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ENGLAND'S CASE 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 HOME EULE. 
 
 By a. Y. dicey, B.C.L., 
 
 HON. LL.D. GLASGOW AND EDINBURGH; 
 
 VINERIAN PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD; 
 
 FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE, AND FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD; 
 
 AUTHOR OF LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE LAW OF THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION. 
 
 THIBD EDITION. 
 
 LONDON: 
 JOHN MUEEAY, ALBEMAELE STEEET. 
 
 1887. 
 
REPLACINCS 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PBINTED BY TVILI.IA3I CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 
 STAMFOIU) bTfiEET AKD CHAUIKO CBOSS. 
 
I>\957 
 
 PEEFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 Three montlis have elapsed since the first publication 
 of this book. The period is short, but meanwhile events 
 have occurred which strengthen two at least of the posi- 
 tions maintained in ' England's Case against Home Kule/ 
 
 The Gladstonian constitution, I contended, failed to 
 fulfil the conditions which it was meant to satisfy. 
 
 That this is so is all but admitted even by Home Eulers. 
 The defence of the Gladstonian constitution has been 
 abandoned, if not by its author, at least by his followers. 
 Few indeed are the eulogies which since the dissolution of 
 Parliament have been pronounced by the advocates of 
 Home Eule on the Government of Ireland Bill. Criticism 
 has not missed its mark ; the vital defects of the measure 
 pressed last summer on the acceptance of Parliament have 
 been made patent to all the world. 
 
 Throughout my statement of the case against Home 
 Eule the opinion is maintained that the discontent of the 
 Irish people is due far more to agrarian than to political 
 causes. 
 
 This opinion is, we now know, shared by the leaders of 
 the National League. Their Plan of Campaign rests on an 
 
 ivi845764 
 
iv Preface. 
 
 appeal not to the sentiment of nationality, but to hatred 
 of rent. The Nationalists no doubt know their own busi- 
 ness. Their conduct proves that they hold " no payment 
 of rent " to be a far more telling cry than " Home Eule for 
 Ireland." On such a matter their judgment is decisive. 
 Nor is the Plan of Campaign the sole circumstance which 
 adds force to my contention. A well-informed author has 
 within the last two months published an account of the 
 battle for tenant-right in France.* The farmers of Picardy 
 have for generations fought for their droit dc marclie with 
 all the arms used by the farmers of Ireland in defence of 
 tenant-right. The contest in France, as in Ireland, has 
 been disgraced by the vilest outrages, by boycotting, by 
 rick-burning, by the mutilation of animals, by the murder 
 of depointeurs, or land-grabbers. In France, as in Ireland, 
 crimes have been committed with impunity in open day 
 and under the very eyes of an indifferent or sympathetic 
 population. Yet the tenants who have fought for the droit 
 de marcJie have not been galled by foreign legislation, and 
 they have never been divided from their landlords by 
 differences of race, of religion, or of politics. Tliey have 
 opposed the law, not because it came to them in a foreign 
 garb, but because it ran counter to popular sentiment, 
 traditions, or customs. In Picardy indeed — and here the 
 parallel with Ireland fails — the feud of centuries has come 
 
 * See the very noteworthy article, * Tenant-Right and Agrarian 
 Outrage in France/ by R. E. Prothero, Contemporary lievieiv^ 188G, 
 p. 832. 
 
Preface. v 
 
 almost to an end. The reason of its cessation is worth 
 notice. The peasants have in effect made good their rights, 
 and the spread of peasant-proprietorship is depriving the 
 droit de marclie of its importance. The moral of these 
 facts hardly needs to be pressed home. This much may- 
 be safely asserted. The policy of the National League, 
 taken in connection with the history of tenant-right in 
 Trance, justifies the opinion that Irish opposition to law is 
 mainly due to agricultural causes and that alterations in 
 the tenure of land may deprive the demand for Home Eule 
 of all effective force. Such reforms, however, must, 
 according to all English notions of fairness, be carried out 
 with due regard to the rights of individuals. A sacrifice 
 of private rights to the interests of the nation gives the 
 sufferer an admitted claim to compensation out of national 
 
 resources.* 
 
 A. V. D. 
 
 All Soul's College, Oxford, 
 February^ 1887. 
 
 * My readers may notice frequent references throughout this work 
 to my treatise on * The Law of the Constitution.* I have ventured to 
 refer to the book, although it is my own, for two reasons. The prin- 
 ciples laid down in it form the basis of many of the arguments contained 
 in the statement of the constitutional case against Home Rule ; these 
 principles seem to me most fairly stated in language used before the 
 appearance of the Government of Ireland Bill, and employed without 
 reference to any political controversy. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 An author who publishes a book having any reference 
 to Irish affairs may, not unnaturally, be supposed either 
 to possess some special knowledge of Ireland, or else to be 
 the advocate of some new specific for the cure of Irish 
 discontent. Of neither of these suppositions can I claim 
 the benefit. My knowledge of Ireland is merely the 
 knowledge — perhaps it were better to say the ignorance — of 
 an educated Englishman. It is derived from conversation 
 with better informed friends, from careful attention to the 
 discussions on Irish policy which for the last eighteen 
 years have engrossed public attention, and from books 
 accessible to ordinary readers. If I can claim no special 
 acquaintance with Ireland, still less have I the presumption 
 or the folly to come forward as the inventor of any political 
 nostrum. My justification for publishing my thoughts on 
 Home Eule is that the movement in favour of the Parlia- 
 mentary independence of Ireland constitutes, whether its 
 advocates recognise the fact or not, a demand for funda- 
 mental alterations in the whole Constitution of the United 
 Kingdom ; and while I may without presumption consider 
 myself moderately acquainted with the principles of 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 Constitutional law, I entertain the firmest conviction 
 that any scheme for Home Eule in Ireland involves 
 dangerous if not fatal innovations on the Constitution of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 To set foi-th the reasons for this opinion is the object 
 of this work. The opinion itself, whatever its worth, 
 is not the growth of recent controversy ; it has been 
 entertained for years, and has been expressed by me in 
 various publications. Tliis book is much more than 
 a reprint ; its contents are, however, in part made up of 
 articles which have already been published. My thanks 
 are due to the owners of the Contemporary Review and of 
 the New York Nation for their permission to make free use 
 of my contributions to the pages of their periodicals ; it is 
 a pleasure to acknowledge the exceptional liberality with 
 which my friend, Mr. E. L. Godkin, has allowed me to 
 publish on my own responsibility in the columns of the 
 Natio7i, opinions of which he is himself the strenuous and 
 most able opponent. 
 
 Nor are my acknowledgments due only to the liN-ing. 
 Gustave de Beaumont's ' Vlrlaiide sociale et politique ' was 
 l)laced in my hands by a friend after the plan of my 
 argument was complete, and the writing of this book was 
 in fact begun. From De Beaumont I learnt more than 
 from any other writer on the subject of Ireland with 
 whose works I am acquainted, and I found to my great 
 satisfaction that liis speculations curiously confirmed the 
 objections I was prepared to urge against the policy of 
 
Preface. ix 
 
 Home Eule. It is a duty to insist upon the debt I owe to 
 De Beaumont, because at the present moment no greater 
 service can be rendered to Englishmen and to Irishmen 
 alike than to press upon them the study of an author 
 whose writings are far better known on the Continent than 
 in England, and whose thoughts, though they may seem a. 
 little out of date, are full not only of profound wisdom but 
 of practical guidance. 
 
 A. V. Dicey. 
 
 October, 1886. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPITER I 
 Nature of the Argument 
 
 PAO> 
 
 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Meaning of Home Rule.. 
 
 20 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Strength of the Home Rule Movement in Ey gland 
 
 34 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 
 
 . Argument 1. — From Foreign Exjperience .. 
 
 II. — From the Will of the Irish People 
 III, — From the Lessons of Irish History 
 IV. — From the Virtues of Self-Qov&rnment 
 V. — From the Necessity for Coercion Acts 
 VI. — From the Inconvenience to England of Refusing 
 Home Rule 
 
 48 
 
 67 
 
 71 
 
 100 
 
 110 
 
 121 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 TjiB Maintenance of the Union 
 
 128 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Separation 
 
 .. 142 
 
xii Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Home Rule — Its Forms. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 /. — Home Rule as Federalism .. .. .. .. .. 160 
 
 II. — Borne Bide a^ Colonial Independence .. .. .. 197 
 
 ///. — Home Rvle as the Revival of Orattan's Constitution .. 218 
 
 IV. — Home Rvle under the Oladstonian Constitution .. .. 223 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Conclusion .. .. .. .. 278 
 
 Appendix 291 
 
ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME 
 EULE. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 My aim is to criticise from a purely English point of 
 view the policy of Home Eule, or the proposal 
 to create a more or less independent Parliament une of 
 in Ireland ; and as a result of such criticism ^^S""^®^ * 
 to establish the truth, and develop the consequences, of 
 this proposition — namely, that any system of Home Eule, 
 whatever be the form it takes, is less beneficial to Great 
 Britain, or (to use popular language) to England, than is 
 the maintenance of the Union, and is at least as much 
 opposed to the vital interests of England as would be the 
 national independence of Ireland. 
 
 The train of reasoning by which it is sought to establish 
 this principle, and the consequences which the principle 
 involves, consists of the following steps: first, an ex- 
 amination into the causes which give strength to the 
 
2 EmjlmuVs Case against Home Ride. [Chap, I. 
 
 Home Eule movement in England, and the nature of the 
 arguments in its support used by English Home Rulers ; 
 secondly, a statement of the advantages and disadvantages, 
 from an English point of view, on the one hand, of main- 
 taining the Union, and on the other, of separation from 
 Ireland; thirdly, a criticism of each of the principal 
 forms * under wliich Home Rule has been actually pre- 
 sented to the attention " of the public, the aim of such 
 criticism being in each case to determine how far the 
 particular form of Home Rule can compete as regards the 
 interests of England with the alternative policies of 
 Unionism and of Irish independence; and, fourthly, a 
 summary of the conclusions arrived at by tliis survey of 
 the policy of Home Rule. My endeavour will be to make 
 this survey without any appeal to prejudice, passion, or 
 sentiment, and with the calmness and fairness which a 
 scientific constitutionalist should display in weighing the 
 merits of any other proposed alteration in our form of 
 government, such for example as the introduction of life 
 peers into the House of Lords, or in estimating the value 
 of some foreign constitutional invention, such, for example, 
 as the Swiss Referendum pr the Dual system which links 
 
 * Tliese are— 
 
 i. Homo llule as Fedemlism. 
 ii. Home Rule as Colonial Independence, 
 iii. Homo Rule as the Restomtion of Grattan's Constitution, 
 iv. Home Rule under the Government of Ireland Bill, or, to 
 use a convenient name, under the Gladstonian constitu- 
 tion. Chap. vii. 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 3 
 
 together Hungary and the Austrian Empire. No citizen 
 of the United Kingdom indeed can pretend to be an 
 impartial critic of a policy which divides the whole nation 
 into opposing parties. But during a period of revolution- 
 ary excitement, it is well to remember, that any legislative 
 innovation, however keen the feelings of partisanship 
 which it may arouse, is always in itself capable of being 
 looked at from a logical or abstract point of view, and 
 ought to be so looked at by jurists. To one class indeed 
 among the advocates of Home Eule, the fundamental 
 principle contended for in these pages will appear 
 irrelevant to the points at issue between such Home 
 Kulers and their opponents. Nationalists, who still occupy 
 the position held in 1848 by Sir Gavan Duffy and his 
 friends, and who either openly contend for the right of 
 Ireland to be an independent nation, or accept Home 
 Eule (as they may with perfect fairness) simply as a step 
 towards the independence of their country, are naturally 
 and rightly unaffected by reasoning which shows, however 
 conclusively, that Home Eule may be as injurious to 
 England as a complete severance of the political connection 
 between England and Ireland. . A Nationalist may say 
 with justice that he is no more bound to consider whether 
 England will or will not be damaged by Ireland's becoming 
 a nation, than an Italian patriot was bound, in 1859, to 
 show that Austria would not suffer by being deprived of 
 Lombardy or of Venetia ; he accepts Home Kule on the 
 maxim that half a loaf is better than no bread, but a 
 
 B 2 
 
4 Eagla'nd*8 Case against Home Bulc, [Chap. I, 
 
 starving man is not required to refuse the offer of food 
 because the donor cannot make the gift without getting 
 into debt ; nor does the acceptance of half a loaf afford the 
 least presumption that the recipient would not prefer a 
 whole loaf if he could get it. Some indeed of the con- 
 siderations which tell in the eyes of an Englishman 
 against Home Eule may indirectly lead an Irish Nation- 
 alist to the belief that the boon of legislative independence, 
 if granted to Ireland, would prove the present of a stone 
 in reply to a prayer for bread. But should a Nationalist 
 be convinced that no form of Home Eule would benefit 
 Ireland, he would cling all the more firmly to the faith 
 that her salvation depends upon her taking her place 
 among independent states. To Nationalists, therefore, 
 even though at present they may be fighting the cause of 
 Irish nationality behind the visor of Home llule, these 
 pages are not addressed. The position thay occupy is one 
 of which no man has any cause to feel ashamed. The 
 opinion that, considering the misery which has marked the 
 connection between England and Ireland, the happiest 
 thing for the weaker country would be complete separation 
 from the United Kingdom, is one wliich in common with 
 most Englishmen, and, it may be added, in common with 
 the wisest foreign observers, I do not share ; but fairness- 
 requires the admission that it is an opinion wliich a man 
 may hold and may act upon, without incurring the charge 
 either of folly or of wickedness. To Nationalists, how- 
 ever, these pages, as I have said, are not addressed. The 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument, 5 
 
 persons for whom they are intended are either Home 
 Eiilers, in Great Britain or in Ireland, who hond fide 
 advocate the policy of Home Eule for its own sake, 
 as a policy good and wise in itself; or else Unionists, 
 who firmly believe that the whole State will suffer by 
 any attempt to tear up the Treaty of Union, but yet 
 are unable to give for the faith that is in them as 
 strong grounds of reason as they would desire. To such 
 persons the importance of the principle (if true) which is 
 contended for throughout these pages must appear un- 
 deniable ; it strikes at the root of more than one half of 
 the arguments by which Home Eulers from the time of 
 Mr. Butt to the days of Mr. Parnell have attempted, fairly 
 enough, and latterly with great success, to win over English 
 opinion to their cause, and it undermines the whole position 
 occupied by Mr. Gladstone and his English followers. 
 They assume, with undeniable truth, that the English 
 people will not at the present moment, except under 
 compulsion, acquiesce in Irish independence ; they further 
 assume, and must from the nature of the case assume, that 
 Home Eule under one shape or another presents a fair 
 prospect at least of advantages not derivable from the 
 maintenance of the Union, and is at the very worst so 
 much less injurious to British interests than would be 
 separation from Ireland, as to offer to England a reasonable 
 compromise between the just claims of Englishmen to 
 secure the prosperity of Great Britain and the greatness 
 of the British Empire, and the legitimate desire of Irish- 
 
6 England^s Case against Home Bide. [Chap. i. 
 
 men for national independence. If the proposition which 
 it is my object to maintain turn out to be sound, all these 
 assumptions fall to the ground, together with a host of 
 fallacies for which these assumptions form the necessary 
 basis. The principle, in short, which it is my object to 
 enforce — that Home Rule in Ireland is more dangerous to 
 England than Irish independence — ^lies at the bottom of all 
 the rational opposition made by Unionists to the creation 
 of an Irish Parliament, and, together with the arguments 
 by which the principle is maintained, and the conclusions 
 to which it leads, forms tlie true and just and reasonable 
 case of England against Home Eule. 
 
 The whole spirit and method of my argument is open 
 
 to at least three plausible objections, which 
 
 objections deserve examination, both because if left un- 
 to method. . 1 , 
 
 noticed they are certain to occur to and perplex 
 
 any intelligent reader, and because their removal brings 
 
 into relief the strength of my line of reasoning. 
 
 First objectimi. — To deal with a burning controversy in 
 1. Too ^^^^ abstract and logical manner suitable to the 
 abstract, discussiou of the problems of jurisprudence 
 savours, it may be objected, of theoretic, academic, or 
 pedantic disquisition more fit for a University class-room 
 than for the living world of contemporary politics. 
 
 The force of this criticism does not admit of denial. 
 My method of treating the question of Home Rule is 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 7 
 
 necessarily lifeless when compared with the vehement 
 rhetoric or heated eloquence which characterises public or 
 parliamentary discussion; it is also true that the argu- 
 mentative treatment of matters affecting actual life always 
 bears about it a certain air of unreality. 
 
 If, however, systematic argument lacks the animation 
 of political discussion or dispute, it possesses its own 
 counterbalancing merits, and the mode of treating Home 
 Kule purposely adopted in these pages has, it is conceived, 
 two not inconsiderable advantages. The first of these 
 advantages is that it diverts the mind from a crowd of 
 personal, temporary, and in themselves trivial considera- 
 tions, which, though they possess not only an apparent 
 but also a real significance, are at bottom irrelevant to 
 the final decision of the true points at issue. Whether, 
 for example, Mr. Gladstone ought to have proclaimed 
 himself a Home Euler before the elections of 1885 ; 
 whether Lord Salisbury's reference, or alleged reference, to 
 twenty years of coercion was or was not judicious, and 
 did or did not receive a fair interpretation from his 
 opponents; whether Lord Carnarvon misled Mr. Parnell, 
 or whether the Irish leader was a dupe to his own astute- 
 ness ; whether Mr. Chamberlain ought to have joined the 
 late Ministry, or, having gone into the Cabinet, ought 
 never to have left it ; what have been the motives con- 
 sciously or unconsciously affecting Mr. Gladstone's course 
 of action — these and a hundred other enquiries of the 
 like sort, which engage the attention and distract the 
 
8 England^s Case against Home Rule, [Chap. I. 
 
 judgment of the public, possess, in the eyes of any serious 
 thinker occupied in estimating the strength of the argu- 
 ments for and against Home Eule, no material importance 
 whatever. His concern is the merit or demerit of a legis- 
 lative enactment. He is not concerned at all with the 
 conduct or the character of legislators. Mr. Gladstone's 
 motives may be the highest which can be ascribed to the 
 Premier by the voice of admiring friendship, or the basest 
 which can be imputed to him by the unfairness of political 
 rancour. In any case tliey are irrelevant to the matter in 
 hand. An unwise measure will not become a beneficial 
 law because its author is a saint or a patriot; a states- 
 manlike law will not turn out a curse to the country 
 because its defender is an intriguer or a traitor. We all 
 see that this is so if we carry our view back to the 
 controversies of the last generation ; the personalities of 
 fifty or sixty years ago are reduced before our eyes into 
 their real pettiness. The first Eeform Bill still retains 
 its importance as a measure which for good or for bad 
 revolutionised the constitution; its beneficial or per- 
 nicious effects are still traceable in the England of to-day ; 
 but its evils are not lessened by the acknowledged virtues 
 of Lord Althorpe, nor are its good effects marred by the 
 ambition of Brougham or the violence of O'Connell. It 
 is no slight recommendation of any mode of reasoning, if 
 it suggests to us the prudence of judging the policy of 
 1886, in the spirit and by the standards which every man 
 of sense applies to the policy of 1832. Academic dis- 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 9 
 
 quisition has its faults, but ought to produce academic 
 calmness ; a class-room is, after all, a better place for quiet 
 reflection than the House of Commons or the hustings. 
 
 The second of the advantages which marks the proposed 
 mode of argument is that a line of thought which fixes a 
 reader's attention all but exclusively upon the probable 
 effects of Home Eule is a preservative against the errors 
 which arise from introducing into a dispute, bitter enough 
 in itself, all the poisonous venom of historical recrimina- 
 tion, and all the delusions which are the offspring of the 
 misleading tendency to personify nations. The massacres 
 of 1641, the sack of Drogheda, the violated treaty of 
 Limerick, the follies strangely mingled with the patriot- 
 ism of Grattan's Parliament, the outrages which dis- 
 credited the rebellion of 1798, and the cruelties which 
 disgraced its suppression, the corruption which carried 
 the Union, and the broken pledges which turned political 
 union into a source of fresh sectarian discord — the 
 calamities, the mistakes and the crimes which mark each 
 scene in the tragedy of Irish history — afford to Protestants 
 and to Catholics alike, an exhaustless mine of recrimi- 
 natory invective. But to evoke the spectres of past ages 
 is not the way to assuage the animosities of the present 
 day. The crimes of bygone generations are subjects for 
 curious investigation, but the determination of historical 
 problems, even when conducted in the spirit of the 
 calmest enquiry, never removes the difficulties of practical 
 statesmanship. Apologies, at any rate, or diatribes pro- 
 
10 U^iff land's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. I. 
 
 duced by the necessity for palliating or for denouncing 
 the misdeeds of other times, only add a new element of 
 confusion to the turmoil of political warfare. Whether 
 the insurgents of 1641 massacred every Protestant on 
 whom they could lay their hands, or bear only an indirect 
 responsibility for the death of eight or nine thousand men 
 and women ruthlessly expelled from the lands, of which, 
 in Irish eyes, they were wrongful occupiers, is a question 
 to be settled by Mr. Froude, Mr. Lecky, and Mr. Gardiner ; 
 but the barbarities of insurgent Catholics, and the retalia- 
 tory severity of Protestant victors, which mark the fury 
 of an internecine conflict removed from us by the lapse 
 of more than two centuries, have little to do with the 
 practical question whether it be expedient, at the present 
 day, that the local affairs of Ulster should be dealt with 
 by a Parliament sitting at Dublin, or whether members 
 from Ireland should have seats at Westminster. Re- 
 crimination, while it adds nothing to knowledge, disturbs 
 the judgment of statesmen and of electors ; but not even 
 tlie reckless resuscitation of bitter memories, which ought 
 to be forgotten, adds so much to the confusion of the day, 
 as does the habit fostered by the illusions of language, 
 and by the falsely applied historical method, of speaking 
 and thinking of England and Ireland as though they were 
 two human beings, who, on closing a life-long quarrel, 
 might be expected to entertain towards one another 
 those sentiments of regret, generosity, or gratitude which 
 are proper to men and women, but can only by tho 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 11 
 
 boldest of fictions be supposed to enter into the relations 
 between classes or nations. To this delusion of personifi- 
 cation is due the notion that Englishmen of to-day ought 
 to make compensation and feel personal shame for the 
 cruelties of Cromwell, or for Pitt's corruption of Irish 
 patriots ; that we are in some way liable and should feel 
 compunction for crimes committed by (possibly) the an- 
 cestors of the very men to whom we are now supposed to 
 owe reparation. To the same cause is to be attributed the 
 absurd demand that the Irish Catholics should put on sack- 
 cloth and ashes for the massacres of 1641. To this cause 
 is due the ridiculous claim that living Irishmen should 
 be grateful for the well-meant though most unsuccessful 
 efforts made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom to 
 govern one-third of the United Kingdom on sound princi- 
 ples of justice. A Sovereign's plainest duty is to rule his 
 subjects for their good according to the best of his power 
 and of his knowledge, and the mere discharge of duty 
 does not entitle a ruler to gratitude from the persons who 
 are benefited by his justice. A Parliamentary Sovereign, 
 being the representative and agent of its (so-called) sub- 
 jects, is afai'tim^i — if there can be degrees in such matters 
 — bound to govern for the benefit of the people whom the 
 Sovereign represents and ought to serve; and there is some- 
 thing strictly preposterous in the idea that Irish electors, 
 who in common with the rest of the United Kingdom 
 send representatives to Westminster, should glow with 
 o-ratitude when the Parliament of the United Kingdom so 
 
12 Fnr/land's Case against Horm Rule. [Chap. I. 
 
 far performs its duty as to enact laws from which Ire- 
 land derives benefit. No one suggests tliat Englishmen 
 or Scotchmen should feel grateful either to Parliament or 
 to their Irish fellow-citizens for the maintenance of good 
 government throughout England and Scotland. And it 
 would puzzle the wit of man to show, why one-third of 
 the United Kingdom should be expected to entertain feel- 
 ings never demanded from the other two-thirds thereof. 
 
 Second objection. — The habitual reference made through- 
 2. Too out these pages to national interest as the test 
 forence to ^^ Standard of national policy has (it may be 
 interest. suggested) a touch of sordidness and selfishness, 
 and implies that statesmanship has nothing to do with 
 morality. 
 
 This impression may, it is possible, be conveyed to a 
 careless reader by the form in which the case against 
 Home Eule is stated ; but no suggestion can in reality 
 be more ill-founded. It will be seen to be unfounded 
 by any one who notes for a moment the meaning of the 
 term " interest " as applied to matters of national policy. 
 The interest or the welfare of a nation comprises many 
 things which have nothing to do with trade or with 
 wealth, and the value of wliich does not admit of being 
 measured in money. The interest, welfare, or prosperity 
 of England includes the maintenance of her honour, 
 the performance of all her obligations, and, above all, 
 the strict discharge of every engagement which she has 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument, 15 
 
 undertaken towards countries or to individuals. The 
 protection, for example, of law-abiding citizens in the 
 enjoyment of rights secured to them by law, the main- 
 tenance of peace throughout the length and breadth of the 
 Empire, the suppression of lawlessness, the strict per- 
 formance of every promise which the State has made to 
 every man or body of men (whether poor or rich, whether 
 belonging to the class of labourers, of farmers, or even of 
 landlords) — the rendering, in short, to every man of his due 
 — are things, which, without any improper extension of the 
 term interest, fall under the head of national interests. 
 Utilitarianism, in truth, being a body of principles applic- 
 able primarily to legislation and only secondarily to ethics, 
 its doctrines hold true far more obviously in the field of 
 politics than in the field of morals. On any wide view of 
 large public questions expediency will be found to be only 
 another name for justice. It can be neither the interest 
 nor the duty of any nation to legislate in a way which pro- 
 duces more of suffering than of happiness. A policy opposed 
 to the interests or the welfare of the United Kingdom as a 
 whole, even though it may appear for a moment to favour 
 some particular portion of the State, is, we may be; well 
 assured, a policy opposed not only to wisdom, but to justice. 
 
 Tliird ohjection. — To look at Home Eule mainly from an 
 Eno'lish point of view, to criticise it because of 3- Ex- 
 
 ° clusively 
 
 its bearing on the interests or welfare of England, English 
 
 point of 
 
 is, it may perhaps be thought, to treat the whole view. 
 
14 EiiglancVs Case against Home Rule, [Chap. I. 
 
 matter from the wrong side, and to betray an indifference 
 to the welfare of Ireland. Home Eule, the objector may- 
 say, is a scheme for the government of Ireland. It there- 
 fore concerns the people of Ireland alone, it should be 
 subjected to examination from an Irish, not from an 
 English point of view, and to consider it in any other 
 light is to exhibit in a new form that callous disregard by 
 England of Ireland's claims which has prevented the two 
 countries from blending into one community. 
 
 It is of primary importance that this objection should 
 be stated with all the force which can be given to it, for 
 were it valid it would assuredly be, in the judgment of all 
 just persons, fatal to the line of reasoning wliich my 
 readers are invited to pursue. The objection is, however, 
 so far from being valid as to present my whole method of 
 reasoning in a false light. A main reason why an English- 
 man does well to look at Home Eule from an English point 
 of view is, that this mode of dealing with the adjustment 
 of the possibly opposed interests of England and Ireland is 
 (paradoxical though the assertion may sound) both the least 
 irritating and in itself the fairest method of meeting the 
 demands of Irish Home llulers; though — and this is 
 the one certainly good result which has arisen from the 
 changed attitude towards Home Eule of Mr. Gladstone 
 and his followers — these demands may now happily be 
 dealt with as claims put forward not specially by Irishmen, 
 but by a political party which includes large numbers of 
 Scotchmen and Englishmen. Tlie assertion, however, that 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 15 
 
 to look at Home Paile from an English point of view is 
 the way to minimise irritation, and to deal fairly 
 with a topic specially requiring fair treatment, requires 
 some explanation. 
 
 Experience of the world tells every man that in com- 
 plicated affairs of private life, involving questions, say, 
 both of money and of sentiment, nothing so surely 
 prevents quarrels as to separate in the clearest manner 
 possible matters of business from matters of feeling. In 
 determining a dispute between A. and B., a great step 
 is gained when a friend induces each of the parties first 
 to state clearly his exact legal rights and his exact 
 pecuniary interest, and only when these facts are made 
 clear to consider- what are the concessions fairly to be 
 demanded from him as a matter, not of right, but of 
 liberality. ISTothing, again, is plainer in the conduct of 
 controversies between man and man, than that if A. 
 intends to exact his full legal rights from B., the most 
 iiTitating defence of A.'s conduct is his pretence of acting 
 solely with a view to B.'s own good ; and that, on the other 
 hand, no manner of enforcing A's claims against B. causes 
 so little unnecessary vexation to B. as for A, to say 
 openly that he demands his rights because they are his 
 rights, and because to demand them is his interest. Here, 
 if nowhere else, the rules which apply to private disputes 
 apply also to political controversies. If millions of 
 Englishmen refuse a request made by millions of Irish- 
 men, by far the least irritating form of refusal is open 
 
16 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. I. 
 
 avowal that the reason for denying a separate Parliament 
 to Ireland is the in-eparable injury which Home liule will 
 work both to Great Britain and to the British Empire. 
 This assertion has the merit, which even in politics is not 
 small, of truth. If the Parliamentary independence of 
 Ireland threatened as little damage to England as the 
 Parliamentary independence of Victoria, an Irish legisla- 
 ture would meet in Dublin before the end of the year. 
 Englishmen, it is true, do not believe that Ireland would 
 in the long run gain by the possession of legislative 
 independence. It is not, however, the doubt as to the 
 reality of the blessing to be conferred on Ireland, but the 
 certainty as to the injuiy to be done to England, which 
 causes their opposition to Home Rule. To base this 
 opposition upon the probable inconsistency between a 
 Home Rule policy and the true interests of Ireland, in- 
 volves the assumption that Englishmen are better judges 
 of what makes for the true interest of Ireland than are the 
 majority of Irishmen. The soundness of this assumption 
 must seem to any man, who either recalls the most obvious 
 facts of Irish history, or notes the depth of ignorance as to 
 all tilings Irish which prevails even among our educated 
 classes, to be open to reasonable question. What is not 
 questionable is that the assertion, in whatever form it be 
 made, that three millions of Irishmen do not understand 
 what is good for themselves must arouse in their hearts 
 deep and natural anger. If indeed the claim of GreAt 
 Britain to look in this matter of Home Rule solely to the 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 17 
 
 effect of Home Kule on British interests, were equivalent 
 to tlie assertion that because England is strong she ought 
 wherever her own interests are at stake to reck nothing* 
 of justice, such cynical scorn for all considerations except 
 the possession of superior power would kindle just resent- 
 ment in the soul of every man, whether in Ireland or in 
 England, who believes that national morality is more than 
 a mere phrase, though even in this case open cynicism 
 might excite less disgust than cynicism veiling itself 
 under the mask of benevolence. Happily, however, there 
 is in the present instance no opposition between truth 
 and justice. Home Eule is no doubt primarily a scheme 
 for the government of Ireland, but it is also much more 
 than this : it is a plan for revolutionising the constitution 
 of the whole United Kingdom. There is no unfairness, 
 therefore, in insisting that the proposed change must not 
 take place if it be adverse to the interests of Great 
 Britain. This is merely to assert that the welfare of 
 thirty millions of citizens must, if a conflict of interest 
 arise, be preferred to the interest of five millions of citizens. 
 Home Eulers, it must again and again be repeated, 
 demand not the national independence of Ireland, but the 
 maintenance of the connection between England and 
 Ireland on terms different from the conditions contained 
 in the Act of Union. To keep one's mind clear on this 
 point is of importance, because the result follows that, as 
 already intimated, a whole series of arguments or claims 
 which may fairly be put forward by a Nationalist are not 
 
 c 
 
18 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. L 
 
 available to a Home Kuler. A Nationalist, for example, 
 may urge that the will of the Irish people to be indepen- 
 dent is decisive of their moral right to independence, and 
 that the perils which a free Ireland may bring upon 
 England need not in any way concern him or his country. 
 Whether indeed the principle of "nationality," or the 
 contention that any portion of a State which deems itself 
 conscious of distinct national sentiment may, as a matter 
 of absolute right, claim to become a separate nation, can be 
 maintained, is an enquiry not so easily answered in the 
 affirmative as is often assumed by modern democrats. 
 What, however, is here insisted upon is not that the 
 principle of nationality is unsound, but that this principle 
 does not cover the demand for Home Rule. A Home 
 Euler asks not for the political separation, but for the 
 political partnership of England and Ireland. He wishes 
 not that the firm should be dissolved, but that the Articles 
 of Association should be revised. There is not then the 
 least unfairness in the answer that no modification can be 
 allowed wliich in the judgment of his associates is fatal 
 to the prosperity of the concern. To crowds excited by 
 pictures of past greatness or of past struggles, by the hope 
 of future prosperity to be brought about by miracles 
 wrought by substituting the rule of love for the rule of 
 law, there may appear to be something prosaic, not to say 
 repulsive, in the comparison of the relation between Great 
 Britain and Ireland to the relation between shareholders in 
 a trading company. But at a period when a fundamental 
 
Chap. I.] Nature of the Argument. 19 
 
 change in the constitution is advocated on grounds of faith, 
 benevolence, or generosity, a good deal is gained by bring- 
 ing into relief the business aspect of constitutional reforms. 
 It can never be amiss to be reminded that, in the words 
 of one of the most thoughtful among the advocates of 
 Home Eule," Government is a very practical business, and 
 that those succeed best in it who bring least of sentiment 
 or enthusiasm to the conduct of their affairs." It is at 
 moments of revolutionary fervour, when men measure 
 proposed policies rather by their wishes than by their 
 experience, that every citizen needs to have impressed 
 upon his mind that government and legislation are 
 matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination. 
 Nor let any one imagine that the expression of the belief 
 constantly avowed or implied throughout these pages, that 
 Home Eule would be as gTcat an evil to England as Irish 
 independence, shows a reckless and most unbusinesslike 
 indifference to the perils and losses of separation. My 
 conviction is unalterable that separation would be to 
 England, as also to Ireland, a gigantic evil. This position 
 is fully compatible with the belief that there are other 
 evils as great, or greater. If a man says that he prefers 
 the loss of his right hand to the loss of his life, he cannot 
 reasonably be charged with making light of amputation. It 
 is however perfectly true that the line of argument pursued 
 in this work must, if it be sound, drive those to whom it is 
 addressed to a choice between the maintenance of the Union 
 and the concession to Ireland of national independence. 
 
 C 2 
 
20 England's Case against Honic Bulc. [Chap. II. 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 MEANING OF HOME RULE. 
 
 " Home Kule " is a term which, like all current and 
 popular phrases, is, though intelligible, wanting in pre- 
 cision. Hence it is well, before we investigate the 
 different forms wliich schemes of Home Eule may assume, 
 to fix in our minds precisely what Home Eule does mean 
 and what it does not mean. 
 
 *' Home Eule " — or, to speak more accurately, the policy 
 yj\^l of Home Eule — means, if we may use language 
 Kulo^ with which we are all familiar in relation to 
 means. j^\^q Colonies, the endowment of Ireland with 
 representative institutions and resi)onsible government. 
 
 It means, tlierefore, the creation of an Irish Parliament 
 which shall have legislative authority in matters of Irish 
 concern, and of an Irish executive responsible (in general) 
 for its acts to the Irish Parliament or tlie Irish people. 
 Hence every scheme of Home Eule which merits that 
 name is marked by three features— /rs/, the creation of 
 an Irish Parliament; secondly y the right o the Irish 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Bute. '21 
 
 Parliament to legislate within its own sphere (however 
 that sphere may be defined) with habitual freedom from 
 the control of the Imperial or British Parliament ; and 
 thirdly y the habitual responsibility of the Irish executive 
 for its acts to the Irish people or to their representatives. 
 
 These three characteristics, which I do not attempt to 
 define with anything like logical precision, constitute the 
 essence of Home Eule. Other things, however important 
 in themselves, are matters of subordinate detail, and open 
 to discussion or compromise. The limitations to the 
 sphere within which the Irish Parliament is to exert 
 independent authority, the definition of the term " Irish 
 concerns," the constitution of the Irish Parliament, the 
 nature and appointment of the Irish executive (wliich, 
 though it is no doubt generally assumed to be a Cabinet 
 chosen in effect like the Victorian Ministry, by the local 
 Parliament, might well, and indeed far better, be a 
 President or Council elected, like the Governor of N"ew 
 York, by popular vote), the occasions on wliich the British 
 Parliament should retain the legal or moral right of 
 legislation for Ireland — these and a score of other subjects 
 which at 'once suggest themselves to a critic of constitu- 
 tions are of supreme importance, but in whatever way they 
 may be determined, they do not touch the principle of 
 .Home Eule. A scheme, on the other hand, however wise 
 its provisions, wliich lacked the essential characteristics 
 already enumerated, would not meet the demand for Home 
 Eule ; an Act which did not constitute a Parliament for 
 
22 England's Case against Home Eidc. [Chap. II. 
 
 Ireland could not possibly satisfy the sentiment of Irish 
 nationality ; an Irish Parliament which did not habitually, 
 at any rate, legislate with independence of the Parliament 
 at Westminster could not divest the law in Ireland of its 
 " foreign garb '* ; an executive not responsible dii-ectly or 
 indirectly to the Irish people could not give full effect to 
 the legislation of an Irish Parliament, and the existence 
 of such an executive would (if the true ground why law 
 is hated in Ireland be its alien character) only divert 
 popular hostility from the law to the government. 
 
 What Home Kule does not mean Local Self-Govem- 
 
 Ruledoes ^^^^'f Home Eule does not mean National 
 not mean. Independence. 
 
 Local Self-Government means the delegation by the 
 Sovereign, and in England therefore by Parliament, to 
 local bodies, say town councils, county boards, vestries, 
 and the like, of strictly subordinate powers of legislation 
 for definite localities. The authority possessed by such 
 local bodies extends over definite and limited areas (wliich 
 themselves are often created by legislation); exists for 
 definite purposes ; is directly conferred or tolerated by 
 Parliament ; has no capacity of indefinite extension ; and 
 neither comes into competition witli nor restrains, eitlier 
 legally or morally, the legislative authority of Parliament. 
 Logically, indeed, there may be difficulty in drawing the 
 precise line of demarcation between a plan for conferring 
 on Ireland the minimum of legislative independence 
 
Chap. II.] Cleaning of Home Riolc. 23 
 
 which could without absurdity be dignified with the name 
 of Home Eule, and a plan for giving to the boroughs and 
 counties of Ireland the maximum of law-making power 
 which could, without fraud upon the intelligence of the 
 English people, be comprehended within the elastic phrase 
 " extension of Local Self-Government." But this logical 
 puzzle need give us no trouble ; it is based on the fact 
 that every non-sovereign law-making body, whether it be 
 the French National Assembly, the American Congress, 
 or the London, Chatham and Dover Eailway Co., belongs 
 to one and the same genus.* The casuists of juris- 
 prudence may quibble for ever over the confines between 
 Home Eule and Local Self-Government; men of sense 
 engaged in the consideration of affairs thrust aside such 
 inopportune logomachy, and content themselves with the 
 knowledge that were the Town Council, say, of Birming- 
 ham or of Belfast endowed with tenfold its present powers, 
 it would differ essentially from any Irish Parliament 
 wliich, even though denied the Parliamentary title, should 
 represent the people of Ireland, and should have received 
 the very smallest amount of authority which could by 
 any possibility satisfy Mr. Parnell. Nor are differences 
 which may not admit of easy definition difficult for a 
 candid enquirer to discern. A town council, whatever 
 its powers, does not represent a nation, and derives no 
 prestige from the principle of nationality; the feeblest 
 legislative assembly meeting at Dublin would rightly 
 
 * See Dicey, Law of the Constitution (2nd ed.), p. 80. 
 
:24 ErifjlamVs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. II. 
 
 claim to speak for the Irish people. A town council, 
 whether of Birmingham or of Belfast, springs from and is 
 kept alive by the will of Parliament, and cannot pretend 
 that its powers, however extensive, compete with the 
 authority of its creator. Should a town council use even 
 its strictly legal rights in a way not conducive to the 
 public interest. Parliament would without scruple over- 
 ride the bye-laws of the council by the force of Par- 
 liamentary enactment. The authority of an Irish re- 
 presentative assembly would from the necessity of things 
 be, if not a legal, at any rate a moral check, I will not say 
 on Parliamentary sovereignty, but assuredly on Par- 
 .liamentary legislation. Extended rights of self-govern- 
 ment, though given to every local body in Ireland, would 
 not affect the relation between the people of Ireland and 
 the Parliament at Westminster. The very aim of Home 
 Ilule, even under its least pretentious form, is to intro- 
 duce a new relation between the people of Ireland and 
 the Parliament at Westminster. The matter may be 
 summed up in one plirase : Local Self-Government 
 however extended means the delegation, Home Ilule 
 however curtailed means the surrender, of Pai'liamentary 
 authority. 
 
 The distinction here insisted upon is of practical im- 
 portance, for it is connected with a question so 
 Local Self- ^ . ^ 
 
 Govern- pressing as to excuse an apparent, thougli not 
 
 more than an apparent, digression. 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Rule. 25 
 
 English lladicals, and many politicians who are not 
 Eadicals, hold, whether rightly or not, that the sphere of 
 Local Self-Government may with benefit to the nation be 
 greatly extended in England. The soundness of this view 
 in no way concerns us, and it is a matter upon which there 
 is no reason, for our present purpose, to form or express 
 an opinion ; they also hope that by a similar extension of 
 Local Self-GoA^ernment to Ireland they may satisfy the 
 demand for Home Eule. They conceive, in short, that it 
 is possible to confer a substantial benefit upon the Irish 
 people, and to close a dangerous agitation, by giving to 
 Belfast and to Cork the same municipal privileges which 
 they wish to extend to Birmingham or to Liverpool. The 
 reasons for this belief are threefold : that Local Self- 
 Government is itself a benefit ; that Ireland ought, as of 
 right, to have the same institutions as England ; that Local 
 or Municipal Self-Government will meet the real if not the 
 nominal wish of the Irish people. This hope I believe to 
 be delusive. The reasons on which it is grounded are — 
 one of them probably, and two of them certainly — unsound. 
 
 Local Self-Government is one of those arrangements 
 which, like most political institutions, cannot be called 
 absolutely good or bad. It is a good thing, I suppose, at 
 Birmingham, and was some fifty years ago a good thing in 
 Massachusetts, and it may prove (though this is specula- 
 tion) a good thing in an English county. Local Self- 
 Government is not admirable at New York ; it works less 
 well than it once did in New England ; it does not pro- 
 
26 JUmjlancVs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. II. 
 
 duce very happy effects in London parishes ; we may well 
 doubt whether it be really suited for modern France. 
 Local Self-Government where it flourishes is quite as 
 much a result as a cause of a happy social condition ; the 
 eulogies bestowed upon it contain a curious mixture of 
 tmth and falsehood. What is true is, that where self- 
 government flourishes, society is in a sound state ; what 
 is false is, that Local Self-Government produces a sound 
 state of society. The primary condition necessary for tlie 
 success of self-government is harmony between different 
 classes. The rich must be the guides of the poor, the poor 
 must put ti-ust in the rich. Men who are placed above 
 corruption must interest themselves in the laborious but 
 important details of local administration ; men who might 
 be corrupted themselves, must desire to place power in the 
 hands of leaders who are as a class incorruptible. High 
 public spirit, a detestation of jobbery, trust and goodwill 
 between rich and poor, are the feelings which make good 
 local or municipal government possible. There are certain 
 parts of England, there are larger parts of the United 
 States, where these admirable and rare conditions exist. 
 Do they exist in Ireland ? I need not answer the question, 
 for if they existed our ditticulties in Ireland would be at an 
 end. If, indeed, there were a genuine desire for Local Self- 
 Government, expressed by Irishmen themselves, every sen- 
 sible man would at once surrender apnori theories in favour 
 of the conclusions drawn by practical experience. But no 
 such wish has been expressed, and until it is expressed, a 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Rule. 27 
 
 tlioughtful observer may fairly believe that Local Self- 
 Government will not flourish in a country where are pre- 
 sented none of the conditions on which its prosperity 
 depends, and he may conjecture that in Ireland, as in 
 France, an honest centralised administration of impartial 
 officials, and not Local Self-Government, would best meet 
 the real wants of the people.* 
 
 * De Beaumont's opinions on this point are perfectly clear: they 
 represent the judgment of an extremely able thinker, who approaches 
 the problems presented by Irish society with an impartiality which 
 from the nature of things is unattainable by any Englishman or Irish- 
 man. His utterances will moreover command the more respect from 
 the consideration that De Beaumont, belonging as he did to the school 
 of his intimate friend De Tocqueville, was incHned rather to overrate 
 than to underrate the virtues of self-government ; whilst as a French- 
 man he possessed a knowledge which cannot fall to any Englishman 
 of the benefits conferred upon the people by a good administration of 
 the French type. The following extracts from a chapter too long for 
 complete citation, which is written to show that Ireland needs a 
 centralised government, deserve the most careful attention. The 
 whole chapter, and indeed the whole work to which it belongs, ought 
 at the present moment to be familiar to every English Liberal : — 
 
 " Pour detruire le pouvoir politique de Varistocratie, il faudrait lui 
 oter Vapplication quotidienne des lois, comma on Va jprivee precedem- 
 ment du pouvoir de les faire. II faudrait, par consequent, modifier 
 profondement le systems administratif et judiciaire qui repose sur 
 Vinstitution des juges de paix et sur Vorganisation des grands jurys, 
 tels quails sont constitues aujourdliui. Et^ d'ahord, pour executer cette 
 reforme, il faudrait centraliser le pouvoir. 
 
 * « « * * 
 
 " Plus on considere Vetat de VIrlande, et plus il semhle qu'a tout 
 prendre un gouvernement central fortement constitue serait, du moins 
 p)Our quelque temps, le meilleur que puisse avoir ce pays. Une aristo- 
 eratie existe, qiCon veut reformer. Mais a qui remettre le pouvoir 
 qiCon va retirer de ses mains ? Aux classes moyennes ? — Llles ne font 
 
28 England's Cctsc cujainst Home Rule. [Chap. II. 
 
 The notion that Ireland or any one part of the United 
 Kingdom ought, or has a claim, to have the same institu- 
 
 q^ie de naitre en Irlande. Uavenir leur appartieiit ; mais ne comr 
 promettront-elles pas cet avenivy si la cJiarge de mener la sodete est 
 confiee des aujourd'hui d leur 8 mains inhahihs et a Jeiirs ardent es 
 passions f 
 
 " Telle est aujourdliui en Irlande la situation des partisy que Von 
 ne peat obtenir qv^lque justice des pouvoirs politiqiieSy si on les laisse 
 a Varistocratie protestantCy et que Von ne saurait guere en esperer 
 davantaqey si on les donne aussitut a la classe moyenne catholique 
 qui s^eleve. 
 
 " Ce qu'ilfaudrait a V Irlande, ce serait une administration superieure 
 aux partis, d Vombre de laquelle les classes moyennes pussent qrandiry se 
 developper et s'instruire, pendant que Varistocratie perdrait soiipouvoir. 
 * * * * * 
 
 "/Z n^entre, du restCy ni dans mon desiVy ni dans mon plan, d'ex- 
 pliquer la forme et le mecanisme de la centralisation qui conviendrait 
 a, VIrlandey et dont je me borne d reconnaitre en principe Vutilite 
 passage re poiir cepays ; je ne ha,8arderaiy sur ce sujety qvHune seule idee 
 pratique. 
 
 " (Test quCy 2>our organiser en Irlande un gouveniement central 
 puissant, il faudrait de plus en plus resserrer le lien d* union qui 
 attache V Irlande d VAngleterrCy rapprocher le plus possible Dublin de 
 LondreSy etfaire de V Irlande un comte anglais. 
 
 « * * * • 
 
 " On ne conteste point que VIrlande ait besoin d'un gouvernement 
 special ; et sHl y a necessite de la soumettre d un regime Ugislatif autre 
 qu^ celui de VAngleterrCy ilfaut hien aussi des agents particidiers pour 
 appliqu^r des regies diffcrcntes ^administration. Mais, ceci itant 
 admisy Von ne voit pas ce qui aujourd'hui emprcheinit de placer le 
 siege du gouvernement irlandais dans la premiere ville de Vempire 
 hritannique. 
 
 « • * * * 
 
 "Xa reforme de la vice-royaute et V abolition des cul ministration* 
 locales d* Irlande ne sont, sans doutey que des changements de forme. 
 Mais ce sont des moycns pratiques indispensables pour executer lea re- 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Rule. 2& 
 
 tions as every other part rests on a confusion of ideas, and 
 is a false deduction from democratic principles. It is 
 founded on the feeling which has caused lialf the errors of 
 democracy, that a fraction of a nation has a right to speak 
 with the authority of the whole, and that the right of 
 each portion of the people to make its wishes heard 
 involves the right to have them granted. This delusion 
 has once and again made Paris the ruler of France, and 
 the Parisian mob the master of Paris. The sound prin- 
 ciple of democratic government — and England must, 
 under the present state of things, be ruled on democratic 
 principles — is, that all parts of the country must be 
 governed in the way which the whole of the State as 
 represented by the majority thereof deems expedient for 
 each part, and that while every part should be allowed a 
 voice to make known its wants, the decision how these 
 wants are to be met must be given by the whole State, 
 that is (in the j)articular instance) by the majority of the 
 electors of Great Britain and Ireland. From this prin- 
 ciple it does not follow either that every part of the 
 kingdom should have those institutions which that part 
 prefers, (though in so far as this end can be attained its 
 attainment is desirable,) or, still less, that every part of the 
 
 formes poUtiqnes dont ce pays a hesoin. llfaut que^ iJendant laperiode 
 de transition ou se frouve Vlrlande^ ceux qui la gouvernent soient places 
 absolument en deJiors d^elle, de ses mopurs^ de ses passions ; ilfaut qtte 
 son gouvernemenf cesse completement d'etre iriandais ; ilfaut qu'il soit 
 entierementt non pas anglais^ mais remis d des Anglais." — 2 De 
 Beaumont, VIrlande, Sociale, Politique ef Bsligieuse, pp. 124-129. 
 
30 Eiiglan^s Case a/jainst Home Bide. [Chap. II. 
 
 kingdom should have the same institutions as every 
 other part. That this is so everybody in a general way 
 admits. No one supposes that because the people of 
 Leicester abominate vaccination the Vaccination Acts are 
 not to be extended to tliat borough, or that the wish of 
 the people of Birmingham in favour of free schools is 
 decisive in favour of making education in Birmingham 
 gratuitous. The will of a locality is admitted not to be 
 the expression of the will of the nation. No one, again, 
 fancies that the legal institutions of England ought of 
 necessity to be extended to Scotland, or the law of 
 Scotland to England. In Ireland recent legislation has, 
 and with general approval, established institutions which 
 no one alleges must, because they exist in Ireland, be 
 applied of necessity or as a matter of justice to England. 
 English tenants might in many cases, it is likely enough, 
 think the provisions of the Irish Land Acts a boon, but 
 no one would listen to the argument that simply because 
 under the special circumstances of Ireland special privi- 
 leges are given to Irish tenants, similar privileges ought 
 to be conferred upon every Ejjglish tenant farmer. The 
 idea therefore that because English boroughs or counties 
 receive an increased measure of self-government the same 
 measure ought to be extended to Ireland, though it sounds 
 plausible, is neither conformable to democratic principle 
 nor to our habitual practice, grounded as that practice 
 is on considerations of common sense and expediency. 
 The true watchwords which should guide English demtv 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Rule. 31 
 
 crats in their dealings with Ireland, as in truth with 
 every other part of the United Kingdom, are not 
 " equality," " similarity," and " simultaneity," but " unity 
 of government," " equality of political rights," " diversity 
 of institutions." Unless English democrats see this they 
 will commit a double fault : they will not in reality deal 
 with Ireland as with England, for to deal with societies in 
 essentially different conditions in the same manner is in 
 truth to treat them differently ; they will not — and this is 
 of even more importance — perform the true function of the 
 democracy, which is to remove by special legislation, 
 mainly in a democratic direction, the peculiar evils which 
 are the result of Ireland's peculiar and calamitous history. 
 Once realise that Local Self-Government is essentially 
 different from Home Kule, and it becomes patent that the 
 idea of satisfying the wish for Home Eule by increasing 
 the municipal franchises of every township in Ireland is a 
 dangerous delusion. Local Self-Government may be an 
 excellent thing in its way — it is possibly (though I do not 
 say it is) the thing which the inhabitants of Ireland ought 
 to wish for ; but it is not the thing which they do wish 
 for, and it has not the qualities which, if Home Eule be 
 really desired by the Irish people, make Home Eule 
 desirable. It does not meet the feeling of nationality ; it 
 does not give the popular leaders authority to settle the 
 land question ; it does not free the law from its alien 
 aspect. The very reasons which make English reformers 
 favour the extension of Local Self-Government in Ireland 
 
32 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. n. 
 
 prove that Local Self-Government, wliatever its merits, is 
 no substitute for Parliamentary independence. English- 
 men recommend Local Self-Government because it does 
 not check the authority of the Imperial Parliament ; 
 Home Rulers desire Home Rule because it does check 
 Imperial legislation. Brandy is good, and water is good ; 
 but when a neighbour asks for a glass of spirits, it is 
 mockery to tender a glass of water on the ground that both 
 spirits and water are drink. The benevolent person who 
 makes the offer must not wonder if he receives no thanks. 
 
 Home Rule does not mean National Independence. 
 This proposition needs no elaboration. Any 
 
 National ^ ^ . -^ 
 
 liidepen- plan of Home Rule wliatever implies that there 
 deuce. 
 
 are spheres of national life in wliich Ireland is 
 
 not to act with the freedom of an independent State. 
 Mr. Parnell and his followers accept in principle Mr. 
 Gladstone's proposals, and therefore are willing to accept 
 for Ireland restrictions on her political liberty absolutely 
 inconsistent with the principle of nationality. Under thfe 
 Gladstonian constitution lier foreign policy is to be 
 wholly regulated by a Britisli l*arliament in wliicli sit no 
 Irish representatives ; she is not to have the riglit either of 
 raising an army or of endowing a Church ; she is in fact to 
 surrender any claim to the rights of a nation in considera- 
 tion of receiving a certain number of State-rights. In all 
 this there is nothing unreasonable and nothing blame- 
 worthy. One part of the United Kingdom is prepared to 
 
Chap. II.] Meaning of Home Rule, 33 
 
 accept new terms of partnership. But this acceptance, 
 though reasonable and fair enough, is quite inconsistent 
 with any claim for national independence. A nation is 
 one thing, a state forming part of a federation is quite 
 another. To ask for the position of a dependent colony- 
 like Victoria, or of a province such as Ontario, is to 
 renounce the demand to be a nation. A hona fide Home 
 Euler cannot be a hona fide Nationalist. This point 
 deserves attention, not for the sake of the miserable and 
 ruinous advantage which is obtained by taunting an 
 adversary in controversy with inconsistency till you drive 
 liim to improve his logical position by increasing the 
 exactingness of his demands, but because the advocates 
 of Home Eule (honestly enough, no doubt) confuse the 
 matter under discussion by a strange kind of intellectual 
 shuffle. Wlien they wish to minimise the sacrifice to 
 England of establisliing a Parliament in Ireland, they 
 hring Home Eule down nearly to the proportions of Local 
 Self-Government ; when they wish to maximise — if the 
 word may be allowed — the blessings to Ireland of a separate 
 legislature, they all but identify Home Eule with National 
 Independence. Yet you have no more right to expect 
 from any form of State-rights the new life which some- 
 times is roused among a people by the spirit and the 
 responsibilities of becoming a nation, than you have to 
 .suppose that municipal councils will satisfy the feeEngs 
 Avhich demand an Irish Parliament. 
 
 D 
 
34 England's Case against Home Enle. [Chap. III. 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND. 
 
 A DISPASSIONATE obsei'ver will easily convince himself 
 that in Great Britain the movement in favour 
 
 Strength 
 
 of move- of Home Eule is stronger than is believed by 
 ment. 
 
 its opponents. Patent facts show that tliis is so. 
 
 In 1880 no single English statesman had avowed himself 
 its supporter; not fifty English or Scotch members of 
 l*arliament could have been found to vote for an enquiry 
 into the admissibility of Mr. Parnell's policy. It may 
 well be doubted whether at that date ten British 
 constituencies would liave returned to Parliament repre- 
 sentatives pledged to grant Ireland a separate legislature. 
 Contrast this state of things with the present condition 
 of affairs. England has indeed pronounced decisively 
 against any tampering with tlie Act of Union, but the 
 leading statesman of the day lias avowed himself a Home 
 Euler; he is supported by eminent colleagues, and by 
 nearly two hundred representatives of British consti- 
 tuencies. Scotland and Wales on the whole favour the 
 policy of sepai-ation ; and if, as has been roughly computed,. 
 
Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Rule Movement 35 
 
 of the electors of the United Kingdom, 1,316,327 have 
 voted in support of the Union, the same computation 
 shows that 1,238,342 are, to say the least, indifferent to its 
 maintenance. These are facts which tell their own tale. 
 The Home Eule movement has waxed strong. What is in 
 England the source of its strength, and what are the argu- 
 ments in its support relied upon by its English advocates ? 
 
