DEBATERS' HANDBOOK SERIES MONROE DOCTRINE DEBATERS' HANDBOOK SERIES Enlargement of the United States Navy (3d ed. rev. and enl.) Direct Primaries (3d ed. rev. and enl.) Capital Punishment (2d ed. rev.) Commission Plan of Municipal Govern- ment (3d ed. rev. and enl.) Election of United States Senators (2d ed. rev.) Income Tax (2d ed. rev. and enl. ) Initiative and Referendum (3d ed. rev. and enl.) Central Bank of the United States Woman Suffrage (2d ed. rev.) Municipal Ownership (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Child Labor (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Open versus Closed Shop (2d ed.) Employment of Women Federal Control of Interstate Corporations (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Parcels Post (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Compulsory Arbitration of Industrial Dis- putes (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Compulsory Insurance Conservation of Natural Resources Free Trade vs. Protection Government Ownership of Railroads (2d ed. rev. and enl.) Reciprocity Trade Unions Recall (2d ed. rev. and enl.) World Peace Government Ownership of Telegraph and Telephone Single Tax Monroe Doctrine HANDBOOK SERIES European War Agricultural Credit Other titles in preparation Each volume, one dollar net Debaters' Handbook Series SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE COMPILED BY EDITH M. PHELPS THE H. W. WILSON COMPANY WHITE PLAINS, N. Y. f AND NEW YORK CITT 1915 Published March. 1915 EXPLANATORY NOTE The development of affairs in Mexico during the past few years as well as the change in European affairs have revived the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. In response to the conse- quent demand for material on the subject this volume has been compiled for the use of students, debaters, and others wishing to make a study of the question. This volume follows the general plan of the other volumes in this series and contains affirmative and negative briefs, a selected bibliography, and reprints of valuable material covering the history and present status of the Monroe Doctrine, and also the arguments for and against its retention as a part of our permanent foreign policy. E. M. PHELPS. February 27, 1915. 300872 <; *s CONTENTS BRIEF Affirmative , x Negative xii BIBLIOGRAPHY General References xv Affirmative References xxiii Negative References xxv INTRODUCTION I Introduction ; . ix GENERAL DISCUSSION Moore, John Bassett. Non-intervention and the Monroe Doctrine Harper's Magazine 5 Woodburn, James Albert. Monroe Doctrine and Some of Its Applications Chautauquan 18 Mahan, A. T. Monroe Doctrine National Review 23 Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine Harper's Weekly 44 Alvarez, Alejandro. Latin America and International Law. , American Journal of International Law 48 Magdalena Bay Resolution American Journal of International Law 56 Latane, John Holladay. Effects of the Panama Canal on Our Relations with Latin America Annals of the American Academy 58 Woolsey, Theodore S. Monroe Doctrine Fundamentals North American Review 64 Kraus, Herbert. What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine Annals of the American Academy 71 Wheless, Joseph. Monroe Doctrine and Latin America . Annals of the American Academy 76 Blakeslee, George H. Should the Monroe Doctrine Continue to Be a Foreign Policy of the United States? American Society of International Law. Proceedings 94 Barrett, John. Pan-American Policy: The Monroe Doctrine Modernized Annals of the American Academy 104 viii CONTENTS Hull, William I. Monroe Doctrine : National or Interna- tional ? American Society of Internationl Law. Proceedings 108 AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION Elihu. Real Monroe Doctrine American Society of International Law. Proceedings 123 w/Taft, William H. Monroe Doctrine: Its Limitations and Implications Independent 137 Roberts, W. Carman. Vitality of the Monroe Doctrine.... Craftsman 141 Callahan, J. Mi Modern Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. .. Journal of Race Development 143 Scruggs, William L. Monroe Doctrine Its Origin and Import North American Review 150 Stanwood, Edward. Moral Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Outlook 154 Chester, Colby N. Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine. Annals of the American Academy 160 MacCorkle, William A. Monroe Doctrine and Its Applica- tion to Haiti Annals of the American Academy 167 Notable Pan American Addresses Bulletin. Pan American Union 174 NEGATIVE DISCUSSION v/Bmgham, Hiram. Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine? Journal of Race Development 179 ^/Dole, Charles F. Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine. Atlantic Monthly 199 Bingham, Hiram. Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibbo- leth Atlantic Monthly 210 Tucker, George F. Monroe Doctrine ... Journal of Race Development 224 Commercial Side of the Monroe Doctrine. Review of Reviews 228 Wellman, Walter. Shall the Monroe Doctrine Be Modified? North American Review 230 Shuster, W. Morgan. Is there a Sound American Foreign Policy ? Century 238 Brooks, Sydney. Some Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Fortnightly Review 246 I BRIEF Resolved, That ^e Monroe Doctrine should be continued as part of the permanent foreign policy of the United States. INTRODUCTION j. The Monroe Doctrine has been the subject of considerable discussion in the past few years. A. In conferences which have convened for the special study of our international relations. B. In the press, on the platform, and by the people, not only in the United States, but also in Europe and in Central and South America. C. It has been condemned by some and vigorously reasserted by others as part of our foreign policy. JT. The Monroe Doctrine, as formulated in President Monroe's message of 1823, was the result of two circumstances. The claim of Russia to occupy territory in the North- west. B. The threatened intervention of the Holy Alliance to restore to Spain her former South American colonies. II' President Monroe's declaration was i. That the American continents were thereafter not to be considered open to colonization by European Powers. y. That any intervention in South American affairs would be regarded as unfriendly toward the United States. IV. It is generally admitted that the Doctrine has been extended to include u^ BRIEF xi II. The Monroe Doctrine is supported by experience. A. Under it the Latin-American republics have been able to continue their independent existence and have grown and prospered free from the domination of any European Power. B. It has been of great value to the United States. 1. It has made for our peace and prosperity. 2. It has added to our prestige and strengthened our position among the world powers. 3. It has given us moral supremacy in the western hemisphere. C. It has made for international peace. i. It has prevented the old-world Powers from bringing their quarrels into the new. III. The Doctrine is still a necessary part of our foreign policy. A. It is still necessary for self-preservation." i. To abandon it would not only impair our prestige among nations but would invite danger from foreign aggression. a. It \yould be necessary to increase our army and havy. b. The mere fact that the Doctrine has existed tyas relieved us from this necessity so far. 2. It is made more necessary than ever before by our duty to preserve the neutrality of the Panama Canal. B. It is essential to the welfare of Central and South America. 1. The need of European Powers for more territory would soon bring about in South America a repetition of what has happened in Africa, if the Motiroe Doctrine did not exist to prevent it. 2. The argument that it would be to our advantage and that of Latin-America if these republics were to become European colonies is untenable. a. These peoples are strong and progressive. b. They have a right to an independent existence. xii BRIEF IV. There is no foundation for the attitude of hatred and suspicion that exists among some of the peoples of Central and South America toward the Monroe Doctrine. A. When we have intervened in the affairs of these re- publics it has been done in a disinterested manner and has been for the benefit of all concerned. B. In so far as the Doctrine applies to Argentina, Brazil and Chile, it is never likely to be enforced, both because these countries are fully able to protect their own interests and because they are so remote from the United States as to make any violation of the Doctrine with respect to them of little harm to our interests. V. To invite the Latin-American republics to share with us the responsibility of maintaining the- principles of the Monroe Doctrine on the American continents would be impracticable. A. It is not likely that many of them would be willing to accept the responsibility B. To join with some of them, say with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, in maintaining the Doctrine on behalf of the others would excite jealousy and suspicion among- the remaining republics. C ~ ft(. &(rA/j^>t~*4 8 35 United States marines, who drove him into exile, placed a third president in the chair, captured five of the republic's towns, suppressed another revolt, distributed food supplies to the victims of the war, and left four hundred marines "on guard" in the republic's capital city. All this was justified on the plea of "the protection of the life and property of United States citizens and the influencing in all appropriate ways the restoration of lawful and orderly government." In the present administration, a treaty is said to be pending between the United States and Nicaragua which, if ratified, would make the latter republic a veritable "protectorate" of our own and a base of naval operations, also, against domestic revolts, foreign land-grabbers, and European creditors in the other Central American republics. The enforcement of a fair trial of political offenders in Cuba, the "supervision" of Domini- can elections, and the refusal to recognize Huerta, an enforced presidential election, and the rejection of the electoral returns, THE MONROE DOCTRINE in in Mexico, are all too recent to need more than a mere mention. In view of such achievements as these by an administration only one year of age, we must all recognize grave significance in President Wilson's declaration in his first annual message that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions." Thus, not only in our own dependencies, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, but in our neighboring republics, which are nominally independent, our government has become the school- master in the science and art of popular government. Jeffer- son's and Monroe's confidence in democracy has grown into a determination that our neighbors in the western world shall enjoy for themselves, nolens volens, the blessings of constitu- tional government, even if we are obliged to blow these blessings upon them from the guns of super-dreadnoughts. When it is suggested that this enterprise upon which we are engaged is a rather quixotic one, that it is in fact a superlatively and preposterously altruistic one for a mere government to be engaged in, the reply which has hitherto proved sufficient is, that popular government and financial solidity are essential to Latin America's political stability, that political stability is the sine qua non of its territorial integrity, and' that its territorial integrity is imperatively demanded by the Monroe Doctrine for the safety and peace of the United States. We Americans who have grown restive under the heavy burden of the Monroe Doctrine have sought for some means of' evading or lessening our country's responsibility, and sundry alternatives have been suggested. Some have roundly denounced it as an "obsolete shibboleth" and demanded that the United States throw it overboard from its ship of state, leaving Latin America to shift for itself, on its own resources, or with such defensive alliances as it can make in the new world or the old. But in the present state of world politics, this policy of scuttle is rejected by the majority of Americans as fraught with certain peril to Latin America and to the United States as well. Not only is the specter of old world territorial aggrandize- ment in the new world, with its military consequences to ourselves, seen in this policy of relinquishment, but the hope of efficient popular government throughout Latin America would be relinquished with it. If left entirely to themselves, it appears 112 SELECTED ARTICLES ON too optimistic to hope for most of these republics, as President Wilson said of Mexico in his first annual message : "And then, when the end comes [after civil war has ceased], we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distrest Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions." Ambition, ignorance and lack of political training would long continue to retard the permanent adoption of constitutional government. If, then, say other sincere critics, the United States must continue to bear the burden of the Monroe Doctrine, let us at least repress it within the straight-jacket of its modest original. The prevention of old world conquest or colonization, and the prevention of the restoration of monarchical government, in Latin America, are surely sufficient for the safety of the United States and are as much as Latin America can expect at our hands. But nulla vestigia retrorsum is the law here as else- where in national development ; and in these days of complex civilization, conquest, colonization and monarchical government assume such subtle forms that eternal vigilance or constant watchful waiting on the part of the United States is held to be the price of America's freedom from them. Through the doorways of national bonds, of industrial concessions, of land companies, and of special privileges of many kinds, may come those old enemies of the Holy Alliance era whom Jefferson and Monroe so valiantly resisted. Let us, then, say a third class of critics, bargain with those old-world Powers from whom, in our enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we are supposed to have most to fear, Ger- many and Japan, for example, and secure their formal recogni- tion of the Doctrine, not as a mere national policy, but as genuine international law. We have secured partial and sporadic recognition of it by some of the European Powers; let us induce them, by giving them some suitable quid pro quo, such as the Philippines, or tariff concession, to yield it once for all their formal acceptance. But students of the history of our country need -not be reminded that our chief national charac- teristics and instincts are opposed -to such international bargain- ing; while students of the history of international law need not be reminded that so-called international law which is based on THE MONROE DOCTRINE 113 such partial and selfish agreements is as unstable as the shifting sand of the desert or the shore. Let us, then, say still other critics, make a direct alliance with the Great Powers of Europe, Great Britain, Germany and France, for the enforcement of the Doctrine. If we can not make it genuine international law, let us continue it as a national policy and make an alliance for its support with those European Powers which are most interested in it and which are best able to render support to it. The advocates of this plan are not Americans alone. A member of the British House of Commons who is travelling in our country at the present time has recently said: "We are one people and of one blood. Our King came from Germany ; and I hope to see an alliance between England, Germany and the United States, with the entente with France maintained." These are friendly senti- ments ; but aside from the probable cost of such alliances as these, they run counter to our national antipathy, which has been firmly rooted ever since Washington's Farewell Address, to entangling alliances; and they run counter to that strong and ever increasing current of world-wide internationalism which is so marked a characteristic of our era, and which is opposed to partial alliances of every kind and degree. Again, it is suggested with growing insistency that, if not with the strongest of the old-world Powers, then surely with the strongest and most stable of the new-world Powers, "the A. B. C," for example, we can make an alliance for the enforcement of a distinctively American policy. This sugges- tion is a revival of President Jefferson's plan of 1808 to form, through General Wilkinson, an alliance between the United States, Spanish America, and Brazil. It is a revival under greatly changed and more favorable circumstances, of course; but it would be in this twentieth century an example of atavism, of reversion to the barbarous diplomacy of the Middle Ages. For the very reason that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy which vitally concerns all of the twenty-one American republics, its interpretation and enforcement may not justly be left to any partial "concert" of a few of them. The injustice to the weaker Powers, and the lack of harmony among the allied Powers themselves, which must be anticipated from any such "American ii4 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Concert," may be estimated from the history of the "Holy Alliance" and the "Concert of Europe." With the growth of the Latin American Powers, such a course would lead in time to the institution in this hemisphere of the precarious and portentous condition of affairs in the old world with its triple and dual alliances, and its ententes which are cordial only toward their own members and inimical and menacing toward all outsiders. Again, such a "Concert of America" would necessarily be on equal terms, or it would be dominated by the United States. If on equal terms, its object would be inevitably frustrated, by disagreement both as to what should be done and as to who should do it. The recognition of Maximilian's govern- ment in Mexico by Brazil, and Chile's impression of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States' collection of the Alsop claim, are two out of many illustrations of the inevitable disagreements which would ensue under any such quadruple alliance. If the "concert" be dominated by the United States, even though only for the sake of prompt decision and effective enforcement, the A. B. C. Powers would naturally regard it as only one more and the most galling of all the evidences of the "Yankee Peril" which the A. B. C. was formed primarily to combat. Foreign nations would inevitably regard the alliance of the United States with a selected few of its Latin- American neighbors as an illustration of the lion and the lamb lying down together, with the lamb inside, and much to the detriment of the lion's digestion and prestige among the other beasts of the jungle. A distinguished London journalist, who is a representative of his paper in this country, has frankly declared that such a sugges- tion is rank cowardice, a confession of weakness which a great nation like ours has no right to make ; and he assured his audience that Great Britain would never be dictated to by Latin Americans, even though allied with the United States. The distinguished Director General of the Pan-American Union has broadened the A. B. C. suggestion to include all of Latin America and to substitute the "Pan-American," for the "Monroe," Doctrine. This is a revival of Bolivar's dream of a Pan-American amphictyonic council, sitting at Panama, and checking the nefarious designs of the Holy Alliance. Pan- Hellenism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism are thus to be fol- THE MONROE DOCTRINE 115 lowed by Pan- Americanism. But if too much lamb might impair the lion's digestion, what might be expected from the addition of so many mice, and mice of a peculiarly tough and indigestible quality? The Latin Americans themselves would probably object to the achievement of such a meal: "But not on us," the oysters said (in response to the supper invitation of the walrus), "And they shed a salty tear." For the relations of our republic toward many of its neighbors in the past have partaken too much of that policy which has been graphically described as "a quick succession of kicks and kindness," to make such a proposal acceptable in entire confidence. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Chile, even Haiti, might be suspicious of entering into an alliance on unequal terms with the American eagle, whose talons have been felt more than once on their soil ; and to an alliance with them on equal terms, it would seem better to throw the Monroe Doc- trine overboard at once and invite Chaos to climb on board and thus avoid the long and poignant agony which would inevitably intervene before that goddess eventually took control. What alternative, then, is left? If the Monroe Doctrine is not to be declared obsolete and to be utterly discarded, if it can not now, in face of the imperative demands of twentieth cen- tury civilization, be repressed within the straight- jacket of its modest original; if no attempt should be made to induce the great Powers of Europe to give their formal assent to the United States' enforcement of it, and if no alliance with them should be made to aid the United States in its enforcement ; if an "American Concert," including the United States and the A. B. C. Powers, be impracticable and undesirable, and even more impracticable and undesirable a Pan-American Concert; what other refuge is there? There are two alternatives left, namely, the strictly national, and the genuinely international, or what I have ventured else- where to call the supranational, sanction. The advocates of the strictly national enforcement of the Mpnroe Doctrine, of its enforcement by the United States alone, form very probably at present the great majority of our fellow- countrymen; but this majority is daily decreasing as the logic of accumulating events is brought irresistibly home to them. Of course, "we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got ii6 SELECTED ARTICLES ON the money too ;" and if put to it we can still, doubtless, "lick all creation." But the process of keeping constantly prepared for so ani- mated a struggle is found to be increasingly expensive, and a resort to an income tax in a time of profound peace for the pur- pose of enabling us to expend two-thirds of the annual revenue on military objects is not greatly relished by the large and intel- ligent part of our citizenship upon whom the tax falls. Our merchants and financiers who deal with Latin America are increasingly aware that the United States' individual respon- sibility for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine lies like a lion across the path of their future opportunities for doing an increasing business with our rapidly developing neighbors; and they find, too, that their old-world competitors in these fields are utilizing the unpopularity of our government's policy to secure the lion's share of railroad and other concessions and of the foreign commerce. The growing importance of a foreign market as a stimulus and outlet for our domestic industry is being appreciated so keenly by our chambers of commerce that they are making their voice heard in favor of the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption clause ; the light of a similar experi- ence may be expected to dawn upon them in no distant future from the problem of the Monroe Doctrine as well. Meanwhile, the upper branch of our Congress, less sensitive at present to changes in public opinion than is the lower branch, advances the necessity of preserving sacred the Monroe Doc- trine as a reason for rejecting any such policy of "truckling" to Great Britain and the other commercial nations of the old world as is discovered in the repeal of the tolls exemption clause. Still more menacing to our responsibility for the Mon- roe Doctrine were considered the general arbitration treaties of 1911 with Great Britain and France, and the Senate accordingly rejected them. Unfortunately, the Senate's determination that no degree of arbitration, not even the compromise clause in greatly restricted general treaties, shall be permitted to infringe upon our monopoly of the Monroe Doctrine, persists side by side with, and is the prime cause of, the suspicion and ill-will which bursts forth from time to time between our country and such natural and traditional friends as Germany and Japan. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 117 This sensitiveness as to the safety of the Monroe Doctrine has not brought -with it a corresponding backwardness in claim- ing all the rights and privileges pertaining to it. For example, neither old-world Powers, nor other American republics, besides the one sole champion of the Monroe Doctrine, may be permitted to share in the building, ownership or control of any canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The right of forti- fying the Panama Canal has been followed by the assertion that we have also the right to discriminate in favor of our own ships passing through it, the diplomatic history of seventy years and the existence of a precise treaty to the contrary notwithstanding. "A leetle country never misconstrues a treaty with a big one," says the Albany philosopher ; "that is contrary to self-preserva- tion and the law of nations. A leetle country allus construes a treaty with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent ; but a big nation ain't so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, not by a long sight. If we ever want anything down in Guatemala that we can't git except with the aid of a handful o' blue-jackets an' a marine band; we'll discover a reason fer landin' 'em [and that will probably be the Monroe Doctrine] ; we'll dig up a reserve clause in a peace protocol [or the Monroe Doctrine] that can only be interpreted one way in the light of human progress." Since we insist on the exclusive possession of the rights entailed by the Doctrine, the old world naturally demands that we shall assume the corresponding duties. Its governments accordingly invoke our protection for the lives and property of their citizens in the not infrequent times of Latin-American revolt and disorder; its corporations make a similar demand; its merchants insist that we shall suppress civil warfare in the interest of neutral commerce; and its peoples assume that it is our duty to put an end to the inhumanity which may be dis- covered in the rubber-fields of Peru or Bolivia. The Latin- American governments, .also, have kept us tolerably busy in defending their only available assets, namely, their custom- houses and territory, from the pressing claims of the old-world creditors ; and even our own industrial corporations are demand- ing that our government shall intervene in their behalf against their old-world rivals, lest the latter should infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine by securing concessions from Latin American 10 n8 SELECTED ARTICLES ON governments which might place those governments under foreign control, or which might prevent valuable deposits of oil from rinding their natural destiny in the tanks of United States war- ships, the chief object of which is to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, largely in Latin America's behalf. Thus runs the argument in its vicious circle. So elastic has this Doctrine become under the strain of twentieth century cosmopolitanism that so good a friend of our country as the President of the Argentine Republic has char- acterized it as being made of gutta percha. So indefinite has it become in consequence of our country's attempt to make it apply to every new international emergency that no jurist or publicist outside of our own country can satisfactorily define it; and it is much to be doubted if we can do so ourselves. When it is finally laid to rest, its epitaph may well be : Here lies one whose name was writ in water. From the point of view of our own republican form of government, of our own constitution, the assumption by our government of the exclusive enforcement O'f the Doctrine is open to serious question. The American Revolution was due to Great Britain's adoption of an exaggerated Monroe Doctrine in dealing with its colonies. The Declaration of Independence is opposed to the claim of one nation to coerce the political status of another. Senator Hoar declared in a memorable address : "I maintain that holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but it is an end prohibited therein." The Constitution established a gov- erment of, by, and for the people of the United States, and certainly did not provide for a paternalistic government of foreign peoples. Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution was never designed to read: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Hemisphere a Republican Form of Govern- ment, and shall protect each of them agarist invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), or even without such applica- tion, it shall protect them against domestic violence." Our first President's strict appeal for obedience to the Constitution was so far forgotten by a recent President that, as he himself admits: "I took the Canal Zone and left Congress to debate, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 119 not the Canal, but me;" and again: 'The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo [to collect and administer that republic's revenues] ; but the Constitution did- not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution two years before the Senate acted. The Senate adjourned without any action at all. I went ahead and admin- istered the proposed treaty anyhow, considering it a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which would be con- verted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted." Thus near the verge of imperialism, at home as well as abroad, has the Monroe Doctrine and our exclusive administration of it brought us. It is small wonder that the Senate should have struggled with the Executive so ardently under President Roosevelt's administration and that similar acts on the part of his successor caused the late Democratic chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to introduce a resolution in the Senate for- bidding the use of the United States' military forces in lands not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Such are the insuperable and increasing difficulties, the fun- damental objections, to the strictly national, or the United States go-it-alone, policy of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. This solution of the problem is no longer tolerable, either in itself or in its consequences. The hand-writing on the wall, predicting its relinquishment, and the advancing shadow of its successor, are already to be seen. Not that the eternal prin- ciples of right and justice which underlie the doctrine are passing; but that the enforcement of these principles on the sole responsibility of a single one of the forty-six members of the family of nations is tottering to its fall. Le roi cst mort; vive le roi! The preservation of the integrity of national terri- tory and the maintenance of popular government can never be surrendered ; but they can and must be placed under the aegis of the entire family of nations and of a truly international court of justice. One splendid move was made by the United States itself in the direction of sharing with the rest of the family of nations a portion of the responsibility and burden of the Monroe Doc- trine when it secured the adoption by the Second Hague Con- ference of that proposition to which the name of our own 120 SELECTED ARTICLES ON General Porter has been given. This provides for the obligatory arbitration of contractual debts before a resort is had to force for their collection; and it was intended to apply especially to Latin American indebtedness to European creditors. But the collection of contractual indebtedness is only one of the multi- tudinous ways in which an attack on Latin-American territory or self-goverment may invoke the application of the Monroe Doctrine ; and hence it represents only the first step in the journey which must be made. The neutralization of Latin America by the Third Hague Conference, or, better still, a guarantee by that Conference of the territorial integrity of all the members of the family of nations, would not only relieve our country of the burden of sustaining this principle of the Monroe Doctrine, but would apply that just and righteous prin- ciple to the entire world. The institution of the Court of Arbi- tral Justice would be greatly facilitated by such a measure; for the smaller members of the family of nations would be more willing to constitute the court on some one of the plans pro- posed, if they could be assured that this important element of their sovereignty could not be brought, before the bar of a court on which they may not have absolute equality of repre- sentation. The ratification of treaties of general and even uni- versal arbitration would also be greatly facilitated, as was shown in the Senate's debate on the treaties of 1911, by this world-wide application of the first principle of the Monroe Doctrine. The world-wide application of the second principle of the Doctrine, namely, the guarantee of a constitutional government, although more difficult, is not, in my humble judgment, impos- sible. With the triumphant march of constitutional government around the world, it represents already nine points of national law, and the burden of proof against it would be placed by any international court of our time upon the opposing party. National courts are daily grappling with far more difficult cases in equity than would be brought before the international court by, for example, the present political problem in Mexico. Two precedents have already been created in this field of international law, and although they were set up on a relatively small and obscure part of the international stage, they were established under exceedingly difficult circumstances and were THE- MONROE DOCTRINE 121 wholly effective. These were, first, the arbitration of the revo- lutionary struggle between Presidents Bonilla and Davila, of Honduras, in 191 1, which resulted in the resignation of the lat- ter, the election of the former, and the end of the civil war; and, second, the issue of an interlocutory decree by the Central American Court of Justice, in 1909, which put an end to a revolutionary movement in Honduras by fixing the status quo, and by. enjoining the neighboring republics of Guatemala and Salvador from giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. The sanction back of such an award by the court of all the nations at The Hague, including as it would all the vis maxima of the twentieth century's diplomacy, commerce, finance, and international public opinion, not to mention, if necessary, an international police force, would be ample for its enforcement. The crux of this problem, of course, is the getting of such cases into court. But, as the United States knows only too well, the modern world is bound too closely together, and is too much under the dominion of the ideals of civilization, to permit the indefinite running of an open sore in the body politic of any member of the international family. This fact would supply the motive force to bring such cases into the international court; while the medium through which it could be done might well be supplied by some such development of the international com- missions of inquiry as is recommended by the Taft arbitration treaties, which development I have had the honor of discussing elsewhere under the name of "The International Grand Jury." This, then, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, is the solution of the problem of the Monroe Doctrine which I venture to submit to you, believing as I do that it will be the final and wholly desirable solution of a problem which is already difficult and potentially impossible if left to the solution of the United States alone, or of any partial alliances between it and the other Powers, great or small. AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION American Society of International Law. Proceedings. 1914: 6-22 Real Monroe Doctrine. Elihu Root It is undoubtedly true that the specific occasions for the declaration of Monroe no longer exist. The Holy Alliance, long ago disappeared. The nations of Europe no longer contemplate the vindication of monarchical principles in the territory of the new world. France, the most active of the Allies, is herself a republic. No nation longer asserts the right of colonization in America. The general establishment of diplomatic relations be- tween the Powers of Europe and the American republics, if not already universal, became so when, pursuant to the formal assent of the Powers, all the American republics were received into the Second Conference at The Hague and joined in the con- ventions there made, upon the footing of equal sovereignty, en- titled to have their territory and independence respected under that law of nations which formerly existed for Europe alone. The declaration, however, did more than deal with the specific occasion which called it forth. It was intended to declare a general principle for the future, and this is plain not merely from the generality of the terms used, but from the discussions out of which they arose and from the understanding of the men who took part in the making and of their successors. When Jefferson was consulted by President Monroe before the message was sent he replied : The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to inter- meddle with cisatlantic affairs. Three years later Daniel Webster declared that the Doctrine 124 . SELECTED ARTICLES ON involved the honor of the country. He said in the House of Representatives : I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and, for one, I intend to guard it. ... I will neither help to erase it nor tear it out; nor shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and will not diminish that honor. Mr. Cleveland said in his Message of December 17, 1895 : The doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essen- tial to the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to every, stage of our national life and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures. As the particular occasions which called it forth have slipped back into history, the Declaration itself, instead of being handed over to the historian, has grown continually a more vital and insistent rule of conduct for each succeeding generation of Amer- icans. Never for a moment have the responsible and instructed statesmen in charge of the foreign affairs of the United States failed to consider themselves bound to insist upon its policy. Never once has the public opinion of the people of the United States failed to support every just application of it as new oc- casion has arisen. Almost every President and Secretary of State has restated the Doctrine with vigor and emphasis in the discussion of the diplomatic affairs of his day. The Governments of Europe have gradually come to realize that the existence of the policy which Monroe declared is a stubborn and continuing fact to be recognized in their controversies with American countries. We have seen Spain, France, England, Germany, with admirable good sense and good temper, explaining beforehand to the United States that they intended no permanent occupation of territory, in the controversy with Mexico forty years after the Declaration, and in the controversy with Venezuela eighty years after. In 1903 the Duke of Devonshire declared "Great Britain accepts the Monroe Doctrine unreservedly." Mr. Hay coupled the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule as cardinal guides of American diplomacy. Twice within very recent years the whole treaty-making power of the United States has given its formal approval to the policy by the reservations in the signa- ture and in the ratification of the Arbitration Conventions of THE MONROE DOCTRINE 125 The Hague Conferences, expressed in these words by the Senate resolution agreeing to ratification of the Convention of 1907 : Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political ques- tions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state, nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a re- linquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions. It seems fair to assume that a policy with such a history as this has some continuing and substantial reason underlying it; that it is not outworn or meaningless or a purely formal relic of the past, and it seems worth while to consider carefully what the Doctrine is and what it is not. No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of international law or that the Doctrine which he declared has become international law. It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The Declaration does not say what the course of the United States will be in case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance. Mr. Calhoun said, in the Senate debate on the Yucatan Bill, in 1848: Whether you will resist or not and the measure of your resistance whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. This is the only wise course. There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba. In particular instances, indeed, the course which the United States would follow has been very distinctly declared, as when Mr. Seward said, in 1865 : It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points: namely, first, that the United States earnestly desires to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Sec- ondly, that this policy would be brought in imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it consistent with her honor to desist from the prosecu- tion of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country. 