LOED LYTTON'S 
 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
T^HE HISTORY of LORD LYTTON'S 
 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, 1876 
 to 1880: compiled from Letters and 
 Official Papers. 
 
 Lady Betty Balfour 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
 
 NEW YORK AND BOMBAY 
 
 1899 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
>^ 
 
 "7 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration 
 has been drawn up in compliance, as far as circum- 
 stances permitted, with the instructions in my father's 
 will, which were as follows : ' I request my wife to 
 endeavour to obtain the assistance of some statesman 
 or writer, in whose ability and character she has 
 confidence, for the production of a complete record 
 of my Indian Administration.' With this request at 
 heart my mother first turned to Sir John Strachey, 
 my father's colleague and most loyal friend, who 
 responded to her appeal with cordial zeal. Into his 
 hands were placed all the private and official docu- 
 ments of Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, and no man 
 was more highly qualified to deal with them than 
 he. Unfortunately, illness interrupted his fulfilment 
 of this task, and his medical advisers forbade his 
 undertaking any arduous work. His assistance, 
 however, in the preparation of this book has been 
 invaluable. The first chapters owe much to his 
 pen, and his advice throughout has been continually 
 sought, and ungrudgingly given. 
 
 The materials collected and preserved by my 
 father in connection with his work in India were so 
 
 226348 
 
vi LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 ample, liis letters, both private and official, so 
 detailed and consecutive, as to form in themselves an 
 almost complete record of his administration. When 
 Sir John Strachey was obliged to relinquish the task 
 of writing the history, it seemed best to make such 
 selections from these documents, and so to connect 
 them in chronological order, as to constitute a 
 narrative in Lord Lytton's own words of the events 
 with which he was concerned. At my mother's re- 
 quest I undertook to carry out this scheme. Where 
 letters, minutes, and despatches required to be 
 supplemented it was possible to supply the con- 
 necting links from the official records at the India 
 Office, of which free use has been made. 
 
 When the preliminary work was accomphshed of 
 sifting the materials and selecting the portions which 
 seemed most adequately to tell the story, I sought 
 the assistance of several of my father's colleagues 
 in the Indian Government in whom I knew he 
 had placed confidence, and for whom he felt a 
 personal friendship. From all those to whom I 
 appealed I have received the most generous and 
 effective help, not only in the way of advice and 
 criticism, but also of substantive contribution. 
 
 Sir Alfred Lyall has given me leave to quote from 
 his published writings on the events detailed in this 
 book, and in those chapters which relate to my 
 father's frontier policy and negotiations with Afghan- 
 istan I have had the benefit of his intimate knowledge 
 of all the circumstances. 
 
 To Sir Charles Elliott and Sir Stuart Bayley I owe 
 
PREFACE VU 
 
 the three chapters on Internal Administration, and 
 material assistance in the chapter dealing with the 
 famine of 1877. 
 
 My gratitude to those who have thus helped me 
 may be best expressed by the conviction that but 
 for them the present work would never have been 
 published, and that it owes to them whatever may 
 be of value in the book apart from my father's own 
 writings. 
 
 The narrative is presented to the public as a con- 
 tribution rather to history than biography. It does 
 not deal with my father's personal life in India, but 
 with his opinions and acts with regard to the public 
 questions which came before him during the years 
 in which he held the greatest post in the service of 
 the Crown that can fall to an Englishman. 
 
 On the other hand, the method adopted in pre- 
 senting the narrative necessarily tends to emphasize 
 the aspects of it which are personal to Lord Lytton, 
 and may possibly seem in a measure to subordinate 
 the part played by others. I think it only right, 
 therefore, to say that nothing could be more foreign 
 to his wishes and feelings. His language, by letters 
 and word of mouth, always abounded in expressions 
 of admiration for those who shared with him the 
 responsibilities and labours of ofl&ce, and his gratitude 
 kept pace with his praise. 
 
 I trust it will be acknowledged that the impartial 
 tone of this book has been studiously preserved, in 
 the earnest desire not to revive the virulent party 
 bitterness which perverted so much of the criticism on 
 
viu LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Lord Lytton's polic}'' eighteen years ago, and which to 
 this day has prevented it from receiving any measure 
 of fair play. The present narrative gives to the 
 pubUc, for the first time, the true, inner history of an 
 administration which has been greatly criticised, yet 
 little understood. It is hoped that a knowledge 
 of the authentic facts may lead to a calm and just 
 appreciation of an Englishman who, as he always 
 regarded above all other objects the welfare of his 
 country, devoted to that end in his various offices 
 the services of his whole working life. 
 
 BETTY BALFOUR 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 II. PREPARATIONS FOR INDIA. JOURNEY THITHER 
 FIRST NEGOTIATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 III. TREATY WITH THE KHAN OP KHELAT . 
 
 IV. DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 
 
 V. PESHAWUR CONFERENCE AND FRONTIER NEGOTIA 
 TIONS OF 1877 ...... 
 
 VI. FAMINE OF 1877 ....... 
 
 VII. RUSSIAN MISSION TO KABUL. WAR OF 1878. FLIGHT 
 OF SHER ALI 
 
 VIII. HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 
 KABUL MASSACRE. WAR OF 1879 
 
 IX. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN. CHANGE OF 
 ENGLISH MINISTRY. CONCLUSION 
 
 X. INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. FINANCE 
 
 XI. VERNACULAR PRESS BILL .... 
 
 XII. INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 INDEX 
 
 25 
 
 94 
 
 106 
 
 134 
 
 189 
 
 240 
 
 310 
 
 426 
 461 
 502 
 527 
 537 
 
LOED LYTTON'S 
 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION 
 
 CHAPTEE I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The most important public post ever held by Lord 
 Lytton was offered to him at a time when he was 
 contemplating the immediate close of his official 
 career. He was then only forty- four years of age, but 
 having two years previously succeeded, on the death 
 of his father, to the title and family estate, his longing 
 desire was to retire from public life, and devote the 
 remainder of his da3'S to the exclusive pursuit of 
 literature and his home duties. In the spring of 
 1875 he had been appointed Minister of Legation 
 at Lisbon, and this he intended to be his last 
 diplomatic post. 
 
 The Governorship of Madras had been offered 
 to him early in this year ; this he had refused after 
 consulting his medical adviser, who solemnly assured 
 him that the constitutional delicacy from which he 
 suffered was of a kind to be specially aggravated and 
 increased by the climate and work in India, and that 
 he could not with safety accept such a post. 
 
 On November 23, 1875, he received the following 
 letter from the Prime Minister : 
 
 > < 
 
2 LOUD Li^TTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Mr. Disraeli to Lord Lytton 
 
 ' 2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W. : November 23, 1875. 
 
 ' My dear Lytton, — Lord Nortlibrook has resigned 
 the Viceroyalty of India, for purely domestic reasons, 
 and will return to England in the spring. 
 
 ' If you be willing, I will submit your name to the 
 Queen as his successor. The critical state of affairs 
 in Central Asia demands a statesman, and I believe 
 if you will accept this high post you will have an 
 opportunity, not only of serving your country, but 
 of obtaining an enduring fame. 
 
 ' Yours sincerel}^, 
 
 ' B. Disraeli.' 
 
 To this letter Lord Lytton replied : 
 Lord Lytton to Mr. Disraeli 
 
 ' Lisbon : December 1, 1875. 
 
 'My dear Mr. Disraeli, — No man was ever so 
 greatly or surprisingly honoured as I am by your 
 splendid offer, nor could any man possibly feel 
 prouder than I do of an honour so unprecedented, or 
 more deeply anxious to deserve it. 
 
 ' But I should ill requite your generous confidence 
 were I to accept the magnificent and supremely im- 
 portant post for which you are willing to recommend 
 me to the Queen, without first submitting to your 
 most serious consideration a circumstance which 
 cannot be already known to you, and in which you 
 will probably recognise a paramount disqualifica- 
 tion.' 
 
 He then went on to explain that the condition of 
 his health would, he feared, at times render him 
 incapable of prolonged mental labour coupled with 
 
1875 INTEODUCTION 3 
 
 anxiety, and, at any rate, prevent liim from count- 
 ing on the enjoyment of that physical soundness 
 and strength which might otherwise have helped 
 to counteract his inexperience of all administrative 
 business and his ignorance at the outset of Indian 
 affairs. This consideration he urged not upon private 
 but upon public grounds : ' I assure you most 
 earnestly,' he wrote, ' that if, with the certainty of 
 leaving my life behind me in India, I had a reasonable 
 chance of also leaving there a reputation comparable 
 to Lord Mayo's, I would still without a moment's 
 hesitation embrace the high destiny you place within 
 my grasp. But the gratitude, industry, and will 
 which must help me to compensate all my other 
 deficiencies afford no guarantee against this physical 
 difficulty. I am persuaded that you will not mis- 
 understand the hesitation and anxiety it causes me. 
 ... If there be reasons unknown to me which, 
 upon purely public grounds (the only ones I would 
 ask you to consider), still dispose you to incur such 
 a risk, an intimation from you to that effect will 
 relieve me from all hesitation. In that case, and 
 in that case only, I shall regard your letter, not as 
 an offer which I can decline, compatibly with my 
 intense appreciation of the undeserved honour it 
 involves, but as a high and glorious command, which 
 it would be a dereliction of duty to disobey.' 
 
 The answer to this letter was telegraphed on 
 December 20 : 
 
 Mr. Disraeli to Lord Lytton 
 
 ' Hatfield : December 20, 1875. 
 
 'We have carefully considered your letter, and 
 have not changed our opinion. We regard the 
 matter as settled.' 
 
 B 2 
 
4 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 On January 7, 1876, Lord Salisbury, then Secre- 
 tary of State for India, telegraphed to Lord Lytton : 
 
 'Announcement of your appointment has been 
 officially made and well received. Very important 
 that you should come home soon, as many pre- 
 parations to be made and much business to be trans- 
 acted.' 
 
 Lord Lytton prepared to leave Lisbon at once, 
 and was in England by the end of January. His 
 wife and children followed him as soon as possible, 
 and he undertook to sail for Lidia by March 20. 
 
 Writing to an intimate friend on the eve of his 
 departure from Portugal, he said : ' I have the 
 courage of the coward in front of battle, and shall 
 march on with an unflinching step.' The decision 
 he had taken was one, he knew, which involved the 
 temporary farewell to all that was most cherished 
 and pleasant in the life he had laid out for himself; 
 but whatever the fate now before him, he could face 
 it with the knowledge that he had neither rashly 
 courted nor selfishly shirked it. Li the first year 
 and a half of his sojourn in India few could know 
 or understand the extent of the physical misery which 
 he endured. But the breakdown which he had 
 dreaded never came, and the often ailing condition 
 of his health was not allowed to interrupt or inter- 
 fere with the work he had undertaken. From the 
 moment that he accepted the appointment he set 
 himself to grapple with the subjects with which 
 in the future he would have to deal. He began, as 
 he expressed himself to a friend, ' knowing nothing 
 of India except its myths.' Shortly after his arrival 
 in England, after holdini? interviews with his friends 
 of the Cabinet, Mr. Disraeh, Lord Sahsbury, and 
 Lord Carnarvon, he writes : ' The work is over- 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 whelming, and most puzzling and strange to me, but 
 intensely interesting.' 
 
 Before entering upon the narrative of Lord 
 Lytton's Indian administration it is necessary to give 
 some account of the situation, especially with regard 
 to the foreign policy of the Indian Government and 
 its relations with the frontier State of Afghanistan, 
 such as it was left by Lord Northbrook on his 
 retirement. 
 
 The importance of keeping Eussia at a distance summary of 
 from the North- West Frontier of India, by estabhsh- 'IdhlgLord 
 ing barriers against the advance of her power and the Northbrook's 
 spread of her influence, has been recognised by suc- 
 cessive Indian governments ever since the beginning 
 of the century. It is only with regard to the 
 proper methods and measures for attaining these 
 objects that opinions have differed. The gradual 
 growth and recent development of two distinct 
 schools, representing two different policies advocated 
 for dealing with affairs beyond our frontier, have 
 been recently summarised by Sir Alfred Lyall in the 
 following terms : 
 
 ' Up to the era of the Napoleonic wars, and so 
 long as India was only accessible from Europe by 
 sea, the continental politics of Asia gave the English 
 in India very little concern. The limits of our pos- 
 sessions were still far distant from the natural or 
 geographical boundaries of the country over which 
 our dominion was gradually expanding. But from 
 the beginning of this century, when it became known 
 that Napoleon was seriously entertaining the project 
 of an expedition by land against British India, the 
 project of fortifying ourselves against any such 
 invasion from the north-west by a system of alliances 
 with the Asiatic powers beyond the Indus and the 
 
6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical Afghan mountains occupied successive Governors- 
 Summary General. The first Afghan War was a rash and 
 premature attempt to carry out this system. The 
 disastrous result cooled for many years the ardour 
 of the party who insisted on the paramount necessity 
 of establishing, by friendly means if possible, other- 
 wise by the display of armed superiority, our influence 
 over the rough, recalcitrant, hberty-loving people of 
 Afghanistan. Ten years later, when the English had 
 crossed the Indus and the Eussians were hovering 
 about the Oxus, the prospect of a rapid approxima- 
 tion of the two rival empires grew much more 
 distinct. But within India we had then much on our 
 hands. Nor was it until the country had been finally 
 pacified after the Sepoy Mutiny that the question of 
 barring the further advance of Eussia again took 
 shape, and prominence. The policy of setting up 
 barriers against a powerful neighbour is well known 
 in Europe ; it consists in establishing a preponderant 
 diplomatic influence over intervening kingdoms, and 
 in placing the weaker States or petty princes under a 
 protectorate, or admitting them to an arrangement 
 for the common defence. That this system is sound, 
 and peculiarly applicable to Afghanistan and the 
 minor chiefships beyond our north-western frontier, 
 has never been seriously disputed ; and the long con- 
 troversy (which is at this moment in full vigour) has 
 always turned entirely upon ways and means of 
 pursuing objects that are generally admitted to be 
 desirable. One party has declared confidentl}^ in 
 favour of active overtures to the tribes and rulers 
 beyond our borders ; of pressing upon them friendly 
 intercourse ; of securing the contact of their external 
 relations ; of inducing them to receive missions, to 
 enter into co-operative alliances, to acknowledge our 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 protection, and to admit British Eesidents, and British Historical 
 Agents. No time is to be lost, and no efforts spared, ^""^"^^"^y 
 in the resolute employment of all those devices 
 whereby civilised powers have, since the days of the 
 Eomans, gradually imposed their supremacy upon 
 barbarous neighbours. 
 
 ' The other party has never denied the expediency 
 or possible necessity of these measures. But whereas 
 on the one side there has been a constant demand for 
 the speedy execution of the policy, for distinct steps 
 forward to be taken without delay, for urgent over- 
 tures to Afghan Amirs, for operating by pressure 
 where persuasion seemed to work too slowly, for 
 intimating to suspicious chiefs that when friendly 
 offers were rejected there might be force in reserve, 
 on the other side these demands were opposed by 
 politicians of the more cautious school as hasty and 
 undeniably hazardous. " Your conciliatory advances," 
 they argued, " must be expected to fail among jealous 
 and intractable folk who only wish to be left alone, 
 and who know as well as you do that protection means 
 supremacy in disguise, and that intercourse with the 
 English spells intervention. So that the rejection of 
 your friendl}^ overtures will most probably become 
 merely the formalities preliminary to some masterful 
 action which will damage your popularity, and will 
 entangle you in new responsibilities, military and 
 political, still further beyond your ever-moving 
 frontiers. If we really desire so to gain the con- 
 fidence of the Afghans that they may in an emergency 
 stand by us and against our enemies, we must abstain 
 from forcing our friendship upon them, though our 
 relations with them ought to be civil and neighbourly. 
 And the surest way of preventing any misunderstand- 
 ing of our intentions is to keep within our own 
 
8 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. i 
 
 Historical borders until we have just and necessary cause for a 
 unimary movement across them, or until the force of circum- 
 stances leads an Afghan ruler to seek or willingly 
 accept our assistance." ' ^ 
 
 The attitude last described has grown to be as- 
 sociated with the name of Lawrence. The opposite 
 one has been represented with more or less difference 
 by all those ranking themselves on the side of the 
 Forward Policy. With the inauguration of this 
 policy Lord Lytton's name must ever be associated, 
 and despite the violent opposition it excited in his 
 time, it is the policy which has since been almost 
 continuously pursued by his successors. 
 
 It is one of tlie purposes of this book to set forth 
 Lord Lytton's own defence of this policy ; the policy 
 of masterly inactivity having in his judgment failed 
 to achieve the objects at which it aimed. 
 
 The following historical summary of the events 
 which led to the situation in 1876 is given almost 
 entirely in Lord Lytton's own words, taken from 
 private notes written in the year 1880. 
 
 All schools of frontier policy are alike agreed 
 that Eussian influence should be excluded from 
 Afghanistan at any cost. Lord Lawrence never 
 doubted this. In a memorandum dated November 25, 
 1808, he said : 
 
 ' No one, of course, can deny that the advance 
 of Eussia in Central Asia is a matter which may 
 gravely affect the interests of England in India. No 
 person can doubt that the approach of Eussia 
 towards our North-West Frontier in India may 
 involve us in great difficulties ; and this being the 
 case, it will be a wise and prudent pohcy to 
 endeavour to maintain a thoroughly friendly power 
 
 ' Sir -\lfre(l Lyall. 
 
1876 INTEODUCTION 9 
 
 between India and the Eussian possessions in Central Historical 
 Asia. Nevertheless, it appears to me clear that 
 it is quite out of our power to reckon with any 
 degree of certainty on the attainment of this 
 desirable end. And,' he added, 'I feel no shadow 
 of a doubt that, if a formidable invasion of India 
 from the west were imminent, the Afghans en masse, 
 from the Amir of the day to the domestic slave of 
 the household, would readily join in it.' 
 
 These were the views expressed by Lord Law- 
 rence in 1868, when the only danger apprehended 
 was the establishment of Eussian influence in 
 Afghanistan by forcible means, and when the public 
 presence of the Eussian power at Kabul, not as the 
 foe, but as the avowed friend and ally of the Amir, 
 was a danger wholly unforeseen. Nor did Lord 
 Lawrence counsel passive acquiescence in such a 
 situation when it actually occurred. What he con- 
 tended in 1878 was. that Eussia rather than Slier Ali 
 should have been called by us to account. And in 
 this he was consistent ; for what he had advised in 
 1868 was, that Eussia should be plainly told 'that 
 an advance towards India beyond a certain point 
 would entail upon her war with England in every 
 part of the world.' 
 
 The relations between Eussia and Afghanistan 
 may be said to have coramenced in the year 1870 
 with a complimentary letter from General Kaufmann 
 to the Amir. It was entirely colourless ; and it 
 was answered by the Amir in terms suggested by 
 the Viceroy of India, who found in it no ground for 
 objection. But the letters of the Eussian Governor- 
 General gradually assumed a tone more practical 
 and more significant ; and in the summer of 1872 
 he addressed to Sher Ali a communication about 
 
lO LOEU LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical the bouiiclaries of Bokhara which caused consider- 
 able sensation in the Kabul Durbar. The Amir, who 
 was much alarmed by it, immediately forwarded 
 this letter to the Viceroy, with a confidential 
 message, the terms of which were transmitted to 
 the Government of India through our native agent. 
 In this message the Amir drew attention to the 
 wish of the Eussian authorities to establish ' a 
 regular and frequent correspondence with the Kabul 
 Government,' and to the fact that they now styled 
 the Afghan State their ' neighbour,' ' oblivious of the 
 fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervened ' ; and the 
 message closed with an entreaty to the British 
 Government to ' bestow more serious attention than 
 they have hitherto done on the establishment and 
 maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan.' 
 
 This appeal was made to the British Government 
 in 1872 ; and in reply to it the Amir was advised to 
 thank General Kaufmann for the friendly sentiments of 
 a letter which had caused His Highness so much uneasi- 
 ness. For the purpose of reassuring him the Vicero}'' 
 expressed to the Amir his confident belief that the 
 assurances given by Eussia to England in regard to 
 Afghanistan would be strictly and faithfully adhered 
 to.^ Nevertheless, General Kaufmann continued his 
 correspondence, and in the autumn of the same year 
 the Eussian officer acting for him at Tashkend in- 
 formed the Afghan Governor of Balkh of the desire of 
 the Eussian Government ' that the relations between 
 the Eussians and Afi^hans should become more firm 
 and consolidated daily.' This while ' positive 
 assurances ' were being given by the Eussian Govern- 
 
 1 In 1869 the Eussian Government had assured Lord Clarendon 
 that they looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere of 
 Russian influence. 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 1 1 
 
 ment to the English Foreign Office that the ' Imperial Historical 
 Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely ^^^^^^ 
 beyond its sphere of action.' 
 
 Again the Amir was informed by the Viceroy 
 that the British Government in nowise shared or 
 approved his dissatisfaction at the increasing frequency 
 and significance of these unsolicited communications. 
 His Highness consequently ceased to consult the 
 British Government about them, and in the winter of 
 1 8 7 3 the acting Governor-General of Kussian Turkestan 
 appears to have considered himself in a position to 
 address Sher Ali as a subordinate ally of the Eussian 
 Government. ' I entertain the hope,' he wrote, ' that 
 the high Governor- General will not refuse your 
 request, and that he will represent to H.M. the 
 Emperor your endeavour to become worthy of the 
 grace of my august Master.' 
 
 At the close of that year the Amir's disregarded 
 apprehensions had been justified by the Eussian con- 
 quest of Khiva. From the Governor-General of 
 British India, to whom he had so recently confided 
 those apprehensions, he received no communication 
 whatever on that rapid realisation of them which 
 closely concerned his interests and deeply afiected 
 his feelings. But from the Governor-General of 
 Eussian Turkestan he received a long communication, 
 frankly recognising in the fall of Khiva an event 
 which His Highness could not reasona]3ly be expected 
 to regard with indifference. Sher Ali did not consult 
 the Viceroy about his reply to General Kaufmann. 
 And this was only natural ; for he must have clearly 
 gathered, first from the language, and then from the 
 silence of the Viceroy, that on this matter the views 
 and feelings of the British Government were altogether 
 different from his own. But it was immediately after 
 
12 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical Slier Ali's receipt of General Kaufmann's communi- 
 ummaiy c^i^ion about Kliiva that the first sio'iiificant change 
 occurred in the tone of his own communications with 
 the Viceroy. Till then no Amir of Kabul had ever 
 ventured to address the Viceroy of India in letters 
 not written in the Amir's own name and bearing the 
 Amir's own signature. Disregarding this established 
 etiquette, Slier Ali now, for the first time, addressed 
 the Viceroy indirectly, through one of the Afghan 
 Ministers, in a form for which there was absolutely 
 no precedent. While Slier Ali was thus beginning 
 to display his estrangement from the Government of 
 India, these are the terms in which he was addressed 
 by the Government of Eussian Turkestan in the 
 spring of 1873 : 
 
 'I hope,' writes the Eussian authority at Tashkend, 
 ' that after your death Sirdar Abdullah Jan will 
 follow your example and make himself an ally and 
 friend of the Emperor ' — the ally and friend, that 
 is, of a Power pledged to treat Afghanistan as a 
 State entirely beyond the sphere of its influence ! 
 This letter was quickly followed by another from 
 General Kaufmann himself on the same subject. ' I 
 hope,' writes the Eussian Governor-General, ' that 
 the chain of friendship now existing between Eussia 
 and Afghanistan will in future increase and become 
 firm, owing to the recent alliance between the 
 Emperor of Eussia and the Queen of England ; ' and 
 he adds : ' I doubt not that this alliance of the two 
 Powers will be an omen for those countries which are 
 under the protection of the Emperor of Eussia and 
 the Queen of England.' 
 
 While appreciating the skill with which a 
 matrimonial alliance between two reiofninii' houses is 
 here represented as a political alliance between two 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 1 3 
 
 empires, and the significant anxiety of the writer to Historical 
 
 1 • n 111 Summary 
 
 convey assurances which would have come more 
 naturally from the Viceroy of India, European 
 readers might not be disposed to attach to the 
 phraseology of this letter any special importance. 
 But Asiatics are accustomed to weigh such utterances 
 with scrupulous attention ; and its native agent at 
 Kabul reported to the Government of India that on 
 the receipt of this letter the Kabul Durbar observed : 
 ' The Eussian Government has now made itself partner 
 in the protection of Afghanistan.' 
 
 An event now occurred which Lord Lytton con- 
 sidered to be the turning-point in our relations with 
 Afghanistan. In the year 1873 Sher Ali reviewed 
 his position. There was much in it which, rightly or 
 wrongly, had caused him increasing anxiety; and 
 finding in recent occurrences significant indications 
 of future contingencies, he appears to have then 
 wisely realised the inevitable necessity of accepting 
 closer and more subordinate relations with one or 
 other of his two great European neighbours. To us 
 his preference was given. And in 1873 the Amir 
 made a last effort to obtain from the British Govern- 
 ment more definite and practical protection from the 
 unsolicited patronage of Eussia. 
 
 The Envoy sent by the Amir of Kabul to confer 
 with the Viceroy of India at Simla in 1873 said to 
 Lord Northbrook : ' Whatever specific assurances 
 the Eussians may give, and however often these may 
 be repeated, the people of Afghanistan can place no 
 confidence in them, and will never rest satisfied 
 unless they are assured of the aid of the British 
 Government.' 
 
 The Viceroy telegraphed home, and proposed to 
 assure him that the Government would help the Amir 
 
14 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical with moiiey, arms, and troops, if necessary, to repel 
 Summary ^^^ unprovoked invasion, if he unreservedly accepted 
 our advice in foreign affairs. But the Duke of 
 Argyll entirely declined to sanction any such under- 
 taking ; and the Viceroy could only promise the 
 Envoy to assist him in any circumstances with advice, 
 assure him that a Eussian invasion of Afghanistan 
 was not apprehended, and offer to supply him with 
 a certain quantity of arms. But the possibility of 
 direct invasion was by no means the only danger 
 anticipated by the Afghan Envoy, although the point 
 on which he desired to be satisfied was whether he 
 might count on the English to defend him against 
 actual aggression. He said also, and he said it very 
 distinctly, that the Amir contemplated with serious 
 anxiety the inevitable result of those unceasing and 
 increasing endeavours which, in the circumstances 
 explained by the Envoy, the Eussian authorities at 
 Tashkend, if not checked by our intervention, were 
 certain to make for the acquisition and exercise of 
 some influence in his kingdom. To these representa- 
 tions no direct reply was given ; but the Amir was 
 told that the Government of India thought it highly 
 desirable that a British ofiicer should be deputed to 
 examine the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, and 
 to communicate with His Highness at Kabul regard- 
 ing the measures necessary for the frontier's security. 
 The Amir's reply, which plainly, though in reserved 
 language, indicated disappointment at the failure 
 of his negotiations for a defensive alliance against 
 Eussia, merely stated that there were general 
 objections to European travellers in his country. 
 
 To those who look back, after the lapse of 
 twenty-five years, upon these transactions there can 
 be no doubt that the refusal of the British Ministry 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 1 5 
 
 to entertain Sher All's request for an assurance of Historical 
 
 (. 1 , •,! • Summary 
 
 protection was iraugnt with very serious consequences, 
 and that the departure of the Afghan Envoy was 
 followed, in effect, by the rupture of friendly relations 
 at Kabul. 
 
 In 1873 Sher Ali had the sense to perceive in 
 time that Afghanistan could not permanently stand 
 alone, and that sooner or later she must openly 
 and practically throw in her lot with that Power 
 which might prove, not only best able, but also most 
 willing, to befriend and assist her, Eecent events, 
 to which the British Government appeared indifferent, 
 had convinced him that the time was at hand when 
 her final choice must be made ; and he was disposed 
 to give his alliance to the highest bidder for it. 
 Eussia was apparently the most willing, and she was 
 obviously the best able, to make the highest bid. 
 When Sher Ali found the British Government so 
 undisguisedly afraid of increasing its liabilities on 
 his behalf, and so apparently disinclined to contract 
 with him any closer or more responsible relations, it 
 is not surprising that he should have accepted Eussia's 
 repeated assurance of her constant desire to consoli- 
 date and tighten what General Kaufmann correctly 
 called the chain of her friendship with him — that 
 chain which, to use the Amir's own expression, 
 eventually dragged not only Afghanistan, bu^ India 
 also, into a ' sea of troubles.' 
 
 At all events, after the return to Kabul of Sher 
 All's Envoy in 1873 there was a marked change for 
 the worse in the Amir's attitude towards the Govern- 
 ment of India, and less than two years later there 
 was a very important change in the character of his 
 relations with the Government of Eussian Turkestan. 
 In the second week of September 1875 a native 
 
1 6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical Eussiaii Envoy arrived for the first time at Kabul, 
 umraary ^^^ ^^^^^ entertained there with marked consideration, 
 as the confidential bearer of verbal communications 
 and a letter from General Kaufmann. From that time 
 forward the Eussian Governor-General was, for all 
 practical purposes, permanently represented at Kabul, 
 in the most efficacious manner, by relays of special 
 Envoys, the one arriving as the other left. The Govern- 
 ment of India was informed by its officiating Commis- 
 sioner at Peshawur that the business of these Envoys, 
 whatever it might be, could not be ascertained by our 
 native agent at Kabul, because it was conducted 
 directl}^ and secretly with the Amir himself, and not 
 with the Durbar. ' But,' he observed, ' the meaning 
 of these frequent communications from Eussia is 
 obviously to establish friendly relations with the 
 Afghans, and gain them over to an alliance with 
 Eussia. As soon as one agent is preparing to take 
 his departure another comes.' 
 
 In March 1874 there was a change of Ministry 
 in England ; Mr. Disraeli became Prime Minister, 
 Lord Salisbury became Secretary of State for India, 
 and Lord Derby Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 
 While the Eussian Government continued to 
 give our Foreign Office persistent assurances that no 
 military movement in the Transcaspian countries 
 w^as contemplated or would be countenanced, Eussian 
 advance in the direction of Merv w^as nevertheless 
 steadily pursued. 
 
 In the autumn of 1874 the submission of several 
 of the Turkoman tribes to Eussia was announced, 
 and the Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that 
 the whole of the country between Khiva and the 
 Attrek was regarded as annexed to Eussia. In 
 
1876 INTEODUCTION 1 7 
 
 1875 a military ' reconnaissance ' of the Turkoman Historical 
 steppe started from Krasnovodsk in July, in what 
 was called ' a most amicable spirit,' and although, 
 in consequence, it may be presumed, of the Emperor's 
 orders, which had been communicated to our Govern- 
 ment, no actual occupation of fresh territory in 
 the direction of Merv took place, the nominal sub- 
 mission to Eussia of the Akhal Tekke tribe was 
 reported to have been obtained ; and the movements 
 of General Lomakin, which continued for several 
 months, led to renewed rumours that a serious 
 expedition was contemplated. More important 
 events occurred in another quarter. Since the 
 occupation of Samarkand, in 1868, there had been 
 little interference with the Khanate of Kliokand, 
 lying to the east of Khojend and Tashkend ; but in 
 the autumn of 1875, in consequence of aggressions 
 upon Eussian territory. General Kaufmann marched 
 on Khokand. The result of the operations that 
 followed was the formal declaration that the whole 
 of Khokand had been incorporated in the Eussian 
 dominions under the name of the province of 
 Ferghana. 
 
 All these proceedings continued to convince the 
 British Government that the advance of Eussia 
 towards the Afghan frontier threatened to involve 
 us before long in dangerous difficulties ; and the 
 matter had now become still more serious because the 
 outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina in the summer of 1875 had shown the 
 probability that the Eastern Question was again 
 about to be opened in Europe. This probability 
 became before long a certainty. 
 
 Under these circumstances the undisguised ill- 
 feeling towards us of the Amir Sher Ali Khan, com- 
 
 c 
 
l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical billed with the apparent certainty that the time was 
 
 Summary ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ distant when the frontiers of the Eussian 
 
 Empire would be brought into close proximity with 
 
 those of Afghanistan, became a cause of the gravest 
 
 anxiety. 
 
 The most unsatisfactory and dangerous part of 
 the position was this — that while Eussian intercourse 
 with the Amir of Kabul grew daily more free and 
 frequent, we were in a condition of almost complete 
 ignorance regarding everything that was passing in 
 Afghanistan and in the countries immediatelv 
 beyond its borders. This ignorance had long been 
 admitted and regretted. Lord Dalhousie had made 
 it one of the stipulations of his Treaty with Dost 
 Mohammed, in 1857, that British officers should be 
 deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, 
 to Kabul, Kandahar, and Balkh, to see that the 
 military subsidy given to the Amir was properly 
 expended. They were to be withdrawn when the 
 subsidy should have ceased ; and although the Amir 
 thought it undesirable that they should be sent to 
 Kabul, he entirely approved of their presence at 
 Kandahar. In 1859 our Government had come to 
 the conclusion, although it was not carried into 
 effect, that a British agent ought to be established 
 at Herat, then independent of Kabul. Lord Lawrence, 
 in 1868, recorded the opinion that one of the con- 
 ditions on which it was desirable to give assist- 
 ance to Slier Ali in consolidating his power was 
 that he should consent to our sending at any time 
 native agents to Kandahar, Herat, or other places 
 on the frontier. Lord Mayo recorded the opinion 
 that it was desirable that we should have an English 
 representative at Kabul, and that, although he found 
 it inexpedient to insist upon this measure, he did 
 
Bartle Frere 
 
 1876 INTRODUCTION 1 9 
 
 not think that the difficulties in the way of carrying Historical 
 it out were hkely to be permanent. Lastly, in 1873, ™^™'^^y 
 the Government of Lord Northbrook proposed, as 
 we have seen, the temporary deputation of a British 
 officer to examine the boundaries of Afghanistan. 
 
 Although the importance of obtaining better 
 means of information regarding the course of events 
 in Afghanistan and on its frontiers had thus been 
 repeatedly acknowledged, our Government had, never- 
 theless, thought it undesirable to press the matter 
 on the Amir. 
 
 An important Note on this subject was written Note by sir 
 by Sir Bartle Frere, who was then a member of the 
 Secretary of State's Council. He insisted strongly 
 on the dangers into which, as it appeared to him, 
 we were drifting, and pointed out the measures of 
 precaution which he believed to be necessary. The 
 most important of these were the appointment of 
 British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan and 
 Central Asia, and the occupation of Quettah. In 
 regard to the first measure. Sir Bartle Frere's Note 
 proved that it was very desirable, but gave no aid 
 towards overcoming the difficulties. The latter step 
 he recommended because its adoption would give 
 us a far stronger frontier, and because he looked 
 forward to the inevitable contingency of our having, 
 at some future time, to meet Kussia on the western 
 borders of Afghanistan. There can be no doubt 
 that Sir Bartle Frere's Note had a great effect in 
 convincing Her Majesty's Government that the state 
 of affairs had become extremely serious, and on 
 January 22, 1875, a despatch exhibiting their 
 anxiety was addressed by Lord Salisbury to the 
 Government of Lord Northbrook. 
 
 In this despatch he commented on the scantiness 
 
 c 2 
 
20 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADxMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 Historical 
 Jriummary 
 
 Loid Salis- 
 bury's Des- 
 patch 1875 
 
 Lord North- 
 brook's reply 
 
 of the information whicli the Viceroy received 
 through the Kabul Diaries, and remarked that for 
 knowledge of what passed in Afghanistan and upon 
 its frontiers the Government were compelled to rely 
 mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reached 
 them through the Foreign Office. Lord Salisbury 
 then went on to point out that our native agent, 
 however intelligent and honest, was in the nature 
 of things disqualified to collect the information 
 which the Government of India required. ' One of the 
 principal qualifications,' he said, ' for this function 
 is the neutrality of feeling in respect to rehgious 
 controversies which only a European can possess.' 
 
 He therefore urged the Viceroy to take measures, 
 ' with as much expedition as the circumstances of 
 the case permit, for procuring the assent of the 
 Amir to the establishment of a British Agency at 
 Herat,' adding, ' when this is accomplished it may 
 be desirable to take a similar step with regard to 
 Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with 
 respect to Kabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties 
 which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the 
 
 people.' 
 
 The importance attached to an English Agency at 
 Herat was, primarily, for the sake of the information 
 an Enshsh officer might collect ; but it would also be 
 an indication of English solicitude for the safety of 
 our aUies, and might so tend to discourage counsels 
 dangerous to the peace of Asia. 
 
 Lord Northbrook's Government replied to this 
 despatch on June 7, 1875. They considered that 
 the value of the reports received from the native 
 af^ent at Kabul had been under-estimated; that 
 it was probable that information regarding the 
 Turkestan frontier would be obtained with greater 
 
1876 INTRODUCTION 2 1 
 
 promptness and accuracy through Persia than Historical 
 tlirough Afghanistan ; that it was doubtless true that Nummary 
 the position of the agent compelled him to be cautious 
 in communicating news to the British Government ; 
 but that, making due allowance for the difficulty of 
 his position, the information supplied by him was 
 fairly full and accurate. While it was thought that 
 either the Amir or his Minister, during the conference 
 at Umballa, had expressed, in confidential conversa- 
 tions, a readiness to accept at some future time, 
 not far distant, the presence of British agents in 
 Afghanistan, excepting at Kabul itself, it was pointed 
 out that no formal record of the alleo-ed admission 
 existed, and that its scope and intention were un- 
 certain, and that Lord Mayo had distinctly informed 
 the Amir ' that no European officers would be placed 
 as Eesidents in his cities.' Under these circumstances 
 the Government of India held that they would not 
 be justified in founding any representation to the 
 Amir regarding the appointment of a British agent 
 at Herat upon the assumption that he had formerly 
 expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrange- 
 ment. It was shown that, in the opinion of all the 
 officers most likely to form a correct judgment on 
 the subject, the Amir would certainly be altogether 
 disinclined to receive a British agent, and if he 
 should give an unwilling consent no advantage would 
 be gained from the proposed measure. If, on the 
 other hand, he should refuse, his refusal would im- 
 pair the influence of the British Government in 
 Afghanistan, and would weaken the hands of Her 
 Majesty's Government in an}^ future negotiations 
 with Eussia. ' At the same time,' it was said, ' we 
 agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having 
 regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkestan, 
 
22 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 it would be desirable that a British officer should be 
 stationed at Herat.' But for the successful realisa- 
 tion of this end it was essential that the proposed 
 arrangement should have the cordial consent of the 
 Amir. Believing that this consent could not possibl}" 
 be obtained, the Government of Lord Northbrook 
 concluded that ' the present time and circumstances 
 are unsuitable for taking the initiative in such a 
 matter.' 
 
 They advised that no immediate pressure should 
 be put upon the Amir, or particular anxiety shown 
 upon the subject, but that advantage should be 
 taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own 
 action or other circumstances might present for the 
 purpose of sounding his disposition, and of represent- 
 ing to him the benefits which would be derived by 
 Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The 
 object in view was, in their judgment, more likely to 
 be attained by taking this course than by assuming 
 the initiative at once. 
 Lord Saiis- The Government at home was little disposed to 
 
 r)"e7'atcr°'^*^ accept this opinion of the Government of India, that 
 it was inexpedient to put any immediate pressure 
 on the Amir of Afghanistan to induce him to enter 
 into new arrangements, and on November 19, 1875, 
 a further despatch was sent to India by Lord 
 Salisbury, containing a complete statement of the 
 policy which Her Majesty's Government considered 
 it essential to carry out. In this despatch the Secre- 
 tary of State recapitulated and emphasised the urgent 
 and important grounds upon which Her Majesty's 
 Government desired the establishment of a British 
 agent in Afghanistan, and the Viceroy was instructed 
 to press upon the Amir the reception of a temporary 
 
brook's reply 
 
 1876 INTRODUCTION 23 
 
 Embassy in liis capital. Neither tlie desirability of 
 this object nor the strength of the reasoning in 
 demonstration of its importance was disputable, or 
 in fact disputed ; but Lord Northbrook's Government, Lord North- 
 in their reply, insisted on the improbability that the 
 Amir would willingly agree to the location of British 
 officers in his country, on the impolicy of pressing 
 the demand against his will, and on the inutility, in 
 their opinion, of establishing agencies there without 
 his hearty consent. This correspondence fully 
 represents the differences of opinion which had arisen 
 between the Government of India and the Home 
 Government at the time of Lord Northbrook's resigna- 
 tion in the spring of 1876 ; and it will be seen that 
 they all converge upon one main issue — whether an 
 immediate and strenuous attempt should be made to 
 induce the Amir to receive a Mission at Kabul for 
 the purpose of negotiating the establishment within 
 his dominions of a representative of the British 
 Government. That the issue thus defined was one 
 of extraordinary difficulty cannot in fairness be 
 denied. The objections urged b}^ Lord Northbrook's 
 Government were grave and substantial ; yet, on the 
 other hand, Lord Salisbury's despatches prove that he 
 had rightly appreciated the true situation, in treating 
 the reception of a British diplomatic agent by the 
 Amir as the first essential step towards improving 
 our relations and restoring our influence with the 
 Afghan ruler. By no other pacific measure could we 
 hope to counteract the growth of Eussian influence 
 at Kabul, to explain our policy, or to obtain the Amir's 
 consistent adherence to and co-operation with it ; 
 while even if the moment for beginning fresh over- 
 tures was not opportune, it was quite possible that 
 
24 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. i 
 
 the situation might not improve, but the reverse, by 
 delay. It was at this juncture, when the difficuUies 
 of the position and the conflict of opinions had 
 reached their climax, that Lord Lytton assumed 
 charge of the Viceroy alty in April 1876. 
 
25 
 
 CHAPTEE II 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR INDIA JOURNEY THITHER FIRST 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 During the time which elapsed between the nomi- 
 nation of Lord Lytton as Viceroy of India and his 
 departure from England to assume charge of his 
 office he devoted himself to the work of increasino- 
 his knowledge of Indian subjects. He studied 
 assiduously all books and papers on recent events 
 which the India Office could furnish, and he en- 
 deavoured to place himself in personal communica- 
 tion with everyone wdio he thought could speak with 
 authority on the more important questions wdth 
 which he would soon have to deal. A few years 
 before he had made the acquaintance of Lord 
 Lawrence. They had met at the house of their 
 common friend John Forster, and they had been 
 neighbours in Hertfordshire when Lord Lawrence 
 w^as living at Brocket. They had at that time many 
 conversations, and Lord Lytton would afterwards 
 recall with interest much that Lord Lawrence had 
 said to him about India, his stories of the stirring 
 times through which he had passed, the adventures 
 and daring deeds of our officers, and how Lord 
 Lawrence had explained to him at length his views 
 on a multitude of subjects connected wdth Indian 
 Government, our relations with Afghanistan and the 
 tribes on the North-Western Frontier, and with the 
 advance of Eussia through Central Asia. These 
 
26 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 conversations were renewed when Lord Lytton 
 was appointed Viceroy, but it had ah-eady become 
 apparent that the poUcy towards Afghanistan which 
 the Government had resolved to carry out, and which 
 he himself believed to be right, would not have Lord 
 Lawrence's approval, and it was difficult in such 
 circumstances to discuss these matters freely. Lord 
 Lytton could say nothing regarding the instructions 
 which he knew that he was about to receive, and 
 he could not attempt to controvert Lord Lawrence's 
 opinions without seeming to himself to be wanting 
 in proper deference to one of the most illustrious 
 of Indian statesmen, for whose great actions and 
 noble character he always felt sincere admiration and 
 respect.^ 
 
 ^ The obituary notice of Lord Lawrence's death published in The 
 Gazette of India, June 30, 1879, was written by Lord Lytton, and ran 
 as follows : — 
 
 ' The Governor-General in Coiincil has received, with deep 
 concern, the announcement of the death of Lord Lawrence, late 
 Viceroy and Governor-General of India. 
 
 ' No statesman, since Warren Hastings, has administered the 
 Government of India with a genius and an experience so exclusively 
 trained and developed in her service as those of the illustrious man 
 whose life, now closed in the fulness of fame, though not of age, 
 bequeaths to his country a bright example of all that is noblest in the 
 high qualities for which the Civil Service of India has justly been 
 renowned ; and in which, with such examples before it, it will never 
 be deficient. 
 
 ' The eminent services rendered to India by Lord Lawrence, both 
 as ruler of the Punjab, in the heroic defence of British power, and as 
 Viceroy, in the peaceful administration of a rescued Empire, cannot 
 be fitly acknowledged in this sad record of the grief which she suffers 
 by his death, and of the pi-ide with which she cherishes his name. 
 
 ' The Viceroy and Governor-General in ComiciJ, however, desiring 
 to give some public expression to those feelings and to that national 
 gratitude which is the best reward of national services, directs that the 
 flag of Fort William shall, during to-morrow, the first of July, be 
 lowered half-mast higla ; that thirty-one minute guns shall be fired, at 
 sunset, from the Fort ; and that the last gun shall be fired, and the 
 flag dropped, as the sun sets. 
 
 ' His Excellency in Council fiu'ther directs that on this sorrowful 
 
1876 PKEPAEATIONS FOE INDIA 27 
 
 From no one did Lord Lytton receive at this 
 time more wise and practically useful advice or 
 warmer sympathy than from Sir James Stephen,^ and gj^ J[g^^^ 
 during the rest of his life no man could have had a 
 more constant or more affectionate friend. Indeed, this 
 friendship, which may truly be said to have sprung 
 up in a single night, became to Lord Lytton one of 
 the closest and most valued intimacies of his later life. 
 They first met at a dinner at Lord Arthur Eussell's, 
 and went afterwards together to the ' Cosmopolitan.' 
 India was, of course, the subject of their talk. Lord 
 Lytton was not more eager to hear than Sir James 
 to tell all that he knew of the condition of that great 
 empire. They did not part till they had spent half 
 the night walking up and down, too absorbed in 
 their subject to feel fatigue or the wish to separate. 
 
 Sir James Stephen's knowledge on Indian affairs 
 was deep, and his views so interesting to Lord Lytton, 
 that he begged to have some recorded expression of 
 them. Sir James went home and wrote for him an 
 elaborate exposition of the Indian administrative 
 system, which his friend compared to a ' policeman's 
 buU's-eye.' ^ 
 
 From the time of Lord Lytton's departure till his 
 return Sir James Stephen wrote to him by every mail. 
 These letters were a constant source of pleasure, 
 solace, and support. When he returned from his 
 four years ' rule of empire his other chief friends were 
 
 occasion the same raarks of national respect shall be simultaneously 
 shown at all the other seats of government in India ; in order that, 
 throughout the length and breadth of the Empu'e with whose history 
 the fame of Lord Lawrence is imperishably associated, honour may be 
 rendered to the memory of the Statesman who ruled India with a 
 wisdom strengthened in her laborious service, and whose fortitude, 
 severely tested, was splendidly displayed throughout her fiercest trial.' 
 
 ^ At this time Mr. FitzJames Stephen. 
 
 ~ Life of Sir J. Stephen, by his brother, LesUe Stephen. 
 
25 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 nearly all either dead or alienated, but in Stephen 
 he never failed to find the most loyal, faithful, and 
 devoted friend to the day of his death. The contrast 
 between the two men could hardly have been greater. 
 Sir James was somewhat Johnsonian in appearance 
 and talk ; Lord Lytton singularly endowed with charm 
 and grace of manner. In mind Lord Lytton was 
 essentially a poet gifted with a romantic and creative 
 imagination ; Sir James had little taste for poetry, 
 or sympathy with the ' artistic temperament ' in any 
 of its forms, but his intellectual force, his herculean 
 capacity for work, and the strength and loyalty with 
 which he defended his convictions and the friends 
 who shared them, gave to his personality an heroic 
 stamp. They had in common, despite the widest 
 differences, a certain rather rare and sturdy manli- 
 ness of thought, and an enthusiastic patriotism. Lord 
 Lytton's admiration and sympathy for Sir James 
 evoked in him a responsive tenderness and affection 
 which perhaps was all the deeper for having so rarely 
 found an outlet, while Stephen's mental attitude on 
 all public questions, and his strong and uncompro- 
 mising way of expressing whatever he felt, were to his 
 friend a source of unending satisfaction and support. 
 During all this time Lord Lytton was in frequent 
 communication with Mr. Disraeli and Lord Salisbury 
 in regard to the affairs of Central Asia and Afghani- 
 stan. The Prime Minister strongly impressed upon 
 the new Viceroy his opinion that the policy of Russia 
 gave cause for extreme anxiety and watchfuhiess, and 
 that it was essential, even at the risk of failure, the 
 possibility of which could not be denied, that an 
 attempt should be made to induce the Amir of Kabul 
 to enter into more satisfactory relations with our 
 Government, or, if such a result proved impracticable, 
 
1876 PREPAEATIONS FOE INDIA 29 
 
 that he should at least be compelled to show clearly 
 the attitude which he intended to hold towards 
 Kussia and towards ourselves. Anything, Mr. Disraeli 
 thought, was better than the state of absolute uncer- 
 tainty and suspicion in which our relations with 
 Afghanistan were involved. This was the conviction 
 of Lord Lytton himself when he left England. LordLytton 
 'Afghanistan,' he wrote a few months afterwards gt",-^ ^ ^°^" 
 in a confidential letter, ' is a State far too weak 
 and barbarous to remain isolated and wholly unin- 
 fluenced between two great military empires such 
 as England and Eussia. The present difference be- 
 tween the policies of these two empires, as regards 
 the interests of the Amir, is that the British 
 Government sincerely desires to promote his security 
 abroad and his stability at home. It is our policy 
 to cultivate on our north-western border a strong 
 bulwark, by aiding Afghanistan to become a power- 
 ful and prosperous State, provided its power be 
 friendly to ourselves and its prosperity in harmony 
 with that of those other frontier States whose wel- 
 fare and independence we are resolved to defend 
 against all aggression. It is our wish to see the 
 revenues of Afghanistan increased, the authority of 
 its ruler consolidated, the permanence of his dynasty 
 established, the peace and loyalty of the Amir's 
 subjects assured, the safety of his border guaranteed, 
 the efficiency of his military force developed, his 
 independence placed above all question, on the sole 
 condition that his loyal friendship and that of his 
 people for the British Government be equally 
 indubitable. We do not covet one inch of his 
 territory, we do not desire to diminish one iota of 
 his independence. But we cannot allow him to fall 
 under the influence of any power whose interests are 
 
30 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 antao-onistic to our own, and thereby become the 
 tool of ambitions to which the whole energy of the 
 British Government will, in case of need, be reso- 
 lutely opposed. On the other hand, the Eussian 
 Government, although its real policy has not been 
 and cannot as yet be openly avowed, desires and 
 would gladly effect the disarmament of Afghanistan 
 and the absorption of the Amir's dominions, either 
 by Russia alone or by Eussia in conjunction with 
 England, each of the two European powers taking, 
 by previous agreement, its own share of the spoil. 
 This object could be best attained by the assent and 
 connivance of the British Government, but, failing 
 that condition of success, its attainment will be, and 
 indeed is already being, sought by means of adroitly 
 playing on the hopes and fears of the Amir, and thus 
 establishing a diplomatic influence at Kabul. The 
 Amir, who appears to be tumbling headlong into the 
 trap thus skilfully laid for him, under the illusion 
 that he is strong enough, or crafty enough, to play 
 off" Eussia against England and thereby maintain his 
 equilibrium between them, must now choose which of 
 his two powerful neighbours he will rely upon. But 
 one lesson he will have to learn, and that is that if 
 he does not promptly prove himself our loyal friend 
 we shall be obliged to regard him as our enemy 
 and treat him accordingly. A tool in the hands of 
 Eussia I will never allow him to become. Such a tool 
 it would be my duty to break before it could be 
 used.' ^ 
 
 We have seen that Lord Northbrook fully 
 recognised, like all his predecessors, the paramount 
 importance of maintaining the independence of 
 
 1 Letter to C. Girdlestone, Ai.igiist 27, 1876. Letters Despatched^ 
 vol. i. p. 427. 
 
1876 PREPARATIONS FOR INDIA 31 
 
 Afghanistan, and of preventing the interference of 
 Eussia in its affairs. But we have also seen that, in 
 regard to the ways and means for giving effect to 
 these views, there had been found to be serious 
 divergence of opinion between the Government of 
 India and the Ministry at home. In these circum- 
 stances some embarrassment was felt in drawing for 
 the new Viceroy the instructions which were to define 
 our future policy in Afghan affairs, and to authorise 
 his acting upon it. The Prime Minister and Lord 
 Salisbury, in common with the rest of the Cabinet, 
 held more decidedly than ever the view — and it was 
 a view which had the complete concurrence of Lord 
 Lytton — that it was urgently necessary that our 
 relations with Afghanistan should no longer be suffered 
 to remain in a condition which seemed to them full 
 of danger. But it was felt that it would be neither 
 expedient nor courteous to issue orders for taking 
 steps to which the members of Lord Northbrook's 
 Council, who would also be Lord Lytton's Councillors, 
 had already demurred, and, under the constitution of 
 the Indian Government, no action could be taken by 
 the Governor-General on any instructions from home 
 until they had been communicated to his Council in 
 the manner prescribed by law. Instead, therefore, 
 of the instructions of Her Majesty's Government being 
 sent to India in the ordinary way, they were placed 
 by Lord Salisbury in the hands of Lord Lytton when 
 he left England, with permission to choose his own 
 time for laying them before his colleagues. 
 
 The most important passages of these instructions 
 relating to Afghanistan will be found in a note at the 
 end of this chapter. 
 
 They may be summarised here as follows : 
 
 The Government at home considered it of first- 
 
32 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 class importance to ascertain the true attitude of 
 the Amir towards the Government of India, and as a 
 means to this end suggested that, after communicating 
 with the Amir, a friendly mission, combined, perhaps, 
 with one to the Khan of Khelat, should proceed to 
 Kabul by way of Quettah and Kandahar. In the 
 event of the Amir refusin<2f to receive such a mission 
 the Government of India might find themselves 
 obliged to reconsider their whole policy towards 
 Afghanistan, but there would no longer be any 
 doubt as to the Amir's estrangement. Should he, 
 however, consent to receive it, the Government 
 anticipated that certain questions would probably be 
 raised upon which the Amir would ask for more 
 definite assurances than had yet been made to him. 
 
 These questions were divided under three heads : 
 
 I. A fixed and augmented subsidy. II. A more 
 decided recognition than has yet been accorded by 
 the Government of India to the order of succession 
 established by the Amir in favour of the younger son 
 Abdullah Jan. III. An explicit pledge by treaty 
 or otherwise of material support in case of foreign 
 aggression. 
 
 With regard to the first of these questions the 
 Government were prepared to leave the Viceroy a 
 free hand to deal with it in such a manner as the 
 circumstances and attitude of the Amir might suggest 
 to his judgment. 
 
 With regard to the second question the Govern- 
 ment laid down that, while they did not desire ' to 
 renounce their traditional policy of abstention from 
 all unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of 
 Afghanistan,' they yet considered that ' the frank 
 recognition of a de facto order in the succession 
 established by a de facto Government to the throne 
 
1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW T,^ 
 
 of a foreign State ' did not ' imply or necessitate any 
 interference in the internal affairs of that State.' 
 
 With regard to the third question : ' An explicit 
 pledge by treaty or otherwise of material support in 
 case of foreio-n ao-o-ression ' the Government, while 
 admitting that Lord Northbrook's declaration in 1875 
 would justify the Amir in expecting support should 
 his kingdom be subjected to unprovoked foreign ag- 
 gression, yet commented upon the fact that it was 
 nevertheless too ambiguous to satisfy the Amir. They 
 therefore promised to support the Viceroy should he 
 find it necessary to make more definite declarations on 
 this head, only reserving their right of judgment as to 
 the circumstances involving the obligation of material 
 assistance in some clear case of unprovoked aggression 
 
 These instructions are remarkable for two things 
 First, for the latitude and freedom they leave to the 
 Viceroy ; secondly, for the manifest desire revealed 
 in them to secure the friendship and good will of 
 the Amir if by any means such a result were still 
 attainable. 
 
 A few days before Lord Lytton left London he 
 paid a visit to Count Shouvalow, in accordance with 
 the wish the ambassador had expressed to him. 
 The conversation that followed was remarkable. It 
 was opened by Count Shouvalow, who informed Lord 
 Lytton that he had made to Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, through Lord Derby, the proposal that some 
 permanent means of direct and confidential com- 
 munication should be established between the 
 Eussian military forces in Central Asia and the 
 Viceroy of Lidia. He said that the Cabinet of St. 
 Petersburg was seriously alarmed by the critical 
 condition of its relations with England in regard 
 to Central Asian affairs, that the Emperor was most 
 
34 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ri 
 
 anxious to keep on good terms with us, and to 
 restrain the greed of territory evinced by his military 
 officers, and it was in the hope of avoiding future 
 misunderstandings that the Russian Government had 
 made the present suggestion. Count Shouvalow had 
 already spoken privately to Lord Lytton on this 
 subject, and had suggested to him that such com- 
 munications might conveniently be commenced 
 through a special agent accredited on a complimen- 
 tary mission to the new Viceroy by General Kaufmann. 
 Lord Lytton had replied that, so far as the accep- 
 tance or refusal of the proposal depended upon 
 himself, he at once declined it on the ground that 
 a mission from Tashkend could not reach Calcutta 
 without passing through Afghanistan or Khelat. 
 Count Shouvalow had sent to Prince Gortchakow a 
 report of this conversation, and he now read to Lord 
 Lytton the reply of the Eussian Chancellor, and a 
 confidential letter from General Kaufmann to the 
 Russian Minister of War. The Chancellor's despatch 
 authorised Count Shouvalow to assure Lord Lytton 
 that Russia had no desire to approach Afghanistan 
 from any direction, and, least of all, by way of Merv. 
 Should her military forces, he said, be unavoidably 
 obliged to occupy Merv, their occupation would in 
 any case be only temporary. He added that the 
 Russian occupation of Merv, or of any other post 
 equally close to the frontiers of Afghanistan, really 
 depended less upon the Government of Russia than 
 upon the Government of India. The Tekke tribe, 
 which acknowledged the authority and claimed the 
 protection of the Czar, was continually harassed 
 by Turkomans, whom the army of the Caspian was 
 continually obliged to pursue and punish. These 
 marauders, when captured, always averred that they 
 
1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW 35 
 
 had been instigated to acts of hostility against the 
 Tekkes by the Turkoman tribes on the Afghan 
 frontier and presumably under the influence of the 
 Amir of Kabul. Herein, the Chancellor wrote, lay 
 the increasing danger of the situation, and that 
 danger could only be averted by a more active and 
 friendly exercise of the paramount authority which 
 the Government of India must by this time have 
 acquired over the Amir of Kabul, whom it openly 
 pays and protects. It was, in short, for the Govern- 
 ment of India to command and compel its acknow- 
 ledged protege, the Amir, to keep these troublesome 
 Turkomans quiet, and Merv would then be safe from 
 Eussian occupation. The despatch concluded by 
 pointing out how the policy thus commended to the 
 consideration of the Government of India might be 
 facilitated by the establishment of direct communica- 
 tions with General Kaufmann, and Count Shouvalow 
 was instructed to obtain the acquiescence of Her 
 Majesty's Government in arrangements for that 
 purpose. The ambassador then read to Lord Lytton 
 the letter from General Kaufmann in which this 
 proposal appeared to have had its origin. It began 
 with a complaint that while the Eussians in Central 
 Asia had never, du moins sciemment, done anything 
 to embarrass or annoy England, the English Govern- 
 ment in India had been sending arms and military 
 instructors to Yarkand, with the deliberate purpose 
 of enabling Yakub Beg to be aggressive to Eussia. 
 England and Eussia, General Kaufmann said, si sua 
 bona norint, had in Central Asia a common interest 
 and a common foe. The interest was civilisation, 
 the foe was Islamism. The only real danger which 
 threatened the British power in India was Islamism. 
 Every other was a bugbear, but this would, ere 
 
 d2 
 
36 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 long, reveal its formidable reality. The wise policy, 
 therefore, would be an alliance between England 
 and Eussia ; the Government of India should aid 
 Eussia cordially and openly in effecting, as soon as 
 possible, the disarmament of Afghanistan and of the 
 Mohammedan populations of all the States interven- 
 ing between India and the Eussian possessions in 
 Central Asia, and the division of those territories 
 between the two powers. The knowledge that there 
 existed between Eussia and England a complete 
 understanding, for this avowed purpose, would suffice 
 to render powerless the known disaffection of our 
 Mohammedan subjects in India, and should they 
 afterwards give us any trouble we should, at least, 
 have close at hand, upon our North-Western Frontier, 
 a powerful and friendly Christian empire, upon 
 whose prompt co-operation we could at all times rely 
 for the suppression of revolt. Unfortunately, instead 
 of embracing the opportunities still open to it for 
 the prosecution of this great defensive policy, the 
 Government of India had hitherto been endeavouring 
 in an underhand way to exclude Eussian influence 
 from the frontier States, and to strengthen those 
 States against what was called Eussian aggression. 
 The fear of such aggression was caused by a mis- 
 conception of the whole situation, which direct com- 
 munications between Tashkend and Calcutta would. 
 General Kaufmann trusted, suffice to rectify. 
 Animated by these convictions, he had already 
 prepared a complimentary letter to the new Viceroy, 
 which he proposed to despatch through Afghanistan to 
 the care of Slier Ali Khan, with instructions to the 
 Amir of Kabul to forward it immediately to Peshawur, 
 so that Lord Lytton might find it at Calcutta on his 
 arrival. But he refrained from sending the letter 
 
1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW 2)1 
 
 until he had ascertained, through the Eussian 
 ambassador in London, how it would be received 
 by the Viceroy. 
 
 This letter from General Kaufmann was written 
 in Eussian, and Count Shouvalow translated it into 
 French as he read it to Lord Lytton, without 
 apparently suppressing any part of it. After hearing 
 the letter, Lord Lytton asked what were the means 
 at the disposal of General Kaufmann for sending a 
 letter to Sher Ali Khan, and what were his guarantees 
 for the Amir's obedience to his instructions. The 
 ambassador, who seemed a little embarrassed by the 
 question, replied : ' I suppose that we must have, just 
 as you have, safe and easy means of private com- 
 munication with Sher Ali. But I don't know what 
 they are. That is Kaufmann's affair.' 
 
 Count Shouvalow then admitted that there was 
 no foundation for the statement that military support 
 had been given by the Government of Lidia to 
 Yakub Beg, and he laid great stress upon the fact 
 that this absurd fiction had been seriously believed 
 at St. Petersburg as proving the importance of 
 the proposal for establishing direct communication 
 between General Kaufmann and the Viceroy. Li 
 replying to these communications. Lord Lytton said 
 that as the ambassador wished for a frank statement 
 of his views he would state frankly that the British 
 Government would tolerate no attempt on the part 
 of General Kaufmann to obtain an influence in 
 Afghanistan or in any of our frontier States, and that 
 we should absolutely refuse to co-operate with Eussia 
 in any anti-Mohammedan crusade such as that 
 which had been suggested. We regarded, he said, 
 Afghanistan and Beloochistan as the porches of British 
 India; we should defend them with all our power 
 
38 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 against aggression by any foreign State ; we would 
 never knowingly allow Eussia to enter into any 
 relations witli those States which might have the 
 effect of undermining our influence over their rulers 
 or their people, and would never become a party to 
 any injury to our Mohammedan allies or subjects. 
 General Kaufmann's proposed communications with 
 the Viceroy of India could only be carried on through 
 Afghanistan, a territory with which Eussia had no 
 right to interfere, and they were therefore inadmis- 
 sible and unwarrantable. To this Count Shouvalow 
 replied that General Kaufmann was no politician, 
 that he was an honest soldier without political ideas, 
 whose views must not be taken cm serieiuv, or con- 
 founded with those of the Eussian Government, 
 and that he accepted without reserve, in regard to 
 Afghanistan, the position as Lord Lytton had de- 
 fined it. 
 
 Although the ambassador thus disclaimed 
 sympathy with the policy advocated by General 
 Kaufmann, and only gave, on behalf of his Govern- 
 ment, approval to the suggestion that means of direct 
 communication might with advantage be established 
 between the Viceroy of India and the Eussian 
 authorities in Central Asia, this interview left on the 
 mind of Lord Lytton the conviction that Eussia was 
 desirous of coming to an understanding with England 
 which would have led to the absorption of the Stages 
 intervening between the British and Eussian pos- 
 sessions, to the partition of Afghanistan, and the 
 establishment of a common frontier between the two 
 empires. His belief was strengthened soon afterwards 
 by the publication, doubtless with the authority or 
 sanction of the Eussian Government, of an article 
 in the ' Golos ' containing the substance of General 
 
1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW 39 
 
 Kaufmann's letter to the Minister of War. There 
 can now be no question that this opinion of Lord 
 Lytton was correct. It had become a fixed idea 
 with Eussian statesmen that in the interests of their 
 country the most satisfactory result that could be 
 arrived at in Central Asia would be one which 
 brought their borders into immediate contact with 
 our own. Nor is this view confined to those who 
 entertain ambitious expectations of future advances 
 upon India ; it is held equally by men who desire that 
 all existing causes of difference between Eussia and 
 England should be removed. Lord Lytton's com- 
 munications with Count Shouvalow completely satis- 
 fied him on another point, in regard to which his 
 conclusion received afterwards ample confirmation. 
 They were thus described by him in a confidential 
 paper written immediately after his final interview 
 with the ambassador : 
 
 ' The Eussian Government has established those To Lord 
 means of direct, convenient, and safe communication Feb. 267i876 
 which Sher Ali refuses to us, and which we are 
 afraid of proposing to him, although we openly 
 subsidise His Highness. At the same time the 
 Eussian Chancellor holds us responsible, as a matter 
 of course, for the exercise of an authority over the 
 Amir which we neither possess nor know how to 
 acquire. The Eussian General confidentially avows 
 his object to be the disarmament of Afghanistan, yet 
 he has acquired such influence at Kabul that he can 
 not only communicate with Sher Ali Khan whenever 
 he pleases, but also reckon with confidence upon the 
 Amir's obedience to his instructions. England openly 
 declares her object to be the prosperity and indepen- 
 dence of Afghanistan, and for the furtherance of that 
 object she subsidises its ruler ; yet she has so little 
 
40 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION en. ii 
 
 influence at Kabul that she cannot induce Sher Ali 
 to receive an agent from her Viceroy, or tolerate the 
 passage of a British officer through his territoriesi 
 Comment on these facts is, I think, superfluous. I 
 cannot conceive a situation more fundamentally false 
 or more imminently perilous than the one which they 
 reveal.' 
 
 Count Shouvalow had, as he stated to Lord Lytton, 
 made to Lord Derby the proposal to establish direct 
 means of correspondence between the Eussian 
 authorities in Central Asia and the Viceroy in Lidia. 
 The views of our Government agreed with those of 
 Lord Lytton, and the proposal was declined. These 
 communications were on both sides verbal only. 
 They took no official form and were not officially 
 recorded. 
 The Viceroy 0^ Marcli 1, 1876, Lord Lytton left England with 
 
 land^^ ^^^' I^^^y Lytton and their }■ oung daughters. Colonel 
 (afterwards Sir Owen) Burne accompanied him as 
 private secretary, an officer of well tried ability and 
 Indian knowledge, who had served Lord Mayo in 
 the same capacity. Colonel CoUey, the brilliant and 
 accomplished soldier who afterwards, as his country- 
 men bitterly remember, found in Africa an unhappy 
 death, was his military secretary ; and among the 
 other officers of his suite was Sir Lewis Felly, to whom 
 Lord Lytton had determined to entrust the duty of 
 conducting the negotiations which he hoped to open 
 with the Amir of Afghanistan. 
 
 Egyptian aflairs were at this time in a critical 
 condition, the Khedive was on the verge of bank- 
 ruptcy, and the French and English Governments 
 were discussing the measures to be taken for pre- 
 venting a probable catastrophe. Lord Lytton 
 remained in Faris for a few days. He had numerous 
 
1876 JOUKNEY TO INDIA 4 1 
 
 friends and acquaintances among French statesmen, 
 and some of his conversations with them were 
 extremely interesting to him. One observation made 
 to him by Thiers deserves to be repeated, for it shows 
 the foresight of one of the keenest intellects of France 
 in regard to a transaction which has had, and will 
 have in the future, no small political and financial 
 importance. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares 
 by Mr, Disraeli's Government had just been an- 
 nounced, and Thiers said to Lord Lytton that he 
 looked upon this as the cleverest thing ever done by 
 an English Minister, and that he envied the statesman 
 who had done it. 
 
 From Paris Lord Lytton travelled to Naples, 
 where H,M.S. Orontes was waitino- to take him to 
 Bombay, He halted for a day at Bologna, and met 
 there Sir Louis Mallet, who was on his way back 
 from Calcutta, where he had gone on a special mission 
 from the India Ofiice with the object of discussing 
 with Lord Northbrook and his Government the 
 question, which was exciting much interest in this 
 country, of the duties levied in India on English 
 cotton manufactures. There was no higher authorit}' 
 on economical subjects than Sir Louis Mallet, and 
 Lord Lytton was glad of the opportunity to hear 
 from him his views on the trade and customs tariff 
 and taxation of India, and on other questions of 
 financial and economical importance. 
 
 On March 21 Lord Lytton landed at Alexandria, 
 He went on at once to Cairo, where he had an 
 interview with Ismail Pasha, the Khedive, then in 
 the midst of the financial difiiculties which after- 
 wards led to his deposition. In a letter written at 
 this time to Lord Derby, he expressed in strong 
 terms the conviction, which all that he had learned 
 
of Cairo 
 
 42 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. 11 
 
 in Paris and in Cairo on this subject had im- 
 pressed upon him, that if we did not immediately 
 take into our own hands the settlement of the 
 financial situation in Egypt our political hold upon 
 that country might perhaps be swiftly and irre- 
 trievably lost, with serious consequences to us in 
 India. 
 Impressions To his great regret only two days could be spared 
 
 for Cairo, and there was httle time for anything 
 but business. Western civilisation had been rapidly 
 carrying out in Egypt its beneficial and unsightly 
 work, but in 1876 Cairo was still one of the most 
 characteristic and picturesque of oriental cities, and 
 the glimpses of its monuments, its streets, and its 
 people which Lord Lytton was able to obtain filled 
 him with admiration. They were the more delightful 
 because they foreshadowed to his imagination the 
 scenes that India was soon to show to him. He told 
 in his letters to England how charmed he had been 
 with the grace of gesture and the dignity of the Arab 
 population, their flowing garments and statuesque 
 draperies, the rich colouring that everywhere met 
 the eye, and the beauty and picturesqueness of the 
 architecture. One corner of the great bazaar 
 especially deUghted him, with 'its dim glow of 
 infinitely varied but harmonious colours, in the noon 
 light of an oriental sun softened by the mellow 
 shade of fantastic awnings, while through the narrow 
 street, in front of the little Moorish court where 
 the carpet merchants spread their wares, a quaint 
 crowd of men and women, in every variety of 
 costume, was escorting with flutes and trumpets an 
 Arab Sheikh, who had just returned in triumph from 
 the pilgrimage to Mecca with the dignity of a Hadji.' 
 At Suez interest of another sort awaited Lord 
 
the Serapis 
 
 1876 JOURNEY TO INDIA 43 
 
 Lytton. M. de Lesseps was there to receive him 
 and to show him parts of the canal. He descanted 
 eloquently on a project of his own for establishing, 
 in the interests of peace and civilisation, railway 
 communication between India and the Eussian 
 possessions in Central Asia. The intervening countries 
 were to be divided between the two powers, and their 
 barbarous inhabitants, Afghans and the rest, were, 
 faute de mieiLv, to be swept away. He had been 
 speaking about this project, M. de Lesseps said, to 
 the Grand Duke Alexis of Eussia, who was then in 
 Egypt, and he had highly approved of it. The 
 scheme, Lord Lytton wrote, was ' the industrial 
 development of Kaufmann's recommendations.' 
 
 On the day after his arrival at Suez he met the Description of 
 Prince of Wales, who was returning from his visit to 
 India on the Serapis, and Lord Lytton was interested 
 in hearing from him and from the officers who 
 accompanied him the impressions they had formed 
 on a multitude of Indian subjects. The ship itself 
 was a striking object, a floating western palace 
 laden with the products of the East. 'As Noah's 
 Ark,' Lord Lytton wrote, ' was supposed by the 
 Eabbis to be a type of the whole world, the Serapis 
 lYiSLj be regarded as a sort of picturesque epitome 
 of the Indian empire. But the two finest specimens 
 of Indian produce are human ones, a Sikh and an 
 Afghan, native officers of Probyn's Horse, who are 
 coming, for the first time of course, to England with 
 the Prince. They are fine soldier- like fellows, who 
 look as if they might have been born sword in hand 
 and cradled in a military saddle. I had a pleasant 
 thrill of patriotic pride, however, in comparing their 
 appearance with that of their General, Probyn, as he 
 stood before them in full uniform. You felt that the 
 
Frere 
 
 44 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cii.ii 
 
 Englishman was the finest man of the three, fitted in 
 all respects to command these stalwart men, not only 
 par droit de conquete, but also par droit de naissance.'' 
 Sir Battle Among the Prince's suite was Sir Bartle Frere. 
 
 He had much to say that was deeply interesting to 
 Lord Lytton, and he gave to him important papers 
 containing his views on some of the questions with 
 which the Government of India would soon have to 
 deal. 
 
 No man living possessed a more intimate know- 
 ledge of the questions connected with our relations 
 with Afghanistan and the other countries beyond the 
 north-western frontiers of India, and with the pro- 
 gress of Eussia in Central Asia than Sir Bartle Frere. 
 Not long before he met Lord Lytton he had visited 
 the Punjab and Peshawur, and he had come away 
 with a strong conviction that our relations with 
 Sher Ali were in the highest degree unsatisfactory. 
 Personal observation and communication with the 
 most experienced officers of the Indian Government 
 had entirely confirmed the conclusions which (as I 
 have shown) he had placed on record in the previous 
 year. He was specially impressed with the fact that 
 even the officers through whom all diplomatic corre- 
 spondence with the Amir was carried on were 
 completely ignorant of his feelings and wishes and 
 intentions, and had no means of obtaining information 
 on which reliance could be placed. We were follow- 
 ing, Sir Bartle Frere said, ' a blind man's buff sj^stem,' 
 and, while he admitted that it was impossible to 
 speak with any certainty, he impressed upon Lord 
 Lytton his own belief that the Amir was in his heart 
 bitterly hostile, that it was a matter of urgent 
 necessity that steps should be taken to establish a 
 better understanding, and, if that should prove 
 
1876 JOURNEY TO INDIA 45 
 
 impracticable, that we should at least satisfy our- 
 selves that we understood the facts with which we 
 had to deal. 
 
 While he was at Lahore Sir Bartle Frere had 
 described, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, the measures 
 which he thought should be adopted. This letter 
 had not reached England before Lord Lytton's 
 departure, and when Lord Lytton saw it he was 
 greatly struck with the virtually complete identity of 
 the conclusions of Sir Bartle Frere with those which 
 he had himself independently formed, and which had 
 been adopted in the instructions which he was taking 
 with him to India. ' There is,' he wrote, ' something 
 positively startling in the almost exact coincidence 
 of Sir Bartle Frere's opinions with those which, 
 before leaving England, I put on paper confidentially 
 for examination by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Disraeli, 
 who entirely concurred with them.' 
 
 'The objects,' Sir Bartle Frere wrote, 'which Sir Bartle 
 Her Majesty's Government have in view are not to gaiLlbmy 
 quarrel with the Amir of Kabul, but to be on the 
 best possible terms with him, using the Afghans as 
 a buffer to avoid immediate contact between our 
 frontier and that of Eussia as long as possible, and 
 to prevent throwing on to the Eussian side in 
 Central Asiatic politics such near neighbours of our 
 own. . , . I would intimate to the Amir that the 
 Viceroy's agent was charged with formal credentials, 
 after delivering which he would communicate the 
 Viceroy's views on several important matters, and I 
 would invite the Amir to name any time and place 
 for giving an audience to the Envoy which would be 
 agreeable to him. If he responded cordially I would 
 not mind some delay in arranging the meeting. I 
 would not hurry or show much anxiety about it, but 
 
46 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Sir Bartie woulcl coHsult the Amir's convenience and make 
 Afghanistan allowancc for his many difficulties with his own 
 people and fanatical advisers, as well as with foreign 
 influence, which will certainly be exerted to prevent 
 any greater intimacy in his relations with us. If, on 
 the other hand, the Amir showed obvious signs of 
 disinclination to improve his relations, I would take 
 it as clear proof that hostile influences had worked 
 more effectually than we now suppose, that it was 
 useless to attempt to coax or cajole him into a better 
 frame of mind, that we must look for alliance and 
 influence elsewhere than at Kabul, and must seek 
 them in Khelat, at Kandahar, at Herat, and in 
 Persia, and I would lose no time in looking out for 
 them. ... It is clear from the records that, up to 
 a very late period, the anxiety of the late Amir and 
 his son to be on better terms, and more closely allied 
 to us and our fortunes in India against all comers 
 from the north and west, was very marked. It is, 
 however, unfortunately equally true that there has of 
 late been a marked change in the disposition of the 
 reigning Amir in this respect. What is the extent 
 and what the cause of the change is not clear. 
 Wliether the Amir has become convinced that he has 
 more to hope for or fear from the Eussians than from 
 us ; whether he believes we are in secret league with 
 the Eussians to divide his kingdom, a common belief 
 in the bazaars of India since the marriage of the 
 Duke of Edinburgh ; whether he is angry at our 
 continued refusal to pledge ourselves to support his 
 chosen heir ; whether he is sulky at the smallness or 
 alarmed at the magnitude of our late gifts, or really 
 fears the fanaticism of his own subjects ; all these 
 are guesses with more or less to support them, but 
 they are only guesses on a point regarding which 
 
1876 JOURNEY TO INDIA 47 
 
 certainty is attainable and of the highest importance. Sir Bartie 
 The Envoy who is usually sent by the Amir to AfghanStan 
 communicate with the Commissioner at Peshawur 
 made use of a significant proverb which indicated 
 his view of the cause. It was to the effect that " the 
 cat and dog only cease spitting and snarling when 
 they hear the wolf at the door." But as both know 
 that the wolf is there this does not account for the 
 cat still refusing to be friends with the dog, unless 
 she thinks herself likely to be safer as the ally of the 
 wolf. But before seeking from the Amir any direct 
 explanation of his changed attitude towards us, I 
 would instruct the Envoy to lay before the Amir a 
 perfectly frank and full explanation of the English 
 view of the present situation. It is worse than use- 
 less to tell him, as we have so often told him before, 
 that the Eussians are our good friends and have no 
 designs beyond t he protection of their own frontier 
 ajid the exte nsion of civil isation and commerce ; that 
 we are not in the least disturbed by tlieir advances 
 and are prepared to co-operate with them in pro- 
 moting an era of peace and goodwill. The Amir 
 knows that all this is humbug, and that we know it to 
 be so ; that the Russians are our friends as long as we 
 leave them to pursue their schemes of conquest 
 unchallenged and no longer ; that they are essen- 
 tially a conquering and aggressive nation, and will 
 conquer in our direction unless they are convinced 
 that we shall actively oppose them ; that we and 
 our Indian subjects are grievously disturbed by their 
 advances, that we wish them no nearer but have 
 hitherto been afraid to say so openly, or in any manner 
 that would pledge us to observe them openly.' 
 
 There is one paragraph in this paper which calls 
 for comment. ' If,' it says, ' the Amir showed signs 
 
48 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 of disinclination to improve his relations, I would take 
 it as clear proof that hostile influences had worked 
 more effectually than we now suppose ; that it was 
 useless to attempt to coax or cajole liim into a better 
 frame of mind ; that we must look for alliance and 
 influence elsewhere than at Kabul, and must seek them 
 in Khelat, at Kandahar, at Herat, and in Persia, and 
 I icould lose no time in looking out for them.' 
 
 The biographer of this eminent Indian statesman 
 has taken upon himself to say that, ' had Frere gone 
 to India as Viceroy in 1870 ' he would in all human 
 probability have converted Sher Ali to the English 
 alliance, and thus prevented war. It is, on the con- 
 trary, clear from the words quoted above, that had 
 Sir Bartle Frere been able to carry out these views in 
 1876, he would 'in all human probability' have 
 brought about the war of 1878 much earlier. To 
 have taken steps leading towards the disintegration 
 of Afghanistan, by seeking alliances in those parts of 
 the Amir's kingdom known to be most disaffected, 
 and with neighbouring States whose power might be 
 turned against him, before the Eussians had made 
 the false move of sending a mission to Kabul, and 
 while they still seemed to be on the eve of war with 
 England, could hardly have failed to throw the Amir 
 into their arms. And they might then have assisted 
 him more effectively than afterwards, when, having 
 accomplished his alienation from the British Govern- 
 ment, they left him in the lurch. 
 .\rrivai at On April 7 the Orontes reached Bombay. ' The 
 
 °"^ ^^ most picturesque town I have ever seen, especially 
 as regards its population,' Lord Lytton wrote. He 
 proceeded in easy stages towards Calcutta. At 
 Allahabad he had an interview with Sir John 
 Strachey, then Lieutenant-Governor of the North- 
 
1876 ARKIVAL IN INDIA 49 
 
 West Provinces. Their understanding and mutual 
 appreciation of each other dates from that inter- 
 view, when Lord Lytton found that they agreed 
 upon every financial question, and subsequently he 
 was able to persuade Sir John Strachey to consent 
 to give up his Governorship and accept the post 
 of Financial Minister on the Indian Council at the 
 retirement of the then Minister, Sir William Muir. 
 
 Lady Lytton and her children left the Viceroy at 
 Allahabad and went straight to Simla on account of 
 the heat. 
 
 Lord Lytton reached Calcutta on April 12, and 
 was there received at Government House by Lord 
 Northbrook. The out-going Viceroy led his suc- 
 cessor into the Council Chamber where the Members 
 of Council assembled. The officiating Home Secre- 
 tary read the Royal Warrant of appointment and 
 Lord Lytton then made a short speech. 
 
 ' It was not without considerable hesitation,' he 
 writes to Lord Salisbury, ' that I decided at the last 
 moment on breaking the customary rule of silence 
 on such occasions by at once addressing to the 
 Council in presence of the public a short speech. 
 
 ' From day to day and hour to hour I found as I 
 approached Calcutta that the spirit of anticipative 
 antagonism to the new Viceroy was so strong on the 
 part of the Council here that any appearance of 
 scolding or lecturing them at starting would have 
 been fatal to our future relations. The choice, there- 
 fore, lay between saying nothing, or saying something 
 studiously sedative to the quills of these fretful 
 porcupines ; and on reaching Allahabad I had fully 
 made up my mind to say nothing. My intention 
 was changed by Strachey.' 
 
 Of the eff*ect made on the audience by the speech 
 
 E 
 
50 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Colonel Colley wrote to Lady Lytton. ' I confess I 
 had hoped he would not speak, for it is one of the 
 occasions when it is so difficult to avoid platitudes 
 on one side or saying too much on the other, and I 
 have hardly ever before heard that kind of address 
 without wishing half of it unsaid. But now I am 
 very glad he did speak and that I was there to hear 
 him, and only wish you had been too. I had not 
 realised either the power or the modulation of his 
 voice before, nor, though I was prepared for beautiful 
 language, was I quite prepared for such perfect and 
 easy command. But it was the simple earnestness 
 which carried home more than an3^thing else, and 
 there was a sort of holding of the breath in the room 
 at some parts. 
 
 ' I cannot but think that that speech will help him 
 greatly in his start ; that the general impression was 
 much the same as mine I gather from the remarks I 
 heard around me. A stranger standing near me I 
 heard say : " That was a treat indeed worth coming 
 to hear.' " 
 
 The intercourse between Lord Lytton and Lord 
 Northbrook was of the friendliest character. 
 To Lady ' Lord Nortlibrook has been to me most kind, 
 
 AprU Ts 187G ^auk, and friendly,' writes Lord Lytton, ' and we parted 
 from each other not altogether without emotion.' 
 
 The new Viceroy was now left to meet his Council 
 alone. He was not well, the heat affected him, and 
 he suffered from constant headache and nausea. He 
 confided to his wife that he felt as if he were 
 living under the weight of an increasing nightmare, 
 and oppressed by a sense of forlornness, isolation, 
 and discouragement. 
 
 Nothing, however, of this mood appeared in his 
 relations with those who now surrounded him. 
 
1876 FIRST DAYS IN INDIA 5 1 
 
 Tlie improvement of our relations with Afghani- 
 stan was the first matter of importance to which 
 Lord Lytton directed his attention after his arrival 
 in Calcutta. He had anticipated much difficulty in 
 obtaining the support of his Council to the measures 
 which in the first instance he desired to take, but 
 his fears proved to be unfounded. For the reasons 
 that have already been explained, he did not produce 
 the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, and 
 he had no difficulty in obtaining the assent of the 
 Council to the opinion that the appointment of a new 
 Viceroy and the proposed assumption by the Queen of 
 an imperial title which would proclaim unmistakably 
 to the Eastern world the fact of her supremacy 
 over the whole of India, afforded a favourable occa- 
 sion for endeavouring to re-open friendly communi- 
 cations with the Amir of Kabul. The Commander- 
 in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, had come to Calcutta 
 for the express purpose of giving Lord Lytton his 
 support. He was in complete accord, in regard to 
 this Afghan question, with his predecessor, that 
 chevalier sans 'peur et sans reproche, Lord Napier of 
 Magdala, who, when he was leaving Lidia, had 
 written to Lord Lytton expressing in strong terms 
 his conviction that our position towards Afghanistan 
 was 'unsafe and humiliating,' and that measures 
 ought no longer to be delayed for improving it. 
 
 The instructions of the Home Government had left 
 to Lord Lytton complete discretion in regard to the 
 manner in which communications should be opened 
 with Sher Ali. The suggestion that a mission to the 
 Amir might perhaps be combined with one to the 
 Klian of Khelat, and proceed to Kabul by way of 
 Quettah and Kandahar, could not be acted upon, 
 because an officer had been sent by the Government 
 
 B 2 
 
52 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 of Lord Northbrook on a special mission to the Khan 
 a few days before the arrival of Lord Lytton in 
 India.' The adoption of the further suggestion that 
 it would be desirable, in the first instance, to 
 communicate with the Amir through the Commis- 
 sioner of Peshawur seemed, however, open to no 
 objection. There could be no difference of opinion 
 in regard to the importance of improving our 
 relations with Sher Ali, and the members of Council 
 gave their unanimous consent to Lord Lytton's 
 proposal that while no letter should be sent by the 
 Viceroy himself, a less formal communication should 
 be made to the Amir by the Commissioner, telling 
 him that it was proposed to send either to Kabul or 
 to any other place which he might prefer a special 
 mission to announce to him the recent accession of 
 the Viceroy to ofiice, and the assumption by the 
 Queen of the title of Empress of India, and assuring 
 him of the friendly disposition of the British Govern- 
 ment. The risk would thus be avoided of any em- 
 barrassing refusal on the part of Sher Ali to receive 
 the mission, a contingency which could not be ignored 
 while his attitude towards us was so little satisfactory. 
 The mission thus proposed differed to some 
 extent in its character from that contemplated in 
 the instructions of the Secretary of State, and was 
 more restricted in its immediate aim. It was not 
 only ostensibly but essentially ' one of compliment 
 and courtesy.' The primary object was the esta- 
 blishment of more friendly relations and the removal 
 of the feelings of anger and distrust which the Amir 
 
 ' It was nevertheless asserted by Lord Lytton's opponents in 
 England that the negotiations with the Khan of Khelat and the signing 
 of the Treaty at Jacobabad were begiin and carried out by hiin for 
 the express purpose of irritating the Amir of Kabul, and forcing him into 
 an attitude of open hostility. 
 
1876 FIRST NEGOTIATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 53 
 
 appeared to entertain. The mission might at least, it 
 was hoped, if nothing else were gained, prepare the way 
 for future negotiations, and be the first step towards 
 a settlement of existing difficulties. Lord Lytton did 
 not wish that any question likely to be unpleasant to 
 the Amir should be raised at all. It was only in the 
 event of the Amir receiving the Envoy with cordiality, 
 and showing an apparently sincere desire to improve 
 his relations with us, that any subject of political 
 importance need be discussed. It was possible that 
 in the course of amicable communications the real 
 wishes of the Amir might be ascertained, but the 
 Envoy would volunteer no proposals on behalf of our 
 Government. 
 
 A few days after this decision had been arrived 
 at, Lord Lytton left Calcutta for Northern India, and 
 on April 24 he met the Commissioner of Peshawur, 
 Sir Eichard Pollock, at Umballa, and gave to him the 
 draft of the letter which was to be sent to the Amir. 
 A Mohammedan officer, Eessaldar-Major Khanan 
 Khan, Aide-de-camp to the Viceroy, was chosen to 
 carry the Commissioner's letter to Kabul. The letter First letter to 
 was to the effect that the Commissioner desired to ^ ™'^ 
 acquaint the Amir that Lord Lytton had assumed 
 the Viceroyalty of India, that ' His Excellency had 
 inquired very cordially after the Amir's health and 
 welfare and that of His Highness Abdullah Jan,' and 
 that it was the Viceroy's intention, as soon as the 
 necessary arrangements could be made, to depute 
 Sir Lewis Pelly to him as special Envoy. 'Sir 
 Lewis Pelly (the letter said) will be accompanied 
 by Dr. Bellew and Major St. John, for the purpose of 
 delivering to your Highness in person at Khureeta, 
 a letter informing your Highness of His Excellency's 
 accession to office, and formally announcing to your 
 
54 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen 
 has been pleased to make to her sovereign titles 
 in respect to her Empire in India. I feel sure that 
 your Highness will fully reciprocate the friendly 
 feelings by which the Viceroy's intention is prompted, 
 and I beg the favour of an intimation of the place at 
 which it would be most convenient to your Highness 
 to receive His Excellency's Envoy. Sir Lewis Pelly, 
 who is honoured by the new Viceroy with His 
 Excellency's fullest confidence, will be able to discuss 
 with your Highness matters of common interest to the 
 two Governments.' 
 Amir receives Some delay occurrcd in consequence of the 
 necessity of obtaining from Kabul a safe-conduct for 
 the Eessaldar, and it was not until May 17 that he 
 was able to deliver the Commissioner's letter to the 
 Amir. It was impressed upon him that he had no 
 political function of any kind, and that he had been 
 selected simply out of compliment to the Amir, as 
 the bearer of the letter. He was to make it known, 
 however, that the proposed mission would be of 
 the most friendly character, and that the probable 
 result would be one highly favourable to the Amir's 
 interests. 
 
 Before the Commissioner's letter reached its 
 destination some interesting information regarding 
 the attitude of the Amir was received throucrh a 
 
 o 
 
 pensioner of the British Government who, in the time 
 of Dost Mohammed, had taken a prominent part in 
 Afghan politics. It strengthened the opinion which 
 Lord Lytton had formed regarding the feelings of 
 Sher Ali towards our Government, and rendered him 
 more doubtful than before of obtaining any satis- 
 factory reply to the overtures that were being made. 
 This information was contained in a letter giving an 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 55 
 
 account, which there was every reason to believe 
 trustworthy, of a durbar held by the Amir at 
 Kabul, at which all the principal Sirdars and officers 
 of the Court and the heads of the principal tribes 
 were present. A report had been received that an 
 English army was marching through the Bolan Pass 
 with the intention of occupying Kandahar. This the 
 Amir declared to be perfectly groundless ; he said 
 that Mr. Disraeli, who was then in favour in England 
 and who had appointed Lord Lytton, was the same 
 Minister who had previously appointed his true 
 friend Lord Mayo, that the new Viceroy had brought 
 with him Lord Mayo's Secretary, and would un- 
 doubtedly be his friend also. He then ordered the 
 Court to be cleared; his confidential officers were 
 alone allowed to remain, and the Amir told them 
 that he wished to learn their opinions. He said that 
 he believed that the English Government was 
 seriously disturbed by the approach of the Eussians 
 towards Merv, and that they wished to send an Envoy 
 to Kabul or to obtain his consent to the establishment 
 of a permanent mission at Herat. If this were to 
 happen he was afraid that he would be involved in 
 difficulties, and that the Eussian Governor-General 
 at Samarkand would declare that he had taken 
 measures hostile to the interests of Eussia. The 
 Sirdars replied : ' We are in a dilemma which 
 requires deep deliberation to remove. The Amir 
 should summon or write to the Governor of Balkh, 
 who is in constant communication with the Eussians 
 and well versed in their affairs, for advice what to 
 do.' A letter was written to the Governor accord- 
 inglj^ Various reports were then mentioned. One 
 of them from Bokhara was to the effect that it was 
 the common talk in the Eussian camps at Samarkand 
 
56 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cu. ii 
 
 and other places in Turkestan that the daughter of 
 the Emperor of Eussia, who was married to an 
 EngUsh Prince, had been offended, and had gone to 
 her father to complain, and that this had caused a 
 rupture between the two Powers. After a long- 
 silence the Amir said that an English escort had 
 passed with a kafila unmolested through the Bolan 
 Pass, and that a complaint that the Kliyber was not 
 kept similarly safe for trade would next be made. 
 He was bewildered, he said, what to do. To this 
 the Prime Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, 
 replied that so long as intercourse with the English 
 was prevented, the interests of the Amir and of the 
 Afghans would flourish and the friendship of the 
 Amir would be eagerly sought by the Eussians on 
 the side of the Oxus and by the English on the side 
 of India. ' The lessons,' he said, ' which had been 
 learned by his frequent missions to the English 
 Government in India would never efface this im- 
 pression from his heart.' 
 
 There can be no question that this declaration 
 summed up very accurately the views of the Afghan 
 Minister, He, it will be remembered, had been the 
 Envoy whose fruitless mission to Lord Northbrook 
 in 1873 is well known. He had returned to Kabul 
 with feelings anything but friendly to our Govern- 
 ment, and with the conviction that more was to be 
 feared from Eussia than from ourselves. He was a 
 man of no little ability, his influence was great, and 
 his constant hostility to the English produced, 
 without any doubt, a most serious impression on the 
 suspicious mind of the Amir. 
 May 12, 187G On May 22 the Amir gave to the Eessaldar his 
 
 repV^™'"^'^ answer to the Commissioner's letter, and it reached 
 Peshawur on June 1. It was written in the usual 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 57 
 
 Style of oriental verbosity, and was full of the 
 ordinary commonplaces of politeness, but in sub- 
 stance it was vague and ambiguous and hardly 
 courteous. It was virtually a refusal to receive the 
 proposed mission. It was to the effect that all 
 questions affecting the two States had been sufficiently 
 discussed with the Amir's agent in 1873, and in the 
 correspondence between the Viceroy and Amir that 
 followed the Simla conferences, and that further 
 discussion was unnecessary. If, however, there 
 were any fresh subjects which the British Govern- 
 ment wished to bring forward, the Amir preferred to 
 make himself acquainted with them by sending to 
 the Viceroy a confidential agent of his own.^ 
 
 On the same day on which the Amir's letter was 
 despatched, the British agent at Kabul sent to the 
 
 ' It is not easy to give either a translation or a summary of the 
 obscure verbiage of the Amir's Persian letter. The following is the 
 official literal version of the only portions of it which have any im- 
 portance : 
 
 ' In the particular of the coming of the Sahibs for the purpose of 
 certain matters of the two Governments is this, that the Agent of his 
 friend formally personally held political parleys at the station of 
 Simla ; those subjects, full of advisability for the exaltation and 
 permanence of friendly and political relations, having been considered 
 sufficient and efficient, were entered in two letters, dated Thursday, 
 the 21st of the month of Eamzan the Sacred, in the year 1290 of the 
 Flight of the Prophet, and dated Friday, the 22nd of the month of 
 Safar the Victorious, in the year 1291 of the Flight of the Prophet, 
 and need not be repeated now. Please God the Most High, the 
 friendship and the union of the God-given state of Afghanistan in 
 relation to the state of lofty authority, the Majestic Government of 
 England will remain strong and firm as usual. At this time, if there 
 be any new parleys for the piirpose of freshening and benefitting the 
 God-given state of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let 
 it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in 
 that place and being presented with the things concealed in the 
 generous heart of the English Government, should reveal to the 
 suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the matters weighed by 
 a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of 
 affectionate writing.' — Narrative of Events in Afghanistan.. 
 
58 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Commissioner of Pesliawur an interesting account of 
 the consultations that had taken place between the 
 Amir and his advisers and of his reason for refusing 
 to receive the mission. This account was especially 
 valuable, because it was undoubtedly written with 
 the knowledge and approval of the Amir. Three 
 reasons were given. The first was that the Amir 
 could not guarantee the safety of the British officers 
 of the mission. The second reason was that if the 
 British Envoy ' should put forth any such weighty 
 matter of State that its entertainment by His 
 Highness, in view of the demands of the time, should 
 prove difficult, and he should verbally reject it, there 
 would occur a breach of the friendship of the two 
 Governments. And then, for the sake of removing 
 that breach, it will be necessary for both Govern- 
 ments to endure troubles. It was by reason of these 
 very considerations, at the time of making the first 
 treaty between the Enghsh Government and the 
 State of Kabul, that His Highness the late Amir 
 objected to the coming of an English Envoy of 
 European race. Moreover, from that time to this, 
 whenever occasions have presented themselves for 
 the coming of Sahibs, the Kabul Government has 
 always objected to them from farsightedness. Now, 
 too, the coming of Sahibs, in view of the state of 
 affairs, is not desirable.' 
 
 The third reason for refusing the mission was the 
 most significant of all, and it was undoubtedly that 
 which had the greatest influence on the decision 
 of the Amir. It is here quoted in extenso from the 
 official translation of the agent's report : 
 
 ' To us especially the point of chief regard is this 
 — that if simply, for the sake of seeking the good- 
 will of the English Government, we consent to the 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 59 
 
 coming of a European agent, and for his safety, let 
 us suppose, perfect arrangements are made, then 
 this great difficulty arises, that the coming and going 
 of the Sahibs cannot be concealed anyhow from the 
 Eussian Government, which on my northern border 
 is conterminous with the frontier of the Ens^lish 
 Government. The people of the Eussian Govern- 
 ment are extremely fearless. If any man of theirs, 
 by way of Envoy, or in the name of speaking about 
 some other matter of State, should suddenly enter the 
 territory of Afghanistan, then it would be impossible 
 by any means to stop him. In other words, their 
 way too would be opened ; and in the opening of 
 that road there is good neither to the State of Kabul 
 nor to the English Government. Consequently in 
 this matter it is better that the coming and going of 
 the Sahibs should, according to the former custom, 
 remain closed ; and first that some confidential agent 
 of ours going to the English Government, and there 
 becoming acquainted with the State requirements, 
 should inform us of what is in the mind of the 
 English Government ; and the Kabul Government, 
 considering the subject in its own place, give answer 
 to the English Government regarding those objects, 
 whether written or verbal. And if our man, in 
 conversation there, agree to or refuse any point, 
 then by all pretexts the Amir can arrange for its 
 settlement. But if in his presence it devolves on His 
 Highness to summarily accept or reject some State 
 demand, this becomes a very hard matter, and its 
 ultimate issue will not turn out well.' 
 
 These communications from Kabul reached the Viceroy re- 
 
 CG1V6S COlU- 
 
 Viceroy on June 5. They appeared to him entirely munications 
 to confirm the opinions which he and Her Majesty's J^^ f ^^"^ 
 Government had formed, and to show very plainly 
 
6o LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 the convictions and intentions of Sher Ali, He 
 summed up his conclusions as follows in a private 
 To Lord letter to Lord Salisbury : ' First, the Amir is 
 
 Salisbury satisfied that there is nothinof more to be cfot out of 
 us ; second, that there is not much to be feared 
 from us. He is also under an impression that if we 
 are not positively pledged to passivity by some 
 understanding with Russia, we are at least mortally 
 afraid of coming into collision with her by more 
 actively supporting him. He consequently looks 
 upon his northern neighbours as the more formidable 
 of the two. He argues that if we are obliged to 
 propitiate Eussia, a fortiori he must do so, and that 
 his only safe policy for the present is to treat us both 
 as Penelope treated the suitors. But, as he believes 
 us to be the most scrupulous and least offensive of 
 his two awkward customers, it is England that he is 
 least afraid of ofTendinof. The Government of a oreat 
 empire which, in a matter closely concerning its own 
 interests, suffers itself to be with impunity addressed 
 by a 'weak barbarian chief who is under accumu- 
 lated obligations to its protection and forbearance 
 in terms of contemptuous disregard, cannot be sur- 
 prised if its self-respect and powers of self-assertion 
 are under-rated by such a correspondent. The prac- 
 tical difficulty of the present situation is that I 
 have no means of verbal communication with the 
 Amir. The native agent is not to be trusted. Many 
 things which it is absolutely necessary to make Sher 
 Ali understand and duly appreciate, and which could 
 be very effectively said to His Highness by an i ntel- 
 ligent agent, one hesitates to put into writing when 
 "itris-^obable that the letter will be transmitted to 
 Eussian headquarters.' 
 
 When the Amir's letter was received, it was 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 6 1 
 
 necessary to decide whether his answer should be 
 taken as final. It was Lord Lytton's conviction that 
 the reasons given by Slier Ali for refusing to receive 
 the proposed mission could neither be accepted by 
 the British Government with dignity nor be passed 
 over in silence. He thought that an opportunity 
 should be afforded to the Amir of reconsidering his 
 decision, and that this course was not only desirable 
 in our own interests, but was the fairest towards the 
 Amir himself. But he felt that a second communica- 
 tion, renewing an offer already rejected, would place 
 our Government in a false position if it failed to 
 show to the Amir the serious responsibility that he 
 would incur by adopting a line of conduct which 
 would have the appearance of deliberate discourtesy, 
 or which omitted to show to him generally but 
 distinctly the views which we held regarding his 
 position and our own. The subject was discussed in 
 the Council, to which Lord Salisbury's instructions of 
 February 28 were now communicated. The majority 
 agreed with the opinion of the Viceroy, and the 
 Commissioner of Peshawur was directed to write to 
 the Amir in the following terms : 
 
 After acknowledging the receipt of the Amir's 
 letter, and once more explaining that in the suggested 
 mission the Viceroy was actuated only by friendship 
 towards the Amir, the letter went on : ' The reluctance juiy 8, istg 
 evinced by your Highness to the reception of this fj^theVrnfr 
 friendly mission is much to be regretted. 
 
 ' But by a letter which I have received from the 
 British agent at your Highness' Court, I am induced 
 to believe that your Highness' advisers, in counselling 
 you not to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, may have 
 been influenced by a misconception of the objects of 
 His Excellency, or may not have fully considered the 
 
62 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. n 
 
 light in which such a refusal might be regarded by 
 the British Government. I have therefore, in accor- 
 dance with the Viceroy's instructions, explained at 
 length to the British agent the views of His Excellency 
 on the relations between the two Governments, and 
 on the causes to which he attributes the reluctance 
 of your Highness to receive the mission. These 
 views he has been instructed to communicate to your 
 Highness. 
 
 ' Your Highness has indeed suggested that it would 
 answer all purposes were you to depute a confidential 
 agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the 
 British Government. My friend, the Viceroy cannot 
 receive an agent from your Highness when you have 
 declined to receive His Excellency's trusted friend 
 and Envoy. The British agent at the Court of your 
 Highness will explain to you the reasons which 
 make it impossible for the Viceroy to accept such a 
 proposal. 
 
 ' It is the Viceroy's sincere desire not merely to 
 maintain, but also materially to strengthen, the bonds 
 of friendship and confidence between the British 
 Government and the Government of Afghanistan, so 
 that the interest of your Highness, as the sovereign 
 of a friendly and independent frontier State, may be 
 effectually guaranteed against all cause for future 
 anxiety. But the support of the British Government 
 cannot be effectual unless it is based on reciprocal 
 confidence and a clear recognition of the means 
 requisite for the protection of mutual interests. 
 
 ' I am to repeat that in proposing to send a friendly 
 mission to your Highness, the Viceroy has been 
 actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your 
 Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance on closer 
 terms than heretofore of amicable relations between 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 63 
 
 the two Governments, in view of common interests 
 more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the 
 personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty. 
 It will for this reason cause the Viceroy sincere 
 regret if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand 
 of friendship now frankly held out to you, should 
 render nugatory the friendly intentions of His 
 Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as 
 a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the 
 alliance and support of the British Government.' 
 
 The letter to the Amir was despatched on July 8, 
 and the British agent at Kabul was at the same time 
 instructed to give personally to the Amir additional 
 explanations and assurances. He was to point out, 
 with reference to the fears that had been expressed 
 regarding the safety of the proposed mission, that it 
 had never been thought essential that the Envoy should 
 go to Kabul itself, and that it had been distinctly stated 
 that the Viceroy was prepared to send his Envoy to 
 any place which the Amir himself might prefer ; that 
 the apprehension that demands injurious to the Amir 
 might be made upon him was quite groundless, and 
 that so long as the Amir showed himself to be a loyal 
 friend and ally, the Viceroy would always regard the 
 interests of Afghanistan as identical with those of the 
 British Government. With regard to the objections 
 made in the Kabul Durbar, that if British missions 
 were received by the Amir he would be obliged to 
 receive Kussian missions also, the agent was to 
 remind him that the Government of the Czar had 
 given to the British Government assurances that it 
 would not interfere, directly or indirectly, in the 
 affairs of Afghanistan, that consequently the reception 
 of a British Envoy could lead to no such consequences 
 as those that had been feared, for in declining to 
 
64 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 receive a Eussian Envoy the Amir would only be 
 acting in conformity with the policy which had 
 alreadv been solemnly agreed upon. ' If,' tlie Amir 
 was told, ' His Highness should on further reflection 
 recognise the expediency of learning the true nature 
 of His Excellency's views and dispositions in regard 
 to matters which materially concern the interests of 
 His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly will still be authorised 
 to wait upon the Amir, at such place as he may 
 appoint, and should the interviews consequent on 
 this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable 
 understanding between the two Governments, the 
 Viceroy will be happy to meet the Amir in person at 
 Peshawur in November next, if His Highness should 
 so desire.' 
 
 Three members of the Council, Sir William Muir, 
 Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse, dis- 
 sented from the views of Lord Lytton and the 
 majority of their colleagues. They were of opinion 
 that Slier Ali was acting within his right in refusing 
 to receive an English mission, that the reasons 
 assigned by him were substantial, and that the pro- 
 posed letter was almost equivalent to a threat of war. 
 They held that although stress had been laid on 
 the temporary and complimentary character of the 
 mission, its real object was, as the Amir well knew, 
 to enforce the reception of permanent English agents, 
 that we were not dealing fairly with the Amir if we 
 omitted to state distinctly the object at which we 
 were aiming, that if the temporary mission were 
 accepted and the permanent mission refused our 
 position would be embarrassing, and that we ought 
 to resolve beforehand whether in such a case we 
 should accept the refusal or resort to force. It was 
 better, they thought, to wait until the Amir was in 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 65 
 
 want of our assistance to help him out of difficulties, 
 when we could make terms with him. 
 
 Lord Lytton's reasons for thinking it essential 
 that this further communication should be made to 
 the Amir were recorded by him in an official note 
 from which the following extract may be made : 
 
 ' I am anxious to take this opportunity, the viceroy's 
 earliest in my power, of noticing the arguments urged ^g^^^^' ^"°^ 
 against the course which, after anxious reflection, 
 I still deem it my duty to pursue, in the conduct of 
 our relations with the Amir of Kabul. I understand 
 the policy of those of my colleagues who are unable 
 to adopt my own point of view to have been correctly 
 described, by those whose description of it is most 
 authoritative, as " a waiting policy." But a policy 
 of waiting is, by the essential nature of it, a policy 
 destined and intended to merge, at some period in 
 the course of events, into a policy of action, or at 
 least of attainment ; and, for this reason, at every 
 point in the prosecution of such a policy, as time 
 goes on without bringing us any nearer to the attain- 
 ment of its avowed object, it behoves us to consider 
 whether the inadequate result of our waiting be due 
 to our not having yet waited long enough, or to our 
 having already waited too long. 
 
 ' It is obvious that a policy of waiting for ever on 
 the course of events, without the slightest attempt to 
 control it, would be no policy at all ; and I am per- 
 suaded that such a simulacrum of a policy has no 
 advocate in this Council. The only practical ques- 
 tion, therefore, for present consideration is, whether 
 we have waited long enough, or too long. 
 
 ' The policy of passive expectation has been tried 
 with great patience for many years past ; and I 
 cannot find that it has been productive of a single 
 
 ¥ 
 
66 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's result that is not eminently unsatisfactory. Not in 
 iSTo'*^' '^""'^ ^ '^^^ official correspondence to which it has given 
 rise is there one solitary expression of opinion that 
 this policy has improved the character of our inter- 
 course with the Afghan Government, or increased 
 our control over its conduct. Any such opinion is, 
 indeed, forbidden by indisputable facts. Whilst the 
 avenging current of uncontrolled events has been 
 rapidly deepening the danger and strengthening the 
 pressure from without, which augment the defensive 
 importance to us of a strong hold upon Afghanistan, 
 our relations with that country have steadily deterio- 
 rated ; until at last the Amir, whose disposition 
 towards the British Government was in 1869 unmis- 
 takably cordial, now rejects our gifts and advice, 
 with an apparently profound indifference to the 
 periodical expressions of our meekly passive regret. 
 
 '■ Judging the tree by its fruits, therefore, I can 
 come to no other conclusion than that the waiting 
 policy has failed after a singularly fair trial of it. 
 Is there any valid ground for hoping that, by a pro- 
 longed and more assiduous cultivation of it, this 
 policy will now, within an}^ calculable period of time 
 or at any time at all, be suddenl}^ productive of 
 results essentially different from those it has already 
 produced ? I think not. Tlie anticipation has, 
 indeed, been expressed with some confidence by two 
 or three of my colleagues that, if we only still go on 
 waiting long enough, the Amir will very soon be 
 spontaneously sorry for his conduct towards us and 
 eagerly solicitous of our favours, that events, if left 
 entirely to themselves, will before long bring him to 
 our feet, or drive him into our arms. Could I share 
 this anticipation, I should recognise in it a conclusive 
 argument for maintaining the policy of passive 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 67 
 
 expectation, undeterred by the experience of the viceroy's 
 past. I have, therefore, examined with care the only J^'^g"*^' "^^^^ 
 grounds on which such an hypothesis can rest, 
 
 ' Virtually they resolve themselves into a single 
 assumption, viz. the early probability of one or other 
 of two events, pressure on the Amir by Eussia from 
 without or by his own subjects from within. It is 
 certainly probable that Slier Ali would spontaneously 
 sue for our assistance, and accept it on our own terms, 
 if he were attacked by Eussia. But that is precisely 
 the contingency which it is our interest to prevent. 
 The alliance of the Amir will have lost much of the 
 value we may even still accord to it when, instead 
 of enabling us to make better provision for the 
 defence of our territory, it obliges us to rush, 
 unprepared, to the rescue of his. Eussian statesmen, 
 however, are, to say the least, as wary and sagacious 
 as we. I foresee no probability of such a mistake on 
 their part ; and the most dangerous of all policies is 
 that which reckons exclusively for its success upon 
 the faults or blunders of others. Our present object, 
 as I understand it, must be, not war for the defence 
 of our frontier, but the security of our frontier for 
 the prevention of war. If Eussia ever attacks 
 Afghanistan, it will be with the intention of attack- 
 ing the British Empire in India, and in the belief 
 that the British Empire cannot efficiently defend 
 itself. If we passively await such an event, it is not 
 so much Slier Ali who wiU then help us, as we who 
 shall have to help him, under conditions which his 
 previous disregard of our advice and our own neglect 
 of timely precautions may have rendered seriously 
 disadvantageous . 
 
 ' But, if Eussia does not attack Afghanistan, she 
 can do nothing else which will have the effect of 
 
 F 2 
 
68 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's driving the Amir, "before long," into our arms. 
 
 1876"*^' '^""^ Every successful attempt, secretly made by her, to 
 establish a pacific political influence at Kabul, or a 
 moral ascendency over the mind of the Amir, must 
 surely have the effect, not of driving him into our 
 arms, but of still further detaching him from us. 
 • And if, in the meanv^diile, we are to make no effort 
 to avert such a result ; if the Amir is to remain 
 perfectly independent of our influence, and absolutely 
 unpledged to our Government, so that, when the 
 critical moment arrives, he may be conveniently free 
 to choose between the alliance of England and the 
 alliance of Eussia, we must not take it for granted 
 that he will then throw himself into our arms rather 
 than into those of our great rival. To me the 
 possibilities seem all the other way ; for, if ever such 
 a moment does arrive (and who can even feel sure 
 that it is far distant ?), the most we can then offer the 
 Amir will be less than the least that Eussia can offer 
 him — viz. a share in her anticipated conquest of the 
 rich plains of British India. 
 
 ' The importance of being beforehand with Eussia 
 by establishing a dominant British influence at 
 Kabul was fully appreciated by Lord Palmerston as 
 early as 1847. In a letter then written to Lord 
 Eussell, he observed that " a Eussian force in 
 occupation of Afghanistan might not be able to 
 march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan 
 into the advanced post of Eussia, instead of that 
 advanced post being in Persia; and, whatever 
 Hardinge may say of the security of the rest of our 
 frontier, you would find in such case a very restless 
 spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese, 
 and by all the unincorporated States scattered about 
 the surface of our Indian possessions. These things 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 69 
 
 would lead to great expense, would require great viceroy's 
 efforts, and might create considerable damage. The Jg^^**^' '^"^"^ 
 best method of preventing these embarrassments 
 seems to be to take up such a position, not in posse, 
 but in esse, as would make it plain to everybody that 
 we could not be taken by surprise." 
 
 ' I am of opinion that there is no sufficient reason 
 to anticipate from the " waiting policy " in the future 
 any better results than those whereby it must be 
 condemned if judged by the past. 
 
 ' Nevertheless, if this great empire, for the safety 
 of which so large a share of personal responsibility 
 has been laid upon me, had now no neighbour more 
 formidable than the Amir of Kabul, I think that, 
 considering the weakness of such a neighbour, the 
 turbulent character of his subjects, the geographical 
 configuration of his country, and the wretched 
 recollection of former ill advised and ill executed 
 interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, it might 
 possibly be prudent to treat with passive indifference 
 the churhshness of Sher Ali ; and accept, without 
 remonstrance, all that is unsatisfactory in our rela- 
 tions with him, so long as he abstained from acts of 
 aggression, to which he is not likely to resort and 
 which we could easily punish. In other words, I 
 think that much might, perhaps, be urged with 
 effect in favour of the " waiting policy," if the situa- 
 tion we have now to deal with were not materially 
 different from the situation to which that pohcy was 
 first applied. 
 
 ' But, Rusticus exspectat dura dejiuit amnis. While 
 we wait upon the bank, the stream is bearing from 
 us what we wish to keep, and to us what we wish to 
 avoid. The circumstances of 1876 are essentially 
 different from those of 1869. The neighbour we 
 
70 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN .IDMINISTEATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's have now to fear is not Afghanistan but Eussia. 
 
 Minute, June ^^^ ^^le danger with which we are most immediately 
 menaced by Eussia is not the loss of territory, but 
 the loss of that political influence or prestige which 
 is the most pacific safeguard of territory. Sher Ali 
 may wish to remain stationary ; but the Eussian 
 power in Central Asia cannot remain stationary. Its 
 position is too weak. Small bodies gravitate to great 
 ones. If Afghanistan does not gravitate towards 
 the British, it must gravitate towards the Eussian 
 Empire. And between bodies of equivalent gravity 
 the attractive force of the one that is in movement 
 will always exceed that of the one which is motionless. 
 'In 1853 Lord Palmerston, writing to Lord 
 Clarendon, recorded an opinion which (if I may 
 venture to speak of myself in connection with so 
 eminent a statesman) completely expresses the con- 
 viction I have formed from nearly twenty years' 
 practical study of Eussian diplomacy in Europe. 
 " The policy and practice of the Eussian Government," 
 he says, "have always been to push forward its 
 encroachments as fast, and as far, as the apathy, or 
 want of firmness, of other Governments would allow 
 it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was 
 met with decided resistance, and then to wait for 
 the next favourable opportunity to make another 
 spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of 
 this policy, the Eussian Government has always had 
 two strings to its bow — moderate language and 
 disinterested professions at Petersburg and London ; 
 active aggression by its agents on the scene of 
 operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the 
 Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait ac- 
 compli which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, 
 recede from. If the local agents fail, they are 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 7 1 
 
 disavowed and recalled, and the language previously viceroy's 
 held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have f^^^^^' '^^^^ 
 overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified 
 in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits 
 of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia. Orlof! 
 succeeded in extorting the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi 
 from* the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden 
 thought suggested by the circumstances of the time 
 and place, and not the result of any previous in- 
 structions ; but, having been done, it could not be 
 undone. On the other hand, Simonivitch and Viko- 
 vitch failed in getting possession of Herat in conse- 
 quence of our vigorous measures of resistance ; and 
 as they failed, and ivheii they had failed, they were 
 disavowed and recalled and the language previously 
 held at Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the 
 sincerity of the disavowal, although no human being 
 with two ideas in his head could for a moment doubt 
 that they had acted under specific instructions." 
 
 ' Our own position, as regards Slier Ali, seems, 
 at the present moment, to be this — that, whilst his 
 Highness is in no wise bound to help us against 
 Eussia, we are under an admitted obligation to help 
 him against her ; that he is practically free to 
 negotiate with Eussia whenever he pleases ; and that 
 ■we are practically unable to negotiate with him. 
 Such a position is not only undignified ; it is, in 
 our present circumstances, positively dangerous. It 
 suggests the following question, to which, during the 
 last few months, my most anxious and constant con- 
 sideration has been given : Can we now better it, 
 and, if we fail in any attempt to better it, may we 
 not make it worse ? It is not a question of letting 
 well alone, but of letting bad alone ; and there are, no 
 doubt, situations in politics, as in life, when, for those 
 
72 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's wlio are the victims of tliem, it is " better to bear 
 mmitcJune ^]^g -jjg ^g ^iSLve, tliaii fly to others that we know 
 not of." 
 
 ' Now, nobody can recognise more seriously than 
 I do, that there is considerable risk in whatever we 
 do as well as in whatever we do not do ; it is a risk 
 bequeathed to us by the inexorable Nemesis of 
 neglected opportunities. Fortune is a fair player, 
 and never checkmates a man, or a nation, without 
 first crying check ; but we have greatly increased 
 the difficulty of our game by not moving our pieces 
 when there was still time to cover the Kino-. 
 
 'The arguments in favour of letting bad alone, 
 for fear of making bad worse — or, in other words, of 
 meeting the Amir's rejection of our present proposals 
 by reversion to a waiting policy — are all comprised, I 
 think, in the three following propositions : 
 
 ' 1. The position in which we are thus left, as 
 regards our relations with Afghanistan, though not, 
 indeed, all that could be wished, is quite good 
 enough. We have endured it without serious incon- 
 venience for the last five years, and there is no reason 
 why we should not as conveniently endure it for the 
 next five years ; since, in fact, we have obtained from 
 Eussia the recognition of our exclusive right to hold 
 diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, and that is 
 really all we need. 
 
