 
 mediating other is likewise its own determining positing. 
 
 Therefore this fact that an occasion for the activity of a force is pre- 
 sented through another force to which it is in so far passive, but, on 
 account of the occasion, goes over from its passivity into activit}' all 
 this is only the return of force into itself. It externalizes itself, or 
 manifests itself. The externalization is reaction in the sense that it 
 posits the externality as its own phase or moment, and consequently 
 annuls the solicitation of itself through another force. The two are 
 therefore one. The externalizing of the force, whereby it gives itself 
 extantness for others through its negative activity upon itself, and 
 the infinite return in this externality to itself, so that this externality 
 is only its own self -relation. The presupposing reflection to which 
 belongs the conditioning activity and the " occasion," is therefore 
 only the reflection returning into itself, and the activity is essentially 
 reactive against itself. The positing of the occasion, or of the ex- 
 ternal as itself the annulment of the same, and conversely, the annul- 
 ment of the occasion, is the positing of externality [_i. e., of the force 
 itself]. 
 
 c. The Infinitude of Force. 
 
 Force is finite in so far as its moments have still the form of im- 
 mediateness ; their presupposing ajid their self-relating reflections are 
 distinct in this determination. The presupposing reflection manifests 
 itself as an external force independently existing, and the self-relating 
 reflection manifests itself in relation to it as passive. Force is there-
 
 Essential Relation. 167 
 
 fore conditioned as regards form, and likewise limited as regards its 
 content ; for a determinateness as regards form contains a limitation 
 as regards content. But the activity of force consists in self-utter- 
 ance. This means, as has been shown, the annulment of externality 
 and the determining of it to be that in which force is identical with 
 itself. Therefore what the force really manifests is this, that its rela- 
 tion to another is its relation to itself, that its passivity consists in its 
 activity. The occasion through which it is solicited to activity is its 
 own soliciting ; and the externality which comes to it [to solicit it] is 
 no immediate somewhat, but mediated through it; and likewise its 
 own essential identity with itself is not immediate, but mediated 
 through its negation. In other words, the force manifests this, or 
 expresses this, that its externality is identical with its internality. 
 
 c. 
 
 Relation of External and Internal. 
 
 1. The essential relation of the whole and the parts is the immedi- 
 ate phase of essential relation ; the reflected immediateness and the 
 existent immediateness have therefore within it, each an independence 
 of its own ; but since they stand in essential relation their independ- 
 ence is only their negative unity. This is now posited in the utter- 
 ance or manifestation of force. The reflected unity is essentially the 
 becoming-other as transference of itself into externality, but exter- 
 nality has likewise immediately gone back into the reflected unity. 
 The distinction between the independent forces annuls itself; the 
 manifestation of force is only a mediation of the reflected unity with 
 itself. It is only an empty transparent distinction a mere appear- 
 ance ; but this appearance is the mediation which constitutes the 
 independent reality itself. Besides the contrary or opposite deter- 
 minations which mutually annul each other, and besides their activity 
 of transition the immediateness from which the movement into the 
 other is begun is itself only a posited being ; and through this each 
 of the determinations is in its immediateness already the unity with 
 its other and therefore the transition is likewise the self-positing 
 return into itself. 
 
 The Internal is defined as the form of the reflected immediateness, 
 or of Essence, as opposed to the External which is the form of Being ; 
 they however, form only one identity. This identity is, in the first 
 place, the solid unity of the two as substrate replete with content 
 in other words as the absolute Thing [Sacke] or substrate in which
 
 1C) 6 Essence. 
 
 the two determinations named are indifferent, external moments. 
 In so far as it is content and totality which constitutes the Internal 
 and which becomes likewise External, but in this becoming does not 
 change or pass over out of itself, but remains self-identical. The 
 External in this respect is not only identical with the Internal as 
 regards its content, but the two constitute only one thing \_Sache~\. 
 
 But this thing \_Sache] as simple identity with itself is different 
 from its form-determinations in other words, the latter are exter- 
 nal to it ; in this respect it is itself an internal which is different from 
 its externality. This externality, however, consists in the two de- 
 terminations, viz., the internal and external, which constitute it. 
 But the thing \_Sache~\ is itself nothing but the unity of the two. 
 Consequently the two sides are again identical as regards the content. 
 But in the thing \_Sache] they form a self-penetrating identity as a 
 substrate replete with content. But in the external, as forms of the 
 thing \_Sache] the two sides are opposed to the former identity and 
 are consequently mutually indifferent. 
 
 2. They have thus become different form-determinations which 
 possess an identical substrate not in themselves, but in another ; they 
 are'determinations of reflection; the internal as the form of reflection- 
 into-itself is essentiality, the external in the form of immediateness 
 reflected into something else is non-essentiality. But the nature of 
 the essential relation has exhibited these determinations as constitut- 
 ing merely one identity. Force is in its utterance a presupposing 
 activity which is identical with the determining activity as returning 
 into itself. Therefore in so far as internal and external are regarded 
 as form-determinations, they are first only the simple form itself ; sec- 
 ondly, since they are defined within it as opposites their unity is the 
 pure, abstract mediation in which the one is immediately because the 
 other is, and the latter immediately because the former is ; thus the 
 internal is immediately the external and it has the form of externality 
 because it is the internal ; conversely, the external is only an internal 
 because it is only an external. 
 
 Since this form-unity contains the two determinations as opposed, 
 their identity is only this transition, and it is an identity which differs 
 from them, rather than their identity with fulness of content. In 
 other words this firm retention of the form is the side of particular- 
 ity. And what is posited in this regard is not the real totality of the 
 whole, but the totality or the thing [-Sac/te] itself merely in the de- 
 terminateness of form. Since this is merely a composite or aggre- 
 gate unity of the two opposite determinations, it follows that each is 
 essentially in the other determinateness and only in the other, and it
 
 Essential Relation. 169 
 
 follows also as first remarked that they are only in the former deter- 
 minateness, it being indifferent which determinateness we take first 
 whether that of substrate or of thing \_Sache]. [It is evident 
 that if the external is outside of the internal the internal is also out- 
 side of the external i. e.. separate from it, beyond its limits. This 
 shows the emptiness of the distinction of external and internal as 
 affording any real explanation.] 
 
 It follows that anything that is only an internal is likewise for that 
 reason only an external ; and conversely, whatever is only external 
 is likewise only internal. In other words, since the internal is defined 
 as Essence, while the external is defined as Being, it follows that a 
 thing [Sacke] in so far as it is only in its essence is for that reason 
 only an immediate being [i. e., without mediation or essential relation 
 which it ought to have if it is Essence] ; or on the other hand a thing 
 [Sache] which only is, or has being alone, is for that reason still in 
 its essence [i. e., has not unfolded its nature manifested its essence, 
 and hence is no true being]. The external and internal ai-e sides of 
 determination in which determinateness is posited in such a manner 
 that each of the two determinations not only presupposes the other 
 and passes over into it as into its truth, but, besides this, remains 
 posited as determinateness in so far as it is the truth of the other, 
 and indicates the totality of the two. The internal is therefore the 
 completion of Essence as regards form. Essence, viz., defined as in- 
 ternal, as such, must necessarily be defective, and a mere relation to 
 its other, the external ; and the external is likewise not mere being 
 or existence even, but a somewhat relating to essence or to the inter- 
 nal. But it is not merely the relation of each to the other that we 
 have here, but the absolute form in its completeness, viz., that each is 
 immediately its opposite, and the common relation of these opposites 
 to their third or their unity. Their mediation lacks however as yet 
 this identical substrate containing them both ; their relation is on 
 this account an immediate inversion of the one into the other, and 
 this negative unity which combines them is a simple point, without any 
 content. 
 
 Remark. 
 
 The activity of Essence is in general the becoming [or production 
 of, or genesis of] the Idea [Begriff or " concrete Idea," as the being 
 which is both subjective and objective, i. e., self-determined as its 
 own object conscious being]. In the essential relation of the in- 
 ternal and external the essential feature of the Idea makes its appear-
 
 170 Essence. 
 
 ance, viz., the existence of such a negative unity that each of its 
 moments is not only its other, but is also the totalit}' of the whole 
 [human nature manifests itself as such a negative unity of individual 
 human beings, each one of which not only depends upon the others 
 and avails itself of their strength, but through this relation realizes 
 within itself its own negative unity, i. e., elevates itself to a total by 
 this means]. But this totality is in the Idea as such the universal 
 [i. e., the category of the universal corresponds to the totality in the 
 category of External and Internal] ; the totality however is a sub- 
 strate which has not yet appeared at the stage of the process 
 where we have internal and external. In the negative identity of in- 
 ternal and external, which is the immediate inversion of each of these 
 determinations into the other, there is also lacking that substrate 
 which has been called thing [$ac/ie]. 
 
 The unmediated identity of form as it is here posited as yet without the 
 activity filled with content belonging to the thing \_Sache'] itself ought 
 to be noted very carefully. It makes its appearance in the thing 
 [ Sache ] as it is in its beginning. Similarly pure being is immediately 
 nothing. So too everything real in its beginning is such an immediate 
 identity only ; for in its beginning it has not yet developed its 
 moments, and contrasted them, nor withdrawn itself back out of its 
 externality, and on the other hand it has not yet through its own ac- 
 tivity proceeded forth from its internality and externalized itself. In 
 such case it is therefore only the internal as determinateness in con- 
 trast with the external, and only the external as a contrast with the 
 internal. Hence it is in one respect only an immediate being; in 
 another respect, in so far as it is likewise the negativity which is 
 destined to become the activity of development, it is as such essen- 
 tially only an internal. 
 
 In all natural scientific and spiritual evolution, in general, this 
 phase presents itself and it is important to recognize it: that the first 
 phase of any thing is that of its internality, in other words its exist- 
 ence in its idea [ an ideal not yet realized, e. g., an acorn not yet be- 
 come an oak, a child or a savage not yet become a developed, civ- 
 ilized man] and is for this reason only its immediate passive being. 
 And the most convenient example of this is the essential relation just 
 above considered which has passed through mediation the essential 
 relation of force, and has realized the essential relation within 
 itself, its ideal, or first internality. On this account, because it 
 is first internal only, it is only the external immediate essential rela- 
 tion, the essential relation of the " whole and the parts " in which 
 the sides have an indifferent reality, outside of relation to each other.
 
 Essential Relation. 171 
 
 Their identity does not yet essentially exist for them ; it is only 
 internal as yet, and on this account they fall asunder, and have only 
 an immediate external existence. So too the sphere of Being in gen- 
 eral is nothing but an internality, and what is the same thing the 
 sphere of existent immediateness or of externality. 
 
 Essence is at first only the internal ; and consequently as such it is 
 taken for a mere unsystematized common interest and quite external. 
 In German one has the words, Schulwesen = school-essence [ where 
 the English say school-system] , Zeitungswesen =r newspaper-es- 
 sence [where the English say journalism] and understand under these 
 expressions a common interest formed by external combination of ex- 
 isting objects, without essential connection or organization. Among 
 concrete objects the seed of a plant is an internal plant [ internally a 
 plant ] and a child is an internal man [ a man not yet realized]. But 
 on this account the plant or the man as a germ is only an immediate 
 somewhat, an external being, which has not yet attained the negative 
 relation to itself, and is therefore a passive being exposed to external 
 influences ; so also God defined in his immediate idea would not be 
 spirit; spirit is not the immediate, the opposite of mediation, but 
 rather the essence which externally posits immediateness, and eternally 
 returns from that immediateness into itself. Regarded as immediate 
 therefore God would be only nature. In other words Nature is only 
 the internality of spirit, not the actuality of spirit, and is therefore 
 not the true God. In other words God in the first [ or lowest form 
 of ] thinking is only pure being, or mere essence, that is to say, the 
 abstract absolute, and not God as absolute spirit [ self-conscious ] 
 which alone is the true nature of God. 
 
 3. The first of the considered identities of the internal and ex- 
 ternal is the identity opposed to the distinction of these determ- 
 inations as an indifferent substrate opposed to a form external to it, 
 or an identity as content. The second of the identities considered is 
 the unmediated identity of the distinction of the external and inter- 
 nal, viz., the immediate inversion of each into its opposite this is 
 the pure form. But these two identities are only the sides of one 
 totality ; in other words the totality itself is only their conversion of 
 each into the other. The totality as substrate and content is their 
 immediateness reflected into itself by means of the presupposing re- 
 flection of form which annuls its distinction and posits itself as in- 
 different identity, as reflected unity opposed to it. In other words 
 the identity is the form itself in so far as it is defined as variety, or 
 indifferent multiplicity, and in so far as it reduces itself to one of its
 
 172 Essence. 
 
 sides as externality, and to the other of its sides as immediateness 
 reflected into itself, or internality. 
 
 Hence, on the other hand, the distinctions of form the internal 
 and the external, are by this means posited each as the totality of 
 itself and its other; the internal as simple identity reflected into itself 
 is therefore the immediate and consequently being and externality, as 
 well as essence. The external, on the other hand as manifold, par- 
 ticular being, mere externality, is posited as unessential, and returned 
 into its ground, and consequently as internal [that which is posited as 
 unessential is thereby posited as dependent and as belonging to some- 
 thing else whose manifestation it is ; and as a manifestation or ap- 
 pearance it is only the internality of something else, which has thus 
 been externalized as appearance]. This transition of each into the 
 other forms their immediate identity as substrate, but it is also their 
 mediated identity, viz., each is through its other what it is within 
 itself, i, e., the totality of the essential relation. Or conversely, the 
 determinateness of each side is meditated with the other determin- 
 ateness, through the fact that it is potentially the totality ; the totality 
 mediates itself therefore through the form, or through the determ- 
 inateness, and the determinateness mediates itself through its simple 
 identity. 
 