126 SELECTED ARTICLES ON So Secretary Buchanan said, in 1848 : The highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime State, with all means which Providence has placed at our command. And Secretary Clayton said, in 1849 : The news of the cession of Cuba to any foreign Power would in the United States be the instant signal for war. No foreign Power would at- tempt to take it that did not expect a hostile collision with us as an inevitable consequence. The Doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection, and that right is recognized by inter- national law. The right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilization of an army by another power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other power may be within its own territory. Yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war. The most common exercise of the right of self-protection outside of a state's own territory and in time of peace is the interposition of objection to the occupation of territory, of points of strategic military or maritime advantage, or to indirect accomplishment of this effect by dynastic arrangement. For example, the objection of England in 1911 to the occupation of a naval station by Ger- many on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco; the objection of the European Powers generally to the vast force of Russia extending its territory to the Mediterranean; the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Treaty of Berlin; the establishment of buffer states; the objection to the succession of a German prince to the throne of Spain; the many forms of the Eastern Question; the centuries of struggle to preserve the balance of power in Europe all depend upon the very same principle which underlies the Monroe Doctrine; that is to say, upon the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself. Of course each state must judge for itself when a threatened act will cre- ate such a situation. If any state objects to a threatened act and THE MONROE DOCTRINE 127 the reasonableness of its objection is not assented to, the efficacy of the objection will depend upon the power behind it. It is doubtless true that in the adherence of the American people to the original Declaration there was a great element of sentiment and of sympathy for the people of South America who were struggling for freedom, and it has been a source of great satisfaction to the United States that the course which it took in 1823 concurrently with the action of Great Britain played so great a part in assuring the right of self-government to the countries of South America. Yet it is to be observed that in reference to the South-American governments as in all other respects, the international right upon which the Declara- tion expressly rests is not sentiment or sympathy or a claim to dictate what kind of government any other country shall have, but the 'safety of the United States. It is because the new gov- ernments cannot be overthrown by the allied Powers "without endangering our peace and happiness" ; that "the United States cannot behold such interposition in any form with indifference." We frequently see statements that the Doctrine has been changed or enlarged; that there is a new or different Doctrine since Monroe's time. They are mistaken. There has been no change. One apparent extension of the statement of Monroe was made by President Polk in his messages of 1845 and 1848, when he included the acquisition of territory by a European Power through cession as dangerous to the safety of the United States. It was really but stating a corollary to the Doctrine of 1823 and asserting the same right of self-protection against the other American states as well as against Europe. This corollary has been so long and uniformly agreed to by the Government and the people of the United States that it may fairly be regarded as being now a part of the Doctrine. But, all assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, there has been no other change or enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine since it was first promulgated. It must be remembered that not everything said or written by Secretaries of State or even by Presidents constitutes a national policy or can enlarge or modify or diminish a national policy. .It is the substance of the thing to which the nation holds, and that is and always has been that the safety of the United States demands that American territory shall remain American. 128 SELECTED ARTICLES ON The Monroe Doctrine does not assert or imply or involve any right on the part of the United States to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any American state. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there are many rights unques- tioned and universally conceded. The assertion of any particular right must be considered, not as excluding all others, "but as coin- cident with all others which are not inconsistent. The funda- mental principle of international law is the principle of inde- pendent sovereignty. Upon that all other rules of international law rest. That is the chief and necessary protection of the weak against the power of the strong. Observance of that is the necessary condition to the peace and order of the civilized world. By the declaration of that principle the common judg- ment of civilization awards to the smallest and weakest state the liberty to control its own affairs without interference from any other power, however great. The Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon that right. It asserts the right. The declaration of Monroe was that the rights and interests of the United States were involved in main- taining a condition, and the condition to be maintained was the independence of all the American countries. It is "the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained" which is declared to render them not subject to future coloniza- tion. It is "the governments who have declared their inde- pendence and maintained it and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged" that are not to be interfered with. When Mr. Canning's proposals for a joint declaration were under consideration by the Cabinet in the months before the famous message was sent, John Quincy Adams, who played the major part in forming the policy, de- clared the basis of it in these words : Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they them- selves and no other nation had the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent. In the most critical and momentous application of the Doctrine Mr. Seward wrote to the French Minister : France need not for a moment delay her promised withdrawal of mili- tary forces from Mexico and her putting the principle of non-intervention THE MONROE DOCTRINE 129 into full and complete practice in regard to Mexico through any appre- hension that the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy in that respect which on their behalf it has been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened correspondence. The practice of this government from its beginning is a guarantee to all nations of the respect of the American people for the free sovereignty of the people in every other state. We received the instructions from Washington. We applied it sternly in our early intercourse even with France. The same principle and practice have been uniformly inculcated by all our states- men, interpreted by all our jurists, maintained by all our Congresses, and acquiesced in without practical dissent on all occasions by the American people. It is in reality the chief element of foreign intercourse in our history. In his message to Congress of December 3, 1906, President Roosevelt said: In many parts of South America there has been much misunderstanding of the attitude and purposes of the United States toward the other Ameri- can republics. An idea had become prevalent that our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine implied or carried with it an assumption of superiority and of a right to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to whose territory that Doctrine applies. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He quoted the words of the Secretary of State then in office to the recent Pan-American Conference at Rio Janeiro : We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the -family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic. And the President then proceeded to say of these statements: They have my hearty approval, as I am sure they will have yours, and I cannot be wrong in the conviction that they correctly represent the senti- ments of the whole American people. I cannot better characterize the true attitude of the United States in its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine than in the words of the distinguished former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Doctor Drago, "... the traditional policy "of the United States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance, con- demned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great Powers of Europe." Curiously enough, many incidents and consequences of that independent condition itself which the United States asserted in the Monroe Doctrine have been regarded in some quarters as 130 SELECTED ARTICLES ON infringements upon independence resulting from the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the personal rights of each individual free citizen in the state are limited by the equal rights of every other free individual in the same state, so the sovereign rights of each independent state are limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other independent state. These limitations are not impair- ments of independent sovereignty. They are the necessary con- ditions to the existence of independent sovereignty. If the Monroe Doctrine had never been declared or thought of, the sovereign rights of each American republic would have been limited by the equal sovereign rights of every other American republic, including the United States. The United States would have had a right to demand from every other American state observance of treaty obligations and of the rules of international law. It would have had the right to insist upon due protection for the liv.es and property of its citizens within the territory of every other American state, and upon the treatment of its citi- zens in that territory according to the rules of international law. The United States would have had the right as against every other American state to object to acts which the United States might deem injurious to its peace and safety, just as it had the right to object to such acts as against any European Power, and just as all European and American Powers have the right to object to such acts as against one another. All these rights which the United States would have had as against other Ameri- can states it has now. They are not in the slightest degree affected by the Monroe Doctrine. They exist now just as they would have existed if there had been no Monroe Doctrine. They are neither greater nor less because of that Doctrine. They are not rights of superiority; they are rights of equality. They are the rights which all equal independent states have as against one another. And they cover the whole range of peace and war. It happens, however, that the United States is very much bigger and more powerful than most of the other American re- publics. And when a very great and powerful state makes de- mands upon a very small and weak state it is difficult to avoid a feeling that there is an assumption of superior authority in- volved in the assertion of superior power, even though the demand be based solely upon the right of equal against equal. An examination of the various controversies which the United THE MONROE DOCTRINE 131 States has had with other American Powers will disclose the fact that in every case the rights asserted were rights not of superiority, but of equality. Of course, it cannot be claimed that great and powerful states shall forego their just rights against smaller and less powerful states. The responsibilities of sov- ereignty attach to the weak as well as to the strong, and a claim to exemption from those responsibilities would imply not equality, but inferiority. The most that can be said concerning a question between a powerful state and a weak one is that the great state ought to be especially considerate and gentle in the assertion and maintenance of its position ; ought always to base its acts not upon a superiority of force, but upon reason and law; and ought to assert no rights against a small state because of its weakness which it would not assert against a great state notwith- standing its power. But in all this the Monroe Doctrine is not concerned at all. The scope of the Doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American gov- ernment. It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European states. In good conduct or bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement or contro- versy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for interference. So Secre- tary Cass wrote, in 1858 : With respect to the causes of war between Spain and Mexico the United States have no concern, and do not undertake to judge them. Nor do they claim to interpose in any hostilities which may take place. Their policy of observation and interference is limited to the permanent sub- jugation of any portion of the territory of Mexico, or of any other Ameri- can state, to any European Power whatever. So Mr. Seward wrote, in 1861, concerning the allied opera- tions against Mexico : As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the President does not feel at liberty to question, and does not question, that the sovereigns represented have un- doubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they have sus- tained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the war severally or jointly. So when Germany, Great Britain, and Italy united to compel by naval force a response to their demands on the part of Ven- 132 SELECTED ARTICLES ON ezuela, and the German Government advised the United States that it proposed to take coercive measures to enforce its claims for damages and for money against Venezuela, adding, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory," Mr. Hay replied: That the Government of the United States, although it regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American countries, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for in- juries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated. Quite independently of the Monroe Doctrine, however, there is a rule of conduct among nations under which each nation is deemed bound to render the good offices of friendship to ihe others when they are in trouble. The rule has been crystallized in the provisions of The Hague Convention for the pacific set- tlement of international disputes. Under the head of "The Main- tenance of General Peace" in that Convention substantially all the Powers of the world have agreed: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between states, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences. In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers. Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it ex- pedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, 'should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance. The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act. The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the states at variance. The United States has frequently performed this duty in con- troversies between American republics among themselves and between American republics and European states. So in the controversy last referred to, the United States used her good offices to bring about a series of arbitrations which superseded the resort to force determined upon by the allied Powers against Venezuela. She did this upon the request of Venezuela. She did it in the performance of no duty and the exercise of no right THE MONROE DOCTRINE 133 whatever except the duty and the right of friendship between equal sovereign states. The Monroe Doctrine has nothing what- ever to do with acts of this description ; yet many times cen- sorious critics, unfamiliar with the facts and uninstructed in the customs and rules of action of the international world, have accused the United States in such cases of playing the role of schoolmaster, of assuming the superiority of guardianship, of aiming at a protectorate. As the Monroe Doctrine neither asserts nor involves any right of control by the United States over any American nation, it imposes upon the United States no duty toward European Powers to exercise such a control. It does not call upon the United States to collect debts or coerce conduct or redress wrongs or revenge injuries. If matters ever come to a point where in any American country the United States intervenes by force to prevent or end an occupation of territory to the subversion or exclusion of an American government, doubtless new rights and obligations will arise as a result of the acts done in the course of the intervention. Unless such a situation shall have arisen there can be no duty on the part of the United States beyond the exercise of good offices as between equal and inde- pendent nations. There are, indeed, special reasons why the United States should perform that duty of equal friendship to the full limit of international custom and international ethics as declared in The Hague Convention, whenever occasion arises in controversy between American and European Powers. There is a motive for that in the special sympathy and friendship for the gradually developing republics of the South which the American people have always felt since the days of Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Richard Rush and Henry Clay. There is a motive in the strong desire of our Government that no controversy be- tween a European and an American state shall ever come to the point where the United States may be obliged to assert by force the rule of national safety declared by Monroe. And there is a motive in the proper desire of the United States that no friendly nation of Europe or America shall be injured or hindered in the prosecution of its rights in any way or to any extent that can possibly be avoided because that nation respects the rule of safety which Mr. Monroe declared and we maintain. None of these 11 134 SELECTED ARTICLES ON reasons for the exercise of the good offices of equality justifies, nor do all of them together justify, the United States in infring- ing upon the independence or ignoring the equal rights of the smallest American state. Nor has the United States ever in any instance during the period of almost a century which has elapsed made the Monroe Doctrine or the motives which lead us to support it the ground or excuse for overstepping the limits which the rights of equal sovereignty set between equal sovereign states. Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted into a joint or common declaration by American states or any number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to contribute the weight of her influence toward a similar end, the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration would be its own safety, not the safety of the United States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the safety of Chile Argentina would declare what was necessary for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was necessary for the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and in its own right, and it would be impossible to go beyond that except by more or less offensive and de- fensive alliances. Of course, such alliances are not to be con- sidered. It is plain that the building of the Panama Canal greatly accentuates the practical necessity of the Monroe Doctrine as it applies to all the territory surrounding the Caribbean or near the Bay of Panama. The plainest lessons of history and the universal judgment of all responsible students of the subject concur in teaching that the potential command of the route to and from the Canal must rest with the United States, and that the vital interests of the nation forbid that such command shall pass into other hands. Certainly no nation which has acquiesced in the British occupation of Egypt will dispute this proposition. Undoubtedly, as one passes to the south and the distance from the Caribbean increases the necessity of maintaining the rule of Monroe becomes less immediate and apparent. But who is competent to draw the line? Who will say, "To this point the rule of Monroe should apply; beyond this point, it should not"? Who will say that a new national force created THE MONROE DOCTRINE 135 beyond any line that he can draw will stay beyond it and will not in the long course of time extend itself indefinitely? The danger to be apprehended from the immediate proximity of hostile forces was not the sole consideration leading to the Declaration. The need to separate the influences determining the development and relation of states in the New World from the influences operating in Europe played an even greater part. The familiar paragraphs of Washington's Farewell Address upon this subject were not rhetoric. They were intensely practical rules of conduct for the future guidance of the country. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, there- fore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and col- lisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. It was the same instinct which led Jefferson, in the letter to Monroe already quoted, to say: Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. The concurrence of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson in the declaration of this principle of action entitles it to great respect. They recalled the long period during which every war waged in Europe between European Powers and arising from European causes of quarrel was waged also in the new world. English and French and Spanish and Dutch killed and harried one another in America, not because of quarrels between the settlers in America, but because of quarrels between the Euro- pean Powers having dominion over them. Separation of influ- ences as absolute and complete as possible was the remedy which the wisest of Americans agreed upon. It was one of the primary purposes of Monroe's Declaration to insist upon this separation, and to accomplish it he drew the line at the water's edge. The problem of national protection in the distant future is one not to be solved by the first impressions of the casual observer, but only by profound study of the forces which, in the long life of nations, work out results. In this case the results of such a 136 SELECTED ARTICLES ON study by the best men of the formative period of the United States are supported by the instincts of the American democracy holding steadily in one direction for almost a century. The prob- lem has not changed essentially. If the Declaration of Monroe was right when the message was sent, it is right now. South America is no more distant to-day than it was then. The tre- mendous armaments and international jealousies of Europe afford little assurance to -those who think we may now abandon the separatist policy of Washington. That South American states have become too strong for colonization or occupation is cause for satisfaction. That Europe has no purpose or wish to colon- ize American territory is most gratifying. These facts may make it improbable that it will be necessary to apply the Monroe Doc- trine in the southern parts of South America; but they furnish no reason whatever for retracting or denying or abandoning a declaration of public policy, just and reasonable when it was made, and which, if occasion for its application shall arise in the future, will still be just and reasonable. A false conception of what the Monroe Doctrine is, of what it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its limits, has invaded the public press and affected public opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes of national expansion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested motives to compel Cen- tral or South American countries to do or refrain from doing something by which individual Americans may profit invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Clamors for national glory from minds too shallow to grasp at the same time a sense of national duty invoke the Monroe Doctrine. The intolerance which demands that con- trol over the conduct and the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny invokes the Monroe Doctrine. Thoughtless people who see no difference between lawful right and physical power assume that the Monroe Doctrine is a warrant for inter- ference in the internal affairs of all weaker nations in the New World. Against this supposititious doctrine many protests both in the United States and in South America have been made, and justly made. To the real Monroe Doctrine these protests have no application. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 137 Independent. 76:540-4. December 18, 1913 Monroe Doctrine: Its Limitations and Implications. William H. Taft It Has Made for Peace The original declaration of the Monroe Doctrine was prompted by England's wish, when Canning was Foreign Minister, that England and the United States should make a joint declaration of such a policy. Since its announcement by President Monroe there have been frequent intimations by English statesmen while in office that they do not object to its maintenance. Whether the other governments of Europe have acquiesced in it or not, it is certain that none of them have insisted upon violating it when the matter was called to their attention by the United States. Every one admits that its maintenance until recently has made for the peace of the world, has kept European govern- ments from intermeddling in the politics of this hemisphere, and has enabled all the various Latin-American republics that were offshoots from Spain to maintain their own governments and their independence. While it may be truly said that it has not made for peace between them, still that was not within the scope of its purpose. It has, however, restrained the land- hunger and the growing disposition for colonization by some European gov- ernments, which otherwise would certainly have carried them into this hemisphere. The very revolutions and instabilities of many of the Latin- American republics would have offered fre- quent excuse and opportunity for intervention by European gov- ernments which they would have promptly improved. It Does not Forbid War The second great limitation of the Monroe Doctrine is that it does not contemplate any interference on our part with the right of an European government to declare and make war upon any American government, or to pursue such course in the vindi- cation of its national rights as would be a proper method under the rules of international law. This was expressly declared to be a proper term in the statement of the Doctrine by Mr. Seward during our Civil War, when Spain made war against Chile. He 138 SELECTED ARTICLES ON announced our intention to observe neutrality between the two nations and he laid down the proposition that the Doctrine did not require the United States, in a consistent pursuit of it, to protect any government in this hemisphere, either by a defensive alliance against the attacking European Power or by interfering to prevent such punishment as it might inflict, provided only that in the end the conquering power did not force its own govern- ment upon the conquered people, or compel a permanent transfer to it of their territory, or resort to any other unjustly oppressive measures against them. And Mr. Roosevelt in his communica- tions to Congress has again and again asserted that maintenance of the Doctrine does not require our Government to object to armed measures on the part of European governments to collect their debts and the debts of their nationals against governments in this continent that are in default of their just obligations, provided only that they do not attempt to satisfy those obligations by taking over to themselves ownership and possession of the territory of the debtor governments, or by other oppressive meas- ures. It may be conceded that Mr. Olney used language that was unfortunate in describing the effect of the Monroe Doctrine upon the position of the United States in this hemisphere. It is .not remarkable that it has been construed to be the claim of suzerainty over the territory of the two American continents. Our fiat is riot law to control the domestic concerns or indeed the internal policies, or the foreign policies of the Latin-American republics, or of other American governments, nor do we exercise substantial sovereignty over them. We are concerned that their governments shall not be interfered with by European govern- ments ; we are concerned that this hemisphere shall not be a field for land aggrandizement and the chase for increased political power by European governments, such as we have witnessed in Africa and in China and Manchuria, and we believe that such a condition would be inimical to our safety and interests. More than this, where a controversy between an European government and a Latin-American republic is of such a character that it is likely to lead to war, we feel that our earnest desire to escape the possible result against which the Monroe Doctrine is aimed, is sufficient to justify our mediating between the European Power and the Latin-American republic, and bringing about by negotia- tion, if possible, a peaceable settlement of the difference. This THE MONROE DOCTRINE 139 i is what Mr. Roosevelt did in Venezuela and in Santo Domingo. It was not that the use of force or threatened force to collect their debts by the European Powers constituted a violation of the Monroe Doctrine that induced Mr. Roosevelt to act, but only a general desire to promote peace and also a wish to avoid circum- stances in which an invasion of the Monroe Doctrine might easily follow. "A National Asset" It is said and this is what frightened peace advocates from the Monroe Doctrine that it rests on force, and ultimately on the strength of our army and our navy. That is true, if its en- forcement is resisted. Its ultimate sanction and vindication are in our ability to maintain it; but our constant upholding and assertion of the Doctrine have enabled us, with the conflicting interests of European Powers and the support of some and the acquiescence of others, to give effect to that Doctrine for now nearly a century, and that without the firing of a single shot. This has given the Doctrine a traditional weight that assertion of a new policy by the United States never could have. It is a national asset, and, indeed, an asset of the highest value for those who would promote the peace of the world. The mere fact that the further successful maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in the improbable event that any European Power shall deliberately violate it will require the exercise of force upon our part, is cer- tainly not a reason for the most sincere advocate of peace to insist upon sacrificing its beneficent influence and prestige as an instrument of peace to prevent European intermeddling in this hemisphere which a century of successful insistence without actual use of force has given it. Much as the Doctrine may be criticized by the Continental press of Europe, it is an institution of one hundred years' stand- ing, it is something that its age is bound to make Europe respect. It was advanced at a time when we were but a small nation with little power, and it has acquired additional force and prestige as our nation has grown to the size and strength and international influence that it now has. Were we to abandon the Doctrine and thus in effect notify the European governments that so far as our remonstrance or inter- position was concerned, they might take possession of Santo 140 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Domingo, of Haiti, or of any of the Central American republics, or of any South American republics that might be disturbed by revolution, and that might give them some international excuse for intervention, it would be but a very short time before we would be forced into controversies that would be much more dangerous to the peace of this hemisphere than our continued assertion of the Doctrine properly understood and limited. Should We Invite Their Cooperation? But it is said that we ought to invite in these so-called A. B. C. powers of South America to assist us in upholding the Doctrine and also in doing what the Doctrine, as well as neighborhood interests, may lead us to do with nearby countries around the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and that we ought to establish some sort of relationship with these great powers as members of a kind of hegemony to decide upon Latin-American questions and participate in intervention to help along the smaller countries, and thus put such powers on an equality with us in our American policy and give assurance of our disinterestedness. If we could do this, I would be glad to have it done, because it would relieve us of part of a burden and would give greater weight to the declaration of the policy. I would be glad to have an effort tactfully made to this end and I don't want to dis- courage it ; but I fear we should find that these powers would be loath to assume responsibility or burden in the matter of the welfare of a government like one of the Central American re- publics, or Haiti or Santo Domingo so remote from them and so near to us. We attempted in case of disturbance in the Central American governments once or twice to interest Mexico, when Mexico had a responsible government and was very near at hand, but President Diaz was loath to take any part with the United States in such an arrangement, and we found that whatever had to be done had to be done largely on the responsibility of the United States. If action in respect of any republic of South America were necessary under the Monroe Doctrine, the joining of the A. B. C. powers with the United States might involve suspicion and jeal- ousy on the part of other South American republics not quite so prosperous or so stable as the A. B. C. powers. Thus, instead of helping the situation, the participation of part of the South THE MONROE DOCTRINE 141 American governments might only complicate it. I know some- thing about the character of those countries myself, not from personal observation, but from a study of the character of Span- ish descended civilizations and societies, and I venture to say that sensitive as they all may be in respect to suspected encroach- ments of the United States, they are even more sensitive as be- tween themselves and their respective ambitions. During my Administration, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, tendered the good offices of the United States as between South American governments who were bitter against each other over boundaries and other disputes, and successfully brought them to a peaceful solution, but in those controversies it was quite apparent that whatever then might be the general feeling against the United States, their suspicions of each other, when thejr interests were at variance, were quite as intense. Indeed it is not too much to say that the fear in the hearts of the less powerful peoples of South America of a South American hegemony is more real than any genuine fear they may have of the actual suzerainty of our Gov- ernment. My belief, therefore, is that unless we could organize a union of all the countries of two continents, which would be so clumsy as to be entirely impracticable, the influence of the United States can probably be exerted in support of the Monroe Doctrine more effectively and much less invidiously alone than by an attempt to unite certain of the South American Powers in an effort to preserve its successful maintenance. I hope my fear in this respect will prove to be unfounded and that the plan sug- gested may be successful. Craftsman. 25:311-4. January, 1914 Vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. W. Carman Roberts This doctrine which for ninety years has been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy has not merely held its own dur- ing this period, but has proved its vitality by gradually extending its scope under succeeding administrations. Thus under Presi- dent Cleveland it was interpreted to mean that any European Power owning land in the Western Hemisphere must arbitrate its boundary disputes with its neighbors. President Roosevelt went further than his predecessors in accepting for Uncle Sam 142 SELECTED ARTICLES ON under the Monroe Doctrine the role of benevolent policeman, "the big brother with a stick," who, as Professor Hiram Bingham of Yale puts it, "would keep intruders from annoying the little fellows, and who would also see to it that the little fellow did not annoy the neighbors." Under President Taft the Lodge resolution, passed by the Senate but not signed by the President, undertook to carry Monroeism still further by denying the right of American republics to sell harbor rights to foreign cor- porations. But the most remarkable development of the Monroe Doctrine is that formulated by President Wilson within very recent weeks and involving the proposition that the United States will not countenance the establishment of any foreign financial control over- the weaker Latin-American countries of a sort that would in effect control their government. Speaking at Mobile recently the President said: "States that are obliged to grant concessions are in this condition that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What" these states are going to see is an emancipation from this subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprises. The United States must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are ma- terial interests made superior to human liberty and national op- portunity." This was prefaced by an emphatic statement that never again would the United States acquire a foot of territory by conquest. An almost immediate sequel to this warning to the foreign concessionaires was the abandonment by a powerful British syndicate of gigantic oil project in Colombia and Ecuador. These projects, if consummated, would have put certain ports in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal practically under British control a situation in direct conflict with the Monroe Doctrine as elaborated in the Lodge resolution. Moreover, since oil is likely to supersede coal as naval fuel, an oil port is virtually the equivalent of a coaling station. Thus, despite repeated assertions that it is dead or obsolete, the Monroe Doctrine not only remains a controlling factor in our foreign relations, but is proving its vitality by constant growth in meaning and scope. Moreover, it is and always has been a popular doctrine with the American people. Even the weaker of the Latin-American nations are now beginning to THE MONROE DOCTRINE 143 understand that it does not mean "the Americas for the United States," but, "the Americas for the Americans." They begin to see that if the "big brother" has sometimes been "bossy," his motive has not been one of arrogance but of helpfulness. And as an aid to this understanding they have the assurance of Presi- dent Wilson that "we are the friends of constitutional govern- ment in America ; we are more than its friends, we are its cham- pions ; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty." Journal of Race Development. 