B 
 
 1423 
 
 P91 
 
 HAMILTON 
 
 PREPARING FOR 
 PUBLICATIONS
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 PREPARING FOR PUBLICATION 
 
 BY 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON. 
 
 I. 
 
 ESSAY TOWARDS 
 A NEW ANALYTIC OF LOGICAL FORMS. 
 
 " Now, what has been the source of all these evils, I proceed to relate, and 
 shall clearly convince those who have an intellect and a ivill to attend, that a 
 trivial slip in the elementary precepts of a Logical Theory, becomes the cause 
 of mightiest errors in that Theory itsdf." GALEN. (De Temperamenlis, 
 I. i. c. 5.) 
 
 As my peculiar views on Logic have, for years, been academically 
 published, and, long adequately tested and matured, should before now 
 have been given to the world through the press ; whilst, at the same 
 time, circumstances may prevent, at least for a season, my intentions in 
 this respect from being carried into effect : I take the present opportu- 
 nity, (in order formally to establish my right of authorship,) of more 
 widely publishing the prominent results of my doctrine, especially of 
 Syllogistic ; results, the nature, novelty, and importance of which, those 
 competently versed in logic will be able to estimate, apart even from the 
 exposition which the proposed Essay will contain. 
 
 This New Analytic is intended to complete and simplify the old ; to 
 place the keystone in the Aristotelic arch. Of Abstract Logic, the theory, 
 in particular, of Syllogism, (bating some improvements, and some errors 
 of detail,) remains where it was left by the genius of the Stagirite ; if it 
 have not receded, still less has it advanced. It contains the truth ; but 
 the truth, partially, and not always correctly, developed, in complexity t 
 even in confusion. And why '! Because Aristotle, by an oversight, mar-
 
 vcllous certainly iu him, was prematurely arrested in his analysis; began 
 his synthesis before he had fully sifted the elements to be recomposed; and 
 thus, the system which, almost spontaneously, would have evolved itself 
 into unity and order, he laboriously, and yet imperfectly, constructed by 
 sheer intellectual force, under a load of limitations and corrections and 
 rules, which, deforming the symmetry, has seriously impeded the useful- 
 ness, of the science. This imperfection, as I said, it is the purpose of the 
 New Analytic to supply. 
 
 In the first place, in the Essay there will be shown, that the Syllogism 
 proceeds, not as has hitherto, virtually at least, been taught, in one, but 
 in the two correlative and counter wholes, (Metaphysical) of Comprehen- 
 sion, and (Logical) of Extension ; the major premise in the one whole, 
 being the minor premise in the other, &c. Thus is relieved, a radical 
 defect and vital inconsistency in the present logical system. 
 
 In the second place, the self-evident truth, That we can only ration- 
 ally deal with what we already understand, determines the simple logical 
 postulate, To state explicitly what is thought implicitly. From the con- 
 sistent application of this postulate, on which Logic ever insists, but 
 which Logicians have never fairly obeyed, it follows : that, logically, 
 we ought to take into account the quantity, always understood in thought, 
 but usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in its expression, not only 
 of the subject, but also of the predicate, of a judgment. This being done, 
 and the necessity of doing it, will be proved against Aristotle and his 
 repeaters, we obtain, inter alia, the ensuing results : 
 
 1- That the preindesignate terms of a proposition, whether subject or 
 predicate, are never, on that account, thought as indefinite (or indetermi- 
 nate) in quantity. The only indefinite, is particular, as opposed to definite, 
 quantity ; and this last, as it is either of an extensive maximum undi- 
 vided, or of an extensive minimum indivisible, constitutes quantity 
 universal (general,) and quantity singular (individual.) In fact, definite 
 and indefinite are the only quantities of which we ought to hear in Logic ; 
 for it is only as indefinite that particular, it is only as definite that 
 individual and general, quantities have any (and the same) logical avail. 
 
 2- The revocation of the two Terms of a Proposition to their true 
 relation ; a proposition being always an equation of its subject and its 
 predicate. 
 
 3- The consequent reduction of the Conversion of Propositions from 
 three species to one that of Simple Conversion. 
 
 4- The reduction of all the General Laws of Categorical Syllogisms to 
 a Single Canon. 
 
 5- The evolution from that one canon of all the Species and varieties 
 of Syllogism. 
 
 6- The abrogation of all the Special Laws of Syllogism. 
 