 Nine persons out of ten will reply that the Home Eule 
 movement in Enj^land owes its oriodn and force 
 
 " Sources 
 
 to the patronage of Mr. Gladstone. No one of its 
 
 strength. 
 
 who has watched the ebb and flow of popular 
 feeling will underrate that statesman's influence, and few 
 persons, whatever their political bias, will deny that but 
 for Mr. Gladstone's conversion Mr. Parnell's teaching 
 would not at this moment have gained for him as many 
 as fifty disciples among English politicians. It may even 
 be conceded that but for Mr. Gladstone's action no 
 English party would, during his lifetime, have adopted the 
 Parliamentary independence of Ireland as a watchword. 
 But here, as in other instances, there is grave danger of 
 mistaking the occasion for the cause of events, and if 
 Mr. Gladstone's conversion has determined the form and 
 increased the momentum of the Home Eule movement, 
 it would be an error to hold that the prevalence of 
 doctrines unfavourable to the maintenance of the Union 
 between England and Ireland were wholly or even in the 
 main due to his conduct. His conversion itself remains 
 
 D 2 
 
36 England's Cccse against Home Rule. [Chap. III. 
 
 to be accounted for. This would (except to those critics 
 who ascribe the most important acts of public statesman- 
 ship to the pettiest forms of private selfishness) remain 
 almost unaccountable unless it were regarded in the 
 light, in which it ought no doubt to be looked upon, of an 
 example of the facility with which a leader guided by 
 keen sympathy with the real or supposed opinions or 
 emotions of the moment follows, while apparently he 
 guides, the phases of public opinion. Candour moreover 
 compels the admission that, if Mr. Gladstone's action has 
 led some politicians to " find salvation " — according to the 
 miserable cant of the day — in the adoption of opinions 
 which cannot be dignified with the name of convictions, 
 many lionest men both witliin and without the sphere of 
 public life have under the countenance of a great name 
 been encouraged to avow publicly sympathies with the 
 demand for Home Eule which have been slowly matured, 
 and have hitherto scarcely been acknowledged even in the 
 convert's own mind. To any one who perceives that the 
 force of a movement opposed to the traditions of English 
 .statesmansliip must be attributed to some cause beyond 
 the personal influence of a leader, the idea naturally 
 suggests itself that the prevalence of conversions to the 
 policy of Home Rule is due to the power of argument, 
 and that the English people have been brought to see the 
 expediency of conceding a legislature to Ireland by the 
 same metliods which induced them to abolish the policy 
 of Protection. This notion does not correspond with 
 
Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Bide Movement. 37 
 
 known facts. Till a recent date hardly an argument was 
 addressed to the English public in favour of Home Eule ; 
 no great writer or speaker even aimed at proving to the 
 nation that a reform or innovation which has been 
 rejected again and again as repeal had more to re- 
 commend it under a new name. Great changes in our 
 institutions or policy have hitherto been preceded by 
 lengthy, in general by too lengthy, discussion. The 
 doctrines of Free Trade were established by Adam Smith 
 seventy years before the abolition of the Corn Laws, and 
 Protection was not vanquished till Cobden and Bright 
 liad, by laborious controversy, exposed its fallacies in 
 every corner of Great Britain. The reasons in favour of 
 Catholic Emancipation were stated in their full force by 
 Burke more than forty years before a Eoman Catholic was 
 admitted to Parliament, and the whole case in favour of 
 the Catholics had been argued out in the presence of the 
 nation long before the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill. 
 No movement ever appealed to keener popular sympathies 
 than the movement for the abolition of slavery. Yet the 
 Abolitionists made their case out — proved it, as lawyers 
 say, "up to the very hilt," before a single slave was 
 released from bondage. The Irish Church (it may be 
 suggested) was abolished off-hand. This apparent ex- 
 ception to the regular course of long argumentative 
 controversy which in England marks all gi-eat inno- 
 vations has misled Home Eulers, yet the exception is only 
 apparent. Long before 1869 the intelligence of England 
 
38 England^s Case against Home Ride. [Chap. III. 
 
 — one might say of the civilised world — had been 
 convinced by the power of reason that the maintenance 
 in a Eoman Catholic country, and at the expense of a 
 Eoman Catholic population, of a Protestant ecclesiastical 
 establishment was an indefensible anomaly. The walls 
 fell at the first blast which sounded attack, because the 
 foundations had been argumentatively sapped and under- 
 mined for more than a generation. With the cause of 
 Home Rule it is far otherwise. Its sudden progress has 
 been characterised by a singular absence of systematic 
 discussion. No one supposes that its English advocates 
 are deficient in talent or in zeal. Mr. Gladstone, Mr. 
 John Morley, Mr. Bryce — to name no others — are as 
 competent apologists for any opinion they entertain as 
 can well be found. They have been put upon their 
 mettle ; they have addressed the nation in Parliament 
 and out of Parliament; they have produced a certain 
 number of reasons, which deserve respectful consideration, 
 in support of their favourite innovation. But no candid 
 critic can feel that these eminent men, and other less 
 distinguished labourers in the same cause, have put 
 forward arguments of strength enough to account for the 
 undoubted conviction of the reasoners. Appeals to trust 
 in the people, to confidence in human nature, to the 
 strength of love as contrasted with the weakness of law, 
 to shame for our past misgovernment of the Irish, to 
 sanguine expectations of terminating a secular feud 
 which has caused wretchedness to Ireland and has 
 
Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Rule MoveTnent 39 
 
 lessened the power of England, would appear in the 
 judgment of orators addressing English electors likely to 
 have much more weight with their audience than any 
 attempt to prove that the establishment of a Parliament 
 ai Dublin will be conducive to the benefit of the Empire. 
 Nor is this wonderful. The plain truth is that the strength 
 of the Home Eule movement depends, as far as England 
 is concerned, on a peculiar, though not of necessity a 
 tnnsitory, state of opinion. The arguments of Home 
 Kilers, whatever their worth (and I have not the re- 
 motest intention of denying that they have weight), 
 derive at least half their power from their correspondence 
 with dominant sentiments. That this is so is admitted by 
 tlie now celebrated appeal from the classes to the masses. 
 lii is in its nature an appeal from a verdict likely to be pro- 
 nounced by the understanding or the prejudice of educated 
 men, to the emotions of the uneducated crowd. The appeal 
 may or may not be justifiable. This is not the point for 
 discussion ; but the making of such an appeal necessarily 
 implies that the existence of certain widespread feelings is 
 a condition requisite for full appreciation of the reasoning 
 in support of Home Eule. The reasons may be good, but 
 it is faith wliich gives them convincing power. They 
 derive their cogency from a favouring atmosphere of 
 opinion or feeling. Two features of recent controversy 
 suffice of themselves (if proof were needed) to establish 
 the truth of this assertion. The rhetorical emphasis laid 
 by Home Eulers on the baseness of the arts which carried 
 
40 E'iigland's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. III. 
 
 the Act of XJDioii is, as an argument in favour of repealing 
 the Act, little else than irrational. The assumed infamy 
 of Pitt does not prove the alleged wisdom of Gladstone ; 
 and to urge the- repeal of an Act which has stood for 
 nearly a century, because it was carried by corruption, is 
 in the eye of reason as absurd as to question the title of 
 modern French landowners because of the horrors of tlie 
 Eeign of Terror. Even a Legitimist would not now bass 
 a moral claim to an estate on the ground that his granc- 
 father was deprived of it through confiscation and murdei\ 
 But rhetoric is not governed by the laws of logic, and 
 insistence on the corruption or the criminality by which 
 the Act of Union was carried is an effective . method of 
 conciliating popular sentiment to the cause of repeal. Na 
 notion again has been more widely circulated or put 
 forward on higher authority than that past reforms have 
 been due in the main to the enthusiasm of the masses. 
 But no notion is more directly at variance with the lessons 
 of history. In the eighteenth century the enhghtenment of 
 the Whig aristocracy was England's safeguard against the 
 Jacobitism and the bigotry of the crowd. Every effort 
 in favour of religious liberty was till recently the work of 
 an educated minority who opposed popular prejudice. In 
 the last century popular sentiment would have denied all 
 rights to Jews ; in 1780 Lord George Gordon was the 
 hero of the people of England, and even more emphatically 
 of the people of Scotland. And Burke was forced to 
 present an elaborate defence to his constituents at Bristol 
 
Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Eule Movement. 41 
 
 for taking part in an attempt to mitigate the penal laws* 
 against the Eoman Catholics. There is every reason ta 
 suppose that even in 1829 a ^plebiscite, had one been 
 possible, would have negatived the Catholic Eelief BilL 
 The mitigation again of the Criminal Law was the work 
 of thinkers like Eomilly and Bentham. These eminent 
 reformers would have been much surprised to have been 
 told that the uneducated masses were their staunch sup- 
 porters. One of the greatest improvements ever effected 
 by legislation was the reform in the administration of 
 parochial relief. The new poor law was essentially un- 
 popular ; its principles were established by economists ; 
 its enactment was due to the Whigs, supported, as it 
 should always be remembered to his credit, by the Duke 
 of Wellington. It may be conjectured from recent legis- 
 lation that at this very moment an indiscriminate renewal 
 of outdoor relief would command the approval of the- 
 agricultural voters. Protection in the form of the corn 
 laws was unpopular in England; this, however, cannot 
 with fairness be put down to the moral or intellectual 
 credit of the multitude. The corn laws were disliked 
 because they enhanced the price of bread. Even as it was, 
 the Chartists used to interrupt the meetings of the Anti- 
 Corn Law League, and it is an idle fancy that the dangers 
 pf a protective tariff are in themselves more patent to the 
 electors of England than to the democracy of France or of 
 America. Trades Unionism is in many of its features a 
 form of protectionism. If again we turn to foreign policy,. 
 
42 England's Case against Horiie Rude. [Chap. III. 
 
 "we must read history with a strangely perverted eye if we 
 hold that the people have in general condemned wars, 
 whether just or unjust. There is hardly to be named a 
 great war in which England has been engaged which has 
 not engaged popular support. In the struggle with the 
 American Colonies the warlike sentiment of the people 
 was undoubtedly opposed to the prudence and justice of 
 a small body of enlightened men, who found their re- 
 ]3resentative in Burke. In England, it is true, no great 
 ■change of law or of policy can in general be effected until 
 it has in some sort been sanctioned by popular approval. 
 But to attribute every advance, or even most advances, 
 along the path of progress to the masses by whom a step 
 forward is finally sanctioned, is hardly a more patent 
 fallacy than the notion that because every statute is 
 passed with the assent of the Crown, to the Queen may 
 be ascribed the glory of every beneficial Act passed in 
 her name. To maintain, as every man versed in history 
 must maintain, that ignorance must from the necessity 
 of the case be the ally of prejudice, is not to deny to 
 the people their merits or virtues. If ignorance were 
 wisdom as well as bliss, every effort in favour of popular 
 education were folly. No doubt the rich or educated 
 classes are slaves to delusions from which the crowd are 
 free. This concession falls far short ot the doctrine that 
 legislative progress is mainly due to the soundness of 
 popular feeling. That this doctrine should in one shai)e or 
 another have been promulgated, and have formed the basis 
 
Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Rule Movement. 43 
 
 of an argument for a complicated change in the con- 
 stitution, is a sign that the advocates of the innovation or 
 reform feel instinctively that the strength of their case lies 
 in its coincidence with dominant sentiment. Nor is it hard 
 to see what is the condition of sentiment or opinion which 
 favours the doctrine of Home Eule. The matter, however, 
 is of such importance as well to repay careful examination. 
 For the first time in the course of English history, 
 national policy has passed under the sway, not so much 
 of democratic convictions, but of a far stronger power — 
 democratic sentiment. Every idea which can rightly or 
 wrongly be called popular, commands, even among persons 
 who deem themselves Conservatives, ready assent or 
 superstitious deference. Hence flow (be it at once con- 
 ceded) some of the best characteristics of the age, such as the 
 detestation of inhumanity ; the distrust in violent methods 
 of government ; the dislike to anything which savours of 
 indifference to the wishes, or callousness to the wants, of 
 the people. Hence the growth of the conviction that pro- 
 perty has at least as many duties as rights, and of the 
 faith inspired, rather by compassion than by reason, that 
 the toiling multitudes can and must be made to share in 
 the prosperity and the luxuries created in great part by 
 their ceaseless labour. Erom the same source — from the 
 prevalence of the democratic spirit — arise a crowd of 
 dubious not to say ignoble ideas, as that the voice of the 
 majority is the voice of God ; that it is a folly, if not a crime, 
 to resist any widespread phase of belief or of passion; that 
 
44 EnglancCs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. III. 
 
 any body of persons claiming to be united by a sense of 
 nationality possesses an inherent and divine right to be 
 treated as an independent community. Many of these 
 notions are radically inconsistent with one another. The 
 dogma, for example, of the supremacy of the majority, or 
 the conviction that legislation ought to aim at the greatest 
 happiness of the greatest number, each belongs to a different 
 order of ideas from the principle of nationality, and may 
 easily come into conflict with it. This inconsistency does 
 not lessen the influence exerted by the mass of democratic 
 feeling. We may, however, well note that democratic 
 ideas at the present day produce their effect far less by 
 exciting enthusiasm (for they now kindle nothing like the 
 flery fervour which the doctrines of popular sovereignty 
 or of human equality excited a century ago througliout 
 the length and breadth of Europe), than by their singular 
 capacity for dissolving the convictions which oppose the 
 claims of revolutionists. Of this solvent power recent 
 events have given us more than enough examples. One 
 may suffice. The argument tliat because Irish householders 
 have received votes therefore the majority of tlie electors 
 of the United Kingdom must concede to the majority of 
 Irish liouseholders anything whatever having reference 
 to Ireland whicli Irish liouseholders desire, is logically 
 absurd. r)Ut (combined, no doubt, with other causes) it 
 convinced the Conservative Government of 1885 that 
 the executive in Ireland was bound to bow to the 
 will of the Irish people, and was relieved, from the 
 
.Chap. III.] Strength of the Home Rule Movement, 45 
 
 obligation of enforcing at all costs the law of the 
 land. Popular sympathies, moreover, blend in the 
 minds of modern Englishmen with feelings of a much 
 less generous and much less respectable order. Dislike 
 of trouble, hatred to the performance of arduous public 
 duties, a growing indifference to ordinary commonplace 
 ideas of law and justice, contempt for the legal rights of 
 individuals whenever these rights clash for a moment 
 with the ease or interest of the public, exert an incalculable 
 influence on the conduct, and in truth upon the convictions, 
 both of Members of Parliament and of electors. It is not 
 too much to say that the favour or acquiescence with which 
 so-called practical politicians are prepared to accept 
 Home Eule is grounded to a far greater extent than 
 any one who respects the character of England likes to 
 confess upon the naive but intense conviction that it is 
 too much to expect from five hundred and more English 
 gentlemen that they should take the trouble of with- 
 standing the continuous pressure exerted by eighty-six 
 Parnellites. Cowardice masks itself under the show of 
 compromise, and men of eminent respectability yield to 
 the terror of being bored concessions which their fore- 
 fathers would have refused to the threat of armed rebellion. 
 It is unnecessary to explain how this condition of opinion, 
 under which the best and the lowest feelings of human 
 nature are blended in a current of democratic sentiment, 
 predisposes large bodies of Englishmen towards acquies- 
 cence in the Home Eule movement. My aim is not so 
 
46 England^s Case against Home Bule, [Chap. HI. 
 
 much to analyse with precision the mode in which the 
 cause of Home Eule is fostered by the moral atmosphere 
 of the day, as to insist upon the all-important considera- 
 tion that the progress of the Home Eule movement is due 
 rather to the encouragement it derives from prevailing 
 sentiment than to any intellectual conviction on the part 
 of Englishmen that it is dictated by considerations of sound 
 policy. 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 ENGLISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOME RULE. 
 
 To lay stress upon the consideration that the Home Kule 
 movement in England derives its force from the af^u- 
 condition of imblic feeling is not, be it remarked, ^^?*^ ^^ 
 equivalent to showing that the policy of Home S°]"® ,. 
 Eule is unwise, still less that the policy of defended. 
 Home Eule is unlikely to be adopted by the nation. 
 Masses of human beings must generally, as individuals 
 must often, trust to the guidance of feeling. Tlie differ- 
 ence between the sentiment which ought and the senti- 
 ment which ought not to determine national conduct is, 
 that the one admits and the other does not admit of 
 justification on grounds of reason or experience. Eeason- 
 ing is the test, not the source of wise action. Slavery was 
 abolished, the abuses of the ancien regime were destroyed, 
 Italian unity was created under the stress of emotions 
 which carried away thousands who could not have lof^- 
 cally defended the impulse which governed their acts. But 
 in these, as in other cases in which humanity has been 
 carried forward along the path of progress by the force of 
 emotion, the enthusiasm of the time could, in so far as it 
 
48 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. rv. 
 
 worked for good, be justified on grounds of reason. Man 
 is (difficult though it often be to believe the fact) a 
 rational being, in so far at least that he is constrained to 
 defend on argumentative grounds courses of action dic- 
 tated by feeling. From this law of human nature Home 
 Eulers have neither the power nor, in fairness be it added, 
 the wish to escape. Their influence is due to the con- 
 dition of public sentiment, but they justify their policy by 
 arguments which are the intellectual equivalents for the 
 moral feelings which go to constitute the opinion of the 
 day. Of these arguments, those which require statement 
 and examination can be conveniently summed up under 
 six heads — the argument from foreign experience — the 
 argument from the will of the Irish people — the argument 
 from the lessons of Irish history — the argument from 
 the virtues of self-government — the argument from the 
 necessity for Coercion Acts — ^the argument from the incon- 
 venience to England of refusing Home Rule to Ireland. 
 
 Tlic argument from foreign experience. — Home Rule 
 under one shape or another has been tried in 
 
 Argu- 
 ment 1. a large number of foreign countries, and has (it 
 Foreign . ^ 
 oxperi- 13 alleged) been found everywhere to solve the 
 
 problem of combining into one State com- 
 munities which, like England and Ireland, were not 
 ready to coalesce into one united nation. Each State 
 throughout tlie American Union, each Canton of Swit- 
 zerland, has something like sovereign independence. Yet 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bule. 49 
 
 the United States are strong and prosperous, and the 
 Swiss Confederacy, which was a land at one time torn by- 
 religious animosities, and divided by differences of race, is 
 now a country so completely at harmony with itself that 
 without a regular army it maintains its independence in 
 the face of the armed powers of Europe. Canada or 
 Victoria have more complete liberty of action than any 
 one dreams of claiming for Ireland. Yet Canada and 
 Victoria are loyal, and under the guidance of men who, 
 it may be, wxre yesterday rebels in Ireland, support the 
 supremacy of the British Parliament and contribute to 
 the splendour of the English Crown. The German Empire 
 contains not only separate States, but separate kingdoms, 
 such as Bavaria, ruled by kings or princes who certainly 
 value highly the independence of their countries and the 
 dignity of their thrones. The despotism of Turkey has 
 not forbidden the local independence of Crete, and self- 
 government has, it is hinted, produced acquiescence in 
 Turkish rule. The autocracy of the Czar is found com- 
 patible with Home Kule in Finland, and Finland is the 
 most contented portion of Eussia. Norway and Sweden 
 are united in feeling because they are not by law a 
 " united kingdom," and act in harmony just because each 
 country has a different constitution, and each is governed 
 by its own Parliament. Denmark has, with benefit to 
 herself, given local independence to Iceland, and Iceland 
 is content. Austria and Hungary, after centuries of 
 misunderstanding and twenty years of bitter conflict, have 
 
50 England's Case af/ainst Honic Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 finally composed the feud of ages by a compromise, which 
 gives to the two parts of the Empire the practical blessings 
 of Parliamentary independence, and concedes to Hungary 
 at least the sentimental blessing of acknowledged nation- 
 ality. The argument, in fact, from foreign experience, 
 professes to be an induction based upon a foundation of 
 instances as large as can support any conclusion of social 
 science. In one land after another the existence of Home 
 Kule, or, to use the curiously inaccurate phraseology of 
 the day, of " autonomy," in one part of the State has been 
 found consistent with the unity of the whole. An ex- 
 periment which has succeeded in one set of cases ought to 
 succeed in another, and England has no reason to dread a 
 scheme of government which has been tried with success in 
 other portions of the civilized world. Nor does the zealous 
 advocate of Home Rule pause at the conclusion that the 
 measure he recommends may, on the strength of foreign ex- 
 perience, be regarded as a tolerable evil or as a probable cure 
 for a chronic disease. He suggests that it is a good in 
 itself, and laments that ignorance led our ancestors to fuse 
 Scotland and England into an United Kingdom, when they 
 might, had they understood the principles of federalism, 
 have left to each country the blessings of State sovereignty. 
 
 There is some difficulty in treating with perfect serious- 
 ness a line of reasoning which, proceeding from 
 on argu- the quarter w^hence it comes, holds up for our 
 admiration the wisdom or lenity of Turkish rule 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 51 
 
 in Crete, and extols the supreme justice of the system 
 upon which rests the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, wliich 
 implies that the arts of government may be learnt from 
 the Eussian administration of Finland, and omits all 
 reference to the disastrous results of the attempt to endow 
 Poland with some sort of independence, which bases 
 weighty inferences as to the proper relation between 
 England and Ireland on the concession by Denmark to 
 the scanty inhabitants of a desolate island lying 1100 
 miles from her coast of as much autonomy (if that be the 
 right term) as under the Crown of England has been en- 
 joyed for generations by Jersey or Man, and which suggests 
 lamentations over the splendid triumph of constructive 
 statesmanship embodied in the treaty of Union with 
 Scotland. Dc minimis non curat lex is a maxim of judicial 
 procedure which in spirit applies to proposals for legis- 
 lation. Arguments from Iceland and the like may be set 
 aside as the ornaments or curiosities of debate, and may 
 be allowed as much weight and no more as would be 
 given to an argument in favour of petty states from the 
 flourishing condition of Monaco, or to reasonings in 
 support of Eepublicanism from the condition of Andorre. 
 There is something slightly ridiculous in the zeal with 
 wliich the advocates of Home Rule, using at least as much 
 industry as discrimination, have scraped together every 
 instance they can lay their hands upon of constitutions 
 under which something which can be called Home Rule 
 exists without producing palpable injury to the State ; it 
 
 E 2 
 
52 ETiglamVs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. rv. 
 
 would however be unfair to deny some real weight to a kind 
 of induction, which, if not convincing as argument, yet 
 possesses undoubtedly a good deal of rhetorical effectiveness. 
 Nor ought the concession to be refused that if there be any 
 man dull or ill-informed enough to suppose that countries 
 cannot be politically united unless they are subject to a 
 common legislative power, the slightest knowledge of 
 lands outside England is sufficient to make manifest liis 
 ignorance. When, however, the instances on which the 
 induction is supposed to be founded are carefully scruti- 
 nised, it will be discovered that those examples which 
 deserve attention are far less numerous than might be 
 supposed from a glance over the lists (now well known to 
 the public) of what may be termed successful experiments 
 in Home Eule, and, further, that this limited number of 
 instances does not go far to make out the conclusion in 
 favour of which they are adduced. 
 
 At the present stage of my argument I purposely omit 
 all minute examination of the applicability to the re- 
 lations between England and Ireland, either of the 
 English Colonial system or of federalism as it exists in the 
 United States or in Switzerland. Any scheme of Home 
 Rule must follow in some degree one or other of these 
 models. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider in 
 subsequent chapters how far either of them may admit 
 with advantage of imitation. Two observations, however, 
 may even at this point not be out of place. An English 
 colony, such as Victoria, is a virtually independent 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 53 
 
 country, attached to England mainly by ties of loyalty or 
 of well-understood interest, but placed at such a distance 
 from the mother country that England could without 
 inconvenience, and would without hesitation, concede to 
 it full national independence when once it was clear that 
 Victoria desired to be a nation. Victoria, in sliort, is a 
 land which might at any moment be independent, but 
 which desires to retain or strengthen the connection with 
 England. Ireland, on the other hand, is a country lying 
 so near to the English coast that, according to the views 
 of most statesmen, England could not with safety tolerate 
 her independence, and also a country, which, to put the 
 matter in the least exaggerated language, feels the con- 
 nection with England so burdensome that the greater part 
 of her population desire at least the amount of indepen- 
 dence conceded to a self-governing colony. The case of 
 Victoria and the case of Ireland each constitute, so to 
 speak, the antithesis to the other. There is, therefore, at 
 any rate no a 2^Tiori ground for the assumption that the 
 system which successfully regulates the relation of 
 England to Victoria is ec[ually adapted for regulating the 
 relation between England and Ireland. The federalism 
 again, of America or of Switzerland is the consequence of 
 the existence of the States which make up the Federation. 
 The United Kingdom does not consist of States. The 
 world has heard of the difficulty of forming a republic 
 without republicans : this feat would appear to be easy of 
 performance in comparison with the achievement of 
 
54 EiuflancVs Cccse against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 erecting federation without the States which form its 
 natural members. In America or in Switzerland federal- 
 ism has developed because existing States wished to be 
 combined into some kind of national unity. Federalism 
 in England would necessarily mean the breaking up of a 
 nation in order to form a body of States. To the question 
 constantly raised in one form or another, " Why should 
 not the federalism wliich suits the United States suit 
 England ? " the true answer is suggested by the counter- 
 inquiry, " Why should not the constitutionalism of 
 England suit the United States?" The obvious and 
 eonclusive reply to both these inquiries is, that the 
 circumstances of the two countries are totally different. 
 There is, in short, no ground in the nature of things 
 to presume that constitutional arrangements, which 
 are well adapted for the condition of America, are well 
 adapted for the totally different condition of the United 
 Kingdom. To say this, be it noted, is not to pre- 
 judge the question reserved for subsequent considera- 
 tion, whether some kind of federalism may not supply 
 the solution of the problem how to adjust the political 
 connection between EngLmd and Ireland. It is no 
 more than noting the often-overlooked fact that the 
 j^dmitted success of federal government in the United 
 States gives no presumption in favour of its suitability for 
 Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 The experience of foreign countries to which Home 
 Eulers confidently appeal resolves itself, if the matter be 
 
Chap, IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 55 
 
 carefully sifted, and if the colonial system of England and 
 the federalism of America be left for the moment out of 
 account, into the fact that two powerful continental 
 Empires maintain Imperial unity, and yet (as it is alleged 
 without lessening their strength) contain within their 
 limits States each of which enjoys a large amount of 
 independence. That neither the German Empire nor 
 the Austro-Hungarian monarchy suffers inconvenience 
 from the looseness of the connection between the States 
 which they each contain is one of those assertions 
 more easily made than proved to be true ; but supposing 
 its truth to be, for the moment and purely for the 
 sake of argument, admitted, there will still be found 
 considerable difficulty in showing that either German 
 Imperialism or the Dual system of Austria-Hungary 
 contains lessons of practical value for the guidance of 
 English statesmen. 
 
 . What indeed is the precise inference wliich one is to 
 draw from the fact that the constitution of the German 
 Empire leaves, for example, to Bavaria a large amount of 
 independence it is not very easy to understand. The 
 whole circumstances of the German Empire are as 
 different from the circumstances of Great Britain as the 
 position of one civilised European country can well be 
 from the situation of another. The salient characteristic 
 of German history is that Germany consists of States 
 which until quite recently have never been politically 
 consolidated into a nation. The United l^ngdom has for 
 
66 England*s Case ctgainst Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 nearly a century formed a political unit, and has now for 
 something nearly approaching two centuries been sub« 
 ject in reality if not in name to one sovereign Parlia- 
 ment. The whole scheme of the Empire, with its indepen- 
 dent or semi-independent sovereigns, with its kings, 
 princes, and free towns, is something to which there is 
 absolutely nothing to correspond in the present condition 
 or in the historical development of England. The Ger- 
 man Empire is the natural though strange growth of a 
 special and strange history. Tlie sober English statesmen 
 who advocate Home Kule assuredly never dreamt any 
 dream so wild as that the Imperial Federalism of Ger- 
 many could in any way be reproduced in the United 
 Kingdom. But if this be so, it is a little difficult to 
 understand references to the lessons to be drawn from the 
 position of such countries as Bavaria. For the difficulty 
 of applying German precedents to proposed innovations 
 in the English constitution lies far deeper than the un- 
 suitability to England of the forms of German Im- 
 perialism. The condition which has given birth to the 
 present German Empire is that in Germany the sentiment 
 of nationality has overridden the political divisions which 
 broke up Germany into almost disconnected and often 
 hostile States. In Germany the popular passion for unity 
 has compelled the formation of a United Empire. This 
 sentiment, and not the cimibersome device of an ill* 
 arranged constitution, prevents Bavaria from using her 
 independence in a manner inconsistent with the unity of 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 57 
 
 the Empire. The force which tends towards unity is 
 constantly on the increase. The Empire holds in its hands 
 the legal means of diminishing or indeed of destroying the 
 independence of the States, and should the independence 
 of a State ever come into conflict with the unity of the 
 nation State rights will not, we may be sure, win the day. 
 Nor, further, is it any accident that Bismarck whilst 
 tolerating the existence of Parliaments will not tolerate the 
 introduction of Parliamentary government. The acquies- 
 cence of Liberals in the evils of personal rule is due to the 
 consciousness that the real authority of the Emperor is 
 necessary for the unity of the Empire. Contrast all this 
 with the condition of things under which Englishmen are 
 adjured to concede a Parliament to Ireland. The leading 
 features of the case, according at any rate to Home Rulers, 
 are that Parliament is too weak to withstand the pressure 
 exercised by eighty-six obstructives, and that Ireland, no 
 less, as we are now at last frankly told, than Scotland 
 and Wales, desires to relax the bonds of national unity. 
 We are advised to dissolve the United Kingdom into a 
 confederacy because Germany, through a clumsy form of 
 confederacy, is growing into a united empire. This 
 counsel confuses the stages of imperfect development with 
 the stage of incipient decay ; it ascribes to the childish- 
 ness of approaching senility the hopes which are proper to 
 the childishness of early youth. The point is worth 
 pressing. The considerations which govern a confederacy 
 as it is developing into a nation are very different from 
 
58 Ungland's Case against Home Bide. [Chap, rv* 
 
 the considerations applicable to a full grown nation when 
 threatened with dismemberment into a confederacy. 
 
 Deiik's statesmanship undoubtedly found at any rate a 
 temporary solution of the questions which kept Austria 
 and Hungary at variance in a compromise which bears 
 some analogy to the arrangement by wliich Home Kulers 
 propose at once to loosen and to maintain the connection 
 between England and Ireland. In the case of Austria- 
 Hungary, the union which exists is not, on the face of it 
 at least, a step towards unity, but rather the surrender of 
 the endeavour to mould the two parts of the monarchy 
 into a united empire. The Dual system is therefore the 
 instance of the blessings attending Home Eule which is 
 most sedulously thrust upon English attention. Let us 
 see, then, what in outline this system is, and what are the 
 causes which favour its existence.* 
 
 German jurisprudence has taxed hard its boundless 
 stores of ingenuity and obscurity in the endeavour to find 
 a proper scientific definition of the nature of the anomalous 
 union which binds together the monarchy of Austria- 
 Hungary, With the inquiry, however, what may be the 
 precise class of constitutions under wliich we ought to 
 bring a political arrangement wliich is " singular " in the 
 strictest sense of that word, English inquirers need not 
 
 * For the constitution of Austria-Hungary see Ulbrich's Oesterreich- 
 Ungarn in Martiuardsen's Ilatidbttch des OeffentlicJien Hechts ; Francis 
 Dedk, with preface by M. E. Grant Duft'; Home Kule in Austria- 
 Hungary, by David King, in the Nineteenth Century^ January 1886, 
 p. 35. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favoi^r of Home Rule. o9 
 
 concern themselves. The broad outlines of the Dual 
 system, invented by the ingenuity of Deak, and accepted 
 under the stress of necessity by the sagacity of the 
 Emperor, may, for our present purpose, be roughly sketched 
 in short, and, it is hoped, in not unintelligible terms. 
 
 The Dual system is a permanent alliance rather than a 
 union between the kingdom of Hungary and the countries 
 now represented in the Austrian Imperial Parliament, or 
 (to use convenient though not quite accurate terms) be- 
 tween Austria and Hungary. 
 
 The essential features of this alliance or compromise, 
 which is in its nature a treaty far more than an act of 
 legislation, may be thus summed up. 
 
 At the head of the whole monarchy stands the 
 Emperor-King. The rules for the succession to the throne 
 indeed secure that the Imperial and the Hungarian Crown 
 shall always devolve upon the same person. The Crowns, 
 however, are distinct, the monarch on whose head they 
 rest governs two distinctly different peoples, bound to him 
 by different ties of allegiance. He has Hungarian sub- 
 jects and Austrian subjects, but he can claim authority 
 over no man as a subject or citizen of Austria-Hungary. 
 The monarch (and this is a matter of supreme importance) 
 is not only the nominal, but the real link connecting the 
 two halves of his dominions. He is moreover a true 
 ruler. Englishmen hear of a Parliament at Vienna and of 
 a Diet in Hungary, of Austrian ministers and of Hungarian 
 ministers, and they fancy that Francis Joseph is a con- 
 
60 Eyigland's Case a{/ainst Home Rule. [Chaf. IV. 
 
 stitutional king after tlie type of Queen Victoria of Eng- 
 land, or King Humbert of Italy. No idea is more erroneous. 
 He is the actual head of the State ; lie is the real com- 
 mander of the army. In the Austrian Empire he exercises 
 a predominant influence on the Government, and observers 
 who look at the past exertions of Imperial prerogative, 
 and who weigh well the immense power of temporary 
 legislation reserved under the Imperial constitution to the 
 Emperor, suspect that in his Austrian dominions, Francis 
 Joseph might if he chose as easily suspend constitutional 
 government, as he did in fact suspend it (though for a most 
 legitimate object) in 1866. In Hungary the parliamentary 
 constitution is a reality, but the King of Hungary's 
 authority is a good deal more than nominal. The transac- 
 tions between Deak and the Emperor become incompre- 
 hensible unless you allow for the influence conferred by 
 Hungarian loyalty upon the King of Hungary. 
 
 This real monarch rules the monarchy with the 
 co-operation of what might roughly be called three 
 Parliaments. 
 
 The first Parliament is the Hungarian Diet sitting at 
 Pesth, which constitutes the real and true legislature for 
 Hungary, and which, in spite of the powers retained by or 
 conferred upon the local legislature of Croatia, makes laws 
 for the wliole domain of the Hungarian Crown. The 
 King of Hungary appoints the Hungarian ministers, who 
 are responsible to the Hungarian Diet, and are kept in 
 office by the Diet's support. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bule, 61 
 
 The second Parliament is the Imperial Parliament, or 
 EeicJisrath, sitting at Vienna, legislating for the territories 
 of the Austrian Empire which do not belong to the 
 Hungarian Crown. The Emperor appoints the Austrian 
 or Imperial Ministry, who are responsible to the Imperial 
 Parliament, and need the support of the Reichsrath ; it 
 may well however be doubted whether an Austrian 
 Premier does not depend for his authority far more on the 
 will of the Emperor than on the votes of Reichsrath ; the 
 authority of the Reichsrath is, moreover, considerably re- 
 stricted by the powers conferred upon the subordinate 
 assemblies of the different countries, e.g. Bohemia or the 
 Tyrol, which make up the Empire.* 
 
 Englishmen should note that the Hungarian Diet has 
 as such no legislative authority in Austria, and the 
 RcicJisrath has no legislative authority in Hungary. 
 
 The third Parliament consists of the so-called Delegations. 
 These Delegations are two committees of sixty members 
 €ach, elected by and from the members of the Hungarian 
 Diet and the Imperial Parliament respectively, but though 
 I have termed them " committees " they are committees 
 wliich within their sphere have an authority independent 
 of the bodies by whom they are appointed. 
 
 The function of the Delegations is to determine the 
 
 ** common affairs " of the monarchy, that is to say a strictly 
 
 limited number of matters, namely, common finance, 
 
 common military matters, and foreign affairs. On these 
 
 * Ulbrich, pp. 15, 76, 77. 
 
62 England's Case against Home Bnle. [Chap. IV, 
 
 three topics, and on these alone, the Hungarian and the 
 Austrian Delegations are (acting of course with the 
 Emperor) supreme. They determine the common Budget 
 of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire ; they determine 
 as far as legislation is required all questions affecting the 
 Imperial army as a whole ; they also determine, as far as 
 their intervention is required, questions of foreign policy. 
 The function in short of the Delegations is to deal with 
 matters, and with those matters only, which affect the 
 Austro-Hungarian State as a united body, and in its re- 
 lation to foreigners. Hence three Ministers, the Minister 
 of War, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, who act for the whole monarchy, con- 
 stitute what is called the Common Ministry, and are 
 appointed by the Emperor-King, and are responsible 
 neither to the Hungarian Parliament nor to the Imperial 
 Parliament, but simply to the Delegations. It is natural 
 for Englishmen to conclude that the Delegations regulate 
 matters, such for example as questions regarding customs, 
 &c., which must aifect every portion of the State, and 
 must, if the two divisions of it are to be united at all, be 
 regulated on common principles. But this is not so. The 
 economical relations of the two parts of the Empire are 
 determined by laws identical in substance, passed by the 
 Hungarian and Imperial Parliaments respectively. "These 
 laws are enacted from ten years to ten years. It is therefore 
 possible under the present arrangement that in '88 tlie 
 existing customs union between Austria and Hungary may 
 
Chap. IV.] English Argicments in Favour of Home Bide. 63 
 
 come to an end.* The position further of the Delegations is 
 in reality that of two separate committees each represent- 
 ing a separate Parliament. Infinite pains have been taken 
 to place the Hungarian and the Austrian Delegations on 
 exactly equal footing. The Delegations meet alternately 
 at Vienna and at Pesth, they debate in general separately, 
 and come to an agreement through written negotiations ; 
 they may have a common meeting. In this case the 
 number of deputies present on each side must be equal, 
 and by a vote of the majority at such common meeting, 
 any question in dispute is finally determined. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian system is therefore briefly tliis : 
 two separate States, each having a separate administra- 
 tion, a separate Parliament, and separate bodies of sub- 
 jects or citizens, are each ruled by one and the same 
 monarch; the two portions of the monarchy are Hnked 
 together, mainly as regards their relation to foreign powerSj 
 by an assembly of delegates from each Parliament and by 
 a Ministry which is responsible to the Delegations alone, 
 and which acts in regard to a limited number of matters 
 which are of absolute necessity the common concern of 
 the monarchy. This is the Dual system held up for our 
 imitation. Picture it for a moment as actually existing 
 in what is still the United Kingdom. We should have an 
 English Ministry and an English Parliament at West- 
 minster which had not the least authority in Ireland ; we 
 should have an Irish Ministry and an Irish Parliament at 
 * See Marquardsen, 28-30. 
 
64 EiiglancVs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 Dublin wliicli had not the least authority in England. 
 Each Parliament would in point say of foreign policy be 
 hampered by the superior authority of a third Parliament 
 consisting of sixty English and sixty Irish members who 
 sat alternately at "Westminster and at Dublin to transact 
 or perplex or obstruct the affairs common to the whole 
 Empire. To imagine such an arrangement, to sketch out 
 in one's fancy, for example, how the common budget 
 decreed by the Delegations would be provided for by 
 taxation imposed by the Irish Parliament, is enough to 
 show that the Dual system is absolutely inapplicable to 
 our circumstances. It could not last for a year, and if by 
 any miracle it did last for that time, the whole British 
 Empire would be reduced to confusion or ruin. The 
 advocates of innovation exhibit the most singular mixture 
 of despair and hopefulness. The presence in Parliament 
 of eighty-six Parnellites makes them despair of tlic 
 British constitution, which has existed for centuries. 
 They hope or expect that three Parliaments, in two of 
 which these very Parnellites, or men like them, would 
 reappear, would harmoniously legislate for England, 
 Ireland, and the British Empire, and this hope is based on 
 the alleged success of that Dual system which has not 
 without difficulty been kept going for not quite twenty 
 years. The alliance of scepticism and credulity, of which 
 we have often heard in the sphere of theology, is a startling 
 phenomenon in the province of politics. The Dualsystem, 
 however, it will be urged by its admirers, has worked welL 
 
Chap. IV.] EiKjlisJh Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. Qo 
 
 Admit the fact, the success is clearly due to circumstances 
 negative and positive totally absent in the case of 
 England and Ireland. The bodies united by means of 
 the compromise do not, like the United Kingdom, con- 
 stitute the centre of a world-wide Empire. Hungary has 
 taken up arms against the Austrian Emperor, yet there has 
 never been in strictness a feud between the Hungarians 
 and the other subjects of the Emperor. The compromise 
 or alliance manifestly met the interest of both portions of 
 the monarchy: it restored to Hungary a constitution 
 which for eighteen years or more had been suppressed, but 
 which had never been given up ; it secured, or went far 
 to secure, the new constitutional liberties of the Austrian 
 Empire. Hungary could not stand alone, and she knew 
 it. The compromise w^as in reality a politic alliance 
 between the two leading races among the many races 
 governed by Francis Joseph. The Germans and the 
 Magyars came to terms ; the alliance strengthened them 
 each against other foes. But with every political advan- 
 tage the Dual system, of which the permanence is not as 
 yet at all secure, might have proved as undurable as 
 Grattan's Constitution of 1782 but for one circumstance, to 
 which I have already directed attention. At the head of 
 Austria-Hungary stands not an absolute, but a powerful 
 monarch. The authority of the Emperor is the spring 
 wliich makes the cumbersome machinery of a complicated 
 constitution keep going. The matter is worth attention. 
 The power of the Emperor William holds together the States 
 of the German Empire ; the power of Francis Joseph 
 
■66 JEngland's Case against Home Bide. [Chap. IV. 
 
 keeps alive the Dual system ; where the Crown has a real 
 authority trial may be made of experiments in the way of 
 local independence, which are impossible in a State where, 
 as in England, the true sovereign is an elective assembly. 
 Foreign experience then affords but a YQvy tottering 
 foundation on which to raise pleas for Home Eule in 
 Ireland. It may no doubt be read by those who are 
 already convinced that Home Eule is desirable in favour 
 of their views. It may confirm a faith based on other 
 grounds, more it cannot do. Fairly looked at, foreign 
 experience tells ratlier against than for the doctrines 
 of Home Eule. If appealed to at all, it must be taken 
 as a whole. It then shows that Federalism is when 
 flourishing a stage towards, not a stage away from, national 
 unity ; it shows that a strong central power above Parlia- 
 mentary control is almost a condition to the successful 
 combination in one body of semi-independent States.* It 
 shows that the wliole tendency of modem civilization 
 flows towards the creation of great States ; national unity 
 is, so to speak, the watchword of the age ; this is scarcely 
 a reason for breaking up the United Kingdom. The 
 sagacity of Italian statesmanship rejected the plausible 
 scheme of an Italian Federation. If Englishmen are to 
 take lessons from foreigners they need not be ashamed of 
 being instructed by Cavour.t 
 
 * This is, in my judgment, true even of such federations as the 
 United States or the Swiss confederacy. 
 
 t John Stuart Mill, in his very reniarlvable jiamphlet * England and 
 Ireland,' gives it as his distinct opinion that neither the Canadian 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bute. 67 
 
 The argument from the ivill of the Irish ^people. — Eighty- 
 six representatives of the Irish people represent 
 
 Argu- 
 
 the wish of Ireland for Home Kule. We can- ment 2. 
 
 WiUof 
 
 not under a Parliamentary system of govern- Irish 
 ment go behind the result of an election. It 
 must be taken therefore that Ireland wishes for Home 
 Iwule ; and since popular government as it exists in England 
 means nothing else than government in accordance with 
 the wishes of the people, the wish of the Irish people 
 for the Parliamentary independence of their country 
 proves their right to an Irish Parliament, and terminates, 
 or ought to terminate, all opposition to Home Eule. 
 
 This simple argument, that because three millions of 
 Irishmen, or for that matter three millions of 
 
 Criticism 
 
 Englishmen, wish for a thing, they are therefore on argu- 
 ment, 
 absolutely entitled to have it, is not often put 
 
 forward in its naked simplicity, but is constantly pre- 
 sented under various rhetorical disguises, such for example 
 as the assertion that Irishmen have a right to manage 
 their own affairs, that Ireland only wants to be left to 
 herself, and the like ; and impresses both the imagination 
 and the conscience of the masses. There is a good deal to 
 be said about the truth of the alleged fact on wliich the 
 argument is based, namely the wish of the Irish people . 
 
 Confederation nor the Dual system of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
 afford models which could be followed in regulating the connection 
 between Great Britain and Ireland. See * England and Ireland, 
 pp. 32-37. 
 
 f2 
 
68 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 It might be worth while to note that the " people " in this 
 case meant only a majority of the electors, whose wisli is 
 notoriously opposed to the ardent desire of a respectable 
 minority ; and it might be well to suggest that tlie con- 
 stitutional pedantry which refuses to "go behind an 
 electoral return," i.e.., to see things as they are, is not the 
 same thing as either good sense or statesmanship. But for 
 the present purpose it is better to admit that the majority 
 of the inhabitants of Ireland would, if a fair vote were 
 taken, express their wish for Home Eule, as they might, 
 probably, under similar conditions express their wish for 
 separation. The argument in hand, however, even when 
 its basis is conceded, allows, according to the different 
 meanings which it may bear, of different answers. If 
 taken in its most obvious sense, as asserting the absolute 
 right of a majority among Irish electors to any concession 
 with regard to Ireland which they are pleased to claim, 
 it may be met by another formula of equal cogency or of 
 equal weakness. " The vast majority of the United 
 Kingdom, including by the way a million or more of the 
 inhabitants of Ireland, have expressed their will to main- 
 tain the Union. Popular government means government 
 in accordance with the will of the majority, and therefore 
 according to all the principles of popular government the 
 majority of the United Kingdom have a right to maintain 
 the Union. Their wish is decisive, and ought to terminate 
 the whole agitation in favour of Home Kule." To any 
 sensible person who has passed beyond the age of early 
 manhood (for youths may without blame treat politics 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 69 
 
 as a form of logic) neither of these formulas can present a 
 sound ground from which to defend or impugn legislation 
 which involves the welfare of millions. The contradiction 
 however between two formulas each of which if pro- 
 pounded alone would command the assent of a demo^ 
 cratic audience is noteworthy. This contradiction brings 
 into prominence the consideration that the principle that the 
 will of the majority should be sovereign cannot, whether 
 true or false in itself, be invoked to determine a dispute turn- 
 ing upon the enquiry which of two bodies is the body the 
 majority of which has a right to sovereignty. The majority 
 of the citizens of the United States were opposed to Seces- 
 sion, the majority of the citizens of the Southern States were 
 in favour of Secession ; the attempt to determine which side 
 had right on its side by an appeal to the " sovereignty of 
 the majority " involved in this case, as it must in every 
 case, a j^etitio principii, for the very question at issue was 
 wliich of two majorities ought, as regarded the matter in 
 hand, to be considered the majority. 
 
 It would however be doing injustice to the argument from 
 the will of the people to dispose of it by dwelling upon the 
 logical inconsistencies inevitably involved in every attempt 
 to determine a question of practical politics by the applica- 
 tion to it of a priori dogmatism. Formulas such as " the 
 sovereignty of the people " often contain much solid truth 
 hidden under an inaccurate and a too absolute form of 
 expression. The assertion that the wish of the Irish 
 people is decisive as to the form of constitution to be 
 maintained in Ireland covers two genuine and in them- 
 
70 England's Case against Home Ride. [Qhw. l\. 
 
 selves rational convictions. The first is, that a body of 
 human beings v*^ho feel themselves, in consequence of their 
 inhabiting a common country, of tlieir sharing a common 
 history and the like, inspired with a feeling of common 
 nationality, have, if not a right, at lowest a strong claim to 
 be governed as a separate nation. Tliis is the doctrine of 
 nationality which, be it noted, tliough often confused with, 
 is at bottom different from, the dogma of the supremacy of 
 the majority. That the doctrine of nationality is, when 
 reasonably put, conformable with obvious principles of 
 utility may be readily admitted ; but it is a doctrine which 
 can only be accepted with considerable qualifications. Its 
 validity was denied both theoretically and practically, and, 
 in the judgment of most English democrats, not to say of 
 most European Liberals, denied justly and righteously by 
 the Northern States of America, when the Southern States 
 claimed the benefit of its application. The argument 
 moreover from the principle of nationality in reference 
 to the present controversy proves too much. If the 
 Irish people are a nation, this may give them a riglit to 
 independence, but it can never in itself give them a moral 
 claim to dictate the particular terms of union with 
 England. The second conviction which underlies tlie 
 argument from the will of the people is of far more serious 
 import than any reasoning drawn from even so respectable 
 a formula as the doctrine of nationality. The dogma that 
 the will of the people must be obeyed often expresses 
 the rational belief that under all polities, and especially 
 under the system of popular government, institutions derive 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 71 
 
 their life, and laws their constraining power, not from the 
 will of the law-giver, or from the strength of the army, 
 but from their correspondence with the permanent wishes 
 and habits of the people. Home Rule, to put this matter 
 in its strongest form, means, it may be said, the application 
 to Ireland of the very principle on which the English 
 constitution rests — that a people must be ruled in accord- 
 ance with their own permanent ideas of right and of justice, 
 and that unless this be done, law, because it commands no 
 loyalty, ensures no obedience. The whole history of the 
 connection between the two islands which make up the 
 United Kingdom is a warning of the wretchedness, the 
 calamities, the wickedness and the ruin which follow upon 
 die attempt to violate this fundamental principle not only 
 of popular, but of all good and just government. Home 
 Eule may appear to be an innovation. It is in this point of 
 view simply a return to the essential ideas of English con- 
 stitutionalism, it is an attempt to escape from the false path 
 which has been pursued for centuries, and to return to the 
 broad highway of government in accordance with popular 
 sympathy. At this point, however, the argument from the 
 will of the people merges in the much stronger and more 
 serious train of reasoning derived from the teacliing of 
 history. 
 
 The argument from Irish history, — Appeals to the lessons 
 of the past are at times in the mouths of Home Eulers, 
 as also of their opponents, a noxious revival of ancient 
 
72 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 passions, or (it may be) nothing better than the use of an 
 3 Arffu- unreal form of rhetoric; yet a supporter of Home 
 mcnt from j)^|q j^^^y ^^gg ^]^q argument from Irish history 
 history. in ^ way which is at once legitimate and telling. 
 On one point alone (it may be urged) all men of 
 whatever party, or of whatever nation, who have seriously 
 studied the annals of Ireland are agreed— the history of 
 the country is a record of incessant failure on the part of 
 the Government, and of incessant misery on the part of 
 the people. On this matter, if on no other, De Beaumont, 
 Froude and Lecky are at one. As to the guilt of the 
 failure or the cause of the misery, men may and do differ ; 
 that England, whether from her own fiiult or from the 
 fault of the Irish people, or from the perversity of circum- 
 stances, has failed in Ireland of achicAdng the elementary 
 results of good government, is as certain as any fact of 
 history or of experience. Every scheme has been tried in 
 turn, and no scheme has succeeded, or has even (it may be 
 suggested) produced its natural effects. Oppression of 
 the Catholics has increased the adherents and strengthened 
 the hold of Catholicism. Protestant supremacy while it 
 lasted did not lead even to Protestant contentment, and 
 the one successful act of resistance to English dominion 
 was effected by a Protestant Parliament supported by an 
 army of volunteers led by a body of l*rotestant officers. 
 The independence gained by a l*rotestant l*arliament led, 
 after sixteen years, to a rebellion so reckless and savage, 
 that it caused if it did not justify the destruction of 
 
Chap. IV.] EnrjlisJh Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 73 
 
 the Parliament, and tlie carrying of the Union. The 
 Act of Union did not lead to national unity, and a measure 
 which appeared on the face of it (though the appearance 
 it must be admitted was delusive) to be a copy of the law 
 which turned England and Scotland into a common 
 country inspired by common patriotism, produced con- 
 spiracy and agitation, and has at last placed England and 
 Ireland further apart morally than they stood at the 
 beginning of the century. The Treaty of Union, it was 
 supposed, missed its mark because it was not combined 
 with Catholic Emancipation. The Catholics were emanci- 
 pated, but emancipation instead of producing loyalty 
 brought forth the cry for Eepeal. The Eepeal movement 
 ended in failure, but its death gave birth to the attempted 
 rebellion of 1848. Suppressed rebellion begot Fenianism, 
 to be followed in its turn by the agitation for Home Eule. 
 The movement relies, it is said, and there is truth in the 
 assertion, on constitutional methods for obtaining redress. 
 But constitutional methods are supplemented by boycot- 
 ting, by obstruction, by the use of dynamite. A century 
 of reform has given us Mr. Parnell instead of Grattan, and 
 it is more than possible that Mr. Parnell may be succeeded 
 by leaders in whose eyes Mr. Davitt's policy may appear 
 to be tainted with moderation. No doubt in each case the 
 failure of good measures admits, like every calamity either 
 in private or in public life, of explanation, and after the 
 event it is easy to see why, for example, the Poor Law 
 when extended to Ireland did not produce even the good 
 
74 Eiujland's Case a/jcmist Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 •effects, such as they are, which in England are to be set 
 against its numerous evils ; or why an emigration of un- 
 paralleled proportions has diminished population without 
 much diminishing poverty ; why the disestablishment of 
 the Anglican Church has increased rather than diminished 
 the hostility to England of the Catholic priesthood ; or why 
 two Land Acts have not contented Irish farmers. It is 
 easy enough, in short, and this without having recourse to 
 any theory of race, and without attributing to Irishmen 
 either more or less of original sin than falls to the lot of 
 humanity, to see how it is that imperfect statesmanship 
 — and all statesmansliip it should be remembered is 
 imperfect — ^lias failed of obtaining good results at aU 
 commensurate with its generally good intentions. Failure, 
 however, is none the less failure because its causes admit 
 of analysis. It is no defence to bankruptcy that an insolvent 
 can, when brought before the Court, lucidly explain the 
 errors which resulted in disastrous speculations. The 
 failure of English statesmanship, explain it as you will, 
 has produced the one last and greatest evil which mis- 
 government can cause. It has created hostility to the law 
 in the minds of the people. The law cannot work in 
 Ireland, because the classes whose opinion in other 
 countries supports the action of tlie Courts are in IreUmd, 
 even when not law-breakers, in full sympathy with law- 
 breakers. This fact, a Home Pailer may add, is for his 
 purpose all the more instructive, if it be gi-anted tliat the 
 errors of British policy do not arise from injustice or ill- 
 
•Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 75 
 
 will to Irishmen. The inference, he insists, to be drawn 
 from the lesson of history is, that it is impossible for the 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom to understand or to 
 provide for Irish needs. The law is hated and cannot be 
 •executed in Ireland because, as we are told on high 
 authority, it comes before the Irish people in a foreign 
 garb. The law is detested, in short, not because it is 
 imjust, but because it is English. The reason why judges, 
 •soldiers or policemen strive in vain to cope with law- 
 lessness is, that they are in fact trying to enforce not so 
 much the rule of justice as the supremacy of England. 
 The Austrian administration in Lombardy was never 
 deemed to be bad — it was very possibly better than any 
 which the Italian kingdom can supply ; the Austrian rule 
 was hated not because the Austrians were bad rulers, but 
 because they were foreigners. In Ireland, as in Lombardy, 
 permanent discontent is caused by the outraged sentiment 
 of nationality. Meet this sentiment, argues the friend of 
 Home Eule, by the concession to Ireland of an independent 
 Parliament. The law which comes from Ireland's own 
 legislature will be obeyed because it is her own law, and 
 will be enforced throughout Ireland by Irish officials 
 supported by the sympathy of the Irish population. Let 
 Ireland manage her own affairs, and England will be freed 
 from a task which she ought never to have taken up 
 I)ecause she cannot perform it, and you will lay upon 
 Ireland duties which she can perform but wliich she has 
 never yet been either allowed or compelled to take up. 
 
7C England's Case against Home Ilv2c. [Chap. IV. 
 
 Irislimen for the first time will feel the full responsibility, 
 because for the first time they have received the full 
 power, of self-government. The argument, in short, on the 
 Home Eule view stands thus : the miseries of Ireland flow 
 historically from political causes, and are to be met 
 by political changes. At the bottom of Irish disorder 
 lies the sentiment of Irish nationality. The change, 
 therefore, that is needed is such a concession to that 
 sentiment as is involved in giving Ireland an Irish 
 legislature. This is the reform by which the result of 
 curing Irish discontent can be achieved, and it is a 
 reform not incompatible with the interests of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 This is (in my judgment) a fair statement of the 
 historical argument relied upon l)y the advocates of Home 
 Eule, though, of course, it allows of infinite variety as to 
 its form of expression. It is a line of reasoning which 
 rests on premisses many of which (as any candid critic 
 must admit) contain a large amount of truth. It is 
 logically by far the strongest of the Home Eule argu- 
 ments. It is one, moreover, in which authorities who on 
 other points differ from each other are in agreement. 
 Mr. Parnell asserts with emphasis that Ireland is a 
 " nation," and apparently holds that the passing of a good 
 law by the Parliament of the United Kingdom is less 
 desirable than the existence of an Irish Parliament, even 
 should that Parliament delay good legislation. Mr. 
 Gladstone attributes the inefficacy of laws passed by the 
 
Chap. IV.] Eiiglisli Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 77 
 
 Imperial Parliament to their coming before Irishmen in a 
 " foreign garb," and an author who is not in any way a 
 supporter of the Liberal leader does not apparently on 
 this point disagree with Mr. Gladstone. " If there was a 
 hope that anything which we could give would make the 
 Irish contented and loyal subjects of the British Empire, 
 no sacrifice would be too great for such an object. But 
 there is no such hope. The land tenure is not the real 
 • grievance : it is merely the pretext. The real grievance 
 is our presence in Ireland at all. If there was a hope 
 that by buying up the soil and distributing it among the 
 tenantry we could make them, if not loyal, yet orderly 
 and prosperous, even so the experiment would be worth 
 trying ; but, again, there is no such hope. The Land Bill 
 of 1870 gave the tenants a proprietary right in their 
 holdings. They have borrowed money on the security of 
 that right at ruinous interest, and the poorest of them are 
 already sinking under their debts to the local banker or 
 tradesman. If we make them proprietors to-morrow, 
 their farms in a few years will be sold or mortgaged. We 
 shall have destroyed one set of landlords to create another 
 who will not be more merciful." * 
 
 The only way of meeting the historical argument, 
 containinc^ as it does admitted truth, and sup- ^ ... . 
 
 ^ ^ ^ Criticism. 
 
 ported as it is by high authorities, is to 
 survey the broad phenomena of Irish history, and see 
 * Fronde's * English in Ireland,' vol. 3, pp. 681, 582. 
 
