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 ALEXANDER. A Hirtoryof the Origin and Growth of the Art of War, 
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 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 
GREAT CAPTAINS 
 
 A COURSE OF SIX LECTURES'. : 
 
 SHOWING THE INFLUENCE ON THE ART OF WAR 
 OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 
 
 ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CESAR, 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, FREDERICK, AND NAPOLEON 
 
 BY 
 
 THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE 
 
 B*evet Lieutenant- Colonel United States Army, Retired List. Author of 
 
 ' The Campaign of Chancellorsville ; " "A Bird's-eye View of 
 
 Our Civil War;" " Patroclus and Penelope A 
 
 Chat in tue Saddle" etc., etc. t etc. 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
-t jj/7 
 d / 
 
 Copyright, iSSp 
 BY THEODORE A. DODGE 
 
 rights reserve^ 
 
TO 
 
 IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF 
 
 MANY ACTS OF FRIENDSHIP AND HELPFULNESS 
 
 AND IN GENUINE APPRECIATION OF HIS 
 
 ACUMEN AS A MILITARY CRITIC AND HIS FELICITY AS 
 AN AUTHOR 
 
 THESE PAGES ARE INSCRIBED 
 
 WITH CORDIAL ESTEEM 
 
 BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 7034SB 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 rr\HE following lectures were delivered in Boston, 
 under the auspices of the Lowell Institute, in Janu- 
 ary, 1889. Their conciseness needs but the apology of 
 scant time. Little can be said about Alexander or 
 Napoleon within the limit of an hour. The sketches 
 are of necessity meagre. They are a summary in 
 part of a larger work, of which the author hopes 
 soon to begin the publication, in which a volume will 
 be devoted to each great captain, and mention made 
 of other soldiers who have contributed to the growth 
 of the art of war. The lectures aim to indicate 
 briefly what we owe to the great captains, and to 
 draw an intelligible outline of their careers, which may 
 be filled in by reference to the extended narratives of 
 others. Historical detail often assumes prominence in 
 the mind to the exclusion of general form. It is the 
 latter which it is attempted to portray. 
 
 It is generally admitted that Alexander, Hannibal, 
 Caesar, Frederick, and Napoleon belong in a class by 
 themselves. Some may claim for Marlborough or 
 
 CW 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 Prince Eugene an equality with Gustavus Adolphus. 
 But, mindful that Gustavus was the first to rescue 
 methodical war from the oblivion of the Middle 
 Ages, and that he originated the modern system, 
 the art appears to owe that to him which entitles him 
 to greater rank, though, indeed, the achievements of 
 others may have reached or even exceeded the height 
 of his. 
 
 All sources of information have been utilized, from 
 Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander to JominFs Life of 
 Napoleon. Among quite recent works, special thanka 
 are due to the exhaustive History of War of Prince 
 Galitzin, and the Studies of Count von Wartenburg. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 ALEXANDER 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 IliXNIBAL ............. 38 
 
 LECTURE in. 
 
 ........ .73 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS .......... 107 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 FREDERICK ............. 140 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 NAPOLEON ............. 178 
 
LIST OF MAPS. 
 
 PlM 
 
 PARALLEL ORDER 3 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THYMBRA, B.C. 545 .... 4 
 
 BEFORE THE BATTLE OF MARATHON 6 
 
 THE GREEK MANOEUVRE AT MARATHON .... 7 
 THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA, B.C. 371 .... 9 
 CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, B.C. 334 TO 323. . 15 
 THE BATTLE OF THE HYDASPES, B.C. 326 . . 17 
 HANNIBAL'S FLANK MARCH, B.C. 217 . . . . 43 
 THE BATTLE OF CANN.E, B.C. 216, I. .... 47 
 THE BATTLE OF CANNAE, B.C. 216, II .... 53 
 
 CAPUA, B.C. 211 .63 
 
 GAUL 75 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR 89 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS IN 
 
 GERMANY, A.D. 1630-1-2 120 
 
 MAP FOR THE SEVEN-YEARS WAR 145 
 
 LEUTHEN, DEC. 5, 1757 155 
 
 1796 180 
 
 THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN 187 
 
 THE ULM-AUSTERLITZ CAMPAIGN 189 
 
 THE JENA CAMPAIGN , 194 
 
 THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 209 
 
 (xiii) 
 
LECTURE I. 
 
 ALEXANDER. 
 
 THE earliest history is but a record of wars. Peace 
 had no events stirring enough to call for record. 
 It was the conflict of heroes which inspired the oldest and 
 .still greatest of poems. As the more intelligent peoples 
 were, as a rule, the victors, the march of civilization fol- 
 lowed in the footsteps of war up to very recent times. 
 The history of war has been carefully recorded for nearly 
 twenty-five centuries, but the science of war, in a written 
 form, dates back less than one hundred years. 
 
 The art of war owes its origin and growth to the deeds 
 of a few great captains. Not to their brilliant victories ; 
 not to the noble courage evoked by their ambition ; not to 
 their distortion of mechanics and the sciences into new 
 engines of slaughter ; not to their far-reaching conquests ; 
 but to their intellectual conceptions. For war is as highly 
 intellectual as astronomy. The main distinction between 
 the one and the other lies in the fact that the intellectual 
 conception of the general must at once be so put into play 
 as to call for the exertion of the moral forces of his charac- 
 ter, while the astronomer's inspiration stops at a purely 
 mental process. What has produced the great captains 
 
/| : GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 is the coexistence of extraordinary intellect and equal force 
 of character, coupled with events worthy of and calling 
 out these qualities in their highest expression. 
 
 My effort will be to suggest how, out of the campaigns 
 and battles of the great captains, has arisen what to-day 
 we call the art of war, not so much out of the technical 
 details, which are a subordinate matter, as the general 
 scheme ; and to show that, while war is governed by its 
 rules as well as art, it is the equipment of the individual 
 which makes an Alexander or a Michael Angelo. Six of 
 these captains stand distinctly in a class by themselves, 
 far above any others. They are, in ancient days, Alex- 
 ander, Hannibal, Caesar, all within three hundred years 
 of each other. Then follows a gap of seventeen centuries 
 of unmethodical war, and we complete the list with Gusta- 
 vus Adolphus, Frederick, and Napoleon, all within 
 two centuries. " The art of war is the most difficult of 
 all arts, the military reputation in general the greatest 
 of all reputations," says Napoleon. The limited number 
 of great captains proves this true. 
 
 he words campaign and battle cover the same_ground 
 as strategy and tactics. Let me make these plain to you, 
 and 1 shall have done^with definitions and technicalities. 
 A campaign consists in the marching of an army about 
 the country or into foreign territory to seek the enemy or 
 inflict damage on him. Strategy is the complement of 
 this term, and is the artof so moving an army- over a 
 country, on the map, as it were, -S^that when you 
 meet the enemy you shall have placed him in a disadvajq- 
 tageous position for battle or other manosuvres. 
 
ALEXANDER. 
 
 more battles may occur in a campaign. Tactics ( r grand 
 tactics, to distinguish the art from the mere details of^ 
 drill) r^kte^milv^to_and is coextensive with the evolutions 
 of thebattle-field. Strategy comprehends your manoeuvres 
 when not in the presence of the enemy ; tactics, your ma- 
 noeuvres when in contact with him. Tactics has always 
 existed as common military knowledge, often in much 
 perfection. Strategy is of modern creation, as an art 
 which one may study. But all great captains have 
 been great strategists. 
 
 To say that strategy is war on the map is no figure of 
 speech. Napoleon always planned and conducted his 
 campaigns on maps of the country spread out for him by 
 his staff, and into these maps he stuck colored pins to 
 indicate where his divisions were to move. Having thus 
 wrought out his 
 plan, he issued or- 
 ders accordingly. 
 To the general, the 
 map is a chessboard, 
 and upon this he 
 moves his troops 
 as you or I move 
 queen and knight. 
 
 Previous to Cy- 
 r u s , about 550 
 B.C., we have a 
 record of nothing 
 useful to the modern soldier. Nimrod, Semiramis, Se- 
 eostris were no doubt distinguished conquerors. But 
 
 R&RALLEL ORDER 
 
4 GREAT CAPTAINS, 
 
 they have left nothing for us to profit by. War was 
 a physical, not an intellectual art, for many centuries. 
 Armies marched out to meet each other, and, if an am- 
 bush was not practicable, drew up in parallel order, and 
 fought till one gave way. The greater force could form 
 the longer line and overlap and turn the other's flanks. 
 And then, as to-day, a flank attack was fatal ; for men 
 cannot fight unless they face the foe ; and a line miles in 
 length needs time to change its front. 
 
 Cyrus is to the soldier the first historical verity. In 
 the battle of Thymbra, according to Xeriophon, where 
 
 CROESUS' ARMY 
 
 BATTLE OF THYMBRA B C. 545 
 
 Crcesus outnumbered him more than two to one and over- 
 lapped his flanks, he disposed his troops in so deep a 
 tactical order of five lines, and so well protected his 
 flanks, that when Cro3sus' wings wheeled in to encompass 
 him, his reserves in the fifth line could fall on the flanks 
 of these Tery wheeling wings. And as the wheel was 
 extensive and difficult of execution, it produced a gap 
 between wing and centre, as Cyrus had expected, - 
 
ALEXANDER. 5 
 
 and into this he poured with a chosen body, took Crcesue r 
 centre in reverse, and utterly overthrew him and his king- 
 dom. Cyrus overran in his conquests almost as great a 
 territory as Alexander. 
 
 It is of advantage to see what had been done before 
 Alexander's time, to understand how much Alexander 
 knew of war from others. For Alexander found war in a 
 crude state and conducted it with the very highest art. 
 That his successors did not do so is due to the fact that 
 they did not understand, or were not capable of imitating 
 him. 
 
 Cyrus' successor, Darius I. (B.C. 513), undertook a 
 campaign against the Scythians north of the Danube, with, 
 it is said, seven hundred thousand men. The Greek 
 Mandrocles bridged for this army both the Bosphorus and 
 the Danube, no mean engineering feat to-day. 
 
 Shortly after came the Persian invasion of Greece and 
 the battle of Marathon (490 B.C.). Here occurred one of 
 the early tactical variations from the parallel order. Miltiades 
 had but eleven thousand men ; the Persians had ten times as 
 many. They lay on the sea-shore in front of their fleet. To 
 reach and lean his flanks on two brooks running to the 
 sea, Miltiades made his centre thin, his wings strong, and 
 advanced sharply on the enemy. As was inevitable, 
 the deep Persian line easily broke through his centre. 
 But Miltiades had either anticipated and prepared his 
 army for this, or else seized the occasion by a very stroke 
 of genius. There was no symptom of demoralization. 
 The Persian troops followed hard after the defeated centre. 
 Miltiades caused each wing to wheel inwards, and fell upon 
 
GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 both flanks of the Persian advance, absolutely overwhelm- 
 ing it, and throwing it back upon the main line in such 
 confusion as to lead to complete victory. 
 
 w 
 
 You must note that demoralization always plays an 
 immense part in battle. The Old Dessauer capped all 
 battle-tactics with his : " Wenn Du gehst nicht zuriick, so 
 geht der Feind zuriick ! " (If you don't fall back, why, 
 the enemy will fall back.) Whenever a tactical ma- 
 noeuvre unnerves the enemy, it at once transforms his 
 army into a mob. The reason why Pickett's charge did 
 not succeed was that there was no element of demoraliza- 
 tion in the Union ranks. Had there been, Gettysburg 
 might have become a rebel victory. 
 
 The Peloponnesian War shows instances of far-seeing 
 strategy, such as the seizure of Pylos (B.C. 425), whence 
 
ALEXANDER. 7 
 
 the threat of incursions on Sparta's rear obliged her to 
 relax her hold on the throat of Athens. Brasidas was the 
 general who, at this time, came nearest to showing the 
 moral and intellectual combination of the great soldier. 
 His marches through Thessaly and Illyria and his defeat 
 of Cleon at Amphipolis were admirable. He it. was who 
 
 first marched in a hollow square, with baggage in the 
 centre. 
 
 The soldier of greatest use to us preceding Alexander 
 was unquestionably Xenophon. After participating in 
 the defeat of Cyrus the Younger by Artaxerxes, at 
 Cunaxa (B.C. 401), in which battle the 'Greek phalanx 
 had held its own against twenty times its force, Xeno- 
 phon was chosen to command the rear-guard of the 
 phalanx in the Eetreat of the Ten Thousand to the Sea ; 
 
6 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 and it is he who has shown the world what should be the 
 tactics of retreat, how to command a rear-guard. No 
 chieftain ever possessed a grander moral ascendant ever 
 his men. More tactical originality has come from the An- 
 abasis than from any dozen other books. For instance, 
 Xenophon describes accurately a charge over bad ground in 
 which, so to speak, he broke forward by the right of com- 
 panies, one of the most useful minor manoeuvres. He 
 built a bridge on goat-skins stuffed with hay, and sewed up 
 so as to be water-tight. He established a reserve in rear 
 of the phalanx from which to feed weak parts of the line, 
 a superb first conception. He systematically devastated 
 the country traversed to arrest pursuit. After the lapse 
 of twenty-three centuries there is no better military text- 
 book than the Anabasis. 
 
 Alexander had a predecessor in the invasion of Asia. 
 Agesilaus, King of Sparta, went (B.C. 399) to the 
 assistance of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, unjustly 
 oppressed by Tissaphernes. He set sail with eight thou- 
 sand men and landed at Ephesus ; adjusted the difficulties 
 of these cities, and, having conducted two successful cam- 
 paigns in Phrygia and Caria, returned to Lacedemon 
 overland. 
 
 Associated with one of the most notable tactical 
 manoeuvres the oblique order of battle is the im- 
 mortal name of Epaminondas. This great soldier origi- 
 nated what all skilful generals have used frequently and 
 to effect, and what Frederick the Great showed in its 
 highest perfection at Leuthen. As already observed, 
 armies up to that time had with rare exceptions attacked 
 
ALEXANDER. 9 
 
 In parallel order and fought until one or other gave way. 
 At Leuctra (B.C. 371), Epaminondas had six thousand 
 men, against eleven thousand of the invincible Spartans., 
 The Thebans were 
 
 SPARTANS 
 
 dispirited by many ( | | ^ | f ^ | | ^ | | ^ j 
 
 failures, the Lace- 
 demonians in good F3 r\J rp 
 
 heart. The Spar- ' p 1 """] f<3 fv] ftl 
 
 tan king was on m 
 
 the right of his t 
 
 army. Epami- THE BANS. i ' > 
 
 nondas tried a D D n *7 1 
 
 BATTLE OF Leu CTR A B C. 371 
 
 daring innova- 
 tion. He saw that if he could break the Spartan 
 right, he would probably drive the enemy from the 
 field. He therefore quadrupled the depth of his own 
 left, making it a heavy column, led it sharply for- 
 ward, and ordered his centre and right to advance more 
 slowly, so as not seriously to engage. The effect was 
 never doubtful. While the Spartan centre and left 
 was held in place by the threatening attack of the Theban 
 centre and right, as well as the combat of the cavalry 
 between the lines, their right was overpowered and 
 crushed ; having defeated which, Epaminondas wheeled 
 around on the flank of the Spartan centre and left, and 
 swept them from the field. The genius of a great tac- 
 tician had prevailed over numbers, prestige, and confi- 
 dence. At Mantinoea, nine years later, Epaminondas 
 practised the same manoeuvre with equal success, but 
 himself fell in the hour of victory. (B.C. 362.) 
 
10 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 The Greek phalanx was the acme of shock tactics 
 It was a compact body, sixteen men deep, whose long 
 spears bristled to the front in an array which for defence 
 or attack on level ground made it irresistible. No body 
 of troops could withstand its impact. Only on broken 
 ground was it weak. Iphicrates, of Athens, had devel- 
 oped the capacity of light troops by a well-planned skir- 
 mish-drill and discipline, and numbers of these accom- 
 panied each phalanx, to protect its flanks and curtain its 
 advance. 
 
 Such, then, had been the progress in military art when 
 Alexander the Great was born. Like Hannibal and 
 Frederick, Alexander owed his military training and 
 his army to his father. Philip had been a hostage in 
 Thebes in his youth, had studied the tactics of Epami- 
 nondas, and profited by his lessons. When he ascended 
 the throne of Macedon, the army was but a rabble. 
 He made and left it the most perfect machine of ancient 
 days. He armed his phalanx with the sarissa, a pike 
 twenty-one feet long, and held six feet from the loaded 
 butt. The sarissas of the five front ranks protruded 
 from three to fifteen feet beyond the line ; and all were 
 interlocked. This formed a wall of spears which nothing 
 could penetrate. The Macedonian phalanx was perfectly 
 drilled in a fashion much like our evolutions in column, 
 and was distinctly the best in Greece. It was uncon- 
 quered till later opposed by the greater mobility of the 
 Roman legion. The cavalry was equally well drilled. 
 Before Philip's death, in all departments, from the 
 ministry of war down, the army of Macedon was as 
 
ALEXANDER. 11 
 
 perfect in all its details as the army of Prussia is to- 
 day. 
 
 Philip also made, and Alexander greatly improved, 
 what was the equivalent of modern artillery. The cata- 
 pult was a species of huge bow, capable of throwing pikes 
 weighing from ten to three hundred pounds over half a 
 mile. It could also hurl a large number of leaden bullets 
 at each fire. It was the cannon of the ancients. The 
 ballista was their mortar, and threw heavy stones with 
 accurate aim to a considerable distance. It could cast 
 flights of arrows. Alexander constructed and was always 
 accompanied by batteries of ballistas and catapults, the 
 essential parts of which were even more readily trans- 
 ported than our mountain batteries. These were not, 
 however, commonly used in battle, but rather in the 
 attack and defence of defiles, positions, und towns. 
 
 Alexander's first experience in a pitched battle was 
 at Choeronea (B.C. 338), on which field Philip won his 
 election as Autocrator, or general-in-chief, of the armies of 
 Greece. Here, a lad of eighteen, Alexander commanded 
 the Macedonian left wing, and defeated the hitherto in- 
 vincible Theban Sacred Band by his repeated and ob- 
 stinate charges at the head of the Thessalian horse. 
 Philip had for years harbored designs of an expedition 
 against the Persian monarchy, but did not live to carry 
 them out. Alexander succeeded him at the age of twenty 
 (B.C. 336). He had been educated under Aristotle. No 
 monarch of his years was ever so well equipped as he in 
 head and heart. Like Frederick, he was master from the 
 tart. "Though the name has changed, the king re* 
 
12 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 mains," quoth he. His arms he found ready to hand, 
 tempered in his father's forge. But it was his own 
 strength and skill which wielded them. 
 
 The Greeks considered themselves absolved from Mace- 
 donian jurisdiction by the death of Philip. Not so thought 
 Alexander. He marched against them, turning the passes 
 of Tempe and Kallipeuke by hewing a path along the 
 slopes of Mount Ossa, and made himself master of Thes- 
 ealy. The Amphictyonic Council deemed it wise to sub- 
 mit, and elected him Autocrator in place of his father. 
 
 Alexander's one ambition had always been to head the 
 Greeks in punishing the hereditary enemy of Hellas, the 
 Persian king. He had imbibed the idea of his Asiatic 
 conquests in his early youth, and had once, as a lad, 
 astonished the Persian envoys to the Court of Pella by his 
 searching and intelligent questions concerning the peoples 
 and resources of the East. 
 
 Before starting on such an expedition, however, he must 
 once for all settle the danger of barbarian incursions along 
 his borders. This he did in a campaign brilliant by its 
 bkilful audacity ; but on a rumor of his defeat and death 
 among the savages, Thebes again revolted. Alexander, 
 by a march of three hundred miles in two weeks across a 
 mountainous country, suddenly appeared at her gates, 
 captured and destroyed the city, and sold the inhabitants 
 into slavery. Athens begged off. Undisputed chief, he 
 now set out for Asia with thirty thousand foot and five 
 thousand horse. (B.C. 334.) 
 
 There is time but for the description of a single cam- 
 paign and battle of this great king's. The rest of his all 
 
ALEXANDER. 13 
 
 but superhuman exploits must be hurried through with 
 barely a mention, and the tracing of his march on the 
 map. I have preferred to select for longer treatment the 
 battle of the Hydaspes, for Issus and Arbela are more 
 generally familiar. 
 
 Alexander's first battle after crossing into Asia was at 
 the Granicus, where he defeated the Persian army with the 
 loss of a vast number of their princes and generals. 
 Thence he advanced through Mysia and Lydia, freeing the 
 Greek cities on the way, captured Miletus and Halicar- 
 nassus, and having made himself a necessary base on the 
 -33gean, marched through Caria and Lycia, fighting for 
 every step, but always victorious, not merely by hard 
 blows, but by hard blows delivered where they would best 
 tell. Then through Phrygia to Gordium (where he cut 
 the Gordian knot), and through Cappadocia to Cilicia. 
 He then passed through the Syrian Gates a mountain 
 gap heading for Phoenicia. Here Darius got in his 
 rear by passing through the Amanic Gates farther up the 
 range, which Alexander either did not know, or singularly 
 enough had overlooked. The Macedonians were abso- 
 lutely cut off from their communications. But, nothing 
 daunted, Alexander kept his men in heart, turned on 
 Darius, and defeated him at Issus, with a skill only 
 equalled by his hopeful boldness, and saved himself harm- 
 less from the results of a glaring error. 
 
 So far (B.C. 333), excepting this, Alexander had taken ' 
 no step which left any danger in his rear. He had con- 
 fided every city and country he had traversed to the hands 
 of friends. His advance was our first instance on a grand 
 
14 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 ecale of methodical war, the origin of strategy. He 
 continued in this course, not proposing to risk himself in 
 the heart of Persia until he had reduced to control the 
 entire coast-line of the Eastern Mediterranean as a base. 
 This task led him through Syria, Phoenicia, where the 
 siege of Tyre, one of the few greatest sieges of antiquity, 
 delayed him seven months, and Palestine to Egypt. 
 Every part of this enormous stretch of coast was sub- 
 jugated. 
 
 Having in possession, practically, all the seaports of the 
 then civilized world, and having neutralized the Persian 
 fleet by victories on land and at sea, Alexander returned 
 to Syria, inarched inland and crossed the Euphrates and 
 Tigris, thus projecting his line of advance from the centre 
 of his base. At Arbela he^defeated the Persian army in 
 toto, though they were twenty to his one. Babylon, Susa, 
 Persepolis, and Pasargadae opened their gates to the con- 
 queror. But Darius escaped. 
 
 It was now the spring of 330 B.C. Only four years 
 had elapsed and Alexander had overturned the Persian 
 Empire ; and though he left home with a debt of eight 
 hundred talents, he had won a treasure estimated at from 
 one hundred and fifty millions of dollars up. 
 
 Alexander now followed Darius through Media and the 
 Caspian Gates to Parthia, subduing the several territories 
 he traversed. He found Darius murdered by the satraps 
 who attended him. This was no common disappointment 
 to Alexander, for the possession of the person of the Great 
 King would have not only rendered his further conquests 
 more easy, but would have ministered enormously to his 
 
16 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 natural and fast-growing vanity. He pursued the murder 
 ers of Darius, but as he could not safely leave enemies in 
 his rear, he was compelled to pause and reduce Aria, 
 Drangiana, and Arachosia. j Then he made his way over 
 the Caucasus into Bactria and Sogdiana 
 
 which equals Hannibal's passage of the Alps. [His east- 
 ern limit was tne river Jaxertes, the crossig~oTwhich was 
 made under cover of his artillery, its first use for such a 
 purpose. The details of all tQefcer movements are so won- 
 derful and show such extraordinary courage, enterprise, 
 and intelligence, such exceptional power over men, so true 
 a conception of the difficulties to be encountered, such cor- 
 rect judgment as to the best means of overcoming them, 
 that if the test should be the accomplishment of the all but 
 impossible, Alexander would easily stand at the head of 
 all men who have ever lived. He now formed the project 
 of conquering India, and, returning over the Caucasus, 
 marched to the Indus and crossed it. Other four years 
 had been consumed since he left Persepolis. It was May, 
 B.C. 326. 
 
 Alexander was in the Punjaub, the land of the five 
 rivers. The Hydaspes was swollen with the storms of 
 the rainy season and the melting snows of the Himalayas. 
 The roads were execrable. On the farther side of the 
 river, a half-mile wide, could be seen Porus, noted as the 
 bravest and most able king in India, with his army drawn 
 up before his camp and his elephants and war-chariots 
 n front, ready to dispute his crossing. The Hydaspes is 
 nowhere fordable, except in the dry season. Alexander 
 saw that he could not force a passage in the face of this 
 
ALEXANDER. 
 
 17 
 
 array, and concluded to manreuvre for a chance to cross. 
 He had learned from experience that the Indians were 
 good fighters. His cavalry could not be made to face 
 their elephants. He was reduced to stratagem, and what 
 he did has ever since been the model for the passage of 
 rivers, when the enemy occupies the other bank. Alex- 
 ander first tried to convince Porus that he intended to 
 
 BATTLE OF THE 
 HYOASPES 
 
 BJC.326 
 
 wait till the river fell, and carefully spread a rumor to 
 this effect. He devastated the country, accumulated vast 
 stores in his camp, and settled his troops in quarters. 
 Porus continued active in scouting the river-banks, and 
 held all the crossings in force. Alexander sent parties in 
 boats up and down the stream to distract his attention. 
 He made many feints at crossing by night. He put the 
 phalanx under arms in the light of the camp-fires ; blew 
 the signals to move ; marched the horse up and down ; got 
 the boats ready to load. To oppose all this Porus would 
 
18 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 bring down his elephants to the banks, order his men 
 under arras, and so remain till daylight, lest he should be 
 surprised. 
 
 After some time Porus began to weary his troops by 
 marching them out in the inclement weather to forestall 
 attempts to cross ; and finding these never actually made, 
 grew careless, believing that Alexander would, in reality, 
 make no serious effort till low water. But Alexander was 
 daily watching his opportunity. He saw that to cross in 
 front of Porus' camp was still impossible. The presence 
 of the elephants near the shore would surely prevent the 
 horse from landing, and even his infantry was somewhat 
 unnerved by them. But he had learned that large reen- 
 forcements were near at hand for Porus, and it was 
 essential to defeat the Indians before these came to hand. 
 
 The right bank, on which lay the Macedonians, was 
 high and hilly. The left bank was a wide, fertile plain. 
 Alexander could hide' his movements, while observing 
 those of Porus. When he saw that the Indian king had 
 ceased to march out to meet his feigned crossings, he 
 began to prepare for a real one, meanwhile keeping up 
 the blind. Seventeen miles above the camp was a wooded 
 headland formed by a bend in the river and a small afflu- 
 ent, capable of concealing a large force, and itself hidden 
 by a wooded and uninhabited island in its front. This 
 place Alexander connected by a chain of couriers with the 
 camp, and laid posts all along the river, at which, every 
 night, noisy demonstrations were made and numerous 
 fires were lighted, as if large forces were present at each 
 of them. When Porus had been quite mystified as to 
 
ALEXANDER. 19 
 
 Alexander's intentions, Craterus was left with a large part 
 of the army at the main camp, and instructed to make 
 open preparations to cross, but not really to do so unless 
 Poms' army and the elephants should move up-stream. 
 Between Craterus and the headland, Alexander secreted 
 another large body, with orders to put over when he 
 should have engaged battle. He himself marched, well 
 back of the river and out of sight, there was no dust to 
 betray him, to the headland, where preparations had 
 already been completed for crossing. 
 
 The night was tempestuous. The thunder and rain, 
 usual during the south-west monsoon, drowned the noise 
 of the workmen and moving troops and concealed the 
 camp-fires, as well as kept Poms' outposts under shelter. 
 Alexander had caused a number of boats to be cut in two 
 for transportation, but in such manner that they could be 
 quickly joined for use, the first mention we have of any- 
 thing like pontoons. Towards daylight the storm abated 
 and the crossing began. Most of the infantry and the 
 heavy cavalry were put over in the boats. The light 
 cavalry swam across, each man sustaining himself on a 
 hay-stuffed skin, so as not to burden the horses. The 
 movement was not discovered until the Macedonians had 
 passed the island, when Porus* scouts saw what was doing 
 and galloped off with the news. It soon appeared that 
 the army had not landed on the mainland, but on a second 
 island. This was usually accessible by easy fords, but the 
 late rains had swollen the low water from it to the shore to 
 deep and rapid torrent. Here was a dilemma. Unless 
 the troops were at once got over, Porus would be down 
 
20 GREAT CAPTAIN'S. 
 
 upon them. There was no time to bring the boats around 
 the island. After some delay and a great many accidents, 
 a place was found where, by wading to their breasts, the 
 infantry could get across. This was done, and the cavalry, 
 already over, was thrown out in front. Alexander, as 
 speedily as possible, set out with his horse, some five 
 thousand strong, and ordered the phalanx, which num- 
 bered about six thousand more, to follow on in column, 
 the light foot to keep up, if possible, with the cavalry. 
 He was afraid that Porus might retire, and wished to be on 
 hand to pursue. 
 
 Porus could see the bulk of the army under Craterus 
 still occupy ing the old camp, and knew that the force which 
 had crossed could be but a small part of the army. But 
 he underestimated it, and instead of moving on it in force, 
 sent only some two thousand cavalry and one hundred and 
 twenty chariots, under his son, to oppose it. Porus desired 
 to put off battle till his reinforcements came up. Alexan- 
 der proposed to force battle. 
 
 So soon as Alexander saw that he had but a limited 
 force in his front, he charged down upon it with the heavy 
 horse, " squadron by squadron," says Arrian, which must 
 have meant something similar to our line in echelon, while 
 the light horse skirmished about its flanks. The enemy 
 was at once broken, and Porus' son and four hundred men 
 were killed. The chariots, stalled in the deep bottom, 
 were one and all captured. 
 
 Porus was nonplussed. Alexander's manoeuvre had 
 been intended to deceive, and had completely deceived him. 
 He could see Craterus preparing to cross, and yet he knew 
 
ALEXANDER. 21 
 
 Alexander to be the more dangerous of the two. He was 
 uncertain what to do, but finally concluded to march 
 against Alexander, leaving some elephants and an adequate 
 force opposite Craterus. He had with him four thousand 
 cavalry, three hundred chariots, two hundred elephants, and 
 thirty thousand infantry. Having moved some distance, 
 he drew up his lines on a plain where the ground was solid, 
 and awaited Alexander's attack. 
 
 His arrangements were skilful. In front were the re- 
 doubtable elephants, which Porus well knew that Alex- 
 ander's cavalry could not face, one hundred feet apart, 
 covering the entire infantry line, some four miles long. 
 The infantry had orders to fill up the gaps between the 
 elephants by companies of one hundred and fifty men. 
 Columns of foot flanked the elephants. These creatures 
 were intended to keep the Macedonian horse at a distance, 
 and trample down the foot when it should advance on the 
 Indian lines. Porus had but the idea of a parallel order, 
 and of a defensive battle at that. His own cavalry was on 
 the wings, and in their front the chariots, each containing 
 two mailed drivers, two heavy and two light-armed men. 
 
 When the Macedonian squadrons reached the ground, 
 and the king rode out to reconnoitre, he saw that he must, 
 wait for his infantry, and began manoeuvring with his 
 horse, to hold himself till the phalanx came up. Had 
 Porus at once advanced on him, he could easily have 
 swept him away. But that he did not do so was of 1 
 a part with Alexander's uniform good fortune. The 
 phalanx came up at a lively gait, and the king gave it 
 A breathing-spell, while he kept Porus busy by email 
 
22 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 demonstrations. The latter, with his elephants, and three 
 to one of men, simply bided his time, calmly confident of 
 the result. Alexander yielded honest admiration to the 
 skill of Porus' dispositions, and his forethought in oppos- 
 ing the elephants to his own strong arm, the cavalry. 
 
 The Macedonians had advanced with their right leaning 
 on the river. Despite the elephants, Alexander must use 
 his horse, if he expected to win. In this arm he outnum- 
 bered the enemy. He could not attack in front, nor, in- 
 deed, await the onset of the elephants and chariots. With 
 the instinct of genius, and confident that his army could 
 manoeuvre with thrice the rapidity of Porus, as well as 
 himself think and act still more quickly, he determined to 
 attack the Indian left in force. He despatched Coenus 
 with a body of heavy horse by a circuit against the 
 enemy's right, with instructions, if Porus 1 cavalry of that 
 wing should be sent to the assistance of the left, to charge 
 in on the naked flank and rear of the Indian infantry. He 
 himself with the bulk and flower of the horse, sustained 
 by the more slowly moving phalanx, made an oblique 
 movement towards Porus' left. The Indian king at first 
 supposed that Alexander was merely uncovering his in- 
 fantry, to permit it to advance to the attack, and as such 
 ~~i an attack would be playing into Porus' hands, he awaited 
 X results. This, again, was Alexander's salvation. It left 
 C him the offensive. Porus had not yet perceived Coenus' 
 r' march, the probably rolling ground had hidden it, and he 
 / ordered his right-flank cavalry over to sustain that of the 
 / left, towards which flank Alexander was moving. The 
 phalanx, once uncovered, Alexander ordered forward, but 
 
ALEXANDER. 23 
 
 not to engage until the wings had been attacked, so as to 
 neutralize the elephants and the chariots. 
 
 These dispositions gave the Macedonian line the oblique 
 order of Epaminondas, with left refused. Alexander had 
 used the same order at Issus and Arbela. As he rode 
 forward, he pushed out the Daan horse-bowmen to skir- 
 mish with the Indian left, while he, in their rear, by a half 
 wheel, could gain ground to the right sufficient to get be- 
 yond and about the enemy's flank, with the heavy squad- 
 rons of Hephasstion and Perdiccas. The Indian horse 
 seems to have been misled by what Alexander was doing, 
 it probably could not understand the Macedonian tac- 
 tics, for it was not well in hand, and had advanced out 
 of supporting distance from the infantry. 
 
 Meanwhile Coenus had made his circuit of the enemy's 
 right, and, the Indian cavalry having already moved over 
 towards the left, he fell on the right flank and rear of the 
 Indian infantry and threw it into such confusion that it 
 was kept inactive during the entire battle. Then, com- 
 pleting his gallant ride, and with the true instinct of the 
 beau sabreur, Coenus galloped along Porus' rear, to join 
 the mUe already engaged on the left. To oppose Coenus 
 as well as Alexander, the Indian cavalry was forced to 
 make double front. While effecting this, Alexander drove 
 his stoutest charge home upon them. They at once broke \ 
 and retired upon the elephants, " as to a friendly wall for 
 refuge," says Arnan. 
 
 A number of these beasts were now made to wheel to 
 the left and charge on Alexander's horse, but this exposed 
 them in flank to the phalanx, which advanced, wounded 
 

 24 OR HAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 many of the animals, and killed most of the drivers. De- 
 prived of guidance, the elephants swerved on the phalan- 
 gites, but they were received with such a shower of darta 
 that in their affright they made about-face upon the Indian 
 infantry, to the great consternation of the latter. 
 
 The Indian cavalry, meanwhile, had rallied under the 
 cover of the elephants, and again faced the Macedonians. 
 But the king renewed his charges again and again, it 
 was a characteristic feat of Alexander's, from boyhood up, 
 to be able to get numberless successive charges out of his 
 squadrons, and forced them back under the brutes' heels. 
 The Macedonian cavalry was itself much disorganized ; but 
 Alexander's white plume waved everywhere, and under his 
 inspiration, Coenus having now joined, there was, despite 
 disorder, no let-up to the pressure, from both fronts at 
 once, on Porus' harassed horse. 
 
 The situation was curious. The Macedonian cavalry, 
 inspired by the tremendous animation of the king, main- 
 tained its constant charges. The Indian cavalry was hud- 
 dled up close to the infantry and elephants. These 
 unwieldy creatures were alternately urged on the phalanx 
 and driven back on Porus' line. The Macedonian infantry 
 had plenty of elbow-room, and could retire from them and 
 again advance. The Indian infantry had none. But 
 ^ finally the elephants grew discouraged at being between 
 two fires, lifted their trunks with one accord in a trumpet- 
 ing of terror, and retired out of action, "like ships backing 
 \water," as Arrian picturesquely describes it. 
 Alexander now saw that the victory was his. But the 
 lituation was still delicate ; he kept the phalanx in place 
 
ALEXANDER. 25 
 
 and continued his charges upon Porus' left flank with the 
 cavalry. Finally, Porus, who had been in the thickest of 
 the fray, collected forty of the yet un wounded elephants, 
 and charged on the phalanx, leading the van with his own 
 huge, black, war-elephant. But Alexander met this des- 
 perate charge with the Macedonian archers, who swarmed 
 around the monsters, wounded some, cut the ham-strings 
 of others, and killed the drivers. 
 
 The charge had failed. At this juncture, his eye was 
 as keen as Napoleon's for the critical instant, Alexander 
 ordered forward the phalanx, with protended sarissas and 
 linked shields, while himself led the cavalry round to the 
 Indian rear, and charged in one final effort with the ter- 
 rible Macedonian shout of victory. The whole Indian 
 army was reduced to an inert, paralyzed mass. It was 
 only individuals who managed to escape. 
 
 The battle had lasted eight hours, and had been won 
 against great odds by crisp tactical skill and the most 
 brilliant use of cavalry. The history of war shows no 
 instance of a more superb and effective use of horse. 
 Coenus exhibited, in carrying out the king's orders, the 
 clean-cut conception of the cavalry general's duty, and 
 Alexander's dispositions were masterly throughout. His 
 prudent forethought in leaving behind him a force sufficient 
 to insure his safety in case of disaster in the battle is 
 especially to be noted. 
 
 Craterus and the other detachments now came up, and 
 the pursuit was intrusted to them. Of Porus ? army, 
 twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, in- 
 cluding numberless chiefs, were killed, and all the chariots, 
 
26 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 which had proved useless in the battle, were broken up. 
 The Macedonian killed numbered two hundred horse and 
 seven hundred foot. The wounded were not usually 
 counted, but averaged eight to twelve for one of killed. 
 This left few Macedonians who could not boast a wound. 
 
 Porus, himself wounded, endeavored to escape on his 
 own elephant. Alexander galloped after on Bucephalus, 
 the horse we all remember that, as a mere lad, he had 
 mounted and controlled by kindness and by skilful, rational 
 treatment, when all others had failed to do so, and who 
 had served him ever since. But the gallant old charger, 
 exhausted by the toils of the day, fell in his tracks and 
 died, at the age of upwards of thirty years. x Porus sur- 
 rendered, when he might have escaped. When brought 
 to Alexander, the king, in admiration of his bravery and 
 skill, asked him what treatment he would like to receive. 
 w That due to a king, Alexander ! " proudly replied Porus. 
 w Ask thou more of me," said Alexander. " To be treated 
 like a king covers all a king can desire," insisted the 
 Indian monarch. Alexander, recognizing the qualities of 
 the man, made Porus his friend, associate, and ally, and 
 viceroy of a large part of his Punjaub conquests.^ 
 
 The Macedonian king went but a short distance farther 
 into India. His project of reaching the Ganges was ship- 
 wrecked on the determination of his veterans not to advance 
 beyond the Hyphasis. He returned to the Hydaspes, and 
 moved down the river on a huge fleet of two thousand boats, 
 subduing the tribes on either bank as he proceeded on his 
 way. In capturing a city of the Malli he nearly met hii 
 death. 
 