 7- A demonstration of the exclusive possibility of Three syllogistic 
 Figures ; and (on new grounds) the scientific and final abolition of the 
 Fourth.
 
 8* A manifestation that Figure is an unessential variation in syllogistic 
 form ; and the consequent absurdity of Reducing the syllogisms of the 
 other figures to the first. 
 
 9- An enouncetnent of one Organic Principle for each Figure. 
 
 10- A determination of the true number of the legitimate Moods ; 
 with 
 
 11- Their amplification in number ; 
 
 12 . Their numerical equality under all the figures ; and, 
 
 13- Their relative equivalence, or virtual identity, throughout every 
 schematic difference. 
 
 14- That, in the second and third figures, the extremes, holding both 
 the same relation to the middle term, there is not, as in the first, an 
 opposition and subordination between a term major and a term minor, 
 mutually containing and contained, in the counter wholes of Extension and 
 Comprehension. 
 
 15- Consequently, in the second and third figures, there is no determi- 
 nate major and minor premise, and there are two indifferent conclusions ; 
 whereas, in the first the premises are determinate, and there is a single 
 proximate conclusion. 
 
 16 That the third, as the figure in which Comprehension is predo- 
 minant, is more appropriate to Induction. 
 
 17- That the second, as the figure in which Extension is predominant, 
 is more appropriate to Deduction. 
 
 18- That the first, as the figure in which Comprehension and Exten- 
 sion are in equilibrium, is common to Induction and Deduction, indiffe- 
 rently. 
 
 In the third place, a scheme of Symbolical Notation will be given, 
 wholly different in principle and perfection from those which have been 
 previously proposed ; and showing out, in all their old and new applica- 
 tions, the prepositional and syllogistic forms, with even a mechanical 
 simplicity. 
 
 This Essay falls naturally into two parts. There will be contained 
 in the first, a systematic exposition of the new doctrine itself; in the 
 second, an historical notice of any occasional anticipations of its several 
 parts which break out in the writings of previous philosophers. 
 
 Thus, on the new theory, many valid forms of judgment and reason^ 
 ing, in ordinary use, but which the ancient logic continued to ignore, are 
 now openly recognised as legitimate ; and many relations, which hereto- 
 fore lay hid, now come forward into the light. On the one hand, there- 
 fore, Logic certainly becomes more complex. But on the other, this 
 increased complexity proves to be only a higher development. The 
 developed Syllogism is, in effect, recalled, from multitude and confusion, 
 to order and system. Its laws, ercwhile many, are now few, we might 
 say one alone, but thoroughgoing. The exceptions, formerly so per- 
 plexing, have fallen away ; and the once formidable array of limitary 
 ru les has vanished. The science now shines out in the true character of 
 
 1993232
 
 beauty, as One at once and Various. Logic thus accomplishes its final 
 destination; for as "Thrice- greatest Hermes," speaking in the mind of 
 Plato, has expressed it, " The end of Philosophy is the intuition of 
 Unity." 
 
 In conclusion : I am fully conscious of the boldness, of the apparent 
 arrogance of the pretension, To illustrate what was left obscure by the 
 brightest luminary ever rising on the horizon of philosophy, and to sup- 
 ply what has remained imperfect during more than two thousand years, 
 after the published labours of far more than two thousand Logicians. 
 Not that, for a moment, I would compare my Aveakness with Aristotle's 
 strength : his bow, I have never thought to bend. If any thing is here 
 accomplished over Aristotle, to Aristotle's method, precept, discipline, 
 and example to his spirit, if not to his letter, be it all ascribed. To 
 the Stagirite and I rejoice in the acknowledgment I owe more than to 
 all other philosophers together. But this obligation I would not dis- 
 charge by a blind sequacity. " Non imitando, imitamur." In a certain 
 sense, therefore, I may profess : 
 
 " Te sequor, o Grains gentis decus ! inque tuis nunc 
 
 Fixa pedum pono pressis vestigia signis ; 
 
 Non ita certandi cupitlns, qnam propter amorem 
 
 Quo te imitari aveo. Quid enim contendat hirondo 
 
 Cycnis ? aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus hsedei 
 
 Consimile in cursu possint, ac fortis equi vis ? 
 
