Ex Libris 
 C. K. OGDEN

 
 LETTER 
 
 ADDRESSED TO A MEMBER OF 
 
 THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ARTICLES OF CHARGE 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 M4RQUIS WELLESLEY.
 
 J 
 
 
 
 :O 83,, 
 
 . CLisr^ 
 
 
 G. SIDNET, Printer, 
 Northumberland Street, Strand.
 
 LETTER 
 
 ADDRESSED TO A MEMBER 
 
 OF 
 
 THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 articles of Cfwrge" 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 MARQUIS 
 
 WHICH HAVE BEEN LAID BEFORE 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 BY LAWRENCE DUNDAS CAMPBELL, 
 
 PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, STRAND. 
 
 1808.
 
 
 IMAL T 
 
 <:< 
 
 . 
 
 to as 
 
 . 

 
 A LETTER, &c. 
 
 IT affords me very high gratification to find, 
 that my observations on the foreign policy 
 of Lord Wellesley's administration, and on 
 the late transactions in the Carnatic,* have 
 fully satisfied your mind, of the wisdom and 
 justness of the principles on which that 
 policy, and those transactions were founded. 
 I, therefore, readily comply with your de- 
 sire, to submit to you my view of the ques- 
 
 * Vide A Reply to the " Strictures of the Edinburgh 
 Review, &." 
 
 B 
 
 if
 
 tion, that forms the subject matter of the 
 specific charges which have been exhibited 
 against Lord AVellesley, in the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 That question will, I presume, be finally 
 determined in Parliament, early in the en* 
 suing Session. And, as you concur in that 
 general sentiment of reprobation, which all 
 impartial and independent men express, at 
 the conduct of the last House of Commons, 
 in suffering the accusers of Lord Wellesley 
 to postpone, from time to time, the consi- 
 deration of the charges which they had 
 brought against him, after the whole of their 
 own evidence had been before the House and 
 the country, for ten months, I shall hope to 
 see you exert the spirit and manliness of 
 your mind, and .the power of your constitu- 
 tional knowledge, in asserting the legal right 
 of the accused to call for a decision on his 
 case, and in thereby rescuing the character
 
 3 
 
 of Parliament, and the justice of your coun- 
 try, from that opprobium with which any 
 farther delay must indelibly stigmatize 
 them.* , 
 
 * The opinion of Mr. Fox on all subjects, must have 
 great weight with you, and with every thinking man ; 
 but on a constitutional question, it must carry with it all 
 the force of decisive authority. In one of the last speeches 
 which that illustrious man made in the House of Com- 
 mons, relative to the charge against Lord Wellesley, he 
 declared, " That the House, having pledged itself to the 
 " accuser and the accused by this vote, and, more than 
 " that, having actually ordered witnesses to attend, it stood 
 " bound to both parties to enteY upon the consideration of 
 " this charge at softie convenient time *****. We 
 " had now only to proceed with the evidence for two or 
 " three days -, and if it was likely to go to any lengthy then 
 " it would be necessary to adopt some new and cxtraordi- 
 " nary course ; for he felt that it was necessary y in justice 
 " to the accuser and accused, that the House should come 
 " to some decision THIS SESSION". 
 
 Vide. Stocfcdale^s Parliamentary Debates, June 1 8, No. 
 16, page 250, et seq. In the course of this speech, Mr. Fcx 
 
 B2
 
 Leaving the merits of this point, therefore, 
 to your informed understanding, and confid- 
 ing in that spirit of justice, with which I 
 cannot doubt the present House of Commons 
 will be animated, I shall proceed to examine 
 the specific articles of charge, on which its 
 judgment will be called upon to decide. 
 
 Of these charges, the first relates to the 
 conduct of Lord Wellesley, in the late ar- 
 rangements with the Nabob of Oude ; the 
 second, to the arrangement which his Lord- 
 ship concluded with the Nabob of Furruck- 
 abad ; and the third, to certain measures 
 which were adopted by the British govern- 
 ment, against the Zemindars of Sassnee and 
 Cutchoura. The two last charges are im- 
 
 went so far as to state, that ministers might even advise 
 his Majesty " to prolong the Session, and keep the Parliament 
 " sitting," in order that the question might be brought to 
 a speedy conclusion.
 
 plicated and involved in the first, and are in 
 fact supplementary to it. The Nabob of 
 Furruckabad was a tributary of the govern- 
 ment of Oude; and the Zemindars of Sassnee, 
 and Cutchoura were its subjects : Hence, 
 the arrangement in Furruckabad, and the 
 measures pursued against these Zemindars 
 will be found to have followed, as necessary 
 consequences of those proceedings in Oude, 
 on which the accusers of Lord Wellesley 
 found their principal charge. 
 
 That charge rests on an assumption which 
 I shall shew to be totally false; and on this 
 assumption is raised a variety of allegations, 
 which the very evidence adduced to sus- 
 tain them completely disproves. To these 
 allegations I shall hereafter particularly 
 advert. But, in the first instance, it is of 
 much more importance to prove, that the 
 great measure of policy, which it is their 
 object to criminate, was fully justifiable on
 
 6 
 
 principles of general equity, and imperiously 
 recommended, not only by the consideration 
 of its being an essential part of an humane,, 
 enlightened, and comprehensive system of 
 political reformation, but also by a concur- 
 rence of circumstances which actually in- 
 volved the security of our dominions in Hin- 
 dustan. 
 
 In order to make you acquainted with th6 
 true grounds of this measure, and to prove, 
 beyond the possibility of contradiction, the 
 falsehood of the assumption on which the 
 charge proceeds, it will be necessary to give 
 you some account of the family of the present 
 Nabob of Oude, as well as of the political 
 state of that province, both before, and after, 
 its connection with the British government. 
 
 In the charge against Lord Wellesley, it 
 is assumed, as an admitted and established 
 fact, " that Oude is an INDEPENDENT PRUK-
 
 7 
 
 " ciPAtiTT, under the government of a Sa- 
 " VEREIGN, whose title is NABOB VIZIER!!" 
 
 This assertion is expressed with such a 
 felicitous incongruity, that, in spite of its bre* 
 vitv, it contains in itself its own complete 
 falsification. The Sovereign of an Inde- 
 pendant principality is dignified with a title, 
 which literally signifies, that he is not 
 merely the dependant, but the actual servant 
 of another monarch. I have shown in a late 
 publication,* " that the title of Nabob could 
 not have been adopted by any prince of 
 Hindustan, without a degradation of his, 
 superior rank, nor expressed along with his 
 other titles, without a manifest solecism in 
 language. According to "theMoghulInstitu- 
 " tions, as established in Hindustan, Nabob 
 " -(NdwdbJ was a title of honour, which was 
 " always conferred on the Subahdars, orgo- 
 
 * A Reply to the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review.
 
 8 
 
 " vernors of provinces, and sometimes on the 
 " Omrahs or nobles of the empire ;" and, ac- 
 cording to the Mohgul institutions, as esta- 
 blished throughout the whole of the Tartar 
 conquests, the Vizier is the .first minister of 
 the sovereign. The title of Nabob Vizier, 
 therefore, means that the person so denomi- 
 nated, is a nobleman of the Moghul empire, 
 and the chief minister of the emperor. 
 
 . 
 
 The office of Vizier, as well as that of Su- 
 bahdar, was entirely personal, and both were 
 consequently held at the will of the sovereign, 
 " TheSubahdar, along with his appointment, 
 " received written instructions, in which the 
 " duties of his office are specifically laid down, 
 " and in which he is enjoined, in positive and 
 " distinct terms, " not to consider himself as 
 <( permanently fixed in his office, but to hold 
 " himself, at all tirftes, in perfect readiness tc 
 " be removed t on the shortest notice fron
 
 " the emperor"* These instructions prove, 
 incontestibly, the dependant nature of a Su- 
 bahdar's office ; whence the Nabobs of Oude, 
 who were Subahdars of that province of the 
 Moghul empire, derived all their local autho- 
 rity and power. 
 
 Safidut Khan, the ancestor of the present 
 Nabob of Oude, and the founder of his fa- 
 mily, was a native of Rhorasan, who had 
 travelled into Hindustan as a military ad- 
 venturer. Through the friendship which 
 he formed with some of the principal 
 officers of the court of Behaudar Shah, 
 he was retained in the service, and in- 
 troduced to the personal notice of that mo- 
 narch. On the accession of Mohammed 
 Shah, over whose mind he had gained a 
 great ascendancy, he was first created an 
 
 * Vide the Ayeen Akbarry, or the Institutes of Akbar, 
 and the Akbar-Namah, or the History of Akbar.
 
 10 
 
 Emir, or noble of the empire, then appointed 
 to the govern ment of Akbarabad, and, finally, 
 received the command of a Munsub, or 
 corps of 5000 horse, the dignity of Nabob, 
 and the Subahdarry of Oude. 
 
 The elevation of this adventurer to these 
 dignities, naturally gave his family consi- 
 derable influence at court ; so that upon 
 his death, his nephew Sufdar Jung was ap- 
 pointed to succeed him in the government 
 of Oude ; and on the death of the famous Ni- 
 zam -ul-Mulk, he was raised to the high office 
 of the Vizierut, or Vizier of the empire, and 
 at the same time to that of Meer-atush, or 
 master-general of the artillery. From both 
 these offices, however, he was afterwards 
 dismissed, for having ordered a favourite 
 eunuch of the Emperor to be put to death ; 
 but on account of his former services, he 
 was allowed to retain the government of 
 Oude. At his death, in 1753, his son, Sujah- 
 ud-Dowlah, the father of the present Nabob,
 
 11 
 
 was invested in the office of Subahdar of 
 Oude ; and, on the elevation of the unfortu- 
 nate Shah Allum to the imperial throne, in 
 1761, he was appointed Vizier of the empire. 
 
 At that period of time the emperor was at 
 war with the English, who had defeated him 
 in several engagements, and who had in 
 reality, if not ostensibly, established their 
 sovereignty over the provinces of Bengal and 
 Behar, of which he endeavoured, in vain, to 
 divest them. Repulsed in these endeavours, 
 he withdrew from the contest, and a cessa- 
 tion of hostilities consequently took place, 
 which lasted for two years. 
 
 About the expiration of that time, a rup- 
 ture broke out between the British govern^ 
 ment and Meer Caasim Alii, the Subahdar of 
 Bengal: and the cause of the latter being 
 warmly espoused by the Nabob Yizier Sujah- 
 ud-Dowlah, the emperor was again induced 
 to proclaim war against the English, and to
 
 12 
 
 march against them with a formidable army 
 In this march he was accompanied by the 
 Vizier, who, in his own mind, had formed 
 the project, not only of re-conquering the 
 whole of Bengal and Behar, but of extermi- 
 nating the English in Hindustan. This 
 mighty plan, however, was destroyed by 
 the battle of Buxar, in which the English 
 
 \ 
 
 obtained a decisive victory over the Mussul- 
 man arms. 
 
 The vanquished emperor, mortified and dis- 
 heartened, retired to Benares, from whence 
 he communicated to the English general his 
 desire to terminate hostilities, and to place 
 himself under the generous protection of 
 his conquerors : but the Vizier, exasperated, 
 rather than humbled, at the overthrow of his 
 ambitious scheme, determined still to op- 
 pose them, on his own authority ; and for 
 this purpose repaired to his government of 
 Oude, where he assembled an army, com-
 
 13 
 
 posed of his provincial troops, and a de- 
 tachment of Mahratta mercenaries. 
 
 This conduct, on the part of the Vizier, 
 being of course considered by the emperor 
 as an act of rebellion, he dismissed him from 
 the vizierut, and from the subahdarry of 
 Oude ; and concluded an agreement with 
 the English, whereby it was stipulated, 
 among other things, " that they should dis- 
 possess the Nabob Sujah-tid-Dowlah, of the 
 government and territories of Oude, and 
 deliver them to the emperor." A fur- 
 maun, or royal mandate was accordingly 
 issued, in which it is expressly declared, 
 " that the Nabob Sujah-ud-Dowlah, having 
 " unjustly, and contrary to the royal pi ea- 
 " sure, waged war against the English, the 
 " country of Ghazipur, &c. &c. belonging to 
 " the Nizamut (or Subadarry) of the Nabob 
 " Sujah-ud-Dowlah, shall be given to their 
 " disposal. And further, that the army of the
 
 14 
 
 " English, &c. shall'put the emperor in pos- 
 " session of the rest of the countries belong- 
 " ing to the Nixamut of the Nabob Sujah- 
 " ud-Dowlah"* 
 
 In conformity with this furmaun, and 
 with the stipulations in which it originated, 
 the English marched against Siijah-ud-Dow- 
 lah, and after totally defeating and discom- 
 fiting his forces at the battle of Kalpi, made 
 im entire conquest of the whole province of 
 Oude. 
 
 * See this Furmawn in the Appendix to the " View of 
 " the Rise and Progress of the English government in 
 " Bengal ; By H. Fere/sf, Esq.- late Governor of Bengal;" in 
 which work, the whole of the transactions here glanced, 
 at are recorded and elucidated. The Oriential reader 
 will find the accuracy of Mr. Verelst's narrative fully con- 
 firmed in the valuable History of Gkolaum Hussein Khan, 
 who was a spectator of those events, and in many of them 
 bore a personal share.
 
 15 
 
 In this desperate situation of bis affairs, 
 Sujah-ud-Dowlah threw himself on the 
 mercy of the English, and surrendered at 
 discretion. From the month of May, until 
 August 1765, he continued a prisoner with 
 the English army at Allahabad, when Lord 
 Clive (then governor of Bengal) arrived 
 there, for the purpose of making a final ar- 
 rangement for the settlement of the pro- 
 vinces, which had thus been conquered by 
 the English arms. 
 
 Various considerations of policy, which 
 it would be irrelevant to my present purpose 
 to state, induced Lord Clive to decline the 
 ratification of the articles of agreement, 
 which had been previously concluded with 
 the emperor, notwithstanding the valuable 
 cession of territory which had thereby been 
 made to the company. His Lordship con- 
 sidered, that from the very limited nature of 
 the -Company's military resources, at ftiat
 
 16 
 
 period of time, and still more from the con- 
 tracted principles on which their affairs were 
 then conducted in England, the establishment 
 of a decisive and permanent political autho- 
 rity in northern Hindustan, would, upon the 
 whole, be a wiser policy, than to augment 
 our power by any farther extension of ter- 
 ritory in that quarter. And, for the purpose 
 of establishing this political authority, his 
 sagacity soon discovered, that the Nabob 
 Sujah-ud-Dowlah, from the general spirit 
 of his character, was the fittest instrument 
 he could chuse. 
 
 With this view, therefore, he prevailed on 
 the emperor to give up to the Company, 
 in perpetuity, the Diwannee, or revenues of 
 Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, instead of the 
 cession of actual territory before agreed on ; 
 
 and, at the same time, he persuaded him 
 to grant an amnesty to Sujah-ud-Dowlah, 
 
 to restore him to his government of Oude,
 
 17 
 
 and the office of Vizier, and, finally, to allow 
 him to form, under the royal sanction, a 
 treaty of protection with the English govern- 
 ment. A convention of this nature was ac- 
 cordingly concluded with Sujah-ud-Dowlah, 
 in his capacity of Vizier of the empire, and 
 under tlte seal of the Emperor ; whereby it 
 was stipulated, amongst other things, " that 
 the Company should protect the territory of 
 Oude from all enemies by whom it might be 
 attacked, ivith a part or with the ivhole of 
 their forces, if necessary ; and that the Nabob 
 Vizier should furnish the Company with 
 part or the whole of his troops, in the event 
 of their dominions being attacked; but that 
 the EXPENSE OF THE COMPANY'S FORCES, 
 
 EMPLOYED IN THE PROTECTION OF OuDE, 
 
 should be defrayed by the Nabob ; that the 
 Nabob Vizier should pay ffty lacs of rupees 
 to the Company, in discharge of the ex- 
 penses they had incurred by this war ; and 
 that, when this last stipulation was fulfilled,
 
 18 
 
 the Company's army should be withdrawn 
 from the territories of Oude, and that pro- 
 vince delivered up to the Vizier."* 
 
 You will observe, that this treaty was ex- 
 ecuted by Sujah-ud-Dowlah, as Vizier of the 
 Moghul empire, under the seal, and with the 
 expressed approbation of the Emperor ; that it 
 placed under the protection of the English go- 
 vernment a province of the Moghul empire, 
 of which Sujah-ud-Dowlah was the chief 
 magistrate, and that for the expense of suck 
 protection, he bound himself to pay ; and that 
 in making a fruitless attempt to establish an 
 indeperidant authority, Sujah-ud-Dowlah had 
 been subdued by the English, who, on his 
 entire submission to them, restored him to 
 
 * See this Treaty, or Convention, in the Appendix to 
 Mr. Verelst's View of the Rise and Progress of the English 
 Government in Bengal before referred to: and see also, 
 in page 53 of that able and valuable work, the Author's 
 elucidation of the Principles on which that Treaty was 
 concluded.
 
 19 
 
 his original situation of governor of Oude, 
 under the influence of that paramount poli- 
 tical ascendancy which they had acquired, 
 hoth by their conquest of that province, 
 and by the general fame of their arms. 
 
 Yet, in the charge against Lord Wellesley, 
 this very same treaty is gravely referred to, 
 as affording " the fullest proof, in its form, 
 " language, and tenor, that Sujah-ud-Dow- 
 " lah was the sovereign of a state perfectly 
 " independant ! ! !" That is, in " its form" 
 he is designated as Chief Minister oftheMog- 
 hul Empire; in " its language and tenor" 
 he agreed to receive from the English, the ter- 
 ritoryof Oude, to be governed by him, but to 
 
 be PROTECTED BY THEM, AT HIS EXCLUSIVE 
 
 CHARGE. So that these are the circumstances, 
 thus happily adduced to prove, the PERFECT 
 INDEPENDANCE of a Sovereign State ! 
 
 The writers on the Law of Nations, to be 
 c2
 
 20 
 
 sure, inform us, that a state which submits 
 to a superior power, and consents to place 
 its PRESERVATION on the PROTECTION which 
 that power stipulates to afford it, becomes 
 subject to its PROTECTION, and is, therefore, 
 no longer independant.* And it must be 
 obvious to the common sense of every one, 
 that he who is maintained by the support of 
 another, is the DEPENDANT of the person by 
 whom that support is given. 
 
 But such considerations as these had no 
 concern in the composition of this charge, 
 the allegations of which could only be sus- 
 tained by a gross perversion of the language, 
 as well as of the spirit of history ; and in 
 which, therefore, it was essential to as- 
 sert, that Oude was an Independant Sove- 
 reignty. 
 
 * Vide Vattel, sur le Droit des Gens. p. 95.
 
 21 
 
 The Province of Oude, indeed, had never 
 been in a state of independance, since it was 
 first subdued by the Mohammedan conque- 
 rors of Hindustan. From that period of 
 time until its conquest by the English, it 
 continued a province of the Mussulman em- 
 pire. After the establishment of the Moghul 
 dynasty in that empire, and the consequent 
 introduction of the Moghul institutions, the 
 territory of Oude formed one of those grand 
 divisions of Hindustan, which was called 
 Subahs. Over the revenues of those Subahs, 
 the Subahdars by whom they were governed 
 had no authority whatever. The civil, judi- 
 cial, and military authorities were entrusted 
 to them ; but the revenue department was 
 wholly committed to the management of an 
 officer, called the diwan, whose office was 
 completely distinct from that of the Subah- 
 dar, and who was accountable only to the 
 Yizier of the empire. In the decline and 
 weakness of the Moghul power, many of the
 
 . 22 
 
 Subahdars assumed the diwannee, or the 
 revenues of their respective Subalis, and 
 some of them altogether cast off the authority 
 of their sovereign. In Oude, the predeces- 
 sors of Safdar Jung had never deviated in 
 any manner from the strict line of their 
 duty, nor had they ever violated the obli- 
 gations of their public trust. But that 
 officer, availing himself of his authority, as 
 Vizier, and of the decisive influence which 
 at one period he possessed at court, appro- 
 priated to himself the revenues of his subah- 
 darry, out of which he remitted an annual 
 tribute to the royal treasury at Delhi ; and 
 the payment of this tribute was continued 
 by his son Sujah-ud-Dowlah, until the Em- 
 peror had placed himself under the protec- 
 tion of the English. This appropriation was 
 made with the tacit concurrence of the Em- 
 peror ; though it never received the sanc- 
 tion of a royal grant, either in Altumgha or
 
 23 
 
 in Jagheer* which, according to the Moghul 
 constitution, could alone have rendered it 
 legal. Those Nabobs, however, made not 
 any farther encroachment on the rights of 
 their sovereign ; but partly from the conti- 
 guity of their government to the seat of the 
 supreme power, and partly from the circum- 
 stance of their holding the highest office in 
 the empire, they were induced to adhere to 
 their allegiance. Hence it appears, that 
 the only decisive and open attempt which 
 any of the Nabobs of Oude had ever made 
 to establish an INDEPENDANT State, was the 
 war in which Sujah-ud-Dowlah engaged 
 against the English, in direct opposition to 
 the commands of the emperor ; and the 
 result of that war was, the transfer to the 
 English of that DEPENDANCE on the court 
 
 r 
 
 * An Altitmgha is a free gift of a certain portion of tht 
 revenues in perpetuity; a Jagheer is an assignment of 
 portion of the revenues during life.
 
 24 
 
 of Delhi, by which his authority had been 
 upheld, and from which all his dignities 
 were derived. 
 
 Such then was the origin of the connec- 
 tion between the British government and 
 the Nabob of Oude ; which, whether he be 
 considered as an officer of theMoghul empire, 
 or as the chief of a province which had 
 been conquered by our arms, and was placed 
 under our protection, equally sealed his sub- 
 jection to our power. 
 
 The political supremacy which we had 
 thus established over the province of Oude, 
 was strengthened and confirmed by subse- 
 quent transactions and compacts. In 1773, 
 a fresh arrangement was concluded with 
 Sujah-ud-Dowlah, by which it was agreed, 
 that an English brigade should be perma- 
 nently stationed in Oude, and that the subsidy
 
 25 
 
 for the service of that brigade should be fixed 
 at the rate of ^25,000 sterling, a month. 
 
 Soon after the conclusion of this agree- 
 ment, Oude was menaced by a most formi- 
 dable invasion of the Mahrattas, who, under 
 the command of Mahagee Scindeah, and Hol- 
 kar, had actually penetrated into its western 
 frontier, and carried their devastations into 
 the neighbouring province of Rohilcund. 
 But the English troops, to whom the defence 
 of Oude was entrusted, attacked and re- 
 pulsed them with considerable loss, and 
 finally compelled them to abandon their 
 meditated scheme of reducing these coun- 
 tries to subjection. On this occasion the 
 English government, and the Nabob Vizier, 
 had made an engagement with Hafiz Rahu- 
 mut, the Rohilla chief, whereby he stipulated 
 to pay forty lacs of rupees towards the 
 expenses of this war against the invaders of
 
 his country. But either from disinclination 
 or inability, the fulfilment of this stipulation 
 was delayed ; and this circumstance, together 
 with some indications of an hostile disposi- 
 tion towards the Vizier, which the Rohilla 
 chief was alleged to have manifested, formed 
 the ostensible grounds of that well-known 
 Rohilla war, which took place in 1774, and 
 which terminated in the conquest oj Rohil- 
 cund by the English, and in their placing the 
 whole of that fertile and populous province 
 under the government of Oude, excepting a 
 few districts, which were bestowed in Jag- 
 heer on Fizula Khan, a justly- celebrated 
 chief, who submitted to their arms. 
 
 Upon the death of Sujah-ud-Dowlah in 
 the following year, the investiture of the 
 Vizierut, and of the Subahdarry of Oude, 
 was obtained for his son, Assof-ud-Dowlah, 
 from the court of Delhi, through the direct 
 influence of the English government. And,
 
 27 
 
 at the same time, a fresh treaty was con- 
 cluded with the new Nabob Vizier, by 
 which the force for the Protection of Oitde 
 was considerably augmented, and the sum 
 of thirty-one thousand pounds, per month, 
 allotted for its expense. 
 
 This force, however, was in a few years 
 found inadequate, not only to the external 
 defence of the country, but to the preser- 
 vation of its internal tranquillity. It was, 
 therefore, found necessary to strengthen it in 
 the first instance, by a temporary brigade, 
 and afterwards, in 1781* by a. permanent 
 augmentation, for which the Nabob was 
 charged with an increase of ^2,500 a month 
 to the subsidy. 
 
