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 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION 
 
 AND SCIENCE: A BIOLOGICAL 
 
 APPROACH 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPAKT.MKNT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE 
 GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL 
 
 BY 
 
 ANGUS STEWART WOODBURNE 
 
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 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1920 
 
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Zbc TUntvcrsttp ot Cbicago 
 
 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION 
 
 AND SCIENCE: A BIOLOGICAL 
 
 APPROACH 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE 
 GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL 
 
 BY 
 
 ANGUS STEWART WOODBURNE 
 
 'A 
 
 • » • * • 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1920 
 

 yvu 
 
 Copyright 1920 By 
 The University of Chicago 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Published January 1920 
 
 rxcH/M«n?» 
 
 Composed and Printed By 
 
 The University of Chicago Press 
 
 Chicago. lUinois. U.S.A. 
 
f^O i{ 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The attempt is made in this thesis to examine the age-long 
 problem of the interrelationship of religion and science from a new 
 angle, namely that of psychology considered as a biological science. 
 There is a general recognition today that the elements common to 
 the religions and those common to the sciences are psychological. 
 The facts of religious experience and the facts of scientific experi- 
 ence are so multiform that the only place to discover a common 
 basis is in the attitudes of consciousness giving rise to these variant 
 concrete expressions. Furthermore there is a general recognition 
 among psychologists that the genesis of all the attitudes, including 
 the religious and the scientific, is localizable in the instinctive 
 behaviors of the psycho-physical organism. 
 
 It seems only fair that psychologists should recognize that 
 those best equipped to define instinctive behavior are the biolo- 
 gists. On the basis of a biologically acceptable defijiition, a sound 
 theory of the origin of religion and science is possible. The theory 
 proposed is that these attitudes have their roots in behavior which, 
 while instinctive, is multiple. In proof of the contention, refer- 
 ence is made to many of the rites and practices of primitive peoples 
 which are recorded in the source books on anthropology. It is 
 the hope of the author that this effort may contribute in some small 
 measure to the solution of a great problem. 
 
 A. S. WOODBURNE 
 Camp Dodge, Iowa /- 
 
 January, 1920 / 
 
 433145 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. Concerning Method i 
 
 II. A Historical Survey of the Influence of Psychological 
 
 Theory on the Problem lo 
 
 III. The Differentia of Religion and Science . . .31 
 
 IV. The Search for a Scientific Definition of Instinct . 44 
 
 V. The Theory of Specific Religious and Scientific Instincts 56 
 
 VI. The Effort to Identify Religion and Science with Cer- 
 tain Specific Instincts 63 
 
 VII. The Multiple Instinctive Origin of Religion and Science 69 
 
 VIII. Theological Implications . 91 
 
 Bibliography 96 
 
 vu 
 
CHAPTER I 
 CONCERNING METHOD 
 
 It is the aim of this chapter to set forth in outline the develop- 
 ment of a scientific method. The deductive method of Aristotle 
 dominated the thinking of the Middle Ages and was ecclesiastically 
 sanctioned in Catholicism. But the needs created by scientific 
 progress made the evolution of a better method inevitable. The 
 seventeenth century witnessed the rise of induction which in its 
 developed form is the method of modern science. But induction, 
 to be complete, must make use of the genetic method, involving 
 history and psychology. Thus this sketch (i) indicates the 
 cause and nature of the long conflict between science and theology, 
 and (2) furnishes a vindication for the study of the relation of 
 religion to science from the point of view of psychology. 
 
 The attainment of a method for a scientific approach to our 
 human problems has a history which takes us back to the Greeks. 
 The beginning of logic is to be found in Aristotle. It was his 
 theory that reality is to be found in particulars, and that these 
 particulars have universals and attributes attached to them. He 
 was the first to conceive of reason {\6yos) as a definite subject of 
 investigation. The process of reasoning, he taught, was a com- 
 bination of premises {crvWoyLo-iJLos) to produce a new conclusion. 
 Logic was thus for him a science of deductive inference. He can 
 hardly be said to have a logic of induction. His universals were 
 obtained by a process of analysis and abstraction in which differ- 
 ences were eliminated and particulars were grouped according to 
 their homogeneity into classes. Accordingly science, which was 
 selective, picked on a specific object, which it handled with the 
 tools forged for the purpose. Its abstract universals were obtained 
 in the analytical fashion, and were then made the major premises 
 in a deductive process which led to a definite conclusion. Any 
 reasoning which could not be put thus in the form of a syllogism 
 was regarded as imperfect. 
 
2 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 Following upon the period of Greek scholarship came a long 
 period when scientific learning made no progress. The achieve- 
 ments of the Greeks had been absorbed in the utilitarian spirit 
 of the Roman Empire. Then followed that period of political 
 and social corrosion known to history as the "Dark Ages," a 
 period noteworthy for its lack of creative thought. It is to the 
 Arabians that we owe the dawn of a new interest in both science 
 and philosophy. These men, though Moslem, had come under the 
 influence of Greek thought, and were the means for a revivification 
 of Aristotelianism through the channel of a Semitic language. In 
 Persia and in Spain, then under Saracen control, from the ninth 
 to the twelfth centuries these men championed the mediaeval 
 renaissance of science and philosophy. From the Arabians the 
 renewed interest in Greek thought rapidly spread. The fact that 
 the King of Sicily, Roger II (1093-1154), and the emperor, Fred- 
 erick II (11 94-1 2 50), called numbers of these Arabian scholars 
 to their courts gave to the movement a new impetus. Translations 
 of Aristotle were made, and the universities at Paris, Bologne, and 
 Oxford began to study Aristotle with zest. 
 
 The spread of Greek thought meant that it soon found its 
 way into Christian circles. The later scholastics were acquainted 
 with and largely influenced by the new movement. At first the 
 effect was an unsettling of the orthodox views of the time, and a 
 type of mystical pantheism arose. This resulted in the University 
 of Paris, with papal sanction, placing a ban on Aristotle (12 15), 
 but in less than half a century the ban was removed, and the 
 Aristotelian system became the church's best tool chest. Alexander 
 of Hales (d. 1245), Robert Groseteste (d. 1253), and John Rochelle 
 (d. 1 271) were among the first ecclesiastics to make use of Aristotle. 
 Albertus Magnus (i 193-1280) was "the first scholastic who 
 reproduced the whole philosophy of Aristotle in systematic order 
 with constant reference to the Arabian commentators, and who 
 remodelled it to meet the requirements of ecclesiastical dogma. "* 
 But it is to Albert's great pupil, Thomas Aquinas {ca. 1227-74), 
 that we owe a thoroughly digested and ecclesiastical rendering of 
 
 'Encyclopaedia Britannica (nth edition), XXIV, 353, article "Scholasticism," 
 by A. S. Pringle-Pattison. 
 
CONCERNING METHOD 3 
 
 the Aristotelian system. In his Summa Theologica Aquinas has 
 made use of the conceptuaHst machinery of the Greek thinker. 
 The form of the propositions with which he dealt is syllogistic. 
 The content is intended to cover the range of human knowledge 
 arranged according to the method of the subsumptive logic and 
 subordinated to the church. It made use of all sources of ecclesi- 
 astical authority, Scripture, conciliar decisions, patristic comments 
 and tradition, and thus built up a work which soon became the 
 theological dicta of the Catholic church. So that the test of 
 CathoHc orthodoxy from that day until this is agreement with 
 Aquinas. 
 
 The effect of this movement upon the church was to be seen 
 in the attitude which it assumed throughout the Middle Ages. 
 The effort was made to maintain an ecclesiastical standardization 
 of all the departments of human hfe, science, and ethics, no less 
 than religion and theology. The church claimed that she had 
 received her knowledge by a supernatural revelation. The super- 
 natural character of church knowledge thus placed it in a class 
 independent of and superior to scientific knowledge, the source 
 of which is fallible human reason. In case of a disagreement 
 between ecclesiastical and scientific findings the course of conduct 
 was logically plain. Remembering the source of church knowledge 
 and that quality depends on origin, the inevitable rejection of 
 scientific knowledge followed. Thus it was that the Catholic 
 church maintained its authority ever science, and the bitter conflict 
 between science and theology ensued. It ought to be evident 
 that the conflict was virtually between two types of science. 
 Theology, as we have seen, rested upon the whole framework of 
 the Aristotelian deductive schema. But the physical sciences 
 have never made any clear progress under the regime of deduction. 
 
 The heroic struggle of science for emancipation in the use of a 
 method which would insure the most trustworthy results met with 
 dogged and prolonged opposition. A beginning was made by 
 Roger Bacon, who was a contemporary of the great Aquinas. But 
 for two hundred years after Roger Bacon the church completely 
 dominated the situation and no appreciable progress was made. 
 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries certain epoch-making 
 
4 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 events transpired which, on the one hand, compelled the church to 
 take a less dictatorial attitude toward the sciences, and, on the 
 other hand, made the evolution of a new method inevitable. 
 
 First there occurred the two great discoveries which gave rise 
 to the great extension of navigation — the discovery of America by 
 Columbus in 1492 and the circumnavigation of the globe by 
 Magellan, 15 19-21. The necessities of the expansion of naviga- 
 tion called for a new cosmology. The Ptolemaic hypothesis posited 
 a flat and stationary earth at the center of the cosmos. Magellan 
 proved that the earth was round by sailing around it. Copernicus 
 (1473-1543) was the framer of the heliocentric cosmology which 
 recognized the rotundity and motion of the earth. 
 
 The astronomical theory of Copernicus was opposed by Catholic 
 and Protestant aUke. The Protestant Reformation antedated 
 the birth of induction, so that the Reformers were as bitter as the 
 church in the invectives which they hurled at the new science, 
 which conflicted with the scriptural cosmology to which the church 
 had lent its imprimatur. Bruno, the Italian philospher and 
 scientist, was burned as a martyr to the new science in 1600. But 
 the telescope of Galileo, ten years later, proved the truth of that 
 for which Bruno had been compelled to lay down his life. 
 
 The importance of Galileo was twofold. Not only did he 
 establish beyond a peradventure the heliocentric cosmology, but 
 he discovered that the motion of the earth was self-induced and 
 self -sustained. This was a double attack on church doctrines. 
 First, the church anthropology made man the center of creation, 
 but even the earth which he inhabited was now seen to be eccentric. 
 The dissolution of that doctrine was completed in the nineteenth 
 century with the advent of Darwinianism. Secondly, the hypoth- 
 esis of self-motion was a death-dealing blow to the doctrine of 
 absolutes and apriority. Statics gave way to dynamics. 
 
 The work of Galileo was continued by Johann Kepler (1571- 
 1630), Issac Newton (1642-1727), and Laplace (1749-1847). 
 Newton formulated the doctrine of gravitation by which the 
 motions of the various planets are attributed to an inner pervading 
 force, thus encountering opposition from the theological doctrine 
 of a creating Providence. Laplace's nebular hypothesis afforded 
 
CONCERNING METHOD 5 
 
 a causal explanation of the origin of the heavenly bodies which 
 still further retired the theological explanation. 
 
 Every step of advance was made at the cost of a struggle. The 
 older method was intrenched with all the fortifications of an 
 organized and supermundanely authenticated system. But for all 
 that, events proved that the source of the old knowledge was no 
 guaranty of its truth. So the work of these astronomers along 
 with the accomplishments of men in the other sciences, such as 
 Leonardo da Vinci in the geological realm, made insistent the 
 evolution of a method which should do justice to things as they are. 
 
 It remained for Francis Bacon to make the first formulation 
 of the inductive method. Beginning with the hypothesis that 
 the knowledge of nature depends on observation and experience, 
 he proposed to observe and collect a vast number of facts, and 
 then to follow the inductive method of getting universals from 
 this mass of particulars. The aim was to acquire a command over 
 nature by knowledge. He was therefore opposed to the syllo- 
 gistic method which accepted its major premises from science on 
 trust. 
 
 Descartes in his Discourse on Method attempted with mathe- 
 matical precision to attain a basis for knowledge in the indubitable 
 facts of experience. He carried into the field of the mental pro- 
 cesses the method of natural explanation which the astronomers 
 had introduced in the explanation of cosmic processes, in con- 
 tradistinction to the supernaturalism of the Middle Ages. So 
 that Francis Bacon and Descartes both insisted on the banishing 
 of theology from science, thus freeing science to work out a new 
 method as it substituted mechanical for final causation in the 
 explanation of phenomena. 
 
 From the seventeenth century the inductive method has 
 gradually become dominant in science, until today we may say 
 that science is coterminous with induction. To be sure, the 
 inductive method in our day has become something more scientific 
 than it was in the days of Francis Bacon. Baconian induction 
 was too atomistic and lacked a means of testing its conclusions. 
 That has been remedied in the use of hypotheses and the trial- 
 and-error plan for testing them. We are able to take the past up 
 
6 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 into the present in this way, and through the difference with the 
 past we realize the present. The scientist finds an exception to a 
 rule and sets about the formulation of a new rule that will include 
 the exception. In this way the conclusions of science are attained 
 experimentally and afiford a legitimate means for the explanation 
 and interpretation of human institutions, including religion. 
 Science uses the research method, which includes the recognition 
 of a problem and the finding of a solution thereto by the employ- 
 ment of hypotheses and tests. 
 
 With the evolution of a scientific method it was inevitable that 
 sooner or later it should be employed in the study of religion. 
 So long as religion was equated with revelation a science of religion 
 or a historical study of religion was impossible. A beginning was 
 made when David Hume in 1755 published his Natural History of 
 Religion, giving it a historical and psychological basis. For more 
 than a hundred years after that progress was slow. Here and 
 there a scholar attempted to study religion more scientifically. 
 But as a rule the method was the examination of a non-Christian 
 religion and a comparison of it with Christianity with a view to 
 showing the spuriousness of the former. It was a contrast between 
 a human invention and a divine revelation. 
 
 It was not until the nineteenth century that the historical 
 method really came to its own. That was consequent upon the 
 rise of induction. A thoroughgoing observation of any human 
 institution involves an investigation into the matter of how it came 
 to be in the historical process, of the social substratum in which it 
 was created, and of the order of sequence in its development. The 
 first chair in the History of Religions to be established in a university 
 was in the College de la France in 1884. Since then progress has 
 been so rapid that the historical method has become synonymous 
 with scholarship in the study of religion. 
 
 The historical method furnishes a survey of the way or ways 
 in which any human product has functioned and has changed to 
 meet the exigencies of social situations. It also furnishes data for 
 the work of classification and appraisal. By the use of historical 
 analyses one is compelled to understand the social and functional 
 worth of all human creations. The older method tried to give an 
 
CONCERNING METHOD 7 
 
 account of the truth of an idea by a syllogistic process; the new 
 method leads to a study of the worth of an idea in the historical 
 process. That means an appreciation of the relativity of all 
 thought-products and the necessity of working with a true organon. 
 And the organon to which the historical study of either religion or 
 science leads is not conformity to an authoritative standard, but 
 competency to do something for man which he needs to have done 
 in his struggle for existence. 
 
 Notwithstanding the Catholic theory of an unalterable system 
 of religious truth, the actual history of beliefs shows constant 
 experimentation and mutation, an unconscious recognition of the 
 scientific method. Contingency has played comparatively little 
 part in the development of scientific thought as it has in religious 
 thought. Actual problems demanding solution, concrete needs 
 demanding satisfaction, social tensions demanding adjustment — 
 these have been the historical progenitors of scientific laws and 
 discoveries as well as of religious doctrines. 
 
 The historical method is the effort to be honest. It is the 
 recognition that every development in history is determined by 
 sociological and psychological influences. The deductive method 
 is essentially normative. It works well so long as the major 
 premise is scientifically credible. But when the universal scorns 
 to account for the exceptions the method breaks down. The 
 historian is just as much interested in exceptions as in rules. He 
 seeks to know the facts and to adjust his theory to the facts rather 
 than the facts to his theory. So that the historical method is the 
 only method for objectivity. It recognizes that the life-processes 
 cannot be confined within the bounds of the syllogism. Hence it 
 takes cognizance of things as they occur, regardless of their place 
 in logical processes. Scholasticism worked on the assumption 
 that the criterion for rehgion must be logical, which in the last 
 analysis is an attempt to locate the seat of religion in the intellect. 
 But the historical and psychological study of religion shows that 
 its locus is rather in deep-seated, felt needs of Hfe which find their 
 roots in the instincts. 
 
 The historical study involves the application of the genetic 
 method. An interest in the functional value of an institution leads 
 
8 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 to the functional problem of how it came to be as the product of an 
 evolutionary process. So that the natural complement of a histori- 
 cal study leads into the field of social psychology. "The past is 
 involved in the present in the case of human history as much as in 
 that of geological evolution.'" Social psychology is one of the 
 best tools that modern thought has invented for the interpretation 
 of human institutions. It helps to an understanding of the place 
 of religion in the social current and of the functional relationship 
 between the facts of religion and the larger social whole in which 
 rehgion operates. Historical study proves that there is no period 
 which has a monopoly of spiritual values sui generis. Social 
 psychology shows that it is as fruitless to seek to understand any 
 religious reaction by itself as to visit a fossil museum without an 
 understanding of geology. History gives us the records; social 
 psychology helps us to relate religion to the stream of thought and 
 life. 
 
 So then the deeper problems of life urge us on from a historical 
 to a psychological study. History may be able to supply us with 
 the order of sequence of religious happenings, but even here there 
 are lacunae to fill in which the historian is dependent on the psychol- 
 ogist. In addition there are the further problems of (i) the 
 determinants of the sequence of religious occurrences, and (2) the 
 cause of the genesis of the religious phenomena themselves, and 
 these are functional problems which it is not the province of history 
 to solve. History is concerned with the external forms and prod- 
 ucts of rehgion and science. The study of the mental processes, 
 individual and social, which gave birth to those externals is a 
 psychological study. Consequently the last quarter of a century 
 has witnessed the apphcation of a psychological method to a study 
 of these human institutions, particularly of religion. 
 
 The immense advance in the study of psychological science 
 itself is fortunately coincident with its being used as a method for 
 studying religion and other disciplines. Of especial import for the 
 religious problem is social psychology, through which we are learning 
 that the individual '^omes to mental and moral consciousness only 
 
 ' F. A. Tennant, "Historical Fact in Relation to the Philosophy of Religion," 
 in Hibbert Journal, VIII, 177. 
 
CONCERNING METHOD 9 
 
 in a social world. The rise of religion is in the corporate life of the 
 group. And, as Durkheim has shown/ the religion of a folk is a 
 socializing of the supermundane world on the analogy of its own 
 social structure. 
 
 The data for the historian and the psychologist alike are what 
 people do. But behavior is socially determined both as to origin 
 and to direction. So that history and psychology both lead to a 
 social investigation. It is in the life-experiences of folks, considered 
 historically and spiritually, externally and internally, that we seek 
 to locate the genesis and value of both religion and science. Reli- 
 gion and science are both of them social facts inasmuch as they 
 originated in the folk experiences to meet human needs. 
 
 It is only by the use of psychology that we can hope to make any 
 adequate analysis of the phenomena of religion and science as 
 human institutions. Historical observation furnishes us merely 
 with the external phenomena. Cults and ceremonials, rites and 
 rituals in religion, and laws, theories, and laboratory materials in 
 science are not the stuff which afford us the differentia and the 
 common elements for definitive purposes. The hopelessness of 
 getting definitions on the basis of mere externals has been sub- 
 stantiated by their very numbers. The basis is a psychological 
 one,^ and it is to be found in the study of the history of human 
 endeavors in their actual situations. The unifying principle which 
 underlies the multiplicity of religious phenomena, the synthesis by 
 which we abstract meaning from the facts of religious development, 
 must be psychological. In precisely the same way the unity 
 behind the multiplicity of scientific phenomena is psychological. 
 So that we are driven into the use of a historico-psychological 
 method for an appreciation at once of the differentia and the 
 genesis of religion and of science. 
 
 ' Les Formes Elemenlaires de la Vie Religieuse, pp. 56, 57. 
 
 ' Cf . Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, section B of the Introduction, where 
 the author discusses the problem of method. He points out very lucidly that an 
 understanding of religion is only possible through psychology, because its expressions 
 are those of a conscious mind which it is the province of psychology to interrogate. 
 If, as Galloway points out, "the unifying principle which underlies the religious 
 phenomena is the psychical nature of man" (p. 31), so too we may contend that the 
 unifying principle beneath the multiform activities and creations of science has its 
 seat in man's psychical nature. To that problem chapter ii is addressed. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHO- 
 LOGICAL THEORY ON THE PROBLEM 
 
 In an examination of the problem of the relation between 
 science and religion, it would be difficult to exaggerate the impor- 
 tance of the psychological bearing of the problem. A survey of the 
 history of the relationships which have existed between these two 
 disciplines reveals the fact that the prevalent psychological theory 
 and method which were dominant in each period were two of the 
 most important factors in determining the viewpoint of the scholars 
 of that period toward this specific problem. Before passing to a 
 consideration of the approach to the problem which is obtained 
 through contemporary psychology it is the purpose of this chapter 
 to indicate the bearing of the theories of the past upon our problem. 
 
 An investigation into the behavior of primitive peoples dis- 
 closes the fact that there was no such thing as a science, mental or 
 physical. There was no such thing as religion in the differentiated 
 sense that we use the word today. There was no such thing as 
 magic, as sophisticated people use the term. What we see is a 
 vast complex, a heterogeneous mass of all the stuff out of which life 
 is made. In other words, it is an undifferentiated complex of 
 materials. One of the difficulties against which we need to guard 
 is the danger of reading back into the activities of primitive man 
 the differentiations which mark an age of culture. 
 
 The behavior of primitive man approximates to that of his 
 animal ancestors in that it is more instinctive than reflective. 
 His nervous system is as yet not developed to the degree that he 
 has attained control over his motor activity, but that motor 
 activity is simple and is spontaneously discharged in response to 
 the stimuli which irritate his sensory organs. The attainment of 
 control over those motor reactions is a part of the process through 
 
 JO 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY ii 
 
 which there emerges intelligence and the power of reflection. 
 The differentiation between the neurosis and the psychosis was 
 evolved in this primitive stage of the life-process. 
 
 In this early period of the history of the race man did not make 
 the difference which he came to make later between himself and 
 the lower animals. The dominant needs of life which he ex- 
 perienced, nutrition and reproduction, were characteristic of the 
 animals of the other genera. They were possessed of qualities, 
 such as celerity in the deer, strength in the tiger, or cleverness in 
 the fox, which he deemed to be decided advantages in the struggles 
 of life. In that primitive stage when his brothers were often a 
 prey to other animals, there was no overmastering evidence that 
 he was getting the best of it. He belonged to a subaltern genus 
 (man) in the summum genus (animal). It was, in brief, a pre- 
 dualistic age. 
 