 Tu Pater, et rerum Inventor ! Tu patria nobis 
 
 Subpeditas praecepta ; tuisque ex, inclute, chartis, 
 
 Floriferis ut apes in saltibus crania limant, 
 
 Omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta, 
 
 Aurea, perpetua semper dignissima vita." 
 
 Neither is the pretension rash or indeliberate. I have not specu- 
 lated without preparation ; nor hastened to lay the result before the 
 world. I have been diligent in collecting all works of a logical import ; 
 have read many, and examined most. In an academical experience, 
 too, as long at least as the Horatian term, and during which my sys- 
 tem has been gradually matured, I have proved that its principles are, 
 with their applications, easily, nay eagerly, apprehended by logical 
 learners ; and have, indeed, to thank the delicacy of my pupils, for not 
 precipitating a publication through the press of those doctrines, which so 
 many showed themselves well qualified to appreciate. Neither is the 
 pretension shielded from opprobrium if opprobrium be deserved. After 
 the indications now given, touching what is to be found, and the mode 
 of finding it, after these alone, it would not be difficult for any respect- 
 able proficient in logic to reproduce, w r ith competent exactness, that 
 system in detail, and to apply to it the test of criticism. But I confi- 
 dently challenge criticism to show, that, in comparison with the Old, the 
 New Analytic is not, both more correct in theory, and preferable in 
 practice. 
 The following must, however, take precedence of all else :
 
 II. 
 
 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS 
 A TRUE HISTORY OF LUTHER AND THE LUTHERANS. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 CONTAINING NOTICE OP 
 
 THE VENERABLE ARCHDEACON HARE AND HIS POLEMIC. 
 
 " Melanchthon is dear, Luther is dearer, but dearest is the Truth for which 
 they both contended." LUTHER. (De Servo Arbitrio, P. i. s. 6. ; Pro- 
 verb paraphrased.) 
 
 " Censor ! For shame ! Thy Note, it brands thyself." 
 
 LUTHER (quotes passim.) 
 
 IT was recently, and by accident, that I became aware of the attack 
 made on me by Mr Hare, through seventy-six dense pages of his " Mis- 
 sion of the Comforter," published, I believe, several months previously. 
 I am there charged with archidiabolic ingenuity, logic, and learning, but 
 eke with ignorance, false reasoning, and stupidity ; affronting an attack, 
 yet conscious that there were no means of defence ; and calumniating 
 Luther and Melanchthon, through statements false in fact, and false in 
 intention. Alas ! if these conflicting accusations be not, and be not 
 evinced to be, one and all, unfounded. For the only logic and learning 
 I do not scorn, is the ability wherewithal to seek, and I prize no inge- 
 nuity, apart from the disposition ingenuously to speak, the truth. But to 
 establish my veracity, to roll back, from myself at least, the imputation of 
 bad faith, is easy in fact, too easy. It would, assuredly, please me bet- 
 ter had I been called to vindicate the truth against a more puissant con- 
 troversialist ; for Mr Hare is strong only in maligning. But, such as he 
 is, there is no alternative ; contemned he cannot, answered he must, 
 be. For, his position in the Church, his reputation, I believe, for learn- 
 ing, and above all, the purport of his "Note W," would make silence 
 on my part tantamount to a defeat ; and, in the circumstances, defeat 
 would be tantamount to criminality. 
 
 I only regret, that my rejoinder cannot be altogether so prompt as 
 the assault deserves, and as I could wish it to be. Hitherto, my atten- 
 tion has been engrossed with more important at least, more urgent, 
 matters ; and the whole almost of my disposable exertion is, for some 
 months to come, necessarily preoccupied. At the same time, as what is 
 personal in the affair is of a narrow and transitory interest, whilst the 
 question itself is of wide and permanent import ; it becomes requisite
 
 to detail the evidence in the cause more fully, than might otherwise 
 suffice to settle the comparative value of Mr Hare's authority and mine. 
 In other respects, were it not always painful to expose the faults and 
 follies of the good and wise ; painful to exhibit any one, far more a 
 Christian minister, in the colours in which I shall be forced to make Mr 
 Hare reveal himself ; and, now especially, to me a tedious drudgery to 
 dictate the (translated) passages which detail the proof; were it not for 
 these abatements, the work would be one of mere amusement. For the 
 evidence is in my mind ; I know it to be resistless ; recollecting, amain, 
 both what the passages contain, and where they should be looked for. 
 A thing, however, is soon enough done, when it is done well ; and as to 
 that in hand, no time, I promise, shall be lost by me, in performing it 
 effectually. 
 
