THE L UNIVERSITY OF LOS ^ TREATISE ON THE SOCIAL COMPACT; O R The PRINCIPLES of POLITIC LAW. By J. J. ROUSSEAU, Citizen of GENEVA. A NEW EDITION. Fcederts +1% C H A P. VIII. Of civil fociety in general, 27 CHAP. IX. &f real demefna^ izq 3 O K CONTENTS. B O O . K II. Concerning the Legiflaturei CHAP, i. That the fovereignty is unalienable,. 3& CHAP. II. that the fovereignty is indivifible,, %$ G H A P. III. Whether the general will can be in the wrong, 4.2 CHAP. IV. Of the limits of thefovereign power t 44.. C H A P. V. On capital punijbments, 5 IB C H A P. VI. $ the law,. 535 CONTENTS. CHAP. VII. Of tie ftiaui and char after of a hgijlator 9 6 1 CHAP. VIII. Of the people, 6p CHAP. IX. *Nie fubjeft continued, 72 CHAP. X. The fubjeft continued^ 78 CHAP. XI. Of the various fyjiems of legijlature, 83 CHAP. XII. On the divijiom of the law*} 87 BOOK III. Concerning political laws, or the form* of Government. CHAP. I. On government in general, 77 CHAP. CONTENTS. CHAP. II. On the principle which con/1 itutes the different forms of government, 1OI> CHAP. III. Of the aflual diftinftions cf governments, 116 CHAP. IV. Of a Democracy, -.JCK) CHAP. V. Of an Ari/locracyt 113 CHAP. VL On CHAP VII. Of mixed Governments, 12$ / CHAP. VIIL That every form of government is not equally proper for every country, 130 e H A P, CONTENTS. CHAP. IX. Of the marks of a good Government, 141 CHAP. X. Of the abufe of government, and its ten* dency to degenerate, 144 CHAP. XI. Of the diffolution of the body politic, 151 C H A P. XII. By what means the fovere'tgn authority is maintained, 153 CHAP. XIII. The fubjefl continued, 156 CHAP. XIV. Tbefuljeft continued \ 159 CHAP. XV. Of deputies or representatives, 161 CHAP. CONTENTS. CHAP. XVI. the injlitution of government is not a 1 68 CHAP. XVII. Of the inflltution of government, 171 CHAP. XVIII. Of the means of preventing the ufurpa- tions of government, 173 BOOK IV. In which thefuljeft of political laws is con* tinued, and the means of Strengthening the conftitution of the fate confidered. CHAP. I. That the general will cannot be annihilated, 179 CHAP. II. On Votes, 183 CHAP. CONTENTS, CHAP. III. On Ek ft ions, jg^ CHAP. IV* Of the Roman Comitia, 194. CHAP. V. On the Tribunal 'e t 214 CHAP. VI. Of the Dittature y 2 ig CHAP. VII. Of the Cenforfiip, 224 CHAP. VIII. Of political Religion, 227 CHAP. IX. Condufion, 2a A TREATISE O N T H E SOCIAL COMPACT, &c. BOOK I. INTRODUCTION. MY defign, in the prefent treatife, is to inquire, Whether the nature of fociety admits of any fixed and equitable rules of go- vernment, fuppofing mankind to be fuch as they are, and their laws fuch as they might be made. In this iiavefligation I (hall endeavour conftantly to join the confiderations of natural right and public intereft, fo that juflice and utility may never be difunited. This being premifed, I fhall enter on my fub- jeft, -without expatiating on its importance. If B it 3 A TREATISE ON THE it be aflced, Whether I am a prince or legif- lator, that I thus take upon me to write on po- litics ? I anfwer, I am neither ; and that it is for this reafon I write. Were I a prince or legifla- tor I would not throw away my time in pointing out what ought to be done ; I would myfelf put it in practice, or be filent. As the citizen of a free ftate, and a member of the fupreme power, by birth, however weak may be the influence of my fmgle vote in public affairs, the right of giving that vote is fufficient to impofe on me the duty of making thofe affairs my ftudy, thinking myfelf happy in difcuffing the various forms of government, to find every day new reafons for admiring that of my own coun- try * ! M CHAP. I. The fubjeft of the frjl look. AN is born free, and yet is univerfally enflaved. At the fame time, an indi- vidual frequently conceives himfelf to be the lord and matter over others, though only more emi- nently deprived of liberty. Whence can this change arife ? Are there any means by which it may be rendered lawful ? The former quef- * Geneva. tion SOCIAL COMPACT. 3 tton I cannot anfwer, though I imagine myfelf capable of refolving the latter. If I took into confideration only the exiftence and effects of power, I ftiould fay, So long as a people are compelled to obey, they do well to be obedient ; but, as foon as they are in a capa- city to refift, they do better to throw off the yoke of reftraint : For, in recovering their li- berty on the fame plea by which they loft it, ei- ther they have a juft right to reaflTume it, or thofe could have none who deprived them of it. But there is an inviolable right founded on the very nature of fociety, which ferves as the bafts of all others. Man doth not derive this right, how- ever, immediately from nature; it is founded on mutual convention. We rnufl proceed, then, to inquire, of what kind fuch convention mufl have been. But, before we come to argue this point, I fhould eftablifh. what I have already ad- vanced. CHAP. II. On the primitive Ji ate of fociety. TH E moft ancient of all focieties, and the only natural one, is that of a family. And even in this, children are no longer con- nected with their father, than while they iland in need of his affi fiance. When this becomes B 2 needlefs, 4 A TREATISE ON THE needlefs, the natural tie is of courfe diffolved-, the children are exempted from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is equally fo from the folicitude due from him to his children ; both affume a ftate of independence refpecting each other. They may continue, indeed, to live together afterwards ; but their connection, m fuch a cafe, is no longer natural, but voluntary; and even the family union is then maintained by mutual convention. This liberty, which is common to all man- kind, is the neceffary confequence of our very nature; whofe fkft law being that of felf-pre- fervation, our principal concerns are thofe which relate to ourfelves ; no fooner, therefore, doth man arrive at years of difcretion, than he be- comes the only proper judge of the means of that prefervation, and of courfe his own matter. In a family, then, we may fee the firft of political focieties : their chief is reprefented by the father, and the people by his children, while all of them being free, and equal by birth, they cannot alienate their liberty, but for their common interest. All the difference between a fa- mily and a ftate, lies in this, That, in the former, the love which a father naturally bears to his children is a compenfation for his folicitude con- cerning them ; and, in the latter, it is the pleafure of SOCIAL COMPACT. 5 of command that (applies the place of this love, which a chief doth not entertain for his people. Grotius denies that government is inverted with power folely for the benefit of thofe who are governed, and cites the cafe of flaves as an example. It is, indeed, his conflant practice, to eftablifh the matter of right on the matter of fact *. He might have employed a more con- clufive method, though not a more favourable one for tyrannical governments. It is then doubtful, according to Grotius, whether the whole race of mankind, except about an hundred individuals, belong to thofe individuals, or whether the latter belong to the whole race of mankind; and he appears, throughout his whole work, to lean to the for- mer opinion. This is alfo the opinion of Hobbes. Thus they divide the human fpecies in- to herds of cattle, each of which hath its keeper, who protects it from others, only that he may make a property of it himfelf. * " The learned refearches into the laws of nature and nations are often nothing more than the hiftory of ancient abufes ; fo that it is a ridiculous infatuation to be too fond of ftudying them." Manufcript Trea- tife on the Inter efts of France, by ibe Marquis (T A, This was exactly the cafe with Grotius. B 3 As 6 A TREATISE ON THE As a fhepherd is of a fuperior nature to his flock, fo the herd-keepers of men, or their chiefs, are of a fuperior nature to the herd, over which they prefide. Such was the reafoning, according to Philo, of the Emperor Caligula, \vho concluded logically enough from this ana- logy, that either kings were gods, or their fub- jtcts no better than brutes. This argument of Caligula bears much refem- blance to thofe of Hobbes and Grotius. Arif- totle had faid, indeed, before either of them, that men were not naturally equal ; but that fome of them were born to flavery, and others to dominion. Ariftotle was right as to the fact, but miftook the effect for the caufe. Nothing is more cer- tain, than that every man born in flavery is born to be a flave. In fuch a ftate, men lofe even the 1 defire of freedom, and prefer fubjedYion, as the companions of Ulyfles did their brutality *. If there are any flaves, therefore, by nature, iris becaufe they are flaves contrary to nature. Power firfl: made flaves, and cowardice hath per- petuated them. * See a little trad written by Plutarch, on the ra- tionality of brutes. I SOCIAL COMPACT. 7 I have faid nothing of king Adam, or the emperor Noah, father of three monarch?, who, like the children of Saturn, as fome have ima- gined them to be, divided the world among them. I hope my moderation alfo in this re- fpec~l will be efteemed fome merit ; for, as I am defcended in a right line from one of thefe princes, and probably from the eldeft branch of the family, how do I know, that, by a regular deduction of my defcent, I might not find my- felf the legitimate heir to univerfal monarchy ? Be this, however, as it may, it cannot be denied, that Adam had as good a title to the fovereignty of the world, when he was the only perfon in it, as Robinfon Crufoe had to that of his ifland un- der the fame circurhftances. A very great con- veniency alfo attended 1 their government, in that the monarch might reft fecurely on his .throne, without fear of wars, confpiracies, or rebellion. CHAP. III. On the right of the Strange/}. f ^ HE frrongeft is not firong enough to con- JL tinue always matter, unlefs he transforms his power Into a right of command, and obe- dience into a duty. Hence is deduced the right of the ftrongeft j a right taken ironically in ap- B 4 pearance, 8 A TREATISE ON THE pearance, and laid down as an eftabliftied prin- ciple in reality. Put will this term never be rightly explained ? Force, in the fimpleft fenfe, is a phyfical power ; nor can I fee what morality can refult from its effefts. To yield to fuperior force is an aft -of neceffity, not of the will ; at moft it is but an aft of prudence. And in what fenfe can this be called a duty ? Let us fuppofe, however, for a moment, this pretended right eftablifhed, and we {hall fee it attended with inexplicable abfurdities for, if it be admitted, that power conflitutes right, the effeft changes with thecaufe, and every fucceed- ing power, if greater than 'the former, fucceeds alfo to the right ; fo that men may lawfully dif- obey, as foon as they can do it, with impunity ; and, as right is always on the ftrongeft fide, they have nothing more to do, than to acquire fuperior force. Now what kind of .right can that be, which vanifhes with the power of en- forcing it ? If obedience be only exafted by com- pulfion, there is no need to make fuch obedience a duty, as when we are no longer compelled to obey, we are no longer obliged to it. It ap- pears, therefore, that the word Tight adds no- thing in this cafe to that of force, and, in faft, is a term of no figniflcatjon. SOCIAL COMPACT. 9 Be obedient to the higher powers. If by this precept is meant, fuhj-ft to a fuperior force> the advice is good, though fuperfluous ; I \vill an- f'wer for it, fuch a rule will never be broken. All power, I own, is derived from God ; but every corporeal malady is derived alfo from the fame fource. But are we therefore forbid to call in the phyfician ? If a robber (hould ftop me on the highway, am I not only obliged, on corti- pulfion, to give him my purfe, but am I alfo obliged to it in point of confcience, though I might poffibly conceal it from him ? This will hardly be averred ; and yet the piftol he holds to my bread, is, in effect, a fuperior force. On the whole, we muft conclude, then, that mere power doth not confHtute right, and that men are obliged only to pay obedience to lawful authority. Thus we are conflantly recurring to my firfl queftion. CHAP. IV. On flavery. S no man hath any natural authority over the reft of his fpecies, and as power doth not confer right, the bafis of all lawful authority is laid in mutual convention. B 5 H A io A TREATISE ON THE If an individual, fays Grotius, can alienate his hberty, and become the flave of a matter, why may not a whole people colledlivelyalienate theirs, and become fubjecl: to a king ? This propofition, however, contains fome equivocal terms, which re- quire explanation, but I (hall confine myfelf to that of alienate. Whatever is alienated muft be difpofed of, either by gift or fale. Now a man who becomes the flave of another doth not give himfelf away, but fells himfelf, at leaft for his fubfiftence ; but why fhould a whole people fell themfelves ? So far is a king from furniihing his fubjecls fubfiftence, that they maintain him ; and, as our friend Rabelais fays, A king doth not live on a little. Can fubjecls be fuppofed to give .away. their liberty, on condition that the receiver (hall take their property along with it ? After this, I really cannot fee any thing they have left. It may be faid, a monarch maintains among his fubjeifls the public tranquillity. Be it fo ; I would be glad to know, of what they are gain- ers, if the wars in which his ambition engages them, if his infatiable avarice, or the oppreffions of his minifters, are more deftructive than civil diffenfions? Of what are they gainers, if even this tranquillity be one caufe of their mifery ? A-prifoner may live tranquil enough in his dun- geon ; but will this be fufficient to make him contented there ? When the Greeks were flm* up SOCIAL COMPACT. n up in the cave of the Cyclops, they lived there unmolefted, in expectation of their turn to be devoured. To fay, that a man can give himfelf away, is to talk unintelligibly and abfurdly ; fuch an aft muft necefTarily be illegal and void, were it for no other reafon, than that it argues infanity of mind in the agent. To fay the fame thing of a whole people therefore, is to fuppofe a whole na- tion can be at once out of their fenfes ; but were it fo, fuch madnefs could not confer right. Were it poilible alfo for a man to alienate himfelf, he could not, in the fame manner, dif- pofe of his children, who, as human beings, are born free j their freedom is their own, and no- body hath any right to difpofe of it but them- felves. Before they arrive at years of difcretion, indeed, their father may, for their fecurity, and in their name, flipulate the conditions of their prefervadon, but he cannot unconditionally and irrevocably difpofe of their perfons, fuch a gift being contrary to the intention of nature, and exceeding the bounds of paternal authority. It is requifite, therefore, in order to render an ar- bitrary government lawful, that every new ge- neration fhould be at liberty to admit or reject its authority, in which cafe it would be no longer an arbitrary government. B 6 To 12 ATREATISE ON THE To renounce one's natural liberty, is to re- nounce one's very being as a man ; it is to re- nounce not only the rights, but even the duties of humanity. And what poffible indemnification can be made the man who thus gives up his all ? Such a renunciation is incompatible with our very nature ; for to deprive us of the liberty of the will, is to take away all morality from our actions. In a word, a convention, which ftipu- lates on the one part abfolute authority, and on the other implicit obedience, is, in itfelf, fu- tile and contradictory. Is it not evident, that we can lie under no reciprocal obligation what- ever to a perfon, of whom we have a right to demand every thing; and doth not this circum- flance, againft which he has no equivalent, ne- ceflarily infer fuch act of convention to be void ? For what claim can my flave have upon me, when he himfelf, and all that belongs to him, are mine ? His claims are of courfe my own, and to fay thofe can be fet up againft me, is to talk abfurdly. Again, Grotius and others have deduced the origin of this pretended right from the fuperiority obtained in war. The conqueror, fay they, ha- ving a right to put the vanquished to death, the latter may equitably purchafe his life at the ex- pence of his liberty ; fuch an agreement being 9 the SOCIAL COMPACT. 13 the more lawful, as it conduces to the mutual advantage of both parties. It is clear and certain, however, that this pre- tended right of the viclor over the lives of the vanquiflied is not, ia any fhape, the natural re. fult of a ftate of war. This is plain, were it for no other reafon than that the reciprocal relations of mankind, while living together in their pri- mitive independence, were not fufficiently du- rable, to conftitute a ftate, either of peace or war ; fo that men cannot be naturally enemies. It is the relation fublifting between things, and not between men, that gives rife to war ; which arifing thus, not from perfonal, but real, relations, cannot fubfift between man and man, either ia a ftate of nature, in which there is no fettled property, or in a ftate of fociety, in which every thing is fecured by the laws. The quarrels, encounters and duels of indi- viduals are not fufficient toconftitute fuch a ftate of war ; and, with regard to the particular combats authorifed by the inftitutions of Lewis XI. King of France ; they were only fome of the abufes of the feudal government, a fyf- tem truly abfurd, as contrary to the principles of natural juftice, as of good policy. War 14 A TREAT IS E ON THE War is not, therefore, any relation between man and man, but a relation between Hate and ftate, in which individuals are enemies only acci- dentally, not as men, or even as citizens, but as foldiers; not as members of their particular community, but as its defenders. !.< (Iiort, a ftate can have for its enemy nothing but a ftate, not men ; as between things eflentially different, there can be no common relation. This principle is, indeed, conformable to the cftabHfhed maxims of all nges, and the conftant practice of every civilized people. Declarations of war are made lefs to give notice to fovereigns, than to their fubjects. The foreigner, whether a- fovereign, an indi- vidual, or a people, who- plunders, kills, or takes prifoner a fubjecl:, without declaring war againfl his prince, is not an enemy, but a robber. Even in a time of war, a juft prince may make himfelf mafter, in an enemy's country, of what- ever belongs to the public, but he will refpect the perfoni and private properties of individuals ; he will refpedr. ihofe rights on which his own are founded. The defign of war being the deftruc- tion of an hoftile ftate, we have a right to kill its defenders, while, they are in arms ; but as, in laying down their arms, they ceafe to be enemies, SOCIAL COMPACT. 15 or inftruments of hoftility, they become, in that cafe, mere men, and we have not the leaft right to murder them. It is fometimes poffible effec- tually to deftroy a ftate, without killing even one of its members ; now war cannot confer any right or privilege, which is not neceflary to accomplifli its end and defign. It is true, thefe are not the principles of Grotius, nor are they founded on the authority of the poets ; but they are fuch as are deduced from the nature of things, and are founded on reafon. With regard to the right of conqueft, it has no other foundation than that of force, the law of the ftrongeft. But, if war doth not give the victor a right to maflacre the vanquiftied, this pretended right, which does not exift, cannot be the foundation of a right to enflave them. If we have no right to kill an enemy, unleis we cannot by force reduce him to flavery, our right to make him a Have never can be founded on our right to kill him. It is, therefore, an iniquitous bargain, to make him purchafe, at the expence of liberty, a life, which we have no right to take away. In eftablifliing thus a right of life and death over others, on that of enflaving them ; and, on the other hand, a right of enflaving them on that of life and death, we certainly fall into the abfurdity of reafoning in a circle. Let 4 i6 A TREATISE ON THE Let us fuppofe, however, that this Shocking right of general maflacre exifted, I ftill affirm, that a (lave, made fo by the fortune of war, or a conquered people, fo reduced to flavery, lie under no other obligations to their matter, than to obey htm fo long as he hath the power to compel them to it. In accepting of an equiva- lent for their Jives, the victor confers on them no favour ; inftead of killing them ufelefsly, he hath only varied the mode of their deftruclion to his own advantage. So far, therefore., from his having acquired over them any additional authority, the ftate of war fubfifts between them as before j their relation to each other is the evi- dent effect of it, and his exertion of the rights of war is a proof, that no treaty of peace hath fucceeded. Will it be faid, they have made a convention; be it fo : This convention is a mere truce, and is fo far from putting an end to the ftate of war, that it neceflarily implies its con- tinuation. Thus, in whatever light we confider this af- fair, the right of making men flaves is null and void, not only becaufe it is unjuft, but becaufe it is abfurd and infignificant. The terms Jlavery and jujlice are contradictory and reciprocally ex- elufive of each other, Hence the following pro- pofal SOCIAL COMPACT. 17 pofal would be equally ridiculous, whether made by one individual to another, or by a pri- vate man to a whole people. / enter into an agreement with you, altogether at your own charge, and folely for my profit, u,huh I wilt olferve as long as I pteafe, and which you are to olferve a'fo, es long as 1 think proper* CHAP. V. On the-meceffity of recurring always to the primi- tive convention, ON the fuppofition, that I fhould grant to be true what I have hitherto difproved, the advocate for defpotifm would, however, profit but little. There will be always a great difference between fubjecYmg a multitude, and governing a fociety. Let individuals, in any number whatever, become feverally and fuccef- fively fubjeft to one man, they are all, in that cafe, nothing more than mailer and flaves ; they are not a people governed by their chief ; they are an Aggregate if you will, but do not form an aflbciation ; there fubfiits among them neither commonwealth nor body politic. Such a fuperior, though he fhould become the mafter of half the world, would be ftill a private per- fon, and his interefr, feparate and diftinct from that of his people, weuJd be iUli no more than a private 18 A TREATISE ON THE private intereft. When fuch a perfon dies, alfo the empire over which he prefided is diflblved, and its component parts remain totally uncon- nected, juft as an oak falls into a heap of afhes, when it is confumed by the fire, A people," fays Grotius, may voluntarily be- flow themfelves on a king : According to Gro- tius, therefore, a people are a people before they thus give themfelves up to regal authority. Even this gift, however, is an aft of foeiety, and prefuppofes a public deliberation on the matter. Hence, before we examine into the act, by which a people make choice of a king, it is proper to examine into that by which a people became a people, for, on this, which is necelTarily prior to the other, refts the true foundation of fa- ciety. For, if, in fact, there be no prior conven- tion, whence arifes (unlefs indeed the electioa was unanimous) the obligation of the fmaller number to fubmit to the choice of the greater ? and whence comes it, that an hundred perfons, for inftance, who might defire to have a matter, had a right to vote for ten others who might de- fire to have none ? The choice by a plurality of votes is in itfelf an eflablifhment of convention, and fnppofes, that unanimity muft at leaft for once have fubfifted among them. CHAP. SOCIAL COMPACT. 19 CHAP. VI. On the facial paft or covenant, ISuppofe mankind arrived at that term, when the obftacles to their prefervation , in a ftate of nature, prevail over the endeavours of individuals, to maintain themfelves in fuch a ftate. At fuch a crifis_this primitive ftate there- fore could no longer fubfift, and the human race muft have periled, if they had not changed their manner of living. Now as men cannot create new powers, but only compound and direct thofe which really ex- id, they have no other means of prefervation} than that of forming, by their union, an accu- mulation of forces, fufficient to oppofe the ob- ftacles to their fecurity, and of putting thefe in action by a firft mover, capable of making them aft in concert with each other. This general accumulation of power cannot arife but from the concurrence of many particu- lar forces ; but the force and liberty of each in- dividual being the principal inftruments of his own prefervation, how is he to engage them in the common interefr., without hurting his own, und neglecting the obligations he lies under to himfelf ? 20 A TREATISE T>N TITE himfelf ? This difficulty, being applied to my prefent fubject, may be expreffed in the follow- ing terms : vereign authority, and fubjefts, as fubjecled to the laws of the (late. Thefe terms, indeed, are frequently confounded, and miftaken one for the other ; it is fufficient, however, to be able to diftinguifh them, when they are to be ufed with precifion. I CHAP. VII. Of the fiverelgn. T is plain from the above formula, that the aft of aflfociation includes a reciprocal en- gagement between particulars and the public j neva, he committed a wretched blunder, in miflaking one for the other. Mr. d'Alembert indeed has avoid- ed this mi (lake in the Encyclopaedia, where he has properly diftinguifhed the four orders of people (and even five, reckoning mere flrangers) that are found in oar city, and cf which two only compofe the re. public : No other French author that I know of hath ever comprehended the meaning of the word citizen. and 1 4 A TREATISE ON THE and that each individual, in contracting, if I may fo fay, with himfelf, is laid under a twofold engagement, viz. as a member of the fovereign- ty toward particular perfons, and as a member of the ftate toward the fovereign. That maxim of the civil law, however, is inapplicable here, which fays, that no one is bound by the engagements he enters into with himfelf; for there is a wide difference between entering into a perfonal obligation with one's felf, and with 2 whole, of which one may conftitute a part. It is farther to be obferved, that the public determination, which is obligatory on the fub- jefr., with regard to the fovereign, on account of the twofold relation by which each ftands con- tracted, is not, for the contrary reafon, obliga- tory on the fupreme power towards itfelf : and that it is confequently inconfiftent with the na- ture of the body politic, that fuch fupreme power fhould impofe a law, which it cannot break. For, as the fovereign ftands only in a fmgle relation, it is in the fame cafe as that of an individual contracting with himfelf ; whence it is plain, that there neither is, nor can be, any fundamental law obligatory on the whole body of a people, even the focial compact itfelf not being fuch. By this, however, it is not meant, that fuch a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters that do not derogate from SOCIAL COMPACT. 25 from this contract ; for, with refpeft to foreign objefts, it is a limple and individual pejrfon. But, as the body politic, or the fovereign, derives its very exigence from this inviolable contraft, it can enter into no lawful engagement, even with any fimilar body, derogatory from the tenour of this primitive aft ; fuch as that of alienating any part of itfelf, or of fubmitting it> felf intirely to a foreign fovereign. To violate the aft whereby it exifts would be to annihilate itfelf, and from nothing can arife nothing. No fooner are a multitude of individuals thus united in a body, than it becomes impoffible to aft offenfively againft any of the members, with- out attacking the whole, and 1U11 lefs to offend the whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and interefl equally oblige the two contracting parties to affift each other, and the fame perfons ought to endeavour to include, within this twofold relation, all the advantages which depend on it. Now the fovereign, being formed only by the feveral individuals of which the ftate is com- pofed, can have no intereft contrary to theirs ; of courfe the fupreme power ftands in no need of any guarantee toward the fubjefts, becaufe it is C impoffible, 26 A TREATISE ON THE impoflible, that the body fliould be capable of hurting all its members ; and we (hall tee here- after, that it can as little tend to injure any of them in particular. Hence the fovereign is neceflarily, and for the fame reafon that it exifts, always fuch as it ought to be. The cafe is different, however, as to the re- lation in which the fubjecls (land to the fove- reign ; as, notwithftanding their common inte- reft, the latter can have no fecurity that the former will difcharge their engagements, unlefs means be found to engage their fidelity. In fact, every individual may, as a man, en- tertain a particular will, either contradictory or diffimilar to his general will, as a citizen. His private intereft may influence him, in a manner diametrically oppofite to the common intereft of the fociety. Reflecting on his own exiftence as po- fltive and naturally independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common caufe, to be a free and gratuitous contribution, the want of which will be lefs hurtful to others, than the difcharge of it will be burthenfome to himfelf j and, re- garding the moral perfon of the flate as an ima- ginary being, becaufe it is not a man, he may be defirous of enjoying all the privileges of a citizen, without fulfilling his engagement as a fubjed j SOCIAL COMPACT. 