 Any somewhat is what it is therefore wholly in its externality ; its 
 externality is its totality ; it is likewise its unity reflected into itself. 
 Its manifestation or phenomenal existence is not merely reflection 
 into something else, but reflection into itself, and its externality is 
 therefore the externality of that which it is in itself; and since in this 
 way its content and its form are absolutely identical there is nothing 
 in and for itself but this, to utter itself or manifest itself. It is the 
 revelation of its own essence, so that this essence consists merely in 
 self-revelation. 
 
 The essential relation has thus defined itself as identity of its phe- 
 nomenal manifestation with its interaality, and therefore now defines 
 essence as Actuality.
 
 Actuality 173 
 
 THIRD SECTION. 
 
 ACTUALITY. 
 
 Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence. In it the 
 formless essence and the fleeting phenomenon have their truth in 
 other words, persistence devoid of determination and multiplicity 
 devoid of persistence find here their truth. Although existence is 
 immediateness which has resulted from a ground it has not the form 
 posited within it and as belonging to it. When it determines itself 
 and forms itself it is the phenomenon [t. e., totality of appearance]. 
 And since it develops persistence as reflection-into-another until it 
 becomes reflection into itself, there originate two worlds, two totali- 
 ties of content, the one of which is defined as reflected into itself 
 and the other as reflected into another. The essential relation, how- 
 ever, exhibits its form-relation which arrives at its full development 
 in the essential relation of Internal and External as one identical 
 substrate for the content of both, and thus only one identity of form. 
 Through the fact that this identity of the form has arisen, the cate- 
 gorv of form has lost its multiplicity of distinctions [and is hence 
 annulled] and one absolute totality has resulted. 
 
 This unity of the Internal and External is the absolute actuality 
 ( WvrJdiekkc&). This actuality is in its first phase of consideration 
 the absolute as such ; and in so far as it is posited as unity in which 
 the form is annulled, it has become the empty or external distinction 
 of External and Internal. The activity of reflection is regarded as 
 an external affair in its relation to this absolute, and not as the activ- 
 ity of the absolute itself, but since this reflection essentially belongs 
 to it, it is [?'. e. , will be found to be] the negative return of the abso- 
 lute into itself. [Such is the first phase of Actuality.] 
 
 In the second place [i. e., in the second phase of its consideration] 
 this unity of the Internal and External is the Actuality properly so- 
 called. Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity constitute the formal 
 moments [elements or phases] of the absolute, i. e., its reflection. 
 
 In the third place [the third phase of its consideration] the unity 
 of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute essential 
 relation in other' words it is the absolute as essential relation to 
 itself ; this is called SUBSTANCE. 
 
 [In the preceding paragraphs, Hegel gives the substance or out- 
 line of this third section of Essence.]
 
 174 Essence. 
 
 FIRST CHAPTER. 
 The Absolute. 
 
 The simple, pure identity of the absolute is indeterminate [without 
 particularization] . In other words within it all determinateness, 
 whether of essence and existence or of being, have been annulled ; 
 and so has the activity of reflection. In so far as this is the case the 
 definition of that which the absolute is, is merely negative ; and the 
 absolute itself appeai-s only as the negation of all predicates and as 
 entirely empty and void ; but in as much as the absolute must at the 
 same time be pronounced as the affirmation of all predicates, it is 
 manifestly the most formal contradiction. In so far as this negating 
 and affirming belong to external reflection it is a formal, non-system- 
 atic dialectic, which, with little trouble, seizes upon determinations 
 of different kinds here and there, and with just as little trouble shows 
 up their finitude and mere relativity, while, on the other hand, the 
 totality hovers before it, and it pronounces this absolute to possess 
 all determinations inherent within it. It has not the ability to bring 
 this affirming and negating to a true unity. There is a necessity, 
 however, to show what this absolute is, but this exposition must not 
 be a determining or a defining of it, nor an external reflection, because 
 by them determinations of the absolute would appear ; there is admis- 
 sible only an analysis or exposition the exposition on the part of the 
 absolute itself which only shows what it is. 
 
 A. 
 
 The Display or Exposition of the Absolute. 
 
 The Absolute is not merely Being, nor is it merely Essence. 
 Being is the first non-reflected immediateness ; Essence is the re- 
 flected immediateness. Each of the two is a totality within itself, 
 but a definite, particular totality. In the sphere of Essence the cate- 
 gory of Being reappears as Existence ; and the relation of being to 
 essence has developed into the essential relation of Internal and Ex- 
 ternal. The Internal is the Essence as totality, which is related to 
 being .and is immediate being. The External is being, but it is re- 
 lated to the activity of reflection and it is immediate identity with 
 essence. The absolute itself is the absolute unity of the two. It is
 
 The Absolute. 175 
 
 that which constitutes the ground of the essential relation, which as 
 essential relation has not gone back into this identity, and its ground 
 is not yet posited. 
 
 Hence it is evident that the definition of the absolute makes it to 
 be absolute form, but at the same time not as an identity whose 
 moments or phases are mere simple determinatenesses ; it is rather 
 the identity whose moments or phases are both totalities, and as 
 such are indifferent to the form, and hence constitute the perfect 
 content of the whole. Conversely, the absolute is the absolute con- 
 tent in such a manner that the content which as such is an indiffer- 
 ent [i. e., a non-related] multiplicity and possesses the negative form- 
 relation within it, and through this its multiplicity forms one solid 
 [i.e., homogeneous or continuous] identity. 
 
 The identity of the absolute is consequently the absolute through 
 this fact, that each of its parts is the whole, in other words, that 
 each determinateness is the totality. This makes each determinate- 
 ness to be a transparent appearance, a distinction that has vanished 
 in its posited-being. Essence, existence, in-itself-existent world, 
 whole, part, force, these reflected determinations appear to the 
 imaging [representing] form of thought as if they were something 
 valid in and for themselves as possessing true being; but the ab- 
 solute is their ground and they have vanished into it. Since in the 
 absolute the form is only simple self-identity, the absolute does not 
 determine itself [or particularize itself ] ; for determination is a form- 
 distinction [a distinction within form.] But since the absolute con- 
 tains all distinction and form-determination in other words since 
 it is absolute form and activity of reflection, it must have difference 
 or diversity in its content. But the absolute itself is absolute iden- 
 tity. This is its definition since all multiplicity of the self-existent 
 world and of the phenomenal world, or of the internal and external 
 totalities have vanished. In itself there is no becoming, for it is not 
 & form of Being nor is it the self-reflecting form of determination ; 
 it is not essence, which determines itself only within itself; it is 
 moreover not a self-manifestation, for it is the identity of the internal 
 and external. 
 
 But the activity of reflection stands in opposition to its absolute 
 identity. The activity of reflection is annulled in its absolute iden- 
 tity. Hence it is only the internality of it and therefore external to it 
 p. ., separate from it]. The activity of reflection consists in this 
 the annulment of its activity in the absolute. It is * 4 the beyond " of 
 the manifold distinctions and determinations and of their activity 
 which the absolute holds in abeyance. It is therefore their assump-
 
 176 Essence. 
 
 tion [adoption] but at the same time their destruction. It is thus 
 the negative exposition of the absolute already mentioned. In their 
 true presentation this exposition forms the whole of the logical activ- 
 ity which has preceded in this investigation, including the spheres of 
 Being and Essence, whose content is not gathered together from 
 without as something accidentally found, nor has it gone down into 
 the ab}'ss of the absolute through external reflection, but it is de- 
 termined within it through its own inner necessity: a becoming, 
 inherent in being, and an activity of reflection belonging to essence 
 has returned into the absolute as its ground. 
 
 This Display or exposition has however a positive side, namely, in 
 so far as the finite within it that which perishes shows by perish- 
 ing that it is related to the absolute, or that the absolute is contained 
 in it [or manifested upon it]. But this side is not so much the posi- 
 tive exhibition of the absolute itself as it is the exhibition of the de- 
 terminations which it has through the fact that the absolute is its 
 foundation and also its ground in other words, that which gives it, 
 as appearance, a reality, is the absolute itself. The appearance is not 
 a mere nothing, but it is reflection, i. e., relation to the absolute ; in 
 other words, it is appearance, in so far as the absolute appears in it. 
 This positive exposition or display, therefore, prevents the finite 
 from disappearing and regards it as an expression and image of the 
 absolute. But the transparency of the finite which permits only the 
 absolute to appear through it, results in its entire disappearance, for 
 there is nothing in the finite which can give it an independent indi- 
 viduality as against the absolute ; it is only a medium which is lost 
 in the manifestation of that which shines through it. 
 
 This positive analysis or display of the absolute is therefore only an 
 appearance ; for the true positive which contains it and the content 
 which is exhibited, is the absolute itself. As regards the further de- 
 terminations, the form in which the absolute appears is something 
 nugatory which the exhibition assumes as an external affair, and makes 
 its beginning with it. Such a determination has not its beginning in 
 the absolute, but only its end. This exhibition is therefore an abso- 
 lute deed through its relation to the absolute into which it returns ; 
 but it is not this in its point of departure, for that is only an external 
 determination to the absolute. 
 
 In fact, however, the display or exposition of the absolute is its 
 own act, and it begins with itself as well as arrives at itself. The 
 absolute is determined solely as absolute identit}' ; through the activ- 
 ity of reflection it is posited as identical in contrast with antithesis 
 and multiplicity ; in other words it is only the negative of reflection
 
 The Absolute. 177 
 
 and of determination in general. Not only that exhibition of the abso- 
 lute is something incomplete, but so also is this absolute itself at which 
 it has arrived. In other words, that absolute which exists only as 
 absolute identity is such an absolute merely as belongs to external 
 reflection. It is therefore not what is absolute in an absolute sense, 
 but it is the absolute in the form of determinateness or particularity- 
 it is what is called " Attribute." 
 
 The absolute however is not attribute merely because it is the 
 object of external reflection and is particularized through that. In 
 other words reflection is not external to it solely ; but it is also imme- 
 diate, and therefore because it is external it is also internal. The 
 absolute is the absolute only because it is not abstract identity, but 
 the identity of being and essence i. e., the identity of the internal 
 and external. It is therefore the absolute form which causes its 
 manifestation within itself and determines it to be an attribute. 
 
 B. 
 
 The Absolute Attribute. 
 
 The expression which has been used the absolute absolute [the 
 absolute taken absolutely] denotes the absolute as returned into itself 
 in its own form, or that whose form is identical with its content. The 
 attribute is only the relative absolute an expression wliich means' 
 only that the absolute is in a form-determination. The form is 
 namely at first, before its complete analysis or exposition, only inter- 
 nal, or, what is the same thing, only external particularized form or 
 negation. But since it is the form of the absolute, the attribute is the 
 entire content of the absolute ; it is the totality such a totality as 
 we formerly named a "world" [the " phenomenonal world " and 
 the " in-itself-existent world "] or as one of the sides of the essential 
 relation each of those sides being at the same time the entire rela- 
 tion. But those two " worlds " the phenomenal and in-itself-exist- 
 ent worlds were defined as antithetic to each other in their nature. 
 One side of the essential relation was identical with the other ; the 
 whole identical with the parts ; the manifestation of the force pos- 
 sessed the same content as the force itself, and the "external" 4 was 
 the same as the "internal." At the same time however each of these 
 sides possessed an ^immediate reality of its own ; one side possessed 
 an existent immediateness and the other a reflected immediateness. 
 In the absolute on the contrary these distinctions of immediateness 
 are reduced to a mere appearance [or seeming] and the totality 
 12
 
 178 Essence. 
 
 which is the attribute is posited as its true and only proper reality ; 
 but the determination in which it appears is posited as non-essential. 
 
 The absolute is therefore attribute for the reason that it is simple, 
 absolute identity in the determination of identity. There may be 
 other determinations joined to this determination so that there are 
 several attributes. But since the absolute identity has only this 
 meaning, not only that all determinations are annulled, but that it is 
 also the activity of reflection which has annulled itself, it conse- 
 quently happens that all determinations belonging to it are posited 
 as annulled. In other words, the totality is posited as the absolute ; 
 or the attribute has for its realit} 1 ' and content the absolute. Its 
 form-determination through which it is attribute is therefore also 
 posited immediately as mere appearance, and thus the negative is 
 posited as negative. The positive appearance, which the exhibition 
 or exposition reaches through the attribute, since it takes the 
 finite in its limitation as something lacking self-existence, and annuls 
 its independent existence in the absolute and reduces it to an at- 
 tribute, again annuls it as attribute; it causes it to perish in the 
 simple absolute, and thus it recalls the act which distinguished or 
 displayed it as attribute. 
 
 Since, however, the reflection thus returns from its act of distin- 
 guishing back to the identity of the absolute, it has not emerged 
 from its externality and arrived at the true absolute. It has reached 
 only the indefinite, abstract identity; i. e., that form of it which has 
 the determinateness of identity. In other words, the reflection, since 
 it is determined as attribute, as the internal form of the absolute, 
 is in this determining, different from the externality; the internal de- 
 termination does not interpenetrate the absolute its manifestation 
 is a vanishing, as a mere posited on the absolute. 
 
 The form therefore taken as external, or as internal, whereby the 
 absolute becomes an attribute, is therefore posited as a self-nugatory, 
 a mere appearance, a mere mode and manner of existence. 
 
 C. 
 
 The Modus of the Absolute. 
 
 The attribute is in the first phase the absolute as simple self-iden- 
 tity. In the second phase it is negation, and as such negation it is 
 the formal activity of reflection into itself. These two sides consti- 
 tute the two extremes of the attribute while it itself is the middle 
 term, since it is itself both the absolute and the determinateness.
 