 ' 2. Whatever may be the intrinsic weakness of 
 this position, the native population of India is still 
 fortunately under the impression that it is a strong- 
 one, and that our relations with Afghanistan are 
 thoroughly satisfactory. Any proceeding, therefore, 
 on our part which might disturb this salutary faith 
 by revealing the hoUowness of its foundation would 
 prejudicially weaken the confidence of our native 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 73 
 
 subjects ill the plenitude of our power and the viceroy's 
 
 . T /. T Minute, June 
 
 Wisdom oi our policy. i876 
 
 ' 3. Be the situation good or bad, any attempt to 
 improve or escape from it must infallibly land us in 
 a worse position ; for practically there is no alter- 
 native between the passive toleration of the Amir's 
 present attitude towards us, and a declaration of 
 hostilities against Afghanistan, So that any step to 
 right or left out of the false position in which we 
 now find ourselves must be deprecated as a first step 
 towards war. Such a step would be specially unwise 
 at the present moment; because the mind of our 
 Mohammedan population is, in all probability, much 
 excited just now by the ncM^s which daily reaches 
 us from Constantinople, and their sympathies would 
 be against us in any act of aggression on a Moham- 
 medan State. 
 
 ' Now all these propositions appear to me to rest 
 on fallacious premisses. As regards the first, it is 
 unhappily not to be denied that the situation we have 
 accepted during the last five years has been steadily 
 deteriorating ; and I cannot contemplate without 
 alarm its continued deterioration during the next five 
 years. Looking at what has recently happened in 
 Central Asia, and at what is now happening in 
 Europe, I am persuaded that, if our influence declines, 
 that of Eussia must increase at Kabul. 
 
 ' As regards the second of the above-mentioned 
 propositions, I have been at some pains to ascertain 
 the impression made by recent and present events on 
 those native chiefs and princes with whom I have as 
 yet come into personal contact ; and I have myself 
 been seriously impressed by the apparent unanimity 
 of their opinion as to the reality of the rivalr}^ between 
 
74 LORD LYTTOX'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's England and Eussia in the East and the weakness of our 
 1870^ ^' "°^ pohtical influence in Afghanistan. But even if I could 
 believe that the natives of India are under any illusion 
 as to the true character of our actual position in re- 
 gard to Afghanistan, I should still consider it unwise 
 to refrain from all attempt to rectify that position 
 for fear of dispelling an illusion which cannot last for 
 ever. 
 
 ' With regard to the third proposition, I neither 
 desire a war with Afghanistan nor contemplate any 
 step likely to provoke it. But ever3''one who has 
 had the slightest experience in the management of 
 international relations must be aware that there are 
 a thousand ways of influencing the conduct of your 
 neighbours without going to war with them ; and of 
 augmenting, or enforcing, the external power of a 
 State without recourse to arms. Nor is reckless 
 action the only alternative to reckless inactivity. 
 
 ' I entirely share the opinion that a frank and 
 straightforward policy is generally the best on all 
 occasions. But the above-mentioned remarks appear 
 to have been suggested by a misapprehension of fact. 
 I have always thought, and still think, that a per- 
 manent British Envoy at Kabul would be both 
 unnecessary and unwise ; for if the Amir can be 
 induced to recognise his true interests, satisfactory 
 intercourse between the two Governments can be 
 better secured by other means. Therefore, the 
 establishment of a permanent British mission at 
 Kabul is not amongst the objects I have in view. 
 But here I must further explain that, in the event of 
 Slier All's assent, on further reflection, to the recep- 
 tion of a special Envoy from the Viceroy, it is not, 
 and never was, my intention to instruct or permit 
 the Envoy to make to the Amir a single proposal of 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 75 
 
 any kind or on any subject, in the name of the viceroy's 
 Viceroy, or the Government. All I desire and i876 ' 
 intend is that if the Amir should, on his part, make 
 any proposals to the Envoy, the Envoy may be in a 
 position to answer them with perfect frankness and 
 decision, so far as they can be anticipated ; explaining 
 clearly to the Amir the terms and conditions on 
 which the British Government is prepared to accede 
 to such and such demands on his part, and the 
 reason why such and such others must be 
 declined. 
 
 ' If, therefore, the Amir makes no proposals to our 
 Envoy, the mission will retain to the last its purely 
 complimentary character ; and we shall be neither 
 better nor worse off for it, except in so far as it will 
 have served to test the disposition of the Amir, as to 
 which, at present, we can only make guesses, more 
 or less plausible ; and possibly to furnish us with 
 some intelligent and intelligible information about 
 the actual state of affairs at Kabul, as to which we 
 are now for all practical purposes in profound 
 ignorance. If, on the other hand, the Amir does make 
 any overtures to our agent, or any demands upon 
 our Government, they will at least be answered 
 whether affirmatively or negatively without ambiguity, 
 and in a manner consistent with the dignity of a 
 great empire. . . . 
 
 ' As it is, unfortunately, one of our chief difficulties, 
 in any possible negotiation with Sher Ali, is the 
 probability that he may make demands upon us so 
 exorbitant that none of them can be accepted. But 
 if we formally invite him beforehand to make all the 
 demands which we are secretly disposed to accept, it 
 stands to reason that he will take it for granted that 
 our first word is not our last ; that he will greatly 
 
"J^ LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's Overrate the iniportance we attach to his alliance, 
 
 Minute, June j j.i • /> , , , . n 
 
 1876 and the sacrmces we must accept to secure it ; and 
 
 that he will raise his pretensions accordingly. . . . 
 
 ' When I received Sher All's letter rejecting the 
 proposed mission, I had to consider whether his 
 rejection of it was tentative or final. Had I come to 
 the conclusion that it must be regarded as final, I 
 should have felt it my duty to lose no time in 
 informing my colleagues of the steps which, in antici- 
 pation of such an event, I had considered, and was 
 prepared to take, for the protection of British 
 interests without further reference to those of the 
 Amir. But, bearing in mind the reticence of the 
 letter written by Sir Eichard Pollock under my 
 instructions to Sher Ali, and all the circumstances 
 which might have reasonably induced the Amir to 
 believe that he has nothing more to hope and nothing 
 more to fear from us, I came to the conclusion that 
 it was fairer to His Highness, and more advantageous 
 to ourselves, to regard his reply as a tentative one, and 
 to give him the opportunity of reconsidering his 
 decision. The occasion, therefore, for acting on the 
 Amir's rejection of the mission had not, as it seems to 
 me, yet arisen.' 
 The Amir '^^^® Commissioner's letter was delivered to the 
 
 replies, Sept. 3 Amir on July 17, but it was not until September 3 that 
 any answer was sent to it. Meanwhile the attitude 
 of the Amir was extremely doubtful, and the Diaries 
 of the British agent showed that much excitement 
 had been aroused in Kabul by reports that a religious 
 war against the infidels was to be proclaimed. The 
 Mulla, Mushk-i-Alam of Ghuzni, who was held in 
 special honour, was consulted, and all the corre- 
 spondence of the Amir with the British and Eussian 
 Governments was placed before him. He was 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN ']^ 
 
 received at a special durbar, at which Sher Ali 
 described to him the situation in which he was 
 placed between the two great Powers. ' It is desi- 
 rable,' the Amir said, ' that you should, in compliance 
 with my wishes, summon all the MuUas and learned 
 men of all grades from time to time, and direct them 
 to advise and exhort the people occasionally, so that 
 by your exertions the gem of the promotion of the 
 strength of Islam may fall as desired into the palm 
 of success. Though hitherto the friendship existing 
 between the Governments has not been disturbed, it 
 is evident that if a more powerful bird catches a 
 little one in his claws, the small bird does not refrain 
 from using its claws for its release until it is killed. 
 It is a matter for thousands of congratulations that 
 the Mohammedans of Afghanistan have from ancient 
 times stood against the depredations of foreign races. 
 ' Under these circumstances it is incumbent on me and 
 on you to consider it one of your most important 
 objects to direct the people of Islam to make efforts 
 for their safety and to provide for or guard against 
 the evil day.' 
 
 In accordance with the desire of the Amir, the 
 MuUa Mushk-i-Alam summoned the MuUas of Kabul 
 and the neighbourhood, and, after consulting them, 
 pronounced his opinion that the first decision to 
 refuse to receive the British mission had been right 
 and should be maintained. 
 
 While the Amir was hesitating regardinf? the 
 answer to be sent to the letter from the Commissioner 
 of Peshawur, he received with much cordiality a 
 Mohammedan Envoy bearing a letter from the 
 Eussian Governor-General. Another Envoj^ from 
 General Kaufmann had arrived in June, and he still 
 remained at Kabul. A copy of the letter brought by 
 
78 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. ii 
 
 one of tliese Envoys was given by the Durbar to the 
 British agent and sent by him to the Government of 
 India, but with this exception nothing transpired 
 recrarding; the communications between General 
 
 CD O 
 
 Kaufmann and the Amir. General Kaufmann's letter 
 was a very long one, giving minute details regarding 
 the late annexation of Khokand. It was sent, General 
 Kaufmann said, in continuation of previous com- 
 munications, because it was due to the Amir as the 
 friend of Eussia that he should be made acquainted 
 with the events that had occurred. Although it 
 professed to be a letter of mere courtesy, it was 
 obviously intended to impress on the mind of Sher 
 Ali the hopelessness of any opposition to the 
 military power of Eussia and the danger of pro- 
 voking it.^ 
 
 These proceedings of General Kaufmann were 
 reported by Lord Lytton's Government to the 
 Secretary of State, and diplomatic correspondence 
 between the British and Eussian Governments fol- 
 lowed. It led, as usual, to no practical result. The 
 Eussian Government declared that they ' had not 
 endeavoured to conclude any arrangement, com- 
 mercial or political, with the Amir of Kabul, and 
 that the rare relations of their authorities in Central 
 Asia had never borne any other character than one 
 of pure courtesy, in conformity with local usages in 
 the East. While now receiving these assurances the 
 Imperial Government hoped that the British Govern- 
 ment would recognise that practically they had never 
 swerved from them, whatever may have been the 
 erroneous interpretations placed by the native 
 Asiatic Governments on the communications of 
 
 ^ The letter will be found in Parliamentary Papers No. 1, 1881, 
 Central Asia, pp. 12-14. 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 79 
 
 General Kaufmann, and whatever false importance 
 may have been attributed to the method of trans- 
 mission adopted by him.^ Some months afterwards, 
 the correspondence closed with the following per- 
 fectly just and accurate comments of Lord Lytton's 
 Government : ' There can be no doubt that the 
 communications between General Kaufmann and 
 Sher Ali exceed the requirements of mere exchanges 
 of courtesy, and are regarded as something much 
 more than complimentary by the person to whom 
 they are addressed. The messages from General 
 Kaufmann to the Amir have not been despatched, 
 as stated by the General, only " once or twice a year." 
 During the past year they have been incessant. The 
 bearers of them are regarded and treated by the 
 Amir as agents of the Eussian Government, and, on 
 one pretext or another, some person recognised by 
 the Afghan Government as a Eussian agent is now 
 almost constantly at Kabul. We desire to submit to 
 your Lordship's consideration whether our own 
 conduct would be viewed with indifference by the 
 Cabinet of St. Petersburg, were the Government of 
 India to open similarly friendly relations with the 
 Klians of Khiva and Bokhara, and if, without 
 actually making to them overtures of alliance, we 
 addressed to those princes frequent letters containing 
 assurances of friendship, coupled with explanations 
 of the policy we deem it desirable to pursue towards 
 the States upon our own frontier.' 
 
 At this time a remarkable proposal was made 
 privately to the Viceroy by Sir Jung Bahadur, the proposals of 
 Prime Minister and virtual master of N"epaul. His S'^^/T^ 
 loyal friendship towards our Government was 
 undoubted ; he understood that our relations with 
 
 ^ Note by M. de Giers to the British ambassador, March 5, 1877. 
 
So LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 the Amir were in a most unsatisfactory position and 
 that the growing influence of Eussia in Afghanistan 
 was causing us anxiety, and he fancied that if he 
 were himself to visit Kabul as our recognised repre- 
 sentative he would be able to convince Slier Ali that 
 we had no designs hostile to his interests, and that he 
 would act wisely in entering into the closest and 
 most loyal alliance with our Government. The pro- 
 posals of Sir Jung Bahadur could not be entertained, 
 but they were declined with an expression of sincere 
 and cordial thanks, and the Eesident at Kliatmandu 
 was authorised to explain confidentially to the 
 Minister the Viceroy's views of the whole situation. 
 
 The news of the constant and intimate corre- 
 spondence which was now carried on between the 
 Eussian General and the Amir of Kabul had one 
 salutary effect. It finally convinced the members of 
 the Viceroy's Council that the time for a purely 
 inactive policy was over, and that one of more active 
 interference must now be insisted upon. ' The 
 neck of the opposition on this subject has been 
 broken,' writes the Viceroy to Lord Salisbury, ' and I 
 anticipate no further difficulty in carrying out my 
 own views.' 
 Amir's reply, On September 3 the Commissioner of Peshawur 
 
 tie^tl'^ received the Amir's reply to the letter which had 
 
 Amir proposes been addrcsscd to him on July 8. This reply con- 
 *BrSh native taiucd the suggcstiou that our native agent at 
 agent to India gabul, wlio had loug been acquainted with the 
 wishes of the Amir, should be summoned to his own 
 Government, to expound to them the state of affairs 
 at Kabul, and hear from them all their desires and 
 projects, returning then to Kabul to repeat to the 
 Amir the result of such intercourse. 
 
 This was much what Lord Lytton had anticipated, 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 8 1 
 
 and he decided without hesitation to accept the Viceroy 
 
 . • J 1 accepts the 
 
 Amir s proposal. suggestion 
 
 An answer accordingly was immediately sent to 
 the Amir, to the effect that his proposal was accepted 
 by the Government of India, as being ' altogether 
 advantageous to the realisation of their chief object, 
 which was to ascertain the actual sentiments of his 
 Highness.' 
 
 Atta Mahomed Khan, the British native agent, British native 
 reached Simla on October 6. Si Oct.\'' 
 
 After being closely cross-examined by Sir Lewis 
 Pelly, Colonel Burne, the Viceroy's Private Secretary, 
 and Captain Gray, a personal friend of the Amir's 
 Prime Minister, the agent had two interviews with 
 the Viceroy himself. The substance of these several 
 conversations has already been made public, and it is 
 therefore only necessary to give a short summary of 
 them. The agent, after first denying that there 
 existed any grievance in the mind of the Amir, was 
 induced to make a full confession of the complaints 
 which he nourished against us and of the demands 
 which he still had at heart. The Viceroy then con- 
 fided to the agent how far he was prepared to accede 
 to these demands, and upon what terms. 
 
 The agent represented the Amir as chiefly 
 alienated and disappointed by the results of the 
 mission in 1873 of his Minister Syud Noor Mahomed 
 to Lord Northbrook. The principal object of tliat 
 mission, on the part of the Amir, had been to secure 
 a definite treaty of alliance with the British Govern- 
 ment ; a guarantee that he would receive support in 
 the shape of arms and money in every case of 
 external aggression ; that the British Government 
 should disclaim connection with any pretender to the 
 throne of Kabul, and agree to recognise and support 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Conference 
 with native 
 at;ent at 
 Simla 
 
 only his declared heir ; finally, that he should receive 
 a permanent subsidy to enable him to support his 
 troops. 
 
 These demands the British Government of Lord 
 Northbrook's time had refused to grant, and from 
 that time the Amir had distrusted us, and had 
 derived the impression that our policy and action in 
 his regard had been for our own self-interest, irre- 
 spective of the interests of Afghanistan ; that while 
 we desired to depute political agents into Afghanistan 
 and induce the Amir to guide his policy by our 
 advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any 
 future course in regard to him. He had thus come 
 to question our consistency and good faith; while 
 his counsellors were habitually seeking hidden mean- 
 ings in our communications. 
 
 As regards the Amir's objections to receiving the 
 mission which the Viceroy had proposed sending to 
 Kabul, the agent stated that His Highness entertained 
 no hope of an improvement in our mutual relations, 
 and thought therefore no practical result would 
 follow from the mission ; that his presence might 
 create excitement, and be attended by personal risk ; 
 that if a British mission were received at Kabul, a 
 pretext would be afforded the Eussians for sending 
 a similar one. Eecent political history in Europe 
 showed that the English were unable to compel the 
 Eussians to adhere to treaties, and were equally 
 impotent to arrest Eussian aggressions. The Amir 
 was well aware that, sooner or later, Eussia would 
 attack Afghanistan, and this with ulterior objects ; 
 but his Highness also knew that in such a crisis the 
 British would defend him in their own interests. 
 Finally, the agent averred, and this greatly interested 
 the Viceroy, that the Amir's reluctance to admit 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 83 
 
 British officers within his territor}^ arose out of a Conference 
 fear not that they would be murdered, but that in agent at^^^ 
 the present unfriendly state of his relations with us ^^™^* 
 they would be regarded by his subjects as persons 
 deputed, not to support, but to control or check, his 
 authority, and in that case the Afghans would make 
 of such agents the confidants of all their grievances, 
 and claim from them the protection and goodwill of 
 the British Government versus the Amir. 
 
 Privately to Captain Gray the agent mentioned 
 the matters which the Amir and his advisers had 
 m.ost at heart. 
 
 1. That no Englishman should reside in Afghani- 
 
 stan, at any rate at Kabul. 
 
 2. That the British Government should agree to 
 
 recognise and support the declared heir 
 Abdullah Jan, and should disclaim connec- 
 tion with Mahomed Yakub or any pretender. 
 
 3. That we should agree to support the Amir 
 
 with troops and money against all external 
 aggression. 
 
 4. That we should grant them some permanent 
 
 subsidy. At present the treasury of the 
 Amir was empty, the revenue quite in- 
 adequate to the maintenance of his force 
 of some 75,000 troops. Consequently the 
 force was underpaid, ill found, and inefficient. 
 The Amir was also anxious to obtain a pied 
 a terre in British territory, whither to send 
 his family and property when he cleared 
 for action with the Eussians. 
 
 5. That the British Government should refrain 
 
 from internal interference in Afghanistan. 
 
 6. That we should enter into an ofiensive and 
 
 defensive alUance, equally binding to both 
 parties. g 2 
 
Simla 
 
 84 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ir 
 
 Conference Havinfi- fully heard these complaints and demands, 
 
 with native • _. ^ -^ ,, . . ^^ , . ' 
 
 agent at the Viceroy personally miormed the agent what con- 
 
 cessions he was prepared to make to the Afghan 
 ruler, and upon what terms. 
 
 1. He was willing to enter into an alliance such 
 as had been demanded — namely, that the 
 friends and enemies of either State should 
 be those of the other. 
 
 2. That in the event of unprovoked external 
 aggression, assistance should be afforded the 
 Amir in men, money, and arms. Also that 
 the British Government were willing to 
 assist him in fortifying his frontier. 
 
 3. That Abdullah Jan should be recognised as the 
 Amir's successor. 
 
 4. That a yearly subsidy should be offered the 
 Amir, the amount of which and other details 
 to be settled by Plenipotentiaries. 
 
 These concessions amounted to a promise to grant 
 all the requests which had been denied to the Amir 
 at the Simla Conference of 1873, and which, had 
 they then been granted, might perhaps have secured 
 Sher Ali as a firm and friendly ally to the British 
 Government. 
 
 The conditions attached to the proposed conces- 
 sions were as follows : 
 
 That the Amir held no external relations without 
 our knowledge, and refrained from provoking his 
 neighbours. 
 
 That he declined all communication with Eussia, 
 referring? the ao-ents of that Power to us. That 
 British agents should reside at Herat, or elsewhere 
 on the frontier. 
 
 That a mixed Commission of British and Afghan 
 officers should determine and demarcate the Amir's 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 85 
 
 frontier. That arrangements should be made for the conference 
 free circulation of trade along the principal trade ^ent'at'^^ 
 routes of Afghanistan and for the establishment of a Simla 
 line of telegraph. 
 
 Finally, the Viceroy would forego the establish- 
 ment of a permanent Envoy at Kabul on condition 
 that the Amir deputed an envoy to the Viceroy's 
 headquarters and that he received special missions 
 whenever requested. 
 
 If the Amir was prepared to treat on the above 
 basis he might at once send his minister Syud Noor 
 Mahomed Shah to meet Sir Lewis Felly at Feshawur, 
 Jellalabad, or wherever might be preferred. The 
 Viceroy, however, clearly explained to the British 
 agent that unless the Amir gave his consent to the 
 establishment of a British agency on the frontier as 
 a basis of negotiation it would be needless for him 
 to depute his minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, 
 and the Viceroy would then be free to adopt his 
 own course in his re-arrangement of frontier relations 
 without regard to Afghan interests. 
 
 Sir Lewis Felly regretted this conditional stipu- 
 lation, having been alarmed by the agent's strong 
 expression of opinion that the Amir would not 
 consent to the establishment of British agencies on 
 his frontier. The Viceroy, however, held firmly that 
 negotiations entered into without any accepted 
 basis of principle would after protracted discussions 
 end in a pubUc failure and increased misunder- 
 standings. 
 
 A remark made by the Viceroy in the course of 
 these interviews with the native agent became the 
 subject of attack by the Opposition at home as if it 
 had been made to the Amir himself or to his repre- 
 sentative, whereas it must be remembered that this 
 
86 
 
 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. n 
 
 Conference 
 ■with native 
 agent at 
 Simla 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Memorandum 
 
 agent was a confidential servant of the Government of 
 India, usually resident at Kabul, but bound to act in 
 our interests and to represent our views there. Lord 
 Lytton wrote of this matter after his return to England: 
 ' I said to the agent that the position of the Amir wa& 
 that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots ^ ; but 
 I never addressed those words directly to the Amir, 
 or to any agent of his. My motive for using such 
 an expression in conversation with our own native 
 agent was that I found him under a totally false 
 and exaggerated impression as to the power of the 
 Amir, and it was necessary to make him understand 
 the real character of the situation. But the words 
 I did deliberately address to the Amir through this 
 agent I was careful to write down, in order that they 
 might be accurately conveyed to His Highness.' As 
 the short Memorandum which the agent was instructed 
 by the Viceroy to communicate to the Amir for this 
 purpose contains a complete refutation of the charge 
 that he attempted either to bully or deceive Slier Ali, 
 it may be quoted here. 
 
 'I authorise the aj:>-ent to tell the Amir that, if 
 His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be 
 a warm and a true, a firm and a fast friend to him, 
 doing all that is practically in my power to stand by 
 him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to 
 strengthen his throne, establish his dynasty, and 
 confirm his succession in the person of his selected 
 heir. 
 
 'I am willing to give him, if he wishes it, a 
 treaty of friendship and alliance, to afford him 
 assistance in arms, men, and money, and to give to 
 his heir the public recognition and support of the 
 
 ^ This simile was first used by Sir B. 
 Salisbury, March 3, 1876. 
 
 Frere in his letter to Lord 
 
1876 AFGHANISTAN 87 
 
 British Government. But we cannot do these things viceroy's 
 unless the Amir is, on his part, equally willing to ^^emorandum 
 give us the means of assisting him in the protection 
 of his frontier, by the residence of a British agent 
 at Herat, or such other parts of the frontier most 
 exposed to danger from without as may hereafter 
 be mutually agreed upon. I do not wish to em- 
 barrass the Amir, with whose difficulties I fully 
 sympathise, by carrying out any such arrangement 
 until after the signature of a treaty of alliance on 
 terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the 
 perfect loyalty of our friendship, nor until after he 
 has had the means of satisfying his people that the 
 presence of a British agent on his frontier signifies 
 our firm support of himself and his Heir Apparent 
 with all the power and influence of the British 
 Government. Nor have I any wish to urge upon the 
 Amir the reception of a permanent British Envoy at 
 his Court, if His Highness thinks it would be a source 
 of embarrassment to him. 
 
 ' In short, it is my object and desire that our 
 alliance and the presence of our agents on the 
 Afghan frontier should be a great strength and 
 support to the Amir at home and abroad — not a 
 source of weakness or embarrassment to him.' 
 
 Eeferring to this Memorandum in a paper 
 written in 1880, Lord Lytton wrote: 'Neither to 
 Slier Ali nor to Yakub Khan did I ever propose, 
 much less did I ever urge on either of them, the 
 establishment of a Eesident British Mission at Kabul. 
 I sincerely believe that such an arrangement would 
 have been extremely beneficial to the two Govern- 
 ments, had they mutually desired it. But it could 
 vUot be advantageously pressed on a reluctant prince. 
 Our view was that if Sher Ali no lono-er desired to 
 
88 LOKD L\TTOX'S IXUI.IX ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Viceroy's draw closer to the British Government, there was 
 
 Memorandum , ^ ^ , > • p i mi t • 
 
 nothing to be done. But ii he were still as solicitous 
 as he professed to be in 1872 that we should pay 
 greater attention to his boundaries and increase our 
 liabilities on his behalf, then we might reasonably 
 claim his cordial acquiescence in the only means which 
 could practically enable us to satisfy his wishes.' 
 
 At the end of October the agent returned to 
 Kabul, carrying with him a letter from the Viceroy 
 to the Amir, and an aide-rnemoire which he was au- 
 thorised to communicate to His Highness containing 
 a summary of the conversations he had recently held 
 with the Viceroy, concerning the concessions he was 
 prepared on certain conditions to ofier the Amir. 
 
 To those communications no direct reply was 
 made for several months. In the meantime, events 
 in Europe were not without their effect upon the 
 Amir. Throughout India and Asia there was a pre- 
 valent expectation that hostilities between Eussia 
 and Turkey were imminent and must lead to war 
 between Eussia and England, and on the eve of such 
 an event the Amir had no intention of committing 
 himself to an English alliance ; his polic}^ was to 
 stand aloof till the latest possible moment, and then, 
 when a strict neutrality was no longer possible, to sell 
 his alliance to the hioliest bidder. 
 
 O 
 
 Lord Lytton's The most important passages of the instructions 
 relating to Afghanistan which Lord Lytton took out 
 with him were as follows : 
 
 They began by suggesting that the best coirrse of procedure might 
 be — after previous communication with the Amir, throiigli the Com- 
 missioner of Peshawur — to send a mission to Kabul by way of Quettah. 
 They then went on as follows : 
 
 ' The ostensible function of such a mission would, in either case, be 
 one of compliment and com-tesy, and the Amir's friendly reception of 
 
1876 
 
 LORD LYTTON'S INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 89 
 
 it might, in the first instance, be taken for granted. But you will, of Lord Lytton'a 
 
 course, be careful not to expose the dignity of your Government to the Instructions 
 
 affront of a publicly rejected courtesy, and should the Axnir express to 
 
 the Commissioner of Peshawur an insurmountable objection to the 
 
 reception of the proposed mission, you will, perhaps, deem it expedient 
 
 to limit its destination to Khelat. In that case you may have to 
 
 reconsider yoiu' whole line of policy as regards Afghanistan ; but you 
 
 will, at least, be enabled to do this with diminished uncertainty as to 
 
 the personal sentiments or political tendencies which determine the 
 
 value now set by Slier Ali uj)on the friendship and support of the 
 
 Government of India. . . . 
 
 ' To invite the confidence of the Amu* will be the primary' purpose 
 of your agent. To secure that confidence must be the ultimate object 
 of your Government. But to invite confidence is to authorise the 
 frank utterance of hopes which it may be impossible to satisfy', and 
 fears which it may be dangerous to confirm. "N^liether these hopes 
 and fears be reasonable or the reverse, their open avowal is, in the 
 opinion of Her Majesty's Government, preferable to their concealment. 
 
 ' It is necessary, however, that you should be prepared for demands 
 or inquiries which cannot be altogether unanticipated in the course of 
 confidential intercom'se with the Amir. In the conduct of such inter- 
 course you will be, above all things, careful to avoid evasions or ambigui- 
 ties calculated to leave upon the mind of a prince whom temperament 
 has made suspicious, and events mistrustful, any legitimate doubt as 
 to the plenitude of your power or the firmness of your policy. 
 
 ' The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly power 
 has at all times been the object of British policy. The attainment of 
 this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation 
 created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian army in 
 Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India. 
 
 ' Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference 
 the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character 
 of an Oriental Chief, whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought 
 within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of 
 tv/o great military empires, one of which expostulates and remains 
 passive, whilst the other apologises and continues to move forward. 
 
 ' It is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also 
 all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly 
 translated for the information of the Amir and carefully studied by His 
 Highness. 
 
 ' Sentiments of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of 
 Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression through the English 
 Press, in language which, if taken by Sher Ali for a revelation of the 
 mind of the English Government, must have long been accumulating 
 in his mind impressions mifavourable to its confidence in British 
 power. "Whether the passivity of that power, in presence of a situa- 
 tion thus unoflicially discussed with disquietude, be attributed by the 
 
90 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oh. ii 
 
 Lord Lytton's Amir to connivance with the pohtieal designs or fear of the miUtarj- 
 
 Instructions force of his Russian neiglibours, the inference, although erroneous, is 
 
 in either case prejudicial to our influence in Mghanistan. 
 
 ' The Russian ambassador at the Court of St. James has been 
 officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan 
 are : 
 
 ' 1st. To secure that State against aggression. 
 ' 2nd. To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by 
 giving such moral and material support to the Amu-, 
 without interfering m the internal affairs of his country, 
 as may enable Her Majestj-'s Government to prevent a 
 recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival 
 candidates for power among his own family, or the jNIirs 
 of the different Provinces. 
 ' Her Majesty's Government would not, therefore, view with in- 
 difference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British 
 influence in Afghanistan ; nor could the Amir's reception of a British 
 agent (whatever be the oflicial rank or function of that agent) in any 
 part of the dominions belonging to His Highness afford for his subse- 
 quent reception of a Russian agent similarly accredited any pretext to 
 which the Government of Her Majesty would not be entitled to except 
 as incompatible with the assurances spontaneously offered to it by the 
 Cabinet of St. Petersburg. 
 
 ' You will bear m mind these facts, when framing secret instructions 
 for yoiar Minister to Kabul. . . . 
 
 ' To demands which you have no intention of conceding your agent 
 will oppose a frank and firm refusal. You will instruct him to prevent 
 such demands from becoming siibjects of discussion. Others which, 
 under certain conditions, you may be willing to entertain, he will 
 undertake to refer to your Government, with such favourable assurances 
 as may induce the Amir to recognise the advantages of facilitating by 
 compliance with your wishes the fiilfihnent of liis own. 
 
 ' If the language and demeanour of the Amir be such as to promise 
 no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus opened, His Highness 
 should be distinctly reminded that he is isolating himself, at his own 
 peril, from the friendship and protection it is his interest to seek and 
 deserve. 
 
 ' The requests which may be made by Sher Ali in connection with 
 his reception of permanent British agents in Afghanistan will probably 
 raise the question of granting to His Higlmess : 
 ' 1st. A fixed and augmented subsidy. 
 
 ' 2nd. A more decided recognition than has yet been accorded by 
 the Government of India to the order of succession esta- 
 blished by him in favour of the younger son Abdullah Jan. 
 '3rd. An expUcit pledge, by treaty or otherwise, of material 
 support in case of foreign aggression. 
 
1876 LOED LYTTON'S INSTRUCTIONS 9 1 
 
 ' The first of these questions is of secondary magnitude. You will Lord Lytton's 
 probably deem it inexpedient to commit yom' Government to any Instructions 
 permanent pecuniary obligation on behalf of a neighbour whose 
 conduct and character have hitherto proved uncertain. On the other 
 hand, you may possibly find it worth while to increase from time to 
 time the amount of pecuniary assistance which up to the present 
 moment the Amir has been receiving. But your decision on this 
 point can only be determined by circumstances which have not arisen, 
 and considerations which must be left to your appreciation of such 
 circumstances. 
 
 ' With regard to the recognition of AbduUah Jan, whose selection 
 as legitimate successor to the throne of his father has been made with 
 much solemnity by Sher Ali, and ostensibly acquiesced in by the most 
 influential of the Afghan chiefs, 
 
 ' Her Majesty's Government, in considering this question, have 
 before them the solid and deliberate declarations made in 1869 by 
 Lord Northbrook's predecessor to the present Amir, viz. " that the 
 British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs 
 of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between 
 that Government and your Highness have been lately more closely 
 drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any 
 attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as ruler of 
 Kabul and rekindle civil war ; and it will further endeavour from time 
 to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen 
 the Government of yoiir Highness to enable you to exercise with 
 equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your 
 descendants all the dignities and honours of which 3'ou are the lawful 
 possessor." 
 
 ' The Government of India having in 1869 made that declaration, 
 which was approved by Her Majesty's advisers, have not based upon 
 it any positive measures ; whiie to the Amir, who had received that 
 declaration under circumstances of some solemnity and parade, it 
 appears to have conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favom-. 
 
 ' It is not siu*j)rising that these conflicting interpretations of an 
 ambiguous formula should have occasioned mutual disappointment to 
 His Highness and the Government of India. 
 
 ' Her Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce their 
 traditional policy of abstention from all unnecessary interference in 
 the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But the frank recognition of a 
 de facto order in the succession establisiied by a de facto Government 
 to the throne of a foreign State does not, in their opinion, imply or 
 necessitate any intervention in the internal affairs of that State. The 
 order of succession in Afghanistan has always been dictated by the 
 incmnbent of the throne, though it has generally been disputed by 
 each aspirant to the vacated position of that incumbent. 
 
 ' It remains to consider the question of giving to the Amir a 
 definite assm'ance of material support in case of internal aggression 
 
92 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ii 
 
 Lord Lytton's upon those territories over which Her ]\Iajesty's Government has 
 Instructions pvibUcly recognised and officially naaiutained his right of sovereignty. 
 ' With or without any such assurance, England would be impelled 
 by her own interests to assist His Highness in repelling the invasion 
 of his territory by a foreign Power. It is therefore on all accoimts 
 desirable that the Government of India should have at its disposal 
 adequate means for the prevention of a catastrophe which may yet 
 be averted by prudence and the fulfilment of an obligation which, 
 should it ever arise, could not be evaded with honour. The want of 
 such means constitutes the weakness of the present situation. 
 
 ' In the year 1875 Lord Northbrook gave to the Envoy of the Amir 
 the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the 
 territories of His Highness which the British Government had failed 
 to avert by negotiation, that Government would be prepared to 
 assure the Amir that they wiU afford him assistance in the shape of 
 arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with, 
 troops. 
 
 ' The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to 
 justify reproaches on the part of Slier Ali if, in the contingency to 
 which it referred, he should be left unsupported by the British 
 Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence 
 or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. 
 
 ' The Amir, in fact, appears to have remained imder a resentful 
 impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude 
 towards the Government of India has ever since been characterised by 
 ambiguity and reserve. 
 
 'Her Majesty's Government are therefore prepared to- sanction 
 and support any more definite declaration which may in your 
 judgment secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which 
 it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. 
 But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as 
 to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material 
 support to the Amir, and it must be distinctly understood that only in 
 some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation 
 arise. 
 
 ' In the next place, they cannot secure the integrity of the Amir's 
 dominions unless His Highness be willing to afford them every 
 reasonable facility for such precautionary measures as they may 
 deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve 
 the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan, nor 
 do Her Majesty's Government entertain the slightest desire to quarter 
 British soldiers upon Afghan soil ; but they must have for their own 
 agents imdisputed access to its fi-ontier positions. Tliey must also 
 have adequate means of confidentiallj' conferring with the Amir upon 
 all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognise a 
 community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming 
 attention to their friendly counsels ; and the Amir must be made to 
 
1876 LOED LYTTON'S INSTRUCTIONS 93 
 
 understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the Lord Lytton's 
 country and the character of the population, territories tdtimately Insteuction'S 
 dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to 
 those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorised 
 to enter them, 
 
 ' Her Majesty's Government are also of opinion that the establish- 
 ment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian 
 frontier to Kabul, via the Kiu'um Valley, is an object deserving of 
 consideration, and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of 
 a properly accredited Afghan Envoy is much to be desired, as a 
 guarantee for the due ftilfilment of comiter obligations on the part of 
 the Amir and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations 
 with His Highness. Subject to these general conditions, Her Majesty's 
 Government can see no objection to your compliance with any 
 reasonable demand on the part of Sher Ali for more assured respect 
 and protection, such as pecimiary assistance, the advice of British 
 officers in the improvement of his military organisation, or a promise, 
 not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate 
 aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power. 
 
 ' Such a promise personally given to the Amir wiU probably 
 satisfy His Highness, if the terms of it be unequivocal. But Her 
 Majesty's Government do not wish to fetter your discretion in consider- 
 ing the advantages of a secret treaty on the basis above dictated. 
 
 ' The conduct of Sher Ali has been more than once characterised 
 by so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the 
 Government of India that the alienation of his confidence in the 
 sincerity and power of that Government is a contingency which 
 cannot be dismissed as impossible. 
 
 ' Should such a fear be confirmed by the result of the proposed 
 negotiation, no time must be lost in reconsidering from a new point 
 of view the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan. 
 
 ' On the other hand, the success of these efforts (which, if they be 
 made at all, cannot be safely delayed) will be pregnant with results 
 so advantageous to the British power in India that Her Majesty's 
 Government willingly leave to the exercise of your judgment every 
 reasonable ft-eedom in carrying out the present instructions.' 
 
 These instructions Lord Lytton took out with 
 him. It will be seen from them that the Government 
 at home, while suggesting the lines on which negotia- 
 tions with the Amir might be conducted and a new 
 treaty framed, practically left the Viceroy free to 
 choose the time and manner in which these in- 
 structions should be carried out. 
 
94 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iii 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 TREAT! WITH THE KHAN OF XHELAT 
 
 While the overture to Sher Ali had so far been 
 fruitless of good result, negotiations with the Khan 
 of Khelat were most satisfactorily terminated in 
 a treaty signed by the Khan and his Sirdars with the 
 Viceroy and Government of India at Jacobabad on 
 December 8. 
 
 The dominion over which the Khan of Khelat 
 claims chief authority embraces the whole province 
 of Beloochistan, being bounded on the north b}^ 
 Afghanistan, on the south by the Arabian Sea, on 
 the west by Persia, and on the east by the British 
 provinces of Sindh and the Punjab. 
 
 In a confidential Memorandum submitted to his 
 Council on the subject of our relations with Klielat 
 Minutes and the Viccroy wrote : ' The history of this country is 
 Notes, 1876 ^^^^ ^^ ^^ feudal States. It is a chronicle of turbu- 
 lent ambitions and barbaric intrigues engendered by 
 a social chaos out of which no cosmical order has 
 yet been evolved ; a sanguinary narrative of incessant 
 defections and revolts, incessant submissions and 
 reconquests ; the barons fighting for their cherished 
 liberty to be lawless ; the titular ruler unable to 
 consolidate or develop his theoretical authority, and 
 barely able to secure his personal safety by adroitly 
 playing off this chief or that tribe against some other 
 tribe or chief.' 
 
1876 KHELAT 95 
 
 Up to the year 1872 it had been the pohcy of History of 
 successive agents at the Court of the Khan to uphold 
 the authority of the existing ruler, while endeavouring 
 to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs 
 of the country; but in the years 1870 and 1871 an 
 unfortunate rivalry sprang up between the Punjab 
 and Sindh systems of policy and their official repre- 
 sentatives. Colonel Phayre, political superintendent 
 at Khelat, took up the cause of the disaffected 
 Sirdars, and was supported by Captain Sandeman, 
 the official representative of the Punjab Government. 
 Sir William Merewether, however, Commissioner of 
 Sindh, strongly opposed this policy. These three 
 gentlemen were authorised by the supreme Govern- 
 ment to meet at Jacobabad, investigate the com- 
 plaints of the Sirdars, and mediate between them and 
 the Khan. To this conference Lord Lytton traces the 
 origin of all the subsequent difficulties in Khelat. It 
 resulted in the removal of Colonel Phayre and the 
 recall of Captain Sandeman. Sir William Merewether 
 was left to conclude the mediation alone, but though 
 his decision was in the main against the Sirdars it left 
 the Khan ' deeply incensed and offended by a media- 
 tion which admitted his rebellious Sirdars to be heard 
 and treated by the British Government as his equals.' 
 ' The Tro] an war,' wrote Lord Lvtton, ' would probably ,,. , 
 
 *' . . " Minutes and 
 
 have been of brief duration had the conduct of it Notes, i876 
 been left to the craft and cruelty of ordinary mortals. 
 But certain bellicose divinities espoused the rival 
 claims of Argives and Trojans, and took a pleasure 
 of their own in prolonging the conflict. In the same 
 way our Sindh and Punjab officers transferred to the 
 Olympian altitudes of the supreme Government a 
 series of miserable quarrels only appropriate to 
 their barbarian birthplace.' 
 
96 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. in 
 
 Minutes and 
 Notes, 1876 
 
 Sandeman's 
 first mission, 
 November, 
 1875 
 
 From this time forward matters grew worse and 
 worse. ' Outrage followed outrage, and no satis- 
 faction could be obtained by the British Govern- 
 ment.' A daring inroad w^as made by some Brahooe 
 tribes on British territory ; it remained unredressed. 
 The Khan's subsidy was stopped and our agent with- 
 drew from his Court, bringing with him the ex- 
 minister Wullee Mahomed. Sir William Merewether 
 then recommended an armed intervention in Khelat 
 and deposition of the present Khan. 
 
 This proposal was not looked upon with favour 
 by the British Government, and it was decided to 
 send Captain Sandeman iiito the Murree Hills for the 
 settlement of some of our disputes with the tribes in 
 that district. He started on November 22, 1875. 
 
 Lord Lytton remarks that in reading through the 
 official papers on the subject of our relations with 
 Khelat he has often found cause to appreciate the 
 wisdom of a maxim attributed to the Kino- of Burmah. 
 ' There is to everything,' says His Majesty, ' a beginning, 
 a middle, and an end. You should never go beyond 
 the beginning until you are sure of the middle ; when 
 you get to the middle, you should never forget the 
 befjinnino- • and neither at the besfinnino' nor the 
 middle should you ever lose sight of the end.' ' It 
 appears to me,' he adds, ' that in the middle of our 
 relations with Khelat we have sometimes forgotten 
 the beginning ; at least between our policy at one 
 time and our policy at another there seems to be a 
 complete solution of continuity, and I greatly fear 
 that at the present moment we are in some danger 
 of being hurried, or beguiled, towards an end not 
 clearly foreseen or deliberately desired.' 
 
 The general results of Major Sandeman's first 
 mission were, that after hearing the complaints of the 
 
1876 KHELAT 97 
 
 chiefs he had ascertained from them that they would Minutes and 
 
 T, • • 1 T • 1 -. 1 Notes, 1876, 
 
 welcome iDntish mediation, and that they were 
 willing to become peaceable subjects of the Khan on 
 certain conditions, that moreover they had been 
 induced to make a conditional submission to the 
 Khan. Further, that the Khan himself was willing to 
 submit to British mediation, and was prepared to 
 submit his case directly to the Government. 
 
 The Government of India, on receipt of Major 
 Sandeman's report (of February 1876), decided in 
 accordance with the advice given it by Colonel 
 Munro and the Punjab Government, that it was 
 worth while to take advantage of the opening thus 
 ojQfered and allow Major Sandeman to make another 
 attempt at mediation ; with the advantage, this time, 
 of enlarged instructions and a recognised position. 
 The ' instructions,' however, were again of a vague 
 character, and, much to Lord Lytton's surprise, they 
 were not conveyed in writing. 
 
 Major Sandeman started on this second mission ^^ajo'" Sande- 
 three days before Lord Lytton himself landed in mission, 
 India. The news was conveyed to Lord Lytton at ^^^^' ^ 
 Bombay, and entirely upset his original intention — 
 approved by the Government at home — of sending a 
 confidential mission first of all to Khelat, and thence, 
 after the satisfactory settlement of our relations with 
 the Khan, to Kabul via Kandahar. 
 
 The character of Major Sandeman's mission was so 
 much at variance with the principle which Lord Lytton 
 desired to adopt as the basis of his foreign policy — viz. 
 ' that of treating all frontier questions as parts of a 
 whole question, and not as separate questions having 
 no relation to each other ' — that he telegraphed and 
 wrote to Lord Northbrook on his way to Calcutta, 
 ' urging him to suspend the mission of Major 
 
 H 
 
98 LORD LYTTON'y INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. in 
 
 Minutes and Saiideman, who had not then entered Khelat territory,' 
 until his assumption of office, which took place a few 
 days later, in order that he might ' have an oppor- 
 tunity of reconsidering, and if necessary revising. 
 Major Sandeman's instructions in connection with the 
 views and plans ' he had already formed with regard 
 to his whole frontier policy, and of associating his 
 mission, if possible, more directly with the attainment 
 of the object he had in view. 
 
 Tiiis suggestion, however, was not accepted by 
 Lord Northbrook, who was ignorant of the grounds 
 on which it had been urged, and Lord Lytton was 
 forced, therefore, to recast the arrangements he had 
 contemplated in a form, he thought, less favourable 
 to their success. 
 
 Major Sandeman in the meanwhile received at 
 first answers both from the chiefs and from the Khan 
 that were not encouraging. On June 5, however, 
 he was able to telegraph that the Khan, after receiving 
 the Viceroy's (Lord Northbrook's) letter, was willing 
 to consent to the mediation of the British Govern- 
 ment, that he had overcome his objections to leaving 
 Klielat, and that he consented to meet his chiefs and 
 Major Sandeman at Mastung. On June 16 Major 
 Sandeman further telegraphed the terms of settlement 
 proposed by the Khan and acceptable to the Sirdars. 
 
 These terms as they were first drawn up did not 
 meet with the Viceroy's approval. They were, he 
 thought, too humiliating to the dignity of the Khan 
 and too favourable to the rebellious chiefs. The 
 effect of such a treaty would, he believed, greatly 
 impede his negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan. 
 
 Although it subsequently became inevitable to 
 dissociate our policy in Beloochistan from that 
 adopted towards Afghanistan, the Viceroy at this 
 
1876 KHELAT 99 
 
 time was anxious not to deal with the one frontier 
 State without carefully considering how his action 
 would affect the other, and he felt that the importance 
 of ail frontier questions was enhanced by the struggle 
 which might be pending between ourselves and 
 Eussia, on our side for the maintenance, on theirs for 
 the acquisition, of imperial power and influence in 
 the East. 
 
 The Viceroy in a long letter to Major Sandeman 
 indicated the objects which should be borne in mind 
 in drafting the new Treaty with the Khan. 
 
 1. The maintenance of a commanding influence 
 
 in Khelat. 
 
 2. The support of a strong and settled Govern- 
 
 ment there. 
 
 3. The freedom and security of the Bolan Pass, 
 
 and other trade routes. 
 
 4. The pacification of Kutchee, and the speedy 
 
 development of its great natural wealth. 
 
 5. With regard to Quettah, the importance of 
 
 which station in the event of a frontier war 
 he fully realised, he was in favour of placing 
 there a British ofiicer and hospital as a 
 means of increasing the social and political 
 influence of the English over the surrounding 
 neighbourhood, without at present availing 
 themselves of a treaty right to occupy that 
 place. 
 The Viceroy's military secretary, Colonel Colley, 
 was dispatched to Major Sandeman with full powers 
 to explain to that officer the views of the Govern- 
 ment, and bearing letters from the Viceroy to Major 
 Sandeman and the Khan. In this letter the Vice- 
 roy proposed to come himself to Jacobabad for 
 the signature of the new Treaty, and invited the 
 
lOO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. m 
 
 follow him afterwards to Delhi on 
 of the proclamation of the Queen 
 
 the 
 as 
 
 The Viceroy 
 starts for 
 Jacobabad 
 
 Letter to the 
 Queen, 
 Novetaber 15 
 
 Khan to 
 occasion 
 Empress. 
 
 Colonel Colley reached Khelat on October 14, 
 and on the 18th, at a grand Durbar, presented to the 
 Khan the Viceroy's letter and invitation. The invi- 
 tation was accepted, and the Khan at once made 
 arrangements for meeting the Viceroy at the time 
 and place appointed. 
 
 Early in November the Viceroy, accompanied by 
 Lady Lytton and suite, commenced his march from 
 Simla towards the frontier. On November 1 5 he writes 
 from Camp Dalhousie to the Queen : ' I must now 
 ask your Majesty's permission to say a few words on 
 the subject of our frontier relations, which derive 
 special importance from the present critical condition 
 of the Eastern Question. To begin with Klielat. 
 Through the territories of this State your Majesty's 
 Indian Empire is most open to attack, either from 
 the Russian army of the Caspian, or from Afghanistan 
 if the Amir of Kabul were to enter into any alliance 
 hostile to us. The assured co-operation or allegiance 
 of this State in case of war is therefore essential to 
 our means of defence or aggression. Six months 
 aofo Khelat was seethino- with civil war ; the conduct 
 of the Khan had been so unsatisfactory that we had 
 broken off relations with His Highness, and no power 
 remained in the State strong enough, or friendly 
 enough, to control the predatory border tribes, who 
 had rendered all the trade routes impassable, and 
 were with impunity incessantly devastating our own 
 territory and plundering our own subjects. Some of 
 the most experienced political officers of your 
 Majesty's Indian Government advised the Govern- 
 ment to depose the Khan and take forcible possession 
 
1876 KHELAT ' I'oi 
 
 of his country ; others proposed that we should enter 
 into separate relations with the tribes, and purchase 
 their good behaviour (as the Eomans of the lower 
 empire purchased that of the Barbarians) by paying 
 them subsidies. The first of these two proposals 
 appeared to me injudicious, and indeed impracticable. 
 The second proposal also seemed to me pusillanimous 
 and unworthy of a great empire. I have now, how- 
 ever, the satisfaction of being able to inform your 
 Majesty that the Khan of Khelat has agreed to sign 
 with me a Treaty, the terms of which will make us 
 virtually the masters of Khelat, not by annexing the 
 country, but by re-establishing the Khan's authority 
 on conditions which secure his implicit allegiance. 
 This Treaty puts an end to civil war in Khelat, and 
 provides, I think, adequate guarantees against its 
 recurrence. It is hailed with satisfaction by the 
 Sirdars and the tribes, as well as by the prince him- 
 self ; and it secures for ever to the British Government 
 the right and the power to place British troops at any 
 time in an}^ part of the khanate. In anticipation of 
 the conclusion of the Treaty, and in view of the 
 uncertain character of our present relations with 
 Eussia, I have, with the full assent — and indeed at the 
 express request — of the Khan, already thrown a small 
 British force into Quettah, a post of great strategical 
 importance in the event of war. The trade routes 
 have been re-opened, and commerce has peaceably 
 resumed its customary course. The Khan agrees to 
 meet me on my march round the frontier for the 
 purpose of signing this Treaty, and afterwards to 
 attend the Imperial assemblage at Delhi, accompanied 
 by aU his principal Sirdars, for the purpose of there 
 publicly doing homage to your Majesty as his 
 Suzerain. I anticipate from this arrangement a 
 
Jacobabad 
 
 1 02 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. m 
 
 great increase to our influence and prestige beyond 
 the frontier.' 
 Treaty of On the evening of December 7 the Viceroy 
 
 and his staflf reached Jacobabad, and the Treaty with 
 the Khan and all his Sirdars was executed on 
 December 8. A description of the ceremony is 
 given in a letter from the Viceroy to Sir Henry 
 Norman, dated ' Eiver Indus en route for Kurrachee, 
 December 12.' 
 
 ' Now I must, I fear, be more brief than I could 
 wish in my narration of the general results of my 
 exceedingly interesting visit to Jacobabad. Early in 
 the morning after my arrival, I received, in a great 
 public durbar, the Khan (who had previously 
 telegraphed to me en route offering to meet me on 
 the road, an offer which I declined with thanks) and 
 all his Sirdars, not one of whom was absent. The 
 little Khan was obviously very nervous or very 
 much alarmed, and trembled violently when I led 
 him to his seat. The durbar was most picturesque 
 and uncouth. Immediately afterwards I made him a 
 return visit, which was purely complimentary ; and 
 after luncheon, as soon as the English levee was over, 
 I had a private interview with the Khan, his chief 
 Sirdars and Ministers, Thornton, Munro, Sandeman, 
 Burne, and CoUey only. The Treaty was then signed 
 quite privately, without any salvoes or public demon- 
 strations, as I think it best not to publish it immedi- 
 ately ; and I addressed both the Khan and the Sirdars 
 at some length in explanation of their mutual obliga- 
 tions to each other and to us, under the terms of it. 
 To these injunctions and warnings the response from 
 both sides was all that could be wished. Both Khan 
 and Sirdars appeared to understand every clause of the 
 Treaty thoroughly, and to be equally delighted with it. 
 
1876 KHELAT IO3 
 
 They left me about sunset, and, this being the hour 
 of prayer, they all knelt down together outside the 
 house before mounting their horses, and offered 
 thanks to Allah for the day's event. Khan and 
 Sirdars are now on their way to Delhi. . . . [The 
 Khan] has the furtive face and restless eye of a little 
 hunted wild beast which has long lived in daily 
 danger of its life. But his manners are good, and as 
 soon as it loses its expression of alarm and mistrust 
 his countenance is not unpleasing.' 
 
 Major Sandeman, to whose tact and ability the 
 success of the Treaty was largely due, was appointed 
 the representative of the British Government at the 
 Court of the Khan, with an agent under him at 
 Quettah. He was henceforth to correspond direct with 
 the Government of India. 
 
 Lord Lytton communicated to him this news in 
 the following letter of congratulation : 
 
 'My dear Major Sandeman, — I must congratulate to Major 
 you cordially on the complete success of your difficult ^g^^g^JJ^g 
 and anxious mission, and ask you to accept my thanks 
 for the services you have rendered to my Govern- 
 ment, and to India, by enabling us to effect a satis- 
 factory re-organisation of our relations with Khelat, 
 which I think likely to become ere long much more 
 important than they have ever been before. I have 
 recommended you to the Secretary of State for a 
 C.S.I., and shall take an early opportunity of officially 
 acknowledging the good work you have done. 
 
 ' The conclusion of the Treaty signed yesterday 
 between myself and the Khan virtually terminates 
 your mission, and thus raises the question of redistri- 
 buting your escort and fixing your future position 
 and duties, &c. 
 
 ' I am not surprised to learn from Colonel Burne 
 
I04 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iii 
 
 that after your tr3dng labours of the last nine months, 
 you feel the need of rest ; and I need not say that on 
 this point I am most anxious to meet your own 
 wishes, whatever they may be, or the consideration of 
 any arrangement that is safe and practicable. But I 
 feel so strongly that just at present, and, indeed, so 
 long as our relations with Eussia and Afghanistan 
 remain in their present ambiguous and critical 
 position, your continued presence and influence in 
 Khelat are so absolutely necessary to secure and 
 confirm the results of the recent Treaty, that I anxiously 
 trust it may be compatible with your convenience 
 not to withdraw them till matters are a little more 
 settled. I think that you should have under your 
 orders a very intelligent and trustworthy agent in 
 whose tact, adroitness, and loyalty you can place 
 implicit confidence. I anticipate that Quettah will 
 henceforth be the seat of our most important Intelli- 
 gence Department in regard to trans-frontier politics ; 
 and, indeed, as soon as the pacification of Khelat is 
 completely assured, the main work of jouy diplomacy 
 in that Khanate will be to extend our influence 
 quietly, peacefully, but, if possible, rapidly from 
 Quettah in the direction of Kandahar. These con- 
 siderations I cannot attempt to develop, or discuss in 
 the present letter. It is desirable that you should 
 now address your oflicial correspondence direct to my 
 Foreign Department. 
 
 'Yours, my dear Major Sandeman, 
 
 ' Very sincerely, 
 
 ' Lytton.' 
 
 Writing in 1880 of this Treaty Lord Lytton says : 
 
 ' The Bolan Pass, then re-opened, has never since 
 
 been closed. During the Afghan campaign of 1878 
 
 not a single British soldier was maintained or a 
 
1876 KHELAT 1 05 
 
 single robbery committed in that pass. Throughout 
 the country villages have been rebuilt, and trade 
 and agriculture not only restored but powerfully 
 stimulated. The revenues of the Khan and the 
 wealth of his subjects have been largely increased ; 
 they are still rapidly increasing ; both the sovereign 
 and the people are contented ; and our Khelat 
 border is perfectly quiet. ... I am at a loss to 
 understand how our intervention in Khelat could 
 injuriously affect the Amir of Kabul. But be that 
 as it may, the propriety of a policy which was 
 intended to rescue, and which actually did rescue, 
 Beloochistan from horrible anarchy, and restore it 
 not only to peace but prosperity, was a matter to be 
 conducted on its own merits without reference to the 
 light in which it might be viewed by Sher Ali. The 
 occupation of Quettah was indispensable to the 
 success of that policy, for the Khan could not be 
 adequately supported without it. The measure was 
 adopted at the request of His Highness and his 
 Sirdars, and carried out in accordance with treaty 
 rights of long standing. There is only one word I 
 wish to add on the subject of Khelat . . . Consider 
 how terribly the difficulties, the anxieties, and the 
 expense of the Government of India would have been 
 augmented if the condition of that country, and our 
 relations with it, had been in '78 or in '80 such as I 
 found them in '76 !' 
 
 The close of the year 1876 found the Viceroy 
 and his suite in camp at Delhi for the proclamation 
 of the Queen-Empress. This historical ceremony will 
 be described in the next chapter. 
 
I06 LORD LYTTOIs'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 
 
 gueen|s title ^"hen the administration of India was transferred 
 
 in India 
 
 from the East India Company to the Sovereign, it 
 seemed in the eyes of her Indian subjects and feuda- 
 tories that the impersonal power of an administrative 
 abstraction had been replaced by the direct personal 
 authority of a human being. This was a change 
 thoroughly congenial to all their traditional senti- 
 ments, but without some appropriate title the Queen 
 of England was scarcely less of an abstraction than 
 the Company itself. The only Indian word corre- 
 sponding to the English Queen — namely, Maliha — was 
 one commonly bestowed on the wife of an Indian 
 prince and therefore entirely inapplicable to the true 
 position of the British Sovereign in India. The title 
 of Empress or Pddshdh could alone adequately repre- 
 sent her relations with the states and kingdoms of 
 India, and was moreover a title familiar to the natives 
 of the country, and an impressive and significant one 
 in their eyes. 
 
 Embarrassments inseparable from the want of 
 some appropriate title had long been experienced 
 with increasing force by successive Indian adminis- 
 trations, and were brought, as it were, to a crisis 
 by various circumstances incidental to the Prince 
 of Wales's visit to India in 1875-76, and by a 
 recommendation on the part of Lord Northbrook's 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 107 
 
 Government that it would be in accordance with 
 fact, with the language of political documents, 
 and with that in ordinary use, to speak of Her 
 Majesty as the Sovereign of India — that is to say, the 
 paramount power over all, including Native States. 
 
 It was accordingly announced in the speech from 
 the throne in the session of 1876, that whereas when 
 the direct government of the Indian Empire was 
 assumed by the Queen no formal addition was made 
 to the style and titles of the Sovereign, Her Majesty 
 deemed that moment a fitting one for supplying the 
 omission, and of giving thereby a formal and emphatic 
 expression of the favourable sentiments which she 
 had always entertained towards the princes and 
 people of India. 
 
 Lord Lytton, on his arrival in India, found that 
 this announcement, following directly upon the visit 
 of the Prince of Wales, had ' set the whole native 
 population on the qui vive,'' their prevailing sentiment 
 being one of ' anxious curiosity, with a little flutter 
 of hope,' a hope which it might be dangerous to 
 disappoint, and not only beneficial but easy to satisfy, 
 and ' in so doing to convert popular satisfaction into 
 a national enthusiasm, the force of which will be 
 felt far beyond our frontier, and more than justify 
 every argument ' used for the defence of the measure. 
 
 The feeling of favourable expectation and satis- 
 faction first excited by the prospect of the Queen's 
 assumption of the new title was troubled and chilled 
 by the unfortunate opposition to the Eoyal Titles Bill 
 in its passage through Parliament. The title required 
 to be rehabilitated in native imagination, and the final 
 efiect of its adoption would now depend on the 
 manner and circumstances of its proclamation. 
 
 To the Viceroy this presented an opportunity of 
 
Io8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Opportunity 
 for enlisting 
 sympathies 
 of native 
 aristocracy 
 
 inaugurating a new policy by virtue of which the 
 Crown of Eni^land should henceforth be identified 
 with the hopes, the aspirations, the sympathies and 
 interests of a powerful native aristocracy. To do 
 this would, he felt, materially diminish the dangers 
 with which the Empire of India was then threatened 
 by the condition of affairs in Central Asia. 
 
 Ill a letter to Mr. Disraeli, on April 30, he wrote : 
 ' Nothing has struck me more in my intercourse 
 thus far with Indian Eajas and Maharajas than the 
 importance they attach to their family pedigrees and 
 ancestral records. Here is a great feudal aristocracy 
 which we cannot get rid of, which we are avowedly 
 anxious to conciliate and command, but which we 
 have as yet done next to nothing to rally round the 
 British Crown as its feudal head. Every Eaja I have 
 yet conversed with has l^een curiously and amusingly 
 anxious to convince me of the antiquity of his family, 
 and the extent to which its importance has been 
 recognised by the Suzerain Power at various times. 
 Many of them have presented me with printed and 
 illustrated genealogies and family records, lovingly 
 edited by themselves and published at their own 
 expense. Several of these genealogies are composed 
 and printed in English. But what is worthy of notice 
 is that in all of them I find evidence that small favours 
 and marks of honour bestowed from time to time by 
 the British Government on the head of the family 
 (such as an additional gun to his salute, the right to 
 a return visit from the Viceroy, or a more honourable 
 place in durbar, &c.) are quite as highly prized and 
 appreciated as the more substantial benefits (of 
 augmented territory or revenue) conferred in earlier 
 times upon their family by an Aurengzebe or an 
 Akbar.' 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE IO9 
 
 Writing to Lord Salisbury, on May 11, he again 
 enforces his view as to the importance of this appeal 
 to sentiment. ' I am convinced that the fundamental 
 political mistake of able and experienced Indian 
 officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by \ r J 
 what they call good government; that is to say, by --- ■" 
 
 improving the condition of the ryot, strictly ad- 
 ministering justice, spending immense sums on irri- 
 gation works, &c. Politically speaking, the Indian 
 peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at 
 all, it will move in obedience, not to its British bene- 
 factors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however 
 tyrannical they may be. The only political repre- 
 sentatives of native opinion are the Baboos, whom we 
 have educated to write semi-seditious articles in the 
 native Press, and who really represent nothing but 
 the social anomaly of their own position. Look at 
 the mistake which Austria made in the cfovernment 
 of her Italian provinces. They were the best 
 governed portions of Italy ; she studied and protected 
 the interests of the native peasantry ; but, fearing the 
 native nohlesse, she snubbed and repressed it; when 
 that noblesse., having nothing to gain or to liope from 
 the continuation of her rule, conspired against it, 
 the peasantry either remained passive or else followed 
 the lead of its national superiors in attacking its alien 
 benefactors. But the Indian chiefs and princes are 
 not a mere noblesse. They are a powerful aristocracy. 
 To secure completely, and efficiently utilise, the 
 Indian aristocracy is, I am convinced, the most 
 important problem now^ before us. I admit that it 
 is not easy of immediate solution. For whilst, on 
 the one hand, we require their cordial and willing 
 allegiance, which is dependent on their sympathies 
 and interests being in some way associated with the 
 
no LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 interests of the British Power, on the other hand we 
 certainly cannot afford to give them any increased 
 pohtical power independent of our own. Fortunately 
 for us, however, they are easily affected by sentiment, 
 and susceptible to the influence of symbols to which 
 facts very inadequately correspond.' 
 
 By August 1876 the proposed scheme for the 
 proclamation of the new title had been drawn up 
 and had received the cordial support of the Vicero5'''s 
 Council in India. 
 Kaisar-i- The translation of the new title in the vernacular 
 
 dbos1;n^for^*^^ was a matter for careful consideration and consulta- 
 the Queen- tiou. The Government of India finally decided to 
 adopt the term Kaisar-i-Hind. It was short, sonorous, 
 expressive of the Imperial character which it was 
 intended to convey, and a title, moreover, of classical 
 antiquity, the term Kaisar-i-Eoom being that gene- 
 rally applied in Oriental literature to the Eoman 
 emperors, and still representing the title of emperor 
 throughout Central Asia. 
 Plans' for It was, morcovcr, decided that the new title 
 
 Delhi Assam i i i n j x. i. ■\^^ J.^ 
 
 biage should be announced at a great assemblage on the 
 
 historical plain near Delhi, on January 1, 1877 — in 
 the presence of the heads of every government in 
 India ; of 1,200 of the noble band of civil servants ; 
 of 14,000 splendidly equipped and disciplined British 
 and native troops ; of seventy-seven of the ruling 
 chiefs and princes of India, representing territories 
 as large as Great Britain, France and Germany com- 
 bined ; and of 300 native noblemen and gentlemen 
 besides. Altogether 68,000 were invited and did 
 actually reside in Delhi and in its surrounding camps 
 during the fourteen days of the Assemblage. 
 
 Had Lord Lytton been able wholly to carry out 
 his policy with regard to the Delhi Assemblage the 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE III 
 
 acts of grace which accompanied the proclamation 
 would have been of a more substantial and less formal 
 character than they actually were. 
 
 He had desired to take this opportunity to esta- Proposed 
 blish an Indian Privy Council, forming a distinct and ™n^^ct1oir 
 separate institution, restricted, at all events in the Y^**^ ^.^}^^ 
 
 Jt^ ' _ ' Assemblage 
 
 first instance, to the great chiefs, and empowered to 
 consult with and advise the Viceroy from time to 
 time on general matters of State. Occasions might 
 arise on which such sympathy and counsel would be 
 of extreme importance. 
 
 The Viceroy proposed at the same time to initiate ^''^ ','1^ 
 a Native Peerage for the Empire of India and establish • ,*f,\y>^ 
 a Herald's College at Calcutta. Such an institution 
 might, he considered, receive important development, 
 not only as a matter of sentiment, but as a material 
 addition to the forces of the Empire. The opposition, 
 however, of certain authorities at home proved too 
 strong for the schemes to be carried out in the way 
 the Viceroy had planned them, and they were finally 
 reduced to an association of some of the leading 
 native princes, with the principal advisers of the 
 Indian Government as ' Councillors of the Empress,' 
 thus forming a nucleus for a future Indian Privy 
 Council. 
 
 The further acts which were actually carried out 
 in connection with the proclamation were as follows : 
 
 Services hitherto inadequately recognised were Measures 
 rewarded ; pensions enjoyed by ancient native families adopted 
 whose unquestioned loyalty had rendered them 
 deserving of assistance were increased; numerous 
 increased salaries for life were granted to the principal 
 native chiefs ; and to each chief entitled to a salute 
 was presented, in the name of the Queen and with all 
 due ceremony, a large silken banner bearing on one 
 
I I 2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 side the Eoyal Arms and on the other his own. The 
 banners were of diverse colours, varying according 
 to the rank of the chief, and were to be carried 
 henceforth at all State ceremonials in front of those 
 to whom they were given. Gold and silver medals 
 commemorative of the day were also struck and 
 delivered respectively to each chief and to other 
 selected persons from Her Majesty. Honorary titles 
 were conferred — a reward very dear to the native 
 mind — on more than 200 native noblemen and 
 gentlemen ; a large number of certificates of honour 
 were presented to native and other gentlemen through- 
 out India holding such offices as honorary magis- 
 trates and members of municipal councils ; the pay 
 and allowances to the commissioned and non-com- 
 missioned officers and men of the native army in 
 India were increased, and a large number of appoint- 
 ments were made to the Order of British India. 
 
 There remained the more difficult task of devising 
 some appropriate recognition on the part of Govern- 
 ment of the claims of the British portion of the 
 community, representing the power by which the 
 Empire had been won and maintained in the past, 
 and on which it depended for its consolidation and 
 advancement in the present. The question was long 
 and carefully considered, more especiall}'' as Lord 
 Lytton was personally anxious that some such 
 recognition should be made. Insuperable objections, 
 however, were raised to some of the more material 
 suggestions made by the Viceroy and it proved 
 impossible finally to do more than give some ap- 
 pointments to the Order of the Star of India; to 
 create an order specially open to non-official classes, 
 now known as the ' Most Eminent Order of the 
 Indian Empire ; ' to improve in some degree the 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE II3 
 
 position of British officers serving in native regiments ; 
 and to give a day's pay to the seamen and soldiers 
 serving the Queen-Empress within Indian hmits on 
 the day of the proclamation. 
 
 On the day of the proclamation of the new title 
 nearly 16,000 prisoners were released throughout 
 British India, carrying the feeling of rejoicing to a 
 vast number of individuals in remote districts, who 
 but for this act of grace would probably never have 
 heard of the occasion. It is creditable to the judg- 
 ment with which the selections for release were made, 
 that out of this number only two cases were brought 
 to notice, after a considerable interval of time, in 
 which prisoners so released were re-committed on 
 criminal charges. 
 
 On September 11, the news of the proclamation 
 having then been made public, Lord Lytton writes to viceroy to 
 the Queen : ' All the principal chiefs have responded gept n^"^' 
 with enthusiasm to my appeal, including even the 
 Nizam, who was considered the most doubtful. I 
 now reckon on the attendance of seventy-nine ruling 
 chiefs, besides a vast number of minor chiefs. Our 
 only difficulty, indeed, is now to restrain the size of 
 the assemblage within reasonable limits. I need not 
 say that the sanitary and other arrangements, as weU 
 as the supply of food for so large a concourse of 
 human beings, besides horses, camels, and elephants, 
 require much care and forethought. The whole 
 Press of this country, English and native, has received 
 the announcement of the assemblage in the most loyal 
 and satisfactory spirit. Even those Anglo-Indian 
 journals which, as habitual supporters of the Opposi- 
 tion at home, were most hostile in their antagonism 
 to the Titles Bill, have completely changed 
 their tone, and now write in warmly approving 
 
 I 
 
114 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 terms of the policy of giving to the announcement 
 of your Majesty's Imperial Title in this country 
 the utmost possible splendour and importance. I 
 have thought it well to invite to Delhi, for this 
 occasion, the editors of all the respectable newspapers 
 in India, both the native and the English, and to 
 entertain them in their separate camp. This step, 
 which was never before taken in connection with 
 any similar ceremonial, has had the happiest effect 
 upon the tone of the whole Press. I have also invited 
 all the Members of Council, with their wives and 
 daughters^ to be my j^srsonal guests during the week's 
 festivities at Delhi, and I propose to invite the 
 attendance of the French and Portuguese Governors.' 
 Writing to Lord Beaconsfield, on October 3, he 
 says : ' I am afraid I may have seemed fussy or 
 frivolous about the decorative details of the Delhi 
 assemblage. . . . The decorative details of an 
 Indian pageant are like those parts of an animal 
 which are no use at all for butcher's meat, and are 
 even unfit for scientific dissection, but from which 
 augurs draw the omens that move armies and 
 influence princes.' 
 Threatened AH wcut wcU till late in the autumn, when news 
 
 Bombay and ^^ ^ threatened famine in Bombay and Madras started 
 Madras hostilc criticism on the proclamation scheme on the 
 
 ground that it was ' spending money on pageants * 
 when the people were starving. Lord Lj'tton, how- 
 ever, writes : ' I am strongly of opinion that the 
 Dellii meeting has become more important than ever. 
 In the first place, if we are on the eve of a war,^ it 
 is of vital importance to rouse the enthusiasm and 
 secure the loyalty of all our great feudatories ; and 
 no such opportunity of doing this has ever occurred 
 
 ' With Kussia. 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE II5 
 
 before, or is likely to occur again. . . . Again, if we 
 are really threatened with a serious famine, necessi- 
 tating additional imperial taxation and upsetting 
 all our present financial calculations, the same 
 opportunity will most advantageously enable the 
 Government of India to enter into timely and personal 
 consultation with the heads of local administrations 
 on the subject of the financial policy required to 
 meet the situation.' 
 
 Early in November 1876 the Viceroy, accom- 
 panied by Lady Lytton and his staff, left Simla for 
 a tour round the frontier, to which reference has 
 already been made in connection with the affairs of 
 Khelat. After visiting Peshawur, Lahore, Multan, 
 Bhawulpore, Jacobabad, and Kurrachee, they arrived 
 at Delhi on December 23. The completest and most 
 picturesque account of the great functions which then 
 took place there is given by Lord Lytton in his letter 
 to the Queen dated January 10, 1877. 
 
 From Lord Lytton to the Queen 
 
 ' Delhi, Pattiala, Umballa, Aligiirh, Agva ; 
 
 December 23, 1876, to January 10, 1877. 
 
 'Madam, — I have so much to report to your 
 Majesty, and so little time to write, that I should 
 scarcely know where to begin this letter, if personal 
 gratitude did not claim precedence even over public 
 business. Yesterday was rendered eventful to Lady 
 Lytton and myself by our receipt of the splendid and 
 beautiful cup which your Majesty has deigned to 
 confer upon our favoured baby boy.^ It is impos- 
 sible for me to express to your Majesty the pride we 
 feel in being honoured by this exquisite gift from the 
 
 ^ Born on August 9, 1876, at Simla. 
 
 I 2 
 
Il6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Letter to the belovecl and revered hand of " Our Queen and 
 DemrAssem- gracious Lady," nor how greatly we admire the 
 Wage beauty and perfect taste of it as a work of art. This 
 
 beautiful tassa will be an heirloom, cherished, I hope, 
 for generations in a family to which your Majesty's 
 godson, if his life be spared, will becpeath those 
 sentiments of grateful and devoted loyalty which it 
 is now his father's privilege to express on his behalf. 
 ' The day before yesterday (December 23), I 
 arrived, with Lady Lytton and all my staff, at Delhi, 
 punctually to the hour which was fixed three months 
 ago. I was received at the station by all the native 
 chiefs and princes, and, before alighting from the 
 train, I addressed to them a few words of welcome to 
 Delhi, and thanks for the cordiality with which they 
 had responded to the Viceroy's invitation. These 
 were translated by Mr. Thornton, the Officiating 
 Foreign Secretary ; and then, after shaking hands 
 with Kashmir, Sindiah, Holkar, the Nizam, Jeypore, 
 and others, I immediately mounted my elephant, 
 accompanied by Lady Lytton, our two little girls 
 following us on another elephant. The procession 
 through Delhi to the camp, which we only reached 
 towards sunset, lasted upwards of three hours. It 
 was a magnificent and most successful pageant. The 
 Viceroy and staff were followed by the chief 
 functionaries, civil and military, of your Majesty's 
 Indian Government, mounted on elephants spendidly 
 caparisoned. The streets were lined for many miles 
 by the troops ; those of the native princes being 
 brigaded with those of your Majesty. The crowd 
 along the whole way, behind the troops, was dense, 
 and apparently enthusiastic ; the windows, walls, 
 and housetops being thronged with natives, who 
 salaamed, and Europeans, who cheered as we 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 1 7 
 
 passed aloiif?. . . . The infinite variety of the non- Letter to the 
 
 £1 . . , . T " ., . -■ Queen on 
 
 British native troops presented a most striking and Delhi ABsem- 
 pecuhar appearance. Those who saw it will pro- ^^^^^ 
 bably never again behold in one spot so vivid and 
 various a display of strange arms, strange uniforms, 
 and strange figures. . . . Your Majesty's Highlanders 
 were the admiration of all who beheld them, and 
 your Majesty ma}'' well be proud of these splendid 
 troops. . . . 
 
 'My reception by the native princes at the 
 station was most cordial. The Maharaja of 
 Jeypore (who has lighted the Viceroy's camp with 
 gas of his own manufacture) informed Sir John 
 Strachey that India had never seen such a gathering 
 as this, in which not only all the great native princes 
 (many of whom have never met before), but also 
 chiefs and envoys from Khelat, Burmah, Siam, and 
 the remotest parts of the East, are assembled to do 
 homage to your Majesty. He himself, he said, could 
 hardly realise the difiiculties which had been over- 
 come, or the success which had been achieved, by 
 this assemblage ; and, indeed, up to the present 
 moment there is, so far as I can ascertain, only one 
 opinion on the part of Europeans, as well as natives, 
 that our great undertaking has commenced most 
 successfully with every promise of a no less success- 
 ful conclusion. . , . 
 
 ' I began this letter to your Majesty on the 
 evening of my arrival at Delhi ; but my time since 
 then has been so incessantly occupied by other duties 
 to your Majesty that I have only been able to continue 
 it interruptedly at rare intervals of time. I will now 
 endeavour to give your Majesty a short account of 
 all that has happened up to date, without breaking 
 the narrative by dating the interruptions in it. 
 
Il8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Letter to the ' Sunday and Christmas Day were days of rest. 
 
 ^ei^rissem- I^ivine Service was peformed in the Viceroy's camp 
 by the Bishop of Madras and Archdeacon Baly : and 
 special prayers were offered up for your Majesty in 
 reference to the event we were about to celebrate. 
 Our Christmas Day was saddened by a sudden and 
 deeply felt bereavement. Captain Clayton of your 
 Majesty's 9th Lancers, who was attached to ray staff" 
 as an extra aide-de-camp at Delhi, broke his neck by 
 a fall from his pony, whilst playing at polo, and 
 expired in the course of the night. This excellent 
 and most efficient officer was warmly beloved by all 
 who knew him. His untimely death is a great loss 
 to your Majesty's service and a lasting sorrow to 
 his fellow-officers and many friends. To poor Lord 
 William Beresford, who, from boyhood, had known and 
 loved him as a brother, the shock and grief of it have 
 been quite heartrending to witness. I have written to 
 express my deep sympathy to the officers and men of 
 his regiment. He has been buried in the camp at Delhi. 
 *0n Tuesday (December 26) from 10 a.m. till 
 past 7 P.M., I was, without a moment's intermission, 
 occupied in receiving visits from native chiefs, and 
 bestowing on those entitled to them the banners, 
 medals, and other honours given by your Majesty. 
 The durbar, which lasted all day and long after 
 dark, was most successful. The order of the chiefs' 
 visits to the Viceroy had been carefully arranged on 
 a new principle, which completely obviated all 
 difficulties and heartburnings about precedence, and 
 each of them left my tent radiant with pleasure 
 and surprise, and profuse in protestations of the 
 most grateful and devoted loyalty. The medals are 
 most artistic. They are universally admired. Their 
 recipients seem to be exceedingly proud of them : 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE I 1 9 
 
 and there is already a growing competition amongst ^eUer to the 
 both Europeans and natives to obtain even the silver Delhi Assem- 
 ones; which, I may say, have been particularly ^^® 
 useful, by enabling me, in your Majesty's name, to 
 distinguish many minor services for which no other 
 decoration, or honour of any kind, was available. 
 The banners, which are splendidly embroidered by 
 hand on the finest Chinese satins of every colour (the 
 colours chosen for each being those most appropriate 
 to the ruling prince to which it was given), have had 
 a great effect. Their only fault, which I had not 
 anticipated, is that the brass poles, which are 
 elaborately worked, make them so heavy that it 
 requires the united efforts of two stalwart Highlanders 
 to carry one of them ; and, consequently, the native 
 chiefs who have received them will, in future pro- 
 cessions, be obliged, I anticipate, to hoist them on 
 the backs of elephants. This is what they did on the 
 first occasion of their use in procession at the review 
 I held on the day of ray departure from Delhi. 
 Your Majesty's portrait, which was placed over the 
 Viceregal throne in the great durbar tent, was 
 thought by all who saw it to be a very good copy, 
 and an excellent likeness of your Majesty. The 
 native chiefs examined it with special interest. 
 
 ' On Wednesday, the 27th, I received visits from 
 native chiefs, as before, from 10 a.m. till 1 p.m., and 
 from li P.M. to 7^ p.m., was passed in returning visits. 
 I forgot to mention that on Tuesday and Wednesday 
 evenings I gave great State dinners to the Governors 
 of Bombay and Madras. Every subsequent evening 
 of my stay at Delhi w^as similarly occupied by State 
 banquets and receptions to the Lieutenant-Governors, 
 the Commanders-in-Chief, and the Governor-General 
 of Goa. To these dinners the Siamese, Nepaulese, and 
 
120 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.iv 
 
 Letter to the Yarkaiicl ambassadoi's were invited, besides many 
 
 Queen on t .• -it • a^. t r^^ 
 
 Delhi Assem- clistmguished natives. After dinner on Thursday, I 
 
 biage Yi^i^ ^ levee, which lasted till one o'clock at night, 
 
 and is said to have been attended by 2,500 persons — 
 
 the largest, I believe, ever held by any Viceroy or 
 
 Governor-General in India.' 
 
 After referring to the spontaneous expressions of 
 loyal enthusiasm uttered by Sindiah at the great pro- 
 clamation, and to the gratitude of Ilolkar for the 
 promised rectification of the Khandeish boundar}^ in 
 his favour — a gratitude which took the practical form 
 of an immediate subscription of 800/. to the famine 
 expenses of the British Government — the letter goes 
 on to say : 
 
 ' The satisfactory and cordial assurances received 
 from Kashmir are, perhaps, less important, because 
 his loyalty was previously assured. But your 
 Majesty will, perhaps, allow me to mention, in 
 connection with the name of this prince, one little 
 circumstance which appears to me very illustrative 
 of the efiect which the assemblage has had on him 
 and others. In the first interviews which took place 
 months ago between myself and Kashmir, and which 
 resulted in my securing his assent to the appointment 
 of a British officer at Gilgit, I noticed that, though 
 perfectly courteous, he was extremely mistrustful of 
 the British Government and of myself. He seemed 
 to think that every word I had said to him must have 
 a hidden meaning ac^ainst which he was bound to be 
 on his guard. During our negotiation he was careful 
 to keep all his councillors round him, and he referred 
 to them before answering any question I put to him : 
 and, although he finally agreed to my proposals, he 
 did so with obvious reluctance and suspicion, after 
 taking a night to think them over. On the day 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 121 
 
 following the Imperial assemblage, I had another Letter to the 
 private interview with Kashmir for the settlement of DemrAssem- 
 some further details. His whole manner and language ^^^s^ 
 on this last occasion were strikingly different. He 
 spontaneously dismissed all his councillors, no one 
 besides ourselves remaining in the room, except 
 Mr. Thornton, my own Foreign Secretary, and 
 Colonel Burne, and when I began to explain to him 
 the reasons why I wished him to do certain things, 
 he stopped me at once by saying, " It is unnecessary 
 to explain all that. I am now convinced that you 
 mean nothing that is not for the good of me and mine. 
 Our interests are identical with those of the empire. 
 Give me your orders and they shall be obeyed." 
 
 ' I have alread}^ mentioned to your Majesty that 
 one of the sons of Kashmir acted as my page at 
 the assemblage.^ I can truly affirm that all the 
 native princes, great and small, with whom I was 
 previously acquainted vied with each other in doing 
 honour to the occasion, and I sincerely believe that 
 this great gathering has also enabled me to establish 
 the most cordial and confidential personal relations 
 with a great many others whom I then met for the 
 first time. 
 
 ' Thursday, the 28th, was passed, like the preceding 
 days, in receiving and returning the visits of the 
 native princes, with a dinner and levee in the evening. 
 This levee was so numerously attended, and the 
 difficulty of making arrangements for the convenience 
 and good order of so large a crowd under canvas, 
 and in tents, to which the entries and modes of egress 
 are necessarily somewhat small in size and limited in 
 number, was so great that the crowd became almost 
 
 ^ The Viceroy's other page was a young midshipman in H.M.' 
 Navy. 
 
122 LORD LyTTO]S''S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Letter to the unmanageable and, as many persons thus suffered 
 Delhi Assam- from the crush, some Europeans who had come to 
 biage Delhi resolved to find there a pretext for grumbling, 
 
 being able to find no other, complained that proper 
 arrangements had not been made for their comfort 
 in connection with this levee. But really I know not 
 what more could have been done than was done by the 
 members of my staff", who, though their number had been 
 largely increased for the occasion, had been working 
 day and night for more than a week at the complicated 
 arrangements necessary for the entertainment of the 
 Viceroy's numerous guests, and the countless other 
 details connected with the assemblage. For my own 
 part I cannot express too warmly my admiration of 
 the intelligence and foresight of all their arrange- 
 ments, nor my gratitude for the cheerful devotion 
 with which they have borne all their fatiguing 
 labours ; especially are my thanks due to Colonel 
 Burne and Colonel Colley, who, during the last 
 fortnight, cannot have slept more than two hours out 
 of the forty-eight, and to whose indefatigable exertions 
 the complete success of the assemblage is mainly due. 
 If the vast number of persons collected together at 
 Delhi, and all almost entirely under canvas, be fairly 
 taken into consideration — a number including the 
 highest executive officers of your Majesty's adminis- 
 tration from every part of India, each with his own 
 personal staff*; all the members of my own Council, 
 with their wives and families, who were entertained 
 as the Viceroy's personal guests ; all the representa- 
 tives of the Press, native and European ; upwards of 
 15,000 British troops, besides about 450 native 
 princes and nobles, each with a following of from 
 2 to 500 attendants ; the foreign ambassadors with 
 their suites ; the foreign consuls ; a large number of 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 23 
 
 the rudest and most unmanageable trans-frontier Letter to the 
 chieftains with their horses and camels, &c. ; and then Demf Aiem-^ 
 an incalculably large concourse of private persons ^^^^e 
 attracted by curiosity from every corner of the 
 country — I say if all this be fairly remembered, no 
 candid person will, I think, deny that to bring 
 together, lodge, and feed so vast a crowd without a 
 single case of sickness, or a single accident due to 
 defective arrangements, without a moment's con- 
 fusion or an hour's failure in the provision of supplies, 
 and then to have sent them all away satisfied and 
 loud in their expressions of gratitude for the muni- 
 ficent hospitality with which they had been enter- 
 tained (at an expenditure of public money scrupu- 
 lously moderate), was an achievement highly 
 creditable to all concerned in carrying it out. Sir 
 Dinkur Eao (Sindiah's great Minister) said to one of 
 my colleagues : " If any man would understand why 
 it is that the English are, and must necessarily 
 remain, the masters of India, he need only go up 
 to the Flagstaff Tower, and look down upon this 
 marvellous camp. Let him notice the method, the 
 order, the cleanliness, the discipline, the perfection 
 of its whole organisation, and he will recognise in it 
 at once the epitome of every title to command and 
 govern which one race can possess over others." 
 This anecdote reminds me of another which may 
 perhaps please your Majesty. Holkar said to me 
 when I took leave of him : " India has been till now 
 a vast heap of stones, some of them big, some of 
 them small. Now the house is built, and from roof 
 to basement each stone of it is in the right place." 
 
 ' The Khan of Khelat and his wild Sirdars were, 
 I think, the chief objects of curiosity and interest to 
 our Europeans. . . On the Khan himself and all his 
 
124 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch iv 
 
 Letter to tiie Sirdars, the assemblage seems to have made an 
 DdM Assem- impression more profomid even than I had antici- 
 biage pated. Less than a year ago they were all at war 
 
 with each other, but they have left Delhi with 
 mutual embraces, and a very salutary conviction 
 that the Power they witnessed there is resolved that 
 they shall henceforth keep the peace and not dis- 
 turb its frontiers with their squabbles. The Khan 
 asked to have a banner given to him. It was 
 explained to His Highness that banners were only 
 given to your Majesty's feudatories, and that he, 
 being an independent prince, could not receive one 
 without compromising his independence. He replied : 
 " But I am a feudatory of the Empress, a feudatory 
 quite as loyal and obedient as any other. I don't 
 want to be an independent prince, and I do want to 
 have my banner like all the rest. Pray let me 
 have it." 
 
 ' I anticipate an excellent effect by and by from 
 the impressions which the yet wilder envoys and 
 Sirdars of Chitral and Yassin will carry with them 
 from Delhi, and propagate throughout that important 
 part of our frontier where the very existence of the 
 British Government has hitherto been almost un- 
 realised, except as that of a very weak power, 
 popularly supposed in Kafristan to be exceedingly 
 afraid of Eussia. Two Burmese noblemen, from the 
 remotest part of Burmah, said to me : " The King 
 of Burmah fancies he is the greatest prince upon 
 earth. When we go back, we shall tell all his people 
 that he is nobody. Never since the world began 
 has there been in it such a power as we have witnessed 
 here." These Burmese are writing a journal or 
 memoir of their impressions and experiences at Delhi, 
 of which they have promised me a copy. I have 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 125 
 
 no doubt it will be very curious and amusing. Letter to the 
 Kashmir and some other native princes have expressed Derhf Asaem- 
 a wish to present your Majesty with an imperial ^^^^se 
 crown of great value ; but as each insists upon it 
 that the crown shall be exclusively his own gift, I 
 have discouraged an idea which, if carried out, would 
 embarrass your Majesty with the gift of half a dozen 
 different crowns, and probably provoke bitter heart- 
 burnings amongst the donors. The Eajpootana Chiefs 
 talk of erecting a marble statue of the Empress on 
 the spot where the assemblage was held ; and several 
 native noblemen have already intimated to me their 
 intention of building bridges, or other public works, 
 and founding charities, to be called after your 
 Majesty in commemoration of the event. 
 
 ' But I must resume my narrative. 
 
 ' Friday, the 29 th, was passed in receiving native 
 noblemen and decorating them, and in presenting 
 banners to the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors, 
 and medals to the Members of Council and others 
 entitled to receive them. On Saturday, the oOth, I 
 received the Khan of Khelat, paid some final return 
 visits, had interviews with the Nizam, the ladies of 
 the Gaekwar's family, the Begum of Bhopal, and the 
 Princess of Tanjore. In the afternoon I held a loner 
 and very important Council, at which we settled 
 various arrangements for the administration of the 
 famine districts, about which we could not possibly 
 have effected a satisfactory understanding with the 
 local governments had it not been for the Imperial 
 assemblage, which afforded us the means of taking 
 the Governors of Madras and Bombay into personal 
 conference. I think it fair to Sir Phihp Wodehouse 
 to inform your Majesty that he appears to me to be 
 dealing with the scarcity in Bombay on sound prin- 
 
126 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Letter to the ciples and with great efficiency. But we have been 
 DeihrAssem- obliged to Send Sir Eichard Temple to Madras to 
 biage g^Q-p aj2 alarming waste of money which would, in 
 
 our opinion, if unchecked, eventually lead to a great 
 waste of life in that Presidency. The Imperial 
 assemblage, which has brought together all the 
 principal Talukdars of Oudh, has also enabled me 
 to complete, with their concurrence, arrangements 
 for the early annexation of Oudh to the North-West 
 Provinces. In fact, the great pageant at Delhi, so 
 far from being a mere empty show, has enabled me 
 to settle promptly and satisfactorily a great many 
 important administrative questions. 
 
 ''Sunday, the olst. — The accumulation of famine 
 and other business obliged me to work hard all the 
 morning. But in the afternoon I was able to visit 
 the beautiful Kutub (one of the wonders of Delhi), 
 where the Duke of Buckingham, with his daughters 
 (and Lord and Lady Downe, who are now staying 
 with us, and whose visit is the greatest comfort to 
 Lady Lytton and the greatest joy to us both), 
 picnicked with us among the ruins. 
 Ceremony of ' Monday was the day of the assemblage, which I 
 
 Januar^^i,'"'^ camiot attempt to describe to your Majesty. The 
 1877 weather was fortunately most fine. Everj^one who 
 
 witnessed it is unanimous in the opinion that it was 
 the grandest spectacle and the most impressive they 
 had ever seen. I have the honour to enclose here- 
 with to your Majesty the text of my address to the 
 princes. The afternoon was passed in the transaction 
 of business ; and at a State banquet during the even- 
 ing it was my privilege to propose the health of 
 your Majesty as Empress of India. I humbly ask 
 permission to enclose a report of the words I used in 
 discharging this honourable and most welcome duty.' 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 2/ 
 
 The letter, wliicli does not attempt to describe the 
 assemblage, may here be supplemented by a short 
 account of the actual ceremony. 
 
 Three large pavilions had been specially erected Description 
 for the occasion, at some distance outside, and over- tLn'^^Cei^e™^ 
 looking an extensive plain to the north of the cit}?^ of ^'^^y 
 Delhi. The largest of these pavilions, which was 
 semi-circular in form, about 800 feet long, facing the 
 Viceregal throne, was occupied by the governors of 
 Madras and Bombay, the ruling chiefs present at 
 Delhi, with their principal attendants, and the various 
 high officers of Government, all of whom were seated 
 in such a manner that the native chiefs were inter- 
 mingled with the high officials. The two other 
 pavilions erected to the rear, right and left, of the 
 Viceroy's throne were occupied by a large concourse 
 of spectators, including the Governor-General of the 
 Portuguese settlements in India, the Khan of Khelat, 
 the Foreign Envoys and Consuls, and European and 
 Native noblemen and gentlemen from all parts of 
 India. The British troops, European and Native, 
 were drawn up in a vast circle in the plain around. 
 
 The Viceroy arrived at the place of assemblage a 
 little after noon, and was received with a royal salute 
 from the troops assembled. On arriving at the grand 
 entrance the Viceroy, accompanied by Lady Lytton 
 and the members of his personal Staff, alighted from 
 his carriage and, preceded by his Staff, advanced in 
 procession to the dais. 
 
 His Excellency, wearing the collar, badge, and 
 robes of the Star of India, was received by the whole 
 assembly standing, the massed bands drawn up close by 
 playing the National Anthem until he had taken his seat 
 on the dais. The proclamation formally declaring Her 
 Majesty the Queen to be Empress of India was then 
 
128 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.iv 
 
 Description 
 of Proclama- 
 tion Cere- 
 mony 
 
 read in English by the chief Herald and afterwards 
 in Urdu by the Foreign Secret ar}". At its conclusion 
 101 salvos of artillery, intermingled with, feiix dejoie 
 from the assembled troops, were fired ; the Eoyal 
 Standard was hoisted, and the bands again played the 
 National Anthem. After a brief pause the Viceroy 
 then rose and addressed the assemblas^e. At the 
 close of his address he read aloud the telegraphic 
 message which the Queen-Empress had that day sent 
 in her Eoyal and Imperial name. 
 
 At the conclusion of this address the whole 
 assembly spontaneously rose and joined the troops 
 in giving repeated cheers. Man}- of the chiefs pre- 
 sent attempted to offer their congratulations, but were 
 unable to make themselves heard. The Maharaja 
 Sindiah was the first to rise. He said : ' Shah-in-Shah 
 Padshah (Monarch of Monarchs), may God bless you ! 
 The Princes of India bless you and pray that your 
 sovereignty and power may remain steadfast for ever.' 
 
 Commenting upon this spontaneous speech. Lord 
 Lytton writes to Her Majesty : ' His words have a 
 very special significance, which is recognised through- 
 out India, though it is not apparent in the translation 
 of them, and cannot be adequately rendered in Eng- 
 lish. The w^ord used by Sindiah to express your 
 Majesty's position in reference to himself and brother 
 princes is a word which the princes of India have 
 hitherto been careful to avoid using ; for it signifies 
 in the original the power of issuing absolute orders 
 which must be obeyed. Coming, therefore, from the 
 lips of Sindiah, on such an occasion, as the spokesman 
 of all the native princes then and there assembled, it 
 permanently and publicly fixes your Majesty's suzerain, 
 and more than suzerain, power in India beyond all 
 possibility of future question.' 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 129 
 
 The Viceroy's letter to Her Majesty continues : Letter to the 
 'Tuesday, the 2nd, was passed in receiving depu- p^f^f^g em 
 tations and addresses, with a visit to the Imperial biage 
 races, which were numerously attended by the native 
 princes, one of whom (His Highness the Maharajah 
 of Jodhpore) won the Empress Cup. 
 
 'Wednesday, the 3rd, was chiefly occupied 
 by private interviews with Sir Salar Jung and 
 various political officers. But I and Lady Lytton 
 visited the soldiers' games, and attended the fire- 
 works in the evening, at which the crowd was 
 enormous. After the fireworks I gave a farewell 
 dinner to the Governor-General of Goa, followed by 
 a large reception. On Friday morning (the 5th) I 
 reviewed all the British troops, the review being 
 preceded by a march past of the troops of all the 
 native princes at Delhi. The appearance of your 
 Majesty's troops was really magnificent, and the 
 whole review, as a spectacle, scarcely less imposing 
 than the Imperial assemblage itself. Sindiah and 
 Kashmir (your Majesty's two honorary Generals) 
 were present, as also the Khan of Khelat and a large 
 number of native princes. But the sun was so 
 powerful that my Aide-de-camp, Lord William 
 Beresford (who had been terribly shaken by the sad 
 death of his friend. Captain Clayton), fainted in his 
 saddle ; and, indeed, I cannot feel too thankful that 
 I was able to go through the fatigue of it without 
 any worse contretemps than the loss of my gold medal, 
 which fell off its riband into the dust as I was canter- 
 ing home, and which the police have not yet been 
 able to recover. At the close of the review I rode 
 up to the lines, and addressed to the commanding 
 officers a few words, of which I have also the honour 
 to submit the report herewith to your Majesty. 
 
 K 
 
130 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.iv 
 
 Letter to the 'I think I have forgotten to mention that the 
 
 §"Jh?Assem- whole of the previous Tliursday had been passed by 
 biage jr^Q [^^ receiving the farewell visits of the native 
 
 princes. On Thursday, I also presided at a small 
 conference of the native princes who are interested 
 in the maintenance of the Mayo College. A report 
 of our proceedings accompanies this letter. On 
 Friday evening we left Delhi. On the following 
 Saturday I reached Pattiala, and there installed the 
 young Maharaja on the throne. He is only five 
 years old, and I could not help pitying the poor 
 child (a very promising little fellow), for so premature 
 a commencement of the tedious ceremonials of a 
 public life. The town was beautifully decorated, 
 and the whole population seemed to have poured 
 into the streets of it. Sunday we halted at Umballa, 
 and, reaching Aligurh on Monday, the 8th, I there 
 opened the Mohammedan College. I enclose a report 
 of the proceedings. In a few days I shall be again 
 at Calcutta, and able to commence with Sir John 
 Strachey (who is an immense strength to our Council) 
 our Budget for next March. 
 
 ' It now only remains for me to solicit your 
 Majesty's gracious acceptance of my deeply grateful 
 thanks for the generous and valued encouragement 
 with which I have been honoured by your Majesty 
 in reference to the great undertaking which is happily 
 over, and to crave your Majesty's indulgent pardon 
 of this very imperfect account of the Imperial 
 assemblage. To say the truth, I am beginning to 
 feel sensible of the physical effects of the strain which 
 has been upon me during the last fortnight, and 
 I fear that I have failed to convey to your Majesty, 
 by this long and unavoidably rambling letter, any 
 adequate idea of the completeness of a success upon 
 
blaoe 
 
 1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 131 
 
 which I would humbly ask permission to offer the Letter to the 
 congratulations of her devoted .subject to our beloved Delhi Assem- 
 and revered Queen-Empress. I hope, however, that 
 descriptions of the event by pens less wearied, and 
 more graphic, than my own will be written, and that 
 proofs of its success, indirect but significant, will 
 long continue to reach the throne of our Empress 
 from all parts of her great empire. 
 
 ' There is but one other piece of news which I 
 wish to convey to your Majesty before closing this 
 long (and I fear tedious) letter. The Amir of 
 Kabul has, at last, agreed to my proposals for an 
 alliance, and has already sent two of his ministers to 
 Peshawur, there to negotiate the details of it with my 
 Envoy. . . . 
 
 ' With heartfelt prayers for all that can prolong 
 and increase the happiness of your Majesty's life and 
 the glory and prosperity of your great reign, 
 
 ' I have the honour to be. Madam, your Majesty's 
 -devoted and faithful humble servant, 
 
 (Signed) 'Lytton.' 
 
 The new title was welcomed throughout India by 
 the people as well as by the chiefs ; its proclamation 
 was received with every possible demonstration of 
 loyalty. Throughout the whole of the British districts 
 food and clothing were gratuitously distributed to 
 thousands of poor, whilst many of the wealthy 
 zemindars and municipalities gave liberal grants 
 towards works of public utility. The durbars held 
 simultaneously at the capitals of the native chiefs and 
 princes were equally characterised by unmistakable 
 evidences of good feeling. 
 
 Letters from public bodies and private individuals 
 written in divers languages and dialects, poured in upon 
 
132 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. iv 
 
 Effect of Government. One chief wrote : ' The event of to-day 
 Proclamation -^ ^ red-letter day in the annals of modern India, of 
 vrhich not only we ourselves but our children and 
 children's children m.2ij well be proud.' ' This is the 
 third time,' wrote another, ' that India is going to be 
 ruled by an Empress. The first was the widow of 
 the Hindu King Agniborna ; the second was the 
 Eizia Begum, the daughter of the Mohammedan 
 Emperor Altamash ; the third is the Queen Victoria, 
 the EngUsh Sovereign. But something greater has 
 been achieved. Such a powerful Sovereign of so vast 
 a territory never ruled India. This proclamation may 
 consequently be considered superior to all its kind.' 
 
 Another address exclaimed : ' Mother, O 
 Beloved, residing in the Palace of London, the 
 descendants of the great Emperor of Delhi are burnt 
 in the fire of your might. Surely to-day angels will 
 sing your Majesty's glory in the heavenly regions 
 where Yadhish Ea, the Son of Justice, who performed 
 the great Eajasuya festival of Pandaras 3,000 years 
 ago at Delhi, now resides.' 
 
 The ' Empress Day ' is still kept in India as one of 
 the great days of the year. Shops are shut, dinners 
 are given, parades are held, salutes are fired. 
 
 Enormously exaggerated statements were made in 
 the English papers as to the cost of the assemblage. In 
 the Viceroy's opinion a great saving was accomplished 
 through the policy of enlisting the hearty co-operation 
 of the native princes, who all attended this great 
 ceremony at their own expense. Most of the English 
 troops came in the ordinary course of relief move- 
 ments. The Viceroy entertained all the members of 
 his own council at his personal expense, and the 
 heads of local administrations similarly entertained 
 their own guests. 
 
1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 33 
 
 In the opinion of the best judges in India, after 
 some years' experience, the assumption by the Queen 
 of the title of Empress has had poHtical results of 
 far-reaching importance. The supremacy of the 
 British Government had of course been long admitted 
 as a practical fact by all the native States of India, 
 but in many cases their chiefs gave themselves, when 
 opportunity offered and it seemed safe to do so, the 
 airs of independent powers. Treaties, made perhaps 
 nearly a hundred years before and still in force, 
 might be quoted to show that the native prince, 
 although not so strong, was equal in dignity and 
 rightful position to the Viceroy. The Nizam, the 
 Gaekwar, and the Viceroy had all the same salutes, 
 than which to native imaginations there could be 
 nothing more significant. The twenty-one guns 
 ceased after the Delhi Assembly to be a sign of 
 equality with the representative of the Sovereign. 
 There can indeed be no doubt of the fact, now 
 universally acknowledged in India, that the pro- 
 clamation of the paramount superiority of the British 
 Crown was an act of political wisdom and foresight 
 which has not only strengthened our position 
 throughout the vast territories of India proper, but 
 has had no small effect also beyond the frontier of 
 the Indian Empire. 
 
134 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. r 
 
 Letter to Lord 
 Salisbury. 
 Sher Ali 
 agi'ees to 
 Peshawur 
 Conference, 
 December 1> 
 
 Beginning of 
 Peshawur 
 Conference, 
 Jan. 27 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PESHAWUR CONFEEENCE AND ERONTIEE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 OE 1877 
 
 The news that Sher Ali had at last consented to 
 enter into negotiations with the British Government 
 by sending his Minister to meet our Envoy on the 
 frontier reached the Viceroy on December 18, 1876. 
 The members of the Amir's durbar, after lengthy and 
 frequent consultation, had voted for the rejection of 
 our proposals, but our agent had then urged the 
 Amir to decide the matter himself. He agreed to 
 do so, and after some hesitation intimated his inten- 
 tion of sending two of his principal ministers to 
 discuss with our Envoy at Peshawur the conditions 
 on which the permanent location of British officers 
 on his frontier would be accepted. 
 
 This appeared to be a virtual, though reluctant, 
 acceptance of the Viceroy's proposals, but the Amir 
 did not reply to the Viceroy's letters, and took no 
 notice of the invitation which had been sent him to 
 the Imperial assemblage at Delhi. 
 
 On January 27, 1877, the Kabul Envoy, Syud Noor 
 Mahomed Shah, accompanied by the Mir Akhor 
 Ahmed Khan, arrived at Peshawur, where Sir Lewis 
 Pelly, to whom Dr. Bellew was attached as secretary, 
 awaited him. 
 
 The first meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and 
 
1877 PESHAWUE CONFERENCE 1 35 
 
 Syud Noor Mahomed took place on January 30, the 
 last interview was held on February 19. From the 
 very beginning it was doubtful whether the envoy 
 was authorised to accept the sine-qud-non condition 
 that British officers should reside on the frontier of 
 Afghanistan to watch outside events. Ultimate^, 
 after much fencing, he rejected it. Sir Lewis Pelly 
 then broke off the conference on the ground that if 
 the basis on which alone any discussions wiere to 
 take place was not accepted, he had no authority to 
 open negotiations. He consented, however, to refer 
 to the Viceroy what the Envoy had said, and to await 
 His Excellency's reply. 
 
 In the course of the conference three successive 
 meetings had been occupied with a long statement of 
 the Amir's grievances. This statement repeated and 
 confirmed the information previously given by our 
 native agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, to the Viceroy at 
 Simla. The Amir was represented as having lost con- 
 fidence in the British Government, and amongst the 
 reasons assigned for his mistrust the Envoy referred to 
 the interference of the Viceroy on behalf of the Amir's 
 imprisoned son, Yakub Khan, and the complimentary 
 gifts and messages sent to the Mir of Wakhar with- 
 out previously asking the Amir's permission to deal 
 thus directly with one of his responsible governors. 
 Both these causes of complaint occurred during the 
 Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook. The Envoy repre- 
 sented the Amir as having, before that time, had 
 ' perfect confidence ' in the British Government ; 
 having, however, refused to comply with the request 
 that he should release his son Yakub, and restore 
 him to Herat, Sher Ali considered the friendship 
 between the two Governments was no longer intact. 
 Lord Lytton's reply to Sir Lewis Pelly, conveyed in 
 
136 LOIJD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pelly, 
 March 3 
 
 a letter dated March 3, refers to these grievances as 
 follows : 
 
 'I sincerely regret to learn that the Amir has 
 been for years secretly harbouring in his mind a 
 sentiment of resentment towards the British Govern- 
 ment, in consequence of three or four incidents in 
 the conduct of its relations with His Highness ; 
 which caused him, at the time of their unnoticed 
 occurrence, feelings of annoyance, only now for the 
 first time made known to the Viceroy. I am con- 
 fident that the causes of annoyance enumerated by 
 the agent were not occasioned by any deliberate or 
 intentional, or even conscious, disregard of the 
 Amir's feelings on the part of the British Govern- 
 ment. I have no doubt whatever that most of them 
 might, and would, have been prevented by the 
 presence of a discreet and intelligent British officer 
 at Kabul, had such an officer been admitted to that 
 unrestricted intercourse with the Government of His 
 Highness which an experience tested by centuries, 
 and gratefully acknowledged by every civilised 
 State in the world, has proved to be the only 
 practical means of maintaining amicable and mutually 
 advantageous relations between nei^'libourino- States. 
 Such States must always have many interests in 
 common, on which misunderstandings can hardly 
 fail to arise if their Governments have no adequately 
 confidential and authoritative medium of communi- 
 cation with each other.' 
 
 With regard to the question of admitting British 
 officers to Afghanistan, the Envoy, in an informal 
 conversation with Dr. Bellew, had stated that this 
 subject, so constantly pressed upon the consideration 
 of the Amir, had aroused his suspicions, and he was 
 now ' convinced that to allow British officers to reside 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERE^X'E 1 37 
 
 in his country' would 'be to relinquish his own viceroy's 
 authority ' ; ' and the lasting disgrace thus brought LewiTpeiiyT 
 on the Afghan people ' would be ' attached to his ^^^^^^ ^ 
 name, and he would sooner perish than submit to 
 this. The British nation is great and powerful, and 
 the Afghan people cannot resist its power, but the 
 people are self-willed and independent, and prize 
 their honour above life.' In the subsequent inter- 
 views with Sir Lewis Pelly this view was repeated in 
 different words again and again. 
 
 Lord Lytton comments upon this : 
 ' Li the communications made by the Viceroy to 
 His Highness from Simla in the month of October 
 last the Amir was distinctly informed that unless he 
 was prepared to recognise, in principle, the expedi- 
 ency of appointing British officers to reside in certain 
 parts of the Afghan frontier, it would be useless to 
 appoint Envoys for the negotiation of a Treaty 
 entirely conditional upon that arrangement. His 
 Highness was, at the same time, earnestly requested 
 to consider very carefully the expediency of the 
 proposal then made to him before committing himself 
 to a decision. He did take many weeks to consider 
 it; and when, after having thus deliberately con- 
 sidered it, he appointed his Minister to negotiate 
 with you the best means of carrying it out, we were 
 entitled to assume, as we naturally did assume, that 
 the principle clearly explained by us to be the only 
 possible basis of negotiation on our part had been 
 duly and fully accepted by His Highness, and that 
 the expediency of carrying it out was no longer open 
 to discussion. The Envoy's present attempt to ignore 
 the recognition of that principle, and to discuss the 
 expediency of it as an open question, is a breach 
 (which should be pointed out to him) of the under- 
 
138 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Letter to Sir 
 Lewis Peily, 
 March 3 
 
 standing on which we agreed to receive him as the 
 Amir's representative in this negotiation. 
 
 ' If, however, as would seem to be the case, the 
 Amir, influenced by circumstances or considerations 
 still unknown to us, has completely changed his mind 
 since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its 
 present form, was originated by His Highness), the 
 very last thing desired, or attempted, by the British 
 Government would be to pin His Highness pedantic- 
 ally to the fulfilment of an understanding from 
 which he now wishes to withdraw, or to the adoption 
 of an arrancrement which he does not reo-ard with 
 satisfaction. 
 
 ' . . . . But in that case there is nothing left to 
 negotiate about, and consequently no reason why the 
 Afghan Minister should not immediately return to 
 Kabul. You have rightly pointed this out to the 
 Envoy ; and I entirely approve the terms in which 
 you have done so.' 
 
 Finally, the Envoy had contended that by Lord 
 Mayo's written assurance at Umballa, and Lord 
 Northbrook's verbal one at Simla, the British 
 Government were already bound to protect the Amir, 
 not only against foreign aggression, but also against 
 internal revolt ; that if this was admitted the Amir 
 had nothing to gain by the re-statement of our 
 obligation in any new form ; that if this was denied 
 then the British Government were chargeable with 
 breach of faith. Lord Lytton emphatically repudi- 
 ated this false position. 
 
 ' The [Envoy's] argument would be perfectly 
 sound if its premisses were true. But, unfortunately 
 for the Amir, they are fundamentally erroneous. 
 The only obhgations ever contracted on behalf of 
 each other by the British and Afghan Governments 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 39 
 
 are embodied in two treaties, of which the first wa:^ viceroy's 
 signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. Lewis Peiiy, 
 
 ' The Treaty of 1855 contains only three articles. ^^'"'^^ ^ 
 The first stipulates that there shall be perpetual 
 peace and friendship between the East India Com- 
 pany (to whose treaty rights and obhgations the 
 British Government has succeeded) and the Amir 
 of Kabul, his heirs and successors. The second 
 binds the British Government to respect the 
 territories possessed by the Amir at the time when 
 the Treaty was signed, that is to say in 1855, and not 
 to interfere with them. The third article binds the 
 Amir, his heirs and successors, not only to respect 
 the territories of the British Government, but also to 
 be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its 
 enemies. It is to be observed that this Treaty con- 
 tains no corresponding obligation on the part of the 
 British Government. The British Government is 
 not without cause to complain that the Amir's 
 conduct of late years has been inconsistent with 
 the obligations contracted by the Government of 
 His Highness under the terms of Article I. of this 
 Treaty of 1855. Friendship between neighbouring 
 States does not necessarily involve liabilities on the 
 part of either State to furnish the other with material 
 assistance ; but it does necessarily involve the 
 uninterrupted maintenance of friendly intercourse, 
 and the fairly reciprocal recognition and discharge 
 of all the customary duties of good neighbour- 
 hood. 
 
 ' Kow, not only are all the territories of the 
 British Government freely open at all times to all 
 the subjects of the Amir, but His Highness has 
 received from the British Government repeated gifts ■ 
 of arms and of money, as well as a consistent moral 
 
140 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pelly, 
 March 3 
 
 support \both at home and abroad. In return for 
 these advantages to His Highness, what has the 
 British Government received from the Amir ? 
 The territories of His Highness have been, and con- 
 tinue to be, churhshly closed to all the subjects 
 of the British Government ; with whom the Amir 
 forbids his own subjects to hold any kind of friendly 
 intercourse. Trade, traffic, travel, — all the custom- 
 ary bonds of union between neighbouring and 
 friendly States, have been systematically discouraged 
 and practically prohibited to British subjects in 
 Afghanistan, by His Highness. 
 
 ' The Amir has refused permission to the Envoy 
 of the British Government, bound on a peaceful 
 mission to another neighbouring State, to pass through 
 his territory ; and the determination of His Highness 
 to withhold from the British Government all such 
 natural good offices has been conveyed to it in terms 
 scarcely consistent with courtesy, and certainly not 
 consistent with friendship. Colonel Macdonald, a 
 British subject, was barbarously murdered on the 
 borders of the Amir's territory, by a person subject 
 to the authority of the Amir, and for whose punish- 
 ment His Highness was, therefore, responsible. But 
 instead of cordially and efficiently co-operating to 
 avenge this crime, the Amir has allowed the 
 murderer to remain at large ; and not only unmo- 
 lested, but actually, I believe, in receipt of a pension 
 from His Highness. I forbear to dwell upon the 
 Amir's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered 
 the proposal made to His Highness by the late 
 Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in 
 refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the 
 present Viceroy, and in taking no notice whatever of 
 the friendly invitation to Dellii which was subse- 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 141 
 
 quently addressed, to His Highness. More serious viceroy's 
 grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the Lewi^s^ Peiiy) 
 closing of the Khyber Pass for the last two 3^ears ^^^^^ ^ 
 appears to be mainly attributable to the hostile 
 influence of the Amir ; that His Highness has 
 openly received at Kabul in an authoritative manner, 
 and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes, v^^ho are 
 in the pay, and under the control, of the British 
 Government ; that he has, for some time past, been 
 speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate 
 hostile designs upon territories beyond his own, and 
 in the neighbourhood of the British frontier ; and that 
 even since the commencement of the present negotia- 
 tions, he has been openly and actively endeavouring to 
 excite against us the religious animosities of his own 
 subjects, and of the neighbouring tribes, by misre- 
 presenting the policy, and maligning the character, 
 of the British Government. 
 
 ' In short, the whole conduct and language of the 
 Amir during the last four years has been one 
 chronic infraction, or evasion, of the first Article of 
 the Treaty of 1855. But this Treaty cannot be 
 abrogated without the mutual consent of the two 
 contracting parties to it ; and, so long as it remains 
 valid, the Amir is legally bound by it to co-operate 
 with the British Government, if called upon to do so, 
 in attacking its enemies and defending its friends ; 
 although the Treaty does not place the British 
 Government under any reciprocal obligation on 
 behalf of the Amir. His Highness, indeed, was 
 so conscious of this fact when he met the Earl of 
 Mayo at Umballa, that he then vehemently com- 
 plained of the Treaty of 1855 as a " one-sided Treaty," 
 and earnestly solicited from the British Government 
 a new Treaty based upon the terms which the present 
 
March 3 
 
 142 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 Viceroy's Vicerov was prepared to offer the Amir in the 
 
 letter to Sir .t r r\ j. i i j. 
 
 Lewis Peiiy moiith oi October last. 
 
 ' It is clear, therefore, that, under the terms of 
 the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has 
 contracted no habiUties whatever on behalf of the 
 Amir. Moreover, although the British Government 
 has assuredly no desire, or intention, to take advan- 
 tage of the fact, it nevertheless is a fact, that the 
 territories recognised by that Treat}' as belonging 
 to the Amir did not include Afghan Turkistan. 
 
 ' I now turn to the consideration of the subsequent 
 Treaty signed in 1857. This Treaty consists of 
 thirteen Articles. The first of them recites the cir- 
 cumstances, arising out of the war then being 
 wasred between the British and Persian Govern- 
 ments, which induced the British Government 
 to " agree, out of friendship, to give the Amir " 
 of Kabul one lakh of rupees monthly during 
 the continuation of that war, upon certain condi- 
 tions. The second, third, fourth, and fifth Articles 
 specify these conditions : whereby in return for the 
 pecuniary assistance guaranteed to him by Article I, 
 the Amir undertakes to maintain his army at a 
 certain strength, to appoint and maintain a Yakeel at 
 Peshawur, and to receive at Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar, 
 and other places in Afghanistan, British officers with 
 suitable establishments, whose duty shall be to 
 insure the subsidy granted the Amir being devoted 
 to the purpose for which it was given. The sixth 
 Article stipulates that this subsidy shaU cease at the 
 conclusion of the war between England and Persia, 
 or at any previous date preferred by the British 
 Government. The seventh Article, to which the 
 Envoy has made special reference, with an emphasis 
 and iteration apparently superfluous, stipulates that. 
 
1877 PESHAWUK CONFERENCE 1 43 
 
 on the cessation of the subsidy, the British officers viceroy's 
 shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but that the Lew[s Peny, 
 Amir shall continue, during the pleasure of the ^^ai"ch3 
 British Government, not only to receive at Kabul a 
 permanent resident Vakeel appointed by the British 
 Government, but also to appoint, and keep on 
 behalf of the Afghan Government, a permanent 
 resident Vakeel at Peshawur, The Envoy says that 
 the Amir has scrupulously adhered to the terms of 
 this seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 ; but, so 
 far as I am aware, His Highness lias not for many 
 years fulfilled the last-mentioned condition of the 
 Article. All the remaining Articles of the Treaty 
 refer exclusively either to the preceding stipulations, 
 or else to special circumstances, considerations, and 
 conditions, occasioned by, and ceasing with, the 
 war between England and Persia, which led to the 
 signature of the Treaty of 1867. 
 
 ' I should not have thought it worth while to say 
 anything at all about this Treaty of 1857, if the 
 Afghan Envoy had not laid such special stress upon 
 its seventh Article ; which is indeed the only one of 
 all its articles that has reference to the conduct of 
 general relations between the two Governments. It 
 is obvious, however, that no treaty stipulation was 
 required to oblige the British Government not to 
 appoint a resident British officer at Kabul without 
 the consent of the Amir. It is equally obvious that 
 the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 was not 
 intended to bind, and could not possibly bind, the 
 Amir, never, under any circumstances, or at any 
 future time, to assent to the appointment of a 
 resident British officer at Kabul ; for such a stipula- 
 tion would have been clearly inconsistent with the 
 freedom and dignity of the two contracting Powers. 
 
1 44 LOIli) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pellj, 
 March 
 
 It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh 
 Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing 
 whatever to preclude the British Government from 
 pointing out, at any time, to the Amir the advan- 
 tage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as 
 its permanent representative at Kabul ; nor even from 
 urging such an arrangement upon the consideration 
 and adoption of His Highness, in any fair and 
 friendly manner. But it so happens that the British 
 Government has not proposed, and does not propose, 
 or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently, 
 the Envoy's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to 
 the point, and need not be further noticed. 
 
 ' Now, these two Treaties, of 1855 and 1857, are 
 the only ones which, up to the present moment, the 
 British Government has ever contracted with the 
 Government of Afghanistan ; and it is as clear as 
 anything can be that neither the one nor the other 
 imposes on the British Government, either directly 
 or indirectly, the least obligation, or liability, what- 
 ever, to defend, protect, or support, the Amir, or 
 the Amir's dynasty, against any enemy, or any dan- 
 ger, foreign or domestic. 
 