 The great irregularity, however, with 
 which this subsidy was paid, and the ac- 
 cumulating arrears into which it had there- 
 by fallen, demonstrated the necessity of
 
 making a new arrangement with the Vizier, 
 by which the nature of his connection with 
 the Company should be clearly defined, and 
 the subsidy fixed at a more regular standard. 
 With this view, the Court of Directors in- 
 structed the Governor-general in Council, in 
 Bengal, in the early part of Lord Cornwallis's 
 administration, to adopt immediate and deci- 
 sive measures, for effecting a reformation in 
 the state of our relations with Oude. In 
 those instructions they observe " one thing 
 " is clear ; the defence of Oude MUST be pro- 
 " videdfor. If, therefore, the Cawnpore bri- 
 " gade be not equal to such defence, either 
 " the Vizier's troops MUST be reformed, so 
 " as to make them serviceable, or another 
 " detachment of the Company's troops MUST 
 " be stationed in the country ; the additional 
 " expense of which he may be able to de- 
 " fray, by reducing his own useless troops. 
 " This we recommend to your most serious 
 " consideration; always bearing in yvur
 
 29 
 
 " mind, that, from the nature of our connection 
 " with the Nabob of Oudc, we consider the 
 " prosperity of that country as inseparable 
 (t fromthe prosperity of our own provinces ."* 
 
 In the spirit of these instructions, Lord 
 Cornwallis concluded a new compact with 
 the Yizier, in which it was 'stipulated, 
 " That he should pay up the arrears of 
 subsidy then due ; that the subsidy should 
 thenceforward be fixed at the annual sum 
 of ^500,000, to be paid ivith strict 
 punctuality, by monthly instalments ; that, 
 should it at any time be necessary to station 
 any additional troops in Oude, the expense 
 of such troops should be defrayed by the 
 Vizier; that a resident, that is, a confidential 
 
 * Extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors t<? 
 
 the Governor-general in Council at Bengal, 31st July, 
 
 1787. Vide East India Papers relative to Qude, printed 
 
 for the House of Cf
 
 officer of the British government, should 
 constantly reside with the Vizier, for the 
 express purpose of advising him in all mat- 
 ters of importance, but in effect, in order to 
 guide and control the political affairs of his 
 government in all its external relations ; 
 that the expenses attending the establishment 
 of the British Resident should be borne 
 by the Vizier \ and, finally, that the British 
 government should not interfere in the 
 internal details of the Vizier's govern- 
 ment, except by way of advice and remon- 
 strance" 
 
 The nature of this last stipulation Lord 
 Cornwallis has himself explained, in a mi- 
 nute which he recorded on this occasion. 
 In that minute he declares, " that by a non- 
 " interference in the details of the Vizier's 
 " government, he did not mean to preclude 
 " himself, or the Company, from making 
 " representations to the Vizier on the subject
 
 31 
 
 " of his administration, whenever it may be 
 " essentially necessary, or of proposing to 
 " him any general arrangement of impor- 
 " tance to the interests of both govern- 
 " ments." He adds, " that the board 
 <e would see the necessity of giving their 
 " countenance to Hyder Beg Khan, or 
 " whoever might be the acting minister of 
 " the Vizier. At present he possesses the en- 
 " tire confidence of his master, who is anxious 
 <e to procure for his minister the avowed 
 " PROTECTION of the English government.* 
 
 (e I assured Hyder Beg Khan," continues 
 his Lordship, " that he might depend on the 
 " support of the English government, whilst 
 " he served the Vizier with fidelity, go- 
 " verned the country with justice, and 
 
 * See copy of a minute from the Right Honourable 
 the Governor-general in Council, recorded in consulta- 
 tion, April 20th, 1787.
 
 32 
 
 " strictly adhered to the engagements form* 
 " ed with the Company" 
 
 Upon the death of this minister, the 
 Nabob made an arrangement for the ap- 
 pointment of a successor ; but it was only 
 acted upon as a temporary measure, in the 
 absence of Lord Cornwallis, who was at that 
 period of time with the army in Mysore, 
 and whose SANCTION was considered as in- 
 dispensably necessary to its CONFIRMATION.* 
 In one of his Lordship's dispatches to the 
 Court of Directors on that occasion, he ex- 
 presses himself in the following terms : 
 " Although Hassein Reza (the new mi- 
 nister) does not possess all the qualifications 
 THAT I COULD WISH for a minister, yet, AS 
 
 * See a Letter from the Governor-general in Council 
 at Bengal, to the Court of Directors, 3d Sept. 1792, No. 2, 
 of Papers before the House of Commons, relative to the 
 Oude Charge, &c.
 
 33 
 
 I HAVE an exceeding good opinion both 
 principles, and of his disposition to promote 
 cordiality between his master and the Com- 
 pany, / did not see that a better choice could 
 be made ; arid ACCORDINGLY I SIGNIFIED TO 
 
 THE VlZlER MY ENTIRE APPROBATION of 
 
 THEIR (that is Hassein Reza, and Teket 
 Rai, the two new ministers) BEING PER- 
 MANENTLY APPOINTED."* 
 
 When the appointment of these ministers 
 was thus CONFIRMED, by the APPROBATION 
 of the Governor-general of the British do- 
 minions, he addressed to these ministers a 
 letter of instructions, for the guidance of 
 their conduct, in the execution of their 
 official functions. In that letter he informs 
 these ministers, " that he had written his 
 sentiments very fully to the Vizier, on the 
 
 * A Letter to the Court of Directors, of the 
 August, 1792 See India Papers, No, 2, ibid. su$ra. 
 
 D
 
 necessity of effecting an immediate refor- 
 mation in the domestic affairs of his govern- 
 
 '" +XJ *s O 
 
 ment" " I refer you," says his Lordship, 
 " to my letter to the Yizier ; and I DESIRE 
 " that you will urge such arguments in sup- 
 (t port of it, as shall appear to you most 
 '* conducive to the accomplishment of MY 
 " WISHES, which have his prosperity for 
 " their object." * * * " From you I 
 " EXPECT every necessary exertion in such 
 " matters, RESPONSIBLE as you are to BOTH 
 " GOVERNMENTS for restoring the country 
 " to a flourishing state."* 
 
 By this practical illustration of that 
 clause in the treaty of 1787, which stipu- 
 lates, that the Company shall not interfere 
 in the interior details of the Nabob's go- 
 
 * See Lord Cornwallis's Letter to Hassein Reza 
 JOian, and Rajah Teket Rai, 2?th Jan, 17QI. Qude 
 Papers, No, 2 1 p. 10.
 
 35 
 
 rernment, except by way of advice and re- 
 monstrance, it appears, that Lord Corn- 
 wallis did not consider that stipulation as 
 debarring the British government from the 
 exercise of a decisive control, not only in the 
 appointment of the Nabob's ministers, but 
 also in the regulation of their conduct. 
 Neither did that stipulation prevent his 
 Lordship from addressing a letter to the 
 Nabob, containing a plan for reforming the 
 system of domestic administration in Oude ; 
 urged, to be sure, in the language of a stre- 
 nuous recommendation, but at the same 
 time in the spirit of a conscious authority, 
 and in the tone of a man who evidently 
 feels his right to expect, that his advice 
 shall be complied with. After pointing out 
 to the Nabob the ruinous system which he 
 pursued in the collection of the revenues, 
 Lord Cornwallis expresses himself in these 
 words ; " Though the Company's subsidy 
 " is at present j&id up with regularity, yet
 
 " I cannot risk my reputation, nor neglect 
 " my duty, by remaining a silent spectator of 
 " evils, which will in the end, and perhaps 
 *' that end is not very remote, render abor- 
 " tive even your Excellency's earnest desire, 
 " that the subsidy should be punctually 
 paid." * * * * " Your Excellency must 
 *' be aware, that such is our close connec- 
 " tion, that every chief in India must con- 
 " sider the two states as forming one power', 
 " and you have so uniformly adhered to 
 " that connection, that hitherto no political 
 '* transaction has been concerted, but with 
 " the advice of each other ; and as the 
 " Company have _ expressed THEIR APPRO- 
 " B ATI ON of the choice which you have 
 ** made of Hassein Reza Khan, and Rajah 
 " Teket Rai, / shall naturally consider the 
 " political measures of your government to 
 " be dependant on them, as well as the 
 " domestic." * 
 
 * Lord Cornwallis's letter to Assof-ud-Dowlah, the 
 Nabob of Oude, 29th Jan. 1793. Oude Papers t No. 2 W 
 p. 12, 13.
 
 37 
 
 For the execution of this plan of reform 
 in the internal affairs of Oude, Lord Corn- 
 wallis informed the Nabob's ministers, that 
 he held them " responsible to the British 
 " government" as well as to that of the 
 Nabob ; and he therefore desired them to 
 make " every necessary exertion" to expe- 
 dite and accomplish it. 
 
 If any political control more decisive 
 than this, or if any case in which the au- 
 thority of a paramount state over its vassal, 
 was more clearly exercised, can any where 
 be found in the history of nations, it is in 
 the transactions of the succeeding adminis- 
 tration of Lord Teignmouth. 
 
 That administration commenced its cor- 
 respondence with the government of Oude, 
 by urging the Nabob, in the strongest 
 language of remonstrance, * to carry into 
 
 * Qude Papers^ No. 2. p. ,23, 25.
 
 38 
 
 immediate execution that plan of reform 
 in the domestic affairs of the country, which 
 Lord Cornwallis had framed, and so em- 
 phatically had enjoined him to adopt. But 
 some memorable circumstances which after- 
 wards occurred, rendered it necessary for 
 Lord Teignmouth to put in actual force 
 that right of supremacy over the state of 
 Oude, which the British government derived 
 from the principle of its original connection 
 with it, and which had been so repeatedly 
 and 'unequivocally declared, both by that 
 government, and by the constituted autho- 
 rities in England. 
 
 On the death of Fizula Khan, in August 
 1794, the jagheer which had been granted 
 to him, at the conclusion of the Rohilla war 
 iu 1774, reverted to the Vizier; and, ac- 
 cording to the general practice of the Mo- 
 ghul constitution in such cases,, it was 
 bestowed on his eldest son, Mohammed
 
 39 
 
 Alii. But that chief was unpopular with 
 his tribe, who were attached to his younger 
 brother, Gholauin Mohammed, partly from 
 his having been the favourite of his father, 
 and partly from his possessing much of 
 that warlike spirit which animates and dis- 
 tinguishes their national character. Actu- 
 ated by this feeling of partiality, and little 
 regarding legal forms, the Rohilla peasantry 
 beheld, with a mortified dislike, the elevation 
 of the elder brother. Taking advantage of 
 this feeling in the people, and stimulated by 
 that ruling and ungovernable passion for 
 power which predominates in the Mussul- 
 man character, Gholaum Mohammed deter- 
 mined to raise himself to the government 
 of the Jagheerdarry, by putting his brother 
 to death ; which atrocious act he accord- 
 ingly perpetrated. In order, however, to 
 secure his establishment, he sent a consider- 
 able nuzzdranah, or present, to the Vizier, 
 with promises of an increased peishcush, or
 
 40 
 
 tribute, if the Jagheerdarry were granted to 
 him in perpetuity. Tempted by this offer, 
 and utterly indifferent to the horrible crime of 
 which theperson who made it had been guilty, 
 the Vizier manifested the strongest desire 
 to comply with his wishes: but, knowing that 
 he could not do so without the sanction of the 
 British government, he laid before the Go- 
 vernor-general in council, through the Eng- 
 lish resident at Luckhow, a full account of 
 the whole transaction in Rohilcund. 
 
 Contrary to the detestable avarice of the 
 Vizier's wishes, the Governor -general in 
 council at once resolved to dispossess the 
 murderer : and the Commander in Chief, 
 Sir Robert Abercrombie, who was then in 
 Oude, was instructed to inform the Vizier, in 
 explicit and distinct terms, that the British* 
 government WERE DETERMINED to remove 
 Gholaum Mohammed, and that the Jagheer
 
 41 
 
 Must be conferred on the infant son of Mo- 
 hammed Alii. 
 
 To this decision the Vizier was obliged to 
 submit ; but he did so with a marked and 
 positive reluctance : so that you here see 
 the British government exercised over him 
 a paramount and completely absolute au- 
 thority, even in the disposal of one ofhisoivn 
 Jagheers. 
 
 In enforcing the resolution of the British 
 government, the Vizier manifested his dis- 
 satisfaction, by withholding that active 
 assistance which it was his duty to exert. 
 The determined resistance of Gholaum Mo- 
 hammed rendered it necessary for the Bri- 
 tish army .to march against him : but the 
 Vizier, instead of accompanying its march 
 with his provincial troops, and of furnishing 
 the requisite supplies, according to the obli- 
 gation of his covenant, kept at the distance
 
 of an hundred miles in the rear, and afforded 
 no aid tvliatever, until the Rohillas, who had 
 assembled in great numbers, and who fought 
 with a desperate courage, had sustained a 
 total defeat. 
 
 After these transactions, the Vizier evinced, 
 if possible, a still greater indifference than 
 before, to the advice and remonstrances of 
 the British government, relative to the refor- 
 mation of his internal administration. And 
 such was the ruinous and miserable condi- 
 tion to which the country was reduced, and 
 such the imminent dangers to which the 
 neighbouring provinces of the Company 
 were consequently exposed, by the continu- 
 ance of that pestilent misrule from which 
 these evils sprung, that the Governor-gene- 
 ral proceeded to Lucknow in 1797* for the 
 avowed purpose of endeavouring to effect, by 
 " personal remonstrance and the influence
 
 43 
 
 of his public station/'* that reform which 
 had so often been recommended in vain. 
 
 That important object, however, was not 
 to be attained by these means. The stub- 
 born profligacy of the Vizier rendered all 
 the Governor-general's admonitions and re- 
 monstrances entirely fruitless. " He seemed 
 ' ' insenible of the real value of character, 
 and regardless of the prosperity of his 
 country/'^ The Governor-general, therefore, 
 determined to provide in some measure against 
 the dangers of that anarchy, which the in- 
 herent vices of the Oude government inevita- 
 bly tended to produce, and which the Vizier's 
 own mischievous proceedings were fast ac- 
 celerating. He accordingly augmented the 
 
 * See Sir John Shore's (now Lord Teignmouth) Letter 
 to the Vice President in Council at Bengal, 21st March, 
 1797. Oude Papers, No. 11 in No. 2. 
 
 f Ibid, supra*
 
 44 
 
 -British force in Oude, with two regiments, 
 and called upon the Vizier for an addition 
 of d@7Z,QQQ to the annual subsidy. 
 
 Towards the end of 1797* Assof-ud- 
 Dowlah died, and was succeeded in his go- 
 vernment by his reputed and acknowledged 
 son Vizier Alii. This succession was sanc- 
 tioned by the principles of the Mohammedan 
 law, as well as by the practice of the Moghul 
 constitution ; and it was approved of and 
 confirmed by the British government, in so 
 decided a manner, that it ivas considered 
 throughout Hindustan as their act.* 
 
 In the course, however, of a few months 
 after the elevation of Vizier Alii, the Go- 
 
 * " In the opinion of all" says Sir John Shore. " Vizier 
 " Alli's elevation was considered as an act of the English Go- 
 " vernment; and it is certain, that without their acknowledge- 
 " ment and support ; , he could not have maintained his situ- 
 "' ation." See Sir John Shore's Minute in Council, 13th 
 Jan. 1798. Oude Papers, No. 1.
 
 45 
 
 vernor-general discovered, that, on account 
 of the spurious origin of the young Nabob, 
 his succession to the government was gene- 
 rally considered as an act of injustice to the 
 lineal heirs of the house of Sujah-ud-Dowlah; 
 that it was, therefore, highly repugnant to 
 the feelings of all persons of any weight or 
 respectability in Oude; and that, ABOVE ALL, 
 Vizier Alii had shewn indications of a de- 
 cided hostility to the English interests, and 
 to that supremacy over Oude which the 
 English had acquired by their arrrxs, and 
 thought it essential to their security to main- 
 tain. These circumstances induced the Go- 
 vernor-general to repair again to Lucknow; 
 where he instituted an inquiry respecting the. 
 birth and parentage of Vizier Alii; and after a 
 minute and elaborate investigation, ascertain- 
 ed, that he was not the son of the late Nabob, 
 but a person of mean birth, whom he had 
 chosen to adopt for the purpose of excluding 
 his brother, Saadut Alii, from the succession.
 
 46 
 
 In the progress of this inquiry, abundant 
 evidence was likewise obtained, of the dis- 
 affection of Vizier Alii, of the impatience 
 with which he bore the control of the Bri- 
 tish government, of the secret preparations 
 which he was making to resist its authority, 
 and of the unappeasable antipathy which he 
 nourished against the English name. 
 
 These facts constitute the grounds oa 
 which Lord Teignmouth felt himself justi- 
 fied in exercising the highest degree of au- 
 thority, which a paramount power can en- 
 torce over a vassal state, namely, that of 
 DEPOSING its chief magistrate, and of appoint - 
 ing another in his place. The right on which 
 that authority, in this case, rested, his lordship 
 asserts in the clearest and strongest terms. 
 " The government of Oude," says he, " ia 
 " the opinion of the natives of the country, 
 " as well as externally, is considered a de- 
 " pendancyupon the English, whatever its re^
 
 47 
 
 " lation under treaties may be. Scindiah* 
 
 " referred the investiture of Vizier Alii by 
 
 " his majesty (that is by theMoghul emperor) 
 
 " to the Governor-general; and there are many 
 
 " respectable families (meaning native Ja- 
 
 " milies) in Lucknow, who live under the 
 
 " protection of British influence. IN THE 
 
 " OPINION OF THE NATIVES OF INDIA, OuDE 
 " IS HELD AS A GIFT FROM THE COMPANY TO 
 " SlJJAH-UD-DoWLAH, AND AS A DEPENDANT 
 
 " FIEF." His Lordship farther observes, 
 " we are so implicated in our connection with 
 
 * Scindiah, at this period of time, held in his charge the 
 capital of the Moghul empire, and the person of the em- 
 peror, whom he had rescued from the domination of the 
 traitor, Gholaum Khader. In return for this service, Scin- 
 diah had induced the emperor to constitute the Peishwa, 
 his Vakeel-uLMutluky or regent of the empire^ and to appoint 
 himself the Naib> or Deputy of the Regent. So that Scindiah, 
 the Mahratta Chief } was thereby the legal organ t as well as 
 the actual and uncontrolled director, of all the public acts of the 
 sjill nominal authority of i.he Moghul Sceptre.
 
 48 
 
 " Onde f that we cannot withdraw from it; 
 * ( and we are so situated in it, that without a 
 
 " DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN ITS ADMINISTRA- 
 " TION, WE CANNOT HAVE ANY SECURITY. 
 
 " The consequences of such a situation might 
 *' be fatal, if , the government of the country 
 " were secretly hostile to us ; and such, in 
 " my judgment, would be the situation of 
 " the Company, under the administration 
 " of Vizier Alii.' 3 * 
 
 Considering that the British government 
 possessed the undoubted and universally -ac- 
 knowledged right of sovereignty over the state 
 of Oude, and considering that the territory of 
 Oude ivas not, and never had been, the pro- 
 perty of any of its Nabobs, who only held 
 the office of chief magistrate of that pro- 
 
 * See Sir John Shore's (now Lord Teignmouth) Minute 
 In Council, 13th Jan. 1798, before referred to, Qude 
 Papers, &c. &c.
 
 49 
 
 vince, both under the Moghul constitution* 
 and the English supremacy, it appeared to 
 the Governor-general to follow, as a neces- 
 sary consequence, that the British govern- 
 ment had an unquestionable right to dismiss 
 the Nabob from his office, when the internal 
 welfare of so important a dependancy, the 
 stability of our supremacy over it, and the 
 political interests of our Indian empire at 
 large, would have been endangered by his 
 continuance in it. The Governor-general 
 therefore, determined to enforce the right of 
 deposition. Vizier Alii was accordingly 
 displaced-, and Saadut Alii, the present 
 Nabob, invested in the government of Oude. 
 
 With respect to the person thus placed 
 by the British government in the important 
 office of Jirst magistrate of Oude, it is ob- 
 served by Lord Teign mouth, " that every 
 argument of a political nature was in his 
 favour ; and that these arguments may be 
 

 
 50 
 
 comprised in this reflection" " THAT His 
 
 " WHOLE DEPENDANCE AND SUPPORT ARE 
 " ON THE ENGLISH COMPANY."* 
 
 Thus the Nabob Saadut Alii was raised 
 to the government of Qude, by the Com- 
 pany, upon the express principle of a com- 
 plete and absolute depcndance on their autho- 
 rity ; and, as dependance necessarily implies 
 obedience, he, by consequence, received it, 
 upon the understood condition of his implicit 
 compliance with their instructions, in all 
 matters relating to the affairs of his govern- 
 ment, and to that radical reform in its do- 
 mestic administration, which his predeces- 
 sors had so often, and so earnestly been 
 recommended to effect. Nor is this condi- 
 tion in any manner weakened, or remitted, 
 though it be partially modified by some of 
 
 * Lord Teignmouth's minute, 13th January, 1798, 
 before referred to.
 
 51 
 
 the stipulations of the treaty, which, on 
 this occasion, Lord Teignmouth framed, and 
 concluded between the Company and the 
 Nabob. 
 
 By this treaty it was, among other things, 
 stipulated, " First, that the English Com- 
 pany, having made a large augmentation to 
 their military establishment in Oude, the 
 Nabob agreed, in addition to the annual 
 subsidy, before paid, to pay in perpetuity 
 the further sum of nineteen lacs, twenty * 
 two thousand three-hundred and sixty- two 
 rupees, making together the sum of seventy 
 six lacs of rupees, or, in pounds sterling, 
 912,000/. and this sum to be punctually 
 paid, month by month, as it became due ; 
 Second, that the English forces, maintained 
 in Oude for its defence, should never consist 
 of less than 10,000 men, and if at any 
 time it should become necessary to augment 
 the English troops in Oude, beyond the 
 
 E2
 
 52 
 
 number of 13,000 men, the Nabob agreed 
 to pay the actual difference occasioned by 
 the excess above that number ; Third, that 
 the exclusive possession of the fortress of 
 Allahabad, should be made over to the Com- 
 pany, together with a sum of money suffi- 
 cient for improving the fortifications ; 
 Fourth, that, as the payment of the Com- 
 pany's troops depends on the regular dis- 
 charge of the subsidy, the Nabob engaged 
 to exert his utmost endeavours to discharge 
 the stipulated monthly payments with punc- 
 tuality ; but if, contrary to his sincere in- 
 tentions and exertions, these payments should 
 fall into arrear, the Nabob engaged and pro- 
 tnised to give such SECURITY to the Com- 
 pany, for the discharge of the existing ar- 
 rears, and the future regular payments, as 
 should be deemed SATISFACTORY ; Fifth, 
 that as by the engagements thus entered 
 into between the Company and the Nabob, 
 the amount of the subsidy was considerably
 
 53 
 
 increased, and many other permanent charges 
 upon his Excellency were incurred, on a 
 comparison of his disbursements with the 
 assets of the country, it became necessary 
 to make such reductions in the superfluous 
 charges of the public establishments, &c. &c. 
 as might be requisite, or as were consistent 
 with the maintainance of the Nabob's dig- 
 nity ; and the Nabob agreed to consult with 
 the English governments, and in concert 
 with them, to devise the proper objects of 
 such reductions, and the best means of 
 effecting them ; Sixth, that as the political 
 interests of the Company and the Nabob 
 WERE THE SAME, it was agreed, that all 
 correspondence between the Nabob and any 
 foreign power should be carried on ivith the 
 knowledge and concurrence of the Company ; 
 and the Nabob agreed, that no correspon- 
 dence, contrary to the tenor of this article, 
 should be carried on by him ; Seventh, that 
 the Nabob should not entertain any European
 
 54 
 
 of any description, in his service, nor allow 
 any to settle in the country, ivithout the con- 
 sent of the Company; and eighth, that 
 the Nabob should possess full authority over 
 his household affairs, his hereditary domi- 
 nions, his troops, and his subjects." 
 
 These stipulations confirm and ratify the 
 principle on which Saadut Alii was placed 
 by the English, at the head of the govern- 
 ment of Oude. They established the entire 
 political dependance of the Nabob on the 
 Company, by positively restricting him from 
 holding any correspondence with any foreign 
 poiver, without their consent : they place the 
 military poiver of the state altogether under 
 the authority of the Company, by authori- 
 zing them to augment, at their discretion, 
 the forces permanently stationed for its pro- 
 tection, to an indefinite amount ; and by 
 binding the Nabob to defray the additional 
 charges of such .augmentation, they recog-
 
 ftize the necessity of reforming the system 
 of civil administration in Oude, by binding 
 the Nabob to act in concert with the British 
 government, in effecting a reduction of the 
 public establishments, in order that the 
 revenues of the state might be improved, 
 and thereby rendered adequate to the in- 
 creased charges of subsidy : and they leave 
 the administration of the internal govern- 
 ment, as it was before, under the authority 
 of the Nabob. 
 
 Such, evidently, is the spirit and sense of 
 the treaty which Lord Teign mouth con- 
 cluded with Saadut Alii. But the accusers 
 of Lord Wellesley have laid great stress on 
 the last clause, upon the presumption that 
 it vested a degree of authority in the Nabob, 
 which precluded the interference, and ren- 
 dered him independant of the controul of 
 the British government, in regard " to his 
 household affairs, his dominions, his troops,
 
 56 
 
 and his subjects." The real meaning, how- 
 ever, of ^this clause clearly is, that the 
 Kabob should possess full authority over his 
 household, his troops, and the dominions and 
 people of Oude, so far as regarded the cus- 
 tomary administration of his domestic go- 
 vernment, 
 
 4 
 
 This degree of authority necessarily be- 
 longed to the Nabob, as first magistrate of 
 the country ; but it in no manner contra- 
 vened, or invalidated that paramount con- 
 " trolling power of the Company over him, 
 in all matters of importance, to which his 
 predecessors had been invariably subject, to 
 which he himself owed his elevation, and 
 which was ratified by all the other stipula- 
 tions, as well as by the general spirit and 
 tenor of the treaty in question. The literal 
 signification of the words, " he shall have 
 " full authority over his hereditary do- 
 " minions and subjects" is equally re-
 
 57 
 
 pugnant to the truth of history, and to the 
 nature of our relations with the state of 
 Oude : for I have shewn that none of 
 Saadut-Alli's family ever possessed any 
 dominions at all ; that their authority over 
 Oude originated in their being governors of 
 that province under the Moghul emperor to 
 whom it belonged ; and, that after its con- 
 quest by the English, they were continued 
 in it, as the political vassals of our govern- 
 ment. 
 