78 England^s Case against Home Bule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 what are the inferences which they warrant.* Whoever 
 wishes to derive instruction from the melancholy history 
 of the kingdom of Ireland must, as has already been 
 intimated, rid himself from the delusions caused in the 
 domain of history by personification. He must dismiss 
 the notion that England and Ireland are persons to be 
 charged with individual and continuous responsibility for 
 the crimes or follies of past ages. He must check the 
 natural but misguiding tendency of the human mind to 
 imagine that in national affairs when anything goes 
 wrong you can always, or indeed generally, lay your 
 finger upon some definite assignable wrong-doer, that is, 
 upon some man or some men who can be held responsible 
 for political calamities or errors, as a murderer may be 
 held guilty of murder, or a robber of theft. A calm critic 
 should also reflect on the profound truth of the dictum 
 (attributed by the way to an Irishman) that " history is at 
 best but an old almanack," and, while not entertaining 
 any great hope that antiquarian research can afford much 
 direct guidance as to the proper mode of arranging the 
 future relations between England and Ireland, remember 
 that the most salutaiy function of the study of the past is 
 to tone down those historical animosities which derive 
 their bitterness from the ignorant habit of trying the 
 actors in bygone scenes by moral laws to which they are 
 not justly amenable. The moral function of an historian 
 
 * See especially on this subject 1 De Beaumont, ' L'Irlande,* Partie 
 Historique, pp. 15-207. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 79 
 
 is to diminish the hatreds which divide nation from 
 nation and class from class, such as, at the present moment, 
 do more to prevent real unity between the inhabitants of 
 the two islands making up the United Kingdom than do 
 unjust laws or vicious institutions. To a student who 
 regards with philosophic calmness a topic which has 
 mainly been dealt with by politicians or agitators, it 
 easily becomes apparent that the crimes or failures of 
 England, no less than the vices or miseries of Ireland, 
 have to a great extent flowed from causes too general to 
 be identified with the intentional A\Tong-doing either of 
 rulers or of subjects. 
 
 One fact thrusts itself upon the attention of any serious 
 student. England and Ireland have from the commence- 
 ment of their ill-starred connection been countries stand- 
 ing on different levels or at different stages of civiliza- 
 tion ; they have moreover been countries impelled by 
 the force of circumstances towards a different development. 
 Englishmen forget, or (more strictly speaking) have 
 never understood, how exceptional has been the path 
 pursued by English civilization ; they do not realise to 
 themselves that the gradual transformation of an aristo- 
 cratic and feudal society into a modern industrial State 
 which still retains the forms, and in many points of view 
 the spirit of feudalism is a process which, although owing 
 to the most special circumstances it has been accomplished 
 with success in England, has hardly a parallel in any 
 other European country. Ireland on the other hand has. 
 
80 EnglctTuVs Case ctf/ainst Home Rnlc. [Chai-. IV. 
 
 despite the deviations from her natural course caused by 
 her connection with a powerful nation, tended to follow 
 the lines of progress pursued by continental countries, and 
 notably by France. A foreign critic like De Beauniont 
 finds it far easier than could any Englishman to enter 
 into the condition of Ireland, and this not only because he 
 is as a foreigner delivered from the animosities or 
 partialities which must in one way or another warp every 
 EngKsli judgment, but mainly because the phenomena 
 which puzzle an Englishman, as for example the passion 
 of Irish peasants for the possession of land, are from his 
 own experience familiar and appear natural to a Erench- 
 man. "What to the mind of a foreign observer needs 
 explanation is the social condition of England rather than 
 of Ireland. He at any rate can see at a glance that the 
 relation between the two countries has planted and 
 maintained in Ireland an aristocracy, aristocratic institu- 
 tions, and above all an aristocratic land law, foreign to the 
 traditions and opposed to the interests of the mass of tlie 
 people. Let an observer for a moment take up the point 
 of view natural to a continental critic, and admit, in tlie 
 language of De Beaumont, that the primary radical and 
 permanent cause of Irish misery has been the maintenance 
 in Ireland by England of a " bad aristocracy," * or, to put 
 
 * "On ne saurait considdrer attentivement I'Irlande, etudier son 
 Iiistoire et ses revolutions, observer ses mocurs et analyser ses lois, sans 
 rcconnaitre que ses malhcurs, auxquels ont concouru tant d'accidents 
 fuuestes, ont eu et ont encore de nos jours, pour cause principale, uno 
 
€hap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 81 
 
 the same thing more generally, and it may be more fairly 
 that the vice of the connection between the two countries 
 has consisted in its being a relation of peoples standing 
 at different stages of civilization and tending towards 
 different courses of development. Here you find the 
 original source of a thousand ills, and hence especially 
 have originated four potent causes of the condition of 
 things which now tries the patience and overtaxes the 
 resources of English statesmanship. 
 
 Pirst, — The English constitution has both from its form 
 find from its spirit caused in past times, and even at the 
 present day causes as much evil to Ireland as it has con- 
 ferred, or does confer, benefit upon England.* 
 
 The assailants of popular government point to the 
 misrule of Ireland as a proof that the Parliamentary 
 rsystem is radically vicious. They do not prove their 
 
 cause ^premiere, radicale, permanente ; et qui domine toutes les autres ; 
 •cette cause, c'est une mauvaise aristocrafiej* 1 De Beaumont, 'L'lrlande^' 
 deuxi^me partie, p. 228. The only objection which may be fairly 
 taken to De Beaumont's language, though not to his essential meaning, 
 is, that the words he uses occasionally suggest the idea that he attributes 
 some special vice of nature, so to speak, to the landed classes in 
 Ireland ; whilst there is, of course, no reason to suppose that the original 
 lS[orman invaders of Ireland were a whit worse than the Normans they 
 left behind them in England, or that the CromweUian settlers did not 
 possess the virtues which distinguished Puritan soldiers. What De 
 Beaumont really means is that the aristocracy, or landed gentry, have 
 been from first to last placed in a false position, which has led to their 
 exhibiting the vices, with few of the virtues, of aristocratic government. 
 * Compare 1 De Beaumont, * L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., pp. 253-256. 
 
 G 
 
82 Englaiid^s Case against Home Bulc. [Chap. IV. 
 
 point, because the calamities of Ireland afford no evidence 
 whatever that England, which has been more prosperous 
 for a greater length of time than any other nation in 
 Europe, has essentially suffered from the power of the 
 English Parliament. What these critics do prove is that 
 a representative assembly is a bad form of government for 
 any nation or class whom it does not represent, and 
 they establish to demonstration that a parliamentary 
 despotism may well be a worse government for a de- 
 pendency than a royal despotism. This is so for two 
 reasons. The rule of Parliament has meant in England 
 government by parties; and whatever be the merits of 
 party spirit in a free, self-governed country, its calami- 
 tous defects, when applied to the administration of a 
 dependency, are patent. Down to 1782 Ireland was 
 avowedly subject to the despotism or sovereignty of the 
 British Parliament, and at every turn the interest of the 
 country was sacrificed to the exigencies of English 
 politics. Between 1782 to 1800 the nominal indepen- 
 dence of Ireland placed a check on the power of the 
 English Parliament, yet in substance the English exe- 
 cutive, controlled as it was by the Parliament at 
 Westminster, remained the ultimate sovereign of the 
 kingdom of Ireland. If Pitt could have carried the King 
 and the English Parliament with him, he would, in spite 
 of any opposition at Dublin by the adherents of 
 Ascendancy, have emancipated the Catholics, just as, 
 when backed by the King and the English Parliament, he 
 
CiiAr. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 83 
 
 did, in the face of strenuous opposition in Ireland, pass 
 the Act of Union. And even at the present day the most 
 phiiisible charge which can be brought against the 
 working of the Act of Union is that Ireland under it fails 
 to obtain the full benefit of the British constitution, and 
 that in spite of her hundred representatives she is not for 
 practical purposes represented at Westminster in the same 
 sense as is Middlesex or Midlothian. A Parliament again 
 is less capable than a King of compensating for the evils 
 of tyranny by the benefit of good administration, and here 
 we come across a matter hardly to be understood by any 
 one who has not with some care compared the action and 
 the spirit of English and of continental administrative 
 systems. It is hardly an exaggeration to assert that even 
 now we have in the United Kingdom nothing like what 
 foreigners mean by an administration. We know nothing 
 of that official hierarchy which on the Continent re- 
 presents the authority of the State.* Englishmen are 
 accustomed to consider that institutions under which the 
 business of the country is carried on by unconnected local 
 bodies, such as the magistrates in quarter session, or the 
 corporations of boroughs, controlled in the last resort only 
 by the law courts, ought to be the subject of unqualified 
 admiration. Foreign observers might, even as regards 
 England itself, have something to set off against the merits 
 
 * See Dicey, *Law of tlie Constitution' (Second Edition), pp. 181- 
 210; and compare 1 De Beaumont, *L'Irlande Sociale,' &;c., pp. 
 253-299. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 of a system which is, if the apparent contradiction of 
 terms may be excused, no system at all, and might point 
 out that in continental countries the administration may 
 often be the intelligent guide and protector of the weak 
 and needy. The system complimented by the name of 
 self-government, even if as beneficial for England as 
 Englishmen are inclined without absolute proof to 
 believe, is absolutely unsuitable for a country harassed 
 by religious and social feuds, where the owners of land 
 are not and cannot be the trusted guides of the people. 
 An impartial official is a better ruler than a hostile oj 
 distrusted landowner, and any one who bears in mind the 
 benefits conferred by the humanity and justice of Turgot 
 on a single province of France may, without being any 
 friend of despotism, hold that in the last century Ireland 
 suffered greatly from a scheme of government wliich did 
 not allow of administration such as Turgot's. In some 
 respects the virtues of Englishmen have been singularly 
 unfavourable to their success in conciliating the goodwill 
 of Ireland. It will always remain a paradox that the 
 nation which has built up the British Empire (with vast 
 help, it may be added, from Ireland) has combined ex- 
 traordinary talent for legislation with a singular in- 
 capacity for consolidating subject races or nations into 
 one State. The explanation of the paradox lies in the 
 aristocratic sentiment wliich has moulded the institutions 
 of England. An aristocracy respects the rights of in- 
 dividuals, but an aristocracy identifies right with privilege, 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bute. 85 
 
 and is based on the belief in the inequality of men and 
 of classes. Privilege is the keynote of English con- 
 stitutionalism ; the respect for privileges has preserved 
 English freedom, but it has made England slower than 
 any other civilized country to adopt ideas of equality. 
 This love of privilege has vitiated the English adminis- 
 tration in Ireland in more ways than one. The whole 
 administration of the country rested avowedly down to 
 1829, and unavowedly to a later period, on the inequality 
 of Catholics and Protestants, and Protestant supremacy 
 itself meant (except during the short rule of Cromwell)* 
 not Protestant equality, but Anglican privilege. The 
 spirit which divided Ireland into hostile factions prevented 
 Englishmen who dwelt in England from treating as equals 
 Englishmen who settled in Ulster. When in 1782 the 
 Volunteers claimed Irish independence, and the American 
 colonists renounced connection with the mother country, 
 similar effects were produced by the same cause. In 
 each case English colonists revolted against England's 
 sovereignty, because it meant the privilege of Englishmen 
 
 * Cromwell's reputation as a statesman suffers even more than that 
 of most great men from the indiscriminating eulogy of admirers. The 
 merit of his Irish policy was not his severity to Catholics, but his 
 equity to Protestants. If he did not acknowledge the equality of 
 man, he at any rate acknowledged what English statesmanship before 
 and after his time refused to admit — the equality of Englishmen, at 
 least when Protestants. His policy handed down to us a legacy of 
 justifiable hatred on the part of Irish Catholics. But it is the fault 
 not of the Protector, but of his successors, that his policy did not 
 ensure to England the loyalty of every Protestant in Ireland. 
 
SG England's Case agaimt Home Bule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 who dwelt in Great Britain to curtail the rights and 
 hamper the trade of Englishmen who dwelt abroad. For 
 the iniquitous restrictions on the trade of Ireland, which 
 are morally by far the most blameworthy of the wrongs 
 inflicted by England upon Irishmen, were not precisely 
 the acts of deliberate selfishness which they seem to 
 modern critics. The gi'ievance under which Ireland 
 suffered was in character the same as the gi'ievances in 
 respect of trade inflicted on the American colonies. Yet 
 but for the insane attempt to subject the colonists to 
 direct taxation by the English Parliament the War of 
 Independence might have been long deferred. Even the 
 sufferers from a vicious commercial policy did not see its 
 essential iniquity, and it is hardly a subject for wonder 
 that a generation of Englishmen who supposed themselves 
 to gain greatly by controlling or extinguishing the 
 colonial or the Irish trade should not have recognised 
 the full iniquity of a policy which in itself hardly seemed 
 intolerable to many of those colonists w^ho endured the 
 wrong. Still less can we be surprised that Englishmen a 
 century ago, amid a world where the idea of human 
 equality was not as yet recognised, should have failed to 
 perceive what many Englishmen it may be suspected 
 will hardly admit at present, that to most men equality, 
 i.e. the treatment of all subjects by their government on 
 similar principles, seems a form of justice, and that the 
 multitude will tolerate restrictions on their freedom far 
 more easily than offences against their sense of equality. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 87 
 
 No one will care to deny that French Governments have 
 at all periods been far more despotic than the Government 
 of England ; but few persons who have given the matter a 
 thought can deny that France has shown a power quite 
 unknown to Englishmen of attaching to herself by 
 affection countries which she has annexed by force. 
 Strasburg was stolen from Germany, yet Strasburg soon 
 became French in heart. Belgium and the Ehine 
 Provinces would gladly have remained parts of the 
 Napoleonic Empire. Savoy annexed in 1859 showed no 
 disposition to separate from France in 1870. The ex- 
 planation of these facts is not far to seek. When France 
 annexes a country she may govern it well or ill, but she 
 governs it on the same principles as the rest of the French 
 dominions. Englishmen found it for centuries impossible 
 to govern Englishmen in Ireland or Englishmen in 
 Massachusetts exactly as if they were Englishmen in 
 Middlesex. It is not uninstructive that every French 
 Assembly since the Eevolution has included Deputies 
 from the colonies ; no colony has ever sent a member to 
 the Parliament at Westminster. 
 
 Secondly, — The English connection has inevitably, and 
 therefore without blame to anyone, brought upon Ireland 
 the evils involved in the artificial suppression of revolution. 
 
 The crises called revolutions are the ultimate and 
 desperate cures for the fundamental disorganisation of 
 society. The issue of a revolutionary struggle shows 
 what is the true sovereign power in the revolutionised 
 
88 England's Case against Home Bulc. [Chap. IV. 
 
 state. So strong is the interest of mankind, at least in 
 any European country, in favour of some sort of settled 
 rule, that civil disturbance will, if left to itself, in general 
 end in the supremacy of some power which by securing the 
 safety, at last gains the attachment, of the people. The 
 Eeign of Terror begets the Empire ; even wars of religion 
 at last produce peace, albeit peace may be nothing better 
 than the iron uniformity of despotism. Could Ireland 
 have been left for any lengthened period to herself, some 
 form of rule adapted to the needs of the country would in 
 all probability have been established. Whether Protes- 
 tants or Catholics would have been the predominant 
 element in the State ; whether the landlords would have 
 held their own, or whether the English system of tenure 
 would long ago have made way for one more in con- 
 formity with native traditions ; whether hostile classes and 
 races would at last have established some modus vivendi 
 favourable to individual freedom, or whether despotism 
 under some of its various forms would have been sanc- 
 tioned by the acquiescence of its subjects, are matters of 
 uncertain speculation. A conclusion which, though specu- 
 lative, is far less uncertain is, that Ireland if left absolutely 
 to herself would have arrived like every other country 
 at some lasting settlement of her difficulties. To the 
 establishment of such a reign of order the British 
 connection has been fatal ; revolution has been suppressed 
 at the price of permanent disorganisation, the descendants 
 of colonists and natives have not coalesced into a nation. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Fav(Mr of Home Rule, 89 
 
 and a country which has never known independence has 
 never borne the burdens or learnt the lessons of national 
 responsibility. Disastrous as this result has been, it is 
 impossible to say who it was that at any given point was 
 to blame for it. Had Prance been attached to and 
 dependent upon a powerful neighbour, this sovereign state 
 must have checked the cruelties and the injustice of the 
 Eeign of Terror. But the forcible extinction of Jacobinism 
 by an external power would, we can hardly doubt, have 
 arrested the progress and been fatal to the prosperity of 
 France. Ireland, in short, which under English rule has 
 lacked good administration, has by the same rule been 
 inevitably prevented from attempting the cure of deeply- 
 rooted evils by the violent though occasionally successful 
 remedy of revolution. 
 
 Thirdly, — From the original flaw in the connection 
 between the two countries has resulted, almost as it were 
 of necessity, the religious oppression, which, recorded as it 
 has been in the penal laws, has become the opprobrium of 
 English rule in Ireland. 
 
 The monstrosity of imposing Anglican Protestantism 
 upon a people who had not reached the stage of develop- 
 ment which is essential for even the understanding of 
 Protestant dogma, and who if left to themselves would 
 have adhered to Catholicism, conceals from us the strength 
 of the pleas to be urged in excuse of a policy which to 
 critics of the nineteenth century seems at least as absurd 
 as it was iniquitous. Till towards the close of the seven- 
 
90 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 teenth century all the best and wisest men of the most 
 civilised nations in Europe believed that the religion of a 
 country was the concern of the Government, and that a 
 king who neglected to enforce the " truth" — that is, his 
 own theological beliefs — failed in his obligations to his 
 subjects and incurred the displeasure of Heaven. From 
 this point of view the policy of the Tudors must appear to 
 us as natural as to themselves it appeared wise and praise- 
 worthy. That the people of England should have been 
 ripe for Protestantism at a time when the people of Ire- 
 land had hardly risen to the level of Eoman Catholicism 
 was to each country a grievous misfortune. That English 
 Protestants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
 should in common with the whole Christian world have 
 believed that the toleration of religious error was a sin, and 
 should have acted on the belief, was a cause of immense 
 calamities. But inevitable ignorance is not the same thing 
 <is wickedness.* 
 
 Fourthly, — To the same source as religious persecution 
 is due the whole crop of difficulties connected with the 
 tenure of land. 
 
 When James L determined that the old Brehon law 
 was to be abolished, and an appeal to the law of England 
 to be brought within the reach of every Irishman, he and 
 
 * Tlie penal laws against the Catholics in England were as severe 
 ^s those in Ireland. Their practical eftect and working was however 
 very different in the two countries. Sec 1 Lecky, * History of England,* 
 PI). 268-310. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bule. 91 
 
 his ministers meant to introduce a beneficial reform. 
 They hoped that out of the old tribal customs a regular 
 system of landowning according to the English tenure 
 would be developed. In forcing on this change, English 
 statesmen felt convinced not only that they were re- 
 formers, but that they were promoters of justice. To a 
 generation trained under the teaching of lawyers like 
 Coke, and accustomed to regard the tenure which pre- 
 vailed in England as good in itself, it must have appeared 
 that to pass from the irregular dominion of uncertain 
 customs to the rule of clear, definite law, was little less 
 than a transition from anarchy and injustice to a condition 
 of order and equity. They acted in precisely the spirit of 
 their descendants, who are absolutely assured that the 
 extension of English maxims of government throughout 
 India must be a blessing to the population of the country, 
 and shape their Egyptian policy upon their unwavering 
 faith in the benefits which European control must of 
 necessity confer on Egyptian fellahs. If, however, it is 
 probable that King James meant well to his Irish sub- 
 jects, it is absolutely certain that his policy worked gross 
 wrong. His scheme only provided for the more powerful 
 members of the tribes, and took no account of the inferior 
 members, each of whom in his degree had an undeniable 
 if somewhat indefinite interest in the tribal land. Sir 
 John Davis, who carried out the plan, seems to have 
 thought that he had gone quite far enough in erecting the 
 sub-chiefs into freeholders. It never occurred to him 
 
92 England^ s Case against Home Bute. [Chap. IV. 
 
 that the humblest member of the tribe should, if strict 
 justice were done, have received his aUotment out of the 
 common territory ; and the result of his settlement ac- 
 cordingly was that the tribal land was cut up into a 
 number of large freehold estates which were given to the 
 most important personages among the native Irish, and 
 the bulk of the people were reduced to the condition of 
 tenants at will.* An intended reform produced injustice, 
 litigation, misery, and discontent. The case is noticeable, 
 for it is a type of a thousand subsequent English attempts 
 to reform and improve Ireland. The rulers of the country 
 were influenced by ideas different from those of their 
 subjects. Ignorance and want of sympathy produced all 
 the evils of cruelty and malignity. 
 
 Bad administration, religious persecution, above all a 
 thoroughly vicious system of land tenure, accompanied by 
 such sweeping confiscations as to make it at any rate a 
 plausible assertion that all the land in Ireland has during 
 the course of Irish liistory been confiscated at least thrice 
 over,t are admittedly some of the causes, if they do not 
 constitute the whole cause, of the one immediate difficulty 
 which perplexes the policy of England. This is notliing 
 else than the admitted disaffection to the law of the land 
 prevailing among large numbers of the Irish people. The 
 
 * See Walpole, * Sliort History of the Kingdom of Ireland,* p. 17G. 
 
 t See a sixjecli of Lord Clare made in defence of the Bill for 
 Establishing the Union with England, and republished by the Irish 
 Loyal and Fatriotic Union. 
 
€hap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 93 
 
 •existence of this disaffection, whatever be the inference to 
 be drawn from it, is undeniable. A series of so-called 
 Coercion Acts passed both before and since the Act of 
 Union give undeniable evidence, if evidence were wanted, 
 of the ceaseless, and as it would appear almost irrepres- 
 sible, resistance in Ireland offered by the people to the 
 enforcement of the law. I have not the remotest inclina- 
 tion to underrate the lasting and formidable character of 
 this opposition between opinion and law, nor can any 
 jurist who wishes to deal seriously with a serious and 
 infinitely painful topic question for a moment that the 
 ultimate strength of law lies in the sympathy, or at 
 lowest the acquiescence, of the mass of the population. 
 Judges, constables and troops become almost powerless 
 when the conscience of the people permanently opposes 
 the execution of the law. Severity then produces either 
 no effect or bad effects, executed criminals are regarded as 
 heroes or martyrs, and jurymen or witnesses meet with 
 the execration, and often with the fate, of criminals. On 
 such a point it is best to take the judgment of a foreigner 
 unaffected by prejudices or passions, from which no Eng- 
 lishman or Irishman has a right to suppose himself free : 
 
 " Quand vous en etes arrives a ce 2>oint, croyez hien que 
 dans cette voie de rigueurs fous vos effm^ts jpour retablir 
 Vordre et la 'paix seront inutiles. En vain, pour reprimer 
 des crimes atroces, vous appellerez a voire aide toutes les 
 severites du code de Dracon ; en vain vous ferez des lois 
 cruelles pour arreter k cours de revoltantes cruautes ; vaine- 
 
94 Ungland's Case against Hoinc Bule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 'inent voiis frapperez de mort Ic moindre delit se rattachant a 
 CCS grands cii^mes ; vainement, dans Veffroi de voire im- 
 puissance, vous suspendrez le cours des his ordinaires, 
 proclccmerez des comtes entiers en etat de sicsjncion legale, 
 molercz le pHncipe de la liberie indivichcellc, creerez des cours 
 Tnariiales, des commissions exirccordinaires, et pour pi^oduire 
 de scdiUaires impressions de ierreur, midiiplicrez a Vexces 
 les executions capiiales"* 
 
 * 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' p. 251. It is of primary 
 consequence that Englishmen should realise the undoubted fact, that 
 agrarian conspiracies and agrarian outrages, such as those which baffle 
 the English Government in Ireland, are known to foreign countries. 
 For centuries the question of tenant-right, in a form very like that in 
 which it arises in Ireland, has been known in the parts of France near 
 Saint-Quentin under the name of the droit de marche. In France, 
 as in Ireland, tenants have claimed a right unknown to the law, and 
 have enforced the right by outrage, by boycotting, by murder. The 
 Depointeur is the land grabber, and is treated by French peasants 
 precisely as the Irish land grabber is treated by Irish peasants. See 
 Calonne, * La Vie Agricole, sous I'Ancien Rdgirae,' pp. G6-G9. Precisely 
 the same phenomena have appeared in parts of Belgium, where for 
 centuries there has been, in respect of land, the conflict to which we are 
 accustomed in Ireland, between the law of the Courts and the law of 
 the people. " From the commencement of the year 1836 to the end 
 of 1842 there had been " [in consequence of this conflict] " forty-three 
 acts of incendiarism, eleven assassinations, and seven agrarian outrages 
 entailing capital punishment," all within a limited part of Belgium. 
 See Parliamentary Kcix)rts on Tenure of Land in Countries of Europe, 
 1869, p. 118-123. In Belgium decisive measures of punishment at last 
 put an end to agrarian outrages. What should be specially noted is that 
 in France and Belgium crimes in character exactly resembling the 
 agrarian outrages which take place in Ireland had, it is admitted, no 
 connection whatever with national, or even it would seem with general 
 political feeling. 
 
Chap, iv.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Eule. 95 
 
 1^0 advocate of Home Eule can find a clearer statement 
 of the condition of tilings with which on his view the 
 Imperial Parliament is morally incompetent to deal than 
 in these words of De Beaumont's ; but before we hastily 
 draw any inference from an undoubted fact, let us examine 
 into the exact nature of the fact. The opposition of Irish 
 opinion to the law of the land is undoubted, but the 
 opposition is not now, and if we appeal (as under the pre- 
 sent argument we are appealing) to the teaching of history 
 never has been general opposition to law, or even general 
 opposition to English law. The statistics of ordinary 
 dime are (it is said) no higher in Ireland than in other 
 parts of the United Kingdom. A pickpocket or a burglar 
 is as easily convicted in Ireland as elsewhere ; the persons 
 who lamentably enough are either left unpunished, or if 
 punished may count on popular sympathy, are criminals 
 whose offences, atrocious and cruel as they constantly are, 
 are connected in popular opinion with political, and at bot- 
 tom, it must be added, with agrarian questions. For more 
 than a century there has existed an hereditary conspiracy 
 against the rights of the landowners. The White Boys of 
 1760, the Steel Boys of 1772, the Pdght Boys of 1785, the 
 Kockites of a few years later, the Thrashers of 1806, the 
 White Boys who re-appear in 1811, 1815, 1820, the Terralts 
 of 1831, the White Feet of 1833, the Black Feet of 1837 ; * 
 later Eibbon men under different names, the Boy cotters 
 or the assassins who have added a terrible sanction to the 
 * See 1 De Beaumont, ' L'Irlande Sociale/ &c., p. 251. 
 
96 UTtglancTs Case afjainst Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 commands of the Land League or of the National League, 
 have each and all been, in most cases avowedly and in 
 every case in fact, the vindicators or asserters of the just 
 or unjust popular aversion to the rights of landlords given 
 by the law and enforced by the courts of the land. It 
 would be folly to assert that all popular opposition to the 
 law in Ireland had been connected with agrarian questions. 
 But if we look either to the experience of past generations, 
 or to the transactions passing before our eyes, we can 
 hardly be mistaken in holding that the main causes of 
 disaffection have been either questions connected with 
 religion, or rather with the position of Koman Catholics, 
 or disputes connected with the possession of land. 
 
 The feeling of nationality has played a very subordinate 
 part in fomenting or keeping alive Irish discontent. The 
 Repeal agitation, in spite of O'Connell's legitimate influence, 
 collapsed. No one can read Sir Gavan Duffy's most in- 
 teresting account of the Young Ireland movement without 
 perceiving that just because it was strictly a nationalist 
 movement it took very little hold upon the people. The 
 Home Ptule movement never showed great strength till it 
 became avowedly a Land League, of which the ultimate 
 result should be, by whatever means, to make the tenants 
 of Ireland owners of their land. To this add that in the 
 judgment of foreign critics, and of thinkers like Mill, the 
 popular protest against the maintenance in Ireland of a 
 tenure combining the evils both of large estates and of 
 minute subdivision of farms is founded upon justice. De 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 97 
 
 Beaumont at any rate teaches that to transform Irish 
 tenants into peasant proprietors would be the salvation of 
 the country : — 
 
 " Plus on consider c VIrlande, ses hesoins et ses difficicUes 
 de toutes soiies, et plus on est i^orte a peoiser que ce change- 
 ment dans Vetat de sa po2mlation agricole serait le vrai 
 remede a ses maux .... 
 
 *' tPauraismille autres raisonspour appuyer cette opinion ; 
 je m^arrete eependant. Un lecteur anglais trouvera mes 
 arguments incomp)lets. Tout aiUre gu\m Anglais lesjugera 
 peut-etre surahondants.'^ * 
 
 This opinion may be well-founded or ill-founded ; but 
 no wise statesman will reject it without the maturest 
 consideration. 
 
 History, then, if fairly interrogated, gives this result : 
 Historical causes have generated in Ireland a condition of 
 opinion which in all matters regarding the land impedes 
 that enforcement of law which is the primary duty of 
 every civilized government. 
 
 From this fact Home Eulers draw the inference that 
 the law is hated because it is foreign, and that England 
 should surrender to Irishmen the effort to enforce legal 
 rights, since this duty is one which can be performed by 
 a native and cannot be performed by any English or 
 foreign authority. 
 
 This conclusion is clearly not supported by the premisses. 
 
 * 2 De Beaumont, *L'Irlaiide Sociale, Politique et Keligeuse.* 
 Septieme edition, pp. 135 and 137. 
 
 H 
 
98 England^ s Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 If the source of popular discontent be agrarian, then the 
 right course is to amend the land laws while improving 
 the administrative system, and enforcing justice between 
 man and man. 
 
 A Home Kuler may, however, if hard driven, say that 
 my interpretation of history is erroneous, arid that a hatred 
 to English law, and to all things English, and not a special 
 disHke to the land law, is the sentiment which prevails 
 over every other feeling of the Irish people. It is difficult 
 to me to see how this view can be seriously maintained. 
 Let us grant however for a moment that Home Eulers 
 are right, and that millions of Irishmen are inspired with 
 the passion of nationality. Even on this supposition the 
 Home Eule doctrine stands in a bad way. If the demand 
 of the Irish people be like that of the Italian people — 
 a demand for recognised nationality — then the demand 
 must be satisfied, if at all, not by Home Itule, but by 
 independence. The most eminent among English Home 
 Eulers believes that the law is hated in Ireland because it 
 comes before the Irish people in a foreign garb. Mr. Froude 
 in substance agrees in tliis matter with Mr. Gladstone, since 
 he holds that " the real grievance is our presence in Ire- 
 land at all." But the eminent statesman and the dis- 
 tinguished liistorian draw a diflerent inference from the 
 same premisses. Mr. Ghidstone infers tliat Irehand can be 
 satisfied by semi-independence. Mr. Froude infers that if 
 we are to meet Irish wishes we must let Ireland be free. 
 ]\Ir. Fronde's logic will be to most persons far more in- 
 
Chap. IV.] Enfjlisli Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 99 
 
 telligible than the logic of the Liberal leader. Here, at 
 any rate, we come to the true issue suggested by the 
 phenomena of Irish history. Is Irish discontent due in 
 the main to agrarian or to political causes ? On the 
 answer to this enquiry depends, as far as the argument we 
 have in hand goes, the line of right policy in Ireland. But 
 neither answer favours the contention of Home Kulers.* 
 
 The argument from Irish history gives rise to, or, 
 more properly speaking, contains in itself two further 
 distinct lines of reasoning in favour of Home Eule, each 
 of which supplements the other. The first of these 
 aims at showing that to leave Ireland to herself is the 
 only method by which to restore order throughout the 
 country : this I have termed " the argument from the 
 good effects of self-government." The other deduces from 
 the necessity for Coercion Acts the conclusion that 
 England cannot maintain order in Ireland : this I have 
 termed "the argument from the necessity for Coercion 
 Acts." These two lines of reasoning are simply an am- 
 plification of points suggested by the Home Kule 
 argument from Irish history, and are of necessity there- 
 
 * A Home Ruler may in this matter take up one position which 
 is consistent. He may say that England can allow to be carried out 
 through the agency of an Irish Parliament a policy which no English 
 Parliament could itself adopt. To put the matter plainly, an English 
 Parliament which cannot for very shame rob Irish landlords of their 
 property may, it is suggested, create an Irish Parliament with au- 
 thority to rob them. This position is consistent, but it is disgraceful. 
 To ascribe it to a fair opponent would be gross controversial unfairness. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 EnfjlancTs Case against Home Bulc. [Chap. IV. 
 
 fore open to the same criticisms to which that argument 
 is obnoxious. They have, however, each a certain value 
 of their own, and have made an impression on the English 
 public : they can each also be met by more or less special 
 replies. The argument, therefore, from the good effects of 
 self-government and the argument from the necessity for 
 Coercion Acts each deserve separate statement and con- 
 sideration. 
 
 the argiLment from the virtues of self-goveimment. — Self- 
 4. Ar<ni- dependence is the source of self-reliance and of 
 Sgl'''"' self-help. Leave Ireland to herself, and Ireland 
 vetnment. '^yill (it is argued) develop the sense of respon- 
 sibility and the power of self-government. Mr. Pamell 
 or Mr. Davitt as Irish Prime Minister will be able to 
 perform with ease feats beyond the reach of any English 
 Cabinets. He will dare to be strong because he knows he 
 is popular : he will punish conspii-ators with a severity 
 unknown to modern English governments ; he will feel 
 that anarchy is the bane of his country, and he will not 
 tolerate disorder. Boycotters, Moonlighters, Dynamiters 
 or Assassins will find that they are called upon to meet a 
 force of which they have had before no experience. They 
 will discover that they are engaged in a contest with the 
 v/ill of the people, and deprived, as they will be, of the 
 moral sympathy which has hitherto given them comfort 
 and encouragement, will yield obedience to a law which 
 is the expression of the national will. Self-government 
 
Chap. IV.] En-glish Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 101 
 
 in Ireland means strong government, and strong govern- 
 ment is the one cure for Irish misery. 
 
 This train of reflection has, unless I am mistaken, con- 
 vinced many English Eadicals that the installation of an 
 Irish Ministry at Dublin will be the dissolution of every 
 secret society throughout Ireland, and thus gained over to 
 the cause of Home Kule men who detest anarchy even 
 more than they love liberty. 
 
 This belief in the virtues of self-government is con- 
 firmed by the teaching of American critics, who hold that 
 the recent experience of the United States presents a clue 
 by which Englishmen may find a path out of the labyrinth 
 of their present perplexities. Transactions known to 
 every citizen of the States show conclusively that the 
 hatred of law which in Ireland fills Englishmen with 
 amazement has arisen among a people who, whatever 
 their faults, cannot be charged with those inherited vices 
 which English opinion freely and gratuitously imputes to 
 Irish nature. In Connecticut, in New York, in Georgia, 
 throughout all the Southern States, open or secret com- 
 binations, supported by public opinion and enforcing its 
 decrees by violence and murder, have with success defied 
 the law courts. Social conditions, and not the perversities 
 of Irish character, are seen to be the true cause of 
 phenomena which, if they are now a feature of Irish life, 
 have appeared in countries where not an Irishman was to 
 be found, and where the Irish had no appreciable influence. 
 To this fact, which appears to me not to admit of question. 
 
102 England's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 Americans add the consideration tliat lawlessness when 
 supported by public opinion has in America been success- 
 fully met, not by coercion, but by yielding to public 
 sentiment. Hence they draw the conclusion that the 
 proper mode of terminating the conflict between law and 
 widespread sentiment is to yield to opinion, and, by 
 conceding something of the nature of Home Eule, to turn 
 law-breakers into law-makers. The application of this 
 dogma to Ireland is obvious : the crucial instance by 
 which its truth is supposed to be established is the treat- 
 ment of the conquered South by the victorious North. 
 From the termination of the War of Secession up to 1876 
 tlie fixed policy of the Northern Eepublicans was to 
 maintain order in the South by the use of Federal troops. 
 This policy began and ended in failure: in 1876 the 
 troops were withdrawn ; the endeavour to enforce law by 
 means of the Federal armies was given up — as if by magic, 
 chaos gave place to order. Local self-government has 
 given peace to the United States, why should it not 
 restore concord to the United Kingdom ? * 
 
 It has been freely admitted in the foregoing pagesf that 
 
 * A reader who ^vishes to see the American view put ia its best 
 and strongest form should read Mr. E. L. Godkin's article on " Ameri- 
 can Home Eule," Nineteenth Century^ June, 1886, p. 793. I entirely 
 disagree with the general conclusion to which the article is intended to 
 lead, but I am anxious to acknowledge the importance of the infonna- 
 tion and the arguments which it contains. 
 
 t See pp. 87-89, ante. 
 
Chap. IV.] ETujlvilh Arguments in Favour of Home Eule, 103 
 
 the historical connection between England and Ireland 
 has brought upon the weaker country the evils 
 
 Criticism. 
 
 involved in the suppression of internal re- 
 volution by external force. This admission contains the 
 main ground for the argument in favour of Home Eule 
 drawn from the good effects of self-government, but is not 
 in reality a sound foundation on which to place the 
 suj^ojested conclusion. 
 
 For the argument under consideration, even after the 
 concession that Ireland has suffered from not having been 
 left to herself, is vitiated by more than one flaw. 
 
 Home Eule, as it is again and again necessary to point 
 out, is not national independence, nor anything like 
 independence. Home Eule gives Ireland at most semi- 
 independence — that is to say, it leaves Ireland at least 
 half dependent upon England. It is vain to argue that 
 the position of the member of a confederacy or of a 
 colonial dependency will give to Irishmen the sense of 
 independence and responsibility which belongs to a self- 
 governing nation. 
 
 Grant, however (though the assumption is a hazard- 
 ous one), that the creation of an Irish government and 
 an Irish Parliament would of itself give to Ireland, even 
 though she were still in many respects dependent on 
 England, such a new sense of power and of responsibility 
 as would enable her to create for herself a strong 
 executive. This concession is not enough to make out the 
 argument m favour of Home Eule, Laws ought to be not 
 
104 EnglancVs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 only strong but just, and Englishmen must consider 
 whether rulers who had come to the head of affairs solely 
 because they represented the strongest among many Irish 
 factions or parties would be able to rule with justice. 
 The " Jacobin Conquest " installed a strong executive in 
 power, but England could not be an accomplice in in- 
 augurating a reign of terror. The connection which under 
 any form of Home Eule would bind together the parts of 
 the present United Kingdom would be, it may be sug- 
 gested, a guarantee against the supremacy of an Irish 
 Eobespierre or Danton. Granted : but if so, Home Rule 
 would restrain an Irish revolution. The strongest, in 
 other words the most reckless leaders, would be prevented 
 from coming to the front. Ireland would not follow her 
 own course, and since she would not be in truth self- 
 governed she would not reap the good fruits of self- 
 government. 
 
 Nor, in truth, does the American version of our argu- 
 ment give much help to Home Pailers. 
 
 In more than one instance popular sentiment has in the 
 United States defied the law of the land. Nothing can be 
 a better example of such defiance than the anti-rent war 
 which raged in New York between 1839 and 1846.* 
 The struggle exhibited all the recklessness of a no-rent 
 agitation in Ireland, with none of the excuses which can be 
 urged in palliation of outrage by half-starving tenants ; it 
 
 ♦ See "American Home 1X\i\q^ Nineteenth Centm^, June, 188G, 
 pp. 793, 803, 804. 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 105 
 
 produced a " reign of terror which for ten years practically 
 suspended the operations of law and the payment of rent 
 throughout the district " which was the field of the anti- 
 rent movement ; it ended in a nominal compromise which 
 was a real victory for the anti-renters. In this instance, 
 be it remarked, no sentiment of nationality or State right 
 came into play. The law was hated, not because it was 
 ''foreign," but because it enforced the obligation of an 
 unpopular contract. Landlords, it is now all but admitted, 
 are not entitled to the full rights of citizens. The triumph 
 therefore of the anti-renters at Xew York may command 
 a certain amount of sympathy. The popular sentiment 
 which in 1833 induced the people of Connecticut to 
 boycott Miss Prudence Crandall cannot be brought under 
 the sanction of any " higher law." Her crime was that 
 she chose, obeying the dictates of her conscience, to open a 
 school for Negro girls in Connecticut. She was subjected 
 to every annoyance and insult which the most reckless 
 boycotter could invent. Legislation itself was turned 
 against her, and the State failed utterly in the duty of 
 protecting one of the most meritorious, and now, one is 
 happy to think, one of the most honoured among the 
 women of America. The Lyman Eiots at Boston, as 
 indeed every stage in the noble struggle of the American 
 Abolitionists against popular injustice, tell the same tale, 
 namely, that law in the United States has once and again 
 failed to assert its due supremacy over injustice backed by 
 public approval. This melancholy failure may possibly 
 
106 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 support the proposition that England cannot enforce the 
 law in Ireland. It far more conclusively shows that even 
 in countries deeply imbued with the spirit of legality self- 
 government has no necessary tendency to produce just 
 government or just legislation. 
 
 Let us, however, examine with care the lessons to be 
 drawn from the treatment of the Southern States of 
 America by the North. 
 
 The natural and most obvious moral of modern 
 American history is that the majority of a nation have 
 both the riglit and power to coerce a minority who claim 
 to break up the unity of the State. The most dis- 
 tinguished English Liberals, such as Bright and Mill, held, 
 and as I conceive on sound grounds of reason and justice, 
 that the Southern States were neither legally nor morally 
 justified in their claim to secede from the Union ; but no 
 fair-minded man can deny that a plausible constitutional 
 case could be made out in favour of Secession, nor that 
 the citizens of the Southern confederacy demonstrated 
 their wish and determination to secede by far more cogent 
 evidence than the return of eighty-six Secessionists to 
 Congress. The prima facie arguments which may bo 
 alleged in favour of Secession were tenfold stronger — un- 
 founded as I hold them to have been — than the prima 
 facie arguments in favour of Ireland's right to Home Rule. 
 Moreover, in studying the history of the United States, 
 an Englishman is at the present moment more concerned 
 with the results than with the justification of the suppres- 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bute. 107 
 
 sion of the Soutliern rebellion. The policy of the North 
 attained its object : the Union was restored, and its 
 existence is now placed beyond the reach of peril. The 
 abolition of slavery took away the source of disagreement 
 between the Northern and Southern States, and the 
 tremendous exhibition of the power of the Eepublic has 
 finally, it is supposed, destroyed the very idea of Seces- 
 sion. There is certainly nothing in all this which dis- 
 courages the attempt to maintain the political unity of 
 Great Britain and Ireland. We are told, however, to 
 forget the force employed to suppress Secession, and to 
 recollect only the policy of the Kepublicans after the close 
 of the Civil War. That policy was a failure as long as it 
 involved the denial to the Southern States of their State 
 autonomy, and became a success from the moment when 
 it recognised to the full the sacredness of State rights. 
 This, or some statement like this, represents the mode in 
 which the annals of the Union must be read if they are to 
 be interpreted in favour of Home Rule. The reading is 
 a strained interpretation of events which are known to 
 every one. The North, once and for all, settled that the 
 matters which lay at the bottom of the Civil War should 
 be settled in the manner which conform to Northern 
 notions of justice and of expediency. The abolition of 
 slavery, and the final disposal of the alleged right to 
 Secession, gave to the North all the requisite securities 
 against attacks on the unity of the Eepublic. The 
 Eepublicans, influenced in part by considerations of party, 
 
108 EiiglancVs Case ar/cdnst Home Hide, [Chap. IV. 
 
 but partly (it must in fairness be admitted) by the feeling 
 that it \yas a duty to secure for Negro citizens the full 
 enjoyment of the civil and political rights given them, 
 under the constitutional amendments supported for years 
 the so-called Carpet Bag Governments, that is to say, the 
 rule of Northern adventurers who were kept in office 
 throughout the South by the Negro vote. The Federal 
 Government, in short, up to 1876 gave by its arms 
 authority in the South to the unscrupulosity of Northern 
 scoundrelism supported by the votes of Negro ignorance. 
 Such a policy naturally produced bitter irritation among 
 the Southern Whites. Its reversal as naturally restored 
 to the Whites at once power and contentment. Whether 
 this reversal was as satisfactory to the Blacks is less clear. 
 In any case, it is hard to see how the restoration of the 
 Southern States to their natural place in the Union tells 
 in favour of giving Ireland a position quite inconsistent 
 with the existing constitution of the United Kingdom. 
 The case stands thus : Northern Kepublicans insisted that 
 every State in the South should submit to the supremacy 
 of the United States on every point which directly or 
 indirectly concerned the national and political unity of 
 the American people. Having secured this submission 
 the Eepublican party restored to the Southern States the 
 reality as well as the name of State rights ; and allowed 
 the same and no more than the same independence to 
 South Carolina as is allowed to New York. No doubt 
 something was sacrificed ; this " something " was a matter 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bide, 109 
 
 which did not greatly concern the citizens of the North. 
 It was the attempt to secure to the Black citizens of the 
 South the political rights given them by the constitution. 
 The sacrifice may have been necessary; many of the 
 wisest Americans hold that it was so. But we may sus- 
 pect that even amongst those who, as a matter of policy, 
 approve the course pursued by the Federal Government 
 in the South since 1876, qualms are occasionally felt as to 
 some of its results. The able writer who sets American 
 Home Eule before Englishmen as an example for imita- 
 tion says with the candour which marks his writings : " I 
 do not propose to defend or explain the way in which '* 
 Che Native Whites " have since then " (1876) kept the 
 Government " in their hands by suppressing or controlling 
 the Negro vote. This is not necessary to my purpose."* 
 It is however necessary for the purpose of weighing the 
 effect of American experience to bear this " suppression " 
 constantly in mind ; it has deprived the Negroes of 
 political rights which possibly they had better never have 
 received, and has falsified the result of Presidential 
 elections. When we are told that the South votes solid 
 for a Democratic President, we must remember that in the 
 Southern States the Negro vote is " controlled " ; and that 
 in reckoning the number of votes to which a State is 
 entitled in virtue of its population, the Negro voters of 
 the South are counted for as much as the uncontrolled 
 White voters of the North. Whether this state of things 
 * Nineteenth Century , June, 1886, p. 801. 
 
110 EmjlaiuVs Case agcdnst Home Eulc. [Chap. IV. 
 
 will always be contentedly borne by the Korthern States 
 is a matter on whicli a foreigner can form no opinion. It 
 is a condition of affairs which does not conduce to respect 
 for law, and the satisfaction with which thoughtful 
 Americans regard a policy founded on the tolerance of 
 illegality confirms the belief suggested by other circum- 
 stances, that deference to opinion tends in the United 
 States to undermine respect for law ; it certainly does not 
 tend to show that self-government has much connection 
 with justice. 
 
 The argument, in short, from the good effects of self- 
 government appears, when examined, either to be an argu- 
 ment which tells far more strongly in favour of Separation 
 than of Home llule, or else to be an argument whicli 
 shows only that England might gain some immediate 
 advantage from shutting her eyes to injustice committed 
 by an Irish government. 
 
 The argument from the necessity for Coercion Acts. — 
 5. Arou- Coercion Acts are (according to popular appre- 
 S^j^^u"^ hension) enactments suspending the operation 
 Acts. of the ordinary law, and conflicting therefore 
 
 with the principles of the English Constitution. Order 
 has been maintained in Ireland since the Union (we are 
 told) mainly by means of Coercion Acts. The English 
 democracy, it is argued, cannot acquiesce any longer in 
 these violations of the Constitution ; but since order must 
 somehow be maintained in Ireland, and Coercion Acts 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 111 
 
 must no longer be passed, the English democracy must 
 surrender the duty of maintaining the law into the hands 
 of the Irish people, who, as is assumed by Home Eulers, 
 can exact obedience to the law of Ireland without the use 
 of exceptional legislation. 
 
 A lawyer irritated by the folly of popular declamation is 
 tempted to dismiss all objections to Coercion Acts, 
 together with all arguments founded upon such 
 objections, with one peremptory remark — namely, that since 
 a law is merely a rule which men are compelled to obey by 
 the power of the State, and Coercion is but another name 
 for compulsory obedience to the law, to object to Coercion 
 is in reality to object to law itself, or in effect to the 
 existence of political society. The temptation to cut 
 down a popular delusion by some such summary criticism 
 as this is great, but it is a temptation which at all costs 
 must be resisted. Vague ideas, which have obtained 
 general currency, are, in spite of their inaccuracy, the 
 outgrowth for the most part of reasonable feeling. Who- 
 ever wishes to meet, and, if need be, dispel the antipathy 
 to Coercion Acts, must try to understand what is the 
 meaning wliich sensible men attach to the word " Coer- 
 cion," what is the conviction represented by the dislike to 
 Coercion Acts, how this dislike may be lessened, and, for 
 the purpose with which these pages are written, how far 
 the disapproval of Coercion Acts provides a reason in 
 favour of Home Eule. 
 
112 Ewjland's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 Of all the terms which at the present moment confuse 
 public judgment, none is more vague and misleading than 
 the word " Coercion " when applied to every stringent 
 attempt to enforce in Ireland obedience to the law of the 
 land. 
 
 Coercion means and includes two different though 
 closely connected ideas which the laxity of popular 
 thought fails to distinguish. 
 
 First — Coercion means any attempt to enforce a law 
 among people whose moral sympathies are at variance 
 with the law itself. In this sense Coercion is opposed to 
 that enforcement of ordinary law wdth which we are all 
 familiar. Thus, to punish a Eitualist for not conforming 
 to the judgment of the Priv}^ Council, to enforce vaccina* 
 tion at Leicester, to compel a Quaker to pay tithes, to 
 eject an Irish tenant from the farm he has occupied, to 
 drag him into Court and seize his goods if he does not pay 
 his rent, to punish severely resistance to the Sheriffs 
 officer, or to the bailiff who gives effect to the rights of 
 an Irish landlord, are in popular estimation proceedings 
 whicli according to the nature of the law put in force are 
 stigmatised as persecution or Coercion. They certainly 
 differ from the compulsion by which common debtors are 
 compelled to pay their debts, or thieves are prevented 
 from picking pockets or breaking into houses. The 
 difference lies in this. Where the enforcement of the law 
 is called " Coercion," not only does the criminal think 
 himself in the right, or at any rate think the law a 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Bide. 113 
 
 wrongful law, but also the society to which he belongs 
 holds that the law-breaker is maintaining a moral right 
 against an immoral law. The anti-vaccinator is deemed 
 a martyr at Leicester, the farmer who will not pay his 
 rent is thought a patriot at Cork. Where the enforcement 
 of tlie law is not popularly deemed coercion the law- 
 breaker does not suppose himself to be in the right, and 
 still less do his associates think him morally praiseworthy. 
 A thief does not in general hold any theory about the 
 lightness of larceny, and there is no society in the United 
 Kingdom at least which denies the moral validity of the 
 Eighth Commandment. 
 
 Secondly. — Coercion means the enforcement of law by 
 arbitrary and exceptional methods which tend to diminisli 
 the securities for freedom possessed by ordinary citizens. 
 Thus the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the 
 abolition of trial by jury, the introduction of peculiar 
 rules of evidence to facilitate convictions for a particular 
 class of crimes, a suspension (speaking generally) of what 
 would be called in foreign countries " constitutional 
 guarantees," in order to secure obedience to particular 
 laws, would be called coercion.* 
 
 An enactment, then, which in ordinary language is 
 called a Coercion Act, has one or both of the two following 
 characteristics. It is an Act which either enforces some 
 
 * Contrast the Coercion Acts of 1881 and 1882 respectively. For 
 list of Coercion Acts see "Federal Union with Ireland," by E. B. 
 O'Brian, Nineteenth Century, No. 107, ]). 35. 
 
114 England's Case against Home Eulc, [Chap. rv. 
 
 rule of law {e.g., the law that tenants must pay their 
 rent, or that trades-unionists must not molest artisans 
 who accept lower wages than the scale prescribed by the 
 union), which does not command the moral assent of the 
 society or people among whom it is enforced, or else 
 constrains obedience to law by some exceptional and 
 arbitrary mode of procedure. Now the general prejudice 
 against an Act which has either or both of these charac- 
 teristics is within certain limits justifiable on grounds of 
 good sense. Laws derive three-fourths of their force not 
 from the fears of law-breakers, but from the assent of 
 law-keepers; and legislation should, as a rule, con-es- 
 pond with the moral sentiment of the people. The 
 maxim quid leges sine morihus, though it should always 
 be balanced by the equally important maxim quid Tiwres 
 sine legihus, is one which no legislator dares neglect 
 with impunity, and a law permanently at variance \vith 
 wide moral feeling needs repeal or modification. It is 
 also true that exceptional and arbitrary legislation is, 
 simply because it is exceptional and arbitrary, open to 
 suspicion. If it be desirable that personal liberty should 
 be protected by the writ of Habeas Corpus, a suspension 
 of the Habeas Corpus Act is on the face of it an evil. If 
 it is not desirable that officers of the aimy should 
 suddenly and without legal training exercise the power of 
 judges, the establishment of martial law is in itself a 
 great, though it may be a necessary calamity. Legislation 
 wliicli has received the odious name of Coercion has 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule, 115 
 
 frequently (though not always) exhibited one or both of 
 the characteristics which render it fairly obnoxious to 
 that designation. The objection, therefore, to Coercion 
 Acts is on the face of it not unreasonable. What are the 
 inferences which the objection supports is, of course, quite 
 a different matter, and shall be considered in its due 
 place. 
 
 It is most important, however, to note that the valid 
 opposition to so-called Coercion Acts may and ought to 
 be greatly mitigated by careful adherence to two maxims 
 which are obvious, but are often neglected. 
 
 A Coercion Act, in the first place, should be aimed, not 
 at the direct enforcement of rules opposed to popular 
 opinion, but at the punishment of offences which, though 
 they may be indirectly connected with dislike of an un- 
 popular law or with opposition to rights (for instance, 
 of landowners) not sanctioned by popular opinion, 
 are deeds in themselves condemned by the human 
 conscience. Deliberate breaches of contract, insults to 
 women and children, the murder or torture of witnesses 
 who have given truthful evidence in support of a convic- 
 tion for crime, brutal cruelty to cattle, may be methods of 
 popular vengeance, or the sanctions which enforce an 
 agrarian code ; but one may feel certain that the man who 
 breaks his word, who tortures or murders his neighbour 
 or who houghs cattle, knows himself to be not only a 
 criminal, but a sinner, and that the law, which condemns 
 him to punishment, though it may excite temporary 
 
 I 2 
 
116 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. rv. 
 
 outcry, can rely on the ultimate sanction of the popular 
 conscience. 
 
 A Coercion Act, in the second place, should as far as 
 possible be neither a temporary nor an exceptional piece 
 of legislation. 
 
 An Act which increases the efficiency of the criminal 
 law should, like other statutes, be a permanent enactment. 
 The temporary character of Coercion Acts has needlessly 
 increased their severity, for members of Parliament have 
 justified to themselves carelessness in fixing the limits of 
 powers conferred upon the Executive under the insufficient 
 plea that these powers were intended to last but for a 
 short time. It has also deprived them of moral weight. 
 An Act wliicli is a law in 1881, but will cease to be a law 
 in 1882, has neither the impressiveness nor the certainty 
 which gives dignity to the ordinary law of the land. 
 Coercion Acts, again, should be general — that is, should 
 apply, not to one part, but to the whole, of the United 
 Kingdom. Powers needed by the Government for con- 
 stant use in Ireland must occasionally be wanted in 
 England, or, if they do not exist there already, in Scotland. 
 It were tlie strangest anomaly for the law to sanction a 
 mode of procedure which convicts a dynamiter in Dublin, 
 and not to give the Goverimient . the same means for 
 the conviction of the same criminal for the same offence 
 if he has crossed to Liverpool. The principle forbidd- 
 ing exceptional or extraordinary legislation suggests that 
 Coercion Acts should in the main give new stringency 
 
Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 117 
 
 to the criminal procedure, and should not invade the 
 liberties of ordinary citizens. The object of a Coercion 
 Act is to facilitate the punishment of wrongdoers, not 
 to restrict the liberty of citizens who have not broken 
 the law. This is a point legislators are apt to neglect. 
 The distinction insisted upon will be understood by any 
 one who compares the Act for the Better Protection of 
 Person and Property in Ireland, 44 Vict. c. 4, of 1881, 
 with the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 
 46 Vict. c. 25. They were each denounced as Coercion 
 Acts : the earlier enactment was in many ways the 
 more lenient of the two; yet in principle the Act of 
 1881 was thoroughly vicious, whilst in principle the Act 
 of 1882 was, as regards its most effective sections, 
 thoroughly sound. The Act of 1881 in effect gave the 
 Irish executive an unlimited power of arrest : it established 
 in theory despotic government. The Act of 1882 was in 
 principle an Act for increasing the stringency of criminal 
 procedure. The one could not be made permanent, and 
 applied to the whole United Kingdom, without depriving 
 €very citizen of security for his personal freedom. The 
 main enactments of the other might extend through the 
 whole of Great Britain and Ireland, and produce only the 
 not undesirable effect of making the whole United King- 
 dom a less pleasant residence than at present for criminals 
 or conspirators. 
 
 An Act which should be permanent, which should apply 
 to the whole United Kingdom, which should deal, not in- 
 
118 England's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. iv. 
 
 deed exclusively but in the main, with criminal procedure, 
 could hardly contain injudicious, harsh or tyrannical 
 provisions. The passing of one such good Criminal Law 
 Amendment Act would, though its discussion occupied a 
 whole Session, save our representatives in Parliament an 
 infinite waste of time, and would make unnecessary half- 
 a-dozen Coercion Acts for Ireland. To enlarge the power of 
 examining persons suspected of connection with a crime, 
 even though no man is put upon his trial ; to get rid of every 
 difficulty in changing tlie venue; to give the Courts the right 
 under certain circumstances of trying criminals without the 
 intervention of a jury ; to organise much more thoroughly 
 than it is organised at present in England the whole 
 system of criminal prosecutions ; to enable the Executive to 
 prohibit public meetings which might provoke a breach of 
 the peace, would in many cases be an improvement on the 
 criminal law of England itself, and woidd in several in- 
 stances be simply an extension to the whole United 
 Kingdom of laws wliich exist without exciting any dis- 
 approval in some one division of it.* Without special 
 experience it would be presumptuous to assert that these 
 or similar changes in criminal procedure would suffice for 
 
 * In England the Courts can change the venue for the trial of a 
 criminal. In Scotland the Lord Advocate can always (I am told) bring 
 any case he chooses to trial before the High Court of Justiciary iii 
 Edinburgh, and the same thing could be done by the Court on the 
 application of the prisoner. In Scotlantl, again, any Sheriff or Chief 
 Magistrate of a Burgh could prohibit a meeting, however lawful, which 
 he thought likely to endanger the peace. The provisions of the last 
 Irish Coercion Act, Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 4(> 
 
CHAr. IV.] UnfflisJh Arguments in Favour of Home Bule, 119 
 
 the enforcement of the law in Ireland during a period of 
 disturbance. That such improvements in procedure would 
 go a good way to make special Coercion Acts unnecessary, 
 is in the highest degree probable. There is, moreover, 
 nothing objectionable or anomalous in increasing as time 
 goes on the stringency of criminal procedure. The law 
 against crimes is the protection of men who are not 
 criminals. Civilisation raises our estimate of the pro- 
 tection which good citizens ought to receive from the 
 State ; it also places new means of attack in the hands of 
 cheats and ruffians. An elaborate criminal code is as 
 necessary for a civilised society as are elaborately trained 
 armies and scientific arms both of defence and of offence. 
 