27 fubjecl ; an injuflice, that, in its progrefs, muft neceffarily be the ruia of the body politic. To the end, therefore, that the focial com- pact fliould not prove an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which only can en- force the reft, viz. that whofoever refufes to pay obedience to the general will, fhall be liable to be compelled to it by the force of the whole bo- dy. And this is in effect nothing more, than, that they may be compelled to be free ; for fuch is the condition which, in uniting every citizen to the ftate, fecured him from all perfonal depend- ence ; a condition, which forms the whole artifice and play of the political machine : it is this alone that renders all focial engagements juft and equi- table which, Without it, Would be abfurd, tyran- nical, and fubject to the moft enormous abufes. ; CHAP. VIII. Of civil fociety in general. THE tranfition of man from a flate of na- ture to a (late of fociety is productive of a very remarkable change in his being, by fub- ftituting jufticc inftead of inftinct, as the rule of his conduct, and attaching that morality to his actions, of which they were before deftitute. It is in immediate confequence of this change, when C 2 the 28 A TREATISE ON THE the voice of duty fucceeds to phyfical impulfe and the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto regarded only his own gratification, finds himfelf obliged to aft on other principles, and to con- fult his reafon, before he follows the dictates of his paflious. Although, by entering into a ftate of fociety, he is deprived alfo of many advan- tages which depend on that of nature, he gains by it others fo very confiderable, his faculties exert and expand themfelves, his ideas are en- larged, his fentiments ennobled, and his whole foul is elevated to fo great a degree, that, if the -abufes of this new ftate do not degrade him be- low the former, he ought incefTantly to blefs that happy moment in which he was refcued from it, and converted from afiupid and ignorant animal into an intelligent and wife Being. To ftate the balance of what is loft and gain-* ed by this change, we fhall reduce it to compa- rative terms. By entering into the focial com- pact, man gives up his natural liberty, or unli- mited right to every thing which he is defirous of, and can attain. In return for this, he gains fo- cial liberty, and an exclusive property in all thofe things of which he is poffefTed. To avoid any miftake, however, in the nature of thefe compenfations, it is neceflary to make a juft dif- - tiuftion between natural liberty, which is limited * by SOCIAL COMPACT. 29 by nothing but the inabilities of the individual, and facial liberty, which is limited by the gene- ral will of the community ; and alfo, between that pofTeffion, which is only effected by force, or follows the right of prior occupancy, and that property, which is founded only on a poft - tive title. To the preceding alfo may be added, as the acquisition of a focial ftate, moral liberty, which only renders a man truly mafter of himfelf: for to be under the direction of appetite alone is to be in a ilate of flavery, while to pay obedi- ence only to thofe laws which we prefcribe to ourfelves, is liberty. But I have faid too much already on this fubjecr., the phiiofophical mean- ing of the word Liberty being, in this place, out of the queftion. CHAP. IX. Of real dsmefnes. EAch member of the community, in becom- ing fuch, devotes himfelf to the public from that. moment, in fuch a fl'ate as he then is, with all his power and abilities, of which abili- ties his pofTdfions make a part Not tbnt in confequcnce of this aft the pofleflion changes its nature, by changing hands, and becomes actual C 3 property 30 ATREATISE ON TH-E property in thofe of the fovereignty ; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public pofTefTion is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at kaft with regard to fo- reigners. For every ftate is, with refpect to its members, matter of all. their pofTeflions, by vir- tue of the focial compact, which, in a ftate, ferves as the bafis of all other rights ; but, with regard to other powers or ftates, it is mailer of them only, by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals. The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the ftrongeft, becomes not an equitable right, till after the eftablifhment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to every thing which is neceflary for his fubfiftence; but the pofitive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain pofleflion excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being afligned him, he ought to confine himfelf to that, and hath no longer any right to a com- munity of pofieffion. Hence it is that the right of prior occupancy, though but of little force in a ftate of nature, is fo refpectable in that of fociety. The point to which we are chiefly di- rected ia the qonfideration of this right, is ra- ther, SOCIAL COMPACT. 31 ther what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us. To define the right of prior occupancy in ge- neral terms, it is founded on the following con- ditions. It is requifite, in the firft place, that the lands in queftion fhould be unoccupied ; fe- condly, that no greater quantity of it fhould be occupied than is neceflary for the fubfiftence of the occupiers ; and, in the third place, that pof- feflion fhould be taken of it, not by a vain cere- mony, but by aftual cultivation, the only mark of property, which, in defeft of juridical titles, fliould be at all refpefted. To allow the firft occupier a right to as much territory as he may cultivate, and is neceflary to his fubfiftence, is certainly carrying the matter as far as is reafonable. Otherwife we know not how to fet bounds to this right. Is it fufficient for a man to fet foot on an uninhabited territory, to pretend immediately an exclufive right to it ? Is it fufficient for him to have power enough at one time to drive others from the fpot, to deprive them for ever afterwards of the right of returning to it ? How can a man, or even a whole people, poflefs themfelves of an immenfe territory, and exclude from it the reft of mankind, without C 4 being 32 A TREATISE ON THE being guilty of an illegal ufnrpation ; fince, by fo doing, they deprive the reft of mankind of an habitation, and thofe means of fubfiftence, which nature hath given in common to them all ? When Nunez Balbao flood on the fea-fhore, and, in the name of the crown of Caftile, took 'pofTef- flon of the Pacific Ocean, and of all South- America, was this fufficient to difpofTefs all the inhabitants of that vaft country, and exclude all the other fovereigns in the world ? On fuch a fuppofition, the like idle ceremonies might have been rkliculoufly multiplied, and his Catholic Majefly would have had no more to do, than to h.ive taken pofleffion in his clofet of all the coun- tries in the world, and to have afterwards only deducted from his empire fuch as were before poflefled by other princes. It is eafy to conceive, how the united and contiguous eftates of individuals become the ter- ritory of the public, and in what manner the rght of fovereignty, extending itfelf from the fubjefts to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and perfonalj a circumftance which lays the pofTeflbrs under a Hate of the greateft dependence, and makes even their own abilities a fecurity for their fidelity. This is an advantage SOCIAL COMPACT. 3$ advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to, by fovereigns among the an- cients, who, by filling themfelves only kings of the Perfians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, feemed to look on themfelves only as chief of men, rather than as matters of a country. Mo- dern princes more artfully ftile themfelves the kings of England, France, Spain, feV. and thus, by claiming the territory itfelf, are fecure of the inhabitants. What is very fingular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the pofleffions of individuals, is fo far from defpoiling them there- of, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in fuch pofieflions, by converting an ufurpation into an actual right, and a bare pofTeffion into a, real property. The pofleflbrs alfo being confi- dered as the depofitaries of the public wealth, while their rights are refpected by all the mem- bers of the ftate, and maintained by all it's force againft any foreign power, they acquire, if t may fo fay, by a ceffion advantageous to the public, and flill more fo to themfelves, every thing they ceded by it : a paradox which is eafily explained by the diflhiction to be made be- tween the lights which the fovereign and the C 5 proprietor 34 A TREATISE ON THE proprietor have in the fame fund, as will be feea hereafter. It may alfo happen, that men may form them- felves into a fociety, before they have any pof- feffions ; and that, acquiring a territory fufficient for all, they may poflefs it in common, or di- vide it among them, either equally, or in fuch different proportions as may be determined by the fovereign. Now, in whatfoever manner fuch acquifition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own eftate, muft be al- ways fubordinate to the right which the com-- munity hath over the pofTeffions of all ; for, without this, there would be nothing binding^ in the focial tie, nor any real force in the exer- cife of the fupreme power. I (hall cod this book, with a remark, that ought to ferve as the bafis of the whole focial fjftem : and this is, that, inftead of annihilating the natural equality among mankind, the funda- mental, compact fubftitutes, on the contrary, a moral and legal equality, to make up for that natural and phyfical difference which prevails among individuals, who, though unequal in per- fonal SOCIAL COMPACT. 3$ fonal flrength and mental abilities, become thus all equal by convention and right *. * This equality, indeed, is under fome govern- ments merely apparent and delofive, ferving only to keep the poor ftill in mifery, and favour the oppref- fion of the rich. And, in fad, the laws are always ufeful to perfons of fortune, and hurtful to thofe who are deflitute : whence it follows, that a (late of fo- ciety is advantageous to mankind in general, only when they all poflefs fomething, and none of them have any thing too much. The END of the FIRST BOOK. C* BOOK T A TREATISE ON THE BOOK II. CHAP. I. That the fovereignty is unalienalle. HE firft and moft important confequence to be drawn from the principles already eftablifhed, is, that the general xy/7/only can di- rect the forces of the ftate agreeable to the end of its original inftitution, which is the common good ; for, though the oppofition of private in- terefts might make the eftablifliment of focieties necefTary, it muft have been through the coali- tion of thofe interefts, that fuch eftablidiment became poffible. The bonds of fociety muft have been formed out of fomething common to thofe feveral interefts, for, if there had been no point to which they could have been recon- ciled, no fociety could poffibly have fubfifted. Now it is only on thefe points that the govern- ment of fociety fhouldbe founded. I fay, therefore, that the fovereignty, being only the exertion of the general will, cannot be alienated, and that the fovereign, which is only a collective being, cannot be reprefented but by itfelf; SOCIAL COMPACT. 37 itfelf : the power of a people may be tranfmitted or delegated, but not their will. It may not be abfolutely impoffible, that the will of an individual (hould agree, in fome par- ticular point, with the general will of a whole people ; it is, however, impoflible, that fuch agreement (hould be conftant and durable, for the will of particulars always tends to make dif- tinctions of preference, and the general will to a perfect equality. It is further ftill more im- poffible, fuppofing fuch agreement might always fubfifr, to have any fecurity that it would do fo, as it could never be the effect of art, but of chance. The fovereign may fay, My will is now agreeable to the will of fuch an individual, or at leaft to what he pretends to be his will ; but it cannot pretend to fay, I agree to whatever may be the will of fuch individual to-morrow ; as it is abfurd for the will to lay itfelf under any re- ftraint regarding the future, and as it is impof- lible for the will to confent to any thing contrary to the intereft of the being whofe will it is. Should a people therefore enter into the engage- ment of fimply promifing obedience, they would lofe their quality, as a people, and be virtually diflblved by that very act. The moment there exifts a mafrer, there can be no longer a fove- reign, the body politic being thereby deftroyed. I would 38 A TREATISE ON THE I would not be underftood to mean, that the orders of a chief may not pafs for the dictates of the general will, when the fovereign, though at liberty to contradift, does not oppofe it. In fuch a cafe, it is to be prefumcd, from the uni- verfal filence of the people, that they give their confent. This will be farther explained in the end. CHAP. II. < f7}at the fovereignty is indivijible. FOR the fame reafon that the fovereignty is unalienable, it is alfo indivifible j for the will is general*, or it is not; it is that of the body of the people, or only that of a part. In the firft cafe, this -will, when declared, is an ac> of fovereignty, and becomes a law: in the fe- cond, it is only a particular will, or an aft of the magiftracy, and is- at mofl a decree. But our politicians, incapable of dividing the fovereignty in its firft principles, divide it in its In order that this will fhoald be general, it i not always neceflary it fliould be unanimous : it is ne- ceflary, however, that every individual fhould be permitted to vote ; every formal exclufion infringing the generality. SOCIAL COMPACT. 39. object ; they diftinguifh it into power and will ;. into a legiflative and executive power ; into the prerogatives of taxation, of executing juflice, and of making war ; into departments of do- meftic and foreign adminiftration. Sometimes they blend all thefe confufedly together, and, at others, confider them as diftinft and feparate, making out the fovereign to be a fantaftic com- pound, juft as if they mould compofe a man out of feveral bodies, of which one fhould have on- ly eyes, another arms, a third feet, and nothing more. It is faid of the jugglers in Japan, that they will take a child, and cut it into pieces ip the prefence of the fpeftators, then, throwing up its difmembered limbs one after another into the air, they are united, and the child defcends alive, and well as before. The legerdemain of our modern politicians greatly refembles this trick of the Japonefe ; for they, after having difmem- bered the body politic with equal dexterity, bring all its parts together by hocus pccus again, and reprefent it the fame as before* This error arifes from their not having form- ed precife ideas of the fovereign authority, and from their miftaking the fimple emanations of this authority, for parts of its efTence. Thus, for inftance, the acts of declaring war and ma- king peace are ufually regarded as afts of fove- reignty. 40 A TREATISE ON THE reignty, which they are not ; for neither of thefe acts are laws, but confift only of the application of the law. Each is a particular act, determi- nate only of the meaning of the law in fuch cafe, as will be feen more clearly, when the idea attached to the word law (hall be precifely fettled. By tracing, in like manner, their other divi- fions, we (hall find, that we are conftantly mif- taken, whenever we think the fovereignty di- vided ; and that the prerogatives, which are fup- pofed to be parts of the fovereignty, are all fub- ordinate to it, and always fnppofe the predeter- mination of a fuperior will, which thofe prero- gatives only ferve to put in execution. It is impoilible to fay, in how much obfcurity this want of precifion hath involved the reafon- ings of authors, on the fubject of political law, when they came to examine into the refpective rights of kings and people, on the principles they had eftablifhed. By turning to the third and fourth chapters of the firft book of Grotius, the reader may fee, how that learned author and his tranflator, Barbeyrac, bewildered and en- tangled themfelves in their own fophifms, through fear of faying too much or too little for their purpofe, and of making thofe interefls clafh, which, SOCIAL COMPACT. 41 which it was their bufinefs to reconcile. Grotius, being diiTatisfied with his own countrymen, a refugee in France, and willing to pay his court to Lewis XIII. to whom his book is dedicated, fpared no art nor pains to ftrip the people of their privileges, and to inveft kings with prero- gative. Barbeyrac alfo wrote with a fimilar view, dedicating his tranflation to George I. of England. But, unluckily, the expulfion of James II. which he calls an abdication, obliged him to be much on the referve, to turn and wind about, as he faw occafion, in order not to make William III. an ufurper. Had thefe two writers adopted true principles, all thefe diffi- culties would have vanimed, and they would have written confiftently ; in fuch a cafe, how- ever, they could only, in fober fadnefs, have told the truth, and would have paid their court only to the people. Now, to tell the truth, is not the way to make a fortune ; nor are ambafTadors appointed, or places and penfions given away by the populace. CHAP. 42 A TREATISE ON THE I CHAP. HI. Whether the general Will can be in the wrong. T follows, from what has been faid, that the general Will is always in the right, and con- ftantly tends to the public good ; it does not fol- low, however, that the deliberations of the people will always be attended with the fame rec- titude. We are ever defirous of our own good, but we do not always diftinguifh in what it con- fifts. A whole people never can be corrupted, but they may be often miftaken, and it is in fuch a cafe only that they appear to feek their own difadvantage. There is often a considerable difference be- tween the will of all the members and the gene- ral will of the whole body j the latter regards only the common intereft, the other refpefts the private intereft of individuals, and is the aggre- gated futn of their particular wills ; but, if we take from this fum thofe contradictory wills that mutually deftroy each other*, the fum of the. remaining differences is the general will. If * Each intereft, fays the Marquis d'A. has different principles, d coalition bet'iufen t*u.o particular intereflf may le formed, out if offo/ition. to that of a third. He might SOCIAL COMPACT. 43 If a people, fufficiently informed of the na- ture of the fubjeft under their consideration, fhould deliberate, without having any communi- cation with each other, the general will would always refult from the greater number of their little differences, and their deliberation would be fuch as it ought to be. But when they enter into cabals, and form partial affectations, at the expence of the general one, the will of each of thefe aflbciations becomes general, with regard to the particular members of each, and, in it- felf, particular, with regard to the ftate. In fuch a cafe, therefore, k may be faid, there & no longer as many voters as individuals, but on- ly as many voices as there are aflTociations. The differences then become lefs numerous, and give a lefs general refult. Again, Ihould one of thefe partial aflbciations be fo great, as to influence all the reft, \he refult would no longer be the fum of many little differences, but that of one great one j in which cafe, a general will would no longer fubfift. might h^ve added, that a. coalition of all is farmed out of oppofition to the intereft of each. Were there no different and clafhing interdt-s, th't of the whole would be hardly diftirvgu-fhable, as it would meet with no obftacle. All things would go regularly on of their own accord, and "civil policy would ceafe to ks an art. It 44 A TREATISE ON THE It is requifite, therefore, in order that each re- fblution may be dictated by the general will, that no fuch partial focieties fhould be formed in a flate, and that each citizen fliould think for hin>felf *. Such was the fublime inftitution of the great Lycurgus. But, if fuch partial fo- cieties muft and will exift, it is then expedient to multiply their number, and prevent their in- equality, as was done by Solon, Numa, and Servius. Thefe are the only falutary precautions that can be taken, in order that the general will may be properly informed, and the people not be miftaken as to their true intereft. I CHAP. IV. Of the II ml s f tie fovereign power, F the flate, or the city, be a mere moral perfon, whofe lite depends on the union of its members, and. if the muft important of its concerns be that of its own prefervation, it * Vera cofa e, fays Machiave!, che alcuni divifi- oni nuocono alle republiche, e alcane giovano : quel!e nuocono che fono dalle fetre e da partigiani accom- pagnate : quclie giovano che fenza fette, fenza parti- giani fi mantejigono. Non pocendo adunque prove- dere un fondatored'una republica che non fiano nimi- cizie in quella, ha da prove ier alme:o che non vifia- no fettc. Hift. Fiorenr. 1. vii. iliould SOCIAL COMPACT. 45 ftiould certainly be poflefTed of an univerfal compullive force, to move and difpofe each part in fuch a manner as is mofl conducive to the good of all. As nature hath given every man an abfolute power over his limbs, to move and direct them at pleafure, fo the focial compact gives to the body politic an abfolute power ever all its members, and it is this power which, di- rected by the general will, bears the name, as I have already obferved, of the fovereignty. But, befides this public perfon, we are to con- fider farther the private perfons of which it is compofed, and whofe life and liberty are natu- rally independent of it. We come now, there- fore, to make a proper diftinction between the refpective privileges of the citizens and the fove- reign *, as well as between the obligations the former lie under as fubjects, and the natural rights they claim as men. It is agreed, that what an individual alienates of his power, his pofTeffion, or his liberty, by the focial compact, is only fuch parts of them whofe ufe is of importance to the community ; * Be not in hafte, attentive reader, to accufe me here of contradi&ion. I cannot avoid the feeming contradi&ion in terms, from the native poverty of the i inguage. But have a little patience. but 4$ A TREATISE ON THE but it rnufl be confefled alfo, that the fovereiga is the only proper judge of this importance. A citizen is bound to perform all the fervices he can poffibly be of to a ftate, whenever the fovereign demands them ; but the fovereign, on his part, cannot require any thing of the fub- ject that is ufelefs to the community ; he cannot even be defirous of fo doing ; for, under the laws of reafon, nothing can be produced with- out a caufe, any more than under the law of na- ture. The engagements, in which we are bound to the body of fociety, are obligatory, only becaufe they are mutual ; and their nature is fuch that we cannot, in difcharging them, labour for the good of others, without, at the fame time, la- bouring for that of ourfelves. Wherefore, in- deed, is it, that the general will is always in the right, and that all conftantly defire the good of each, unlefs it be, becaufe there is no one that does not appropriate the term each to himfelf, and who does not think of his own interefl, in. voting for that of all ? This ferves to prove alfo, that an equality of privilege, and the notion of Juftice it produces, are derived from that prefe- rence which each naturally gives himfelf, and of couife from the very nature of man ; that the i general SOCIAL COMPACT. 47 general will, in order to be truly fuch, ought to be fo in its effect, as well as in its eflence j that it ought to flow from all, in order to be ap- plicable to all ; and that it muft lofe its natural refVitude, when it tends to any individual and determinate object ; becaufe judging, in fuch a cafe, of what is foreign to ourfelves, we have no real principle of equity for our guide. In fair, no fooner do we come to treat of a particular fa Hence 50 A TREATISE os THE Hence we fee, that the fovercign power, ab- folute, inviolable, and facred as it is, neither does nor can furpafs the bounds of fuch general conventions, and that every man hath a right to difpofe, as he pleafes, of that liberty and pro- perty which the terms of fuch conventions have left to his own difpofjl ; fo that 'the fovereign hath not any right to lay a greater burthen on one fubjecl than on another, becanfe, in fuch a cafe, it becomes a particular affair, in which the fovereign hath no power to act. Thefe diftincVions being once adinitted, it is fo far from being true, that there is any real re- nunciation on the part of .individuals, when they enter into the focial compact, that their li- tuation becomes, by means of that very compact, much better than before ; as, inltead of making any alienation, they only make an advantageous exchange of an uncertain and . precarious mode of fubfiilence, for a more fettled and deter- minate one ; they exchange their natural inde- pendence, for focial liberty, the power of inju- ring others for that of fccuring tuemfe'ves from injury ; and th,eir own natural flrength, which m'yght be overcome by that of others, fora civil powti which the foetal union renders invincible. Their very lives, which they have' by thefe means dc- SOCIAL COMPACT. 51 devoted to the fhte, are continually protected ; and even when they are obliged to expofe them- felves to death, in its defence, what do they more than render back to fociety what they have before received of it ? What do they more, in rifquing their lives for their country, than they \vould have been obliged to do more fre- quently, and with much greater danger in a Hate of nature ; when, fubjefl to inevitable outra- ges, they would have been obliged to defend their means of fubfiftance at the hazard of their lives ? That everyone lies under the obligation of fight- ing in defence of his country, is true ; but then he is relieved by the laws from the neceffity of fighting to defend himfelf. And are cot men gainers, on the whole, by running part of thofe rifks, for their common fecurity, which they mud: feverally run for themfelves, were they deprived of that fecurity ? CHAP. V. On capital punifnments, T T hath been afked, how individuals, having no right to difpofe of their own lives, can tranfmit that right to the foverdgn ? The diffi- culty of refolving this queftion, arifes only from D 2 it* 52 A TREATISE ON THE its being badly exprefled. Every man hath an un- doubted right to hazard his life for its prefervation. Was a man ever charged with fuicide, for throw- ing himfelf from the top of an houfe in flames, in order to avoid being burnt? Was it ever im- puted as a crime to a man, who might be caft away at fea, that he knew the danger of the voyage when he embarked ? The end of the focial compact, is the pre- fervation of the contracting parties. Such, therefore, as would reap the benefit of the end, muft aflent to the means, which are infeparable from fome dangers and lofles. He that would pre- ferve his life at the expence of others, ought to rifle it for their fafety when it is neceflary. Now, the citizen is no longer a judge of the dan- ger to which the law requires him to be expofed : but when the prince declares that the good of the ftate requires his life, he ought to refign it ; fmce it is only on thofe conditions he hath hi- therto lived in fecurity, and his life is not folely the gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the ftate. The ptmifhment of death inflifted on male- factors may be confidered alfo in the fame point -ef view : it is to prevent our falling by the hands SOCIAL COMPACT. 5-5 hands of an affaffin, that we confent to die, on becoming fuch ourfelves. We are fo far from- giving away our lives, by this treaty, that we enter into it only for ourprcfervation : as!t is not to be prefumed that any one of the contracting parties formed therein a premeditated defign to get himfelf hanged. Add to this, that every malefactor, by break- ing the laws of his country, becomes a rebel and traitor ; ceafing, from that time, to be a member of the community, and even declaring war againft it. In this cafe, the prefervation of the ftate is incompatible with his ; one of the two muft perifh : and thus when a criminal is executed, he doth not fufFer in the quality of a citizen, but in that of an enemy. His trial and fentence are the evidence and declaration of his having broken the focial compact, and that, of confequence, he is no longer a member of the fhte. Now, as he had profefTed himfelf fuch> at leaft by his refidence, it is right that he ftiould befeparated from the ftate, either by banifhment as a violator of the focial compact, or by death as ?. public enemy j for fuch an enemy is not a moral perfonage, he is a mere man, and it is ia this cafe only that the right of war takes place of killing an enemy. D 3 Butj 54 A TREATISE ON THE But, it may be {aid, the condemnation of a criminal is a particular acl. It is fo, and for that reafon it does not belong to the fovereign : it is an acl:, for doing which the fupreme power may confer the authority, though it cannot ex- ercife fuch authority itfelf. My ideas on this fubjecl: are confident, though I cannot explaia them all at once. It is to be obferved, however, that the fre- quency of executions is always a fign of the weaknefs or indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for fomething : Nor ought any perfon to be put to death, even by way of example, unlefs fuch as could not be preferved without endangering the community. With regard to the prerogative of granting pardons to criminals, condemned by the laws of their country, and fentenced by the judges, it belongs only to that power which is fuperior both to the judges and the laws, viz. the fove- reign authority. Not that it is very clear that even the fupreme power is vefted with fuch a right, or that the circumftances in which it might be exerted are frequent or determinate. In a well-governed Hate there are but few execu- tiocs; SOCIAL COMPACT. 