 But even if the literal signification of 
 those words had been historically true, it 
 would nevertheless have been wholly in- 
 admissible in the interpretation of this 
 treaty ; because it is irreconcilable with its 
 other clauses, as well as with its general 
 spirit, and with the principle on w r hich it 
 was framed. In such a case, we are bound 
 to interpret the adverse clause in a sense 
 which shall be consonant to the other parts
 
 58 
 
 of the treaty. We must consider the whole 
 treaty together, in order perfectly to under- 
 stand the true sense of any particular clause; 
 and we must give to each expression, not so 
 much the signification of which it in- 
 dividually admits, as that which it ought to 
 have from the context and spirit of the- 
 treaty. Upon this maxim of natural reason, 
 which is laid down in the Roman law/ and 
 which is observed in all laws, in the inter- 
 pretation of covenants, I have explained 
 the meaning of the clause in question, upon 
 which the accusers of Lord Wellesley had 
 fastened, if not with the dexterity of so- 
 phistry, at least with the eagerness of a con- 
 scious weakness. 
 
 This treaty, together with the principle on 
 which it was framed, and the right of de- 
 
 * Incivile est, nisi cota lege perspecta, una aliqua par- 
 
 ticulaejus proposita, judicare, vel respondere Vide Digest. 
 
 lib. i, ///. iii, de legibus, I. 24.
 
 59 
 
 position which it established, was finally 
 ratified by the Court of Directors, who ex- 
 pressed their approbation of it in terms of the 
 most unqualified applause. " After an atten- 
 " tive perusal," they observe, " of the 
 " several minutes and letters of the late 
 " Governor-general, which contain a most 
 " able, elaborate, and impartial detail of 
 " all the circumstances which led to a de- 
 " cision, by which Vizier Alii was deposed, 
 " and Saddut Alii placed upon the musnud, 
 " we have not the least hesitation in pro- 
 " nouncing, that, in that decision, the just 
 " right of inheritance has been supported, 
 " and the honour, the reputation, and the 
 " justice of the Company's government 
 " fatty maintained"* 
 
 * Extract of a general Letter to Bengal, in as far as 
 regards Sir John Shore's conduct in the arrangements 
 for Oude, dated 15th May, 1796. -Oudc Papers, No. 3 
 in No. 1.
 
 60 
 
 From the brief historical account which 
 I have thus given you of the family cf the 
 Nabob of Oude, and of the origin, the 
 progress, the nature, and the spirit of our 
 connection with that state, you will, I con- 
 ceive, be fully satisfied, that the assumption 
 on which the charge proceeds, of the 
 Nabob Fizier being the sovereign of a state 
 perfectly independant, is totally and com- 
 pletely unfounded. But, on the contrary, 
 you will agree, from the extent and variety 
 of the evidence which has been adduced, 
 that the following facts, essential to the main 
 question at issue, are fully substantiated. 
 
 First. Neither Saadut-Alli, the present 
 Nabob of Oude, nor any of his family ever 
 possessed, or had the smallest pretensions to, 
 either the title or dignity of a prince, or 
 the sovereignty of Oude. 
 
 Second. Oude was a subah, or province,
 
 61 
 
 of the Moghul empire, which, according to 
 ^he constitution of that empire, was go- 
 verned by an officer called a Subahdar, 
 who also possessed the title of Nabob. 
 
 Third. The ancestor, the grandfather, 
 and the father of the present Nabob of 
 Oude, were Subahdars, or governors of that 
 province, appointed by their sovereign, the 
 Moghul Emperor, whom they represented, 
 and from whom they derived all their 
 authority and power. 
 
 Fourth. In addition to the office of go- 
 vernor of Oude, the grandfather and father 
 of the present Nabob, filled the high office 
 of Vizier, or first minister of the Moghul 
 empire. 
 
 fifth. Though those officers, taking ad- 
 vantage of the vast authority with which 
 they were invested, and of the weakness tp
 
 62 
 
 which the power of their master was then 
 reduced, had appropriated to themselves the 
 revenues of Oude, from which they paid 
 only an annual tribute to the royal treasury, 
 yet neither of them ever attempted to 
 cast- off his dependance on his sovereign, 
 until, in the year 1/63, Sujah-ud-Dowlah 
 formed the scheme of driving the English 
 from Hindustan, and in execution of that 
 scheme waged war against them, in direct 
 opposition to the positive orders of the 
 Emperor. 
 
 Sixth. The result of that war was the 
 
 ENTIRE CONQUEST OF OuDE BY THE ENGLISH, 
 
 and the SURRENDER OF SUJAH-UD-DOWLAH, 
 
 WHO THREW HIMSELF ON THEIR MERCY. 
 
 Seventh. The English having thereby 
 acquired the unquestionable right of djspo- 
 sing of Oude in any manner they thought 
 most conducive to their own interests, re-
 
 63 
 
 s/ora/Sujah-ud-Dowlah to the government of 
 that province, under the stipulations of a com- 
 pact, made with the concurrence, and executed 
 under the seal of the Moghul Emperor. 
 
 Eighth. By virtue of that compact the 
 province of Oude was placed under the en- 
 tire protection of the English, and the 
 Nabob was bound to defray the expenses of 
 such protection : so that, in effect, the 
 Nabob was thereby made completely de- 
 pendant on the military poiver, and subject 
 to the political authority of the English. 
 
 Ninth. By several subsequent covenants, 
 and by various other transactions, between 
 the English and the Nabob, their authority 
 over him was PROGRESSIVELY INCREASED ; 
 in so much "THAT THROUGHOUT ALL INDIA" 
 the English dominions, and the province 
 
 Of Oude, " WERE CONSIDERED AS FORMING 
 
 " ONE STATE," and that, in the opinion of
 
 64 
 
 the inhabitants of Oude themselves, as well 
 as of all the other natives of Hindustan, 
 that province was considered as a " DE- 
 " PENDANT FIEF" of the English govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Tenth. That such likewise was the opi- 
 nion of Marquis Cornwallis, of Lord Teign- 
 mouth, of the Court of Directors, and of 
 the Board of Control, all of whom 
 thought that the exercise of a decisive au- 
 thority over Oude, by the English govern- 
 ment, was absolutely essential y not only to 
 the internal prosperity of that province, but 
 to the security of our own dominions in 
 Hindustan. 
 
 * 
 
 Eleventh. On this principle, Marquis. 
 Cornwallis thought himself justified in ex- 
 ercising a direct and positive control over 
 ttye government of Oude, not only in it 
 political and military relations, but also i
 
 its civil affairs, by making his approbation 
 indispensable in the choice, and his sanction 
 necessary in the appointment of its public 
 ministers ; by instructing those ministers in 
 the duties of their official functions ; by 
 recommending to the Nabob, and to them, 
 in the spirit of authority, a plan of reform 
 for the domestic government of the country; 
 and by informing the ministers, that they 
 were RESPONSIBLE to the ENGLISH GOVERN- 
 MENT for RESTORING OuDE to a FLOURISH- 
 ING STATE. 
 
 Twelfth. Lord Teignmouth pursued the 
 same mode of control over the conduct of 
 the Nabob's ministers, and remonstrated 
 with the Nabob himself, in the strongest 
 terms, on the growing evils inherent in the 
 system of his domestic government, and on 
 the necessity of his reforming it according 
 to the plan which Marquis Cornwallis had 
 so strenuously recommended : And, on,
 
 66 
 
 two memorable occasions, Lord Teignmouth 
 found it necessary to put in actual force the. 
 paramount AUTHORITY of the English over 
 the government of Oude; 1st. bj disposing 
 of the Rohilla Jagheer, contrary to the 
 ivishcs of the Nabob : 2d. by DEPOSING 
 Vizier Alii, the acknowledged son and pre- 
 sumptive heir of Assof-ud-Dowlah, after the 
 English government had publicly sanctioned 
 feis elevation to the Nabobship, and by 
 PLACING SAADUT ALLI IN THAT STATION. 
 
 Thirteenth. Lord Teignmouth concluded 
 a treaty with Sa&dut Alii, whom he had 
 thus raised to the Nabobship, whereby that 
 entire political and military power, which 
 the English had always exercised over this 
 their " DEPENDANT FIEF/' was fully RA- 
 TIFIED by positive and express stipulations ; 
 whereby the Nabob was bound to pay to the 
 English government t out of the revenues of 
 Ondc, the annual sum of nine hundred and
 
 twelve thousand pounds, in order to support 
 the expense of that paramount power, which 
 was thus definitively established-, and where- 
 by he was moreover bound to defray the 
 expense of any augmentation to the military 
 establishment in Oude, which the English 
 government might hereafter think it necessary 
 to make. 
 
 These facts prove incontestibly, the com- 
 plete paramount power and authority pos- 
 sessed by the English government over the 
 province of Oude, and the progressive in- 
 crease of that power and authority from the 
 origin of their connection with it, up to the 
 conclusion of the treaty of 1798- Hence , 
 then, Oude was a " DEPENDANT FIEF," and, 
 by necessary consequence, the Nabob wag a 
 VASSAL of the English government. 
 
 I shall now proceed to shew you, 1st. 
 That such being the real nature of the re- 
 
 F2
 
 68 
 
 hition between the English government and the 
 Nabob of Qude, the right of paramount au- 
 thority over him, which Lord Wellesley en- 
 forced, is founded on the established principles 
 of universal justice. 2d. That there had ex- 
 isted, for a long period of time, a general ne- 
 cessity for exercising this right, in order to 
 effect a radical reformation in the internal 
 government of the country. And, 3d. 
 That, superadded to this general necessity, 
 there was, at the commencement of Lord 
 Wellesley's administration, a. particular po- 
 litical necessity, which rendered the imme- 
 diate exercise of this right indispensable to 
 the security of the British dominions in 
 Hindustan. 
 
 First. The accusers of Lord Wellesley 
 contend, that whatever virtual rights the 
 Company may have possessed over the go- 
 vernment of Qu.de, from the general nature 
 and spirit of their connection with it, yet,
 
 69 
 
 under the stipulations of the treat}' of 1798, 
 no rights could be justly exercised, except 
 such as those, stipulations expressly autho- 
 rized ; and as those stipulations did not 
 sanction the right of coercive interference in 
 the internal affairs of that province, the 
 exercise of it on our part, was a violation 
 of our covenant with the Nabob. But 
 these profound logicians have overlooked 
 this important consideration, that there are 
 certain rights inherent in the civil consti- 
 
 o 
 
 tution of mankind, which, unless covenants 
 expressly restrain, they are always under- 
 stood to recognize. Every man has a right 
 to demand reparation for an injury which 
 his 'interests are sustaining, through the mis- 
 conduct, or negligence of any person with 
 whom he may have contracted an engage- 
 ment in which those interests are essentially 
 involved. And so far from his contract 
 precluding him from insisting on adequate 
 reparation, unless it expressly contains such
 
 70 
 
 a power, it becomes forfeited by the 
 party guilty of the misconduct or negligence, 
 from the very circumstance of those inte- 
 rests having thereby suffered, which it was 
 designed to protect. 
 
 This right is founded on the principle, 
 that the protection of men's property and 
 interests being essential to the existence of 
 civil society, all acts, or omissions, by which 
 they shall receive any material detriment, 
 ought in justice to be punished. The 
 sound wisdom and morality of this prin- 
 ciple has rendered its equity and usefulness 
 universally manifest. Combining in itself 
 the idea of preserving the benefits of the 
 labour, with that of inciting the active 
 virtues of mankind, it has been adopted into 
 all the most distinguished civil codes which 
 have prevailed in the world. In the Roman 
 law, in the feudal law of Europe, in the 
 law of England, and in the Mohammedan
 
 71 
 
 law, both as it is laid down in the writings 
 of the Arabian lawyers, and as it was 
 modified under the Moghul institutions, it 
 forms a fundamental maxim of equity. * 
 
 * The authorities to which you may refer on this sub- 
 ject are almost innumerable; but you may conveniently 
 consult, Domains abridgement of the Civil and Public 
 Law ; Wright, or Spelman, on Feudal Laivs and Tenures 
 and Hamilton's Translation of the H eddy a, or System of 
 Mohammedan Law. This code of Mohammedan Law, 
 however, is only in part practised under the Mussulman 
 governments of Hindustan, where the celebrated system 
 of ABU HANIFAH, modified in some particulars by 
 Moghul institutions and customs, more generally prevails. 
 Of the numerous commentaries on this system, nothing 
 has been translated into any European language, except a 
 short Tract on Inheritance, of which Sir William Jones 
 has given an English version. But in all the different 
 systems of Mussulman law, the principle which I have 
 stated is clearly laid down, and a set of rules founded 
 upon it, analogous to those of the laws of Europe. 
 
 As to our own laws, it is unnecessary to make any 
 reference. You know that the principle is explained at
 
 72 
 
 Accordingly, in those systems of juris- 
 prudence, the rule of right which I have 
 laid down, is applicable to all persons what- 
 ever. But between a paramount and his 
 vassal, or a landlord and his tenant, there 
 exists a right of a still stronger nature. 
 
 If a man receives from another, under a 
 special contract, during life, the manage- 
 ment and usufruct of any particular pro- 
 perty in land, in which the granter retains 
 a considerable interest, not only in its re- 
 version, but in its annual produce, the tenant 
 who enjoys the property shall be account- 
 able to his landlord for the use which he 
 shall make of it : and, if any material waste 
 be committed, or suffered, in that property, 
 either by any voluntary act, or by the omission 
 
 
 
 great length by Sir Edward Coke ; and the practical rules 
 stated and elucidated by Blackstone, in the chapters on 
 Waste, and on Forfeiture.
 
 73 
 
 of any necessary duly, the tenant shall 
 forfeit loth his contract and the land which 
 he has thus wasted ; unless the contract 
 contains a specific clause to exempt him 
 from the penalty. Now, by waste is meant, 
 not only that demolition in the temporary 
 profits of the land, but the destruction of 
 the land itself, by rendering it desolate and 
 unproductive : so that in the eye of the 1 law, 
 no civil offence can be of a more heinous 
 nature thait that mismanagement, or neg- 
 ligence, from which such ruinous conse- 
 quences inevitably flow. 
 
 Hence, in the laws of England, the statute 
 directs, that the tenant shall not onli; LOSE 
 and, FORFEIT the PLACE wherein the WASTE 
 was committed, hut ako TRETJLE DAMAGES. 
 And, according to the Mohammedan law, 
 the possessor of an estate for life, is liable 
 
 tO the IMPRISONMENT OF HIS PERSON", US Well 
 
 as to the FORFEITURE of that estate, if by
 
 74 
 
 his misconduct he injures the property com- 
 mitted to his trust. 
 
 The equity of this rule, therefore, will 
 not be questioned by Englishmen, who see 
 it practised every day in the courts of 
 Westminster-hall ; much less will it be 
 objected to by the Mussulmans of India, 
 who know it to have been promulgated by 
 the Arabian legislators, and sanctioned by 
 the most renowned of their Moghul princes, 
 whose joint authority, in all legal affairs, 
 they would account it sacrilege to impeach. 
 
 If then, the equity of these rules of civil 
 wisdom be admitted, in dispensing justice to 
 individuals in the common transactions of 
 life, with how much greater force must it be 
 felt, when applied to the affairs of nations ; 
 in which the interests and happiness of so 
 many millions of men are concerned, and 
 in which, therefore, the waste and deterio-
 
 75 
 
 ration ot property arising from negligence 
 and misrule, must be productive of such 
 extensive calamity. 
 
 A paramount state, therefore, which shall 
 have committed to its vassal, during life, 
 under the stipulations of a covenant, the 
 domestic government of any province, over 
 which it retains the supreme political 
 and military power, together with a large 
 portion of its revenues for the support of 
 that power, possesses the just right to. make 
 that vassal accountable for the manner in 
 which he shall administer its affairs. And 
 if, through any mismanagement, omission, or 
 negligence of the vassal, the province shall 
 have suffered waste, the paramount state 
 has a right to demand from him the resti- 
 tution of the country, the government of 
 which, together with his covenant, he has, 
 by his misconduct, completely forfeited.
 
 Hence, then, the British government 
 possessed that just and indisputable right, 
 not merely of coercive interference in the 
 domestic affairs of its " DEPENDANT FIEF," 
 (the province of Oude,) but also of compel- 
 ling its VASSAL, (the Nabob,) to surrender 
 back' that province, which, according to the 
 established rules of equity, sanctioned by 
 those laws which he is bound to obey, as well 
 as by those of every civilized nation, he had 
 for ever forfeited, in consequence of his 
 having, either through contumacy or omis- 
 sion, made no endeavour whatever to remedy 
 
 rr$ a -i* 
 that pernicious system of administration, 
 
 which both he and his predecessors had been 
 
 I r 
 
 so often instructed to reform, which origi- 
 nally produced that deplorable waste, which 
 his own peculiar misgovernment had so 
 largely extended, and which was dilapidating 
 the revenues, impoverishing the people, 
 and fast reducing the country to a state of 
 wretchedness, anarchy, and despair, calcu-
 
 lated at once to invite the hostility of our 
 enemies, and to render it a source of endless 
 distress to ourselves. 
 
 Of the Nabob's misgovern ment, of the 
 additional calamities which it brought on 
 the country, and of the consequent general 
 necessity which there existed for the exercise 
 of the right in question, the clearest and 
 most irrefragable evidence shall now be ad- 
 duced. Second. It has been already stated, 
 that the civil condition of Oude had, for a 
 long period of time, exhibited a most afflict- 
 ing picture of dilapidation and misrule; and 
 that it had consequently been an object of 
 increasing anxiety and uneasiness to the 
 British government. This condition arose 
 partly from the radical defects of the Nabob's 
 system of government, and partly from the 
 rapaciousness, corruption, and depravity, 
 which prevailed in all its different depart- 
 ments, and which characterized jthe conduct
 
 73 
 
 of its public officers. These abuses, which 
 existed long before* the province became 
 subject to the paramount authority of the 
 English, must infallibly have soon produced 
 a total dissolution of the Nabob's govern- 
 ment, were it not for the partial subordi- 
 nation which that authority inspired : and 
 though the policy which we pursued was 
 ill adapted to arrest the rapid progress of 
 such enormous evils, it undoubtedly saved 
 the country from internal rebellion, as well 
 as from foreign invasion. 
 
 In the administrations of Marquis Corn- 
 wallis and of Lord Teign mouth, our policy 
 in regard to Oude was greatly improved; 
 the real nature of our connection with it 
 was more clearly defined ; a firmer and more 
 
 t This fact is candidly stated by the native historia/i 
 Gholaum Hassein Khan, in his Seir Mfadkhareen, or View 
 <if Modern Timer.
 
 79 
 
 uniform tone of authority was observed in 
 our correspondence with the Nabob ; the 
 military defence of the country was consi- 
 derably strengthened ; a plan for reforming 
 its internal government was recommended ; 
 and the whole powers of persuasion and re- 
 monstrance, respecting the necessity of that 
 plan being adopted, were completely ex- 
 hausted. Still, however, the Nabob's go- 
 vernment continued unreformed; the state 
 of the country, by consequence, had become 
 progressively worse; and Assof-ud Dowlah 
 died, without having made the smallest at- 
 tempt, or even indicated any sincere desire 
 to make any reparation for the" vices of his 
 own profligate administration, and for the 
 deep injury which the British interests had 
 thereby sustained, by complying with the 
 repeated recommendation which he had re- 
 ceived, to remove the grievous evils of that 
 oppressive system under which the people 
 too severely suffered.
 
 80 
 
 Under these circumstances, the British 
 government would have been clearly and 
 amply justified, according to the principles 
 I have laid down, in dissolving the incorri- 
 gible goA-ernment of this its " DEPENDANT 
 FIEF," and in annexing the province to its 
 other dominions in Hindustan. 
 
 . 
 But" Lord Teignmouth finally adopted the 
 
 policy of placing Saadut Alii in the Nabob- 
 ship ; as well from a respect which he 
 thought due to the family of Sujah-ud-Dow- 
 lab, as from a hope that Saadut Alli's known 
 love of oeconomy, and his sense of gratitude 
 to the Company for his elevation, would in- 
 duce him to carry into immediate execution, 
 that reformation in the domestic government 
 of Oude, in which his own prosperity, the 
 interests of the Company, and the happiness 
 ot the people were equally concerned. Yet, 
 though Saadut Alii was raised to the go- 
 vernment with this view, as well as upon
 
 81 
 
 the understood condition of his reforming all 
 its abuses, and under an express stipulation 
 to make reductions in the public establish- 
 ments, we find, at the end of two years after 
 he had been in possession of the Nabobship, 
 the different branches of his administration 
 performing their functions precisely in the 
 same corrupt and disorderly manner that 
 they had done for twenty-four years before;* 
 
 * This fact is stated by the Nabob himself in the most 
 explicit terms, in a letter to the Governor-general. " It 
 " must," says he, " be well known to your Lordship, 
 " that, for these four and twenty years pasty the administra~ 
 " tlon of affairs in this country has been in a state of disorder," 
 See Oude Papers, No. 3, p. 22. 
 
 In another letter to the Governor-general the Nabob 
 apologizes for a delay in the payment of the stipulated sub" 
 sidy, by urging, as a cause of that delay, " that the organi- 
 " zation of the Sirkar, (state) which had, for a long period 
 " of time, been very loose and confused, is NOW, in the LAST 
 ** DEGREE, ineffective and irregular. Oude Papers^ No. 3, 
 f.2. 
 
 6
 
 82 
 
 no retrenchments ivhatever made in any of 
 his establishments, the revenues of Oude, by 
 
 HIS OWN CONFESSION, DAILY DECLINING ;* 
 
 an arrear of four hundred and seventy -five 
 thousand pounds due to the British troops 
 employed in its defence ; the Nabob's pro- 
 vincial troops in a state of mutiny from dis- 
 affection to his person, as well as from the 
 want of actual subsistence ; the cultivators 
 of the land groaning under the most merci- 
 less oppressions ; the people at large unpro- 
 tected by any administration, either of criminal 
 or civil justice ; and these primary sources 
 of ruin, together with the numerous subor- 
 
 * The Nabob's own words are, " The approaching failure 
 " of the resources is to be ascribed to the precarious reatiza-* 
 " tion of the revenues , and to the DECLINING ASSETS of 
 " the country." See Nabob's letter to Col. Scott, llth Nov. 
 1800. Oude Papers, 3. See also his admission confirmed 
 and elucidated, in the official dispatches of Col. Scott, the 
 resident in Oude, to the Governor-general Onde Paper /, 
 No. 3, passim.
 
 dinate evils naturally incident to them, con- 
 spiring to accelerate the civil distinction of 
 the country. 
 
 The truth of this general description of 
 Oude, under the government of Saadut 
 Alii, is abundantly proved, both by the offi- 
 cial documents, and by the minutes of oral 
 evidence taken before the House of Com- 
 mons, in support of the Oude charge. But 
 as you, who have never seen the calamitous 
 spectacle of a Mussulman government in 
 India, can form no adequate notion of its 
 monstrous corruptions, and cruel depravities, I 
 shall fill up the picture with a delineation of 
 its minuter parts. 
 
 An account of the mode in which the dif- 
 ferent departments of the government wer$ 
 administered, will at once furnish you with 
 the real causes of the decay of the country, 
 and convince you of the necessity either of 
 
 G2
 
 a radical reformation, or the entire aboli* 
 tion of a system so inherently vicious. 
 
 ." The revenue of the state," says Mr. 
 Burke, " is the state. In effect all depends 
 " upon it, whether for support, or for re- 
 "formation: it is the spring of all power, 
 '-' and becomes, in its administration, the 
 " sphere of every active virtue." In the 
 states of India, where the revenue is almost 
 entirely drawn from the land rents, it is 
 directly connected with the agriculture of the 
 country ; the prosperity of which, therefore, 
 depends upon the rate at which the land is 
 assessed, and its rent to government col- 
 lected. 
 
 \ 
 
 Under the Mussulman governments, since 
 the fall of the Moghul (empire, there has 
 feeen no standard of assessment in the re- 
 venues; the cultivators are subject to de- 
 mands always irregular, and generally ex-
 
 85 
 
 orbitant ; a failure in their payments neces- 
 sarily follows ; and the collections are always 
 made by an armed force, attached to the 
 aumildar, or collector. 
 
 But in Oude, the fundamental vices of 
 this general system were greatly augmented, 
 by numerous evils, peculiar to itself, arising 
 from the corruption of the government, and 
 the insatiable rapacity of its revenue col- 
 lectors. 
 
 To those collectors, the Nabob farmed 
 the whole revenues, that is, in effect, the 
 whole lands of the country. This was done, 
 by granting leases of the different districts 
 from year to year ; and one or more of 
 these districts were included in a lease, ac- 
 cording to the power or the art of the collec- 
 tors, in tempting the avarice of the Na- 
 bob, by offering him exorbitant rent. So 
 that the land was thus let as at an auction^ to
 
 86 
 
 the highest bidder, without the smallest 
 consideration or regard, on the part of the 
 Nabob, to the character of the person, either 
 for integrity or ability, to whom he was 
 confiding so important a trust. Hence the 
 manner in which the collectors executed 
 this trust, corresponded with the base prin- 
 ciple on which they obtained it. 
 