 As to the objection of Scandal; this I hold, and have always held, as 
 of the lightest indeed, as of no weight at all. In sooth, against the 
 promulgation of the true, the objection is itself a scandal. I am well 
 aware that false opinions are prevalent, that false opinions have been 
 industriously inculcated, touching the Reformers, and this not alone by 
 enemies of the Reformation. I am consequently well aware, that the 
 propagation of the true opinion will give pain will give offence to many. 
 But I know also that men ought to be disabused of then 1 errors ; and that 
 it is the duty of every one capable of this, so to disabuse them. In the 
 words of an illustrious Father: " He is not alone a traitor to the truth, 
 by whom the false is spoken for the true ; but he also who does not pro- 
 claim, who does not vindicate, the truth, as proclaimed and vindicated it 
 ought to be." If, indeed, scandal could be taken at the truth, before the 
 truth the scandal would sink to insignificance. " In so far," says another 
 great Saint and Father, " as this can be done without sin, we should 
 refrain from affording scandal to our neighbour. But should our neigh- 
 bour conceive scandal at the truth, better allow scandal to arise, than truth 
 to be abandoned" But, in reality, truth can never be a ground of legiti- 
 mate scandal. No man is, no man can even pretend to be, a Christian, 
 unless actuated (in reality or profession) by the spirit of truth ; and he 
 who does not love to speak, he who does not love to hear, the truth, is 
 a renegado, at once, of truth and Christianity. To say that truth, as 
 truth, may justly scandalise a believer, is, in effect, to blaspheme. For 
 what is this, but to denounce our faith as false? what is this, but " to 
 turn the truth of God into a lie?" Well, therefore, is it declared by Lu- 
 ther : " Truth should be proclaimed, in all ways, to all persons, and at 
 all times ; never should it be contorted, never should it be concealed. For 
 why? Truth is ' the rod of right ;' it cannot, therefore, be a source of 
 scandal.' 1 ' 1 
 
 W. H. 
 
 Nov. 1840.
 
 Extract from a Lecture. 
 
 [IV.] IT is evident that the division of Nouns into Nouns 
 of the First Intention and Nouns of the Second Intention 
 can be rendered clear only by an explanation of the meaning 
 of the First and Second Intentions themselves. The Theory 
 of the Medieval Logicians with respect to these Intentions 
 has always been considered to be extremely subtle ; and as 
 it frequently served on the one hand as a handle for merri- 
 ment, so on the other it was as often ostentatiously held up 
 to admiration as the master invention of the Human Mind in 
 its relation to the highest and most exact department of 
 Philosophy. The Second Intentions may in fact be said to 
 have been for Centuries the Idols of the Logical World ; and 
 they became as such not unnaturally the objects of worship 
 or derision, according to the respective intellects or tempers 
 of those who concerned themselves with them. 
 
 The distinction has been, I think, with propriety referred 
 back for its origin to the Arabian Commentators upon Aristotle. 
 It is at any rate as old as these. But whensoever it arose, it 
 was intended to support the claims of Logic to Universality ; 
 or, in other words, to establish the applicability of the Logical 
 System to all knowledge whatsoever. It is indeed througli 
 the medium of the Second Intentions alone (as they are 
 explained by the Schoolmen) that Logic does deal with all 
 our thoughts and reasonings. And hence a right knowledge 
 of their meaning would seem at all times to form an indis- 
 pensable part of the business of the Logical Studcat.
 
 In endeavouring to explain the meaning of both cxpies- 
 sions " Primse Intentiones" and " Secundae Intentiones," I 
 would first observe, that the term " Intentio" expresses a 
 condition of the mind of the thinker, and not any quality 
 attaching properly to the nature of the idea or thing thought. 
 Such indeed it would seem to mean from its very derivation 
 only, and the same would also appear to be the case with the 
 terms " notiones," " conceptus," which are often used as 
 synonymous with " Intentiones." The tendency of this 
 remark is manifestly to make the distinction at once to lie in 
 the " Modus" or way of contemplating our ideas, and not in 
 any variations which might supposably be undergone by the 
 Ideas themselves. The language of Sanderson as respects 
 the " Secunda Intentio" is express to this effect ; for a he 
 makes the phrases " Secunda Intentio" and " Ratio contem- 
 plandi Formalis" to be identical in point of signification : 
 following up this statement with the remark, that the " Secundae 
 Intentiones" (using the plural) are the Instruments or Media 
 through which and through which alone the Logician con- 
 templates the various natures of Entia and Non-Entia which 
 compose the Physical and Mental Universe. 
 
 From what has been already said, it seems easy to collect 
 some notion of the distinction implied in both the phrases 
 under consideration, or, in other words, to discern in some 
 degree what were the First Intentions and what the Second 
 Intentions of the early Logicians. The " First Intentions" 
 were the conceptions which men formed of the several natures 
 of the Phenomena with which their minds or occupations 
 brought them into communication. Whatsoever a man's 
 profession or course of thought led him to apprehend, so long 
 as he confined himself to the real natures of the things 
 known, so long was he said to be conversant with " First 
 Intentions," and to use the Words also which he employed to 
 
 Lib. i. c. 1. of his Compendium.
 
 signify these natures in the " First Intention." If, for example, 
 the thoughts of the Farmer were directed to sheep and oxen, 
 and he used the words " Sheep," " Oxen," (as men commonly do) 
 simply to denote the real natures thereof, he was said to have 
 proceeded no farther than the First Intention. He might be 
 said to think and speak popularly, to be concerned only 
 with matter as it were ; not to have entered into the philo- 
 sophy of his subject ; to view and use his terms as a sort of 
 household words ; which is exactly what I conceive Aldrich 
 may have meant by defining " Nouns of the First Intention" 
 as " in Commtini usu posita." What has been now said of 
 the Farmer will equally apply to all other Persons who think 
 and converse about things according to their real and material 
 natures. And the same may likewise be extended to those 
 who are conversant with the Phaenomena of the Intellectual 
 world; allowing of course for the necessary difference of their 
 natures. There was then no very great refinement perhaps 
 in that part of the theory which concerns the First Inten- 
 tions. 
 
 But the Logical System, we must remember, advanced its 
 claims to a connexion with every nature, both real and 
 imaginary, although at the same time it professed not to 
 concern itself with the intimate and immediate knowledge of 
 those natures. It was freely allowed, that is, that the exact 
 knowledge of the phenomena of every department of human 
 speculation appertained of right and exclusively to the 
 proficient in each department. Logic did not pretend to 
 appropriate the natures falling within any department 11 ; nor 
 to deal with one department more than another; so that 
 obviously in order to be possessed of this so very general 
 application to which it laid claim, its mode of regarding the 
 contents of each department must be very general also. 
 Reflection suggested that the natures comprehended within 
 the several departments stood all in certain similar relations 
 
 h Except, of course, those of its own Technicalities, as a System.
 
 to each other, and that the Terms which should be employed 
 to express these similar relations must consequently be of 
 universal applicability. This " Intentio," or mode of 
 viewing all things, was called the " Secunda Intentio," and 
 the words or terms expressive of the relations (whether the 
 parties employing them always perceived the relations or 
 not) came to be called " Words" or " Nouns" of the Second 
 Intention. 
 
 It follows from this explanation that the Signification 
 of Nouns was not affected at all by this mode of re- 
 garding them. A Noun when viewed through the medium 
 of the Second Intention expressed precisely the same thing 
 as it did before. If a word varied in meaning, much or 
 little, it became to all intents and purposes as many words, 
 Logically speaking, as it represented natures, and in each 
 and all of these meanings, it was subject to the two " In- 
 tentions" or modes of regarding it. The Logician, if asked 
 what the terms " Apple," " Fruit," " Sheep," " Animal," 
 " Comet," " Luminary," meant, gave, if he knew the nature 
 of them, the same answer as the Fruiterer, the Shepherd, and 
 the Astronomer. But he at the same time was at liberty to 
 add ; " It is to be looked upon as merely accidental that I 
 know the natures of these ; you should have asked the 
 Fruiterer, the Shepherd, and the Astronomer, to tell you what 
 phaenomena these terms really stand for. I happen to 
 know what they are, and what people mean when they talk 
 about them, but they really do not belong to me, except in 
 so far as they may turn out to be Genera or Species, or to 
 come within any other of my universal classifications. And 
 even now, although I know them, I look upon them, Logically 
 speaking, only as Genera and Species, and every other thing 
 which these or any other persons bring before me must in like 
 manner be so considei^ed. In short, I only view the whole of 
 men's thoughts as comprehensible within certain relations, and 
 to these relations I give the names of Genera and Species, and
 