 The Absolute. 179 
 
 The second of these two extremes is the negative as negative, the 
 activity of reflection external to the absolute. In other words, in so 
 far as it is taken as the internal of the absolute, and it is defined as 
 the activity of positing itself as modus, it is the externality of the 
 absolute, its lapse into the realm of change and contingency, of im- 
 mediate being its transition into the opposite without return into 
 i.self ; the multiplicity of form and content determinations, without 
 totality. 
 
 The modus as the externality of the absolute is moreover the ex- 
 ternality posited as externality, a mere " mode and manner;" conse- 
 quently the appearance as appearance, or the reflection into itself of 
 form ; consequently the self-identity which is the absolute. In fact 
 therefore the absolute is posited as absolute identity first in the 
 modus ; it is only what it is, i. e., self-identity as self -relating negativ- 
 ity, as appearance which is posited as appearance. 
 
 Therefore in so far as the analysis or exposition of the absolute 
 begins with its absolute identity and passes over to the attribute and 
 thence to the modus it has in these moments completed its course. 
 But, in the first place, it is not a merely negative activity in its atti- 
 tude towards these determinations, but it is the reflecting activity it- 
 self, the very activity by which the absolute is true absolute identity. 
 In the second place it does not have to do merely with externality, 
 and the modus is not the extreme of externality, but since it is ap- 
 pearance as appearance, it is the return into itself, the self-annulling 
 reflection as which the absolute is absolute being. 
 
 In the third place the exhibiting reflection appears to commence 
 with its own determinations, and with the external the modus or 
 the determinations of the attribute taking them up as though they 
 were already existent outside of the absolute, and the activity of the 
 existing reflection seems to consist in this that it reduces these 
 determinations to independent identities. But in fact the exhibiting 
 reflection finds the determinateness with which it begins in the abso- 
 lute. For the absolute as first indifferent identity is only the deter- 
 mined absolute, called the attribute because it is the inactive absolute 
 devoid of ^reflection. This determinateuess, since it is determinate- 
 ness, belongs to the reflecting activity ; only through it is it deter- 
 mined as the first identical and only through it does it possess the 
 absolute form, and is not merely in identity but a positing of itself 
 in identity. 
 
 The true meaning of the modus is therefore that it is the reflecting 
 activity belonging to the absolute; an activity of determination 
 whereby it does not become another, but only becomes what it is
 
 180 Essence. 
 
 already ; it is thus a transparent externality, which shows what it is 
 in itself; a movement, away from itself whose externality is at the 
 same time its internality ; and hence it is a positing which is not a 
 mere positing, but absolute being. 
 
 If therefore the question is asked regarding the content of the ex- 
 position of the absolute, what it is that the absolute exhibits? it must 
 be remembered that the distinction between form and content in the 
 absolute has utterly vanished. Or that the content of the absolute is 
 self-manifestation. The absolute is absolute form, which as the 
 diremption or dualizationof the absolute is wholly self-identical the 
 negative as negative ; or it comes into identity with itself which is 
 likewise indifferent towards its distinctions and is thus absolute con- 
 tent; the content is therefore only this very exposition (or exhibition 
 of itself). 
 
 The absolute as this self-sustaining activity of exposition as mode 
 and manner, which is its absolute self-identity, is manifestation not 
 of an internal, nor a manifestation made to something else, but it is 
 only a manifesting of itself for itself absolutely; it is therefore 
 Actuality [ WirJclichkeif] . 
 
 Remark. 
 
 The idea of the " substance " of Spinoza corresponds to this idea 
 of the absolute, and to the essential (reciprocal) relations of reflec- 
 tion belonging to it, as we have explained above. Spinozism is defi- 
 cient as a philosophy through the fact that the activity of reflection 
 and its manifold determining is an external form of thinking. His 
 "substance" is one substance, one indivisible totality ; there is no 
 deterrainateness or particularity that is not contained in or annulled 
 b}' this absolute ; and it is important enough that all which appears 
 to the naive representation, or the defining understanding as some- 
 thing independent, is reduced utterly to a mere posited-being [de- 
 pendence] within that necessary thought [of the absolute or 
 substance]. " Determinateness is negation," is the absolute principle 
 of Spinozistic philosophy ; this true and simple insight establishes the 
 absolute unity of substance. But Spinoza remains at the stand- 
 point of negation as determinateness or quality ; he does not reach 
 the idea of absolute negation, i. e., self-negating negation ; hence his 
 "substance " does not contain absolute form [self-determined form] 
 and the science of it is no immanent scientific process [i. e., a nec- 
 essary procedure]. His " substance " is absolute unity of thought 
 and being or extension ; therefore it contains the thinking activity,
 
 The Absolute. 181 
 
 but only in its unity with extension. This implies that the thinking 
 does not separate itself from extension, and consequently is not an 
 activity of determining and form-giving, nor a return into itself, nor 
 a beginning with itself. The "substance " therefore lacks the prin- 
 ciple of personality, a defect which has been urged against the Spino- 
 zistic system most frequently. Moreover its form of knowing is ex- 
 ternal reflection, which takes up the determinateness of attribute and 
 mode as a finite phenomenon without deducing it from the idea of 
 " substance," and it makes reflections upon the same in an external 
 manner, and, assuming those determinations as given, refers them to 
 the absolute, without commencing its procedure in the absolute. 
 
 The definitions which Spinoza gives of "substance" are those of 
 self-cause causa sui defined as a somewhat, "whose essence 
 includes within itself its existence ;" and he says that " The idea of 
 the absolute does not need the idea of anything else for its concep- 
 tion." These definitions, deep and true as they are, are nevertheless 
 assumed without proof in his system. Mathematics and other sub- 
 ordinate sciences are obliged to begin with presuppositions ; the}' are 
 under the necessity of assuming their elements or matter with which 
 they have to deal. But the absolute cannot be a direct immediate 
 something ; it is essentially its own result. 
 
 After the definition of the absolute, Spinoza gives next his defini- 
 tion of attribute, namely, as " That which the intellect comprehends 
 as the nature or essence of the absolute." Not to dwell upon the 
 fact that the intellect is assumed as something subsequent to the 
 attribute according to its nature for Spinoza defines the intellect as a 
 modus it must be observed that the attribute which is a determina- 
 tion of the absolute is made by Spinoza dependent upon something 
 else, namely, the intellect which regards " substance " from an exter- 
 nal and independent point of view. 
 
 Spinoza defines the attribute further as infinite ; and infinite also 
 in the sense of infinite multiplicity. There appear however only two 
 attributes thought and extension and it is not shown how infinite 
 multiplicity is reduced to this antithesis of thought and extension. 
 These two attributes are therefore taken from experience. Thought 
 and being are the absolute conceived in a determination. The abso- 
 lute itself is their absolute unity, and within it they are only non- 
 essential forms ; the arrangement of things is the same as that of 
 mental images or thoughts, and the one absolute is perceived only by 
 the external reflection, by a modus, as existing in those two determ- 
 inations [thought and extension] on the one hand, as the 
 totality of mental images, and on the other, as a totality of things
 
 182 Essence. 
 
 and events. As it is this external reflection that makes that 
 distinction, so it is the same reflection that carries it back into the ab- 
 solute identity, and annuls it. This entire activity however goes on 
 outside of the absolute. Although the absolute is also the activity 
 of thought, and hence thinking occurs only in the absolute, yet, as 
 already remarked, thought, in the absolute, is only in unity with exten- 
 sion, consequently not as the activity which is essentially opposed to 
 extension. Spinoza makes the sublime demand upon thought that it 
 shall consider things under the form of eternity, sub specie ceterni, 
 i. e., as they are in the absolute. But in that absolute which is only 
 the inactive identity, the attribute, as well as the modus, exist only as 
 vanishing, not as beginning, so that even that vanishing has its posi- 
 tive origin only from without. 
 
 The third, the modus, is understood by Spinoza as an affection of 
 substance, particular determinateness, that which is in another and 
 is apprehended through that other. The attributes really have for 
 their determination only indefinite multiplicity. Each of the attri- 
 butes should express the totality of substance and be understood 
 through itself, but, in so far as the absolute exists as determined or 
 particular, it involves other-being and cannot be understood through 
 itself. In the modus therefore the definition of attribute is first 
 posited in its true form. This third remains moreover mere modus ; 
 on the one hand it is an immediately given somewhat, and on the other 
 hand its nngatoriness is not recognized as reflection into itself. The 
 Spinozistic exposition of the absolute is therefore complete only in so 
 far as it begins with the absolute, proceeds to the attribute, and con- 
 cludes with the modus. These three, however, are merely mentioned 
 one after the other without showing any inner necessity of develop- 
 ment; the third is not negation defined as negation the negation 
 relating to itself negatively, through which it would be a return into 
 itself within the first identity, and thus the true identity. Therefore 
 it lacks the necessity of procedure from the absolute to the non-essen- 
 tial, as well as their dissolution again into the identity. In other words 
 it lacks the becoming of the identity as well as of its determina- 
 tions. 
 
 In like manner the oriental idea of emanation conceives the abso- 
 lute as the self-kindling light. But the light not onl}" originates 
 within itself, it streams forth away from itself. Its rays are depart- 
 ures from its undimmed clearness ; the remote results are more im- 
 perfect than the preceding ones from whence they came. The 
 raying forth of the light is taken only as an event, and the process 
 only as a continnous loss of energy. Hence the being continually
 
 The Absolute. 183 
 
 grows dimmer and the end of the line is night the negative, which 
 does not turn back to the source of light. 
 
 The defect of reflection, which Spinoza's exposition of the abso- 
 lute contains as an emanation theory, does not exist in the idea of 
 the monad as set forth by Leibnitz. The one-sidedness of the 
 philosophical principle usually draws out its opposite principle 
 in another system so that the whole, the totality, exists in its com- 
 pleteness although sundered into different systems. The monad is 
 merely one, a negative reflected into itself ; it is the totality of the 
 content of the world. The variety and multiplicity within it has not 
 vanished altogether but is preserved in a negative manner. Spinoza's 
 *' substance" is the unity of all contents. But this manifold con- 
 tent of the world does not exist as such within the " substance " but 
 only in the activity of reflection external to it. The monad is 
 essentially a representing activity. And although it is finite it pos- 
 sesses no passivity ; but the changes and determinations within it are 
 manifestations in itself. It is an " Eutelechy;" the revelation is its 
 own activity. By this the monad is particularized and distinguished 
 from others ; the determinateness of particularity consists in the 
 special content and in the mode and manner of the manifestation. 
 The monad is therefore potentially as regards its substance the 
 totality, but not in its manifestation. This limitation of the monad 
 does not appertain to it as self-positing or self-representing, but, to 
 its nature, its potentiality ; in other words it is an absolute limit, a 
 predestination imposed upon it through another being. Moreover 
 the limited ones are in relation to each other while the monads are 
 self-contained absolutes. Hence the harmony of these limitations, 
 namely, the relation of the monads to each other, is external to the 
 monads and proceeds from another being, or is a "pre-established 
 harmony." 
 
 It is clear that through the principle of reflection-into-itself, which 
 constitutes the fundamental principle of the monad, that otherness 
 and the influence of the external is removed, and the changes which 
 happen to the monad are through its own activity. But on the other 
 hand, the passivity is converted into an absolute limitation, a limita- 
 tion of nature or constitution [a limitation impressed upon it from with- 
 out]. Leibnitz ascribes to the monads a certain kind of completeness 
 within themselves, a kind of independence. They are created beings. 
 Upon a closer examination of the nature of this limitation it appears 
 that the self-manifestation which belongs to the monad is the totality 
 of form. It is an extremely important idea that the changes in the 
 monad are conceived as self-manifestations, as actions devoid of
 
 184 Essence. 
 
 passivity, and the principle of reflectiou-into-itself, or of individual- 
 ization, is made prominent as essential. Moreover it is necessary that 
 the finitude or particularity is allowed to exist within the monad 
 that the content or the substance is distinguished from the form, and 
 moreover that the content is limited while the form is infinite. But 
 in the idea of the absolute monad we ought to find not only the men- 
 tioned unity of form and content, but also the nature of reflection as 
 self-related negativity which repels itself from itself and is thereby 
 a positing and creating activity. In the system of Leibnitz we find 
 further the doctrine that God is the source of the existence and of 
 the essence of the monads: which means that the mentioned absolute 
 limitations in the nature of the monads are not existent in and for 
 themselves but that they vanish in the absolute. But these notions 
 are derived from current conceptions which are without philosophical 
 development and not brought up to the speculative stand-point. 
 Hence the principle of individualization does not receive its deeper 
 meaning; the thoughts on the distinction between the different finite 
 monads and upon their relation to the absolute, do not originate in 
 this essence itself, i. e., in an absolute manner. They belong only to 
 discursive reasoning to dogmatic reflection, and they therefore 
 attain no internal coherence. 
 
 SECOND CHAPTER. 
 
 Actuality. 
 
 The absolute is the unity of the internal and external as the first 
 phase of unity existing in itself or potentially. The exhibition or 
 exposition proved to be an external reflection, which possessed the 
 immediate on its side as an already given somewhat ; but it is an 
 activity which i - elates the immediate to the absolute, and as such 
 connects it to the latter, and determines it as a mere mode and man- 
 ner. But this mode and manner is the activity of determination 
 which belongs to the absolute itself; it is namely its first identity or 
 its mere in-itself -existent unity. And although by means of this 
 reflection, that former being-in-itself or nature is posited as a non- 
 essential determination, yet through its negative relation to itself it 
 becomes the mode (" modus ") as described. This activity of reflec- 
 tion as annulling itself in its determinations and as activity that 
 returns into itself, becomes true absolute identity, and is at the same 
 time the determining [particularizing] of the absolute in other 
 words, its modality. The mode is, therefore, the externality of the
 
 Actuality. 185 
 
 absolute, but only as its reflection into itself ; in other words, it is its 
 own manifestation, so that this externalization is the reflection into 
 itself of the absolute, and, therefore, its being-in-and-for-itself. 
 