ALEXANDER. 27 
 
 This episode is too characteristic of the man to pass by 
 unnoticed. Battles were won in those days by hand-to- 
 hand work, and Alexander always fought like a Homeric 
 hero. He had formed two storming columns, himself 
 heading the one and Perdiccas the other. The Indians 
 but weakly defended the town wall, and retired into the cit- 
 adel. Alexander at once made his way into the town 
 through a gate which he forced, but Perdiccas was delayed 
 for want of scaling-ladders. Arrived at the citadel, the 
 Macedonians began to undermine its wall, and the ladders 
 were put in position. Alexander, always impatient in his 
 valor, seeing that the work did not progress as fast as his 
 own desires, seized a scaling-ladder, himself planted it, 
 and ascended first of all, bearing his shield aloft, to ward 
 off the darts from above. He was followed by Peucestas, 
 the soldier who always carried before the king in battle the 
 shield brought from the temple of the Trojan Athena, and 
 by Leonnatus, the confidential body-guard. Upon an ad- 
 joining ladder went Abreas, a soldier who received double 
 pay for his conspicuous valor. Alexander first mounted 
 the battlements and frayed a place for himself with his 
 sword. The king's guards, anxious for his safety, crowded 
 upon the ladders in such numbers as to break them down. 
 Alexander was left standing with only Peucestas, Abreas, 
 and Leonnatus upon the wall in the midst of his enemies ; 
 but so indomitable were his strength and daring that none 
 came within reach of his sword but to fall. The barbari- 
 ans had recognized him by his armor and white plume, 
 and the multitude of darts which fell upon him threatened 
 his life at every instant. The Macedonian/a below im- 
 
28 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 plored him to leap down into their outstretched arms. 
 Nothing daunted, however, and calling on every man to 
 follow who loved him, Alexander leaped down inside the 
 wall and, with his three companions backing up against it, 
 stoutly held his own. In a brief moment he had cut down 
 a number of Indians and had slain their leader, who ven- 
 tured against him. But Abreas fell dead beside him, with 
 an arrow in the forehead, and Alexander was at the same 
 moment pierced by an arrow through the breast. The 
 king valiantly stood his ground till he fell exhausted by 
 loss of blood, and over him, like lions at bay, but glowing 
 with heroic lustre, stood Peucestas, warding missiles from 
 him with the sacred shield, and Leonnatus guarding him 
 with his sword, both dripping blood from many wounds. 
 It seemed that the doom of all was sealed. 
 
 The Macedonians, meanwhile, some with ladders and 
 some by means of pegs inserted between the stones in the 
 wall, had begun to reach the top, and one by one leaped 
 within and surrounded" the now lifeless body of Alexander. 
 Others forced an entrance through one of the gates and 
 flew to the rescue. Their valor was as irresistible as their 
 numbers were small. The Indians could in no wise resist 
 their terrible onset, their war-cry doubly fierce from rage 
 at the fate of their beloved king, who, to them, was, in 
 truth, a. demigod. They were driven from the spot, and 
 Alexander was borne home to the camp. So enraged were 
 the Macedonians at the wounding of their king, whom they 
 believed to be mortally struck, that they spared neithei 
 man, woman, nor child in the town. 
 
 Alexander's wounds were indeed grave, but he recov* 
 
ALEXANDER. 2& 
 
 ared, much to the joy of his army. While his life was de- 
 spaired of, a great deal of uncertainty and fear was engen- 
 dered of their situation, for Alexander was the centre 
 around which revolved the entire mechanism. Without 
 him what could they do? How ever again reach their 
 homes? Every man believed that no one but the king 
 could lead them, and how much less in retreat than In 
 advance ! 
 
 Alexander's fleet finally reached the mouth of the Indus 
 The admiral, Nearchus, sailed to the Persian Gulf, while 
 Alexander and part of his army crossed the desert of Ge- 
 drosia, Craterus having moved by a shorter route with 
 another part and the invalids. When Alexander again 
 reached Babylon, his wonderful military career had ended. 
 In B.C. 323, he died there of a fever, and his great con- 
 quests and schemes of a Graeco-Oriental monarchy were 
 dissipated. 
 
 Alexander was possessed of uncommon beauty. Plu- 
 tarch says that Lysippus made the best portrait of him, 
 " the inclination of the head a little on one side towards 
 the left shoulder, and his melting eye, having been ex- 
 pressed by this artist with great exactness." His likeness 
 was less fortunately caught by Apelles. He was fair and 
 ruddy, sweet and agreeable in person. Fond of study, he 
 read much history, poetry, and general literature. His 
 favorite book was the Iliad, a copy of which, annotated 
 by Aristotle, with a dagger, always lay under his pillow. 
 He was at all times surrounded by men of brains, and 
 enjoyed their conversation. He was abstinent of pleasures, 
 except drinking. Aristobulus says Alexander did not 
 
30 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 drink much in quantity, but enjoyed being me rry. Still, 
 the Macedonian w much " was more than wisdom dictates. 
 He had no weaknesses, except that he over-enjoyed flat- 
 tery and was rash in temper. 
 
 Alexander was active, and able to endure heat and cold, 
 hunger and thirst, trial and fatigue, beyond even the 
 stoutest. He was exceeding swift of foot, but when young 
 would not enter the Olympic games because he had not 
 kings' sons to compete with. In an iron body dwelt both 
 an intellect clear beyond compare, and a heart full of gen- 
 erous impulses. He was ambitious, but from high mo- 
 tives. His desire to conquer the world was coupled with 
 the purpose of furthering Greek civilization. His courage 
 was, both physically and morally, high-pitched. He 
 actually enjoyed the delirium of battle, and its turmoils 
 raised his intellect to its highest grade of clearness and 
 activity. His instincts were keen ; his perception remark- 
 able ; his judgment all but infallible. As an organizer of 
 an army, unapproached ; as a leader, unapproachable in 
 rousing the ambition and courage of his men, and in 
 quelling their fears by his own fearlessness. He kept his 
 agreements faithfully. He was a remarkable judge of 
 men. He had the rare gift of natural, convincing oratory, 
 and of making men hang upon his lips as he spoke, and 
 do deeds of heroism after". He lavished money rather on 
 his friends than on himself. 
 
 While every inch a king, Alexander was friendly with 
 his men ; shared their toils and dangers ; never asked an 
 iffort he himself did not make ; never ordered a hardship 
 of which he himself did not bear part. During the herculean 
 
ALEXANDER. 31 
 
 pursuit of Darius, after a march of four hundred milei 
 in eleven days, on which but sixty of his men could keep 
 beside him, and every one was all but dying of thirst, 
 when a helmetful of water was offered him, he declined 
 to drink, as there was not enough for all. Such things 
 endear a leader to his men beyond the telling. But Alex- 
 ander's temper, by inheritance quick, grew ungovernable. 
 A naturally excitable character, coupled with a certain 
 superstitious tendency, was the very one to suffer from a 
 life which carried him to such a giddy height, and from 
 successes which reached beyond the human limit. We 
 condemn, but, looking at him as a captain, may pass over 
 those dark hours in his life which narrate the murder of 
 Clitus, the execution of Philotas and Parmenio, and the 
 cruelties to Bessus and to Batis. Alexander was dis- 
 tinctly subject to human frailties. His vices were partly 
 inherited, partly the outgrowth of his youth and wonderful 
 career. He repented quickly and sincerely of his evil 
 deeds Until the last few years of his life his habits were 
 very simple. His adoption then of Persian dress and 
 manners was so largely a political requirement, that it can 
 be hardly ascribed to personal motives, even if we fully 
 acknowledge his vanity. 
 
 The life-work of Philip had been transcendant. That of 
 Alexander surpasses anything in history. Words fail to 
 describe the attributes of Alexander as a soldier. The 
 perfection of all he did was scarcely understood by his 
 historians. But to compare his deeds with those of other 
 captains excites our wonder. * Starting with a handful of 
 men from Macedonia, in four years, one grand achieve- 
 
32 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 ment after another, and without a failure, had placed at 
 his feet the kingdom of the Great King. Leaving home 
 with an enormous debt, in fifty moons he had possessed 
 himself of all the treasures of the earth. Thence, with 
 marvellous courage, endurance, intelligence, and skill he 
 completed the conquest of the entire then known world, 
 marching over nineteen thousand miles in his eleven years' 
 campaigns. & And all this before he was thirty-two. His 
 
 ! * 
 
 health and strength were still as great as ever ; his voracity 
 for conquest greater, as well as his ability to conquer. It 
 is an interesting question, had he not died, what would 
 have become of Rome. The Roman infantry was as good 
 as his ; not so their cavalry. An annually elected consul 
 could be no match for Alexander. But the king never 
 met in his campaigns such an opponent as the Roman 
 Republic, nor his phalanx such a rival as the Roman 
 legion would have been. That was reserved for Hannibal. 
 
 Greek civilization, to a certain degree, followed Alex- 
 ander's footsteps, but this was accidental. " You are a man 
 like all of us, Alexander," said the naked Indian, "except 
 that you abandon your home, like a meddlesome destroyer, 
 to invade the most distant regions, enduring hardship 
 yourself and inflicting it on others." Alexander could 
 never have erected a permanent kingdom on his theory of 
 coalescing races by intermarriages and forced migrations. 
 His Macedonian- Persian Empire was a mere dream. 
 
 Alexander was never a Greek. He had but the Greek 
 genius and intelligence grafted on the ruder Macedonian 
 nature ; and he became Asiaticized by his conquests. Hia 
 \ife-work, as cut out by himself, was to conquer and thei 
 
ALEXANDER. 33 
 
 to Hellenize Asia. He did the one, he could nut accom- 
 plish the other aim. He did not plant a true and perma- 
 nont Hellenism in a single country of Asia. None of his 
 cities have lived. They were rather fortified posts than 
 self-sustaining marts. As a statesman, intellectual, far- 
 seeing, and broad, he yet conceived and worked on an 
 impossible theory, and the immediate result of all his geniua 
 did not last a generation. 
 
 What has Alexander done for the art of war? When 
 Demosthenes was asked what were the three most impor- 
 tant qualities in an orator, he replied : w Action, action, 
 action ! " In another sense this might well be applied to 
 the captain^ No one can become a great captain without 
 a mental and physical activity which are almost abnormal, 
 and so soon as this exceptional power of activity wanes, 
 the captain has come to a term of his greatness. Genius 
 has been described as an extraordinary capacity for hard 
 work. But this capacity is but the human element. 
 Genius implies the divine spark, fit is the personality of 
 the great captain which makes him what he is. The 
 maxims of war are but a meaningless page to him who 
 cannot apply them.j They are helpful just so far as the 
 man's brain and heart, as his individuality, can carry 
 them. It is because a great captain must first of all be 
 a great man, and because to the lot of but few great men 
 belongs the peculiar ability or falls the opportunity of 
 being great captains, that preeminent success in war is so 
 rarely seen. 
 
 All great soldiers are cousins-german in equipment of 
 heart and head. No man ever was, no man can by any 
 
34 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 possibility blunder into being, a great soldier without the 
 most generous virtues of the soul, and the most distin- 
 guished powers of the intellect. The former are independ- 
 ence, self-reliance, ambition within proper bounds ; that 
 sort of physical courage which not only does not know 
 fear, but which is not even conscious that there is such a 
 thing as courage ; that greater moral quality which can 
 hold the lives of tens of thousands of men and the destinies 
 of a great country or cause patiently, intelligently, and 
 unflinchingly in his grasp ; powers of endurance which 
 cannot be overtaxed ; the unconscious habit of ruling men 
 and of commanding their love and admiration, coupled 
 with the ability to stir their enthusiasm to the yielding of 
 their last ounce of effort. The latter comprise business 
 capacity of the very highest order, essential to the care 
 of his troops ; keen perceptions, which even in extraordi- 
 nary circumstances or sudden emergencies are not to be 
 led astray ; the ability to think as quickly and accurately 
 in the turmoil of battle as in the quiet of the bureau ; the 
 power to foresee to its ultimate conclusion the result of a 
 strategic or tactical manoeuvre ; the capacity to gauge the 
 efforts of men and of masses of men ; the many-sidedness 
 which can respond to the demands of every detail of the 
 battle-field, while never losing sight of the one object aimed 
 at ; the mental strength which weakens not under the tax 
 of hours and days of unequalled strain. For, in truth, there 
 is no position in which man can be placed which asks so 
 much of his intellect in so short a space as that of the 
 general, the failure or success, the decimation or security 
 of whose army hangs on his instant thought and un- 
 
ALEXANDER. 31 
 
 squivocal instruction under the furious and kaleidoscopic 
 ordeal of the field. To these qualities of heart and head 
 add one factor more opportunity and you have the 
 great soldier. 
 
 Now, Alexander was the first man, the details of whose 
 history have been handed down to us, who possessed these 
 qualities in the very highest measure ; whose opportunities 
 were coextensive with his powers ; and who out of all 
 these wrought a methodical system of warfare from 
 which we may learn lessons to-day. Look at what he 
 accomplished with such meagre means ! He alone has u 
 the record of uniform success with no failure. And this, 
 not because he had weak opponents, for while the Persians 
 were far from redoubtable, except in numbers, the Tyrians, 
 the tribes beyond the Caucasus, and the Indians, made a 
 bold front and good fight. 
 
 Alexander's movements were always made on a well- - 
 conceived, maturely-digested plan ; and this he kept in 
 view to the end, putting aside all minor considerations for 
 the main object, but never losing sight of these. His 
 grasp was as large as his problem. His base for his ad- 
 vance into the heart of the then known world was the 
 entire coast-line of the then known sea. He never ad- 
 vanced, despite his speed, without securing flanks and 
 rear, and properly garrisoning the country on which he 
 based. Having done this he marched on his objective, i/ 
 which was wont to be the enemy's army, with a 
 directness which was unerring. His fertility in ruse and*- 
 stratagem was unbounded. He kept well concentrated ; " 
 his division of forces was always warranted by the condi- 
 
GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 tioiis, and always with a view of again concentrating, 
 His rapidity was unparalleled. It was this which gave him 
 such an ascendant over all his enemies. Neither winter 
 cold nor summer heat, mountain nor desert, the widest riv- 
 ers nor the most elaborate defences, ever arrested his course ; 
 and yet his troops were always well fed. He was a mas- 
 ter of logistics. He lived on the country he campaigned in 
 as entirely as Napoleon, but was careful to accumulate 
 granaries in the most available places. He was remark- 
 able in being able to keep the gaps in his army filled by 
 recruits from home or enlistments of natives, and in trans- 
 forming the latter into excellent soldiers. Starting from 
 home with thirty-five thousand men, he had in the Indian 
 campaigns no less than one hundred and thirty-five thou- 
 sand, and their deeds proved the stuff that was in them. 
 Alexander's battles are tactically splendid examples of 
 conception and execution. The wedge at Arbela waa 
 more splendid than Macdonald's column at Wagrain. It 
 was a scintillation of genius. Alexamfer saw__where his 
 enemy's fltrp.ntrt.hn.rifl weakness lay, g"f1 took prompt fld- 
 vantage of them. He utilized his victories to_the_full 
 extent, amTpursued with a vigor which no other has 
 reached. J3e was jpqu ally grnnf i" njp.crpa na in 
 
 The only thing, he was never called on to show waa the 
 p.fljifl/jjy tr> fyf.p. disaster. ffe possessed ftYfiry.rpmflrkahlft 
 military attribute ; we can discover in him no milit ary 
 weakness.^ 
 
 I As a captain, he accomplished more than any man ever 
 did. He showed the world, first of all men, and best, how 
 to make war. He formulated the first principles of the 
 
ALEXANDER. 31 
 
 art. to be elaborated by Hannibal. Caesar, Gustavus 
 Adolphus, Frederick, and Napoleon. His conditions did 
 not demand that he should approach to the requirements of 
 modern war. But he was easily master of his trade, as, 
 perhaps, no one else ever was. For, as Napoleon says, 
 " to guess at the intentions of the enemy ; to divine his 
 opinion of yourself; to hide from him both your own 
 intentions and opinion ; to mislead him by feigned ma- 
 noeuvres ; to invoke ruse, as well as digested schemes, so 
 as to fight under the best conditions, this is, and always 
 was, the art of war." 
 
LECTURE II. 
 
 HANNIBAL. 
 
 TWO generations after the death of Alexander, the 
 power of the Mediterranean world was divided 
 between Aryan Rome and Carthage, the vigorous daugh- 
 ter of Semitic Tyre. Carthage was first on the sea ; 
 Rome, on land. But Rome, always intolerant of powerful 
 neighbors, fell to quarrelling with her great rival, and at 
 the end of a twenty- three years' struggle, the first Punic 
 War, imposed her own terms on defeated Carthage 
 (241 B.C.). There were two parties bred of these 
 hostilities in Carthage, the war party, headed by Hamil- 
 car Barca ; the peace party, headed by Hanno. Hamilcar 
 knew that peace with Rome meant oppression by Rome, 
 and final extinction, and was ready to stake all on renew- 
 ing the struggle. But he saw that present war was 
 impossible ; that opposition could only be in the future, 
 and that it must be quietly prepared for. "With a view of 
 doing this, Hamilcar got the consent of the Carthaginian 
 Senate to attempt the subjugation of Spain, a land of 
 great natural resources, in conquering and holding which 
 an army could be created which by and by might again 
 cope with the Italian tyrant. 
 38 
 
HANNIBAL. 39 
 
 The Carthaginian fleet had been destroyed. Rome 
 rrould not permit the building of a new one. Hnmilcar'g 
 army was obliged to march overland from Carthage along 
 the north coast of Africa and ship across the strait, now 
 Gibraltar. This was a bold thing to do, but it succeeded, 
 and, in a series of campaigns, Hamilcar reduced the 
 southern half of Spain, and (B.C. 236-227) firmly 
 planted the Carthaginian power there. So conciliatory as 
 well as vigorous had been his policy, that, on his death, 
 the native tribes elected Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, 
 general-in-chief of the allied Carthaginian and Spanish 
 forces, which then amounted to nearly seventy thousand 
 men and two hundred elephants. 
 
 Hasdrubal continued the policy of Hamilcar, and largely 
 increased the Spanish influence and territory. But as 
 Rome had colonies in northern Spain, the two powers 
 were sure soon again to clash. In fact, Rome, after 
 awhile, woke up to this new danger, and notified Carthage 
 that she would extend her colonies north of the Ebro at 
 her peril. 
 
 Hannibal was the son of Hamilcar. His father gave him 
 the best Greek education, and this the lad's remarkable 
 intellect readily assimilated. He trained him to arms 
 under his own eye. Hannibal received his first schooling 
 as a soldier at the age of nine, in his father's camps in 
 Spain, and later his brother, Hasdrubal, made him his chief 
 of calvary at the age of twenty-one. A pen-picture by 
 Hannibal's arch enemy, Livy, tells us what he then was : 
 "No sooner had he arrived than Hannibal drew the whole 
 army towards him. The old soldiers fancied they saw 
 
40 OR EAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Hamilcar in his youth given back to them ; the same bright 
 look, the same fire in his eye, the same trick of counte- 
 nance and features. But soon he proved that to be his 
 father's son was not his highest recommendation. Never 
 was one and the same spirit more skilful to meet opposition, 
 to obey or to command. It was hard to decide whether 
 ho was more dear to the chief or the army. Neither did 
 Hasdrubal more readily place any one at the head when 
 courage or activity was required, nor were the soldiers 
 under any other leader so full of confidence and daring. 
 He entered danger with the greatest mettle, he comported 
 himself in danger with the greatest unconcern. By no 
 difficulties could his body be tired, his ardor damped. 
 Heat and cold he suffered with equal endurance ; the 
 amount of his food and drink was gauged by natural 
 needs, and not by desire. The time of waking and sleep- 
 ing depended not on the distinction of day and night. 
 What time was left from business he devoted to rest, and 
 this was not brought on by either a soft couch or by 
 quiet. Many have often seen him covered by a short 
 field-cloak lying on the ground betwixt the outposts and 
 sentinels of the soldiers. His clothing in no wise distin- 
 guished him from his fellows ; his weapons and horses 
 attracted every one's eye. He was by long odds the best 
 rider, the best marcher. He went into battle the first, 
 
 he came out of it the last Hannibal served 
 
 three years under Hasdrubal's supreme command, and left 
 nothing unobserved which he who desires to become a great 
 leader ought to see and to do." 
 
 Hannibal and his brothers had been brought up vith ao 
 
HANNIBAL. 41 
 
 intensity of hatred of Rome which it is hard to describe. 
 Every schoolboy knows the anecdote of the lad's swearing 
 never to make peace with Rome. The feeling grew with 
 his years. When Hannibal was twenty-four, Hasdrubal 
 died, and he himself was unanimously elected his suc- 
 cessor. 
 
 Hamilcar had planned an invasion of Italy by way of the 
 Alps ; but the scheme was left inchoate at his death. 
 Hannibal at once began definitely to pave the way for such 
 an enterprise by completing the conquest of Spain. The 
 original conception of crossing the Alps was Harnilcar's, 
 just as Philip originally planned the invasion of Asia. 
 But it was the fertile brain of Hannibal which gave thev 
 undertaking birth. The colossal nature of the plan, its 
 magnificent daring, the boundless self-confidence and con- 
 tempt of difficulty and danger which it implies, no less than 
 the extraordinary manner of its execution, are equalled only 
 by Alexander's setting forth also but a lad to conquer 
 the illimitable possessions of the Great King. 
 
 In three years (B.C. 221-218) Hannibal had subjugated 
 all Spain, and after a long siege captured Saguntum. He 
 finally set out, with fifty thousand foot, nine thousand 
 horse, and thirty-seven elephants, across the Pyrenees, 
 whence his route was almost as unknown to him as the 
 Atlantic to Columbus. It is impossible to follow him in 
 this wonderful march, the first crossing of the Alps by 
 any but isolated merchants, and probably the most 
 daring enterprise ever set on foot. After toils and dangers 
 impossible to gauge, even by the losses, Hannibal reached 
 the Po in October, B.C. 218, with but twenty-six thou- 
 
42 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 sand men and a few elephants, less than half the force with 
 which he had left Spain. With this hnndful he wns 
 to face a nation capable with its allies of raising seven hun- 
 dred thousand men ; and yet the event as well as our 
 knowledge of Hannibal shows that he had contemplated 
 even this vast odds. 
 
 But Rome was not ready. Hannibal gained numberless 
 confederates among the Gauls in northern Italy, and that 
 same fall and winter won two victories over the Romans at 
 the Ticinus and Trebia. Next year (B.C. 217) he again 
 defeated the Romans, by an ambuscade at Lake Trasymene, 
 killing or capturing their entire army of thirty thousand 
 men. These three victories were due to the over-eagerness 
 of the Roman generals to fight, their careless methods, and 
 Hannibal's skill in handling his troops and his aptness at 
 stratagem. 
 
 The campaign preceding, and the battle of Lake Trasy- 
 mene, taught the Romans two valuable lessons. The 
 instruction given the world by Alexander had not reached 
 self-important, republican Rome, though Hannibal was 
 familiar enough with the deeds of the great Macedonian. 
 The Romans knew nothing of war except crude, hard 
 knocks. The first lesson showed them that there is some- 
 thing in the art of war beyond merely marching out to 
 meet your enemy and beating him by numbers, better 
 weapons, or greater discipline. 
 
 It was thus : The Romans had retired into Etruria. In 
 March, B.C. 217, Hannibal, who was in Liguria, desired 
 to cross the Appenines and move upon them. There 
 were but two roads he could pursue. The highway would 
 
HANNIBAL. 
 
 43 
 
 take him across the mountains, but by a long circuit. 
 This was the route by which the Consul Flaminius, at 
 Aretium, with his forty thousand men, was expecting him, 
 and, therefore, the way Hannibal did not choose to march, 
 for Flaminius could easily block the mountain roads. The 
 other route was so difficult that Flaminius never dreamed 
 that Hannibal knew of, or could by any possibility pursue 
 
 HANNIBAL'S 
 FLANK MARCH. 
 
 B.C.2I7 
 
 it. Hannibal's crossing of the Alps had taught Flaminius 
 nothing of his daring or his skill. This route lay along the 
 coast to near the mouth of the Arnus, and thence up the 
 right bank. It ran through an immense marsh, which, for 
 an army, was all but as difficult an obstacle as the Alps. 
 But it was the lesser evil, and promised the greater results ; 
 and Hannibal chose it, as Napoleon did the Great St. 
 Bernard in 1800. No better description of the task can 
 be given than to say that for four days and three nights 
 
44 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 the array marched through watev where only the wagons, 
 dead animals, or abandoned packs afforded the men any 
 chance for rest. But the Carthaginian general reached hia 
 goal, turned Flaminius' left flank, and cut him off from 
 Rom' 1 *. Here was the conception of turning the enemy's 
 strategic flank as clearly carried out as ever Napoleon did 
 it. Such was lesson one. 
 
 The result of this turning manosuvre was the battle of 
 Lake Trasymene, where Hannibal taught the Romans, 
 and us through them, the second lesson. The Romans 
 had always marched in careless open order, without any 
 idea of van or rear guard, or of flankers. This Hannibal 
 knew. He placed his whole army ill hiding at both 
 ends of a defile at Lake Trasymene, through which 
 the Romans must march, in such a manner that, when 
 he made his attack, it was on an unsuspecting col- 
 umn, in front, rear, and one flank; and the lake 
 being on the other flank, the result was utter annihila- 
 tion. After this the Romans marched with proper 
 precautions. Hannibal had inflicted three staggering 
 b' fws on his enemy. 
 
 But Rome now appointed a Dictator, Quintus Fabius, 
 truly surnamed Maximus, and nicknamed Cunctator, 
 because, recognizing that he was not able to cope with 
 Hannibal on the battle-field, he wisely chose to conduct a 
 campaign of delays and small war, the one thing Hannibal 
 could not afford, but also the one thing the Romans could 
 not tolerate or understand ; for the Romans had always 
 won by crisp fighting. Still, it was the policy shaped by 
 Fabius which eventually defeated Hannibal, and next to 
 
HANNIBAL. 45 
 
 Hannibal himself, he was the best master the Romans then 
 had. 
 
 It is impossible, even slightly, to touch on many of 
 Hannibal's campaigns and battles. I prefer to give a short 
 description of the battle of Cannae, which, in its conduct 
 and results, is typical of Hannibal's methods. And first, a 
 few words about the organization of either army. 
 
 The Carthaginian discipline was based on the Macedo- 
 nian idea, and the formation of the troops was phalan- 
 gial, that is, in close masses. But Hannibal's army 
 contained troops of all kinds, from the Numidian horse- 
 man, whose only clothing was a tiger- skin, on his tough 
 little runt of a pony, or the all but naked Gaul with his 
 long, curved sword, to the Carthaginian heavy-armed hy- 
 paspist. All these diverse tribes had each its own manner 
 of fighting, and it required a Hannibal to keep up disci- 
 pline or tactical efficiency in such a motley force. The 
 Roman army, on the contrary, was wonderfully homo- 
 geneous, carefully disciplined, in all parts organized and 
 drilled in the same manner, and the legion was a body 
 which was the very opposite of the phalanx. It had much 
 more mobility, the individual soldiers were more independ- 
 ent in action, and instead of relying on one shock or on 
 defence, the several lines could relieve each other, and re- 
 new a failing battle three or even four times with freah 
 troops. After Trasymene, Hannibal not only armed hia 
 men with captured Roman weapons, but modified his or- 
 ganization somewhat to the legion pattern. 
 
 The legion was at this time formed in three lines of 
 maniples (or companies) placed checkerwise. In front were 
 
46 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 thehastati, the least efficient ; behind this theprincipes ; and 
 in the rear the triarii, or veterans. Each maniple was an 
 excellent tactical unit. Each of these lines could relieve 
 the other, and thus give a succession of hammer-like blows. 
 
 The phalanx we already know, and while it was wonder- 
 ful for one shock, it had no reserve, and if demoralization 
 set in, it was gone. The tendency of formation in ancient 
 days, as now, was towards greater mobility, and later on 
 the Roman legion in Greece, particularly at Pydna (168 
 B.C.), proved that it was superior, if properly handled, to 
 the phalanx. 
 
 In B.C. 216, ^Emilius Paulus and Varro were consuls. 
 The former was a man of high character and attainments ; 
 Varro came of plebeian stock, was overbearing and self- 
 sufficient. The Roman and Carthaginian armies lay facing 
 each other near the Aufidus, Hannibal backing on Canme. 
 His position here had been the result of an admirable 
 mano2uvre. The consuls commanded on alternate days. 
 There had been a serious combat on the last day of Varro's 
 command, in which the Carthaginians had been outnum- 
 bered two to one, and been defeated. This had greatly 
 elated Varro, and whetted his appetite for battle. He left 
 the troops at evening in such a manner that next day his 
 associate was badly placed. JEmilius scarcely wished to 
 withdraw, lest his men should be disheartened ; he could 
 aot remain where he was, as he was exposed to Hannibal's 
 better cavalry. He took a middle course, on the whole 
 unwise. He sent a third of his force to the north of the 
 Aufidus, a trifle up-stream, to sustain some foragers he had 
 there, and make a secondary camp, from which to annoy 
 
HANNIBAL. 
 
 47 
 
 Hannibal's parties in search of corn. This division of 
 forces was very risky. Hannibal had long been trying to 
 bring the consuls to battle, and now saw that the moment 
 had come, for Varro was precipitate, and would probably 
 draw ^Emilius into active measures. 
 
 Each general made a stirring address to his army. 
 Polybius gives both. Hannibal's has the true ring of the 
 great captain A " Let us hasten into action. I promise 
 
 ToCANNUSlUM 
 
 BATTLE OF CANNAE B.C. 216 
 i 
 
 you victory, and, the gods willing, I will make my prom- 
 ise goodjl Two days later Hannibal offered JEmilius 
 battle. But ^Emilius declined it, and Hannibal sent his 
 Numidians to the other side to annoy the Roman foragers. 
 The succeeding day, knowing Varro to be in command, 
 Hannibal again offered battle, aware that the hot-tempered 
 Roman would be burning to avenge the yesterday's taunt. 
 He left eight thousand men to guard his camp. 
 
 There has been much discussion as to which bank of the 
 was the scene of the battle. It seems to me that 
 
48 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 the plan in the diagram comes nearest to fitting all the 
 statements, however conflicting, of the several authorities. 
 Near Hannibal's camp the Aufidus makes a bold, southerly 
 B weep. Here Hannibal forded the stream in two columns, 
 drew up his army, and leaned his flanks on the river-banks 
 so as to prevent the Romans, with their numerical superior- 
 ity, from overlapping them. His front he covered with 
 archers and slingers^so as to hide his formation from the 
 Roman generals. jVarro, as Hannibal anticipated, thought 
 the Carthaginians were crossing to attack the lesser camp, 
 and leaving eleven thousand men to guard the larger one, 
 with orders to attack Hannibal's camp during the battle, 
 he also crossed and drew up in the plain opposite the Car- 
 thaginians, he and every Roman in the ranks craving to 
 come to blows with the hated invaders^/ 
 
 Varro also threw out his light troops in advance. He 
 had sixty-five thousand foot and seven thousand horse, to 
 Hannibal's thirty-two thousand foot and ten thousand 
 horse. He could not overlap Hannibal's flanks, so he de- 
 termined to make his line heavier, and seek to crush him at 
 the first impact. He changed the formation of the mani- 
 ples so as to make them sixteen men deep and ten men 
 front, instead of sixteen men front by ten deep, as usual. 
 This was a grievous error. His men were unapt to ma 
 nocuvre or fight well in this unwonted form. He should 
 have employed his surplus, say twenty-five thousand 
 men, as a reserve for emergencies. His army was in the 
 usual three lines, fifteen legions in all, the Roman on the 
 right, the allied on the left. The intervals between the 
 maniples always equalled their front, and the distance 
 
HANNIBAL. 49 
 
 between the lines the depth of the maniples. The Roman 
 cavalry, twenty-four hundred strong, was on the right. 
 The allied, forty-eight hundred strong, on the left. It 
 would have been better massed in one body. But such 
 was the only formation then known. JEmilius com- 
 manded the right, Varro the left wing. 
 
 Hannibal placed on his left, opposite the Roman cavalry, 
 his heavy Spanish and Gallic horse, eight thousand strong, 
 two-thirds in a first, and one-third in a second line. This 
 body was strong enough to crush the Roman horse, and 
 thus cut off the retreat of the legions to their camps and 
 towards Rome. In other words, Hannibal's fighting was 
 to be forced on the Romans' strategic flank. He had a 
 perfectly lucid idea of the value of a blow from this 
 direction. On his right, facing the allied cavalry, were 
 his Numidians, two thousand strong. Of the infantry, the 
 Spaniards and Gauls were in the centre in alternate bodies. 
 His best troops, the African foot, he placed on their either 
 flank. He expected these veterans to leaven the whole 
 lump. The foot was all in phalanxes of one thousand and 
 twenty-four men each, the African foot in sixteen ranks, as 
 usual, the Spaniards and Gauls in ten. Hannibal had 
 been obliged thus to make his centre thin, from lack of 
 men, but he had seething in his brain a manoeuvre b} 
 which he proposed to make this very weakness a factor of 
 success. He had been on the ground and had seen Varro 
 strengthen the Roman centre. This confirmed him in his 
 plan. 
 
 Hannibal commanded the centre in person, Hanno the 
 right, Hasdrubal the left, Maharbal the cavalry of the left. 
 
50 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Hannibal relied on Maharbal to beat the Roman cavaliy, 
 and then, riding by the rear of the Roman army, to join 
 the Numidians on the Carthaginian right, like Coenus at 
 the Hydaspes. His cavalry was superior in numbers, and 
 vastly outranked in effectiveness the Roman horse. 
 
 Hannibal was, no doubt, familiar with Marathon. He 
 proposed to better the tactics of that day. Remember that 
 Miltiades had opposed to him Orientals ; Hannibal faced 
 Roman legions. His general plan was to withdraw his 
 centre before the heavy Roman line, to allow them to 
 push it in, and then to enclose them in his wings and 
 ^_ fall on their flanks. This was a highly dangerous manoeu- 
 vre, unless the withdrawal of the centre could be checked 
 at the proper time; but his men had the greatest confi- 
 dence in him ; the river in his rear would be an aid, if 
 he could but keep his men steady ; and in war no de- 
 f 0^ cisive result can be compassed without corresponding risk. 
 Hannibal had fully prepared his army for this tactical evo- 
 lution, and rehearsed its details with all his subordinates. 
 He not only had the knack of making his lieutenants com- 
 prehend him, but proposed to see to the execution of the 
 work himself. 
 
 'V^ 
 
 The Carthaginians faced north, t{ie Romans south. 
 I?* 16 rising sun was on the flank of either! The wind was 
 southerly, and blew the dust into the faces of the Romans. 
 The light troops on either side opened the action, and 
 fiercely contested the ground for some time. During the 
 preliminary fighting, Hannibal advanced his centre, the 
 Spanish and Gallic foot, in a salient or convex order 
 from the main line, the phalanxes on the right and left 
 
HANNIBAL. 51 
 
 of the central one being, it is presumed, in echelon to it. 
 Tha wings, of African foot, kept their place. 
 
 While this was being done, Hannibal ordered the heavy 
 horse on his left to charge down on the Roman horse in 
 their front. This they did with their accustomed spirit, but 
 met a gallant resistance. The Roman knights fought for 
 every inch with the greatest obstinacy, when dismounted, 
 continuing the contest on foot. The fighting was not by 
 shocks, it was rather hand to hand. But the weight and 
 superior training of the Carthaginian horse soon told. 
 They rode down the Romans and crushed them out of 
 existence. ^Emilius was badly wounded, but escaped 
 the ensuing massacre and made his way to the help of 
 the Roman centre, hoping there to retrieve the day. On 
 the Carthaginian right the Numidians had received orders 
 to skirmish with the allied horse and not come to a de- 
 cisive combat till ihey should be joined by the heavy 
 horse from the Carthaginian left. This they did in their 
 own peculiar style, by riding around their opponents, 
 squadron by squadron, and by making numberless feigned 
 attacks. The battle in the centre had not yet developed 
 results, when Maharbal, having destroyed the Roman 
 cavalry, and ridden around the Roman army, appeared 
 in the rear of the allied horse. The Numidians now at- 
 tacked seriously, and between them, in a few minutes, 
 there was not a Roman horseman left upon the field alive. 
 The Numidians were then sent in pursuit, Maharbal re- 
 maining upon the field. 
 
 While this was going on, the light troops of both 
 sides had been withdrawn through the intervals, and had 
 
52 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 formed in the rear and on the flanks of legion and pha- 
 lanx, ready to fill gaps and supply the heavy foot with 
 weapons. This had uncovered Hannibal's salient. Varro 
 had committed still another blunder. In the effort to 
 make his line so strong as to be irresistible, he had ordered 
 his maniples of principes from the second line forward 
 into the intervals of the maniples of hastati in first line, 
 thus making one solid wall and robbing the legionaries of 
 their accustomed mobility, as well as lending them a feel- 
 ing of uncertainty in their novel formation. Still, with its 
 wonted spirit, the heavy Eoman line advanced on Hanni- 
 bal's salient. The Carthaginian wings could not yet be 
 reached, being so much refused. Striking the apex, the 
 fighting became furious. Hannibal's salient, as proposed, 
 began to withdraw, holding its own in good style. Varro, 
 far too eager, and seeing, as he thought, speedy victory 
 before him, was again guilty of the folly of ordering the 
 third line, the triarii, and even (he light troops, up to the 
 support of the already overcrowded first and second lines. 
 The Carthaginian centre, supported by its skirmishers, held 
 the ground with just enough tenacity to whet the deter- 
 mination of the Romans to crush it. Varro now insanely 
 ordered still more forces in from his wings to reenforce 
 his centre, already a mass so crowded as to be unable to 
 retain its organization, but pressing back the Carthagi- 
 nians by mere weight of mass. He could not better have 
 played into Hannibal's hands. jJThe Romans three men 
 the place of one struggled onward, but became every 
 moment a more and more jumbled bodvA, Its maniple 
 formation, and consequent ease of movement, was quite 
 
HANNIBAL. 
 
 53 
 
 lost. Still, it pushed forward, as if to certain victory, and 
 still the Carthaginian salient fell back, till from a salient 
 it became a line, from a line a reentering angle or crescent. 
 Hannibal, by great personal exertions, had in an extraor- 
 dinary manner preserved the steadiness and formation of 
 his centre, though outnumbered four to one. The Car- 
 thaginian wings he now ordered slowly to advance, which 
 all the more edged the Roman centre into the cul-de-sac 
 
 n 
 
 To CANNUSIUM 
 
 BATTLE *> CANNAE B.C.2is 
 
 E 
 
 Hannibal had prepared. The Roman legionaries were 
 already shouting their eager cry of victory ; but so herded 
 together had they got that there was no room to use their 
 weapons. Hannibal had kept the Carthaginian centre free 
 from any feeling of demoralization, and ready at his com- 
 mand to turn and face the enemy. The wings, by their 
 advance, had hustled the Roman legions into the form of a 
 wedge without a vestige of maniple formation left. The 
 decisive moment had come. Hannibal seized it with the 
 
54 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 eye of the born soldier. Arresting the backward movement 
 of the centre, which still had elbow-room to fight, as the 
 Romans had not, he gave the orders to the wings which 
 they were impatiently awaiting. These veteran troops, in 
 perfect order, wheeled inward to right and left, on the 
 flanks of the struggling mass of legionaries. The Roman 
 army was lost beyond a ray of hope, for, at the same 
 instant, Maharbal, having finished the destruction of the 
 cavalry, rode down upon its rear. The cry of victory 
 changed to a cry of terror. Defeat degenerated into mere 
 slaughter. The Carthaginian cavalry divided into small 
 troops and rode into the midst of the Roman soldiers, 
 eabring right and left. Some squadrons galloped around 
 to the flanks and lent a hand to the African phalanx in its 
 butchery. No quarter was given, or indeed asked. The 
 Romans died with their faces to the foe. The bloody work 
 continued till but a handful was left. Livy and Poly- 
 bius place the killed at from forty to seventy thousand men. 
 Yarro had already escaped with a mere squad of horse. 
 JEmilius Paullus died, sword in hand, seeking to stem 
 the tide of disaster. Three pro-consuls, two quaestors, 
 twenty-one military tribunes, a number of ex-consuls, 
 pra?tors, and aediles, and eighty senators, perished with 
 the army. 
 