 ' The Envoy, however, appears to be under an 
 impression that obligations and liabilities of this 
 kind, though not contracted under any Treaty, 
 have been, none the less, incurred by the British 
 Government through certain written and verbal 
 assurances received by the Amir in 18G9 from 
 Lord Mayo, and by His Highness' Envoy in 1873 
 from Lord Northbrook. This impression is entirely 
 erroneous ; and I, therefore, proceed to examine in 
 detail the facts and circumstances referred to by the 
 Envoy in support of his assumption that the Amir 
 of Kabul has, at the present moment, any claim upon 
 
March 3 
 
 1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 45 
 
 the unconditional support of the British Govern- Viceroy's 
 
 letter to Sir 
 ment. Lewis Pelly, 
 
 ' The words, referred to by the Envoy as having 
 been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Amir on 
 March 31, 1869, were as follows : 
 
 ' " Although, as already intimated to you, the 
 British Government does not desire to interfere in 
 the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering 
 that the bonds of friendship between that Govern- 
 ment and your Highness have lately been more 
 closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with 
 severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your 
 rivals to disturb your position as Euler of Kabul, and 
 rekindle civil war ; and it will further endeavour, 
 from time to time, by such means as circumstances 
 may require, to strengthen the Government of your 
 Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and 
 with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to 
 your descendants all the dignities and honours of 
 which you are the lawful possessor." 
 
 ' Now, what were the circumstances in which these 
 words were uttered? Only just established on a 
 throne, to which he had fought his way through a 
 long and bloody civil war, the Amir had come to 
 Umballa, anxious for the support and protection of 
 the British Government, and hopeful of obtaining 
 from it a Treaty of Alliance. Disappointed in that 
 hope, he eagerly besought the Viceroy to give him 
 some written assurance of the good will and friendship 
 of the British Government ; which might serve to 
 strengthen his position when he returned to Kabul, 
 by convincing both his subjects and his rivals that 
 his relations with that Government were of a 
 thoroughly cordial and satisfactory character. In 
 compliance with this request, the words above 
 
 L 
 
146 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pelly, 
 March 3 
 
 quoted were addressed to His Highness, by the 
 Viceroy. Such were tlie circumstances in which 
 they were uttered. What, then, were the meaning, 
 purpose, and intention of their utterance? It is 
 self-evident, in the first place, that whatever their 
 meaning, and whatever their purpose, they were not 
 intended to have the force of a Treaty ; for the 
 British Government had just declined the Amir's 
 request for a Treaty of Alliance with it, and it could 
 have had no possible reason for declining the Treaty, 
 if it were prepared to accept on his behalf, in a 
 form equally conclusive, all the liabilities of an 
 alliance. 
 
 ' The meaning and purpose of the Viceroy's as- 
 surance to the Amir in 1869, however, are clearly 
 indicated and explained, beyond all possibility of 
 question, by the context, as well as the circumstances, 
 of His Excellency's address to His Highness at 
 Umballa. In that paragraph of the address which 
 immediately precedes the one I have quoted (because 
 it is the one to which the Envoy has referred), the 
 Viceroy expressed his confidence (a confidence 
 founded on the assurance of His Highness) that the 
 Amir was about " to create a firm and merciful 
 administration," and " to promote the interests of 
 commerce in every province of Afghanistan." In 
 encouraging recognition of these excellent intentions 
 (never fulfilled b)'' the Amir) and of the closeness 
 with which the bonds of friendship were then drawn 
 between the British Government and His Highness 
 (whose subsequent conduct has relaxed them), the 
 Viceroy assured the Amir that the British Govern- 
 ment would view with severe displeasure any attempt 
 to disturb his throne. It is perfectly clear, however, 
 that the Viceroy did not, and could not, thereby 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 47 
 
 commit the British Government to an unconditional viceroy's 
 protection of the Amir, or to any liabilities on behalf Lewis Peiiy, 
 of His Highness which were not dependent on his ^^^^^ ^ 
 future conduct towards the British Government and 
 his own subjects. In short, the plain meaning of the 
 Viceroy's statement was neither more nor less than 
 an assurance that so long as the Amir continued to 
 govern his people justly and mercifully, and to main- 
 tain frank, cordial, and confidential relations with 
 the British Government, that Government would, on 
 its part, also continue to protect His Highness ; 
 using every legitimate endeavour to confirm his in- 
 dependence and consolidate his power. 
 
 ' In precisely the same spirit, and from the same 
 point of view, the present Viceroy authorised the 
 Kabul Agent to assure Sher Ali, last October, that 
 if His Highness sincerely desired to deserve the 
 friendship, and thereby secure the protection, of the 
 British Government, they would be cordially and un- 
 reservedly accorded to him. But His Highness has 
 evinced no such desire ; and it is a puerile absurdity 
 to assume that, because the British Government 
 would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 
 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and 
 trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, 
 from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the 
 damaged power of a mistrustful and untrustworthy 
 neighbour. 
 
 ' You wiU teU the Envoy plainly that the British 
 Government neither recognises, nor has ever recog- 
 nised, any such obligation. British influence is so 
 paramount throughout the East that the Govern- 
 ment of India need rarely have recourse to arms 
 in order to protect the friends who are faithful to 
 it, or to punish those who are faithless. There 
 
 L 2 
 
148 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's is no neighbouring State which, is not strengthened 
 Lewis Peiiy, ^J ^he bestowal, and weakened by the withdrawal, 
 March 3 ' ^f i^ friendship. 
 
 ' The same observations apply to the statement 
 made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Amir's 
 Envoy at Simla. The Envoy, on that occasion, 
 represented and explained to the Viceroy the 
 apprehensions and anxieties occasioned to the Amir 
 by the recent advance of the Eussian Power in 
 Central Asia. His Highness fearing that, without 
 the declared alliance and material support of the 
 British Government, his independence might ere long- 
 be exposed to dangers Avith which he could not cope 
 single-handed, had instructed his Envoy to sohcit 
 once more from the British Government a definite 
 Treaty of Alliance on the basis of reciprocity, as well 
 as material assistance in arms and money. Lord 
 Northbrook declined to give the Amir the Treaty 
 which His Highness asked for. And, therefore, as 
 in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear 
 that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord 
 Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to 
 commit, and could not possibly commit, the British 
 Government to any of those liabilities which it would 
 have contracted on behalf of the Amir had the 
 Viceroy felt able to compl}^ with the request of His 
 Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance. 
 The Envoy then endeavoured, as he has again 
 endeavoured on the present occasion, to maintain 
 that the British Government had ah-eady contracted 
 such liabilities by virtue of assurances received in 
 time past from Lord Lawrence and the Earl of Mayo. 
 In reply to this assertion Lord Northbrook laid before 
 the Envoy the whole of the correspondence which 
 had passed between His Excellency's predecessors 
 
1877 PESHAWUE CONFERENCE 1 49 
 
 and the Amir, and requested him to point out in it a viceroy's 
 single word confirming or justifying the statement he Lewis Peiiy, 
 had made, " that the British Government was bound March 3 
 to comply with every request preferred by the Amir." 
 The Envoy, however, was unable to do so, and 
 acknowledged the fact. Lord Northl^rook then gave 
 the Envoy the following assurance : — That in the 
 event of any imminent aggression upon the territories 
 of His Highness, " should the endeavours of the 
 British Government to bring about an amicable 
 settlement prove fruitless, the British Government 
 were prepared to assure the Amir that they would 
 afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, 
 and would also, in case of necessity, aid him with 
 troops ; " adding, however, that " the British Govern- 
 ment held itself perfectly free to decide as to the 
 occasion when such assistance should be rendered, 
 and also as to its nature and extent : moreover, the 
 assistance would be conditional upon the Amir him- 
 self abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved 
 acceptance of the advice of the British Government 
 in regard to his external relations." 
 
 'It is sufficiently apparent that this personal 
 assurance committed the British Government to no 
 pledges which were not carefully guarded on every 
 side by positive conditions with which the Amir has 
 of late evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt 
 of it the Envoy left Simla, apparently disappointed, 
 and observing that the Amir was not likely to derive 
 from it much comfort or support. 
 
 ' I trust, therefore, that, on reflection, the Envoy 
 will perceive and acknowledge that, in intimating to 
 the Amir, last October, his willingness to grant him 
 not only money, arms, and, should he require it, the 
 services of British officers, but also a definite Treaty 
 
150 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pelly, 
 March 3 
 
 of Alliance, such, as the Amir had twice vainly 
 solicited from the British Government — once in 1869 
 and once again in 1873 — the present Viceroy was 
 offering His Highness altogether new, and very 
 substantial, advantages. It appeared to the Viceroy 
 that relations of mutual reserve and mistrust between 
 neighbouring States so closely contiguous, and having 
 in common so many interests, as Afghanistan and the 
 Empire of India, were much to be deplored ; more 
 specially in the interests of the weaker State. An 
 attentive study of the correspondence, to which the 
 Envoy has referred, induced him to think that, in 
 judging of the unfriendly attitude which, during the 
 last few years, the Amir has thought fit to assume 
 and maintain towards the British Government, it 
 would be ungenerous not to make great allowances 
 for the disappointment and mortification with which 
 His Highness appeared to have regarded the reiterated 
 failure of all his previous efforts to enter into closer 
 relations with that Government ; the extent to which 
 the increasing weakness and isolation of his position 
 might have aggravated this feeling ; and the fact that 
 the unfortunate imperfection of the hitherto existing 
 means of communication between the two Govern- 
 ments afforded to neither of them any adequate 
 opportunity of avoiding, or removing, those causes of 
 irritation which might be solely attributable to their 
 ignorance of each other's motives and interests. The 
 Viceroy, therefore, came to the conclusion that, if 
 the Amir still sincerely desired the open alliance and 
 protection of the British Government, and was pre- 
 pared to prove the sincerity of that desire by taking 
 practical steps for placing his relations with us on 
 a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory footing, the 
 wishes of His Highness in regard to the Treaty of 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 151 
 
 Alliance, and any other reasonable evidence of our Viceroy's 
 confidence and friendship, should receive from us a Lewis Peiiy. 
 similarly frank and cordial response. Her Majesty's ^^^^'°^ ^ 
 Government concurred in that conclusion : and it 
 was in all sincerity that the Viceroy authorised Atta 
 Mahomed to say to the Amir — " If you really desire 
 to secure and reciprocate our friendship, you shall 
 have it without reserve, and find in us a firm and 
 faithful ally." 
 
 ' It would appear, however, from the whole tone 
 of the Envoy's language to you, and from the state- 
 ment so carefully made by His Excellency (at whose 
 request it has been submitted to me), of the Amir's 
 present views and sentiments, that His Highness now 
 no longer desires our alliance and protection. The 
 British Government does not press its alliance and pro- 
 tection upon those who neither seek nor appreciate 
 them. This being the case, it only remains for the 
 Viceroy to withdraw, at once, the offers made to the 
 Amir in the month of October last ; and, in so doing, 
 to express his deep regret that these offers, and the 
 spirit in which they were made, should have been so 
 completely misunderstood, and so grossly and publicly 
 misrepresented, by His Highness. Such unwarrantable 
 misrepresentations of our recent policy, however, 
 render it necessary to guard against similar misre- 
 presentation of our present position. I must, there- 
 fore, request you to explain distinctly to the Envoy, 
 and to place on record, in language not susceptible 
 of misconstruction, that, in withdrawing from the 
 Amir those ofiers of material assistance, in reply to 
 which His Highness has instructed the Envoy to 
 inform us that he neither requires, nor is disposed to 
 accept, them, the British Government harbours no 
 hostile designs against Afghanistan. This Govern- 
 
152 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION c;u. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pell}', 
 March 3 
 
 ment repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Amir 
 and his dynasty. It does not indeed withdraw from 
 any obligations previously contracted by it ; but it 
 absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever 
 incurred any such obligations as those imputed to 
 it by the Envo}- of His Highness ; and it, further, 
 affirms that it will never, in any circumstances, 
 undertake such obligations without adequate gua- 
 rantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Amir. 
 But, at the same time, it will scrupulously continue, 
 as heretofore, to respect the Amir's independence 
 and authority throughout those territories which, up 
 to the present moment, it has recognised as being in 
 the lawful possession of His Highness ; and will duly 
 abstain from interference therein, so long as the 
 Amir, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains 
 from every kind of interference with tribes or 
 territories not his own. The Amir, therefore, so 
 long as he remains faithful to those treaty stipula- 
 tions which the Envoy has invoked on behalf of His 
 Highness, and which the British Government fully 
 recognises as still valid, and, therefore, binding upon 
 the two contracting parties, need be under no 
 apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the 
 part of the British Government. 
 
 ' It must also be placed on record, in a form to 
 which authoritative and public appeal can be made, 
 should the policy thus frankly explained be again 
 misrepresented by the Kabul Durbar, that the 
 British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel 
 with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires 
 their permanent independence, prosperity, and 
 peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly 
 no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It 
 will unreservedly respect their independence ; and, 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 53 
 
 should they at any time be united in a national viceroy's 
 appeal to its assistance, it will doubtless be disposed, -^ewls Peiiy, 
 and prepared, to aid them in defending that inde- ^^aixh 3 
 pendence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan 
 people may rest fully assured that so long as they 
 are not excited by their ruler, or others, to acts of 
 aggression upon the territories or friends of the 
 British Government, no British soldier will ever be 
 permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.-^ 
 
 ' With these explanations and assurances you are The viceroy 
 now authorised to close those conferences with the s^r^LewL° 
 Afghan Envoy which, up to the present moment, you Peiiy's pro- 
 
 o . . . ceedings and 
 
 have conducted with so much judgment and ability, authorises 
 The felicitous combination of firmness and concilia- the Con- 
 tion, of frankness and caution, which has characterised f^rence 
 your language to the Envoy, and all your official 
 intercourse with His Excellency, commands the cordial 
 approval of the Viceroy, and will doubtless receive 
 that of the Secretary of State. I do not consider 
 that your exertions have been in vain. On the 
 contrary, they have, in my opinion, been prolific in 
 useful results. For four years the Government of 
 India has been acting, or abstaining from action, in 
 profound and perilous ignorance of the actual con 
 dition of its relations with the Amir of Kabul, and 
 
 -) 
 
 ^ Nor was this assurance forgotten in 1878. "When the Amir 
 insulted the British Government by receiving in full Durbar a Russian 
 Mission, after having refused to receive a British one, the Government 
 of India requested him equally to receive a British one, unless he 
 wished us to consider him openly hostile. He refused to receive our 
 Mission. We then considered he had committed an act of aggression 
 against us, and massed our troops on the frontier. We did not, however, 
 then fire a single shot or invade his territory till we had given him 
 another chance of retracting this act of hostility. When, however 
 we had warned him that we should consider his silence as a declara- 
 tion of war on his part, and no answer came, there was no course teft 
 but to march into his country. 
 
1 54 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 letter to Sir 
 Lewis Pelly, 
 March 3 
 
 the real sentiments and dispositions of His Highness. 
 The information you have now obtained, partly in 
 the course of negotiation, and partly by other means, 
 and the completeness with which you have enabled 
 the Government of India to verify that information, 
 have torn aside the impenetrable veil which has so 
 long concealed from us the increasing, and now 
 apparently complete, extinction of British influence 
 at Kabul. Your reports have also enabled the 
 Government of India, whose policy in regard to 
 Afghanistan has hitherto been based upon the merest 
 guesswork, to form, for the first time since the Amir 
 visited Umballa, a sufficiently definite and accurate 
 notion, not only of the personal sentiments of His 
 Highness, but also of his actual position, and the 
 influences by which it is affected. I attach much 
 value to these salutary revelations ; and I am, my 
 dear Sir Lewis, 
 
 ' Yours faithfully, 
 
 (Signed) ' Lytton.' 
 
 Death of 
 
 Amir's 
 
 Minister 
 
 Lord Lytton's 
 Minute, 
 March 1877 
 
 Syud Noor Mahomed, who had been suffering 
 from severe illness throughout the proceedings, died 
 on March 26, before he had attempted any reply to 
 this communication. 
 
 ' Thus,' wrote Lord Lytton, ' after months of fruit- 
 less discussion, endured with great patience by the 
 British Government, this conference was closed by the 
 death of the Kabul Envoy. The re-opening of the con- 
 ference was rendered impossible by the declaration 
 of that Envoy's surviving colleague that he had no 
 powers authorising him to continue it.' 
 
 ' While these protracted discussions with Syud 
 N^or Mahomed were in progress, intelligence 
 reached India from Kabul that the Amir was 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 55 
 
 straining every effort to increase liis military force ; viceroy's 
 
 , ^ "^ . . .*'„,. Minute on 
 
 that he was massing troops on various points 01 ms close of 
 frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his coSe^nce 
 subjects and neighbours to make immediate pre- 
 paration for a religious war, apparently directed 
 against his English rather than his Eussian neigh- 
 bours, both of whom he denounced, however, as the 
 traditional enemies of Islam ; that, on behalf of this 
 Jehad, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative 
 support of the Akhoond of Swat and the armed 
 co-operation of the chiefs of Dir, Bajour, and other 
 neighbouring Khanates ; that he was, by means of 
 bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to 
 bring those chiefs under personal allegiance to 
 himself; that he was tampering with the tribes 
 immediately on the frontier, and inciting them to 
 acts of hostility against us ; and that for the pro- 
 secution of these objects he was in correspondence 
 with Mohammedan border chiefs openly subsidised 
 by the Indian Government.' ^ 
 
 The Viceroy commented upon this inteUigence : 
 ' The Amir throughout the whole course of 
 the conference displayed, and subsequently con- 
 tinued to manifest without the slightest provoca- 
 tion, a marked hostility towards the British 
 Government. Whilst his representative was carry- 
 ing on friendly negotiations with the British Envoy 
 at Peshawur, the Amir himself was publicly and 
 falsely informing his subjects that the British 
 Government had broken its engagements, and 
 threatened the independence of his kingdom. On 
 this mendacious pretext His Highness proclaimed a 
 religious war against the British Government, and 
 actively endeavoured, by every means in his power, 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
156 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 close of 
 Peshawur 
 Conference 
 
 not only to incite the border tribes against us, but 
 also to tamper with the loyalty of our own subjects. 
 All the letters addressed to him by the British 
 Government calling for an explanation of this con- 
 duct have been left unanswered. Whilst continuinof 
 military preparations avowedly directed against this 
 Government, His Highness has arbitrarily stopped the 
 transmission of ordinar}^ intelligence between Kabul 
 and Peshawur. He has barbarously killed, mutilated, 
 or expelled persons suspected by himself or his 
 informants of holding even the most legitimate and 
 inoffensive intercourse with the authorities or sub- 
 jects of the British Government, and his whole 
 conduct continues to be characterised by undisguised 
 animosity. Such is the return made by the present 
 Amir of Kabul for nine years of friendship and 
 support on the part of the British Government. 
 His authority over the outlying districts to the 
 north of his present kingdom has been acknow- 
 ledged by Eussia solely in consequence of the firm- 
 ness with which the British Government has, in his 
 interests, insisted on that acknowledgment. From 
 the commencement of our relations with the present 
 Amir up to this moment no attempt has at any 
 time been made by the British Government to 
 disturb the peace of his dominions, no injury has 
 ever been inflicted by this Government on himself or 
 his subjects. 
 
 ' In return for all this generosit}^ and forbearance, 
 the British Government has received from the Amir 
 nothing but discourtesies, only rendered insignificant 
 by his absolute impuissance. Our latest offers to 
 protect his dominions and his dynasty, with much 
 expense and trouble to ourselves but with no inter- 
 ference in his authority, have been answered by an 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 1 57 
 
 attempt to stir up open hostility against us. We are Viceroy's 
 even led to believe, from the best information at our close of °° 
 command, that in order to iniure the Government P^shawur 
 
 •' Conference 
 
 which has for years befriended and protected him, 
 the Amir, in violation of his engagements with it, 
 has not scrupled to enter into secret intrigues with a 
 power which is now openly attacking Islam, and 
 menacing the independence of his co-religionists and 
 neighbours. 
 
 'The only pretext which has been put forward 
 in justification of this conduct is that His Highness 
 considers the recent stationing of a British garrison 
 at Quettah detrimental to his own relations with the 
 Khanate of Khelat and an indirect menace to him- 
 self. 
 
 'But it must here be observed that the hostile 
 attitude assumed towards the British Government by 
 the Amir of Kabul preceded, instead of following, 
 the event in which His Highness now attempts to 
 find a pretext for having assumed it. 
 
 ' No such pretext, therefore, can be admitted by 
 the British Government. For more than twenty 
 years this Government has held direct relations with 
 the Khanate of Khelat by virtue of Treaty stipula- 
 tions which secure to it the right, not only of placing 
 its own troops in the Khanate whenever it may have 
 occasion to do so, but also of permanently excluding 
 and opposing all interference on the part of any 
 other Power in the affairs of the Khanate. 
 
 ' The establishment of the present garrison at 
 Quettah is in strict accordance with these pre-exist- 
 ing Treaty rights ; as also with the terms of a new 
 convention, recently signed, between the British 
 Government and the Government of Khelat. It 
 is, moreover, considered by the Khan and Sirdars of 
 
158 LORD LYTTON'S INDIA.N ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 close of 
 Peshawur 
 Conference 
 
 Klielat to be absolutely necessary for the peace of the 
 Khanate, for the protection of trade, and for the 
 security of our own frontier. 
 
 ' The step thus imposed on us was obviously 
 uncharacterised by any hostile design against the 
 Amir, with whom we were at that moment con- 
 ducting friendly negotiations, on a basis extremely 
 advantageous to His Highness. 
 
 ' Throughout the recent negotiations, as also 
 throughout the whole of the previous connection 
 between the two States since the accession of the 
 present Amir of Kabul to the throne, the British 
 Government has manifested the m^ost scrupulous 
 regard for the independence of Afghanistan and the 
 most patient goodwill towards its ruler. 
 
 ' The independence of Afghanistan is still desired 
 by the British Government, although the British 
 Government cannot undertake to secure it if the 
 unfriendly and unwise conduct of the present Afghan 
 ruler remains unchanged. The British Government, 
 moreover, is still, as it has always been, sincereh^ 
 animated by an unselfish interest in the general 
 welfare of the Afghan population, and will view with 
 great regret any sufiering inflicted on that population 
 by the errors of the present Amir. 
 
 ' But if His Highness persists in the prosecution 
 of his present faithless and unfriendly proceedings, 
 all responsibility for the inevitable consequence of 
 those proceedings must rest upon his own head. In 
 any case the British Government now considers 
 itself free to withdraw from the present Amir of 
 Kabul, if further provoked by him, the support of its 
 friendship and protection. 
 
 ' The Government of India takes this opportunity 
 of warning all the chiefs and tribes upon its frontier 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 159 
 
 to beware how they place themselves in the power of Viceroy's 
 the Amir of Kabul, or become involved in the close S°° 
 heavy responsibility which will be incurred by all P^shawur 
 
 ♦'J- -^ , , «' Conference 
 
 who aid or abet that prince m any act of aggression 
 on British territory or British subjects. 
 
 ' By listening to the false statements or trusting to 
 the deceptive assurances of His Highness they will only 
 prepare for themselves many future calamities. The 
 British Government desires to cultivate their friend- 
 ship and to respect and uphold their independence : 
 but this it will be unable to do if they participate in 
 hostile demonstrations against it.' 
 
 It subsequently became known to the Viceroy 
 that Sher Ali would never have acquiesced in our 
 proposals, even had he made a temporary pretence 
 of accepting them, for he was already too far com- ^ 
 mitted to the Eussian Alliance. But there is little 
 doubt that he was anxious to prolong the conference 
 to the latest possible moment, whilst actively push- 
 ing forward his own warlike preparations. 
 
 He sent instructions to the surviving Envoy to 
 prolong the conference by every means in his power, 
 and despatched a fresh Envoy, who was reported to 
 have authority to accept all the conditions of the 
 British Government. In the opinion of the Viceroy, 
 however, the concessions which it might have been 
 well for the British Government to offer to the Amir 
 had he shown any eagerness for our friendship could 
 no longer be safely offered in the face of the situa- 
 tion revealed by Sir Lewis Felly's investigations, and 
 he decided that under these circumstances the pro- 
 longation of the conference could only lead to em- 
 barrassments and entanglements best avoided by the S^^,^^^^^ 
 
 . . . Pelly leaves 
 
 timely termination of it. On April 2 Sir Lewis Pelly Peshawur 
 left Peshawur. ^^^ 
 
l6o I-ORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Native agent 
 recalled 
 
 The Indian 
 Government 
 acquires new 
 sources of 
 information 
 
 Our native agent at Kabul was also at this time 
 withdrawn. 
 
 For purposes of information he had been proved 
 worthless. He was nothing more than a tool in 
 the hands of the Amir, and during the Peshawur 
 Conference he was kept virtually as a prisoner at 
 Kabul, all power of action being taken from him and 
 all his movements carefully watched and controlled. 
 
 For long past the Government of India had been 
 solely dependent for information on the reports of 
 the agent at Kabul and those of the Commissioner 
 of Peshawur, thus living in ' profound and perilous 
 ignorance of actual facts and true causes ' of all 
 that went on in Kabul, while the Eussian authori- 
 ties were working most energetically and successfully 
 against us. 
 
 Now, however, other and more effective methods 
 were inaugurated for obtaining authentic informa- 
 tion. In establishing any new system of frontier 
 organisation, the Viceroy had to contend with the 
 opposition of all the old frontier officials, who objected 
 to any radical changes, and looked with suspicion 
 upon any system of diplomacy which required 
 secrecy and dexterity. Amongst the Punjab frontier 
 officers, there was one, however, who in the opinion of 
 the Viceroy appeared to possess the requisite qualities 
 of open-mindedness and intellectual quickness for 
 carrying on such a work as the political management 
 of the Peshawur frontier, this man being Captain 
 Cavaonari. It was a cause of ^reat satisfaction to 
 Lord Lytton when, towards the end of May, this 
 officer was moved to Peshawur to act as Deputy 
 Commissioner. Before he actually started for Pesha- 
 wur, he received a letter from the Viceroy promising 
 him unreserved confidence on the subject of the 
 
1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE l6l 
 
 frontier polic)^ he was anxious to inaugurate, and 
 demanding from Captain Cavagnari in return a 
 similar freedom of communication. The letter then 
 goes on as follows : 
 
 ' As regards our present relations with Sher Ali, Viceroy to 
 the one thing to bear constantly in mind is the M^y^ig"^' 
 importance of maintaining towards him an attitude 
 of the most complete indifference and unbroken 
 i-eserve. 
 
 ' .... I do not intend to send Atta Mahomed ^ back 
 to Kabul at all : and, if I eventually permit Bukhtiar 
 Khan to return there in a private capacity, it will 
 not be yet a while. In the meantime, therefore, it is 
 expedient that through Mr. Christie, or by any and 
 every other means in your power, you should obtain, 
 from all available sources, information of what is 
 going on in Kabul or elsewhere throughout Afghani- 
 stan, and keep the Government regularly and fully 
 furnished with such information. Hitherto our 
 intelligence from Afghanistan has been more constant, 
 complete, and trustworthy since the withdrawal of 
 the native agent than it was before. This is partly 
 due to the Klielat telegraph and the communications 
 opened b}^ Sandeman with Kandahar. We get a fair 
 amount of news, however, from Peshawur also. In 
 working this Intelligence Department, I feel sure you 
 will be careful to abstain from any word or sign 
 which, if reported to the Amir, would convey to his 
 mind the impression that we care three straws about 
 what he may now do or not do, or that we have the 
 least desire to re-open negotiations with him. I doubt 
 if our present relations with His Highness will ever 
 be satisfactory ; but the only chance of improving 
 them is to let him first thoroughly realise the diffi- 
 
 ^ Our native agent. 
 
 M 
 
1 62 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy to culties of the positioii ill which he has now placed 
 CavaKnari, hiiiiself. Mc judice, the radical defect in the conduct 
 of our past relations with Sher Ali is that the tone of 
 it has never been in wholesome accordance with the 
 realities of our relative positions — the weakness of 
 his position and the strength of our own. Thus, 
 induced by our own conduct to believe himself a 
 political necessity to us, and consequently a great 
 political catch to the Russians, he has naturally 
 sought his personal advantage in playing his two 
 great neighbours off against each other. A few 
 months, possibly a few weeks, will, I think, suffice to 
 show him that he is not strong enough to play this 
 game successfully, I trust we shall never allow 
 Afghanistan to fall into the hands of any other 
 Power. But between Afghanistan and the pi-esent 
 Amir there is a practical distinction. We can get 
 on without Sher Ali ; he cannot get on without us. 
 Ere long he must either go to shipwreck altogether, 
 or else return to his old moorings on the Peshawur 
 side in a temper chastened by sharp experience. In 
 the former case our hands will be completely free to 
 deal promptly with the new situation which will then 
 arise. In the latter case we shall be able to replace 
 both the Amir and ourselves in what is our true, and 
 should always be our permanent, relative position 
 towards each other. The wrecks come to the shore : 
 the shore does not go to the wrecks. 
 
 ' Yours, dear Captain Cavagnari, very faithfully, 
 
 (Signed) 'Lytton.' 
 
 A mission from the Sultan of Turke}^ was sent this 
 year to the Mohammedans of India and Afghanistan, 
 and it was thought that his influence over the Amir 
 might induce the latter once more to come to a better 
 
1877 MISSION FROM THE SULTAN 1 63 
 
 understanding with the British Government. But it 
 had no such effect. The mission was received by the 
 Amir with great pomp and an obvious desire to 
 impress the Envoy by a strong display of military 
 power. Eeports first reached the Viceroy to the 
 effect that the Amir seemed really anxious to avail 
 himself of this opportunity of escape from his present 
 difficulties by renewing friendly relations with the 
 Indian Government and rupture with the Eussians. 
 This rumour was so far confirmed by the fact that 
 the troops intended for the jehad against us had been 
 removed from our frontier to Maimema. Then, 
 again, the Amir reverted to his old policy of trying 
 to gain time. He was indisposed, and could not 
 grant the Turkish Envoy an interview for fifteen days. 
 When the interview took place the Envoy found 
 His Highness very badly disposed towards the 
 English and his sympathies strongly Eussian. 
 Eussian influence he found predominant at Kabul, 
 where the Eussian Government had established an 
 active agency supplied from different parts of 
 Khokand. The Turkish Envoy was a ' pious Mulla 
 without guile,' and in all his interviews with Sher 
 Ali the Amir had the best of the argument. At all 
 events the Envoy departed having totally failed to 
 establish better relations between the Governments 
 of India and Afghanistan. 
 
 All these negotiations had broken down upon the 
 essential point, which was indeed the keystone 
 defined by Lord Salisbury's despatch of February 
 1876. Her Majesty's Government had authorised 
 Lord Lytton to conclude a treaty with the Amir, 
 guaranteeing the integrity of his dominions, but 
 stipulating that for the effective performance of this 
 guarantee, the Amir should permit British agents to 
 
 M 2 
 
1 64 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. y 
 
 have undisputed access to frontier positions upon the 
 North- West border of Afghanistan. This was, there- 
 fore, necessarily insisted upon in the negotiations of 
 1877, as the prehminary basis, and when the Afghan 
 Envoy dechned to admit it, the proceedings inevitably 
 came to an end. The rupture of these negotiations 
 undoubtedly widened the breach between the Amir 
 and the Indian Government. Slier Ali began now 
 more openly to listen to friendly overtures from 
 beyond the Oxus, while the Viceroy of India, re- 
 cognising that the Amir was completely estranged, 
 reofarded him henceforth rather as a dangerous and 
 untrustworthy neighbour than as a ruler whose power 
 it would be well to strengthen, and whose dominions 
 should be guaranteed. 
 
 The importance he attached to the newly acquired 
 position at Quettah and his negotiations with the 
 Maharaja of Kashmir concerning the tribes of 
 Chitral and Yassin were prompted by the idea of 
 widening the influence of the British power over the 
 frontier tribes, and of loosening that of the Amir 
 be}'ond the boundary of his own little kingdom. 
 From this point of view, also, he discusses in a 
 correspondence with Cavagnari the advisability of 
 openly befriending some of the more important of 
 the tribes whose territory lay between that of the 
 Amir of Kabul and the North- West Frontier of India. 
 
 Captain Cavagnari heartily agreed that the 
 independence of these tribes of the Amir of Afghan- 
 istan was a fact which had not been sufficiently 
 taken into account by the British Government, but 
 at the same time he warned the Viceroy that any 
 active steps on the part of the British Government to 
 secure their independence by the gift of arms or 
 money would at once be resented by the Amir as 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 1 65 
 
 an act offensive towards him, and should not, there- 
 fore, be resorted to while there was still any chance 
 of patching up differences with Sher Ali. 
 
 The Viceroy in his reply gives his reasons why, in Viceroy to 
 his opinion, a complete change of policy with regard june?^^^' 
 to these intermediate tribes has become necessary. 
 ' Our original Afghan policy,' he wrote, ' was to 
 regard these tribes as the political property of the 
 Amir of Kabul, with a view to making him re- 
 sponsible for the control of them. I think that policy 
 was a very reasonable one ; for it is always convenient 
 to simplify your external relations as much as possible, 
 and unif}^ the authority you have to deal with on 
 your border, whenever that can be practically done. 
 But, owing to various causes, the policy has failed, 
 and failed so irremediably that we cannot now set it 
 on its legs again. The Amir has never been able to 
 exercise authority over these intervening tribes in 
 the sense contemplated by those who laid down the 
 lines of the old policy ; what influence he does 
 exercise over them is distinctly prejudicial and per- 
 manently inconvenient to us ; and meanwhile we, on 
 our part, have never been able to exercise authority 
 or influence over their Amir. Practically, therefore, 
 the result is that already Eussian influence can 
 approach the Amir tlu"ough an open door, which it 
 is not even in his power to close ; while we can only 
 get at him across a hedge of thorns. . . . Our rela- 
 tions with the Amir of Kabul, instead of being to us 
 a source of increasing security, are a cause of incessant 
 anxiety. It is not, and cannot be, in our interests to 
 promote the consolidation of a border power whose 
 friendship we have no means of securing, and whose 
 enmity we cannot punish save by a war in which 
 success would not be free from embarrassment. 
 
1 66 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION 
 
 CII. T 
 
 Viceroy to Therefore I conceive that it is rather the gradual 
 June^g"^"' disintegration and weakening, than the consoUdation 
 and the estabhshment, of the Afghan power at which 
 we must now begin to aim.' To Cavagnari's objection 
 that the conclusion of satisfactory relations between 
 the British Government and the independent frontier 
 chiefs would render impossible a reconciliation with 
 the Amir, the Viceroy's reply was this : ' Slier Ali 
 has irrevocably slipped out of our hands ; and it is 
 therefore inadvisable to neglect any opportunity of 
 strengthening or improving our position by means 
 independent of his goodwill for fear that by so doing 
 we should provoke his resentment.' Cavagnari had 
 further objected that any such relations established 
 with border chiefs would be as distasteful to Sher 
 All's successors as to himself. To this again the 
 Viceroy replied that if the aim of British policy was 
 not to consolidate but to disintegrate the Kabul 
 power, this did not matter. ' We can never satisfy 
 their national ambition, because many of its natural 
 objects are not compatible with our own interests. 
 They will never greatly value such help as we are 
 able and willing to give them, and the more 
 confidently they can reckon on it the less they will 
 appreciate it. But they will always be more or less 
 influenced by our practical power of hurting them ; 
 and it is this which we should now endeavour to 
 develop and confirm.' 
 
 The system of government and organisation of 
 the North-West Frontier of India has been the subject 
 of discussion and controversy now for generations. 
 
 Writing in the spring of 1877, Lord Lytton 
 comments upon the ' overwhelming concurrence of 
 opinion ' then existing on three points. Firstly ' that 
 our frontier administration was in need of adjustment, 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 1 6/ 
 
 secondly that the Government of Sindh should be 
 severed from that of Bombay, and thirdly that ' the 
 line of demarcation between the Sindh or lower 
 frontier and the Punjab or upper frontier should be 
 readjusted according to the distribution of the races 
 on the border ; so that the Belooch tribes [might] all 
 come within one district and administration, and the 
 Pathan tribes within the other.' 
 
 In a minute dated April 22, 1877, Lord Lytton 
 examined the various propositions of reform which 
 were then before the Government of India, and 
 sketched in outline a scheme which embodied his 
 own views as to the best policy to be pursued. 
 
 He was in favour of forming a new frontier Vic oy's 
 district beyond the Indus, and separate from Sindh Frontier re- 
 and the Punjab. This district should be placed under o^^sanisation 
 a Chief Commissioner or Governor-General's agent, 
 having the management directly under the Govern- 
 ment of India of all frontier business and trans- 
 frontier relations. ' The Viceroy would, by means of 
 this arrangement, command the services of his own 
 specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads 
 of aU our border politics and tribal relations would 
 be concentrated. The time of such an assent could 
 be devoted almost entirely to purely frontier duties ; 
 and he would be better able than any Lieutenant- 
 Governor of the Punjab can possibly l)e to visit with 
 adequate frequency, freedom of mind, and singleness 
 of interest all parts of the frontier; thus making 
 himself personally and thoroughly familiar with the 
 social facts, individual characters, and local senti- 
 ments which claim incessant and concentrated 
 attention in the successful administration of border 
 politics. The political and administrative conduct 
 of the frontier would be in the same hands and pass 
 
l68 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cu. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 Frontier re- 
 organisation 
 
 through the same channels. All division of respon- 
 sibility and all antagonism of schools and systems 
 would thus be eliminated.' 
 
 Objections to such a system were expressed on the 
 grounds, firsts that these frontier districts naturally 
 formed an integral part of the Punjab, and should 
 not, therefore, be separated from it ; secondly^ that 
 their internal administration would suffer by separa- 
 tion ; thirdly, that our frontier relations are best 
 carried on through the Punjab Government. 
 
 With regard to the first of these objections Lord 
 Lytton's inquiries led him to an exactly opposite 
 conclusion. ' The frontier districts,' he writes, ' are 
 separated from the Punjab by almost every possible 
 kind of distinction. They are separated geographi- 
 cally, historically, by race, by institutions, and by 
 customs. The Indus, for a great part of its course, 
 forms a natural and little traversed boundary between 
 two essentially distinct territories. The trans-Indus 
 districts were only conquered and annexed to the 
 Sikh kingdom late in the reign of Eunjeet Singh ; and 
 the tribal system prevalent throughout the greater 
 portion of them differs widely from the institutions of 
 the cis-Indus population.' 
 
 The second objection, namely, that the internal 
 administration of these frontier districts would suffer 
 by their separation from the Punjab, came chiefly 
 from those officers directly connected with the 
 Government of the Punjab. While acknowledging 
 that such men were undoubtedly ' the best qualified 
 judges on certain points,' Lord Lytton pointed out 
 that ' they were yet hardly in a position to form the 
 soundest or most impartial opinion ' on the general 
 merits of an arram^'ement involving; ' some reduction 
 in the scope and power ' of the particular Govei-n- 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 1 69 
 
 ment with whose ' achievements and traditions they viceroy's 
 w^ere justly proud to be associated.' Frontier re- 
 
 The last objection was that our frontier relations organisation 
 were best carried on through the Punjab Govern- 
 ment. With regard to this Lord Lytton wrote : 
 ^ So long as our relations with the trans-frontier 
 States are carried on by an officer of comparatively 
 subordinate position, there may be reasons why he 
 should communicate through the local Govern- 
 ment rather than directly with the Government of 
 India. But if the conduct of these relations be trans- 
 ferred to an officer whose official rank is little below 
 that of the Lieutenant-Governor himself, it is in that 
 case difficult to imagine what advantage could be 
 gained by reserving to the Punjab Government any 
 share in the conduct of them. All unnecessary links 
 in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the 
 strencfth of it. The frontier officer has all the local 
 knowledge necessary to enable him to form and 
 submit an opinion, or to frame a line of jDolicy for 
 the consideration of the Government of India. The 
 Government of India reviews the information and 
 opinions thus submitted to it with a knowledge of 
 British and Imperial interests, as also of the military 
 and financial conditions of India, wider and more 
 accurate than that of any local administration. But 
 what new light can the Punjab Government throw on 
 the matter ? It has not the local knowledge of the 
 Chief Commissioner on the spot, and it has no know- 
 ledge of Imperial policy and political conditions 
 which the Commissioner does not equally possess.' 
 
 With regard to the military portion of the 
 Viceroy's scheme it was his intention to amalgamate 
 the Punjab Frontier Force and the Sindh Frontier 
 Force, placing the whole under the orders of the 
 
1 70 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's Commander-m-Cliief. 'The time had come,' he 
 F^f^erie- thought, ' for the mihtary force to take its proper 
 organisation place with the rest of the troops under the immediate 
 orders of the Commander-in-Chief ; and for the civil 
 Government to rely more directly under ordinary 
 circumstances on its own force — the police. The 
 intermixture of commands which has been so often 
 pointed out as the great blot in our frontier military 
 system would thus cease ; and Peshawur, instead of 
 being a separate command interposed between and 
 interrupting the continuity of the frontier chain of 
 ports, would take its national position as the military 
 headquarters of the northern division. 
 
 ' Though amalgamated and placed under the 
 Commissioner-in-Chief the force should still be 
 localised and retain its character of a frontier force ; 
 that is to say, the regiments should serve only 
 within the frontier military districts, though inter- 
 changeable within these. 
 
 ' For the immediate security of the frontier 
 against petty raids, &c., it is essential that it should 
 possess a picked and most efficient police force, com- 
 manded by picked officers. For the Sindh frontier 
 the money saved by the reduction of one regiment of 
 Sindh horse might suffice to increase and improve 
 the police force ; the existing Belooch Guides form- 
 ing part of the police organisation. ... I am 
 hopeful that the force thus formed may eventually 
 become an admirable school for frontier work, and 
 a promising and popular field of distinction for young 
 men of energy and character.' 
 
 This Minute on frontier organisation closes with 
 some general remarks on frontier administration, 
 which are quoted in full : 
 
 ' I think it desirable that I should take this- 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FEONTIER TRIBES I 7 I 
 
 opportunity of indicating broadly the views I per- viceroy's 
 sonally hold regarding frontier administration. Very yvontrer°IL- 
 broad the sketch must necessarily be, when so much organisation 
 
 '' . General prin- 
 
 depends on conditions constantly changing ; on the cipies of 
 
 T T . « •.! 1 Frontier ad- 
 
 prejudices and passions 01 races with whom w^e are ministration 
 as yet but imperfectly acquainted ; and on the indi- 
 vidual judgment and special qualifications of the 
 officers on whom so much depends. If, in the views 
 I am about to express, I have the concurrence of our 
 frontier officers, and they claim to have been en- 
 deavouring to act on the lines here set forth, I shall 
 feel myself strengthened and encouraged by their 
 support. If, on the other hand, they differ on some 
 points from the conclusions I have arrived at, I can 
 only say that these conclusions are not " evolved 
 from my inner consciousness," and that I claim no 
 supernatural insight into frontier politics. My 
 views on this subject have been derived from long 
 and careful study of masses of correspondence, 
 reports, minutes, &c., containing the opinions of the 
 most competent judges, both actors and spectators. 
 By the recorded experience of others I have en- 
 deavoured to test and correct all a priori impressions 
 of my own ; and the conclusions thus gradually 
 matured are confirmed by such knowledge of the 
 facts they refer to as I have been able to acquire 
 from a year's tenure of office, during which several 
 important frontier questions have forced themselves 
 prominently on my notice. It is weU to bear in mind 
 that in policy, as in other games of skill, the obser- 
 vant spectator is often a better judge than the player 
 absorbed in the chances of the game. 
 
 ' In the first place, then, I think it should be our 
 aim to cultivate more direct and frequent intercourse 
 than at present exists between ourselves and the 
 
172 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 Frontier re- 
 organisation 
 
 tribes on our borders. I have already had occasion 
 to observe more than once, what I cannot too often 
 repeat in reference to this subject, that it is to the 
 effect of the straightforward, upright, and disinterested 
 o-entlemen, and to the influence 
 
 action 
 
 of Enghsh 
 
 which higher mental power and culture never fail to 
 exert over those who are brought much in contact 
 with them, rather than to superiority in lighting 
 power and appliances, that I attribute British su- 
 premacy in India, as well as the exceptional success 
 of British rule in all quarters of the globe. If per- 
 sonal character and influence be the powerful engines 
 I believe them to be, it is desirable that their force 
 should be exercised as constantly and directly as 
 possible. For this, among other reasons, I propose 
 the appointment of a Chief Commissioner at Peshawur, 
 invested with exceptionally high powers, who can 
 represent to the native mind more directly and per- 
 sonally than either the Lieutenant-Governor at 
 Lahore, or the stiU more distant Viceroy at Calcutta, 
 the embodied power and dignity of the British 
 Government. For this reason also I propose to in- 
 crease the administrative staff of divisions and dis- 
 tricts ; so that the Commissioners and Deputy Com- 
 missioners, relieved of much purel}'- routine work, 
 may have more time for visiting, and becoming 
 personally acquainted with, their troublesome, but 
 not hopelessly unmanageable, neighbours. I have 
 before me now a Minute by Major James, formerly 
 Commissioner of Peshawur ; in which, as the result 
 of thirteen years' frontier experience, he expresses 
 himself most strongly as to the absolute impossibility 
 of combining a proper intercourse with the border 
 tribes with the execution of his ordinary civil duties. 
 The then Lieutenant-Governor, and Lord Lawrence, 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 1 73 
 
 hinted, indeed, that this incompatibiUty of functions viceroy's 
 was Major James's own fauh ; yet from all quarters Froutierre- 
 I hear Major James spoken of as one of the ablest organisation 
 and most active administrators the frontier has 
 known, and one who, but for his untimely death, had 
 a brilliant career before him. 
 
 ' Again, for the reasons given above, I think that 
 the employment of Arbabs, or middlemen, should be 
 discontinued as much as possible. I do not myself 
 believe that it strengthens our hold even upon the 
 small class we thus employ. For every man gratified 
 by employment, a host of jealousies are raised against 
 him and ourselves. ... I admit, however, that there 
 are many occasions on which the services of Arbabs 
 have been, and may again be, most valuable to us, 
 especially in opening communication with frontier 
 tribes ; but I think that whenever their services can 
 be dispensed with, and direct communication opened, 
 or maintained, by our own authorities, this should 
 be done. Even if we could always depend on the 
 absolute loyalty of Arbabs, these men cannot convey 
 to the Native the same clear idea of our views and 
 character that he would gain by personal intercourse 
 with British officers. 
 
 'For the same reasons, I would be inclined to 
 relax somewhat the restrictions now placed on dis- 
 trict officers corresponding with Chiefs beyond the 
 border, and on officers crossing the border. I am 
 aware that this is a matter which will require very 
 careful and delicate handling ; and that any relaxation 
 of the present restrictions may be attended with con- 
 siderable risk. But it seems to me that, in our anxiety 
 to avoid present risk and complications, we have 
 somewhat sacrificed future influence and security. I 
 think there is no one who considers our jiresent 
 
1 74 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 Frontier re- 
 organisation 
 
 relations with the trans-frontier tribes to be altogether 
 satisfactory. I believe that our North- Western Frontier 
 presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the 
 world : at least, I know of no other spot where, after 
 twenty-five years of peaceful occupation, a great 
 civilised Power has obtained so little influence over 
 its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little 
 knowledge of them, that the country within a day's 
 ride of its most important garrison, is an absolute 
 terra incognita ; and that there is absolutely no 
 security for British life a mile or two beyond our 
 border. I can see no force in the oft-repeated 
 argument that the Sikh and other kincrdoms were no 
 more successful than ourselves in their intercourse 
 with these hill tribes ; unless, indeed, it be assumed 
 that English civilisation and rule are no better than 
 those of a Sikh or Persian kino-dom ; that an Eno-lish 
 officer represents no higher type of character than 
 the servant of an eastern king ; and that our power 
 and military resources and appliances are not 
 immeasurably superior to those of the kingdoms 
 which were crushed by a mere fraction of the force 
 now at our command. 
 
 ' Next, as regards our general system of fron- 
 tier defence, and the punishment of offences com- 
 mitted by the independent tribes ; I think, as 
 already stated, that the time has come when the 
 military force should pass under the Commander-in- 
 Chief, losing somewhat of its police character, while 
 the civil power should be more directly responsible 
 for the protection of life and property. I propose, 
 therefore, to increase somewhat the police force, 
 giving it as good an organisation as possible, and 
 placing it directly under the district officers. The 
 local militia also should be under the district officers ; 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES I 75 
 
 and ordinarily these civil forces should be sufficient viceroy's 
 to meet and punish any attempts from over the Frontier' re- 
 border. With a picked police force, composed of organisation 
 men of the same stamp, and as inured to hill work 
 as the tribes whom they have to act against, l)ut 
 better armed, organised, and disciplined, under 
 picked officers, and with a proper system of espionage 
 and intelligence, I see no reason why the security of 
 the frontier should not be maintained, in ordinary 
 times, without the assistance of troops. But when 
 once the troops are called out, then the control of 
 all armed forces, military, police, or militia, should 
 pass into the hands of the officer commanding the 
 troops ; and he alone, acting of course in concert 
 and communication with the civil authorities, 
 should be responsible for the protection of the 
 frontier. 
 
 ' I have already, on several occasions, expressed 
 my strong disapproval of the system of small 
 punitive military expeditions ; and I have twice, 
 within my short tenure of office, refused to sanction 
 them when they have been recommended. I do not 
 for a moment suppose that these turbulent and 
 savage tribes can be managed without occasional 
 displays of power, and severe punishment ; but I object 
 to this particular form of punishment. I object 
 to it because it perpetuates a system of semi-bar- 
 barous reprisal, and because we lower ourselves to 
 the ideas of right and might common to our barbarous 
 neighbours, rather than endeavour to raise them to 
 our own ideas; — because it seldom really touches 
 the guilty, and generally falls most heavily on the 
 innocent ; because its natural tendency is to perpe- 
 tuate animosity rather than lead up to good relations ; 
 because, as a rule, it leaves no permanent mark, and 
 
176 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. y 
 
 vicGioy's the tribes assailed by us can point triumphantly 
 FrorIiiti°re- ^'^ <^^^ haviug evacuated their country after all ; 
 organisation bccause there can be no more trying fighting for our 
 own troops than that which obliges them ultimately 
 to retire before an enemy increasing in strength and 
 boldness : and it appears from the records of these 
 expeditions, which are not always successes even in 
 the most limited sense, that the losses suffered by 
 ourselves often exceed the losses we inflict. Finally, 
 I object to this system because I think the confidence 
 of the hill tribes and their warlike spirit are quite as 
 likely to be raised as lowered by contests in which 
 they generally fire the last shot at a retreating foe. 
 I am aware that the expeditions I thus deprecate are 
 defended by a large number of our most experienced 
 frontier administrators, on the grounds, so far as 
 I understand them — 1st, that they are the only 
 means of dealing with barbarous races ; and, 2nd, 
 that their success has been proved by results. 
 With regard to the first argument, I cannot find that 
 any other system has ever been tried with sufficient 
 persistence to give it a chance ; and, with regard to 
 the second, I cannot at all admit the results that have 
 been obtained, after twenty five years' frontier adminis- 
 tration, as evidence of successful dealings with these 
 tribes, seeing that European life is as insecure as ever 
 beyond our immediate border ; that we have recently 
 been exposed to a series of successful raids and 
 outrages from one tribe ; and that in my short 
 tenure of office I have twice had to consider the 
 necessity of military operations against offending 
 sections. I maintain that, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, the police should be able to cope with 
 offences committed within our border, and, if 
 necessary, follow up and inflict punishment beyond it. 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FEONTIER TRIBES 1 77 
 
 I also maintain that when troops are used, the expe- viceroy's 
 ditions should be on a considerable scale, and pro- Frontier re- 
 ductive of permanent results. At any rate, under no °^g^°is^*io" 
 circumstances should the troops be withdrawn until 
 all opposition has absolutely ceased : they should 
 never be required to turn their backs to an enemy 
 who is still firing at them. And I think these expe- 
 ditions, in which, while doing little to put our 
 relations permanently on a better footing, we injure 
 a whole tribe for the vicarious punishment of an 
 individual, are particularly inapplicable where (as is 
 so repeatedly and strongly represented to us by the 
 Punjab authorities) there really is little or no tribal 
 responsibility or control. In the Punjab Eeport of 
 October 1876 it is pointed out that the Belooch 
 system of tribal responsibility cannot be applied to 
 the Pathan tribes, because "every tribe is divided 
 and sub-divided into numerous clans, each indepen- 
 dent of the others, and yielding but small obedience 
 to its own petty headmen." These tribes, it is 
 stated, " only unite against a common enemy. Con- 
 trol exercised over such tribes through their chiefs 
 would be impossible, for the chiefs do not exist." Yet 
 it is to these very tribes that the system is applied of 
 burning certain villages because other members of 
 the tribe have committed outrages. 
 
 ' In dealing with barbarous tribes, our object 
 should be either to support and enforce tribal re- 
 sponsibility to the utmost wherever it already exists, 
 or to reduce tribal cohesion to a minimum where no 
 recognised authority can be found and used. The 
 worst system of all is that which, while it gives us 
 none of the advantages of tribal responsibility, yet 
 unites the tribe against us when we seek to exact 
 reparation for injuries inflicted. If, therefore, as we 
 
178 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch, v 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute on 
 Frontier re- 
 organisation 
 
 are repeatedly assured by the Punjab authorities, the 
 heads of these tribes cannot be held answerable for 
 the actions of individuals, it should be an object to 
 trace the offence, and bring home the punishment to 
 the individual and his immediate abettors, rather 
 than to punish the tribe itself for the acts of the 
 one or more of its members. 
 
 ' It is hardl}^ necessary to say that in reference 
 to this, as to other points which I have indicated, I 
 am fully alive to the difficulties of execution; but 
 I think it none the less important to lay down general 
 lines for guidance in our action. 
 
 ' The last point to which I attach special impor- 
 tance, is the gradual disarmament of the popula- 
 tion immediately within our frontier. The old 
 reasons for allowing and encouraging them to carr}- 
 arms, namely, that they were required to participate 
 actively in the defence of the frontier, have almost 
 disappeared ; and, in any case, I would entrust the 
 protection of the frontier against violence to the 
 ■police and military, rather than to the inhabitants 
 themselves. One of the first steps towards civilisa- 
 tion and social progress is the separation of the 
 military from the agricultural and trading classes ; 
 and the sooner our subjects can be taught to confine 
 themselves to peaceful pursuits, looking to the 
 authorities for protection and redress instead of 
 taking the law into their own hands, the better it 
 will be for all concerned. Such a measure would 
 require care and time for its execution ; but when- 
 ever the inhabitants of a village or district have 
 shown themselves troublesome, or specially quarrel- 
 some, or slow to render assistance when called upon, 
 the opportunity should be taken to deprive them of 
 their arms. Meanwhile all who do carry arms 
 
1877 DEALINGS WITH FEONTIER TBIBES I 79 
 
 should be to some extent organised ; and the carry- Viceroy's 
 ing of arms be clearly understood to carry with it Frontier re- 
 certain responsibilities. The number of able-bodied organisation 
 men carrying arms, and the nature of their arms, 
 should, as far as possible, be registered, and all armed 
 villages required to furnish assistance to the police 
 or civil power, or supply escorts, watchmen, &c., in 
 proportion to their armament. 
 
 ' These are my general views on the subject of 
 border policy. The re-organisation of the frontier 
 districts, which is here proposed, will doubtless 
 afford great facilities and advantages for giving 
 practical effect to the principles on which I am 
 anxious to see the management of frontier affairs con- 
 ducted. But I need scarcely point out that the 
 necessity for a speedy and complete re-organisation 
 of the present S3^stem of Frontier Government is 
 entirely independent of any administrative theories, 
 or political principles, peculiar to myself. This 
 measure is absolutely and urgently requisite for the 
 efficient execution of the policy of the Government 
 of India, whatever that policy may be, or howsoever 
 that Government may be composed now, or here- 
 after. 
 
 Lytton. 
 
 ' Naini Tal : April 22, 1877.' 
 
 This Minute was written in April of 1877. In 
 the autumn of this year the Viceroy authorised a 
 small expedition against the Jowaki tribes who had 
 perpetrated incessant raids upon the Peshawur 
 border. In authorising a punitive expedition against 
 them, however, the Viceroy endeavoured to carry out 
 as far as possible the principles which he had laid 
 down in the Minute. His difficulties were great, 
 
 N 2 
 
l8o LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. 
 
 owing to the multiplicit}^ of authorities with whom 
 he had to deal, and the first expedition was a 
 failure. The Viceroy had explicitly urged a ' night 
 surprise.' Nevertheless it was carried out in broad 
 daylight, 
 vioeioy to ' The tribes were thus made aware in good time 
 
 o^tober^l^**^' ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ authorities flattered themselves they 
 were keeping secret ; the expedition was ludicrously 
 ineffectual, and has of course done more harm than 
 good.' 
 
 In despair of otherwise coming to a satisfactory 
 understanding with the frontier authorities, the 
 Viceroy sent his military secretary, Colonel CoUey, 
 unofficially to Peshawur to ascertain the real facts 
 of the situation there and to assist the Viceroy in 
 arriving at some practical decision on the various 
 proposals which had been submitted to him. The 
 principles which were laid down at this conference of 
 officers were as follows : 
 
 '1st. To avoid as far as possible operations ne- 
 
 Sec. of state, ccssitating the ultimate retirement of the 
 
 ''^^'"^^^ British troops under pursuit and fire of 
 
 the enemy. 
 
 2nd. To hold all positions once taken until the 
 
 absolute submission of the tribe has been 
 
 secured. 
 
 3rd. To make the loss and suffering fall as 
 
 heavily as possible on the enemy's fighting 
 
 men, and as lightly as possible on the 
 
 non-combatants.' 
 
 Under the new system advocated by the Viceroy 
 
 operations were begun against the Jowaki tribes 
 
 under General Keyes, who advanced into their 
 
 country on November 9, with a force about 2,000 
 
 strono-. Pains were taken to isolate this tribe, which 
 
1877 JOWAKI EXPEDITION l8l 
 
 had caused the disturbances, from the surrounding 
 and neighbour tribes, thus reducing the strength 
 of the enemy to be quelled to some 1,200 or 1,500 
 men. This was successfully accomplished. The 
 other tribes refused the appeal for help from the 
 Jowakis, and continued to trade actively and peace- 
 fully in British territory. 
 
 On November 23 the Vicero)^ wrote to Lord To Lord 
 Salisbury : ' I have made every effort to keep the November 23 
 present operations (which in some form or other 
 were absolutely unavoidable) within the narrowest 
 possible bounds ; first, by confining them to the 
 Jowakis and taking every security for the isolation 
 of that tribe before we attacked it ; secondly, by 
 rejecting every plan of operations which was not so 
 devised as to enable us to employ the minimum of 
 force with the maximum of effect ; and thirdly, by 
 steadily resisting the pressure put upon me by the 
 Punjab authorities, both civil and military, as well 
 as by the Commander-in-Chief, for permission to 
 employ a force greatly in excess of what is admitted 
 to be necessary for the purposes to which the present 
 expedition is confined,' 
 
 On December 7 he was able to write as follows : To Lord 
 ' Our operations against the Jowakis have thus far December 7 
 been an unprecedented success. Our troops are now 
 masters of nearly the whole Jowaki country. The 
 tribe seems to be quite bewildered and cowed by 
 the new tactics which I have at last succeeded in 
 getting our frontier authorities to adopt. The Jowakis 
 have shown hardly any fight, but, considering the 
 small amount of fighting there has been, the losses 
 of the enemy have been unusually large and our own 
 unusually small. None of the other tribes have 
 shown the slightest disposition to join the Jowakis, 
 
1 82 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 who, being thus completely isolated, with all their 
 strongholds destroyed and all their cultivated land 
 in our hands, have already sent in headmen to sue 
 for terms. All that is now necessary is that the 
 terms imposed on them be sufficiently precautionary 
 as well as punitive. We must secure guarantees for 
 the future, as well as inflict punishment for the past. 
 I anticipate from the success of this expedition the 
 permanent establishment in India of a whole set of 
 new and better principles of warfare. I do not think 
 it likely that our frontier officers, having once recog- 
 nised the ease, safety, and superior result of the new 
 system, will ever again revert to the old one, which 
 its most inveterate advocates of a j^ear ago now 
 admit to have been justly condemned ; and I think 
 we have heard the last of the old "British Eaid." 
 Our frontier authorities, both civil and military, write 
 me word that not only has the new system of 
 operations been signally successful against the Jowakis 
 themselves, but that it has also made a profound 
 impression on all the surrounding tribes, who now 
 for the first time perceive that war with the British 
 Government may be to them a much more serious 
 matter than it hitherto has been.' 
 
 The Viceroy had from the beginning settled the 
 terms which he would deem it expedient to enforce : 
 (1) the surrender of arms, and, if possible, of ring- 
 leaders ; (2) the opening up of the country byroads, 
 which, if the Jowakis behaved peacefully in the 
 future, would be extremely beneficial to their own 
 trade, whilst if they mean mischief their power of 
 doing it will thus be crippled. 
 
 These conditions were unconditionally accepted 
 early in the following year, and the expedition 
 was most satisfactorily concluded. A well planned 
 
1878 JOWAKI EXPEDITION 183 
 
 and well executed surprise movement under Major 
 Cavagnari upon the village of Sapi resulted in the 
 killing of one ringleader and the capture of four 
 others concerned in the outrage on the Swat Canal 
 in the autumn of 1877. 
 
 Writing to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff (then 
 Mr. Grant Duff), on February 24, 1878, Lord Lytton 
 refers to the success which had attended the adoption 
 of the new system of dealing with the constantly 
 recurring frontier raids. 
 
 ' When I came to India I found that our officials To Mr. Grant 
 on the Punjab frontier were profoundly ignorant of 1878 ' ' 
 the geography of the country five miles beyond their 
 border. No map of it existed. Within our border 
 raids were constantly perpetrated with perfect im- 
 punity by the same tribes. The raiders, though a 
 mere handful of men, invariably found our frontier 
 authorities totally unprepared for their visitations 
 and invariably escaped unharmed, after cutting the 
 throats, and plundering the property, of the Queen's 
 subjects. . . . iV(9Z(7, at least, the whole Jowaki country 
 has been accurately surveyed and mapped from end 
 to end ; practicable roads have been made through 
 it in all directions ; every one of its strongholds have 
 been destroyed ; the fighting power of the whole 
 tribe has been broken ; the fighting men of the tribe 
 have surrendered all their European arms, and have 
 acquiesced in the expulsion of all the ringleaders 
 concerned in recent raids. Not another tribe, or 
 section of a tribe, has ventured to stir hand or foot 
 in support of them, though I was confidently assured, 
 of course, by those very experienced gentlemen (of 
 whom George Selwyn once said that, had their advice 
 been always listened to, " Gad, sir, we should still 
 be champing acorns") that all the Afridi tribes 
 
184 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 Lord Lytton would uiiite to support the Jowakis in resisting the 
 Duff^FS™! outrageous conditions prescribed by the Viceroy; 
 1878 that in the course of a few months we should have 
 
 the whole frontier seethins^ with fire : that the much- 
 offended and all-powerful Amir of Kabul would 
 then descend upon us like a wolf on the fold with 
 his ' gleaming cohorts,' and that all sorts of other 
 terrible things would happen. The successful result, 
 however, of the new system, which I have had such 
 difficulty in getting applied (and for the application 
 of which I must ssij I am much indebted to the 
 loyalty and good sense of the present Lieutenant- 
 Governor), has established several things. It has 
 established the fact that no Afridi tribe can resist 
 the action of British troops (with their present arms) 
 if these troops be employed in accordance with 
 rational principles. It has established the perfect 
 practicability of night surprises (if properly organised 
 in connection with such a system), as preferable to 
 the old system of cumbrous and protracted military 
 operations ; and, finall}?-, it has established throughout 
 all the border tribes such a salutary fear of our power, 
 will, and patience that I think I can safely predict 
 that, during my own tenure of office at least, the peace 
 of the Punjab frontier will not again be troubled by 
 any mere tribal attacks. I am persuaded that, under 
 a decent system of frontier administration, occasion 
 for recourse to military expeditions ought never to 
 occur.' 
 
 While matters remained in a state of expec- 
 tation and immobility on the Afghan border, the 
 Viceroy was engaged in arrangements for occupying 
 a fresh position on the extreme northern frontier of 
 India. He carried through negotiations with the 
 Maharaja of Kashmir for the establishment of a 
 
1878 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KASHMIR 1 85 
 
 British political agent at Gilgit, a small semi-inde- 
 pendent district beyond Kashmir, upon the slopes of 
 the range of the Hindu Kush mountains. In writing 
 an account of these proceedings to Lord Cranbrook, Lord Lytton 
 he says : ^ ' Kafristan consists of a small loose group cr^bn)ok 
 of independent chiefdoms, very weak, and, so far as 
 I can judge, destined to be absorbed ere long by one 
 or other of their four more powerful neighbours — 
 Kabul, Kashgar, Kashmir, and ourselves. They are 
 greatly coveted by the present Amir of Kabul. His 
 absorption of them would weaken the security of our 
 frontier by strengthening a frontier State which 
 already commands some of the most important 
 passes into it — a State always unreliable, at present 
 openly unfriendly. This consideration is all the 
 more serious because, so long as we command not 
 a single one of its external debouches, our " mountain 
 frontier," on which the " Lawrentians " profess to 
 place such reliance, is simply a fortress with no 
 glacis — in other words, a military mouse-trap. The 
 absorption of the Mirs of Kafristan by any Power 
 holding Kashgar would probably make them the 
 political appendages of the Eussian or Chinese 
 empire (to one of which it seems probable that 
 Kashgar must eventually belong), thus bringing 
 either of those empires into direct contact with our 
 own. Their absorption by ourselves is impossible, 
 because the British public has vetoed annexation. 
 And, moreover, so long as we can prevent them from 
 being annexed by Kabul or the future Kashgar 
 Power, it would certainlj'- not be worth our own 
 while to annex these poor and barren territories. 
 The country of the two northernmost of these small 
 chiefdoms (Chitral and Yassin) contains two passes, 
 
 1 April 9, 1878. 
 
1 86 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 The Viceroy Qf wliicli at present we know very little. But, if 
 
 to Secretary ^ 
 
 of State, either of these passes (the Baroghil and the Iskoman) 
 ^^' be practicable for troops, it would enable an in- 
 
 vading force, with a fine base at Yarkand, to 
 reach our frontier (its weakest point) by a route 
 quicker than any other. Just before my arrival in 
 India, Lord Northbrook, whose attention had been 
 turned to the obvious importance of clearing up the 
 doubt as to the character of these passes, instructed 
 Major Biddulph (an officer on his staff, well qualified 
 for such a task) to explore them. Owing to various 
 unforeseen circumstances. Major Biddulph was only 
 able to explore very imperfectly a portion of one of 
 them. From his report it would appear that this 
 pass is not practicable, and of the other we still 
 know next to nothing. 
 
 ' Subsequently, when it became apparent that we 
 could no longer, rationally or safely, rest our whole 
 frontier policy on the fiction of an Afghan alliance 
 which does not exist and which we have no means 
 of securing. Lord Salisbury authorised me to do 
 what I could, quietl3% to make the security of our 
 North- West Frontier as far as possible independent of 
 any such alliance. To the attainment of this object 
 my efibrts have been directed in various directions, 
 and one result of them is the present more or less 
 confidential arrangement with the Maharaja of 
 Kashmir . . . whose loyalty can, I think, be 
 thoroughly relied upon. If there be one thing more 
 than another which every Indian Prince is ambitious 
 of, it is extension of territory or rule. By the 
 present arrangement, Kashmir is authorised to enter 
 into treaty relations with these neighbouring chiefs, 
 with a view to obtaining their recognition of his 
 suzerainty in return for a small subsidy. In return 
 
1878 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KASHMIR 1 87 
 
 for tliis permission, the Maharaja assents to the The viceroy 
 estabhshment of a British agency at Gilgit to watch of state, ^^^ 
 the frontier at that point, and the construction, at ^p"^ ^ 
 his own expense, of a telegraph from Gilgit to British 
 territory. The Maharaja is not to use force for the 
 purpose of extending his authority over Chitral, 
 Yassin, or any of the other neighbouring chiefdoms ; 
 but should he at any time hereafter be obliged to 
 resort to it for the maintenance of rights acquired 
 by his treaties with them, he is assured of our 
 support and assistance, if he requires them for that 
 purpose. This arrangement was approved some 
 time ago by Lord SaUsbury, and is now in force. 
 One of the Mirs has already signed a treaty with 
 Kashmir, pledging his allegiance, and has sent 
 hostages to the Maharaja's Court. I am hopeful 
 that his example will be followed by others in due 
 course of time. If so, we shall have secured a 
 vicarious but virtual control over the chiefdoms of 
 Kafristan (which will have cost us nothing) by their 
 absorption under the suzerainty of Kashmir, our 
 vassal. As it is, the Baroghil and Iskoman passes 
 [quantum valeat) are already brought within that 
 suzerainty. But the arrangement can only bear 
 fruit slowly ; first, because Kashmir is forbidden to 
 use force, and the diplomacy of native Courts is 
 always slow ; and, secondly, because Kashmir is a 
 Hindu dynasty, and these Mirs and Khans are all 
 Mohammedan. That fact will not prevent them from 
 placing themselves under Kashmir's protection, if 
 they find it to their interests to do so ; but it would 
 probably throw them into the hands of the Amir of 
 Kabul (whom they now dread and mistrust), if any 
 attempt were made by Kashmir at forcible inter- 
 ference with their independence. Meanwhile the 
 
1 88 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. v 
 
 To Secretary telegraphic Cable from Gilgit to Srinuggur is already 
 
 Ap^hj!'i878 ill course of construction, and, I believe, nearly 
 
 completed. Major Biddulpli, whom I selected for 
 
 the new post of observation at Gilgit, arrived there 
 
 not long ago ; and this is how matters now stand.' 
 
1 89 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 FAMINE OF 1877 
 
 The most serious anxiety which pressed upon the Famine 
 Government of India this year, however, was not in 
 connection with frontier affairs, but with the famine 
 in the southern provinces of India. 
 
 In October of the year 1876 signs of scarcity 
 appeared in the neighbourhood of Bombay, owing to 
 the failure of the food crops. These were the first 
 symptoms of a famine, which in the following year 
 proved to be 'in respect of area and population Famine Com- 
 affected, and duration and intensity, one of the most mission 
 grievous calamities of its kind experienced in British 
 India since the beginning of the century. The failure 
 of the summer rains of 1876 extended over about 
 half of the Madras Presidency, the distress being 
 most intense in the same tract (that lying above the 
 Eastern Ghats) which suffered in 1853 and 1854. 
 The scarcity was felt with great severity over the 
 whole of Mysore (except the hilly tracts that lie along 
 the Western Ghats), the southern half of the Hyder- 
 abad State, and all the Deccan districts of the Bom- 
 bay Presidency. The area thus affected was about 
 200,000 square miles, containing a population of 
 thirty-six millions.' 
 
 In the earliest stages of the famine considerable 
 difference of opinion existed as to whether the relief 
 measures should be mainly based on the system of 
 
I90 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADmNISTRATIOX ch. vi 
 
 employing the people on large or on small works. 
 Small works are easily started, with little previous 
 preparation, require little expert skill in their super- 
 vision, and offer emplo3^ment to people close to their 
 own homes ; they are therefore suitable for a slight 
 and temporary scarcity, and for the earlier stages, 
 when it is still uncertain whether scarcity will develop 
 into famine ; but the}^ are liable to break down when 
 very large numbers have to be provided for, audit soon 
 becomes impossible to apply a strict labour test to the 
 disorganised masses collected on such works. More- 
 over, the character of these works (the cleaning out 
 and digging of tanks, repairs or embankment of old 
 Different roads, &c.) is sucli that it is hardly possible that the 
 fam?ne\eiief ^louey laid out on them should be remuneratively 
 employed. On the other hand, large works, carried 
 out under experienced officers of the Public Works 
 Department, require much previous preparation, sur- 
 veys and estimates, and involve careful organisa- 
 tion of the staff, housing of the labourers, provision 
 for food and water, with sanitar}^ and medical 
 arrangements. But when thus started they form the 
 best means of utilising the labour for permanent and re- 
 munerative objects. Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor 
 of Bombay, taking a serious view of the extent of the 
 disaster which had befallen the country, advocated 
 from the first the commencement of large public 
 works. The Government of Madras, on the other 
 hand, adopted the system of opening small and 
 scattered works, which would not involve a large 
 expenditure if the anticipated famine should not 
 turn out to be ver}^ severe, and tlieir views were at 
 first supported by the Supreme Government. 
 Viceroy to Writing on November 30 from Multan to Sir 
 
 Nov. '3o!™87G Richard Temple, the Viceroy said : ' This calamity is an 
 
1876-77 FAMINE 1 9 1 
 
 unforeseen and serious embarrassment. As the first 1876 
 intimation of it only reached nie on the eve of my 
 departure from Simla, and my reasons for visiting 
 the frontier were urgent, I have left the conduct of 
 all correspondence with the local Governments on 
 this subject entirely to Norman and my colleagues, " 
 whose experience of such matters is, of course, much 
 greater than my own. We are all of us agreed, how- 
 ever, firstly, not to sanction the commencement, 
 for purely relief purposes, of large, long, and costly 
 undertakings unless the public works of that kind 
 proposed by the local Governments have been 
 previously approved by the Supreme Government, as 
 advantageous or necessary in themselves and com- 
 patible with the present state of our finances ; and, 
 secondly, not to sanction, except on very clearly 
 proved necessity, any interference with the natural 
 course of trade. I am afraid that these principles 
 are not in favour with either of the two Governments 
 chiefly concerned in carrying them out ; and, indeed, 
 Madras has, without any reference to us, bought 
 large quantities of grain at what seem to me high 
 prices, and without any adequate cause.' 
 
 Lord Lytton, however, soon perceived that tenta- 
 tive measures were unsuitable when the certainty 
 of having to deal with a great and widespread famine 
 became established, and he disapproved of sending 
 instructions to the Bombay Government to confine 
 its operations. 
 
 This was how matters stood when the Viceroy 
 himself reached Bombay, and his interviews with the 
 Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, and the other local 
 authorities sufficed to satisfy him that the Bombay 
 Government was dealing with the difiiculty on sound 
 principles, and with great discretion as well as energy. 
 
192 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Bombay sys- The Bomba}^ system became, before tlie year was out, 
 adoptel? ^ ^^6 universally accepted plan of dealing with labour 
 on relief works. 
 
 After acknowledging, in a private letter, this change 
 of opinion as to the justification of the management 
 of the Bombay Government, the Viceroy adds : 
 To Sir Louis ' In answering the various addresses I received 
 
 Jan. 11, 1877 ^t Bombay, I thought it only fair to give public 
 expression to this opinion.' He went on to explain 
 that, considering the gravity of the case, he had 
 thought it desirable to invite the two Governments 
 of Bombay and Madras to meet him at Delhi, and 
 discuss the condition of affairs and the future policy 
 in a personal conference. ' This, I think, has been 
 quite satisfactory. We had a long conference 
 attended by the two Governors, and I think it has 
 effectually removed all misunderstanding between the 
 Government of Bombay and the Government of 
 India ; my colleagues having agreed to modify their 
 last despatch in a sense acceptable to the Bombay 
 Government.' "Writing to Lord George Hamilton ^ on 
 January 22, he said : 'I think you can truly affirm, 
 I certainly assert it myself, that as regards the famine 
 difficulties the Imperial assemblage has been a god- 
 send. Had it not enabled me to bring the two 
 Governors into personal conference with my own 
 Council, I really believe that we should at this 
 moment have found ourselves in an inextricable mess. 
 The opportunity tlius afforded furnished me with the 
 only possible means of removing what threatened to 
 be a serious misunderstanding between the Govern- 
 ment of India and the Bombay Government on 
 questions of vital importance.' The presence of the 
 
 * Lord George Hamilton was then Under-Secretary of State for 
 India. 
 
1877 FAMINE 1 93 
 
 Duke of Buckingham at Delhi revealed a state of 
 things at Madras which excited the gravest appre- 
 hensions in the mind of the Viceroy. The notion of 
 dealing with the scarcity in that Presidency was 
 apparently to keep down prices artificially by huge 
 purchases of grain, 'not perceiving,' writes the 
 Viceroy, ' that the high prices, by stimulating import 
 and limiting consumption, were the natural saviours 
 of the situation. The result is that the Madras Mistaken 
 Government has not only shaken the confidence of Madias" 
 a trade already shy enough, but has also created a 
 pauper population, whose numbers are no test of 
 the actual scarcity and whom it will be very difficult 
 to get rid of. 
 
 ' We were unanimous that this must be stopped 
 at once, and we have come to the conclusion that 
 our best course is to send Sir Eichard Temple ^ in the Sir Richard 
 
 T , f, ^ . . I'll Temple sent 
 
 Character 01 our Commissioner, and with adequate asCommis- 
 power, to Madras. He will go there vid Bombay, in ^^°^^^' 
 order to strengthen his hands in dealing with the 
 Madras Council by having first inspected some of the 
 Bombay districts where similar phenomena are being 
 successfully treated in accordance with the policy we 
 have laid down. In the meanwhile we have forbidden 
 the Madras Government to buy more grain as a 
 trader, whilst authorising it in cases of necessity to 
 purchase grain for grain wages, just as any Com- 
 missioner might do.' 
 
 At the earliest stage there was some excuse to 
 be made for the policy of the Madras Government. 
 They pleaded that the precedent of the famine in 1874 , 
 the management of which (entrusted to Sir Eichard 
 Temple) had not at that time been officially over- 
 ruled, justified the purchase of grain, and they also 
 
 ^ On account of his experience in the Behar famine of 1874. 
 
 O 
 
mission 
 
 1 94 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 argued on the merits of the case, that the knowledge 
 of the fact that Government possessed stores of grain 
 which they could throw on the market or lay down 
 at places out of the way of trade would prevent the 
 absolute withholding of stocks or prohibitive prices, 
 and so tend to avoid panics, one of the greatest 
 dangers in the early days of famine. They did not 
 appreciate the fact that Lord Northbrook and Sir 
 Eichard Temple had for the most part to deal with 
 an isolated area badly connected with the trade 
 centres, and that in that area the Government under- 
 took practically to supersede private trade, and did 
 so, but at an expense which, if applied to the area 
 over which the famine of 1877 extended, would 
 have brought speedy bankruptcy. 
 Famine Com- In the instructions given to Sir Eichard Temple 
 by the Government of India the principle was re- 
 affirmed that the Government would spare no efforts 
 to save the population of the distressed districts 
 from starvation or from an extremity of suffering 
 dangerous to life ; but they would not attempt the 
 task of preventing all suffering and of giving general 
 relief to the poorer classes of the community. 
 Everyone, it was said, admits the evils of indis- 
 criminate private charity, but the indiscriminate 
 charity of a Government is far worse. The Govern- 
 ment held that the task of saving life irrespective 
 of the cost was one which it was beyond their 
 power to undertake, but from the history of past 
 famines rules of action might be learned which 
 would enable them in the future to provide efficient 
 assistance for the suffering people without incurring 
 disastrous expenditure. 
 
 In the opinion of the Viceroy, Sir Eichard Temple 
 carried out his instructions at Madras with admirable 
 
1877 FAMINE 1 95 
 
 tact, judgment, and energy, and for the time being 
 exerted a much-needed check on the expenditure 
 of the Madras Government. He found that vast 
 numbers were in receipt of reUef who, for a time 
 at any rate, could support themselves. Under his 
 influence the wage rate was lowered and the super- 
 vision of relief labour was increased. 
 
 Unfortunately there was a relapse to the original 
 condition of excessive extravagance soon after Sir 
 Richard Temple's departure. 
 
 The grain transactions of the Madras Govern- 
 ment continued so to alarm the Government of 
 India that they finally gave vent to their anxiety in 
 a despatch on the subject, the publication of which 
 caused the Duke of Buckingham some annoyance. 
 The Viceroy thus defended it in a letter to Lord 
 Salisbury : ' The whole action of the Calcutta grain viceroy to 
 trade was on the point of being paralysed by the state, ^'^^^ 
 conduct of the Madras Government and its pertina- ^^^y ^'^' ^^'"^ 
 cious reticence on matters demanding the utmost and 
 most prompt publicity. Complaints and expostula- 
 tions from the trade were pouring in to us daily. 
 
 ' The greatest distrust and uncertainty prevailed 
 where it was of essential importance to estabhsh 
 confidence. All our representations to Madras on 
 this subject had been ignored and disregarded. All 
 the principal mercantile houses in Calcutta concurred 
 in assuring us that so great was the mistrust that 
 unless this impression were promptly removed all 
 shipments of grain from Bengal would immediately 
 cease. That would have landed us in a huge 
 disaster, which neither we nor the local Government 
 could cope with. . . . 
 
 ' The case was extremely urgent, and had we not 
 instantly made the publication of which the Duke 
 
 o 2 
 
196 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 complains I think you would at this moment have 
 been under the obligation of instructing us how to 
 deal with a situation entirely beyond our own power 
 of managing it. If there be one thing to which more 
 than any other, in the history of this famine, I look 
 back with unshaken satisfaction, it is the patient, 
 persistent, and hitherto successful efforts made by 
 the Government of India to prevent the Madras 
 Government from stopping, by its most unwise 
 proceedings, the action of the private trade in grain. 
 I am also confident that if the present famine has not 
 yet become altogether unmanageable this is mainly 
 due to the resolute and unremitting publicity given 
 by the Government of India to every fact connected 
 with it.' 
 
 Eain fell throughout the famine districts of 
 Madras in May and June 1877, but the hopes then en- 
 tertained that the worst period of scarcity was ov^er 
 were subsequently disappointed. The state of things 
 at Madras grew from bad to worse. The Madras 
 Government raised their scale of relief wages. This, 
 in the opinion of the Viceroy, was unwise, but he 
 considered it a matter in which the Supreme Govern- 
 ment was not justified in interfering. In Bombay, 
 where the scarcity was the same, a much lower rate 
 of wages was found to work successfully, and in that 
 presidency there had been far less famine mortality. 
 The mortality in Madras was terrible, and in the 
 Viceroy's opinion was not a little attributable to 
 the defective management and unsound principles of 
 the local Government. 
 Viceroy to Writing to the Duke of Buckingham on July 6 
 
 Madras, the Viccroy expressed his distress at the great 
 
 ^^^^ increase in the numbers receiving charitable relief in 
 
 Madras without any prospect of diminution till the 
 
1877 FAMINE 1 97 
 
 next crop should be reaped, and attributed tliis state 
 of things to the recent increase of relief wage, adding : 
 ' So long as a pinched population, not habitually 
 or by temperament very self-helpful, can live at 
 Government expense, on high wages for light work, 
 I greatly fear you will experience serious difficulty in 
 forcing such a population to revert to dependence 
 on its own unaided resources, however sufficient those 
 resources may be. But would it not be a sound 
 principle in such cases that Government relief should 
 cease, as far as regards cultivators, as soon as crops 
 have been soicn under fairly favourable circum- 
 stances. For when this happens the cultivator can 
 at once obtain credit for his property.' 
 
 Towards the end of July drought was so wide- 
 spread as to threaten a general scarcity, and the 
 Viceroy informed the Governor of the Straits Settle- 
 ments of the failure of the crops, requesting him to 
 communicate the information to the Governments of 
 Cochin China and Siam, where there was abundant 
 grain for export. 
 
 The condition of affairs at Madras by the end of 
 July was so deplorable that the Viceroy decided to 
 go there himself without delay. The following letter 
 to Lord Salisbury gives a vivid picture of the exist- 
 ing state of things. 
 
 To the Marquis of Salisbury 
 
 [Private.l ' Simla : July 29, 1877. 
 
 ' My dear Lord Salisbury, — I fear it is impossible 
 to exaggerate the gravit}^ of the situation we have 
 now to recognise, and, if possible, to deal with, in 
 Madras and Mysore. I have briefly recorded the 
 main facts of this situation in my telegram of 
 yesterday, and I need not now repeat what I have 
 
198 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 To Lord said in that telegram. When Temple inspected the 
 
 Juiy^ay"^' relief works in Madras, he reported that the popula- 
 tion employed upon them was a mere mob for want 
 of adequate supervision. The total number of the 
 population on relief work, or in receipt of charitable 
 aid, was then, I think, within half a million. It has 
 now increased to one million and three-quarters 
 (probably owing, in no slight degree, to the measures 
 which have simultaneously lowered the rate of labour 
 and raised the rate of wages), but the means of 
 supervision have not been augmented in proportion ; 
 nor, indeed, so far as I can make out, have they been 
 appreciably augmented at all. If the relief gangs, 
 when Temple inspected them, were an unregulated 
 rabble, what must now be their condition? But, 
 supposing the public works staff to be adequately 
 strengthened, all relief labour to be brought under 
 its supervision, and that supervision to be as com- 
 plete as possible, there is really, so far as I can 
 discover, nothing to supervise. By far the greater 
 portion of the relief labour throughout Madras seems 
 to consist of scraping mud off a road, or out of a tank, 
 and scraping it back again, or chopping prickly pears. 
 According to the weekly despatch from the Madras 
 Government to you, the grants for famine relief 
 amounted, on the lltli instant, to two millions and 
 a half. This, of course, is irrespective of loss of 
 revenue, and enhanced military and other charges. 
 So far as I can judge, this enormous expenditure will 
 bequeath to the presidency little or no permanent 
 benefit in the shape of any important public works. 
 Some few works of lasting utility will no doubt have 
 been completed or commenced, but none of which 
 the importance will render any appreciable return 
 for the vast outlay already incurred. But we have 
 
1877 FAMINE 1 99 
 
 now to contemplate another unexpected year of ToLord 
 famine, with increased and increasing expenditure for j^^|!f 29''^' 
 an indefinite period ; and I am sure you will share 
 my anxiety that this enormous, and apparently 
 inevitable, outlay should not, at least, be altogether 
 wasted ; that it should contribute to the permanent 
 improvement of the presidency, and bequeath to the 
 population some increased insurance against future 
 famine. 
 
 ' Of village relief throughout Madras there is, so 
 far as I can ascertain, no organised system, nor at 
 present any means of establishing or working such 
 a system. The Public Works Department staflf is 
 notoriously inadequate. . . . The district officers 
 complain that they can get no practical instructions, 
 no practical assistance, from their Government. I 
 notice that one of them, Mr. Oldham, reported the 
 other day that, with the assistance of onlj^ one European, 
 he was left to inspect upwards of 70,000 labourers. 
 The Madras Government has recently issued an 
 instruction to its district officers ordering them to 
 give to persons applying for gratuitous relief practi- 
 cally just whatever they ask for. Some of the officers 
 to whom this circular was addressed pointed out, and 
 protested against, the absurdity of it ; and, reluctant 
 as I am to interfere with the proceedings of the local 
 Government, however deplorable they may seem to 
 me, I felt constrained to request the withdrawal of 
 this instruction. 
 
 ' In Mysore the state of things, though fortu- 
 nately on a smaller scale, is even worse, so far as it 
 goes. The returns given in last Saturday's " Gazette " 
 are startling — 
 
 On relief work under revenue officers . . . 26,158 
 
 „ „ Public Works Department . 24,275 
 
 Gratuitously relieved 120,251 
 
203 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 ' Thus, the number employed on public works, 
 which was very small last May, has considerably 
 diminished since then, whilst the number of persons 
 in receipt of gratuitous relief has largely increased. 
 
 ' Compare the corresponding returns from 
 Bombay : 
 
 On relief works ....... 295,514 
 
 Gratuitously relieved 66,399 
 
 'In Bombay, moreover, of all the persons em- 
 ployed on relief work, only 27,000 are under civil 
 agency. All the others are employed, under an 
 admirably organised Public Works Department 
 supervision, on works of real and permanent utility. 
 I suspect the radical vice of the Mysore system to 
 be the multiplication of petty useless works, which 
 cannot be properly supervised, and which are supple- 
 mented by food kitchens where (as in Madras) it 
 is practically " ask and have." Only two or three 
 months ago there were in Mysore actually more than 
 2,000 petty works going on, with an average of about 
 30 persons upon each. For want of more recent and 
 complete information, I cannot positively affirm, but 
 I think it may be presumed, that since then the 
 number of these petty works, like the area of gratui- 
 tous relief, has increased. The famine expenditure 
 in Mysore is certainly increasing ; and I anticipate 
 that hereafter Mysore will be in no wise permanently 
 benefited by it. 
 
 ' Mysore is easier to deal with than Madras ; not 
 only because the field of operations is smaller, but 
 also because the Government of India has, at least, 
 some power of control and direction over the local 
 authorities, who cannot disregard its instructions 
 with complete impunity. In Mysore I am hopeful 
 
1877 FAMINE 20I 
 
 that it may still be possible to effect a timely rescue To Lord 
 by the appointment of a Special Commissioner, care- juiy^gg'^^' 
 fully selected and furnished with adequate powers. 
 But in Madras what can we do ? . . . I believe 
 that Temple's mission saved us from a great cata- 
 strophe ; and nothing but the conviction that a great 
 catastrophe was impending, and could not other- 
 Avise be averted, induced me, most reluctantly, to 
 resort to that measure. . . , But the good results of 
 his mission were chiefly negative ; and, as soon as his 
 back was turned, ever3^thing relapsed into the old bad 
 groove. . . . The situation in which we are now landed, 
 with the prospect all around as black as night, is one 
 of such difficulty that the boldest man might shrink 
 from dealing with it. You suggested in a former Need for a 
 letter the propriety of a famine dictatorship on future tatorship 
 occasions. There never has been yet, and I doubt 
 if there ever will be again, in India an occasion so 
 urgently needing such a dictatorship, but no one in 
 India is able to give the word of command. It is, I 
 am convinced, not in the power of the Madras 
 Government to cope unaided with the present diffi- 
 culties and dangers ; which, though partly due to its 
 own mistakes, are also in a great degree the inevitable 
 results of a famine which now threatens to be unpre- 
 cedented in duration, extent, and intensity. The 
 adequate management of such a famine urgently 
 requires all the ability and experience which can be 
 found in India. We are fighting a desperate battle 
 with nature, and our line of battle has been com- 
 pletely broken at Madras. It is there, therefore, that 
 we should at once concentrate our reserves. But I 
 cannot, of course, force upon the Madras Government 
 assistance which it will neither invite nor accept. 
 ' My own position in reference to this situation is 
 
202 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Difficulty of 
 interference 
 with Madras 
 Government 
 
 extremely embarrassing. The famine department of 
 my own Government is not a strong one. But, if the 
 Supreme Government were composed of the ablest 
 and most experienced famine administrators in all 
 India, what could we do, so long as we are practically 
 powerless to control the action or change the system 
 of the local Government ? I fully recognise the diffi- 
 culty of any adequate intervention at Madras, even 
 by yourself, if you thought our efforts deserving of 
 support. For, unfortunately for us, the local Govern- 
 ments are more strongly represented than the Supreme 
 Government, not only in your Council, but through- 
 out the whole region of retired Anoflo-India. . . . 
 I fully and painfully recognise all the danger and 
 embarrassment of provoking the Duke's resignation, 
 and the clamour it would raise ; and, what is more, I 
 have little doubt that this would be the result of the 
 slightest pressure on my part. But, on the other 
 hand, let the Duke and his Government alone, and 
 how are we to deal with the danger to India, and the 
 embarrassment to our own finances, which in that 
 case are nievitable ? You see I am between Scylla 
 and Charybdis. So long as there was a fair prospect 
 of the worst of the Madras famine being over shortly, 
 I have thought it best to refrain from visiting 
 Madras ; for, since it was decided not to interfere 
 with a system I thoroughly mistrusted and disap- 
 proved of, I could do no good by going to the seat 
 of its operations, and should only have placed the 
 Duke and mj^self in an awkward position. Now, 
 however, the situation is so alarming that (although 
 I anticipate no practical good from the result), I 
 feel that, " for appearance sake " alone, I ought to 
 proceed at once to Madras ; and, in order to do this, 
 I have submitted to an operation which will, I hope, 
 
1877 FAMINE 203 
 
 enable me to undertake the journey. ... I may gaii^J„^. 
 possibly be able, with the assistance of Arbuthnot, J«iy 29 
 who is a Madrassee and knows the members of the 
 Duke's Government, to persuade them to make some 
 slight ameliorations in their present system. But 
 these will be wholly insufficient to avert the cata- 
 strophe I fear ; for their system is rotten to the core. 
 
 ' Yours, &c. 
 
 (Signed) ' Lytton.' 
 
 The Duke of Buckingham had published a famine 
 minute, in which he laid down a doctrine of village 
 relief which filled the Viceroy with ' profound 
 distrust.' The Duke, moreover, had appealed to the 
 public for subscriptions in aid of the famine — a step 
 which Lord Lytton considered of very doubtful 
 wisdom at that stage of affairs. Lord Salisbury had 
 suggested that a dictator should be appointed for the 
 management of famine affairs. It now occurred to 
 the Viceroy that the Duke of Buckingham himself 
 might be induced to occupy such a position, that in 
 that case he might be persuaded to act independently 
 of his Council, that the famine business could then 
 be rescued from the circumlocution of the Eevenue 
 Board, followed by the circumlocution of the Council, 
 and the advice and assistance secured of one or 
 two first-rate men employed in any capacity that 
 the Duke might please. If the Duke proved willing 
 to fall in with such a proposal — one certainly not 
 derogatory to his dignity — there would be no need 
 for intervention on the part of the Government of 
 India. The Viceroy would trust the opinions of the 
 experts to guide the Duke, and believed that matters 
 would then be well managed. ' I would leave him To Lord 
 the freest possible play, suppress my own personality, August72 
 
204 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ti 
 
 suspend all interference on the part of the Supreme 
 Government, and return to Simla as soon as the 
 arrangement was concluded. If the Duke accepts 
 my proposal he will have a very good chance of 
 greatty distinguishing himself, and converting an 
 enormous administrative failure into a remarkable 
 success. If he rejects it, the meYitahle jiasco of his 
 administration will be the smallest of the evils which 
 must be anticipated.' 
 
 In the despatch addressed to the Duke of 
 Buckingham, in which the Viceroy announced his 
 intention of visiting the famine districts of Madras 
 and Mysore, the general principles for the manage- 
 ment of famine affairs were once more laid down. 
 
 After stating that the Government of India, with 
 the approval of Her Majesty's Government and of the 
 people of India, were resolved to avert death by 
 Viceroy's Starvation by tlie emplo3mient of all means available. 
 Minute ^^^ Viceroy first expressed his conviction that 
 
 'absolute non-interference with the operations of 
 private commercial enterprise must be the foundation 
 of their present famine policy.' This on the ground 
 that ' free and abundant private trade cannot co-exist 
 with Government importation,' and that more food 
 will reach the famine-smitten districts if private 
 enterprise is left to itself (beyond receiving every 
 possible facility and information from the Govern- 
 ment) than if it were paralysed by State compe- 
 tition. 
 
 With regard to the population out of work and 
 unable to buy food at famine prices, he explains that 
 it is the policy of Government to employ such people 
 on relief works, but that such relief employment, at 
 a subsistence rate of wage, should be provided on 
 large, fully supervised works of permanent benefit to 
 
1877 FAMINE 
 
 205 
 
 the country. ' The advantage of large works of this 
 kind over petty local works is twofold — firstly, the 
 obligation to do a full day's work, at a low rate 
 of wage, and to go some distance to work, keeps 
 from seeking relief people who can support themselves 
 otherwise ; and secondly, the money expended on 
 such works bequeaths permanent benefits to the 
 country.' 
 
 For people who, from infirmity or social custom, 
 or other reasons, are unable to work, ' the State must, 
 when the sources of private benevolence run dry, 
 provide gratuitous relief.' But such relief imposes 
 upon the State a task of peculiar difiiculty and 
 delicacy, 'for it is the inevitable tendency of all 
 gratuitous relief afforded by the State, if it be not 
 supervised and restricted with the most scrupulous 
 exactitude, to intrude injuriously on the field of relief 
 labour, and thus demoralise large masses of the 
 population.' Then follows a description of the forms 
 in which such relief may be given. 
 
 Finally, two main objects are put forward towards 
 which the endeavours, and all the available power, of 
 the Indian Government and local Government should 
 be directed. ' Firstly, the framing and working of 
 a scheme whereby 4,500 to 5,000 tons of food may 
 be carried daily into the famine country ; and, 
 secondly, the selection and commencement of large 
 public works of lasting utility, on which all the able- 
 bodied relief recipients of either sex and any age 
 should at once be employed.' 
 
 The Minute closes with these words : ' Nothing 
 could be further from my intention than to inter- 
 fere unduly with the local authorities, and the de- 
 voted ofiflcers, who have so long and zealously been 
 combating the growth of a gigantic catastrophe. 
 
206 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Although, up to the present moment, the result has 
 not equalled the assiduity of their untiring efforts, 
 yet the energy and devotion of the district officers 
 throughout Madras, during the protracted and 
 increasing strain upon their physical and mental 
 faculties, cannot, I think, be too highly or gratefully 
 appreciated. It is not to inadequate energy or 
 intelligence, but to inadequate numbers and in- 
 adequate executive powers, that I attribute the 
 incompleteness of their success. 
 
 * My journey, therefore, to the famine-stricken 
 districts of Southern India, and more especially my 
 journey to Madras, is prompted by the hope that it 
 may enable me to strengthen and augment the means 
 on which His Grace the Governor of that presidency 
 is now dependent for the satisfactory solution of a 
 problem as serious as any which has ever occupied 
 the mind or taxed the abilities of an Indian states- 
 man.' 
 The Viceroy It was now Settled that the Viceroy should leave 
 
 Madras""^^ Simla on August 17, accompanied by his private 
 Aug. 17 secretary, Sir Owen Burne, his military secretary. 
 
 Colonel Colley, his fam.ine secretary, Mr. Bernard,^ 
 and Mr. Arbuthnot,^ his minister in council for 
 famine alTairs. The Duke of Buckingham was 
 to join them at Bellary and proceed with them 
 to Madras. A few days before his departure 
 Lord Lytton wrote to his friend. Sir James 
 Stephen : 
 
 ' I start for Madras next Thursday with but very 
 little hope of being able to avert what threatens to 
 be an unprecedented catastrophe. . . . The weather 
 is hideously hot, and I start on my journey with a 
 
 ' Now Sir Charles Bernard. 
 
 ^ Now Sir Alexander Arbuthnot. 
 
1877 FAMINE 207 
 
 profound sense of discouragement, having little 
 assistance here, nor, in short, 
 
 " hope, nor health, 
 Nor that content, surpassing wealth, 
 The sage in meditation found." 
 
 If I survive this adventure, you will doubtless hear 
 from me at Madras.' 
 
 Lord Lytton's despondency at this crisis was 
 greatly increased by the illness of Sir John Strachey 
 — the colleague and friend upon whose help and 
 counsel he most relied. Sir John was suffering from 
 a serious affection of the eyes, and the doctors feared 
 that he would have to choose between resisnino- his 
 office and losing his eyesight. 
 
 To Lady Lytton 
 
 ' Dhurmpore : August 17, 1897. 
 
 ' . . . . The journey thus far has not been at all 
 intolerably hot. The tonga afforded abundance of 
 shade, and being in the van of the tonga train I and 
 Colley escaped most of the dust we raised for the 
 benefit of those who followed us. Of these I think 
 my jemadar came worst off, arriving here like an 
 old man with perfectly white hair, or a marquis of 
 the days of Louis XV. We came at a tearing pace ; 
 but this during the latter part of the drive involved 
 a good deal of shaking and jolting. We stopped for 
 ten minutes at Solen, where we had tea, and shook 
 hands with the Eana. Here we were met by 
 Pattiala's people, who have provided me with a table- 
 cloth and a quilt so beautiful that I long to steal 
 them. After dinner we were treated to a masked 
 dance by the " folk of the place." But Colley and I 
 
2o8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Viceroy's being agreed that no one above the age of four could 
 
 Faniine appreciate this amusement we speedily adjourned to 
 
 Districts whist. Our whist table was set in the open air, our 
 
 party consisted of the Commissioner W. Nisbet, Colley, 
 
 and George.^ I left off at 11 p.m., having lost five 
 
 points. 
 
 ' At dinner I sat next to Stuart Bayley, in whom 
 I found a most agreeable companion. We talked of 
 metaphysics, philosophy, Darwin, Herbert Spencer, 
 &c., and for a while forgot the famine — of which, 
 however, I received reports this morning that are 
 most discouraging, except as regards Madras, where 
 apparently light showers still continue.' 
 
 Jubbulpore. 
 
 Aug. 19 ' . . . We have now got over the hottest parts 
 
 of our journey, and really the reported excessive 
 heat has been a mere bugbear — none of us have 
 suffered from it — and as for myself, I was never 
 better in my life. I have received here a very 
 satisfactory letter from Salisbury approving my pro- 
 posed plan of operations with the Duke, and 
 promising to support it. . . . If the Duke accepts my 
 suggestions readily I see no reason why we should 
 not be all back at Simla very soon. But, in spite of 
 Lord Salisbury's support, I anticipate a good deal of 
 difficulty and resistance. However " time and the 
 hour wear out the longest day." ' 
 
 In writing to Lord Salisbury from Juljbulpore 
 Lord Lytton, after thanking him for his promised 
 support, tells him other members of his Council are 
 opposed to his scheme, and prefer to it a proposal 
 that no plan of action should be devised till the 
 
 ' Colonel G. Villiers. 
 
1877 FAMINE 209 
 
 Viceroy has arrived at Madras and inquired for 
 himself into the details of famine administration 
 there. Such a course, however, appeared to him 
 to involve endless embarrassment and conflict. 
 'Virtually we should be sitting as a committee of 
 inquiry on the Madras Govermnent. Every man's 
 back would be up and every man's hand against us, 
 and we should have to fight every inch of ground. 
 It is, I am convinced, impossible that we could con- 
 scientiously arrive at a final verdict favourable to 
 the Madras Government, and any other would, of 
 course, be bitterly resented and probably appealed 
 against. The only objection that I can see to my 
 own plan is that the Madrassees will, I am told, 
 resent the introduction of even a single ofiicer, 
 however eminent, into their presidency. But do 
 what we will we cannot avoid some difiiculty and 
 soreness.' 
 
 At Jubbulpore Lord Lytton found 24,000 tons Failure of 
 of grain (only a comparatively small portion of it J^Xbuipor** 
 under cover) ready and waiting for transport south, 
 but the communicating line of railway was only able 
 to carry one thousand tons 'per week. Not only was 
 the ' carrying power insufiicient on the line, but the 
 pressure of famine traffic began seriously to impede 
 foreign export traffic' This, the Viceroy feared, if 
 not remedied, might lead to a commercial crisis at 
 Bombay, involving an immediate rise in exchange, 
 with serious loss of national credit and wealth. 
 
 Wliile at Poona, Lord Lytton took steps in com- 
 munication with the managers of the railway lines, 
 and with the assistance of the Department of Public 
 Works, to relieve the block by borrowing, buying, 
 and increasing in all possible ways the available 
 rolling stock. 
 
2IO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 To Lady Lytton 
 
 ' Poona : Aug. 21. 
 
 ' We reached Poona at 11 p.m. last night, all of us 
 in excellent condition. This house, the famous Fitz- 
 gerald one, is really most beautiful and luxurious — by 
 far the most civilised official residence I have yet seen 
 in India, with a very pretty garden. I am told it is 
 unusually hot here, but I don't find it hotter than 
 Simla, and I think the climate agrees with me better. 
 I have written to-day a hurried letter to Strachey on 
 business.' 
 
 The Viceroy's plan of campaign was to explain 
 to the Duke what must be done, and, if he succeeded 
 in convincing him of the wisdom of his proposals, to 
 leave the entire management of the scheme in his 
 own hands. Failing this, however, and in the event 
 of it being found that he did not possess the legal 
 power to act the part of famine dictator himself, the 
 Viceroy was prepared to appeal to the Secretar}^ of 
 State to choose between the Duke and himself. The 
 day before his arrival at Bellary and his first meeting 
 with the Duke, Lord Lytton wrote, ' My legal powers 
 are much feebler and fewer than I supposed. Nothing 
 left but sheer diplomacy. I go to battle as Louis 
 Napoleon went to Sedan — without hope. But we 
 must do our best.' 
 Aug. '2(i On August 26 they reached Bellary, and the first 
 
 First inter- interview between the Viceroy and the Duke took 
 
 view with , *' 
 
 Duke of place. 
 
 BuckinghP.m rj.^,^ ^^^^^ j^^^^. -^ord Lyttou writcs to his wife : 
 
 ' I am thankful to say I feel much relieved in mind 
 by my conversation of yesterday with the Duke, 
 which was, I think, on the whole decidedly satisfac- 
 tory. 
 
 ' I reached Bellary about six, and remained in my 
 
1877 FAMINE 2 11 
 
 room till dinner-time. There was a large dinner (in To Lady 
 the house of the collector, Mr. Masters, who put us ^ 
 up) and reception afterwards. No business was 
 discussed that day, but as I was bidding him good- 
 night, the Duke (who was to have remained here two 
 days with me) informed me he was obliged to return 
 to Madras to hold a Council in the afternoon of the 
 following day. It struck me that this meant stealing 
 a march on me. So after talking over with Colley 
 (who has been most helpful to me) our plan of 
 campaign, I sat down at once and wrote the Duke a 
 letter of twelve pages fully explaining my views and 
 intentions, and leaving him only the alternative 
 between the removal of the seat of the Supreme 
 Government to Madras, and the plan originally 
 devised by Strachey with some modifications, and I 
 think improvements, suggested by subsequent reflec- 
 tion and information. It was a quarter to 3 a.m. when 
 I had finished my letter, which I delivered to the 
 jemadar, to be handed to the Duke early next 
 morning, as the Duke was to meet me after breakfast 
 and I thought it best to have it all down in black and 
 white before we met. 
 
 ' I then went to bed, but was too restless to sleep 
 sound, and was waked at six by the guns of my own 
 salute. My plan, I think, succeeded well, as it pre- 
 pared the Duke for what he was to hear, and I found 
 him more tractable than I had expected. I think the 
 neck of the difficulty is now broken. It is quite 
 astonishing how well I continue to keep. If I get 
 through my week at Madras successfully, I shall fling 
 up my hat and sing, " lo Psean ! " ' 
 
 Leaving Bellary on August 28, the Viceroy 
 reached Madras on the 29th. On the 30th he wrote 
 to Lady Lytton : ' Hurrah ! I think that I may now 
 
 p 2 
 
212 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ti 
 
 safely inform you that everything has been satis- 
 factorily settled between the Duke and myself. 
 
 Aug. HO ' Briefly, these are the details of the arrangement 
 
 Details of now concluded. 
 
 agreement ,t.t»' • -i i'tt • xr- j 
 
 with the Duke ' Ist. rrmciples laid down m Viceroys minute 
 
 are to be carried out, all relief operations 
 being transferred to Public Works super- 
 vision. 
 
 ' 2nd. Duke takes famine management into his 
 own hands. 
 
 ' 3rd. An ofiicer selected by Government of India 
 to represent its views will be attached 
 to the Duke as " personal assistant " for 
 famine affairs. 
 
 ' 4:th. This officer to be General Kennedy. 
 
 ' 5th. All famine papers to be submitted to Duke 
 by local famine secretary, through General 
 Kennedy. Duke's orders upon these to 
 have force of Orders in Council without 
 consultation of Council. 
 
 ' 6th. Members of Board of Eevenue to act as 
 travelling commissioners in the interior, 
 reporting direct to Duke. Famine corre- 
 spondence to be only communicated to 
 Board for record, after action has been 
 taken on it by Duke. 
 
 ' 7th. Circles for supervision of gratuitous rehef 
 to be greatly strengthened by imported 
 officers. 
 
 ' 8th. Ditto. Public Works staff. 
 
 ' 9th. All relief to be subsidiary and conducive 
 to main object of getting people on big 
 works with proper task.' 
 
 In another letter he expresses his thankfulness at 
 the success of his mission, adding : ' The more I think 
 
1877 FAMINE 2 1 3 
 
 over what must have happened if I had failed to 
 settle matters amicably with the Duke on their present 
 footing . . . the more I am convinced that we have 
 very narrowly escaped a very dangerous and dis- 
 creditable situation, . . . My plan of campaign with viceroy attri- 
 
 .T -r\ 1 I'll 1 jy 1 1-T butos success 
 
 the Duke, which has been so successiui, was laid toCoiiey 
 out by CoUey, and owes its success to his military 
 genius.' 
 
 On September the 6th the Viceroy received the 
 following telegram from the Secretary of State : 
 
 ' I have heard with great satisfaction of judicious gept. 6 
 arrangements concluded between you and the Duke Telegram 
 of Buckingham. I believe that concentration of tar^of^state 
 famine management in his hands will be of greatest 
 advantage. The appointment of General Kennedy, 
 in whom you repose well grounded confidence, will 
 also be very beneficial. I approve generally of your 
 arrangements, reserving any observations I may have 
 to make in matters of detail. Greater stringency in 
 confining relief to those unable to work is no doubt 
 in many places necessary, but every precaution 
 should be taken that consequent requirement of task 
 work is not allowed to press dangerously on those 
 who by privation have become partially incapacitated 
 for labour,' 
 
 In acknowledging this telegram in a private letter 
 the Viceroy writes : 
 
 To the Marquis of Salisbury 
 
 ' Bangalore : Sept. 9, 1877. 
 
 ' My dear Lord Sahsbury, — I feel relieved of a 
 great anxiety by your welcome telegram approving 
 of the arrangements concluded with the Duke of 
 Buckingham at Madras. I think I can assure you 
 
214 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. vi 
 
 To Lord that every provision has been made, and every pre- 
 Sept. 9'^' caution taken, on behalf of those who have fallen out 
 of condition and are quite unfit for work. Of such 
 persons (putting aside the aged, the infirm, and the 
 diseased) there is undoubtedly a large number ; and 
 the care of these should, I conceive, be the special 
 function of the relief camps. All the officers in 
 charge of these camps aver that wanderers, picked 
 up in an advanced stage of emaciation, recover flesh 
 and strength after about a fortnight of the diet they 
 receive in camp, and that in less than a month all 
 who are not diseased become perfectly fit for work ; 
 but at present there is no work to put them on to, 
 and all the camps I inspected were swarming with 
 fat, idle, able-bodied paupers, who had been living 
 for months in what is to them unusual luxury at 
 the expense of Government. The main difiiculty I 
 now experience will be to get these demoralised 
 masses on to real work of any kind, even when the 
 work has been provided for them. The Duke showed 
 me, on the day I left Madras, a letter from the 
 collector of one of the largest Madras districts com- 
 plaining that his camps were beginning to get flooded 
 with immigrants from other parts of the presidency 
 where minor works " near the homes of the people " 
 had already been started, and where agriculture 
 itself was not yet entirely arrested. Though many 
 of these persons, who had come from a considerable 
 distance, arrived in an emaciated condition, it had 
 been proved on inquiry that all of them were able to 
 support themselves. But they positively refused to 
 do any kind of work, or to return to their own farms 
 and villages, having heard that plenty of food was to 
 be had for nothing elsewhere. 
 
 ' The despatches I send you by this mail report 
 
1877 FAMINE 2 1 5 
 
 in detail not only the arrangements concluded at ToLord 
 Madras, but also the chief facts which have come gep\^ 9^'^ 
 under my personal notice as regards the condition of 
 the people and the crops. I will therefore confine 
 this letter to the private particulars of what I have 
 seen and done. In the first place, the alarming 
 financial and social results of the famine management 
 (or mismanagement) in Madras are clearly not 
 attributable to the cause I had supposed. I expected 
 to find there a bad system at work ; but what I 
 found everywhere was the total absence of any 
 system at all. It is equally certain that this must 
 be attributed to radical defects in the organisation 
 of the existing administrative machinery — the ideal 
 of a circumlocution ofiice. Every one, from the 
 highest to the lowest — the Duke himself, the Govern- 
 ment secretaries, the collectors, the Department of 
 Public Works officers — acknowledged the evil, de- 
 plored it, and dwelt on the urgent necessity of 
 administrative reform. I need not now trouble you 
 with illustrations of this particular evil (which will, 
 I hope, be remedied by the measures adopted at 
 Madras), but some few which came prominently 
 under my own notice were very startling.' 
 
 Of the Governor himself the Viceroy writes in the Popularity of 
 same letter : ' I must, however, bear witness to the Buckingham 
 general esteem and affection with which, so far as I 
 can judge, he is regarded by his subjects in Madras. 
 These feelings are justly due to the Duke's thorough 
 straightforwardness, benevolence, and honesty. He 
 is an exceedingly hardworking man, with an astonish- 
 ingly omnivorous appetite for detail and a remarkable 
 aptitude for dealing with it. But this I think he 
 indulges too much. He seems to be very slow in 
 taking in a general principle and seeing how it should 
 
2 1 6 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 be applied, or why it must be applied. Herein lies 
 the only cause for anxiety I feel about his personal 
 administration of the famine portfolio. Already he 
 does too much, and thus not enough is done. I am 
 hopeful, however, that General Kennedy's influence 
 will gradually be able to rectify the present method 
 of conducting famine business at Madras. I have 
 been greatly struck by Kennedy's tact, ingenuity, 
 and address in the conduct of personal intercourse 
 with other men, his quickness in recognising, and his 
 skill in managing, their idiosyncrasies. These qualities 
 are rare in Indian officials, so far as my experience 
 of them goes, and he seems to possess them all in a 
 high degree. 
 
 'Eelief camps. Of the relief camp I visited at 
 Bellary there is not much to be said. It is a hona- 
 jide relief camp, though not, I should say, so well 
 organised as it might be. The relief camps in and 
 around Madras are simply huge popular picnics, 
 whose inmates are at present thoroughly enjoying 
 themselves at the Government expanse. 
 Conversation ' The following is a faithful summary of my con- 
 
 a reiiefcamp" vcrsation with the officer in charge of the Palaveram 
 camp, when I visited it : 
 
 ' Self. — All these men and women seem in splendid 
 condition for work. 
 
 ' Officer. — Yes. Unluckity we have no work to 
 give them, and if we did not keep them here they 
 would soon drop out of condition again. It is the 
 future population that we are saving. 
 
 '■Self. — Then you have stringent precautions, 
 of course, for the prevention of wandering from the 
 camp ? I see none, but I presume they exist. 
 
 ' Officer. — Oh dear, no. None are required. The 
 people know when they are well off; and they 
 
1877 FAMINE 2 1 7 
 
 have never been before, and will never be again, so To Lord 
 well off as they are here. The famine has been a g^p^^ 9 ^^' 
 godsend to all the people you see here, and there is 
 not a man, woman, or child in this camp who will 
 not bitterly regret the cessation of scarcity. Look 
 at our sleeping and feeding arrangements ! This 
 class of the population are never so comfortably 
 lodged or so highly fed at home. In addition to the 
 rations you have seen, those who are in delicate health 
 receive fish and meat twice a week, and all receive 
 sundry little condiments and spices to season their 
 rice and dal. This prevents the diet from being 
 monotonous, and keeps up a healthy appetite. You 
 see we have no need of precaution against wandering 
 from the camp. Our difficulty will be, by and by, 
 to get the people out of it. . . . 
 
 ' We pass to the huts containing the women and 
 children. 
 
 \Self. — I notice that, whilst all these children 
 are in a genuine famine condition, the women they 
 seem to belong to are uncommonly fat. What is the 
 reason of this ? 
 
 ^Another Official (interposing). — Ah ! This is 
 one of the saddest facts we have to deal with. 
 Though all these miserable mothers are apparently 
 in such fair condition, their milk has run dry. We 
 are now providing milk for all these poor infants. 
 Allow me to draw your attention to another very 
 curious fact. You will probably have noticed that, 
 whereas the majority of the children have red hair, 
 all their mothers have black hair. Now this is one 
 of the most mysterious, but general, effects of famine 
 on the constitution of infants. It turns their hair 
 red. 
 
 ' Self (to First Officer privately as we leave the 
 
2l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 To Lord ward). — Do you believe those fat women are the 
 ^ep't. 9^' mothers of all those lean l^abies ? 
 
 ' Officer. — Of course not. All the babies are 
 hired, borrowed, or stolen. Famine babies are now 
 at a premium, as the presentation of them obliges us 
 to admit their supposed mothers. 
 
 'I compliment on the great cleanliness of 
 
 the camp. " Yes," he replies, " we have now got 
 our organisation well in hand, and have not had 
 a single case of fire in the camp." "No," I say, 
 " I noticed that your kitchens are well away from 
 the huts." " Oh, it is not that. But you see all the 
 men smoke in their huts. Tobacco is one of the 
 little luxuries we allow them, poor fellows, and if 
 we did not look sharp the whole camp might be 
 burnt down." 
 
 'Here we rejoin who has been con- 
 versing through an interpreter with a portly old 
 native almost entirely nude, who has been on 
 gratuitous relief for the last three months, and whom 
 . has discovered to be " a fine old farmer." 
 
 ' (to fine old farmer). — And do you find 
 
 more flavour in the vegetables now than last month ? 
 
 ' Fine old farmer says, he does ; and explains 
 
 to me that among the sad phenomena of the famine 
 is the tastelessness of the vegetables given in relief 
 food to season the rice with, owing to the recent hot 
 dry winds. 
 
 ' The above, which is not an imaginary conversa- 
 tion, will suffice to illustrate the manner in which 
 relief operations are treated in Madras. All the 
 camps I have seen are splendidly organised as regards 
 sanitary and conservancy arrangements. But they 
 are treated like " model farms," regardless of expense. 
 
 'Before leaving the subject of Madras, I may 
 
1877 FAMINE 2 1 9 
 
 mention that I offered the Duke, if he wished it, to To Lord 
 take the famine business of the Government of India ^f^l 9^^' 
 into my own hands, and also to attach to it any 
 Madras officer in whom he had confidence. The 
 Duke did not seem to think that these arrangements 
 
 o 
 
 would make any material difference to him; and 
 there was no Madras officer whom he felt able to 
 recommend. But as regards the first of my two 
 proposals, I have decided on other and general 
 grounds to take the Famine Department into my own 
 hands, and have already informed you of this by 
 telegraph. . . . 
 
 ' And now, my dear Lord Salisbury, I must end 
 this long letter with many apologies for the length of 
 it. Temple has behaved exceedingly well, and greatly 
 helped me by assisting all my arrangements, at some 
 sacrifice, I fear, to his own convenience and the 
 strength of his famine staff. 
 
 ' I start to-night for Ootacamund, where I meet 
 the Duke again ; thence to Mysore itself. From 
 Mysore back here, when the above-mentioned arrange- 
 ments for the management of the Mysore famine 
 will be published in an extraordinary gazette ; and, 
 on the same night, I shall return to Simla without 
 stopping. 
 
 'Arbuthnot, having surrendered to me all the 
 famine business, returns to Simla to-night. With 
 the exception of the North- Western Provinces, from 
 which the weather reports are still bad, I am sanguine 
 that the rain, which has now begun to fall every- 
 where else, will have broken the neck of the famine 
 and materially reduced its duration and intensity. 
 But in this province the severity of the famine has 
 thrown everything out of gear, and so greatly changed 
 for the worse the financial condition and prospects 
 
2 20 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ti 
 
 Sept. 9 
 
 Abundant 
 rainfall in 
 Madras 
 
 that I fear it will be absolutely necessary to postpone 
 the restoration of the province to native rule beyond 
 the date hitherto contemplated. 
 
 * Yours, dear Lord Salisbury, very faithfully, 
 
 (Signed) ' Lytton.' 
 
 The new arrangement between the Viceroy and 
 the Madras Government had hardly been completed 
 when the long expected rain fell abundantly. The 
 hearts of the people revived, and they dispersed so 
 rapidly that the numbers which in September were 
 2,218,000, by December had fallen to 444,000. 
 
 The people in Madras connected the advent of 
 the rain with the Viceroy's visit, which they looked 
 upon as a most propitious omen. 
 
 Sept. 16 
 
 Ootacamund 
 
 To Lady Lytton 
 
 ' Neddeevettam ! Sunday, September 16, 1877. 
 