 Therefore as the manifestation which shows the absolute as having 
 no other content than to be self-manifestation, the absolute becomes 
 absolute form. The " actuality" is to be seized or conceived as this 
 reflected absoluteness. The category of being does not express actu- 
 ality ; for it is only a first immediateness ; its reflection is, therefore, 
 only a becoming a transition into something else; in other words 
 its immediateness is not being-in-and-for-itself. The category of 
 Actuality is moreover higher than that of Existence. Existence has 
 an immediateness which has issued forth from Ground and Condi- 
 tions in other words from Essence and its reflection. It is there- 
 fore potentially what actuality is, real reflection, but it is as yet not 
 the posited unity of reflection and immediateness. Existence ac- 
 cordingly passes over into "Phenomenon" when it develops the 
 activity of reflection that it contains. It is the category of Ground 
 that has become annulled (" gone to the ground ") ; its determination 
 is its restoration, hence it becomes essential [or reciprocal] relation ; 
 and its final activity of reflection is the positing of its immediateness 
 as reflection into itself, and conversely. This unity, which contains 
 Existence or immediateness and being-in-itself as mere moments or 
 subordinate elements, is now before us as the Actuality. The actual 
 is therefore manifestation, it does not pass over into the sphere of 
 change through its externality nor is it an appearance in something 
 else, but it manifests itself. This means that it is itself in its exter- 
 nality, and is only in that externality ; in other words, it is only the 
 activity which distinguishes and determines. 
 
 In the actuality as this absolute form, the moments or elements are 
 only as annulled formal, not yet realized; their diversity [multi- 
 plicity] belongs, therefore, to external reflection, and is not defined 
 as content. 
 
 Actualitv as immediate unity of form of the internal and external 
 is consequently in the determination of immediateness as opposed to 
 the determination of reflection into itself ; in other words it is an ac- 
 tuality opposed to a possibility. The relation of the two to each 
 other constitutes therefore a third term : the actual defines itself as a 
 being reflected into itself, and the latter is at the same time an imme- 
 diately existing somewhat. This third term is Necessity. 
 
 But in the first place, since the actual and p issible are formal dis- 
 tinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists only in this
 
 180 Essence, 
 
 that the one as well as the other is a posited-being, hence mere Con- 
 tingency. 
 
 Now, because the contingency contains the actual as well as the 
 possible, as mere posited-being, they have received the determination 
 within themselves ; there arises therefore, secondly, the real actuality. 
 And with this likewise there arises the real possibility and the relative 
 necessity. The reflection of the relative necessity into itself gives, 
 thirdly, absolute necessity, which is absolute possibility, or poten- 
 tiality and actuality. 
 
 Contingency or Formal Actuality, Possibility and Necessity. 
 
 1. Actuality is " formal" in so far as it is mere immediate unre- 
 flected actuality the first phase of actuality consequently merely 
 in this form-determination, but not as totality of form. It is in this 
 phase nothing more than a being or existence in general. But since 
 it is not merely immediate existence but essentially the form-unity of 
 the being-in-itself or of internality and externality it contains imme- 
 diately being-in-itself or potentiality. Whatever is actual is pos- 
 sible. 
 
 2. This potentiality is actuality that is reflected into itself. But 
 this first phase of reflected-being is also a formal phase and hence 
 only the determination of identity with itself, or of being-in-itself in 
 general. 
 
 Since, however, the determination here is the totality of form, this 
 being-in-itself is determined as annulled or as essentially a mere rela- 
 tion to actuality ; as the negative of actuality posited as negative. 
 Potentiality contains therefore two phases ; first, the positive phase, 
 its reflection into itself ; but since it is within the absolute form it is 
 reduced to a mere phase, its reflection into itself is no longer valid as 
 essence, but in the second place possesses the negative significance, 
 viz., that the potentiality is something defective, something that refers 
 to another, t. e., to the actuality, and supplements its deficiencies with 
 the same. 
 
 According to the first phase, the merely positive side, the poten- 
 tiality is therefore the mere form-determination of self-identity, 
 i. e., the form of essentiality. In this phase it is devoid of relativ- 
 ity, an indefinite receptacle for everything in general. In the sense 
 of formal potentiality ever3 ? thing is possible which does not contra- 
 dict itself ; the realm of potentiality is therefore the limitless multi-
 
 Actuality. 187 
 
 plicity. But every individual of the multiplicity is particularized or 
 determined within itself and in opposition to others, and has the 
 negation inherent in it. Indifferent variety or diversity passes over 
 into antithesis [i. e., is found upon careful examination to imply 
 antithesis as the basis of its distinction] ; but antithesis is contradic- 
 tion [i. e., implies contradiction, which is the first phase of self- 
 distinction ; that is to say, all distinction or difference rests finally 
 on self-distinction]. Therefore every particular thing is likewise a 
 contradictory somewhat [as well as a possible one], and therefore 
 everything is impossible. 
 
 This merely formal statement regarding anything that it is pos- 
 sible is therefore likewise shallow and empty, like the principle of 
 contradiction, and every content that it may have, e.g., ' ; A is pos- 
 sible," means only that A is A. In so far as one regards this without 
 considering the development of the content it has the form of sim- 
 plicity. Distinction arises within it only upon the annulment of the 
 form of simplicity. When one holds fast to the simple form, the 
 content remains a self -identical one and therefore a possible. There 
 is nothing more expressed, however, by this term " possible " than 
 with the formal principle of identity. 
 
 The possible contains however more than the mere principle of 
 identity. The possible is the reflection-into-itself again reflected ; 
 in other words, the identical as phase of the totality is also de- 
 termined or defined to be not in-itself, i. e., potential. It has therefore 
 the second determination to be a mere possible something and its 
 ideal is the totality of the form. The potentiality without this ideal 
 is the essentiality as such ; but the absolute form contains the essence 
 merely as moment, and has no truth except as being. Potentiality is 
 this mere essentiality posited in such a manner as to be a mere 
 phase and not commensurate with the absolute form. It is being-in- 
 itself defined as mere posited; in other words as not possessing 
 being-in-itself. The potentiality is therefore the contradiction or the 
 impossibility. 
 
 In the first place, this states that the possibility whose posited form- 
 determination is annulled, possesses a content. This as possible is a 
 being-in-itself which is at the same time annulled or other-being 
 [?. e., a being for others or dependent]. Since it is for this reason 
 only a possible being it follows that another being is possible, and 
 even its opposite. 'A is A ; likewise not-A is not-A. These two 
 principles both express the possibility of its content. But these 
 principles as identical are indifferent towards each other ; when one 
 of them is posited the other is not of necessity also posited. The
 
 188 Essence. 
 
 potentiality is the relation in which the two are brought into compari- 
 son. It contains in its determination as a reflection of the totality, 
 the implication that the opposite is also possible. It is therefore the 
 relating ground : that because A is A also not-A is not-A. In the 
 possible A the possible not-A is contained, and it is this relation 
 that determines both as possible. 
 
 As this relation however that in one possible thing its other is also 
 contained it is the contradiction that annuls itself. Since now accord- 
 ing to its definition it is reflected and the reflection is self-annulled, as 
 has been shown, it is consequently also the immediate and with this 
 it is actuality. 
 
 3. This actuality is not the first phase of actuality, but the re- 
 flected form of it posited as unity of itself and potentiality. The 
 actual as such is possible ; it is in immediate positive identity with 
 potentiality ; but potentiality has defined itself as mere potentiality ; 
 consequently the actual is defined as merely a possible. And it 
 follows immediately that because the potentiality is found in the 
 actuality that it is annulled and mere potentiality. Conversely, 
 actuality which is in unity with potentiality is only the annulled im- 
 mediateness ; in other words, because the formal actuality is a mere 
 immediate, first phase, it is only an element, a mere annulled actu- 
 ality. 
 
 Hence a more accurate definition is reached of the degree in which 
 possibility is actuality. Possibility is, namely, not all actuality of 
 the real and absolute actuality we are not speaking here. This 
 phase is only the first one, namely, the formal one which has been 
 defined as mere possibility, therefore formal actuality, which is mere 
 being or existence in general. Every possible therefore possesses 
 being, or existence. 
 
 This unity of potentiality and actuality is contingency. The con- 
 tingent is an actual which is at the same time defined as merely possible 
 and whose other or opposite is likewise possible. This actuality i& 
 therefore mere being or existence posited in its truth as having the 
 value of a posited-being or potentiality. Conversely, potentiality aa 
 reflection into itself or being-in-itself, is posited as posited-being. 
 Whatever is possible is an actual in this sense of actuality ; it has 
 only as much value as the contingent actuality, and is itself contin- 
 gent. 
 
 The contingent presents therefore two sides. First, in so far as 
 it possesses potentiality immediately, or, what is the same thing, in so 
 far as potentiality is annulled in it, it is not posited-being nor medi- 
 ated but it is immediate actuality, it has no ground. Since this ini-
 
 Actuality. 189 
 
 mediate actuality belongs also to the possible, it is defined as the 
 contingent and likewise as devoid of ground, just as the actual was. 
 
 The contingent is however, in the second place, the actual as a 
 mere possible, in other words, as a posited-being ; and so too the 
 possible is as formal being-in-itself, mere posited-being. Conse- 
 quently, the two are not in and for themselves but each has its true 
 reflection into itself in another, in other words, it has a ground. 
 
 The contingent has therefore no ground, just for the reason that it 
 is contingent ; and likewise it has a ground because it is contingent. 
 
 It is the posited, nnmediated vanishing of the external and internal 
 into each other ; in other words the vanishing of the reflection into 
 itself into being and vice versa. It is posited through this that 
 possibility and actuality each within itself possesses this determination 
 and consequently that they are moments or elements of the absolute 
 form. The actuality in its immediate unity with potentiality is mere 
 existence and therefore defined as groundless, that is as a mere 
 posited or mere potential. In other words, it is posited as reflected 
 and determined in opposition to potentiality, and therefore it is sun- 
 dered from the potentiality and from reflection into itself and conse- 
 quently it is likewise immediate and only a possible. Likewise poten- 
 tiality as simple being-in-itself is an immediate somewhat, merely an 
 existent in general. In other words, opposed to actuality it is a 
 being in itself devoid of actuality, merely a possible : and just on this 
 account an existence in general which is not reflected into itself. 
 
 This absolute unrest of the becoming of these two determinations 
 is contingency. But for the reason that each vanishes immediately 
 in its opposite, it goes together with itself [returns into itself A 
 vanishing in B, which vanishes again into A] and this identity of 
 the same, of one in the other, is Necessity. 
 
 The necessary somewhat is an actual somewhat, hence it is devoid 
 of ground, as it is an immediate ; but it has likewise its actuality 
 through another, or in its ground ; but it is at the same time the 
 posited-being of this ground and its reflection into itself; the poten- 
 tiality of the necessity is annulled. 
 
 The contingent is therefore necessary because the actual is deter- 
 mined as possible, and hence its immediateness is annulled, and is 
 repelled into ground, t. e., being-in-itself, and grounded ; and also 
 since this its potentiality is the ground-relation, it is entirely annulled, 
 and it is posited as being. That which is necessary is ; and this exis- 
 tent is itself that which is necessary. At the same time it is in itself; 
 this reflection into itself is something else than the immediateness of 
 the sphere of being; and the necessity of die existent is something
 
 190 Essence. 
 
 else. The existent itself is therefore not that which is necessary ; 
 but this being-in-itself is mere posited-being it is annulled and even 
 immediate. Therefore actuality is in its distinctions, i. e., its possi- 
 bility, self-identical. As this identity it is Necessity. 
 
 B. 
 
 Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility and Necessity. 
 
 1. Necessity as thus derived is formal, for the reason that its ele- 
 ments are formal; they are, viz., simple determinations, which are 
 totality only as immediate unity or as the immediate conversion of 
 the one into the other, and consequently not as having the form of 
 independence. In this formal necessity the unity is therefore only 
 asimple one, and indifferent towards its distinctions. As immediate 
 unity of form-determinations this necessity is actuality ; but such an 
 actuality as possesses a content for the reason that its unity is now 
 defined as indifferent towards the distinction of its form-determina- 
 tions, viz., itself and possibility. This content contains an indif- 
 ferent identity, also an indifferent form, i. e., as a mere diversity 
 of determinations, and it is a manifold content. This actuality is real 
 actuality. Real actuality, as such, is in its first phase the thing with 
 many properties, the existing world ; but it is not the existence that 
 loses itself in the phenomenon, but as actuality it is at the same 
 time being-in-itself and reflection-into-itself ; it preserves its indi- 
 viduality in the multiplicity of mere existence ; its externality is 
 only an internal activity of relation to itself. That which is actual 
 can act ; its actuality is manifested in what it produces. Its activity 
 of relation to another is the manifestation of itself; not a transition 
 as the existent somewhat relates to another, nor a phenomenal ap- 
 pearance like that of the thing which has mere relativity to another 
 which is independent, but possesses its reflection-into-itself, its par- 
 ticular essentiality in some other independent being. 
 
 The real actuality has likewise the potentiality immediately within 
 itself. It contains the element of being-in-itself ; but as mere first 
 phase the immediate unity is in one of the determinations of form, 
 hence as the existent, which is different from the being-in-itself or 
 the potentiality. 
 
 2. This potentiality as the being-in-itself of the real actuality is 
 the real potentiality and as such a being-in-itself full of contents. 
 Formal potentiality is the reflection into itself only as abstract iden- 
 tity, an identity in which a something is not self-contradictory. But 
 in so far as one examines the determinations, circumstances, and con-
 
 Actuality. 191 
 
 ditions of a somewhat with a view to learn its potentialities he deserts 
 the formal point of view and comes to the consideration of its real 
 potentiality. 
 