 In this primitive period there were certain phenomena, such as 
 dreams, sleep, death, the visibility of the breath on a cold day, 
 which played an important role in the evolution of man's reflective 
 processes. One of the first evidences which we have of a dualism 
 resultant therefrom was the difference which he made between the 
 seen and the unseen. The phenomena mentioned helped him to 
 the conclusion that there must be an unseen world which he 
 imaginatively peopled with life such as existed in the seen world, 
 with the exception that the life there was disembodied, which 
 gave to it an undue advantage over him. These animistic con- 
 ceptions were at first very vague, as were indeed all of his primitive 
 reflections. They were the reflections which belonged to a pre- 
 scientific and therefore pre-psychological age. In the seeking for 
 the satisfactions for his primitive wants, about all the distinction 
 which he made was a distinction between things or powers which 
 helped and things or powers which hindered him in the procuring 
 of those satisfactions. The unforeseen phenomena of life would 
 call forth instinctive reactions. The stubbing of his toe on a 
 protruding stone or root would cause him to react to the stone as 
 though it were animated, and he would never quite recover from 
 that attitude growing out of his first reaction. In that way the 
 objective world would very gradually become for him animated 
 
12 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 with helpful and harmful spirits. His own desire to help his 
 friends or to hinder his enemies in the struggle to procure the 
 satisfaction of their wants contributed to the association of his 
 helps and hindrances which were to him inscrutable with some 
 other animus. Here we have another factor which played its part 
 in the development of animism. It would be assuming too great 
 sophistication, however, to say that here we have primitive man's 
 scientific category of causality. It was simply his distinctions 
 between helps and hindrances toward the satisfaction of pressing 
 needs, the helps being gradually associated with a friendly attimus 
 and the hindrances with a hostile animus. Neither can we say 
 that this behef in animi was due to the fact that man was "incurably 
 religious," to use the phrase of Sabatier,^ but it was rather the 
 beginnings of the reflective process trying to solve the problems of 
 life with its demands for means to meet its recurring needs. 
 
 The age of primitivity, then, is not to be studied with the 
 object of procuring data to substantiate a preconceived theory 
 which we desire to have confirmed. If we approach the facts as 
 they are presented in experience in the history of the race, we do 
 not find primitive man making those differentiations which we 
 sometimes assume are as old as the race, the distinctions between 
 the physical and the psychical, between the human and the lower 
 animal, between religion and science and art. We are able, indeed, 
 to find a great deal of the material out of which these differentiations 
 developed, but the process of making those distinctions belongs to a 
 subsequent age, and the fact that man did learn to apprehend the 
 differences noted proves that he has transcended the age of primi- 
 tivity. ^ 
 
 II 
 
 In Greek thought we meet with the development of a thorough- 
 going dualism. And the great names with which this development 
 is associated are, of course, Plato and Aristotle. Plato arrived 
 at his dualistic hypothesis through a consideration of the cognitive 
 problem. He set out with the conviction that knowledge is 
 attainable only through deduction, and set for himself the problem 
 
 ' Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, p. 3. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 13 
 
 of discovering why knowledge comes through conception. He 
 concluded that the value-judgments of truth, beauty, and goodness 
 do not arise from experience. So he was forced to posit a super- 
 sensible world as the source of those value-judgments. In that way 
 he had the supersensible world as the intelligible world, the real 
 world, the world of ideas. Over against it was the world of ex- 
 perience, the sensible world, or the phenomenal world. The latter 
 he conceived to be a copy of the former; the latter was the par- 
 ticular and the former the universal. Plato gave metaphysical 
 value to the world of ideas and had an aversion to the natural 
 order. His process was the very opposite of ours. He knew the 
 supersensible world through knowledge (eTrio-ri^jUt) and the sensible 
 world through faith (xiaTrts), thus reversing our order of faith and 
 certainty. Plato was certain of God, and he accepted the phenome- 
 nal world by faith. We are sure of the world, and we know God 
 by faith. For him the Idea was being; matter was non-being 
 {to bv and jui) 6v). In this way Plato arrived at dualism as an 
 epistemological device. 
 
 Aristotle attempted to overcome the difficulty inherent in the 
 dualism of Plato. He accepted the point of view of his predecessor 
 that the beginning must be made from conceptual knowledge. 
 The knowledge of real being, he agreed, is the knowledge of univer- 
 sal. But he saw that Plato's theory of Ideas was inadequate to 
 explain the world of experience. So he tried to identify the two 
 worlds of Platonic thought by saying that real being is in the par- 
 ticular, in which the universal is also present. To discover the 
 relationship of the universal to the particular he founded the 
 science of logic. Aristotle asked the question, What are the gener- 
 ative causes of real being? His answer was that there are four 
 causes, viz., material causes (uX?;), formal causes (etSos), efficient 
 causes or moving causes {apxv), and final causes (reXos). As the 
 reflection went on there came to be a practical identification of 
 the formal, efficient, and final causes in one constituent general 
 principle. This meant a reduction of generative causes to two, 
 Idea or form (elSos) and matter {v\r}) . The former is the essential 
 or cause proper, while the latter is the secondary cause. Aristotle 
 formed a conceptual pyramid with his one eternal, actual Being, 
 
14 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 the uncaused Cause, unmoved Mover, pure Form without matter, 
 at the apex of the pyramid. 
 
 So we see as a development of Greek thought a dualism whereby 
 the material world was made secondary to the ideational world. 
 Mind is in control. Mind was the form of organized matter, 
 which Baldwin takes to be a "restatement of the hylozoism and 
 animism of the Ionic thinkers."^ 
 
 When Aristotle comes to discuss the individual he is controlled 
 by this same dualistic viewpoint. He refers to the relationship 
 between the body and the soul as that which exists between matter 
 and form, capacity or potentiahty, and function or actuality 
 (dwanis and euTekexeta). The soul dominates the body which 
 exists only for the sake of the soul. At the same time he makes a 
 differentiation in the soul itself, there being a part which, like the 
 body, is mortal, i.e., sensation, imagination, memory, and will, 
 but also a part which is immortal, viz., the active intellect {vovs 
 TTOLTiTLKos). lu this actlvc intellect he posits actual existence and 
 describes it as immaterial, imperishable, impassive, and eternal. 
 Yet this active intellect is something which is external to man and 
 is not an organic part of him. It comes to him from without. 
 It appears from his descriptions to be in no wise different from the 
 absolute intellect. In this way he seems to make the immortal 
 part of the human intellect, active intellect, a gift of the Absolute, 
 if he does not identify it virtually with the Absolute. Absolute's 
 love of scientific knowledge might be called a passion, and, as Weber 
 says, his "theology is at bottom an apotheosis of vovs."^ 
 
 Ill 
 
 The theoretical dualism of the Greek thinkers furnished a mode 
 of thought for the Christian thinkers of the New Testament, patristic, 
 and scholastic periods. 
 
 In Thomas Aquinas we reach a man who had all the inheritance 
 of the biblical and patristic writings upon which he meditated with 
 a mind trained in the subtleties of Greek thought. His great 
 teacher, Albcrtus Magnus, had been a pupil of Avicenna, the 
 Arabian philosopher who had been foremost in the revivification 
 
 ^History of Psychology, II, 184-97. ^ Weber, History of Philosophy, p. 134. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 15 
 
 of Aristotle. In the time of Albertus there was already emerging 
 the perplexity over the opposing truths of revelation and of natural 
 science. He tried to effect a modus vivendi by asserting that 
 "revelation is above but not contrary to reason." Yet he con- 
 cluded that the ideas of a creation in time, of the miraculous, and 
 of such elements in doctrine as those which have to do with the 
 soul, sin, grace, etc., are incapable of harmonization with reason. 
 They must be accepted as given by a higher authority. So he used 
 a method which made a reconciliation of science (reason) and 
 religion (revelation) impossible. His attempt to apply the Aristo- 
 teHan logic consistently meant that he made a breach between 
 Jewish supernaturalism and Greek rationalism which was irrepa- 
 rable. "By the false antithesis thus raised between reason and 
 revelation, he prepared the way for the long conflict between 
 theology and science, of reason and dogma, of naturalism and 
 supernaturalism, of individual judgment and collective authority. "^ 
 Aquinas was a greater pupil of a great teacher. As we have 
 seen, like Albertus, he made diligent use of the tools which had 
 been forged in the workshop of Aristotle. Aristotle had worked out 
 a scheme whereby you proceed from class-concept to larger class- 
 concept up the line until you reach ultimate class-concept. The 
 only way to understand the particular was by realizing that the 
 universal was contained in it. This gave to Aquinas the mold 
 into which to run the stream of his theological thought. It was 
 his purpose to trace the passing of revelatory knowledge from the 
 higher to the lower in ecclesiastical authority. The system of 
 Aquinas was essentially a hierarchy. He posited a hierarchy of 
 bodies in nature, the consummation of which is the natural life 
 of man which on its part became the starting-point for a higher 
 spiritual life which is developed under church supervision. He had 
 two realms, the realm of grace and the realm of nature. The 
 intellect is governed by the reason which it cannot evade. The 
 will tends to be governed by the principle of the good in which 
 its freedom is established. But evil comes when the efforts of the 
 will are paralyzed by sensuality. So we see the beginning of the 
 division of the psychic life into intellect, senses, and will. Wherever 
 
 ' Beckwith in Neiv Schaf-Herzog E.R.K., I, no, article "Albertus Magnus." 
 
i6 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 we have that division made in a mechanical way, some power 
 of control is necessary to prevent inner chaos. Here Aquinas 
 resorted to the technique of Aristotle in an ecclesiasticized form. 
 The church must be in control. Reason must be under the domina- 
 tion of revelation, as Albertus had said. Science must be dominated 
 by theology which, of course, was that theology which the church 
 sanctioned as orthodox. Thus we see the beginnings of the asser- 
 tion of religious authority over psychology, science, and all the 
 other disciplines, a characteristic tendency of the whole mediaeval 
 period. "During the greater part of the Middle Ages to be learned 
 
 in science meant to be learned in the sacred text The 
 
 scientific textbooks were based upon the Bible, at least in con- 
 siderable part. "^ And the spirit of the Middle Ages was made 
 vocal in such books as Ymago Mundi, written by Cardinal D'Ailly 
 in 1410 — a geographical work in which the author "gives us one 
 of the most striking examples in history of a great man in theological 
 fetters. "^ Another book of the same type is Vincent's of Beauvais, 
 Mirror of Nature, in 1 244, It was a book of amazing erudition in 
 which the author had gathered materials from all sorts of sources, 
 and then proceeded to show that the church is dominant over all, 
 whether it be in matters of astronomy, physics, botany, geology, 
 anatomy, psychology, physiology, zoology, geography, law, art, 
 mathematics, economics, or rehgion. Still another example is to 
 be found in the work of Samuel Bochart in 171 2 on The Animals of 
 the Holy Scripture, in which all the investigations of the naturalists 
 are used to corroborate his theological interest. Every book which 
 attempts to use the Bible as a source book for the deduction of 
 science is, whatever be the date of its publication, a work of 
 mediae valism. 
 
 IV 
 
 The advent of Descartes (b. 1596) marks for us the dawn of 
 the modern period, the beginnings of the release from mediaevalism. 
 Here the distinction between the subject-self, or the self as the 
 thinking and judging principle, and the object-self, or the self as 
 
 ' A. C. McGiffert, TIte Rise of Modern Religious Ideas, p. 26. 
 » A. D. WTiite, History of the Warfare of Science with Theology, I, 107. Cf. ako 
 PP- 32-36 for reference to the Physiologus and Bestiaries. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 17 
 
 the object of thought, whether representing mind or ideas, iirst 
 emerges. In short, Descartes marks a transition, viz., a shift 
 in the point of interest from the divine to the human, from the 
 supernatural to the natural. He was led to this point of view 
 from the fact that he was primarily a scientist and a mathematician, 
 and secondarily a philosopher. His interests in the problems of 
 philosophy and psychology grew out of his speculations with his 
 scientific data. He made a critical examination of the process of 
 human thinking, giving it a natural basis as over against the 
 supernatural basis accorded to it in the Middle Ages. The merit 
 of his critical work is that he gives the beginnings of the freedom 
 of our modern world. The unfortunate thing is that he reduced 
 man to a logical entity, and made religion and science both to 
 consist in ideas. However, he was moving in the direction of 
 freedom, so that for him science was no longer in the control of 
 theology. Both religion and science were left free within the 
 distinctive sphere to which each belonged, religion to the sphere 
 of the supernatural destiny of the soul, and science in the sphere 
 of nature. "Between science and faith, thus conceived, a bargain 
 was struck. Hands off; each to his own was the compact; the 
 natural world to intelligence, the moral, the spiritual world to 
 belief."^ 
 
 We have seen that the psychological thought of Descartes was 
 rationalistic. Leibnitz and Wolff were psychologists of the same 
 type. Kant criticized this rationalistic system on the ground 
 that there were unwarranted metaphysical assumptions involved, 
 as, e.g., when Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am," he men- 
 tally added, "a substance. " The conclusion from a logical subject 
 to a metaphysical one is unwarranted. So Kant criticized that 
 very reasoning process which Descartes and the other rationalists 
 had taken as a point of departure. 
 
 The modern period brings us to that very interesting develop- 
 ment in psychological theory known as faculty psychology. To 
 be sure, there are traces of it before the modern period. As we 
 have seen, even the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, had divided the 
 soul into "parts." And Thomas Aquinas talked of the ''lumen 
 
 ' John Dewey, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, pp. 180 ff. 
 
i8 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 supernaturale to receive the unchangeable concept or essence of 
 an object, and of a lumen naturale to conceive the nature of a 
 species by sense presentations, regardless of individual character- 
 istics. "' The faculty concept had been used by Leibnitz, but he 
 had along with it a conception of a pre-established harmony, and 
 his approach toward the problem of the relation between religion 
 and science was an effort to overcome the dualism of that of 
 Aquinas and the other Schoolmen. Wolff was a follower of Leibnitz, 
 and he posited the faculty theory, saying that the faculty of 
 knowledge comprises a well-ordered combination of facts and 
 theories. Wolff stated the law of association, which was that 
 "every idea tends to recall to the mind the total idea of which it 
 is a part. "^ The theory of Wolff was that the activity of the soul 
 is distinguishable in various directions which may be called "facul- 
 ties, " and of which he makes the logical faculty the primal. He 
 had also the active faculty or will, and the imaginative faculty 
 which produces representations connected by the law of associa- 
 tion, to which reference has just been made. 
 
 The faculty concept was sharpened up still more in Kant 
 (17 24-1804), who made distinctions between the sensibility or 
 faculty of perception, understanding or the faculty of rules, and 
 reason or faculty of principles. "Sense gives order to objects in 
 space and time, inteUigence relates them in synthetic categories, 
 and reason imposes the regulative ideals of all knowledge. "^ 
 
 The most consistent and logical of the psychologists of this 
 type was Lotze. Baldwin sums up the matter in connection with 
 him as follows: 
 
 Put on the defensive in the matter of determining the fundamental func- 
 tions or faculties, Lotze accepted the consequences of his view. Herbart and 
 Brentano had argued that if once we admit different facidties, there is no 
 stopping anywhere; every distinguishable mode of mental process may be 
 described as a separate faculty; color-perception and piano-playing no less 
 than feehng and will. Lotze did not deny this, but claimed that certain 
 generaUzations were possible which permitted the valid demarcation of the 
 great functions recognized in the Kantian threefold division.'' 
 
 ' Max Dessoir, Outlines of the History of Psychology, p. 65. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 136. J James Mark Baldwin, History of Psychology, II, 34. 
 
 ■» Ibid., p. 86. Lotze's date was 181 7-81. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 19 
 
 There are two reactions, in general, which have come about in 
 relation to our problem as a consequence of the domination of 
 faculty psychology. In the first place, wherever we have the 
 mental processes divided in a mechanical fashion into faculties, 
 it means that some device must be sought in order to secure a 
 unity of the psychical life. We have seen that in the mediaeval 
 scholars this unity was secured by the positing of an external 
 control in the Catholic church. We have seen also that with 
 Descartes we pass out from this external control and seek for a 
 human way of dealing with our data. The next point of interest 
 for us is to be found in the fact that first one and then another of 
 these faculties of the mind or soul is made the regnant influence. 
 For example, in Descartes ideas are uppermost, and religion and 
 science are given their place in accordance with the domination 
 of the faculty of judgment. And the God of Descartes was born 
 in the matrix of his need, to be sure, but that need was not the 
 usual religious need, but the need for a bridge by which he might 
 be able to pass from the self over to the world. So much does 
 Descartes emphasize this point of view that he reduces man to 
 little more than a cognitive somewhat. 
 
 The reaction away from this domain of the reason is to be 
 seen in Paschal (1623-62), the French scientist and reHgious phi- 
 losopher. He was far from locating religion in the domain of 
 reason, and his conception was that of a diametrical opposition 
 of the one to the other. This did not result in his throwing religion 
 overboard because he could not make it conform to the demands of 
 reason. But rather he determined to hold to religion and to 
 defend it in the face of the difficulties which it encountered from 
 the side of reason. This he did by giving to reason what he con- 
 sidered to be its rightful place in the realm of feeling. We are 
 famihar with his famous dictum: "Le coeur a ses raisons que le 
 raison ne connait pas." But the fact that he finds a legitimate 
 place for religion in the domain of the faculty of feeling does not 
 prevent him from being a first-rate scientist. In the spheres of 
 mathematics and physics his discoveries were epoch-making. 
 
 In Immanuel Kant we come to the man who stood for the 
 domination of the third faculty, namely, that of the practical 
 
20 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 reason or will. Descartes had criticized ideas; Kant criticized 
 ideational processes. He knocked the bottom out of all the stock 
 intellectualistic arguments for the existence of God. He also 
 argued that God cannot be an object of sensuous perception either 
 to men or to himself, so that disposes of the faculty of reason and 
 sensibility as spheres within which to get a basis for rehgion. And 
 he resorts to the will or practical reason as the guaranty of our 
 faith in God, in freedom, and in immortality. It was the urge of 
 the moral problem which drove him to the conclusion to which he 
 eventually came. We must have God or there is no sufficient 
 guaranty of the existence of the moral order in the universe and 
 of the ultimate victory of the good over the evil. 
 
 Thus we have in Descartes, Paschal, and Kant the experiment 
 of trying out successively the three faculties of judgment, sensibil- 
 ity, and volition as a means of securing a unity of the psychical 
 processes and as a basis for religious assurance. And the interesting 
 observation which we may make is that all three men were in favor 
 of giving to science a free hand in proceeding with the work which 
 belonged to its sphere. Each of them was a man of wide scientific 
 knowledge, an authority in his own sphere in the day in which he 
 lived. Descartes was learned in mathematics, being one of the 
 founders of analytical geometry, and also learned in anatomy and 
 physiology; so that his science gave to him the method with which 
 he proceeded to carry on his philosophical speculations. In 
 Paschal, too, we have a man of great learning as a mathematician 
 and a physicist. His name is connected with the science of hydro- 
 dynamics as one of its founders, and stands high in the annals of 
 the mathematical sciences as a contributor to progress in more 
 than one direction. Immanuel Kant was also an authority in 
 matters of science as well as philosophy in his day. Among the 
 subjects which he taught in the University of Konigsberg were 
 logic, metaphysics, and cosmography. He attained special distinc- 
 tion for his work in physical geography, the well-known nebular 
 hypothesis being associated with his name. 
 
 Other names might have been added to those cited to show 
 that the tendencies to make one of these three faculties as the 
 dominant one is a recurring tendency. We might have included 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 21 
 
 Hegel in the group of those who emphasize the intellectual element ; 
 and Schleiermacher with his definition of religion as "a feeling of 
 absolute dependence" might be placed in the group of those who 
 put the emphasis on the sensibilities; and Royce, who thought of 
 religion as the will to be socially minded in terms of the "beloved 
 community," is a type of those who emphasize the will. , 
 
 We owe to the faculty psychologists a second reaction which 
 has direct bearing on our specific problem. Reference has already 
 been made in the discussion regarding Descartes to the relationship 
 which Dewey describes as a compact between science and religion 
 that each would not infringe upon that territory which was held 
 to be sacred by the other.' And this seems to be the general 
 position assumed by men of that type of thought, excepting, of 
 course, those who seek for a harmonizing device among the faculties 
 in the form of an external control, such as Bible or church. But 
 men of the type to which reference has been made — Descartes, 
 Paschal, Kant — ^represent faculty psychology with a thoroughly 
 human reference. And the tendency among all men of the type 
 is to assume that religion and science each dwells in a glass house 
 at which the other dare not throw stones. There is a legitimate 
 sphere for each of them in the processes of life, and no occasion 
 for any cross-fertilization. 
 
 In the system originating with Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) we 
 have a splendid example of the manner of dealing with the problem 
 of the relation of science to religion from the point of view of 
 faculty psychology. For Ritschl rehgion was antithetical to 
 mechanistic science. It was a spiritual freedom which comes 
 through cormnunion with the one God in the person of Jesus and 
 in the living community of God to which the Scriptures refer as the 
 "Kingdom of God." Ritschl acknowledged that he was a disciple 
 of Lotze, and we have already noted that he was the most radical 
 of all the faculty psychologists. The result, it would seem, of 
 Ritschl's discipleship to Lotze is that he has acquired a faculty 
 theory of the functions of religion and science. He distinguished 
 them by sajdng that science gives us existential judgments, whereas 
 religion gives us value-judgments. The aim of the religious man 
 
 'Page 19 above. 
 
22 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 is entirely at variance with the aim of the man of science, the 
 former being interested in the conservation and interpretation of 
 estabhshed values, while the other desires rather to interpret 
 reahty mechanistically in the terms of causal relationships. To 
 explain a thing scientifically means that you show the causal nexus, 
 so that if science accomplished its task fully it would give us the 
 complete explanation of phenomena in terms of causality. Ritschl 
 places these two realms in such marked antithesis to one another 
 that he thinks a scientific attempt to deal with the values of 
 religion would put religion out of business. A man working in the 
 realm of science might come to the conclusion that there is no 
 adequate ground for a belief in God. But even then the fact of 
 Jesus will make such an impression on his emotional experience 
 that he will be compelled from the point of view of value- judgment 
 to make an affirmation. In this way Ritschl makes religion 
 independent of science. At the same time he is willing that the 
 scientist should enjoy the fullest liberty within his own field, which 
 field he marks off very concisely by calling it the sphere within 
 which existential judgments are made. The following quotations 
 from his own words will show explicitly how he has dealt with 
 the matter : 
 
 Scientific knowledge is accompanied or guided by a judgment affirming 
 the worth of impartial knowledge gained by observation. In Christianity, 
 religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it 
 deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and 
 sought by man, and the whole of the world which God has created and rules in 
 harmony with his final end.' 
 
 The lordship over this world which Christianity bestows upon men is not 
 to be taken in an empirical sense. So that it is of no consequence what position 
 the planet, with which our existence is bound up, occupies in the universe. 
 .... It is impossible to perceive how this should invalidate the estimate 
 
 of self which Christianity leads men to form Our spiritual Ufe is 
 
 subject to laws which are not related to known natural laws as their conse- 
 quences, but come under an exact opposite category Collisions between 
 
 religion and science, especially natural science, are only when laws which are 
 valid for narrower realms of nature or spirit are erected into world laws.* 
 
 " Albrecht Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 207. 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 614-16. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 23 
 
 The criticism of this position is that it is so dualistic that it keeps 
 rehgion and science in two separate and distinct planes. Science 
 is in the plane of existence. Religion is practically supernatural; 
 at least it is placed in a sphere of reality which is unique and which 
 does not supply any data with which science can deal. Science 
 moves altogether in the realm of the objective, whereas religion 
 has a right to put up a sign over the subjective sphere: No tres- 
 passing allowed. Moreover, the distinction between existence- 
 judgments and value-judgments can hardly be validated. Ex- 
 perience does not find any such antithesis between the two kinds 
 of judgments. The judging process means the classification of 
 certain things, which means that you have evaluated them accord- 
 ing to certain standards. It is also true that any judgment, 
 whether it be one of value or not, implies the existence of that 
 which is being judged. The truth of the matter is that, as there 
 can be no valid line drawn between existence- judgments and 
 judgments of value just because they are constantly intermingling, 
 so there is a constant intermingling of the religious and scientific 
 interests, and the differentiation will have to be sought in another 
 direction. 
 
 Professor Ames has keenly criticized the approach of the 
 faculty psychology to the problems of life when he stated that this 
 particular form of psychology arose ''historically with individual- 
 ism, while individuahsm in turn accompanied the differentiation 
 of the old social unity into various activities.'" 
 
 Before passing to a consideration of the functional psychology 
 with its implications for our problem, there are still some move- 
 ments that are out of the general stream of thought that we should 
 note. 
 
 I. In the first place, positivism is a movement with which we 
 shall have to reckon. Positivism owes its genesis to Auguste Comte 
 (i 798-1857), who began by saying that human thought had passed 
 through two stages and is now entering a third. Of these the first 
 is the theological stage, the chief characteristic of which is animism. 
 The second is the metaphysical stage when things that exist are 
 accounted for by philosophical substances. The third stage, which 
 
 ' E. S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 289. 
 
24 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 is the one upon which the race is now entering, is the positive. We 
 do not look for spirits nor metaphysical substances nor gods, but 
 we try to discover empirically the laws which bind us together. On 
 this basis Comte proceeded to a classification of the sciences, in 
 which he begins with mathematics and ends with sociology. But 
 the striking thing is that in his classification of the sciences Comte 
 did not find a place for psychology. The mechanical way in which 
 he has dealt with the history of the race is evidence of his lack of 
 psychological sympathy. And the result is just what we might 
 expect of one who neglects psychology. God is ruled out of the 
 game, and religion is curbed by an over-intellectualism. The 
 center of interest is humanity, which he capitalizes as "Le Grand 
 Etre" and elevates to a place of worship. In this way Comte 
 attempts to keep religion in the real world in which science also 
 moves, and attempts to find a synthetic relationship between the 
 two disciplines. When human culture attains its highest level, 
 then religion will pass away. Its place will be taken by sociology, 
 which is the Rome to which all the roads of the sciences lead. In 
 the meantime Comte recognizes the utihty of the religious illusion, 
 and he himself proceeds to build up a cult of humanity by a whole- 
 sale borrowing from the Catholic liturgy. 
 
 2. Scientific agnosticism is the name which has been given to 
 the system which has been propounded by Herbert Spencer (1820- 
 1903). The contribution to thought for which his name is famed 
 is the doctrine of the Unknowable. In his Principles oj Psychology 
 Spencer proposes to explain the activities of human mind geneti- 
 cally, but in the question of the relation between psychosis and 
 neurosis, of mind and matter, he is vague. His mechanical evo- 
 lutionary scheme leads him to suggest that the mind is composed 
 of homogeneous units of consciousness, similar to nervous shocks, 
 each of which finds a parallel in the physical movements of nature. 
 At the same time he posits substance as an unknowable substratum 
 of phenomena, and speaks of the relation of the mind to matter as a 
 relation of two unknowable substances, and therefore something 
 which is to be left to the province of the Unknowable. This 
 unknowableness which he finds in his psychological investigations 
 he carries into his other fields, where he deals with our problem of 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 25 
 
 the relation of religion to science. It is his conviction that science 
 and religion alike must reach the conclusion that the "most certain 
 of all facts is that the Power which the universe manifests to us is 
 utterly inscrutable." Rehgion is the unknown and unknowable 
 mystery. Science too has to recognize that the ultimate source of 
 things is unknowable. For Spencer science is positive and religion 
 is negative. It is sufficient from his point of view to demonstrate 
 that positive science is unable to cover the whole range of ex- 
 perience. Religion is a sense of mystery, and that involves an 
 agnostic element. In science the more our knowledge increases, 
 the larger seems the field of nescience. So Spencer found that a 
 reconciliation between these two spheres is possible only as each of 
 them realizes that neither of them can dominate over the other, 
 and that both in the end have to come to the ultimate reality of 
 things to find their legitimate place, and, as we have seen, that 
 ultimate reality is Unknowable. So we find in Spencer the same 
 sort of agnosticism in his attempts to deal with the problem of the 
 relationship between science and religion as have characterized his 
 psychological dissertations. 
 
 3. Another movement that demands attention is evolutionistic 
 monism, of which the leading exponents are Haeckel and Ostwald. 
 Monism means the fundamental unifying of all thinking and acting. 
 It desires to eliminate root and branch the last vestige of super- 
 naturalism. Science insists on having the whole field to itself. 
 Religion is not to be permitted to enjoy an independent field at all. 
 Haeckel proposes a monism of substance. Under the laws of 
 substance he would unite the scientific laws of the conservation of 
 energy and of the conservation of matter. Matter and energy, 
 he claimed, are two separate attributes of the fundamental sub- 
 stance. He arrives at a virtual hylozoism, since he regards energy 
 and spirit as one. According to his system, psychology is merely 
 a branch of physiology, and psychical activity is nothing more 
 than a group of vital phenomena which depend entirely on physi- 
 ological and material changes that are taking place in the proto- 
 plasm of the organ. He says: 
 
 Scientific psychology is a part of physiology, the doctrine of the functions 
 and the Ufe-activities of the organisms. The psychology and psychiatry 
 
26 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 of the future, like the physiology and pathology of today, must take the form 
 of cellular study, and in the first instance investigate the soul-functions of 
 the cells.' 
 
 Again he says: 
 
 Consciousness, like feeling and willing, among the higher animals is a 
 mechanical work of the ganglion-cells, and as such may be carried back to 
 chemical and physical events in the plasma of these.^ 
 
 So that for Haeckel every living cell was regarded as possess- 
 ing psychical properties. In the case of Haeckel we have that 
 happening which we might expect of one who places physiology 
 completely over psychology. Religion is ruled out by science 
 in the same summary fashion that psychology was ruled out 
 by physiology. Haeckel was a biologist, and he was interested in 
 getting an unbroken chain of causal cormectedness on the basis of 
 biological evolution. And for him the biological causal explana- 
 tions of phenomena, which must form an unbroken series, does away 
 with the necessity of or the place for a God. Religion, he takes for 
 granted, deals with the miraculous, and since science by organizing 
 a complete chain of causes does away with the miraculous, religion 
 is left stranded on a shore that is barren of any material for the 
 continuation of its work. 
 
 The work of Haeckel has been carried on by Ostwald. The 
 former was a biologist ; the latter is a chemist. So that the funda- 
 mental difference between the two men is to be found in the science 
 in which each is interested. The constant factor is monism. 
 Ostwald declared the laws of energy to be the laws of reaHty. These 
 he summarized as (i) the law of the conservation of energy, and 
 (2) the law of the dissipation of energy. The siun-total of energy 
 remains the same, but there are some processes which cannot be 
 reversed. For Ostwald energy was a sufficiently spiritualized 
 concept that it was able to take care of all the phenomena of both 
 the physical and psychical spheres. He even imitated Kant's 
 categorical imperative with his energetic imperative: "Economize 
 energy. " So that Ostwald in his system, which is an attempt to do 
 away with the necessity of religion, is required to read into the 
 mechanical concept emotional significance. In other words, he 
 
 I Ernst Haeckel, Monism, pp. 42, 43. * Ibid., pp. 47, 48. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 27 
 
 has to borrow from that very field of life which in the beginning he 
 had repudiated. And in the case of both of these evolutionistic 
 monists, Haeckel and Ostwald, we see that the reduction of psy- 
 chology has been accompanied with a reduction of religion, an 
 apparent neglect to take accoimt of all the facts of life resulting 
 in this parallel reduction. 
 
 V 
 
 Contemporary psychological thought introduces us to a new 
 stage in the history of the science. The change has been on the 
 way ever since the time of Charles Darwin. 
 
 With the coming of the evolution theory, especially in the form of the 
 "natural selection" hypothesis of Darwin, considerations of origin, develop- 
 ment, and growth came systematically into the natural sciences. Psychology 
 in time felt the impulse; and gradually the genetic concept and method be- 
 came current. The progress of Darwinism in the mental and moral sciences 
 shows itself in certain of the departments of psychology in which specializa- 
 tion has recently taken place: normal genetic psychology, child-psychology, 
 animal-psychology, and race-psychology.' 
 
 Thus we see that the change is one of methodolog3\ The evolu- 
 tionistic hypothesis has worked its way into the study of the mental 
 processes, as well as into the other biological processes. And the 
 study of how things came to be is essentially a functional study. 
 It is through the understanding of functions that we appreciate 
 the evolving structures. We regard psychology now as taking its 
 place among the biological sciences. The antithesis which was 
 once thought to exist between the physical and the psychical has 
 disappeared. The rationalistic philosophy of the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries had as its corollary a rational or faculty 
 psychology. Rationalism is logical; psychological science today 
 is biological. The adoption of this biological point of view imphes 
 that consciousness must be studied in connection with the psycho- 
 logical processes with which we have learned to deal genetically. 
 The gist of the matter is that — 
 
 the real human organism is a psycho-physical organism, and that the mental 
 portion of it is not to be completely or correctly apprehended without reference 
 to the physiological portion. The psycho-physical organism is, moreover, 
 
 'James Mark Baldwin, History of Psychology, II, 94. 
 
28 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 a real unit. The separation of the mind from the body which we commonly 
 make in thinking about them is a separation made on behalf of some one of 
 our theoretical or practical interests, and as such the separation is often 
 serviceable. In actual life experience, however, the two things are never 
 separated.^ 
 
 Professor Angell gathers some of the evidence to establish his 
 thesis of the essential unity of the psychical and the physical. 
 Of the points of evidence he mentions (i) "that our consciousness 
 or knowledge of the world depends primarily on our use of the 
 senses," (2) "that the expressions of the mind ordinarily take the 
 form of muscular movements which we call acts," (3) that a 
 pathological condition of the brain is accompanied by a pathological 
 condition in some portion of the conscious life.^ When a man acts, 
 we do not think of saying any more that his action is to be traced 
 to some one of the life-processes which in that particular action 
 shows itself to be evidently dominant at the time that the action 
 takes place. But action is the result of the unified life-process 
 responding to some stimulus. One element may be more affected 
 than the other in the reaction to the stimulus, but the organism 
 which responds is a unity. The reaction is the reaction of a single 
 organism. As we shall presently see, this unity of the psycho- 
 physical organism can scarcely be exaggerated in its importance 
 for the specific problem which we are considering. 
 
 That leads to the further remark that functional psychology 
 is behavioristic. Formerly psychology was regarded as that 
 science which, as Professor Ladd said, deals with the states of 
 consciousness as such. But today, though it is still regarded as 
 the science of consciousness, it is not the science of states so much 
 as a science of phenomena. It deals with facts, and attempts to 
 classify its observations in much the same way that the botanist 
 or the zoologist deals with his materials. The life-processes are 
 motor as well as mental, and the motor phenomena give us the key 
 to the mental, so that human behavior furnishes psychology with 
 the data for the interpretation of human creations. The study of 
 that which is done is the primary thing. The social psychologist 
 helps us materially at this point with his description of the rise of 
 
 ' J. R. Angell, Psychology, p. 8. ' Ibid., pp. 13-15- 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 29 
 
 consciousness. He deals with behavior, with the act as the starting- 
 point. Action is determined by the instinctive impulse directed 
 toward the satisfaction of some felt need. There are certain in- 
 fluences which tend to reinforce and others which tend to inhibit 
 the impulse. Sometimes by association one impulse will tend to 
 call forth another. Again, one impulse may function as an inhibi- 
 tion to another. Now consciousness arises from the necessity for 
 a selective process, picking out the impulse which it will set free, 
 and also the forms which it will utilize for the satisfaction of the 
 impulses. Thus consciousness arises in a social process, whereby 
 the act, which is social, is made the bond of connection between 
 the subject-self and the object-self. This means that there is a 
 whole mass of data, which hitherto psychology has passed over 
 superficially, which now affords the psychologist a laboratory in 
 which to work, viz., the study of the instincts, impulses, habits, 
 attitudes, actions, functions, etc. In other words, the data of 
 functional psychology are concrete and biological, whereas those 
 of the older psychology were abstract and logical. 
 
 The conception of psychology as a biological science carries 
 with it certain implications for us. It is, to be sure, a part of that 
 larger movement which makes all science biological in the sense 
 that it is a servant of life, so that the only excuse for scientific 
 labor in any field is that it may minister to and enrich hfe, giving it 
 a better technique of control over the mechanical environment. 
 But, to be more specific, the treatment of psychology as a biological 
 science means that the mind is to be regarded not as an entity 
 but as an instrument, "an instrument of adaptation by which the 
 
 organism adjusts itself to the environment The conception 
 
 of the mind as an instrument of adjustment and adaptation is a 
 biological conception, and marks the radical transformation which 
 psychology has undergone through the influence of the science of 
 biology."^ We have a parallelism in the pragmatic notion of the 
 instrumental character of ideas. In theology it gives us an instru- 
 mental doctrine of the character of religious dogmas and formulas. 
 The meaning of this doctrine of instrumentalism, whether it be 
 employed in psychology, philosophy, or theology, means that life 
 'E. S. Ames, The Psychology of Religions Experience, p. 15. 
 
30 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 is made the center of interest, and that all these instruments are so 
 named from their ability to function as ministers to the developing 
 life-processes. This gives to us a method for dealing with religion 
 and science. The instrumental doctrine is valid here also, as in 
 all other spheres. Our religious knowledge and our scientific 
 knowledge, and equally art, morality, politics, etc., are instruments 
 in the service of life as it makes its adjustments and adaptations 
 within the environment which is the sphere of experience. Religion 
 and science arose biologically as ministers to life, just as surely as 
 did the eye or the ear. They do something for Hfe which life needs 
 to have done for it. " That ye may have life, and that ye may have 
 it more abundantly" is the underlying motive of both religion and 
 science. 
 
 The thesis which I propose is that religion and science are 
 differentiable attitudes toward the extra-human environment, 
 involving specific ends and techniques for the attainment of those 
 ends, and that these attitudes are the outgrowth of those ineradi- 
 cable tendencies of life which we call innate and instinctive, so that 
 both genetically and functionally they may be said to be biological. 
 
 Inasmuch as the differentiation of the various disciplines of 
 life — religion, science, aesthetics, ethics, et alia — has a functional 
 evolution, and is not localizable in the behavior of primitive 
 peoples, the order of procedure is determined for us as : 
 
 1. An attempt to define the differentia of the religious and 
 scientific attitudes, or the question of their psycho-physical func- 
 tions. 
 
 2. An endeavor to discover the genetic elements in the innate 
 and instinctive behavior out of which these differentiated attitudes 
 have evolved, or the question of their psycho-physical genesis. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 The differentiation between religion and science, on a psycho- 
 logical basis, is to be made in the realm of attitudes. It is the 
 intent of this chapter to make such an examination of these atti- 
 tudes as will make clear in what respects they may be differentiated. 
 
 A functional point of view in psychology, as we have observed, 
 is concerned with an organism which is regarded as a unity. It is 
 impossible to separate man in the ways that either the duaUsts or 
 the faculty psychologists tried to do. The psychical and the 
 physical aspects of Ufe are inextricably woven together. So the 
 cognitive, the affective, and the conative phases of the mental 
 processes are strands interwoven in the warp and woof of a unified 
 life. ReHgion and science are to be interpreted in that light as 
 products of human life which is regarded as an organic unity. 
 There are no mental compartments or pigeonholes which have 
 served as molds for these two disciplines, and into which they may 
 be fitted ad libitum. 
 
 The real differentiation of religion and science, considered 
 psychologically, is to be found in the realm of attitudes. By an 
 attitude I mean a disposition to attend or to act in a specific manner. 
 Contemporary psychologists regard attitudes as the unifying 
 agency in mental life, and the attitudes of habit (i.e., of conserv- 
 ing the type) and of accommodation (i.e., of modifying the type) as 
 the manner in which mental development proceeds through the 
 organization of experience. The religious attitude is, therefore, a 
 habitual disposition to seize upon the spiritual elements of the 
 extra-human environment and to organize and conserve them in 
 the interests of hfe. In differentiation from that, the scientific 
 attitude may be described as the habitual disposition to make 
 adjustment to and to gain control of the mechanical forces in the 
 extra-human environment for the sake of life.^ 
 
 ' To be sure, there are other attitudes which may be and are assumed under certain 
 circumstances; as, e.g., the moral, which is the disposition to enter into mutually 
 desirable social relationships with the human environment; and the aesthetic, which 
 is the disposition to appreciate the beautiful in the environment. 
 
 31 
 
32 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 I, It will be apparent that the position adhered to is in har- 
 mony with that so ably defended by Dr. Watson in tracing the 
 differentia in terms of a "social" as against a "mechanical"^ 
 attitude toward the non-human environment.^ I choose this dif- 
 ferentiation as basic because, in the first place, it is broad enough 
 and generic enough to present the psychological difference between 
 religions and sciences, speaking collectively; and in the second 
 place, because the definitions include all the historical phenomena 
 with which we have to deal. Many of the so-called definitions of 
 rehgion are selective rather than definitive. An extreme illustra- 
 tion is in the statement of the fabled bishop who said: "By religion, 
 I mean the Christian reUgion; by the Christian religion, I mean 
 Protestantism; and by Protestantism, I mean the Church of 
 England." This is simply an absurd illustration of a selective 
 process determining a man's definition. In a similar way some 
 have called everything pseudo-science which does not harmonize 
 with revelation and tradition. 
 
 Spencer and Gillen in their work on the tribes of Central 
 Australia refer to one particular tribe, the Aruntas, who, so far 
 as they could discover, had no gods. Yet they had a totemistic 
 system with elaborate ceremonials, such as the "intichuima" 
 ceremony for the increasing of the supply of the totem animal^ in 
 their case the kangaroo or emu.^ This is a definite attempt to 
 socialize with the extra-human environment, and who shall deny 
 that the attitude is religious ? 
 
 Again let me refer to Hinayana Buddhism. Many of the 
 definitions of religion which have been formulated have been forced 
 to regard Hinayana Buddhism as merely a philosophy and to 
 reject it as a religion, the reason being that the definition of religion 
 
 ' The words "mechanical" and "mechanistic" are used in this thesis in the philo- 
 sophical rather than the physical sense, i.e., as antithetical to organic. 
 
 ^ A. C. Watson, "The Logic of Religion," in the American Journal of Theology, 
 II, 81-101, 244-65. The definition of religion used by C. H. Toy is in agreement with 
 this position: "Religion is man's attitude toward the universe regarded as a social 
 and ethical force; it is the sense of social solidarity with objects regarded as powers, 
 and the institution of social relations with them." — Introduction to the History of 
 Religions, p. i. 
 
 3 Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia, pp. 288 flf. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 33 
 
 used called for a deity or deities which did not come into Buddhism 
 until the Mahayana period. Yet it seems to me that a careful 
 reading of such literature as the Dhamma Pada must impress the 
 reader with the fervor of a soul striving to make a real religious 
 adjustment — a social attitude toward the cosmos. No definition 
 of religion is big enough which excludes Buddhism, even in its 
 earlier form. 
 
 So too the definition of science may be defended for its breadth 
 as well as its precision. Astrology was superseded by astronomy, 
 and alchemy gave way to chemistry. Nevertheless each of these 
 were expressions of a mechanical attitude toward the extra-human 
 environment which it would be incorrect to leave out of account 
 in a historical account of the sciences. Science is not confined of 
 necessity to that which is true, any more than religion, but a 
 scientific attitude is assumed in all the efforts to gain control over 
 the non-human environment by the use of a mechanistic technique, 
 however imperfect. 
 
 In religion and science we are not dealing with two separate 
 environments, but we have two techniques for dealing with the 
 same envirormient. The assumption of one attitude does not 
 preclude one from assuming another toward the same object. Nor 
 does the use of one technique prevent the other. Consider the 
 rainhaw.asaiL example. The scientist with his mechanical out- 
 look is able to explain it as the result of the refraction of light on 
 water. The artist with his aesthetic point of view sees it to be a 
 thing of beauty. The Hebrews, with their religious attitude, inter- 
 preted it as the sign-language of Yahweh in social relationship with 
 his people. Analogously in time of war the different attitudes 
 appear with reference to the course of events. The religious inter- 
 pretation sees a victory or a defeat as an indication of the presence 
 of God in vindication of the right or in the humiliation of the 
 erring. A scientific point of view measures victory or defeat in 
 terms of preparedness and strategy. The differentia is in the type 
 of the attitudes, both of which are perfectly legitimate because 
 both are serviceable. 
 
 Leuba explains the differentiation between religion and science 
 behavioristically. He says: "Anthropomorphic behavior becomes 
 
34 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 religion when it is directed to gods, and the mechanical becomes 
 science when the principle of quantitative proportion it implies is 
 definitely recognized."^ Doubtlessly he is on the right track, but 
 his conclusions are all of them discounted somewhat because his 
 definition of religion restricts it to a belief in supernatural agencies 
 of ontological reference to which man relates himself.^ 
 
 The objection may be raised that the differentiation of religion 
 and science on the basis of a social versus a mechanical attitude 
 breaks down when one comes to examine such sciences as sociology, 
 ethnology, and anthropology where the subject-matter is persons, 
 not things. The answer is that the sociologist, the ethnologist, and 
 the anthropologist have, to be sure, to adopt a social attitude when 
 in the practical business of collecting their data. But the scientific 
 task itself is not concerned with people but with the data, the 
 objective facts which the scientist has gathered and which he treats 
 quite mechanically. If he is unable to abandon, even temporarily, 
 his social attitude, he may be a good social worker, but he vitiates 
 his ability to become a thorough scientist. 
 
 It seems to me to be another way of describing the same situa- 
 tion to say that the rehgious attitude is one of participation as 
 against the scientific, which is analytical.^ The gain of control over 
 all forces in the environment to aid in the struggle for existence is 
 the purpose of both. Religion seeks to obtain that control by 
 means of a social participation with the process, conceived in 
 personal terms. Science, by means of analysis and reflection, puts 
 us in a position to deal more efficiently by mechanical means with 
 a fragment of experience. The technique developed in the former 
 instance is the cult; in the latter case it is the intellectual and 
 material tools of the theoretical and practical sciences. 
 
 2. Another point of differentiation between religion and 
 science is that religion is concerned with life in its totality, whereas 
 science concerns itself with certain specific situations. It is a 
 characteristic of the social attitude which men take toward the 
 
 ^ J. H. Leuba, The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion, p. 75. 
 * Ibid., p. 44. 
 
 3 This distinction was unfolded by Professor E. S. Ames in his lectures in the 
 Psychology of Religion, Philosophy 60, University of Chicago, autumn, 1916. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 35 
 
 extra-human environment that they regard it in the aggregate. 
 In worship and in all his endeavors to establish a spiritual fellow- 
 ship, man acts as though he regarded the power or powers toward 
 whom he assumes the social attitude as of cosmic significance. 
 Whether the supermundane world be considered monotheistically 
 as in Christianity and Mohammedanism, pantheistically as in 
 Stoicism and Brahmanism, or pantheonically as in the Vedic and 
 Roman religions, religion is regarded as putting one into relation- 
 ship with the extra-physical environment in its wholeness. The 
 means employed to establish that relationship vary with the cul- 
 tural state of the people from flattery, bribery, and gaudy gifts to 
 social and missionary service, ethically conceived. Religion thus 
 interprets the world as a totality in terms of social relationships 
 which are with a view to living with it in such a way as to secure 
 satisfaction for the spiritual life. 
 
 In contrast with the religious attitude, the scientific attitude 
 concerns itself with only a fragment of life. The sciences are only 
 developed sufliciently to provide man with a technique for a 
 mechanical manipulation of a small percentage of his environment. 
 And any one science concerns itself with a still smaller group of 
 phenomena within that range. So that the scientific attitude at 
 any one time is necessarily selective. One evidence of the selective 
 process in science is that a thoroughly scientific manipulation 
 depends upon the situation being repeated frequently enough to 
 enable observation that will lead to generalization and the develop- 
 ment of a technique. The scientific attitude is one of observation 
 in the interest of mechanically calculable manipulations, and the 
 human powers of observation imply a process of selection. As 
 Professor Mead has said: "The scientist always deals with an 
 actual problem, and even when he looks before and after he does 
 so far as he is facing in inquiry some actual problem. No actual 
 problem could conceivably take on the form of a conflict involving 
 the whole world of meaning."^ 
 
 3. Another way of expressing the differentiation between the 
 religious and scientific attitudes is to say that the former is an 
 evaluatory and the latter an explanatory attitude. Professor 
 
 ' G. H. Mead, chapter on "Scientific Method" in Creative Intelligence, p. 219. 
 
36 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 Hoffding has the merit of making that distinction clear in the 
 epistemological section of his great work on the philosophy of 
 religion. "Only against their will," he says, "was it gradually 
 borne in on the representatives of religion that it was no part of 
 the work of religion to supply a scientific explanation of the world. 
 What is now commonplace in the mouth of theologians, viz., that 
 we must not look to the Bible to teach us natural science, could 
 not get a hearing in the days of Bruno, GaHleo and Spinoza."^ 
 The scientific temperament is historically a later development than 
 the rehgious. It was impossible, as we have seen, to have a 
 thoroughly scientific attitude so long as the deductive method held 
 the field. But the introduction of induction involved a more 
 mechanical way of approach, as it freed man for untrammeled 
 observation and experimentation leading to a mechanical technique, 
 whereas deduction meant subjugation to authority, and in that 
 sense had sometimes a measure of social reference. Science was 
 under the domination of the church, and the earliest scientists were 
 priests. It was only gradually that science won her freedom. The 
 result has been that some scholars have declared religion to be the 
 mother of science as well as of art, philosophy, and their sister- 
 disciplines. Historically there is a measure of truth in the idea, 
 for it was out from the church that the sciences gradually gained 
 their emancipation, until the scientific attitude came to be regarded 
 as having a right to an independent existence.^ On the psycho- 
 logical side, however, it would be better to speak of the gradual 
 differentiation of the two attitudes, one from the other, than of 
 the evolution of one of them out of the other. 
 
 The result of the long domination of the church over science, 
 coupled with the use of the deductive method, meant that religion 
 was continually trying to assume a scientific role. It indulged in 
 the business of explanation, i.e., of placing phenomena in their 
 
 'Harold Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 14, 15. 
 
 » Friedrich Daab, in his essay, "Religion und Wissenschaft," in Das Suchcn der 
 Zeit, V (1909), 123, quotes with approval from Friedrich Ritzel: "Die Religion der 
 Kulturarmen Volker faszt alle Keime in sich, die spater den herrlichen, blutemreicher 
 Wald des Geisteslebens der Kulturvolker bilden soUen; sie ist Kunst und Wissen- 
 schaft, Theologie und Philosophie zugleich, so dasz es nichts von noch so feme her auf 
 Ideales Hinstrebendes in diesem armen Leben gift, das nicht von ihr umfaszt wiirden." 
 
THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 37 
 
 causal sequence, with the results which are too well known to need 
 delineation. The real interest of religion was a socialization of 
 the environment, so that explanation became a reference to God, 
 and the tools were Aristotehan. The First Person of the Christian 
 Trinity was described as the Prime Mover, himself unmovable, 
 the First Cause, himself uncaused. Consequently a thoroughly 
 scientific explanation of phenomena was not forthcoming because 
 the attitude of religion was social and not mechanical. It was due 
 to the observations and hypotheses of Galileo, as we have seen, that 
 this old world of thought eventually passed away. He stated the 
 law of the pendulum, which furnished an instance of self-motion 
 in opposition to the mediaeval notion of God-originated motion. 
 And from the self-motion of the pendulum there began to evolve 
 the scientific notion of causality, the conception of relativity, and 
 the age of freedom. Likewise the reference of phenomena to a 
 First Cause was seen to be simply an acknowledgment of scientific 
 agnosticism, and with the progress of scientific knowledge the 
 plausibility of religious explanations was hazarded. 
 
 Those who are fearful that the advance of science carries with 
 it as a necessary corollary the corrosion of religion are under the 
 domination of that mediaeval conception of the business of rehgion, 
 viz., that religion is concerned with ultimate causes, in contrast 
 with science, which was deemed to be concerned with proximate 
 causes. Should science make such strides of progress that the time 
 would come when she would be able to give a thorough causal 
 account of phenomena, what would become of religion? If her 
 business were to give a religious explanation as against a scientific 
 explanation, she would be in danger of being retired. But religion 
 has discovered that there are things to be done about phenomena 
 other than explaining them. Science deals with time, space, cause, 
 motion, number, etc., and there is no appraisal in any of these 
 concepts. After science has finished her task, be it ever so com- 
 plete, in explaining any phenomenon, there still remains the religious 
 task of evaluating it for human life. So that advancement of 
 science has meant in the long run the emancipation of religion for 
 her real task, as well as the liberation of science for greater efiiciency 
 within her own domain. 
 
38 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 Now the religious attitude is one of evaluation, in which the 
 subject seeks to appreciate the significance or extract the meaning 
 from phenomena as instruments for the furtherance of human 
 welfare. This point has been so ably developed by recent writers^ 
 that it seems to be unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis to 
 do more than make a statement. The valuational attitude is 
 essentially one of appreciation of worthfulness which grows as the 
 environment is related socially to the individual or the group. 
 "Certain elements in the life of a people come to consciousness as 
 having peculiar value, and therefore the religious attitude is a 
 special case of the larger sense of value. "^ The "peculiar value" 
 which these elements possess by virtue of which they give rise to 
 the religious attitude is that they are serviceable to the individual 
 or to the group in the business of obtaining spiritual reinforcement 
 by the use of a social technique. Value is essentially a relativized 
 social concept, and it takes the character of a religious value when 
 that social relationship is given cosmic reference. Certain events 
 make such impress on a man and influence him in such a way that 
 those events have the value of God to him. He sees in them more 
 than the mechanism of law, more than determinism, though he 
 may at the same time accept the causal explanation which is 
 presented as he views the events scientifically. When a great 
 catastrophe occurs, the scientist seeks the causal sequence of 
 events leading up to the catastrophe with a view to preventing a 
 recurrence, in the belief that "prevention is better than cure"; 
 but the religious man, while accepting the explanation of the 
 scientist as quite satisfactory, still claims the legitimate right to 
 obtain spiritual worth from the event by interpreting its signifi- 
 cance in terms of a vocal expression in a social relationship. Science 
 provides the explanation; religion extracts the meaning. And 
 again I say the evaluatory attitude of the religious consciousness 
 is every whit as legitimate as the explanatory attitude of the 
 scientific temperament because it functions as a powerful aid to 
 man in the struggle for existence. 
 
 'Cf. Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion; Irving King, The Development of 
 Religion; Ames, The Psychology of Religions Experience; Watson, The Logic of 
 Religion; and Wright, The Evolution of Values from Instincts. 
 
 ^ Irving King, The Development of Religion, p. 215. 
 
THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 39 
 
 Hoffding has formulated his definition of religion in terms of 
 value, defining it as ''the conservation of value. "^ He was doubt- 
 less right in conceiving the question of value to be a great concern 
 of religion. But the difficulty is that the definition rests upon the 
 assumption that values are already in existence, and leaves no 
 room for the achievement of new values. It fails to provide for 
 the creative element in the religious valuational attitude. We may 
 apply to the question of values one of the differentiations which 
 Professor Daab makes between religion and science, viz., "Die 
 Religion schafft; die Wissenschaft entdeckt."^ 
 
 4. Herbert Spencer answered the query as to the possibility 
 of religion and science coexisting by saying that it is possible, 
 since it is a fact that they do co-exist. He differentiated the 
 attitudes, making religion qualitative as compared with the quan- 
 titative attitude of science. ReHgion has for its object the Abso- 
 lute, and hence deals with the inscrutable. The sciences attempt 
 a classification of objects and data according to their resemblance. 
 Thus the religious attitude is essentially qualitative, whereas the 
 scientific attitude is rather quantitative or mathematical. 
 
 It is something of the same idea which Professor Daab has in 
 mind in saying : " Die Religion erhebt ; die Wissenschaft berechnet. 
 Die Religion wagt; die Wissenschaft wagt."^ It should be fairly 
 clear that if science is to furnish us with a mechanical technique 
 of control, it must work that out by a consideration of mathematical 
 relationships, by calculating and weighing the data with which it 
 has to deal. Especially is this illustrated in the mathematical and 
 physical sciences. On the other hand, the way to the organization 
 of a social control is by taking a risk, if need be, and living through 
 experience, and then seeking to interpret its significance in terms 
 of cosmic relationships. 
 
 It is of the nature of science to calculate as accurately as pos- 
 sible, to endeavor to understand causal relationships as logically 
 and chronologically as possible, and then to organize a technique 
 by means of hypotheses and laws, which are its tools for controlling 
 the future. But the tools for future control are forged out of the 
 
 ' Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 12. 
 
 » Daab, op. cit., pp. 123 ff. ^ jbid. 
 
40 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 calculated materials of the past. Religion, on the other hand, is 
 more ready to venture to manipulate tools forged out of untried 
 materials. True, science has its faith and makes ventures in 
 formulating hypotheses, but science as a rule does not attempt to 
 construct machinery except with materials brought from the past. 
 Religion is constantly constructing new machinery, but frequently 
 goes farther and creates the materials that it puts into the machin- 
 ery. The calculations of science are determined by the past; the 
 adventures of reHgion are frequently in the face of a past which 
 seems to insure failure. 
 
 There is a good reason for the venturesomeness of religion in 
 spite of the calculations of science, viz., that in religion we are 
 dealing with relationships that are social as against the mechanical 
 in science. Science handles its materials as things; reHgion regards 
 both subjects and objects as social. It is a characteristic of per- 
 sonality that future behavior is only partially determinable by 
 past behavior. When we are dealing with the inorganic world, 
 and when we are dealing with reflexive and instinctive behavior in 
 the organic world, we are able to tabulate our results pretty accu- 
 rately, so that we can predict the future with reference to the 
 past. But this method breaks down when we are deahng with the 
 conscious behavior of human beings. The conative process of con- 
 sciousness enables a man to do something quite different, under 
 the same stimulus, from what he had done previously. The 
 religious attitude, involving as it does a relationship conceived in 
 personal terms, dares to neglect the quantitative element and to 
 venture upon a line of action, urged on the one hand by the felt 
 needs of life and on the other hand by its conception of the nature 
 of that person or power with whom it is socializing. So we con- 
 clude that the differentiation into qualitative and quantitative 
 relationships is a corollary of the social and mechanical. 
 
 5. There is another way in which we may express this differ- 
 entiation, viz., by stating that the religious attitude is subjective 
 and the scientific attitude is objective. For the simple reason that 
 scientists are human, it is impossible to deny that there is a sub- 
 jective element in the attitude of many scientists. Indeed, the 
 very selective process which belongs to the work of the scientist is 
 
THE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 41 
 
 in a measure subjective. On the other hand, I do not wish to 
 deny by this statement the vaHdity of the rehgious object. The 
 latter belongs to the metaphysical implications of our problem and 
 does not concern us at this point. But the point which I wish to 
 make clear is that science tries to deal at first hand with the actual 
 data under consideration, and in a thoroughly objective way. 
 And because the attitude of science is mechanical, there is less of 
 the affective element and more of the cognitive. On the contrary 
 the religious object is an idealization, and consequently the felt 
 needs involve the introduction of an affective element. 
 
 The historic struggle between science and religion has been in 
 reality a struggle between two world-views. Science offers to us 
 a naturalistic world-view, presents us a world calculated in the 
 formulas of determinism. Religion offers to us an idealistic world- 
 view, presents a world formed out of images created in response 
 to our felt needs. In either case there is teleology to this extent, 
 that the formulation has resulted from the struggle for existence, 
 and that both are instrumental and functional, and are serviceable 
 to the individual and to society in the expansion of the life- 
 processes. 
 
 The differentiation between religion and science, stated in psy- 
 chological terms, is a matter that concerns the types of images 
 employed. The primal form of ideas in human experience is the 
 sense-idea which originates as a direct image of the sense-object. 
 Sensations are the first ways in which consciousness functions, the 
 simplest form of cognition. The association of ideas has its cor- 
 relate in brain activity. So that when two simple brain-processes 
 have been contemporaneous or one immediately succeeds the other, 
 the recurrence of the first tends to stimulate the recurrence of the 
 second. The principle of association affords an explanation of the 
 reproduction of an idea or image in memory. The chain of ideas 
 by which an occurrence in the past is imaged in consciousness is 
 simply the operation of the machinery of association which has 
 its physiological correlate in neural processes. Sensations are 
 regarded as so modifying the organism that copies of them arise in 
 consciousness even when the original stimulus is lacking. No 
 ideas and no images ever occur within consciousness which have 
 
42 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 not sometime had an external stimulus. Sometimes returning 
 images are simply reproductions of the original sense-images; at 
 other times they combine elements original to various sense- 
 experiences. When the image is reproductive of the past in some 
 detail, it is known as a memory-image or recollection; when it is 
 a picture combining elements from various past sense-hnages, it is 
 given the name of imagination. The memory-image is a recall in 
 as much concrete detail as possible of the original sense-image, 
 whereas in imagination it is not possible to trace the details to any 
 one original sense-object. Yet the function of imagination is just 
 as real as that of recollection. 
 
 It is accepted by a large school of psychological scholars that 
 there can be no thinking apart from the use of images. The 
 thought-processes may be described as a flux and flow within con- 
 sciousness of images of varying types. In other words, images are 
 the stuff of which thoughts are constituted. That which differen- 
 tiates is the end or purpose of the thinking process. It is the desire 
 of science to scrutinize and observe its objects as closely as pos- 
 sible with the aim of attaining a causal explanation and ultimately 
 a mechanical technique with which kinetically to manipulate the 
 future. The scientist aims to preclude as completely as possible 
 the subjective element, and yet at times when he is formulating a 
 hypothesis he purposely combines imagery in the trial-and-error 
 method of seeking a solution to his problem. On the other hand, 
 the effort of the religious man to sociahze the extra-human environ- 
 ment involves a continual interplay of images. Sense-experiences 
 give rise to images, some of which by association are connected 
 with pleasurable and others with painful experiences. In religion 
 the elements of sense-images are combined in accordance with felt 
 needs, the process of combination being determined in considerable 
 measure by the social mind. The ideas of a devil or a hell of tor- 
 ment are images, the elements of which are painful sensations in 
 the experiences of the past. The conception of a heavenly city or a 
 heavenly Father are constructions of the image-making disposition 
 of consciousness, the elements of which are sense-images which 
 have been associated with experiences of pleasure or comfort. 
 Psychologically speaking, the imagery involved in the scientists' 
 
TEE DIFFERENTIA OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 43 
 
 hypothesis is of a piece with that involved in the faith of the 
 religious man. 
 
 We have here also an explanation of the social character of 
 Christian doctrine which Professor Mathews has pointed out so 
 clearly.' Theological expression hinges upon the prevalent social 
 concepts for the precise reason that imagination depends upon 
 sense-images for its building material. An image of a tiger-god 
 could never arise where people had no sense-images of tigers. A 
 conception of a god of thunder implies the sense-image of thunder. 
 So also the conception of the Christian God such as Anselm presents 
 in terms of feudalism was the necessary product of an age when the 
 sense-images of the people were formed in a feudalistic environment. 
 
 This fundamental difference between religion and science enters 
 into our approach to actual problems. The business of the scientist, 
 as we have seen, is to take an objective, analytical attitude in 
 obtaining a mechanical technique. If he admits any fantasy into 
 the data with which he is dealing, his work will be jeopardized, 
 and he is liable to be drawn into making metaphysical assumptions. 
 The only legitimate place for the scientist to create new imagery 
 out of sense-experiences is in the hypothesis-forming activity. On 
 the other hand, the religious attitude involves the facing of problems 
 with which scientific technique cannot help us. The question of 
 immortality, e.g., is not one about which we can make observations 
 in the scientific sense because it takes us into the realm of the 
 imagination where the technique which was designed for the world 
 of purely sense-experiences does not function. Religion interprets 
 the meaning of human life no less really than science, but it does 
 so by the use of a different sort of technique. Moreover, the 
 difference in technique was necessary to cope with the different 
 situations arising because of different attitudes. But the social 
 attitude and its imagery are as truly the servants of life as the 
 mechanical attitude and its imagery. 
 
 'Shailer Mathews, "Theology and the Social Mind," in the Biblical World, 
 XL VI, 201-48. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE SEARCH FOR A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 
 
 As stated in the conclusion of the second chapter, the proposi- 
 tion of this thesis is that the religious and scientific attitudes have 
 their psycho-physical genesis in the innate and instinctive behavior 
 of life. As a basis for inquiry into this problem it is necessary to 
 obtain a scientific definition of instinctive behavior. This chapter 
 is devoted to that attempt. 
 
 The attempt to find the genesis of religion and science in the 
 instinctive life of the race is by no means novel. But the accounts 
 which have been given have been disparate because of the changing 
 content of the concepts employed. There has been no unifying 
 conception as to what is meant by the words "instinct" and 
 "instinctive," so that the relative bearing of instinctive behavior 
 in the formation of the religious and scientific attitudes has not 
 been treated with any degree of uniformity. 
 
 It will be of service to us in the deUneation of our task if we can 
 come to an understanding of the sense in which the term "instinct" 
 is used by contemporaneous scientists. Let us assume that the 
 phenomena of instincts are physiological, and that they "represent 
 structurally prefonned pathways in the nervous system."' On 
 this basis it should be apparent that biology is the science which 
 should decide for us what content we shall put into our definition. 
 The use which psychology should make of the term is fundamentally 
 dependent on the findings of biology. Since the days of Charles 
 Darwin a great deal of valuable experimentation has been con- 
 ducted in this field, but so much remains to be done that it will be 
 well to recognize the tentative character of any hypotheses that 
 may be set forth. 
 
 The works of such men as Jacques Loeb, Father Wasmann, 
 G. A. Reid, C. Lloyd Morgan, C. S. Sherrington, R. M. Yerkes, 
 and H. S. Jennings are helping toward the formation of a correct 
 
 ' Angell, op. ciL, p. 339. 
 
 44 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 45 
 
 definition from a biological standpoint. The laboratory investiga- 
 tions of scores of scholars are all bringing light to the problem. 
 Unfortunately the conclusions of some men are discounted in 
 biological circles because their treatment of instincts is set by a 
 preconceived philosophical theory. Lloyd Morgan, whose work* 
 in the biological treatment of instincts is reckoned by scientists as 
 the most authoritative, criticizes the conclusions of Hans Driesch 
 as dominated by his idea of ''entelechy, " those of Henri Bergson 
 as shaped by his "elan vital,'' and those of William McDougall as 
 unduly influenced by his animistic theory of a "psychic entity." 
 All such ideas, Uke Plato's Idea, Berkeley's Eternal Spirit, and 
 Kant's Transcendental Ego, are concerned with a source or agency 
 underlying the process, creating it, and directing its course. They 
 are metaphysical questions and hinder an absolutely objective 
 treatment of the subject.^ The purely scientific attitude, as we 
 have seen, is analytical and logical, but not interpretative. Con- 
 sequently metaphysical considerations must not enter into a thor- 
 oughly scientific definition of instinct. 
 
 Some definitions have been criticized because they are too 
 simple. Herbert Spencer's "compound reflex action" is too 
 meager.^ Other definitions need to be remodeled because of the 
 light shed from subsequent laboratory experimentation. Darwin, 
 if still alive, would probably see that it was a doubtful procedure 
 to apply the term "instinctive" to the emotions, unless in a second- 
 ary sense. It is somewhat surprising to find Driesch including in 
 his definition of instinct as a complicated reaction the phrase 
 "that is perfect the very first time, "^ which would a priori spell 
 the impossibility of modifiabihty and of progress. 
 
 Still another group of definitions is criticized because they 
 tend to be over-psychological, to the neglect of the data which are 
 furnished by biology. Wilham James defined instinct as "the 
 faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without 
 
 ^ Habit and Instinct, i8g6; Animal Behavior, igoo; Instinct and Experience, 
 1912; "Instinct," in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (nth ed.), XIV, 648 ff. 
 
 * Lloyd Morgan, Instinct and Experience, pp. viii, 137. 
 3 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, 1, 427. 
 
 * Hans Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism (1908 volume), p. no. 
 
46 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the per- 
 formance. "^ Parmelee trenchantly criticized this definition be- 
 cause (i) it is so vague that it "might cover a tropism or a simple 
 reflex action," (2) ''it makes instinct necessarily purposeful in 
 its character," which is very objectionable, and (3) it is not 
 explicit in showing the hereditary character of instinct.^ The 
 definition of William McDougall is a good example of an over- 
 emphasis of the psychic element. His conclusion is that we "may 
 define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposi- 
 tion which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention 
 to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement 
 of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act 
 in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an 
 impulse to such action. "-^ Parmelee again has the credit of pointing 
 out the weakness in this definition: (i) He regards instinct as 
 /'^^'c/^o-physical, and his definition includes cognitive, affective, 
 and conative elements, but biological investigation has shown 
 that instinctive action is sometimes devoid of any psychical element. 
 (2) The terms "to perceive" and "to pay attention" involve a 
 consciousness which is not necessarily present. (3) The "emo- 
 tional excitement" which McDougall posits is not the concom- 
 tant of all instincts.'' 
 
 Biological investigation has reached certain conclusions as to 
 the characteristics of instinctive behavior which lead to definiteness : 
 
 I . It is a congenital mode of behavior in differentiation from an 
 acquired mode which involves intelligence. Driesch thinks that 
 it is "perfect the very first time."^ Lloyd Morgan would modify 
 that by saying that it is "serviceable on the occasion of its first 
 appearance."^ But that it is congenital, biologists agree. It is 
 characteristic of the species, and hence it is hereditary and structural. 
 It requires no foresight before the behavior takes place, and hence 
 is independent of prior experience. 
 
 ' William James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 383. 
 
 ^ Maurice Parmelee, The Science of Human Behavior, pp. 223, 224. 
 
 3 McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 29. 
 
 * Parmelee, ibid., pp. 218-21. ^ Driesch, op. clL, II, no. 
 
 •* Lloyd Morgan, Instinct and Experience, p. 22. 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 47 
 
 2. It is characteristically performed by all the members of the 
 group, and tends toward the well-being of the group or of the 
 individual components of the group. 
 
 3. Nevertheless it is capable of adaptability and modification 
 under the guide of experience, in the same way that the structures 
 themselves have the power of variabihty and adaptability. It is 
 capable of stimulation and of obstruction whereby reinforcement 
 or inhibition may take place, a fact of importance in the develop- 
 ment of the various attitudes. 
 
 4. It is relatively complex. In the words of Lloyd Morgan: 
 "Such behavior is a more or less complex organic or biological 
 response to a more or less complex group of stimuli of external and 
 internal origin, and it is, as such, wholly dependent on how the 
 organism and especially the nervous system and brain-centres 
 have been built through heredity under the racial preparation 
 which we call biological evolution."' 
 
 As to the matter of the neurosis of instinctive behavior, much 
 work has been done, but the conclusions do not lay claim to finality. 
 The fact that instincts are congenital dispositions to relatively 
 definite types of behavior puts them on the same plane with trop- 
 isms and reflexes. This has led Loeb to an identification of the 
 three. We have noted the definition of Herbert Spencer in which 
 he makes instincts compound reflex actions. Some writers, such 
 as Romanes, have found the differentia by positing a conscious 
 element in instinctive behavior which is absent from reflex action.^ 
 The position which was taken by Spencer has been adopted by 
 Lloyd Morgan,^ Parmelee,'' and Hobhouse,^ viz., that instincts 
 are complexes or co-ordinates of reflexes. Lloyd Morgan makes 
 a further differentiation in claiming that instinctive action would 
 involve the organism as a whole, whereas reflex action would not. 
 
 Experiments in regard to the neural bases of reflexes, instincts, 
 etc., are leading biologists to the conclusion that the lines of 
 demarcation are by no means sharp, and the distinctions may be a 
 
 'Op. cit., p. 5. ^ G. J. Romanes, Animal Intelligence, pp. 3, 17. 
 
 3 Lloyd Morgan, Instinct and Experience, chap. iii. 
 
 * M. Parmelee, op. cit., p. 203. 
 
 s L. T. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution, p. 53. 
 
48 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 matter of relative complexity. At the same time they are finding 
 
 neural explanations for these distinctions. The simple reflex is a 
 
 reaction due to the environmental stimulus of some afferent nerve 
 
 which conducts the excitement through the spinal cord to the 
 
 efferent nerves, which in turn connect with the muscles or glands 
 
 where the action is effected. The reflex arc or path through which 
 
 the stimulus is conducted from the sensory neurone to the motor 
 
 neurone does not pass through the cerebrum. On the other hand, 
 
 intelligent or voluntary behavior for the obtaining of precision 
 
 necessitates the passing of the stimulus over pathways which lead 
 
 to the cerebral centers. The property of consciousness has been 
 
 located in the cerebral cortex, and hence behavior which involves 
 
 experience and which is conative is due, on its neural side, to the 
 
 functional activity of the cortical brain centers. Between these 
 
 two types of behavior is the instinctive, which is more complex 
 
 than reflexes and less so than intelligence. How is that to be 
 
 explained physiologically ? On the one hand, there is a practical 
 
 agreement that instincts are co-ordinated reflexes. On the other 
 
 hand, there is the problem of their relation to intelligence. On 
 
 this latter point Lloyd Morgan and C. S. Sherrington have the 
 
 credit of putting forth an attractive hypothesis. Morgan states 
 
 it as follows : 
 
 Intelligent guidance is the function of the cerebral cortex with its dis- 
 tinguishing property of consciousness; the co-ordination involved in instinctive 
 behavior, and in the distribution of physiological forces to the viscera and 
 vascular systems, is the primary function of the lower brain-centres; in instinct- 
 ive behavior as such, consciousness correlated with processes in the cerebral 
 cortex is, so to speak, a mere spectator of organic and biological occurrences 
 at present beyond its control; but, as spectator, it receives information of 
 these occurrences through the nerve-channels of connexion between the 
 lower and the higher parts of the brain.' 
 
 This hypothesis, whereby he locates the co-ordinations involved in 
 instinctive behavior in the subcortical brain centers, in the case of 
 the higher vertebrates, is substantiated by experiments conducted 
 by many biologists on decerebrate animals, i.e., animals which have 
 had the cerebral hemispheres and cortex destroyed, but have the 
 subcortical region and spinal cord intact. And so far as the investi- 
 
 ' Lloyd Morgan, Instinct and Experience, pp. 7, 8. 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 49 
 
 gations have been carried out, they have led to the conclusion that 
 such animals are capable of behavior which, in the biological usage 
 of the term, may be called instinctive. 
 
 The importance of locating the neural center of instinctive 
 behavior is apparent. If Morgan is correct, then we must con- 
 clude that there is a considerable amount of instinctive behavior 
 from which psychical elements are lacking. It does not deny, 
 however, that when the cerebral cortex is present it functions 
 in the assimilation of instinctive experience, thus conserving a 
 "changing continuum of experience."^ So that the control of 
 instinctive behavior by the cerebral centers must be an "extension 
 of the same processes as are operative in simultaneous and succes- 
 sive combinations of reflexes."^ 
 
 The relative character of reflex, instinctive, and intelligent 
 behavior leads some scientists to urge that it is more advisable to 
 use tlie adjectival rather than the substantive form of the word. 
 It is better to speak of instinctive behavior or tendencies or dis- 
 positions than of instincts. There are no instincts per se. The 
 word should be employed in a descriptive sense rather than as 
 denoting an entity. The use of the word in this quahfying sense 
 has the advantage that certain behavior may be described as 
 instinctive, in a primary and direct or in a secondary and indirect 
 sense, whereas the use of the word "instinct" would involve a 
 restriction to a limited type of activity. 
 
 It is surely more scientific to use the terminology in this sense 
 than to try to make a catalogue of instincts, especially when a 
 comparative study of the lists prepared reveals the fact that 
 scarcely any two of them correspond. There can be no doubt 
 that much of the difference is due to the fact that there has been 
 no uniform sense in which the word has been employed. When 
 writers like Thomas^ and Ames'' refer to hunger and sex as two 
 primal instincts, they are not using the word in its biological 
 connotation, but with reference to the great life-interests, viz., 
 
 ^Op. cit.,p. 81. 
 
 ^ C. S. Sherrington, Integrative Action of the Nervous System, p. 390. 
 
 3 W. I. Thomas, Sex and Society, pp. 97-99, 1 18-19. 
 
 < E. S. Ames, op. cit., p. 34. 
 
50 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 the struggle for food and rivalry for mates in the interests of 
 reproduction. Doubtless it was out of the needs created by these 
 interests that much instinctive behavior has resulted. The 
 opposite tendency is shown in William James, who held that the 
 number of human instincts is much larger than the number of 
 animal instincts. Thorndike has drawn up a list' of all that James 
 would include under instinct, and the list covers three pages, 
 including what Thorndike would break up into reflexes, instincts, 
 and inborn capacities, as well as other types of behavior of a more 
 complex character. 
 
 Between these two examples there are lists that vary in length 
 in accordance with the content which the author places in the word 
 "instinct." Angell, e.g., includes fear, anger, shyness, curiosity, 
 affection, sexual love, jealousy and envy, rivalry, sociabihty, 
 sympathy, modesty (?), play, imitation, constructiveness, secre- 
 tiveness, and acquisitiveness.^ McDougall has seven primary 
 instincts and four others which are more complex. The first list 
 includes flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement and 
 self-assertion, and the parental instinct; the supplementary list 
 includes the instincts of reproduction, gregariousness, acquisition, 
 and construction.^ Kirkpatrick prefers to group the instincts as 
 the individualistic or self-preservative, the parental, the social, 
 the adaptive, the regulative (under which he includes the moral 
 and the religious tendencies), and resultant or miscellaneous 
 instincts."* Marshall makes a threefold classification of the indi- 
 vidualistic instincts, those relating to the persistence of the species 
 to which the individual belongs, and those relating to the persistence 
 of social groups.^ He also refers to a group of regulative instincts. 
 
 Such a wide variety in the treatment of the subject is evidence 
 of the complexity of ideas about the subject under treatment. 
 There is a further difficulty in the fact that scholars have not 
 always been faithful to their own definitions. Parmelee has 
 criticized Angell's list, e.g., from the point of view of the author's 
 
 »E. L. Thorndike, The Original Nature of Man, pp. 17-20. 
 = Angell, op. cit., p. 349. ' McDougall, op. cit., chap. iii. 
 
 4 Edwin A. Kirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study, pp. 51-63. 
 s H. R. Marshall, Instinct and Reason, pp. 103-59. 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 51 
 
 own definition that instincts "represent structurally preformed 
 pathways in the nervous system, and stand functionally for effective 
 inherited co-ordinations made in response to environmental de- 
 mands. '" In the light of this definition Parmelee asserts that 
 "it is strange that he should include as instincts such general 
 tendencies as imitation and play, which do not represent any 
 specific pathways or co-ordinations in the nervous system, but 
 which manifest themselves through many reflexes and combinations 
 of reflexes. "^ A grouping of the instincts, such as in the classifica- 
 tion of Kirkpatrick, has its advantages, and the interest of this 
 author is, of course, pedagogical. Marshall's analysis is in the 
 interest of proving the presence of a specific religious instinct, a 
 matter for later consideration. 
 
 Let us observe again that the definition underlying the dis- 
 cussion is largely determinative of what the scholar will include in 
 his list of instincts. Lloyd Morgan's suggestions for a scientific 
 approach seem to me to be entirely justifiable. He says: 
 
 I suggest that, for the biologist and the psychologist, a criterion — not the 
 only criterion, but a criterion of instinctive behavior — is that it is serviceable 
 on the first occasion. But the biologist for the purposes of his interpretation 
 of animal life will ask: Serviceable to what end? First of all, serviceable as 
 affording the congenital foundations for an improved superstructure of behavior. 
 That is one one way in which instinctive behavior is serviceable — the way 
 which is of special interest to the psychologist. From the more distinctly 
 biological point of view, instinctive behavior is broadly and generally serviceable 
 for survival to which sundry bodily activities contribute. In further detail, 
 instinctive behavior is serviceable for avoiding danger, by shrinking, quiescence 
 or flight; serviceable for warding off the attacks of enemies; serviceable for 
 obtaining food, capturing prey and so forth; serviceable for winning and 
 securing a mate, for protecting and rearing offspring; in social animals, service- 
 able for co-operating with others, and so behaving that not only the individual 
 but the social group shall survive. But it will be said, these are the very ends 
 for the attainment of which intelligence is serviceable. Unquestionably it is 
 so. It is just because the many and varied modes of instinctive behavior 
 are serviceable for the attainment of the same ends for which intelligence is 
 serviceable, that their consideration is essential to the right history of ex- 
 perience. Instinctive behavior, which has its roots in organic evolution, 
 affords the rude outline sketch of that far less imperfect and far more fully 
 serviceable behavior, the finishing touches of which are supplied by practice 
 
 ' Angell, op. cit., p. 339. * Parmelee, op. ciL, pp. 243, 244. 
 
52 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 under the guidance of intelligence. The net result (what is for popular speech 
 the perfected instinct) is a joint product of instinct and intelligence, in which 
 the co-operating factors are inseparable, but none the less genetically dis- 
 tinguishable.' 
 
 From the biological point of view, then, we may speak of an 
 instinct as a congenital co-ordination of reflexes, neurally integrated 
 and effecting an organic response characteristic of and serviceable to 
 the species and in some manner^ capable of subsequent modification. 
 The character of the response depends on the character of the 
 stimulus and the presence or absence of any obstruction to its 
 normal expression. 
 
 As we move into the field of psychology, we must proceed to 
 the tasks set before us in that field with the realization that we are 
 dependent on the biologist for the scientific understanding of 
 instinctive tendencies and behavior. In the matter of instinct we 
 may say that the psychological task is interpretative rather than 
 definitive. Functional psychology is behavioristic and is not con- 
 cerned with "states of consciousness, " as were the associationalists, 
 but with behavior, with what is done. The act is the starting-place, 
 and action is determined by instinctive behavior directed to the 
 satisfaction of some felt need. Sometimes one instinctive tendency 
 functions in inhibition of another; sometimes they reinforce one 
 another. Social psychology has helped us to an understanding of 
 the rise of consciousness as due to the necessity of a selective process 
 which will choose the impulse to be set free and the forms which 
 it will utilize for the satisfaction of the need. In that way expe- 
 rience has its genesis in instinctive behavior, which is regarded 
 as including all the primal and congenital types of behavior which 
 in any manner are synthesized in experience. And here we are in 
 the field of intelligent behavior, the physiological correlate of 
 which is to be seen in neural processes which involve the cerebral 
 cortex. 
 
 ' Morgan, Instinct and Experience, pp. 25, 26. 
 
 ^ The biological debate as to the manner in which modifications take place in 
 the evolutionary process does not necessarily affect our problem. Darwinianism, 
 Lamarkianism, the mutation theory of de Vries, and the germ-plasm theory of 
 Weissmann are all attempts to account for the unanimously recognized phenomena 
 of modification and variation. 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 53 
 
 We need to remind ourselves, however, that there is another 
 tj'pe of activity which is so characteristic of the species or race that 
 we may deem it to be innate, and which nevertheless is too complex 
 to be classified as instinctive. Some psychologists, as we have 
 seen, make their treatment of instinct so broad that all these 
 innate tendencies, such as the tendencies to imitate, to sympathize, 
 to play, to respond to suggestions, to experience emotions, are 
 included under instincts. Thorndike and others have done 
 valuable work in pointing out the necessity of a differentiation. 
 For certain psychological purposes, such as the task before us, 
 these innate tendencies afford data which may be treated on the 
 same plane with instinctive behavior, because instinctive tenden- 
 cies are also innate. I need only refer to the fourth chapter of 
 McDougali's Social Psychology for a valuable treatment of this 
 subject. It would be difficult to give a physiological account of all 
 innate tendencies. Each would require individual treatment. More- 
 over, the behavior lacks that definiteness which characterizes the 
 instinctive. "The tendency is to an extremely indefinite response 
 or set of responses to a very complex situation,"' and the final 
 form in which the tendency expresses itself is more largely deter- 
 mined by experience and intelligence. Innate tendencies corre- 
 spond to instinctive behavior in being congenital responses, but 
 differ in that they depend upon having connections in the cortical 
 regions. 
 
 Another problem which commands attention is that which 
 concerns the instinctive basis of the emotions and sentiments. 
 There are some instinctive reactions which occur so quickly in 
 response to their stimuH that they are almost entirely reflex, and 
 emotional quality is almost entirely lacking. On the other hand, 
 there may be some cases where the instinctive reaction and its 
 emotional correlate seem to be simultaneous. In the majority of 
 cases the action precedes the emotion, as has been indicated in the 
 James-Lange theory. The instinctive response is accompanied 
 by a characteristic quality of emotional tone. Now this emotional 
 experience has its neurosis corresponding to the neurosis of the 
 instinctive experience. It has already been indicated that under 
 
 'Thorndike, op. cit., p. 5. 
 
54 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 the proper environmental stimuli there issue from the subcortical 
 region of the brain characteristic types of instinctive behavior 
 which include muscular and glandular reactions. It is to be 
 observed further that some of the motor responses are themselves 
 described as emotional expressions. But in addition there take 
 place certain visceral disturbances, such as alterations in the 
 heart-beat, in the respiratory rhythm, and in the digestive and 
 glandular functions, changes which influence the general coen- 
 esthesia; and these disturbances also are efferent reactions to 
 the stimuli in the same sense as the motor reactions. The physical 
 changes resultant from these two types of instinctive reaction 
 give rise to afferent impulses which come into the central nervous 
 system with the result that the experience of the situation is 
 qualified as the impulse reaches the cerebral cortex. And this 
 qualification is what gives the instinctive experience its emotional 
 tone. Lloyd Morgan says: *'I regard it as probable that, in its 
 primary genesis, the emotional tone is in large measure correlated 
 with cortical disturbances due to stimulation which is visceral 
 and coenesthetic in origin."' After the emotional tone has been 
 experienced and has been integrated, the subject is able to recall 
 the affective meaning without going through the whole neurosis 
 as first experienced. Instinctive tendencies may receive a reinforce- 
 ment or an obstruction by the emotion which is called forth, and 
 this gives rise to the regulative processes which characterize 
 morality and religion. The position which Mr. Shand takes is 
 practically the same as that of Professor Lloyd Morgan. He 
 explains^ the organic sensations which characterize the intense 
 emotions by the alteration of the function of different organs, 
 causing either a depression or a stimulation of the normal functions. 
 He points out further-* that the primary emotions have the ability 
 to organize into their system all instincts that are serviceable to 
 their ends, and are not confined each to one characteristic instinct. 
 In complexity the sentiments mark a stage more advanced 
 than the emotions. They may be defined as a synthesis of emotional 
 
 ' Morgan, Instinci and Experience, p. 113. 
 
 - A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Characler, pp. 193, 194. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 192. 
 
A SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION OF INSTINCT 55 
 
 qualities which are organized about the ideas concerning objects, 
 relationships, or values. A sentiment is capable of much greater 
 complexity than an instinct or an emotion, as we may see in the 
 moral, aesthetic, and religious sentiments. Yet its genesis is 
 plainly traceable to the combination of emotions, the physiological 
 connections of which with instinctive reactions have been shown. 
 References may be made to the works of McDougall,^ Shand,"* 
 and Ribot^ for psychological discussions of the origin and func- 
 tions of the sentiments. The significance for our task consists in 
 the instinctive origin of the sentiments, and in the evolution of the 
 religious and scientific attitudes which are characterized by the 
 presence of certain specific sentiments. 
 
 ' McDougall, Social Psychology. 
 
 ' Shand, The Foundations of Character. 
 
 J Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE THEORY OF SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC 
 
 INSTINCTS 
 
 Having secured a working definition of instinct, the next part 
 of the task is to endeavor to discover the bearing of that upon the 
 problem of the relation of religion and science, especially in respect 
 to their genesis in the instinctive life. The fifth chapter proposes 
 to examine the hypotheses put forth by various writers that there 
 are specific religious and scientific instincts, on the basis, of course, 
 of the definition proposed in the previous chapter. 
 
 The next part of our task is to inquire into the instinctive origin 
 of religion and science in the light of what biology has taught us 
 as to the nature of the instincts, innate tendencies, emotions, and 
 sentiments. The purpose of the discussion concerning the nature 
 of instinct was to attain that clarity that is necessary to avoid the 
 danger which Mr. McDougall so rightly deprecates, viz., of using 
 the words "instinct" and "instinctive" in such a loose sense as 
 almost to spoil them for scientific purposes.'' Alongside of that 
 danger is the other, which we have already noted, of using the 
 terms without a proper conception of their significance in biological 
 thought. 
 
 Some scholars, having first concluded that religion and science 
 were of instinctive origin in the race, have jumped to the inference 
 that there must be correspondingly specific instincts. The question 
 has been discussed by those interested in accounting for the origin 
 of religion more frequently than in regard to the beginnings of 
 science. The Deists, who appeared in England in the seventeenth 
 and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, in their efforts to 
 establish the certainty and sufficiency of natural religion as against 
 revelatory religion, declared religion to be a human instinct.' 
 
 'McDougall, op. cit., p. 21. 
 . *Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) taught that there were certain mental 
 faculties, of which the fundamental group were the natural instincts which are innate 
 and of divine origin. 
 
 56 
 
THEORY OF RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC INSTINCTS 57 
 
 Reimarus, the German rationalist who was contemporaneous with 
 the Deists, upheld the same position in the Wolfenbiitiel Fragments. 
 Religion he declared to be an instinct, therefore requiring no revela- 
 tion. Boutroux, in stating the position of Auguste Comte, repre- 
 sents him as holding that "the heart possesses an instinct, called 
 the religious instinct, in virtue of which the individual is able to 
 live with the dead, and to assimilate their excellences."' 
 
 So eminent a scientist as Romanes wrote of "the religious 
 instincts of the human race," with the comment: 
 
 Elsewherein the animal kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an 
 instinct pointing aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 
 "a religious animal" — i.e., presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar nature 
 directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical with, true instinct 
 — is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in favor of the reality of 
 some object toward which the religious side of this animal's nature is directed.^ 
 
 The position of Max Miiller, one of the great pioneers in the 
 field of the history of religions, is in intent the same as that of the 
 writers who posit a definite religious instinct, although he uses 
 the word "faculty" in lieu of the word "instinct." He states his 
 conviction that "as there is a faculty of speech, independent of all 
 the historical forms of language, there is a faculty of faith in man, 
 independent of all historical religions." Miiller explains the func- 
 tion of this faculty of religion as enabhng man "to apprehend the 
 Infinite under different names, and under varying disguises." Under 
 the historical expressions of religion he thinks that he detects "a 
 groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to 
 utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God."'^ 
 Although the author uses the word "faculty," it will be seen that 
 he uses it in the same sense as he does when referring to the power 
 of speech, which of course can only be conceived with a biological 
 reference. Professor Tiele, who follows Max Miiller in his inter- 
 pretation of the origin of rehgion, has interpreted him as I have 
 done. Tiele, of course, interprets "the Infinite" in the Hegehan 
 
 ' Emile Boutroux, Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophies (English 
 translation by J. Nield), p. 66. 
 
 2 Romanes, Thoughts on Religion, essay on "The Influence of Science on Religion," 
 p. 86. 
 
 3 F. Ma.x Miiller, Inlroduclion to the Science of Religion, pp. 13, 14. 
 
58 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 fashion as being within rather than without. So for him "the 
 origin of rehgion consists in the fact that man has the Infinite within 
 him, even before he himself is conscious of it, and whether he 
 recognizes it or not." He then proceeds to say that ''Whatever 
 name we give it — instinct, or an innate, original, and unconscious 
 form of thought, or form of conception — it is the specifically human 
 element in man, the idea which dominates him."^ 
 
 Jastrow is another author who gives expression to this theory. 
 "The origin of religion," according to him, "so far as historical 
 study can solve the problem, is to be sought in the bringing into 
 play of man's power to obtain a perception of the Infinite through 
 the impression which the multitudinous phenomena of the universe 
 
 as a whole makes upon him He contemplates with a certain 
 
 awe both himself and the world outside of himself, and the religious 
 instinct thus stirred up leads him to realize his insignificance," etc. 
 Thus by this writer the "perception of the Infinite" is used syn- 
 onymously for "the religious instinct." Indeed, in one passage he 
 expressly states that "the faint perception of the Infinite .... 
 strikes a responsive chord in what, for want of a better name, we 
 may call man's religious instinct."^ The point of view which finds 
 expression in Brinton seems to be similar. He suggests a "uni- 
 versal postulate" which is the "psychic origin of all reHgious 
 thought," and "a reUgiosity in man as a part of his psychic being," 
 which is surely not far removed from the theory of a religious 
 instinct.^ 
 
 The outstanding example of an elaborate argument to estab- 
 lish the theory of a religious instinct is the attempt of Marshall.'' 
 Marshall's argument is as follows: (i) The universahty of rehgious 
 expression argues for its instinctiveness. Given the appropriate 
 stimulus, the instinctive response is assured. (2) It is developed 
 in man in whom ethical impulses and other social instincts are well 
 developed. (3) Religious expressions are spontaneously developed. 
 (4) Activities involved in rehgious expression have some biological 
 
 ' C. p. Tide, Elements of the Science of Religion, II, 230-31. 
 ' Morris Jastrow, The Study of Religion, pp. 196-98. 
 3 D. G. Brinton, Religions of Primitive People, p. 47. 
 < H. R. Marshall, Instinct and Reason, chap. ix. 
 
THEORY OF RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC INSTINCTS 59 
 
 function, some import to the race. (5) The rise of religious activ- 
 ities is anterior to the speculative, intellectual life. He then pro- 
 ceeds to the assumption of the existence of a religious instinct which 
 expresses itself in ascetic practices, fasting, prayer, sacrifice, making 
 of pilgrimages, etc. He sums up his thesis in the statement: 
 "Religious activities are the expression of a true instinct; and the 
 religious instinct must be looked on as our highest instinct because 
 its function is regulative of reason, tending to bring about sub- 
 ordination of variation to the typical reactions lower than those 
 expressive of the religious instinct itself, in case variation becomes 
 over-influential. "^ 
 
 Renan is another writer who upheld the theory in question. He 
 said that reHgion was as instinctive in man as the nest-building 
 instinct in the birds.^ 
 
 Starbuck, in his well-known book on The Psychology of Religion, 
 in one of the opening paragraphs makes the statement that "religion 
 is a life, a deep-rooted instinct,"^ which expresses itself as certainly 
 as hunger and the desire for exercise. But we shall find this 
 author taking a position in the latter part of the book which is not 
 quite the same as this. 
 
 One of the most recent expressions of this hypothesis is to be 
 found in these words from the pen of Professor W. E. Hocking: 
 "Religion is to be understood as a product and manifesto of human 
 
 desire Religion is a reaction to 'our finite situation,' a 
 
 natural reflex of small and highly aspiring beings in a huge — per- 
 haps infinite — arena. This reaction seems to be, at its heart, as 
 instinctive as a start or a shudder. ""^ In other passages also he 
 makes reference to "the religious instinct. "^ The external expres- 
 sions of religion, such as prayer and worship, are also spoken of as 
 instinctive.*^ 
 
 'Marshall, op. cit., p. 528. 
 
 * E. Renan, Studies of Religious History, pp. xxiv and 153. He also uses the 
 expression, "the eternal instinct which induces man to adopt a religious belief." 
 Cf. Ribot, Psychology of the Emotions, p. 307. 
 
 3 E. D. Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion, p. 7. 
 
 4 W. E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 49-50. 
 sJUd., pp. 43, 151, 474. , ('Ibid., pp. 341, 342, 358, 
 
6o THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 There are some authors who have postulated a religious instinct 
 who would not do the same for science because they take the 
 ground that the differentiation between religion and science consists 
 in the fact that religion is instinctive, while science involves intel- 
 lection. The position that instinct and intelligence produce two 
 sorts of knowledge which may be kept apart is an epistemological 
 position dependent upon a faculty psychology. Biology, in proving 
 the unity of the neural processes, has given psychology a unifying 
 conception of the mental processes which is functional, thus retiring 
 the epistemology which would assign religious knowledge and 
 scientific knowledge to separate faculties. Even if we grant that 
 the scientific attitude has in it more of the cognitive element than 
 the religious attitude, we are still able to find the instinctive genesis 
 of cognition. 
 
 There are a few writers who have referred to a scientific instinct. 
 It may be that it is due to a loose manner of writing, but we are 
 justified in criticizing their use of the term, whatever may have 
 been the motivation. In this way we find Starbuck speaking of a 
 psychical instinct and an intellectual instinct.'' So also in Professor 
 Hocking's book there appears this curious combination of words: 
 "It is not our religious instinct alone, but something much like an 
 acquired scientific instinct which sends us looking today among the 
 feeling-roots of religion for its essence. Into the building of that 
 scientific instinct have entered many strands."^ 
 
 The statements which express or infer the existence in man of 
 specific religious and scientific instincts are at variance with a 
 scientific understanding of all three terms, science, religion, and 
 instinct. It has been shown that the differentiation between religion 
 and science is to be made psychologically in the realm of attitudes. 
 From the psychological point of view, attitudes are much higher up 
 the scale than instincts. We may state it somewhat as follows: 
 The conflict which takes place between the instinctive and innate 
 tendencies, or between the means available for the satisfaction of 
 those instinctive and innate tendencies, results in the emergence of 
 
 ' Starbuck, op. cii., p. 339, the impulse to know is called a "psychical instinct"; 
 p. 270, the author speaks of the "intellectual instinct." 
 ' W. E. Hocking, op. cii., p. 42. 
 
THEORY OF RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC INSTINCTS 6i 
 
 a desire toward the realization of an end of which man is conscious. 
 In the next stage we meet with a conflict of these desires which 
 induces a further operation of the selective process. Certain desires 
 are emphasized and cultivated; others are obstructed and inhibited. 
 This means that attitudes and habits are formed. And here we 
 arrive at the field in which we have located the differentiation of 
 the two disciplines. In their present manner of functioning, both 
 religion and science belong to a more complex sphere of life than 
 that characterized by simple instinctive behavior. The attitudes 
 have evolved from a complex of desires which go back to a further 
 complexity in which various instincts interact. 
 
 For criticisms of the theory of a specific religious instinct 
 reference may be made to the works of Irving King' and Coe.^ The 
 criticism of Coe is especially of interest and value as coming from 
 one who, in one of his earlier publications, spoke very decidedly of 
 the religious instinct and the intellectual instinct.^ But in the 
 later book he has completely abandoned that hypothesis. It is 
 evident from the phenomena of religion that there is no specific 
 set of stimuli which incites a religious reaction, and, further, that 
 there is no typical reaction which may be called religious. And 
 the criticisms apply with equal cogency to the notion of a scientific 
 instinct. 
 
 From the point of view of our working definition of instinct, 
 the refutation of the hypothesis of a specific religious instinct or a 
 scientific instinct should be quite feasible. The religious and the 
 scientific attitudes may be compared to instincts in that they are 
 characteristic of and serviceable to the species and capable of sub- 
 sequent modifications. But these attitudes are both characterized 
 by an element of intelligence, and religion especially by an emo- 
 tional tone, neither of which belong to behavior, which finds its 
 physiological correlate in neural processes involving only the sub- 
 cortical regions. If religion be put in the sarn.e class as "a start 
 or a shudder," as we noted Professor Hocking placed it, then it is 
 
 ' Irving King, The Development of Religion, pp. 25 ff. 
 
 ^ G. A. Coe, The Psychology of Religion, p. 323. 
 
 3 G. A. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, pp. 52, 58, 247. 
 
62 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 a tj^e of reaction which involves the afferent and eflferent nerves 
 and the spinal cord and does not require the brain at all. 
 
 If the conclusions of the biologists are correct, as their experi- 
 ments seem to show, then a decerebrate animal is capable of all 
 known instinctive reactions. That being the case, there seems no 
 good reason why the person who is defective in cerebral matter, 
 according to the theory of a religious instinct, should not be capable 
 of being religious in the same way as a person of normal capacities. 
 But the truth is that there is no combination of reflexes which have 
 been integrated by the nervous system in such a way that it effects 
 an instinctive reaction that can be designated as specifically 
 religious. Neither is it possible to find a specifically scientific 
 instinct as a result of a neural integration of a certain group of 
 reflexes. 
 
 The assumption of Marshall and others who hold to a religious 
 instinct is tied up with the idea that there is an element of con- 
 sciousness in all instinctive behavior. But our biological observa- 
 tions have precluded an acceptance of that theory. Consciousness 
 is present when the activity includes cerebral cortical processes, 
 while instinctive behavior in its primal form is subcortical. The 
 religious attitude involves an element of consciousness, and it is 
 difficult to understand how any scholar can reduce it to the sim- 
 plicity of "a natural reflex .... as instinctive as a start or a 
 shudder," as we have observed to be the position of Professor 
 Hocking. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE EFFORT TO IDENTIFY RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 WITH CERTAIN SPECIFIC INSTINCTS 
 
 The last chapter was engaged with a discussion of the hypoth- 
 esis of specific instincts for the rehgious and scientific reactions. 
 This chapter is intended to serve as criticism of the theories which 
 endeavor to account for the rise of religion and science by reference 
 to specific instincts with which they are identified. 
 
 A further approach toward the solution of the genetic problem 
 is in the direction of identifying one or both of the religious and 
 scientific disciplines with specific instincts. This is not the same 
 position as that of those who posit religious and scientific instincts, 
 though it has this in common with that hypothesis that it resolves 
 both of them to a single root. 
 
 Campanella Tommaso, the Italian philosopher who was a 
 contemporary of Giordano Bruno, 1 568-1 639, declared religion to 
 be an inherent part of existence, and identified it in its lowest 
 form with the instinct of self-preservation.^ A somewhat similar 
 position is taken by Angus te Sabatier, who speaks of faith as "the 
 higher form" of the instinct of conservation, and of man as "in- 
 curably religious, " and again of the religious need as a manifesta- 
 tion of the "instinct of every being to persevere in being. "^ 
 
 Reference has already been made to the position of Professor 
 Hocking in positing a religious instinct which is compared to 
 behavior as instinctive as starts and shudders. In other passages 
 the author virtually identifies this religious instinct with the 
 instinct of self-preservation. He quotes from Lippert's Kultur- 
 geschichte, chapter i, where that author derives religion from the 
 fundamental need of "Lebensfiirsorge," and says that this deep-set 
 desire which we call religious may "be represented as an ultimate 
 
 ^Encyclopaedia Brilannica (nth ed.), V, 121, 122, article "Campanella, Tom- 
 
 maso." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' Auguste 
 
 Sabatier, 
 
 op. 
 
 cit., 
 
 . PP- 
 
 3, 
 
 9, 
 
 21. 
 63 
 
64 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 demand for conscious self-preservation."' Again he describes the 
 religious passion as seeking to secure satisfaction for the "instinct 
 of self-preservation. "^ Further he refers to this instinct as prompt- 
 ing the search for the Absolute.^ And yet again worship is deline- 
 ated as "a spontaneous impulse for spiritual self-preservation."'' 
 
 The history of biological evolution leads to the conclusion that 
 instinctive action is characterized by the ability to be serviceable 
 on the first occasion to the organism or to the species. Darwin 
 would have explained it on the theory of natural selection in the 
 struggle for existence. Some would deny the existence of a specific 
 instinct of self-preservation, and use the term for a group of in- 
 stincts, as, e.g. , Kirkpatrick.^ Others would take the ground that the 
 preservation of the self and of the species is the end of all instinctive 
 behavior. Those who admit of a specific instinct of self-preservation 
 usually connect it with physiological processes such as are de- 
 signed to maintain nutrition, expel poison, and ward off danger. 
 Ribot points out that this instinct on its offensive side gives rise to 
 the emotion of anger, and on its defensive side to the emotion of 
 fear.* Doubtless the desire for self-preservation is one of the 
 contributory causes, but it would require an unwarranted breadth 
 to the definition of the instinct of self-preservation to justify an 
 identification of religion with it. 
 
 Another theory which has been advanced is that which finds 
 the source of religion in the sexual instinct. Students of the 
 sociology of religion find that there is a kinship between the reli- 
 gious and the sexual Hfe. As we shall see, there are many points 
 of contact as, e.g., in the adolescent experiences and the initiation 
 ceremonies which were so often observed at that period. As 
 Starbuck points out with reference to the attainment of puberty: 
 "The physiological birth brings with it the dawning of all those 
 spiritual accompaniments which are necessary to the fullest social 
 
 activities This is the time biologically when one enters 
 
 into deep relation with social life."^ So marked is the kinship 
 
 ' Hocking, op. cit., p. 49. ' Ibid., p. 106. 
 
 •' Ibid., pp. 202, 203. " Ibid., p. 366. 
 
 s Kirkpatrick, Fundamenlals of Child Study. See his classification of the instincts. 
 
 ^ Ribot, op. cit., pp. 207, 218. ' Starbuck, op. cit., p. 401. 
 
RELIGION AND SCIENCE AND SPECIFIC INSTINCTS 65 
 
 that it has led the author to conclude that "in a certain sense the 
 religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct."^ He 
 makes it clear, however, that the sexual instinct is to be considered 
 rather as a condition of growth than as a cause. "The sexual life, 
 although it has left its impress on fully developed religion, seems 
 to have originally given the psychic impulse which called out the 
 latent possibilities of development, rather than to have furnished 
 
 the raw material out of which religion was constructed 
 
 Although the reproductive instinct may be primal, it seems to have 
 been entirely superseded as a distinct factor in reHgious growth 
 by other elements."^ In another passage Professor Starbuck 
 makes reference to two works — Havelock Ellis, Mati and Wofnan, 
 p. 295, and Burnham, A Study of Adolescence, Pedagogical Semi- 
 nary, I, 181, which base the phenomena of the religious life largely 
 on the sexual.^ 
 
 The view to which Professor Starbuck has given expression is 
 quoted by Professor Ames, and with a more precise definition 
 he approves of it. He points out the importance of recognizing 
 that it is the social character of the sexual life that is important 
 for religion, and in that sense may be regarded as "an irradiation 
 of the reproductive instinct."^ Bearing in mind that Professor 
 Ames makes the food-seeking and reproductive instincts basal to 
 all, we can appreciate the reason that he traces the genesis of the 
 social life to the sexual instinct, as against the position of many 
 other psychologists who affirm that there is a specific instinct 
 of gregariousness. In his definition he identifies it with the highest 
 social values.^ Consequently he is entirely consistent in tracing 
 the genesis of religion to the sexual instinct. 
 
 Professor Thomas seems to take a somewhat similar position. 
 He is quite explicit in defining the food and sex instincts as elemen- 
 tal.^ And again he bases the social life on the sexual.^ He does 
 
 ^Ibid. ^ Ibid., p. 207. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 402. t Ames, op. cit., pp. 221, 222. 
 
 5 Ibid., p. 168: "The religious consciousness is identified with the consciousness 
 of the greatest values of life." 
 
 ^ W. I. Thomas, Sex and Society, pp. 97-99. 
 T Ibid., p. 107. 
 
66 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 not make any extended reference to the matter of religion, but he 
 makes this statement: "The appeal made during a religious re- 
 vival to an unconverted person has psychologically some resem- 
 blance to the appeal of the male to overcome the hesitancy of the 
 female .... in both cases the appeal is an intimate, sympathetic, 
 and pleading kind. "^ 
 
 The connection between religion and the sexual life is one 
 which can be readily demonstrated, and we shall endeavor to show 
 that in the genesis of religion an important role may be assigned 
 to the behavior which was originated by the reactions connected 
 with the sexual life. However, our biological considerations 
 preclude us from an acceptance of the theory. The instinctive 
 reactions are of such a nature that it would be difficult to make a 
 list that would be agreeable to everybody. Even though we may 
 be prepared to admit that the elemental interests of life are the 
 struggle for food and the rivalry for mates, those interests cannot 
 be shown to be the only specific groups of reflexes which have been 
 integrated by the nervous system. There are other reactions 
 which can be shown to be instinctive, yet which serve these elemen- 
 tal interests only in an indirect way. The cortical regions are 
 marked by the tendency to make use of the data which are secured 
 by the automatic responses which center in the subcortical regions. 
 In this way behavior that at first is entirely automatic may be 
 made to serve specific ends. But in their primal forms these 
 instinctive reactions cover a wide range of activity in which there 
 is action and interaction, marked by variety and complication. 
 These tendencies include, to be sure, behavior that is serviceable 
 in the obtaining of food and in mating and procreating. But they 
 include also behavior that serves the purposes of self-protection 
 either by flight or pugnacity, of associational life in flocks, herds, 
 and social groups, and of prying into that which is strange, etc. 
 The length of one's list depends upon whether the dominating 
 interest is to analyze or to classify. 
 
 Another example of an unscientific use of the word "instinct" 
 in applying it to the genesis of religion and science is to be found 
 in Hardy, The Religious Instinct. The title would seem to suggest 
 
 ' W. I. Thomas, Sex and Society, p. 115. 
 
RELIGION AND SCIENCE AND SPECIFIC INSTINCTS 67 
 
 that there is a specific religious instinct; but not so the argument. 
 He states his theory on pp. 41 ff., that 
 
 what we call the instinct of approach — of which propitiation is one expression- 
 must be accepted as the source of the whole active religious phenomena of 
 the race. Here we have something as fundamental as the instincts of causation 
 and self-preservation. If the former of these — ^that of causation — ^has proved 
 the basis of all intellectual advance, and the latter — the instinct of self- 
 preservation — the mainspring of all man's social organization, why should not 
 the instinct, so universal, so ineradicable, as this of "approach" prove as valid 
 in its direction as its kindred instincts have done in theirs ? 
 
 It is apparent that in the sense in which the author uses the word 
 "instinct" he is thinking of something involving conscious ex- 
 perience, much more complex than behavior, which may technically 
 be called instinctive. 
 
 There is a similar tendency, though of perhaps less frequent 
 appearance, to identify science with a specific instinct. May it 
 not be that there are fewer tendencies to speculate about the 
 genesis of science than about the genesis of religion because the 
 scientist is more interested in functions than he is in origins? 
 The scientific method has long been in vogue in science itself. But 
 the subjective nature of the material and the a priori conceptions 
 of its divine origin have prevented a thoroughly objective treatment 
 of religion. We are only beginning to apply the scientific method 
 to religion, and thus to get a science of religion. Science has 
 become completely emancipated from the view that the validity 
 of her knowledge is determined by reference to its source. 
 
 Shand traces the genesis of science to the instinct of curiosity. 
 The definition of curiosity as an instinct is in the sense that its 
 end is innately determined, and not in the sense that its "behavior 
 which is instrumental to this end is also innately determined." 
 The behavior which is the correlate of curiosity is distinguished, 
 not by a special set of movements, "but by the way in which 
 they are combined."^ He admits, however, that in some of the 
 simpler and earlier forms the movements are quite instinctive.^ 
 Curiosity having been shown to be instinctive, the author follows 
 McDougall in making wonder the primary emotion which accom- 
 panies it.^ Then he proceeds to show that wonder reacts in two 
 
 ' Shand, op. cit., p. 439. * Ibid., p. 440. ^ Ibid., p. 442. 
 
68 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 diverse ways. In the one case it becomes the source of the love of 
 knowledge, basic to science and philosophy. In the other it gives 
 rise to the love of mysterj^ an element in religion. Wonder, he 
 says, "is the force and principle of the mind which leads us to 
 
 pursue truth for itself as an end In wonder curiosity is 
 
 freed from alien control, and pursues knowledge as an end."' 
 
 Ribot also, in his account of the genesis of "the intellectual 
 sentiment," says: "This feeling, lilce all the others, depends on an 
 
 instinct, a tendency, a craving This primitive craving — 
 
 the craving for knowledge — under its instinctive form is called 
 curiosity." In the evolution of this sentiment, the writer dis- 
 tinguishes three stages, the first being the utilitarian and practical, 
 the second disinterested and scientific, and in the third it becomes 
 a passion.^ Whatever we may think of his third stage, we must 
 admit that he is correct in finding the genesis of the scientific 
 attitude in the practical. 
 
 There is a tendency in some quarters to find the origin of science 
 connected with the behavior resulting from the instinct to obtain 
 food. Professor Ames, e.g., makes reference to "science exemplify- 
 ing the insight and mastery worked out in connection with the 
 food process."^ Professor Thomas finds that the "strain on the 
 attention in the food and conflict side of life involves the develop- 
 ment of mental impressionability, particularly of an impression- 
 ability on the side of cognition. "^ 
 
 The same arguments which prevented the acceptance of the 
 theories which proposed a single root for the origin of the religious 
 attitude apply in the case of the genesis of the scientific attitude. 
 The complexity of life and the variety of instinctive responses lead 
 to the conclusion that the root of science, as well as of religion, is 
 analogous rather to the fibrous than to the taproot, is multiple 
 rather than unitary. The statements of Shand and Ribot on the 
 curiosity origin, and of Ames and Thomas on the food origin of 
 the scientific attitude, are both true, and because they are both 
 true, each of them expresses only a part of the matter. 
 
 ' Shand, op. cil., pp. 449, 450. ^ Ames, op. ciL, pp. 416, 417. 
 
 ' Ribot, op. cit., pp. 368, 369. " Thomas, op. cii., pp. 118, 119. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE MULTIPLE INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION 
 
 AND SCIENCE 
 
 It is the ambition of the present chapter to present and defend 
 the thesis that the origin of both the religious and scientific atti- 
 tudes, while instinctive, is at the same time multiple. This is 
 done by a reference to the differentiation proposed in the fourth 
 chapter, and then by an attempt to show that such a differentiation 
 may grow out of the instinctive behavior connected with any set 
 of instincts. In this case illustrations are drawn from the instinc- 
 tive reactions in connection with five of the leading types of stimuli. 
 
 The great truth which Hes behind the theories that we have 
 noted is that the religious and scientific attitudes have their genesis 
 in the innate and instinctive dispositions and behavior of the race. 
 The thesis which I propose is that the origin of both religion and 
 science, whUe instinctive, is multiple. We must bear in mind 
 that there are no such things as religion and science, in the 
 sense of species. Both are generic terms. There are religions 
 and sciences. We may say of both what William James said of 
 religion, viz., that they are "collective names like government."^ 
 The various species of these two genera are so multiform 
 that it has been difficult to get a definition of religion. Most 
 definitions have been in terms of the species in which the author 
 was especially interested. The common element in all religions, 
 as Dr. Watson has pointed out, is "the social attitude toward 
 the non-human environment," and the common element in the 
 sciences is the "mechanical attitude toward the non-human 
 environment."^ 
 
 Therefore we are concerned with a variety of phenomena that 
 are connected with the rise of these attitudes. The history of 
 religions furnishes us with a heterogeneity of data, representing 
 
 ' William James, The Varieties of Religions Experience, p. 26. 
 
 * A. C. Watson, "The Logic of Religion," American Journal oj Theology, XX, 98. 
 
 69 
 
70 TEE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 interests as varied as life itself. Whatever may be one's theory of 
 man's origination of an extra-human environment, it must be 
 evident to the student of history that he has associated almost all 
 of the interests of life at some time with that environment in his 
 struggle for existence. So too the history of the sciences furnishes 
 evidence of a progressive attempt to gain dominion by mechanical 
 means over the forces by which he was environed. Man, in his 
 achievement of religion and science, was not dealing with phe- 
 nomena which he was able to differentiate under these two captions. 
 They are both of them human products, arising in a human environ- 
 ment by the effort of man as he attempted to gain control in the 
 great struggle for existence. They represent variant attitudes 
 toward the extra-human environment in accordance with whether 
 that environment was conceived to be amenable to social relation- 
 ships or to be wholly under mechanistic law. So that they involved, 
 to a considerable extent, the same human interests, and arose as 
 differentiable techniques in the struggles and conflicts of Ufe which 
 was characterized by a unified type of instinctive behavior. 
 
 This thesis may be illustrated by reference to different types of 
 instinctive behavior, and I shall attempt to illustrate it by a brief 
 treatment of the instinctive reactions connected with (i) the obtain- 
 ing of food, (2) mating and procreating, (3) self-preservation, 
 (4) contact with the strange and unusual, and (5) gregariousness. 
 
 I. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE 
 
 SECURING OF FOOD 
 
 The importance of the supply of food is apparent, for with that 
 is tied up the existence of the individuals of the group. The 
 necessity of food underlies the total economic Hfe, and it is to the 
 ordinary man the all-absorbing interest. In prehistoric times 
 anthropologists conclude that primitive man inhabited the equa- 
 torial regions where his wants were simple, and nature offered an 
 ample supply to him of those things which were necessary to his 
 existence. But as time passed there came about critical situations 
 in this phase of the struggle for existence. We have observed that 
 the reflective process was a product of a conflict of instincts or of 
 conflicting ways of securing satisfaction for those instincts. When 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 71 
 
 the natural supply of food failed, or became limited, and man had 
 to go into unexplored regions to supply his needs, he faced crises 
 which induced reflection. When a choice was presented to him, 
 because of the luxuriance of the available supply, he was compelled 
 to call into being a selective process, and so the conflict realm 
 induced reflection. The latter situation was not one in which he 
 needed to seek for any outside assistance, for it was simply a matter 
 of gratifying his particular taste. But the former situation con- 
 stituted a crisis and demanded action. It called for the creation 
 of some technique to help him over such critical experiences. 
 
 If we go into the accounts of the ways in which primitive peoples 
 actually met such situations, we find a considerable degree of uni- 
 formity in the techniques which they worked out. The first of 
 the techniques to be mentioned is magic. Magic is an attempt 
 to get satisfaction for a desired end by reference to some occult 
 powers. It is an attempt at coercion, and is based upon the belief 
 that if one knows the proper occult means the securing of the desired 
 end is inevitable. Hence magical behavior is intended to coerce 
 the occult powers to do the thing needed. It is not necessary for 
 our purposes to go into an extended discussion of magic, the 
 attempted classifications, etc. The point of importance for us to 
 note is that it arose as a technique to help man over critical sit- 
 uations, many of which arose in connection with the supply of 
 food. How was a good crop of grain or fruit, or a good catch of 
 fish, or a plentiful supply of rain to be secured ? Magic was one 
 solution. The system was completely wired so that, if you knew 
 how to turn on the switch, the circuit was complete and the result 
 inevitable. 
 