 ' The Duke drove me in his pony carriage this 
 morning to the first stage of our little journey hither. 
 The morning was fine, and for the first time I have 
 seen Ootacamund. Having seen it, I affirm it to be 
 a paradise, and declare without hesitation that in 
 every particular it far surpasses all that its most 
 enthusiastic admirers and devoted lovers have said 
 to us about it. The afternoon was rainy and the 
 road muddy, but such beautiful Englisli rain, such 
 delicious English mud. Imagine Hertfordshire 
 lanes, Devonshire downs, Westmoreland lakes, Scotch 
 trout-streams, and Lusitanian views ! I write from a 
 cinchona plantation which I have been visiting and 
 where I pass the night.' 
 
 In the province of Mysore a partial failure of 
 the rains in 1875 had been followed by an almost 
 complete failure in 1876, and severe famine set in 
 
1877 FAMINE 22 1 
 
 in December 1876. When the Viceroy visited Banga- 
 lore in September 1877 the famine was at its height, ' 
 the number of people on relief was very large, and Famine in 
 much the larger portion of them were in receipt of ^"^^ ^^^ 
 gratuitous relief. The conflict between large and 
 small works had gone on here as elsewhere, but had 
 taken a peculiar form. The engineers of the Public 
 Works Department had an abundance of large 
 schemes in hand, suited for the employment of great 
 masses of labourers, but they contended that their 
 business was only to take on able-bodied labourers 
 who could perform the usual task at the usual rate 
 of pay, and that all persons who were unaccustomed 
 to labour or weakened by famine should be employed 
 by the civil officers on local, small works. They 
 refused to alter the system of petty contract, or to 
 introduce that of daily payment for work done, and 
 they asserted that whatever work was done under 
 their department must be done according to strict 
 departmental rules, and that they must not be turned 
 into relief officers. The result was that in September 
 1877 less than the usual number of labourers was 
 employed on departmental works, a nearly equal 
 number was employed under civil officers on small, 
 scattered works all over the country, and the great 
 majority were suffering under the most demoralising 
 form of public charity — gratuitous relief distributed 
 in the form of cooked food to paupers herded 
 together in poor houses. Even the personal authority Major Seott- 
 of the Viceroy failed to break down the Chief r.e'!!!?- ' 
 Engineer's objections to the wiser policy or to con- "^^^^f^ 
 vince him of his error, and Lord Lytton had to Engineer 
 remove him elsewhere, replacing him by Major (now 
 Colonel Sir Colin) Scott-Moncreiff, E.E., whom he 
 brought down from the North- West Provinces. At the 
 
222 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Mr. Charles 
 Elliott 
 appointed 
 Famine Com- 
 missioner 
 of Mysore 
 
 Viceroy 
 returns to 
 Simla, 
 Sept. -27 
 
 New Famine 
 Administra- 
 tion 
 
 same time he placed the administrative charge of the 
 famine in tlie hands of Mr. (now Sir) Charles Elliott 
 (also from the North-West Provinces), to whom 
 he gave the title of Famine Commissioner of Mysore, 
 and he appointed as his secretary Mr. A. Wingate, of 
 the Bombay Civil Service, who had earned much 
 credit by his management of famine relief in one of 
 the Bombay districts. 
 
 By September 27 the Viceroy had accomplished 
 his personal tour through the famine districts and 
 was once more back at Simla. 
 
 Writing to General Kennedy, on October 3, he 
 congratulates him on the admirable orders which he 
 had just issued ' for the general guidance of relief 
 operations at Madras,' and which he anticipated 
 would be equally useful for the guidance of the 
 famine officers at Mysore. 
 
 The principal changes made by the new Famine 
 Administration in Mysore were to transfer all the 
 paupers who were able to do any work, however slight, 
 from the ' kitchens ' to relief works, to remodel the 
 kitchens as hospitals for the sick, and to establish a 
 system of village relief in their own homes for those 
 who were unfit to be emplo3^ed on works. These efforts 
 were greatly aided by the bountiful rain which fell in 
 September and October, filling the tanks, securing 
 the rice harvest, and affording abundant employment 
 to agriculturists in the fields. The number on 
 gratuitous relief, which stood at 220,100 in September 
 1877, had fallen in June to 11,000, and the number 
 employed in relief works, after rising from 49,000 to 
 86,000, fell in June to 37,000. Mr. EUiott left the 
 province in May 1878, making over the post of 
 Famine Commissioner to Major Moncreiff, who, with 
 Mr. Wingate, remained in Mysore tiU August, by 
 
1877 FAMINE 223 
 
 which time hardly any need of famine relief continued 
 to exist. In May, Lord Lytton imposed on Mr. Elliott 
 the duty of drawing up the Mysore Famine Eeport, 
 and wrote a minute on it (November 1878) when it 
 was completed, from which the following extracts 
 have been made : — 
 
 ' The first step taken, in September 1877, was to re- Lord Lytton's 
 inforce the Mysore staff with trained Civil officers and Mr^EiHott's 
 officers from Her Majesty's Army, whose duty was to ^^^°^^^ 
 direct relief operations; with engineers to manage relief Report 
 works and to organise famine labour ; with medical 
 officers to arrange famine hospitals and tend the sick. 
 The next step was to gather all the threads of famine 
 administration into one hand, and to lay down 
 detailed rules for the guidance of famine officers 
 of all grades And the last step, which followed 
 close upon the others, was to effect a thorough and 
 intelligent inspection of all the famine operations 
 throughout the country. It is only too clear that all 
 this ought to have been done in December 1876. 
 The report tells of the many difficulties which were 
 met in the management of the relief works ; in getting 
 the people to come to these works ; in employing 
 persons in different stages of weakness so as not to 
 overtask them, while giving them some incentive to live 
 and work ; in clearing the relief kitchens and carrying 
 the inmates with their own consent to the works, if they 
 were fit to labour, or to their own homes if they were 
 past work ; in establishing and working a system 
 whereby house-ridden folk were relieved in their 
 homes ; in preventing peculation ; in securing to the 
 province a moderate out-turn of useful work in 
 exchange for relief given to the able-bodied ; and, 
 lastly, in helping the ryots to recover their position 
 and independence by a judicious distribution of the 
 
2 24 ^OUB L^TTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Minute ou aliiis seiit from Great Britain, Ireland and the 
 Kepoit^ Colonies for the aid of the famine-stricken people of 
 
 Southern India. . . . 
 
 ' I am deeply indebted to Mr. Elliott for his 
 excellent report, which tells truthfully and graphi- 
 cally the story of much human suffering, borne with 
 the patient endurance characteristic of the people 
 of India, and gives a faithful account of the early 
 failure and subsequent success in relieving a great 
 population from the dreadful effects of prolonged 
 famine. . . . 
 
 ' The thanks of the Government of India are due 
 to Mr. Elliott for the ability and energy with which 
 he carried out their famine policy in Mysore. 
 Though the province and its people were new to him, 
 he promptly mastered the position. He organised 
 and directed relief operations with a patience and 
 cfood sense which overcame all difficulties, and with 
 the fullest tenderness to the people in dire calamity. 
 To Major Scott- Moncreiff, the Chief Engineer, and to 
 Mr. Wingate, the famine secretary, I tender the 
 hearty acknowledgments of the Government for the 
 skill, knowledge, and zeal which they brought to 
 bear on the difficult questions connected with the 
 conduct of relief work and the organisation of gratui- 
 tous relief.' 
 Eain in the Eain uow began to fall in the north-west as well 
 
 as in the southern provinces of India, thus saving 
 only just in time the Punjab and North- West 
 Provinces from a famine worse and more widespread 
 than any which had yet been known. Writing to 
 the Queen, on October 11, the Viceroy was able to 
 send a favourable report of the result of his journey. 
 'The measures in which I was so fortunate as to 
 secure the Duke of Buckingham's co-operation in 
 
 North-West 
 
1S77 FAMINE 225 
 
 Madras, and those which before leaving Bangalore I viceroy to 
 set on foot throughout the Mysore provinces, are 0^^"?^* 
 already producing excellent results, and the weekly 
 reports, both from Madras and Mysore, now show a 
 steadily increasing diminution in the number of 
 persons gratuitously supported by the State, as well 
 as a marked improvement in the health of those put 
 upon works and a reduction in the death rate. This 
 improvement in prospects so anxious and almost 
 desperate a few weeks ago is no doubt partly due to 
 the recent rains and the partial revival of agriculture ; 
 but the rains could have effected no appreciable 
 change for the better, for many months to come at 
 least, had no change been previously effected in the 
 system of famine relief, and as regards Madras I 
 think the improved condition of that presidency is 
 mainly attributable to the ability with which 
 General Kennedy is discharging his very difficult and 
 delicate task there. This officer is certainly one of 
 the ablest of your Majesty's public servants in India. 
 It is entirely owing to his great foresight and energy 
 that whilst the Madras famine has cost the Govern- 
 ment of India over ten millions, the Bombay famine, 
 under his management, has cost only four millions, 
 although a much larger saving of human life has 
 been effected in Bombay than in Madras.' 
 
 Whilst admitting that private subscription had its 
 use and place, the Viceroy continued to hold the view 
 that any appeal to private charity in England was ' a 
 dangerous folly ' unless by previous arrangement a 
 sphere of operation could be marked out for it which 
 should not overlap the field already occupied by the 
 Government's organisation. Ultimately, in accord- 
 ance with Lord Lytton's views, the sums collected 
 were profitably used in helping the farmers, who in 
 
 Q 
 
2 26 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 November 1 
 
 Madras 
 
 Mysore 
 
 1878 
 
 the time of famine had been forced to sell their 
 agricultural implements, to buy them back, thus 
 saving them from degenerating from the condition of 
 peasant proprietors to that of coolie labourers. His 
 own subscription of 1,000/. towards the Madras 
 Charitable Eelief Committee was a practical answer 
 to the report propagated by some persons that the 
 Viceroy was personally averse to private subscrip- 
 tions. 
 
 Writing to Lord Salisbury on November 1 the 
 Viceroy says : ' Kennedy has really done wonders in 
 Madras, and the enormous reductions he has effected 
 in the numbers gratuitously relieved (especially at 
 Salem) convincingly demonstrate, I think, the waste 
 and mismanagement of the old system, against which I 
 have been in vain protesting ever since January last. 
 For these reductions, which have afforded the 
 greatest relief to our Treasury, have been effected 
 without loss of life or health in a single instance.' 
 
 In Mysore the results of the famine operations 
 were equally successful, and here also the Viceroy's 
 visit had been followed by an abundant rainfall. 
 The mortality in that district had been more patent 
 and terrible than anywhere else, and compared to 
 Madras the state of things did not seem to improve 
 so rapidly — but, considering the state of exhaustion 
 in which the people were, and that famine adminis- 
 tration had to be organised from the very foundation 
 — the Viceroy declares to Lord Salisbury that he is 
 ' really startled at the complete and rapid success 
 with which the efforts of the responsible Mysore 
 officers in the execution of the new system had been 
 attended.' 
 
 During the following year (1878) all relief opera- 
 tions were finally wound up. At the close of 1877 
 
1877 FAMINE 227 
 
 a measure was introduced at the Les^islative Assem- 
 bly of the Indian Government, by Sir John Strachey, legislation to 
 which, supplemented by the Acts previously passed K'ture^famine 
 in that year, was designed to provide for the future expenses 
 cost of famines/ 
 
 In a work published by Sir John Strachey and 
 his brother on ' The Finances and Public Works of 
 India,' it is written : ' A nobler, more humane, or 
 wiser programme was never devised by any Govern- 
 ment for the benefit of a country than that put forth 
 by the Government of India in 1878 for the protection 
 of India against this most terrible and ruinous and 
 far-reaching of all natural calamities ; and until it is 
 brought into far more complete operation than has 
 hitherto been permitted, the most urgent of the duties 
 of the British rulers of India to the vast population 
 the}?- have undertaken to govern will be left unful- 
 filled.'- 
 
 It was Lord Lytton's conviction, a conviction 
 shared by all the leading men in India, that the 
 wisest policy was, by the construction of a network 
 of cheap railways and carefully planned works of 
 irrigation, to do all that it was in the power of a 
 Government to do to prevent the frightful calamities 
 of famine to which India is still exposed, and he 
 believed this could be done not only without finan- 
 
 ^ The first new taxation was the Public Works cess of 1877, imposed 
 on the land in Bengal, which yielded about 355,000L New cesses were 
 also imposed in 1878 on the land in the North-West Provinces, Oudh, 
 Punjab, and Central Provinces, yielding about 170,000Z. A license tax 
 on traders was first levied in the North-West Provinces in 1877, and 
 was afterwards extended to all India, and developed so as to include 
 officials and professional men, thus becoming to aU intents and pur- 
 poses a tax on all incomes except those derived from land ; its maximum 
 yield was estimated at 820,000?. The total amoimt of what has been 
 called the Famine Insurance Taxation was therefore aboiit 1,345.000Z. 
 
 ~ Page 170. 
 
 Q 2 
 
2 28 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 cial risk, but with certain financial advantage. This 
 poHcy was set forth in a speech deUvered by Lord 
 Lytton at the close of the Legislative Council held on 
 December 27, 1877, a speech which Sir John Strachey 
 has characterised as worthy ' to be remembered 
 among the wisest utterances of Indian Governors.' 
 The principles therein laid down may be understood 
 from the following extracts. 
 LordLytton's ' Qf the countless sufjc'cstions made from time to 
 
 speech on . . \'° ^ . . 
 
 Famine time, and more especially during the present year, 
 
 Dec!^2^7*'Ts77 ^^^ rendering less bitterly ironical than it still seems, 
 when read by the sinister light of recent events, that 
 famous inscription on the huge granary built at 
 Patna for " the perpetual prevention of famine in these 
 provinces" there are only three which merit serious 
 consideration. They are,^?'6%,EMiGKATi0N; secondly^ 
 Eailways ; and thirdly, Ikrigation Woeks. Unfor- 
 tunately for India, however, the first of these three 
 material factors in the practical solution of problems 
 similar to those we are now dealing with is inappli- 
 cable, or only very imperfectly applicable, to the 
 actual conditions of this country. The first con- 
 dition requisite to render emigration available as a 
 precaution against famine is a normal excess of the 
 population as compared with the food-produce of 
 the country ; the second condition is sufficient energy, 
 on the part of the surplus population, to induce it to 
 seek a higher standard of material comfort than that 
 to which it is accustomed ; and the third condition 
 is a foreign field of labour in which this higher 
 standard may be reached. Now, none of these con- 
 ditions are sufficiently developed in India to justif}- 
 reliance upon emigration as an efficient auxiliary in 
 our struggles with famine. Of our whole population 
 only a small portion as yet exceeds its food-producing 
 
1877 FAMINE 229 
 
 power. The possible increase of this proportion of Lord Lytton's 
 the population will undoubtedly augment our future Famine*'" 
 difficulties, if, in the meanwhile, no adequate cor- ^If^lf^i^^^ 
 recti ves be applied to them. But in those parts of 
 India which, during the last two years, have most 
 suffered from scarcity, the population only averages 
 at 250 inhabitants to every square mile ; and, since 
 those districts comprise large areas of uncultivated 
 land, this average cannot be regarded as at all exces- 
 sive. In the next place, there is no contesting the 
 fact that, in spite of the inducements offered to 
 emigration by this Government, in spite of the 
 widespread organisation for the recruitment of it 
 established by Colonial Governments, and in spite of 
 the encouraging example furnished by that small 
 number who, having tried the experiment of 
 temporary emigration, return, after a few years' 
 absence, in possession of savings which they could 
 not otherwise have stored by the labour of a life- 
 time — in spite of all these things the people of India 
 ivill not emigrate. The uncomplaining patience of 
 the Indian ryot has a profoundly pathetic claim upon 
 our compassionate admiration. In no country of the 
 "Western world could a national calamity, so severe 
 and prolonged as that which has now for more than 
 twenty-four months affected one-half of this empire, 
 have lasted so long without provoking from the 
 sufferings of an ignorant and starving population 
 agrarian and social disturbances of the most for- 
 midable character. But for this very reason we 
 cannot safely frame any plans for improving the 
 condition of the Indian ryot in exclusive reliance on 
 his spirit of adventure. And, although the exporta- 
 tion to foreign countries of large numbers of the 
 people, without reference to their feelings and in 
 
230 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vr 
 
 LordLytton's oppositioii to their known inclination, is a policy 
 FamSe°" wliicli might possiblj have been enforced by a Moghul 
 Legislation, Empcror, it is certainly not a policy which can be 
 adopted by a British Government. It is a very 
 significant fact that those of our native subjects who 
 do occasionally emigrate belong to the least, rather 
 than the most, densely populated parts of the 
 country. Finally, it must be borne in mind that if 
 to-morrow all the native races of Hindustan were 
 animated by a simultaneous impulse to emigrate, 
 there is at present no field of foreign labour capable 
 of absorbing a proportion of the enormous population 
 of this continent sufficiently large to make any appre- 
 ciable difference in the general condition of the 
 remainder. Our colonies take from India, annually^ 
 a few thousand labourers. Multiply that number by 
 ten, or even twenty, and the percentage of Indian emi- 
 gration would still bear but an insignificant relation 
 to the number of the whole non-emigrant community. 
 For all these reasons, although emigration un- 
 questionably claims our fostering encouragement, I 
 fear that for many years to come we must practi- 
 cally exclude this expedient from the list of those on 
 which we mainly rely as a means of insuring the 
 population of India against the calamities of 
 periodical famine. The conclusion thus arrived at 
 forcibly confines our immediate efforts to the most 
 rapid development, by the cheapest methods, com- 
 bined with the most appropriate and efficient appli- 
 cation, of the only two remaining instruments for 
 increasing the produce of the soil, facilitating its 
 circulation, and thereby improving the general 
 social condition, and augmenting the collective 
 wealth, of the whole community. Those instruments 
 are railroads and irrisfation works. . . .' 
 
1877 FAMINE 23 1 
 
 After examining in detail the principles on which Lord Lytton's 
 the development of railroads and irrigation works Famine"" 
 should be carried out, he summed up the Government ^^s^^l?;*^?"i„ 
 
 . ^ Dec. 27, 1877 
 
 policy in the following words : ' The Government of 
 India is convinced, upon a careful review of its finan- 
 cial position and prospects, that the heavy obligations 
 imposed upon it by the calamitous circumstances of 
 recent years can only be discharged without serious 
 risk to its financial stability by a strict and patient 
 adherence to the principle afiirmed in the financial 
 measures we introduced last year, and developed in 
 those which are now before the Council. That prin- 
 ciple involves the enlargement, with adequate pre- 
 cautions, of the financial, and consequently also of the 
 administrative, powers and responsibilities of the local 
 Governments. In the next place, we believe that, if 
 this principle be fairly carried into effect, the new 
 imposts which the Council is now asked to sanction 
 will, when added to the resources already created, 
 provide the State with sufficient means for the 
 permanent maintenance of a national insurance 
 against famine, without heavily increasing the 
 pecuniary burdens of its subjects. For the attain- 
 ment of this object the material appliances we 
 intend to promote, by means of additional revenue, 
 are cheap railroads and extensive irrigation works. 
 We are conscious of the reproach we should justly 
 incur if, after such a declaration as I have now made, 
 the prosecution of these necessary works were com- 
 menced, suspended, or relinquished according to the 
 increased or relaxed pressure of annual circumstance 
 or the intermittent activity of spasmodic effort. We 
 therefore propose to entrust, in the first instance, to 
 the local Governments the duty of framing a sufficient 
 and carefully considered scheme of local railroad and 
 
232 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Lord Lytton's irrigation works. We are prepared to provide tliem 
 Famine witli the Hieans whereby they may, from year to 
 
 Def ^2?^i877 y^^^j work Systematically forwards and upwards to 
 the completion of such a scheme. The funds locally 
 raised for this purpose will be locally applied. But 
 provincial Governments will have to meet the cost of 
 provincial famines out of provincial funds, to the 
 fullest extent those funds can bear. They will find 
 that thriftless expenditure in one year may involve 
 the risk of diminished allotments in subsequent years ; 
 and I cannot doubt that the unavoidable recognition 
 of this fact will make them wisely eager to spend the 
 requisite proportion of their annual income upon 
 well planned and carefully estimated railway and 
 irrigation works, which will be their best insurance 
 against the losses of famine, and the postponement of 
 all administrative progress which famine generally 
 entails. It will be the special duty of the Public 
 Works Department of this Government to keejj those 
 objects constantly in view of the local Governments, 
 and to assist them no less constantly in their 
 endeavours to give a rational preference to really 
 useful and remunerative works over those more 
 captivating, but less compensating, subjects of expen- 
 diture which in all comparatively small communities 
 so powerfully appeal to provincial pride, professional 
 proclivities, or popular pleasure. 
 
 ' The specific projects now announced to this 
 Council I have not presumed to put forward as the 
 enunciation of any new policy. On the contrary, I 
 should have spoken with much more hesitation if I 
 imagined myself to be treading upon ground not long 
 since surveyed by experienced authorities ; and the 
 strongest recommendation I can claim for the views 
 I have expressed is that they differ in no important 
 
1877 FAMINE 233 
 
 particular from those of the eminent statesmen who LordLytton's 
 have preceded me in the office I now hold. But Famine 
 between the present and all previous occasions on Def^2?T877 
 which the Government of India has declared its 
 policy and principles in reference to the prevention 
 of famine, there is one essential difference which I 
 am anxious to impress upon your attention. I can 
 well imagine that many of those I am now addressing 
 may be disposed to say to me : " Your good in- 
 tentions are possibly sincere ; but the path to the 
 nethermost pit is already paved with good intentions. 
 Promise is a good dog, but Performance is a better ; 
 we have often heard the bow-wow of the first ; we 
 have j'-et to see the tail of the second. We have 
 been told over and over again by the highest 
 authorities that India is to be insured against famine 
 in this way, or in that, but when famines come 
 upon us we find that the promised way is still 
 wanting. The current claims upon the activities 
 and resources of the Government of India are so 
 numerous, so pressing, so important, official forces 
 and imperial funds so necessarily limited, that when 
 once the daily, hourly strain of a great famine has 
 been removed from a wearied administration and 
 impoverished treasury, its fearful warnings are 
 soon forgotten ; its disquieting ghosts are quickly 
 exorcised by the conventional declaration of some un- 
 exceptionable principle ; its bitter memories decently 
 interred beneath the dull hie jacet of a blue book ; 
 and there, for all practical purposes, is an end of the 
 matter." 
 
 ' Well, then, I think I am entitled to point out 
 to the Council that we are not now fairly open to 
 this customary criticism. We do not speak without 
 having acted : and we promise nothing which we 
 
2 34 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Lord Lytton'3 liave not, after long and anxious consideration, pro- 
 Fam*ine°° vided ourselves with means of performing. I must 
 Def ^'>?'i877 ^^^® ^''^^y imperfectly explained myself thus far, if I 
 have failed to make it clearly understood that I am 
 not now speaking of what we ought to do, or would 
 do, to insure this country ac^ainst the worst effects of 
 future famine had we only the means of doing it : 
 but of what we can do, and will do, with the means 
 already provided for in the measures now before the 
 Council. I do not mean to say that the construction 
 of such an extensive system of local railroads . and 
 irrigation works as we propose to undertake will 
 not be the gradual task of many years. But I do 
 mean to say that, in the manner and on the prin- 
 ciples already explained, we are now providing for 
 the prompt commencement and uninterrupted 
 continuation of this great and necessary task. We 
 are systematising a policy the principles of which 
 have been repeatedly approved and proclaimed by 
 our predecessors. We are associating with it the 
 interests, the powers, and the duties of our local 
 administrations. We are providing them with the 
 means of permanently prosecuting and developing it, 
 not without reference to our financial control, but 
 exempt from the distressing uncertainty which has 
 hitherto been inseparable from the practical execu- 
 tion of this policy, in consequence of the obligation 
 which till now has rested on the Government of 
 India, with the very limited funds at its disposal for 
 the prosecution of public works, to choose from 
 year to year between the conflicting claims upon 
 its purse of the various and dissimilar localities of 
 this spacious empire. . . . 
 
 ' If you look back over a wider and a longer tract 
 of experience than that which is covered by the 
 
1877 FAMINE 235 
 
 history of India, if you embrace in one view our Lord Lytton's 
 own history with the past history of other countries pSne"* 
 in other chmates, you will find that the principles on ^ef ^27*^1877 
 which we have lately acted, and on which I trust 
 we shall continue to act, in dealing with seasons of 
 calamitous drought have been found no less appli- 
 cable, no less efficient, in other countries similarly 
 aifected than they have proved to be in this country, 
 wherever they have been intelligently understood 
 and loyally carried out. There is, I venture to think, 
 no more striking illustration of this truth than the 
 history of the scarcity that occurred in central 
 France during the year 1770-71. That great 
 statesman, M. Turgot, was then Minister. His 
 administrative ability was equalled by his philo- 
 sophical power of thought ; and, fighting with diffi- 
 culties, in many respects almost identical with those 
 which we ourselves have lately had to deal with — 
 difficulties partly material, but greatly aggravated 
 by the prevalence of extremely erroneous economical 
 conceptions, Turgot conceived, developed, and, in 
 the face of great opposition, carried into effect views 
 no less identical with those which have guided our 
 own action as to the essential importance of guarding 
 the perfect freedom of inland trade in grain ; of im- 
 proving the internal communications of the cou.ntry ; 
 and of providing relief works of permanent utility 
 upon which to employ the suffering population. 
 Here, to-day, in India, those views are as sound and 
 as applicable as thev were in the Limousin a century 
 ago. If, then, from the past we look forward into 
 the future, why, let me ask, may we not hope that 
 under improved conditions of administration, and 
 with increased development of those material appli- 
 ances which civilisation creates for the provision of 
 
236 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIXISTKATION 
 
 Lord Lyft^on 
 speech on 
 Fiimine 
 Legislation, 
 Dee. 27, 1877 
 
 Famine 
 Commission 
 
 national wealth, India will eventually enjoy as com- 
 plete an immunity from the worst results of scarcity 
 as that which now exists throusfhout those reofions 
 of France where but a century ago such a result 
 might have seemed as difficult of attainment as it 
 now appears to be in many of our own provinces ? ' 
 
 These plans, however, were destined not to be 
 carried out, at least at that time. The English 
 Government had taken alarm at the apparent in- 
 crease of expenditure in India, and a Committee of 
 the House of Commons decided that a larcfe reduc- 
 tion should be made in the outlay on Productive 
 Public Works, and that the borrowing of the Govern- 
 ment of India for this purpose should be curtailed 
 so as not to exceed for the present the amount of 
 2,500,000Z. a year. It was not till the Eeport of the 
 Famine Commission had restored public confidence 
 in the really productive and remunerative character 
 of these works that Parliament allowed the Govern- 
 ment to increase its annual borrowing up to the 
 limits of 3,500,000/. a year. 
 
 Lord Lytton was not content with the active 
 steps he took to make himself acquainted with all 
 the details of famine distress and to supervise and 
 direct the measures of relief. He saw that famine 
 must be treated as a periodically recurring calamity, 
 and that the time had come for collecting and 
 handing down to posterity, not only the experience 
 which had been gained as to the most efficient 
 way of dealing with famine when it occurs, but also 
 the knowledge which had been accumulated as to 
 how to forecast its imminence, and the measures 
 best calculated to obviate or to lessen its severity. 
 Accordingly, he proposed and obtained sanction to 
 the appointment of the Indian Famine Commission, 
 
1^77 FAMINE 237 
 
 and in May 1878 he laid down the principles which Famine 
 
 ,1 f» ,1 • • • • rm Commission 
 
 were to govern the scope 01 their inquiries, ihey 
 were directed to investigate the effect of famine 
 on the vital statistics, and to report how far ' local 
 influences, peculiarities of administration or tenure, 
 climate, soil, water, density of population, system of 
 cultivation, &c., have tended to mitigate or intensify 
 its inevitable effects.' The character of the works 
 on which relief was to be given, the need of a special 
 system of village inspection, the restrictions under 
 which gratuitous relief can safely be given ; the 
 duty of the Government in respect of the supply, 
 importation and distribution of food ; the benefit 
 which might be expected from the extension of irri- 
 gation canals and railways, or from improvement in the 
 system of agriculture, from encouragement of emi- 
 gration, and from suspension or remission of the 
 land revenue, and the relations to be observed with 
 Native States in famine management, were among 
 the chief topics expressly brought to their notice. 
 
 The Famine Commission completed its labours 
 in July 1880, and their report, which embodied the 
 principles hereafter to be adopted for famine adminis- 
 tration, was at once accepted. 
 
 The great famine of 1876-78 was followed by a 
 long period of fairly prosperous years, during which 
 local scarcities occurred from time to time, but no 
 widely spread catastrophe overtook the agricultural 
 population. This period was utilised in carrying 
 out the recommendations of the Commission, and 
 when famine again visited the land, in 1896, the Effect of 
 Government and the country were found in a very commi^ssion 
 different state of preparation from that which had on Famine 
 existed in 1876. A Famine Code had been drawn 
 up in every province, comprising in the fullest detail 
 
238 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Famine the I'ules uncler which every branch of the Adminis- 
 
 tration was to act, and the manner in which the 
 services of every agent were to be utihsed in carry- 
 ing out the measures for rehef. An Agricuhural 
 Department had been created, whose special charge 
 it was to bring together a comprehensive and 
 exact record of the agricultural, vital, and economic 
 condition of the people, and to co-ordinate the 
 machinery necessary for combating the disaster. 
 Lists of works were drawn up for every district, on 
 which the masses of men deprived of their usual field 
 occupations would be employed. Eules were framed 
 for utilising the existing staff and creating additional 
 impromptu establishments for the supervision of these 
 works and for the distribution of gratuitous rehef 
 to non- workers in their homes. The principle was 
 established, that unless under certain peculiar local 
 conditions. Government ought not to intervene in 
 order to control or aid the activity of private trade 
 in the supply of food to the distressed tracts, and 
 that its functions should be confined to the improve- 
 ment of communications, and especially to the con- 
 struction of railways by which the requisite supplies 
 could be brought in. Accordingly, when the famine 
 of 1896 broke out, it was found that in every tract 
 to which the Commission had pointed as both liable 
 to the occurrence of drought and insufiiciently pro- 
 vided with the means of obtaining food, the necessary 
 railways had been constructed, and the whole length 
 of railway communication had risen from 8,200 
 miles in 1876 to 19,600 in 1896. With one or two 
 exceptions, all the irrigation canals recommended 
 by the Commission, and several not suggested by 
 them, have been carried out, and the area irrigated 
 in this way and rendered completely independent 
 
1878 FAMINE 239 
 
 of the accidents of the season has risen from 7,000 Famine 
 square miles in 1876 to about 12,000 in 1896. °^'^™^^^^° 
 Everything possible has been done at the same time 
 to increase the area protected, though less securely 
 protected, by tanks and wells. There has been 
 much legislative activity, directed to the improve- 
 ment of the relations between the Government and 
 the landlords, and between the landlords and their 
 tenants, and facilities have been granted for re- 
 mission or suspension of the land dues and the 
 granting of loans from the public treasury. 
 Universal testimony is borne to the success with 
 which the recent famine of 1896-7 has been met, 
 both as regards the prevention of mortality, and 
 disorganisation of native society, the useful objects 
 on which famine labour has been employed, and the 
 economy with which the work has been carried out. 
 This success is largely due to the far-seeing policy 
 of Lord Lytton, in his determination that the ex- 
 perience gained under his Administration should 
 not be wasted or foro^otten. 
 
 o 
 
 Of the financial measures for providing for the 
 cost of recurring famine, which have been so mis- 
 described and misunderstood under the name of 
 ' The Famine Insurance Fund,' more will be said 
 in another chapter dealing with the various financial 
 reforms of Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty. 
 
240 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch.yii 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 RUSSIAN MISSION TO KABUL. WAR OF 78. 
 FLIGHT OF SHER ALI 
 
 All communications with the Amir of Kabul havin<>- 
 ceased with the termination of the Peshawur Confer- 
 ence in March 1877, there followed an interval of 
 suspense and inaction on the Afghan frontier. But 
 in April 1877 war broke out between Eussia and 
 Turkey, and in January 1878 the Eussian army 
 had passed the Balkans and encamped before Con- 
 stantinople ; whereupon the English Government 
 had made overt preparations for armed intervention, 
 and a body of Indian troops had been summoned 
 /" to Malta. The reverberation of these great events 
 
 had been felt throuo-hout Asia, for the Eussians had 
 taken measures to counteract English intervention 
 in Europe by moving troops towards the Afghan 
 Russian frontier and by sending a mission to the Amir. The 
 
 the Amir missiou scems to have left Samarkand on June 14, 
 the day after the first meeting of the Congress of 
 Berlin. In the meantime Lord Salisbury had, in 
 March 1878, become Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 and Lord Cranbrook succeeded him as Secretary oi 
 State for India. 
 
 On receipt of this news Lord Lytton wrote to his 
 first chief: 
 
 April 3, 1878. 
 
 ' My dear Lord Salisbury, — It is with a real pang- 
 that I read your telegram informing me of the change 
 
1878 LOED CKANBROOK SUCCEEDS LORD SALISBURY 24 1 
 
 M^hicli deprives me of the chief to whom I am To Lord 
 indebted for great forbearance, generous support, April 3^^^ 
 and considerate guidance. I shall ever recall with 
 grateful feelings the support you have given me in 
 every principal episode of the time during which I 
 have had the honour to serve under you. The 
 cessation of our direct official relations is a sad 
 event in my life, nor are my regrets wholly selfish, 
 for the withdrawal from the India Office, especially 
 at this moment, of your long experience of Indian 
 administration and intimate knowledge of the char- 
 acter of the men engaged in it will be a real loss 
 to India. On behalf, however, of the highest public 
 interests, on behalf of the character of the Govern- 
 ment and the honour of the nation, I must con- 
 fess that I unfeignedly rejoice to know that the 
 conduct of foreign affairs has now passed into your 
 hands. 
 
 ' Notwithstanding the innumerable obstacles to a 
 " bold foreign policy " which you mentioned in your 
 letter, and which I keenly recognise, I feel confident 
 that our foreign policy will now be at least a strong 
 and intelligible one, though prudent not pusil- 
 lanimous, and if flexible, as every foreign policy must 
 be, still not aimless. Assuredly never did an English 
 Minister assume the seal of the Foreign Office at a 
 time more pregnant with difficulty and anxiety, nor 
 can the blunders and neglect of twenty years be 
 rapidly repaired. But your courage is the herald 
 of your success, and if only you are adequately 
 supported by the Cabinet and the country I feel 
 sure you are destined to be one of England's great- 
 est Foreign Ministers. Such a Minister she never 
 needed more than now. I cannot sufficiently express 
 
 R 
 
242 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. vii 
 
 tlie deep sympathy and affectionate interest in your 
 most anxious but beneficent task with which I am, 
 ' Dear Lord SaUsbury, 
 
 ' Yours ever obhged and faithfully, 
 
 '■ Lyttox.' 
 
 From Lord Salisbury he received tlie following 
 letter : 
 
 ' April :>., 1878. 
 
 From Lord ' My dear Lord Lytton, — I have passed from the 
 
 Aprn.r^' quiet haven of Lidia to the stormy sea of foreign 
 politics, and I now write no longer, alas ! in official 
 relations, but merely to say good bye. I shall retain 
 long a very pleasant recollection of my association 
 with the earlier years of your Viceroyalty and with 
 your vigorous famine, financial, and political adminis- 
 tration, and shall watch, so far as I have the oppor- 
 tunity, the development of your policy with the 
 keenest interest. A great career of activity and 
 fame, during the three years of your official tenure 
 yet remaining, lies before you, and I earnestly hope 
 3^ou may have health to fulfil the bright promise of 
 its beginning. I have to thank you very cordially 
 for your hearty and loyal co-operation during a 
 period that has been alwaj^s full of difficulty, and 
 often of anxiety. The two offices are so placed 
 towards each other that they tend naturally to 
 friction, and it is only by such friendly and con- 
 siderate conduct as you have shown that it can be 
 avoided. I am sure that you will find in my 
 successor a character with which you will sym- 
 pathise, and that he will heartily appreciate you. 
 Pray convey to Lady Lytton our kindest remem- 
 brances and regards, and 
 
 ' Believe me ever, yours very sincerely, 
 
 ' Salisbury.' 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 243 
 
 At tlie time Lord Cranbrook succeeded Lord 
 Salisbury at the India Office the situation in Europe 
 still seemed likely to lead to war between England 
 and Eussia, and it was not tiU. the result of the 
 Berlin Conference was known in the following 
 July that the fear of such an event could be 
 dispelled. The Viceroy's letters, therefore, at this time 
 go fully into the preparations which should be made 
 in India in anticipation of an attack by Russia in 
 Central Asia at the same time that war was declared 
 between the two Powers in Europe, 
 
 Writing to Lord Cranbrook on April 8, 1878, he 
 says : 
 
 ' Indian statesmen, however widely they may viceroy to 
 differ as to the right policy for securing it, have bi°ooii^'J"'ii . 
 always, I believe, agreed in regarding as supremely 
 important the alliance and co-operation of Afghan- 
 istan in the event of India being involved in hostilities 
 between England and Eussia. . . . Lord Lawrence 
 and his disciples, who are numerously represented 
 in your Council, believed that the alliance of 
 Afghanistan in the event of war between us and 
 Eussia was infallibly guaranteed by the " Masterly 
 Inactivity Policy," which I need not here discuss. 
 It is enough to observe that the practical failure 
 of that policy has been complete, and, I fear, irre- 
 mediable. The efforts which, as you know, I was 
 authorised to make for improving our relations with 
 the present Amir of Kabul have also failed com- 
 pletely; and thus Afghanistan remains, as it has 
 been for the last six or seven years, impenetrably 
 closed to British intercourse and alienated from 
 British influence ; whilst, in violation of the pledges 
 repeatedly given us by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, 
 constant and confidential communication with the 
 
 B 2 
 
244 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord Amir is now maintained by the Eussian Governor 
 
 AprU 8° ' of Turkestan, who has at the present moment two 
 agents at Kabul. The neutrality or hostility of 
 Afghanistan are contingencies which I will presently 
 discuss ; but the first fact it behoves us to recognise 
 as absolutely certain is that, in the event of hostili- 
 ties with Eussia, we shall assuredly not have the 
 alliance of Afghanistan.' 
 
 Lord Lytton fully realised that ' from the 
 moment when Eussia resolved to play gros jeu for a 
 stake at Constantinople which there was even the 
 merest chance of our disputing, her diplomacy in 
 Central Asia would naturally be exerted with more 
 than usual activity to secure every preliminary 
 political point likely to embarrass our action, or im- 
 prove her position, in case of collision with us in this 
 part of the world. And Kaufmann would not scruple 
 to address to the Amir more promises and menaces 
 than he had the means of fulfilling.' The policy of 
 the Amir would always be to play ofi" the two great 
 Powers against each other as long as he possibly 
 could, without willingly yielding to either the smallest 
 recognised footing in any part of his dominions. 
 But his neutrality towards us would not be a 
 ' benevolent ' one, and the duration of it was 
 doubtful. 
 
 ' Sher Ali is not only a savage, but he is a 
 savage with a touch of insanity ; and his action is, 
 therefore, at all times liable to be dictated by a 
 coup de tete. However much he may dislike, or mis- 
 trust, the Eussians, there can be no doubt that his 
 feelings towards us are those of bitter personal 
 animosity. He has never forgiven us our arbitration 
 about Seistan. During the last twelve months he has 
 been arming to the teeth, and during the same time 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 245 
 
 has been in constant communication with Russia. To Lord 
 Though our attitude towards him has been one of Aprils 
 scrupulous abstention, yet, more slavonico, he declares 
 that it is our policy which obliges him to arm. At 
 the beginning of the Turko-Russian war he openly 
 declared a jehad, not against the Russians, but 
 against us ; and he still proclaims that this jehad 
 is only postponed to a more favourable oppor- 
 tunity. . . . He is arrogant, and overrates his own 
 military strength. He is an Asiatic, and our attitude 
 durino- the Turko-Russian war has led him to under- 
 rate ours. Finally, the taxation and confiscation to 
 which he has resorted for the purpose of increasing 
 his ill-paid army has exposed him to such widespread 
 unpopularity, and his troops are so untrustworthy, 
 that, unless he can ere long justify to his subjects 
 the strain he has put upon them by finding foreign 
 employment for his army, he is threatened with 
 rebellion and assassination. Moreover, it must be re- 
 membered that Russia's retention of Abdul Rahman, 
 a candidate for the throne, enables her at any 
 moment to put a strong screw upon Slier Ali. 
 
 ' The situation I have thus sketched seems to point 
 to the foUowinof conclusions as reo^ards our action 
 here in the event of war with Russia : We cannot 
 attempt any aggressive operations against the 
 Russians ; and we cannot, without considerable pre- 
 paration, which will require time, attempt any 
 operations beyond our own frontier of a defensive, or 
 retaliatory, character. But I think we ought at once 
 to commence such preparations as will enable us, in 
 case of need, to punish promptly any act of aggression 
 by the Amir of Kabul. . . . 
 
 * There are some facts which it seems to me very 
 important to bear always in mind. The dangers 
 
246 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAX ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord with whicli we are permanently threatened by 
 April 8 ' Eussia's presence in Central Asia come, not from 
 the strength, but the weakness of her present posi- 
 tion there. It seems to me so weak that I doubt 
 if she can permanently hold it without extending 
 it. Her position on this continent so far differs 
 from ours that extension of territory will increase, 
 not only her military strength, but also her financial 
 resources. Extension of territory, however, must 
 eventually bring her into contact with us, . . . 
 Diplomacy is the natural weapon of weak Powers, 
 and it is the diplomacy, rather than the arms, of 
 Russia we have to fear in Central Asia. But, 
 unfortunately for us, diplomacy is a weapon with 
 which we cannot fight Eussia on equal terms. And 
 she knows it. The diplomacy of Parliamentary 
 Governments is always heavily handicapped. It 
 seems to me, therefore, that we should be unwise 
 to neglect any opportunity which circumstances may 
 offer us of settling scores with her by means of that 
 weapon in the use of which we are strongest and 
 she weakest. This weapon is the sword. (Of course, 
 I am only speaking with reference to our relative 
 positions and resources in India and Central Asia.) 
 So long as peace lasts, we cannot use the sword ; 
 and our diplomacy is impotent. The declaration 
 of war, therefore, would be an opportunity, which 
 may never recur if we neglect it, for India to make 
 safe all those outworks of her empire which must 
 otherwise fall, sooner or later, into the hands or 
 under the influence of Eussia. . . . 
 
 ' One last word. I am persuaded that the policy 
 of building up in Afghanistan a strong and indepen- 
 dent State, over which we can exercise absolutely 
 no control, has been proved by experience to be a 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 247 
 
 mistake. If by war, or the death of the present To Lord 
 Amir, which will certainly be the signal for conflict ^p^^ l^^ ' 
 between rival candidates for the mus7iud, we should 
 hereafter have the opportunity (and it is one which 
 may at ai y moment occur suddenly) of disinte- 
 grating and breaking up the Kabul Power, I sincerely 
 hope that opportunity will not be lost by us. I 
 believe that this is also the opinion of Lord Salisbury. 
 The best arrangement for Indian interests would be, 
 me judice, the creation of a Western Afghan Khanate, 
 including Merv, Maimena, Balkh, Kandahar, and 
 Herat, under some prince of our own selection, who 
 would be dependent on our support. With Western 
 Afghanistan thus disposed of, and a small station of 
 our own, close to our frontier, in the Kurum Valley, 
 the destinies of Kabul itself would be to us a matter 
 of no importance.' 
 
 The first authentic news of the Eussian move- 
 ments, political and military, in Central Asia had 
 reached the Government of India across Afg;hanistan 
 by the month of June, 1878. During this month 
 various warnings were received that Eussian Envoys 
 were expected at Kabul, and by the end of July it 
 was positively ascertained that they had arrived. 
 
 General StoletofF and his staff left Tashkend on Russian 
 June 13 — that is to say, on the day when the European ™r^iyg°g\t 
 Congress was holding its first sitting at Berlin — and Kabul, July 2- 
 he reached Kabul on July 22, with a letter from 
 General Kaufmann, informing the Amir that General 
 StoletofF was empowered by the Emperor, whose full 
 confidence he enjoyed, to make to His Highness certain 
 important communications with reference to the then 
 existing condition of the relations between Eussia and 
 England, and their bearing on the position of Afghani- 
 
248 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. vii 
 
 Stan : ' When the Eussian agent at Kabul informed 
 the Amir that a European officer of high rank was on 
 his way to Kabul, as ambassador from the Czar to His 
 Highness, the Amir, in dire alarm, wrote to Kaufmann 
 declining to receive such an ambassador, on the 
 ground that he could not possibly answer for any 
 European officer in Afghanistan owing to the turbu- 
 lent, barbarous, and fanatical character of the 
 Afghans ; and, in short, recapitulating to the Eussian 
 Governor-General all the arguments he has used to 
 us, in justification of his flat refusal to receive an 
 English officer. To this letter (our informants say) 
 Kaufmann replied that the ambassador had already 
 been despatched from St. Petersburg with the Czar's 
 instructions, which could not now be recalled, that 
 he was far advanced on his way to Kabul, and that 
 the Amir would be held responsible, not only for his 
 safety, but his honourable reception, within Afghan 
 territory. The Amir had said in his letter that if the 
 Eussian Government had anything important to sa}^ to 
 him, rather than receive a Eussian (European) Envoy 
 at Kabul, he would at once send one of his ministers 
 to Tashkend, to receive the communication on his 
 behalf, and to this Kaufmann replied that the Amir's 
 proposal to accredit a permanent representative at 
 Tashkend was accepted, and could not now be 
 withdrawn without offending Eussia ; but that this 
 arrangement could not supersede the special mission 
 of the Eussian Embassy to Kabul, &c. The report 
 continues that on receipt of this reply Slier Ali, 
 after great hesitation, has made up his mind to 
 submit to the Eussian Embassy, and has issued orders 
 for its safe conduct to Kabul ; but that he is in 
 great trepidation, and is being pressed by his advisers 
 to appeal to us for protection against Eussian 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 249 
 
 demands, &c.' Pending tlie further development of 
 this situation, the Viceroy held that the Government 
 of India should remain ' vigilantly but imperturbably 
 passive.' ^ 
 
 Major Cavagnari, writing at this time from 
 Peshawur, reported that the Amir complained 
 frequently of the unseemly haste with which the 
 Russian authorities wished to hurry matters ! Further 
 that his rule became daily more unpopular in his 
 own dominions, and ' that the cry throughout the 
 length and breadth of Afghanistan ' was ' for some 
 change of any kind to take place as speedily as 
 possible.' 
 
 As soon as the news reached Simla of the recep- 
 tion of the Eussian Envoy at the Amir's Court, the 
 Viceroy wrote as follows to the Secretary of State : 
 
 ' It is now almost exactl}^ a year since we ad- to viscount 
 dressed to your predecessor ' a ' despatch about JlT uS'^' 
 Merv,^ which elicited from the India Office a some- I'^^s: Simla 
 what sarcastic reply. We were then told that our 
 warnings were witless ; our anxieties, nightmares ; 
 our calculations, the crude excursions of an un- 
 tutored fancy ; our conclusions, airy fabrics, raised 
 by unreasonable fears, from a foundation which, 
 whilst we were building on it, had already vanished 
 from the region of fact. High authorities at that 
 time impressed on me that " the complete collapse 
 of Eussia as a great military power " rendered 
 practically impossible any serious danger to the land- 
 frontier of India from that quarter. 
 
 ' I venture to think that our political foresight will 
 stand comparison with that of our critics, and that 
 subsequent events have better justihed our alarm 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 ~ Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 21, July 2, 1877. 
 
250 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAJs ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cianbi'ook, 
 August 3 
 
 Scientific 
 frontier 
 
 than their confidence. Within the year now closing, 
 Eussia, though temporarily checked by the excep- 
 tional and unprecedented strain of her severe struggle 
 in European and Asiatic Turkey, has made greater 
 strides towards India than were then " dreamed of in 
 our " repudiated " philosophy." . . . 
 
 ' Now the Russian outposts are actually 150 miles 
 nearer than they were then. Now the Eussian officers 
 and troops have been received with honour at 
 Kabul, within 150 miles of our frontier and of our 
 largest military garrison. And this is a distance 
 which, even on the large-scale maps recommended to 
 us, looks very small indeed. . . . 
 ^ ' It is because I attach supreme importance to the 
 basement of our Indian frontier policy upon definite 
 guiding principles, and the direction of it to an in- 
 telligible practical object, in complete and constant 
 accordance with the deliberate conclusions of the 
 Cabinet, that I venture once more, and most earnestly, 
 to urge upon the practical consideration of Her 
 Majesty's Government a question which is vital to 
 
 India 
 
 -^ 'With some slight modifications, which I will 
 explain in the course of this letter, the views formed 
 and put forward, even before I reached India, have 
 been strengthened by subsequent local knowledge 
 and two years' active experience of Indian frontier 
 administration. 
 
 ' These views may, I think, be thus formulated : 
 ' I. Although, undoubtedly, a small, friendly, and 
 comparatively weak Asiatic State would be to us a 
 more convenient neighbour than a great European, 
 military, and rival Power, yet it is almost absolutely 
 certain that in the ordinary uncorrected, and 
 probably incorrigible, course of events all inter- 
 
1878 . AFGHANISTAN 25 1 
 
 mediate States between our own Asiatic Empire and To Lord 
 
 Cranbrook, 
 
 that of Eussia must ere long be absorbed by one or August 3 
 other of the two rival Powers ; and we shall then find 
 ourselves conterminous with Eussia along our North- 
 West Frontier. 
 
 ' II. We must, therefore, carefully consider, and 
 decide beforehand, while there is yet time for con- 
 sideration and scope for decision, where such contact 
 can be admitted with the least inconvenience and 
 injury to ourselves. 
 
 ' III. The line of contact selected by us, while 
 we have still the power of selection, must be a strong 
 military line. 
 
 ' IV. But our present frontier line, which, if 
 closely approached, would leave in the hands of our 
 great and eners^etic rival all the outer debouches of 
 the passes leading into India is a hopelessly bad 
 line. The great natural boundary of India to the 
 north-west is the watershed formed by the range of 
 the Hindu-Kush and its spurs ; and that ranj^e, with Hindu-Kush 
 
 , the natural 
 
 such outposts as may be necessary to secure the boundary of 
 passes, ought to be our ultimate boundary. ^^ '^ 
 
 ' I am told, by persons more conversant than I am 
 with modern military science, that the theory of 
 standing on the defensive behind a mountain range 
 is a pre-Napoleonic idea ; that it was exploded by 
 Napoleon ; and that, in modern times, whenever it 
 has been attempted the result has in every instance 
 been disastrous. ... I think it possible to give to 
 India a magnificent defensive line — perhaps the 
 finest in the world. To the left, our flank rests on 
 the Persian Gulf, of which we have the command, 
 and is covered by the sandy deserts of Western 
 Beloochistan. Our occupation of Quettah fulfils all the 
 requisites of a strong military position on that side. 
 
252 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord For, wliile we can thence debouch at any moment on 
 Augusts ' to the open plains (where our arras of precision and 
 superior drill and organisation would tell with vast 
 effect), any adversary trying to enter India from this 
 direction would first be obliged to besiege and 
 capture Quettah, giving us ample time to prepare for 
 his reception, and then to force the long gorges of 
 the Bolan Pass. In fact, I look upon our frontier 
 from Multan to the sea as now so well guarded by 
 our position at Quettah that it leaves almost nothing 
 to be desired ; and, from a military point of view, 
 should certainly much regret any circumstance 
 „ which compelled us to advance to Kandahar. 
 
 Importance of _ _ ••■ 
 
 Kandahar Politically, liowever, it would be inconvenient to let 
 Kandahar fall into the hands of any rival Power ; 
 and, in certain conceivable contingencies, there 
 would also, I doubt not, be military reasons for 
 holding this point, and so stopping the roads which 
 lead northward to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, Ghuzni, and 
 thence, by various passes, to our frontier above 
 Multan. 
 
 ' Turning now to our extreme right, we are there 
 protected by the great Himalayan ranges and the 
 deserts of Thibet. I originally advocated, though 
 hesitatinsflv and with avowed io-norance of the 
 precise geographical conditions, an occupation of 
 the debouches to the passes leading on to Kashgar 
 and the Pamir Steppes. Further knowledge of the 
 country, however, has somewhat modified that view. 
 I can hardly imagine any circumstances in which we 
 ought to think of engaging a force in the long and 
 difiicult passes of Kashmir for the sake of debouch- 
 ing on Kashgar and striking at Eussia in that 
 direction. And except for this purpose, there would 
 be little use in holding the debouches of those passes. 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 253 
 
 I have also satisfied myself that it would be extremely c°anbrook, 
 difficult to cross the ridge, and estabhsh ourselves Augusts 
 in the valleys leading to Kashgaria, without being 
 gradually drawn further down into regions where we 
 have no real interests to defend. Moreover, beyond 
 those mountains we should meet the Eussians at a 
 considerable disadvantage; and the passes leading 
 through them into India are so few and so difficult 
 that I think they could be easily stopped if occasion 
 required. For all these reasons I conceive that, in 
 this direction, our ultimate boundary should be the 
 great mountain range, or watershed, dividing the 
 waters of the Indus from those which run north- 
 wards ; and I have accordingly instructed our officers 
 in Kashmir, whilst endeavouring to extend our in- 
 fluence over the petty chiefdoms along the southern 
 slopes of this ridge, to avoid most carefully the least 
 appearance of interference with the tribes and races 
 beyond it. 
 
 'The question of our central line of defence, or Frontier from 
 
 /-\ 1 r^^ • ^ ' Quettah to 
 
 ultimate boundary from Quettah to Chitral, is a much chitrai 
 more difficult problem. 
 
 ' I had advocated the continuation of the Hindu- 
 Kush, and its spurs, to Herat, as our main line, with 
 outposts at Balkh, Maimena and Herat, and the Oxus 
 as our visible boundary, in accordance with the 
 understanding arrived at between the British and 
 Eussian Governments. But I am led to believe that 
 the people of Badakshan are much less united with 
 Afghanistan, and much more closely connected with 
 the Usbegs of Bokhara, Darwar, and countries under 
 Eussian influence than I had supposed ; and that the 
 Oxus, so far from forming a distinct demarcation of 
 nationalities, is really a bond of union between the 
 populations of the upper and lower banks of it. The 
 
2 54 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. tii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cianbrook, 
 August 3 
 
 Outer and 
 inner frontier 
 line 
 
 Merv 
 
 same consideration applies, though in a minor degree, 
 to the Afghan provinces of Balkh, &c. It has also to 
 be considered that Eussia's rapid progress and our 
 own quiescence have rendered it extremely doubtful 
 whether we can noic bring under our influence the 
 provinces on the left bank of the Oxus. It seems to 
 me, therefore, that although perhaps we need not 
 prematurely and definitely abandon all pretension to 
 influence or self-assertion along the line of the Oxus, 
 there are many arguments in favour of confining our 
 views and efforts to the nearer mountain line ; thus 
 leaving Badakshan, Balkh, &c., to fall undisputed 
 under Eussian influence, and ultimately under 
 Eussian dominion. In that case, however, it would 
 be absolutely necessary to secure for ourselves, and 
 betimes, Bamian and other posts commanding the 
 northern debouches of the Hindu-Kush. 
 
 ' The choice thus seems to lie between 2iHouter line 
 with the Oxus for ultimate boundary, and Balkh, 
 Maimena, Herat, for its main outposts ; and an inner 
 line following the mountains, with only posts like 
 Bamian, occupied at the debouches of the passes. If 
 we chose this inner line, it might trend southward 
 from the angle a little west of Bamian, and follow 
 the course of the Helmund to Girishk. Here, I am 
 considering the question exclusively in its military 
 aspect; and, from this point of view, I think that 
 for my own part I should prefer the inner line. But 
 our ultimate decision will have to be made on 
 political grounds. 
 
 ' Merv is altogether beyond our sphere of prac- 
 tical action, even were it not now plainly too late 
 to interfere with Eussian progress at that point ; 
 although in reference to other points more vital to 
 the existence of our Indian Empire it would doubtless 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 255 
 
 be advantao^eous to us to delay if possible, and bv all ^^ ^ord 
 
 • n M 1 1 .1 . ^ n.i Cranbroolc 
 
 practicaily available means, the occupation of Merv August 3 
 by Eussia. 
 
 ' Between us and Eussia the really crucial point 
 is Herat. Whilst military considerations, though ^^'^*'^' 
 almost evenly balanced, preponderate in favour of 
 taking up a line of virtual resistance nearer home, all 
 political considerations are strongly against the aban- 
 donment of Herat to any other Power, Persian or 
 Eussian. 
 
 ' Finally, there are three, and only three, courses 
 of action still open to us if we still desire to secure 
 the effective command of a suitable northern frontier. 
 
 ' I state these three courses in a sequence which Fiontier 
 indicates what seems to me their relative merits : ^° ^^^ 
 
 ' (1) To secure, by fear or hope, such an alliance 
 with the present Amir as will effectually and per- 
 manently exclude Eussian influence from Afghanistan. 
 
 ' (2) Failing this, to withdraw, promptly and 
 publicly, all countenance from the present Amir ; to 
 break up the Afghan kingdom (which I think we 
 can do, if so minded, without much difficulty), and 
 to put in the place of its present ruler a sovereign 
 more friendly to our interests and more dependent 
 on our support. 
 
 '(3) To conquer and hold so much of Afghan 
 territory as will, in the failure of the two above- 
 mentioned precautions, be absolutely requisite for the 
 permanent maintenance of our North- West Frontier. 
 As a military operation, this will not, I think, be so 
 formidable as it has often been represented ; but, as 
 a political measure, I should contemplate it with 
 great reluctance only as a pis-aller, rendered impe- 
 rative by the failure of the two preceding guaran- 
 tees. . . . 
 
256 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cranbrook, 
 August 3 
 
 Proposed 
 British 
 mission to 
 Kabul 
 
 ' It is now useless to recall the history of Sher 
 All's long-growing hostility to us, nurtured under 
 our " Masterly Inactivity " system, and significantly 
 revealed by the failure of the Peshawur negotiations 
 in 1876. The present most injudicious action of 
 Eussia fortunately affords us a convenient opportunity 
 for making, without loss of dignity and under some- 
 what more favourable conditions, another — and, as I 
 conceive it must be, a last — attempt to establish more 
 satisfactory relations with the present Amir. 
 
 ' I propose, therefore, in accordance with your 
 sanction, to send a British Mission to Kabul as soon 
 as it can be properly organised ; and to precede it by 
 a message, through a native agent, informing the 
 Amir that it is on its way to him, and that he is 
 expected to receive it (like the Eussian one) with all 
 becoming honours, &c. Our British Envoy, whilst 
 instructed to use every endeavour to conciliate and 
 convince the Amir, will be armed with a formidable 
 bill of indictment against His Highness ; setting forth 
 all his inimical and hitherto unpunished acts towards 
 us, his attempts to stir up a holy war against us, 
 his systematic maltreatment of our subjects, &c., and 
 the culminating insult of his reception of Eussian 
 officers at his capital after his flat refusal to receive 
 there our own officers, &c. The precise instructions 
 to this mission will require very careful consideration. 
 But the terms I should deem it necessary to insist on 
 (by making the Amir distinctly understand that, if 
 he rejects them, we shall openly break with him 
 altogether) are : 
 
 '1st. A treaty binding him not to enter into 
 negotiations with, or receive agents from, 
 any other State or nation, without our 
 permission. 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 257 
 
 ' 2nd. The right to send British officers to Kabul To Lord 
 
 r. .1 r. •,! ,1 A • Ciaiibrook, 
 
 lor special conierence with the Amir Augusts 
 whenever we see adequate occasion for 
 such special missions, on matters affecting 
 our joint interests. 
 ' 3rd. The permanent location of a British agent 
 at Herat. It might be useful to secure 
 the right to send British officers to Balkh 
 and Kandahar, but I would certainly 
 not break off negotiations on such a point 
 as this. 
 ' I do not now propose to offer the Amir any 
 dynastic guarantees or subsidy. The latter, however, 
 will perhaps afterwards be considered if he acts 
 loyally towards us. Meanwhile, I would confine our 
 promises to efficient support against any unprovoked 
 aggression on the part of other Powers. I think that 
 our Envoy should insist strongly on our grievances, 
 and make the Amir distinctly understand that, if he 
 does not now come to terms with us, we shall find it 
 necessary to take material guarantees for the preven- 
 tion of mischief or danger to ourselves from his 
 recognised hostility. 
 
 ' The precise measures which in that case I should 
 propose to take — and which should, I think, be 
 shadowed forth to him by our Envoy if Sher Ali 
 proves callous to other considerations — would be : 
 (1) an armed occupation of the Kurum Valley, with 
 the establishment of a cantonment near the head of 
 it, and (2) the temporary occupation of Kandahar. 
 The Amir knows as well as we do that he is 
 absolutely powerless to oppose either of these two 
 measures, which will not give him even such chances 
 of resistance as might be offered by the conditions of 
 rough hill-fighting in the Afghan mountains. 
 
 s 
 
258 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cranbrook, 
 August 3 
 
 Conditions 
 favourable 
 for coercing 
 the Amir 
 
 ' The Kurum Valley is comparatively open. It is 
 peopled by an agricultural population who have no 
 close sympathies with the Afghans, and who hate the 
 Amir, by whom they have been worried and oppressed. 
 It is close to our own frontier, easily, quickly, and 
 quite safely accessible from Thul ; and a cantonment at 
 the head of this valley would turn the Khyber Pass and 
 Jellalabad; bringing us within a few days' march of 
 Kabul, at Ghuzni. I believe that the Amir could 
 not live a week at Kabul in known hostility to us, 
 and with our hands so close to his throat. Nor was 
 there ever a time so favourable as the present for 
 bringing pressure to bear upon His Highness. The 
 conclusion of peace in Europe has freed our hands 
 and destroyed, at the same time, all hopes on his part 
 of complications to us, or active assistance to himself, 
 from Kussia. The intervening tribes have become 
 sick of his cries for help and his abortive attempts 
 to raise a religious war, which they now thoroughly 
 understand to have been only a political experiment. 
 They will not now rise, as they might, perhaps, have 
 risen a year ago. The fame of the deadly effects of 
 our breech-loaders in the Jowaki and other recent 
 expeditions has spread far and wide through the 
 country, and will make its inhabitants very careful 
 henceforth how they expose themselves to these 
 weapons. Nor is the Amir under any illusion or 
 doubt as to the cogent fact that, from our command- 
 ing position at Quettah, we could now at any moment 
 lay our hands swiftly upon Kandahar ; where our 
 superior weapons and organisation would sweep away 
 like flies the badly armed, badly drilled, and badly 
 disciplined troops he could oppose to us. 
 
 ' I do not pretend to say that I am confident about 
 the success of the contemplated mission. It is quite 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 259 
 
 impossible to feel confidence in the result of any To Lord 
 dealings with Sher Ali. But I feel no doubt what- August 3 ' 
 ever that such a mission is the best measure we can 
 adopt in dealing with the present situation. We 
 cannot afford to leave wholly unnoticed the public 
 xeception of the Eussian mission now at Kabul. I 
 think we are bound to take this step before taking 
 any other ; and I think there are reasonable grounds 
 for anticipating from it a satisfactory result. More 
 than this I cannot say. We must, of course, be 
 prepared for failure. Much will depend on the man 
 selected as our envoy. I am still considermg this 
 selection, but at present I am strongly inclined to 
 choose Sir Neville Chamberlain. There is, I think, sir Neville 
 
 1 , T • 1 • x- r I, 1 • Chamberlain 
 
 very much to be said m lavour 01 such a choice, pioposedas 
 Sir Neville is an able, resolute man, of exceptional ^"^°y 
 experience in all frontier matters. He is personally 
 acquainted with the Amir. He knew the Amir's late 
 father, Dost Mahomed, and he knows many of the 
 present Afghan notables. He is thoroughly familiar 
 with native character, and has had long intercourse 
 with Afghans and Pathans of all kinds. He is a man 
 of striking presence and address, and one whose 
 name would darry great weight with the public at 
 home. He has been to Kabul before, he knows the 
 country well. His military experience and ability 
 would be invaluable if Sher Ali (which is most 
 improbable, however) attempted to place any obstacle 
 in the way of the mission's return to Peshawur. His 
 selection would, I think, be agreeable to Lawrence 
 and the whole Punjab school, whose favourite hero 
 he is ; and would probably tend to conciliate, or 
 impose moderation on, those members of your 
 Council who are most likely to write disagreeable 
 minutes about the mission or its results if they can 
 
 s 2 
 
26o LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 To Lord pet a chance of dome- so. Moreover, his official rank 
 
 Cranbrook, ° ji- 
 
 August 3 and status, and nis reputation along and beyond our 
 Afghan frontier, would give special authority and 
 influence to his presence at Kabul. I am not sure 
 whether he would care to undertake this mission, 
 or whether his health would enable him to do so. 
 But I shall have telegraphed to you full informa- 
 tion on the subject long before you receive this 
 letter. 
 
 ' Failing our efforts thus to effect some satisfactory 
 understanding with the Amir (in consequence either 
 of the non-reception or the abortive result of the 
 proposed mission), we must, I think, without hesita- 
 tion adopt the second of the three courses I have 
 already indicated. That is to say, we must upset 
 Slier Ali or pare his claws. The measures I would 
 then advocate are those I have stated in the previous 
 part of this letter — viz. occupation of the Kurum 
 Valley and Kandahar. I am having these two 
 operations carefully considered and planned out, 
 without, however, making any outward preparations 
 or doing anything that could indicate the contem- 
 plation of them. . . .' 
 
 The question has often been asked of the advo- 
 cates of the Forward Policy, ' How far would you 
 go ? ' Lord Lytton in this letter defines clearly the 
 possibility he conceived of giving to India ' a magni- 
 Summaiy oi ficciit frontier line — perhaps the finest in the world.' 
 FrontS"°"'' Therangeof theHindu-Kushhe states distinctly should 
 policy be ' our ultimate boundary.' If a military point of 
 
 view alone is considered he is in favour of abandoning 
 all pretensions to influence along the line of the Oxus, 
 leaving the provinces on its left bank to fall under 
 Eussian influence, and adopting an inner frontier 
 line following the Hindu-Kush mountains, with certain 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 26 1 
 
 posts such as Bamian occupied at the debouches of 
 the passes. On pohtical grounds, however, he con- 
 templated the necessity of retaining influence over an 
 * outer hne ' with the Oxus for ultimate boundary, 
 and Balkh, Maimena, and Herat for its main outposts. 
 Merv he regarded as altogether beyond our sphere of 
 action. It was too late to prevent it falling into the 
 hands of Eussia. 
 
 It will also be seen from this letter that Lord 
 Lytton regarded the appearance of the Eussians at 
 Kabul as an opportunity of once more entering into 
 negotiations with Sher Ali, and of making another 
 attempt — though he recognised it must be the last — 
 of securing his alliance. 
 
 Writing on August 8 to Sir John Strachey the Home 
 Viceroy said : ' I have obtained telegraphic per- ^nTtSns^"* 
 mission to insist now on the Amir's immediate proposed 
 
 c -r\ • • 1 •• 1 1 r«i'i-r mission 
 
 reception 01 a British mission, the charge 01 which I 
 have offered to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who has just 
 accepted it.' 
 
 When the news was received at Kabul that the 
 British Government was also about to send a mission, 
 General Stoletoff departed, promising, however, to 
 return shortly, and urging on the Amir the desi- 
 rability of preventing if possible the arrival of the 
 British mission. On August 23 the Amir informed 
 the Eussian Governor-General of General Stoletoffs 
 approaching return to Tashkend with written 
 arrangements ' for the purpose of strengthening the 
 friendly relations previously established between 
 their respective Governments.' ' I attach great im- 
 portance to this expression,' Lord Lytton comments, 
 'because it shows that General Stoletoff's mission 
 was not an impromptu mission, and that the object 
 of it was merely to carry into practical effect a long- 
 
262 I.ORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Minute on 
 Russian 
 mission, 
 September 4 
 
 previously established understanding with Sher Ali/ 
 Similar evidence was furnished by Sher Ali's sub- 
 sequent letters both to General Kaufmann and to 
 the Emperor of Eussia. But of these more will be 
 said later on. 
 
 In a Minute dated September 4, 1878, the Viceroy 
 wrote : ' Neither the withdrawal of the Eussian 
 mission nor any assurances on the part of Eussia 
 will cancel the fact that a Eussian mission has been 
 well received at Kabul, after one from us had been 
 refused; and that Eussian officers have had full 
 opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Amir 
 and his councillors distrust and dislike towards 
 England, belief in Eussia's power and destiny, 
 and hopes of assistance against us from that 
 country. . . . 
 
 ' War with Eussia is not a thing to be lightly 
 undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an 
 object which might have been attained by other 
 means would be most discreditable to our states- 
 manship. A British statesman, remembering the 
 American war, and the lasting effect which a few 
 hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial 
 prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British 
 commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of 
 war with Eussia in Central Asia has been forced on 
 my mind in the study of the anxious question 
 now under consideration. But the more closely I 
 contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the 
 repugnance with which I regard it — a repugnance 
 amounting almost to horror. ... I conceive, there- 
 fore, that our first object should be to use every 
 endeavour to re-establish such relations with the 
 Amir as will give us due influence in Afghanistan 
 and for ever exclude Eussia therefrom ; and that to 
 
1878 SIE NEVILLE CHAMBERLAINS MISSION 263 
 
 effect this we must appeal both to his fears and his Minute on 
 
 T," • 1 i r 1 ' Russian 
 
 hopes. ... it It appears that we cannot nncl m mission, 
 
 a friendly alhance with the Amir the necessary September 4 
 
 securit)^ for our North-West Frontier, we must then 
 
 be prepared to take immediate steps for making 
 
 the security of that frontier independent of him. 
 
 The military measures proposed for this purpose 
 
 have already been indicated. . . . But as it is 
 
 indispensable, both for the security of the mission 
 
 and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is 
 
 its object, that nothing should now be done which 
 
 could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile 
 
 intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction 
 
 from any active preparations. 
 
 ' It will be seen from what has already been said, 
 as well as from the smallness of the proposed 
 military preparations, that no invasion and subju- 
 gation of Afghanistan is contemplated. ... I view 
 an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Eussia, 
 as a measure which may become unavoidable, and 
 must therefore be taken into consideration in our 
 forecast, but which is only to be resorted to in case 
 of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. . . . 
 I earnestly hope and trust tliat we shall be able to 
 attain, by peaceable means, a settlement of the 
 questions considered in this Minute which shall be 
 alike becoming to the dignity of the great British 
 Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it 
 specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to 
 the neighbouring States concerned.' 
 
 The British mission was to consist of Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain, Major Cavagnari, Major St. John, 
 Captain Hammick, and Kazi Syud Ahmed, with an 
 escort of 250 sabres, under the command of Lieute- 
 nant Colonel Jenkins, of the Guide Corps. Two 
 
264 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 native noblemen, one Hindu, the other Moham- 
 medan, the Maharaja Purtab Sing of Jodhpur, and 
 Sirdar Obed Allan Khan of Tonk were also attached 
 to it. 
 
 The Government of India decided to announce 
 
 the arrival of the mission through a special native 
 
 emissary (the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Klian), who 
 
 was to leave Peshawur on August 23. On the 21st, 
 
 Death of howcver, news was received of the death of Sirdar 
 
 Abduiia Jan Abdulla Jan, the Amir's heir-apparent. 
 
 The Nawab's departure was accordingly delayed 
 until August 30, when he left Peshawur charged with 
 a second letter from the Viceroy to the Amir con- 
 doling with His Highness's bereavement. 
 
 Writing of this event to the Viceroy on August 23, 
 Major Cavagnari said : 
 
 ' The Amir's embarrassments have been so great 
 of late that I should not be at all surprised to hear 
 that the death of the heir-apparent has produced the 
 same mental derangement he suffered from after the 
 ' death of his eldest and favourite son, Md. Ali Khan. 
 
 In that case he was stricken with excessive grief on 
 account of his real affection for his son. In the 
 present instance he will not feel the death of Abdulla 
 Jan in the same way, but will be overwhelmed by 
 the reflection that all the trouble he has caused both 
 himself and the nation has been of no purpose, and 
 that he wiU once more have to decide the question of 
 appointing a successor. It will be regarded as a very 
 bad omen, for people have already been drawing 
 comparisons between the present state of affairs in 
 Kabul and that which immediately preceded the 
 dissolution of the Sikh power.' 
 
 The progress of the native Envoy towards Kabul 
 was stopped at Jellalabad by a letter from the Amir 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 265 
 
 telling him to remain at Peshawur, that His Highness 
 was unfit to attend to business, and that the matter 
 must be deferred until after Eamazan, the month of 
 mourning. 
 
 It was conjectured that the true cause of this 
 delay lay in the Amir's desire to receive some com- 
 munication from Eussia before sanctioning the 
 British mission. 
 
 The Commissioner of Peshawur, under instructions 
 from the Government of India, then wrote to the 
 Amir's minister to the effect that the date of depar- 
 ture of the British mission was fixed for September 
 16 or 17,^ and would not be postponed whether the 
 native Envoy had or had not by that time waited 
 upon His Highness the Amir. 
 
 The object of the mission was friendly, and the 
 refusal of free passage to it, or interruption or injury 
 to its friendly progress, would be regarded as an act 
 of hostility. It would not in any case enter Kabul 
 till after the expiry of the month of Eamazan. 
 Similar letters were sent to the Afghan authorities at 
 Ali Musjid, Dakka, and Jellalabad. 
 
 To these letters there was no direct reply, but. The Amir 
 while declaring he saw no good in the visit of the receive 
 native Envoy, the Amir gave permission to his Council ^^i^li^^ 
 to do as they thought best, and thereupon the Afghan 
 authorities along the road were instructed not to 
 prevent the Envoy passing, but not to sa}^ he had 
 permission. 
 
 ^ ' The Eussian Envoy is said to have taunted the 
 Mustaufi with acting otherwise than in the interests 
 of Kabul, and the Mustaufi retaliated. This was in 
 open durbar. The Eussian Envoy then left for 
 
 ^ It was afterwards delayed till the 21st. 
 * Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
266 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Tashkend with an escort of one hundred Kabul 
 Sowars, saying that he would return in forty days. 
 
 ' His subordinates remained behind him. . . . The 
 Council advised the Amir to see the English Envoy, 
 and to decide afterwards what should be done (with 
 regard to the British mission), saying that it would 
 not be polite to refuse to receive him.' 
 
 Thus while the Amir had attempted to delay the 
 arrival of the British native Envoy at Kabul on 
 account of his ill health and sorrow, he was receiving 
 in Council members of the Piussian mission and con- 
 sulting them as to his conduct towards us. 
 
 The Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, acting upon 
 instructions from the Commissioner of Peshawur, 
 pushed on his journey as fast as he could and arrived 
 at Kabul on September 10. He had been well 
 treated during the journey, and was hospitably 
 September 12, received at Kabul. On the 12th he saw the Amir, to 
 Viceroy's '^ wliom lie delivered the Viceroy's letters, 
 letters Q^ September 17, 18, and 19 letters were 
 
 received from him at Peshawur. These all described 
 the Amir as in a bad humour, irritated at the lan- 
 guage used towards his officials to the effect that the 
 British mission would be forced upon him whether 
 he would or not, but implying that if his pleasure 
 was consulted and the departure of the Eussians 
 awaited he might be disposed to receive it. He 
 further said ' that the Eussians had come with his 
 permission though not at his request, and that his 
 country being exposed, and he quite estranged from 
 the English, he was obliged to let them come on after 
 they had crossed the Oxus ; that if the British mission 
 advanced at once it would be resisted, but that, if 
 conciliatory letters were sent to the Amir and his 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
October 3 
 
 1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 267 
 
 dignity studied, all might be arranged.' The Envoy 
 contrived to send a separate letter in which he stated 
 that his official letters had been dictated by the 
 Amir, and that no one was allowed to communicate 
 with him. 
 
 The following extract from a letter to the Secre- 
 tary of State gives an interesting account of the dis- 
 cussions at Kabul between the Amir and his ministers 
 relative to the reception of the British mission : 
 
 ' A man sent by Bukhtiar Khan has just returned LordLytton 
 from Kabul with the following information. The o^ state, ^'^^ 
 early arrival of the British mission has been an- 
 nounced to the Amir by the Mir Akhor ; who asked 
 for immediate orders, adding that he was continuing, 
 under previous orders, to do all in his power to 
 obstruct the mission. The Amir sent for the 
 Mustaufi and Wali Mahomed Klian, and consulted 
 them privately. The Mustaufi said " he had long 
 been trying to persuade His Highness that the alliance 
 with England was more profitable than one with 
 Eussia could be ; that no Power had ever stopped 
 an Envoy even during war ; and that it would be 
 better to send for the mission and hear what it has 
 to say, than bear the blame of refusing it." 
 
 ' Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan supported the 
 Mustaufi. The Amir said " he was so disgusted with 
 the British Government that he could not bear to 
 see anyone connected with it, not even this mission." 
 The Mustaufi asked the Amir to give him a certi- 
 ficate that such and such an official of his had repre- 
 sented to him the impropriety of stopping the mission, 
 but that he (the Amir) had not agreed with them. 
 Such a certificate, he said, " might be of use to him 
 in the day of adversity, and they, his well-wishers, 
 should not be held responsible by the people, for not 
 
268 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Lord Lytton having understood the state of aflfah's." The Amir 
 of Se^^ repUed " very angrity and bitterly " : " Perhaps you 
 October 3 want this certificate from me to show the Engiish." 
 The Mustaufi said : " He had nothincf to do with the 
 British Government, and had asked nothing from any 
 Government, but that he spoke with a view to the 
 welfare of the Amir, who must do as he thought 
 best." The Amir remarked that "to allow the 
 mission to come just as the British Government 
 wished it to come, was the same to him as if it came 
 against his own wishes." At this moment a letter 
 arrived from Mir Afzul Khan (of Kandahar) to the 
 effect that, in his opinion, after hearing what was 
 going on at Kabul, the Amir had better allow the 
 mission to come and receive it with honour, and that 
 the Amir should well weigh the demands of both 
 the British and Eussian Governments before choos- 
 ing between them. The Amir remarked that " this 
 Sirdar was too old to understand political matters." 
 The Mustaufi returned home in anxiety, remarking 
 " that it was strange that the Amir neither had any 
 assurance from Eussia, nor any disposition to settle 
 his differences with the British Government. Perhaps 
 the days of adversity had arrived." The messenger 
 adds : " The Amir is daily, and most anxiously, expect- 
 ing the return of the Eussian Envoy. The remainder 
 of the Eussian mission under two European ofiicers 
 is still at Kabul." ' 
 
 Lord Lytton comments upon this : ' I cannot, of 
 course, vouch for the complete accuracy of the 
 above information, but I think it was given to our 
 messenger by the Mustaufi himself, who is obviously 
 unwilling to pull and sink in the same boat with the 
 Amir. According to recent information, of slightly 
 earher date, the Sirdar who took my (still unan- 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 269 
 
 swered) letters to the Amir, ISTawab Gliulam Hasan, 
 was received at Kabul without any of the customary 
 honours, by special order from the Amir.' 
 
 In the meantime Sir Neville Chamberlain and the Sir Neville 
 other officers of the British mission had reached reaches^'^ ^^" 
 Peshawur on September 12. Major Cavagnari had g'^^^^T'^'. 12 
 been negotiating with the independent Khyber 
 tribesmen for the safe conduct of the mission, and all 
 had gone well till, on September 14, the commandant 
 of the Amir's troops at Ali Musjid sent to Peshawur to 
 summon back to the pass all the Khyberi headmen, 
 and they feared to disobey lest their allowance from 
 the Amir should be stopped. Sir Neville Chamberlain 
 wrote to the Afghan commander, Faiz Mahomed, 
 that a friendly mission from the British Government 
 was about to proceed to Kabul via the Khyber Pass, 
 that any negotiations which had been carried on with 
 the independent tribesmen were for the sole object of 
 arranoino- with them for the safe conduct through 
 the Ifliyber Pass, and that they had been given 
 clearly to understand that such negotiations were in 
 no way intended to prejudice their relations with His 
 Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan. 
 He therefore trusted the assurance would speedily 
 reach him that the mission would be safely conducted 
 to Dakka, but that if the answer proved other than 
 he expected, he would have no alternative but to 
 make whatever arrangements might seem to him best 
 for carrying out the instructions he had received 
 from his Government. 
 
 Faiz Mahomed replied on September 16 that 
 the mission could not be allowed to pass without the 
 Amir's consent, but that the Mir Akhor was expected 
 from Kabul with further orders. 
 
 News of the Mir Akhor's arrival was received on 
 
270 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 the 18th of September, but it was reported that his 
 object, instead of being of a friendly character, was 
 to see that Faiz Mahomed did not flinch from the 
 execution of his orders. 
 
 In the opinion of the Viceroy, the time had now 
 come to bring the situation to a decisive issue. In 
 a letter written to the Secretary of State early in 
 October he recapitulates the circumstances which led 
 to the advance of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission 
 Lord Lytton as far as Jamrud. ' In submitting to you proposals 
 of statf'^'^ for the immediate despatch of a British mission to 
 Kabul as a preliminary measure, and the least 
 aggressive of those rendered necessary by the Amir's 
 reception of a Eussian mission after the repeated 
 rejection of an English one, I dwelt specially on the 
 necessity of my having authority to insist upon the 
 reception of this mission as a sine qua non condition 
 of sending it at all. That condition you sanctioned 
 officially, giving me the requisite authority early in 
 August. Your teleo-ram was sent on Auci'ust 3. 
 Aofain, on the loth of the same month, when tele- 
 graphing to you further details about the organisation 
 and movements of the mission, I took special occasion 
 to repeat " I cannot propose it unless I have authority 
 to insist on it." To this reiteration of the under- 
 standing on which I was acting no objection was 
 made or suggested by Her Majesty's Government. 
 The well-understood object of the mission was to 
 bring the Amir's relations with the British and 
 Eussian Governments to the earliest and most 
 decisive test. Meanwhile, as time went on and my 
 letters to the Amir demanding his reception of the 
 mission remained unanswered, it became as clear as 
 anything could possibly be to Sir Neville Chamberlain, 
 to mvself, to our frontier authorities, to the Punjab 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 27 1 
 
 Government, and to my own Council that the Amir To Secretary 
 was resolved to prevent our bringing matters to a 
 test with him, and that for this j)urpose he would 
 neither receive, nor refuse to receive, our mission ; 
 neither say no nor yes to the Viceroy's request for 
 its immediate reception on business declared to be 
 urgent and serious, but keep it waiting indefinitely 
 on the threshold of his dominions, without any answer 
 at all, while the Eussian mission still remained at 
 his capital as a studiously insolent and significant 
 advertisement to all India, and all Central Asia, of 
 the impunity with which he could slight the friendly 
 overtures and brave the loner restrained resentment 
 of the British Government. Such a position we 
 could not possibly accept with either dignity or 
 safety. It was rapidly undermining, all along our 
 frontier, the confidence of our subjects in our power 
 and self-respect. I consequently informed you by 
 telegraph, on September 8, that the mission would 
 leave Peshawur on September 16. On September 13 
 (at a time when I knew by 3'Our letters that you 
 were absent from the India Office), I received the 
 following telegram from the India Office : ' Official 
 reply to remonstrance from St. Petersburg on way 
 London. Important to receive this before Chamber- 
 lain starts.' It was perfectly obvious that no 
 communication from St. Petersburg (especially if it 
 were the sort of reply that might be confidently 
 predicted to the sort of remonstrance which had 
 been made there) could have the smallest practical 
 effect upon the previously recognised necessity for 
 the mission we were sending the Amir, or the con- 
 ditions requisite for maintaining the dignity of that 
 mission and our own. It was equally obvious that 
 if the expected Eussian answer contained a single 
 
2 72 LORD LYTTONS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Secretary word that could render expedient any modification 
 of the instructions given to Sir Neville Chamberlain 
 for his guidance at Kabul, the modified instructions 
 could reach him without difficulty long before his 
 mission reached Kabul, if it were allowed to proceed, 
 whilst on the other hand they would be useless if 
 the mission were not allowed to proceed. Never- 
 theless, on receipt of this telegram of September 13, 
 and in compliance with it, I delayed the departure 
 of the mission from Peshawur from September 16 
 till the 21st. But by that time the negotiations 
 with the Khyberis (reported in my telegram of the 
 17th, and opened with the knowledge of Her 
 Majesty's Government) had reached a point which 
 rendered further delay seriously dangerous, and 
 indeed practically impossible. Matters stood thus : 
 My letter to the Amir, requesting in civil terms 
 that he would issue immediate orders for the proper 
 reception of Sir Neville's mission, had been, as j^ou 
 know, accompanied by a friendly letter of condolence 
 on the death of the heir-apparent. And this was 
 well known. Now, according to native etiquette, 
 letters of condolence are rarely written previous to 
 the receipt of letters announcing the bereavement to 
 which they refer. But whenever they are so written, 
 it is considered as a very special mark of courtesy 
 and friendship. On the other hand, to leave un- 
 answered, or without an immediate answer, any 
 letter of condolence under any circumstances is 
 regarded by all Indian and Afghan Mohammedans as 
 an unpardonable afii-ont. No grief, no pressure of 
 business, is considered as sufiicient to justify such 
 a discourtesy, especially on the part of a reigning 
 prince or any person of high rank. So long as the 
 Viceroy's letter of condolence remained unanswered 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 273 
 
 (after reasonable time had been allowed for a reply to To Secretary 
 it), so long did the British Government and its Envoy 
 remain in the eyes of our native subjects and neigh- 
 bours suffering under a tolerated affront. But it was 
 well known all along the border that, whilst the 
 Amir still left the Viceroy's letters unanswered, His 
 Highness was actively sending imperative orders of 
 some kind to his frontier authorities. It was as 
 clear to our subjects and neighbours as it was to 
 ourselves, that if these orders were not to receive the 
 British mission they must be to oppose it. And no 
 further room was left for doubt as to the nature of 
 the orders issued by the Amir when, after receipt of 
 them, the first act of Faiz Mahomed and the Mir 
 Akhor was to summon away from Peshawur, under 
 threats of the Amir's instant displeasure, the friendly 
 Khyberis who were there in negotiation with us. 
 Placed in this position, the Khyberis said to us — 
 " What do you wish us to do ? We don't wish to 
 break with you, or desert, or betray you, if you really 
 mean business. We are ready, in proof of our good 
 faith, to escort you at once to Ali Musjid, where the 
 power of our section ceases, but where you can 
 promptly test the real character of the Amir's orders ; 
 and we also undertake to escort you safely back 
 again. We know that by so doing we shall incur 
 the Amir's resentment, but we confide in your subse- 
 quent protection. What we cannot possibly do, 
 however, after the summons we have received, is to 
 remain any longer at Peshawur doing nothing, not 
 knowing whether you are going to do anything, and 
 serving neither you nor the Amir, whilst our families 
 and properties remain, in our absence, undefended 
 from his authorities." . . .' 
 
 In these circumstances Lord Lytton felt that if he 
 
 T 
 
2 74 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Secretary 
 of State 
 
 The mission 
 moves to 
 Jamiud, 
 September 21 
 
 Major 
 Cavagnari 
 confers with 
 the Khyberi 
 Pass-men 
 
 did not authorise the mission to advance, and give the 
 necessar}^ guarantee to the friendly tribes, we should 
 irretrievably lose the Khyberis. ' I consequently,' he 
 continues, ' after further consultation with Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain, authorised him to advance the mission 
 on the 21st as far as Jamrud, which is in British 
 territory, and thence to send forward an officer under 
 Khyberi escort to ascertain distinct!}'' from the Amir's 
 authorities at Ali Musjid whether they would allow 
 the mission to pass, returning at once to Jamrud if 
 he received a negative answer. Of this arrangement 
 I simultaneously informed you by my detailed tele- 
 gram of September 21, which explained that any 
 subsequent instructions (should they be necessitated 
 by the Eussian reply) would reach the mission if it 
 advanced beyond Jamrud, any time within the 
 following fifteen days before its arrival at Kabul/ 
 
 The Khyberis having agreed to escort the 
 mission to Ali Musjid, or any nearer point, until it 
 came into contact with the Amir's authorities, the 
 Envoy's camp moved out from Peshawur to Jamrud 
 early in the morning of September 21. As aU 
 reports agreed that resistance was intended, it was 
 decided that the mission should stand fast, while 
 Major Cavagnari, with a small escort, proceeded to 
 Ali Musjid and demanded passage. The object of 
 this arrangement was to minimise the loss of prestige 
 which a repulse must entail, as, in the words of Sir 
 Neville Chamberlain, ' after long warning and con- 
 siderable preparation, we could not now move for- 
 ward out of our territory and be openly turned back 
 without being disgraced in the eyes of India.' 
 
 Accordingly Major Cavagnari, with Lieutenant- 
 Colonel F. H. Jenkins, in command of the escort, 
 Captain W. Battye, of the Guides Cavalry, and twenty- 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 275 
 
 four men, with certain of the Border Khans, advanced 
 to within a mile of Ali Musjid. The ridges beyond 
 were held by the Amir's levies, who threatened to fire 
 if anyone approached. Eventually a message was 
 received from Faiz Mahomed Khan to the effect that 
 he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed 
 of the stream just below where the party were halted, 
 and that on his arrival there he would send for 
 Major Cavagnari and three others, and would hear 
 anything he had to communicate. 
 
 What followed may best be given in the terms of 
 Major Cavagnari's report of September 22 : 
 
 ' As it appeared to me that it would have been an Report of 
 indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz ca^vagnari, 
 Mahomed Khan would send for me, as well as to be September 22 
 dictated to as to the number of men that should 
 accompany me (it would have been different if I had 
 been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort 
 of Ali Musjid, when, of course, I would only have 
 entered the post with as many men as the officers in 
 command chose to admit), I determined to advance 
 at once, with as many men as I thought fit to take, 
 and endeavour to meet Faiz Mahomed Klian before 
 he should reach the spot named by him. 
 
 ' Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or 
 two of the Guide Cavalry, with some of the Kliyber 
 headmen and the native gentlemen marginally 
 noted, descended without much delay into the bed of 
 the stream and advanced to meet Faiz Mahomed Elhan. 
 A party of Afridis, headed by AbduUa Nur, a Kuki 
 Khel, Afridi Malik, in receipt of special allowances 
 from the Amir, attempted to stop me, saying that 
 only four persons should advance. I rode past him, 
 telling him that my mission concerned the Kabul 
 officials and that I desired to have no discussion with 
 
 T 2 
 
276 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Report of the Afridis. The Mahk made no further opposition — 
 Sagnari, ^^ ^^^t, he knew that most of his tribe were with me, 
 September 22 g^j-^j \^q himself was onlj acting a part to save his 
 allowances. 
 
 ' After meeting Faiz Mahomed Khan and ex- 
 changing salutations, I pointed to what I considered 
 a suitable place for an interview ; it was a watermill, 
 with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side 
 of the stream to the spot originally named for the 
 place of meeting. Faiz Mahomed Khan was accom- 
 panied by the Naib, or deputy, of the Mir Akhor, a 
 considerable number of the Ali Musjid levies, and 
 some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of 
 the Khyber and their respective followers. 
 
 'When we had seated ourselves, I commenced 
 the interview by pointing out to Faiz Mahomed 
 Khan that he and myself were servants of our 
 respective Governments, and had met to carry out 
 whatever orders we had received ; so that, whatever 
 the result of our meeting might be, there need be 
 nothing personal between him and myself. After the 
 Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment, 
 I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the 
 British Government had decided on sending a friendly 
 mission of European British officers, accompanied 
 by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of 
 Kabul, that the mission was encamped at Jamrud, 
 and intended to proceed through the Khyber on 
 the following day ; that, in consequence of various 
 reports received, I had been deputed by the Govern- 
 ment to ascertain from the Amir's ojQB.cials at Ali 
 Musjid whether they had received instructions or 
 were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and 
 proper treatment of the mission during its journey 
 to Kabul or not ; and I hoped that, if there was any 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 277 
 
 latitude for independent action in the orders he had Report of 
 received from Kabul, he would do all he could ca^vagnari, 
 towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the September 22 
 two Governments. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied 
 that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner, 
 and that, actuated by such motives, he had allowed 
 Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan to proceed without 
 any detention, but that his action in this respect had 
 met with disapproval from the Kabul Durbar ; that if 
 he had not been friendly disposed he would not have 
 consented to the present interview or have restrained 
 his levies from firing on my party ; that he had 
 received no orders from the Amir to let the mission 
 pass his post; and that, without such orders, he 
 could not let it proceed; but that if the mission 
 would only wait for a few days he would commu- 
 nicate with Kabul and ask for orders. I replied 
 that my orders were distinct, and that I was in- 
 structed to say that the mission would advance on 
 the next day unless I received a reply from the 
 Amir's ofiicials that its advance would be opposed ; 
 and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself 
 such a heavy responsibility as to say he would 
 oppose the advance of the British mission, unless 
 his orders were clear and distinct in the matter ; for, 
 whatever his reply was, it would be considered as 
 that of the Amir of KabuL Faiz Mahomed Khan 
 replied that he was only a sentry, and had no 
 regular troops but only a few levies ; but that such 
 as his orders were he would carry them out to the 
 best of his ability, and that, unless he received orders 
 from Kabul, he could not let the mission pass his 
 post. I rejoined to this, that it did not signify what 
 the actual strength of his post was, as the mission 
 was a friendly one and bent on peaceful objects ; 
 
278 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Keport of and I again urged him not to take sucli a grave 
 Cavagnari, responsibility if he had any option in the matter. 
 September 22 jj^ repUed that it was a very heavy matter for him 
 to decide upon ; as, on the one hand, he could not 
 act without orders from Kabul, while, on the other 
 hand, he was told that his reply would be considered 
 as that of the Amir of Kabul. He then began with 
 much warmth to question the friendly intentions of 
 the British Government, by stating that it was not 
 a sign of friendship for the British authorities to 
 negotiate direct with the Khyber tribes, who were 
 subjects of the Amir of Kabul and in receipt of 
 allowances from that ruler, and induce them to 
 escort Nawab Ghulam Hasan and also some 
 British officers (meaning my party), without the 
 Amir's permission. I replied that there was no 
 cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in 
 the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendty 
 mission would have met with an}^ opposition, as such 
 missions are never opposed in any civilised country ; 
 and that the arrangements made with the Afridis 
 were merely to induce them to undertake the safe 
 conduct ( ' hadragga ' ) of a peaceably disposed 
 mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a 
 right to undertake in its own country. 
 
 ' Faiz Mahomed Klian continued with increasing 
 warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an 
 uneasy sort of murmuring amongst the people around, 
 which appeared to me — and, as I afterwards ascer- 
 tained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and 
 to some of the native gentlemen with me — to indicate 
 that if the discussion was any longer prolonged the 
 movement alluded to might assume a more decided 
 form, which might possibly be one which our small 
 party could not deal with in a suitable manner. I 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 279 
 
 therefore interrupted the Khan by saying that the Report of 
 subject was one which it did not behove subordinates cavagnari, 
 to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had September 22 
 been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the 
 British Government would give him a suitable answer. 
 I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly 
 understood him to say that, if the British mission 
 advanced as intended on the following day, he would 
 oppose it by force ; and he replied that such would 
 be the case. I then got up and shook Faiz 
 Mahomed by the hand, and assured him that I had 
 no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and 
 that I hoped to meet him again on some future occa- 
 sion. I then turned to the native gentlemen who 
 were with me, and asked them if they did not con- 
 sider a clear and decisive answer had been given ; 
 and they replied that it was so. 
 
 ' In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an 
 interview to settle this point, as the hostile prepara- 
 tions made by the Ali Musjid garrison on seeing my 
 party approach — notwithstanding that my object in 
 coming and the small strength of my escort had 
 been communicated to and received by the com- 
 mandant of the fort and the Amir's representative, 
 Mir Akhor — would ordinarily have been quite suf- 
 ficient to indicate predetermined affront and insult ; 
 and, I believe, that with any other of the Amir's 
 officials but Faiz Mahomed Khan, who from first 
 to last has behaved in a most courteous manner and 
 very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and 
 myself, a collision of some kind would have taken 
 place. The general belief is that Faiz Mahomed 
 Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mir 
 Akhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir 
 to supervise Faiz Mahomed Khan's management of 
 
2 So LOlil) LYTTON'S INDIAN AUMINISTRATIOX ch. vii 
 
 the Kliyber affairs, and to see that, without orders to 
 the contrary, he checked the advance of the British 
 
 The close of 
 the interview 
 
 Keport of 
 
 Major 
 
 Cavagnari, 
 
 September 22 mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Mahomed 
 Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that 
 was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is 
 impossible to imagine what more could be done to 
 effect the Amir's object.' 
 
 Colonel Jenkins, in his report to the military 
 secretary of the Envoy, thus described the close of the 
 interview : 
 
 ' Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar : " We are 
 both servants, you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the 
 British Government. It is no use for us to discuss 
 these matters. I only came to get a straight answer 
 from you. Will you oppose the passage of the 
 mission by force ? " 
 
 ' The Sirdar said : " Yes, I will ; and you may 
 take it as kindness, and because I remember friend- 
 ship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have 
 done already." After this we shook hands and 
 mounted our horses ; and the Sirdar said again, " You 
 have had a straight answer." ' ^ 
 
 The advance party at once rejoined the camp at 
 Jamrud, and the mission returned to Peshawur. A 
 letter was sent to Faiz Mahomed intimating that his 
 reply was understood to be dictated by the Amir of 
 Kabul, and instructions were despatched (September 
 22) to the Nawab Ghulam Hasan immediately to 
 take leave of His Highness. Sir Neville Chamberlain's 
 mission was formally dissolved, full aid and protec- 
 tion, if necessary, being guaranteed to the Khyberi 
 tribes who had given a passage to Major Cavagnari. 
 The Punjab Government was at the same time 
 directed to instruct the frontier officers to lose no time 
 
 The British 
 
 mission 
 
 repulsed 
 
 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 
 
1S78 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 28 1 
 
 and spare no efforts to detach from all political con- 
 nection with the Afghan Government those indepen- 
 dent tribes lying outside the northern portion of the 
 border, whom it was most important, either upon poli- 
 tical or military grounds, to bring permanently under 
 our influence, to the exclusion of that of the Amir. 
 
 The view taken by Sir Neville Chamberlain of what 
 had passed was expressed with emphasis. Writing 
 to the Viceroy immediately afterwards, he said : 
 
 ' No man was ever more anxious than I to sir Neville 
 preserve peace and secure friendly relations, and it f^^t^he viceroy 
 was only when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed inten- 
 tion to drive us into a corner that I told you we 
 must either sink into the position of merely obeying 
 his behests on all points or stand on our rights and 
 risk a rupture. Nothing could have been more dis- 
 tinct, nothing more humiliating to the dignity of the 
 British Crown and nation ; and I believe that, but for 
 the decision and tact of Cavagnari, at one period of 
 the interview the lives of the British officers and 
 native following were in considerable danger.' 
 
 There can be no doubt, indeed, that the British 
 officer was in some danger, for the Afghan soldiers 
 had begun to pull back their sleeves in the peculiar 
 manner that goes before handling of swords. 
 
 No precaution had been neglected to ensure Defence of 
 the success of this mission. ' Our Envoy,' writes the *^^ mission 
 Viceroy, ' was specially selected with a view to his of°state! ^ ^ 
 conciliatory character, his pacific principles, his October 3 
 personal acquaintance and sympathy with the Amir. 
 The Envoy's escort was carefully confined to the 
 minimum of troops absolutely necessary to protect 
 through a wild intervening tract of country the 
 baggage of the Envoy and the costly gifts he was 
 charged to present to the Amir. 
 
282 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Viceroy's 
 defence of 
 the mission 
 
 To Secretary 
 of State, 
 October 3 
 
 'The total number was only 200 men. It was 
 therefore numerically weaker than the escort attri- 
 buted by our information to the Eussian mission, 
 and certainly weaker than the customary escort of 
 any Asiatic prince or minister proceeding on a 
 similarly peaceful mission of State to a friendly 
 Court. It was neither preceded nor accompanied 
 by any hostile demonstration or military preparation. 
 So anxious was I to avoid even the faintest appear- 
 ance of a militar}^ threat, that pending the ascertained 
 result of the mission I stopped the customar}^ relief 
 movement, necessary at that season for the health of 
 our troops at frontier stations, and would not even 
 allow a baggage animal to stir. In adopting and 
 following out this course, however, one great practical 
 difficulty (which had been clearly foreseen from the 
 first) was how to counteract the Amir's invariable 
 policy of evasion and delay. The waiting game 
 was one which, unless some check was put upon it, 
 he could continue to play against us ad infinitum. 
 Unless we could bring matters to a definite issue, 
 the situation which our mission was to represent as 
 intolerable might have been prolonged, and the 
 settlement of affairs my letter to the Amir had 
 declared to be urgent might have been with impunity 
 evaded ad libitum ; while the British Government 
 remained with all India and Central Asia the specta- 
 tors of its ludicrous and discreditable performance, 
 dancing attendance on the will and pleasure of a 
 weak and insolent barbarian prince. It was for this 
 reason that I represented to Lord Cranbrook the 
 futility of sending to Kabul any mission at all, unless 
 I was permitted to insist on its reception. The 
 mission, however, never advanced an inch beyond 
 British territory. Nor was it until after repeated 
 
1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 283 
 
 delays, which, stretched patience to the verge of not viceroy's 
 merely pusillanimity, but of imprudence, and which the mission 
 if prolonged would have alienated from us the Budni To Secretary 
 tribes, whose friendship had been secured, and October's 
 rendered practically impossible the peaceful advance 
 of the mission to the Amir's frontier, whilst seriously 
 increasing the difficulty and extent of any subsequent 
 military measures for the protection of our own 
 frontier, that matters were at last brought to a 
 definite issue at Ali Musjid, a small fort not in 
 Afghan territory, as the English Press seems to 
 suppose, but in independent Afridi territory, which 
 has been quite recently occupied by the Amir's 
 authorities under the conditional permission of the 
 Government of India, and in virtue of pecuniary 
 arrangements with the independent tribes.' 
 
 After the repulse of his mission at Ali Musjid 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain asked some native notables 
 (old friends of his) at Peshawur what they and the 
 natives on the border thought of it. They replied : 
 ' It is doubtless a studied and great affii-ont to the to Secretary 
 British Government, but not greater than the ^^P^*®* 
 
 ' . o October 3 
 
 Amir's omission to answer the Viceroy's letter of con- 
 dolence, for amongst us (natives) such an omission 
 is one of the greatest insults one man can offer 
 another.' 
 
 Sir N. Chamberlain. — ' Well, what do the people 
 about here say, and what do you think we shall now 
 do?' 
 
 The Notables (after much hesitation and press- 
 ing) — ' Well, Sahib, to say the truth, the people say 
 and we think that you will do nothing ! ' 
 
 In the telegram acknowledging the receipt of 
 the information of the repulse of the mission the 
 Secretary of State raised no objection to the course 
 
284 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cranbrook, 
 September 26 
 
 The Amir's 
 hostility 
 openly 
 revealed 
 
 which the Government of India had deemed it 
 necessary to take under his previous sanction of its 
 proposals. 
 
 On September 23 the Viceroy wrote to Lord 
 Cranbrook of the measures which he now proposed 
 to adopt. 
 
 'I fully understand and personally sympathise 
 with Sir Neville Chamberlain's irritation at the 
 humiliating position in which he has been placed. 
 But the sacrifice of his personal dignity was essentially 
 necessary pro bono publico. Ever since the Peshawur 
 Conference, I have been convinced that, even long 
 previous to that date, the Amir (thanks to the un- 
 corrected prosecution of the Lawrence-Gladstone 
 policy) was irretrievably alienated from us. But no 
 one else shared that conviction, nor was I permitted 
 to act on it. The mot d'ordre was to describe and 
 treat the Amir as an honoured friend, whose humours, 
 however capricious and inconvenient, were to be 
 scrupulously respected. When action of some kind 
 was at last forced upon us by his reception of the 
 Eussian mission, had I entrusted the conduct of our 
 own mission to anyone in Lidia except Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain the failure of that mission would have 
 been universally ascribed to my own rash departure 
 from the principles of the established Punjab policy, 
 or to the ineptitude of my selected agent. This, I 
 trust, is now impossible. The affront offered to the 
 British Government, in the person of Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain, is certainly not greater than any of the 
 numerous affronts tacitly accepted from the Amir by 
 the British Government during the last seven years. 
 The only difference is that this particular affront is 
 the first of the series which it has been impossible 
 to conceal from the British public. You will observe 
 
1878 SIK NEVILLE CHAMBEELAIN'S MISSION 285 
 
 in the enclosed correspondence that Chamberlain, To Lord 
 naturally reluctant to participate conspicuously in Beptemb°er' 23 
 the reception of an apparently inevitable afiront, 
 wanted to break off negotiations with the Amir with- 
 out leaving Peshawur ; and that I instructed him to 
 move his mission to Jamrud, an advanced post 
 within our frontier, which I knew to be safe in any 
 eventuality as soon as Cavagnari had secured the 
 Khyberi escort. My motive for this instruction is 
 obvious. Had relations with the Amir been broken 
 off without any overt act of hostility on his part, our 
 public would never have understood the cause of the 
 rupture, and we should have been placed in a very 
 embarrassing position. The Amir's policy was to 
 make fools of us in the sight of all Central Asia and 
 all India, without affording us any pretext for active 
 resentment. My object was naturally to force the 
 Amir either to change his policy, or to reveal it in 
 such a manner as must make the public a partner 
 with the Government in the duty of counteracting it. 
 And I feel thankful to have effected this object with- 
 out loss of life. 
 
 ' Thus far I think we have made no false move in 
 the game, and if Cavagnari succeeds in his negotia- 
 tions with the Khyberis, we have taken, and the 
 Amir will (by bad play) have lost, the first trick. 
 
 ' The second rubber now opens ; and I think we 
 begin it with the odd trump in our hands. Ordinary 
 diplomatic action is, of course, exhausted, and we 
 must immediately adopt other measures.' 
 
 For those other measures Lord Lytton was fully Military and 
 prepared; he had already stated what they should S^asurLto 
 be. His aim was 'by means of immediate com- be adopted 
 bined political and military pressure, simultaneously 
 exerted at every point ' to secure ' with the least 
 
2 86 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 possible cost and inconvenience to ourselves, one or 
 other of the two following results: — (1) The un- 
 conditional submission of the Amir ; or (2) his 
 deposition and the disintegration of his kingdom.' 
 Military operations of a certain kind were, he now 
 recognised, ' absolutely necessary,' and he at once 
 sanctioned their immediate preparation. But he 
 laid stress on the point that ' military preparations 
 should be undertaken only in support, and not in 
 supersession of political pressure, for which all the 
 conditions were now peculiarly favourable.' He 
 moreover considered ' that we should spare no effort 
 to convince the Afghan people that our quarrel was 
 with the Amir, who had deliberately forced it on us, 
 and not with them ; thus, if possible, isolating the 
 Amir from his people, instead of uniting his people 
 with him in a national opposition to our movements.' 
 He proposed within a month to reinforce Quettah 
 with 6,300 men and twenty-seven guns, but not to 
 move a man beyond it in the direction of Kandahar 
 till experience had shown that the political effect of 
 so large a force at Quettah itself was not adequate 
 to effect the requisite pressure in the direction of 
 Western Afghanistan. While Kandahar was thus 
 threatened from Quettah, a force of 4,000 men with 
 twelve guns would assemble at Thull, and from 
 thence advance and take up a strong position in the 
 Kurum Valley, thus indirectly threatening Kabul and 
 Jellalabad. These lines of attack were selected as 
 including all the advanced positions which the 
 Government were determined to hold permanently. 
 
 The Viceroy proposed that certain political 
 measures should accompany these military operations. 
 Major Cavagnari was actively engaged in nego- 
 tiations with all the Khyber tribes and with the 
 
1878 PEEPARATIONS FOR WAR 287 
 
 Mohmunds with the object of ' promptly and perma- 
 nently detaching them from the Amir.' With regard 
 to other tribes, the Punjab Government, under orders 
 from the Viceroy, instructed its frontier officers to 
 prepare for the appearance of a British force at Thull 
 and its immediate advance into the Kurum Valley, by 
 completing arrangements with the Kurum tribes, as 
 wellas with the Waziris. Lord Lytton also instructed 
 Major Sandeman to ascertain from the Ghilzais what 
 they were prepared and able to do ; and ' if proper 
 hostages were given, and he deemed it safe, to 
 authorise Major Browne to return with the chief of 
 the disaffected clan now at Quettah to the Ghilzai 
 country, and thence report on the conditions under 
 which this important tribe can be further utilised.' 
 Major Sandeman was simultaneously instructed to 
 lose no time in concluding arrangements with the 
 Kakar Pathans for placing under our complete 
 control the shortest and most important of the 
 alternative routes to Quettah which runs through 
 their country. The Viceroy also proposed to open 
 direct and indirect communications with the influen- 
 tial Sirdars at Kabul, for the purpose of convincing 
 them that our quarrel was with the Amir, and not 
 with his Sirdars or subjects. 
 
 These proposals were telegraphed to the Secretary Policy sanc- 
 of State on September 26, and acknowledged by Lord Secretary of 
 Cranbrook on October 1 in a telegram despatched September 26 
 after consultation with the Prime Minister and con- 
 taining these words : 
 
 ' Measures proposed in your telegram of Sep- 
 tember 26 are approved. Further proposals, if any, 
 should be reported by telegraph.' 
 
 It was due to the assistance and courage of the 
 Khyberis that the British Mission ever reached Ali 
 
2 88 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Musjid, or returned from it in safety. They thereby, 
 however, incurred the resentment of the Amir, and 
 consequently appealed to us to afford them protection 
 against his revenge. 
 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain had assured them ' that 
 the British Government would send its last soldier 
 and spend its last rupee before it would allow any 
 one of them to suffer unavenged the smallest injury 
 from the Amir or his authorities.' Ali Musjid, in 
 the meantime, in the heart of their pass, was in the 
 hands of the Amir's troops, and they offered, as proof 
 of good faith, to attack it themselves on condition 
 that we came to their assistance if they were repulsed. 
 While negotiations were proceeding the garrison of 
 Ali Musjid was reinforced by the Amir's troops, and 
 thus placed beyond the power of capture by the 
 unassisted tribesmen. At the same time the house 
 of the head Mahk of the tribe was burnt by the 
 Amir's people. 
 Dealings with The Viceroy considered that this was an injury 
 Sbef^^^^^ which we were pledged to avenge promptly; that, 
 moreover, if we hesitated to expel the Afghans from 
 the Khyber with the tribesmen, the pass would be 
 irretrievably lost to us, for that the Khyberis en 
 masse, disgusted at our want of faith, would go over 
 to the Amir. 
 
 He was therefore in favour of placing a regiment 
 of Guides and a mountain battery from Kohat at 
 Major Cavagnari's and Colonel Jenkins' disposal, and 
 intrusting to him the task of surprising Ali Musjid 
 and taking it by storm. 
 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was in Government 
 House at Simla and suffering from an attack of 
 Peshawur fever, was opposed to this scheme, and 
 on hearinjT that the Vicerov had sanctioned it the 
 
1878 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 289 
 
 Government at home telegraphed a somewhat alarmed 
 and reluctant assent. The Viceroy's object was to 
 convince the tribes of the Khyber at once of our loyal 
 support, and to expel the Afghans from the fort 
 rapidly by a coup de main, not as part of our general 
 military operations, but in order to restore it into the 
 hands of the tribesmen, who would hold it themselves 
 against the Amir. The execution of the scheme, 
 however, was stopped by news of the still stronger 
 reinforcements of the fort by the Amir, and as 
 soon as it became clear that it could no longer be 
 taken by a small force the Viceroy abandoned the 
 attempt. 
 
 With reference to this, in a letter to Maior y/ceroyto 
 
 ' "^ Major 
 
 Cavagnari, the Viceroy wrote : ' I feel that the Cavagnari 
 only awkwardness of our position is in reference to 
 the Khyber tribes, which your able and successful 
 negotiations have detached from the Amir ; and that 
 upon you must unavoidably fall the delicate and 
 difficult daily task of minimising to the utmost the 
 awkwardness of this position. 
 
 *I think, first, that you may tell the friendly 
 Khyberis, without hesitation, that the course of our 
 quarrel with the Amir may be long or short 
 according to circumstances, but that the end of it is 
 certain, and that when the score is finally settled 
 the Khyber Pass will most certainly not be allowed 
 to remain in the hands of His Highness, or ever 
 again to fall into them. It is, therefore, for the 
 Khyberis to consider betimes their future interests in 
 reference to this settled determination on the part of 
 the British Government, even though the enforcement 
 of it may be long delayed. The result is not a question 
 of power, for our power as compared with that of 
 the Amir is overwhelming; it is merely a question 
 
 u 
 
290 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 of time and convenience. Second, for any injury 
 meanwhile suffered by individual Kliyberis full 
 compensation should of course be promptly given 
 them. I should hardly think such individual injuries 
 to be numerous, for I cannot think the Amir's 
 authorities will find it in their interests to harass the 
 Khyberis systematically, nor is it probable that they 
 will venture far beyond Ali Musjid in any direction 
 for that purpose.' 
 Amir's reply Ou October 19 the Nawab Ghulam Hasan 
 
 Oc^toberTQ^"^' returned from Kabul, bringing with him the reply 
 of the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of August 14. 
 
 ' From the Amir's answer to my letter announcing 
 the mission,' writes Lord Lytton, ' which has now 
 at last been received (and which, whilst expressing 
 no desire and fixing no time to receive the mission, 
 leaves wholly unnoticed the insult publicly offered to 
 the British Government in the person of its Envoy), 
 it is clear that, had we been content to await this 
 answer at Peshawur, it would have left us precisely 
 as we were two months before, and still obliged us 
 either to go on waiting for further answers to further 
 uninvited communications or else advance without 
 permission and be repulsed. In the former case the 
 mission must have been postponed till the spring, 
 and during the whole of the present winter the only 
 practical facts placed palpably before the eyes of all 
 our Asiatic subjects and neighbours would have been 
 the Amir's public alliance with Eussia, his public 
 hostility to us, and our publicly passive acceptation 
 of both.' 
 
 The Viceroy at this time saw much of the Nawab, 
 who had arrived from Kabul. According to him 
 the Amir described the Viceroy as the mere servant 
 of half a dozen Sahibs in London who constitute the 
 
 The Amir's 
 view of the 
 British 
 Government 
 
1878 AFGHANISTAN 29 1 
 
 durbar of a woman, and are themselves practically 
 the mere servants of a large number of small Sirdars 
 who call themselves a Parliament, whereas, he added, 
 ' I and the Czar of Eussia are kings and can do what 
 we like.' 
 
 Lord Lytton waited with the utmost anxiety the 
 consent of the Government at home to commence 
 military operations, for if our troops did not cross 
 the border before the end of November, the passes 
 would become impracticable for six months. 
 
 Mr. (now Sir) Alfred Lyall was then Foreign Mr. Lyaii 
 Secretary. He Vv^rote on this subject to the Viceroy ^^ ^^^^ 
 with emphasis. ' The strongest motives for im- 
 mediate action appear to be political, and these I 
 think irresistible, so irresistible that I can hardly 
 believe any natural impediments could possibly 
 justify our deferring action until the spring. To sit 
 idle on the threshold of Afghanistan until next spring 
 would in my opinion be almost too ruinous a policy 
 to be even mentioned ; we should lose the tribes, lose 
 our reputation, and give the Amir the immense 
 prestige of having defied us for a whole season of 
 campaigning. I cannot believe that the Cabinet 
 would be even thinking of such a policy.' 
 
 The Government of India now asked the sanction 
 of the Government at home to the following 
 measures : 
 
 1. The immediate issue of a manifesto defining Measures 
 our cause of offence, declaring our friendly disposi- p^'oposed by 
 tion towards the Afghan people and our reluctance to Government 
 interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing the sole 
 responsibility on the Amir. 
 
 2. The immediate expulsion of the Amir's troops 
 from the Khyber, and the permanent occupation of 
 the entire pass up to Dakka. 
 
 TT 3 
 
292 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vn 
 
 Opinion of 
 
 Home 
 
 Government 
 
 3. The simultaneous occupation of the Kurum 
 Valley far enough to threaten Kabul and Jellalabad 
 in that direction also. 
 
 4. An advance from Quettah to the neighbourhood 
 of Kandahar and the annihilation of any force the 
 Amir can be tempted to oppose to us at that point. 
 
 The Government at home, however, did not con- 
 sider that matters were ripe for taking all the above 
 steps. They were of opinion that a locus j)oenitentice 
 should be allowed to the Amir ; that, before crossing 
 the frontier, a demand, in temperate language, should 
 be made for an apology and acceptance of a per- 
 manent British mission within the Afghan territory ; 
 that a reply should be demanded within a time 
 sufficient for the purpose ; and that, meanwhile, the 
 masshig of troops should be continued. 
 
 Accordingly, on November 2 the following ulti- 
 matum, of which the terms were first approved 
 by the Home Government, was delivered to Faiz 
 Mahomed, at Ali Musjid, a duplicate being sent by 
 post : 
 Ultimatum ' I havc received and read the letter which you 
 
 Amir, Novem- havc scut me by the hands of my Sirdar. It will be 
 ^^^ ^ in your recollection that immediately on my arrival in 
 
 India I proposed to send you a friendly mission, for 
 the purpose of assuring you of the good will of the 
 British Government, and of removing those past mis- 
 understandings to which you have frequently alluded. 
 'After leaving this proposal long unanswered, 
 you rejected it, on the grounds that you could not 
 answer for the safety of any European Envoy in your 
 country, and that the reception of a British mission 
 might afford Eussia a pretext for forcing you to 
 receive a Eussian mission. Such refusal to receive a 
 friendly mission was contrary to the practice of allied 
 
1878 ULTIMATUM SENT TO THE AMIR 293 
 
 States, yet the British Government, unwilling to Ultimatum 
 
 •^ , to the Amir 
 
 embarrass you, accepted your excuses. 
 
 ' Nevertheless you have now received a Eussian 
 Envoy at your capital, at a time when a war was 
 believed to be imminent in which England and 
 Eussia would have been arrayed on opposite sides, 
 thereby not only acting in contradiction to the 
 reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British 
 mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance 
 of being actuated by motives inimical to the British 
 Government. 
 
 ' In these circumstances the British Government, 
 remembering its former friendship with your father 
 and stiU desiring to maintain with you amicable 
 relations, determined to send, after such delay as the 
 domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fitting, 
 a mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of 
 the Government who is personally known to you ; the 
 escort attached to his mission, not exceeding 200 men, 
 was much less numerous than that which accompanied 
 you into British territory, and was not more than 
 was necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such 
 missions are customary between friendly neighbouring 
 States, and are never refused except when hostility is 
 intended, 
 
 ' I despatched, by a trusted messenger, a letter 
 informing you that the mission credited to you was 
 of a friendly character, that its business was urgent, 
 and that it must proceed without delay. 
 
 'Nevertheless you, having received my letter, 
 did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the 
 frontier to repel the mission by force. For this act 
 of enmity and indignit}^ to the Empress of India, in 
 the person of her Envoy, your letter affords no 
 
294 J-OllD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vi 
 
 Ultimatum explanation or apology, nor does it contain any 
 
 to the Amir ,„ f.,, -i n i t "^ 
 
 answer to my proposal tor a lull and irank under- 
 standing between our two Governments. 
 
 ' In consequence of this hostile action on your 
 part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on 
 your frontier, but I desire to give you a last oppor- 
 tunity of averting the calamities of war. 
 