4:359-69. January, 1914 Modern Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. J. M. Callahan It is unfair to say that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere pro- nunciamento based on provincialism and selfishness, and that it has never served any useful purpose. True, one of its earlier basic ideas was the natural separation between the old and the new world an idea of two separate spheres which was unwarranted however, much it may have seemed desirable to Jefferson in the Napoleonic period of "eternal war" in Europe. This idea of isolation was never a vital prin- ciple of the doctrine. The United States was a world power from the beginning and early felt the need of naval bases in the Mediterranean. As a world power it has rights in Europe, Africa and Asia. True, the Doctrine was largely due to self interest, together, with the feeling that the United States was logically the political leader among the American powers. Secretary Adams in his instructions to Rush, on November 29, 1823, said: "American affairs, whether of the northern or southern continent, can hence- forth not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States that they can- not be left to the disposal of European Powers animated and directed exclusively "by European principles and interests." The United States, beginning with the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France in 1801 and the apprehended transfer of Florida from Spain to some other European Power in 1811, has 144 SELECTED ARTICLES ON steadily opposed any European acquisition of American territory which as a European colony might prove dangerous to American peace and security. The Monroe Doctrine, based upon this prin- ciple, has been preeminently a doctrine of peace especially se- cured by freeing the Americans from the contests of European diplomacy and politics. In 1905, President Roosevelt said the doctrine as gradually developed and applied to meet changing needs and conditions, and as accepted by other nations, was one of the most effective instruments for peace in the western hemisphere. Although its policy was based on self interest, the American government under Monroe gave proper consideration to the in- terests of Latin America. Although in recognizing the inde- pendence of Spanish American countries, it had issued a declara- tion of neutrality, Secretary Adams later (October, 1823), in- formed the Russian minister that this declaration "had been made under the observance of like neutrality by all the European Powers" and might be changed by change of circumstances. The Monroe Doctrine which followed was directly caused by the belief in the right of free peoples to determine their destinies and by it the United States, with unusual courage, became a protector of liberty and self government in the western hemi- sphere. Its high purpose and convenient usefulness was properly recognized at the time by the weak Latin-American republics. It was the outgrowth of the sympathy felt for Latin-American peoples who were struggling to free themselves from conditions imposed by European politics and who had been recognized as independent nations by the United States. Monroe, who pre- viously as secretary of state was familiar with Latin- American conditions, at first contemplated a bold stand to prevent Euro- pean interference in Spain itself. After the decision to limit the scope of active opposition to the threatened European interven- tion in American affairs, he appointed a special secret repre- sentative to visit Europe, to watch the operations of European congresses and to furnish reports as a basis of determination of American policy. Luckily he was successful in blocking interven- tion without resort to more active measures. The Doctrine has prevented the partition of Latin America, and without any request of remuneration for the service rendered. Its unselfish purpose and unusual daring, in face of what seemed THE MONROE DOCTRINE 145 a serious peril, gave it a well deserved popularity in the United States and in Latin- American countries many of which have in many instances since endeavored to secure treaty stipulations based upon its principles, or have invited the United States actively to intervene to protect them from the apprehended inter- vention of European Powers or from despots who might prepare the way for European intervention. In spite of apparent lapses of consistency, illustrated in the case of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which was supported as a measure which was expected to free an important part of the con- tinent from European intervention), the basic principles of the Doctrine, interpreted with proper elasticity to meet changing con- ditions, were asserted with success in other later cases. The most notable cases were the termination of French intervention in Mex- ico in 1867, and the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute with England in 1895-96 after the famous Cleveland-Olney interpretation which resulted in a triumph of the American de- mand for arbitration, awakened the entire world to the modern meaning of the "menaces of Monroe," and caused someone to re- gard the Doctrine as an international impertinence. Although originally a mere declaration of Monroe,- nobody since the action of the United States in the Venezuelan affair can surely say it has never had the sanction of Congress. The Doctrine, although based primarily upon the right of Latin American states to govern themselves, has been sometimes erroneously regarded as a doctrine of American expansion. It is not based on territorial conquest-*-although over half a century ago it was sometimes associated with that idea. It expresses a duty and a sympathy toward Latin America and not a desire for territory. Americans, who logically in their early history established their boundaries on the gulf, for a half century have not been inclined to encroach upon the territories of their neighbors. It is true that much Latin- American suspicion of American territorial designs was justified in the decade before the American Civil War, when under the influence of American leaders of the southern states, the shibboleth of "Manifest Destiny" was added to the doctrine of national security. In January, 1855, Marcoleta of the Nicaragua legation protested against the projects of the self-styled "Central American Land and Mining Company" to 146 SELECTED ARTICLES ON encourage immigration to Central America, and especially against the nature of the "schemes devised against Central America by these modern Phoenicians who assume military titles . . . and grasp the sword and musket instead of the ploughshare and ax and shepherd's crook, thinking to make conquest of the golden fleece which they believe to be hung and secreted amidst the briars, forests, thickets and swamps . . . under the by no means attractive and seductive influence of a pestiferous and fever-giving atmosphere." Suspicion was doubtless increased in 1856 by plans for an American protectorate over the Isthmus of Panama, formulated in a treaty (between the United States and New Granada) whose ratification was prevented by a change of administration in the United States and a revolution in New Granada. These suspicions were prominent in producing the project of a Latin-American Confederacy of 1856 a proposed alliance which was regarded as antagonistic to the United States, and which caused Dana, the American minister to Bolivia, to propose to the Buchanan administration early in 1857 a clear statement of American foreign policy based upon the Monroe Doctrine, non-expansion in Latin America, and treaties of alli- ance with the Latin-American states, in order to sustain self- government in both Americas. In 1858, in connection with the policy of the American government to secure a neutral transit route across Central America, Nicaragua issued a manifesto against apprehended filibustering expeditions from the United States, and by demanding a European protectorate indicated a line of policy which Secretary Cass promptly warned her that the United States had long opposed and would resist by all means in her power, for reasons "founded on the political circum- stances of the American continent which has interests of its own." It is true that, after the Gadsden purchase, persistent efforts were made under the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, not only to extend American influence and domain in the West Indies, but also to solve the Mexican problem by additional re- duction of Mexican territory or by -.the establishment of an American protectorate which was expected to result in new acqui- sitions to the stronger country. These efforts, largely based on the danger of European influence and apprehended European intervention in Mexico, closed with the beginning of the Ameri- THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 147 can Civil War and with the arrival of the long-predicted Euro- pean intervention in Mexico. Under Seward, the American government sought only to pre- serve Mexico from the Confederates and from permanent Euro- pean occupation, and the American senate refused to enter into any arrangement by which a proposed mortgage on lands of Mexico might have resulted in new annexations. Later, although Mexico feared American expansion toward the southwest and hesitated to cooperate in the construction of railroads across the international boundary, the United States government remained true to the assurances of Seward in Mexico after the expulsion of Maximilian. It sought no acquisition of territory in Mexico ; and much less did it desire territory in Latin America farther south, except in connection with the later projects for the con- struction of the interoceanic canal whose benefits would be shared by Latin America and the entire world. The part taken by the United States in Cuba and in the Venezuelan controversy with the European allies has revealed to Latin America the true feeling of the government of the United States. It has shown them that the mother republic is sincerely and earnestly interested in the success of republican government throughout this hemisphere. It has shown that the purpose of the older republic in relations with Latin America is not one of conquest, but one of sympathy, cooperation, and as- sistance. The true policy of the American government since the Civil War was recently expressed by Secretary Root, and more recently by President Wilson in his Mobile speech. The idea of an American interoceanic-isthmian canal, which possibly was considered as a minor factor in producing the origi- nal declaration of Monroe, was later a prominent factor in caus- ing the United States government to assert a status of "paramount interest," which is now emphasized as a cardinal point of Ameri- can foreign policy growing from the basic principle of the policy of Monroe and Adams. Seward steadily acting under the doc- trine of the larger influence and interest of the United States in American affairs, in 1864 began to assert it in a series of negotia- tions and treaties with Central America and Colombia in regard to the proposed isthmian canal. His successor, under Grant's administration, hopefully expecting the future "voluntary de- 148 SELECTED ARTICLES ON parture of European government from this continent and the adjacent islands," in 1870-77 favored the acquisition of San Do- mingo, as a measure of national protection to prevent the appre- hended danger of its control as a possession or a protectorate of a European Power, and to secure a "just claim to a controlling influence" over the future commercial traffic across the isthmus. Later, he endeavored to negotiate with Colombia a treaty by which he sought for the L^nited States a greater privileged status and more extensive rights of intervention on the isthmus a treaty which Colombia refused to ratify. In 1880, Secretary Evarts asserted the doctrine of American "paramount interest" in projects of interoceanic canal communication across the isth- mus, and the right to be a principal party to any political ar- rangements affecting this American question. This doctrine received new meaning in 1881 after the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain which already owned a controlling majority of the stock of the Suez Canal, and again after the events of the Ameri- can intervention in Cuba which brought new opportunities, new duties and new responsibilities to the United States. The con- struction of the canal under American control was the logical conclusion of a long series of events ; and the wisdom of the diplomacy and policy which seized opportunity by the forelock, and terminated the long period of discussion and delay, can safely be submitted to the test of time. Although changed conditions in both hemispheres, and of motive power on the ocean, have modified the earlier meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and may still further modify it, its main basic principle for America has not been abandoned. This prin- ciple is not obsolete. It has been retained on the broad ground of national welfare, in spite of the defects in Latin American governments so frequently resulting in troubles due to unpaid claims; and European Powers have recently shown a readiness to accept it at the Hague Conference and in connection with the Venezuelan debt question of 1902. The latter incident, according to leaders in England, gave the Monroe Doctrine an immensely increased authority. Mr. Balfour, approving the American policy, suggested that the United States should more actively enter into an arrangement by which constantly-occurring difficulties between European Powers and certain states in Latin America could be avoided. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 149 Unless we have reached the conclusion that all Latin America might be better under European control, and that this control would not seriously threaten the peace and permanent interests of the United States, at least one important principle of the Doctrine should still be retained as a fundamental part of Ameri- can foreign policy. Under whatever name, and however modified to suit the conditions and needs of American foreign policy, it is still a useful principle. It may fitly be called the doctrine of national defense, which in its results may be regarded also as a doctrine of Pan-American defense. In America the United States government has duties and responsibilities which can not be abandoned to the mercy of trans-oceanic powers, nor sub- mitted to the decision of international conferences or tribunals. It must attend to the larger interests of the United States with- out any unnecessary interference with the larger interests of other powers. Certainly, in Mexico at present, the United States has a larger interest than that of any European Power. She has a far greater interest than any other power in the restoration of peace and the establishment of a government that has proper basis or permanency in its method of selection and in its policies for adjustment of problems that press for solution. Peace in America, on the basis of good government, is more important to the United States than it is to Europe, and more important to the United States than peace in Europe. The present basis of policy is the paramount interest of the United States in American affairs a special interest which, especially in the Caribbean, can be shared with no other power, and perhaps would be questioned by no European Power. After the war for the relief of the Cuban situation in 1898 a war which made the United States an Asiatic power and brought it in contact with European politics in the far East American paramount interests in the West Indies, and in the Caribbean, were greatly increased and especially found expression in the messages of President Roosevelt and in various acts of the American government including the construction of the Panama Canal which has clearly increased the importance of maintaining around the Caribbean the American policy against the interfer- ence of European Powers. In this region the United States has duties and responsibilities which it may not willingly share with any European Power. 12 150 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Farther south, the assertion and maintenance of the doctrine of non-intervention has been rendered less necessary by the growth of several more perfect, orderly and stable governments, which themselves are the best guarantors of the Doctrine. The larger Latin American republics, in which governments have reached sure bases of permanence, may properly be invited by the United States to cooperate or participate in the consideration of mutual larger interests in America, and to share the responsi- bilities incident to the American principle of defense of American nationalities. Doubtless by such a continental extension of the means of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American neighbors through the sobering effect of actual responsibility would cease to misinterpret the motives of the mother republic in the Caribbean and on the Isthmus. Whether we admit Olney's declaration that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent," it seems clear that as a result of its geographic situation it has a "paramount inter- est" in the western hemisphere which imposes certain rules of policy toward Latin-American neighbors especially toward those in the Caribbean and round its shores. This doctrine was at the basis of the Cuban intervention, of the construction of the Panama canal under American control, of the declaration of policy to Germany in connection with the blockade of Venezuelan ports, of the policy in Santo Domingo, of the recent policy in Nicaragua, and of the present Mexican policy. The essential idea is to prevent the danger of European intervention which might result in the acquisition of territory. North American Review. 176: 185-99. February, 1903 Monroe Doctrine Its Origin and Import. William L. -Scruggs It has been said that the Monroe Doctrine, even as thus limited and understood, has never received the assent of Europe, nor even the sanction of our own Congress; consequently, that it has no legal validity. It seems to me that such an assumption, totally unsupported as it is by either fact or law, scarcely needs refuta- tion. Even if the facts were as alleged, they would not warrant the conclusion drawn from them. But since the facts are not as alleged, the conclusion is doubly erroneous. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 151 As a matter of fact, there has never been a formal protest against the Monroe Doctrine by any European Power. On the contrary, all have passively acquiesced in it for nearly a whole century, and passive acquiescence is tantamount to assent. And, whilst our national legislature has never specifically, and in so many words, reaffirmed it, that body has many times either taken its validity for granted or constructively affirmed it. Every reso- lution or other measure bearing upon it that has ever been intro- duced into either House of Congress, has been in support of it; never has there been one against it. That of 1824, by Mr. Clay, was never called up, because, under the change of ' circumstances which soon followed, the measure was deemed superfluous. That of 1864, which passed both Houses without a dissenting vote, took the validity of the Monroe Doctrine for granted, and re- sulted, as everybody knows, in the almost immediate evacuation of Mexico by the French. That of 1879 was never reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs possibly because the occasion for it had already passed. That of 1880 was unani- mously sustained by the Foreign Affairs Committee, but the ses- sion closed before it could be acted upon. That of 1895-6, in relation to the Anglo-Venezuelan question, passed both Houses without a dissenting voice, and led to the settlement of the dispute by arbitration. The Resolution of 1826, relative to the proposed Panama Con- gress, constitutes no exception.. In the first place, it was not germane to the case at all. Its passage turned upon totally differ- ent issues, as is manifest from the very words of the Resolution itself. It merely expressed the opinion that the United States ought not, under the then existing circumstances, to be repre- sented in that particular conference "except in a purely diplo- matic character;" that we ought not, at that particular time, to form "any alliance with all or any of the Spanish-American states," but be left free to act, in any crisis that might arise, in "such manner as our feelings of friendship towards our sister republics and our own honor and traditional policy may at the time dictate." In the next place, viewed at this distance of time, it is easy to see just why that Congress failed. Not the Monroe Doctrine, but Negro Slavery was the rock on which it was wrecked. One of the questions proposed for discussion by the Congress was "the consideration of means to be adopted for the 152 SELECTED ARTICLES ON entire abolition of the African slave trade." Cuba and Porto Rico, then slave-holding provinces of Spain, we're certain to be made subjects of discussion; Hayti, already a Negro republic, would be represented ; and there were then over four millions of negro slaves in the United States, right of property in which was guaranteed by our fundamental law. Here, then, was an awk- ward dilemma to be avoided ; and in avoiding it in yielding to the necessity of preserving a class of vested interests in our slave-holding States we lost the opportunity of giving perma- nent direction to the political and commercial connections of the newly enfranchised South-American republics, and the bulk of their trade passed into other hands. But the 'principles of the Monroe Doctrine were not, in any manner, abridged or modified thereby. Again, it has been said that the so-called "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," of 1850, was a material modification, if not a virtual abandonment, of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. That that compact was a monumental diplomatic blunder, cannot be denied. Even British statesmen could not conceal their amaze- ment at our short-sightedness in entering into such a one-sided agreement. It kept us on the stool of repentance for nearly half a century. But there were no circumstances connected with its negotiation, nor anything in the Treaty itself as ratified by the Senate, to warrant an inference that it contemplated the aban- donment, or even a modification, of the Monroe Doctrine. The primary object was to obtain from Great Britain a solemn pledge never to attempt to colonize any alleged "unoccupied" portions of Central America. The secondary object was to stimulate in- vestment of foreign capital in a great American enterprise, at a time when capital for such purposes was difficult to obtain. The blunder consisted in overlooking a covert (and perhaps doubtful) recognition of a British colony already illegally established in Central America. But aside from this, and the incautious "agree- ment to agree" (in Article VIII) relative to the control and management of some possible future isthmian canal, the Treaty could not be construed as, in any way, derogatory of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, the Treaty itself, as finally proclaimed, was of very doubtful legality. It lacked the Senate's concur- rence in Mr. Clayton's incautious assent to certain written con- structions of it by the British Government, presented for the THE MONROE DOCTRINE 153 first time at the exchange of ratifications, which materially altered its meaning as understood by the slender majority of Senators who had ratified it. It never had much real vitality, even before our Government formally denounced it in 1881 ; it had still less after England abandoned her pretended "Protectorate" in Nicaragua, fourteen years later; and it has now happily ceased to have even a nominal existence. Strangely enough, the intervention by the United States in the Anglo- Venezuelan case, in 1895-6, already alluded to, has been cited as an instance in which we disregarded the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The contention is that, since the contro- versy was over a disputed divisional line between a long estab- lished and duly recognized European colony and a free American state, our interests were in nowise involved; and that our inter- position, contrary to the expressed wish of one of the parties to the dispute, even with the laudable purpose of bringing it to friendly arbitration, was at once a violation of our traditional policy of neutrality and of our pledge not to interfere with Euro- pean colonies "already established." But this is a total miscon- ception of the facts in the case, as well as of the real principles involved. The important feature of that controversy was, Eng- land's assertion of right to extend the area of her colony in Guiana over adjacent "unoccupied territory;" for she claimed sovereignty in virtue of alleged "British settlements" made as late as 1881, and she furthermore claimed eminent domain, even beyond those "settlements," in virtue of alleged "treaties made with the native Indian tribes." It needs no argument to show that both of these contentions were wholly untenable one being a palpable violation of a well settled principle of international law, the other being in open defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. If either of them were once conceded with respect to a particular region in South America, it would have to apply to others ; and, if applied to South America in general, it would have to be ad- mitted with respect to North America as well. It was precisely this "covert, but ever present, feature of the case which gave it such international importance. Hence, so far from being a viola- tion of the Monroe Doctrine, our interposition was directly and affirmatively in support of it. Nor was that interposition an attempt to "expand"the Monroe Doctrine, as has been thoughtlessly charged. England had seized 154 SELECTED ARTICLES ON and forfeited whole districts hitherto acknowledged to be Vene- zuelan territory. She had done this in defiance of repeated re- monstrances and formal protests; and had persistently refused to evacuate those places, or to submit her claim of title to impar- tial arbitration. Under such circumstances, her acquisition in- volved either an act of war or an act of piracy; and, in either case, it was as. much a violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as if those districts had been seized by British troops or covered by British guns. The situation, therefore, presented one of two alternatives either the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, or its total abandonment. Finally, as every one knows, or is presumed to know, the great body of what we call international law, like that of the English common law, is made up of precedent sanctioned by usage. In its last analysis, it is, as Lord Chief-Justice Russell once aptly expressed it, "little more than crystallized public opinion." And I think it has been sufficiently shown that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are precedents as old as our Government itself. They have been sanctified by unbroken usage, and have given direction to our foreign policy for more than a century. Every one of our Presidents, from the first to the present, who has ever had occasion to refer to it, has specifically reaffirmed it. Every one of the Latin- American republics has, at one time or another, and in some form or other, affirmatively supported it. Not one of the European Powers has ever entered formal protest against it; on the contrary, all have acquiesced in it, and thus tacitly as- sented to it. It is, therefore, a valid part of the public law of this continent ; and until abandoned by us, or until formally chal- lenged by Europe, or until modified or abrogated by public treaty, it will continue to be recognized as part of the modern interna- tional code of the Christian world. Outlook. 70:371-4. February 8, 1*902 Moral Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Edward Stanwood The Monroe Doctrine is the one political principle which has been and is accepted by American statesmen of every party. Every President in whose administrative term any question in- volving the principle has arisen has repeated, enforced, and if THE MONROE DOCTRINE 155 necessary extended the Doctrine, and has been applauded by his political opponents for so doing. There seems at present no reason to anticipate a change of view on the part of any con- siderable number of influential public men. Nevertheless, the occasions for maintaining the Doctrine, and for making a semi- warlike demonstration in enforcing it have lately been frequent. To one who reasons from the occurrences in Africa and Asia to what may take place in South America, large possibilities loom up in the not distant future. Should it become necessary for this Government not only to make a display of force, but also to use force to uphold the Doctrine, we may be sure that timid and ultraconservative men will seek reasons for abandon- ing the time-honored principle. In the search they will be as- sisted by those who carry to the extreme logical limit the princi- ples denominated by its adherents anti-imperialism. They hold an anonymous writer lately published the opinions that the Mon- roe Doctrine is a chip on the shoulder of a bully; that it has no foundation in international law or equity; that we are in no danger of foreign aggression ; that our interference is unwelcome to those in whose behalf it is made ; and that the Doctrine men- aces seriously the peace and prosperity of the world. It seems worth while to anticipate a discussion that is likely to arise, and to consider if objections of the class just noted are fair and sound ; in other words, leaving out of sight altogether the question of the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to our Na- tional security, to examine the moral basis of the doctrine. We are not to inquire whether or not any vestige of the original reasons for promulgating the Doctrine still remains, nor whether or how far the Doctrine has been modified in the course of time. All that concerns us is to know if the Doctrine in its present form and in its modern application represents a policy that can be defended as one justifies his individual conduct toward his neighbors, a policy that makes for the peace of the world, a policy that conduces to the independence of the nations affected by it, a policy that is generous, humane, and benevolent on the part of the Government which maintains it or the contrary. One answer of these questions is furnished by history. This Government has upheld the Doctrine for eighty years, and has asserted it on many occasions. In one case of its application it frustrated the attempt of the Emperor of the French to wrest the 156 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Government of Mexico from the inhabitants of the country, and to set up an empire as the next-door neighbor of the United States. On another occasion it protected Venezuela from a forcible an- nexation of territory by Great Britain, and secured for it a peace- able hearing before a duly constituted tribunal. When De Les- seps's scheme for constructing the Panama Canal was about to be put in force, so mildly disposed and peace-loving a President as Rutherford B. Hayes sent a message to the Senate in which he took the ground that the smallest measure of political control or protection of the proposed canal by "any European Power or any combination of European Powers" was inadmissible; and his Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, secured from the French Government a 'disclaimer of any attempt to give the enterprise support, either direct or indirect. Still later the action of the American navy in preventing a blockade of the port of Rio de Janeiro broke up a plot, to which the commanders of several European squadrons were consenting, to restore the imperial government of Brazil. These are the most conspicuous, but by no means all, of the occasions when the United States has acted upon the Monroe Doctrine. In every case, not only in those mentioned but in every other, this Government has intervened not to destroy but to preserve the sovereignty of the weak members of the American family of republics. It has never exacted or claimed a penny of indemnity, nor has it ever asked or taken an inch of territory from any country whose sovereignty it has defended. If all or any of the acts were acts of a bully among nations, then our dictionaries must be revised. The bully threatens and terrorizes those who are weaker than himself. Our Government in every case has taken the side of the weaker party against the stronger and has brought the schemes of the bully to naught. It has sometimes refused to interfere for the protection of the Spanish-American republics any further than it has lately signi- fied its intention to do in the case of Venezuela. A debt is justly due to Germany; Venezuela ought to pay; this Govern- ment declines to ask more from Germany than that it refrain from exacting territorial indemnity. The present dictator of Venezuela is extremely unfriendly to the United States, and has taken especial pains to let his unfriendliness be known. Yet our Government not only overlooks his childish hostility, but seeks THE MONROE DOCTRINE 157 and obtains from his powerful adversary an agreement not to overthrow the sovereignty nor to encroach on the territory of Venezuela. We may answer our questions in another way quite as con- vincingly although what would have happened in other circum- stances can never be known so certainly as what has happened. During the last twenty years substantially the whole of the conti- nent of Africa has been partitioned among the Powers of Europe. France picked a quarrel with Madagascar and took the whole of that island to redress its grievances. It found another cause of complaint, or rather a series of them, in southern Asia; and has Annam, Cochin-China, and Tonking as a reward of its activity in pressing its complaints. Germany, England, and Russia enjoy the possession of slices of China to soothe and heal the wounds inflicted by the warlike and aggressive Chinese. If there are any islands in the Pacific that have not been annexed by the colonizing countries of Europe, information regarding them will be thankfully received and suitably rewarded at London, Paris, or Berlin. During the time all this appropriation of territory in every other part of the world has been going on, the continents of America have been wholly free from the exploits of European enterprise against native governments. Was it because Central and South America offer less enticing fields for such enter- prises? By no means. There is not on the globe a region not already controlled by Great Britain of more importance to the Government which enjoys the sea-power of the world than the strip of territory between Mexico and Venezuela. The coloniza- tion of Germans in southern Brazil and northern Argentina in a country abounding in resources and opportunities is more than suggestive of aspirations that might be realized were there no other obstacle than native governments to be overcome. In the event of a beginning of the partition of South America, who can doubt that France and perhaps Italy would demand and receive a share of the territory? But, says an objector at this point, the world, would be better and civilization would be advanced if we were to withdraw our pretensions and to allow Great Britain and Germany and the other countries to enter Central and South America and develop the country. Would it be right, then, for the European Powers 158 SELECTED ARTICLES ON to brush aside the native governments and annex all that is worth annexing? Of course not, replies our objector; but it is not for us to say them nay. This position means that although we hold to the principle that the independent sovereignty of a nation and its right to self-government should be inviolable, we have a moral right to stand by, indifferent spectators, while both are being destroyed. The United States is the only country that can defend those countries from aggression, the only one that is disposed to do so. If the duty rests anywhere, it rests here. Moreover, the suggestion that the progress of civilization which might and might not result from an abandonment of the republics to their fate excuses us from the duty of protect- ing them raises the question whether it would be excusable to remain passive if a government say that of China, to put an extreme case were to assail Mexico. Again, if Great Britain is to be justified in seizing Colombia on the ground that it would give the Isthmian republic better government, how can the ac- ceptance of the Philippine Islands from Spain be regarded as criminal, unless it be held that this country is incapable of im- proving upon Spanish administration or Filipino self-govern- ment? Any argument founded upon the ability of European Governments to ameliorate the condition of the South American nations involves the person who uses it in inextricable difficulties and inconsistencies. ' In point of fact, no such consideration can enter into the argument. It is not disputed by any one that the Governments of Central and South America are justly established. It is uni- versally admitted that the people of those countries have a right to preserve or to modify or to overthrow their governments. The Monroe Doctrine forbids that right to foreign powers across the seas. It is not for us to decide that Great Britain or Ger- many might make the world better, or that Spain might make the world worse, by taking over one or more of the turbulent republics ; and that we should interfere or not interfere, accord- ing to our judgments as to the respective merits of governments having designs upon them. Our policy must be a consistent one of interference or of non-interference. But has this country a right to constitute itself the guardian of these republics? and if so, how has it arisen? We may answer that, so far as it exists, it has arisen in the same way that THE MONROE DOCTRINE 159 all civil government has been evolved from original chaos. It all rests ultimately upon an original usurpation. In the primitive community every individual enjoys absolute freedom, but only on condition that he is strong enough to maintain it. Cain kills Abel, and asks with all the candor when he is questioned about the matter, "Am I my brother's keeper?" In order to put an end to anarchy a condition in which the rights of any individ- ual are secure only so far as the individual is able to beat down the neighbor who covets his possessions the strong man as- sumes power ; he is gradually aided by others who adopt his view that anarchy should be replaced by order; civil government is organized, and the new situation is liberty regulated by law. The primitive situation has prevailed and to a certain extent still prevails, in respect of national governments. International law, concert of powers, arbitration tribunals, and the like are much more difficult to establish than civil government over com- munities. But are we so sure of that? Who knows how many centuries of absolute lawlessness elapsed, after man appeared on the earth, before the beginning of civil government? We do know that two centuries have not passed since the first principles of international law began, not to be enunciated, but to be ac- c,epted, by so-called enlightened governments. Before that time each and every sovereign nation was a law unto itself. Out of the disorder and lawlessness a semblance of international gov- ernment has been evolved. Nations recognize the binding force of certain rules, some of which have the sanction of general and formal agreement. In some cases as, for example, in 1878, after the war between Russia and Turkey two sovereign combatants have not been allowed to arrange terms of peace, but have been forced morally, if not physically to accept a settlement pro- posed by a council of powers. Thus, gradually, a system among nations corresponding to civil government is establishing itself. It, also, had its origin in usurpation ; but as man becomes better, his international agreements have a deeper foundation in his moral nature; his international laws are more and more con- ceived with a view to securing the individual rights of nations great and small, and to preventing a resort to the duello method of settling disputes; and the authority of international opinion is strengthened. i6o SELECTED ARTICLES ON Annals of the American Academy. 54:20-7. July, 1914 Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine. Colby N. Chester The Monroe Doctrine is the cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States. It has been so construed for nearly one hundred years of our national history, and it so remains to- day, in spite of some statements that have been made to the con- trary. "It is," as Jefferson said, " the offspring of the American revolution and the most momentous question offered to my con- templation since the Independence." When promulgating the doctrine as the basis of our foreign policy, President Monroe said in his message to Congress, December 2, 1823 : It is impossible that the allied Powers (of Europe) should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. Two distinct and far reaching principles are laid down in the Monroe Doctrine. The first is the principle of "self-defense." Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and it is the first law of nations. In the case of the United States the national defense required, when the doctrine was enunciated, that the country should hold a protectorate throughout the entire western continent. The second principle is that South American repub- lics, which followed our lead in declaring their independence, should have our protection in maintaining this doctrine for themselves. As Secretary Bayard once said : "The United States proclaimed themselves the protector of the western world in which she was the -strongest Power," as "it was manifest," said his successor Mr. Olney, "that it was the only power on this hemisphere capable of enforcing the doctrine." The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine self-preservation is axiomatic and immutable, and all other considerations must give way to it. The second principle, like the constitution of a country, is amenable to changes or amendments that will bring it into accord with new conditions that may arise in the country. The question now is, therefore, do the same conditions prevail THE MONROE DOCTRINE 161 on the western continent today, that existed at the time Presi- dent Monroe sent his message to Congress in 1823? There have been 'so many different interpretations placed upon the Monroe Doctrine, by theorists and others, who know but little of its practical applications, that it is necessary to recall a little of its history in order to obtain a clear understanding of the subject. In the early twenties of the last century, the whole of Europe became alarmed at the unsettled political outlook caused by the American and French revolutions, which had shaken every throne on the continent, and bid fair to undermine monarchical government. Three of the Great Powers, Russia Prussia and France (once again a kingdom), then formed what is known as the "Holy Alliance," on account of their common religious affiliation, for the purpose of staying the tide of free- dom which threatened to overwhelm them. They then prepared to recapture the South and Central American republics, which had recently severed their connection with Spain, and make them appendages to European monarchies. England was, at the time, the only constitutionally governed country in Europe, a^nd fearing that the "balance of power" between the European states might again be disturbed by such a combination, she, with no desire to promote republican institutions, however, proposed an alliance with the United States. Naturally neither country could harmonize its views on such a matter, and no political com- bination was formed, but an understanding was reached that England would not interfere with any action that America might take in the matter, thus giving her quasi approval to the message sent to Congress by President Monroe. Had it become necessary for the United States to take any overt action, at that time, in support of the Monroe Doctrine, this country would have had the moral support at least of the British government; but we now could hope for no aid from that country, and it is doubtful, indeed, if we could count on the approval of the Latin Americans, for whom, more than for ourselves, the doctrine was established, unless we harmonize some of our conflicting interests with them. We should not fail to remember that the South American republics were in their infancy at the time the Monroe Doctrine was declared, and were struggling for freedom against great odds, The United States proclaimed herself the protector of the 162 SELECTED ARTICLES ON western world as a matter of necessity, for without her aid the newly formed republics were helpless to battle against the great odds opposing them. The declaration of the Monroe Doctrine constituted, therefore, the most significant and decisive act to- wards guaranteeing the independence of all the American states that could have been devised. It produced the prompt recogni- tion of the infant republics of South America by the English in 1823, and performed a service for Great Britain herself, of which Canning, the secretary of British foreign affairs, said: "I have brought out a new world in order to reestablish the equilibruim of the old." The question today, as far as our own national defense is concerned is, would it be a menace to interests centered so far away as the United States, if a European Power, whose politi- cal and even religious aspirations may be the same as our own should attempt to acquire territory in Argentina for instance? Such an assault would of course affect the interests of that -country, but should the United States attempt to interfere in the matter unless asked by Argentina to aid her in throwing off the menace that assailed her? In case of assisting her we would become her ally, and probably one of many powers that might join with her in resisting the attack. It would seem, now that the continent is cut in twain by the construction of the Panama Canal neutralizing if not destroying the value of the old trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans via Cape Horn, that it would have no material effect on the "vital" interests of the United States, if a forcible attempt should be made by some European Power to take one of the Argentine islands, situated at the extreme end of the continent. It is such changed condi- tions in the political relations with our South American brethren as this, that call for some new arrangements concerning the application of the Monroe Doctrine. The principle that the affected country had paramount impor- tance in its own affairs, unless they related to interests of a com- bination of which she was a part, was admitted by President Cleveland, in his celebrated message sent to Congress in 1895, commonly known as the "Venezuela case." In this message he stated (with some logical defect, I think, as far as Venezuela is concerned, as I shall endeavor to show later on), that if that country wished to sell any portion of her territory to Great THE MONROE DOCTRINE 163 Britain, she had a perfect right to do so, and the United States had no right to interfere in the matter. This principle might apply to Argentina, at the present time, but such an act of selling a portion of her territory to a European state would not have been tolerated by the United States in 1823, under any circumstances ; for Mr. Monroe then said in no uncertain words, that, "any attempt on their part (Europeans) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere (would be) dangerous to our peace and safety." On account of changed conditions in South America at the present time, there is a growing disposition on the part of some well informed Americans to limit the territorial extent to which the Monroe Doctrine should apply to the states that lie to the northward of the Amazon River ; but such a limitation would be met with