55 tions ; not becaufe there are many pardoned, but becaufe there are few criminals : Whereas when a It ate is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occafions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, .neither the Senate nor the Con- fuls ever attempted to grant pardons ; even the people never did this, .although they {pmqtiihes recalled their own fentence. The frequency of pardons indicates that in a.fhort time crimes will not iTand in need of them, and every one may fee the confequence of fuch conduct. But my reluctant heart retrains my pen ; let us leave the d; feu (lion of t'aefe queftions to the jnft rnan who hath never been criminal, and v, ho "never flood in need of pardon. C H A P. VI. On the law. HAVING given exigence and life to the body politic, by a focial compact, we come now to give it action and wil!, by a legifla- ture. For the primitive act, by which fuch body is formed, determines nothing as jet with refpedt to the means of itsprefervation. Whatever is right and conformable to order, is fuch from the nature of things, independent D 4 Qi 5 6 A T R E A T I S E ON THE of all human conventions. All juftice comes from God, who is the fountain of it j but could we receive it immediately from fo fublime a fource, we fhould ftand in no need of government or laws. There is indeed an univerfal juftice fpring- ing from reafon alone ; but, in order to admit this to take place among mankind, it fhould be reciprocal. To confider things as they appear, we find the maxims of juftice among mankind, to be vain and fruitlefs, for want of a natural fupport; they tend only to the advantage of the wicked, and the difadvantage of the juft, while the latter obferves them in his behavour to others, fcut no body regards them in their condu6l to him. Laws and conventions, therefore, are necefTary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine juftice to its proper objects. In a ftate of nature, where every thing is common, I owe nothing to thofe I have promifed nothing; J acknowlege nothing to be the property of an- other, but what is ufelefs to myfelf. In a ftate of fociety the cafe is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law, We come at length, therefore, to. confider what is law. So long as we content ourfelves with the metaphyfical idea annexed to this term, we mutt talk unintelligibly ; and though we ihould SOCIAL COMPACT. 57 fliould come to a definition of natural law, \ve fliould not know thence any thing more of political law. I have already faid there can be no general will relative to a particular object In face every particular object mnfl be within or with- out the irate. If without, a will that is foreign, cannot with regard to it be general ; and if the object be within the ftate, it muft make a parG of it : in which cafe there arifes between the whole and the part, a relation that conttitutes two feparate beings, one of which is the part, and the whole wanting fuch part, is the other,; But the whole wanting fuch part, is not the whole, and fo long as that relation fubfifts, there is no whole, but only two unequal parts : whence it follows 'that the will of the one is no longer general with regard to that of the other. But when a whole people decree concerning a whole people, they confider only their whole body ; and, if it then forms any relation, it muft be between the entire object confidered in one point of view, and the entire object con- fidered in another point of view, without any divifion of the whole. In this cafe, the matter of the decree is general as the will that decrees^ Such is the act which I call a law. D .5 58 ATREATISE ON THE When I fay that the object of the laws is al- ways general, I mean that the law confiders the fubjects in a collective body, and their actions abitractedly, but never concerns itfelf with in- dividual perfons, nor particular actions. Thus the law may decree certain privileges, but it cannot beftow them on particular perfons : the law may conftitute feveral clafTes of citizens, and aflign even the qualities which may entitle them to rank in thefe clafTes ; but it cannot no- minate fuch or fuch perfons to be admitted therein : It may efhblifli a legal government, and appoint an hereditary fucceffion, but it can- not make choice of a king, nor appoint the royal family ; in a word, every function that relates to an individual object, doth not belong to the le- giflative power. Taking things in this light, it is immediately feen how abfurd it is to afk in whofe power it is to make laws ? as they are acts of the general will ; or whether the prince be above the laws ? 3s he is but a member of the ftate. Hence alfo, jt is plain, the law cannot be unjuft, as nothing can be unjuft to itfelf; as alfo what it is to be free, and at the fame time fubject to the laws* as the laws are only the records of our own will. It SOCIAL COMPACT. 59 It is hence farther evident, the law re-uniting the univerfality of the will to that of its object that whatever an individual, of what rank fo- ever, may decree of his own head, cannot be a law : indeed, whatever the fupreme power itfelf may ordain concerning a particular object is not a law, but a fimple decree ; it is not an aft of the fovereignty, but of the magiltracy. I call every ftate, therefore, which is govern- ed by laws, a Republic, whatever be the form of its adminiftration ; for in fuch a cafe only, it is the public interefl that governs, and what- ever is public is fomething. Thus every lawful government is republican *. I (hall explain hereafter what I mean by a government. The laws are, flrictly fpeaking, only the con- ditions of civil fociety. The people who fub- * I do not here mean, by the term republican, either an ariftocracy or democracy ; but in general every go- vernment influenced by the general will of the people, which is the law. To make a government legal, it is not neceflary that it fhould be confounded with the fovereign, but that it fhould be the minifter : fo that in this fenfe even a monarchy, is a republic. This will be more fully explained in the fubfequent bock. D 6 mit 6c A TREATISE ON THE mil to them fnould therefore be the authors of them ; as it certainly belongs to the aiTociatiiig parties, to fettle the conditions on which they agree to form a fociety. But how are they to- be fettled ? is it to be done by common confent or by a fudden infpiration ? hath the body po- litic an organ by which to make known its will ? who (hall furnifh it with the neceflary prefcience to form its determinations, and to publifh them before-hand, or how (hall it divulge them iu the time of aeed ? how (hall an ignorant multitude, who often know not what they chufe, becaufe they feldom know what is for their good, exe- cute an enterprize fo great and fo difficult a* that of a fyftem of legiflature ? A people mult neceflarily be defirous of their own good, but they do not always fee in what it confifts. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment by which it is directed is not always fufficiently informed. It is neceflary it fliould fee objects fuch as they are, and fometimes fuch as they ought to appear ; it (hould be directed to the falutary end it would purfue, (hould be fecured from the feduclion of private interefts, fhould have an infight into the circumftances of time and place j and (hould be enabled to fet the prefent and perceptible advantages of things, agaiuft the diihnt and concealed evil tli at SOCIAL COMPACT. 6r that may attend them. Individuals often fee the good which they reject ; the public is de. firous of that which it is incapable to fee. Both ftand equally in need of a guide : the former fhould be compelled to conform their defires to reafon, and the latter (hould be infrrucled in the difcovery of what it defires. It is thus from the proper information of the public, that there re- fults an union of the understanding and the will in the body of fociety, and thence the exacl: concurrence of its parts, and in the end the greateft force of the whole. Hence arifes the neceffity of a legiflator. CHAP. VII. Of the genius and char a tier of a legijlalor*. TO invefligate thofe conditions of fociery which may beft anfwer the purpofes of nations, would require the abilities of fome fu- perior intelligence, who fhould be witnefs to all the paffions of men, but be fubjecT: itfelf to none ; who fhould have no connection with human nature, but fhould have a perfect know- lege of it ; a being, in fhort, whofe happi- aefs fhould be independent of us, and who would 62 A T R E A T I S E ON THE would neverthelefs employ itfelf about ours *. It is the province of Gods indeed to make laws for men. The fame argument which Caligula made ufe of, in point of fact, Plato himfelf employs, in point of right, when he goes about to de- fine the civil or royal perfonage, in treating of a king. But if it be certain that a great prince is a perfonage rarely to be met with, what is that of a great legiflator ? The former hath no- thing more to do than to follow the model de- figned by the latter. The one is the mechanical genius who invents the machine, the other only the workman who puts it into execution. In the commencement of focieties, fays Montef- quieu, it is the principal perfons in republics which form their inflitution ; and afterwards it is the inflitution which forms the chiefs of re- publics. He who (hould undertake to form a body po- litic, ought to perceive himfelf capable of work- ing a total change in human nature ; of tranf- forming every individual, of himfelf a folitary * Nations become famous only as their legislature declines. The inflitution of Lycurgus made the Spartan, happy forages before they were famous in Greece. and SOCIAL COMPACT. 63 and independent being, into a part of a greater whole, from which fuch individual is to receive in one fenfe his life and exigence ; he muft be capable of altering the conllitution of the man, in order to ftrengthen it ; and to fubftitute a partial and moral exigence in the room of that phyfical and independent exiftence which we receive from the hands of Nature. In a word, he mull: be able to deprive man of his na- tural abilities, in order to invert him with fo- reign powers which he cannot makeufe of with- out the affiftance of others. The more fuch natural force is annihilated and extinct, the greater and more durable are thofe which are acquired, and the more perfect and folid is the focial inftitution. So that if each citizen be nothing, and can effect nothing but by the ex- iftence and affiftance of all the reft, and that the force acquired by the wjiole body be equal, or fuperior, to the fum of the natural forces of all its individuals, the legiflature may be faid to have reached the higheft pitch of perfection it is capable to attain. The legiflator is in every refpect a mofl ex- traordinary perfon in aftate. If he be undoubt- edly fo, on account of his genius, he is not lefs fo from his fun&ion. Yet this is not that of the 64 A T RE ATI S E ON THE magiftrate or the fovereign. That function, which conftitutes the republic, doth not enter into its confutation. It is, on the contrary, a particular and fnperior employment that hath nothing in common with human government : for if he who hath the command over the citizens, Ihould not be entrufted with the command over the laws, he who hath the power over the laws, ought as little to have the power over the ci- tizens : for were it otherwife, his laws, being made inftrumental to his paflions, would often ferve to perpetuate his injuftice, and he could never pre- vent particular views from altering his fyilem. When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by abdicating the throne. It was the cuftom of moft of the Grecian cities to entruft their eftablifhment with flrangers ; a cuftom that hath been often imitated by the modern republics of Italy : that of Geneva did the fame, and found its account in it *. In the moft * Thofe who confidcr Calvin only as a tittofogift know but little of his comprehenfive genius. The digeft of cur laws, in which he had a conflder- able (hare, do him as much honour as his religious fyltem ; and what revolution fcever time may effect in our public worfliip, the memory of this greit man will cominue to be revered fo long as patriotifm and a fenfe of liberty furvive among us. ffowifli- SOCIAL COMPACT. 65 flouri/hing age of Rome, that city fuffered un- der flagitious afts of tyranny, and beheld itfelf on the brink of ruin, for having cntrufted the fovereign power and the legislative, authority ia the fame hands. Even the decemviri themfelves, however, ne- ver afiumed the right of paffing any law merely on their own authority. Nothing that we pro- pofe> faid they to the people, can pafs into a taw wiihsut your confent. Be your/elves^ ye Romany the authors of thcfe laws on which ysur happinefs : depends., The legiflator, therefore, who digefts the laws, (hould have BO right to make them pafs for fuch ; nor indeed can the people, though inclined to do it, deprive themfelves of that in- communicable right : becaufe, according to the fundamental compact, it is the general will only that is obligatory oa individuals, and it is 5m- poffible to be allured that any particular will is conformable to the general, till it be fubmitted to on the free furfrage of the people. I have faid this before, but perhaps have not unneceflarily repeated it. Thus. 66 A TREATISE ON THE Thus in the bufinefs of a legiflature, \ve find two things apparently incompatible ; a fupcrior to human abilities, carried into execu- tion by an authority which is nothing. Another difficulty which merits attention is, that wife men, in talking their o-.vn language to the vulgar, fpeak unintelligibly. And yet there are many kinds of ideas which it is impofiible to convey in the language of the people. Views too general, andobjecls too diftant, are equally beyond their comprehension ; the -individual, relifhing no other plan of government than that which is conducive to his private intereft, is with difficulty brought to fee thofe advantages which are to be deduced from the continual checks he may receive from falutary laws. la order to give a newly-formed people a tafle for the found maxims of policy, and induce them to follow the fundamental rules of focie'ty, it is neceflary that the effecT: (hould in a manner become the caufe ; that the fpirit of union which fhould be the effect of focial inftitutions mould prefide to form that infUtution itfelf, and that men fhould be fuch before the laws are made as the laws are defigned to make them. For this reafon therefore, the legiflator being capa- ble of employing neither force nor argument, hs SOCIAL COMPACT. 67 he is of ntcefllty obliged to recur to an autho- rity of an higher order, which may compel without violence, and perfuade without con- viction. Hence it is that the founders of na- tions have been obliged, in all ages, to recur to the intervention of celeftial powers, and have honoured their gods with their own wifdom, in order that the people, by fubmit- ting themfelves to the laws of the ftate in the fame manner as to thofe of nature, and acknow- leging the fame power in the formation of the city as in the formation of man, might bend more freely, and bear more tractably the yoke of obedience and public felicity. Now the determinations of that fublime rea- fon, which foars above the comprehenfion of vulgar minds, are thofe which the legiflator puts into the mouths of his immortal perfonages, in order to influence thofe by a divine authoiity, which could not be led by maxims of human, prudence. It does not belong to every man, however, to make the gods his oracles, nor even to be believed when he pretends to be their interpreter. The comprehenfive genius of the legillator, is the miracle that proves the truth of his million. Any man may engrave tables of flone, hire an oracle, pretend to a fecret com- munica- $8 A TREATISE ON THE munication with fome deity, teach a bird to whifper in his ear, or hit upon other devices to impofe on a people. But he who knows no- thing more, though he may be lucky enough to get together an aflembly of fools and madmen, will never lay the foundations of an Empire ; the fabrick raifed by his extravagance prefently falling and often burying him in its ruins. A tran/hory union may be formed from flight and futile connexions ; nothing but the diftates of wifdom, however, can render it durable. Th Jewi/h law, ftill fubfifting, and that of the fon of Jfmael, which for ten centuries hath governed half the world, are (landing proofs of the fu- perior genius of thofe great men by whom they were dictated : and though the vanity of phi- lofophy, and the blind prejudice of party fee nothing in their characters but fortunate im- poftors, the true poliiician admires, in their re- fpective inftitutions, that fagacious and com- prehenfive power of mind which muft ever lay the lafting foundation of human eflablimments. It muft not, from all this, be concluded, how- ever, that religion and government have, in our times, as Warburton alleges, one common ob- ject ; but only that in the firft eftablimment of focieties, the one was made inftrumental to the other. C. H A P- SOCIAL COMPACT. 69 CHAP. VIII. Of the AS the architect, before he begins to raife an edifice, examines into the ground where he is to lay the foundation, that he may be able to judge whether it will bear the weight of the fuperftructure j fo the prudent legiflator does not begin by making a digefl of falutary laws, but examines firfl whether the people for whom fuch laws are defigned, are capable of fupporting them. It was for this reafon Plato refufed to give laws to the Arca- dians and Cyrenians, knowing they were rich and luxurious, and could not admit of the in- troduction of equality among them. It was for this reafon that Crete, though it boafted good laws, was inhabited by fuch bad men 5 Minos had only endeavoured to govern a people already depraved by vice. Various have been the na- tions that have made a diftinguiihed figure in the world, and yet have not been capable cf being governed by good laws ; and even thofe who were capable of being fo governed, con- tinued fo but a fhort time. Nations, as well as individuals, are docile only in their infancy : they be. 70 A -TREATISE ON THE become incorrigible as they grow old. When cuftoms are once eftabliihed and prejudices have taken root among them, it is a dange- rous and fruitlefs enterprize to attempt to re- form them. A people cannot even bear to have their wounds probed, though in order to be cured ; but refemble thofe \veak and cowardly patients who (hudder at the fight of their phy- iician. Not, but that fometimes, as there arc diltempers which affect the brain of individuals and deprive them of the capacity of remember- ing what is part, there happen in ftates fuch revolutions as produce the fame effect on a peo- ple, when the horror of the part fupplies the place of oblivion, and the ftate, inflamed aird exhaufted by civil wars, rifes again, if I may (b'exprefs myfelf, out of its own afhes, and re- a flumes the vigour of youth in forfaking the arms of death. This was the cafe with Sparta in the time of Lycurgus, and of Rome after the Tarquins ; and fuch hath been the cafe in mo- dern times with Holland and Switzerland after the expulfion of their tyrants. 'But thefe events are rare ; and are fuch exceptions as have their caufe in the particular conftitution of the (late ex.cepted. They cannot even take place twice among the fame people : for though they may be made free when they are. only barbarous and SOCIAL COMPACT. 71 uncivilized ; yet, when the refources of fociety are exbaufled, they cannot be renewed. In that cafe, faclion may deftroy, but revolutions can- not re-eflabliih their freedom ; they require for ever after a mafter, and not a deliverer. Every free people, therefore, fhould remember this maxim, that tho' nations may acquire liberty, yet if once this ineftimable acquifition is loft, it is abfolutely irrecoverable. There is in nations, as well as individuals, a term of maturity, at which they ihonld be permitted to arrive before they are fubjccled to laws. This term, however, is not always eafy to be known ; and yet if it be anticipated it may be of dangerous confequence. Again, one people may be formed to difcipline in their in- fancy ; while another may not be ripened for fubjeclion till after many centuries. The Ruf- fians, for inftance, will never be truly polifhed becaufe they were difciplined too foon. Peter had only an imitative turn ; he had nothing of that true genius, whofe creative power forms things out of nothing. Some of his meafures, indeed, were proper enough, but moft of them were ill-timed or ill-placed. He faw that his fubjecls were mere barbarians, but he did not fee 72 A T R E A T I S E ON THE fee that they were not ripe for being made po- lite. He wanted to civilize them, when he fhould only have checked their brutality. He wanted to make them, at once, Germans and Englifh- men, whereas he ought to have begun by making them firft Ruffians ; and thus he pre- vented his fubjecls .from ever becoming what otherwife they might have been, by pcr- fuading them they were fuch as they were not. It is thus a French tutor forms his pupil to make a figure in his child-hood, and to make none for ever afterwards. The Empire of Ruffia, while it is ambitious of reducing all Europe to its fubjection, will be fubjecled itfelf. Its neighbours, the Tartars, will in time become both its matters and ours. This event feems to me inevitable ; all the monarchs in Europe feeming to act, in concert, to accelerate fuch a revolution. CHAP. IX. The Jubjefl con;in;ed. IN the fame manoer as nature hath limited the dimcnfions of a well- formed human body, beyond which {he produces only giants or dwarfs, fo in the body politic there are limits, SOCIAL COMPACT. 73 limits, within or beyond which a ftate ought not to be confined or extended ; to the end that it may not be too big to be well governed, nor too little to maintain its own independency. There is in every body politic a maximum of force which it cannot exceed, and from which it often recedes by extending its dominion. The more the focial knot is extended, the more lax it grows ; and in general, a little ftate is always proportionably (Ironger than a great one. A thoufand reafons might be given in fupport of this maxim. In the firft place, the admini- flration of government becomes always more difficult as the diftance from the feat of it in- creafes, even as a body has the greateil weight at the end of the longeft lever. It be- comes alfo more burthenfome in proportion a it is divided into parts ; for every town hath firft its own particular government to pay ; that of each diftrift again is paid by the fame peo- ple ; next that of the province, then that of particular governments with their viceroys, all of whom are to be paid as they rife in dignity, and always at the expence of the unhappy people j whom, laftof all, the fupreme actoni- nillration itfeif crufties with the whole weigl t of its oppreflion. It is impofliblc fa many E oeed- 74- A TREATISE ON THE needlefs charges {hould not tend continually to impoverifb, the people ; who, fo far from being better governed by thefe different ranks of fuperiors, are much woife fo, than if they had but one order of governors in the fhte. And yet with this multiplicity of rulers, they are far from being furnifhed with proper re- fources for extraordinary occafions ; but, on the contrary, when they have occafion to recur to them, the flate is always on the brink of ruin. Nor is this all ; the government not only be- comes lefs vigorous and active in putting the laws in execution, removing private oppreflion, correcting abufes, or preventing the feditious efterprifes of rebellion in diftant provinces.; but the people have lefs affection for their .chiefs, whom they never have an opportunity to fee j for their country, which to them is like the. whole world ; and for their fellow-fubjects, of which the greater part are utter fl rangers. The Time laws cannot be convenient for fo many various people of different manners, and cli- mates, and who cannot be fuppofed to live equally happy under the fame form of govern- ment. ' And yet different laws mult occafion much SOCIAL COMPACT. 75 much trouble and confufion among people, who, living under the fame adminiftration, and carrying on a perpetual intercourfe, frequently change their habitations, inter marry with each other, and, being educated under different cu- ftoms, hardly ever know when their property is fecure. Great talents lie buried, virtue lives obfcured, and vice prevails with impunity, amidft that multitude of Grangers, which flock toge- ther round the chief feat of adminiftration. The principals, overwhelmed with a multipli- city of bufinefs, can look into nothing them- felves ; the government of the ftate being left to their deputies and clerks. In a word, the meafures to be taken, in order to maintain the general authority., on which fo many diftant officers are ever ready to encroach or impofe, engrofs the public attention ; there is none of it left to be employed about the happinefs of the people, and indeed hardly any for their de- fence in cafe of need : thus it is, that a body too unwieldy for its conftitution grows debilitated and fmks under its own weight. Oa the other hand, a ftate ought to be fixed on fome bafis, to fecure its folidhy, to be able to refift thofe {hocks which it will not fail to encounter, and to make thofe efforts which it E 2 will 76 A TREATISE ON THE will find neceflary to maintain its independence, N aliens have all a kind of centrifugal force by which they aft continually againft each other, and tend, like the vortices of Defcartes, to aggran- dize themfelves at the expence of their neigh- bours. Thus the weak run in danger of being prefently fwal lowed up by the ftrong ; nor is there any fecurity for them, but by keeping themfelves in equilibrio with the reft, and mak- ing the compreflion on every fide equal. Hence we fee it is prudent in feme cafes to extend, and in others to reftrain, the limits of a /late; nor is it one of the leaf! arts in civil po- lity to diftinguifh between one and the other, and to fix on that advantageous proportion which tends moft to the prefervation of the ftate. It may be obferved in general, that the reafons for extending dominion, relating to ob- jects external and relative, ought to be fubor- dinate to thofe for contracting it, vvhofe objecls are internal and abfolute, A found and vigorous conftitution is the firft thing to be confidered, and a much greater reliance is to be made on a good government, than on the Tefources which are to be drawn from an ex ten five territory. Not SOCIAL COMPACT. 77 Not but that there have been inftances of ftates fo confirmed, that the neceflity of their making conquefts hath been efTential to their very conftitution. It is poflible alfo they might felicitate themfelves on that happy neceflity, which pointed out, neverthelefs, with the fum- mit of their grandeur, the inevitable moment of their fall. C FI A P. X. 77* fubjeft continued. TH E magnitude of a body politic may be taken two ways ; viz. by the extent of territory, and the number of the people ; a certain proportional relation between them con- ftituting the real greatnefs of a ftate. It is the people which form the ftate,, and the territory which affords fubfiftence to the people ; this relation, therefore., exifts when the territory is fufTkient for the fobfiftence of the inhabitants* and the inhabitants are as numerous as the ter- ritory can maintain. In this proportion confifts the maximum of the force of any given number of people ; for if the territory be too exten- five, the defence of it is burthenfome, the cultivation inefficient, and the produce fuper^ E 3 fluousj 78 A TRE A T I S E CN THE fiuous ; hence the proximate caufes of dcfenfive war. If, on the other hand, the territory be too fmall, the ftate is under the neceffity of being obliged for part of its fubf:flence to its neigh- boars ; hence the proximate caufes of offenfive war. Every people who, by their fituation, have no other alternative than commerce or war, rnufl be necefTarily feeble : they murt de- pend on their neighbours, on adventitious cir- cumftances, and can only have a (hort and un- certain exiftence. They muft conquer others, and thereby change their fituation, or be con- quered themfelves, and thence be reduced to no- thing. It is impoffible fuch a ftate can preferve its independency but by its infignificancy or its ^reatnefs. It is not eafy to calculate the determinate re- lation between the extent of territory and num- ber of inhabitants, fufficient for each other ; fjot ooly on account of the difference in the qua- lities of the foil, in its degrees of fertility, in the nature of its productions, and in the in- fluence of climate, but alfo on account of the re- markable difference in the temperament and con- ftitution of the inhabitants ; fome confuming but little in a fertile country, and others a great deal on a barren foil. Regard muft alfo be had to the SOCIAL COMPACT. 79 the degree of fecundity among the females, to the circumftances favourable or deftruclive to population, and to the number of people which the legiflator may hope to draw from other countries by the advantages attending his fcheme of government; fo that he ought" not to found his judgment on what actually exifts ; but on what he forefees may exifl here- after; not on the prefent flate of population, but on that which will naturally fucceed. In fine, there are a thoufand occafions, on which local accidents acquire, or permit, a flate to poflefs a larger {hare of territory than may ap- pear actually neceflaiy for prefent ufe. Thus & people may fpread themfelves over a large fpot in a mountainous country, whofe natural pro- duce, of wood or pafture, requires lefs labour of cultivation; where experience teaches us that women are more fruitful than in the flat coun- tries ; and in which a large inclined fuperficies gives but a fmall horizontal bafe, by which only the land muft be efVimated in the affair of ve- getaiion. A people, on the contrary, may in- habit a lefs fpace on the fea-fhore, or even a- mong rocks and almoft barren fands ; becaufe the fifhery fupplies them with fuftenance, inftead of the produce of the earth ; they can eafily difbunhen their community by fending 4 out So A T R E A T I S E ON- THE out colonies of its fuperrmmerary inhabitants ; and laftly, becaufe it is neceflary for them in fuch a cafe to live near to each other, in order to re- pel the invafions of pyrates, We may add to thefe conditional precaution*?, refpecYmg the formation of a people, one that can be fupplied by no other, but without which al! the reft are ufelefs : this is, that they /houlcl enjoy peace and plenty. For the time in which a flate is forming, refembles that in which foldiers are forming a battalion ; it is the mo- ment in which they are leaft capable of refift- ance, and the moft eafily defeated. They would even make a greater refinance when put into abfolute diforder afterwards, than during the in- terval of their firlt fermentation, when each is taken up more about his own particular rank than the common danger. Should a war, a famine, or a rebellion, break out at fuch a criiis, the ftate would be Infallibly fubverted. Not but there have been many governments eftablifhed in times of diforder and confu- /lon : in fuch cafes, however, thofe very go- vernments fubverted the Hate. Ufurpers have always given rife to, or took the advan- tage o, thofe times of general confufion, in or- der SOCIAL COMPACT. 8r der to procure fuch deftructive laws, which the people never could have been prevailed on to pafs at a more difpaffionate feafon. The choice of the proper time for the inftitution of laws, is one of themoft certain tokens by which we may diftinguifh the defign of a legiflator from that of a tyrant. If it be afked then, what people are in a fituation to receive a fyftem of laws ? I anfwer, thofe who, though connected by fome primitive union either of intereft or compact, are not yet truly fubjecled to regular laws j thofe whofe cuftoms and prejudices are not deeply rooted ; thofe who are under no fear of being fwallowed up by a fudden invafion, and who, without entering into the quarrels of their .neighbours, are able to encounter feparately with each, or to engage the afliftance of one. to repel the other ; a people whofe individuals may be known to each other, and among whom it is not necef- fary to charge a man with a greater burthen than it is poffible for him to bearj a people who can fubfift without others, and without whom all others might fubfift * j a people nei- ther * If two neighbouring people were fo fituated tha 1 one couid not fubfift without the other, the circum- E 5 ftances 82 A TREATISE ON THE ther rich nor poor, but pofTefled of a compe- tence within themfelves ; a people, in fhort, who poflefs at once the confiftency of an an- cient nation, and the docility of a newly-created one. The great difficulty in legiflation, con- fifts lefs in knowing what ought to be eftablifhed than what ought to be eradicated ; and what renders it fo feldom fuccefsful, is the impoffibi- Jity of finding the fimplicity of nature in the wants of fociety. It is true that all thefe cir- cumftances are very rarely united ; and it is for this reafon that fo few ftates have much to boaft of, in their conftitution. There is ftill one country in Europe capable of receiving Jaws : this is the ifland of Corfica. The va- lour and conflancy, with which thofe brave people recovered, and have defended their liber- ftances of the firft would be very hard, and of the latter very dangerous. Eveiy wife nation, in fuch a cafe, would extricate itfelf as foon as poffible from fuch a ftate of dependence. The republic of Thlafcala," fhuated in the heart of the Mexican empire, chofo rather to be without fait than pui chafe it, or even receive it gratis of the Mexicans. The prudent Thlafcalans favv thiough the fnare of fuch liberality. Thus they preferved their liberty ; this petty ftate, deluded within that great empire, being, in the end, the caufe of its ruin. SOCIAL- COM PACT. 83 ty, might defervedly excite fome wife man to teach them how to preferve it, I cannot help furmifing, that this little ifland will, one day or other, -be the aftonifhment of Europe. CHAP. XI. Of the various fyjl ems o IF we were to enquire, in what confifts pre- cifely the greateft good, or what ought to be the end of every fyftem of legiflature ; we fhould find it reducible to two principal ob- jects, liberty and equality, liberty, becaufe all partial dependence deprives the whole body of the ftate of fo much ftrength ; equality, be- caufe liberty cannot fubfift without it. I have already explained the nature of focial liberty ; and with regard to equality, we are not to underftand by that term, that individuals fhould all abfolutely pofiefs the fame degree of wealth and power; but only that, with refpecl to the latter, it mould never be exercifed con- trary to good order and the laws ; and with refpeft to the former, that no one citizen fhould be rich enough to buy another, and that none fhould be fo poor as to be obliged to fell him- E 6 felt. 84 A TREATISE ON THE felf*. This fuppofes a moderation of pofieflions and credit on the fide of the great, and the mo- deration of defires and covetoufnefs on the part of the little. This equality, thr-y tell us, is a mere fpecu- Jative chimera, which cannot exift in practice : but though abufes are inevitable, does it thence follow they are not to be corrected ? It is for the v ery reafon that things always tend to deflroy this equality, that the laws fhould be calculated to preferve it. Thefe general objects of legiflature, how- ever, jfhould be varioufly modified in different countries, agreeable to local fituation, the cha- racter of the inhabitants, and thofe other cir- cnmftances which require that every people ftiould have a particular fyftem of laws, not always the beft in itfelf, but the beft adapted to * Would you give a ftate confiftency and ftrength, prevent the two extremes as much as pofTible ; let there be no rich perfons nor beggars. Thefe two conditions, naturally infeparable, aie equally deflruc- tive to the commonwealth : the one furnifhes tyrants, and the other the fupporters of tyranny. It is by thofe the traffic of public liberty is carried on ; the on4t>uying, the other felling it. that SOCIAL COMPACT. 85 that ftate for which it is calculated. If, for ex- ample, the foil be ungrateful and barren, or the country too fmall for its inhabitants, cherifh in- duftry and the arts, the productions of which may be exchanged for the commodities required. On the other hand, if your country abounds in fertile hills and plenteous vales ; if you live on a rich foil in want of inhabitants ; apply your- felves to agriculture, which affords the means of population ; and banifh the deftruclive arts which ferve only to ruin a country, by gather- ing the few inhabitants of it, together in one par- ticular fpot or two, to the depopulation of all the reft *. Do you occupy an extenfive and commodious fituation by the fea fide ? Cover the ocean with your fhips, cultivate the arts of navigation and commerce : you will by thefe means enjoy a brilliant but fhort exigence. On the contrary, do the waves only wafte their ftrength againft your inacceflible rocks . ? Re- main barbarous and illiterate ; you will live but the more at eafe, perhaps more virtuous, af- * The advantage of foreign commerce, fays the Marquis d'A. is productive only of a delufive utility to the kingdom in general. It may enrich a few in- dividuals, and perhaps fome cities; but the whole nation gains nothing by it, nor are the people the better for it. furedly 86 A TREATISE ON THE furedly more happy. In a word, befides the maxims common to all nations, every people are poflefled in themfelves of fome caufe which influences them in a particular manner, and renders their own fyftem of laws proper only for themfelves. It is thus that in ancient times, among the Hebrews, and in modern times, a- mong the Arabians, religion was made the prin- cipal object of national concern ; among the Athenians this object was literature ; at Car- thage and Tyre it was commerce, at Rhodes it was navigation, at Sparta war, and at Rome public virtue. The author of the Spirit cf laws hath (hewn, by a number of examples, in what manner the legiflator fliould model his fyftem agreeable to each of thefe objects. What renders the conftitution of a ftate truly folid and durable, is that agreement maintained therein between natural and focial relations, which occafions the legiflature always to act in concert with nature, while the laws ferve only to confirm and rectify, as it were, the dictates of the former. But if the legiflator, "deceived in his object, (hould aflume a principle different from thac which arifes from the nature of things } fhould the one tend to flavery and the other to liberty, one to riches, the other to population, one SOCIAL COMPACT. 87 one to peace the other to war and conquefls, the laws would infenfibly lofe their force, the conftitution would alter, and the flate continue to be agitated till it mould be totally changed or deftroyed, and nature have refumed its empire. CHAP. Xlf. On the divijlon of the laws. T N order to provide for the government of * the whole, or give the beft poffible form to the conftitution, various circumftances are to be taken into confideration. Of thefe the firft is the action of the whole body operating on it- felf ; that is the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the fovereign to the ftate, which relation is compofed of thofe between the inter- mediate terms j as will be fcen hereafter. The laws which govern this relation bear the name of politic laws, and are alfo called funda- mental laws, not without forte reafon when they are wifely ordained. For if there be only one good method of government in a ftate, the peo- ple, who have been fo happy as to hit on that method, ought to abide by it : but, wherefore 4 fhould 88 A TREATISE ON THE fhould a people, whofe laws are bad or defec- tive, efteem fuch laws to be fundamental ? Be- ildes, a nation is in any cafe at liberty to change even the beft laws, when it pleafes: for if a people have a mind even to do themfelves an injury, who hath any right to prevent them ? The fecond circumftance is the relations which the members of the community bear to each other and to the whole body, the firft of which fhould be as little, and the laft as great, as poffible : fo that every citizen fliould live in a ftate of perfect independence on all the reft, and in a ftate of the greateft dependence on the city. Both thefe are ever effected by the fame means : for it is the power of the ftate only that conftitutes the liberty of its members. OQ this fecond kind of relation is laid the immediate foundation o the civil laws. It may be proper to confider alfo a third fpecies of relation between the individual and the law j which gives immediate rife to penal ftatutes : thefe, however, are in fact lefs a di- /Unft fpecies of laws than the fanction of all tiae others. To SOCIAL COMPACT. 89 To thefe three kinds of laws, may be added a fourth, more important than all the reft ; and which are neither engraven on brafs or marble ; but in the hearts of the citizens r forming the real conftitution of the ftate. Thefe are the laws which acquire daily frefti influence, and when others grow old and obfolete, invigorate arid revive them i thefe are the laws which keep alive in the hearts of the people, the original fpirit of their inftitution, and fubflitute infen- fibly the force of habit to that of authority. The laws I here fpeak of, are manners, cuftoms, and above all public opinion ; all unknown or difregarded by our modern politicians, but on which depends the fuccefs of all the reft. Thefe are the objects on which the real legislator it employed in fecret, while he appears folely to confine himfelf to thofe particular regulations which compofe only the preparatory centre of the vault, of which manners, more flow in their progrefs, form in the end the immoveable arch. Of thefe clafles, politic laws, or thofe which conftitute the form of government, are relative only to my prefent fubjedl. The END of the SECOND BOOK. BOOK 90 A T REA T ISE ON THE BOOK III. BEFORE we enter on a difcutfion of the feveral forms of government, it will not be improper to afcertain the precife meaning of that term ; which as yet hath not been well ex- phiined. CHAP. I. On government in general. T MU S T previoufly caution the render to pe- A rufe this chapter very deliberately, as it is impo/Tible to render myielf clearly intelligible to fuch as are not attentive. Every free action hath two caufes, which con- cur to efFecT: its production, the one moral, viz. the will which deiermins the aft ; the other phyfical, viz. the power which puts it in exe- cution. When I walk, for inftance, toward any particular object, it is firft neceflary that I fliould will to go; and fecondly that my feet fhould bear me forward. A paralytic may will to run, and an active racer be unwilling ; the want of power in the one hath the fame effect as SOCIAL COMPACT. qt as the want of will in the other; both remain in their place. The body politic hath the fame principles of motion ; which are diftinguifhed alfo in the fame manner by power and will : the latter under the name of the legijlative power, and the former under that of the executive p^wer. Nothing is or ought to be done without the concurrence of both. We have already feen that the legiflative power belongs to the people in general, and can belong to none elfe. On the other hand, it is eafy to conclude, from the principles al- ready eftablifhed, that the executive power can- not appertain to the generality, as legiflator or fovereign ; becaufe this power is exerted only in particular acts which are not the province of the law, nor of courfe that of the fovereign, whofe acts can be no other than Jaws. To the public force, therefore, ftiould be annexed a proper agent, which may re-unite and put it in action, agreeable to the directions of the general will ; ferving as a communica- tion between the ftate and the fovereign, and effecting the fame purpofe in the body politic, as the union of the foul and body in man. Such is the rationale of government, fo generally con- founded 92 A TREATISE OK THS founded with the fovereign, of which it is only the miniftry. What then is government ? It is an interme- diate body eftablifhed between the fubjecl: and the fovereign, for their mutual correfpondence ; charged with the execution of the laws, and with the maintenance of civil and political liberty. The members of which this body is compof- ed, are called magiftrates or iirgs, that is to fay, governors, and the whole body bears the name of the prince *. Thofe, therefore, who affirm that the aft, by which a people profefs fubmiflion to their chiefs or governors, is not a contract, are certainly right ; it being in fat nothing more than the conferring a fimple com- miflion on the faid chiefs ; an employ, in the difcharge of which they aft as mere officers of the fovereign, exercifing in its name the pawer which it hath placed in their hands, and which it may limit, modify or refume whenever it. preafes; the alienation of its right fo to do, being incompatible with the very nature and being of fociety. * Thus at Venice the college'of ferators is called the moft ferene pria.e, even when the doge is not prefent. I call SOCIAL COMPACT. 93 I call therefore, the legal exercife of the exe- cutive power, the Government or fupreme ad- miniftration; and the individual or body, charg- ed with that adminiftratton, the prince or the magiftrate. 'In the government are to be found thofe in- termediate forces, whofe relations compofe that of the whole to the whole, or of the fovereign to the flate. This laft relation may be repre- fented by that of the extremes of a confrant proportion, the mean proportional of which is the government. The government receives from the fovereign thofe orders, which it gives to the people i fo that, in order to keep the ftate in due equilibrio, there {hould, every thing cor. fidered, be the fame equality between the mo- mentum or force of the government taken in hfelf, and the momentum or force of the citi- zens, who are the fovereign confidered collective- ly on one fide, and fubjecls confidered feverally en the other. It is, befides, impoiTible to vary any of thefe three terms, without inftantly deftroying the pro- portions. If the fovereign (hould be defirous to govern, or the magiftrate to give laws, or the fubjefts refufe to obey ; diforder muft im- 94. A TREATISE ON THE mediately take place ; the will and the power thus no longer acting in concert, the ftate would be diffolved, and fall into defpotifm or anarchy. Add to this, that as there can be but one mean proportional between each relation, there can be but one good government for a ftate. But as a thoufand events may change the relations fubfifting among a people ; different govern- ments may not only be good for different peo- ple, but even for the fame people at different periods of time. In order to give the reader an idea of the va- rious relations that may exift between thefe two extremes, I fhall, by way of example, make ufe of the number of people, as a relation the moft eafily expreffed. We will fuppofe, for inftance, that a ftate is compofed of ten thoufand citizens. The fovereign muft be confidered as collectively only and in a body : but every particular in quality of fubjecl is confidered as an individual: thus the fovereign is in this cafe to the fubjecl: as ten thoufand to one: That is to fay, every member of the ftate (hares only the ten thoufandth part of the fovereigu authority, while at the fame time he is fubjected to it in his whole perfon. Again, (hould the number of people beincreafed to SOCIAL COMPACT. 95 to an hundred thoufand, the fubmiflion of the fubjefts would receive no alteration ; each of them being totally fubjecied to the authority of the laws, while his (hare in the fovereignty, and vote in the enaction of thefe laws, would be reduced to the hundred-thoufandth part ; a tenth lefs than before. Thus the fubjetf, re- maining always a fingle integer, the proportion between him and the fovereign increafes as the number of citizens is augmented : whence it follows, that as a ftate increafes, the liberty of the fubject diminiihes. When I fay the proportion increafes, I mean that it recedes farther from the point of equa- lity. Thus the greater the proportion, in the language of the geometricians, it is reckoned the lefs according to common acceptation : a- greeable to the former, the relation, confidered in point of quantity, is eftimated by its extent; and according to the latter, confidered in point of identity, it is eftimated by its proxima- tion. Now, the 'lefs proportion which particular voices bear to the general, that is to fay, the manners to the laws, the more ought the gene- ral reftriclive force to be augmented. Thus the government fhould be relatively more powerful as the people are more numerous, On 96 ATREATISEoN THE On the other hand, the increasing greatnefs of a (late affording the guardians of the pub- lic authority greater temptations and means to abufe their power, the more force a govern- ment is poffefTed of to reftrain the people, the more ought the fovereign to be poflefled of in its turn to reftrain the government. I am not {peaking here of abfolute power, but of th relative forces of the component parts of the ftate. It follows, from this two-fold relation, that the conftant proportion between the fovereign, the prince, and the people, is not a mere ar- bitrary idea, but a neceffary confequence of the very exigence of the body politic. It follows alfo, that, one of the extremes, viz. the people as fubjecls, being a fixed term reprefented by unity, wherever the two-fold ratio is increafed or diminifhed, that the fimple ratio mull in- creafe or diminifhin like manner, and of courfe the mean term will be changed. Hence it ap- pears there is no one fettled conftitution of go- vernment, but that there may be as many go- vernments different in their nature as there are flates differing in magnitude. IF SOCIAL COMPACT. 97 If any one fhould afFeft to turn my fyftem into ridicule, and fay that, in order to find this mean proportional, and form thegovernment as it ought to be, we have no more to do than to find the fquare root of the number of the people; E anfwer that I here make ufe of the number of people only by way of example ; that the rela- tions of which I have been fpeaking, are not only eftimated by the number of individuals, but in general by the momentum or quantity of aclion, which arifes from a combination of va- rious caufes ; and though, in order to exprefs myfelf concifely, I borrow the terms of geo- metry, I am not ignorant that geometrical pre- cifion is not to be expected in treating of mo- ral quantities. The government is in miniature what the body politic containing ir, is at large. It is a moral perfon endued with certain faculties, acYive as the fovereign, paffive as the fiate, and capable of being refolved into other fenfible relations, from which of courfe arifes a new fcale of proportion, and ftill another within this, according to the order of the courts of jufUce, till we arrive at the laft indivifible term, that is to fay, the fole chief or fupreme raa- giftrate, which may be reprefented in the centre F of 98 A TREATISE ON THE of this progreffion, as an unity between the feries of fractions, and that of whole numbers. But, without embarraffing the reader with a multiplicity of terms, we ftiall content ourfelves with confideiing the government as a new body in the ftate, diftinct from the fubjects and the fovereign, and exifting between both. There is this efTential difference, however, between the government and the ftate, that the latter exifts of itfelf, and the former only by means of the fovereign. Thus as the ruling will of the prince is, or ought to be, only the general will, or the law, the power of the prince is only that of the public centered In him ; fo that whenever he would derive from himfelf any abfolute and independent aft, the combination of the whole is affected. And if, at length, the prince fhould have a particular will of his own, more active than that of the fovereign, and (hould make ufe of the public- power in his hands to enforce obedience to fuch particular will, forming, as it were, two fo- vereigns, the one of right and the other of fact, the focial union immediately vani/hes, and the body politic is diflblved. lu SOCIAL COMPACT. 99 In order that the body of government, never- thelefs, may have an exiftence, a real life to diftin- guiflutfromthatof the ftate, and that its members may adl in concert to anfwer the end for which it is inftituted, it is neceflary that it fliould be pofTefTed of a particular identity, a fenfibility common to all its members, a power and will of its own for the fake of its prefervation. Such a particular exiftence neceflarily fuppofes that of aflemblies and councils ; of a power to de- liberate and refolve ; of the rights, titles and privileges which belong exclusively to the prince, and render the fituation of a magiftrate the more honourable in proportion as it is more laborious. The difficulty lies in the me. thod of difpofmg all the inferior parts of the whole body ; fo that, while it is ftrengthening its own conflitution, it may not injure that of the ftate. At the fame time alfo, it fliould always diftinguifti between the peculiar force, deftined to its own prefervation, and the public force deftined to the prefervation of the flate ; in a word, it fliould be always ready to facri- fice the government to the people, and not the people to the government. To this we may add, that, although the ar~ tificial body of government be the work of an- F 2 other ioo A T R E A T I S E ON THE other artificial body, and is poflefled only of a borrowed and fubordinate exiftence ; this doth not prevent it from acting with different degrees of vigour and celerity, or from enjoying, if I may fo exprefs myfelf, a greater or lefs (hare of health and ftrength. Infhort, it may, with- out running diametrically oppofite to the pur- pofes of its inftitution, deviate from them more or lefs, according to the mode in which it is conftituted. It is from all thefe differences that arife thofe various relations and proportions, which the go- vernment ought to bear toward the Hate, ac- cording to thefe accidental and particular re- lations in which the ftate is modified. For the beft government in itfelf may often become the worft, if the relation of its component parts are not altered according to the defects of the body politic to which it belongs. CHAP. SOCIAL COMPACT. ii CHAP. H. On the principle ivbi.h conjlitutei the different forms of government. TO explain the general caufe of thefe dif- ferences, it is neceflaryto diftinguifa here between the prince and the government, in the fame manner as I have already done between the fovereign and the Irate. The body of the magiftracy may be compofed of a greater or a lefs number of members. It hath been obferv- ed alfo that the relation the fovereign bears ,to the fubjecT: increafes in proportion to the num- ber of people ; thus, by an evident analogy, we may fay the fame of the relation between the government and the magiftrates. Now the total force of the government, being always equal to that of the flate, furFcrs no al- teration ; whence it follows that the more fuch force is fpent by the diftribmion of it among the members of the government, the lefs re- mains 'to be exerted on the whole body of people. F 3 That 1C2 A TREATISE ON THE That government, therefore, which is in the hands of the greateft number of magiftrates muft be the moft feeble. As this is a fundamen- *al maxim, we fhall take fome pains to illuf- trate it. In the perfon of the magiftrate may be diftin- guifhed three wills eflentially different. In the iirit place the particular will of the individual, which tends only to his private advantage ; fe- condly, that will which is common to him as a magiftrate, tending folely to the advantage of the prince j being general with refpecl to the government, and particular with regard to the flate, of which the government is only a part ; and in the third place, the will of the people or the fovereign will, which is general as well with regard to the ftate confidered as a whole, as with regard to the government confidered as a part of that whole. In a compleat fyftem of legiflature, the par- ticular will or that of the individual fhould amount to nothing; the will of the body of government fliould be very limited, and of courfe the general or fovereign will the ruling and fole director of all the others. Ac- SOCIAL COMPACT. 103 According to the order of nature, however* thefe different wills are ranged in a contrary manner ; being always more active as they are concentrated in themfelves. Thus the general will is always the moft feeble, that of the go- vernment next, and the will of the individual the flrongeft of all ; fo that each member of the adminiftration is to be confidered firft of all as an individual, fecondly as a magiftrate, aiid laitly as a citizen : a gradation directly op- pofite to that which the order of fociety re* quires. This point being fettled, let us fuppofe the adminiftration of government committed to the hands of one man. In this cafe the will of the individual, and that of the body of the magi- ftracy are perfectly united, and of confequence the latter pofTefTes the greatert degree of inten- fity. Now, as it is on the degree of the will that the exertion of force depends, and as the abfolute force of the government never varies, it follows that the moft active of all admini- ftrations mufl be that of a fingle perforh On the contrary, if we unite the admlniftra* tion and the leglflature 5 if we makg the prince F 4 the 104 A T R E A T I S E ON THE the fovereign, and the citizens all fo many ma- giftrates: in this cafe, the will of the govern- ment, confounded with the general will, would polTHs no greater {hare of activity, but would leave the particular will of individuals to exert its whole force. Thus the government, hav- ing always the fame degree of abfolute force, would be at its minimum of relative force Or activity. Thefe relations are inconteftible, and may be farther confirmed by other confederations. It is evident, for example, that the magiftrate is more active in that capacity than the citizen in his, and that of courfe the will of the indivi- dual muft have a more confiderable fhare of in- fluence in the adminiftration of government, than in the actions of the fovereign ; every magiftrate being almoft always charged with fome function of government, whereas no ci- tizen, confidered as an individual, difcharges any function of the fovcreignty. Befide this, the real force of a ftate increafes, as the Hate increafes in magnitude, though not always in the ratio of that magnitude ; but while the ftate remains the fame, it is in vain to increafe the number of magiftrates, as the government will not thereby acquire any additional ftrength, becaufe SOCIAL COMPACT. 105 becaufe its force, being always, that of the flate, is conftantly equal. And thus the rela- tive force or aclivity of government is diminiPu- ed, without its real and abfolute force being augmented. It is farther certain that public affairs muftb'e tranfacted more or lefs expeditiouily according to the number of people, charged with their, difpatch ; that by laying too great a (Irefs on. prudence, too little is trufted to fortune ; that the opportunity of fuccefs is thus frequently loft, and that by the mere force of deliberation, the end of. it is defeated. This may ferve to prove that the reins of government are relaxed in proportion as the magiftrates are multiplied; and I have before demonftrated that the more numerous the peo- ple are, the more IhouJd the reflraining power of government be increafed : Hence it follows that the proportion which the number of ma- giftrates fhould hold to the government fliould be in the inverfe ratio of the fubjecls to the fovereign ; that is to fay, the more extenfive the (rate the more contracted fhould be the govern- ment, the number of chiefs diminishing as that of the people increafes. F 5 io6 A TREATISE ON THE I fpeak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of the rectitude or pro- priety of it. For, othcrwife, it is certain that the more numerous the magiftracy is, the nearer doth the will of that body approach to the general will of the whole people ; whereas under a fole chief, the will of the magiftracy is, as I have before obferved, only that of an indivi- dual. Thus what is gained in one refpec"r, is Joft on the other ; and the art of the legiflator confifts in tracing the fixed point, at which the force and the will of the government, always in a reciprocal proportion to each other, unite in that proportion which is moft advantageous to the ftate. CHAP. III. Of the aftual di/llnffions of governments. WE have treated in the preceding chap- ter of the reafons for diftinguifliing the feveral fpecies and forms of government, by the number of the members compofing them j it remains therefore to {hew, in the prefent, how thvfe diHiaclions are actually made, The SOCIAL COMPACT. 107 The fovercign authority may, in the firfr place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the greater pJfct of them j the number of magiftratcs in fuch cafe exceed- ing that of private citizens. This form of go- vernment is diftinguiflied by the name of a de- mocracy. Or, otherwife, the fuprcme power may com- mit the office of government into the hands of a few, fo that the number of private citizens may exceed that of magiftrates ; and this form bears the name of an ariftocracy. Or laftly, the government may be entrufted to one raagiftrate only, who delegates his power to all the reft. This third form is the moft common, and is called a monarchy or a regal government. It is to be obfemd that all thefe forms, and particularly the two former, are fufceptible of different degrees of perfection, and admit in- deed of confiderable latitude in their modifica- tion : for a democracy may comprehend the whole people, or be limited to the half. An. ariftocracy alfo may comprehend any quantity F 6 from io8 A T RE A T I SE ON THE from the half of the people to the (mailed number indefinitely. Nay a monarchy itfelf is iufceptible^of fome distribution. Sparta, for intlance, had conlHtutionally two kings at a time ; and the Romans had even eight emperors at once, without the empire having been ac- tually divided. Thus, we fee, there is a cer- tain point, at which each form of government is confounded with that to which it is neareft re- laied ; and thus under three diAinguiming de- nominations only, government is really fufcep- tible of as many different forms, as there are citizens in the (late. To go ftill farther ; as even one and the fame government is capable, in many refpecls, of being ftibdivided into parts, of which the adminiftra- tion may refpectively differ, there may refult from the varied combinations of thefe forms a multitude of others, every one of which may be again multiplied by all the fimple forms. Politicians have in all ages difputed much about the beft form of government, without confidering that each different form may pof- fibly be the bell in fome cafes, and the worft in others. If S C I A L COMP A C T. 109 If in different ftates the number of fupreme magiftrates fhould be in the inverfe ratio to that of the citizens, it .follows that the democratical government is generally fpeaking better fuited to fmall ftates, the ariftocratical to middling ftates, and the monarchical to great Oates. This rule is deduced immediately from our prin- ciples} 'but it is impoflible to particularize the multiplicity of circumftances which may furnifh exceptions againft it. CHAP. IV. Of a jutptocracy* Til E inftitutor of a law fhould certainly know better than any other perfon, how it ought to be underftood and executed. It fhould feem therefore that the befl constitution, muft be that in which the legiflative and execu- tive powers are lodged in the fame hands. It is this very circumftance, however, that renders (uch a government imperfect; becaufe there doth not exift the necefTary diftin&ion, which ought to be made in its parts ; while the prince and the fovereign, being one and the fame perfon, only form, if I may fo exprcfs myfelf, a government without a government. It no A T R E A T I S E ON THE It is not proper that the power which -makes the laws fhould execute them, or that the at- tention of the whole body of the people fhould be diverted from general views to particular ob- jects. Nothing is more dangerous than the in- fluence of private intereft in publick affairs; the abufe of the laws by the government, being a lefs evil than the corruption of the legiflature; which is infallibly the confequence of its being governed by particular views. For in that cafe, the ftate being effentially altered, all reformation becomes impoffible. A people who would not abufe the power of government, would be no more propenfe to abufe their independence ; and a people who (hould always govern well, would have no occafion to be governed at all. To take the term in its ftricleft fenfe, there never exifted, and never will exift, a real de- mocracy in the world. It is contrary to the natural order of things, that the majority of a people {hould be the governors, and the mino- rity the governed. It is not to be conceived that a whole people {hould remain perfonally affembled to manage, the affairs of the public ; and it is evident, that no fooner are deputies or reprefentatives appointed, than the form of the adminiftration is changed. It SOCIAL COMPACT. in It may be laid down indeed as a maxim, that when the functions of government are divided among feveral courts, that which is compofed of the feweft perfons will, fooner or later, ac- quire the greateft authority ; though it were for no other reafon than the facility with which it is calculated to expedite affairs. Such a form of government fuppofes, alfo, the concurrence of a number of circumfrances rarely united. In the firft place, it is requifite that the ftate itfelf (hould be of fmall extent, fo that the people might be eafily aflembled and all perfonally known to each other. Secondly, the fimplicity of their manners ftiould be fuch as to prevent a multiplicity of affairs, and per- plexity in difcuffing them : And thirdly, there fhould fubfift a great degree of equality between the rank and fortunes of individuals ; without which there cannot exift long any equality be- tween them in point of right and authority. Laftly, there (hould be little or no luxury ; for luxury muft either be the effeft of wealth, or it muft make it necefTary ; it corrupts at once both rich and poor ; the one by means of the pofleffion of wealth, and the other by means of the want of it, Luxury makes a facrifice of pa- 8 j-12 A T R E A T I S E ON THE patriotifm to indolence and vanity ; it robs a Hate of its citizens by fuKjecVmg them to each other, and by fubjecling all to the influence of public prejudice. It is for this reafon that a certain celebrated author hath laid down virtue as the firft prin- ciple of a republican government : for all thefe circumftances cannot concur without the exi- ftence of public virtue. For want, however, of making proper diftiacYions, this great genius hath been led into frequent miftakes, as well as want of precifion ; not having obferved that, the fovereign authority being every where the fame, the fame principle muft take place in every well conftituted ftate ; though it is true in a greater or lefs degree, according to the form of government, To- this it may be added, that no government is fo fubjecl to civil wars and inteftine commo- tions as that of the democratical or popular form; becaufe no other tends fo ftrongly and fo conftantly to alter, nor requires fo much vi- gilance and fortitude to preferve it from altera- tion. It is, indeed, in fuch a conftitution par- ticularly that the citizen ftiould always be arm.- ed SOCIAL COMP A CT. 113 cd with force and conftancy, and fhould repeat every day, in the fincerity of his heart, the faying of the virtuous palatine *. Mah peri- cuhfam llbertattm qnam'quietumfirvitium. Did there exift a nation of Gods, their go- vernment would doubtlefs be democratical ; it is too perfect a form, however, for mankind. N CHAP. V. : :nw*'1pwoil<$*-,i&a ;v Of an Arljlocra -y. T N this form of government exifl two moral perfons, very palpably diftinft, viz. the ad- mimfrration and the fovereign ; which of courfe poflTtfs two general wills, the. one regarding the cimeiis univerfally ; the other only the members of the adminiftration. Thus, although the go- vernment may regulate the interior police of the ftate as it pleafes, it cannot addrefs the peo- ple but i-n the name of the fovereign, that is to fay, the people themfelves ; which is a circum- ftance never to be omitted. The primitive fo- cieties of mankind were governed ariftocrati- * The Palatine of Pofnania, father of the king of Poland, Duke of Lorrain. cally. ri4 A T R E A T I S E ON THE cally. The heads of families deliberated among themfelves concerning public affairs ; the young people readily fubmitting to the authority of experience. Hence the names of Prie/ls, th$ Fathers, the Senate^ &c. The favages of North America are governed in the fame manner lo this day, and are extremely well governed. But, in proportion as the inequality ariiing from focial inftitutions prevailed over natural inequality, riches and power were preferred to age*, and the ariftocracy became elective. At length power, tranfmitted with property from father to fon, making whole families patrician, rendered the government hereditary, and boyj of twenty became fenators. Ariftocracy therefore is of three kinds; natu- ral, elective and hereditary. The fuft, is ap- plicable only to the moft fimple ftate of fociety, while the lair, is the worft of all kinds of go- vernment. The fecond is the beft ; and is what is mod properly denominated an ariflocracy. * It is evident that the term optimal*! among die indents, did not mear/the belt, but moll powerful. Befide SOCIAL COMPACT. 115 Befide the advantage of the abovementioned diftinftion, this form hath alfo that of the choice of its members : ia a popular govern- ment all the citizens are born magiftrates; but in this the number of the latter are very limit- ed, and they become fuch only by election * ; a method by which their probity, their talents, their experience, and all thofe other reafons for preference in the public efteem, are an ad- ditional fecurity that the people fhall be wifely governed. Again, their public afTemblies are attended with more decorum ; affairs of ftate are more regularly difcuffed, and bufmefs executed with greater order and expedition i while the credit of the flute is better fupported, in the eyes of foreigners, by a felecl number of venerable fenators, than by a promifcuous or contemptible mob. * It is of great importance to regulate by law the method of chufing magiftrates; for, in leaving this to the prince, it is impoffible to avoid falling into an hereditary ariftocracy, as happened to the republics of Venice and Berne. Hence the fiift has been long fince diflblved, but the fecond hath been fupported by the great prudence of the Senate. This is an ex- ception, liowever, as dangerous as honourable. In n6 A TRE AT IS E ON THE In a word, tnat order would be undoubted- ly the beft and moft natural, according to which the wife and experienced few direct the multitude, were it certain that the few would in their government confult the intereft of the majority governed, and not their own. It is ab- furd to multiply the fprings of action to no pur- pofe, or to employ twenty thoufand men in doing that, which an hundred properly felected would effect much better. With regard to the particular circumftances requifite to this form of government ; the (late mould not be fo fmall, nor the manners of the people fo fimple or fo virtuous as that the ex- ecution of the laws mould coincide with the public Will, as in a well founded democracy. On the other hand alfo, the ftate mould not be fo extenfive that the governors, diftributed up and down its provinces, might be able to render themfelves, each in his feparate department, independant of the fovereign. But if an arifrocracy requires fewer virtues than a popular government ; there are yet fome which are peculiar to it j fuch as moderation in the rich and content in the poor : an exact equa- lity SOCIAL COMPACT. 117 lity of condition would in fuch a government be quite improper : nor was it obferved even at Sparta. If a certain degree however, of inequality in the fortunes of the people, be proper in fuch a government ; the reafon of it is, that in ge- neral the adminiftration of public affairs, ought to be put into the hands of thofe perfons who can belt devote their time to fuch fervice ; not, as Ariftotle pretends, that the rich ought always to be preferred merely on account of their wealth. On the contrary, it is very neceflary that an oppofite choice fhould fometimes teach the people that there exift other motives of prc* ference much more important than riches. C H A P. VI. On monarchy. HITHERTO we have confidered the prince as a moral and collective perfo- nage, formed by the force of the laws, and as the depofitory of the executive power of the ftate. At prefent, it is our bufmefs to confider this power, as lodged in the hands of a phyfical per- fonage or real man j poffefled of the right of n5 A TREATISE ON THE exerting it agreeable to the laws. Such a per- fon is denominated a monarch or king. In other adminiftrations it is common for a collective body to reprefent an individual being ; whereas in this an individual is, on the con-? trary, the reprefentative of a collective body ; fo that the moral unity which conftitutes the prince, is at the fame time a phyfical unity, in which all the faculties which the law combines in the former are combined naturally in the latter. f Thus the will of the people and that of the prince, together with the public force of the ftate, and the particular force of the govern- ment, all depend on the fame principle of action: all the fprings of the machine are in the fame hand, are exerted to the fame end ; there are no oppofite motions counteracting and deftroying each other ; nor is it poffible to conceive any' fpecies of government in which the leaft effort is productive of fo great a quantity of action. Archimedes, fitting at his eafe on the (here, and moving about a large veflel on the ocean at pleafure, reprefents to my imagination an able monarch fitting in his cabinet, and governing his diftant provinces, by keeping every thing in mo tun, SOCIAL COMPACT. 119 motion, while he himfelf feems immoveable. But, if no other kind of government hath fo much activity, there is none in which the particular will of the individual is fo predomi- nant. Every thieg, it is true, proceeds toward the fame end ; but this end is not that of pub- lic happinefs ; and hence the force of the admi- niftration operates inceflantly to the prejudice of theftate. ',' ' Kings would be abfolute, and they are fome- times told that their beft way to become fo, is to make themfelves beloved by the people This maxim is doubtlefs a very fine one, and even in fome refpecls true. But unhappily it is laughed at in courts. That power which arifes from the love of the people is without doubt the greateft : but it is fo precarious and conditional, that princes have never been fatisfied with it. Even the beft kings are defirous of having it in their power to do ill when they pleafe, without lofing their prerogatives. It is to no purpofe that a declaiming politician tells them that the ftrength of the people being theirs, it is their greateft intereft to have the people flourilhing, numerous and refpeclable : they know that this is not true. Their perfonal and private intereft izo A TREATISE ox THE is, in the firft place, that the people fhould be fo weak and miferable as to be incapable of mak- ing any refiftance to government. I confefs indeed that, fuppofing the people to be held in perfect fubjection, it would be to the intereft of the prince that they ftiould be rich and powerful, becaufe their ftrength, being alfo his, ferves to make him refpeftable to his neigh- bours; but as this intereft is only fecondary and fubordinate, and that thefe fuppofitions are incompatible, it is natural for princes to give the preference always to that maxim which is the moft immediately ufeful. This is what Samuel hath reprefented very forcibly to the Hebrews ; and Machiavel hath made evident to a demonftration. In afFecYmg to give inftruclions to kings, he hath given the moft ftriking lefTons to the people : His book entitled the Prince, is particularly adapted to the fervice of Republics. We have already {hewn from the general re- lations of things, that a monarchy is fuitable only to great ftates, and we fhall be more particularly convinced of it, on a further examination. The more numerous the members of the public ad- miniftration, the more is the relation beween the prince and the fubjecls diminifhed, and the nearer SOCIAL COMPACT. 121 nearer it approaches to nothing, or that point of equality which fubfifts in a democracy. This relation increafes in proportion as the government is contracted ; and arrives at its maximum when the adminiftration is in the hands of a fmgle perfon. In this cafe, then, there is too great a diftance between the prince and people, and the ftate is void of connection. To fupply its place, therefore, recourfe is had to the inter- mediate ranks of people. Hence the feveral orders of nobility. But nothing of this kind is fuitable to a fmall ftate, to which thefe diffe- rent ranks are very dcflruclive. If the good government of a flate be a mat- ter of difficulty under any mode of adminiftra- tion, it is more particularly fo in the hands o a fingle perfon ; and every body knows the confequences when a king reigns by fubftitutes. Again, there is one efTentiul and unavoidable defect, which will ever render a monarchical go^ vernment inferior to a republic ; and this is, that in the latter, the public voice hardly ever raifes unworthy perfons to high pofis in the ad mini- ftration ; making choice only of men of know- lege and abilities, who difcharge their refpeclive G funclious 122 A TREATISE ON THE functions with honour : whereas thofe who ge- nerally make their way to fuch ports under a monarchical government, are men oflittle minds and mean talents, who owe their preferment to the meritricious arts of flattery and intrigue. The public are lefs apt to be deceived in their choice than the prince; and a man of real mentis as rarely to be found in the miniftry of a king, as a block- head at the head of a republic. Thus, when by any fortunate accident, a genius born for go- vernment, takes the lead in a monarchy, brought to the verge of ruin by fnch petty rulers, the world is amazed at the refources he difcovers, and his adminiftration ftands as a fingular epoch in the hiftory of his country. i To have a monarchical Aate well governed, it is requifite that its magnitude or extent Should be proportioned to the abilities of the regent. It is more eafy to conquer lhan to govern. By means of a lever fufficiently long, it were pof- fible with a Tingle finger to move the globe ; but to fupport it requires the {houlders of an Hercules. When a Hate may with any pro- priety be denominated great, the prince is ai- moft always too little. And when, en the con- trary, it happens, which however is very feJdom, that SOCIAL COMPACT. 123 that the ftate is too little for its regent, it muft be ever ill-governed ; becaufe the chief, actuated by the greatnefs of his own ideas, is apt to forget the intereft of his people, and makes them no lefs unhappy from the abufe of his fuperflitous talents, than would another of a more United capacity, for want of thofe talents \vhich fhould be neceflary. It is thence requi- fite, that a kingdom fhould, if I may fo fay, contract and dilate itfelf, on every fncceffion, according to the capacity of the reigning prince : whereas the abilities of a fenate being more fixt, the flate, under a republican government, may be confined or extended to any determinate li- mits, and the adminiflration be equally good. The moft palpable inconvenience la the go- vernment of a fole magiftrate, is the default of that continued fucceilion, which, in the two other kinds, forms an uninterrupted connection in the ftate. When one king dies, it is neceflarjr to have another; but when kings are elective, fuch elections form very ^jrbulent and dange- rous intervals ; and unlefs the citizens are pof- fefled, of a diftntereftednc-fs and integrity, in- compatible with this mode of government, ve-, nality and corruption will necefTarily have an. influence over them. It is very rare that he, G 2 to 124 A TREATISE o?f THE to whom the ftate is fold, does not fell it again in his turn, and make the weak repay him the money extorted from him by the ftrong. Every one becomes, fooner or laffcr, venal and corrupt, under fuch an adminiftration j while even the tranquillity, which is enjoyed under the kings, is worfe than the diforder attending their inter- regnum. To remedy thefe evils, crowns have been made hereditary, and an order of fucceflion hath been eftablifhed, which prevents any difputes On the death of kings : that is to fay, by fub- fHtuting the inconvenience of regencies to that of elections, an apparent tranquillity is preferred to a wife adminiftration ; and it is thought bet- ter to run the rifk of having the throne fup- plied by children, monfters, and ideots, than to have any difpute about the choice of good kings. It is not confidered, that in expofmg a ftate to the riilc of fuch an alternative, almoil every chance is againft it. Almoifl everything confpires to deprive a youth, educated to the command over others, of the principles of reafon and juftice. Great pains, it is faid, are taken to teach young princes the art of SOCIAL COMPACT. 125 of reigning j it does not appear however that they profit much by their education. It would be better to begin by teaching them fubjection. The greatefl monrchs that have been cele- brated in hiftory, are thofe who were not edu- cated to govern. This is a fcteoce of which thofe know the leaft who have been taught the moft, and is better acquired by Ay-dying obe- dience than command. Nam utillijjirnus iden fie brcvijfimus lonarum malar u't^uc rerum deleflus t coi'nare quid aut nclutrh ful alto principe out vo - luff it, A confequence of this want of coherence, is the inconflancy of regal government, which is fometimes purfued on one plan, and fome- tunes on another, according to the character of the prince who governs, or of thofe who hold the reins of adminiftration for him ; fo that its conduct is as inconfiflent as the object of its purftiit is wavering. It is this inconftancy which keeps the flate ever fluctuating from maxim to maxim, and from project to project j an uncer- tainty which does not take place in other kinds of government, where the prince is always the fame. Thus we fee, in general, that if there be more cunning in a court, there is more true G 3 \vifdom 126 A TREATISE ON THE wifdom in a fenate ; and that republics accom- piifh their ends, by means more conflant and better purfued : while on the contrary, every revolution in the miniftry of a court, produces one in the ftate : it being the conftant maxim with all minilters, and almoft with all kings, to engage in meafures directly oppoflte to thofe of their immediate predeceffbrs. Again, it is from this very incoherence that we may deduce the folution of a fophifm very common with regal politicians ; and this is not only the prac- tice of comparing the civil government of So- ciety to the domefHc government of a family, and the prince to the father of it, (an error already expofed) but alfo that of liberally be- ftowing on the reigning magiftrate all the virtues he flands in need of, and of fuppofing the prince always fuch as- he ought to be. With the help of this fnppofition, indeed, the regal government is evidently preferable to all others, becaufe it is incontcftably the ftrongeft ; and no- thing more is required to make it alfo the beft, than that the will of the prince ftiould be con- formable to the general will of the people. But if, according to Plato, the king by na- ture is fo very rare a perfonage, how feldom may we fuppofe nature and fortune hath concurred to crown him-? If a regal education alfo SOCIAL COMPACT. 127 alfo neceflarily corrupts thofe who receive it, what hopes can we have from a race of men thus educated ? It is a wilful error, therefore, to confound a regal government in general with the government of a good king. But, to fee what this fpecies of government is in itfelf, it mud be confidered under the direftion of weak and wicked princes : for fuch they generally are when they come to the throne, or fuch the throne will make them. Thefe difficulties have not efcaped the notice of fome writers, but they do not feern to have been much embarrafled by- them. The remedy, fay they, is to obey without murmur- ing. God fends us bad things in his wrath, and we ought to bear with them as chaftifements from on high. This way of talk is certainly very edifying ; but I conceive it would come with greater propriety from the pulpit, than from the pen of a politician. What fhould we fay of a phyfician who might promife miracles, and whofe whole art {hould confift in preaching up patience and refignation ? It is obvious enough that we muft bear with a bad govern- ment, when we live under it ; the qucftioa is to find a good one. G 4 CHAP. 128 A TREATISE ON THE CHAP. VII. Of m!.\ed Governments. THERE is no fuch thing, properly fpeak- ing, as a fimple government. Even a fo3e chief muft have inferior magiftraf.es, and a popular government a chief. Thus in the di- flribution of the executive power there is al- ways a gradation from the greater number to the Jefs, with this difference that fomethnes the greater mimber depends on the lefs, and at others the Icfs on the greater. Sometimes indeed the diflribution is equal, either when the conftituent parts depend mutu- ally on each other, as in the Englifh govern- ment j or when the authority of each part is independent, though imperfect, as in Poland. This laft form is a bad one, becaufe there is no union in fuch a government, and the feveral parts of the fiate want a due connection. It is a qneftion much agitated by politicians ; \Vhichis beft, a fimple or mixt government? The fame anfwer however might be given to it, as SOCIAL COMPACT. 129 as I have before made to the like cpeftion con- cerning the forms of government in general. A fimple government is the beft in itfelf, though for no other reafon than that it is fimple. But when the executive power is not fufficiently dependent on the legiflative, that is to fay, when there is a greater disproportion between the prince and the fovereign, than between the peo- ple aed the prince, this defect muft be remedied by dividing the government ; in which cafe all its parts would have no Icfs authority over the .fubjecl, and yet their divifion would render them collectively lefs powerful to oppofe their fovereign. The fame inconvenience is prevented alfo by cftabli thing a number of inferior magiftrates, which tend to preferve a ballance between the two powers, and to maintain their refpective prerogatives. In this cafe, however, the go- vernment is not properly of a mixt kind ; it is only modsrated. The like means may alfo be employed to re- medy an oppofite inconvenience, as when a go- vernment is too feeble, by creeling of proper G tribunate 130 A TREATISE ON THE tribunals to concentrate its force. This me- thod is practifed in all democracies. In the firft cafe, the adminiflration is divided in order to weaken it, and in the fecond to enforce it : For a tnax:'m:.m both of flrength and weaknefs, is equally common to fimple governments, while thofe of mixt forms always give a mean propor- tional to both. CHAP. VIII. That every form of government is not equally proper for every country. AS liberty is not the produce of all climates, fo it is not alike attainable by all people. The more one reflects on this principle, efla- bli&ed by Montefquieu, the more fenfible we become of its truth. The more it is contefted, the more we find it confirmed by new proofs. Under every kind of government, the po- litical perfonage, the public, confumes nuich, but produces nothing Whence then doth it derive the fubftance confumed ? Evidently from the labour of its members. It is from the fu- perfluity of individuals that the neceffities of the public are provided. Hac* it follows that SOCIAL COMPACT. 131 that a focial ftate cannot fubfift longer than the induftry of its members continues to produce fuch fuperfluity. The quantity of this fuperfluity, however, .is not the fame in all countries. It is in many very confiderable, in fome but moderate, in others null, and again in others negative. The proportion depends on the fertility of the cli- mate, the fpecies of labour required in the cul- tivation of the foil, the nature of its produce, the ftrength of its inhabitants, the confumption necefiary to their fubilAence, with many other fimilar circumftances. On the other hand, nil governments are not of the fame nature ; fome devour much more than others, and their difference is ^bunded on this principle, viz. that the farther public con- tributions are removed from their fource, the more burthenfome they grow. It is not by the quantity of the impofuion that we are to e(U- mate the burthen of it, but by the time or fpace taken up in its returning back to the hamls from which it is exacted. When this retWn is quick and eafy, it matters little whether fuch impofuion, be fmall or great 3 the people are G 6 al- 132 A TREATISE ON THE always rich, and the finances in good condition. On the contrary, however low a people be taxed, if the money never returns, they are fure by conftantly paying ro be foon exhaufted ; fuch a flate can never be rich, and the indivi- duals of it muft be always beggars. It follows hence that the farther the people are removed from the feat of government, the more burthenfome are their taxes : thus in a democracy their weight is leaft felt: in an ariflocracy they fall more heavy ; and in a mo- narchical flate they have the greatest weight of all. Monarchy, therefore, is proper only for opulent nations ; ariflocracy for middling Rates j and a democracy for thofe which are mean and poor. In faft, the more we reflect on this circum- ftance, the more plainly we perceive the diffe- rence in this refpect between a monarchical and a free fbte. In the latter, all its force is ex- the public utility ; in the former, the of the flate and the private inte- reft of the prince are reciprocally oppofed ; the wae increafmg by the decrafe of the other. To SOCIAL COMPACT. 13$ In a word, inftead of governing fubjedls in fucli a manner as to make them happy, defpotifra makes them miferable, in order to be able to govern them at all. Thus may we trace in every climate thofe na- tural caufes, which point out that particular form of government which is beft adapted to it, as well as even the peculiar kind of people that fliould inhabit it. Barren and ungrateful foils, whofe produce will not pay for the la- bour of cultivation, would remain uncultivated and uninhabited, or, at beft, would be peo- pled only with favages. Thofe countries from which the inhabitants might draw the ne* ceflaries of life, and no more, would be peo- pled by barbarians, among whom the efiablifti- ment of civil polity would be impoftible. Such places as might yield to their inhabitants a mo- derate fuperfluity, would be beft adapted to a free people ; while the country where fertile plains and plenteous vales more bounteously reward the labours of the cultivator, would beft fuit with a monarchical form of government* in order that the luxury of the prince might confume the fuperfluity of the fubjefts : for it is much better that this fuperfluity (hould be expended by government than dijflipated by in* dividuals. I am not infeniible that fame ex- ceptions 7 J34 A TREATISE ON THE ceptions might be made to what is here ad- vanced ; thefe very exceptions, however, ferve to confirm the general rule, in that they are fooner or later conftantly productive of revo- lutions, which, reduce things to their natural' order, We (hould always make a difHnclion between general laws, and thofe particular orufes which may diverfify their effects. For, though the fouthern climates ftiould be actually filled with republics, and the northern with defpotic monarchies, it would be nevcrthelefs true in theory, that, fo far as climate is concerned, def- potifm agrees beft with an hot, barbarifm with a cold, and good polity with a tempera^ re- gion. I am aware farther that, even granting the piinciple, the application of it may be dU- puted. It may be laid, that fome cold coun- tries are very fertile, while others more warm and fouthern are very barren. This objetfion, however, hath weight only with fuch as do not examine the matter in every point of view. It is requifite to take into confideration, as I be- fore obferved, the labour of the people, their ftrength, their coniumption, with every other circumiUiice that affects the point in qutftioD. Let SOCIAL COMPACT. 