 Hannibal's loss had been barely six thousand men, but 
 he had annihilated the splendid army of eighty-seven thou- 
 sand men the flower of Rome. It had vanished as if 
 swallowed up in an earthquake. The battle had been won 
 by crisp tactical skill and the most effective use of cavalry, 
 as fine as that at the Hydaspes. It was, indeed, tho 
 
HANNIBAL. 55 
 
 gorgeous handling of the cavalry which made the iufantry 
 manoeuvre possible. 
 
 J Few battles in history are more marked by ability on 
 one side and crass blundering on the other than the 
 battle of Cannae./ The handling of the cavalry was quite 
 beyond praise. The manner in which the far from reliable 
 Spanish and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in 
 echelon, and, under the mettlesome attack of the Roman 
 legions, was first held there, and then withdrawn step by 
 step, until it had reached the converse position of a reen- 
 tering angle/ and was then steadied in place by ordering 
 up the light troops into its intervals, alj^this being done 
 under the exultant Roman shouts of victory! is a simple 
 chef d'ceuvre of battle-tactics, due solely to Hannibal's 
 magnificent personality ; and the advance at the decisive 
 instant of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left 
 upon the flanks of the disordered and overcrowded legion- 
 aries, caps the master-stroke. The whole battle, from the\ 
 Carthaginian stand-point, is a consummate piece of art, 
 having no superior, few equals in the history of war. 
 
 It is usual for historians to blame Hannibal for not at 
 once marching on Rome after this victory. Let us see 
 what his chances were. We have no hint of what he him- 
 self thought, of what his reasons were for not so doing. 
 We must content ourselves with collecting a few guess- 
 work items, and endeavoring to argue as he did. 
 
 Two facts are peculiarly prominent in Hannibal's cam* 
 paign in Italy. First, he had opposed to him the troops 
 of the strongest and most intelligent military power of the 
 urorld, some of which were, to be sure, comparatively rayr 
 
56 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 in active duty, but yet trained to war from their youth, 
 mixed with legionaries of many campaigns, and instinct 
 with the ardor of fighting for their household gods. It ia 
 often assumed that Hannibal's troops were veterans, the 
 Romans levies of a day. During the first three years this 
 was in part true, and defeat had somewhat drawn the tem- 
 per of the Roman blade ; but throughout the rest of Han- 
 nibal's campaigns the Roman army was much superior to 
 his own in all but one quality, that strange influence 
 which a great man exercises over men. It will be noticed 
 that whenever the fighting was on equal terms, from the 
 beginning the Roman soldier gave a good account of him- 
 self. But Hannibal's victories were won by stratagem, or 
 by tactical genius and skilful use of his cavalry arm, not 
 by brute fighting] In the latter act the legionary waa 
 fully the equal of the phalangite. One cannot compare 
 the task of any other great captain with that of Hannibal. 
 No one ever faced such odds. Secondly, Hannibal had 
 calculated absolutely upon being able to detach the allies 
 the socii from their fealty. We cannot imagine him 
 to have set out on his marvellous expedition without having 
 made this the prime factor in his calculations. Hannibal 
 was no madman. He was a keen, close calculator. But 
 he would have been insane, indeed, if he had undertaken 
 his hazardous campaign without such expectation. He 
 was well justified in reckoning on such defection. There 
 had jJways been a good deal of opposition to high-handed 
 Rome among all her allies, municipal cities, and colonies, 
 and it was a fair assumption that many, if not most, of 
 them would be glad to free themselves and humble their 
 
HANNIBAL. 57 
 
 proud conqueror and mistress. In this expectation Hanni- 
 bal had been entirely disappointed. None of the socii, 
 who were the brawn of the Roman body, had shown any 
 disposition to meet him otherwise than with the sword ; 
 none of the colonies, except in distant Gaul, had met him 
 even half way. He had captured towns and territory and 
 had garrisoned citadels. But the aid he received was not 
 that which enables a conqueror to hold what he takes 
 except with the strong hand. And without just such aid, 
 Hannibal could not only not win, but could not be other- 
 wise than defeated, in his contest with the mighty republic. 
 To assume that Hannibal did not see all this, and that he 
 was not fighting against hope almost from the second 
 year, is to underrate this man's intellectual ability. No 
 one ever fathomed Hannibal's purpose. He was so singu- 
 larly reticent that Roman historians called him perfidious, 
 because no one could, from his face or conduct, gauge 
 either his thought or intention, or calculate upon his 
 acts. He had no Heph&stion as had Alexander. But no 
 doubt he was keenly alive to the failure, so far, of his cal- 
 culation on the disaffection of the allies. 
 
 And now, after the overwhelming victory of Cannae, 
 he had to weigh not only the strategic and tactical diffi- 
 culties, but the still more serious political ones. If the 
 allies, or a good part of them, could be induced to join 
 his cause, Rome would fall sooner or later. If not, he 
 could never take Rome, nor permanently injure the Roman 
 cause. The chances were, in a military sense, all against 
 his capturing Rome by a coup de main. Rome WHS 
 tver two hundred miles distant, well walled, and with a 
 
58 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 large force which could be quickly gathered to protect 
 it. If he failed, the game was lost. It was fcir wiser 
 for him to still try to influence the allies, which he could 
 now do with a record of wonderful victories such as the 
 world had not yet seen. Hannibal was not a military 
 gambler. He never risked his all on a bare chance, as 
 some other soldiers have done. He always reckoned his 
 chances closely. And every reason prompted him not 
 to risk the loss of his all on the chances of a brilliant 
 march on the enemy's capital, which had only its bold- 
 ness to commend it, and every military reason as well 
 as the stanch Roman heart to promise failure as its re- 
 sult ; for there was no obsequious satrap to open its 
 gates and welcome the conquering hero, as it had been 
 Alexander's fortune to meet. If Hannibal marched on 
 Rome, he must be prepared to besiege the city ; and he 
 had neither eiege equipment, nor were sieges consonant 
 with his peculiar ability. If the story be true that Ma- 
 harbal asked of Hannibal, after Cannae, that he might 
 march on Rome with five thousand horse, promising that 
 he should sup in the Capitol in four days, and that on 
 Hannibal's declining, Maharbal exclaimed, " Truly, Han- 
 nibal, thou knowest how to win a victory, but knowest 
 not how to use one ! " it may tend to show that Maharbal 
 possessed indeed the daring recklessness of a true gen- 
 eral of cavalry, but it also proves that Hannibal had the 
 discretion, as he had shown in abundant measure the 
 enterprise, of the great captain. 
 
 Hannibal probably at this time harbored the hope that, 
 tftcr this fourth and overwhelming defeat of the Ro 
 
HANNIBAL. 59 
 
 mans, the allies would finally see that iheir interests lay 
 with him. In fact, Capua, the Samnites, Lucanians, and 
 many cities of Lower Italy did join his cause, and the 
 unexplained time which he spent in the vicinity of his 
 late battle-field was no doubt devoted to political questions, 
 the favorable solution of which could be better brought 
 about by not for the moment risking his now unques- 
 tioned military supremacy. 
 
 The institutions and laws which gave Rome strength 
 never demonstrated her greatness so well as now. The 
 people which had created these institutions, which had 
 made these laws, never rose superior to disaster, never 
 exhibited the strength of character of which the whole 
 world bears the impress, so well as now. The horrible 
 disaster to both state and society for there was not a 
 house in which there was not one dead by no means 
 changed the determination of the Roman people, how- 
 ever horrified the cool-headed, however frightened the 
 many. Not that among the ignorant there was not fear 
 and trembling ; but it was not the ignorant who had made 
 or ruled Rome. The more intelligent and courageous 
 element spoke with a single voice. The praetors at 
 once called the Senate together to devise means of de- 
 fence, and it remained in constant session. All Rome 
 was in affliction, but this must not interfere with the ne- 
 cessity of saving the city, and courage must be outward 
 as well as in the heart. The word peace was forbidden 
 to be pronounced. Movrning was limited to thirty days. 
 Tears were prohibited to women in public. New en- 
 ergies were at once put at work. In view of the 
 
60 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 - alarming circumstances and the impossibility of carrying 
 out the requirements of the law, the Senate itself made 
 M. Junius Pera dictator, who chose Titus Sempronius 
 Gracchus as master of cavalry. The entire male popu- 
 lation above seventeen years of age was enrolled. Four 
 new legions and one thousand horse were added to the 
 city garrison. All mechanics were set to work to repair 
 weapons. The walls were already in a state of excellent 
 defence. The Senate purchased and armed eight thou- 
 sand slaves and four thousand debtors or criminals, with 
 promise of freedom and pardon. Naught but stubborn 
 resistance to the last man was thought of. It was indeed 
 well that Hannibal did not march on Rome. 
 1 Cannre was the last great victory of Hannibal, but the 
 beginning of his most masterly work. He had up to this 
 moment conducted a brilliant offensive. There is nothing 
 in the annals of war which surpasses his crossing of the 
 Alps, his victories at the Ticinus and Trebia, his march 
 through the Arnus marshes, his victory at Lake Trasymene, 
 his manoeuvres up to Cannae, and that wonderful battle. 
 But this splendid record had not helped his cause. Yet, 
 against all hope, he stuck to his task for thirteen long 
 years more, waiting for reinforcements from Carthage, or 
 for some lucky accident which might turn the tide in his 
 favor. Up to Canna? Fortune had smiled upon him. After 
 Cannae she turned her back on him, never again to lend 
 him aid. 
 
 Livy asserts that Hannibal's want of success came from 
 his exposing his troops to a winter in Capua, where 
 iebauch destroyed their discipline. Many historians have 
 
HANNIBAL. 61 
 
 followed this theory. But the soldier who looks at the 
 remarkable work done by Hannibal from this time on, 
 knows that nothing short of the most exemplary 
 discipline can possibly account for it, and seeks his rea- 
 sons elsewhere. Livy's statements will bear watching. 
 
 Hannibal soon became too weak to afford the attrition 
 of great battles. He had sought to impose on the allies 
 by brilliant deeds. He had failed, and must put into 
 practice whatever system would best carry out his pur- 
 pose. From this time on he avoided fighting unless it 
 was forced upon him, but resorted to manoeuvring to 
 accomplish his ends. He seized important towns, he 
 marched on the Roman communications, he harassed the 
 enemy with small war. He did the most unexpected and 
 surprising things. He appeared at one end of southern 
 Italy before the enemy had any idea that he had left the 
 other. He was teaching the Romans the trade of war. 
 They were not slow to see wherein Hannibal's superiority 
 lay, and profited by it. He educated their best generals, 
 and these now came to the front. 
 
 The Romans raised annually from one hundred and fifty 
 thousand to two hundred and forty thousand men, of which 
 one-half to two-thirds were in Hannibal's own front, and 
 they were of the bone and sinew of Rome. He himself 
 never had more than thirty-five thousand to forty thousand 
 effective, and these far from as good. The Carthaginian 
 Senate, under lead of the Hanno faction, forsook him, nor 
 sent him men nor money, except one small reinforcement. 
 He was cast on his own resources in the enemy's country. 
 \Vhile the Roman legions grew in numbers and experience, 
 
62 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 his own veterans gradually disappeared &nd left but a 
 ragged force behind. And yet, during most of this time, 
 he marched over the length and breadth of Italy, ravag- 
 ing and destroying, and not one nor all the Roman armies 
 could prevent him from acting out his pleasure. 
 
 Among all the brilliant lessons in strategy which Hanni- 
 bal gave the Romans, there is time but to mention one 
 more. Capua, one of the large cities of Italy, had em- 
 braced Hannibal's cause as the coming man. But Hanni- 
 bal had in B.C. 211 been crowded back into southern 
 Italy, and the Romans were besieging Capua. He was 
 called upon for aid. The Capuans were in sorry plight. 
 Hannibal, who was blockading the citadel at Tarentum, 
 left this pressing affair to answer their appeal, made a 
 secret forced march, eluding the four consular legions in 
 Apulia and at Beneventum, and suddenly appeared before 
 the astonished Roman army at Capua, intent on raising 
 the siege. The Capuans and Carthaginians attacked the 
 Roman lines at the same time, but both recoiled from 
 superior numbers and entrenched position. Hannibal, 
 seeing that he could not raise the siege by direct means, 
 tried, for the first time in the history of strategy, an indirect 
 means, hoping to effect by moral weight what he could 
 not by weight of men. He marched straight on Rome. 
 He counted on the proconsuls, from fear for their capital, 
 to raise the siege of Capua and follow him. He knew he 
 could not capture Rome, where were forces much larger 
 than his own. But he ravaged the land to its very gates 
 and filled the city with affright. Hannibal had, how- 
 ever, taught his pupils much too well. Rome waa 
 
HANNIBAL. 
 
 63 
 
 terribly demoralized, and called lustily for the proconsuls 1 
 armies to come from Capua to its aid. But these gen- 
 erals were not to be misled ; they by no means relaxed 
 their grip, and Hannibal lost the game. At an earlier 
 stage of the war this brilliant movement would certainly 
 have raised the siege of Capua. 
 
 Finally, Hannibal became so reduced in numbers that he 
 
 ADK.AT,C 
 
 was compelled to remain in the extreme south of Italy. 
 He could not move out of Brutium. His forces were 
 quite unequal to fighting, or even campaigning. He waa 
 hoping against hope for some kind of recognition from 
 home, some aid in men and material. He could undertake 
 nothing, but clung to what he held with a despairing grasp. 
 Weak as he was, however, no Roman consul chose to come 
 Within reach of his arm. His patience and constancy 
 Under these trials, and the dread his name still inspired, 
 
64 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 show him up in far greater measure than any of his tii 
 umphs. Even Livy, who is full of depreciation of Han- 
 nibal's abilities, says, "The Romans did not provoke him 
 while he remained quiet, such power did they consider that 
 single general possessed, though everything else around 
 him was falling into ruin," and is compelled to follow up 
 this statement with a panegyric. 
 
 For a dozen years Hannibal had held more or less terri- 
 tory in the midst of the Roman Empire, far from home and 
 his natural base. His old army had quite disappeared, and 
 a motley array of the most heterogeneous materials had 
 taken its place. He had for three or four years past had 
 nothing which he could oppose to the Roman legions with- 
 out danger of without actual defeat. His troops had 
 often neither pay nor clothing ; rations were scant ; their arms 
 were far from good ; they must have foreseen eventual disas- 
 ter, as did Hannibal. And yet the tie between leader and 
 men never ceased to hold ; the few soldiers he had were all 
 devotion to his cause. Driven into a corner where he 
 must subsist his army on a limited area, which he could 
 only hold by forcing under his standard every man possibly 
 fit for service ; among a people whose greed for gold and 
 plunder was their chief characteristic, he was still able not 
 only to keep his phalanxes together, but to subject them to 
 excellent discipline. The Carthaginians, meanwhile, were 
 only dreaming of holding on to Spain ; their one useful 
 captain, with all his possibilities, they were blindly neg- 
 ecting. He was left absolutely to his own resources. 
 A.nd yet, it is so wonderful that one can but repeat it 
 again and again, though there were several armies of 
 
HANNIBAL. 65 
 
 Roman veteran legions for nearly all Roman soldiers 
 were veterans now around him on every side, such was 
 the majesty which hedged his name, that neither one singly, 
 nor all together, dared to come to the final conflict with 
 him, brave and able though their leaders were. Even 
 after the Metaurus, when the Romans knew what the effect 
 of his brother's defeat must be on the morale of Hannibal's 
 army, if not on himself, this dread of the very name of 
 Hannibal, even by the best of the Roman generals, is 
 almost inexplicable. They must each and all have recog- 
 nized that it needed but one joint effort to crush out his 
 weakened and depleted semblance of an army, and yet none 
 of them was apparently willing to undertake the task. 
 Whatever the Roman historians may tell us about these years, 
 is not here really a great and stubborn fact, which testifies 
 to more than a thousand pages penned by his detractors ? 
 
 Finally, long after Hasdrubal had made his way to Italy, 
 and had been defeated by the consul Nero, Rome carried 
 the war into Africa, and Hannibal was recalled from Italy 
 and defeated at Zama by Scipio. It was, however, 
 neither Scipio nor Zama that defeated Hannibal. The 
 Carthaginian cause had been doomed years before. It was 
 inanition, pure and simple, which brought Hannibal's 
 career to a close, the lack of support of the Carthaginian 
 Senate. He all but won Zama, even with the wretched 
 material he had brought from Italy, and without cavalry, 
 igainst the best army Rome had so far had, the most skil- 
 ful general, and every fair chance. Had he won Zama, 
 he must have lost the next battle. The Semitic cause 
 tgainst the Aryan was bound to fail. 
 
66 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 This battle ended the war. Hannibal lived nineteen 
 years after the defeat, for six years in Carthage, thirteen 
 in exile. Rome never felt secure until his death. 
 
 Hannibal ranks with the few great captains of the world. 
 Alexander, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick, Napo- 
 leon, alone can stand beside him. In this galaxy the stars 
 are equal. His self-reliant courage, which prompted him 
 to undertake the conquest of Italy with twenty thousand 
 foot and six thousand horse, without a definite base, and 
 with uncertain confederates, is the mark which stamps the 
 genius or the fool. Without the ability and iron reso- 
 lution to do so vast a thing, no great man ever accom- 
 plished results. Upon such a rock have been shattered 
 many reputations. 
 
 Hannibal had remarkable control over men. Reaching 
 Cisalpine Gaul, it was but a few weeks before the whole 
 province became his sworn allies, and they remained true 
 and faithful to his cause, and bore their heavy burden 
 with cheerful alacrity, though then, as now, the most 
 unstable of peoples. Hannibal possessed a keen knowl- 
 edge of human nature, as well as an unbounded individual 
 power over men. Unfortunately, only a few anecdotes re- 
 main to us as the portrait of this extraordinary man ; but 
 we cannot doubt that he carried that personal magnetism 
 with him which lent a wonderful strength to what he said 
 or did. 
 
 His victories were as brilliant as any ever won ; but on 
 these does not rest his chief glory. When he won Tre- 
 bia, Trasymene, Cannae, he had opposed to him generals 
 ignorant of the art of war, which art the genius of Hanni- 
 
HANNIBAL. 67 
 
 bal enabled him to use in a manner beyond all others, and 
 which his experience in many arduous campaigns had 
 taught him to the bottom. But Hannibal instructed these 
 same Romans in this very art of war, and his later oppo- 
 nents fought him on his own system, and with wonderful 
 aptness at learning what he had instilled into them with 
 such vast pains. These scholars of Hannibal, however, 
 able as they became, never in any sense grew to their mas- 
 ter's stature. They were strong in numbers and courage, 
 they surrounded him on all sides, they cut off his reenforce- 
 ments and victuals, they harassed his outposts and fora- 
 gers, they embarrassed his marches, all in the superb style 
 he had shown them how to use. But, for all that, though 
 outnumbering him many to one, not one or several of them 
 could ever prevent his coming or going, at his own good 
 time or pleasure, whithersoever he listed, and never was 
 more than a momentary advantage gained over him in a 
 pitched battle till the fatal day of Zama. Even after Has- 
 drubal's death, his aggressors dared not attack him. Like 
 a pack of bloodhounds around the boar at bay, none ven- 
 tured to close in on him for a final struggle. Even when 
 he embarked for Carthage, the most dangerous of opera- 
 tions possible for an army, it was not attempted to hamper 
 his progress. Even Scipio, in Italy, seemed by no means 
 anxious to encounter him, except at a disadvantage, 
 and in Africa did not meet him until he could do so on hia 
 own conditions, and under the very best of auspices. 
 
 By some, Scipio has been thought equal to Hannibal. 
 But great soldier as Scipio was, he falls very far short of 
 the rank attained by Hannibal. The list of generals of a 
 
68 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 lesser grade numbers many great names, among them that 
 of Scipio, linked with commanders like Brasidas, Epami- 
 nondas, Xenophon, Prince Eugene, Turenne, Marlbor- 
 ough, Montecuculi. But between these and men of the 
 stamp of Hannibal there is a great gulf fixed. 
 
 Like all great captains, Hannibal not infrequently vio- 
 lated what we now call the maxims of war ; but when he 
 did so, it was always with that admirable calculation of the 
 power or weakness of the men and forces opposed to him, 
 which, of itself, is the excuse for the act by that man who 
 is able to take advantage of as well as to make circum- 
 stances. All great captains have a common likeness in 
 this respect. 
 
 Napoleon aptly says : " The principles of Caesar were 
 the same as those of Alexander or Hannibal : to hold 
 his forces in hand; to be vulnerable on several points 
 only when it is unavoidable ; to march rapidly upon the 
 important points ; to make use to a great extent of all 
 moral means, such as the reputation of his arms, the fear 
 he inspires, the political measures calculated to preserve 
 the attachment of allies, and the submission of conquered 
 provinces." 
 
 Such men have used ths maxims of war only so far as 
 they fitted into their plans and combinations. Success 
 justifies them, but the failure of the lesser lights who 
 infringe these maxims only proves them to be maxims 
 indeed. 
 
 What has Hannibal done for the art of war r First and 
 foremost he taught the Romans what war really is ; that 
 there is something beyond merely marching out , fighting a 
 
HANNlhAL. 69 
 
 battle, and marching home again. He showed them that 
 with but a small part of their numerical force, with less good 
 material, with less good arms, with but a few allies, he 
 could keep Rome on the brink of ruin and despair for two- 
 thirds of a generation. He showed them for thirteen years 
 that he could accomplish more than they could, despite 
 their numbers, and without battle. And while battle 
 should be always the legitimate outcome of all military 
 manoeuvres, Hannibal taught the Romans that there was 
 something far higher in war than mere brute weight, and 
 through the Romans he has taught us. 
 
 Hannibal was as typically a fighter as even Alexander, 
 though he preferred to prescribe his own time and condi- 
 tions. But all through Alexander's campaigns it happened 
 that the results he aimed at could be accomplished only by 
 hammering. And he had the power to hammer. Hanni- 
 bal, on the contrary, found that he could not stand attri- 
 tion ; that he must save men. Alexander was constantly 
 seeking conquests ; Hannibal, like Frederick, only to keep 
 what he had won, and in doing this he showed the world 
 the first series of examples of intellectual war. Alexan- 
 der's strategy, in its larger aspect, was as far-seeing and 
 far-reaching as that of any of the great captains, and he 
 was the first to show it. But Alexander's strategic move- 
 ments had not been understood, and ran danger of being 
 lost. Hannibal was, probably, the only man who under- 
 stood what Alexander had done, and he impressed his own \- 
 strategy so thoroughly upon the Romans that it modified 
 their whole method of waging war. Alexander's strategy 
 was equally marked. Like Caesar's, his strategic field waa 
 
70 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 the whole known world. But he did not exhibit that more 
 useful phase of strategy, on a smaller theatre, which Han- 
 nibal has given us. 
 
 While Hannibal's movement into Italy was offensive, 
 the years after Cannae partook largely of the defensive. 
 He was holding his own till he could get reinforcements 
 from home, or the help of the Roman allies. And yet it 
 was he who was the main-spring which furnished the 
 action, the centre about which everything revolved. Per- 
 haps there is no surer test of who is the foremost soldier of 
 a campaign than to determine who it is upon whose action 
 everything waits ; who it is that forces the others to gauge 
 
 ir own by his movements. And this Hannibal always 
 did. It made no odds whether it was in his weak or his 
 strong years. It was Hannibal's marching to and fro, 
 Hannibal's manoeuvres, offensive or defensive, which pre- 
 determined the movements of the Roman armies. 
 
 We know little about the personal appearance of Han- 
 nibal. We only know that in the march through the 
 Arnus swamps he lost an eye. In the British Museum is 
 an ancient bust of a soldier with but one eye by some 
 supposed to be Hannibal. But there is no authentic like- 
 ness of the man. It is improbable that he possessed 
 Alexander's charm of beauty. But in all his other 
 qualities, mental and physical, he was distinctly his equal ; 
 and in his life he was simple, pure and self-contained. 
 
 Alexander did brilliant things for their own sake. 
 Hannibal always forgot self in his work. Alexander 
 needed adulation. Hannibal was far above such weak- 
 ness. Alexander was open, hasty, violent. His fiery 
 
HANNIBAL. 71 
 
 nature often ran away with his discretion. Hannibal was 
 singularly self-poised. From his face you could never 
 divine his thought or intention. So marked was this 
 ability to keep his own counsel, never to betray his pur- 
 pose, that the Roman historians talked of deception when 
 he did unexpected things. But Punic faith was distinctly 
 as good as Roman faith. The Romans promised and did 
 not perform ; Hannibal never promised. Hannibal's mind 
 was broad, delicate, clear. His Greek training made him 
 intellectually the superior of any of the Roman generals. 
 His conception of operations and discrimination in means 
 were equalled by his boldness even obstinacy of exe- 
 cution. 
 
 Hannibal's influence over men is perhaps his most i 
 wonderful trait. Alexander commanded fealty as a king, 
 as well as won it as a man ; Hannibal earned the fidelity 
 and love of his men by his personal qualities alone. 
 When we consider the heterogeneous elements of which 
 his army was composed, the extraordinary hardships it 
 underwent, the hoping against hope, the struggling against 
 certain defeat and eventual annihilation, the toils and 
 privation, and remember that there was never a murmur 
 in his camp, or a desertion from his ranks, and that event- 
 ually he was able to carry his army, composed almost 
 entirely of Italians, over to Africa on the most dangerous 
 of tasks, and to fight them as he did at Zama, it may 
 be said that Hannibal's ability to keep this body together 
 and fit for work shows the most wonderful influence over 
 men ever possessed by man. 
 
 Alexander always had luck running in his favor. Han- 
 
72 
 
 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 r 
 
 nibal is essentially the captain of misfortune. Alexander 
 was always victorious ; Hannibal rarely so in battle in the 
 last twelve years in Italy. Alexander fought against a 
 huge but unwieldy opponent, brave, but without discipline, 
 and top-heavy. Hannibal's work was against the most 
 compact and able nation of the world, at its best period, 
 the very type of a fighting machine. Not that all this in 
 any sense makes Hannibal greater than Alexander, but it 
 serves to heighten the real greatness of Hannibal. 
 
 Hannibal's marches were quick, secret, crafty. He was 
 singularly apt at guessing what his enemy would do, and 
 could act on it with speed and effect. He was unsurpassed 
 in logistics. The Romans learned all they ever knew of 
 ihis branch of the art from Hannibal. Despite the tax 
 upon him, his men always had bread. He utilized his 
 victories well, but was not led astray by apparent though 
 delusive chances. As a besieger Hannibal was not Alex- 
 ander's equal. Only Demetrius and Caesar, perhaps, were. 
 In this matter Hannibal and Frederick were alike. Both 
 isliked siege-work. 
 
 But as a man, so far as we can know him, and if he 
 had any vices, his enemies, the Roman historians, would 
 have dilated upon them, Hannibal was perhaps, except- 
 ing Gustavus Adolphus, the most admirable of all. Ag 
 a captain he holds equal rank with the others. As a dis- 
 tinguishing mark, we may well call him w The Father of 
 Strategy." 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 CJSSAR. 
 
 AIUS JULIUS CAESAR is the only one of the great 
 captains who trained himself to arms. Alexander, 
 Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick, owed their early 
 military training to their fathers, though, indeed, Freder- 
 ick's was but the pipe-clay of war. Napoleon got his in 
 the best school in France. Every Roman citizen was, to 
 be sure, trained as a soldier, and Ca3sar had had a slight 
 experience in some minor campaigns. But the drilling 
 of the soldier cannot produce the captain. And Caesar 
 began his military career at an age when that of the 
 others except Frederick had ceased. 
 
 A comparison of ages is interesting. Alexander made 
 his marvellous campaigns between twenty-one and thirty- 
 three years of age. Gustavus Adolphus' independent 
 military career was from seventeen to thirty-eight, the 
 last two years being those which entitle him to rank with 
 the great captains. Hannibal began at - twenty-six and 
 never left the harness till he was forty-five. Napoleon's 
 wonderful wars began at twenty-seven and ended at 
 forty-six. Frederick opened his Silesian struggles at 
 twenty -nine and closed them at fifty-one ; the Seven 
 
 73 
 
74 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Years' War ran from his forty-fifth to his fifty-second 
 year. Caesar began at forty-two and ended at fifty-five. 
 Thus the only two of the great captains whose best work 
 was done near the fifties were Caesar and Frederick. Of 
 the others, Hannibal and Gustavus Adolphus were most 
 admirable in the thirties, Napoleon between twenty- 
 seven and thirty-nine, Alexander in the twenties. 
 To take the age of each in the middle of his military 
 career, Alexander and Gustavus were twenty -seven, Han- 
 nibal thirty-six, Napoleon thirty-seven, Frederick forty, 
 and Caesar forty-eight. Or, to place each at the height 
 of his ability, Alexander was twenty-five, Hannibal thir 
 ty-four, Gustavus thirty-seven, Napoleon thirty-nine, 
 Frederick forty-five, Caesar fifty-two. 
 
 Caesar's youth had been that of a young man of the 
 upper- tendom, with a not unusual mixture of high breed- 
 ing and vices, and was rather inclined to be a dandy, 
 but one of whom Sulla remarked that " it would be well 
 to have an eye to yonder dandy." In manhood he can 
 socially be best described as a thorough man of the world, 
 able and attractive ; in stirring political life always remark- 
 able for what he did and the way in which he did it. 
 
 When Caesar was forty-two he was chosen Consul and 
 leceived Gaul as his province (B.C. 58). Pompey, Cras- 
 sus and he divided the power of the Roman state. 
 Caesar proposed to himself, eventually, to monopolize it. 
 His reasons do not here concern us. For this purpose 
 he needed a thorough knowledge of war and an army 
 levoted to liis interests. He had neither, but he made 
 Gaul furnish him both. Let us follow Caesar in a cursory 
 
C^SAR. 
 
 75 
 
 through all his campaigns and see what the grain of 
 the man does to make the general ; for here we have the 
 remarkable spectacle of a man entering middle life, who, 
 beginning without military knowledge or experience, by 
 his own unaided efforts rises to be one of the few great 
 
 BRITAIN 
 
 SPAIN 
 
 Se/ 
 
 captains. I shall speak more of the Gallic War, because 
 its grand strategy is not often pointed out. 
 
 Caesars object in Gaul was not merely to protect Roman 
 "nterests. He needed war to further his schemes of cen- 
 tralization. On reaching the Province, as was called the 
 territory at that time held by Rome in Gaul (B.C. 58), 
 be encountered an armed migration of the Helvetii, 
 
76 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 moving from the Alps, by way of Geneva, towards 
 the fertile lowlands. This was a dangerous threat to 
 the Province, and, moreover, to attack this tribe would 
 e'Tvc as initiation to Czesar and his men. Ho com- 
 manded the Helvetii to return to their homes, which 
 being refused, he first outwitted them in negotiations, 
 until he assembled troops, followed, surprised, and at- 
 tacked them while crossing the Arar, and annihilated a 
 third of their force. Then following them up with a 
 cautious inexperience, but, though making mistakes, with 
 extraordinary foresight and skill, he finally, in the battle 
 of Bibracte, after grave danger and against heroic resist- 
 ance, utterly worsted them, and obliged the relics of the 
 tribe to obey his mandate. Of the entire body, numbering 
 three hundred and sixty-eight thousand souls, but one 
 hundred and ten thousand lived to return home. Thus 
 began what will always be a blot on Caesar's fame as a 
 soldier, his disregard for human life, however brave his 
 enemies, however unnecessary its sacrifice. Alexander, 
 on several occasions, devastated provinces. But in his 
 case the military necessity was less doubtful ; and the 
 number of Alexander's victims never rises to the awful 
 sum of Caesar's, nor was the law of nations as definite in his 
 day as it had become fifty years before the Christian era. 
 
 Csesar next moved against Ariovistus, a German chief 
 who was bringing numbers of his countrymen across the 
 Rhine to seize the lands of the friendly Gauls. Caesar saw 
 that to conquer Gaul he must eliminate this migratory 
 element from the problem ; for the Germans would be 
 pouring in on his flank during any advance he might 
 
CAESAR. 77 
 
 make into the heart of the country. Moreover, Caesar'a 
 actions always sought to forward Caesar's plans ; only as 
 a second consideration to protect the Roman territory. 
 To place Caesar at the head of the Roman state would 
 best serve the Commonwealth. War he must have, and 
 anything would serve as casus belli. But, though far 
 from faultless as a statesman, Caesar grew to be all but 
 faultless as a soldier, and his present military object, 
 the conquest of Gaul, he carried out in the most brill- 
 iant and methodical manner. 
 
 Caesar ordered Ariovistus to return across the Rhine. 
 Ariovistus declined. Caesar moved by forced marches 
 against him. After a useless conference, Ariovistus, 
 who was a man of marked native ability, made a hand- 
 some manoeuvre around Caesar's flank, which the latter 
 was not quick enough to check, and deliberately sat 
 down on his line of communications. Caesar was thun- 
 derstruck. He endeavored to lure Ariovistus to battle, 
 as an outlet to the dilemma, for he was compromised. 
 But Ariovistus was well satisfied with his position, to 
 hold which would soon starve the Romans out. Caesar, 
 not unwilling to learn from even a barbarian, resorted, 
 after these failures, to a similar manoeuvre around Ario- 
 vistus' flank, which he made with consummate skill, 
 and regained his line of retreat. Then, having learned 
 that the German soothsayers had presaged defeat, if 
 Ariovistus should fight before the new moon, he forced 
 a battle on the Germans, and, after a terrible contest, 
 iefeated them, destroyed substantially the whole tribe, 
 and drove the few survivors across the Rhine. 
 
78 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Caesar had shown the decision, activity, courage, and 
 quickness of apprehension which were his birthright. 
 But underlying these was a caution bred of lack of that 
 self-reliance which in after years grew so marked. He 
 made blunders which in later campaigns he would not 
 have made, nor was he opposed to such forces as he 
 later encountered. Ariovistus had no great preponder- 
 ance over Caesar's fifty thousand men. One rather ad- 
 mires in this year's campaigns the Helvetii and the 
 Germans for their noble gallantry in facing Roman 
 discipline and so nearly succeeding in their struggle. 
 
 Next year (B.C. 57) Caesar conducted a campaign 
 against the Belgae, whose joint tribes had raised a force of 
 three hundred and fifty thousand men. By prompt action 
 and concessions he seduced one tribe from the coalition, 
 and by a well-timed diversion into the land of another, 
 weakened the aggressiveness of the latter. He had won a 
 number of Gallic allies. Curiously enough, all his cav- 
 alry throughout the war was native, the Roman cavalry 
 being neither numerous nor good. All told, he had some 
 Beventy thousand men. 
 
 The Belgae attacked him at the River Axona, but by 
 dexterous management Caesar held his own, inflicted 
 enormous losses on them, and finally, from lack of rations, 
 they dispersed, thus enabling Caesar to handle them in de- 
 tail. Many gave in their submission : others were reduced 
 by force ; disunited they were weak. 
 
 The Nervii, however, surprised Caesar at the River Sabis, 
 from ambush, and came near to annihilating his army, 
 [le had forgotten Hannibal's lesson of Lake Trasymene 
 
CJESAR. 79 
 
 Nothing but stubborn courage and admirable discipline 
 the knowledge, too, that defeat meant massacre saved the 
 day. Caesar headed his legionaries with superb personal 
 gallantry, and his narrow escape made him thereafter 
 much more cautious on the march. Out of sixty thousand 
 Nervii, barely five hundred were left when the battle 
 ended. Their fighting had been heroic beyond words. 
 Their defeat and the capture of a number of cities induced 
 many tribes to submit to the inevitable. 
 
 The best praise of this splendid campaign is its own suc- 
 cess. The energy, rapidity, clear-sightedness, and skill 
 with which Cajsar divided, attacked in detail, and over- 
 came the Belgian tribes with their enormous numbers, is a 
 model for study. But he still committed serious errors, of 
 which the careless march without proper scouting, which 
 led to the surprise by the Nervii, was a notable example. 
 He was not yet master of his art. 
 
 During the succeeding winter the Belgae again banded 
 together, and the Veneti seized some Roman officers seek- 
 ing corn (B.C. 56). This act Caesar considered in the 
 light of a revolt, and determined summarily to punish. 
 The Veneti were a maritime people, living in what is now 
 Brittany, whose strongholds could only be reached by sea. 
 Caesar's attempts to attack them by land proved abortive, 
 but his admiral, with a fleet built for the occasion, worsted 
 the Venetan squadron, and Caesar, with needless cruelty 
 and distinct bad policy, put the Senate to death and sold 
 the tribe into slavery. Caesar was personally humane, 
 These acts of extermination are the less pardonable. 
 His lieutenants, meanwhile. .iad subdued a part of Aqui- 
 
80 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 tania. All Gaul, save only the tribes opposite the Brit 
 ish coast, had, after a fashion, been reduced. This third 
 year in Gaul redounds to Caesar's credit foi the general 
 scheme ; to his lieutenants for the detailed campaigns. 
 
 The fdurth year (B.C. 55) was tarnished by, per- 
 ba|>8, the most gigantic piece of cruelty ever charged to tho 
 score of civilized man. Two German tribes, the Usipetes 
 and Tencheteri, had been crowded across the Rhine by the 
 Suevi, the stoutest nation on the eastern bank. These 
 people Caesar proposed to chase back across the river. He 
 marched against them, and was met by a suit for peace. 
 Caesar alleges treachery, on their part, in the negotiations, 
 but his own version in the Commentaries does not sustain 
 him. During what the barbarians deemed an armistice, 
 Caesar, by a rapid and unexpected march, fell upon them, 
 and utterly destroyed the tribes, men, women, and chil- 
 dren, whose number himself states at four hundred and 
 thirty thousand souls. A few thousands escaped across 
 the river. So indignant were even many of the citi- 
 zens of Rome, his political opponents, to be sure, 
 that Cato openly proposed to send Caesar's head to the 
 tew survivors in expiation. It is impossible to overlook, 
 in Caesar's military character, these acts of unnecessary 
 rxtermination. 
 
 Caesar next made a campaign across the Rhine, for which 
 purpose he built his celebrated bridge. It was a mere re- 
 connoissance in force, of no strategic value or result. And 
 the same must be said of his first expedition to Britain, 
 which shortly followed. This was conducted with so few 
 precautions, and so little knowledge of what he was actu- 
 
CJESAR. 81 
 
 ally about, that Cassar was indebted to simple fortune that 
 he ever returned to Gaul. 
 
 The second British expedition (B.C. 54), in which he 
 encountered Casivelaunus, was better prepared and more 
 extensive. But though these invasions of Britain and 
 Germany show wonderful enterprise, they were of doubtful 
 wisdom and absolutely no general military utility. Apart 
 from the fact that they were unwarranted by the laws 
 of nations, they were not required for the protection of 
 the Province. "Caesar observed rather than conquered 
 Britain," 
 
 During the succeeding winter Caesar quartered his 
 troops unwisely far apart, from scarcity of corn, and relying 
 on the supposed subjection of the Gauls. This led to an 
 uprising, the destruction of one legion and the jeopardiz- 
 ing of several others. The error of thus dispersing his 
 forces was, to an extent, offset by Caesar's prodigious 
 activity and brilliant courage in retrieving his error and 
 succoring his endangered legions. 
 
 In the sixth campaign (B.C. 53), Caesar again crossed 
 the Ehine, with no greater result than added fame, and 
 definitely subdued the tribes along the western borders of 
 this stream. The work of this year was admirable in 
 every way. At its expiration Caesar, as usual, returned to 
 Rome. 
 