difficulties surpassing 1 , in my opinion, those we should attempt to escape. By holding a protectorate over this restricted field only, we throw out of consideration all fellowship with the states to the southward of this line of demarcation, at once causing jealousies among the larger and more important of the South American republics, making them enemies of our defensive policy as selfish in its nature, and would most likely tend to add their moral support to our many commercial rivals and antagonists. Leading statesmen of Brazil and other South American repub- lics have declared that the Monroe Doctrine is discredited in the republics for whose benefit it was devised, not that they do not appreciate the good intentions of the United States, but they deny the right of this nation to appoint itself a guardian over their welfare. A doctrine founded upon the principle laid down by James Monroe, but giving the right of a protectorate to the powers in general and not to any country in particular, would be the ideal doctrine, in the belief of the people of Latin America. As exemplifying the interests and aspirations of the South Americans in this connection I would relate the following: On the isth day of November, 1894, the fifth year of the foundation of the republic of Brazil, in the presence of the representatives of the principal American republics, including the United States, was laid in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the corner stone of a monument to American solidarity. Under this stone this official record lies: "The monument which will be erected on this spot in which this stone is laid, and which will symbolize the political union of the different nations of the continent of Columbus, 164 SELECTED ARTICLES ON will be surmounted by the figure of James Monroe, author of the celebrated doctrine known by his name, which teaches that the nations of the new continent should unite for the purpose of preventing any undue interference of the nations of Europe in the internal affairs of America. Around the principal figure will be grouped the great national liberators of America, Washington, Jefferson, Juarez, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Bolivar, Jose Boni- facio and Benjamin Constant." I give you this incident and picture to study in contrast with another view depicting the scowling faces of many South Ameri- cans, from whom we are just now seeking commercial advan- tages, who spurn the foreign policy of the United States as it now stands, shun its commercial policy and belittle its domestic policy. No, it were better in my opinion, to maintain the original jurisdiction of the Monroe Doctrine, but to recognize the fact that many of the twenty other American republics are no longer the weaklings they were when the policy was formulated, unable to defend themselves, but are now strong enough to share in the common defense of the continent, and act in consonance with them in maintaining the political rights of all. We cannot, however, with propriety form an "alliance," for that word has been tabooed by an unwritten law of the land ; but we can engage in an "entente," as foreigners call it, with the republics of South America that will give them a share in the responsibility of maintaining a policy which looks to the general good of all parties concerned. Let us form then, not an alliance, but a "concert of action" after the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, similar to that established in Europe for the support of the doctrine known, there, as "the balance of power," which will show that all the states interested hold the same opinion regarding this doctrine. The moral effect of such an "entente" will be sufficient to stay the hand of any European nation, which may seek political annexation of American territory. Aside from all considerations of our own self-interests, should the United States arrogate to herself the right to dictate a policy to the Latin-American states, which concerns their vital interests quite as much as our own, and which they resent as "bossism," now so universally abhorred, and which is belittling to their self- respect? Should we not, on the other hand, urge such powerful nations as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and such others as may THE MONROE DOCTRINE 165 be useful to the cause, whenever they may be able to maintain stable governments for a sufficient length of time to warrant it, to join with us in carrying out a general policy that is of mutual advantage to all republics on the continent? Call this part of our international policy by the name of the Monroe Doctrine, if you will, or by the term "America for the Americans," which will probably better please our confreres in the south, and at the same time be in accord with the general principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Having made a compact with the South American republics as suggested the United States would be in a better position to devote attention to those matters which more especially affect her interests at home and in nearby states, where foreign aggres- sion would jeopardize its vital interests. There is a field, in which the interests of the United States as far as they relate to the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine "self-preservation" are paramount, the protection of which can- not be shared with any other nation. This district comprises the countries lying contiguous or adjacent to our own, bordering on the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. The right of the United States to protect these countries from foreign aggression has been recognized in many ways by European countries, and the protection of "the father of republics" has been called for, and accepted so many times, as to establish this policy of the American government as an inalienable right. Notable instances were when the United States drove the French out of Mexico in 1865, and again when Spain was forced to give up her control, in Cuba in 1898. But aside from the fact that "self-protection," the basic prin- ciple of the Monroe Doctrine, compels the United States to take cognizance of the political affairs of Mexico, the Central and South American countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, we have assumed an obligation here in behalf of the interests of the whole world, that makes it imperative that these countries and seas shall be under the supervision of the United States, and we have also by treaty stipulated that no other country shall share in this protectorate. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, and the one recently made with Panama confirming its main features, the United States agrees, not only that the Ameri- can "canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and 13 i66 SELECTED ARTICLES ON of war of all nations," but, guarantees that "the canal shall never be blockaded nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as shall be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and dis- order." This is a most sweeping assumption of responsibility, and the fact is the United States cannot protect the world's interests in the Panama Canal, without maintaining naval control of the seas that wash her shores on the south, as well as holding supervision of the foreign relations of the countries bordering on those seas. The Caribbean Sea holds the base of the American fleet at Guantanamo, Cuba, and its advance base at Culebra, Porto Rico. In fact all the essentials for properly defending the canal lie in the region covered by its waters and those of the Gulf of Mexico. For all military purposes, therefore, these seas must be considered "The greater Panama Canal Zone," and the naval policy of the United States the only guide to perfect peace within their limits. In defending the continental policy of "America for the Ameri- cans" the United States will have ample cause for keeping up an efficient navy, and to protect the seven thousand miles of coast line, including "the greater Panama Canal Zone," she will need every ship that our non-military people will authorize to be con- structed. It has been well said that the Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the navy of the United States, and in view of the fact that our countrymen insist on maintaining but a small navy as com- pared with those that might be brought against it in combination, our people should avoid creating enemies, who might be tempted, in order to protect their own interests, to form an alliance with more power than we could bring to bear against them. In this connection I would recall the visit of Senator Root to 'South America in 1906, which, at the time, produced a friendly feeling between the North and South Americans, that lately has been greatly augmented by the forceful presence of his then chief, President Roosevelt, in that country. The sojourn of these two greatest of American statesmen in the South, has done more to cement the ties of fellowship between the two sections of the continent than anything that has occurred in the political lives of its people in many years. Dr. Edward Everett Hale once said of THE MONROE DOCTRINE 167 the first visit, that it was the most important event that had taken place in the history of the country during the first decade of the century, not excepting 1 the peace of Portsmouth, and nothing has yet arisen in the second decade, which, I believe, will have greater influence in strengthening this feeling than the expedition of Colonel Roosevelt to South America. As this last occasion took place at a significantly opportune moment, just before the opening of the Panama Canal, when we are about to inaugurate a new' departure in our foreign trade relations, its commercial value is very important. Let the United States follow up these auspicious visits of our countrymen to the Southland, and, in the words of the Hon. John Barrett, director of the Pan-American Union, 'take advantage of the opening of the Panama Canal, to signalize formally, as it were, the beginning of a new Pan-American era in which the Monroe Doctrine, which represents the dictum of one government in the family of nations, shall evolve into a greater Pan-Ameri- can doctrine, which shall represent the mutual interest and pro- tection of all." It is better to make friends than to build guns. Annals of the American Academy. 54: 28-56. July, 1914 Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti. William A. MacCorkle A distinguished writer in advocating the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine speaks of it as if all danger to the South and Central American republics was over. Permit a little plain speak- ing on this subject, for it is sometimes helpful in the great as well as in the small affairs of the world. I believe if it had not been for the promulgation and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by this republic, there would not today be on the conti- nent of South America, or in Central America a government independent of European control. Let us look at the situation of today throughout the world, and ascertain if there is any change in the desires of the nations since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. The earth hunger of the European countries is fiercer than ever in its history. Their vastly increasing populations demand an enlargement of their national life, and the peoples of 168 SELECTED ARTICLES ON the European governments demand more food and more labor than their countries can furnish. The great new markets of the world are South and Central America, China and some parts of Africa. China has been practically delimited into the spheres of influence by the European and the Japanese governments, and Mongolia has been raped from her bosom. The gaunt breast of Africa has been seized and marked out for their own by the European governments. The whitening bones of Italian, Arab and Turk in Tripoli, the fierce anger of France and Germany only last year over Morocco, the busy colonization plans of Europe in Northern Africa, the strife of the dying Moslem Empire, the seizure and occupation of Egypt by England, and the tremendous conflict between Russia and Japan, which in its last analysis was a conflict for territory, all attest that today the earth hunger is not satiated by the peoples of Europe. I say it solemnly and with all the earnestness with which I can express it, that I believe, were it not for the power of the Monroe Doctrine, within ten years, excepting Argentine, Brazil and Chili, there would not be a free and independent government in South America. Their mar- velous natural wealth, their splendor of climate, their richness of flora and fauna, and their wealth of precious metals, would more surely provoke the desire of the European nations than the gaunt, fever stricken and the fierce sunburned wastes of Africa. Those who feel that the Monroe Doctrine is outworn and that it should .be abrogated evidently do not remember very modern history. My meaning is illustrated by one of the great ABC nations of the South American continent. Many of us remember the incident as of yesterday, when the revolution against the republic was inaugurated in Brazil. For the purpose of reestablish- ing the empire the navy of Brazil was in favor of the overturning of the republic and the restoration of the Braganza family to the head of an imperial Brazilian government. In the harbor of Rio Janeiro was congregated an assembly of the warships of the monarchies of Europe and the Republic of the United States. The commanders of the European squadrons were in sympathy with the revolutionists and unwilling to do anything which would interfere with the plans of the Imperialists. When the Imperial- ists attempted to establish a blockade, to carry out their plans of revolution, the American commander, acting under the Monroe Doctrine, by direction of our government at Washington, was the THE MONROE DOCTRINE i<% only naval commander who objected, and he cleared for action and forced the admiral commanding the Imperial forces to desist from his purposes. It must be remembered that this was only in 1893, and happened to the great republican government of Brazil, our friend and neighbor. Let us take another modern and well known application. So late as 1894, the British government attempted to force a situation with Venezuela, which would bring about British control of the Orinoco region and practically shut up in British hands the con-' trol of one of the greatest rivers of commerce, a region which has imperial potentialities of trade and commercial life. Had it not been for the strong hand of this government, acting through and under the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine, today an important field of commerce, a vast region of South America, a great por- tion of an independent republic, and the. control of a mighty river would be in the grasp of the British empire. The question of European interference today is not dead. To every one who reads, there arises the question of the settlement of the position of the great foreign colonies in South America. Every well informed student of public affairs and international matters is looking forward to the time when friction will develop between the home governments of these colonists and the repub- lics within whose territories they live. Secretary Olney says: The people of the United States have learned in the school of experi- ence to what extent the relations of states to each other depend, not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of the Powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an easy defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity. i;o SELECTED ARTICLES ON We desire to go in peace and equity with the peoples of this hemisphere, to that consummation where all will be kindliness and trust between this republic and our neighbors. Still, the great thought of this republic is that it is best for all to maintain the Monroe Doctrine in all its virility. With our President we ex- expressly disclaim any desire of conquest, nor do we wish any suzerainty or control of the stable nations of this hemisphere. Here is where the correct differentiation is lost sight of in the Latin countries. It is idle to speak of the great nations, stable and orderly as they are, as standing on a level with disorderly, revolution-ridden despotisms, such as have been discussed and which in many instances obtain in Latin America. This great doctrine is fundamentally necessary to the existence of the peace and safety of this country, yet we wish the help and the assistance of the great and stable nations of South America to carry it to its great fruition. The application of these propositions to the subject under consideration is plain. Whilst this government has no desire for conquest, yet the great advance in the world movement and in the vital commercial affairs of the globe, demands that the peace and safety of this hemisphere shall riot be needlessly and wickedly broken, and that the peace, happiness and safety of this nation and the commerce of the world within the bounds of our govern- mental life shall not be imperiled in the future as they have been in the past. The tremendous impetus, which under the world movements of today, has been so potent and plain, demands order in all of the affairs and details of its life. The conditions of the times and the dependence of one part of the globe upon the other, brought about by the easy interchange between the nations, mean that no disorder in that great world commerce will be again lightly tolerated. Under the plainest and fairest interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine it reaches easily the subject under discussion. Under its original application it will not allow a situation to obtain which will give the opportunity for foreign nations to interfere in the governmental life of countries of our hemisphere. Under the fundamental meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, it will imperil the peace, safety and happiness of this country if an island, lying at our doors, within touch of our daily life, athwart our greatest line -of commerce, shall continue its life of disorder in the future THE MONROE DOCTRINE 171 as it has in the past. This position of our country should breed no distrust among our self-respecting and stable neighbors on this hemisphere. We will go along with them, hand in hand, and with their assistance help the nations which are weak, and do what we can to place them on eternal foundations of freedom, prosperity and order, so that they may become part and parcel of this great free brotherhood on the western hemisphere. A great writer speaks of the abrogation of the doctrine, and voices the distrust and suspicion among the nations of the southern hemi- sphere. To this we reply with the pages of history, and ask under what government, people, or system, that has ever existed since history began to write its pages, have there been preserved, in their freedom and governmental life, so many weak nations as have existed on this hemisphere, side by side with this powerful republic? He has cited as cause of distrust California and Mexico. These were life movements, absolutely instinctive in their being, and demanded by the very existence of this nation. Distinguished writers so frequently discuss the jealousy of the South American nations toward the United States by reason of the Monroe Doctrine. One has gone so far as to give in detail the size and strength of South American dreadnoughts, and to deal with immense particularity as to the amount of beef and wheat raised and shipped by these nations. It is true that some jealousy does exist. That cannot be avoided. The thinking statesmen of the South American countries, however, do not believe in the unjust aggression of the United States. Those of them who know the situation and understand it do not fear the Monroe Doctrine or its consequences. There are professional politicians in South America who fan the embers of distrust for their own uprising and their own purposes, but the great trend of sentiment and thought on the part of the leaders in the great states of South America is not in this direction. I quote the statement of Senor Zabellos of Argentina, as a fair indication of the thought of those of South America who know the real feeling of our country towards its southern neighbors : What other countries of America have the same world problems as Panama and Mexico, the latter on the frontier of the United States, and the former the throat of the continent itself? They have nothing in com- mon with the problems of the River Plata, or the shores of Brazil, or the coast of Chili. The Monroe Doctrine is necessary today to the United 172 SELECTED ARTICLES ON States. The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the richest part of the United States, and it is necessary that it be dominated by them, in order to guarantee the independence and security of the United States. Under these circumstances, when there is constant danger of European inter- vention, as in the case of Venezuela, the United States said to the Powers, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, "You can urge your claims in accordance with international procedure, but you cannot take territory, because if you do you will have to deal with the armed forces of the United States." The Powers thereupon became less aggressive and the matter was settled by arbitration. This action of the United States emphasized once more the doctrine that no European Power will be permitted to acquire territory on the continent of America. Thoughtful men do not agree with the contention in 'some directions that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced under an agreement with South American states. It seems that this would be impracticable. The Monroe Doctrine necessarily is an emer- gency doctrine. While it is fundamental the demand for its action is immediate and decisive. It is a doctrine which demands absolute and direct action to make it effective. Very many seri- ous questions arise as to the practicability of the carrying out of any such agreement between the states of South America and the United States. In the first place, the interests of this government are greater than the interests of any other government on this hemisphere. What relative power would this government have as against the other contracting powers? The Monroe Doctrine is a doctrine peculiarly applying to the United States. When this Doctrine is divided, so that it applies to other governments, necessarily the very essence of this Doctrine is done away with. Again, it has been the history of international affairs, that agreements between nations, diverse in thought, life, sentiment, situation, and race, have never been successful. Here would be an agreement for the enforcement of the Doctrine between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin nations absolutely different in tem- perament, and also between nations whose whole financial and local situation is absolutely different from that of the United States. Suppose, for instance, a question should arise between Eng- land and some of the South American states, and that the con- tracting powers for the maintentance of the Monroe Doctrine would be the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Those who know the situation in Argentina would not suppose for a THE MONROE DOCTRINE 173 moment that Argentina would oppose England in some contro- versy as to some minor state, which would be important to the United States, but relatively unimportant to Argentina. This illus- tration applies with equal force as to the other South American states. The money with which these great states are being developed, and the population which is largely engaged in developing them, come from Europe and Europe could injure these states financially if they opposed European interests in and about the enforcing of the Monroe Doctrine. This is a mere illustration of the multitude of troubles which would come by an agreement that the Monroe Doctrine should be enforced by a joint action of South American states and the United States. The questions are so absolutely diverse as between the United States and these countries, that no unity of action could be brought about so as to make the enforcement of the doctrine effective. While this is true the Monroe Doctrine should not be enforced with a strong Hand, but should be car- ried out in justice, in courtesy and in fairness between our country and the countries of South America. This honesty and respect obtain aihong nations just as among men and by the immutable laws of cause and effect, and the action of this government upon a high plane will surely obtain and hold the respect of the countries of South America. The Monroe Doctrine within its very nature is a doctrine which is fundamental and peculiar to the United States. While it should be carried out in justice, the mode, the time, the place and the manner of its operation should be, and \ believe will be, directed and controlled absolutely by the United States. To place it in other hands would be the destruction of the Doctrine, which has been vital to this country and to this hemisphere, and cause the weakening of the hands of this government in the direction where international trade and life will demand that our hands should be strong, and absolutely free to act decisively in the great international emergencies which arise so unexpectedly and which are fraught with such momentous consequences. The doctrine of Monroe is a doctrine of help and peace. It is true that those who love our country believe that this Republic "looks hopefully to the time when by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and 174 SELECTED ARTICLES ON the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American." Still these governments and their systems are here and are part of the life of this hemisphere. They will surely demand that we preserve order and conserve the safety of the commerce within our sphere. This means absolute order. To bring about this order this government will not hurt the self-respect or pride of any great and stable nations of our hemisphere. We will work with them along the lines of mutual respect and esteem. Touched by the new life, which is making them so vital and important a part of the world affairs of the day, they will understand that the conditions of other days cannot continue, and that the responsibilities brought about by present world conditions demand that our safety and peace, as well as theirs, compel the continued existence of the Monroe Doctrine in its full virility. When this is understood there will be no distrust. There will be the co-mingling of nations with the same govern- mental freedom. It will be a great brotherhood, and the only one, of free people and free nations marching onward hand in hand to the consummation of that blessed time when the strong will not oppose the weak, and when filled with mutual esteem, confidence and regard, and touched by the wondrous vitalizing life of freedom, the nations of this hemisphere, great and little, Latin and Anglo-Saxon, will show to the world the splendor of freedom in its highest and best development. Bulletin Pan American Union. 34: 790-800. June, 1912 Notable Pan American Addresses At the meeting of the American Society of International Law, held on the morning of April 26, Sr. Don Luis Anderson, former minister of foreign affairs of Costa Rica, read a paper dealing with the Monroe Doctrine and its relation to international law. After briefly reviewing the circumstances which led to the famous declaration of President Monroe in 1823, and quoting the paragraph of his message which was later to constitute the Doc- trine bearing his name, Sr. Anderson said : Such an important and solemn declaration, uttered at the most opportune time, was really the last stone to complete the edifice of Spanish-American independence; and until this day it has been the rock against THE MONROE DOCTRINE 175 which have foundered all the different enterprises of reconquest and domination on the part of the countries of the old world. Before this statement the vast projects entertained at Verona by the monarchs united in the Holy Alliance had to hold themselves in check and remain reduced to nothing; and the same fate was later shared by the unfortunate adventures of Mexico, the Chincha Islands, the Dominican Republic, etc. To avail myself of the happy expression of our illustrious colleague, Don Alejandro Alarez, "the message of President Mon- roe, although it was not its purpose to declare any principle, nor had anything in view beyond the immediate interests of the United States, yet it formulated with such a precision the inter- national situation of the new world with respect to the old, and synthesized so exactly the aspirations and destinies of all America, that in a certain manner it came to be its gospel." In fact, the declaration of President Monroe, made under trying circumstances and at the most proper occasion, was for the Iberian Republics of America the fundamental ground for their sovereignty and institutions ; for America at large it was, and continues to be, the symbol of continental solidarity which united the English-speaking and the Spanish-speaking peoples, and places the territory and the institutions of every American country sheltered from violence and possible foreign interven- tion, assuring them their national life as organizations which shall never be disintegrated by any expansionist ambition. The Monroe Doctrine, so considered and understood, consti- tutes the corner stone of our existence as political bodies and is in fact one of the cardinal principles of our international life. Proclaimed and maintained in the most energetic way by the United States, but sustained with no less decision and enthusiasm by the other Republics of the continent, each time that the inde- pendence and integrity of the Latin American nations have been menaced, the Monroe Doctrine has played an important role in the incident and has received a new consecration. Thus it is evident, among other instances, from the declaration of Secretary of State Buchanan in 1848 in regard to the expedition of Flores to Ecuador; the attitude of the United States in regard to the French intervention in Mexico in 1863-1866; the declaration of Secretary of State Seward in regard to the war of Spain with Chile and Peru; the protest of the United States against the 176 SELECTED ARTICLES ON reincorporation by Spain of the island of Santo Domingo in 1881 ; the declaration of the Government of the United States in view of the conflict over the boundary of Guiana, between England and Venezuela, etc. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, maintained by the diplomacy of the United States with such ability, energy and constancy, the Latin-American continent has remained until now immune to the colonizing tendency which characterizes the policy of the Great Powers of Europe. But will this policy of the United States Government be suffi- cient in coming years to prevent the weak nations of America from attempts at conquest by the strong nations? This is a prob- lem with which we may, perhaps we shall, be confronted in the near future ; and logic, as well as the most elementary precaution, teaches us all that we ought to foresee the events, and prepare ourselves to face them, seeking from now on satisfactory solu- tions to so delicate a situation. This is not a pessimistic point of view. The social and po- litical conditions of Europe are truly exceptional and critical. The powerful armaments by sea and by land, those great armies which of themselves are a heavy burden on the citizen, against his will turned from the home to serve in the ranks, make neces- sary the imposition of tremendous taxation, each day more bur- densome and oppressive for every class ; add to this an over- crowded population, poverty among the working class, together with the socialistic tendencies which advance everywhere with the onrush and persistence of the tides, and which are already beginning to shake the political and social structure, and you shall see how near is the realization of the prophecy of Lord Grey spoken before the House of Commons on the I3th of May of last year: "Rebellion will not come until the taxes oppress di- rectly the classes of society for whom life, even in the better conditions, is a constant struggle. When hunger begins to come by reason of the taxes, and it will arrive sooner or later in every nation if the actual military expenses continue increasing as at present, then a rebellion will be near which will bring an end to this military expense. Such is the end to which the great nations to-day are sinking." The Governments of the Great Powers of Europe believe they have found in territorial expansion the means, if not to prevent, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 177 at least to delay the danger with which they are confronted; and thus, we have seen them, during the last few years, striving to enlarge at any cost their colonial empire, with a view to trans- fer beyond the seas their overflow of population without weaken- ing the country by migration, but enlarging their frontiers and acquiring at the same time splendid advantages for their com- merce. With no limitations other than those which they them- selves have been willing to use against each other as a matter of compensation and equilibrium, the European Powers, while rejoicing at the peace the Continent has enjoyed since 1871, have been bringing war into the regions of Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands, in order to raise here and there the flag of conqueror. But this colonial policy has proved nothing more than a momentary remedy, as the disease still exists while the medicine is being used up ; the territories appropriated are no longer suffi- cient, and the Old Continent offers no more land available for colonization. The danger as an ever increasing and threatening wave shows itself again, and the Governments, utterly astounded, realize that the colonial policy in which they expected to find their salvation was no more than a truce. New fields for the colonizing and adventurous spirit would perhaps be the means of prolonging that truce, to set aside for a longer period the danger which is now imminent. But where are these new fields? It is not difficult to see that the answer should be found on this side of. the Atlantic. I read in an important book, written not long ago by Dr. Albert Hale, what follows : The nations of Europe are crowded and South America offers the only available land on earth into which the surplus can overflow. Who will occupy this virgin soil? When and how, by whom and under what in- fluences, will its productive acres be used for the sustenance of man? I think that the very Monroe Doctrine would be sufficient to meet the difficulty if only all the American countries, without looking at past events but with eyes cast upon their future destinies, would resolve to carry out the idea of President Mon- roe in all its logical developments and conclusions according to what the spirit of the times demands. If they unite to proclaim, as they should do, that "conquest shall be hereafter absolutely prescribed from the American continent, binding each and all neither to undertake nor to tolerate conquest of American terri- i;8 THE MONROE DOCTRINE tory," the Monroe Doctrine would thus attain its highest conse- cration, and the bonds uniting the sister republics of the world of Columbus would be made more binding and become real and actual ties of fraternal friendship. That should be the main point and the most important subject before the next Pan American Conference. NEGATIVE DISCUSSION Journal of Race Development. 4:334-58. January, 1914 Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine? Hiram Bingham "The Monroe Doctrine, or the doctrine of the dual political organization of the nations of the earth, is a barbaric stumbling- block in the way of enlightened international policy." So wrote the late William Graham Sumner, in an essay on "Earth Hun- ger," in 1897. At that time, very little attention was paid to his remarks. Professor Sumner had a way of -being many years ahead of public opinion in his attitude toward political and economic policies. During the past few months the number of people who have come to take an unfriendly attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine has very greatly increased. True, this national shibboleth is still a plank in the platforms of our great national parties. In many quarters it is still a rallying cry. A great chain of news- papers, extending from San Francisco to Boston, edited by the most highly paid editorial writer of the day, constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine as something sacred and precious, like the Declaration of Independence. Other powerful newspapers, less popular in their appeal, but no less powerful in their in- fluence, still resent any attack on what is considered by them the most essential feature of our foreign policy. And they continue to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time they try to explain away its disagreeable features. A recent editorial in a journal devoted to the interests of the Army and Navy, in vigorously denouncing the present at- tacks being made on the Monroe Doctrine, and calling loudly on patriotic Americans to see to.it that no academic sentimental- ists were allowed to weaken our national defenses, declared that without the Monroe Doctrine, we could not hold the Panama Canal ! It would have been j ust as logical to say that without the Monroe Doctrine we could not hold Hawaii, or Key West, or i8o SELECTED ARTICLES ON Boston harbor. The Panama Canal is one of the possessions of the United States. Its defense is a national right and a national duty. In defending the Panama Canal as in defending Key West or Boston harbor, we have back of us the most uni- versally accepted principles of international law. In upholding the Monroe Doctrine, on the other hand, we are merely upholding what has been believed for many years to be a useful foreign policy, but one that has no standing in international law, and is, in fact, neither law nor doctrine but merely a declaration of policy having to do with our relations with foreign nations. Consequently, in considering the question as to whether we should abandon the Monroe Doctrine or not, we must first clear our minds of any idea that the maintenance or abandonment of this policy is in any way synonymous with the maintenance or abandonment of our national defenses, be they in Hawaii, Boston harbor, or the Panama Canal. Of course, it is perfectly true that to maintain a vigorous foreign policy and one that is at all unpopular, means the maintenance of an efficient Army and Navy. But without any vigorous foreign policy, we should, at the same time, need an Army and a Navy, and both ought to be efficient for the same reason that every city needs an efficient police force. In considering the advisability of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, let us attempt to get clearly in mind exactly what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine. We shall find that at different periods of our history, it has meant very different things. When it was promulgated by President Monroe in 1823, it meant that we were afraid that the rising wave of monarchy and despotism in Europe might overwhelm the struggling republics in the new world. We were, in a sense, in the position of the big brother on the edge of the swimming pool, who sees his little brothers swimming under the water and about to come to the surface; and who also sees a couple of bullies getting ready to duck them before they can get their breath. As a matter of fact, this was the only republic, at that time, that had come to the surface, scrambled on to the bank, and shown itself able to stand on its own legs. The little fellows in Spanish-America were swimming hard, but they had not got their heads above water. We believed it to be for our interests to see that they had a square deal and THE MONROE DOCTRINE 181 were not interfered with as they came to the surface. We pro- mulgated a high-minded, unselfish policy, without a thought of gaining prestige or power in Latin America. We bravely warned the nations of the continent of Europe not to attempt to inflict their system of government on any land in the western hemi- sphere, where a democratic or republican form of government had established itself. From such a high-minded and altruistic position as this, it is a far cry to the connotation which goes with the Monroe Doc- trine in the minds of many American citizens of today. Our people have been taught by jingoistic politicians, like the heelers of Tammany Hall, to believe that the Monroe Doctrine means that it is our duty to keep America in order ; that it is our policy to allow Europe to have nothing to say about the American re- publics, and that it would be a national disgrace, almost unthink- able, for us to abandon this sacred shibboleth. It was a Tam- many Hall orator, according to Professor Hart, who said, "Tammany Hall is a benevolent institution; Tammany Hall is a patriotic institution ; Tammany Hall has the honor of being the first to propose that immortal Monroe Doctrine which blesses and revivifies the world." And it was a former Tammany politician, who, on being ques- tioned in regard to our present policy with Mexico, stated, a few days ago, that under the Monroe Doctrine it was our duty to go in and annex Mexico, and the sooner we did it, the better. It is a far cry from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the Monroeism of our politicians and newspapers at the present day. In 1823, this declaration of foreign policy made a profound im- pression on Europe, and won us the gratitude and the eulogies of the Latin-American republics. At the present time, there is no question that the Monroe Doctrine is a cause of world-wide irritation and is almost universally hated throughout Latin America. In the words of a careful student of Pan-American affairs, who has lived many years in various parts of Spanish America, "the two principal results of the Monroe Doctrine are : intense hatred of the United States on the part of powerful and self-respecting South American nations, able and willing to meet their responsibilities to the countries to whom they are under obligations; and an attempt at evasion of these responsibilities X4 182 SELECTED ARTICLES ON by other Latin-American countries, who, while using the Doctrine where they think they can for such a purpose, equally hate the originators of it." Contrast this with that memorable sentence in Mr. Cleveland's message to Congress regarding the Venezuela boundary .dispute, in which he said that the Monroe Doctrine "was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures." This was quoted by the editor of the New York Times in a recent article in the Century, in which the part played by the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela dispute was carefully brought out. In a recent number of the Times, in an editorial discussion of the present writer's proposal to regard the Monroe Doctrine as obsolete, it was admitted that the Monroe Doctrine was, as a matter of fact, a purely selfish