13$ Let us fuppofe two countries of equal extent, the proportion of whofe product fhould be as five to ten. It is plain that, if the inhabitants of the firfl confume four, and of the latter nine, the fuper- fluity of the one would be ', and that of th other |. Their different fuperfluities being alfo in an inverfe ratio to that of their produce, the territory whofe produce mould amount only to five, would have near double the fupcrfluity of that which fhould amount to ten. But the argument does not reft upon a double produce ; nay I doubt whether any perfon will place the actual fertility of cold countries in ge- neral, in a bare equality with that of warmer climates. We will fuppofe them, however, to be in this refpect fimply equal ; fttting England, for inftance, on a balance with Sicily, and Po- land with Egypt. Still farther to the South we have Africa and the, Indies, and to the North hardly any thing. But to effect this equality in the produce, what a difference in the labour of cultivation! In Sicily they have nothing more to do than barely turn up the earth : in England agriculture is extremely toilfome and laborious, Now, where a greater number of hands 136 A TREATISE ON- THE hands is required to raife the fame produce, the fuperfluity muft neceffarily be Itfs. Add to this, that the fame number of people con fume much lefs in a warm country than in a cold one. An hot climate requires men to be temperate, if they would preferve their health. Of this the Europeans are made fenfible, by fee- ing thofe who do not alter their manner of living in hot countries, daily carried off by dyfenteries and indigefHon. Chardin reprefents us, as beafts of prey, as mere wolves in com- parifon of the Afiatics ; and thinks thofe writers miftaken, who have attributed the temperance of the Periians, to the uncultivated fhte of their^ country. His opinion is that their country was fo little cultivated, becaufe the inhabitants required fo little for their fub- Mence. If their frugality were merely the effe& of the barrenness of their country, he ob- ferves, it would be only the poorer fort of them that (bould eat little ; whereas their abftinence is general. Again, they would in fuch cafe be more or lefs abiremious in different provinces, as thofe provinces differed in degrees of fieri- lity ; whereas their fobriety is general, and pre- vails equally throughout the kingdom, He tells us, SOCIAL COMPACT. 137 us, alfo, that the Perfians boaft much of their manner of living ; pretending their complexions only to be a fuffkicnt indication, of its being preferable to that of the Chriuians. At the fame time, he admits that their complexions ase very fine and fmooth ; that their fkin is of a foft texture, and poliihed appearance; while, on the other hand, the complexion of the Armenians, their fubjecls, who live after the European manner, is rough and pimply^ and their bodies grofs and unwieldy. The nearer we approach to the line, it is certain, the more abitemious we find the peo- ple. They hardly ever eat meat ; rice and maize are their ordinary food. '! here are millions of people in the Indies, whofe fubfiftence does not amount to the value of a penny a day. We fee even in Europe, a very fenfible difference, in this refpeft, between the inhabitants of the North and South. A Spaniard will fubfift a whole week, on what a German would eat up at a fmgle meal. In countries where the peo- ple are voracious, even luxury hath a tendency to confumption. Thus in England it difplays itfelf in the number of difh.es and quantity of folid meat on the table j while in Italy, a re- paft 138 A TREATISE ON THE paft is furnifhed out with fweetmeats and liowers. The luxury of drefs prefents us, alfo, with fimilar differences. In climates, where the change of the weather is fudden and violent, the people wear better and plainer clothes j while in thofe where the inhabitants drefs only for ornament, brilliancy is more confulted than ufe; even clothes themfclves are an article of luxury. Thus at Naples, you will daily fee gentlemen walking about in laced clothes with- out ftockings. It is the fame with regard to buildings : magnificence only is confulted, where nothing is to be feared from the inclemencies of the weather. At Paris and London people are defirous of warm and commodious apartments. At Madrid, they have fuperb faloons, but no faihes nor cafements ; and their beds lie opea to the rats that harbour in the roof. The aliment is alfo more fubftantial and nou- rifhingin hot countries than in cold ; this is a third difference that cannot fail to have an influence over the fecond. Wherefore is it that the Italians eat fuch a quantity of vegetables ? Becaufe they are good, and of an excellent favour. In France, where SOCIAL COMPACT. 139 where they are themfelves nourished chiefly by water, they are lefs nutritive, and are held of little confequence. They occupy neverthelefs as much ground, and cofl as much pains to cultivate them. It hath been experimentally proved that the corn of Barbary, in other re- fpecls inferior to that of France, gives a greater quantity of meal, and that the French corn yields ftill more than that of the North. Hence it may be inferred that a funilar gradation is car- ried on in the fame direction from the line to the pole. Now is it not an evident difadvan- tnge to have, in an equal produce, a lefs quan-- tity of aliment ?-i %& To all thefe different confideratlons, I may acid another, which arifes from, and ferves to confirm them; this i. c , that hot countries require fewer inhabitants than the cold, and yet afford fubfiftence for more ; a circumftance that caufes a two-fold fuperfluity, always to the advan- tage of defpotifm. The more the fame number of people are diftiibutedover the face of a large territory, the more difficult becomes a revolt ;, as they cannot meet together fo readily or fe- cretly, and it is always eafy for the government to cut off their aflbciations, and.ruin their pro- jetfs. 140 A T R E A T I S E ON THE jects. On the other hand, the more a nume- rous people are collected together, the lefs can the government afTume over the fovereign ; the chiefs of a faction may deliberate as fecurely at their meetings, as the prince in his council ; and the mob are as readily affembled in the public fquares as the troops in their quarteis. It is the advantage of a tyrannical government, therefore, to aft at great dittances ; its force increafing with the diftance like that of a lever *, by the affiftance of a proper center. That of the people, on the contrary, acts only by being concentrated ; it evaporates and lofes itfelf when dilated, even as gunpowder fcattered on the ground, takes fire, particle by particle, and is productive of no effect. Countries thinly in- * This doth not contradict what is advanced in Chap. ix. Book II. concerning the inconvenience of great dates ; the matter in queftion there being the authority of the government over its members, and here of its influence over the fubjefts. Its members, fcattered about in different places, ferve as points of fupport to enable it toaft at a diftance on the peo- ple ; but it hath no fuch props to afli \ its action on its members themfelves. Thus in one cafe the length of the lever is the caufe of its itrength, and in the other of its weaknefs. SOCIAL COMPACT. 141 habited are the moft proper places for tyrants ; wild beads reign only in defarts. CHAP. IX. Of the marks of a good Government. WHEN it Is afked, therefore, in general terms, what is the bed form of go- vernment ? the queftion is as indeterminate as unanfwerable : or rather it may be reafonably anfwered as many different ways as there are poiTible combinations of the abfolute and rela- tive circumftances of a people. But if it be alked, by what figns it may be known whether any given people are well or ill governed ? This is quite another thing, and the queftion, as to the faft, is to be refolved. This queftion, however, is never actually re- folved, becaufe every one is for doing it after his own manner. The fubjecl cries up the public tranquillity, the citizen the liberty of individuals; the one prefers the fecurity of property, the other that of his perfon ; the one maintains the beft government to be the moft fevere, the other affirms that to be beft which is moft agree- able} 142 A TREATISE ON THE able ; the latter is for punifhing crimes, the former for preventing them : the ore thinks it a fine thing to be dreaded by his neighbours; the other thinks it better to be unknown to them ; the one is fa'isfied if money does but circulate the other requires the people fbould have bread. Were they even acrted alfo on thefe and other fimihr points, they would not be much nearer the end of the difpute. Moral quantities are deficient in point of precifion j fo that, were men agreed on the fign, they would flill differ about its eftimation. For my part, 1 am aftonl/hed that a flgr? To very f:;nple Ihould be miftaken, or that any (hould be fo difmgenuous as not to acknowlege it, What is the end of political fociety ? doubt- Jefs the preservation and profperiry of its tnembers. And \vh.u is the mod certain fign or proof of thefe ? Certainly it is their number and population. Let us rot k>ok elfewhere, then, for this difputed proof; fmce it is plain, that government mud be the bed, under which the citizens increafc and multiply moll, fup-- pofing all other circumfh.Kts equal, and no foreigners naturalized or colonies introduced, to caufe fucix increafe : and tba% on the contrary SOCIAL COMPACT. 143 contrary, that government muft be the word, under which, itsttns pan<,.i~, the number of people fhould dimmifh. This being admit- ted, the decifion of the queftion becomes an affair of calculation *, and as fuch I give it up to the arithmeticians. CHAP. * It is on the fame principle that we eug'-t to judge of the feveral periods of time that defcrve the pre- ference, in being diljinguifhed for the rrcfperity of mankind. We have in general too much admired thofe, in which literature and the fine arts have flou- riflied, without penetrating into the fecret canfe of their cultivation, or duly confidering their fatal ef- fels ', iaque afcucl iwperitos hum.tnitas ltptalrettvr t cum pa>-s fervitutii ejfit. Shall we never be able to fee through the maxims laid down in books, the inte- refted motives of their authors ? No, let writers fay what they will, whenever the inhabitants of a coun^ try decreafe, it is not true that all things go well, whatever be its external profperity and fplendour : A poet poffcffed of an hundred thoufand livres a year, does not neceflarily make the age he lives in the bed of all others. We fhould not fo much re/- gard the apparent repofe of the world, arid the tran- quillity of its chiefs, as the "well being of whole na- tions, and particularly of the moft populous ftates > A itorm of hail may lay wafte fome few provinces, but it fe!dom caufes a famine. Temporary tumults and civil 144 A TREATISE ON THE CHAP. X. Of ifa abufe of government, and its tendency to degenerate, AS the particular will of the prince afts conftantly againft the general will of the people, the government neceiTarily makes a con- tinual effort againft the fovereignty. The greater this effort is, the more is the conftitution al- tered ; and as in this cafe there is no other di- fttncl: Will to keep that of the prince in equi- Hbrio, it muft fooner or later infallibly happen that civil wars may give much difturbance to rulers ; but they do not conltitute the real misfortunes of a peo- ,ple> who ma are reftored -o the rights of natural liberty, and are -compelled, not legally obliged, to obedience. It is the fame thing, when the members of government afTume feparately the power they are entitled to exercife only collectively; which is no lefs an infringement of the laws, and is productive of (till worfe confequences. For, in this cafe, there may be faid to be as many princes as magiftrates ; while the flate no lefs divided than the government, is totally diflblved or changes its form. When the (late is diilblved, the abufe of government, of whatever nature it be, takes the common name of anarchy. To diftinguith. more nicely, democracy is faid to degenerate into ecbtecracy ; arlftocracy into oligarchy ; and I may add nunarchy into tyranny : but this laft term is equivocal, arid requires fome explana- tion. In the vulgar fenfe of the word, a tyrant is a king who governs by force and without regard to juftice or the laws. In the more pre- cife and determinate fenfe, it means any imli- H 3 vidual 150 A TREATISE ON THE vicinal who afiumes the royal authority, with- out having a right to it. In this latter fenfe the Greeks underftood the word tyrant ; and give it indifcrhninately both to good and bad princes whofe authority was not legal *. Thus, ty- rant and ufurfrer are two words perfectly fy- nonimous. To give different names, however, to diffe- rent things,- I call the ufurpation of regal au- thority, tyranny^ and that of Sovereign power defpotifm. The tyrant is he, who takes upon himfelf, contrary to law, to govern ac- cording to law; and the defpotic chief, one who places himfelf above the laws themfelves. Thus a tyrant cannot be defpotic, though a defpotic prince muft always be a tyrant. . * Qmnes enim et balentur ft dhuntur tyranni qui pst'Jiate utuvtur fe'petite., in a civitate quee iibertate vfaej). CORN. NEPOS. IN MILTIADE. It is true tb,at Ariftotle makes a diftinfiion between the tyrant and king, in that the one governs for his own good, and the other for the good of his fubjefts : but, be- fides that all the Greek writers ufe the word tyrant jn a different fenfe, as appears particularly by the Hiercn of Zenophon, it would follow from Ariftotle's diftin&ien that no king ever exifted en the face of the earth, CHAP, SOCIAL COMPACT. 151 CHAP. XI. Of the diffolution of the bady politic. SU C H 5s the natural and unavoidable ten- dency of even the beft conftituted govern- ments. If Rome and Sparta perifhed, what ftate can hope to laft for ever ? In our endea - vours to form a durable eftablidiment, we'muft not think, therefore, to make it eternal. If we would hope to fucceed, we mull not attempt impoffibilities, nor flatter ourfelves to give that permanency to human inftitutions, which is in- compatible with their nature. The body politic, as well as the phyfical, begins to die at its birth, and bears in itfelf the caufes of its deftruftion. Both, however, may pofTefs a coniUtution more or lefs robuit, an/I adapted to different peiiods of duration, corftituticn of mr>n is ,he work "f nature ; that of the Hat-'-, is the worl- .>f art. : : i depend on men to prolong* 'their lives, depends on them to prolong trut oi' r! as much as pofTIble, bv ^vi I < ;i a ..Tiditutioa the beft adapted to luug.v,^. The mofr per- fedt conlatution, 1 it is true, will have ai H 4 but 152 A T R E A T I S E ON TUB but fiill fo much later than others, if no un- forefeen accident bring it to an untimely dif- folution. The principle of political life, lies in the fovereign authority. The kgiflative power is the heart of the ftate ; the executive power is the brain, which puts every part in motion, The brain may be rendered ufelefs by the palfy, and yet the individual furvive. A man may be- come an infenfible driveller and yet live : but as foon as the "heart ceafes to beat, the animal . , , ' is dead. The ftate doth not fubfift by virtue of the laws, but by the legiflative power. The fla- tutes of yefterday are not in themselves necef- fivrily binding to day*, but the tacit confirmation of them is prefamed from the illence of the legiflature; the fovereign being fuppofed in- ceffantly to confirm the laws not actually re- pealed. Whatever is once declared to be the will of the fovereign, continues always fo, un- lefs it be abrogated. Wherefore, then, is there fo much refpect paid to ancient laws ? Even for this reafon. It is rational to fuppofe, that nothing but the ex- SOCIAL COMPACT. 153 excellence of the ancient laws, could preferve them fo long in being ; for that, if the fove* reign had not found them always falutary and ufefulj they would have been repealed. Hence we fee that the laws, inftead of lofing their force, acquire additional authority by time, in every well formed ftate ; the prepof- feffion of their antiquity renders them every day more venerable ; whereas, in every country where the laws grow obfoleie and lofe their force as they grow old, this alone is a proof that the legiflative power itfelf is decayed, and the ftate extinL CHAP. XII, By what means the fovereign authority is main* tained.. THE fovereign, having no other force than the legiflative power, acts only by the laws ; while the laws being only the au- thentic acts of the general will, tlte fovereign cannot acl unlefs the people are alTembled. The people aflemble ! you will fay. What a chi- mera ? It is indeed chimerical at prefent j though it was not reckoned Ib two thou- H 5 fknd 154 A TREATISE ON THE fand years ago. Are mankind changed in their nature fmce that time ? The bounds of poffibility in moral affairs are lefs confined than we are apt to imagine : It is our foibles, our vices, our prejudices that con- tract them. Mean fouls give no credit to the fentiments of heroic minds j while (laves affect to turn the notion pf liberty, into ridicule. By what hath been done, however, we may judge of what may be done again. I (hall not fpeak of the petty republics of ancient Greece ; but the Roman republic was, undoubtedly, a great flate, and the city of Rome a great city. By the laft regifter of the citizens of Rome, their number amounted to four hundred thou- fand perfons cap.ible of bearing arms ; and the laft regiiler of the Empire amounted to more than four millions of citizens, without reckon- lug fubjedts, women, children or (laves, How very difficult, you will fay, muft it have been, to afTemble frequently the people of that capital and its environs ? And yet hardly a week pafled in which the Roman people were not aflembled, and on fome occafioas feveral times a week. I s o CIA L COMPACT; i^ a week. This numerous body indeed not only exercifed the functions of fovereignty,, but alfo in fome cafes thofe of government. They fometimes deliberated on flate affairs, and' at others decided in judicial caufes ; the whole people being publicly affembled lmoft as fre- quently in the capacity of magiftrates as ci>- tizens. By recurring to the primitive flate of na- tions, we (hall find that moft of the ancient governments, even the monarchical, as that of the Macedon and others, had the like popular afTemblies. Be this, however, as it may, the. fact being once inconteftibly proved, obviates all difficulties ; for, to deduce the poffibilhy of a thing from its having actually happened, will; admit of no objection. H 6 H A &. 156 A T R E A T I S E ON THE CHAP. XIII. The fubjeft continued. T T is not enough, however, that the people once afTembled fhould fix the conflitution of the flate, by giving their fanftion to a certain code or fyftem of laws : it is not enough that they fhould eftablifh a perpetual government, or provide once for all by the election of ma- giftrates. Befides the extraordinary afTemblies, which unforefeen accidents may require, it is neceflhry they fhould have certain fixed and pe- riodical meetings, which nothing might abolifh. or prorogue : fo that the people fhould, on. a certain day, be legally fummoned by law, with- out any exprefs ftatute being required for their formal convocation. But, excepting thefe regular afTemblies, ren- dered legal by the date, all others, unlefs con- voked by the proper magiftrate previoufly ap- pointed to that end, agreeable to prefcribed forms, fliould be held illegal, and all their de- terminations declared null and void; becaufe the very manner of the people's afTembling fhould be determined by law. As SOCIAL COMPACT. 157 As to the frequency of legal afTemblies, it depends on fo many different confiderations, that it is impoflible to lay down any precife rules on this head. It can only be faid in ge- neral that the more powerful the government* the more often ought the fovereign ty to difplay itfclf. All this, it may be faid, is very well for a fingle town or city ; but what muft be done in a ftate comprehending feveral cities ? Muft the fovereign authority be diftributed, or ought k to centre in one, to the total fubjeclipn of the reft? I anfwer, neither one nor the other. In the fir ft place, the fovereign authority is flmple and uniform, fo that it cannot be divided with- out deftroying it. In the next place, one city cannot be legally fubjecl: to another, any more than one nation to another ; becaufe the effence of the body politic confifts in the union of obedience and liberty, and in the ttrmsfukjeft and fcvere : gn being thofe identical correlatives, the ideas of which are united in the fingle term citizen. I anfwer 158 A TREATISE ON THE I anfwer farther, that it is fundamentally wrong, to unite fcveral towns to form one city ; and that fuch union being made, the natural inconveniences of it muft enfue. The abufes peculiar to great ftates mnft not be made ob- jections to the fyftem of one, who maintains the exclufive propriety of little ones. I ..: how, it will be faid, can little ftates be mude powerful enough ro refift the great ? Eren as the cities of ancient Greece were able to refill the arms of a powerful monarch; and, as in more modern times, Switzerland and Hol!nndj have refitted the power of the houft of Auftria,. In cafes, alfo, where the ftate cannot be re* duced within proper bounds, there remains one refource ; and this is by not permitting the ex- iftence of a capital, but removing the feat of go- vernment from one town to another, and aflemb- ling the ftates of the country in each alternately. People a country equally in every part ; dif- fufe the fame privileges and advantages through- out j and the ftate will become at once the ftrongeft and the beft governed. Remember that the walls of cities are founded on the ruins of the villages, and that the fplendid palaces in SOCIAL COMPACT. 159 in town are raifed at the expence of miferable. cottages in the country. CHAP. XIV. Subjcfl continued. NO (boner are the people legally a/Tembled,, in a fovereign body, than the jurifdiftion of government ceafes, the executive power of the ftate is fufpended, and the perfon of the meaneft citizen becomes as facred and inviolable as the greateft magiftrate ; becaufe when the body reprefented appears, it is not requifite that the reprefentatives of it (hould exifl. Moft of the tumults which happened in the Cornitia at Romej were owing to the general ignorance or negleft of this rule. On thofe occafions, the confuls were only prefidents of the afTembly of the people, the tribunes merely orators*, and the fenate abfolutely nothing. Thefe intervals of fufpenfion, when the prince acknowleges, or at lead ought to ac- * Nearly in the fenfe given to thofe who {peak , on any queftion in the parliament of England. The refemblance of their employments fet the confuls and tribunes together by the ears ; even when their jurifdiction was fufpended; knowlege 160 A TREATISE ON THE knowlege an aftual fuperior, have 'been always formidable, while fuch formidable aflemblies, the fecurity of the body politic and the reftraint of government, have been held in honour by the chiefs : fo that they never have been fparing of pains, in raifing objections and difficulties, or of making fair promifes in order to difgufl the citizens with fuch meetings. When the latter, therefore, have been avaritious, mean, or cowardly, preferring their cafe to liberty, they have not been able to withnandlong the re- peated efforts of government : and thus it is that, this encroaching power mceflantly aug- menting, the fovereignty becomes totally ex- tincl:, and thus moft cities come to an un- timely end. Sometimes, however, there is introduced be- tween fovereign authority and arbitrary go- vernment, a mean term of power, of which it is neceflary to treat* CHAP. SOCIAL COMPACT. 161 CHAP. XV. Of deputies or rtprejentativej. WH E N the fervice of the public ccafes to be the principal concern of the ci- tizens, and they had rather difcharge it by their purfes than their perfons, the ftate is al- ready far advanced toward ruin. When they fhould march out to fight, they pay troops to .fight for them, and flay at home. When they fhould go to council, they fend deputies, and Jftay at home. Thus, in confequence of their indolence and wealth, they in the end employ foldiers to enQave their country, and reprefen- tatives to betray it. It is the buttle of commerce and the arts ; it is the fordid love of gain, of luxury and eafe, that thus convert perfonal into pecuniary fer- vices. "M en readily give up one part of their profit, to increafe the reft unmolefted. But fupply an adminiftration with money, and they will prefently fupply you with chains. The very term of taxes is flavifo, and unknown in a free city. In a ftate truly free, the citizens difcbarge their duty to the public with their 1 62 A T R E A T I S E ON THE own hands, and not by money. So far from paying for being exempted from fuch duty, they would pay to be permitted to difcharge it themfelves. I am very far from" adopting re- ceived opinions, and think the fervices exafted by force a kfs infringement of liberty than taxes. The better the conftitution of a flate, the greater influence have public affairs over private, in the minds of the citizens : They will have, alfo, much fewer private affairs to concern them ; becaufe the fum total of their common happinefs, furnifhing a more considerable por- tion to each individual, there remains the lefs for each to feek from his own private concerns. In a city well governed, every one is ready to fly to its public afTemblies ; under a bad govern- ment they are carelefs about going thither at all; becaufe no one interefts himfelf in what is doing there ; it is known that the general will does not influence them, and hence at length domeftic concerns engage all their at- tention. Good laws tend to the making better, while bad ones are introductory of Worfe. No fooner doth a citizen fay, what are ftate-arTairs> to me ? than the flate may be given up for loft. It SOCIAL COMPACT. 163 It is this want of public fpirit, the influence of private interefl, the extent of flates, con- quefts and abufes in government, that have given rife to the method of afTembling the peo- ple by deputies and reprefentatives. THe af- fembly of thefe reprefensanves is called in fome countries, the third eftate of the nation ; fa that the particular interefts of the two orders are placed in the firft and fecond rank, and the public intereft only in the third. The fovereignty, however, cannot be repre- feuted, and that for the fame reafon that it cannot be alienated. It con fills efTentially of the general will, and the will cannot be repre- fented : it is either identically the fame, or fome other ; there can be no mean term in the cafe. The deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be their reprefentatives ; they are only mere commiflioners, and can conclude de- finitively on nothing. Every law that is not confirmed by the people in perfon is null and void ; it is not in fact a hvr. The Englifh imagine they are a free people ; they are how- ever miftaken : they are fuch only during the- election of members of parliament. Whea thefe are chofen, they become flaves again ;. and indeed they make fo bad a ufe of the few tran- 164 A TREATISE ON THE tranfitory moments of liberty, that they richly deferve to lofe it. The notion of reprefentatives is modern ; de- fcending to us from the feudal fyftem, that mod iniquitous and abfurd form of government, by which human nature was fo fhamefully degraded. In the ancient republics, and even monarchies, the people had no reprefentatives ; they were ftrangers to the term. It is even very fmgular that, at Rome, where the Tribunes were fo much revered, it was never imagined they could ufurp the functions of the people ; and as ftrange that they never once attempted it. One may judge, however, of the embarraflfment fometimes caufed by the multitude, by what happened in the time of the Gracchi, when part of the citizens gave their votes from their houfe-tops. Where men value their liberty and privileges above every thing, inconveniences and difficul- ties are nothing. Among this wife people things were held in a proper eftimation ; they per- mitted the LiSors to do what they would not fuffer the Tribunes to attempt ; they were not afraid SOCIAL COMPACT. 165 afraid the Lifters would ever think of repre- fenting them. To explain, neverthelefs, in what manner thefe Tribunes did fometimes reprefent them, it will be fufficient to conceive how govern- ment reprefents the fovereign. The law being only a declaration of the general will, it is clear that the people cannot be reprefented in the legif- lative power ; but they may, and ought to be, in the executive ; which is only the application of power to law. And this makes it evident that, if we examine things to the bottom, we fhall find very few nations that have any laws. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the Tri- bunes, having no part of the executive power, could not reprefent the Roman people, by vir- tue of their office, but only in ufurping thofe of the fenate. Among the Greeks, whatever the people had to do, they did it in perfon ; they were per- petually aflembled in public. They inhabited a mild climate, were free from avarice, their (laves managed their domeftic bufinefs, and their great concern was liberty. As you do not poffefs the fame advantages, how can you ex- pea i66 A TREATISE ON THE peft to preferve the fame privileges ? Your cli- mate being more fevere, creates more wants * ; for fix months in the year your public fquares are too wet or cold to be frequented ; your hoarfe tongues cannot make themfelves heard in the open air ; you apply yourfelves more to gain than to liberty, and are lefs afraid of flavery than, poverty. On this occafion, it will probably "be afked me, if liberty cannot fnpport itfelf without the afliftance of flavery ? Perhaps not. At leaft the two extremes approach very near. What- ever does not exift in nature, mufl have its conveniences, and civil fociety flili .more than any thing elfe. There are fome circumflances fo critically unhappy that men cannot preferve their own liberty but at the expence of the li- berty of others ; and in which a citizen cannot be perfectly free without aggravating the fub- je&ion of his flaves. Such was the fituation of Sparta. As for you, ye moderns, you have DO flaves, but are flaves yourfelves, and purchafe * To adopt in cold countries the luxury and ef- feminacy of the Eaft, is to appear defirous of fla- very, without hayinguhe.iame excufe for fabmitting to it. their SOCIAL COMPACT. 167 their liberty by your own. You may if you pleafe boaft of this preference ; for ray part, I find more meannefs in it than humanity. I do not intend, however, by this to inculcate that we fhould have flaves, or that it is equit- able to reduce men to a ftate of flavery ; hav- ing already proved the contrary. I am here only giving the reafons why certain modern na- tions who imagine themfelves free, employ re- prefentatives, and why the ancients did not. But let this be as it will, I affirm that when once a people make choice of reprefentatives, they are no longer free. Every thing duly confidered, I do not fee a poflibility of the fovereign maintaining its rights, and the exercife of its prerogatives, for the" future among us, unlefs the ftate be indeed very fraall. But if it be fo very fin? 11, will it not be liable to lofe its independency ? No. I will make it hereafter appear in what manner the exterior power of a great people may be united with the policy and good order of a little one. CH A i68 A TREATISE ON THE CHAP. XVI. That the injlltuilon of government is not a compaft. 'T^HE legiflative power being once well ^ eftablilhed, we proceed to fettle the exe- cutive power in the fame manner : for the latter which operates only by particular acts, being effentially different from the other, is na- turally divided from it. If it were poffible for the fovereign, confidered ns fuch, to pofTefs the executive power, the matter of right and fact would be fo confounded, that we fhould no longer be able to diftinguifh what is law and what Is not ; the body politic alfo being thus unnaturally fituated, would foon become a prey to that violence, which it was originally infU- tuted to con-eft. The citizens being, by virtue of the focial compact, all equal, that which all may perform, all may prefcribe, whereas none can have a right to require another to do what he does not himfelf. Now it is properly this right, indifpen- fibly neceflary to animate and put the body po- litic in motion, with which the fovereign in- verts SOCIAL COMPACT. 169 vefts the prince in the inflitution of govern- ment. It has been pretended by Come that the aft forming this inflitution, was a contract between the people and the chiefs of which they made choice : a contract in which the two parties fHpulated the conditions on which the one obliged themfelves to command, and the other to obey. I am perfuaded every one will agree with me that this was a very ftrange mode of contract, But let us fee whether this opi- nion is in itfelf well founded. In the firfl: place the fupreme authority can no more modify or alter its form than it can alienate itfelf; to limit or reflram, would be to- deftroy it. It is abfurd and contradictory to fay the fovereign made choice of a fuperior ; to oblige itfelf to obey a matter, is to diflfolve its own conftitution, and reftore its members to their natural liberty. Again, it is plain that fuch a fuppofed con- tract between the people in general' and certain particular perfons would be a particular act ; whence it follows that it would not be a law nor 170 A TREATISE ov THE nor an aft of fovereignty, and of confequence would be illegal. It is farther evident, that the contracting parties would remain, refpefting each other, limply under the laws of nature, without any fecurity for the performance of their reciprocal engagements, a circumftance totally repugnant to a (late of civil fociety. The party only who might have the power, could enforce the execu- tion of the terms ; fo that we might as well give the name of a contract, to the aft of a man who ihould fay to another, ** I give you my whole property, on condition that you will re- itore me juft as much of it as you pleafe." There is but one compaft in a date, and that is the aft of aflbciation, which alone is ex- cluilve of every other ; as it is impoflible to imagine any fubfequent public contract which would not be a violation of the original. CHAP. SOCIAL COMPACT. 171 CHAP. XVII. Of the injlitution of government. WHAT notion, then, are we to form of the act, by which government is inftituted ? In anfwer to this queftion, I (hall firft remark that this act is complicated, or compofed of two others, viz the ellablifliment of the law and the execution of it. By the firft, the fovereign enacls that a go- vernment (hall be eftablifhed in fuch or fuch a form ; and it is clear, this being a general aft, that it is a law. By the fecond, the people name the chiefs who are to be charged with the adminiftration of the .government fo eftablifhed. No\y this nomination, being a particular acl, is not a fe- cond law, but only a confequeuce of the fir ft, and in reality an aft of government. The difficulty lies in being able to compre- hend how an adt of government can take place before the government exiiled, and how the I 2 people, I 172 A T R E A T I S E ON THE people, who muft be always either fovereign or fubjecls, become prince or magiflrate, in cer- tain circumftances. "We have here made a difcovery of one of thefe aftonifhing properties of the body politic, by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory to each other ; this aft being ef- fected by a fudden converfion of the fovereignty into a democracy : fo that, without any fenfible change, and only by means of a new relation of all to all, the citizens, becoming magiftrates, pafs from general afts to particular ones, and from enadling laws to the execution of them. This change of relation is not a matter of mere fpeculation, unexemplified in practice : it takes pldce very frequently in the parliament of England, where among the commons, the whole houfe is formed on certain occafions, into a committee, for the better enquiry into, and difcuffion of the matter in hand ; the members become mere commiffioners of the fovereign court they conftituted but a moment before. Agreeable to which, the enquiry being ended, they make a report to themfdves, as the houfe of Commons, of their proceedings as a grand com- SOCIAL COMPACT. 173 committee, and deliberate anew under the former title on what they had already determined under the latter. Such, indeed, is the peculiar advantage of a democratical government, that it is eftablifhed in fact by the fimple act of the general will. After which, this provifional government con- tinues, if fuch be the intended form ; or efta- bliflies, in the name of the fovereign, the form of, government adopted by law ; and thus every thing proceeds according to order. It is im- poffible to'inftitute a government in any other legal manner, without renouncing the principles before eftablifhed. CHAP. xvm. Of the means of preventing the ufurpations of government* FROM the foregoing illuftrations refults the confirmation of what is aflerted in the XVIth chapter, viz. that the aft which infli- tutes government is not a contract: but a law ; that the depofitories of the executive power are 13 not 174 A TREATISE ON THE not the matters, but the fervants of the people ; that the people may appoint or remove them at pleafure ; that they have no pretence to a con- tract with the people, but are bound to obey them ; and that in accepting the offices the ftate impofes on them, they only difcharge their duty as citizens, without having any fort of light to difpute the conditions. When it fo happens, therefore, that the people eftablifh an hereditary government, whether monarchical, and confined to one particular family, or ariftocratical, and divided among a certain order of citizens, they do not enter thereby into any formal engagement ; they only give the adminiftration a provifional form, which remains legal till they think proper to change it. It is certain that fuch changes are always dangerous, and that a government once efta- blifaed {hould not be meddled with, unkfs it be found incompatible with the public good ; but this circumfpecYion is a maxim of policy, and not a matter of right. The ftate, how- ever, is no more bound to refign the civil au- thority SOCIAL COMPACT. 175 thority into the hands of its magiftrates or chiefs, than the military authority into thofs of its generals. It is certain, alfo, that great care ihould b e taken to obferve all thofe formalities, which, in fiich a cafe, are requifite to diftinguifh a regular and legal act from a feditious commotion ; to diftinguifli between the general will of a whole people and the clamours of a-faclion.. In which latter cafe, a people are particularly obliged to give the beft founded remonftrlmces no farther countenance, than in the utmoft ftriclnefs of juftice they may deferve. Of this obligation, however, the prince may take great advantages, in order to preferve his power in fpite of the people, without running the riik of being chajged with ufurping it. For in appearing only to make ufe of his prerogatives, he may extend them, and under the pretence of main- taining the public peace, may prevent thofe aflemblies which might otherwife be calculated to re-eftablidi the good order of government : fo that he might profit by that filence which he keeps from being broken, and by thofe ir- I 4 regu- 176 A TREATISE ON THE regulaiities which he himfelf might caufe to be committed ; pleading in his favour the ta- cit approbation of thofe \vhofe fears keep them Ulent ; and puniftiing thofe who are bold enough to fpeak. It was thus the decemviri^ at firft elected for one year only, and after- wards continued for another, attempted to per- petuate the duration of their power, by pre- venting the Ccmilia from aflembling as ufual ; and it is by fach eafy means that all the go- vernments in the .world, when once invefted with power, ufurp fooner or later the fovereign authority. Thofe periodical aflembl'ies, of which I have Ipokea above, are very proper to prevent, or protract, this misfortune, particularly when they require no formal convocation ; for then the prince cannot prevent them without de- claring himfelf openly a violator of the laws, and an enemy to the ftate. The opening of thefe afiemblies, which have no other object than the preservation of the focial contract, ought always to be made, by two SOCIAL COMPACT. 177 two proportions, which can never be fup- prefTed, and fhould pafs feparately by vote. FIRST; Whether it be the determination of the fovereign to preferve the prefent form of government. SECOND ; Whether it be the determination of the people to continue the adminiftra- tion in the hands of thofe, who are at prefent charged with it, It is to" be obferved, that I here take for granted, what I conceive has already been demonflrated, viz. that there is no fundamen- tal law in any flate, which fuch ftate cannot repeal, not excepting even the focial compact : for, fhould all the citizens aflemble with one accord to break this compact, it would un- doubtedly be very legally diflblved. Grotius even thinks that an individual may renounce the ftate of wjiich he is a member, and re- fume his natural independence and property by leaving the country *. Now it would be very * With this exception, however, that he does mt fly, to elude his duty, and avoid fervirg his coim- I S try 1 78 A TREATISE ON THE very abfurd to fuppofe that the whole body of citizens united, could not do that in con- cert, which any one of them might do fepa- rately. try on any emergency, when his fervice is required. In this cafe his flight would be criminal and highly deferving of punifhment. It would not be a retreat but defertion. The END of the THIRD BOOK. BOOK SOCIAL COMPACT. 179 BOOK IV. CHAP. I. Tkat tie general will cannot be annihilated^ Q O long as a number of individuals remain *? perfectly united and confider themfelves as one body, they can have but one will; which, relates to their common prefervation and wel- fare. All the refources of the ftate, are then fimple and vigorous, its political maxims clear and obvious ; it comprehends no intricate and oppofite interefts; but that of the public is demonltrably evident to all, and requires only the gift of common fenfe to underftand it. Peace, concord, and equality are enemies to po- litical refinements. When men are honeft, and fimple, their very fimplicity prevents their de- ception ; they are not to be impofed on by fophiftry, but are too artlefs even to be duped. When it is .known, that, among the happieft people in the world, a number of peafants meet together under the (hade of an oak, and re- gulate the affairs of ftate, with the mo:i pru- dential ceconomy, is it poffible to forbear de- I 6 fpiilng iSo A TREATISE ON THE fpifing the refinements of other nations, who employ fo much artifice and myitery to render themfelves fplendidly miferable ? A ftate thus fimply governed hath need of but few laws, while in proportion as it becomes neceflary to promulgate new ones, that neceffity is univerfally apparent. The firfr, perfon who propofes them, takes on himfelf to fpeak only what every one hath already thought ; and nei- ther eloquence nor intrigue is requifite to make that pafs into a law, which every one had al- ready refolved to do, as foon as he fhould be allured others would do the fame. That which deceives our reafoners on this {abject, is, that, feeing none but fuch flates as were badly conftituted at their beginning, they are ftruck with the impoffibility of maintaining fuch a police in them. They fmile to think of the abfardities, into which a designing knave -or insinuating orator might lead the people of Paris and London. They are not apprized that a Cromwell, and a Beaufort, would have been treated as incendiaries at Berne and Geneva, and have underwent the difcipline due to their demerit. But SOCIAL COMPACT. 181 But when the bonds of fociety begin to relax, and the ftate to grow weak ; when the private interefts of individuals begin to appear, and that of parties to influence the irate, the ob- jects of public good meet with oppofition ; un- animity no longer prefides in the aflemblies of the people ; the general will is no longer the will of all; contradictions and debates arife, and the moft falutary counfel is not adopted xvithout difpute. Again, when the ftate is bordering on ruin, and exifts only in empty form, when the focial tie no longer connects the hearts of the people, when the bafeft motives of intereft impudently aflume the facred name of the public good ; then is the general will altogether filent j indi- viduals, actuated by private motives, cherifh no more the fentiments of citizens, than if the ftate had never exifted, while the mock legif- lature pafs, under the name of laws, thofe ini- quitous decrees which have no other end than private intereft. Doth it follow from hence, however, that the general will is annihilated or corrupted ? No. This remains 'ever conftant, invariable, and 182 A TREATISE ON THE and pure ; though it is fubjecled to that of party. There is not an individual who doth not fee, while he detaches his own intefelt from that of the public, that he cannot feparate himfelf from it entirely : but his mare in the common evil fcems nothing in comparifon to the good which he propofes to fecnre exclufively to him- felf. Setting this motive afide, he is as r.ady to concur in,meafures for the good of the pub- lic, and that even for his own fake as any one. Nay, even in felling his vote, he doth-noc lofe all fenfe of the genet al will ; he only dudes it. The fault he is guilty of, lies in changing the (late of the queftion, and making an anfwer to what is not afked Mm; fo that, inftead of ad- mitting by his vote, that it is to the >n erejt cf tbeftate^ he fays, it is to the infereft of fit h an individual or fuch a party, that this or th t law Jhould pafe. Thus the o. der which fhould pre- vail in the public aflembiies oi the -.ate. mould not be calculated fo much to prtferve the ge- neral will inviolate, as to -caufe it to be always interrogated, and to make it anfwer. j I might here make a variety of reflections on the fimple right of voting in every act of the fovertignty ; a right which the -citizens cannot be deprived of : as alfo on the rights of think- SOCIAL COMPACT. 183 thinking, propofing and debating on public matters j privileges which government is ever felicitous enough to confine to its own mem- bers. This fubject, however, is of importance enough to deferve a whole treatife of itfelf ; and it is impoffible for me to fay every thing in the prefent. CHAP. II. On Votes. IT is evident, from what hath been faid in tjie preceding chapter, that the manner in which public affairs are carried on, may afford a fure indication of the actual ftate of manners, and the health of the body politic. The more concord there is in public aflemblies, that is to fay, the nearer the members approach to un- animity in giving their votes, the more preva- lent is the general will among them: but long debates, diflentions and commotions, evince the afcendency of particular interelts and the de- cline of the flate. This appears lefs evident, indeed, when two or more orders of men, enter into the confti- tution ; as at Rome, where the quarrels of the Pa- i8 4 A TREATISE ON THE Patricians and Plebeians occafioned frequent di- fturbances in the Comitia^ even in the moft flou- riming times of the republic. This exception however, is more apparent than real : as in that cafe there exifts, by a defeft inherent in the body politic, two ftates in one ; and that which is not trne of both together, may neverthelefs be true of each apart. It is alfo true in faft that, even during the moft turbulent times of the republic, the decrees of the Plebeians, when he Senate did not intermeddle, were patted with great tranquillity agreeable to the plura- lity of voices. The citizens having but one common intereft, the people could have but one will. Unanimity returns again at the oppofite ex- tremity of the circle ; and this is where the ci- tizens, reduced to flavery, have neither liberty nor will. In fuch a fituatlon, fear and flattery pervert their votes into acclamations ; they no longer deliberate among themfelves ; but either adore or curfe their tyrants. Such were the debafed principles of the Senate under the Ro- man emperors. Under thefe circumflances alfo, the fentiments of the public were frequently exprefled, with the moft ridiculous precau- tion ; Tacitus obferving that, under Otho, the Se- SOCIAL COMPACT. 185 Senators, while they loaded Vitellius with exe- crations, they affected at the fame time to make a confufed and clamorous noife, in order to prevent his knowing, fhould he become their nwfter, what any individual had faid. From thefe confiderations may be deduced the maxims, on which the manner of counting votes, and comparing different fufFrages, (hould be regulated, according as the general will is more or lefs eafy to be difcovered, and the flate more or lefs advanced towards its decline. There is bat one law, which in its own' nature, requires unanimous confent : and this i,s the focial com- pact. For civil aflbciation is the moft volun- tary aft in the world : every man being born free, and mailer of himfelf, no one can lay him under reftraint, on any pretence whatever, without his own confent. To affirm that the fon of a flave is born a flave, is to affirm he is not born a man. If there be any perfons, however, who op- pofe this contract itfelf, their oppofition. does not invalidate that contract ; , it only hinders their being comprehended therein ; and they re- main aliens in the midfl: of citizens. When a flate i 6 A TREATISE ON THE a ftate is formed, a confent to its inftitution is inferred by the refidence of the party : to fub- mit to refidence iu any coantry is to fubmit to its fovereignty *. If we except this primitive contract, the de- termination of the majority is always obliga- tory on the reft : this is a neceiTary confequence of the contract itfelf. But it may be afked, how can a man be free, and yet be obliged to conform to the will of others. How can the members of an oppofition be called free-men, who are compelled to fubmit to laws which they have not confented to ? I anfwer that this queftion is not properly ftated. The citizen. confents to all laws pafled by a majority, though fome of them in particular may have pafled con- trary to his inclination ; nay he confents to thofc by which he is puuifliable for the breach of * This muft always be underftood, however, of a free ftate, from which people have the liberty to de- part with their effefts at pleafure. For in others the confideration of their family, their property, the want of au afylum, neceffity or violence, may de- tain an inhabitant in a country contrary to his will; J n which cafe, his fimple refidence neither implies his confent to the>contracl, nor his violation of it. any SOCIAL COMPACT. iffy any one. The conftant will of all the mem- bers of a flate, is the general will ; and it is this .alone that makes them either citizens or freemen*. When a law is propofed in the aflTembly of the people, they are not precifely demanded, whether they feverally approve or reject the propofition ; but whether it be con- formable or not to the general will, which is theirs as a colleclive body ; each perfon, 'there- fore, in giving his vote declares his opinion on this head, and,on counting the votes, the de- claration of the general will, is inferred from, the majority. When a law thus pafles contrary to my opinion, it proves nothing more than that I was miflaken, and that I concluded the general will to be what it really was not. So that, if my particular advice had been follow- ed, it would have been^ contrary to my will, * At Genoa we fee the word Lilertas infcribed on the chains of the galley flaves, and on the doors of the prifoners : the application of which device is beautiful and juft; as it is in fact only the criminals of all ftates that infringe the liberty of the citizen. A country, whofe malefactors (hould be all actually chained to the oar, would be a country of the molt perfect liberty. which i88 A TREATISE ON THE which as a citizen is the fame as the general, and in that cafe I fliould not have been" free. This argument fuppofes, indeed, that all the characteriftics of the general will, are contain- ed in the plurality of votes: and when this ceafes to be the cafe, take what courfe you will, there is an end of liberty. In having fliewn how the will of particulars and parties is fubftituted for the general, in public deliberations, I have already fufficiently pointed out the practicable means of preventing fuch abufes ; of this, however, I fhall fpeak fur- ther hereafter. With regard to the proportional number of votes that indicate this general will, I have alfo laid down the principles on which it may be determined. The difference of a fingle voice is enough to break the unanimity ; l)ut between unanimity and an equality there is a variety of proportions ; to each of which the number in quefKon may be applied, according to the circumftances of the body politic. There are two general maxims, which may ferve to regulate thefe proportions: the one is, that the more grave and important the deliberations, the SOCIAL COMPACT. 189 the nearer ought the determination to approach to unanimity : the other is, that the more ex- pedition the affair requires, the lefs fliould un- animity be infifted on. In deliberations where the matter fhould be immediately determined, the majority of a fingle vote fhould be fufficient. The firft of thefe maxims feems mofl applicable to permanent laws, and the fecond to matters of bufinefs. But be this as it may, it is from their judicious combination, that the beft propor- tions muft be deduced, concerning that plura- lity in .whofe votes fhould be fuppofed to con- fifl the general will. CHAP. III. Of Eletliom. WITH regard to the election of a prince or of magiftratesi which, as I before obferved is a complicated aft ; there are two methods of proceeding ; viz. by choice and by lot. They have each been made ufe of in dif- ferent republics ; and we fee in our own times, a very intricate mixture of both in the election of the doge of Venice. 8 The 190 A TREATISE ON THE "The preference by lot, fays Montefquieu, is of the nature of a democracy. This I admit, but not for the reafons given. The choice by /TpH AT inflexibility of the. laws, \vhich pre- vents their yielding to circumftances, may in fome cafes render them hurtful, and in fome critical juncture bring on the ruin of the ftate. The order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occafion will not al- ways admit. A thoufand accidents may hap- pen for which the legislature hath not provid- ed ; and it is a very necefTary foreflght to fee that it is impoffible to provide for every thing. We fliould not be defirous, therefore, of eftablifhing the laws fo firmly as to fufpend their effects. Even Sparta itfelf fometimes permitted the laws to lie dormant. Nothing, however, but the certainty of greater danger fhould induce a people to make any al- teration in government j nor fhould the facred power of the laws be ever reftrained unlefs the public fafety is concerned. In fuch uncommon cafes, when the danger is manifeft, the pub- lic fafety may be provided for by a particular act, which commits the charge of it to thofe who SOCIAL COMPACT. 219 are moft worthy. Such a commiffion may pafs, in two different ways, according to the nature of the danger. If the cafe require only a greater activity in the government, it fhould be confined to one or two members j in which cafe it would not be the authority of the laws, but the form of the adminiftration only that would be changed > But if the danger be of fuch a nature, that the formality of the laws would prevent a re- medy, then a fupreme chief might be nominated who fliould filence the laws, and fufpend for a moment the fovereign authority. In fuch a cafe,- the general Will cannot be doubted, it being evident that the principal intention of the people mufl be to fave the flate from perdition, By this mode of temporary fufpenfion the le- giflative authority is not abolimed ; the ma- giftrate who filences it, cannot make it fpeak, and though he over-rules cannot reprefent it j he may do every thing indeed but make laws. The firft method was taken by the Roman Senate, when it charged the confuls, in a fa- cred manner, to provide for the fafety of the L 2 com- 220 A TREATISE ON THE common- wealth. The fecond took place when one of the confuls nominated a dictator * ; a cuftom which Rome adopted from the example of Alba. In the early times of the republic, the Ro- mans had frequent recourfe to the diclatorfhip, becaufe the flate had not then fufficient (lability to fupport itfelf by the force of its constitution. The manners of the people, alfo, rendering thofe precautions unneceflary, which were taken in after- times, there was no fear that a dictator would abufe his authority, or that he would be tempted to keep it in his hands, beyond the term. On the contrary, it appeared that fo great a power was burthenfome to the per- fon inverted with it, fo eager were they to re- fign it ; as if it were a difficult and dangerous port, to be fupedor to the laws. Thus it was not the danger of the abufe, but of the debafement of this fupreme magiftracy, * This nomination was fecretly made in the night, 2s if they were afhamed of the aftion of placing any c;an fo much above the laws. that SOCIAL COMPACT. 221 that gave occaflon to cenfure the indifcreet ufe of it, in ancient times. For when they came to proftitute it in the affair of elections and o- ther matters of mere formality, it was very juflly to be apprehended that it would become lefs refpeclable on prefiing occafions ; and that the people would be apt to look upon an office as merely titular, which was inAituted to aflift at empty ceremonies. Toward the end of the republic, the Ro- mans, becoming more circumfpect, were as fparing of the dictature, as they had before been prodigal of it. It was eafy to fee, how- ever, that their fears were groundlefs, that the weaknefs of the capital was their fecurity again ft the internal magifl rates ; that a dictator might in fome cafes have acted in defence of public li- berty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged in Rome itfelf, but in its armies abroad. The weak refinance which Nkrhs made to Sy!!aa-nd Pompey to Cacfar, (hewed plainly how litile the authority from within the city could do againlt the powei from without. L 3 T< ' 222 A TREATISE ON THE This error led them to commit great blun- ders. Such for inftance, was their neglecting to appoint a dictator in the affair of Cataline. For, as it engaged only the city, or atrmoft a province in Italy, a dictator inverted with that unlimited authority which the laws conferred en him, might eafily have diffipated that con- fpiracy, which was with -difficulty fupprefled by a numerous concurrence of fortunate circum- ftances ; which human prudence had no reafon to expect. Inftead of that, the Senate con- tented itfelf with committing all its power into. the hands of confuls ; whence it happened that Cicero, in order to act effectually, was obliged to exceed that power in a capital circumftance ; and though the public, in their firft tranfports, approved of his cpnduct, he was very juftly called to an account afterwards for the blood he had fpilt contrary to the laws ; a reproach they could not not have made to a dictator. But the eloquence of the conful carried all before it j and preferring, though a Roman, his ow-n glory to his country, he thought lefs of the moft legal, and certain method of faving the ftate, than the means of fecuring all the honour of SOCIAL COMPACT. 