 At the commencement of every year, the 
 collectors, or their deputies entered into writ- 
 ten engagements with the ryots, or culti- 
 vators of the land. In these engagements, 
 the rent stipulated to be paid was usually 
 moderate, in order to encourage the ryot to 
 cultivate the largest portion of land of 
 which his means would admit ; but as soon 
 as the crops had ripened, the collectors in- 
 sisted on a new engagement, founded on a cal- 
 culation of their actual value. The unfor- 
 tunate cultivators, aware of the inutility of 
 remonstrance, and hopeless of redress,
 
 ally submitted, with silent reluctance, to the 
 demand; but sometimes, in the anguish of 
 their hearts, or in the bitterness of their 
 resentment, they suffered the crops to be 
 burnt and destroyed by the sun, rather than 
 yield them up to the ravenous cupidity of 
 their oppressors. More frequently, how- 
 ever, the collectors placed guards over the 
 crops ; directed them to be cut down, and 
 appropriated the whole to their own ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 From this horrible practice, which united 
 the improvident and ferocious rapacity of 
 barbarism, with the artful and relentless 
 avarice of a declining civilization, the most 
 fatal consequences naturally resulted. Large 
 tracts of land were left uncultivated; and 
 the distressed and harrassed peasantry, en- 
 couraged by the Mahrattas under Monsieur 
 Perron, upon the Western frontier of Oude, 
 abandorted their native homes in great num-
 
 88 
 
 bers, and sought an asylum in that country, 
 which was subject to the authgrity of the 
 French officers in Hindustan. 
 
 The rapacity of the collectors, however, 
 continued to increase in proportion to the 
 decay of the country. Possessing only a 
 temporary interest in the land, their sole 
 object and consideration was to enrich them- 
 selves, during the period of their lease, by 
 all sorts of extortion, alike regardless of 
 every principle of good faith, and of every 
 feeling of humanity. But it sometimes 
 happened, with the effect of a retributive 
 justice, that the oppression which they prac- 
 tised, at last overtook themselves ; and that 
 the Nabob, upon a collector failing in his 
 engagement, seized upon the wealth which 
 he had thus iniquitously amassed, and im- 
 mured him in a dungeon. 
 
 The existence of these enormous evils is
 
 proved by the testimony of Lord Corn- 
 wallis, * who, in his letter to the Nabob 
 Assof-ud-Dowlah, has described them with 
 great force, and with considerable minute- 
 ness; and the continuance of them, under 
 the government of the present Nabob, 
 Saadut Alii, is attested by the official dis- 
 patches of the British Resident in Oude, f 
 as well as by the evidence of Major Ousely, 
 who held a confidential situation in the Na- 
 bob's own service, and who was called to the 
 Bar of the House of Commons, by the ac- 
 cuser of Lord Wellesley, to substantiate the 
 charge in question. 
 
 Major Ousely, on being questioned as to 
 the state of the revenues of Oude, under 
 the government of the present Nabob, an- 
 
 * Oude Papers, No. 5 in 2. 
 
 \ 
 
 f Ibid supra, No. 13,
 
 90 
 
 swered, " That they were in A STATE OF 
 
 " ANNUAL DECREASE OR DECAY, from the 
 
 " mal-administration of the under aumils, 
 " (the collectors' deputies) in the time of 
 " Assof-ud-Dowlah, AND IN THE TIME OP 
 ' THE PRESENT NABOB, though he paid a 
 " great deal of attention to it." * 
 
 Of the nature and extent of this defalca- 
 tion in the revenues, you will be able to 
 form a pretty accurate notion, from the fol- 
 lowing statement of the British resident : 
 
 " The decrease," says he, " in the re- 
 " sources of these districts, proceeds not 
 " from any calamity to which they have 
 " been peculiarly exposed, but solely from 
 " the mismanagement and oppression of 
 " the different aumils to whose charge they 
 
 * See the Minutes of Evidence on the Oude Charge, 
 p. 65.
 
 91 
 
 " have been entrusted ; and this scourge 
 
 " appears to kave been felt more severely 
 
 " in that part of Rohilcund, which has 
 
 " fallen into the hands of the Nabob Vizier, 
 
 " than in any other division of his Excel- 
 
 " lency's territory. Of this assertion no 
 
 " more convincing proof need be required, 
 
 " than what is furnished by the following 
 
 " incontrovertible facts : The district of 
 
 " Bareilly, when ceded to the Nabob in 
 
 *' 1774, yielded, at that time, an annual re- 
 
 ** venue of upwards of sixty lacs of rupees, 
 
 " and does not at present produce more 
 
 " than thirty -six lacs ; and the district of 
 
 " Rehir, which was ceded by the Rohillas in 
 
 " 1794, little more than three years ago, 
 
 " and produced a revenue of ten lacs taFizula 
 
 " Khan, as appeared from the inspection of 
 
 " his accounts, now yields barely four 
 
 " lacs."* 
 
 * Oude Papers, No. 13 in 2, before referred Jo.
 
 92 
 
 Such was the manner in which the re- 
 venue department of the government of 
 Oude was conducted, and such the dilapi- 
 dation which it naturally produced. 
 
 With this department, that of the military 
 was intimately connected, and indeed subor- 
 dinate to it. The province being protected 
 from all external enemies by the English 
 forces, the Nabob's troops were maintained 
 solely as an instrument of internal tyranny, 
 and were never exercised but in quelling 
 those tumults which they at once con- 
 tributed to foment, by the example of their 
 own insubordination, and to exasperate into 
 fury, by the very cruelties with which they 
 endeavoured to suppress them. Those 
 tumults originated in collecting the revenues, 
 the only service in which the troops were 
 regularly employed. They were conse- 
 quently placed under the absolute and ex- 
 clusive command of the revenue collectors,
 
 by whom they were paid, and whom, 
 therefore, on the Asiatic principle of fidelity 
 to the master whose SALT is eaten, they 
 would alone obey. 
 
 The troops, thus placed at the uncon- 
 trolled disposal of the collectors of the 
 revenue, consisted in the whole of 10,800 
 horsemen, 55 battalions of infantry, a con- 
 siderable body of artillerymen, and 10,000 
 peons, or armed attendants. The annual 
 expense of these establishments amounted 
 to ^B 735,600 sterling, which sum the col- 
 lectors deducted from the revenues paid to 
 government. Of this sum, however, though 
 it was made a regular charge in the returns 
 to the Nabob, there was only a part paid to 
 the troops, who were kept, constantly in 
 considerable arrear. This circumstance 
 produced and fostered that spirit of mutiny 
 and passion for plunder, which constituted 
 the only principle of their union and co-
 
 94 
 
 herence. And the collectors, in order to 
 appease that spirit, by gratifying the pas- 
 sion with which it was connected, or by 
 any mode rather than by paying the 
 arrears, annually granted to the troops 
 assignments on those districts in which the 
 land-rents were with the greatest difficulty 
 collected. Those assignments were conse- 
 quently made on the lands of the more 
 wealthy and powerful Zemindars, * or land- 
 
 * The Zemindars, both under the Moghul constitution, 
 and under the governments of their ancient Hindu 
 princes, were public ofikers, whose duty it was to super- 
 intend the cultivation of the land, and the management 
 and collection of the rents. They were appointed by a 
 commission from the sovereign, called sunnud, to receive 
 in charge certain portions of land, from the rents of which 
 they were to pay a given per centage to government, and 
 over which they were to exercise, not only the official 
 authority of managers of the land, but also a considerable 
 civil jurisdiction. But as this office was conferred on 
 them as an inheritance, so it partook of the nature of pro- 
 perty, for the grant of which, certain civil services were
 
 95 
 
 holders, who, being themselves inimical to 
 the government of the Nabob, both from 
 the oppressive exactions to which they were 
 subjected, and from their own turbulent 
 and rebellious disposition, had not, for 
 many years, paid any part of their rents, 
 until they were actually reduced to submis- 
 sion by military force. To enable them to 
 resist the revenue collectors, as well as to 
 coerce their own peasantry, and to commit 
 
 to be performed to the sovereign. Hence, in the decline 
 of the Moghul empire, when the whole country was 
 thrown into confusion, and all property, as well as offices 
 were thereby unsettled, the Zemindars considered these 
 inheritances as actual estates, of which they were the sole 
 proprietors. This had been their condition for fifty years 
 before the provinces of Bengal and Behar fell under the 
 dominion of the English. And, upon the ground of this 
 presumptive title, together with that of actual possession^* 
 were, I think, fully justified in adopting the wise and 
 enlightened policy of granting to them their zemindaries 
 in perpetuity on the condition of their paying a fixei 
 to government.
 
 96 
 
 depredations on their neighbours, the Ze- 
 mindars retained in their service from ten 
 to twenty thousand men each. And, for the 
 purpose of securing the treasures which they 
 acquired by these spoliations, they had 
 erected small forts, on which they mounted 
 cannon ; and many of which were of suf- 
 ficient strength to withstand, for several 
 weeks, a siege by the Nabob's troops, and 
 sometimes to set their utmost efforts at 
 complete defiance. 
 
 In the province of Du-ab, part of which 
 was subject to the government of the 
 Nabob, and part to the French establish- 
 ment in the service of the Mahrattas, there 
 were no less than seventeen of those 
 fortresses. The Zemindars to whom they 
 Belonged, derived great facility in resisting 
 their payments to government, from the 
 circumstance of part of their lands being 
 within the Mahratta line of demarcation,
 
 97 
 
 and consequently holding of the Mahratta 
 government, and intitled to its protection ; 
 under which, therefore, when they found 
 their forts no longer tenable, they always 
 took refuge. 
 
 No measures, either of conciliation or of 
 decisive force, had ever been adopted, to 
 bring those Zemindars to submit, with 
 peaceful allegiance, to the government of 
 the Nabob ; so that the business of col- 
 lecting the revenues invariably produced an 
 annual war. 
 
 Thus habituated to scenes of rebellion 
 and oppression, the Nabob's troops were 
 actuated by the combined spirit of mutiny 
 and of tyranny, which rendered them no 
 less the enemies of the government, than 
 of the suffering and pkindered peasantry 
 whom they were employed to scourge.
 
 98 
 
 This spirit had, in some districts, risen to 
 a lieighth which menaced the total subver- 
 sion of the government, and which nothing 
 but the presence of the English army could 
 have availed to repress. But in these dis- 
 tricts, the only expedient to which the col- 
 lectors had recourse, in order to allay that 
 spirit, was to allow the soldiers to live at 
 free quarters on the weaker Zemindars, and 
 thp helpless cultivators, over whom they 
 exercised all those extortions, and atrocities, 
 to which in every country such a monstrous 
 expedient must always give birth, and 
 which, in that country, therefore, you will 
 readily conceive, must have been productive 
 of aggravated horrors. 
 
 i 
 
 obviousness and mutiny, like pes- 
 tilential disorders, are propagated by con- 
 tagion,, Hence the troops attached to the 
 person of the Nabob, caught those vices, 
 arid that rebellious humour, with which the
 
 99 
 
 rest of the soldiery were infected : so that, 
 under the government of the present Nabob, 
 these troops resisted his own immediate 
 orders. 
 
 The combined and continued operation 
 of all those evils, and the exasperation and 
 resentment to which the peasantry were at 
 last roused, served to irritate and spread 
 those violent commotions with which the 
 province was convulsed, and by which all 
 lawful authority was destroyed. 
 - 
 
 This statement of facts is fully proved 
 by the evidence before the House of 
 Commons. * But I shall just point out to 
 you what was said relative to these facts by 
 
 * See the official dispatches of Colonel Scott, the Bri- 
 tish Resident at Lucknow. Oucle Papers, p. 2, et passim. 
 
 And the Resident's correspondence with Sir James 
 Craig. Ibid. 
 
 H2
 
 Major Ousely, the Nabob's aid -de- camp, 
 and Sir James Craig, the commander in chief 
 of the British forces in Oudc, during the 
 period of time under review. 
 
 " The Nabob," said Major Ousely, " was 
 " at first, I believe, very willing to disband 
 " his troops, finding them totally insufficient 
 " for the purposes of collection, (that is, of col- 
 " lecting the revenues) or for the subordi- 
 " nation of the country.'' On being ques- 
 tioned farther as to the disposition of the 
 troops, he said, " he had seen instances of 
 " their mutinous and disorderly conduct" 
 
 ' * 
 
 Sir James Craig stated to the House, 
 " That the Nabob's troops were totally nn- 
 " disciplined, mutinous, licentious, and many 
 " of the battalions not armed. He said 
 " he always understood, that they were the 
 " reverse from being attached to the person 
 " and government of the Nabob, and that
 
 101 
 
 " he KNEW the NABOB HIMSELF considered 
 " them in that light. He always consi- 
 " clered the Nabob's troops useless and dan- 
 " gcrous ; consequently it was desirable to 
 t( reduce them" 
 
 Yet this undisciplined rabble, at once the 
 scourge of the people, and the terror of the 
 government, afforded the only miserable and 
 precarious security for life and property 
 which existed in the country. Considering 
 the lives and property of their countrymen 
 as their own proper and exclusive prey, they 
 preserved them from the ravages of those 
 vices and passions, which their own enor- 
 mities had fomented and inflamed, in order 
 that their voracious appetites might not be 
 disappointed of their annual banquet at the 
 collection of the revenues. 
 
 There was no civil police in the country, 
 except at the seat of government, at Luck-
 
 103 
 
 now: And the manner in which that 
 branch of jurisdiction was constituted and 
 conducted, was full of the grossest defects, 
 and altogether inefficient. 
 
 On this point Major Ousely, the Nabob's 
 Aid-de-Camp, informed the House of Com- 
 mons, " that the police of Lucknow was 
 " better than in the other parts of Oude ; 
 " that the present Nabob paid a great deal 
 " of attention to it; but that though he 
 " constantly changed his cutwal (that is the 
 " chief police magistrate) and fined some, 
 " and confined others, YET- THE EVILS WERE 
 " NOT CORRECTED. He had himself wit- 
 " nessed at Lucknow, in a morning going 
 if out a hunting, a man just murdered. He 
 " used to send notice to the Nabob on such 
 " occasions ; and a search was made, but 
 " the murderer seldom or never found 
 " out. Instances of that kind were very 
 tf common indeed.
 
 103 
 
 " As to the police ^of the Du-ab (which 
 " forms so large, and so important a part of 
 " the dominions of Oude) there could be 
 " nothing worse than this was, when Ma- 
 " jor Ousely lived in it. As to the lenity of 
 " the laws, you might call it lenity of laws, 
 " where you saw few instances of execu- 
 " tion according to the rules of the law, 
 "for they seldom applied to latv at all; 
 " they generally took it into their own hands. 
 " But he never saw, nor read of a country 
 " where there was more bloodshed, than in 
 " the Du-ab, while he lived in it. There 
 " was no stirring out of ones house, without 
 t( being attended by a guard. Persons tin- 
 " attended tvere frequently attacked, and 
 " probably killed. As to the people cal- 
 " ling themselves Zemindars, and land- 
 " holders, there was no imposition which 
 " they did not practice, on persons travel- 
 " ling, indigo merchants, and persons in 
 " trade. One instance he could state of a
 
 104 
 
 " gentleman who was stopped by the 
 " Zemindar of Sassnee, and though he pro- 
 " duced a pass of Almas Alii Khan (the 
 " Nabob's aumildar, or revenue collector, 
 " and, in fact, governor of the district) yet 
 " still, in defiance of all authority of the 
 " persons he ought to be subject to, this man 
 " not only stopped the indigo, but carried it 
 " into his fort, _and levied what duty he 
 " pleased upon it before he would liberate it. 
 " In this way there was a constant fghting 
 " about the common property tuhich tvas 
 (t carrying from one place to another. At 
 " every place almost it was stopped by every 
 " Zemindar who chose to put an exaction 
 " upon it ; and the matter was decided by 
 " the longest sword" * 
 
 Such is the description given of the po- 
 lice of the country, by a gentleman who 
 
 * See Minutes of Evidence on the Oude Charge, taken 
 before the House of Commons, p. 67.
 
 105 
 
 resided in it constantly for upwards of nine 
 years ; who, when lie gave this evidence, icas 
 still in the service of (he present Nabob; who 
 is perfectly acquainted with the language of 
 India, and who has made the manners and 
 customs of the natives his particular 
 study. * 
 
 His testimony, if it required confirmation, 
 is strongly corroborated by the evidence of 
 Lord Teignmouth, -j* and of Mr. Cowper, 
 the latter of whom had resided thirty years . 
 in Hindustan, had lived in Oucle for upwards 
 of one year, and who, from his being for 
 several years one of the members of the 
 Supreme Council at Bengal, possessed the best 
 means of knowing the actual state of all 
 the English territories and dependencies. 
 
 * See Minutes of Evidence, p. 60. 
 f Ibid supra.
 
 106 
 
 This gentleman informed the House of 
 Commons, " That it was impossible to 
 " conceive a greater state of anarchy and 
 " misrule, than had prevailed in the domi- 
 " nions of Oude as far back as he could 
 " recollect : there was neither law nor justice, 
 " nor subordination of any kind." The 
 " progressive decline in the revenues was to 
 " be attributed to the total want of all go- 
 " vernment in the country. And as to the 
 " police, there ivas none that he had ever 
 " heard of."* 
 
 Nor was there in Oude any established in- 
 stitution for the administration of justice; 
 for the judicial office in the city of Lucknow 
 deserved not that name. The laws were 
 dispensed at the arbitrary discretion of the 
 officer who presided in it ; and who never 
 
 * Minutes of Evidence before the House of Com- 
 mons, p. 46.
 
 determined a cause but by the intervention 
 of private favour, or the more potent influ- 
 ence of a bribe. " I think, in Oude," says 
 Lord Teignmouth, " there was no justice at 
 " all. In other Mohammedan countries, 
 " there was a regular, decently-conducted 
 " court of justice. In Oude, justice was 
 " at the arbitrary discretion of the officer 
 " employed by fhe Nabob. I speak posi- 
 " tiuelij to my knowledge of the government 
 " of Oude, as well as to what Lord Corri- 
 " wallis has particularly detailed* in the 
 " papers before the House, of the abuses 
 " as far as they were known to us. * * * 
 " All the papers before the House shew 
 " what the state of that country was ; that 
 " its administration was exceedingly bad in 
 " all the departments the whole admi- 
 " m'stration was as bad as it well could be, 
 
 * See Lord Cornwallis's letters to Assof-ud-Dowlah. 
 Oude Papers, No. 1 and 2.
 
 108 
 
 " in all its departments : and it was the 
 " perpetual object of our government to 
 " prevail on the Nabob to make a change 
 " in his administration. Lord Cornwallis 
 " had attempted it ; and it ivas equally 
 " urged by the government abroad, and by 
 t( the company at home.'"* 
 
 Such", then, was the state of this " DE- 
 " PENDANT FIEF," of the British empire in 
 India, at the beginning of Saadut Alli's ad- 
 ministration. Under a government so con- 
 stituted, and so debased, the condition of 
 the people was necessarily reduced to the 
 last degree of impoverishment, depression, 
 and misery : so that the effects of its own 
 corruptions, whilst they silently under- 
 mined its power, exhibited the prognostic 
 of its rapid dissolution. The protection of 
 
 * See Minutes of Evidence on the Oude Charge, 
 pnges IS 22.
 
 109 
 
 the British government had long protracted 
 its fate ; but it was fast approaching to that 
 stage of its intestine disorders, at which no 
 external power could have any longer averted 
 it. 
 
 In this situation, the British government 
 had to consider the increasing waste and 
 dilapidation of the resources of this its 
 dependency, by which its most essential 
 interests were so materially impaired ; and 
 it had also to consider the policy of support- 
 ing this falling system of plunder and op- 
 pression, in a province which formed the 
 only barrier between its own dominions in 
 Bengal, and those of its powerful and mar- 
 tial neighbours, the Mahrattas in Hindustan, 
 " wlio made war a source of revenue"* 
 
 * See Tone's Dissertation on the Institutions of the 
 Mahrattas. Asiatic Reg. vol. I. Miscellaneous Tracts. 
 
 Mr. Tone was, for twenty -eight years, ,an officer in the 
 Mahratta armies.
 
 110 
 
 Jn both these points of view it appears 
 to have been a wise, as well as a just and 
 necessary measure, to interpose its paramount 
 authority, in order to save its " DEPENDANT 
 " FIEF," with all the various interests it 
 involved, from utter. destruction. 
 
 
 
 Hence, then, there existed a general 
 necessity of the strongest and most impe- 
 rious nature, for effecting a radical reforma- 
 tion in the government of Oude: a necessity 
 felt and expressed by Lord Corn wallis, Lord 
 Teignmouth, and the Court of Directors ; 
 and a reformation which they had, with the 
 utmost solicitude, sought in vain to accom- 
 
 The Nabob Saadut Alii, Who himself 
 admitted this general necessity, who was 
 placed in the government with a perfect 
 understanding, that he should reform its 
 abuses, who was bound by his covenant to
 
 make a reduction in his establishments, and 
 who, nevertheless, at the end of two years, 
 had taken not one single step towards effect- 
 ing amj of these objects, did, by that very 
 neglect and omission, greatly augment the 
 pre-existing waste in the country, and thereby 
 clearly forfeit, on the general principles of 
 justice which I have laid down, all the 
 rights which he possessed over Oude, whe- 
 ther acquired by succession, or stipulated, 
 by treaty. 
 
 Now, if there existed a general ?iccessity 
 for a radical reformation in this government, 
 if the Nabob had made no endeavours 
 whatever to effect that reformation, and if 
 the substantial resources of the dependancu, 
 the welfare of its inhabitants, and the in- 
 terests of the paramount state, were, through 
 his negligence or contumacy, suffering pro- 
 gressive deterioration, it is plain that the 
 British government could not loo soon have
 
 112 
 
 called upon the Nabob, either for the for- 
 feiture which he had incurred, or for such 
 other reparation of a less extensive nature, 
 as motives of indulgence might dispose it 
 to take. But I will shew you that, in the 
 early part of Lord Wellesley's administra- 
 tion, there existed a particular political 
 necessity, which rendered the immediate 
 demand of reparation from the Nabob in- 
 dispensable to the security, not only of this 
 dcpendancy, but of the whole of the Bri- 
 tish dominions in Hindustan. 
 
 Third. The political geography of this 
 dependancy embraces some of the most 
 important interests of our Indian empire, in 
 its foreign relations. Situated between our 
 own territories and the Mahratta dominions 
 in Upper Hindustan, the province of Oude 
 formed the medium of mutual intercourse 
 in peace, and the principal scene of our 
 operations in war. That part of Oude
 
 113 
 
 which bordered on the English territories, 
 was separated from the Mahratta dominions 
 by the river Jumnah, and from thence 
 stretched across to the forests of Bhotwal, 
 and the lofty mountains of Gorkah, which 
 bound it on the north east. But the north- 
 west quarter of Oude was not protected 
 from the Mahrattas by any natural barrier. 
 Scindeah having possessed himself of the 
 provinces of Agra and Delhi, and of the 
 capital and person of the Moghul emperor, 
 occupied a large extent of country on the 
 Oude side of the river Jumnah, which in- 
 cluded the upper part of the Du-ab, and in 
 which the French establishment, that he 
 had retained in his service, was fixed. 
 
 In this quarter, therefore, as I before 
 stated, there was an open frontier between 
 the dominions of Oude, and the French 
 Mahratta establishment.
 
 114 
 
 This establishment consisted of forty 
 thousand disciplined native troops, three- 
 hundred European officers, and an artillery 
 amounting to two-hundred and eighty pieces 
 of cannon, appointed and served under the 
 direction of French engineers. Thus for-< 
 miq'able in itself, it derived additional 
 strength in its position, from the circum-* 
 s&nce of local interests and attachment. 
 1$ was maintained by military and per* 
 $oaal grants of the lands which it was 
 stationed to defend. Hence its interests 
 were identified with, the soil ; and were 
 directed by Monsieur perron, its com- 
 mander, partly to extend the conquests of 
 Scindeah, but principally to promote the 
 views of France. 
 
 Monsieur Perron, to say nothing of his 
 zeal in the cause of his native country, knew, 
 that it was only by the gradual advance- 
 ment of her views, and by the aid of her
 
 115 
 
 support, that he could preserve his own 
 establishment, in the probable event of 
 rupture between Scindeah and the English. 
 So that his attachment to France, and his 
 consequent hostility to the English govern- 
 ment, were founded on the strongest prin- 
 ciples of self-interest, fortified by every con- 
 sideration of policy, heightened by senti- 
 ment^ of ambition, animated by his patri- 
 otic feelings, and stimulated by those desires 
 with which the combined operation of all 
 these motives of action may be supposed to 
 have inspired him. Perron, therefore, not 
 merely from the peculiar nature, but from 
 the very necessities of his situation, became 
 the irreconcilable enemy of the English 
 government: and, at the period of time 
 under review, he was actually carrying on a 
 secret correspondence with the government 
 of the Isle of France, with a view to the 
 adoption of measures for supplying the 
 other French military establishments, in the 
 
 i2
 
 116 
 
 service of the native princes, as well as his 
 own array, with additional officers of ex- 
 perience and skill. 
 
 Now, this our irreconcilable enemy, 
 guided by such views, and actually engaged 
 in such projects, was constantly stationed 
 with his large and well-appointed army, on 
 the open and defenceless frontier of the do- 
 minions of Oude in the Du-ab. 
 