 The question that concerns us is the question as to the connec- 
 tion of magic with religion and science. Magical practices arose 
 in an age prior to the differentiation of the various attitudes. It 
 was a pre-psychological period. We are not compelled to try to 
 identify magic with one human attitude to the exclusion of the 
 others. On the one hand, if the conception of religion as a social 
 attitude toward the extra-human environment be correct, magic 
 has elements that are decidedly reHgious. If the definition used 
 the phrase superhuman instead of extra-human, magic would have 
 
72 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 to be excluded in the majority of cases. Magical practices were 
 sometimes directed to the object directly; sometimes to a spirit 
 or god, when it was tied to animism. The very recognition of 
 an occult power which man is endeavoring to coerce implies a 
 socializing tendency which is at least on the way to religion. 
 
 On the other hand, magic is also prescientific. It was man's 
 endeavor to get over the critical situation by the use of a mechanical 
 means. In many instances the social element was absent, espe- 
 cially in private magical ceremonies and formulas, and indeed in 
 many instances of pubhc magic. If the performance of a ceremony 
 or recitation of a formula was regarded as productive of the desired 
 end, we have here primitive man's first conception of cause and 
 result. It was by no means a regular and orderly form of the 
 causal category, but it was a beginning, and in that sense it was a 
 precursor of a scientific explanation. 
 
 The use of magical practices for the securing of an abundant 
 supply of food may be illustrated from scores of sources. We need 
 only refer to the rain-making ceremonies which are practiced in 
 Central Africa among the Agoni people, in India, in Russia, and 
 in Australia.' Similarly the Indians of British Columbia resort to 
 magical practices to insure the supply of salmon.^ In Central 
 Australia sympathetic magic is systematically used to insure the 
 supply of the totem animal or plant, which is, in the majority of 
 cases, the chief article of diet.-* Frazer has some interesting 
 accounts of ceremonial dances and other practices observed in 
 certain parts of Europe — Transylvania, Baden, and Macedonia — 
 to make the crops grow high.'' 
 
 The connection between the food interest and religion is further 
 observable in a multiplicity of ceremonials connected with various 
 primitive peoples. With the evolution of a supermundane world, 
 peopled with spirits, some benignant and some malignant, the 
 human task was to relate one's self in such a way to that world as 
 
 ' Cf. J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, Part I, Vol. I, pp. 249, 250, and D. G. 
 Brinton, Religions of Primitive People, pp. 173, 174, for accounts of rain-making 
 ceremonies. 
 
 ' Frazer, op. cit., p. 108. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 85. " Ibid., pp. 137-39- 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 73 
 
 to avoid the displeasure and to procure the aid of these spirits in 
 securing the satisfaction for felt needs. Hence the cult arose as a 
 technique for operating on the wills of such spirits so as to enlist 
 their sympathy and procure their assistance. In their elemental 
 forms the ceremonials connected with the cult were designed to 
 secure satisfaction for those needs which grew out of instinctive 
 behavior. Illustrations are available in abundance. Ceremonials 
 connected with the mother-goddess associated her with the idea 
 of fertility. Oases were the sacred spots to the Arabs. Sacrificial 
 rites were connected with edible animals. The images and objects 
 of worship are in numerous instances the characteristic food 
 objects for the geographically defined region where the worship 
 prevails. Totem objects are in the majority of cases the most 
 staple food objects of the totem clans. Spencer and Gillen give 
 a list of tribes in Central AustraHa with their respective food objects. 
 The totem of the Ainus was a bear; of the Hopi Indians, maize; 
 of the Arabs, the date palm; of certain Babylonian people on the 
 Persian Gulf, the fish. 
 
 Reference has been made to a suggestion by Professor Ames 
 that science illustrates "the insight and mastery worked out in 
 connection with the food process,"^ and to a similar position taken 
 by Professor Thomas. There seems to me to be no doubt of the 
 correctness of this theory. With the development of the observa- 
 tional processes, man would note that certain fruits and certain 
 grains came only at certain seasons, and that during the remainder 
 of the year there was no supply. Fisher folk would observe that 
 certain meteorological conditions were favorable and others un- 
 favorable to a good catch. Hunting people would find climatic 
 and other conditions affecting the supply of game. Thus a sense 
 of regularity, of conditionality, and hence of causality, gradually 
 evolved in connection with the food supply. The occurrence of 
 critical situations, as the natural supply became insufficient and 
 man had to evolve mental powers to help him over the crises, would 
 only serve to make his observation keener as to conditionahty 
 and causality. With the progress of time this led to practical 
 reactions in the evolution of primitive agriculture and horticulture 
 
 ' The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 416, note. 
 
74 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 as techniques by which man might gain control over the food 
 supply. So that the reactions of the food instinct led in this way 
 to the beginnings of a scientific attitude. 
 
 II. INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH MATING AND 
 
 PROCREATING 
 
 The other dominant life-interest is that of reproduction. If 
 food is essential to the existence of individuals, mating and pro- 
 creating are necessary to the preservation of the species. It was 
 to be expected that man, in his desire to obtain control over the 
 forces by which he was environed, should so organize his techniques 
 as to obtain help in matters relative to these two primal life- 
 interests. We have seen how that worked out in regard to the 
 food interest. It may be shown in an analogous way that he used 
 both the social and the mechanical processes in attaining control 
 of the sexual interests. 
 
 The argument has been presented for an understanding of 
 magic which involves both the prereHgious and the prescientific 
 elements. The theory which was appHed to magical practices in 
 connection with the food process apphes in precisely the same way 
 in respect to magical practices connected with the reproductive 
 process. Frazer has recounted various instances where the resort 
 has been to sympathetic magic to secure the ends served by the 
 procreative instinct. In Sumatra a make-believe child is used for 
 a barren woman who desires children. In Greece, Bulgaria, and 
 Bosnia there is a make-believe ceremony of restoring dead persons 
 to life. There is also an Indian practice of shooting darts at a clay 
 image in order to win the love of a woman.^ 
 
 In some instances the magical practices involve both the food 
 and the reproductive interests. It is a carrying over of the idea 
 of fertility from the region of the sexual Hfe to those activities 
 connected with the food supply. "The Greeks and Romans sacri- 
 ficed pregnant victims to the goddesses of corn and of the earth, 
 doubtless in order that the earth might teem, and corn swell in 
 the ear."^ Analogously the magical value of pregnant women to 
 communicate fertility was a widespread belief. Austrian and 
 
 ' Frazer, op. cit., pp. 70-77. 'Ibid., p. 141. 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 75 
 
 Bavarian peasants gave the first fruit to a pregnant woman to make 
 the tree bear abundantly. Nicobar Islanders have pregnant women 
 and their husbands, and Orinoco Indians have pregnant women, 
 sow the seed to insure a good crop. In some tribes the blood shed 
 at the circumcision and subincision of boys and also the foreskin 
 are regarded as possessing fertilizing value, and so are buried in 
 proximity to the crop which it is desired to cultivate.' In other 
 cases circumcision is regarded as in the nature of a sacrifice to the 
 goddess of fertility, securing the protection of the goddess for the 
 child, and putting the child's reproductive powers at the command 
 of the deity.^ 
 
 In this connection reference may be made to "taboo," which 
 has been rightly described as "negative magic. "^ Taboo has its 
 origin in the social structure, and its origin is purely human. But 
 in animism it came to be associated with the rights of gods and 
 demons which were not to be infringed upon, without the trans- 
 gressor endangering himself by the infringement. It has been 
 associated with food objects, with sexual functions, and with dead 
 bodies. The uncleanness that rests with all sexual functions is 
 most marked. Marriage, a woman in her courses, a man with an 
 issue, and the birth of a child are all curiously tabooed. "This is 
 because birth and everything connected with the propagation of 
 the species .... seem to him to involve the action of superhuman 
 agencies of a dangerous kind."'* Thompson gives a number of 
 instances of sexual taboo, as (a) menstruation taboos, {b) co- 
 habitation taboos, (c) childbirth taboos, (d) girls of irregular 
 menstruation supposed to be possessed of supernatural power, and 
 (e) men fearful of interfering with the harem rights of gods and 
 goddesses.^ Here we have, as in positive magic, the social attitude 
 toward powers considered to be extramundane, and also a primitive 
 approximation toward a causal explanation of certain mysterious 
 phenomena. 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 95 ff. * Barton, Semitic Origins, p. 100. 
 
 3 Ames, op. cit., p. 88; N. W. Thomas, "Taboo," in Encyclopaedia Brilannica 
 (nth ed.), XXVI, 337 flf. 
 
 * Thompson, Semitic Magic, pp. 113, 114. 
 5 Ibid., pp. 131-33. 
 
76 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 The ceremonies connected with the attainment of puberty 
 afford another example of the connection between sex and religion. 
 The phenomena in connection with puberty were mysterious and 
 seemed to involve the coming to birth of an ability to perform 
 certain instinctive reactions hitherto impossible. It is the period 
 when the boy or the girl sees the dawn of the adult life, and in- 
 volves the birth of the youth's appreciation of his or her part in the 
 group life. Consequently it has been a custom, widespread both 
 chronologically and geographically, to mark the transition by 
 certain sacred rites, almost invariably attended with an element 
 of mystery.' 
 
 Another example of the connection between religion and sex is 
 phallicism. Examples of phallic worship, or worship of the genera- 
 tive power of nature as symbolized in the phallus, may be seen in 
 the history of the religions of Greece, Phoenicia, Rome, Mexico, 
 Peru, India, and Japan.^ 
 
 Still another group of phenomena may be cited as illustrating 
 the bond of connection between religion and sex. I refer to the 
 conversion phenomena in connection with the Christian religion. 
 Those who have made thorough investigations in this field have 
 come to the conclusion that conversion is a distinctly adolescent 
 phenomenon. From the biological standpoint we have noted that 
 the adolescent period is the time when the procreative instincts 
 are awakened. It is also a well-known fact that adolescence is the 
 period of life in which the majority of conversions take place. The 
 philosophy of the situation has been treated in the works of Star- 
 buck, Stanley Hall, Coe, Ames, Leuba, and others, and need not 
 concern us here. But the fundamental connection between the 
 religious awakening and the birth of the sexual instinct seems to be 
 proven by their synchronous appearance. 
 
 It is interesting to note that man, in picturing to himself the 
 world of the gods, has carried over the elements which were of 
 
 'Examples of ceremonials connected with puberty and initiation abound. Cf. 
 Brinton, Religions of Primitive People, pp. 197-200; Jane Harrison, Ancient Art 
 and Ritual, pp. 106-13; Frazer, The Golden Bough, copious references. 
 
 " See art. "Phallicism," in Encyclopaedia Britannica (nth ed.), XXI, 345, and art* 
 "Phallism" in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 815 ff., by Hartland- 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 77 
 
 paramount interest in human life. Surely the gods must be like 
 men, possessed of like interests and desires. In Assyrian mythology 
 the goddess Ishtar is pictured as conducting amorous relationships 
 with men. In Indian literature Krishna is portrayed as sporting 
 with shepherd girls. The Mohammedan idea of heaven is a carry- 
 ing over into the other world the degradation of womanhood in 
 sensuous pictures. 
 
 The association between activity connected with behavior 
 induced by the sexual instinct and religion is established by an 
 abundance of historical evidence. There is not so much data to 
 show the connection between the beginnings of science and pro- 
 creative activity. At the same time there is evidence that cannot 
 be overlooked. From the point of view of magic and taboo the 
 material is abundant to show the connection with the reproductive 
 life. We have already observed that magic implies a mechanical 
 technique for avoiding dangers and overcoming crises, so that in 
 magical practices we have the prescientific view of man toward the 
 sexual life. The progress of more exact conceptions broke down 
 magical causality and paved the way for a scientific causality. 
 
 Barton gives it as his opinion that among the Semites "the 
 beginnings of intelligent life, the knowledge of clothing, agriculture, 
 and the arts of civilization,'" were attributed to the sexual relation. 
 Thomas, as we have seen, attributes the development of mental im- 
 pressionability to the strain on the attention in connection with food 
 and reproduction.^ From the sexual instinct arises a susceptibility 
 to the opinions of others, resulting in the mental activity of 
 comparison and selection. 
 
 One of the best evidences for the theory proposed is the growth 
 of the primitive conception of paternity.^ Anthropologists find 
 that in primitivity the birth of children was a mystery. In the 
 beginning the father of the child did not understand that he had a 
 part in the reproductive process, owing to ignorance concerning 
 the nature of physiological processes. But as the understanding 
 
 ' Barton, op. cit., pp. loi, 102. 
 ^ Thomas, Sex and Society, pp. 118, 119. 
 
 3 A thorough elaboration may be consulted in the work of E. S. Hartland, Primitive 
 Paternity, 2 vols., London, 1909. 
 
'78 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 came, it meant the birth of a primitive conception of causality in 
 respect to the procreative process. The first discovery of the part 
 played by the father in the reproductive process led to the strange 
 "couvade" ceremony among certain primitive peoples, an illus- 
 tration of the crudity with which they formed their first mental 
 tools. Nevertheless, it marks the beginning of the displacement 
 of mythological knowledge by scientific knowledge in regard to the 
 sexual processes and relationships. 
 
 III. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SELF- 
 PRESERVATION 
 
 Some psychologists would include self-preservation under the 
 instinctive 'behavior connected with the obtaining of food. If they 
 are to be considered together, I would prefer to include the food- 
 getting instinct under self-preservation, because the latter is the 
 more generic term and might be taken to include a larger scope. It 
 is even possible to use the term "self-preservation" in a sense 
 wide enough to include all instinctive behavior. But in this in- 
 stance I propose to use it in a narrower connotation as applying 
 to two types of reaction, the aim of which is to avoid dangers and 
 to overcome opposition to the normal operation of the life-processes. 
 These are flight or the defensive reaction with its accompanying 
 emotional tone of fear, and pugnacity or the offensive reaction with 
 its concomitant emotion of anger. These two types of behavior 
 are the characteristic expressions of the instinctive tendency toward 
 self-preservation. We might say that they are the organism's 
 way of expressing the will to five in the face of circumstances ready 
 to crush it. To be sure, we may include the instinctive disposition 
 to procure food to satisfy the felt needs in this organic will 
 to live. Indeed the instinctive behavior of self-preservation may 
 be associated with many other circumstances of types of behavior. 
 Circumstances connected with the securing of food, with mating, 
 with procreation, with curiosity, and with gregariousness may be 
 the stimuli calling forth flight or pugnacity, with their emotional 
 tones of fear or anger. 
 
 Starbuck sees in religion a response to the instinct of self- 
 preservation and the desire for the fulness of life on the physiological 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 79 
 
 plane. ^ Hocking, as we have seen, identified the two instincts.^ 
 Herter finds in religion, as well as in music, painting, and litera- 
 ture, a human product which represents "the fusion of self- 
 preservation and the sexual instincts."^ 
 
 There is no doubt that much of the ceremonial originated by 
 primitive people was designed to help them in thus determining 
 to persevere in Hfe, in the struggle for existence. That fact may be 
 illustrated from almost any ceremonial. Moreover, the struggle 
 for existence Hes behind the evolution of both the religious and the 
 scientific techniques. Socially and mechanically they are designed 
 to help man satisfy the felt needs of life in the struggle against the 
 opposing forces. Primitive man's ceremonial was indicative of a 
 fear lest he should lose out in the struggle for existence. The 
 ritual was an expression of the felt emotion, often by a mimetic 
 representation of the desired result which enhanced the desired end 
 or object. This factor in the process, whereby that which was 
 felt would satisfy the need was mimetically enacted beforehand, 
 illustrates the indistinguishable beginnings from which art and 
 religion originate. Jane Harrison has presented the matter in 
 Ancient Art and Ritual with typical illustrations.'* Thus also 
 many of the dramatic representations which enter into religious 
 ceremonial are illustrative of the emotion of fear lest they should 
 not pass the crisis in safety. Miss Harrison presents an account 
 of a traveler in Euboea during Holy Week who was 
 
 struck by the genuine grief shown at the Good Friday services. On Easter 
 eve there was the same gloom and despondency, and he asked an old woman 
 why it was. She answered: "Of course I am anxious; for if Christ does not 
 rise tomorrow, we shall have no corn this year." The old woman's state of 
 mind is fairly clear. Her emotion is the old emotion .... fear, imminent 
 fear for the failure of food. The Christ again is not the historical Christ of 
 Judaea, still less the incarnation of the Godhead, proceeding from the Father; 
 he is the actual figure fashioned by his village chorus and laid by the priests, 
 the leaders of that chorus, in the sepulchre.^ 
 
 ' Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion, p. 403. 
 
 ' Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 106. 
 
 3 Herter, The Biological Aspect of Human Problems, p. 285. 
 
 4 See pp. 24-27, where she refers to the prayer-disks of the Huichol Indians, which 
 as prayers may be classified as ritual, and as decorated surfaces are specimens of 
 primitive art. 
 
 5/W<f., pp. 73, 74. 
 
8o THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 Farther down in the scale of civilization the fear element is to 
 be seen operative in many ways. It is tied up with animism in the 
 majority of cases. So prevalent is this element of fear in the primi- 
 tive forms of religion that many have seen in it the origin of religion. 
 Lucretius said: "It is fear that engenders the gods." Thomas 
 Hobbes said: "The feare of things invisible is the natural seede of 
 religion.'" David Hume said: "The first ideas of religion arose 
 from a common concern with regard to the events of life and fears 
 which actuate the mind."^ Ribot finds the emotion of fear in 
 varying degrees in all religions, "from profound terror to vague 
 uneasiness, due to the faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable 
 Power, able to render great services, and, more especially, to inflict 
 great injuries."^ 
 
 The source books furnish us abundant illustrations of the fear 
 motive in religion and in other social customs. Mary H. Kingsley 
 cites examples of the influence of fear among the people of Guinea. 
 She describes it thus: 
 
 I have often seen on market roads in many districts but always well away 
 from Europeanized settlements, a little space cleared by the wayside, and 
 neatly laid with plantain leaves, whereon were very tidily arranged various 
 
 little articles for sale Against each class of articles so many cowrie 
 
 shells or beans are placed, and always hanging from a branch above, or sedately 
 sitting in the middle of the shop, a little fetish. The number of cowrie shells 
 or beans indicates the price of the individual articles in the various heaps, 
 and the little fetish is there to see that anyone who does not place in the stead 
 of the articles removed their proper price, or who meddles with the tiU, shall 
 swell up and burst. '' 
 
 The element of fear led not only to a socializing attitude toward 
 the extra-human environment, but the mechanical attitude also 
 was developed in the struggle of life to dominate in the face of 
 dangers and crises. This is exemplified in the use of magic, counter- 
 magic, and sorcery as techniques which were thought to furnish 
 
 ' Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 73. 
 
 ^ Quoted by Leuba, The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion, p. 81. 
 
 3 Ribot, Psychologie des Sentiments, 4th ed., 1903, p. 309. 
 
 •» Mary H. Kingsley, West African Studies, pp. 248, 249. Other illustrations may 
 be found in Frazer, The Golden Bough; Tylor, Primitive Culture; Spencer and Gillen, 
 The Northern Tribes of Central Australia. 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 8i 
 
 the individual with a mechanism for controlling those environ- 
 mental forces which were otherwise able to work him ill. The 
 formula of the magician or sorcerer as a mechanism of this type is 
 illustrated in the life of the Todas of South India, whose whole 
 social fabric is bound up with the Hfe of the buffaloes. An example 
 of the sorcerer's formula is as follows: 
 
 For the sake of Pithiotea, Om, Teikirji and Tirshti, by the power of the 
 gods, if there be power; by the gods' country, if there be a country; may his 
 calves perish; as birds fly away, may his buffaloes go when the calves come to 
 suck; as I drink water, may he have nothing but water to drink; as I am 
 thirsty, may he always be thirsty; as I am hungry, may he also be hungry: 
 as my children cry, so may his children cry; as my wife wears only a ragged 
 cloth, so may his wife wear only a ragged cloth.' 
 
 When the sorcerer is uttering this incantation he holds in his 
 hand five small stones tied together by a hair and all tied in a cloth. 
 Then they are hidden in the thatch of the house of the man on whom 
 he desires the misfortunes to fall. Thus satisfaction for the instinct 
 for self-preservation is sought by a mechanical means which is 
 supposed to operate in removing the danger which the individual 
 fears is imminent. As we have observed in analogous circum- 
 stances, the breakdown of the magical conception of causality was 
 what led to the search for a scientific explanation and a scientific 
 technique. 
 
 The instinct of self-preservation reacts at other times in pug- 
 nacity, and this is the activity which is basal to war. Sometimes 
 fear enters and may serve either to stimulate the anger and fighting 
 power or at other times to inhibit it. Professor Ames has rightly 
 emphasized war as one of the occasions giving rise to the ceremonial. 
 "In carrying out any interest savage tribes usually find innumer- 
 able occasions for war. The war ceremonies are therefore much 
 in evidence. They consist of councils, assemblages, decorations, 
 fasts, parades, manoeuvres, dances, triumphal processions, feasts."^ 
 
 Tylor points out how these savage races create divinities for 
 special functions, including war. One of the numerous illustrations 
 which he records is cited: "Areskove, the Iroquois War-god, seems 
 to be himself the great celestial deity; for his pleasant food they 
 
 ' W. H. R. Rivers, The Todas, pp. 256-58. ^ Op. cit., p. 75. 
 
82 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 slaughtered human victims, that he might give them victory over 
 their enemies; as a pleasant sight for him, they tortured the war- 
 captives; on him the war-chief called in solemn council, and the 
 warriors, shouting his name, rushed into the battle he was surveying 
 from on high."' 
 
 But man did not depend exclusively on the spirit world to help 
 him to win his battles. His need for self-preservation urged him 
 to seek mechanical means also. At first he found his implements 
 and tools and utensils and weapons in nature. Nature provided 
 him with the grubbing-stick to enable him to handle the soil, with a 
 round stone to serve as a hammer, with a cave or a thickly befoliaged 
 tree for a shelter, with a rough stick for a club, and with a sharp 
 stone for a knife or a spearhead. The critical situations with which 
 he was surrounded led to the birth of intelligence and selection. 
 These tools and weapons were improved and his mechanistic tech- 
 nique made increasingly efiSicient. In proportion to his advance- 
 ment in this direction, he approached in the direction of a scientific 
 conception of causality. 
 
 IV. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS STIMULATED BY CONTACT WITH 
 THE STRANGE AND THE UNUSUAL 
 
 It will not be necessary for my purpose to go into an elaborate 
 discussion concerning the problem as to whether curiosity is an 
 instinct or not. Some psychologists deny that it is. Many claim 
 that it is", among whom some classify it as a compound or secondary 
 instinct. Biologists are agreed that there are in man and in many of 
 the lower animals tendencies to distinctive reactions in the presence 
 of the strange and the unusual. The behavior of dogs, of water 
 snakes, and especially of monkeys is illustrative. The same dis- 
 position is apparent in little children. I do not know of any word 
 which my daughter has used more frequently during her fourth and 
 fifth years than "Why?" For this type of behavior, whereby 
 there is a disposition to pry into the strange and the unknown and 
 which is indeed complex, we may apply the name "curiosity" in a 
 generic sense. In another connection, where the discussion was 
 concerned with the reference of science to a specific instinct, a 
 
 ' Tylor, Primitive Culture, II, 306, 307. 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 83 
 
 brief statement was made of the positions of Shand and Ribot/ 
 The analysis of Mr. Shand seems to me to be keen. His position, 
 it may be observed, is close to that of Mr. McDougall, whose dis- 
 cussion of curiosity^ is good. The point which has interest in this 
 connection is that both of these psychologists find curiosity as one 
 of the roots appearing both in religion and science. Men of the 
 greatest intellectual and spiritual vigor are men in whom the 
 disposition to inquiry is most marked. To the impulse of curi- 
 osity we surely "owe most of the disinterested labors of the 
 highest types of intellect. It must be regarded as one of the prin- 
 cipal roots of both science and religion."^ Mr. Shand's theory, 
 by which he traces elements of both religion and science to curi- 
 osity, has already been stated. 
 
 The result of this prying into the unusual and the unknown, like 
 other instinctive behavior to which we have given our attention, has 
 been the development of two distinctive attitudes. One is the 
 attempt to estabHsh a personal relationship with the power which 
 the mind of man has posited as an animus in the unknown. This 
 is a religious conception because it is a socializing concept and man 
 tries to establish communion with this power. It is a prescientific 
 concept because it is an effort to explain the inexplicable by refer- 
 ence to a First Cause. Such an idea finds expression among many 
 primitives, such as the Dakota Indians' wakan, the Polynesian 
 mana, and the Algonquins' manitou. We have an expression of the 
 same attitude in a more sophisticated environment in the concept 
 of an Unknowable presented by Herbert Spencer. The desire to 
 pry into the sphere beyond experience, the meta-empirical or meta- 
 physical, is accompanied by the effort to establish social relation- 
 ship therewith, or an element of mysticism. 
 
 The other attitude is evidenced in the insatiable desire to add to 
 the stock of human knowledge by the paths of investigation and 
 experimentation. It is the basis of many of the most brilliant 
 achievements of the human race. It has led to our scientific con- 
 ception of causation and mechanical control through its accompany- 
 ing technique. It has retired much that is magical and many 
 
 'Pp. 67, 68, above. 
 
 ' An Introduction to Social Psychology (loth ed.; Boston, 1916), pp. 57-59, 315-20. 
 
 * Shand, op. cit., p. 59. 
 
84 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 animistic conceptions through the splendid discoveries which it has 
 made possible. 
 
 In this connection it is of interest to note that the mystical 
 temperament is more characteristic of people in tropical climates 
 than of those in the temperate zones, whereas the scientific tempera- 
 ment has had a richer development in the temperate climes. It 
 leads to the conclusion that among the stimuli which affect the 
 reactions of the organism the climatic forces play an active r61e. 
 The warmer the climate, the greater the ennui, and ennui is no 
 friend to science. At the same time, the warmer climates have 
 given birth to more mystical types of religion, as witness Hinayana 
 Buddhism, the bhakti development of Hinduism, the Sufi sect of 
 the Mohammedans, and the ascetic ideal of Christianity developing 
 on Egyptian soil. Theologies or scientific treatments of religious 
 development have largely originated in the temperate climes where 
 the climatic conditions seem to favor the development of a colder, 
 more objective type of intellectual acumen. So also the larger 
 developments of the other sciences have had their history in the 
 temperate zone, and particularly in the north temperate zone. 
 
 V. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH 
 GREGARIOUSNESS 
 
 Psychologists are not in perfect unanimity as to whether gre- 
 
 gariousness is an instinct or not. Sometimes it is interpreted as 
 
 intelligent behavior growing out of the needs created by the hunger 
 
 and sex instincts.^ Those who argue for the instinctive character 
 
 of gregariousness refer to such phenomena in the lower animals as 
 
 the swarming of bees, migrations of birds, colonies of ants, packs 
 
 of wolves, herds of deer, flocks of sheep, droves of cattle, shoals of 
 
 fishes, and the like. Among primitives the characteristic form of 
 
 life is the group life of a clan or a tribe. In many cases the unity 
 
 of the group is preserved by means of a totem animal with which the 
 
 life of the group is identified. Among children the disposition to 
 
 form cliques and gangs is further evidence of this tendency. The 
 
 disposition for large numbers of people to herd in towns and cities 
 
 is another link in the chain of evidence. 
 
 ' Ames and Thomas find the origin of the social bond in the sexual life. See 
 Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 37; Thomas, Sex and Society, p. 56. 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 85 
 
 From the biological point of view the evidence points to the 
 belief that there are certain co-ordinations of reflexes which have 
 been neurally integrated in such a way that the behavior is service- 
 able in helping not only the individual but the group in the struggle 
 for existence, i.e., serviceable for co-operation. Professor Brooks 
 has shown convincingly that a study of the adaptations that are 
 developed in the various species leads to the conclusion that such 
 adaptations are ''for the good of the species and not for the indi- 
 vidual" as such. Moreover, he argues that "the law is universal, 
 but since the welfare of the species is usually identified with that of 
 the constituent individuals it is not obvious unless the good of the 
 species demands the sacrifice of the individuals." The general 
 law of nature which refers the properties of all living things to a 
 social, utiHtarian basis affords an explanation, he claims, for such 
 varied gregarious activities as the migrations of salmon and the 
 altruistic moral sense of man.'' 
 
 The question at issue is as to which is the dominant principle in 
 biological evolution, struggle or co-operation. Does the struggle 
 for existence mean a ruthless struggle in which only the fittest 
 individuals survive, and the less fortunate are destroyed by cruel 
 competition? There are some phenomena in nature, such as the 
 struggle between different species of ants for mutual extermination, 
 which afford evidence that certain biologists consider to be sufficient 
 for the adoption of mutual struggle as a principle of biological 
 evolution.^ But the evidence seems to point more conclusively in 
 the direction of the principle of mutual aid. There is more of co- 
 operation than of cruel competition among the lower animals as 
 well as in human society, and the biological justification for making 
 sociability a law of nature is quite as sound as the argument for 
 mutual struggle. The struggle for existence is not to be inter- 
 preted as a struggle to exterminate the unfit, but as a collective 
 struggle. Gregariousness is the rule in animal behavior, and not 
 the exception. Association is to be seen in every stage of the evolu- 
 tionary process. Decay and extermination are phenomena much 
 
 'W. G. Brooks, The Foundations of Zoology, pp. 11 7-19. 
 
 ' Cf. the argument of the German biologist in "Headquarters Nights" by Vernon 
 Kellogg in the Atlantic Monthly, August, 191 7. Also Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, A 
 Factor in Evolution, chap. i. 
 
86 TEE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 more characteristic of unsociable than of gregarious animals. 
 "Students of animals under domestication have shown us how the 
 habits of a gregarious animal, taken away from his kind, are shaped 
 in a thousand details by reference to the lost pack which is no 
 
 longer there It is a strange thing, this eternal hunger of the 
 
 gregarious animal for the herd of friends who are not there. "^ 
 There is good reason to believe that the non-social animal is a 
 decadent type, the gregarious animal being antecedent and truer 
 to type. 
 
 The collective activities of the lower animals are almost as varied 
 as in the case of primitive man. The animals co-operate with 
 others of the same species for warding off inclement weather, 
 guarding against danger, fighting, playing, dancing, singing, obtain- 
 ing nutriment, migrating, procreating, and for the elimination of 
 competition. So, too, primitive man lives an associated life. He 
 is never characterized by individualism, but frequently by com- 
 munism. The most primitive people observable, such as the Todas 
 of South India, the Bushmen of South Africa, and the aborigines of 
 Australia, show a well-developed tendency to sociality. 
 
 The higher up we proceed in the scale of culture and sophistica- 
 tion, the more evidence do we see of man's social nature and the 
 more complex become the co-ordinations of men. Among mam- 
 mals, the nearest akin biologically to man, association is present, 
 but the organizations are developed very meagerly in comparison 
 with man. Where the gregarious tendencies are most highly 
 cultivated, there appears a better foundation for happiness and 
 morality. Duty, morality, culture, happiness, love, sacrifice, 
 service, truth, religion— these are all terms meaningless apart from 
 social relations. 
 
 We have, therefore, a biological justification for using the word 
 " gregariousness" as a generic term for all the instinctive reactions 
 which are serviceable to the group in the struggle for existence. 
 Gregariousness has not always been regarded as an instinct, 
 because in the case of "mammals at any rate the appearance of 
 gregariousness has not been accompanied by any gross physical 
 
 'From Gilbert Murray's lecture on "Stoicism," quoted by H. G. Wells in God 
 the Invisible King, pp. 88, 89. 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 87 
 
 changes which are obviously associated with it."^ On the other 
 hand the cumulative results of gregariousness are so great as to 
 really overbalance the most pronounced structural variations, so 
 that, as Trotter points out, we find a state, frequently thought of as 
 an acquired rather than as a congenital mode of behavior, "capable 
 of enabhng the insect nervous system to compete in the complexity 
 of its powers with that of the higher vertebrates."^ One might 
 say that the whole structure is such that its functions and adapta- 
 tions are quite as serviceable to the species as to the individual, and 
 that includes the co-ordination and integration by the nervous 
 system of reflexes; so that we are justified in urging that gregarious 
 behavior is instinctive to the human organism as well as to the 
 lower animals. 
 
 The psychologist today is emphasizing as never heretofore the 
 significance of gregariousness. Since man is a social animal, all 
 psychology is, of necessity, the psychology of a social animal. 
 There is no human psychology of an unadulterated individualism, 
 since man as a solitary animal does not exist. On that account 
 Professor Cooley is inclined to believe that all the instincts are 
 social and holds that "social or moral progress consists less in the 
 aggrandisement of particular faculties or instincts and the suppres- 
 sion of others, than in the discipHne of all with reference to the 
 progressive organization of life."^ He believes, however, that social 
 behavior is of such a nature that it may be classified as instinctive. 
 He says: 
 
 I take it that the child has by heredity a generous capacity and need for 
 social feeling, rather too vague and plastic to be given any specific name like 
 love. It is not so much any particular emotion or sentiment as the undiflfer- 
 entiated material of many, perhaps sociability is as good a name for it as any. 
 And this material, like all other instinct, allies itself with social experience to 
 form, as time goes on, a diversifying body of personal thought in which the 
 phases of social feeling developed correspond, in some measure, to the com- 
 plexity of life itself.^ 
 
 The reference of religion to gregariousness may be substantiated 
 by an abundance of material. It has been noted already that in 
 
 » W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 19. ^ Ibid., p. 20. 
 
 3 Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 12. ^ Ibid., pp. 50, 51. 
 
88 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 primitivity human life is a group life, so that human interests and 
 human needs are all tinged with a social element. Men went in 
 groups to hunt and fish. Women went in groups to gather fruits. 
 Men carried on war as groups. The group camped together, lived 
 together, worked together, played together, fought together, and 
 together they carried out their mimetic dances and other ceremo- 
 nials. There would never have arisen a ceremonial or a cult had 
 life been always and only individualistic. The struggle for exist- 
 ence was a social struggle, calling for co-operation on all sides. 
 The connection between the gregarious tendency and the social 
 life is so close that, as we have seen, some psychologists and sociolo- 
 gists find its origin there. Thus the need for food, the business 
 of mating and procreating, the urge toward self-protection and 
 preservation by means of war, and the search for a larger life by 
 prying into the strange — all these interests have contributed to 
 the understanding of human life as essentially, indeed as instinc- 
 tively, gregarious. 
 
 Among the evidences of the connection between rehgion and 
 gregariousness we need only remind ourselves of a few, such as 
 totemism and its concomitant ceremonial, animism and its extension 
 of the social bonds beyond the mundane, group magic, ancestor 
 worship, mimetic dances and ceremonials connected with war, 
 mimetic ceremonials and sacrificial rites connected with the supply 
 of food, and ceremonies connected with the normal occupation of 
 the group, such as the Toda dairy rites. Among the more 
 sophisticated races the connection is no less apparent, as witness 
 the caste system and Hinduism, monasticism in various religions, 
 religious festivals, churches and church services, revival meetings, 
 sacred meals in the Greek and Christian religions, and social and 
 missionary propagandism. 
 
 But in another sense still, religion may be considered as an 
 "irradiation," to borrow Starbuck's word, of the social instinct. 
 The reference of religion to the limits of the human group is too 
 narrow. The cult did not arise solely as a mimetic expression of 
 group activities. It conveyed also the yearning of the group to 
 enUst the aid of the extra-human power or powers in whose existence 
 it believed. It was the mutual-aid principle carried into the life 
 
INSTINCTIVE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE 89 
 
 of a people which did not believe that it was bounded by the ordi- 
 nary human group limits. It was the attempt of the group to 
 make vocal its groping for the power or powers with which it would 
 fraternize and co-operate. The prayer of the religious man is 
 characteristic, like the call of the bird that has lost its mate or the 
 lonely animal that has strayed from the herd, of a gregarious nature.* 
 Religion is the socializing of man, the social animal, with that which 
 is beyond human society. 
 
 On the other hand the evolution of a technique for mechanical 
 adjustment and control has been within the social group. Human 
 needs and human struggles are social because they are human. 
 Thus the urge for the organization of a technique of a mechanistic 
 type as well as of a technique of a socializing character is the urge 
 which man, the social animal, has experienced as he, an individual 
 within a group, struggled for existence. The advance of the sci- 
 ences, progress of any kind of knowledge, depends upon the social 
 structure. We may interpret co-operation as a big historical 
 sweep by which the various members of the race in different groups 
 and in different periods of history have entered into one another's 
 labors for the great good of the social whole. The heritage of a 
 scientific past is a conservation of energy, releasing the power of 
 the present for new tasks, fresh achievements. Progress is a child 
 of gregariousness. 
 
 The foregoing discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive 
 treatment of instinctive behavior. I think, however, that the 
 principal types have been treated. The investigation has led to 
 two conclusions, the first of which concerns the complexity of 
 instinctive behavior, and the second showing that the origins of 
 religion and science are traceable to a multiple causality. 
 
 I . In dealing with the five types of instinctive reactions with 
 
 which we were concerned, it was impossible to deal with any one of 
 
 them without finding one's self in contact with behavior which 
 
 belonged to one or more of the other types. In the reactions 
 
 resulting from the efforts to obtain food, ceremonials arose which 
 
 'The parables of Jesus in Luke, chap. 15, are illustrative. Here religious need 
 and religious longing are compared to the needs and longings of the sheep which had 
 strayed from the flock, and the prodigal who had abandoned the privileges of home. 
 
90 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 involved gregarious activity. Crises in regard to the supply of 
 food sometimes called forth flight; sometimes pugnacity. Neces- 
 sity of providing for women and children developed a social dis- 
 position. The sexual life with its mating and procreating activities 
 involved gregariousness, the provision of food, curiosity as to the 
 reproductive process, and flight or pugnacity in the interests of 
 preservation. Self-preservation involved a demand for food, a 
 satisfaction for the normal sexual desires, a search into the strange 
 and unknown, and co-operation. Curiosity might arise as to 
 whether a fruit were food or poison, or over the behavior of 
 animals, and be akin to fear. It also called forth a group co- 
 operation to procure satisfaction for its needs. Gregariousxiess 
 involved a group need for food, the mating and parental relation- 
 ships, a social demand for preservation, and a common desire to 
 satisfy the human craving to increase the stock of knowledge by 
 investigation and experimentation. Thus we come back to the 
 conclusion that the organism is a unity and that the dominating 
 urge is its struggle for existence. The end of each type of instinc- 
 tive behavior appears to be a co-operation with the other types in 
 the human struggle. 
 
 2. Furthermore it is the struggle for existence to which the 
 instinctive behavior is constantly contributing which has urged 
 man to the formation of the two techniques of control which we call 
 religion and science. By religion he seeks to establish social adjust- 
 ments and relationships with the extra-human environment, and 
 by science he endeavors to create mechanical adjustments and 
 relationships to that environment. The purpose of both is the 
 same — that he may "have dominion."* 
 
 ' Gen. 1 : 28. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The application of the historico-psychological method to the 
 problems of the functions and genesis of religion and science is not 
 without certain results of which the theologian must take cogni- 
 zance. It is the purpose of this chapter to summarize the signifi- 
 cance for theology in relation to the problems of authority, of the 
 task of theology, of theological method, and of apologetics. 
 
 It remains for us to observe of what significance it is for theology 
 that we have estabHshed the genesis and functions of religion and 
 science in the psycho-physical organism and its modes of behavior. 
 For it must be evident that the significance is far-reaching. 
 
 I. We have seen that it is possible to trace the origin of science 
 and religion to certain typical methods of instinctive reaction to 
 external stimuli. We are able also to trace with some degree of 
 clarity the development of the attitudes from the instincts. Thus 
 we have a genetic account of both religion and science as human 
 attitudes. In that way the inductive approach has made it appar- 
 rent that the differentiation is not between science, the human 
 creation, and religion, the heavenly donation. Both are of human 
 origin and both of them function to human needs. Hence both 
 are developmental. We look for the beginnings of religion as well 
 as of science in the behavior of primitive peoples where life is least 
 complex, and not in an ecclesiastical Adam. We find that their 
 function is to meet the insistent needs of man for control by the 
 social and mechanical techniques which men have evolved in the 
 reHgions and sciences. The whole conflict which raged so long 
 between science and theology was due to the ecclesiastical self- 
 assurance that theology possessed all the weight of divine authority 
 behind it, whereas science was an impostor of human invention. 
 If the conclusions of this thesis be correct, it means that the 
 question of authority must be interpreted, not in the sense of 
 
 91 
 
92 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 conformity to ecclesiastical standards, but with reference to 
 efficiency and ability in satisfying the needs of a progressing 
 humanity. 
 
 2. The ecclesiasticizing of religion, which was the work of the 
 Middle Ages, and the rationalizing of religion, which was attempted 
 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were both of them of a 
 piece with deductive science. The presupposition was that truth 
 was ready-made and unalterable. The laws of science and the 
 dogmas of rehgion were alike everlasting. Man's task was one of 
 discovery. What becomes of that conception as we historically 
 and psychologically observe man in his struggle for existence and 
 dominion actually participating in the making of truth ? It 
 means that the task of theology is not simply the discovery and 
 classification of never-to-be-altered dogmas, but is creative and 
 serviceable. It too must accept the universal challenge to prove 
 its worth by its ability to minister to man's religious needs. 
 
 In the examination of the instincts it was observed that the 
 findings of biology include the modifiability and adaptability of the 
 instincts. But in the instinctive reactions we have the simplest, 
 least complex type of human behavior. If even the instincts are 
 modifiable and adaptable, surely the life-processes in toto must be 
 likewise. It ought to be apparent that a static theology cannot 
 hope to satisfy a kinetic world in which human nature itself is 
 always in process of change. The future of theology is tied up 
 with the recognition of its creative task as a ministrant to an 
 evolving life. 
 
 Theology is an interpreter of religion. Its purpose is instru- 
 mental and functional rather than dictatorial and dogmatic. The 
 only adequate criterion for testing and revising theology must be 
 an appreciation of religion as we study it in actual social experience. 
 The theology of the experience of an age of feudahsm cannot do 
 justice to the experiences of an age of democracy. It was out of the 
 question that Anselm and Aquinas should write a theology for all 
 time. Theology is always in the making even as religion itself is 
 always in the making, or, still more fundamentally, as human life 
 is conceived in terms of process. The theological task is never com- 
 
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 93 
 
 plete; so that a study of the religious life as evolving from the 
 instinctive life constitutes a challenge for theology to face the situa- 
 tion in a time when experimental science, democracy, war, indus- 
 trial expansion, and rapid transportation have created a new world 
 with social, ethical, and religious problems demanding the creative 
 efforts of serious-minded men. 
 
 3. The biocentric theory of the genesis and function of religion 
 and science involves important consequences for the student of 
 theological method. If the criterion be biocentric, then the demand 
 is for co-operation between the two disciplines in the interests of the 
 highest good for life. That means that theology becomes more ethical 
 in proportion as it becomes scientific. Ritschi, as we have seen, 
 tried to protect religion by saying that it is independent of science, 
 and he argued that collisions occur only when a law of science, 
 which obtains in the narrower field of nature, is erected into 
 a world-law. His faculty psychology and dualism worked hand 
 in hand. But the development of the organism as a unity suggests 
 the impossibility of making such sharp lines of demarcation between 
 the religious and scientific interests that the one can develop regard- 
 less of the other. In that way theology may be protected against 
 the danger of making statements which would be annulled by the 
 known findings of science. The purpose of the theological doctrine 
 is as truly functional as the scientific theorem. The needs of life 
 demand of each of them a regard for the other. 
 
 4. The apologetic possibilities of theology are immensely 
 increased by the conclusions of this thesis. Some attention was 
 given to the positivistic movement in its leading representative, 
 Auguste Comte. It was Comte's contention that the history of 
 man begins with a mythological stage, passes through a metaphysical 
 stage, and is entering upon a positive stage. At the bottom we have 
 cultureless religion, and at the top we shall have religionless culture. 
 So also M. Guyau in his Non-Religion of the Future argued that 
 civilization was moving toward a higher plane where it would be 
 independent of religion. Thus these positivistic writers argued 
 for the ultimate disintegration of religion. But if religion be a 
 social attitude toward the extra-human environment having its 
 
94 THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 
 roots in the instinctive life, as we have shown, we have an argument 
 for its ineradicability and against any liability of corrosion. There 
 will have to be a much greater modification in man's way of func- 
 tioning than has yet taken place before religion is in danger of 
 passing away. 
 
 The evolutionistic monism of Haeckel and Ostwald was another 
 effort to deny to religion any legitimate sphere. Their attempt 
 was to work out a monistic system on the basis of science which 
 should do everything for Kfe that religion has done in the past. 
 Their work was based on the fundamental misconception that 
 religion deals only with the supernatural, and is therefore retired 
 when scientific causality upsets miracle. But the work that was 
 done by Hoffding is the best defense against such an attack. He 
 showed that the whole question of miracle was due to a confusion 
 of the religious and scientific tasks. When we conceive of religion 
 as an evaluatory attitude as against the explanatory attitude of 
 science, we see at once that the relegation of the question of miracle 
 to the domain of the scientist is the most scientific procedure, since 
 science deals with causes, while it emancipates religion for its real 
 task of evaluating and interpreting the phenomena of experience 
 in terms of our cosmic relationships. 
 
 Naturahsm has sometimes attacked religion on the ground that 
 it is too metaphysical. All the truth of which we can be sure, 
 says the naturalist, is that which we can prove in the laboratory. 
 Thus the differentiation is made: religion deals with the meta- 
 physical and hypothetical, whereas science deals with the physical 
 and demonstrable. This is made the basis for a scientific agnosti- 
 cism as to the questions of God, freedom, and immortality. Reli- 
 gion has at least the argumentum ad hominem that science too has 
 its metaphysics in the aeons, electrons, atoms, and molecules of 
 the scientist. When scientists attempt to furnish a philosophy 
 of Hfe which shall take the place of and function for us as religion 
 has done in the past, they become every whit as metaphysical and 
 hypothetical as any religionist. The naturalistic theories are all 
 of them capable of criticism at this point, as Professor Ward has 
 shown in his epoch-making critique of Naturalism and Agnosticism. 
 
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 95 
 
 Moreover, the new emphasis in religion on function as against on- 
 tology means that the force of this attack is largely spent on a 
 phantom enemy. 
 
 The persistence of religion, the truth of religion, the adequacy 
 of doctrinal statements, and the uniqueness of Christianity— these 
 are all of them questions with which we deal functionally today. 
 Our defense is in terms of their serviceableness to life rather than 
 their superior origin. The imperishable values are the achieved 
 values rather than the donated. Against such an epistemology 
 science has no case, and let us hope for her own sake that she desires 
 none. 
 
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