policy. These were the words used: The Monroe Doctrine was declared by us with reference to our own interests, and is maintained for no other reason. It was not declared with direct regard or thought of the interests of the weaker republics of the continent, and it will be maintained or abandoned with more thought of our interests than of theirs. If that is the ablest defence which can be made for the Doc- trine in its present form, it is not surprising that we find so much opposition to it on the part of our southern neighbors. General Reyes, former president of the Republic of Colombia, said recently: Having for many years closely followed, step by step, the development of the American republics and the convulsions of their ardent and rexed democracies, I am more than ever convinced that unity of action with the United States is necessary to initiate the advent of that glorious future to which they are so manifestly entitled. But that unity of action can only be accomplished by the removal of the causes which have led to the pre- vailing doubts, jealousies, and suspicions. In my opinion, the Panama Canal will solve many of the difficulties which owe their existence to the present lack of intercourse between the people of the north and those of the south, but even that beneficial change of conditions will not serve by itself to eradicate the evils of the past. There must be a wider recognition of the fact that the relations of the United States with the Latin republics are those of a friendly, powerful neighbor, with no other objects than the advantages to be gained from the ties of sisterhood and the extension of commerce. There must be a saner propaganda as to the inalienable sovereign rights and complete independence of even the smallest of the Latin States. There must be no "big stick," THE MONROE DOCTRINE 183 and no such use of the Monroe Doctrine as to make it an instrument of terror to the smaller republics, and a subject for ridicule in the greater countries of the South. The more advanced Latin nations appreciate and sympathize with the benevolent designs and objects of that doctrine, as is shown by the formulation of their own doctrine, intended to protect the smaller states against the employment of armed force by foreign nations for the collection of contractual debts. But they resent the spirit of domination and tutelage which implies that they need the protection of the United States against foreign aggression. (The italics are mine.) It is easy to understand the cause of such remarks when one calls to mind the thoughtless jingoism of some of our news- papers and the more intelligent selfishness of some of our leading editorial writers. It would be easy to multiply quotations from North American writers and newspapers which justify the fears and hatred of Latin America. And it would be equally easy to gather many 'paragraphs from Spanish and French authors to illustrate what forms this distrust and hatred take. I have already called at- tention to a number of these in the little book just referred to. Why is it that it is so difficult for us to formulate an answer to the question as to what the Monroe Doctrine really means? Because there are probably no two words in American history which have been more variously interpreted, which have meant more things to more people, and which have been more highly praised by some and more bitterly condemned by others. What is the reason of this confusion? I believe that the reason is that these two words "Monroe Doctrine" have come to be used by us in place of two other words that are less interesting and less significant, namely, "for- eign policy." Our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. What- ever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment, it is called the "Monroe Doctrine." Do we decide to intervene in Cuba, we do not say that we believe it to be for our best inter- ests as a nation to overstep the bounds of international law and to carry our intervention into a neighboring territory. We wave a banner and call it the Monroe Doctrine. Are we too busy at home to intervene between Spain and Chile when they go to war and when Spain bombards the port of Valparaiso? We declare that the Monroe Doctrine does not mean that we shall interfere in any righteous war. Do we wish to take any part of 184 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Spanish-American territory which we need or which is being badly governed? We refer our actions to the Monroe Doctrine. It is no wonder that Monroeism, as it is called in South America, has come to mean -to the Latin-American mind interference, inter- vention, tutelage and patronizing insolence. This connotation does us infinite harm. The truth is, instead of facing squarely the question of what is the best foreign policy for us to follow, we cloud our minds with this national shibboleth; we remember that it is nearly one hundred years old; we believe that it has done a great deal of good in keeping Europe from crushing the life out of incipient South American republics ; we feel that it is a benevolent institu- tion, and, therefore, w r e brand whatever selfish or unselfish policy we adopt for the moment with the words "Monroe Doctrine." It would seem as though for the very sake of clarifying our own ideas and placing our foreign policy on a logical foundation, it would be well for us to abandon a combination of words which stands for so many different things to so many different people. It can be fairly said that the United States has had as many ideals and has fought for as high ideals as any nation in history. The calm judgment of our foreign critics sometimes is willing to admit that we have been more idealistic than any modern nation. We once shed a vast amount of blood and treasure in order to suppress an economic institution called slavery, largely because it was not our ideal of the right way to progress toward higher things. We went to war with Spain largely for the sake of giving Cuba her freedom, and then, contrary to the belief of most of the world who were looking on, we did not keep Cuba, but gave her independence. Knowing this and other things of a similar nature, we sometimes flatter ourselves that our motives are always correct, and chiefly idealistic. And the worst of it is, we sometimes so blind ourselves with the dazzling spectacle of our unselfishness that we cannot see our selfishness. In the case of Cuba, for instance, we were so pleased with our unselfish sacrifices, that we shut our eyes to the fact that while we were giving Cuba freedom, we were taking Porto Rico and the Philip- pines and Guam, and a very useful naval base at the east end of Cuba, and putting them in our pockets. The world did not say that the Spanish-American war gave us no reward for our pains. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 185 Before deciding whether we ought to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and considering what ought to be our policy for the future, let us review a few of the more striking features of our foreign policy since 1823. For twenty years after the promulgation of the Monroe Doc- trine, we were regarded with extraordinary friendliness through- out Spanish-America. Our willingness to recognize the inde- pendence of the newly-fledged republics; our willingness to protect them from European aggression, and our generous non- interference with them in the time of their greatest weakness, earned us their gratitude. But in 1846 came the war with Mexico, one of those independent republics that we were going to protect. We had stated in the original Monroe Doctrine that it was the true policy of the United States to leave the new governments of Spanish-America to themselves, in the hope that other powers would pursue the same course. And yet, we did not hesitate, at the conclusion of the war with Mexico, to take away from her nearly one half her area. It did not help matters that a year or two later, gold was discovered in California. It did not increase our popularity in Spanish- America when it appeared that we were getting enormously wealthy out of the gold and silver mines in California and Nevada, which we had so recently taken by force from Mexico, even though we -had paid $15,000,000 for what we took. It may be replied that it was far better for California and Nevada that we should have taken them, and that we could afford to stand the unpopularity that this engendered in South America. Granting for the sake of argument that this is true, why not admit frankly that when we took California and Nevada, we went contrary to the principles laid down by President Monroe in his famous message of 1823. In 1898, we went to war with Spain, and eventually took away all her American possessions. We believed ourselves justified in so doing. I hold no brief against the justification of that war. It was undoubtedly a good thing for Spain. Many Spaniards will admit this today. Their country has been stronger and their economic condition has improved since they lost their for- eign possessions. But President Monroe had said that "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." Is it not per- fectly evident that in 1898 we regarded the Monroe Doctrine r86 SELECTED ARTICLES Ol\ as outgrown, and said to ourselves that we could afford to dis- regard one of the most positive sentences in the original declara- tion of President Monroe? Why should we still feel that there is something so sacred in this national shibboleth of ours that, although we have repeatedly gone contrary to it when it suited us to do so, we must still cling to it as a precious thing, without which our own independence would be in danger of being lost? In 1906, Secretary Root made his well-known tour of South America. It has been said that this tour was made necessary owing to the fear of the United States aroused throughout South America, by some of President Roosevelt's message to Congress, in which he took pains to reassert the Monroe Doctrine, and in which he accepted, quite logically, the very great responsibilities which the maintenance of a policy of "America for the Ameri- cans" entailed upon us. He had said in 1905 : When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to claim a right and then to shirk the responsibility for its exercise. Not only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the Doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than -its duty to insist upon its own rights. After the opening of the third session of the Fifty-Eighth Congress, Mr. Roosevelt had said : Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as else- where, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. These official utterances had greatly alarmed and annoyed the South American republics, and it was no small part of Secretary Root's visit to quiet their fears and assure them of the pacific quality of our intentions. So well did Mr. Root do this, so ably had he prepared himself by the study of South American history, so favorable an impression did he make by his dignified and THE MONROE DOCTRINE 187 courteous bearing, and so profound a conviction did his words convey, coming as they did from the actual head of our depart- ment of foreign affairs, that great good was accomplished, and an era of friendship and good-will was ushered in. The most striking effect of this was to be seen in Chile. Owing to a series of misunderstandings, including the blunders of an over-zealous diplomat, the wrong-headed ideas of many American newspapers, and the seeming interference of American warships during the great Chilean civil war of 1891, we had become extremely unpopular in that vigorous republic of the South Pacific. Then had followed the deplorable Baltimore inci- dent, when a number of our sailors on shore leave in the port of Valparaiso, got into trouble with some of the rougher elements of the port, and a few were killed and several more wounded. We had lost our patience with what we termed Chilean dilatory conduct ; we took the law into our own hands, and eventually we issued an ultimatum to Chile demanding financial redress. There was nothing for her to do but to grant our request. But the scar was long in healing, and it may fairly be said that we had less cordial friends in Chile than in any other American republic, with the possible exception of Colombia. Mr. Root's visit to South America and his able exposition of our foreign policy, changed the attitude of the Chileans to a very marked degree. They took the first opportunity of showing their change of heart. The Fourth Latin-American Scientific Congress was due to be held in Santiago in December, 1908. Former congresses of this nature had been held in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The organization committee for the fourth congress was com- posed entirely of Chileans. They decided that in consequence of the new and friendly attitude of the United States, it would be an appropriate thing to make the Congress not Latin-American, but Pan-American, and to invite the participation of the American government, and of universities and other scientific bodies in the United States. Secretary Root saw the advantages that would accrue to the United States in properly accepting such an invita- tion. In accordance with his ideas, the United States congress passed a suitable appropriation to send ten delegates from this country to Chile. These delegates were received with the utmost courtesy and given the best of everything. It was with difficulty that they avoided offence in declining a few of the many honors i88 SELECTED ARTICLES ON showered upon them. At the end of the month which they spent in Chile, it is safe to say that the relations between Chile and the United States were more cordial than they had ever been before. Washington was selected as the place of meeting for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, and October, 1912, was desig- nated as the proper time for it to meet. It has not met yet. (November, 1913.) The United States congress was asked by Secretary Knox for a small appropriation of $50,000, about one-half of what Chile had appropriated for the Scientific Congress, when it had met in Santiago, to provide for the expenses of the Congress that should meet in Washington in October, 1912. Unfortunately, our Congress felt too poor to grant this request, and although the appropriations which were passed footed up somewhere in the neighborhood of one billion dollars, the item of $50,000 for the Scientific Congress was struck out, and our national obliga- tions to provide for returning the hospitality which we had re- ceived, were denied. As the result of a vigorous protest and of public sessions of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the next session of Congress the same amount was again re- quested and the appropriation of this amount was unanimously recommended by that committee. The passage of the appropria- tion, however, was lost on some flimsy technicality, and our na- tional honor in regard to the obligations of hospitality still re- mains under a cloud. Apparently, it is part of our foreign policy to accept invitations to Pan-American congresses, but not to pro- vide suitably for such congresses when they have to meet in this country. As the best-known term for our foreign policy through- out Latin-America is Monroeism, this appears to our neighbors to be one of the attributes .of the Monroe Doctrine. There was another sequel to our relations with Chile even more serious than not providing suitably for the second Pan- American Scientific Congress. By sending an ultimatum demand- ing the immediate settlement of the Alsop claim, Secretary Knox destroyed in three minutes what Secretary Root had taken three years to build up. The delicate edifice of good-will and friend- ship with Chile, which had arisen from the ashes of the Baltimore episode, was destroyed because a Secretary of State felt that the claim of a private citizen for $1,000,000 had been left too long unsettled. This is not the place to go into the details of the THE MONROE DOCTRINE 189 Alsop claim. Everyone knows that Chile inherited this debt from Bolivia. The claim was recognized, but there was post- ponement in its settlement. Chile avoided the dire effects of Secretary Knox's ultimatum by depositing $1,000,000 in the Bank of England, and requesting that the ownership of this sum be decided by the Hague Tribunal. At least, so it was reported in the newspapers. Such matters are too recent to make it wise for the State Department to allow its records to be used as the basis of a thorough history of that episode. But there is no question about the results. The claimant eventually got his money, and we lost the cordial friendship of Chile. In the dis- cussion which followed in the Chilean congress, a speech was made by the aged Senator Vincente Reyes on July 26, 1911. Said Senator Reyes: It seems to me that no Chilean is to blame for what has taken place; everyone has endeavored, in the role that corresponded to him, to further the public interests in the most convenient manner. The fault, the real fault and it is necessary to declare it publicly, and I can say it better than another because I have no intervention, either in the acts of the government, or in the active political life, from which I am removed by reason of my age, so that in pronouncing my opinion, my own exclusive opinion, I compromise nobody, I shall say, then, that the fault of all this is owing to the intemperance of the United States government that has made an excessive use of its power, treating us as barbarous tribes were treated in past times, imposing on us an ultimatum and giving us ten days in which to perform what that government believed we ought to do. In the following year, on August 2 of 1912, a resolution was introduced in the senate of the United States by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, which has been regarded throughout Latin- America as a still further extension and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It was known as the Magdalena Bay resolution. This new phase of our foreign policy was, as might be suspected, treated even more vehemently, not only in Latin- America, but also in Europe. In La Revista de America for September, 1912, Sir Jose de Astorga, commented as follows (I give a free translation) : The Monroe Doctrine has just suffered a transformation for the benefit of Yankee imperialism, and for the detriment and diminution of the sovereignty of the Latin-American republics, in .the adoption by the Senate at Washington of the Lodge Resolution. . . . This resolution, reduced to its simplest terms, says that in the future the governments of the Ibero- American republics are prohibited from negotiating with any foreign com- IQO SELECTED ARTICLES ON panics for the cession of any lands for the purpose of merely commercial or industrial ends, without the previous consent of the White House. Without entering into any discussion of the motives which, from the Yankee point of view, secured the adoption of the Lodge proposal by a nearly unanimous vote [54 to 4] of the North American Senate, it is perfectly evident that this proposal cannot lean upon the so-called Monroe Doctrine as originally declared, and that, furthermore, it involves a most odious and unwarranted offense against the sovereignty and the inde- pendence of the Latin republics of the continent. ... If the republics which occupy the territory of America to the south of the United States are independent nations, in full enjoyment of their political sovereignty, and have the same title and the same capacity in the family of nations as North America has, then neither the Senate nor the government at Wash- ington has the power to proclaim before the world, as a rule of inter- national conduct applicable to the territories of foreign sovereigns, the Lodge proposal. Anyhow, the importance of securing concerted movement and unanimity of action among the chancellaries of Latin-America in order to offset the imperialistic action of the United States, is urgent, and is of supreme importance. The protests of confraternity, of disinterestedness, and of respect for the political sovereignty and the commercial independence of Latin-America, which the government of the United States sets forth so freely on every occasion, are not able to counteract nor to lessen the elo- quence of deeds, and these are the deeds: tutelage over Cuba; the abduction of Panama; the embargo on the custom houses of Santo Domingo; eco- nomic and military intervention in Central America; the "big stick;" dollar diplomacy, and the Lodge declaration. Here we have the Latin-American judgment on the Monroe Doctrine in a nutshell. We can on occasion make charming speeches. We can claim that our foreign policy is idealistic, and we can point to the Monroe Doctrine as evidence of our willing- ness to protect the weaker against the stronger. Actions speak louder than words. The fruits of our foreign policy have been the acquisition of more territory and direct interference in the affairs of our neighbors. One of the questions for us to decide is, whether it is worth while to pretend adherence to a shibboleth which has so often spelt intervention, and which means to our neighbors in the west- ern hemisphere that we consider it our duty to intervene when- ever sufficient occasion arises. How much do we believe in intervention? One of our most distinguished diplomats and statesmen, the late E. J. Phelps, delivered an address in the city of Brooklyn on March 30, 1896, which dealt with the Monroe Doctrine at a THE MONROE DOCTRINE 191 time when we had been drawn dangerously near to a war with Great Britain over the Venezuela boundary. That distinguished publicist treated our right to interfere in the affairs of other nations in no uncertain terms. The fact that he was selected by President Cleveland as our minister at the Court of St. James, and that he rilled that post with marked success, is sufficient excuse for quoting him at the present time, when once again w r e have a distinquished Democrat at the head of the nation. Said Mr. Phelps : International law is international morality and justice, formulated by the general consent of civilized men. That is its basis and its sanction. The claim that Americans are in any respect above or beyond this law of the civilized world, or that we are invested with authority to interfere in the affairs of other nations in which we are in no way concerned, merely because the location of the dispute is in South America, are propositions that will find no favor among just or thoughtful men. We have no pro- tectorate over South American nations, and do not assume any responsi- bility in their behalf. Our own rights there, as elsewhere, it is to be hoped, we shall never fail to maintain. But those rights have their founda- tion and their limit in the settled law to which we are subject as all other nations are, and which is as necessary to us as to them. And when we undertake to assert that we are not bound by that law, and care nothing for the opinion of the world; that we are Americans and monarchs of all we survey; and that we are going to control the part of this hemisphere that does not belong to us, regardless of the rights of those to whom it does belong, merely for the sake of doing it, and because we think we are strong enough, we adopt the language of the bully, and shall certainly encounter, if that is persisted in, the bully's retribution. Surely, with these words ringing in our ears, we do not wish to stand by a policy which can be so construed as as to spell interference and intervention. It is difficult to exaggerate the present attitude of South America towards the Monroe Doctrine. As late as September 13, 1913, La Presna, one of the leading papers of Peru and the prin- cipal supporter of the present government, prints in the most conspicuous place in the paper a letter from a Chilean newspaper correspondent in New York. The headlines are as follows : "Studying the Situation in Mexico." The Chilean journalist, Montcalm, speaks from New York. He calls on Latin-America to "unite itself against Yankee imperialism." One of the para- graphs reads : "The United States today controls Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama. Tomorrow it is going to control Central 192 SELECTED ARTICLES ON America. It has commenced to control Mexico. Who says that it will not continue still further?" The article ends with a spirited plea to the Latin-American republics to help Mexico out of the hole into which she has got herself by her revolutionary civil war. It its issue of September 15, 1913, in the same conspicuous position under the heading, "The Voice of a Mexican," La Presna reprints an article from La Revista, of Yucatan, signed by R. De Zayas Enriques, in which he criticises severely our attitude of mentor of the Latin-American republics, and our pretention of being the only arbiter of their fate. He refers to the increasing application of the Monroe Doctrine, which, he says, is already too ample, and refers to the fact that European Powers have always paid better respect to the Doctrine than the American peoples themselves. The whole trend of this two- column article is to arouse feeling against the United States. Recent travelers in South America, and several of our re- cently returned diplomats, tell the same story. But perhaps no one has put the situation more clearly than the recent Ambassador from England to the United States. It can hardly be denied that the United States has no better friend than Mr. Bryc'e. In his "American Commonwealth," he has shown a depth of sympathy and a keenness of appreciation for our institutions which have never been surpassed. His residence in Washington as the Brit- ish Ambassador increased his already great popularity in this country. His advice is worth heeding, if we heed the advice of our friends at all. In his recent book on South America, he says : As regards the United States there is a balance between attraction and suspicion. The South Americans desire to be on good terms with her, and their wisest statesmen feel the value of her diplomatic action in trying to preserve peace between those of their republics whose smouldering enmities often threaten to burst into flame. More than once in recent years this value has been tested. On the other hand, as has already been observed, they are jealous of their own dignity, not at all disposed to be patronized, and quick to resent anything bordering on a threat, even when addressed not to themselves, but to some other republic. It is as the disinterested, the absolutely disinterested and unselfish, advocate of peace and good-will, that the United States will have most influence in the western hemisphere, and that influence, gently and tactfully used, may be of incalculable service to mankind. Surely, this must be our ultimate aim. We do desire to THE MONROE DOCTRINE 193 influence for good the western hemisphere. We are beginning to realize that there are several states in South America that are no longer infant republics. They have grown up. To return to our former metaphor the little swimmers have got their heads well out of water, and have climbed out and are safely standing on their own legs. They naturally resent any implied assertion on our part that we will protect them from Europe. If the Monroe Doctrine implies this we-will-protect-you-from- Europe attitude, if it is disagreeable and irritating to those whose friendship is most worth having in the western hemisphere, if, as a matter of fact, we have deliberately broken the Monroe Doctrine whenever it suited us to do so, why should we cling to it so tenderly and so tenaciously any longer? What possible good can it do us? We apparently have a great deal to lose by maintaining it. What have we to gain by pretending to stick to it? The chief arguments in favor of retaining the Monroe Doc- trine appear to be three: The first is, that the good old Doctrine is ninety years of age; it has survived and flourished nearly a century, and there must be something in it to have given it such a long life! To such an argument as this, it is only necessary to reply that the same notion was used with even more telling effect against Copernicus, when he declared that the world revolved on its axis. Furthermore, it sounds suspiciously like the defence that we made of slavery in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is an argument that need not be treated seriously. In the second place, it is claimed that the Monroe Doctrine should be maintained because we have more interests in America than has Europe. "We are remote from Europe; we are close to South America." Therefore, it is natural that we should have more interest than England or Germany in maintaining a benevolent protection over the fortunes of the Latin-American republics. This may be true of the countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean Sea, but it is far from true of the larger republics of South America. Their great cities are geographically nearer Europe than they are to the United States. Their population contains at least a million Italian immigrants, and many hundreds of thousands of Spanish, Portuguese, French, Germans and Eng- lish. While there are probably fewer French than those of any other nationality, the French actually outnumber the citizens 194 SELECTED ARTICLES ON of the United States who are living in the larger republics. Consequently, if there is any weight whatever in the fact that a nation has interests in a country where its citizens are employed, our interests are less than those of almost any one of the larger European countries. So far as investments are concerned, there is also no question whatever but that Europe has far more of a claim to be directly interested in the present state and future of the South American republics than has the United States. Compared to the hundreds of millions which England has in- vested in Argentina and Brazil, for instance, our own invest- ments in those countries are ridiculously small. Consequently, this argument falls of its own weight, for to it we can reply that the larger and more important part of South America is nearer in miles, nearer in days of traveling, closer in ties of relationship, and more directly interested in commercial intercourse with Europe than with the United States. The third argument is that the Monroe Doctrine has done South America a great deal of good in preventing her from being partitioned, as was Africa. Therefore, let us preserve it in all its pristine strength ! It is quite true that the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly protected South America against European aggres- sion during a large part of the nineteenth century, when such aggression might have been fatal to the independence of several South American republics. But such a condition of affairs no longer exists, and if it should arise, that is to say if Germany should attempt to seize part of Brazil, for instance, or if Japan or China should attempt to coerce Peru into receiving undesirable immigrants, the best course for us to pursue would be, not to step forth single-handed as we did in 1823, but to join hands with the leading nations of South America in protecting the new world from the aggression of the old. It is replied by some that this is merely a modification of the Monroe Doctrine. In so far as it aims to accomplish certain results, that is true ; in so far as it is promulgated in a different spirit and with a direct recogni- tion of the actual state of our southern neighbors, it is different. Taking into account the extremely unpleasant connotation, in the ears of our southern neighbors, of the word Monroeism, we should be in a much stronger position if we would put that word aside, and adopt a new one, such as Pan-American Defense, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 195 which shall have for its connotation America for Humanity, and not America for the North Americans. Having considered the chief arguments for retaining the Mon- roe Doctrine, let us now briefly sum up the reasons why we should abandon it.* First, the original Monroe Doctrine has been disregarded in several historical instances, notably after our war with Mexico in 1847, after our war with Spain in 1898, and in our dealings with Colombia, Santo Domingo, and Nica- ragua. Second, owing to the constitutional changes that have taken place in the leading European nations since 1823, there is no danger that, in the words of President Monroe, the allied Powers will "extend their political system to any portion of either continent." The world has advanced since then and the Euro- pean nations themselves would be the first to object to any one of their number seizing a Latin-American republic, or setting up a monarchy there. Third, several of the South American states, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, having attained their ma- jority are no longer infants, do not need our protection and will make better friends and stronger allies if we cease to hold the Monroe Doctrine as one of the tenets of our political faith. Fourth, their friendship is worth having. They are already build- ing super-dreadnoughts, and, with our more extended frontier, and our outlying ports, such as Panama and Honolulu, we need cordial friends in the western hemisphere, and cannot afford to treat them in such a way as to estrange their sentiments. Fifth, the later form of the Monroe Doctrine, sometimes known as the "Big stick policy," or the "American policeman idea," by which we say to Europe that we cannot allow her to take any active interest in the political affairs of the western hemisphere, and accept the corresponding responsibility to look after her people and her property in the less well established republics, is a policy likely to involve us in tremendous difficulties and possibly in costly wars. It is a policy from which we have nothing to gain, and in which we have everything to lose. It is a policy which is likely to cost us the friendship not only of our American neighbors but, what is really of more importance to us, our European neighbors. Sixth, we should give up the Monroe Doc- trine because the premises on which it was founded, and on which it was justified, no longer exist. ip6 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Today Europe has more citizens in South America than we have. She has invested a far larger share of her capital in South America than we have. She is bound to South America, not only by these ties of brotherhood and of property, but also by the racial ties which bind together the Latin race. Geographically, Europe is nearer the chief cities of South America than is the United States ; racially, she is closer ; practi- cally, she has more business interests there, and more of her sons are living there ; and, finally, Europe has no intention of enforcing arbitrary monarchy and despotism on American states any more than we have. As the premises on which the Monroe Doctrine was based no longer exist, and as the maintenance of our adherence to those words is of harm rather than good to us, it must be evident that the time has arrived for us to. abandon this national shib- boleth, and to clear the way for a new and logical foreign policy. If we abandon the Monroe Doctrine, what shall we adopt to take its place? The answer to this question is fairly simple if one is willing to admit that the words "Monroe Doctrine" simply stand for our foreign policy. Under President Monroe, we announced it as our foreign policy to have nothing to do with Europe, and to see to it that Europe had nothing to do with America. We had a kind of splendid isolation. We were sepa- rated from Europe by a stormy ocean, which could be crossed only by a painful journey on board small sailing vessels. We promulgated a doctrine intended to keep foreign complications out of our national life, and to enable us to avoid entangling alliances. Today, as was recently said in an editorial in the World's Work, this very Monroe Doctrine is the chief breeder of diplomatic negotiations. In other words, it is a trouble-maker. To take its place, let us adopt a more rational foreign policy. We have already begun to do so. President Wilson, in his Mobile declaration, stated clearly that the United States did not intend to take another foot of territory by conquest. He has declined to send an army into Mexico, although there have been loud clamors for intervention, and many of these clamors, par- ticularly in the yellow journals, have been based upon the so- called "logic of the Monroe Doctrine." But we must go a few steps further if we would make our friends in South America THE MONROE DOCTRINE 197 believe that we have really adopted a new foreign policy, and that we have outgrown Monroeism. One of these steps was recommended by Prof. Theodore VVoolsey in an able article in Scribner's Magazine in 1909, in which it was proposed that we invite the leading powers of Latin- America to unite with us whenever intervention became neces- sary. This principle of joint intervention attracted little attention at that time, but its practibility has been rapidly gaining force recently. In 1911, the present writer, in a book entitled "Across South America," suggested that the time had come to "amend our outgrown Monroe Doctrine, as has already been suggested by one of our writers on international law, so as to include in the police force of the western hemisphere, those who have shown themselves able to practice self-control." This -suggestion was given favorable notice*by Mr. Bryce in his book on South America just referred to. It was again called to public atten- tion by the Hon. Charles Sherrill, recently our Minister to Argentina, and has since been referred to many times both in print and on the platform. Some of those who have sanctioned it, feeling that it was necessary to stick to the words of our ancient shibboleth, have felt that the invitation to Argentina or Brazil to intervene with us in Mexico, should come under the cloak of the Monroe Doc- trine ; but it seems to me that this is a most unfortunate sug- gestion. It is to our interests, it is in the interests of the peace and happiness of the western hemisphere, that we get as far away from these words "Monroe Doctrine" as possible, and that we build up a new foreign policy that is abreast of the times, that recognizes the greatness of several of the Latin-American states, that recognizes that some of them are weak, and need the pro- tection of an international police, and that gives evidence to the world that our foreign policy is really unselfish and is based on high ideals. As a matter of fact, we are a peaceful nation. Our desire to be helpful to our neighbors is sincere. The present administration has given evidence of its intention to discount revolution and to give the aid of its formal recognition only to such governments as are constitutionally elected. We are not going to put a premium on revolution by promptly recognizing any government that comes to the top in the seething cauldron 15 198 SELECTED ARTICLES ON of unstable conditions in any Latin-American country. This is a doctrine of high ideals. It has nothing whatever to do with the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, there are several minor things of practical im- portance which we can do to show not only that we have aban- doned the Monroe Doctrine, but that we have adopted a legiti- mate new foreign policy. In the first place, by offering to exchange ambassadors with Argentina and Chile, we can give them evidence that we realize their present position in the world today. There is no reason why we should have ambassadors in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, and none in Argentina and Chile. In the second place, we can make a generous appropriation for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. We can at least offer, to treat our international guests as hospitably as Chile did. In fact, in order to make up for lost time and for the seem- ing insolence due to our negligence, we can afford to do better than they did. And we ought to do it promptly. In the third place, we can show our personal interest in our neighbors by visiting them more frequently. There are no longer any serious handicaps in the way of visiting a number of the states of South America. By becoming intimately acquainted with the problems of Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can do more toward aiding in the formation of an intelligent foreign policy than might appear at first sight. It is ignorance that breeds insults. Finally, let us stop using the words "Monroe Doctrine." It would be well if a formal resolution of Congress could be passed, but since Congress has never formally approved of the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, it is probable that it would be suffi- cient if our great parties in their next platforms should avoid the repetition of those phrases supporting the doctrine which have been customary for so many years. For the immediate future, let us adopt a policy of Pan- American Defense. Let us invite to the round table of discussion all the American republics who can show clean records and eco- nomic stability. If we believe that any American republic, by reason of civil war or internal discord, is endangering the peace of its neighbors, if we believe that cause for interference in its affairs is arising, let the matter be considered at the round table. Let it meet in some one of the American capitals, not merely THE MONROE DOCTRINE 199 to discuss, as Pan-American conferences have done, innocuous policies regarding Pan-American railway projects and interna- tional postal regulations, but the actual business in hand. In other words, let these Pan-American conferences not represent a formal exchange of pleasantry every so often, but let them be called for the definite object of settling definite and difficult prob- lems. If there is to be any intervention, let it come as the re- sult of a family gathering, and not as the decision of the Ameri- can Department of State. Let us remember that it is "as the disinterested advocate of peace and good-will that we shall have most influence in the western hemisphere." If Argentina, Brazil and Chile decline to meet us on these terms, then let us go to The Hague and call a council of all civil- ized nations, and ask for an expression of international opinion, and the appointment of international police. Here is an oppor- tunity for a truly enlightened international policy. Meanwhile let us not forget that the maintenance of the Mon- roe Doctrine involves an attitude of constant suspicion both at home and abroad, which raises barriers against the progress of international good-will and diminishes our influence both in Eu- rope and America. Atlantic Monthly. 