 In that station he derived a powerful and 
 diffusive influence, from the circumstance of 
 his acting under the ostensible authority of 
 the Moghul emperor, whom he held in his 
 charge ; but whose nominal power it was 
 the policy, both of Perron and of Scindeah, 
 to preserve. For that purpose, Scindeah, as 
 I have already adverted to, had made the 
 Emperor constitute the Peishwa the Regent 
 of the Empire, and himself, the Regent's 
 Deputy ; so that every measure, and every
 
 117 
 
 public act, either of Scindeah's or of Per- 
 ron's in Hindustan, was executed in the 
 name, and under the sanction of the 
 Moghul. 
 
 This influence was eminently calculated 
 to facilitate that system of political intrigue, 
 amongst the minor chiefs in Hindustan, 
 which Perron, as the instrument of French 
 policy, incessantly laboured to promote. 
 The great object of this intrigue was, to 
 instil into the minds of the natives, by all 
 the ingenuities of falsehood, the bitterest 
 sentiments of hatred for the English go- 
 vernment ; and to impress them with tht 
 notion, that their sole chance of deliverance 
 from its domination, rested on the support 
 which they gave to the French, who were 
 represented as the servants of the Moghul, 
 acting under his authority for the re- esta- 
 blishment of his power, and for the advance- 
 ment of his glory.
 
 118 
 
 Amongst the Rohillas, both in that, part 
 of their country which is tributary to Oude, 
 and in that also which was directly subject 
 to its government, the dissemination of those 
 artifices of intrigue was well-adapted to 
 increase the discontent which previously 
 prevailed, and which had. grown out of the 
 detestation and contempt of the Nabob's adr 
 ministration, which that turbulent, but spirited 
 and warlike race had always entertained. 
 
 The dissaifection which these combined 
 causes had produced, was fomented by the mar 
 lignant zeal, the unremitting stratagems, and 
 tjie unextinguishable animosity with which, 
 Vizier AHi stroye to excite a, general insur- 
 rection against the English, in the hope of 
 recovering the government from which he 
 had been deposed. During the few months, 
 in which, he held the Nabobship, he had 
 studiously and strenuously sought to gain 
 the favour of the profligate and mutinous
 
 soldiery of Oude, by the most profuse 
 largesses, and by granting them every sort 
 of indulgence which was calculated to gra^ 
 tify their licentious passions. After his de- 
 position, and during his residence at BedJ- 
 ares, he employed every secret means to 
 keep alive, amongst the Nabob's troops, that 
 regard for him, or rather that interest in his 
 fortunes, with which his lavish munificence 
 had inspired them. The short distance of 
 Benares from Oude facilitated the prosecu* 
 tion of these practices, and the British gOr 
 vernment had, on that account, ordered him 
 to be removed to Calcutta. To this re- 
 moval, which would defeat all his projects, 
 he resolved not to submit ; and, in a fit of 
 vindictive despair, he cruelly murdered, in 
 cold blood, Mf. Cherry the Resident, and 
 several other English gentlemen at Benares^; 
 after which he effected his escape with a 
 few followers 1 , and took refuge in the forests 
 of Bhotwal. There he was soon joined by
 
 120 
 
 some rebellious Zemindars, and by a whole 
 battalion of the Nabob's troops who had 
 been sent against him. In the course of 
 two months his retinue amounted to nine 
 thousand men. With this powerful and 
 desperate band of ruffians, he entered the 
 plains of Goorakpoor, which form the 
 Eastern districts of Oude ; from whence, 
 by his incessant depredations, no less than 
 by the interest which his appearance ex- 
 cited amongst the disaiftcted, he kept the 
 whole province in a state of continual agi- 
 tation and alarm. 
 
 Whilst Oude was thus menaced by all 
 those circumstances of contiguous external 
 danger, and pregnant with those com- 
 plicated domestic evils which were fast de- 
 stroying the sources by which alone that 
 danger could be effectually repelled, the 
 British government received positive intel-
 
 121 
 
 ligence* of the approach of Zemaun Shah, 
 King of Cabul, with a powerful army, for 
 the avowed purpose of carrying into ex- 
 ecution, liis long-meditated design of wrest- 
 ing the dominions of Oude from the au- 
 thority of the English. 
 
 " Zemaun Shah was sovereign of a power- 
 " ful Mohammedan state, situated principally 
 " on the west side of the river Indus, but com- 
 " prising the provinces of Lahore and Cash- 
 " meer, which form the north-west frontier 
 " of Hindustan, and which are from tl>ree 
 " hundred to four hundred miles distant 
 " from Oude. This state was founded in 
 " 1740, by Ahmed Shah Duranee, a war- 
 " rior of great renown throughout Asia, 
 " who left to his successor Zemaun Shah, 
 
 * See Letters and Papers relative to the apprehended 
 invasion of Hindustan, by Zemaun Shah, King of CabuL 
 -Oude Papers, No. 12 in 2.
 
 m 
 
 " not only a numerous and well-disciplined 
 array, but also the fame which that 
 " army had acquired under his command, 
 " in his several invasions of Hinddstan, and 
 " more particularly in his celebrated victory 
 "over the Mahrattas at Paniput. Along 
 " with these inheritances, Zemaun Shah 
 *' possessed something of the enterprizing 
 spirit, and all the ambition of his ances- 
 " tor. The design of subjugating the 
 " state, of Oude, and of extinguishing the 
 ffahab's family, had long formed the 
 " main object of that prince's policy ; and 
 * his inveterate hostility to the English 
 " power in Hindustan had been publicly 
 " and repeatedly announced to all the 
 " courts of AsiaV'*- 
 
 * Having given this short account of Zemaun Shah, 
 In a recent publication, and knowing it to be accurate, I 
 have thought it best to transcribe it here> without any 
 alteration in the form of
 
 123 
 
 The march of Zemaun Shah into Hin- 
 dustan, was a part of the extensive scheme} 
 which Tippoo Sultaun had formed for 
 extermination of the English in India, 
 which, in conjunction with France and with 
 several Mussulman chiefs, he was, in the latn 
 ter end of 1798* on the point of carrying 
 into actual effect.*? 
 
 Advices had at the same time been 
 ceived by Lord Wellesley, from the Court of 
 Directors, apprizing him of Buonaparte's 
 expedition into Egypt, and of India being 
 the ultimate object of his destination. f 
 
 * See the Letters of Tippoo to the Governor of the 
 Mauritius, to the Executive Directory of France, ad to 
 Zernaun Shah. Asiatic Register, for 1799, VoJ. I. State 
 Papers,, &<;. 
 
 f See an extract of a, Dispatch from the, Court of 
 Directors to the Governor-general, Ibid.
 
 124 
 
 At this critical conjuncture, when it was 
 palpably necessary to call forth the whole 
 resources of our Indian empire, in its own 
 defence, and, at the same moment, to assem- 
 ble a powerful army in the Carnatic to op- 
 pose the designs of Tippoo, and another in 
 Oude to resist the invasion of Zemaun Shah, 
 what, in a military point of view, was the 
 actual state of that our frontier province 
 in Hindustan, and the declared object of 
 the enemy's attach ? 
 
 Sir James Craig, the Commander in Chief 
 of the British forces in that dependancy, 
 informs us, in his public dispatches to the 
 Resident at Lucknow. " that should the long- 
 " threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah be at 
 " length realized, there was, he thought, little 
 " doubt that he would be supported by al- 
 " most the whole of the Rohilla tribe, and 
 " that the means, therefore, to be employed 
 " to repel it, must be of a magnitude far
 
 125 
 
 " exceeding what was then in the pro- 
 
 vince."* 
 
 This account of the danger to be appre- 
 hended from the disaffection of the Rohillas, 
 is strongly confirmed by a dispatch of 
 Major-general Stuart, the officer who com- 
 manded the English forces which were 
 stationed in Rohilcund. 
 
 " I do conceive," says he, " in the event of 
 " Zemaun Shah's actual approach, that the 
 " presence of the whole of the force under 
 " my command w ill be required in Rohil- 
 
 With regard to the state and disposition 
 of the Nabob's troops at this period, Sir 
 
 * Qude Papers, No. 12 in 2, p. 35. 
 f ibid supra, p. 24.
 
 126 
 
 James Craig, in his letter to Lord Wellesley, 
 gives the following account: 
 
 (1 I know not What to say with respect 
 " to the Nabob's troops. I would be con- 
 " tent that they should be useless, but I 
 " dread! tfiei? being detttg&rous. Unless 
 " s^me stefy is taken with regard to them, 
 " I should be almost as Unwilling to leaVfe 
 " them behind me, AS I SHOULD BE TO 
 
 " LEAVE A FORTRESS Otf THE ENEMY. The 
 
 *" Nabob is highly unpopular, and of all 
 f< his subjects, I believe he would least ex- 
 pect attachment from his army." * * * 
 *' Your Lordship judges most rightly, that 
 " in its present shape, 720 sort of service can 
 " 5e effpfectexJ from the Nabob's army ; 
 *' and I a"m confident, that ivithout a total 
 '* change in the policy of the government, 
 " and in the manners of the people, there 
 " exists no possible means by which it can 
 " be rendered such as can merit that the
 
 127 
 
 " smallest degree of confidence should be 
 " placed in it. The money now expended 
 " on the Nabob's army is thrown aivay, and 
 " can only be rendered subservient to the 
 " object of general defence, by being ap- 
 t( propriated to the increase of the Com- 
 " panys army. ****** The Nabob 
 " has repeatedly declared to me, that we 
 " must not reckon on deriving the smallest 
 " assistance from his troops. He said, that 
 " their arms in general tvere scarcely ser- 
 " viceable, that there was no subordination 
 <( amongst them, and that no reliance was to 
 4( be placed on their fdelity. * * * The 
 " Nabob expressed considerable apprehen- 
 " sions, with respect to the Rohillas, who 
 " he repeatedly said, he had no doubt ivould 
 " take up arms, the moment they could 
 " make themselves sure of support by 
 " Zemaun Shah's approach. He was ex- 
 " tremely pressing to have some of the 
 " Company's troops left for his own pro-
 
 12S 
 
 " tection ; indeed he almost made it a con- 
 " dition" * * * With respect to the re- 
 sources in Oude for the supply of the army 
 at this crisis, Sir James Craig informed Lord 
 Wellesley, " that he was sorry to see good 
 " grounds for the conviction, that no one 
 ?' step had been taken, for laying in grain 
 " in any of the magazines ; and that this 
 " important object would never be attained, 
 ?' whilst the management of it remained i?i 
 " the hands of the Nabob's people"* 
 
 The melioration in the state of Oude, 
 however, which the circumstances here re- 
 
 * These facts are substantially contained in Sir James 
 Craig's evidence before the House of Commons ; but I. 
 have chosen in this place to take them from his letters ; 
 because those letters were written on the spot, and at tht 
 time, and because they furnished the information upon 
 which Lord Wellesley acted, in framing the subsequent 
 arrangements for improving the defence, as well as the ge- 
 neral condition of Oude, by reducing the Nabob's troops.
 
 129 
 
 lated so strongly demanded, was reserved for 
 a season of greater tranquillity, and there- 
 fore more suitable for effecting the im- 
 portant arrangements, which the attainment 
 of such an object necessarily embraced. 
 
 By the enlarged and dextrous .policy of 
 dispatching an embassy to the King of 
 Persia, a diversion was effected against Ze- 
 maun Shah in that quarter, which, together 
 with some domestic dissentions, compelled 
 him to retreat from Hindustan ; whilst 
 the same policy, by an effort of vigour and 
 promptitude which has been rarely equalled, 
 anticipated the hostility of Tippoo, and in a 
 few months completely subdued his power. 
 And, in Oude, the party of Vizier Alii was 
 routed and dispersed. 
 
 But those important successes, though 
 they greatly lessened the magnitude of the 
 general danger, and averted the immediate 
 
 K
 
 130 
 
 invasion of Oude, yet in no manner dimi- 
 nished the force of that imperious necessity, 
 which the other political circumstances con- 
 nected with the state of Oude had created, 
 for insisting upon the Nabob making such 
 immediate reparations as the dangerous 
 vices of his government, the increasing 
 waste which the country was suffering, and 
 his own continued neglect did in justice 
 entitle us to demand. 
 
 The arcliieves of Seringapatam had dis- 
 closed the whole details of the vast plan 
 which had been formed for the destruction 
 of the English power in the East. From 
 these it appeared, that almost all the French 
 officers in the service of the native princes, 
 had either been directly concerned in that 
 scheme, or had secretly encouraged it. It 
 also appeared, that Tippoo had succeeded in 
 obtaining a promise of neutrality from Scin^ 
 deah, in the event of Zemaun Shah invading
 
 131 
 
 Hindu-Stan ; and that he had also engaged 
 him to exert his influence in the councils of 
 the Peishwa, to detach that prince from the 
 British alliance. 
 
 Scindeah had been induced to promise 
 this neutrality from his own jealousy of the 
 English power ; aud from the hope that 
 Holkar, hig rival in the Mahratta empire, 
 might, from his warlike and predatory spi- 
 rit, and from his known desire of ravaging 
 the British provinces in Bengal, be led to 
 take an active part against the English. 
 
 The fall of Tippoo produced no change 
 in the hostile sentiments which Scindeah 
 thus cherished against the English power, 
 and which, indeed, he seemed not very 
 solicitous to conceal. But the ' violent dis- 
 sentions which prevailed at Poonah en- 
 grossed all his attention to the politics of 
 the Deccan ; and he entrusted to Perron the 
 
 K2
 
 132 
 
 exclusive and uncontrolled management of 
 all his interests in Hindustan. The views 
 and interests of that officer, and those of 
 France, I have already shewn to be the 
 same ; and the fact* of his having made no 
 preparation ivhatever to take the field, when 
 Zemaun Shah was in full march into Hin- 
 dustan, clearly indicates a knowledge on 
 his part, that the invasion was not directed 
 against his interests, and that he had no 
 thing to fear from it ; so that, combining 
 this circumstance with his known policy, 
 it is, I think, fair to conclude, that, in the 
 event of another expedition from Cabul, he 
 was much more likely to have supported it, 
 than to have thrown any impediment in its 
 way. 
 
 Nor was the apprehension of another ex- 
 
 * See Sir James Craig's evidence before the House of 
 Commons, Minutes of Evidence, p. 98.
 
 133 
 
 pedition against Oude, and the British pro- 
 vinces in Hindustan at all diminished by 
 the circumstance of Zemaun Shah having 
 been dethroned ; for his brother Mahmud 
 Shah, who perpetrated that act, and who 
 placed himself on the throne, was known 
 to entertain precisely the same vieivs in re- 
 gard to the projected invasion of Hindus- 
 tan*. 
 
 Hence, then, there were two existing 
 sources of external danger to Oude, at the 
 
 * This fact is confirmed by the evidence before the 
 
 House of Commons. See Extract of a Letter from 
 
 Governor Duncan, (the Governor of Bombay) to the 
 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 8th January, 
 1801. In this letter, after mentioning the termination 
 of the contest between Zemaun Shah and his brother, and 
 the elevation of the latter, Governor Duncan expressly 
 says, " The news refers to the probability of Mahmud pro- 
 " securing his brother's vieivs in India, to which he is said 
 *<* to have been invited by the Afghan
 
 134 
 
 beginning of the year 1801, against which 
 it was evidently necessary to provide -.first, 
 the invasion of Mahrnud Shall, the new 
 king of Cabul, which Governor Duncan, on 
 certain information received from Persia, 
 represented as probable, arid as being insti- 
 gated by the Afghan chiefs ; and second, the 
 French Mahratta establishment in the Du-ab, 
 which, at best a suspicious neighbour, was, 
 in that view, formidable, from its intrinsic 
 force, but which was still more formidable, 
 from the circumstances of that force being 
 constantly stationed on our open and de- 
 fenceless frontier, and being, in that posi- 
 tion, under the ostensible sanction of the 
 Moghul, and the powerful protection of 
 Scindeah, the actual instrument of the policy 
 of France,* and the means to which she 
 
 * See a Memorial on the present Importance of India, and 
 on the most EFFICACIOUS MEANS OF RE-ESTABLISHING THE 
 FRENCH NATION in that country. 
 
 This dpcument was obtained at Pondicherry, from an
 
 135 
 
 confidently looked for the ultimate accom- 
 plishment of her known designs on Hin- 
 dustan. The execution of those designs 
 might be retarded for a while, by tempo- 
 rary obstacles; but the policy on which 
 they w^ere formed was steady, constant, and 
 uniform ; and it was certain would never 
 be abandoned by any government in France, 
 much less by the grasping ambition of the 
 present ruler. 
 
 f This last source of danger, therefore, was 
 constant, progressive, and at hand, and was, 
 in its nature, calculated to lead to actual 
 hostility. The landing of a French force 
 
 officer who accompanied General De-Caen to India, in 
 1802. An extract from it, which proves the fact I have 
 stated, may be seen in a valuable and interesting publi- 
 cation, intitled, Notes relative to the peaci concluded between 
 the British government and the Mahratta chieftains, &c. 
 Stoddale, 1805.
 
 136 
 
 on any of the shores of the peninsula, or a 
 rupture with the Mahrattas would have 
 been the signal for Perron to have marched 
 into Oude with his whole force. The events 
 which soon afterwards took place, in the 
 war with Scindeah, attest the justness of 
 this observation : and if, at that great crisis, 
 the military defence, the civil condition, and 
 the financial resources of Oude had not 
 been previously strengthened, improved, and 
 consolidated, the consequences of Perron's 
 hostility would, in all probability, have 
 proved fatal to that dependancy, if not to 
 our own contiguous territories. 
 
 That this French Mahratta army, of forty 
 thousand disciplined troops, stationed on the 
 unprotected frontier of Oude, was a neigh- 
 bour who required to be guarded with the 
 most unremitting vigilance, and by an ade- 
 quate force, is. a position that cannot be 
 controverted : that the mutinous state of the
 
 137 
 
 Nabob's troops, and the rebellious disposi* 
 tion of the Rohillas were sources of immi- 
 nent danger, in the event of an attack from 
 that neighbour, is equally undeniable. There 
 existed, therefore, the strongest political ne- 
 cessity for making immediate preparations in 
 our own defence, suited to the nature and 
 extent of the perils that threatened us, and 
 adapted to establish a substantial and perma- 
 nent protection against them. And, as it 
 has been already shewn, from the internal 
 state of the country, that those preparations 
 could not have been made, without a total 
 change in its civil affairs ; so it became the 
 duty of Lord Wellesley to employ a period 
 of peace in effecting an object, which was 
 palpably essential to the safety of our in- 
 terests, and which we were entitled to de- 
 mand from the Nabob, on the clearest prin- 
 ciples both of policy and of justice. 
 
 Thus the four points on which the merits
 
 138 
 
 of this question entirely rest, and must be 
 finally decided, appear to be established,- 
 namely : 
 
 First. The province of Oude \vas--a_ 
 " DEPENDANT FIEF," and the Nabob a 
 VASSAL of the British government. 
 
 Second. The right possessed by the Bri- 
 tish government, of exercising its paramount 
 authority over this its VASSAL in all matters 
 of importance, and more especially of de- 
 manding from him substantial reparation for 
 any waste committed, or suffered, through 
 his mismanagement, or omission in this 
 " DEPENDANT FIEF," was founded on the 
 established principles of universal justice, 
 
 Third. There had existed for a long 
 period of time, a general necessity for exer- 
 cising this right, in order to effect a radical 
 reformation in the internal government of
 
 139 
 
 the dependancy ; and, combined with this 
 general necessity, there was the increasing 
 tvaste which the British interests were daily 
 suffering through the contumacy, or negli- 
 gence of this VASSAL, and which, therefore, 
 intitled the British government to exercise 
 its right of calling on him for ample re- 
 paration. 
 
 Fourth. Superadded to this general ne- 
 cessity, there was, in the early part of Lord 
 Wellesley's administration, a particular po- 
 litical necessity, which rendered the imme- 
 diate exercise of the right in question indis- 
 pensable to the safety, not only of this 
 " DEPENDANT FIEF," but of the actual ter- 
 ritories of Britain in Hindustan. 
 
 Having then shewn, that the Nabob, on 
 
 the established principle of forfeiture for 
 
 waste committed, or suffered, had completely 
 
 forfeited to the British government the place
 
 140 
 
 which he had wasted, it follows, that any 
 arrangement made by the British govern- 
 ment, by which the whole forfeiture was 
 not insisted on, was an abatement of its 
 legal claim, and, therefore, an act of signal 
 indulgence. 
 
 Now, Lord Wellesley did not insist on a 
 greater reparation from the Nabob than was 
 exactly sufficient to secure effectually, the 
 amount of revenue, necessary for the sup- 
 port of our establishments in Oude. He 
 commuted the subsidy which the Nabob 
 was previously bound to pay, for a portion 
 of territory, the annual revenue of which, 
 as then assessed, was exactly equal to that 
 subsidy : He reduced the Nabob's mutinous 
 and incorrigible troops, in whose " fidelity 
 " and services' the Nabob himself declared 
 " there was no reliance to be placed: " and, 
 he reserved to the Nabob a considerable 
 territory, comprizing some of the most fer-
 
 141 
 
 tile districts in Oude, free from the payment 
 of any tribute, and from all pecuniary 
 demands whatever ; but under positive stipu- 
 lations, that he should effect a complete re- 
 form in the civil administration of his 
 government. 
 
 The correspondence which took place 
 between the British government and the 
 Nabob relative to those important transac- 
 tions, was extremely tedious, and by him 
 unnecessarily and purposely prolonged ; so, 
 that, under all the aggravated circum- 
 stances which have been stated, it does in 
 my opinion exhibit a degree of patience and 
 forbearance on the part of Lord Wellesley, 
 which is highly commendable in itself, but 
 to which the Nabob's contumacious con- 
 duct in no way intitled him. 
 
 It is wholly useless to trespass upon your 
 time with any detailed account of that cor-
 
 142 
 
 respondence* the whole, of it is before the 
 House ; and it will, therefore, be sufficient 
 to mention the objects to which it related, 
 and the results to which it led. 
 
 A few months after Lord Wellesley's ar- 
 rival in Bengal, his attention was powerfully 
 called to the situation of affairs in Oude, 
 and particularly to the state of our military 
 defence in that dependancy, by the menaced 
 invasion of Zemaun Shah. As soon as 
 certain intelligence was received, of that 
 prince being actually on his march into 
 Hindustan, the English army in Oude was 
 increased from ten thousand men, the num- 
 ber stipulated by Lord Teignmouth's treaty 
 to be stationed constantly in the country, to 
 twenty thousand men, which Sir James 
 Craig, the Commander in Chief in Oude, 
 represented to be absolutely and indispen- 
 sably necessary to defend the province* 
 
 * See Sir James Craig's evidence befor the House of 
 Commons. Minutes of Evidence, p. 91.
 
 143 
 
 against the enemy who threatened to in- 
 vade it. 
 
 This augmentation of the army for the 
 defence of Chide, occasioned a demand on 
 the Nabob for a proportional increase of 
 subsidy, which, according to the 7th article 
 of Lord Teignmouth's treaty, and to Lord 
 Teignmoutlis interpretation* of that article, 
 the Nabob was bound to provide. This 
 increase of subsidy amounted to fifty-four 
 lacs of rupees, which, together with the 
 subsidy of seventy-six lacs, fixed by treaty, 
 inade the sum of one million, six hundred and 
 
 * " By the terms of the treaty," said Lord Teign- 
 mouth, " if the Company thought it necessary to station 
 ** a force, to the amount of double the force stationed in 
 " 'Oudc, the Nabob was bound to pay for that firce, so 
 " long as it was necessary for the defence of the country." 
 Minutes of Evidence before the House of Commons, 
 p. 13.
 
 144 
 
 eighty-nine thousand, one hundred and s/r- 
 teen pounds sterling. 
 
 The dilapidated resources of Oude pro- 
 duced by former waste, and by the Nabob's 
 own mismanagement and neglect, disabled 
 him from fulfilling his payments under the 
 augmented subsidy, which, therefore, fell 
 into an arrear of four hundred and seventy - 
 five thousand pounds, sterling. * 
 
 This arrear the Nabob declared his inabi- 
 lity to liquidate, in consequence of the dis- 
 ordered and distressed state of the country, 
 and of the increasing defalcation in its 
 revenues.* But, whilst he made this de- 
 claration, and constantly expressed an ear- 
 
 * See Col. Scott's letter to the Nabob. Oude Papers, 
 No. 3. p. 83-4. 
 
 f See the Nabob's letter to Col. Sctft. Oude 
 No. 3. p. 77, 102, and 141.
 
 145 
 
 nest solicitude to remedy the evils of which 
 he complained, he used not the smallest 
 endeavour whatever to accomplish that 
 object ; and whenever he was pressed by 
 the British Resident to adopt some decisive 
 measure for removing the acknowledged 
 abuses of his government, he invariably be- 
 trayed that real disinclination and reluctance 
 to any change in his ruinous system, which 
 always lurked in his heart. 
 
 When Lord Wellesley discovered this* 
 disposition in the Nabob, and saw that he 
 was making no effort, either to liquidate 
 the arrear which was due, to reform his 
 government, or even to reduce those super- 
 fluous establishments which formed one of 
 the obligations imposed on him by the treaty 
 of 1798, his Lordship insisted on an imme- 
 diate reduction of his mutinous and useless 
 troops, as a very material saving in the 
 public expenditure would thereby be ob-
 
 146 
 
 tained, as they constituted a primary source 
 of the grievous calamity with which the 
 country was afflicted, as they formed the 
 first object of reform in the government, 
 and finally, as the Nabob himself had re- 
 peatedly acknowledged the necessity of such 
 a measure, and had, with apparent earnest- 
 ness, even urged its adoption. 
 
 But, when the reduction was actually com- 
 menced, the Nabob, in the face of his former 
 declarations, started objections to it; and 
 when these objections were removed, he still 
 frustrated and delayed it by various secret 
 artifices, which prove incontestibly, that he 
 had no intention whatever of ever reforming 
 his government, or of repairing the waste 
 which the country was suffering through his 
 pertinacious misconduct, and that all his 
 specious professions on that subject were 
 hollow and insincere.
 
 147 
 
 Under these circumstances the reduction 
 of the Nabob's troops was at last accom- 
 plished ; but the arrears of subsidy remained 
 still unpaid. And, though Zemaun Shah 
 bad then retired to his own country, it was 
 still necessary, as I have already shewn you, 
 to keep a large force in Oude to watch the 
 motions of the French Mahratta army, 
 which was stationed on its open frontier, 
 and to awe into submission, by a superi- 
 ority of strength which would not be op- 
 posed, rather than by measures of coercion 
 which must have terminated in bloodshed, 
 that rebellious spirit of the Rohillas, which 
 had kept the whole province in continual 
 alarm. 
 
 The Nabob's continued failure, therefore, 
 in paying up the arrears of subsidy, was 
 attended with considerable inconvenience tQ 
 theBritish government; and, consequently, its 
 interests were sustaining a positive and direct
 
 148 
 
 damage from the Nabob's culpable pro- 
 crastination in repairing those errors in the 
 internal management of the country, which 
 at the same time he urged as an apology for 
 the very failure in question. 
 
 About this period of time, the Nabob 
 made a proposal to Lord Wellesley to abdi- 
 cate the government of Oude, stating, 
 " That he felt himself unequal to manage 
 " it, either with satisfaction to himself, or 
 " advantage to the people ; for, that he was 
 " neither pleased with them, nor they with 
 " him:"* but he accompanied this pro- 
 posal with the conditions, that one of his 
 
 
 sons should be appointed to- succeed him, and 
 
 that he should be allowed to retain posses- 
 sion of the public treasure, witli the sole 
 and absolute power to dispose of it, in any 
 manner he might think Jit. 
 
 * See Colonel Scott's report to the Governor-general, 
 22d Nov. 1799 Qudt Papers, No. 3.
 
 149 
 
 To his abdication on these conditions 
 Lord Wellesley refused to agree. An un- 
 conditional abdication, though a thing 
 highly desirable, was nothing more than the 
 British government had a legal right to de- 
 mand, as the forfeiture for the tvaste which 
 the country was suffering through the 
 Nabob's pernicious administration, and in 
 consequence, not only of his stubborn re- 
 jection of every measure which had been 
 proposed for its improvement, but also of 
 his actual opposition to the reduction of his 
 troops, whom he himself represented as 
 useless and faithless, and of his positive 
 failure in the payment of his subsidy. And, 
 though from motives of indulgence to the 
 Nabob, the British government was induced 
 to remit the full exercise of this right, it 
 would have been at once criminal and pre- 
 posterous to have placed the Nabob's son at 
 the head of the government for the purpose 
 , of intitling him to the same indulgence, and
 
 150 
 
 of enabling him to participate in those in- 
 veterate abuses, which it was evident from 
 experience he would never make any sin- 
 cere or effectual endeavour to correct. The 
 administration of Oftde, under the extra- 
 vagance of Assof-ud-Dowlah, and the 
 parsimony of Saadut Alii, had been alike 
 destructive to the public interests ; whilst 
 both of them admitted the necessity, yet 
 rejected the means of reforming it. So 
 that there was, therefore, good reason to 
 believe, that any son of either of those 
 Nabobs would be actuated by the same dis- 
 tempered prejudices that had made them 
 adhere to the ruinous customs, which they 
 had at the same moment followed and con- 
 demned. 
 
 # 
 
 With regard to the public treasures, as 
 they formed a part of the resources from 
 which the Nabob derived the means of ful- 
 filling his current payments to the Com-
 
 151 
 
 pany, it is manifest, that Lord Wellesley 
 could not consent to their being appro- 
 priated to the Nabob's exclusive use, in the 
 event of his resigning the government, 
 without releasing him from the obligation 
 of paying up his arrears, and without 
 thereby adding in an equal proportion to 
 the public embarrassments of the state. 
 
 Wellesley, therefore, informed the 
 Nabob, that he could not consent to his 
 abdication, unless he surrendered to the 
 Company, in perpetuity, the sole and ex- 
 clusive possession of Oude, under such ar- 
 rangements as should secure a liberal pro- 
 vision for himself and his family. 
 
 The Nabob, however, would not ac- 
 quiesce in this proposition ; which, founded 
 on substantial justice, was neither adapted to 
 
 gratify his sordid avarice, nor to flatter his 
 i 
 
 insidious pride : and, as the notion of ab-
 
 152 
 
 dicating the government had entirely origi- 
 nated with himself, Lord Wellesley did not 
 press it upon him, and the business accord- 
 ingly dropped. 
 
 Yet, whilst the Nabob was thus soliciting 
 the British government for permission to 
 appropriate the public treasures to his own 
 private use, his arrear still remained unliqui- 
 dated, and the financial exigencies of the 
 Country continued rapidly to increase. Such 
 at last was the pressure of public distress, 
 that the Nabob explicitly declared his ap- 
 prehension of a total failure in the revenues ; 
 and he again intreated the aid of the British 
 government to place them under a better 
 system of management. Lord Wellesley 
 embraced this occasion of again impressing 
 upon his mind the indispensable necessity 
 of an immediate and total change in his 
 government, and of his giving the Company 
 a complete and permanent security for the
 
 153 
 
 future maintainance of the British army in 
 Oude, which was essential to the projection 
 of the province against foreign aggression, 
 and to its preservation from domestic com- 
 motion. 
 
 On these principles Lord Wellesley pro- 
 posed to the Nabob, as the result of his 
 final deliberations on this important subject, 
 that he should transfer to the Company 
 the exclusive possession of the whole pro- 
 vince of Oude, with all its public authori- 
 ties ; and that he should receive for himself, 
 and all the branches of his family, his re- 
 lations and dependants, such allowances as 
 should be amply proportioned to their 
 respective ranks and dignities. If the 
 Nabob objected to this proposal, his Lord- 
 ship informed him, he should not enforce 
 it ; but that in that case he must insist on 
 the Nabob making an immediate cession to 
 the Company, in perpetuity, of such par-
 
 154 
 
 ticular portions of territory, in commutation 
 of the subsidy which he then paid, as 
 should appear best calculated to secure the 
 general interests of the state. 
 
 The Nabob, in answer to this communi- 
 cation, made such earnest objections to the 
 proposal of transferring the whole province 
 to the Company, that Lord Wellesley, from 
 motives of lenity, and from considerations 
 of personal respect, was induced to re- 
 linquish it. His Lordship, therefore, only 
 insisted on the territorial cession , in com- 
 mutation of subsidy ; and he accordingly 
 instructed the British Resident in Oude to 
 make an arrangement with the Nabob for 
 that purpose, 
 
 The Nabob, however, by long delibera- 
 tions, frequent discussions, much evasion, 
 and occasional letters, contrived to delay, for 
 nine months, the conclusion of this arrange^
 
 155 
 
 ment; until at length the necessities of 
 the country became so urgent, and the 
 arrears of subsidy, which had been due for 
 three years being still unpaid, Lord Wel- 
 lesley determined to admit of no farther 
 postponement of a settlement, in which the 
 interests and happiness of so many millions 
 of people were involved. He, therefore, 
 deputed his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, 
 to the Nabob ; who, by the spirited good 
 sense, and judicious moderation of his con- 
 duct, in conjunction with the knowledge 
 and experience of Colonel Scott, soon 
 brought the business to a final termination. 
 
 In November, 1801, a treaty with the 
 Nabob was concluded, by which certain dis- 
 tricts in the dependancy of Oude, the 
 annual revenue of which exactly amounted 
 to the subsidy that the Nabob was before 
 bound to pay, were ceded in perpetuity to 
 the Company; by which the Nabob was
 
 156 
 
 exonerated from all future payments of sub- 
 sidy, as well as from all pecuniary demands 
 whatever; and by which the Nabob en- 
 gaged to establish, in the reserved depen- 
 
 D O t 
 
 dancy, such a system of administration as 
 should be adapted to secure the lives and 
 property, and to advance the prosperity of 
 the inhabitants. 
 
 Lord Wellesley, soon after the ratifica- 
 tion of this treaty, proceeded to Oude him- 
 self, when, in several conferences with the 
 Nabob, he adjusted some points arising out 
 of the provisions of the treaty, which 
 formed a necessary supplement to it. 
 
 These points were, 1st. the immediate 
 discharge of the arrear of subsidy, which, 
 though some part of it had been paid, still 
 amounted to 242,000. 2d. The further 
 reduction of the Nabob's military establish- 
 ments to five battalions of infantry and two
 
 157 
 
 thousand horsemen. 3d. The future regu- 
 lar payment of the pensions to the Nabob's 
 relations and other dependants. 4th. The 
 introduction of an improved system of civil 
 government into the reserved dominions of 
 Oude, with the advice and assistance of the 
 British government. 5th. The British force 
 employed within the reserved dependancy, 
 to be concentered at a cantonment in the 
 vicinity of Lucknow. 
 
 The Nabob made no material objections to 
 any of these points, and an arrangement found- 
 ed upon them was accordingly concluded. 
 
 Thus the dependancy of Oude, whilst it 
 was narrowed in its extent, was improved 
 in its condition, by the reduction of the 
 Nabob's troops ; by the Nabob being bound 
 by an express stipulation of his new cove- 
 nant, to reform all the existing abuses of his 
 civil government ; by the additional security
 
 158 
 
 which it derived from the new arrangement, 
 both with a view to foreign invasion and to 
 internal rebellion ; by the general confidence 
 with which the people were inspired ; and 
 by the encouragement which was conse- 
 quently held out to the revival of industry, 
 agriculture, and commerce. 
 
 These important benefits were greatly 
 enhanced by the principle of choice adopted 
 by Lord Wellesley, in fixing on the districts 
 to be placed under the British government. 
 His Lordship did not fix on those districts 
 in which there existed a comparative supe- 
 riority in point of tranquillity and cultiva- 
 tion ; but he made choice of those parts of 
 the country in which the greatest turbu- 
 lence and waste prevailed, which had been 
 annexed to the province of Oude by the 
 British arms, which had never peaceably 
 submitted to the Nabob's government, and 
 which formed the natural barriers of that
 
 159 
 
 dependancy, as well as of the whole of our 
 dominions in Hindustan, not only against 
 the encroachments of the French Mahratta 
 establishment on our frontier, but against 
 the attack of any invader from the North- 
 west of Asia. 
 
 Hence, the districts appropriated by the 
 British government were, Jirst, those which, 
 together with the tributary state of Furruc- 
 kabad, form the tract of country called the 
 lower Du-ab, that is situated between the 
 rivers Jumnah and Ganges, and extends 
 from their confluence at Allahabad, to the 
 French Mahratta frontier on the plains of 
 Coel; second, the districts of Rohilcund, 
 which were annexed to Oude in 1774, and 
 which bound it on the North; and third, 
 the district of Goorakpoor, which forms ite 
 Eastern confine. 
 
 Into all these tracts of country the same 
 system of government was introduced as
 
 160 
 
 that which had long been established in 
 Bengal; and which had redeemed that fer- 
 tile province from a state of impoverish- 
 ment and misery, and raised it to a higher 
 degree of affluence and happiness, than what 
 history records, or even poetry celebrates, of 
 its ancient condition. 
 
 Thus our dependancy in Oude is now 
 surrounded by provinces, flourishing under 
 the benignant influence of the British sys- 
 tem ; and protected, not alone by the power- 
 ful valour, but by the unsullied and wide-, 
 spreading fame of our arms. 
 
 This auspicious conclusion, as well as 
 every other part of those important trans- 
 actions, was regularly reported to the Court 
 of Directors, and highly approved of by 
 them. 
 
 The printed papers before the House of
 
 161 
 
 Commons shew, that as early as the 3d of 
 October, 1798, Lord Wellesley stated to the 
 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
 that he had under consideration, " the best 
 " means of securing the regular payment 
 " of the subsidy in Oude." * 
 
 In his letter to the Secret Committee, of 
 the 21st and 28th November 1799, Lord 
 Wellesley continues to state " his anxiety 
 " to carry into execution such a reform of 
 " the Nabob Vizier's military establishments, 
 " as should secure us from all future danger 
 " on the frontier of Oude, and should 
 " enable him to introduce a variety of ne- 
 " cessary improvements in the government 
 " of the country." -j* 
 
 His Lordship again brought the subject 
 
 * Oude Papers, No. 5. 
 
 * Ibid, supra. 
 M
 
 162 
 
 before the consideration "of the Secret Com- 
 mittee in January and in March, 1800. In 
 his letter, under date the 7th of March, he 
 observes, " When I shall have completed 
 " my arrangements for the military defence 
 " of Oude, and shall have disarmed the 
 " useless and dangerous troops of the Yizier, 
 " I shall proceed to adopt the most effectual 
 
 " measures for the reform of all the branches 
 
 '. 
 
 " of his Excellency's government. Such a 
 
 " reform cannot be postponed without the 
 
 " certain injury, if not the absolute destruc- 
 
 " tion of the valuable resources which the 
 
 " Contyany at present derive, from that 
 
 " country.'"* 
 
 On the 31st of August 1800, the Gover- 
 nor-general in Council, in a letter to the 
 Secret Committee, reported, " That it was 
 " their intention to proceed, with the least 
 
 * Oude Papers.
 
 163 
 
 '* possible delay, to a revision of the Nabob 
 
 " Vizier's civil establishments, and of the 
 
 " general interests of the Company in the 
 
 " province of Oude." * 
 
 The treaty with the Nabob was concluded 
 on the 10th of November, 1801, and a copy 
 of it was transmitted to the Court of Di- 
 rectors, on the 14th of that month. This 
 dispatch was received by the Court of Di- 
 rectors in May 1802; and, after eighteen 
 months deliberation on the subject, the Secret 
 Committee, on the 19th of November, 1803, 
 addressed the Governor-general in Council, 
 in the following terms ; 
 
 " Having taken into our consideration the 
 " treaty lately concluded between the Go- 
 " vernor-general and the Nabob Vizier, 
 " we have now to SIGNIFY OUR APPROBA- 
 
 * See Oude Papers. 
 M 2
 
 164 
 
 " TION OF THE PROVISIONS of that treaty. 
 
 " We consider the stipulations therein con- 
 
 " tained, as calculated to improve and secure 
 
 " the interests of the Fizicr, as well as 
 
 " those of the Company, and to provide 
 
 " more effectually hereafter for the good 
 
 " government and prosperity of Oude, and 
 
 " consequently for the happiness of its- 
 
 f< native inhabitants"* 
 
 Thus was the APPROBATION of the Court 
 of Directors explicitly and unequivocally 
 expressed, by that authority to whom their 
 power, in political affairs, is delegated by 
 Act of Parliament. 
 
 I have indeed heard, that the faction, by 
 
 * See this letter in No. 12, of the list of Papers before 
 the House, marked No. 2. page 58. It is signed, 
 
 JACOB BOSANQUETJ 
 v JOHN ROBERTS, 
 WILLIAM DEVAYNES.
 
 165 
 
 whom the councils of the Company have 
 for these last two years been ruled, attempt 
 to make a distinction between the orders 
 and communications of the secret com- 
 mittee, and those of the whole body of the 
 Directors ; as if the approbation of a treaty, 
 or of any other political measure, trans- 
 mitted by that committee to the executive 
 officers in India, was not to be considered 
 by them as conveying the sanction of 
 the supreme authorities in England, or 
 as a binding and definitive confirmation 
 of the Act to which it related. But to 
 shew you that this distinction has not even 
 the merit of a sophistical fallacy, and that 
 it is totally untrue in fact, as well as in reason, 
 it will be sufficient to cite to you, the ORDER of 
 
 / 
 
 the whole collective body of the Court of 
 Directors, which is transmitted regularly 
 every year, to the Governor-general in 
 Council at Bengal. That ORDER is thus 
 expressed : " Having appointed
 
 166 
 
 " during the present direction, to be a secret 
 " committee, agreeable to, and for the pur- 
 " poses stated in, the Acts of the 24th, 26th, 
 " and 33d of his present Majesty, ive here- 
 *' by direct, that ALL ORDERS AND INSTRUC- 
 " TIONS which you shall receive from our 
 " said secret committee be OBSERVED and 
 " OBEYED with the SAME PUNCTUALITY AND 
 
 " EXACTNESS, AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN 
 
 " SIGNED BY THIRTEEN, or MORE members 
 " of the Court of Directors, conformable to 
 " the said Acts." 
 
 The gentlemen who make the distinction 
 in question, may continue to exercise their 
 unsophisticated casuistry in maintaining, that 
 the executive officers in India had no right 
 to consider the orders and instructions of 
 the secret committee, as having the au- 
 thority and force of the Court of Directors : 
 but I think that you, and every other man 
 unconnected with those most conscientious
 
 reasoners, will agree, that, by the annual order 
 of the Court of Directors, and consequently 
 by the Acts of Parliament therein referred 
 to, the Governor-general was bound to 
 " observe' the dispatches of the secret 
 committee, with the same attention as those 
 of the Court of Directors at large ; and, 
 that he was, therefore, bound to consider 
 their APPROBATION of the arrangements in 
 Oude, as a complete and final ratification 
 of them. 
 
 After reading this statement of the trans- 
 actions in Oude, which is supported in all 
 its parts by the accuser s own evidence, I 
 request you to turn to the specific allegations 
 of the charge, and ask your own clear and 
 unbiassed judgment, whether Lord Wel- 
 lesley has been guilty of injustice and op- 
 pression f Has his Lordship, as the charge 
 asserts, violated the rights, and insulted the 
 sovweign of an independant state ? Did he
 
 unjustly, unlawfully, and on false pretexts, 
 pour troops into Oude, in order to effect 
 designs of encroachment , extortion, and cor- 
 ruption ? Did he unlawfully call on the 
 Nabob, contrary to treaty, to good faith, to 
 honour, and to honesty, to defray the ex- 
 penses of those troops, for the sinister pur- 
 pose of. compelling the Nabob to declare his 
 inability to do so? And finally, did he un- 
 justly and unlawfully seize on that declared 
 inability, as a pretext for depriving the 
 Nabob of one half of his territories & 
 
 Compare these allegations with the evi- 
 dence which has been adduced in their sup- 
 port, with the elucidations which I have 
 given you of that evidence, with the grounds 
 on which I have placed the main question at 
 issue, and witfy the arguments by which I 
 have maintained those grounds, and, I think, 
 you cannot but be satisfied, that the whole 
 charge is a tissue of falsehood and misrepre-
 
 169 
 
 sentation, more gross and palpable than any 
 with which parliament, or the country was 
 ever before attempted to be deluded. 
 
 There are, however, three remaining alle- 
 gations against Lord Wellesley, upon which 
 it may be necessary to make a few obser- 
 vations. 
 
 His Lordship is charged with having been 
 guilty of an illegal act, in appointing his 
 brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, to conclude 
 the negotiation ivith the Nabob, and after- 
 wards to superintend the transfer and set- 
 tlement of the ceded districts in Oude. 
 
 The alleged illegality of appointing Mr. 
 H. Wellesley to manage the settlement of 
 the ceded districts, is founded on the cir- 
 cumstance of Mr. Wellesley not being a 
 covenanted civil servant of the Company, 
 and his appointment being therefore supposed
 
 170 
 
 to be contrary to the provision of an Act of 
 Parliament. But a reference to the particu- 
 lar clause in the Act, which contains the 
 provision alluded to, will at once shew you, 
 that it does not embrace, and can on no 
 means be made applicable to the temporary 
 appointment in question, 
 
 The Act of the 33d Geo. III. cap. 52. 
 sec. 57. directs, " That all VACANCIES in 
 " the civil line of the Company's service in 
 " India, shall be supplied from amongst the 
 " Company's civil servants." 
 
 Here you see, that the letter of this clause 
 applies only to the filling-up of VACANCIES 
 in the Company's regular civil establishment 
 in India ; and it is quite evident; that taking 
 the spirit of the clause in its widest latitude, 
 it can only apply to appointments to PER- 
 MANENT offices, under an extention of that 
 establishment. It is, therefore, totally in-
 
 171 
 
 applicable to the appointment in question, 
 which was in its nature temporary, and in 
 its duties confined to particular and distinct 
 objects. 
 
 Mr. Henry Wellesley was private and 
 confidential secretary to the Governor-* 
 general : and, from the circumstance of his 
 holding that situation, from the authority 
 which his own tried abilities naturally gave 
 him, and from the respect which the near- 
 ness of his connection with the Governor- 
 general was calculated to create amongst the 
 natives, his Lordship justly conceived, that 
 it would be productive of advantage to the 
 public service, to employ him in carrying 
 into effect the final arrangements in Oude. 
 For this purpose he was first deputed to 
 Lucknow, to bring the long depending ne- 
 gotiation with the Nabob to a conclusion ; 
 and, after the accomplishment of that object, 
 he was appointed, with the temporary rank
 
 172 
 
 of Lieutenant-governor, to be President of 
 a Commission, composed of the Company's 
 civil servants, and instituted for the express 
 and exclusive purpose of introducing into 
 the ceded districts that system of revenue, 
 
 */ 
 
 and of jurisprudence, which was established 
 in our other dominions in India. So that, 
 when this specific service was completed, 
 the commission for which it was formed 
 was of course dissolved. 
 
 From this appointment Mr. Wellesley 
 derived no emolument whatever, nor did he 
 ever receive any pay. His salary as private 
 secretary to the Governor-general, the amount 
 of which is fixed by the express orders of 
 the Court of Directors, was continued to 
 him ; but he neither received, nor would 
 lie accept of any thing beyond it. The 
 whole cost of this appointment to the Com- 
 pany is, therefore, comprised in the charge 
 
 N 
 
 made for the extra expenses which he un-
 
 173 
 
 avoidably incurred in the performance of 
 his arduous and important duties. 
 
 The right of the Governor-general to 
 make an appointment of this nature, is fully 
 recognized by the discretionary power with 
 which he is invested, of selecting for the 
 execution of extraordinary and important 
 services, those persons who shall appear to 
 him best qualified to perform them with 
 credit and success, and in whom, therefore, 
 he can repose the greatest confidence. 
 
 The exercise of this discretionary power 
 was justified, not only by the practice of the 
 Supreme Government in India, but by the 
 express sanction of the Court of Directors. 
 Lord Cornwallis appointed Colonel Read, 
 and three military officers, to settle the 
 countries ceded by Tippoo Sultauh in 1792. 
 
 Mr. Henry Wellesley was appointed to a
 
 commission for settling the affairs of the 
 conquered countries in 1799 ; and the Court 
 of Directors not only approved of this 
 appointment, but bestowed a reward on Mr. 
 Wellesley for the important service which 
 he had rendered the Company on that oc- 
 casion* 
 
 Lord Wellesley, therefore, had the most 
 powerful reasons for appointing his brother 
 to a similar commission in Oude ; and the 
 Court of Directors found the same cause to 
 testify their approbation of the manner in 
 which that service was performed. 
 
 In the letter from the Secret Committee 
 of the Court of Directors to the Governor- 
 general in Council in Bengal, before referred 
 to, and under date the 19th November 1803, 
 their approbation is expressed in the follow- 
 ing terms : " We cannot," they say, 
 " conclude, without expressing our satis-
 
 175 
 
 " faction, that the cessions in question have 
 " been transferred, and provisionally set- 
 " tied, with so little delay, and in a manner 
 " so satisfactory, as already to admit of 
 " their being brought under the general 
 " administration of the Bengal government. 
 " The Special Commission, at the head of 
 " which Mr. Henry Wellesley was placed^ 
 " appears to have executed their trust with 
 " zeal, diligence, and ability ; and the set- 
 " tlement of the revenue, which they have 
 '* concluded for a period of three years, 
 " holds out flattering prospects of future 
 " increase. The general report delivered in 
 <( by Mr. Wellesley, on the* termination of 
 " his mission, has afforded us much satis- 
 " factory information with respect to the 
 " resources of the upper provinces; and 
 " we are happy to take this occasion of ap- 
 " proving the conduct, and acknowledging 
 " the services of that gentleman."
 
 176 
 
 The accusers of Lord Wellesley, how- 
 ever, entertain a far different opinion of 
 those services ; for, through the agency of 
 Mr. Wellesley, his Lordship is expressly 
 charged with having committed " Mur- 
 der ! / r 
 
 But when, to their infinite mortification, 
 they discovered that the official documents, 
 which they had moved for and laid before 
 the House, did not supply them even with a 
 colourable ground on which this general, 
 but positive, accusation could be sustained, 
 and that the cry of indignation and horror 
 which it was their sole object to raise against 
 the accused, was turning upon themselves 
 with reverberated force, some of their more 
 discreet, if not less malevolent, abettors, 
 thought it might be prudent to give some 
 explanation of the specific acts, which their 
 peculiar notions of the distinctions of crimes, 
 and the propriety of language, had led them
 
 177 
 
 to designate, under the expressive appella- 
 tion of *' Murder." 
 