 5 
 
 the like. If you bring me any thoughts which are not capable 
 of being submitted to these my general classifications, then is 
 my System defective ; but it cannot be defective so long as 
 it can be shewn that there are no conceptions of the human 
 mind, no Intelligibilia whatever, which may not be so com- 
 prehended. You, Mr. Astronomer, are concerned with your 
 terms as representing the phenomena of your Science, and 
 you look upon your words " Comets," Luminaries," (which 
 denote classes of phenomena in your province,) as re- 
 presenting such and such things or natures as your Science 
 has enabled you to observe. But I look at your words 
 " Comets," &c. not through the medium of the phaenomena 
 which you tell me they express, but as capable like all other 
 words (voces) of being ranked by my formal way of viewing 
 them with other terms in a well-constructed scale of certain 
 fixed and immutable relations. If, for example, your word 
 " Comet" denote a Genus or a Species, I shall know what 
 position it is entitled to hold in a Proposition with other 
 terms of its own family, and by and by I shall also know 
 what is the part it may play in a Syllogism. This is my 
 " Conception," or " Notion," or " Intention," of the term, 
 whereas you perhaps cared or thought little (if at all) of this 
 manner of contemplating your subject. But permit me 
 to observe, that whenever you philosophize on the subject, or 
 when, to speak more directly to the point, you take your 
 term in its Logical use and bearings, you too must regard it 
 as capable of being thus classified, or you will never under- 
 stand its proper place either in the Proposition or the 
 Syllogism in which it may hereafter chance that you would 
 wish to have it included d ." 
 
 e I conceive that the Edinburgh Review, No. CXV. in an Article commonly 
 attributed to Sir "W. Hamilton, takes a similar view when it calls the Secunda 
 Intentio " a conception of a conception." 
 
 d If it be still contended, that tbe Distinction implies a Difference of Signifi- 
 cation, I would say, that it amounts to no more than if we should say that the 
 common Noun a Man" in common usage signifies Mankind, and that in a Logical
 
 6 
 
 If these remarks be correct, it is plain that the distinction 
 which gave rise to a " Nomen" being ever called a " Nomen 
 Secundae Tntentionis," is connected with that view of Logic 
 which makes it the Science of Universal Classification*. 
 Nor do I believe that any of the representations of Logic 
 which make it " Scientia scientiarum,"" " Ars artium," or 
 entitled to any other like grandiloquent form of description, 
 can be supported except by the admission or adoption of 
 this view of its nature. If the theory be sound which I have 
 advanced on the subject of the two Intentions and Nouns 
 regarded according to each of them, it is obvious that the 
 explanations of the difference between " Nouns Primao" and 
 " Nouns Secundae Intentionis," which have found their way 
 into the Logical Treatises of late years, are for the most part 
 erroneous. I firmly believe them to be so, and that the 
 account which I have attempted to give of this very famous 
 distinction (although I am sensible that it may not be im- 
 mediately understood by all of you) would have been pro- 
 nounced to be substantially correct by those writers who 
 lived and wrote before the publication of Aldrich's Com- 
 pendium. I may say also in conclusion, that the definitions 
 given by Aldrich are not incompatible with the explanation 
 now attempted, and that I for my own part am ready to 
 believe, that Aldrich f understood the distinction in the same 
 way, although I cannot deny that his words are such as to 
 make this highly problematical 
 
 sense it signifies M an KIND. The word Kind, it may be observed, is by the 
 Logician understood after every common Noun, with the exception perhaps of the 
 Summa Genera, or Summum Genus. \ 
 
 e The word " Philosophia," in Aldrich's Definition of the Nomen Secunda) 
 Intentionis, may be intended perhaps to convey nearly the same idea. 
 
 f Aldrich, it is true, calls the Nomen 2J Intentionis vox Artis ;" but it is his 
 Commentators, and not he, who taking a part only of his definition^ and then 
 making a simple Converse of the Universal Affirmative, call every Vox Artis, 
 of such, a Nomen 2da Intentionis. 
 
 BAXTER, PBINTER, OXFORD.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 Los Angeles 
 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 
 
 Form L9-Series 4939
 
 A A 000011678 
 
 PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
 THIS BOOK CARD Z 
 
 University Research Library