95:567-73. April, 1905 Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine. Charles F. Dole Among the magical words that hypnotize men's minds and keep them from asking intelligent questions, the Monroe Doc- trine has a sovereign charm in American politics. Secretary Hay has coupled the mention of this Doctrine with the Golden Rule. Let us venture to ask a few straight questions, and not be afraid to go wherever the honest answer to our questions may carry us. First, what was the substance of the original Monroe Doc- trine in 1823, when it was promulgated? The Spanish-American colonies had then revolted, and we had recognized their inde- pendence. There was a boundary question between the United States and Russia. We were a young republic, trying a great experiment in the eyes of a critical and unfriendly world. A "Holy Alliance," organized at the instance of Russia, with a 200 SELECTED ARTICLES ON really beautiful program for the good order of Europe, threat- ened to be turned into an instrument of mischief and oppression and even to help Spain recover her possessions in America. It is likely that, as in many other instances of human alarm, nothing dangerous would have happened. But our government naturally felt nervous, and raised its cry of warning in the form of the Monroe Doctrine. This was merely a declaration, made by the President in his message to- Congress, to the effect that the United States would hold it unfriendly in the European Powers to take any aggressive action in this continent. Impor- tant as the subject now seems, it involved no vote in Congress, nor the careful discussion that an actual vote generally involves. It is doubtful whether many Americans who read Monroe's message gave serious thought to the passages which were des- tined to give his name prominence. But Americans would have generally agreed in their disinclination to see monarchies set up in the new world, or to suffer any kind of undemocratic system to be brought over here from Europe. It is noteworthy that the bare statement of the attitude of the United States, without any show of force or preparation for war, was sufficient to secure respectful treatment from the European Powers. President Monroe did not feel called upon to ask appropriations for an increase in the navy in order to "back up" his doctrine. The United States did not possesss a formidable navy till it had to build one in the period of the Civil War. It should also be remarked that England, doubtless for commercial reasons, forwarded our government in its attitude in behalf of the independence of the South American republics. Few would have dreamed at that time that the Monroe Doctrine would ever be used as a menace against England. See now what enormous political changes have come about within eighty years. Except Russia, there is not an autocratic government left of all the nations who composed the short-lived Holy Alliance. All the others, even Austria and Spain, have adopted constitutional methods. Their people have everywhere been given more or less democratic representation. Spain does not contemplate winning back her colonies. We possess by amicable purchase the very territory over which there was once risk of a boundary dispute with Russia. So far from fearing THE MONROE DOCTRINE 201 the extension of autocratic and oppressive governments from Europe to America, the European governments are daily brought to face new demands on the part of the people in the direction of democratic experiments. Autocratic militarism all over the world stands on the defensive. It is becoming recognized as economically and politically intolerable. A great international court has been established on purpose to put an end to war between the nations. It has begun to be used and respected. Meanwhile the world has become one in geography and international relations. We are practically nearer to the shores of Europe than we are to South America. We have larger and closer interests with China and Japan than we have with Chile and Guatemala. Let us try now to find what European Power, if, any, threatens to bring the methods of oppression and tyranny to our continent, or in any way to menace the welfare of the United States. Russia, as we have observed, is out of the ques- tion, having voluntarily withdrawn from this continent. She allowed her proud flag to be hauled down in Alaska without the slightest loss of honor. England is our best friend in all the world. Let us never admit jealousy or suspicion between us. For three thousand miles our territory and the Dominion of Canada march together. By mutual consent neither of us has a ship of war upon the Great Lakes. Let us see to it that we never put warships there. We are obviously safer without them. Like two strong men, dwelling on adjacent farms, we are mutually safeguarded, not by building suspicious fences against each other and purchasing weapons in view of the possibility of our wishing to fight, but rather by assuming that we shall never be so foolish as to injure each other. If we ever disagree, we do not purpose to degrade ourselves by fighting. So far as England is concerned, we may venture boldly to declare that the United States does not need a fort nor a battleship. We contemplate her time-honored naval station at Halifax as complacently as travelers views the collection of ancient armor in the Tower of London. More- over, as regards the Monroe Doctrine, the last thing which Eng- land could possibly attempt, with her own popular constitution, would be to abridge the liberties of the Americans, either North or South. 202 ' SELECTED ARTICLES ON Summon now the Republic of France, and interrogate her as to her designs and ambitions touching' the affairs of America. Probably few Americans could name her cis-Atlantic possessions, so inconspicuous are they. They are costing the French treasury a steady outgo. No intelligent nation would take the gift of them, especially of Martinique, with its tempestuous volcanoes. France has had little experience with American colonies cheer- ful enough to stir her to desire the risk of a disagreement with the United States for the sake of gaining more territory. Nevertheless, we must admit that we had rather live under the rule of France than in most of the states of South or Central America. From no point of view does France threaten to establish a tyranny over any of the populations in the New World. We hear of Italians in South America. They have emi- grated to the Argentine Republic. Does this fact make the slightest demand upon the United States to build iron ships to guard against the friendly government of Victor Emmanuel ? On the contrary, -the more Italians in the Argentine Republic, the better we like it. They are more enterprising and indus- trious than either the Spaniards or the natives, and there is plenty of room for all who wish to go there. Is it conceivable that Italy, saddled with ruinous debt and with a fearful burden of European militarism, should undertake a war of conquest in South America? If this were conceivable, does any one suppose that Italian rule down there, supposing it to prevail, would be less enlightened, or less righteous, than Spanish-American rule has been under the delusive name of "republic" ? The people of the United States cannot know Italy, or her political conditions, and feel the slightest apprehension that she is capable of extend- ing to our continent methods of government inimical to our peace. No other nation in Europe remains, about whose designs in our continent the American people have the need to lose a wink of sleep, except Germany. If the plain truth were told by the alarmists, Germany is very nearly the one power in Christen- dom on whose account we are called upon to pay a naval "insur- ance fund" of a hundred millions of dollars a year. The talk about a "German peril" would be laughable, if millions of poor people did not need the money which such incendiary talk costs THE MONROE DOCTRINE 203 us ; or, worse yet, if this ceaseless talk about possible war with a great nation were not irritating to every one concerned, and naturally provocative of ill feeling. Why, indeed, should we imagine mischief from Germany? To hear certain speakers and writers, one would suppose that Germany instead of being a land of arts and laws, of univer- sities and free institutions, with a vast network of world-wide trade was overrun, as of old, by barbarous hordes breathing violence and robbery. Germany, in fact, has no quarrel or enmity against the kindred people of the United States. Ger- many is richer every day by reason of the prosperity of our country. The export and import trade between the United States and Germany amounted in 1911 to over four hundred and fifty millions of dollars. The trade with all the countries of South and Central America for the same year was only about three hundred and ten millions. The trade with all Asia, including India and the British dependencies, was hardly three hundred millions. The boasted "open door" into the Chinese Empire only allowed the passage both ways of about fifty-four millions of dollars' worth of products, less than one-eighth of our trade with Germany.* Does any one think that Germany would lightly quarrel with the source of so much bread and butter? For what possible use? She could not conquer and enslave us, nor does she wish to. We have no boundary lines on the planet to make friction between us. We may say again stoutly, as in the case of England, we are safer from any possible attack from Germany without a ship or a fort than we are with the largest navy that Admiral Mahan could desire. For in the one case we should be sure to avoid needless dis- putes, and should be more than willing on both sides to put any question that might ever arise between us to arbitration : whereas in the other case, standing with loaded guns as it were, some trifling explosion of an angry man's temper might involve the two nations in strife. It may be asked whether there is not grave risk that Ger- many may endeavor to plant colonies in South America or to interfere in some way with the affairs of the South American people. We hardly need more than to repeat the paragraph * The value of the total trade to and from the Philippine Islands in the same year (about thirty-seven millions) could not possibly have covered the military and naval cost of holding the Islands. 204 SELECTED ARTICLES ON touching this kind of contingency on the part of Italy. Ger- mans are doubtless coming in considerable numbers into the temperate coutries of South America. They are a most desir- able kind of immigrant. Wherever they go, a higher civilization goes with .them. Life and property are safer. A more efficient type of government is demanded. All this is surely for the interest of the United States. We can only be glad for any influences which will tone up the character of the South and Central - American states. If they were all Germanized, the whole world, including 1 the United States, would be perma- nently richer. In fact, the ties of trade and friendship between us and a possible Germanized state in South America would normally tend to be closer than they seem likely to be with the Spanish-American peoples. Neither is there the- slightest evidence that Germany would ever threaten to introduce tyrannical forms of government into South America or to oppress the native peoples. Indeed, so far as it is good for the United States to govern the Philippine Islands for the betterment of their people, the same argument holds in favor of any reasonable method (for example, through purchase or by the final consent of the people) for the extension of German law and political institutions into ill-governed South American states. I do not care to press this argument, which is only valid for those Americans who believe in our colonial experiment. But the argument is far stronger for possible German colonies than it is for the United States, inasmuch as South America is a natural and legitimate field for German immigration, being largely a wilderness, while no large number of Americans will ever care to settle in the Philippine Islands. The time may naturally come when Germany would have the same kind of interest in the welfare of her people beyond the seas that England has in that of the Englishmen in South Africa. There can be no good reason why the United States should look upon such an interest with jealousy or suspicion. For we are unlikely to have any legitimate colonial interest in the southern half of our continent. Meanwhile, the whole history of colonial settlements goes to show the futility of holding colonies with which the home government is not bound by the ties of good-will: Thus Canada and Australia uphold the British Empire, because they possess THE MONROE DOCTRINE 205 practical freedom; while England has to spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year, badly needed by her own poor people, to maintain the armaments necessary to keep her hold over India and other dependencies reluctant to her rule. All prece- dents go to show that the Empire of Germany would only weaken herself in case she should endeavor to meddle in South America against the interests and the good-will of. the people there. Let us ask another question, hitherto too little considered. On what ground of right is the United States justified in con- tinuing to assert the Monroe Doctrine? We may warn tres- passers off our own land. Have we the right to bar our neigh- bors from lands to which we have no shadow of a title? Sup- pose that we may do this, as the stronger people, for the sake o'f humanity, to protect weaker people from oppression. It is surely a dangerous concession to permit a single state, however civilized it deems itself, to assume the right to become a knight- errant, to adjust wrongs in the world, and incidentally to be sheriff, judge and jury on its own motion. But grant this concession for a moment in favor of the United States. While it may have been true eighty years ago that the American people were filled with sympathy for the republics which revolted from Spain, it would be hypocrisy to claim today that our people are seriously concerned over the troubles of their South American neighbors. We are rather apt to say that they are unfit to govern themselves. The United States today holds eight millions of people on the other side of the globe, very like the South Americans, on the distinct ground that they are not yet fit for independence. Our own course, therefore, bars us from sensitiveness over the perils which South America suffers from the bare possibility of the interference of European states. Moreover, we have shown that there is no state in Europe which has a mind to do any wrong to South America. So far as the promise of higher civilization goes, the planting of bona fide colonies in the vast areas of our southern continent signifies good to humanity. We must fall back upon a totally different line of reason- ing in order to find the only legitimate defense of our Monroe Doctrine. The argument is this: that a nation has the right 206 SELECTED ARTICLES ON to safeguard herself against the menace of aggression. Concede that this might have been a sound argument when the Monroe Doctrine was first proclaimed. Our government saw a peril in the setting up of a European system of despotism on this continent. We have made it clear, however, that this peril which disturbed our fathers appears to have vanished forever. No one can show what actual danger to our liberties is threat- ened by any governmental system that European Powers can set up in South America. Let us not even imagine that we are in fear of such a chimerical peril. We have no fear that Ger- many wishes to harm us while she stays at home in Europe. We have no more ground for fear, if Germany were by some magic to fill South America as full of sturdy German people as Canada is now full of friendly English, Scotch and Frenchmen. The better civilized our neighbors are, the less peril do they threaten to our liberties. Let us then disabuse our minds of any fear of European aggression, to injure American liberties. But it may be urged that the European governments, as was shown in the Venezuelan episode, may prove disagreeable in their efforts to collect debts due to their subjects or, on occasion, in safeguarding the rights of their colonists in the disorderly South American states. The condition of these states, it is urged, offers points of serious friction between us and our European neighbors. The class of issues here raised stands quite aside from the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine. Here is the need of new international law, of the services of the Hague Tribunal, very likely of the establishment of a permanent Con- gress of Nations. How far ought any nation to undertake by warships and armies to collect debts for venturesome subjects who have speculated in the tumultuous politics of semi-civilized peoples? How far is the real welfare of the world served by punitive expeditions dispatched in the name of missionaries, travelers, and traders, who have chosen to take their own lives in their hands in the wild regions of the world? There is no call for a Monroe Doctrine on these points. The issue is international, not American. The question is not so much whether France and England may send a fleet to take the customs duties of a dilapi- dated South American port as it is what course ought any government to take when wily promoters ask its assistance in carrying out their schemes in Bogota or Caracas or Peking ; or, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 207 again (an equally pertinent question), what remedy, if any, international law ought to give when one of our own cities or states defaults its bonds held in Paris or Berlin. Grant that it would be uncomfortable to our traders in South America to see European sheriffs holding ports where we wish to do business. We evidently have no right to protest against other nations doing whatever we might do in like circumstances. If we can send armored ships to South America, all the others can do so. If we like to keep the perilous right to collect debts, we must concede it to the others. We may not like to see strangers, or even our own neighbors, taking liberties and quar- reling in the next field to our own. But who gives us the right forcibly to drive them out of a field which we do not own? The rule here seems to be the same for the nation as for the individual. Meanwhile there is one simple proposition the adoption of which could do nothing but good. The DragO' doctrine, associ- ated with the name of an. eminent Argentine statesman, is in line with the general trend of civilization and with our own national spirit. A mild and tentative approach to it was made at the Second Hague Conference, under the lead of General Porter, one of our delegates. So far, however, the agreement only looks to the use of an obligation to arbitrate claims for debts, but leaves open the menace of possible war. What we need is a new and complete formulation of the idea of the Drago doctrine, in such terms that no nation should be permitted under any circumstances to go to war to collect her subjects' debts. It ought to be made infamous to kill innocent people merely because of a quarrel over the payment of debts, presumably incurred under dubious political conditions. The fact is, whatever the Monroe Doctrine historically means, it no longer requires us to stand guard against any nation in Europe, with a show of force to maintain it. In its most critical form, when it meant a warning against despotism, it only needed to be proclaimed, and never to be defended by fighting ships. In the face of governments practically like our own, the time has come to inquire whether there remains any reasonable issue under the name of the Monroe Doctrine, over which the American people could have the least justification for a conflict of arms with a European government. The interests of the United States 208 SELECTED ARTICLES ON in South America are not different from those of other powers, like England and Germany. They are substantially indentical interests; they are all obviously involved together with the improvement of material, political and moral conditions in the South American states. We have spoken so far as if the Monroe Doctrine had refer- ence only to our relations with European nations. The last thing that any one dreamed of in the days of President Monroe was that the doctrine would ever be brought to bear against an Asiatic power! Japan is the one power which seems to cause certain nervous statesmen and builders of battleships a spasm of anxiety. What if Japan should establish a colony on our conti- nent? Having reached our own hands into Asiatic waters to seize territory against the will of its inhabitants, we are now asked to contemplate the possibility that Japan likewise might reach many thousands of miles after American territory. Calmly considered, however, this seems to be a purely gratuitous cause of apprehension. Those who know Japan best assure us that she harbors no hostile intention against the United States. She is certainly much occupied with costly enterprises at home and in Korea and Manchuria. She has growingly valuable trade rela- tions with us, which tend always to make peace. The worst source of mischief in sight between Japan and us is really what we are doing ourselves by way of making a Gibraltar in Hawaii. What is this but to show fear and suspicion, which in turn excite the like uncivilized passions. Let us even suppose that Japan desired to establish a colony in Mexico or some other state in America. How could she possibly do this, except by the good- will and agreement of the people by whose side she settled? Does any one imagine that her experience in Formosa has been so cheap and easy as to lead her to" seek a hornet's nest on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean into which to put her hands ! But suppose the most unlikely thing, that Mexico or Chile wished the Japanese colony. Can any one show what shadow of right the United States would have to forbid this? We have sought, so far such an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as may honorably go in company of the Golden Rule, or, in other words, of international justice. There remains, how- ever, a possible new definition of the doctrine, which should be fairly faced. There is an idea in the air that the United States THE MONROE DOCTRINE 209 holds a certain protectorate or suzerainty over the whole conti- nent of America. A manifest destiny is thought to be working in favor of the dominion or suzerainty of a single power from the Arctic Ocean to Patagonia. Porto Rico is ours. Cuba is almost ours. Many believe that Canada will some time desire to be with us. No people to the south of us shows stable promise of what we call good government. The new canal at Panama affords additional reasons for our control of the continent. Boundless resources are yet to be developed in the virgin con- tinent. We are the people who can provide the brains, the capital and the political security requisite for the exploitation of prac- tically a seventh of the surface of the earth. The new Monroe Doctrine comes thus to mean, frankly, that we want, or at least may some time want, all America for our- selves. We give due notice in advance of our claim of pre- emption. What else does the Monroe Doctrine mean, that there should be the pretense of a necessity to fight for it? What else did President Roosevelt mean by his note of repeated warning to the republics of South and Central America that they must "behave themselves" ? Here and nowhere else looms up the need of new battleships and a hundred millions of dollars a year for the navy. It is in regard to South America, and for the exten- sion of the Monroe Doctrine to a control over the continent, that we discover in the political horizon all manner of colossal foreign responsibilities and the possibilities of friction and war. The new Monroe Doctrine may kindle the imagination and stir the ambition of thoughtless people; it may tempt some of them with a glamour of power and wealth. We may fancy that we would like to be the suzerain power on the continent, with United States officials in authority in every Spanish and Portu- guese American capital. The stern ancient question presses: What right has the United States to assume a protectorate, and much less any form of sovereignty, over South America? The South American governments are as independent as our own; they are growing more stable and less revolutionary every year. There are no traditions common between us to constitute us an acknowledged Lord Protector over them. On the contrary, our conduct toward Colombia and the Philippines, and the extra- ordinary utterances of some of our public men seem to have 210 SELECTED ARTICLES ON already produced a certain nervousness among our Spanish- American neighbors who naturally resent our patronage. Neither does international law, which has never in the past given the Monroe Doctrine any clearly acknowledged footing, admit the right of the United States to mark off the American continent as its own preserve, and to stand, like a dog in the manger, to warn other friendly peoples from entering it. In short, so far as we are good friends of the South American peoples, so far as we are friends of our own kinsmen over the seas on the continent of Europe, so far as we desire permanent amicable relations with the people of Japan, so far as our intentions in South America are honestly humane and philan- thropic, we have no need whatever of the Monroe Doctrine any longer. On the side of our common humanity all our inter- ests are substantially identical. On the other hand, so far as we purpose to exploit the continent for our own selfish interests, so far as we aim at the extension of our power, so far as we purpose to force our forms of civilization and our government upon peoples whom we deem our "inferiors," our new Monroe Doctrine rests upon no grounds of justice or right, it has no place with the Golden Rule, it is not synonymous with human freedom : it depends upon might, and it doubtless tends to provoke jealousy, if not hostility and war. Atlantic Monthly. 111:721-34. June, 1913 Monroe Doctrine : An Obsolete Shibboleth. Hiram Bingham Of the difficulties of establishing any kind of an alliance be- tween ourselves and the South American Republics no one who has traveled in South America can be ignorant. As has been well said by a recent Peruvian writer: "Essential points of differ- ence separate the two Americas differences of language, and therefore of spirit; the difference between Spanish Catholicism and the multiform Protestantism of the Anglo-Saxons; between the Yankee individualism and the omnipotence of the state nat- ural to the South. In their origin, as in their race, we find fundamental antagonisms. The evolution of the north is slow and obedient to the lessons of time, to the influences of custom; THE MONROE DOCTRINE 211 the history of the southern peoples is full of revolution, rich with dreams of an unattainable perfection." One of the things which make it, and will continue to make it, difficult for us to treat fairly with our southern neighbors is our racial prejudice against the half-breed. As Senor Calderon bluntly says, "Half-breeds and their descendants govern the Latin-American Republics" ; and it is a well-known fact that this leads to contempt on the part of the average Anglo-Saxon. Such a state of affairs shows the difficulty of assuming that Pan-Americanism is axiomatic, and of basing the logical growth of the Monroe Doctrine on "natural sympathy." In the third place, the new form of the Monroe Doctrine de- clared, in the words of Secretary Olney, that the "United States is practically sovereign on this continent." This at once aroused the antagonism and the fear of those very southern neighbors who, in another sentence, he had endeavored to prove were "friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States." Less than three years after the enunciation of the new Mon- roe Doctrine we were at war with Spain. The progress of the war in Cuba and the Spanish colonies was followed in South America with the keenest interest. How profoundly it would have surprised the great American public to realize that while we were spending blood and treasure to secure the independence of another American republic, our neighbors in Buenos Aires were indulging in the most severe and caustic criticism of our motives! This attitude can be appreciated only by those who have compared the cartoons published week after week during the progress of the war in this country and in Argentina. In the one, Uncle Sam is pictured as a benevolent giant saving the poor maid Cuba from the jaws of the ferocious dragon, Gen. Weyler, and his cruel mistress in Spain. In the other, Uncle Sam, in the guise of a fat hog, is engaged in besmirching the fair garments of the Queen of Spain in his violent efforts to gobble up her few American possessions. Representations of our actions in the Philippines are in such disgusting form that it would not be desirable to attempt to describe some of the Argentine cartoons touching upon that subject. Our neighbors felt that a decided change had come over the Monroe Doctrine! In 1823 we had declared that ."with the ex- 212 SELECTED ARTICLES ON isting colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere" (so runs the original Monroe Doctrine). In 1898 we not only interfered, but actually took away all of Spain's colonies and dependencies, freeing Cuba and retaining for ourselves Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Without for a moment wishing to enter into a discussion of the wisdom of our actions, I desire to emphasize the tremendous difference between the old and the new Monroe Doctrine. This is not a case of theories and arguments, but of deeds. What are the facts? In 1895 we^ declare that we are practically sovereign on this continent ; in 1898 we take a rich American island from a Euro- pean Power; and in 1903 we go through the form of preventing a South American Republic from subduing a revolution in one of her distant provinces, and eventually take a strip of that province because we believe we owe it to the world to build the Panama Canal. Again, let it be clear that I am not interested at this point in defending or attacking our actions in any of these cases I merely desire to state what has happened and to show some of the fruits of the new Monroe Doctrine. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Another one of the "fruits" which has not escaped the at- tention of our neighbors in South America is our intervention in Santo Domingo, which, although it may be an excellent thing for the people of that island, has undoubtedly interfered with their right to do as they please with their own money. Furthermore, within the past three years we have twice landed troops in Central America and taken an active part by way of interfering in local politics. We believed that the conditions were so bad as to justify us in carrying out the new Monroe Doctrine by aiding one side in a local revolution. Of our armed intervention in Cuba it is scarcely necessary to speak, except to refer in passing to the newspaper story, cred- ited and believed in Cuba, that if American troops are again obliged to intervene in the political life of that country they will not be withdrawn, as has been the practice in the past. The menace of intervention, armed intervention, the threat- ened presence of machine guns and American marines have re- peatedly been used by Latin-American politicians in their en- deavors to keep the peace in their own countries. And we have THE MONROE DOCTRINE 213 done enough of that sort of thing to make it evident to disinter- ested observers that the new Monroe Doctrine, our present policy, is to act as international policeman, or at least as an elder- brother-with-a-big-stick, whenever the little fellows get too fresh. Is this Doctrine worth while? Let us see what it involves, first, from the European, second, from the Latin-American point of view. By letting it be known in Europe that we shall not tolerate any European intervention or the landing of European troops on the sacred soil of the American Republics, we assume all re- sponsibility. We have declared, in the words of Secretary Olney, that the United States is "practically sovereign on this continent, and that its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition. Therefore European countries have the right to look to us to do that which we prevent them from doing. A curious result of this is that some of the American Republics float loans in Europe, believing that the United States will not allow the Governments of their European creditors forcibly to collect these loans. Personally I believe that it ought to be an adopted principle of international law that the armed intervention of creditor na- tions to collect bad debts on behalf of their bankers and bond- holders is forbidden. If this -principle were clearly understood and accepted, these bankers and underwriters would be far more particular to whom they lent any great amount of money and under what conditions. They would not be willing to take the risks which they now take, and many unfortunate financial tangles would never have a beginning. It is natural for a Re- public which has great undeveloped resources, much optimism, and a disregard of existing human handicaps, to desire to borrow large amounts of money in order to build expensive railroads and carry out desirable public improvements. It is equally natu- ral that capitalists seeking good interest rates and secure invest- ments, should depend on the fact that if the debtor country attempts to default on its national loans, trfe Government of the creditors will intervene with a strong arm. It is natural that the money should be forthcoming, even though a thorough, busi- nesslike, and scientific investigation of the possessions and re- sources of the borrowing nation might show that the chances of her being able to pay interest, and eventually to return the 16 214 SELECTED ARTICLES ON capital, were highly problematical and to be reckoned as very high risks. Millions of dollars of such loans have been made in the past. It is perfectly evident that many of these loans can not be repaid ; that the time is coming when the creditor nations will look to us as the policeman or "elder brother" of the western hemi- sphere to see to it that the little boys pay for the candy and sweetmeats they have eaten. Is it worth while that we should do this ? One can not dodge the truth that the continuation of our sup- port of this Doctrine implies that we will undertake to be re- sponsible for the good behavior of all of the American nations. If we are the big-brother- with-the-club, who will not permit any outsider to spank our irritating or troublesome younger brothers, we must accept the natural corollary of keeping them in order ourselves, for we can not allow the American family to become a nuisance, and some members of it have a decided tendency in that direction. Is this task worth while? Will it not cost more than it is worth? Is there not a better way out of the difficulty? Furthermore Europe knows that in order to continue to execute our self-imposed and responsible mission we must run counter to the most approved principles of the law of nations. The right of independence is so fundamental and so well established a principle of international law, and respect for it is so essential to the existence of national self-restraint, that armed intervention, or any other action or policy tending to place that right in a subordinate position, is properly looked upon with disfavor, not only in Latin America, but by all the family of civilized nations. The grounds upon which intervention is permitted in international law differ according to the authority one consults, but in general they are limited to the right of self-preservation, to averting danger to the intervening state, and to the duty of fulfilling engagements. When, however, the danger against which intervention is directed is the consequence of the prevalence of ideas which are opposed to the views held by the intervening state, most authorities believe that intervention ceases to be legitimate. To say that we have the right to inter- vene in order to modify another state's attitude toward revolu- THE MONROE DOCTRINE 215 tions is to ignore the fundamental principle that the right of every state to live its life in a given way is precisely equal to that oi another state to live its life in another way. In the last analysis no intervention is legal except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of international law has taken place or unless the family of civilized states concur in authorizing it. If, then, our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine means prac- tically disregard of the principles of the accepted law of nations, is it worth while to continue? Why should we not abandon the Monroe Doctrine, and publicly disclaim any desire on our part to interfere in the domestic quarrels of our neighbors? Why should we not publicly state to Europe that we shall not inter- vene except at the request of a Pan American Congress, and then only in case we are one of the members which such a Con- gress selects for the specific purpose of quieting a certain trouble- some neighbor? From the Latin- American point of view, the continuance of the Monroe Doctrine is insulting, and is bound to involve us in serious difficulties with our neighbors. We seem to be blind to actual conditions in the largest and most important parts of Latin America, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. We need to arouse the average citizen to study the commercial situ- ation and the recent history of those three Republics. Let him ponder on the meaning of Brazil's $100,000,000 of balance of trade in her favor. Let him realize the enormous extent of Argentina's recent growth and her ability to supply the world with wheat, corn, beef, and mutton.* Let him examine Chile's political and economic stability. Let him ponder whether or not these nations are fit to take care of themselves, and are worthy of being included in an alliance to preserve America for the Americans, if that it is worth while, and if there is any danger from Europe. Let him ask himself whether or not the "A B C" powers that is, the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean Govern- ments deserve our patronizing, we-will-protect-you-from-Europe attitude. The fact is we are woefully ignorant of the actual conditions in the leading American Republics. To the inhabitants of those * In 1912 Argentina's exports amounted to $480,000,000 of which $200,000,000 represented wheat and corn and $188,000,000 pastoral products. The Author. 