 During his absence the chiefs of the Gallic tribes deter- 
 mined to make one more universal uprising, surround the 
 legions, and, cutting Caesar off from return, to destroy 
 them. The leader of the movement was Vercingetorix, a 
 foung chief of exceptional ability, to whose standard 
 
32 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 flocked numberless warriors (B.C. 52). Notified of 
 this danger, Caesar hurried to the Province. He found 
 himself in reality cut off from his legions, and without 
 troops to fight his way through. He must divert the at- 
 tention of Vercingetorix to enable him to reach his army. 
 Raising a small force in the Province, he headed an expedi- 
 tion across the Cebenna Mountains, which had never yet 
 been crossed in winter, into the land of the Arverni, which 
 he devastated. Vercingetorix, astounded at his daring, 
 marched to the rescue. No sooner had he arrived than 
 Caesar, with a small escort of picked cavalry, started for 
 his legions, and, by riding night and day, faster than even 
 news could travel, kept ahead of danger and reached them 
 safe and sound. He at once opened a winter campaign, 
 drew together the nearest of his legions and attacked Ver- 
 cingetorix's allies in his rear, capturing and pillaging town 
 after town. The whole opening was a splendid piece of 
 daring skill and brilliantly conceived. 
 
 Vercingetorix was by far the most able of Caesar's oppo- 
 nents in Gaul. He saw that in the open he could not 
 match the Romans, and began a policy of small war and 
 defensive manosuvres similar to what Fabius had practised 
 against Hannibal. This greatly hampered Caesar's move- 
 ments by cutting off his supplies. Caesar took Avaricum ; 
 but the siege of Gergovia, which place he reached by clev- 
 erly stealing a passage over the Elaver, was not fortunate. 
 The Gauls ably defended the town, while Vercingetorix 
 aptly interfered with the Roman work ; and by rousing to 
 insurrection Caesar's allies, the -$3dui, in his rear, he com- 
 pelled the Romans to raise the siege. This was Caesar's 
 
CJB8AR. 83 
 
 Bole failure in the Gallic campaigns. He returned to quell 
 the uprising of the JEdui, on whose granaries he relied for 
 corn, and was joined by the rest of the legions. 
 
 Shortly after this the pressure of the over-eager barba- 
 rians on Vercingetorix forced him to give up his sensible 
 policy of small war. He attacked Ca3sar in the open field, 
 in an effort to cut him off from the Province, on which 
 Caesar, having regained his legions, now proposed to base. 
 As always in such cases, discipline prevailed, and the 
 Gauls suffered defeat ; but Vercingetorix managed to 
 withdraw without the usual massacre. Caesar then sat 
 down before Alesia, a town on holding which the barba- 
 rians had placed their last stake. Vercingetorix occupied 
 it with eighty thousand men. Caesar had fifty thousand 
 legionaries, ten thousand Gallic horse, and perhaps ten 
 thousand allies. 
 
 This siege is one of the most wonderful of antiquity. It 
 equals Alexander's siege of Tyre or Demetrius' siege of 
 Rhodes. The works Caesar erected were marvellous in 
 their extent and intricacy. So strong were his lines that 
 even an army of relief of a quarter of a million men added 
 to the garrison, was unable to break them. Alesia fell. 
 Vercingetorix was surrendered to Caesar and kept for 
 exhibition in his triumph. Gaul never again rose en 
 masse. By alternate generosity and severity, Caesar com- 
 pletely reduced it to the Roman yoke. 
 
 This seventh year was a brilliant exhibition of Caesar'ff 
 ability in engineering, strategy, tactics, logistics. His 
 achievements are unsurpassed. He had taught the Gaula 
 that they were not the equals of the Roman legions 01 
 
84 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 nation. Still this courageous people was not subdued. 
 They could see that although Caesar was able to beat them 
 wherever they met, he was not able to be in all places at 
 once. They determined to essay one more uprising in 
 isolated bodies. But this also failed, and Caesar's eighth 
 and last year (B.C. 51) snuffed out all opposition. 
 
 It was no doubt for the good of Europe that Gaul 
 should be brought under Roman rule. But it is ques- 
 tionable whether, under the law of nations, as then 
 understood, Caesar had the right to conquer Gaul. His 
 duty was merely to defend the Province. Not so, how- 
 ever, thought Caesar. All things bent to his ulterior 
 designs. His cardinal motive was self. But accepting his 
 theory, his purpose was clean-cut and carried out with 
 preeminent skill. His errors lie more in his political than 
 military conduct. Strategetically, his course was sound. 
 
 The Province, when to Caesar fell Gaul as one of the 
 triumvirs, was a species of salient thrust forward into the 
 midst of the country. West and north o its boundary, 
 the Rhone, lived allied peoples. From the mountains on 
 the east danger was threatened by a number of restless 
 tribes. The advantages of this salient were by no means 
 lost on Caesar, nor the central position which it afforded. 
 He utilized it in the same fashion as Napoleon did Switzer- 
 land in 1800. His first war, against the Helvetii, was 
 intended to and resulted in protecting the right flank of 
 the salient, an absolute essential to safety in advancing 
 into north or north-west Gaul. From this point, duly 
 secured, northerly, the Rhine, and the Jura and Vosegus 
 mountains protected in a marked degree the right of an 
 
CJSSAR. 85 
 
 advancing army, provided the tribes west of this river 
 were not unfriendly ; and it will be noticed that one of 
 Caesar's early efforts was directed to winning the friendship 
 of these tribes by generous treatment and effective protec- 
 tion against their German enemies. When he could not 
 so accomplish his end he resorted to drastic measures. 
 Caesar thus advanced his salient along the Mosa as far as 
 the Sabis, and could then debouch from the western water- 
 shed of the Mosa down the valleys of the Matrona and 
 Axona with perfect safety. For, besides the friendship of 
 the near-by tribes, he always kept strongly fortified camps 
 among them. The line of the Axona thus furnished him 
 an advanced base from which to operate against the Belgae, 
 and from their territory, once gained, safely move even so 
 far as Britain, if he but protected his rear and accumulated 
 provisions. Having subdued the Belgae he could turn to 
 the south-west corner of Gaul, against Aquitania. Caesar 
 thus exemplified in the fullest degree the advantage in 
 grand strategy of central lines of operation. And his 
 most serious work was devoted to establishing this central 
 salient by alliance or conquest. Once gained, this sim- 
 plified his operations to isolated campaigns. 
 
 There is nothing more noteworthy in all military 
 history than Caesar's broad conception of the Gallic prob- 
 lem, nor more interesting than his self-education. It is 
 true that a soldier is born, but he has also to be made ; 
 and Caesar made himself more distinctly than the others. 
 He began with his native ability alone. He went to 
 school to Caesar in the Gallic War. He graduated as one 
 of the six great captains. Caesar was always numerically 
 
86 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 weaker than the enemy, but far stronger in every othei 
 quality, especially in self-confidence and capacity for work. 
 His legionaries would bear anything, and could do any- 
 thing. They were very Yankees for ingenuity. Caesar 
 did not mix Gallic allies with his legions, as Alexander or 
 Hannibal mixed natives with their phalanxes. He em- 
 ployed only native bowmen in addition to his native cav- 
 alry. He worked his army well concentrated. If he 
 divided his forces it was but for a short time, soon to 
 concentrate again. But he improved every chance to 
 attack the enemy before he had concentrated. Speed of 
 foot, with Caesar, stood in place of numbers. His objec- 
 tive was always well chosen, and was either the most 
 important point, or more commonly, the army of the 
 enemy. 
 
 It was impossible that during this period of schooling, 
 Caesar should not make blunders grave ones ; but all his 
 errors bore fruit, and raised the tone or both consul and 
 legions. One can see, step by step, how success and 
 failure each taught its lesson ; how native ability came to 
 the surface ; how the man impressed his individuality on 
 whatever he did ; and how intelligence led him to apply 
 whatever he learned to his future policy. No praise is too 
 high for the conduct or moral qualities of the army. 
 From Caesar down, through every grade, military virtue 
 was pronounced. In organization and discipline, ability 
 to do almost any work, endurance of danger and trial, 
 toughness and manhood, it was a model to the rest of 
 Rome. And not only his legionaries, but his auxiliary 
 troops were imbued with the same spirit, all breathed 
 
CAESAR. 87 
 
 not only devotion to Caesar, but reflected his own great 
 qualities. 
 
 Caesar had some worthy opponents. Vercingetorix, 
 Ariovistus, Casivelaunus, were, each in his own way, able 
 leaders. That they were overcome by Caesar was to be 
 expected. Disciplined troops well led cannot but win 
 against barbarians. The end could not be otherwise. And 
 while the Gallic War does not show Caesar as the second 
 Punic War did Hannibal opposed to the strongest mili- 
 tary machine in existence, it did show him opposed to gen- 
 erals and troops quite equal to most of those encountered 
 by Alexander. The Gauls must not be underrated. 
 They were distinctly superior to most uncivilized nations. 
 Some of their operations, and all of their fighting, call 
 for genuine admiration. They contended nobly for their 
 independence. Defeat never permanently discouraged 
 them. Once put down, they again rose in assertion of 
 their liberty, so soon as the strong hand was removed. 
 They were in no sense to be despised, and while Caesar's 
 army proved superior to them, yet, in their motives and 
 hearty cooperation, they were more commendable than 
 Caesar pursuing his scheme of conquest. 
 
 Anarchy in Rome and his disagreement with Pompey 
 brought about the Civil War ; this immediately succeeded 
 the Gallic. Caesar was ready for it. Pompey practically 
 controlled the whole power of Rome. Caesar had only 
 his twelve legions. But these were veterans used to 
 rictory, and belonged to him body and soul. He could 
 do with them whatever he chose. Caesar was the em- 
 bodiment of success, and fresh legions were sure tc 
 
88 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 spring up at his approach. Pompey lived on his past 
 fame ; Caesar, on to-day's. Pompey had made no prepara- 
 tion ; Caesar was armed and equipped. Pompey con- 
 trolled vast resources, but they were not ready to hand. 
 What Caesar had was fit. Moreover, Caesar was shrewd 
 enough to keep the apparent legal right upon his side, 
 as well as constantly to approach Pompey with proposals 
 for peace, which, however, he was no doubt aware 
 Pompey would not accept. 
 
 Pompey was a man of ability, but age, as is not un- 
 common, had sapped his power of decision. He began by 
 a fatal mistake. Instead of meeting Ca3sar on his native 
 soil, and fighting there for Rome, he moved to Greece 
 so soon as Caesar reached his front, and left the latter 
 to supplant him in the political and armed control of 
 Italy. * 
 
 Caesar was wont to push for his enemy as objective, 
 and one would expect to see him follow Pompey to 
 Greece, for it is a maxim, and maxims are common 
 sense, first to attack the most dangerous part of your 
 enemy's divided forces. But there were seven Pompeian 
 legions left in Spain, and fearing that these might fall 
 upon his rear, Caesar concluded to turn first toward the 
 peninsula, relying on Pompey 's hebetude to remain 
 inactive where he stood. He knew his man. 
 
 It had taken but sixty days for Caesar to make himself 
 master of all Italy. In six weeks after reaching Spain, 
 by a brilliant series of manoeuvres near Ilerda, in which 
 he utilized every mistake Pompey 's lieutenants made 
 and without battle, for he wished to be looked on as 
 
80 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 anxious to avoid the spilling of Roman blood, he had 
 neutralized and disbanded the seven legions. This ac- 
 complishment of his object by manoeuvres instead of 
 fighting is one of the very best examples of its kind in 
 antiquity, and is equal to any of Hannibal's. Meanwhile, 
 Pompey had not lifted a hand against him. This was 
 good luck ; but was it not fitting that fortune should 
 attend such foresight, activity, and skill? 
 
 Caesar returned to Italy. He was now ready to fol- 
 low his enemy across to Epirus. Pompey controlled 
 the sea with his five hundred vessels. Caesar had no 
 fleet, and, curiously enough, had neglected, in the past few 
 months, to take any steps to create one. And yet he 
 determined to cross from Br undisium to the coast of 
 Greece by sea. It is odd that he did not rather march 
 by land, through Illyricum, thus basing himself on his 
 own province ; for a large part of his legions was al- 
 ready on the Padus. But he chose the other means, 
 and when, with half his force, he had stolen across, Pom- 
 pey's fleet dispersed his returning transports, and so 
 patrolled the seas that he commanded the Adriatic be- 
 tween the two halves of Caesar's army. This was not 
 clever management. Caesar was in grave peril, and 
 simply by his own lack of caution. If Pompey concen- 
 trated he could crush him by mere weight. But, nothing 
 daunted, Caesar faced his opponent and for many months 
 skilfully held his own. 
 
 Finally, Antonius, with the other half, eluded the Pom- 
 peian fleet and reached the coast, where, by an able series 
 f inarches, Caesar made his junction with him. He 
 
CJSSAR. 91 
 
 even now had but about half Pompey's force, but despite 
 this he continued to push his adversary by superior ac- 
 tivity and intelligence, and actually cooped him up in 
 siege-lines near Dyrrachium. This extraordinary spec- 
 tacle of Caesar bottling up Pompey, who had twice his 
 force (May, 48), by lines of circumvallation sixteen 
 miles long, borders on the ridiculous, and well illustrates 
 his moral superiority. But so bold a proceeding could 
 not last. Combats became frequent, and grew in im- 
 portance. The first battle of Dyrrachium was won by 
 Caesar. The second proved disastrous, but still Caesar 
 held on. The third battle was a decisive defeat for 
 Caesar, but this great man's control over his troops was 
 such that he withdrew them in good condition and cour- 
 age, and eluded Pompey's pursuit. In fact, the defeat 
 both shamed and encouraged his legionaries. Caesar's 
 position and plan had been so eccentric that it was 
 from the beginning doomed to failure. It was one of 
 those cases where his enterprise outran his discretion. 
 
 Caesar now moved inland, to gain elbow-room to ma- 
 noeuvre. Pompey followed, each drawing in his outlying 
 forces. The rival armies finally faced each other at 
 Pharsalus. 
 
 Pompey commanded a force sufficient to hold Caesar at 
 his mercy. So certain were his friends of victory that 
 already they saw their chief at the head of the Roman state, 
 and quarrelled about the honors and spoils. The cry to 
 be led against Caesar grew among soldiers and courtiers 
 alike. 
 
 Pompey believed that Caesar's troops were not of the 
 
92 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 best ; that he had few Gallic veterans ; that his young 
 soldiers could not stand adversity ; that his own cavalry 
 was superior to Caesar's ; and that with the preponderance 
 of numbers there could be no doubt of victory. There 
 was abundant reason for his belief. But one lame pre- 
 mise lay in his argument. He forgot that he had Caesar in 
 his front. The great weakness in Pompey's army was the 
 lack of one head, one purpose to control and direct events. 
 
 Caesar, on the other hand, was^ his army. The whoje 
 body was instinct with his purpose. From low to high all 
 worked on his own method. He controlled its every 
 mood and act. He was the main-spring and balance- 
 wheel alike. And he now felt that he could again rely 
 upon his legions, perhaps better than before their late 
 defeat. He proposed to bring Pompey to battle. 
 
 The test soon came. In the battle of Pharsalus (Aug. 
 48) Pompey was, by tactical ability on Caesar's part and 
 by the disgraceful conduct of his own cavalry, wholly 
 defeated ; fifteen thousand of his army were killed and 
 twenty-four thousand captured. Pompey himself fled to 
 Egypt, where he was murdered. In eighteen months 
 from taking up arms, Caesar had made himself master 
 of the world by defeating the only man who disputed 
 him this title. 
 
 Caesar now committed one of those foolhardy acts of 
 which several mar his reputation for wisdom, and from 
 which only " Caesar's luck " delivered him. He followed 
 Pompey to Egypt with but three thousand men, and 
 attempted to dictate to the Government. In consequence 
 of this heedless proceeding, he and this handful he, the 
 
C&SAR. 93 
 
 man who disposed of the forces of the whole world were 
 beleaguered in Alexandria by an Egyptian army for eight 
 mouths, until he could procure the assistance of allies. 
 He was finally rescued by Mithridates, King of Perga- 
 rrius, and the Egyptians were defeated at the battle of the 
 Nile. 
 
 The months thus wasted by Caesar's lack of caution 
 gave the Pompeian party a breathing-spell and the oppor- 
 tunity of taking fresh root in Africa. This was what 
 necessitated the two additional campaigns, one in Africa 
 and one in Spain. Had Caesar, immediately after Pharsa- 
 lus, turned sharply upon Pompey's adherents; or had he 
 taken four or five legions with him to Alexandria ; or had 
 he put aside the question of the rule of Egypt by a tem- 
 porizing policy, and turned to the more important questions 
 at hand,, he would have saved himself vast future, trouble. 
 
 The force he carried with him was absurdly inadequate. 
 By extreme good luck alone was he able to seize the cita- 
 del and arsenal, and the tower on the Pharos, and thus 
 save himself from collapse. " There seems to be nothing 
 remarkable about the campaign," says Napoleon, " Egypt 
 night well have become, but for Cesar's wonderful good 
 fortune, the very grave of his reputation." 
 
 Caesar was now called against Pharnaces, King of 
 Pontus, who, during the distractions of the Civil War, 
 was seeking to enlarge his territory. It was this five 
 days' campaign (Aug. 47) which led Caesar to exclaim, 
 "Veni, Vidi, Vici!" And here again he committed the 
 blunder of opening a campaign with too small a force, 
 Hid came within an ace of failure. Fortune saved Alex 
 
94 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 ander in many acts of rashness ; she was callel on to 
 rescue Caesar from many acts of folly. 
 
 Caesar had barely arrived in Rome when his presence 
 was demanded in Africa to put down the coalition of 
 Pompey's lieutenants ; and for the fourth time he was 
 guilty of the same imprudence. In his over- ardor to 
 reach the scene, he gave indefinite orders to his fleet, 
 and once more landed on the African coast with but 
 three thousand men in his immediate command, while the 
 enemy had near at hand quadruple the force, and along 
 the coast, within two or three days' march, some fifty 
 thousand men. But again Caesar's audacity stood in stead 
 of legions, and gradually reinforcements came to hand 
 (Dec. 47). Time fails to follow up this campaign. 
 Full of all that characterizes the great man and greater 
 captain, it not only excites our wonder, but puzzles us 
 by alternate hypercaution and intellectual daring. After 
 a series of movements extending over four months, dur- 
 ing which he made constant use of field fortifications, 
 much in our own manner, Caesar absolutely overthrew the 
 Pompeians (Apr. 46) at Thapsus and dispersed the coali- 
 tion to the winds. Only the two sons of Pompey in 
 Spain remained in arms. 
 
 An interesting fact in the campaigns of Caesar, which 
 cannot but impress itself on every American soldier, is the 
 handiness of Caesar's legionaries in the use of pick and 
 ehovel. These entrenching tools, quite apart from fortify- 
 ing the daily camp, seemed to be as important to the 
 goldiers as their weapons or their shields. They often dug 
 themselves into victory. 
 
CMSAR. 95 
 
 Csesans manoeuvring and fighting were equally good. 
 The reason for some of his entrenching in Africa is hard 
 to comprehend. Caesar was a fighter in his way, but he 
 often appeared disinclined to fight, even when his men 
 were in the very mood to command success. He was so 
 clever at manoeuvring that he seemed to desire, for the 
 mere art of the thing, to manoeuvre his enemy into a cor- 
 ner before attack. His pausing at the opening of the battle 
 of Thapsus has led to the remark, that while he prepared 
 for the battle, it was his men who won it. 
 
 We cannot follow the Spanish campaign, which ended 
 Caesar's military exploits, and which came to an end in the 
 remarkable battle of Munda (March, 45), of which Caesar 
 remarked that he had often fought for victory, but here 
 fought for life. We must treat of the man rather than 
 events. 
 
 Caesar had the inborn growth of the great captain. In 
 the Civil War he made fewer errors than in the Gallic. 
 His operations, all things considered, were well-nigh fault- 
 less. H^ first chose Rome, the most important thing, as 
 his objective ; and in sixty days, by mere moral ascendant, 
 had got possession of the city. The enemy was on three 
 sides of him, Spain, Africa, Greece, he occupying the 
 central position, and this he was very quick to see. He 
 turned first on Spain, meanwhile holding Italy against 
 Pompey by a curtain of troops. Spain settled, he moved 
 over to Epirus with a temerity from which arch luck alone 
 could save him, and, victorious here, he turned on Africa. 
 There is no better example in history of the proper use of 
 central lines on a gigantic scale, though the first recogni- 
 
96 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 tion of these is often ascribed to Napoleon. In these 
 splendid operations Csesar made repeated errors of precip- 
 itancy, at Dyrrachium, at Alexandria, in Pontus, in 
 Africa. That, despite these errors, he was still victorious 
 in so comparatively short a time he owes to his extraordi- 
 nary ability, his simply stupendous good fortune, and the 
 weakness of his opponents. In success he was brilliant, in 
 disaster strong and elastic, and he never weakened in 
 morale. It is adversity which proves the man. 
 
 Caesar's strategy was broad and far-seeing. His tactics 
 were simple. There are no striking examples in his bat- 
 tles of tactical formations like Epaminondas' oblique order 
 at Leuctra, Alexander's wedge at Arbela, Hannibal's 
 withdrawing salient at Cannae. Though the military 
 writers of this age exhibit great technical familiarity with 
 tactical formations, Caesar was uniformly simple in his. 
 
 From the beginning Caesar grew in every department of 
 the art of war. In strategy, tactics, fortification, sieges, 
 logistics, he showed larger ability at the end of his career 
 than at any previous time. To his personality his sol- 
 diers owed all they knew and all they were. Remarkable 
 for discipline, esprit de corps, adaptiveness, toughness, 
 patience in difficulty, self-denial, endurance and boldness 
 in battle, attachment to and confidence in their general, his 
 legionaries were an equal honor to Caesar and to Rome, 
 us they were a standing reproach to Roman rottenness in 
 their splendid soldierly qualities. Pompey's men could not 
 compare with them in any sense, and this was because 
 Pompey had made his soldiers and Caesar had made his. 
 
 It is difficult to compare Caesar with Alexander or Hail- 
 
C&SAR. 97 
 
 nibal. To make such comparison leads towards the triv- 
 ial. A few of their marked resemblances or differences 
 can alone be pointed out and their elemental causes sug- 
 gested ; every one must draw his own conclusions ; and 
 the fact that the equipment of all great captains is the 
 same will excuse apparent iteration of military virtues. 
 
 In Ccesar we can hardly divorce the ambitious statesman 
 from the soldier. We are apt to lose sight of the soldier 
 proper. The two characters are closely interwoven. In 
 the motive of his labors Csesar is unlike Alexander or 
 Hannibal. He strove, in Gaul, solely for military power ; 
 after Pharsalus he worked with the ample power so gained. 
 Hannibal was never anything but a subordinate of the Car- 
 thaginian Senate. He had no political ambition whatever ; 
 military success was his sole aim, and this on patriotic 
 grounds. Alexander was a monarch ab initio. His in- 
 spiration was the love of conquest, the greed of territory, 
 if you like, but as a king. 
 
 As a soldier, pure and simple, however, Caesar is on an 
 equal level, though his campaigns were markedly colored by 
 his political aspirations. Hannibal employed state- craft to 
 further his warlike aims ; Ca3sar waged war to further his 
 political aims. Alexander had no political aims. His 
 ambition was to conquer ; to make Macedon the mistress 
 of the world, as he was master of Macedon, and then to 
 weld his dominions into one body. Rome was already 
 mistress of the world, and Csesar aimed to make himself 
 master of Rome. Each had his own motive as a keynote. 
 
 In personal character, Hannital stands higher than 
 either. His ambition was purely for Carthage. The man 
 
98 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 was always merged in the patriot. He himself could ac- 
 quire no greatness, rank, or power. His service of his 
 country after Zama abundantly demonstrates Hannibal's 
 lofty, self-abnegating public spirit. What we know of 
 Hannibal is derived, mostly, from Roman writers, and 
 these are, of necessity, prejudiced. How could they be 
 otherwise towards a man who for more than half a gener- 
 ation had humiliated their country as she had never been 
 humiliated before ? But in reading between the lines you 
 readily discover what manner of soldier and man Han- 
 nibal truly was. 
 
 In personal attributes there is a divinity which hedges 
 Alexander beyond all others. Despite his passionate out- 
 bursts and their often lamentable consequences, a glamour 
 surrounds him unlike any hero of antiquity. But in mind 
 and will, in true martial bearing, all are alike. The con- 
 duct of each is equally a pattern to every soldier. 
 
 Alexander and Hannibal, from youth up, led a life of 
 simplicity and exercise, and their physique, naturally good, 
 became adapted to their soldier's work. Caesar led the 
 youth of a man of the world, and was far from strong at 
 birth. He did, however, curb his pleasure to his ambition 
 until he grew easily to bear the fatigue incident to the 
 command of armies. Throughout life he accomplished a 
 fabulous amount of work, mental and physical. His ner- 
 vous force was unparalleled. 
 
 Intelligence and character were alike pronounced in all. 
 But Alexander, perhaps because young, exceeded Caesar 
 ind Hannibal in fire and in unreasoning enthusiasm. 
 Hannibal possessed far more quiet wisdom, power of 
 
99 
 
 weighing facts, and valor tempered with discretion. In 
 Caesar we find an unimpassioned pursuit of his one object 
 with cold, calculating brain- tissue, and all the vigor of 
 body and soul put at the service of his purpose to control 
 the power of the Roman State. 
 
 In each, the will and intellect were balanced, as they 
 must be in a great captain. But in Alexander, the will 
 often outran the intelligence ; in Hannibal the intelligence 
 occasionally overruled the ambition to act ; in Caesar it was 
 now one, now the other bias which took the upper hand. 
 Alexander was always daring, never cautious. Hannibal 
 was always cautious, often daring. Caesar was over -dar- 
 ing and over-cautious by turns. This is perhaps to an ex- 
 tent due to the ages of each, already given, twenty-five, 
 thirty-four, fifty-two. 
 
 Each possessed breadth, depth, strength, energy, per- 
 sistent activity throughout his entire career, a conception 
 covering all fields, a brain able to cope with any problem. 
 But in Alexander we find these qualities coupled with the 
 effervescence of imaginative youth ; in Hannibal, with 
 singular sharpness and the judgment of maturity ; in 
 Caesar, with the cool circumspection of years, not unmixed 
 with a buoyant contempt of difficulty. The parts of each 
 were equally developed by education. By contact with 
 the world, perhaps most in Caesar, least in Hannibal. 
 
 The high intellectuality of each is shown in the art 
 af their plans, in their ability to cope with difficult 
 problems in the cabinet, and work them out in the field ; 
 and with this went daring, caution, zeal, patience, ner- 
 vous equipoise which never knew demoralization. With 
 
100 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 each, intelligence and decision grew with the demand. 
 They were never over-taxed. Strain made them the mor 
 elastic. Danger lent them the greater valor. With each 
 the brain worked faster and more precisely the graver 
 the test. As good judgment became more essential, the 
 power rightly to judge increased. 
 
 All were equally alert, untiring, vigilant, indomitable. 
 But Alexander was sometimes carried beyond the bounds 
 of reason by his defiance of danger. Caesar's intellectual 
 powers were more pronounced in action than his physical. 
 Hannibal was always, in brain and heart, the true captain ; 
 remembering his own necessity to his cause, but remem- 
 bering also the necessity to his cause of victory. 
 
 All maintained discipline at an equal standard. All 
 fired their soldiers to the utmost pitch in battle, all 
 encouraged them to bear privation in the field, and bore it 
 with them. All equally won their soldiers' hearts. All 
 obtained this control over men by scrupulous care of 
 their army's welfare, courage equal to any test, readiness 
 to participate in the heat and labor of the day, personal 
 magnetism, justice in rewards and punishments, friendli- 
 ness in personal intercourse, and power of convincing men. 
 In what they said, Alexander and Hannibal spoke plain 
 truths plainly. Caesar was a finished orator. But Caesar 
 and Alexander were so placed as readily to win the hearts 
 of their soldiers. That Hannibal did so, and kept the 
 fealty of his motley crowd of many nationalities throughout 
 thirteen long years of disaster, is one of the phenomenal 
 facts of history. 
 
 Personal indifference or cruelty can not be charged to 
 
CAESAR. 
 
 the score of any one of them. Each gave frequent proof 
 that he possessed abundant human kindness. But Alex- 
 ander was at times guilty of acts of brutality and injus- 
 tice. To Hannibal's score can be put nothing of the 
 kind. Caesar by no means lacked the gentler virtues. 
 Some claim for him sweetness equal to his genius. But 
 he exhibited in the Gallic War a singularly blunted con- 
 science. Peoples were mere stepping-stones to his prog- 
 ress. Judging Caesar solely by his Commentaries, there 
 goes hand in hand with a chivalrous sense a callousness 
 which is unapproached. He could be liberal in his per- 
 sonal dealings, and unfeeling in his public acts ; magnani- 
 mous and ruthless. 
 
 Alexander and Hannibal were ambitious, but nobly so, 
 and generous withal. Caesar's ambition more nearly ap- 
 proached egotism. It was not honor, but power, he 
 sought. Not that he loved Rome less, but Caesar more. 
 He was satisfied with nothing falling short of absolute 
 control. But Caesar was not miserly. Gold was only 
 counted as it could contribute to his success. He was as 
 lavish in the use of money as he was careless of hia 
 methods of getting it. So far as native generosity was 
 concerned, Caesar had, perhaps, as much as either of the 
 others. 
 
 All three were keen in state-craft. But Alexander was 
 c rankly above-board in his dealings. Hannibal kept hia 
 own counsel, making AO promises, nor giving his confi- 
 dence to any. Caesar was able, but underhanded whenever 
 it suited his purpose. He could be more cunning in nego- 
 tiation than even Hannibal, because less scrupulous. He 
 
102 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 could exert his powers to bring the wavering or inimical ta 
 his side in a most faultless manner. 
 
 In accomplishing vast results with meagre means, Alex- 
 ander apparently did more than either Hannibal or Caesar 
 in contending with savage or semi-civilized tribes. The 
 difference in numbers between Alexander and the Oriental 
 armies he met was greater, as a rule, than anything Caesar 
 had to encounter. Yet on one or two occasions, as at the 
 River Axona and at Alesia, Caesar was faced by overwhelm- 
 ing odds. Hannibal was the only one of the three who 
 contended against forces better armed, better equipped, 
 more intelligent, and ably led. There is no denying 
 him the palm in this. Of all the generals the world 
 has ever seen, Hannibal fought against the greatest 
 odds. Alexander never encountered armies which were 
 such in the sense the Macedonian army was. Ca3sar fought 
 both against barbarians and against Romans. Not equal, 
 perhaps, in his contests with the former, to Alexander, he 
 was never taxed with such opponents as was Hannibal. It 
 is difficult to say that either of the three accomplished more 
 with slender means than the other. To reduce them to the 
 level of statistics savors of the absurd. 
 
 Each devoted scrupulous care to the welfare of hid 
 troops ; to feeding, clothing, and arming them ; to prop- 
 erly resting them in winter quarters, or after great exer- 
 tions, and to watching their health. 
 
 Fortune, that fickle jade, was splendid Alexander's 
 constant companion from birth till death. She forsook 
 patient Hannibal after Cannae, and thenceforward per- 
 lietently frowned upon him. She occasionally left brilliant 
 
C^SAR. 103 
 
 Caesar, but it was for a bare moment, she always re- 
 turned to save him from his follies, and was, on the whole, 
 marvellously constant to him. Caesar had to work for his 
 results harder than Alexander, but in no sense like over- 
 taxed, indomitable Hannibal. Alexander will always 
 remain essentially the captain of fortune ; Hannibal essen- 
 tially the captain of misfortune ; Caesar holds a middle 
 place. But had not Fortune on many occasions rushed to 
 the rescue Caesar would never have lived to be Caesar. 
 
 In common, these three great men obtained their results 
 by their organized system of war, that is, war founded on 
 a sound theory, properly worked out. To-day war has 
 been reduced to a science which all may study. Alexander 
 knew no such science, nor Hannibal, nor indeed Caesar. 
 What was, even so late as Caesar's day, known as the art 
 of war, covered merely the discipline of the troops, camp 
 and permanent fortifications, sieges according to the then 
 existing means, and the tactics of drill and battle. What 
 has come down to this generation, as a science, is a collec- 
 tion of the deeper lessons of these very men and a few 
 others, reduced during the past century by able pens to a 
 form which is comprehensible. Even Napoleon was an- 
 noyed at Jomini's early publications, lest the world and 
 his opponents should learn his methods of making war. 
 We must remember that these captains of ancient times 
 were great primarily, because they created what Napoleon 
 calls methodical war. It was many centuries before any 
 one understood the secret of their success. But Gustavus. 
 Frederick, and Napoleon guessed the secret and wrought 
 according to it ; and they made war in a day when 
 
104 OR EAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 brain-tissue could analyze their great deeds for the benefit 
 of posterity. 
 
 Whatever their terms for designating their operations, 
 the great captains of antiquity always had a safe and suit- 
 able base ; always secured their rear, flanks, and communi* 
 cations ; always sought the most important points as objec- 
 tive, generally the enemy himself; and divided their forces 
 only for good reasons, at the proper moment again to 
 bring them together. We find in their history few infrac- 
 tions of the present maxims of war, and only such as a 
 genius is justified in making, because he feels his ability to 
 dictate to circumstances. 
 
 War to these men was incessant labor, never leisure. 
 It was only at rare intervals that they stopped even to 
 gather breath ; and this done, their work was again 
 resumed with double vigor. Each sought to do that which 
 his enemy least expected, and looked upon no obstacle as 
 too great to be overcome. Each was careful in the matter 
 of logistics, according to the existing conditions. Each 
 was careful to husband his resources, and each had a far- 
 reaching outlook on the future. 
 
 Their battle tactics were alike in suiting the means at 
 disposal to the end to be accomplished, and in originating 
 new methods of disturbing the equipoise of the enemy, and 
 thus leading up to his defeat. Each of them used his vic- 
 tories to the utmost advantage. Even Hannibal, though 
 after the first few years he was unable to reap any harvest 
 from his wonderful work, continued his campaign by oc- 
 easional minor victories, while awaiting recognition from 
 home. Alexander's and Caesar'vS victories were uniformly 
 
CJESAR. 105 
 
 decisive ; from the very nature of the case, Hannibal's 
 could not be so. 
 
 In field fortification, Caesar was far in the lead. At a 
 long interval followed Hannibal. Alexander made little 
 or no use of this method of compelling victory. In regu- 
 lar sieges, both Alexander and Caesar stand much higher 
 than Hannibal, who disliked siege-work, and whose only 
 brilliant example is the siege of Saguntum. Nor can thin 
 compare with Tyre or Alesia. 
 
 What has Caesar done for the art of war? Nothing be- 
 yond what Alexander and Hannibal had done before him. 
 But it has needed, in the history of war, that ever and 
 anon there should come a master who could point the 
 world to the right path of methodical war from which it is 
 so easy to stray. Nothing shows this better than the fact 
 that, for seventeen centuries succeeding Caesar, there was no 
 great captain. There were great warriors, men who 
 did great deeds, who saved Europe w from the civil and re- 
 ligious yoke of the Koran," as Charles Martel did at 
 Tours, or England from the craft of Rome and power of 
 Philip, as Howard, Drake, and Hawkins did in destroying 
 the Invincible Armada, men who changed the course of the 
 world's events. But these were not great captains, in the 
 sense that they taught us lessons in the art of war. The 
 result of their victories was vast ; but from their manner of 
 conducting war we can learn nothing. Caesar is of another 
 stamp. In every campaign there are many lessons for the 
 student of to-day. In his every soldierly attribute, intel- 
 lectual and moral, we find something to invite imitation, 
 It is because Caesar waged war by the use of purely intel- 
 
106 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 lectual means, backed up by a character which overshad- 
 owed all men he ever met, that he is preeminent. Con- 
 querors and warriors who win important battles, even 
 battles decisive of the world's history, are not, of necessity, 
 great in this sense. All that Alexander, or Hannibal, or 
 Caesar would need in order to accomplish the same results 
 in our day and generation which they accomplished before 
 the Christian era, would be to adapt their work to the 
 present means, material, and conditions. And it is the 
 peculiar qualification of each that he was able, under any 
 and all conditions, to fuse into success the elements as they 
 existed, by the choice from the means at hand of those 
 which were peculiarly suited to the bearings of the time. 
 
 Caesar was tall and spare. His face was mobile and 
 intellectual. He was abstinent in diet, and of sober habi^. 
 As a young man he had been athletic and noted as a rider. 
 In the Gallic campaigns he rode a remarkable horse which 
 no one else could mount. He affected the society of 
 women. His social character was often a contrast to his 
 public acts. He was a good friend, a stanch enemy, 
 affable and high-bred. As a writer, he was simple, 
 direct, convincing ; as an orator, second to no one but 
 Cicero. No doubt Caesar's life-work was as essential in the 
 Roman economy as it was admirably rounded. But that 
 he was without reproach, as he certainly was without fear, 
 can scarcely be maintained. 
 
 In leaving Caesar, we leave the last great captain of 
 ancient times, and, perhaps, taking his life-work, which 
 it has been outside my province to dwell upon, the great* 
 Mt, though not the most admirable, man who ever lived. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 
 
 THE difference between ancient and modern war ii 
 marked, but each is consistent with its conditions. 
 In ancient days the armies of the civilized nations were, as 
 a rule, not large. They could generally find sustenance 
 wherever they moved, and were obliged to carry but a few 
 days' victuals with them. Their arms were such as not 
 only to remain long fit for service, but they were capable 
 of repair upon the spot. Neither trains to carry provision 
 and munitions of war were essential, nor were fortified 
 magazines for storing such material indispensable. The 
 communications of an army had not to be so zealously 
 guarded, for it could live and fight even if cut off from its 
 base. On the other hand, battle was of the utmost impor- 
 tance, and the average campaign was but a march toward 
 the enemy, a fight in parallel order and a victory. A bat- 
 tle, owing to the short reach of missiles, was of necessity a 
 more or less hand-to-hand affair. First, the light troops, 
 archers and slingers, advanced like our skirmishers, and 
 opened the fighting. They were then withdrawn and the 
 lines of heavy foot advanced to within javelin-throwing dis- 
 tance. Here they stood and cast their weapons, with 
 107 
 
108 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 which the light troops kept them supplied. At mterv<J 
 groups from the lines closed and the sword was used, or 
 the heavy thrusting pike. Meanwhile the cavalry, always 
 on the extreme wings, charged the enemy's, and if it could 
 defeat it, wheeled in on the flanks of the infantry, and this 
 was apt to decide the day. 
 
 Once engaged, an army could not be withdrawn, as ours 
 can be, under cover of artillery, whose effective use from 
 a distance over the heads of the troops will retard or 
 prevent the enemy's pursuit. Battles joined had to be 
 fought out to the end. Thus victory to one was wont to be 
 annihilation to the other. From these simple conditions it 
 resulted that the art of war among the ancients was con- 
 fined to tactical values, or the evolutions of the battle-field, 
 and to fortification and sieges. The ancient military 
 writings cover no other ground. There was little concep- 
 tion of what we call strategy, the art of so moving 
 armies over the surface of a country, that as great damage 
 may be done to the enemy as by battle, or at least that the 
 enemy may be so compromised as that a victory over him 
 shall be a decisive one. Strategy among the ancients was 
 mere stratagem, except in the case of the great captains, 
 whose genius made them instinctively great strategists, 
 for strategy is the highest grade of intellectual common 
 sense. But the reasons for their strategic movements were 
 not understood by the rest of the world, as we to-day can 
 understand them. Others could not make sound strategic 
 manoeuvres, and saw good in naught but battle. 
 
 From the time of Caesar, there was a gradual decline in 
 the conduct of war, which he had so highly illustrated, and 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 109 
 
 there is little, from his age to the invention of gunpow- 
 der, which has any bearing of value on the art to-day. 
 There were great generals, there were victories which 
 changed the destinies of the world, but there was no 
 method in war. For many centuries there was scarcely 
 such a thing as an art of war. One might say that matters 
 had reverted to the old lack of system antedating Alexander. 
 
 After the discovery of gunpowder, however, there was a 
 gradual revival of scientific, or more properly methodical 
 war, to which Gustavus Adolphus gave the first intellectual 
 impulse. The conditions of warfare became completely 
 changed by this great invention in ballistics. Fire-arms 
 soon got into the hands of both infantry and cavalry. Ar- 
 tillery took on importance and effectiveness. Armies 
 became numerically stronger, depots for the needful mate- 
 rials were established in their rear, and the troops were 
 supplied from these depots. This gave great importance 
 to fortifying cities and to fortresses, in which lay the pro- 
 vision and war material ; and as rations, ammunition, and 
 stores had to be constantly brought from these depots to 
 the front, to maintain the communications of the armies 
 with these strong places became a matter of primary 
 importance. For the loss of a great fortress containing 
 the army's bread and powder and ball might have as grave 
 sonsequences as the loss of a battle, even graver. 
 
 Armies, thus handicapped with heavier trains and with 
 artillery-parks, had less mobility, and were less fitted 
 for pursuit than the old troops, which could carry all 
 they needed with them. Victories were not followed up. 
 Battles became less decisive, and dropped into disuse. 
 
110 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Strategy had not yet grown to be the science to which 
 Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick, and Napoleon elevated it, 
 and generals had not learned so to manoeuvre as to 
 make battles decisive when won. Modern war, up to 
 the days of Gustavus, was clumsy and lacking in general 
 scheme. It was rescued from this condition by the Swedish 
 king. 
 
 In antiquity, battle was the head and front of all 
 things, and armies were nimble and independent. In 
 the seventeenth century, on the contrary, the construc- 
 tion and preservation of fortresses and depots, and com- 
 munications with these, and operations against the enemy's 
 fortresses, depots, and communications became the chief 
 study. This marked difference in system is shown in 
 the military literature of these periods. Any operations 
 which lay outside of battle, the ancients ascribed to the 
 genius of the general, assumed that these were subject to 
 no method and could not be learned ; or at best classed 
 them with mere stratagems. Their object and scope 
 was not understood, nor indeed considered of much 
 moment. Older military literature does not in any 
 sense deal with them. Soldiers believed that the whole 
 success of war was based on courage and hard knocks. 
 
 But about the time of the Thirty Years' War, theorists 
 had discovered that there were other means, besides 
 battle, of doing harm to the enemy, and began to re- 
 duce such principles as they could extract from the 
 campaigns of the better generals to a permanent form. 
 Their work was, however, only partial and scrappy. 
 The most important document which first saw the light 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. Ill 
 
 was Frederick the Great's " General Principles " or w In- 
 structions " for his officers. This paper, written before 
 the Seven Years' War and purposely kept in manuscript 
 for a number of years, was finally pirated and published 
 in 1753. It is a noble work. But Frederick's deeds in- 
 spired a yet more important one. Serving in the Aus- 
 trian army as captain of light- horse, was a young Welsh- 
 man of good education and extraordinary perceptions, 
 Henry Lloyd. This man's inquiring mind was not 
 satisfied with the half-and-half explanations which the then 
 military books could give him of the wonderful exploits of 
 the great king, whose marvellous manoeuvres he had so 
 often followed on scouting duty, and from which the 
 Austrian army so bitterly suffered. He began, with 
 singular critical and analytical equipoise, to study these 
 and seek reasons for their success. He served under 
 Ferdinand of Brunswick in the two last campaigns of 
 the Seven Years' War, and later was Major-general in 
 the Russian army. He spent his old age in Belgium. 
 Among other works he wrote a "Military and Political 
 Memoir," which contains the important part of his labors. 
 It was issued in 1780. The ground-work of our modern 
 science of war is therein laid down. It is the first work 
 except Frederick's in which are exhibited in comprehensi- 
 ble form the true principles of conducting war. It is here 
 first pointed out that intellect and moral forces combined 
 go to make up the great captain. But what Lloyd says 
 is mainly applicable to his own times and conditions, 
 and is not exhaustive. He remarks that the art of war 
 \s, like all other art, founded on well-settled rules, to 
 
112 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 which alterations can only be made in the application 
 He divides it into two parts, the material, which can b 
 subjected to rules, and another pait which one can 
 neither limit nor teach, and which consists in the ability 
 to apply the rules of the first part quickly and correctly 
 under rapidly changing and various circumstances. This 
 is the same distinction which Napoleon draws between what 
 he aptly calls the terrestrial and the divine in the art. 
 The divine part, says he, embraces all that comes from 
 the moral forces of the character and talents, from the 
 power to gauge your adversary, to infuse confidence and 
 spirit into the soldier, who will be strong and victorious, 
 feeble and beaten, according as he thinks he is. The 
 terrestrial part comprises the arms, entrenchments, orders 
 of battle, all which consists in the mere combination or 
 use of everyday matters. It is singular that this analy- 
 sis of the art of the great soldier is but one hundred 
 years old, that only within three generations has been 
 recognized its divine part. 
 
 The man, however, who has crowned with his acumen 
 the written science of war is Jomini, who first became 
 known as a young staff-officer of Marshal Ney's, and died 
 but twenty years ago. Though he rose to the highest rank 
 in the Russian service, his career was as military advisef 
 rather than as commander. His chief value to us lies in 
 his having collated and so plainly set down the lessons 
 taught by the great captains, particularly Frederick and 
 Napoleon, that all may now study them, as during the last 
 century they could not be studied, were not even under 
 stood. He has enabled us to assimilate the history of war, 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 113 
 
 Other military students have since written with equal pro- 
 fundity. But our debt to Jomini is not lessened thereby. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus was born in Stockholm, in 1594, 
 the son of Charles IX. of Sweden, but at a time when his 
 cousin Sigismund III. occupied the throne. He was a lad 
 of great personal beauty and strength, and his naturally 
 bright mind profited well by the careful training he re- 
 ceived. His boyhood showed all the traits of strong ear- 
 nestness, clean-cut courage, and deep religious feeling 
 which later characterized the Champion of the Reformation. 
 Of naturally quick temper, in youth a blow followed a 
 word ; in manhood he acquired exceptional self-control. 
 His education was largely under the direction of Oxenstiern, 
 who later became his prime-minister, general, and greatest 
 intimate. He was a constant reader, an eloquent and 
 persuasive speaker, a poet whose religious verses are still 
 sung in every household of Sweden. He was famous in 
 athletics, and was both a noted rider and able swordsman. 
 
 The Swedish government was an elective-hereditary 
 monarchy. Sigismund, a bigoted Catholic, was deposed 
 when Gustavus was ten years old, and the lad's father 
 made king. Sigismund retired to Poland, of which country 
 he was also monarch, and remained thereafter the sworn 
 enemy of Charles and of Gustavus. 
 
 The young prince went through every step of military 
 rank and training, and at seventeen was declared of age and 
 participated with distinguished credit, and rare skill and 
 enterprise, in a war with Denmark. In this same year 
 (A.D. 1611) his father died, and, against all precedent, 
 Irustavus Adolphus was chosen king. During his reign of 
 
114 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 twenty-one years, his people and he were an unit. Tli 
 world has never seen a more striking instance of mutual love 
 and confidence, justly earned, between king and people. 
 
 Sweden was at war with Denmark, Russia, and Poland. 
 Gustavus determined to finish each war, if possible, singly 
 and in turn. From the very beginning he showed in his 
 military conduct that his intelligence ranged beyond the 
 conventional method of conducting war, which he had been 
 taught with so much care. In 1613 he conquered a peace 
 with Denmark. 
 
 In 1614 he began war with Russia, making, meanwhile, 
 a two years' truce with Poland. In this year, and the 
 next, he drew the attention of all Europe to his bold inva- 
 sion of the Russian territory, at the point where now stands 
 St. Petersburg, and was for the first time approached by 
 the Protestants of Germany with a request to aid their 
 cause. In 1617 Gustavus conquered a peace with Russia. 
 
 Sigismund would not hear of peace, but under the 
 curious habit of that day, of conducting war on a sort of 
 picnic system, he did extend the existing truce for five 
 years. At its expiration, in 1621, active war began. 
 Gustavus, with twenty-four thousand men, making Livonia 
 his objective, landed at Riga, took the place, and from 
 thence as a base, conducted his campaign. 
 
 Sigismund represented the Catholic element ; Gustavua 
 was the most prominent Protestant prince, and as such 
 received many urgent petitions for help from the harassed 
 Protestants of Germany. The eventual necessity of taking 
 % share in the religious war was clearly foreseen by 
 Sweden. With the advice and consent of the ministry and 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 115 
 
 people, Gustavus reorganized the army and created a dis- 
 tinctly national force of eighty thousand men, and based its 
 discipline and character on the most intelligent foundation, 
 Sweden thus acquired the first modern regular military 
 organization. Other nations, as a rule, whenever a war 
 was imminent, raised troops from the crowds of soldiers of 
 fortune, with whom all Europe swarmed, and discharged 
 them after its expiration. The Swedish organization con- 
 sisted of one- quarter regular troops for service out of the 
 country, and three-quarters landwehr for the defence of the 
 Fatherland and for filling gaps in the regulars. Recruit- 
 ment was by districts on a well-settled plan of quotas. 
 The troops in service and the militia were scrupulously 
 drilled and taught, uniformed, well armed and fed, and 
 regularly paid. 
 
 The Polish war lasted until 1629, the campaigns being 
 annual, but varying in scope. Gustavus invariably took 
 the offensive, and was habitually successful. He was 
 always head and front of every movement, full of intelli- 
 gence, activity, and courage, ran constantly great personal 
 danger, and suffered from frequent wounds. No character 
 of modern history exhibits the qualities of the ancient 
 hero so distinctly as Gustavus Adolphus. Cautious and 
 intelligent to a marked degree in his campaigns, he was in 
 battle a very Alexander for audacity and chivalrous bear- 
 ing. Always in the thickest of the fray, he led his men in 
 person, and, despite the protests of his generals and suite, 
 could never be restrained from exposing himself at the 
 point of greatest importance. He was unwisely reckless of 
 his own safety, though never losing for a moment his cool 
 
116 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 calculation or power to gauge the situation. His army 
 partook his enthusiasm, as it shared his earnest religion* 
 feeling, and was devotedly attached to him as man and 
 king. 
 
 In 1628, Wallenstein, the distinguished commander of 
 the Imperial forces, had won great success in northern 
 Germany, and had laid siege to Stralsund. The German 
 Protestants again turned with piteous appeals to Gustavua. 
 The king well knew that sooner or later Protestant Sweden 
 must, in self-defence, enter the lists against the Catholic 
 Empire, and threw a Swedish garrison into Stralsund, 
 which, gallantly backed by the citizens, held the place 
 against Wallenstein's best efforts. 
 
 In the campaign of 1629, the Emperor sent an army to 
 reenforce the Poles. This the more impelled Gustavus to 
 actively embrace the Protestant cause. At the end of 
 this campaign, Sigismund, largely under the influence of 
 Kichelieu, was prevailed on to agree to a six years' truce. 
 France could not openly join the Protestants in their 
 struggle against the Catholic Emperor, but was glad to see 
 Gustavus do so in order to check such success by Ferdi- 
 nand as might disturb the balance of power. 
 
 This truce ended the Swedish-Polish wars, which had 
 lasted eight years (1621-1629). The king had con- 
 ducted six campaigns against Poland, and two against 
 Denmark and Russia. These were to him what the Gallic 
 campaigns were to Caesar, a practical school of war, in 
 which both he could learn his trade, and his army be dis- 
 ciplined and toughened. He had observed the practical 
 rorking of his new army organization, and learned the 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPIIUS. 117 
 
 iveak points of the existing system of war. Comparison 
 showed the advantages of his own conceptions. In the 
 three remaining years of his life he moulded these into a 
 new art, which pointed the way back to a system full of 
 intellectual and moral force as well as more consonant with 
 common Christian charity. The king, during this period, 
 gleaned varied experience. He learned the habits of dif- 
 ferent leaders and armies, and how to adapt his own ways 
 to theirs. His infantry underwent a good schooling. His 
 cavalry he gradually improved by imitating the admirable 
 Polish horsemen, and by adding discipline and ensemble to 
 it. His artillery gave a good account of itself. Under 
 Gustavus' careful eye, every branch of the service during 
 these campaigns grew in efficiency. Equipment, arms, 
 rationing, medical attendance, drill and discipline, field- 
 mano3uvres, camp and garrison duty, reached a high grade 
 of perfection. Each year added to the skill and self-poise 
 of the Swedish forces. They were distinctly superior to 
 any European army of the day. 
 
 Not only had Gustavus learned to know his generals 
 and men, but these had gauged their king. There had 
 arisen between them that mutual confidence, esteem, and 
 affection which only great souls ever evoke and keep. 
 And as there was no danger or labor of which Gustavus 
 did not bear with them his equal part, so the Swedish 
 army saw in its king a harbinger of victory, a sure pro- 
 tection in disaster. Gustavus' own character, his braverv, 
 religious ardor, honesty, and humanity infused itself into 
 ?very soldier in the Swedish ranks. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus was now hi a position to afford 
 
118 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 efficient aid to the German Protestants. The efforts of 
 the latter had been noble, but far from systematic, and 
 they were fast being driven to the wall. The war had 
 been marked by barbarities characteristic of religious 
 struggles, and by the adoption of happy-go-lucky plans of 
 campaign. Armies had moved into a province, not because 
 it was strategically important, but because it was rich in 
 plunder. Manoeuvres were conducted without reference to 
 base or communications. There was no aim beyond tem- 
 porary expediency in any one's movements. A fortress 
 would arrest the march of an army, which would sit down 
 before it without the remotest conception of whether its 
 capture would have an effect on the general result. Lack 
 of system was supplemented by religious fanaticism, 
 which made everything redolent of atrocity. No general 
 but was characterized by some fearful vice. Gustavua 
 Adolphus was destined to change all this in a short two 
 years. 
 
 As a soldier Gustavus is less noted for his battles than 
 for the conduct, in 1630, 1631, and 1632, of a campaign 
 on one broad, intelligent, far-seeing plan, from which he 
 never swerved. This of itself was an entire novelty in 
 this period of shallow operations. In lieu of detailing 
 one of his manreuvres, I will give a hasty sketch of his 
 entire plan of campaign in Germany. This was the first 
 crisply strategic series of operations since the days of 
 Csesar. 
 
 It was clear that if the Emperor overcame the Protes- 
 tants of Germany he would turn on Sweden. To await 
 Attack was the preference of the Swedish ministry. But 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 119 
 
 Gustavus pointed out the advantages of an immediate 
 offensive war in Germany. The struggle would be kept 
 from Swedish territory. The Emperor would not gain so 
 much headway as to lay Sweden open to an exhausting 
 war. They owed a duty to their oppressed Protestant 
 brethren. He convinced his people and gained their sup- 
 port. He took with him fifteen thousand men. This 
 number he expected to, and did in fact, largely increase 
 in Germany by recruitment and the aid of Protestant 
 allies. 
 
 Gustavus landed in Rugen in June, 1630. He added 
 five thousand men of the Stralsund garrison to his army, 
 and took possession of all the islands at the mouths of the 
 Oder. He then captured Stettin and extended his grasp 
 right and left along the coast. He proposed to base him- 
 self on the Baltic, as Alexander had done on the Mediter- 
 ranean. He took and garrisoned many seaboard towns 
 and others lying not far inland. His army, reenforced 
 by German allies and recruitment, soon rose to twenty-five 
 thousand men, and he established a firm footing on the 
 Oder, which river was an excellent line for operations into 
 the heart of Germany. The imperial Field Marshal 
 Conti, who had ten thousand men in his front, was unable 
 to interfere with his operations. Garrisoning Stettin, 
 Gustavus moved into Mecklenburg to encourage its Prot- 
 estant princes, further secure his base, increase his supplies 
 and forces, and gain active allies. He relied on collecting 
 seventy to eighty thousand men. Count Tilly had been 
 put in supreme command of the Imperial forces, in place 
 of Wallenstein, against whom the Catholic princes had 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 121 
 
 fonceived a marked prejudice. This resulted in disband 
 ing a large part of Wallenstein's soldiers, who considered 
 themselves only in his personal service, and left Ferdinand 
 for the nonce but unimportant armies to oppose to the 
 Swedish advance. 
 
 Having substantially rescued Mecklenburg from the 
 Imperialists, Gustavus left a force to operate there and re- 
 turned to Stettin, purposing to move with the main army 
 up the Oder (Dec., 1630). The end of the year was at 
 hand. The Imperial army in his front was in no condi- 
 tion for a winter campaign, either from habit, discipline, or 
 equipment. For this very reason Gustavus moved against 
 it, his own troops being well clad and equipped, and 
 inured to cold. He soon drove the enemy back to the line 
 of the Warta, and then eat down in an entrenched camp at 
 Barwalde till he could recruit his army up to a standard 
 equal to larger operations. The Protestant Elector of 
 Brandenburg meanly refused his help to the cause, but 
 Catholic France subsidized the king, and the Protestants 
 called an assembly at Leipsic to agree on new measures of 
 defence. 
 
 Tilly now appeared on the scene, thirty- four thousand 
 strong. The king had but twenty- five thousand men and 
 would not risk a battle, neither would Tilly assault the 
 Barwalde camp. But Gustavus had a better scheme in 
 his head. He planned to draw Tilly into Mecklenburg, 
 and then quickly return and capture the enemy's line on 
 the Warta. He made forced marches into that province, 
 fell on the Imperialists and again defeated them. Tilly, 
 alarmed, followed with twenty-four thousand men. Gus- 
 
122 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 tavus, by occupying the direct road, had compelled Tilly tc 
 resort to a long circuit. When Tilly was fairly on the way, 
 Gustavus moved rapidly and secretly back to Stettin, ad- 
 vanced on Frankfort, took it after a seventeen days' siege, 
 and thus broke up the enemy's line. The Warta fully 
 protected his left flank in advancing into Germany. Gus- 
 tavus had completely baffled his adversary. But Tilly 
 took bitter revenge by the capture of Magdeburg, which, 
 though it cannot perhaps be charged to Tilly himself, was 
 given up to sack, and suffered a horrible fate at the hands 
 of his unbridled soldiery. Gustavus had been unable to 
 cross neutral Brandenburg to its assistance. 
 
 The barbarous treatment of Magdeburg enraged instead 
 of disheartening the Protestants. Two able allies, Hesse 
 Cassel and Saxony, joined the king's train. And by able 
 manoeuvring, restless energy, and clear-headed method he 
 swept Pomerania and Mecklenburg of Imperial troops. 
 
 The pusillanimous conduct of the Elector of Brandenburg, 
 under the plea of neutrality, finally constrained Gustavus to 
 dictate terms to him. He marched on Berlin and compelled 
 the Elector to allow free passage to the Swedes over hia 
 territory, as well as to refrain from damaging the Protes- 
 tant cause, if he would not help it. 
 
 Thus in one year from his landing in Germany, Gusta- 
 vus had occupied Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and had 
 nsutralized Brandenburg (June, 1631). By holding the 
 lines of the Havel, the Spree, and the Oder, he controlled 
 all the territory to the confines of Poland and Silesia, and 
 fvith a sufficiency of reinforcements he could safely ad- 
 ranee on central Germany. 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPffUS. 123 
 
 Tilly invaded Hesse Cassel. Gustavus tried a diversion 
 to lure him away from his new ally. Count Pappenheiiu 
 opposed him at the Elbe. Gustavus stele a clever march 
 on him, crossed and went into an entrenched camp near 
 Werben. These entrenched camps, it will be perceived, 
 were a feature of this period which Gustavus still affected. 
 They continued in use until he himself in part, and 
 Frederick wholly, demonstrated that entrenchments could 
 be taken by vigorous assault. At this time it was consid- 
 ered the height of foolhardiness to attack entrenchments. 
 
 Tilly vacated Hesse Cassel and moved on the Swedish 
 camp. Gustavus had but ten thousand men there ; Tilly 
 had twenty-seven thousand ; but the king waylaid Tilly's 
 isolated cavalry, handled it roughly, and returned safely to 
 camp. Tilly, despite his excess of force, did not care to 
 risk an assault. Large reinforcements soon reached both 
 armies. Gustavus' diversion had accomplished all he 
 sought. By defending the line of the Elbe and Havel, he 
 prevented Tilly from making any compromising advance. 
 
 Tilly was ordered to Saxony. The cruelties here perpe- 
 trated by his troops made the Elector all the better ally. 
 He offered Gustavus the support of his army of eighteen 
 thousand men. The king again crossed the Elbe, at Wit- 
 tenberg, and joined the Saxons at Diiben. This gave him 
 a force of forty thousand men, of which twelve thousand 
 were cavalry. Tilly had arrived at Leipsic, and promptly 
 advanced to meet Gustavus with thirty-two thousand under 
 the colors. But, at the battle of Breitenfeld, he suffered a 
 stinging defeat, with the loss of six thousand men. 
 
 Tilly's soldiers were in action much what their com 
 
124 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 raander was, a stiff, dense, unwieldy mass, still hide-bound 
 in the Spanish school, which won its way by mere weight 
 of men in the old phalangial manner. The Swedes were 
 quite a different body. Gustavus had reduced the number 
 of their firing- ranks to three, placed reliance on their indi- 
 vidual intelligence, which was marked, and had drilled his 
 musketeers, as well as his gunners, to fire as much more 
 rapidly than the enemy, as Frederick's men with their iron 
 ramrods, or the Prussians of this generation with their 
 needle-guns. In this, his first great battle, the result was, 
 despite the ignominious flight of the Saxons, predetermined 
 by the condition of the respective armies and their leaders. 
 Here, as on all occasions, the king, in personal conduct, 
 was an Alexander in audacity ; a Caesar in intelligence. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus had been only fourteen months in 
 Germany, but he had by his broad, prescient, cautious, and 
 well-digested scheme, crowned by the victory of Breiten- 
 feld, completely changed the prospects of the Protestants. 
 He had got a firm footing in northern Germany, where he 
 now held most of the strong places. He had secured his 
 communications with Sweden by the possession of the sea. 
 He had grown in strength by his treaties with Hesse Cassel 
 and Saxony, and by accessions of troops from all quarters, 
 lie had gained enormously in moral weight, and his army 
 in aplomb and confidence. His operations had been slow 
 and cautious, though rapid when measured by the times, 
 but they had been sure, and were justified by the event. 
 The late victory had placed him on a totally different foot- 
 ing. The Catholic party no longer looked down on the 
 w Snow -king," as Wallenstein had jeeringly called him. 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 125 
 
 The Imperial army had lost in spirit and organization that 
 which he had gained. Its present retreat to the Weser 
 opened the heart of the Emperor's possessions to the king's 
 advance. The former's authority had received its first severe 
 blow, and the Protestants of north and west Germany, 
 lately cowed into submission, now rose and joined Gusta- 
 vus' standard. These fourteen months had shifted the moral 
 superiority from the Catholic to the Protestant cause. But 
 the work was far from ended. It required the same 
 wise and cautious action, coupled with vigor and intelli- 
 gence, to complete what had been so well begun. 
 
 The advisers of Gustavus strongly urged an advance on 
 Austria, believing that such a course would bring Ferdi- 
 nand to terms. But so far Gustavus' successes had come 
 from a systematic plan of campaign which embraced the 
 whole of Germany in its scope. He had secured each step 
 and had risked nothing unnecessarily. He saw the chances 
 pointed out, but he also saw that if he advanced south, his 
 right rear would be threatened by Tilly, who had, after his 
 defeat, retired toward the Rhenish provinces and there 
 made a new base. The king preferred his own plan of 
 first gaining a firm footing in western Germany. He held 
 interior lines and saw that he could operate against his 
 enemies in detail. To complete his plan would secure him 
 from the lower Elbe to the middle and upper Rhine, and 
 he could then turn against Bavaria and Austria from the 
 west, as his advisers would now have him do from the 
 uorth, and with distinctly better effect. Meanwhile the 
 Saxons could operate towards Silesia and Bohemia to 
 secure Gustavus' left in his advance, and Hesse Cassel 
 
126 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 could hold head against Tilly on Gustavus' right. The 
 scheme was wise and far-sighted, took into calculation all 
 the political and military elements of the situation, and was 
 based on broad, sound judgment. For seventeen hundred 
 years, no one had looked at war with so large an intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 It may be said that war is a game of risks. But to play 
 a gambler's game was not Gustavus' forte. When the 
 occasion demanded, he could disregard every dange;. 
 What he has taught us is method, not temerity. His 
 mission was to abolish the Quixotism of his day. 
 
 The Saxon Elector, with a mixed army over twenty 
 thousand strong, accordingly marched into Bohemia and 
 Silesia (Oct., 1631) and pushed the Imperialists back 
 from Prague on Tabor. Everything promised success. 
 But all at once the Elector appeared to lose heart, arrested 
 his advance, and opened negotiations with the Emperor, 
 who, seeing that threats had not succeeded, had tried con- 
 ciliation. This part of the operation was nullified. 
 
 Gustavus moved to Wiirzburg. Franconia joined the 
 Protestant cause as Thuringia had already done. Tilly, 
 having recovered from his late defeat, and his present 
 position being no threat to Gustavus, marched southerly. 
 With allies he collected over fifty thousand men and pro- 
 posed to seek battle. But the Elector of Bavaria, fearful 
 for his territory, kept Tilly on the defensive. 
 
 Gustavus was now firmly established on the Main, and 
 in Thuringia and Franconia, and he presently moved down 
 the river to fully secure the Rhineland, leaving a sufficient 
 force opposite Tilly in Franconia. His men marched 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 127 
 
 along both banks with the baggage on boats. He crossed 
 the Rhine, took Mainz and transformed it into an allied 
 fortress. 
 
 Germany was metamorphosed. The allies had one hun- 
 dred and fifty thousand men in the field. Recruiting was 
 lively. All Protestants were united in sentiment, purpose, 
 and efforts. France was helpful in keeping the Catholic 
 princes along the Rhine in a condition of neutrality, while 
 Gustavus lay in a central position between the Emperor 
 and these same princes. Bavaria was an uncertain ele- 
 ment. The Emperor had a total of but eighty thousand 
 men, and of these the bulk were protecting the Danube 
 instead of carrying desolation into the Protestant territory. 
 
 Gustavus now concentrated on the middle Main to the 
 number of forty-five thousand men and marched on 
 Nurnberg, where he was received with enthusiasm. Tilly 
 crossed the Danube and took up a position over against 
 Rain, behind the Lech, with forty thousand effective. 
 From Nurnberg Gustavus marched to Donauworth, also 
 crossed the Danube and sent out a detachment to take 
 Ulm. 
 
 The king was daring at the proper time. His whole 
 campaign so far had been cautious and systematic, neglect- 
 ing no point in his general scheme. He was now face tc 
 face with the army he had driven from northern and west 
 ern Germany, and was ready for battle. He could not 
 draw Tilly from his entrenched camp ; and he determined 
 to impose on him by boldly crossing the river in his fron* 
 and attacking it, then simply an unheard-of proceeding 
 He believed that the moral advantage to be gained by a 
 
128 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 stroke of audacity would more than compensate for the 
 danger, and danger was to Gustavus an incentive. He 
 erected a battery of seventy-two guns on the left bank of 
 the Lech, opposite Rain, and under cover of its fire ^et 
 over a portion of the troops in boats, built in two days a 
 bridge and a bridge-head, led over the infantiy, and sent 
 the cavalry up stream to ford the river above the enemy's 
 position (April, 1632). 
 
 Tilly and the Elector of Bavaria sought too late to in- 
 terrupt these fearless proceedings. They issued from their 
 camp with a select body of troops and attacked the 
 Swedes, who were backing on the Lech. But the cross- 
 fire of the admirably posted Swedish batteries was severe ; 
 the Swedish infantry held its own, and the cavalry rode 
 down upon their flank. In this obstinate combat Tilly 
 was mortally wounded. His second in command suffered 
 a like fate. The Imperial troops lost heart and took 
 refuge within their breastworks. Oncoming darkness fore- 
 stalled pursuit. But Gustavus had gained his object. 
 The Imperial army had lost morale and organization, and 
 his own had gained in abundant measure. This is the first 
 instance of forcing the passage of a wide and rapid river 
 in the teeth of the enemy. 
 
 The Elector retired to Ratisbon. The Swedes took pos- 
 session of many towns in Bavaria, including Munich. 
 But the country population was so hostile that a permanent 
 occupation seemed a waste of energy ; Gustavus retired to 
 Ingolstadt. 
 
 A disturbing element now arose in a curious suspicion 
 of the ulterior motives of Gustavus. Both Protestants 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPUUS. 129 
 
 and Catholics Germans alike began to fear that the 
 king might be tempted by his successes to make himself 
 autocrat of Germany. This feeling soon begot a half- 
 heartedness among the king's supporters. Richelieu feared 
 that Gustavus, instead of Ferdinand, was reaching a point 
 which might make him dangerous to France. The 
 Emperor, meanwhile, went back to Wallenstein, who had 
 been so successful before his deposition from command. 
 Wallenstein made hard terms, but he was a power which 
 could no longer be disregarded. Ferdinand, to gain his 
 aid, gave him uncontrolled authority over the army he 
 should raise and all its operations. 
 
 Wallenstein began recruiting. He soon had forty 
 thousand men. The Catholics grew braver when the 
 reconciliation of Wallenstein and the Emperor became 
 known. This, added to the suspicions of the allies, con- 
 strained Gustavus to cease his successful offensive for a 
 cautious holding of what he already had. 
 
 Wallenstein marched into Bohemia, the Saxons offering 
 no resistance, and took Prague. He then moved to 
 Bavaria and joined the Elector. Seeing that Wallenstein 
 by this manoeuvre had gained a position from which he 
 might endanger his communications with northern Ger- 
 many, Gustavus marched summarily on Niirnberg, which 
 was the " cross-roads " of that section of the country, to 
 head Wallenstein off from Saxony, and ordered his outly- 
 ing detachments to concentrate there. He had under bia 
 immediate command but one-third of Wallenstein's total, 
 and could not assume the offensive. But he would not 
 abandon southern Germany uitil driven from it. Ho 
 
130 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 entrenched a camp near the town. Despite eujerior nunv 
 bers, Wallenstein did not attack. lie could not rise above 
 the prejudice of the day. He deemed hunger a more effi- 
 cient ally than assault. He sat down before Niirnberg 
 (July, 1632). The small-war indulged in generally ran 
 in favor of the king, who patiently awaited reinforcements, 
 having provided two months' provisions for his army and 
 the town. Oxenstiern meanwhile collected thirty-eight 
 thousand men and advanced to the aid of his chief. Gus- 
 tavus marched out to meet him. Wallenstein did not in- 
 terfere. The king was prepared for battle should he do 
 so. It was a grave military error that Wallenstein took 
 no means to prevent this junction. 
 
 Soon after Gustavus had received his reinforcements, 
 he determined to bring Wallenstein to battle, for famine 
 had begun to make inroads in Niirnberg and in both 
 camps. He accordingly marched out and drew up in the 
 enemy's front, but Wallenstein could not be induced to 
 leave his entrenchments (Aug., 1632). Failing in this, 
 the king at last resorted to an assauk on the Imperial 
 fortifications. But after a gallant struggle he was driven 
 back with a loss of two thousand men. He has been 
 blamed for this assault. He deserves rather the highest 
 praise for his effort to show the world that gallantry and 
 enterprise are among the beat characteristics of war. After 
 him, Frederick proved that good troops can more often take 
 entrenchments than fail. His grenadiers were accustomed 
 to assault works held by two to one of their own number, 
 ~-and take them, too, under the king's stern eye. 
 
 4fter ten weeks of this futile struggle, and much loss on 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPUUS. 131 
 
 both sides, Gustavus, fairly starved out by want of rations 
 and of battle, determined to regain his communications 
 with northern Germany. He left five thousand men in 
 Niirnberg, and marching past Wallenstein's camp un- 
 challenged, moved to Wiirzburg. He had but twenty-four 
 thousand men left. Wallenstein, who again neglected an 
 admirable chance of falling on Gustavus' flank, soon after 
 marched to Bamberg with the relics of his army, reduced 
 to about the same number (Sept., 1632). 
 
 Learning that Wallenstein had left Niirnberg, Gustavus, 
 in the belief that his opponent would seek repose for a 
 period, marched back to the Danube to resume the thread 
 of his own work. The Niirnberg incident had inter- 
 rupted, not discontinued his general plan. Wallenstein, 
 as he had anticipated, sat quietly in Bamberg. He had 
 shown singular disinclination to come to blows with the 
 king, and exhibited far less activity, though, in truth, 
 Wallenstein was both a distinguished and able soldier. 
 
 On other fields the Swedes and allies were generally suc- 
 cessful, but finally thirty thousand Imperialists concentrated 
 in Saxony, and Wallenstein joined them and took Leipsic. 
 Gustavus (Sept., 1632) feared for his Saxon alliance, 
 without which he could scarcely maintain himself. He 
 again put off the prosecution of his general scheme, to go 
 where lay the most imminent danger. Oxenstiern again 
 advised a summary march on Vienna, but Gustavus wisely 
 rejected the advice. At that day Vienna had not its im- 
 portance of 1805. The king left a suitable force in 
 Bavaria (Oct., 1632), marched northward and en- 
 trenched a camp at Naumberg. Wallenstein turned to 
 
132 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 meet him. His evident duty was to concentrate and 
 attack. But, according to the idea of that day, he parcelled 
 out his army in detachments, sending Pappenheim to Halle 
 while he marched to Merseburg. The Imperial general 
 had blundered into a cardinal position in the midst of the 
 allies. The Swedes, twenty-seven thousand strong, were 
 at Naumberg, the Saxons, with eighteen thousand, at Tor- 
 gau, and ten thousand allies were marching up the left 
 bank of the Elbe. Wallenstein's manifest operation was 
 to fall on each of these forces singly on Gustavus first, as 
 the strongest. But he appeared to lose both head and 
 heart when facing Gustavus. He grew weaker as Gus- 
 tavus grew more bold. He made no use of his advantage, 
 even if he comprehended it. 
 
 The king had got possession of the crossing of the 
 Saale, but Wallenstein stood between him and the Saxons. 
 Gustavus' generals advised a manoeuvre to join these allies, 
 fc ut the king was instinct with mettle, and determined upon 
 action. 
 
 The ensuing battle of Liitzen has little which is remark- 
 able, beyond the fiery ardor which ended in the death of 
 Gustavus Adolphus. It was a battle in simple parallel 
 order, but the better discipline of the Swedish army and 
 the greater mobility of its organization showed as marked 
 superiority over Wallenstein's masses as the Roman legion, 
 for the same reason, had shown over the Macedonian 
 phalanx eighteen centuries before. The Swedes won the 
 victory, but they lost their king, and Germany its protector 
 and champion. 
 
 As is the case with all great captains, Gustavus Adol* 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPHU8. 133 
 
 phus gave the impulse to every action while on the theatre 
 of operations of the Thirty Years' War. For many cen- 
 turies war had been conducted without that art and pur- 
 pose which Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar so markedly 
 exhibited. But in the operations of the Swedish king we 
 again find the hand of the master. We recognize the 
 same method which has excited our admiration in the 
 annals of the noted campaigns of antiquity, and from now 
 on we shall see generals who intelligently carry forward 
 what Gustavus Adolphus rescued from the oblivion of the 
 Middle Ages. 
 
 The operations of the king, from his appearance in Ger- 
 many, showed his exceptional genius for war. He had no 
 military guide, except his study of the deeds of the 
 ancients, for modern war up to his day had altogether 
 lacked depth and directness. During the first fourteen 
 months, he secured his foothold in the northern coast 
 provinces, in a most clear-witted and orderly manner. 
 Every circumstance was against him. He had weak 
 forces to oppose to the Emperor's might. The half- 
 hearted, fear-ridden Protestants yielded him little aid and 
 comfort ; yet he reached his goal, step by step, seizing and 
 holding strong places at key points, and accumulating sup- 
 plies where he could count on their safety. But once, 
 during his entire German campaign, at Niirnberg, 
 was he out of rations, and this without ravaging the 
 country. He carefully secured his communications with 
 the base he had established and with Sweden, and never 
 manoeuvred so as to lose them. He gradually strength- 
 ened himself with allies and recruits. Unlike the armies 
 
134 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 of the day, who behaved as if the populations of the coun- 
 tries they traversed were of less consequence than the 
 beasts of the field, Gustavus dealt with them in a spirit of 
 kindliness and Christian charity which won them over to 
 his side. He kept his troops under strict discipline, and 
 by supplying all their wants and paying them regularly, 
 could rightfully prohibit marauding and plunder. He 
 understood how to avoid battle with an enemy too strong 
 to beat, how to lead him astray on the strategic field, how 
 to mano3uvre energetically against an enemy, his equal or 
 inferior in strength ; how to make the tactical mobility of 
 his troops and his own ardor on the battle-field tell ; how to 
 improve victory ; and how to heighten and maintain the 
 morale of his troops under victory and defeat alike. 
 
 When, by his cautious and intelligent plan, the king 
 stood firmly planted between the sea, the Oder, and the 
 Elbe, with flanks and rear well guarded, he at once altered 
 his conduct. He crossed the Elbe and boldly attacked the 
 enemy, adding to his strength by beating him ; and, leav- 
 ing the allies to protect his flanks and communications, he 
 advanced with spirit and energy. In thirty days he had 
 established himself firmly on the Main ; in little over four 
 months more he had moved down the Main, and had pos- 
 oessed himself of or neutralized the whole middle Rhine ; 
 and in twelve weeks thence had crossed the Danube, 
 beaten the enemy at the Lech, and occupied almost all 
 Bavaria. Thus in less than nine months (Sept., 1631 to 
 June, 1632) he had overrun a much larger territory 
 than he had previously gained in fourteen, and had 
 added vastly to his standing. He had been bold and de- 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHU8. 135 
 
 cisive, and yet never lacking in the method and caution 
 which were his guide. He had established himself as 
 firmly in southern Germany as previously in northern. 
 
 At the height of his reputation and success, he was now 
 ready to attack Austria from the west. But the policy of 
 France changed, his allies became suspicious, and Wal- 
 lenstein moved toward his rear. The scene changed. 
 Gustavus had no longer the security of whole-hearted 
 allies to connect him with Sweden, and his policy at once 
 shifted to the cautious one he had first shown. The thing 
 for him to consider, if he was to be thrown on his own 
 resources, was first and foremost his communications. 
 With forces inferior to Wallenstein's, he acted on the de- 
 fensive. With the accessions which made his army equal 
 to Wallenstein's, he again went over to an offensive at that 
 day startling in its audacity. This failing, and provision 
 having given out, he moved, not to Bavaria, but to the 
 Main, to protect his line of retreat, which naturally 
 traversed Hesse Cassel. So soon as Wallenstein retired to 
 Bamberg, Gustavus, leaving a lieutenant to observe him, 
 felt at liberty to take up his old thread in Bavaria. He 
 had gauged his opponent aright. When again Wallen- 
 stein, by his Saxon affiliations, threatened, and this time 
 more seriously, the king's allies, and remotely the security 
 of his advanced position, Gustavus again resorted to deci- 
 sive operations. His march to Saxony and his attack on 
 the enemy at Liitzen were equally bold, rapid, and skilful. 
 
 Herein is a peculiarly intelligent adaptation of work to 
 existing conditions. From the king's landing to the pas- 
 sage of the Elbe, while securing his base, a cautious, but 
 
136 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 by no means indecisive policy ; from crossing the Elbe t* 
 Niirnberg, while moving upon the enemy, a singular quick- 
 ness and boldness, but by no means lacking in intelligent 
 and methodical caution ; from Niirnberg to Liitzen an 
 alternation from caution to boldness as circumstances 
 warranted. After Caesar's day, Gustavus was the first 
 who firmly and intelligently carried through a campaign 
 on one well considered, fully digested, broad, and intelli- 
 gent plan, and swerved therefrom only momentarily and 
 partially to meet exigencies which could not be foreseen. 
 The advice of his most trusted aides was often opposed to 
 what he did ; but they could not see as far as he saw. 
 Each variation had its definite object, which attained, the 
 general plan was at once resumed. There was an entire 
 freedom from blind subservience to the rules of war as then 
 laid down ; an intelligent sequence and inter-dependence 
 of movement on a plan elastic enough to meet unexpected 
 obstacles ; these produced a perfectly systematic whole, in 
 which the unity of plan was never disturbed ; and with 
 this broad scheme went hand ii hand a careful execution of 
 detail upon which depended the success of the whole. His 
 occupation remained firm ; his victualling was sufficient to 
 his needs ; his movements accomplished what he sought. 
 
 In pursuance of his cautious plan he neglected no essen- 
 tial fortress or city ; he held the passages of important 
 rivers by erecting bridge-heads or occupying towns; he 
 kept upon his line of operations suitable detachments, or 
 met descents upon it by a prompt movement towards the 
 enemy. He so managed the division of his forces as not 
 to endanger his strength n'/r to lose the ability to concen- 
 
OUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 137 
 
 trate. He used his allies for the work they could best 
 perform. He kept the main offensive in his own hands, 
 generally so ordering that his lieutenants should act on the 
 defensive, unless they outnumbered the enemy, and then 
 made them push with vigor. He uniformly did the right 
 thing at the right moment. 
 
 The secret of Gustavus* success lay in his breadth of 
 plan, in his constancy to the work cut out, and in his 
 properly adapting boldness or caution to the existing cir- 
 cumstances. As with Alexander, Hannibal, and Ca3sar, 
 it was the man himself whose soul illumined his work ; 
 and this man had those transcendent qualities which pro- 
 duce incomparable results in war, whenever they coexist 
 with great events. Equal as monarch and soldier, he 
 united in his one person the art of both. His nation and 
 army were devoted to him soul and body. His motives 
 were the highest and purest which have ever inspired a 
 great captain ; his pursuit of them was steadfast and noble, 
 open-handed and above-board, prudent and intrepid. In 
 weighing his intelligence, sound judgment, strong will, 
 elevated sentiment, energy and vigilance, he is properly put 
 in the highest rank. But though his record cannot perhaps 
 vie with the others in the brilliancy of his tactics, in the 
 splendor of his victories, in extent of conquest, in immensity 
 of ambition, in the surmounting of all but impossible nat- 
 jral or artificial barriers, in resisting overwhelming disaster 
 with heroic constancy, still, if we look at the man, 
 upon the results of what he did, at the purposeless and 
 barbarous nature of war as conducted up to his day ; if 
 we weigh the influence of .his short campaigns upon all 
 
138 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 modern war, and consider how his nobility of charactel 
 and his life-work has made toward civilization, we cannot 
 rate Gustavus Adolphus too high. His pointing out the 
 importance of key-points in holding a country ; the value 
 of feeding an army by careful accumulation of supplies, 
 instead of by ravaging every territory it enters ; the advan- 
 tage of a carefully drawn plan extending over the entire 
 theatre of operations ; and the propriety of waging war in 
 a more Christian and civilized spirit, marks the first step 
 towards the modern system. Gustavus Adolphus must be 
 called the father of the modern art of war ; and is ac- 
 knowledged as the one of all others who re-created system- 
 atic, intellectual war, and stripped war of its worst horrors. 
 
 After his death, his lieutenants tried fruitlessly to carry 
 on his methods. They retained a part of what he gave 
 them ; in many things they slid back into the old ruts ; 
 and war (except with masters like Turenne, Prince 
 Eugene, and Marlborough) resumed its character of iso- 
 lated raids, until Frederick once more elevated it and 
 stamped upon it a permanence which it cannot now lose. 
 
 Among his enemies, during the remainder of the Thirty 
 Years' War there was nothing but the extremity of barbar- 
 ous methods, over which it is well to draw a veil. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus was tall, handsome, and strong. 
 In his later years he grew so heavy that none but well- 
 bred horses of great bone and endurance could carry him. 
 But he rode fast and far. His bearing Avas noble, full of 
 simple complaisance, and genuine. His quick mind robbed 
 work of effort ; his ideas were clear, and he expressed 
 them crisply and in happy words ; his voice was rich, hia 
 
QUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 139 
 
 manner convincing. A remarkable memory served to re- 
 tain the names and merits of his subordinate officers and 
 numberless worthy men. He maintained stern discipline 
 in a just and kindly spirit. His religious fervor was as 
 honest as his courage was high-pitched. The Bible was 
 his constant companion and guide. He began all his acts 
 with unaffected prayer, and ended with thanksgiving. 
 The Christian virtues never resided in a more princely 
 soul. He was sober, of simple habit, and upright life. 
 Towering over all around him in mind and heart, and in- 
 flexible withal, he was yet modest and ready to weigh the 
 opinions of others. A tireless worker, he demanded equal 
 exertion from his officials and aides. But in his intercourse 
 with all men were kingly condescension and dignity joined. 
 He was more than monarch, he was a man. 
 
 What has Gustavus Adolphus done for the art of war? 
 In a tactical sense, many things. Before him, not a few 
 noted generals had introduced improvements naturally 
 growing out of the introduction of gunpowder. Gustavus 
 made various changes towards greater mobility. The 
 cumbrous armies of the day were marshalled in battalia, 
 which were huge, dense squares or phalanxes of deep files 
 of musketeers and pikemen mixed, awkward and unwieldy. 
 The recruiting of the day assembled many men of many 
 minds, and the three arms worked at cross-purposes. Gus- 
 tavus began by reducing the pikemen to one-third the entire 
 infantry, and later (1631) formed whole regiments of 
 musketeers alone. He lightened the musket, did away 
 vrith the crutch-rest, till then used in firing, introduced 
 ^heel-locks, paper cartridges, and cartridge-boxes. lie 
 
140 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 taught his men a much quicker manual of aims. TLe 
 times and motions of loading and firing had been some one 
 hundred and sixty ; Gustavus reduced them to ninety-five, 
 which sounds absurdly slow to us to-day. But his men 
 none the less vastly exceeded the enemy in rapidity of 
 fire. He lightened the guns of his artillery, and made the 
 drill of other arms conform to its manoeuvres, so that his 
 whole army worked with one purpose. His batteries 
 became active and efficient. In the Thirty Years' War he 
 generally had a preponderance of artillery over the Im- 
 perialists. 
 
 To secure better fire, Gustavus reduced his musketeers 
 to six ranks, which to fire closed into three. This it 
 was which principally gave it so much greater nimbleness 
 of foot. The troops were well armed and equipped, and 
 uniformed for the first time. Few wagons were allowed 
 per regiment, and effectual discipline prevailed. Severe 
 regulations were enforced. The behavior of the Swedish 
 troops was the marked reverse of that of Wallenstein's and 
 Tilly's forces. Service and seniority alone secured promo- 
 tion ; nepotism was unknown. The force Gustavus created 
 was the first truly national regular army. 
 
 So much for discipline and tactics, which, in themselves, 
 are of minor value. But what has given Gustavus Adol- 
 phus unfading reputation as a captain is the conduct, for 
 the first time in the Christian era, of a campaign in which 
 the intellectual conception overrides the able, consistent, 
 and at times brilliant execution. (From a mere contest of 
 animal courage he had raised war at one step to what it 
 really should be, a contest in which mind and charactei 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 141 
 
 rin, and not brute force. Little wonder that Gustavus, 
 landing at Rugen to attack the colossal power of the Ger- 
 man Empire with his 15,000 men, should have excited the 
 laughter of his enemies, and have provoked Wallenstein to 
 exclaim that he would drive him back to his snow-clad 
 kingdom with switches. It appeared like Don Quixote 
 riding at the windmills. But his action was in truth 
 founded on as substantial a calculation as Hannibal's march 
 into Italy, and was crowned with abundant results. The 
 method of his work could not but win. And Gustavus 
 did one thing more. He showed the world that war 
 could be conducted within the bounds of Christian teach- 
 ings ; that arson, murder, rapine, were not necessary- 
 concomitants of able or successful war ; that there was no 
 call to add to the unavoidable suffering engendered of any 
 armed strife, by inflicting upon innocent populations that 
 which should be borne by the armies alone. In both 
 these things he was first and preeminent, and to him be- 
 longs unqualifiedly the credit of proving to the modern 
 world that war is an intellectual art ; and the still greater 
 eredit of humanizing its conduct. 
 
LECTUEE V. 
 
 FREDERICK. 
 
 WHILE Frederick II., or as Prussians love to call 
 him "Friedrich der Einzige," had been brought 
 up by a military martinet, and had gone through every 
 step by which a Hohenzollern must climb the ladder of 
 army rank, he had, in youth, exhibited so little aptitude 
 for the pipe-clay of war, that few suspected how great his 
 military achievements were to be. But Prince Eugene, 
 then the greatest living soldier, whom young Frederick 
 joined with the Prussian contingent in 1733, is said 
 to have discovered in him that which he pronounced 
 would make him a great general. Frederick had been 
 a keen student of history, and there is nothing which 
 trains the high grade of intellect and the sturdy character 
 which a good leader must possess as birthright, as does 
 the study of the deeds of the great captains, for out 
 of these alone can that knowledge be gleaned, or that 
 inspiration be caught, which constitutes the value of 
 the art. The camp and drill-ground, however essential, 
 teach but the handicraft, not the art, of war. 
 
 We all know how Frederick's youth was passed : 
 how his father sought to mould him into the ramrod 
 142 
 
FREDERICK. 143 
 
 pattern of a grenadier, and how he avoided the system 
 by constant subterfuge. He was an intelligent, attrac- 
 tive lad, witty and imaginative, and possessed a reserve 
 of character which grew abreast with his father's harsh- 
 ness. As we know, Frederick William's brutality finally 
 culminated in an attempt to punish by death the so-called 
 desertion of his son, to which his own cruelty and in- 
 sults had impelled him. The succeeding years of retire- 
 ment were full of active work, and no doubt gave Frederick 
 the business training which in after life made him so 
 wonderful a financier, as well as the opportunity for 
 study ; and perhaps the tyranny of his father added to his 
 constancy and self-reliance as well as to his obstinacy, 
 than which no character in history ever exhibited greater. 
 Frederick William, before his death, understood his son's 
 make-up. Frederick ascended the throne in 1740, and 
 from that day on he was every inch a king. 
 
 Frederick had certain hereditary claims to Silesia, in 
 the validity of which he placed entire confidence, though 
 no doubt his belief was colored by the desirability of this 
 province as an appanage of the Prussian crown. Maria 
 Theresa was in the meshes of the Pragmatic Sanction 
 imbroglio. Frederick determined to assert his claims. 
 He was, thanks to his father, equipped with an army 
 drilled, disciplined, and supplied as none since Caesar's 
 day had been, unconquerable if only the divine breath 
 were breathed into it, and a well-lined military chest. 
 Giving Austria short shrift, he marched across the 
 border and in a few weeks inundated Silesia with hia 
 trooos. From this day until 1763, when it was definitely 
 
144 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 seded to him, Frederick's every thought was devoted 
 to holding this province. Nothing could wrest it from 
 his grasp. 
 
 His first campaign, however, brought him near dis- 
 comfiture . Field-Marshal Neipperg quite out-mano3uvred 
 Frederick, who, under the tutelage of old Field- 
 Marshal Schwerin, had failed to carry out his own 
 ideas, and cut him off from his supply-camp at Ohlau. 
 Seeking to regain it, the Prussian army ran across the 
 Austrians at Mollwitz (April 10, 1741). Here, but 
 for the discipline of the Prussian infantry, the battle 
 would have been lost, for the Prussians were tactically 
 defeated. But these wonderful troops, drilled to the 
 highest grade of steadiness, had no idea of being beaten. 
 To them rout and disaster on all sides were as nothing. 
 They stood their ground like a stone wall, and their five 
 shots to two of the enemy's finally decided the day. 
 The young king had been hurried off the field by 
 Schwerin when defeat was imminent. 
 
 This campaign taught Frederick that in war he must 
 rely only on himself. He never after allowed one of his 
 generals to hamper his movements. Counsel was neither 
 asked nor volunteered. Frederick was distinct head of the 
 Army and State. 
 
 In the second campaign the king advanced, with the 
 French and Saxons, in the direction of Vienna. But these 
 allies proved weak, and Frederick was fain to abandon his 
 project. Prince Charles made his way around the king's 
 right flank and threatened his supplies. But Frederick 
 took prompt advantage of this manoeuvre, and at the 
 
146 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 battle of Chotusitz (May 17, 1742) inflicted a stinging 
 defeat on the Austrians. This ended the First Silesiaa 
 War. Silesia became a Prussian province. 
 
 Frederick had learned good lessons. He had gained 
 self-poise, and a knowledge of the hardships of war, the 
 meannesses of courts, and the fact that he could trust no 
 one but himself and his devoted legions. He was dis- 
 enchanted. War was no longer a glory, but a stern, cold, 
 fact. He had, however, won his point, and he proposed to 
 maintain it, though he must give up the delights of his 
 attractive French Court for the labors of his thoroughly 
 German camp. He had found that his own conceptions 
 of war ranged beyond the stereotyped routine of the 
 Prussian army, though this indeed was not to be under- 
 rated. Silesia became valuable to Prussia beyond the 
 wildest dreams of its worth by Austria, and, being allied by 
 religion with North Germany, had every reason to remain 
 satisfied and faithful. 
 
 It is generally assumed that great captains are fond of 
 war for war's sake, or for the lust of conquest. While 
 often true, it was not so with Frederick. To none of the 
 great captains was war so heartily distasteful. Not one 
 was so fond of the pursuits of peace. The king had as 
 marked a liking for the pleasures of literature, music, art, 
 the companionship of clever men, and intellectual friction 
 of all kinds, as any monarch who ever reigned. He cor- 
 dially hated the hardships and mental strain of war. But 
 Frederick would listen to no peace which should not leave 
 trim in possession of Silesia. His naturally inflexible 
 
FREDERICK. 14< 
 
 nature could entertain no other idea. And for this he 
 would fight if he must. 
 
 During the two years' peace which ensued, Frederick 
 prepared for the war which he knew must occur whenever 
 Maria Theresa felt strong enough to attempt to reconquer 
 her lost province. He was abundantly ready for it when it 
 came in 1744. Austria had as allies England, Saxony, 
 Sardinia, and some of the lesser German States. Frederick 
 had France, the Emperor, the Elector Palatine, and Hesse 
 Cassel. As usual, Frederick opened with a sharp offen- 
 sive. Prague was taken, and from here, the French 
 agreeing to neutralize Prince Charles, who was in the 
 Rhine country, the king undertook a second operation 
 toward Vienna (Sept., 1744). But this was equally 
 unlucky. The French were shiftless. Field-Marshal 
 Traun was joined by Prince Charles, and the two drove 
 Frederick from his purpose. Traun would not come to 
 battle, but worried the king by restless manoeuvring. The 
 Prussians were fortunate to reach Silesia without a serious 
 disaster. Frederick had this time learned that confed- 
 erates were like broken reeds, and that he himself was his 
 own best ally. With the wonderful frankness which 
 characterized him, the king acknowledged the ability of 
 Traun, and the good lessons he had learned from this 
 opponent. 
 
 Elate Prince Charles, early next year (1745), invaded 
 Silesia with seventy-five thousand men and descended upon 
 its fertile plains with flying colors, intending to march on 
 Breslau. The king made no attempt to stop his crossing 
 the mountains. <f If you want to catch a mouse, leave the 
 
148 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 trap open," quoth he, and lay in wait for him, with an 
 equal force, behind Striegau Water. This time he was 
 managing his own affairs. Prince Charles camped near 
 Hohenfriedberg, unsuspicious of his vicinity (June 4). 
 Silently, all night long, and with such precautions that he 
 was not discovered, Frederick marched his men across 
 the stream. His plan was perfectly worked out. Every 
 man and officer had his orders by heart. Daylight had 
 no sooner dawned than, with a tactical beauty of preci- 
 sion which reads like the meter of a martial poem, Fred- 
 erick struck the Saxon left. Blow succeeded blow ; 
 battalion after battalion was hurled upon the enemy with 
 a rapidity and certainty and momentum which the world 
 had never yet seen. By eight o'clock barely break- 
 fast-time the Saxons and Austrians were utterly over- 
 thrown. They had lost nine thousand killed and wounded, 
 seven thousand prisoners, seventy-six standards, and 
 sixty- six guns. Frederick's whole performance his first 
 had bordered on the marvellous. 
 
 The king followed the Austrians across the mountains. 
 By careless detachments and small-war his forces fell to 
 eighteen thousand men. Prince Charles had nearly forty 
 thousand. Frederick was about to retire to Silesia, when 
 Prince Charles surprised him, and appearing in rear of 
 his right flank at Sohr, actually cut him off from his line of 
 retreat. The prince had bagged his game. But not eo 
 thought Frederick, though his army stood with its back to 
 the enemy. "They are two to one of us, but we will beat 
 them yet, meine Kinder ! You shall see ! " exclaimed the 
 king, and ordered a change of front of the army by a right 
 
FREDERICK. 149 
 
 wheel of over one-naif circle, under a 6 re of artillery en- 
 filading the whole line. Fancy an aririy doing such a 
 thing to-day ! The manoeuvre was completed in perfect 
 order. Not a man left the ranks unless shot down. The 
 line came into oblique order opposite the Austrian left. 
 And no sooner in place than the king flung his squadrons 
 and regiments up the heights against the Austrians, who 
 stood curiously watching the strange evolution. So auda- 
 cious and skilful was the whole affair, and so brilliant the 
 Prussian fighting, that the king inflicted another telling 
 defeat, with loss of eight thousand men, twenty-two 
 guns, and twelve flags, on the Austrian army (Sept. 30). 
 After some mano3uvring, during the winter peace was 
 made, and Frederick kept Silesia. This was the Second 
 Silesian War. 
 
 Such was Frederick's apprenticeship. He emerged from 
 it the best tactician the world has ever seen. As a strate- 
 gist he had yet made no great mark. 
 
 The First and Second Silesian wars were succeeded by a 
 ten years' peace, which Frederick used to the best advan- 
 tage in military preparations. Hie army became the one 
 perfect machine of Europe. 
 
 In 1756 came the Seven Years' War. Maria Theresa 
 had resolved to regain Silesia at any cost. We can barely 
 glance at the leading events of each year. In 1756 
 Frederick had Field-Marshal Brown opposed to him. He 
 took Dresden, and defeating Brown at Lobositz, he cap- 
 tured the Saxon army at Pirna ^October). The year's end 
 b^w Saxony under Frederick's control. The campaign 
 was in every sense deserving its success. 
 
150 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 In 1757, France, Russia, and Sweden made common 
 cause with Austria. England was Frederick's one reliance, 
 and aided him with money and an observation-army in 
 Hanover. No less than one hundred millions of population 
 were arrayed against his scant five millions, including 
 Silesia. The allies put four hundred and thirty thousand 
 men on foot, Frederick one hundred and fifty thousand. 
 Always first in the field and retaining the offensive, Fred- 
 erick advanced on Prague in three large concentric 
 columns, setting the sixth of May for meeting there and 
 beating the Austrians. So accurate were his calculations 
 and their execution by his lieutenants, that in the bloody 
 battle of Prague, on the very day set, he drove Prince 
 Charles and Field-Marshal Brown into the city and sat 
 down before it. 
 
 But Field-Marshal Daun was not far off with an army of 
 relief of sixty thousand men. To meet this serious threat, 
 Frederick, from his lines at Prague, could barely detach 
 thirty-four thousand, and in the battle of Kolin (June 18), 
 by a series of contretemps, in part due to the king's hasty 
 temper, though he had attacked and handled Daun so 
 roughly that the latter actually gave the order of retreat, 
 he was finally beaten and obliged to raise the siege. 
 But Frederick shone in reverse far higher than in success. 
 From not only the field of battle but from the siege-lines 
 of Prague he retired deliberately, without a symptom of 
 flurry, and unopposed. 
 
 He was none the less in a desperate strait. He had but 
 seventy thousand men available. In his front were the 
 Victorious Austrians, one hundred and ten thousand strong, 
 
FREDERICK. 15 J 
 
 elate and confident. On his left were approaching one 
 hundred thousand Russians, and these not only threatened 
 Berlin, but an Austrian raiding party actually took the 
 suburbs. On his right, a French and Imperial array of 
 sixty thousand threatened Dresden. The king's case was 
 forlorn. But he utilized to the full his central position. 
 Turning on the French, and marching one hundred and 
 seventy miles in twelve days, a remarkable performance 
 at that date, he reached their vicinity at Rossbach, 
 beyond the Saale. Soubise outnumbered Frederick nearly 
 three to one. But in a simply exquisite mano2uvre the 
 king took advantage of the enemy's error in trying to cut 
 him off by a wide flank march, fell upon their head of 
 column, and in a bare half-hour disgracefully routed them, 
 with loss of eight thousand men, five generals, and four 
 hundred officers, seventy guns, and numberless flags 
 (Nov. 5). Having performed which feat, he at once turned 
 his face toward Silesia, whence came alarming rumors. 
 
 During his absence disaster had piled on disaster. The 
 Duke of Bevern, left in command, had been driven back 
 to Silesia, and the Austrians had captured Breslau and 
 Schweidnitz, and proclaimed Silesia again part of Her 
 Imperial Majesty's dominions. There is something so 
 heroic, so king-like, about Frederick's conduct in the 
 ensuing campaign, which culminated in the battle of 
 Lent hen, that I cannot refrain from enlarging upon it, as 
 typical of the man. 
 
 As the king proceeded on his way, the news of what had 
 happened gradually reached his ears. There had been, 
 9od wot, enough already to tax Frederick's manliness, and 
 
152 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Buch great misfortunes were fit to overwhelm him. Bui 
 the king's mettle was indomitable. There was not an 
 instant of pause or hesitation. The greater the pressure, 
 the more elastic his mood and his method. And he had 
 the rare power of making his lieutenants partake of his 
 buoyant courage. Nothing was ever lost to Frederick till 
 he had played his final card. He would rather die with 
 his last grenadier at the foot of the Austrian lines than 
 yield one inch of Silesia. His men marched in light order, 
 leaving the heavy trains behind, and making no stops to 
 bake the usual bread. The king rationed his army on the 
 country. This was not the first instance, but it had been 
 rare, and but partially done, and was a novelty in war. 
 It is curious that so clear-sighted a man as Frederick did 
 not expand the method, so important a factor in speed. 
 But at that day, to sustain an army by foraging in an 
 enemy's country would have been considered an infraction 
 of the laws of nations. The distance from Leipsic, nearly 
 one hundred and eighty miles, was covered in fifteen days. 
 At Parch witz he met the troops brought from Breslau by 
 Ziethen, some eighteen thousand men. This increased 
 Frederick's force to thirty-two thousand under the colors. 
 The king determined to attack Prince Charles whenever 
 ai 1 wherever he should meet him. He called together 
 his general officers and made them one of those stirring 
 speeches which lead captive the heart of every soldier : 
 " You know, Meine Herrn, our disasters. Schweidnitz 
 and Breslau and a good part of Silesia are gone. The 
 Duke of Bevern is beaten. There would be nothing left 
 Out for my boundless trust in you and your courage. 
 
FREDERICK. 153 
 
 Each of you has distinguished himself by some memorable 
 act. These services I know and remember. The hour is 
 at hand. I shall have done nothing if I do not keep Si- 
 lesia. I intend, in spite of all the rules of art, to seek 
 Prince Charles, who has thrice our strength, and to at- 
 tack him wherever I find him. It is not numbers I rely 
 on, but your gallantry and whatever little skill I myself 
 possess. This risk I must take or everything is lost. We 
 must beat the enemy, or perish every one of us before his 
 guns. Tell my determination to your officers, and prepare 
 the men for the work to be done. I demand of you and them 
 exact obedience. You are Prussians, and will act as such. 
 But if any one of you dreads to share my dangers, he may 
 now have his discharge without a word of reproach." The 
 king paused. A murmur and the soldier's look of pride 
 were his answer. "Ah! I knew it," said the king, "not 
 one of you would desert me. With your help victory is 
 sure ! " After a few more words the king added. " I de- 
 mand again exact obedience. The cavalry regiment which 
 does not on the instant, on orders given, dash full plunge 
 into the enemy, I will unhorse and make a garrison regi- 
 ment. The infantry battalion which, meet it what may, 
 pauses but an instant shall lose its colors and sabres, and I 
 will cut the trimmings from its uniform. And now, good- 
 night. Soon we shall have beaten the enemy, or we shall 
 never meet again." 
 
 Having learned of the approach of the Prussian 
 army, Prince Charles, relying on his vast preponder- 
 ance of forces, left his intrenched camp at Breslau 
 nd marched out to meet the king. He felt certain of 
 
154 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 victory, as how could he otherwise? Had not Frederick 
 been beaten at the last encounter and his territory 
 overrun? He imagined that he would etand on the 
 defence along the Katzbach. He little knew this iron- 
 hearted king. 
 
 The Austrian van, with the bread bakery, was sent 
 to Neumarkt. In his own advance, Frederick ran 
 across this outpost and bakery and captured it. It 
 was on a Sunday, and furnished the men a holiday 
 dinner. He was glad to learn that the enemy had 
 come out to meet him. Prince Charles, surprised at 
 the Neumarkt incident, lost heart and retired to re- 
 ceive battle in front of Schweidnitz Water. The Aus- 
 trian army was posted at Leuthen, extending from 
 Nypern to Sageschiitz. The villages in its front were 
 prepared for defence. 
 
 The king broke up from Neumarkt long before 
 day. He was advancing by his right, in four columns, 
 on the straight road toward Breslau. Prince Charles 
 lay across his path (Dec. 5). In Frederick's mind 
 was nothing but the firm determination he had ex- 
 pressed to his officers. He proposed to attack the 
 enemy on sight, and under any conditions. In bold- 
 ness alone for him lay safety, and he never doubted 
 himself or his men. 
 
 Riding with the vanguard, as was his wont in an 
 advance, the king ran across a cavalry outpost at 
 Borne. Quickly surrounding it, he captured almost 
 the entire body. The few who escaped carried con- 
 tidings back to Prince Charles, who believed 
 
FREDERICK. 
 
 155 
 
 the king's party to be only scouts. From here Fred- 
 erick rode to the Scheuberg, from whence he could 
 see the Austrian line, and gauge its strength. Care- 
 ful to occupy this hill and a range of knolls running 
 south from it and parallel with the Austrian line, the 
 king speedily perfected his plan of battle. He was 
 never at a loss. His vanguard he sent beyond Borne 
 
 LCUTHEN 
 DEC. 5 1757. 
 
 to engage the enemy's attention. He knew the 
 ground well. On the Austrian right it was swampy 
 and unsuited to manoeuvring. On their centre and 
 left it was open and firm. The Austrian position, 
 in two lines, had been well chosen, but, almost five 
 miles long, was open to be broken by well-concen- 
 trated columns. Nadasti held the left, Lucchesi the 
 light. Frederick filed his entire army off the main 
 road in columns of platoons to the right, behind 
 the swelling hills, and ployed his four columns of 
 advance into two, which would thus become the first 
 
156 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 and second lines when the column should wheel to the 
 left into line. Upon doing this they were to advance in 
 echelon and obliquely upon the Austrian left flank. On 
 good manoeuvring ground and with Prussian troops, the 
 king felt confident that he could strike a formidable 
 blow to the enemy. 
 
 Frederick's officers and men had become familiar with 
 this oblique order of attack, from the frequency of its use on 
 the drill-ground and in battle. Its origin was Epaminon- 
 das' manoeuvre at Leuctra, but the details the king himself 
 had introduced. The cumulative effect of the impact, ac- 
 quiring power as every additional battalion came into line, 
 was apt to impose strongly upon the enemy. And at the 
 actual point of contact Frederick would have the larger 
 force, though outnumbered three to one. 
 
 Prince Charles occupied Leuthen belfry. He could not 
 see beyond the Scheuberg hills. The Prussian cavalry 
 here he assumed to be the Prussian right wing, as it ex- 
 tended some distance south of the main road. The atten- 
 tion of Lucchesi was particularly called to the Prussian van 
 of horse, and he conceived that the Austrian right was to 
 be attacked in overwhelming numbers. He sent for reen- 
 forcements. These were denied him by Daun, who was 
 second in command ; but the request was repeated so 
 urgently that Daun, finally convinced, moved the bulk of 
 the cavalry and part of the reserve from the Austrian left 
 ever to the right, an operation requiring nearly two hours. 
 Here was an unfortunate blunder to begin with. To read 
 aright your enemy's intentions savors of the divine. 
 
 The king's columns soon emerged from the shelter of the 
 
FREDERICK. 157 
 
 Scheuberg hills, opposite the strongly posted Austrian left. 
 To the distant observer they appeared a confused mass, 
 without form or purpose. But the king well knew how 
 certainly, at the proper moment, his perfectly drilled bat- 
 talions would wheel into line. Eye-witnesses state that 
 the movement was conducted as if on parade ; that the 
 heads of columns remained absolutely even, and that the 
 .echeloning of the line was done at exact intervals. Each 
 battalion followed the one on its right at a distance of fifty 
 paces. The line was not only oblique from its echeloned 
 character, but was formed at an angle to the Austrian front 
 as well. The Austrian left was thrown back in a crochet. 
 It was the salient of line and crochet which was to be the 
 centre of attack. The manoeuvre had lasted two hours. 
 The Austrians had not budged. 
 
 It was one P.M. A battery of ten heavy guns was 
 placed opposite the abatis which protected the Austrian left 
 and shortly broke this down. Ziethen headed his cavalry 
 for an attack upon the extreme left of the enemy, to com- 
 plement that of the main line. Lest his own right should 
 be turned, he reenforced it with some infantry troops. 
 Nadasti had been weakened by the removal of his cavalry, 
 but nothing daunted, he sallied out without waiting for 
 Ziethen's shock, and all but countered the Prussian blow. 
 But though the Prussian horse, charging uphill, for a mo- 
 ment wavered, the infantry on its right was undisturbed. 
 Nadasti was hustled back. 
 
 While the cavalry was thus advancing to the assault, the 
 batteries posted by the king to sustain the attack of his 
 infantry delivered an effective fire. Under its cover the 
 
158 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Prussian regiments, despite the abatis which, no. quite 
 levelled, still retained them under fire, after a sanguinaiy 
 struggle, broke the salient at its apex, while Ziethen turned 
 its extreme left. The crochet was thus taken in double 
 reverse, a battery of fourteen guns was captured, and the 
 main line of the enemy was outflanked. It was barely two 
 o'clock, but the left wing of the Austrians had been com- 
 pletely broken. 
 
 Prince Charles, alarmed, hurried troops and guns from 
 the centre to the assistance of Nadasti ; but the more came 
 up the greater the confusion. Ziethen was taking whole 
 regiments prisoners. Seeing that all efforts to rally the 
 left were useless, and that Nadasti could probably retreat 
 upon the centre while the Prussians were gathering for a 
 second blow, the prince made a desperate effort to form a 
 new line at Leuthen. Lucchesi moved forward by a left 
 wheel. Nadasti fell back as best he might. Prince 
 Charles posted a strong force in Leuthen churchyard as a 
 point d'appui. 
 
 The Prussian army was now advancing almost north. 
 The new Austrian line lay at right angles to its first posi- 
 tion, and, as drawn, encircled the village. The Prussians, 
 within half an hour, attacked them in this new position. 
 A bitter contest ensued around the churchyard and some 
 windmills on the hills beyond. The Austrian line was 
 badly mixed up. In places it was thirty to one hundred 
 men deep, and the Prussian guns cut great furrows through 
 the mass. Still the resistance was so stubborn that Fred- 
 erick was compelled to put in his last man. 
 
 Meanwhile Luccheei, whose misconception had caused 
 
FREDERICK. 159 
 
 the defeat of the Austrian left, debouched with his cavalry 
 upon the Prussian left, which was engaging the enemy on 
 the west of Leuthen. This diversion was well intentioned 
 and came near to being fatal. But the Prussian squadrons 
 left by the king on the Scheuberg hills, emerging from 
 their hiding when the Austrians had somewhat passed, fell 
 smartly upon their flank and rear. Lucchesi was killed 
 and his cavalry scattered ; the flank of the enemy's new 
 line was thus taken in reverse, and the position soon made 
 untenable. Prince Charles was compelled again to beat a 
 hasty retreat. 
 
 A third stand was attempted at Saara, but to no effect. 
 The defeated Austrians poured pell-mell over the bridges 
 spanning Schweidnitz Water. The Prussian cavalry fol- 
 lowed them some distance. 
 
 In this astonishing victory, which was won in three 
 hours, the Prussian loss was six thousand two hundred 
 killed and wounded out of thirty thousand men. The 
 Austrians, out of over eighty thousand men, lost ten thou- 
 sand in killed and wounded, and twelve thousand prison- 
 ers on the field of battle, fifty-one flags, and one hundred 
 and sixteen guns. Within a fortnight after, nearly twenty 
 'housand more men, left by Prince Charles at Breslau, 
 were taken prisoners. 
 
 Prince Charles crossed the mountains and reached K5n- 
 igsgratz with a force of but thirty-seven thousand men, of 
 whom twenty- two thousand were invalided. So much 
 &lone was left of the proud army which was to give the 
 loup de grace to doughty Frederick. 
 
 By this victory, whose like had not been seen since 
 
160 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Cann#, and which is, tactically considered, distinctly the 
 most splendid of modern days, Frederick rescued himself 
 from immediate disaster, and earned a winter's leisure in 
 which to prepare for the still desperate difficulties before 
 him. The most threatening matter was the Russian army ; 
 the one comfort a subsidy from England. Pitt was clear- 
 sighted in his help to the king. 
 
 Frederick is by no means as distinguished a strategist as 
 Napoleon, but he is a more brilliant tactician. He was 
 not a conqueror ; he was a king defending his territory. 
 While theoretically on the defensive, he kept the initiative 
 and was always the attacking party. Surrounded as he 
 was by enemies, his strategy was confined to selecting the, 
 for the time, most dangerous opponent and making an 
 uncompromising onslaught upon him. During the Seven 
 Years' War he was placed somewhat as was Napoleon in 
 the campaign around Paris, in 1814, and flew from one 
 margin of his theatre of operations to the other. But 
 Frederick won ; Napoleon lost. It was Frederick's forti- 
 tude, unmatched save by Hannibal, which carried him 
 through. 
 
 In 1758, true to his custom, Frederick took the field 
 before the enemy and surprised him by a march into 
 Moravia and a sudden siege of Olmiitz. But Frederick, 
 like Hannibal, was never happy in his sieges. This one 
 was interrupted by Daun from Konigsgriitz, and ended in 
 the capture of one of Frederick's convoys by the active 
 partisan chieftain Laudon. Frederick was forced to retire, 
 but he did so deliberately and with all his trains. One of 
 the most remarkable qualities of the king was the dread ha 
 
FREDERICK. 161 
 
 inspired, even in defeat. As the Romans avoided Han- 
 nibal, so the Austrians never ventured to attack Frederick 
 in disaster. Napoleon by no means rose superior to mis- 
 fortune in the manner of Frederick. In this instance the 
 enemy attempted no pursuit, and to Daun's utter con- 
 sternation, instead of retreating on Silesia from whence he 
 had come, Frederick made a forced march around the 
 Austrian flank, captured and established himself in Daun's 
 own fortified camp, and there feasted his men on Daun's 
 supplies. He had absolutely checkmated the Austrian 
 general. This turning of the tables almost provokes a 
 smile. (July.) 
 
 From Kb'nigsgratz, however, Frederick was soon called 
 against the Russians, who had advanced as far into Prus- 
 sian territory as Frankfurt. He marched rapidly north- 
 ward, met the enemy at Zorndorf, and by a beautiful 
 movement around their position established himself on 
 (heir communications. Then with his thirty thousand men 
 he boldly assailed the fifty thousand Russians strongly 
 entrenched on Zorndorf heights (August 25). The Rus- 
 sians have always been stubborn fighters, but they now 
 met a man who would not take less than victory. There 
 ensued one of those horrible butcheries which these tena- 
 cious troops have so often suffered rather than yield. 
 Frederick won the day, but it was with a loss of ten thou- 
 sand four hundred killed and wounded out of his thirty 
 "housand men, more than one-third, in a few hours, 
 while the Russians lost twenty-one thousand men and one 
 hundred and thirty guns. Frederick, however, from sheer 
 ixhaustion, allowed the Russians to retire without pursuit , 
 
162 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 md singularly enough he neglected to seize the Russian 
 wagon-camp, which was absolutely under his hand. This 
 was an undoubted error ; but he had eliminated the most 
 grievous danger from his problem, which was all he 
 had in view. 
 
 He was now obliged to hurry back to draw Daun away 
 from Dresden. This he accomplished ; but Daun still 
 stood athwart his path to Silesia, which the king must 
 reach to relieve the siege of Neisse. In endeavoring to 
 elude the enemy he ran across him at Hochkirch, and, in 
 one of his not unusual fits of unreasonable obstinacy, sat 
 down in a recklessly bad position within a mile of the 
 Austrian front. Here he remained four days. " The 
 Austrians deserve to be hanged if they do not attack us 
 here," said grim Field-Marshal Keith. "They fear us 
 worse than the gallows," replied the king. But just as 
 Frederick was preparing a new flank march, Daun, who 
 had ninety thousand men, fell upon the Prussian army of 
 less than forty thousand, and, despite the best of fighting, 
 fairly wrested a victory and one hundred guns from the 
 king (Oct. 14). For all which Frederick retired from 
 the field in parade order merely shifted his ground, as it 
 were and again camped within four miles of the battle- 
 field. " The marshal has let us out of check ; the game i 
 not lost yet," quoth he. From here, within a few days, 
 Frederick made another of his wonderful turning move- 
 ments, and this time actually seized the road to Silesia. 
 Thus in spite of a defeat and of numbers he had gained his 
 point. The Austrians raised the siege of Neisse at the 
 laere rumor of his approach, and this campaign of marvel- 
 
FREDERICK. 163 
 
 lous marches left the king in possession of all that for 
 which he had been contending. 
 
 But though Frederick had in every sense held his own, 
 and had won battles such as the world had never yet seen, 
 he had none the less lost ground. His three years' hard 
 fighting had robbed him of most of his trusted generals 
 and the flower of his army. He had an inimitable knack 
 of making recruits into soldiers, but these were not his old 
 grenadiers, nor could his dead lieutenants be replaced. 
 The Austrian troops were, on the contrary, distinctly im- 
 proving. Their ranks contained more veterans, for, in 
 their larger standing army, the losses of the Austrians did 
 not decimate their battalions. 
 
 The king's financiering during these years was remark- 
 able. He never ran in debt. He always had money 
 ahead. How he managed to arm, equip, supply, feed, and 
 pay his men on less than eighty-five dollars per man per 
 year, is beyond our comprehension. But he did it, and 
 well too. 
 
 As 1759 opened, a cordon of over three hundred and 
 fifty thousand men surrounded Frederick's one hundred 
 and fifty thousand. The king had, however, interior lines 
 and undivided purpose. His difficulty in raising troops 
 and he had a press-gang in every country of Europe 
 obliged him to give up fighting for manoeuvring, like 
 Hannibal after Cannae. He could afford battle only 
 when he must wrench the enemy's grip from his very 
 throat. He remained in Silesia watching Daun, who 
 induced the Prussians to advance into Brandenburg, by 
 lending Soltikof some reinforcements under Laudon. 
 
164 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Frederick must parry this thrust at his heart. He 
 marched on the allies and met them at Kunersdorf, and, 
 though he had but half their force, he attacked them 
 with his usual impetuous valor. But the king was 
 over- impetuous that day. Ill luck beset him. Hie 
 combinations would not work. He tore himself to 
 shreds against the entrenchments and artillery of the 
 enemy. He would have victory. Not until he had 
 lost one-half his army, nineteen thousand out of forty- 
 two thousand men, would he desist from repeated, ob- 
 stinate assaults. He was the last to leave the field. 
 No such stubborn fighting is elsewhere inscribed on 
 the roll of fame. After the battle the king could as- 
 semble but three thousand men. The allies had been 
 too roughly handled to pursue (Aug. 12). 
 