 They accordingly drew up a supplemen- 
 tary article of charge, accusing Marquis 
 Wellesley of high crimes and misdemeanors, 
 in his transactions with the Zemindar of 
 Sassne and Bijjeghur, the Zemindar of 
 Cutchoura, and other Zemindars in the 
 Dd-db. 
 
 In this article, the original charge of 
 " Murder" is explained in the following 
 manner : That Lord Wellesley usurped the 
 country of the Du-db, in ivhich the Zemin- 
 dars in question possessed estates, and in 
 ivliich they resided; that he demanded from 
 them an increase of the land-rent, or tax. 
 That the Zemindars REFUSED TO PAY this 
 increased rent. That Lord Wellesley, in 
 consequence, declared them to be in a state 
 of rebellion. That troops were marched 
 
 N
 
 178 
 
 against them to compel them to submit. 
 That the Zemindars naturally resisted that 
 force. That many of their followers and 
 adherents fell in the conflicts which conse- 
 quently took place. And, finally, that all 
 these acts were unjust, unlawful, cruel, and 
 tyrannical, having been committed totvards 
 persons over whom the British government 
 had no control, from whom Lord JFelleslcy, 
 therefore, had no right to demand allegiance, 
 who oived no obedience ivhatever to his com- 
 mands, and who were, " IN LAW AND IN 
 " FACT, THE SUBJECTS OF THE NABOB 
 " VIZIER OF OUDE." 
 
 Now, taking the facts as they are here 
 stated by the accusers, it is clear they would 
 not have considered the acts imputed to 
 Lord Wellesley as unjust and unlawful on 
 the part of the Nabob Vizier of Oude, as 
 the Zemindars were, " in law and in fact" 
 the Nabob's subjects. If, then, I have sue-
 
 1/9 
 
 r.eeded in proving, that the arrangements 
 concluded with the Nabob Vizier, by Lord 
 Wellesley, were founded in justice and 
 sound policy, it is impossible to deny, that 
 the transfer of the Nabob's civil authority 
 over the districts in the Du-ab, and, conse- 
 quently, over the Zemindars in question, to 
 the British government, which formed the 
 principal part of those arrangements, was a 
 just and legal act. And if that transfer was 
 just and legal, the Zemindars of the Du ab 
 became, " in laiu and in fact" the subjects 
 of the British government. 
 
 Having thus become the lawful subjects 
 of the British government, those Zemindars 
 were bound to obey the laws which that 
 government enacted, and, by an unavoidable 
 consequence, to pay the taxes which it im- 
 posed. And, if they resisted the execution 
 of its laws, or the payment of its taxes, the 
 government had a clear and indisputable 
 
 2
 
 180 
 
 egal right to coerce them into submission 
 by force of arms. Hence, any resistance 
 which they made to the exercise of this 
 right, was an act of rebellion against the 
 sovereign authority of the state, by which 
 their lives and properties were protected from 
 all enemies ; and by which, therefore, ac- 
 cording to the principles of equity, and to 
 the practice of nations, they were under a 
 sacred obligation to obey. 
 
 That the Zemindars did not concur in the 
 change of government, or were hostile to 
 it, could in no manner alter the obligation 
 of their allegiance, or exempt them from the 
 penalties of treason and rebellion. 
 
 A government, whatever may be its form, 
 which is justly established in any country, 
 is the legitimate organ of the nation, and all 
 its acts are completely valid in themselves, 
 and binding on the people. The Zemindars,
 
 181 
 
 and other inhabitants of the Du-ab, were 
 subject to the dependant government of the 
 Nabob in all civil affairs ; but they owed 
 obedience to the paramount authority of the 
 English, because they derived from them 
 their sole security against all foreign aggres- 
 sion, and more particularly against the 
 Mahrattus, whom nothing but such power- 
 ful protection could have prevented from 
 annually ravaging and laying waste their 
 lands. It is therefore plain, that if the 
 Nabob, under all the peculiar circumstances 
 which I have stated, was legally bound to 
 submit to that paramount authority, so all 
 those subject to his subordinate government, 
 and consequently the Zemindars of the 
 Du-ab, were necessarily included in that 
 submission. Hence, the arrangements made 
 with the Nabob, for placing the Du-ab 
 under the immediate authority of the British 
 government, was completely binding on the 
 Zemindars : and hence, if they opposed that
 
 182 
 
 authority with an armed force, we had an 
 unquestionable right to declare them in a 
 state of rebellion, to reduce them to obedi- 
 ence, and to inflict upon them all the penal- 
 ties which they had incurred. 
 
 The exercise of this right, however, 
 ought in general to be used with a sparing, 
 though firm, hand. In a rebellion arising 
 from a recent change of government, many 
 extenuating circumstances may occur. Much 
 certainly is due to mistaken views of na- 
 tional interest, much to ancient, or con- 
 firmed prejudices, much to the excesses of 
 a generous enthusiasm, and more to the mis- 
 guided virtues of private worth. 
 
 But in the case under our review, where 
 can we find any of those mitigating cir- 
 cumstances which engage our compassion, 
 and soften the rigour of the law ?
 
 183 
 
 The charge, indeed, informs us, that the 
 Zemindars of the Du-ab are Rajahs, who 
 have descended from the ancient Hindu 
 princes of Hindustan " 1 1 trough a long line 
 " of venerable ancestry ; that they possessed 
 " princely rights, honours, and estates, ivliich 
 " their sovereign could neither alienate nor 
 
 13 
 
 " destroy ; that they were greatly respected 
 " by the sovereigns, and highly revered by 
 " the people of Hindustan ;" and that the 
 Zemindar of Sassnee and Bijjeghur was 
 " RENOWNED" for his " PRIVATE WORTH," 
 and " BELOVED" by the WHOLE COUNTRY, 
 on account of the l< EQUITY" and " LIBE- 
 *' RALITY" of his " character." 
 
 But this glowing picture is only a ficti- 
 tious representation, displayed by the ac- 
 cusers as a stratagem to lure the sympathies 
 of the ignorant, and to betray them into an 
 approbation of their cause; for the first 
 glance of truth detects and defeats it.
 
 184 
 
 In describing the condition of the Du-ab, 
 in a former part of this letter, I stated, that 
 the Zemindars of that country were charac- 
 terised by their predatory and rebellious 
 spirit ; that they had amassed wealth, by 
 committing continual depredations on their 
 neighbours, and by the habit of making 
 enormous exactions from the travelling mer- 
 chants who passed through their districts ; 
 that, in order to protect the property which 
 they had thus acquired, they had erected 
 small forts, and retained in their service 
 large bodies of armed adherents ; and that, 
 fortified by these means, they had long op- 
 posed the lawful authority of the govern-* 
 ment of Oude, and had never paid their 
 taxes, until they were reduced to submission 
 by force of arms. The accuracy of this 
 ttatement is fully proved by the accusers' 
 9wn evidence at the bar of the House of
 
 185 
 
 Commons, * and is sufficiently corroborated 
 by the very documents laid before the House, 
 in support of this specific charge, f 
 
 As to the *' venerable ancestry of those 
 " Zemindars, and to their princely dignities 
 " and estates /" it is necessary to advert to 
 a few historical facts, in order that you may 
 know the real nature of those hereditary 
 distinctions, the fall of which we are so dole- 
 fully called upon to reverence and bewail. 
 
 All the native historians, who describe the 
 state of the Du-ab in modern times, concur 
 in representing the chief Zemindars of that 
 
 * See the evidence of Major Ousely, Aid-de-camp to 
 the Nabob of Oude. Minutes of Evidence t p. 67. before 
 referred to. 
 
 f See Supplement, No. 2 to No. 3, of the Oude Pa- 
 pers, relative to the Rajahs of Sassnee, &c. &c. &c. pages 
 275, 6, 7, 8, 291, 296, et passim.
 
 186 
 
 country, as belonging to the tribe of Jauts, 
 a ferocious but politic banditti, who mi- 
 grated from the lower parts of the province 
 of Moultan, towards the close of the reign 
 of Autungzebe, and who first attracted 
 notice on the banks of the Jumnah, about the 
 beginning of the last century. Churamana, 
 the most famous leader of this band of rob- 
 bers, settled in the southern districts of the 
 province of Agra, where, by plundering the 
 numerous traders, and other travellers who 
 passed through that part of the country, he 
 acquired immense riches, gathered round 
 him several thousand adherents, assumed 
 the title of Rajah, and fixed his place of re- 
 sidence at Bhurtpoor. Other chiefs of the 
 tribe who had followed his fortunes, becom- 
 ing envious of his success, or rather from 
 the natural turbulence of their disposition, 
 feeling impatient of the control of any 
 superior, deserted his standard; and crossing 
 the Jumnah, were suffered, by the Moghul
 
 187 
 
 government, to form establishments in the 
 Du-ab, on the conditions of performing 
 military service, and of paying the usual 
 taxes to the state. There, those chiefs 
 rivalled their former leader in the ardour 
 and constancy with which they adhered to 
 the characteristic habits of their race ; and 
 they even surpassed him in the extraor- 
 dinary dexterity, if not in the boldness of 
 their robberies. As their wealth accumu- 
 lated by these means, the number of their 
 followers proportionally increased ; until, 
 at last, their depredations were conducted in 
 so systematic and formidable a manner, 
 that the presence of the imperial army was 
 often necessary to suppress them. Hence, 
 when the Moglml empire had sunk into the 
 last stage of its decline^-ar-some of those 
 chiefs, no longer fearing its power, assumed 
 the title of Rajah or Prmce, enlarged the 
 boundaries of their possessions, built forts, 
 and set at defiance the authority of their 
 sovereign,
 
 188 
 
 Such was the situation of those chiefs, 
 when the Du-ab was conquered by the 
 British arms, and placed under the govern- 
 ment of the Nabob of Oude. 
 
 The weakness and corruption of that 
 government greatly favoured their pre- 
 datory habits ; they extended their system 
 of plunder beyond their own immediate 
 sphere ; and often pillaged the peaceful vil- 
 lages of the surrounding provinces ; until 
 at length they became notorious through- 
 out Hindustan, as a lawless and desperate 
 banditti. 
 
 The most powerful, as well as the most 
 atrocious of the chiefs of this banditti in 
 the Du-ab, was the Zemindar of Sassnee. 
 That man, from being, about thirty years 
 ago, the proprietor of a small Zemindary, 
 gradually raised himself to an evil eminence, 
 by the flagrant and extensive robberies which
 
 he committed on his neighbours, by the vast 
 sums of money which he extorted from 
 travellers, by his keeping an armd force of 
 twenty thousand men for these purposes, 
 and by the possession of two strong forts, 
 in which he treasured his spoils. 
 
 Yet this is the very man whom the ac- 
 cusers of Lord We^lesley represented " as 
 " renowned for his PRIVATE W T ORTH, and as 
 " beloved for his EQUITY and LIBERALITY ! !"* 
 But it is likewise the very man w^hom Major 
 Ousely, a principal evidence called before the 
 House by tlie accusers to prove their allega- 
 tions, describes as one 9f the people " CALL- 
 " IXG THEMSELVES" Zemindars and Rajahs, 
 who practised all sorts of imposition on per- 
 sons travelling, indigo merchants, and per- 
 sons in trade. " One instance," said Major 
 
 * See the Charge against Marquis Wellesley for his 
 conduct to the Rajah of Sassne and Bijjeghur, &c. &c, &c. 
 Printed by order of the House of Commons.
 
 190 
 
 Ousely, " / can state of a gentleman who 
 " was STOPPED by the RAJAH OF SASSN^P ; 
 " and though he produced to the Rajah a 
 " perwannah, tvliich was a pass of Almas 
 " Alii Khan, (the Collector of the Nabob's 
 revenue, and, in fact, governor of the dis- 
 trict) yet still, in DEFIANCE of all AUTHO- 
 " RITY of the people he OUGHT TO BE SUB- 
 " JECT TO, this man iwt only STOPPED the 
 " indigo, but CARRIED IT INTO HIS FORT, 
 
 " AND LEVIED WHAT DUTIES HE PLEASED 
 " UPON IT BEFORE HE WOULD LIBERATE 
 " IT !" * 
 
 Such, therefore, is the " EQUITY" and 
 " LIBERALITY" which these accusers 
 " LOVE," and such the " PRIVATE WORTH," 
 
 which they celebrate. 
 
 \ 
 
 * See the evidence of Major Ousely before the House 
 of Commons. Minutes of Evidence, p. 67. Before 
 quoted.
 
 191 
 
 The Zemindar of Cutchoura, the next 
 object of the accusers' sympathy, was a less 
 distinguished, because he was a less power- 
 ful, robber; his enterprizes had not been 
 signalized by such dauntless atrocities ; but, 
 true to the character of his tribe, he had 
 pursued, with unremitting activity, the same 
 practices which had raised them into notice; 
 and he was fired with all the ambition of 
 emulating the boundless rapacity of his 
 more formidable rival. 
 
 Of the " equity and liberality" of the 
 Zemindar of Tetteah, and his adherents, 
 who, though not expressly named, are com- 
 prehended in the charge, * you will be able 
 to form a competent notion, from the fol- 
 
 * The Zemindar of Tetteah, with all the other re- 
 fractory Zemindars, are comprehended in the charge, 
 under the general appellation of the (t Rajahs end Zt- 
 " minddi's in ihf Du-ab"
 
 192 
 
 lowing extract of an official letter from Mr. 
 Ryley, the judge and magistrate of the dis- 
 trict of Etawah, to Lord Lake, which letter 
 was moved for and laid before the House of 
 Commons, by the accusers in support of 
 their charge. 
 
 " By a Persian paper," says Mr. Ryley, 
 " inclosed in Mr. Stracy's letter, it appears, 
 " that Rajah Chutter Sail and Chutter Sing, 
 " with four or Jive thousand me?i, and two 
 " guns, a few nights ago, plundered an in- 
 " digo manufactory, and murdered the per- 
 " son in charge of it ; and, on the 8th in- 
 " stant, a salt golah, belonging to the Ho- 
 " nourable Company, at Meagung, the con- 
 " tents of which they, sent in carts, in the 
 " middle of the day to their fort of Tetteah, 
 " in the district of Etawah : by the same 
 " .account it appears, that they have stationed 
 " people at the ferries of the river Ganges,
 
 193 
 
 " and plundered every boat and passenger 
 " they met with." 
 
 " I shall, of course, require them to at- 
 " tend to answer the charge lodged against 
 " them, which, if they refuse to do, their 
 " disaffection being so very apparent, I hope 
 " your Excellency will be pleased to order 
 " their fort to be immediately destroyed, or 
 *' garrisoned by our troops, and the proprie- 
 " tors, if not apprehended, declared rebels 
 " against the state ; for but little peace and 
 " tranquillity can be expected in that part of 
 " the country, whilst they are permitted, in 
 " open defiance to all authority, to ravage and 
 " plunder the country around them." * 
 
 It does not, therefore, appear, that those 
 Zemindars were intitled to any special in- 
 
 * See papers relative to Sassnee, Bijjeghur, Cutchoura, 
 and Tetteah, in Supplement No. 2 to No. 3, of the Oude 
 Papers, page 291. 
 
 O
 
 194 
 
 diligence from the English government, on 
 account of their former good conduct, their 
 general character, or any of those generous, 
 though mistaken prejudices and feelings, by 
 which men are sometimes prompted to resist 
 the lawful authorities of the state. With 
 them, a resistance to lawful authority was 
 not produced by any peculiar circumstances, 
 much less by sentiments of dislike to any 
 particular system of rule : the governments 
 of the Moghul, of the Nabob, and of the 
 English, they had alike insulted and defied ; 
 and if they felt a greater repugnance to the 
 government of the English, than to that 
 which preceded it, their increased enmity 
 evidently arose from the restraint which it 
 imposed on their depredations, by its re- 
 gular administration of justice. Hence their 
 hostile resistance to the laws and regula- 
 tions which we introduced into the country, 
 did not proceed from any peculiar antipathy
 
 195 
 
 to them, but from that inveterate hatred of 
 all laws, and of every sort of authority and 
 subordination, which constituted an essential 
 principle of their system of life. 
 
 Men, whose principles and habits were 
 thus in eternal hostility with all social order, 
 could under no circumstances have any 
 claim to compassion. Even if they had 
 not opposed the lawful authority of govern- 
 ment, the interest of society, and the peace 
 and safety of the country would have re- 
 quired that their practices should be stopped. 
 But when the Zemindars of Sassnee and 
 Cutchoura had actually taken up arms 
 against the government, political necessity, 
 as well as public justice, loudly demanded 
 their punishment. 
 
 A military force was accordingly em- 
 ployed to reduce them ; their forts were 
 token and destroyed ; they themselves ef- 
 
 o
 
 196 
 
 fected their escape ; and their estates were 
 confiscated.* 
 
 In this fatal consequence of the rebellion 
 of those desperate depredators, much 
 slaughter ensued, and some innocent lives 
 must doubtless have been lost. But against 
 such an evil it was impossible to provide a 
 remedy. " That the same vengeance," 
 says Dr. Johnson, " involves the innocent 
 " and the guilty is an evil to be lamented ; 
 
 " but human caution cannot prevent it, nor 
 
 ' 
 " human power always redress it. To 
 
 " bring; misery on those who have not 
 
 t> J 
 
 " deserved it, is part of the aggregated 
 " guilt of rebellion." 
 
 * A special civil court was afterwards appointed, for. 
 the trial of persons who had been actua'ly concerned in 
 this rebellion. Ten of the followers of the Zemindar of 
 Tetteah were tried, of whom nine were acquitted See the 
 Papers relative to Sassnee, &c. &c. in No. 2 to No. 3, of 
 the Supplement of the Oude Papers,^. 302.
 
 197 
 
 On the whole then, I think we may con- 
 clude, that the Zemindars of the Du-ab 
 were the lawful subjects of the British go- 
 vernment ; that their hostile resistance to 
 its authority was an act of rebellion ; that 
 their habits of life were at war with civil 
 society itself; and that, therefore, the 
 punishment of their rebellion, and the sup- 
 pression of their practices were equally 
 called for by the voice of reason, of justice, 
 and of morality ; and can only be con- 
 
 sidered as crimes by the inverted ethics of 
 
 ^ 
 the accusers, who have exemplified " equity, 
 
 " liberality, and private worth" in the 
 character of a man, whose custom was, to 
 stop unoffending travellers on the road, to 
 carry them forcibly to his fort, and there to 
 compel them to surrender their property, as 
 
 the ransom of their deliverance. 
 
 ** 
 
 According to this their new system of 
 morals, having laid down, that the sup-
 
 pression of rebellion, robbery, and murder, 
 was a high crime, they proceed to charge 
 Lord Wellesley, " with having, in a wicked 
 and cruel manner, violated the most sacred 
 ties" by concluding an arrangement with 
 the Nabob of Furruckabad, which the pub- 
 lic documents prove, was of the most 
 peaceful and amicable nature. 
 
 This charge is before the House, and I 
 must refer you to it ; but the subject matter 
 of it may be comprised in a few words. 
 
 It states, that Furruckabad was a small 
 province, tributary to the government of 
 Oude, ivithout ani/ military defence of its 
 own, and soldi/ relying for its protection on 
 the Nabob fa'zier. That the British govern- 
 ment had guaranteed the protection, and 
 
 i 
 
 had long been in the habits of directly inter- 
 fering in the internal affairs of Furruckabad: 
 That Lord Cornwallis, disapproving of this
 
 199 
 
 direct interference, withdrew from Fur- 
 ruckabad the British agent, by whom it was 
 exercised : That in this state of things, 
 Lord JPellesley having obtained from the 
 Nabob Vizier of Oude, a cession of one 
 half of his territories, included in that ces- 
 sion the tribute from Furruckabad : That 
 Lord IVellesleij, not satisfied with this tribute, 
 did, through the agency of his brother, Mr. 
 IFelleslcy, and by unjustifiable means, urge 
 the Nabob of Furruckabad to consent to a 
 transfer of the whole province to the English 
 Company : And that, at last, he did actually 
 compel the Nabob to sign a treaty, by which 
 " the province of Furruckabad and its 
 " depend ancics were ceded in perpetual 
 " sovereignty to the Company," 
 
 The information here given by the * 
 cusers, respecting the state of Furruckabad, 
 and its relations with the Nabob Vizier, and
 
 200 
 
 with the English, previous to the new ar- 
 rangements in Oude, though sufficiently 
 correct as far as it goes, requires the addition 
 of some historical particulars, to enable you 
 to take a full view of the subject, and to 
 form your judgment on the measure which 
 Lord Wellesley adopted, and for which he 
 is arraigned. 
 
 The territory of Furruckabad was, at the 
 commencement of the last century, a dis- 
 trict of the Moghul empire, and was then, 
 >s it still is, chiefly inhabited by Patans, 
 a race of Mussulmans equally distinguished 
 in Hindustan by their intrepid bravery, and 
 their ungovernable turbulence. Mum mud 
 Khan, one of those Patans, having signalized 
 himself in the service of the Emperor 
 Furruckseer, was elevated by that prince, 
 to the rank of Nabob, and farther rewarded 
 with a grant of twelve villages in his native
 
 201 
 
 district ; where, in 1718, he founded a city, 
 which, in honour of his sovereign, he named 
 Furruckabad. By obtaining additional 
 grants from time to time, but principally 
 by farming the land rents of the imperial 
 government, in the adjacent districts, he 
 gradually enlarged his domain. So that, 
 in the course of thirty years, he established 
 a small state, which yielded a revenue of 
 about forty lacs of rupees, in which he 
 maintained a considerable military force, 
 and in which, from the distractions that 
 prevailed in the Court of Delhi, at the com- 
 mencement of the reign of Ahmed Shah, 
 he was enabled to withhold from his 
 sovereign the customary tribute, which, by 
 the Moghul constitution, he was bound to 
 pay. But this virtual assumption of inde- 
 pendancy, soon excited the jealousy of 
 Sufdur Jung, the Nabob Vizier of Oude, 
 who, partly on that account, and partly from 
 a quarrel which had for some years before
 
 202 
 
 subsisted between the two families, obtained 
 the Emperor's permission to reduce his rival 
 to subjection. The death of Mummud 
 Khan, and the succession of his son, an 
 inexperienced youth, encouraged this enter- 
 prize ; which was carried into effect by 
 instigating the Rohillas to attack Furruck- 
 abad. A battle ensued, in which the young 
 Nabob was slain. But his more resolute 
 and skilful successor, rallied his shattered 
 forces, and marching against the Vizier, who 
 was at the head of a large army, compelled 
 him to retreat with considerable loss. The 
 family animosity was, by these events, na- 
 turally increased ; and, by the protracted 
 hostility which they occasioned, the re- 
 sources of Furruckabad were almost entirely 
 exhausted. Under these circumstances, the 
 Vizier Sujah-ud-Dowlah, adopting a wiser 
 policy, mitigated, if he did not heal the ex- 
 isting feud ; and obtained, by an amicable 
 treaty, that ascendancy over Furruckabad,
 
 203 
 
 which his father bad strovcd in vain to 
 establish by arms. 
 
 From this period of time the affairs of 
 Furruckabad were administered under the 
 authority of the Nabob Vizier, by whom 
 the public ministers of its government were 
 appointed. A few years after the succes- 
 sion of the Vizier Assof-ud-Dow T lah, the 
 Nabob MuzufFer Jung having ordered two 
 of those ministers to be put to death, with- 
 out any reference to the government of 
 Lucknow, the Vizier proceeded to Furruck- 
 abad, with a military force, for the avowed 
 purpose of displacing the Nabob, of send- 
 ing him a prisoner to Lucknow, and of con- 
 fiscating the whole of his property. But 
 the English Resident in Oude remonstrated 
 against the severity of this punishment ; and, 
 under his controlling authority, a treaty was 
 concluded, whereby the province of Fur- 
 ruckabad was placed under the sole and
 
 204 
 
 entire protection of the Vizier and the 
 English government;* and whereby the Nabob 
 MuzufFer Jung, became bound to pay to the 
 Vizier an annual tribute of four lacs and a 
 half of rupees, or ^56,250 sterling. 
 
 The Nabob of Furruckabad, having by this 
 treaty permanently sealed his vassalage to the 
 Vizier, and his subjection to the paramount 
 authority of the English government, an Eng- 
 lish agent was appointed to reside at Fur- 
 ruckabad, in order to control the administra- 
 tion of its affairs; and detachments of the 
 English troops were occasionally employed 
 in suppressing those insurrections which the 
 collection of the revenues annually produced. 
 The Vizier, however, jealous of the actual 
 extension of the supreme control of the 
 British government over the subordinate 
 
 * The words of the Treaty are " the Noble English 
 Sirdars See No. 12, Furruckabad Papers, p. 7.
 
 205 
 
 dependency of Furruckhabad, though abso- 
 lutely essential to its tranquillity, prevailed 
 oil the Governor-general to make it an ex- 
 press article in the new arrangement which 
 was concluded in 1781, that no English re- 
 sident should be stationed at Furrucltabad' 
 The impolicy of thus withdrawing our con- 
 trol from Furruckabad, was in a few years 
 strikingly manifested, by the revival of that 
 civil discord which formerly existed between 
 the families of the Vizier and of the Nabob, by 
 their mutual complaints and recriminations, 
 by the increased rapidity with which the 
 revenues declined, by the arrears into which 
 the annual tribute had consequently fallen, 
 and by the additional distraction with which 
 the province was overspread. 
 
 But the Court of Directors disapproved 
 of the removal of the control which had been 
 exercised in Furruckabad, before they had 
 any knowledge of these bad effects of the
 
 measure ; and they transmitted orders to the 
 Governor-general in council, for the resump- 
 tion of our authority over the affairs of that 
 province. Hence an agent of the English go- 
 vernment was again appointed to superintend 
 them; who, after a residence of three years 
 in the country, made an interesting report 
 on its civil condition to Lord Cornwallis, 
 then Governor-general. 
 
 That report states, that the revenues of 
 the province which, under Mummud Khan, 
 were estimated at upwards of forty lacs of 
 rupees, had been reduced to seven lacs, and 
 that such was the insecurity of property, 
 and the consequent reluctance with which 
 the people cultivated the lands, that even 
 this small sum could only be collected in a 
 season of tranquillity. " Some measures," 
 says the resident, "but totally fruitless, 
 " were adopted last year for the restoration 
 " of tranquillity, which would have gra*
 
 207 
 
 " dually benefited the country. An increase 
 " of revenue could not be expected ; that can 
 " only arise, in a course of years, from 
 " an increase of inhabitants, consequent 
 "to a reliance on a regular and steady 
 '* government. At present, a long state 
 " of anarchy has so perfectly corrupted the 
 " minds of the people, that all confidence is 
 *' lost between man and man, and villainy 
 " has so little scandal annexed to it, that 
 " there is scarcely an Annul, or a Zemindar, 
 " in these districts, from whom it is not ex- 
 " pedient to take either father, child, pr 
 " nearest relation, into confinement, as an 
 " hostage for the performance of his engage- 
 " ment to government ; and even this often 
 " proves inadequate to its purpose."* 
 
 * A Report presented to the Right Hon. Earl Corn- 
 wallis, Governor-general, &c. in Council, by Mr. J. Wille?, 
 resident at Furruckabad, 29th Jan. 1787.
 
 208 
 
 Lord Corn wall is, after reading this report, 
 and " after the maturest reflection on the 
 " situation of Furruckabad, was convinced 
 " of the propriety of withdrawing all inter- 
 " ference in its management, because the 
 " attempts to promote the prosperity of 
 " the country had been equally offensive to 
 " the Vizier, and to the Nabob MuzufFer 
 " Jung."* 
 
 An event some years afterwards occurred, 
 which shewed the impracticability of with- 
 holding the exercise of our control over the 
 affairs of Furruckabad, without sacrificing 
 the peace and the interests of our own 
 " DEPENDANT FIEF the province of Oude. 
 
 The eldest son of the Nabob of Furrucka- 
 
 * I quote his Lordship's own words. See a Minute in. 
 Council from the Right Hon. the Governor-general, re- 
 corded 4pril IQth, 1787.
 
 209 
 
 jbad, having murdered his father, and being 
 convicted of the crime, was carried to Luck- 
 now, and there imprisoned by the orders of 
 the Vizier ; and the succession to the Nabob- 
 ship, having thereby devolved on the second 
 son Emdaud Hussein Khan (the present 
 Nabob) who was then a minor, the province 
 was left without any person to conduct its 
 government. In this situation of affairs, the 
 British government found its interposition in- 
 dispensably necessary to save the country from 
 utter ruin; and a manager was accordingly 
 appointed by the Governor-general, to con- 
 duct its administration during the minority 
 of the young Nabob. With a. view to esta- 
 blish a system of regularity in the manage- 
 ment of the province, Lord Teignmouth, 
 when he was at Lucknow in 1797* saw the 
 young Nabob and the manager; and, under 
 his lordship's orders, an engagement was 
 framed in concert with the Vizier, prescrib- 
 ing rules for the future administration of
 
 210 
 
 affairs, and containing limitations and re- 
 strictions, calculated to suppress the pre- 
 vailing evils and abuses. Upon the system 
 established by this engagement, and under 
 the direct support and protection of the 
 British government, the manager continued 
 to act until the new arrangements con- 
 cluded with the Vizier, by Lard Wellesley, 
 gave us a still nearer interest in the pros- 
 perity of Furruckabad. 
 
 
 
 Such being the history and condition of 
 this province, and such the nature, origin, 
 progress, and actual state of its relations 
 with Oucte, and with the British govern- 
 ment, you will at once perceive, that if 
 Lord Welksley's arrangements with the 
 Nabob Vizier were just and politic, the whole 
 question, arising out of this particular charge, 
 turns on the two following points. First, 
 whether the cession of the Furruckabad tri- 
 bute was necessary to complete and per-
 
 211 
 
 feet the arrangement with Oude ; and, se- 
 condly, whether the subsequent transfer 
 of the whole province of Furruckabad to the 
 Company was obtained by fair and just 
 means, and was in itself a measure adapted 
 to advance and secure the prosperity of that 
 dependancy, as well as to improve the in- 
 terests, and strengthen the authority of the 
 British government in northern Hindustan. 
 
 
 1st. You will bear in mind, that one of 
 
 the chief objects of that reform in the go- 
 vernment of Oude, which it had been so 
 long our endeavour to accomplish, was the 
 reduction of the Nabob's troops, and that 
 the dismission of those troops formed a pri- 
 mary part of the arrangement which Lord 
 Wellesley effected. You will at the same 
 time observe, that the dependancy of Fur- 
 ruckabad was destitute of all military de- 
 fence of its own ; and that it wholly placed 
 its security, both from foreign and domestic 
 
 p2
 
 212 
 
 enemies, in the protection of Oude, guar- 
 ranteed by the British government. So that 
 if it were just and necessary to disband the 
 troops of the Nabob of Oude, who contri- 
 buted to disturb, rather than to maintain in- 
 ternal tranquillity, it follows, that we were 
 
 '"* 
 
 bound by the obligation of our guarantee, 
 to supply an effectual, protection to the 
 state of Furruckabad, instead of the useless 
 and licentious soldiery, whom we had re- 
 moved, and by whom its safety was endan- 
 gered. Such protection had, in fact, become 
 absolutely essential to avert its impending 
 ruin ; and was earnestly solicited by the per- 
 son who administered its affairs. 
 
 
 On this ground alone, then, it is evident, 
 
 that if the dismission of the Nabob's troops 
 
 f 
 was a measure indispensably necessary, the 
 
 protection of Furruckabad devolved upon the 
 British government, by whom it was guar- 
 ranteed; -and for that protection we had a
 
 213 
 
 just right to a transfer of the tribute, which 
 was not more than barely sufficient to defray 
 the expenses of the military force, which the 
 distracted state of the province constantly 
 required. 
 
 Bat the transfer of this tribute is also jus- 
 tifiable on grounds of general policy, con- 
 nected with the defence of Oude, 
 
 The province of Furruckabad is situated 
 between the northern part of the ceded dis- 
 tricts in the Du-ab, and the river Ganges, 
 and it is separated by that river from those 
 parts of Rohilcund, which Lord Wellesley 
 had appropriated to the British government, 
 because they were essential to the comple- 
 tion of our line of defence against foreign 
 invasion. That line of defence was nar- 
 rowed in one part by the intervention of the 
 province of Furruckabad, which lay both 
 upon it, and in its rear. Under these cir-
 
 214 
 
 cumstances, it became a matter of the highest 
 importance to place that province under our 
 immediate protection : so that, in the event 
 of an attack from the French Mahratta army, 
 stationed on our frontier, from which Fur- 
 ruckabad was distant only eighty -Jive miles, 
 we should not be exposed to the imminent 
 danger of having on our rear a province in^ 
 habited by a warlike race, who were impo- 
 verished, corrupted, and distracted by a long 
 state of anarchy; who were destitute of every 
 feeling of attachment either to their govern- 
 ment, or to their country; who would there- 
 fore have been wholly careless about the 
 issue of the contest; who would have looked 
 
 upon it only with the hope of additional 
 
 
 confusion and plunder ; who would conse- 
 quently have cut off the resources of our 
 army ; and who, if it sustained a repulse, 
 would have been readily seduced to join the 
 ptandard of the enemy.
 
 215 
 
 Hence, then, the extension of our perma- 
 nent protection to the dependancy of Fur- 
 ruckabad, and the consequent transfer of its 
 tribute, were equally demanded, by the neces- 
 sity of disbanding the troops, of Oude by the 
 obligation of our guarantee, by the earnest so- 
 licitation of its government, by the deplorable 
 and dangerous condition of its people, and, 
 in fine, by the obvious policy of fortifying 
 that line of defence on which I have shewn 
 you the security not only of Oude, but of 
 the whole of our dominions in Hindustan 
 materially depended. 
 
 2d. The arrangement which was after- 
 wards concluded with the Nabob of Fur- 
 ruckabad, for ceding the whole province to 
 the British government in .perpetual so- 
 vereignty, was obtained by means unexeep- 
 tionably fair and just, under the peculiar 
 circumstances of the ease, and was founded
 
 on the plainest maxims of a wise and bene- 
 ficent policy. 
 
 Whilst the exercise of British authority 
 over the affairs of Furruckabad had enabled 
 the manager to give to his administration, 
 some degree of tone and vigor, it rendered 
 him obnoxious to the resentment of a few 
 candidates for office, whose hopes had been 
 defeated by his elevation : and who had in 
 consequence placed themselves under the 
 patronage of the young Nabob, with whom 
 they had contracted an intimacy, into whose 
 mind they laboured to instil sentiments of 
 hostility against their rival, and through 
 whose favour they sought to advance their 
 own ambitious views. The intrigues which 
 those persons unremittingly employed, to 
 counteract the ordinary operations of go- 
 vernment, in order to cast discredit on the 
 managers administration, had involved it 
 in the most insurmountable embarrassments. 
 Hence, the principal persons in the depen-
 
 217 
 
 dancy were divided into two parties, whose 
 animosity had reached the highest degree of 
 rancour, and had greatly aggravated those 
 grievous evils, which the country had been 
 50 long fated to endure. 
 
 On the arrival of Lord Wellesley at Luck- 
 now, after the conclusion of the arrange- 
 ments with the Nabob Vizier, both those 
 parties solicited, with the utmost earnestness 
 and urgency, his lordship's interposition, 
 not so much with a view to the adjustment 
 of their differences, as to the accomplish- 
 ment of their respective objects. The Na- 
 bob, whose minority was nearly expired, 
 claimed a right of being invested in the 
 government, and complained of the mal-ad- 
 ministration of the manager. Whilst the 
 manager, on the other hand, represented 
 that those persons who had obtained an in- 
 fluence over the mind of the young Nabob, 
 were men of the most abandoned characters,
 
 218 
 
 that they misled the Nabob's judgment, per- 
 Terted his principles, and openly encouraged 
 him in every sort of profligacy and vice ; and 
 such was the ruinous effects of their conduct 
 on the peace and interests of the country, and 
 such the personal danger to which he was 
 thereby continually exposed, that he intreated 
 permission to resign an office, which it was 
 impossible any longer to conduct with credit 
 or advantage. 
 
 Combining these circumstances with the 
 necessity of adopting some measure, which 
 should effectually secure our interests in the 
 dependency of Furruckabad from the inevi- 
 table waste, to which they would be exposed 
 by a continuance of the misrule which had 
 so long prevailed, it became not a matter 
 of choice, but of obligation, with Lord 
 Wellesley, to frame, in concert with the 
 Nabob, a new arrangement for the govern- 
 ment of the province, and for the relief of
 
 219 
 
 its suffering people. His lordship, therefore, 
 instructed his brother, Mr. H. Wellesley, in 
 his capacity of Lieutenant-governor of the 
 ceded districts in Oude, to meet the Nabob 
 and the manager at a town, distant seventy 
 miles from Furruckabad, to which they had 
 been requested to repair for that purpose, and 
 there to confer with them on the affairs of the 
 province, and to form some settlement for its 
 future government. And his lordship at 
 the same time recommended the transfer of 
 the dependancy to the Company, if the Na- 
 bob's concurrence could be obtained, as, 
 being under all the ruinous circumstances 
 of its condition, the only measure by which 
 its tranquillity could be restored, the revival 
 of industry encouraged, its resources im- 
 proved, the Nabob's own comfort and per- 
 sonal safety effectually provided for, and the 
 British interests permanently secured. 
 
 Mr. Wellesley accordingly met the Nabob 
 and the manager; and, after consulting with
 
 20 
 
 them separately on every point connected 
 with the state of the country, he submitted 
 to the Nabob a proposition, to place the 
 civil authorities, and the whole administra- 
 tion of the province, in the hands of the Bri- 
 tish government, and to secure to him and his 
 heirs, in perpetuity, all the honours, dignities, 
 jand style of his rank, together with a sa- 
 lary fully adequate to support them. 
 
 With this proposition, the Nabob at first 
 shewed a reluctance to comply, and ex- 
 pressed a wish, that the province might be 
 intrusted to his management. But, upon 
 Mr. Wellesley begging him to re-consider it, 
 and impressing upon his attention the ad- 
 vantages which it embraced, he assented to it, 
 with this observation, ?" That he was in 
 " every way disposed to satisfy him, and 
 " that, whatever he thought proper to settle, 
 " was for his (the Nabob's) good..* 
 
 * See a letter from Imdaud Hussein Khan, to the Lieu- 
 tenant-governor, &C. &c. Furrukabad Papers^ p- 28.
 
 221 
 
 An agreement was then executed by the 
 Uabob and Mr. Wellesley, whereby it was 
 stipulated, that the province of Furruckabad, 
 and its dependancies should be ceded in per- 
 petual sovereignty to the Company ; that the 
 Nabob should be maintained in all the style 
 and dignities, and treated with all the respect 
 and honour due to his rank ; that a salary of 
 ^?15,500 sterling, should be settled on him 
 and his heirs for ever ; * that the houses, 
 
 * This salary is more than equal to the annual sum 
 which the Nabob could have reserved for his own use out 
 pf the revenues of the country, under his management, 
 after paying the Company's tribute, the expenses of his 
 government, and the allowances which the different mem- 
 bers of his family had been in the habit of receiving, and 
 which he would therefore have been bound to continue. 
 
 The Court of Directors have blamed Lord Wellesley 
 for the smallness of this salary. The munificent sentiment 
 by which that censure must of course have been dictated, 
 I cannot but admire : and as it is entirely in their own
 
 222 
 
 gardens, villages, and all other property which 
 belonged exclusively to his father, should be 
 secured to him ; and that certain annual 
 allowances should be made to the different 
 members of his family, and to his depend- 
 ants, proportioned to their respective ranks. 
 
 . 
 You will observe, that this negotiation 
 
 was conducted on the most friendly footing; 
 and that no other influence was used by Mr. 
 Wellesley, except that which arose from the 
 natural predominancy of his public station, 
 as the representative of a paramount power. 
 To object to a negotiation on this ground, 
 would be to preclude the British govern- 
 ment from making any arrangement what- 
 ever with any of its dependants ; a principle 
 which, pushed to its extent, involves the 
 
 power to rectify the deficiency, you will no doubt wonder 
 to be told, that the benefit of their enlarged generosity 
 has not yet been extended to the Nabob*
 
 223 
 
 palpable absurdity of denying the validity of 
 any contract, made between a superior and 
 his dependant, because, from their relative 
 situations, it must have been concluded un- 
 der a predominating influence. The free 
 consent of the parties to an agreement is, 
 undoubtedly, essential to its legality ; but by 
 free consent, it is understood, not that no 
 persuasion shall be exerted, but that no 
 undue influence shall be employed to ob- 
 tain it. The employment of an undue in- 
 fluence in a negotiation between a superior 
 and his dependant, can alone mean the use 
 of threats or intimidation. Now, in the 
 case in question, there is not one word of 
 evidence to prove, that any expression was 
 used, which bore any semblance of a threat, 
 or conveyed any sentiment of a compulsory 
 nature. 
 
 The accusers fasten on the circumstance 
 of the negotiation not having been holder
 
 224 
 
 at the city of Furruckabad, where the 
 Nabob might have conveniently consulted 
 with his favourite advisers. But the known 
 character of those advisers, who were 
 not old councellors, intitled to respect froni 
 their age, but young associates, remarkable 
 only for the depravity of their morals, and 
 their avidity for power, afforded the 
 strongest reason to conclude, that their 
 advice would be dictated by considerations 
 of their own individual views, without any 
 regard whatever either to the welfare of 
 the Nabob, or to the peace and interests of 
 the state. In order, therefore, to prevent 
 the exercise of an undue influence on their 
 part, over the mind of the Nabob, it was 
 justly determined to treat with him at a 
 place, where he should not be subject to 
 their selfish and profligate control. 
 
 The accusers indeed, assert, that the 
 manager was bribed to betray the interests
 
 225 
 
 of the Nabob. But how is this allegation 
 supported by the documents before the 
 House ? 
 
 The Manager, who had previously so- 
 licited, in the most earnest manner, the 
 permission of the British government to 
 resign his office, was desired by Mr. Wcl- 
 lesley to state his unreserved sentiments, as 
 to the arrangement which he thought best 
 calculated for the future government of the 
 country. He accordingly submitted to Mr. 
 Wellesley three plans, one of which was, 
 the transfer of the province to the Com- 
 pany ; at the same time he expressed a hope, 
 that his past services would not be forgotten ; 
 and Mr. Wellesley then informed him, that 
 for those services, he might rely on the 
 generosity of the British government. 
 
 But it is clear, that this assurance was 
 neither made by Mr. Wellesley, nor un- 
 
 Q
 
 226 
 
 derstood by the manager, as a lure to in- 
 fluence his conduct in regard to the depend- 
 ing arrangements with the Nabob ; for Mr. 
 Wellesley expressly informs us, that he re- 
 ceived no assistance whatever from the 
 manager, in the course of the negotiation.* 
 
 The assertion, therefore, that the manager 
 was bribed to betray the interests of the 
 Nabob, is wholly unsubstantiated by the 
 evidence ; and though it may appear in that 
 light to the perverted reason of the accusers, 
 it must be instantly rejected, as fallacious, 
 by the plain sense of every impartial man. 
 
 This negotiation was, in fact, conducted 
 throughout, and the treaty concluded on 
 the same general principles by which the 
 transfer of the province of Benares was 
 
 * See Mr. Wellesley's Letter to the Governor-generaL 
 Furrucltabad Papers, p. 1.9.
 
 227 
 
 obtained. And with this APPROVED PRE- 
 CEDENT before him, Lord Wellesley must 
 have felt his own opinion fortified, in regard 
 to the justice and policy of the measure in 
 question. 
 
 That this measure, by which the laws 
 and regulations of the British government 
 have been established in the province of 
 Furruckabad, in which " a long state of 
 " anarchy had destroyed all confidence 
 " between man and man, and took away 
 " all shame from villainy,"* is adapted 
 to advance its prosperity, I presume no 
 one will attempt to deny. And, that this 
 measure is calculated to strengthen the 
 authority, and to improve the interests of 
 our government in northen Hindustan, 
 must appear abundantly manifest, from 
 
 * See the Report of Mr. Willes, the English Resi- 
 dent at Furruckabad. Before quoted.
 
 228 
 
 what I have already said to you in regard to 
 the province of Oude. 
 
 The whole of those arrangements but 
 formed a part, though indeed a material 
 part, of that great system of policy, the 
 principles of which I endeavoured, in a late 
 publication, to explain to the country. 
 
 This part of the system embraced the 
 two great objects of inspiring and securing 
 the attachment of several millions of peo- 
 ple, inhabiting a fertile territory which we 
 were previously bound to defend ; and of 
 thereby converting that territory, from a 
 scene of waste and anarchy, into a source 
 of domestic prosperity, and a powerful bul- 
 wark against foreign aggression. The pros- 
 perity which it is calculated to diffuse, can 
 indeed only be fully displayed in a course 
 of years ; but, with the experience before 
 us of the effects of our government, in the
 
 229 
 
 provinces of Bengal and Behar, the same 
 happy results may be looked for with a 
 cheering confidence. 
 
 The defence which it affords against 
 foreign aggression, was strikingly exem- 
 plified in the Mahratta war of 1803. The 
 districts in Oude flourishing under the 
 British government, supplied the most am- 
 ple and ready resources to that victorious 
 army, which vanquished and crushed the 
 French Mahratta establishment, and thereby 
 destroyed that instrument of hostility on 
 which the cherished hopes of France had 
 for some years been placed, and by which 
 she had sought, with ambitious solicitude, 
 to undermine, and ultimately to overthrow 
 the mighty fabric of our Indian empire. 
 
 In the subversion of that politic project 
 of France, Lord Wellesley derived the 
 means of extending, and fortifying our line
 
 of defence in northen Hindustan ; not only 
 by occupying the course of the river Jum- 
 nah, with the provinces of Delhi and Agra, 
 through which it flows, but also by forming 
 alliances with the small Hindu principalities, 
 inhabited by that martial and generous race, 
 the Rhatore Rajpoots, who had solicited our 
 protection against the merciless ravages of 
 Holkar. 
 
 By the occupation of those provinces, we 
 carried our frontier, in one broad unbroken 
 line, across that part of the country through 
 which alone an invading army from the 
 west of Asia can penetrate into our domi- 
 nions ; and by those alliances we engaged 
 the attachment of a people, characterized by 
 their fidelity, no less than by their courage, 
 who possess that tract of country which 
 extends from the pathless desert of Moultan, 
 to the province of Agra on the west, and 
 to the river Seraswatee on the north; so
 
 231 
 
 that an invading enemy, from the west of 
 Asia, could not form a junction with Hol- 
 kar or Scindeah, whose dominions lie to 
 the south of that tract, without passing 
 through it. 
 
 In extending our frontier, and in forming 
 those alliances, Lord Wellesley, I conceive, 
 had it in view to improve a principal object 
 of theOude arrangements, that of strength- 
 ening and multiplying our securities in that 
 quarter of our dominions, which is alone 
 accessible to the attack of a continental 
 invader. He saw r , that though one instru- 
 ment of French policy was destroyed, 
 which had threatened us with immediate 
 danger, the present ruler of France, still 
 constantly and systematically pursuing his 
 purpose, would never abandon the hope of 
 extinguishing our powei: in the East. His 
 Lordship saw, that after he had conquered 
 by his arms, or subdued by his policy, the
 
 232 
 
 fallen monarchies, and feeble governments 
 on the continent of Europe, he would again 
 cast his mind upon Asia ; and that, in- 
 vigorated by the collective resources of those 
 subjugated kingdoms, and animated with a 
 fresh fury, he would form a new and ex- 
 tensive scheme for the invasion of India. 
 His Lordship saw, that in the formation of 
 that scheme, he would endeavour to attach 
 to his interests the states of Persia and 
 Cabul, and after concluding alliances with 
 them, he could gradually organize, in those 
 countries, a French ASIATIC ARMY, the 
 only means by which it is practicable to 
 invade our dominions in India with a chance 
 of success. 
 
 These things his Lordship contemplated 
 with the mind of a statesman, who pene- 
 trated into the vast designs of our enemy, 
 who could not think it wise to delay our 
 preparations for resistance until those designs
 
 233 
 
 were actually put in execution, who, there- 
 fore, constructed a permanent system of 
 defence against them, and who represented, 
 in impressive and luminous language, the 
 dangers which he thus saw from afar. 
 
 AMMO VIDIT, INGENIO COMPLEXUS EST, ELOQUENTIA 
 ILLUM1NAVIT. 
 
 Those dangers are now no longer matter 
 of speculation. France has actually formed 
 an alliance with Persia, and is at this mo- 
 ment organising in that country an army 
 for the invasion of India. By the next ac- 
 counts we may expect to hear of the French 
 commander in Persia having formed a 
 similar alliance with the more powerful state 
 of Cabul ; and of his having also obtained 
 the permission of its monarch to organise 
 and discipline an army of his warlike sub- 
 jects, with a view to the conquest of Hin-
 
 dustan, that great object of his hereditary 
 ambition. 
 
 In these preparations for the invasion of 
 India, the most confident and intrepid states- 
 man might see something to apprehend; 
 but he would be powerfully struck with the 
 comprehensive wisdom of that policy, by 
 which such ample means for resisting it had 
 been arranged and consolidated. 
 
 Yet the Court of Directors, with a gene* 
 nerous magnanimity, seeing nothing to fear, 
 have actually dissolved those alliances with 
 the Rajpoot princes, which formed a small, 
 but an important link in our chain of de- 
 fence ; and have thus delivered back to the 
 vindictive rapacity of Holkar, those brave 
 men, who had sought our protection, and 
 had identified their interests with ours. And 
 the arrangements in Oude, which constitute
 
 235 
 
 the foundation of our whole system of de- 
 fence against the menaced invasion .of 
 France, and without which it would have 
 been impracticable to have furnished sup- 
 plies in that province for an army adequate 
 to resist it, are at this moment about to be 
 exhibited to the House of Commons as a 
 ground of criminal charge, fraught with 
 ruin and discredit to the country. 
 
 I cannot, however, but feel the strongest 
 confidence, that the Commons of England, 
 representing the collective sense of a nation 
 so long renowned for its wisdom, will come 
 to a far different conclusion ; that, viewing the 
 question in all its bearings, they will see the 
 enlightened forethought, the unimpeachable 
 rectitude, and the sound policy of that great 
 measure ; and that, with an entire convic- 
 tion of the security in which it has placed 
 our Indian dominions, and of the solid and
 
 23t> 
 
 lasting benefits which it has conferred oa 
 the province of Oude, it will be finally rati- 
 fied by their approving fiat. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 Tour's, &c 
 
 L. D. CAMPBELL. 
 
 Bath, Jan. I2tf> t 1808. 
 
 (J S , , v . i-'ruu-jr, 
 Nonhuuiberijiicl Succt, Strand,

 
 A 000 094 070 o