THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AUGUSTE COMTE. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE. FREELY TRANSLATED AND CON DENSED ET HARRIET MARTINEAU. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. THIRD EDITION. LONDON: KEGAN TAUL, TEENCH, TEUBNER, & CO. I/P PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD. 1893. TliC riijlds (ij IrunslutkiH and of rcjirefor6 ascertaining the stage which the Positive Philosophy has reached, we must bear in mind that the different kinds History of the of our knowledge have passed through the three Positive Pki- stages of progress at different rates, and have not ^''^''My- therefore arrived at the same time. The rate of advance dej)ends on the nature of the knowledge in question, so distinctly that, as we shall see hereafter, this consideration constitutes an accessary to the fundamental law of progress. Any kind of knowledge reaches the ])ositive stage early in proportion to its generality, simplicity, and independence of other departments. Astronomical science, which is above all made up of facts that are general, simi)le, and inde])en- dent of other sciences, arrived first ; then terrestrial Physics ; then Chemistry ; and, at length. Physiology. It is difficult to assign any precise date to this revolution in 6 POSITIVE PHI 10 SO PHY. science. It mny be said, like everything else, to have been always going on ; and especially since the labours of Aristotle and the school of Alexandria; and then from the introduction of natural science into the West of Europe by tlie Arabs. But, if we nuist fix upon some marked period, to serve as a rallying point, it nuist be that, — about two centuries ago, — when the human mind was astir under the precepts of Bacon, the conceptions of Descartes, and the discovei'ies of Galileo. Then it was that the spirit of the Positive philosophy rose up in opposition to that of the superstitious and scholastic systems which had hitherto obscuied the true character of all science. Since that date, the progress of the Positive philos- ophy, and the decline of the other two, have been so marked that no rational mind now doubts that the revolution is destined to go on to its completion, — every branch of knowledge being, sooner or later, brought within the operation of Positive philosopliy. This is not yet the case. Some are still lying outside : and not till they are brought in will the Positive philosophy possess that character of imiversality which is necessary to its definitive constitution. In mentioning just now the four })rincipal categories of phenomena, — astronomical, physiciil, chemical, and physiological, — there was New departmmt ^" omission which will have been noticed. Nothing of Positive was said of Social phenomena. Though involved Philosophy. y][\\x the ])hysiological, Social phenomena demand a distinct classification, both on account of their importance and of their difficulty. They are the most individual, the most complicated, the most dependent on all others ; and therefore they must be the latest, — even if they had no special obstacle to encounter. This bi-anch of science has not hitherto entered into the domain of Positive philosophy. Theological and metaphysical methods, exploded in other departments, are as yet exclusively applied, both in the way of inquiry and discussion, in all treatment of Social subjects, though the best minds are heartily weary of eternal disputes about divine i-ight and the sovereignty of the people. This is the great, while it is evidently the only gap which has to be filled, to constitute, solid and entire, the Positive Philosophy. Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics, — mechanical and chemical ; organic physics, both vegetable and animal, — there remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation, — Social physics. This is what men have now most need of : and this it is the ])i-incipal aim of the jn-esent work to establish. It would be absurd to pretend to offer this new science at once Social Phusics ^" ^ Complete state. Others, less new, are in very unequal conditions of forwardness. But the same character of ])ositivity whicli is impressed on all the othei's will be shown to belong to ihis. This once done, the philosophical system of the moderns will be in fact complete, as there will then be no phenomenon which does not naturally enter into some one of the NE W PROVINCE OF POSITIVE PIIIIOSOPH Y. 7 five great categories. All our fuiulauiental conceptions having become homogeneous, the Positive state will bo fully established. It can never again change its character, though it will be for ever in course of development by additions of new knowledge. Having acquired the character of universality which has hitherto been the only advantage vesting with the two preceding systems, it will supersede them by its natural superiority, and leave to them only an historical existence. We have stated the special aim of this woi-k. Its secondary and general aim is this : — to review what has been effected Secondaru aim, m the Sciences, in oi'der to show that they are not of this work. radically separate, but all branches from the same trunk. If we had confined ourselves to the first and special object of the work, we should have produced merely a study of Social physics : whereas, in introducing the second and general, we offer a study of Positive philoso[)hy, passing in review all the positive sciences already formed. The purpose of this work is not to give an account of the Natural Sciences. Besides that it would be endless, and that Toreviciothe it would require a scientific preparation such as no p/uiosuphi/ of one man possesses, it would be apart from our object, i/^e Sciences. which is to go throuuh a course of not Positive Science, but Positive Philosophy. We have only to consider each fundamental science in its relation to the whole positive system, and to the spirit which characterizes it ; that is, with regard to its methods and its chief results. The two aims, though distinct, are inseparable ; for, on the one hand, there can be no positive j)hilosophy without a basis of social science, without which it could not be all-comprehensive ; and, on the other hand, we could not pursue Social science without having been prepared by the study of phenomena less complicated than those of society, and furnished with a knowledge of laws and anterior facts which have a bearing upon social science. Though the funda- mental sciences are not all equally interesting to ordinary minds, there is no one of them that can be neglected in an inquiry like the ])resent; and, in the eye of philosophy, all are of equal value to human welfare. Even those which appear the least interesting have their own value, either onaccoimtof the perfection of their methods, or as being the necessary basis of all the others. Lest it should be supposed that our course will lead us into a wilderness of such special studies as are at present . the bane of a true positive philosophy, we will briefly ' '' ' advert to the existing prevalence of such special ])ursuit. In the primitive state of human knowledge there is no regular division of intellectual labour. Every student cultivates all the sciences. As knowledge accrues, the sciences part off ; and students devote them- selves each to some one branch. It is owing to this division of 8 POSITIVE PHIIOSOPHY. employment, and concentration of whole minds upon a sini^le department, that science has made so prodigjious an advance in modern times; and the perfection of this division is one of the most important characteristics of the Positive philosophy. But, while admitting all the merits of this change, we cannot be blind to the eminent disadvantages which arise from the limitation of minds to a particular study. It is inevitable that each should be possessed with exclusive notions, and be therefore incapable of the general superiority of ancient students, who actually owed that general superiority to the inferiority of their knowledge. We must consider whether the evil can be avoided without losing the good of the modern arrangement ; for the evil is becoming ui-gent. We all acknowledge that the divisions established for the convenience of scientific pursuit are radically artificial ; and yet there are very few ■who can embrace in idea the whole of any one science : each science moreover being itself only a part of a great whole. Almost every one is busy about his own particular section, without much thought about its relation to the general system of positive know- ledge. We must not be blind to the evil, nor slow in seeking a remedy. AVe must not forget that this is the weak side of the positive philosojihy, by which it may yet be attacked, with some hope of success, by the adherents of the theological and metaphysi- cal systems. As to the remedy, it certainly does not lie in a return to the ancient confusion of pursuits, which would be mere retrogression, if it were possible, which it is not. It lies in jierfecting the division of employments itself, — in carrying it one degree higher, — in constituting one more speciality from the study of scientific generalities. Let us have a new class of students, Proposed veio Suitably prepared, whose business it shall be to take class of stu- the respective sciences as they are, determine the ^^"'^*- spirit of each, ascertain their relations and mutual connection, and reduce their respective princi])les to the smallest number of general principles, in conformity with the fundamental j-ules of the Positive Method. At the same time, let other students be prepared for their special pursuit by an education which recog- nizes the whole scope of positive science, so as to profit by the labours of the students of generalities, and so as to correct j'eciprocally, under that guidance, the results obtained by each. We see some ap{)roach already to this arrangement. Once established, there would be nothing to a})prehend from any extent of division of employments. Wlien we once have a clnss of learned men, at the disposal of all others, whose business it shall be to connect each new discovery with the general system, we may dismiss all fear of the great whole being lost sight of in the pursuit of the details of knowkulge. The organization of scientific research will then be com])lete; and it will henceforth have occasion only to extend its development, and not to chynge its charactei'. After all the FIRST BENEFIT. 9 f->'iosoph!/. tages, four may be especially pointed out. I. The study of the Positive Philosophy affords the only rational means of exhibiting the logical laws of the human illustrates the mind, which have hitherto been sought by unfit intellectual methods. To explain what is meant by this, we may fi^nctwn. refer to a saying of M. de Blainville, in his work on Comparative Anatomy, that every active, and especially every living being, may be regarded under two relations — the Statical and the Dynamical ; that is, under conditions or in action. It is clear that all considera- tions range themselves under the one or the other of tliese heads. Let us apply this classification to the intellectual functions. If we regard these functions under their Statical aspect —that is, if we consider the conditions under which they exist — we must de- termine the organic circumstances of the case, which inquiry involves it with anatomy and pliysiology. If we look at the Dynamic aspect, we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual ])0wers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philoso[)hy. In short, looking at all scientific theories as so many great logical facts, it is only by the thorough observation of these facts that we can arrive at the know- ledge of logical laws. These being the only means of knowledge of intellectual phenomena, the illusory psychology, which is the last })hase of theology, is excluded. It jiretends to accomplish the dis- coveiT of the laws of the human mind b}^ contemplating it in itself; that is, by separating it from causes and effects. Such an attempt^ n)ade in defiance of the physiological study of our intellectual organs, and of the observation of rational methods of pioccdure, cannot succeed at this time of day. The Positive Philosoj)hy, which has been rising since the time of Bacon, has now secured such a preponderance, that the meta- physicians themselves profess to ground their pi-etended science on an observation of facts. They talk of external and internal facts, and say that their business is with the lattej-. This is much like saying that vision is explained by luminous objects painting their images npon the retina. To this the physiologists reply that another eye would be needed to see the image. In the same mannei', the nn'nd may observe all phenomena but its own. It \m\y ha said that a man's intellect njay observe his passions, the scat of the reason lo POSITIVE PHIIOSOPIIY. l>eing somewlial Jipnvt from that of the emotions in the brain; but there can be nothin<^ like scientific observation of the passions, except from without, as the stir of the emotions (hsturbsthe observing faculties more or less. It is yet more out of the question to make an intel- lectual observation of intellectual processes. The observing and observed organ are here the same, and its action cannot be pure and natural. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity ; yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe : if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity. After two thousand years of psychological ])ursuit, no one proposition is established to the satisfaction of its followers. They are divided, to this day, into a multitude of schools, still disputing aljout the very elements of their doctrine. This in- terior observation gives birth to almost as many theories as there are observers. We ask in vain for any one discovery, great or small, which has been made under this method. The psychologists have done some good in keeping up the activity of our understandings, when there w\as no better work for our faculties to do ; and they may have added something to our stock of knowledge. If they have done so, it is by practising the Positive method — by observing the progress of the human mind in the light of science ; that is, by ceasing, for the moment, to be psychologists. The view just given in relation to logical Science becomes yet more striking when we consider the logical Art. The Positive Method can be judged of only in action. It cannot be looked at by itself, apart from the work on which it is employed. At all events, such a contemplation would be only a dead study, which could produce nothing in the mind whicli loses time upon it. We may talk for ever about the metliod, and state it in terms very wisely, without knowing half so much about it as the man who has once put it in practice upon a single particular of actual research, even without any philosophical intention. Thus it is that psychol- ogists, by dint of reading the precepts of Bacon and the discourses of Descartes, have mistaken their own dreams for science. Without saying whether it will ever be possible to establish a 'priori a true method of investigation, independent of a philosophical study of the sciences, it is clear that the thing has never been done yet, and that we are not capable of doing it now. We cannot as yet explain the great logical procedures apart from their application. If we ever do, it will remain as necessary then as now to form good intellectual habits by studying the regular application of the scientific methods which we shall have attained. This, then, is the first great result of the Positive Philosophy — the manifestation by experiment of the laws which rule the Intel- lect