 This real potentiality is itself immediate existence, not however 
 for the reason that the potentiality as such as a formal element is 
 immediately its opposite an actuality that is not reflected ; but, 
 because it is real possibility, this determination belongs to it itself. 
 The real possibility of a thing is therefore the existing multiplicity of 
 surrounding conditions which stand in relation to it. 
 
 This multiplicity of existence is potentiality as well as actuality, but 
 its identity is only the content which is indifferent towards the determi- 
 nations of form ; they constitute thei-efore the form, determined [par- 
 ticularized] in respect to their identity. In other words, the immedi- 
 ate, real actuality, for the reason that it is immediate, is determined 
 against [or defined and distinguished from] its potentiality ; as this 
 determinate [definite, special] and reflected it is the real potentiality. 
 This is the posited totality of form, but the form in its determinate- 
 ness [particularity], namely, the actuality as formal or immediate, 
 and likewise the potentiality as the abstract being-in-itself. This 
 actuality which constitutes the potentiality of a thing is therefore not 
 its own potentiality but the being-in-itself of another actuality ; it is 
 itself the actuality which is to be annulled the potentiality as mere 
 potentiality. Hence the real potentiality constitutes the totality of 
 conditions which is not an actuality reflected into itself but which is 
 defined as something whose destiny is to go back into itself and to 
 become another. 
 
 What is really potential is therefore as regards its being-in-itself 
 something formally identical, that is, something which does not con- 
 tradict itself as regards its simple contents ; but it is necessary also 
 that it should not contradict itself as regards the developed condi- 
 tions and various surroundings with which it is connected it must 
 be self-identical even in these. Secondly, because it is manifold 
 and stands in manifold connection with others, there is diversity 
 within itself, and this diversity passes over into opposition [antithe- 
 sis] and into self-contradiction. When one speaks of potentiality 
 and undertakes to show its contradiction he has only to call attention 
 to the multiplicity of its content, or of its conditioned existence ; by 
 this its contradiction is easily shown. But this is not a contradiction 
 of external comparison. For the existence that contained multiplicity, 
 on that account, essentially annuls itself and is destroyed ; hence it is 
 essentially a mere potentiality. If all the conditions of a thing are 
 complete and present the thing becomes actual ; the completeness of
 
 192 Essence. 
 
 the conditions is the totality of the content of a thing and the thing 
 itself is this content determined as actual in the entire scope of its 
 possibility. In the sphere of the conditioned ground the conditions 
 have the form outside of them that is to say : the ground or the 
 reflection which exists for itself, is outside of them ; and this relates 
 to the moments of the thing and brings them into existence. Here, 
 on the contrary, the immediate actuality is not defined to be condi- 
 tioned through a presupposing reflection, but it is posited that it 
 itself is the potentiality. 
 
 In the self-annulling, real potentiality, that which is annulled is two- 
 fold ; for it is itself twofold actuality and potentiality. (1.) The 
 actuality is the formal, or an existence which has an immediate, 
 independent manifestation, and through its annulment has become 
 reflected and a moment of another being, and hence contains within 
 it the being-in-itself . (2.) The mentioned existence was also deter- 
 mined as the potentiality or as being-in-itself, but it was the being-in- 
 itself of another. Since it therefore annuls itself, the being-in-itself 
 gets annulled, and passes over into actuality. This movement of the 
 self-annulling, real potentiality produces therefore the same moments 
 that were already extant, each arising from the other ; in this nega- 
 tion it is therefore also not a transition but a return into itself. In 
 the case of the formal potentiality, for the reason that the somewhat 
 was potential, it was not itself but something else that was potential. 
 The real potentiality has no longer such another over against it, for 
 it is real in so far as itself is also the actuality. Since it annuls 
 therefore the immediate existence of the same i. e. , the circle of 
 conditions it becomes being-in-itself which it already is, namely, 
 the being-in-itself of another. And since conversely it annuls at the 
 same time its moment of being-in-itself, it becomes actuality ; that 
 is, it becomes the moment which it likewise is already. That which 
 vanishes is therefore the definition of the actuality as the potentiality 
 or being-in-itself of another ; and, conversely, there vanishes the 
 potentiality as an actuality which is not the actuality of its poten- 
 tiality. (3.) The negation of the real potentiality is consequently its 
 identity with itself ; since it therefore is the opposite of this annul- 
 ment in its annulment, it is the real necessity. 
 
 That which is necessary cannot be otherwise than it is ; but that 
 which is possible, is ; for the potentiality is the being-in-itself, the 
 mere posited-being, and therefore it is essentially other-being. The 
 formal potentiality is this identity as transition into an absolute 
 other; but the real, since it has the other moment, the actuality, 
 belonging to it, is already itself necessity. What, therefore, is really
 
 Actuality. 193 
 
 possible can never be anything else ; under these conditions and cir- 
 cumstances, nothing else can happen. Real possibility and necessity 
 are therefore only apparently distinct ; their identity is not one that 
 develops, but one that is presupposed and underlies them. The 
 real necessity is therefore relation which is full of contents [i. e.. a 
 totality of conditions] ; for the content [which consists in these 
 details] is the mentioned identity existing in itself, which is indif- 
 ferent as regards the distinctions of form. 
 
 This necessity is however at the same time relative. That is to 
 say: it has a presupposition as its origin it has its beginning in 
 what is contingent. The really actual as such is a completelv 
 defined actual, and possesses this completely defined character as its 
 immediate being as a multiplicity of existing circumstances : but 
 this immediate being as definiteness is also the negative of it [i*. e. . of 
 the really actual] it is its being-in-itself or potentiality: hence it 
 is real possibility. As this unity of tile two moments it is the totality 
 of form, but the totality which is still external to itself : it is there- 
 fore unity of possibility and actuality in such a manner that (1) the 
 multiplex existence is immediately or positively the potentiality a 
 potential that is self-identical, because it is actual. (2.) In so far 
 as the potentiality of existence is posited, it is determined as mere 
 potentiality and as immediate conversion of actuality into its oppo- 
 site or as contingency. Therefore this potentiality which has the 
 immediate actuality attached to it as its condition, is only the being- 
 in-itself as the potentiality of another. Through the fact that as 
 has been shown this other-being annuls itself and this posited- 
 being is itself posited, the real potentiality becomes necessity. But 
 this necessity begins with that real potentiality as a unity of the 
 potential and actual, which is not yet reflected into itself. This pre- 
 supposition, and the self-returning movement are as yet separate. 
 In other words, the necessity has not as yet determined itself into 
 contingency. 
 
 The relativity of the real necessity presents itself in the content as 
 an identity which is indifferent to the form, and which is. therefore, 
 distinct from it and a definite content altogether. The really neces- 
 sarv is on this account a limited actuality which, on account of this 
 limitation, may be regarded also as a contingent. 
 
 In fact the real necessity is in itself also contingency. This is 
 evident in the fact -that the really necessary as regards the form is lim- 
 ited as regards its content, and through this limitation possesses con- 
 tingency. But also in the form of the real necessity there is found 
 contingency ; for, as has been shown, the real potentiality is only in
 
 194 Essence. 
 
 itself necessary, but it is posited as the other-being of actuality and 
 potentiality opposed to each other. The real necessity contains 
 therefore contingency ; it is the return into self out of the mentioned 
 restless other-being of actuality and ' potentiality opposed to each 
 other, but it is not the return- into itself, from itself. 
 
 In itself therefore there is found here the unity of necessity and 
 contingency ; this unity is to be called the absolute actuality. 
 
 C. 
 
 ABSOLUTE NECESSITY. 
 
 The real necessity is definitely determined necessity ; the formal 
 has as yet no content nor determinateness belonging to it. The 
 determinateness of necessity consists in the contingency or the nega- 
 tion which it possesses. This has been shown. 
 
 This definite determinateness in its first simplicity is actuality. 
 The definitely determined necessity is therefore immediately actual 
 necessity. This actuality which as such is itself necessaiy because it 
 contains the necessity as its being-in-itself is the absolute actuality. 
 It is actuality which can never be other than it is ; for its being-in- 
 itself is not potentiality but necessity itself. But this actuality, 
 because it is posited, is absolute, that is to say, it is the unity of 
 itself and with possibility a mere empty determination ; in other 
 words it is contingency. The emptiness of its determination reduces 
 it to a mere potentiality to a determination which can be just as 
 well something else and be determined as potential. This poten- 
 tiality is however itself the absolute ; for it is precisely the poten- 
 tiality which will be determined as potentiality as well as actuality. 
 Through the fact that it is this indifference to itself it is posited as an 
 empty, contingent determination. 
 
 Thus the real necessity contains contingency not only in itself 
 [/. e. , potentially] , but this will also develop itself ; this develop- 
 ment however as externality is only its being-in-itself, because it is 
 only an immediate determinateness. It is not only this but its own 
 development or the presupposition that it has its own positing. For 
 as real necessity it is the annulment of actuality in potentiality and 
 conversely. Since it is the simple com r ersion of one of these 
 moments into the other, it is also its simple positive unity, since 
 each as shown goes together with itself [i. e., comes into identity 
 with itself in the other]. But it is thus actuality; such an actuality, 
 however, as is only this simple going together of the form with itself. 
 Its negative positing of those elements is therefore presupposition or 
 the positing of itself as annulled or as immediateness.
 
 Actuality. 195 
 
 In this, however, this actuality is defined as negative ; it is a going- 
 together-with-itself [arrival at self-identty] that proceeds from actu- 
 ality which was real potentiality. Therefore this new actuality arises 
 only from being-in-itself, from the negation of itself. Thus it is 
 determined immediately as potentiality, as mediated through its nega- 
 tion. This potentiality, however, is nothing but this mediation in 
 which the being-in-itself (namely, it itself and the immediateness) are 
 both, in the same way, posited-being. Hence it is the necessity 
 which is just as well the annulment of this posited-being or the 
 positing of immediateness and the annulment of being-in-itself, as it 
 is the determining of this annulment as posited-being. It is there- 
 fore itself which determines itself as contingency, and in its being 
 repels itself from itself, and in this repulsion has only returned into 
 itself and in this return as into its being, has repelled itself from 
 itself. 
 
 Hence the form in its realization has penetrated all of its distinc- 
 tions and made itself transparent ; and as absolute necessity is only 
 this simple identity of being- with-itself, in its negation, or in the 
 essence, the distinction of content and form even has likewise van- 
 ished. For that unity of potentiality and actuality and of actuality 
 in potentiality is the form indifferent to itself in its determinate- 
 ness or in the posited-being a thing with its totality of conditions 
 from which the form of necessity has been removed as far as it 
 is external. But in this way it is this reflected identity of the two 
 determinations as indifferent to it, and consequently the form-deter- 
 mination of the being-in-itself opposed to the posited-being. and this 
 potentialitv constitutes the limitation of content that the real neces- 
 sitv possessed. The dissolution of this difference, however, is the 
 absolute necessity whose content is this self-penetrating difference 
 within it. 
 
 The absolute necessity is therefore the truth, into which actuality 
 and potentiality in general, as well as formal and real necessity, return. 
 It is, as shown, the being which in its negation in essence relates 
 to itself and is being. It is likewise simple immediateness, or pure 
 beiug as simple reflection-into-itself or pure essence within it, these 
 two are one and the same. The purely necessary w, only because 
 it is ; it has no other condition nor ground. It is likewise pure 
 essence, its being is the simple reflection into itself ; it is because 
 it is. As reflection it has ground and condition, but it has only itself 
 for ground and condition. It is being in itself, but its being-in-itself 
 is its immediateness its potentiality is its actuality. It is there- 
 fore because it is. As the going together with itself of being [f. e. y
 
 196 Essence. 
 
 the arrival at self-identity] it is essence ; but for the reason that 
 this simple somewhat is likewise immediate simplicity it is being. 
 
 Absolute necessity is therefore reflection, or the form of the abso- 
 lute. It is the unity of being and essence simple immediateness, 
 which is absolute negativity. On the one hand, its distinctions are 
 nothing but determinations of reflection, only however as existent 
 multiplicity, actuality full of distinctions, and this has the shape of 
 independent somewhats opposed to each other as others. On the 
 other hand, their relation is the absolute identity ; it is the absolute 
 conversion of their actuality into their potentiality and of their poten- 
 tiality into actuality. Absolute necessity is therefore blind. On the 
 one hand, the distinctions of actuality and potentiality have the form 
 of reflection-into-itself as being; they are therefore both as free 
 actualities, neither of which appears in the other, nor exhibits a single 
 trace of its relation to the other each is grounded in itself and is 
 necessary in itself. Necessity as essence is included within this 
 being. The contact of these actualities with each other appears 
 therefore as an empty externality. The actuality of the one in the 
 other is the mere potentiality contingency. For being is posited 
 as absolutely necessary, as mediation with itself, which is absolute 
 negation of mediation through another, or as being which is only 
 identical with being. It is another which has actuality in being, and 
 is therefore determined as merely potential, empty posited-being. 
 
 But this contingency is rather the absolute necessit3 r . It is the 
 essence of those free actualities necessary in themselves. This 
 essence avoids light, because in these actualities there is no appear- 
 ing, no reflex, for the reason that they are grounded only within 
 themselves, and shaped for themselves, self-manifestations be- 
 cause they are mere being. But their essence will manifest itself in 
 them and reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity of its 
 being, of its repose upon itself, is the absolute negativity : it is the 
 freedom of their non-manifesting immediateness. This negative 
 breaks forth in them, because being is the contradiction of itself 
 through this, its essence. And this negation breaks forth in contrast 
 to this being in the form of being, hence as the negation of those 
 actualities which is absolutely different from their being, as well as 
 from their non-being, and hence comes forth as a free other-being 
 opposed to it as its being. Yet it was not to be ignored in them. 
 They are, in their self-dependent formation, indifferent to form, 
 hence a content of different actualities a definitely determined con- 
 tent. This is the seal which necessity impresses upon them, since it 
 sets them free as absolute, actual things, possessing absolute return-
 
 Actuality. 197 
 
 into-itself in their determination. Upon them it impresses itself, and 
 its impressions are marks of its right over them, and they are seized 
 by it and perish. This manifestation of that which is the deter- 
 minateness in truth negative relation to itself is blind dissolution 
 in other-being. The manifestation or reflection appears, in the phase 
 of being, as becoming or transition of being into naught. But being 
 is conversely also essence, and in the phase of essence " becoming" 
 is reflection or appearance. Hence externality is their internality, 
 their relation is absolute identity ; and the transition of the actual 
 into the possible, or of being into naught, is a going together with 
 itself [arrival at self-identity]. Contingency is absolute necessity, 
 it is itself the presupposition of the mentioned first absolute actuality. 
 This identity of being with itself in its negation is the category of 
 Substance. It is this unity as in its negation, or as in contingency : 
 hence it is Substance as essential relation to itself. The blind transi- 
 tion of necessity is rather the self-exposition of the absolute, the 
 movement of the absolute within itself which in its externalization 
 exhibits or manifests only itself. 
 
 THIRD CHAPTER. 
 The Absolute Essential- Relation or Reciprocal-Relation. 
 
 The absolute necessity is not the necessary still less a necessary 
 but Necessity being which is pure and simple reflection. It is 
 essential relation [ VerJtaeltniss^ reciprocity, relativity] because it is 
 the activity of distinguishing, each of whose moments is the entire 
 totality, and whose moments have independent existence in such a 
 manner that the totality has only one simple existence [notwith- 
 standing the multiplicity that it includes], and therefore the distinc- 
 tions within it have only the appearance of independence, and this 
 appearance is the absolute itself. The Essence as such is reflection 
 or appearance ; essence as absolute relativity [Verhaeltniss, reciprocal 
 relation] is, however, appearance posited as appearance, and this as 
 self-relation is the absolute actuality. The absolute, which has been 
 unfolded and exhibited by external reflection, now unfolds itself, it 
 being absolute form or necessity [it sunders itself into a form of 
 relation or disrupts itself]. This self-unfolding [self -disruption] is 
 its self-positing and it fa only in this self-positing. As light in 
 nature is not a something nor a thing, but exists only as appearance, 
 so manifestation is absolute actuality in its self-identity. 
 
 The sides of absolute relativity are therefore not attributes. In an
 
 198 Essence. 
 
 attribute, the absolute appears only in one of its moments [phases] 
 as a presupposed somewhat and taken up by the external reflection. 
 The unfolding or display of the absolute [its self-sundering] is 
 performed by the Absolute Necessity, however, which is self-iden- 
 tical as self-determining. Since it is the activity of appearing which 
 is posited as appearance, the sides of this relativity are totalities, 
 because they are appearance ; because as appearance the distinctions 
 are both themselves and their opposite, and thus the whole. Con- 
 versely, they are appearance, because they are totalities. This act 
 of distinction, or activity of appearing, which pertains to the abso- 
 lute, is therefore only the positing of itself as self-identity. 
 
 This essential relation [reciprocity] in its immediate form is the 
 relation of Substance and Accidents, the immediate vanishing and 
 becoming of absolute appearance in itself. Since substance deter- 
 mines itself as being for itself opposed to another, or the absolute 
 reciprocity becomes real [in both its moments] it becomes the recip- 
 rocal relation found in Causality. Finally, when the latter [causality] 
 passes over into self -relation in reciprocal action [interaction] , then 
 the absolute essential relation [interrelation] is posited in all the 
 essential characteristics that it contains. This posited unity of itself 
 in its determinations which are posited as the whole and as deter- 
 minations at the same time, is the category of the IDEA [Beg r iff = 
 concrete idea] . 
 
 The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality. 
 
 Absolute necessity is absolute essential- relation or reciprocity, 
 because it is not being as such, but being which is because it is 
 [being which expresses the ground of itself] being as the absolute 
 mediation of itself through itself. This being is Substance ; as the 
 ultimate unity of Essence and Being ; it is the being in all being. It 
 is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract something stand- 
 ing behind existence and phenomenon, but it is the immediate act- 
 uality itself as absolute reflection into itself as in-and-for-itself, inde- 
 pendent, existence. Substance as this unity of being and reflection 
 is essentially their appearance and positecl-being. The activity of 
 appearing is the self-relating appearing and hence it has the form of 
 being [the "form of being" is that of self- relation]. This being is 
 substance as such. Conversely, this being is only the self-identical, 
 posited-being, hence it is the totality as appearance or it is Acci- 
 clentality.
 
 The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality. 199 
 
 This activity of appearing is identity as form [the form is the 
 determining activity which makes the distinctions which belong to the 
 object] ; it is the unity of potentiality and actuality. First it is 
 Becoming. Contingency as the sphere of beginning and ceasing. 
 For according to the determination of immediateness the relation of 
 potentiality and actuality is an immediate transformation of each into 
 its other. But since being is appearance its relation is also identical 
 relation, in other words, the appearance of each in the other hence 
 it is reflection. The activity of accidentally, therefore, presents in 
 each of its moments the appearance of the categories of being and of 
 the reflection-determinations of essence each appearing in the other. 
 The immediate somewhat has a content : its immediateness is at the 
 same time a reflected indifference as regards the form. This content 
 is determined and since this is the determinateness of beinsr the some- 
 what passes over into another. But quality is also a determinateness 
 of reflection: hence it is indifferent variety [different things existing 
 without relation to each other]. This annuls itself; but it is self- 
 reflected being-in-itself ; hence it is potentiality and this being-in- 
 itself is in its transition, which is likewise reflection-into-itself the 
 necessarily actual. 
 
 This activity of accidentality is the effectiveness [Actuosilat = ex- 
 ternal manifestation] of substance as a quiet outflow from itself. It 
 is not an activity as directed against anything else, but active against 
 itself as simple element offering no resistance. The annulment of 
 what is presupposed is the vanishing of appearance. First in the 
 activity which annuls the immediate originates the immediate itself. 
 This is the activity of appearance. The beginning with itself as 
 source or origin is the positing of this very self from which it starts 
 [its presupposing is a positing]. 
 
 Substance, as this identity of the activity of appearance, is the 
 totality of the entire process, and includes accidentality within it, aad 
 aceidentality is the entire substance itself. This distinction of sub- 
 stance into the simple identity of being, on the one hand, and the 
 reciprocity of accidents, on the other hand, is a form of its activity 
 of appearance. The former [identity] is the formless substance 
 conceived by the imagination, to which appearance does not seem to 
 be appearance. This image-thinking chugs to an absolute which is 
 an indeterminate identity that possesses no truth, but is only the deter- 
 minateness of immediate actuality, or in other words, the being-in- 
 itself, or potentiality. These are determinations of form which per- 
 tain to accidentality. 
 
 The other determination, that of the reciprocity of accidents, is
 
 200 Essence. 
 
 the absolute form-unity of accidentality substance as absolute 
 might or power. The ceasing of the accident is its return as actu- 
 ality into itself, as into its being-in-itself or into its potentiality. 
 But this its beiug-in-itself is only a posited-being. Hence it is alsa 
 actuality, and because these form-determinations are likewise con- 
 tent-determinntions this potential somewhat is, as regards content, 
 another particular, actual somewhat. Substance manifests itself 
 through the content of the actuality, into which it translates the 
 potential, as creative might ; and through the content of the poten- 
 tiality, into which it transmutes the actual, it manifests itself as 
 destructive might. But the two are identical. The creative activity 
 is destructive, and the destructive activity is creative. For the 
 negative and positive, potentiality and actuality are absolutely united 
 in substantial necessity. 
 
 Accidents as such and there are many of them, since multiplicity 
 is one of the determinations of being have no power over each 
 other. The}' are existent somewhats or existent for themselves 
 things existing with manifold properties wholes consisting of parts, 
 independent parts forces which need to be solicited into activity 
 by each other and which are conditioned through each other. In 
 so far as such an accidental somewhat seems to exercise power 
 over another, it is the power of the substance that is manifest- 
 ing itself. This substance includes both within it, and as nega- 
 tivity it gives them unequal values it posits the one as vanishing 
 and the other as arising, or it determines the former as passing 
 over into its potentiality and the latter as passing over into its actu- 
 ality. Substance eternally dirempts itself into these distinctions of 
 form and content and eternally purifies itself from this one-sidedness ; 
 but in this purifying it dirempts itself again into the distinctions, 
 one accident replaces another onty because its own subsistence is 
 this totality of form and content in which it, as well as its other, 
 vanishes. 
 
 On account of this immediate identity and presence of substance 
 in its accidents, there is no real distinction remaining between them. 
 In this first determination substance is not yet manifested according 
 to its whole extent. If substance is distinguished as the self- 
 identical being-in-and-for-itself from itself as totality of accidents, 
 it is the mediating-power. This is necessity which retains positive 
 persistence in the negativity of accidents, and in its persistence 
 retains its mere posited-being. This mediating term is consequently 
 the unity of substantiality and accidentality itself, and its extremes 
 have no proper self-subsistence of their own. Substantiality is there-
 
 The Reciprocal Relation as /Substantiality* 201 
 
 fore only reciprocal relation as immediately vanishing ; it relates to 
 itself not as negative, and is immediate unity of power with itself in 
 the form of identity alone, and not of its negative essence. This 
 can also be explained in another way, as follows : Appearance or 
 accidentally is in itself substance through power, but it is not so 
 posited as this activity of appearance identical with itself. There- 
 fore substance possesses aecidentality in its form or posited-being, 
 but not in itself ; aecidentality is not substance as substance. The 
 substantiality-relation therefore reveals itself as a formal power whose 
 distinctions are not substantial; substance is in fact only the internal 
 of accidents, and the accidents are only at'ached to the substance. 
 In other words, this reciprocal relation is only an appearing-totality 
 as a becoming ; but it is likewise reflection ; aecidentality which is 
 in-itself substance is therefore posited as substance. Therefore it 
 is defined as self-relating negativity opposed to itself, determined 
 as self-relating, simple identity with itself ; and it is f or-itself-existent 
 mighty substance. The substantiality-relation, through this, passes 
 over into the causality-relation. 
 
 B. 
 
 The Causality- Relation. 
 
 Substance is might, that is reflected into itself and not merely 
 transition. But it is a might, which posits determinations, and dis- 
 tinguishes them from itself. In its determining it is self-relating and 
 it is that which posits its determining as negative or as posited-being. 
 This is consequently annulled substantiality, merely posited it is 
 Effect ; the substance existing for itself however is the Cause. 
 
 This causality-relation is in the first place only this reciprocal rela- 
 tion of cause and effect ; it is the f ormal causal-relation. 
 
 a. Formal Causality. 
 
 1. Cause is the source, in contrast with the effect; but the sub- 
 stance is the power of manifestation, or it possesses aecidentality. 
 But it is as power likewise reflection into itself in its appearance ; 
 therefore it unfolds its transition and this activity of appearing is 
 determined as appearance in other words, the accidents are posited 
 as mere effect [or as merely posited.] The substance however in 
 its determining does not start from accidentalitv as though the latter 
 existed already in another, and now was to be posited as determi- 
 nateness but both substance and its aecidentality are one activity. 
 Substance as power determines itself ; but this determining is imme-
 
 202 Essence. 
 
 diately the annulment of the determining and the return. It deter- 
 mines itself it, the determining is therefore the immediate, and 
 itself already the determined. Since it determines itself it posits 
 this already determined as determined ; it has therefore annulled the 
 posited-being, and returned into itself. Conversely, this return, 
 because it is the negative relation of substance to itself, is itself a 
 determining or repelling from itself. Through this return the deter- 
 mined originates and from this it seemed to begin, and to posit it as 
 an already existent determined somewhat. Therefore the absolute 
 activity of manifestation \_Actuositat] is Cause. The power of sub- 
 stance, in its truth as manifestation, which unfolds what was within 
 itself, namely, the accidents, which is the posited-being immediately 
 
 n the development of the same, it sets up this as posited-being : 
 the Effect. This is therefore, in the first place, the same as the acci- 
 dentality which occurs in the relation of substantiality, viz., sub- 
 stance as posited-being. But, secondly, the accidents as such are 
 subtantial only through their vanishing as transitory. As effect, 
 however, they are posited-being as self-identical. Cause is mani- 
 fested in the effect as the whole substance, viz. , as reflected into itself 
 in the posited-being as such. 
 
 2. The substance as not-posited, original source stands over against 
 this posited-being reflected into itself the determined as deter- 
 mined. Since it as absolute might or power is return into itself, but 
 as self-determining in this return, it is not any longer the mere in- 
 itself of its accidents, but it is also posited as this being-in-itself. 
 Substance has therefore actuality first in the category of Cause. But 
 this actuality, viz., that its being-in-itself its determinateness in 
 the relation of substantiality is now posited as determinateness in 
 the category of Effect. Substance, therefore, has its actuality which 
 it possesses as cause, only in its effect. This is the necessity which 
 the cause is. It is the actual substance, because the substance as 
 power determines itself. But it is at the same time cause, because it 
 unfolds this determinateness or posits it as posited-being. Therefore 
 it posits its actuality as posited-being or as the effect. This is 
 the other of the cause, the posited-being over against the origin or 
 source and mediated through this. But the cause as necessity annuls 
 also this its mediation, and is in the determining of itself as the origi- 
 nal self-relating opposed to the mediated, the i-eturn into itself. For 
 the posited-being is determined as posited-being, and is therefore 
 self-identical. The cause is therefore first in the effect truly actual 
 and self -identical. The effect is therefore necessary because it is the 
 manifestation of the cause or it is this necessity which the cause is.
 
 The Causality-Relation. 203 
 
 Only as this necessity is the cause self-acting, originating from itself, 
 without being solicited by another and the independent source of 
 self-production. It- must act ; its originality consists in the fact that 
 its reflection-into-itself is a. determining-positing, and conversely, 
 both are in one unity. 
 
 The effect contains therefore nothing that is not in the cause. 
 Conversely, the cause contains nothing that is not in its effect. The 
 cause is cause only in so far as it produces an effect. And the 
 cause is nothing else than this determination which produces an 
 effect, and the effect nothing else than the determination which has 
 a cause. In the cause as such lies its effect ; and in the effect its 
 cause. In so far as the cause has not yet acted, or in so far as it 
 has ceased to act, it is not cause. The effect in so far as its cause 
 has vanished is no longer effect but only an indifferent actuality. 
 
 3. In this identity of cause and effect, has vanished the form 
 through which they were distinguished as being-in-itself and posited- 
 being. Cause is quenched in its effect ; and with this the effect is 
 likewise quenched because it is only the deterniinateness belonging 
 to the cause. This causality that is exhausted [quenched] in its 
 effect is consequently an immediateness that is indifferent towards 
 the necessary connection between cause and effect, and is external 
 to it 
 
 b. The Specialized Causality-Relation in its Special Applications. 
 
 1. The identity of the cause in its effect is the annulment of its 
 power and negativity, and therefore the unity indifferent towards 
 distinctions of form it is content. It is therefore related only in- 
 itself to the form which is here causality. They are therefore posited 
 as differing, and the form opposed to the content is an actual only in 
 an immediate sense a contingent causality. 
 
 Moreover, the content as thus determined is a "content diverse 
 within itself ; and the cause is determined as regards its content, and 
 is therefore the effect. The content, since the reflected-being is here 
 also immediate actuality, is, so far forth, actual but the finite sub- 
 stance. 
 
 This is the causality-relation in its reality and finitude. As formal 
 it is the infinite, necessary connection within the absolute power 
 whose content is pure manifestation or necessity. As finite caus- 
 ality, on the other hand, it has a given content and is an external 
 distinction appertaining to this identical somewhat which is in its 
 determinations one and the same substance. 
 
 Through this identity of content causality is an analytical proposi-
 
 204 Essence. 
 
 tion. The same content is taken in the first instance as cause and in 
 the second instance as effect ; there it is self-existent, and here only 
 posited-being or a determination belonging to another. Since these 
 determinations of form are external reflection, it follows that it is 
 only a tautological activity of a subjective understanding which 
 describes one phenomenon as effect, and traces it back to its cause 
 for the purpose of comprehending and explaining it. It amounts 
 only to a repetition of one and the same content. There is nothing 
 in the cause different from what is in the effect. Rain, for example, 
 is the cause of the moisture which is its effect. The rain makes 
 moist this is an analytical proposition ; the same water which con- 
 stitutes the rain constitutes the moisture. As rain this water exists 
 in the form of an object per se; as moisture or wetness, on the 
 other hand, it is an adjective, a posited which does not .possess its 
 own self-subsistence ; and the one determination as well as the 
 other is external to it. Thus again the cause of a color is said to be 
 a coloring-matter, a pigment, which is one and tlie same actuality as 
 the color itself ; at one time being taken in the external form of an 
 active that is to say, externally-connected with an activity different 
 from it [i. e., as cause] ; and in the second place in the likewise 
 external determination of an effect. The cause of a deed is the 
 internal resolution in an active subject which as an external being 
 has received through an action the internal resolution and is the 
 same content and value. If the activity of a body is regarded as an 
 effect its cause is an impelling force. But it is the same quantum of 
 activity before and after the impulse the same existence which the 
 impelling body contains and imparts to the impelled body. So much 
 as it imparts, so much it itself loses. 
 
 The cause, e. g., the painter or the impelling body, has, it is true, 
 other content besides the former as the colors and the form com- 
 bining them into paintings ; the latter as an activity of determined 
 strength and direction. But this latter content is a contingent 
 matter not concerning the cause. What the painter possesses in other 
 qualities is to be abstracted in considering him as cause of this 
 painting they have nothing to do with this painting ; only those 
 qualities of his which exhibit themselves in this effect are its cause, 
 the rest is not cause. Thus, in the case of the impelling body 
 whether it is stone or wood, green or yellow, etc., does not concern 
 this impulse in those qualities it is not cause here. 
 
 It is to be noted of this tautology of the causality-ivlation that it 
 does not seem to contain tautology when only the remote causes of 
 an effect are adduced and not the proximate ones. The change '^f
 
 The Causality-Relation. 205 
 
 form which the subject that forms the basis suffers in this passage 
 through several members of a series conceals the identity which is 
 preserved in it. It connects itself in this multiplication of causes 
 which enter between it and the ultimate effect, with other things and 
 circumstances in such a manner that it is not the first member of the 
 series which is called cause that contains the perfect effect, but only 
 this series of causes taken together. So, for example, if a man came 
 into circumstances such that he developed his talents, through the 
 fact that he had lost his father, killed by a bullet in a battle, it would 
 be possible to regard this shot, or in an ascending series, the battle, 
 or the war. or the causes of the war, etc., ad infinitum, as the cause 
 of the development of this man's talents. But it is evident that, for 
 example, the shot in question is not the cause of this intrinsically, but 
 that it is only the condition of it through its connection with other 
 active determinations. In other words, it is not the cause, but only a 
 single phase of the circumstances which gave it possibility. 
 
 In the next place, it is to be especially noted how inadequate is 
 the application of the causal relation to phenomena of physical-organic 
 and spiritual life. Here it is shown that what is called the cause has 
 quite a different content from the effect : and for this reason that 
 that which acts upon the vital is determined as independent of this 
 and is changed and transformed, since vitality does not allow a cause 
 to produce its effect, that is to say annuls it as cause. Therefore it 
 is not proper to say that nourishment is the cause of the blood, or 
 that articles of food or coldness or moisture is the cause of fever etc. 
 And it is improper to speak of the Ionic climate as the cause of the 
 Homeric poems, or to allege Caesar's ambition as the cause of the 
 destruction of the republican constitution of Rome. In history 
 spiritual masses and individuals are in reciprocal determination with 
 each other. It is the nature of mind in a far higher sense than the 
 character of organic life to take up into itself something that origi- 
 nates in another ; it does not allow it to continue its causal activity 
 when within it, but it transmutes and transforms it. But these 
 reciprocal relations belong to the stage of the Idea and will receive 
 consideration with it [i. e., in the Third part of this Logic]. 
 
 It may be further remarked here that in so far as the necessary 
 connection of cause and effect is conceded although not in its proper 
 sense, the effect cannot be greater than the cause, for the effect is 
 nothing but the manifestation of the cause. It is a play of wit, 
 much resorted to in history, to explain great effects through small 
 causes, and for a deep and widely prevailing event to allege an anec- 
 dote as the first cause. Such a cause so-called is nothing but an
 
 206 Essence. 
 
 occasion, an external incitement of which the internal spirit of the 
 event did not stand in need, or it might have used any one of an 
 innumerable multitude of others for the occasion of its manifestation. 
 Conversely, it is to be regarded that the small and contingent has 
 been determined by the great event as its occasion. That arabesque- 
 painting of history which builds up a great shape on a slender stalk 
 is therefore though brilliant only a superficial treatment. In this 
 development of the great out of the small, the true order of things is 
 inverted and spirit is made to take its occasion from external circum- 
 stance. But for this very reason this external is not conceived as a 
 real cause in it in other words this inversion itself annuls the causal 
 relation. 
 
 2. But this determinate ness of the causal relation that content and 
 form are diverse and indifferent to each other, extends further. The 
 form-determination is also the content-determination; cause and 
 effect, the two sides of the relation, are therefore also another con- 
 tent. In other words, the content because it is only the content of a 
 form, has its distinction within itself and is essentially diverse or 
 varied [possessing variety within itself] . But since its form is the 
 causal relation which is a content identical in cause and effect, the 
 varied content is connected externally with the cause and with the 
 effect ; consequently it does not enter into the activity of the causal 
 relation. 
 
 This external content is therefore outside of the necessary con- 
 nection between cause and effect it is an immediate existence. 
 In other words, because as content it is the in-itself existent identity 
 of cause and effect it is also immediate, existent identity. This is 
 therefore something or other which possesses manifold determinations 
 in its being, and among these the determination that it is in one 
 respect a cause or an effect. The form-determinations, cause and 
 effect, have their substrate in it ; that is to say, have their essential 
 subsistence and each side has a special subsistence for their 
 identity is their subsistence. At the same time, however, it is its 
 immediate subsistence, and not its subsistence as form-unity or as 
 essential connection. 
 
 But this thing is not merely substrate, but also substance, for it is 
 the identical self-subsistence only in the form of essential connection. 
 Moreover, it is finite substance, for it is determined as immediate in 
 opposition to its causality. But it has likewise causality, because it 
 is identical only as this causal relation. As cause this substrate is 
 negative relation to itself. But itself to which it relates is first a 
 posited-being, because it is determined as an immediate actual.
 
 The Causality-Relation. 207 
 
 This posited-being as content is some one determination. Secondly, 
 the causality is external to it ; this, consequently, makes its posited- 
 being. Since it is now causal substance, its causality consists in 
 this : to relate to itself negatively and therefore to its posited-being 
 and external causality. The activity of this substance begins there- 
 fore from without, and emancipates itself from this external deter- 
 mination, and its retnrn-into-itself is the preservation of its immediate 
 existence and the annulment of its posited existence, and consequently 
 of its causality. 
 
 Thus, a moving stone is a cause ; its movement is a determination 
 which it possesses one among many determinations, such as color, 
 shape, etc. , which do not belong to its causality. Because its imme- 
 diate existence is separated from its form-relation, i. e. . its causality, 
 this form-relation is something external. Its movement and the 
 causality which pertains to it is only a posited-being within it. But 
 the causality is also its own. This is involved in the fact that its 
 substantial self-subsistence is its identical relation to itself, but this 
 is now defined as posited-being. it is therefore at the same time neg- 
 ative relation to itself. Its causality which is directed upon itself as 
 upon the posited-being or an external, consists therefore in this, that 
 it annuls it and by its removal returns into itself ; consequently it is 
 not self-identical in its posited-being, but it restores only its abstract 
 independence. In other words, the rain is the cause of the moisture 
 which is the same water as before. This water is determined as rain 
 and cause, through the fact that the determination is posited in it by 
 another. Another force or something has elevated the water into 
 the air by evaporation and brought it together into a mass whose 
 weight has made it fall. Its removal from the earth is a determina- 
 tion alien to its original identity with itself its weight. Its caus- 
 ality consists in removing the same and in restoring that identity, 
 and therewith annulling its causality. 
 
 The now considered second determinateness of causality belongs to 
 the form : this connection is causality as self-external as primary 
 independence which is at the same time in-itself-posited-being or 
 effect. This union of the opposite determination as in an existent 
 substrate constitutes the infinite regress in the series of causes. 
 Beginning is made with the effect ; this has a cause ; the cause again 
 has a cause, and so on. Why has the cause again a cause ? That 
 is, why is it that' the same side which, previous!}' determined as 
 cause, is now detennined as effect, and a new cause now demanded 
 for it ? On the ground that the cause is a finite, a determined ; it is 
 determined as one element of the form opposed to the effect as the
 
 208 Essence. 
 
 other element ; hence it has its determinateness or negation outside 
 of it. Precisely for this reason it is itself finite, has its determi- 
 nateness on it, and is consequently posited-being, or effect. This, 
 its identity, is also posited, but it is a third the immediate sub- 
 strate. Causality is therefore self-external, because its originality is 
 here an immediateness. The form-distinction is therefore first deter- 
 minateness and not yet determinateness posited as determinateness 
 it is existent other-being. Finite reflection holds fast to this immedi- 
 ate, removes the form-unity from it and makes it a cause in one respect 
 and an effect in another ; and on the other hand it transposes the 
 form-unity into the realm of infinitude, and by this perpetual progress 
 or regress from cause to cause it expresses its incompetency to attain 
 and hold it. 
 
 With the effect it is the same case or rather the infinite progress 
 from cause to cause. In the latter the cause develops into an effect 
 which has again another cause. Conversely, the effect becomes 
 cause which again has an effect. The considered particular cause 
 begins in an externality, and returns into its effect not as cause, but 
 it loses its causality in it. Conversely, the effect arrives at a sub- 
 strate which is substance, an original, self-relating subsistence. In it 
 therefore this posited-being, becomes posited-being i. e. , this sub- 
 stance, since an effect is posited in it, takes ont he form of cause. 
 But the mentioned first effect, the posited-being which was external 
 to it is a different one from the second which is produced by it ; for 
 this second is determined as its reflection-into-itself , but the first one 
 was an externality to it. But since the causality is here, the self -ex- 
 ternal causality, it returns, in its effect, not into itself. In its effect 
 it becomes external, its effect is again posited-being in a substrate 
 as another substance which reduces it to a posited-being, or mani- 
 fests itself as a cause, and repels its effect again from itself, and so 
 on in the infinite progress. 
 
 3. It is now for us to see what has become through the move- 
 ment of the determination or limited causal relation. The formal 
 causality exhausts itself in the effect ; through this the identity of the 
 two moments has arisen ; with this the unity of the cause and the 
 effect is only in-itself, and the form-relation is external to it. 
 This identity is also immediate according to the two determinations 
 of immediateness first as being-in-itself , a content, to which caus- 
 ality comes externally; secondly, as an existing substrate in which 
 cause and effect inhere as different form-determinations. These are 
 in themselves one, but each is on account of this-in-itself, or the 
 externality of form, self, hence in its unity with the other, deter-
 
 The Causality-Relation. 209 
 
 mined also as other in opposition to it. Therefore the cause has an 
 effect and is at the same time an effect itself ; and the effect has not 
 only a cause but is also itself a cause. But the effect which the 
 cause has, and the effect which it is likewise the cause which the 
 effect has and the cause which it is are different. 
 
 Through the movement of the limited causal relation it has resulted 
 that the cause is extinguished not only in the effect, and with it the 
 effect also, as in formal causality, but the cause in its extinction, 
 reappears again in the effect, and that the effect vanishes in the 
 cause, but reappears again, likewise. Each of these determinations- 
 annuls itself in its positing and posits itself in its annulment. It is 
 not an external transition of causality from one substrate to another, 
 but this becoming- other is its own positing. Causality therefore 
 presupposes itself, or conditions itself. The identity preexisting- 
 merely-in-itself, the substrate, is therefore now determined as pre- 
 supposition, or it is posited in opposition to the active causality, and 
 the reflection (formerly external to the identity) stands now in essen- 
 tial connection with the same. 
 
 c. Action and Reaction. 
 
 Causality is presupposing activity. The cause is conditioned, it is 
 the negative relation to itself as presupposed, as external other, 
 which however is in itself, but only in itself, causality. It is, as we 
 have seen, the substantial identity into which formal causality passes 
 over, that has now determined itself in opposition to it as its negative. 
 In other words, it is the same as the substance of the causality-rela- 
 tion, but which stands in opposition to the power of accidentally as 
 self-substantial activity. It is the passive substance. That which is 
 passive is the immediate, or in-itself- existing which is not also for- 
 itself : the pure being or the essence which is only in this determinate- 
 ness of abstract self-identity. To the passive stands in opposition 
 the active substance as negative self-relation. It is the cause, in so- 
 far as it has restored itself from the effect in the limited, specialized 
 causality, through the negation of itself and which is active as a, 
 positing in its other-being, i. e., as immediate and through its nega- 
 tion mediates itself through itself. On this account causality has no 
 longer any substrate in which it inheres and is not form-determina- 
 tion opposed to this identity, but is itself the substance, or the ulti- 
 mate and original is only causality. The substrate is the passive 
 substance which has presupposed itself. 
 
 The cause now acts ; for it is the negative power related to itself ; 
 
 14
 
 210 Essence. 
 
 at the same time it is presupposed by it ; hence it acts upon itself as 
 though itself were another upon itself as upon passive substance. 
 Consequently, in the first place it annuls its other-being and returns 
 within it into itself. Secondly, it determines the same, and posits 
 this annulment of its other-being, or the return-into-itself as a deter- 
 minateness. This posited-being, for the reason that it is at the same 
 time its return into itself, is, in the first place, its effect. But, con- 
 versely, because it determines itself as its other, presupposing it, it 
 posits the effect in the other, the passive substance. In other words, 
 because the passive substance is itself the duplicated, namely, an 
 independent other, and at the same time is a presupposed, and in- 
 itself already identical with the active cause, the activity of this 
 passive substance is also double. Both phases of activity are in 
 one, the annulment of its being-determined, namely, its condition, 
 or the annulment of the independence of the passive substance ; and 
 besides this, that it annuls its identity with the same, and conse- 
 quently presupposes itself or posits itself as other. Through the 
 last moment the passive substance is preserved ; the first annulment 
 of it manifests itself in relation to it, in such a manner that only a 
 few of the determinations are annulled in it, and their identity with 
 the first in the effect becomes external to it. 
 
 In so far it suffers external compulsion. The external compulsion 
 is the manifestation of the power, or the power as external. But 
 the power is external only in so far as the causal substance is pre- 
 supposing in its activity at the same time that it is positing i. e. , it 
 posits itself as annulled. Conversely, therefore, the act of external 
 compulsion is an act of .the power. It is only another, presupposed 
 by itself, that the external-compulsory cause acts upon its effect 
 on it is negative relation to itself, or it is the manifestation of itself. 
 The passive is the independent, which is only a posited something 
 broken in itself an actuality which is conditioned, and the condi- 
 tion now in its truth, namely, an actuality which is only a possibility, 
 or, conversely, a being-in-itself which is only the determinateness of 
 the being-in-itself, onty passive. Hence that upon which the external 
 compulsion is exerted not only may be subject to violence but must 
 be. That which exerts compulsion upon the other does it because 
 it is the power of the same which manifests itself and the other in 
 it. The passive substance is posited only through the external com- 
 pulsion as that which it is in truth, namely, because it is the simple 
 positive or immediate substance, and for this reason is only a posited. 
 The presupposition which is its condition is the appearance of imme- 
 diateness, which appearance the active causality removes from it.
 
 T/ie Causality- Relation. '2\l 
 
 The passive substance is therefore given its dues only through the 
 influence of another constraining force. "What it loses is the men- 
 tioned immediateness the substantiality foreign to it. What it 
 receives as a foreign, namely, the being-determined as a posited-being 
 is its own determination, but since it is now posited in its posited- 
 being or in its own determination it is not annulled through this, but 
 it goes into identity with itself, and is therefore, in this activity of 
 becoming, determined, primitive independence. The passive sub- 
 stance is therefore, on the one hand, preserved or posited through 
 the active, namely, in so far as the latter makes itself merely an 
 annulled activity but on the other hand it is the doing of the pas- 
 sive itself, to go into identity with itself and consequently to make 
 itself primitive independence and cause. The being-posited through 
 another and its own becoming is the same thing. 
 
 Through the fact that the passive substance has inverted itself 
 into a cause, the effect is annulled within it. This constitutes its 
 reaction in general. It is in itself the posited-being as passive sub- 
 stance ; also the posited-being is posited within it through the other 
 substance in so far, namely, as it received on it the effect. Its 
 reaction contains therefore two phases: (1) That it is posited as 
 what it is in itself, and (2) that it exhibits itself in its being-in-itself 
 as that which it is posited. It is in-itself posited-being. and there- 
 fore it receives an effect upon it through the other. But this posited- 
 being is, conversely, its own being-in-itself, hence this is its effect 
 and it exhibits itself as cause. 
 
 Secondly, the reaction is opposed to the first-acting cause. The 
 effect which the previously passive substance annuls within itself 
 is, namely, that effect of the first-acting cause. The cause has 
 however its substantial actuality only in its effect. And since this is 
 annulled its causal substantiality is also annulled. This takes place 
 first in itself and through itself when it becomes effect; in this 
 identity its negative determination vanishes, and it becomes passive. 
 Secondly, this happens through that which was formerly passive, but 
 is now the reacting substance which annuls its effect. In the limited 
 causality, the substance upon which it acts becomes also again the 
 cause, it acts therefore against the activity which has posited it as an 
 effect. But it does not react against that cause, but it posits its 
 effect again in another substance, and thus the progress of effects 
 ad infinitum presents itself. For the reason that the cause here in 
 its effect is first self-identical only in-itself, and, therefore, on the 
 one hand, it vanishes into an immediate identity in its inactivity ; on 
 the other hand, it arouses its activity, again, in another substance.
 
 212 Essence. 
 
 In the limited causality, on the other hand, the cause relates to itself 
 in the effect, because it is its other as condition, as presupposed, and 
 its action is therefore just as much a becoming of its other as it is a 
 positing and annulling of the other. 
 
 Moreover it stands in this relation as passive substance. But, as 
 we saw, it originates through the effect that has been produced upon 
 it as primitive substance. The mentioned first cause which acts, and 
 receives its effect as reaction upon itself, appears again therefore as a 
 cause ; and by this the activitj 7 which in the finite causalit}' extends 
 into the infinite progress, is redirected toward its origin and returns 
 into itself, and becomes an infinite reciprocal-action. 
 
 Reciprocal Action. 
 
 In finite causality there are substances which act upon each other. 
 Mechanism consists in this externality of causality in which the 
 cause is reflected into itself in its effect, and is a repelling being. 
 In other words, the identity which has the causal substance, and its 
 effect within it, remains immediately self-external, and the effect 
 passes over into another substance. In reciprocal action, this mech- 
 anism is annulled ; for it contains in the first place the vanishing of 
 that original persistence of immediate substantiality. In the second 
 place, it involves the origination of the cause, and hence the primitive 
 independence mediates itself through its negation. 
 
 Reciprocal action first exhibits itself as opposite causal activity 
 proceeding from substances that are presupposed and self-condi- 
 tioning. Each one of them is opposed to the other as active and at 
 the same time as passive substance. Since both are passive as well 
 as active, each of these distinctions is annulled. It is a perfectly 
 transparent appearance. They are substances onby in so far as they 
 are the identity of the active and passive. Reciprocal action is there- 
 fore still an empty form and mode. It needs only an external com- 
 bination of that which is just as well in itself as posited. 
 
 In the first place, there are no longer any substrates which stand 
 in relation to each other, but they are substances. In the activity 
 of the conditioned causality the other presupposed immediatenes? 
 is an milled, and the conditioning of the causal activity is only an 
 influence from without, or it is its own passivity. This influence 
 from without, however, does not come from another original sub- 
 stance but from a causality winch conditions thi\,;:gh external
 
 Reciprocal Action, 213 
 
 influence, or is a mediated causality. This is external, in the first 
 place it comes to the cause, and constitutes its side of passivity, 
 and is therefore mediated through itself ; it is produced through its 
 own activity, and hence it is passivity posited through its own activ- 
 ity. Causality is conditioned and conditioning ; the conditioning is 
 the passive, but the conditioned is also passive. This conditioning 
 or the passivity is the negation of the cause by itself, since it essen- 
 tially makes itself into effect, and by this very act becomes cause. 
 The cause has not only an effect, but in the effect it stands in rela- 
 tion to itself as cause. 
 
 Through this, causality has returned into its absolute ideal, and has 
 become the idea itself [idea = Begriff, the totality of a process in its 
 three phases of universal, particular, and individual i. e. of deter- 
 mining, determined and self-determined]. It is in the first place, 
 real necessity. It is absolute identity .with itself, so that the 
 distinction of necessity is opposed to the inter-related determina- 
 tions within it substances, free actualities, opposed to each other. 
 Necessity is in this way, the internal identity. Causality is its mani- 
 festation in which its appearance of substantial other-being has been 
 annulled, and the necessity is elevated to freedom. In reciprocal 
 action, the original causality presents itself as arising from its nega- 
 tion, passivity, and as vanishing also into this passivity and becom- 
 ing the passivity. But this happens in such a manner that the becom- 
 ing is. at the same time, a mere appearance. The transition into 
 another is reflection into itself. The negation which is the ground of 
 the cause is its positive return into self-identity. 
 
 Necessity and causality have therefore vanished in this result. 
 They contain both the immediate identity as connection and relation and 
 the absolute substantiality of the distinct somewhats, and consequently 
 their absolute contingency. This is the primitive independent unity 
 of substantial multiplicity ; hence absolute contradiction. Necessity 
 is the being which is because it is ; the unity of being with itself 
 which is its own ground ; but, conversely, because it has a ground it 
 is not being, it is only appearance relation or mediation. Caus- 
 ality is this 1- Ited transition of original independent being, the 
 cause, into appearance or mere posited-being and conversely, of 
 posited-l>eing into original independence. But the identity of being 
 and appearance is still internal necessity. This intemality or this 
 being-in-itself is annulled by the activity of causality. In this activ- 
 itv. substantiality loses its sides, which stand in essential connec- 
 tion and necessity conceals itself. Necessity does not through 
 this become freedom i. e., through the fact that it vanishes but
 
 214 Essence. 
 
 through the fact that its internal identity is manifested. This is a 
 manifestation which is the identical movement of the distinct phases 
 within it the reflection of appearance, as appearance, into itself. 
 Conversely, contingency becomes freedom through this ; the sides of 
 necessity which have the form of free actualities not appearing in 
 each other [net mutually dependent] are now posited as identity, so 
 that these totalities of reflection-into-itself appear in their difference 
 only as identical, or are posited only as one and the same reflection. 
 The absolute substance distinguishing itself from itself as absolute 
 form, therefore, does not any longer repel itself as necessity, nor does 
 it fall asunder as contingency into indifferent substances external to 
 each other; but it distinguishes itself, on the one hand, (1) into the 
 totality which is the primitive independent (that was the formerly 
 passive substance), and is the reflection out of detcrminateness into 
 itself, as a simple whole which contains its posited-being in itself, 
 and, in this, is posited as self-identical ; this is the UNIVERSAL 
 [das Allgemeine], In the second place (this self -distinction) is the 
 (2) totality (which was formerly the causal substance), and which 
 is likewise the reflection out of determinateness into itself as negative 
 determinateness, and which is therefore the whole as self-identical 
 determinateness, but is now posited as self -identical negativity ; 
 this is THE INDIVIDUAL [cZas Einzelne]. But since the Univer- 
 sal is only self-identical inasmuch as it contains the determinateness 
 within itself as annulled, and is therefore the negative as negative, it 
 is immediately the same negativity that Individuality is. And the 
 Individuality, because it is the particularized determination [the 
 determined determination], which is the negative as negative, is 
 immediately the same identity that Universality is. This its simple 
 identity is particularity which retains from the Individual the moment 
 of determinateness and from the Universal the moment of reflection- 
 into-itself, and holds these in immediate unity. These three totalities 
 are therefore one and the same reflection, which as negative self-rela- 
 tion distinguishes itself into Universality and Individuality, but inas- 
 much as the distinction is a perfectly transparent one a determin- 
 ate simplicity, or a simple determinateness it is one and the same 
 identity. This is the IDEA [_Begriff~\, THE REALM OF SUBJEC- 
 TIVITY, OR OF FREEDOM.
 
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