216 SELECTED ARTICLES ON countries the very idea of the existence of the Monroe Doctrine is not only distasteful but positively insulting. It is leading them on the road toward what is known as the "A B C" policy, a kind of triple alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, with the definite object of opposing the encroachments of the United States. They feel that they must do something to counteract that well-known willingness of the American people to find good and sufficient reasons for interfering and intervening; for ex- ample, for taking Porto Rico from Spain, for sending armies into Cuba, for handling the customs receipts of Santo Domingo, for taking a strip of territory which (South Americans believe) belongs to the Republic of Colombia, for sending troops into Nicaragua, and for mobilizing an army on the Mexican frontier. (In regard to the latter point it may be stated, in passing, that it is not the custom for South American nations to mobilize an army on a neighbor's frontier merely because that country is engaged in civil war or revolution.) To the "A B C" powers even the original Monroe Doctrine is regarded as long since outgrown and as being at present merely a display of insolence and conceit on our part. With Brazil now owning the largest dreadnoughts in the world; with Argentina and Chile building equally good ones; with the fact that the European nations have long since lost their tendency toward monarchical despotism and are in fact quite as demo- cratic as many American Republics, it does seem a bit ridiculous for us to pretend that the Monroe Doctrine is a necessary ele- ment in our foreign policy. If we still fear European aggression and desire to prevent a partition of South America on the lines of the partition of Africa, let us bury the Monroe doctrine and declare an entirely new policy a policy that is based on intelligent appreciation of the present status of the leading American powers let us declare our desire to join with the "A B C" pow r ers in protecting the weaker parts of America against any imaginable aggressions on the part of European or Asiatic nations. Some people think that the most natural outlet for the crowded Asiatic nations is to be found in South America, and that Japan and China will soon be knocking most loudly for the admission which is at present denied them. If we decide that they should enter, well and good; but if we decide against THE MONROE DOCTRINE 217 such a policy, we shall be in a much stronger position to carry out that plan if we have united with the "A B C" powers. If these "A B C" powers dislike and despise our maintenance of the old Monroe Doctrine, it is not difficult to conceive how much more they must resent the new one. The very thought that we, proud in the consciousness of our own self-righteousness, sit here with a smile on our faces and a big stick in our hands, ready to chastise any of the American Republics that do not behave, fairly makes their blood boil. It may be denied that this is our attitude. -Grant that it is not, still our neighbors believe that it is, and if we desire to convince them of the contrary we must definitely and publicly abandon the Monroe Doctrine and enunciate a new kind of foreign policy. We ought not to be blind to the fact that there are clever authors residing in Europe who take the utmost pains to make the Latin-Americans believe what they are unfortunately only too willing to believe that we desire to be not only practically but actually sovereign on the western hemisphere. A recent French writer, Maurice de Waleffe, writing on "The Fair Land of Central America," begins his book with this startling an- nouncement of a discovery he has made : The United States have made up their mind to conquer South America. Washington aspires to become the capital of an enormous empire, com- prising, with the exception of Canada, the whole of the new world. Eighty million Yankees want to annex not only 40,000,000 Spanish-Americans but such mines, forests, and agricultural riches as can be found nowhere else on the face of the globe. Most of us, when we read those words, smile, knowing that they are not true; yet that does not affect the fact that the Latin-American, when he reads them, gnashes his teeth and be- lieves that they are only too true. If he belongs to one of the larger republics, it makes him toss his head angrily and increases his hatred toward those "Yankis," whose manners he despises. If he belongs to one of the smaller republics, his soul is filled with fear mingled with hatred, and he sullenly awaits the day when he shall have to defend his state against the Yankee invaders. In every case the effect produced is con- trary to the spirit of peace and harmony. In another book, which is attracting wide attention and was written by a young Peruvian diplomatist, there is a chapter 218 SELECTED ARTICLES ON entitled "The North American Peril," and it begins with these significant words : "To save themselves from Yankee imperial- ism, the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance or the aid of Japanese arms ; everywhere the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles and in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the character of a Latin crusade." This is a statement not of a theory, but of a condition set forth by a man who, while somewhat severe in his criticism of North American culture, is not unfriendly to the United States, and who remembers what his country owes to us. Yet he asserts that in the United States "against the policy of respect for Latin liberties are ranged the instincts of a triumphant plutocracy." The strident protest in this book has not gone out without finding a ready echo in South America. Even in Peru, long our best friend on the southern continent, the leading daily papers have during the past year shown an increasing tendency to criti- cize our actions and suspect our motives. Their suspicion goes so far as actually to turn friendly words against us. Last September a successful American diplomat, addressing a dis- tinguished gathering of manufacturers in New York, was quoted all over South America as stating that the United States did not desire territorial expansion, but only commercial, and that the association should combat all idea of territorial expansion if any statement proposed it, as this was the only way to gain the confidence of South America. This remark was treated as evidence of Machiavellian politics. One journalist excitedly ex- claimed, "Who does not see in this paternal interest a brutal and cynical sarcasm? Who talks of confidence when one of the most thoughtful South American authorities, Francisco Garcia Calderon, gives us once more the cry, no longer premature, 'Let .us be alert and on our guard against Yankeeism.' " Even the agitation against the Putumayo atrocities is mis- understood. "To no one is it a secret," says one Latin-American writer, "that all these scandalous accusations only serve to con- ceal the vehement desire to impress American and English in- fluence on the politics of the small countries of South America; and they can scarcely cover the shame of the utilitarian end that lies behind it all." Another instance of the attitude of the Latin-American press THE MONROE DOCTRINE 219 is shown in a recent article in one of the leading daily papers in Lima, the Government organ. In the middle of its front page in a two-column space is an article with these headlines : "North American excesses the terrible lynchings and they talk of the Putumayo !" The gist of the article may easily be imagined. It begins with these words : "While the Saxons of the world are producing a deafening cry over the crimes of the Putumayo, imagining them to be like a dance of death, and giving free rein to such imaginings ; while the American Government re- solves to send a commission that may investigate what atrocities are committed in those regions, there was published, as regards the United States, in La Razon, of Buenos Aires, a fortnight ago the following note, significant of the 'lofty civilization and high justice' of the great republic of the north." Here follows a press dispatch describing one of the terrible lynchings which only too often happen in the United States. Then the Peruvian editor goes on to say, "Do we realize that in the full twentieth century, where there is not left a single country in the world whose inhabitants are permitted to supersede justice by summary punishment, there are repeatedly taking place, almost daily, in the United States lynchings like that of which we are told in the telegraphic dispatch?" Is it worth our while to heed the "writing on the wall"? Is it not true that it is the present tendency of the Monroe Doctrine to claim that the United States is to do whatever seems to the United States good and proper so far as the western hemisphere is concerned? Is there not a dangerous tendency in our country to believe so far in our own rectitude that we may be excused from any restrictions, either in the law of na- tions or in our treaty obligations, that seem unjust, trivial, or inconvenient, notwithstanding the established practices of civil- ized nations? Our attitude on the Panama tolls question, our former disregard of treaty rights with China, and our willing- ness to read into or read out of existing treaties whatever seems to us right and proper, have aroused deep-seated suspicion in our southern neighbors, which, it seems to me, we should en- deavor to eradicate if we have our own highest good at heart. Are we' not too much in the state of mind of Citizen Fix-it, who was more concerned with suppressing the noisy quarrels of his neighbors than with quietly solving his own domestic dim- 220 SELECTED ARTICLES ON culties? Could we see ourselves as our southern neighbors see us in the columns of their daily press, where the emphasis is still on the prevalence of murder in the United States, the astonishing continuance of lynching, the freedom from punishment of the vast majority of those who commit murder, our growing disre- gard of the rights of others, bomb outrages, strikes, riots, labor difficulties, could we see these things with their eyes, we should realize how bitterly they resent our assumed right to intervene when they misbehave themselves or when a local revolution be- comes particularly noisy. So firmly fixed in the Latin-American mind is the idea that our foreign policy to-day means intervention and interference that comments on the splendid sanitary work being done at Panama by Col. Gorgas are tainted with this idea. On the west coast of South America there is a pesthole called Guayaquil, which, as Ambassador Bryce says, "enjoys the reputation of being the pesthouse of the continent, rivaling for the prevalence and malignity of its malarial fevers such dens of disease as Fontesvilla on the Pungwe River in South Africa and the Guinea coast itself, and adding to these the more swift and deadly yellow fever, which has now been practically extir- pated from every other part of South America except the banks of the Amazon. ... It seems to be high time that efforts should be made to improve conditions at a place whose develop- ment is so essential to the development of Ecuador itself." Re- cent efforts on the part of far-sighted Ecuadorian statesmen to remedy these conditions by employing American sanitary engi- neers and taking advantage of the offers of American capital were received by the Ecuadorian populace so ill as to cause the fall of the cabinet and the disgrace of the minister who favored such an experiment in modern sanitation. Peru suffers from the conditions of bad health among her northern neighbors, and yet the leading newspapers in Peru, in- stead of realizing how much they had to gain by having Guayaquil cleaned up, united in protesting against this symptom of "Yanki" imperialism, and applauded the action of the Ecuador mob. Is it worth while to continue a foreign policy which makes it so difficult for things to be done, things of whose real advan- tage to our neighbors there is no question? THE MONROE DOCTRINE 221 The old adage that actions speak louder than words is per- haps more true in Latin America than in the United States. A racial custom of saying pleasant things tends toward a sus- picion of the sincerity of pleasant things when said. But there can be no doubt about actions. Latin- American statesmen smiled and applauded when Secretary Root, in the Pan-American Con- gress at Rio Janeiro, said, "We consider that the independence and the equal rights of the smallest and weakest members of the family of nations deserve as much respect as those of the great empires. We pretend to no right, privilege, or power that we do not freely concede to ea.ch one of the American re- publics." But they felt that their suspicions of us were more than warranted by our subsequent actions in Cuba, Santo Do- mingo, and Nicaragua. Our ultimatum to Chile on account of the long-standing Alsop claim seemed to them an unmistakably unfriendly act and was regarded as a virtual abandonment by Secretary Knox of the policy enunciated by Secretary Root. Another unfriendly act was the neglect of our Congress to provide a suitable appropriation for the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress. Before 1908 Latin-American scientific congresses had been held in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Brazil (Rio Janeiro), and Uruguay (Montevideo). When it came Chile's turn, so kind was her feeling toward Secretary Root that the United States was asked to join in making the Fourth Latin-American Sci- entific Congress become the first Pan-American. Every one of the four countries where the international scientists met had made a suitable, generous appropriation to cover the expenses of the meeting. Chile had felt that it was worth while to make a very large appropriation in order suitably to entertain 'the delegates, to publish the results of the congress, and to increase American friendships. This First Pan-American Scientific Con- gress selected Washington as the place for the second congress, and named October, 1912, as the appointed time for the meet- ings. But when our State Department asked Congress for a modest appropriation of $50,000 to meet our international obli- gations for this Pan-American gathering, our billion-dollar Con- gress decided to economize and denied the appropriation. When the matter came up again during the Congress that has just 222 SELECTED ARTICLES ON finished its sessions, the appropriation was recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but was thrown out on a technical point of order. Now, you can not make a Latin-American believe that the United States is so poor that it can not afford to entertain inter- national scientific congresses as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile have done. They argue that there must be some other reason underlying this act of courtesy. No pleasant words or profuse professions of friendship and regard can make the lead- ing statesmen and scientists throughout Latin America forget that it was not possible to hold the Second Pan-American Sci- entific Congress because the United States did not care to as- sume her international obligations. Nor will they forget that Chile spent $100,000 in entertaining the First Pan-American Sci- entific Congress and that the 10 official delegates from the United States Government enjoyed the bounteous Chilean hospitality and were shown every attention that was befitting and proper for the accredited representatives of the United States. In short, here is a concrete case of how our present policy toward Latin America justifies the Latin-American attitude to- ward the country that has been maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, there is another side to the question. Some of the defenders of the Monroe Doctrine state quite frankly that they are selfish, and that from the selfish point of view the Monroe Doctrine should at all costs be maintained. They argue that our foreign commerce would suffer were Europe permitted to have a free hand in South America. Even on this very point it seems to me that they make a serious mistake. You can seldom sell goods to a man who dislikes you, ex- cept when you have something which is far better or cheaper than he can get anywhere else. Furthermore, if he distrusts you, he is not going to judge your goods fairly or to view the world's market with an unprejudiced eye. This can scarcely be denied. Everyone knows that a friendly smile or cordial greeting and the maintenance of friendly relations are essential to "holding one's customers." Accordingly, it seems that even from this selfish point of view, which some Americans are willing to take, it is absolutely against our own interests to maintain this elder-brother-with-the-stick policy, which typifies the new Monroe Doctrine. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 223 Furthermore, Germany is getting around the Monroe Doc- trine, and is actually making a peaceful conquest of South America which will injure us just as much as if we had allowed her to make a military conquest of the southern republics. She is winning South .American friendship. She has planted col- onies, one of which, in southern Brazil, has 350,000 people in it, as large a population as that of Vermont and nearly as large as that of Montana. Germany is taking pains to educate her young business men in the Spanish language, and to send them out equipped to capture Spanish-American trade. We have a saying that "Trade follows the flag." Germany has magnificent steamers, flying the German flag, giving fortnightly service to every important port in South America ports where the Ameri- can flag is practically never seen. She has her banks and business houses which have branches in the interior cities. By their means she is able to keep track of American commerce, to know what we are doing, and at what rates. Laughing in her sleeve at the Monroe Doctrine as an antiquated policy, which only makes it easier for her to do a safe business, Germany is engaged in the peaceful conquest of Spanish America. To be sure, we are not standing still, and we are fighting for the same trade that she is, but our soldiers are handicapped by the presence of the very doctrine that was intended to strengthen our position in the new world. Is this worth while? At all events let us face clearly and frankly the fact that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is going to cost the United States an immense amount of trouble, money, and men. Carried out to its logical conclusion, it means a policy of suzerainty and interference which will earn us the increasing hatred of our neighbors, the dissatisfaction of Europe, the loss of commercial opportunities, and the forfeiture of time and at- tention which would much better be given to settling our own difficult internal problems. The continuance of adherence to the Monroe Doctrine offers opportunities to scheming statesmen to distract public opinion from the necessity of concentrated attention at home by arousing mingled feelings of jingoism and self-importance in attempting to correct the errors of our neighbors. If we persist in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, we shall find that its legitimate, rational, and logical growth will lead us 224 SELECTED ARTICLES ON to an increasing number of large expenditures, where American treasure and American blood will be sacrificed in efforts to re- move the mote from our neighbor's eye while overlooking the beam in our own. The character of the people who inhabit .the tropical Ameri- can republics is such, the percentage of Indian blood is so great, the little understood difficulties of life in those countries are so far-reaching, and the psychological tendencies of the peo- ple so different from our own, that opportunities will continually arise which will convince us that they require our intervention if we continue to hold to the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. It is for us to face the question fairly and to determine whether it is worth while to continue any longer on a road which leads to such great expenditures and which means the loss of international friendships. That international good will is a desideratum it needs no words of mine to prove to anyone. Looked at from every point of view, selfishly and unselfishly, ethically, morally, commer- cially, and diplomatically, we desire to live at peace with our neighbors and to promote international friendship. Can this be done by continuing our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine? Journal of Race Development. 4:324-33. January, 1914 Monroe Doctrine. George F. Tucker We should not forget that at the time of President Monroe's declaration this country had a population of only a few millions, and that her interests were inconsiderable in comparison with those of today, that the Spanish- American countries were emerg- ing from colonial conditions that made the transition to inde- pendence and democracy difficult and problematical; that trade between civilized countries was not extensive and was largely limited to merchandise peculiar to an age when wants were few and luxuries little known; that transportation was not yet effected by the agencies which man has since called from latency ; that knowledge the world over was the possession of the few, and that such a thing as the education of the masses was hardly contemplated; that racial affinities and prejudices were marked and prevalent a fact due to the aloofness of nations, caused in THE MONROE DOCTRINE 225 a large measure by slow and imperfect means of communication; that there were few, perhaps no, societies and associations or- ganized to promote the cause of peace and to agitate for settle- ment of wars and disputes by compromise or arbitration, and that no one dreamed not even the visionary and enthusiast of the discoveries and inventions that were to modify the methods of trade and business, augment the wealth of the world, raise the standards of living, bring long separated peoples into closer relations and make possible cooperative efforts to promote amity and good-will among nations. Is it not a fact that the Monroe Doctrine might possibly be applied today to the detriment of the southern republics in whose interest it may be invoked, and possibly to the discredit of the United States? It is fair to assume that there are only two nations that are likely in any event to oppose or violate this Doctrine or inhibition Great Britain and Germany. In the past ninety years Great Britain has advanced from the rule of the few to that of the many, so that the subjects of the King enjoy about all the privileges of citizens of our country; she has covered the seas with her shipping, and has developed a colonial system the most remarkable and efficient in the history of the world; she has guarded and guards her subjects in every corner of the globe, and, wherever her flag flies, the lives and property of aliens are accorded the same protection as those of her own. Now is it not probable that, if Great Britain should interfere in the affairs of a Latin- American country, she would establish a system calculated to promote the interests of that country, and not at all inimical to those of the United States? And what system? Not that of the old Great Britain governed by gentle- men, but that of the Great Britain of today governed by the people. Ninety years ago Germany was a collection of states without cohesion and with a not redundant population. Now regard the aspect of governmental unification, and consider her great ad- vance not only in education and all the activities that go with learning, but in manufacturing and trade and commerce. The growth in population has been marvelous, and the label "Made in Germany," testifies everywhere to commercial expansion and prosperity, but her territory is hardly sufficient to maintain her constantly increasing numbers, and she naturally seeks other IQ- 226 SELECTED ARTICLES ON calities for those who are handicapped at home by the struggle for existence. Now if Germany should take over a Latin- Ameri- can country, would its people be subjugated and deprived of their liberties, or would they affiliate with the conquerors and profit by the appropriation? And how would our own institutions be affected? Would there be ground for apprehension that such an appropriation would be a menace to our democratic govern- ment? The speaker does not answer these questions, but he adverts to the fact that there are several million German-Ameri- cans ; that they have been famed for their indifference to political intrigue, and have been and are equally famed for their diligence, their frugality, their thrift, and their loyalty to their adopted land. So far as is known, they have never attempted to destroy the American republic, but on the other hand have been among the foremost to contribute to its prosperity. But how about coaling stations and the transference to Ameri- can shores of the European military system? This suggests other questions. Have not the great Powers of Europe all they can attend to in colonial enterprise and expansion, especially since their taking over of the available portions of Africa, under spheres of influence? Would not the maintenance of military strong-holds and coaling stations in Central and South America be an element of weakness rather than of strength? Command- ing a large portion of the trade of these southern republics are not Great Britain and Germany, for example, better off than they would be if they were compelled by expensive military and naval measures to guard a commerce which prospers and in- creases under the protection of the countries with whom it is carried on? The chief solicitude, perhaps, of the alarmists relates to the Panama Canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has been supplanted by the Hay-Pauncefote convention. Under the direction, and at the expense of this country, the Canal is nearly completed. It is to be neutralized. The United States may maintain such military police as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder ; belligerent vessels are restricted in method and activity, and the provisions of the treaty are to apply to waters adjacent to the Canal, within three marine miles of either end. And what is this solicitude? Is it not that the littoral is in peril, that is the shores adjacent to the Canal, particularly on the Atlantic THE MONROE DOCTRINE 227 side; that some strong European Power may appropriate a part of this littoral, and that the position of the United States may be thus rendered insecure and the Monroe Doctrine made in- effective? Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration, for there is no reason to believe that, after settling the pro- tracted controversy over Isthmian transit, she is going to pursue a course which may weaken the alliance she has entered into to further her own trade. With the English speaking peoples in accord, is there ground for apprehending interference with the littoral, or the establishment of coaling-stations in any parts thereof, or in any of the islands of the Caribbean Sea? Is not the logical conclusion that the successful operation of this great .waterway will prove such a benefit to the commercial nations of the globe, that no one of them will be disposed to pursue a policy calculated to give umbrage to the others? A matter which merits attention is the enforcement of money claims. The Latin-American republics have been frequent bor- rowers of European money-changers, and frequently also the disinclination or refusal to settle has led to threats of coercion. In one notable instance a little over a decade ago war was actually resorted to and the American people, misled by the yel- low newspapers, were distracted by the bugaboo of an invaded Monroe Doctrine. The case was that of Venezuela. It is not contended that the government of Venezuela repudiated its obli- gations ; in fact, that government only objected to the amount of the claims, and proposed that they be passed upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the creditor nations urged their reference to a mixed commission. The method adopted the sinking of Vene- zuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan ports is believed to be one of the first attempts in history to enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of war. It is to be noted, however, that both Great Britain and Germany disavowed to the American government in advance any intention to acquire territory, the German ambassador assuring the State Department, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we con- sider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occu- pation of Venezuelan territory." The intention to acquire terri- tory was disavowed, but were not the attitude and measures of Great Britain and Germany in a sense an interference in the affairs of Venezuela, and were the interests of South and Cen- 228 SELECTED ARTICLES ON tral America, and those of the United States in any way jeopardized? Before dismissing the subject, we feel that the attitude, the views, the preferences and purposes of the Latin-American gov- ernments deserve attention, for it may be that today they regard the assumed protectorate of the United States as different from the very acceptable service rendered ninety years ago. Suppose that one of the Latin-American republics desires to hand over its autonomy to a European Power or for a consideration to cede to that Power a bit of territory for the location of a coaling-station, has the United States a right to set up the Mon- roe Doctrine, and, if set up, would it prove a deterrent? With- out answering this question can we not say that the United States has shown too little general interest in the affairs of her Spanish-American neighbors? The matter of interrelation is one which this country should not ignore, and which means far more to the Latin-Americans than the North American people at pres- ent comprehend. During the last twenty years several of our southern neighbors have made such progress, and have so in- creased their resources, that they are amply able to look out for their own affairs in the event of threatened aggression of Euro- pean nations. Review of Reviews. 34: 114. July, 1906 Commercial Side of the Monroe Doctrine What has our adhesion to the Monroe Doctrine done .for the extension of American commerce? This question has been raised in connection with the coming Pan-American Conference at Rio. Harold Bolce, a writer in the July number of Appleton's Mag- azine, ventures the assertion that our trade with South America would be greater if England owned that entire continent. The latest figures show that little British Guiana bought more goods from America, by one million dollars' worth, last year than the whole of Venezuela did, and Venezuela has an area equal to all that of the United States east of the Mississippi River and north of the fringe of Gulf States. The Britisher the world over is a big buyer of American merchandise. To Canada, with its less than six million people, we sell more goods in six months than we do in a whole year to all the republics of South America, with its upward of forty million inhabitants. Theoretically, THE MONROE DOCTRINE 229 it would appear that a practical nation like America would gather material benefits from its guardianship of a continent. The opposite is true. It is the European nations, protesting against the Monroe Doctrine,' who have prospered most in the southern portion of the western hemisphere. In the past decade, for example, Germany's progress in Brazil has been phe- nomenal, while we have lost ground in that republic. The latest returns show that the amount of merchandise bought by all nations, exclusive of the United States, amounted last year to 11.6 billions of dollars. Of that America supplied 14.33 per cent. If the Monroe Doctrine were of any value in getting foreign trade for the United States, our proportion of the commerce of South America would be greater than our share in the trade of countries beyond the pale of our political pro- tection. But of South America's imports we supply only 13.28 per cent. After recalling the disasters resulting to the London banking house of Baring and to American financial interests from the failure of Argentina to meet her obligations, in 1890, this writer continues : Some people question Uncle Sam's right to act as the receiver for insolvent San Domingo, but any one who will study the path of panics will realize that it is a. solemn obligation upon the part of the American nation to avert, whenever possible, any financial collapse in the countries of Latin America. The disaster that began in Buenos Ayres reached America when our harvests were prodigal, and when our factories were running overtime. It is more picturesque, perhaps, to think of the Monroe Doctrine as safeguarding our export trade with South America. In 1890 we were shipping at the rate of $32,000,000 worth of goods to the southern half of this hemisphere, but twenty years of such commerce would not com- pensate the United States for the loss we sustained in the three years of failures following the fall of the house of Baring. In that brief period of panic the liabilities of failures in the United States amounted to $650,000,000. Summing up the lessons of the past, Mr. Bolce shows that the downfall of a Latin-American republic represents, first, the alarm of Europe and the collapse of some of its financial houses ; second, a reflex disaster in the United States, and, third, the utter demoralization of the South American people who hold the spurious paper of the defunct republic. The total export and import trade of South America now exceeds $1,000,000,000, a sum greater than that representing the trade of the United States in 1870. 17 230 SELECTED ARTICLES ON North American Review. 173:832-44. December, igoi Shall the Monroe Doctrine Be Modified? Walter Wellman Tne weakness and falseness of the Monroe Doctrine is that it applies not only to the islands and seas near our shores and to the isthmus, where we have a large and unmistakable special interest, but broadly to the whole hemisphere, in a considerable part of which we have almost no actual interest at all, and where the interest of other Powers is in many cases equal to ours and in some cases far greater than ours. What is the evidence that the United States possesses an interest in middle and lower South America sufficiently greater than that of the remainder of the world to give the United States a reasonable right to exclusive privilege? Not in the preservation of a republican form of government, for as a general principle no nation has a right to dictate what the form of government of any of its neighbors shall be; besides, the Monroe Doctrine applied to Brazil when it was under a monarchy as well as now, when Brazil is a republic; further, the chief countries of Europe, whose possible activities in South America we seek to limit, are better democracies than the best of the governments we seek to 'perpetuate. Evidence is not found in trade, investment of capital, or colonization, for in all these respects several Euro- pean nations have vastly greater interests in South America than the United States. It is not found in the danger of greater proximity of European Powers, for proximity is not o'f itself a danger, except in special circumstances or when accompanied by the menace of enmity. No one will assert that any European Power is the enemy of the United States. We have friendly relations with them in all other parts of the world ; the assump- tion that our friendship would be endangered by having them nearer to us is of itself a false and unfriendly note. You may say that you will not have your friend as a dweller in your own house, but you may not with decency or consistency forbid him to live in your neighborhood. Besides, when the Monroe Doctrine was born proximity counted for much more than it does in this day of electricity, cables, steam and sea power. Now it counts only under special circumstances. We should be justified in saying 1 we did not want Germany in Cuba, or Russia in Mexico, or France in the THE MONROE DOCTRINE 231 Isthmus. But what has the political control of Argentina, or Patagonia, or Brazil, or Chili, to do with the security of the United States? The proximity excuse, even if valid, would not hold as to South America. New York is farther from Rio Janeiro than from Hamburg, Bremen, Cherbourg or Liverpool. It is much farther from New York to Buenos Ayres than from New York to any port of western Europe. The one broad justification of United States exclusiveness in central and lower South America superiority of interest does not exist. Is there any particular justification? It might be found in two new declarations accompanying the Monroe Doctrine, as follows : 1. That the United States will at once assume a suzerain's relations to all South American nations, maintaining responsi- bility for them, standing between them and the remainder of the world, securing or offering redress for all wrongs committed by them, and disciplining such of them as may be rash enough to reject our control. 2. That wherever government fails and disorder or wrong follows in South America, the United States will take over such territory in its role of primate Power as a trustee for civilization and through annexation and its own superior administration bring about better conditions. Declaration of such policies as these would be aggression and imperialism of the boldest stamp, and would doubtless involve us in no end of troubles with South American states. But they would afford a better basis for the Monroe Doctrine than none at all, and would at least possess the merit of candor and consistency of an unmistakable though selfish sort. If the United States is going to fence off all America and put up "no tresspass" signs against all comers, we must on demand show at least a color of justification. But we cannot in decency put up the signs, forbidding all others to go in and improve, and at the same time declare that we have no intention of doing 1 so. We cannot assume an attitude of responsibility for the selfish purpose of keeping others out, and then repudiate that respon- sibility in order to save ourselves the trouble of meeting it. The Monroe Doctrine, as applied to the whole hemisphere, is to-day the one example of a first-class Power setting its strength against progress. There is abroad to-day a world- 232 SELECTED ARTICLES ON movement which follows natural law, which is as irresistible as the march of time itself a movement in which we are our- selves mightily participating in various parts of the globe. This movement is the centralization process, a political phase of the natural law of survival of the fittest. In the present state of international morality, it does not mean the passing of the small into the control of the great, for the doctrine of the absolute domination of the strong over the weak is happily becoming obsolete. The essence of the law and of the move- ment which springs from it is the passing of the inefficient and unfit and the coming 6f the efficient and worthy. Thus there is constantly going on the transfer of control from the incom- petent to the competent, from the ineffective to the effective, from the inferior to the superior. The first and most important function of government is uplifting the people governed. As the world is now constituted, broadly speaking, all governments which do this are insured against overthrow from without, for it is one of the glories of civilization at the beginning of the twentieth cen- tury that the strong do not prey upon the weak, so the weak be only competent. But every government which is both weak and incompetent, which fails to meet its responsibilities to its people and to the world, is inevitably threatened both from within and from without. For object-lessons on the bright side of the pic- ture, it is only necessary to cite Switzerland, Belgium, the Nether- lands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. For examples on the darker side, it is only necessary to cite Hawaii, the causes which led to our ousting of Spain from Cuba and the Philippines, Euro- pean overrunning of semi-savage Africa, the concert of all the Powers in distressed China. This principle of the constantly increasing responsibility of the superior and competent nations, of the constantly lessening sway, influence and territory of the inferior and the incompetent, is the international law of gravity. It is the mightiest force in the progress of the world, the advancement of civilization, the preservation of peace. It is the practical application of the theory of trusteeship which has wrought great works in Africa, in Asia, in the islands of the sea, and which, better than all, has brought with greater and more complex responsibility a higher morality to the chief nations of the world. There is one exception to the universality of the application THE MONROE DOCTRINE 233 of this principle, and only one. This is found in the western hemisphere. The youngest and, all things considered, the greatest and most progressive of the Powers, seeks to put up the barrier and prevent the world-movement touching the shores of America. It recognizes the virtue of the principle every- where else, and itself aids in its application to the islands of the Pacific and to China; but it has declared it will not have it here. The United States stands absolutely alone in its championship of the incompetent against the competent, in its purpose to perpetuate the rule of the inferior and to bar out that of the superior. If Central and South American govern- ments were Switzerlands, Belgiums, Netherlands and Scandi- navias there might be excuse for the United States setting up the dead-line of its imperious will for their protection. But if, like the Swiss, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Scandinavians, these American governments were fulfilling their proper mission, adequately meeting their responsibilities, the protection of the United States would not be needed. Th^ enlightened opinion of the world would protect them, as it protects the minor states of Europe. The United States would occupy a wholly correct and justifiable position if it assumed that its great power and commanding influence gave it leadership in the western world ; that it intends to meet the responsibilities of its leadership; that it will not sit idly by whilst a competent American gov- ernment, one which has shown its fitness to survive, is being subverted by the superior force of some outsider; that it must have an early and loud voice in determining what is and what is not international morality on these continents. Such attitude would be irreproachable. Were the United States to confine its South American declaration to that of a special interest, without any attempt to assert exclusiveness, it would have the free hand. It could meet every case that might arise upon the merits of that case. It could select the instances in which it would have nothing to say, and those in which it might have very much to say. It could protect the competent, but would not be bound to protect the incompetent. It could make sure that in every case to which it extended its interposition it had right and reason on its side. But this is not the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine sets up an 234 SELECTED ARTICLES ON arbitrary, immovable, unvariable rule of action. It declares that not only may we of right, but that we shall and must, interfere in any and every case whatsoever, regardless of the circumstances, where native control is threatened from without. It binds us to interference not only where interference would be a duty, but where it would be a crime. It ties us to the principle that all native control, no matter how wretched or unstable, must be per- petuated at any cost; that no European control, no matter howl desirable or promising, can be permitted under any circumstances. Conditions have greatly changed since the Doctrine declared that European presence in this hemisphere would be a menace to the United States. One European nation is already here, with an area greater than our own, but her presence is not a menace. If British rule in Canada were incompetent ; if the people were oppressed ; if disorder ensued ; if our peace and prosperity were menaced; if our sensibilities were harassed year after year, then it is quite probable we should have to put an end to it. Spain's rule in Cuba and Portp Rico was inefficient and led to so many evils that we finally ousted her, and were well within our rights in doing so. But we did not oust her because she is of Europe ; nor because she is a monarchy ; nor because she, as a European Power, was a menace to us. We ousted her solely because she was in- competent. We have taken good care to hold in our hands a power over the new Cuba which gives us the right to oust or correct any native misrule that may follow. But as to South America we have declared over and over again that we will not ourselves apply this wholesome rule, and through the Monroe Doctrine we assert that we will not permit any one else to do so. If a new Prussia or Bavaria were set up in Brazil, a new Italy in Argentina, another Holland in Patagonia, a new Brit- tany in Guiana, who can say that the result would constitute a menace to the United States? Would there not then be all the greater reason for perpetual peace between those mother coun- tries and the first power of the western world? Is it not true that the wider the Great Powers spread their people and their trusteeship, the more complex and diffuse becomes their respon- sibility; that the farther they extend their commerce and their capital, the more sure a perpetual world peace? Would not such a European colonization and control in South America make for good to the United States in every way in greater THE MONROE DOCTRINE 235 stability of government, in a higher civilization, in an uplifting of the people now there and great accretion to their numbers, in broadening markets? The Monroe Doctrine had its origin more than three-quar- ters of a century ago. There was justification for it then, but the conditions have wholly changed. There is now no "Holy Alliance" trying to make absolutism and government by divine right dominate the earth. What the Monroe Doctrine was devised to meet has no longer to be met. The Doctrine was a move, and a good one, in the international game of that hour. If we could frighten off the absolutists with a "no trespass" placard, it was a clever thing to -do. But why keep the placard up forever, after the rules and aim of the game have wholly changed ? No other nation has accepted the Monroe Doctrine. As yet, it has never been affirmed by any branch of our government save the executive. True, it is well supported by public opin- ion. But has that public opinion ever paused to analyze it in its modern application? Has it not, rather, placed the Doctrine upon a pedestal and made an idol and a fetich of it, without well comprehending what it signifies? Have not the people fallen down and worshipped it as a sanctified being, and without the slightest conception of whether it is a true or false god, a tower of strength or a sign of weakness? Foreign statesmen marvel that the United States should persist in attempting to force this rule of international relationship upon -them. They have not as yet thought it wise to contest it, but they only await the coming of the hour the occasion when the attitude of the United States is more than usually weak, because without a basis of natural right to stand upon when the incentive to them is sufficiently important to make the contest worth while. It is certain as fate that the world will not go on forever, mute and astonished at our dead-line, but crossing it not. And it is certain, too, that when it is crossed, it will be crossed at its weakest point, and probably with two or three of the Powers moving side by side. What is the United States to do then? It is not pleasant to think of that emergency. If we are in the right, we shall have nothing to fear. But if we are in the wrong and the other Powers will take care to select an instance in which we are in the wrong it may not be so easy to retreat. 