in the investigation of truth ; and, as a consequence, the know- ledge of the general rules suitable for that object. SECOi\n AND TJinUJ BENEFITS. n II. The socoml offoct of the Positive Philosopliy, an effect not less important and far more urgently wanted, will be Must ra/merate to regenerate Eilucation. Education. The best minds are agreed that our European education, still t'ssentially theological, metaphysical, and literary, must be su})er- seded by a Positive ti'ainiug, conformable to our time and needs. Even the governments of our day have shared, where they have not originated, the attempts to establish positive instruction ; and this is a striking indication of the prevalent sense of what is wanted. While encouraging such endeavours to the utmost, we must not however conceal from ourselves that everything yet done is inadequate to the object. The ])resent exclusive speciality of our ])ursuits, and the consequent isolation of the sciences, spoil our teaching. If any student desires to form an idea of nattu-al philos- 0})h3'' as a whole, he is com})elled to go through each department as it is now taught, as if he were to be only an astronomer, or only a chemist; so that, be his intellect what it may, his training must remain very imperfect. And yet his object requires that he should obtain general positive conceptions of all the classes of natural phenomena. It is such an aggregate of con- ceptions, whether on a great or on a small scale, which must hence- ibrth be the permanent basis of all human combinations. It will constitute the mind of future generations. In order to this i-egen- eration of our intellectual system, it is necessary that the sciences, considered as branches from one trunk, should yield us, as a whole, their chief methods and their most important lesults. The speci- alities of science can be pursued by those whose vocation lies in that direction. They are indispensable ; and they are not likely to be neglected ; but they can never of themselves renovate our system of Education ; and, to be of their full use, they must rest upon the basis of that general instruction which is a direct result of the Positive Philosophy. III. The same special study of scientific generalities must also aid the progress of the respective positive sciences : Ajranccs and this constitutes our third head of advantages. acUurc,^ i,y The divisions which we establish between the combmingthcm. sciences are, though not arbitrary, essentially artificial. The sub- ject of our researches is one: we divide it for our convenience, in order to deal the more easily with its difficulties. But it sometimes liappens — and especially with the most important doctrines of each science — that we need what we cannot obtain under the present isolation of the sciences, — a combination of several special points of view ; and for want of this, veiy important problems wait for their solution much longer than they otherwise need do. To go back into the past for an example: Descartes' grand conception with regard to analytical geometiy is a discovery which has changed the whole aspect of mathematical science, and yielded the germ of all 12 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. future progress; and it issued from the union of two sciences which liad always before been separately regarded and pursued. The case of pending questions is yet more impi-essive ; as, for instance, in Chemistry, the doctrine of Definite Proportions. Without entering upon the discussion of the fundamental principle of this theory, we may say with assurance that, in order to determine it — in order to determine whether it is a law of nature that atoms sliould necessarily combine in fixed numbers, — it will be indispensable that the chemical point of view should be united with the pliysiological. The failure of the theory with regard to organic bodies indicates that the cause of this immense exception must be investigated ; and such an inquiry belongs as much to physiology as to chemistry. Again, it is as yet. imdecided whether azote is a simple or a compound body. It was concluded by almost all chemists that azote is a simple body ; the iHustrious Berzelius hesitated, on purely chemical considerations ; but he was also influenced by the physiological observation that animals which receive no azote in their food have as much of it in their tissues as carnivorous animals. Fi'om this we see how physi- ology must unite with chemistry to inform us whether azote is simple or compound, and to institute a new series of researches upon the relation between the composition of living bodies and their mode of alimentation. Such is the advantage which, in the third place, we shall owe to Positive pliilosophy — the elucidation of the respective sciences by their combination. In the fourth place IV. The Positive Philosophy offers the only solid basis for that Must reorrjan- Social Reorganization which must succeed the ize. society. critical condition in which the most civilized nations are now living. It cannot be necessary to prove to anybody who reads this work that Ideas govern the world, or throw it into chaos ; in other words, that all social mechanism rests upon Opinions. The great political and moral crisis that societies are now undergoing is shown by a rigid analysis to arise out of intellectual anarchy. While stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social ordei', we ai'e suffering under an utter disagreement which may be called universal. Till a certain number of general ideas can be acknow- ledged as a rallying-point of social doctrine, the nations will remain in a revolutionary state, whatever palliatives maybe devised; and their institutions can he only provisional. But whenever the iiecessaiy agreement on first principles can be obtained, appropriate institutions will issue fi'om them, without shock or resistance; for the causes of disorder will have been arrested by the mere fact of the agreement. It is in this direction that those must look who desiie a natural and regular, a normal state of society. Now, the existing disorder is abundantly accounted for by the existence, all at once, of three incompatible philosophies, — the FO UR TH BENEFIT. 1 3 tlieological, the metapliysicul, and the positive. Any one of these might alone secnre some sort of social order ; but while the three co-exist, it is impossible for ns to understand one another upon any essential point Avhatever. If this is true, we have only to ascertain which of the philosophies must, in the nature of things, prevail ; and, this ascertained, every man, whatever may have been his former views, cannot but concr.r in its triumph. The problem once recognized cannot I'emaiu long unsolved ; for all considerations whatever point to the Positive Philosophy as the one destined to prevail. It alone has been advancing during a course of centuries, thi'oughout which the others have been declining. The fact is incontestable. Some may deplore it, but none can destro}' it, nor therefore neglect it but under penalty of being betrayed by illusory speculations. This general i-evolution of the human mind is neaily accomplished. We have only to complete the Positive Philosoi)hy by bringing Social phenomena within its comprehension, and aftei- wards consolidating the whole into one body of homogeneous doctrine. The marked preference which almost all minds, from the highest to the commonest, accord to positive knowledge over vague and mystical conceptions, is a pledge of what the reception of tliis philosophy will be when it has acquired tlie only quality that it now wants — a character of due generality. When it has becomi! complete, its supremacy will take ])lace spontaneously, and will le-establish order throughout society. There is, at present, n(» conflict but between the theological and the metaphysical philoso- ])hies. They are contending for the task of reorganizing society ; but it is a woi-k too mighty for either of them. The })ositive ])hilosophy has hitherto intervened oidy to examine both, and both are abundantly discredited by the process. It is time now to be doing something more effective, without wasting our forces in needless controvensy. It is time to complete the vast intellectual operation begun by Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, by constructing the system of general ideas which must henceforth prevail among the human race. This is the way to put an end to the revolutionary crisis which is tormenting the civilized nations of the world. Leaving these four points of advantage, we must attend to one precautionary reflection. Because it is propo.scd to consolidate the whole of our acquired knowledge into one body of homogeneous doctrine, it j^^^ hor,eofre- must not be supj)osed that we are going to study this auction to a vast variety as proceeding from a single principle, smgielaw. and as subiected to a sinjii-le law. There is something so chimerical in attempts at universal explanation by a single law, that it niay be as well to secure this Work at once from any imputation of the kind, though its development will show how undeserved such an imputation would be. Our intellectual resources are too narrow, and the imiverse is too complex, to leave any liope tluit it will ever 14 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. be widiin our power to cany scientific perfection to its last degree of simplicity. Moreover, it appears as if the value of such an attainment, supposing it possible, were greatly overrated. The only way, for instance, in which Ave could achieve the business, would be by connecting all natural phenomena with the most general law we know, — which is that of Gravitation, by which astronomical phenomena are already connected with a poi-tion of terrestrial })hysics. Laplace has indicated that chemical phenomena may be regarded as simple atomic effects of the Newtonian attraction, modified by the form and mutual position of the atoms. But supposing this view proveable (which it cannot be while we are Avithout data about the constitution of bodies), the difficulty of its application would doubtless be found so great that we must still maintain the existing division between astronomy and chemistry, Avith the difference that Ave now regard as natural tliat division which Ave should then call artificial. Laplace himself presented his idea only as a philosophic device, incapable of exercising any useful influence over the progress of chemical science. Moreover, supposing this insuperable difficulty overcome, Ave should be no nearer to scientific unity, since Ave then should still have to connect the Avhole of physiological phenomena Avith the same law, Avhich certainly would not be the least difficult part of the enterprise. Yet, all things considered, the hypothesis Ave have glanced at Avould be the most favourable to the desired unity. The consideration of all phenomena as referable to a single origin is by no means necessary to the systematic formation of science, any more than to the realization of the great and happy consequences that Ave anticipate from the positiv'C philosophy. The only neces- sary unity is that of Method, Avhich is already in great part estab- lished. As for the doctrine, it need not be one; it is enough that it should be homogeneous. It is, then, under the double aspect of unity of method and homogeneousness of doctrine that we shall consider the different classe;? of positive theories in this work. While pursuing the philosophical aim of all science, the lessening of the number of general laws requisite for the explanation of natu- ral phenomena, Ave shall regard as presumptuous every attempt, in all future time, to reduce them rigorously to one. Having thus endeavoured to determine the spirit and influence of the Positive Philosophy, and to mark the goal of our labours, we haA^e noAv to proceed to the exposition of the system ; that is, to the determination of the universal, or encyclopaedic order, Avhich must regulate the different classes of natural phenomena, and con- sequently the corresponding positive sciences. ) IS CHAPTEE II. VIEW OF THE HIERARCHY OF THE POSITIVE SCIENCES. Im proceedinp^ to offer a Classification of the Sciences, we must leave on one side all others that have as yet been attempted. Such scales as those of Bacon and D'Alembert are con- paihirc ofpro- structed upon an arbitrary division of the faculties of posed dassiji- the mind ; whereas, our principal faculties are often <^<^twns. enga<;ed at the same time in any scientific pursuit. As for other classifications, they have failed, through one fault or another, to command assent : so that there are almost as many schemes as there are individuals to propose them. The failure has been so cons])icuous, that the best minds feel a prejudice against this kind of enterprise, in any shape. Now, what is the reason of this ? — For one reason, the distribution of the sciences, having become a somewh.at discredited task, has of late been undertaken chiefly by persons who have no sound knowledge of any science at all. A more important and less personal reason, however, is the want of homogeneousness in the different parts of the intellectual system, — some having successively become positive, while others remain theological or metaphysical. Among such incoherent materials, classification is of course impossible. Every attempt at a distribution has failed from this cause, without the distributor being able to see why; — without his discovering that a radical contrariety existed between the materials he was endeavouring to combine. The fact was clear enough, if it had but been understood, that the enterprise was prematui-e ; and that it was useless to undertake it till our princi{)al scientific conceptions should all have become positive. The ])receding chapter seems to show that this in- dispensable condition may now be considered fulfilled : and thus the time has arrived for laying down a sound and durable system of scientific order. We may derive encouragement from the example set by i^ecent botanists and zoologists, whose philosophical labours have exhibited the true principle of classification; viz., that the classification must proceed from the study of the things to be classified, and must by no means be determined l3y dpriori considerations. The real affinities and natural connections presented by objects being allowed to deter- mine their order, the classification itself becomes the expression of the most general fact. And thus docs the positive method apply i6 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY, to the question of classification itself, as well as to the objects in- T rut 'principle cluded Under it. It follows that the mutual depend- of classification, g^ce of the sciences, — a dependence resulting from that of the corresponding phenomena, — must determine the arrange- ment of the s3-stem of human knowledge. Before proceeding to investigate this mutual dependence, we have only to ascertain the real bounds of the classification proposed : in other words, to settle Avhat we mean b}' human knowledge, as the subject of this work. The field of human labour is either speculation or action : and Boundaries thus, we are accustomed to divide our knowledge of our field. j^to the theoretical and the practical. It is obvious that, in this inquiry, we have to do only with the theoretical. We are not going to treat of all human notions whatevei", but of those fundamental conceptions of the diflferent orders of phenomena which furnish a solid basis to all combinations, and are not founded on any antecedent intellectual system. In such a study, speculation is our material, and not the application of it, — except where the appli- cation may happen to throw back light on its speculative origin. This is probably what Bacon meant by that First Philosophy which he declared to be an extract from the whole of Science, and which has been so differently and so strangely interpreted by his meta- physical commentators. There can be no doubt that Man's study of nature must furnish the only basis of his action upon nature ; for it is only by knowing the laws of phenomena, and thus being able to foresee them, that we can, in active life, set them to modify one another for our advantage. Our direct natural power over everything about us is extremely weak, and altogether disproportioned to our needs. Whenever we effect anything great it is through a knowledge of natural laws, by which we can set one agent to work upon another, — even very weak modifying elements producing a change in the results of a large aggregate of causes. The relation of science to art may be summed up in a brief expression : From Science comes Prevision : from Prevision comes Action, We must not, however, fall into the error of our time, of regard- ing Science chiefly as a basis of Art, However great may be the services rendered to Industry by science, however true may be the saying that Knowledge is Power, we must never forget that the sciences have a higher destination still ; — and not only higher but more direct ; — that of satisfying the craving of our understanding to know the laws of phenomena. To feel how deep and urgent this need is, we have only to consider for a moment the physiological effects of consternatiQii, and to remember that the most terrible sensation we are capable of, is that which we experience when any phenomenon seems to arise in violation of the familiar laws of nature. This need of disposing facts in a comprehensible order (which is the ])roper object of all scientific theories) is so inherent in our 1 ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE SCIENCE. 