223 of fuch a tranfadYion to himfelf *. Thus was he very juftly honoured as the deliverer of Rome, and as juftly punifhed as the violator of its laws. For, however honourable was his repeal, if was certainly a matter of favour. After all, in whatever manner this important commiflion may be conferred, it is of confe- quence to limit its duration to a fhort term ; which fhould on no occafion be prolonged. In thofe conjunctures, when it is neceflary to ap- point a dictator, the ftate is prefently faved or deftroyed, which caufes being over, the dicla- ture becomes ufelefs and tyrannical. At Rorrie, the dictators held their office only for fix months ; and the greater part refigned before that term expired. Had the time appointed been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer flill ; as did the decemvir whofe office lafted a whole year. The dictator had no more time allotted him than was neceflary to difpatch the bufmefs for which he was appointed ; fo that he had not leifure to think of other projects. * This is what he could not be certain of, in pro- pofing a dictator; not daring to nominate himfelf, and not being allured his colleague would do it. L 4 CHAP. 224 A T R E A T I S E ON CHAP. VII. Of the Cenforjkip. AS the declaration of the general will is made by the laws, fo the declaration of the public judgment is made by their cenfure. The public opinion is a kind of law, which the Cenfor puts in execution, in particular cafe*, after the example of the prince. So far, therefore, is the cenforial tribunal from being the arbiter of popular opinions, it only declares them ; and, whenever it departs from them, its decifions are vain and inef- fectual. It is ufelefs to difUoguifh the manners of a nation by the objects of its efteem ; for thefe depend en the fame principle, and are necefTa- rily confounded together. Among all people in the world, it is not nature, but opinion, which determines the choice of their pleafures. Correct the prejudices and opinions of men, and their manners will correct themfelves. We al- ways admire what is beautiful, or what appears foj SOCIAL COMPACT. 225^ fb ; but it is in our judgment we are miftaken-;. it is this judgment then we are to regulate. Whoever judges of manners, takes upon him to judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion; The opinions of a people depend on the con- ftitution ; though the laws do not govern manners, it is the legiflature that gives rife to them. As the legiflature grows feeble, manners degenerate, but the judgment of the cenfors will not then effeft what the ppwer.of the laws- have not before effected* It follows, hence, that the office of a -cenfor may be ufeful to the prefervation of manners, but never to their re ; eftablifliment. Eftablifh, cenfors during the- vigour of the laws ; when this is part, all is over ; no legal means can be effectual whea-the laws have, loft their force. The cenfor is prefervative of manners, by preventing the corruption of opinions, by main- taining their morality and propriety by judici- ous applications, and even fometimes by fettling thfiin when in a fluctuating fituation, The ufe. L-, ofc 226 A TREATISE ON THE of feconds in duels, though carried to the great- eft excefs in France, was abolished by the fol- lowing words inferted in one of the kings edicts ; As to thofe who have the cowardice to call themfelves fecor.ds. This judgment, anticipating that of the public, was effectual and put an end to that cuftom at once. But when the fame edicts pronounced it cowardice to fight a duel ; though it is certainly true, yet as it was con- trary to the popular opinion, the public laugh- ed at a determination fo contrary to their own. I have obferved elfewhere * that the public opinion, being fubjected to no conftraint, there fliould be no appearance of it in the tribunal eftablifted to reprefent it. One cannot too much admire with what art this fpring of action, entirely neglected among the moderns, was em- ployed by the Romans, and fttll more effectually by the Lacedemonians. A man of bad morals, having made an ex- cellent propofal in the council at Sparta, the * I do but flightly mention here, what I have treated more at large in my tetter to M. d'Alem- berf. Ephori, SOCIAL COMPACT. 227 Ephori, without taking any notice of it, caufed the fame propofal to be made by a citizen of character and virtue. How honourable was this proceeding to the one, and how difgraceful to the other j and that without directly praifing or blaming either ! Some drunkards of Samos, having behaved indecently in the tribunal of the Ephori, it was the next day permitted, by a public edict, that the Samians might become flaves. Would an aclual puniihment have been fo fevere as fuch impunity ? When the Spar- tans had once pafTed their judgment on the de- cency or propriety of any behaviour, all Greece fubmitted to their opinion. CHAP. VIII. Of political Religion. IN the firft ages of the world, men had no other kings than gods, nor any other go- vernment than what was purely theocratical. It required a great alteration in their fentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on them- felves, to look upon a fellow creature as a ma- tter, and think it went well with them. L 6 Hence, 22S A TREATISE ON THE Hence, a deity being conftantly placed at th head of every; political fociety, it followed that there was as many different gods as peopla. Two communities, perfonally ftrangers to each other, and almoft always at variance > could not long acknowlege the fame mafter j nor could two armies, drawn up againft each other in battle, obey the fame chief. Thus Polytheifm became a natural confequence of the divifion of nations, and thence the want of civil and theo- logical toleration, which are perfectly the fame> as will be itiewn hereafter. The notion of the Greeks, in pretending to trace their own gods among thofe of the Bar- barian nations, took its rife evidently from the ambition of being thought the natural fove- reigns of thofe people. In this age, however* we think that a moft abfurd part of erudition, which relates to the identity of the deities of different nations, and according to which it is fuppofed that Moloch, Saturn and Chronos were one and the fame god ; and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and the Jupiter of the Latins were the fame deity j as if any thing could be found in common be- SOCIAL COMPACT. 229 between chimerical beings bearing different names ! If it be afked v/hy there were no religious wars among the Pagans, when every ftate had thus its peculiar deity and worfhip ? I anfwery it was plainly for this very rcafon, that each- flate having its own peculiar religion as well as government, no diflinclkm was made between the obedience paid to their gods and that due to their laws. Thus their political were at trte fame time theological wars ; and the departments of their deities were prefcribed by the limits of their refpeclive nations. The god of one peo- ple had no authority over another people j nor were thefe Pagan deities jealous of their pre- rogatives ; but divided the adoration of man- kind" amicably between them. Even Mofes himfelf fometimes fpcaks in the fame manner of the god of Ifrael. It Is true the Hebrews de- fpifed the gods of the Canaanites, a people pro- fcribed and devoted to deftruftion, whofe pof- feflions were given them for an inheritance : but they fpeak with more reverence of the dei- ties of the neighbouring nations whom they were forbidden to attack. Witt tbou net- poj/efs that, fays Jeptha to Sihon, king of the Ammo- nites, 230 A T R E A T I S E ON THE nites, wbi b Chetnoth thy God givetb thee to pof- fefi ? So wbomfoever the Lord our God Jh&ll drive out from before us, them will we pojfefi. There is in this pafTage, I think, an acknowleged fimili- tude between the rights of Chemofh, and thofe of the God of Ifrael. But when the Jews, being fubjefted to the kings of Babylon, and afterwards to ihofe of Syria, perfifted in refufing to acknowlege any god but their own, this refufal was efteemed an aft of rebellion againft their conquerer, and drew upon them thofe perfecutions we read of in their hiftory, and of which no other example is extant previous to the eftablifhment of chri- ftianity *. The religion of every people being thus ex- clufively annexed to the laws of the ftate, the only method of converting nations was to fub- due them ; warriors were the only miflionaries ; and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquifhed, they were firft to be conquered before they were folicited on * It is evident that the war of the Phocians, called an holy war was not a religious war. Its objeft was to punifh facrilege, and not to fubdue infidels. this SOCIAL COMPACT. 231 this head. So far were men from fighting for the gods, that their gods, like thofe of Ho- mer, fought in behalf of mankind. Each people demanded the victory from its refpe&ive deity, and exprefled their gratitude for it by the erection of new altars. The Romans be- fore they befieged any fortrefs fummoned its gods to abandon it ; and though it be true they left the people of Tarentum in pofleflion of their angry deities, it is plain they looked upon thofe gods as fubjecled and obliged to do ho- mage to their own : They left the vanqui/hed in pofTeffion of their religion as they fometimes did in that of their laws ; a wreathe for Jupiter of the Capitol, being often the only tribute they exacted. At length, the Romans having extended their religion with their empire, and fometimes even adopted the deities of the vanquished, the peo- ple of this vaft empire found themfelves in pofleflion of a multiplicity of gods and reli- gions j which not differing eflentially from each other, Paganifm became infenfibly one and the fame religion throughout the world. Things were in this ftate, when Jefus came to tftablifh his fpiritual kingdom on earth } a de- fign 2J2 A TREATISE ON THE fign which, neceflarily dividing the theological from the political fyftem, gave rife to thofe in- teftine divifions which have ever fmce continued to embroil the profeflion of Chriftianity. Now this new idea ef a kingdom in the other world, having never entered into the head of the Pa- gans, they regarded the Chriflians as aflual rebels, who, under an hypocritical {hew of humility, waited' only a proper opportunity to render themfelves independent, and artfully to. ufurp that authority, which in their weak and infant ftate they pretended to refpedt : and this was undoubtedly the caufe of their being per r fecuted. What the Pagans were apprehenfive of, alfo, did, in procefs of time, actually come to pafs. . Things put on a new face, and the meek Chri- flians, as their number increafed, changed their tone,, while their invifible kingdom of the other world, became, under a vifible head, the moft .- defpotic and tyrannical in. this. As in all countries, however, there were ci- vil governors, and laws, there refulted from this two-fold power a perpetual ftruggle for jurifdicYion, which renders a perfect fyftem of do SOCIAL COMPACT. 233 dcmeftic policy almoft impoffible in Chriftian* ftates ; and prevents us from ever coming to a determination, whether it be the prince or the prieffc we are bound to obey. Some nations indeed, even m. Europe or its neighbourhood, have endeavoured to preferve or re-eHabliih the ancient fyftem, but without fticcefs ; the fpirit of Chriilianity hath univer- fally prevailed. Religious worfhip hath always remained, or again become independent of the fo.vereign, and without any neceflary connection with the body of the ftate. Mahomet had very falutary and well-connected views in his political fyftem, and fo long as his modes of government fubiifted under the caliphs and their fucceflbrs, that government remained perfectly uniform, and fo far good. But the Arabians becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent and cowardly, were fubdued by the Barbarians : then the divifton between the two powers re- commenced ; and though it be lefs apparent among the Mahometans than among ChrLftians, it is neverthelefs to be diftinguifhed, particu- larly in the fe& of Ali : there are fome ftates, alfo, as in Perfla, where this divifion is con- rceptible. Among 234 A TREATISE ON THE Among us, the kings of England are placed at the head of the church, as are alfo the Czars inRuflia : but by this title they are not fo pro- perly matters as minifters of the religion of thofe countries : they are not poflTefTed of the power to change it, but only to maintain its prefcnt form. Wherever the Clergy conftitute a col- lective body*, they will be both matters and legiflators in their own caufe. There are there- fore two fovereigns in England and Ruffia, as well as elfewhere. Of all ChriiHan authors, Mr. Hobbes was the only one who faw the evil and the remedy, and that hath ventured to propofe the re-union. * It muft be obfcrved, that it is not fo much the ' formal afTemblies of the clergy, fuch as are held ia France, which unite them together in a body, as the communion of their churches. Communion and excommunication form the focial compact of the clergy ; a compact by means of which they will al- ways maintain their afcendency over both kings and people. All the priefts that communicate together are fellow-citizens, though they mould be perfonally as diftant, as the extremities of the world. This in- vention is a mafter-piece in policy. The Pagan priefts had nothing like it; and therefore never had any clerical body. of SOCIAL COMPACT. 235 of the two heads of this eagle, and to reftore that political union, without which no ftate or government can be well conftituted. But he ought to have feen that the prevailing fpirit of Chriftianity was incompatible with his fyftem, and that the intereft of the Church would be always too powerful for the frate. It was not fo much that which was really falfe and fhock- ing in the writings of this philofopher, as what was really juft and true, that rendered him odious *. I conceive that, by a proper difplay of hi- ftorical facls, in this point of view, it would be eafy to refute the oppofire fentiments both of Bayle and Warburton j the -former of which pretends that no religion whatever can be of fervice to the body politic, and the latter that Chriflianlty is its bell: and firmed fupport. It might be proved againir. the firft, that every * In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the nth of April, 1643, may be feen what that great Civilian approved and blamed in his book de cive- it is true^that Grotius, being indulgent, feems inclined to forgive the author, the faults of his book, for the fake of its merits, the reft of the world, however, were not fo candid. fUte 236 A TREATISE ON THE ftate in the world hath been founded on the bafis of religion ; and againft the fecond, that the precepts of Chriftianity are at the bottom more prejudicial than conducive to the ftrength of the Hate. In order to make myfelf fully underftood, I need only give a little more precifion to the vague ideas, generally entertained of political religion. Religion, confidered as it relates to fockty, which is either general or particular, may be diftinguifhed into two kinds, viz. the religion of the man and that of the citizen. The firfr, deftitute of temples, altars, or rites, confined purely to the internal worfhip of the fnpreme Being, and to the performance of the eternal duties of morality, is the pure and fimple re- ligion of the gofpel ; this is genuine theifm, and may be called the law of natural divinity. The other, adopted only in one country, whole gods and tutelary faints are hence peculiar to it- felf, is compofed of certain dogmas, i!:es, and external modes of worfhip prefcrib ' by the laws of fuch country ; all foreigners being ac- counted Infidels, Aliens and Barbarians ; this kind SOCIAL COMPACT. 237 kind of religion extends the duties and privi- leges of men no farther than to its own altars. Such were all the religions of primitive ages, to which may be given the name .of the law of civil or pofitive divinity. There is a third kind of religion (Hll more extraordinary, which dividing foctety into two legiflatures, two chiefs, and two parties, fub- jects mankind to contradictory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas, of the Japanefe, and of the Roman Catholics ; which may be denominated the religion of the priefts, and is productive of a fort of mixed and unfociable obligation, for which we have no name. If we examine thefe three kinds of religion in a political light, they have all their faults. The third is fo palpably defective that it would be mere lofs of time, to point them out. What- ever contributes to diflblve the focial union is good for nothing : all inftitutions which fet man in contradiction with himfelf are of no ufe. The 238 A TREATISE ON THE The fecond is fo far commendable as it unites divine wormip with a refpecl for the laws, and that, making the country the object of the peo- ple's adoration, the citizen is taught that to ferve the ftate is to ferve its tutelary divinity. This is a fpecies of theocracy, in which there (hould be no other pontiff than the prince, no other priefls than the magiflrates. To die, in fuch a ftate, for their country, is to fuffer martyrdom ; to violate the laws is impiety ; and to doom a criminal to public execration is to devote him to the anger of the gods. It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falfehood and deceit, it leads man- kind into error ; rendering them credulous and fuperftitious, it fubftitutes vain ceremonies in- flead of the true worfliip of the deity. It is further blameable, in that, becoming exclufive and tyrannical, it makes people fanguinary and perfecuting ; fo that a nation (hall fometimes breathe nothing but murder and maflacre, and think, at the fame time, they are doing an holy aftion in cutting the throats of thofe who wor- fliip the gods in a different manner from them- ferves. This circumflance places fuch a people in SOCIAL COMPACT. 239 in a natural flate of war with all others, which is very unfavourable to their own fafety. There remains then only the rational and manly religion of Chriflianity ; not however, as it is profefled in modern times, but as it is difplayed in the gofpel, which is quite another thing. According to this holy, fublime, and true religion, mankind, being all the children of the fame God, acknowlege themfelves to be brothers, and the fociety which unites them dif - folves only in death. But this religion, having no particular rela- tion to the body politic, leaves the laws in pof- feflion only of their own force, without adding any thing to it ; by which means the firmeft bonds of fuch particular fociety are of no ef- fect. Add to this, that Chriftianity is fo far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the flate, that it detaches them from it, as well as from all worldly objects in general : than which nothing can be more contrary to the fpirit of fociety. It is faid that a nation of true Chriflians would form the moll perfect fociety imaginable. To t>40 A TREATISE ON THE To this aflertion, however, there is one great objection ; and this is, that a fociety of true Chriftians would not be a fociety of men. Nay, I will go fo far as to affirm, that this fuppofed fociety, with all its perfection, would neither be of the greatefl ftrength nor duration. In confequence of its being perfect, it would want the flrongeft ties of connexion ; and thus this very circumflance would deflroy it. Individuals might do their duty, the people might be obedient to the laws, the chiefs might be juft, the magiftrate incorrupt, the foldiery mi;ht look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in fuch a ftate. So far all would go well ; but let us look farther. Chriftianity is a Spiritual religion, relative only to celeftial objects : the Chriftian's inhe- ritance, is not of this world. He performs his duty, it is true, but this he does with a profound indifference for the good or ill fuccefs of his en- deavours. Provided he hath nothing to re- proach himfelf with, it is of little importance to him whether matters go well or ill here be- low SOCIAL COMPACT. 241 low. If the ftate be in a flourishing fituation, he can hardly venture to rejoice in the public felicity, left he fhould be puffed up with the in- ordinate pride of his country's glory ; if the ftate decline, he blefles the hand of God that humbles his people to the duft. It is farther neceflary to the peace and har- mony of fociety, that all the citizens fliould be without exception equally good Chriftians ; for, if unhappily there fhould be one of them ambitious or hypocritical, if there ihould be found among them a Cataline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an eafy prey of his pious countrymen. Chriftian charity doth not eafily permit the thinking evil of one's neigh* bour. No fooner fhould an individual difcover the art of impofing on the majority, and be inverted with fome portion of public authority, than he would become a dignitary. Chriftians jnuft not fpeak evil of dignities ; thus refpeed, he would thence affume power ; Chriftians mufl obey the fuperior powers. Does the depofitary of power abufe it ? he becomes the rod by which k pleafes God to chaftife his children. M And 242 A TREATISE ON THE And, would their conferences permit them to drive out the ufurper, the public tranquillity muft be broken, and violence and blood-fhed fuc- ceed ; all this agrees but ill with the meeknefs of true Chriftians ; and, after all, what is it to them, whether they are freemen or flaves in this vale of mifery ? Their efTential concern is to work out their falvation, and obtain happi- cefs in another world ; to effect which, their resignation in this, is held to be their duty. Should fuch a ftatebe forced into a war with any neighbouring power? The citizens might march readily to the combat, without thinking of flight ; they might do their duty in the field, but they would have no ardour for victory ; being better inflructed to die than to conquer. Of what confequence is it to them, whether they are victors or vanquifhed ? Think what ad- vantages an impetuous and fanguine enemy might take of their ftoicifm ! draw them out againft a brave and generous .people, ar- dently infpired with the love of glory and their country; fuppofe, for inftance, your truly Chriftian republic againft that of Sparta or of Rome j what would be the confequence ? Your de- I SOCIAL COMPACT. 243 devout Chriflians would be beaten, difcomfited and knocked on the head, before they had time to look about them j their only fecurity depend- ing on the contempt which their enemy might entertain for them. It was,, in my opinion, a fine oath that was taken by the foldiers of Fa- bius. They did not make a vow either to die or conquer ; they fwore they would return con- querors, and punctually performed their oath. Chriftian troops could not have made fuch a vow, they would have been afraid of tempting th& Lord their God. But I am all this while committing a blunder, in fpeaking of a Chriftian republic ; one cf thefe terms necefTarily excluding the other.. Chii- flianity inculcates fervitude and dependence j the fpirit of it is too favourable to tyrants, for them not fometimes to profit by it. True Chri- flians are formed for flaves j they know it, and never trouble themfelves about confpiracies and infurrections ; this tranfitory life is of too little value in their efteem. Will it be faid, the Chriftians are excellent foldiers ? I deny it. Produce me your Chri- M 2 ftiaa 244 A T R E A T I S E ON THE ftian troops For my part, I know of no true Chriftian foldiers. Do you name thofe of the Crufades ? I anfwer, that, not to rail in queftion the valour of the Crufaders, they were very far from being Chri ftian citizens : they were the foldiers of the prieft, the citizens of the church ; they fought for its fpiritual country, which fome how or other, it had converted into a temporal one. To fet this matter in the beft light, it was a kind of return to Paganifm j for as the gofpel did not eftabiifh any national re- ligion, an holy war could notpoffibly be carried cm by true Chriftians, Under the Pagan emperors, the Chriftian fol- diers were brave } of this all the Chriftian wri- ters ailure us, and I believe them ; the mo- tive of their bravery was a fpirit of honour or emulation, excited by the Pagan troops. But when the emperors became Chriftians, this mo- tive of emulation no longer fubfifted ; and when the Crofs had put the Eagle to flight, th Roman valour difappeared. But, laying afide political confiderations, let us return to the matter of right, and afcertain SOCIAL COMPACT. 245 its true principles with regard to this important point. The right which the focial compact con- fers on the fovereign, extending no farther than to public utility *, the fubjecl is not account- able to that fovereign, on account of any opi- nions he may entertain, that have nothing to do with the community. Now, it is of great importance to a ftate, that every citizen fliould be of a religion that may infpire him with a re- gard for his duty; but the tenets of that re-- ligion are no farther interefting to the commu- nity than as they relate to morals, and to the- difcharge of thofe obligations, which the pro- fe/Tor lies under to his fellow citizens. If we * In a republic, fays the Marquis d'A. every one *V perfectly at liberty, becavfe no one may injure another. This is the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor is itpoffible to ftate the cafe more precifely. I can- not deny myfelf the pleafure of fometrmes quoting' this manufcript, though unknown to the public, nv order to do honour to the memory of an illuilrious and refpe&able perfonage, who preferved the inte* grity of the citizen even in the miniftry, and adopted^ the mod unpright and falutary views in the govern. ment of his country. M 2 except- i4& A T R E A T I S E ON THE except thefe, the individual may profefs what others he pleafes, without the fovereign's hav- ing any right to interfere ; for, having no ju- rifdiclion in the other world, it is nothing to the fovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future fife, provided they difcharge the du- ties incumbent on them in the prefent. There is a profeffion of Faith, therefore, purely political ; the articles of which it is in the province of the fovereign to afcertain, not precifely as articles of religion, but as the fen- timents due to fociety, without which it is im- poffible to be a good citizen or faithful fubjecT; *. Without compelling any one to adopt thefe fen- timents, the fovereign may alfo equitably baniirr him the fociety ; not indeed as impious, but as wnfociable, as incapable of having a fincere re- * Casfar, in pleading for Cataline, endeavoured to eftablifh the doflrine of the Mortal ty of the Soul : Cato and Cicero, in anfwer to him, did not enter in'o a philofophical difcuffion of the argument, but con- tented themfelves with [hewing that Caefar had fpoken j ike a bad citizen, and advanced a dogma pernicious to the fiate. And this was in faft the point only that come before the Senate of Rome, and not a queftion in theology. gard SOCIAL COMPACT. 447 gard to juftiee, and of facrificing his life, if re- quired, to his duty. Again, fhould any one, after having made a public profeffion of fuch fentiments, betray his difbelief of them by his mifconduct, he may equitably be punifhed with death ; having committed the greateft of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of the laws- The tenets of political religion fhould be few and fimple ; they fhould be laid down alfo wit precifion, and without explication or comment. The exigence of a powerful, intelligent, bene- ficent, prefctent and provident Deity j a future ftate ; the reward of the virtuous and the pu- nifhment of the wicked ; the facred nature of the focial contract, and of the laws ; thefe fhould be its pofitive tenets. As to thofe of a - negative kind I would confine myfelf folely to one, by forbidding perfecution. Thofe who affect to make a diftinction be- tween civil and religious toleration, are, in my opinion miflaken. It is impoffible to live cor- dially in peace with thofe whom we firmly be- lieve devoted to damnation : to love them would be to hate the Deity for punifhing them, it is- therefore abfolutely necefTary for us either to per- 248 A TREATISE ON THE perfecute or to convert them. Wherever the fpirit of religious perfecution fubfifts, it is im- poffible it fhould not have fome elrec! on the civil police, in which cafe, the fovereign is no longer fovereign even in a fecular view; the priefts become the real mailers, and kings only their officers. In modern governments, where it is impof- fible to fupport an excluflve national religion, it Is requifite to tolerate all fuch, as breathe the fpirit of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are not contradictory to the duty of a good citizen. But whofoever fhould prefume to fay, There is no falvation out of the pale of oar church, ought to be banifhed the ftate ; uniefs indeed the ftate be an ecclefiaftical one, and tire prince a pontiff. Such a dogma is of ufe only in a theocratical government; in every other it is de- ftruclive. The reafon which it is faid Henry IV. gave, for embracing the Roman Catholic re- ligion, ought to have made an honeft man reject it, and more particularly a prince capable of leafoaing on the fubjecT:. \ C'H-A F. SOCIAL COMPACT. 2^9 CHAP. IX. The Conclnfion. HAVING thus ftated the true principles of politic law, and endeavoured to fix the ftate on its proper bafis, it remains to (hew in what manner it is fupported by external re- lations. Under this head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of war and conqueft, leagues, negotiations, trea- ties, &c. But thefe prefent a new profpecl, too vafl and extenfive for fo fliort a fight as mine ; which fhould be confined to objects lefs diftaat and more adapted to my limited capacity. FINIS. 'Jn the Prefs, and fpeedily will be pubUjbed, THE MISCELLANEOUS WORKS O F Mr. J. J. R O U S S E A U, Alfa, A NEW-EDITION, Revifed and Corre^e.d from the Author's la*1 ' corre&ed Copy. In 4 Volumes. E L O I S A: O R, A Series of Original Letters between two Lovers. By Mr. J. J. R O U S S E A U. \ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book Is DUE on the last date stamped below. fcc 12 1984 orm L9-Series 444 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LI3R A 000020827 2