 For once despair seized poor Frederick. He thought 
 the end had come. But his elasticity came to the rescue. 
 In three days he was himself again. Every one was 
 certain that Prussia was gone beyond rescue. Happily 
 the allies were lax. Dresden was indeed lost, and 
 Frederick was cut off by Soltikof and the Austrians 
 from Prince Henry, who were on tfie confines of Saxony. 
 But by a handsome series of manoeuvres between him 
 and the prince as beautiful as any on record he re- 
 gained touch and reoccupied all Saxony except Dresden. 
 And although he suffered another grievous blow, and 
 again by his own obstinacy, as at Hochkirch, in the 
 tapture of twelve thousand men at Maxen, still Daun 
 
FREDERICK. 165 
 
 made no headway, and the end of the fourth year saw 
 the king where he was at the beginning. 
 
 The characteristic of 1760 was a series of wonderful 
 mano2uvres. Frederick, from Saxony, had to march to the 
 relief of Breslau, threatened by Laudon. He had thirty 
 thousand men. The enemy barred his passage (August) 
 with ninety thousand, and the Russians were near by with 
 twenty-four thousand more. Despite this fearful odds of 
 four to one, despite the unwonted activity of the enemy, 
 Frederick, by unheard-of feats of marching, the most 
 extraordinary schemes for eluding his adversaries, strategic 
 turns and twists by day and night, the most restless activity 
 and untiring watchfulness, actually made his way to Silesia, 
 beat the Austrian right at Liegnitz and marched into Bres- 
 lau safe and sound, and with martial music and colors 
 flying. No parallel exhibition of clean grit and nimble- 
 footedness can be found. From Breslau as base, Fred- 
 erick then turned on Daun in the Glatz region. 
 
 The Russians and Austrians now moved on Beilin, and 
 while Frederick followed, Daun marched towards Saxony 
 (October) . The king by no means proposed to give up 
 this province. To its fruitful fields he was indebted for 
 too much in breadstuffs and war material for a moment 
 peaceably to yield them up. His stubbornness had grown 
 by misfortune. Knowing full well that failure meant the 
 dismemberment of Prussia, he was ready to sacrifice every 
 man in the ranks and every coin in the treasury, and him- 
 self fall in his tracks, rather than yield his point. This 
 wonderful man and soldier was made of stuff which, like 
 rteel, gains quality from fire and blows. 
 
166 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 The Berlin incident proved more bark than bite, and in 
 the battle of Torgau, though Daun and the Imperialists had 
 over one hundred thousand men to Frederick's forty-four 
 thousand, the king attacked their intrenchments and won a 
 superb victory (Nov. 3). 
 
 For 1761, Frederick's forces dropped to ninety-six thou- 
 sand men. The enemy had the usual number. This, too, 
 was a year of manoeuvres, which are of the greatest interest 
 to the soldier, but need volumes to relate. At the camp of 
 Bunzelwitz, for the first time, Frederick resorted to pure 
 defence. The result of this year left the king where he 
 had been, save the capture of Schweidnitz by General 
 Laudon. Frederick was fighting to keep Silesia, and the 
 close of each year, through good and evil alike, saw him 
 still in possession of the cherished province. 
 
 The winter of 1761-2 was one of great bitterness to the 
 king. His health had broken down. On every hand the 
 situation was clearly desperate. No prospect but failure 
 lay before him. He led the life of a dog, as he said. 
 Still the iron- hearted man ceased not for a moment his 
 preparations. He was resolved to die with honor if he 
 could not win. Had the outlook been promising in the ex- 
 treme, he could not have labored more consistently, even 
 if more cheerfully. " All our wars should be short and 
 sharp," says he ; "a long war is bad for our discipline and 
 would exhaust our population and resources." The theory 
 of the strategy as well as the battle evolutions of the king 
 was the saving of time by skill and rapidity. 
 
 The death of the Czarina and accession of Peter III, 
 yave Frederick a breathing-spell. This lasted but a short 
 
FREDERICK. 167 
 
 while, when the death of Peter again changed the current. 
 But the war from now on languished, and there finally 
 came about a peace on the w as-you-were " principle. 
 Frederick kept Silesia (1763). 
 
 Frederick had not been a strong boy, but in early man- 
 hood he had gained in physique. His life with troops had 
 lent him a robustness of constitution equal to any drain or 
 strain, and his wonderful determination drove him to cease- 
 less activity. Later in life he was troubled with gout. 
 Even when seventy- three years old, and clinging to life by 
 a mere thread, he never ceased daily, hourly work. 
 His efforts were all for the good of Prussia, and his sub- 
 jects recognized what he had done for the fatherland. 
 Zimmermann, the Hanoverian physician, thus describes 
 him in his old age : 
 
 "He is not of tall stature, and seems bent under his load 
 of laurels and his many years of struggle. His blue coat, 
 much worn like his body, long boots to above the knees, 
 and a white snuff-besprinkled vest, gave him a peculiar 
 aspect. But the fire of his eyes showed that Frederick's 
 soul had not grown old. Though his bearing was that of 
 an invalid, yet one must conclude from the quickness of his 
 movements and the bold decisiveness of his look, that he 
 could yet fight like a youth. Set up his unimportant fig- 
 ure among a million of men, and every one would recognize 
 in him the king, so much sublimity and constancy resided 
 in this unusual man ! " 
 
 And the same writer says of his palace : 
 
 " At Sans Souci there reigned such quiet that one might 
 notice every breath. My first visit to this lonely spot was 
 
168 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 of an evening in the late fall. I was indeed surprised 
 when I saw before me a small mansion, and learned that in 
 it lived the hero who had already shaken the world with 
 his name. I went around the entire house, approached 
 the windows, saw light in them, but found no sentry before 
 the doors, nor met a man to ask me who I was or what I 
 craved. Then first I understood the greatness of Freder- 
 ick. He needs for his protection not armed minions or 
 firearms. He knows that the love and respect of the 
 people keep watch at the doors of his modest abode." 
 
 Frederick's military genius was coupled with absolute 
 control of his country's resources. Though Gustavus 
 Adolphus was both general and king, he was not an auto- 
 crat. The constitution of Sweden prescribed his bounds. 
 In ancient days, only Alexander stood in the position of 
 Frederick, and Caesar, during the latter portion of his 
 campaigns. Hannibal was always limited in his authority. 
 Alexander, working in a far larger sphere, had personal 
 ambitions and a scope which Frederick lacked, yet each 
 worked for the good of his country. Frederick was not a 
 conqueror. He fought to defend his possessions. His 
 military education was narrow ; his favorite studies and oc- 
 cupations essentially peaceful. But from history he had 
 sucked the ambition to make more powerful the country 
 which owed him allegiance, and he had digested the deeds 
 of the great commanders as only a great soldier can. Un- 
 tonscious of his own ability, necessity soon forced him to 
 show what he was worth. Like the Romans, he laid down 
 one rule : Never wait for your opponent's attack. If you 
 we on the defensive, let this be still of an offensive char- 
 
FREDERICK. . 168 
 
 acter in both campaigns and battles. This rule he followed 
 through life. 
 
 Frederick most resembled Hannibal. He possessed 
 Hannibal's virtue, the secret of keeping a secret. He 
 never divulged his plans. From the start he was a cap- 
 tain, and so he remained to the end. How did he learn 
 his trade ? Alexander and Hannibal learned theirs under 
 Philip and Hamilcar in Greece and Spain. Caesar taught 
 himself in Gaul ; Gustavus Adolphus, in Denmark, Russia, 
 and Poland. But Frederick had had no opportunities, 
 except to learn the pipe-clay half of the art of war. His 
 five years' retirement after his court-martial must have 
 done for him more than any one ever knew. The fertility 
 of his intelligence, and his power of applying what he 
 learned, were the foundation of his skill. His first cam- 
 paign advanced him more than a life of war does the 
 greatest among others. The First Silesia'h War was a 
 Bchool out of which Frederick emerged the soldier he 
 always remained. 
 
 That Frederick was not a warrior for the sake of con- 
 quest was well shown in his moderation after the First 
 Silesian War. He demanded only his rights, as heunder- 
 etood them. And after the Second Silesian, and the Seven 
 Years' War, he asked no more than he got at the peace of 
 Dresden, when he might have made far greater claims. 
 Indeed, Frederick's whole life showed his preference for 
 the arts of peace. After the glamour of the first stey 
 had vanished, war was but his duty to Prussia. 
 
 Frederick had assimilated the theory of war from the 
 history of great men ; but its study was never a iavorite 
 
170 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 pursuit. He was a born soldier. As Caesar taught him- 
 self from ambition, so Frederick taught himself from 
 necessity. What he did had not a theoretical but an 
 essentially practical flavor. He rose to the highest in- 
 tellectual and characteristic plane of the art, not by imita- 
 tion of others, but by native vigor. Frederick had by heart 
 the lesson of Leuctra and Mantincea, but it required 
 genius to apply the oblique order as he did it at Leuthen. 
 No man has ever so perfectly done this. No one in 
 modern times has had such troops. 
 
 Frederick placed war among the liberal arts. Perhaps 
 the least straight-laced of any captain, he held that only 
 broad principles can govern it ; that the use of the maxims 
 of war depends on the personality of the soldier and the 
 demands of the moment. His " Instructions "to his gen- 
 erals set out Frederick's whole art. It is full of simple, 
 common sense,' apt rules, practical to the last degree. But 
 it was the man who made them so fruitful. Just because 
 they do represent the man they are interesting in this con- 
 nection. 
 
 Frederick is the first writer on the military art who goes 
 to the root of the matter. He always wrote profusely, 
 most plentifully in bad French verse, but his " Instruc- 
 tions " are admirable throughout. At the head of the 
 paper stands this motto : " Always move into the field 
 sooner than the enemy ; " and this was his course in cam- 
 paign and battle alike. He asked of the enemy a cate- 
 gorical yes or no to his ultimatum, and upon no struck an 
 instant blow. So novel was Frederick's quick decisiveness 
 that he was at first looked upon in Europe as a rank dis- 
 
FREDERICK. 17 J 
 
 turber of the peace. But his was only the old Roman 
 method revamped. 
 
 Underlying this rule was the good of Prussia. Thia 
 motive he ground into his men's souls. He demanded as 
 a daily habit extraordinary exertions. His men must per- 
 form the unusual at all times. And " from highest officer 
 to last private, no one is to argue, but to obey," says he. 
 A habit of obedience supplanted fear of punishment. The 
 king's zeal flowed down through every channel to the 
 ranks. He was himself notoriously the hardest- worked 
 man in Prussia, and his men appreciated the fact. 
 
 Next in importance to discipline comes the care of the 
 troops. In his day subsistence tied armies down to pre- 
 determined manoeuvres. Frederick carried his rations with 
 him, and in his rapid movements made requisitions on the 
 country, as Napoleon, a generation later, did more fully. 
 
 Then follows the study of topography. Positions were 
 to Frederick only links in a chain, or resting places, but he 
 ably utilized the lay of the land in his battles. He taught 
 his generals, wherever they might be, to look at the sur- 
 rounding country and ask themselves, "What should I do 
 if I was suddenly attacked in this position ? " He enun- 
 ciated many maxims scarcely known at his day. "If you 
 divide your forces you will be beaten in detail. If you 
 wish to deliver a battle bring together as many troops as 
 possible." Frederick did not try to keep everything, but 
 put all his energy into the one important matter. His was 
 DO hard and fast system. He did what was most apt. 
 His battle plans were conceived instantly on the ground. 
 What was intricate to others was simple to him and to the 
 
172 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Prussian army. Frederick held Hannibal up as a pattern. 
 " Always," said the king, "lead the enemy to believe you 
 will do the very reverse of what you intend to do." 
 
 Minor operations are clearly treated of. In general the 
 motif of these " Instructions " is attack and initiative. 
 w Prussians," said he, "are invariably to attack the enemy." 
 Close with him even if weaker. Make up for weakness by 
 boldness and energy. He opposed passive defence. Every 
 one of his battles was offensive. He complained, indeed, 
 that he had to risk much all his life. 
 
 Frederick's irrepressible courage under misfortune is 
 equalled in history only by Hannibal's. Fortune was not 
 his servant as she was Alexander's and Cesar's. He thanked 
 himself for his good luck, or rather his successes were due 
 to the fact that he made use of good luck when he had it, 
 and threw no chances away. The magnificence of his war- 
 like deeds is traceable almost solely to his own mental 
 power and remarkable persistency. No danger or difficulty 
 ever, in the remotest degree, changed his purpose or af- 
 fected his reasoning power. It was this kept the ascend- 
 ant on his side. 
 
 Despite sternest discipline, Frederick was familiar with 
 his men, who knew him as Vater Fritz, and bandied rough 
 jokes with him. "The Austrians are three to one of us, 
 and stoutly entrenched," said the king, riding the outposts 
 before Leuthen. "And were the devil in front and all 
 around them, we'll hustle them out, only thou lead us on I" 
 answered a brawny grenadier. " Good-night, Fritz." He 
 gained such personal love from his men that it eeems to 
 have been transmitted as a heritage of the Hohenzollerns 
 
FREDERICK. 173 
 
 He spurred his men to the most heroic efforts, the most ex- 
 traordinary feats of daring and endurance. As the com- 
 plement to this quality, he infused in his enemies a dread 
 of his presence. He utilized the mistakes they made and 
 led them into still others, less from any system than by 
 doing the right thing at the right moment. Strict rules aid 
 only the minds whose conceptions are not clear, and whose 
 execution lacks promptness. Rules were as nothing to 
 Frederick. He observed them, not because they were 
 rules, but because they were grounded on truths which his 
 own mind grasped without them. He broke them when 
 there was distinct gain in so doing. His operations against 
 six armies surrounding him was based on his own maxim, 
 that " Whoso attempts to defend everything runs danger of 
 losing everything," and he turned from one to the other, 
 risking much to gain much. This idea of Frederick's was 
 a novel one in his century, whose warfare consisted in an 
 attempt to protect and hold everything by fortresses and 
 partial detachments. In working out this idea he is 
 unapproached. 
 
 Frederick never allowed his enemies to carry out their 
 own plans. His movements imposed limitations upon 
 them. He impressed his own personality on every cam- 
 paign. To carry his victuals with him enabled him to out- 
 manoeuvre them, for his enemies relied exclusively on 
 magazines established beforehand. He could select his 
 toutes according to the exigencies of the moment, while 
 they must keep within reach of their depots. 
 
 Tactically, Frederick stands highest of all soldiers. 
 Strategically he was less great. In strategic movements! 
 
174 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 his brother, Prince Henry, did occasional work worthy tc 
 be placed beside the king's. Tactically, no one could ap- 
 proach him. His method of handling the three arms was 
 perfect. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus had given new impulse to systematic, 
 intelligent war. But what he did was not understood. 
 His imitators jumbled the old and new systems. They 
 placed too much reliance on fortresses and magazines, and 
 on natural and artificial obstacles ; they made strained 
 efforts to threaten the enemy's communications ; they man- 
 oeuvred for the mere sake of doing something and apart 
 from any general plan ; they avoided decisive movements 
 and battles. 
 
 Frederick, by making his armies less dependent on 
 magazines, acquired a freer, bolder, and more rapid style. 
 The allies aimed to parcel out Prussia. Frederick met 
 them with decision. Surrounded on all sides by over- 
 whelming numbers, he was compelled to defend himself by 
 hard knocks. And his individual equipment as well as the 
 discipline of his army enabled him to do this with un- 
 equalled brilliancy. In all history there is no such series 
 of tactical feats as Frederick's. 
 
 Each captain must be weighed by the conditions under 
 which he worked. We cannot try Alexander by the 
 standard of Napoleon. While Napoleon's battle tactics 
 have something stupendous in their magnificence, Fred- 
 erick's battles, in view of numbers and difficulties, are 
 distinctly finer. Frederick's decisiveness aroused fresh 
 interest in battle. Manoeuvres now sought battle as an 
 abject, while sieges became fewer and of small moment. 
 
FREDERICK. 175 
 
 All Europe was agog at Frederick's successes, but no 
 arie understood them. Lloyd alone saw below the sur- 
 face. As Gustavus had been misinterpreted, so now 
 Frederick. Some imitated his minutiae down to the pig- 
 tails of his grenadiers. Some saw the cure-all of war in 
 operations against the enemy's flanks and rear. Some saw 
 in detachments, some in concentration, the trick of the 
 king. Only Lloyd recognized that it all lay in the mag- 
 nificent personality of the king himself, that there was no 
 secret, no set rule, no legerdemain, but that here again 
 was one of the world's great captains. The imitators of 
 Frederick caught but the letter. The spirit they could not 
 catch. Until two generations more had passed, and Lloyd 
 and Jomini had put in printed form what Frederick and 
 Napoleon did, the world could not guess the riddle. 
 
 His own fortresses were of importance to Frederick 
 because his enemy respected them. But he paid small 
 heed to the enemy's. He could strike him so much harder 
 by battle, that he never frittered away his time on sieges, 
 except as a means to an end. The allies clung to their 
 fortified positions. Frederick despised them, and showed 
 the world that his gallant Prussians could take them by 
 assault. 
 
 This period, then, is distinguished for the revival of 
 battles, and of operations looking towards battle. Of 
 these Frederick was the author. Battles in the Seven 
 Years' War were not haphazard. Each had its purpose. 
 Pursuit had, however, not yet been made effective so 
 to glean the utmost from victory. No single battle in this 
 period had -pmarkable results. Frederick's battles were 
 
176 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 generally fought to prevent some particular enemy from 
 penetrating too far into the dominions of Prussia. In this 
 they were uniformly successful. But in the sense of 
 Napoleon's battles they were not decisive. The superior 
 decisiveness of Napoleon's lay in the strategic conditions 
 and in his superiority of forces. No battles as battles 
 could be more thoroughly fought out than Frederick's ; 
 no victories more brilliant. 
 
 Frederick not only showed Europe what speed and de- 
 cision can do in war, but he made many minor improve- 
 ments in drill, discipline, and battle-tactics. He introduced 
 horse-artillery. His giving scope to such men as Seydlitz 
 and Ziethen made the Prussian cavalry a model for all 
 time. He demonstrated that armies can march and operate 
 continuously, with little rest, and without regard to sea- 
 sons. Light troops grew in efficiency. War put on an 
 aspect of energetic purpose, but without the ruthless bar- 
 barity of the Thirty Years' War. 
 
 No doubt Napoleon, at his best, was the greater sol- 
 dier. But Napoleon had Frederick's example before him, 
 as well as the lessons of all other great captains by heart. 
 Napoleon's motive was aggressive ; Frederick's, pure de- 
 fence. Hence partly the larger method. But Frederick 
 in trial or disaster was unspeakably greater than Napoleon, 
 both as soldier and man. 
 
 In the forty -six years of his reign Frederick added sixty 
 per cent, to the Prussian dominion, doubled its population, 
 put seventy million thalers in its treasury, and created two 
 hundred thousand of the best troops in existence. Prussia 
 had been a small state, which the powers of Europe united 
 
FREDERICK. 177 
 
 to parcel out. He left it a great state, which all Europe 
 respected, and planted in it the seed which has raised its 
 kings to be emperors of Germany. This result is in 
 marked contrast to what Napoleon's wars did for France. 
 
 Whoever, under the sumptuous dome of the Invalidep, 
 has gazed down upon the splendid sarcophagus of Napoleon, 
 and has stepped within the dim and narrow vault of the 
 plain old garrison church at Potsdam, where stand the sim- 
 ple metal coffins of Frederick the Great and of his father, 
 must have felt that in the latter shrine, rather than the 
 other, he has stood in the presence of the ashes of a king. 
 
 Whatever may be said of Frederick's personal method of 
 government, or of the true Hohenzollern theory that Prussia 
 belonged to him as an heritage to make or to mar as he 
 saw fit, it cannot be denied that he was true to the spirit 
 of his own verses, penned in the days of his direst di- 
 tress : 
 
 "Pour moi, menace du naufrage, 
 Je dois, en affrontant Forage, 
 Penser, vivre et monrir en Boi* 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 
 NAPOLEON. 
 
 THE career of Napoleon Bonaparte is so near to oui 
 own times and so commonly familiar, that it is not 
 essential to describe any of those operations which were, 
 within the memory of some men yet living, the wonder 
 and dread of Europe. In certain respects Napoleon was 
 the greatest of all soldiers. He had, to be sure, the his- 
 tory of other great captains to profit by ; he had not to 
 invent ; he had only to improve. But he did for the mili- 
 tary art what constitutes the greatest advance in any art, 
 he reduced it to its most simple, most perfect form ; and 
 his and Frederick's campaigns furnished the final material 
 from which Jomini and his followers could elucidate the 
 science ; for it has taken more than two thousand years 
 of the written history of war to produce a written science 
 of war. 
 
 I shall not touch upon Napoleon's life as statesman or 
 lawgiver, nor on his services in carrying forward the 
 results of the Revolution toward its legitimate conse- 
 quence, the equality of all men before the law. In these 
 roles no more useful man appears in the history of modern 
 times. I shall look at him simply as a soldier. 
 178 
 
NAPOLEON. 179 
 
 Napoleon's career is a notable example of the necessity 
 of coexistent intellect, character, and opportunity to pro- 
 duce the greatest success in war. His strength distinctly 
 rose through half his career, and as distinctly fell during 
 the other half. His intellectual power never changed. 
 The plan of the Waterloo campaign was as brilliant 
 as any which he ever conceived. His opportunity here 
 was equal to that of 1796. But his execution was 
 marred by weakening physique, upon which followed a 
 decline of that decisiveness which is so indispensable 
 to the great captain. It will, perhaps, be interesting to 
 trace certain resemblances between the opening of his 
 first independent campaign in 1796, and his last one 
 in 1815, to show how force of character won him the first 
 and the lack of it lost him the last ; and to connect the 
 two campaigns by a thread of the intervening years of 
 growth till 1808, and of decline from that time on. 
 
 When Napoleon was appointed to the command of the 
 Army of Italy he had for the moment a serious problem. 
 In this army were able and more experienced officers of 
 mature powers and full of manly strength, who looked on 
 this all but unknown, twenty- seven years old, small, pale, 
 untried commander-in-chief, decidedly askance. But Na- 
 poleon was not long in impressing his absolute superiority 
 upon them all. They soon recognized the master-hand. 
 
 The army lay strung out along the coast from Loano to 
 Savona, in a worse than bad position. The English fleet 
 held the sea in its rear, and could make descents on any 
 part of this long and ill-held line. Its communications lay 
 in prolongation of the left flank, over a single bad road, 
 
180 
 
 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 subject not only to interruption by the English, but the 
 enemy, by forcing the Col di Tenda, could absolutely cut 
 it off from France. The troops were in woful condition. 
 They had neither clothing nor rations. They were literally 
 " heroes in rags." On the further side of the Maritime 
 Alps lay the Austrian general, Beaulieu, commanding a 
 superior army equally strung out from Mount Blanc to 
 
 Genoa. His right wing consisted of the Piedmontese 
 army under Colli at Ceva ; his centre was at Sassello ; with 
 his left he was reaching out to join hands with the English 
 at Genoa. Kellerman faced, in the passes of the Alps, a 
 force of twenty-five thousand Sardinians, but for the mo- 
 ment was out of the business. 
 
 Napoleon spent but few days in providing for his troops, 
 and then began to concentrate on his right flank at 
 Savona. He knew that his own position was weak, but 
 he alsc divined from the reports brought in from the out- 
 
NAPOLEON. 181 
 
 posts that the enemy's was worse. From the very start he 
 enunciated in his strategic plan the maxim he obeyed 
 through life : Move upon your enemy in one mass on one 
 line so that when brought to battle you shall outnumber 
 him, and from such a direction that you shall compromise 
 him. This is, so to speak, the motto of Napoleon's 
 success. All perfect art is simple, and after much com- 
 plication or absence of theoretical canons from ancient times 
 to his, Napoleon reduced strategy down to this beauti- 
 fully simple, rational rule. 
 
 Nothing in war seems at first blush so full of risk as to 
 move into the very midst of your enemy's several detach- 
 ments. No act in truth is so safe, if his total outnumbers 
 yours and if you outnumber each of his detachments. For, 
 as always seemed to be more clear to Napoleon and Fred- 
 erick than to any of the other great captains, you can first 
 throw yourself upon any one of them, beat him and then 
 turn upon the next. But to do this requires audacity, skill, 
 and, above all, tireless legs. And success is predicated in 
 all cases on the assumption that God is on the side of the 
 heaviest battalions. 
 
 So Napoleon, who was very familiar with the topography 
 of Italy, at once determined to strike Beaulieu's centre, and 
 by breaking through it, to separate the twenty-five thousand 
 Piedmontese in the right wing from the thirty-five thousand 
 Austrians in the left wing, so that he might beat each sepa- 
 rately with his own thirty- seven thousand men. 
 
 Beaulieu's reaching out toward Genoa facilitated Napo- 
 leon's manoeuvre, for the Austrian would have a range of 
 mountains between him and his centre under Argenteau, 
 
182 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 whom he had at the same time ordered forward on Savona 
 via Montenotte. Napoleon's manoeuvre was strategically a 
 rupture of Beaulieu's centre. Tactically it first led to an 
 attack on the right of Argenteau's column. The details of 
 the manoeuvre it would consume hours to follow. Suffice 
 it to say that by a restless activity which, barring Frederick, 
 had not been seen in war since the days of Caesar, Napo- 
 leon struck blow after blow, first upon Argenteau, throwing 
 him back easterly, then on Colli, throwing him back west- 
 erly, absolutely cut the allies in two, fought half a dozen 
 battles in scarce a greater number of days, and in a short 
 fortnight had beaten the enemy at all points, had captured 
 fifteen thousand prisoners, fifty guns, and twenty-one flags. 
 
 Still the problem was serious. Beaulieu, if active, 
 could shortly concentrate one hundred thousand men. 
 Napoleon must allow him not a moment of breathing spell. 
 He issued a proclamation to his troops which sounds like 
 the blare of a trumpet. It set ablaze the hearts of his men ; 
 it carried dread to his enemies, and Napoleon followed it 
 4 up by a march straight on Turin. Alarmed and discon- 
 certed, the King of Sardinia sued for peace. Napoleon 
 concluded an armistice with him, and thus saw himself dis- 
 embarrassed of the enemy's right wing and free to turn on 
 the left under Beaulieu. His columns were at once 
 launched on Alexandria, and by his skilful manoeuvres and 
 unparalleled alertness he soon got the better of the Aus- 
 trians. He had at a stroke made himself the most noted 
 general of Europe. The rest of the campaign was equally 
 brilliant and successful. 
 
 Napoleon had shown his army that be commanded not 
 
NAPOLEON. 183 
 
 by the mere commission of the Directory, but by the divine 
 right of genius. He had not only taken advantage of every 
 error of his opponents, but had so acted as to make them 
 commit errors, and those very errors of which he had need. 
 His army had been far from good. But " I believe," says 
 Jomini, " that if Napoleon had commanded the most excel- 
 lent troops he would not have accomplished more, even as 
 Frederick in the reversed case would not have accomplished 
 less." 
 
 We recognize in this first independent campaign of 
 Napoleon the heroic zeal of Alexander, the intellectual 
 subtlety of Hannibal, the reckless self-confidence of Caesar, 
 the broad method of Gustavus, the heart of oak of Fred- 
 erick. But one fault is discoverable, and this, at the time, 
 was rather a virtue, Napoleon underrated his adversary. 
 By and by this error grew in the wrong direction, and 
 became a strong factor in his failures. 
 
 Through the rest of this campaign, which numbered 
 the victories of Lodi, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole, the 
 most noteworthy thing except his own personal dili- 
 gence is the speed with which Napoleon manoeuvred 
 his troops. To state an instance : from September 5 
 to September 11, six days, Napoleon's men fought 
 one pitched battle and two important combats and 
 marched, Masse'na eighty-eight miles, Augereau uinety- 
 BIX miles, and the other corps less distances. He waa 
 far from being uniformly lucky. He had many days 
 of serious backsets. But whenever luck ran in his 
 favor, he seized it and made it useful ; when against 
 him, he gamely strove to stem its tide. If Fortune 
 
184 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 frowned, he wooed her unceasingly till she smiled 
 again. 
 
 The campaign which began in April, 1796, really lasted 
 till April, 1797. Napoleon pushed the Austrians out of 
 Italy and well back towards Vienna. His triumphs 
 culminated in the brilliant victory of Rivoli, and hia 
 success at the truce of Leoben. At Rivoli, with thirty 
 thousand men, Napoleon defeated the enemy and cap- 
 tured twenty thousand prisoners. The men who had 
 left Verona and fought at San Michele on the 13th 
 of January, marched all night to Rivoli, there con- 
 quered on the 14th, and again marching to Mantua, 
 some thirty miles, compelled Provera to lay down 
 his arms on the 15th. Napoleon could rightfully 
 boast to have equalled Caesar in speed of foot. 
 
 The men of the Revolution had cut loose from 
 eighteenth century methods of warfare by rising en 
 masse and putting the personal element into the scale. 
 But it was reserved for Napoleon to substitute a new 
 method for the old. From Nice to Leoben he showed 
 the world what modern war can do. He made him- 
 self independent of magazines, as Frederick had done 
 but rarely. With a smaller army he always had more 
 men at the point of contact. This was Napoleon's 
 strongest point. He divined what his enemy would 
 do, not from his tent but from the saddle, seeing 
 with his own eyes and weighing all he saw and 
 heard. He was every day and all day long in motion ; 
 he rode unheard-of distances. He relied on no one 
 out himself, as, with his comparatively small army, he 
 
NAPOLEON. 185 
 
 could well do ; and correctly seeing and therefore cor- 
 rectly gauging circumstances, he had the courage to 
 act upon his facts. He sought battle as the result of 
 every manoeuvre. The weight of his intellect and his 
 character were equally thrown into all he did. And 
 his abnormal ambition drove him to abnormal energy. 
 In this his first campaign and in one year, with 
 moderate forces, he had advanced from Nice to within 
 eighty miles of Vienna, and had wrung a peace from 
 astonished Austria. 
 
 Napoleon next undertook the Egyptian campaign. His 
 ambition had grown with success. But matters in France 
 were not in a condition of which he could personally avail, 
 and he believed he could increase his reputation and power 
 by conquests in the East. His imagination was boundless. 
 Perhaps no great soldier can be free from imagination, or 
 its complement, enthusiasm. Napoleon had it to excess, 
 and in many respects it helped him in his hazardous under- 
 takings. At this time he dreamed himself another Alex- 
 ander conquering the Eastern world, thence to return, ae 
 Alexander did not, with hordes of soldiers disciplined by 
 himself and fanatically attached to his person, to subjugate 
 all Europe to his will. The narration of this campaign of 
 sixteen months may be made to sound brilliant ; its result 
 was miscarriage. It is full of splendid achievements and 
 marred but by one mishap, the siege of Acre. But the 
 total result of the campaign was failure to France, though 
 gain to Napoleon, who won renown, and, abandoning hia 
 army when the campaign closed, returned to Paris at a 
 icason more suited to his advancement. Napoleon's mill- 
 
186 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 tary conduct in this campaign shows the same manelloui 
 energy, the same power of adapting means to end, of 
 keeping all his extraordinary measures secret, the better to 
 impose on the enemy by their sudden development, the 
 same power over men. But the discipline of the army was 
 disgraceful. The plundering which always accompanied 
 Napoleon's movements for, unlike Gustavus and Fred- 
 erick, he believed in allowing the soldier freedom beyond 
 bounds if only he would march and light was excessive. 
 The health of the army was bad ; its deprivations so great 
 that suicide was common to avoid suffering which was 
 worse. And yet Napoleon, by his unequalled manage- 
 ment, kept this army available as a tool, and an excellent 
 one. 
 
 Napoleon now became First Consul. The campaign 
 of 1800 was initiated by the celebrated crossing of 
 the Alps. This feat, of itself, can no more be compared, 
 as it has been, to Hannibal's great achievement, nor in- 
 deed to Alexander's crossing the Paropamisus, than a 
 Pullman excursion to Salt Lake City can be likened to 
 Albert Sidney Johnston's terrible march across the 
 Plains in 1857. Napoleon's crossing was merely an 
 incident deftly woven into a splendid plan of campaign. 
 From Switzerland, a geographical salient held by them, 
 the French could debouch at will into Italy or Germany. 
 Melas, the Austrian general in Italy, had his eyes fixed 
 upon Masse*na in Genoa. A large reserve army was 
 collected by Napoleon in France, while Moreau pushed 
 toward the Danube. Me*las naturally expected that the 
 French would issue from Provence, and kept his outlook 
 
NAPOLEON. 
 
 187 
 
 towards that point. When Napoleon actually descended 
 from the Great St. Bernard upon his rear, he was as 
 badly startled as compromised. This splendid piece of 
 strategy was followed up with Napoleon's usual restless 
 push, and culminated in the battle of Marengo. This 
 
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 was at first a distinct Austrian victory, but good counte- 
 nance, Melas' neglect to pursue his gain, and Na- 
 poleon's ability to rally and hold his troops until 
 absent Dessaix could rejoin him, turned it into an 
 overwhelming Austrian defeat. And Napoleon, by the 
 direction given to his mass, had so placed Melas that 
 defeat meant ruin. He was glad to accept an armistice 
 on Napoleon's own terms. 
 
 This superb campaign had lasted but a month, and 
 had been characterized by the utmost dash and clear- 
 
188 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 ness of perception. Again Napoleon's one mass pro- 
 jected on one properly chosen line had accomplished 
 wonders. 
 
 Napoleon once said to Jomini, "The secret of war 
 lies in the secret of communications. Keep your own 
 and attack your enemy's in such a way that a lost battle 
 may not harm you, a battle won may ruin your adversary. 
 Seize your enemy's communications and then march to 
 battle." Napoleon's success came from study of the 
 situation. His art was founded on an intimate knowl- 
 edge of all the facts, coupled with such reasoning 
 power as enabled him to gauge correctly what his enemy 
 was apt to do. Without the art the study would be 
 useless. But the art could not exist apart from study. 
 
 After Marengo there were five years of peace. These 
 and the four years between Wagram and the Russian 
 campaign were the only two periods of rest from war 
 in Napoleon's career. Succeeding this came the mem- 
 orable Austerlitz campaign. Napoleon had had for 
 some months three of his best officers in Germany study- 
 ing up topography, roads, bridges, towns, in the Black 
 Forest region and toward the Tyrol and Bohemia. 
 To thus make himself familiar with the status was his 
 uniform habit. 
 
 Napoleon, now Emperor, was at Boulogne, threaten- 
 ing and perhaps at times half purposing an invasion of 
 England. He commanded the best army he ever had. 
 The Austrians, not supposing him ready, inundated 
 Bavaria with troops, without waiting for their allies, 
 the Russians, and marched up the Danube to the Iller, 
 
NAPOLEON. 189 
 
 under Field- Marshal Mack. Napoleon put an embargo 
 on the mails, broke up from Boulogne at twenty-four 
 hours' notice, and reached the vicinity of the enemy 
 with an overwhelming force before Mack was aware of 
 bis having left the sea. His line of march was about 
 
 ULM-AUSTERLITZ 
 CAMPAIGN 
 
 Mack's right flank, because this was the nearest to 
 Boulogne and gave him a safe base on the c.onfederate 
 German provinces. So well planned was the manoeuvre, 
 so elastic in its design for change of circumstances, thst 
 it fully succeeded, step for step, until Mack was sur- 
 rounded at Ulm and surrendered with his thirty thousand 
 men. Here again we find the Napoleonic rule fairly 
 overwhelming Mack with superior numbers. Except 
 in 1796 and 1814, Napoleon always had more men 
 than the enemy on the field at the proper time. "They 
 ascribe more talent to me than to others," he observed^ 
 
190 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 w and yet to give battle to an enemy I am in the habit 
 of beating, I never think I have enough men ; I call to 
 my aid all that I can unite." 
 
 The chart herewith given of the grand manoeuvre of 
 Ulm is so simple as to suggest no difficulties of execution. 
 But there is probably nothing in human experience which 
 taxes strength, intellect, judgment, and character to so 
 great a degree as the strategy and logistics of such a move- 
 ment, unless it be the tactics of the ensuing battle. The 
 difficulties are, in reality, gigantic. 
 
 Napoleon headed direct for Vienna, and on the way 
 absolutely lived on the country. w In the movements and 
 wars of invasion conducted by the Emperor, there are no 
 magazines ; it is a matter for the commanding generals of 
 the corps to collect the means of victualling in the coun- 
 tries through which they march," writes Berthier to Mar- 
 niont. Napoleon took Vienna and marched out towards 
 Briiim, where the Austrians and Russians had concentrated. 
 Here he was far from secure, if equal talent had been 
 opposed to him ; but he took up a position near Austerlitz, 
 from which he could retreat through Bohemia, if necessary, 
 and, calmly watching the enemy and allowing several 
 chances of winning an ordinary victory to pass, he waited, 
 with an audacity which almost ran into braggadocio, for 
 the enemy to commit some error from which he could wrest 
 a decisive one. And this the allies did, as Napoleon 
 divined they would do. They tried to turn his right flank 
 and cut him off from Vienna. Napoleon massed his forces 
 on their centre and right, broke these in pieces, and won 
 the victory of which he was always most proud. Napo- 
 
NAPOLEON. 191 
 
 Icon's conduct here showed distinctly a glint of what he him- 
 self so aptly calls the divine part of the art. 
 
 There is always a corresponding danger in every plan 
 which is of the kind to compass decisive results. In this 
 case Napoleon risked his right wing. But to judge how 
 much it is wise to risk and to guess just how much the 
 enemy is capable of undertaking is a manifestation of 
 genius. 
 
 The era of the great battles of modem war dates from 
 Austerlitz. Marengo was rather two combats than one 
 great battle. Frederick's battles were wonders of tactics 
 and courage, but they differ from the Napoleonic system. 
 In Frederick's battles the whole army was set in motion for 
 one manoeuvre at one time to be executed under the man- 
 agement of the chief. If the manoeuvre was interrupted by 
 unforeseen events, the battle might be lost. In Napoleon's 
 system, the centre might be broken and the wings still 
 achieve victory ; one wing might be crushed while the other 
 destroyed the enemy. A bait was offered the enemy by 
 the exhibition of a weak spot to attract his eye, while 
 Napoleon fell on the key-point with overwhelming odds. 
 But in this system the control passed from the hand of the 
 leader. All he could do was to project a corps in a given 
 direction at a given time. Once set in motion, these could 
 not readily be arrested. Such a system required reserves 
 much more than the old method. " Battles are only won 
 by strengthening the line at a critical moment," says 
 Napoleon. Once in, Napoleon's corps worked out their 
 Dwn salvation. He could but aid them with his reserves. 
 
 There is a magnificence of uncertainty and risk, and 
 
192 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 corresponding genius in the management of the battles of 
 Napoleon ; but for purely artistic tactics they do not appeal 
 to us as do Frederick's. The motif tf Alexander's battles 
 is more akin to Napoleon's ; that of Hannibal's, to Fred- 
 erick's. 
 
 It has been said that Napoleon never considered what he 
 should do in case of failure. The reverse is more exact. 
 Before delivering a battle, Napoleon busied himself little 
 with what he would do in case of success. That was easy 
 to decide. He busied himself markedly with what could 
 be done in case of reverse. 
 
 Like all great captains, Napoleon preferred lieutenants 
 who obeyed instead of initiating. He chafed at independ- 
 ent action. This was the chief's prerogative. But as his 
 armies grew in size he gave his marshals charge of detail 
 under general instructions from himself. Dependence on 
 Napoleon gradually sapped the self-reliance of more than 
 one of his lieutenants, and though there are instances of 
 noble ability at a distance from control, most of his mar- 
 shals were able tacticians, rather than great generals. 
 Napoleon grew impatient of contradiction or explanation ; 
 and he sometimes did not learn or was not told of things 
 he ought to know. He was no longer so active. Cam 
 paigning was a hardship. His belief in his destiny becam 
 so strong that he began to take greater risks. Such a thing 
 as failure did not exist for him. His armies were increas- 
 ing in size, and railroads and telegraphs at that day did not 
 hasten transportation and news. The difficulties he had to 
 contend with were growing fast. 
 
 These things had the effect of making Napoleon's milk 
 
NAPOLEON. 193 
 
 tary plans more magnificent, more far-reaching. But all 
 the less could he pay heed to detail, and from now on one 
 can, with some brilliant exceptions, perceive more errors 
 of execution. In the general conception he was greater 
 than ever, and this balanced the scale. His ability to put 
 all his skill into the work immediately in hand was mar- 
 vellous. But with a vast whole in view, the parts were, 
 perhaps of necessity, lost sight of. 
 
 The campaigns of 1806 and 1807 were in sequence. 
 To move on the Prussians, who, under the superannuated 
 Duke of Brunswick, were concentrated in Thuringia, 
 Napoleon massed on his own right, disgarnishing his left, 
 turned their left, in this case their strategic flank, 
 because the manrcuvre cut them off from Berlin and their 
 allies, the Russians, and with overwhelming vigor fell 
 on the dawdling enemy at Jena and Auerstadt. The 
 Prussians had remained stationary in the art of war where 
 they had been left by Frederick, and had lost his burning 
 genius. 
 
 It was at the outset of this campaign that Jomini 
 handed in to Marshal Ney, his chief, a paper showing 
 what Napoleon must necessarily do if he would beat the 
 Prussians and cut them off from their approaching allies. 
 He alone had divined the strategic secrets of the Emperor. 
 
 In this campaign we plainly see the growth of risk com- 
 mensurate within the magnitude of plan, but we also recog 
 nize the greater perfection of general intuitions, the larger 
 plan and method. Details had to be overlooked, but the 
 whole army was held in the Emperor's hand like a battal- 
 ion in that of a good fieli officer. In forty-eight hours 
 
194 
 
 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 his two hundred thousand men could be concentrated at 
 any one point. And the very essence of the art of war is 
 to know when you may divide, to impose on the enemy, 
 Bubsist, pursue, deceive, and to know how to divide so 
 that you may concentrate before battle can occur. 
 
 BALTIC SEA 
 
 Again Napoleon had carried out his principle of moving 
 on one line in one mass on the enemy, and a few great 
 soldiers began to see that there was a theory in this. Jo- 
 mini first grasped its full meaning and showed that only 
 battle crowns the work. Without it a general is merely 
 uncovering his own communications. Victory is essential 
 to the success of such a plan. Napoleon pushed restlessly 
 in on the enemy. " While others are in council, the 
 French army is on the march," quoth he. 
 
NAPOLEON. 
 
 In the Austerlitz and Jena campaigns, Napoleon's manoeu- 
 vre was so admirably conceived that he kept open two lines 
 of retreat, which he could adapt to the enemy's evolutions, 
 at Auslerlitz via Vienna and Bohemia, at Jena still more 
 secure lines on the Rhine and on the Main or Danube. 
 This is a distinct mark of the perfection of the plans. 
 
 The succeeding Friedland campaign has several items of 
 interest. At his first contact with the Russians, Napo- 
 leon, instead of sticking to his uniform plan of one mass 
 on one line, tried to surround his enemy before he knew 
 where the tactical decision of the campaign would come. 
 Result, a thrust in the air by one corps, another did not 
 reach the appointed place, a third met unexpected and 
 superior forces, and the enemy broke through the net. 
 Napoleon seemed to be experimenting. The captain of 
 1796, Ulm, Jena, is for the moment unrecognizable. 
 
 The Russians attacked Napoleon in his winter-quarters, 
 and the bloody and indecisive battle of Eylau resulted, 
 where for the first time Napoleon met that astonishing 
 doggedness of the Russian soldier, on which Frederick 
 had shattered his battalions at Kunersdorf. Later came 
 the victory of Friedland. Napoleon's order for this day is 
 a model for study. Every important instruction for the 
 battle is embraced in the order ; details are left to his 
 lieutenants. Only the time of launching the first attack 
 is reserved to the chief. But the strategy of the Friedland 
 campaign was not so crisp. The true manxuvre was to 
 turn the Russian left, their strategic flank, and throw them 
 back on the sea. Napoleon turned their right to cut them 
 off from Konigsberg. It was mere good luck that Fried- 
 
196 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 land ended the campaign. Even after defeat the enemy 
 could have escaped. 
 
 In the Spanish campaign of the winter of 1807-8, Napo- 
 leon reverted to his 1796 manoeuvre of breaking the enemy's 
 centre. But Napoleon had undertaken what could not 
 be accomplished, the subjugation of Spain. His own 
 strategy and the tactics of his marshals were both brill- 
 iant and successful ; he could have compelled a peace, had 
 such been the object. But to subdue a people fanatically 
 fighting for their homes, in a mountainous country, is prac- 
 tically impossible by any means short of extermination. 
 It was in the political, not the military, task that Napo- 
 leon failed. 
 
 While Napoleon was struggling in Spain, Austria 
 deemed the occasion good again to assert herself. This 
 gave Napoleon an opportunity of leaving to his lieutenants 
 a game he already saw he could not win, but in which he 
 had achieved some brilliant openings, and hurry to fields 
 on which he felt a positive superiority. His army and 
 allies were already on the scene. 
 
 Berthier was in charge, and to him Napoleon had given 
 full and explicit instructions. But Berthier, though a good 
 chief of staff, had no power to grasp a strategic situation. 
 By not obeying orders, he had, by the time Napoleon 
 arrived, muddled the problem, and instead of concentrating 
 behind the Lech, had got Davout's corps pushed out to 
 Ratisbon, where it was liable to be cut off. Napoleon waa 
 in perilous case. But by a beautiful and rapid series of 
 manoeuvres, in which he cut the enemy in two, he wrought 
 rictory out of threatening defeat. He was justly proud of 
 
NAPOLEON. 197 
 
 this. "The greatest military manoeuvres that I have ever 
 made, and on which I most flatter myself, took place at 
 Eckmiihl, and were immensely superior to those of Marengo 
 or other actions which preceded or followed them." It is 
 the rapidity and suddenness of these manoeuvres which dis- 
 tinguished them from 1805. There was a regular plan. 
 Here a constant series of surprises and changes. 
 
 In making his plans, Napoleon never began by " What 
 can the enemy do ? " but he first sought to place his army in 
 the best position, and then asked, " What now can the 
 enemy do ? " This gave him the initiative. But his plan 
 was always elastic enough to bend to what the enemy 
 might do. He never made plans colored by the enemy's 
 possibilities. He chose his own plan intelligently, accord- 
 ing to the geography, topography, and existing conditions, 
 and made it elastic enough to be equal to the enemy's. 
 " The mind of a general should be like the glass of a telescope 
 in sharpness and clearness, and never conjure up pictures." 
 The elasticity of Napoleon's Eckmiihl plan is well shown 
 by his ability to turn threatening disaster into brilliant 
 success. 
 
 During all these days, Napoleon was tremendously active. 
 He was personally at the important points. He hardly 
 ate or slept. His body was governed entirely by his will. 
 The soldier of 1796 was again afoot. But he was well and 
 hearty. The lapse he now made is all the more singular. 
 The Archduke Charles had been beaten at Eckmiihl and 
 was retiring into Ratisbon to cross the Danube ; Napoleon 
 neglected to pursue. They say he was persuaded by hia 
 marshals that the troops were too tired. For the first time 
 
198 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 in his life he succumbed to an obstacle. ff Genius consists 
 in carrying out a plan despite obstacles, and in finding few 
 or no obstacles," he once said. 
 
 Failure to pursue may come from the difficulty of leaving 
 one's magazines, as in Frederick's era, or because the cap- 
 tain is exhausted, as well as the troops. But if the captain 
 wants to pursue, the troops can always do so. If the 
 enemy can fly, the victor can follow. Some part of the 
 army is always in condition to march. 
 
 Jomini says that if Napoleon had here pursued like the 
 Prussians after Waterloo, it would have greatly modified 
 the campaign. As it was, the Archduke made good his 
 escape. Napoleon had broken in between the two wings 
 of the Austrian army, .but he had not crippled the one 
 before turning against the other. So that when he reached 
 Vienna on the heels of the left, he found ready to meet 
 him the right wing, which he ought to have crushed beyond 
 so quick recovery at Ratisbon. This failure to pursue is 
 the first symptom of a habit which from now on is more 
 observable of not utilizing every advantage. 
 
 Then followed the crossing of the Danube at Lobau and 
 the battles around Aspern and Essling, which terminated 
 with defeat and great loss. The Archduke was on hand, 
 received in overwhelming numbers that part of the French 
 army which crossed ; the bridges were broken behind the 
 French ; and a disastrous retreat to Lobau followed. 
 
 Napoleon's difficulties were growing apace with the size 
 of his armies, and he was now opposed by abler men. But 
 it also seems as if occasional fits of apathy or impatience of 
 exertion were growing on him. His splendid energy at 
 
NAPOLEON. 199 
 
 Eckmiihl did not continue. Details received less personal 
 attention. He was more rarely at the front. He began to 
 rely on the eyes of others more than, with his ancient vigor, 
 he would have done despite his dictum that "a general 
 who sees through the eyes of others will never be in condi- 
 tion to command an army as it should be commanded." 
 Until battle actually opened, he lacked his old enthusiasm. 
 After the first gun he was himself again. But his method 
 of conducting war was no longer so crisp as of yore. He 
 was more daring than careful ; he relied on his luck, and 
 strove to cover errors of omission by stupendous blows. 
 He was suffering from not having about him a well-edu- 
 cated, properly selected staff, each member drilled in hia 
 specific duties. Till now Napoleon had been his own 
 staff; but with lessening activity, he had no one on 
 whose eyes and judgment he could rely. " The general 
 staff is so organized that one cannot see ahead at all by 
 its means," said he in the next campaign. Still it must 
 constantly be borne in mind that one hundred and fifty 
 thousand men cannot be commanded as readily as forty 
 thousand. And Napoleon's breadth of view, his power of 
 grasping the tout ensemble, were still present in greater 
 measure ; and when he chose he could summon up all his 
 old spirit. 
 
 Succeeding this defeat were the skilful preparations for 
 a new crossing and battle, the putting over from Lobau of 
 one hundred and fifty thousand men and four hundred 
 guns in one night, and the victory of Wagram. Truly a 
 marvellous performance ! The strength of mind and con- 
 itancy displayed by Napoleon on Lobau recalls the elastic 
 
200 OR EAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 courage of Alexander when, cut off from his communica- 
 tions, he turned upon the Persians at Issus. But after 
 Wagram the Austrians retired in good order and Napoleon 
 did not pursue. It was no doubt a difficult task, but with 
 the inspiration of his earlier days he would certainly have 
 pushed the Archduke home, or lost the game. He forgot 
 the principles which had made him what he was, in not 
 following up the retreat. To other arid even great 
 generals this criticism could not apply, but Napoleon has 
 created a measure by which himself must be tried and 
 which fits but a limited group. In 1805 he said, "One 
 has but a certain time for war. I shall be good for it but 
 six years more ; then even I shall have to stop." Was 
 Napoleon's best term drawing to a close ? Or was it that 
 the Archduke Charles was not a Wiirmser or a Mack ? 
 
 In Napoleon's battles, tactical details are made to yield 
 to strategic needs. Frederick generally chose his point of 
 attack from a strictly tactical standpoint. Napoleon did 
 not appear to consider that there were such things as 
 tactical difficulties. He always moved on the enemy as 
 seemed to him strategically desirable, and with his great 
 'masses he could readily do so. The result of Napoleon's 
 battles was so wonderful, just because he always struck 
 from such a strategic direction as to leave a beaten enemy 
 no kind of loophole. But Napoleon would have been 
 more than human if his extraordinary successes had not 
 finally damaged his character. It is but the story of 
 Alexander with a variation. In the beginning he was, 
 after securing strategic value, strenuous to preserve hii 
 tactical values. By and by he began to pay less heed to 
 
NAPOLEON 201 
 
 these ; stupendous successes bred disbelief in failure ; care- 
 lessness resulted, then indecision. Those historians who 
 maintain that Napoleon succumbed solely to the gigantic 
 opposition his status in Europe had evoked, can show good 
 reasons for their belief, for Napoleon's task was indeed 
 immense. But was he overtaxed more than Hannibal, 
 Caesar, or Frederick? 
 
 In the Russian campaign (1812) Napoleon's original 
 idea was to turn the Russian right, but finding the Russian 
 position further north than he expected, he resorted to 
 breaking the Russian centre. It here first became a ques- 
 tion whether the rule of one mass on one line, distinctly 
 sound with smaller armies, will hold good with the enor- 
 mous armies of 1812 or of modern days; whether the 
 mere manoeuvre may not become so difficult of execution 
 as to open the way to the destruction of the entire plan by 
 a single accident. Certainly its logistics grow to a serious 
 problem with a force beyond two hundred thousand men, 
 and it seems probable that when armies much exceed this 
 figure, the question of feeding, transportation, and com- 
 mand, even with railroads and telegraph, make concentric 
 operations more available. And the fact that even Napo- 
 leon could not, in the absence of a thoroughly educated 
 staff and perfectly drilled army, obtain good results from 
 the handling of such enormous forces, gives prominence to 
 the value of the Prussian idea of placing greater reliance 
 on an army drawn from the personal service of the people 
 and made perfect in all its details from the ranks up, than 
 vn the genius of a single general. 
 
 The entire plan of the Russian campaign was consistent 
 
202 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 and good. The Bonaparte of 1796 would picbably have 
 carried it through, despite its unprecedented difficulties. 
 But its execution was seriously marred by the absence of 
 Napoleon at the front, and the want of his ancient decisive- 
 ness. To be sure he had nearly half a million men to 
 command and feed ; but he was no longer the slim, ner- 
 vously active, omnipresent man. He was corpulent, liked 
 his ease, and shunned bad weather. This want appears in 
 his long stay in Wilna, his failure to put his own individ- 
 uality into the details of the advance ; his now relying on 
 his lieutenants, whom he had never trained, and some of 
 whom were unable, to rely on themselves. Napoleon be- 
 gan to draw his conclusions, not from personal observation, 
 but from assumed premises. He had from the beginning 
 the habit of underrating the enemy's forces. It now grew 
 to be a rule with him to take one-third off from what the 
 enemy really had and double his own forces, in order to 
 encourage his subordinates. This exaggerated reckoning 
 could not but lead to evil. There is none of Frederick's 
 straightforward dependence on his own brain and his 
 army's courage. The king's frankness stands out in high 
 relief against Napoleon's simulation. 
 
 But we must constantly bear in mind that Napoleon led 
 an army of unprecedented size, made up of different 
 nationalities, in a limitless territory, and that his difficulties 
 were enormous. It should be noted that Alexander's 
 largest army in the field numbered one hundred and thirty- 
 five thousand men ; Hannibal's less than sixty thousand ; 
 Caesar's about eighty thousand ; Gustavus' never reached 
 eighty thousand men ; Frederick had to parcel out his 
 
NAPOLEON. 203 
 
 forces so that of his one hundred and fifty thousand men 
 he rarely could personally dispose of more than fifty 
 thousand in one body. Napoleon carried three hundred 
 and sixty thousand men into Russia. This is not a final 
 measure of the task, but it stakes out its size. 
 
 Some of Napoleon's Russian manoeuvres are fully up to 
 the old ones. The manner of the attempt to turn the 
 Russian left at Smolensk and seize their communications 
 so as to fight them at a disadvantage, is a magnificent ex- 
 hibition of genius. But at the last moment he failed. The 
 spirit of his plan was to seize the communications of his 
 opponent and force him to fight ; the letter was to seize 
 Smolensk. When he reached Smolensk, the Russians had 
 retired to the east of the city. Napoleon apparently over- 
 looked the spirit of his plan, and though he could easily 
 have done so, he did not cut the Russians off by a tactical 
 turning movement. He was not personally where he 
 needed to be, on the right, but remained at his head- 
 quarters. It may be claimed that the commander of so 
 huge an army must necessarily remain at central head- 
 quarters. It is rather true that his administrative aide 
 should be there, and he at the point of greatest impor- 
 tance. At Smolensk, theoretically and practically, this 
 was the right, and operations at this point were intrusted 
 to by no means the best of his subordinates. Napoleon's 
 intellect was still as clear as ever. It was his physique 
 and his power of decision which were weakening. Even 
 allowing the utmost to all the difficulties of the situation, 
 if tried by the rule of 1796 or 1805, this seems to be in 
 disputable. 
 
204 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 When Napoleon did not bring on a battle at Smolensk, 
 the Russian campaign had become a certain failure. Foi 
 it was there settled that he could not reach Moscow with 
 a force sufficient to hold himself. He had crossed the 
 Niemen with three hundred and sixty-three thousand men. 
 At Moscow he could have no more than one hundred thou- 
 sand. Arrived at Smolensk he was called on to face 
 retreat, which was failure ; or an advance to Moscow, 
 which was but worse failure deferred, almost sure anni- 
 hilation. This seems clear enough from the military 
 standpoint. But Napoleon advanced to Moscow relying 
 largely on the hope that the Russians would sue for a 
 peace. For this dubious hope of the statesman, Napoleon 
 committed an undoubted blunder as a captain. It is hard 
 to divorce the statesman from the soldier. All great cap- 
 tains have relied on statecraft, and properly so. But such 
 was the purely military syllogism. 
 
 Much has been written about Napoleon's failure to put 
 the guard in at Borodino. Under parallel conditions 
 at an earlier day, he would certainly have done so. That 
 he did not is but one link more in the growing chain of in- 
 decisiveness. But had he done so, and won a more com- 
 plete victory, would it have made any eventual difference? 
 Smolensk was his last point of military safety. Even ha'1 
 he been able to winter in Russia, it is not. plain how spring 
 would have bettered his case, in view of the logistic diffi- 
 culties and of the temper of the Russian emperor and 
 people. Time in this campaign was of the essence. 
 
 Once or twice on the terrible retreat, Napoleon's old fire 
 and decision came to the fore, but during the bulk of it he 
 
NAPOLEON. 205 
 
 was apparently careless of what was happening. He 
 habitually left to his generals all but the crude direction 
 of the outlying corps. The contrast between Napoleon in 
 this disaster and Napoleon after raising the siege of Acre, 
 or after the defeat at Aspern and Essling, is marked. He 
 did not oppose his old countenance to misfortune. 
 
 After this campaign, in which the grand army of half a 
 million men was practically annihilated, Napoleon showed 
 extraordinary energy in raising new troops, and actually 
 put into the field, the succeeding spring, no less than three 
 hundred and fifty thousand men. They were not the old 
 army, but they were so many men. Napoleon understood 
 this : " We must act with caution, not to bring bad troops 
 into danger, and be so foolish as to think that a man is a 
 soldier." He had thirteen hundred guns. "Poor sol- 
 diers need much artillery." The lack of good officers was 
 the painful feature. The few old ones who were left were 
 ruined by bad discipline. The new ones were utterly 
 inexperienced. 
 
 In the campaign of 1813, Napoleon showed all his old 
 power of conception. The intellectual force of this man 
 never seemed overtaxed. But the lack of resolution 
 became still more marked. He began by winning two 
 battles, Liitzen and Bautzen, in which he freely ex- 
 posed himself and worked with all his old energy, to lend 
 his young troops confidence. He was then weak enough 
 to enter into an armistice with the allies. This was a sin- 
 gularly un-Xapoleonic thing to do. He had turned the 
 enemy's right and was strategically well placed. It was 
 just the time to push home. If the reasons he alleged 
 
206 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 want of cavalry and fear of the dubious position of 
 Austria were really the prevailing ones, Napoleon was 
 no longer himself, for his wonderful successes hitherto 
 had come from bold disregard of just such things. 
 
 Napoleon here shows us how often fortune is of a man's 
 own making. So long as he would not allow circum- 
 stances to dictate to him, fortune was constant. When he 
 began to heed adverse facts, we see first indecisive victo- 
 ries, then half successes, and by and by we shall see 
 failure and destruction. 
 
 The operations about and succeeding Dresden show a 
 vacillation which contrasts with the intellectual vigor. 
 For the first time Napoleon conducted a defensive cam- 
 paign. He studied his chances of an offensive, and cast 
 them aside for reasons which would not have weighed a 
 moment with him in 1805. And yet the defensive against 
 his concentrically advancing enemies was no doubt the best 
 policy. It shows Napoleon's judgment to have been better 
 than ever. After this brilliant victory Napoleon ordered a 
 pursuit which he ought to have made effective across 
 the Erzgebirge, but without issuing definite instructions. 
 Sickness forbade the personal supervision he had expected 
 to give; troops intended to sustain the advanced corps 
 were diverted from this duty by a sudden change of pur- 
 pose. Here was, as Jomini says, " f without contradiction, 
 one of Napoleon's gravest faults." But Napoleon had got 
 used to seeing things turn in his favor, until he deemed 
 constant personal effort unnecessary. Decreasing strength 
 had limited his activity ; great exertion was irksome. The 
 immediate result of this ill-ordered operation was the de- 
 
NAPOLEON. 207 
 
 etruction of a corps; the secondary result, the re-encour- 
 agement of the allies, whose morale had been badly shaken 
 by three defeats, and whose main army he should have fol- 
 lowed into Bohemia and broken up. The grand result was 
 loss of time, which to Napoleon was a dead loss, a new 
 advance of the allies, and the battle of Leipsic. During 
 all this time, while Napoleon's execution was weak com- 
 pared to his old habit, his utterances and orders showed 
 the clearest, broadest conception of what was essential. 
 But he was no longer the man who used to gallop forty to 
 sixty miles a day to use his eyes. Even at Leipsic he 
 exhibited at times his old power ; when defeat was certain 
 he lapsed into the same indifference he had shown on the 
 Russian retreat. 
 
 Nothing now, in a military sense, could save Napo- 
 leon, except to concentrate all his forces into one body and 
 manoeuvre against the allies with his old vigor. But the 
 Emperor Napoleon could not bear to give up Italy, Bel- 
 gium, Spain, as General Bonaparte had given up Mantua 
 to beat the enemy at Castiglione ; and he committed the 
 grievous mistake of not concentrating all his forces for the 
 defence of France. The campaign around Paris is a mar- 
 vel of audacious activity, though indeed it did not bring up 
 any of the larger intellectual problems of Marengo, Ulm, 
 or Jena. If Napoleon had done half as good work with 
 the larger army he might have had, there is scarce a 
 doubt but that he would have gone, far towards peace with 
 honor. As it was, he was crushed by numbers. But no 
 words can too highly phrase his military conduct, within 
 its limits, in this brief campaign. There is but one mis- 
 
208 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 take, the underrating of his enemy, the misinterpretation 
 of manifest facts. 
 
 The Waterloo campaign (1815), as already said, bears 
 marked resemblance to that of 1796. The details of 
 Waterloo are so well known that only the reasons will 
 be noted which appear to make Napoleon's first so great 
 a success and his last so great a failure. 
 
 At the beginning of June, Napoleon had available for 
 Belgium, where he proposed to strike the allied forces, 
 one hundred and ten thousand foot, and thirteen thousand 
 five hundred horse. In Belgium were Wellington, cov- 
 ering Brussels with ninety-five thousand men, and Blucher 
 lying from Charleroi to Namur with one hundred and 
 twenty- four thousand. Napoleon was superior to either ; 
 inferior to both together. He chose against these allied 
 armies the same offensive manoeuvre he had employed 
 against Beaulieu and Colli, a strategic breaking of their 
 centre, so as to separate them and attack each one 
 separately. The controlling reasons were the same. The 
 allies were of different nationalities, and each had a differ- 
 ent base, as well as varying interests. If cut in two they 
 no doubt would retire eccentrically, of which Napoleon 
 could take immediate advantage. The key to the whole 
 problem was the exhibition by him of foresight, boldness, 
 and rapid action. The plan could not be better. 
 
 He concentrated on Charleroi. From here led two 
 pikes, one to Brussels, which was Wellington's line of ad- 
 vance and retreat, one to Liege, which was Blucher's. 
 Wellington and Blucher were connected by the Namur - 
 Novell es road, which cut the other pikes at Quatre-Braa 
 
NAPOLEON. 
 
 209 
 
 and near Ligny. In order to push in between the allies to 
 any effect, Napoleon must seize on both these points. 
 
 The French army broke up June 15th at 3 A.M. 
 Napoleon was full of eagerness and early in the saddle. 
 The French advanced with slight opposition to Quatre- 
 Bras, and forced the Prussians back to Fleurus. Napoleoa 
 
 WATERLOO 
 CAMPAIGN 
 
 remained in the saddle all day, then retired to Charleroi 
 overcome with a fatigue which seemed to paralyze his men- 
 tal faculties. He could no longer conquer sleep as of old. 
 His bodily condition was bad, and even the necessity of 
 present success was unable to evoke persistent effort. 
 There is a singular difference between Napoleon at this 
 time and grim old Frederick in 1759 suffering from gout. 
 The king never gave up for an instant his restless work. 
 Disease and pain could not subdue his obstinate diligence. 
 
210 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 The emperor's ailments overcame his zeal. Here began 
 those little lapses of unused time whose addition, in four 
 days, sufficed to bring Napoleon to the end of his career. 
 The plan of campaign was as brilliantly thought out and 
 begun as that of 1796, and with equal vigor would have 
 equally succeeded. Wellington and Blucher had foreseen 
 the manoeuvre, and agreed to concentrate for mutual sup- 
 port at Quatre-Bras and Ligny. But Wellington, instead 
 of holding Quatre-Bras, gave Nivelles as the rallying- 
 point. Not even Wiirmser or Mack could have made an 
 ewor more in Napoleon's favor, for this separated him from 
 Blucher instead of gaining him his support. Napoleon 
 had the chance to strike Blucher singly. Wellington had 
 not yet assembled. Napoleon should have reached Quatre- 
 Bras and Ligny on the 15th, as he could easily have 
 done, or at a very early hour on the 16th. But no orders 
 even were issued till nearly 9 A.M. of the 16th. In his old 
 days, Napoleon would have been at the outposts at day- 
 light, have gauged the situation with his own eyes and his 
 incomparable power of judgment, and would have attacked 
 at an early hour. But he did not reach the ground till 
 noon nor finish his reconnoissance till 2 P.M. Ney had 
 been sent to Quatre-Bras. 
 
 Despite delays, however, part of Napoleon's plan did 
 succeed. Wellington was prevented from joining Blucher, 
 and Blucher was beaten and fell back in disorder. Now 
 Napoleon's object was so to manoeuvre as to keep the allies 
 apart. This could be done only by immediate pursuit. 
 He must push on after Blucher relentlessly, so as to throw 
 him off in an easterly direction, where he could observe 
 
NAPOLEON. 211 
 
 him with a small force, while he should dispose of Welling- 
 ton singly. And the more Wellington should manage to 
 push back Ney, the graver danger he would run. 
 
 Nothing was done about the pursuit of Blucher on the 
 night of 16th to 17th. Next morning Napoleon leisurely 
 visited the battle-field of Ligny and conversed with his 
 officers about indifferent things. None of the old-time 
 drive was manifest. It was again noon before he ordered 
 Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussians, while he himself 
 would turn against the English. Grouchy got off about 2 
 P.M. No one knew at that time whether Blucher had 
 retired on Namur or Wavre. In earlier days Napoleon 
 would have ascertained this fact with his own eyes, for it 
 was the one fact to make no mistake about. Whether to 
 ascertain this was the duty of the staff or the general is 
 immaterial. That Napoleon did not do so may not have 
 been his fault ; but it was his misfortune. Great captains 
 have won success by personal activity and by relying only 
 on themselves in critical matters. In estimating a great 
 soldier, one must number all his errors of omission and 
 commission. No general may shelter himself behind the 
 lapse of a subordinate. He must stand or fall by what he 
 himself does or fails to do. 
 
 But the fate of the campaign was already sealed. 
 Blucher had had the night of the 16th to 17th, and th* 
 morning of the 17th, and he had used the respite well, 
 He boldly threw up his own base on Liege and marched ott 
 Wavre to rejoin Wellington. Napoleon had assumed that 
 Blucher would retire along his line of communications. 
 He desired him to do this, and erroneously calculated on 
 
212 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 his having done so. The object of breaking the allied 
 centre, the sundering of the allies so as to beat them in de- 
 tail, had been forfeited by the sixteen or eighteen hours of 
 unnecessary delays after the battle of Ligny. 
 
 The battle of Waterloo itself has been so fully and ably 
 discussed from this rostrum, and Grouchy 's part of the 
 failure so clearly explained, that I will go no further. It 
 seems clear that the battle was lost on the day preceding it. 
 If Blucher did not join Wellington by one means he would 
 by another, when Napoleon gave him so many hours lee- 
 way. Nothing but the old activity in following up his 
 initial success could possibly have enabled Napoleon to 
 fight Wellington and Blucher separately, and if they 
 joined they were sure to beat him. Had he kept right on, 
 he would have beaten Wellington, and Blucher would have 
 retired. His difficulties here were not great. He was 
 successful in his early steps, and failed in later ones. The 
 explanation of the whole matter lies in the fact that Napo- 
 leon's physical powers and moral initiative had waned. 
 His intellect was unimpaired, but his character had lost 
 its native quality. 
 
 No man should be subject to criticism for inability 
 to do his best work when suffering from disease. It 
 is not intended to criticise in this sense. La critique 
 est facile; Vart est difficile. The motto of (heee 
 lectures is that coexistent intellect, character, and op- 
 portunity go to make the great captain. We see 
 Napoleon for twelve years possibly the greatest soldier 
 who ever lived. We then see his successes lessen. 
 It was not from declining intellect. It was partly 
 
NAPOLEON. 213 
 
 lesser opportunity, that is, greater difficulties, 
 partly loss of activity and decisiveness, - or, in other 
 words, character, proceeding from weakening phy- 
 sique or decrease of moral strength. There may be 
 room for doubt whether failing health alone, or failing 
 health combined with waning character, caused the inde- 
 cisiveness. It descends into a question of nomenclature. 
 Of the bald fact there can be no doubt. Napoleon at 
 Waterloo was not as great as Napoleon at Austerlitz. 
 
 The secret of Napoleon's power lay in his clear eye 
 for facts, his positive mind. Carlyle says : " The man 
 had a certain, instinctive, ineradicable feeling for reality, 
 and did base himself upon fact so long as he had 
 any basis." Napoleon said of himself that he was 
 most of a slave of all men, obliged to obey a 
 heartless master, the calculation of circumstances and 
 the nature of things. Coupled with this were a re- 
 liance on facts, rare capacity for divination, and an 
 immense power of imagination. But finally the latter 
 overran the other qualities. His successes convinced 
 him that he could do anything ; he forgot what his 
 success had been grounded on, and he began to neg- 
 lect facts. " It is not possible " is not French, said 
 he. This is the best of maxims construed one way, 
 the worst, if misconstrued. Napoleon believed himself 
 able to accomplish all things, until his accuracy of 
 judgment was lost in his refusal to look facts in the 
 face. He ceased to be slave of the nature of things. 
 He deserted belief in facts for belief in his destiny. 
 Finally facts became for nim not what they were, but 
 
214 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 what he wished them to be. He refused credit to 
 what did not suit his theory of how things ought to 
 turn. 
 
 Napoleon had what rarely coexists, an equally clear 
 head on the map and in the field. On the map 
 he was able in both theory and practice. His theories 
 are text-books ; his letters are treatises. No higher 
 praise can be spoken than to say that every one of 
 Napoleon's fourteen campaigns was, in a military sense, 
 properly planned. 
 
 Napoleon showed the value of masses in strategy 
 as well as tactics. In former times the worth of troops 
 was of greater value than numbers. To-day worth of 
 itself is less essential than it was. Napoleon founded 
 his calculations on the equality of thousands. It is 
 he who collated all that was done by the other great 
 captains, clothed it in a dress fit for our own days, 
 and taught the modern world how to make war in 
 perfect form . 
 
 Strategy will always remain the same art. Its uses 
 are to-day varied by railroads, telegraphs, arms of 
 precision. What was not allowable in the Napoleonic 
 era can be undertaken now with safety. But all this 
 has only modified, it has not changed strategy. The 
 tendency of modern armies is toward better organiza- 
 tion. Ramrod discipline is giving way to dependence 
 on the individuality of officers and men, and to in- 
 struction in doing what at the moment is the most 
 expedient thing. But every great soldier will be great 
 hereafter from the same causes which have made al] 
 
NAPOLEON. 215 
 
 capta.ua what they were ; in conducting war he, will bu 
 governed by the same intellectual and moral strength 
 which they exhibited, and will do, as they always 
 did, what befits the time, unfettered by rules and 
 maxims, but with a broad comprehension of their 
 true value. 
 
 Napoleon is so close to this generation that he sometimes 
 appears to us gigantic beyond all others. He certainly 
 moulded into shape the method in use to-day, which the 
 Prussians have carried forward to its highest development 
 by scrupulous preparation in every department, personal 
 service, and the teaching of individuals to act with intelli- 
 gent independence. That Napoleon was always intellect- 
 ually the equal, and, in the first part of his career in the 
 moral forces, the equal of any of the captains, cannot be 
 denied. But we must remember that because Napoleon 
 wrought in our own times we can the better appreciate 
 what he did, while our more meagre knowledge of the 
 others makes it impossible to see as clearly the manner in 
 which, to accomplish their great deeds, they must have 
 patterned their means to the work to be done. "The 
 most important qualities of an army leader," says Jomini, 
 "will always be a great character or constitutional cour- 
 age, which leads to great determinations ; sany froid or 
 bodily courage which conquers danger ; learning appears 
 in third line, but it will be a strong help." 
 
 Napoleon exhibited these qualities in full measure up to 
 1808, and comes close to being, at his best, the greatest of 
 the captains. He failed to exhibit the moral power in as 
 great measure thereafter. It was not years, for Cicsar and 
 
216 GREAT CAPTAINS. 
 
 Frederick were older when they showed these same quali- 
 ties in the highest degree. That Napoleon lost activity 
 and decisiveness, and thereby forfeited success, is no 
 reproach . No man can keep his faculties beyond a certain 
 period. He lacked that equipoise which enables a man to 
 stand success. He did not last as the others lasted ; and 
 proved that only so long as a man retains the highest 
 grade of character can he remain a great captain. At 
 the same time it is but fair to repeat that the conditions 
 under which Napoleon worked gradually became more 
 difficult : that the allies learned from him as the Romans 
 did from Hannibal, and made fewer mistakes as the years 
 went on ; that he was not always able to retain about him 
 the most efficient of his marshals ; that he commanded 
 vastly larger armies than the other captains. His task was 
 larger accordingly. 
 
 Napoleon's strategy shows a magnificence in conception, 
 a boldness in execution, and a completeness and homogen- 
 eity not shown by any other leader. The other captains 
 can only stand beside him because they builded eo that he 
 might add ; they invented so that he might improve. But 
 while Napoleon reached a height beyond the others, they 
 did not show the decrease of genius which he showed. 
 
 To ) little time is left to draw a satisfactory comparison 
 between Napoleon and his peers in arms. In Frederick 
 we recognize a man of higher standard than Napoleon 
 reached. Not merely because Frederick was, of all the 
 captains, the only one who, with vastly smaller forces, at- 
 tacked troops equal to his own and defeated them right 
 and left, in other words, because he was the typical tac- 
 
NAPOLEON. 217 
 
 tician, the typical fighter, but because he was iteadfast 
 in victory and defeat alike ; because he was so truly a king 
 to his people as well as a soldier ; because he &o truly 
 merged his own self in the good of Prussia. Napoleon 
 flared like a comet. Frederick burned like a planet or a 
 fixed star, less brilliant, less startling, but ever constant. 
 Frederick at the close of his life was the same great 
 man. Napoleon had burned out his lamp. Frederick 
 never waned. Years or infirmity never changed his force 
 or determination, or limited his energies. Moreover, 
 Frederick, like Hannibal, was greater in disaster than in 
 success. Napoleon succumbed to disaster. Frederick and 
 Hannibal alone held themselves against overwhelming civ- 
 ilized armies. They were stronger, more able, more de- 
 termined, more to be feared the more misfortune crowded 
 upon them. We instinctively couple Napoleon's genius 
 with his greatest success ; we couple Hannibal's or Fred- 
 erick's with their direst disasters. Alexander and Gustavus 
 never looked real disaster in the face, as Frederick before 
 Leuthen, or Hannibal after the Metaurus. Nor indeed did 
 Caesar. But Caesar opposed wonderful countenance to 
 threatening calamity. 
 
 Looking at Napoleon and Gustavus, it is perhaps impos- 
 sible to compare them. Gustavus was immeasurably above 
 all the others in purity of character, and their equal in 
 force and intellect. To him we owe the revival of intel- 
 lectual war, lost for seventeen centuries ; and on what he did 
 Frederick and Napoleon builded. Napoleon is nearer akin 
 to Cassar. Perhaps, take them all in all, as soldiers, 
 statesmen, law-givers, Caesar and Napoleon are the two 
 
218 ORE AT CAPTAINS. 
 
 greatest men. But they sink below the rest in their 
 motives and aspirations. Neither ever lost sight of self; 
 while Alexander's ambition was not only to conquer the 
 East, but to extend Greek civilization ; the motive of Han- 
 nibal and Frederick was patriotic, and that of Gustavus 
 love of country and religion. Three of the captains were 
 kings from the start. Their ambition was naturally imper- 
 sonal. Of the other three, Hannibal alone worked from 
 purely unselfish motives. 
 
 Nor can we compare Napoleon with Hannibal. In his 
 successes Napoleon is equally brilliant, more titanic ; in his 
 failures he falls so far below the level of this great pattern 
 of patient, never-yielding resistance to adversity as to be 
 lost. To Alexander fighting semi-civilized armies, Napo- 
 leon can only be likened in his Egyptian campaigns, and in 
 this he in no sense rises to the height of the Macedonian. 
 Napoleon's genius was most apparent on the familiar fields 
 of Europe. 
 
 In intellectual grasp, all six great captains stand side 
 by side. In enthusiastic activity and in all the qualities 
 which compel good fortune, Alexander stands clearly at 
 the head. No one but Frederick has perhaps so brilliant 
 a string of tactical jewels as Hannibal, while in a persist- 
 ent unswerving struggle of many years to coerce success 
 against the constantly blackening frowns of Fortune, 
 Hannibal stands alone and incomparable. Cassar was a 
 giant in conception and execution alike, and stands apart 
 n having taught himself in middle life how to wage war, 
 and then waging in it a fashion equalled only by the other 
 dve. Gustavus will always rank, not only as the man 
 
NAPOLEON". 21 9 
 
 Tvhc rescued intellectual war from oblivion, but aa the 
 most splendid character, in nobility of purpose and intel- 
 ligence of method, which the annals of the world have to 
 Bhow. Frederick is not only the Battle Captain who 
 never blenched at numbers, but truly the Last of the 
 Kings, king and priest, in the history of mankind. 
 Napoleon carries us to the highest plane of genius and 
 power and success, and then declines. We begin by 
 feeling that here is indeed the greatest of the captains, and 
 we end by recognizing that he has not acted out the 
 part. No doubt, taking him in his many-sidedness, Caesar 
 is the greatest character in history. It may not unfairly 
 be claimed that Napoleon follows next, especially in that he 
 preserved for Europe many germs of the liberty which was 
 born of the blood of the Revolution. Caesar was the most 
 useful man of antiquity ; Napoleon comes near to being ir.e 
 most useful man of modern times. But neither Caesar nor 
 Napoleon appeal to us as do splendid, open-hearted Alex- 
 ander ; patient, intrepid, ever-constant Hannibal ; the 
 Christian hero, Gustavus ; and daring, obstinate, royal 
 Frederick. 
 
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