17 organization, that if wo couUl not satisfy it by ]iositi\'e concepl-ions, we must inevitably return to those theological and metaphysical explanations which hiul their origin in this very fact of human nature. — It is this original tendency which acts as a preservative, in the minds of men of science, against the narrowness and incom- ])]eteness whicli the practical habils of our age are apt to produce. it, is through this that we are able to maintain just and noble ideas of the importance and destination of the sciences; and if it were not thus, the human untlerstanding would soon, as Condorcet has observed, come to a stand, even as to the practical a{)i)lications for the sake of which higher things had been sacrificed ; for, if the arts flow from science, the neglect of science must destroy the consequent arts, tSome of the most important arts are derived from speculations ))m'sued during long ages with a purely scientific intention. For instance, the ancient Greek geometers delighted themselves with beautiful specidations on Conic Sections; those speculations wrought, after a long series of generations, the renovation of astronumy ; and out of this h;is the art of navigation attained a perfection which it never could have reached otherwise than through the speculative labours of Archimedes and Apollonius : so th;it, to use Condorcet's illustration, "the sailor who is pi-eserved from shipwreck by the exact observation of the longitude, owes his life to a the((fry conceived two thousand yenrs before by men of genius who had in view simply geometrical speculations." Oui" business, it is clear, is with theoretical researches, letting alone their })ractical application altogether. Though we may con- ceive of a course of study wliich should unite the generalities of speculation and ajiplication, the time is not come for it. To say nothing of its vast extent, it would require preliminary achievements which have not yet been attempted. We must first be in possession of appropriate Special conceptions, formed according to scientific theories; and for these we have yet to wait. Meantime, an inter- mediate class is rising up, whose particidar destination is to oi-ganize the relations of theory and practice; such as the engineei-s, who do not labour in the advancement of science, but wdio study it in its existing state, to apply it to practical purposes. Such classes are furnishing us with the elements of a futiu-e body of doctrine on the theories of the different arts. Already, Monge, in bis view of descriptive geometry, has given us a general theory of the arts of construction. But we have as yet only a few scattered instances of this nature. The time Avill come when out of such i-esults, a de[)artment of Positive ])hilosophy may arise : but it will be in a distant future. If we remember that several sciences are im- plicated in every important art, — that, for instance, a true theory of Agricidture requires a combination of physiological, chemical, mechanical, and even astronomical and mathematical science, — it will be evident that true theories of tiie arts must wait Vol. I. B 1 8 POSITIVE PHIIOSOPHY. for a large and equable development of these constituent sciences. One more preliminaiy remark occurs, before we finish the pre- scription of our limits, — the ascertainment of our ticld of iuquiry. We must distinguish between the two classes of Abstract science. -kt i. i • ^ ii i j l i i • i i JNatural science ; — the abstract or general, winch nave for their object the discovery of the laws which regulate })henomena „ . in all conceivable cases: and the concrete, particulai", Concrete science. , . ^. , . , ^. n i tvt ^ i or descriptive, which ai-e sometimes called JNatural sciences in a restricted sense, whose function it is to apply these laws to the actual history of existing beings. The*first are funda- mental ; and our business is with them alone, as the second are derived, and however important, not rising into the rank of our subjects of contemplation. We shall treat of physiology, but not of botany and zoology, which are derived from it. We shall treat of chemistry, but not of miuerfdogy, which is secondary to it. — We may say of Concrete Physics, as these secondary sciences are called, the same thing that we said of theories of the arts, — that they require a preliminary knowledge of several sciences, and an advance of those sciences not yet achieved ; so that, if there were no other reason, we must leave these secondary classes alone. At a future time Concrete Physics will have made progress, according to the development of Abstract Physics, and will afford a mass of less in- coherent materials than those which it now presents. At present, too few of the students of these secondary sciences appear to be even aware that a due acquaintance with the primary sciences is requisite to all successful prosecution of their own. We have now considered, First, that science being composed of speculative knowledge and of ])ractical knowledge, we have to deal only with the first ; and Second, that theoretical knowledge, or science properly so called, being divided into general and particular, or abstract and concrete science, we have again to deal only with the first. Being thus in possession of our proper subject, duly prescribed, we may j)roceed to the ascertainment of the true order of the funda- mental sciences. This classification of the sciences is not so easy a matter as it Difficulty of may appear. However natural it may be, it will classification. always involve something, if not arbitrary, at least artificial ; and in so far, it will always involve inqiei'fection. It is im[)ossil)le lo fulfil, quite rigorously, the object of presenting the sciences in their natural connect ion, and according to their mutual de})endence, so as to avoid the smallest danger ot being involved in a vicious circle. It is eas}" to show why. Historical and Every scieuce may be exhibited under two methods doresented as it mi,<;ht be conceived of at this day, by a mind which, duly jirepared and })Iaced at the ri,i2,ht point of view, should begin to reconstitute the science as a whole. A new science must be pursued historically, the only thing to be done being to study in chronological oider the ditierent works which have contributed to the ])rogress of the science. But wdien such materials have become lecast to form a genei'al system, to meet the demand ibr a more natuial logical order, it is because the science is too far advanced i'or the liistorical order to be practicable or suitable. The more discoveries are made, the gi-eater becomes the labour of the historical method of study, and the more effectual the dogmatic, because the new concej)tions bring forward the earlier ones in a fresh light. Thus, the education of an ancient geometer consisted simply in the study, in their due order, of the very small number of original treatises then existing on the different parts of geometry. The wiiiingsof Ai'chimedes and ApoUonius were, in fact, about all. On the contrary, a modern geometer cojumonly finishes his education without having read a single original work dating further back than the most recent discoveries, which cannot be known by any other means. Thus the Dogmatic Method is for ever sui)erseding the liistorical, as we advance to a higher position in science. If every mind had to jiass through all the stages that every predecessor in the study had gone through, it is clear that, however easy it is to learn rather than ins'ent, it would be impossible to effect the pur- ])ose of education, — to place the student on the vantage-ground gained by the labouis of all the men who have gone before. By ihe dogmatic method this is done, even though the living student may have only an ordinary intellect, and the dead may have been men of lofty genius. By tlie dogmatic method therefore must every advanced science be attained, with so nmcli of the historical com- bined with it as is rendered necessary by discoveries too recent to be studied elsewhere than in their own records. The only objection to the preference of the Dogmatic method is that it does not show how the science was atbuned ; but a moment's reflection will show that this is the case also with the Historical method. To pursue a science historically is quite a different thing from learning tlie history of its ])rogress. This last ])ertains to the study of huujan history, as we shall see when we reach the final division of this work. It is trtie that a science cannot be completely understood without a knowledge of how it arose ; and again, a dogmatic know- ledge of any science is necessary to an understanding of its history ; and therefore we shall notice, in treating of the fundamental sciences, the incidents of their origin, when distinct and illustra- 20 POSITIVE nilLOSOPIIY. five ; nnd we slmll use their history, in a Rcientifio sense, in onr treatment ot" Social Phj'sics; but the historical sl-udy, imjjortant, even essential, as it is, remains entirely distinct from tlie proper dogmatic study of science. These considerations in this place, tend to define more precisely the spirit of onr course of inquiry, while they more exactly detei-mine the conditions under which we may hope to succeed in the construction of a ti'ue scale of the aggre- gate fundamental sciences. Great confusion would arise from any ;ittem])t to adhei'e strictly to historical oi'der in our exposition of the sciences, for they have not all advanced at the same rate; and we must be for ever borrowing from each some fact to illustrate another, without regard to priority of origin. Thus, it is clear that, in the system of the sciences, astronomy must come before physics, properly so called : and yet, several branches of physics, above all, optics, are indispensable to the complete exposition of astronomy. Minor defects, if inevitable, catmot invalidate a classification which, on the whole, fulfils the princijial conditions of the case. They belong to what is essentially artificial in our division of intellectual laljour. In the main, however, our classification agrees with the liistory of science; the more general and simple sciences actually occurring first and advancing best in human histor}'', and being followed by the more complex and i-estricted, though all were, since the earliest times, enlarging simultaneously. A simple mathematical illustration will precisely represent the difficulty of the question we have to resolve, while it will sum up the preliminary considerations we have just concluded. We propose to classify the fimdamental sciences. They are six, as we shall soon see. We cannot make them less; and most scientific men would reckon them as more. Six objects admit of 720 different dispositions, or, in popular language, changes. Thus we have to choose the one right order (and there can be but one right) out of 720 possible ones. Very few of these have ever been proposed ; yet we might venture to say that there is probably net one in favour of which some plausible reason might not be assigned ; for we see the wildest divergences among the schemes whicii have been proposed, — the sciences which are placed by some at the head of the scale being sent by others to the further extremity. Our problem is, then, to find the one rational order, among a host of possible systems. Now we must remember that we have to look for the principle True principle of classification in the comparison of the different of classification, orders of phenomena, through which science discovers the laws which are her object. What we have to determine is the real dependence of scientific studies. Now, Ibis dependence can result only from that of the corresponding phenomena. All observable phenomena may be included within a very few natural categories, so arranged as that the study of each category may be PRINCIPLE OF classification: 21 t]^ronnded on tlio ])rincipal Inws of tlio precedini^, iuid serve as llie basis of llie next ensning. This oi'der is determined by the degree of sinii)licitv, or, what comes to tlie same thinjj^, of ^ generality ot tlieu- phenomena. Jlence resnlts their successive dependence, and tlie greater or lesser ^ ...,., P , f . 1 • T Dependence. hicility tor bemg studied. It is clear, d priori, that the most simple phenomena must be the most general ; for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course the most disengaged from the incidents of ])articular cases. We nuist begin then with the study of the most general or simple phenomena, going on successively to the more particular or complex. This must be the most methodical way, ibr this order of generality or simplicity fixes the degree of facility in the study of phenomena, while it determines the necessary con- nection of the sciences hy the successive dependence of their pheno- mena. It is worthy of remark in this place that the most general and simple phenomena are the furthest removed from Man's ordi- nary sphere, and must thereby be studied in a calmer and more iMtional frame of mind than those in which he is more nearly implicated ; and tliis constitutes a new ground for the correspond- ing sciences being developed more rapidly. We have now obtained our rule. Next we proceed to our classiti cation. We ai'e first struck by the clear division of all natural [)henomena into two classes— of inorganic and of organic bodies, j^organicand The organized are evidently, in fact, more complex Organic phe- and less general than the inorganic, and depend upon ^omena. them, instead of being de{)eiided on by them. Therefore it is that ])hysiological study should begin with inorganic phenomena ; since the organic include all the qualities belonging to them, with a special oi'der added, viz., the vital {)hen()mena, which belong to organization. We have not to investigate the nature of either ; for the positive philosophy docs not inquire into natures. Whether their nature be supposed different or the same, it is evidently necessary to separate the two studies of inorganic matter and of living bodies. Our classification will stand througli any future decision as to the way in which living bodies are to be regarded ; for, on any supposition, the general laws of inorganic physics nuist be established before we can proceed with success to the examina- tion of a de{)endent class of phenomena. Each of these great halves of natural philosojiliy has subdivisions. Inorganic ])hvsics must, in accordance with our rule ^ ^ f 1-. " 1 *i 1 i- 1 1 c 1 I- Inorganic. ot generality and tlie order ot dependence or pheno- mena, be divided into two sections — of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Tims we have Astronomy, geometrical and mechanical, and Terrestrial Physics. The ne- " " '"^' cessity of this division is exactly the same as in the former case. 22 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. Astronomical plienomena are the most general, sim])le, and abstract of all ; and therefore the study of natural |)liiloso{)liy must clearly begin with them. They are themselves independent, while the laws to which they are subject influence all others whatsoever. The general effects of gravitation ])reponderate, in all terrestrial ])henon]ena, over all effects which may be peculiar to them, and modify the original ones. It follows that the analysis of the simjilest teri-estrial phenomenon, not only chemical, but even purely mechanical, pi'esents a greater complication than the most com- jiound astronomical phenomenon. Tiie most difficult astronomical question involves less intricacy than the simple movement of even a solid body, when the determining circumstances are to be com- puted. Thus we see that we must separate tiiese two studies, and proceed to the second only through the first, from which it is derived. In the same manner, we find a natural division of Terrestrial Physics into two, according as we regard bodies in their mechanical or their chemical charactei-. Hence we have Physics, properly so called, and Chemistry, Again, the second class must be studied through the first. Chemical phenomena are more complicated than mechanical, and depend upon o. itmi>> iy. ^i^gj^-,^ without influencing them in return. Every one knows tb.at all chemical action is first sid)mitted to the influence of weight, heat, electricity, etc., and presents moreover something which modifies all these. Thus, while it follows Physics, it presents itself as a distinct science. Such are the divisions of the sciences relating to inorganic matter. An analogous division arises in the other half of II. Okganic. jsfatural Philosophy — the science of organized bodies. Here we find ourselves presented with two orders of phenomena ; those which relate to the individual, and those which relate to the species, especially when it is gregnrious. With regard to Man, especially, this distinction is {'undan)ental. The last order of pheno- mena is evidently dependent on the first, and is more complex. Hence we have two great sections in organic physics u/iioornj. — Physiology, pi'operly SO called, and Social Physics, which is dependent on it In all Social phenomena we perceive the working of the ])hysiological laws of the indivi- ocioogy. ^\yy^\ -^ and moreover something which modifies their effects, atid which belongs to the influence of individuals over each other — singularly complicated in the case of the human race by the influence of generations on their successors. Thus it is clear that our social science must issue from that which relates to the life of the individual. On the other hand, there is no occasion to suppose, as some eminent ])hysiol()gists have done, that Social Physics is only an aj)pendage to })hysiology. The phenomena of the two are not identical, though they are homogeneous ; and it is of high ORGANIC PJIYSICS. 23 inipoilaiioe lo liold tlie two sciences sep;n-nto. As social cnndltioMs modify the 0]ici'atioii of })liysiol()<;ical laws, {Social IMiysics must liiive a set of observations of its own. It would be easy to make the divisions of the Orr the theory of Classifications. The best idea of the Positive Method would, of course, be obtained by tlie study of the most })rimitive and exalted of the sciences, if we were confined to one; but this isolated view would i^ive no idea of its capacity of a]){)lica- lion to others in a modified form. Each science has its own proper advantages ; and without some knowledle. We sliall cniicolve of it as niakiiii; a p:irt of some //V/^^re, or system of lines of some sort, of which the oilier paits are directly mensurable ; let iis say ;i trijin,<:jle (for this is the simplest, and to it all others are reducible). The distance in question is supposed to form a portion of a triangle, in which we are able to determine directly, either another side and two angles, or two sides and one angle. The knowledge required is obtained by the mathematical labour of deducing the uidcnown distance from the observed elements, by means of the relation be- tween them. The process may, and commonly does, become highly complicated by the elements supposed to be known being themselves determinable otdy in an indirect manner, by the aid of fresh aux- iliary systems, the number of which may be veiy considerable. The distance, once ascertained, will often enable us to obtain new quan- tities, which will oiler occasion for new mathematical questions. Thus, when we once know the distance of any object, the observa- tion, sim[)le and always possible, of its apparent diameter, may dis- close to us, with certainty, however indirectly, its real dimensions ; and at length, by a series of analogous inquiries, its surface, its volume, even its weight, and a niultitude of other qualities which might have seemed out of the reach of our knowledge for ever. It is by such labours that Man has learned to know, not only the dis- tances of the planets from the earth and from each other, but their actual magnitude, — their true form, even to the inequalities on theii- surface, and (what seems much more out of his reach) their respective masses, their mean densities, and the leading circumstances of the fall of heavy bodies on their respeclive surfaces, etc. Through the power of mathematical theories, all this and very much more has been obtained by means of a veiy small number of straight lines, properly chosen, and a larger number of angles. We might even say, to describe the general beai'ing of the science in a sentence, that, but for the fear of multiplying mathematical operations unnecessarily, and for the consequent necessity of reserving them for the determination of quantities which could not be measured directly, the knowledge of all magnitudes susce[)tible of precise estimate which can be offered by the vai'ious orders of phenomena, woidd be finally reducible to the immediate measurement of a single sti'aight line, and of a suitable munber of angles. We can now define Mathematical science with precision. It has for its object the indirect measurement of magni- Truedefini- tudes, and it proposes to determine magnitudes hy Hon of ma- each other, according to the inecise relations luhich <^"^"'«^"^-'*- exist between them. Preceding definitions have given to Mathe- matics the character of an Art ; this raises it at once to the I'ank of a. true Science. According to this defim'tion, the sj)ii-it of Mathe- matics consists in regaj'ding as nmtually connected ail the quantities which can be presented by any phenomenon whatsoevei', in order to 32 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. deduce all from each other. Now, there is evidently no phenomenon which may not be reo;arded as affording such considerations. Hence I'esults the naturally indefinite extent, and the rigorous logical universalit}^ of Mathematical science. As for its actual practical extent, we shall see what that is hereafter. These explanations justify the name of Mathematics, applied to the science we are considering. By itself it signifies Scirnce. The Greeks had no other, and we may call it tlie science; for its defini- tion is neither more nor less (if we omit the specific notion of magnitudes) than the definition of all science whatsoever. All science consists in the co-ordination of facts ; and no science could exist among isolated observations. It might even be said that Mathematics might enable us to dispense with all direct observation, by empowering us to deduce from the smallest possible number of imme(h"ate data the largest possible amount of results. Is not this the real use, both in speculation and in action, of the laws which we discover .among natural phenomena ? If so, Mathematics merely urges to the ultimate degree, in its own way, researches which every real science ])ursues, in various inferioi- degrees, in its own sphere. Tims it is only through Mathematics tiiat we can ihorouglily understand what true science is. Here alone can we find in the highest degree simplicity and severity of scientific law, and such abstraction as the human mind can attain. Any scientific education setting forth from any other point, is faulty in its basis. Tiuis far, we have viewed the science as a whole. We must now consider its primary division. Tiie secondar}' divisions will be laid down afterwai'ds. Every mathematical solution spontaneously separates into two parts. The inquiry being, as we have seen, the J TS TWO PARTS •. • • determuiation of utdvuown magnitudes, thi'ough their relation to the known, the student must, in the first place, ascertain what these relations are, in the case under his notice. This first Their differ- IS the Concrete pai't of the inquiry. When it is ent objects. accomplished, what remains is a pure question of numbers, consisting simply in the determination of unknown numbers, when we know by what relation they are cmmected with known numbers. This second opeivation is the Abstract part of the inquiry. The primary division of Mathematics is therefore into two great sciences: — Abstract Mathematics, and Concrete Mathematics. This division exists in all complete mathematical questions whatever, whether more oi- less simple. Recurring to the simplest case of a falling body, we must begin by learning the relation between the lieight from which it falls and the time occupied in falling. As Geometers say, we must find the equation which exists between them. Till this is done, there is no basis for a computation. This ascertainment may be extremely difficult, and it is incomparably tlie superior part of the problem. CHARACTER OF THE TWO DIVISIONS. 33 The true scientific spirit is so modern, llint :is fnr :is we know, no one before Galileo had remarked the acceleration of velocity in a falling body, the natural supposition having been that the lieight Avas iu unitorm proportion to the time. This first inquiry issued in the discovery of the law of Gnlileo. The Concrete part being ;iCcom{)lished, the Abstract remains. We have ascertained that the spaces traversed in eacii second inci'ease as the series of odd numbers, and we now have only the tnsk of the computation of the height from the time, or of the time from the lieight ; and this con- sists in finding that, by the established law, the first of these two quantities is a known multiple of the second power of the other ; ■wlience we may finally detei-mine the value of the one when that of the other is given. In this instance the concrete question is the more difficult of the two. If the same ]>henomenon were taken in its greatest generality, the reverse would be the case. Take the two together, and they may be regarded as exactly equivalent in difficulty. The mathematical law may be easy to ascertain, and difficult to work ; or it may be difficult to ascertain, and easy to work. In importance, in extent, and in difficulty, these two great sections of Mathematical Science will be seen hereafter to be equivalent. We have seen the difference in their objects. Tkcir differ- They ai-e no less different in their nature. entnatm-es. The Concrete must depend on the character of the objects examined, and must vary when new })henomena present them- selves: whereas, the Abstract is wholly independent of the nature of the objects, and is concerned only with their numerical relations. Thus, a great variety of phenomena may be brought nnder one geometrical solution. Cases which appear as unlike each other as possible may stand foi- one another under the Abstiact process, which thus serves for all, while the Concrete process must be new in each case. Thus the Concrete ])rocess is Special, and the Abstract is General. The character of the Concrete is experimental, ])hysical, phenomenal : while the Abstract is purely logical, rational. The Concrete part of every mathematical question is necessarily founded on consideration of the external world ; while the Abstract part consists of a series of logical deductions. The equations being once found, in any case, it is for the understanding, without external aid, to educe the results which these equations contain. We see how natural and complete this main division is. We will briefly prescribe the limits of each section. As it is the business of Concrete Mathematics to discover the equations of phenomena, we might suppose that it Concrete must comprehend as many distinct sciences as there Mathematics. are distinct categories of phenomena ; but we are very far indeed from liaving discovered mathematical laws in all orders of pheno- mena. In fact, there are as yet only two great categories of pheno- VOL. I. * C 34 POSITIVE PHILOSCniY. inena whose equations are constantly known : — Geometrical and Meclianical plienomena. Tims, the Concrete part of Mathematics consists of GrEOMKTKY and Kational Mechanics. There is a point of view from which all phenonuvna miassing on to Geometry and Mechanics. The Concrete ]iortions of ihe science depend on the Abstract, which are wholly independent of them. We will now therefore proceed to a rapid review of the leading conceptions of the Analysis. First, however, we must take some nolice of the general idea of an equation, and sec how far it is from being the True idea of true one on which geometers proceed in practice; for an equation. without settling this point we cannot determine, with any precision, tiie real aim and extent of abstract mathematics. The business of concrete mathematics is to discover the equations which express the mathematical laws of the phenomenon under consideration ; and these equations are the starting-point of the calculus, which must obtain from them certain quantities by means of others. It is oidy by forming a true idea of an equation that we can lay down the real line of separation between the concrete and the abstract part of mathematics. It is giving much too extended a sense to the notion of an equa- tion to suppose that it means every kind of relation of equality belween any two functions of the magnitudes under consideration ; for, if every equation is a relation of equality, it is far from being the case that, reciprocally, eveiy relation of equality must be an equation of the kind to which analysis is, by the nature of the case, applicable. It is evident that this confusion must render it almost impossible to explain the difficulty we find in establishing the relation of the concrete to the abstract which meets us in every great mathematical question, taken by itself. If the word equation meant what we ai'e apt to suppose, it is not easy to see what diffi- cultv there could be, in jrcneral, in establishing the equations of any . •••11 jiioblem whatever. This ordinary notion of an equation is widely iiidike what geometers understand in the actual working of the hcience. According to my view, functions must themselves be divided into 40 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. Abstract and Concrete ; the first of wliicli alone can enter into trne equations. Every equation is a relation of eqnality between two abstract functions of the magnitudes in question, including with the primary magnitudes all the auxiliary magnitudes which may be connected with the problem, and the introduction of which may facilitate the discovery of tlie equations sought. This distinction may be established by both the d 'priori and d posttriori methods; by characterizing each kind of function, and by enn.merating all the abstract functions yet known, — at least with regai'd to their elements. A priori ; Abstract functions express a mode of dependence between magnitudes which may be conceived between Abstract numbers alone, without the need of pointins: out anv fwn.cttoTis «•• r *^ phenomena m which it may be found realized ; Concrete while Concrete functions are those whose expression functions. ■ -n i x \ c i • > requu-es a speciiied actual case oi physics, geometry, mechanics, etc. Most functions were concrete in their origin, — even those which are at present the most purely abstract ; and the ancients discovered only through geometrical definitions elementary algebraic properties of functions, to which a numerical value was not attached till long afterwards, rendering abstract to us what was concrete to the old geometers. There is another example which well exhibits the distinction just made — that of circular functions, both direct and inverse, whicli are still sometimes concrete, sometimes abstract, according to the point of view from which they are regarded, A 'poHtei'ioi'i ; the distinguishing character, abstract or concrete, of a function having been established, the question of any deter- minate function being abstract, and therefore able to enter into true analytical equations, becomes a simple question of fact, as we are acquainted with the elements which compose all the abstract func- tions at present known. We say we know them all, though analy- tical functions are infinite in number, because we are here speaking, it must be remembered, of the elements — of the sim})le, not of the compound. We have ten elementary foi-nuilas; and, few as they are, they may give rise to an infinite number of analytical combina- tions. There is no reason for supposing that there can never be more. We have more than Descartes had, and even Newton and Leibnitz; and our successors will doubtless inli'oduce additions, though there is so much difficulty attending their augmentation, that we cannot hope tiiat it will proceed very lar. It is the insufficiency of this very small number of analytical elements which constitutes our difficulty in passing from the con- crete to the abstract. In order to establish the equations of pheno- mena, we must conceive of their mathematical laws by the aid of functions composed of these few elements. Up to this point the question has been essentially concrete, not coming within the ALGEBRA AND ARITHMETIC. 41 (lomaiii of tlie calciihis!. The dilliculiy of the pnssnf)^e from the coiici'ete to tlie abstract in general consists in our having only these i'ew analytical elements with which to represent all the precise rehi- tions which the whole range of natural phenomena afford to us. Amidst their infinite variety, our conceptions must he far below the real difficnlty ; and especially because these elements of our analysis have been snppliedtous by the mathematical consideration of the simplest phenomena of a geometrical origin, which can afford us LL priori no rational guarantee of their fitness to represent the mathematical laws of all other classes of phenomena. We shall hereafter see how this difficulty of the relation of the concrete to the abstract has been diminished, without its being necessary to multiply the munber of analytical elements. Thus far we have considered the Calculus as a whole. We must now consider its divisions. These divisions we Twopart^of nnist call the Algebraic Calculus, or Algebra, and theCaiaUus. the Arithmetical Calculus, or Aritliinetic, taking care to give them the most extended logical sense, and not the restricted one in which the terms are usually received. It is clear that every question of Mathematical Analysis presents two successive parts, perfectly distinct in their nature. The first stage is the transformation of the proposed equations, so as to exhibit the mode of formation of unknown quantities by the known. This constitutes the algebraic question. Then ensues the task of finding the values of the formulas thus ^'^ '"" ol)tained. The values of the numbers sought are already repre- sented by certain ex{)licit functions of given numbers : these values must be determined; and this is the arithmetical question. Thus the algebraic and the arithmetical calculus differ in their object. They differ also in their view of quantities, — Algebra considei'ing quantities in regard to their ?'c'/a- tions, and Ai'ithmetic in regard to their values. In practice it is not always possible, owing to the imperfection of the science of the cal- culus, to separate the pi'ocesses entirely in obtaining a solution; but the radical difference of the two operations should never be lost sight of. Algebra, then, is the Calculus of Functions, and Arith- metic the Ccilculus of Valves. We have seen that the division of the Calculus is iuto two branches. It remains for us to compare the two, in oi'der to learn their respective extent, importance, and difficulty. The Calculus of A^alues, Arithmetic, appears at first to have as wide a field as Aljjrebra, since as many questions . .,, ,. . , ^ . ..''./ "^ . 1 ,.^ Arithmetic. nuglit seem to arise irom it as we can conceive uitier- ent algebraic formulas to be valued. But a very simple reflection will show that it is not so. Functions being divided into simple and compound, it is evident that when we become ^^^ able to determine the value of sim[)le functions, there will be no difficulty with the compound. In the algebraic relation, 42 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. a coinponnd function plnys a very different part from that of the elementary functions which constitute it ; and this is the source of oiu" chief analytical dififlcuh.ies. But it is quite otherwise with the Arithmetical Calculus. Thus, the number of distinct arithmetical operations is indicated by that of the abstract elementary functions, which we have seen to be very few. The detei-mination of the values of these ten functions necessarily affords that of all tlie infinite number comprehended in the whole of mathematical analysis : and there can be no new arithmetical operations otherwise than by the creation of new analytical elements, which must, in any case, for ever be extremely small. The domain of arithmetic then is, by its nature, narrowly restricted, while that of algebra is rigorously indefinite. Still, the domain of arithmetic is more extensive than is commonly represented ; for there are many questions treated as incidental in the midst of a body of analytical researches, which, consisting of determinations of values, are truly arithmetical. Of this kind are the construction of a table of logarithms, and the calculation of trigonometrical tables, and some distinct and higher ])rocednres ; in short, every operation which has for its object the determination of the values of functions. And we nnist also include that part of the science of the Calculus which we call the Theory of Numbers, the object of which is to discover the properties irdierent in different numbers, in virtue of their values, independent of any particular system of numeration. It constitutes a sort of transcendental arithmetic. Though the domain of arithmetic is thus larger than is counnonly supposed, this Calculus of values will yet never be more than a point, as it were, in comparison with the calculus of functions, of which mathematical science essentialh'' consists. This is evident, when we look into the real nature of arithmetical questions. Determinations of vahies are, in fact, nothing else than real -., , ^ra?2s/br7?ia^iow6' of the functions to be valued. These J.tiS 7lQ/tlI/7*C transformations have a special end ; but they are essentially of the same nature as all taught by analysis. In this view, the Calculus of values may be regarded as a sup[)lement, and a ])articular application of the Calculus of functions, so that arithmetic disaj)pears, as it were, as a distinct section in the body of abstract mathematics. To make this evident, we must obsei've that when we desire to determine the value of an unknown number whose mode of formation is given, we define and express that value in merely announcing the arithmetical question, already defined and expressed under a certain form ; and that, in deter- mining its value, we merely express it under another detei-minate form, to which we are in the habit of referring the idea of each ])articulai- number by making it re-enter into the regular system of numci-ation. This is made clear by what happens wiien the mode of numeration is such that the question is its own answer ; as, for ALGEBRA, 43 instance, wlien we want to add toi^eilier seven and tliiity, and call the result seven-and-thirty. In adding other numbers, the terms are not so ready, and we transform the question ; as when we add togetlier twenty- three and fourteen : but not the less is the opera- tion merely one of transformation of a question already defined and expressed. In this view, the calculus of values might be regarded as a jiarticular application of the calculus of functions, arithmetic thereby disappearing, as a distinct section, from the domain of abstract matiiematics. — And here we have done with the Calculus of values, and pass to the Calculus of functions, of which abstract mathematics is essentially com[)osed. We have seen that the difficulty of establishing the relation of ihe concrete to the abstract is owing to the insuffici- ,, , cncy of the very small number of analytical elements ihat we are in possession of. The obstacle has been surmounted in a great number of important cases : and w^e will now see how the establishment of the equations of ])henomena has beeri achieved. The first means of remedying the difficulty of the small number of analytical elements seems to be to create new Creation of ones. i3ut a little considei'ation will show that this neiv functions. I'esource is illusory. A new analytical element would not serve unless we could immediately determine its value : but how can we determine the value of a function which is simple; that is, which is not formed by a combination of those already known ? This appears almost impossible : but the introduction of another ele- mentary abstract function into analysis sup})oses the simultaneous creation of a new arithmetical operation ; which is cei-tainly ex- tremely difficult. If we tiy to proceed according to the method w^hich procured us the elements w^e possess, we are left in entire uncertainty ; for the artifices thus employed are evidently exhausted. We have thus no idea how to proceed to create new elementary abstract functions. Yet, we nmst not therefore conclude that we have reached the limit appointed by the powers of our understand- ing. Special impiovements in mathematical analysis have yieldeil us some ])artial substitutes, which have increased oiu" resources: but it is clear that the augmentation of these elements cannot pro- ceed but with extreme slowness. It is not in this direction, then, that the human mind has found its means of facilitating the estab- lishment of equations. This first method being discarded, thei'o I'emains only one other. As it is im])Ossible to find the equations directly, we „. ,. , Z ,. ,. J , ^ ''' Finding equa- must .seek itir corresponcnng ones l)etween other tions between auxihary quantities, connected with the first accoi'd- auxiliary A.-1. -ii ir .1 1 quantities. ing to a certam deternunate law, and from the rela- tion between which we may ascend to that of the primitive magni- tudes. This is the fertile conce[)tion whicli we term the (ransceu- 44 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. denial analysis, and use as our finest instrument for the matlie- in;itical exploration of natural ])henoiuena. This conce])tion lias a much larger scope than even profound geometers have hitherto supposed; for the auxiliary quantities resorted to might he derived, according to any law whatever, from the immediate elements of the question. It is well to notice this ; because our future improved analytical resources may ])er- haps he found in a new mode of derivation. But, at })res- enr, the only auxiliary quantities habitually substituted for the primitive quantities in transcendental analysis are what are called— 1st, infinitely small elements, the differentials of different orders of those qnauLities, if we conceive of this analysis in the manner of Leibnilz : or 2nd, the fi^uxions, the limits of the ratios of the simultaneous increments of the primitive quantities, compared with one another ; 01", more briefly, the prime and ultimate ratios of these increments, if we adopt the conception of Newton : or 3rd, the derivatives, properly so called, of these quantities ; that is, the coefficients of the different teitus of their respective incre- ments, according to the conception of Lagrange. These conceptions, and all others that have been proposed, are by their nature identical. The various grounds of preference of eacli of them will be exhibited hereafter. We now see that the Calcidus of functions, or Algebra, must Division of consist of two distinct branches. The one has for the Calculus its object the resolution ol equations when they are of functions. Jii-ectly established between the magnitudes in ques- tion : the other, setting out from equations (generally much more easy to form) between quantities indirectly connected with those of the problem, has to deduce, by invariable analytical procedures, the corres})onding equations between the direct magnitudes in question ; — bringing the problem within the domain of the preced- ing calculus. — It might seem that the transcendental analysis ought to be studied before the ordinary, as it provides the equations which the other has to resolve. But, though the transcendental is logically independent of the ordinary, it is best to follow the usual method of study, taking the ordinary fii-st ; for, the proposed ques- tions always requiring to be completed by ordinary analysis, they must be left in sus[)ense if the instrument of resolution had not l)een studied beforehand. To ordinary analysis I propose to give the name of Calculus of DiRKCT Functions. To transcendental analysis (which is known by the names of Infinitesimal Calculus, Calculus of fluxions and of fluents. Calculus of Vanishing quantities, the Differential and Integral Calculus, etc., according to the view in which it has been conceived) 1 sliall give the title of Calculus of Indiukct Fung- AL GEBRAIC E Q UA TJONS. 45 TiONS. I obtain these fenns by generabzin<^ niul .giving ]irecisi()ii to the ideas of Lagrange, and employ them to indicate the exact character of the two forms of analysis. SECTION L ORDINARY ANALYSIS, OR CALCULUS OF DIRT:CT FUNCTIONS. Algebra is adeqnate to the solution of mathematical quest ions \vhicii are so sim[)le that we can form directly the equations between the magnitudes considered, without its being necessary to bring into the problem, either in substitution or alliance, any system of auxiliary quantities derived from the primary. It is line, in the majority of important cases, its use requires to be preceded and })repai'ed for by that of the calculus of indirect functions, by which the establishment of equations is facilitated: but though algebra then takes the second })Iace, it is not the less a necessaiy agent iu 1 he solution of the question; so that the Calculus of direct func- tions must continue to be, by its nature, the basis of mathematical analysis. We must now, then, notice the rational composition of this calculus, and the degree of develo[)ment it has attained. Its object being the resolution of equations (that is, the discovery of the mode of formation of unknown quantities by r, r.- the known, according to the equations which exist between tliem), it presents as many parts as we can imagine distinct classes of equations; and its extent is therefore rigorously indefinite, because the number of analytical functions susceptible of entering into equations is illin}itable, though, as we have seen, composed of a very small number of j)rimitive elements. Tlie rational classification of equations must evidently be deter- mined by the nature of the analytical elements of Classification which their members are composed. Accordingly, of Equations. analysts first divide equations with one or more variables into two ])rincipal classes, according as they contain functions of only the first three of the ten couples, or as they include also either exponential or circular functions. Though the names of algebraic and tran- scendental functions given to these principal groups are inapt, the division between the corresponding equations is real enough, in so far as that the resolution of equations containing the transcendental functions is more difficult than that of algebraic equations. Hence the study of the first is extremely imperfect, and our analytical methods relate almost exclusively to the elaboration of the second. Our business now is with these Algebraic equations only. In the first place, we must observe that, though they may Ahjehraic often contain irrational functions of the unknown equations. quantities, as well as rational functions, the first case can always be brought under the second, by transformations more or less easy ; 46 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. po tliat it is onl}' with the latter that analysts liave had to occupy themselves, to resolve all tlie algehraic equations. As to their classification, tlie early method of classing them according to the numher of their terms has heeu retained only for equations with two terms, which are, in fact, susce{)tihle of a resolution proper to them- selves. The classification hy their degrees, long universally estah- lished, is eminently natui'al; tor this distinction rigorously determines the greater or less difficulty of their resolution. The gradation can be independently, as well as practically exhibited : for the most general equation of each degree necessarily comprehends all those of the different inferior degrees, as must also the formula which deter- mines tlie unknown quantity: and therefore, however slight we may, d j)riori, suppose the difficulty to be of the degree under notice, it must offer more and more obstacles, in proportion to the rank of the degree, because it is complicated in the execution with those of all the preceding degrees. This increase of difficulty is so great, that the resolution of Algebraic re- f^'gebraic equations is as yet known to us oidy in the solution of four first degrees. In this respect, algebra has ad- equations. vauced but little since the labours of Descartes and the Italian analysts of the sixteenth century; though there has pro- bably not been a single geometer for two centuries past who has not striven to advance the resolution of equations. The general equa- tion of the fifth degree has itself, thus far, resisted all attempts. The formula of the fourth degree is so difficult as to be almost inapplicable ; and analysts, while by no means despairing of the I'esolution of equations of the fifth, and even higher degrees, being obtained, have tacitly agreed to give u[) such researches. The only question of this kind which would be of eminent impor- tance, at least in its logical relations, would be the genei-al resolution of algebraic equations of any degree whatever. But the more we ponder this subject, the moi'e we are led to suppose, with Lagrange, that it exceeds the scope of our understandings. Even if the requisite formula could be obtained, it cotdd not be usefully applied, unless we could simplify it, without im})airing its generality, by the introduction of a new class of analytical elements, of which we have as yet no idea. And, besides, if we had obtained the resolution of algebraic equations of any degree whatever, we should still have treated only a very small part of algebra, properly so called ; that is, of the calculus of direct functions, comprehending the resolution of all the equations that can be formed by the analytical functions known to us at this day. Again, we must rememlier that by a law of our nature, we shall always remain below the difficulty of science, our means of conceiving of new questions being always more power- ful than our i-esotuces for resolving them; in other words, the human mind being more a[)t at imagining than at reasoning. Thus, if we hud resolved all the analytical equations now known, and if, to do NUMERICAL RESOL UTION OF E QUA TJONS. 4 7 this, wo liad found new analytical elements, lliese again would intro- duce classes of equations of which we now know nothing: and so, however great might be the increase of our knowledge, the imper- fection of our algebraic science woidd be perpetually reproduced. Tiie methods that we have are, the coniplete resolution of the equations of the first ibur degrees; of any binomial Ourcxisiivy equations; of certain special equations of the superior knowicdae. degrees ; and of a very small number of ex})onential, logarithmic, and circular equations. These elements are very limited ; but geo- meters have succeeded in treating with them a great number of important questions in an admirable manner. The im{)rovements introduced within a cenluiy into mathematical analysis have con- tributed moi-e to render the little knowledge tliat we have immea- surably useful, than to increase it. To fill up the vast gap in the resolution of algebraic equations of the higher degrees, analysts have had recourse to a .r . , * . ^ .' •' Numert'-.al re- new order of questions, — to Avtiat they call the numer- solution of ical resolution of equations. Not being able to obtain equations. the real algebraic formula, they have sought to determine at least the value of each unknown quantity for such or such a designated system of particular values attributed to the given quantities. This opera- tion is a mixture of algebraic with arithmetical questions; and it has been so cultivated as to be rendered possible in all cases, for equations of any degree and even of any form. The methods for tins are now sufficiently general ; and what remains is to simplify them so as to fit them for regular application. While such is the state of algebra, we have to endeavour so to dispose tlie questions to be worked as to require finally only this 7iumerical resolution of the equations. We must not forget however that this is veiy imperfect algebra ; and it is only isolated, or truly final questions (wiiich are very few), that can be brought finally to depend upon only the numerical resolution of equations. Most questions ai-e only l)reparatoiy, — a first stage of the solution of other questions ; and in these cases it is evidently not the value of the unknown quantity that we want to discover, but \\\e formula which exhibits its deriva- tion. Even in the most simple questions, when this luimerical resolution is strictly sufficient, it is not the less a very imperfect method. Because we cannot abstract and treat separately the alge- braic ]iart of the question, which is coujmon to all the cases which result from the mere variation of the given numbers, we are obliged to go over again the whole series ol operations for the slightest change that may take place in any one of the quantities concerned. Tims is the calculus of direct functions at piesent divided into two parts, as it is employed for the algebraic or tlie numei-ical lesolution of equations. The first, the only satisfactory one, is unfortunately very restricted, and there is little hope that it will ever be otherwi«e : the second, usuallv insufficient, has at least the 48 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. n(lvanln<;e of a much greater generality. They must be carefully distinguished in our minds, on account of their different objects, and therefore of the different ways in which quantities are considered by them. Moreover, there is, in regard to their methods, an entirely different ])rocedure in their rational distribution. In the first part, Ave have nothing to do with the values of the unknown quantities, and tlie division must take place according to the nature of the equations which we are able to resolve ; whereas in the second, we liave nothing to do with the degrees of the equations, as the methods are applicable to equations of any degree whatever ; but the con- cern is with the numerical character of the values of the unknown quantities. These two parts, which constitute the immediate object of the Tiie Theory of Calculus of direct functions, are subordinated to a equations. third, purely speculative, from which both derive their most effectual resources, and which has been very exactly designated by the general name of Theory of Equations, though it relates, as yet, only to algebraic equations. The numerical resolution of equations has, on account of its generality, special need of this rational foundation. Two orders of questions divide this important department of algebra between them ; first, those which relate to the composition of equations, and then those that relate to their transformation ; the business of these last being to modify the roots of an equation with- out knowing them, according to any given law, provided this law is uniform in relation to all these roots. One more theory remains to be noticed, to com])lete our rapid exhibition of the different essential parts of the calculus of direct Method of fuuctious. This theory, which relates to the trans- indeifminate formation of functions into series by the aid of what Coefficients. jg called the Method of indeterminate Coefficients, is one of the most fertile and important in algebra. This eminently analytical method is one of the most remarkable discoveries of Desca.rtes. The invention and development of the infinitesimal calculus, for which it might be very happily substituted in some respects, has undoubtedly deprived it of some of its importance ; but the growing extension of the transcendental analysis has, while lessening its necessity, multiplied its applications and enlarged its lesources ; so tliat, by the useful combination of the two theories, the employment of the method of indeterminate coefficients has become nnich more extensive than it was even before the formation of the calculus of indirect functions. I have now completed my sketch of the Calculus of Direct Func- tions. AVe must next pass on to the moi'e important and extensive branch of our science, the Calculus of Indirect Functions. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS. 49 SECTION II. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS, OR CALCULUS OF INDIRECT FUNCTIONS. We referred (p. 44) in a former sectioti to the views of tlie tran- scendental analysis presented by Leibnitz, Newton, Tkreeprinci- and Lno-i-ans^e. We shall see that each conception purviews. has advantages of its own, that all are finally eqnivalent, and that no method has yet been fonnd which unites their respective character- istics. Whenever the combination takes place, it will probably be by some method founded on the conception of Lagrange. The other two will then offer oidy an historical interest ; and meanwhile, the science must be regarded as in a merely provisional state, which requires the use of all the three conce})tions at the same time; for it is only by the use of them all that an adequate idea of the analy- sis and its api)lications can be formed. The vast extent and diffi- culty of this part of mathematics, and its recent formation, should ])revent our being at all surprised at the existing want of system. The concei)tion which will doubtless give a fixed and uniform character to the science has come into the hands of only one new generation of geometers since its creation ; and the intellectual habits requisite to perfect it have not been sufficiently formed. Tiie first germ of the intiin"tesimal method (which can be con- ceived of independently of the Calculus) may be re- cognized in the old Greek MetJiod of Exhaustions, employed to pass from the properties of straight lines to those of curves. The method consisted in substituting for the curve the auxiliary considei-ation of a polygon, inscribed or circumscribed, by means of which the curve itself was reached, the limits of the ]Mimitive ratios being suitably taken. Tliere is no doubt of the tiliation of ideas in this case ; but there was in it no equivalent for our modern methods; for the ancients had no logical and general means for the determination of these limits, which was the chief difficulty of the question. The task remaining for modern geome- ters was to generalize the concei)tion of the ancients, and, consider- ing it in an abstract manner, to reduce it to a system of calculation, which was impossible to theni. Liigrange justly ascribes to the great geometer Fermat the first idea in this new direction. Fermat may be regarded as having initiated the direct formation of transcendental analysis by his method for the determination of maxima and minima, and for the finding of tatigents, in which piocess he introdnced anxiliaries which he afterwards suppressed as null when the ecpiations obtained had undergone certain suitable transformations. After some modi- fications of the ideas of Fermat in the intermediate time, Leibnitz stripped the process of some complications, and formed the analysis VOL. I. 1) 50 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. into a general and distinct calculus, having its own notation : and Leibnitz is thus the creator of transcendental analysis, as we employ it now. This pre-eminent discoveiy was so ri[)e, as all great conceptions are at the hour of their ndvent, that Newton had at the same time, or rather earlier, discovered a method exactly equivalent, regarding the analysis from a different point of view, much more logical in itself, but less adapted than that of Leibnitz to give all practicable extent atid facility to the fundamental method. Lagrange afterwards, discarding the lielerogeneous considerations which had gnided Leibnitz and Newton, reduced the analysis to a purely algebraic system, which only wants more aptitude for appli- cation. We will notice the three methods in their order. The method of Leibnitz consists in introducing into the calcidus. Method of in order to facilitate the establishment of equations, Leibnitz. the infinitely small elements or dijftrentials whicli are supposed to constitute the quantities whose relations we are seeking. There are relations between these difierentials which are simpler and more discoverable than those of the pi-imitive quantities ; and by these we may afterwards (through a special calculus employed to eliminate these auxiliary infinitesimals) recur to the equations sought, which it would usually have beenimpossible to obtain dii-ectl v. This indirect analysis may have various degiees of indirectness ; for, when there is too much difficulty in forming the equation between tlie differentials of the magnitudes under notice, a second application of the method is required, the differentials being now treated as new ])rimitive quantities, and a relation being sought between their infinitely small elements, or second differentials, and so on ; the same transformation being repeated any number of times, provided the whole number of auxiliaries be finally eliminated. It may be asked by novices in these studies, how these aux- iliary quantities can be of use while they are of the same species with the magnitudes to be treated, seeing that the greater or less value of any quantity cannot afiect any inquiry which has nothing to do with value at all. The explanation is this. We must begin by distinguishing the different orders of infinitely small quantities, ol)taining a precise idea of this by considering them as being either the successive powers of the same primitive infinitely small quantity, or as being quantities which may be regarded as having finite ratios with these powers ; so that, for instance, the second or third or other differentials of the same variable ai'e classed as infinitely small quantities of the second, third, or other order, because it is easy to exhibit in them finite nniltiples of the second, third, or other powers of a certain first differential. These ])i-e- liminary ideas being laid down, the spirit of the infinitesimal analysis consists in constantly neglecting the infinitely small quantities in comparison with finite quantities ; and genei'ally, the METHOD OF LEIBNITZ. 51 infiintely small quantities of any order whatever in comparison with all those of an inferior order. We see at once liow such a power must facilitate the formation of equations between the difFerentials of quantities, since \ve can substitute ior these difFerentials such other elements as we may choose, and as will be more simple to treat, only obscrvini:^ the condition that the new elements shall diller iVom the prece^ling only by quantities infinitely small in relation to them. It is thus that it becomes possible in geometry to treat curved lines as composed of an infinity of rectilinear elements, and curved surfaces as formed of ])lane elements ; and, in mechanics, varied motions as an infinite series of uniform motions, succeeding each other at infinitely small intervals of time. Such a mere hint as this of the vai'ied aj)[)licatiou ot" this method may give some idea of the vast scope of the con("e})tion of transcendental analysis, as formed by Leibnitz. It is, beyond all question, the loftiest idea ever yet attained by the human mind. It is clear that this conce[)ti()n w\as necessary to complete the basis of mathematical science, by enabling us to establish, in a broad and practical manner, the relation of the concrete to the abstract. In this lespect, we must regard it as the necessary com- plement of" the great fundamental idea of Descartes on the general analytical rejiresentation of natural j)henomena ; an idea which could not be didy estimated or put to use till after the formation of the infinitesimal analysis. This analysis has another pi'operty, besides that of facilitating the study of the mathematical laws of all phenomena, and perhaps not less important than that. The differential formulas exhibit an extreme generality, expressing in a single equation GeneraiiUjof each deternn'nate phenomenon, however varied may the formulas. be the subjects to wdiich it belongs. Thus, one such equation gives the tangents of all curves, another their rectifications, a third their quadratures; and, in the same way, one invaiiable formula ex- presses the mathematical law of all variable motion; and one single equation rej)resents the distribution of heat in any body, and for any case. This remarkable genei'ality is the basis of the loftiest views of the geometers. Thus this analysis has not only furnished a general method for forming equations indirectly which could not have been directly discovered, but it has introduced a new order of more natural laws for our use in the mathematical study of natural phenomena, enabling us to rise at times to a perce[)tion of positive approximations between classes of wholly different phenomena, through the analogies presented by the differential expressions of llieir mathematical laws. In virtue of this second property of the analysis, the entire system of an immense science, like geometiy or mechanics, has submitted to a condensation into a small number of analytical formulas, from which the solution of all particular problems can be deduced, by invariable rules. 52 POSITIVE PIIILOSOFHY. Tills beautiful meiliod is, liowever, imperfect in its lo<^icjil basis. Justification of At first, j^^eoiiieters were naturally nioi-e intent upon the Method. extending llie discovery and nniltiplying its applica- tions, tlian upon establishing the logical foundation of its processes. It was enough for some time to be able to produce, in answer to objections, unhoped-for solutions of the most difficult pi'oblems. It became necessary, however, to recur to the basis of the new analysis, to establish the rigorous exactness ot" the pi-ocesses employed, notwithstanding their appai'ent breaches of the ordinary laws of reasoning. Leibnitz himself failed to justify his conception, giving, when urged, an answer which represented it as a mere approximative calculus, the successive operations of which might, it is evident, admit an augmenting amount of error. Some of his successois were satisfied with showing that its results accorded with those obtained by oi'dinary algebra, or the geometry of the ancients, i-eproducing by these last some solutions which could be at first obtained only by the new method. Some, again, demon- strated the conformity of the new conception with others ; that of Newton especially, which was unquestionably exact. This afforded a practical justitication : but, in a case of such unequalled inipor- tance, a logical justification is also required, — a direct proof of the iiecessaiy rationality ot" the infinitesimal method. It was Carnot who furnished this at last, by showing that the method was founded on the principle of the necessary compensation of en-oi-s. We can- not say that all the logical pcaffoldingof the infinitesimal method may not have a merely provisional existence, vicious as it is in its nature: but, in the present state of our knowledge, Oarnot's principle of the necessary compensation of errors is of more importance, in legitimat- ing the analysis of Leibnitz, than is even yet commonly suj)p()sed. His reasoning is founded on the conception of infinitesimal quantities indefinitely decreasing, while those from which they are derived are fixed. The infinitely small errors introduced with the aux- iliaries canuftt have occasioned other than infinitely small errors in all the equations ; and when the lelations of finite quantities are reached, these relations must be I'igorously exact, since the only errors then possible nuist be finite ones, which cannot have entered: and thus the final equations become perfect. Carnot's theory is doubtless moi-e subtle than solid; but it has no other radical logical vice than that of the infinitesimal method itself, of which it is, as it seems to me, the natuial develo])ment: and general explanation ; so that it nuist be adopted as long as that method is directly em})loyed. The philosophical character of the transcendental analysis has now been sufficiently exhibited to allow of my giving only the principal idea of the other two methods. Newton's Newtou offered his conception under several dif- MhTHOD. ferent forms in succession. That which is now NEWTON'S METHOD. 53 most commonly adopted, at least on the Continent, was called by liinisell", sonu'tinies the Method of iw'imc and ullimale liatios, sonu'- tiuies the Method of Limits, by which last term it is now usually known. Under this Method, the auxiliaries introduced are the limits of the ratios of the simultaneous increments of the Method of primitive quantities ; or, in other words, the final Limits. ratios of these increments; limits or final ratios which we can easily show to have a determinate and finite value. A special calculus, wliich is the equivalent of the infinitesimal calculus, is afterwards employed, to rise from the equations between these limits to the coi-responding equations between the primitive quantities themselves. Tlie power of easy ex))ressijn of the mathematical laws of pheno- mena <;iven by this analysis arises from the calculus api)lyin<;, not to the increments themselves of the jjroposed quantities, but to the limits ot the lalios of those increments ; and from our being therefore able always to substitute for each increment any other magnitude more eaty to treat, provided their final ratio is the ratio of equality; or,, in other words, that the limit of their ratio is unity. It is clear, in fact-, that the calculus of limits can be in no way afifected by this substitution. Starting from this princi[)le, we find neaily the equivalent of the facilities offered by the analysis of Leibnitz, which are merely considered from another point of view. Thus, curves will be regarded as the limits of a series of rectilinear jjolygons, and variable motions as the limits of an aggre- gate of uniform motions of continually nearer a})[)roximation, etc. etc. Such is, in Kubslance, Newton's conception ; or ratlier, that which Maclauiin and D'AIembert have offered as the most j-ational basis of the transcendental analysis, in the endeavour to fix and arrange Newton's ideas on the subject. Newton had another view, however, which ought to be presented here, because it is still the special form of the cal- Fiuxiunsund cuius of indirect functions commonly adopted by fluc7Us. English geometers; and also on account of its ingenious clearness in some cases, and of its having furnished the notation best adai)te(l to this manner of legarding the transcendental analysis. I mean the Calculus of fluxions and of fluents, founded on the general notion of velocities. To facilitate the conception of the fundamental idea, let us con- ceive of every curve as generated by a point affected by a motion varying according to any law whatever. The ditferent quantities presented by the curve, the abscissa, the ordinate, the arc, the area, etc., will be I'egai-detl as simultaneously produced by succes- sive degrees during this motion. The velocit// w'llh which each one will have been described will be called the fluxion of that quantity, which inversely would have been called {influent. Henceforth, the 54 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. transcendei)inl nnnlysis will, accordingly to tliis coDcepiion. consist in ibrminii; directly tlie equations between the fluxions of the ])roposcd quantities, to deduce from them afterwards, by a special Calculus, the equations between the fluents themselves. What has just been stated respecting curves may evidently be transferred to any magni- tudes whatever, regarded, by the help of a suitable image, as some being produced by the motion of others. This method is evidently the same witb that of limits complicated wilh the foreign idea of motion. It is, in fact, only a way of representing, by a comparison derived from mechanics, the method of prime and ultimate ratios, which alone is reducible to a calculus. It therefore necessarily admits of the same general advantages in the various principal applications of the transcendental analysis, without its being re- quisite for us to offer special proofs of this. Lagrange's conception consists, in its admirable simplicity, in Lagrange's considering the transcendental analysis to be a great Method. algebraic artifice, by which, to facilitate the establish- ment of equations, we must introduce, in the place of or with the ]trimitive functions, their derived functions; that is, according to the definition of Lagrange the coefficient of the first term of the increment of each function, arranged according to the ascending ])owers of the increment of its variable. The Calculus of indiiect fimctions, pi-o))erly so called, is destined here, as well as in the conceptions of Leibnitz and Newton, to eliminate these derivatives, employed as auxiliaries, to deduce from their relations the corre- sponding equations between the primitive magnitudes. The tran- scendental analysis is then only a simple, but very cons^iderable extension of ordinary analysis. It has long been a common practice with geometers to intioduce, in analytical investigations, in the place of the magnitudes in question, their different powers, or tlieir logarithms, or their sines, etc., in order to simplify the equations, and even to obtain them more easily. Successive derivation is a general artifice of the same nature, only of greater extent, and eommanding, in consequence, much more important resources for this connnon object. But, though we may easily conceive, a priori, that the auxiliary use of these derivatives may facilitate the study of equations, it is not easy to ex})lain why it tiiust be so under this method of deriva- tion, rather than any other transformation. This is the weak side of Lagrange's great idea. We have not yet become able to lay hold of its j)iecise advantages, in an absti'act manner, and without rocun-ence to the other conceptions of the transcendental analysis. These advantages can be established only in the separate consider- {ition of each j)rincipal question ; and this vei-ification becomes laborious in the treatment of a complex problem. Other theories have been proposed, such as Euler's Calculus of vanisldvg quantities: but they are merely modifications of the three IDENTITY OF THE THREE METHODS. 55 just cxliihik'd. AVe must next compaie niul csliinate these methods ; and in the liivst place observe their perfect and necessary conformity. Considering tlie lliree methods in re^^ard to their destination, in- de[»endently of [)reliminary ideas, it is clear that they Jdcntity of the all consist in the same j^eneral logical artifice; that three methods. is, the introduction of a certain system of auxiliai'y magnitudes uniformly correlative with those under investigation ; the auxiliaries being substituted for the express object of facilitating the analytical expression of the mathematical laws of phenomena, though the}^ must be finally eliminated by the help of a special calculus. It was this which ck'tei'mined me to define the transcendental analysis as the Calculus of indirect functions, in order to mark its true })hilo- soi)hical character, while excluding all discussion about the best manner of conceiving and applying it. Whatever may be the Tiiethod employed, the general effect of this analysis is to bring every mathematical question more speedily into the domain of the calculus, and thus to lessen considerably the grand difficulty of the passage from the concrete to the abstract. We cannot hope that the Calculus will ever lay hold of all questions of natural philosophy — geometrical, mechanical, thermokigical, etc. — from their birth. That would be a contradiction. In every problem there must be a certain preliminary operation before the calculus can be of any use, and one which could not by its nature be subjected to abstract and invariable rules: — it is that which has for its object the establishment of equations, which are the indispensable point of de])artuie for all analytical investigations. But this preliminary elaboration has been remaikably simplified by the creation of the transcendental analy^sis, which lias thus hastened the moment at which general and abstract processes may be uniforndy and exactly applied to the solution, by reducing the operation to finding the equations between auxiliaiy magnitudes, whence the Calculus leads to equations directly ixdatitig to the proposed magnitudes, which had formerly to be established directly. Whether these indirect equations are differential equations, according to Leibnitz, or equations of limits, according to Newton, or derived equations, accord- ing to Lagrange, the general procedure is evidently always the same. The coincidence is not only in the result but in the pro- cess ; for the auxiliaries introduced are really identical, being only legarded from different points of view. The conceptions of Leibnitz and of Newton consist in making known in any case two general necessary properties of the derived function of Lagrange. The ti'anscendental analysi.s, then, examined abstractly and in its prin- ciple, is always the same, whatever conception is adopted; and the jirocessesof the Calculus of indirect functions are necessarily identical ii' the.se diffeient methods, which must therefore, under any applicii- liun whatever, lead to ligorously unilorm results. 56 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. If we endeavour to estimate their comparative value, we shall find Their compara- in eacli of the three conceptions advantat^jes and live value. inconveniences which are peculiar to it, and which prevent geometers from adhering to any one of them, as exclusive and final. The method of Leihnitz has eminently the advantage in the rapidity and ease with which it effects the formation of equations hetween auxiliary magnitudes. We owe to its use the high per- fection attained by all the general theories of geometry and mechanics. Whatever may be the s{)eculative opinions of geometers as to the infinitesimal method, they all employ it in the treatment of any new question. Lagrange himself, after having reconstructed the analysis un a new basis, rendered a candid and decisive homage to the con- ception of Leibnitz, by employing it exclusively in the whole system of his 'Analytical Mechanics.' Such a fact needs no com- ment. Yet are we obliged to admit, with Lagrange, that the con- ception of Leibnitz is radically vicious in its logical relations. Ho himself declared the notion of infinitely small quantities to be a false idea : and it is in fact impossible to conceive of them clearly, though we may sometimes fancy that we do. This false idea bears, to my mind, the characteristic impress of the metaphysical age of its birth and tendencies of its originator. By the ingenious principhj of the compensation of errors, we may, as we have already seen, explain the necessary exactness of the processes which compose the method ; but it is a radical inconvenience to be obliged to indicate, in Mathematics, two classes of reasonings so unlike, as that the one order are perfectly rigorous, while by the others we designedly com- mit errors which have to be afterwards compensated. There is nothing very logical in this ; nor is anything obtained by pleading, as some do, that this method can be made to enter into that of limits, which is logically irreproachable. This is eluding the difficulty, and not resolving it; and besides, the advantages of this method, its ease and rapidity, are almost entirely lost under such a transformation. Finally, the infinitesimal method exhibits the very serious defect of breaking the unity of abstract mathematics by creating a transcendental analysis founded upon princii)les widely different from those which serve as a basis to ordinary analysis. This division of analysis into two systems, almost wholly inde- ])endent, tends to prevent the formation of general analytical con- ceptions. To estimate the consequences duly, we must i-ecur in thought to the state of the science before Lngrange had estab- lished a genei'al and complete harmony between these two great sections. Newton's conception is free from the logical objections imputable to that of Leibnitz. The notion of limits is in fact remarkable for its distinctness and precision. The equations are, in this case, re- ijrarded as exact from their oiiifferentiai which admit of the employment of the difierential Calculus alone. calculus alone. They are those in which the magnitudes sought enter directly, and not by their differentials, into the jirimitive dif- ferential equations, which then contain differentially only the various known functions employed, as we saw just now., as intermediaries. This calculus is here entirely sufficient for tlie elimination of the infinitesimals, without the question giving rise to any integration. There are also questions, few, l)ut highly im])ortant, wdiich are the converse of the last, requiring the emj)loyment of the Cases of the in- integral calculus alone. In these, the difierential tegrai Calculus equations are found to be inuuedialely I'cady for «''<'"''• intrgiation, because they contain, at their first formation, only t.he infinitesimals which relate to the functions sought, or to the really independent variables, without th(; inti-oduction, diffei-entially, of any intermediaries being required. If intermediaiy functions are intro- duced, they will, by the hypothesis, enter directly, and not by their u.bdiVisions. aecorduig as we have to dillerentiate functions ot a .single variable, or functions of several independent variables, — the second bi'anch being of far gieater complexity than the first, in the case of explicit functions, and much more in that of implicit. One more distinction remains, to complete this brief sketch of the pai-is of the dilferential calculus. The case in which it is i-equired to dif- ferentiate at once dilferent im|)licit functions combined in certain ])iimitive equations must be distinguished from that in which all these functions are separate. The same imperfection of ordinary analysis which ])revents our converting every implicit function into an equivalent ex[)licit one, renders us unable to separate the func- tions which enter simultaneously into any system of equations ; and the functions are evidently still more implicit in the case of com- bined than of separate functions : and in differentiating, we are not only unable to resolve the primitive equations, but even to effect the proper elimination among them. We have now seen the different ]iarts of this calculus in their natural connection a!id rational distribution. The Reduction to whole calculus is linally found to rest upon the dif- the elements. ferentiation of explicit functions with a single variable, — the only one which is ever executed directly. Now, it is easy to understand ihat this first theory, this necessary basis of the whole system, simply consists of the diffeientiation of the elementary functions, ten in number, which compose all our analytical combinations; for the differentiation of compound functions is evidently deduced, inmie- diately and necessarily, from that of their constituent simple func- lit)ns. We find, then, the whole system of differentiation i-educed to the knowledge of the ten fundamental differentials, and to that of the two general principles, by one of which the differentiation of implicit functions is deduced from that of explicit, and by the other, the difTei'entiation of functions of several variables is reduced to that of functions of a single variable. Such is the simplicity and per- fection of the system of the differential calculus. The transfurmaiion of derived Functions for neio variables is a theory which must be iust mentioned, to avoid the „ , omission 01 an mdispensable complement of the sys- tion of derived lem of differentiation. It is as finished and perfect f u-nct ions for , , . , . , , , . h new rartaOles. as tlie other parts or tins calculus; and its great impor- tance is in its increa.sing our resources by permitting us to choose, to facilitate the formation of differential equations, that system of independnet variables which may appear to be most advan- tageous, though it may afterwards be relinquished, as an inter- mediate step, by which, through this theory, we may pass to the final system, which sometimes could not have been considered directly. 62 POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. Thougli we cannot here consider tlie concrete applicalion.s of tliis Analytical calculus, we innst glance at tliose which are analy- appiications. tical, bccause they are of the same nature with the theory, and slioukl be looked at in connection wiih it. These ques- tions are reducible to three essential ones. First, tiie development inlo series of functions of one or more variables ; or, more generally, the transformation of functions, wbich constitutes the most beauliful and the most important application of tlie differential calculus to general analysis, and which comprises, besides the fundamental series discovered by Taylor, the remarkable series discovered by Maclanrin, John Bernouilli, Lagrange, and others. Secondly, the general theory of maxima and minima values for any functions whatever of one or more variables: one of the most interesting problems that analysis can present, however elementary it has become. The third is the least im})ortant of tlie three : — it is the determination of the true value of functions which present themselves under an indeterminate appearance, for certain hypotheses made on the values of the corre- sponding variables. In every view, the first question is the most eminent ; it is also the most susceptible of future extension, especi- ally by conceiving, in a larger manner than hitherto, of the employ- ment of the dilFerential calculus for the transformation of functions, about which Lagrange left some valuable suggestions which have been neither generalized nor followed up. It is with regret that I confine myself to the generalities which are the })roper subjects of this work ; so extensive and so interesting are the developments which might otherwise be offered. Insufficient and summary as ai'e the views of the Differential Calculus just offered, we must be no less ra])id in our survey of the Integral Calculus, properly so called ; that is, the abstract subject of inte- gration. The Integral Calculus. The division of the Integral Calculus, like that of the Differential, The Integral proceeds ou the principle of distingin'shing the inte- Caicuius. gration of explicit differential fornndas from the in- tegration of implicit differentials, or of differential equations. The r/. ^,-. -o^v,,,. sei)aration of these two cases is even more radical in jI to (Xvv ISvOltSt *■ c * •1*1 1 Tl the case of uitegration than m the otlier. In tiie differential calculus this distinction rests, as we liave seen, oidy on the extreme impeil'ection of ordinary analysis. But, on the other iiand, it is clear that even if all equations could be algebraically resolved, differential equations would nevertheless constitute a case of integration altogether distinct from that presented by explicit differential formulas. Their integration is necessarily more com- l»licated than that of explicit differentials, by the elaboration of which the integial calculus was oiiginated, and on which the others THE INTEGRAL CALCULUS. d^ Imve l)eon made to dopcnd, as far as possible. All ilic vaiioiis a/tialytical processes hitherto l)rop()se(l for the integration of did'eren- tial eqnalions, whether by the separation of variables, or the method of multipliers, or other means, have been designed to reduce these integrations to those of differential fbi-mulas, tiie only object which can be directly undertaken. Unhappily, im{)erfect as is this neces- sary basis of tlie whole integral calculus, tiie art of" reducing to it the integration of ditFerential equations is even nnich less advanced. As in the case of the differential calculus, and for analogous reasons, each of tiiese two branches of the integral „,,... ,,'....-, . ,. V, iimdivisioiis. calcuUis IS divided agam, according as we consider functions with a single variable or functions with several indepen- dent variables. Tiiis distinction is, like the preced- One variable, ing, even more important for integration than for or several. dilferentiation. This is especially remarkable with respect to differ- ential equations. In fact, those which relate to several independent variables may evidently present this characteristic and higher difii- culty — that the function sought may be differentially defined by a simple relation between its various special derivatives with regard to the different variables taken separately. Thence results the most difficult, and also the most extended branch of the integral calculus, which is commoidy called the Integral Calculus of partial difterences, created by D'Alembert, in which, as Lagrange truly perceived, geometers shoukl have recognized a new calculus, the philosophical character of which has not yet been precisely decided. This higher branch of transcendental analysis is still entirely in its infancy. In the very simplest case, we cannot completely reduce the integration to that of the ordinaiy differential equations. A new distinction, highly important here, though not in the differential calculus, where it is a mistake to insist Orders of upon it, is drawn from the higher or lower order of differentiation. the differentials. We may regard this distinction as a subdivision in the integration of explicit or implicit differentials. With regai'd to explicit differentials, whether of one variable or of several, the necessity of distinguishing their different orders is occasioned merely by the extreme imperfection of the integral calculus ; and, with reference to implicit differentials, the distinction of ordei-s is more important still. In the first case, we know so little of integration of even the first order of differential formulas, that differential formulas of a high order produce new difficulties in arriving at the primitive function wdiich is our object. And in the second case, there is the additional difficulty that the higher order of the differ- ential equations necessarily gives rise to questions of a new kind. The higlier the order of differential equations, the more implicit are the cases which they present; and they can be made to dejjend on each other only by special methods, the investigation of which, in 64 POSITIVE PBIIOSOPHY. consequence, forms a new class of questions, with regard to the simplest cases of which we as yet know next to nothing. The necessary hasis of all other integrations is, as we see from the foregoing considerations, that of explicit differential formulas of 1-he first order and of a single variable ; and we cannot succeed in effecting other integrations hut by reducing them to this elementary _ case, which is the only one capable of being treated "' '" '"'^^' directly. This simple fundamental integi'ation, often conveniently called quadratures, corresponds in the differential calculus to tlie elementary case of the differentiation of explicit functions of a single variable. But the integral question is, by its nature, quite otherwise complicated, and much more extensive than the ditfeiential question. We have seen that the latter is reduced to the differentiation of ten simple functions, which furnish the elements of analysis; but the integration of compound functions does not necessarily follow from that of the simple functions, each combination of which may present special difficulties with respect to the integral calculus. Hence the indefinite extent and varied complication of the question of quadratures, of which we know scarcely anything completely, after all the efforts of analysts. The question is divided into the two cases of algebraic functions Ahjehraic