 No adherence, however, to sound maxims of criminal 
 jurisprudence would, it must be frankly admitted, en- 
 tirely take away, though it might greatly mitigate, the 
 justifiable distaste for Coercion Acts. The necessity 
 for these Acts points to discord in Ireland between the 
 law of the land and the law of the people ; they are the 
 outward and visible sign of internal discontent and dis- 
 loyalty ; they give good ground for supposing that the law 
 or some part of it requires amendment, and to many 
 persons laws which admit the existence of a bad social 
 condition will appear to be themselves odious. But the 
 
 Vict. c. 25, s. 16, giving power to a magistrate where an offence had 
 been committed to summon and examine witnesses, even though no 
 person is charged with the offence, formed, I believe, part of the draft 
 criminal code for England. 
 
120 England] s Case against Home Rule. [Chap. IV. 
 
 necessity for amending bad laws or vicious institutions is 
 no reason why just laws, or any law which cannot rightly 
 be repealed, should not be enforced. The fallacies of pro- 
 tection afforded no reason for not punishing smugglers, 
 though the existence of smuggling gave good ground for 
 considering whether the customs law did not require re- 
 vision. There seems to the thoughtless crowd, whether 
 rich or poor — and all men are thoughtless about most things, 
 and many men about all things — to be a certain incon- 
 sistency between reform and coercion ; there is something 
 absurd in the policy of " cuffs and kisses." But the in- 
 consistency or absurdity is only apparent. The necessity 
 for carrying through by legal means an agrarian revolution 
 — and the passing of the Irish Land Act was in effect an 
 admission by the English Parliament, that this necessity 
 exists — is a solid reason for the strict enforcement of justice. 
 Eeform tends, as its immediate result, to produce lawless- 
 ness. A wise driver hokls his reins all the tighter because 
 he is compelled to drive along the brink of a precipice. 
 Whether Coercion Acts, which it must be remembered 
 have been known before now in England, and were known 
 in Ireland during the era of her Parliamentary indepen- 
 dence, and which are the sign of the difficulty of enforcing 
 the law, are or are not to be tolerated as a necessary 
 evil, depends on the answer to the inquiry, whether tlie 
 Government of the United Kingdom can by just adminis- 
 tration, and by just legislation, remove the source of Irish 
 opposition to the law ? Answer the question affirmatively, 
 
^55J?»»i^^^'^WWJU-JXJ.I. A. JL^JUJ JijA J!JC-»»-U*»:iU -t Ji m%tmJ»JSiiiM^ ■ 
 
 €hap. IV,] EtujUsTi Arguments in Favour of Hortie Rule. 121 
 
 and the outcry against coercion becomes unmeaning; 
 answer the question negatively, and you produce an 
 argument which tells with crushing power in favour not of 
 Home Kule, but of Separation. 
 
 Tlie argununt from the inconvenience to England. * — 
 Apologies for Home Eule drawn from foreign ex- 
 perience, from the deference due to the popular argument 
 
 from in- 
 
 \^aQ, or from the historical failure of England to conve- 
 _ _ _ . - nience. 
 
 govern Ireland with success, have about them 
 
 when employed by English members of Parliament a 
 touch of unreality ; they are reasons meant to satisfy the 
 hearer, but do not convince the speaker. When however we 
 •come to the argument for Home Eule drawn from the incon- 
 venience of the present state of things to England generally, 
 and to English members of Parliament in particular, we 
 know at once that we are at any rate dealing with a real 
 tangible serious plea which has (if anything) only too 
 much weight with the person who employs it. There is 
 nothing in the whole relation of England to Ireland about 
 wliich politicians are so well assured, as that the presence 
 of a body of Parnellites at Westminster is an unutterable 
 nuisance, and works ^ intolerable 'evil. Of the reality of 
 their conviction we have the strongest proof. The 
 sufferings of Irish tenants, the difficulties or the wrongs of 
 Irish landlords, the evils of coercion, the terror of assassi- 
 
 * See for an admirable statement of this argument, " Alternative 
 Policies in Ireland," in the Nineteenth Century for February, 1886. 
 
122 England's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 Elation, but slightly ruffled the composure with wliich 
 English statesmen faced the perplexities of the Irish 
 problem. They first began to think that the demand for 
 Home Eule might have something in it when the refusal 
 to erect a Parliament at Dublin meant the continuance of 
 obstruction in the Parliament at Westminster. The 
 terror of obstruction has to speak the plain truth, done 
 more to effect the hona fide conversion of English M.P.'s 
 into advocates of Home Eule than any other single 
 influence. 
 
 What then is the harm which a body of eighty or 
 ninety Irish members can work in Parliament ? This is 
 the answer. They may (it is said) in the first place delay, 
 obstruct, and render impossible the carrying through of 
 important measures ; London may go without a munici- 
 pality ; widowers may wait for years without being able to 
 marry their deceased wives' sisters; we may not during 
 this generation get the blessing of a good criminal code, if 
 Mr. Parnell and his followers sit in Parliament prepared 
 to practise all the arts of obstruction. The Irish members, 
 in the second place, perturb and falsify the whole system of 
 party government. The majority of Great Britain wish to 
 be ruled say by Lord Salisbury ; the Parnellites do not 
 care whether Lord Salisbury or Mr. Gladstone is Premier, 
 but they do care for making the English Executive feeble, 
 and ridiculous. They will, therefore, by the practice of a 
 very little art, seize some opportunity of putting Lord 
 Salisbury in a minority, and turning huu out of office. 
 
^^^pn^mimw x. >.wmv vj^iiumuic* ' .' " '"j »■ ^^^^sm^mtfrnmim 
 
 Chap. IV.] English Arguments in Favour of Home Rule. 123 
 
 Mr. Gladstone comes back into what is ironically called 
 power. The same game begins again. The Parnellites 
 coalesce with the Tories, we have a change of Cabinet, 
 and possibly a dissolution. Kor are changes of Ministry 
 the whole of the evil. The high tone of party politics is 
 degraded. English or Scottish members of Parliament 
 are but men ; they are liable to be tempted ; the Parnell- 
 ites have the means of offering temptation ; and temptation, 
 members of Parliament intimate to us, will in the long 
 run be too great for their virtue. The presence, in short, 
 at Westminster of eighty-six gentlemen who do not 
 respect the dignity or care for the efficiency of Parliament 
 is absolutely fatal to the success of Parliamentary govern- 
 ment, and to the character of Parliamentary statesmanship. 
 We must, it is inferred, let the Parnellites have a Parlia- 
 ment of their own in Ireland, or else we shall soon cease 
 to have any Parliament worth keeping in England. 
 
 The force of this line of argument, as far as it goes, 
 cannot be denied. The presence in the House 
 of Commons of politicians disloyal to Parliament 
 causes immense inconvenience; but to anyone not amember 
 of the House of Commons, it appears singular that men of 
 sense should think the inconveniences of obstruction a 
 sufficient ground for breaking up the Constitution. The 
 whole thing is a question of proportion. The nation 
 suifers a good deal from obstruction, but the suffering is 
 not of a kind to justify revolution. A toothache is a bad 
 
124 England's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 thing, but a severe toothache hardly suggests suicide ; and 
 though life might not be worth having, if toothache were 
 to last for years, the thoughts of putting an end to one's 
 existence are removed by the knowledge that an aching 
 tooth can be drawn by a dentist. Now the more obvious 
 €vils of obstruction can clearly be removed by changes of 
 procedure. Members of Parliament appear to think that 
 to alter the rules of the House of Commons — to curtail and 
 limit the power of debate — to confer, if necessary, upon the 
 Speaker, or upon the bare majority of members present, 
 authority to bring every debate summarily to a close — is 
 something like overthrowing the monarchy a thing not to 
 be dreamt of by the wildest of innovators. Plain men 
 outside the walls of Parliament can assure our represen- 
 tatives, that the world would bear with infinite calmness 
 the imposition of stringent restrictions on the overflow of 
 Parliamentary eloquence. If even the great debate on 
 Home Eule had been finished say in a week, the outer 
 world would have been well pleased ; and measures such 
 as the Government of Ireland Bill happily do not come 
 before Parliament every year. The more subtle evils 
 arising in part at least from the presence of the Irish 
 members must be met by more searching remedies. 
 Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused the 
 weakness of government by Parliament. The experience, 
 not of England only, but of other countries, shows the 
 great difficulty of working our present party system of 
 government in a representative assembly which is divided 
 
Chap. IV.] Eiiglislh Arguments in Favour of Home, Rule. 125 
 
 into more than two parties. The essential difficulty lies 
 in the immediate dependence of a modern ministry for its 
 existence on every vote of the House of Commons. If 
 you see the difficulty, you can also see various means by 
 which it may be removed. In more than one country,, 
 and notably in the United States and in Switzerland — 
 states, be it remarked, in which popular government 
 flourishes — the Executive, though in the long run amenable 
 to the voice of the people, and though in Switzerland 
 actually appointed by the legislature, is not like an 
 English Cabinet, dependent on the fluctuating will of a 
 legislative assembly. If it were necessary to choose 
 between modifications in the relation of the Executive ta 
 Parliament and the repeal of the Act of Union, most 
 Englishmen would think that to increase the independence 
 of the executive — a change probably desirable in itself — 
 was a less evil than a disruption of the United Kingdom, 
 not only in itself a gigantic evil, but one which may w^ell 
 lead to others. A modification, however, in the practice 
 would, for the moment at least, save the real principles of 
 Parliamentary government. Were it once understood 
 that a Ministry w^ould not retire from office except in 
 consequence of a direct vote of w^ant of confidence in the 
 House of Commons, the political power of the Parnellite,. 
 or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished. 
 Meanwhile, members of Parliament may be reminded that 
 it is on them that the duty lies of removing the obstacles 
 which from time to time impede the working of Parlia- 
 
126 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. IV. 
 
 mentaiy machinery, and that the existence of temptation 
 to political turpitude is not an admitted excuse for 
 yielding to it. In one way or another a majority of 684 
 members must, if they choose, be able to make head 
 against the minority of 86. Their failure already excites 
 astonishment; the time is coming when it will excite 
 contempt. The English people, moreover, have the 
 remedy in their own hands. By giving to either of the 
 great parties an absolute majority they can terminate all 
 the inconveniences threatened by Parnellite obstruction. 
 The remedy is in their hands, and recent experience 
 suggests that they will not be slow to use it. 
 
 A survey of the arguments in favour of Home Pade 
 suggests the following reflections : 
 
 The arguments, taken , as a whole, do undoubtedly show 
 that the present state of things is accompanied by con- 
 siderable evils or inconveniences. They show what no one 
 who has given a thought to the matter ever doubted, that 
 the relation between England and Ireland is unsatisfactory. 
 They are, as far as they go, objections to the maintenance 
 of the Union, but neither the feelings which favour Home 
 Kule, nor the reasons by which they are supported, tell in 
 reality in favour of Home Eule policy. They scarcely 
 tend to show that Home Eule would cure the evils 
 complained of; they certainly do not show, they only 
 assume, that Home Eule in Ireland would not be injurious 
 
€hap. IV.] E'}iglislv Arguments in Favoitr of Home Bide. 127 
 
 to England. They are, in short, arguments in favour of 
 Irish independence ; every one of them would be seen in 
 its true character if the Irish demand should take the 
 form of a claim that Ireland should become an indepen- 
 dent nation. Meanwhile, even on the Home Eule view, 
 the case stands thus. The present condition of things 
 excites Irish discontent, and involves great evils ; we 
 have before us but three courses: — maintenance of the 
 Union ; the concession of Irish independence ; the 
 grant of Home Eule to Ireland. The Home Euler 
 urges that the last is the best course left open to us. 
 To decide whether this be so or not requires a fair ex- 
 amination of the possibilities which each course presents 
 to England. 
 
128 EnfjlancVs Ccisc against Home Rule, [Chap. V. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION. 
 
 Eighty-six years have elapsed since the conchision of the 
 
 Treaty of Union between Endand and Ireland. 
 The -^ ° 
 
 failure of The two countries do not yet form an united 
 
 the . mi T • 1 
 
 Union; nation. The Irish people are, if not more 
 wretched (for the whole European world has 
 made progress, and Ireland with it), yet more conscious of 
 wretchedness ; and Irish disaffection to England is, if not 
 deeper, more wide-spread than in 1800. An Act meant 
 by its authors to be the source of such prosperity and con- 
 cord as followed though slowly, upon the Union with 
 Scotland, has not made Ireland rich, has not put an end 
 to Irish lawlessness, has not terminated the feud between 
 Protestants and Catholics, has not raised the position of Irish 
 tenants, has not taken away the causes of Irish discontent, 
 and has therefore not removed Irish disloyalty. Tliis is 
 the indictment which can fairly be brought against the Act 
 of Union, It is, however, of importance to notice that 
 the main charges to which the Act of Union is liable are 
 negative. It has not removed (its foes, say that it has not 
 
Chap. V.] TJie Maintenance of the Union. 129 
 
 mitigated) great evils ; but the mass of ills for which the 
 Union is constantly made chargeable were in existence 
 before the days of Pitt or Cornwallis. Destitution, 
 sectarian animosities, harsh evictions met by savage 
 outrages, the terror of secret societies, the stern enforce- 
 ment of law, representing to the people anything but 
 justice, are phenomena of Irish society, which, as they 
 existed before the Irish Volunteers established the Parlia- 
 mentary independence of their country, and continued to 
 exist in Ireland when subject to no laws but those passed 
 or upheld by an Irish Parliament, cannot be attributed to 
 the Act of Union. That enactment introduced a purely 
 political change. It could not, except very indirectly, 
 either increase or remove evils which it did not affect to 
 touch. To two charges its authors are indeed, with more 
 or less of justice, liable ; they committed the intellectual 
 error of supposing that a change or improvement in the 
 form of the Constitution would remove evils due to social 
 and economical causes ; they committed the moral error of 
 thinking that a beneficial enactment might allowably be 
 passed by means which outraged all the best moral feeling 
 of Ireland. Their mistakes are worth notice. England is 
 again told that a Constitutional change is the remedy for 
 Irish misery. Ethical considerations (in this case the 
 moral rights of a loyal minority and the legal rights of 
 Irish landlords) are, it is again intimated, to be held of 
 slight account compared with the benefit to Ireland and 
 to England which is to be expected from an experiment in. 
 
 K 
 
130 En(jland!s Case agaiinst Home Bule. [Chap. V. 
 
 Constitution-making. To impartial observers it may- 
 appear that the proposed policy of 1886 threatens to re- 
 produce in its essence the errors and the vices of the 
 policy of 1800. Be this as it may, the reflection that the 
 ill results of the Act of Union are mainly negative 
 suggests the conclusion that the good results (if any) of 
 its repeal would probably be negative also, and clears the 
 way for the question with which we are immediately 
 concerned, namely. What are the actual and undoubted 
 evils to England of maintaining a legislative union with 
 Ireland ? 
 
 The nature and extent of these evils has been considered 
 The evils ^^ criticising the arguments in favour of Home 
 of mam- Kule. A bare enumeration of them therefore 
 
 taming 
 
 the Union, j^^y here suffice. 
 
 First. — The Union hampers and complicates English 
 
 1. Compli- policy, and this even independently of the 
 
 cation of . . .. . • ^ tx -t. i mi 
 
 English existing agitation tor Home liule. The tenacity 
 
 policy. ^£ England during the war with America, her 
 
 triumphant energy during the revolutionary struggle, 
 
 were due to a unity of feeling on the part, at any rate, 
 
 of her governing classes, which even under the most 
 
 favourable circumstances can hardly exist in a Parliament 
 
 containing, as the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
 
 always must contain, a large body of Irish Roman 
 
 Catholics. If it be urged that the presence of Roman 
 
€hap. v.] The Maintenance of the Union, 331 
 
 Catholics is clue to the Catholic Emancipation Act, and 
 not to the Act of Union, the remark is true but irrelevant 
 !N'o maintainer or assailant of the Union is insane enough 
 to propose the repeal of the Emancipation Act. 
 
 Secondly. — The refusal of Home Eule involves a long, 
 tedious, and demoralising contest with opponents 2 Ob- 
 who will use, and from their own point of view struction. 
 have a right to use, all the arts of obstruction and of 
 Parliamentary intrigue. The battle of the Constitution 
 must be fought out in Parliament, and if it is to be won. 
 Englishmen may be compelled to forego for a time much 
 useful legislation, to modify the rules of party government, 
 £ind, it is possible, even the forms of the Constitution. 
 
 Thirdly. — If the Union is to be maintained with 
 advantage to any part of the United Kingdom, 3 8^,^^^ 
 the people of the United Kingdom must make ^ ^t^^" 
 the most strenuous, firm, and continuous effort, Ireland, 
 lasting, it may well be, for twenty years or more, to 
 enforce throughout every part of the United Kingdom 
 obedience to the law of the land. This effort can 
 only be justified by the equally strenuous determination 
 (which must involve an infinity of trouble) to give ear 
 to every Irish complaint, and to see that the laws which 
 the Irish people obey are laws of justice, and (what 
 is much the same thing) laws which in the long run the 
 people of Ireland will feel to be just. To carry out this 
 
 K 2 
 
132 Eiu/land's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. V. 
 
 course of action is difficult for all governments, is perhaps 
 specially difficult for a democratic government. To main- 
 tain the Union is no easy task, though it has yet to be 
 proved that any form of Home Eule will give more ease 
 to the people of England ; nor can the difficulty be got rid 
 of, though it may be somewhat changed, by abolishing the 
 Irish representation in Parliament, or by treating Ireland 
 as a Crown colony. Such steps, which could hardly be 
 termed maintenance of the Union, might, as expedients 
 for carrying through safely a course of reform, be morally 
 and for a time justifiable. Their adoption is, however, 
 liable to an almost insuperable objection. Democracy in 
 Great Britain does not comport with official autocracy in 
 Ireland. Every government must be true to its principles, 
 and a democracy which played the benevolent despot 
 would suffer demoralisation. 
 
 The Act of Union has been the aim of so much random 
 Good invective that its good fruits (for it has borne 
 
 onhe^ good no less than evil fruits) are in danger of 
 Union. being forgotten. It ended once and for all an 
 intolerable condition of affairs, and its scope will 
 never be understood unless its enactments are read in 
 the lurid light cast upon them by the rebellion of 1798. 
 The hateful means used to obtain an apparently good end 
 have cast a slur on the reputation of more than one high- 
 toned statesman. Humanity, in the case of Cornwallis at 
 least, had far more share thun ambition in his deteimi- 
 
Chap. V.] The Maintenance of the Union. 133 
 
 nation to abolish the Irish Parliament. His anxiety in 
 1798 to save Catholics and rebels from oppression was as 
 keen and as noble as the anxiety of Canning in 1858 to 
 protect the natives of India from the resentments excited 
 by the Mutiny. Every reason which in our own day after 
 the disturbances of 1865 made it necessary to abolish the 
 ancient constitution of Jamaica told in 1800 in favour of 
 abolishing the still more ancient Parliament of Ireland. 
 If statesmen, bent on restoring at least the rule of law 
 and peace in a distracted country, fancied that the 
 corruption of the legislature might be counted a low price 
 to pay for protecting the mass of the population from the 
 rule or the vengeance of a faction, they committed a grave 
 moral error. But their mistake was more pardonable 
 than it seems to modern critics, and the lesson which it 
 teaches — that you cannot base a just policy upon a foun- 
 dation of iniquity — is one which the modern censors of Pitt 
 may well lay to heart. However this may be, the transac- 
 tions which discredited the passing of tlie Act of Union 
 give no ground for repealing it, and, except to a rhetorician 
 in want of an argiimentuni ad hominem, it will never 
 appear that the philosophic historian who maintains that 
 the Treaty of Union was ill-conceived and premature, 
 contradicts the political philosopher who contends that to 
 . repeal the Union would be not to cancel but to aggravate 
 the evils of an historical error.. The considerations which 
 recommend or require the maintenance of the Union are 
 often forgotten, but are obvious. 
 
134 England's Case against Honie Bule, [Chap. V. 
 
 The support of the Union is, after all, let controver- 
 Reasons sialists say what they like, the policy which in 
 tainTng"" fact holds the field, and it is (strange though 
 Union. the assertion may appear) on the advocates of 
 innovation, not on the supporters of things as they are, 
 that lies the burden of making out their case. A 
 fundamental alteration in the constitution of the realm is 
 in itself no light matter, and any man who has eyes to see 
 or ears to hear may easily convince himself that the 
 creation of an Irish Parliament must be the beginning, 
 not the end, of a revolution. Dublin is not the only city 
 in the United Kingdom where has met a Parliament 
 claiming to represent an independent nation ; at Edinburgh 
 an Assembly has sat which not only occasionally denied, 
 but during the whole of its existence never admitted, the 
 sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster ; and in the 
 present state of the world it is inconceivable that Irish 
 autonomy — if such be the proper term — should not excite 
 or justify claims for local independence which would 
 unloose the ties which bind together the huge fabric of the 
 Strent'th- ^British Empire. The Union again of England 
 rrfi^"^' ^^^^ Ireland has increased, as its relaxation would 
 Crown. of necessity diminish, the power of the central 
 government. That the Treaty of Union has, disappoint- 
 ing and even harmful as some of its results have been, 
 formed a guarantee against successful rebellion, hardly 
 admits of question. The difference between the abortive 
 revolt of 1848 or the Fenian disturbances of 18C6, and 
 
Chap. V.] Tlie Maintenance of the Union. 135 
 
 the desperate insurrection of 1798, affords some measure 
 of the strength which the legislative unity of the king- 
 dom has added to the English Crown. If it be suggested 
 that the disloyalty, which has prompted sedition during 
 this century, was less deep than the animosities which 
 armed the insurgents of '98, the suggestion may be true, 
 but it incidentally shows that under the Union some 
 progress, however slight, has been made towards national 
 harmony, and recalls the important fact that at the 
 present day the wealth and the energy of Protestant Ire- 
 land firmly support the legislative unity of the kingdom. 
 Consider again what are the facilities possessed, say, by 
 the State of New York, by the kingdom of Bavaria, or by 
 the Cape Colony for interfering with or arresting the 
 action of the central power to which the State, kingdom, 
 or dependency is subject, and you perceive at once how 
 ample must, from the very necessity of the case, be the 
 opportunities possessed by a semi-independent Irish execu- 
 tive representing a semi-independent Irish Parliament for 
 embarrassing the action of the Government in London. 
 This will appear more clearly from a detailed examination 
 of the different forms which may be assumed by Home 
 Ptule. One remark, however, may with advantage be made 
 at this point of our argument, since it holds good of every 
 possible scheme for repealing or modifying the Union. 
 Powers conferred upon an Executive and a Parliament at 
 Dublin must, from the nature of things, be a deduction 
 from the powers which can be exercised by the Parliament 
 
13G England! s Case against Home Rule, [Chap. V. 
 
 and Ministry at Westminster. This is a principle the 
 truth of which is independent of the wishes or fancies 
 either of Englishmen or of Irishmen. "The more you 
 have of the more," runs a quaint Spanish proverb, " the 
 less you have of the less." The saying is of mathematical 
 certainty, but, in the excitement of controversy, men 
 constantly forget the depth and variety of the maxim's 
 application. 
 
 To the existence of the Union and to the power which 
 Enables it ^^ confers upon the Executive, is due the possi- 
 tain free- ^^^7 0^ curbing the violence of religious and 
 dom. political zealots by the interposition of an au- 
 
 thority endowed at once with overpowering strength and 
 obvious impartiality. In Belfast even a Nationalist must, 
 if he is a peaceable citizen, feel that the withdrawal of 
 the Queen's troops would not conduce to liis comfort. 
 Under a system of Home Rule (it will perhaps be said) 
 one body of fanatics or the other would, with or without 
 the aid of the army, gain the upper hand and restore 
 order. Grant the truth, perhaps open to doubt, of this 
 suggestion, it is at best a plea, not for Home Rule but 
 for separation, since no civilised government could (whilst 
 England and Ireland formed, under any terms whatever, 
 parts of the same political community) suffer Belfast to 
 become the scene of a free fight, which should decide by 
 the ordeal of battle, whether Protestants should tyrannise 
 over Catholics, or Catholics coerce Protestants by a reign 
 of terror. A reign of order moreover is not equivalent to 
 
Chap, v.] The Maintenance of the Union. 137 
 
 the reign of justice. Still less is it equivalent to the 
 establishment of that personal freedom which can only 
 exist under the equal rule of equal law, and is the bless- 
 ing which every government worthy the name is bound 
 to confer upon its subjects. 
 
 An impartial foreigner again would probably ' hold, as 
 indeed De Beaumont (unless I misunderstand his teaching) 
 did, to the end of his life, actually hold, that the existing 
 connection between England and Ireland is dictated, by 
 the state of the world, by the circumstances of the times, 
 by the very nature of things. We are living in 1886, not 
 in 1782 : the nineteenth century is not the age for small 
 States or for weak States. Such an observer, however, 
 would also see much that is hidden, by the dust of battle, 
 from the combatants in a desperate political conflict. 
 What is really needed to meet the real wants, of which the 
 cry for Home Eule is a more or less factitious expression, 
 is, he would note, much more a change in the spirit of 
 Englishmen than an alteration in the constitution of 
 England. If Englishmen could learn to speak and think 
 of Irishmen with the respect and consideration due to 
 fellow-citizens, if they could cease to jeer at Irishmen now 
 as not much more than a century ago they used to jeer at 
 Scotchmen, the Union would soon become something 
 more than a mere work of legal ingenuity. A change of 
 feeling would make it easy for English politicians and 
 English voters to perceive that the local affairs of Ireland 
 ought to be managed in the Parliament of the United 
 
138 EnylaiicCs Case agcdnst Home Rule. [Chap. V. 
 
 Kingdom in accordance witli the opinion of the Parlia- 
 mentary representatives of Ireland, just as Scotch affairs 
 are managed at Westminster in accordance with the 
 opinions of Parliamentary representatives of Scotland. 
 Towards this reform in the practice, which need not change 
 anytliing in the law of our constitution, Mr. Briglit has 
 already pointed the way. And Mr. Bright's moral intuitions 
 have more than once endowed him with a prophetic in- 
 sight denied to our other statesmen, into the future of 
 English policy. Meanwhile those who urge the main- 
 tenance of the Union have a right to insist upon the 
 possibilities which it contains of reconciling the strength 
 of the Empire with due regard to the local interests and 
 local sentiment of Ireland. 
 
 The Union, lastly, whilst it increases the power of the 
 whole United Kingdom, provides the means for 
 
 And carry . . i i 
 
 out just carrying out, and for carrying out with due regard 
 reforms. . . ^ > .. -r- 
 
 to justice, any reform, innovation, or it you 
 
 please revolution, required for the prosperity of the Irish 
 
 people. The duty, it has been laid down, of an English 
 
 Minister is to effect by his policy all those changes in 
 
 Ireland which a revolution would effect by force. The 
 
 maxim comes from a strange quarter, but the doctrine of 
 
 Disraeli sums up on this matter the teaching of Mill and 
 
 De Beaumont, and it is absolutely sound if you add to it 
 
 the implied condition that an English [Minister, wliilst 
 
 aiming at the ends of a wise revolutionist, must pay a 
 
 respect to the demands of justice not always evinced by 
 
Chap. V.] Tlic Maintenance of the Union. 18J> 
 
 the revolutionary spirit. But to put in force a policy of 
 just revolution, nothing is so necessary as the combination 
 of resistless power with infinite wealth. Tliis is exactly 
 what the government of the United Kingdom can, and my 
 Irish government could, supply. Mr. Gladstone and his 
 followers fully admit this, and the Land Purchase Bill was 
 the sign of their conviction that the policy of Home Eule 
 itself needs for its success and justification the power to 
 draw upon the wealth of the United Kingdom. Let the 
 United Kingdom, it is said in effect, pay fifty millions, 
 that, without any injustice to Irish landlords, Irish tenants 
 may be turned into landowners, and may then enjoy the 
 blessings of Home Eule, freed from all temptation to use 
 legislative power for purposes of confiscation. The advice 
 may in one sense be sound, but prudence suggests that if 
 the fifty millions are to be expended, it were best first to 
 settle the agrarian feud, and then to see whether the 
 demand for Home Eule would not die a natural death. 
 French peasants were Jacobins until the revolution 
 secured to them the soil of France. The same men when 
 transformed into landed proprietors became the staunch 
 opponents of Jacobinism. It is in any case the interest of 
 England to see whether, say in a generation, the existing 
 or further changes in the tenure of land may not avert 
 all necessity or demand for changes in the constitu- 
 tion. Interest here coincides with duty. No scheme 
 (either of Home Eule or of Irish independence) has 
 been proposed, nor, it may be said with confidence. 
 
140 England's Case against Home Bute. [Chap. V. 
 
 ever can be proposed, which, disguise the matter as you 
 will, does not savour of treachery to thousands of 
 Irishmen who have performed the duties and claim to 
 retain the rights of citizens of the United Kingdom. The 
 worst delusion of the revolutionary spirit is the notion 
 that justice to the people may be based upon injustice to 
 individuals. Protestants have not more, but neither have 
 they less, claim to protection from the State than Catholics. 
 Even landowners are not of necessity wrong-doers. Eent 
 is a debt, and it may occasionally be the duty, even of a 
 tenant, to pay his creditor. An insolvent debtor has, how- 
 ever excusable or pitiable his position, no absolute moral 
 Tight to improve his own position by torturing or murdering 
 Any solvent neighbour who may be inclined to pay his own 
 <lebts. To maintain the Union is to maintain the effort 
 to perform the obligations of the country, and to compel 
 iiU citizens of the country to perform the duties imposed 
 by law. The effort is an arduous one, the more so since 
 it must be combined with the equally strenuous en- 
 deavour to see that in Ireland, as in every part of the 
 United Kingdom, the demands of the law be made to 
 coincide with the demands of morality and of humanity. 
 Still pactum scrva is a good maxim for nations no less than 
 for individuals : there may be a higher law than the rule of 
 keeping one's promise, but before a man or a government 
 incurs even the appearance of bad faith, it were well to see 
 whether the so-called higher law of conscience may not 
 in reality be the lower dictates of indolence or cowardice. 
 
Chap. V.] Tlic Maintenance of the Union. 141. 
 
 Neither nations nor individuals are bound in duty to do 
 imx^ossibilities. The limit of power is the limit of re- 
 sponsibility, but if England can no longer enforce justice 
 in Ireland, there will still be the grave question 
 whether this fearful result of past misdoing or error- 
 does not suggest and justify Separation rather than 
 Home Eule. 
 
142 EnglancCs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VI. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Separation. 
 
 Englishmen are so firmly and with such good reason 
 convinced that the independence of Ireland 
 Separa- would be fatal to the greatness and security 
 of Great Britain, that they rarely attempt to 
 weigh accurately the grounds of reason producible 
 in support of a conviction wliich has acquired the 
 character of a political instinct. The evils, however, to 
 England which may be reasonably anticipated from the 
 political separation of the two countries, may be summed 
 up under three heads. 
 
 First, — The acquiescence by England in Irish indepen- 
 dence, would be a deliberate and complete sun-ender of the 
 objects at which English statesmanship has, under one 
 form or another, aimed for centuries. Such a surrender 
 would, in addition to its material effects, inflict an amount 
 of moral discredit on England which would itself be the 
 cause of serious dangers. That a powerful nation should 
 (except under the force of crushing defeat) assent to an 
 arrangement which would decrease its resources and 
 
Chap. VI.] Separation. 143 
 
 authority must inevitably appear to all the world to be, 
 and probably would be in reality, such a sign either of 
 declining strength or of declining spirit as must in a 
 short time provoke the aggression of rivals and enemies. 
 Abdication of royal or imperial authority is with States 
 no less than with individuals the precursor of death. 
 Loss of territory, indeed, in consequence of defeat, is in 
 itself only in so far damaging as defeat may imply a want 
 of capacity to resist attack, or as the diminution of 
 territory may involve loss of resources. Thus the 
 surrender of Lombardy by Austria, of Alsace by France, 
 of Schleswig-Holstein by Denmark, the acquiescence of 
 Holland in the independence of Belgium, or, to come 
 nearer home, the treaty by which England acknowledged 
 that the struggle to retain her American colonies had 
 ended in failure, each and all of them brought only such 
 discredit upon the defeated country as is the direct conse- 
 quence of want of success. None of these transactions 
 had anything like the disastrous results which the con- 
 cession of Irish independence would entail on England. 
 The Austrians, the French, the Danes, and the Dutch had, 
 as the whole world admitted, struggled manfully to main- 
 tain their power. They were beaten as one party or other 
 to a fight must be beaten, but they did not betray any 
 of those failings which encourage further attack. The 
 close of the conflict with our colonies assuredly did not 
 leave England disgraced before the world. The obstinacy 
 of George III., the splendid resistance made by a nation 
 
144 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. VL 
 
 assailed at once by a combination of enemies (any one of 
 whom alone would have seemed a formidable foe), the 
 victories of Kodney, the defence of Gibraltar, not only 
 saved but increased the renown of England, and were 
 warnings which no foreigner could disregard, that the loss 
 of the American colonies, though it might diminish the 
 Empire, had not quenched the spirit or undermined the 
 strength of Great Britain. Ko one can suppose that a. 
 ])eaceful retreat from the diflBculties and responsibility of 
 providing for the Government of Ireland would leave to 
 England that reputation for courage and endurance wliich, 
 even in the midst of defeat, was retained by the gener- 
 ation which acknowledged the independence of America. 
 Peaceable surrender may avert material loss ; it cannot 
 maintain moral character. One thing only would render 
 the concession of Irish independence compatible with 
 Englishmen's respect for themselves, or with the respect 
 of other nations for England. -This condition would be 
 the obvious, and, so to speak, patent conviction on the 
 part of the whole English people, that the grant of 
 independence to Ireland was the fulfilment of a duty 
 demanded by justice. No such conviction exists, nor is 
 it ever likely to come into existence. Even were so great 
 a change of English sentiment to take place that a 
 majority of the people became ready, on grounds of 
 expediency, to break up the connection between Great 
 Britain and the neighbouring island, it would still be hard 
 to persuade the nation that there was not vile treachery 
 
Chap. VI.] Se'pavation. 145 
 
 in refusing to stand by and support that part of the Irish 
 people which wished to retain the connection with Eng- 
 land. The treachery would approach to infamy if it 
 should appear that England, for the sake of her own 
 comfort, left English subjects who had always obeyed the 
 law and relied on the honourable protection of the 
 United Kingdom at the mercy of conspirators whose 
 lawlessness had taken the form of cruelty and tyranny, 
 and whose vindictiveness was certain to punish as crimi- 
 nality former acts of loyalty or obedience to English 
 sovereignty. High-toned self-sacrifice which results in 
 breach of faith to associates is considered by the world at 
 large as a particularly odious form of hypocrisy. Nothing 
 in the treaty between England and the American Colonies 
 involved more just bitterness of feeling than the partial, 
 and probably inevitable, desertion of the Loyalists. The 
 national conscience would condemn rather than approve 
 the prudential considerations which might, under certain 
 circumstances, induce Englishmen to consent to see 
 Ireland an independent nation ; such consent would imply 
 the adoption of views of national interest fundamentally 
 inconsistent with the maintenance of Imperial power ; the 
 damage resulting from loss of character is difficult to 
 estimate, but is none the less real because it does not 
 admit of computation in the terms of the multiplication 
 table. 
 
 Secondly, the independence of Ireland means loss to 
 Great Britain both in money and in men. The pecuniary 
 
 L 
 
146 EnglaTuVs Case agahist Home Ride. [Chap. VI. 
 
 loss is, indeed, not quite so serious as might at first sight 
 be looked for.* The provisions of the rejected Govern- 
 ment of Ireland Bill imply, it would seem, that the 
 pecuniary gain of the United Kingdom from Ireland in 
 the way of taxation may, in Mr. Gladstone's judgment, be 
 estimated at about three and a half millions per annum, 
 and this may presumably be taken as a not unfair esti- 
 mate. The sacrifice of a seventh part of the population of 
 the United Kingdom is no slight matter. Its importance 
 is enhanced by the circumstance, never to be forgotten, 
 that Great Britain is the centre of an Empire. The 
 brutal and stupid jests by which respectable Englishmen 
 often hint that the bravery, the capacity, and the genius 
 of Irishmen are of little service to the Empire, and that 
 their value is more than counterbalanced by the ill results 
 of Irish discontent and sedition, conceal from unreflecting 
 minds the extent to which every part of the United 
 Kingdom has severally contributed to the fortune and 
 power of the country. Irish labourers, Irish soldiers, Irish 
 generals, and Irish statesmen have assuredly rendered 
 no trifling services to the British Crown. There is, 
 however, one valid ground for rating the loss in men to 
 England, which would result from separation from Ireland 
 somewhat lower than one would on first thoughts be 
 inclined to place it. Even were Ireland an independent 
 country there is nothing to prevent England from leaving 
 
 * See * Economic Value of Ireland to Great Britain,' by Robert 
 Gififen, The JsHneUcnth Century, March, 1886, p. 229. 
 
Chap. VI.] Separation, 147 
 
 all the advantages of English citizenship open to the 
 inhabitants of the Irish State. In this matter much is to 
 he learnt from Germany. Neither Stein, nor Niebuhr, 
 nor Moltke, were by birth subjects of Prussia, yet Prussia 
 did not lose the inestimable gains to be derived from 
 their talents. A generous, a liberal, and a just extension 
 of the privileges of citizensliip miglit fill the English army 
 and the English civil service with men drawn from a 
 State independent of Great Britain. If the independence 
 of Ireland were proclaimed to-morrow, there would not be 
 a hundred Irish labourers the fewer in Liverpool or in 
 London. Connections and relations depending upon 
 community of language, community of interest, community 
 of feeling, the ties of kindred, of business, of friendship, or 
 of affection cannot, happily, be dissolved, or to any great 
 extent affected, by political revolutions. In any case, it 
 would depend on the wisdom of Great Britain whether 
 separation from Ireland should or should not mean the 
 estrangement of Irishmen. 
 
 Tliirdlify the independence of Ireland would give England 
 a foreign, and possibly a hostile, neighbour along the 
 western coast of Great Britain. We should, for the first 
 time since the accession of the Stuarts, occupy a position 
 something like that of a Continental nation, and know 
 what it was to have a foe, or at best a very cold friend, 
 upon our borders. In time of war Ireland would be the 
 abettor or the open ally of, say, the United States, or of 
 France ; Dublin would, unless reconquered, be the outpost 
 
 L 2 
 
148 EnylancVs Case against Home Btdc. [Chap. VI. 
 
 of the French Kepublic or of the American Union. In 
 times of peace things would not stand much better ; our 
 diplomacy would be constantly occupied with the intrigues 
 carried on in Dublin; the possibility of attack from 
 Ireland would necessitate the increase of our forces; 
 increased taxation would be drawn from a diminished 
 population ; we should be compelled to double our army 
 when we had lost that part of the kingdom which used to 
 form our best recruiting-ground. Sooner or later England 
 would be driven, like every Continental State, to accept 
 the burden of conscription, and with conscription would 
 come essential changes in the whole habits of English life. 
 Nor can we count upon this being the end of our calami- 
 ties. The burden of conscription would deprive us of our 
 one great advantage over competitors in the struggle for 
 trade; an overtaxed and overburdened people could not 
 long maintain their mercantile pre-eminence. This is the 
 picture which is constantly drawn, in one shape or another, 
 of the ruinous results to England of the free development 
 of Irish nationality. No one can undertake to say that 
 its main features are false. Still, it must be admitted 
 that the prophets of evil neglect to notice several facts 
 which ought not to be overlooked. Ireland is a poor 
 country of about the population of Belgium ; it is occupied 
 by a people far less wealthy than the inhabitants of 
 England; and, moreover, by a people divided among^ 
 themselves by marked differences of race, religion, and 
 historical tradition. Is it really to be feared that such a 
 
Chap. VT.l Separation. 149 
 
 neighbour could, even if both independent and hostile, be 
 lialf the peril to England that Germany is to France, or 
 France to Italy ? Money constitutes now more truly 
 than ever the sinews of war, and it will be a long time 
 before Ireland is a country abounding in money. There 
 is, to say the least, something ignominious in the dread 
 that Englishmen could not hold their own in the face of 
 an Irish Eepublic, which would certainly be poor, and 
 would probably be a prey to violent factions. Grant 
 again — and this is granting a good deal — that Ireland 
 might become a province of France, there is still some 
 difficulty in seeing why Englishmen can live without fear 
 within sight of Boulogne, and yet must tremble at the 
 thought of French regiments assembling in Dublin. The 
 command of the sea moreover would, whether Ireland 
 were or were not aided by foreign allies, be a complete 
 protection for England against invasion. If England's 
 naval supremacy w^ere lost, the power of the British 
 Empire would in any case be gone. The vital matter for 
 us is to retain command of the seas. Our capacity for 
 doing this would not be greatly affected by Irish indepen- 
 dence. America, further, and France are the only allies 
 to whom Ireland could look for aid. The notion that the 
 United States would consent to receive Ireland under any 
 terms into the Union must appear to any one who has 
 studied American politics the wildest of dreams. It 
 supposes that the Americans would, without any gain to 
 themselves, disarrange the whole balance of their consti^ 
 
150 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. VI. 
 
 tution, and by involving themselves in all the complexi- 
 ties of European politics depart from the path which they 
 have continuously pursued, and which is marked out to 
 them by the plainest rules of common sense, and, it is 
 hardly an exaggeration to say, by the laws of nature. A 
 people who decline to annex Cuba, and are fully willing to 
 wait till circumstances bring Canada into the Union and 
 give the United States possession of Mexico, are not likely 
 to incorporate Ireland. The alliance of France is a different 
 matter. Eeflection, however, mitigates the dread of it» 
 occurrence. Active alliance with Ireland would mean 
 war with England, and now for seventy years France and 
 England have been at peace. This state of tilings is the 
 more remarkable because there have during that period 
 arisen occasions for discord, and because no feeling of 
 sentimental friendship forbids warfare. The true gua- 
 rantee for peace between nations which were long deemetl 
 hereditary foes is the immense interest which each 
 has in abstaining from war. Could the state of things 
 which existed at the beginning of the century be revived, 
 thousands of Englishmen and Frenchmen would be ruined. 
 The security for peace depending upon national interest 
 would not be diminished were Ireland to-morrow pro- 
 claimed an independent republic. That this independence 
 would facilitate French attack is undeniable, but attack 
 would not be the more likely to occur. Add to all this 
 that Irish discontent or sedition would, during a war, help 
 France as much as Irish independence. Ireland is no 
 
Chap. VI.] Separation. 151 
 
 doubt the weak point in the defences of Great Britain. 
 This no one denies. The only question is whether and to 
 what extent the independence of that country would 
 widen the breach in England's defensive system. 
 
 Any one who attempts to forecast the probable evils to 
 England of Irish independence should keep one Possible 
 recollection constantly before his mind. The ^f sTS* 
 wisest thinkers of the eighteenth century (in- *^o°- 
 eluding Burke) held that the independence of the 
 American Colonies meant the irreparable ruin of Great 
 Britain. There were apparently solid grounds for this 
 belief ; experience has proved it to be without foundation. 
 
 A calm observer can even now see that the complete 
 dissolution of the connection between Great Britain and 
 Ireland, disastrous as in many respects such an event 
 would undoubtedly be, holds out to the larger country the 
 possibility of two advantages. 
 
 Loss of territory might be equivalent in some aspects 
 to increase of power. 
 
 There exists in Europe no country so completely at 
 unity with itself as Great Britain. Eifty years of reform 
 have done their work, and have removed the discontents, 
 the divisions, the disaffection, and the conspiracies which 
 marked the first quarter or the first half of this century. 
 Great Britain, if left to herself, could act with all the 
 force, consistency, and energ}^ given by unity of sentiment 
 and community of interests. The distraction and the 
 
152 Enr/lancTs Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VI. 
 
 uncertainty of our political aims, the feebleness and in- 
 consistency with which they are pursued, arise, in part at 
 least, from the connection with Ireland. Neither English- 
 men nor Irishmen are to blame for the fact that it is 
 difficult for communities differing in historical associations 
 and in political conceptions to keep step together in the 
 path of progress. For other evils arising from the con- 
 nection the blame must rest on English statesmen. All 
 the inherent vices of party government, all the weaknesses 
 of the Parliamentary system, all the evils arising from 
 the perverse notion that reform ought always to be pre- 
 ceded by a period of lengthy and more than half 
 factitious agitation met by equally factitious resistance, 
 have been fostered and increased by the inter-action of 
 Irish and English politics. No one can believe that the 
 inveterate habit of ruling one part of the United Kingdom 
 on principles wliich no one would venture to apply to the 
 government of any other part of it, can have produced 
 anything but the most injurious effect on the stability of 
 our Government and the character of our public men. 
 The advocates of Home Eule find by far their strongest 
 arguments for influencing English opinion, in the proofs 
 which they produce that England, no less than Ii'eland, 
 lias suffered from a political arrangement under which 
 legal union has failed to secure moral unity; these 
 arguments, whatever their strength, are, however, it must 
 be noted, far more available to a Nationalist than to an 
 advocate of Federalism. English authority in Ireland 
 
Chap. VI.] • Separation. 153 
 
 would be increased by the possession of that freedom of 
 action wliich every powerful State exercises in its dealings 
 with a weaker though an independent nation. There is 
 something so repulsive to the best feelings of citizenship 
 in even the hypothetical contemplation of the advantages 
 (such as they are) which would accrue to Great Britain 
 from the transformation of thousands of our fellow- 
 countrymen into aliens, that it is painful to trace out in 
 clear language the strength of the position which England 
 would occupy towards the Irish Eepublic. But in 
 argument the strict following out of the conclusions flow- 
 ing from facts is a form of honesty, and however repulsive 
 these conclusions may be, their statement is a matter of 
 duty. Were Ireland independent, England would possess 
 means ^ far more effective for enforcing her will upon 
 her weaker neighbour than are coercion acts, courts, or 
 constables. England could deal not with individuals, 
 but with the State, and she could compel respect for 
 treaties or due regard to English interests by invasion, 
 by a pacific blockade, or by a hostile tariff. There is a 
 special reason for dwelling on the facility with which 
 England could compel the observance of engagements. 
 Morally the most serious of all the objections to England's 
 conceding Irish independence is the indelible disgrace 
 which would rightly fall upon any country which did not 
 provide for the protection of men who had been loyal and 
 faithful citizens. Now the point to be noted is that 
 England's authority, resulting not from law but from 
 
\ 
 
 154 EnglamVs Case against Hmne Bute, [Chap. VI. 
 
 power, in an independent Ireland, would greatly enhance 
 lier capacity for ensuring the fair treatment of Irish 
 Protestants. The treaty of independence would provide 
 guarantees for their rights, and any breach of these 
 guarantees would be a (msus belli. The mere threat of a 
 hostile tariff would of itself be a stronger sanction than 
 the most strenuous provisions of an Act of Parliament 
 backed only by the very hypothetical power of compelling 
 a half-independent Executive to obey the judgments of, say, 
 the Privy Council. The guarantees of a treaty are, it may 
 be said, often worthless. This is so ; but their worthless- 
 ness arises from the weakness of the country in whose 
 favour tliey are made. In any event they may be worth 
 a good deal more than provisions of an Act of Parliament. 
 The deriders of a paper Union which has lasted for a 
 century have no right to count on the validity of a paper 
 Federation which still awaits creation. 
 
 It is, again, possible that the severance of all political 
 connection might open the way to friendship or alliance. 
 
 Tliis assertion is no unmeaning paradox. If one could 
 anticipate with any confidence that tlie acknowledgment 
 of Irish nationality would bring to Ireland happiness and 
 prosperity, it would not be a very bold conjecture that as 
 Ireland flourished and prospered, ill-will to England might 
 rapidly decrease. With nations, as with individuals, to re- 
 move all causes of mutual irritation is much the same thing 
 as removing the disposition to quarrel. Kot twenty-one 
 years have passed since the last Austrian soldier marched 
 
Chap. vi.J Separation. 15i> 
 
 out of Italy, yet Austria is at this moment less unpopular 
 with the Italians than France, and Garibaldi's death 
 evoked tributes of respect at Vienna. Tor fifteen years 
 the whole force of European law was employed to kee]> 
 Belgium united to Holland ; the obvious interests, more- 
 over, of all the inhabitants of the kingdom of the ]N"ether- 
 lands told in favour of union. Yet year by year the two 
 divisions of one country became more and more hostile to 
 each other. Fifty years of separation have, as far a& 
 appearances go, restored, or for the first time created, 
 feelings of friendliness between the Belgians and the 
 Dutch. There are to be found Belgian statesmen who 
 regret the proclamation of Belgian independence. When in 
 1881 the Americans celebrated at Yorktown the centenary 
 of British defeat, they went out of their way to display 
 their goodwill towards Great Britain. Plaudits and toasts, 
 it may be said, prove nothing except the existence of a 
 sentiment which, even if it be genuine, is certain to be 
 evanescent. This is true ; but the matter for consideration 
 is not whether the feeling of friendliness towards Great 
 Britain which found expression during the festivities at 
 Yorktown would survive a conflict of interest between 
 England and America, but whether a condition of feeling 
 which allows the two nations to look calmly after their 
 own interests, unblinded by passion or animosity, could 
 possibly have been produced by the continuance of that 
 connection between England and America which was 
 terminated by the surrender of Cornwallis. There is at 
 
\ 
 
 156 E'tiglaiid's Case agahisi Home Ride. [Chap. VI. 
 
 least no absurdity in the supposition that this question 
 ought to be answered in the negative, and that Americans 
 and Englishmen are at any rate not enemies just because 
 a hundred years ago they ceased to be fellow-citizens. 
 
 Let not, however, the gist of my argument be misunder- 
 stood. The possible increase of English power, and the 
 possible growth of goodwill between England and Ireland, 
 are not used as anything like reasons in favour of 
 Separation. They are set down simply as deductions from 
 the immense evils of a policy w^liich no Englishman can 
 regard as other than most injurious to the whole United 
 Kingdom. The reason why it is wise to dwell on this 
 kind of set-off against the ill effects of Separation is 
 that Home Eule, while involving almost all the evils of 
 Separation, will be found on examination not to hold out 
 anything like the same hopes of compensating advantages. 
 
 \ 
 
( 157 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 Home Eule — Its Tokms. 
 
 The proposals for giving Ireland Home Eule, in so far as 
 they have taken any definite shape whatever, -po r 
 have assumed four forms : — ■ ?^°^® 
 
 Eule. 
 
 I. Home Eule as Federalism. 
 
 II. Home Eule as Colonial Independence. 
 
 III. Home Eule as the revival of Grattan's Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 IV. Home Eule under the proposed Gladstonian 
 Constitution. 
 
 How far Home Eule under these forms, or any one of 
 them, is compatible with the interests of the condition & 
 English people must be determined by con- fig^^^^^*^^' 
 siderins what are the conditions which an vl^^of 
 
 ° Home 
 
 acceptable plan of Home Eule must fulfil, and l^^le. 
 by then examining how far any given form of Home Eule 
 satisfies them. 
 Any scheme of Home Eule which can conceivably be 
 
158 Eiigland^s Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 accepted by England must, it is admitted, satisfy the 
 following conditions.* 
 
 It must in the first place be consistent with the ultimate 
 supremacy of the British Parliament, t 
 
 It must in the second place be just ; it must provide 
 that each part of the United Kingdom take a fair share 
 of Imperial burdens ; that the citizens of each part have 
 -equality of rights ; that the rights both of individuals and 
 of minorities be safely guarded. { 
 
 * Compare Mr. Gladstone's speech of 8th April, 1886, * Tlie Times 
 Parliamentary Debates,' pp. 130, 131 ; and Mr. Gladstone's speech of 
 13th April, iUd., pp. 255, 256. 
 
 t Compare ihid., pp. 130, 132. 
 
 % Compare the following expressions in Mr. Gladstone's siDceches : — 
 
 *' The essential conditions of any plan that Parliament can be asked 
 or could be expected to entertain are, in my opinion, these : — The 
 unity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy ; the safety and 
 welfare of the whole — if there is an unfortmiate conflict, which I do not 
 believe — the welfare and security of the whole must be preferred to the 
 security and advantage of the part. The ix)litical equality of the three 
 countries must be maintained. They stand by statute on a footing of 
 absolute equality, and that footing ought not to be altered or brought 
 into question. There should be what I will at present term an 
 equitable distribution of Imperial burdens. Next I introduce a pro- 
 vision which may seem to be exceptional, but which in the jjeculiar 
 circumstances of Ireland, whose history unhappily has been one long 
 chain of internal controversies as well as of difficulties external, is 
 necessary in order that there may be reasonable safeguards for the 
 minority. I am asked why there should be safeguards for the 
 minority. 
 
 « * <0 * * » 
 
 " I have spoken now of the essential conditions of a good plan for 
 Ireland, and I add only this — tliat in order to be a gocnl plan it must 
 be a plan promising to be a real settlement of Ireland. (Si)eech of 
 
CiiAP. VII.] Home Rule — Its Forms. 159 
 
 It must in the third place promise finality ; it must be 
 in the nature of a final settlement of the demands made 
 on behalf of Ireland, and not be a mere provocation to the 
 revival of fresh demands. 
 
 It must, in short, to sum up the whole matter, be, as 
 already insisted upon, a scheme which promises to England 
 at least not greater evils than the maintenance of the 
 Union or than Irish independence. 
 
 These conditions constitute the touchstone by which any 
 given plan of Home Eule must be tested. Xo scheme, 
 however ingenious, can be accepted which lacks any of 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, 8tli April, 1886, ' Tlce Times Parliamentary Debates, 
 pp. 130, 131.) 
 
 " I laid down, I say, five essential conditions, from which it appeared 
 to me we could under no circumstances depart. These were the 
 essential conditions under which in our opinion the granting of a 
 domestic Legislature to Ireland would be justifiable and wise — first, 
 that it must be consistent with Imperial unity ; secondly, that it must 
 bo founded upon the political equality of the three nations ; thirdly, 
 that there must be an equitable distribution of Imperial burdens; 
 fourthly, that there should be safeguards for the minority ; and, fifthly, 
 that it should be in the nature of a settlement, and not of a mere 
 provocation to the revival of fresh demands, which, according to the 
 right lion, gentleman, exceeded all reasonable expectation and calcu- 
 lation." (Speech of Mr. Gladstone, 13th April, 1886, '• Tlie Times 
 Parliamentary Debates,' p. 256.) Let it be observed that when Mr. 
 Gladstone speaks of the unity of the Empire he means the sovereignty 
 of Parliament, for in the same speech from which these extracts are 
 taken he says, " The unity of the Empire rests upon the supremacy of 
 Parliament and on considerations much higher than considerations 
 merely fiscal (* TJie Times Parliamentary Debates,' p. 132.) 
 
160 EnglancVs Case against Home Bide. [Chap. VII. 
 
 these characteristics, namely, the maintenance of Parlia- 
 mentary sovereignty — justice — finality. 
 
 I. Home Bule as Federalism. — Federal government is 
 General ^^® latest invention of constitutional science, 
 of fSc-^ Several circumstances confer upon it at the 
 ralism. present moment extraordinary prestige. It 
 is a piece of political mechanism which has been 
 found to work with success in three notorious in- 
 stances. In its favour is engaged the pride — may we 
 not say vanity ? — of one of the leading nations of the 
 earth. Americans regard Federalism with pardonable 
 partiality. They are the original inventors of the best 
 Federal system in the world, and Federalism has made 
 them the greatest of all free communities. A polity under 
 which the United States has grown up and flourished, and 
 fought the biggest war which has been fought during the 
 century, and come out of it victorious, and with renewed 
 strength, must, it is felt, be a constitution suited for all 
 nations who aspire to freedom. There is notliing therefore 
 surprising in the fact that Federalism is supposed to be 
 the panacea for all social evils, and all political perplexities, 
 or that it should be thrust upon our attention as the 
 device for bringing England and her colonies into closer 
 connection, and (not perhaps quite consistently) for re- 
 laxing the connection and terminating the feud between 
 England and Ireland. We should do well, therefore, to 
 recollect what is the true nature of Federalism. Federal 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Hide — As Federalism. 161 
 
 government, whatever be its merits, is a mere arrange- 
 ment for the distribution of political power. It is an 
 arrangement which requires for its application certain 
 well-defined conditions.* 
 
 There must, in the first place, exist a body of countries, 
 (such, for example, as the cantons of Switzerland, or the 
 colonies of America, or the provinces of Canada,) so closely 
 connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as 
 to be capable of bearing in the eyes of their inhabitants an 
 impress of common nationality. There must, in the second 
 place, be found among the people of the countries which it 
 is proposed to unite in Federal union, a very peculiar state 
 of sentiment. They must desire union ; they must not desire 
 unity. Federalism, in short, is in its nature a scheme for 
 bringing together into closer connection a set of states, each 
 of which desires, whilst retaining its individuality, to form 
 together with its neighbours one nation. It is not, at any 
 rate as it has hitherto been applied, a plan for disuniting 
 the parts of a united state. It may possibly be capable of 
 this application ; experience, however, gives no guidance 
 on this point,t and loyalty to the central government is to 
 
 * Dicey, *Law of tlie Constitution,' lecture iv. Parliamentary 
 Sovereignty and Federalism. 
 
 t A singular instance of the attempt to dissolve a country into 
 States deserves notice. In 1852 a constitution was devised for New 
 Zealand, under which the country was to be governed by a central 
 legislature and subordinate provincial governments and councils. This 
 artificial federation was of short duration ; the provincial governments 
 were in 1875 abolished by an Act of the General Assembly. — Todd, 
 * Parliamentary Government,' pp. 320-322. 
 
162 England's Case against Home Hide. [Chap. VII. 
 
 the working of a Federal system as necessary as loyalty 
 on the part of individual citizens to their own separate 
 State. When, therefore, it is suggested that Federalism 
 may establish a satisfactory relation between England and 
 Ireland, a doubt naturally suggests itself whether the 
 United Kingdom presents the conditions necessary for the 
 success of the Federal experiment. Whether in the case 
 of two countries, of which the one has no desire for 
 State rights and the other has no desire for union, the 
 bases of a Federal scheme are not wanting, is an inquiry 
 which deserves consideration. Politicians, however, may 
 reject references to abstract theory, and the best way of 
 testing the application of Federalism to the relations 
 between England and Ireland is to make clear to our- 
 selves what are the aims proposed to himself by a genuine 
 Home Euler, and then trace in outline the characteristics 
 of FederaL'sm, and consider how the Federal system would 
 work in reference to the interests of England. 
 
 " My plan of Home Rule for Ireland," writes an eminent 
 Home Euler, " would establish between Ireland 
 
 Aim of 
 
 Home and the Imperial Parliament the same relations 
 HulGrs. 
 
 in principle that exist between a State of the 
 
 American Union and the Federal Government, or between 
 
 any State of the Dominion of Canada and that Central 
 
 Canadian Parliament which meets in Ottawa." 
 
 This statement exhibits both laxity of language and 
 
 laxity of thought, but it gives a definition of the objects 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bulc — As Federalism. IGS^ 
 
 proposed to liimself by a genuine Home Puler which 
 is sufficiently definite for the ends of my argument. 
 Home Eule is, for our present purpose, Federalism. 
 We may, therefore, assume that it involves the adoption 
 throughout the present United Kingdom of a constitution 
 in principle, though not in detail, like that of the United 
 States. The United Kingdom would, if the distinguished 
 Home Euler's proposals were adopted, be transformed 
 into a confederacy ; the different States, say Great 
 Britain and Ireland, or England, Scotland, and Ireland, 
 would bear to the whole Union the same relation which 
 Virginia and New York bear to the United States ; 
 they would bear towards each other the same relation 
 which Virginia bears to j^ew York, or which they both 
 bear towards Massachusetts. Such a constitution has, it 
 must be at once admitted, no necessary connection with 
 Eepublicanism. The King or Queen of England for the 
 time being would occupy the position of a hereditary 
 president ; this arrangement would, as Mr. Butt seems to 
 have perceived, increase rather than diminish the authority 
 of the Crown. It must, on the other hand, be noted that 
 Federalism necessarily involves the formation of a new con- 
 stitution, not for Ireland only, but for the whole of the 
 United Kingdom. It is necessary to insist upon this point 
 For half the fallacies of the arguments for Home Eule rest 
 upon the idea that Home Eule is a matter affecting Ire- 
 land alone. 'Irish Federalism,' the title of a pamphlet 
 by Mr. Butt, is a term involving something like self- 
 
 M 2 
 
164 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. vn. 
 
 contradiction. The misnomer is curious and full of 
 instruction. 
 
 Whoever wishes to understand the relation of Federal- 
 ism to the English Constitution and to English interests 
 must give some attention to the nature of a Federal 
 Union. 
 
 A Federal constitution must, from its very nature, be 
 Character- marked by the following characteristics. 
 Fed ^raf- It must, at any rate in modern days, be a 
 
 ism. written constitution, for its very foundation is the 
 
 " Federal pact " or contract ; the constitution must define 
 with more or less precision the respective powers of the 
 central government, and of the State governments of the 
 central legislature and of the local legislatures ; it must 
 provide some means (e.g., reference to a popular vote) for 
 bringing into play that ultimate sovereign power which is. 
 able to modify or reform the constitution itself; it must 
 provide some arbiter, be it Council, Court, or Crown, with 
 authority to decide whether the Federal pact has been 
 observed; it must institute some means by which the 
 principles of the constitution may be upheld, and the 
 decrees of the arbiter or Court be enforced against the 
 resistance (if need be) of one or more of the separate 
 States. These are not the accidents but the essential 
 features of any Federal constitution ; and are found under 
 the constitution of the Canadian Dominion and of the Swiss 
 Confederacy, no less than under the constitution of the 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bule — As Federalism, 165 
 
 United States. They all depend on the simple, but often 
 neglected fact, that a Federal constitution implies an 
 elaborate distribution and definition of political powers ; 
 that it is from its very nature a compromise between the 
 claims of rival authorities, the Confederacy and the States, 
 and that behind all the mechanism and artifices of the 
 constitution there lies, however artfully concealed, some 
 sovereign power which must have the means both to 
 support the principles of the constitution and, when 
 occasion requires, to modify its terms. Hence almost of 
 necessity flow some further results. Under a federation 
 the law of the land must be divided into constitutional 
 laws (or, in other words, articles of the constitution), which 
 can be changed, if at all, only with special difficulty, say 
 by an appeal to the popular vote or by a constituent 
 assembly, and ordinary laws which may be changed by the 
 central Congress or by the separate assemblies of the States. 
 The powers both of the central Parliament and of the local 
 parliaments, depending as they do upon the constitutional 
 compact, must be limited. Neither the National Assembly 
 of Switzerland nor the Congress of the United States have 
 anything like the sovereign power of the British Parlia- 
 ment : the same thing is obviously true of the Cantonal 
 or State Assemblies. Such are, under one form or another, 
 the essential characteristics of a Federal Government, A 
 confederation of which England and Ireland formed a 
 part would further of necessity exhibit a feature not to 
 be found in the United States. The authority of the Con- 
 
166 England's Case against Honie Bule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 federacy would in reality mean the power of one State — 
 namely. Great Britain, l^o artificial distribution of the 
 whole country into separate States would get rid of a fact 
 depending upon laws or facts of nature beyond the reach 
 of constitutional arrangements. 
 
 It is now possible to perceive pretty clearly the relation 
 of Federalism to British or English interests. 
 
 Advan- *^ 
 
 tages of It would, as compared with the independence 
 
 Federal- ^ ^ 
 
 ism to of Ireland, present three advantages. There would 
 ° * not be the same obvious and patent failure in 
 the efforts of British statesmanship to unite all the British 
 isles into one country ; the continuity of English liistory 
 would be to a certain extent preserved ; the break with the 
 past would be lessened. The Federal Union might, in the 
 eyes of foreign powers, be simply the United Kingdom 
 under another form. The loss, again, to England in 
 material resources would be somewhat less than that 
 involved in separation. Ireland might possibly continue 
 to contribute her share to the Federal Exchequer, though 
 a critic, who reflects upon the expectations expressed by 
 Home Kulers of benefit to Ireland from the expenditure of 
 Irish taxes on Irish objects, will wonder ho^^', unless the 
 taxation of a poverty-stricken country is to be greatly 
 increased, the Irish people could support the expense both 
 of the central and of the local governments. American 
 experience hardly justifies the notion that Federalism is an 
 economical form of (lovemment. It would, and this is 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Federalism. 167 
 
 no small advantage, make it possible to guarantee, at any 
 rate in appearance, that the executive and legislative 
 authority of the Irish Government should be exercised 
 with due regard to justice. The Federal compact might, 
 and probably would, contain articles which forbade any 
 State Government or legislature to suspend the Habeas 
 Corpus Act, to bestow political privileges upon any 
 church, to pass laws which infringe the obligation of 
 contracts, or to deprive any man of his property without 
 due compensation. The Ten Commandments, in short, 
 and the obvious applications thereof, might be embodied 
 in the fundamental law of the land. Federalism would 
 at lowest preserve a formal respect for justice, and, if the 
 system worked efficiently, would protect individuals and 
 minorities from gross oppression at the hands of the Irish 
 State Government. 
 
 These are the benefits Great Britain might derive from 
 Federalism. Let us now examine w^hat are the evils to Great 
 Britain of the proposed constitutional revolution. For 
 whoever either will meditate for a short time on the nature 
 of Federalism, or will examine the mode in which the 
 constitution of the United States — the most successful 
 federation which the world has seen^ — actually w^orks, will 
 soon perceive that what is miscalled " Irish Federalism " 
 is in reality " British Federalism," and amounts, as I am 
 forced to reiterate again and again, to a proposal for 
 changing the whole constitution of the United Kingdom. 
 It is, in fact, the most " revolutionary " proposal, if the 
 
168 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 word " revolutionary " be used in its strict sense, which 
 has ever been submitted to an English Parliament. The 
 abolition of the House of Lords, the disestablishment of 
 the Church, the abolition of the monarchy, might leave 
 the English constitution far less essentially changed than 
 would the adoption of Federalism even in that apparently 
 moderate form in which it was presented by Mr. Butt to 
 the consideration of the English public. 
 
 The definite disadvantages to England of the proposed 
 ^. , revolution may be summed up under three 
 
 tages of heads : — First, the sovereignty of the Imperial 
 
 Federal- 
 ism to Parliament would be destroyed and all English 
 
 ^England. 
 
 constitutional arrangements would be dislocated 
 secondly, the power of Great Britain would be diminished ; 
 thirdly, the chance of further disagreement with Ireland 
 would certainly not be diminished, and would probably 
 be increased. 
 
 First. — Under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the 
 shams of the British constitution, there lies latent an 
 element of power which has been the true source of its 
 life and growth. This secret source of strength is the 
 iibsolute omnipotence,* the sovereignty, of l*arliament. 
 As to the mode in which King, Lords, and Commons were 
 to divide the sovereign power between themselves there 
 have been at different times disputes leading to civil war; 
 but that Parliament — that is, tlie Crown, the Peers, and 
 * See Dicey, * Law of the Constitution,* 2nd ed., pp. 35-79. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Eulc — As Federalism, 169 
 
 the Commons acting together — is absolutely supreme, has 
 never been doubted. Here constitutional theory and 
 constitutional practice are for once at one. Hence, it has 
 been well said by the acutest of foreign critics that the 
 merit of the English constitution is that it is no con- 
 stitution at all. The distinction between fundamental 
 articles of the constitution and laws, between statutes 
 which can only be touched (if at all) by a constituent 
 assembly, and statutes which can be repealed by an 
 ordinary Parliament — the whole apparatus, in short, of 
 artificial constitutionalism — is utterly unknown to English- 
 men. Thus freedom has in England been found com- 
 patible at crises of danger with an energy of action 
 generally supposed to be peculiar to despotism. The 
 source of strength is, in fact, in each case the same. The 
 sovereignty of Parliament is like the sovereignty of the 
 Czar. It is like all sovereignty at bottom, nothing else 
 but unlimited power ; and, unlike some other forms of 
 sovereignty, can be at once put in force by the ordinary 
 means of law. This is the one great advantage of our 
 constitution over that of the United States. In America, 
 every ordinary authority throughout the Union is 
 hampered by constitutional restrictions ; legislation must 
 be slow, because the change of any constitutional rule 
 is impeded by endless difficulties. The vigour which is 
 wanting to Congress is indeed to a certain extent to be 
 found in the extensive executive power left in the hands 
 of the President ; but it takes little acuteness to perceive 
 
170 England's Case ar/ainst Home Eule. [Chap. VIL 
 
 that in point of pliability, power of development, and free- 
 dom of action, English constitutionalism far excels the 
 Federalism of the United States. Nor is it less obvious 
 that the very qualities in which the Englisn constitution 
 excels that of the United States are essential to the 
 maintenance by England of the British Empire. Home 
 Kulers, whether they know it or not, touch the mainspring 
 of the British constitution. Eor from the moment that 
 Great Britain becomes part of a federation, the omnipo- 
 tence of Parliament is gone. The Federal Congress might 
 be called by the name of the Imperial Parliament. It 
 might possibly be made up of the same elements, be 
 elected by the same electors, and even in the main consist 
 of the very same persons as the existing Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom ; but its nature would be changed, and its 
 power would be limited on all sides. It might deal with 
 Imperial expenditure, with foreign affairs, with peace and 
 war, with other matters placed within its competence ; on 
 every other point the British Congi'ess would, like the 
 American Congress, be powerless. Nor would all the 
 powers taken from the Congress be necessarily given to 
 the local assemblies. Every analogy points tlie other 
 way. If the example of the United States is to be 
 followed, articles of the constitution would limit the power 
 both of the Imperial Congress and of the local represen- 
 tative assemblies. This limitation of authority could not 
 be measured by what appeared on the face of the constitu- 
 tion. Some council, tribunal, or other arbiter — let us, for 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — As Federalism. 171 
 
 the sake of simplicity, call it the Federal Court — would 
 have authority to determine whether a law was or was not 
 constitutional, or, in other words, whether it was or was 
 not a law. Let no one fancy that the restraint placed on. 
 the power of ordinary legislation by the authority of a 
 Federal Court, which alone can interpret the constitution, 
 is a mere form which has no practical effect. The history 
 of the United States is on tliis point decisive. De 
 Tocqueville, Story, and Kent are far safer and better 
 instructed guides than authors who " cannot conceive how 
 any conflict of authority could arise which could not be 
 easily settled by argument, by conference, by gradual 
 experience;" and who seem to hold that to deny the exist- 
 ence of a diflftculty is the same thing as providing for its re- 
 moval. The following are a few of the instances in which 
 the American judiciary have in fact determined tlie limits 
 which bound the powers, either of Congress or of the State 
 legislatures. The judiciary have ruled that a State is 
 liable to be sued in the Federal Courts ; that Congress has 
 authority to incorporate a bank ; that a tax imposed by 
 Congress was an indirect tax, and therefore valid ; that 
 the control of the militia really and truly belongs to 
 Congress, and not, as in effect contended by Connecticut 
 and Massachusetts, to the governors of the separate States. 
 The Federal judiciary have determined the limits to their 
 own jurisdiction and to that of the State Courts. The 
 judiciary have pronounced one law after another invalid, 
 as contrary to some article of the constitution — e.g., either 
 
172 England's Case against Home Eidc. [Chap. Vil. 
 
 by being tainted with the vice of ex x>ost facto legislation, 
 or by impairing the obligation of contracts. These are a 
 few samples of the mode in which a Federal Court limits 
 all legislative authority. If any one wishes to see the 
 ♦extent to which the power of such a Court has gone in 
 fact, he should study the decisions on the Legal Tender 
 Act, which all but overset or nullified the financial legisla- 
 tion of Congress during the War of Secession. If he wishes 
 to see the effect of applying the constitution of the United 
 States, or anything like that constitution, to Great Britain 
 and Ireland, he should consider what is implied in the 
 undoubted fact that the Land Act of 1870 and the Land 
 Act of 1881 would, whether passed by the central or by 
 •any local legislature under such a constitution, be at once 
 treated as void.* If I am told that we might adopt 
 Federalism without adopting the details of the American 
 ■constitution, my reply is, not only tliat the remark comes 
 awkwardly from innovators who wish to place Ireland in 
 the position of Massachusetts, but that the very gist of my 
 •argument is that the existence of some arbiter (whether it 
 hQ named Crown, Council, or Court), who may decide 
 whether the constitution has or has not been violated, is 
 of the essence of Federalism, while the existence of such an 
 arbiter absolutely destroys the sovereignty of Parliament. 
 Nor do the inferences to be drawn from the action of the 
 
 * If passed by Congress it would be invalid as being ultra vires; if 
 passed by a State legislature it would l)0 invalid as imjvairing the 
 obligation of contracts. See * Constitution of the United States,* 
 Art. 1, s. 8, and Art. 1, s. 10, cl. 1. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bule — As Federalism, 173" 
 
 Federal Court, and a study of the American constitution 
 as it actually exists, end here. In the decisions of the 
 Court we may trace the rise of question after question — 
 that is, of conflict after conflict — as to the respective rights, 
 of the Federation and the individual States. From the 
 history and from the immobility of the constitution, we 
 may perceive the extent to which the existence of a 
 Federal pact checks change, or, in other words, reform. 
 Every institution which can lay claim to be based upon an 
 organic law acquires a sort of sacredness. Under a system 
 of Federalism, the Crown, the House of Peers, the 
 Imperial Parliament itself, when transformed into a 
 Federal Assembly, would be almost beyond the reach of 
 change, reform, or abolition. Nor is it the Legislature of 
 Great Britain alone which would suffer a fundamental 
 change. The relations between the Executive and the 
 country would undergo immense modification. The 
 authority of the Crown might be enhanced by the 
 establishment of a Federal Union: the King would 
 become, in a very special sense, the representative of 
 national or Imperial unity, and the weakening of Parlia- 
 ment might lead to the strengthening of the monarch- 
 However this might be, it has, it is submitted, been now 
 shown that Federalism would dislocate every English con- 
 stitutional arrangement. 
 
 Secondly. — The changes necessitated by Federalism 
 would all tend to weaken the power of Great Britain. 
 That this is so has been already to a great degree estab* 
 
174 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. Vll. 
 
 lished, in considering the mode in wliich Federalism 
 destroys the sovereignty of Parliament. But a system of 
 Federalism would assuredly weaken the Government 
 quite as much as the Legislature. The Executive, as the 
 organ of the Federal Union, would be hampered by new 
 conditions utterly unknown to an English Ministry. The 
 language of Federalists exhibits a curious and ommous 
 silence or ambiguity as to the disposal of the armed forces. 
 Is the army to be a British army, with authority at the 
 will of the Federal Government to enter every part of the 
 new Union, or is Ireland to have an independent force of 
 her own? This, again — and every specific criticism is 
 open to the same retort — may be called a detail, but it 
 is a detail which touches the root of the whole matter. If 
 the Federal, that is in effect the English, Government is to 
 retain the same control over the whole army as at present 
 — if Ireland is not to own a local force under the control 
 of local authorities — then the language as to Irish inde- 
 pendence used by Irish Nationalists is singularly mis- 
 leading. If, on the other hand, order is to be maintained, 
 or not maintained, by a native army under the guidance 
 of Irish commanders, then it passes the wit of man to see 
 by what means the rights of the central government are 
 to be enforced in any case of disagreement between the 
 Imperial and the Irish Parliament; With the memory of 
 the Irish volunteers before his mind, an historian, such, 
 for example, as Mr. ^McCarthy, will hardly assert that the 
 difficulty raised is one of wliich he cannot concei^•e the 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Federalism. 175 
 
 existence. For my part, I heartily join in tlie admiration 
 lie, no doubt, feels for the patriots of 1782, but no man in 
 his senses will maintain that the moral of that year is that 
 •a local Irish army cannot under any circumstances, prove 
 an embarrassment to the central Government. The 
 general tone, even more than the precise language of Irish 
 Federalists, all but forbids the supposition that they a.re 
 prepared to secure the supremacy of the Federal Govern- 
 ment by giving it the sole control of the only armed force 
 which is to exist in any part of the Union. They probably 
 hope that some sort of compromise may be found with 
 regard to a matter in which, as theory and experience 
 alike prove, compromise is all but impossible. Under 
 certain circumstances, and in certain cases, and subject to 
 certain conditions, the use of the armed force throughout 
 Great Britain and Ireland is, we may suppose, to be left 
 in the hands of the Federal Executive; under other 
 circumstances, and under other conditions, the local forces 
 are probably to be controlled by the local or State 
 Government. Wliether such an arrangement would con- 
 tinue in working order for a year, is more than doubtful. 
 Assume, however, that somehow it could be got to work, 
 the fact still remains that a scheme, intended to secure 
 local liberty, would certainly ensure Imperial weakness. 
 The need, moreover, for bestowing some element of 
 iStrength on a Federal Executive as a counterpoise to its 
 many elements of weakness leads almost of necessity to 
 a result which has scarcely received due notice. The 
 
176 Erujland's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. Vll. 
 
 executive authority must be placed beyond the control of 
 a representative assembly. Neither in the United States, 
 nor in Switzerland, nor in the German Empire, can the 
 Federal administration be displaced by the vote of an 
 assembly. Federalism is in effect incompatible with 
 Parliamentary government as practised in England. The 
 Canadian Ministry (it may be urged) can be changed at 
 the will of the Dominion Parliament, and the common 
 Ministry of Austria-Hungary is responsible to the Dele- 
 gations. This is true ; but these exceptions are precisely 
 of the class which prove the rule which they are cited to 
 invalidate. The Cabinet system of the Dominion is a 
 defect in the Canadian Constitution, and could not work 
 were not Canada, by its position as a dependency, under 
 the guidance of a power beyond the reach of the Dominion 
 Parliament. What may be the real responsibility to the 
 Delegations of the common ministry of Austria-Hungary 
 admits of a good deal of doubt. No one, who will not 
 be deceived by words, believes the responsibility to be 
 at all like the liability of Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salis- 
 bury to be dismissed from office by a vote of the House of 
 Commons. The Emperor-King is, as regards the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy, the permanent and unchangeable 
 head of the State. Turn the United Kingdom into a 
 Federal State, and Parliamentary Government, as Eng- 
 lishmen now know it, is at an end. This may or may not 
 be an evil, but it is a revolution which ought to give 
 pause to innovators who deem it a slighter danger t(> 
 
€hap. VII.] Home Rule — As Federalism. Ill 
 
 innovate on the Act of Union than to remodel the pro- 
 cedure of the House of Commons. 
 
 The central Government would again, merely from that 
 division of powers which is of the essence of Federalism, 
 be as feeble against foreign aggression as against local 
 resistance. Home Paile, it is constantly said, has at least 
 this advantage, as compared with Irish independence, that 
 it prevents any alliance between Ireland and a foreign 
 enemy. This gain might turn out rather nominal than 
 real. Neither the United States nor France could, of 
 course, send an Embassy to any State comprised within 
 the British Union ; but, if war impended, they might and 
 would attempt to gain the favour of the Irish Ministry, or 
 the Irish party who controlled the Irish Parliament, or 
 exercised tlie authority of the local Government of Ireland. 
 Suppose that when war was about to be proclaimed 
 between the British Federation and France, the Irish 
 Parliament objected to hostilities with the French Ee- 
 public. Can it be denied that the local Parliament and 
 the local Executive could, by protests, by action, or even 
 by inaction, give aid or comfort to the foreign enemy? 
 The local legislature would, in the supposed case, be aided 
 by a minority of the central Parliament or Congress. 
 Obstruction would go hand in hand with sedition. Loyalty 
 to the Union was strong throughout the Northern States 
 during the War of Secession ; but the tale used certainly 
 to be told that, had Meade been defeated at Gettysburg, 
 the leaders of the New York democracy would have 
 
178 EiujlancVs Case against Home Bule. [Chap. vn. 
 
 attempted " to carry the State out of the Union." More- 
 over, Great Britain would perhaps find it easier to control 
 the action of an independent than of a confederated 
 Ireland. Blockades and embargoes are, as already pointed 
 out, modes of persuasion applicable to foreigners, but 
 inapplicable to citizens ; the Government of the Union 
 found it harder to check the latent disloyalty of South 
 Carolina than it would have found it to deal ^\dth tlie 
 open enmity of Canada. This topic is too odious and too 
 far removed from the realm of practical politics, to need 
 more than the allusion required for the completeness of 
 my argument. 
 
 Federalism, in short, would mean the weakness of 
 Great Britain, both at home and abroad. As the head of 
 a Confederacy, England, as the head also of the British 
 Empire, would meet undiminished responsibilities with 
 greatly diminished power. 
 
 TJiirdly. — Federalism is at least as likely to stereotype 
 and increase the causes of division between England and 
 Ireland as to remove them. 
 
 A Federal Government is, of all constitutions, the most 
 artificial. If such a government is to be worked with 
 anything like success, there must exist among the citizens 
 of the confederacy a spirit of genuine loyalty to the 
 Union. The " Unitarian " feeling of the people must 
 distinctly predominate over the sentiment in favour of 
 " State rights." To require this is to require a good deal 
 more than that mere general submission to the Govern- 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Federalism. 17^ 
 
 ment which is requisite for the prosperity of every State, 
 whatever be the nature of its polity. In a Federation 
 every citizen is influenced by a double allegiance. He 
 owes fealty to the central Government; he owes fealty 
 also to his Canton or State. National allegiance and local 
 allegiance divide and perplex the feelings even of loyal 
 citizens. Unless the national sentiment predominate, 
 the Federation will go to pieces at any of those crises 
 when the interest or wishes of any of the States conflict 
 with the interest or wishes of the Union. So keen an 
 observer and profound a critic as De Tocqueville believed 
 that both the American and the Swiss Federations would 
 make shipwreck on this rock. He was mistaken ; he did 
 not allow for the rapid development of national sentiment. 
 But his error was pardonable. The leaders of the Sonder- 
 bund did prefer the interest of Lucerne to the unity of 
 Switzerland. Lee and Jackson were disloyal to the 
 Union, because they were loyal to Virginia. Leading 
 ofticers of the United States army, soldiers educated at 
 Westpoint, trained the armies of the Confederates. They 
 were men of unblemished honour; they were, some of 
 them, not originally zealous in the cause of secession, 
 but they believed that their duty to their State — to 
 Virginia, to South Carolina, or to Georgia — was para- 
 mount over their duty to the Government at Wasliington. 
 If Virginia had stood by the Union, General Lee might, 
 in all probability, have been the conqueror of those Con- 
 federate States, of which he was the hero. Ireland has 
 
 N 2 
 
180 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 had far graver causes for disaffection towards the English 
 Government than any of the reasons alleged for the 
 secession of Virginia ; but Irish officers and Irish soldiers 
 have always been perfectly loyal to England. The reason 
 of the difference is obvious; the officers of the English 
 army have never been distracted by the difficulties of 
 divided allegiance. Make Ireland one of the States of 
 a Confederacy, and these difficulties will at once arise. 
 Irish officers and Irish soldiers, members of the Irish 
 State — paid by and to a certain extent under the com- 
 mand of the Irish Government — can hardly be blamed if 
 in times of civil differences, leading it may be to civil 
 war, they should feel more loyalty to their State than to 
 the Union. This Union, be it remembered, would in such 
 a case be nothing but Great Britain under a new and less 
 impressive title, while the State would be Ireland. 
 
 The existence and nature of the Federal bond is calcu- 
 lated to supply both the causes and occasions of such 
 differences. 
 
 Home Eulers, it is clear, form already most exaggerated 
 liopes of the benefits to be conferred on Ireland by Home 
 Ilule ; and, further, in their own minds (naturally enough) 
 confound Federalism with national independence. 
 
 "Give Ireland," writes Mr. Finch,* "the management 
 
 of her own affairs, and you will see called into her service 
 
 the ablest and most capable of lier sons ; while, as things 
 
 now stand, the intellect of Ireland is shut out from all 
 
 * ConUmporary Review^ vol. xli., p. 908. 
 
Chap. TIT.] Home jRulc — As Federalism. 181 
 
 share in the administration. With careers at home worthy 
 of the best and ablest of the people, much of the wealth 
 which is now drained off from Ireland without any return, 
 will be expended in developing the industrial resources of 
 the country ; industry will revive, and with the revival of 
 industry will come employment for the people. ' It is the 
 difficulty of living by wages in Ireland,' says Sir G. C. 
 Lewis, ' which makes every man look to the land for 
 maintenance.' With employment for the people, half 
 the difficulty of the land question will be solved. If, 
 then, we wish to promote the moral and material welfare 
 of the Irish people, let us make them masters of their own 
 affairs." 
 
 " I have indicated what I believe," writes Mr. O'Neill 
 Daunt,* " to be the radical disease of Ireland : the want 
 of a domestic legislature racy of the soil, and acting in 
 harmony with the national sentiment. God has created 
 Ireland with the needs of a separate nation, and with the 
 needs are associated the rights. 'Our patent to be a State, 
 not a shire,' said Gooldin 1799, ' comes direct from Heaven. 
 The Almighty has in majestic characters signed the great 
 charter of our independence. The great Creator of the 
 world has given our beloved country the gigantic outlines 
 of a kingdom.' 
 
 " If Ireland had been left the unfettered use of the 
 natural materials of wealth in her soil and in her people, 
 and of the facilities of internal and external commerce 
 * Contemporary Eeview, vol. xli., p. 921. 
 
182 Emjland's Cane against Home Rule. [Chap. YII. 
 
 supplied by her physical configuration and her geographi- 
 cal position — if her interests were protected by a Parlia- 
 ment sitting in her capital, securing the expenditure at 
 home of her annual revenue, both public and private, 
 rendering impossible that destructive haemorrhage of her 
 income by which she is impoverished, aiding the develop- 
 ment of her industries, and resisting all aggression on her 
 commercial and political rights — in a word, if the Irish 
 Constitution had not been treacherously undermined and 
 overthrown, we should now have been the best support 
 of the Empire, instead of being its scandal and its 
 (weakness." 
 
 Politicians who write thus expect far more from 
 national independence than nationality itself can give. 
 More than fifty years have elapsed since Spain expelled 
 the foreign invader ; but Spain has not yet succeeded in 
 expelling ignorance, prejudice, superstition, or oppression. 
 But whatever be the miracles of nationality, Ireland would 
 not, under Federalism, be a nation. Khode Island has 
 all the freedom demanded for his country by an eminent 
 Home Ruler, whose expressions I have cited. He surely 
 does not consider the inhabitants of llhode Island to be 
 a nation. 
 
 Wliatever else Home Eule might give to Ireland, one gift 
 it assuredly would not bring with it. It would not endow 
 the country with wealth. To Irish enthusiasm and 
 patriotism illusions on tliis matter are pardonable. In 
 the English advocate of Home liule they are unpardonable. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — As Federalism. 183 
 
 Ireland is, and must, under any form of government 
 conceivable, for a length of time remain a poor country. 
 Capital knows nothing of patriotism or sentiment. Com- 
 merce has no partiality for the masses. Credit cherishes 
 no trust towards the people. The one prediction which 
 we may make with confidence is that a measure of Home 
 Euld would not increase Irish capital, and would shake 
 Irish credit. The rumour of Home Eule has already, it is 
 said disturbed the course of business in Ireland. From 
 the aature of things, then, the establishment of Federalism 
 wouli lead to bitter disappointment. The country would 
 not enjoy the dignity of independence ; it would not enjoy 
 the comfort of wealth. Every Irishman would feel that he 
 had been cheated of his hopes, and this he would feel not 
 because he is an Irishman, but because he is a man. It is 
 humai to expect far more from even the most beneficial 
 of revolutions than any political change can bring. The 
 unity of Italy was well worth all the price it cost. The 
 unity of Germany gave intense gratification to natural 
 feelings of national pride. Yet there are probably many 
 even in the Italian Kingdom who sigh for the light taxes 
 of tie Bourbon or the Pope, and Germans who glory iu 
 the greatness of the Empire flee by thousands to the 
 Fnited States that they may escape the burden of con- 
 scription. The disappointment which naturally attends a 
 great change would in the case of Ireland be specially 
 bitter. To what cause would the disappointment be 
 attributed? The answer is easy to find. If taxation 
 
184 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 increased — as it probably would ; if wealth did not in- 
 crease — as it certainly would not ; if the sense of semi- 
 independence did not produce the hope, the energy, the 
 new life, the regeneration which enthusiasts consider to 
 be the natural result of nationality — if anything, in short, 
 failed to go according to the hopes of men who had formed 
 hopes which a miracle itself could . hardly satisfy — the 
 blame for the non-fulfilment of groundless anticipations 
 would rest upon the Confederacy — that is, in other words, 
 upon England. To suppose this, is not to attnbute 
 special unreasonableness to Irishmen. If Italy had been 
 forced to accept, instead of her longed-for indepenience, 
 the local self-government which might be conceded to the 
 State of an Austrian Federation, we may be quite sure 
 that the Grist Tax, the Sicilian Banditti, the intrigues of 
 France in Tunis, the perversity of the Pope, the pverty 
 of Italian workmen, the factiousness of Italian politicians, 
 every evil, in short, real or imaginary, under whicL Italy 
 now suffers, or has suffered since 1870 — would have 
 been attributed to her connection with a Unioi pre- 
 sided over by the Austrian Emperor. National incepen- 
 dence, like every other form of independence, has at 
 least this merit, that it compels men to take theii fate 
 into their own hands, and to feel that they themselves 
 or the circumstances of the world are the causes of 
 their misfortunes. Semi-independence makes it easy foi 
 men to attribute every mishap to the absence of absolute 
 freedom. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Federalism. 185 
 
 If the existence of a Federal constitution would of itself 
 supply the cause for discontent, it is of the very nature of 
 such a constitution to supply the occasions of dispute. 
 Nothing can prevent the rise of burning questions about 
 Federal and State rights. Is nullification or secession, or 
 the refusal to pay Federal taxes a State right ? If these 
 questions arise, by whom are they to be settled ? Suppose 
 they are referred to a Federal Court, say the Privy Council, 
 is it reasonable to fancy that Irishmen or Englishmen, for 
 that matter, will acquiesce in the decision of grave 
 political issues (say the right of the Federal Government 
 to proclaim martial law at Dublin, or the validity of the 
 Land Act) by any tribunal ? For when political issues 
 are referred to the decision of a Court the difficulty is 
 great of enlisting public opinion in favour of its decrees. 
 The theory of the constitution and the expectation of the 
 people is that references to the judges will be events of 
 rare occurrence, and that the Bench, when it acts at all, 
 will act only as interpreter of the constitutional pact. 
 Tilings are certain to turn out far otherwise. The inter- 
 vention of the tribunals will in one form or another be 
 constantly invoked, and will be invoked to determine the 
 most burning questions of the day. The Constitution of 
 the United States would be unintelligible without refer- 
 ence to a long line of determined cases ; its principles are 
 to be found quite as much in the decisions of the Supreme 
 Court as in its Articles. Swiss Constitutionalists have 
 greatly enlarged, as years have gone on, the originally 
 
186 EnglamVs Case against Home Rule. [Qnw. VII. 
 
 limited powers of the Federal tribunal. The statesmen who 
 drafted the Act constituting the Canadian Dominion fancied 
 ■they could in effect avoid the necessity for judicial inter- 
 pretation, but a long series of reports proves the futility 
 of their expectation. Each day increases the mass, and it 
 must be added the importance, of the judgments by which 
 tlie Privy Council determines questions of constitutional 
 law for the Colonies. Moreover, even laymen soon perceive 
 that interpretation means legislation. It is technically 
 correct to say that the Supreme Court of the United 
 States acts only as interpreter of the Constitution, but we 
 must not be deceived by fictions. The Supreme Court 
 has legislated as tnily, and perhaps more effectively than 
 Congress. It has achieved, and from the nature of things 
 was compelled to achieve, a feat forbidden to Congress ; it 
 has added to or enlarged the Articles of the Constitution. 
 The good fortune of the United States gave to them in 
 Judge Marshall a profound and statesmanlike lawyer, and 
 the judgments of the great Chief Justice have built up the 
 existing Constitution. He may be counted, if not among 
 its founders, at any rate as its main architect. In this 
 instance judicial authority was combined with political 
 wisdom, and Marshall's opinion was, it is said, rejected by 
 the Court in but two cases, and had it in these instances 
 been followed, would have improved the Constitution. 
 Unfortunately, while one may often secure the fairness 
 one cannot ensure the wisdom of the Bench. Judges err ; 
 a final Court of Appeal must often give decisions which 
 
Chap, yii.] Home Rule- — As Federalism. 187 
 
 are or are supposed to be erroneous, i.e., not a just deduc- 
 tion from the facts and principles which the Court is 
 called upon to consider. ISTo historian will, it is likely, 
 now defend the doctrine of the House of Lords about 
 marriage laid down in Beg. v. Millis. Competent authori- 
 ties question some of the most important ecclesiastical 
 judgments given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
 Council. The decision in the Dred Scott Case, whether 
 right or wrong, did not approve itself to some eminent 
 lawyers in the United States. One of the decisions of the 
 Supreme Court in the Legal Teiiider Cases must have been 
 wrong ; whether the last was sound is open to debate. It 
 is when a Court gives what is thought to be an erroneous 
 decision on matters exciting the feelings of large classes 
 that the difficulty of obtaining acquiescence in its judg- 
 ments is palpable. The judges decided, and it is quite 
 possible decided rightly, that Ship Money was a legal 
 exaction, and that the Crown's dispensing power was 
 authorized by law. Popular opinion branded the judges 
 as sycophants and traitors. Chief Justice Taney and his 
 colleagues decided in effect, and from a legal point of view 
 may have been right in deciding, that slavery was recog- 
 nised by the Constitution of the United States. Their deci- 
 sion was denounced by many of the best men in the Union 
 as infamous. The Privy Council have laid down doctrines 
 on matters of ritual which are held to be erroneous by a 
 large body of the clergy, and Eitualists have gone to 
 prison rather than treat the judgment of the Privy Council 
 
188 England's Case against Hemic Ilulc. [Chap. VIL 
 
 as of moral validity. Clergj^men are not perhaps the 
 most reasonable of mankind, but they are not more 
 unreasonable than political enthusiasts. How then is it 
 possible to expect that a Federal tribunal would command 
 an obedience not yielded willingly to the laws of the 
 Imperial Parliament ? Englishmen, indeed, might, it is 
 possible, acquiesce in the ruling of Federal judges, and 
 this for two reasons : they are a legaUy-minded nation ; 
 and (what is of far more consequence) a Federal Court 
 must represent in the main the opinions of the Federal 
 Government — that is, of Great Britain. But it is idle to 
 suppose that Mr. Parnell and Mr. ParneU's followers 
 would find it easier to respect an Imperial or Federal 
 tribunal than to bow to the will of the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 Home Rulers would, moreover, soon discover a reason 
 for resistance to the Federal Court or the Federal 
 Government, which from their point of view would be a 
 perfectly valid reason. The Federal Government would, 
 in effect, be the Government of England ; the Federal 
 Court would in effect be a Court appointed by the English 
 Government. In a Confederacy where there are many 
 States, the Government of the Federation cannot be 
 identified with even the most powerful of the States ; it 
 were ridiculous to assert that the Government at Wash- 
 ington is only the Government of New York under 
 another name. "Where a Confederacy consists in reality, 
 if not in name, of two States only, of which the one 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — As Federalism. 189 
 
 has at least four or five times the power of the other, 
 the authority of the Confederacy means the authority 
 of the powerful State. "Irish Federalism," if in 
 reality established, would soon generate a demand 
 from Ireland, not unreasonable in itself under the 
 circumstances of the case, that the whole British Empire 
 should be turned into a Confederacy, under the guidance 
 of a general Congress. Thus alone could Ireland become 
 a real State, the member of a genuine Confederation. 
 Hence arises a new danger. Apply Federalism to Ireland 
 and you immediately provoke demands for autonomy in 
 other parts of the United Kingdom, and for constitutional 
 changes in other parts of the British Empire. Federalism, 
 which in other lands has been a step towards Union, would, 
 it is likely enough, be in our case the first stage towards a 
 dissolution of the United Kingdom into separate States, 
 and hence towards the breaking-up of the British Empire. 
 This is no future or imaginary peril ; the mere proposal 
 of Home Eule, under something like a Federal form, has 
 already made it an immediate and pressing danger. Sir 
 Gavan Duffy, by far the ablest among the Irish advocates 
 of Home Eule, predicts that before ten years have elapsed 
 there will be a Federation of the Empire.* A majority of 
 Scotch electors support the policy of Mr. Gladstone, and 
 forthwith a most respectable Scotch periodical puts for- 
 ward a plan of Home Eule for Scotland. Canon MacColl 
 
 * * Mr. Gladstone's Irish Constitution,' Contemporary Beview^ May, 
 1886, p. 616. 
 
190 England's Case against Home Bute. [Chap. VII. 
 
 already suggests that we should make tentatively an 
 experiment capable of development into a permanent 
 system on the lines of the American Constitution, and 
 make it not only in Ireland, but also perhaps gradually in 
 Scotland, and even in Wales.* It is unnecessary to 
 discuss Canon MacColl's argument at length. Wlien he 
 asks t " why should a system which imparts strength to 
 America, to Austria, and to Germany, disintegrate and ruin 
 the British Empire," he raises an inquiry wliich does not 
 admit of an answer, since it assumes the identity of things 
 which are radically different. The system which may or 
 may not impart strengtli to Austria is no more the system 
 which imparts strength to America, than the system 
 which imparts strength to England is the same as the 
 system which does or does not impart strength to Russia. 
 To lump under one head every policy which can by any 
 straining of the terms be brought under the heads of 
 " Federalism " or " Home Rule," is neither more nor less 
 absurd than to classify together every Constitution which 
 can be called a monarchy. 
 
 A significant indication has now appeared of the nearness 
 of the danger of Imperial disintegration. Mr. Gladstone's 
 own method of interpreting liis own past utterances makes 
 it the duty of his critics to weigh well not only his direct 
 
 ♦ * Arguments for and against Homo Kule,' by the Kev. Malcolm 
 MacColl, M.A., p. 71. 
 t IhkL 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Ride — As Federalism, 191 
 
 statements, but his suggestions ; and there is, I think, no 
 possible unfairness in construing the language of his 
 pamphlet on the Irish Question as an intimation that he 
 already entertains, if he does not favour, the idea of 
 applying the Federal principle to Scotland and to Wales.* 
 Federalism is the solvent which, if applied to one part 
 of the United Kingdom, will undo the work not only of 
 Pitt, but of Somers, of Henry VIII., and of Edward I. 
 Meanwliile, the one prediction which may be made with 
 absolute confidence is that Federalism would not generate 
 that goodwill between England and Ireland which, could 
 it be produced, would, in my judgment at least, be an" 
 adequate compensation even for the evils and the incon- 
 veniences of the Federal system. 
 
 To the view of Federalism here maintained there exist 
 one or two objections, so obvious that without some 
 reference to them my argument would lack completeness. 
 
 Federalism, it is urged, has succeeded in Switzerland 
 and in America ; it may, therefore, succeed in the United 
 Kingdom. 
 
 If the general drift of my argument does not sufficiently 
 answer this objection, two special replies lie near at hand. 
 In the case both of Switzerland and of America, a Federal 
 Constitution supplied the means by which States, con- 
 scious of a common national feeling, have approached to 
 
 * *The Irish Question,' by the Eight Hon. VV. E. Gladstone, 
 pp. 36, 37. 
 
192 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 political unity. It were a rash inference from this fact, 
 tliat when two parts of one nation are found (as must 
 be asserted by any Home Ruler) not to be animated by 
 a common feeling of nationality, a Federal Constitution 
 is the proper means by which to keep them in union. 
 The more natural deduction from the general history of 
 Federalism is, that a confederation is an imperfect political 
 union, transitory in its nature, and tending either to pass 
 into one really united State, or to break up into the 
 different States which compose the Federation. 
 
 If, again, the example either of America or of Switzerland 
 is to teach us anything worth knowing, the history of those 
 countries must be read as a whole. It will then be seen 
 that the two most successful confederacies in the world have 
 been kept togetlier only by the decisive triumph through 
 force of arms of the central power over real or alleged 
 State rights. General Dufour in Switzerland, General 
 Grant and General Sherman in America, were the true 
 interpreters and preservers of the constitutional pact. 
 This undoubted fact hardly suits the theories of Irish 
 Federalists. 
 
 Nor ought we to stop at this point. Citizens of the 
 Union filled with justifiable pride at the success of the 
 American Constitution assume that a Federal Govern- 
 ment is in itself absolutely the best form of government, 
 that in any country where it can be adopted it must 
 be an improvement on the existing institutions of tlie 
 land, and that as compared with tlie constitutional 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Ride — As Federalism. 193 
 
 monarchy of England federalism exhibits no special faults 
 from which English constitutionalism is free. This 
 assumption is perfectly natural ; it resembles that absolute 
 faith in the virtues of the British Constitution which 
 reached its culminating point when Burke's intimate 
 friend and pupil, Gilbert Elliot, himself no mean states- 
 man, went to Corsica to keep going a miniature copy of 
 English Parliamentary institutions.* But in each case a 
 faith which is natural will also be pronounced by any 
 candid judge to be unfounded. Federalism has in its very 
 essence, and even as it exists in America, at least two 
 special faults. It distracts the allegiance of citizens, and 
 what is even more to the present point, it does not provide 
 sufficient protection for the legal rights of unpopular 
 minorities. There is not, and never was, a word in the 
 Articles of the Constitution forbidding American citizens 
 to criticise the institutions of the State. An American 
 Abolitionist had as much right to denounce slavery at 
 Boston, or for that matter at Charlestown, as an English 
 Abolitionist had to denounce slavery in London or Liver- 
 pool. It were ridiculous to maintain that the right was 
 one which either Lloyd Garrison or his disciples were 
 able to exercise. Mr. Godkinj has repeated with perfect 
 fairness the tale of the persecutions suffered by Prudence 
 Crandall in Connecticut because she chose in exercise of 
 
 * See Life ai^d Letters of Gilbert Elliot, vol. 2, pp. 354, 355. 
 t * American Home Rule,' by E. L. Grodkin, Nineteenth Century 
 June, 1886, pp. 793, 802. 
 
 
 
194 England^ s Case ctgcdnst Hmnc Bulc. [Chap. VII 
 
 her legal and moral rights to educate young women of 
 colour. Mr. Godkin apparently draws, as I have already 
 pointed out, from the fact an inference — which I confess 
 myself not well able to follow — against all attempts to 
 enforce an unpopular law. The more natural conclusion 
 is that the Federal Government was not able to protect 
 the rights of individuals against strong local sentiment. 
 This moral at any rate has an ob\ious application to any 
 scheme of Federalism for Ireland. 
 
 The experience of Canada, again, is adduced to prove 
 that a Federal constitution is compatible with loyalty to 
 the British Crown. Why should an arrangement which 
 produces peace, prosperity, and loyalty across the Atlantic 
 not be applied to Ireland ? 
 
 Tlie answer is, that the case of Canada is as regards 
 Federalism irrelevant. Canada is not part of a British 
 Federation. The Dominion as a whole is simply a colony, 
 standing essentially in the same relation to England as 
 Victoria or New South Wales. The laws of the Parlia- 
 ment that meets at Ottawa need the Eoyal sanction, or, 
 in other words, may be vetoed, or rather not approved, 
 by the English Ministry of the day. The Act itself on 
 which the existence of the Canadian constitution depends 
 is an Act of the l^ritish Parliament, and cannot be 
 modified by any other authority. The British I*arlia- 
 ment is supreme in Canada as throughout the British 
 dominions; and Canada sends no representatives to the 
 British Parliament. The provinces, no doubt, which 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — As Federalism. 195 
 
 compose the Dominion are under an Act of Parliament 
 a Federation ; but the dangers and difficulties of Federalism 
 are to a great extent avoided by the supremacy of the 
 British Crown. These difficulties, however, do arise. If 
 any one wdll study the " Letellier case," he will soon 
 perceive that Canada has exhibited the germ of the con- 
 flict between the central authority of the Dominion and 
 the " State right " of the provinces ; he will also perceive 
 tliat the conflict was determined by a reference to the 
 English Ministry, who in effect gave judgment in favour 
 of the Dominion. The example of Canada suggests, if any- 
 thing, that some Irish difficulties might be solved by 
 turning Ireland into a colony without representatives in 
 the Imperial Parliament. 
 
 We have now the materials for comparing, as regards 
 the interests of England, the effects of Irish independence 
 with the effects of Home Eule as Federalism. The case 
 as between the two stands thus : — 
 
 The national independence of Ireland entails on England 
 three great evils — the deliberate surrender of the main 
 object at which English statesmanship has aimed for 
 centuries, together with all the moral loss and disgrace 
 which such surrender entails; the loss of considerable 
 material resources in money, and still more in men ; the 
 incalculable evil of the existence in the neighbourhood 
 of Great Britain of a new, a foreign, and, possibly, a 
 hostile State. For these evils there are, indeed, to be 
 found two real though inadequate compensations — namely, 
 
 2 
 
196 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 the probability that loss of territory might restore to 
 England a unity and consistency of action equivalent to 
 an increase of strength, and the possibility that separation 
 might be the first step towards gaining the goodwill, 
 and ultimately the alliance of Ireland. It is, however, 
 hardly worth while to calculate what might be the extent 
 of the possible deductions from evils which no English 
 statesman would knowingly bring on Great Britain. By 
 men of all parties and of all views it is practically 
 conceded that England neither will nor can, except under 
 compulsion, assent to Irish independence. 
 
 Federalism, on the other hand, has the appearance of a 
 compromise. It does not avowedly break up the unity of 
 Great Britain and Ireland; it does not wholly deprive 
 England of Irish resources ; it does not, directly at least, 
 lay Great Britain open to foreign attack. Federalism has, 
 however, special evils of its own. It revolutionizes the 
 whole Constitution of the United Kingdom; by under- 
 mining the sovereignty of Parliament, it deprives English 
 institutions of their elasticity, their strength, and their 
 life ; it weakens the Executive at home, and lessens the 
 power of the country to resist foreign attack. The 
 revolution which works these changes holds out no hope 
 of reconciliation with Ireland. An attempt, in short, to 
 impose on England and Scotland a constitution which 
 they do not want, and which is quite unsuited to tlie 
 liistorical traditions and to the genius of Great Britain, 
 offers to Ireland a constitution which Ireland is certain to 
 
Chap. A'IL] Home Ride — As Colonial Independence, 197 
 
 dislike, which has none of the real or imaginary charms of 
 independence, and ensures none of the solid benefits to be 
 hoped for from a genuine union with England. 
 
 If this be the true state of the case, thus much at least 
 is argumentatively made out : Federalism offers to England 
 not a constitutional compromise, but a fundamental re- 
 volution; and this revolution, however moderate in its 
 form or in the intention of its advocates, does not offer 
 that reasonable chance of reconciliation with the mass of 
 the Irish people which might counterbalance the evils 
 of Separation, while it is at least as much opposed to 
 the interests of Great Britain as would be the national 
 independence of Ireland. Tliis conclusion is a purely 
 negative one, but it is, as far as British statesmen are 
 concerned, the reductio ad impossihile of the case in favour 
 of Home Eule in so far as Home Eule takes the form of 
 Federalism. 
 
 II. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. — The modern 
 Colonial policy of England has, or is thought to have, 
 achieved two results which impress popular imagination : 
 — it has relieved English statesmanship from an unbear- 
 able burden of worry and anxiety ; it has (as most people 
 believe) changed Colonial unfriendliness or discontent 
 into enthusiastic or ostentatious loyalty. Some politi- 
 cians, therefore, who are anxious to terminate the secular 
 feud between England and Ireland, and to free Parliament 
 from the presence, and therefore from the obstructiveness. 
 
198 EnfjlcincVs Ca>ic against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 of the Home Eulers, readily assume that the formula of 
 "Colonial independence" contains the solution of the 
 problem how to satisfy at once the demand of Ireland for 
 independence and the resolution of Great Britain to 
 maintain the integrity of the Empire. This assumption 
 rests on no sure foundation, but derives such plausibility 
 as it possesses from the gross ignorance of the public as to 
 the principles and habits which govern the English State 
 system. A mere account of the constitutional relations 
 existing between England and a self-governed colony is 
 almost equivalent to a suggestion of the reasons which 
 forbid the hope that the true answer to the agitation for 
 Home Eule is to be found in conceding to Ireland in- 
 stitutions like those which satisfy the inhabitants of New 
 South Wales or Victoria. To render such a statement at 
 once brief and intelligible is no easy matter, for, among 
 all the political arrangements devised by the ingenuity of 
 statesmen, none can be found more singular, more com- 
 plicated, or more anomalous than the position of combined 
 independence and subordination occupied by the large 
 number of self-governing colonies which are scattered 
 throughout the British Empire. Victoria, which may be 
 taken as a type of the whole class, is, for most purposes 
 of local and internal administration, and for some pur- 
 poses which go beyond the sphere usually assigned to 
 local government, an independent, self-governing com- 
 munity. Victoria is at the same time, for all purposes in 
 theory and for many pui'poses in fact, a merely subor- 
 
Chap. VII.] Hoiiic Bale — As Colonicd T/idependence. 199 
 
 dinate portion of the British Empire, and as truly subject 
 to the British Parliament as is Middlesex or the Isle of 
 Wight. 
 
 Let us try in the first place to realize — for this is the 
 essential matter as regards my present argument — the full 
 extent of Victorian independence. 
 
 Victoria enjoys a Constitution after the British model. 
 The Governor, the two Houses, the Ministry, reproduce 
 the T^rell-known features of our limited monarchy. The 
 Victorian Parliament further possesses in Victoria that 
 character of sovereignty which the British Parliament 
 possesses throughout the dominions of the Crown, and is 
 (subject, of course, to the authority of the British Parlia- 
 ment itself) as supreme at Melbourne as are Queen, Lords, 
 and Commons at Westminster. It makes and unmakes 
 Ca,binets ; it controls the executive action of the Ministry ; 
 who, in their turn, are the authorized advisers of that 
 sham constitutional monarch, the Colonial Governor. The 
 Parliament, moreover, recognizes no restrictions on its 
 legislative powers; it is not, as is the Congress of the 
 United States, restrained witliin a very limited sphere of 
 action ; it is not, as are both the Congress and the State 
 Legislatures of the Union, bound hand and foot by the 
 articles of a rigid Constitution; it is not compelled to 
 respect any immutable maxims of legislation. Hence the 
 Victorian Parliament — in this resembling its creator, the 
 British Parliament — exercises an amount of legislative free- 
 dom unknown to most foreign representative assemblies. 
 It can, and does, legislate on education, on marriage and 
 
200 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. vn. 
 
 divorce, on ecclesiastical topics, on tlie tenure of land, on 
 finance, on every subject, in short, which can interest the 
 Colony. It provides for the raising of Colonial forces ; it 
 may levy taxes or impose duties for the support of the 
 Victorian administration, or for the protection of Colonial 
 manufactures. It is not forbidden to tax goods imported 
 from other parts of the Empire ; it is not bound to abstain 
 from passing ex post facto laws, to respect the sanctity of 
 contracts, or to pay any regard to the commercial interests 
 of the United Kingdom. It may alter the Constitution 
 on which its own powers dei^end, and, for example, 
 extend the franchise or remodel the Upper House. To 
 understand the full extent of the authority possessed by 
 the Victorian Parliament and the Victorian ^Ministry — 
 which is, in fact, appointed by the Parliament — it should 
 be noted that, while every branch of the administration 
 (the courts, the police, and the Colonial forces) is, as in 
 England, more or less directly under the influence or the 
 control of the Cabinet, the Colonies have, since 1862, 
 provided for their own defence, and, except in time of 
 war, or peril of war, are not gari'isoned by British troops.* 
 It is, therefore, no practical exaggeration to assert that 
 Victoria is governed by its own Executive, which is 
 appointed by its own Parliament, and which maintains 
 order by means of the Victorian police, supported, in case 
 of need, by Victorian soldiers. An intelligent foreigner, 
 
 * See Todd, * Parliamentary Government in tlie British Colonics,* 
 pp. 274-30J>, and especially p. 281, as to the position of the colonial 
 troops in Victoria. ^ 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Colonial Independence. 201 
 
 therefore, might reside for years in Melbourne, and con- 
 ceive that the supremacy of the British Government 
 was little more than nominal. In this he would be 
 mistaken. But should he assert that, as to all merely 
 Colonial matters, Victoria was in practice a self-governed 
 and independent country, his language would not be 
 accurate, yet his assertion would not go very wide of 
 the truth. 
 
 The local independence, however, of an English colony 
 is hardly more noteworthy than are the devices by which 
 a colony is retained in its place as a subordinate portion 
 of the British Empire, and anyone who would understand 
 the English Colonial system must pay hardly less attention 
 to the subordination than to the independence of a 
 country like Victoria. 
 
 The foundation of the whole scheme is the admission of 
 the complete and unquestioned supremacy of the British 
 Parliament throughout every portion of the royal do- 
 minions. No Colonial statesman, judge, or lawyer ever 
 dreams of denying that Crown, Lords, and Commons can 
 legislate for Victoria, and that a statute of the Imperial 
 Parliament overrides every law or custom repugnant 
 thereto, by whomsoever enacted, in every part of the 
 Crown dominions. The right, moreover, of Imperial 
 legislation has not fallen into disuse. Mr. Tarring* 
 
 * See Tarring, * Chapters on the Law relating to the Colonies,* 
 pp. 79-85. As examx^les of Imperial Statutes which affect the Colonies 
 may be taken the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, the Coinage Act, 
 1870, and the Temtorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878. 
 
202 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 enumerates from sixty to seventy Imperial statutes, 
 extending from 7 Geo. III. c. 50 to 44 & 45 Vict. c. 69, 
 which apply to the Colonies generally, and to this list, 
 which might now be lengthened, must be added a large 
 number of statutes applying to particular colonies. The 
 sovereignty of Parliament, moreover, is formally recorded 
 in the Colonial Laws Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. cap. 63), 
 which itself may well be termed the Charter of Colonial 
 legislative authority. This essential dogma of parlia- 
 mentary sovereignty, moreover, is not proclaimed as a 
 merely abstract principle — it is enforced by two different 
 methods. Every court, in the first place, as well in 
 Victoria as elsewhere throughout the British dominions, 
 is bound to hold void, and in fact does hold void, enact- 
 ments which contravene an Imperial statute, and from 
 Colonial courts there is an appeal to the Privy Council. 
 The Colonial Governor, in the second place, though from 
 one point of view he is a constitutional monarch acting 
 under the advice given him by his Ministers, bears also 
 another and a different character. He is an Imperial official 
 appointed by the Crown — that is, by the English Cabinet, 
 which represents the wishes of the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment — and he is, as such representative of the Imperial 
 power, bound to avert if possible the passing of any Bill, 
 and when he cannot avert the passing, then to veto any 
 Act of the Colonial Legislature, whicli is disapproved of by 
 the Home Government as opposed either to Imperial law 
 or to Imperial policy. Thus, a Victorian Act, even when 
 sanctioned by the Governor, must pass through anotlier 
 
Chap. TIL] Home Rule — As Colonial Independence. 203 
 
 stage before it finally becomes law. It must receive the 
 assent of the Crown, or, in other words, the assent of the 
 English Secretary of State for the Colonies, and, unless 
 this assent be either actually or constructively given, it 
 does not come into force.* The matter to be carefully 
 
 * See Dicey, ' liaw of the Constitution,' pp. 105, 106. 
 
 The somewhat complicated principles which govern what is popu- 
 larly called the right of veto on Bills xjassed by Colonial Legislatures, 
 are thus stated in the ' Rules and Regulations ' published for the use of 
 the Colonial Office, Chapter III., Legislative Councils and Assemblies, 
 Rules 48-55 :— 
 
 "48. In every Colony the Governor has authority either to give 
 or to withhold his assent to laws passed by the other branches or 
 members of the Legislature, and until that assent is given no such 
 law is valid or binding. 
 
 " 49. Laws are in some cases passed with suspending clauses ; that 
 is, although assented to by the Governor they do not come into 
 operation or take effect in the Colony until they shall have been 
 specially confirmed by Her Majesty, and in other cases Parliament 
 has for the same purpose empowered the Governor to reserve Laws 
 for the Crown's assent, instead of himself assenting or refusing his 
 assent to them. 
 
 *■ 50. Every Law which has received the Governor's assent (unless 
 it contains a suspending clause) comes into operation immediately 
 or at the time specified in the Law itself. But the Crown retains 
 power to disallow the Law; and if such power be exercised at any 
 time afterwards, the Law ceases to have operation from the date at 
 which such disallowance is published in the Colony. 
 
 " 51. In Colonies having Representative Assemblies the disallowance 
 of any Law, or the Crown's assent to a reserved Bill, is signified by 
 Order in Council. The confirmation of an Act passed with a sus- 
 pending clause is not signified by Order in Council unless this mode 
 of confirmation is required by the terms of the suspending clause 
 itself, or by some special provision in the constitution of the Colony. 
 
 " 52. In Crown Colonies the allowance or disallowance of any Law 
 is generall;^ signified by despatch. 
 
204 EnglancVs Case against Rome E^de. [Chap. YIL 
 
 noted is that the Crown, or, in other words, the English 
 Ministry, which represents the House of Commons, has, as 
 
 " 53. In some cases a period is limited, after the expiration of which 
 Local Enactments, though not actually disallowed, cease to have the 
 authority of Law in the Colony, unless before the lapse of that time 
 Her Majesty's confirmation of them shall have been signified there ; 
 but the general rule is otherwise. 
 
 " 54. In Colonies possessing Representative Assemblies, Laws pur- 
 port to be made by the Queen or by the Grovernor on Her Majesty's 
 behalf or sometimes by the Governor alone, omitting any express 
 reference to Her Majesty, with the advice and consent of the Council 
 and Assembly. They are almost invariably designated as Acts. In 
 Colonies not having such Assemblies, Laws are designated as Ordin- 
 ances, and purport to be made by the Governor with the advice and 
 consent of the Legislative Council (or in British Guiana of the Court 
 of Policy). 
 
 " 55. In West Indian Islands or African Settlements which form part 
 of any general Government, every Bill or Draft Ordinance must be 
 submitted to the Governor-in-Chief before it receives the assent of the 
 Lieutenant-Governor or Administrator. If the Governor-in-Chief shall 
 consider any amendment indispensable, he may either require that 
 amendment to be made before the Law is brought into oi)eration, or he 
 may authorize the officer administering to assent to the Bill or Draft 
 on the express engagement of the Legislature to give effect to the 
 Governor-in-Chief* s recommendation by a supplementary Enactment." 
 
 The effect of these Regulations may be best understood by taking tho 
 following supposed case as an example of their oi)eration. 
 
 The Houses of the Victorian Parliament pass a Bill legalising the 
 marriage of a widower with his deceased wife's sister. 
 
 i. The Governor refuses his assent. The Bill is lost and never 
 becomes law. 
 
 ii. The Governor assents to the Bill on the Ist of January. It 
 thereupon becomes an Act, and law in Victoria. 
 
 iii. The Crown disallows the Act on the 1st of April. Tho dis- 
 allowance is published in Victoria on the 1st of May. From the 
 Ist of May the Act ceases to be law in any i>art of the British Do- 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Colonial Independence. 205 
 
 far as law goes, complete power of controlling the legisla- 
 tion even of colonies like Victoria. This power is both 
 positive and negative. If the Victorian Parliament fails 
 to pass some enactment necessary, in the opinion of the 
 British Parliament, for the safety of the Empire, then 
 the Parliament at Westminster can pass an Act for 
 Victoria supplying the needful provisions. If on the 
 other hand the Victorian Legislature passes a bill, {e.g. 
 expelling Chinese from the Colony,) which the Home 
 Government representing the British Parliament deems 
 opposed to Imperial interests, then the Government can 
 either direct the Governor to refuse his assent to the 
 law, or cause the Crown to disallow it, and thus in any 
 case make it void. When we add to all this that there 
 are many occasions, to which we can here only allude, 
 when a Colonial Governor can, and does, act so as to 
 hinder courses of action which conflict with English 
 interests or policy, it becomes clear enough that, as far as 
 
 minions, but marriages made under it between the 1st of January 
 and the 1st of May are valid. 
 
 iv. The Crown allows the Bill. It thereupon becomes an Act which 
 continues in force in Victoria until it be repealed either by the British 
 Parliament or by the Victorian Parliament. 
 
 V. The Bill contains a clause that it shall not come into force unless 
 and until allowed by the Cro^vn within two years of its passing. It 
 is not so allowed, it never comes into force, or in other words never 
 becomes law. 
 
 The point to be noted is that the Crown, or in reality the Colonial 
 Office, has and often exercises the jwwer of placing a veto upon any 
 Colonial law whatever. 
 
206 EnfjlancVa Case against Hanie Bulc. [Chap. vn. 
 
 constitutional arrangements can secure the reality of 
 sovereignty, the Imperial Parliament maintains its supre^ 
 macy throughout the length and breadth of the British 
 Empire. It is of course prefectly true that Parliament 
 having once given representative institutions to a colony, 
 does not dream of habitually overriding or thwarting 
 Colonial legislation. But it were a gross error to suppose 
 that Colonial recognition of British sovereignty is a mere 
 form. It is in the main cheerfully acquiesced in by the 
 people of Victoria, because they gain considerable prestige 
 and no small material advantage from forming part of 
 the Empire. They have no traditional hostility to the 
 mother country; they have every reason to deprecate 
 separation, and — a matter of equal consequence — they 
 believe that, if they wished for independence, it would not 
 be refused them. England stands, in short, as regards 
 Victoria, in a position of singular advantage. She could 
 suppress local riot, or cause it to be suppressed, and she 
 would not try to oppose a national demand for separation. 
 Hence a complicated political arrangement is kept in 
 tolerable working order by a series of understandings and 
 of mutual concessions. If either England or Victoria 
 were not willing to give and take, the connection between 
 England and the Colony could not last a month. The 
 policy, in short, of Colonial independence is, like most of 
 our constitutional aiTangements, based on the assumption 
 that the parties to it will act towards one another 
 in a spirit of compromise and good-will, and, though 
 
Chap. YII.] Home Bulc — As Colonial Independence. 207 
 
 at the present moment tlie pride of England in her 
 Colonial empire, and the appreciation on the part of our 
 colonies of the benefits, moral and material, of the supre- 
 macy of Great Britain, keep our scheme of Colonial 
 government in working order, it is well to realize, that 
 this system is not so invariably successful as might be in- 
 ferred from the optimism which naturally colours ofi&cial 
 utterances. The names of Sir Charles Darling and of Sir 
 George Bowen recall transactions which show, that a 
 community as loyal as Victoria may adopt a course of 
 policy which meets with the disapproval of English 
 statesmen. The recent and deliberate refusal of the 
 citizens of Melbourne to endure the landing on their 
 shores of informers whose evidence had procured the 
 punishment of an outrageous crime, combined with the 
 fact that the populace of Melbourne were abetted in a 
 gross, indubitable, patent breach of law by Colonial 
 Ministers, who were after all, technically speaking, 
 servants of the Crown, raises serious reflections, and 
 suggests that, even under favourable circumstances. 
 Colonial independence is hardly consistent with that 
 enforcement throughout the Crown's dominions of due 
 respect for law which is the main justification for the 
 existence of the British Empire.* A student, moreover, 
 who turns his eyes towards dependencies less favourably 
 situated than Victoria, soon perceives how great may, at 
 
 * Compare ' Yictorian Parliamentary Paper,' 1883, 2 S., No. 22, and 
 the Times of September 27, October 2, 5, 10, 12, 15 and 18, 1883. 
 
208 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 any moment, become the difficulty of working an artificial 
 and complicated system of double sovereignty. In 
 Jamaica the hostility of the Whites and Blacks led to riot 
 on the part of the Blacks, followed by lawless suppression 
 of riot on the part of the Governor, who represented the 
 feelings of the Whites, and the restoration of peace and 
 order ultimately entailed the abolition of representative 
 government. At the Cape the pressure of war at once 
 exposed the weak part of the constitutional machine. 
 The pretensions of the Cape Ministry to snatch from the 
 hands of the Governor the control of the armed forces met 
 witli successful resistance ; but the question tlien raised 
 as to the proper relation between the Colonial Ministry 
 and the army, though for a time evaded, is certain sooner 
 or later to re-appear, and will not always admit of an easy 
 or peaceable answer.* 
 
 Any reader interested in my argument should supplement 
 this brief statement of the relation actually existing 
 between England and her self-governing colonies by a 
 perusal of Mr. Todd's most instructive ' Parliamentary 
 Government in the l^ritish Colonies.' But the statement, 
 brief and colourless though it be, is sufficient for its ]nir- 
 pose ; it shows that the proposal to give to Ireland the 
 institutions of a colony is open to two fatal objections. 
 
 1st. — The concession to Ireland of Colonial independence 
 would entail upon England probable peril and certain 
 disgrace. 
 
 * See Todd, * Parliamentary Government in the Colonies,' p. 283. 
 
Chap. YII.] Home Ride — As Colonial Lidependence. 209 
 
 The peril is obvious. An Irish Cabinet armed with the 
 authority possessed by a Victorian Ministry would forth- 
 with provide for the self-defence of Ireland, and an Irish 
 army, obeying an Irish Executive and commanded by 
 Irish officers, would be none the less formidable because it 
 might in name be identified with an armed police, or, like 
 the troops raised at the Cape or in Victoria, enjoy the 
 ominous title of Volunteers. If the Colonial precedent were 
 strictly carried out, British troops ought, from the time 
 Ireland obtained an independent Parliament, to be with- 
 drawn from the country. The acknowledged danger of 
 foreign invasion, and the unavowed probability of Irish 
 insurrection, would make the retirement of the English 
 army impossible. But the presence of British forces — and 
 forces, be it remarked, intended in reality as a check on 
 the action of the local Government — would of itself place 
 Ireland in a position utterly unlike the situation of 
 Victoria, and would also involve both the Imperial and 
 the local Government in endless difficulties and con- 
 troversies. If any one doubts this, let him read the 
 correspondence between Mr. Molteno* and Sir Bartle 
 Erere, and substitute for the Premier of the Cape Colony the 
 name of Mr. Parnell, and for Sir Bartle Frere the name of 
 any Lord-Lieutenant who might be unfortunate enough to 
 hold office in Ireland after Mr. Parnell became Premier of 
 an Irish Cabinet. Suppose, however, that by some miracle 
 of management or good luck the Irish and English forces 
 
 ♦ Todd, p. 283. 
 
 P 
 
210 EnglancVs Case against Home Bulc. [Chap. VIL 
 
 acted well together, and that the satisfaction given by a 
 state of things approaching to independence prevented for 
 the moment all attempts at separation, England might 
 escape peril, but she would assuredly not avoid deserved 
 disgrace. An Irish Parliament, returned in the main by 
 the very men who support the National League, would 
 assuredly pass laws which every man in England, and 
 many men throughout Ireland, would hold to be unjust, 
 and which, whether in themselves unjust or not,' would 
 certainly set aside Imperial legislation, which England is 
 bound by every consideration of honour and justice to 
 uphold. There is no need to demonstrate here what has 
 been demonstrated by one writer after another, and, 
 indeed, hardly needs proof, that at the present day an 
 Irish Parliament would certainly deprive Irish landlords, 
 and possibly deprive Irish Protestants, of rights which the 
 Imperial Parliament would never take away, and which 
 the Imperial Government is absolutely bound to protect.* 
 If the English Government were to be base enough to 
 acquiesce in legislation which the Imperial Parliament 
 would never itself have countenanced, then England would 
 be dishonoured ; if Bill after Bill passed by the Irish Legis- 
 lature were prevented from becoming law by veto after 
 veto, then English honour might be saved, but the self- 
 covernment of Ireland would be at an end, nor would 
 England gain much in credit. The English Ministry 
 can, as long as the connection with a colony endures, arrest 
 * See, e.g,i a letter by Mr. Lecky in the Times of January 13, 1886. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Hide — As Colonial Independence. 211 
 
 Colonial legislation. But the Home Government cannot 
 for any effective purpose interfere with the administrative 
 action of a Colonial Executive. Given courts, an army, 
 and a police controlled by the leaders of the Land League, 
 and it is easy to see how rents might be abolished and 
 landlords driven into exile without the passing by the 
 Irish Parliament of a single Act which a Colonial Secretary 
 could reasonably veto, or which even an English court 
 could hold void under the provisions of the Colonial Laws 
 Act. It is indeed probable that wild legislation at Dublin 
 might provoke armed resistance in Ulster. But a move- 
 ment which, were Ireland an independent nation, might 
 ensure just government for all classes of Irishmen would, 
 if Ireland were a colony, only add a new element of con- 
 fusion to an already intolerable state of affairs. Imagine 
 for a moment what would have been the position of 
 England if Englishmen had been convinced that Eiel, 
 though technically a rebel, was in reality a patriot, re- 
 sisting the intolerable oppression of the Dominion Parlia- 
 ment, and you may form some slight idea of the feeling of 
 shame and disgrace with which Englishmen would see 
 British soldiers employed to suppress the revolt of Ulster 
 against a Government which, without English aid, would 
 find it difficult to resist or punish the insurgents. The 
 most painful and least creditable feature in the history of 
 the United States is the apathy with which, for thirty 
 years, the Northern States tolerated Southern lawlessness, 
 and even now indirectly support Southern oppression. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 2nd. — If Colonial independence would be found, in 
 Ireland, inconsistent with the protection of England's 
 interests and with the discharge of England's duties, it 
 would also fail to produce the one result, which would be 
 an adequate compensation for many probable or certain 
 evils — namely, the extinction of Irish discontent. 
 
 It is by no means certain, indeed, that Colonial indepen- 
 dence would be accepted, with genuine acquiescence, by 
 any class of Irishmen. Certainly the demand for Grattan's 
 Parliament lends no countenance to the supposition, that 
 the people of Ireland would accept with satisfaction a 
 political arrangement which is absulutely opposed in its 
 character to the Constitution of 1782.* Suppose, however, 
 for the sake of argument, that the Irish leaders and the 
 Irish people accepted the offer of Colonial independence ; 
 we may be well assured that this acceptance would not 
 produce good-will towards England, and this not from the 
 perversity of the Irish nature, of which we hear a great 
 deal too much, but from difficulties in the nature of 
 things, of which we hear a great deal too little. The re- 
 strictions on the authority of the Irish Parliament would, 
 one cannot doubt, be, as safeguards for the authority of 
 the Imperial Government, absolutely illusory. But they 
 would cause intense irritation. Irish leaders would wish, 
 and from their own point of view, rightly wish, to carry 
 through a revolutionary policy. The Imperial Govern- 
 ment would attempt, and, from an English point of view, 
 ♦ See pp. 221, 222, post. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — As Colonial Indeimidence. 213 
 
 rightly attempt, to arrest revolntion. Every considerable 
 legislative measure would give ground for negotiation 
 and for understandings — that is, for dissatisfaction and for 
 misunderstandings. There would be disputes about the 
 land laws, disputes about the army, disputes about the 
 police, disputes about the authority of Imperial legislation, 
 disputes about the validity of Irish enactments, disputes 
 about appeals to the Privy Council. To say that all these 
 sources of irritation might embitter the relation between 
 England and Victoria, and that, as they do not habitually 
 do so, one may infer that they will not embitter the re- 
 lation between England and Ireland, is to argue that 
 institutions nominally the same will work in the same 
 way when applied to totally different circumstances. 
 Victoria is prosperous; Ireland is in distress. Victoria 
 takes pride in the Imperial connection ; large bodies of 
 Irishmen detest the British Empire. Victoria has never 
 aspired to be a nation ; the best side of Irish discontent 
 consists in enthusiasm for Irish nationality. Above all 
 this, there has never been any lasting feud between Eng- 
 land and her Australian dependencies ; the main ground 
 in favour of a fundamental change in the constitutional 
 relations of Ireland and England is the necessity of appeas- 
 ing, at almost any cost, traditional hatred and misunder- 
 standing generated by centuries of misgovernment and 
 misery. If, as many believe, the source of this misery, 
 so far as it can be touched by law at all, is a vicious 
 system of land tenure, it is vain to imagine that the 
 
214 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. vn. 
 
 misfortunes of Ireland can be cured by any mere change 
 of constitutional forms. Grant, however, for the sake of 
 argument, that the passion of nationality is the true 
 ground of the demand for Home Eule ; grant, also, in de- 
 fiance of patent facts, that the autonomy of a dependency 
 satisfies the sensibilities of a nation ; still it is idle to fancy 
 that a system based, like our scheme of Colonial govern- 
 ment, on friendly understandings and the habitual 
 practice of compromise, can regulate the relations of two 
 countries which are kept apart, mainly, because they 
 cannot understand one another, and can neither of 
 them admit the necessity of mutual concessions. More- 
 over, a scheme of nominal subjection combined with real 
 independence has one vital defect; it does not teach 
 the lessons which men and nations derive from depend- 
 ence on their own unassisted and uncontrolled efforts. 
 No one learns self-control who fancies he is controlled by 
 a master.* 
 
 The scheme, in short, of Colonial independence, though 
 less absolutely impracticable than any form of Federalism, 
 has, as a solution of our Irish difficulties, two fatal defects : 
 it gives Ireland a degree of independence more dangerous 
 to England than would be the existence of Ireland as a 
 separate nation; it bestows on Ireland a kind of self- 
 government which presents neither the material advan- 
 tages derived from the Union, nor the possible, though 
 
 * See a letter in the Spectator of January 2, 1886, on * Home Rule 
 or Separation,' by Mr. J. Cotter Morison. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — As Colonial Indepc'iidence. 215 
 
 hypothetical, gains which might accrue to her from the 
 self-control and energy supposed to flow from the inspiring 
 sentiment of nationality. Still the Colonial system remains 
 in spite of its immense defects as a scheme of Home Eule 
 for Ireland, out and out the least objectionable of the 
 models which have been proposed to us for our imitation, 
 and this for several reasons. To grant to Ireland, if she 
 be prepared to accept it, the position of Victoria is not to 
 impair the supremacy of Parliament ; if we copied faith- 
 fully the Victorian polity, every Irish member of Parlia- 
 ment would permanently depart from Westminster, there 
 would be no more need for having at Westminster a repre- 
 sentative of Dublin than there is for having at Westminster 
 a representative of Melbourne, the Irish Parliament would 
 depend for its very existence on an Act of the Imperial 
 Parliament, and the British Parliament would be able 
 without consulting any Irish representative to modify, 
 override, or abolish all or any part of the Act constituting 
 the Irish Parliament. In this there would be no breach 
 of faith, for the Constitution would bear on its face that 
 the Act of Parliament on which it depended could be 
 changed by the British Parliament as lawfully as can the 
 Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 55, which calls into existence the 
 Victorian legislature. The legal authority and the ease 
 with which the British Parliament could suspend or 
 abolish the Irish Constitution would have two good results : 
 the one that Great Britain would have a sanction by 
 which to enforce the adherence of the Irish government to 
 
216 Encfland^s Case against Home Bulc. [Chap, YII. 
 
 just principles of legislation and of administration ; the 
 other that the readiness with which this sanction could be 
 applied would, it is not unlikely, make its application 
 needless. England, again, would not by the concession of 
 Colonial independence dislocate her own Constitution : 
 she would only be extending to Ireland a scheme of 
 government already existing in other parts of the Empire, 
 and would find herself possessed of officials accustomed to 
 make a Colonial Constitution work. Nothing would be 
 changed : there would only be one Colony the more, and 
 the Colonial Office would find no insuperable difficulty in 
 undertaking the government of Ireland in the same sense 
 in which the Office undertakes the government of Victoria. 
 The position, it may be objected, would be a very poor 
 one for Ireland. With this objection I entirely agree: 
 my very contention is that for Ireland, no less than for 
 England, it is best that Ireland shall form part of the 
 United Kingdom. Home Eulers think otherwise: they 
 prefer the local autonomy of Victoria to a share in the 
 United Kingdom. They may probably, however, say that 
 taxation involves representation, and that if Ireland is to 
 take the disadvantages she must also receive the immuni- 
 ties of a colony. Here fair-minded men will hold that the 
 Home Rulers are right. The maxim, indeed, that taxation 
 involves representation, need not deeply impress any one 
 who remembers that throughout the United Kingdom 
 the property of every woman is taxed, and that no woman 
 has a share in l\arliamentary representation. But a 
 
Chap. YII.] Home Ride — As Colonial Independence. 217 
 
 formula which is not logically defensible may yet be the 
 embodiment of a just claim. If the very hazardous 
 experiment of placing Ireland in the position of Victoria 
 is to be tried, it must be tried fairly and with every 
 circumstance which may increase its chances of success. 
 Ireland on assuming the position of a colony should, like 
 other colonies, be freed from Imperial taxation. England 
 can afford the sacrifice of three or four millions a year, 
 and she would obtain a valuable quid pro quo in the 
 increased homogeneity of the British Parliament. Ireland 
 too would gain something. A country impoverished, in 
 part at least through bad government, might think it no 
 hard bargain to gain at once local independence and 
 exemption from a heavy weight of taxation. The absence 
 of anything like a tribute to Great Britain would be an 
 immense advantage, for it would remove one cause of 
 certain discontent, and would for once place England 
 before the Irish people at any rate in the light of a 
 liberal ally. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not 
 recommend Home Kule under any form whatever : what 
 I do assert is that of all its forms the Colonial form is the 
 least injurious to British interests, and that the experi- 
 ment of placing Ireland in the situation of Victoria cannot 
 be carried out either with fairness nor with any chance 
 of success, unless Englishmen let Ireland, like Victoria, be 
 exempt from Imperial taxation. If any English taxpayer 
 says that the price is too high to pay for the success of an 
 experiment of which I do not myself recommend the 
 
218 England's Case against Home Ride. [Chap. VII. 
 
 trial, I am not concerned to consider whether he is right. 
 My only concern is to insist that the sacrifice of three or 
 four millions per annum is an essential feature of this 
 particular scheme of Home Eule, and that persons who 
 say the sacrifice is too great have only added one more to 
 the many arguments which lead to the conclusion that 
 under no form whatever can Irish Home Paile be accepted 
 by England. 
 
 III. Home Bule as the revival of Grattan's Constittction. — 
 
 ^ The cry for Home Eule sometimes takes the 
 
 Objection 
 
 to Consti- form of a demand that Ireland should reacquire 
 
 tution of 
 
 1782, not the Constitution of 1782. The true answer to this 
 Irish Par- demand is not to be found, where Englishmen 
 often seek for it, in attacks on Grattan's Parlia- 
 ment. That body exhibited some grave defects common 
 to the English Parliament of the day ; it had also many 
 faults of its own to answer for ; but it displayed with all 
 its demerits, virtues which still cast a halo round its 
 memory in the eyes of Irish patriotism, and serve to redeem 
 many of its admitted faults in the judgment of impartial 
 history. It produced great men. Flood, Grattan, Curran, 
 and Fitzgibbon were none of them faultless statesmen, but 
 they were leaders of whom any people have a riglit to be 
 proud. Grattan's Parliament, moreover, though it repre- 
 sented a class, represented a class of Irishmen, and we may 
 even say the best class of Irishmen. It was lastly, with 
 all its defects, a Parliament of men who knew Ireland 
 
€hap. VII.] Home Rule — Grattan's Constitution. 219 
 
 and belonged to Ireland, and after its lights cared for the 
 country. It was in a true sense a national Parliament. 
 When we consider further that the Parliament was 
 abolished against the wish of the best men in Ireland, that 
 it was abolished by arts which have brought lasting and 
 just discredit on the men who carried through the Act of 
 Union, we can well understand why as calm and as well- 
 informed judges as Mr. Lecky hold to the belief — certainly 
 in nowise in itself unreasonable — that the Treaty of 
 Union was, to say the least, premature, and that England 
 and Ireland would have gained much if, for a generation 
 or two more, the interest and repute of Ireland had been 
 guarded by an Irish Parliament. The argument that the 
 Irish Parliament because it was corrupt, or because it 
 represented a class, was rightly abolished, proves too 
 much. The English Parliament, under Walpole, was at 
 least as open as the Irish Parliament in the time of 
 Grattan, to each of these charges, yet, long before legis- 
 lation had removed the flagrant anomalies of the un- 
 reformed House of Commons, the English Parliament 
 had cast off its worst vices ; and few persons will maintain 
 that England would have gained if during the time of 
 Walpole Parliamentary government had been abolished. 
 Be this as it may, vituperation of Grattan's Parliament, 
 is for our present purpose, as irrelevant as it is unjust and 
 injudicious. 
 
 The true reason for declining: to consider the demand for 
 
220 Unr/land's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII- 
 
 the Constitution of 1782 is, that to concede it is in the 
 Trueob- strictest sense of the word an impossibility, 
 restoration Grrattan's Constitution not only is dead, but can 
 impossible, look for no resurrection. The social, the political,, 
 the religious, we might almost say the physical conditions 
 under which G rattan's Parliament existed have vanished,, 
 never to return. " It cannot be too clearly understood,'* 
 writes Mr. Lecky, " that the real meaning of the separate 
 Irish Parliament of the eighteenth century was that the 
 efficient government of the country was placed in the 
 hands of its Protestant gentry, qualified by the fact that 
 the English Government possessed a sufficient number of 
 nomination boroughs to exercise a constant controlling 
 influence over their proceedings. The existing Grand 
 Juries and the Synod of the disestablished Church are the 
 bodies which now represent most faithfully the indepen- 
 dent elements in Grattan's Parliament. That Parliament 
 consisted exclusively of men who were bound to the 
 English connection by the closest ties of interest and 
 sentiment [and] who were pre-eminently the representatives- 
 of property."* We may deplore that such a Parliament 
 was doomed to destruction when it might possibly have 
 been saved by reform. But, to any one who has eyes to 
 see, it is as clear as day that with Protestant ascendancy,, 
 with the prestige of the Established Church, with the 
 leading position of Irish landlords, with the submission of 
 Irish tenants, with the power of control exercised by the. 
 * 2%e Tme«, May 5, 1886. 
 
€hap. VII.] Home Rule — Grrattan's Constitution. 221 
 
 English Government, with the necessary dependence of the 
 English Colony upon the connection with England, 
 Orattan's Constitution with all its possibilities or im- 
 possibilities has vanished for ever. You can no more 
 restore the Parliament of 1782 in Ireland than you can 
 restore the unreformed Parliament of 1832 in England. 
 In either case to reproduce the form would not renew the 
 spirit of an ancient institution, and the attempted revival of 
 an anomaly would turn out the creation of a monstrosity. 
 One consideration suggested by the memory of Grattan's 
 Parliament is well worth attention. With the curious 
 laxity of thought about constitutional changes which marks 
 modern British statesmanship, language is often used 
 which implies that to ask for Grattan's Parliament is 
 equivalent to asking for Colonial self-government as in 
 Victoria. No two things are in reality more different. It 
 is no exaggeration to say that the Constitution of 1782 
 presented, in its principles, the exact antithesis to the 
 modern Constitution of Victoria. Grattan's Constitution 
 rested on the absolute denial of British Parliamentary 
 sovereignty. The keynote of his policy was the Par- 
 liamentary independence of Ireland; its aim was to 
 make Ireland an independent nation connected with 
 England only by goodwill, by common interest, and by 
 what has been called the "golden link" of the Crown. 
 The statement, indeed, that between the date of Irish 
 Parliamentary independence and the date of the Union 
 England and Ireland were governed under two Crowns, 
 
222 England's Case against Home Bulc, [Chap. VII 
 
 is not much better than a piece of rhetorical anti- 
 quarianism.* It is, however, undoubtedly true that from 
 1782 to 1800 the British Parliament had no more right 
 to legislate for Ireland than at the present day it has to 
 legislate for IS'ew York, and no appeal lay from any 
 Irish Court to any English tribunal. But if under the 
 Constitution of 1782 Ireland was in one sense an inde- 
 pendent nation, she could not under that Constitution 
 be called a self-governed country. The Irish Executive 
 was controlled by George the Third and his English 
 Ministers, and the passing of the Act of Union was proof, 
 if evidence were needed, that England possessed potent, 
 though unavowed, means for controlling the decision of the 
 Irish Legislature. The Constitution, it may be added, bore 
 exactly the fruit to be expected from its anomalous 
 character. It stimulated national feeling; this was its 
 saving, merit. It did not secure supremacy to the will of 
 the Irish nation ; this, as appeared in 1800, was its fatal 
 
 * Under the political arrangements connecting the two countries, it 
 was i^ractically impossible that the two crowns could by legal means 
 be separated without the assent of the British Parhament. George III. 
 was necessarily a member both of the British and of the Irish Parlia- 
 ments ; and it is inconceivable that as King of Ireland he should have 
 assented to a bill passed by the Irish Houses of Parliament which was 
 strenuously opposed by the British Houses of Parliament. The mad- 
 ness of the King raised a case not provided for by the Constitution, and 
 the accidental difference of opinion between the British and Irish 
 Houses of Parliament, as to the Eegency, has been treated as pos- 
 sessing more importance than, from a constitutional jwint of view, 
 belonged to it. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution. 225 
 
 flaw. Compare with this the Constitution of Victoria. 
 The Victorian Constitution is based on complete acknow- 
 ledgment of English Parliamentary sovereignty. But the 
 amplest recognition of British authority is balanced by the 
 unrestricted enjoyment of local self-government. Hence 
 Victoria manages her own affairs, but Victorians are not 
 inspired with the sense of constituting a nation. 
 
 IV. Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution* — 
 No legislative proposal submitted to Parlia- 
 
 Glad- 
 
 ment has ever received harder measure than stonian 
 
 . Constitu- 
 
 the Government ot Ireland Bill. Its mtro- tion— its 
 duction aroused the keenest political battle 
 which during half a century has been fought in England. 
 The Bill therefore became at once the mark of hostile and 
 (what is nearly the same thing) of unfair criticism at the 
 hands of opponents. This was to be expected ; it is the 
 necessary result of the system which makes tenure of 
 ofifi.ce depend on success in carrying through or resisting 
 proposed legislation. What did take place but was not 
 
 * See Appendix for the Government of Ireland Bill. It is there 
 printed in extenso. The clauses which mainly concern the points 
 discussed in the following pages are printed in italics. Readers 
 who wish to understand my comments on the Gladstonian Consti- 
 tution, should study the Bill itself. I am anxious to call attention 
 to its words, because I am quite aware that on more than one point 
 the interpretation put by me upon its provisions will be disputed by 
 supporters of Mr. Gladstone's policy. My interpretation is, I believe, 
 sound, but it would be unfair not to give my readers the opportunity 
 of judging for themselves as to its soundness. 
 
224 JSngland's Case ctgainst Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 to be expected was, that the Government of Ireland Bill 
 met with harsh criticism at the hands of its friends. The 
 Opposition wished to prove that the principle of the Bill 
 was bad, by showing that it led to disastrous and absurd 
 results. They therefore directed their assaults upon the 
 details of a measure which they disliked, in reality, not 
 because of the special provisions which they attacked, but 
 because of the principle to which these provisions gave 
 effect. Ministeralists on the other hand were only too 
 ready to surrender any clause in the Bill as a matter of 
 detail, provided only they could persuade Parliament to 
 sanction the principle of the measure, and thereby athrm 
 the policy of giving Ireland an Irish Executive and an 
 Irish Parliament. Nor was this course of action dictated 
 solely by the exigencies of Parliamentary strategy. 
 Ministerialists saw the flaws in the Bill as plaiidy as did 
 the Opposition, and no man (it may be conjectured), from 
 the Premier who devised, down to the draughtsman who 
 drew, the Government of Ireland Bill, would have wished 
 it to become an Act in the form in which it stood on the 
 7tli day of June, 1886. The supporters, moreover, of the 
 Government emphasized their dislike to the details of the 
 particular measure, because to attack a detail of the 
 machinery by which it was proposed to give Ireland Home 
 Eule countenanced in the critic's own mind the as- 
 sumption that some mechanism could be invented which 
 might carry out the principle of creating an Irish 
 Parliament without violating the conditions on wliich 
 
Chap. VII.] Home JRule — Gladstonian Constitution. 225 
 
 alone the idea of any such measure could be entertained 
 by any English statesman. Opponents, in short, of the 
 Government of Ireland Bill attacked its details out of 
 hostility to its principle ; its defenders tried to win 
 approval for its principle by conceding or insisting upon 
 the defects of its details.* The result was unfortunate. 
 The Bill was never either by its opponents or its friends 
 regarded in the light in which it ought to be viewed by a 
 constitutional lawyer. It was never criticised as a whole ; 
 it never therefore received full justice. Whoever examines 
 the now celebrated Bill in the spirit of a jurist will see 
 that it constitutes, in spite of many obvious blots both in 
 its special provisions and in its language, a most ingenious 
 attempt to solve the problem of giving to Ireland a 
 legislature which shall be at once practically independent, 
 
 * Criticism of particular provisions was made the easier by the fact 
 that hesitations of statesmanship betrayed themselves throughout the 
 Bill ia blunders of draughtsmanship. The very heading of the Bill 
 is a misdescription, and involves confusion of ideas. The expressions 
 *' status of the Crown," " Executive Government," " Imperial Parlia- 
 ment," are from a legal point of view open to severe criticism ; and 
 the substitution of the name " Irish legislature " or " Legislature of 
 Ireland" for the plain intelligible term Irish Parliament, involves 
 something like political cowardice. For errors of this kind, though 
 in one sense errors of draughtsmanship, official draughtsmen are, it must 
 in fairness be remembered, no more responsible than is an amanuensis 
 for the erasures and blots which mar a letter written or re-written to suit 
 the contradictory views of a writer who does not quite know his own 
 meaning and is not anxious to put his meaning into plain words. 
 (See for some excellent criticisms on the Government of Ireland Bill 
 two letters in the St. James's Gazette of 20th and 22nd April, 1886, 
 signed II.) 
 
 Q 
 
226 EnrjlmuV!^ Ca.^c agaiifist Home Bnle. [Chap. VII. 
 
 and theoretically dependent, upon the Parliament of 
 Great Britain ; which shall have full power to make laws 
 and appoint an Executive for Ireland, and yet shall not use 
 that power in a way opposed to English interests or sense 
 of justice. The problem (it may be said) admits of no 
 solution. This may be so, and is indeed my own con- 
 viction. But this conviction ought not to prevent the 
 acknowledgment that the Bill is the rough outline of 
 an ingeniously attempted solution. If the Bill fails in 
 achieving its object, the failure arises not from mistakes of 
 detail, but from the unsoundness of the principle on wliich 
 the Bill rests, and shows that the conditions on which 
 Englishmen can wisely give Home Eule to Ireland are 
 conditions which no scheme of Home Eule can satisfy* 
 The idea which lies at the basis of tlie plan sketched out 
 in the Government of Ireland Bill is tlie combination of 
 the Federal system and the Colonial system of Home 
 Piule. The right mode of criticising this combination is 
 first to trace in the barest outline the leading features of 
 the Bill, treating it much as if it had become an Act, and 
 had given to Ireland an actual Constitution ; and next to 
 examine how far this Constitution, wliich may with no 
 unfairness bo called the " Gladstonian Constitution," 
 satisfies the conditions which a scheme of Home Eule is 
 bound to fulfil. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution establishes a new form of 
 government in Ireland ; it also modifies, or, to use plain 
 and accurate language, repeals the main provisions of the 
 
iChap. vil] Home Ride—Gladstonian Constitution. 227 
 
 Act of Union, and thus introduces a fundamental change 
 into the existing Constitution of England.* 
 
 * My statement that the Grovernment of Ireland Bill repeals the 
 main provisions of the Act of Union is made, not because I anticipate 
 that the Bill if passed would lead to a repeal of the Union, but because 
 it is my opinion that the Bill if passed would, as a matter of law, 
 repeal the provisions of that Act, under which the United Kingdom is 
 represented in one and the same Parliament to be styled the Parliament 
 of Great Britain and Ireland. The effect of the Bill would be in very 
 general terms that Ireland would be represented in a Parliament which 
 contained no English or Scotch representatives, and Great Britain would 
 be represented in a Parliament which contained no Irish representatives. 
 Occasionally and for one definite purpose, and no other, namely for the 
 jiurpose of modifying the terms of the Gladstonian Constitution, a 
 Parliament might be convened which contained representatives from 
 England, Scotland, and Ireland. By what name any one of these 
 assemblies might be called is a matter of indifference; but that, either 
 the British Parliament which contained no Irish representatives, or the 
 Irish Parliament which contained no English or Scotch representatives, 
 or the exceptional and only occasionally convoked body whose one 
 function is to modify a single Act of Parliament, could be considered by 
 any lawyer the " one and the same Parliament " in which the United 
 Kingdom is now represented, is in my judgment all but incredible. If, 
 however, the term " repeal " causes offence or misunderstanding, let us 
 substitute the word " modify," wliich, however, I beUeve to be less 
 accurate. The lay reader ought to be reminded that " Statutes may 
 be repealed either by express words contained in later Acts of Parha- 
 ment, or by implication," and that " a repeal by implication is effected 
 when the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with, 
 or repugnant to, the provisions of an earlier enactment that the 
 two cannot stand together" (Wilberforce, * Statute Law,* p. 310). 
 ISIy contention is that the Government of Ireland Bill would on 
 becoming law be so inconsistent with portions of 39 & 40 Geo. III. 
 cap. 67, as to amount to a repeal thereof. (For a statement of an 
 opposite opinion, see Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on the Irish Question, 
 pp. 38, 39.) My opinion that the Government of Ireland Bill repeals 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 Ungland's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 The following are for our present purpose its principal 
 features. 
 
 As regards the government of Ireland — 
 
 The Executive Government of Ireland is vested in the 
 J Queen, but is carried on by the Lord-Lieutenant 
 
 as regards and a Council.* Though the formation and 
 
 govern- 
 
 mentof powers of the Executive are under the 
 Ireland. 
 
 Constitution left very much at large, we 
 
 may fairly assume that the authors of the Constitution 
 intend that the Lord-Lieutenant should occupy the 
 position in substance of a Colonial Governor, and rule 
 Ireland through a ministry nominally appointed by the 
 Lord-Lieutenant, but in reality selected by the Irish legis- 
 lative body. In this matter the Irish Constitution is, 
 like that of Victoria, a copy of the English original. 
 
 There is created — and this, of course, is the vital 
 provision of the Constitution — an Irish legislature, 
 which I shall take lea^e hereafter to call by its proper 
 name, the "Irish Parliament," consisting of the Queen and 
 an Irish legislative body, (wliich we may call a House of 
 Parliament or a Chamber,) made up itself of two orders, t 
 
 The Irish Parliament, subject to certain restrictions, has 
 authority to make or repeal any laws for the peace, order, 
 and good government of Ireland ; it is in fact in the 
 
 the Act of Union is now, I am happy to think, supported by the high 
 authority of Lord Selborne. See Lord Selborne'a speech at the Con- 
 ference of Unionist Liberals, reported in the Times, 8th Dec, 1886. 
 
 * The Government of Ireland Bill, clause 7. 
 
 t See the Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 1, 9. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution. 229 
 
 strictest sense what I have termed it, an Irish Parliament. 
 It is the body which indirectly appoints and controls the 
 Executive, and directly legislates for Ireland. It can 
 repeal laws which have been passed by the existing 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom in so far as they are 
 in force in Ireland. 
 
 The powers of the Irish Parliament are, it should be 
 noted, indefinite. The Irish Parliament, that is to say, 
 may pass any law which it is not, under the Con- 
 stitution, forbidden to pass. In this respect it stands not 
 in the position of the American Congress, which can 
 legislate only on certain topics, which are expressly placed 
 within the competence of Congress, but in a position 
 like that occupied by the Parliament of the Canadian Do- 
 minion, which can legislate on all topics not expressly 
 excepted from its competence. The difference between a 
 legislature of definite and a legislature of indefinite powers 
 is important. In the one case changes of circumstances 
 may diminish but cannot increase the authority of the 
 legislature; in the other case changes of circumstances 
 may increase but cannot diminish that authority. The 
 Irish Parliament is a body whose authority will, from 
 the necessity of things, tend constantly to increase. 
 
 If the authority given to the Irish Parliament is in- 
 definite, it is not unlimited. A large number of exceptions 
 and restrictions are imposed upon its freedom of action. 
 It is hard to name any clear principle on which they 
 rest. Their object undoubtedly is to guard against legis- 
 
230 England's Case against Hmne Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 lation on subjects such as the armed forces, the coinage, 
 and the like, which are of Imperial rather than of local 
 concern. But we can hardly say that the line between 
 the things which the Irish Parliament can do, and the 
 things which it cannot do, exactly coincides with the line 
 which divides Imperial from local legislation. The Irisli 
 Parliament might lawfully pass laws opposed to the whole 
 tenour of British legislation, such, for instance, as an Act 
 preventing particular classes of foreigners, or even of 
 Englishmen, from settling in Ireland. The Irish Parlia- 
 ment could not, on the other hand, pass any law for tlie 
 establishment or the endowment of religion. Hence 
 Ireland could not, in imitation of England and Scotland, 
 provide herself with an established Church, nor could she 
 again pass any law relating to volunteers. She could not 
 therefore take steps for the defence of the country, which 
 are permissible to Victoria or Canada. 
 
 The observance of these limitations on the Parliament's 
 power of legislation is enforced by a twofold method : first, 
 by the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant ; * secondly, by the 
 special authority given to the Judicial Committee of the 
 English Privy Council.f 
 
 The Lord-Lieutenant can, after the manner of a Colonial 
 Governor, refuse the Eoyal assent to any bill passed by 
 the Irish House of Parliament. % It would rather appear 
 (tliough tliis is by no means certain) that a Bill passed by 
 
 * See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 
 
 t Ihid.f clause 25. % Ibid.y clause 7. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Eulc — Gladstonian Constitution. 231 
 
 the Irish I'arliaiiient might, even though the Lord-Lieu- 
 tenant assented thereto, be like the Bill of a Colonial 
 legislature, disallowed by the Crown, or in effect by the 
 English Ministry.* 
 
 The Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council, 
 with the addition of certain members, who must be, or 
 have been, Irish Judges, exercises under the Gladstonian 
 Constitution a very peculiar authority in respect of Irish 
 legislation. It becomes both an administrative and a 
 judicial body. 
 
 As an administrative body it can give a decision as to 
 the constitutional validity f of any Bill brought before or 
 Act passed by, the Irish Parliament. In its judicial 
 character it is a court of final appeal, with exclusive 
 power to pronounce a decision upon the validity of an 
 Act of the Irish Parliament whenever the validity tliereof 
 comes in question in the course of an action. { The 
 decisions of the Privy Council are final ; their twofold 
 character as opinions and judgments deserves special 
 attention. The result is that the Judicial Committee of 
 the English Privy Council can always in one way or 
 another pronounce void the proposed or actual legislation 
 of the Irish Parliament if in the judgment of the Privy 
 Council such legislation is unconstitutional. 
 
 * As to the disallowance of Colonial bills, see pp. 202-5, ante. 
 
 t It therefore is intended to exercise an authority different in kind 
 from the power possessed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 X See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 25, sub-clause (a), (b) 
 and (c). 
 
232 EnglancCs Case arjaiTist Home Ride. [Chap, vn. 
 
 Ireland in return for the advantages gained by her 
 under the Gladstonian Constitution gives up the repre- 
 sentation which she now has in each of the two Houses of 
 the Parliament of the United Kingdom. No Irish repre- 
 sentative, either Peer or Commoner, sits under that Con- 
 stitution at Westminster.* The present Parliament of 
 the United Kingdom under whatever name it be described, 
 and whatever be its powers, becomes therefore on the 
 withdrawal of the Irish representatives a British Parlia- 
 ment, and is hereinafter termed by rne, for the sake of 
 distinction, the British Parliament. Ireland also con- 
 tributes annually to the Consolidated Fund of the United 
 Kingdom a sum of over four millions. The Irish customs 
 and excise are made the security for the payment of this 
 contribution ; they are, if I understand the Government 
 of Ireland Bill rightly, to be collected by British officials 
 and paid into the British Treasury, but the details of the 
 financial arrangements intended to exist under the Glad- 
 stonian Constitution are not within the scope of this work. 
 
 The Irish Parliament has no power to modify or alter 
 the provisions of the Constitution under which it exists,t 
 except in one or two cases provided for by the Constitution 
 
 ♦ Government of Ireland Bill, clause 24. 
 
 t Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 37, 39. On the whole 
 question as to the mode in which the Gladstonian Constitution, or in 
 other words the Government of Ireland Bill, is intended to be altered, 
 readers are si^ecially referred to the terms of the Bill itself. The whole 
 matter is involved in so much controversy that one can hardly make 
 any statement about it which an opponent will not question. The 
 parts of the Bill to be studied are clauses 37 and 39. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — Gladstonian Constitution, 233 
 
 itself. The Constitution is alterable in a particular 
 manner therein pointed out, namely by the co-operation 
 of the British Parliament and the Irish Parliament. If 
 we omit certain complications of detail, this co-operation 
 takes place by the Irish representatives being summoned 
 back, and thus added to the British Parliament. The 
 body thus constituted for the alteration of the Gladstonian 
 Constitution is formed of much the same elements as the 
 existing Parliament of the United Kingdom, and is here- 
 inafter called the Imperial Parliament.* 
 
 As regards the Constitution of England — 
 The Gladstonian Constitution, as it will now be seen, 
 does, (whatever the intention of its authors) as as re^^rds 
 a matter of fact seriously affect the Constitution constitu- 
 of England, and this in more points than one. *^°°- 
 
 First. — The withdrawal of the Irish representation from 
 the Parliament of the United Kingdom constitutes in 
 effect a new body, which in its composition is different 
 from the present Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
 and which since (allowing for changes introduced by the 
 different Eeform Acts which have been passed during the 
 century) it corresponds with the Parliament of Great 
 Britain as it existed before the Union with Ireland, may 
 be rightly described by the name I have applied to it, of 
 the British Parliament. This British Parliament has 
 admittedly authority to legislate on every matter which 
 
 * See Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. 
 
234 England's Case against Home Bide, [Chap. VII* 
 
 comes within the competence neither of the Irish Parlica- 
 ment, nor of the body which I have distinguished as the 
 Imperial Parliament, and which, it will be remembered, 
 consists of the British Parliament with the Irish represen- 
 tatives summoned thereto. Whetlier the British Parlia^ 
 ment has or has not any further powers is a moot question 
 which I purposely leave for the moment untouched, 
 "What is admitted on all hands is that a Parliament in 
 which Irish representatives have no voice whatever can 
 legislate on every matter affecting England, Scotland, or 
 the British Empire, and also on the topics specially excluded 
 from the competence of the Irish Parliament unless they 
 belong to the one topic, namely, the alteration of the Glad- 
 stonian Constitution, reserved for the Imperial Parliament. 
 
 Secondly. — The British Parliament, whatever be its 
 theoretical authority, will cease under the Clladstonian 
 Constitution to pass laws for Ireland, and will not impose 
 any taxation on Ireland in addition to the contribution 
 which Ireland is compelled to pay under the Constitution. 
 
 Hence, Thirdly, — and as a result of the various features 
 in the Gladstonian Constitution which have been already 
 noted, there exist under it three bodies with different 
 functions wliich, by whatever name they may be each 
 called, ought to be carefully distinguished. They are — 
 
 (i.) The British I*arliament at Westminster (containing 
 no Irish members), which legislates for Great Britain, 
 and for the whole of the British Empire, except Irelanil, 
 but which does not in general at any rate legislate for 
 Ireland. 
 
Chap. VII.] Homc Bide — Gladstonian Constitution, 235 
 
 (ii.) The Irish Parliament at Dublin (containing no 
 British representatives), which legislates for Ireland, but 
 does not legislate for England, Scotland, or for any other 
 part of the British Empire, and does not have any voice 
 whatever in the general policy of the Empire. 
 
 (iii.) The Imperial Parliament also sitting at West^ 
 minster, and comprising both the British and the Irish 
 Parliament. This body, which in composition corresponds 
 nearly if not exactly with the existing Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom, comes together only on special occasions 
 and only for a special purpose, namely the revision or 
 alteration of the Gladstonian Constitution. 
 
 That the existence of these three bodies, each normally 
 exercising the different functions or powers I have attri- 
 buted to them, constitutes an unmistakable, and I should 
 myself say a fundamental, change in the existing English 
 Constitution with its one sovereign Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom, hardly in my judgment requires or admits 
 of proof. If the change be denied, I have no course but to 
 leave the decision of the question whether such a change 
 can be fairly ignored to the intelligence of my readers.* 
 
 * I am quite aware that the account I have given of the proiX)sed 
 Gladstonian Constitution is likely not to be accepted as correct by some 
 of the supporters of ,the Government of Ireland Bill. That measure 
 by designating both what I have termed the British Parliament and 
 the Imperial Parliament by the one name Imperial Parliament, conceals 
 in my judgment the extent of the alteration which the Bill con- 
 templates. For the sake of clearness of thought I must request my 
 readers to distinguish carefully four dififerent bodies : — 
 
 1. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
 
236 England's Case against Hmnc Ride. [Chap. VII. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution, if it worked in the way 
 contemplated by its authors — if everything, that is to say, 
 went exactly as it was wished, and everybody acted 
 exactly in the manner in which constitutionally they 
 ought to act — would provide a complicated but, as I have 
 already said, most ingenious solution of the problem 
 
 Ireland. This is the actually existing Parliament constituted by the 
 Act of Union with Ireland. 
 
 2. The British Parliament ; that is, the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom with the Irish representatives removed from it. This body 
 is called under the Government of Ireland Bill the Imperial Parliament. 
 It is a distinctly different body from the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom. Whether it does or does not inherit the legal i30wers of the 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom is a separate question afterwards to 
 be considered. All that I now insist upon is that it is a different body. 
 
 3. The Irish Parliament, a body admittedly constituted or to be 
 constituted under the Government of Ireland Bill, and therein called 
 the Irish Legislature. 
 
 4. The Imperial Parliament, a body in effect consisting of the British 
 Parliament with the addition of the Irish representatives, or in other 
 words of the British Parliament combined with the Irish Parliament. 
 This body can be convoked, as I have pointed out, only for the si)ecial 
 purpose of altering the Gladstonian Constitution. It is termed in the 
 Government of Ireland Bill the Imperial Parliament. 
 
 What I am most anxious my readers should note is that the bodies 
 "2 and 4 are each termed in the Bill the Imperial Parliament, and thereby 
 not only confused together, but as far as possible each identified with 
 the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom, with which neither 
 really corresponds. 
 
 The British Parliament differs from the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom certainly in constitution, if not also in authority. 
 
 The so-called Imperial Parliament nearly corresponds with the 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom in constitution, but differs from it in 
 function and authority. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bule — Gladstonian Constitution. 237 
 
 before us. The British Parliament would sit at West- 
 minster undisturbed by any Irish obstructives, and 
 legislate for Great Britain and the whole British 
 Empire in accordance with the wishes of the people of 
 England and Scotland. Not only would Irish obstruction 
 vanish, but what is even better, the necessity of consider- 
 ing Irish questions at all would disappear. English 
 legislators would not be called upon to pay more attention 
 to the affairs of Ireland than to the affairs of Canada or of 
 New Zealand. The Irish Parliament would take the 
 whole burden of legislation for Ireland off our hands, and 
 Irishmen if they did not like Irish laws would have 
 nobody to complain of but Irish legislators. But the 
 Irish Parliament whilst it saved England from all trouble 
 would, if the Constitution worked properly, give England 
 no trouble whatever. If Bills were proposed or Acts 
 passed at DubHn in violation of the Constitution they 
 would be pronounced void by the Privy Council, and all 
 Ireland would at once acquiesce in the final decisions of 
 that exalted tribunal. If on the other hand the Irish 
 House of Parliament were to pass enactments which 
 though not unconstitutional were inexpedient, then foolish 
 proposals would be nullified by the veto of the Lord- 
 Lieutenant. The contribution from Ireland would be 
 duly collected and be paid up to the day, since its 
 collection would lie in the hands of British officials ; and 
 should any difficulty arise, the collectors would be aided 
 by the Irish Court of Exchequer, the Judges of wliich 
 
238 EiujlancVs Case ar/ainst Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 would be appointed by the English Government, and the 
 judgments of the Court of Exchequer could, if need were, 
 be enforced by the Britisli Army. This paper federation, 
 in short, looks as promising as paper Constitutions generally 
 do. It appears at first sight to combine the merits of 
 American Federalism and of Colonial independence. To 
 see, however, whether the Gladstonian Constitution gives 
 any real promise of fulfilling the hopes which it seems to 
 hold out, let us examine how far it really fulfils the 
 conditions on wliich alone, as we have already pointed 
 out, Home Kule can possibly be accepted by the people of 
 Oreat Britain. 
 
 tion!— Is" 1'^^ Question, — Is the Gladstonian Constitution 
 ty^of Pax- consistent with the sovereignty or ultimate legis- 
 liament lative Supremacy of the Britisli Parliament ? * 
 
 preserved ? jt ./ 
 
 * In reference to the legal effect of the Government of Ireland Bill on 
 the sovereignty of Parliament, see on the one side the speeches of Sir 
 Henry James of 13th May, 1886, * The Times Parliamentary Debates,' p. 
 468 ; of Mr. Finlay, 21st May, 1886, * TJie Times Parliamentary Debates,* 
 p. 614 ; and an article by Sir William Anson on the Government of 
 Ireland Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament in the Law Qtiarterly 
 Jievieiu for October, 1886. See on the other side Mr. Gladstone's speeches 
 in Parliament of 8tli April, 1886, * The Times Parliamentary Debates,' 
 p. 125 ; of 13th April, 1886, ihid. 255 ; of 10th May, 1886, ibid. 404 ; 
 and of 7th June, 1886, ihid. p. 861 ; of Mr. Parnell of 7th June, ibid. 
 p. 847 ; and * The Government of Ireland Bill,' being a simjccIi delivered 
 by Mr. James Bryce, M.P., on 17th May, 1886, and published as a 
 pamphlet. My disagreement with Mr. Bryce's conclusions makes me 
 anxious to cxj^ress my great admiration for his speech, which is by far 
 the best statement I have read of the view undoubtedly held by Mr. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution. 239 
 
 It is well to make clear to ourselves the precise 
 meaning of this enquiry. It is nothing else than 
 this: Do or do not the provisions of the Glad- 
 stonian Constitution either legally or morally impair 
 the right of the British Parliament when sitting at 
 Westminster without having summoned a single repre- 
 sentative from Ireland to legislate {e.g. pass a Coercion 
 Act) for Ireland, and if need be to repeal of its own 
 authority all or any of the provisions of the Gladstonian 
 Constitution, including the very provision under which it 
 is declared in substance that the Constitution shall not be 
 alterable except by the Imperial Parliament, which con- 
 sists, as already noted, of the British Parliament and the 
 Irish Parliament ? To put the same matter in another 
 shape, the enquiry is whether, under the Gladstonian 
 Constitution, the British Parliament does or does not 
 retain the sovereignty now admittedly possessed by the 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom.* 
 
 Let us first consider the matter as a pure question of 
 constitutional law. 
 
 Gladstone and his followers, that the Bill did not aftect the sovereignty 
 of Parliament. The reader should notice that the question through- 
 out between the late Government and its opponents was as to the effect 
 of the Bill on the sovereignty of what I have called the " British 
 Parliament," i.e. the body, by whatever name it be called, which 
 consists of the representatives of England and Scotland only, and does 
 not include representatives of Ireland. 
 
 * As to the sovereignty of Parliament, see Dicey, * Law of the 
 Constitution,' pp. 35-79. 
 
240 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII- 
 
 The inquiry then is whether a judge in England 
 Asaques- ^^ Ireland resolved to do his duty would or 
 ^titliUonTl' ^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ homid to treat as invalid 
 ^^^' an Act passed by the British Parliament 
 
 either inconsistent with or, to put the matter more 
 strongly, actually repealing of such Parliament's own 
 authority the provisions of the Gladstonian Constitution,, 
 or in other words of the Government of Ireland Bill, 
 which would then (as we are assuming the Gladstonian 
 Constitution to be in existence) have become the Irish 
 Government Act. 
 
 Such a judge would have to consider a question to which 
 English Courts are now quite unaccustomed as regards 
 Acts passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
 The reason why they are unused to solve the particular 
 kind of question supposed to arise under the new Irish 
 Constitution is, that as the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom is undoubtedly a sovereign body, the validity of 
 its enactments is in any British Court beyond dispute. 
 The reason why the problem might under the Gladstonian 
 Constitution require an answer is, that the question might 
 arise whether the British l*arliament were or were not a 
 sovereign body. 
 
 Our judge would find the question more difficult to 
 answer than is readily admitted by English lawyers not 
 versed in any constitution except their own. He would 
 have to consider the language and effect of the Irish 
 Government Act in the light of certain propositions 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bule — Gladstonian Constitution, 241 
 
 which are now, and at the supposed passing of that Act must 
 have been, true of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
 
 These propositions may be thus stated, roughly indeed 
 but with sufficient accuracy for our purpose : — 
 
 The Parliament of the United Kingdom is admittedly 
 the sovereign of the whole British Empire. 
 
 The Parliament of the United Kingdom because it is a 
 sovereign body can make laws for every part of the 
 British Empire, and can legally make or unmake any law, 
 and establish, alter, or abolish any institution (including 
 in that term the Constitution of the Canadian Dominion 
 or of Victoria) existing within the limits of any country 
 subject to the British Crown. 
 
 The Parliament of the United Kingdom just because it 
 is a sovereign body cannot, whilst retaining its position 
 as sovereign of the British Empire, be itself bound by any 
 Act of Parliament whatever. 
 
 To recur to an instance which is pre-eminently instruc- 
 tive. Parliament conferred in 1867 upon the Dominion of 
 Canada as large a measure of independence as is com- 
 patible with a colony's maintaining its position as part of 
 the British Empire. Yet the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom retains now, as ever, the indisputable legal power 
 to change or abolish the Constitution of the Dominion. 
 
 The Parliament of the United Kingdom, just because it 
 is a sovereign body, though it cannot remain a sovereign 
 and place a legal limit on its own powers, can, like any other 
 sovereign, e.g. the Czar of Eussia, abdicate its sovereignty in 
 
 B 
 
242 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. VII. 
 
 reference to the whole, or it may be to part of the Crown's 
 dominions ; and the Parliament of theUnited Kingdom can, 
 just because it is a sovereign body, do what is at bottom the 
 same thing as abdicate, namely, merge its own powers in 
 those ofanother sovereign body, or, in other words, form, or 
 aid in forming, a new sovereign for the British Empire. ' 
 
 This proposition has during the Home Eule controversy 
 been occasionally, in words at least, disputed or questioned 
 by the supporters of Mr. Gladstone's policy, and language 
 has been used which seems to imply that a sovereign 
 power such as the Parliament of the United Kingdom can 
 never by its own act divest itself of sovereignty. I can 
 hardly think that the able controversialists who seem to 
 maintain this doctrine really meant to contend for more 
 than the admitted principle that a sovereign cannot while 
 remaining a sovereign limit his sovereign powers. If, 
 however, it be seriously suggested that the Parliament of 
 the United Kingdom cannot divest itself of sovereignty, 
 the suggestion is as a matter of argument untenable, and 
 this for more than one reason. 
 
 An autocrat, such as the Russian Czar, can undoubtedly 
 abdicate ; but sovereignty, whether it be the sovereignty 
 of the Czar or of Parliament, is always one and the same 
 quality. If the Czar can abdicate, so can Parliament 
 The Czar again could, instead of abdicating in the ordinary 
 sense of the term, constitute a new sovereign body for the 
 government of Eussia, of which he might himself be a 
 part. Thus ho may undoubtedly give Russia a constitu- 
 
.CriAP. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution. 243 
 
 tion like that of England, under which the Czar and 
 two Houses of Parliament might together become the 
 sovereign of the Eussian State, and no constitutionalist 
 would dream of maintaining that the new power thus 
 constituted was the less supreme owing to the fact that 
 one of its members, namely the Czar, had at one time 
 been liimseK the real sovereign of Eussia. Here again 
 what is true of the Czar is true of Parliament. The Par- 
 liament of the United Kingdom certainly might become 
 a part of another sovereign body, or might join in 
 constituting a sovereign power supreme throughout the 
 British Empire of which Parliament itself did not form a 
 part. There is nothing in the theory of sovereignty to 
 prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from 
 forming a constitution for the whole British Empire under 
 which the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Victorian 
 Parliament, the Parliament of the Canadian Dominion and 
 so forth should become simply State Parliaments, whilst 
 the whole British Empire was ruled by some Imperial 
 Congress sitting, say, either in London or in Victoria. Nor 
 need we in tliis matter have recourse to theory. The 
 present Parliament of the United Kingdom is itself a 
 monument of the historical fact that sovereign Parliaments 
 can divest themselves of sovereignty. For the Parlia- 
 ment of the United Kingdom is itself the result of the 
 abdication of supreme power by sovereign Parliaments. 
 The Union with Scotland was not, as Englishmen often, I 
 STispect, fancy, the absorption of the Parliament of Scot- 
 
 B 2 
 
244 England's Case against Hmne JRule, [Chap. VII. 
 
 land in the Parliament of England. The transaction bears, 
 when carefully looked at, a quite different character. Up 
 to the year 1707 there existed an English Parliament 
 sovereign in England, and there existed a Scotch Parlia- 
 ment sovereign in Scotland, These two sovereign bodies 
 in negotiating the Treaty of Union acted with scrupulous, 
 and on the Scotch side with punctilious, independence. 
 Neither sovereign body woidd consent to be absorbed in 
 the other. What they did agree to was to constitute a new 
 State, namely, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and 
 each to surrender their separate sovereignty in favour of a 
 new sovereign, namely, the sovereign Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom. The English Parliament no more 
 became supreme in Scotland than the Scotch Parliament 
 became supreme in England. The old Parliament of each 
 country abdicated and lost its identity in the New Parlia- 
 ment of Great Britain. In theory the Treaty of Union 
 between Great Britain and Ireland bore exactly the same 
 character as the Treaty of Union between England and 
 Scotland. But on this point I do not care strongly to 
 insist, because at the present moment every part of Irish 
 history excites controversy. Wlien, however, the excitement 
 of the day has passed by, no one will dispute that 22 Geo. 
 III. c. 53 and 23 Geo. III. c. 28 constituted the renunciation 
 by the British Parliament of sovereignty over Ireland. The 
 difterence between the limitation of sovereignty and the sur- 
 render of sovereignty has been pressed for enough for my 
 present purpose ; no principle of jurisprudence is more cer- 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — Gladstonicm Constitution. 245 
 
 tain than that sovereignty implies the power of abdication, 
 and no fact of history is more certain than that a sovereign 
 Parliament has more than once abdicated or shared its 
 powers. To argue or imply that because sovereignty is 
 not limitable (which is true), it cannot be surrendered 
 (which is palpably untrue) is to confuse together two 
 distinct ideas, and is like arguing that because no man 
 can while he lives give up, do what he will, his freedom 
 of volition, therefore no man can commit suicide. 
 
 The Parliament of the United Kingdom, further, whilst 
 because it is a sovereign body it cannot impose any legal 
 limit to the exercise of its own power, may so express an 
 intention to use or not to use its power in a particular way 
 as to excite expectations which it will be extremely 
 difficult or hazardous to disappoint, and so may find 
 itself morally fettered as to its subsequent legislative action. 
 
 A notorious instance, taken from our constitutional 
 history, illustrates this proposition. The statute 18 Geo. 
 III. c. 12 declares in substance that Parliament will not 
 impose any tax on any colony in North America or in the 
 West Indies. The history of the statute is told by its 
 date — 1778. Now no constitutional lawyer will contend 
 that the Parliament of the United Kingdom is legally 
 bound by this Act. If Parliament were to impose an 
 income tax on Jamaica to-morrow the impost would be 
 1-egal, and could, no doubt, be enforced. But tlie 
 Declaratory Act of 1778 makes it morally impossible for 
 Parliament to tax any colony. That the impossibility 
 
246 England* s Case against Home Bide. [Chap. VII. 
 
 does not arise from a law is clear, because it applies with 
 as much strength to colonies which do not fall as to 
 colonies which do fall within the terms of 18 Geo. III. 
 c. 12. Victoria is not a colony in North America or in the 
 West Indies, but Victoria is at least as well protected 
 from Imperial taxation as is Barbadoes. The so-called 
 Act establishes not a rule of law, but a precept of consti- 
 tutional morality. It does not theoretically limit, but it 
 practically impedes and interferes with the legislative 
 sovereignty of Parliament. 
 
 Our judge with these propositions fully before liis mind 
 would scan the terms of the Gladstonian Constitution, or 
 in other words of the Irish Government Act. He would 
 certainly come to the conclusion that the point for his 
 decision was one of great nicety. Against the validity of 
 any Act passed by the British Parliament in contravention 
 of the provisions of the Constitution could be adduced the 
 precise and formal enactment, passed, be it noted, by the 
 undoubtedly sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
 that the Constitution should be alterable in one way, and in 
 one way only ; * and if it were said that the body which 
 passed this enactment could also repeal it, then the judge 
 might consider that the body in question, namely the 
 Parliament of the United Kingdom, had in effect ceased 
 to exist, and that the successor (if any) to its sovereign 
 powers was not the British Parliament, but the Imperial 
 Parliament, the body wliich, under any view, had legal 
 * Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. 
 
Chip. VII.] Home Bule — Gladstonian Constitution. 247 
 
 authority to alter the Constitution. No doubt there 
 would be a great deal to be urged on the other side. The 
 attention of the judge would be called to the singular 
 and ambiguous use throughout the Constitution of the 
 term Imperial Parliament, which it might be argued was 
 meant to show that what I have called the British 
 Parliament was to be identified with the Parliament of 
 the United Kingdom. Keference would also be made 
 to the ambiguous saving of j)owers contained in the 
 37th section of the Irish Government Act. The high and 
 all-important enquiry as to the authority of the British 
 Parliament sitting at Westminster would come to turn 
 upon the studied ambiguities of one ill-drawn section of 
 an Act of Parliament. There the legal question of the 
 sovereignty of the British Parliament under the Glad- 
 stonian Constitution may well be left. It is not within 
 the scope of this work to deal with the draughtsmanship 
 of the Government of Ireland Bill. It is easy to anticipate 
 what would be the practical result of that Bill's ambiguities 
 if it passed into an Act. Irish judges would honestly 
 take one view, English judges would as honestly take 
 another. The Courts of Ireland would maintain that the 
 Constitution could be altered only in the method provided 
 by the Constitution, namely, by the Imperial Parliament. 
 The English Courts would maintain that the Constitution 
 could also be altered by the British Parliament, which was 
 itself the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and possessed 
 the sovereignty inherent in the Parliament of the United _ 
 
248 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VH. 
 
 Kingdom. No Court in either country could satisfactorily 
 terminate the dispute. Force would no doubt settle what 
 law had left undecided, but to interpret a Constitution by 
 power of arms is in reality to substitute revolutiorary 
 violence for forensic discussion.* 
 
 * I do not, of course, for a moment deny that an Act could le so 
 drawn as to give Ireland an Irish Parliament, to remove the Irish 
 members from the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and at the 
 same time to reserve to the residue of the Unitert Parliament, or Kump, 
 the full sovereignty now possessed by the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom. What I do insist upon is, that it is open to question whether 
 the Government of Ireland Bill was so drawn as to achieve these 
 results. Nor is the question unimportant. The fundamental ambiguity 
 of the Bill obviously arose from the fact that its authors, whilst wisling 
 to promise in appearance to Ireland that the new Irish constitution 
 should not be changed by a body in which Ireland had no represen- 
 tatives, also wished to soothe the apprehensions of England by tacitly 
 reserving to the British ParHament the power of altering or repealing 
 the Irish constitution without recalling the representatives of Ireland. 
 The consequence is that the Bill proclaims in so many words that its 
 provisions shall be altered in one way only, but by implication, as its 
 authors suppose, provides that its provisions may be altered in another 
 and quite different way. If this is the intended effect of the Bill it 
 ought to have been made patent on its face. In constitutional matters, 
 as indeed in all the serious concerns of life, ambiguity and uncertainty 
 of expression is the source both of misunderstanding and of danger. 
 
 The question of the sovereignty of the British Parliament might, it 
 should be noted, arise in another and more perplexing form, which 
 received, unless I am mistaken, no attention diu-ing the debates on the 
 Irish Government Bill. Admit for the sake of argument that the 
 British Parliament can legislate for Ireland ; is it equally certain that 
 the Imperial Parliament (i.e. the British Parliament with the addition 
 of Irish representatives) cannot claim to legislate for England or for the 
 whole British Empire ? No doubt the Gladstonian Constitution proposes 
 that the Imperial Parliament should be convened only for a limited and 
 definite purpose ; but is it certain that the Imperial Parliament, which 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bide — Gladstonian Constihttion. 249 
 
 Let us next consider the matter before us, not as a 
 question of constitutional law, but as a question of public 
 morality. 
 
 The enquiry then is whether under the Gladstonian Con- 
 stitution the legislative supremacy of the British j^^ q^es- 
 Parliament is or is not morally and in fact im- public 
 paired ? It is extremely difficult to see how ^lorality. 
 any candid person can answer this question except by the 
 admission that for all practical purposes, and except on 
 possible but very extreme occasions, the right of the British 
 Parliament to legislate for Ireland is morally not only im- 
 paired but destroyed. The supporters of the Government 
 of Ireland Bill have admitted again and again that it consti- 
 tutes what they term a Parliamentary compact ; it embodies, 
 in other words, a solemn contract between Great Britain 
 and the people of Ireland that the British Parliament, 
 v/hatever be its legal power, shall not legislate about 
 Irish affairs without summoning Irish representatives 
 
 would in its constituent parts be in effect the reunited Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom, might not when convened claim to reassume sovereign 
 power ? The addition of a hundred Irish members might turn a minority 
 in the British Parliament into a majority in the Imperial Parliament ; 
 can we feel sure that the English minority in the British Parliament 
 would resist the temptation to exalt the authority of a body in which 
 they would be supreme ? The enquiry sounds to Englishmen a strange 
 one ; but the annals of foreign constitutions suggest that an assembly 
 which, though convoked for a particular purpose, is able from any point 
 of view to consider itself sovereign is with difficulty restrained from 
 asserting supreme power. From this side the Gladstonian Constitution 
 might prove a menace to the supremacy of the British Parliament. 
 
250 England's Case against Home Bule. [Chap. VII.. 
 
 to share in its deliberations. This covenant is made for 
 great and valuable consideration, namely, the withdrawal 
 of the Irish representatives from the Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom, and the consequent acquisition by the- 
 British Parliament of power to legislate not only on every 
 British but on every Imperial concern without consulting 
 the wishes of the Irish people. This is in a moral point 
 of view little less than a treaty ; it is an engagement which 
 England could not break, or incur the imputation of 
 breaking, without dishonour. With all this every man of 
 sense and of honour agrees; but if this be so, it is 
 impossible to see how any one can maintain that this 
 Parliamentary compact does not morally impair, as far as 
 Ireland is concerned, the sovereignty or legislative 
 supremacy of the British Parliament. It may be doubted 
 whether the most earnest Gladstonian really and seriously 
 maintains that under the Gladstonian Constitution the 
 British Parliament sitting at Westminster could or ever 
 would legislate for Ireland in contravention at any rate of 
 the patent and apparent meaning of the Constitution. All 
 that is really maintained is that the British Parliament 
 would retain a legal power of doing that which would 
 never be done by it. There is, however, it is suggested, 
 convenience in retaining a nominal sovereignty which is 
 not intended for real use. Convenience there may be, but 
 there is also immense danger. The Irish Parliament we 
 will suppose acts in a way which is most annoying to 
 England, but the Irish Parliament at the same time takes 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bulc — Gladstonian ConstiMion, 251 
 
 care not to violate a line of the Constitution. The 
 temptation to use our sovereign authority is great, and 
 likely enough may prove irresistible ; yet if we use it every 
 Irishman, and many Englishmen for that matter, will accuse 
 England of bad faith. ISTo doubt a breach of the Consti- 
 tution by the Irish Parliament might be remedied by the 
 use of the sovereignty reserved to the British Parliament. 
 But it is difficult even then to see the great advantage of 
 this reservation. In any case in which England would be 
 morally justified in setting aside the terms of the high 
 Parliamentary contract, she would be equally justified in 
 suspending the Constitution by the use of force. The 
 employment of power becomes the more not the less odious 
 because it is allied, or seems to be allied, with fraud. The 
 miserable tale of the transactions which carried the Treaty 
 of Union teaches at least one indisputable lesson — the due 
 observance of legal formalities will not induce a people to 
 pardon what they deem to be acts of tyranny, made all 
 the more hateful by their combination with deceit. Eor 
 the British Parliament to renounce the exercise whilst 
 retaining the name of sovereignty is the very course by 
 which to run a great risk of damaging the character 
 without any certainty of increasing the power of Par- 
 liament. 
 
 The plain answer then to the enquiry on which we 
 have been engaged is this : — 
 
 Under the Gladstonian Constitution, as foreshadowed in 
 the Government of Ireland Bill, the sovereignty of tha 
 
252 EnglancVs Case against Home Eide. [Chap. VII, 
 
 British Parliament is legally rendered doubtful, and is 
 morally reduced to nothing. 
 
 2nd Qicestiofi. — Does the Gladstonian Constitution secure 
 justice ? 
 
 The justice which the Constitution ought to secure is 
 Does Con- twofold — justice to Great Britain, and justice to 
 eecurr'^ all classes, including minorities, of Irislimen. 
 justice? rpj^g j^g^ claims of Great Britain may roughly 
 
 be summed up under the one claim, that Ireland should 
 contribute her fair share to Imperial expenditure. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution, nominally at least, makes 
 fair provision that this claim should be satisfied. But 
 any one who looks into the matter with care will find 
 reason to think that as regards the exaction of payments 
 from Ireland, which are already known by the hateful 
 name of " tribute," Great Britain will find herself involved 
 in this dilemma. She must either surrender tlie tribute, 
 or else surrender all hope of attaining the main object 
 for the sake of which it is proposed to grant Home 
 Eule to Ireland. If the tribute is exacted, we may be 
 sure that it will have to be exacted in the long run by 
 British officials supported by a British army. Laws, we 
 are told, which are otherwise just are hated in Ireland 
 because they bear a foreign aspect, and come before the 
 Irish people in a foreign garb. If this assertion be 
 false, then the whole case for Home Ihile fiills to the 
 ground. If this assertion possess even partial truth, then 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladsto7iian Constitution, 253 
 
 it ai)plies with far greater force to tribute than to law. It 
 is almost an absurdity to suppose that people who hate 
 good laws because they may be termed English will not 
 detest a heavy tax which not only may be called, but in 
 reality is, a tribute to England. It is w^ell to remember 
 that a " publican " was a tax-gatherer, and that Eoman 
 publicans were far more hated than Eoman judges or 
 Eoman law. If England gives Ireland semi-independence, 
 and at the same time makes Ireland pay tribute, aU the 
 conciliatory effects of Home Eule will be lost. If Home 
 Eule is to have even a bare chance of producing in Ireland 
 the contentment of Victoria, Ireland, the poorest of all 
 civilized countries, must be freed from Imperial taxation, 
 which would not be tolerated by the richest of our 
 colonies. To this conclusion the advocates and the oppo- 
 nents of Home Eule may, I think, both come without 
 grave dissatisfaction. Of all the sacrifices by which 
 Ireland might be benefited, that sacrifice which England 
 should make with the least regret is sacrifice of revenue. 
 If, however, it be assumed, as the supporters of the 
 Government of Ireland Bill must assume, that justice 
 requires the contribution by Ireland of three or four 
 millions annually to Imperial expenditure, then the 
 Gladstonian Constitution, if it provides for the satisfaction 
 of the claims of Great Britain, does so at the cost of 
 keeping alive Irish discontent. Nor is it at all certain 
 that the payment of the tribute could in effect be easily 
 secured. The practical working of tlie Constitution might 
 
■254 ETiglancVs Case against Home Bide, [Chap. VII. 
 
 well be that Great Britain were impoverished and Ireland 
 were angered. 
 
 Justice to individuals and to unpopular minorities is a 
 matter of far greater importance and far more difficult to 
 secure than the regular payment of Ireland's contribution 
 to Imperial expenditure. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution ought to provide securities 
 against executive and legislative oppression. 
 
 To provide however against the possible oppression of 
 classes or individuals by an Irish Ministry and Irish 
 officials is all but an impossibility, though, as every one 
 knows, the grossest oppression may in any country arise 
 from the wrongful action or inaction of the executive 
 power. The assumption, indeed, is constantly made, 
 though its truth is very hard to prove, that if Ireland 
 were self-governed the law of the land would be enforced. 
 In one sense tliis assumption may perhaps be well founded. 
 A strong government, or, to put matters plainly, a popular 
 despotism when installed in office at Dublin would, it may 
 Ije suspected, stringently compel obedience to such laws as 
 the Government approved. The Jacobin Club was no 
 friend to anarchy when anarchy meant defiance of tlie 
 mandates issued by the Club. But the energy of a strong 
 Government in carrying out laws which it approves is a dif- 
 ferent matter from the zealous maintenance of even-handed 
 justice. An Irish Executive will immediately on coming 
 into existence be called upon to deal with cases whicli 
 will severely test its sense of justice. Landlords cannot 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladsionian Constitution, 255 
 
 at once be banished from Ireland ; landlords, as long 
 as tliey exist, must, I presume, have some rights. Is 
 there any security under the Gladstonian Constitution, 
 that these rights — rights, be it remembered, of British sub- 
 jects, which ought to be neither more nor less sacred than 
 tlie rights of a British subject in London or Calcutta — 
 will be protected by an Executive of Land Leaguers ? 
 There is, I answer, none whatever. To distrust the justice 
 of an Irish Government is not, be it remarked, to show 
 any special distrust of Irish nature. The Irish leaders are 
 of necessity revolutionists, and, it must be added, revolu- 
 tionists of no high character. Eevolutionists on accession 
 to power do not lay aside the revolutionary temperament, 
 and this temperament may have every other virtue, but 
 it knows nothing of the virtue of justice. The Glad- 
 stonian Constitution withdraws Ireland from the control 
 of the Government of the United Kingdom, which witlx 
 all its faults must of necessity possess more impartiality 
 than can a Ministry formed out of the leaders of any 
 Irish faction. The Gladstonian Constitution therefore does 
 leave unpopular classes or individuals exposed to con- 
 siderable risks of injustice at the hands of the Irish 
 Government. 
 
 Though it is from the nature of things almost impossible 
 to take effective steps for ensuring that an Irish Executive 
 shall make a right use of its powers, it is an essential 
 feature of the Gladstonian Constitution that the Irish 
 Parliament shall so far at least use its authority justly as 
 
256 England!s Case against Home Bute. [Chap. VII. 
 
 to keep within the limits placed upon its competence. 
 Whether these limitations have been wisely drawn, and 
 whether they may not be in some respects too wide and in 
 others too narrow, are inquiries which, though important 
 in themselves, need hardly detain us. The question in 
 comparison with which all matters of detail sink into 
 insignificance is not what are the limitations which the 
 Constitution imposes on the competence of the Irish 
 „ , , Parliament, but what is the efficacy of the 
 
 Methods "^ 
 
 forsecur- means provided by the Constitution for com- 
 ing just 
 govern- pelling the Irish Parliament to respect these 
 
 limitations ? This is the one vital inquiry, for 
 upon the answer to it depends the reality of the constitu- 
 tional provisions for the maintenance of just legislation. 
 These methods are, as already pointed out, twofold. 
 
 The first is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant. Let us 
 
 assume, though the truth of the assumption is 
 1. Veto of ° ^ 
 
 Lord-Lieu- not quite clear, that this veto is combined, as 
 tenant. 
 
 in the case of the colonies, with a further power 
 
 of disallowance on the part of the Crown, or in effect 
 of the British Ministry. The result is that the British 
 Ministry, or, to put the thing plainly, the British House 
 of Commons, can put a check on such Irish legislation as 
 may be opposed to the letter or to the spirit of the Con- 
 stitution. The check is in one sense real, but it must, as 
 in the case of the colonies, be but rarely employed. Its 
 constant use, or its use on occasions of great importance, 
 would seem to Irishmen, and with good reason, to nullify 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Bule — Gladstonian Constitution, 257 
 
 the concession of Home Eule. Suppose the Irish Ministry 
 carry a measure for artificially stimulating Irish commerce, 
 and the Crown disallows it on the ground that it violates 
 the provision of the Constitution forbidding the Irish 
 Parliament to make laws relating to trade. The Irish 
 Cabinet thereupon resigns. No other can be formed. It 
 returns to power and reintroduces the obnoxious Bill. 
 What course can the Lord-Lieutenant take ? If he uses 
 the veto, he reintroduces in the most awkward form the 
 interference of the British Parliament with Irish legis- 
 lation. If he does not use the veto, and the Act is not 
 disallowed, then the right of veto comes to little or 
 nothing. We may be quite sure that in general neither 
 the Lord-Lieutenant nor the Crown will refuse assent to 
 Bills approved of by the Irish Parliament. The veto 
 in its different forms will, in short, be but a very slight 
 check on unconstitutional or unjust legislation. 
 
 The second method by which it is endeavoured to 
 
 check unconstitutional legislation is the use of 
 
 ® . 2. Action 
 
 the authority vested in the English Privy Council, of Privy 
 
 Council. 
 
 This method is borrowed from Federalism, as 
 the Lord-Lieutenant's veto is borrowed from the Colonial 
 system. The Privy Council, it should be remembered, 
 may nullify the effect of Irish legislation in two ways : — 
 It may as an administrative body give a decision that a Bill 
 or Act is void. It must, however, be hoped and expected 
 that the Privy Council will rarely adopt this mode of 
 exercising its powers, for such exercise would at once give 
 
 s 
 
258 EnglamVs Cccse against Home Rule. [Chap. Vll. 
 
 rise to a direct conflict between the Irish Parliament and 
 
 the English Privy Council. That body may, however, act 
 
 simply as a Court of final appeal, and as a tribunal decide 
 
 whether an enactment of the Irish Parliament is or is not 
 
 void. This, we may suppose, is the mode in which the 
 
 Privy Council will usually put forth its authority. It is 
 
 easy, bearing the experience of America and Canada in 
 
 mind, to see how the whole arrangement will, in theory at 
 
 least, work. A. sues X. in an Irish Court, X. bases his 
 
 defence on some Act passed by the Irish Parliament. The 
 
 Privy Council pronounce the Act void, as being opposed 
 
 to some provision of the Constitution, and give a judgment 
 
 in favour of A.^ under which he has a right to recover 
 
 £10,000 against X. Here it will be said the whole 
 
 matter is settled. The law was unconstitutional ; the law 
 
 has been treated as void ; A. has obtained judgment ; A's 
 
 rights are secured. This would be all that was required, 
 
 but for one consideration. The object of the plaintiff in 
 
 an action is to obtain not judgment, but payment or 
 
 execution. What are the means by which judgments of 
 
 the Privy Council may be put in force where they happen 
 
 not to be supported by Irish opinion, and are opposed, it 
 
 may be, to the decisions of the Irish Courts ? The answer 
 
 is simple : the Constitution provides no means whatever. 
 
 The Federal tribunals of America possess in every State 
 
 officials of their own, and are supported in the main by 
 
 American opinion. The Americans are, moreover, to use 
 
 their own expression, "a law-abiding people." Yet for 
 
Ohap. VII.] Home Bide — Gladstonian Constitution. 259 
 
 all this the judgment of the Supreme Court may be worth 
 little if it runs across State sentiment, and if the President 
 should happen to sympathise with State rights. A 
 citizen was unlawfully imprisoned in Georgia ; he applied 
 for a habeas corpus. The application ultimately came 
 before Chief Justice Marshall, and the writ was granted. 
 The traditional comment of President Jackson is note- 
 worthy: "John Marshall has given his judgment, let 
 him enforce it if he can." The Executive would not 
 assist the Court, and the Supreme Court was powerless. 
 Switzerland, again, has a Federal tribunal : it is a Court, 
 as would be the Privy Council, which cannot command 
 officials of its own to execute its process; it depends 
 for aid on the Cantonal authorities. This state of tilings, 
 I am told on good authority, produces its natural result. 
 The judgments of the Federal tribunal can be rendered 
 almost ineffective by the opposition of a Canton. 
 
 At this moment the statutes of the Imperial Parliament 
 bind every man throughout the United Kingdom. The 
 Courts in Ireland are bound to give effect to every 
 statute, and the Irish Courts are supported by the Sheriff 
 and his of&cers, and in the last resort by the power of the 
 United Kingdom. Yet the difficulty of the day is en- 
 forcement of judgments which run against Irish popular 
 opinion. Is it common sense to imagine that opposition 
 which defies, often with success, the authority of the Irish 
 Queen's Bench Division, or ultimately of the House of 
 Lords, would not easily nullify the judgments of the Privy 
 
 s 2 
 
260 England's Case against Home Bute, [Chap. VII. 
 
 Council when not only unpopular in Ireland, but in 
 contradiction to a law devised by the Irish Executive, 
 passed by the Irish Parliament, supported by the Irish 
 Judges? The truth must be spoken: the Gladstonian 
 Constitution will, as regards the restrictions placed under 
 it on the powers of the Irish Parliament, inevitably turn 
 out a mere paper Constitution. The methods for com- 
 pelling the observance of these limitations have neither of 
 them any real efficacy. The veto can with difficulty 
 and but rarely be used ; the judgments or opinions of the 
 Privy Council may have a speculative interest, but will 
 possess no coercive power. 
 
 If this be so the guarantees afforded by the Constitution 
 for just legislation are nugatory ; they are worth neither 
 more nor less than the pompous securities for every kind 
 of inalienable right which have adorned the most splendid 
 and the most transitory among the Constitutions wliich 
 have during a century been in turn created and destroyed 
 in France — that is, they are worth nothing; nor is it 
 unfair to conjecture that on this point my opinion agrees 
 with the opinion of many English Home Pulers. They 
 think the limitations on the independence of the Irish 
 Parliament useless and destined to disappear; for their 
 avowed belief is that legislation by an Irish Parliament 
 will in the main be just, and that the laws of the Irish 
 Parliament, because they represent the wishes of the Irish 
 people, will obtain easy obedience in Ireland. If this 
 conviction be sound — and it is the almost necessary basis 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution, 261 
 
 for a policy of Home Kule — let us act upon it, and not 
 impose restrictions which, if needless, must certainly be 
 noxious. Meanwhile in any case let us dismiss the 
 delusion that restrictions which cannot be enforced are 
 any guarantee for justice. The Gladstonian Constitution 
 admits on the face of it that guarantees are wanted. 
 Most Englishmen agree in the opinion implied in this 
 admission. But if I am right in asserting that the 
 guarantees for justice are illusory, then the Gladstonian 
 Constitution does not secure justice, and is therefore not 
 just. 
 
 3rd Qtcestion. — Does the Gladstonian Constitution hold 
 out fair hopes of finality ? Does qqj^. 
 
 This is an enquiry which may be answered pog^^gg^ 
 with some confidence. finality ? 
 
 To any one who surveys the Constitution, not as a 
 politician, but as a legist, to any one moderately versed in 
 the study of comparative constitutionalism, few statements 
 which savour of prediction will appear more certain than 
 the assertion that the Gladstonian Constitution cannot be 
 a final or even a lasting settlement of the constitutional 
 relations between England and Ireland. 
 
 The grounds of this opinion are, briefly, tliat the proposed 
 Constitution will, while leaving alive elements of discord, 
 cause disappointment and inconvenience to both countries, 
 and that the mechanism of the Constitution, framed as it 
 is upon a combination of Federalism and of Colonialism, 
 
262 England's Case against Some Bide. [Chap. VII- 
 
 has some of the defects of each system, and promises in 
 its working to produce something like the maximum of 
 irritation and friction. 
 
 The two grounds for believing that the Gladstonian 
 Constitution bears no promise of finality run into one 
 another, but they admit of separate examination, and each 
 requires explanation or justification. 
 
 The Constitution will cause disappointment and incon- 
 Constitu- venience both to England and to Ireland. 
 causraL Englishmen will on the Gladstonian Con- 
 appoint- stitution coming into operation find to their 
 England, great disappointment that they have not attained 
 the object which from an English point of view was the 
 principal inducement to grant Home Eule to the Irish 
 people, that is, freedom from the difficulty of governing 
 Ireland. The difficulty no doubt will be diminished, or 
 rather shifted ; but the dream is vain that under the new 
 Constitution Englishmen would be able to trouble them- 
 selves no more about the concerns of Ireland than they do 
 about the affairs of Canada. Ireland would still be our 
 immediate neighbour. Irishmen would still be divided 
 by differences of class and religion, and England woiQd 
 still, disguise the fact as you may, be ultimately re- 
 sponsible for good government in Ireland. Home Rule 
 is not Separation, and nothing short of Irish independence 
 would greatly lessen English responsibility. Tliis would 
 be true under whatever form Home Ivule were established. 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Eule — Gladstoiiian Constitution. 263 
 
 but it is emphatically true of Home Eule under the par- 
 ticular form contemplated by the Gladstonian Constitution. 
 The army in Ireland — and no one supposes that England 
 can withdraw her soldiers from the country — will be the 
 British Army under the control of the British Government. 
 But the power of the sword is, though we often forget the 
 fact, the sanction by which law is maintained. Hence it 
 follows that the British Ministry remains at bottom re- 
 sponsible for the maintenance of peace and order through- 
 out Ireland. Note the results. If there are riots at 
 Belfast ; if unpopular ofi&cials are assassinated in Dublin ; 
 if evictions give rise to murder in Kerry, the British Army 
 must in the last resort be called in to restore peace or 
 punish crime. If the army are not under the control of 
 the Irish Executive, then the English Cabinet become 
 directly responsible for the government of Ireland. If 
 British soldiers are placed at the disposal of the Irish 
 Ministry, still the English Government must, shift the 
 thing as you will, share the responsibility of the Irish 
 Cabinet. During a riot at Belfast a hundred Protestants 
 or Catholics are shot by British soldiers whilst restoring 
 order. If any one fancies that such slaughter can take 
 place without the English Ministry being called upon in 
 the British Parliament for explanation and defence, he 
 shows utter ignorance of English, or indeed of human, 
 nature. ISTor is it for the action only of the troops that 
 the English Executive will incur liability. If British 
 subjects are killed by a mob in Belfast or in Dublin 
 
2G4 Enrjlatid's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. vn. 
 
 whilst British troops stand quietly by and under the 
 direction of an Irish Home Secretary take no steps to pre- 
 vent murder, we may rest assured that the Queen's Govern- 
 ment in England will be asked whether it is decent that the 
 Queen's forces should be trained to stand as indifferent 
 spectators of outrageous breaches of the Queen's peace. 
 
 Take again the question of pardoning crime. Suppose 
 that the first Irish Ministry on their accession to power 
 propose to inaugurate the new era by a free pardon of all 
 the political offenders, dynamiters and others, whose mis- 
 guided zeal has placed them within the grip of the law, 
 but has also in no small measure contributed to achieve 
 the Parliamentary independence of Ireland. If the request 
 is not granted, then the Irish Administration are refused 
 the means of carrying on the government of the country 
 after their own notions of sound polity. If the request 
 is granted, can the English Government be held entirely 
 irresponsible for the mode in which the Crown exercises 
 its prerogative ? Let it be settled that the prerogative of 
 mercy must in Ireland be exercised in accordance with 
 the wishes of the Irish Ministry. Even then the 
 English Government will not really escape responsibility. 
 British soldiers put down a riot at Belfast; they are 
 indicted for the murder of a Catholic rioter, before a 
 Catholic grand jury, convicted by a Catholic jury under 
 the direction of a Catholic judge who has just been 
 appointed by the new Irish Ministry. Popular opinion 
 demands the execution of the convicted nuirderera, the 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution. 265 
 
 Irish Ministry advise that the law should take its course. 
 The general belief in England, shared we will suppose by 
 the English Home Office, is that the convicted soldiers 
 are about to be capitally punished for having simply dis- 
 charged their duty. Is an English Minister to abstain 
 from advising a pardon ? The dilemma is difficult. If he 
 recommends a pardon, the Irish Government are prevented 
 by England from governing Ireland. If the soldiers are 
 hanged, the English Ministry will not keep long in 
 office, and the British Army will hardly maintain its habit 
 of absolute obedience to the civil power. 
 
 Englishmen, in the next place, will soon discover that 
 the creation of a statutory constitution for Ireland 
 curiously hampers the working of our own institutions. 
 Questions must arise whether Acts of the British Parlia- 
 ment do or do not trench upon the provisions of the Irish 
 Constitution. Few persons are aware of the number of 
 Imperial Acts which touch the Colonies. To such statutes 
 there is no legal or moral objection, because the principle 
 embodied in the Colonial Laws Act, 1865, that enactments 
 passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom override 
 any Colonial law with wdiich they conflict, is universally 
 admitted ; but, as already pointed out, it is questionable 
 as a matter of law whether the statutes of the British 
 Parliament can repeal Acts duly passed by the Irish 
 Parliament, and it is quite beyond question that for the 
 British Parliament to infringe upon the province of the 
 Irish legislature would involve a breach of good faith. 
 
266 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. VII, 
 
 Changes again in the formation of the British Parliament 
 might under the Gladstonian Constitution become difficult. 
 The abolition of the House of Lords would be hard to 
 reconcile with the right of the Irish Peers to be summoned 
 on occasion to the Imperial Parliament. An increase in 
 the number of British representatives in the House of 
 Commons would be objected to by Irishmen because it 
 diminished the relative importance of the members from 
 Ireland when recalled to take part in the deliberations of 
 tlie Imperial Parliament. Tlie reduction of the number of 
 members of the House of Commons, though one of the 
 most salutary reforms which could be carried out, would 
 be opposed by every person interested in maintaining the 
 present excessive number of the Lower House, on the 
 ground that to reduce the numbers of the House of 
 Commons, to say 400, would involve an increase in the 
 authority of the Irish members whenever they reappeared 
 on the scene. The moot question whether the British 
 Parliament could on an emergency repeal of its own 
 authority the articles of the Irish Constitution, the extent 
 to whicli Ireland should be represented on the Judicial 
 Committee of the Privy Council, above all, the vital 
 question whether the reassembled Imperial Parliament 
 were not the true representative of the Parliament of the 
 United Kingdom, and the ultimate sovereign power in the 
 State, would in periods of excitement give rise to disputes 
 hitherto quite alien to English politics, and involving 
 elements of unknown danger. 
 
Chap. VII.] Hoine Bute — Gladstonian Constitution, 267 
 
 Ambiguity and obscurity, since they help to pass Bills, 
 are in the judgment of Parliamentary draughtsmen and 
 Parliamentary statesmen characteristics which promote the 
 easy working of Acts. Few delusions are more dangerous. 
 Knives which are made to sell are not knives which are 
 made to cut. The founders of the American Union knew 
 their own minds, and were not well acquainted with the 
 advantages to be derived from the obscurities of modern 
 draughtsmanship. But on two points they tried the ex- 
 periment of keeping real perils out of sight by omitting 
 to refer to them. " Slave " and " slavery " are words not 
 to be found in the Constitution of the United States. 
 What (if any) was the right of a State to retire from the 
 Union, was a matter purposely left open for the inter- 
 pretation of future genei'ations. The Abolition movement, 
 the Fugitive Slave Law, the War of Secession tell the 
 result of trying to ignore perils or problems which it is 
 not easy to face or to solve. 
 
 The last disappointment of Englishmen would be to 
 find that Home Eule had not satisfied Ire- And to 
 land. For to Irishmen no less than to English- -^^l^^*^- 
 men the Constitution must bring disappointment and 
 inconvenience. 
 
 That the Gladstonian Constitution cannot satisfy Ireland 
 is all but certain. 
 
 To say this is not to imply that its acceptance by Irish 
 Home Eulers is dishonest. In their eyes it is a move in 
 the right direction ; they exaggerate, as their English. 
 
268 • England's Case against Home Ride. [Chap. VII. 
 
 allies underrate, the freedom of action which the Con- 
 stitution offers to Ireland. It cannot, as already pointed 
 out, by any possibility remove the admitted causes of 
 Irish discontent. It cannot tempt capital towards Ireland, 
 but it may easily drive capital away from her shores ; it 
 cannot diminish poverty; it cannot in its direct effect 
 assuage religious bigotry ; it cannot of itself remove 
 iigrarian discontent. The Land Purchase Bill, even when 
 discarded, remains an involuntary exposure of the futility 
 of the Gladstonian Constitution, and of the unsoundness 
 of the principle on which the demand for Home Eule 
 rests. No friend of Italy ever suggested that Italian 
 independence should be accompanied by a loan from 
 Austria to the Italian Kingdom. For the principle of 
 nationality was the true source of Italian disaffection. If 
 in dealing with Ireland we must calm agrarian misery 
 before satisfying national aspirations, this necessity is all 
 but a confession that Irish unrest is due far more to 
 desire for a change in the land laws than to passionate 
 longing for national independence. I do not doubt that 
 the spirit of nationality has some, though probably a 
 small, part in the production of Irish discontent. But the 
 Gladstonian Constitution is unfortunately so devised as 
 to outrage quite as much as it soothes national sentiment. 
 The tribute will affect every Irishman in his pride no less 
 than in his purse. Can any one suppose that Northerners 
 indignant at recent treachery, and Catholics mindful of 
 ancient oppression, will not join, and justly join, in 
 
CuAP. VII.] Home Rule^-Gladstonian Constitution, 26^ 
 
 denouncing as at once ignominious and ruinous the 
 payment of a tribute raised for Imperial purposes at the 
 moment when Ireland ceases to have any voice in the 
 direction of Imperial policy ? Irishmen again will find to 
 their surprise that the Constitution intended to give them 
 independence imposes annoying fetters on their freedom 
 of action. They wish for a protective tariff, and they 
 come across the prohibition to make laws affecting trade ; 
 they desire that the country shall defend herself, and they 
 discover that they cannot raise even a body of volunteers ; 
 they wish to try the plan of concurrent endowment, and 
 they are thwarted by the article of the Constitution 
 prohibiting the endowment of religion. These restrictions 
 are the more annoying because none of them are imposed 
 upon the Colonies. Irishmen will further discover that 
 great achievements of constructive legislation require for 
 their success the command of large pecuniary resources, 
 and that exemption from British control involves the 
 withdrawal of all assistance from the British Treasury. 
 
 The Constitution will produce irritation and friction. 
 
 Every scheme for uniting into a political whole 
 States which are intended to retain, even constitu- 
 when connected together, a certain amount ^ugJ^^^ 
 of independence, aims at minimising the ^'i^ti^n. 
 opportunities for constitutional collision, or for friction 
 between the different States which are connected 
 together, and also between any State and the Central 
 
270 EnglancVs Case against Home Eule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 power. If we compare the mode in which this end 
 is attained, either under the Federal system or under the 
 Colonial system, with the arrangements of the Gladstonian 
 Constitution, we shall easily see how little its authors have 
 attended to the necessity for avoiding occasions of con- 
 stitutional friction. 
 
 Where Federalism, as in America, appears in its best 
 form, the skill with which opportunities for collision or 
 friction have been minimised is almost above praise. The 
 Federal or Central power is so constructed as to represent 
 the whole nation ; its authority cannot by any misrepre- 
 sentation be identified with the power of one State more 
 than another. The Federal Government acts through its 
 own officers, is represented by its own judiciary, and 
 levies its own taxes without recourse to State authorities. 
 Every device which could be thought of has been taken to 
 make it unnecessary for the National Government to come 
 into direct collision with any State. ^ It deals in general 
 with the individual citizens of the United States ; it does 
 not deal with the particular States. The result is that on 
 the one hand, whatever may be said against the taxes 
 imposed by Congress, they cannot by any stretch of 
 imagination be looked upon as tribute paid by one State 
 to another, say by Massachusetts to New York, or by New 
 York to Massachusetts. It is again unnecessary for tlie 
 Federal Government to issue commands to a State. There 
 is, therefore, little opportunity for a contest between a 
 State and the National Executive, Whoever wishes to 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Ride — Gladstonian Constitution. 271 
 
 understand the elaborate devices necessary to make 
 Federalism work smoothly should compare the clumsiness 
 of the arrangements by which the Swiss Confederacy has 
 at times been compelled to enforce obedience of the 
 Cantons to the will of the Confederation, with the 
 ingenuity of the methods by which the Federal authorities 
 of the United States exert their authority over American 
 citizens. 
 
 The English Colonial system on the other hand, though 
 far less elaborate than any form of Federalism, does, as a 
 matter of fact, reduce within very narrow limits tlie 
 chances of collision between England and her colonies. 
 The system, however, succeeds, not because it is a model 
 of constructive art, but because it attempts very little, and 
 can, owing to favourable circumstances, leave to nominal 
 dependencies something little short of complete self- 
 government. Where collisions do arise they are disposed 
 of by the habit of the Imperial Government always to give 
 way. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution is, as we have already 
 pointed out, a combination between Federalism and 
 Colonialism; it may possess some of the merits, but it 
 much more certainly displays some of the demerits of 
 each system. From Federalism is borrowed the idea of 
 leaving the settlement of constitutional questions to a 
 Court. But the conception is spoilt in the borrowing. All 
 the difficulties which under a Federal system beset the 
 enforcement of judgments pronounced by a Federal Court 
 
272 England's Case against Home Hide. [Chap. VII. 
 
 affect in an aggravated form the attempt to enforce 
 in Ireland judgments which invalidate Irish Acts, and 
 are pronounced by a Committee of the English Privy 
 Council sitting in England. The Privy Council, more- 
 over, while it has every weakness of the Supreme 
 Court of America, has more than one special weakness 
 of its own. It lacks moral authority, for it is an Eng- 
 lish Court sitting in England and representing English 
 opinion; it lacks jurisdiction, because while it can 
 pronounce on the validity of Irish, it cannot pronounce on 
 the validity of British Acts of Parliament ; it does not 
 possess a strictly judicial character, because it is not only 
 a Court called upon to give judgments, but is also an 
 administrative body called upon to deliver opinions upon 
 the validity of Irish Bills and of Irish Acts. Hence its 
 decrees come into direct collision with the proposals or 
 enactments of the Irish Parliament, and the Privy Council 
 is made to appear not as a body of judges deciding cases 
 between man and man, but as a body of officials whose 
 duty it is to oppose any unconstitutional action on the 
 part of the Irish Parliament. From Federalism again is 
 borrowed the contribution by Ireland towards meeting the 
 expenses of the Empire. I3ut imposts which under a 
 Federal system are a tax towards the payment of common 
 expenditure are under the Gladstonian Constitution a 
 tribute to a foreign power. From the Federal system 
 further is taken that restriction of legislative authority 
 which hardly affects Parliaments such as that of Victoria, 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Gladstonian Constitution, 273 
 
 and which under any circumstances is a source of 
 irritation. From the Colonial system, on the other hand, 
 is derived the theoretical supremacy of the British 
 Parliament, the right of veto, and the fatal dependence of 
 the Irish Executive on every vote of the Irish legislature. 
 Prom the colonies we therefore bring to Ireland sources of 
 dispute, of friction, and of irritation, which are unknown to 
 a true system of Federalism, whilst we do not give Ireland 
 that practical independence, and that immunity from taxa- 
 tion, which prevent our ill-arranged connection with the 
 colonies from causing real dissatisfaction. Federalism has 
 its merits and its defects ; English Colonialism works well 
 enough ; the sham Federalism and the sham Colonialism of 
 the Gladstonian Constitution must create between Great 
 Britain and Ireland all the causes of discontent wliich have 
 from time to time tried the strength of the American 
 Union, and all the causes of disturbance which from time 
 to time reveal the weakness of the tie which binds together 
 our Colonial Empire. 
 
 Among the hypothetical virtues of the Gladstonian Con- 
 stitution cannot assuredly be numbered the merit of finality. 
 
 The Gladstonian Constitution therefore fails entirely to 
 fulfil for any practical purpose the conditions it is [meant 
 to satisfy. It neither maintains the sovereignty of Parlia- 
 ment, nor makes adequate securities for justice, nor offers a 
 prospect of finality. 
 
 A criticism of Home Eule in its four forms gives then 
 this result : — 
 
 T 
 
274 Um/land's Case against Home Hide. [Chap. VII* 
 
 Home Eule as Federalism means the immediate disloca- 
 Eesult of ^i^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ultimate rebuilding of the whole 
 T^Home English Constitution ; it involves the transfor- 
 Kuie as mation of an old and tried polity which by cen- 
 ism. tunes of experience has been admirably adapted 
 
 to the wants of the English people, and has fostered the 
 growth of the British Empire, into a form of government 
 in itself not free from defects, and successful, where it 
 has succeeded, only under conditions which the United 
 Kingdom does not present. 
 
 Home Eule in the form of Colonial independence in- 
 volves far less chanf]re in the institutions of 
 2. Home ° 
 
 Eule as Great Britain or in the complex arrangements 
 
 Colonial . i i it 
 
 indepen- of the British Empire than does Eederalism. It 
 
 clcnce. 
 
 appears at first sight to be an application to 
 Ireland of institutions which, as they have been found to 
 answer their purpose in such countries as Canada and 
 Victoria, may also prove successful in Ireland. The 
 appearance is delusive. The true reasons why the Colonial 
 system, self-contradictory as it is in theory and unsatis- 
 factory as it sometimes is in practice, has produced 
 harmony between England and her dependencies, are that 
 the colonies are far distant and are prosperous, that they 
 feel pride in their relation to the mother-country, that 
 whilst contributing not a penny towards meeting Imperial 
 burdens they derive valuable and valued benefits from 
 the connection with the Empire, and lastly that they • 
 
Chap. VII.] Home Rule — Its Forms. 275 
 
 are not in reality dependencies ; the colonies willingly 
 acquiesce in the supremacy of England, because England 
 protects them gratis and does not govern them at all. It 
 is not the Colonial system, but the conditions which make 
 that system succeed, which ought to engross our attention. 
 These conditions will not be found in any arrangement 
 whatever between England and Ireland. It is in the 
 strictest sense impossible that Ireland whilst forming part 
 of the United Kingdom, or even of the British Empire, 
 should enjoy or endure the independence of Victoria. If 
 the Act which gives Victoria her constitution were re- 
 enacted with the necessary verbal changes for Ireland, the 
 constitution which satisfies the Victorians would not satisfy 
 the Irish, and for a good reason : the form would be the 
 same> but the effect would be different. A suffering and 
 discontented people will not accept words for facts. 
 
 One condition indeed, which more perhaps than any 
 other ensures the success of our Colonial system. Great 
 Britain has in the case of Ireland the power to reproduce. 
 Immunity from Imperial taxation is one source of Colonial 
 loyalty to the Empire. If Ireland is to accept or to receive 
 the mixed independence and subordination of a colony, she 
 ought to enjoy tlie substantial advantage of a theoreti- 
 cally inferior position. The Colonial system, as I have 
 already insisted, involves the renunciation of Imperial 
 taxation. 
 
 Home Eule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution is 
 
 T 2 
 
276 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. VII. 
 
 an impossibility. The Constitution of 1782 belongs 
 3. Home to a past age, and cannot by any miracle of 
 Constitu- political art be at the present day restored to 
 
 tion of 
 
 1782. life. 
 
 Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution means 
 
 ^ ,^ an artificial combination of Federalism and 
 
 4. Home 
 
 Rule as Colonialism. Its aim is to secure the advan- 
 ce ladston- 
 iati Consti- tages of two Opposite systems ; its result is to 
 
 combine and intensify the disadvantages of both 
 Bystems. It inevitably tends towards the dissolution of 
 the United Kingdom into a Federation ; it immediately 
 disturbs the bases of the Constitution by creating the 
 artificial bond of something like a Federal legislature 
 between England and Ireland; it introduces into the 
 relations between each of the different divisions of the 
 United Kingdom elements of conflict which are all but in- 
 herent in Federalism ; it requires that absolute deference for 
 the judicial decisions of a Federal Court which, if it exist 
 anywhere, can exist only among a people like the Americans, 
 imbued with legal notions, and as it were born with 
 innate respect for law. That this sentiment cannot exist 
 in Ireland is certain; whether it exist in the required 
 intensity even in England is problematical. The Glad- 
 stonian Constitution, again, because it contains some 
 institutions borrowed from the Colonial system without 
 the conditions requisite for their proper working so to 
 speak falsifies them. The Imperial supremacy of Great 
 
Ghap. VII.] Home Eiole — Its Forms. 277 
 
 Britain, the Imperial control over the army, the occa- 
 sional interference with the Irish executive and the veto 
 of the Crown on Irish legislation, are each and all of them 
 under the Gladstonian Constitution certain to be the 
 source of justifiable dissatisfaction. To the ingenuity of 
 the plan proposed by Mr. Gladstone's Ministry hostile 
 critics have given insufficient praise. But the essential 
 unreality which this ingenuity has concealed has not even 
 yet met with due condemnation. Since the day when the 
 National Assembly of France presented the brand-new 
 French Constitution to the acceptance of Louis XVI. no 
 form of government has ever been seriously proposed for 
 adoption by an intelligent people so radically unworkable 
 as that Gladstonian Constitution which has been instinc- 
 tively rejected by the good sense of the British Parliament. 
 The Constitution of France lasted out two years ; to a jurist 
 it may appear conceivable, thougli hardly probable, that 
 by the vigorous aid of the British Parliament the new 
 Constitution for the United Kingdom might have lasted 
 for as long a period. 
 
278 Ungland^s Case agahist Home Ride, [Chap. Tin, 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Let us here review and summarise our argument. 
 Survey of ^^^ demand for Home Eule is a demand for 
 argument. ^ change in the Constitution so fundamental 
 as to amount to a legal and pacific revolution; such a 
 demand requires for its support cogent, we may almost 
 say conclusive, reasons. 
 
 The positive arguments in favour of Home Eule are not 
 easy to grasp. Their strength lies in their correspondence 
 with the prevailing opinions of the day. But though 
 public opinion under any form of government, and 
 especially under the system of what is caUed popular 
 government, deserves great consideration, still the value 
 of a prevailing belief or conviction cannot be determined 
 without examining the elements which have gone to its 
 production. The state of opinion which favours Home 
 Eule is found to result from various and even self-contra- 
 dictory feelings, some of which belong to the highest and 
 some to the lowest parts of human nature ; humanity and 
 a sense of justice are in this instance curiously combined 
 
Chap. VIII.] Concktsion. 279 
 
 with indolence and impatience. The arguments again for 
 Home Eule rest upon one dubious assumption and one 
 undoubted fact. The dubious assumption is that the root 
 of Irish discontent is the outraged feeling of nationality. 
 Th3 undoubted fact is that in Ireland, on all matters either 
 directly or even remotely connected with the tenure of 
 land, the law of. the Courts is opposed to the customs, to 
 the moral sentiment, we may say to the law"of the people ; 
 hence the Queen's tribunals are weak because they are 
 not supported by that popular assent whence judges 
 derive half their authority ; the tribunals of the League 
 are strong because their decisions commend them- 
 selves to the traditional feeling of the people. But the 
 doubtful hypothesis and the undoubted fact, though one 
 or other of them lies at the basis of all the strongest 
 arguments in favour of Home Eule, each invalidate almost 
 as. much as they support the contention that an Irish 
 Parliament will prove the specific for the diseases (due 
 in the first instance to the original vice of the connection 
 between England and Ireland) under which Irish society 
 now suffers. If the passion of nationality is the cause of 
 the malady, then the proposed cure is useless, for Home 
 Eule will not turn the people of Ireland into a nation. If 
 a vicious system of land tenure is the cause of lawlessness, 
 then the restoration or re-creation of an Irish Parliament 
 is needless, for the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
 can reform and ought to reform, the land system of 
 Ireland, and ought to be able to carry through a final 
 
280 Bingland's Case against Home Bule, [Chap. VIII. 
 
 settlement of agrarian- disputes with less injustice to 
 individuals than could any Parliament sitting at Dublin. 
 
 Eeasoning, however, which fails to establish the ex- 
 pediency of creating an Irish Parliament may prove, and 
 in fact does amply prove, that the task of maintaining 
 peace order and freedom in Ireland is at the present 
 juncture a matter of supreme difficulty. Any possible 
 course, moreover, open to English statesmanship involves 
 gigantic inconvenience, not to say tremendous perils. A 
 man involved in the actual conduct of public affairs miy 
 easily bring himself to believe that the policy which Le 
 recommends is not only the best possible under the cir- 
 cumstances, but is also open to no serious objection. Out- 
 siders, who in this matter are better because more impartial 
 judges than the ablest of politicians, know that this is a 
 delusion. We have nothing before us but a choice of diffi- 
 culties or of evils. Every course is open to valid criticism. 
 
 The maintenance of the Union must necessarily turn 
 out as severe a task as ever taxed a nation's energies, 
 for to maintain the Treaty of Union witli any good 
 efiect means that while refusing to accede to the wishes 
 of millions of Irishmen, we must sedulously do justice 
 to every fair demand from Ireland, must strenuously 
 and without either fear or favour assert the equal rights 
 of landlords and tenants, of Protestants and Catholics, 
 and must at the same time put down every outrage and 
 reform every abuse. 
 
 To carry out by i^eaceful means the political separation 
 
Chap. VIII.] Conclusion, 281 
 
 of countries which for good and for evil have for centuries 
 been bound together by position and by history, is an 
 operation so critical that in the judgment of statesmen 
 it involves dangers too vast for serious contemplation. 
 
 How, lastly, to devise a scheme of Home Eule 
 which, while giving to Ireland as much of legislative 
 independence as may satisfy her wants or wishes, shall 
 leave to England as much supremacy as may be necessary 
 for the prosperity of the United Kingdom, or for the 
 continued existence of the British Empire, is a problem 
 which jurists would find it hard to solve as a matter of 
 speculative science, and which politicians may (not without 
 reason) hold to admit of no practical solution. 
 
 Yet Maintenance of the Union, Separation, Home Kule, 
 are names which designate the only paths open to us. To 
 one of these three courses we are absolutely tied down. Each 
 path is arduous. To complain about the nature of things is 
 childisli. The course of wisdom is obvious. We must all of 
 us look facts in the face. " Things and actions are what they 
 are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be. 
 Why then should we desire to be deceived?"* We must 
 calmly compare the advantages of the three steep roads 
 which lie open to the nation, and then on the strength of 
 this comparison determine the course which the nation is 
 bound to follow by motives of expediency and of justice. 
 
 Such a comparison we have already instituted:! its 
 
 * Butler's Sermons ; vii., p. 136, ed. 1726. 
 t See Chapters V., VI., & VII., ante. 
 
282 England^s Case, against Home Rule, [Chap. VIII. 
 
 results to any reader who assents to my train of reasoning 
 must be obvious. 
 
 The maintenance of the Union involves at the outset a 
 strenuous and most deplorable conflict with the will of the 
 majority of the Irish people. It necessitates at once the 
 strict enforcement of law, combined with the resolute 
 effort to strip law of all injustice. It may require large 
 pecuniary sacrifices, and it certainly will require a con- 
 stancy in just purpose which is supposed, and not \vithout 
 reason, to be specially diffi.cult to a democracy. The 
 difficulties on the other hand which meet us are not un- 
 precedented, though some of them have assumed a new 
 form. We have some advantages unknown to our fore- 
 fathers : we can, more easily than they could, remodel the 
 practices of the Constitution, modify the rules of party 
 government, or, incredible as it may seem to members of 
 Parliament, touch with profane hands the venerable 
 procedure of the House of Commons. The English 
 democracy, further, just because it is a democracy, may, 
 like the democracy of America, enforce with unflinching 
 firmness laws which, representing the deliberate will of the 
 people, are supported by the vast majority of the citizens 
 of the United Kingdom. The English democracy, because 
 it is a democracy, may also with a good conscience destroy 
 the remnants of feudal institutions, and all systems of land 
 tenure found unsuitable to the wants of the Irish people. 
 Nor, though the crisis be difficult, are there features lacking 
 in the tendencies of the modern world which in the United 
 
Chap. VIII.] Conclusion, 283 
 
 Kingdom as in the United States and in the Swiss Con- 
 federacy favour every effort to uphold the political 
 unity of the State. Whatever be the difficulties (and they 
 are many) of maintaining the Union, not in form, only 
 but in reality, the policy is favoured no less by the current 
 of English history, than by the tendencies of modern civili- 
 zation. It preserves that unity of the State which is 
 essential to the authority of England and to the mainte- 
 nance of the Empire. It provides, as matters now stand, 
 the only means of giving legal protection to a large body 
 of loyal British subjects. It is the refusal not only to 
 abdicate legitimate power, but (what is of far more conse- 
 quence) to renounce the fulfilment of imperative duties. 
 [Nor does Union imply uniformity. Unity of Government 
 — equality of rights — diversity of institutions, — these are 
 the watchwords for all Unionists. To attain these objects 
 may be beyond our power, and the limit to power is the 
 limit to responsibility. Still, whatever may be the diffi- 
 culties, or even the disadvantages, of maintaining the 
 Union, it undoubtedly has in its favour not only all the 
 recommendations which must belong to a policy of rational 
 conservatism, but also these two decisive advantages — 
 that it does sustain the strength of the United Kingdom, 
 and that it does not call for any dereliction of duty. 
 
 Separation, or in other words the national independence 
 of Ireland, is an idea which has not entered into the practical 
 consideration of Englishmen. The evils which it threatens 
 ^re patent : it at the same moment diminishes the means of 
 
284 EnglandJs Case against Home Bule. [Chap. YIII. 
 
 Great Britain and increases the calls upon her resources. 
 It lowers the fame of the country, and plants by the side 
 of England a foreign, it may be a hostile, neighbour ; it 
 involves the desertion of loyal fellow-citizens who have 
 trusted in the good faith of England. Yet, on the other 
 hand, the material losses and perhaps the dangers involved 
 in the independence of Ireland are liable to exaggeration. 
 Great Britain might find in her complete freedom of action 
 and in restored unity of national sentiment elements of 
 power which might balance the obvious damage resulting 
 from Separation ; she might also find it possible to make 
 for the protection of Loyalists terms more efficacious than 
 any guarantees contained in the articles of a statutory con- 
 stitution. If, further, the spirit of nationality has the vivi- 
 fying power ascribed to it by its votaries, then Ireland might 
 gain from it blessings which (since no form of Home Eule 
 can transform Ireland into a nation) cannot be conferred 
 by any scheme of merely Parliamentary independence. 
 
 Eor Home Eule it may be pleaded that it offers two 
 obvious advantages: it satisfies the immediate wish of 
 millions of Irishmen, and it facilitates the adaptation of 
 Irish institutions to Irish wants. These advantageous 
 results are the best that can be hoped for from Home 
 liule. They are real, and to unden-ate them is folly ; the 
 moral gain indeed of meeting the wishes of the body of 
 the Irish people is so incalculable, that did Home Ilule 
 involve no intolerable evils a rational man might think 
 it wise to venture on the experiment. Home Eule, 
 
Chap. VIII.] Conclusion. 
 
 it may be suggested, has the further gain of lessening 
 English responsibility for the government of Ireland. 
 What it really might effect is to lighten England's sense of 
 responsibility for misrule in Ireland. But this, so far from 
 being a blessing, would in truth be one of the greatest of 
 evils. The distinguished author of the Gladstonian Con- 
 stitution denies in his recent pamphlet that the Govern- 
 ment of Ireland Bill would, if passed, repeal the Act of 
 Union. To follow the reasoning by which it is attempted 
 to make good this denial is beyond my powers. But there 
 is one aspect in which the statement, paradoxical though it ' 
 be, that the Union is not dissolved by the existence of an 
 Irish Parliament, has a most serious meaning, which ought 
 to command hearty and general assent. Under the Glad- 
 stonian Constitution, as under any form of Home Eule, 
 the Government of the United Kingdom must still remain 
 in the last resort responsible for the administration of 
 justice throughout the whole realm. Admit for the sake 
 of argument that the Act of Union, though affected in 
 every section, is not repealed, then assuredly if men be 
 wrongfully deprived of their property, if they be denied 
 their lawful freedom, if they suffer unlawful injury to 
 life or limb in any part of the United Kingdom, the 
 responsibility for seeing that right be done falls on the 
 Executive, and in the last resort on the Parliament, of the 
 United Kingdom. The delegated authority of a subor- 
 dinate legislature will not free the principal from the 
 liability inherent in the delegation of power ; and if Home 
 
286 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. VIII. 
 
 Eiile in Ireland fosters, as it must foster, the notion that 
 the United Kingdom is not as a whole responsible for 
 misdeeds done in Ireland, this is one of tlie worst 
 results of the proposed constitutional change. 
 
 But putting this matter aside, an examination into the 
 various forms which Home Eule may assume leads to 
 the conclusion that whatever be its hypothetical benefits, 
 it threatens more than countervailing loss to England. 
 There is no need to do more than refer in most general 
 terms to evils which have already been set forth in detail. 
 Home Eule under two of its three possible forms dislocates 
 and weakens the whole English Constitution. Under its 
 least objectionable form — that of Colonial independence — 
 it brings upon England many of the perils which would 
 follow upon the national independence of Ireland; it 
 involves, if the experiment is to have a fair chance of 
 success, large pecuniary sacrifice, and it does not present 
 a reasonable hope of creating real harmony of feeling 
 between Great Britain and Ireland. Home Eule, lastly, 
 imder whatever form, whilst not freeing England from 
 moral responsibility for protecting the rights of every 
 British subject, does virtually give up the attempt to 
 ensure to these rights more than a nominal existence, and 
 thus gives up the endeavour to enforce legal and equal 
 justice between man and man. It must also be considered 
 tliat an examination into the different forms of Home 
 Eule, while it shows that no scheme of legislative indepen- 
 dence for Ireland offers any promise of finality, abo 
 
Chap. YIIl.] Canchision. 287 
 
 suggests that the form of Home Rule least injurious to 
 England is the form which gives Ireland most indepen- 
 dence. The inference from these facts cannot be missed. 
 Home Rule is the half-way house to Separation. Grant it, 
 and in a short time Irish independence will become the 
 wish of England. If any thorough-paced Home Ruler 
 admit this conclusion, and suggest that Home Rule is a 
 desirable transition towards Separation, the answer is that 
 Home Rule is such a transition, but assuredly that such a 
 transition is not to be desired. If one country is destined 
 to become independent of another it is better for each not 
 to experience the disappointment and the heartburning 
 which accompany a period of unwilling connection. 
 
 This is the result of the comparison we have instituted 
 between the three possible courses open to England. If 
 the comparison be just the conclusion to which it leads is 
 obvious. The maintenance of the Union is at this moment 
 to England a matter of duty even more than of interest. 
 If the time should come when the effort to maintain the 
 unity of the State is too great for the power of Great 
 Britain, or the only means by which it is found maintain- 
 able are measures clearly repugnant to the humanity or 
 the justice or the democratic principles of the English 
 people, — if it should turn out that after every effort to 
 enforce just laws by just methods our justice itself, from 
 whatever cause, remains hateful to the mass of the Irish 
 people, — then it will be clear that the Union must for the 
 sake of England, no less than of Ireland, come to an end. 
 The alternative policy will then be not Home Rule but 
 
288 England's Case against Home Rule, [Chap. VIII. 
 
 Separation. We shall save tlie unity at the expense of 
 lessening the territory of the State ; we shall escape self- 
 reproach because having reached the limit of our powers 
 ^YQ shall also have filled up the measure of our obligations. 
 But if (as there is every reason to suppose) agrarian 
 misery is the source of Irish discontent, and agrarian 
 misery springs in part from bad administration, and in 
 part from the law governing the tenure of land; if, in 
 general terms, the undoubted ills of Ireland are curable by 
 justice, even though justice proceed from the Parliament 
 of the United Kingdom — an assembly, be it noted, in 
 which the voice of Ireland is freely heard — then there 
 is no need to indulge in speculations,, always dangerous, 
 upon a possible remedy which may never be necessary, 
 and which, while the inhabitants of England and Ireland 
 are still fellow-citizens of one State, it is painful even to 
 contemplate. On the whole, then, it appears that whatever 
 changes or calamities the future may have in store, the 
 maintenance of the Union is at this day the one sound 
 policy for England to pursue. It is sound because it is 
 expedient ; it is sound because it is just. 
 
 This is the case of England against Home Rule ; it is a 
 
 _, case which, however feebly stated — and I may 
 
 Character ' '' '^ 
 
 of Kug- well have failed to state it with force — is founded 
 land's case. . 
 
 on argument. It is a case which makes and 
 
 need make no appeal to rhetoric ; it is a case whicli 
 
 Indeed, like all sound views of national policy, is 
 
 grounded on the interest of the greater number of the 
 
Chap. VIIL] Conclusion, 289 
 
 citizens of the State, but it is a case not grounded 
 on any mere pride of power, a case not based on any 
 disregard of justice, a case which above all involves no 
 unfriendliness to Irishmen, and no assumption, either tacit 
 or express, that there has fallen to Irishmen a greater 
 amount of either original or acquired sin than falls to 
 other human beings, it is a case which does not assume that 
 real or supposed differences of race are a legitimate ground 
 for inequality of rights. Any one, indeed, after having to 
 the best of his power tried to state what can be said with 
 fairness on one side of a question such as that now at 
 issue between the majority and the minority of the 
 citizens of the United Kingdom, may well call to mind the 
 conclusion of the noblest statement ever made by genius 
 of a case involving momentous national interests : — 
 
 " It would be presumption in me to do more than to 
 make a case. Many things occur. But as they, like all 
 political measures, depend on dispositions, tempers, means, 
 and external circumstances for all their effect, not being 
 well assured of these, I do not know how to let loose any 
 speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated in 
 my opinion as it exists. The remedy must be where 
 power, wisdom, and information, I hope, are more united 
 with good intentions than they can be with me. I have 
 done with this subject, I believe for ever. It has given me 
 many anxious moments for the two last years. If a great 
 change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men 
 will be fitted to it ; the general opinions and feelings will 
 
 V 
 
290 England's Case against Home Rule. [Chap. vm. 
 
 » 
 
 draw that way. Every fear, every hope, will forward it ; 
 and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current 
 in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees 
 of Providence itself, than the mere designs of men. They 
 will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate."* 
 The sentiment of these words is one of eternal applica- 
 tion. Still at this great crisis in the fortunes of our 
 country, when every course is involved in undeniable 
 perplexity, and surrounded by admitted danger, there 
 are two principles to which we may confidently appeal ; 
 for it is by habitual adherence to them that England has 
 grown to greatness. These two principles are the main- 
 tenance of the supremacy of the whole State, and the 
 use of that supremacy for the purpose of securing to 
 every citizen, whether rich or poor, the rights of liberty 
 and of property conferred upon him by law. To maintain 
 that any policy, however plausible, by which these 
 principles are violated, must undermine the moral basis 
 of the Constitution, and must therefore lead the nation to 
 calamity and to disgrace, is at any rate to plead a cause 
 which rests upon a firm foundation of plain momlity. 
 The case may be ill-stated, the arguments by which it is 
 defended may admit of reply, but it is a case wliich a just 
 man may put forward without shame, and a humane man 
 may support without compunction. 
 
 * See the conclusion of Thoughts on French Affairs, Burke*s Works, 
 vol. vii., pp. 84, 85. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 GOVEENMENT OF IKELAND BILL. 
 
 AKEANGEMENT OF CLAUSES. 
 
 PAET I. 
 
 Legislative Authority. 
 
 CLAUSE. 
 
 1. Establishment of Irish Legislature. 
 
 2. Powers of Irish Legislature. 
 
 3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. 
 
 4. Eestrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. 
 
 5. Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body. 
 
 6. Duration of the Irish Legislative Body. 
 
 Executive AuthoiHty, 
 
 7. Constitution of the Executive Authority. 
 
 8. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. 
 
 Constitution of Legislative Body. 
 
 9. Constitution of Irish Legislative Body. 
 
 10. First order. 
 
 11. Second order. 
 
 Finance, 
 
 12. Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund. 
 
 13. Annual contributions from Ireland to Consolidated Fund of 
 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 14. Collection and application of customs and excise duties in 
 
 Ireland. 
 
 15. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund. 
 
 16. Irish Church Fund. 
 
 • The clauses printed in italics are the clauses of the Bill which 
 are specially referred to in the foregoing pages. 
 
 u 2 
 
292 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 CLAUSE. 
 
 17. Public loans. 
 
 18. Additional aid in case of war. 
 
 19. Money bills and votes. 
 
 20. Exchequer divisions and revenue actions. 
 
 Police, 
 
 21. Police. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Supplemental Pbovisioxs. 
 
 Powers (f Her Majesty. 
 
 22. Powers over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty. 
 
 Legislative Body. 
 
 23. Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled. 
 
 24. Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament, 
 
 Decision of Constitutional Questions. 
 
 25. Constitutional questions to he submitted to Judicial Com 
 
 mittee, 
 
 Lord-Lieutenant* 
 
 26. Office of Lord-Lieutenant. 
 
 Judges and Civil Servants. 
 
 27. Judges to be removable only on address. 
 
 28. Provision as to judges and other i^ersons having salarie 
 
 charged on the Consolidated Fund. 
 
 29. As to persons holding civil service appointments. 
 
 30. Provision for existing pensions and su[)erannuation allowance) 
 
 Transitory Provisions, 
 
 31. Transitory provisions in Schedule. 
 
 Miscellaneous. 
 
 32. Post OfSce and savings banks. 
 
 33. Audit. 
 
 34. Application of parliamentary law. 
 
 35. Kegulations lor carrying Act into effect. 
 
Section 3. 293 
 
 CLAUSE 
 
 1. 
 
 36. 
 
 Saving of powers of House of Lords. 
 
 37. 
 
 Saving of Rights of Parliament. 
 
 38. 
 
 Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, &c. 
 
 39. 
 
 Mode of alteration of Act. 
 
 40. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 41. 
 
 Short title of Act. 
 
 
 Schedules. 
 
 A Bill to amend the provision for the future Government of 
 Ireland. 
 
 Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and -A-.D. 1886. 
 
 with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, 
 
 and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the 
 authority of the same, as follows : 
 
 PART I. 
 Legislative Authority. 
 
 1. On and after the appointed day there shall he established in Establishment 
 Ireland a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and an of Irish 
 Irish Legislative Body. Legislature. 
 
 2. With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Act Powers of Irish 
 mentioned^ it shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen^ by and Legislature. 
 vrith the advice of the Irish Legislative Body^ to make laws for the 
 
 peace^ order^ and good government of Ireland, and by any such law 
 to alter and repeal any law in Ireland. 
 
 3. The Legislature of Ireland shall not make laws relating to the Exceptions 
 following matters or any of them : — horn powers 
 
 (1.) The status or dignity of the Crowiij or the succession to the ^^ ^y\^^ 
 
 Croiun, or a Regency ; Legislature. 
 
 (2.) Tlie making of peace or war ; 
 (3.) The army, navy, militia, volunteers, or other military or 
 
 naval forces, or the defence of the realm; 
 (4.) Treaties and other relations with foreign States, or the 
 
 relations between the various parts of Her Majesty* s 
 
 dominions ; 
 (5.) Dignities or titles of honour ; 
 (6.) Brize or booty of tvur ; 
 (7.) Offences against the law of nations ; or offences committed in 
 
 violation of any treaty made, or hereafter to be made, 
 
 between Her Majesty and any foreign State; or offences 
 
 committed on the high seas ; 
 (8.) Treason, alienage, or naturalization ; 
 (9.) Trade, navigation, or quarantine ; 
 (10*) The postal and telegraph service, except as hereafter in this 
 
294 Government of Ireland Bill, 
 
 A.D. 1886. -^ci mentioned with respect to the transmission of letters 
 
 and telegrams in Ireland ; 
 
 (11.) BeaconSj lighthouses^ or sea marks 
 (12.) - 
 
 Tlie coinage ; the value of foreign money ; legal tender ; or 
 weights and measures ; or 
 (13.) Copyright^ patent rights^ or otlier exclusive rights to the ttse 
 or profits of any works or inventions. 
 Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. 
 Restrictions on 4. T/ie Irish Legislature shall not make any law — 
 powers of (i,) Bespecting the establishment or endowment of religion^ or 
 
 ^" . prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
 
 ^ a ure. ^2.) Imposing any disability^ or conferring any privilege, on 
 
 account of religious belief ; or 
 (3.) Abrogating or derogating from the right to establish or 
 maintain any place of denominational eduxxution or any 
 denominational institution or charity ; or 
 (4.) Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a 
 school receiving public money without attending the religious 
 instruction at that school ; or 
 (5.) Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council 
 first obtained on an address presented by the Legislative 
 Body of Ireland, or the consent of the corporation interested, 
 the rights, property, or privileges of any existing corpora- 
 tion incorporated by royal cJiarter or local and general 
 Act of Parliament ; or 
 (6.) Imposing or relating to duties of customs and duties of 
 excise, as defined by this Act, or either of such duties, or 
 affecting any Act relating to such duties or either of them; or 
 (7.) Affecting this Act, except in so far as it is declared to he 
 alterable by the Irish Legislature. 
 "^T^^^ogsXiy^s 5. Her Majesty the Queen shall have the same prerogatives with 
 of Her Majesty ^egp^d fo summoning, proroguing, and dissolving the Irish Legisla- 
 as to Irish ^.^^^^ Body as Her Majesty has luith respect to summoning, prorogtt- 
 Bodv ^ '^^ ^^^' ^"^ dissolving the Imperial Parliament. 
 
 Duration of the ®' -^^^^ Irish Legislative Body whenever summoned m^y have 
 Irish Legisla- continuance for five years and no longer, to he reckoned from the 
 tive Body. ^^2/ on which any such Legislative Body is appointed to meet. 
 
 Executive Authority. 
 
 Constitution of 7. — (1.) The Executive Government of Ireland sliall coniinite 
 
 the Executive nested in Her Majesty, and shall be carried on by the Lord- 
 
 Authority. Lieutenant on behalf of Her Majesty iviih the aid of such officers 
 
 and such Council as to Her Majesty may from time to time seem fit. 
 
 (2.) Subject to any instructions which may from time to time he 
 
 given by Her Majesty, the Lord- Lieutenant shall give or withhdd 
 
 the assent of Her Majesty to Bills passed by the Irish Legislative 
 
 Body, and shall exercise the prerogatives of Her Majesty in respect 
 
Section 10. 295 
 
 of the summoning, proroguing, and dissolving of the Irish Legis- a.D. 1886. 
 
 mtive Body, and any prerogatives the exercise of which may he 
 
 delegated to him hy Her Majesty. 
 
 8. Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, from time to time Use of Crown 
 place under the control of the Irish Government ^ for tJie purposes of lands by Irish 
 that Government, any such lands and buildings in Ireland as may Government, 
 ie vested in or held in trust for Her Majesty. 
 
 Constitution of Legislative Body. 
 
 9. — (1.) The Irish Legislative Body shall consist of a first and Constitutioa of 
 iecond order. Irish Legisla- 
 
 (2.) The two orders shall deliberate together, and shall vote *i^^ Body. 
 -together, except that, if any question arises in relation to legislation 
 or to the Standing Orders or Rides of Procedure or to any other 
 matter in that behalf in this Act specified, and such question is to 
 he determined by vote, ea^h order shall, if a majority of the members 
 present of either order demand a separate vote, give their votes in 
 like manner as if they were separate Legislative Bodies ; and if 
 the result of the voting of the two orders does not agree the question 
 shall be resolved in the negative. 
 
 10. — (I.) The first order of the Irish Legislative Body shall First order, 
 consist of one hundred and three members, of whom seventy-five 
 shall be elective members and twenty-eight peerage members. 
 
 (2.) Each elective member shall at the date of his election and 
 during his period of membership be bona fide possessed of property 
 which — 
 
 (a.) if realty, or partly realty and partly personalty, yields two 
 hundred pounds a year or upwards, free of all charges ; or 
 
 (6.) if personalty yields the same income, or is of the capital 
 value of four thousand pounds or upwards, free of all 
 charges. 
 
 (2.) For the purpose of electing the elective members of the first 
 order of the Legislative Body, Ireland shall be divided into the 
 electoral districts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, and 
 €ach such district shall return the number of members in that 
 behalf specified in that Schedule. 
 
 (3.) The elective members shall be elected by the registered 
 electors of each electoral district, and for that purpose a register of 
 electors shall be made annually. 
 
 (4.) An elector in each electoral district shall be qualified as 
 follows, that is to say, he shall be of full age, and not subject to 
 any legal incapacity, and shall have been during the twelve months 
 next preceding the twentieth day of Jidy in any year the owner or 
 occupier of some land or tenement within the district of a net 
 annual value of twenty-five pounds or upwards. 
 
 (5.) The term of office of an elective member shall be ten years. 
 
 (6.) In every fifth year thirty-seven or thirty-eight of the elective 
 
296 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.D. 1886. members, as the case requires, shall retire from office, and their 
 
 1 places shall be filled by election ; the members to retire shall be 
 
 those who have been members for the longest time without re-election. 
 (7.) The offices of the peerage members shall be filled as follows ; 
 that is to say, — 
 
 (a.) Each of the Irish peers who on the appointed day is on« 
 
 of the twenty-eight Irish representative peers, shall, oi 
 
 giving his written assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, becom* 
 
 a peerage member of the first order of the Irish Legislati^e 
 
 Body ; and if at any time within thirty years after ths 
 
 appointed day any such peer vacates his office by death cr 
 
 resignation, the vacancy shall be filled \>y the election to 
 
 that office by the Irish peers of one of their number ia 
 
 manner heretofore in use respecting the election of Irisk 
 
 representative peers, subject to adaptation as provided bj 
 
 this Act, and if the vacancy is not so filled within the proper 
 
 time it shall be filled by the election of an elective member. 
 
 (6.) If any of the twenty-eight peers aforesaid does not within 
 
 one month after the appointed day give such assent to be a 
 
 peerage member of the first order, the vacancy so created 
 
 shall be filled up as if he had assented and vacated his 
 
 office by resignation. 
 
 (8.) A peerage member shall be entitled to hold office during his- 
 
 life, or until the expiration of thirty years from the apjx^inted day> 
 
 whichever i)eriod is the shortest. At the expiration of such thirty 
 
 years the offices of all the peerage members shall be vacated as if 
 
 they were dead, and their places shall be filled by elective members 
 
 qualified and elected in manner provided by this Act with respect 
 
 to elective members of the first order, and such elective members 
 
 may be distributed by the Irish Legislature among the electoral 
 
 districts, so, however, that care shall be taken to give additional 
 
 members to the most populous places. 
 
 (9.) The offices of members of the first order shall not be vacated 
 by the dissolution of the Legislative Body. 
 
 (] 0.) The provisions in the Second Schedule to this Act relating 
 to members of the first order of the Legislative Body shall be of the 
 same force as if they were enacted in tlie body of this Act. 
 Second order. H. — (1.) Subject as in this section hereafter mentioned, the 
 second order of the Legislative Body shall consist of two hundred 
 and four members. 
 
 (2.) The members of the second order shall be chosen by the 
 existing constituencies of Ireland, two by each constituency, with 
 the exception of the city of Cork, which shall be divided into two 
 divisions in manner set forth in the Third Schedule to this Act, and 
 two members shall be chosen by each of such divisions. 
 
 (3.) Any person who, on the appointed day, is a member repre- 
 senting an existing Irish constituency in the House of Commons 
 shall, on giving his written assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, become a 
 
Section 13. 297 
 
 member of the second order of the Irish Legislative Body as if he a.D. 1886. 
 
 had been elected by the constituency which he was representing in 
 
 the House of Commons. Each of the members for the city of Cork, 
 on the said day, may elect for which of the divisions of that city he 
 wishes to be deemed to have been elected. 
 
 (4.) If any member does not give such written assent within 
 one month after the appointed day, his place shall be filled by 
 election in the same manner and at the same time as if he had 
 assented and vacated his office by death. 
 
 (5.) If the. same person is elected to both orders, he shall, within 
 seven days after the meeting of the Legislative Body, or if the Body 
 is sitting at the time of the election, within seven days after the 
 election, elect in which order he will serve, and his membership of 
 the other order shall be void and be filled by a fresh election. 
 
 (6.) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for 
 the Legislature of Ireland at any time to pass an Act enabling the 
 Koyal University of Ireland to return not more than two members 
 to the second order of the Irish Legislative Body in addition to the 
 number of members above mentioned.! 
 
 (7.) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for 
 the Irish Legislature, after the first dissolution of the Legislative 
 Body which occurs, to alter the constitution or election of the 
 second order of that body, due regard being had in the distribution 
 of members to the population of the constituencies ; provided that 
 no alteration shall be made in the number of such order. 
 
 Finance, 
 
 12. — (1.) For the purpose of providing for the public service of Taxes and 
 Ireland the Irish Legislature may impose taxes, other than duties separate Con- 
 of customs or excise as defined by this Act, which duties shall solidated Fund, 
 continue to be imposed and levied by and under the direction of 
 the Imperial Parliament only. 
 
 (2.) On and after the ajjpointed day there shall be an Irish 
 ConsoHdated Fund separate from the Consolidated Fund of the 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 (3.) All taxes imposed by the Legislature of Ireland and all 
 other public revenues under the control of the Government of 
 Ireland shall, subject to any provisions touching the disposal 
 thereof contained in any Act passed in the present session resjoecting 
 the sale and purchase of land in Ireland, be paid into the Irish 
 Consolidated Fund, and be appropriated to the public service of 
 Ireland according to law. 
 
 13. — (1.) Subject to the provisions for the reduction or cesser Annual con- 
 thereof in this section mentioned, there shall be made on the part tributions from 
 of Ireland to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom the Ireland to Con- 
 following annual contributions in every financial year : that is to ^^^l^^!^^^, ^-an^ 
 say— ^ ^ of United 
 
 ''* . Kingdom, 
 
298 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.D. 1886. (<*•) 1'^® sum of one million four hundred and sixty-six tJiousand 
 «— « pounds on account of the interest on and management of 
 
 the Irish share of the National Debt : 
 
 (b.) The sum of one million six hundred and sixty-six thousand 
 pounds on account of the exi^enditure on the army and 
 navy of the United Kingdom : 
 
 (c.) The sum of one hundred and ten thousand pounds on accomit 
 of the Imperial civil expenditure of the United Kingdom : 
 
 (d.) The sum of one million pounds on account of the Royal 
 Irish Constabulary and the Dubhn Metropolitan Police. 
 
 (2.) During the period of thirty years from this section taking 
 effect the said annual contributions shall not be increased, but may 
 be reduced or cease as hereinafter mentioned. After the expiration 
 of the said thirty years the said contributions shall, save as other- 
 wise provided by this section, continue until altered in manner 
 provided with respect to the alteration of this Act. 
 
 (3.) The Irish share of the National Debt shall be reckoned at 
 forty-eight million pounds Bank annuities, and there shall be paid 
 in every financial year on behalf of Ireland to the Commissioners 
 for the Reduction of the National Debt an annual sum of three 
 hundred and sixty thousand pounds, and the permanent annual 
 charge for the National Debt on the Consolidated Fund of the 
 United Kingdom shall be reduced by that amount, and the said 
 annual sum shall be applied by the said Commissioners as a sinking 
 fund for the redemption of the National Debt, and the Irish share 
 of the National Debt shall be reduced by the amount of the 
 National Debt so redeemed, and the said annual contribution on 
 account of the interest on and management of the Irish share of the 
 National Debt shall from time to time be reduced by a sum equal 
 to the interest ujxin the amount of the National Debt from time to 
 time so redeemed, but that last-mentioned sum shall be paid 
 annually to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National 
 Debt in addition to the above-mentioned annual sinking fund, and 
 shall be so paid and be applied as if it were part of that sinking 
 fund. 
 
 (4.) As soon as an amount of the National Debt equal to the 
 fiaid Irish share thereof has been redeemed under the provisions of 
 this section, the said annual contribution on account of the interest 
 on and management of the Irish share of the National Debt, and 
 the said annual sum for a sinking fund shall cease. 
 
 (5.) If it appears to Her Majesty that the exixjnditure in respect 
 of the army and navy of the United Kingdom, or in respect of 
 Imperial civil expenditure of the United Kingdom, for any financial 
 year has been less than ^/^eew times the amount of the contribu- 
 tions above-named on account of the same matter, a sum equal to 
 one fifteenth part of the diminution shall be deducted from the 
 cuiTent annual contribution for the same matter. 
 
 (6.) The sum paid from time to time by the Commissioners of 
 
Section 14. 299 
 
 Her Majesty's Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues to the Con- a.D. 1886. 
 
 solidated Fund of the United Kingdom on account of the hereditary -! 
 
 revenues of the Crown in Ireland shall be credited to the Irish 
 Government, and go in reduction of the said annual contribution 
 payable on account of the Imperial civil expenditure of the United 
 Kingdom, but shall not be taken into account in calculating 
 whether such diminution as above mentioned has or has not taken 
 place in such expenditure. 
 
 (7.) If it appears to Her Majesty that the expenditure in respect 
 of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan 
 Police for any financial year has been less than the contribution 
 above named on account of such constabulary and police, the 
 current contribution shall be diminished by the amount of such 
 difference. 
 
 (8.) This section shall take effect from and after the thirty-first 
 day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven. 
 
 14. — (1.) On and after such day as the Treasury may direct all Collection and 
 moneys from time to time collected in Ireland on account of the application of 
 •duties of customs or the duties of excise as defined by this Act customs and 
 shall, under such regulations as the Treasury from time to time f ^cise duties 
 make, be carried to a separate accomit (in this Act referred to as ^^ Ireland, 
 the customs and excise account) and applied in the payment of 
 the following sums in priority as mentioned in this section ; that is 
 to say, — 
 
 First, of such sum as is from time to time directed by the 
 I'reasury in respect of the costs, charges, and expenses of and 
 incident to the collection and management of the said duties in 
 Ireland not exceeding four per cent, of the amount collected 
 there ; 
 Secondly, of the annual contributions required by this Act to be 
 
 made to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom ; 
 Thirdly, of the annual sums required by this Act to be paid 
 to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National 
 Debt; 
 Fourthly, of all sums by this Act declared to be payable out of 
 
 the moneys carried to the customs and excise account ; 
 Fifthly, of all sums due to the Consolidated Fund of the United 
 Kingdom for interest or sinking fund, in respect of any loans 
 made by the issue of bank annuities or otherwise to the 
 Government of Ireland under any Act passed in the present 
 session relating to the purchase and sale of land in Ireland, so 
 far as such sums are not defrayed out of the moneys received 
 under such Act ; 
 (2.) So much of the moneys carried to a separate account under 
 this section as the Treasury consider are not, and are not likely to 
 be, required to meet the above-mentioned payments, shall Irom 
 time to time be paid over and applied as part of the public 
 revenues under the control of the Irish Government. 
 
300 
 
 Government of Ireland BUI. 
 
 A.D. 188G. 
 
 Charges on 
 Irish Con- 
 Bolidated Fund. 
 
 Irish Church 
 Fund. 
 
 15. — (1.) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund 
 in priority as mentioned in this section : — 
 
 First, such portion of the sums directed by this Act to be paid 
 out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account 
 in priority to any payment for the public revenues of Ireland, 
 as those moneys are insufficient to pay ; 
 Secondly, all sums due in respect of any debt incurred by the 
 Government of Ireland, whether for interest, management, or 
 sinking fund ; 
 Thirdly, all sums which at the passing of this Act are charged 
 on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect 
 of Irish services other than the salary of the Lord-Lieutenant ; 
 Fourthly, the salaries of all judges of the Supreme Court of 
 Judicature or other superior court in Ireland, or of any county 
 or other like court, who are appointed after the passing of this 
 Act, and the pensions of such judges ; 
 Fifthly, any other sums charged by this Act on the Irish Con- 
 solidated Fund. 
 (2.) It shall be the duty of the Legislature of Ireland to impose 
 all such taxes, duties, or imposts as will raise a sufficient revenue 
 to meet all sums charged for the time being on the Irish Consoli- 
 dated Fund. 
 
 16. — (1.) Until all charges which are payable out of the Chm-ch 
 property in Ireland, and are guaranteed by the Treasury, have 
 been fully paid, the Irish Land Commission shall continue as 
 heretofore to exist, with such Commissioners and officers receiving 
 such salaries as the Treasury may from time to time appoint, and 
 to administer the Church property and apply the income and other 
 moneys receivable therefrom ; and so much of the salaries of such 
 Commissioners and officers and expenses of the office as is not paid 
 out of the Church property shall be paid out of moneys carried to 
 the customs and excise account under this Act, and if thos** 
 moneys are insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, 
 and if not so paid, shall be paid out of moneys provided by- 
 Parliament. 
 
 Provided as follows : — 
 
 (a.) A) I charges on the Church property for which a guarantee 
 has been given by the Treasury before the passing of this 
 Act shall, so far as they are not paid out of such property, 
 be paid out of the moneys carried to the Customs and 
 Excise account under this Act, and if such moneys are 
 insufficient, the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, without 
 prejudice nevertheless to the guarantee of the Treasury ; 
 (&.) All charges on the Church proi>erty, for which no guarantee 
 has been given by the Treasury before the passing of this 
 Act shall 1)6 charged on the Coni*olidated Fund of Ireland, 
 but shall not bo guaranteed by the Treasury nor charged 
 on ilie Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 
 
Section 18. 301 
 
 (2.) Subject to any existing charges on the Church property, ^^ d i886. 
 
 such property shall belong to the Irish Government and any portion J 
 
 of the annual revenue thereof which the Treasury, on the applica- 
 tion of the Irish Government, certify at the end of any financial 
 year not to be required for meeting charges, shall be paid over and 
 applied as part of the public revenues under the control of the Irish 
 Government. 
 
 (3.) As soon as all charges on the Church property guaranteed 
 by the Treasury have been paid, such property may be managed 
 and administered, and subject to existing charges thereon disposed 
 of, and the income or proceeds thereof applied, in such manner as 
 the Irish Legislature may from time to time direct. 
 
 (4.) " Church property " in this section means all property 32 & 33 Vict, 
 accruing under the Irish Church Act, 1869, and transferred to the c. 42. 
 Irish Land Commission by the Irish Church Act Amendment Act, 44 & 45 Vict. 
 1881. c. 71. 
 
 17. — (1.) All sums due for principal or interest to the Public Public loans. 
 Works Loan Commissioners or to the Commissioners of Public 
 Works in Ireland in respect of existing loans advanced on any 
 security in Ireland shall on and after the appointed day be due to 
 the Government of Ireland instead of the said Commissioners, and 
 such body of persons as the Government of Ireland may appoint for 
 the purpose shall have all the powers of the said Commissioners or 
 their secretary for enforcing payment of such sums, and all securities 
 for such sums given to such Commissioners or their secretary shall 
 have effect as if the said body were therein substituted for those 
 Commissioners or their secretary. 
 
 (2.) For the repayment of the said loans to the Consolidated 
 Fund of the United Kingdom, the Irish Government shall pay 
 annually into that fund by half-yearly payments on the first day 
 of January and t\iQ first day of July, or on such other days as may 
 be agreed on, such instalments of the principal of the said loans as 
 will discharge all the loans within thirty years from the appointed 
 day, and shall also pay interest half-yearly on so much of the said 
 principal as from time to time remains unpaid at the rate of three 
 per cent, per annum, and such instalments of principal and interest 
 shall be paid out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise 
 account under this Act, and if those are insufficient, out of tlie 
 Consolidated Fund of Ireland. 
 
 18. If Her Majesty declares that a state of war exists and is Additional aid 
 pleased to signify such declaration to the Irish Legislative Body by in case of war. 
 speech or message, it shall be lawful for the Irish Legislature to 
 appropriate a further sum out of the Consolidated Fund ol Ireland 
 in aid of the army or navy, or other measures which Her Majesty 
 may take for the prosecution of the war and defence of the reahn, 
 and to provide and raise money for that purpose ; and all moneys 
 so provided and raised, whether by loan, taxation, or otherwise, 
 shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 
 
302 
 
 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.D. 1886. 
 
 Money bills 
 and votes. 
 
 Exchequer 
 Division and 
 revenue 
 actions. 
 
 19. — (1.) It shall not be lawful for the Irish Legislative Body to 
 adopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the raising or 
 appropriation for any purpose of any part of the public revenue of 
 Ireland, or of any tax, duty, or impost, except in pursuance of a 
 recommendation from Her Majesty signified through the Lord- 
 Lieutenant in the session in which such vote, resolution, address, or 
 Bill is proposed. 
 
 (2.) Notwithstanding that the Irish Legislature is prohibited by 
 this Act from making laws relating to certain subjects, that Legis-» 
 lature may, with the assent of Her Majesty in Council first obtained, 
 appropriate any part of the Irish public revenue, or any tax, duty, 
 or impost imposed by such Legislature, for the purpose of, or la 
 connection with, such subjects. 
 
 20. — (1.) On and after the appointed day, the Exchequer Division 
 of the High Court of Justice shall continue to be a Court of Exchequer 
 for revenue purposes imder this Act, and whenever any vacancy 
 occurs in the office of any judge of such Exchequer Division, his 
 successor shall be appointed by Her Majesty on the joint recom- 
 mendation of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and the Lord High 
 Chancellor of Great Britain. 
 
 (2.) The judges of such Exchequer Division appointed after tho 
 passing of this Act shall be removable only by Her Majesty on 
 address from the two Houses of the Imperial Parliament, and shall 
 receive the same salaries and pensions as those payable at tho 
 passing of this Act to the existing judges of such division, unless 
 with the assent of Her Majesty in Council first obtained, the Irish 
 Legislature alters such salaries or pensions, and such salaries and 
 pensions shall be paid out of the moneys carried to the customs and 
 excise account in pursuance of this Act, and if the same are insuffi- 
 cient shall be paid out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, and if not so 
 paid shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United 
 Kingdom. 
 
 (3.) An alteration of any rules relating to the procedure in such 
 legal proceedings as are mentioned in this section shall not be made 
 except with the approval of the Lord High Chancellor of Great 
 Britain, and the sittings of the Exchequer division and the judges 
 thereof shall be regulated with the like approval. 
 
 (4.) All legal proceedings instituted in Ireland by or against the 
 Commissioners or any officers of customs or excise, or the lYeasury, 
 shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard and 
 determined before the judges of such Exchequer division, or 8<.)me 
 or one of them, and any appeal from the decision in any such 
 legal proceeding, if by a judge, shall lie to the said division, and if 
 by the Exchequer division, shall lie to the House of Lords, and 
 not to any other tribunal ; and if it is made to appear to such 
 judges, or any of them, that any decree or judgment in any such j 
 proceeding as aforesaid, has not been duly enforced by the sheriff or 
 other officer whose duty it is to enforce the same, such judges or] 
 
Section 22. 303 
 
 judge shall appoint some oflBcer to enforce such judgment or decree ; A.D. 1886. 
 
 and it shall be the duty of such officer to take proper steps to 
 
 enforce the same, and for that purpose such officer and all persons 
 employed by him shall be entitled to the same immunities, powers, 
 and privileges as are by law conferred on a sheriff and his officers. 
 
 (5.) All sums recovered in respect of duties of Customs and 
 Excise, or under any Act relating thereto, or by an officer of 
 Customs or Excise, shall, notwithstanding anything in any other 
 Act, be paid to the Treasury, and carried to the Customs and 
 Excise account under this Act. 
 
 Police. 
 
 21, The following regulations shall be made with respect to Police, 
 police in Ireland ; 
 
 (a.) The Dublin Metropolitan Police shall continue and be subject 
 as heretofore to the control of the Lord-Lieutenant as representing 
 Her Majesty for a period of tiuo years from the passing of this Act, 
 and thereafter until any alteration is made by Act of the Legislature 
 of Ireland, but such Act shall provide for the proper saving of all 
 then existing interests, whether as regards pay, pensions, suj^er- 
 annuation allowances, or otherwise. 
 
 (&.) The Koyal Irish Constabulary shall, while that force subsists, 
 continue and be subject as heretofore to the control of the Lord* 
 Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty. 
 
 (c.) The Irish Legislature may provide for the establishment and 
 maintenance of a police force in counties and boroughs in Ireland 
 under the control of local authorities, and arrangements may be 
 made between the Treasury and the Irish Governmeat for the 
 establishment and maintenance of police reserves. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Supplemental Provisions. 
 
 Powers of Ber Majesty. 
 
 22. On and after the appointed day there shall be reserved to Power over 
 Her Majesty — ^ certain lands 
 
 (1.) The power of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, resei-ved to 
 and other buildings for military or naval purposes ; Her Majesty. 
 
 (2.) The power of taking waste land, and, on making due 
 comi3ensation, any other land, for the purpose of erecting 
 such forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other build- 
 ings as aforesaid, and for any other military or naval 
 purpose, or the defence of the realm. 
 
304 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.T). 1886. 
 
 Legislative Body, 
 
 Veto by first 23. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill is lost by disagreement 
 
 order of Legis- between the two orders of the Legislative Body, and after a period 
 
 lative Body, ending with a dissolution of the Legislative Body, or the period 
 
 ^^Y ^^^^' of three years, whichever period is longest, such Bill, or a Bill 
 
 '^ • containing the said provision, is again considered by the Legislative 
 
 Body, and such Bill or provision is adopted by the second order and 
 
 negatived by the first order, the same shall be submitted to the 
 
 whole Legislative Body, both orders of which shall vote together 
 
 on the Bill or provision, and the same shall be adopted or rejected 
 
 according to the decision of the majority of the members so voting 
 
 together. 
 
 Cesser of power 24. On and after the appointed day Ireland shall cease, except 
 
 of Ireland to j^^ ^^^ event hereafter in this Act mentioned, to return representative 
 
 return mem- pggj.g ^^ ^}^q House of Lords or members to the House of Commons, 
 
 Parliament ^^^ ^^^ persons who on the said day are such representative peers 
 
 and members shall cease as such to be members of the House of 
 
 Lords and House of Commons respectively. 
 
 Decision of Constitutional Qitestions. 
 
 Constitutional 25. Questions arising as to the powers conferred on the LegiS' 
 questions to be lature of Ireland under this Act shall be determined as follows : — 
 submitted to ^^-^ jj ^^y ^y^(.\ question arises on any Bill passed by the Legis' 
 
 Judicial lative Body, the Lord-Lieutenant may refer such question 
 
 Committee. ^^ ^^^ Majesty in Council ; 
 
 (6.) Iff in the course of any action or other legal proceeding^ such 
 question arises on any Act of the Irish Legislature, any 
 party to such action or other legal proceeding may^ subject 
 to the rules in this section mentioned, appeal from a 
 decision on such question to Her Majesty in Council ; 
 (c.) If any such question arises otherwise than as aforesaid on 
 any Act of the Irish Legislature, the Lord- Lieutenant or 
 one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State may 
 refer such question to Her Majesty in Council ; 
 (d.) Any question referred or appeal brought under this section 
 to Her Majesty in Council shall be referred for tlie con- 
 sideration of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ; 
 (e.) TJie decision of Her Majesty in Council on any question 
 referred or appeal brottght under this section shall be final, 
 and a Bill which may be so decided to be, or contain a 
 provision, in excess of the powers of the Irish Legislature 
 shall not be assented to by the Lord- lieutenant ; and a 
 provision of any Act which, is so decided to be in eoccess of 
 the powers of the Irish Legislature shall be void ; 
 (/.) There shall be added to the Judicial Committee when sitting 
 
Section 28. 305 
 
 for the purpose of considering questions under this section, A.D. 1886. 
 such members of Her Majesty^s Frivy Council, being or — — 
 
 having been Irish judges, as to Her Majesty may seem 
 meet. 
 
 (jg.') Her Majesty may, by Order in Council from time to time, 
 make rules as to the cases and mode in which and the con- 
 ditions under which, inpursxiance of this section, questions 
 may be referred and appeals brought to Her Majesty in 
 Council, and as to the consideration thereof by the Judicial 
 Committee of the Privy Council, and any rules so made 
 shall be of the same force as if they were enacted in this 
 Act. 
 
 (h.) An appeal shall not lie to the House of Lords in respect of 
 any question in respect of which an appeal can be had to 
 Her Majesty in Council in pursua^ice of this section. 
 
 Lord-Lieutenant, 
 
 26. — (1.) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Office of Lord- 
 any Act of Parliament, every subject of Her Majesty shall \\q Lieutenant, 
 eligible to hold and enjoy the office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 
 without reference to his religious belief. 
 
 (2.) The salary of the Lord-Lieutenant shall continue to be 
 charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and the 
 expenses of his household and establishment shall continue to be 
 defrayed out of moneys to be provided by Parliament. 
 
 (3.) All existing powers vested by Act of Parliament or other- 
 wise in the Chief Secretary for Ireland may, if no such officer 
 is appointed, be exercised by the Lord-Lieutenant until other 
 provision is made by Act of the Irish Legislature. 
 
 (4.) The Legislature of Ireland shall not pass any Act relating 
 to the office or functions of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. 
 
 Judges and Civil Servants. 
 
 27. A' Judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature or other Judges to be 
 superior court of Ireland, or of any county court or other court removable only 
 with a like jurisdiction in Ireland, appointed after the passing of on address, 
 this Act, shall not be removed from his office except in pursuance 
 of an address to Her Majesty from both orders of the Legislative 
 Body voting separately, nor shall his salary be diminished or right 
 to pension altered during his continuance in office. 
 
 28. — (1.) All persons who at the passing of this Act are judges Provisions as 
 of the Supreme Court of Judicature or county court judges, or hold *° J^^^S^^ and 
 any other judicial position in Ireland, shall, if they are removable ^^^} persons 
 at present on address to Her Majesty of both Houses of Parliament, ^hl^fd^on the 
 continue to be removable only upon such address from both Houses Con^solidated 
 
 X Fund. 
 
306 
 
 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.D. 1886. 
 
 As to persons 
 holding civil 
 service 
 appointments. 
 
 34 & 35 Vict, 
 c. 36. 
 
 Provision for 
 existing 
 pensions and 
 superannua- 
 tion allow- 
 ances. 
 
 of the Imperial Parliament, and if removable in any other manner 
 shall continue to be removable in like manner as heretofore ; and 
 such persons, and also all persons at the passing of this Act in the 
 permanent civil service of the Crown in Ireland whose salaries are 
 charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, shall 
 continue to hold office and to be entitled to the same salaries, 
 pensions, and superannuation allowances as heretofore, and to be 
 liable to perform the same or analogous duties as heretofore ; and 
 the salaries of such persons shall be paid out of the moneys carried 
 to the customs and excise account under this Act, or if these moneys 
 are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, and if the same 
 are not so paid, shall continue charged on the Consolidated Fund 
 of the United Kingdom. 
 
 (2.) If any of these mid persons retires from office with the appro- 
 hation of Her Majesty hefoi^e he has completed the period of service 
 entitling him to a pension^ it sJuxll be lawful for Her Majesty^ if she 
 thinks fit, to grant to that person such pension^ not exceeding the 
 pension to ivhich he would have been entitled if he had completed 
 the said period of service, as to Her Majesty seems meet. 
 
 29. — (1.) All persons not above provided for and at the passing 
 of this Act serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the 
 Crown shall continue to hold their offices and receive the same 
 salaries, and to be entitled to the same gratuities and superannua- 
 tion allowances as heretofore, and shall be liable to perform the 
 same duties as heretofore or duties of similar rank, but any of such 
 persons shall be entitled at the expiration of two years after the 
 passing of this Act to retire from office, and at any time if required 
 by the Irish Government shall retire from office, and on any such 
 retirement shall be entitled to receive such payment as the Treasury 
 may award to him in accordance with the provisions contained in 
 the Fourth Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (2.) The amount of such payment shall be paid to him out of the 
 moneys carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, 
 or, if those moneys are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated 
 Fund, and so far as the same are not so paid shall be paid out 
 of moneys provided by Parliament, 
 
 (3.) The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871, shall apply to all 
 persons who, having retired from office, are entitletl to any annual 
 payment under this section in like manner as if they had retired 
 in consequence of the abolition of their offices. 
 
 (4.) This section shall not apply to persons who are retained in 
 the service of the Imperial Government. 
 
 30. Where before the jxassing of this Act any pension or super- 
 annuation allowance has been granted to any person on account 
 of service as a judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Ireland 
 or of any court consolidated into that court, or as a county court 
 judge, or in any other judicial position, or on account of service in 
 the permanent civil service of the Crown in Ireland otherwise than 
 
Scctmi 33. 307 
 
 in some office, the holder of which is, after the passing of this Act, a.D. 1886. 
 
 retained in the service of the Imperial Government, such pension 
 
 or allowance, whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or out 
 of moneys provided by Parliament, shall continue to be paid to such 
 person, and shall be so paid out of the moneys carried to the 
 customs and excise account under this Act, or, if such moneys are 
 insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, and so far as the 
 same is not so paid, shall be paid as heretofore out of the Consoli- 
 <lated Fund of the United Kingdom or moneys provided by 
 Parliament. 
 
 Transitory Provisions. 
 
 31. The provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule to this Transitory 
 Act relating to the mode in which arrangements are to be made for provisions in 
 setting in motion the Irish Legislative Body and Government and schedule, 
 for the transfer to the Irish Government of the powers and 
 
 duties to be transferred to them under this Act, or for otherwise 
 bringing this Act into operation, shall be of the same effect as if 
 they were enacted in the body of this Act. 
 
 Miscellaneous. 
 
 32. Whenever an Act of the Legislature of Ireland has provided Post Office 
 for carrying on the postal and telegraphic service with respect to and savings 
 the transmission of letters and telegrams in Ireland, and the post banks, 
 office and other savings banks in Ireland, and for protecting the 
 
 officers then in such service, and the existing depositors in such 
 post office savings banks, the Treasury shall make arrangements for 
 the transfer of the said service and banks, in accordance with the 
 said Act, and shall give public notice of the transfer, and shall pay 
 all depositors in such post office savings bank who request payment 
 within six months after the date fixed for such transfer, and after 
 the expiration of such six months the said depositors shall cease to 
 have aay claim against the Postmaster-General or the Consolidated 
 Fund of the United Kingdom, but shall have the like claim against 
 the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, and the Treasury shall cause to 
 be transferred in accordance with the said Act the securities repre- 
 senting the sums due to the said dejx)sitors in post office savings 
 banks and the securities held for other savings banks. 
 
 33. Save as otherwise provided by the Irish Legislature, — Audit. 
 
 (a.) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and the Consoli- 
 dated Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply to the 
 Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund, and an officer 
 shall from time to time be appointed by the Lord- 
 Lieutenant to fill the office of the Comptroller General of 
 
 the receipt and issue of Her Majesty's Exchequer and 
 Auditor-General of public accounts so far as respects 
 Ireland; and 
 
308 Government of Ireland Bill. 
 
 A.D. 1886. (&.) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated I'und shall be 
 
 audited as appropriation accounts in manner provided by 
 
 29 & 30 Vict. the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or 
 
 c. 39. under the direction of the holder of such office. 
 
 Application of 34. — (1.) The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, 
 
 parliamentary enjoyed, and exercised by the Irish Legislative Body, and the 
 
 law. members thereof, shall be such as are from time to time defined by 
 
 Act of the Irish Legislature, but so that the same shall never exceed 
 
 those at the passing of this Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the 
 
 House of Commons, and by the members thereof. 
 
 (2.) Subject as in this Act mentioned, all existing laws and 
 customs relating to the members of the House of Commons and 
 their election, including the enactments respecting the questioning 
 of elections, corrupt and illegal practices, and registration of electors, 
 shall, so far as applicable, extend to elective members of the first 
 order and to members of the second order of the Irish Legislative 
 Body. 
 
 Provided that — 
 
 (a.) The law relating to the offices of profit enumerated in 
 Schedule H. to the Representation of the People Act, 1867, 
 shall apply to such offices of profit in the government of 
 Ireland not exceeding ten, as the Legislature of Ireland 
 may from time to time direct ; 
 (6.) After the first dissolution of the Legislative Body, the 
 Legislature of Ireland may, subject to the restrictions iu 
 this Act mentioned, alter the laws and customs in this 
 section mentioned. 
 Regulations 85. — (1.) The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland may make regulations 
 for carrying for the following purposes : — 
 
 Act into effect, (a.) The summoning of the Legislative Body and the election of 
 a Speaker, and such adaptation to the proceedings of the 
 Legislative Body of the procedure of the House of 
 Commons as appears to him expedient for facilitating the 
 conduct of business by that body on their first meeting ; 
 (6.) The adaptation of any law relating to the election of repre- 
 sentative peers ; 
 (c.) The adaptation of any laws and customs relating to the 
 House of Commons or the members thereof to the elective 
 members of the first order and to members of the second 
 order of the Legislative Body ; and 
 (c?.) The mode of signifying their assent or election under this 
 Act by representative peers or Irish members of the House 
 of Commons as regards becoming members of the Irish 
 Legislative Body in pursuance of this Act. 
 (2.) Any regulations so made shall, in so far as they concern the 
 procedure of the Legislative Body, bo subject to alteration by 
 Standing Orders of that Body, and so far as they concern other 
 matters, be subject to alteration by the Legislature of Ireland, but 
 
Section 39. 309 
 
 shall, until alteration, have the same effect as if they were inserted a.D. 1886. 
 in this Act. 
 
 36. Save as is in this Act provided with respect to matters to be Saving of 
 decided by Her Majesty in Council, nothing in this Act shall affect powers of 
 the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords in respect of actions House of Lords, 
 and suits in Ireland, or the jurisdiction of the House of Lords to 
 determine the claims to Irish peerages. 
 
 37. Save as herein expressly provided all matters in relation to Saving of 
 rvhicli it is not competent for the Irish Legislative Body to mahe rights of 
 or repeal laivs shall remain and he within the exclusive authority Parliament. 
 of the Imperial Parliament, whose poiver and authority in re- 
 lation thereto, save as aforesaid, shall in nowise be diminished or 
 restrained by anything herein contained* 
 
 38. — (1.) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing Continuance 
 laws in force in Ireland, and all existing courts of civil and criminal of existing 
 jurisdiction, and all existing legal commissions, powers, and autho- laws, courts, 
 rities, and all existing officers, judicial, administrative, and minis- officers, &c. 
 terial and all existing taxes, licence, and other duties, fees, and otlier 
 receipts in Ireland shall continue as if this Act had not been passed ; 
 subject, nevertheless, to be repealed, abolished, or altered in manner 
 and to the extent provided by this Act ; provided that, subject to 
 the provisions of this Act, such taxes, duties, fees, and other 
 receipts shall, after the appointed day, form part of the public 
 revenues of Ireland. 
 
 (2.) The Commissioners of Inland Eevenue and the Commissioners 
 of Customs, and the officers of such Commissioners respectively, 
 shall have the same powers in relation to any articles subject to any 
 duty of excise or customs, manufactured, imported, kept for sale, or 
 sold, and any premises where the same may be, and to any 
 machinery, apparatus, vessels, utensils, or conveyance used in 
 connexion therewith, or the removal thereof, and in relation to the 
 person manufacturing, importing, keeping for sale, selling, or 
 having the custody or possession of the same as they would have 
 had if this Act had not been passed. 
 
 39. — (1.) On and after the appointed day this Act shall not, Mode of altera- 
 except such provisions thereof as are declared to be alterable by the tion of Act. 
 Legislature of Ireland, be altered except — 
 
 (a.) by Act of the Imperial Parliament and loith the consent of 
 the Irish Legislative Body testified by an address to Her 
 Majesty, or 
 (6.) by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, for the passing of 
 which there shall be, summoned to the House of Lords the 
 peerage members of the first order of tlie Irish Legislative 
 Body, and if there are no such members then twenty-eight 
 Irish representative peers elected by the Irish peers in 
 manner heretofore in use, subject to ada'ptatimi as ptrovided 
 
 * This clause is printed as I am informed that it ought to have been 
 originally printed in the Bill. 
 
110 
 
 Government of Ireland Bill, 
 
 A.D. 1886. ^y ^^** -^^^ » ^^ there shall he summoned to the House of 
 
 ' J * Commons such one of the members of each constituency, or 
 
 in the case of a constituency returning four memho's such 
 two of those members, as the Legislative Body of Ireland 
 inay select, and such peers a7id members sJudl respectively 
 be deemed, for the purpose of passing any such Act, to be 
 members of the said Houses of Parliament respectively. 
 (2.) For the purposes of this section it sJiall be lawful for Her 
 Majesty by Order in Council to make such provisions for sum- 
 moning the said peers of Ireland to the House of Lords and the 
 said members from Ireland to the House of Commons as to Her 
 Majesty may seem necessary or proper, and any provisions contained 
 in such Order in Council shall have the same effect as if they lictd 
 been enacted by Parliament. 
 Definitions. 40. In this Act— 
 
 The expression " the appointed day " shall mean such day after 
 the thirty-jirst day of March in the year one thousand eight hundred 
 and eighty-seven as may be determined by order of Her Majesty in 
 Council. 
 
 The expression " Lord-Lieutenant " includes the lords justices or 
 any other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being. 
 The expression " Her Majesty the Queen," or " Her Majesty in 
 Council," or " the Queen," includes the heirs and successors of Her 
 Majesty the Queen. 
 
 The expression " Treasury," means the Commissioners of Her 
 Majesty's Treasury. 
 
 The expression " Treaty " includes any convention or arrangement. 
 The expression " existing " means existing at the passing of this 
 Act. 
 
 The expression " existing constituency " means any county or 
 borough, or division of a county or borough, or a University 
 returning at the passing of this Act a member or members to serve 
 in Parliament. 
 
 The expression "duties of excise" does not include a duty 
 received in respect of any licence whether for the sale of intoxicating 
 liquors or otherwise. 
 
 The expression "financial year" means the twelve months 
 ending on the thirty-first day of March. 
 Short title 41. This Act may be cited for all purposes as the Irish Govern- 
 
 or Act. ment Act, 1886. 
 
ScJiedules, 
 
 311 
 
 FIRST SCHEDULE. 
 
 A.D. 1&80. 
 
 FIRST ORDER OF THE IRISH LEGISLATIVE BODY. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. 
 
 I 
 
 PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FIRST ORDER OP TSE IRISH 
 LEGISLATIVE BODY. 
 
 THIRD SCHEDULE. 
 
 ftOt'NDARIES OF DIVISIONS OF THE CITY OF CORK FOR THE PURPOSE OP 
 RETURNING MEMBERS TO THE SECOND ORDER OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
 BODY. 
 
 FOURTH SCHEDULE. 
 
 PROVISIONS AS TO SUPERANNUATION ALLOWANCES OP PERSONS IN THE 
 PERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE. 
 
 FIFTH SCHEDULE. 
 
 TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PBINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 STAMFOBD STREET AND CHARINa CROSS. 
 
 ^ 
 
14 DAY USE 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or 
 
 on the date to which renewed. 
 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall 
 
 ^MoVGOHil 
 
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 (A9562sl0)476B 
 
 Generid Library 
 
 Ufurersity of California 
 
 Berkeley 
 
GENERAL LIBRABV-U.C. BERKELEY 
 
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