 ' For this it is necessary that a full and suitable 
 apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered 
 on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. 
 
 ' Furthermore, as it has been found impossible 
 to maintain satisfactory relations between the two 
 States unless the British Government is adequately 
 represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that 
 you should consent to receive a permanent British 
 mission within your territory. 
 
 ' It is further essential that you should undertake 
 that no injury shall be done to the tribes who acted 
 as guides to my mission, and that reparation shall be 
 made for any damage they have suffered from you ; 
 and if any injury be done by you to them, the British 
 Government will at once take steps to protect them, 
 
 ' Unless these conditions are accepted fuUy and 
 plainly by you, and your acceptance received by me 
 not later than November 20, I shall be compelled to 
 consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you 
 as a declared enemy of the British Government.' ^ 
 
 On November 5 instructions were sent from 
 England to the Viceroy to the effect that in the event 
 of no answer, or an unfavourable answer, being re- 
 ceived to the above message, the Amir must be treated 
 as had been threatened, and that operations were to 
 be commenced on November 21. 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1878 BEITISH TROOPS CROSS THE FRONTIER 295 
 
 To Viscount Cranhrook 
 
 [Private.'] ' Lahore : November 21, 1878. 
 
 ' My dear Lord Cranbrook, — Jacta est alea ! The 
 Amir has not condescended to make any reply at 
 all to our ultimatum. The latest hour fixed for the 
 duration of the time within which his answer to it 
 would be awaited, and if received considered, 
 expired, strictly speaking, at sunset yesterday, the 
 20th. For the Mohammedan day ends at sundown. 
 It was not, however, till 10 p.m. last night that I 
 received from Peshawur, by telegraph, a message — 
 which had been delayed in its transmission from 
 Jamrud by the darkness and defective signalling — 
 that no communication from the Amir had been 
 received at our outposts. On receipt of this message, 
 orders were issued to the generals commanding the Military 
 Khyber,^ Kurum, ^ and Quettah ^ columns to cross be^un,^""^^ 
 the frontier and advance at daybreak this morning. I November 21 
 have since heard from Peshawur of the commencement 
 of operations in the Khyber, and probably before the 
 mail leaves Lahore this evening I shall receive some 
 further information as to their progress. Meanwhile 
 the delay of the last month has not been wasted. 
 For last night the negotiations in which I have 
 employed it were satisfactorily closed by the signa- 
 ture of a written agreement between Major Cavagnari Agreement 
 and the representatives of all the Khyber tribes, in S£s^^^'^^^' 
 which the tribes, detaching themselves from the 
 Amir's authority, bind themselves to place the con- 
 trol of the pass under the management of the 
 Government of India, on terms similar to those of 
 the Mackeson Pass administration. The Mir Akhor 
 has sent word to the Amir that, if the British forces 
 
 ^ Browne. ^ Roberts. ^ Biddulph. 
 
296 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. vii 
 
 Vieeroy'B 
 proclamation 
 to people of 
 Afghanistan 
 
 Viceroy's 
 despatch, 
 June 1879 
 
 Taking of 
 Ali Musjid 
 
 move, his position in Ali Musjid will be untenable, 
 and he and his whole garrison must be massacred 
 unless promptly withdrawn or reinforced. But, so 
 far as I can ascertain, the Amir has not made any 
 response to this appeal.' 
 
 On the day that our troops crossed the frontier 
 a proclamation was issued by the Viceroy to the 
 Sirdars and people of Afghanistan, referring to the 
 history of the past which had led to the present crisis, 
 and declaring that the British Government had no 
 quarrel and desired none with the Sirdars and people 
 of Afghanistan, and that upon the Amir Slier Ali 
 alone rested the responsibility of having exchanged 
 the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of 
 India. 
 
 The campaign is described in a despatch to 
 the Secretary of State from which extracts are 
 quoted : — 
 
 ' The force operating on the Khyber line was 
 commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne ; whose 
 instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the 
 Amir's garrisons from the Khyber, and occupy Lundi 
 Kotal, Dakka, or such other point as might be found 
 most convenient at the head of the Pass. . . . ' On 
 the morning of November 21 he entered the Khyber 
 and attacked the fort of Ali Musjid. 
 
 ' The fire of the fort was well sustained and 
 directed ; and the defence made by the garrison of 
 Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its 
 spirit. But the position, having been turned during 
 the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy 
 with the loss of all his guns, stores and camp 
 equipage. Several of the fugitives were captured by 
 our troops, and the remainder were plundered and 
 dispersed b}^ the Afridis. Sir Samuel Browne met 
 
1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 297 
 
 with no further resistance on his march to Dakka, 
 which he held unmolested for some weeks ; but, this 
 position being found inconvenient for the lengthened 
 occupation of so large a force, the General pushed 
 beyond it in the month of December, and occupied 
 Jellalabad, without resistance ; receiving there the Jeiiaiabad 
 unconditional submission of the local officials, and °'''^'^p"^' 
 their request for British protection. No attempt was 
 made by the Amir's army, at any subsequent period, 
 to resist the advance of the British troops on this line 
 of operations.' 
 
 In a private letter to Lord Cranbrook ^ the 
 Viceroy tells how in the captured camp of Ali Musjid 
 were found ' numerous proclamations by the Amir 
 calling on all Mussulmans in our service to desert 
 and oppose us in the cause of their religion. The 
 prisoners taken in the Khyber had also each a 
 small pocket Koran, with all the ferocious passages 
 officially marked for their daily study by order 
 of the Amir. The Afghan officer taken at Ali Report of an 
 Musjid was by my orders sent to Lahore, where prfsoner 
 he is being very well cared for. Sir NeviUe 
 Chamberlain interrogated him yesterday. He is 
 very young — barely twenty years of age ; says his 
 regiment was entirely composed of boys, being one 
 of four different regiments recently raised for the 
 late heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan. He declares that 
 the Amir's troops in the Khyber were nearly starved. 
 Asked to what the sudden death of Abdullah Jan 
 was commonly attributed in Afghanistan, he replied : 
 " God's judgment on the Amir for forcing every 
 youth in the country to do militar}^ service, to the 
 great affliction of his parents." It is reported that 
 most of the other Afghan officers who, escaping 
 
 ^ December 12. 
 
298 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cii. vii 
 
 from Ali Musjid, returned to Kabul, have been blown 
 away from guns by the Amir. Overtures from 
 many quarters have already been made to Cavagnari 
 for the deposition of Slier Ali. But I have warned 
 him by telegraph to be most careful to discourage 
 promptly all such suggestions, as I gather that it is 
 the possible wish of Her Majesty's Government to 
 come to terms with the Amir if possible.' 
 
 The line to which the Government attached most 
 importance was that of the Kurum. ' The Amir,' 
 Despatch wrotc Lord Lytton, ' could scarcely fail to perceive 
 June, 18(9 ^j^^^ ^^ j^^ allowcd a British force, advancing on this 
 line, to reach the Shutargardan in full strength, 
 both Kabul and Ghuzni would remain completely 
 at its mercy. It was, therefore, probable that the 
 strongest resistance to our advance would be made 
 by His Highness at some point in the Upper Kurum 
 Valley, where his troops would command positions 
 of great strength, eas)^ to hold, and very difficult to 
 attack. It was equally probable that, if Sher All's 
 army were thoroughly beaten here, its defeat would 
 immediately be felt in the very heart of his power, 
 which must be more severely shaken by the loss of a 
 battle in the Kurum than by a similar disaster in 
 any other part of his dominions. Our object, there- 
 fore, in despatching a force to the Kurum, was 
 to defeat and disperse any Afghan army which 
 might be found there, and to seize with the utmost 
 rapidity a position directly menacing Kabul and 
 Ghuzni, but without advancing beyond the Shutar- 
 gardan. This force was entrusted to the command 
 of General Eoberts.' 
 
 On the same day that General Sir Samuel 
 Browne entered the Khyber, General Eoberts entered 
 the Lower Kurum Valley, and occupied, without 
 
1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 299 
 
 opposition, the headquarters of the district, replac- Occupation of 
 
 ing the Amir's officials by his own. He found the 
 
 people of this district willing to submit to his 
 
 authority and furnish provisions for the supply of 
 
 his troops. Continuing his advance into the Upper 
 
 Kurum Valley, General Eoberts there encountered a 
 
 large Afghan force, established in a position of great 
 
 strength, strongly armed with well-posted artillery, 
 
 on the ridge of the Peiwar Khotal, which commands 
 
 the valley on one side of it, and the road on the 
 
 other, towards the Shutargardan. 
 
 English readers are already familiar with the 
 story of the engagement which then took place, but, 
 for the sake of its great narrative interest, the 
 following account may be quoted. 
 
 ' It was,' wrote Lord Eoberts himself,^ * indeed a formi- Account of 
 dable position — a great deal more formidable than I had the engage- 
 expected — on the summit of a mountain rising abruptly upper Kurum 
 2,000 feet above us, and only approachable by a narrow, Valley 
 steep and rugged path, flanked on either side by pre- 
 cipitous spurs jutting out like huge bastions, from which 
 an overwhelming fire could be brought to bear on the 
 assailants. The mountain on the enemy's right did not 
 look much more promising for moving troops, and I could 
 only hope that a way might be found on their left by which 
 their flank could be turned. The country, however, in 
 that direction was screened from view by spurs covered 
 with dense forests of deodar.' 
 
 ' The British force was now in a situation 
 resembling that of Marmont's army at the foot of the 
 Busaco heights, with the difference that Marmont 
 had made his first attack and had failed utterly. 
 Eoberts sent out officers to explore the hills in search 
 of a path by which the enemy's left might be turned 
 
 ^ Forty-one Years in India, vol. ii. p. 133. 
 
300 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vn 
 
 and when, to his great rehef, it was found, he made 
 a nio'ht march through stony watercourses and over 
 rough hills to another point upon the ridge occupied 
 by the Afghans, whence he could outflank their 
 defences. 
 
 ' The track (for there was no road) led for two miles 
 due east, and then, turning sharp to the north, entered a 
 wide gorge and ran along the bed of a mountain stream. 
 The moonlight lit up the cliffs on the eastern side of the 
 ravine, but made the darkness only the more dense in the 
 shadow of the steep hills on the west, underneath which 
 our path lay, over piles of stones and heaps of glacier 
 debris. A bitterly cold wind rushed down the gorge, 
 extremely trying to all, lightly clad as we were in anticipa- 
 tion of the climb before us. Onwards and upwards we 
 slowly toiled, stumbling over great boulders of rock, 
 dropping into old water-channels, splashing through icy 
 streams, and halting frequently to allow the troops in the 
 rear to close up.' 
 
 "■ Just when everything depended on silence and 
 secrecy two shots were fired by men of a Pathan 
 company, whether through accident or as a warning 
 to their Afghan countrymen has not been indubitably 
 proved. The Sikhs whispered that there was treachery 
 among the Mohammedans ; the pickets in front might 
 have taken alarm ; yet there was no alternative to 
 pushing on, and by good fortune Eoberts surprised 
 the enemy at the first streak of dawn. There was 
 much trouble in bringing up the regiments before the 
 Afghans could rally, for it is not easy to handle troops 
 upon the rugged shoulder of a mountain range, among 
 ravines and pine forests, at an altitude of 9,000 feet ; 
 and the nature of the ground can best be appre- 
 ciated by reading Lord Eoberts's description of it. 
 But when the Afghans perceived that the English had 
 
1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 3OI 
 
 crossed the ridge at a point which threatened their 
 retreat, they hastily evacuated a position of 
 "enormous natural strength," abandoning guns, 
 waggons, and baggage.' ^ 
 
 ' The limit,' wrote Lord L^^tton, ' assigned to the viceroy's 
 advance of our Kurum force was thus speedily j^^^^^gyg 
 reached and secured without further resistance. 
 
 ' In the month of January 1879, General Eoberts 
 entered the adjoining valley of Khost, where he com- 
 pletely routed an assemblage of hostile tribes. But, 
 as the permanent occupation of Khost formed no 
 part of our political programme, this effectual 
 chastisement of the inimical tribes, who had col- 
 lected in that district, was promptly followed by the 
 withdrawal of our troops after the accomplishment 
 of the reconnaissance to which the movements of 
 General Eoberts were restricted by his original 
 instructions. 
 
 ' General Biddulph, entering Peshin on Nov. 26, 
 found it already evacuated by the Amir's troops. 
 The small, but important, district of Sibi, lying upon 
 our hne of communications close to the Belooch 
 border, had, in the meanwhile, been occupied by a 
 British detachment on the 23rd of the same month. 
 Much political inconvenience had been caused by 
 the interposition of this small Afghan district in the 
 midst of Belooch territory, with which it is almost 
 entirely surrounded ; and we had, therefore, deter- 
 mined upon its permanent withdrawal from the 
 jurisdiction of the Kabul authority. In December, 
 General Stewart reached Peshin, and, assuming com- 
 mand of the Kandahar Expeditionary Force, crossed 
 the Khojak Eange with considerable difficulty, owing 
 to the want of roads. On January 9 he entered 
 
 1 Sir Alfred LyaU. 
 
t02 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vir 
 
 Viceroy's 
 
 Despatch. 
 June 1879 
 
 Surrender ot 
 Kandahar, 
 January 9, 
 1879 
 
 Success of 
 
 military 
 
 operations 
 
 Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On 
 January 21, his cavahy had pushed as far as 
 Khelat-i-Ghilzai, while Girishk, on the Helmund, was 
 occupied by a force under General Biddulph. There 
 was one cavalry skirmish at Taktapul on the road to 
 Kandahar ; and the marauding clans in this neigh- 
 bourhood have given some trouble. But otherwise 
 it may be said that Kandahar and all the adjacent 
 districts passed into our hands without resistance, 
 and with little or no appearance of national resent- 
 ment at their occupation by British troops. 
 
 ' Thus, within two days after the declaration of 
 hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain's mission at Ali Musjid was appro- 
 priately avenged on the spot where it had been 
 offered. Within two weeks after the same date, the 
 passes of the Khyber and the Kurum were completely 
 in our hands, and the Amir's troops swept clean 
 beyond the range of our operations. Not long after- 
 wards, Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied with- 
 out resistance ; and before the end of January (that 
 is to say, in less than three months from the com- 
 mencement of the campaign) the greater part of 
 Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmund to Khelat- 
 i-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British 
 Government. 1 The rapid success of our military 
 operations completely confirmed the calculations on 
 which they had been based. The Amir's standing 
 army was defeated and dispersed beyond all 
 possibility of recovery ; yet not a single one of his 
 Sirdars or subjects had risen to the rescue of his 
 power. His towns opened their gates without 
 remonstrance to our summons ; their authorities 
 readily responded to our requirements ; and their 
 inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the 
 
1878 STORY OF CAJ^IPAIGN 303 
 
 pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence viceroy's 
 of our troops. Nor was the neutrahty of the inde- Ju^e^-yg^' 
 pendent tribes less satisfactory than the indifference 
 of the Afghan people. From these tribes our con- 
 voys and outposts, especially along the Khyber Pass, 
 were exposed to occasional annoyance : but, gene- 
 rally speaking, all the long lines of communication 
 between our advanced positions and their bases in 
 British India were far more facilitated by the 
 friendly co-operation, than impeded by the occasional 
 thefts and assaults, of the tribes along the tracts they 
 traversed. Three years ago no European British 
 subject could approach the Khyber Pass without 
 serious personal danger. But, during the greater 
 part of the recent campaign, telegraphic communica- 
 tion from Peshawur to Jellalabad was maintained 
 along the entire length of this Pass with but little 
 trouble and few interruptions. 
 
 ' In the meanwhile the anticipations of the Govern- 
 ment as to the probable political effects of successful 
 military operations on the Kurum line had been 
 justified with startling rapidity and completeness.' 
 
 On November 30, a messenger from the Amir 
 arrived at Ali Musjid and delivered a letter from the 
 Amir in reply to the Viceroy's ultimatum. It was The Amir's 
 reported that the letter, dated the 19th, had been v£oy'f^ 
 brought as far as Bosawal (on the road from Kabul ultimatum 
 to Jellalabad), when the bearer, hearing of the fall 
 of Ali Musjid and the dispersion of the Amir's force 
 in the Khyber, had returned with the letter to 
 Kabul, The Amir was very angry with him for 
 bringing back the letter, which he then dispatched 
 to the care of his postmaster at Jellalabad with 
 instructions to forward it to our outposts. Major 
 Cavagnari had the impression that the letter finally 
 
304 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 received by him had been written by the Amir 
 subsequent to his knowledge of the fall of AliMusjid, 
 and in substitution of the original letter given to the 
 messenger, which had been written in a haughtier tone. 
 The letter as it was received, however, was a virtual 
 rejection of all the three conditions specified in the 
 ultimatum. It contained no apology for the affront 
 given to the mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain. 
 With regard to the question of a permanent British 
 mission the Amir gave a grudging consent to a 
 temporary British mission, the numbers of which 
 should be dictated by himself, and he did not under- 
 take to abstain from injuring the Khyberis who had 
 been friendly to us, but alluded to this condition in 
 terms of complaint and criticism. 
 
 The letter was regarded by the Home Govern- 
 ment as evading all the requirements of the Viceroy's 
 letter to him, and as impossible of acceptance even 
 if it had been received before November 20. The 
 Viceroy was accordingly authorised, if a suitable 
 opportunity occurred, to reply to the following efiect : 
 That the British Grovernment had every desire to 
 be on terms of peace and intimate friendship with 
 the Government and people of Afghanistan, but 
 that there could be no cessation of hostilities or 
 negotiation for terms of peace until a clear and 
 unequivocal submission was tendered by the Amir. 
 The military operations already begun were not 
 interrupted.^ 
 
 On December 1 9 the Viceroy moved from Lahore 
 to Calcutta. It was there that he heard of the 
 flight of Sher Ali, and the release by him of his 
 imprisoned son, Yakub Khan. 
 
 Writing on the 24th Lord Lytton says: 'My 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 305 
 
 latest information received, three days ago, on my Flight of 
 way is that on receipt at Kabul of the news of December 1 
 General Eoberts's victory at the Peiwar Khotal, the 
 Amir's authority instantly collapsed, and the re- 
 mainder of his army began to desert en masse. 
 Thereupon he apparently decided to release Yakub 
 Khan (" that ill-starred wretch," as he calls him in 
 his last letter) and to fly into Eussian territory, in 
 company of the three remaining ofiicers of Stole toff's 
 mission. With this information a pensioned Eessaldar 
 has reached Jellalabad, now in our hands. The 
 Eessaldar had been furnished by the Amir with a 
 letter stating that, on the advice of his Sirdars, he 
 (Sher Ali) was proceeding to St. Petersburg to lay 
 his case before " Congress *' ! and that any com- 
 munication we might desire to address to him would 
 be considered there (at St. Petersburg) . . . The 
 Eessaldar adds that he asked Yakub also to give 
 him a letter, but that Yakub replied, " The letter 
 given you by my father will sufiice.'" 
 
 Between the time when General Stoletoff left 
 Kabul in the middle of Auf?ust and the flis^ht of the 
 unfortunate Amir after the fall of Ali Musjid and the 
 storming of the Peiwar Khotal in December, the cor- 
 respondence between Afghanistan and the Eussian 
 authorities had been constant. 
 
 Soon after leaving Kabul, Stoletoff wrote from 
 Tashkend to the Amir's foreign minister a letter 
 designed to strengthen the Amir's resolution to hold 
 out against British influence : ' I hope that those who 
 want to enter the gate of Kabul from the east will see 
 that the door is closed, then please God they will 
 tremble.' In October he wrote again, asserting that 
 he was ' busy day and night ' in the Amir's affairs, 
 and that his ' labours were not without result.' ' The 
 
306 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 The Russians 
 refuse to help 
 Shev All 
 
 Letter fiom 
 General 
 Kaufmann, 
 November 26 
 
 Amir to 
 General 
 Kaufmann 
 
 great EmjDeror is a true friend of the Amir's and of 
 Afghanistan, and His Majesty will do whatever he 
 may think necessary.' 
 
 Sher Ali himself wrote to General Kaufmann 
 after the refusal of passage to Sir Neville Chamberlain's 
 mission, asking for Eussian help in the approaching 
 crisis. With this letter was enclosed one to the Czar 
 appealing for ' friendly assistance.' 
 
 These letters were acknowledged on November 4 
 by General Kaufmann in a spirit which must have 
 caused Sher Ali bitter disappointment. He had heard 
 that the English wanted to come to terms, and he 
 advised the Amir as a friend to make peace with them. 
 
 On November 26 General Kaufmann wrote to 
 the Eussian General EazgonofF at Kabul : ' The 
 Amir knows perfectly well that it is impossible for 
 me to assist him with trooj)s in winter, therefore it 
 is necessary that war should not be commenced at 
 this unseasonable time. If the English, in spite of 
 the Amir's exertions to avoid the war, commence it, 
 you must then take leave of the Amir and start for 
 Tashkend, because your presence in Afghanistan in 
 winter is useless. Moreover at such a juncture as 
 the commencement of war with Afghanistan you 
 ought to come here and explain the whole thing to 
 me, so that I may communicate it to the Emperor. 
 This will be of i^reat benefit to Afohanistan and 
 Eussia.' 
 
 On December 8 the Amir addressed to General 
 Kaufmann a renewed appeal on the ground ' of the 
 old friendship, and the recent alliance concluded 
 through General Stoletoff on the part of His Imperial 
 Majesty. . . . Should any harm or injury, which 
 God forbid, befall the Afghan Government, the dust 
 of blame will certainly settle on the skirt of His 
 
1878 FI.IGHT OF SHER ALl 307 
 
 Imperial Majesty's Government.' A simultaneous Amir to 
 letter was sent to Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan, Kaufmann 
 who had been deputed with General Stoletoff, in 
 which the Amir begged that 32,000 troops of Tash- 
 kend should be sent to Afghan Turkestan, troops 
 * which General Stoletoff told me in your presence 
 were ready and would be despatched whenever I 
 required them.' 
 
 Before leaving Kabul, on December 13, the Amir 
 addressed a letter to the officers of the British 
 Government in which he informed them that he 
 departed with a few attendants to lay the whole 
 history of the transactions with the British Govern- 
 ment before the Czar of Eussia at St. Petersburg. 
 
 He also proclaimed the cause and purpose of his Tj^e Amir's 
 departure to his own subjects in a firman dated fi™an to his 
 December 22, addressed to the Governor of Herat 
 and other notables there : ' We have received,' said 
 the Amir in his firman, ' letters from the Governor- 
 General and from General Stoletoff", who, being with 
 the Emperor at Livadia, writes to us as follows : 
 " The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you 
 also, who are on the other side of the water (that is 
 to say the Oxus), must display the same sense of 
 friendship and brotherhood. The English Govern- 
 ment is anxious to come to terms with you through 
 the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take 
 his advice and counsel. But the Emperor's desire is 
 that you should not admit the English into your 
 country ; and, like last year, you are to treat them 
 with deceit and deception until the present cold 
 season passes away ; then the will of the Almighty 
 will be made manifest to you — that is to say, the 
 Russian Government having repeated the Bismillah, 
 the Bismillah will come to your assistance." ' 
 
 X 2 
 
308 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vii 
 
 Lord Lytton's Lord Lytton comments upon this document : ' I 
 the iirman liavc sccu the letter from General Stoletoff to which 
 * this firman refers. I have read it not once or twice 
 
 only, but several times, with the greatest of care ; and, 
 incredible as it must seem, I am bound to say that 
 the firman accurately reproduces the substance of it, 
 though the firman does not do full justice to its 
 remarkable phraseology. I distinctly remember ihe 
 advice given in that letter by General Stoletoff to 
 Sher Ali, and it was this. That Sher Ali should, 
 if possible, incite to rebellion against the Queen's 
 authority Her Majesty's subjects on the other side 
 of the Indus ; but that, if he were unable to do this, 
 then he should send to the Government of India an 
 emissary possessing the tongue of a serpent and full 
 of deceit, who might with sweet words perplex our 
 minds and induce us to suspend hostilities till the 
 spring, as Eussia could not send troops into Afghani- 
 stan during the winter. The firman, therefore, is a 
 true statement. But, if it be a true statement, what 
 then is the true meaning of its allusion to "last 
 year " ? " Like last year, you are to treat them with 
 deceit and deception until the present cold season 
 passes away." What does this mean ? Why, it can 
 have but one meaning, and that meaning is plain. 
 It means this. " The advice we give you now is the 
 same as the advice we gave you last year, and on 
 which you then acted so successfully at the Peshawur 
 Conference. You must do now what j^ou did then — 
 eni;!:age the British Government in a deceptive and 
 abortive negotiation in order to gain time." ' 
 
 Kecapitulating the conclusions which the evidence 
 of Russian intrigue with Afghanistan had left on his 
 mind Lord Lytton says, ' I affirm that Eussian inter- 
 ference in Afghan affairs did not commence with the 
 
1878 CAUSE OF THE WAR 309 
 
 Eussian mission to Kabul, and that it did not cease 
 with the withdrawal of that mission, I affirm that 
 Sher Ali had ceased to be the friend and ally of the 
 British Government, and that for all practical purposes 
 he had become the friend and ally of the Eussian 
 Government, at least three years before I had any 
 dealings with His Highness or any connection with 
 the Government of India. And, finally, I affirm that 
 the real and the only cause of the Afghan war was 
 an intrigue of long duration between Sher Ali and 
 the Eussian authorities in Central Asia, an intrigue 
 leading to an alliance between them for objects 
 which, if successfully carried out, would have broken 
 to pieces the empire of British India.' 
 
3IO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vni 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 HISTOKY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN. 
 KABUL MASSACRE. WAR OF 1879 
 
 The situation of affairs, military and political, at the 
 beginning of the year 1879 was uncertain and 
 obviously inconclusive. The Amir, Sher Ali, had 
 fled across the Oxus into Eussian territory, where the 
 Eussian Government found his presence embarrassing, 
 and where he received from General Kaufmann a 
 series of letters which must have finally dispelled 
 any hope he may still have retained of receiving 
 Eussian aid. He was dissuaded from continuing his 
 journey to St. Petersburg, and advised to make 
 friends with the English and return to his own 
 kingdom. His unhappy life, however, w-as drawing- 
 Death of to a close. He never left Mazar-i-sharif, and died 
 
 Sher Ah, 
 
 February 21, there ou Jp ebruary zl. 
 
 "^^^^ In the meantime the English armies were station- 
 
 ary at the points up to which they had advanced, at 
 or near Jellalabad on the line towards Kabul ; on the 
 Shutargardan ; and at Kandahar. To push on further 
 into the interior of Afghanistan would have necessi- 
 tated the occupation of a wider area than was neces- 
 sary for the policy that the Viceroy had now adopted 
 under instructions from the Government at home, 
 with which, on the whole, he concurred. His per- 
 sonal opinion inclined towards the expediency of 
 disintegratini^ Afg^hanistan ; but he was aware of 
 
1879 DEATH OF SHEE ALL 3 I I 
 
 the grave reasons that existed for termmatmg the 
 war speedily, and he was wilhng to persevere in 
 attempting to carry out the estabHshed programme 
 of maintaining a strong independent kingdom. In 
 writing on the subject to Lord Cranbrookhe noticed, 
 however, one argument against this pohcy, which 
 may here be mentioned in his own words, because it 
 has even now force and apphcabihty : 
 
 ' The primary condition of a strong independent objections to 
 Afghanistan is a strong independent Afghan ruler. JJ'^^f„7iam^*^^ 
 Granting a perennial supply of such rulers, it is im- stan 
 probable that an energetic, able, Asiatic prince of 
 independent character will be free from ambition. 
 The ambition common to all energetic Asiatic princes 
 is of a military, territorial, and not very scrupulous 
 character. Would the aspirations of such a ruler be 
 in harmony with the necessarily conservative char- 
 acter of our own position and policy in the East? 
 Would he not always be a disturbing element? 
 Would not Afghanistan, administered by such a ruler, 
 tend more and more to become a military State, 
 held together by armed power ? Would not the 
 ambitious, energetic, and not over-scrupulous ruler 
 of such a military State find, in the long run, his 
 best account in alliance with the ambitious, energetic, 
 and not over-scrupulous Government of such a 
 military empire as Eussia, rather than in alliance with 
 a Power so essentially pacific and sensitively scrupu- 
 lous as our own.' ^ 
 
 Lord Lytton nevertheless spared no pains in 
 directing all his efforts towards reconstituting the 
 country under some successor of Sher Ali upon the 
 plan which he described in another letter : 
 
 ' First,' he said, ' we want to effect a permanent 
 
 ^ To Lord Cranbrook, January 10, 1879. 
 
3 1 2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Conditions on settlement of our relations with Afghanistan on such 
 relations with Conditions as will adequately secure the three main 
 maybeliiTeiy objccts of the War, namely [a) the punishment of 
 established g^er AH, (b) the permanent improvement of our 
 present frontier, and (c) the establishment of para- 
 mount political influence over all the Afghan terri- 
 tories and tribes between our present frontier and 
 the Oxus. Secondly, we want to do this as speedily 
 as we possibly can, so as to avoid the indefinite 
 prolongation, and possible extension, of hostilities, 
 with all their attendant military risks, political 
 embarrassments, and financial difficulties.' . . . ' But,' 
 he added, 'we cannot close the Afghan War satis- 
 factorily, or finally, without an Afghan Treaty ; we 
 cannot get an Afghan Treaty w^ithout an Afghan 
 Government willing to sign, and fairly able to maintain 
 it. It is only, therefore, in the early establishment 
 of such a Government that we can find a satisfactory 
 solution to our present difficulties. Its early esta- 
 bUshment mainly depends on our own policy ; and we 
 must, I think, be prepared to do whatever may be 
 necessary on our part to promote and maintain the 
 existence of such a Government at Kabul.' ^ 
 
 The Vicero)'''s main object, therefore, was to find 
 some capable ruler with whom he might treat. The 
 heir-apparent to Sher All's kingdom was his son 
 Yakub Khan, who had as yet made no reply to some 
 tentative overtures from the British Government ; 
 he naturally assumed so long as his father was alive 
 an attitude of hostility towards the English invaders, 
 and his power to conciliate the powerful Afghan 
 tribes and to establish his authority was at the time 
 exceedingly questionable. Under these circumstances 
 his abdication and flight seemed for the moment not 
 
 ' January 30. 1879. 
 
1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 
 
 O^o 
 
 improbable ; and Lord Lytton contemplated, in such 
 a contingency, the alternative of opening corre- 
 spondence with Wali Mahomed Khan, brother of Slier 
 Ali, who was supposed to be a man of personal 
 influence and capacity. It was hardly to be expected, 
 however, that Wali Mahomed, as the English nominee, 
 could be strong enough to bring back under his 
 authority at Kabul either Herat or Kandahar, and in 
 submitting this project to the Secretary of State, by 
 whom it was provisionally approved, Lord Lytton 
 warned the Ministry that it might lead to the dis- 
 integration of Afghanistan. But before any step 
 had been taken to act upon this alternative, it was 
 thrown aside upon the receipt by Major Cavagnari 
 of letters in which Yakub Khan acknowledged and 
 amicably responded to the overtures that had been 
 made to him, and announced his father's death in 
 the following terms : 
 
 ' I write in accordance with former friendship, to Letter from 
 inform you that to-day, Wednesday the 4th of Eabi- SJ^^^^j^^" 
 ul-awal (February 26, 1879), a letter was received by tiie death of 
 post from Turkestan announcnig that my worthy and 
 exalted father had, upon Friday, 29 Safar, obeyed 
 the call of the Summoner, and throwing off the 
 dress of existence, hastened to the region of the 
 divine mercy. Since every living being must relin- 
 quish the robe of life, and must drink the draught 
 of death, I remain resigned and patient under this 
 heavy calamity and misfortune. As my exalted father 
 was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Govern- 
 ment, I have out of friendship sent you this 
 intimation.* ^ 
 
 This letter was suitably acknowledged, ' and 
 Major Cavagnari was authorised to communicate 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
314 I'OI^D LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viu 
 
 the conditions on wliicli the British Government were 
 willing to make peace. 
 
 These conditions the Viceroy had borne in mind 
 from the beginning of the campaign, and as soon as 
 the flight of Slier Ali had left Yakub Khan in posses- 
 sion of the throne of Kabul, Lord Lytton had referred 
 them to the Secretary of State as the basis of a treaty 
 of peace, should Yakub Khan make any advances in 
 the direction of a settlement with the British Govern- 
 ment. ' Were negotiations opened with Yakub,' he 
 wrote on December 24, 1878, 'I would offer to 
 restore Kandahar at once, and eventually Jellalabad, 
 Terms of ou Condition of a Treaty giving formal recognition to 
 to^Yakub^^* the permanent withdrawal from the Kabul authorit}' 
 Khan Qf Pesliiu and Sibi, which I would give to Khelat, 
 
 tlie Kurum, the Khyber and all the Mohammedan 
 and Shinwari tribes of the other passes debouching 
 about Dakka. The Peshin Valley is important, 
 because it is the great granar}^ of Quettah, and also 
 because it commands the Khojak and is the debouch 
 of the Thull Chetiali, the best alternative route to 
 Quettah. The Khj^ber we are pledged to retain, and 
 its importance is obvious. But the tribes would 
 remain independent, our relations to them being 
 similar to those we now hold with the other tribes 
 along the Derajat. The Peiwar Khotal is of supreme 
 importance, commanding, as it does, the approaches 
 to Kabul, Jellalabad, and Ghuzni, and in my opinion 
 it should never pass out of our hands. These 
 territorial arrangements (which would add nothing 
 to actual British territory), coupled with the admis- 
 sion of British and the exclusion of foreign agents, 
 would I think suffice for a satisfactory settlement.' 
 It was on these lines that Major Cavagnari was 
 authorised to treat with Yakub Khan in January 1879. 
 
1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 315 
 
 To the territorial condition Yakub demurred : 
 ' As this is beyond the strength and capacity of the Yakub's reply 
 officers of this God-granted Government and is 
 opposed to magnanimity and friendship, you should 
 out of magnanimity and friendship depart from this 
 condition and relinquish the territories of the Afghan 
 State which you have taken possession of recently ; 
 you should positively not interfere with them.' ^ 
 
 To the condition of British control of his foreign 
 relations he submitted willingly. 
 
 On the question of British agents he replied : 
 ' In the event of strong and firm friendship and 
 harmony always existing between the Government of 
 Afghanistan and the British Government, the Afghan 
 Government out of friendship agrees that, in accord- 
 ance with the desire of the British Government, 
 several officers of rank, with a proper escort, should 
 reside on the part of the British Government in the 
 capital only, which is Kabul, but they must not 
 interfere in any of the affairs of Afghanistan. This 
 to last until such time as the British Government 
 obtains complete confidence in the constancy and 
 faithful friendship of the Afghan Government. After 
 that they have the right either to withdraw the 
 officers, or appoint them permanently, whichever they 
 choose.' '^ 
 
 It will be observed that while Yakub Khan made 
 strenuous objection to the cession of any Afghan 
 territory, he assented at once to the demand, which 
 his father had at all costs resisted, that he should 
 receive British agents within his dominions, stipulat- 
 ing only that their place of residence should be 
 Kabul. Herein, as it appeared from subsequent in- 
 formation, he acted upon the advice of his councillors, 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. • Ibid. 
 
,l6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.viii 
 
 Yakub Khan 
 invites 
 Cavagnari 
 to Kabul, 
 March 29 
 
 who argued that territory once ceded could never be 
 recovered, whereas the residence of a British Envoy 
 at his capital might be temporary, and terminable 
 by a change of policy or circumstances. But Yakub 
 Khan's prompt acceptance of a condition of peace 
 which contained one of the main causes and objects 
 of the war may be now thought to have inspired 
 the Indian Government with too much confidence in 
 his power to observe it, and to have withdrawn in 
 some degree their attention from the inevitable risks 
 which surrounded the position of an Envoy at the 
 capital of an Amir whose authority could at first 
 be only unstable and precarious, in the midst of an 
 armed population unsettled and irritated by foreign 
 invasion. 
 
 The territorial cessions, however, were held by 
 the Viceroy to be essential to the conclusion of any 
 treaty, and by his instruction Major Cavagnari 
 proceeded to insist upon them. In his reply to Yakub 
 Khan, after stating that his letter had been trans- 
 mitted to the Viceroy, our representative added that 
 he regretted to find His Highness, having accepted 
 two of the preliminary conditions, had substituted 
 for the third a proposal which his Government was 
 not likely to accept. This letter was sent by the 
 hand of Bukhtiar Khan, who was instructed if pos- 
 sible to obtain from Yakub a written invitation to 
 Cavagnari to come to Kabul and explain the 
 situation. As soon as this letter was despatched 
 Major Cavagnari repaired to Lahore to meet the 
 Viceroy, and discuss with him what language he 
 should hold to Yakub should the meeting take place. 
 
 Yakub Khan's answer to Major Cavagnari's letter, 
 dated March 29, contained the desired invitation to 
 the British Envoy to go to Kabul, that ' the real 
 
18*^9 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 317 
 
 concord on both sides might be declared and proved 
 face to face,' but he still held out on the question of 
 ceding territory. 
 
 On April 9 Major Cavagnari replied that the 
 British Government would appoint a mission of rank 
 to proceed to Kabul, with a suitable escort, on receipt 
 of information from the Amir that the necessary- 
 arrangements for its journey and reception had been 
 made. 
 
 In anticipation of the negotiations, the question 
 of terms was again discussed between the Govern- 
 ment of India and the Government at home. On 
 April 4 the Viceroy telegraphed that, before Yakub 
 Khan accepted in full the bases, he would almost 
 certainly stipulate for protection and guarantee of 
 his territory as the treaty would leave it, and 
 would probably ask for recognition of his heir when 
 declared, and that, if absolutely necessary for suc- 
 cess, it was proposed to make the concessions which 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain had been authorised to offer 
 to Sher Ali. 
 
 The Secretary of State replied, next day, that 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain's terms were never accepted 
 by the Cabinet nor communicated to the Amir ; that 
 circumstances had entirely changed, and that we had 
 protected ourselves ; that the Government agreed to 
 a subsidy and qualified recognition of Yakub's heir, 
 but that they were entirely adverse to any guarantee 
 of Afghan territory.^ 
 
 On April 6, the Viceroy telegraphed to the 
 Secretary of State as follows : 
 
 ' Please telegraph views of Cabinet on following Terms of 
 substance of treaty to be negotiated with Yakub. YakJfbKhan 
 First two articles formal. Third, amnesty for assis- 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
3l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 tance to us during the war. Fourth, Amir agrees 
 to conduct his foreim relations in accordance with 
 advice and wish of British Government, will enter 
 into no engagements or war with foreign States 
 without concurrence of British Government. Fifth, 
 qualified recognition of heir. Sixth, permanent 
 British Eesident at Kabul (according to Yakub's 
 suggestion) and right to depute agents to Herat and 
 other frontier places. Seventh, their safety and 
 honourable treatment guaranteed by Amir. Eighth, 
 right to garrison Herat whenever we deem it neces- 
 sary for frontier protection. Ninth and tenth, com- 
 mercial facilities, protection of traffic, adjustment 
 of duties, selection of open routes. Eleventh, tele- 
 graph line. Twelfth, restoration of Kabul territory 
 now in our possession excepting Kurum, Pishin, and 
 Sibi, as in draft proclamation. Amir renounces 
 authority over tribes and passes mentioned in 
 proclamation. Thirteenth, secures payment by 
 Amir of customary allowances to certain special 
 Sirdars. Fourteenth, subsidy to Amir, amount not 
 yet settled.' 
 
 All the foregoing articles were approved by the 
 Cabinet except the eighth as to Herat, the prudence of 
 which was questioned ; on the other hand, the in- 
 clusion of power to occupy Kandahar was suggested. 
 
 The Viceroy continued to urge, with regard to 
 the fourth article, that if the Amir was wilhng to place 
 his foreign relations entirely in our hands he should 
 in return be guaranteed protection from foreign 
 aofcrression. 
 
 ' If there is to be permanent peace and mutual 
 
 To Lord r. -, • o • 1 
 
 Cianbrook, Confidence between native States, it must be on some 
 
 April 10, 18 < J ^^^^ basis of give and take, which does not leave all 
 
 the advantages wholly on one side, especially if that 
 
1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 319 
 
 side be the side of the stronger power. . . . The J^*?^°^'*^ 
 increasingly bold and frequent attacks on our April 10 
 communications and outposts, to which we are 
 already exposed by the suspension of our advance ; 
 the growing impression that we shall in no circum- 
 stances venture to advance further, and the continued 
 uncertainty of our future relations with Yakub Khan, 
 are significant warnings of what would certainly 
 happen if we leave in power at Kabul a Prince un- 
 reconciled to the results of the war. . . . Our chief 
 difficulties with the late Amir were due to the 
 inopportune ambiguity and reserve of the language 
 held to him by previous administrations on the 
 subject of guarantees. But for such ambiguity there 
 was then, at least, an excuse which no longer exists. 
 The British Government might with some reason , 
 hesitate to guarantee frankly and boldly against 
 foreign aggression a State over whose foreign 
 relations it has practically no control. But Yakub 
 has already agreed to place his foreign relations 
 unreservedly in our hands, and the territorial 
 results of the war will have given us an effectual 
 material guarantee for the due fulfilment of this 
 engagement.' 
 
 The telegrams which preceded the arrival of this 
 letter produced their effect, and on April 13 the 
 following telegram was received from the Secretary 
 of State : 
 
 ' If Yakub faithfully conducts his foreign policy Telegram 
 under our direction, we shall be prepared to support tS"^ o^f^ sTate 
 him against any foreign aggression which may result April 13 
 from such conduct with money, arms, and troops, to 
 be employed at our discretion, when and where we 
 think fit.' 
 
 On April 21 the Viceroy writes : ' Yakub Khan 
 
320 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord is hancrino- fire rather vexatiously. Buklitiar Khan 
 
 1*3,11 It I'ook '^ 
 
 April 21 reports that His Highness makes great difficulties 
 about Cavagnari's reception at Kabul, and that the 
 batch of councillors whom he lately summoned from 
 Herat are urging him not to make peace with us on 
 any terms but those of a reversion to the status quo 
 ante. All this is quite possible ; and if, failing a 
 satisfactory settlement with Yakub, we do not march 
 to Kabul, the bad effect of our inaction in such 
 circumstances will, I am persuaded, destroy all the 
 good effect of our action thus far. I do not, however, 
 at all des})air of a satisfactory settlement with Yakub ; 
 and my impression is that Buklitiar is exaggerating 
 the difficulties of it pour se faire valoir.' 
 
 The continued inactivity of the British force upon 
 the Khyber line produced restlessness and hostile 
 combinations among the tribes. Letters, moreover, 
 were intercepted from Yakub, inciting the tribesmen 
 to attack us and promising them support. Partly 
 on these grounds, and partly for sanitaiy reasons, it 
 was decided to advance a portion of the force from 
 Jellalabad to the higher ground of Gundamuk on 
 the Kabul road. That place was occupied about 
 April 14. 
 
 On April 24, Buklitiar Khan, whose reports 
 from Kabul had been discouraging, returned to the 
 British camp. He brought with him two letters dated 
 April 20 from Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari. One 
 of these was merely formal. The other announced 
 the Amir's intention to proceed himself to the British 
 camp. 
 
 According to the Munshi, Yakub feared to 
 receive a British mission lest it should undermine his 
 authority at Kabul, and so compel him to accept such 
 conditions as the British Government might choose 
 
1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 32 1 
 
 to dictate. There was, moreover, a strong military 
 party at Kabul averse to peace, and it was doubtful 
 whether Yakub would be able to protect the mission 
 from insult ; even when Bukhtiar Khan arrived at 
 Kabul, a hostile crowd assembled and urged a holy 
 war. 
 
 The reception of Yakub in the British camp 
 being considered in all respects a preferable arrange- 
 ment to the deputation of a British mission to Kabul, 
 as had been proposed, assurances were at once 
 (April 25) sent to the Amir, promising the most 
 honourable treatment for himself, escort, and retinue 
 during such period as he might remain the guest of 
 the British Government. 
 
 This time Bukhtiar Khan was received with great 
 honour and cordiality at Kabul, and the Amir 
 himself left his capital on May 3 and arrived at Yakub Khan 
 Gundamuk on the 8th. He had a following of about oundamuk, 
 400 persons, and was accompanied by eight notables, ^^^^ ^ 
 amongst them the Mustaufi and General Daod Shah, 
 who were to be taken into council, the chief place 
 being given to the former. 
 
 On May 10 Major Cavagnari had his first inter- 
 view with the Amir, only Mr. W. Jenkins being 
 present as secretary and interpreter. The discussions 
 on the essential points of the treaty continued until 
 May 17. The Amir was very unwilling to give way 
 about retention or occupation of any part of Afghan 
 territory, arguing that, because he had come to 
 negotiate for peace, the British Government should 
 revert to the status quo ante helium, and trust entirely 
 to his promise of friendship without requiring any 
 material guarantee for good faith. At last, on 
 May 17, after much fencing, he agreed to the manage- 
 ment of the Michni and Khyber Passes by the British 
 
 Y 
 
322 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Government, and tliat the districts of Pisliin, Sibi, 
 and Kuruni should be treated as assigned to that 
 Government, the surplus revenues, after deducting 
 civil charges, being paid to the Amir of Kabul. In 
 Kurum the Amir requested, as a personal favour, that 
 the British administration might only extend to Ali 
 Khel. This was agreed to under limitations deemed 
 necessary to secure control over the Jaji tribe.' 
 
 On May 23, three days before the signing of the 
 treaty, Major Cavagnari wrote to the Viceroy : 
 
 From « Your Lordship will have learned from my late 
 
 ^a^vagnau, telegrams that negotiations with Yakub have taken a 
 favourable turn. We shall get a satisfactory treaty 
 out of him, and the future must decide what sort of 
 an Amir he will turn out. I am inclined at times to 
 believe that he is likely to submit to the influence of 
 the British Resident at Kabul, but sometimes I fancy 
 that his intellect is weak, and he certainly is of a 
 Cavagnari's changeable temperament. The Mustaufi has not a 
 oT Y^akub"^ Very high opinion of him, though he admits that he 
 is the best of the Barakzai family. I have found the 
 Mustaufi very well disposed towards us, but although 
 he is in some respects a shrewd fellow, I can't say that 
 he is very brilliant as regards intelligence. In fact, T 
 found the whole lot to be pretty much of the ordinary 
 Afghan stamp, and that avarice and suspicion were 
 their leading qualities. Their arguments were so 
 feeble and far from the point that I at once made up 
 my mind to deal with the case as if it concerned an 
 ordinary afiair connected with border Pathan tribes. 
 I accordingly arranged that I would visit the Amir 
 or send for his ministers whenever I thought it 
 necessary to do so, and that I would only have one 
 formal meeting at which would be recorded the final 
 
1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 323 
 
 decision, whatever it should be. This has saved From 
 much time and unprofitable discussion, and I think May 23 ' 
 the result will be as satisfactory as could have been 
 brought about by any other means at our disposal. 
 . , . Some of the (Amir's) proposals indicate such 
 a want of knowledge of State business that it is 
 impossible not to feel anxious about his ability to 
 manage the afiairs of his kingdom in future. For a 
 few days I thought he was disposed to feel grateful 
 for the lenient terms granted him, but the more I see 
 of him the fainter becomes my hope that this idea 
 will be realised. . . . The idea that prevailed in 
 England that Yakub Khan is everything that could 
 be desired has of course made me most anxious to 
 bring about a settlement with him, and this I may 
 almost say is an accomplished fact. But I hold to 
 the opinion that I have always held, that our true 
 policy is to see Afghanistan broken up into petty 
 States. I told Yakub Khan that it would be owing 
 to him that Afghanistan continued on the map, and 
 that if anyone demanded from him what good he had 
 gained by throwing himself into an alliance with the 
 English, he could reply to the above effect. 
 
 ' He has a very contemptuous opinion of Persia, 
 and says that if England would permit him to do 
 so he will attack Persia and annex the Khorassan 
 province ! . . . 
 
 'I doubt whether, even if he wished to do so, 
 Yakub Khan could reach Kabul if he failed to arrange 
 a settlement with us. This, however, he has from 
 first to last stated that he will never do. His line 
 has been that he will either return to Kabul with a 
 settlement that will please his countrymen, or else 
 that he will go to India as our pensioner. 
 
 ' I have been able to ascertain that the reception 
 
324 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. viii 
 
 by the late Amir of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission 
 was more nearly coming off than many people are 
 inclined to credit ; especially those who asserted that 
 it ought to have been well known that the mission 
 would be rejected, or that with the foregone conclu- 
 sion that this would be so it was persisted in. 
 
 ' Slier Ali put the question to Stoletoff, who 
 graphically and pointedly replied, " Two swords can- 
 not go into one scabbard." ' 
 Signing of On May 26 the Treaty of Gundamuk was signed, 
 
 Gundamuk° ^^ having been first explained to the Amir that the 
 May 26 withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar and other 
 
 points of Afghan territory to be evacuated could not, 
 for sanitary reasons, be immediate, an intimation that 
 was very distasteful to Yakub Khan, who stipulated 
 that his governors should nevertheless be at once 
 placed in charge of the administration, and that inter- 
 ference by British officers should be prohibited. 
 
 Telegraphic congratulations were exchanged 
 between the Amir and the Viceroy on the signature 
 of the Treaty. His Highness also, in a letter dated 
 May 30, expressed his satisfaction with the treatment 
 he had received at Gundamuk and his desire to visit 
 the "Viceroy, to which, however, he could not give 
 immediate effect, owing to the heat, to the cholera, 
 and to the anarchy in the interior of Afghanistan to 
 which he must attend.^ 
 
 On May 28 Cavagnari wrote to the Viceroy : — 
 
 'It was a great relief to me the being able to 
 telegraph that the Treaty had been signed, for I 
 never felt certain what any twenty-four hours might 
 produce. . . . 
 
 ' My task now is to endeavour to bring about a 
 
 * Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMUK 325 
 
 satisfactory understanding with the Sirdars who are ^^^m ^^^^_ 
 in our camp and the Amir. I am now reaping the May 28 
 benefit of not permitting more chiefs to openly com- 
 mit themselves to our interests than was absolutely 
 necessary for our immediate purposes. The conse- 
 quence is that there are very few that I am concerned 
 about. In the same way the not having interfered in 
 revenue matters, and allowing things to continue as 
 in the old regime, will now be an advantage to us, 
 for as no change has been made there are no people 
 howling at us for going back and leaving them once 
 more to the mercies of the Durani Government. . . . 
 ' In working matters at Kabul, the main object to 
 achieve will be to convince Yakub Khan that he need 
 have no suspicions about us. I have told him that 
 our object is to make him strong, and that he never 
 need fear that the British officers will be intriguing 
 with disaffected Sirdars, &c., as this would be working 
 in an opposite direction to that of our avowed object. 
 Englishmen are no match for Asiatics in intrigue, and 
 our only chance is by straightforward dealing, and in 
 showing everyone that we consider Yakub Khan our 
 friend and are prepared to meet him. Natives, of 
 course, pronounce this to be a mistake, and say that 
 we must keep up a faction in Afghanistan in order to 
 retain a firm hold over the Amir. I doubt whether 
 there would be much advantage in acting on this 
 principle. We should endeavour to get on friendly 
 footing with as many persons as possible, but so long 
 as our alliance with the Amir lasts everyone should 
 be openly and discreetly given to understand that we 
 desire to see our ally's authority strengthened and 
 consolidated, and not weakened by there being a 
 faction throughout the country, whose opportunity 
 for benefiting themselves depended on the rupture 
 
o 
 
 26 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 From of our friendly relations with the ruler. Should it 
 
 May 28' ' unfortuuatelj happen that Yakub Khan breaks his 
 engagement at any future time, I don't think that the 
 mere fact of our not having in the meantime kept up 
 a faction ready for this contingency would ever be 
 felt to be a disadvantage to us, for so long as we are 
 believed to have wealth and strength on our side we 
 shall always be able to count on having plenty of 
 supporters. It is the knowledge that we possess this 
 wealth and power that makes Afghans, especially, 
 join us, and not that they have any feeling of friend- 
 ship for us or any gratitude for past favours. 
 Whether Yakub Khan can be made to appreciate and 
 reciprocate the amount of confidence we may desire 
 to place in him remains to be seen, but I believe the 
 principle is one worth trying to establish, and I think 
 there is a better chance of its success than may at 
 first sight appear likely.' 
 
 The Amir left Gundamuk not apparently merely 
 submissive but satisfied, trustful, and friendly. 
 Despatch on ' The Several articles of this Treaty,' wrote the 
 
 tiie Treaty of Viceroy, ' were framed in the belief that they fully 
 
 Gundamuk, *' ' . 
 
 July 7, 1879 sccure all the objects of the war, which have already 
 been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our 
 exclusive influence throughout Afghanistan, and our 
 paramount control over the Amir's external relations. 
 Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign 
 aggression is the legitimate consequence of this con- 
 dition ; and it is required of us not less imperatively 
 for the security of India than for the independence of 
 Afghanistan. But the British Government could not 
 have undertaken such an obligation if the means of 
 fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article 
 of the Treaty, which provides for the residence at 
 Kabul of a British representative, and for the right to 
 
1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMUK 327 
 
 depute British agents, as occasion may require, to Despatch on 
 
 r o' ^ mA-i-ir *^^ Treaty of 
 
 all parts of the Afghan frontier. The Amir himseii Gundamuk, 
 had requested that our permanent representative "^ ' 
 should reside at his capital ; and from the opening 
 of the negotiations he has evinced no disinclination 
 to the admission of British officers within his do- 
 minions. . . . 
 
 'Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the Treaty 
 His Highness engages to take measures for the pro- 
 tection and encouragement of commerce between 
 India and Afghanistan. . . . Afghanistan itself is a 
 country of no great productive resources, but it com- 
 mands the routes which penetrate into Central and 
 Western Asia ; and the commercial classes, not only 
 of that country, but also of those immediately 
 beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of 
 Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is 
 principally in Indian hands. . . . The route by 
 Herat and Kandahar runs through the more open 
 and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the 
 important towns of Herat and Kandahar. The 
 treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Khelat 
 towards the close of the year 1876 effected the 
 pacification of Beloochistan, and re-opened the great 
 trade route through the Bolan Pass, which has not 
 since been interrupted. By that arrangement the 
 commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Kandahar, 
 is already placed in safe connection with the railway 
 system of India and the rising sea-port of Kurrachi. 
 There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in 
 the number of kajilas now annually passing the 
 Bolan ; and the merchants of Sindh have always been 
 among the most industrious and enterprising of our 
 foreign traders. With proper management, therefore, 
 and under a judicious system of transit duties, con- 
 
328 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vm 
 Despatch on siclerable expansion may be reasonably expected in 
 
 the Treaty of ^ , p x t i • ■ 
 
 Gundamuk, the external commerce 01 India upon this important 
 
 ' The territorial concessions imposed upon the 
 Amir by the Treaty of Gundamuk are light, and 
 involve no permanent alienation of any part of the 
 dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber 
 Pass has never formed part of those dominions ; while 
 the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kurum are retained 
 by the British Government under an assignment. For 
 the better protection and security of our frontier, 
 and for the proper maintenance of communications 
 with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and 
 command the three principal passes into India, it was 
 essential that these three districts should remain in 
 our hands. But we have entertained no projects 
 for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior 
 of the country, or for occupying any posts not 
 absolutely required for the defensive purposes ex- 
 plained. . . . Accordingly the towns of Kandahar 
 and Jellalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gunda- 
 muk to the Amir of Kabul. . . . 
 
 ' The encraoements thus concluded, at Gundamuk, 
 with the Amir Yakub Khan represent and attest an 
 important change in the whole condition of Central 
 Asian affairs. The magnitude of this change will be 
 best appreciated when our present position and in- 
 fluence beyond the frontier are compared with what 
 they were during the greater portion of the preceding 
 period between the Umballa Conferences and the recent 
 Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe 
 any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the 
 part of Afghan princes. The late Amir Slier Ali, 
 throughout the whole period of his reign, was under 
 a formal treaty obligation to be the friend of the 
 
1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMUK 329 
 
 friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Despatch on 
 
 , , . • the Treaty of 
 
 Government ; but that engagement ni no wise pre- Gundamuk, 
 vented his adoption of a course which led him into ""^"^^ '^' ^^'^^ 
 inevitable rupture and open hostility with this 
 Government. We regard the present Treaty rather 
 as the commencement, than as the confirmation, of a 
 new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan. 
 It provides for, and facilitates, the attainment of 
 results incalculably beneficial to the two countries 
 concerned. The character of those results, however, 
 will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadi- 
 ness with which the British Government maintains, 
 and the intelligence with which its local agents 
 carry out, the policy that has dictated this Treaty : 
 a policy which has for its object to substitute co- 
 operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mis- 
 trust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise 
 from ourselves that the practical value of the Treaty 
 mainly depends on the character and disposition of 
 the Amir and his successors. Eelations established 
 with Afghanistan under the most favourable condi- 
 tions, and with the most promising prospects, may, 
 of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty 
 of Afghan princes or by the alienation of their un- 
 requited confidence. In either case complications 
 may arise against which no present precautions on 
 our part can completely guarantee our successors in 
 the Government of India. But, though anxious to 
 deal considerately with the Amir's susceptibilities, 
 and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable 
 requirements and legitimate interests of his Govern- 
 ment, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in 
 countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British 
 Government to punish its enemies and protect its 
 friends should be so generally recognised as to 
 
330 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADJMINISTEATION ch. viii 
 
 Despatch on 
 the Treaty of 
 Gundamuk, 
 July 7, 1879 
 
 From Lord 
 Salisbury, 
 May 23 
 
 render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We 
 have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British 
 interests and influence in Afghanistan, a position 
 substantially independent of the personal caprices of 
 any Afghan ruler ; and for the effectual maintenance 
 of that position the Treaty provides strong material 
 guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place 
 the British Power in permanent command of the 
 main avenues from India to Kabul.' 
 
 Some military authorities regretted that the 
 territorial conditions of the Treaty had not included 
 the occupation of Kandahar and Jellalabad. The 
 Viceroy, however, considered that the means had 
 been secured for occupying these places without 
 difficulty at any moment that it might seem to be 
 necessary, since from the Khojak range beyond 
 Quettah we were within striking distance of Kandahar ; 
 while the Kurum Valley up to the Shutargardan Pass 
 brought us far on our route towards Kabul, and the 
 direct line through Jellalabad was held by our pos- 
 session of the Khyber Pass and its eastern outlet at 
 Lundi Kotal. 
 
 General Stewart warmly advocated the abandon- 
 ment of Kandahar, as did also Major Sandeman, 
 our political agent at Quettah. According to the 
 arrangements, however, made with the Amir, our 
 troops were to remain at Kandahar till the autumn. 
 
 Lord Salisbury, writing on May 23 to the Viceroy, 
 said : ' I cannot allow the conclusion of this affair 
 to pass without warmly congratulating you on the 
 great success you have achieved and the brilliant 
 qualities you have displayed. To my eyes the wise 
 constraint in which you have held the eager spirits 
 about you is not the Jeast striking of your victories. 
 . . . The great military success has done us yeoman's 
 
1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMUK 33 1 
 
 service in negotiating with Eussia ; and I hope that 
 the moderation of your terms will be of no small 
 utility at Constantinople.' 
 
 The approval of the Prime Minister was not less 
 warmly expressed. Lord Beaconsfield wrote at the 
 close of the parliamentary session this year: 'I From Lord 
 write to you now at the end of a long and laborious Aug^s^u^^' 
 campaign, which has terminated triumphantly for 
 Her Majesty's Government. It is not merely that 
 our external affairs figure well in the Queen's Speech, 
 that not a single Eussian soldier remains in the 
 Sultan's dominions, that, greatly owing to your 
 energy and foresight, we have secured a scientific 
 and adequate frontier for our Indian Empire, and 
 that our South African anxieties are virtually closed ; 
 but we have succeeded in passing some domestic 
 measures in spite of factious obstruction of first- 
 class interest and importance — notably our Army 
 Discipline Act, a measure of magnitude and gravity 
 equal in range to these great measures, and our 
 Irish University Act, a question which had upset 
 two administrations. Although we had entered " the 
 sixth year of our reign," our parliamentary majority, 
 instead of diminishing, has increased, and, notwith- 
 standing the rumours which may reach you, I see 
 no reason, scarcely a right, to dissolve Parliament, 
 though this, of course, must depend on circum- 
 stances. 
 
 ' . . . Whatever happens it will always be to me a / 
 
 source of real satisfaction that I had the opportunity 
 of placing you on the throne of the Great Mogul.' 
 
 This letter affords a curious illustration of the 
 instability of Oriental politics and of Parliamentary 
 Governments. Before it reached Lord Lytton the 
 whole framework of the political settlement of 
 
332 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Afghanistan, as ratified by the Gundamuk Treaty, 
 had been dislocated by the massacre of Cavagnari, 
 his staff and escort ; and six months later the 
 majority in the House of Commons had been trans- 
 ferred from the Conservative to the Liberal party, 
 who came into office upon a triumphant denunciation 
 of Lord Beaconsfield's entire foreign policy, particu- 
 larly in Turkey and Afghanistan. 
 Approval of The despatch from the Government of India on 
 
 Go^vernment, ^hc tcrms of the Guudamuk Treaty was acknow- 
 August? ' ledged by the Secretary of State on August 7, 1879. 
 Her Majest^^'s Government cordially approved the 
 whole convention, with especial advertence to the 
 clause providing for a British Resident at Kabul, as 
 an important point of policy that had been finally 
 gained, and as a measure full of promise for the con- 
 solidation of friendship between the two countries. 
 
 Acknowledgment having been made of the 
 loyalty manifested by the native princes of India 
 throughout the crisis, of the valuable aid rendered 
 by the Khan of Khelat, and of the services of the 
 various political officers, and of Major Cavagnari 
 and Major Sandeman in particular, the despatch 
 ended in these words : 
 
 ' I have only, in conclusion, to express the deep 
 interest with which Her Majesty's Government have 
 perused the clear and able exposition of the policy 
 of the Government of India in connection with 
 recent Afghan affairs which is contained in your 
 letter, No. 160, of July 7, and their cordial approval 
 of the proceedings of your Excellency in Council 
 throughout the critical period which is now closed. 
 In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and 
 instructions, your Excellency and your colleagues 
 have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and 
 
1879 TREATY OF GUNDAIVIUK ^^^ 
 
 an accurate appreciation of the obiect essential to be ^^^^^ s^^"^®- 
 attained. Her Majesty s (Government conndentiy August? 
 believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of 
 Gundamuk, to which your Excellency personally has 
 so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently, 
 secure both British and Afghan interests, and pro- 
 mote the stability and peace of the Empire.' 
 
 The policy of the Indian Government was 
 warmly supported by the Government at home, not 
 only in private letters and despatches, but also on 
 the public platform and in the House of Commons. 
 
 As soon as the Treaty of Gundamuk was con- 
 cluded, the Amir Yakub Khan returned to Kabul, 
 there to prepare for the reception of the British 
 Envoy, while Major, now Sir Louis, Cavagnari, who 
 had been appointed as Her Majesty's 'Envoy and 
 Minister Plenipotentiary ' at the Court of Kabul, 
 joined the Viceroy at Simla, there to confer with him 
 as to the character and functions of the mission. 
 
 The following letter to Lord Cranbrook shows 
 how confidently both the Viceroy and the appointed 
 Envoy looked forward to the success of the mission : 
 
 To Viscount Cranbrook 
 
 (Private.) ' Simla : June 23, 1879. 
 
 My dear Lord Cranbrook, — A thousand thanks 
 for your letter of May 27. Major Cavagnari is now 
 with me ; and from all I learn from him and other 
 sources of information, I think you need be under 
 no anxiety about the satisfactory execution and 
 results of the Kabul Treaty, or any troubles in 
 Afghanistan consequent on the withdrawal of our 
 troops. I think the Kabul Treaty must be regarded, 
 not as a conclusion but as a commencement. I 
 would not say this, and do not mean it, in any 
 
334 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord alarming sense. But the new Treaty is rather the 
 june^2T^' inauguration than the crowning result of a sound 
 and rational policy. Persistence in this policy 
 ought, amongst other good results, to relieve India 
 for many years to come from the curse of incessant 
 Eussian panics, and give to us all round our im- 
 mediate border a degree of quiet and security 
 hitherto unknown. But for all this we must look, 
 not to any talismanic value in a piece of paper 
 signed with Kabul, but to the steadiness of the 
 Government and the intelligence of its agents in 
 developing, day by day, the good relations now 
 established with the Amir, confirming the confidence 
 and training the character of His Highness, and 
 convincing his people and himself that their best 
 interests are inseparable from ours. For this the 
 opportunity is open and the facilities are great. The 
 Afghans will like and respect us all the more for the 
 thrashing we hr.ve given Sher Ali and the lesson we 
 have taught to Eussia. Throughout this part of the 
 world, and I dare say throughout the rest of it, a 
 generous enemy is preferred to a frigid or sneaking 
 friend. . . . The Afghan people certainly do not view 
 us with any ill will ; whilst, so far as can be judged 
 from deeds as well as words, Yakub thoroughly 
 realises the advantage of our alliance and is re- 
 solved not to forfeit it by misbehaviour. He has at 
 Cavagnari's suggestion restored to favour and office 
 the Mustaufi who had been disgraced and imprisoned 
 by his father, and whom he has now appointed his 
 finance minister. It is also on Cavagnari's recom- 
 mendation that he has appointed General Daod 
 Shah his Commander-in-Chief, and this he has done 
 with a graceful alacrity which appears to have made 
 a most favourable efiect upon all concerned. As these 
 
1879 TKEATY OF G¥NDAMUK 335 
 
 two men now attribute tlieir appointments to our To Lord 
 
 bro 
 23 
 
 influence, we may reasonably assume that their own june^^°°'^" 
 
 influence at Kabul will not be anti-Enoiisli. To 
 Wall Mohamed, whom he had threatened to impale 
 whenever he caught him, the Amir has frankly 
 reconciled himself; and altogether he is carrying 
 out with a good grace and complete loyalty his 
 obligations under the amnesty clause, which of all 
 his treaty obligations must have been those most 
 distasteful to an Afghan prince. Yakub, by the way, 
 told Cavagnari that his father had been much misled 
 by an impression that Lord Lawrence was omni- 
 potent in England on Indian affairs, and would 
 never allow us to go to war with him. Cavagnari 
 improved the occasion by reading to the Amir some 
 choice bits of Bright's speeches about the ' Barbarous 
 Afghan.' Altogether I feel no doubt that in the 
 work now before us solid progress will be made 
 during the next two years. But the further result 
 will of course depend upon our successors, both 
 here and at home ; and if they relax their efforts 
 or reverse our policy, with them must rest the 
 responsibility of an inexcusable failure.' 
 
 Sir Louis Cavagnari started on his hazardous 
 mission with the knowledge that he possessed the starts for 
 entire confidence, not only of the Viceroy, but of 
 the Secretary of State, and that in Lord Lytton 
 he had a warm and appreciative friend. On July 5 
 he wrote : 
 
 ' Dear Lord Lytton, I trust your Lordship will prom 
 accept this imperfect attempt on my part to express Cavagnari, 
 the gratitude I feel for all the favours conferred upon 
 me since I have had the honour of serving under 
 your immediate orders. 
 
 Cavasnari 
 
2,2,^ LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 From 
 Cavagnari, 
 July 5 
 
 Viceroy's 
 despatch on 
 Kabul 
 mission, 
 Jan. 1880 
 
 ' Lord Cranbrook's letter, together with your 
 Lordship's forwarding it, are prizes which seldom 
 fall to the lot of Indian officials, more especially to 
 one of such comparatively short service as myself, 
 and they will be valued by myself and my family 
 more than anything that could be bestowed upon me.' 
 
 It was decided that the total number of Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari's staff and escort should be as small as 
 possible. The reasons for this decision were given 
 in a despatch from the Government of India dated 
 January 7, 1880. 
 
 ' It had not been our intention to propose Kabul 
 for the residence of our representative ; but when 
 the capital was expressly selected by the Amir him- 
 self, there were many motives for deferring to the 
 choice of His Highness and there was no tenable 
 ground for opposing it. If the Amir felt reluctance 
 to the establishment of a British embassy at Kabul, 
 he certainly exhibited no sign of it; he raised no 
 difficulties, he suggested no impediments, and, while 
 strenuously combating some clauses of the Treaty, he 
 expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to 
 receive the Envoy nor any mistrust of his power to 
 protect him. 
 
 ' In these circumstances we deemed it desirable 
 that the British Eesident should proceed without 
 delay to take up his appointment at Kabul. 
 Assuming the Amir to be dealing with us in good 
 faith, the advantage to both parties of early action 
 under the Treaty was incontestable, while hesitation 
 or inactivity appeared likely to operate adversely, not 
 only to our own interests, but to those of the Amir. 
 This view of the situation was strengthened by 
 reports received by Bukhtiar Klian, whose letters 
 warned Sir Louis Cavagnari that the party opposed 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI'S MISSION 
 
 2>Z7 
 
 to the British aUiance were making open overtures viceroy's 
 to neutrahse the effect of our recent successes, and KabS''^ °'' 
 to render the Amir averse to a liberal treatment of mission, 
 
 , . , . , ^ Jan. 1880 
 
 those persons m whose interests the amnesty clause 
 had been framed, and in whose protection the honour 
 of the British Government was specially concerned. 
 The Amir himself had expressed to Bukhtiar Khan 
 his desire for an early meeting with Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari; and the impression produced by these 
 letters and messages was that the mission should be 
 organised as speedily as possible, and that it should 
 proceed to Kabul without loss of time. This was 
 undoubtedly the view of Sir Louis Cavagnari 
 himself, who was at the time at Simla, and whose 
 opinion on such a point necessarily carried great 
 weight. 
 
 'The constitution of the Envo3^'s staff and of 
 his escort was carefull}^ considered with Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari at Simla. A strong military escort had 
 been attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission, 
 but the duties which this escort was intended to 
 perform, and the contingencies against which it was 
 meant to provide, were of a wholly different character. 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain, carrying with him valuable 
 gifts for Sher Ali, was about to enter the country of 
 predatory and probably hostile tribes, while the dis- 
 position of the Kabul Government towards his 
 mission was very uncertain. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on 
 the other hand, entered Afghan territory under the 
 safe-conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, who 
 had recently been a guest in our camp. Moreover, the 
 strength of Sir Neville Chamberlain's escort, although 
 for the reasons above mentioned it was in our opinion 
 absolutely requisite, had furnished the late Amir 
 with a pretext for attributing an unfriendly purpose 
 
338 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Viceroy's 
 despptch on 
 Kabul 
 mission, 
 Jan. 1880 
 
 to the mission which that escort accompanied. It 
 had also been criticised by others, on the ground that 
 whilst too great for an escort it was too small for an 
 army, and calculated to provoke an opposition which 
 no mere escort could overcome. Such criticism, 
 though inapplicable to the condition of Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain's mission, would have been relevant 
 to those which the Government of India had to con- 
 sider in connection with the embassy of Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari. If our original plan of placing British 
 officers at some points in Afghanistan other than the 
 capital had not been overruled by the Amir's ex- 
 press stipulation regarding Kabul, it might have been 
 expedient to attach to the Envoy a force that would 
 have rendered him independent of the Afghan 
 Government for protection against sudden attacks 
 or local outbreaks. But Sir Louis Cavagnari went, 
 at the special desire of the Amir, to reside at the 
 capital of the Amir's country, within the Amir's own 
 stronghold, and in the closest proximit}^ to the Amir's 
 own residence. It was well known that the Bala 
 Hissar was always occupied by the household troops 
 upon whom the actual ruler believed he could best 
 rely, and it was recollected that at previous periods 
 of extreme anarchy and revolt the fort had afforded 
 a secure refu2:e to those officers who succeeded in 
 I'eaching it. To have required the Amir to entertain 
 within the Bala Hissar a British escort sufficient for 
 ensuring the safety of the Envoy in all eventualities, 
 or to have demanded that these troops should be 
 allowed to occupy an entrenched position within the 
 Amir's own fortifications, would have been inconsis- 
 tent with the whole character of the relations which 
 Sir Louis Cavagnari's embassy represented ; and 
 compliance with such a demand would have relieved 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI'S MISSION 339 
 
 the Amir from tlie greater part of the responsibility viceroy's 
 which his treaty guarantees had solemnly affirmed. It Kabul 
 is probable, indeed, that a force of this strength and J^\f '{"Jj^q 
 character would not have been admitted within the 
 fortress, whilst the objections against placing our 
 embassy thus guarded upon the confines of the city 
 would have been found to be very serious. All 
 experience shows that in such situations the risk of 
 collisions and misunderstandings is multipled in pro- 
 portion to the number of British soldiers and camp 
 followers that are brought into contact with an armed 
 and excitable population. The dangers to which Sir 
 Louis Cava^nari considered himself and those who 
 accompanied him most liable were those of assassina- 
 tion by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by 
 some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort 
 and those of the Amir, and he was therefore 
 personally desirous that his staff and escort should 
 be reduced to the most moderate and manageable 
 dimensions. In accordance with these considerations 
 the Envoy's suite was restricted to a secretary (Mr. The Envoy's 
 Jenkins), a medical officer (Dr. Kelly), and a military 
 attache (Lieutenant Hamilton) in charge of a 
 carefully picked escort of twenty-five Cavalry and 
 fifty Infantry of the Guide Corps.' 
 
 The mission thus constituted left Ali Khel, in 
 the Upper Kurum Valley, on July 18, and from the 
 moment of passing the British border was treated 
 with the utmost cordiality by the Afghan officials.^ 
 
 On July 21 Sir Louis Cavagnari received a letter Death of 
 from Yakub Khan announcing the death of Bukhtiar Khan 
 Khan, who was to have acted as minister to the 
 mission. This event was unfortunate. Bukhtiar 
 Khan had an intimate knowledge of ' all the threads 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, p. 78. 
 
 z2 
 
340 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oh. vni 
 
 and shuttles of the Kabul loom,' and his death closed 
 a valuable channel of information. Considerable 
 evidence was brought forward later to prove that he 
 was poisoned by the Amir. 
 
 General Kaufmann had sent a special messenger 
 to the Amir informing him of his return to St. 
 Petersburg, and begging him to communicate with 
 him fully and freely on all affairs. The Eussian 
 messenger was detained at Kabul till the arrival of 
 Cavagnari, who was instructed to advise the Amir, 
 in a brief but civil reply, to intimate that as corre- 
 spondence with the agents or representatives of foreign 
 Governments was incompatible with his present treaty 
 arrangements, he must request General Kaufmann to 
 discontinue these communications. 
 
 The history of the recent Afghan war includes 
 two distinct periods, of which the first closed with 
 the Treaty of Gundamuk. Sher All's dealings with 
 the Eussian embassy to Kabul had led to his speedy 
 ruin ; he had been driven from his throne by the 
 English, disowned by the Eussians, and had died a 
 fugitive. His son Yakub Khan reigned in his stead, 
 with a British Envoy at the capital. The assignment 
 of Sibi and Pishin to the British Government brought 
 our dominion up to the frontier of South Afghanistan, 
 within striking distance of Kandahar ; the cession 
 of Kurum and of the Khyber and Michim passes 
 secured for us access, when necessary, into North 
 Afghanistan. All our troops had withdrawn from 
 their positions beyond the Khyber on the line of 
 advance towards Kabul : and General Stewart was 
 preparing to evacuate Kandahar. 
 
 The Government of India hoped that the war 
 had been successfully ended : instead of which they 
 were really on the brink of longer, more extensive, and 
 
1879 CAVAGNAEI'S MISSION 34 1 
 
 far more difficult operations. For whereas in tlie 
 former period the pohtical aim and object of the 
 invasion of Afghanistan was clear and definite — to 
 compel the Amir to renounce the Eussian alliance 
 and to accept specific terms ; in this second period, 
 now about to begin, we were forced to depose the 
 ruler with whom we had just made a friendly Treaty, 
 to throw the whole of North Afghanistan into con- 
 fusion by our occupation of the capital, and to stir 
 up against ourselves the jealous animosity of the 
 Afghan people. No one regretted the necessity of 
 this second campaign more than Lord Lytton himself ; 
 it involved all that he had hitherto most strenuously 
 desired to avoid, and against which he had fought 
 most persistently in opposition to many of his military 
 advisers. But the event which brought about this 
 change was not one which human foresight could 
 have guarded against or prevented, if the policy'HtN 
 introducing a British Envo}^ into Afghan territory and \ 
 attempting a friendly alliance with the Amir was to 
 be adopted at all. Had we insisted on the Envoy 
 being sent to Kandahar or elsewhere in Afghan 
 territory, the Amir's consent would not have been 
 obtained, and had we failed at Gundamuk to conclude 
 a Treaty with Yakub we should only have been 
 forced to do then what had to be done four months 
 later, namely to invade his territory and march upon 
 his capital. 
 
 On July 24 the embassy entered the Afghan Cava^nari 
 capital and was assigned quarters in the Bala Hissar. juiy 24 ^ " ' 
 Its reception was brilliant, while the large crowd 
 which assembled was most orderly and respectful. 
 
;42 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vm 
 
 From 
 Cavagnari, 
 July 24 
 
 Proposed 
 railway from 
 Rawalpindi 
 to the Peiwav 
 
 From Sir Louis Cavagnari to Lord Lytton 
 
 ' Kabul : JiUy 24, 1879. 
 
 'Dear Lord Lytton, — My telegram of to-day will 
 have announced to your Lordship the arrival of the 
 British embassy at Kabul. Nothing could have ex- 
 ceeded the hospitable treatment we have experienced 
 since we left the Kurum frontier, and our reception 
 here was all that could be desired. I left it to 
 General Eoberts to describe our departure from 
 Kliaratiza. Our marches were very uneventful, and 
 there is nothing to say about them, except to describe 
 the various features of the country we passed through. 
 This my assistants are drawing up, and it will be 
 submitted in a day or two. I may briefly say that 
 there is nothing whatever to check the march of 
 troops from the Shutargardan to Kabul.' After 
 further dwelling on the character of the country, he 
 adds : ' But it is to be hoped that before we have 
 another rupture with the Amir of Afghanistan these 
 tribes will have become good neighbours of ours and 
 be more likely to side with us than with the Kabul 
 ruler. 
 
 ' What is essential to the perfecting of the Kurum 
 line is a railway from Rawalpindi to the Peiwar, and 
 then the line would not oidy from military and 
 political points of view be a good one, but it would 
 become a great commercial route, and quite cut out 
 the Khyber line. 
 
 ' Yesterdav afternoon, Shahs^assi Mahomed Yusaf 
 Khan (brother of Kushdil Klian, who has been 
 escorting us) came out to our camp bringing a letter 
 from the Amir, to congratulate me on the additional 
 honours I have received, and to inform me of the 
 arrangements for the reception of the embassy. 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 343 
 
 ' At about four miles from the city he met me From 
 this morning with a troop of cavaky, and shortly juiy24 
 after vvards Sirdar Abdullah Jan (son of Sultan Jan 
 of Herat) and Moolah Shah Mahomed, the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, with some more cavalry, met us. 
 Two elephants with gilt and silver howdahs were 
 brought, and the Sirdar and I got into one, while 
 Mr. Jenkins and the Foreign Minister took possession 
 of the other. I don't occupy much sitting room, but 
 the Sirdar was a very fat man and somewhat asthmatic, 
 and as I had to sit cross-legged I began to think that 
 the position was not one in which to spend a happy 
 day, and an hour of it was quite enough for me. 
 
 ' Nine regiments of infantry and two batteries of 
 artillery with some cavalry were drawn up in column 
 and saluted as the procession passed. As we entered 
 the gates of the city, the 18-pounder battery (the 
 Government of India's present in former days to Sher 
 Ali) fired a salute of seventeen guns. There was not 
 room in front of our residence, so a guard of honour 
 of a regiment of infantry was drawn up in a street 
 at straight angles to the one we passed along, and 
 saluted. The bands on each occasion that they 
 played made an attempt at ' God Save the Queen.' 
 Shortly after we alighted at the residence appointed 
 for us, the Mustaufi and Daod Shah came and paid 
 their respects, and conveyed inquiries after our 
 health on the part of the Amir. 
 
 ' I paid a formal visit to His Highness at six. He 
 asked after your Lordship's health, and after Her 
 Majesty and the Eoyal Family, and expressed con- 
 dolence about the death of the Prince Imperial. He 
 showed a fairly good knowledge about French affairs, 
 and said he supposed the republic would have a 
 good chance of lastinsf. 
 
344 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAJs^ ADMINISTRATION ch. vm 
 
 From 
 Cavagnari, 
 July 24 
 
 'None of our late friends amongst the Afghan 
 Sirdars appeared to-day, and I think Bukhtiar Khan 
 was right in saying that they are treated with scant 
 politeness. The ci'owd was numerous but most 
 orderly and I did not hear an uncivil remark. Many 
 salaamed as we passed. The soldiers have frequently 
 asked our people if it is true that they will now 
 be relieved from forced soldiering. The Persian 
 (Kashilbach) element have expressed their regret 
 that we did not take and keep Kabul, and stated 
 that had our troops advanced to Jagdaleak they 
 would have risen and killed every Barakzai Sirdar 
 at Kabul. 
 
 ' The pessimists prophesied that we were going to 
 have trouble between Ali Khel and the Shutargardan, 
 and that the Amir had not the power, even if he 
 had the will, to pass us through the territory of the 
 Aliinedzze Ghilzais (i.e. from Kharatiza to Dobandi). 
 Badshah Khan, the Ghilzai chief, accompanied us, and 
 was very friendly. 
 
 ' To-morrow I intend getting the dismissal of the 
 Eussian letter bearer, and will talk over (cautiously) 
 Persian affairs, without disclosing the Cabinet's 
 wishes until I receive further instructions. 
 
 ' Yours very faithfully, 
 
 ' L. Cavagnarl' 
 
 From 
 Cavagnari, 
 Aug. 30 
 
 Three days before the attack on the British em- 
 bassy Sir Louis Cavagnari wrote : — 
 
 ' Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan will arrive here on 
 the ord. It is to be regretted that he does not care 
 to remain any longer from his home, but he is now 
 rather old for active emplo3anent. I doubt whether 
 he will be of much use, as it is some years since 
 he has had anything to do with Kabul politics, and 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 345 
 
 tilings and people have mucli changed since he was From 
 
 , Cavagnari, 
 
 our agent. Aug. 30 
 
 ' What I require is a Mohammedan gentleman of 
 social influence who can be trusted to say and do 
 what he is told. There are many matters on which 
 an assistant of this kind can procure information 
 from sources to which the ordinary news reporters 
 have no access. If he has local experience he can 
 weigh the information he receives and give an opinion 
 worth having as to its value. My difficulty here 
 has been the loss of Bukhtiar Khan, who, though not 
 by any means a pattern of virtue, was just the man 
 that would have been most useful for the next 
 six months, and he knew that on the carrying out 
 of my wishes depended the accomplishment of his 
 own personal objects. . . . 
 
 ' My principal anxiety up to the present has been 
 regarding the amnesty clause. The Amir has done 
 nothing and will do nothing opposed to the letter of 
 the Treaty, but he shows no disposition to conciliate 
 or treat generously those persons who had com- 
 munication with us during the war. There can be 
 no question as to his perfect right to grant these 
 men whatever allowances he thinks proper, or to 
 give or withhold lucrative appointments they are 
 desirous of obtaining. All that we can properly 
 contend for is that their persons and private property 
 shall not be subject to molestation on account of 
 their connection with us. As a matter of policy, it 
 would be to the Amir's own interests to treat them 
 generously, and my efforts are being directed to that 
 end ; but if he does not follow my advice in this 
 respect, the strict wording of the amnesty clause 
 will not enable us to demand what alone will please 
 these people. On the other hand, if the persons who 
 
346 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 From ]^gi(]^ communication with us, althouo^h they were all 
 
 Cavagnari, , . ' o j 
 
 Aug. 30 without exception the ' out ' party and made over- 
 
 tures to us to benefit themselves, are excluded from 
 the high offices they once held or their personal 
 allowances are reduced, we shall get the reputation 
 of having deserted our friends. 
 
 'When advising these Sirdars at Gundamuk to 
 make their peace with the Amir I gave them the 
 option of acting according to my suggestions, or else 
 to become pensioners in India. This is the most 
 that we can do for them, unless we can insist on 
 special allowances and appointments being conferred 
 on them — a course which the Amir would rightly 
 declare to be interference in his domestic affairs. 
 
 ' The course your Lordship has pointed out as 
 the policy to be followed by the British Envoy at 
 Kabul is precisely what I have been doing. Tree 
 intercourse with the embassy, though not interdicted 
 by the Amir, has not been encouraged, and people 
 are consequently afraid to come. I did not expect 
 it to be otherwise at first, and as the persons most 
 anxious to come and see me are those who feel 
 themselves aggrieved, I am by no means in a hurry 
 to receive them. I spoke to the Amir on this 
 subject shortly after my arrival, and he assured me 
 that no prohibition to visit the embassy had ever 
 been given. I have subsequently spoken on several 
 occasions to his ministers, telling them that free 
 intercourse with British officers will be viewed by 
 the people at large as an indication of thorough 
 confidence on the part of the Amir. I pointed out 
 to them that if I wished to carry on intrigue I could 
 do so in spite of all their precautions, but that the 
 object of the British Government was to strengthen 
 the Amir, and that any conversation I should ever 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 347 
 
 hold with his subjects would be to crive them advice From 
 
 f>i ^ • ^ • T 1-1 Cavagnari, 
 
 calculated to lurtlier this object, i argued with Aug. so 
 them that too frequent or too early intercourse with 
 Sirdar Wall Mahomed Khan and others who are 
 known to be not too friendly to the Amir might be 
 misinterpreted by the public of Kabul, and that 
 therefore I was in no hurry to press the matter, 
 though I informed them that after a reasonable lapse 
 of time I should consider it indicative of a want of 
 trust if some change for the better did not take place. 
 I also remarked to them that whenever I visited the 
 Amir no one was ever present in durbar but the 
 principal officers that he trusts — viz. Sirdar Yahiya 
 Khan, the Mustauii, General Daod Shah, and Moolah 
 Shah Mahomed, the Foreign Minister — and that this 
 looked as if the Amir did not wish me to even know 
 by sight the other Sirdars of Kabul. I have no 
 doubt that in time some improvement will take place. 
 It is more than likely that the real reason is that the 
 Amir distrusts his own countrymen a great deal more 
 than he does us, and fears that they might use to 
 their own advantage the fact that they were on 
 intimate terms with the British officers, and make 
 out that they were no longer dependent on him. 
 
 ' When we first came here there was an Afghan 
 guard over the embassy premises. A few days after 
 this was removed after a reference to me, but a small 
 guard was left at the outer gate, and its duty was to 
 report the names of all visitors and the length of time 
 they remained at the embassy. I took no notice of 
 this, but one day I laughingly remarked to the 
 Foreign Minister that I had heard that the sentry 
 had to make such reports, but that if this was true 
 the returns sent in by him to the War Office could 
 not possibly be correct, as many men who came to 
 
348 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 From see me had to wait a considerable time before I 
 
 Aug^lT"' could see them, and occasionally I had to ask them 
 to call another day, so that if it was supposed that 
 the length of time a man remained within the walls 
 of the embassy indicated that he was closeted with 
 me, it was a great mistake. The other day the 
 sentry did attempt to stop a Hindu, coming to see 
 the doctor, and I made this an excuse for requesting 
 the removal of this guard. My request was at once 
 complied with. 
 
 ' In fact, I have nothing whatever to complain of 
 on the part of the Amir or his ministers that I can 
 really lay hold of, though there are many matters I 
 wish I could influence him about. There is no doubt 
 that his authority is most weak throughout the whole 
 of Afghanistan. This is not to be wondered at after 
 The Amir's ^^^^ ycars of misrulc and oppression on Sher Ali 
 authority Khau's part. But if he keeps straight with us he 
 very wea ^. ^^ ^^^ througli it, as lie dcrivcs the same support 
 from the prestige of an alliance as his father did — a 
 fact which the British nation never properly appre- 
 ciated. The difference, however, is that the people 
 of Afghanistan are inclined to look to the British 
 Envoy more than to their own ruler. The Amir and 
 his advisers, knowing this, will not be in too great a 
 hurry to accept our advice as to administrative 
 reforms that will benefit the people, lest they should 
 consider themselves more indebted to the English 
 than to their own Government. The agriculturists 
 were always praying for the annexation of the 
 country by the English, as they had heard of our 
 light assessments and just rule. But once the late 
 Amir introduced the system of compulsory enlist- 
 ment which resulted in the increased numbers of the 
 standing army which the revenues of the country 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 349 
 
 could not pa}^, the soldiery also hailed our approach From 
 in the hopes that they would be allowed to return to Aug^lT"' 
 their homes. The Sirdar class feel that since the 
 abolition of the feudal system the Amir is less depen- 
 dent on them than used to be the case, and there- 
 fore the}^ never feel safe in their position for twenty- 
 four hours. The hill tribes, I imagine, are pretty 
 much as they used to be. The religious element at 
 Kabul is wonderfully quiet. At none of the mosques 
 has a single word disapproving of the English 
 alliance been uttered. I cannot hear that there is 
 any really anti-English party, though there is a very 
 strong anti-Yakub one. I have been quite bewildered 
 sometimes with the stories that have been brought Rumours 
 me hintincf that no trust should be placed in Yakub YakuV 
 
 trGticliGrv 
 
 Khan, and that he is only temporising with us. 
 Though he is not to be thoroughly trusted, any more 
 than any other Oriental, still if he has any game 
 in hand I must confess to having not the slig-htest 
 conception as to what it can be. His conduct of his 
 foreign relations is apparently all that could be 
 desired. His letter to Kaufmann was altered to suit 
 my wishes, and the most trifling paper relating to 
 the Oxus frontier is submitted for my information. 
 It seems almost impossible for him to be carrying on 
 any secret arrangements with the Eussians, for after 
 his experience of their late perfidy he can have no 
 trust in them. . . . Anyhow, whether there is any- 
 thing in the reports which reach me or not, I have 
 found nothing tangible in Yakub's conduct to lay 
 hold of, and I therefore put them down to his enemies' 
 invention.' 
 
 Early in August six regiments of infantry had 
 arrived from Herat, and alarming reports had reached 
 
350 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 From Cavagnari as to tlieir mutinous behaviour. Eeferring 
 
 Aug? 30^'' to this, he continues in the same letter : 
 
 ' It was asserted that the Amir got up the ex- 
 citement about the Herat regiments, but if he did 
 he did not gain much, for I told his Foreign Minister 
 that either the troops were in hand and could be 
 checked in their present conduct, or else that the 
 Amir had no authority over them. The test I put 
 to him was that I should go out at once in his 
 company in the direction where the troops are en- 
 camped, and that if he would not undertake this 
 responsibility I would stay within the walls of the 
 embassy and report that the Amir had no authority 
 over liis soldiers. The result was that the Mulah 
 went to the Amir, and shortly afterwards returned 
 and took me out as usual. The next occasion on 
 which I had to speak plainly was on account of a 
 fracas which took place between the Afghan soldiery 
 and some of my escort, when I told the Foreign 
 Minister that if the Amir could not restrain his men I 
 would keep mine in their quarters, and I and my staff 
 would remain at home also. Since then there have 
 been no more complaints. I must say that whenever 
 I go out the conduct of the populace is most orderly. 
 ' I can't say there is much foundation in the 
 report that Yakub Khan has been influenced by 
 Yahiya Khan not to go to the provinces in company 
 with British officers, except the fact that he con- 
 templates putting off his trip until his return from 
 India, as he says he has yet a great deal to do at 
 Kabul. As I telegraphed, he would like to visit 
 India towards the end of December or the beginning 
 of January, and on one occasion when I talked to 
 him he himself said he would like to see Calcutta. 
 He frequently alludes to his intended visit, and I 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 351 
 
 hope nothing will occur to make him change his Fiom 
 mind. If there is any necessity for it, I don't antici- Aug^lT"' 
 pate that there would be any difficulty in my going 
 to Turkestan or Herat, or sending one of my staff. 
 I hardly think the Amir has time to make the trip 
 and get back here before the snows connnence ; but 
 rumour occasionally says he intends going on tour at 
 the close of the Fast. 
 
 ' There is growing distrust between the Amir and 
 Daod Shah, but it will be dangerous for Yakub at 
 present to attempt to press the latter too severely, as 
 the Commander-in-Chief has a very strong party to 
 support him. 
 
 ' From what I have seen at Kabul I can quite 
 understand why Yakub Khan preferred to go to 
 Gundamuk than to receive a British mission here. 
 He did not wish us to see the rottenness of the state 
 of affairs for fear that we should increase our 
 demands. Even now there is a strong desire to 
 intrigue to overthrow him, but no one will move in 
 the matter without being sure that we were with them. 
 A report the other day from the Kohistan (even if unpopularity 
 untrue it shows the hue of people's thoughts) stated °^ ^^^^^ 
 that some defaulters of revenue assaulted the col- 
 lectors, and said that if they brought a letter from 
 me that they would pay up. I have no doubt that 
 when these disaffected persons see that they get no 
 encouragement from us things will settle down, and 
 if Yakub Khan will only adopt a little more con- 
 ciliation and show his subjects that he is not 
 going to use our support as a means of grinding 
 them down, all will go well. I was glad to receive 
 your Lordship's cipher telegram about pecuniary 
 assistance, as I have always thought we shall have 
 to start him clear of his financial difficulties ; but it 
 
352 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Prom will be as well to wait until he fully recognises the 
 
 Aug?30 '' necessity for our assistance, and we can then help 
 him on conditions favourable to the interests in this 
 country. Though we do not wish to interfere in the 
 internal administration of Afghanistan, it would be 
 well if through our influence the condition of the 
 people is ameliorated, and that they recognise that it 
 is owing to us that good times have come. This is, 
 as I have already remarked, what the Amir does not 
 want to get into people's minds, as he is particularly 
 sensitive about being left to rule his country after 
 his own fashion.' 
 
 The letter goes on to say that the Amir was dis- 
 turbed at the question of the pa^^ment of the 
 Kandahar revenues during the recent administration 
 of that province under British occupation. Accord- 
 ing to the wording of the Gundamuk Treaty, 
 Cavagnari thought it would be hard to expect the 
 Amir to pay the cost of the administration during 
 war out of the revenues realised after jjeace. He 
 also adds that the Amir had no wish to maintain the 
 telegraph line from Kandahar to Pishin, that all he 
 needed was the existence of a telegraphic communi- 
 cation between Kabul and India. The letter ends 
 thus : 
 
 ' We are much too crowded at the embassy, and 
 if sickness did break out I would request the Amir's 
 permission to go into camp. I think that a residence 
 more on European principles of comfort and sanita- 
 tion should be built, though we are far from being 
 uncomfortable and have a better residence than the 
 Amir himself. 
 
 ' I was a trifle disappointed to see that the 
 " Times " took no notice of the entry of the embassy 
 into Kabul, though it printed the telegram sent from 
 
1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 353 
 
 the India Office. I am afraid there is no denying the From 
 fact that the British pubhc require a blunder and a Aug. 3 ^' 
 huge disaster to excite their interest ! I was sur- 
 prised at the " Times," as during the campaign and 
 the negotiations it behaved welL 
 
 ' Our doctor here has a great deal to do, and I 
 have recommended the establishment of a dispensary, 
 which, besides being a great civiliser, provides a 
 decent excuse for visitors. . . . 
 
 ' Having now exhausted all my news, I will con- 
 clude this I fear very long letter by assuring your 
 Lordship that, notwithstanding all people say against 
 him, I personally believe Yakub Khan will turn out Cavagnari'i 
 to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to Yakub 
 keep him to his engagements. 
 
 ' Yours very faithfully, 
 
 ' L. Cavagnari.' 
 
 This letter gives a vivid picture of the atmosphere 
 of intrigue and mutual distrust which surrounded the 
 Afghan Court. The reports that Yakub Khan was 
 not to be trusted; the growing division between him 
 and General Daod Shah — the only Afghan who was 
 wounded in defence of the British residents when 
 they were attacked ; the suggestion that the hostile 
 attitude of the Herati troops was in some way 
 brought about by the Amir's influence ; his outspoken 
 discontent at the amnesty clause ; his exclusion so far 
 as was possible, while holding to the letter of the 
 treaty, of all those who had befriended us in the war ; 
 the suspicion shown of any free intercourse on the 
 part of the people with the British residents — all 
 these points, read in the light of what followed, seem 
 to indicate danger ; but they were probably no more 
 than the natural outcome of the situation, and with 
 
 A A 
 
354 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 good luck miglit have led to nothing. That they 
 excited no alarm in the mind of Cavagnari himself is 
 evident. His last sentence is one of confident hope 
 and good courage, and the whole tone of the letter 
 is sanguine and cheerful. 
 
 On August 31 the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary 
 of State : 
 To the Seere- ' Hearing lately from Cavagnari that the Amir's 
 August 31 ^ ^' affairs were in a bad way and his position critical, I 
 telegraphed to him that if the Amir were in serious 
 difficulties from which he thought His Highness 
 miglit be extricated by prompt pecuniary assistance 
 he should let me know at once, and the money would 
 not be grudged, conditional on adequate guarantees 
 for the Amir's right use of it. This is the reply 
 I have just received by telegraph from Cavagnari: 
 " Kabul, August 29. Personal. Your Lordship's 
 telegram of 26tli. Yakub Khan will sooner or later 
 require some pecuniary aid from us. But I would 
 wish to see him recognise and admit his helplessness 
 before offering such aid, and then, as a quid pro quo, 
 obtain from him administrative reforms without 
 which his Government cannot last." 
 
 ' Cavagnari is quite right. His telegram, however, 
 is significant, and I think we must be on the look out 
 for rocks ahead.' 
 
 On September 2 Cavagnari sent his last telegram, 
 which contained the words ' All well.' On the follow- 
 ing day was perpetrated the massacre of this gallant 
 officer and all his escort. 
 
 'The first news of the catastrophe came to 
 General Eoberts, who was awakened in his Simla 
 house between one and two o'clock in the morning 
 by his wife telling him that a telegraph messenger 
 had been calling outside for some time with a 
 
1879 MASSACRE OF BRITISH ENVOY 355 
 
 telegram wliicli, when read, said tliat three mutinous 
 Afghan regiments had attacked the Kabul Eesidency, 
 where the Englishmen were defendinsf themselves. 
 Of all the rumours and stirring news sent up to 
 Simla during the last fifty years, from the various 
 fields of war and politics surveyed by an Indian 
 Viceroy, none have been more startling or more 
 important than this message flashed from the army 
 outposts beyond Kurum to the Himalayas.' ^ 
 
 The political ofiicer in the Kurum received two 
 letters from the Amir, the text of which he telegraphed 
 to the Viceroy. The telegram reached Simla very 
 early in the morning of the 5th. ' Kabul, September 3, Kabul 
 8 A.M. Troops who had assembled for pay at Bala SpTemSr s 
 Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their ofiicers, 
 and then all marched to the Eesidency and stoned 
 it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. Confusion 
 and disturbance reached such a height that it was 
 impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and 
 country round Bala Hissar and city — people of all 
 classes — poured into Bala Hissar, and began destroying 
 workshops, artillery park, and magazine, and all 
 troops and people attacked Eesidency. Meanwhile, 
 I send Daod Shah to help Envoy. On reaching 
 Eesidency he was unhorsed by stones and spears, and 
 is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahiya Khan and 
 my own son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the 
 troops ; but no use. I then sent well-known Syuds 
 and Mullahs of each clan, but of no avail. Up till 
 now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will be 
 seen how it ends. I am grieved by this confusion. It 
 is almost beyond conception.' The second telegram 
 reached Simla on the afternoon of the 6th, announc- 
 ing that the Eesidency had been set on fire, and 
 
 ^ Sir Alfred LyaU. 
 
 A A 2 
 
356 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 ending up with the words : ' I have lost ni}^ friend the 
 Envoy, and also my kingdom. Am terribly grieved 
 and perplexed.' These letters were addressed to 
 General Eoberts. The Kurum agent telegraphed that 
 the dead bodies of Sir Louis Cavagnari, his staff, 
 and his escort, had been seen by one of the prin- 
 cipal Ghilzai chiefs, who described their defence of 
 the Eesidency till it was destroyed by fire as almost 
 miraculous. 
 
 In a letter written by the Amir at the same time 
 to his uncle, the Governor of Zemindawar, he gave 
 a very different account of the affair. Only two 
 regiments, both of the body guard, were said to have 
 mutinied. Nothing was mentioned of any attempt 
 at rescue, or participation of the people, and it was 
 expressly stated no other injury was done, and that 
 by evening everything was quiet.' 
 
 A secret Memorandum on the Kabul massacre 
 was received by the Indian Government on October G, 
 1879, from Sirdar Wall Mahomed Khan. In this 
 Memorandum it was stated : — 
 
 ' From the very first day the Amir arrived at 
 Kabul from Gundamuk he preached to the people, 
 and counselled them that he and they being Moham- 
 medans and the faithful, should night and day 
 endeavour to keep in view the policy of religious 
 war. He sent letters on the subject in all directions. 
 
 'When the Herat troops were one march from 
 Kabul they were instructed to raise a crj^, on arrival 
 at the capital, that they would wage a rehgious war, 
 and that they would not allow the English officers 
 to remain in the town. In accordance with these 
 instructions, they raised cries in the city on their 
 arrival there. They quarrelled with the servants of 
 
 * Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1879 MASSACRE OF BRITISH ENVOY 357 
 
 Major Cavagnari in the streets of the town on one or 
 two occasions. I reported this to the Major, and he 
 remarked in reply that it was the habit of a rabid 
 dog to bite, be the person bit however innocent, and 
 that no one could touch his hair. ... On Wednesday, 
 the loth of Eamazan (September 3), three of these 
 six regiments asked for their pay. They were offered 
 one month's wages, but they refused to take the 
 money, and said that they would take nothing short 
 of three months' salary. The Amir told them that 
 they did not perform any service, or any religious 
 act, or protect the honour of their country, and so 
 were not entitled to three months' wages. On hearing 
 this they broke out, and proceeded towards the 
 residence of Major Cavagnari, saying that they would 
 now engage in a religious conflict. Daod Shah came 
 out to prevent them in their design, but was not 
 successful in his attempt. He was disgraced, and 
 was wounded in three or four places. At this junc- 
 ture Saif-ud-din Khan (a general) presented himself 
 before the Amir, and remarked that if His Highness 
 gave permission he would aid and save Major 
 Cavagnari. But he was rebuked, and was dismissed 
 from service with the remark that he had no concern 
 in the matter.' 
 
 The Viceroy, commenting on this information, 
 pointed out ' that all accusations against Yakub made 
 by Wali Mahomed and the other Sirdars whom 
 Yakub had been ill-treating must be taken cum grano. 
 But,' he adds, ' what staggers me in Wali Mahomed's 
 statement is that it elucidates, and confirms, similar 
 sinister assertions as to Yakub's treachery made by 
 two or three other informants, who apparently can 
 have no personal motive for incriminating the Amir. 
 The majority of the survivors, and spectators, of the 
 
358 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. tiii 
 
 Roberts starts 
 for Kabul, 
 September 4 
 
 Lord Lytton 
 to Loi'd 
 Beaconsfield, 
 September 4 
 
 assault of September ord all express a conviction 
 that Yakub could have rescued the Embassy had he 
 chosen to do so ; and all aver that he positively 
 prohibited General Saif-ud-din Khan from going to 
 the assistance of the Envoy. . . . These informants 
 also imply that Yakub permitted or ordered Daod 
 Shah to go to the relief of the Embassy with the 
 intention of getting him killed, as Uriah was put in 
 front of the battle. It is certainly noteworthy that 
 General Daod Shah, who professed strong attachment 
 to the British alliance, was out of favour with Yakub ; 
 that he was very severely wounded in his efforts to 
 quell the mutiny ; and that, of all to whom Yakub 
 entrusted that task, he is the only one who received 
 any injury at all.' 
 
 On receipt of the first intelligence brought by the 
 Ghilzai messenger, the Viceroy telegraphed orders to 
 General Massy to move at once to the Shutargardan 
 and crown it. General Eoberts, who was at Simla on 
 the Army Commission, started within twenty-four 
 hours of the receipt of the news for the Peiwar, with 
 instructions to march upon Kabul, with every possible 
 expedition compatible with safety, with a force of 
 6,000 men of all arms. General Stewart at once 
 re-occupied Kandahar, where the Amir's authorities 
 willingly replaced themselves under his protection. 
 The troops along the Khyber line were rapidly re- 
 inforced, and the Viceroy informed the Amir that a 
 strong British force would march as speedily as 
 possible from the Shutargardan to his assistance, 
 and that he must do all in his power to facilitate its 
 progress through his country. 
 
 The day after the news of the disaster, Lord Lytton 
 wrote to the Prime Minister : ' The web of policy 
 so carefully and patiently woven has been rudely 
 
1879 GENERAL ROBERTS STARTS FOR KABUL 359 
 
 shattered. We have now to weave a fresh, and I fear To Lord 
 
 . , Beaconsfield, 
 
 a wider one, from undoubtedly weaker materials. September 4 
 All that I was most anxious to avoid in the conduct 
 of the late war and negotiations has now been 
 brought about by the hand of fate, the complete 
 collapse of all the national conditions of independent 
 government in Afghanistan, the obligation to occupy 
 Kabul, and the great difficulty of evacuating it with- 
 out risk of renewed disaster to Yakub Khan, or any 
 other puppet ruler, on whose behalf we must now be 
 content to undertake the virtual administration of the 
 country, for the present at any rate. 
 
 ' These conditions, now unavoidable, involve the 
 further vexation of increased militar}^ expenditure 
 and political uncertainty. ... I feel most keenly 
 how heavy must be the weight with which this sore 
 and sudden blow will fall upon Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment. On the other hand, however, the great 
 advantages of our new frontier will be revealed in 
 the comparative alacrity and freedom from serious 
 danger with which its possession enables us to reach 
 Kabul in a crisis, and generally to deal with the 
 serious difficulty which we certainly have not pro- 
 voked. ... I do not disguise from myself that we 
 may now be forced to take in hand the permanent 
 disintegration of the national fabric it was our object 
 to cement in Afghanistan, and that, in any case, 
 we shall probably be compelled to intervene more 
 widely and actively than we have ever desired to 
 do in that country. Still, the renewed, and perhaps 
 extended, efforts now imposed upon us can have no 
 other result, if rightly directed, than the firmer 
 establishment of the undisputed supremacy of the 
 British Power from the Indus to the Oxus . . . But On the death 
 meanwhile and for ever, alas, we suffer one grievous ° avagnan 
 
360 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord bereavement, wliicli to all concerned is irreparable, 
 
 September 4 ^^^ whicli wiU be to m3'self an abiding sorrow and 
 
 bitter pain all the rest of my life. India has lost, 
 
 when she most needed him, one of her greatest men, 
 
 the Queen one of Her Majesty's ablest and most 
 
 devoted servants. I have lost a beloved friend and 
 
 more ! He has perished heroically, in the faithful 
 
 discharge of a dangerous service to his chief and 
 
 his country. It is the duty of his country to avenge 
 
 his death. My hope is, that in the recognition and 
 
 performance of that duty his country will not fail, 
 
 and that some sense of its solemnity may perhaps 
 
 mitigate, for a while at least, the reckless malignity 
 
 of party passion and spite.' 
 
 Support from The Government at home warmly supported the 
 
 GovSnment ^^iceroy in this dark hour. He received an official 
 
 and from the tele£!:ram tellino^ him that the Government were pre- 
 
 Queen . . . . . 
 
 pared to leave everything unconditionally in his hands, 
 and warmly assuring him of unreserved support in 
 taking vigorous measures. From the Queen he also re- 
 ceived a letter which he described as 'kind, patriotic, 
 and manly,' adding : ' She is really a better English- 
 man than anyone of her subjects, and never falls 
 short in a national crisis when the interests or honour 
 of her empire are at stake.' 
 
 The story of the famous march to Kabul has ^een 
 fully told by the hero of it, and no detailed account 
 of it here need be given. 
 
 It will be remembered that after various attempts 
 
 to delay the progress of the march on one pretext 
 
 The Amir and another, the Amir himself finally took refuge in 
 
 in^BritTsh^^ the British camp. General Baker had advanced as 
 
 |^™P' far as Kushi, and there, on September 27, the Amir 
 
 arrived with his father-in-law, Yahiya Khan, the 
 
 heir-apparent,^ all his ministers, including General 
 
 ^ Mnza Khan. 
 
1879 MARCH TO KABUL 36 1 
 
 Daod Shall, and about sixty other followers. Lord 
 Lytton described what followed in a letter to Sir 
 James Stephen : — 
 
 ' October 12. 
 
 ' General Eoberts proceeded to Kuslii on the To sir James 
 following day to meet the Amir, and in the meanwhile oclober'12 
 the Amir's rival, Wali Mahomed, and all the Sirdars 
 who had been out of favour with Yakub ever since 
 the Gundamuk Treaty for having been on friendly 
 terms with the British during the late war, had also 
 arrived in the camp of General Baker. The Amir 
 represented to Eoberts that he had left ladies of his 
 family in the Bala Hissar, besides several regiments, 
 who w^ould probably rise and massacre them all 
 if the British force advanced any further. He was 
 told that, although our advance could not be delayed 
 a day or an hour, ample time would be given to all 
 non-combatants and women to place themselves in 
 safety. In accordance with an instruction I had 
 recently sent him, Eoberts simultaneously issued 
 and forwarded to Kabul a proclamation warning 
 non-combatants to clear out, and announcing that all 
 persons found armed in and around Kabul would be 
 treated as enemies. The Amir, his ministers, and all 
 Sirdars then avowed there was a universal conviction 
 at Kabul that it would be simply impossible for us to 
 advance there in any force before the spring of next Eoberts's 
 year, that he, they, and all concerned had been acting KabuT^ ^'^ 
 on this conviction, and that they were quite be- 
 wildered by the rapidity and mass of our movement. 
 They might well be so. Eoberts was advancing on 
 the direct line to Kabul with a force of between 
 6,000 and 7,000 men, leaving another force of equal 
 strength to hold the Kurum in his rear. General 
 Bright was simultaneously advancing up the Khyber 
 
362 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Stephen, with a force of upwards of 16,000 men, which would 
 ° °'^^^ be in communication with Eoberts almost as soon as 
 
 he reached Kabul ; and the large force under General 
 Stewart, having re-occupied Kandahar and Khelat-i- 
 Ghilzai. was threatenin^f Ghuzni. On hearino- of the 
 Amir's arrival in our camp, my first inclination was 
 to regard this step as a conclusive and conspicuous 
 proof of his loyalty. It appears, however, that the 
 step was by no means a spontaneous or a willing 
 one. This is what Eoberts writes about it : " The 
 Amir left Kabul secretly and rode to Kushi in 
 haste, not bringing with him even a single tent. He 
 had become aware that Wall Mahomed and other 
 Sirdars intended to join the British, and thought it 
 best to be beforehand with them ; especially when 
 he found from my letter of September 25 that our 
 advance was inevitable." He was evidently much 
 disappointed at finding the Sirdars had been before- 
 hand with him, and expressed a wish to be reconciled 
 with them. But General Eoberts rightly considered 
 " the time and place inopportune for reconciliations." 
 General Baker made the best arrangements he could 
 for the Amir's tent accommodation, and placed him 
 in the centre of the camp. On the second day His 
 Highness' own tents arrived, and he asked to have 
 them pitched outside the camp limits. To this 
 Eoberts assented, knowing that if he wished to 
 escape he could do so even from the middle of the 
 camp ; but suggested that for his safety and honour 
 he should have a guard similar to the General's own. 
 He agreed to this, " and so now," writes Eoberts on 
 October 1, " there is a Highlander standing sentry in 
 front and a Goorkha in rear of his tent." 
 
 'Meanwhile General Eoberts's force continued 
 its advance towards Kabul. Somewhere, in time, 
 
1879 
 
 MARCH TO KABUL 363 
 
 between the 2nd and the 6th instant, and, in place, To Stephen, 
 
 . , • CI- J October Iz 
 
 between Kushi and Charasiab, a certain hirclar, 
 Nek Mahomed, said to be an uncle of the Amir's (but Nek ^^^^ 
 of whom I have hitherto heard nothing), rode out conferTwith 
 from Kabul and asked permission to see the Amir, tiieA.mir 
 with whom he had a long and secret interview of 
 some hours. He then rode rapidly back to Kabul. 
 On the 6th instant the reconnoitring parties sent 
 out by Eoberts reported that "the enemy" was 
 advancing in great force from the city ; and soon 
 afterwards the high range of hills intervening 
 between Charasiab and Kabul were crowded with 
 Afghan troops and people from the city; while 
 parties of Ghilzais appeared on the hills running 
 along both flanks of the camp, and the road along 
 which General Macpherson was advancing (to 
 Zahidabad) with large convoys of stores and reserve 
 ammunition was reported to be threatened. Mac- 
 pherson was immediately warned, and some cavalry 
 sent to his assistance. But Eoberts wisely recognised 
 the absolute necessity of carrying the heights on his 
 front before nightfall. This difficult task was en- 
 trusted to Baker, who commanded the advanced 
 guard. Baker at once sent Major White (an excel- Baker carries 
 lent officer), with a wing of the 92nd Highlanders, betwet? 
 three guns, and some native infantry to take J^^g^^ui 
 the right of the position ; from which the enemy was 
 dislodged, after an obstinate resistance, leaving 
 twenty Afghan guns in possession of Major White's 
 small force. Baker, meanwhile, making a turning 
 movement to the left, was soon hotly engaged ; but, 
 carrying height after height, completely scattered 
 the enemy in great confusion, capturing two 
 standards. Our total loss was small — three officers 
 wounded, but none killed. Enemy's loss not yet 
 
;64 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Stephen, 
 October 1'2 
 
 Position out- 
 side Kabul, 
 October 8 
 
 known, but believed to be very great. Nek 
 Mahomed, who had so shortly before had an inter- 
 view with the Amir, was the leading spirit of this 
 resolute and well-planned opposition to our advance. 
 His horse was shot under him in the enoai>ement, 
 but he seems to have escaped. Eoberts has no 
 doubt that the whole thing has been planned and 
 carefully prepared by the Amir, whose instructions 
 were carried back to Kabul by Nek Mahomed. The 
 enemy's position was admirably chosen and held in 
 very great strength. All that has since happened 
 convinces me that had he not been immediately 
 expelled from it he M^ould have been powerfully 
 reinforced and his fortifications well pushed forward 
 during the night, in which case the stand made at 
 Charasiab would probably have been much more 
 formidable and prolonged. It is equally apparent 
 now that the Amir's urgent pleas for delaying our 
 advance were made with the object of gaining time 
 for the organisation of a strong resistance to it, and 
 the reinforcement of the positions, both at Charasiab 
 and the Bala Hissar, by regiments which he has 
 hastily recalled from Kohistan and other localities. 
 
 General Eoberts, continuing his advance, arrived 
 before Kabul in the afternoon of October 8. He 
 found the Afghan troops who had just returned 
 from Kohistan entrenching themselves on a high hill 
 Ijeyond the Bala Hissar, and immediately command- 
 ing the city of Kabul. He at once sent General 
 Massy with eight squadrons of cavalry round by the 
 north of the city to watch the roads leading to 
 Bamian and Kohistan, and thus cut off their retreat. 
 Up till sunset General Eoberts was in heliographic 
 communication with Generals Massy and Baker, 
 and this was then the general condition of the 
 
1879 MARCH TO KABUL 365 
 
 situation before Kabul. General Baker was just To Stephen, 
 about to attack the enemy from the heights above 
 the Bala Hissar. General Massy had reached 
 Aliabad on the Bamian road. He had found the 
 Sherpur cantonment deserted, and in it no less than 
 seventy-eight guns, many of them Armstrongs and 
 48-pounders, given to Sher All by Lord Northbrook. 
 All of these guns he secured. General Macpherson 
 had joined General Eoberts with stores and reserve 
 ammunition, and was hastening forward with a 
 strong force to strengthen, before daybreak, the 
 position of General Baker ; whilst three of the 
 Afghan regiments from Ghuzni were simultaneously 
 hastening to join the force opposed to Baker, and 
 this force was every moment being swelled by armed 
 bands from the citv. This was the state of things 
 before Kabul when General Eoberts's telegram of the 
 8th reached me during the night of the 10th. I am 
 writing on the afternoon of the 12th, and have not 
 since then had any further news from Eoberts. But 
 I am not anxious. The telegraph now does not 
 work beyond the Shutargardan. Messages from 
 Eoberts must reach that place by runners or by 
 heliograph, and he would doubtless be too busily 
 engaged to estabhsh heliographic communication all 
 at once. My only fear is that the scoundrels may 
 escape during the night.' 
 
 ' Camp Naldera : October 12, 6.30 p.m. 
 
 'My dear Stephen, — The news I was awaiting 
 when I interrupted my letter this afternoon has come 
 sooner than I expected. During my walk I received 
 the following telegram from Eoberts : 
 
 ' " Outside Kabul, October 10. — General Baker was Telegram 
 unable to dehver his attack on the evening of the ocSbS^io *'' 
 
366 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.viii 
 
 8tli on account of the darkness. Before daybreak 
 yesterday General Macplierson joined liim with 
 67th Foot, 28th Native Infantry, and four Horse 
 Artillery guns on elephants. Enemy, however, fled 
 during the night, leaving on their very strong posi- 
 tion twelve guns (six field and six mountain). 
 Cavalry pursued for several miles, in two detach- 
 ments, under Generals Massy and Hugh Gough. 
 But the enemy had so completely dispersed that they 
 only overtook a few small parties. We have now 
 in our possession 110 guns. There are some thirty 
 more in the Bala Hissar, and a few, I hear, in the 
 city. Our camp is pitched on the Siah Sung ridge, 
 immediately overlooking and within 1,300 yards of 
 the Bala Hissar and city. I shall make puljlic entry 
 into, and take possession of, the Bala Hissar to- 
 morrow or next day. The troops have worked splen- 
 didly. For several days we have been without tents, 
 and rations had to be carried for want of transport." ' 
 Eoberts Tlius, in a little over a month from the day he 
 
 Octobe?i2"^' left Simla, General Eoberts 'made his triumphal 
 entry into Kabul at the head of as fine a force as was 
 ever put in the field, after having given the Afghans 
 a severe thrashing at Charasiab, and captured two 
 of their standards and 150 of their guns without the 
 loss of a single European officer.' ^ 
 
 On October 12, accompanied by the Amir's eldest 
 son, he made his public entry into the city. Early 
 that mornino; Yakub Khan had ' walked to General 
 Eoberts' s camp, accompanied by only two attendants, 
 and expressed his determination to resign the Amir- 
 ship. He said he had intended doing so before 
 iroino- to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be over- 
 persuaded. He was in very low spirits ; said his life 
 
 1 Written by Lord Lytton in a letter dated October 14, 1879. 
 
1879 ABDICATION OF YAKUB KHAN 367 
 
 had been a miserable one ; that he would rather be 
 a grasscutter in the English camp than ruler of 
 Afghanistan, and begged that he might live in the 
 camp till he could be sent to India or London or 
 wherever the Viceroy might desire to send him.' ^ 
 
 At the close of the Durbar held on the same day 
 the Mustaufi, the Wazir Shah Mahommed, Yahiya 
 Khan (the Amir's father-in-law), and Zakaria Khan, 
 were by the orders of General Eoberts placed under 
 arrest on the ground that they were the most influential 
 men in the country and that all their influence had 
 been exerted against us, as had been clearly proved 
 by the resistance offered to the advance on Kabul. 
 When Yakub Khan heard of these arrests, his look was viceroy to 
 described as that ' of a hunted beast, terror unmis- b°ook!Nov. 5, 
 takably imprinted on his features.' He said he had ^^'^'■^ 
 come to regard his countrymen with unspeakable 
 hatred, loathing, and fear ; that every hour which pro- 
 longed his residence in Afghanistan was a burden and a 
 horror to him : that his sole remaining wish was for 
 safety, repose, and obscurity under British protection 
 anywhere out of his own country. ' The Afghans,' 
 he said, ' know that I put my father on his throne ; 
 and while I was fighting here and there for a pre- 
 carious cause, they loved and admired me : when my 
 father imprisoned me, they forgot me. When I 
 made peace with you in their interests, they hated me 
 and conspired against me. There is no trusting them, 
 they are dogs and serpents, and I have done with 
 them for ever.' 
 
 The Viceroy and Indian Government regarded the 
 spontaneous and unexpected abdication of the Amir 
 as likely to facilitate the immediate settlement of 
 the main lines of our future policy. Even before full 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, p. 95. 
 
368 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 inquiries had been made into the authorship of the 
 massacre of the British Envoy his guilty participation 
 in the crime appeared so far probable as to make 
 the continuance of his rule a matter of doubtful 
 expediency. 
 
 On receipt of the first telegram from Kabul Lord 
 Lytton personally inclined to a speedy declaration of 
 policy on the lines of disintegration. There can be 
 no doubt that any definite pronouncement would have 
 facilitated General Eoberts's task, but the Govern- 
 ment at home were opposed to any premature or 
 hasty decisions with regard to the future administra- 
 tion of the country, and Lord Lytton himself readily 
 agreed that the proclamation to be issued by General 
 Eoberts should leave the future undefined. It ran as 
 follows : 
 General ' I> General Eoberts, on behalf of the British 
 
 Roberts's pio- Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having 
 October 28 by liis owu free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan 
 without a Government. 
 
 ' Li consequence of the shameful outrage upon its 
 Envoy and suite the British Government has been 
 compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the 
 capital, and to take military possession of other parts 
 of Afo'hanistan. 
 
 'The British Government now commands that 
 all authorities, chiefs, and sirdars do continue their 
 functions in maintaining order, referring to me when 
 necessary. 
 
 ' The British Government desire that the people 
 shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and 
 that their rehgious feelings and customs be re- 
 spected. 
 
 ' The services of such sirdars and chiefs as assist 
 in preserving order will be duly recognised, but all 
 
1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 369 
 
 disturbers of the peace, and persons concerned in 
 attacks upon the British authorit}'- will meet with 
 condign punishment. 
 
 ' The British Government, after consultation with 
 the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and others repre- 
 senting the interests and wishes of the various pro- 
 vinces and cities, will declare its will as to the 
 future permanent arrangements to be made for the 
 good government of the people.' 
 
 This proclamation was published at Kabul on 
 October 28, and on the same day Yakub Khan was 
 informed that his resignation was accepted. 
 
 Greneral Eoberts, being convinced that no good 
 would result from the introduction of any Afghan 
 element into the Government pending final orders as 
 to the disposal of the country, decided to carry on 
 the administration without the declared aid of any 
 Afghan chiefs. He assumed possession of the State 
 Treasury, and announced that for the future the 
 collection of revenue and expenditure would be 
 under his control. 
 
 Previous to the acceptance of his resignation, 
 Yakub Khan in a private interview with General 
 Eoberts had volunteered some interesting state- 
 ments with regard to the circumstances that led to 
 Sher All's estrangement from the Government of 
 India and adherence to Eussia. 
 
 'In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw Yakub's 
 in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses reglSg*^ 
 before making himself secure on the throne of SherAU 
 Afghanistan ; and he had come to the conclusion 
 that his best chance of holding what he had won lay 
 in an alliance with the British Government. He did 
 not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of 
 arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but never- 
 
 B B 
 
2iJO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Treaty 
 between 
 liussia and 
 Afghanistan 
 
 theless lie returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so 
 he remained until the visit of Noor Mahomed Shah 
 to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a 
 head. The diaries received from Noor Mahomed 
 Shah during his stay in India, and the report which 
 he brought back on his return, convinced my father 
 that he could no longer hope to obtain from British 
 Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that 
 time he began to turn his attention to the thought of 
 a Eussian alliance.' ^ 
 
 The terms of the Treaty between Sher Ali and 
 the Eussians, written out from memory, were handed 
 to General Eoberts by the two Afghan ministers 
 who had personally participated in the negotiation of 
 it. One of them was Sher All's Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, and the other was the minister deputed by 
 His Highness to accompany the Eussian Plenipo- 
 tentiary on his return to Tashkend with the Treaty in 
 its final form. The statements separate^ made by 
 these ministers were corroborated by Yakub Khan, 
 who declared that the Treaty had been concluded by 
 his father, that it had remained for months in his own 
 possession, and that he had destroyed it with some 
 other important papers on the eve of our entry into 
 Kabul. According to these informants, the Treaty 
 was one of close alliance between Eussia and Afghani- 
 stan. It gave to Eussia complete control over the 
 Amir's foreign relations, with free and exclusive 
 commercial access to all parts of the country. And 
 it gave to the Amir and his selected heir the promise 
 of Eussian assistance in the suppression of domestic 
 rebellion or dynastic rivals, and the Eussian co- 
 operation for the reconquest of the Peshawur Valley 
 in the event of war between Eussia and England. 
 
 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 37 1 
 
 The following is a passage from General Eoberts's 
 report to the Government of India, dated Novem- 
 ber 22, 1879. 
 
 ' The magnitude of Sher Ali's military prepara- General 
 
 .. •• j?-r T • -n Boberts's 
 
 tions IS m my opmion a lact 01 peculiar sigmncance. report, 
 Before the outbreak of hostilities last year, the Amir November 22 
 had raised and equipped with arms of precision 
 sixty-eight regiments of infantry and sixteen of 
 cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to near 
 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were 
 constantly employed in the manufacture of rifles, 
 cannon, and breech-loading small-arms. More than 
 a million pounds of powder, and I believe several 
 million pounds of home-made Snider ammunition, 
 were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late 
 explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other 
 military equipments were stored in proportionate 
 quantities. Finally, Sher Ali had expended on the 
 construction of Sherpur cantonments an astonishing 
 amount of labour and mone3^ The extent and cost 
 of this work may be judged of from the fact that the 
 whole of the troops under my command w^ill find 
 cover during the winter within the cantonment and its 
 outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main 
 line of rampart itself, which extends to a h^ngtli of 
 nearly two miles under the southern and western 
 slopes of the Bemaru hills. Sher Ali's original design 
 was, apparently, to carry the wall round the hills, a 
 distance of five miles, and the foundations were laid 
 for a considerable portion of this length. All these 
 military preparations were quite unnecessary except 
 as a provision for contemplated hostilities with 
 ourselves. And it is difiicult to understand how 
 their entire cost could have been met from the 
 Afghan treasury, the gross revenue of the country 
 
 B B 2 
 
372 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 General 
 Roberts's 
 report, 
 November 22 
 
 Instructions 
 to General 
 Roberts from 
 Government 
 of India, 
 September 29 
 
 amounting onty to about eighty lacs of rupees per 
 annum.' 
 
 On the 28th of October General Eoberts had 
 written to the Viceroy : ' It is surprising to see 
 how much more Eussian than English Kabul is. 
 Eussian money, Eussian crockery, Eussian — or, 
 as they call it, Bokhara — silk, Eussian-cut clothes, 
 &c. The roads leading to Central Asia are not 
 better, perhaps, than those towards India, but the 
 Eussians have certainly taken more advantage of 
 their position than we have and have had apparently 
 much more to do with the commerce of the country 
 than we have had.' 
 
 The instructions, dated September 29, which 
 General Eoberts received from the Government of 
 India before starting for Kabul were purposely very 
 general in their character. The Viceroy desired that 
 he should be as little fettered as possible by regula- 
 tions which might prove inapplicable to the situation 
 he would find at Kabul. But, though general, these 
 instructions were very comprehensive. They ran as 
 follows : 
 
 ' As soon as you shall have established yourself 
 at Kabul you will institute a close investigation into 
 all the causes and circumstances of the outrage 
 which has compelled the British Government to 
 occupy the capital of His Highness the Amir. Upon 
 the question of the punishment which, after due 
 inquiry, it will be your duty to inflict as speedil}^ as 
 possible upon those who have abetted or participated 
 in the perpetration of this outrage. His Excellency the 
 Governor-General in Council desires me to commend 
 to your careful attention the following observations. 
 
 ' I am to point out, in the first place, that for an 
 ofience of this character the Afghan nation must be 
 
1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 2>7 O 
 
 held to be collectively responsible. It was a totally instructions 
 unprovoked and most barbarous attack by tlie Amir's RobJr'ts,^^ 
 soldiery, and by the people of his capital, upon the September 29 
 representative of an allied State, who was residing 
 under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, 
 in very close proximity to the Amir himself, and 
 whose personal safety and honourable treatment had 
 been solemnly guaranteed by the ruler of Afghanistan. 
 In the second place, I am to observe that the nature 
 and magnitude of the outrage leave no room for 
 doubt that it had its leaders and its instigators — that 
 certain persons must have taken a prominent part in 
 the attack on the Eesidency and in the murder of its 
 inmates ; while there is a strong presumption that 
 such an outbreak must have been fomented and 
 encouraged by persons of rank and influence. 
 Towards this latter conclusion all our present infor- 
 mation points, and it is corroborated by expressions 
 used in the letters written by the Amir himself after 
 the occurrence of the catastrophe. 
 
 ' The retribution to be exacted must accordingly 
 be adapted to the twofold character of the offence. 
 It must be imposed upon the Afghan nation in pro- 
 portion as the offence was national and as the 
 responsibility falls upon any particular community, 
 while it must also involve condign punishment of 
 those individuals who may be found guilt}^ of any 
 participation in the crime. In regard to the penalties 
 to be borne by the State, by the city, or by the people 
 generally, it would be premature in the present stage 
 of your operations to issue to you any specific direc- 
 tions. The imposition of a fine upon the city of 
 Kabul would be in accordance with justice and 
 precedent. The military precautions required for the 
 security of your position may necessitate the demoli- 
 
374 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. tiii 
 
 Instructions tioii of fortificatioiis, aud possibly the removal of 
 jRobcrts, buildings which may lie within the range of your 
 September 2D ^gf^j^^^^g qj. j^^y interfere with your control over the 
 city. In forming your plans for works of this kind 
 required by military exigencies, you will have the 
 opportunity of considering whether they can be com- 
 bined with any measures, compatible with justice and 
 humanity, for leaving a memorial of the retribution 
 exacted from the city in some manner and by some 
 mark that will not be easily obliterated.^ 
 
 ' In regard to the punishment of individuals, it 
 should be swift, stern, and impressive, without being 
 indiscriminate or immoderate. Its infliction must 
 not be delegated to subordinate officers of minor re- 
 sponsibility acting independently of your instructions 
 or supervision ; and you cannot too vigilantly main- 
 tain the discipline of the troops under your orders, 
 or superintend their treatment of the unarmed popula- 
 tion, so long as your orders are obeyed and your 
 authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in 
 the majority of cases with persons whose share in the 
 murder of anyone belonging to the British embassy 
 shall have been proved by your investigations ; but 
 while the execution of justice should be as public and 
 striking as possible, it should be completed with all 
 practicable expedition, since the indefinite prolonga- 
 tion of your proceedings might spread abroad un- 
 founded alarm. 
 
 ^ It does not appear that anj'thing of the kind was eventiiaUj^ done, 
 or that the fine, threatened in General Roberts's proclamation of 
 October 12, was levied. A violent explosion oceiuTed in the Bala 
 Hissar on October 16, in conseciuence of which it was decided to move 
 the troops into the Sherpiu' cantonment. . . . The removal to Sherpur 
 was efifected on November 9, but there is no record of the Bala Hissar 
 having been destroyed, either then or later. — Narrative of Events in 
 Afghanistan, p. 93. 
 
1879 GENEKAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 375 
 
 'Althouoii nothing can now be said in regard instructions 
 
 ^ ^ . . f A f 1 • + *° General 
 
 to the future internal administration ot Atgliamstan, Koberts, 
 the Government of India cannot ignore the possi- ^ptember 29 
 bihty of being forced to exercise over that administra- 
 tion a closer and more direct control than has 
 hitherto been contemplated or desired. It is, 
 therefore, especially important that during the period 
 of difficulty and disorganisation which must, it is 
 feared, be passed before a better and more settled 
 system of administration can be established the 
 people should learn from the strict discipline of our 
 army, and from the wise and upright proceedings of 
 our military and political officers, to look to the 
 strength and justice of the British Government as 
 their best guarantee for the future tranquillity of 
 their country.' 
 
 The military tribunal appointed by General 
 Eoberts to investigate the causes and circumstances 
 which led to the outbreak of September 3, and 
 further to undertake the actual trial of accused 
 persons, did not close their sittings till the end of 
 November, when eighty-seven persons had been tried 
 for complicity in the massacre or disobedience to 
 Lord Eoberts's proclamation, and had been executed. 
 
 The evidence collected by the Kabul Commission 
 for the purpose of determining whether, and to what 
 extent, the outbreak was premeditated, and the 
 responsibility which attached to the Amir Yakub 
 Khan in connection with it, was carefully considered 
 and analysed by a committee appointed by the 
 Viceroy, and composed of gentlemen possessing long 
 and varied experience in judicial investigation and 
 in deahng with the testimony of Asiatics. 
 
 Their conclusions were as follows: '(1) That 
 the massacre was not instigated by the Amir, or by 
 
;76 L0I;D LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Conclusions 
 of the Com- 
 mittee of In- 
 quiry on 
 Kabul Com- 
 
 Viceroy to 
 Secretary of 
 State, 
 October 23 
 
 his enemies, or by anyone else ; but that its actual 
 perpetrators proceeded altogether of their own 
 motion ; (2) that though the regiments that attacked 
 the Eesidency had, like other regiments in the Amir's 
 service, for some little time, and at all events since 
 the arrival of the troops from Herat, entertained 
 feelings of hostility towards the mission, the attack 
 was in no way premeditated by them, but was the 
 result of what may in a certain sense be termed 
 accidental circumstances; and (3) that, though the 
 Amir and his immediate advisers must be acquitted 
 of complicity in the attack on the Residency, they 
 were in a position to interpose effectively, when the 
 attack began, and while it was going on, for the 
 protection or rescue of the embassy ; that they were 
 at least culpably indifferent to the fate of the Envoy and 
 his companions ; and that they totally disregarded 
 the solemn obligations which they had undertaken 
 to protect the British embassy at Kabul.' While 
 accepting these conclusions, the Viceroy considered 
 that they erred on the side of leniency to the Amir, 
 and that they constituted sufficient grounds for 
 regarding the restoration of Yakub Khan to the 
 throne of Kabul as for ever out of the question. 
 
 With regard to our future policy Lord Lytton 
 wrote to Lord Cranbrook on October 23 : 
 
 ' October 23. 
 
 ' I entirely agree with jou. that nothing has 
 occurred, or is occurring, to justify a frightened 
 departure from the lines of a policy carefully con- 
 sidered -and deliberately adopted and followed thus 
 far. The Treaty of Gundamuk was undoubtedly the 
 result, the first definite result, of such a policy, and 
 I am confident that any violent deviation from that 
 policy in either direction would be a fatal error. 
 
1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE POLICY ^i^']'] 
 
 But the policy did not grow out of the Treaty, the To Secretary 
 Treaty grew of the poKcy, which always looked and october'23 
 saw far beyond it ; and in our despatch reviewing 
 the situation created by it, the Treaty was distinctly 
 recognised as the commencement, not the conclusion, of 
 a new era in our relations with Afghanistan. The 
 object of the policy which led up to the Treaty was 
 to secure with the minimum of effort, liability, and 
 cost to ourselves, but in any case to secure, a recog- 
 nised hold over Afghanistan sufficiently strong to 
 protect India from the serious dangers to which she 
 must be exposed by the hostility of any Afghan 
 ruler over whom she has no effectual control, bv the 
 anarchy of the Afghan provinces upon our border, or 
 by their subjection to foreign influence other than 
 our own. The method of the policy was to prosecute 
 the attainment of this object steadily, unswervingly,' 
 but without precipitancy, taking prompt advantage 
 of every favourable opportunity as it arose, fore- 
 stalling before it had arisen every danger that could 
 be foreseen within that period of time to which, in 
 the conduct of practical politics, the future is neces- 
 sarily limited, and opposing a firm front to every 
 difficulty which could not be averted ; doing, in 
 short, in each phase of the situation as time might 
 develop it, no more than was strictly necessary to 
 maintain the ground previously won and facilitate 
 progress to the goal not yet reached ; but never in 
 any phase of the situation doing less than this. 
 Unreservedly adopting that method, which I still 
 hold sound, I pointed out in all my letters written 
 before and during the late war, that all we required 
 for the present (which if secured would go far to 
 secure all our requirements in the future) could be 
 allowed at very moderate expenditure of military 
 
378 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIXISTEATIOX ch. viii 
 
 To Secretary aiid financial effort by arrangements similar to those 
 Octob^ei^W subsequently embodied in the Treaty of Gundamuk ; 
 but that the point we must always keep steadily in 
 view was the establishment of a firm hold upon that 
 portion of Afghan territory which lies within our 
 immediate reach up to the Hindu Kush and its 
 passes, along the line of the Helmund. For these 
 lines constitute the outer wall of our natural fortress. 
 It was, I considered, and still consider, most inex- 
 pedient to seize this position prematurely by force 
 so long as there was any reasonable prospect of 
 gradually securing it by other means ; but it was, I 
 thought, absolutely necessar}^ that if other means 
 failed, or if events beyond our control precipitated 
 the crisis we were anxious to avert, it should find 
 us ready and resolved to take up that position 
 without hesitation and dela}^ It appears to me that 
 this is precisely the situation in which we are now 
 placed. The object of the Treaty of Gundamuk 
 was to prevent nearly everything which has now 
 happened in spite of that Treaty, and which would 
 infallibly have happened sooner had we failed in 
 the negotiation of it — complete anarchy throughout 
 Afghanistan, the imminent necessity of forcibly 
 suppressing that anarchy, and the absolute impos- 
 sibility of doing so, or of exercising any peaceable 
 indirect control over its turbulent elements, by the 
 mere support of an independent or ^z^asf-independent 
 Afghan ruler. The Treaty was very carefully 
 considered and very carefully framed. I am con- 
 vinced that of the problem we were then dealing 
 with it was the wisest, safest, and soundest solution 
 that could have been adopted ; and to a situation 
 necessarily and notoriously pregnant with risks and 
 uncertainties, it opened at least the fairest possible 
 
1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTUEE POLICY 379 
 
 prospects. But the Treaty was, from the very nature To Seeretaiy 
 of the conditions which alone rendered it possible, octoiS^b 
 a somewhat delicate and artificial political structure 
 of a tentative character, avowedly dependent on 
 time and favourable chance for the gradual con- 
 solidation of it. If, under conditions apparently 
 favourable to its stability, the Treaty could not avert 
 the blow which has shattered it to fragments, and 
 suddenly let in upon us that deluge of embarrass- 
 ments which it was devised to keep out, is it not 
 idle to attempt to cope with those embarrassments 
 by clinging to the fragments of the Treaty ? Before 
 the confusion of tongues begins, we should hasten 
 to build Babylon from the bricks of Babel, otherwise 
 I fear we shall be pelted with stones taken from the 
 supposed ruins of our own policy. Of course we 
 cannot recede. But neither can we stand still. We 
 must advance if we would be safe. 
 
 'As regards Kabul and the Northern Afghan 
 provinces, it is quite premature, quite impossible, to 
 propound now a permanent programme. Our action 
 in this direction must be provisional ; but, though 
 provisional, it must also, I think, be prompt, plain, 
 and very firm, so far as it goes. In the complete 
 coUapse and disappearance of the Amir's authority, 
 the first instinct of every Afghan chief and tribe will 
 be to consider what and where is the strongest 
 power within reach — that is to say, the power best 
 able to hurt or help them quickly — and then to shape 
 their course in direct reference to the apparent 
 attitude and purpose of that power. In the con- 
 fusion, already general throughout Afghanistan, it is 
 the authority whose first utterance or action is free 
 from confusion that will inspire confidence or com- 
 mand obedience, and thus acquire support. If the 
 
380 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. viii 
 
 To Secretary populations and Sirdars of Northern Afghanistan are 
 October 23 promptly impressed with a conviction that the power 
 of the British Government is stronger, its purpose 
 more definite, and its action more likely to be swift 
 and decisive, than those of all the other forces which 
 will soon be rushing into every vacuum created by 
 the collapse of authority, then the British Govern- 
 ment will, without difficulty, "ride the whirlwind and 
 direct the storm." But if, on the other hand, their 
 first impression, however erroneous, is that the 
 British Government is as much embarrassed as they 
 are themselves by the surrounding chaos, that it is 
 waiting for the independent evolution of some politi- 
 cal nucleus not struck into being b)^ its creative fiat, 
 and that, its policy being dubious, its action is likely 
 to be dilatory, then I think the British Government 
 may have a very hot time of it in Afghanistan. 
 For this reason I think we should instantly take 
 public possession of the authority which falls from 
 the hand of the Amir into our own, and promptly, 
 although provisionally, enforce that authority, so far 
 as our practical power of enforcing extends, in every 
 direction. This, I think, is the first thing we have 
 to do in Northern Afghanistan, and we cannot do it 
 too soon for our own safety. The next step will be 
 either to proclaim our permanent retention of that 
 authority, or to transfer it, with very careful and 
 copious restrictions, to some sort of native govern- 
 ment.' 
 
 A suggestion was made to the Secretary of State 
 by Sir John McNeil to transfer the capital of Afghani- 
 stan from Kabul to Kandahar. Lord Lytton was 
 To General ^vcrse to the idea. ' If we permanently hold the 
 o°?^i3'i87q "^l^ole of Afghanistan . . . then Kabul will always be 
 a point of the highest strategic value to ourselves, 
 
1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE POLICY 38 1 
 
 and if we attempt to retain the whole of Afghanistan 
 under the rule of any single authority Kabul would 
 probably be a stronger political centre than Kandahar.' 
 While strongly advocating the separation of Kan- 
 dahar from Kabul as part of a policy of disintegra- 
 tion, he was not in favour of our direct annexation 
 of that province except under certain conditions. 
 The political and military importance of Kandahar 
 had always seemed to him somewhat over-estimated 
 by Sir H. Rawlinson and other eminent authorities, 
 and the only circumstance which in his opinion 
 would make our occupation of Kandahar an imme- 
 diate and imperative necessity would be the handing 
 over to Persia or any other Power the districts of 
 Herat and Seistan. 
 
 Writing of this to Lord Cranbrook on Novem- 
 ber 5 Lord Lytton says : 
 
 'I hope that the main question of our future To Lord 
 Afghan policy will be deliberately settled before we November's 
 deal with its details. If we decide to remain within 
 our present lines, I do not think it would be safe or 
 wise to give an inch of Afghan territory to Persia. 
 If we decide to annex Kandahar, I think that in that 
 case Seistan may be safely given to Persia. But I 
 should be sorry to see it given to Persia, unless we 
 intend to give her Herat also. ... If Her Majesty's 
 Government does not decide to annex Kandahar, 
 then I should extremely regret, and much fear, the 
 cession of Seistan to Persia.' 
 
 Although the Government at home did not 
 formally sanction the announcement of a policy of 
 disintegration for many weeks after our military 
 occupation of Kabul, Lord Cranbrook from the first 
 shared Lord Lytton's view that ' Afghanistan as a From Secre- 
 whole could no longer exist.' It was in reply to this 0c7i2^^^^^' 
 
382 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 expressed conviction that Lord Lytton T\'rote on 
 November 10. 
 To Lord ' I do not think you have come a day too soon 
 
 Ci-anbraok, ^q ^j-^g couclusion (in which I entirely concur) that 
 the administrative union of Afghanistan under one 
 central authority is no longer practically possible, 
 and that all our future action must be jjuided iDy this 
 conclusion. Taking that point as settled, however, 
 what I mean by adhesion to the lines of the Gundamuk 
 Treaty is the policy of endeavouring to secure the 
 objects of that Treaty by relations with the disin- 
 tecrrated Afsjhan provinces, not involvinor further 
 annexation on our part, or admitting annexation on 
 the part of any other Power ; and what I mean by 
 advancing beyond these lines is the policy of seeking 
 the same objects by a partition of Afghanistan, 
 resulting from early negotiations with one or both of 
 the two neighbouring Powers — Persia and Eussia.' 
 To this he was opposed. 
 
 ' With regard to Kandahar, General Stewart 
 and Major St. John are of opinion that Sher Ali 
 Klian, to whom we have temporarity given over the 
 government of Kandahar (where he represents the 
 rule of that branch of the old Durani race still 
 popular apparently in that part of Afghanistan), is 
 well able to hold his own and entirely subject to our 
 control. The}^ therefore, advise us to place under 
 his authority as large a portion of Western Afghani- 
 stan as that authority is competent to cover, with a 
 British cantonment at Peshin, close enough always 
 to support or control his Government whenever 
 necessary. Under this arrangement the Afghan 
 Governor of Kandahar would be not only our 
 nominee but also our tributary ; that is to say, he 
 would pay us tribute for the authority delegated to 
 
1879 VICEROY'S PROGRAMME 383 
 
 him, and thus Western Afghanistan would, without To Lord 
 annexation, become one of the tributary States of November 10 
 the Indian Empire. It might, perhaps, be advisable Policy of an 
 that it should be so called in our State Papers, and westem ^" 
 so marked upon our maps. It certainly seems pre- ^fg^iamstan 
 ferable that we should receive trihute from any Afghan 
 authority capable of maintaining oiir interests in 
 Afo'hanistan, than that he should receive from us 
 a subvention for the support of his oimi interests. 
 But, in the details of the Kandahar administration, 
 General Stewart and Major St. John would recom- 
 mend complete non-interference so long as the 
 tribute is paid. They would, therefore, place no 
 British Eesident at Kandahar, where they would have 
 only a British dispensary, and the number of British 
 employes necessary for the requirements of the 
 telegraph and railway when completed. The 
 political officer, who would be our local medium of 
 communication with the Kandahar Government, they 
 would locate, where our cantonment is located, at 
 Peshin. They agree in affirming that our military 
 position would be in no wise strengthened by the 
 annexation or permanent occupation of Kandahar, 
 whilst our current expenditure would be perhaps 
 increased, and our political control over Western 
 Afghanistan weakened, by any such step. I give 
 their conclusions without troubling you in detail 
 with all the arguments on which they are based. 
 These conclusions seem to me sensible and well 
 considered, but they rest on the assumption that no 
 large cession of Afghan territory will be made to 
 Persia in the immediate neighbourhood of Kanda- 
 har. . . . Assuming that we do not permanently 
 occupy or administer Kabul, I think it will be 
 advisable to establish a fairly strong British canton- 
 
384 LOED LYTTON'S INDL\N ADMmiSTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord meiit at some point rather nearer to Kabul than the 
 
 November 10 Shutargardan, which is at present our most advanced 
 military station on that line. . . . 
 
 ' If we decide not to annex Kabul, I presume 
 that our object will be to reduce to the utmost, 
 rather than augment, the importance of that place, 
 and assuming the establishment of an advanced 
 British cantonment, say at Kushi, perhaps our best 
 course would be to entrust the administration of 
 Kabul to the most competent and least untrustworthy 
 Sirdar Eoberts can recommend for that purpose. 
 His Government, which would have its seat at Kabul, 
 might be advantageously, and I should think without 
 difficulty, extended to Gliuzni and Bamian. These 
 places would thus be brought under an authority 
 subject to our immediate control. . . . With British 
 garrisons within close striking distance of Kabul and 
 Kandahar, their respective Governments would be 
 permanently dependent upon our own, and practically 
 unable to disregard our commands. It is obviously 
 impossible to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan 
 Withdrawal ^^^^^ wiutcr. It would bc vcry inadvisable to withdraw 
 to be preceded them ucxt Spring, whcn their presence beyond the 
 ^ " '^ ^^^ frontier, after the melting of the snows, will enable us 
 to deal quickly and effectually with those tribes against 
 whom we liave long standing scores to pay off. I 
 unreservedly share your conclusion that these tribes 
 will never be good neighbours till they have been 
 well thrashed. However strong their conviction of 
 the reality of our power and the necessity of sub- 
 mission to it, it is with them a point of tribal honour 
 not to submit without compulsion ; after which I 
 have little doubt that they will, in course of time, 
 prove just as sensible as other savages have hitherto 
 proved in all other parts of the world of the profits 
 
 missioa 
 
1879 VICEROY'S PROGRAMME 385 
 
 and pleasures, when once tasted, of more peaceable To Lord 
 pursuits. We can afford to pay them when we have November' 
 punished them, but not to pay them instead of Future policy 
 punishing them, and at the bottom of our present tribes 
 relations with them still lies the old question of 
 mastery which precedes the alliance between the 
 man and the horse — a question which once settled, 
 and well settled, is generally settled for ever. The 
 sooner, therefore, that the necessary preliminary 
 thrashings are got over, the better will it be for all 
 concerned. Hitherto our dealino-s with the tribal 
 question have been unavoidably checked and re- 
 strained by the paramount importance of not 
 disturbing the Afghan question which lay beyond it. 
 That hindrance to effectual action is now withdrawn ; 
 and we shall have, next spring, a golden opportunity 
 of thoroughly completing, in two or three months, 
 what ma)?" otherwise be the desultory work of as 
 many years and more. For this reason I trust that 
 it will not be necessary to withdraw our troops next 
 spring. But if they are not then withdrawn, it will 
 be impossible to withdraw them next summer without 
 risk of serious injury to their health. I therefore 
 assume that the shortest period within which we can 
 complete the evacuation of Afghanistan will not 
 expire before the autumn of next year. Long ere 
 then General Eoberts will, I trust, have visited 
 Bamian, and possibly either he or General Stewart 
 may also be able to visit Ghuzni. I am told that 
 there already exists a short route, susceptible of 
 easy development, from Shutargardan straight to 
 Bamian, which leaves Kabul entirely on one side. 
 Should this turn out to be the case, the establishment 
 of that route would probably bring the great main 
 outpost of the Hindu Kush well within our military 
 
 c c 
 
386 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord 
 
 Cranbrook, 
 
 November 
 
 Pro^'ramme 
 for future of 
 Afghanistan 
 
 tether, and thus reduce Kabul to ahnost complete 
 insignificance. ... In any case, independently of 
 the information we still require about the resources 
 and conditions of some parts of the country, and 
 on other points similar to those already indicated, 
 I should anticipate very valuable permanent results 
 from our present occupation of Northern and 
 Western Afghanistan if it be prolonged till the 
 autumn of next year. I believe that, when then 
 evacuating the countr}', we shall probably leave the 
 populations of all the occupied districts not only 
 under a very wholesome sense of the irresistible 
 character of our power, and the folly and danger of 
 trifling with it, but also with a lively and suggestive 
 recognition of the practical benefits derived from the 
 settled order, social security, and commercial fair 
 dealing which everywhere accompany the presence 
 of the British Power. It has been strongly urged 
 upon me, in favour of the annexation or permanent 
 occupation of Kabul, that, whatever construction we 
 ourselves may put upon our evacuation of the 
 captured city, our withdrawal from it will infallibly 
 be regarded by the Afghans as a proof of our 
 inability or fear to retain possession of their capital. 
 I fully admit that if the evacuation of Kabul were an 
 isolated step, and if it were taken prematurely or 
 clumsily, it would most probably have this effect. 
 But if it is taken delil^erately, as part of a previously 
 enforced re-settlement of Northern and Western 
 Afghanistan, after our troops have visited Bamian 
 and moved freely about the country in all directions, 
 after that country has been allotted to small separate 
 local Governments, subject to our authority, after 
 Kabul itself has ceased to be the capital of Afghani- 
 stan, and when its population will have been dis- 
 
1879 POLICY OF DISINTEGEATION SANCTIONED 387 
 
 armed and its fortifications destroyed, then, I cannot To Lord 
 think that our prestige will in any wise require the Novmiiber' 
 permanent occupation of a town which our policy 
 will have reduced to insignificance and which our 
 Generals already consider unsuitable for permanent 
 occupation. . . . The programme thus far indicated 
 would, I think, if successfully carried out give us 
 practical supremacy over Afghan territory up to the 
 Hindu Kush and the Helmund. It would do this, 
 moreover, without any appreciable annexation of 
 Afghan territory, or addition to our present military 
 establishment, and with some slight increase of 
 revenue.' 
 
 Pending the decision of the Government with New Frontier 
 regard to the future of Afghanistan Lord Lytton felt ^^^^^^^^^ 
 the urgent necessity of improving as speedily as 
 possible our railway communication with Afghanistan. 
 Work was at once set on foot, designed as part of 
 a general system of frontier railways, and destined, 
 it was hoped, to secure our hold on Kandahar, and to 
 be also of great commercial advantage. This was the 
 construction of a railway from Eukh, on the Indus 
 Yalley line, towards Pishin and the Durani capital. 
 The prosecution of the work was supervised with 
 such energy by Sir E. Temple, the Governor of 
 Bombay, that by the middle of ISTovember it had 
 been carried forty-five miles beyond Eukh, and on 
 January 14 following the line was opened to Sibi, 
 beyond the Kachi desert, 140 miles from the Indus. ^ 
 
 It was not till December 11 that the Secretary of 
 State communicated to the Viceroy the conviction of 
 the Cabinet that the establishment of one Government 
 for the whole of the late kingdom of Afghanistan 
 was no longer possible, and would give no promise 
 
 ^ Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
 cc 2 
 
LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vin 
 
 Correspon- 
 dence with 
 Persia 
 
 Yakub Khan 
 loaves Kabul, 
 December 1 
 
 of permanence. But while contemplating the estab- 
 lishment of independent native States at Kabul and 
 Kandahar, necessarily under our control, they had 
 seriously to consider the future of the more distant 
 and outlying provinces. 
 
 The correspondence which this year was con- 
 ducted between the English Foreign Office and the 
 Government of Persia with regard to Herat and 
 Seistan, and to which allusion has been made in the 
 Viceroy's letters, had an important bearing on the 
 policy adopted by the Indian Government concerning 
 Kandahar and the Western States of Afghanistan. 
 These negotiations eventually came to nothing, and 
 need not, therefore, be here detailed ; but it is necessarj^ 
 to point out that it was in view of the probabihty of 
 Herat and Seistan being handed over to the in- 
 dependent power of Persia that Lord Lytton first 
 held it essential for Kandahar to be secured to British 
 control. 
 
 While these questions of general policy were 
 under discussion the situation at Kabul was growing 
 more difficult. It has already been stated that upon 
 the report of the committee of inquiry into the 
 Kabul massacres, the Government had decided that 
 Yakub Khan's restoration was impossible. After this 
 decision his continued residence in General Eoberts's 
 camp became embarrassing, and the necessary 
 instructions were issued for his removal to India. 
 Yakub Khan, who was himself anxious to depart, 
 left Kabul for India on December 1. He arrived at 
 Meerut on December 14, where he was placed under 
 honourable surveillance. He was followed on 
 December 7 by all the sirdars save one, who had 
 been arrested on October 12. They were sent to 
 Lahore as State prisoners. The Mustaufi, however. 
 
1879 TRIBAL RISING ROUND KABUL 389 
 
 was released by General Eoberts, being credited 
 with a favourable disposition towards the British 
 Government, while it was hoped that his knowledge 
 and influence micjht be of use in the nianao:ement of 
 the country. The departure of the Amir and his 
 ministers was followed by a general rising of the 
 tribes round Kabul. The danger of this had from 
 the first been contemplated by Lord Lytton. On 
 October 21 he had written to Lord Eoberts, ' My 
 fear is that when the Afghan people and tribes have 
 fully realised all that is involved in the Amir's abdi- 
 cation they may begin to form hostile combinations, 
 likely ere long to increase our troubles.' By the 
 time the Government had openly resolved to break 
 up the kingdom of Afghanistan into separate states, 
 a ruler for Kandahar had been found in the shape of 
 Sher Ali Khan, but no such figure had as yet appeared 
 in the Northern provinces, and Lord Lytton held, as 
 has been shown, that no peaceful settlement for those 
 provinces could be expected till fresh evidence had 
 been given of the force of our military supremacy. 
 He was not therefore unprepared for the events which 
 now took place. 
 
 ' Throughout the districts round Kabul the mullahs, j^igijj„ ^^^^^ 
 or religious teachers, headed by one influential and Kabul {Sir 
 patriotic preacher (Mushk-i-Alam), proclaimed war 
 against the infidel; and early in December there 
 was a great mustering of the tribes, who threatened 
 Kabul from various points, while true intelligence 
 of their movements became ominously scarce. The 
 clear account given by Eoberts of his dispositions 
 for meeting the impending attack, and of the pre- 
 liminary skirmishing with the converging bodies of 
 the enemy that were gradually surrounding him, 
 will interest all students of British warfare ; the 
 
390 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Fighting in 
 the Chardeh 
 
 Valley 
 
 From Lord 
 
 Eoberts's 
 
 Narrative 
 
 {Forty-one 
 
 Years in 
 
 India) 
 
 explosive collision occurred in the Chardeh Valley, 
 where a party of cavalry and horse artillery was un- 
 expectedly attacked, while making a reconnaissance, 
 by overwhelming numbers, and forced to retire with 
 some loss upon the entrenchments at Sherpur. The 
 officer in command found himself closely pressed on 
 his left flank, which was also his line of retreat, by a 
 determined enemy who was closing in upon him in 
 such loose order that the fire of his four guns was 
 quite ineffectual. 
 
 " It was at this critical moment that I appeared on 
 the scene. Warned by the firing that an engagement was 
 taking place, I galloped across the Chardeh Valley as fast 
 as my horse could carry me, and on gaining the open 
 ground beyond Bhagwana an extraordinary spectacle was 
 presented to my view. An unbroken line, extending for 
 about two miles, and formed of not less than between 
 9,000 and 10,000 men, was moving rapidly towards me, all 
 on foot save a small body of cavalry on their left flank^in 
 fact, the greater part of Mahomed Jan's army." 
 
 ' The various groups of clansmen were arrayed 
 under their different banners, like the army of Lars 
 Porsena with its thirty tribal standards at the battle 
 of Lake Eegillus ; and, to save his guns, Eoberts 
 ordered the cavalry to charge. 
 
 " But the ground, terraced for irrigation purposes 
 and intersected by dykes, so impeded our cavalry that the 
 charge, heroic as it was, made little or no impression 
 upon the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, now flushed 
 with the triumph of having forced our guns to retire." 
 
 ' The Afghans rushed on, drawing their knives 
 for close quarters ; one gun had to be spiked and 
 abandoned in a water cut, and the artillery fell back, 
 after another stand, until they were stopped " by a 
 
1879 GENEEAL ROBEETS WITHDRAWS TO SHEEPUE 391 
 
 ditch fully twelve feet deep, narrowing towards tlie Fighting in 
 bottom," when one gun stuck fast, blocking the others, vaiif''''^^'^ 
 so that all four guns were for the time lost, and the 
 cavalry could only retire slowly, with great steadi- 
 ness, by alternate squadrons. The consequence 
 might have been more serious if Macpherson, who 
 was out with a force not far distant, and who 
 marched back at full speed toward the sound of 
 cannon, had not arrived just in time to stop the 
 enemy by throwing the 72nd Highlanders into a gap 
 by which the road passed through the hills immedi- 
 ately overhanging Kabul city. 
 
 'This affair, and the handling of overmatched 
 troops in a most perilous predicament, led to much 
 subsequent discussion, but for details we must refer 
 military critics to Lord Eoberts's ample narrative. 
 As the Afghans had now seized and fortified the 
 heights above Kabul, which was in their hands, it 
 was resolved to dislodge them from their most 
 formidable position on the crest of the Takht-i-Shar. 
 But the slopes leading up the hillside " were covered 
 with huge masses of jagged rocks, intersected by 
 perpendicular cliffs, while its natural strength was 
 increased by breastworks and stockades ; " so that 
 our best troops only drove off the obstinate defenders 
 after a very severe and deadly struggle. Meanwhile, 
 large masses of Afghans were seen coming up in such 
 numbers that the young officer whose station com- 
 manded a view of the open valley signalled that the 
 crowd reminded him of Epsom on the Derby Day. 
 Eoberts found himself reluctantly compelled to 
 evacuate all his isolated positions, and to withdraw 
 his whole force within the great walled enclosure 
 which he had carefully fortified and provisioned 
 beforehand at Sherpur. 
 
392 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 General « A retreat before Afo-hans, to wliom any symptom 
 
 Roberts „ . . - ■, n -, • -, "^ . "^ ,^ 
 
 withdraws his oi wavermg IS a Signal tor cnargmg home, is always 
 Sherpur ^ hazardous operation ; and on this occasion the 
 
 British General had every reason for anxiety. 
 
 " The ground was all in favour of the Afghans, who, 
 unimpeded by impedimenta of any kind, swarmed down 
 upon the mere handful of men retreating before them, 
 shouting cries of victory and brandishing their long knives ; 
 but our brave men, inspired by the undaunted bearing of 
 their officers, were absolutely stead}^ They took up position 
 after position with perfect coolness ; every movement was 
 carried out with as much precision as if they were man- 
 oeuvring on an ordinary field-day ; and the killed and 
 wounded were brought away without the slightest hurry 
 or confusion." 
 
 ' Within Sherpur the British force remained com- 
 paratively untroubled for some days, until the dawn 
 of a festival religiously observed by Mohammedans, 
 which fell on December 23. 
 
 " The night of the 22nd was undisturbed, save by the 
 songs and cries of the Afghans outside the walls, but just 
 before day the flames of the signal-fire, shooting upwards 
 from the topmost crag of the Asmai range, were plainly to 
 be seen, followed on the instant by a burst of firing." 
 
 Final ef ort of ' The enemy, advancing through the dim lialf- 
 succSmIv ligl^t in heavy masses, was received with volleys of 
 repelled caniioii and rifles, until, after the failure of repeated 
 
 assaults, a flank attack completed his discomfiture. 
 The defence was admirable ; nor is it possible to 
 withhold our sympathy and admiration for the 
 devoted gallantry of the Afghans, who, though they 
 were ill armed, undisciplined, and unprotected by 
 artillery, persevered for hours in the hopeless enter- 
 prise of storming formidable entrenchments under the 
 
1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AGAIN AT KABUL 393 
 
 deadly fire that swept the open ground in front, and 
 spent their hves by hundreds in endeavouring to 
 scale the abattis. They perished bravely in their 
 patriotic resolve to dislodge, by one supreme effort, 
 the foreign invader who had fixed himself in the 
 heart of their country. 
 
 ' When that effort failed, the backbone of the tribal 
 insurrection was broken, and the country round 
 Kabul subsided into sullen tranquillity, although 
 parties sent into the outlying tracts had to fight 
 their way.' ^ 
 
 The city of Kabul was re-occupied by the British Amnesty pio- 
 troops, and on the 26th the amnesty conditional December 26 
 on submission was proclaimed to all concerned in 
 the late events, with the exception of a few speci- 
 fied individuals, whose cases would be reserved for 
 instructions from the Government of India. 
 
 Arrangements were made for the temporary 
 administration of the Kabul Province, pending the 
 final orders of Government, by Sirdar Wall Ma- 
 homed, and on January 15 he was placed in charge 
 of the city and district of Kabul, when martial law 
 in that district was declared to be at an end.^ 
 
 The Viceroy wrote on December 9 to Lord To Lord 
 Cranbrook : ' I have always fully reckoned, as a §ecember^9 
 certainty, upon a general rising of the country about 
 Kabul next spring ; and what has now occurred is 
 only unforeseen in so far as it has occurred much 
 sooner than I expected, with less warning, and on 
 a larger scale. . . . However difiicult the situation 
 may be, and however heavy the losses which may 
 be inevitably involved in it, I have now implicit 
 confidence that under the present commands things 
 
 1 Sir Alfred Lyall. 
 
 - Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
;94 LOKD LYTTOX'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord 
 Cranbrook, 
 December 9 
 
 Danger of 
 wearing out 
 Native Army 
 
 December 81 
 Viceroy 
 resists the 
 demand for 
 big battalions 
 
 cannot go radically wrong, that our forces will be well 
 handled, and that with such forces under such officers 
 there is no chance of any irreparable disaster. . . . 
 Meantime what we really want is not more British 
 troops, but a timely addition to the strength of our 
 native army, on which we must at all times mainly 
 depend for military operations or garrison duty in 
 Afghanistan. 
 
 ' I consider that our greatest danger at the 
 present moment (and it is, I think, a very real and 
 imminent one) is the danger of wearing out our native 
 army. I do not think we can employ native troops 
 for lengthened periods beyond the North- West 
 Frontier without serious risk of injury to their spirit. 
 While they are actually fighting they will keep in 
 fairly good heart, but what tries and disgusts them is 
 picket and escort duty during the long dead seasons 
 of trans-frontier service, and the unpopularity of such 
 duty amongst the native troops is aggravated by the 
 fact that the burden of it must unavoidably fall on 
 them more heavily than on the Europeans, who 
 are not so well able to stand exposure to the 
 climate.' 
 
 On December 31 he writes: 'The Ancjlo-Indian 
 Press has behaved throughout the crisis ignobly. In 
 a paroxysm of panic, it has been for the last week 
 daily predicting (with an apparently enthusiastic 
 satisfaction at the prospect) irreparable disasters ; 
 and now that all its silly predictions are falsified by 
 the event it systematically ignores our success. I do 
 hope that our military authorities will not encourage 
 the foolish cry (which always re-arises on occasions 
 like this) for " big battalions " in a country where it 
 is almost impossible to feed even small ones. Had I 
 given in to this cry at the outset of the campaign. 
 
1879 VICEROY'S COMMENTS 395 
 
 what would have been the position of General Eoberts To Secretary 
 during the last week ? Absolutely untenable. I December 31 
 should have thought that the disasters of the 
 Eussians in the Attrek might have convinced the 
 believers in " big battalions," here and at home, of 
 the irrational character of their clamour as regards 
 warfare in a barren and barbarous country. The 
 Duke of Wellington, I think, said of his Peninsular 
 campaign : " Any General can fight an army, few 
 can feed one." And the supply difficulties of a 
 Spanish campaign were as nothing to those of an 
 Afghan one. ... I regard the quiet, methodical 
 rapidity with which, under inconceivably difficult 
 conditions, Eoberts has collected at Sherpur five 
 months' food and three months' forage, with abundant 
 firewood for his whole force, and the foresight with 
 which, from the first day of his arrival at Kabul, he 
 has been steadily fortifying that position for defence, 
 as his two greatest military achievements, although 
 doubtless the importance of them will never be fully 
 appreciated by the public. ... I wish I could 
 strengthen his political staff, and I am trying to do 
 so ; but the worst of it is that Afghanistan is a terra 
 incognita to all our present politicals. The best of 
 them is comparatively useless in a country which he 
 enters for the first time, and with whose influential 
 people he has not previously established personal 
 relations. What we sorely need is a small picked 
 poHtical service, specially trained for Afghan work — Political 
 a service of natives as well as Europeans. For in agents 
 
 . . required 
 
 Afghanistan subordinate native agents more or less 
 belonging to the country are invaluable — indeed 
 indispensable — and I cannot find even these native 
 agents fit for employment there.' 
 
 The state and prospect of affairs in Afghanistan 
 
396 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. viii 
 
 Necessity for 
 ending 
 British 
 occupation 
 of Kabul 
 
 Yakub Khan's 
 abdication 
 pvoclaimed 
 irrevocable 
 
 at this time presented to the Indian Government 
 some difficult, and possibly dangerous, problems. 
 Kabul and Kandahar, with their lines of communica- 
 tion towards India, were held in strength by British 
 garrisons and posts; and the districts adjoining these 
 two cities were under the control of British officers. 
 But the range of our effective administration or 
 influence went no further ; so that the country at 
 large was without a Government, except at Herat, 
 where Ayub Khan, one of Sher All's sons, had 
 managed to maintain himself in power. In short, 
 as we held only the ground that was more or less 
 under military occupation, and as we could neither 
 consolidate nor extend our position, the whole course 
 of operations, military and political, was coming to a 
 standstill — a condition that was clearly to our dis- 
 advantage, as it inspired no confidence and seemed 
 to invite attack. The Government of India was there- 
 fore under the imperative necessity of finding some 
 definite issue from this attitude of pause and 
 uncertainty. The first point of importance was to 
 take some final decision on the case of Yakub IQian, 
 then a political detenu in India. After the dispersion 
 of the tribal combination in December, General 
 Eoberts had received letters from the leaders, con- 
 taining a demand for Yakub Khan's restoration, or 
 for the recognition of his son, Musa Khan ; and other 
 similar letters had been sent to him from Ghuzni, 
 including one from Musa Klian himself. 
 
 The Viceroy, with the approval of the Secretary 
 of State, instructed General Eoberts to proclaim in 
 Kabul that Yakub Khan's abdication was irrevocable, 
 and this was accordingly done. The opportunity 
 was taken to declare to the Afghans that no lari^e 
 territorial annexations were contemplated, and that 
 
1880 THE EEC ALL OF YAKUB IMPOSSIBLE 397 
 
 the British Government were quite wilHng to recog- 
 nise a friendly ruler at Kabul selected by the people 
 themselves. 
 
 In a private letter to Lord Cranbrook, dated 
 January 20, 1880, the Viceroy explained the reasons 
 for which Yakub Khan had been set aside, and 
 also sketched out the lines upon which he desired to 
 proceed in dealing with the general question of the 
 future constitution of a Government or Governments 
 in Afghanistan : — 
 
 ' As regards Yakub Khan. I consider his restora- To Lord 
 tion to be out of the question. The reasons which, january^lo, 
 in my opinion, render it impossible are twofold. The ^^^^ 
 main one is that the blood of Cavagnari is on his 
 hands. The committee appointed by me at Calcutta 
 under the presidency of Mr. Elvers Thompson has 
 taken, as you will have seen, a lenient view of the 
 Amir's case ; but it does not, and cannot, absolve 
 him from all responsibility for the death of those 
 whose lives it is certain he might have preserved 
 had he chosen to do so. For my part, I sympathise 
 with those officers at Peshawur who refused to shake 
 hands with Yakub Khan when he arrived there on 
 his way to India ; and, as Cavagnari's personal friend, 
 nothing on earth will ever induce me to aid in 
 restoring to power the man whose hand is imbued 
 in Cavagnari's blood. If Her Majesty's Government 
 think otherwise on this point — and it is one on 
 which I anticipate that our decision will be de- 
 nounced by the Opposition — I must resign. There 
 will be no help for it. But I am confident that Her 
 Majesty's Government will not think otherwise. 
 Putting aside all personal feelings, it seems to me 
 that every consideration of policy and common sense 
 is conclusive against the restoration of Yakub Khan. 
 
198 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. Tin 
 
 To Lord 
 Cranbrook, 
 January 20, 
 1880 
 
 Arguments 
 against the 
 restoration of 
 Yakub Khan 
 
 In the first place, you will notice that the insurgent 
 leaders treat the massacre of the whole British 
 embassy as an unfortunate, but natural and rather 
 trivial, accident which could not be helped, and about 
 which it is absurd to make such a fuss. The 
 suddenly altered language of Yakub Khan himself is 
 also pitched in this key. Now, I am sure you will 
 agree with me that the first duty of the Government 
 of India in this matter is to make the Afghan people 
 understand once for all, and for ever, that the 
 murder of British Envoys is not a trivial accident, but 
 a most heinous crime, for which all concerned in it 
 will sufier severely. It is to effect this object that 
 our forces have re-entered Afghanistan. It is the 
 complete attainment of this object which seems to 
 me the first guarantee for any better understanding 
 or relation with the Afghan people, and assuredly 
 this object will never be attained if the British 
 Government by its action in restoring the Amir, under 
 whose protection our Envoy was murdered, were to 
 acquiesce in the view taken of that murder by the 
 writers of these letters, and apparently more or less 
 by the ex- Amir himself. In the next place, the basis 
 on which we have now deliberately settled our 
 present Afghan policy is the disintegration of the late 
 Afohan kingdom. . . . But if Yakub Khan either 
 could not or would not loyally carry out the mild 
 terms of the Treaty of Gundamuk ; if he and his friends 
 now say that we were fools to expect from him the 
 loyal fulfilment of such terms, although, when he 
 signed them, he was a free agent ; if he now repudiates 
 the abdication which he was thrice asked to withdraw 
 at the time when he made it ; if he declares, as he 
 has declared, that this abdication was extorted from 
 him by ungenerous and cruel pressure, and that we 
 
1880 THE RECALL OF YUKUB I:MP0SSIBLE 399 
 
 have no right to hold him to it and no reason to To Lord 
 expect him to abide by it : is it conceivable that he, January 26, 
 now virtually a State prisoner at Meerut, should, if ^^^^ 
 restored by us to the throne of Kabul, abide one 
 moment longer than he can possibly help by the 
 terms of any agreement with us, however solemnly 
 ratified, that is based on the dismemberment of his 
 kingdom, the permanent alienation of two of its 
 fairest provinces,^ and the gift of one of them, by a 
 foreign Power, to such an hereditary and hated rival 
 as Persia ? He might be treacherous enough, perhaps, 
 to sign such an agreement, but it could not last. If 
 he adhered to it, his Sirdars would rightly despise 
 him as the representative of an unprecedented series 
 of national humiliations. They would soon cabal 
 against him ; and, if we were not prepared once 
 more to intervene and support in arms this worthless 
 creature against the contempt and indignation of all 
 his subjects, he would swiftly be swept away by 
 them. On the other hand, if, as soon as restored by 
 us to the throne of a diminished kingdom, he openly 
 repudiated, or practically evaded, the conditions on 
 which we had restored him, we should have again 
 to intervene for the vindication of a violated treaty 
 against a sovereign who might, perhaps, be enthusi- 
 astically supported by the whole fighting power of 
 the country, and in a cause for which we could not 
 possibly expect any sympathy from any party in 
 Afghanistan. Every one of the arguments now put 
 forth to excuse the disregard of the Gundamuk en- 
 gagement, and the withdrawal of the Kabul abdica- 
 tion, could then be urged against us with infinitely 
 greater truth and justice ; and the British Govern- 
 ment would, in my opinion, be deservedly covered 
 
 ^ Kandahar and Herat. 
 
400 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 To Lord with clerisioii and contempt as the threefold dupe of 
 
 Cranbrook, . i_'T. ii t^ • 
 
 January 20, its own stupiQity, the betrayer oi its own cause, 
 ^^^^ and the renegade of its most sacred duty to the dead 
 
 as well as to the living. Assuming, therefore, the 
 absolute impossibility of restoring Yakub Klian to 
 power at the demand of those who have signed the 
 letters to General Eoberts, and recosinisini? also the 
 
 ^ DO 
 
 impossibility of keeping him at Meerut without 
 needlessly vexatious restrictions on his liberty and 
 that of his household, I propose to remove him as 
 soon as possible to Ootacamund, or to some station 
 in the Neilgherries, where I think he would be out of 
 harm's way. ... I think that if Yakub is removed 
 to the furthest possible distance from the Afghan fron- 
 tier, no avoidable restrictions should be placed on his 
 liberty. Precautions should be taken to prevent his 
 escape ; but, subject to such precautions, I would 
 propose to allow him every possible comfort and 
 personal liberty.' ^ 
 
 In South Afghanistan, the news of the insurrection 
 around Kabul and the general feeling of suspense in 
 regard to our eventual policy, had alarmed Sirdar 
 Slier Ali Khan, who governed with our support at 
 Kandahar, and some clear declaration of our inten- 
 tions became urgently required. Accordingly, with 
 the approval of the Secretary of State, the Govern- 
 ment of India now decided publicly to announce to 
 Sirdar Sher Ali Khan that the province of Kandahar 
 would be permanently detached from Kabul, and 
 placed under his hereditary rulership, and that we 
 would pledge ourselves to give him military 
 support. This decision was communicated by 
 General Stewart to the Sirdar, who accepted with 
 
 ^ Yakub Khan is living under surveillance at Mussourie in India. — 
 B.B. May 20, 1899. 
 
1880 KANDAHAR 4OI 
 
 crratitude the arrangement, but earnestly desired Treaty with 
 that the British auxiliary force should be can- AifoVKumi 
 toned within the immediate neighbourhood of the ^^^^'' "^p"' 
 city. On April 1, 1880, Sir Donald Stewart, who 
 had commanded at Kandahar since its occupation 
 in 1879, started for Kabul; and it was left for 
 Colonel St. John, the political Eesident, to deliver 
 to the Sirdar a letter from the Viceroy, an- 
 nouncing to him that he had been recognised as 
 the independent ruler of the province of Kandahar. 
 This important State paper was afterwards formally 
 presented to him in the presence of a large assemblage 
 of notables. In the speech which Colonel St. John 
 then made he used these words : ' In order that this 
 condition of peace and prosperity may continue, and 
 that it may not return to its former state of poverty 
 and wretchedness, the Government of England has 
 decided to restore it to its ancient independence under 
 the most worthy and capable descendant of its former 
 Governor, the Sirdar of Kandahar, whose rule only 
 ceased twenty-five years ago. Under the just govern- 
 ment of Wali Sher Ali Khan, and under the pro- 
 tection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, 
 remain for ever free from foreign oppression, and 
 will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity 
 that it will be the envy of the whole of Islam.' 
 
 The Wali made a short speech in reply, expres- 
 sive of his own unworthiness and his gratitude to the 
 English Government. The Viceroy's presents were 
 then brought forward and uncovered. The first, 
 consisting of a sword mounted in blue velvet and 
 silver with a heavy gold embroidered belt, was 
 buckled round the Wall's waist by General Primrose, 
 upon which His Highness said that he trusted he might 
 have an opportunity of showing his readiness to draw 
 
 D D 
 
402 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Treaty of it in the causG of the British Government. Colonel 
 Aii of St. John then placed a diamond-studded repeater 
 
 Kandahar watcli and gold chain round His Highness's neck, and 
 presented him with the rest of the gifts. The Guard 
 of Honour presented arms, and a salute of twenty-one 
 guns was fired by the artillery. His Highness then re- 
 ceived the congratulations of all present, and the Kazi 
 and Mullahs offered a prayer in Pushtu, expressive of 
 thanks to God and exhortation to the Wali to govern 
 justly. To this he replied in the same language, 
 exhorting them also to do their duty in keeping the 
 people in the right way. The ceremony then ended. 
 In public everything had gone off well, but in the 
 new ruler's domestic circle matters were not quite so 
 harmonious. It subsequently transpired that after 
 leaving the assemblage the Wali retired to his private 
 apartments, where he took off his dress of ceremony, 
 and, after placing a black rag (expressive of humility) 
 on his head, offered up open prayers to God for 
 having elevated liiin to so exalted a position, vowing 
 at the same time to be faithful to the British Go- 
 vernment which had so honoured him. This pro- 
 duced an outburst of wrath from his niece and 
 from one of his father's widows, who abused him lor 
 joining the infidels and for daring to compare himself 
 with his ancestors. The Wall's favourite wife took 
 his part, and there was a violent quarrel.^ 
 
 In North Afghanistan, the prospect of any definite 
 settlement seemed, at the beginning of 1880, to be 
 still distant and unpromising, and the Viceroy's 
 anxiety to terminate a provisional military occupation 
 was increasing. As one step towards a solution 
 Griffin goes to ^^ ^^^^ Complications at Kabul, he deputed Mr. 
 Stiarch'^''^ (now Sir) Lepel Griffin to undertake the whole 
 
 ^ Narative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 403 
 
 diplomatic and administrative superintendence of 
 affairs and negotiations, in subordinate consultation 
 with the military commander. Mr. Griffin reached 
 Kabul at the end of March, where he was cordially 
 welcomed by Sir Frederick Eoberts ; and the Viceroy 
 embodied in a Minute the lines which he was to 
 follow and the objects at which he was to aim in 
 assuming this most important political charge. 
 
 In this Minute the Viceroy stated that in the Viceroy's 
 main the frontier acquired by the Treaty of Gunda- policy to be 
 muk was satisfactory, and that further extensions of jf^J^^e^J" 
 territory were not desired, but that our principle Afghanistan 
 of future policy in Afghanistan must be based on 
 the disintegration of that country and its division 
 into three or more separate provinces. It would 
 be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near 
 Kandahar, but no alteration of our frontier line on 
 this side was contemplated. Before attempting any 
 political settlement of Northern Afghanistan it had 
 been thought necessary to assert our military 
 powers beyond all possibility of question, and for 
 this purpose arrangements were then in progress 
 for the early concentration around Kabul of a 
 military force sufficient, it was believed, to establish 
 our military command. The Viceroy was afraid of 
 the general harvest, and he felt it most important 
 that the political situation in Northern Afghanistan 
 should be finally settled before the crops had been 
 gathered in and the cultivators set free, or the 
 restless spirits had grown tired of inaction. 
 
 Four courses were now open to the Government : 
 (1) annexation, (2) military occupation, (3) temporary 
 occupation until the secure establishment of a friendly 
 ruler, and (4) withdrawal from the country as soon 
 as circumstances permitted. Of these the fourth 
 
 DD 2 
 
404 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN .VDMINISTKATION cu. vui 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute to 
 Mr. Lepel 
 Griffin, 
 March 1880 
 
 Viceroy's 
 views on 
 policy to be 
 adopted 
 
 seemed to the Viceroy the only one in accordance 
 with our previous declarations, and likely to produce 
 a safe and comparatively speedy settlement without 
 greatly irritating the people of the country, entailing 
 enormous additional cost to the finances of India, 
 and placing a heavy strain on her army. 
 
 ' It is true,' he went on to say, ' that we contemplate 
 the permanent retention of a garrison at Kandahar. 
 But the conditions of the two provinces are very 
 different. The Kandahar population is a less turbu- 
 lent, warlike, and fanatical one, and that country is 
 less favourable to guerilla warfare. With only the 
 moral support of our presence, the Grovernor, Slier 
 Ali, has hitherto found no difficulty in preserving 
 the peace of the province and maintaining his 
 authority there, and we may reasonably hope that 
 this authority will be strengthened rather than 
 weakened as time goes on. Moreover, on this side 
 our present lines of communication run through a 
 friendly country, whose inhabitants have shown that 
 tliey appreciate the ties of interest by which they 
 are bound to us ; and we may hope shortly to see 
 the long and difficult road connecting Kandahar 
 with the Indus replaced, for most of its course at 
 least, by a railway which will alike secure our 
 hold on the districts it traverses and develop their 
 resources. For these reasons neither the location 
 of our small garrison at Quettah in 1876, nor the 
 maintenance now of a permanent military force at 
 Kandahar, can afford any measure of the task 
 involved in a military occupation of Kabul.' 
 
 While admitting that much might be said in 
 favour of the course of continuing our military 
 occupation at Kabul until we ourselves had firmly 
 established on the throne a friendlv ruler, whom we 
 
1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 405 
 
 should not leave till lie could reign safely without 
 our support, this policy had to his mind one fatal 
 objection — want of finality. It would be impossible 
 to foresee how long our troops would have to remain 
 there, and he doubted whether a time would ever 
 come when their withdrawal would not be followed 
 by a temporary period of anarchy. The course, 
 therefore, which he now advocated over all other 
 courses was ' to effect the withdrawal of our forces 
 from Afo'hanistan by next autumn at the latest, yiceioy's 
 
 ^ .'', Minute to 
 
 making the best political arrangements that circum- Mr. Lepei 
 stances admit for carrying out this withdrawal and for March'ieso 
 the future administration of the country.' This was 
 assuming that no change would take place in the rela- 
 tive positions of England and Eussia in Central Asia. 
 Help other than purely military, he thought, 
 might safely be given to a successful candidate for 
 the throne of Kabul. Giving money and arms to a 
 powerful ruler of United Afghanistan was simply to 
 feed with fuel the fire of an enemy and enable him 
 the more effectively to rule independently of British 
 influence, but to give such help to the ruler of the 
 comparatively small and poor province which was 
 all that would be left to Kabul when Kandahar, 
 Herat, and Turkestan were separated from it would 
 have the effect of binding him to our interests, since 
 his success as a ruler would be dependent upon such 
 help. 'Such a subsidy, too, while binding the chief 
 to our interests, would not tend to raise up enemies 
 against him, as any more active interference un- 
 doubtedly would, and, if accompanied by gifts or 
 allowances from us to those chiefs who show them- 
 selves favourably disposed, it might do something 
 to strengthen our influence concurrently with his 
 authority.' 
 
406 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Viceroy's 
 Minute to 
 Mr. Lepel 
 Griffin, 
 March 1880 
 
 In relation to the withdrawal of our forces, the 
 most important question to be decided was where 
 the permanent cantonment should be placed. His 
 own opinion was strongly in favour of returning to 
 the positions taken up in the Treaty of Gundamuk. 
 Now that Kabul was to be reduced to a comparatively 
 insignificant province the necessity no longer existed 
 for the maintenance at or near Kabul of an Envoy with 
 a garrison, and he considered that our ends would 
 be best served by withdrawing to some suitable point 
 from which it would be possible to strike at Kabul 
 when required. For this purpose the old Kurum 
 cantonment seemed to him better than any other 
 site. He doubted whether the obstacles to this 
 route in winter were greater than the obstacles to 
 the Jellalabad route in summer. 
 
 He added : ' As regards communications, I 
 understand from the competent engineer by whom it 
 has been inspected that it would be impossible to 
 carry a railway through the Kliyber, except at a cost 
 which practically puts it out of the question.^ If, 
 therefore, a cantonment were established at Gunda- 
 muk, the long and difficult communication with 
 Peshawur would always have to be maintained by 
 road. On the other hand, I am informed that a line 
 will actually be opened to Kushalghur by July or 
 August of this year ; and from there to Kurum, 
 excepting the bridging of the Indus, there is no 
 serious engineering difficulty. I do not undervalue 
 the political importance of Jellalabad, but I cannot 
 but see that the retention of that district not only 
 entails very great additional political responsibilities, 
 but also the permanent occupation in strength of the 
 most deadly line of posts that we have yet occupied 
 
 ' This is not the present view. 
 
1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 407 
 
 in India — Peshawur, the Khyber, Dakka, and Jella- viceroy's 
 
 Minute to 
 labad. Mr. Lepel 
 
 ' In reviewing the results of an early withdrawal Sarah I88O 
 from Kabul if undertaken as a measure independent 
 of the stability of the political settlement effected 
 there, it is necessar}^ to take into consideration the 
 probable effect of such a course on the public mind 
 in India and at home. In India I do not think it 
 would be misunderstood; it would be generally 
 recognised that our presence at Kabul was forced on 
 us, not sought, and that our mission was rather one 
 of retributive vindication than of conquest, and any 
 ill effect produced by apparent evidence of weakness 
 would, I think, be neutralised by the evidence given 
 of our earnest desire to abstain from annexation. 
 At home it would be less favourably viewed ; and 
 our retirement without having established a settled 
 Government, or left a strong and friendly ruler at 
 Kabul, would be treated by all opponents of our 
 policy as a confession of failure. That it would not 
 be an altogether satisfactory termination I admit. 
 But while critics of the present judge generally by 
 what has not been done, future critics will judge 
 more fairly by what has been done. In 1876 the 
 two great passes of the Bolan and the Khyber, as 
 well as the minor one of Kohat, were closed to us. 
 At a time of nominal peace, no European's life was 
 safe a mile beyond our border, Kutchi was a devas- 
 tated desert, Beloochistan a scene of continued anarchy 
 and bloodshed, Kandahar suffering under the tyranny 
 of Kabul, whither its revenue was obtained for the 
 maintenance of an excessive army ; and immediately 
 opposite us was growing up a great hostile military 
 power, daily drawing further from us and nearer to 
 Eussia. 
 
4o8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 Viceroy's 
 ^[inute to 
 ?tr. Lepel 
 Griffin, 
 March 18.S0 
 
 To Mr. 
 Griffin, 
 P'ebruary 16 
 
 ' Now the }) asses are open, and daily traversed bv 
 numbers ; our officers move freely over parts of the 
 border. Kutchi is becoming a rich agricultural 
 district traversed by a railway ; Beloocliistan is 
 peaceful, prosperous and friendly ; Kandahar thriving 
 under the Governorship of its own natural chief, and 
 likely soon to be connected with India by railway ; 
 and that great threatening military power on our 
 northern border is utterly broken up and dispersed. 
 Some time must yet elapse before the full benefit 
 of our exertions and of our expenditure of blood and 
 money can be reaped, and during this time our 
 effi3rts cannot be relaxed. But a consideration of 
 what has already Vjeen effected may well make us 
 confident of the ultimate results of a policy steadily 
 adhered to through difficulties abroad, and mis- 
 representation and party opposition at home. ' 
 
 On February 16 the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Griffin : 
 ' I see no reason why you should not, as soon as you 
 reach Kabul, set about the preparation of a way for 
 us out of that rat-trap, by making known to all 
 whom such knowledge chiefly concerns the cardinal 
 points of our policy, viz : 
 
 ' 1st. Non-restoration of the ex-Amir. 
 
 ' 2nd. Permanent severance of Western from 
 North- West Afghanistan. 
 
 ' 3rd. Neither annexation nor permanent occupa- 
 tion of the latter. 
 
 '4th. Willingness to recognise any ruler (except 
 Yakub) whom the Afghans themselves 
 will empower to arrange with us on their 
 behalf, for the restoration of their 
 country and its evacuation by our troops.' 
 
 In the same letter he informs Mr. Griffin that it 
 was intended that Sir Donald Stewart, when replaced 
 
1880 ABDUL RAHMAN 409 
 
 at Kandahar from Bombay, should with the whole of 
 liis present force return to India through Gliuzni. 
 He was not to occupy Ghuzni or linger there, but, 
 passing through it and overcoming all opposition 
 ]3y the way, to march as rapidly as he could upon 
 Kabul. 
 
 Writing- to Lord Cranbrook on February 18, the ^o Lord 
 
 ^ , .,. Cranbrook, 
 
 Viceroy says : ' The sole object of all the military February is 
 operations I have sanctioned for this spring is to 
 facilitate the early evacuation of the country. But 
 to retire in the presence of the powerful hostile 
 forces now actually holding the field against us 
 w^ould be a shameful and dangerous folly, and I do 
 not think any Viceroy could take the responsibility 
 of giving or carrying out such an order. It is of 
 course impossible to speak with complete confidence 
 or positiveness about a situation so uncertain as that 
 with which we are still dealing in Northern Afghani- 
 stan, but I still reckon on the evacuation of the 
 country about the autumn of this year, and I hope 
 to effect the withdrawal of Stewart's force by the 
 Shutargardan before the end of the spring.' 
 
 Wliile the Viceroy was thus deliberating over the Abdul 
 difficulty of leaving North Afghanistan masterless and ^^^i™**^ 
 unsettled, the prospect of a new and unforeseen 
 solution of these complications was offered b}^ the 
 appearance at Balkh, on the Oxus frontier, of Abdul 
 Eahman. The father of this Sirdar was Mahomed 
 AfzulKhan, Amir Sher All's elder hah-brother, who had 
 actually ruled in Kabul from May 186G to October 1867. 
 After his death the civil war for succession in 
 Afghanistan had broken out again, and after some 
 vicissitudes Sher Ali succeeded in establishing his 
 authority; whereupon i^bdul Eahman retired, first to 
 the Turkestan districts, and eventually took refuge. 
 
4IO LORD LYTTON'S INDIA X ADMINISTRATION ch. viii 
 
 in 1870, with the Eussians at Tashkend. He made 
 several attempts to obtain their aid and countenance 
 for another campaign against Sher Ah, but ineffec- 
 tually, and he was compelled to reside as a political 
 refugee, in receipt of an allowance, beyond the Oxus 
 till 1880, when he seems to have obtained permis- 
 sion from the Eussian Government to try his chances 
 once more in Afghanistan. His own account of the 
 matter is as follows : 
 ^bdui ' ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ seven years of my stay with the 
 
 Rahman's Eussians thcv insisted on my absolutely holdinof no 
 
 own story . / • i » f> i • i i -i 
 
 communication with Aighanistan, on the plea that 
 they were under treaty obligations with the English 
 to abstain from interference in Afghanistan. After 
 that they told me that Sher Ali Khan had formed 
 friendship with them, and consequent^ they could 
 not permit me to disturb the equanimity of their 
 friend. When Sher Ali attacked Maimena I again 
 begged permission to leave, but was refused. Thus 
 treated, at the death of Sher Ali Klian I contem- 
 plated making my escape secretly. Before my plans 
 were matured, the Eussians heard of my intentions, 
 and forcibly removed me and my family to Tashkend. 
 When telegraphic news of the deportation of Yakub 
 Khan by the English was received. General Kaufmann 
 was at Orenburg. His secretary at Tashkend sent 
 for me and said ; 
 
 ' " You have always been anxious to return to your 
 country. The English have removed Yakub IQian to 
 Hindustan ; the opportunity is favourable. If you 
 wish to go, you are at liberty to do so." Eemarking 
 that I would think over the matter, 1 came away. 
 Some three days later, the secretary again sent for 
 me and said : 
 
 ' " What are you thinking about ? Wliy do you 
 
1880 ABDUL EAHMAN 41 1 
 
 not go ? If you fail it does not matter much, you can Abdul 
 return to us and your present allowances. You will own story 
 not again get such an opportunity ; if you wish to go, 
 go now. You surely will be able to drive out General 
 Grhulam Haidar, and establish yourself in Turkestan.' 
 
 'I represented that I had no arms, horses, 
 trappings, or money. It was finally arranged, after 
 communication by wire with General Kaufmann, that 
 I should be supplied with 200 breech-loading rifles 
 and 100 rounds of ball ammunition per rifle, trap- 
 pings and accoutrements for 100 foot and 100 
 mounted men. When leaving I was presented with 
 5,000 Bokhara tillas. This sum and the money I 
 originally had, together with what I had managed to 
 save out of my allowance, is all that I started with. 
 
 ' The Eussians pressed me most strongly to leave. 
 They said I could not leave soon enough. I have 
 entered into no written or secret engagement with 
 the Eussians. I am bound to them by no oath or 
 promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude, and 
 consequently I should never like to be obliged to 
 fight them. I have eaten their salt and was for 
 twelve years dependent on their hospitality, and 
 during that time, though often annoyed, I never 
 misconducted myself or forgot my duty to them. 
 The assistance given to me in arms, animals, money, 
 &c., has been considered as a loan, which I will have 
 to repay. The rifles have been valued at twenty-five 
 roubles each. If I am fortunate enough to be made 
 Amir, I will desire nothing better than to be allowed 
 to pass the remainder of my days in peace. I left 
 Tashkend with 100 followers, and travelled via 
 Oratippa, Karategin, Hissar, Kolab, and crossed 
 the Oxus at Eustack.' ^ 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
4 1 2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vni 
 
 The earliest rumours of Abdul Ealiman's arrival 
 
 in Afghanistan came to the British authorities in the 
 
 first days of March ] 880 ; and almost simultaneously 
 
 it was found that his mother, then living at Kandahar, 
 
 had received letters indicating that he might not be 
 
 unfavourably disposed towards negotiations with the 
 
 English Government. The project of treating with 
 
 Abdul Eahman for the restoration of government in 
 
 North Afghanistan is understood to have originated 
 
 Suggestion witli Major St. John, who was at the moment in 
 
 liahVian " India with the Viceroy ; and Lord Ly tton, perceiving 
 
 ehoiiia be {^q advanta"'es, immediately acted upon the su<?gestion. 
 
 made Amir '^ ' . ^^ 
 
 On March 6 he wrote to Mr. Griffin at Kabul, 
 referring to the letters received by the Sirdar's 
 family at Kandahar, saying, ' This communication 
 indicates possibilities, and in any case suggests 
 considerations which may, I think, have the most 
 important practical bearing on the early solution of 
 the very difficult problem you are about to deal with 
 in North Afghanistan.' He proceeded to point out that 
 Abdul Eahman fulfilled all the conditions required in 
 a chief to whom might be transferred the rulership 
 of the country, from which it was eminently desirable 
 that our troops should speedily withdraw^, and 
 he accordingly decided that conciliatory messages 
 should be sent to the Sirdar, both from Kabul and 
 from Kandahar, as soon as it should be certain that 
 he was in Afghan territory. These instructions were 
 sanctioned by the Home Government, although not 
 without some hesitation and mis^ivinos as to the 
 advisability of treating with a chief who had been 
 so long connected with Eussia, and accordingly on 
 April 1 a letter from Kabul was addressed to the 
 Sirdar and sent by a confidential messenger. 
 
 Before his arrival several documents addressed 
 
1880 ABDUL RAHMAN 
 
 413 
 
 by Abdul Ealiman to different persons came into the 
 hands of the British authorities at Kabul. One of 
 these, addressed to the principal chiefs of Kohistan, 
 took very high ground. It appealed to the honour 
 and glory of Islam and the dignity of the Kingdom 
 of Afghanistan, and stated that the Sirdar had ar- 
 rived to save it from the misery and degradation into 
 which it had fallen, and was ready with this object to 
 head a religious war and march on Kabul, although 
 he was content to be at peace with the English if 
 only they would accede to his representations. 
 
 Tlie Afghan troops generally rose in favour of 
 the new comer, and Lord Lytton began to fear that 
 the time might slip by when we were in a position to 
 dictate terms to him, rather than to listen to his 
 requests backed up by a strong national party. 
 
 Writing to the Secretary of State on April 12 he 
 said: 
 
 ' You will remember that more than a month ago to Secretary 
 I urged the expediency of sending to (Abdul Rahman), ^^ ^J^jj 
 while his strength was still weak and his position 
 still uncertain, a public deputation from the Kabul 
 Sirdars to offer him, with the open connivance of the 
 British Government, the throne of Kabul, which we 
 were then in a position to assign to him upon our 
 own terms. 
 
 ' The situation has within the last three weeks 
 changed very considerably in favour of Abdul 
 Eahman, and my present fear is that the wrecks and 
 refuse of the Ghuzni faction will ere long rally to his 
 standard, placing him in a position to appear 
 suddenly before Kabul at the head of a united 
 nation, and dictate terms to us, instead of accepting 
 them from us.' 
 
 Sir Donald Stewart and his force left Kandahar 
 
414 LORI^ LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. yii 
 
 Sir Donald on April 1, and occupied Ghuzni on the 21st, after a 
 
 Stewart's 
 victories 
 before Ghuzni 
 
 severe action on the 19 th with the tribesmen, a 
 large body of whom charged the British troops with 
 great gallantry, but without success. The division 
 only remained three days at Ghuzni, leaving Sirdar 
 Mahomed Alam Khan, the uncle of Musa Khan, in 
 charge of a provisional Government. A force was 
 sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar 
 force, the main body of which under General Eoss en- 
 countered no serious opposition. A small contingent, 
 however, under Colonel Jenkins was attacked, but un- 
 successfully, by a formidable gathering at Charasiab. 
 The Kabul and Kandahar forces joined on April 28, 
 and Sir Donald Stewart arrived at Kabul on May 2, 
 and as senior officer assumed from Sir F. Eoberts 
 the chief command, as well as political control. 
 To Lord ' Stewart,' wrote Lord Lytton, ' has gained two 
 
 ^^^\27°^' victories before Ghuzni, one of them a very brilliant 
 and decisive one, and Jenkins has had a most 
 successful engagement at Charasiab. These military 
 successes leave us masters of the political position, if 
 we do not hastily throw away our advantages.' 
 
 On April 21 our messenger to Abdul Eahman 
 returned to Kabul with a letter from that Sirdar 
 which the Viceroy characterised as very friendly 
 and very clever. Writing to Lord Cranbrook on 
 April 27 he says : ' We have found in Abdul Eahman 
 a ram caught in the thicket.' His letter, obviously 
 dictated by Eussian advisers, professed warm friend- 
 ship with us, provided we did not impose on him 
 conditions which he could not accept without 
 apparent ingratitude to Eussia, ' whose salt he had 
 eaten,' and proposed that 'Afghanistan should be 
 neutralised and placed under the joint protectorate 
 of the British and Eussian Empires.' Lord Lytton 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL EAHMAN 415 
 
 comments upon this, ' I feel sure that Abdul Eahman's To Lord 
 letter was composed for him in the belief that we April 27 
 should, according to our invariable custom, reply to it 
 by indicating conditions which, if contested, would 
 furnish matter for lengthened negotiation, and that 
 we should hao^orle and barter about the terms of our 
 future relations with him. This would have ended 
 in his dictating his own terms and remaining master 
 of the situation. Our position would have been 
 that of gamblers sitting down at 10 o'clock to break 
 the bank with the knowledge that, whether they 
 win or lose, they must leave off playing at 12 o'clock.' 
 Lord Lytton, therefore, was in favour of immediately 
 informing Abdul Eahman that whilst, ' if he would 
 not share the fate of Sher Ali, he must put out of 
 his head both the acquisition of Kandahar, which 
 we would never restore, and the Anglo-Eussian 
 protectorate, which we would never tolerate in a 
 country acknowledged by Eussia to be beyond the 
 legitimate sphere of her action ; on the other hand, 
 we were ready to hand over to him at once, icithout 
 any provisions at all, Kabul and all the rest of the 
 country if he would come and receive it from us. 
 But that our troops would in any case be withdrawn 
 not later than October,' when Kabul would probably 
 be 'jumped ' by the leader of the Ghuzni party if 
 he were not previously on the spot to secure the 
 reversion of it with our assistance. 
 
 These views were communicated to Mr. Griffin Letter from 
 in a letter from Mr. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary to JJ^- J^ypjJJ *« 
 the Indian Government, dated April 27. 'The Aprils? 
 single object,' this letter stated, ' to which the Afghan 
 policy of this Government has at all times been 
 directed and limited is the security of the North- 
 western Frontier of India.' The intrusion of any 
 
41 6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cn.viu 
 
 Mr. Lyaii to foreign iiiflueiice into the great border State of 
 April '27 ' Afghanistan had always been held, and luust always 
 be held, incompatible with that security. For long 
 our endeavour had been to find in the friendship and 
 strength of the rulers of Afghanistan the requisite 
 guarantee for the security of our own frontier. 
 Failing in that endeavour, our object must be to 
 establish the security of our frontier independently 
 of such conditions. The letter continues : 
 
 ' This conclusion was not accepted without reluc- 
 tance. Not even when forced into hostilities by 
 the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Eussian 
 alliance proposed by Eussia in contemplation of a 
 rupture with the British Government, did we 
 relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with 
 a strong and friendly Afghan power ; and when the 
 sons of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and 
 protection, they were at once accorded to him on 
 conditions of w^hich His Highness professed to appre- 
 ciate the generosity. The crime, however, which 
 dissolved the Treaty of Gundamuk, and the disclosures 
 which followed that event, finally convinced the 
 Government of India that the interests committed to 
 its care could not but be gravely imperilled by 
 further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition 
 on the o-ratitude, the oood faith, the assumed self- 
 interest, or the personal character of any Afghan 
 prince. 
 
 ' When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered 
 Afghanistan in September last, it was with twc* well 
 defined and plainly avowed objects. The first was 
 to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British 
 mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the 
 safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gundamuk, 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL EAHMAN 41 7 
 
 by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a Mr. Lyaii to 
 more substantial and less precarious character. Apri?27^'^ 
 
 'These two objects have been attained — the first 
 by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the 
 crime committed there, the second by the severance 
 of Kandahar from the Kabul power. 
 
 ' Satisfied of their attainment, the Government of 
 India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into 
 fresh treaty engagements with the ruler of Kabul. 
 The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurance 
 with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the 
 part of the Government by subsidies and favours of 
 various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of 
 them, which was nevertheless a thoroughly friendly 
 one, and no less conducive to the security and 
 advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British 
 power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured 
 to him our friendship and material support, was 
 equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and 
 arrangements have fundamentally changed the situa- 
 tion to which our correspondence and engagements 
 with the Amir of Afghanistan formerly applied. Our 
 advanced frontier positions at Kandahar and Kurum 
 have so materially diminished the political importance 
 to the paramount objects of our policy, that we no 
 longer require to maintain British agents in any part 
 of his dominions.' 
 
 The letter then goes on to say that the victory 
 over the armed gatherings near Ghuzni, and the 
 appearance of Abdul Eahman as a candidate for the 
 throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of 
 India has no cause to oppose, and the majority of the 
 population seemed willing to support, removed the 
 only two reasons which had prevented an even earlier 
 
 E E 
 
41 8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. Tin 
 
 Mr. Griffin 
 to Abdul 
 Kahman, 
 April 30 
 
 Viceroy to 
 Sir Donald 
 Stewart, 
 May 16 
 
 withdrawal of our troops. The answer to be sent to 
 Abdul Eahman is then dictated in the sense of Lord 
 Lytton's letter already quoted. 
 
 Mr. Griffin thereupon addressed a letter to Abdul 
 Eahman, on April 30, in general accordance with 
 these instructions, but specific reference to Kandahar 
 or to a fixed date for the evacuation of Kabul was 
 omitted on the suggestion of Sir Frederick Eoberts 
 and Mr. Griffin — in the one case because mention of 
 Herat would also be necessary, in the other lest the 
 Sirdar should be induced to temporise. 
 
 The letter urged upon Abdul Eahman the impor- 
 tance of a prompt decision, and added that at no 
 place but Kabul could final arrangements be satis- 
 factorily and quickly made. 
 
 The terms of this letter were not thought altogether 
 satisfactory by the Viceroy, who wrote to Sir Donald 
 Stewart at Kabul on May 16 : — 
 
 ' Our position is really a very simple and 
 perfectly plain one — it requires no finessing, and, 
 as I understand and have stated it, it distinctly 
 excludes not only all negotiations or bargaining with 
 Abdul Eahman, but also all pretence of establishing 
 a friendly Amir at Kabul. It is not our business or 
 function to establish any Amir at all ; and it would 
 be sheer folly to rely upon his friendship, or any 
 arrangements for rendering our interest dependent 
 on such friendship, or any arrangements devised for 
 the purpose of securing it. Our position is, that 
 havini? now completed our own arrangements for 
 rendering our interests independent of such friend- 
 ship, and having defeated every attack upon us, we 
 are about to evacuate Northern Afghanistan without 
 delay ; and we give notice of this intention to Abdul 
 Eahman, not because we have any bargain to drive 
 
1880 CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AT HOME 419 
 
 with him about it, but in order that, if he wishes to 
 take advantage of it in any manner not inimical to 
 us, he may lose no time in doing so. 
 
 ' The above mentioned arrangements are of course 
 the irrevocable separation of Kandahar from the 
 Kabul Power, and the permanent retention and 
 strengthening of the frontier positions secured to us 
 by the Treaty of Gundamuk. Though these are 
 doubtless known to Abdul Eahman, I think that the 
 irrevocable nature of them should be in fairness 
 distinctly explained to him. I consented with re- 
 luctance to Griffin's strong recommendation sup- 
 ported by Lyall to omit from his first letter to that 
 Sirdar all reference either to these arrangements or 
 to the date of our evacuation ; but I cannot approve 
 his allusions to the " establishment of a friendly Amir 
 at Kabul." Our position is a strong one so long as 
 we avow it plainly and act on it firmly. Otherwise 
 it may become a very false one.' 
 
 These negotiations, however, were not to be 
 carried to their conclusion under Lord Lytton's 
 administration, which was now drawing to a close. 
 
 The arrival of Sir Donald Stewart at Kabul 
 coincided with a change of administration in England. 
 On April 28 the Government of Lord Beaconsfield Mr. Gladstone 
 was succeeded by that of Mr. Gladstone, Viscount Be?cTnsfieM*^ 
 Cranbrook being replaced as Secretary of State for April 26 
 India by the Marquess of Hartington. Lord Lytton's 
 policy in India had been made the subject of bitter 
 attack by the party who now came into power, and j^^^^^ Lytton 
 he therefore resigned office with his political friends, resigns 
 The Marquis of Eipon was appointed his successor 
 as Viceroy of India. 
 
 On April 7 Lord Lytton wrote to Lord Cran- 
 brook : 
 
 E E 2 
 
420 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. vin 
 From Lord Lytton to Viscount Cranbrook 
 
 [Private] ' Calcutta : April 7, 1880. 
 
 To Lord My dear Lord Cranbrook, — It seems scarcely 
 
 A^^i?""^' worth while to write to you by this mail about 
 affairs. I know not in what circumstances my letter 
 will find you ; but it seems probable that before you 
 get it you will have ceased to be Secretary of State 
 and I shall have ceased to be Viceroy. What an 
 unaccountable collapse. ... I suppose that my 
 successor, whoever he be, can scarcely reach India 
 before June, which will be a very trying season for 
 his journey as well as for mine. But it is extremely 
 desirable that he should relieve me without any 
 avoidable delay. For the safe solution of the Afghan 
 question now seems likely to depend on the manage- 
 ment during the next two months of arrangements 
 at Kandahar and negotiations at Kabul, which can 
 neither be suspended nor postponed with impunity, 
 nor yet satisfactorily conducted by a Viceroy noto- 
 riously destitute of the confidence and support of the 
 Queen's constitutional advisers. If the new ministry 
 breaks the pledges we have given Slier Ali Khan, or 
 swallows the bait likely to be laid for it by Abdul 
 Eahman of a neutralised Afghanistan under joint 
 guarantees, it will be an evil day for India and for 
 England too. Bat I will not paint the devil on 
 the wall. I trust, dear Lord Cranbrook, that those 
 personal relations between us which to me have 
 been such pleasant ones may survive their official 
 ties, and that on my return to England you will 
 still allow me to regard you as a political, though no 
 longer an official, chief. I assure you I shall always 
 recall with the liveliest gratitude the encouraging 
 confidence and generous support with which you 
 
1880 CHANGE OF MINISTRY AT HOME 42 1 
 
 have honoured me during a very critical and anxious 
 period of my Indian administration. 
 
 To Sir James Stephen he wrote : 
 From Lord Lytton to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen 
 
 [Private] ' Calcutta : April 7, 1880. 
 
 ' My dear Stephen, — Were you ever in the Forest to Sir James 
 of Arden? I have always fancied it must be the Sf?"' 
 most charming place in the world, more especially 
 in summer time. I shall shortly be on my way to 
 it, I think, and I hasten to give you rendezvous at 
 the Court of the Banished Duke. If you meet our 
 friend, the melancholy Jacques, greet him from me 
 most lovingly, and tell him — Ducdame! — that aU 
 the fools are now in the circle and he need pipe to 
 them no more. Tell him 'tis found to be a magic 
 circle, which works wonders. Once in it the fools 
 become the wise, whilst out of it wisdom is labelled 
 folly. Tell him that young jade, Democracy, has 
 borrowed from Fortune her wheel and bandage ; 
 and that out of Arden Wood the game now in 
 fashion is chuck-farthing with empires for counters. 
 If that fool Touchstone has not already joined the 
 others now dancing in motley to the tune of Duc- 
 dame ! ducdame ! let him know that I bring him 
 the end of the tale he found hanging by that " pro- 
 digious pippin " which rots when it ripens ; tell 
 him he must sell his old dial, get himself a brand new 
 watch from Birmingham, and so be up to the time 
 of day, if he would not be trampled by all the 
 acorned hogs when they cry Oh ! and mount. And 
 teU your own great heart, dear and true friend, that 
 the joy I take from the prospect of seeing you is 
 more precious to me than all that Providence has 
 
42 2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. vm 
 
 taken from the fancy prospect I had painted on 
 the blank wall of the Future of bequeathing to India 
 the supremacy of Central Asia and the revenues of 
 a first-class Power.' 
 
 From Lord Lytton to Viscount Cranbrook 
 
 ' Simla : April 20, 1880. 
 
 To Lord ' My dear Lord Cranbrook, — I fear that this reply 
 
 Ap^rS"'"' to your very welcome letter of the 21st ultimo will 
 find you functus officio. As for myself, I am still 
 waiting for the fiat of the new Downing Street 
 divinities ; but, like FalstafF, " I would it were bed- 
 time, and all were over." In these circumstances 
 our official correspondence becomes rather anoma- 
 lous, but by force of habit I shall continue the 
 thread, or rather " the tape," of it, till I receive 
 authentic information that your resignation and my 
 own have been accepted by the Queen. I do not think 
 that my successor could, without serious risk to his 
 health, come out earlier than next autumn, for till 
 then the plains of India will be hotter than the 
 furnaces of Nebuchadnezzar ; and if Her Majesty's 
 new ministers wish me to carry on this Government 
 till I can personally transfer it to the new Viceroy 
 I shall deem it a pubhc duty to do so, provided only 
 that during the interval, which must be virtually a 
 sort of interregnum, I am not required to carry out 
 measures to which it would be obviously impossible 
 for me to set my hand. Certainly there could 
 scarcely be a worse or more dangerous moment than 
 the present for any radical change of Government in 
 India ; and, as in the conduct of this Government I 
 have never had any other feeling than a most earnest 
 desire to do my best and utmost for the interests of 
 
1880 LORD LYTTON RESIGNS 423 
 
 India and the service of the Crown, so I trust I should to Lord 
 be sustained by the same motive if required to carry Jp^.n^20°'^' 
 on the Government of India till the cool season is suffi- 
 ciently advanced to enable my successor to relieve 
 me of it without risking his life. But, in that case, 
 my position will not only be a personally painful one : 
 what is far more important is that it will, I fear, 
 be powerless for good and injurious to the dignity 
 and authority of the viceregal office. For I shall 
 be working on sufferance under a ministry whose 
 members have publicly proclaimed that I possess 
 neither their confidence nor their esteem, and who 
 have, indeed, omitted no opportunity of casting ridi- 
 cule and discredit on my character and that of my 
 administration. If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's 
 new advisers are of opinion that the disadvantages 
 would exceed the conveniences of such an arrange- 
 ment, Sir John Strachey, as Senior Member of my 
 Council, would take charge of the Government, pend- 
 ing the arrival at Calcutta of the Duke of Bucking- 
 ham, by whom, as senior Presidency Governor, it 
 must, by law, be conducted till transferred to the 
 new Vicero}^. This arrangement would, I believe, 
 obhge all the members of the Government to return 
 to Calcutta for the Duke's installation ; and I think 
 I should also take sail from Calcutta at the same 
 time, so as to avoid the terrible journey to Bombay ; 
 but, as I could not bring Lady Lytton and my 
 children across the plains of India in this deadly 
 season, even as far as Calcutta, I shall be obliged to 
 leave them somewhere at Simla till they can rejoin 
 me in England next autumn. Enough of these 
 personal matters.' 
 
 Early in May Lord Lytton heard that he had 
 
May 4 
 
 424 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch.viii 
 
 been recommended by Lord Beaconsfield for an 
 Earldom. 
 
 To the Earl of Beaconsfield 
 
 [Private] ' Simla : May 4, 1880. 
 
 rj^Qj^Q^^ 'My dear and honoured Chief, — You will not 
 
 Beaconsfield, have doubted the sincerity of my thanks, and those 
 of Lady Lytton, for 3^our valued recommendation of 
 the Earldom, which I specially value as a public 
 mark of your sympathy and the Queen's approval 
 now that I have fallen, not only upon evil times, but 
 also upon evil tongues. 
 
 ' Li discharging the duties of the important office 
 for which j^ou selected me more than four years ago, 
 it has been my constant endeavour to justify, and if 
 possible requite, the great and courageous confidence 
 which entrusted the duties of it to hands so untried 
 as mine. In now resigning it, therefore, with every 
 sentiment of personal gratitude and fidelity, allow me 
 to assure you that the continuance of your confidence 
 has been my chief sustainment and encouragement 
 throughout four years of much mental anxiety and 
 physical fatigue. I now long for rest and even 
 obscurity. M}^ conception of beatitude is procul 
 negotiis. And even under conditions far more 
 favourable than those to which I can look forward, 
 I feel that I have already survived the age at which 
 any man can, without previous training for it, 
 commence a parliamentary career with reasonable 
 prospects of success. Too old to court failure, I am 
 still too inexperienced to escape it in any new field 
 of public exertion. But although these are the 
 feelings with which I contemplate my early return 
 to England, I am, believe me, neither destitute of 
 gratitude nor indifferent to its duties. And should 
 
1880 EARLDOM BESTOWED UPON LORD LYTTON 425 
 
 it ever be your opinion that I can, by word or deed, 
 speech or pen, in or out of Parliament, render the 
 smallest service to the great cause which history 
 will identify with your name, to the chief who 
 commands my unreserved allegiance, or to the 
 party which has stood by me during the last four 
 troubled years, need I assure you that I feel 
 bound to you by every tie of personal gratitude, 
 political sympathy, and public duty. It is at least 
 in the fullest recognition of all these ties, that I remain, 
 dear Lord Beaconsfield, 
 
 ' Your affectionately devoted friend and servant, 
 
 'Lytton.' 
 
426 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN. CHANGE OP 
 ENGLISH MINISTRY. CONCLUSION 
 
 It has been seen that at the tmie of the change 
 of ministry at home military operations in Af- 
 ghanistan had practically been completed. The 
 Government of India were determined that our troops 
 should retire from Northern Afghanistan by the 
 autumn of the year. The objects of the war had 
 been achieved. The murder of the British Envoy 
 had been avenged ; the disintegration of the country 
 had been secured by the severance of Western from 
 Northern Afghanistan, and such a position had been 
 gained by our troops as to render the Government of 
 India independent henceforth of the good or ill will 
 of the Amir of Kabul. Nothing, therefore, was to be 
 gained by a continued military occupation of a 
 country we had decided not to annex, and much 
 might be lost thereby in lives and money. Lord 
 Lytton, holding this view of the situation very strongly, 
 urged that our withdrawal should be unconditional. 
 That having chosen a date convenient to our troops for 
 their evacuation of Kabul, their movements should not 
 be hindered or precipitated by any arrangements which 
 the people of Kabul were free to make with Abdul 
 Eahman or any other Sirdar. It has already been shown 
 that he strongly disapproved of such language being 
 used by our officers in command at Kabul as could lead 
 Abdul Eahman or any other chief to suppose that we 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIOiVS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 427 
 
 were willing' to enter into treaty arrangements for Situation in 
 
 r . . Afghanistan 
 
 the maintenance or support of any chief aspiring at the time 
 to the throne of Kabul. The poHcy of establishing ^J Govern"^" 
 friendly relations with the Amir, and supporting the ment 
 integrity of his kingdom, on conditions of reciprocal 
 goodwill had failed. We had now made ourselves inde- 
 pendent of the alliance of any Amir, and although we 
 desired, for the restoration of internal order, to leave 
 the government in the hands of a capable ruler, it was 
 otherwise a matter of indifference to us who was 
 chosen, and we did not desire to interfere in the 
 matter of his election. Abdul Eahman had appeared 
 to Lord Lytton a hopeful candidate for the Amirship 
 from the first moment he was known to have set 
 foot in Afghan territory, but the Viceroy held most 
 strongly that no negotiations with him should be 
 entered into without the clearest definition of our 
 position in the sense here stated. 
 
 This view was accepted by those in authority 
 at Kabul with some difference of opinion. They 
 were anxious not to evacuate the country without 
 leaving it in the hands of some settled govern- 
 ment, and with this object their communications 
 with Abdul Eahman were so worded as to en- 
 courage that Sirdar to assume the position of one 
 able and willinsr to bargain. His reply to Mr. GriflQn's ^bdui iiah- 
 
 m9.n's 1761)1 V 
 
 letter of April 30 was to the effect that his further to Mr. Griffin's 
 progress towards Kabul would depend upon whether J^p^^J jj 
 he could obtain satisfactory assurances on such 
 questions as (1) the retention of Kandahar, (2) the 
 presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan, and (3) 
 the conditions we would exact with regard to his 
 attitude towards Eussia. Lord Lytton felt that the 
 principles which should govern any reply to this 
 letter were of vital importance and could hardly be 
 
428 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch ix 
 
 laid down by ' a moribund Government.' It was a 
 matter which must be left for the consideration of 
 the new Viceroy. Lord Lytton could do no more 
 than place on record in a Minute to be put before 
 Lord Eipon and his Council, so soon as he should 
 reach India, the course which, in his opinion, it 
 would be best to pursue. In this Minute he advised 
 that General Stewart should receive very definite 
 and precise instructions respecting not only his reply 
 to Abdul Eahman, but also his own movements. 
 General Stewart in answer to Lord Lytton's inquiries 
 had wired from Kabul : ' The force under my com- 
 mand is so strong that it can withdraw at any moment 
 without serious risk. ... A precipitate withdrawal 
 would be impolitic, but it would not be attended with 
 any dangerous risk, whether a friendly ruler has or 
 has not been found.' Lord Lytton therefore con- 
 sidered that the instructions to General Stewart 
 should express the desire of the Government ' that 
 the evacuation of Kabul should be commenced at 
 the earliest possible date which in the opinion of 
 the General commanding in the field may be com- 
 patible with his military and political appreciation 
 of the situation, for which he is responsible ; that it 
 should be carried out, not with precipitation (which 
 must be the case if it is deferred till the last moment 
 fixed by the Government of India, some months ago, 
 for the complete retirement of our forces from 
 Northern Afghanistan), but in a leisurely deliberate 
 manner, and that every care should be taken to 
 avoid all appearance of mystery or uncertainty in 
 regard to the intentions of Government on this 
 important point. Furthermore, that the evacuation 
 of Kabul should be effected by the gradual, but early, 
 and, if possible, immediately commenced retirement 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 429 
 
 of the army of Northern Afghanistan on the two Lord Lytton's 
 commanding positions of Gundamuk and the Kurum 
 headlands. In the meanwhile the situation in 
 Northern Afghanistan will have greatly developed ; 
 and during the intervening period our forces will 
 hold military positions sufficiently commanding for 
 their support of any political purpose which can 
 possibly arise out of that situation, 
 
 ' As regards the political instructions to General 
 Stewart, I strongly disapprove of any ultimatum to 
 Abdul Eahman, for an ultimatum implies terms and 
 conditions ; it is, in fact, the ordinary result of an 
 abortive negotiation. But with Abdul Eahman we 
 should carefully avoid all negotiation. I would 
 instruct General Stewart to write briefly to the Sirdar 
 in the following sense : 
 
 ' (a) That the Sirdar has misunderstood the object 
 
 of the mission sent to him. 
 ' {h) That the Government of India does not desire to 
 select or appoint any ruler for that portion 
 of the Afghan provinces which it is about to 
 unite. 
 '(c) That in regard to any such selection it is 
 willing to recognise the choice of the people 
 concerned. 
 ' {d) That, though also willing to accept, and ready 
 to reciprocate, the friendship of the ruler 
 thus selected, it has been constrained to take 
 steps for rendering the maintenance of its 
 own interests practically independent of the 
 friendship or hostility of any such ruler, 
 experience having proved to it that no 
 reliance can be. placed upon treaty or other 
 engagements with the Kabul Power ; and 
 all treaties concluded with the last legitimate 
 
430 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 LordLytton's and recognised rulers of Kabul having 
 
 '^^ '^°" ® been dissolved by war. 
 
 ' {e) That the measures which have thus been 
 imposed on the Government of India, in 
 defence of its own interests, are — the per- 
 manent maintenance of the frontier positions 
 acquired by it under the Treaty of Gundamuk, 
 and which, without seeking to renew that 
 treaty, will certainly be retained as con- 
 quered territory ; and also the permanent 
 severance of the whole province of Kandahar 
 from the Kabul Power. 
 
 ' (/) That these territorial arrangements are irrevo- 
 cable ; that they have been made, and will 
 be maintained, without regard to the assent 
 or dissent of any Amir of Kabul ; and that 
 any attempt on the part of such a ruler 
 to disturb them will involve him in open 
 enmity with the British Government. 
 
 ' {g) That the Government of India, having com- 
 pleted these arrangements, and beaten all its 
 enemies in Northern Afghanistan, is about to 
 evacuate the country. 
 
 ' (/i) That our object in communicating with the 
 Sirdar was to give him timely information 
 of these decisions, in order that he might, in 
 his own interests, take such advantage of 
 them as appeared to him desirable. 
 
 ' (^) That we were induced to take that step, 
 because he appeared to be one of the most 
 capable and promising of the numerous 
 candidates for the vacant throne. 
 
 ' (J) But that the Government of India is not con- 
 cerned to espouse or oppose the personal 
 cause of such candidates, so long as their 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 431 
 
 political or military action does not infringe Lord Lytton's 
 its rights or threaten its interests ; and that ^^'* ^'"""^^^ 
 in no case can it sign treaties, or enter into 
 alliances, with rulers who do not yet exist. 
 
 ' {k) It has consequently no conditions to make 
 with Abdul Eahman ; no negotiations to 
 open with him. 
 
 * (/) It retains in its own hands, permanently, the 
 military means of promptly punishing any 
 Kabul ruler who, whether under foreign or 
 domestic influence, fails in any of those 
 commonly recognised duties of good nei^'h- 
 bourhood which every great Power is 
 entitled to expect and demand from the 
 Government of a contiguous State, and it 
 seeks no other guarantee for the good 
 behaviour of the future ruler of those pro- 
 vinces which, having secured that guarantee, 
 it is about to evacuate. 
 
 ' (m) If Abdul Eahman, who will meet with no 
 opposition from us unless he provokes it, 
 succeeds in procuring the position to which 
 he aspires, it will be for him to shape his 
 future conduct as Amir of Kabul, according 
 to his appreciation of his own interests, 
 under the conditions thus explained to him. 
 If, in his endeavours to confirm that position 
 he decides to rely upon Eussian aid, — he 
 wiU do so with a full knowledge of the 
 dangers to which such a decision may expose 
 him. If, on the other hand, he requires, 
 and prefers to seek, our aid, — his application 
 for it wiU be fairly considered in reference 
 to the circumstances under which it is 
 made. 
 
432 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 ' {n) He must understand, however, that, as we 
 have nothing to ask from him, it is out of 
 his power to dictate terms to us. We do 
 not require his assistance. If he requires 
 ours, he must ask for it, and prove to us 
 that it will be worth our while to accede to 
 his request. We do not offer it to him. 
 ' {o) With regard to Herat, he should be told that 
 we shall not oppose any endeavour on his 
 part to take and keep it ; and that, if his 
 endeavour is successful, it will be recognised 
 by us. 
 ' I think it very desirable that measures for the 
 evacuation of Kabul itself should be openly com- 
 menced simultaneously with the despatch of some 
 such letter to Abdul Eahman. 
 
 ' I would offer to, and provide for, Abdul Eahman 
 the earliest possible opportunity of entering Kabul 
 without finding in it any British troops. I would 
 leave to him, on his entry there, a free field for a 
 trial of strength between his own party and that of 
 the partisans and representatives of the ex-Amir. 
 I am convinced that without such a trial of strength, 
 no solid Government can be established at Kabul; 
 and that the British Government cannot advantage- 
 ously interfere with this preliminary process of 
 natural selection. I would scrupulously abstain 
 from any action which could commit us even to the 
 apparent espousal of either cause ; leaving to the 
 surviving victor in the conflict the apparently un- 
 avoidable necessity of suing to us for assistance or 
 support, which we could then give on our own terms 
 or conditions, to enable him to maintain his victory 
 and consolidate the authority acquired by it. I 
 would act, in short, consistently, and persistently, on 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL EAHMAN 433 
 
 the only principle which seems to me appropriate to Lord Lytton's 
 the great strength, and solidity, of our position, if 
 we do not fritter its strength and solidity away by 
 a nervous, fussy, and futile diplomacy. 
 
 ' I have not thought it necessary in this Minute 
 to deal with any of the incidental questions con- 
 nected with the duty of making adequate provision 
 for the protection of any Sirdars or tribes whose 
 relations with our authorities at Kabul during the 
 occupation of that place may have been such as to 
 establish a claim on our protection, which, when 
 finally examined, is admitted by those authorities to 
 be valid. Unless our representatives at Kabul have, 
 in their confidential communications with such tribes 
 or Sirdars, committed the Government to an extent 
 of which we are not at present aware, it is prima 
 facie extremely improbable that there can be any 
 large number of these claims that will stand impartial 
 examination arising out of our temporary relations 
 with the population of wdiich almost every man has 
 been either an open enemy or a secret traitor to our 
 authority. Whatever claims of this kind may be 
 hereafter fairly established by local investigation 
 should be frankly recognised and substantially satis- 
 fied at any cost. But these are questions on which 
 the Government of India can, I consider, express no 
 opinion without further information and advice from 
 General Stewart, to whom a final examination of all 
 such claims may, I think, be safely entrusted. 
 
 ' But, whatever happens, I sincerely trust that 
 the Government of India will never be induced to 
 assent to the restoration of Yakub Khan. The hands 
 of that Prince are deeply stained in the innocent 
 blood of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his brave com- 
 panions. Subsequent secret correspondence and in- 
 
 F F 
 
434 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 formation has, in my opinion, fully confirmed the 
 unanimous verdict of the Kabul Commission as to the 
 deliberate guilt of Yakub Khan ; and I would here 
 remind my colleagues in the Government of India 
 that, without reference to such further information, 
 which the Foreign Secretary will be able to lay before 
 my successor, the Advocate-General and the Chief 
 Justice of the High Court at Calcutta have substan- 
 tially endorsed the verdict of the Kabul Commission. 
 .... But, if such a question is hereafter raised by 
 the action of the Government of India, in restoring 
 Yakub Khan to the throne of Kabul, or otherwise 
 condoning his participation in the massacre of the 
 British Embassy, I think it only due to my successor 
 that I should here place on record my firm determina- 
 tion, as a personal friend of the murdered men, to 
 omit no means or opportunities available to me of 
 opposing and publicl}^ condemning any such action. 
 
 ' Lytton.' 
 
 ' Simla : 5th June, 1880.' 
 
 Lord Eipon's Tliis Miuutc may be said to contain Lord Ly tton's 
 
 arrival j^g^. ^Qj.(jg g^g Viccroy of India. They were written 
 
 on June 5. On June 8 Lord Eipon arrived at Simla 
 and received from Lord L5^tton the charge of govern- 
 Lord Lytton's uicnt. On Junc 28 Lord Lytton left Simla, and set 
 fixlm'^imfia Sail for England from Bombay on July 3. 
 
 A few days after Lord Eipon's arrival at Simla 
 he received news that letters had been intercepted 
 from Abdul Eahman to the Afghan chiefs urging 
 them to assemble their forces and make ready to 
 join him in a united march upon Kabul. 
 
 These letters appeared to betray hostile intentions 
 towards the British Government, and the advisability 
 of at once breaking off negotiations with Abdul 
 Eahman was considered. 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 435 
 
 LordEipon, however, and the Government of India 
 considered that before such correspondence was 
 finally closed it would be reasonable that the Sirdar 
 should receive definite answers upon the points he 
 had raised, to which he no doubt attached chief 
 importance. 
 
 Accordingly, on June 14 the authorities of Kabul, Abdul Eah- 
 acting upon instructions from the Indian Government, ^^JJ^ered in 
 addressed a communication to Abdul Eahman in accordance 
 
 with Lord 
 
 which these replies were clearly stated. Eipon's in- 
 
 In the first place, with regard to the position of j^^g iJ^^' 
 the ruler of Kabul to foreign powers, he was assured 
 that ' the British Government admit no right of 
 interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan,' that 
 since both Eussia and Persia were pledged to abstain 
 from all political interference with the affairs of 
 Afghanistan, it was plain the Kabul ruler could 
 * have no political relations with any foreign power 
 except the English.' If any such foreign power 
 attempted to interfere in Afghanistan ' and such 
 interference should lead to unprovoked aggression 
 on the Kabul ruler,' then the British Government 
 would ' aid him if necessary to repel it,' provided 
 that he followed their advice. 
 
 With regard to the limits of territory he was told 
 that the province of Kandahar had been placed under 
 a separate ruler, that Pishin and Sibi were retained 
 in British possession, and the arrangements concluded 
 with the ex- Amir Yakub Khan with regard to the 
 North-Western Frontier held good. These matters 
 did not admit of discussion, but with these reserva- 
 tions the British Government were willing that he 
 should establish over Afghanistan and Herat, though 
 his possession of Herat could not be guaranteed to 
 
 F F 2 
 
436 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch ix 
 
 him, as complete and extensive authority as had been 
 exercised by anj^ Amir of his family. 
 
 Finally, he was assured that the British Govern- 
 ment did not desire to interfere in the internal 
 government of these territories, and would not 
 require the admission of an English Eesident any- 
 where in Afghanistan, although for ' convenience of 
 ordinary friendly intercourse between two contiguous 
 States it may be advisable to station by agreement a 
 Mohammedan agent of the British Government at 
 Kabul.' 
 
 ' If you should,' the letter went on to say, ' after 
 clearly understanding the wishes and intentions of 
 the British Government, as stated in former letters, 
 and now further explained, desire these matters to be 
 stated in a formal writing, it is necessary that you 
 should first intimate plainly your acceptance or 
 refusal of the invitation of the British Government, 
 and should state your proposals for carrying into 
 effect friendly arrangements.' ^ 
 Abdul Rail- The Sirdar's reply to this communication was 
 
 jun" 2?^'''' received at Kabul on June 26. In it he expressed 
 satisfaction at the terms of Mr. Griffin's letter, but 
 made no direct allusion to the retention of Kandahar. 
 In a circular which at the same time Abdul Ealiman 
 issued to the tribes he gave a misleading version of the 
 nature of the communication he had received from the 
 British Government. But his position was a difficult 
 one. However really anxious to make peace with the 
 English, he had also to impress the powerful and 
 hostile tribes of Afghanistan with the conviction that 
 he came with power to seize and retain authority as 
 ruler at Kabul. His object, therefore, was to accept 
 the best terms possible from the British Government, 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 437 
 
 and appear in the eyes of the Afghans to have 
 dictated those terms. 
 
 Our Envoy to Abdul Eahman, while treated with 
 outward respect and courtesy, was in fact kept a close 
 prisoner in his camp, and never left his tent from 
 the day he arrived to the day he left, except when 
 summoned to formal interviews with the Sirdar, 
 
 After considering the terms of Abdul Eahman's 
 letter, the report of the Envoy as to his general im- 
 pressions of the Sirdar, and the tone of his circular 
 to the tribesmen, the Government decided to com- 
 municate with him once more. Mr. Griffin was 
 instructed to reply to his letter, directing his atten- 
 tion to the territorial reservations previously made, 
 desiring him to move at once towards Kabul with a 
 force not larger than necessary for his own protection, 
 and calling upon him to prevent armed gatherings in 
 Kohistan. In the event of Abdul Eahman failing to 
 comply without delay, and satisfactorily with the 
 requisitions addressed to him. General Stewart was 
 instructed to break off all negotiations with him, and 
 in that case to assemble the Sirdars and leaders 
 of the party of Sher Ali's family and state openly 
 that our correspondence with Abdul Eahman was 
 closed ; that we should withdraw from Kabul at our 
 earliest convenience ; that they must consult and 
 establish a Government for themselves ; that we were 
 prepared to recognise any Government so established, 
 and to transfer Kabul to it, and that if not molested 
 in the positions we might provisionally take up, we 
 intended to retire shortly within our own frontier. 
 These instructions, it will be seen, were drawn up in 
 general accordance with Lord Lytton's advice. They 
 were approved by Lord Hartington, the new Secretary 
 of State. 
 
438 LOP^D LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. ix 
 
 On July 10 Abdul Eahman replied that he would 
 speedily arrive in Kohistan, but could not proceed 
 to Kabul till he had consulted the people of 
 Afghanistan. He evaded the demand that he should 
 disperse the armed gatherings of the tribes. On 
 July 14 he arrived at Kohistan and there received a 
 native deputation from Kabul. From this time the 
 situation improved. On July 17 he wrote in a much 
 more friendly spirit intimating that in five days he 
 would proceed to Kabul, members of the Ghuzni 
 and Ghilzai party having now joined him. 
 
 On July 19 the British authorities at Kabul sent 
 
 to inform Abdul Rahman that a durbar would be 
 
 held on July 22 for the purpose of recognising him 
 
 formally and publicly before the Sirdars and people 
 
 of Kabul and the neighbouring country as their 
 
 future Amir. On July 20 he replied in a friendly 
 
 letter dated from Charikar, expressing his intention of 
 
 sending a deputation to attend the durbar. 
 
 Durbar held Tliis deputation arrived on July 22 and the 
 
 AbdS R^X durbar was held in the afternoon of the same day. 
 
 kT t""^^^ °^ ^^ ^^^'"^ attended by all the principal chiefs and 
 
 residents of Kabul and its neighbourhood. Most of 
 
 the ofiicers of the garrison at Kabul were also present. 
 
 After a short opening address by Sir Donald 
 Stewart, the wishes and intentions of Government were 
 explained by Mr. Griffin inaPersian speech, and Sirdar 
 Abdul Rahman was formally acknowledged and recog- 
 nised by the British Government as ' Amir of Kabul.' 
 
 A few days later a meeting took place at Zimma, 
 about sixteen miles north of Kabul, between Mr. Lepel 
 Grifiin and the Sirdar himself At this interview the 
 questions of assistance in money and arms, the 
 conclusion of a treaty, and the Amir's position in 
 respect to Herat and Kandahar were discussed. With 
 
1880 ABDUL RAHMAN PROCLAIMED AMIR OF KABUL 439 
 
 regard to the first question the Amir was informed 
 that the money found m the Treasury (9,65,731 
 rupees) when the British army arrived at Kabul 
 would be handed to him ; that he would be given, in 
 addition, ten lacs of rupees ; and that the Afghan 
 guns remaining in Sherpur and in the Bala Hissar 
 would be left for his use. These conditions by no 
 means satisfied the Amir. 
 
 With regard to the second point, he was informed 
 that no treaty could be granted him with the British 
 Government till he had established and consolidated 
 his own Government, but that after a reasonable 
 delay it would no doubt be possible to negotiate a 
 treaty with him. 
 
 With regard to the territorial question, he ex- 
 pressed comparative indifference provided he was 
 not held responsible for what happened in territories 
 not under his control. 
 
 Mr. Lepel Griffin wrote of the Amir after this Mr. Lepei 
 interview : ' Amir Abdul Eahman Khan is a man of Government 
 about forty, of middle heio:ht and rather stout. He °} 'i^^ia, 
 has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a 
 pleasant smile, and a frank courteous manner. 
 The impression that he left on me and the officers 
 who were present at the interview was most 
 favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing 
 of all the Barakzai Sirdars whom I have met in 
 Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good 
 sense and sound political judgment. He kept 
 thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his 
 remarks were characterised by shrewdness and ability. 
 He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be 
 on cordial terms with the English Government, and 
 although his expectations were, as might have been 
 anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to 
 
440 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. tx 
 Aug. 4, 1880 satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discour- 
 
 To Govern- •^.' •^. _ , ^ t p -, • • 
 
 ment of India teous msistence, and the result oi the interviews may 
 be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.'^ 
 
 The scene shifts again from Kabul to Kandahar. 
 Four dsijs after the proclamation of the new Amir an 
 event happened which led to the reopening of the 
 question of the severance of the Western from the 
 Northern Provinces of Afghanistan, and finally to 
 the reversal of this part of Lord Lytton's policy. 
 
 The circumstances which led up to the defeat 
 of the British troops by Ayub Khan of Herat at 
 Maiwand need not here be detailed, and the following 
 short summary by Sir Alfred Lyall of the disaster 
 and consequent relief of Kandahar will suffice. 
 
 ' Ayub Khan, Sher All's younger son, who had 
 been holding Herat during our operations at Kabul and 
 Kandahar, set out towards Kandahar with a small 
 army in June 1880, and a brigade under General 
 Burrows was detached from Kandahar to oppose 
 him. Neither upon the manoeuvres of this brigade, 
 nor upon the tactical disposition of our troops when 
 they met the enemy, does Lord Eoberts trust himself 
 to make any observation ; he confines himself to 
 a bare statement of the facts that the Afghans 
 outflanked the British, that our artillery soon 
 expended their ammunition, that the native troops 
 got out of hand and pressed back upon the few 
 European infantry, that " our troops were completely 
 routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans 
 in not following them up for escaping total annihila- 
 tion." No such indisputable victory over British 
 forces in the open field had Ijeen gained by an Asiatic 
 leader in all our long Indian wars ; and for that very 
 reason the study of this short but most instructive 
 
 ' Narrative of Events in Afghanistan. 
 
1880 BATTLE OF MAIWAND 44 1 
 
 campaign may be commended to all Anglo-Indian 
 soldiers, since it serves as a lighthouse to illustrate 
 the ways leading straight to destruction. 
 
 ' The relief of Kandahar, which was now invested Eoberts's 
 by Ayub Khan's army, became a m^atter of urgent Kandahar 
 necessity. With the consent of Sir Donald Stewart, 
 Eoberts telegraphed at once to Simla a proposal that 
 he should lead a relieving force straight from Kabul ; 
 and the Viceroy (Lord Eipon) agreed promptly. Ten 
 thousand picked men, inured to Afghan warfare by 
 their Kabul experiences, armed and equipped up to 
 the highest degree of efficiency, with their tents and 
 baggage reduced to the lowest possible scale, and 
 transported entirely upon beasts of burden, without 
 even wheeled artillery, could probably have marched, 
 like Xenophon's 10,000 Greeks, across half Asia and 
 over any enemy in their path. Their chief anxiety 
 was in regard to the scarcity of supplies upon certain 
 sections of their route ; and their main concern on 
 the march was about stragglers, for the long rapid 
 marches wearied out the camp followers, not one of 
 whom could lag or stray without being killed by the 
 Afghans. Here, again, is another example of methods 
 and resource in difficulties, to be studied this time as 
 a model by those who may be hoping that England 
 has not yet closed her long annals of Asiatic adven- 
 ture. Between August 11 and 31 the force traversed 
 the 313 miles that separate Kabul from Kandahar, 
 where Eoberts, prostrate with fever, halted under the 
 city walls. The place was impregnable, except by 
 scaling-ladders, for Ayub Khan had no siege train, 
 yet the spirits of the garrison seemed to Eoberts 
 somewhat below the standard of moral elevation that 
 inspires heroic resistance ; and undoubtedly he was 
 made welcome in all sincerity. A strong reconnais- 
 
442 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 sance drew the Afghan fire, disclosed their position, 
 and Eoberts made his arrangements to attack it by a 
 turning movement on the next morning. 
 
 ' For an excellent and well-handled force of nearly 
 15,000 men (including the Kandahar garrison), with 
 thirty-six guns, the business of taking in flank the 
 ridge upon which Ayub Khan had entrenched himself 
 against a front attack was no hard matter. After 
 some very creditable fighting on both sides Ayub 
 Khan was duly routed, and his army followed the 
 example of their chief by a speedy flight, leaving a 
 large standing camp entirely deserted, with the whole 
 of the Afghan artillery. The British cavalry made a 
 vain and somewhat inglorious pursuit ; but the work 
 had been done thoroughly in masterly style, and 
 Eoberts, who had led his men to this brilliant termina- 
 tion of their labours, had good excuse for recording 
 that never had a commander been better served.' ^ 
 
 General 
 Stewart's 
 withdrawal 
 from Kabul 
 
 The withdrawal of General Eoberts's force from 
 Kabul made the speedy evacuation of Kabul by the 
 remaining troops a matter of imperative necessity. 
 
 Independently of this, however, all the objects 
 which had hitherto detained them there were ac- 
 complished, their supplies, which had been admirably 
 calculated almost to a day, were now nearly exhausted, 
 and it was possible and natural to withdraw from 
 Kabul on the day which had been fixed for that 
 purpose two months ago. On political and sanitary 
 grounds it was decided to make no halt at Gundamuk, 
 but to retire at once within the limits of our new 
 frontier. This feat was accomplished under General 
 Stewart with masterly skill, and by September 7 he 
 had marched his troops out of Afghanistan without 
 
 ' Sir Alfred LyaU. 
 
1880 EEVEESAL OF LYTTON POLICY 443 
 
 firing a single shot. Adequate garrisons were left 
 at Lundi Kotal and Ali Musjid. 
 
 The future of Kanc'.ahar, now occupied by 
 General Eoberts after Ids successful march and 
 defeat of Ayub Khan, had next to be considered. 
 The openly avowed desire of the Home Govern- 
 ment of 1880 was to reverse as completely as 
 possible the policy of the Government which preceded 
 them, and which they had openly denounced and 
 condemned. The failure of Sher Ali Khan to keep his 
 hold over Kandahar without military assistance from 
 us gave them the looked for opportunity of casting 
 aside the solemn pledges which had been made in 
 the name of the British Government to him and to 
 his heirs, of persuading him to resign and retire to 
 India, and of handing over to the Amir of Kabul 
 once more these provinces of a different race, who 
 had hitherto detested the oppressive yoke which 
 Kabul rule placed upon their necks. 
 
 The question of the evacuation of Kandahar was 
 mooted four days after our defeat at Maiwand, and by 
 the end of November the Secretary of State announced 
 in a dispatch the final decision of the Home Govern- 
 ment to withdraw from this post. By the end of that 
 month Sher Ali Khan publicly announced his resigna- 
 tion and its acceptance by the British Government. 
 He left Kandahar in December and retired to Karachi, 
 where he lives to this day. At the same time Amir 
 Abdul Eahman was invited to take possession of the 
 provinces of Kandahar thus left without a Government. 
 
 It was announced in the Queen's Speech on the 
 reassembling of Parliament, January 1881, that Her 
 Majesty had been advised to abandon the possession 
 of Kandahar. In the Debate on the Address which 
 followed this announcement Lord Lytton rose, for the 
 
444 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 House of 
 Lords on 
 the evacua- 
 tion of Kan- 
 dahar 
 
 first time in the House of Lords, to oppose this pohcy 
 and to make a personal statement with reference to 
 his own action as Viceroy of India in regard to 
 the late Afghan war. In this speech he said : — 
 Jan. 1881 ' I ^o not know, and the House does not know, 
 
 Lord Lytton's ^j^a^ are the reasons which have induced the present 
 
 speech in the i 
 
 Government to come to the decision that Kandahar 
 ought to be abandoned, and to advise Her Majesty to 
 this effect ; but I do say that such a decision ought 
 not to be carried out without a fair, an impartial, 
 and, if necessary, a repeated reference to the reasons 
 which induced the late Government to come to the 
 precisely opposite conclusion that Kandahar ought to 
 be retained, and to advise Her Majesty to that effect. 
 My Lords, these reasons were numerous, they were 
 serious, and they were carefully considered. But, 
 for the present, they may all be summed up in the 
 conviction, to which the late Government was led by 
 them, upon a full review of the whole condition of 
 those affairs with which you are now dealing in 
 Afghanistan — that the permanent maintenance of the 
 British Power at Kabul — I do not say necessarily by 
 means of annexation, though neither do I shrink from 
 saying by means of annexation should that become 
 necessary ; but, at any rate, in some form or other, 
 direct or indirect, which, for all practical purposes, 
 will be a substantial realit}^ — is now the only effectual 
 safeguard against a recurrence, and possibly a con- 
 stant recurrence, of the dangers so conspicuously 
 brought into light, and so forcibly pressed on our 
 attention, by our experience of the late Afghan War, 
 and our knowledge of the circumstances which gave 
 rise to it. Whatever may have been the merits or 
 demerits of that war, it has conclusively established, 
 beyond all possibility of reasonable or honest ques- 
 
1881 KEVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 445 
 
 tion, one fact of supreme importance. That fact is Lord Lytton's 
 the facihty with which Eussia — if she has estabhshed against the 
 her influence in Afghanistan, or if she can establish K^ndahaT °^ 
 her influence there — will always be able, whenever she J=^n- issi 
 desires, to cripple the action or embarrass the policy 
 of England in Europe, by disturbing the security of 
 England in India. And to do this, moreover, without 
 even employing her own troops for the purpose, but 
 simply by creating a diversion on the North-West 
 Frontier of India, through an alliance with the Kabul 
 Power. This, I say, is the one great fact you have 
 now to deal with, and which, whatever be your policy, 
 you must always bear in mind. It is established on 
 evidence of the most formidable character. It cannot 
 be disputed, and it ought not to be shirked. My 
 Lords, the Eussian Mission to Kabul, which was the 
 immediate occasion of the Afghan War, is a proceed- 
 ing of which the morality has been justified on the 
 ground that it was virtually a war measure legiti- 
 mised by the fact that our European relations with 
 Eussia were, at that time, strained to the very verge 
 of imminent hostilities. But we are not concerned 
 to discuss the morality of that proceeding. What 
 does practically concern us is the danger of it. And 
 from this point of view it matters nothing to us 
 whether the mission was the result of sudden impulse 
 or long premeditation. If it was the result of sudden 
 impulse, it clearly shows us how close is the peril to 
 which we shall at all times be exposed from the 
 establishment in Afghanistan of any foreign influence 
 more powerful, or more energetically exerted, than 
 our own. If, on the other hand, it was the result of 
 careful preparation, it shows us, no less clearly, how 
 great is the value attached by Eussia to the acquisi- 
 tion of such an influence, and what is the purpose to 
 
446 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 Lord Lytton's whicli slie 'will put it if she acquires it. In the one 
 speech case, vou must look upon Afghanistan as a loaded 
 
 evacuation of pistol Ivmg on your doorstep, ready to be exploded 
 Jan. Tssi' ill the full front of your power whenever Eussia, upon 
 a sudden impulse, stretches out a hasty hand to seize 
 it. In the other case, you are fully warned of the 
 mischief which such a weapon may inflict on you, if 
 you ever relax your own firm grasp upon the butt end 
 of it. In both cases the danger is the same ; and in 
 either case the magnitude of such a danger can 
 scarcely be exaggerated. And in connection with this 
 consideration there is another, which must always be 
 taken into account. I do not suppose there exists in 
 Europe a man whose mind is loaded with weightier 
 or more constant cares, arising out of wider interests, 
 than the Sovereign who personally administers the 
 vast Empire of Eussia. It is practically impossible 
 for the Eussian Government at St. Petersburg to be 
 incessantly watching and controlling the detailed 
 action of its local authorities in a region so remote 
 as Central Asia. The Eussian Governor- General at 
 Tashkend thus occupies, in his great Satrapy as the 
 Eepresentative of a distant and despotic Government, 
 a position of great practical independence ; and, if he 
 be an able, energetic, and ambitious man, anxious to 
 extend the influence, or the territory, of his Sovereign, 
 he will naturally do a great many things which he 
 has not been instructed to do — at the risk of being 
 disapproved if he fails, but in the hope of winning 
 honour and reward if he succeeds. This considera- 
 tion leads me to the point of what I have to say 
 about the object and origin of that Eussian Mission. 
 It was not an unpremeditated mission. It was not 
 an impromptu act of retaliation or precaution. But 
 it was the carefully prepared result of three years' 
 
1881 EEVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 447 
 
 preliminary correspondence, and three years' direct Lord Lytton's 
 negotiation — in all, six years of patient preparation. agSnst the 
 I affirm this briefly, but positively. It would take Ka^^^ahaT °^ 
 me all night to prove in detail what I affirm ; but the Ja^^- issi' 
 proofs of it are to be found by those who care to 
 search for them, obscurely buried and inconveniently 
 dispersed through numerous Blue Books, all of which 
 are accessible to your Lordships. And, in one word, 
 this is what they prove. From the year 1872 to the 
 year 1875 the Governor-General of Eussian Turk- 
 estan was in constant communication with the Amir 
 of Kabul ; and his communications were regarded — I 
 must say most reasonably regarded — by the Amir 
 and his advisers as having no other conceivable 
 object than that of establishing Eussian influence 
 in Afghanistan. The Amir was at first seriously 
 alarmed, and afterwards dangerously attracted, by 
 the increasing significance of these communications ; 
 and, in the year 1873, he made to the British Govern- 
 ment a strong appeal on the subject of them. With 
 the result of that appeal he was, as your Lordships 
 well know, dissatisfied. . . . 
 
 ' I have thus briefly indicated the position of the 
 Kabul Power, between the now no longer distant 
 bounds of the Eussian and British Empires in Asia. 
 Thus situated, no Amir of Kabul can practically 
 stand alone and aloof from the influence of one 
 or other of the two great European Empires with 
 which Afghanistan is contiguous. He must in- 
 evitably fall under the control either of the British 
 or of the Eussian Power ; and, if he does not fall 
 under British control, it is obvious that he will 
 fall under Eussian control. To deny this appears to 
 me as extravagant a proposition as it would be to 
 assert that a stick, balanced on its end and left to 
 
448 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 Lord Lytton's itself, will iiot fall ill 0116 direction or another. And 
 SSnst the ^^^W' 1^^ ^^ suppose for a moment that Afghanistan 
 evacuation of falls under the control of Eussia. Can any one of your 
 
 Kandahar 
 
 Jan. 1881 ' Lordsliips doubt for a moment that the establishment 
 of Eussian influence in Afghanistan would be prac- 
 tically incompatible with the untroubled maintenance 
 of the British Power in India? My Lords, it does 
 not lie in the mouth of any responsible statesman to 
 maintain such an opinion. And, certainly, no such 
 opinion was entertained by the late Lord Lawrence, 
 whose authority on this subject was so frequently 
 invoked in your discussions of two years ago. Ten 
 years previous to the event of which I am now 
 speaking, the only danger beyond our North- West 
 Frontier anticipated by Lord Lawrence, or by anyone 
 else, was from the establishment of Eussian influence 
 in Afghanistan by forcible means. Lord Lawrence 
 could not then discuss, for no one then foresaw, the 
 danger which actually did arise ten years later from 
 the public presence of the Eussian Power at Kabul — 
 not as the foe, but as the avowed friend and ally of 
 the Amir of Kabul, at a time when that prince had 
 ceased to be the avowed friend and ally of the British 
 Government. Yet even then, in a valuable Minute 
 dated 1868, Lord Lawrence recorded his opinion 
 that it is so necessary to exclude Eussian influence 
 from Afghanistan — ay, and to exclude it at any cost 
 — that Eussia, he said, ought to be plainly told that 
 any further advance upon her part beyond a given 
 point towards Lidia — and, my Lords, her Asiatic 
 frontiers were then far less close to ours than they 
 are now — would entail upon her war with England 
 in all parts of the world. War in all parts of the 
 world ! Such was the importance attached by Lord 
 Lawrence to the efficacious and permanent exclusion 
 
1881 EEVEESAL OF LYTTON POLICY 449 
 
 of Eussian influence from Afghanistan ; and I think Lord Lytton's 
 the leading members of the present Cabinet are all against the 
 equally committed to this principle. ... If, then, all xTiXha " °* 
 responsible British statesmen and all practical Indian J^^^- i^si 
 administrators are agreed as to the importance of 
 maintaining British, and excluding Eussian, influence 
 in Afghanistan, it surely follows that the only 
 practical question we have to consider is how is this 
 to be done ? Now, there are two ways in which you 
 may endeavour to effect this object. You may seek 
 the attainment of it by the exercise of a recognised 
 control over the foreign relations of the Kabul Euler 
 by means of competent British Eepresentatives or 
 Agents in his dominions. This was the plan first 
 tried by the late Government of India, and which led 
 to the Treaty of Gundamuk. So long as that plan 
 was possible, we were anxious not to weaken, but to 
 strengthen the Kabul Power ; and in its despatch of 
 July 1879, the late Government of India, reviewing 
 the terms and objects of that Treaty, recorded its 
 opinion that, so long as the Treaty was loyally 
 observed by the Amir of Kabul, the annexation of 
 Kandahar would not only be unnecessary, but also 
 undesirable. The case, however, was essentially altered 
 by the atrocious massacre of our Mission at Kabul, 
 which defeated the main object of the Treaty of 
 Gundamuk. And, my Lords, I do not deny for a 
 moment that this is an event which I recall, and 
 shall always recall, with the keenest affliction. I do 
 not think that even his nearest relations can mourn 
 with a deeper grief than mine the dastardly murder 
 of my dear and truly gallant friend, Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari. I will not obtrude upon this House my 
 great private sorrow for that irreparable loss. Apart, 
 however, from that great sorrow, my opinion as to 
 
 G G 
 
450 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cu. ix 
 
 Lord Lytton's the propriety of the course we pursued by acquiescing 
 Sainstthe '^^^ ^^^^ Auiir's strougly expressed, and apparently 
 evacuation of giucere, requcst for the support of a British Mission 
 
 Kandahar, - A • • • • ^ 
 
 Jan. 1881 at his Court, IS an opinion entirely unchanged by the 
 abominable crime with which it was so ill requited. 
 But, although, I think it was right, and even neces- 
 sary, in the interests of all concerned, to make 
 that humane experiment, undeterred by the risks it 
 involved, and of which we were not unconscious, I 
 admit, my Lords, that the experiment has failed. 
 That being the case, the failure of it leaves open only 
 one course practically conducive to the attain- 
 ment of those objects which all responsible statesmen 
 have hitherto approved, desired, and insisted on ; and 
 this is the course adopted by the late Government 
 in reference to Kandahar. For if you cannot have 
 moral guarantees for the adequate control of the 
 Kabul Power, then you must have material guaran- 
 tees. The failure of the Gundamuk Treaty has 
 proved the impossibility of moral guarantees ; and 
 what will be vour material o-uarantees if a'ou abandon 
 Kandahar and the Kurum headlands ? As lonjr as 
 you retain possession of these, the position we have 
 to assert, and the interest we have to safeguard, upon 
 our Afghan Frontier will be practically independent 
 of the good or ill will of any Kabul Euler. My Lords, 
 the possession of Kandahar and the surrounding 
 country, when brought into railway connection with 
 the Valley of the Indus, will give us in Afghanistan 
 the only kind of influence which is now possible for 
 us to exercise over the people of that country. It 
 will enable us to compel them, when necessary, to 
 keep the peace ; and it will render comparatively 
 unimportant to us the condition of their relations 
 with Eussia. The possession of Kandahar would lay 
 
1881 EEVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 45 1 
 
 open the whole of AMianistan to our armies in case LordLytton's 
 
 -*- ST)66Cil 
 
 of need. It would most effectually secure the against the 
 Empire's only vulnerable frontier against both attack Kamiahar^ °^ 
 and intrigue ; and it would open the means of bringing J^n. issi 
 by rail all the trade of Central Asia to Karachi on 
 the one hand and Calcutta on the other. I beseech 
 Her Majesty's Ministers — most earnestly I beseech 
 them — not to neglect the warning given them by 
 General Eoberts, or the example set them by Eussia, 
 in reference to the importance of cultivating their 
 trade routes between India and Central Asia. It is 
 not to war, but to commerce, that you must look for 
 the extension of j^our legitimate influence in Asia. 
 And, my Lords, pray remember that the loss of 
 legitimate influence really means the loss of peace, 
 the loss of security, the loss of freedom, the loss of 
 all that renders possible the existence of the Indian 
 Empire. And then there is another point which 
 must not be lost sight of. The question of Kandahar 
 does not stand alone. Beyond Kandahar there is 
 Herat, beyond Herat there is Merv. My Lords, Herat 
 is a position which England has twice fought to 
 preserve from foreign domination. It has been 
 called the key of India ; and Liberal statesmen have 
 at all times attached great importance to it. My own 
 opinion is that the importance of Herat is entirely 
 relative ; and that if the British power were firmly 
 established at Kandahar, you could afford to regard 
 with indifference what happens at Herat. For you 
 would then be in a position both to prevent any 
 arrangements about Herat of which you did not 
 approve, and also to enforce the observance of arrange- 
 ments of which you did approve. But do not 
 flatter yourselves that this is now your position. You 
 are at present utterly powerless to exercise the 
 
 G G 2 
 
452 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 LordLytton's Smallest influence over the destinies of Herat, and 
 against the ^o jou will continue to be till you are firmly 
 evacuation of established at Kandahar. And now let us see what 
 
 Kandahar, , , . . , . ,. ^m ^ j.' i 
 
 Jan. 1881 are the objections to this policy, ihe most practical 
 of them all lies in the assumption that the annexation 
 of Kandahar will be expensive. My Lords, this is a 
 very debatable proposition. I do not think it can be 
 denied or affirmed with any degree of certainty ; 
 for the rude phenomena of Afghan rule furnish no 
 data from which to estimate correctly the probable 
 financial results of British Administration. I do not 
 think that any Indian Administrator could have 
 possibly predicted before the annexation of the 
 Punjab, whether that great addition to Empire 
 would most increase the expenses or the revenues of 
 the Indian Government. Much must necessarily 
 depend upon the manner in which the province is 
 administered ; much also on the selection of the man 
 to whom the administration of it is first entrusted. 
 The opinion I was led to form, as Viceroy of India, 
 upon the best information which could then be ob- 
 tained, is that Kandahar, if judiciously administered, 
 will, when connected by rail with the Valley of the 
 Indus, at once pay its expenses ; and that, in a short 
 while, it will pay them twice over, and much more 
 than twice over. I should think less highly than I 
 do of the administrative capacity of our Indian 
 Services if it turned out otherwise ; but I admit that 
 this is only a personal anticipation — a guess, if you 
 will. Let us assume it to be over sanguine — what 
 then? My Lords, national security, and that 
 permanent immunity from external danger which is 
 the essential condition of national security; these 
 are blessings not to be enjoyed without paying the 
 full price for them. The possession of Empire must 
 
1881 EEVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 453 
 
 always be an expensive privilege. But the loss of LojdLytton's 
 Empire may be a ruinous disgrace ; and the safety of against the 
 India is worth more than a few pieces of silver. We KanXhar? ° 
 cannot haggle with destiny. I feel not a shadow of a Jan. issi 
 doubt that any re-settlement of the North- West 
 Frontier of India which leaves that frontier exposed 
 to a recurrence of the dangers that gave rise to the 
 Afghan war will inflict, and at no distant date, upon 
 the Government of India far heavier financial 
 burdens than any which can be incurred on account 
 of the administration of Kandahar. . . . 
 
 'I come to what may be called the moral objec- 
 tions. We are told that annexation is very immoral ; 
 and that we have no right to annex Kandahar unless 
 the Kandaharis specially request us to be so good as 
 to do so, or unless, on the other hand, they commit 
 some abominable crime, for which their conquest is 
 the only fitting punishment. This objection was 
 mentioned by the noble Marquess who is now 
 Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of 
 Hartington), in reply to a deputation urging him 
 not to relinquish Kandahar. But the noble Marquess 
 is a statesman whose mind is not swayed by impulsive 
 sentiment; and I earnestly hope that the noble 
 Marquess will not allow his calm and manly judg- 
 ment to be confused by a mere word. What is 
 conquest ? It has many difierent meanings. It may 
 mean such an operation as the conquests of Attila — 
 massacre, confiscation, the sack of cities, the sale of 
 their inhabitants into slavery ; and this is probably 
 the greatest of all evils. It may mean such an 
 operation as the conquests of some Mohammedan 
 Princes ; the imposition of a grinding tribute, the 
 degradation of the national religion, the violation of 
 national traditions, and the outrage of national 
 
454 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 Lord Lytton's Sentiment. This also is a great calamity for the 
 Sainstthe conquerecL But when it means only that good 
 evacuation of orovernment is to be substituted for anarchy, that 
 
 Kandahar, ^ . *^ ' 
 
 Jan. 1881 sccurity for life and property is to supersede robbery 
 and murder, and that a few English officials, with 
 a limited number of English troops, who all pay 
 liberally for everything they get, are to replace law- 
 less Sirdars, who, owning a doubtful allegiance to a 
 distant and alien despot, are in the habit of taking 
 whatever they want without paying for it at all — 
 then, my Lords, I really cannot see that conquest is 
 a terrible thing, although you may please to give it 
 a terrible name. The British Power, if established 
 in Kandahar, would interfere with no man's religion. 
 It would bring much money into the country, and so 
 far from augmenting, it would greatly diminish the 
 burden of taxation by increasing the wealth of the 
 population. Under British rule the Ivandaharis would 
 quickly learn, as others have learnt before them, 
 that law and order mean wealth ; and there are no 
 people in the world so greedy of wealth as the 
 Afghans. As to national sentiments and traditions, 
 British rule would not disturb them, for the simple 
 reason that they do not exist. To suppose that the 
 Kandaharis have any sort of loyalty to Kabul or aii}^ 
 liking for the rule of a Kabul Amir, is to evince 
 complete ignorance of their history and way of life. 
 If ever there was a merely geographical entity, it is 
 Afghanistan. It is as idle to talk of the national 
 sentiments of the Afghans as it would be to talk of the 
 corporate feeling of the parish of Marylebone, or to 
 suppose that because Westminster and Athens are 
 both of them cities, therefore the city of Westminster 
 is regarded by its inhabitants with feelings like those 
 with which Athens inspired the Athenians. My 
 
1S81 EEVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 455 
 
 Lords, if any man was competent to judge of the LordLytton's 
 normal natural condition of Afghanistan, that man against the 
 was surely Lord Lawrence. Well, this is what Lord evacuation of 
 
 *' . Kandahar, 
 
 Lawrence wrote of it in 1868 : — Jan. 1881 
 
 ' " It appears to me that it will always be found 
 exceedingly difficult, for any extended period, to 
 maintain a united and strong government in 
 Afghanistan. The genius of the chiefs and people, 
 as evinced in the independent Pathan communities 
 of the Border, is evidence to this effect. A chief 
 may now and then arise who may for a time unite 
 the different provinces under one rule ; but when he 
 has passed away, the tendency again will be to 
 separation. With the single exception of the pressure 
 of a common enemy, and even this circumstance will 
 not always avail, there appear to be no ties to bind 
 the Afghans together." 
 
 ' My Lords, I do not believe that the people of 
 Kandahar would regard themselves as humiliated in 
 the smallest degree by annexation to British Lidia. I 
 am confident that such annexation would be of im- 
 mense and permanent benefit to them ; and .1 am 
 disposed to doubt rather whether they deserve such 
 a favour, than whether they have merited such a 
 punishment. Of any policy, however, which in- 
 volves annexation, it may justly be asked. What is 
 to be the practical limit of it ? How far will you go 
 with such a policy ? How far can you go ? " Are 
 we," it may be said, " to goon conquering and annex- 
 ing one barbarous wilderness after another, till we 
 reach, at last, the Dardanelles in one direction and 
 the boundaries of Eussian Turkestan in another?" 
 If not, where will you stop ? Where will you draw 
 the line ? My Lords, I think it is very right to ask, 
 and very necessary to answer, these questions. I do 
 
456 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch ix 
 
 Lord Lytton's not Underrate, and to a great extent I share, the 
 against the Sentiment with which, by so many of our country- 
 evacuation of nien, war and conquest are regarded in the lii^fht of 
 
 Kandahar, . . . . ® ^ 
 
 Jan. 1881 pubhc crimcs. I will yield to no man in the con- 
 demnation of wars undertaken for no better object 
 than the gratification of personal ambition, the in- 
 dulgence of national vanity, or the provision of active 
 service for an army. But I must observe that no 
 one can denounce war and conquest in the absolute 
 unmeasured terms so frequently employed for that 
 purpose without denouncing, at the same time, one 
 of the most potent agents of civilisation. The 
 greater part of Europe consists of the fragments of 
 the Eoman Empire, an Empire created by wars 
 which rendered possible the diffusion of Christianity 
 and the development of law. The whole of America, 
 North and South, has been conquered from its original 
 owners, who were savages, chiefly by Englishmen 
 and Spaniards. The enormous Eussian Empire has 
 been formed by a series of obscure wars waged 
 against barbarians impenetrable to any other civilis- 
 ing process ; and the whole fabric of the British 
 Empire in India is an additional illustration of the 
 same thing. Upon those, therefore, who have con- 
 demned my Afghan policy, solely on the ground that, 
 in one form or another, it involves conquest, I am 
 entitled, I think, to retort their own questions. 
 Where, I ask, do they draw the line? Can they 
 ^ justify our present possession of the Pesliawur Valley ? 
 Have we any right to Lahore ? Wliat is our title to 
 Delhi, to Allahabad, to Benares, to Calcutta ? My 
 Lords, I believe that the most consistent and candid 
 of my critics would answer all these questions plainly 
 and directly enough. They would sslj, and indeed 
 some of them have said, we have no business in India 
 
1881 REVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 457 
 
 at all. It was by crime that we acquired our power Lord Lytton's 
 
 '' ^ ^ speech 
 
 in India. The only justification for its maintenance against the 
 
 evacuatio 
 Kandahai 
 Jan. 1881 
 
 is that its downfall would be injurious to the natives; Kandaha" ° 
 
 and the only attitude that befits us in that country 
 is one of penitence for the sins of our forefathers, 
 with an anxious desire to expiate, if possible, their 
 fault. But, surely, the first remark suggested by 
 this view of the case is, that those who hold it are, 
 for that very reason, disqualified to form a trust- 
 worthy opinion on the policy best calculated to 
 maintain and uphold the Empire of British India. 
 No one should try to administer an institution of 
 which he entirely disapproves. The man who does 
 not value life and health ought not to practise as a 
 physician; and a man who condemns the Indian 
 Empire in principle is disqualified to judge of the 
 measures necessary for its defence and security. I 
 shall not attempt to refute these views ; but I cannot 
 pass them by without a few words of energetic con- 
 tradiction. Whatever may be said by those who 
 maintain them, I cannot believe, and I do not think 
 the English nation will believe, that an Empire can 
 have been founded on robbery and fraud ; when we 
 are also told in the same breath by those who make 
 this assertion that the Empire thus founded must, 
 nevertheless, be maintained, because its fall would 
 involve 200,000,000 people in anarchy and bloodshed 
 and relegate them to the barbarism from which they 
 are slowly emerging. Grapes do not grow on thorns, 
 nor figs on thistles ; and it is surely not under the 
 protection of thieves and robbers that men sit beneath 
 their own vines and fig-trees in undisturbed enjoy- 
 ment of the peaceful fruits of honest labour. 
 
 ' My Lords, if I seem to have been asserting 
 truisms I am sorry for it ; but it seems to me that 
 
458 LUED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 the alleged moral obligation to retire from Kandahar 
 cannot be stated in any terms which do not imply 
 the proposition that we ought to retire from India 
 altogether. And, therefore, to the question, " How 
 far would j^ou go, and where would you draw the 
 line ? " I reply without hesitation, that, for the 
 present, I would go as far as Kandahar, and there I 
 would draw the line. Because I am convinced that 
 if the line be promptly drawn there, and, when 
 drawn, firmly maintained, then you may look upon 
 the permanent security of the North-West Frontier 
 of India as a question practically closed — I will not 
 say for ever, but closed at least for a period of 
 time so long that the present generation need no 
 longer be practically concerned about it.' 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 It may here be stated, in order to complete the 
 story of the. Afghan war, that Ayub Khan, after his 
 defeat at Kandahar, made his way back with a few 
 horsemen to Herat, where he vigorously restored 
 his power, put down his enemies, and recruited his 
 forces. As soon as he heard that the English had 
 evacuated Kandahar, he marched down again to 
 take possession of it ; and one of his generals, after 
 defeating Abdul Eahman's troops on the way, re- 
 occupied the city in July 1881. The situation was 
 now full of anxiety for the Government of India, for 
 Abdul Eahman was leading an army from Kabul against 
 Ayub at Kandahar, and if the fortune of a battle 
 should turn against him it was evident that all 
 Afghanistan would again be thrown into confusion, 
 and that the policy of establishing in the country 
 a strong and friendly ruler would be very seriously 
 
 i 
 
1881 EEVEESAL OF LYTTON POLICY 459 
 
 compromised. As Abdul Ealiman had not up to this 
 time shown any remarkable energy or militar}' 
 capacity, the general opinion was that he would 
 be beaten. Nevertheless, after some indecisive 
 manoeuvres, he met Ayub's force close to Kandahar 
 on September 22, where he gained a complete 
 victory, taking all the enemy's guns and camp 
 equipage ; and when Ayub fled back to Herat he 
 found the town seized by the Amir's adherents, so 
 that he was forced to take refuge in Persia. 
 
 From that time Abdul Eahman's rulership over 
 Afghanistan has been undisputed except by one or 
 two insurrections, which were speedily quelled, and 
 by the resistance of some of the highland tribes 
 who fought to maintain their independence of the 
 central government. Aided by a constant supply 
 from India of money and arms, he has succeeded in 
 establishing a powerful sovereignty, and he has 
 enforced order by a fierce and relentless use of 
 his despotic authority. His relations with the 
 Government of India have been occasionally troubled 
 by the difficulty of dealing with the independent 
 tribes who occupy the belt of mountainous country 
 lying between Afghanistan proper and the frontier 
 of British India. And the approach of the Eussian 
 dominion to his northern frontier raised similar 
 difficulties in that quarter. For the purpose of 
 settling the tribal question, Mr. (now Sir Henry) 
 Durand was deputed to Kabul in 1894, where a 
 convention was concluded for the demarcation of the 
 Afghan boundar}^ on the east. A few years earlier 
 the Eussian boundary had been marked out, by 
 agreement with Eussia, on the north-west ; and it has 
 since been completely settled up to the Chinese 
 Frontier. The policy of building up Afghanistan 
 
460 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. ix 
 
 into a strong independent kingdom has thus been 
 consummated ; so completely, indeed, that it is be- 
 coming perceptible that this policy, like all others, 
 may have its drawbacks and possibly disadvantages. 
 The old system of non-interference with Afghan 
 affairs had at least this effect, that it kept the 
 country weak and disunited ; if Afghanistan was of 
 little use as an ally, its hostility could never be 
 formidable, while the mountains and the fighting 
 tribes would always, for the sake of their own 
 liberties, resist any foreign invader. But the 
 intrigues of Eussia with the Amir Slier Ali ren- 
 dered this policy impracticable, and the second 
 Afghan war was the result. Then came Lord Lytton's 
 second plan of breaking up the kingdom by the 
 separation of Kandahar under a ruler protected by 
 the British, with the object of relieving the British 
 Government from any dependence upon the good- 
 will or ill-will of future Amirs at Kabul. Strong 
 reasons may be adduced for holding that this policy 
 might have succeeded in spite of evident risks and 
 difficulties ; but the course of events, and the change 
 of views in England, frustrated any trial of it. How far, 
 on the other hand, the consolidation of Afghanistan as 
 an armed power, under an able ruler governing a 
 fanatical people, will have operated for the peace and 
 security of British India, and as a trustworthy barrier 
 against external aggression, has yet to be seen. For 
 the present therefore impartial observers can only con- 
 clude that after many vicissitudes of policy, and a 
 large expenditure of men and money by the Indian 
 Government, the problem of our permanent relations 
 with Afghanistan is still awaiting a durable and 
 satisfactory solution. 
 
461 
 
 CHAPTEE X 
 
 INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. FINANCE 
 
 It has been thought advisable not to interrupt the 
 account of events in Afghanistan by any other 
 matter dealt with during Lord Lytton's administra- 
 tion. The questions of internal administration are 
 therefore reserved for this and the following chapters, 
 which relate to Finance, to the question of the 
 inclusion of Natives in the Indian Civil Service, and 
 to the passing of an Act for repressing seditious 
 writings published in the vernacular. 
 
 The measures carried out by Lord Lytton's 
 Government for the improvement of the Finances and 
 the financial system of India have had a great and 
 lasting influence on the prosperity of the country. 
 In this department Lord Lytton had the good fortune 
 of ' seeing what he foresaw,' of carrying out during 
 his tenure of office all, or almost all, the reforms at 
 which he aimed from the beginning of his Viceroy alty. 
 In a letter to Lord Salisbury of September 24, 1876, 
 he thus summed up the four chief heads of his 
 financial policy : 
 
 ' 1. Equalisation of salt duties throughout India Lord Saiis- 
 with a view to their early reduction, and abolition l?';'^^' ^^p*- 
 
 •^ ' 24, 1876 
 
 01 the sugar duty. 
 
 ' 2, Extension of the system of provincial assign- pio^ramme 
 ments, and its application to sources of income. 
 
 ' 3. Immediate and final abandonment of the 
 
462 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Letter to present system of constructing extraordinary public 
 buiy, Sept. works out of Capital annually borrowed in England, 
 24, 1876 ^^^^ transfer from Imperial to provincial resources 
 
 Financial ^f ^]^g responsibility of carrying out works of acknow- 
 ledged local utility. 
 
 ' 4. Abolition of the import duty on coarse 
 cottons, with a distinct declaration that the duty on 
 the finer cottons is to go also as soon as ever the 
 condition of the finances will permit ; and enuncia- 
 tion of the policy of endeavouring to make India 
 one great free port, open to the commerce of the 
 whole world.' 
 
 It was not, indeed, given to him to carry out 
 these great projects in a single year ; but before he 
 left India all his aims had been achieved, together 
 with the measures needed to place the finances of 
 the country in a secure position against the periodical 
 recurrence of famine. The success of the finan- 
 cial policy he had in view would, Lord Lj^tton 
 knew, depend upon his securing a first-rate Finance 
 Minister to the Indian Government. That post, 
 when he first arrived in India, was occupied by 
 Sir William Muir, who resigned in the course of that 
 year to accept a vacancy offered him on the India 
 Council at home. Lord Lytton felt that, of all men 
 in India, the one most qualified for such a post was 
 Sir John Strachey, then Governor-General of the 
 North-West Provinces. The post of Financial 
 Member of Council was offered to him, and it was 
 to Lord Lytton a source of never-ending gratitude 
 that Sir John, ' under a high sense of personal 
 obligation to public duty, consented to exchange 
 a very comfortable and easy post for a very 
 anxious and laborious one.' To the discharge of 
 its difficult duties during a difficult period it was 
 
1877 FINANCE 463 
 
 the Viceroy's opinion that 'few men could have 
 brought greater courage and capacity.' 
 
 Speaking at Manchester in the year 1882 on the LovdLytton' 
 subject of Indian Finance Lord Lytton referred to sirJohn° 
 Sir John Strachey in the following terms : — ' I cannot Manchester 
 mention the name of that truly great Indian States- 1882 
 man without expressing my admiration of his genius 
 as well as my lasting gratitude for his generous and 
 courageous assistance in the government of India 
 during a ver}^ critical and difficult period. Long 
 distinguished in almost every branch of Indian 
 administration, Sir John Strachey has now closed a 
 career of laborious and far-reaching public usefulness 
 by a remarkable series of financial measures with 
 which his name will be permanently associated in the 
 annals of Indian history as one of the most sagacious 
 and beneficent financiers that India has ever had.' 
 
 Salt Duties 
 
 The conditions under which salt was produced 
 and taxed in India at the commencement of Lord 
 Lytton's Viceroyalty are thus described by Sir John 
 Strachey, in his speech of March 15, 1877, intro- 
 ducing the Budget of 1877-8 : 
 
 ' The circumstances under which the salt duties strachey's 
 are levied vary greatly in different parts of India. fpS 
 Bengal and Assam, with sixty-seven millions of ^^^'"^^ i'^' 
 people, get nearly the whole of their supply from 
 Cheshire. . . . Almost the only local source within easy- 
 reach from which Bengal can obtain salt is the sea ; 
 and the natural facilities for making salt on the 
 northern coasts of the Bay of Bengal are nof^great. 
 The climate is so damp that salt cannot easily be 
 obtained by the cheap process of solar evaporation ; 
 
464 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION 
 
 Salt Duties 
 
 Straehey's 
 Budget 
 Speech, 
 March 15, 
 1877 
 
 and, owing to the vast quantities of fresh water 
 poured in by the Ganges and Brahmaputra, the sea 
 is less salt than on the other shores of India. In 
 Madras and Bombay, on the other hand, containing 
 together about forty-seven millions of people, the 
 manufacture of salt from the sea is cheap and easy, 
 and for these Presidencies, as well as for the greater 
 part of the Central Presidency and the Native States 
 of Southern India, the sea is the great source of 
 supply. 
 
 ' Coming to Northern India, we find that the 
 Punjab possesses inexhaustible supplies of rock 
 salt, which is consumed by about fourteen millions 
 of people. Throughout the North-West Provinces 
 and Oudh, and a portion of the Central Presidency 
 and of the Punjab, on the other hand, although 
 there are many places where more or less impure 
 salts can be produced, the home sources for the 
 supply of good salt can never be sufficient. Forty- 
 seven millions of our own subjects depend almost 
 entirely for their salt on the Native States of 
 Eajputana, or on places on the confines of those 
 States. 
 
 ' The system under which the duty is levied, and 
 the rate of duty, vary in the different provinces. In 
 Madras and Bombay the rate of duty is Es. 1-13 
 per maund ; in Lower Bengal the rate is Es. 3-4 
 per maund, and is levied chiefly in the form of a 
 sea-Customs import duty. In the Upper Provinces 
 the rate is Es. 3 per maund. In the Punjab this 
 is included in the selling price of the rock salt, 
 which is the property of Government. In the rest 
 of the Upper Provinces the duty is levied when the 
 salt is imported from Eajputana. 
 
 ' For this purpose, and to prevent the ingress of 
 
1877 FINANCE 465 
 
 salt taxed at lower rates, a Customs line is maintained Salt Duties 
 extending from a point north of Attock to near strachey's 
 the Berar frontier, a distance of more than 1,500 s^Q^ch, 
 miles. Similar lines some hundreds of miles in ^^J^^ ^^' 
 
 • T-v • 1877 
 
 length are established m the Bombay Presidency, to 
 prevent untaxed salt from Native States entering 
 British territory. Along the greater part of this 
 enormous system of inland Customs lines, which, if 
 they were put down in Europe, would stretch from 
 London to Constantinople, a physical barrier has 
 been created comparable to nothing that I can think 
 of except the Great Wall of China. It consists 
 principally of an impenetrable hedge of thorny trees 
 and bushes, supplemented by stone walls and ditches, 
 across which no human being or beast of burden 
 or vehicle can pass without being subjected to 
 detention and search. It is guarded by an army 
 of some 8,000 men, the mass of whom receive as 
 wao'es Es. 6 or 7 a month. The bare statement of 
 these facts is sufficient to show the magnitude of 
 the evil. 
 
 ' Although I believe that everything is done which 
 can be done under such circumstances to prevent 
 abuses, it may be easily imagined what inevitable 
 and serious obstruction to trade and annoyance and 
 harassment to individuals must take place. I 
 remember a graphic account of Sir George Campbell, 
 in which he described the evils of the system and 
 the instruments, of the nature of cheese-tasters, which 
 are thrust into the goods of everyone whose business 
 takes him across the line. The interference is not 
 confined to the traffic passing into British territory ; 
 for, owing to the levy of the export duty on sugar, 
 the same obstructions are offered to the traffic pass- 
 ing in the other direction. In spite, however, of the 
 
 H H 
 
466 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Salt Duties 
 
 Strachey's 
 Budget 
 Speech, 
 March 15, 
 
 1877 
 
 evils inseparable from the existence of a Customs 
 line, it is practically impossible to dispense with it 
 so long as we levy our salt tax at different rates in 
 different provinces, and have no means of controlling 
 the manufacture and taxation of salt produced in 
 Native States until the salt reaches the British 
 frontier. 
 
 ' The great object at which the Government ought 
 to aim is to give to the people throughout India the 
 means of obtaining, with the least possible incon- 
 venience and at the cheapest rate consistent with 
 financial necessities, a supply of salt, the quantity 
 of which shall be limited onl}^ by the capacity of the 
 people for consumption. 
 
 ' I have a strong belief that more than a hundred 
 millions of people fail now to obtain a full supply 
 of salt. I do not for a moment assert, nor do I 
 believe, that the actual supply is insufiicient for the 
 preservation of health. Nor do I at all agree with 
 those who maintain that the salt tax presses with 
 extreme severity on the poorer classes. But, how- 
 ever this may be, it is a great evil that the supply 
 of this necessary of life should be restricted. . . . 
 With the existing means of communication it was a 
 physical impossibility to bring from Eajputana the 
 salt required for some fifty millions of people. That 
 task was one that could not be performed by any 
 number of carts and camels and ponies which it was 
 possible for the country to furnish ; and these were the 
 only means of transport. Therefore it was that I have 
 sometimes asserted that there was a salt famine 
 in Northern India ; meaning thereby not only that 
 salt was dear, but that sufficient salt could not be pro 
 vided. For such a condition of things reduction of 
 duty would no more afford a remedy than it would 
 
1877 FINANCE 467 
 
 be a remedy in a food famine to give money to the Salt Duties 
 people wlien no food existed in the markets. Lord sti-achey's 
 Mayo saw that there were two essential conditions gpeeS, 
 to be fulfilled before relief could be found. It was ^{f;9^ ^^' 
 
 • -I c 1877 
 
 necessary to provide cheap means of transport to a 
 practically unlimited extent between the salt of 
 Eajputana and our own markets ; and also to make 
 arrangements by which the price of salt to our people 
 should be freed from influences outside our territory. 
 The first condition could only be provided by making 
 railways into Eajputana. The second condition 
 rendered it necessary that our Government should 
 obtain complete control over the manufacture and 
 supply of salt at the chief places of production.' 
 
 It is clear from this speech that there were two 
 conditions precedent to the carrying out of the 
 desired reform : first, the completion of the treaties 
 with the Native States within whose territory salt 
 was produced on a large scale ; and, secondly, the 
 improvement of the general financial position of the 
 country, which just then was entering on the season 
 of trial and distress caused by the great famine in 
 Madras and Bombay. 
 
 In order to carry out the first of these objects 
 Mr. A. 0. Hume, C.B., was placed on special duty to 
 negotiate with the Native States concerned. It is 
 interesting to read some extracts from a note written 
 by Lord Lytton to convey his instructions to Mr. 
 Hume in August 1876. They show how thoroughly he 
 had grasped the details, and what care he evinced in 
 thinking out all the steps needed for carrying out this 
 complicated inquiry. 
 
 After quoting Mr. George Batten's note, to the 
 effect that the immediate business was to ascertain 
 the situation and capabilities of the different salt 
 
468 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Salt Duties sources ill the Native States, the amount of revenue 
 they derived from their salt works, and the nature 
 and rate of transit duties levied on salt on its 
 journey into British territory, he goes on as follows : 
 
 Lord Lytton's ' With regard to the salt works already in exist- 
 
 Note to Mr. . , ° ^ . . ^ , . / 
 
 Hume, ence, It should be ascertamed what is the annual 
 
 August 1876 out-turn, what is the cost per maund of production, 
 what is the selling price, how the realisations are 
 divided, that is, the share of the manufacturer, the 
 proprietor of the works, and the State ; what duty 
 is levied by the State ; what is the course of trade 
 and area of consumption ; what transit duties are 
 levied on salt, and generally what interests would 
 be affected by the works being placed under the 
 control of the British Government — the assumption 
 being that Excise duties would be levied at the works 
 before the salt was permitted to be removed, and 
 that all other duties on salt of every description, 
 including transit duties, would be abolished.' 
 
 Similar inquiries were to be made with regard 
 to the smaller areas of production which it might be 
 proposed to close, and to potential sources not now 
 worked, but which might spring into activity when 
 other salt was excised. ' It should, further, be 
 ascertained who are the persons of local influence, 
 if any, who would l^e able to help on or to obstruct 
 the measures of the Government, and the best way of 
 enlisting their interests, without in any way bringing 
 them into opposition to the Durbar to which they 
 are subordinate, or in any way interfering with the 
 authority of the Native States, with whom alone the 
 British Government can negotiate.' ' Having ascer- 
 tained as nearly as possible the value, present and 
 prospective, of the various salt sources in the hands 
 of the Native States, the British Government will be 
 
1878 FINANCE 469 
 
 in a position to determine the amount of compensation Salt Duties 
 which might be paid to those States for the sur- 
 render of complete control over the manufacture 
 of salt, and for aiding in the suppression of illicit 
 manufacture. The necessary result of putting an 
 excise duty on all salt manufactured in Eajputana 
 will be to make the people of Eajputana and 
 Central India contribute to the British salt revenue, 
 as the people of Hyderabad and Mysore and nearly 
 every other Native State in India do already. From 
 this source ample funds would be available for the 
 liberal treatment of the Native States concerned, 
 and the British Government would be able to pay 
 them more than they have ever received from their 
 salt, and possibly leave a considerable margin for 
 other purposes.' 
 
 By October 1, 1878, these inquiries and negotia- 
 tions had been completed. All the principal sources 
 of salt production had been taken over on lease 
 and the minor sources closed. Liberal compensation, 
 amounting to 54,000/., was paid to manufacturers 
 and others interested in the salt works which had 
 been suppressed. Annual payments of 84,000/. were 
 secured by treaty to the Native States — these pay- 
 ments being equivalent to the duty realised — and a 
 liberal compensation to the chiefs for the salt and 
 transit duties which they and their feudatories would 
 forego. In some cases also large quantities of salt 
 were allowed to be passed free of duty to the people 
 of those States. 
 
 The door was now open for the equalisation of 
 the salt duties throughout India, and for the accom- 
 plishment of the object which Lord Lytton and Sir 
 John Strachey had so ardently desired. The rate of 
 taxation was raised in Madras and Bombay, and 
 
470 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Salt Duties lowered in Northern India to Es. '2-S per maund 
 Equalisation (82 lb.) ; Only, in Bengal it was thought impossible 
 clmld out,'^^ ^^ financial grounds to allow the full reduction, and 
 Oct. 1878 the rate was kept at Es. 2-14, as against 3-4 before. 
 In this way, while the duty on salt was raised for 
 47 millions of people, it was lowered for 130 
 millions. The Customs hedge, so eloquently stigma- 
 tised by Sir John Strachey, 2,000 miles in length, 
 was removed, and the sugar duty was abolished, 
 at a financial sacrifice of 155,000/. This wise 
 and liberal treatment of so important a necessary 
 of life produced the efiects which might naturally 
 have been expected. The consumption of salt 
 in 1879-80 had risen by 12^ per cent, above 
 the consumption of 1876-7. The net salt revenue 
 which in 1876-7 had been less than six miUions, 
 rose in 1879-80 to over seven millions. 
 
 At the same time the price of salt throughout 
 Northern India was greatly cheapened by the 
 opening of railway communication and the removal 
 of hindrances to the trader. At Agra, where a 
 maund (82 lb.) of salt had cost Es. 5-8 and 6 
 in 1868 and 1869, the price of the same salt had 
 fallen in 1879 to Es. 3-8 ; so that while the duty had 
 been lowered 16 J per cent., the cost to the consumer 
 was reduced by 40 per cent. The wisdom of the 
 measures taken by the Government of India to 
 cheapen this important article of consumption was 
 thus effectively established. 
 
 In the debate on the Budget of 1878-79, Lord 
 Lytton devoted a large portion of his speech 
 (February 9, 1878) to a liistory of the salt tax from 
 early times and an exposition of his views on the 
 equalisation of the duty, the abolition of the Customs 
 line, and the justifiability of the tax as a source of 
 
1878 FINANCE 47 1 
 
 revenue. The following quotations from this speech Salt Duties 
 will be read with interest : 
 
 'I would now ask permission to state to the LordLytton's 
 
 11 n Budget 
 
 Council, m a general way, what we have actually speech, 
 done and what we hope to do in this matter. Our ^ ' ' ^^ 
 first step was to enter into friendly communication 
 with the Native States I have already mentioned, for 
 the purpose of obtaining their acquiescence in our 
 control over the salt sources in their territories, and 
 thus enabling us to tax all salt at the places of pro- 
 duction, and so abolish our present barbarous inland 
 Customs cordon, upon conditions equitable, and 
 indeed liberal, as regards the financial interests of the 
 Native States concerned and the social interests of 
 their subjects. . . . 
 
 'I venture to maintain . . . that an equalisation 
 of the salt duties in British territory surrounding the 
 salt-producing Native States is a necessary preliminary 
 to the abolition of the inland Customs line ; that, in 
 the advanced stage of our negotiations with those 
 States, it was incumbent on us to lose no time in 
 making an appreciable approach towards the esta- 
 blishment of such an equalisation in our own salt 
 duties, and that no measure adopted for that purpose 
 could practically be confined to the territories I have 
 mentioned. The Madras duty must be on the same 
 level as the Bombay duty, and the duty in Lower 
 Bengal must not be very much higher than the duty 
 in the Upper Provinces ; for, otherwise, the dearer 
 salt would be entirely displaced by the cheaper salt, 
 to the great disturbance and injury of trade. Now, I 
 grieve to say that in the present state of our finances 
 it was simply impossible for us to lower the rates in 
 Northern India down to the level of the rates in 
 Southern India. Such a measure would have 
 
472 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Salt Duties involved the loss of at least one and a-lialf million 
 LordLytton's Sterling of revenue. We had, therefore, to choose 
 Speech, between raising the rates in Southern India, without 
 
 Feb. 9, 1878 making any simultaneous reduction in the rates of 
 Northern India, or making an addition to the rates 
 in Southern India considerably larger than the simul- 
 taneous reduction effected in Northern India. It is 
 the last of these two courses that we have now 
 adopted, in the belief that it is the fairest. We have 
 not raised the rates in Southern India without effect- 
 ing at least some simultaneous reduction in the rates 
 of Northern India ; and I assert that this is more 
 than any previous Government of India has done 
 towards the establishment of an equilibrium in the 
 salt duty upon equitable principles, and at a level 
 which, if high in the first instance, will, I trust, be 
 found susceptible of gradual reduction to a minimum 
 uniform rate. We have raised the Madras and 
 Bombay duties to Es. 2-8 ; that is to say, we have 
 increased them by 11 annas per maund; but we 
 have simultaneously lowered the salt duties in the 
 Upper Provinces of Northern India by 4 annas per 
 maund, and in the Lower Provinces by 2 annas per 
 maund ; so that at the present moment the salt duty 
 in the Southern Presidencies stands at Es. 2-8, in 
 Lower Bengal at Es. 3-2, and in the Northern Provinces 
 at Es. 2-12 per maund. . . . 
 
 ' Sincerely as I desire to see the price of salt 
 not only equalised, but cheapened throughout India, 
 earnestly as I hope that it may be the privilege of 
 this Administration to accelerate the arrival of the 
 day when such a result may be attainable, stiU, I 
 must frankly own that I feel unable to accept 
 the dictum of those who assert that the present 
 salt duties are a grievous burden to the long 
 
]878 FINANCE 473 
 
 suffering back of the poor ryot. It may be in the Salt Duties 
 power of the Government of India, and I hope, indeed, 
 it may be in the power of the present Government fpelch, 
 of India, to lighten that burden, such as it is ; but it Feb. 9, 1878 
 is my own belief that it will never be in the power of 
 any Government of India to devise a substitute for 
 it which will weigh less heavily on the poorer classes 
 or be less sensibly felt by them. A salt taxof Es. 2-8 
 per maund is a tax of less than three farthings per 
 pound. It would be absurd to represent the pressure 
 of such a tax as oppressive. The manner in which 
 the tax is levied renders the pressure of it almost in- 
 appreciable. It is an indirect impost, distributed, in 
 minute daily instalments, over vast masses of popu- 
 lation, and in all probability the majorit}' of the 
 millions who pay it are not even conscious of its 
 existence. 
 
 'It is the only obligatory tax imposed by this 
 Government upon the masses ; and the total amount 
 of its proceeds, when compared with the numbers 
 from whom it is collected, shows how small is the 
 contribution of each individual. The otoss esti- 
 mated revenue of a salt tax assessed at Es. 2-8 
 per maund is about six millions sterling ; and this 
 revenue would be collected from a population of not 
 less than 200,000,000 of consumers. On this point I 
 shall again venture to quote the words of Sir William 
 Muir : " If," he said, " there were any form of indirect 
 taxation which could be brought to bear upon the 
 rich rather than upon the poor, and on the luxuries 
 rather than on the necessaries of life, I would at 
 once agree to such a tax ; but I know of none that 
 is practicable." And then, after dwelling on the 
 dissatisfaction occasioned by all attempts to extract 
 national revenue from the wealthier classes by direct 
 
474 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Salt Duties taxes Specialty imposed on those classes, as compared 
 
 Lord Lytton's with the ascertained social results of indirect taxation 
 
 SpeSi levied on a commodity which is consumed by rich and 
 
 Feb. 9, 1878 poor, and equally necessary for all classes in the 
 
 community. Sir William Muir concludes by this 
 
 emphatic record of his own experience : " In the one 
 
 case," he says, " we stir up angry feelings in every 
 
 class throughout the country ; in the other case we 
 
 peaceably realise what we require without affecting 
 
 the contentment and tranquillity of any class." 
 
 ' I trust, then, I have shown that the recent action 
 of the present Government of India in reference to 
 the salt duties of Madras and Bombay is in complete 
 accordance with the consistent, continuous and 
 repeatedly avowed aim of its predecessors during the 
 last ten years and more. I trust I have shown that 
 of the sincerity of its devotion to the prosecution of 
 that aim the present Government of India has given 
 conspicuous proof by taking, for the attainment of it, 
 bolder and wider steps than any which have been 
 taken by previous Administrations. I trust I have 
 shown that these steps have been taken without 
 deviation from the course prescribed to us by our 
 predecessors. And if I have succeeded in this 
 endeavour, then I think I am entitled to claim from 
 all who have questioned our policy a complete 
 acquittal from the charge that in what we have done 
 we have sacrificed the interests of the poorer classes 
 to those of the richer, with a view to a mere increase 
 of revenue. The point at which we have now arrived 
 is this : the salt duty in Madras, Bombay, Sindh, 
 and the Central Provinces has been equalised at 
 the rate of Es. 2-8 per maund. In the North- 
 western Provinces, Oudh, the Punjab and Lower 
 Bengal it still varies between higher rates. The 
 
1878 FINANCE 475 
 
 aim of the present Government will be to reduce Salt Duties 
 those higher rates to the level already reached by the Lord Lytton's 
 salt duties of Southern India. Nor shall we relax gp^^dJ 
 our endeavours to cheapen the price of salt through- ^eb. 9, 1878 
 out the whole Empire, by improving our means of 
 communication with the sources of supply. I trust 
 that our Administration may last long enough to 
 achieve these long-deferred results ; and that my 
 honourable friend, Sir John Strachey, may still be a 
 member of it when we attain the Promised Land to 
 which he first guided our progress, and thus fulfil 
 his eloquent prophecy of the day when the Govern- 
 ment of India will have given to the people of India 
 " the means of obtaining, with the least possible 
 inconvenience, and at the cheapest rate consistent 
 with financial necessities, a supply of salt only limited 
 by the people's capacity of consumption." ' 
 
 In March 1882, Lord Eipon's Government, which 
 had succeeded to the benefits of the financial re- 
 forms initiated in Lord Lytton's time, was able to 
 complete this great work by lowering the rate of the 
 salt duty throughout the whole of India, and thereby 
 reducing taxation to the amount of 1,400,000/. 
 
 Cotton Duties and Free Trade 
 
 There had been for many years a growing feeling 
 in England that the duty of 5 per cent, ad valorem 
 levied on the import of cotton goods was a serious 
 hindrance to the trade of Manchester, and protected 
 the Indian manufacturer in a manner subversive 
 of the principles of political economy. Lord 
 Northbrook, in 1875, had said on this subject: 
 ' Indian statesmen have never regarded Customs 
 duties as desirable for the purpose of protecting 
 
p- 
 
 476 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. x 
 
 Cotton Duties the proclucts or manufactures of India. In India, 
 equally as in England, Protection has been regarded 
 as an exploded doctrine, contrary to the general 
 interests of the country which imposes protection 
 duties.' And in 1876 the discussion was closed 
 
 ' Financial by the Secretary of State, who wrote, ' that the 
 
 statements,' • , , c r t • j.' i • ^i i.' i 
 
 15(3 mterests 01 India imperatively require the timely 
 
 removal of a tax which is at once wrong in principle, 
 injurious in its practical effect, and self-destructive 
 in its operation.' Lord Lytton came to India fully 
 imbued with the wisdom of this policy, and he took 
 the earliest possible opportunity of making known 
 his opinion on the subject and the limitations under 
 which he felt himself bound to carry it out. On 
 April 20, 1876, addressing the Calcutta Trades 
 Association, he said : ' So far as I am aware, nobody 
 in or out of India seriously desires to see the cotton 
 duties maintained for purely protective purposes. 
 It is, therefore, only as an item of revenue that their 
 maintenance can be properly advocated. . . . Were 
 our finances in such a condition as to admit of any 
 reduction in those sources of revenue which are 
 derived from taxes on consumption, I must frankly 
 say I would gladly see our tariff purged not only of 
 these cotton duties, but also of some others. , . . 
 Starting, as we do this year, with a surplus unavoidably 
 reduced to the very narrowest limits ... I think no 
 one responsible for the administration of this Empire 
 would at present venture to make even the smallest 
 reduction in any of its limited sources of revenue.' 
 
 Wlien the time came for framing the Budget of 
 1877-78, it became evident that in the face of the 
 famine then impending in Madras and Bombay it was 
 impossible to carry out the desired abolition, or even 
 reduction, of the duties. Lord Lytton said in his 
 
1877 FINANCE 477 
 
 speech of March 28, 1877: 'The Secretary of State Cotton Duties 
 has distinctly affirmed and estabhshed the principle Lord Lytton's 
 by which he intends our action to be guided, and the ^^^q]^ ^s, 
 discretion he has left to us extends only to the time i^^? 
 and mode which we may deem most suitable and most 
 efficacious for carrying that principle into practical 
 effect. In the exercise of that discretion we have 
 reluctantly recognised . . . the practical impossibility 
 of any present reduction of the import duty on cotton 
 goods.' 
 
 Sir John Strachey, in his speech on the same 
 occasion, emphatically declared, on behalf of the 
 Viceroy and himself, their determination to carry out 
 this reform at the earliest opportunity which the state 
 of the finances might admit, and also looked forward to 
 the possible abolition of all Customs duties in India : 
 
 ' I altogether disbelieve that there is in this g^^. j^^j^^ 
 matter any conflict between Indian and Ena;lish strachey' s 
 
 X • r> 1 1 1 • Budget 
 
 interests ; i am satisned that these mterests are Speech, 
 identical, and that they alike require the abolition iq^^'' ^ ' 
 of this tax. I will not speculate on what ought to 
 have been done if the case had been different ; but 
 there is one thing which I wish to take this oppor- 
 tunity of saying. We are often told that it is the 
 duty of the Government of India to think of Indian 
 interests alone, and that if the interests of Manchester 
 suffer it is no affair of ours. For my part, I utterly 
 repudiate such doctrines. I have not ceased to be an 
 Englishman because I have passed the greater part 
 of my life in India, and have become a member of 
 the Indian Government. The interests of Manchester, 
 at which foolish people sneer, are the interests not 
 only of the great and intelligent population engaged 
 directly in the trade in cotton, but of millions of 
 Eno'lishmen. . . . 
 
478 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Cotton Duties 
 
 Sir John 
 Strachey's 
 Speech, 
 Mai-ch 28, 
 1877 
 
 Action of 
 
 House 
 
 of Commons 
 
 ' Financial 
 Statements,' 
 p. 324 
 
 ' It is important, in my opinion, not only on its 
 own account, but for the results which may follow 
 hereafter. The net sea-Customs revenue proper of 
 India amounted in 1875-76 to 2,475,530^,, of which 
 the duties on cotton goods yielded 850,000/. . When 
 the cotton duties are removed there will remain ex- 
 port duties on rice, indigo, and lac yielding together 
 620,000/., and import duties on a multitude of 
 articles yielding 930,000/. Excluding the duties on 
 cotton goods, the export and import duties together 
 give 1,550,000/. Many of these duties are so objec- 
 tionable that it is impossible that they can last ; and 
 can it be supposed that we should long continue to 
 maintain huge establishments for the purpose of 
 levying the small remnant of revenue that might 
 survive ? The truth is that cotton goods are the 
 sole article of foreign production which the people 
 of India largely consume, and there is no possibility 
 of deriving a large Customs revenue from anything 
 else. I do not know how long a period may elapse 
 before such a consummation is reached ; but, whether 
 we see it or not, the time is not hopelessly distant 
 when the ports of India will be thrown open freely 
 to the commerce of the world.' ^ 
 
 On July 11, 1877, the House of Commons adopted 
 without a division the following important resolution : 
 ' That, in the opinion of this House, the duties now 
 levied upon cotton manufactures imported into India, 
 being protective in their nature, are contrary'' to sound 
 commercial policy, and ought to be repealed with- 
 out delay, so soon as the financial condition of India 
 will admit.' The stimulus of this resolution, though 
 not needed to induce Lord Lytton to take the pre- 
 
 ^ Sir John Strachey's speech before Council: Financial Statements, 
 p. 157. 
 
1877 FINANCE 479 
 
 scribed steps, helped to remove public opposition to Cotton Duties 
 the reform. Indian cotton being coarser and shorter > Financial 
 in staple than American, imported goods were mostly statements,' 
 finer in quality than those locally manufactured, and 
 such goods were hardly subject to competition. But 
 those made of yarns whose numbers, in technical 
 language, was below 30, were of the same charac- 
 ter as Indian goods, and therefore were handicapped 
 by having to pay a 5 per cent. duty. Accordingly, 
 the duty on certain coarse goods, as to which there 
 could be no doubt that they were of the kinds with 
 which Indian manufactures competed successfully, 
 was removed ; and the opportunity was taken to 
 purge the tariff of twenty-six other heads which either 
 produced very small amounts or affected the food of 
 the poorer classes, leaving only thirty-five out of 
 the sixty-two tariff numbers of the Tariff Act of 
 1875. 
 
 This partial reduction, however, failed to satisfy 
 the demands of Manchester, and created new and 
 unforeseen embarrassments in the operations of trade. 
 As to the former, the Secretary of State wrote : ' The 
 impost is too much at variance with the declared 
 policy of this country to be permanentl}^ upheld ; 
 but if the task of dealing with it be long post- 
 poned, it will be the subject of controversy between 
 interests far more powerful and embittered than those 
 which are contending over it at the present moment. 
 ... I need hardly insist further on the danger of 
 keeping open between two great communities of Her 
 Majesty's subjects an irritatinof controversy which 'Financial 
 
 ^ 1 -\ ■> n 1 ^ ,' X, • Statements, 
 
 can be closed by one and only one solution, it is p. 327 
 difficult to overstate the evil of permitting an industry 
 so large as the cotton manufacture in India is certain 
 to become to grow up under the influence of a system 
 
480 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTKATION oh. x 
 
 Cotton Duties wliicli a wide experience has proved to be unsound, 
 and wliich is opposed to the deliberate poHcy of 
 England.' As to the second point, the embarrass- 
 ment to trade was caused by the fact that there was 
 little essential difi'erence between the cloths which 
 have been exempted and large classes of cloths, 
 otherwise styled, which have not. A Commission was 
 appointed, of which Sir T. C. Hope was the leading 
 ' Financial ^ member, to look into the question, and they reported 
 p. 322 ' that ' the only effective remedy is to treat similarly, 
 whether b}^ exemption or taxation, all cloths of the 
 same texture, irrespective of the lengths and widths 
 in which they happen to be made up or the names by 
 which people may choose to call them.' Accordingly, 
 the Financial Statement for 1879-80 declared that 
 ' the Governor- General in Council considers that the 
 facts reported by the Commission . . . show con- 
 clusively that adherence to the tentative measures of 
 last year is not possible. It is not reasonable that 
 certain goods should be admitted free, while large 
 quantities of goods of almost precisely the same 
 character in everything but name remain liable to 
 duty. No measure falling short of the exemption 
 from duty of all cotton goods containing no yarn 
 finer than 30's can be defended ; and this measure 
 can no longer be delayed. Its adoption will for 
 the present, at least, remove the directly protective 
 character of these duties. ... A Notification has 
 accordingly now been published, exempting from 
 import duty all cotton goods containing no yarn of 
 a higher number than 30's.' This exemption was 
 estimated to cost 150,000/., in addition to the loss 
 incurred by the previous year's reductions ; and the 
 following paragraphs explain the grounds on which 
 the Government thought it right to incur this sacrifice 
 
1879-80 FINANCE 48 1 
 
 of revenue, in spite of the financial difficulties Cotton Duties 
 caused by the Afghan war : 
 
 ' The pledges given from time to time in regard to ' Financial ^ 
 the gradual removal of the duties on cotton goods pp. 325^26 ' 
 have always been made subject to the condition that 
 their fulfilment must depend on the position of the 
 Indian finances. It certainly cannot now be asserted, 
 in the face of the great and increasing loss occasioned 
 by the fall in the value of silver in relation to gold, 
 that the financial condition of India is satisfactory, 
 although every branch of the public revenue is 
 prosperous, and, with the exception which has been 
 mentioned, no fresh causes for financial anxiety are 
 apparent. . . . 
 
 ' The real question which the Governor-General in 
 Council has had to consider is this : Ought the 
 Government to look upon the fresh financial difficulties 
 arising from the fall in the exchange as a sufficient 
 reason for refusing to sanction any further remission 
 in the duty on cotton goods ? And this question, his 
 Excellency in Council considered, must be answered 
 in the negative. , The injury and loss which these 
 duties are causing both to the English producer and 
 to the Indian consumer, and to the true interests ol' 
 Indian commerce and manufactures, are certain. 
 Measures which, for the present at least, will almost 
 completely remove the protective, and therefore the 
 most objectionable, feature in these duties can be 
 taken without surrendering any very considerable 
 amount of revenue. The difficulties caused by the 
 increased loss by exchange are great, but they will 
 not practically be aggravated to an appreciable 
 extent by the loss of 200,000/. If the fresh fall in 
 the exchange should prove to be temporary, such a 
 loss will possess slight importance. If, on the other 
 
 1 I 
 
482 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Cotton Duties iiand, the loss by exchange does not diminish, and 
 'Financial no Other remedies can be applied, it will become 
 a emen s j^g^cssary to take measures of a most serious nature 
 for the improvement of the financial position ; but 
 the retention of the import duties on cotton goods 
 will not thereby be rendered possible. On the 
 contrary, such retention will become more difficult 
 than ever.' 
 
 The objections urged by members of the Indian 
 Government to the remission of duty on all so-called 
 grey-cotton goods were without doubt honourably 
 and conscientiously formed, but the popular oppo- 
 sition which the measure excited in India arose in 
 part from a suspicion that because the abolition of 
 Custom's duties would be favourable to English 
 manufacturers, therefore it was advocated for the 
 sake of obtaining political support in Lancashire, 
 and not out of regard for the interests of India. 
 Lord Lytton, however, having convinced himself that 
 the essential interests of India required the measure, 
 was not to be deterred by the imputation of such 
 motives. He saw that the case must either be met 
 then and there by a bold and sufficient policy, or 
 must be allowed to drift on to the serious discredit 
 of the Government and the injury of the country. 
 He accordingly had the courage to bring forward 
 a measure exempting certain cotton goods from 
 Customs duty on March 13, 1879, and carried it in 
 opposition to the majority of his Council, but on 
 the advice of the Financial Member, Sir John 
 Strachey. This step was constitutionally possible 
 under a well-known Act of 1870 authorising the 
 Governor-General to overrule a majority of his 
 
 Council. 
 
 Few things caused Lord Lytton greater regret 
 
1880 FINANCE 483 
 
 than that he was unable in his last year of office, by Cotton Dutie 
 reason of financial difficulties, to carry further his 
 policy of abolishing the remains of the cotton duties, 
 as well as all import duties, except those on salt, 
 alcoholic liquor, and arms. In his speech in the 
 Budget debate of 1880-81 (March 2, 1880) he said: 
 ' I must remind the Council that in every one of our 
 Financial Statements for the last three years the LordLytton' 
 
 . Budget 
 
 complete abolition of the cotton duties has been speech, 
 openly avowed as the ultimate aim of the policy we * ^^° ' 
 have been pursuing, in accordance with the repeated 
 resolutions of the House of Commons and repeated 
 instructions from the Secretary of State. Every step 
 taken by myself toward the attainment of this object 
 has been restrained only by considerations of time, 
 opportunity and expediency, never by disapproval of 
 the goal to which, at every stage, those steps were 
 tending, and to which from the outset they were 
 addressed. ... I will not stop to discuss whether 
 the consumers of the goods we have already cheapened 
 are Englishmen or Indians. But what is the present 
 practical effect upon Indian interests of the continued 
 duty upon English cotton ? Why, the}^ are tempting 
 or driving the English manufacturer in one direction, 
 and the Indian manufacturer in another direction, 
 to the manufacture of cloths which neither of them 
 would wish to make, were it not that one desires to 
 escape the duty, whilst the other desires to produce 
 goods protected by it. From those who still suppose 
 that the pressure of a 5 per cent, duty on cotton 
 imports is too light to have any appreciable effect 
 let me solicit consideration of the serious extent to 
 which the whole character of the trade has already 
 been actually changed by it.' 
 
 To the same effect Sir John Strachey said on the 
 
 I I 2 
 
Budget 1880 
 
 484 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Cotton Duties same occasiou : ' The measures taken during the last 
 . Financial two years . . . have at least effected the particular 
 ^^^^Ijriofi object for which they were declared necessary. They 
 have for the present removed all ground for the com- 
 plaint that we were levying protective duties in favour 
 of the Indian mills in their competition with English 
 manufacturers. . . . When, last year, your Excellency 
 decided that it was impossible to defend the main- 
 tenance of the duty on certain classes of cotton goods 
 because it had a distinctly protective character, it 
 was thought right to make a considerable sacrifice 
 of revenue for its immediate removal . . . ; but the 
 Government feels that it cannot at the present 
 moment go further, or submit to loss of revenue 
 beyond that which the measures of the last two years 
 have rendered unavoidable.' . . . ' It is impossible 
 to deny that the present state of things is anomalous 
 and objectionable. The Government wiU give to 
 this question in the future that constant attention 
 which its importance demands, but it cannot at the 
 present moment make the large sacrifice of revenue 
 which its complete solution would involve, and 
 as a provisional arrangement meanwhile it does 
 not seem possible to draw any line better than that 
 drawn last year. The abolition of the remaining 
 duties on cotton goods would cost us 600,000/., 
 in addition to the 250,000/. which we have given up 
 already.' 
 
 As in the case of the salt duties, so in the case of 
 the cotton duties, it was the good fortune of Lord 
 Eipon to complete easily in 1882 what had been 
 thus laboriously begun in 1878 and 1879. The 
 estimates for 1882-83 showed a surplus of over three 
 millions, and Major Baring (now Lord Cromer) was 
 thus enabled, acting on the same principles and using 
 
1877 FINANCE 485 
 
 almost the same arguments as those of Lord Lytton Cotton Duties 
 and. Sir John Strachey, to abohsh the cotton duties Trade 
 and all import duties, except those on wines and 
 spirits, arms and salt, thereby remitting taxation 
 to the amount of l,200,000Z.i 
 
 Pkovincial Conteacts 
 
 The third of the heads of the financial reform 
 which Lord Lytton placed before himself as one of 
 the chief objects to be attained during his Vice- 
 royalty was the development of the system of pro- 
 vincial assignments. It is a rather technical matter, 
 but the importance he attached to it is illustrated 
 by the terms in which he wrote of it in a letter to 
 H.M. the Queen on March 10, 1877: 'The new 
 principles of financial decentralisation and provincial 
 responsibility which, with the valuable aid of Sir John 
 Strachey, I have been able to introduce and carry into 
 partial effect this year, will eventually, I trust, afford 
 considerable relief to the Imperial Treasury.' 
 
 The nature of the measures referred to will be 
 best understood by quoting some extracts from the 
 Budget speech of Sir John Strachey (March 15,1877), 
 under whose advice the first steps in this direction 
 had been taken by Lord Mayo in 1870. Up to that 
 time the central Government had retained in its own 
 hands the entire control of the finances and the 
 distribution of funds to the provincial Governments. 
 ' The ordinary financial condition of India had been ' Financial 
 
 * Unfortunately, under the pressure of financial difficulties, it was 
 subsequently found necessary to abandon, it may be hoped for a time 
 only, a pohcy so enlightened and so beneficial to the people of India. 
 The tax upon salt was increp.sed, and import duties are now levied, 
 for revenue purposes, upon almost every article of commerce. 
 
 Statements, 
 p. 134 
 
486 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Provincial oiie of cliroiiic deficit, and one of tlie main causes 
 of this state of affairs had been the impossibiU'y of 
 resisting the constantly increasing demands of the 
 local Governments for the means of providing every 
 kind of improvement for their respective provinces. 
 Their demands were practically unlimited because 
 there was no limit to their legitimate wants ; they 
 had a purse to draw on of unlimited, because un- 
 known, depth ; they saw on every side the necessity 
 for improvement, and their constant and justifiable 
 desire was to obtain for their own provinces and 
 people as large a share as they could persuade the 
 Government of India to give them out of the general 
 revenues of the Empire.' . . . ' The distribution of 
 public income,' writes General Bichard Strachey, 
 ' degenerates into something like a scramble, in which 
 the most violent has the advantage, with little atten- 
 tion to reason. As local economy tends to no local 
 advantage, the stimulus to avoid waste is reduced to 
 a minimum ; as no local growth of the income leads 
 to an increase of the local means of improvement, 
 interest in developing the public revenue is also 
 brought down to the lowest level.' Adopting these 
 views, Lord Mayo selected eight heads of expenditure 
 in which the increase had been largest and most 
 constant, and transferred them to the local Govern- 
 ments, with a fixed grant of money, out of which to 
 meet all demands, and with power to utilise any 
 savings which could be effected on other improve- 
 ments of which the province stood most in need. 
 
 The effect of the new system had been found, after 
 six years' experience, to be thoroughly satisfactory, 
 not only in preventing the growth of expenditure, 
 but also in diminishing correspondence and friction 
 between the local and supreme Governments, and 
 
1877 FINANCE 487 
 
 en'ablinp^ the local Governments to carry out Provincial 
 
 . 1-1 1 1 1 • 1 Contracts 
 
 many improvements which would, otherwise have 
 been impracticable. It now remained to develop 
 the system and to extend it to an assignment of such 
 sources of revenue as depend for their productiveness 
 on good administration, and thus to bring the self- 
 interest of the provincial Governments to bear on 
 such improvements in administration, 'It may be |^'^'^'?^", 
 very wrong,' said Sir John Strachey, ' but it is true. Budget 
 and will continue to be true while human nature re- M^aTc?i5, 
 mains what it is, that the local authorities take little 1^77 
 interest in looking after the financial affairs of that 
 abstraction, the supreme Government, compared 
 with the interest which they take in matters which 
 immediately affect the people whom they have to 
 govern.' In making all these transfers, whether of 
 revenue or expenditure, a small margin was retained, 
 on the assumption that the local Government would 
 be able to recoup it by stricter attention to finance, 
 and the normal annual rise in the revenue heads was to 
 be shared between the local and supreme Governments 
 in fixed proportions. In this way the original measures 
 taken in 1870 had produced a saving of 330,000^., and 
 the new arrangements made with the Governments of 
 Bengal and of the North- West Provinces and Oudh, 
 which alone had been completed when the Budget of 
 1877-78 was brought in, were estimated to effect a 
 saving to the Imperial Treasury of 145,700/. ; and in 
 1878-79 the completed arrangements were estimated 
 to improve the financial position of the Government of 
 India by 400,000/. In spite of this saving the trans- 
 action was calculated on so liberal a scale that in 1880, 
 when the treasury of the supreme Government was 
 depleted by the cost of the Afghan war and the loss 
 by the fall' in exchange, the provincial treasuries were 
 
Provincial 
 Contracts 
 
 488 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 SO overflowiug that they were able to supply a con- 
 tribution of 670,000/. to the general needs of the 
 Empire. Notwithstanding this large contribution, as 
 the Viceroy pointed out in his speech in the Budget 
 debate of 1880-81, ' the provincial balances of the 
 local Governments will be actually larger by nearly 
 half a million than the sum at which they were 
 estimated at the beginning of the year.' 
 
 Thus, with equal advantage to the supreme and to 
 the provincial Governments, was carried out this great 
 and far-reaching reform, which more than any financial 
 measure of the time has set its mark on the adminis- 
 tration of the country. Initiated by Lord Mayo, it 
 received its full development at the hands of Lord 
 Lytton. Since then more than twenty years have 
 elapsed ; contract after contract has been made, with 
 little or no variation of system ; but no voice has 
 been raised against the grand principle of decentrali- 
 sation, and everyone is agreed that it has been the 
 most fruitful and seminal reform which has been 
 introduced within the knowledge of the living 
 generation. 
 
 EXTRAORDINAEY PUBLIG WORKS 
 
 The remaining financial reform which Lord 
 Lytton proposed to himself in 1876 was the revision 
 of the system under which the cost of the so-called 
 ' Extraordinary Public Works ' was defrayed from 
 borrowed money, and became an addition to the 
 public debt, being kept outside the ordinary Budget. 
 The works thus treated were railway and irrigation 
 works. A programme was drawn up in 1873 of the 
 most important projects of these two classes, the esti- 
 mated cost of which was over thirty-six millions ster- 
 
1877-78 FIN.INOE 489 
 
 ling ; and it was held that it was safe to borrow this Extra- 
 sum, because the revenue arising from them would pubHrworks 
 be equal to the interest on the debt incurred. The 
 amount to be borrowed annually was fixed at four and 
 a half millions up to 1875, and was reduced to four 
 millions in that year. Sir John Strachey, however, 
 showed in his Budget speech of 1 8 7 7-7 8 that the scheme 
 required modification and revision. The revenue 
 produced by the works had not increased as fast as 
 the interest on the money borrowed. Some of the 
 works included in the programme — e.g. the railways on 
 the Punjab and Sindh frontier — were not, and could 
 not be expected to be, remunerative. They were, no 
 doubt, very beneficial to the country through which 
 they passed, but were undertaken, not on financial 
 grounds, but because they were considered for 'Financial 
 political and military reasons to be essential to the p. ^13^™^" ^' 
 service of the Empire. Works of this kind were to 
 be classed as ordinary, not as extraordinary works, and 
 were to be paid for out of revenue. The remaining 
 works, which were expected to be really remunerative, 
 were divided into two classes. The first were those 
 undertaken for objects of such general utility that 
 they might fairly be called Imperial. Such were the 
 great trunk lines of railway, which not only confer 
 immense benefits on the provinces through which 
 they pass, but are essential to the wealth and pros- 
 perity of the Empire. The cost of constructing them 
 might therefore fairly fall on the Empire at large. 
 The second class were those great works of improve- 
 ment which are primarily of provincial or local 
 utility, undertaken for the special benefit of certain 
 districts or places, with the object of increasing their 
 wealth or protecting them against famine ; the irri- 
 gation canals in Orissa, Behar, and the North- West 
 
490 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTKATION ch. x 
 
 Extra- Provinces, or the Northern Bengal and Tirhoot rail- 
 
 Pubiic Works ways, may be cited as instances. It was shown that the 
 interest on the capital sunk in these works exceeded 
 the return by 100,000/. in the North-West Provinces, 
 and by 275,000/. in Bengal ; and the new principle laid 
 down was that the inhabitants of these provinces, and 
 not the general taxpayer, should provide these sums. 
 In many cases, no doubt, the loss would in a few years 
 be turned into a profit, and then that profit would be 
 shared between the provincial and Imperial Trea- 
 suries ; but for the present the loss was to be met 
 by provincial taxation. In closing the debate which 
 followed this speech, Lord Lytton (March 28, 1877) 
 referred to this question in the following terms : 
 Debate on ' There is one of the announcements made by my 
 
 statemenf honourable colleague in his Financial Statement which 
 March 28, no honourable member has yet noticed, but on which I 
 
 1877 
 
 congratulate myself, and on which I think tlie public 
 speech ^ °"^ may also be congratulated. I allude to the announce- 
 ment that although, indeed, we cannot at present 
 apply the new rule to existing works, yet the ex- 
 penditure on all unremunerative public works which 
 may hereafter be undertaken will be carefully ex- 
 cluded from extraordinary account. This is a 
 change of polic}^ decided on by the Secretary of 
 State when Lord Northbrook was Viceroy ; but it 
 has never before been publicly announced as the 
 rule we intend to follow. Now, it may be said that 
 this rule is a mere reform in book-keeping ; in fact, 
 that it is a very small matter. I admit that it is a 
 small matter if it goes no further ; but it wiU 
 certainly not be my fault, nor that of my honourable 
 colleague, if it does not go a great deal further ; and 
 if it only goes far enough, I maintain that it is a very 
 great matter. So far as it does go, it is a step in the 
 
1877 FINANCE 49 1 
 
 right direction ; for I share the doubt expressed by Extra- 
 Sir John Strachey, whether our extraordinary Budgets PubKrworks 
 have not been altogether a mistake. In the course 
 of an official life which at least began early, it has Budget 
 frequently been my hard lot to grope my way with uavch 28, 
 the greatest difficulty through the financial accounts ^^'^'^ 
 of Continental Governments, in order to place before 
 my own Government an accurate estimate of their 
 financial situation. And a system which I have more 
 than once officially described as vicious and mis- 
 leading — a sj^stem which has, I confess, sorely tried 
 my temper when adopted by other Governments — is 
 certainly not one which I can regard without reluc- 
 tance as the system to be permanently pursued by 
 the Government of India. The French Government, 
 to its credit, has already abandoned that system. I 
 have heard it said that our own system is exempt 
 from the objections which apply to the extraordinary 
 Budgets of Continental States, since we do not put 
 into our Extraordinary Budget any expenditure 
 which ought properly to be carried to ordinar}^ 
 account. But I do not think we are entitled to lay 
 that flattering unction to our souls. As a matter of 
 fact, we have put into our extraordinary account 
 many charges which ought to have been carried to 
 ordinary account. However Spartan may be our 
 financial virtue, still we are but human ; and, in my 
 opinion, the whole system of extraordinary account 
 is a perilous temptation to human weakness. . . . No 
 man who has studied intelligently the past history of 
 Indian finance wiU regard as unfounded the fears 
 expressed b}^ my honourable colleague, that the system 
 hitherto followed, of jumbling up together remunera- 
 tive and unremunerative public works in an account, 
 to which the term ' extraordinary ' is extremely 
 
1877 
 
 492 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION cu. x 
 
 Extra- applicable, lias tended to make us less cliary than we 
 
 Pubiirworks sliould Otherwise have been in spending money upon 
 LordLytton's t^^^^- ^^^ "^7 ^'^'^ part, I am not at all afraid of 
 Budget the deficits which we miwht have to show by a 
 
 Speech 
 
 March 28, change of S3'stem. What I do regard with fear and 
 distrust is everything which may tend to conceal 
 those deficits unduly from our own eyes or from 
 those of the public. The first step towards getting 
 rid of deficit is to look it frankly in the face. Nature 
 abhors a vacuum ; and the recognition of a financial 
 vacuum is so revolting to ordinary human nature, 
 that our best chance of filling it up consists in never 
 losing sight of it. My honourable colleague has shown 
 that during the last seven years, while our expendi- 
 ture has remained stationary, our income has steadily 
 increased; and I am convinced that our financial 
 character has everything to gain, and nothing to 
 fear, if only public criticism be furnished with 
 accurate data for the guidance of impartial judg- 
 ments.' 
 
 In the course of this j^ear the orders of the 
 Secretary of State were received abolishing the title 
 of ' Extraordinary Public Works,' and substituting 
 that of ' Productive Public Works,' in order to em- 
 phasise the principle that works not expected to be 
 productive of revenue sufficient to cover their working 
 expenses and the interest on capital outlay should be 
 constructed in future out of ordinary revenue, and 
 not out of loans. A new table was attached to the 
 Financial Statement, in order to show on one side the 
 working expenses and interest due on all productive 
 works, on the other side the revenue derived from 
 them : and for the year 1877-78 this table showed on 
 the one side 7,359,204/. as the expenditure, while on 
 the other the yield of revenue was 7,ol9,35GZ. This 
 
1877 FINANCE 493 
 
 statement was justly characterised as ' encouraging, Extra- 
 for much of the expenditure was, necessarily, at the Pubiirworks 
 time unproductive, and the direct revenue produced b"^^^-^**""'^ 
 to the State is but a small part of the advantages Speech, 
 
 March 28 
 
 which result from these works to the country. 1877 
 
 Famine Insueance Taxation 
 
 The foregoing account shows the manner in which 
 the four great problems in financial administration 
 which presented themselves to Lord Lytton at the 
 commencement of his Viceroyalty were effectively 
 solved. A brief description remains to be given of 
 another series of measures, the necessity of which he 
 had not, and could not have, anticipated, but which 
 were forced upon him by the occurrence of the great 
 famine in the southern part of the peninsula. Up to 
 this time the Government of India had treated famines 
 empirically, as they occurred, not on a settled prin- 
 ciple ; but it now became clear that they were not to 
 be looked upon as exceptional calamities, but as events 
 liable and certain to recur, and that provision must be 
 made for their prevention and relief out of the or- 
 dinary revenue, and not by borrowing. The famine 
 expenditure during the last five years had been 
 16,000,000/. Such a period of extreme calamity was 
 believed to be exceptional, but it was held that the 
 cost of famine relief must be estimated at fifteen 
 millions every ten years, or 1,500,000/. a year on an 
 average. Omitting famine, the revenue and expendi- 
 ture had, during the seven years preceding 1877, been 
 in equilibrium, leaving no margin for contingencies. 
 It was shown by Sir J. Strachey, in his speech of 
 December 27, 1877, that a margin of about half 
 a million ought to be secured, so that the total 
 
494 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Famine improvement required in the finances amounted to 
 
 FmKr"°^ two millions. Of the 1,500,000/. required for famine 
 charges 400,000/. had been provided by the measures 
 of provincial decentralisation already described, and 
 there remained 1,100,000/. to be raised. For this 
 purpose new taxation was necessary, and it took the 
 form of cesses on the land in Bengal and the upper 
 provinces, estimated to bring in 500,000/., and a 
 license tax on trades (an extension of the tax already 
 levied in the North-West Provinces), which was to 
 realise 700,000/., and which fell on every trader having 
 an income above Es. 100 a year. The grounds for 
 this taxation were explained and defended by Lord 
 LordLytton's Lyttou in liis spccch in the Legislative Council on 
 Coimcii! February 9, 1878 : ' Undoubtedly the taxes which 
 1878^'^^'^ ^' ^^^^ come into operation by the passing of the Bills 
 before us must, to be successful, have a wide 
 incidence. . . . But Sir J. Strachey has already 
 shown that it would be a gross misrepresentation of 
 the present license tax to say that it falls only on 
 the very poor ; and, indeed, as a matter of fact, this 
 tax touches no section of the community which can be 
 regarded or rated as other than a well-to-do class. . . . 
 ' We have felt that the two great classes of the 
 community from whom we could most equitably 
 collect our Famine Insurance Fund are the trading 
 and agricultural classes. . . . The necessity of a 
 Famine Insurance Fund, and the duty of Government 
 to provide such a fund, have been generally acknow- 
 ledged. But equally general must be, I think, the 
 acknowledgment that in our selection of the sources 
 of this fund, which are necessarily limited, we could 
 not, w^ith any show of reason or justice, have main- 
 tained the agricultural cess in Bengal had we 
 shrunk from subjecting to a similar obligation the 
 
1878 FINANCE 495 
 
 agricultural classes in other provinces in Northern Famine 
 India. Nor is it less undeniable that, from the same /und^'^'^^ 
 point of view and for the same reason, we could not 
 justly maintain the license tax upon the trading 
 classes of the other provinces if we did not impose 
 it also on the trading classes of Lower Bengal. I 
 think, then, I may fairly claim for the measures now 
 before the Council at least the modest merit of an 
 equitable distribution of famine charges between the 
 two great classes of the community best able to bear 
 them, and on whom such charges most reasonably 
 fall.' 
 
 The remaining half-million needed to provide 
 a margin against other exceptional expenditure was 
 provided by the equalisation of the salt tax, already 
 described, which was estimated to produce 300,000/., 
 and by the normal growth of the ordinary revenue. 
 
 Thus was created the famous Famine Insurance 
 Fund, respecting which more misunderstanding has 
 existed and more misrepresentations have been 
 uttered than about any other question connected 
 with the often misunderstood and misrepresented 
 subject of Indian finance. It has frequently been 
 supposed that the Government undertook to earmark 
 this particular sum of 1^ million, and to apply it 
 only to famine relief, or to the construction of pro- 
 ductive works ; and that if in any year it could be 
 shown that a less sum than 1^ million had been so 
 applied, then the Government might be held to have 
 failed to perform its pledges. Sir J. Strachey, in his 
 speech in the Legislative Council on February 9, 1878, 
 set himself to prevent this error : ' We start with the ' Financial 
 hypothesis that in every ten years the Government p. 268 
 of India will have to spend 15 millions on the relief 
 of famine. If we provide for this purpose a hona-jide 
 
496 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Famine surplus of 1^ million a year for ten years we shall 
 
 Fund have obtained our 15 millions. As we cannot keep 
 
 our annual savings locked up in a separate box, 
 it is inevitable that when the actual necessity for 
 spending the 15 millions arises we shall have to 
 borrow the money, so that what we have practically 
 to do is this : we must reduce our debt by 1-J 
 million year by year during the whole period. 
 Then, when the necessity for spending the 15 millions 
 arises we can borrow that amount, and be no worse 
 off than we were ten years before.' He then went on 
 to explain that the Government was pledged to 
 borrow every year at least 2^ millions for the con- 
 struction of productive public works : ' It would be 
 obviously absurd to pay off every year debt to the 
 amount of 1,500,000^., and simultaneously to incur 
 fresh debt to the same extent. What, therefore, we 
 have to do in the actual circumstances of the case 
 is, by applying to the construction of these works the 
 proceeds of the new taxes, to reduce by 1,500,000/. 
 a year the sum which we might otherwise have 
 borrowed.' 
 
 The system thus established by the Govern- 
 ment of Lord Lytton for protecting the country 
 against the financial consequences of famine has been 
 from time to time modified, but it has been substan- 
 tially followed ever since. It has fulfilled financially 
 the designs of its authors, and its maintenance has 
 from the time of its establishment until now been 
 treated as essential to a sound administration of the 
 finances of India. The sum of 1,500,000/. is now set 
 aside every year from revenue under the head of 
 ' Famine Eelief and Insurance.' 
 
 When properly understood it is evident in the 
 nature of things that a malversation or misappro- 
 
1878 FINANCE 497 
 
 priation of this fund is impossible. Whatever Famine 
 calamity may arise to sweep away the surplus and p^^nJ^"^^ 
 land the Government of India in deficit, the amount 
 of that deficit must be less than it would otherwise 
 have been by exactly the amount brought into the 
 Treasury by the taxes imposed in 1877-78 to create 
 the Famine Insurance Fund. 
 
 Necessary, however, as was the taxation for Insur- 
 ance against Famine, its imposition embittered a section 
 of the native community, and has often been charged 
 against Lord Lytton as a source of unpopularity and 
 a blot on his general administration. But those who 
 bring such charges are apt to forget how much was 
 done, on the other hand, to reduce taxation and to 
 relieve its incidence on the general population. In 
 March 1880 it was ascertained that the actual receipts 
 from the new taxes had been — from the cesses on land, ' Financial 
 525,000/. ; from the license tax, 820,000/. ; making ^.^toT''*''' 
 a total of 1,345,000/. This amount was diminished 
 in that year by exempting from the license tax 
 all incomes below Es. 500 a year, a reduction of 
 Es. 340,000 leaving the total sum of famine 
 insurance taxation at almost exactly 1,000,000/. 
 On the other hand, the Government during the same 
 period gave up 150,000/. from salt, 150,000/. from the 
 inland sugar duties, and 300,000/. from import duties 
 on cotton goods and a multitude of other articles, 
 and the export duties on indigo and lac ; besides 
 enforcing measures which practically kiUed the 
 remaining cotton duties and all import duties except 
 those on salt, alcoholic liquors and arms ; so that 
 they were abandoned, and a further remission of 
 1,100,000/. was secured within the next two years. 
 If, therefore, the gratitude of the country to a Viceroy 
 is founded on the narrow basis of calculating the 
 
 K K 
 
498 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 balance of taxation imposed and removed, Lord 
 Lytton fully deserves that gratitude. 
 
 Eekor in War Estimates 
 
 The close of Lord Lytton's Indian administration 
 was clouded by the discovery of an error in the esti- 
 mates of the cost of the Afghan war. It is probable 
 that the important and far - reaching financial 
 reforms carried during his Vicero3^alty are less 
 widely known to the public than this unfortunate 
 error in accounts. It was discovered at a time 
 when the Viceroy's opponents were only too glad 
 to make political capital out of any blunder which 
 they could lay at his door, and they even stooped 
 to accuse those responsible for the Indian Govern- 
 ment of wilful concealment and deception. Suffi- 
 cient time, however, has now elapsed for the matter 
 to be considered dispassionately, and while acknow- 
 ledging that the error was a singularly unfortunate 
 one at the moment at which it occurred, a statement 
 of the facts is enoug^h to show that its effect on 
 the finances of the country was not a lasting one. 
 The very next year the Government of India realised 
 a surplus. It cannot therefore detract from the 
 honour and credit due to Lord Lytton and his 
 Finance Minister, Sir John Strachey. for the states- 
 manship and far-seeing wisdom of their general finan- 
 cial administration. The history of this blunder is 
 as follows : 
 
 In March 1880 the war expenditure was calcu- 
 lated to be likely to stand at nine and a half millions, 
 of which nearly four millions were the cost of the 
 frontier railways leading to Quettah. It was, indeed, 
 stated that ' the estimates must be to a great extent 
 
1880 FINANCE 499 
 
 speculative,' but they had been prepared with great Error in War 
 care by the Accountant-General of the Mihtary 
 Department, and their accuracy up to that time was 
 supposed to have been highly creditable to him. In 
 other words, Sir John Strachey and the Government of 
 India, though the Finance Department were not the 
 authors of the estimate, made themselves responsible 
 for it. It was felt, therefore, as a crushing blow to 
 the credit of the Government when it was discovered, 
 at the end of 1880, that the expense of the war had 
 been greatly under-estimated. By the end of March 
 five millions of actual outlay had occurred of which 
 the Government was not aware at the time the 
 Budget was prepared and published ; and the total 
 cost of the war (partly through its prolonged 
 duration) was found ultimately to be seventeen and 
 a half million pounds, or twelve millions in excess 
 of the estimate. That the estimate of future expendi- 
 ture should have been falsified was neither unusual 
 nor surprising. No one anticipated in March 1880 
 that the operations beyond the frontier would continue 
 till nearly the end of 1880 ; but the error made in 
 failing to obtain even approximate information as to 
 the expenditure which had actually occurred caused 
 a widespread want of confidence in the soundness of 
 the Indian financial system. The explanation of the 
 mistake was that the Military Accounts Department, 
 following an old and faulty system, took note only 
 of the classified and audited accounts, not of the 
 actual outgoings from the treasuries. In ordinar}- 
 times the audit keeps pace fairly with the expendi- 
 ture ; but in war large disbursements have to be made 
 under great pressure, and with little regard to form 
 and technicalities, and the Audit Department falls 
 into arrears and toils painfully behind. Thus it 
 
 K K 2 
 
500 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. x 
 
 Error in War happened that the Mihtary Accountant-Geiieral pre- 
 s ima es gented to the Financial Department of the Govern- 
 ment ficfures which were altooether incorrect, and, 
 the system which they trusted having failed them, 
 Ihe Government were left in ignorance of facts of 
 essential importance. But though the error was 
 lamentable, a simple set of departmental orders 
 sufficed to correct the system and to prevent the 
 possibility of the recurrence of any similar mistake ; 
 and no evil results actually followed from the mis- 
 calculation. No item in the policy of the Govern- 
 ment would have been altered had the cost of the 
 war been more accurately gauged and foreseen. 
 Aided by the timely contribution of five millions 
 from the English Treasury, the finances of India 
 showed a wonderful power of resisting the unexpected 
 strain. There were deficits of about a million in 
 1879-80, and four millions in 1880-1 ; these were 
 entirely due to the war, but for which those years 
 would have returned surpluses of over four and six 
 millions respectively. But in 1881 there was a surplus 
 of one and a half million, and in 1882-83 a surplus 
 of over three millions, which enabled the Government 
 to carry out the large reductions in taxation which I 
 have mentioned. This prosperity may fairly be attri- 
 buted to the sound basis upon which Lord Lytton's 
 administration had placed the finances of India. 
 
 Although the magnitude of this error in the 
 war estimates was not known before Lord Lytton 
 left India, the fact that such an error existed was 
 realised. Lord Lytton wrote to Lord Cranbrook on 
 May 11, 1880 : 
 
 'AH other revelations sink into insignificance 
 before the tremendous discovery now made by the 
 Financial Department, that the war estimates pre- 
 
1880 FINANCE 501 
 
 pared by the Military Department, confidently re- Error in War 
 commended by it to the Financial Department, and 
 adopted by the latter without misgiving, were utterly 
 worthless and will be indefinitely exceeded. . . . The 
 public scandal and reproach of it must, I fear, fall 
 directly upon myself, and indirectly upon Sir John 
 Strachey ; and although I hold that we are both of 
 us blameless — for I am unable to conceive how either 
 of us could have anticipated or prevented it — yet 
 I can scarcely complain of the popular verdict I 
 anticipated, for of course the external responsibility of 
 the Government of India cannot be subdivided. . . . 
 Ever since the commencement of the first campaign 
 in Afghanistan I have laboured without ceasing and 
 under great difiSculties to keep down military expen- 
 diture. . . But I have always carefully refrained 
 from questioning or interfering with the final esti- 
 mates framed and passed by the responsible depart- 
 ments for sanctioned charges. Any other course 
 would have involved tampering with the public 
 accounts by the head of the Government, and been 
 destructive of that established sense of personal and 
 departmental responsibility which is the best, and 
 indeed the only, guarantee for the conscientious pre- 
 paration and verification of estimates by the authori- 
 ties properly charged with that task. ... I cannot 
 help feeling, with considerable bitterness, that the 
 powers of military darkness, against whom I have 
 been maintaining single-handed for four years such 
 a fatiguing, and till now not unsuccessful, struggle, 
 have in the last hours of my administration contrived 
 to give me a croc aux jamhes which no vigilance 
 on my part could have prevented, and which no 
 explanations on their part or on mine can now solve.' 
 
502 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cu. xi 
 
 CHAPTEE XI 
 
 VERNACULAR PRE^S BILL 
 
 In the Spring of 1878 an important measure was 
 passed by Lord Lytton's Government to deal with 
 seditious pubHcations in the vernacular press. This 
 measure was reversed by his successor only to be 
 brought back in a different form by force of events, 
 after twenty years of deliberate refusal to face a 
 growing evil had led to the murders at Poona, the 
 prosecution of Tiluk, and the incarceration of the 
 Natus. Then the policy was reconsidered and the 
 law altered in a direction differinij from Lord 
 Lytton's scheme, in so far as that aimed at prevent- 
 ing while the new law aims ^t punishing seditious 
 writings. 
 
 Since 1835 the law on the subject of the press 
 required that every printer and publisher should 
 register himself, and that on every issue of a paper 
 the name of printer and publisher should appear. 
 During the Mutiny of 1857 a short-lived Act was 
 passed placing restrictions on the press, but these 
 were, as a matter of fact, directed against the papers 
 published in English ; the vernacular journals did not 
 at that time attract attention. Some five or six years 
 afterwards the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (Sir 
 Cecil Beadon) arranged for a weekly abstract to be 
 prepared of the more important articles in the native 
 press and caused them to be circulated among officials 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 503 
 
 and made available to the Enoiisli press. The History of 
 
 T ^ ,1 r the Act 
 
 growing license of the vernacular press was pro- 
 bably the cause, while the revision in 1870 of the 
 Penal Code afforded the opportunity of inserting in 
 the law a section directed against seditious writing. 
 The section had originally been drafted by Macaulay 
 and his co-operators, but had for some reason, appa- 
 rently through inadvertence, found no place in the 
 code when first passed into law. 
 
 The section, however, introduced in the Penal Code 
 of 1870 to the effect that writers attempting to excite 
 feelings of disaffection to the Government should be 
 punished was so hedged round by legal definitions of 
 what could or could not be called disaffection, that 
 both before and after Lord Lytton's time the Govern- 
 ment of India were advised by their law officers not to 
 prosecute, even in very flagrant cases, because the view 
 which might be taken of the law was uncertain, and 
 thci law therefore practically remained a dead letter. 
 
 We find Lord Northbrook's Government issuing a 
 warning (unofiicial and outside the law) in 1872 to a 
 Bengali paper the ' Som Prakiish.' The next year the 
 Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (Sir G. Campbell) called 
 attention to the growth of the evil and urged on Lord 
 Northbrook a much more stringent law. In the par- 
 ticular case the ' registered ' printer and ' registered ' 
 proprietor of the offending newspaper were college 
 students of eighteen and twenty years respectively, 
 so that a successful prosecution would have been of 
 little value as an example, but Lord Northbrook's 
 Government saw no necessity at that time for altering 
 the law. The correspondence, however, had two 
 useful results. It showed the position of registered 
 printers and proprietors, and it led to the weekly 
 abstract of the native press being made henceforth 
 
504 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 History of a confidential document, at which the vernacular 
 press exclaimed that it was oppressed and its influ- 
 ence seriously curtailed. The next move came from 
 London. In 1875 the Secretary of State (Lord 
 Salisbury) informed the Government of Lidia that his 
 attention had been drawn by writings in the ' Pall 
 Mall Gazette ' and another paper to various articles in 
 the native press ' which are not only calculated to bring 
 the Government into contempt, but which palliate, 
 if they do not absolutely justify as a duty, the assas- 
 sination of British Officers.' He added that the 
 unchecked dissemination amono-st the natives of 
 articles of this character could not be allowed with- 
 out danger to individuals and to the interests of 
 Government. The Advocate-General was consulted. 
 He advised that in his opinion there was an offence 
 under Sec. 124 A. of the Penal Code, but ' a conviction 
 will depend so much on the tribunal charged with the 
 trial of the case and the view which the presiding 
 judge may take of a law not yet judicially inter- 
 preted, that I feel myself unable to predict the result 
 of a trial.' 
 
 On the strength of this the Government of Lord 
 Northbrook replied to the Secretary of State that in 
 the present state of law it was not desirable for the 
 Government to prosecute except in the case of 
 systematic attempts to excite hostihty against the 
 Government. 
 
 It was left to Lord Lytton's Government to deal 
 with this difficult question, and it was not till Septem- 
 ber 1877 that Lord Lytton himself took it in hand. 
 
 Lord Lytton As an illustration of Lord Lytton's methods it is 
 
 takes up the i i -i t i • i i 
 
 subject, worth while to trace the steps by which he reached 
 
 September ^^^ ^^^^^ effect to his final decision. 
 
 First in 1876 he had an historical note prepared 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 505 
 
 in the Secretariat, the writer of which indicated the LordLytton 
 Irish Act ^ as a possible guide. This Act allows the subject^ 
 executive authority, after warning given, to confiscate ^gj^^™''®'^' 
 the plant &c. of the offending paper, but it allows the 
 proprietor to sue for damages if he can show that his 
 publication was not seditious. The question was 
 reviewed by the then legal member of Council, who, 
 partly on the ground that the English press in India 
 was as violent as the vernacular press, and partly on 
 general grounds of the value of a free press, advised 
 against any action being taken. So for a year more 
 things remained as they were. In the autumn of 1 877, 
 when Lord Lytton was planning his famine inspection 
 journey to Southern India, Mr. Eden, the Lieutenant- 
 Governor of Bengal, dealt with the subject in a speech 
 and subsequently wrote to the Viceroy strongly 
 urging legislation. Lord Lytton prepared a Minute 
 giving the recent history of the matter, dwelling upon 
 the obvious futility of the existing control by registra- 
 tion, showing what was thought by experienced 
 officers on the danger of the spread of sedition, but 
 dwelling not less strongly upon the injury done by 
 the use which the press made of its power to intimi- 
 date native officers, and to blackmail native chiefs. 
 
 This Minute, together with an appendix containing 
 the sample extracts from the Bengali vernacular press 
 which Mr. Eden had sent up, was forwarded for the 
 consideration of the members of the Council and of 
 each Local Government and Chief Commissioner. 
 
 The result was to show that every member of the 
 Council, and, with the single exception of Madras, 
 every one of the ten different Local Governments 
 and administrations consulted, was in favour of the 
 principle of taking legislative action. The prepon- 
 
 1 33 & 34 Vict. c. 9 s. 30. 
 
506 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 derance of opinion was in favour of preventive rather 
 than remedial action. No great desire was shown to 
 amend Sec. 124 A. about which discussion had in 
 the first instance princij^ally turned, but ofiicial 
 opinion looked to warnings and confiscation on lines 
 similar to the Irish Act, and in a minor degree to 
 the effect of demanding security, as likely to be ef- 
 fective ; but it was pointed out that the demand for 
 security would at once put a stop to a large proportion 
 of the ephemeral journals started without capital, 
 edited by boys, and printed on credit. It was on the 
 receipt of these opinions that Lord Lytton decided 
 to act. 
 
 The Bill being prepared and approved by his 
 colleagues, Lord Lytton telegraphed to the Secretary 
 of State for permission to introduce it. The intro- 
 ductory part of the telegram ran thus : — 
 Loid Lytton 's 'The increasing seditious violence of the native 
 theSretary P^'^ss, uow directly provocativc to rebelhon, has been 
 of state for some time pressed on our attention by the Local 
 
 Governments, who, except Madras, which has no 
 vernacular press of any importance, all concur as to 
 necessity of early and stringent legislation. This is 
 also the unanimous opinion of Council. We have for 
 some mouths been contemplating repressive action, 
 but, in opinion of my own and the other Goverments, 
 the language of the vernacular press, at all times 
 mischievous, is specially dangerous now, when native 
 communit}' believes our power seriously weakened by 
 events elsewhere. It is thus essentially necessary for 
 Government in interest of public safety to take early 
 steps for checking spread of seditious writing. While 
 need for legislation is urgent owing to feeling of 
 native community, opportunity is also peculiarly 
 favourable owing to feeling of European community ; 
 
of State 
 
 1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 507 
 
 generally felt that seditious efforts of vernacular press, Lord Lytton's 
 if not promptly repressed, will, under peculiar thel^ecretary 
 circumstances of present time, continue rapidly to 
 increase. But if legislation did not take place imme- 
 diately it would not be carried out this year ; for, 
 although Government will not break up so soon, I 
 myself am obliged to leave Calcutta on 18th March, 
 and we could not legislate on such a matter at Simla. 
 We have accordingly prepared a Bill, and I propose 
 to pass it at a single sitting on the plea of urgency, 
 which is not fictitious, afterwards reporting to you 
 our proceedings in detail. 
 
 ' If measure becomes an accomplished fact, 
 declared by us urgently necessary in interests of 
 public safety, it will probably be accepted with far 
 less objection than if it had formed subject of previous 
 discussion.' 
 
 As the telegram gives in brief form the substance 
 of the Act as it was finally passed, it may be as well 
 to explain its provisions here by a further extract 
 from this telegraphic despatch : — 
 
 ' Our Bill is restricted in its operation to publica- 
 tions in Oriental languages ; its chief provisions will 
 take effect only in those parts of British India to 
 which they may be speciall}^ extended by the 
 Governor-General in Council, and will cease to have 
 effect in those parts whenever the Governor-General 
 in Council so directs. Its object is preventive rather 
 than punitive. The system of check it establishes in 
 the case of newspapers in Oriental languages published 
 in British India is as follows : — 
 
 ' First. — The magistrate may, with the previous 
 sanction of the Local Government, require the printer 
 or publisher of any such newspaper to enter into a 
 bond, binding himself not to print or publish in such 
 
508 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 LordLytton's iiewspaper anything likely to excite feelings of dis- 
 
 the b?CTetary Satisfaction to the Government, or antipathy between 
 
 of state persons of different races, castes, religions, or sects, 
 
 and not to use such paper for purposes of extortion. 
 
 The magistrate may further require the amount of 
 
 this bond to be deposited in money or securities. 
 
 ^Second. — If any newspaper, whether a bond has 
 been taken in respect of it or not, at any time con- 
 tains any matter of the description just mentioned, 
 or is used for purposes of extortion, the Local 
 Government may warn such newspaper by a notifica- 
 tion in the " Gazette," and if, in spite of such warning, 
 the offence is repeated, the Local Government may 
 then issue its warrant to seize the plant &c. of such 
 newspaper, and when any deposit has been made 
 may declare such deposit forfeited. 
 
 ' Third. — As the provisions regarding the deposit 
 of security and the forfeiture of the deposit would 
 perhaps be found to press unduly on some of the 
 less wealthy newspaper proprietors, clauses have 
 been inserted enabling the publisher of a newspaper 
 to take his paper out of the operation of this portion 
 of the Act, for such time as he pleases, by undertak- 
 ing to submit his proofs to an officer appointed by 
 the Government before publication, and to publish 
 nothing which such officer objects to. Anj^ publisher 
 may, if he chooses, do this at the time when he is 
 called upon to deposit security, and, if he does so, 
 no security can be demanded from him. Again, if 
 he does not choose to avail himself of this provision 
 at that stage, he may subsequently, in the event of a 
 warning being issued against him, offer such an 
 undertaking, and if the magistrate accepts it the 
 proceedings are at an end. 
 
 ' An appeal is given to the Governor-General in 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 509 
 
 Council against anything done by a Local Govern- Lord Lytton's 
 
 • /. • ,1 •, telegram to 
 
 ment or any mierior authority. the Secretary 
 
 ' Declarations of forfeitures and other proceedings °* ^*^*^ 
 under the Act are made final and conclusive, subject 
 only to such appeal. 
 
 ' This procedure seems to us the most suitable, 
 as it precludes the publicity and eclat which would 
 attach to a trial in a court of justice. 
 
 'We trust this will meet with your Lordship's 
 approval.' 
 
 The permission thus asked for was readily ac- 
 corded by Lord Salisbury subject to observations on 
 details when the text should be received. 
 
 The Bill was introduced into Council by Sir 
 A, Arbuthnot, was passed and became Law as Act IX. 
 of 78 on the 14th of March 1878. 
 
 Nine members of the Legislative Council spoke Act passed, 
 on the Bill, and among those nine were all the non- 1378 
 official members and the only native member of the 
 Council then present. All spoke in favour of the 
 Bill, which they said was necessary, though all 
 regretted the necessity for such a law in a British 
 dependency. Lord Lytton abstained from speaking 
 till the debate had run its course — the singular but 
 officially-prescribed course which involves, after the 
 mover has spoken, a succession of speeches, proceed- 
 ing in regular order, round the table, commencing 
 from the junior member, who sits on the Viceroy's 
 left, and following in the order of seniority up to the 
 Lieutenant-Governor, who has his seat on the Viceroy's 
 right. Finally the Viceroy as President sums up the 
 debate, if he has anything to say upon it. On this 
 occasion Lord Lytton had a good deal to say : — 
 
 ' I cannot but regret the necessity which, by some 
 irony of fate, has imposed on me the duty of under- 
 
5IO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 Lord Lytton's taking legislation for the purpose of putting restric- 
 Cmmcii?" tious ou a portiou of the press of this country. By 
 i8?8^ ^^' association, by temperament, by conviction, I should 
 naturally find my place on the side of those to whom 
 the free utterance of thought and opinion is an 
 inherited instinct and a national birthright. I should 
 have rejoiced had it fallen to my lot to be able to 
 enlarge, rather than restrict, the liberty of the press 
 in India ; for neither the existence nor the freedom 
 of the press in this country is of native origin or 
 growth. It is an exotic which especially claims and 
 needs, from the hands that planted it in a foreign 
 soil and clime, protecting shelter and fostering care. 
 It is one of the many peculiarly British institutions 
 which British rule has bestowed upon a population 
 to whom it was previously unknown, in the belief 
 that it will eventually prove beneficial to the people 
 of India, by gradually developing in their character 
 those qualities which have rendered it beneficial to 
 our own countrymen. For this reason the British 
 rulers of India have always, and rightty, regarded 
 with exceptional tolerance the occasional misuse of 
 an instrument confided to unpractised hands. But 
 all the more is it incumbent on the Government of 
 India to take due care that the gift for which it is 
 responsible shall not become a curse instead of a 
 blessing, a stone instead of bread, to its recipients. 
 
 ' Under a deep sense of this great responsibility, 
 I say distinctly, and without hesitation, that in my 
 deliberate and sincere conviction, the present measure 
 is imperatively called fi^r by that supreme law — the 
 safety of the State. 
 
 ' We have endeavoured to base our rule in India on 
 justice, uprightness, progressive enlightenment, and 
 good government, as these are understood in England ; 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 51I 
 
 and it is at least a plausible postulate, which at first Lord Lytton's 
 sight appears to be a sound one, that, so long as these cJuncu" 
 are the characteristics of our rule, we need fear no ^g^^g*^ ^*' 
 disaffection on the part of the masses. 
 
 ' It must, however, be remembered that the 
 problem undertaken by the British rulers of India 
 (a political problem more perplexing in its conditions 
 and, as regards the results of its solution, more far- 
 reaching than any which, since the dissolution of the 
 Pax Eomana, has been undertaken by a conquering 
 race) is the application of the most refined principles 
 of European government, and some of the most 
 artificial institutions of European society, to a vast 
 Oriental population, in whose history, habits and 
 traditions they have had no previous existence. 
 Such phrases as "Eeligious toleration," "Liberty of 
 the press," "Personal freedom of the subject," 
 " Social supremacy of the Law," and others, which 
 in England have long been the mere catchwords of 
 ideas common to the whole race, and deeply impressed 
 upon its character by all the events of its history, and 
 all the most cherished recollections of its earlier life, 
 are here in India, to the vast mass of our native 
 subjects, the mysterious formulas of a foreign, and 
 more or less uncongenial, system of administration, 
 which is scarcely, if at all, intelligible to the greater 
 number of those for whose benefit it is maintained. 
 It is a fact which, when I first came to India, was 
 strongly impressed on my attention by one of India's 
 wisest and most thoughtful administrators ; it is a fact 
 which there is no diso-uising : and it is also one which 
 cannot be too constantly or too anxiously recognised, 
 that by enforcing these principles, and establishing 
 these institutions, we have placed, and must per- 
 manently maintain ourselves at the head of a gradual 
 
512 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTHATION ch. xi 
 
 Lord Lytton's but gigaiitic revolution — the greatest and most 
 ccmncii," momentous social, moral, and religious, as well as 
 March 14, political, rcvolutiou which, perhaps, the world has 
 ever witnessed. Now, if the public interpreters and 
 critics of our action were only European journalists, 
 capable of understanding and criticising it from a 
 European point of view, in reference to the known 
 principles of European polity, and in accordance 
 with the commonly accepted rules of European 
 reasoning, then, I think, we might rationally anticipate 
 nothing but ultimate advantage to the country, as 
 well as to its Government, from the unrestricted 
 expression of their opinion, however severely they 
 might criticise, from time to time, this or that 
 particular detail in the action of this or that particular 
 administration. But this is not the case as regards 
 those journals which are published in the vernacular 
 languages. Written, for the most part, by persons 
 very imperfectly educated, and altogether inex- 
 perienced ; written, moreover, down to the level of 
 the lowest intelligence, and with an undisguised 
 appeal to the most disloyal sentiments and mis- 
 chievous passions — these journals are read only, or 
 chiefly, by persons still more ignorant, still more 
 uneducated, still more inexperienced than the writers 
 of them ; persons wholly unable to judge for them- 
 selves, and entirely dependent for their interpretation 
 of our action upon these self-constituted and incom- 
 petent teachers. Not content with misrepresenting 
 the Government and maligning the character of the 
 ruling race in every possible way and on every 
 possible occasion, these mischievous scribblers have 
 of late been preaching open sedition ; and, as shown 
 by some of the passages which have to-day been 
 quoted from their publications, they have begun to 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 513 
 
 inculcate combination on the part of the native Lord Lytton's 
 subjects of the Empress of India for the avowed ccmnci/" 
 purpose of putting an end to the British Eaj . This fg^f^ ^^' 
 is no exaggeration. I have here under my hand a 
 mass of such poisonous matter, extracted from the 
 various organs of the vernacular press.' 
 
 Lord Lytton then went on to comment on various 
 extracts, but it is noticeable that, unlike former 
 speakers, who had laid stress mainly on those 
 extracts which in their virulent abuse gave expression 
 to the race hatred against Europeans as a whole, the 
 Viceroy made almost exclusive use of those extracts 
 which deal with the English as afraid of Eussia, as 
 defeated without a fight by Eussia, as rapidly to 
 be driven out of India by Eussia. The selection of 
 these extracts indicates that danger to the Empire 
 was the dominant thought in his mind ; it was on this 
 that he insisted as the justification for his method of 
 passing this law with less than the usual formalities ; 
 the danger he had in view was the diffusion of the 
 idea that England was an effete power unable to 
 stand before Eussia, and destined to see her power 
 in India crumble to pieces at the first contact with 
 the enemy. It will be remembered that these months 
 were a critical period as to the peace of Europe, and 
 the progress of the Eusso-Turkish war had been 
 carefully watched in India. Lord Lytton, writing 
 about this time elsewhere, remarked 'Hindus and 
 Mohammedans alike have from the first instinctively 
 regarded the Ottoman Empire as a counter in a great 
 game for power in which both England and Eussia 
 had a tremendous stake to win or lose. They uni- 
 versally believe that Eussia has won her stake and 
 that we have lost ours. Already their imagination 
 associates her image with the future of their own 
 
 L L 
 
1878 
 
 514 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 Lord Lytton's clestinies &c.' All tliis may have been an exaggerated 
 speech in ^jg^ ^f native feeling, but it explains the urgencv 
 
 Council, ^' \ f 1 A J 
 
 March 14, which he felt in regard to the passing oi the Act, and 
 the importance whicii he attached in the circumstances 
 of the moment to the danger of allowing this par- 
 ticular seed to be sown all over India. 
 
 He went on in his speech to dwell on the justifica- 
 tion for interference and the expediency of preventing 
 rather than punishing. 
 
 ' It is not in the spirit of resentment for injuries 
 that we propose to legislate. It is in the firm convic- 
 tion that the maintenance of our Eaj is for the good 
 of the people, that we seek to save the people from 
 the ruin in which they would involve themselves by 
 seditious agitations against it. We have no desire to 
 resort to fine or imprisonment ; but what we do 
 desire, and wdiat we regard as the plain duty of the 
 Government, is to prevent the open preaching of 
 sedition and rebellion amongst the most ignorant, 
 excitable, and helpless portion of its subjects. 
 
 ' Within the last few weeks I have refused appli- 
 cations from two different Local Governments to 
 permit the prosecution of local vernacular newspapers 
 for obvious and rank sedition ; and I will state mj^ 
 reasons for so doing. The law, as explained by the 
 honourable mover of this Bill, is in its present state 
 a very questionable instrument. The explanation of 
 " disaffection " may be taken to explain away almost 
 any incitement to disaffection that is not followed by 
 actual rebellion ; so that the probability of securing 
 a conviction would always be doubtful. But, though 
 these considerations might well justify me in hesitating 
 to sanction a prosecution under existing circumstances, 
 it was not solely, nor indeed mainly, on these 
 considerations that I have acted. Had the law been 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 515 
 
 certain, and the temper of the jury such as would LordLytton' 
 have rendered a conviction secure, still I should not cmmen," 
 have considered a prosecution desirable. What I Jg^^^^^ ^^' 
 desire is to prevent, not to punish, seditious appeals. 
 A successful prosecution, even should it in some cases 
 have a deterrent effect, would still invest the pro- 
 secuted journal with a mischievous notoriety, and an 
 artificial importance, calculated to give to its seditious 
 teaching the very publicity which, in the interests 
 of good government, we should desire to prevent. 
 Every such victory would be a virtual defeat. 
 
 ' It is for these reasons that I came to the con- 
 clusion that legislation was necessary, and that it 
 behoved us to direct such legislation to methods of 
 prevention rather than of punishment. This conclusion 
 has been adopted, after the most anxious consideration, 
 with the unanimous approval of every member of my 
 Executive Council, and every Local Government in 
 India except one, within whose jurisdiction the 
 vernacular press is wholly insignificant and un- 
 heeded. 
 
 ' It may, and by some persons it probably will, be 
 regarded as an objection to this measure that it draws 
 a distinction, and apparently an invidious distinction, 
 between the native and the English press. It may be 
 said, with perfect truth, that the very words which 
 we regard as innocuous in an English paper will be 
 deemed seditious in a vernacular journal, and that 
 the native editor may be ruined for repeating what 
 the English editor has published with impunity. 
 Well, this seems a very strong indictment against the 
 Bill ; but the briefest examination of the circumstances 
 for which we are legislating will sufiice to dissipate 
 the force of it. In the first place, let the real 
 distinction be observed. The distinction is not 
 
 L L 2 
 
5l6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. ix 
 
 LordLytton's between Englishmen and natives, or between the 
 cSTncii!" EngUsh press and the native press ; for many natives 
 March 14, pubUsh the newspapers in Enghsh, and in very good 
 Enghsh too. Some of the native newspapers thus 
 pubhshed contain excellent and valuable comments 
 on public affairs. Some of them are also edited by 
 men of acknowledged ability and culture, who 
 certainly do not hesitate to criticise the English 
 Government with an asperity and hostility which no 
 other foreign Government in the world would tolerate 
 for a moment. With these papers we do not inter- 
 fere. Being written in English, they are ex vi termini 
 addressed to a more or less educated audience, and a 
 class that has at least the power, even if it has not 
 always the will, to choose between the false and the 
 true, between the evil and the good. From them we 
 apprehend no political danger ; and we can trust to 
 their improving education, as time goes on, to render 
 their criticism fairer, and their judgment more 
 according to knowledge. It is not, then, against 
 native papers, as such, that our legislation is directed. 
 We confine our measures of restriction purely to the 
 papers written in vernacular languages ; and we do 
 so because, as I have said before, they are addressed 
 solely to an ignorant, excitable, helpless class — a class 
 whose members have no other means of information, 
 no other guide as to the action and motives of their 
 rulers ; and who, if such action and motives be 
 persistently misrepresented to them, are likely to 
 ffive vent to their excited feelinsjs in acts of disaffec- 
 tion, which cannot but be fraught with disaster to 
 themselves.' 
 
 The rest of the speech dealt with the abuses incident 
 to the vernacular press as a weapon of extortion and 
 intimidation, to Indian chiefs and native officials — an 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 517 
 
 aspect of the question which clearly appealed with ^°gg^^^^{"°"'^ 
 much force to his sympathy, and he wound up in the Council, 
 
 „ ,, . T ' March 14, 
 
 loliowmg words : — 1878 
 
 ' We must of course expect that by those people 
 whose minds are governed by phrases, and who look 
 upon the liberty of the press as a fetish to be wor- 
 shipped, rather than as a privilege to be worthily 
 earned and rationally enjoyed, this measure will be 
 received with dislike, and the authors of it assailed 
 with obloquy. It is my hope, however, that the 
 gradual spread of education and enlightenment in 
 India may ensure and expedite the arrival of a time 
 when the restrictions we are now imposing can with 
 safety be removed. I am unwilling to hamper the 
 free influence of honest thought ; but I recognise in 
 the present circumstances of this country, and the 
 present condition of the populations committed to 
 our charge, a clear and obvious duty to check the 
 propagation of sedition and prevent ignorant, foolish, 
 and irresponsible persons from recklessly destroying 
 the noble edifice which still generously shelters even 
 its vilest detractors. That edifice has been slowly 
 reared by the genius of British statesmanship out of 
 the achievements of British valour. It was founded 
 by English enterprise ; it has been cemented by 
 English blood ; it is adorned with the brightest 
 memorials of English character. The safe preserva- 
 tion of this great Imperial heirloom is the first and 
 highest duty of those to whose charge it is entrusted 
 — a duty owed to the memory of our fathers, as well 
 as to the interests of our children ; to the honour of 
 our Sovereign, no less than to the welfare of all her 
 subjects in India.' 
 
 The results of this measure and its subsequent 
 fate may now be told. 
 
5l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. xi 
 
 Eesuit of First, it had to run the gauntlet of the Secretary 
 
 of State and his Council. The Secretary of State who 
 had approved its introduction and, indeed, the method 
 of dealing with it, was Lord Salisbury, but the 
 Secretary of State who had to consider it after it was 
 passed was Lord Cranbrook. 
 
 On May 31, 1878 Lord Cranbrook addressed a long 
 despatch to the Government of India reviewing the 
 history of the Act, sharing the regret expressed by 
 the Viceroy and his Council at having to fetter the 
 press, but, having regard to the overwhelming weight 
 of authority in favour of it in India, and to the 
 soundness and sufficiency of the reasons put forth in 
 support of such an Act, he could not but leave it to 
 its operation. One section of the Act, that which 
 allowed editors to contract themselves out of the 
 security clause by consenting to come under a 
 censorship, was objected to, and the Viceroy was 
 further advised that the Act should be executed in 
 accordance with the spirit of the explanation attached 
 to Sect. 124 A. of the Penal Code, to the effect that 
 ' no criticism of Government or its measures should 
 be discouraged if there is reason to think that it has 
 been dictated by an honest desire for improvement,' 
 rather than with the object of spreading disaffection, 
 and he wound up with a hope that the vernacular 
 newspapers might so improve that ' special legislation 
 for any class of publication ' might be found in no 
 long time to be unnecessary. This acceptance of 
 Lord Lytton's work was not, however, arrived at by 
 a unanimous council. Three members of the Secre- 
 tary of State's Council recorded minutes of dissent, 
 viz. Sir William Muir, Sir Erskine Parry, and Colonel 
 Yule. The dissents traversed the necessity for 
 any repressive legislation, attributed the unanimous 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 519 
 
 approval on the part of the Indian authorities to 
 their own over-sensitiveness to attack, fastened on the 
 distinction between the English and the vernacular 
 press as an unpardonable flaw, objected strongly to 
 the hurried manner in which the Bill had been passed 
 into law, and most of all to the fact that the Secretary 
 of State's Council had had no opportunity previously 
 of considering the proposals. The voting, however, 
 was 3 against, and 10 for the measure ; giving a 
 majority of 7, so the Act was left to its operation. 
 Its existence, however, was still threatened. In 
 July 1878 Mr. Gladstone introduced into the House of 
 Commons a motion which in its terms was singularly 
 mild. It proposed that Her Majesty should ' give 
 directions that all proceedings which may be taken 
 by the authorities under the Indian Vernacular 
 Press Act be reported to the Secretary of State and 
 laid before Parliament from time to time.' 
 
 This resolution, which the Government did not 
 think fit to accept (and though harmless in itself it 
 might have afforded an awkward precedent), led to a 
 debate in which, as was natural, the action of the 
 Government of India was unsparingly censured by the 
 opposition on the same grounds as those enumerated in 
 the dissents above mentioned. Indeed, these dissents 
 and the minutes of 1835, when Sir Charles Metcalfe 
 freed the press from its previous disabilities, were the 
 great armoury from which the weapons of attack 
 were borrowed. The outcome of the debate was a 
 majority of 56 against Mr. Gladstone's resolution. 
 
 It has been mentioned above that the Secretary 
 of State objected to so much of the Act as allowed 
 the editor of a vernacular paper to avoid the 
 necessity of providing security by submitting to a 
 censorship. The ground of objection taken was that, 
 
520 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 Result of 
 Measure 
 
 Bureau ot 
 Press Com- 
 missioner 
 established 
 
 looking to the variety of dialects the censors would 
 have to be natives of India, and that the censors 
 would in fact have to write the newspaper. To give 
 effect to this decision of the Secretary of State a fresh 
 Bill was introduced in September. The opportunity 
 was then taken of reviewing the operation of the Act 
 during the seven months of its existence and of 
 replying to some of the strictures passed upon it in 
 the Secretary of State's Council and the Parliament. 
 The main point brought out by the speakers was 
 that the Act had really proved itself preventive and 
 not punitive ; that during the seven months of its 
 existence there had been no necessity to put it into 
 force ; that the criticism on particular measures such 
 as the license tax and the Arms Act, remained as 
 vigorous as ever, but the preaching of general sedition 
 had ceased. Lord Lytton in his remarks explained 
 the attitude which he desired to adopt no less to the 
 vernacular than to the European press in India, to the 
 effect that the Government should in a country where 
 there was no authentic source of political information 
 other than the Government, ' keep the press fully and 
 impartially furnished with accurate current informa- 
 tion in reference to such measures or intentions on 
 the part of the Government as are susceptible of 
 immediate publication without injury to the interests 
 for which the Government is responsible.' 
 
 It was to give effect to these proposals that 
 Lord Lytton established the bureau of a Press 
 Commissioner, an arrangement which might have 
 succeeded in improving the relations of Government 
 with the vernacular press, but which was not con- 
 tinued under succeeding Viceroys. 
 
 The Act of 1878 itself had but a brief Hfe of less 
 than four years. Up to the time when Lord Lytton 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 52 I 
 
 left in 1880, only on one occasion had the Act been 
 resorted to. In March 1879 the ' Som Prakash,' a 
 Bengali journal, published a seditious article which 
 attracted the attention of the Government of India 
 and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Sir A. Eden 
 was directed to apply the Act. The publisher of the 
 ' Som Prakash ' was called upon to give security that 
 he would not again publish seditious writings. He 
 gave the bond, but he closed his paper. In the follow- 
 ing year he applied for permission to re-issue his 
 paper without security, and undertook to be more 
 careful in future. On the recommendation of Sir A. 
 Eden this permission was given and the bond was 
 withdrawn. 
 
 On December 7th, 1881, under Lord Eipon's 
 Government a Bill was introduced to repeal Act IX. 
 of 1878 together with its amending Act XVI. of the 
 same year. The introducer, Mr. Gibbs, gave as the 
 reason for repealing the legislation that since its 
 passing it had never been fully put into operation 
 against any vernacular publication in British India, 
 and that there was not at that time existing a state 
 of circumstances sufficiently serious to justify the 
 law being ' placed in full operation.' So far as ver- 
 nacular publications in British India were concerned 
 the Government proposed to rely on the sections of 
 the Penal Code dealing with the subject ; and with 
 regard to the introduction of seditious matter from 
 abroad, their reliance would be placed on the Customs 
 Act and the Post Office Act, which gave power to 
 prevent the entry of objectionable publications 
 issued in foreign countries. The Bill was passed 
 into law with very few comments on January 19, 
 1882. 
 
 From that time the vernacular press had a free 
 
52 2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xi 
 
 hand unchecked save by the uncertainty whether 
 Sec. 124 A. might not be applied to their writings, 
 and the various Local Governments watched the 
 increasing venom and audacity of the press with 
 profound anxiety, but with equal uncertainty as to 
 whether Sec. 124 A. could be relied on. In Bengal 
 an attempt was made in 1892 to prosecute the 
 ' Bangobashi,' a Calcutta new^spaper, and the Chief 
 Justice in his summing up interpreted the section in 
 a manner favourable to the prosecution, but the jury 
 disagreed, the judge did not express his agreement 
 with the verdict of the majority, and the prosecution 
 fell through. Not till the murders of Messrs. Eand 
 and Aj^erst at Poona in 1897, murders which the 
 Government attributed to the violent inflammatory 
 articles of the vernacular press, was the subject again 
 seriously dealt with. It was felt by the Government 
 that after the disastrous reversal of Lord Lytton's 
 endeavour to grapple with the evil, it would be 
 necessary to avoid if possible the two stumbling 
 blocks of offence which caused the failure of his 
 labours. The High Court of Bombay, equally with 
 that of Calcutta (and supported on appeal by the 
 Privy Council), had by their interpretation of the 
 explanation to Sec. 124 A. shown that, though 
 clumsily worded, it was in substance a sufficiently 
 punitive weapon. The Government of India writing 
 in these circumstances in 1897 proposed, therefore, 
 while maintaining in substance the old punitive 
 section, to make no distinction between the English 
 and the vernacular press, and to leave all action to 
 be taken through the Courts in the ordinary course 
 of law. After some correspondence with the Secre- 
 tary of State, and much discussion in the legislature, 
 the law has now been strengthened in the following 
 
1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 523 
 
 manner. The wording of the old Sec. 124 A. has been 
 made so clear as to leave no room for doubt, and dis- 
 affection towards Her Majesty has become equally 
 punishable with disaffection towards Her Majesty's 
 Government. A new clause has been added making 
 punishable the attempt to promote feelings of hatred 
 or enmity between different classes of Her Majesty's 
 subjects, and the law which deals with the circulation 
 of rumours with the intention of causing mutiny or 
 rioting, or of disturbing public tranquillity, has been 
 amplified ; moreover, a new power has been given to 
 superior magistrates to take security from any person 
 circulating seditious matter or matter likely to pro- 
 mote enmity between classes, or intended to intimidate 
 or defame public officers, and in case the security is 
 not given to commit to prison for a year. 
 
 Lastly, cases of seditious publication can now be 
 prosecuted in the court of the superior magistrates 
 instead of having to be committed to the Sessions 
 where, as a set-off to the risk of heavier punishment 
 there is the certainty of the higher eclat, greater pub- 
 licity, and a more notable advertisement. 
 
 It is at least permissible to doubt whether Lord 
 Lytton's method of dealing with the vernacular press 
 would not have been found in practice a lighter and 
 less galling yoke than that to which after the lapse 
 of fifteen years it has been found necessary to 
 subject it. 
 
524 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xii 
 
 CHAPTEE XII 
 
 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 In order that the following account of Lord Lytton's 
 efforts to solve the problem of a native civil service 
 may be made intelligible to the English reader, it 
 will be well in a few preliminary words to explain 
 the lines on which the civil administration was 
 organised. For present purposes this may be taken 
 as divided into two main branches, the executive and 
 judicial.^ The executive branch covers such functions 
 as the supervision of the police, the work of the 
 magistrates, the collection of revenue, the assessment 
 and settlement of land. The judicial branch (which 
 in all the older provinces is separate from the execu- 
 tive) deals with the trial of all civil cases and of the 
 more serious criminal offences, and the work is carried 
 on by a hierarchy of judicial officers, culminating in 
 the High Courts of Justice. In both branches the 
 superior posts, administrative or appellate, are 
 manned almost exclusively by Europeans, and (save 
 as to a proportion of seats in the High Court) are 
 reserved by statute for members of what was 
 
 ^ There are a multitude of other special departments, Pubhc 
 Works, Education, PoHce, Opium, Forests, &c., in regard to which the 
 same essential problem of admitting natives to the higher ranks has 
 long engaged attention, and was to some extent dealt with in Lord 
 Lytton's time. But these departments were outside the scope of the 
 special administrative dithculty in regard to appointments belonging 
 to the covenanted civil service to which Lord Lytton's efforts were 
 mainly directed, and are not consequently discussed in this chapter. 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 525 
 
 called the covenanted civil service. In practice this 
 meant that while the district officer and all above 
 him, with perhaps two or three officers below him in 
 the executive line, would be covenanted civilians, 
 the crreat bulk of the mag-isterial and revenue work 
 lay in the hands of what was known as the un- 
 covenanted service, consisting mainly of educated 
 natives, with a small sprinkling of Europeans and 
 Eurasians, earning salaries ranging from 200 Es. to 
 800 Es. per mensem, and numerous in the proportion 
 of perhaps six uncovenanted to one covenanted 
 civilian. Similarly in the judicial branch the district 
 judge was by law a covenanted civilian, but his was 
 almost exclusively the supervising work of an appellate 
 court and a court of sessions ; the great bulk of the 
 civil causes of the district would be tried by his 
 native subordinate judges, or munsiffs, whose salaries 
 ranged very much between the same limits as those of 
 the executive service, and the numerical proportions 
 of the superior and subordinate services respectively 
 did not greatly vary in the two branches. The 
 problem which Lord Lytton had to solve was how to 
 secure for the natives of India a proportion of the 
 higher appointments exclusively reserved for the 
 covenanted civil service. This service is recruited 
 by competition, and any British subject, including, of 
 course, natives of India, may compete. As a matter 
 of fact, natives of India have been in the habit of 
 competing, and a certain proportion have been suc- 
 cessful.^ But the fact that the examination was held 
 in London, and held, moreover, on lines specially 
 designed to test the results of English school or 
 
 ^ The last civil list shows some thirty-three natives of India in 
 the covenanted civil service, and about forty-five so-called statutory 
 civilians. 
 
526 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xii 
 
 college educ.'ition, was held to handicap Indian com- 
 petitors too severely, and another open door was 
 required. Two legislative enactments had been 
 designed at different times to deal with this question. 
 The first was the Act of William IV., which merely 
 amounted to a pious opinion that birth or colour did 
 not disqualify anyone from holding any appointment, 
 but left the question for practical purposes very 
 much where it was ; the other was adopted nearly 
 forty years later, and w^as aimed by the Duke of 
 Argyll directly at the legal difficulty involved by the 
 statutory reservation of the appointments in question 
 to the covenanted civil service. The matter had been 
 urged on Lord Lawrence's attention as far back as 
 1867, but with little practical result. Lord Mayo 
 took it up, but pointed out the necessity of legislation 
 to remove the legal obstacles, and in 1870 the Duke 
 of Argyll accordingly introduced and passed an Act 
 (33 Vict. c. 3), by which the Indian authorities are 
 enabled, notwithstanding any previous law, to ap- 
 point natives of India to any office in the civil service, 
 but subject always to such rules as might from time 
 to time be prescribed by the Governor-General in 
 Council, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State. 
 ' Subject always to such rules.' The Act would not 
 work without the rules, and it was for the Govern- 
 ment of India to make the rules. The Secretary of 
 State waited meekly for two years, and then ventured 
 to inquire if any rules had been passed. In October 
 1872 he wrote again more urgently, suggesting that 
 the rules should fix a definite proportion of appoint- 
 ments to be given to natives of India, that these 
 should be mainly judicial rather than executive posts, 
 the Indian mental character adapting itself better to 
 the former than to the latter duties, and finally that 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 527 
 
 the salary should be less in the case of Indians so 
 appointed than in the case of covenanted civilians, on 
 the ground that though the duties were the same, yet 
 that men working in their own country and among 
 their own surroundings did not require the same high 
 salaries as were needed to induce first-class men to 
 adopt a life of exile in the tropics. 
 
 Eules were accordingly passed in 1873, but these 
 rules, being based on the assumption that ' proved 
 merit and ability ' would best, if not exclusively, be 
 shown by previous service in subordinate offices, 
 were disallowed. The law officers had advised that 
 merit and ability need only be proved or established 
 to the satisfaction of the authorities making the ap- 
 pointment, and no particular method of establishing 
 proof is enjoined. To limit discretion by requiring 
 previous service under Government was opposed to 
 the spirit of the Act. So at the end of five years 
 things remained where they were when the law was 
 passed in 1870. 
 
 Lord Northbrook, however, in 187-5 drew up 
 rules in wide terms, making no restrictions save 
 that the nominee was to be appointed provisionally 
 and to undergo a term of probation. These rules, 
 however, which were enabling rather than enacting 
 rules, remained practically inoperative, only one or 
 at the most two appointments having been made 
 thereunder until Lord Lytton's Government reopened 
 the subject in 1878. Lord Lytton had indeed per- 
 sonally set the ball roUing a year previously in an 
 elaborate Note dated May 30, 1877. He had per- 
 ceived that though the legal claims of the covenanted 
 civil service no longer interfered with the freer em- 
 ployment of natives, their moral claims remained 
 where they were. These men had through the door 
 
528 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xii 
 
 of competitive examination entered a close service, 
 which was their profession for hfe. They had reason 
 to expect a certain definite rate of promotion to in- 
 creased salaries and higher position. Every native 
 that was appointed under the law of 1870 would 
 pro tanto diminish those prospects, and disappoint 
 reasonable expectations. To reconcile these conflict- 
 ing claims was still a problem which had to be solved, 
 and the first step towards solving it was taken in the 
 exhaustive Note above mentioned. In that Note the 
 Viceroy explained the position in which his Govern- 
 ment was placed between the pressure of two antago- 
 nistic responsibilities. On the one hand, the pledges 
 implied in the action of Parliament, and the hopes 
 and expectations which have grown out of them in 
 the native mind ; on the other hand, the imperial 
 necessity of maintaining the safety and welfare of the 
 Empire by restricting the most important executive 
 posts to Europeans, and the undoubted claims of the 
 existing covenanted service to a maintenance of the 
 reasonable expectations and prospects under which 
 they were induced to compete for entry into that 
 service. 
 
 The overpowering necessitj^ of more largely em- 
 ploying native agency in the civil administration was 
 justified in the Note, apart from the question of 
 pledges, by the political advantage of associating the 
 subject races in the government of the country, and 
 by the financial duty of employing the cheapest 
 agency available. 
 
 The solution to which Lord Lytton pointed in 
 the Note was to be found in the reduction for the 
 future of the number of admissions to the covenanted 
 civil service, and in the establishment of a close native 
 civil service which should have a monopoly of the 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 529 
 
 appointments removed from the list of those hitherto 
 reserved to the covenanted service, together with 
 a portion of those now held by the uncovenanted ser- 
 vice. It proposed that appointments should be made 
 not by competition but by nomination, and that the 
 new service should be remunerated on rates of pay 
 less than those of the covenanted service, but should 
 be equal to it in status and position. 
 
 Lord Lytton in this Note acknowledged his in- May so, 1877 
 debtedness to Mr. Eden for his forcible contributions 
 to the discussion. It was his view that the cove- 
 nanted civil service should be strictly a corps dJ elite, 
 and should be confined to those appointments which 
 could not safely be entrusted to natives, and from 
 this he argued that the solution of the problem was 
 to be found in the direction of reducing the recruit- 
 ment for the covenanted civil service pari passu with 
 the substitution of a native civil service. This idea 
 Lord Lytton expanded and worked out in his ex- 
 haustive Note. He dwelt with much insistence on the 
 necessity of making the new native service a close one 
 which should have the practical monopoly of the 
 appointments allotted to it, and in which nominees 
 should enter at the bottom and work their way up 
 through the grades ; only in this way, he thought, 
 could they receive adequate training, and their com- 
 petence be secured. He threw out suggestions also 
 that the entrance to this service should be through a 
 special college, and that opportunity should also be 
 taken of devising some sclieme by which properly 
 qualified natives of birth and position might enter 
 the army on a level, more or less, with their English 
 comrades. Neither of these sug-o'estions has com- 
 manded practical acceptance : the former was nega- 
 tived at the time on financial grounds ; the latter has 
 
 M M 
 
530 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xii 
 
 been found by successive military chiefs, even when 
 good will has certainly not been wanting, to bristle 
 with difficulties too numerous and too serious to be 
 tackled without grave misgivings. At the same time 
 the question is one which cannot be indefinitely left 
 alone. 
 
 To revert to the history of the native civil service, 
 Lord Lytton's Note, after being circulated and dis- 
 cussed by local Governments, councillors, and high 
 officials generally, resulted in the scheme which was 
 sent home a year later in the Government of India's 
 despatch of May 2, 1878. This scheme was very 
 much that foreshadowed in the Note. After justify- 
 ing the expediency from a political point of view of 
 associating with us in the work of government the 
 more influential classes of natives, the despatch 
 pointed out that it was essential that such men should 
 be trained for the work from the beginning, and should 
 find therein an influential and honourable career. 
 All this led up to the necessity of making the native 
 service a close one, and it was proposed to assign 
 to it fifteen per cent, of covenanted and twenty 
 per cent, of uncovenanted appointments. The can- 
 didates were to be nominated by the local govern- 
 ments, but appointed on probation by the Govern- 
 ment of India. The new service was to be regarded 
 as a branch of the covenanted civil service, no dis- 
 tinction being made in the duties or responsibilities 
 of those particular posts which were to be open alike 
 to both branches ; and the status and position of the 
 two branches, though not the pay, were to be the 
 same. The despatch suggested that if this scheme 
 were carried out it would be expedient to exclude 
 natives of India from the competitive examination 
 for the covenanted civil service in London ; but this. 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 53 1 
 
 it was pointed out, would require legislation, and tlie 
 Government of India did not insist on it as an essential 
 part of their scheme. It was also pointed out that a 
 close native civil service would conflict with the 
 words of the Act of William IV. from one point of 
 view, and from another with the scheduled list of the 
 Act of 24 & 25 Vict., while it would also involve 
 modification of the Act of 1870. The need for legis- 
 lation was fatal to the scheme. The Secretary of 
 State would not face it, even though Lord Lytton 
 expressly recommended that the ugly part of the 
 scheme (the proposal to exclude natives from the 
 competitive examination for the civil service) should 
 be dropped. In the correspondence which went on 
 while the scheme was under the consideration of the 
 Secretary of State, Lord Lytton, in a letter to Lord 
 Cranbrook, wrote a full defence of it in July 1879. 
 He says : ' Up to the present moment not a single 
 effort has been made to modify the regulations which 
 everybody perceives to be incompatible with the 
 fulfilment of these promises.' He then shows that 
 his scheme will not involve any financial responsi- 
 bilities, and that there was no danger of alienating the 
 existing class of native ofiicials. ' Such a danger might 
 be incurred if we offered this class, in exchange for all 
 it now gets, something else and something different. 
 But what we propose is to continue to it all it now 
 gets, with the addition of a great deal more which it 
 cannot now get. You ask me if I really think the 
 difficulties of employing natives are at present such 
 that a revolution is needed. . . . My reply to this 
 question is that the present system has had an un- 
 limited trial with increasingly unsatisfactory results, 
 and that no one has yet been able to show any reason 
 why it should succeed better in the future than it has 
 
532 LURL) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ch. xir 
 
 succeeded in tlie past. Under the present system we 
 are practically bound by law and custom to appoint 
 Europeans to all the higher posts. To appoint a 
 native to any such post is an altogether exceptional 
 act, for which we are obliged to show very special 
 reasons or obtain special authority. What I say is — 
 shift this condition, at least in regard to a certain 
 number of high appointments which have been 
 ascertained and are acknowledged communi consensu, 
 to be safely open to natives. The number of such 
 posts must always be comparatively small, but it is 
 sufficient for the fair discharge of our unredeemed 
 pledges. In regard to these particular appointments, 
 let the general rule be laid down that prima facie 
 natives only are to hold them. In short, transpose 
 the onns probandi, and we shall have obtained all 
 that is necessary.' He goes on in his summing-up to 
 say : ' The principal cause of the acknowledged failure 
 to fulfil fairly the promises given lies in the vague- 
 ness of the promises themselves. . . . The result is that 
 the pettiness of the prizes open to them, and the 
 extreme uncertainty of their prospects in our service, 
 prevent that service from offering any attraction to 
 the class of natives whom we most desire to associate 
 with it. Thus we remain in the vicious circle round 
 which we have been wandering just half as long as 
 the Hebrews wandered in the wilderness. We don't 
 employ natives more largely because they are not 
 well qualified ; and they are not well qualified 
 because we do not employ them enough. ... I am 
 myself convinced (and so far as I can judge this is 
 also the conviction of all our best and most experienced 
 local administrators), that there is only one safe prac- 
 tical issue from it. Define more clearly the promise.^ 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 533 
 
 which have been given so vaguely and indeed so 
 rashly. Cautiously circumscribe them, but then 
 make them realities within their necessary limits. 
 Don't hold out to the native vague hopes of filling' 
 every appohitment now filled by Europeans, but give 
 him that reasonable certainty to which he is entitled, 
 of reaching a respectable position in the service you 
 invite him to enter.' 
 
 Lord Cranbrook, while complimenting the Vicero}^ 
 and the Government on their endeavours to deal with 
 this question, declined to sanction anything which in- 
 volved legislation, and thus extinguished the proposal 
 for a close native civil service ; he directed, however, 
 that a smaller scheme should be drawn up, confined 
 to appointing ever}^ j^ear to the civil service of India 
 any such number of natives as ma}^ be determined on, 
 and proportionately decreasing the number of recruits 
 for the covenanted civil service. 
 
 In May 1879 the amended rules were sent home 
 with a despatch regretting that the sclieme had been 
 shorn of the features that seemed to make for per- 
 manence and stabilitj^, but explaining that the 
 Government had done the best they could within the 
 limitations laid down. The rules provided (1) that a 
 proportion not exceeding one-fifth of the total number 
 of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the 
 civil service in any one year should be natives selected 
 by the local Governments ; that each selection should 
 be subject to the approval of the Governor-General 
 in Council, and that the selected candidates should 
 ordinarily be on probation for two years. These rules 
 were sanctioned by Lord Cranbrook in August 1879. 
 They were followed up by a Government resolution, 
 issued in December 1879, enjoining that appointments 
 
534 LOKD LYTTO^"S Ds^DIAN ADMINISTEATION ch. xii 
 
 under the rules should generally be confined to young 
 men of good family and social position, possessed of 
 fair abilities and education, to whom the offices open 
 to them in the inferior ranks or uncovenanted service 
 have not proved a sufficient inducement to come 
 forward for employment. {2) That the appointment 
 of persons already in the employment of Government 
 should be exceptional. Thus was the Statutory service 
 constituted, and though its success was incomplete 
 owing partly to its not being a service at all, but a 
 fortuitous concourse of atoms, selected by each local 
 Government on different principles, the conditions of 
 whose employment, moreover, were constantly being 
 varied, yet during the eight years of its existence, the 
 scheme did succeed in giving effect to Lord Lytton's 
 main object. Under it during these eight years, 
 pari passu with a constant decrease in the recruit- 
 ment of the covenanted civil service in England, 
 fifty-seven natives of India were appointed to posts 
 ordinarily held by that service. An agitation sprang 
 up against it in 1884, mainly on the ground that the 
 young men of good family were either not forthcoming 
 or not efficient, and looking to the traditional habits of 
 the class and to the novelty of the experiment, which 
 had not really had time to be fairly tested on the 
 original lines, this deficienc}^ was not to be wondered 
 at. Local Governments were accordingly allowed to 
 make their selections on other principles, and there 
 was a tendency for the pendulum to swing in favour 
 of competition as a substitute for nomination. The 
 favoured position of ' Statutories ' gave rise also to 
 some grumbling in the subordinate native services, 
 and after an ineffectual attempt to deal with the 
 question on other hues by Lord Eipon's Government, 
 the Public Service Commission appointed by Lord 
 
1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 535 
 
 Dufferiu, under the presidency of Sir Charles 
 Aitchison, ended by sweeping away the statutory 
 service in favour of a ' provincial ' service which in 
 one point — that of occupying posts held both by the 
 covenanted and uncovenanted branches — practically 
 reverts to Lord Lytton's original plan. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abdul Rahman (Slier All's cousin), 
 his claim to the Afghan throne, 
 245 ; in Russian protection, 245 ; 
 at Tashkend, 410 ; his account 
 of his experiences in Russian 
 territory, 410, 411 ; suggested 
 as Amir of Kabul, 412 ; appeals 
 to the chiefs of Kohistan, 413 ; 
 negotiates with Lord Lytton 
 concerning the Amirship, 414 ; 
 suggests an Anglo- Russian 
 protectorate, 414, 415 ; Lord 
 Lytton's policy towards him, 
 418, 428,429-434 ; Lord Ripon's 
 exposition of his policy regard- 
 ing him, 435, 436 ; his repl3^ to 
 Lord Ripon, 436 ; recognised 
 as Amir of Kabul, 438 ; meets 
 Mr. Lepel Grilfin to settle 
 conditions of Amirship, 438 ; 
 his personality, 439 ; obtains 
 Kandahar, 443 ; defeats Ayub 
 Khan's forces near Kandahar, 
 459 ; relations with the Govern- 
 ment of India, 459 
 
 Abdullah Jan (son of Slier Ah), 
 his succession to the Amirship 
 recognised, 12, 32, 53, 83, 84, 
 91 ; death of, 264 ; assumed 
 cause of death, 297 
 
 Abdullah Jan, Sirdar (son of 
 Sultan Jan of Herat), 343 
 
 Abdullah Nur at Ali Musjid, 275 
 
 Afghanistan, affairs of, see ' Sher 
 Ali,' ' Yakub Khan,' and 
 'Lytton, Earl of 
 
 Afridi tribes, the, 183, 184, 273, 
 274, 287, 314 
 
 Afzul Khan, Mir, of Kandahar, 
 counsels Sher Ali to receive a 
 British mission, 268 
 
 Agra, salt duties in, 470 
 
 Aitchison, Sir Charles, president 
 of the Public Service Commis- 
 sion, 534 
 
 Akhal Tekke tribe, their submis- 
 sion to Russia, 17 ; use made 
 of, bj- Russia, 35 
 
 Akhor Ahmed Khan, Mir, 134 
 
 Alexis, Grand Duke, of Russia, 
 and M. de Lesseps, 43 
 
 Ali Musjid, where the Neville- 
 Chamberlain mission was 
 checked, 275, 279, 283, 288; 
 captured by the British, 296 
 
 Aligurh, Mohammedan College 
 at, 130 
 
 Anglo-Indian Press, ignoble con- 
 duct of the, 394 
 
 Arbabs (middlemen), their 
 employment discoiiraged by 
 Lord Lytton, 173 
 
 Arbuthnot, Mr. (now Sir Alex- 
 ander), Lord Lytton's minister 
 in council for famine affairs, 
 206, 219 ; introduces a Ver- 
 nacular Press Bill, 509 
 
 Argyll, Duke of, refuses the 
 sanction of British aid to Sher 
 Ali, 14 ; his Indian Civil 
 Service Act of 1870, 526 
 
 Assaiu, its salt supply from 
 Cheshire, 463 
 
 Atta Mahomed Khan (British 
 native agent), at Kabul, 81, 135, 
 151, 161 
 
 Ayerst, Mr., murder of, at Poona, 
 622 
 
 Ayub Khan (son of Sher Ali), in 
 power at Herat, 396 ; defeats 
 the British at Maiwand, 440 ; 
 besieges Kandahar, 441 ; de- 
 
538 I/JKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 feated by General Roberts, 
 442 ; defeats Abdul Rahman's 
 troops and occupies Kandahar, 
 458 ; defeated by Abdul Rah- 
 man, 459 ; takes refuge in 
 Persia, 459 
 
 Badakshan, 253 
 
 Badshah Khan (Ghilzai chief), 
 friendly to the Cavagnari Mis- 
 sion, 344 
 
 Baker, General, joined by Yakub 
 Khan at Kushi, 360, 361, 362 ; 
 in action before Kabul, 363, 364, 
 365 
 
 Bala Hissar, the, Kabul, 338, 341, 
 355, 361, 364, 366, 371, 374 note 
 
 Balkh, 18, 254 
 
 Baly, Ai"chdeacon, at the Delhi 
 Asseuiblage, 118 
 
 Bamian, 254 
 
 Bangalore, famine in, 221 
 
 ' Bangobashi,' the (Calcutta news- 
 paper), proseciition of, for sedi- 
 tion, 522 
 
 Baring, Major (now Lord Cromer), 
 abolishes cotton and other duties 
 in India, 484, 485 
 
 Baroghil Pass, the, 186, 187 
 
 Batten, Mr. George, cited, 467 
 
 Battye, Captain W., on the NeviUe- 
 Chamberlain mission, 274 
 
 Beaconsfield, Earl of (then Mr. 
 Disraeli), Prinre Minister, 2, 16; 
 selects Lord Lytton as Viceroy 
 of India, 2, 3 ; his opinion of 
 the policy of Russia, 28 ; on 
 the Afghan question, 31 ; his 
 piurchase of Suez Canal shares, 
 41 ; letter to him from Lord 
 Lytton on tlie feudal aristocracy 
 of India, 108; congratulates 
 Lord Lytton on the success of 
 his Indian policy, 331 ; fall of his 
 Government in 1880, 419 ; letter 
 of thanks to him from Lord 
 Lytton, 424 
 
 Beadon, Sir Cecil (Lieut.-Gov. of 
 Bengal), and the vernacular 
 pi'ess, 502 
 
 Bellary famine relief camp, 216 
 
 Bellew, Dr. (Sir Lewis PeUy's 
 secretary), 53, 134, 136 
 
 Belooch Guides, the, 170 
 
 Beloochistan, 408 
 
 Bengal, its salt supply from 
 
 Cheshii-e, 463 ; duty on salt in, 
 
 464, 471, 472, 474 
 Beresford, Lord William, his grief 
 
 at the death at fjolo of Captain 
 
 Clayton, 118; illness at the 
 
 Delhi Assemblage, 129 
 Bernard, ]\Ir. (now Sir Charles), 
 
 secretary to Lord Lytton, 206 
 Bhopal, ]jegum of, at the Delhi 
 
 Assemblage, 125 
 Biddulph, Major, his exploration 
 
 of N.-W. frontier passes, 186; 
 
 (General), his expedition against 
 
 the Afghans, 301; occupies 
 
 Girishk, 302 
 Bolan Pass, the, 104 
 Bombav Presidencj', famine in, 
 
 114, "189; relief works, 190, 
 
 191, 200 ; system of famine 
 relief superior to that of IMadras, 
 
 192, 200 ; rehef wages m, 196 ; 
 salt production and duties in, 
 464, 469, 471, 472, 474 
 
 Bright, General, in advance on 
 Kabul after the Cavagnari 
 massacre, 361 
 
 Browne, Major, 287 
 
 Browne, Su- Samuel, captui'es Ali 
 Musjid, 296; occupies Jellala- 
 bad,'297 
 
 Buckingham, Dulie of. Governor 
 of Madras, 126, 193, 195 ; com- 
 plains of Lord Lj-tton's despatch 
 on famine relief, 195 ; his famine 
 minute,203 ; suggested as famine 
 dictator, 203, 208 ; interview 
 with Lord Lj'tton at BeUary, 
 210 ; details of his agreement 
 with Lord Lytton on manage- 
 ment of famine, 212, 224 ; his 
 popularity in Madras, 215 
 
 Bukhtiar Khan (British nati\e 
 agent), 161,207 ; at Kabul with 
 Yakub, 307, 316, 320, 321, 336, 
 337, 344, 345 ; death of, 339 
 
 Bvirmese, at the Delhi Assemblage, 
 124 
 
 Burne, Colonel (Sir) Owen, private 
 secretary to Lord Lj'tton, 40, 
 81, 103, 121, 122 ; in Madras 
 in the famine, 206 
 
 Burrows, General, defeated by 
 Ayub Khan at Maiwand, 440 
 
INDEX 
 
 539 
 
 Cairo, Lord Lytton's description 
 of, 42 
 
 Calcutta, its gi-ain trade paralysed 
 by Madras Government's con- 
 duct of famine relief, 195 
 
 Campbell, Sir George, on the salt 
 customs, 465 ; (Lieut. -Gov. of 
 Bengal), and the seditious 
 vernacular press, 503 
 
 Cavagnari, Major, Deputy Com- 
 missioner at Peshawur, 160 ; 
 letter to him from Lord Lytton 
 indicating line of frontier polic)', 
 161, 165 ; his opinion on that 
 policy, 164, 166 ; chastises ring- 
 leaders in the Swat Canal 
 outrage, 183 ; on the difficulties 
 of Sher All's position, 249, 264 ; 
 negotiates with the Khyber 
 tribes, 269, 286. 295 ; reportof the 
 check of the Neville-Chamber- 
 lain Mission at AliMusjid, 275, 
 280 ; in negotiation with Yakub 
 Ivhan, 313-317 ; first interview 
 with Yakub, 321 ; opinion of the 
 Amir, 322 ; his task after the 
 Treaty of Gimdamuk, 324 ; ser- 
 vices acknowledged by Govern- 
 ment, 332 ; appointed Envoy 
 at Kabul, 333 ; starts for Kabul, 
 335 ; letter of thanks to Lord 
 Lytton, 335 ; constitution of his 
 staff and escort, 337, 338, 339 ; 
 receives news of the death of 
 Bukhtiar Khan. 339 ; enters 
 Kabul, 341 ; his account of his 
 reception, 342-344 ; thinks 
 Ghulam Hasan Khan iinsuited 
 to be native agent at Kabul, 
 344 ; his views on his own and 
 on Yakub's policy, 345 ; restric- 
 tions placed on his intercourse 
 with Afghan notables. 346, 347, 
 348 ; considers l^akub's aiithority 
 very weak, 348 ; receives hints 
 as to Y'^akub's treachery, and 
 controls his mtercom'se with 
 Eussia, 349 ; on the mutinous 
 Herat regiments. 350 ; his faith 
 in Y'akub, 353 ; his last telegram, 
 354 ; massacred at Kabul, 356, 
 357 ; Lord Lytton's tribute to 
 his worth, 360 
 Chamberlain, Sir Neville, pro- 
 posed as Envoy on a mission to 
 
 Afghanistan, 259 ; accepts the 
 post, 261 ; at Peshawur, 269 ; 
 at Jamrud, 274 ; checked by 
 Faiz Mahomed at Ali Musjid, 
 275 ; Cavagnari's report of the 
 afiau-, 275-280 ; return of his 
 mission to Peshawiu:, 280 ; 
 on the result of the mission, 
 281, 283 ; guarantees the 
 Khyberis protection from Sher 
 Ali, 288; ill at Simla, 288; 
 strength of his escort on his mis- 
 sion, 337 
 Charasiab, fights at, 364, 414 
 Chardeh Valley, fight in the, 390 
 Chitral, the fi-ontier from Quettah 
 
 to, 253 ; 185, 187 
 Chitral, Sirdar of, at the Delhi 
 
 Assemblage, 124 
 Christie, Mr., his share in the nego- 
 tiations with Sher Ali, 161 
 Clayton, Captain (9th Lancers), 
 death of, whilst playing at polo, 
 118 
 CoUey, Colonel, military secretary 
 to Lord Lytton, 40 ; on Lord 
 Lytton's first speech before the 
 Indian Council, 50 ; in Khelat, 
 99, 100, 102; at the Delhi 
 Assemblage, 122 ; at Peshawur, 
 180; at Madras in the famine, 
 206, 207, 208 
 Cotton duties, 475 et sqq. 
 Cranbrook, Lord, 185 ; made 
 Secretary for India, 240 ; letter to 
 him from Lord Lytton on policy 
 towards Afghanistan, 243 ; from 
 the same on Prussia's advance 
 in Central Asia, 249 ; Lord 
 Lytton's letter to him on 
 resigning Viceroyship, 422 ; 
 on the Vernacular Press Bill, 
 518 ; agamst a close Indian Civil 
 Service, 533 
 Cromer, Lord, see Baring 
 
 Dalhousie, Lord, his treaty with 
 Dost Mahomed, 18 
 
 Daod Shah (Afghan general). 
 321 ; appointed Y'akub's com- 
 mander-in-chief, 334, 343, 347, 
 353 ; endeavours to prevent the 
 massacre of the British mission, 
 355, 357, 358, 361 
 
540 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Delhi Assemblage, details of the, 
 on the proclamation of Her Ma- 
 jesty as Kaisar i-Hmd, 110-133 
 
 Derby, Lord, Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs, 16 ; Count 
 Shonvalow's proposals to, on 
 direct communication between 
 Russian and English forces in 
 Central Asia, 33 
 
 Dinkur Rao, Sir (Sindiah's 
 minister), on British adminis- 
 tration, 123 
 
 Disraeli, Benjamin, see Beacons- 
 field 
 
 Dost Mahomed, his treaty with 
 the British, 18 
 
 Downe, Lord and Lady, at Delhi, 
 126 
 
 Dufferin, Lord, appoints the 
 Public Service Commission, 
 534 
 
 Durand, Sir Henry, demarcates the 
 Eastern Afghan boundary, 4o9 
 
 Eden, Mr. (afterwards Sir A., 
 Lieutenant-Governor of Ben- 
 gal), urges legislation against 
 the vernacular press, 505 ; pro- 
 secutes a Bengali journal for a 
 seditious article, 521 ; on the 
 Covenanted Civil Service, 529 
 
 Elliott, Mr. Charles (now Sir), 
 Famine Commissioner of jMy- 
 sore, 222 ; the Viceroy's minute 
 on his Mysore famine report, 
 223 
 
 ' Empress day ' in India, 132 
 
 Extraordinary Public Works, 
 India, 488 et sqq. 
 
 Faiz Mahojied (Afghan general), 
 dealing with the Chamberlain 
 mission, 269, 270, 273, 275, 276, 
 277, 279, 280 
 
 Famine, in Bombay and Madras, 
 114; in the southern provinces 
 of India, 189 et sqq. ; insurance 
 taxation, 493 et sqq. 
 
 Forster, John, a personal friend 
 of Lord Lytton, 25 
 
 Frere, Sir Bartle, advocates the 
 appointment of I5ritish officers 
 on the frontiers of Afghanistan, 
 
 19 ; on English policy towards 
 Sher Ah, 44-48 
 Frontier administration. Lord 
 Lytton's views on, 171 et sqq. 
 
 Ghilzais, the, 287 
 
 Ghulam Haidar, General, 411 
 
 Ghulam Hasan Khan, Nawab, 
 emissary to Sher Ali. 264, 265, 
 266, 269, 277, 278, 280. 290 
 
 Ghuzni, 414, 417 
 
 Gibbs, Mr., his Bill repealing the 
 Vernacular Press Act, 521 
 
 Giers, M. de, on Russian dealings 
 with Sher Ali, 78 
 
 Gilgit, British political agent at, 
 185, 187 ; telegraph at, 187, 188 
 
 Gladstone, Mr., succeeds Lord 
 Beaconsfield in 1880, 419 ; his 
 motion on the Indian Ver- 
 ! nacular Press Act, 519 
 I Goa, the Portuguese Governor- 
 I General of, at the Delhi Assem- 
 , blage, 119, 129 
 
 Gortchakow, Prince, on Russian 
 ' i^olicy in Afghanistan, 34 
 
 Gough, General Hugh, at Kabul. 
 ! 366 
 
 Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart, 
 letter to him from Lord Lytton 
 on frontier raids, 183 
 
 Gray, Captain, 81, 83 
 
 Griffin, Mr. Lepel (now Sir), 
 appointed to diplomatic and 
 administrative superintendence 
 at Kabul, 403 ; minute from 
 Lord Lytton, 404-408 ; further 
 instructions of policy from the 
 Viceroy, 408; Abdul Rahman 
 suggested to him as possible 
 Amir of Kabul, 412 ; com- 
 municates to Abdul Lord 
 Lytton's views, 418 ; and those 
 of Lord Ripon, 437 ; negotiates 
 with Abdul personally the 
 terms of Amkship, 438 ; his 
 sketch of Abdul, 439 
 
 Gundamuk, Treaty of, 324, 376- 
 378, 382, 398, 403, 406, 410, 419, 
 449, 450 
 
 Haines, Sir Frederick, com- 
 mander-in-chief in India, 51 
 
INDEX 
 
 541 
 
 Hamilton, Lieutenant (attache to 
 
 Sir Louis Cavagnari), 339 ; 
 
 massacred at Kabul, 354 
 Hamilton, Lord George, receives 
 
 letter from Lord Lytton on the 
 
 famine, 192 
 Hammick, Captain, member of 
 
 Sir N. Chamberlain's mission, 
 
 2G3 
 Hartington, Marquess of (^Dresent 
 
 Duke of Devonshire), becomes 
 
 Secretary of State for India, 
 
 419 ; his policy towards Abdul 
 
 Eahman, 437 
 Herat, 253, 254, 255, 257, 381, 
 
 388, 396, 405, 451 
 Hindu-Kush. the, India's natural 
 
 boundary, 251, 253, 260, 378, 
 
 385, 387 
 Hobhouse, Sir Arthur, member of 
 
 Council, his views on Afghani- 
 stan, 64 
 HoUiar, at the Delhi Assemblage, 
 
 120 ; on British administration, 
 
 123 
 Hope, Sir T. C, 480 
 Hume, Mr. A. O., C.B., 467 
 Hyderabad, famine in, 189 
 
 Indian Civil Service, legislation 
 concerning natives in, 524 et sqq. 
 
 Indian Famine Commission, ap- 
 pointment of, 236 ; results of 
 its labours, 237-239 
 
 Indian Vernacular Press Act, the, 
 506 et s(]q. 
 
 Instructions furnished by the 
 Home Government to Lord 
 Lytton on his assmnption of 
 the Viceroyalty, 88-93 
 
 Iskoman Pass, the, 186, 187 
 
 Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt, 
 in financial difficulties, 40, 41 
 
 Jacobabad, Treaty of, 102 
 
 James, Major (Commissioner of 
 Peshawur), on frontier admin- 
 istration, 172 
 
 Jamrud, British mission at. 270, 
 274 
 
 Jellalabad, 330, 406 
 
 Jenkins, Lieut. -Colonel F. H. 
 (Guide Corps), with Sir Neville 
 
 Chamberlain's mission, 263, 
 274, 275, 278, 279, 280. 288 ; in 
 action at Charasiab, 414 
 
 Jenkins, Mr. W., interpreter 
 between Yakub and Cavagnari, 
 321 ; secretary to Sir Louis 
 Cavagnari, 339, 343 ; massacred 
 at Kabul, 354 
 
 Jeypore, Maharaja of, 117 
 
 Jodhpore, Maharaja of, at the 
 Delhi Assemblage, 129 
 
 Jowakis, the, expedition against. 
 General Keyes in command, 
 179, 180; subjugation of, 181; 
 conditions of peace, 182 
 
 Jubbulpore, failure of transport 
 at, in the Madras famine, 209 
 
 Jung Bahadur, Sir, prime minis- 
 ter of Nepaul, 79 ; his pro- 
 posal to visit Sher Ali as our 
 representative, 80 
 
 Kafristan, constitution of, 185 
 
 Kaisar-i-Hind, the title assumed 
 by Her Majesty as Queen- 
 Empress, 110 
 
 Kakar Pathans, the, Major Sande- 
 man's negotiations with, 287 
 
 Kandahar, events relating to, 
 286, 330, 381, 382, 383, 404, 
 405, 408, 441, 442, 443, 444 
 458 
 
 Kashmir, Maharaja of, at the 
 Delhi Assemblage, 120 ; desires 
 to present the Queen-Empress 
 with an Imperial crown, 125 ; 
 negotiates with Lord Lytton 
 concerning Chitral and Yassin, 
 164 ; and for a British political 
 agent at Gilgit, 185 ; his con- 
 vention with the Indian Go- 
 vernment, 186 
 
 Kaufmann, General, intrigues with 
 Sher AH, 9-12, 15, 16, 36, 37 ; 
 annexes Khokand, 17 ; pro- 
 poses direct communication 
 with the Indian Government, 
 35 ; his views on British and 
 Russian aims in Central Asia, 
 35-37; Lord Lytton's com- 
 ments thereon, 39 ; his envoys 
 at Kabul, 77, 78, 247, 248; 
 declines to give Russian aid to 
 Sher Ali on his fall, 306 ; re- 
 
542 LOR]) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 quests Yaknb to communicate 
 with him, i340 ; his treatment 
 of Abdul Rahman, 410, 411 
 
 Kazi Syud Ahmed, member of 
 Sir N. Chamberlain's mission, 
 263 
 
 Kelly, Dr. (of the suite of Sir 
 Louis Cavagnari), 339 ; mas- 
 sacred at Kabul, 8r)4 
 
 Kennedy, General, personal assis- 
 tant to the Duke of Bucking- 
 ham, 212, 213, 210 ; ably super- 
 intends famine relief in Madras, 
 222, 225, 226 
 
 Keyes, General, subdues the 
 Jowakis, 180 
 
 Khanan Khan, Ressaldar ]\Iajor, 
 bearer of Lord Lytton's first 
 letter to Sher Ali, 53 
 
 Khelat, Khan of, quarrels with 
 his Sirdars, 95 ; stoppage of 
 his subsidy, 96 ; submits to 
 British mediation, 97, 98 ; 
 meets Lord Lytton at Jacoba- 
 bad, and signs a treaty accept- 
 able to his Sirdars, 102 ; with 
 his Sirdars at the Delhi 
 Assemblage, 123 ; declares him- 
 self a feudatory of the Queen- 
 Empress, 124 
 
 Khiva, Russian conquest of, 11, 
 16 
 
 Khokand, annexation of, by 
 Russia, 17 
 
 Khost, General Roberts routs the 
 tribes at, 301 
 
 Khyber tribes, friendliness of, to 
 the Neville-Chamberlain mis- 
 sion, 273, 274 ; 287, 288, 314 
 
 Kohistan, the chiefs of, 413 
 
 Kurum Valley, the, 257, 258, 260, 
 287, 292, 298, 330 
 
 Kushdil Khan (escort to Major 
 Cavagnari on his mission), 342 
 
 Kutchi, 407, 408 
 
 LAWRKNCE,Lord, Viceroy of India, 
 on the dangers of the Russian 
 advance in Central Asia, 8 ; on 
 English support of Sher Ali, 
 18 ; views on Indian policy, 25, 
 26 ; Lord Lytton's obituary 
 notice of him, 26 note ; and the 
 ' masterly inactivity policy,' 
 
 243 ; Sher Ali's opinion of his 
 power, 335 ; on the exclusion of 
 Russian influence from Afghan- 
 istan, 448 ; on the difficulties of 
 Afghan rule, 455 
 
 Lesseps, M. de, his scheme of 
 communication between India 
 and Russian Central Asia, 43 
 
 Lomakin, General, action of, in 
 the Khanates, 17 
 
 Lyall, Sir Alfred, his summary of 
 British policy in India, 5 ; urges 
 immediate action against Sher 
 Ali, 291 ; quoted, on tribal rising 
 round Kabul, 389 ; communi- 
 cates British policy regarding 
 Abdul Rahman to Mr. Griffin, 
 415 417 ; his acc6unt of the 
 disaster at Maiwand, 440-442 
 
 Lytton, Lady, accompanies her 
 husband to India, 40 ; at Simla, 
 49, 115 ; at the Delhi Assem- 
 blage, 115 
 
 Lytton, Earl of (Edward Robert 
 Bulwer-Lytton), accepts the 
 Indian Viceroyalty, 2 ; a sum- 
 mary of events in India pre- 
 ceding that acceptance, 5-24; 
 his preparations for his appoint- 
 ment, 25 ; writes an obituary 
 notice of Lord Lawrence, 26 
 note ; Sir James Stephen's wise 
 counsel to him, 27 ; on Afghan- 
 istan, 29 ; concurs with Mr. 
 Disraeli's and Lord Salisbury's 
 views on Afghan affairs, 81 ; 
 receives Government instruc- 
 tions on his policy, 31-33 ; in- 
 terview with Count Shouvalow 
 on Russian policy, 33-39 ; com- 
 municates with Lord Salisbury 
 on the matter, 39 ; leaves Eng- 
 land for India with his family, 
 40 ; impressions of Cairo, 42 ; in- 
 terview with M. de Lesseps, 43 ; 
 on the Serapis, 43 ; meets the 
 Prince of Wales and Sir Bartle 
 Frere, 44 ; reaches Calcutta, 49 ; 
 speech to the Council, 49 ; 
 Lord Northbrook's fi-iendlmess 
 to him, 50 ; sets himself to the 
 improveixient of British rela- 
 tions Vi'ith Afghanistan, 51 ; 
 proposes a mission to Kabul, 
 52 ; writes to Sher Ali on the 
 
INDEX 
 
 54. 
 
 Lytton, Earl of — {continued) 
 subject, 53 ; the Amir's reply 
 declining a mission, 56 ; sends 
 a second letter to the Amir on 
 the subject, 61 ; dissentient 
 members of the Council pro- 
 pose a ' waiting policy,' 64 ; his 
 minute controverting their 
 views, 65-76 ; comments on the 
 intercourse between General 
 Kaufmann and the Amir, 79 ; 
 Sher All's reply to his second 
 letter, 80 ; conference with 
 native agent at Simla, 82- 
 86; his memorandum to the 
 Amir, 86, 87 ; remarks on 
 his own memorandum, 87 ; 
 instructions from the Home 
 Government on his departure 
 from England, 88-93; his 
 memorandum on oiur relations 
 with Khelat, 94 ; successful 
 treaty negotiations with the 
 Khan of Khelat, 99-103 ; simi- 
 naaryof the results of that treaty, 
 104 ; on the passion of the 
 native aristocracy for rank, 
 titles, and genealogies, 108 ; 
 tu'ges the utilisation of this 
 passion, 109 ; proposed mea- 
 sures in connection with the 
 Delhi Assemblage, 111 ; mea- 
 sures actually adopted, 111 ; 
 proclaims Her Majesty as 
 Kaisar-i-Hind or Queen-Em- 
 press, 113 ; writes to Her 
 Majesty from Delhi describing 
 his reception by the native 
 chiefs and giving details of the 
 ceremonies, 116-131 ; criticism 
 on Sindiah's speech, 128 ; 
 secures a conference at Pesha- 
 wiu- with Sher Ali, 134 ; views, 
 in letters to Sir Lewis Pelly, 
 on past British relations with 
 Afghanistan, and schemes for 
 a settled understanding between 
 the two Powers, 136-154 ; his 
 Minute on the close of the 
 Peshawur Conference, 155-159 ; 
 selects Captain Cavagnari for 
 the political management of 
 the Peshawur frontier, 160 ; 
 discusses with Cavagnari the 
 policy of winning over the 
 
 Lytton, Earl of — (continued) 
 tribes intervening between 
 Kabul and the N-W. frontier, 
 165 ; his minute on frontier re- 
 organisation and administra- 
 tion, 167-179 ; authorises a 
 pmiitive expedition against the 
 Jowakis, 179 ; differences with 
 the fi'ontier authorities on the 
 plan of campaign, 180 ; suc- 
 cessful issue of his own 
 views, 181 ; conditions of peace 
 to the Jowakis, 182; on the 
 repression of frontier raids, 183 ; 
 arranges with the Maharaja of 
 Kashmir for the establishment 
 of a political agent at Gilgit, 
 185 ; on the importance of 
 securing the control of the Mirs 
 of Kafristan, 185-188 ; dealing 
 with the famine of 1877, 191, 
 et sqq. ; alarmed at the method 
 of famine relief in Madras, 193 ; 
 he appoints Sir E. Temple as 
 Commissioner, 193 ; increasing 
 distrust with Madras famine re- 
 lief, 196 ; description of relief 
 labour throughout Madras, 198 ; 
 on the relief of famine in 
 Mysore, 199 ; on a famine dic- 
 tatorship, 201 ; recognises the 
 difficulty of intervention with 
 the Madras Government, 202 : 
 suggests the Duke of Bucking- 
 ham as famine dictator, 203 ; 
 his general principles for the 
 management of famine affairs, 
 204 ; journey to Madras, 207 ; 
 on the failure of transport at 
 Jubbulpore, 209 ; interview with 
 the Duke of Buckingham at 
 Bellary, 210; details of his agree- 
 ment with the Duke, 212 ; letter 
 to Lord Salisbury on the evils 
 of the Madras Government's 
 dealings with the famine, 214 ; 
 testifies to the popularity of the 
 Duke of Buckingham, 215; con- 
 versation with an officer on a 
 rehef camp, 216 ; decides to 
 take the Famine Department 
 into his own hands, 219 ; 
 opinion of Ootacamund, 220 ; at 
 Bangalore, 221 ; appoints Major 
 Scott-Moncreiff Chief Engineer, 
 
544 
 
 LORD LYTTO^'S INDIAN ADMIN [STR AT ION 
 
 Lvtton, Earl of — {continued) 
 221 ; nominates Mr. Charles 
 Elliott Famine Commissioner 
 of i\Iysore, 222 ; returns to 
 Simla, 222; his I\Iinute on Mr. 
 Elliott's Mysore Famine Report, 
 223 ; on the famine operatioiis in 
 Madras and Mysore. 225, 226; 
 legislation favom-ed by him to 
 provide for future famine ex- 
 penses, 227 ; his speech on 
 famine legislation, 228-286 ; 
 appoints a Famine Commission, 
 286 ; letter to Lord Salisbury 
 on his relinquishing the Secre- 
 taryship of State for India, 240 : 
 letter from Lord Salisbury in 
 reply, 242 ; his policy in prepara- 
 tion for an attack by Russia in 
 Central Asia, 248 ; his opinion of 
 Sher All, 244 ; letter to Viscount 
 Cranbrook on the Afghanistan 
 problem and Russian advance, 
 250 ; proposes a scientific fron- 
 tier, 250; suggests the Hmdn- 
 Kush as the natural boundary 
 of India, 251 ; on the frontier 
 froniQuettah to Chitral, 258 ; on 
 an outer and inner frontier line, 
 
 254 ; his general frontier policy, 
 
 255 ; would send a British Mis- 
 sion to Kabul. 256; his terms 
 to Shcr Ah, 257 ; thinks .condi- 
 tions favourable for coercing 
 the Amir, 258; proposes Sir 
 Neville Chamberlain as Envoy 
 to Afghanistan, 259 ; summary 
 of his frontier policy. 260 ; his 
 proposed mission sanctioned by 
 the Home Government, 261 ; his 
 Minute on the Russian Mission, 
 262 ; account of the discussions 
 at Kabul relative to the recep- 
 tion of a Ih-itish Mission. 267 ; 
 reiterates his insistence on the 
 despatch of a mission, 270; 
 letter of condolence lo Sher AH 
 on the death of Abdullah Jan, 
 272 ; authorises the advance of 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain to Jam- 
 rud, 247 ; his defence of the mis- 
 sion after its check, 281; dwells 
 on the Amir's open hostility, 
 284; the political and military 
 measures favoured by him in 
 
 Lytton, Earl of — (continued) 
 return, 285 ; dealings with the 
 Khyber tribes, 288 ; urged to 
 immediate action against the 
 .\juir, 291 ; ultimatum to Sher 
 Ali, 292 ; orders military 
 operations to be begun, 295 ; 
 proclamation to the Afghan- 
 istans, 296 ; his account of the 
 subsequent successful campaign, 
 296-308 ; the Amir's reply to 
 his ultimatum, 808 ; receives 
 news of the flight of Sher Ali, 
 305 ; comments on the firman 
 issued by the Amir to his 
 subjects, 808 ; exposes the du- 
 plicity of Russia and of Sher 
 Ali, 808 ; his objections to the 
 independence of .Afghanistan. 
 311 ; formulates conditions of 
 re-establishment of relations 
 with that State, 312 ; terms 
 of peace offered to Yakub 
 Khan, 314; discusses with 
 Major Cavagnari language to 
 be held with Yakub if sent 
 to Kabul, 316 ; his terms of 
 treaty with Y'akub, 317 ; 
 Cavagnari sends him his im- 
 pressions of Y'akub and Afghans 
 generally, 822 ; congratulates 
 Y''akub on the Treaty of Gunda- 
 muk, 324 ; despatch on that 
 Treaty, 326-880 ; congratulated 
 by Lords Salisbury and 
 Beaconsfield on the success of 
 his Afghan policy, 330, 331 ; 
 approval by the Secretary of 
 State, 832 ; his own view of 
 the Treaty, 383 ; despatch on 
 Cavagnari's mission to Kabul, 
 336-889 ; letter from Cavagnari 
 describing his reception at 
 Kabul, 342-344 ; letters from 
 Cavagnari disclosing the diffi- 
 culties met with in dealing with 
 Y'akub and the intrigue and 
 distrust of an Afghan Court, 
 345-351 ; advises monetary aid 
 to Yakub, 354 ; Amir's account 
 of the massacre of Cavagnari 
 and his mission forwarded to 
 him, 355 ; comments on Wall 
 Mahomed's assertion of Y'akub's 
 treachery, 357 ; orders British 
 
INDEX 
 
 545 
 
 Lytton, Earl of — {continued) 
 advance on Kabul, 358 ; letter 
 to Lord Beaconsfield on future 
 British policy towards Afo^han- 
 istan, 359 ; on the death of 
 Cavagnari, 360 ; receives full 
 support from the Home Govern- 
 ment and Her Majesty, 860; 
 letter to Sir James Stephen on 
 events in Af<^hanistan after 
 flight of Yakub to British camp, 
 361-366 ; regards the proposed 
 abdication of Yakub as ad- 
 vantageous, 367 ; his proclama- 
 tion issiied by General Koberts 
 at Kabul after its occupation, 
 3G8 ; instructions furnished by 
 him to General Eoberts on the 
 punishment of leaders in Kabul 
 massacre and conduct during 
 occupation of Kabul, 372-376 ; 
 letter to Lord Cranbrook re- 
 viewing past and sketching 
 future policy towai'ds Afghan- 
 istan, 376-380 ; averse from 
 transferring the capital from 
 Kabul to Kandahar, 380; on 
 the proposition of establishing 
 an independent Western 
 Afghanistan, 382 ; proposed 
 future policy with frontier 
 tribes, 385 ; programme for 
 future of Afghanistan, 386 ; 
 urges construction of frontier 
 railways, 387 ; foresees tribal 
 risings on the departure of 
 Yakub, 389, 393 ; on the em- 
 ployinent of native army in 
 frontier service, 394 ; deprecates 
 big battalions, 394 ; on the need 
 of native pohtical agents, 395 ; 
 proclaims Yakub's abdication 
 irrevocable, 396 ; believes 
 Yakub to be concerned in the 
 Kabul massacre, 397 ; argues 
 against Yakub's restoration, 
 398-400 ; selects Sher Ah Khan 
 as governor of Kandahar, 400, 
 401 ; appoints Mr. Lepel Griffin 
 administrator at Kabul, 403 ; 
 on policy in Northern Afghan- 
 istan, 403 ; on subsidising a 
 ruler at Kabul, 405 ; on the 
 witlidrawal of our forces from 
 Kabul, 406, 407 ; terms of with- 
 
 Lytton, Earl of — {continued) 
 drawal, 408 ; treats with Abdul 
 Rahman, 412, 413, 414, 415, 
 418 ; resigns Viceroyship on 
 Mr. Gladstone's accession to 
 power, 419 ; letter to Lord 
 Cranbrook on quitting office, 
 420 ; and to Sir James Stephen 
 on their prospective meeting, 
 421 ; suggestions of conduct 
 till arrival of his successor, 
 422, 423; his thanks to Lord 
 Beaconsfield for his recom- 
 mendation to an Earldom, 424 ; 
 his last Minute of Afghan policy 
 to be submitted to Lord Ripon, 
 428-434 ; departure from India, 
 434 ; his speech in the House 
 of Lords on the evacuation of 
 Kandahar, 444-458 ; four chief 
 heads of liis financial pohcy, 
 461 ; his tribute to Sir John 
 Strachey, 463 ; note to Mr, A. 
 O. Hume on salt and its duties, 
 468; his Budget speech of 1878- 
 79 on the salt duties, 471-475 ; 
 on the cotton duties, 478-483 ; 
 deals with provincial contracts 
 485-488; and with 'extra- 
 ordinary public works,' 488- 
 493 ; establishes a famine 
 insurance fund, 494-497 ; his 
 responsibility for the error in 
 war estimates, 498-501 ; takes 
 action against the seditious 
 native press, 504 ; his Minute 
 on the subject, 505 ; introduces 
 a Vernacular Press Bill, 506- 
 509 ; speech in the Legislative 
 Council on its introduction, 
 509-518 ; result of the measure, 
 518-520 ; establishes the bureau 
 of a press commissioner, 520 ; 
 engaged in securing to the 
 natives of India higher ap- 
 pointments in the Civil Service 
 524 et sqq. 
 
 Macdonald, Colonel, murder of 
 
 140 
 McNeil, Sir John, suggests the 
 
 transference of the capital of 
 
 Afghanistan from Kabul to 
 
 Kandahar, 380 
 
 N N 
 
546 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Macpherson, General, on the 
 
 march to Kabul, 363 ; joins 
 
 General Roberts, 365, 366 ; at 
 
 the Chardeh Valley fi^ht, 391 
 
 Madras, Bishop of, at the Delhi 
 
 Assemblage, 118 
 Madras Presidency, famine in, 
 114, 189; rehef v;orks, 190, 
 191 ; Sir Richard Temple sent 
 there as Commissioner, 193 ; 
 relief wages in, 196 ; nature of 
 rehef labour in, 198 ; abundant 
 rainfall in, 220 ; General Ken- 
 nedy superintending famine 
 relief, 222, 225, 228; salt 
 production and duties in, 464, 
 469, 471, 472, 474 
 Rlahomed Afzul Khan (Sher All's 
 
 half-brother), 409 
 Mahomed Alam Khan (uncle of 
 
 Musa Khan), 214 
 Mahomed Jan (Afghan general), 
 
 390 
 Mahomed Yakub, 83 
 Maimena, 253, 254 
 Maiwand, defeat of the British at, 
 
 440 
 Mallet, Sir Louis, 41 ; letter_ to 
 him from Lord Lytton on famine 
 relief, 192 
 Massy, General, ordered to occupy 
 the Shutargardan, 358 ; before 
 Kabul, 364, 365, 366 
 Masters, Mr. (Collector, Madras), 
 
 211 
 Mayo College, the, 130 
 Mayo, Lord, desires an English 
 representative at Kabul, 18 ; 
 guarantees to Sher Ah that no 
 Resident shoiild be placed in 
 his towns, 21 ; his negotiations 
 with Sher Ali, 141, 144, 148 ; 
 cited,467, 485, 486, 488 ; on the 
 Indian Civil Service, 526 
 Merewether, Sir William (Com- 
 missioner of Sindh), his pohcy 
 in Khelat, 95, 96 
 Merv, Russian advance on, 16, 34, 
 
 35, 254 
 Metcalfe, Sir Charles, 519 
 Mir Akhor, the, Sher All's com- 
 mander, at AH Musjid, 267, 269, 
 273, 279 ; 295 
 Mirza IMuhammad Hassan Khan, 
 Russian native agent, 307 
 
 Moolah Shah Mahomed (Yakub's 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs), 
 343, 347 
 
 Most Eminent Order of the 
 Indian Empire, the, institution 
 of, 112 
 
 Muir, Sir WiUiam, Financial 
 Minister on the Indian Council, 
 49 ; views on Afghanistan, 64 ; 
 Finance Minister to Indian 
 Government, 462 ; on the salt 
 tax, 473, 474; disapproves of 
 repressive legislation for the 
 vernacular press, 518 
 
 Munro, Colonel, 97, 102 
 
 Musa I^an (son of Yakub and 
 heir apparent), 360 note, 396 
 
 Mushk-i-Alam, MtiUa, of Ghuzni, 
 76 ; advises Sher Ali to refuse 
 the British mission to Kabul, 
 77 ; preaches war against the 
 British at Kabul, 389 
 
 Mustaufi, the, Afghan Minister, 
 counsels Sher Ali to receive a 
 British mission, 265, 267, 268 ; 
 cited, 321, 322, 334, 343, 347 ; 
 arrested by Roberts at Kabul, 
 367 ; released, 389 
 
 Mutiny of 1857, press restrictions 
 
 at the time of, 502 
 Mvsore, famine in, 189 ; relief 
 "works, 199, 200, 222, 226 
 
 Napier of Magdala, Lord, on 
 Afghanistan, 51 
 
 Native Indian aristoci'acy, 108 et 
 sqq. 
 
 Nek Mahomed (Yakub's uncle), 
 his subtle conference with Yakub 
 Khan in the British camp, 363 ; 
 opposes the British in battle at 
 Charasiab, 364 
 
 Nisbet, Mr. W. (Commissioner), 
 208 
 
 Norman, Sir Henry, member of 
 CouncU, his views on Afghan- 
 istan, 64 ; letter from Lord 
 Lytton to him on the Khelat 
 treaty, 102 
 
 Northbrook, Lord, resigns the 
 VJceroyalty of India, 2, 23 ; 
 approached by Sher Ali on the 
 subject of British protection, 
 13 ; opposes the policy of fore- 
 
INDEX 
 
 547 
 
 ing a British agent on Afghan- 
 istan, 20, 23, 31 ; receives Lord 
 Lytton in Calcutta, 49 ; fi-iendly 
 intercourse with Lord Lytton, 
 50 ; dechnes to suspend Major 
 Sandenian's mission to Khelat, 
 98 ; negotiates with Sher Ali, 
 148, 149 ; appoints Major 
 Biddulph to explore Kafristan 
 passes, 186 ; on the cotton 
 duties, 475 ; deals with the 
 seditious vernacular press, 503, 
 504, 518; legislates on native 
 employment in the Indian Civil 
 Service, 527 
 
 Obed Allan Khan, of Tonk, on 
 Sir Neville Chamberlain's mis- 
 sion, 264 
 
 Oldham, Mr. (district officer in 
 Madras), his famine report, 199 
 
 Ootacammid, 220 
 
 Orloff, General, and the Treaty of 
 Unkiar-Skelessi, 71 
 
 Orontes, the, Lord Lytton on 
 board, 41, 48 
 
 Oudh, annexation of, to North- 
 West Provinces, 126 
 
 Oxus, the, as a boundary line, 6, 
 253, 254, 260, 261 
 
 Palaveram famine relief camp, 
 216 
 
 Palmerston, Lord, his views of 
 British policy towards Afghan- 
 istan, 68 ; on Russian policy, 70 
 
 Parry, Sir Erskine, dissents from 
 repressive vernacular press 
 legislation, 518 
 
 Pattiala, Maharaja of, his installa- 
 tion by Lord Lytton, 130 
 
 Peiwar Khotal, General Roberts's 
 victory at, 299-301 
 
 Pelly, Sir Lewis, 40, 53, 64, 81 ; at 
 the Peshawur conference, 134, 
 135 ; Lord Lytton' s letter to, 
 on Sher Ali, 136, et sqq. ; his 
 conduct of the Peshawur con- 
 ference approved by Lord 
 Lytton, 153 
 
 Persia, Yakub Khan's opinion of, 
 323 ; suggested cession to, of 
 Herat and Seistan, 381, 388 
 
 Peshawur conference, the, 134 et 
 sqq. 
 
 Peshin, British cantonment re- 
 commended at, 382 
 
 Phayre, Colonel, political superin- 
 tendent at Khelat, 95 
 
 Pollock, Sir Richard, Commis- 
 sioner of Peshawur, letters to 
 Sher Ali, dictated by Lord 
 Lytton, 53, 71, 76 
 
 Primrose, General, at the invest- 
 ment of Wali Sher Ali Khan, 401 
 
 Prisoners released on the day of 
 the proclamation of the ne^v 
 title of the Queen-Empress, 113 
 
 Probyn, General, Lord Lytton' s 
 impressions of him, 43 
 
 Productive Public Works, India, 
 492 
 
 Punjab, the, 167, 168, 169 ; rock 
 salt in, 464; duty on salt in. 
 464, 474 
 
 Punjab Frontier Force, 169 
 
 Purtab Sing, Maharaja of Jodhpm-, 
 on Sir Neville Chamberlain's 
 mission, 264 
 
 Queen, Her Majesty the, her as- 
 sumption of the title of Empress 
 of India, 52, 54, 106, 107 ; letter 
 from Lord Lytton on the 
 Treaty with the Khan of 
 Khelat, 100, 101 ; title of 
 Kaisar-i-IIind chosen for her, 
 110 ; Lord Lytton's letters to 
 her describing the Delhi Assem- 
 blage and her proclamation as 
 Kaisar-i-Hind, 113, 115, et sqq. ; 
 native opinion thereon, 132 ; 
 Lord Lytton to her on the 
 Indian famine, 224, 225 ; her 
 letter to Lord Lytton after the 
 Kabul massacre, 360 
 
 Quettah, 101, 104, 105, 164, 258, 
 286, 287, 330, 404; British 
 garrison at, 157 ; military value 
 of, 252; frontier from, to Chitral, 
 253 
 
 Rajputana, salt production in, 
 
 464, 466, 467, 469 
 Rand, Mr., murder of, at Poona, 
 
 522 
 
548 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Bawalpindi, railway from, to the 
 Peiwar Khotal, 342 
 
 Eawlinson, Sir H., on Kandahar, 
 381 
 
 Eazgonoff, General, Eussian 
 Envoy at Kabul, 306 
 
 Eipon, Marquis, becomes Viceroy 
 of India, 419 ; receives charge 
 of Government from Lord 
 Lytton at Simla, 434 ; reverses 
 Lord Lytton's Afghan poHcy, 
 444 et sqq. ; carries out his 
 predecessor's scheme of salt 
 and cotton duties, 484 
 
 Eoberts, General, occupies the 
 Kurum Valley, 298 ; defeats 
 the Afghans at the Peiwar 
 Khotal, 299-301 ; routs the 
 tribes of Khost, 301 ; receives 
 news of the massacre of the 
 British Mission, 354, 356 ; 
 starts for Kabul, 358 ; at Kushi 
 with Yakub, 361 ; issues a 
 proclamation to the Afghans, 
 361 ; defeats the Afghans at 
 Charasiab, 363, 364 ; confronts 
 them outside Kabul, 364 ; takes 
 possession of Kabul, 366 ; 
 Yakub announces to him his 
 resignation of the Amirship, 
 
 366 ; arrests notables at Kabul, 
 
 367 ; proclamation at Kabul 
 after Yakub's resignation, 368; 
 statement made to him by 
 Yakub concerning his father, 
 369 ; terms of a treaty between 
 Sher AJi and Eussia placed in 
 his hands, 370 ; his report on 
 Sher Ali'smilitarj- preparations 
 at Kabul, 371 ; instructions 
 received by him on his investi- 
 gation of the causes of the 
 Kabul massacre, 372-376 ; 
 attacked by tribes in Chardeh 
 Valley, 390, 391 ; withdraws to 
 Sherpur, 391 ; repulses Afghan 
 assault, 392 ; proclaims am- 
 nesty, 393 ; declares Y'akub's 
 abdication irrevocable, 396 ; 
 Mr. Lepel Griffin deputed to 
 assist him, 403 ; marches from 
 Kabul to the relief of Kandahar 
 after the battle of Maiwand, 
 441 ; defeats Ayub Ivhan, 
 442 
 
 Boss, General, in command of a 
 force to relieve Kandahar, 414 
 
 Eoyal Titles Bill, the, 107 
 
 Eukh, railway from, to Sibi, 387 
 
 Eussell, Lord Arthur, 27 
 
 Eussia, establishes her relations 
 with Afghanistan, 9 ; in spite 
 of her assurances that that 
 State is beyond her sphere of 
 action, 11 ; her envoys at 
 Kabul, 16; advance on Merv, 
 16 ; and reduction of the 
 Khanates, 17 ; propositions 
 througli Count Shouvalow to 
 the British Government. 33, 
 40 ; her policy and practice in 
 Central Asia, 70 ; intriguing at 
 Kabul, 78, 79; war with Tiur- 
 key, and English action, 240; 
 mission to Sher Ah, 240 ; 
 further violation of pledges to 
 Great Britain concerning Af- 
 ghanistan, 243 ; her diplo- 
 macy pitted against that of 
 Great Britain, 246; advance 
 toward the Indian frontier, 
 250 ; preference by Sher Ali of 
 a Eussian to an English mission, 
 262 ; refuses aid to Sher Ali on 
 his fall, 306 ; disclosu.re of a 
 treaty with Sher Ali, 370, 372 ; 
 Abdul Eahman's accoimt of his 
 residence at Tashkend under 
 Eussian protection, 410 ; 
 Abdul's gratitude to, 414 ; her 
 influence in Afghanistan pi'e- 
 judicial to British interests, 
 448 ; her Afghan boundary 
 marked out, 459 
 
 Saif-ud-din Khan (Afghan 
 general), proposes to Y'akub to 
 save Cavagnari, 357, 358 
 
 St. John, Major, 53 ; member of 
 Sir N. Chamberlain's mission, 
 263 ; believes the Wah Sher Ali 
 Ivlian competent to govern 
 Kandahar, 382, 383; (Colonel, 
 and Eesident at Kandahar), 
 amiounces to the Wall his ap- 
 pointment as ruler of Kandahar, 
 401, 402 ; suggests Abdul Khan 
 as Amir of Kabul, 412 
 
 Salar Jung, Sii', 129 
 
INDEX 
 
 549 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, Secretary for 
 India, 4, 16 ; urges Lord Nortli- 
 brook to establish a British 
 agency at Herat, 20, 22, 23 ; his 
 instructions to Lord Lytton on 
 Afghanistan, 31-33, 88-93 ; 
 receives letter from Lord 
 Lytton, on the native aristo- 
 cracy of India, 109 ; authorises 
 Lord Lytton to guard the 
 North-West frontier without 
 x\fghan aid, 18G ; becomes Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs, 240 ; 
 congratulates Lord Lytton on 
 the success of his Indian policy, 
 330 ; pohcy with regard to the 
 seditious vernacular press, 504 
 
 Salt duties, 463, et sqq. 
 
 Sandeman, Major, his policy in 
 Khelat, 95 ; in the ]\Iurree hills, 
 96 ; second mission to Khelat, 
 97, 98 ; appointed British repre- 
 sentative at Khelat, 103 ; letter 
 of congratulation from Lord 
 Lytton, 103 ; his dealings with 
 the frontier tribes, 287 ; recom- 
 mends the abandonment of 
 Kandahar, 330 ; services ac- 
 knowledged by Government, 332 
 
 Scott -Moncreiff, Major (now Sir 
 Colin), K.E., appointed Chief 
 Engineer in famine relief in 
 Madras, 221, 222, 224 
 
 Seditious native press in India, 
 502, et sqq. 
 
 Seistan, 381, 388 
 
 Serapis, the, description of, 43 
 
 Shahgassi Mahomed Yusuf Khan 
 (brother of Kushdil Khan), 342 
 
 Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, 
 Bussian intrigues with, 9-12 ; 
 failure of his efibrts to obtain 
 assurance of British support 
 against Eussia, 13, 14, 15 ; 
 welcomes Eussian Envoys, 16 ; 
 pressure put upon him to 
 receive an English embassy, 
 22 ; dealings with Eussian 
 agents, 37, 39 ; Sir E. Pollock's 
 first letter to, 53 ; holds a Dur- 
 bar, 55 ; his reply to the letter, 
 56, 57 note ; reasons for refusing 
 an English mission, 58-60 ; 
 second letter to him from Sir E. 
 Pollock, 61 ; consults the MuUa 
 
 of Ghuzni, 76 ; proposes that 
 the native British agent at 
 Kabul should go to India as 
 the exponent of his views, 80 
 his mind revealed to Lord 
 Lytton by that agent, 81-83 
 in negotiation with the British 
 131, 134 ; his grievances, 135 
 136 ; Lord Lytton's allegations 
 against him, 140, 155, 156 ; his 
 obligations under the treaty of 
 1857, 142; marked hostility to 
 the British during the Pesha^vl^r 
 Conference, 155 ; objects to a 
 Bi'itish garrison at Quettah, 157 ; 
 receives a mission from the 
 Sultan of Turkey in 1877, 162 ; 
 open to Eussian overtures, 164 ; 
 covets Kafristan, 185 ; his cha- 
 racter as conceived by Lord 
 Lytton, 244, 245 ; reception of 
 a Eussian Mission at Kabul, 
 248, 262; death of his son 
 Abdullah Jan, 264; notified that 
 a British Mission under Sir 
 Neville Chamberlain will wait 
 upon him, 265 ; counselled by 
 his ministers to receive it, 
 267, 268 ; his obstructive tactics 
 to the reception of the mission, 
 271 ; his dislike of the English 
 revealed, 284 ; reply to Lord 
 Lytton and view of the British 
 Government, 290 ; receives an 
 ultimatum firom the British, 
 292 ; his hostile proclamations 
 to Mussulmans in our service, 
 297 ; crushing defeat of his 
 forces, 302 ; his reply to the 
 Viceroy's ultimatum, 303 ; 
 flight into Eussian territory, 
 305 ; releases his son Yakub, 
 305 ; his firman to his subjects, 
 307 ; death, 310 ; magnitude of 
 his military preparations at 
 Kabul, 371 
 
 Sherpur cantonment, its construc- 
 tion, 371 ; retreat of General 
 Eoberts to, 390; Afghan at- 
 tempt to capture, 392; stores 
 at, 395 
 
 Shouvalow, Coimt, Eussian 
 ambassador in London, 33 ; 
 his negotiations with Lord 
 Lytton, 33-39 
 
550 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION 
 
 Shutargardan, the, 385, 409 
 
 Sindh, 167 
 
 Sindh Frontier Force, 169, 170 
 
 Sindiah, Maharaja, at the Delhi 
 Assemblage, 120 ; his blessing 
 on the Queen-Empress, 128 
 
 ' Som Prakash ' (Bengali journal), 
 503 ; prosecuted for seditious 
 articles, 521 
 
 Star of India, order of the, 112 
 
 Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, 
 his exposition of the Indian 
 administrative system, 27 ; 
 friendship with Lord Lytton, 
 27, 28 ; Lord Lytton's letters to 
 him on events in Kabul after 
 flight of Yakub, 361-366; and 
 on resigning Viceroyship, 421 
 
 Stewart, General, occupies Kan- 
 dahar, 302 ; advocates its 
 abandonment, 330 ; re-occupies 
 Kandahar after the Kabul mas- 
 sacre, 358 ; threatens Ghuzni, 
 362 ; believes the Wall Sher Ali 
 Khan competent to govern 
 Kandahar, 382, 383 ; parts for 
 Kabul, 401, 409, 413; his 
 victories at Charasiab, 414 ; at 
 Kabul in supreme command, 
 414 ; Lord Lytton's letter to 
 him on the true policy in deal- 
 ing with Abdul Eahman, 418 ; 
 followed by his last Minute on 
 same subject, 428, 429-434; 
 presides at a diu-bar, recognising 
 Abdvil Rahman as Amir, 438 ; 
 withdraws from Kabul, 442 
 
 Stoletoff, General, on a mission 
 to Sher Ah, 247, 261, 305, 306, 
 307, 308, 324 
 
 Strachey, General Richard, on 
 Indian finance, 486 
 
 Strachey, Sir John, Lieutenant- 
 Governor of the North-west 
 Provinces, 48, 49, 117 ; iUness, 
 207 ; his scheme for providing 
 future famine expenses, 227 ; 
 issues a work on India, 227 ; 
 his opinion of Lord Lytton's 
 famine legislation, 228 ; be- 
 comes Financial Member of 
 Coimcil, 462, 463 ; on the salt 
 duties, 463-470, 475; on the 
 cotton duties, 477, 478, 482, 
 483, 484 ; on provmcial contracts, 
 
 485, 487 ; on ' extraordinary 
 public works,' 489, 491 ; and on 
 famine insurance, 493, 494, 
 495 ; his share in the error in 
 the Indian war estimates, 498- 
 501 
 
 Stuart Bayley, Mr., Lord Lytton's 
 impression of, 208 
 
 Suez Canal, British purchase of 
 shares in, 41 
 
 Swat Canal outrage, the, 183 
 
 Sj'ud Noor Mahomed Shah (Sher 
 All's minister), on Afghan 
 policy, 56, 81, 85, 134, 135; 
 death of, 154 
 
 Tanjore, Princess of, at the Delhi 
 Assemblage, 125 
 
 Tashkend, 10, 12 ; Abdul Rahman 
 at, 410 
 
 Temple, Sir Richard, controlling 
 expenditure on the famine in 
 Mach-as, 126, 193, 194, 195, 198 ; 
 engaged in railway construc- 
 tion, 387 
 
 Thiers, M., on the English pur- 
 chase of Suez Canal shares, 41 
 
 Thompson, Mr. Rivers, president 
 of committee investigating the 
 massacre of the Cavagnari Mis- 
 sion, 397 
 
 Thornton, Mr. (officiating Foreign 
 Secretary), 116, 121 
 
 Tilulv (Indian editor), Government 
 prosecution of, 502 
 
 Turgot, M., his administration in 
 the scarcity in France in 1770, 
 235 
 
 Turkej'. Sultan of, his mission to 
 Afghanistan in 1877, 162 
 
 Turkomans, submission of, to 
 Russia, 16 
 
 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 71 
 
 ViLLiERS, Colonel G., 208 
 
 ' Waiting Policy,' definition of a, 
 
 by Lord Lytton, 65-70 
 Wakhar, Mii^ of, 135 
 Wales, Prince of, his visit to India, 
 
 43, 44, 106, 107 
 Wall Mahomed Khan (Sher Ali's 
 
 brother), counsels Sher Ali to 
 
INDEX 
 
 551 
 
 receive a British Mission, 267 ; 
 suggested English nominee, 
 313 ; reconciled with Yakub, 
 835; imfriendly to him, 347; 
 secret memorandum on the 
 Cavagnari Mission massacre, 
 356 ; in the British camp, 361, 
 362 ; administers Kabul pro- 
 vince, 393 
 
 Wall Sher Ali Khan, governor of 
 Kandahar, 382, 383, 389 ; made 
 hereditary ruler of the province, 
 400, 401 ; his domestic difficul- 
 ties after his appointment, 402 ; 
 resigns and goes to Karachi, 443 
 
 War estimates, error in the, 498, 
 501 
 
 Wazir Shah Mahommed, arrested 
 at Kabul, 367 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, cited, 395 
 
 Western Afghanistan, policy of 
 an independent, 382, 383 
 
 White, Major (92nd Highlanders), 
 in action at Charasiab, 363 
 
 Wingate, Mr. A. (Bombay Civil 
 Service), 222, 224 
 
 Wodehouse, Sir Philip, dealing 
 vs^ith the famine in Bombay, 
 125, 190, 191 
 
 Wullee Mahomed (the Khan of 
 Khelat's minister), 96 
 
 Yahiya Khan, Sirdar, 347, 350, 
 355, 360; arrested by General 
 Eoberts at Kabul, 367 
 
 Yakub Beg, 35, 37 
 
 Y'"akub Khan (son of Sher .\li), 87, 
 135 ; becomes Amir of Kabul, 
 312 ; his letter to Cavagnari j 
 announcing his father's death, 
 313 ; terms of peace offered to 
 him by Lord Lytton, 314 ; 
 agrees to an English Mission 
 at Kabul, 315 ; invites the 
 Cavagnari Mission, but ob- 
 jects to territorial cessions, 
 316 ; terms of treaty offered to 
 him by the British, 317-319 ; in 
 the English camp at Gunda- 
 
 muk, 321 ; his opinion of 
 Persia, 323 ; signs the Treaty of 
 Gmidamuk, 324 ; his obliga- 
 tions under that Treaty, 327, 
 328 ; returns to Kabul, 333 ; 
 appoints Daod Shah com- 
 mander-in-chief, 334 ; recon- 
 ciled vt'ith Wali Mahomed, 
 335 ; suspected of poisoning 
 Bukhtiar Khan, 339, 340; re- 
 ception of Major Cavagnari 
 at Kabul, 342-344 ; places re- 
 strictions on Cavagnari's inter- 
 course with Afghan notables, 
 346, 347 ; wishes to visit 
 India, 351 ; his unpopularity, 
 351 ; offered pecuniary assis- 
 tance by the Viceroys 354 ; his 
 account of the massacre of 
 Cavagnari's Mission, 355 ; an- 
 other account of the same by 
 him, 356 ; Wali Mahomed's 
 secret memorandum on the 
 massacre, 356 ; refuses to pay 
 the Herati regiments, 357 ; 
 seeks refuge in the British 
 camp, 360, 361 ; reasons for 
 delaying the British advance 
 on Kabul, 864 ; determines to 
 relinquish the Amirship, 866 ; 
 conduct on the arrest of Afghan 
 notables by General Roberts, 
 367 ; his resignation accepted, 
 369 ; his statements regarding 
 Sher Ali, 369 ; conclusions of 
 the Committee of Inquiry on 
 his complicity in the Kabul 
 massacre, 375, 376 ; removed 
 to Meerut, 388 ; his abdication 
 declared irrevocable, 896, 397 ; 
 reasons against his restoration, 
 398, 399, 400 
 
 Yassin, Sirdar of, at the Delhi 
 Assemblage, 124, 185, 187 
 
 Yule, Colonel, dissents from the 
 necessity for suppression of 
 vernacular press, 518 
 
 Zakaeia Khan, arrested at Kabul, 
 867 
 
 Spottisicoode oC- Co. Printers, New-street Square, London. 
 
tPa 
 
E Classifieb (Tatalooue 
 
 OF WORKS IN 
 
 GENERAL LITERATURE 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.G. 
 
 91 AND 93 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, and 32 HORNBY ROAD, BOMBAY. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BADMINTON LIBRARY (THE). - 
 
 BIOGRAPHY, PERSONAL ME- 
 MOIRS, &c. 
 
 CHILDREN'S BOOKS 
 
 CLASSICAL LITERATURE, TRANS- 
 LATIONS, ETC. . - . . 
 
 COOKERY, DOMESTIC MANAGE- 
 MENT, &c. 
 
 EVOLUTION, ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 &c. ------ - 
 
 FICTION, HUMOUR, &c. - - - 21 
 
 FUR, FEATHER AND FIN SERIES 12 
 
 HISTORY, POLITICS, POLITY, 
 POLITICAL MEMOIRS, &c. - - 3 
 
 LANGUAGE, HISTORY AND 
 SCIENCE OF 16 
 
 MANUALS OF CATHOLIC PHIL- 
 OSOPHY 16 
 
 28 
 
 17 
 
 MENTAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL 
 
 PHILOSOPHY 14 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS AND CRITICAL 
 
 WORKS 29 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS THEOLOGICAL 
 
 WORKS 32 
 
 POETRY AND THE DRAMA - - 19 
 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECO- 
 NOMICS 16 
 
 POPULAR SCIENCE - - - - 24 
 
 SILVER LIBRARY (THE) - - 27 
 
 SPORT AND PASTIME - . . 10 
 
 STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND 
 
 POLITICAL SCIENCE - - . 17 
 
 TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE, THE 
 
 COLONIES, &c. . - . - 8 
 
 VETERINARY MEDICINE, &c. - 10 
 
 WORKS OF REFERENCE- - - 25 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS AND EDITORS. 
 
 Page 
 Abbott (Evelyn) - 3, 18 
 (T. K.) - - 14 
 
 (E. A.) - - :4 
 
 Acland (A. H. D.) - 3 
 
 Acton (Eliza) - - 28 
 
 Adeane (J. H.) - - 7 
 
 /Eschylus - - 18 
 
 Ainger (A. C.) - - n 
 
 Albemarle (Earl of) - 10 
 
 Allen (Grant) - - 24 
 
 Amos (S.) - - 3 
 
 Andre ;R.) - - 12 
 
 Anste\' (F.) - - 21 
 
 Aristophanes - - 18 
 
 Aristotle - - - 14, 18 
 Armstrong (G. F. 
 
 Savage) - - 19 
 
 (E. |. Savage) 7, 19, 29 
 
 Arnold (Sir Edwin) - 8, 19 
 
 (Dr. T.) - - 3 
 
 Ashbourne (Lord) - 3 
 
 Ashby(H.) - - 28 
 
 A^hlev (W. J.)- - 16 
 
 Aj're (Rev. J.) - - 25 
 
 Kacon - - - 7i '4 
 
 Baden-Powell (B. H.) 3 
 
 Bagehot (W.) - 7, 16, 29 
 
 Bagwell (R.) - - 3 
 
 Bain (Alexander) - 14 
 
 Baker (Sir S. W.) - 8, 10 
 
 Balfour (A. J.) - 11,32 
 
 Balfour (Lady Betty) 5 
 
 Ball (John) - - 8 
 
 Baring-Gould (Rev. 
 
 S.) . - - 27, 29 
 
 Barraud (C. W.) - 19 
 Baynes (T. S.) - - 29 
 Beaconsfield (Earl of) 21 
 Beaufort (Duke of) - 10, 11 
 Becker (W. A.) - 18 
 
 Beddard (F. E.) - 24 
 Beeslv(A. H.) - - 7 
 
 Bell (Mrs. Hugh) - 19 
 Bent (J. Theodore) - 8 
 
 Besant (Sir Walter)- 3 
 
 Bickerdyke (J.) - 11 
 
 Bicknell (A. C.) - 8 
 
 Birt (A.) - - - 21 
 Blackburne (J. H.) - 12 
 Bland (Mrs. Hubert) 20 
 
 Boase (Rev. C. W.) - 4 
 
 Boedder (Rev. B.) - 16 
 Boevey (A. W. Crawley-) 7 
 Bosanquet (B.) - 14 
 
 Boyd (Rev. A. K. H.) 29, 32 
 Brassev (Lady) - g 
 
 (Lord) 3, 8, II, 16 
 
 Rrav (C.) - - 14 
 
 Bright (Rev. J. F.) - 3 
 
 Broadfoot (Major W.) 10 
 Browning (H. Ellen) 9 1 
 
 Buck(H. A.) - - II 
 Buckland (Jas.) - 26 
 
 Buckle (H. T.) - 
 Buckton (C. M.) 
 Bull (T.) - 
 Burke (U. R.) - 
 Burrows (Montagu) 
 Butler (E. A.) - 
 
 (Samuel) 
 
 iH, 20, 29 
 
 Calder (J.) 
 
 Cameron of Lochiel 
 
 Campbell (Rev. Lewis) 
 
 Camperdown (Earl of) 
 
 Cannan (E.) 
 
 Channing (F. A.) 
 
 Chesney (Sir G.) 
 
 ' Chola ' - - - 21 
 
 Cholmondeley-Pennell 
 
 (H.) - - . II 
 Churchill (VV. Spencer) 3,9 
 Cicero - - - 18 
 Clarke (Rev. R. F.) - 16 
 Climenson (EmilyJ.) 8 
 
 Clodd (Edward) - 17 
 Chuterbuck (W. J.)- 9 
 
 Coleridge (S. T.) - 19 
 Comparetti (D.) - 30 
 Conington (John) - 18 
 Conway (Sir W. M.) 11 
 Conybeare (Rev. W. J.) 
 
 & Howson (Dean) 
 Coolidse (W. A. B.) 
 Corbett (Julian S.) - 3 
 
 27 
 
 Corder (Annie) - ig 
 
 Coutts (W.) - - 18 
 
 Coventry (A.) - - 11 
 
 Cox (Harding) - 10 
 
 Crake (Rev. A. D.) - 26 
 
 Creiehton (Bishop) - 3,4 
 Crozier (J. B.) - - 7, 14 
 Curzon of Kedleston 
 
 (Lord) - - - 4 
 
 distance (Col. H. - 12 
 
 Cutts (Rev. E. L.) - 4 
 
 Dallinger (F. W.) - 4 
 Davidson (W. L.) 14, 16, 32 
 
 Davies (J. F.j - - 18 
 
 Dent (C. T.) - - 11 
 
 Deploige (S.) - - 17 
 De Salis (Mrs.) - 28, 29 
 
 De Tocqueville (A.) - 4 
 
 Devas (C. S.) - - 16 
 
 Dickinson (G. L.) - 4 
 
 Diderot - - - 21 
 
 Dougall (L.) - - 21 
 
 Dowden (E.) - - 31 
 
 Dovle (A. Conan) - 21 
 Du'Bois (W. E. B.)- 4 
 
 Dufferin (Marquis of) 11 
 
 Dunbar (Mary F.) - 20 
 
 Eardley-Wilmot (Capt. 
 
 S.) - - - 8 
 
 Ebrington (Viscount) 12 
 
H (Tlassifieb Catalogue 
 
 OF WORKS IN 
 
 GENERAL LITERATURE 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.G. 
 
 91 AND 93 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, and 32 HORNBY ROAD, BOMBAY. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BADMINTON LIBRARY (THE)- - 
 
 BIOGRAPHY, PERSONAL ME- 
 MOIRS, &c. - - - - - 
 
 CHILDREN'S BOOKS 
 
 CLASSICAL LITERATURE, TRANS- 
 LATIONS, ETC. - . . - 
 
 COOKERY, DOMESTIC MANAGE- 
 MENT, &c. 
 
 EVOLUTION, ANTHROPOLOGY. 
 &c. ------- 17 
 
 FICTION, HUMOUR, &c. - - - 21 
 
 FUR, FEATHER AND FIN SERIES 12 
 
 HISTORY, POLITICS, POLITY, 
 POLITICAL MEMOIRS, &c. - - 3 
 
 LANGUAGE, HISTORY AND 
 SCIENCE OF 16 
 
 MANUALS OF CATHOLIC PHIL- 
 OSOPHY 16 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 MENTAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL 
 PHILOSOPHY 14 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS AND CRITICAL 
 WORKS 29 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS THEOLOGICAL 
 WORKS 32 
 
 POETRY AND THE DRAMA - - 19 
 
 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECO- 
 NOMICS 16 
 
 POPULAR SCIENCE - - - . 
 
 SILVER LIBRARY (THE) 
 
 SPORT AND PASTIME - 
 
 STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND 
 POLITICAL SCIENCE - 
 
 TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE, THE 
 COLONIES, &c. . - . - 8 
 
 VETERINARY MEDICINE, &c. - 10 
 
 WORKS OF REFERENCE- - - 25 
 
 24 
 27 
 
 17 
 
 INDEX OF AUTHORS AND EDITORS. 
 
 Abbott (Evelyn) 
 
 (T. K.) - 
 
 (E. A.) - 
 
 Acland (A. H. D.) 
 Acton (Eliza) - 
 Adeane (J. H.) - 
 /Eschylus 
 Ainger (A. C.) - 
 Albemarle (Earl of) 
 Allen (Grant) - 
 Amos (S.) 
 Andre ;R.) 
 Anstey (F.) 
 Aristophanes - 
 Arisioile - 
 Armstrong (G. 
 Savage) 
 
 (E. I. Savage) 7 
 
 Arnold (Sir Edwin) - 
 
 (Dr. T.I - 
 
 Ashbourne (Lord) - 
 Ashby(H.) 
 A!-hlev (W. J.)- 
 Avre (Rev. J.) - 
 
 Page 
 
 3,18 
 14 
 14 
 
 3 
 28 
 
 7 
 18 
 
 F. 
 
 19 
 
 19,29 
 
 8,19 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 28 
 
 16 
 
 25 
 
 r.acon - - - 7, 14 
 Baden-Powell (B. H.) 3 
 
 Bagehot (W.) 
 Bagwell (R.) - 
 Bain (Alexander) 
 Baker (Sir S. W.) 
 Balfour (A.J.) 
 
 7, 16, 29 
 
 3 
 14 
 
 - 8, 10 
 
 - 11,32 
 
 Page 
 Balfour (Lady Betty) 5 
 
 Ball (John) - - 8 
 
 Baring-Gould (Rev. 
 
 S.) . - . 27, 29 
 
 Barraud (C. W.) - 19 
 Baynes (T. S.) - - 29 
 Beaconsfield (Earl of) 21 
 Beaufort (Duke of) - 10,11 
 Becker (W. A.) - 18 
 
 Beddard (F. E.) - 24 
 Beeslv (A. H.) - - 7 
 
 Bell (Mrs. Hugh) - 19 
 Bent (J. Theodore) - 8 
 
 Besant (Sir Walter)- 3 
 
 Bickerdyke (J.) - 11 
 
 Bicknell (A. C.) - 8 
 
 Birt (A.) - - - 21 
 Blackburne Ij. H.) - 12 
 Bland (Mrs. Hubert) 20 
 
 Boase (Rev. C. W.)- 4 
 
 Boedder (Rev. B.) - 16 
 Boevey(A. W. Crawley-) 7 
 Bosanquet (B.) - 14 
 
 Boyd (Rev. A. K. H.) 29, 32 
 Brassev (Ladv) - 9 
 
 (Lord) ■ 3, 8, II, 16 
 
 Rrav (C.) - - 14 
 
 Bright (Rev. J. F.) - 3 
 
 Broadfoot (Major W.) 10 
 Browning (H. Ellen) 9 
 
 Buck (H. A.) - - II 
 Buckland (Jas.) - 26 
 
 Page 
 
 3 
 28 
 28 
 3 
 4 
 24 
 
 Buckle (H. T.) - 
 
 Buckton (C. M.) 
 
 Bull (T.) - 
 
 Burke (U. R.) - 
 
 Burrows (Montagu) 
 
 Butler (E. A.) - ■ 
 
 (Samuel) - 18, 20, 29 
 
 Calder (J.) - - 30 
 
 Cameron of Lochiel 12 
 
 Campbell (Rev. Lewis) 32 
 
 Camperdown (Earl of) 7 
 
 j Cannan (E.) - - 17 
 
 I Channing (F". A.) - 16 
 
 Chesney (Sir G.) - 3 
 
 ' Chola ' - - - 21 
 Cholmondeley-Pennell 
 
 (H.) - - . II 
 
 Churchill (VV. Spencer) 3,9 
 
 Cicero - - - 18 
 
 Clarke (Rev. R. F.) - 16 
 
 i Climenson (Emilv J.) 8 
 
 ! Clodd (Edward) ' - 17 
 
 Clinterbuck (W. J.)- 9 
 
 Coleridge (S. T.) - ig 
 
 Comparetti (D.) - 30 
 
 Conington (John) - 18 
 
 Conway (Sir W. M.) 11 
 Conybeare (Rev.W. J.) 
 
 & Howson (Dean) 27 
 
 Coolidcre (W. A. B.) 8 
 
 Corbett (Julian S.) - 3 
 
 Page 
 19 
 
 26 
 
 3.4 
 
 7, 14 
 
 Corder (Annie) 
 Coutts (W.) - 
 Coventry (A.) - 
 Cox (Harding) 
 Crake (Rev. A. D.) - 
 Creiehton (Bishop) - 
 Crozier (J. B.) - 
 Curzon of Kedleston 
 
 (Lord) - 
 distance (Col. H. - 
 Cutts (Rev. E. L.) - 
 
 Dallinger (F. W.) - 4 
 Davidson (W. L.) 14, 16, 32 
 
 Davies (J. F.j - - 18 
 
 Dent (C. T.) - - 11 
 
 Deploige (S.) - - 17 
 De Salis (Mrs.) - 28, 29 
 
 De Tocqueville (A.) - 4 
 
 Devas (C. S.) - - 16 
 
 Dickinson (G. L.) - 4 
 
 Diderot - - - 21 
 
 Dougall (L.) - - 21 
 
 Dowden (E.) - - 31 
 
 Dovle (A. Conan) - 21 
 
 Du Bois ^W. E. B.)- 4 
 
 Dufferin (Marquis of) 11 
 
 Dunbar (Mary F.) - 20 
 
 Eardley-Wiimot (Capt. 
 
 S.) - - - 8 
 
 Ebrington (Viscount) 12 
 
INDEX 
 
 OF 
 
 Ellis (J. H.) - 
 
 (R. L.) - 
 
 Evans (Sir John) 
 
 Page 
 
 12 
 30 
 
 AUTHORS AND 
 
 Farrar (Dean) - - 16, 21 
 
 Fitzwygram (Sir F.) 10 
 
 Folkard (H. C.) - 12 
 
 Ford(H.) - - - 12 
 
 Fowler (Edith H.) - 21 
 
 Foxcroft (H. C.) - 7 
 
 Francis (Francis) - 12 
 
 Francis (M. E.) - 21 
 
 Freeman (Edward A.) 4 
 
 Freshfield (D. W.) - 11 
 
 Frothingham (A. L.) 30 
 Froude (James A.) 4, 7, 9, 21 
 
 Furneaux (W.) - 24 
 
 Gallon (W. F.) - 17 
 
 Gardiner (Samuel R.) 4 
 Gathorne-Hardy (Hon. 
 
 A. E.) - - 12 
 
 Gibbons (I. S.) - 12 
 
 Gibson (Hon. H.) - 13 
 
 (C. H.) - - 14 
 
 (Hon. W.) - 32 
 
 Gleig (Rev. G. R.) - 8 
 
 Goethe - - - 19 
 
 Gore-Booth (Eva) - 19 
 
 (Sir H. W.) - II 
 
 Graham (P. A.) - 12, 13 
 
 (G. F.) - - 16 
 
 Granby (Marquis of) 12 
 
 Grant (Sir A.) - - 14 
 
 Graves (R. F.) - - 7 
 
 Green (T. Hill) - 14 
 
 Greene (E. B.) - - 4 
 
 Greville (C. C. F.) - 4 
 
 Grose (T. H.) - - 14 
 
 Gross (C.) - - 4 
 
 Grove (F. C.) - - 11 
 
 (Mrs. Lilly) - 10 
 
 Gurdon (Lady Camilla) 21 
 
 Gwilt (J.) - - - 25 
 
 Haggard (H. Rider) - 21, 
 Hake (O.) - 
 
 HalHvvell-Phillipps(J.) 
 Hamlin (A. D. F.) - 
 Hammond (Mrs. J. H.) 
 Harding (S. B.) 
 Harte (Bret) - 
 Harting(J. E.)- 
 Hartwig (G.) - 
 Hassall (A.) 
 
 Haweis (H. R.) - 7, 
 
 Heath (D. D.) - 
 Heathcote (J. M.and 
 
 C. G.) 
 Helmholtz (Hermann 
 
 von) - 
 Henderson (Lieut- 
 Col. G. F.) 
 Henry (W.) 
 Henty (G. A.) - 
 
 Herbert (Col. Kenney) 12 
 
 Hiley (R. W.) - - 7 
 
 Hill (Sylvia M.) - 21 
 
 Hillier (G. Lacy) - 10 
 Hodgson {Shadworth)i4, 30 
 
 Hoenig (F.) - - 30 
 
 Hogan (J. F.) - - 7 
 
 Homer - - - 18 
 
 Hope (Anthony) - 22 
 
 Horace - - - 18 
 
 Houston (D. F.) - 4 
 
 Howell (G.) - - 16 
 
 Howitt (W.) - - 9 
 
 Hudson (W. H.) - 24 
 
 Hullah(|.) - - 30 
 
 Hume (David) - - 14 
 
 Hunt (Rev. W.) - 4 
 
 Hunter (Sir W.) - 5 
 Hutchinson (Horace G.) 
 
 II, 13 
 
 Ingelow (Jean) - 19 
 
 James (W.) - - 14 
 
 30 
 
 24 
 
 26 
 
 Jefferies (Richard) • 
 J ekyll (Gertrude) ■ 
 Jerome (Jerome K.) ■ 
 Johnson (J. & J. H.) 
 
 iones (H. Hence) 
 ordan (W. L.) 
 owett (Dr. B.) 
 oyce (P. W.) - 
 Justinian : 
 
 Kant (I.) - 
 Kaye (Sir J. W.) 
 Kent IC. B. R.) 
 Kerr (Rev. J.) - 
 Killick (Rev. A. H.) - 
 Kingsley (Rose G.) - 
 Kitchin (Dr. G. W.) 
 Knight (E. F.)- 
 Kbstlin (J.) 
 
 Page 
 30 
 30 
 22 
 30 
 25 
 16 
 17 
 5. 22, 30 
 14 
 
 Nansen (F.) 
 Nesbit (E.) 
 Nettleship (R. L.) - 
 Newman (Cardinal) - 
 
 Ogle(W.)- 
 Onslow (Earl of) 
 Osbourne (L) - 
 
 Ladd (G. T.) - 
 Lang (Andrew) 5, 10, 
 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 
 Lascelles (Hon. G.) 
 
 10, 
 Laughton (J. K.) 
 Lawley (Hon. F.) - 
 Lawrence (F. W.) - 
 Layard (Nina F.) 
 Lear (H. L. Sidney) - 
 Lecky (VV. E. H.) 5, 
 Lees (J. A.) 
 Leslie (T. E. Cliffe) - 
 Levett-Veats (S.) 
 Lillie(A.)- 
 Lindley(J.) 
 Lodge (H. C.) - 
 Loftie (Rev. W.J.) - 
 Longman (C. J.) 10, 
 
 (F. W.) - 
 
 (G. H.) - - 
 
 Lowell (A. L.) - 
 Lubbock (Sir John) - 
 Lucan 
 
 Lutoslawski (W.) 
 Lyall (Edna) - 
 Lyttelton (Hon. R. H 
 
 (Hon. A.) - 
 
 Lytton (Earl of) 
 
 15 
 
 Hi 13. 
 30. 32 
 
 II 
 17 
 19 
 29 
 
 i5> 19 
 
 9 
 
 16 
 
 22 
 
 13 
 
 25 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 12, 30 
 
 13 
 
 II, 12 
 
 5 
 
 ,) 10 
 
 II 
 
 5, '9 
 
 Macaulay (Lord) 5, 6, 19 
 Macdonald (G.) - 9 
 
 (Dr. G.) - - 20, 32 
 
 Macfarren(Sir G. A.) 30 
 MackaiKJ. W.) - 8, 18 
 Macleod (H. D.) - 16 
 Macpherson (Rev. H. A.)i2 
 Madden (D. H.) - 13 
 Maher (Rev. M.) - 16 
 Malleson(Col. G.B.) 5 
 
 Mann (E. E.) - - 29 
 Marbot (Baron de) - 7 
 
 Marquand (A.) ■ - 30 
 Marshman (J. C.) - 7 
 
 Martineau (Dr. James) 32 
 Maskelyne (J. N.) - 13 
 Maunder (S.) - - 25 
 Max Muller (F.) 
 
 7, 8,15, 16, 22, 31, 32 
 May (Sir T. Erskinel 6 
 
 Meade (L. T.) - - 26 
 Melville (G. J. Whyte) 22 
 Merivale (Dean) - 6 
 
 Merrimm 'H. S.) - 22 
 Mill (James) - - 15 
 
 (John Stuart) - 15, 16 
 
 Milner (G.) - - 31 
 Moffat (D.) - - 13 
 Monck(W. H. S.) - 15 
 Montague (F. C.) - 6 
 
 Montagu (Hon. John 
 
 Scott) - - 12 
 Moon (G. W.) - - 20 
 Moore (T.) - - 25 
 
 (Rev. Edward) - 14 
 
 Morgan (C. Lloyd) - 17 
 Morris (W.) 18, 20, 22, 31 
 
 (Mowbraj') - 11 
 
 Mulhall (M. G.) - 17 
 
 Palgrave (Gwenllian F 
 Park(W.) 
 Pavne-Gallwey (Sir 
 
 ' R.) - - -II, 13 
 
 Peek (Hedley) - - 11 
 
 Pembroke (Earl of) - 11 
 Phillipps-Wollev(C.) 10,22 
 
 Phillips (Mrs. Lionel) 6 
 
 Pitman (C. M.) - 11 
 Pleydell-Bouverie (E. O.) 11 
 
 Pole (W.) - - - 13 
 Pollock (W. H.) - 11,31 
 
 Poole (W.H. and Mrs.) 29 
 
 Poore (G. V.) - - 31 
 
 Potter (J.) - - 16 
 
 Powell (E.) - - 6 
 
 Powys (Mrs. P. L.) - 8 
 Praeger (S. Rosamond) 26 
 
 Prevost (C.) - - 11 
 
 Pritchett (R. T.) - 11 
 Proctor (R. A.) 13, 24, 28 
 
 Raine (Rev. James) - 4 
 
 Rankin (R.) - - 20 
 
 Ransome (Cvril) - 3, 6 
 
 Raymond (W.) - 22 
 
 Reader (Emily E.) - 22 
 
 Rhoades(J.) - - 18 
 
 Ribblesdale (Lord) - 13 
 
 Rich (A.) - - - 18 
 
 Richardson (C.) - 10 
 
 Richmond (Ennis) - 31 
 
 Richter (J. Paul) - 31 
 
 Rickaby (Rev. John) 16 
 
 (Rev. Joseph) - 16 
 
 Ridley (Sir E.)- - 18 
 
 Riley (J. W.) - - 20 
 Roget (Peter .\1.) - 16, 25 
 Romanes (G. J.) 
 
 8, 15, 17, 20, 32 
 
 (Mrs. G.J.) - 8 
 
 Ronalds (A.) - - 13 
 
 Roosevelt (T.) - - 4 
 Rossetti (Maria Fran- 
 
 cesca) - - - 31 
 
 Rowc (R. P. P.) - II 
 
 Russell (Bertrand) - 17 
 
 (Alys) - - 17 
 
 (Rev. M.) - - 20 
 
 Saintsbury (G.) - 12 
 
 Samuels (E.) - - 20 
 
 Sandars (T. C.) - 14 
 
 Sargent (A. J.)- - 17 
 Schrciner (S. C. Cron- 
 
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