236 SELECTED ARTICLES ON One justification for the Monroe Doctrine often urged is that it keeps European Powers out of America, and therefore mini- mizes the danger of friction with them. But it does not keep them out. They are there with their capital, their banks, their commerce, their colonists. Even the Monroe Doctrine does not pretend to reach that extreme of exclusiveness which would en- able the United States to stop South American countries inviting European capital and European people into their territory. If we cannot stop Europeans going there, we cannot presume to con- trol the perfectly natural consequences of their presence. Yet the validity of the Monroe Doctrine may be tested in precisely such an emergency. Suppose German colonists in large numbers settle in some South American country. They gain a numerical majority in a province. They own nine-tenths of the property, pay nine-tenths of the taxes and constitute the wholesome intel- ligent part of the community. Yet they are denied suffrage ; are denied participation in the local government; are ruled by corrupt, oppressive, arrogant natives ; life and property are in- secure ; the colonists appeal to Fatherland for help, and help is sent them ; there is trouble between Germany and the native gov- ernment ; and, when it is over, the Kaiser establishes a colony and gives it the protection of the German flag. The Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to interpose and say this shall not be ; that we will not permit these German colonists to go under the wing of the Fatherland. What right have we to say anything of the sort, and what would be Germany's righteous answer to our interposition? What would be the opinion of the world as to the merits of such a controversy? Should we not be asked where are our interests, our colonists, our capital, the rights of our citi- zens, that give us license to interfere? Let us suppose that Italian colonists are so badly treated in some South American country, and Italy herself so wantonly in- sulted when she attempts to secure redress, that war follows. Surely we have no divine right to prevent Italy exercising her sovereign prerogative of going to war when she has been wronged and flouted. After victory in a costly conflict, Italy may find territory the only available indemnity. We had no right to inter- vene to stop the war; but now the Monroe Doctrine requires us to intervene to deprive Italy of the natural and proper recom- pense for her sacrifices. THE MONROE DOCTRINE 237 Let it be supposed, again, that Scandinavian colonists become the numerical majority in the citizenship of a South American country. On some account, such as threatened troubles with some powerful and warlike neighbors, through plebiscite a majority of the voters of that country elect to attach themselves to Sweden and Norway as a colony, hoping thereby to obtain national se- curity. Sweden and Norway accept the responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine requires the United States to interpose. There may be no Americans or American interests in the colony. The union may be a consummation devoutly to be wished by all friends of peace and progress. It is not aggression that is pro- posed, or seizure by force, but an amicable arrangement. Never- theless, the Monroe Doctrine compels the United States, for con- sistency's sake, to interpose; to say to the colonists they shall not do as they wish with their own ; to say to the Scandinavian governments that their activities, praiseworthy though they are admitted to be, are restrained by our will as expressed by Mr. James Monroe in the year 1823. To such lengths are we led when we adopt as our guide a rule made a long time ago for an emergency then existing but now unknown; a rule which not only commits us to a prescribed line of conduct for ourselves, but to the attempt to prescribe the con- duct of our co-equals. While in our pride and prosperity we go confidently along, following the traditional path marked out in 1823, problems are arising in South America. European emigra- tion, European capital are going thither. Difficulties, friction, complications, exasperations will arise. We expect to have a powerful voice in any political rearrangement of that continent which may ensue ; and it is a vital, a living question whether we are going to speak as of this day, as practical men at the begin- ning of the twentieth century, or whether our voice is to come out of the distant past ; whether we are to permit ourselves to be in- volved in trouble by an effort to maintain an antiquated doctrine which requires that we treat all cases according to a hard and fast rule, or whether we shall put in its place the modern, work- able policy of the free hand which may be expressed in three words, "Primacy, not exclusiveness." No nation now presumes to stake off a large part of the world outside its own sovereignty as reserved for its exclusive activities. If it attempts activity beyond its own boundaries, and beyond the 2 3 S SELECTED ARTICLES ON field where circumstances give it special rights, it does so frankly upon the basis of open rivalry that all have the right to com- pete, and competition must be adjusted on the principle of "give and take." Nearly all the nations have participated in the sub- division of Africa. Nearly all have taken a hand in Asia. The United States has as much right in China as Russia or England, if our policy is such as to send us thither. As Theodore Roose- velt so well said at Minneapolis last September: "The United States must not shrink from playing its part among the great nations. We cannot avoid hereafter having duties to do in the face of other nations." The United States is not shrinking. We have been in China. We are in the great Philippine archipelago with our sovereignty, and we shall build a new nation there, nearly twice as far from our shores as Brazil is from Germany or Italy. We are more or less a factor in what may be called all the world politics of the times. We could not keep out if we would, and we would not if we could. Wherever we go we en- counter no arbitrary dead-lines, no trespassing placards. It is not wholly consistent for us to play the game with a free hand in Europe, in Asia, in the islands of the sea, wherever we wish, and at the same time sit as the dog in the manger in all the great region to the south of us. Century. 87:233-41. December, 1913 Is There a Sound American Foreign Policy? W: Morgan Shuster Conceding perfectly that it was a splendid stroke of diplomacy to frighten land-hungry monarchies away from South and Cen- tral America at a time when that territory was politically un- formed and in a state of chaos, the question remains whether to-day, on impartial analysis, any reason exists for continuing such a stand. The following inquiries should aid in reaching a conclusion : 1. Is the Monroe Doctrine based on any great moral or ethical ground? 2. Is it of any strategical advantage to the United States? 3. Does it cement friendly relations between the United States and other great nations? THE MONROE DOCTRINE 239 4. Does it create friendly political bonds between the United States and the South and Central American countries? 5. Does it aid those countries to maintain stable and en- lightened governments, and thus assure to the world peace, order, and justice within their borders? 6. Does it tend to make those countries keep faith in their financial relations and engagements with the rest of the world? 7. Does it raise American prestige and create respect for the American citizen in those countries? 8. Does it benefit American trade and commerce with those countries or any other place? The answer to every one of these questions must be an em- phatic no, except to the second, to which a modified no may be returned. 1. The United States never assumed moral or ethical grounds in warning Europe against forcible colonization in the western hemisphere. It announced a policy then believed to be one of necessary self-protection. There was no other principle in- volved. The United States, on the contrary, has itself gone into the eastern hemisphere and colonized, with the avowed intention of bettering political and economic conditions. 2. There- is no strategical advantage in keeping European nations out of the western hemisphere, except as to the zone of danger of attack on the Panama Canal, and if the Monroe Doctrine disappeared to-morrow, it would still be the right of the United States to take steps against the gathering of any armed force which might threaten the canal, either on territory now forming independent states or on adjacent colonies already possessed by European nations. There would be no need to in- voke the Monroe Doctrine against any demonstration of that kind, now or at any time in the future. 3. Far from cementing friendly relations, the Monroe Doc- trine is considered by Europe to be an offensive display of Ameri- can arrogance, dictated by motives purely selfish, however futile might be the effort to follow them up. 4. The Monroe Doctrine, and especially certain official in- terpretations which have recently been put on it, is genuinely feared and hated by South Americans, whatever professions may be made by some. I happened to be in Buenos Aires during the summer of 1912 when the news of the Lodge resolution, adopted 240 SELECTED ARTICLES ON by the Senate as a result of the Magdalena Bay discussion, was received. I can testify personally that this officially sanctioned interpretation or extension of the Monroe Doctrine aroused there great indignation against the United States, despite the fact that the Argentine people are naturally and normally most friendly toward Americans. That this resolution produced similar feel- ings in other South American countries was amply confirmed later. 5. That it could never aid the people of any nation, where the temptation to pay personal politics is ever present and strong, to know that they might riot with comparative immunity from punishment, seems self-evident. The whole tendency of such a situation is to foster national irresponsibility. 6. The answer to the fifth question applies equally well to the sixth. The belief that the Monroe Doctrine could be invoked to protect them in the last extremity has steadily encouraged ex- travagance and reckless financial engagements on the part of several Latin-American nations. The appeal made last April by Guatemala that the United States should stand between her and her European creditors is exactly in point. Could there, in fact, be a greater temptation to small nations to be reckless in their dealings with European lenders than to have the United States stand guard over their territorial in- tegrity at all hazards? In addition, the American people thereby virtually undertake the thankless and noisome task of collecting Europe's debts. It is well known that the American Government will go to lengths for European creditors to which it would re- fuse to go for its own citizens. One result of this is that Ameri- can bankers have always been loath to finance any Latin- American business, public or private, unless there was a substantial participation therein by European capital, in order that there might always be, in case of necessity, a club with which to beat the United States Government into more vigorous asser- tion of the lenders' or investors' rights. Could there be a more humiliating position for Americans? Meanwhile the bankers of Europe laugh at our ingenuousness, and give thanks that there is a cheap and ready method of get- ting their Latin-American chestnuts pulled out of the fire. 7. In considering the question of American prestige as af- THE MONROE DOCTRINE 241 fected by the Monroe Doctrine, it must be remembered that one's reputation is always determined, justly or unjustly, by others. Not by its own consciousness of right is the standing of the United States fixed in the eyes of the Latin-American peoples, but by their opinions as to the real motives underlying the Ameri- can political attitude toward them. It is true that the American nation is constantly misrepresented in the western hemisphere, but it is the Monroe Doctrine which gives the handle to those who wish to create suspicion and distrust. In the United States there are already some who expect, and in South and Central America there are many who fear, the coming of a vast American federation, stretching from Alaska to Cape Horn, with every range of climate and production, but with a governing and directing nucleus situate in the north tem- perate zone, represented by appointive executives or elective offi- cials and political agents, as the local situation may indicate, but all subject to the quickening impulses of those in power at Washington. A dream it might be for an Alexander or a Napoleon, but a ludicrous nightmare in this twentieth century. Fortunately, it exists principally in the perfervid imaginations of persons of radical anti-American tendencies ; but even so, it is a theme with which to excite antipathy, a horn on which to blow a call to unite against the feared and hated "imperialists" from the North. 8. There can be no doubt that the feelings of Latin- Ameri- cans toward the Monroe Doctrine do not help American trade and commerce with them, either on sentimental lines or in a practical way. Other things being nearly equal, a business man prefers to deal with those toward whom he feels friendly; in many cases he will even put up with something a little different from what he actually desires in order to do business with a friend. The personal equation plays a specially large part in busi- ness with Latin-America, and to that extent American trade competitors are actually handicapped. Then the effect of the American Government's policy of hesi- tating to assert vigorously purely American financial claims, lest it touch an already irritated spot, is of course to give European bankers and investors an additional advantage in the South American field. 242 SELECTED ARTICLES ON Viewed from every point, therefore, this unique American foreign policy does not stand forth as ethically sound, just, wise, practicable, or expedient. There remain only two other questions : Could it be main- tained, if it should actually be defied? Is it practical to modify or drop it? As to the first question, it must be remembered that the Euro- pean Powers, even Great Britain, have never accepted this policy save at times when it was convenient to tolerate it. It has es- caped serious challenge thus far principally because the Euro- pean nations have been torn by fears and jealousies of one an- other, and this state has served to keep active attention focused nearer home. There is no reason to think, however, that before the dream of universal disarmament comes true, some powerful nation or group of nations will not deliberately deny the United States' vaguely derived, loudly proclaimed, contingent, but ex- clusive, equity in every square mile of territory in the western hemisphere, which, through the partial or complete breaking down of the existing forms of government, may become exposed to intervention and occupation. The world's present distribution of territory and inhabitants cannot last forever. The rapidly increasing population of certain European and Asiatic nations, the additional room which will be absolutely required by them, the growing trade and increasing interests of Europe in South America, the ever-present land- hunger all these factors, in the face of the vast stretches of a rich undeveloped and sparsely settled continent, will inevitably bring it about that hitherto rival nations will recognize their common welfare, call a truce among themselves, and test this vague suzerainty of the United States at some convenient time and place. Pretexts for aggressive action will never be lacking. When the day of trial approaches, the American people will receive scant warning. Ex-President Roosevelt recognized this when he said, "The Doctrine will be respected as long as we have a first-class, efficient navy not very much longer." But did he mean a navy strong enough to defeat England's, or Germany's, or the English and French fleets combined? Our national hat is already in the ring. When a serious move is made to kick it out, the American people will be suddenly faced by the most tremendous crisis in their history. There will be THE MONROE DOCTRINE 243 only two alternatives : to fight an appalling war, probably against overwhelming odds ; or to retire under pressure in national humiliation. It is useless to claim that the United States could count on England for aid. She has made her alliances based on what are deemed her imperative geographical and political necessities. To her, in this matter, the United States is a formidable trade rival pursuing a somewhat fatuous political course. Despite the higher instincts of man's intellectual side, love of peace and justice, abhorrence of war's cruelty and suffering, the attitude of any large number of people gathered into a nation has always been principally, if not conspicuously, influenced by purely material considerations. For example, England dared to make no small part of the world her empire because of her geographical isolation, her im- munity to attack by land. This powerful sense of security at home had much to do with shaping her policies. France, on the other hand, though exposed on every side by land and sea, plays her important part through faith in her wealth and in the en- forced assistance of England should she ever again be seriously threatened with invasion. Germany is similarly exposed to at- tack, and, if anything, more so than France. Her coasts are within easy striking distance of England's superior navy; her frontiers are menaced on one side by the French army and on the other by Russia's formidable forces. Only southward may she look for some respite from the strain of constant preparedness. Germany has been so occupied in knitting herself together and insuring continued existence as an empire that she has had little time to acquire important colonies. Russia lies like a colossus across northern Europe and Asia, protected, except from attack by Germany and Austria, by climatic conditions and the nature of her frontiers. She easily holds her western boundaries against Europe while extending her flag and influence eastward over Asia until she touches Japanese interests in the north or threatens India in the south. Italy's passive attitude in European affairs is largely due to her exposed position on the Mediterranean. With regard to the United States, her mainland territory is fortunately several thousand miles from the natural military and naval bases of the European Powers. This was her great safe- guard in the early days of the republic, and it has never ceased 244 SELECTED ARTICLES ON to be. Virtually free by nature from serious danger of land invasion, she has grown to be a world Power through prolonged peace and industry, with little of the strain and drain entailed by the maintenance of immense military establishments such as have economically weakened Europe. But this gracious isolation ceases to aid the American flag and prestige when the United States indulges in irritating challenges, which, if accepted, would necessitate the issue being decided far beyond her own coasts. Off Sandy Hook or the Panama Canal, the American fleet may be doubly efficient, with shore bat- teries behind it and harbors and supplies within easy reach. But what becomes of this advantage of geographical isolation from European naval bases if a hostile fleet shall defy the Monroe Doctrine off Rio de Janeiro or Curityba or at Montevideo? Has the United States in such case any strategical advantage at all? In other words, is the American navy capable of defending against attack by one or more great world Powers not only the Atlantic, Pacific, and gulf coast-lines of the United States, but the immense coast-line of another vast continent? The question may well cause reflection to the most ardent jingo. Unless the American people are determined on building and maintaining an absolutely commanding fleet, the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine under modern conditions becomes somewhat blatant. To understand better how the nations of Europe regard it, let us suppose that just before the Spanish -American War was declared, and while Spain was endeavoring to subdue the Filipino rebellion, it had occurred to Japan to proclaim her aversion to the taking of the Philippine Islands by any other western power. Is there any doubt as to the way that the United States would have regarded such a declaration? It would be prudent for the American people to study carefully and analyze a foreign policy which is a constant menace to their pride and tranquillity; which exacts care, risk, responsibility, and expenditure from its sponsor, and renders up only shadowy ad- vantages. Common sense and political strategy unite in de- manding that the false and unnecessary features of the Monroe Doctrine be abandoned before some sudden shift in the world's political balance may compel it. Otherwise red danger looms THE MONROE DOCTRINE 245 large for the United States the day when some great Powers compose their fancied difficulties and forget old^animosities. There always remains, of course, the question how the United States could modify or withdraw from certain features and corol- laries of the Monroe Doctrine without appearing either to show weakness or to invite and sanction hostile aggression against Latin- American countries. The problem is a complicated one ; but if the American people once became convinced that a change of policy should be had, the means and the opportunity for a President to make a "new interpretation" would not be hard to discover. It should be possible to make plain to our fellow-Americans to the south that while the United States desires to build up and maintain with them the most intimate and cordial political and trade relations, based on genuine friendship and mutual confi- dence and respect, it should be clearly understood that the United States recognizes the most complete sovereignty and freedom of action on the part of all existing independent nations in the western hemisphere, including both their privileges and their liabilities according to the law of nations, but that because of propinquity and similarities in institutions and forms of govern- ment, the United States has an inherent special interest in any dispute, controversy, or change of sovereignty in which any American nation or portion thereof might become involved, and therefore expects that interest to be considered in any settle- ment which might be made of, or any consequences which might arise from, any such dispute, controversy, or change. The question of how a change may be brought about in the eyes of the world, and particularly with the Latin- American nations, regarding the real attitude of the United States in its foreign relations and line of conduct may well engage the serious attention of all thinking Americans. It is a duty which should not be evaded because of its difficulty or the obscurity which surrounds the exact degree of harm resulting or danger threat- ening from the actual state of affairs. Even in acting upon the Monroe Doctrine itself the United States has not appeared to be entirely consistent. The alacrity with which American marines were poured into Nicaragua, a tiny nation, contrasted with the indecision which has been plainly 246 SELECTED ARTICLES ON and not unnaturally, shown regarding a somewhat similar condi- tion of affairs in a neighboring country of much greater resisting powers, must inevitably make even the one American foreign policy smack somewhat of opportunism in unbiased foreign eyes. Is it not wise to reshape a policy to meet greatly changed con- ditions while it is still intact and even unthreatened ? Fortnightly Review. 70: 1013-26. December, 1901 Some Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. Sydney Brooks If Americans could only for a little while free themselves from the bondage to rhetoric and sentiment, and collect them- selves for the effort of seeing things as they are, they would, I believe, recognise that to abandon the Monroe Doctrine would entail as little harm to their political and material interests as to their moral. In their present condition they either cannot or will not see, at any rate they do not acknowledge, what are the obvious effects of their cherished policy on South America. The Monroe Doctrine perpetuates in South America the predominance of a religion which Americans detest, of a race which they de- sjpise, andTof a system of government which in all but the name is a flat negation of everything America stands for. It rules out Teutonic civilisation in favour of the religious and military dispositions beyond which, after eighty years' trial, the Spanish and Portuguese mestizos have proved their incapacity to advance. In the name of Republicanism it condemns a whole continent to weakness, backwardness, and anarchy. It precludes all moral progress as decisively as it hampers material development; it blocks the way to all that might make South America stable and prosperous, that might open up what are perhaps the richest untapped markets in the world, that might stimulate the Ameri- cans themselves by contact with neighbours on their own level. On almost every page of Professor A. H. Keane's "Central and South America," though the Monroe Doctrine is never mentioned, one finds the traces of its blighting influence. Here is a colossal continent with a destiny that should rival Russia's, magnificently watered, inhabitated by Caucasians, all of it sparsely populated and much of it barely explored, teeming with mineral and agri- cultural wealth, and yet lying half -derelict, the prey of revolu- THE MONROE DOCTRINE 247 tionary turbulence and all for lack of a strong government that would ensure to capital the fruits of its enterprise. As things are, there appears to be nothing in front of South America but a cycle of revolutions. The hope of a stable, orderly rule ever being evolved under the presidency of half-caste attor- neys and guerilla chieftains is one that, after the experience of the last eighty years, no one entertains. From Patagonia to Pan- ama there broods over the continent the spirit of insecurity, disorder, and insurrectionary violence. There is no real guaran- tee, except perhaps in the case of Chili and Argentina, that what is now happening in Colombia and Venezuela may not to-morrow be the fate of any and every South American state. Such a guar- antee can only be forthcoming under a firm, well-established and responsible government, and no such government is possible un- less and until either the United States or some European Power takes the matter in hand. But the Americans, at all events for the present, have no intention of expanding southwards. They do not colonise South America themselves ; they are not reserving it for any private schemes of aggrandizement; they barely even trade with it. Such benefit as they derive from warning-off Eu- rope from South America is altogether indirect, and this again differentiates Pan-Americanism from such an honestly self-seek- ing and tangible movement as Pan-Germanism. When Americans drop declamation on the subject and condescend to argument, their reasoning runs substantially as follows : "It is to our inter- ests to keep South America impotent and in a restless state of anarchy because only so can we maintain the hegemony of the American continent without trouble or expense to ourselves. Under existing conditions our position is invulnerable ; nobody can conquer America, and we are consequently spared the burden of huge armaments and their inevitable drain on the productive energy of the people. But once admit that European Powers have the right to absorb South America at will, and the whole situation is changed: We should then be no longer the sovereign of the new world; our 'fiat' would be 'law' only within the precise confines of the United States, and the national prestige and authority would be proportionately diminished. More than that. By allowing our rivals in peace and our possible enemies in war to establish themselves at our very doors, we provide them gratui- tously with a jumping-off ground from which they may be 248 SELECTED ARTICLES ON tempted to spring at our throat, and we lay upon ourselves the necessity of guarding against their encroachments by shouldering the dead-weight of militarism, to our long and happy exemption from which the nation owes much of its prosperity." To decide how far these arguments are sound and how far illusions, it is almost enough just to glance at the map. The United States is already girdled on three sides with a chain of foreign holdings, one of them all but as large as herself with a contiguous boundary line of over 3,000 miles. Yet no American considers that Canada, or Great Britain through Canada, is in any way a menace to the security of the United States. If through all these years the possession of Canada, Newfoundland, Ber- muda, Jamaica, the Lesser Antilles, Trinidad, Belize and British Guiana by Great Britain ; of Guadeloupe and its dependencies, Martinique, St. Pierre and Miquelon and French Guiana by France; of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz by Denmark, and of Dutch Guiana by Holland has been found compatible with the maintenance by Americans of a regular army of 21,000 men and of a navy third or fourth rate in size whatever it may be in quality, with what force can it be argued that the acquisition, let us say, of a portion of Brazil by Germany, 3,000 miles at least from American territory, would endanger the United States or necessitate the addition of a single man or a single ship to the national defences ? The very conditions which Americans picture to themselves as a calamity to be warded off at any cost, do as a matter of fact, and in all their essentials exist at this moment without causing them the slightest anxiety. That is to say, the country is, and has been for a hundred years, "threatene'd" by a score of fortified positions and naval stations held by foreign powers almost within sight of the American coast. And if these, in spite of the manifest fitness of many of them as bases of operations, can be regarded without uneasiness, can be held guiltless of harbouring any peril to the United States, wherein would lurk the danger of the annexation by a European Power of Patagonia or Uruguay? One may even go further, and con- ceive the whole of South America proper, from the Bay of Panama to Cape Horn, partitioned among the Governments of Europe without being able to say where or how the safety of the United States would be jeopardised. The invulnerability of America would be no less complete then than now, her power THE MONROE DOCTRINE 249 would be just as great, her resources in no ways diminish, her frontiers as much or as little exposed as they are to-day. It can, I believe, be shown that even the danger of a conflict would be lessened, and that Europe's anxiety to keep the peace with America would be considerably more pronounced than one can pretend it to be at this moment. For however much the various Powers might quarrel among themselves in South America, they would all be at one in desiring the friendship of their mighty neighbour to the north. Self-interest would constrain them with a compelling force there could be no escaping, not to risk their colonies by provoking a conflict with the Usited States ; and the possibility of an anti- American coalition with which Americans torture their imaginations, should they abandon the Monroe Doc- trine, is the veriest bugaboo. But it is said that American pres- tige would be damaged. Would it? The prestige, if one can call it such, that the Monroe Doctrine confers upon the United States, is that of the dog in -the manger simply. It produces in Europe nothing but exasperation, enmity and a maddening desire, which one of these days will be uncontrollable, to combine for a de- cisive rush; and even among the South American states them- selves it has aroused a suspicious resentment which its occasional usefulness as a diplomatic cloak has by no means allayed. Among the many hallucinations which surround the Monroe Doctrine, none has been more curious than the belief which Americans held quite seriously up to a year or two ago, that it was a sort of self-acting barrier against European "aggression," and had only to be advertised as such to be automatically effective. The idea that they might one day be called upon to fight for it has only j ust occurred to them ; but, having occurred to them, they at once and with remarkable intensity begin the building of a powerful fleet. This, to be sure, is only common-sense, but it carries with it an inference which Americans should lose no time in digesting. The Monroe Doctrine, instead of being a protection against "the burden of militarism," invites it. Whether the appearance of Europe on South American soil would entail on the United States any considerable addition to her fighting strength is at least ex- tremely arguable. What is clear is that to make the Doctrine effective Americans must ultimately be prepared to face one, and possibly more than one, of the strongest Powers of the old world. They cannot issue a challenge to all Europe without the 250 SELECTED ARTICLES ON force, if necessary, to oppose all Europe ; and the lowest standard of naval strength which the Monroe Doctrine imposes upon them is that which regulates the policy of the British Admiralty. They must, that is, build and equip a fleet that shall be more than equal to the strongest combination that any two Powers can bring against them. This, of course, is not a very formidable under- taking to a country of the wealth and resources of the United States, a country which light-heartedly pays out every year on padded and fraudulent pension claims more than any nation on earth expends on its fleet. But it altogether does away with the convenient fallacy that the Monroe Doctrine is an insurance against large armaments. In their anxiety to avoid a problemati- cal increase, which at the worst would be a small one, in their war strength, Americans, without quite realising it, are incurring the certain liabilities of what may prove the naval supremacy of the world, of what must at all events be a colossal fleet. So far as "militarism" goes, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine seems likely to affect America as the retention of Alsace-Lor- raine has affected Europe. There seems to be an idea in England that the devotion of Americans to the Monroe Doctrine has been somewhat weakened by the Spanish War, and that having interfered so decisively in the affairs of the old world, they now feel it to be logically impossible to resist the claims of Europe to have a voice in South American destinies. I do not believe the idea is at all a correct one, or that the Spanish War has had anything but a pre- cisely contrary effect. It has whetted the appetite for land, has confirmed the American sense of invincibility, and has turned out such a pleasant prelude to the drama of expansion, that if to- morrow the freedom of transit across the Isthmus of Panama were to be threatened by the Venezuelan revolutionists, President Roosevelt would have the whole country behind him in settling the Central American problem by annexation. Moreover, one has to remember that the Monroe Doctrine wears only such aspects as Americans care to give it, and that it is they, and not Europe, who determine the construction to be put upon it. It has, in consequence, the virtue of a most complaisant elasticity, and I honestly do not know of anything in the remotest degree touching upon South America that it could not be stretched to cover. Long before the Spanish War it was appealed to to THE MONROE DOCTRINE 251 justify the seizure of Cuba on the ground that if America did not take it somebody else would. The Southern slave-holders, whose political influence depended on the extension of slavery to fresh states, used it as a pretext for the annexation of Texas; and General Grant sought to prove that it made the absorption of San Domingo inevitable. The Monroe Doctrine even provided the basis of a protest against the confederation of the Canadian provinces. Perhaps its most amazing distortion is to be found in a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, issued in 1898, just when the Cuban question was nearing its crisis: "We cannot consent upon any conditions that the depopulated portions of Cuba shall be recolonised by Spain any more than she should be allowed to found a new colony in any part of this hemisphere or islands thereof." On the other hand, it has several times been overlooked when precedent would have seemed to demand its employment. It is a fact, for instance, that the French were turned out of Mexico without the Monroe Doctrine being once mentioned in official despatches. It is somewhat difficult, there- fore, to say at any given moment what the Doctrine involves or precisely represents. Mr. Olney, for instance, in the notorious despatches to which I have already referred, declares that "it does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states," but further on he announces that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposi- tion." How these two statements are to be reconciled is by no means obvious. "It does not," he goes on, "relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor pre- vent any European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligations, or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them." But here, again, every one knows, though Mr. Olney does not state it, that the "merited punishment" inflicted must be such as the United States approves, and must never take the form of permanent seizure of the offending state's territory. "It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state, or in the relations between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state, or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure." I imagine the 252 SELECTED ARTICLES ON time may come when the words I have italicised will be quoted against the United States Government with uncomfortable apt- ness ; for it is quite conceivable that some day or other the Ger- mans in Brazil or the Italians in Argentina may voluntarily enroll themselves as self-governing colonies under the flag of the Motherland. In which case, no doubt Mr. Olney's unfortunate admission will be quietly dropped, and some American statesman of, say,- 1950, will succeed in proving that the new contingency comes entirely within the category of forbidden things. A cer- tain Mr. Howard, of Texas, speaking in Congress nearly fifty years ago, was rash enough to say that the Monroe Doctrine did not mean "that every settlement upon any sand-bank on this continent is an offence which is to result in war." One gives, perhaps, the best rough-and-ready definition of its scope by say- ing that to the American of to-day that is just what it does mean. It is very doubtful whether, at this stage of the world's his- tory, it is possible for one nation permanently to exclude all other nations from a country which she herself refuses to con- trol or accept any responsibility for. And that is exactly the position into which the Monroe Doctrine forces the United States. The Americans admit no liability whatever for the outrages, dis- orders, and financial crookedness of the half-caste republics under their patronage. It is not their behaviour to Europe, but Europe's behaviour towards them that the United States claims the right to supervise. If any European Power were to claim a similar irresponsible suzerainty over even the most worthless region in Africa, it would be instantaneously challenged; and it is altogether too much to expect that the Monroe Doctrine, which takes upon itself to dispose of the one valuable domain still left open on this rapidly dwindling planet, should not eventually be brought to a decisive test. It seems part of the inevitable evolu- tion of things that an over-crowded Europe, ceaselessly endeav- ouring to lower the social pressure by emigration, and to carve out by conquest or annexation exclusive reserves for traders, should one day fling itself upon South America as it already has upon Africa and China. It is possible to imagine a score of incidents that might call for European intervention in the near future; for South America is a land of sporadic unrest, and one knows how conveniently apt the property of the citizens of a country that is bent on expansion is to get damaged and to need THE MONROE DOCTRINE 253 protection whenever there is the slightest disorder. Whether by accident or design, or as the result of the steady ousting of the mestizo adventurers from authority by the foreign settlers, the United States seems destined to be faced with these alterna- tives : to fight and keep South America as it is, to "Egyptize" the great continent on her southern borders, or to submit to seeing it parcelled out among the nations of Europe. I cannot doubt what will be the choice of America. Dominated by tradi- tion and sentiment, and carried away by the national conviction that anything that touches -the American continent must affect the fraction of it which she occupies, she will elect to fight. She will act as she was ready to act at the time of the Venezuelan affair, when, be it never forgotten, she was prepared to plunge Anglo- Saxondom into war and risk a hundred million pounds' worth of trade sooner than see a strip of territory, eighteen hundred miles from her southernmost boundary, pass from the control of half-caste revolutionists into British hands. When- ever the issue is raised again I believe her course will be the same. Once more she will espouse the lower civilisation against the higher, will support a system for which she has no moral or in- tellectual sympathy against a system all but identical with her own, and will stand with all her power in the path of those reno- vating influences that can alone redeem South America. No con- sideration of national safety, as I have tried to argue, really counsels such a course, and material interests are all against it. It will nevertheless be adopted, unless what under the conditions of American politics it is vain to hope for there should be a sud- den accession of Geist, a wider outlook among tHe leaders, and a campaign of education to free this momentous question from its entangling alliance with sophistry and passion. A recent writer declares the Monroe Doctrine to be simply the principle of self-protection under a concrete name. It may have been so once, but the developments of the last eighty years appear to have changed it into an infringement of the sovereign rights of other nations, far greater in its scope than any warranted by simple self-preservation. Self-preservation, for example, may, and as some think will, make it necessary for the United States to extend her authority over Mexico and the Isthmus of Panama; but by no possible stretch of reasoning can it be held to justify the policy that would make of all South America a terra clausa. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. JAw " ~35T ntuiY RECTO 2Mar'64CQ REC'D DEAD 21A-50m-4,'60 General Library University of California 06556 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY