Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2008 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/essaysonpoliticaOOpraerich 
 
HISTOEICAL ESSAYS 
 
ESSAYS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 POLITICAL HISTOEY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FIFTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, AND SEVENTEENTH 
 CENTUEIES. 
 
 BY 
 
 JULES VAN PRAET. 
 
 f ; 
 
 EDITED BY SIR EDMUND HEAD, BART. 
 
 LONDON: 
 RICHAED BENTLEY, NEW BUELINGTON STEEET, 
 
 ^uWis^u in #rbinarg to ^zx paj^etg, 
 1868. 
 
^ 
 
 '^'b 
 
 yu^ 
 
 «. VLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, 
 BREAD STREET HILL. 
 
EDITOR'S PEEEACE. 
 
 In consenting to edit this translation, I cannot 
 but feel that I have undertaken a task which 
 ought to have been executed by far abler hands. 
 The death of Mrs. Austin has deprived us of one 
 who united a masculine power of understanding 
 with the tact and delicacy peculiar to a woman. 
 Had she fulfilled her intention of looking over 
 these pages the reader might have been sure that 
 the meaning of the author was correctly given, 
 and that it was conveyed to him in pure and 
 idiomatic English. No doubt, too, the fact that 
 those who have executed the translation are near 
 and dear to her, would have secured at her 
 hands peculiar care in its supervision. To her 
 we owe some of the very best translations to 
 be found in the English language ; and there are 
 few persons whose energies and accomplishments 
 would enable them to edit successfully the 
 
VI EDITORS PREFACE. 
 
 Lectures on the Province of Jurisprudence, and 
 translate Kanke's "History of the Popes/' As it 
 is, I have been requested to do that imperfectly 
 which she would have done perfectly, but I 
 cannot let this volume appear without a tribute 
 to the memory of one whose friendship and 
 regard I shall never cease to value. 
 
 EDMUND HEAD. 
 
 Note. — With the exception of the last eight 
 pages, the whole of this translation has been 
 revised and corrected by the late Sir Edmund 
 Head. 
 
'university; 
 
 PEEFACB 
 
 Without having formed the project of executing 
 such a task, I have long and often thought of a 
 work, the object of which should be to show the 
 changes and modifications in the political position, 
 both internal and external, of the large states of 
 the west of Europe from the close of the feudal 
 period to our own days. 
 
 Such a book would have to show the changes 
 which successively took place in the principles, the 
 form, and conduct of the governments guiding the 
 affairs of those great states ; the increase or decrease 
 in their power ; the character of their ambition, 
 whether just or immoderate ; their influence for good 
 or for evil over the fate of the people subject to 
 them ; their relations in peace or war with one 
 another, and the territorial consequences of their 
 wars. It would be necessary to take into account 
 the time when the historical facts occurred, the 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 irresistible movement of human ideas, and the action 
 of the men who held sway ; it would be necessary 
 too to examine what those men, eminent for courage 
 and ability, who from the end of the fourteenth 
 century chanced to be mixed up in the government 
 of nations, said, thought, or wrote in the affairs 
 with which they had to deal Such were Edward 
 III, Van Artevelde, Henry V, Louis XI, Cardinal 
 Amboise, Julius II, Duprat, Charles V, Perrenot, 
 Ximenes, William the Silent, Catherine of Medicis, 
 Elizabeth, L'Hopital, Henry IV, Sully, Ferdinand 
 
 II, Gustavus Adolphus, Eichelieu, Mazarin, Crom- 
 well, Louis XIV, Lionne, De Witt, and William 
 
 III. We ought to learn how they judged the state 
 of society in the midst of which they lived, as 
 compared with that which preceded it, and in 
 what degree each had at heart the well-being of 
 mankind or his own gratification. 
 
 Such a book would be the political history of 
 modern times; but that which I now publish is 
 not the beginning or even the sketch of such a 
 book. It is at the most what a painter would 
 call the ground on which to work. 
 
 It is, perhaps, useless, in the times in which 
 we live, to define what we understand by the 
 politics of a country. In a few words, it means 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 its everyday life, in relation to its institutions, and 
 to the laws of general interest in force at the 
 moment : in short, the relations of all with the 
 government, whatever may be its form, and the 
 relations of that government with foreign states. 
 When this everyday life, with these laws of general 
 interest and the institutions of a country are ex- 
 plained, and when these relations of the people to 
 their government, and of the government to 
 foreign states are discussed, then we in fact write 
 its political history. 
 
 The modern history of Western Europe, if we 
 look at its general outlines, up to the end of the 
 wars of Louis XIY, seems to offer the following 
 characteristics of certain periods. 
 
 First, the Feudal Period. — The territory is split 
 up among the possessors of fiefs, who depend nomi- 
 nally on the crown, but are in reality independent. 
 The Anglo-French wars have the true feudal cha- 
 racter, and turn mainly on the claims of the royal 
 houses engaged in them. They were wars asserting 
 certain rights ; not wars of conquest ; for the kings 
 of England claimed to be the legitimate heirs of 
 the crown of France. This period ends with the 
 fourteenth century ; and these wars gradually re- 
 laxed their force, though they did not cease till 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 the next century ; an epoch which is rather the end 
 of the middle ages than the beginning of modern 
 times. 
 
 Period of the Wars of Families. — Fifteenth 
 Century. — The feudal element has been weakened 
 by the action of time, and by the struggles between 
 the lords themselves. Fiefs have been gradually 
 absorbed into each other, and made larger. The 
 royal power has become stronger in France, in 
 England, and in Spain. Contests are no longer 
 carried on between the feudal vassals, but between 
 the princes of the same family, who are individually 
 more powerful, but less numerous. This was the 
 epoch of the war for the " public weal " in France 
 under the Dukes of Burgundy and Charles VII, and 
 Louis XI, and of the Wars of the Eoses in England. 
 
 Period of the Wars between States. — The great 
 kingdoms now contend either to conquer each 
 from the other certain portions of territory, or 
 to obtain domains situated beyond their own 
 limits. The unity of the state is complete, and 
 feudal or family rivalries have been extinguished. 
 This is the time of the great wars of the sixteenth 
 and seventeenth centuries. France and Spain are 
 fighting for the sovereignty of certain parts of 
 Italy. The rivalry between the Houses of France 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 and Spain, — and after a branch of the Spanish house 
 had been established on the Imperial throne, — the 
 rivaby between the Houses of France and of Austria, 
 fill up these two great centuries, from the acces- 
 sion of Charles VIII. to the Treaty of Utrecht 
 (1483 — 1713). This struggle in the most remark- 
 able manner assumed a personal character in the 
 first instance as between Charles Y. and Francis I. ; 
 it languished during the reign of the last prince of 
 the Yalois race and under Philip II. ; but it became 
 more intense from the time of Philip III. to that of 
 Charles II. of Spain, and under Louis XIII. and 
 Louis XIV. in France. 
 
 The Period of the Wars for Supremacy, which 
 sometimes are scarcely to he distinguished from 
 those of the preceding period. — In proportion as 
 each state became more powerful, and whenever it 
 was represented by a man of greater strength, the 
 ambition of its king was to obtain the supremacy 
 of Europe. Such men were Charles V, Kichelieu, 
 Louis XIY, and William III. AU these, and even 
 Philip II, sought to possess greater power than any 
 other European state, and to acquire a moral in- 
 fluence greater than all of them put together. The 
 struggle for European supremacy confounds itself 
 therefore with the struggle between state and state ; 
 
XU PREFACE. 
 
 it cannot be said to be limited by any fixed epoch, 
 because it depends upon the character and the 
 qualities of certain men. 
 
 Revolutionary Periods. — The insurrections against 
 the crown, by dissatisfied subjects, depend, like the 
 wars for supremacy, on the character of the sove- 
 reigns under whose reign they break out. The 
 three great revolutions of modern history, which 
 shook the throne of Philip TL of Spain, and over- 
 threw those of Charles I. of England, and Louis 
 XVI. of France, are separated by intervals of one 
 century from each other. They imply an advanced 
 state of society, and an exaggerated condition of 
 the kingly power. The difierences of their cha- 
 racter, violence, and duration depend on the social 
 condition in the midst of which they spring, and 
 the greater or less feebleness of the power which 
 they attack. 
 
 The modern history of Western Europe has, there- 
 fore, to narrate successively the end of the feudal 
 system, the family wars, and, at the same time, 
 the wars between state and state, the wars of 
 nations for supremacy, and the revolutions, which 
 have taken place. It has to tell us, moreover, how 
 far religious ideas before the Eeformation in the 
 sixteenth century, but especially after it, were con- 
 
PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 nected with the political government of states, 
 and what portion of aid or of embarrassment, in 
 a manner ever-varying and irregular but full of 
 passion, they brought to each. 
 
 Up to the end of the seventeenth century, these 
 are the great chapters of modern history. But in 
 the midst of its principal features there is one which 
 in those powerful states of Western Europe that 
 played the most important parts, and led the way 
 in social progress, is most constantly prominent ; 
 and that is their uninterrupted advance towards the 
 unity of the monarchy. Those who governed these 
 states had to sway masses of people every day 
 becoming larger, and territories every day becoming 
 wider. Of the five great principal sovereignties, or 
 groups of sovereignties, which, if we except some 
 secondary states, geographically make up Western 
 Europe — that is to say, England, France, Spain, 
 Germany, and Italy — the three first were con- 
 stituted, in a manner more or less open to question, 
 on the basis of monarchical unity. The two others, 
 Germany and Italy, followed a different course. 
 They remained broken up, — Germany into mo- 
 narchical states for the most part of secondary im- 
 portance, Italy into small principalities, more or 
 less independent, and into republics. Burgundy, if 
 
^ 
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 it had continued to exist as a powerful and inde- 
 pendent state, such as it was under the Dukes of the 
 House of Yalois, would have formed a sixth great 
 kingdom ; but, after one century of such a life (the 
 fifteenth), it disappeared from the map of Europe. 
 
 Thus, as historically there are five great cate- 
 gories of facts, which are present in succession in 
 the modern history of Western Europe, so geogra- 
 phically, and putting aside some secondary states 
 which will be mentioned, there are five great and 
 principal divisions of territory. 
 
 If we consider how these five great kingdoms, 
 or these groups of kingdoms, are placed with 
 reference to each other on the European scene, we 
 recognise among them the following condition of 
 things : — 
 
 When the Anglo-French wars had ceased with 
 the fifteenth century — when the three great mon- 
 archies of Spain, France, and England had each 
 secured its independence at home, and was firmly 
 established — when the wars between France and 
 Spain had commenced — France and Spain played 
 the first part as combatants ; generally, at first with 
 a marked superiority on the side of Spain. During 
 these wars, England — that is to say, the England 
 of Henry VHI, of Elizabeth, and even later the 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 England of the Stuarts — kept a little in the back- 
 ground of the two principal powers. She interfered 
 indeed in the affairs of the continent with her 
 material force and her moral authority, but she 
 remained in the second rank ; she consulted her 
 own security, leant by preference towards that one 
 of the rivals who was the weaker, and occasionally 
 proposed herself as mediator between the two. At 
 a later period England was destined to occupy the 
 first rank. During this great war between France 
 and Spain, the two remaining powers — Italy 
 and Germany — which with France, Spain, and 
 England, completed the five great states of Europe 
 — were made up, as they have since continued to 
 be, of groups of states, separated one from the other, 
 and divided in their wishes and interests, without 
 any force of unity or cohesion. They were less 
 advanced, if we may so speak, in their political 
 career, and stood in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
 centuries at a point in politics which France, 
 Spain, and England had attained one hundred and 
 fifty years before. Now and then they showed a 
 tendency to unite under the influence of an ambi- 
 tious or a powerful man, like Julius II, Charles V, or 
 Ferdinand II. ; but they could not accomplish their 
 end, and they thus continued to act a secondary 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 part to that played hj France, Spain, or England. 
 They served however as a mark for the ambition 
 of the powers of the first rank, each of which 
 wished, at one and the same time, to exercise a pre- 
 dominant influence over them. Charles V. and 
 Francis I, Charles V. and Henry II, afterwards 
 Henry IV. and Kichelieu, Philip HI. and Philip IV, 
 and Ferdinand II, all sought successively, in the 
 great wars of Italy, in the wars of Germany and of 
 Lorraine, in the Thirty Years' War, in that of the 
 Valtelline and of Mantua, not exactly the mastery, 
 but the preponderance in Italy and in Germany. 
 Italy precedes Germany, in the order of time, as the 
 theatre and object of this struggle ; and, when 
 Spain had established her superiority over the 
 French arms in Italy, so as to leave for France of 
 the seventeenth century nothing more there to gain, 
 except some petty conquests, then Germany, in her 
 turn, became the field and the subject of contention. 
 Thus, during the wars between Spain and France, 
 and between Austria and France, Italy and Ger- 
 many, which lay beyond their limits, were coveted, 
 if not as affording territory to be conquered, at least 
 in the character of a field for the exercise of superior 
 influence by one of the combatants. Throughout 
 these two centuries of conflict, Italy and Germany 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 figured only in tlie third rank, behind France, 
 8pain, and England. It was not their destiny in 
 those times, which are now so remote from us, to 
 follow the course pursued by the other great powers 
 in their progress towards unity. 
 
 Still further in the rear of this third rank, three 
 other states of less importance fill up the geogra- 
 phical outline of Western Europe. Two of these, 
 from their position, their character, and their 
 history, became independent early in their career, 
 while the destiny of the third was special and 
 remarkable. I allude, of course, to Switzerland, 
 Venice, and the Low Countries. The two first 
 were powerful and warlike republics, but Venice, 
 though Italian, did not always share the destinies 
 of Italy, nor Switzerland those of Germany, 
 although it spoke that language. 
 
 The Low Countries remain, and we will speak of 
 them presently, but we will first succinctly sum up 
 that which we have just been attempting to describe. 
 
 Spain, France, England, Italy, and Germany — 
 five great states, or groups of states — Venice, 
 Switzerland, and the Low Countries, — three states 
 of secondary importance — compose the map of 
 Western Europe. After the cessation of the wars 
 between France and England, first Spain and 
 
 b 
 
^ 
 
 Xviii PREFACE. 
 
 France, and then Austria and France, play the 
 principal part in war against each other. England 
 at this epoch figures only in the second line, as 
 the ally of one or the other of the two great powers, 
 or the mediator between them. The part of 
 England, however, is destined one day to become 
 more important than that of France or Spain. 
 Italy and Germany, which complete the number 
 of the five great states, occupy the third place 
 in the scene. France and Spain, and later still, 
 France and Austria, fight to obtain preponderance, 
 first in Italy, and subsequently in Germany. They 
 contend for the possession of Italy, frequently in 
 Italy itself; and they contend for Germany, 
 frequently in Germany itself. 
 
 Such is the position of affairs presented to us, 
 and such, with successive variations of time and 
 place, is the most general view put before us on the 
 map of Western Europe since the feudal wars. This 
 portion of the Continent, then, in the transition from 
 feudal times to our own, has passed through the 
 wars of families, the wars between States, the general 
 European wars, the Eeformation, and the revolution 
 afiecting the form of government. We have already 
 said that, when wars became of a general character, 
 and were conducted by men of great ambition or 
 
PREFACE. XIX 
 
 of great genius, they ceased to have some fixed 
 conquest as their object, but aimed rather at 
 obtaining supremacy in Europe — a supremacy which 
 passed from one to the other of the great powers — 
 from Spain to France or from France to England — 
 as the capricious chances of a battle, or the success 
 which fortune gave to the genius of some politician, 
 might alternately decide. Such was the supremacy 
 which belonged to Spain under Charles Y, and 
 even after him under Philip II. ; to France under 
 Henry IV, and Eichelieu, and during the early 
 days of Louis XIY. ; to England in the old age 
 of Louis XIY, and under William III. 
 
 I have now something to say of the Low 
 Countries, and of their position in Europe. 
 
 The provinces which once formed the circle of 
 Burgundy have almost always played a more 
 important part in the affairs of Europe than the 
 amount of their population would seem to warrant. 
 If it was a matter of discussion for ages to whom 
 the superior influence in Italy and in Germany 
 should belong, it was equally a matter of impor- 
 tance to know whether the Low Countries should 
 enter or remain in the orbit of Spain, France, 
 England, or Germany. The southern provinces of 
 the Netherlands, during the middle ages, were 
 
 h 2 
 
XX PREFACE. 
 
 very powerful by their arms, their wealth, their 
 municipal liberty, and their industry. Before and 
 dui'ing the government of the Dukes of Burgundy, 
 these provinces were by turns French or English 
 in the sentiments which they manifested, or ratlier 
 in the tendencies of those who governed them. 
 They were French during the wars of the Arma- 
 gnacs, and were engaged in the troubles of France 
 against that faction ; they were English when the 
 Treaty of Troyes was signed. They were French 
 because the Dukes of Burgundy were the vassals 
 of France ; they were English, and the allies of 
 England, by accident, and because a spirit of 
 vengeance animated Philip the Good against 
 France, or because Charles the Bold professed to 
 intend the invasion of that country with the 
 assistance of England. This alliance was far from 
 being, as it might have been, the result of a 
 serious combination. In the succeeding age, 
 Charles V. found the Low Countries as it were 
 on the rent-roll of his inheritance, and Francis I. 
 did not take them from him : in fact he never 
 seriously made the attempt. 
 
 Charles V. was too powerful, and during the 
 greater part of his career too successful, to allow 
 any one gravely to dispute his possession of the 
 
PREFACE. XXI 
 
 Netherlands. They rendered him the greatest 
 service, for they provided him abundantly with 
 money, and, if we except the revolt of Ghent, they 
 caused him little anxiety. To the people of Ghent 
 the Emperor was cold and severe, but he made up 
 for it by entrusting the government of the country 
 to two women of high character and of great 
 capacity, Margaret of Parma and Mary of Hungary. 
 He showed so much affection and confidence to 
 his Flemish subjects, as frequently to rouse the 
 jealousy of the Spaniards. Under Philip II, during 
 the religious wars, the southern provinces had the 
 wish but not the power to throw off the Spanish 
 yoke. They were at length convinced that they 
 could not free themselves from Spain without 
 foreign aid. They might have offered themselves 
 to France, if the sovereign of that country, not 
 being able to make up his mind to defend them, 
 had had energy enough to incorporate them. They 
 would have given themselves to England, as the 
 provinces of the north wished to do, had Eliza- 
 beth consented to take them ; and had not she 
 seen, in the bitter resentment of Spain deprived of 
 her possessions, and in the jealousy of France, a 
 double chance of war, which shocked her prudence, 
 and alarmed her parsimony. 
 
XXU PREFACE. 
 
 The northern provinces, lost to Philip II, founded 
 and maintained their independence ; so that Holland 
 became, after the sixteenth century, as formidable 
 as any state in Europe by its maritime power and 
 the boldness of its commercial enterprise. 
 
 The southern portion, however, remained subject 
 to Spain ; and Philip II, regretting in his old age 
 that he had passed all his life away from the Low 
 Countries, gave what he yet possessed of them to 
 his daughter, without renouncing his claim to them 
 definitively, and without recognising the inde- 
 pendence of those which had freed themselves in 
 the north. After the death of Isabella, Spain 
 still retained possession of this rich domain, but 
 Henry lY. once thought of taking it from her, 
 and bestowing it on the United Provinces (a plan 
 conceived, but not executed). Eichelieu also had 
 for a moment the project, which he did not realize, 
 of dividing the spoil between France and Holland ; 
 and Louis XIV. imprudently attempted the con- 
 quest, without thinking that he was ruining France, 
 and that he had to deal with the armies of 
 Europe, the navy of England, and the bold and 
 patient spirit of William III. The southern pro- 
 vinces of the Low Countries, then — let us call 
 them for shortness, Belgium — remained Spanish, in 
 
PREFACE. XXm 
 
 spite of the greed of France, and in spite of the 
 fact that they were ill- defended by Spain. Thus 
 it was that Belgium, during the whole course of 
 the struggle between France and Spain, from the 
 rupture of the Treaty of Noyon (1519), until the 
 conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht (1713), conti- 
 nued throughout that great war to have an 
 importance disproportioned to its population and 
 military force, as one of the fields of battle, and 
 as one of the great stakes which were played for, 
 
 This importance resulted from its central posi^ 
 tion on the map of Europe, from its wealth, its 
 contiguity to France, to Germany and to the sea, its 
 situation on two great rivers, the considerable in- 
 crease of power it brought or threatened to bring 
 to any one of the great states which might possess 
 it or covet it ; and from the difficulty of founding a 
 balance of power in Europe likely to last, when these 
 provinces were in the hands of one of the great 
 States, or of one of those deeply engaged in a 
 general war. The Treaty of Utrecht caused these 
 provinces to pass from the hands of the elder 
 branch of the Spanish house to those of the younger, 
 which had been established on the Imperial throne 
 since the abdication of Charles V. 
 
 The Low Countries — the birthplace of Philip the 
 
XXIV PREFACE. 
 
 Good, of Mary of Hungary, of the family of Croy, 
 of Adrian VI, of four or five generations of the 
 House of Nassau, of Egmont, of Barneveld, of 
 Tilly, of Tromp, of De Witt, and of Heinsius — and 
 more especially the provinces of the south, the 
 country where the Dukes of Burgundy lived, where 
 Charles V. was born, where the Duke of Alva 
 combated the Ee volution and the Keformation, 
 where Maurice of Nassau fought against Spinola, 
 William HI. against Louis XIV. — where so much 
 blood has been shed, from the time of the battle 
 of Bouvines down to our own day — this country 
 has her place in the annals of Europe, and has 
 assigned to her a definite and important sphere of 
 action of her own. 
 
 It would be curious to examine the detail of 
 military or diplomatic events, for the sake of seeing 
 how far Belgium was mixed up in the affairs of 
 Europe from the time of the death of Edward III. 
 to the Peace of Utrecht, that is, from the time when 
 she made a commercial alliance with England to 
 that day when, after having been less than one hun- 
 dred years governed by the Dukes of Burgundy, 
 and for two hundred years by the Kings of Spain, 
 the country passed under the dominion of the House 
 of Austria. It would be interesting, by closely 
 
PREFACE. XXV 
 
 questioning the sovereigns of Europe, and the acts 
 of their respective governments, to ascertain in what 
 manner, why, in what circumstances, and in how 
 great a degree, the uncertain fate of Belgium in- 
 volves or menaces the true, necessary and lasting 
 conditions of the balance of power in Europe. 
 
 When we follow the steps of French policy, 
 from the time of the English wars to the close 
 of the seventeenth century — from the accession of 
 Charles VIII. to the death of Louis XIV, it is 
 easy to distinguish three leading ideas. First, there 
 was that of the war with Spain, represented by 
 Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I. ; then that 
 of the alliance of France with the foreign Keformers, 
 with a view to the same contest, and this alliance 
 was represented by Henry IV. and Eichelieu ; 
 lastly, there was that most ill-judged war against 
 Austria and against all Europe united, whether 
 Protestant or Catholic, at once the dream and the 
 ruin of Louis XIV. 
 
 All these wars, all the treaties which terminated 
 them, the dynastic revolutions of the Low Countries 
 and of England, and the civil wars in France and 
 in Germany, affected the fate of the Belgian pro- 
 vinces, by increasing or diminishing in some way 
 their security or prosperity. 
 
XXVI PREFACE. 
 
 They never could be indifferent to the general 
 course of these European events, nor unaffected by 
 their results. Looking thus to the destinies of 
 Europe as a whole, and to the course of events 
 during three centuries, such, in a' few words, is the 
 place, and such the influence which belongs to the 
 Low Countries, and particularly to the Belgian 
 provinces. We cannot rank them among the great 
 states of Europe ; but we can say, that they have 
 been a party in all the great suits, and that during 
 their temporary connexion with Burgundy and 
 Franche-Comte, while France and England were 
 wasting their strength in the convulsions of civil 
 war, they occupied one of the first places. 
 
 This general picture, presented so briefly, will 
 be repeated in a still more incomplete manner in 
 the five sketches which form this volume. Making 
 allowance for the encroachment which we have 
 remarked, of one epoch upon another, whenever a 
 powerful genius hastens the course of events, these 
 sketches correspond to the five sets of historical facts 
 which we have enumerated. They are indissolubly 
 connected by the chain of occurrences through 
 three centuries, and they are intended specially to 
 illustrate the principle, whether it were lasting or 
 transitory, generous or selfish, which animated and 
 
PREFACE. XXVU 
 
 guided each government. This is a peculiar aspect 
 of history which may be studied lovingly and care- 
 fully, without neglecting its general tenor, or the 
 other portions of the great drama which it presents. 
 The government, whatever was its form, its excel- 
 lences, or its defects, whatever was the principle or 
 the passion that guided it — we are speaking of 
 governments of former times — affected all the in- 
 terests, and involved the whole fate of the people 
 with whom it was concerned. 
 
 In making an especial study of the conduct of 
 governments, we are bound to observe what changes 
 have been made in their principle, and in the law 
 of their existence, as well as what passed in the 
 mind of those who administered them. There is 
 no country, for example, which, in the progress of 
 its domestic policy, presents a field of observation 
 so varied as England, inasmuch as the system was 
 feudal under the descendants of the Norman con- 
 querors, and advanced gradually towards a parlia- 
 mentary form, as the influence of the Great (Jharter 
 was developed ; at a later period the country was 
 governed despotically, after the fashion of con- 
 tinental states, by craft under the Tudors, and with 
 bhnd rashness under the Stuarts. The government 
 was republican for a moment as an experiment, but 
 
XXVlll PREFACE, 
 
 it was only again to become and to remain parlia- 
 mentary, after its second revolution ; and in this 
 form, thus definitively adopted, England has conti- 
 nued to grow in power and influence. The history, 
 therefore, of the constitutional government of 
 England has the merit of exhibiting to the 
 spectator, in its successive conditions, each theo- 
 retical principle and its practical application in 
 politics, as it likewise shows in the persons of the 
 rulers — from the reign of Henry V. in the fifteenth 
 century to that of Queen Anne in the eighteenth — 
 all the varieties of intellect and passion which are 
 to be found in a human being invested with power 
 and authority, and thus subjected to a dangerous 
 trial. 
 
 It would require much more time than I have 
 devoted to this work — and the subject would re- 
 quire to be more completely worked out — if I 
 wished to place before the eye of the reader a 
 complete picture of European politics during the 
 period which separates us from the middle ages. In 
 order to set forth the ideas of those who, during 
 the course of those great centuries, stamped the 
 mark of their own will on the politics and the wars 
 of their day, we ought, for instance, to enter much 
 more deeply into the disagreements of the Dukes 
 
PREFACE. XXIX 
 
 of Burgundy and of Charles V. with their people 
 and their states, into the minute history of the 
 religious sects in Holland and in France, — into the 
 details of the events of the Thirty Years' War, 
 and of the policy which prevailed in Holland during 
 the interregnum subsequent to the death of the 
 Stadtholder William H, before the military enter- 
 prises of Louis XIV. We cannot understand the 
 true bearing of great events unless we study them 
 in their particular incidents, just as we never know 
 the character of a man unless we follow him in the 
 details of his daily life. 
 
 Against my wish and my tastes, this book is 
 then only a summary, and it may be that on 
 certain events and on certain men its views differ 
 somewhat from those which are generally received. 
 
 I have made use of the great works in which 
 documents hitherto unpublished have now appeared, 
 and which allow us, with reference to the fifteenth 
 and sixteenth centuries, to the wars of Charles VH, 
 the personal labours of Charles Y, to Cardinal 
 Granvelle, Philip H, the members of the House 
 of Nassau, and Cardinal Eichelieu, to know that 
 which was hidden from the generation before us.^ 
 
 ^ The Correspondence of Charles V. by Dr. Lanz ; the Papers of 
 Cardinal Granvelle, collected by M. Weiss ; the Correspondence of 
 Philip II. and of the Prince of Orange, published by M. Gachard ; the 
 
n 
 
 XXX PREFACE. 
 
 Having already passed more than thirty years in 
 the absorbing pursuits of public life, without having 
 enjoyed what can be properly called the leisure 
 necessary for study, I have written the five chapters 
 which form this volume at considerable intervals. 
 They were frequently composed with a haste, marks 
 of which the reader will not fail to see, and with 
 the hesitation of one who never had the time to 
 exercise himself in the art of writing history. To 
 execute the grand work, to which this would serve 
 merely as the introduction, must require a fitness 
 for the task and an amount of diligence greater 
 than any one can hope to possess who has remained 
 for the larger portion of his life a stranger to 
 literary labour. 
 
 It is possible that, in observing the progress 
 of governments, an involuntary preference, or long 
 and deeply-rooted habit, has led me to look more 
 especially to the personal side of historical events, 
 and has induced me to dwell too much on the 
 
 Archives of the House of Orange-Nassau, — each volume of which is 
 preceded by an Introduction by M. Groen Van Prinsterer ; the Docu- 
 ments on the Succession of Spain, by M. Mignet ; the Negotiations 
 between France and Austria, by M. Le Glay ; the different Collections 
 of Venetian Despatches ; the voluminous Memoirs of Richelieu, are 
 publications of our own time. The Memoirs of Richelieu were first 
 printed in 1823. The publication of the Letters and State Papers of 
 Richelieu (Coll. des Documents intdits), by M. Avenel, was commenced 
 in 1853. 
 
PREFACE. XXXI 
 
 influence exercised by tlie acts of particular men at 
 critical moments. This is, perhaps, natural enough, 
 when we are dealing with times in which it was 
 the tendency of power to concentrate and to 
 strengthen itself more and more in a small number 
 of hands. 
 
 It is unnecessary, I think, to say that, in 
 speaking of European events and of the men of 
 former times, I have not sought to make any 
 comparison with contemporary or recent occur- 
 rences, or with those who have borne a part in 
 them. The events of former days and of the 
 present time have their resemblances and their 
 differences : they resemble each other in certain 
 points and they differ in others. To make any 
 malignant allusion to those resemblances would be 
 as childish as the affectation of denying their 
 existence would be absurd. I will here only men- 
 tion one point of comparison, or rather of contrast, 
 between the past and the present. I have said, 
 with reference to certain epochs of misery and 
 trouble in the history of the Low Countries, that 
 each might be designated by the name of the 
 individual who played the greatest part in it. 
 Hereafter, when history shall describe the first 
 years of the independent kingdom of Belgium — 
 
XXXll PREFACE. 
 
 1 
 
 years during which the country has enjoyed greater 
 tranquillity, greater freedom, and greater wealth 
 than ever it did before, it will be found that 
 personal influence of the highest kind in like 
 manner claims respect, and that there have been 
 acts of the loftiest self-sacrifice which, in the 
 memory of our country, may well be mingled with 
 those of its earlier existence. 
 
 n 
 
 ^ 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGi: 
 
 Preface vii — xxxii 
 
 I. — Introduction. 
 
 Introductory Remarks 1 
 
 The Burgundian Period — the Transition between the 
 
 Feudal and Monarchical Era 2 
 
 Characteristic Traits of Middle Ages 2 
 
 Feudal System 3 
 
 Petty Independent Sovereignties 3 
 
 Absorption of Fiefs , 4 
 
 Increase of Eoyal Power in France 4 
 
 Disappearance of Chivalry and Feudal Traditions ... 5 
 
 The Communes — their Decay 6 
 
 Etienne Marcel 7 
 
 Events and Political Institutions in England — Tlie 
 
 Anglo-I^orman Barons — Growth of Eepresentative 
 
 Institutions 8 
 
 Causes of Differences of the Historical Development in 
 
 England and France 9 
 
 The Co-existence of two Paces in England 10 
 
 England subject to fewer Disorders — The Distress in 
 
 France under the Valois 11 
 
 The English Possessions in France 12 
 
 Wars between Edward III. and Philip of Valois ... 13 
 
 The Dukes of Burgundy 14 
 
 C 
 
XXxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 i 
 
 PAGK 
 
 Vigorous Condition of Municipal Government in Burgundy 
 
 and Flanders 15 
 
 Sympathy of Flanders with England — Its Causes ... 16 
 Jacques Van Artevelde — Difficulties of liis Position, and 
 
 his Death 17 
 
 The Flemish Communes victorious at Courtrai, and de- 
 feated at Roosebeke 18 
 
 Less powerful under the Dukes of Burgundy — Rivalries 
 
 between the Towns 19 
 
 Increase of Royal Power in France — Organization of Par- 
 liamentary Power in England 20 
 
 The Dukes of Burgundy of the Race of Valois .... 21 
 The Part the Dukes of Burgundy play in History from 
 
 their Position and Wealth 22 
 
 The Weakness of the Dukes of Burgundy 23 
 
 The Condition of France during the Reigns of Charles VI. 
 
 and Charles VII 24 
 
 Destruction of Feudalism, and imperfect Form of the 
 
 Monarchy 25 
 
 Death of Charles V. and Anarchy in France .... 26 
 
 Personal Character of Charles VI 27 
 
 Great Career opened to Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy 28 
 The two Parties of Burgundy and Orleans — Distress in 
 
 France 29 
 
 Death of Philip the Bold, and Accession of John the 
 Fearless — Misery of France under his Rule — The 
 
 Murder of the Duke of Orleans 30 
 
 Character of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy . . 31 
 
 The Burgundians and the Armagnacs 32 
 
 The Pretensions of England to the Crown of France — 
 
 Henry V 33 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy joins England — His Murder at 
 
 Montereau 34 
 
 Failure of the Dukes of Burgundy to fulfil their Mission 35 
 Philip the Good, the Last of the Dukes of Burgundy . 36 
 
 His Character and Career — His Indecision 37 
 
 The Treaty of Troyes 39 
 
 Henry V. proclaimed King of France 40 
 
TABLE OF COJS TENTS. XXXV 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Failure of the Objects of the Treaty of Troyes . . . • 41 
 The Distress of France produces a feeling of Lassitude — 
 
 Henry VI 42 
 
 The Duke of Bedford 43 
 
 Plots against the English in Paris 44 
 
 Joan of Arc — Her Career 45 
 
 Slow Eecovery of France 46 
 
 Both Parties make Overtures to the Duke of Burgundy . 47 
 Philip the Good marries Isabel of Portugal — Institutes 
 
 the Order of the Golden Fleece 48 
 
 His Indecision between the English and French Parties . 49 
 He recognises Charles VII. as King of France, and signs 
 
 the Treaty of Arras 50 
 
 Charles VII. enters Paris 51 
 
 Riots at Bruges and at Ghent 52 
 
 The Object in dispute at Ghent — Municipal Elections . . 53 
 The Battle of Gavre, and Victory of John the Fearless — 
 
 The Peace of Gavre 54 
 
 The Troubles of Flanders are appeased 55 
 
 Charles VII. of France — His Character 56 
 
 Characters of Louis, the Dauphin, and of Charles, the Son 
 
 of the Duke of Burgundy 57 
 
 Happiness of France under Charles VII 58 
 
 His Death, in 1461 59 
 
 Louis XI. — His Character . . . • 60 
 
 The chief Object of his Policy 65 
 
 His Accession viewed with Fear and Distrust .... 66 
 Growing Animosity betAveen Louis XL and Charles, Count 
 
 of Charolois 67 
 
 The Count of Charolois invades France 6^^ 
 
 Death of Philip the Good, of Burgundy 69 
 
 The Rivalry and Struggle between Louis XL and Charles 
 
 the Bold, of Burgundy 70 
 
 Vast Schemes of Charles the Bold 71 
 
 The Policy of Louis XI 73 
 
 The League of the Princes against Louis XI. and the - 
 
 Attempt of Charles the Bold to contract an Alliance 
 
 with England 74 
 
 C 2 
 
XXXVl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Failure of those Schemes 78 
 
 The Conduct of Louis XL with reference to England and 
 
 Burgundy 81 
 
 His great Ability 82 
 
 Scheme of Charles the Bold to found a Kingdom of Bur- 
 gundy 83 
 
 The Battles of Morat and ISTancy, and Death of Charles 
 
 the Bold 84 
 
 Fall of the Burgundian Dynasty 85 
 
 Character of Charles the Bold 86 
 
 Louis XL takes possession of Part of Burgundy ... 87 
 
 Character of Louis XI 88 
 
 The Influence of the House of Burgundy ought to have 
 
 been greater 89 
 
 The Disappearance of Burgundy from the Map of Europe 
 is to be attributed to want of Ability and Fore- 
 thought in the Dukes of Burgundy 91 
 
 The Fifteenth Century — The Transition between Feu- 
 dalism and Monarchy 92 
 
 The End of the House of Burgundy coincides with the 
 
 End of the Middle Ages 94 
 
 War changes its Character and its Theatre — Charles VIII. 
 
 invades Naples 95 
 
 11. — Charles V. 
 
 Condition of Royal Power in France, England, and Spain. 97 
 
 Progress of Monarchical Power in the West of Europe . 98 
 
 Altered Aspect of Aflairs in the Sixteenth Century . . 99 
 European jN'ations mix more together, and enter into 
 
 mutual Alliances . . 100 
 
 Political Science commences in the Sixteenth Century . 101 
 
 Commencement of the Reformation 102 
 
 Spirit of the new Doctrine 103 
 
 Undecided Conduct of the Rulers with respect to the 
 
 Reformation 104 
 
 The Italian War between Spain and France — Struggle for 
 
 Supremacy 105 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXVll 
 
 PAOK 
 
 State of Italy in the Sixteenth Century 106 
 
 Conquest of Naples by Charles VIII., and its Eecapture 
 
 by the Spaniards 107 
 
 Political Conduct of Italian States, — Milan, Florence, 
 
 Eome, and Venice 108 
 
 Loss of Liberty in Italy 109 
 
 Complicated State of Affairs in Europe 110 
 
 Louis XIL and the League of Cambrai . . . . . . Ill 
 
 Policy of JuUus II 112 
 
 Characters of Louis XII, Maximilian, and Henry VIII. . 113 
 Death of Louis XII. and Accession of Francis I. — State 
 
 of Italy at his Accession 114 
 
 Death of Maximilian, and Accession of Charles V. . . 115 
 
 The Battle of Marignan, and the Treaty of Noyon. . . 116 
 
 Three Years' Peace between France and Spain . . . . 117 
 Contest for the Empire of Germany between Charles V. 
 
 and Francis 1 118 
 
 Election of Charles V 119 
 
 Conduct of Francis I. in these Circumstances . . . . 120 
 The Part which Francis I, Henry VIII, and the Pope 
 
 might have played 121 
 
 The Pope had more to fear from Charles V. than from 
 
 Francis 1 122 
 
 Commencement of War in Italy under Lautrec . . . . 122 
 
 Character of the Duke de Bourbon 123 
 
 His Treason to his Sovereign 124 
 
 The great League against Francis 1 125 
 
 His Defeat and Capture at Pavia 126 
 
 Conduct of Charles V. in this Matter 128 
 
 The Treaty of Madrid 130 
 
 Motives of Francis I. for signing the Treaty of Peace . . 131 
 
 Excuses to be made for the Conduct of Francis . . . . 132 
 
 The Defects and Contradictions of his Character . . . 133 
 Difference between his early Career and his Condition in 
 
 after Life 134 
 
 State of Public Feeling in Europe after the Treaty of Madrid 135 
 Francis I. and his Allies against Charles V. — The Holy 
 
 League 136 
 
^ 
 
 XXXVUl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Defeat of French Troops, Sack of Eome, and the Pope 
 
 made Prisoner 137 
 
 . The Peace of Cambrai, called the " Paix des Dames " . . 138 
 
 France driven out of Italy 139 
 
 Differences between Charles Y. and the Protestant Princes 
 
 of Germany 140 
 
 War between Charles Y. and those who maintained the 
 
 Eight of Free Inquiry 141 
 
 Erasmus, Melancthon, Luther, Zuingli, and Calvin . . . 142 
 
 The Diet of Worms 143 
 
 Hesitations of Charles Y. with regard to the Eeformers, 
 
 between Peace and War, Toleration and Eepression . 144 
 Position of Charles Y. with regard to the Eeformation . 145 
 Ideas of Charles Y. with respect to the Possibility of a 
 
 Compromise 146 
 
 The Conduct of the Imperial Diet with respect to the 
 
 Eeformation 147 
 
 The Confession of Augsburg 148 
 
 Period of Transition in the Life and Ideas of Charles Y. 149 
 He is desirous of carrying the War into Germany — The 
 
 Campaign against Barbarossa 150 
 
 Difficulty of finding a Solution to the Secret Thoughts and 
 
 Aims of Charles Y 151 
 
 Charles signs the Treaty of x^ice with Francis I. . . . 152 
 Interview of the two Monarchs at Aigues-Mortes . . . 153 
 The Temper of the two variously affected by Illness and 
 
 Infirmities 154 
 
 The Insurrection at Ghent 155 
 
 Causes of the Insurrection 156 
 
 Charles Y. resolves to go in person to Ghent, and 
 put down the Insurrection — He journeys through 
 
 France 157 
 
 Charles quells the Insurrection, and abolishes the Com- 
 munal Privileges of Ghent 158 
 
 His Firmness of Execution and Energy of Decision in tliis 
 
 Matter 159 
 
 The Management of Affairs in the Low Countries gene- 
 rally left to Margaret of Austria or Mary of Hungary 160 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXXIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Arguments drawn from the Journey of Charles V. through 
 
 France 161 
 
 Doubts whether any Advances or Overtures for Peace 
 
 were made 162 
 
 Schemes of Charles Y. with regard to European Matters, 
 
 and Illusions of Francis 1 163 
 
 Proposed Marriage between the Duke of Orleans and a 
 
 JSTiece or Daughter of Charles V . . 164 
 
 Parties in France in favour of an Alliance with the Em- 
 peror Charles Y. 165 
 
 ISTegotiations for Peace broken off, and Commencement 
 
 of War 166 
 
 Inconvenience of this War to the Emperor Charles Y. . 167 
 
 Both Parties begin to think about Peace 168 
 
 The Treaty of Crespy-en-Laonnais 169 
 
 Eeasons why Charles Y. and Francis I. signed the Treaty 
 
 of Crespy-en-Laonnais 170 
 
 The active and busy Career of Charles Y 171 
 
 Early Indications of his intended Abdication . . . . 172 
 His Intentions with regard to the Empire and his own 
 
 Family . 173 
 
 His Campaigns in Germany 174 
 
 Object of the Campaign in Germany 175 
 
 Condition of Germany in the Sixteenth Century, as com- 
 pared with France or England 176 
 
 The Eeformation a great Eesource to the German Princes 
 
 in their Struggle with the Emperor 176 
 
 Manrice of Saxony 177 
 
 The "Interim" and the "Eecess" of Augsburg . . . 178 
 
 Charles Y. signs the Peace of Passau with the Protestants 179 
 
 Failure of the Campaign 180 
 
 Charles Y. renounces the Idea of leaving the Empire to 
 
 his Son 181 
 
 The Marriage of Philip 11. and Mary 182 
 
 The Abdication of Charles Y 183 
 
 His Address on abdicating at Ghent 184 
 
 His Eesidence at the Monastery of Juste 185 
 
 His Mode of Life in the Cloister 186 
 
xl TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 He is visited by his Sisters, Queen Mary of Hungary, and 
 
 Eleanora, Widow of Francis 1 187 
 
 Character of Charles V 188 
 
 His colossal Power 189 
 
 His Capacity equal to his Position 190 
 
 The chief Objects Charles V. had in view 191 
 
 His incomplete Attainment of those Objects 1.92 
 
 Keligious Unity destroyed by the " Eecess " 193 
 
 Charles V. founded and consolidated the Political System 
 
 of Modern Government 194 
 
 The Printed Documents in the reign of Charles V. — Pub- 
 lications by M. Weiss, Le Glay, Gachard, Champollion, 
 Dr. Lang, Henne, Juste, Mignet, and Lettenhove . 195 
 The Memoirs of Pleuranges, Comines, Guise, the two Du 
 
 Bellays, and of Montluc 197 
 
 The ^Negotiations previous to the Congress of Passau — The 
 Military and Political Struggle with Maurice of 
 
 Saxony 199 
 
 Conjectures as to the Conduct of Charles Y 200 
 
 III. — Philip II. and William the Silent. 
 
 The History of the great States from the Middle Ages to 
 
 Modern Times follows a regular Course 201 
 
 The Rivaby of Charles V. and Francis 1 202 
 
 The Success of the Warlike Enterprises of Charles V. . 202 
 His Doubts as to the best European Organization to esta- 
 blish after his Death 203 
 
 He had not the Strength to carry out all his Undertakings 204 
 Charles V. had conceived Three great Military Enter- 
 prises 205 
 
 Spain under Philip II 206 
 
 His great Power, with France enervated by Civil War, and 
 
 with Germany torn by the Reformation 207 
 
 Philip II. had no fixed System with regard to France or 
 
 Germany, or the Reformation 208 
 
 He immui-es himself in the Escurial, and governs by 
 
 Corres])ondence 209 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xli 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Cruelty of Philip II. against the Eeformers 210 
 
 Levelling Effects of Foreign Despotism under Philip II. 211 
 Difference of the Mode of Government of Charles Y. and 
 
 Philip II 212 
 
 Mysterious System of Government pursued by Philip II. . 213 
 Despotism of Philip II. — Analogy between the Political . 
 
 Situation of France and the Low Countries . . . ^14 
 Philip 11. not conscious of the Changes he was working 
 
 in the Government of the Low Countries . . . . 215 
 Philip II. no longer Master of his Political Conduct . . 216 
 Irritation of all Parties against the Government . . . 217 
 Philip 11. institutes Spanish Despotism in place of the 
 IN^ational Institutions — He quits the Low Countries, 
 
 and leaves Granvelle as Minister 218 
 
 Character of Cardinal Granvelle 219 
 
 The Aristocracy driven to support the Eeformation . .v,. 220 
 Comparison of the Government of Philip II. and of Mary\ ^^ 
 
 of Medicis r 221 
 
 Conduct of Margaret of Parma — The Three different 
 Parties in the Aristocracy— Brederode, William the 
 
 Silent, and Count Egmont 222 
 
 Character of Count Egmont 224 
 
 The Duke of Alva - 225 
 
 After Six Years the Duke of Alva takes his Depar- 
 ture, leaving the Southern Provinces discontented, 
 and the Northern Provinces separated from the 
 
 Monarchy 226 
 
 The part the Prince of Orange had to play was at first 
 
 Military rather than Political 227 
 
 The War which the Prince of Orange waged against Spain 
 
 lasted Sixteen Years 229 
 
 The energy of the Dutch Patriots seconded the Prince of 
 
 Orange 230 
 
 The Dutch Provinces become the object of Kivalry in 
 
 Europe 231 
 
 The future United Provinces take a decided Place in the 
 
 System of European Alliances 232 
 
 The variable and complicated Course of Events in the , 
 
Xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Low Countries between the Departure of the Duke 
 of Alva and the Death of William of Orange . . 233 
 The patient, intelligent, and conciliatory Efforts of the 
 
 Prince of Orange 234 
 
 His desire was to see them united under the Protectorate 
 
 of some Foreign Power 235 
 
 The Prince of Orange's great Power ; his Popularity, and 
 
 the Confidence he inspired 236 
 
 The Aristocracy disliking his religious Ideas turned their 
 attention to Austria ; the States to the Duke of 
 
 Anjou, or to England 237 
 
 The Pacification of Ghent the "Work of the Prince of 
 
 Orange— The " Union of Brussels " 238 
 
 Don John of Austria sent by Phihp II. to the Low 
 
 Countries 239 
 
 The Duke of Anjou 240 
 
 Everything augments the Public Disorder — the Insurrec- 
 tion of Ghent, and the Mutiny in the Spanish Army 241 
 The several Parties in the State — the Aristocracy, the 
 
 Calvinists, and the old Democratic Party .... 242 
 
 The Character of the Prince of Orange 243 
 
 His Policy was rather to see the Low Countries in the 
 
 Possession of a powerful Neighbour 244 
 
 His great and brilliant Character 245 
 
 His extraordinary Destiny 246 
 
 The Death of William the Silent 247 
 
 Conflict of rival Ambitions and Interests 248 
 
 The different Phases the Low Countries passed through . 249 
 
 Prince Alexander Farnese 250 
 
 His great Influence as Governor-General 251 
 
 His Merit seconded by his good Fortune 252 
 
 The King of France, Henry III, rejects the formal Offer 
 
 by the States 253 
 
 The Siege and Capitulation of Antwerp 254 
 
 Advantages obtained by Spain awaken Uneasiness in the 
 Northern Provinces, and the United Provinces appeal 
 
 to Elizabeth 255 
 
 Mission of Leicester to the States-General of the North . 256 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xliii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 His Failure from Deficiency of Capacity and of Steadiness 
 
 of Conduct 257 
 
 Maurice of Nassau named Stadth older 258 
 
 Age had wrought no Change in the Character of Philip II. 259 
 The Failure of his Schemes for conquering England, and 
 
 for maintaining E-eligious Unity in Europe . . . 260 
 The Despatches of Badoaro, Tiepolo, and Contarini too 
 
 favourable to Philip 261 
 
 hilip II. judged too severely by his Deeds 2Q2 
 
 The Historical Importance of Philip II. — Analogy between 
 
 Philip II. and Charles the Bold 263 
 
 Philip prepares the way for the Career of Henry IV. and 
 -----_Qf^ Kichelieu, and for the great European Struggle . 264 
 The Direction he gave to the Policy of Spain marks the 
 
 Commencement of the Degradation of Spain . . . 265 
 Peace made between France and Spain, but not between 
 
 Spain and the United Provinces 2Q6 
 
 The Battle of Nieuport gained by Maurice ; and the Taking 
 
 ^ of Ostend by the Archduke Albert 267 
 
 \lie Policy of Henry IV. which went under the name of 
 
 /^ "The Great Design" 268 
 
 Henry IV. 's Project was to create a Eedistribution of 
 
 Power in Europe 269 
 
 The Government of the Archduke Albert and Isabella in 
 
 Belgium 270 
 
 The Policy of that Day very different from that of 
 
 Philip II 271 
 
 The War between the Spanish and Dutch, after the Twelve 
 
 Years' Truce, conducted by Spinola and Frederick 
 
 Henry of Nassau 272 
 
 Existence and Rivalry of two Parties in Holland — the 
 
 party of the States and of the Stadtholder . . . 273 
 The States inclined to Peace, and the Stadtholder to War 274 
 The Low Countries play an important Part in Europe 
 
 during this Period 275 
 
 Tlie Importance lessened or increased as the Policy of 
 
 other Countries was vigorously or feebly administered 276 
 > Character of the Dutch Nation 277 
 
xliv TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Question whether the Decline of Spain should be attri- 
 buted to its Eulers 278 
 
 Excuses that may be urged in Extenuation of the Faults 
 
 of Philip II 279 
 
 Posterity condemns Philip II 280 
 
 Works written on the subject of the Revolution of the 
 Low Countries — Granvelle's State Papers, Correspon- 
 dence of William the Silent and of Philip II, Mr. 
 Motley's History, and others 281—285 
 
 IV. — Cardinal Richelieu — The First English Revolution. 
 
 State of Affairs in Prance and Germany in the Seven- 
 teenth Century 286 
 
 Conduct of England during this Period 287 
 
 Concurrence of various Political Accidents — The Truce 
 
 of 1609 288 
 
 -^he Treaty of the Pyrenees— The Death of Mazarin . . 289 
 X Three rival Forces stand face to face — the Royal Power, 
 the Aristocracy, and the Party of Liberty, or the 
 
 Third Estate 290 
 
 The French Aristocracy 291 
 
 The Aristocracy lost ground in France 292 
 
 The Position of the Third Estate 293 
 
 It gained no Share in the direction of General Affairs . 294 
 
 Position of the Tliree Estates in Germany 295 
 
 The German Princes become more independent, and the 
 
 Imperial Power less absolute 296 
 
 The People in Germany, from the Sixteenth to the Seven- 
 teenth Century, did not pursue the same Course as 
 
 in France 297 
 
 y The Principle of Monarchical Unity and of Feudal Inde- 
 pendence had a different Destiny in the two Coun- 
 tries .... 298 
 
 *7 Monarchical Power gained in France and lost in Germany 299 
 ^ The Social Movement in England different from that of 
 
 France and Germany 300 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xlv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Fate of the Aristocracy in England different from 
 
 what it was elsewhere 301 
 
 The Popular Party obtained more Power in England than 
 
 in other Countries 302 
 
 Changes wrought in the International Eelations of great/ 
 
 States in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries . 303 
 In the Sixteenth Century Italy was the Battle-field of 
 
 Europe, in the Seventeenth it was Germany ... 304 
 
 The Policy of Eichelieu T '. T^^t-— ^0^ 
 
 The principal Points of the International Eelations of 
 
 Erance and Spain 306 
 
 Eichelieu carried out the System of Henry lY. with some 
 
 Modifications 307 
 
 Eichelieu's Plan of Foreign Policy 308 
 
 Eichelieu's Foreign System firm but conciliatory . . . 309 
 
 The Thirty Years' War 310 
 
 The Military Events of that War turned to the Profit of 
 
 France 311 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus and his Death at Lutzen 312 
 
 The Eesult of the Thirty Years' War 313 
 
 Grandeur of France under Eichelieu 314 
 
 Supremacy of France founded on Eichelieu's Foreign 
 
 Policy 315 
 
 Difficulties of Eichelieu in dealing with the French 
 
 Court 316 
 
 Eichelieu wages War against the French Aristocracy . . 317 
 
 Difficult but successful Career of Eichelieu 318 
 
 France came out of his Hands greater than it was when 
 
 he came into Power 319 
 
 Hatred of his Contemporaries against Eichelieu .... 320 
 
 The Memoirs of Eichelieu 321 
 
 The Object which Eichelieu had in view 322 
 
 His Firmness, Exactness, and the Courage of his Mind, 
 
 and the Lukewarmness of his Feelings 323 
 
 His Audacity tempered by Eule and Eeflection .... 324 
 
 General Character of Eichelieu's Policy 325 
 
 His Success in carrying it out 326 
 
 The Death of Eichelieu 327 
 
Xlvi TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Cardinal Mazarin 328 
 
 Character of his Policy 329 
 
 The Treaty of the Pyrenees 330 
 
 Events in England 331 
 
 The Dynasty of the Stuarts 332 
 
 Sympathy shown in England to the Stuarts 333 
 
 The Prevalence of New Opinions in England connected 
 
 with the Reformation 334 
 
 Charles never recognised the Existence of these New 
 
 Opinions 335 
 
 False or exaggerated Calculations of Charles 1 336 
 
 The Parliament becomes more hostile, and the Govern- 
 ment more arbitrary 337 
 
 The Presbyterians — their Power and Influence .... 338 
 
 Character of Charles 1 339 
 
 Slow Progress of the Revolution 340 
 
 The King leaves London 341 
 
 The Throne might still have been saved and the Revolu- 
 tion stayed 342 
 
 The Revolution passes through Four several Stages . . . 343 
 
 The War goes against Charles 1 344 
 
 The Three great Parties who divided the Country — the 
 
 Royalists, the Presbyterians, and the Independents . 345 
 
 The Independents, backed by Cromwell, gained the day . 346 
 
 Conduct of Charles 1 347 
 
 The Conduct he ought to have followed 348 
 
 The Proceedings of the Independents 349 
 
 In the midst of the Vacillation of the King and of the 
 
 Presbyterians Cromwell takes decisive Steps . . . 350 
 
 He advances upon London, and seizes the King's Person . 351 
 Without Cromwell the Independents would have been 
 
 divided and destroyed 352 
 
 Cromwell's profound and true Judgment 353 
 
 The unvarying Qualities of Charles 1 354 
 
 The Fate of Royalty in England 355 
 
 The Country right in its general Wishes and Principles . 356 
 Correct Judgment of Cromwell of the Spirit of the 
 
 Country 357 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xlvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Parliament disappears to make way for the Protec- 
 torate 358 
 
 The English Eevohition had no important Bearing on 
 
 general Events in Europe 360 
 
 The Protectorate an inevitable Incident between the 
 
 Commonwealth and the Restoration 361 
 
 The Protector Cromwell 362 
 
 His Government maintained itself in the Country as an 
 
 Authority commanding Respect by Force . . . . 363 
 
 Professions of Cromwell with regard to the various Sects. 364 
 
 Cromwell circumspect in his Dealings with Mazarin . . 365 
 
 Difficulty of Cromwell's Position 366 
 
 His Power of Self-control 367 
 
 The Breadth and Force of his Political Sagacity . . . 368 
 
 Cromwell's Genius, Courage, and easy Conscience . . . 369 
 His Firmness between the Republicans and the other 
 
 Parties 370 
 
 Death of Cromwell and Accession of his Son Richard — 
 
 his Incapacity 371 
 
 General Monk 372 
 
 His Line of Conduct 373 
 
 The Loss of the English Commonwealth regretted in 
 
 Holland 374 
 
 Change in the Condition of the English Crown effected 
 
 by the Seventeenth Century 375 
 
 Importance of the Political Part played by William of 
 
 Orange 376 
 
 Y.— William IIL 
 
 The general State of Europe after the Reformation . . 377 
 
 The Influence formerly exercised by Charles V. passed 
 
 into other Hands 378 
 
 The Double Character of Politics and Religion in the 
 Thirty Years' War and in Louis' War against Hol- 
 land 379 
 
 Change in the Position of Afiairs in the United Provinces 380 
 
xlviii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAtiE 
 
 *^ Mazarin's Policy 381 
 
 ^ Period of Transition between the Peace of Miinster and 
 
 when William was made Stadtholder 382 
 
 The Grand Pensionary De Witt 383 
 
 De Witt represents the Patrician Class of the " Estates " 384 
 
 Tendency of De Witt's Policy 385 
 
 Animosity and Jealousy against the Office of Stadtholder 386 
 
 Prosperity of Holland under De Witt's Administration . 387 
 Louis XIV. attempts to cultivate a good Understanding 
 
 with De Witt 388 
 
 Louis XIV. afterwards makes War on Holland — Ruin 
 
 of De Witt's Party, and his Death 389 
 
 ^^T^^he leading Principle in the Eeign of Louis XIV. . . 390 
 The chief Object was to prevent the Junior Branches of 
 
 the House of Austria from succeeding to the Inhe- 
 ritance of the Elder Branch 391 
 
 The War upon Holland in 1672 392 
 
 V--State of Europe at the Time 393 
 
 y Charles II. maintains a personal Alliance with Louis 
 
 XIV 394 
 
 State of Affairs when William of Orange appeared on the 
 
 Stage 395 
 
 The War with Holland 396 
 
 -TThe Triple Alliance 397 
 
 ' The Difficulties of William in Holland 398 
 
 Character of William of Orange 399 
 
 The Tenacity, the Coolness in Reverses, and the Patience 
 
 of William 400 
 
 In spite of his great Qualities he remained unpopular . 401 
 The Thoughtlessness of Louis XIV, in rousing the Genius 
 
 of William by attacking Holland 402 
 
 The Dutch War the most brilliant Episode in the Life of 
 
 Louis XIV 403 
 
 Exhaustion of France in the midst of Victory .... 404 
 Louis XIV. victorious, anxious to make Peace, while 
 
 William of Orange desires to continue the War . . 405 
 
 7 The Objects of French Diplomacy 406 
 
 The State of Affairs between England and France . . . 407 
 
 7 
 
 \ 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. ttIix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 J 
 
 Position of Affairs in Austria and in Holland .... 408 
 
 The Peace of Kimeguen 409 
 
 A Halt in the Progress of Public Affairs 410 
 
 Commencement of Difficulties in France 411 
 
 The Prosperity of Louis XIV. begins to diminish . . . 412 
 The Affairs of England occupy much of the Public 
 
 Attention 413 
 
 The Embarrassments of the Stuarts 414 
 
 They hesitate between two Lines of Policy 415 
 
 James IL more ambitious than his Brother 416 
 
 At his Accession he possessed considerable Power . . . 417 
 
 James II. adopts the narrower Line of Policy . . . . 418 
 The Erench Protection weakened and was dangerous to 
 
 James II 419 
 
 James, on his side, was a mischievous Ally to Louis 
 
 XIV. 420 
 
 Violent Proceedings of James II. 421 
 
 Sunderland, the President of the Council to James H. — 
 
 the " Dispensing Power " 422 
 
 The Three great Divisions of Religious Parties in England 423 
 James II. provokes the Revolutionary Movement in 
 
 England 424 
 
 James II. is dethroned 425 
 
 The great Judgment and Firmness of William of Orange. 426 
 
 Hesitation and Anxiety of William 427 
 
 He decides upon making a Descent on England .... 428 
 
 He sails from Helvoetsluys . 430 
 
 He announces himself not as a Conqueror, but as a 
 
 Negotiator 431 
 
 He refuses every Title but that of King 432 
 
 The Commonwealth had retained but little hold on 
 
 England 433 
 
 The Feelings of the Whigs and Tories 434 
 
 William III. makes advances to the Tories 435 
 
 Questionable Wisdom of this Proceeding 436 
 
 It was from the Party called the "Trimmers" that he chose 
 
 his principal Instruments of Government — Halifax 
 
 and Danby 437 
 
 d 
 
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Unpopularity of William III. — He threatens to leave 
 
 England 438 
 
 His Second Government led by a Tory Member of the 
 
 House of Peers 439 
 
 But the Position of "William III. abroad was great and 
 
 strong 440 
 
 The Second Coalition — The Power of the British Nation 
 
 made itself felt in the Balance of Europe . . . . 441 
 The Battle of the Boyne, and the N'aval Victory of La 
 
 Hogue 442 
 
 The Government grew stronger and better, and assumed 
 
 a more regular form — The Toleration Act .... 443 
 William forms a more regular and solid Government, 
 under the Advice of Sunderland, from among the 
 
 Whigs 444 
 
 Jacobite Plots against the King — Loyal Addresses to him 445 
 The King gains from the Hatred which these Plots inspired 446 
 
 *^he Treaty of Eyswick 447 
 
 y Question of the Partition of the Spanish Succession . . 448 
 
 ^ ^^e Two Treaties of Partition 449 
 
 Acrimonious Discussions between William III. and the 
 
 Parliament 450 
 
 Difficulties and Cares of William III 451 
 
 He is reproached with being a Dutch Eepublican rather 
 
 than King of England 452 
 
 He becomes more popular, owing to the Jacobite Plots . 453 
 
 The Character of William III 454 
 
 The Death of William III 455 
 
 William introduced the System of active Intervention of s 
 
 England in European Affairs 456 
 
 The Influence of William III. in England and Europe 
 
 very great 457 
 
 Comparison between the Fate and the Character of Louis 
 
 XIY. and of WiUiam III 458 
 
 Everything in the " Age of Louis XIV." continues to 
 
 attract the Attention of Mankind 450 
 
 The Character of Louis XIV. himself, and the Variety of 
 
 his Adventures 46 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. li 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The "Age of Louis XIV." still remains an interesting 
 
 Point of Discussion 461 
 
 The Faults and Errors of his Eeign 462 
 
 The Difference in the Renown and in the Career of Louis 
 
 XIV. and William III 463 
 
 The Glory of the Latter more solid 464 
 
 i 
 
HISTORICAL ESSAYS, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 rpHE period during which the Dukes of Burgundy, 
 of the House of Valois, reigned, does not yet 
 belong to modern history. In these introductory 
 remarks I will endeavour to indicate, in general 
 terms, the place which these four princes, more 
 especially the two latter of them, occupy in his- 
 tory. These sketches will form the introduction to 
 a series beginning with Charles V, with whom, in 
 fact, modern history commences. It is, at any rate, 
 with Charles V. that political interest first appears 
 in history, and that the exercise of power rises to 
 the level of a science. 
 
 It was from this time, with the exception of a few 
 years in the reign of Louis XI, that the governing 
 powers, while they acted in public, learned to de- 
 liberate and negotiate in secret; and it becomes 
 just as important to get to the bottom of their 
 
 B 
 
1 
 
 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 thoughts, as it is to observe their acts. In the 
 Burgundian period, which forms the transition 
 between the feudal and the monarchical era, it 
 would be difficult to trace and follow out any- 
 systematic government action, because authority, 
 then weak and contested in the large countries of 
 the west of Europe, frequently changed hands, and 
 altered its direction. 
 
 There was, so to speak, but little political action 
 in the court of Philip the Bold, of John the 
 Fearless, of Philip the Good, and so it was in the 
 courts of their contemporaries, Charles VI. and 
 Charles VII. of France, and in those of the Kings 
 of England. I have therefore placed by itself, as 
 it were in a preamble, that which I have to say 
 of the Dukes of Burgundy and of the situation in 
 which, at the moment of their appearance on the 
 scene, they found the royal power in the countries 
 adjoining that wdiich they governed. 
 
 The fifteenth century belongs neither to the 
 middle ages nor to the modern world : — it is neither 
 feudal nor monarchical: — it holds a middle place 
 between the two. The feudal system was first de- 
 vised, established, generalised, and then weakened, 
 both in France and in England ; with notable dif- 
 ferences, however, between the two countries. The 
 King of France was the equal of his vassals before 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 becoming first their superior, and subsequently their 
 master. The possession of land was then the base 
 of the relations between the vassal and the suzerain* 
 The owner of free lands owed only military service, 
 without other services. Homage (that is, the recogni- 
 tion of a suzerain by the vassal) was for some long 
 time only a vague form of respect, implying simply 
 — until the time when there were standing armies 
 and regular taxation — that service was due, without 
 other obedience — without money payment or any 
 positive obligation. 
 
 So long as this state of things lasted, the soil 
 was cut up into an infinite number of petty inde- 
 pendent sovereignties, who waged war against each 
 other without asking the permission of the suzerain : 
 there was no distinction between one and the other, 
 save the accidental difference in the strength and 
 the position of their castles, in the character of 
 their owners, or in the extent of their domains ; nor 
 were they in any way different from the reigning 
 sovereign, save in the fact that the latter trans- 
 mitted to his heir a particular title. Of this organi- 
 zation of society but little remained. The posses- 
 sors of independent fiefs, between whom the soil 
 was divided in the middle ages, had in course of 
 time become fewer in number ; the fiefs had been 
 either absorbed one into the other, or enlarged by 
 war, by alliances, or by escheat. This transformation 
 of the feudal system, in which its weakness was 
 turned to account by royalty, was slow in its accom- 
 
 B 2 
 
4 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 plishment. For a long period of time the French 
 monarch possessed only the Isle of France, and a 
 portion of Picardy and of the territory of Orleans. 
 
 Eoyalty in France made no real progress, ob- 
 tained no recognition of its supremacy, and did 
 not succeed in establishing any subordination on the 
 part of its great vassals, until its territory was en- 
 larged by war ; until the victories of the Kings of 
 France over the Anglo-Norman monarchs — victo- 
 ries attended with great difficulties, in which success 
 alternated with reverses — permitted them to set up 
 their personal authority in a more efficient form on 
 a territory gained by their own right arm in battle. 
 
 These were the two first phases through which 
 the feudal system passed in France. First there 
 was the absorption and diminution of the inde- 
 pendent fiefs by private warfare between the owners 
 of the dirferent castles ; then came the increase to 
 the royal authority through enlargement of territory, 
 and by a war which we may term foreign, although 
 it actually took place on the soil which for four 
 centuries had been French. 
 
 Subsequently came the organization in a legal 
 form of what had been established in fact. The 
 royal tribunals were formed, and took the cases out 
 of the jurisdiction of the seigneurs ; the private 
 warfare between the owners of castles was abolished 
 by royal proclamation, and judicial duels between 
 the lords were forbidden. Royalty had not as yet 
 attained any great power, and the rxiles and regula- 
 
INTRODaCTION. 5 
 
 tions wliicli assumed the existence of its authority 
 preceded the establishment of this very authority ; 
 but the right was gradually secured, to the profit of 
 the crown. 
 
 By degrees, the characteristic traits of the middle 
 ages were effaced, and gave way to a state of things 
 which was ill-defined ; the old building was de- 
 stroyed while the new edifice was still left un- 
 finished. All that was good, and generous, and 
 simple in the middle ages vanished by degrees : 
 whilst with the feudal traditions disappeared those 
 of chivalry, which was more than a mere habit, and 
 which had the substance of an institution. Chivalry 
 was a medley of human generosity and of religious 
 zeal ; it prescribed individual sacrifice, an appeal to 
 the Deity, the keeping of one's word, the protection 
 of the weak ; it exacted, in fact, all that even now 
 constitutes the code of honour. Chivalry, however, 
 as a collection of rules — one may say, as a profes- 
 sion of faith — was dead some time before the 
 fifteenth century ; and the Black Prince, after the 
 battle of Poitiers, in 1356, did that which was 
 already out of date, when he took King John with 
 him captive into England, and made his solemn 
 entry into London, — the French king in a suit of 
 brilliant armour on a splendid war charger; the 
 Black Prince himself on a sorry hackney, clad in a 
 sombre costume, riding at a foot's pace behind the 
 king, escorting, honouring, and ready to wait upon 
 his prisoner. 
 
6 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 The Crusades, too, had ceased, and the Western 
 races, after the days of St. Louis, no longer made 
 the pilgrimage to the Holy Land as Crusaders. 
 
 The communes, another characteristic trait of 
 the middle ages, disappeared likewise in France 
 about the fourteenth century. Miserable and crushed 
 as the royal power frequently was in those times, 
 the communes were unable to defend their exist- 
 ence against the House of Valois, when it was 
 delivered from the rivalry of the great vassals. 
 The communes in the south were the remains of 
 the Italian municipalities ; in the centre of France 
 they had been formed by the population clustered 
 round the castles of the nobility, without any 
 charter or written recognition from their masters, 
 but tolerated by them because they required their 
 services ; they were granted by charter in the pro- 
 vinces of the north. All this, however, must be 
 understood in a general manner, for the territorial 
 demarcation between the three zones of communes 
 was by no means so well defined as we have stated 
 it. The communes, we repeat, fell in France when 
 the royal power ceased to need their assistance 
 against feudalism. It is true, indeed, that the 
 government of the Provost Etienne Marcel ruled 
 over Paris during some years of the fourteenth 
 century, during the disastrous w^ars of that period, 
 at a time when authority was so precarious, and 
 when its administration in any form was so difficult, 
 that any one who seized it in a vigorous manner, and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 who knew how to wring from an exhausted country 
 the little money which was left, had a chance of 
 maintaining his power : it was, in fact, an explosion 
 of the strength of the Parisian middle classes. It 
 acted just as revolutionary powers act, and lasted 
 as long ; and if its accession to power denoted a 
 certain vigour in that layer of society, its destruc- 
 tion by the assassination of its chief was a final 
 check to the communal element. It is in this 
 point of view that the revolutionary dictatorship of 
 Etienne Marcel presents itself to us, although his 
 fall appeared to the eyes of the people of that 
 day under another light, and was attributed in 
 Paris to the vicissitudes of the war between England 
 and France. 
 
 Thus, piece by piece, the machine — the whole of 
 what constituted society in the middle ages — fell 
 asunder. The men of that day did not see, as we 
 see it, the progress of this great work. What strikes 
 us with clearness was hidden from them. The 
 events — the social transformations — which are the 
 most striking to the eyes of a distant posterity, 
 frequently pass unperceived before the eyes of con- 
 temporaries and immediate spectators. The gradual 
 weakening of institutions, the substitution of one 
 system for another, sometimes even a change of 
 dynasty, — when there is only an interruption in 
 the direct line of succession and the crown does 
 not go to some one out of the family, — cause little 
 excitement even at the moment of their taking place 
 
8 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 The middle ages did not cease all at once, any more 
 than the night succeeds the day in a moment of 
 time. There are in history, as there are in the day, 
 certain states of twilight by which light and dark- 
 ness pass gradually into each other : of these transi- 
 tions succeeding ages take no account ; they per- 
 ceive only the origin of events and their results. 
 
 We have spoken of France ; let us say a few 
 words about England. 
 
 The events and the political institutions of the two 
 countries were not developed in the same manner. 
 The Anglo-Norman sovereignty, founded on conquest, 
 never had any vassals who equalled the sovereign 
 in power and in authority. The superiority of the 
 king over this or that vassal, taken separately, 
 was never doubtful. The feudal period in England 
 had another character, and the struggle for autho- 
 rity which prevailed in France between royalty 
 and the barons, was carried on in England between 
 the conquering aristocracy and the conquered race. 
 The Anglo-Norman barons fought with the Saxons 
 for the preservation of their conquest, and it was 
 only when the two races amalgamated, and when 
 the struggle between them w^as appeased, that a 
 league of the barons took effect against the king. 
 But the issue of this struggle again differed from 
 what it was in France. 
 
 The Anglo-Norman barons united against the 
 king soon obtained written guarantees, which after- 
 wards became the subject of much discussion and 
 
INTRODUCTION. » 
 
 dispute, but which were never lost, and which 
 prevented the establishment of a personal and 
 absolute government. The charter obtained by the 
 league of the barons embraced in its object the 
 whole of the nation, and secured to the people 
 individual rights and judicial institutions. In the 
 end, and as a consequence of this condition of 
 things, which was special to England, the elements 
 of a parliamentary system were developed very 
 much earlier than elsewhere. At the time when 
 royalty in France, relieved from the rival powers 
 which had hampered it in the middle ages, was 
 advancing to an uncontested triumph, the English 
 nation saw the growth of representative institutions 
 on her soil. At first these institutions were incom- 
 plete and irregular, but in the fourteenth century 
 they attained a fixed form and an organization 
 which it only required time to complete. The 
 English aristocracy did not continue to form one 
 single body : it was divided into an upper and a 
 middle class, and the latter amalgamated with the 
 elements belonging to the population of the towns 
 and to the landed proprietors whose origin was less 
 ancient than the Conquest, so as to form with them 
 the second chamber of Parliament. This historical 
 development, so different from what we have indi- 
 cated in France, depended chiefly on the establish- 
 ment of a conquering race on the English soil, and 
 on the especial interest this race had in defending 
 itself If the chief part of the great events of the 
 
n 
 
 10 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 history of the middle ages in England can be traced, 
 more or less, to the co-existence of these two races, 
 it does not follow that we see in it the cause of all 
 that is important in that country. When, a century 
 after the Conquest, Henry 11. put the Archbishop of 
 Canterbury to death, it is falsifying history to see in 
 Henry H. a Norman, and in Becket a Saxon. The 
 struggle of the higher and lower clergy, the rivalry 
 of the sees of York and Canterbury, and other 
 causes, brought about this catastrophe.^ 
 
 Thus England passed through the last centuries 
 of the middle ages, subject to fewer disorders and 
 miseries than France. If we attribute this to the 
 institutions which were established at an early period 
 in England, and which were an indirect consequence 
 of the Conquest, we must not forget another most 
 important difference. The war which for so many 
 centuries set England and France against each other, 
 always took place on the Continent ; and England, 
 being from its geographical position very difficult to 
 invade, remained during all this time exempt from 
 the miseries which pressed on its rival. War raged 
 in France ; meanwhile the country was desolated 
 by anarchy, distracted by civil war, ruined by 
 bad government. All these scourges overwhelmed 
 France at the same time, and nothing can be so 
 melancholy and distressing as the spectacle which 
 France presents to us from the beginning of the 
 
 ^ Quarterly Review, Sept. 1853, p. 348, &c. Revue ContemporainCj 
 1854 : Thomas Becket, by M. Emile Bonnechose. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 1 
 
 war with England till the end of the fourteenth 
 century, under the last of the Capets, and under the 
 first princes of the House of Yalois. 
 
 We enumerated just now the characteristic traits 
 of the middle ages which had gradually died out in 
 the fifteenth century, and under the House of Bur- 
 gundy of the branch of Yalois. We must add to 
 this list the Anglo-French war, which may be 
 considered as belonging to the middle ages by 
 its origin, and by the territorial conditions in 
 which France then found itself — conditions the 
 direct consequence of feudal royalty. This great 
 war lasted till the beginning, but finished before 
 the end of the fifteenth century ; and its prolon- 
 gation during the greater part of that century 
 contributes to give it a transitory and mixed 
 character which belongs neither to the old nor yet 
 to the new state of society. It embraces in itself 
 the catastrophes and the miseries of those two 
 historical epochs, without displaying any of their 
 redeeming qualities of grandeur and generosity. 
 
 The English possessions in France varied, accord- 
 ing to the chances of war, from the end of the 
 twelfth to the end of the fifteenth century, — a period 
 of three hundred years. But a reference to the prin- 
 cipal facts which brought about this state of things 
 will assist us to characterise this English dominion. 
 The Dukes of Normandy, while they conquered 
 England, remained nominally vassals of the King of 
 France, as French feudatories. But in the middle 
 
12 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 ages homage frequently was, as we have already 
 observed, only a matter of courtesy, especially when 
 the vassal was more powerful than the suzerain, as 
 was the case with the Anglo-Norman kings. The 
 English royal house was constantly increasing its 
 domains, but not at the expense of the King of 
 France, who, even long after the Conquest, possessed 
 nothing that excited the cupidity of the English 
 sovereigns. At the close of the twelfth century, one 
 hundred years after the Norman Conquest, the Eng- 
 lish royal house had acquired, by marriage or suc- 
 cession, all that part of Aquitaine which now forms 
 the departments of the Gironde, of the Dordogne, and 
 of Lot and Garonne ; and, besides this, a large block 
 of territory, bounded on the one side by the mouths 
 of the Loire and of the Garonne, and on the other 
 by the coast and the frontiers of Auvergne and of 
 the Bourbonnais. This was the domain possessed 
 by Henry II, whose successors did not retain it. 
 Philip Augustus, and his son Louis VIII, con- 
 quered by arms a great portion of this territory : 
 the former retook Normandy and Aquitaine ; and 
 the latter was successful enough to be able to 
 conquer a territory extending from the Elione to 
 Eochelle, and from Calais to Montpelier. Under 
 his successors, Normandy and Aquitaine were lost 
 and retaken several times. The rivaliy between 
 the two kingdoms had gone through various 
 phases : there had been intervals of peace, when 
 the great war broke out between Edward III. and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 the Black Prince with Philip of Valois, Charles V., 
 and Du Guesclin — a war on a great scale, con- 
 ducted by the most illustrious chiefs, signalized 
 by memorable events, such as Crecy, Poitiers, and 
 the siege of Calais, and which we may fairly 
 call a war of succession. Edward ITT. claimed the 
 crown of France in right of his mother, Isabel 
 of France, and disputed the right of Philip of 
 Valois, who was only a collateral of the last of the 
 Capets ; he thus contested the validity of the Salic 
 law — which had, in fact, an authority in itself very 
 doubtful and very obscure. 
 
 Edward III. began by being victorious and ended 
 by sustaining reverses, and at the time of his 
 death and of the death of his son, the Black Prince 
 — an epoch which is contemporaneous with the 
 accession of the House of Burgundy — Edward's 
 possessions in France consisted only of certain 
 points on the coast, such as Calais, Bordeaux, 
 Bayonne, and of some places on the Dordogne. 
 
 The war between England and France Avas far 
 from ending ; for it continued during the fifteenth 
 century under Henry Y. and Henry VI. 
 
 We have shown up to this point, in very few 
 words, what w^as the general condition of the 
 monarchy in France and in England, and the state 
 of the territorial possessions between the two 
 countries before the accession of the House of 
 Burgundy. 
 
 To complete this rapid sketch of the condition 
 
1 
 
 14 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 which, at the close of the fifteenth century, is 
 presented by this portion of Europe, — in which, 
 during the following century, the influence of the 
 Dukes of Burgundy made itself felt, — there is 
 nothing important to say of the position of their 
 predecessors in Burgundy itself. The last Dukes of 
 Burgundy of the House of Capet do not occupy 
 any marked place in the events of the day ; and 
 even under the Dukes of the House of Valois, 
 Burgundy properly so called — that is, the Duchy 
 and Franche-Comte — was not the theatre of great 
 events. The dukes only lived there occasionally ; 
 they went into France to wage war or to take part 
 in public affairs, and their habitual place of resi- 
 dence, as well as the principal seat of their govern- 
 ment and of their court, was in those provinces 
 which they had newly acquired — in those which 
 Marguerite of Flanders had brought as her dower 
 to Philip the Bold, and in those which the House of 
 Burgundy had annexed subsequently. 
 
 These provinces, at this moment composing Bel- 
 gium and a portion of Holland, — excluding Lidge, 
 which formed a separate principality governed by a 
 bishop — were subjected as borderers to the influences 
 of events passing in France and in England ; but 
 they did not follow the political movement of either of 
 the two neighbouring countries. This was especially 
 the case in Flanders, which, historically, was the most 
 important of the provinces. That which charac- 
 terises Flanders of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
 
 « 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 century, is the existence of a municipal g(r 
 exceedingly vigorous, and capable of offering great 
 resistance, founded on great industrial wealth ; 
 Flanders possessed a rich soil, it had well-established 
 commercial dealings with its neighbours, it pos- 
 sessed a middle class endowed with great indepen- 
 dence of character, willing and capable of steady 
 work, warlike if needed, under the rule of sove- 
 reigns whose power was founded in the wealth and 
 prosperity of the country. 
 
 This is what can be said of the causes which 
 maintained in those provinces the communal system 
 in all its vigour, at a period when municipal free- 
 dom in France was crushed by the power of the 
 crown. It is possible that Flanders may have 
 retained something of Teutonic liberty, just as the 
 Italian municipalities retained some portion of the 
 liberty of ancient Eome. 
 
 The greater part of the Flemish communal 
 bodies were, so to speak, self-created ; their exist- 
 ence does not emanate from any formal charter, 
 nor can it be traced back to any precise date. 
 Many of these municipalities grew up by insensible 
 agglomeration, and gradually acquired their own 
 independence. 
 
 In the great wars between France and England, 
 the position of Flanders with regard to the two 
 belligerent powers — a position which varied a little 
 according to circumstances — is in reality very easy 
 to apprehend. The Earl of Flanders was the vassal 
 
1 
 
 16 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of the King of France, and, moreover, was fre- 
 quently attached to him by family ties. He felt 
 that he could not take part against France without 
 compromising his own safety and his existence as 
 a sovereign prince. Whenever he happened to 
 act thus, or whenever he leaned towards England, 
 France considered him as an enemy. Many Earls 
 of Flanders were subjected to long imprisonment 
 in France, for having failed in what the French 
 considered their duty as vassals of that crown. The 
 Earl of Flanders was present in the ranks of the 
 French army at the battle of Crecy ; and the aris- 
 tocracy of the country generally followed the line of 
 conduct prescribed by their sovereign. 
 
 On the other hand, the sympathy of the industrial 
 population of the towns was chiefly towards England. 
 The chief inducement was a material one, as England 
 furnished Flanders with the raw material essential 
 to the spinning and weaving of wool, one of the 
 principal objects of Flemish industry. Flanders 
 likewise obeyed a political instinct — the fear of 
 seeing the freedom of her institutions sufler from 
 too intimate a contact with France ; whereas Eng- 
 land, allied with Flanders by the tie of reciprocal 
 commercial interests, and having an afiinity with 
 her through her own free political institutions, — 
 England, which could have no ideas of invasion, 
 offered to Flanders substantial advantages and some 
 chance of sympathy and protection. 
 
 Such was, in very general terms, the condition of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 7 
 
 the Flemish provinces in the epoch anterior to the 
 fifteenth century — a condition, however, which it is 
 frequently difficult to define with complete accuracy, 
 on account of the complication of events, and their 
 fluctuating character. In the middle of the four- 
 teenth century, during the wars of Edward III, 
 Jacques van Artevelde, a popular leader, exercised a 
 complete dictatorship in Flanders. From his posi- 
 tion, his character, the nature of the power he 
 enjoyed, and the capacity which he displayed, Van 
 Artevelde bears some analogy to his contemporary 
 Etienne Marcel. 
 
 The King of England sought with assiduity the 
 alliance of the middle classes of Flanders and of its 
 leaders. There were moments when Van Artevelde 
 was Edward's strict ally, and had the most complete 
 understandinor with him. But the correctness of his 
 judgment pointed out to the leader of the Flemish 
 middle class that his country could not take part 
 absolutely with England : France w^as too near a 
 neighbour for Flanders to throw herself entirely into 
 the arms of England. There were some moments 
 of difficulty when Van Artevelde was carried away 
 by the thought of taking Flanders from the reigning 
 family and giving it to the Prince of Wales ; but 
 the prevailing character of his conduct was modera- 
 tion, and an intention of not following the populace 
 in its passions ; he wished to tolerate the existence 
 of the reigning prince while he took away his power, 
 and to resist the seductions of an unrestricted 
 
^ 
 
 18 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 alliance with England. Van Artevelde met a violent 
 death because the people found him too strong, and 
 because the balance which he wished to maintain 
 was difficult. For some time he was at the head of 
 a militia of 140,000 men, very brave, very well 
 supplied and equipped. His death did not entail 
 the loss of so great a portion of the power of the 
 middle classes as was caused by the death of Marcel 
 in France.* 
 
 He had a son less powerful than himself : but 
 he had successors who were men of energy. The 
 Flemish communes won a great victory over France 
 at Courtrai during the first years of the fifteenth 
 century. Eighty years afterwards, at the time when 
 the House of Burgundy took possession of the 
 Flemish provinces, they suffered a bloody defeat 
 at Koosebeke, a village placed, like Courtrai, on the Jl 
 borders of French Flanders. 
 
 The Flemish communes were less powerful after 
 
 ^ Van Artevelde played too great a part, and his character is too 
 remarkable, for the learned of his country not to have searched dili- 
 gently into all that concerns him. They have made careful inquiries 
 into his family history, whether his origin was patrician or middle 
 class, into the profession of his wife, his fortune, his private habits, 
 and his attitude in public. Researches such as those relating to so 
 important a person are of value and interesting, and opinions vary 
 on more than one circumstance. But so far as concerns the great 
 traits of his character, the nature and measure of his power, and his 
 public conduct, it appears to me that all the world nearly agrees in the 
 appreciation of his important actions, and recognises in him the pos- 
 session of great capacity, and of a certain moderation of views in a 
 time of great passion, and under circumstances full of danger. (See 
 the interesting works of Messrs. Cornelissen, Rapsaet, Kervyn de 
 Lettenhove, Saint-Genois, Lenz, De Gerlache, and Voisin.) 
 
 41 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 their defeat at Roosebeke ; and under the House of 
 Burgundy these revolts, although still conducted 
 with vigour, were less formidable to their rulers, 
 because these rulers were stronger, because the 
 monarchical principle had made some progress, and 
 because the communal liberties, by dint of being 
 opposed, had lost ground. During the period of 
 their vigour, they manifested some traces of repub- 
 lican spirit, and at the same time great zeal for 
 their own private interests. The rivalries between 
 different towns which occupy so large a space in 
 the annals of Flanders, frequently arose from ques- 
 tions of navigation : the different towns occupied 
 with commerce being interested in receiving with 
 the greatest rapidity, facility, and economy, the 
 foreign merchandise which arrived by sea. 
 
 The communal spirit of the Flemish provinces, 
 without being extinct at the accession of the House 
 of Burgundy, was thus weakened ; and the position 
 of things made it clear that in the struggle between 
 the Flemish towns and the Dukes of Burgundy, the 
 latter would generally have the advantage. Under 
 them and after them, the sovereigns of the Low 
 Countries had to struggle with the communes ; other 
 elements of resistance had indeed come to the aid 
 of the popular movement ; but, nevertheless, the 
 ultimate success of constituted authorities was never 
 for one moment doubtful. 
 
 Thus, at the close of the fourteenth century, and 
 at the accession of the Dukes of Burgimdy of the 
 
I 
 
 20 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 House of Valois, royalty in France, feeble as it 
 was in regard to the persons, had become strong 
 as an institution, and had triumphed over its 
 rivals and over the opposition it had until then 
 encountered ; the predecessors of Philip of Valois 
 being, since Philip Augustus and St. Louis, but 
 feeble and unenlightened men. 
 
 In England, which was governed by men who 
 were in general superior to the Kings of France, the 
 parliamentary form of government was organized, 
 and the country extricated itself from the struggle Jll 
 of races and parties, which had retarded the deve- 
 lopment of its institutions in the middle ages. 
 
 Communal government, after so long retaining 
 its energy and strength in the Flemish provinces, 
 without being actually destroyed, had still lost 
 ground. 
 
 France and England were engaged in a secular 
 war : at first it was territorial, but it had recently 
 become a war of succession, since the Kings of 
 England pretended that they were nearer to the 
 throne of France than the House of Valois. This 
 war was far from its end, and its chances had been; 
 various. Edward HI. and his son had gained great 
 victories, and had then suffered several defeats. 
 
 It was under such circumstances that the four- 
 teenth century was coming to a close, that the 
 period of the Burgundian rule was commencing, 
 and that the princes of that House entered upon 
 the part which they had to play in history. 
 
 « 
 
INTRODUCTION, 21 
 
 IT. 
 THE DUKES OF BURGUNDY. 
 
 The House of Burgundy of the race of Yalois 
 has a separate place in history. It scarcely existed 
 for one century ; as the latter years of the four- 
 teenth century witnessed its birth, so the end of the 
 fifteenth century witnessed its extinction. There is 
 a marked difference between that which preceded 
 and that which followed it. Before this period, we 
 have the old Burgundy of the Capets, which ended 
 from want of posterity, and lapsed from want of 
 heirs ; after it occurred the partition of the Burgun- 
 dian domain, and its absorption into other states, in 
 consequence of the disaster of Charles the Bold, the 
 last duke, and of his death without heirs male. 
 
 Under the rule of the four Dukes of Burgundy, 
 their territory, by the marriage of the first duke 
 with the heiress of Flanders, and then by inherit- 
 ance and by acquisition, was enlarged by the annex- 
 ation of almost all the provinces of Belgium, Hol- 
 land, and Zealand. With the ancient duchy, with 
 the county of Burgundy, and the provinces of the 
 north of France as far as the Somme, it formed a 
 considerable state, without territorial contiguity, 
 indeed, but rich and large : it was a sovereignty 
 without pretenders, easier to govern, and more diffi- 
 cult to disturb; than the neighbouring states. 
 
 The part which the Dukes of Burgundy played 
 
I 
 
 22 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 in history is, however, transient. By what it did 
 during one hundred years, under princes of mode- 
 rate abilities or of a violent or undecided character, 
 we may judge what Burgundy might have become 
 had it lasted longer, and been entrusted to dif- 
 ferent hands. 
 
 Given as an appanage by King John to one of 
 his sons, Philip the Bold, Burgundy, which, from 
 the end of the fifteenth century, has disappeared 
 from the map of Europe as an independent state, 
 united in itself admirable elements of force and of 
 grandeur. Its very geographical position entitled it 
 to exercise great influence. It separated France 
 from Germany by the duchy and the county of ^ 
 Burgundy, placed to the east of the French terri- f | 
 tory. It separated France from the coasts of the 
 North Sea by the interposition of the newly-acquired 
 territories of Flanders and of Holland. Its money 
 resources, frequently ill-employed, were considera- 
 ble ; its population was sometimes turbulent, with- 
 out being very dangerous to the ruling power ; it 
 was not so profoundly divided into parties as were 
 the English or French people. Moreover, it had the 
 power of raising soldiers, it paid its contributions, 
 and, after having been very turbulent, did not in 
 fact desire any other government than the one 
 which was over it. 
 
 The possession of these two territories on the east 
 and the north made Burgundy a state of the first 
 class. Moreover, it was a new state, placed between 
 
 « 
 
INTRODUCTION. ^ 23 
 
 the two powers which for three centuries had been 
 at war. It was strong enough and free enough to 
 be able, at the suggestion of its own interests, to 
 make or break the alliance with its neighbours: 
 not only could it make terms with those powers 
 themselves, but, with one or other of the parties 
 existing in their very heart, it could be their 
 enemy or their friend ; and this with an inde- 
 pendence and a freedom of action according to its 
 fancy, which, during that epoch, had in it nothing 
 unusual, and, as we are bound to believe, meant 
 nothing blameable. 
 
 That which marks, therefore, in a special manner 
 the character of the House of Burgundy and its 
 history in the fifteenth century, is this : it repre- 
 sents, in the centre of Europe, a new political 
 element, a state without pretenders, as strong as 
 its neighbours, rich in the midst of impoverished 
 kingdoms; and its territorial position alone was 
 sufficient to secure its political influence. Never- 
 theless, it was a state whose existence was transient, 
 and it was not governed by men sufficiently strong 
 to enable it to fulfil all its destiny. The events 
 of this epoch, when studied, explain of themselves 
 the part which princes so important as were the 
 Dukes of Burgundy might have played, and what 
 they might have become, in the midst of a society 
 so divided and of ideas so changing. They were 
 considerable historical figures, even as they appear 
 to us ; but the disturbed state of the neighbouring 
 
24 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 countries would have made them still grander and 
 more powerful if, with their enormous power, their 
 will had been firmer, their humour more serious, 
 their conduct more consistent, and their object a 
 higher one — had they been neither slow, nor 
 frivolous, nor wild — had any one of the princes 
 shown a grand character — had any one of them, 
 for instance, to keep within their time, been a 
 Du Guesclin, a Clisson, or a Dunois, a Black Prince, 
 a Henry V, or a* Bedford. It frequently happens 
 that men endowed with eminent faculties fail to 
 accomplish their destiny from the want of an 
 opportunity to show what they are. It was quite 
 otherwise with the House of Burgundy. The 
 opportunity, during their brief existence, frequently 
 occurred ; but the princes were destitute of the 
 qualities necessary to acquire a high political posi- 
 tion, and the family existed too short a time for 
 any one to guess what changes a power so con- 
 stituted and situated could have effected in Europe, 
 had its existence been prolonged. Of the two 
 things always necessary in this world for the 
 accomplishment of a great work, — opportunity and 
 genius, — they had only the first ; the second was 
 denied them. 
 
 France, during this period, — during the reigns of 
 Charles VI. and of Charles VII. — passed through 
 eighty years of disorder and anarchy. England 
 went through the bloody period of the wars of the 
 Roses. National life was, so to speak, interrupted 
 
INTKODUCTION. 25 
 
 in the two cuLiiitries, Miid social life was troubled 
 and suspended. 
 
 Feudalism was destroyed in France ; the monar- 
 chical form still remained imperfect. The former 
 institutions, in their fall, had left a void, and this 
 void was still unoccupied. Eoyalty having absorbed 
 the feudal system, and having stifled the develop- 
 ment of the communes, ought to have supplanted 
 the local influences by the exercise of concentrated 
 power. One institution which dies out gives place 
 to another. Feudalism disappearing after having 
 lived its time, required the establishment of an 
 energetic monarchy. 
 
 But it was not so. What so often happens in the 
 history of nations happened then ; the transforma- 
 tion was slow ; the substitution of one form for 
 another did not take place without long intervals ; 
 the succession remained open, and, meanwhile, the 
 country was profoundly miserable and ruined. 
 
 It was precisely when a strong government was 
 essential, that the government in France was most 
 weak : it was at the time when a vigorous monarch 
 was most needed, when a strong will was wanted 
 to gather together the scattered remains of local 
 institutions, when such monarchs as Philip Augustus, 
 St. Louis, and Charles V. (the best that had reigned 
 for some five hundi-ed years) were indispensable — it 
 was then that Charles V. died young, leaving France, 
 under Charles VI. and during the early part of the 
 reign of Charles VII, exposed to terrible anarchy. 
 
26 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 There was then a great career open to Philip the 
 Bold, Duke of Burgundy. He possessed the entire 
 confidence of his nephew, the King of France, and 
 he deserved it more than any one among the 
 relatives of Charles VI. He was the most consi- 
 derable among them all by his power. Possessing a 
 principality equivalent to a crown, he had a great 
 army, personal wealth, immense financial resources 
 in his own land, family alliances in Germany, ties 
 of interest and of policy with England — that is to 
 say, his position with reference to England was 
 open, and friendly if necessary. He oftered himself 
 as one experienced in government and in war : as 
 the sovereign of a rich and vast country, he was 
 clothed with great authority ; and his court was 
 held with excessive magnificence. 
 
 The public distress in France, the insufiiciency of 
 the then existing institutions with a king incapable 
 of governing, — the gravity and urgency of these 
 circumstances to a certain degree ennobled the 
 task, and rendered it more captivating to a pure 
 conscience. The greatest of all dangers threatened 
 France — the chance of finding herself exposed to 
 rival factions, and liable to a war of which the 
 embers were still smouldering, whilst she had neither 
 a government nor institutions of her own. When 
 we consider the fatal character of a position in 
 which, more than at any time, France required to 
 be well governed, and when the monarch who alone 
 could have saved the country was a raving madman, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 we are tempted to consider the country less blame- 
 able for drifting into the most profound disorder, 
 the parties into which it was divided less criminal 
 for disputing over the shreds of power, and the 
 men themselves less culpable for kindling the flames 
 of discord. 
 
 Philip the Bold was not fully conscious of the 
 necessities of the time, and did not make use of his 
 superiority over the party of the Duke of Orleans, 
 the brother of the king, to seize upon, defend, 
 and keep the regency ; by this he might have ful- 
 filled his duty, served his own ambition, and saved 
 the country. 
 
 The personal character of Charles VI. interests 
 us ; the kindliness of his disposition, his chivalrous 
 courage, his passion for war, his deep sufferings, the 
 abandonment, the neglect, the sordid destitution in 
 which his family allowed him to wallow ; the miser- 
 able condition of a madman with occasional lucid 
 intervals, just sufficient to enable him from time to 
 time to recall the agonies of the previous day and to 
 foresee those of the morrow, so as to take account 
 of the public miseries which his transient moments 
 of sense did not leave him time to remedy ; the 
 egotism and cupidity of those about him ; the cruel 
 contrast between the interested respect for the 
 crown, which still rested on his deranged head, and 
 the contempt with which the individual who wore 
 that crown was treated by his relatives ; — for all 
 these reasons \vg must have compassion on this 
 
1 
 
 28 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 unfortunate monarch, so conscious of his own mis- 
 fortune, and the involuntary cause of the miseries 
 of his country. 
 
 To govern France, to keep down the different 
 parties, — the House of Orleans, the Queen Isabel 
 — that detestable woman, incapable of saying herself 
 or even allowing people to guess which sentiment 
 was most dead in her, that of queen, wife, or mother, 
 — would have required a high standard of virtue, 
 far higher than that possessed by Duke Philip of 
 Burgundy. France, while Philip lived, and under 
 his influence, which was at intervals more or less 
 felt, appeared to adapt its progress to the character 
 of this prince — a character without depth, without 
 decision, and without fixity of purpose. Events 
 were as undecided as he was himself; the country 
 lived on in the same discomfort as that in which he 
 lived ; periods of crisis were constantly occurring 
 without coming to a head ; they remained in a state 
 of uncertainty, and the evils which overwhelmed 
 France were neither calmed by an active remedy nor 
 yet urged on to their results. The governing force 
 was less brutal, less barbarous under Philip than 
 under his successor. The distress of France had not 
 reached its culminating point. The two parties of 
 Burgundy and of Orleans, which were afterwards 
 destined to desolate the country, to ruin and betray 
 it, were then forming and assembling ; they were 
 armed in Paris, but had not as yet come to blows. 
 Men feared insurrection, burning, and })illage; pre- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 cautions were taken, houses were fortified, but tlie 
 torch was not yet applied. Executions were taking 
 place, but as yet there was no massacre. The 
 Companies, that undisciplined and dangerous horde 
 of mercenaries, had not as yet given themselves their, 
 full licence. 
 
 Abroad, the relations with England remained in 
 the condition of an ill-defined truce. The territorial 
 situation was comparatively good for France, for the 
 English had lost on the Continent a portion of 
 what the treaty of Bretigny had given them. In 
 Flanders Philip had only some slight differences 
 with his subjects. The peace made between them 
 after the wars at the end of the fourteenth century, 
 neither destroyed their wealth nor then* liberties. 
 
 Thus Philip the Bold was neither a tyrannical 
 sovereign in Flanders nor a rebellious vassal in 
 France. He did not stay the course of the miseries 
 of the country, but he contributed towards their 
 delay. He died old and insolvent in 1404. 
 
 III. 
 
 The authority which John the Fearless, the second 
 duke, exercised in France, was possibly even more 
 absolute than that of his father ; but it was exercised 
 at intervals, in a violent manner, at the expense of 
 the well-doing and of the security of the country, 
 and there was nothing in his character or his acts. 
 
I 
 
 30 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 or in the events of which he was the instigator or 
 the passive witness, which could aggrandize the 
 position of the House of Burgundy, or the moral 
 power of its head. There is scarce a period in the 
 annals of France more miserable than those fifteen 
 years of the rule of John the Fearless (1404-1419), 
 fifteen years which were only one long convulsive 
 struggle. History has not ascribed to him all the 
 miseries of that period, — the civil war, with its 
 bloody excesses, or the foreign war with its reverses ; 
 but there is no doubt that the passionate nature of 
 this prince contributed to them. The beginning of 
 the reign was marked by the murder of the Duke 
 of Orleans, the end by that of the Duke of Burgundy 
 himself, the chiefs of the two parties who disputed 
 in France the possession of all the power still vested 
 in the crown, and all the wealth that still remained 
 in the country. John the Fearless had his cousin 
 murdered in order to destroy his party; but the 
 Orleans party did not die with its chief, and this 
 murder, instead of delaying civil war, precipitated 
 its explosion.^ 
 
 All this is miserable. The country passed through 
 terrible sufferings; blood flowed in torrents in towns 
 delivered over to pillage, and in fields which were 
 desolated. Terror reigned in Paris with that distinc- 
 tive mark which ever prevails in all times in which 
 
 ^ Bulletins de VAcademie JRoyale, for the year 1861, p. 558, &c., — a 
 paper of M. Kervyn de Lettenhove ou the assassination of the Duke 
 of Orleans, and on the harano;ue of Mai t re Jean Petit. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 'M 
 
 it rae^es. There was the same indifference for the 
 lives of others in those who governed, the same 
 solicitude for themselves, the same improvident 
 calculations, the same pretended skill in discovering 
 dangerous enemies and the same readiness to pro- 
 scribe them. 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy, of a robust and active 
 nature, a worthy grandsire of that other Burgundian 
 prince who was the last of his race — equally vin- 
 dictive — whose ambition was still more narrow and 
 more grasping — knew not how to employ his ardour 
 and his audacity otherwise than in constituting 
 himself the chief of a faction. He forgot that for 
 a genius like his, enterprising and enthusiastic, there 
 was another mission to be fulfilled, that of applying 
 a palliative to the misery of France, and attempting 
 to secure the future grandeur of Burgundy. John 
 the Fearless never conceived this idea any more 
 than did his father. Both of them, the son being 
 more passionate, the father more frivolous in cha- 
 racter, are fit to figure, each by the side of the 
 other, in the ranks of second-rate princes. 
 
 Let us rapidly trace the principal characteristics of 
 the deplorable condition of France during this period. 
 
 Within there was the war of the Armagnacs. 
 When the young Duke of Orleans, the son of the 
 murdered Duke, had married Bonne of Armagnac, 
 he made his father-in-law the leader of the party 
 which was from that time called after the name of 
 that bold Gascon. 
 
32 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 If we compare the two factions which then 
 fought for supremacy in France, we are aware of 
 certain differences between them. The Burgundians. 
 were, take them altogether, more popular, even in 
 the very worst times of the public disasters. We 
 cannot help recognising in that party some traces of 
 a form of government. Its task did not seem to 
 consist exclusively in ruining the country, in taking 
 the money, and in butchering the obstinate tax- 
 payers. Its chief was something taken by himself : 
 he possessed a great sovereignty, an imposing mili- 
 tary force, and wealth of his own. If, when he 
 leaned for support, in Paris, on the bloody faction of 
 the Butchers, some cruel disorders were perpetrated 
 in the name of the Duke of Burgundy, the respon- 
 sibility for all that took place was never brought 
 completely home to him. 
 
 The Armagnacs, on the contrary, were an army of 
 brigands, recruited from the ranks of the worst class 
 of foreign adventurers ; they consisted of Scotch, 
 Arragonese, and Lombards, who, during these days 
 of confusion and of impunity, sought their fortune 
 in Europe, and more especially in France. Behind 
 this army there was nothing resembling a leader, an 
 administration, or the court of a prince. When the 
 Armagnacs desolated the kingdom, under the name 
 of the Duke of Orleans, the Duke himself lent them 
 only his flag; and soon afterwards his long cap- 
 tivity in England commenced. When, later still, 
 the Armagnacs joined tlu^ p^^i'ty of the Dauphin 
 
INTRODUCTION^ 33' 
 
 (Charles VIIL), he was living a recluse in his 
 palace, indifferent to the calamities or the crimes of 
 his party, and learning what took place only from 
 public rumour. 
 
 Such is the distinction A^hich we can admit 
 between these two parties, or rather these two 
 tyrannies. 
 
 Abroad, the old pretensions of England to the 
 crown of France became more pressing, in the pre- 
 sence of the deep afflictions to which France 
 was exposed, its sufferings and impoverishment. 
 Henry V. possessed the political and military quali- 
 ties of forethought and courage. He had to con- 
 sider which of the two rival factions in France was 
 the strongest, which of them presented to him the 
 best chances of a solid alliance, and whether a 
 union contracted with one of the two was more to 
 his interest than a dash at France. 
 
 The counsellors of the Duke of Burgundy urged 
 him on towards an English alliance at any price. 
 They told him that Henry V. was the most for- 
 midable enemy he could have ; that he ought to 
 treat with him, even at some sacrifice ; that France 
 had existed some time without much suffering, 
 although England held possession of a portion of 
 her territory ; and that the alliance with England 
 would strike terror into the Orleanist party. 
 
 The decision rested with Henry V. He decided 
 for war, \^as victorious at Agincourt, took Eouen, 
 and occupied Normandy. It is hard to decide in 
 
34 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 which of the two rival parties the anti-English feel- 
 ing was stronger. It varied with each, according 
 to the chances of good or bad fortune. 
 
 Posterity, in its judgment of John the Fearless, 
 has seen, in this progress towards evil which dis- 
 tinguishes his career from that of his father, the 
 fatal tendency of successive events, and the recipro- 
 cal reaction of the two wars on one another — the 
 civil war within, and the war between France and 
 England without. This revolution, like all others, 
 became more passionate and bloody as the danger 
 increased. The Duke of Burgundy, in the excite- 
 ment of the struggle, became a rebellious vassal to 
 the King of France ; and during this time the 
 French throne was occupied by a prince totally 
 deranged, who was hawked about Paris like a stan- 
 dard by the faction which happened for the moment 
 to have the upper hand; for to that faction he 
 delegated his power, merely for form's sake, after it 
 had wrested its substance from him by revolu- 
 tionary violence. 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy, whenever he had the 
 worst of it in France, still had one resource left; 
 he could return to his own country, where wealth 
 and order were to be found, — where he could forget 
 the violence which characterised the government of 
 France, — in the midst of a population that, during 
 the course of those years, did not stir up domestic 
 troubles, and took part in foreign wars only with 
 reluctance. 
 
 fl 
 
 ■ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 38 
 
 When the Duke of Burgundy was murdered at 
 Montereau, under the eyes of the Dauphin, this event 
 was looked upon as a stroke of destiny ; the mass of 
 the public could not decide whether it was a sub- 
 ject of congratulation or of regret. The catastrophe 
 alarmed, but did not afflict people. It seemed 
 indeed to be the presage of fresh misfortunes ; but 
 the murdered man was neither lamented nor hated. 
 The moral feeling of the age was such as to allow 
 every one, excepting the son of the murdered Duke, 
 to consider the event in itself with the most pro- 
 found indifference. 
 
 IV. 
 
 While the House of Burgundy played an impor- 
 tant part in the drama of the fifteenth century, and 
 while it left the mark of the personal character of 
 its princes on the history of those times, still we 
 cannot but see, after the death of the two first 
 Dukes, that the House of Burgundy had failed to 
 fulfil its mission. 
 
 After the extinction of the petty principalities of 
 the middle ages, and before the development of the 
 large modern kingdoms, as units of power at a 
 moment when many things were about to be 
 decided and fixed in Europe, the House of Bur- 
 gundy seemed created for a vocation which it 
 missed. Modern Europe has formed itself without 
 
 d2 
 
T^ 
 
 36 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the House of Burgundy, and it is impossible to sayll 
 what would have happened in that corner of the 
 world, if an additional powerful state, in a central 
 position, had sprung into being and defended its 
 territory. Everything great which has been called 
 into existence by the hand of God, and destroyed 
 soon after by the folly of man, allows the imagina- 
 tion to conceive the continuation of its grandeur, 
 with all its consequences. Nor is this the only 
 political creation which would appear to have re- 
 fused to fulfil the views of Providence. 
 
 Among the four Dukes of Burgundy, it was evi- 
 dently the third, Philip the Good, who had the least 
 incomplete and the truest sense of his mission. 
 The brilliancy of his court and of his fortune, his 
 long career, the increase of his territory, the ability 
 which he displayed in preserving his power in the 
 face of many perilous incidents, made him an 
 eminent prince, the most important one of his 
 epoch. Such at least is the view of historians, and 
 the Turks called him " the great Duke of the West." 
 He exercised influence in cases of grave importance ; 
 he was conscious of his power ; he had a certain 
 respect for his own dignity, and he was proud and 
 haughty. His self-control did not prevent him 
 from being very inconsistent in his conduct ; but he 
 knew how to maintain, at any rate on the surface, 
 the appearance of a lord and master, according to 
 the language of the time. 
 
 Whatever were the revolutions through which 
 France and England passed during his life, we are 
 
 4 
 
• INTKODUCTION. 37 
 
 tempted to believe that, had it not been for him, 
 events would have gone faster ; that his character, 
 with its vis inertice, its coolness in the hour of 
 danger, impressed upon events a certain slowness. 
 More than once during his life he was placed in a 
 ^position which was critical and dangerous for all the 
 world, but for him was full of responsibility ; and yet 
 affairs were kept in suspense for years, whilst under 
 his father or his son all would have been decided at 
 once. We will not say whether this peculiarity is a 
 merit or a reproach — whether it arose from cold- 
 ness or irresolution. 
 
 He had to face dangerous or embarrassing events, 
 rather than powerful rivals or adversaries : and it 
 would be curious to know if he would have had 
 the same success in resisting men as, for the most 
 part, he had in resisting circumstances. He so 
 arranged matters that he had not to deal with 
 Henry V. as an enemy. He was very young when 
 Henry Y. died ; and he was already weakened by 
 age, aud near his end, when Louis XL ascended 
 the French throne. Thus he had no contest with 
 these two princes, whose talents were so different. 
 
 When we consider the career of Philip the Good, 
 as a whole, and when we set side by side distant 
 dates, we find him, at the beginning and at the end 
 of his life — the first time of his own free will, the 
 second time drawn into it by his son — at war with^ 
 or in rebellion against, the King of France ; but the 
 very length of his reign renders less apparent these 
 
38 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 breaclies of political allegiance. Two contests with 
 his suzerain succeeding each other immediately 
 would attract more attention than when occurring 
 at an interval of twenty years; more especially 
 since the transition is marked by many shiftings 
 to and fro, which again may be reckoned as 
 scruples. 
 
 During the interval which separates these two 
 epochs, and these two breaches of faith, Philip the 
 Good practised a shuffling policy of indecision be- 
 tween England and France ; leaning, according to 
 circumstances, more or less towards the one or the 
 other ; and assuming just sufficient independence to 
 take a decided part, if necessary, but generally 
 keeping himself aloof from the contest with the 
 liberty and calmness of a judge, so as to be certain 
 that his influence would give the preponderance as 
 he chose. Moreover, as we have already said, the 
 length of his reign allowed him in all things to take 
 his time : his proceedings and resolutions, which 
 were dilatory, and followed upon each other slowly, 
 were looked upon both as wise and energetic, and 
 precluded any idea of pressure, or any suspicion 
 of caprice. 
 
 Philip the Good then was prudent and calculat- 
 ing, rather brave in face of a danger to be incurred, 
 than decided in any resolution to be taken ; he was 
 jealous of his authority, proud of his power, fully 
 impressed with the sentiment of his greatness ; he 
 resisted the pressure of circumstances as if they 
 
INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 were menaces which could not reach him ; he occa- 
 sionally combated his political passions as if they 
 were unworthy of his rank ; altogether with an 
 unsteady character, and a mind which was at once 
 frivolous and flighty, he exhibited a harmonious 
 and not unpleasing mixture of personal courage, 
 patience, knowledge of the world, and generosity. 
 
 It may well be asked how a man with such a 
 character, and such qualities, could have concluded 
 and signed the Treaty of Troyes, have sold France 
 and its crown, have brought the king and the army 
 of England to Paris, and have shared the dishonour 
 of Queen Isabel. The only answer is, that it was 
 a contrast to his usual life, and a dishonour to him. 
 The imperious desire to avenge himself upon the 
 Dauphin, as the passive author of the murder com- 
 mitted at Montereau, overcame on that day all his 
 principles, and overruled all his calculations. 
 
 "That is the hole through which the English 
 entered France," said a Carthusian friar, one hun- 
 dred years later, to Francis I, who visited the tomb 
 of Duke John of Burgundy, and was shown the 
 skull of the Duke, with the deep dent made in 
 it by the battle-axe of Tanneguy du Chatel.^ 
 
 Among all the events in which the influence of 
 Philip the Good was exercised, there is no occa- 
 sion on which it was more decisive than when he 
 forced Queen Isabel to pronounce that her son, the 
 
 * Vallet de Viriville, Mistoire de Charles VII. vol. i. p. 184. 
 
40 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Dauphin, had forfeited his rights to the throne of 
 France, when he proclaimed Henry V. the true heir, 
 and brought about the marriage of the English king 
 with a French princess. Without the intervention 
 of the Duke of Burgundy, the treaty would never 
 have been signed at all. It required some powerful 
 action between the two to bring together the King 
 of England and the Queen of France. It required 
 some one man with a will both strong and passionate 
 to carry out this purpose. The Queen Isabel, who 
 betrayed her son, and trafficked away his inherit- 
 ance, was too indolent to act of her own accord. 
 Henry V. — whether it arose from foresight, or from 
 fear of abusing his good fortune, or from a dislike 
 to extreme measures — would have been content with 
 supporting the old English pretensions to the throne 
 of France by the usual political means, or by force 
 of arms ; he would never have had the idea of 
 taking such violent steps. He would never have 
 looked upon the consent of Charles VI. to such 
 treason as possible ; he would never have dreamed 
 of supposing the Queen to be invested with the 
 regency which no one save herself could have con- 
 ferred. Left to his own personal instincts, to his 
 reason, and to his intelligence, he might probably 
 have thought that the cause of the English succes- 
 sion to the throne of France would have been 
 weakened by the use of such criminal means. 
 There can, in fact, be no doubt that the Treaty of 
 Troyes, instead of assuring, abridged the duration of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 41 
 
 the English power in France : it precipitated the 
 reaction which put an end to it. All the anti- 
 cipations of those who signed that treaty were 
 successively frustrated. Henry did not succeed to 
 Charles YI. : he died himself young at Yincennes 
 before the decease of the unfortunate Charles YI. 
 England under the successors of Henry Y. was in 
 a disturbed state : it was ill governed, and could 
 not retain the territories it had conquered. Queen 
 Isabel of France, who only cared for security, 
 luxury, and riches, languished in obscurity, and 
 almost in misery. The Dauphin, on the contrary, 
 after many miserable and misspent years, occupied 
 a throne which he ended in making glorious. Philip 
 the Good, whom the passion of one day had carried 
 away so far, gained from this shameful 'act the 
 gratification only of a temporary vengeance. If he 
 shortly felt any regret, he made no haste to show 
 it. His repentance was first shown by depression 
 and by disgust ; and when he did at last say, " I 
 " never was English at heart, and if I did ally 
 " myself with England, I did it only to revenge 
 " the death of my father," it was after the lapse of 
 many years, after the death of Henry Y. and of 
 Charles YI, and after the armies of England had 
 quitted the soil of France. 
 
 The consequences therefore of the Treaty of 
 Troyes (1420) were not such as had been expected 
 by its authors, Henry Y, Isabel of France, and 
 Philip the Good. Philip placed the government of 
 
1 
 
 42 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 France for about ten years in the hands of the 
 English ; but it profited neither Henry V, who died 
 as a young man, nor Isabel, who was despised during 
 her lifetime, nor yet Philip the Good, who, from a 
 feeling of shame, refused for some time the offer 
 made to him of sharing the government of France 
 with the English. 
 
 Philip the Good has been vehemently blamed for 
 the part he took in the Treaty of Troyes ; and the 
 blame was well deserved. He aided and abetted 
 Queen Isabel in the sale to England of the crown 
 of her husband and of the inheritance of her son. 
 The spirit of vengeance, however legitimate it may 
 be held to be when the murder of a father is in 
 question, by no means justifies the Duke of Bur- 
 gundy. In this particular circumstance, he shared 
 and facilitated the crime of a woman whose very 
 memory is odious. 
 
 There was in France so great a feeling of lassi- 
 tude, produced by the prevalent disorders, that the 
 treaty and the English domination were favourably 
 accepted as a guarantee of material security. The 
 Parisians, among others, preferred the English to 
 the Armagnacs. The English, who had a garrison 
 in Paris, administered all that portion of the ter- 
 ritory held by their armies ; and these exacting and 
 proud conquerors, at the end of a short time, had 
 only an infant of eleven months old, Henry YI, 
 born at Windsor, to present as sovereign of France : 
 a monarch who was destined later to be driven 
 
INTRODUCTION. 43 
 
 from his own kingdom, and who only brought to the 
 throne a mediocrity of intelligence closely bordering 
 upon idiotcy. This made no difference ; the French 
 preferred, in the first instance, the government of 
 strangers to a state of anarchy. 
 
 The Duke of Bedford^ exercised the functions 
 of Eegent with authority and with capacity : the 
 English army met with that reception which is 
 given by timid people, in troubled times, to the 
 police. It was not that the condition of Paris was 
 improved, or that sickness and famine had ceased to 
 rage. But the miseries had been so great, that people 
 hailed any change : all patriotic sentiment was ex- 
 tinguished, and there remained in the minds of the 
 Parisians but one single desire — that of obtaining 
 some protection against lawless plunderers. 
 
 In Burgundy, where the sufferings had not been 
 so great, the treaty was still worse received, and 
 Philip, during the English occupation, would have 
 willingly inclined towards the sentiments of his sub- 
 jects. The gradations by which his mind was led, 
 first to manifest coldness, then dislike, towards the 
 English domination in France, and which at length 
 induced him to resume his ancient and normal 
 position with regard to France, — this movement 
 was accomplished with extreme slowness. It was 
 necessary that he should see France herself pass 
 from resignation to discouragement, and eventually 
 to disgust. We can trace in him the motives of 
 
 ^ Bedford had married Anne of Burgundy, the sister of Philip. 
 
n 
 
 44 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 personal dislike towards the English — among others, 
 the marriage of Jacqueline of Hainault with the 
 Duke of Gloucester ; and at the same time we 
 remark more constancy and devotion displayed by 
 the friends of the Dauphin. Several plots against 
 the English were formed in Paris. Philip was pro- 
 foundly impressed with the conviction that, so long 
 as the two rival powers fought on the soil of France 
 without any marked success, the alternating victories 
 or defeats would produce nothing but indifference 
 in the minds of the French. The war could not go 
 on for ever, and peace depended upon him ; it was 
 his interest — his frontiers were threatened and de- 
 vastated. It required the constant influence of these 
 motives, these repeated and ripe reflections, to alter 
 the determination of the Duke of Burgundy. The 
 French, unconnected with the Dauphin's party, who 
 had begun by looking on the English government as 
 a safeguard, ended by recognising its oppression. The 
 Dauphin, after having been governed by selfish 
 favourites, at last met with useful ministers. The 
 provinces which obeyed him were principally those 
 in the centre of France, precisely those which the 
 English had held under the Capets. The conversion 
 of the Duke of Burgundy, therefore, can be attri- 
 buted at one and the same time to personal motives, 
 to the impatience shown by France to the English 
 domination, and to the tenacity of the party in 
 favour of a native monarchy. 
 
 It was about this time that we hear the first 
 
 I 
 
lyTiiODUCTiox. 45 
 
 mention of Joan of Arc. Her history is well known. 
 Her visions, her purity, the life she led in her 
 village, the journey of a hundred leagues she made 
 from Vaucouleurs to Chinon, where the Dauphin 
 then was, — her marvellous entry into Orleans, the 
 raising of the siege, the coronation of Charles YII, 
 the acknowledged truth up to that time of all her 
 predictions, — all these circumstances have been re- 
 peated a hundred times, with details which vary 
 according to times and ideas. The general truth 
 of the history is no longer contested : her cap- 
 tivity, her sufferings, the trial, the agony and the 
 execution, bring the story to a mournful close. 
 The hatred which pursued Joan of Arc, and which 
 was only allayed by her death, was political hate. 
 The English feared her power, and envied her cele- 
 brity. The history of her trial, longer even than 
 that of her triumphs, exhibits national hatred pur- 
 suing her to her very death. The University of 
 Paris pronounced a verdict in conformity with the 
 wishes of the English ; the illustrious Chancellor of 
 the University, Gerson, who, without doubt, would 
 have shown greater independence, was expiating in 
 exile his fidelity to the Dauphin's cause. Certain 
 ideas of that time have ceased to exist, in like 
 manner as the passions of that time are now extinct. 
 No one now any longer denies that Joan of Arc was 
 more frequently obeyed than guided by men of cha- 
 racter and experience; such as were Xaintrailles, 
 Dunois, and Eichemont. It is open to us now, a^ 
 
1 
 
 46 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 formerly, to admit or to deny the supernatural 
 character of her mission ; but it is long since every 
 one has recognised the sincerity of her convictions 
 and of her devotion to the king's cause, as well as 
 the uprightness and simplicity of her soul. The 
 scepticism of Hume, the philosophical historian of 
 England, agrees on this point with Father Daniel, 
 who represents the orthodox French opinion.^ 
 
 Some time still elapsed before France, ruined and 
 ill at ease, was in a position to regulate her own 
 affairs, and that peace at home and abroad was 
 restored. Her recovery was slow ; generally speak- 
 ing, such serious maladies have a more rapid conclu- 
 sion. But although France still went through long 
 years of warfare and of suffering, of disorder and 
 of disquiet, nevertheless from this date we may 
 recognise the first symptoms of her recovery. 
 
 Civil war, a foreign occupation, the madness of 
 the King, the absence of the Dauphin from Paris, 
 the hostility of the Duke of Burgundy, the rivalry 
 of the princes of the blood royal, the disorders 
 of the armed force, — all these scourges, all these 
 
 ^ Proces de Condamnation d de lUhahilitation de Jeanne d^Arc; 
 Documents published by M. Jules Quicherat, in the Collection 
 "Des Memoires de I'Histoire de France," of Messrs. Michaud and 
 Poujoulat ; " Notice sur Jeanne d'Arc," first series, vol. iii. The 
 second volume of VHistoire de Charles VII. by M. Vallet de Viriville, 
 contains long and touching details concerning the events in which 
 Joan of Arc took part. We there find new details on the rival 
 interests which her military success caused among the immediate 
 friends of the Dauphin, such as Georges de la Tr^mouille and Renaud 
 de Chartres. The first half of the volume, pp. 42-234, is devoted to 
 the history of Joan of Arc, and of her trial. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 47 
 
 misfortunes, had existed simultaneously, and had 
 entailed their disastrous consequences. They gra- 
 dually and successively, disappeared, reacting one 
 upon the other, during the period when affairs 
 were becoming better, as they had done whilst they 
 were becoming worse. 
 
 At first the change was insensible. The French 
 armies went through alternate phases of gain and 
 loss which left no trace, and were viewed by the 
 country with indifference. It was only at the end 
 of a certain time that on the side of the French 
 party we can trace a real success. The Duke of 
 Burgundy for some time showed no favourable change 
 of policy in his conduct towards France. The spirit 
 of vengeance had been softened in him probably 
 before he was aware of it, certainly before he con- 
 fessed the change in his sentiments. The feeling 
 of the country was equally modified in an imper- 
 ceptible manner, when the position of the national 
 monarchy began to mend, and when Philip, from 
 the enemy which he was, became indifferent, and 
 when moreover a slight return of confidence in the 
 future arose. 
 
 According as this movement was appreciable, the 
 two parties made strenuous advances towards the 
 Duke of Burgundy — the one to keep him, the other 
 to obtain his alliance. ** Take care," said the English, 
 " lest fortune changes, if you do not stay on our 
 " side." — " The English are of no assistance to you in 
 " anything," said the French, '' and you receive no 
 
48 HISTORICAL E8.SAYS. 
 
 " benefit -from their alliance ! " Learned doctors e: 
 amined, on both sides, whether Charles VL had the 
 power to alienate his crown and to disinherit his 
 son. Philip at this time lived much in Flanders ; 
 he celebrated there, with festivals of unexampled 
 luxury, his marriage with Isabel of Portugal, his 
 third wife.^ He instituted, in the midst of a splendid 
 court, the Order of the Golden Fleece, destined to 
 rival in its glorious associations the Order of the 
 Garter, founded by Edward III.^ It was also about 
 this time that the death of the Duke of Brabant put 
 Philip in possession of the duchy of Brabant, of the 
 marquisate of Antwerp, and of all the inheritance of 
 Jacqueline of Hainault. He had previously bought 
 from the last Count the county of Namur. 
 
 Philip appears to have done all he could to make 
 the gradual upward progress of the French monarchy 
 as slow as possible — a progress that was uninter- 
 rupted from the appearance of Joan of Arc on the 
 scene, till the time when Charles VII. found himself 
 at the head of a kingdom that was pacified and saved. 
 It is curious to mark the turns and transitions of 
 policy — timid and carefully managed as they were — 
 which were employed by Philip the Good, before he 
 entered into the previously-existing relations with 
 
 ^ The two first had been Michelle of France and Bonne of Artois. 
 
 2 The Baron of Reiffenberg, in his Histoire de VOrdre de la Toison 
 d'07', gives no decided opinion on the origin to be given to the 
 institution of this Order. See on the festivals celebrated at Bruges 
 on this occasion, EechercJies sur Louis de Bruges, Seigneur ds la 
 Gruthume. Paris, 1831, in 8vo. pp. 265-324. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 49 
 
 France. For some time lie did not confess that he 
 repented having signed the treaty dethroning the 
 King of France ; but he showed it by a long course 
 of inaction, by a dilatory mode of conduct, by 
 doubtful and contradictory proceedings, before he 
 avowed this change by evident acts, or declared 
 it by spoken words. From the point of view where 
 we now are placed, and bringing together circum- 
 stances separated by long intervals, we are now 
 enabled to follow, step by step, his hesitation and 
 tlie oscillations of his mind. Thus he began by 
 declaring to the King of France that he forgave 
 him the murder of John Duke of Burgundy, and 
 almost at the same time he accepted from the hands 
 of the King of England the Eegency of France. 
 Then he fell away from the English alliance, and 
 entered into negotiations with Charles VI I. which 
 led to nothing ; and this he did without recog- 
 nising him as King. Subsequently he laid down 
 with him the conditions of a pacific arrangement ; 
 this he again broke off, and returned to Paris as if 
 he had all along remained the ally of the English. 
 Later still, h^ favoured the conferences between 
 France and England — conferences which came to 
 nothing, and in which it was confessed that the 
 peace was one of the most difficult to attain, that 
 the pretensions of the two parties were almost in- 
 compatible, that the English wished to keep all 
 their French conquests, while the French were 
 disposed to give up nothing, or next to nothing. 
 
 E 
 
50 HISTORICAL E8SAYS. 
 
 He allowed the validity of the Treaty of Troyes 
 and of the renunciation of Charles Y. to be dis- 
 cussed ; and it was only after all these tentative 
 measures and contradictory movements, after having 
 recognised the fact that he could no longer remain 
 neuter, and that the French party had become the 
 more powerful in France, — it was then only that 
 he signed the Treaty of Arras (1435), concluded a 
 separate peace with Charles VII. and recognised 
 him as King. The decisive reason that guided the 
 Duke of Burgundy, in this return to a French 
 alliance, was undoubtedly the improved position of 
 the Crown in France, and the change in the con- 
 dition of the country. Such was the uncertain and 
 tortuous course of policy pursued by Philip the 
 Good, destitute alike of frankness or courage, with 
 regard to France and England, in the period be- 
 tween the Treaty of Troyes when he sided with 
 the English, and the Treaty of Arras when ho 
 attached himself to the French party. His policy 
 was undecided ; and the events, the public spirit of 
 the day, and the military position of the two parties 
 were equally such. Philip, after having become a 
 partisan of the English with the precipitancy of a 
 passionate nature, was, in retracing his steps, as 
 timid as he was slow ; he followed events with 
 docility, or guided them with caution ; nor did he 
 join the French party and the King until fortune 
 returned to them, and set him the example. 
 
 This hesitation on the part of the Duko of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 51 
 
 Burgundy was not so much the calculation of 
 prudence as the desire to place an interval of space 
 between events which it was painful to him to see 
 approaching. But for this, the exercise of a firmer 
 will, joined to such power as he wielded, would 
 have put an end to the war much sooner, would 
 have brought Charles VII. to Paris, and would have 
 restored Normandy to the hands of that prince. 
 The Duke of Burgundy would willingly have de- 
 layed attaching his signature to the treaty, had not 
 the state *of affairs, ripened as it was by time, swept 
 away his hesitation and his scruples. 
 
 But France, bowed down by misery, impatient 
 and weary of the war, was still disposed to strike 
 one last blow. The English garrison at Paris was 
 weak ; and as the people manifested no wish to aid 
 it, the King entered his capital without fighting. 
 The great struggle was at an end — every one felt it 
 to be so — and Philip had been reconciled to France 
 only under this impression. It was long before 
 peace was signed between England and France; 
 but the war between the two powers languished, 
 and in the encounters France was invariably 
 successful. Indifferent and without occupation as 
 had been the Dauphin in his youth, governed and 
 kept apart from business by ambitious courtiers, 
 always absent from Paris and from the army, 
 Charles VII. now changed his character and his 
 habits : he became henceforth the King of France, 
 and not the King of Bourges ; he prepared 
 
 E 2 
 
^ 
 
 52 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 for his people a future of order and of tranquillity. 
 France, slow in recovering her strength, at any rate 
 enjoyed some peaceful years ; and the name of 
 Charles VII. is honourably remembered in history 
 for the substitution of organized armies in lieu of 
 the bands of adventurers and freebooters.^ 
 
 After his third marriage, and after the peace of 
 Arras, Philip the Good had twice to interfere with 
 what was passing in the Flemish provinces. The 
 first time the difficulties arose at Bruges, the second 
 time at Ghent ; on both occasions — and a tolerably 
 long interval of time elapsed between each — Philip 
 had his own way after the struggle was over. The 
 Flemings saw with displeasure that Philip, like his 
 predecessors, was absorbed in foreign affairs, and 
 felt but a secondary interest in possessions which 
 furnished him, when he needed it, with ample re- 
 sources in money. He made several appeals to 
 them to contribute a voluntary aid, but in vain. 
 He wished to impose on Ghent a tax on salt, which 
 :they refused to give ; and he was many years with- 
 out setting foot in their town. The people of 
 Bruges were jealous of the favour with which the 
 Duke of Burgundy treated his subjects in Picardy ; 
 moreover, they reproached him with protecting the 
 agricultural interest of the flat country to the detri- 
 ment of the manufacturing trades of the towns, 
 and with having made the port of Sluis, through 
 which all English goods were imported, too inde- 
 
 1 Vallot flo Virlvillo, vol. iii. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 53 
 
 pendent, as far as the interests of Bruges were 
 concerned. 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy had to contend against a 
 violent riot at Bruges, where he exposed himself to 
 danger without sufficient escort, and where his life 
 was in jeopardy. Had it not been for the presence 
 of mind of a workman, who forced open the city 
 gate and allowed him to escape, the people of 
 Bruges would possibly have made him a prisoner or 
 a victim to their violence. The sentence which he 
 pronounced against the insurgents, after the revolt, 
 was severe. He condemned the insurgents to pay 
 a heavy fine in money, to beg pardon of their 
 sovereign, and to undergo some restrictions in 
 the electoral laws afiecting their magistrates.^ 
 
 The contest which Philip the Good had with 
 Ghent, some time later, was of a character more 
 purely political. In these insurrections against the 
 sovereign, we may remark the fact that the hatred 
 of the towns one against another was so great as 
 to prevent any union against the sovereign, even 
 when their grievances were identical. The hatred 
 against the rival city overpowered every other 
 feeling. At Ghent, the object in dispute was espe- 
 cially the freedom of their municipal elections ; and 
 in the course of this contest the people of Ghent 
 gave the Duke of Burgundy the opportunity of 
 carrying on a long and a final contest against the 
 
 1 This event is narrated by Monstrelet with more of detail than 
 elearness. (Monstrelet, vol. i. and ii. pp. 2ia, 216, 220, 224.) 
 
^ 
 
 5 4 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 communes. The great difficulty between him and 
 the city was this : the deans of the two principal 
 guilds being electors, the magistrates elected {ecJie- 
 vins) belonged always to the same guilds ; these 
 guilds were the most powerful and the most inde- 
 pendent, and the Duke thought that by such a 
 composition of the magistracy the legitimate influ- 
 ence of the sovereign received great detriment. 
 He wished to reform the law, and the war began. 
 It was long and bloody. The army of Ghent 
 amounted to forty thousand men ; it could have 
 been raised to one hundred thousand, if necessary. 
 To conquer the town of Ghent appeared an impos- 
 sibility to Philip. The unexpected capture of the 
 fort of Gavre, held by the people of Ghent, and 
 their desire to retake it, induced them to march 
 their army out of the city. The battle of Gavre, in 
 which twenty thousand of the citizens perished, was 
 fought and won by the Du"ke, under the walls of 
 the fort. Charles VII, in his character of suze- 
 rain, several times offered to mediate between 
 the citizens and their; liege lord. He pronounced 
 sentence against them, and sent a herald to read it 
 to them. The herald failed in accomplishing his 
 mission, and with difficulty saved his life. The 
 Count of Charolais, Philip s son, who subsequently 
 became Charles the Bold, was present at the battle 
 of Gavre, in defiance of the express orders of his 
 father. His passion for war and the wilfulness of 
 his character were manifested from the very first. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 55 
 
 The sentence pronounced by Philip was a severe 
 one. The insurgents had to pay fines, and were 
 condemned to come before their sovereign, to the 
 number of two thousand, in their shirts and with 
 bare feet. Moreover, the deans of the guilds were 
 deprived of their right of electing. The magis- 
 trates were in future to be nominated by four 
 commissioners named by the Duke, and four ap- 
 pointed by the town. This sentence, which was 
 confirmed by virtue of a treaty called the Peace 
 of Gavre, marks, as does the battle of the same 
 name, an important epoch in the annals of Flanders. 
 The treaty shows that the power of the Dukes of 
 Burgundy was becoming greater than that of the 
 communes. Mary of Burgundy, the granddaughter 
 of Philip the Good, in a time of great distress and 
 embarrassment, reversed this sentence, and restored 
 to the people of Ghent the privileges which Philip 
 had abolished. But the time for the preponderance 
 of the communes had passed. When the Flemings 
 rose against Charles V. and Philip II, their strength 
 failed them in their contest with these monarchs, 
 and they were beaten in the sixteenth, as they had 
 been beaten in the fifteenth century.^ 
 
 1 We find many details on this campaign, which ended with the 
 battle of Gavre, in the Recueil de Documents inedits sur VHistoire de 
 la Belgique published by M. Gachard, vol. ii. pp. 92, 95, &c. See also 
 the learned and interesting Histoire de Flandre, by M. Kervyn de 
 Lettenhove, vol. iv. pp. 35.5-497. 
 
^ 
 
 56* HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Thus the troubles of Flanders were appeased 
 under Philip the Good, as those in France ceased 
 under Charles VII. ; and these two princes, whose 
 early years had been so agitated and so tragic saw 
 the dawn of more tranquil days. The moderation 
 of character, which in Charles for some time had 
 taken the form of indifference and carelessness, and 
 in Philip showed indecision and a desire to tem- 
 porise, had some part in this return of tranquillity. 
 A man of a more passionate or unquiet temper than 
 Charles YII. would have felt aggrieved by the 
 existence even of the relics of the English faction, 
 and by his incomplete and insincere reconciliation 
 with the Duke of Burgundy ; the want of military 
 and civil discipline, after miseries so long and so 
 deeply felt, would have vexed him, and he would 
 have derived less pleasure and less profit from the 
 calmer condition of the country. Charles VII, 
 however, as his nature remained the same, — as he 
 retained his indolence in the maturity of his years, 
 — showed neither impatience nor mistrust in the 
 exercise of his royal prerogative. He had much to 
 endure from the jealous disposition of the Dauphin, 
 who was ambitious and egotistical in his youth, and 
 who was destined to present later, in his policy and 
 in all his tastes, such striking contrasts to his 
 father. 
 
 I 
 
INTKODUCTION. 57. 
 
 The latter years of Charles VII. appear peaceful, 
 when we compare them with those of his early 
 reign. He had to ask himself more than once, first, 
 whether the peace with the Duke of Burgundy 
 would be maintained ; next, whether England, 
 during the intervals of peace in the civil wars of 
 the Roses, would not take up arms again to recover 
 her lost provinces in France, especially those she 
 had possessed so long and so securely — Normandy 
 and Guienne ; and also whether the French parti- 
 sans of England, who were now dispossessed, would 
 not again rebel. 
 
 The heir of Philip of Burgundy, whose character 
 differed essentially from that of the Dauphin of 
 France, caused also profound anxiety to his father. 
 His temper was uncontrollable ; and the passions of 
 these two young princes, destined to meet later, and 
 to measure their strength in a memorable contest, 
 already interposed elements of discord between the 
 two courts. Charles YII. was by no means pleased 
 that the Dauphin, who impatiently demanded, with- 
 out success, the exercise of some power in France, 
 should parade his discontent and his anger in the 
 court of Burgundy. For his part, Philip, ill and 
 weakened by age, saw with terror that his heir, at 
 variance with him in all things, in lieu of attempt- 
 ing to evade, seized with avidity all points which 
 gave an excuse for hostility with France ; so that 
 he even pretended his life was in danger from 
 French agents, and openly expressed his suspicions 
 
n 
 
 58 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 by saying that all the assassins of Montereau were 
 not dead.^ 
 
 ' It was owing then to the personal characters of 
 Charles VII. and Philip, that the end of Charles 
 VII.'s career was not disturbed by war. Men more 
 carried away by temper would easily have found, — 
 as their successors did find later, and as Charles 
 the Bold very soon found, — that sufficient subjects 
 of dispute, both domestic and foreign, still remained 
 in the three countries formerly at war with each 
 other, to disturb or drive them into hostility. 
 
 The personal action of Charles YII, however little 
 apparent, was efficient and successful towards the 
 close of his life : his light, facile, and flexible cha- 
 racter did not indeed become actiA^e, but it exhibited 
 greater seriousness and wisdom. 
 
 He had it much at heart to hasten the return of 
 order, and to make the peace lasting. Although he 
 did not give up the retiring and listless habits of 
 his youth, and lived, as he had done before, much 
 away from Paris, yet he had about him enlightened 
 and honourable advisers, and his military regulations 
 have remained celebrated. The English, driven out 
 of the country, attempted to recover in the south the 
 territory which the Black Prince had occupied and 
 governed ; but the attempt failed. Although the 
 Eno-lish left behind them some who regretted their 
 absence — although the French garrisons were weak, 
 the taxes heavy, and the liberty of the subject mucli 
 
 ^ A'allct <le Viriville, vol. iii. pp. 104, 107. PiciTe de Brczc. 
 
 I 
 
INTRODUCTION. 59 
 
 restrained — the English could not re-establish their 
 rule. Charles VII. retook Bordeaux, which for a 
 moment had eluded his grasp, and he retained pos- 
 session of all the kingdom. This was a happy epoch 
 for France. The King exercised a mild, kindly, and 
 confiding authority over his subjects, suitable to the 
 times and to the condition of the country. He was 
 patient with the Dauphin ; and, after having in 
 vain tried to induce him to live near him, or in his 
 own government of Dauphiny, he was content that 
 he should continue to live with the Duke of Bur- 
 gundy, who, he said, paid him so much attention 
 only from the respect which was due to the King 
 his father. He was at peace with England, on the 
 faith of a truce, he organized his army without giving 
 any pretext for war, and accepted as evils which 
 he could not help the indecision of the Duke of 
 Burgundy, the doubtful faith of the Duke of Brit- 
 tany, and the preference which the princes of the 
 blood showed for the Dauphin over himself. After a 
 crisis which had lasted for nearly a century, it was 
 better and more reasonable to allow these traces 
 of a violent storm to die out of themselves, with- 
 out taking too much account of them. He had 
 a treaty of peace with his neighbour ; he saw 
 England absorbed and weakened by the Wars of 
 the Eoses, and by deeply seated troubles; he 
 fostered in France the elements of order ; he ruled 
 over a larger surface of reconquered territory, and 
 over a more obedient population, than any sovereign 
 
6() HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of France had done for some time ; and he bestowed 
 on his country a government which was kindly, 
 beloved, and not vindictive — a government which 
 would have continued to suit France and serve her 
 purposes so long as the King might have lived. 
 
 Such was the inheritance which Charles VII. on 
 his death, at the age of fifty-eight, left to his son 
 Louis XL (1461). 
 
 Louis XL had much more ability, as well as more 
 political intelligence and activity, than his prede- 
 cessor. He had, however, much less kindliness of 
 disposition ; he was less simple in his desires, and 
 less disinterested. Embittered against his father — 
 impatient to succeed and to reign — anxious to 
 make his power felt by his enemies abroad, and his 
 authority respected by those at home — he wished 
 to destroy, in the league of the princes, one of the 
 last manifestations of feudalism, and to crush its ex- 
 piring efforts. Himself verging on mature age, and 
 full of confidence in his own faculties, after a few 
 hours of afiected grief, he showed indifierence to the 
 death of Charles VII, a total want of respect to his 
 memory, and contempt for the moderate policy of 
 the latter years of his father's reign. The qualities 
 of the dead monarch, which perhaps would have 
 been of no service to Louis XL in his later career, 
 would have been of essential use at its commence- 
 ment. The policy of Charles VII, when he did 
 begin to govern, had the impress of kindness ; the 
 policy of Louis XI, in his easy as well as in his 
 
ffUNIVERSITY 
 
 INTRODUCTION. ^^S^IPC5l*^^^^ 
 
 difficult times, was uniformly cunning and wicked. 
 No one would venture to say that Louis XL would 
 have overcome, as he did, the embarrassments of 
 his reign by imitating the conduct of his father ; 
 but we may affirm, without fear of contradiction, 
 that he would have done well, had he at least com- 
 menced with the same moderation with w^hich 
 Charles VII. finished. 
 
 His vindictive feelings, on the contrary, got the 
 better of his reason ; and Louis XL when he 
 ascended the throne, showed the wickedness of his 
 heart, without giving any idea of the amount of his 
 ability. Those who were looked upon with suspi- 
 cion by his father obtained the favour of the son ; 
 the father's trusted counsellors were disgraced. The 
 well-tried friends of the last reign saw themselves 
 repelled, and animosities which had been smothered 
 were revived. The ill-humour which had been pent 
 up and accumulated in Louis XL during a long and 
 painful minority broke out in all things, without 
 profit, without reflection, and to the detriment of 
 his own most serious and nearest interests. It was 
 reserved to him in subsequent times to show his 
 abilities for mischief — it would have been far better, 
 without doubt, to have been at the same time able 
 and kindly; — but, at the beginning of his reign, 
 he did not even display his dominant quality, whilst 
 he was deficient both in generosity and in prudence. 
 This was not his real nature. His heart was cold 
 and hard ; but in the whole of his policy towards 
 
62 TTTSTORIOAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the sovereign powers, his neighbours — in his struggle 
 with Burgundy and with the French princes — he 
 developed the resources of a genius at once pene- 
 trating and prudent. 
 
 Louis XL was not possessed by the passion of 
 those great things which his power, his faculties, 
 and the circumstances in which he was placed 
 would have justified. He did not aim at them 
 either for France or for himself. He saw the House 
 of Burgundy perish under his eyes, without at- 
 tempting to extract from its fall all the profit which 
 he mio^ht have derived from it.^ Nevertheless, the 
 temptation was very great, and the moment solemn. 
 When Charles the Bold died, his daughter was neither 
 of the age, nor had she the reputation, which give 
 power. On the part of T^ouis XL this moderation 
 was a system. He wished to acquire, on the condition 
 that he ran no risk — to keep rather than increase 
 his territory — to avoid battles, not from cowardice, 
 but because he thought it absurd to place on 
 the throw of one die such great stakes as his 
 fortune and his life : he wished to have everything 
 secure, and to indulge in no dreams of conquest — 
 to manage ably and tranquilly the affairs of France 
 and his own, without compromising or exposing 
 France or himself. During his whole reign he only 
 fought two battles, those of Montl'hery and of 
 
 * Louis XL appropriated the Duchy of Burgundy as reverting to him 
 by right, as a male fief of the crown. He never dreamt of conquering 
 any other portion of the Bnrgundian inheritance. 
 
INTRODIJCTTON. 63 
 
 Guinegatc. He made himself unpopular both with 
 the nobles and with the townspeople, because while 
 his purpose was to crush the aristocracy, he did not 
 hesitate to oppress the towns with imposts. He 
 ruled harshly ; he preserved the country indeed, but 
 he made it miserable and discontented ; in short, he 
 followed a policy which resembled his own character 
 — a policy destitute of any moral principle. It was 
 thus that Louis XI. made life intolerable to every 
 one, and carved out for himself an existence full of 
 suffering. 
 
 Louis XL possessed qualities of mind so well 
 developed, so intense, and so strangely mingled 
 with vices of the heart, as to present to us the study 
 of a most complicated nature. We may observe 
 that all that which in the character of other men is 
 mere detail and a sort of passing shade, was in him 
 an essential and striking trait. Nothing was super- 
 ficial, nothing was insignificant. The smallest as- 
 perities of surface which showed themselves in him 
 were deeply rooted. Up to a certain point he was 
 neither ferocious, nor dissimulating, nor indiscreet : 
 neither irascible nor enduring, neither suspicious 
 nor trusting : but he was in no degree either 
 kindly or compassionate. The paths by which he 
 attained his end, which was a serious one, well 
 worthy of a man of sense, were as infinite as the 
 secrets and the windings of his own mind. He was 
 active and punctual ; calm, if necessary, as befitted 
 a leader ; patient as a craftsman who slowly works 
 
1 
 
 <U HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 at any monotonous daily task ; he was ardent in the 
 pursuit of success, yet he knew how to wait for it ; 
 though at other times he risked his success by some 
 imprudence of language or of conduct — as if his 
 object were to show, by his calmness in adverse cir- 
 cumstances, how dexterous he was in getting out of 
 his difficulties. He was very proud of what in these 
 days would be called diplomatic skill — a skill full 
 of subtlety, and made up of meanness, of small 
 details, of treachery, and of cruelty. He had full 
 confidence in his own power of seduction and fas- 
 cination, and he made trial of this power without 
 discretion ; he gave himself up to this temptation 
 without thought ; from a confidence in his ability, 
 he talked without reserve, even with those whom 
 he considered clever ; and he afterwards left no 
 sacrifice, no effort, no inducements untried to ap- 
 pease or again to win over those whom he had thus 
 hurt or offended. As he did not believe that others 
 possessed the good feelings or even the good ordinary 
 impulses which w^ere wanting iu himself, he inva- 
 riably took men by their bad side ; he threatened 
 them with imprisonment or torture ; he trafficked 
 with them for a price, or for promises of his favour, 
 according as he thought he had to deal with those 
 who were timid, avaricious, or proud ; he always 
 preferred real power to the outward show of it, 
 what was useful to that which glittered, the sub- 
 stance to the form. For the rest, he was indifferent 
 to many things ; he was coarsely clad, like a man 
 
INTRODUCTION. 65 
 
 of the people ; nevertheless those who looked closely 
 at him could trace that expression, at once sarcastic 
 and deeply penetrating, which denotes a combined 
 habit of raillery and of reflection. 
 
 Such is the idea which we are able to form of 
 Louis XI, and of his mode of action in political 
 affairs. We must, however, be on our guard against 
 the effect which men present when seen at a distance, 
 and we must take care not to attribute to Louis XL 
 the thoughts which he causes to arise in our minds, 
 and which were not in his. When we read what 
 was said of him by his contemporaries — well-dis- 
 posed or hostile, — such as Comines, Olivier de la 
 Marche, Chastelain, Jean de Troyes, and by others 
 who knew him ; when we take account of their 
 judgments and of the motives of their opinions — 
 judgments and opinions, for example, like those 
 of Comines, which were very indulgent — we find 
 that we possess of Louis XL a complete portrait : 
 no trait of his character is in shadow. Louis XI, in 
 consequence of his taste for direct and personal 
 action, and of his desire to see, to know, and to do 
 everything by himself, has revealed himself to pos- 
 terity with the greatest complaisance. 
 
 To make a solid peace with England, without 
 giving up any of the French territory ; to acquire 
 a good frontier on the side of the Burgundian pos- 
 sessions, and secure the course of the Somme ; to 
 be the absolute master in France, by governing 
 the different parties and institutions, by disuniting 
 
 F 
 
66 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 or disarming tlie princes, by destroying those repre- 
 sentatives of expiring feudalism ; — these were the 
 chief objects of the policy of Louis XI, if we con- 
 sider his reign, taken as a whole. It would have 
 been long before he would have attained his object, 
 had he persevered in the course by which he begun. 
 His bad reputation, his quarrels with his father, 
 his habitual inconstancy, his unquiet humour, were 
 sufficient to insure his accession being viewed with 
 disfavour, and even with fear. His action fully 
 justified and confirmed the feeling of the country. 
 The princes of the blood, the population of the towns 
 ground down by taxes, the attendants of the king 
 his father driven away in disgrace, — all this made 
 France pass from a feeling of distrust to one of dis- 
 content. Louis XL then did what he learnt subse- 
 quently to avoid : he raised a strong prejudice 
 against himself, in order merely to gratify his ven- 
 geance and hatred. All his life he was indifferent 
 to the misfortunes of others ; but time taught him 
 the prudence of doing as little mischief as possible 
 to himself, a maxim he seemed then to ignore. 
 
 Philip the Good was old, frequently ill, and no 
 longer took any interest in public affairs. At peace 
 with France, with the benefit of a separate truce 
 with England, considering the King of France 
 attached to him by the debt of hospitality, and the 
 sovereign over a prosperous country, Philip was 
 justified in thinking that his task was finished, and 
 that he might leave the direction of public affairs 
 
INTRODUCTION. 67 
 
 to his son, tlie Count of Charolais.^ The Peace of 
 Arras had lasted thirty years, and during this time 
 several causes of dissension had arisen between 
 France and Burgundy. The possession of the fron- 
 tier towns, the good understanding of the Duke of 
 Burgundy with the French princes banded against 
 Louis XI, the difference of opinion with regard to 
 the rival parties in England, and, lastly, the encou- 
 ragement afforded by Louis XL to the revolution 
 at Liege, which was a source of danger to the Duke 
 of Burgundy; — these were the principal causes of 
 division. But with Philip the Good, whose character 
 was conciliatory, these grievances might produce' 
 coldness without hostility, and embitter relations 
 without embroiling the two sovereigns. With the 
 Count of Charolais, they became causes of war, be- 
 cause the latter, instead of endeavouring to allay 
 them when they arose, would have willingly raised 
 such grievances when they did not exist. Neither 
 Louis XL nor the Count of Charolais took a strong 
 interest for either the House of York or that of 
 I^ancaster ; of the two Houses, France favoured 
 rather the cause of Henry VI, while Burgundy 
 preferred that of Edward IV. But there were 
 other subjects of quarrel, which touched them nearer 
 and were far more grave. The Count of Charolais 
 insinuated that his life was threatened by the 
 secret agents of Louis XL The people of Liege, 
 to whom the King of France had only given 
 
 ^ States-General of 1465. 
 F 2 
 
68 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 encouragement and promises, sending neither money 
 nor men, had risen in revolt, while they counted 
 on French protection. Nothing more was wanting 
 to make the army of the Count of Charolais cross 
 the Somme, the Oise, and the Seine. "Without 
 meeting a French army, he pitched his camp on 
 the south side of Paris. 
 
 Thus Louis XL had managed, by quitting the 
 beaten track of his father, to create for himself a 
 bad and dangerous position between the Burgundian 
 army, the league of the princes, and the general 
 discontent of the country ; but it was then that his 
 political ability was revealed. The question was to 
 dissolve the league of the princes, which represented 
 the ancient coalition and what remained of the 
 Armagnac party : at this time the league was led 
 by the young Duke of Berry, the King's brother. 
 Louis XI, convinced that the princes only wanted 
 appanages, governments, and pensions, made large 
 concessions ; among others, he gave Normandy to 
 his brother. He had a personal interview with the 
 Count of Charolais, under the walls of Paris, and 
 conceded to him the course of the Somme — that 
 old subject of dispute between the two neighbouring 
 sovereigns. It cannot be denied that he showed a 
 degree of coolness and dexterity — and, we must add, 
 a remarkable degree of falseness — in dissolving so 
 dangerous a coalition.^ 
 
 He gave himself a great deal of trouble, and 
 
 ^ Treaty of Conflans. 
 
INTRODUCTTON. 69 
 
 imposed on himself many sacrifices, to bring about 
 a state of things less favourable than that which 
 he had inherited from his father. This was a 
 lesson he gave himself, and by which he profited. 
 There remained only the insurrection in Liege, 
 which he did not at that moment attempt to 
 repress, after having assisted to bring it about. The 
 people of Liege were in open revolt, and they per- 
 sisted in it. 
 
 We may say, then, that at the beginning of his 
 reign, Louis XL learned from bitter experience the 
 science which afterwards served him so well. Per- 
 sonal experience developed in him the dormant seeds 
 of his faculties : and if he suffered then for having 
 committed the double mistake of being both vin- 
 dictive and unskilful, he only reformed on one 
 point : he avoided imprudence for the future, but 
 he retained his liking for hypocrisy and evil ways. 
 
 VI. 
 
 It was in the midst of these events, on the 
 15th of June, 1467, that Philip the Good died at 
 Bruges, and the Count of Charolais succeeded to 
 the inheritance of Burgundy. 
 
 The struggle between Charles the Bold and 
 Louis XL may be reckoned as one of the great 
 duels in history ; it was one of those rivalries 
 between man and man which were reproduced and 
 
70 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 personified later in the rivalry between Francis I. 
 and Charles Y, between Philip 11. and the Prince 
 of Orange, and again between Louis XIV. and 
 William III. The reign of Louis XL belongs to 
 an epoch when the royal prerogative had not yet 
 freed itself, as far as its material position was con- 
 cerned, from the pretensions of the feudal barons ; 
 when the family feuds were not yet ended ; when 
 the King of France had still to defend the pos- 
 session of his sovereignty against the attacks of 
 the royal family; while, on the other hand, the 
 King was strong enough to aim at becoming the 
 absolute master of France, and Louis XL ended 
 by being so. His rival, by his ambition and his 
 audacity, by the vast circle of enterprises which 
 he compassed, and the sacrifices which he imposed 
 on his people, — ^by the impatience of his humour 
 and the uncertainty of his projects,^contributed to 
 make his career more remarkable, and his actions 
 more men^orable. Louis XL and Charles the Bold 
 were more important personages, displayed greater 
 power, and exercised greater authority over the 
 difierent nations they governed than their prede- 
 cessors had ever exercised. They present to us 
 a far grander spectacle. 
 
 In these contests between two historical per- 
 sonages, there is generally a marked difierence in 
 the character, the conduct, the ambition, and the 
 objects of the champions. There is no one who 
 resembles Charles V. less than Francis I, Philip II. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7l 
 
 than William of Orange, "William III. than Louis 
 XIY, or Charles the Bold than Louis XL Charles 
 the Bold was the attacking party, Louis XL defended 
 himself; the former aspired to vast conquests, the 
 latter wished to preserve what he possessed; the 
 former displayed audacity, the latter prudence. It 
 has been frequently said that Charles the Bold was 
 the last representative of feudal policy, and that 
 Louis XL was the first who unfolded with any 
 success the flag of monarchy. We must not be 
 misunderstood : the second part of the assertion is 
 truer than the first. 
 
 The plan which we may attribute to Charles the 
 Bold is as vast as his ambition, and as vague as his 
 conception. That which in his projects recalls the 
 idea of feudalism is, that finding a struggle still 
 going on in France between the King and the 
 members of his family, and seeing that the powerful 
 vassals were intent upon making independent and 
 rival sovereignties out of the provinces, Charles 
 the Bold, during a part of his reign, endeavoured 
 to gain the support of these great French vassals 
 so as to make use of them to divide the forces of 
 the King, and to effect diversions against him. This, 
 it may be said, was to make common cause with 
 the feudal element, and to endeavour to prolong 
 the existence of the rivak of royalty, which was 
 menaced. Taking a still more superficial view, it 
 may be said that Charles kept feudalism alive by 
 continually running in search of adventures; by 
 
72 HIST'.illCAL ESSAYS. 
 
 contrasting his warlike tendencies, his gorgeous 
 armaments, and the splendour of his court, with 
 the bourgeois habits, the secret manoeuvres, and the 
 simple outward appearance of Louis XL 
 
 But these are secondary considerations. That 
 whiph stands out with greater relief when we review 
 the actions and the thoughts of the last Duke of 
 Burgundy is, that he was more ambitious than 
 Charles V. or Louis XIV. ; that he wished — perhaps 
 not quite at the same moment, but at certain periods 
 of his life, and at the price of extravagant efforts — 
 to succeed Frederick III. as Emperor of Germany, 
 to be King of Burgundy, the conqueror of France ; 
 and that he desired this with a passion as personal 
 and as despotic as could have been conceived by 
 even the most puissant sovereign of the most 
 monarchical period. We may say that he was in 
 advance of hi^ age, not from what he effected, but 
 from the nature of the attempts he made. This 
 certainly is not to recall the feudal period. 
 
 We must, however, add, without exactly contra- 
 dicting what is stated above, that it is by no means 
 certain t ut Charles the Bold had any definite 
 schemes \ e have to guess or to infer them from 
 his actioi^ rather than profess to know them for 
 certain. The greater part of what he did was so 
 little prepared, and so ill combined, that we may 
 well doubt whether he ever had any plans of opera- 
 •tion traced out in a precise manner. Those who 
 have devoted themselves to a profound study of 
 
INTRODUCTIJN. 73 
 
 the history of this prince grant readily that many 
 parts of his history are obscure, more especially 
 those where the action of the man, or rather his 
 tentative processes, were directed to distant schemes, 
 were addressed to more than one interest, to more 
 than one influence, or to more than one state, with 
 the view to attract them to him, or again where 
 he attacked them openly. After having studied 
 what has been written on this subject in ancient 
 and in more recent days, it is difficult to gain a clear 
 idea of what he wished, or of the means he had 
 devised to attain his object. It is easier to under- 
 stand the policy of Louis XI, who appears so 
 measured in his conduct, and so anxious to avoid 
 scandal, than it is to explain completely the policy 
 of his rival. The reason is obvious : putting aside 
 the morality of his intentions, Louis XL had a 
 clearness of intellect and of purpose, whilst the 
 conduct of the Duke of Burgundy was fantastic 
 and uncertain. 
 
 Charles the Bold realized none of the projects for 
 which history gives him credit. The resistance 
 which Louis XL offered to his rival nsisted in 
 watching and following him, in layin snares for 
 him, in confirming in their evil intent^ is all such 
 as were already ill-disposed. The policy of the 
 King with regard to the Duke of Burgundy there- 
 fore was ever shifting; it was not always careful 
 or prudent, but we may say of him what a great 
 captain of our day said of the art of war : the 
 
74 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 talent of Louis XI. consisted in committing fewer 
 and smaller blunders than his adversary. 
 
 The two objects which were essential to the 
 success of Charles the Bold were, first, to put him- 
 self, and to remain, on good terms with the league 
 of the princes formed against Louis XL ; and, 
 secondly, to contract a solid alliance with England 
 against the French monarch. Neither one nor the 
 other of these two conditions would appear to have 
 been very difficult of attainment. It was clearly 
 as much the object of the French princes as it was 
 that of the Duke of Burgundy to seek an alliance 
 against the King ; an alliance with Burgundy 
 offered them incomparable advantages ; but it was 
 never solidly confirmed. The Duke of Berry, the 
 brother but nevertheless the enemy of Louis XL — 
 to whom the King gave in succession Normandy 
 and Guienne, with a view to gain him over to his 
 side — the Duke of Berry, who died in a manner so 
 opportune, that the fair fame of the monarch was 
 tarnished with a horrible suspicion, never remained 
 attached to the Duke of Burgundy. The Duke of 
 Brittany, in possession of a province remarkable 
 for its importance, its antecedents, and its resources, 
 with its English as well as its French tendencies, 
 and which alone retained its independence long after 
 all the great domains had been reunited to the 
 crown — the Duke of Brittany even was not an 
 ally on whom Charles could always depend. The 
 Constable of Saint-Pol, connected with several of 
 
INTHODUCTION. *7S 
 
 the reigning sovereigns, was the owner of consi- 
 derable domains on both banks of the Somme, a 
 river whose course had been so long a subject of 
 dispute between France and Burgundy. He was 
 suspected by both combatants, and, constantly 
 wavering between the two, was encouraged in his 
 indecision by the peculiar position of his domains ; 
 yet even he never gave a solid support to the Duke 
 of Burgundy, but ended by being the victim of his 
 vacillating policy. The same may be said of the 
 other members of the league. Louis XL was not 
 always fortunate in his efforts to neutralise their 
 efforts or dissolve their union ; occasionally only 
 his intrigues were successful, whilst at other times 
 his imprudent conduct entailed certain failure ; but 
 in the end he carried the day. Fortune more often 
 favoured than hindered him in the steps which 
 he took. He was more often cunning than defi- 
 cient in skill and intelligence, whereas his adversary 
 was almost always inattentive and carried away by 
 his passion. 
 
 The assistance of England entered into the com- 
 binations of Charles the Bold, and was as essential 
 as the alliance of the French princes to the aggres- 
 sive position which he wished to assume with regard 
 to the King of France. The circumstances attend- 
 ing the English alliance, which was the great aim 
 both of France and of Burgundy, were most com- 
 plicated in this reign. The dream of Charles the 
 Bold was nothing less than the invasion of France ; 
 
76 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the continuation or renewal, under his command, of 
 the wars of Edward III. and of Henry V.; and the 
 conclusion of a military alliance between England 
 and Burgundy — an alliance of which he should be 
 the author, and the army of which should be led 
 by himself The scheme, which he pursued with 
 the greatest assiduity, was, in fact, to recommence, 
 in the name of Burgundy, the invading policy of 
 England — but England was to be his ally, and he 
 was to be the general of the combined armies. 
 The idea of an Anglo-Burgundian or Anglo-Flemish 
 alliance with a view to war — an idea which Van 
 Artevelde had cherished when he could dispose only 
 of Flanders, and which Philip the Bold and John 
 the Fearless, the chiefs of a party in France, could 
 only entertain for a moment — this idea had pre- 
 sented itself to Philip the Good as a means of ven- 
 geance, and had led him into but one bad action, 
 committed with the connivance of the Queen of 4M 
 France. This same idea, so long as the war con- 
 tinued between France and England, could not fail 
 to arise in the mind of a Duke of Burgundy who 
 was flushed with conquest, and openly in revolt 
 against the French monarch. It could never have 
 been one of those which guided the policy of 
 Charles V, who had more to do in the south than 
 in the north ; nor was it open to Philip II, who 
 found in the Reformation an obstacle between 
 England and himself 
 
 We may admit the existence of a scheme like this 
 
INTRODUCTION. 77 
 
 in the mind of an ambitious prince. There was 
 no reason why a warlike genius should not dream, 
 for the united armies of England and of Burgundy, 
 of one of those victories which Englaad, unaided, 
 had won, at a time when the Duke of Burgundy 
 was fighting in the French ranks. Charles, it may 
 be said, only had to recognise the facts that France 
 was much stronger and more compact under Louis 
 XL than at the time when the battles of Crecy and 
 of Agincourt were fought ; that a solid alliance with 
 England was difficult when the English throne was 
 the subject of dispute between two branches of the 
 same dynasty ; lastly, that England would scarcely 
 condescend to hold a secondary rank. There was 
 no question, on the other hand, but that the King of 
 France, although crooked in his policy, was patient, 
 skilful, attentive, and full of resources ; and it is 
 obvious that for the conduct of a great war, a 
 genius far-sighted and stedfast in purpose is of 
 far more value than a passionate nature. 
 
 We must then with regard to the English alliance 
 draw a distinction between the beginning and the 
 end of the reign ; between the epoch when the civil 
 war in England armed Henry VL against Edward 
 IV, and the time when Henry VL had been 
 beaten, and had died in prison, under circumstances 
 which have never yet been clearly explained. 
 During the civil wars of England, the Duke of 
 Burgundy was more inclined to an alliance with the 
 House of York — Edward IV. being his brother-in- 
 
^ 
 
 78 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 law — while Louis XL sided rather with the House 
 of Lancaster. The alliance therefore on the part 
 of the Duke and of the King was rather with the 
 two English parties than with England itself, and, 
 even in the preference of one party or the other, 
 Charles the Bold manifested all his instinctive 
 vacillation, while Louis XL showed the calculated 
 reserve which controlled his inclinations. Later, 
 when the defeat and death of Henry VL had put 
 an end to the Wars of the Eoses, Charles the Bold 
 was in a position to contract a more complete 
 alliance with Edward IV, who was then without 
 a competitor for the throne. This league was 
 concluded, but it lasted only a short time ; it was 
 neither solid nor had it important consequences. 
 It did not last, because to insure a durable political 
 tie between two contracting powers mutual con- 
 fidence is required, and the capricious character 
 and blind passions of the Duke of Burgundy were 
 not calculated to inspire this feeling in his ally. 
 
 I have thus indicated, first, the gigantic nature 
 of the projects of Charles the Bold ; secondly, his 
 incapacity to establish a community of interest 
 between himself and the league of French princes ; 
 and, lastly, the incomplete and transitory nature of 
 such success as attended his attempts at an English 
 alliance. If we put together these three facts, it 
 is easy to explain all the events of his reign — 
 both those which impair the power of Burgundy, 
 and those which profit the crown of France ; we 
 
INTRODUCTION. 79 
 
 shall then comprehend the successive incidents of 
 the struggle, its progress, and its final issue. 
 
 The Duke of Burgundy failed in establishing in a 
 durable manner either one or the other of the two 
 alliances which were the essential conditions of 
 success even for schemes less enormous than those 
 which he entertained. It is this want of proportion 
 between a conception which professes to be grand, 
 and the means employed to insure its success, which 
 marks the degree of historical importance that 
 attaches to the reign of the last Burgundian prince. 
 It has seldom been the fate of a conqueror to 
 avow such pretensions and to take so little pains as 
 to the means by which they could be realized. 
 This is the prominent and distinctive character of 
 this history. The idea was a grand one, and 
 its execution was promptly attempted, but those 
 attempts were marked by inexperience and want of 
 ability. The distance between the design and its 
 execution was immense. 
 
 It is unnecessary, when the object is only to 
 describe the general results of the events of this 
 reign, to detail the grievances which the Duke of 
 Burgundy raised, and the complaints which he made 
 against the King of France. These were only the 
 pretexts, not the real motives, for the war, and as 
 pretexts they were of very small importance. A 
 prince of an ambitious nature like Charles the Bold 
 conceives his plans for no other reason but to gratify 
 his own passions. It is only afterwards, when his 
 
80 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 passions have perverted and inflamed his mind, that 
 he seeks for some justification in the real, or sup- 
 posed, injuries he has received from his adversary. 
 Charles the Bold unfolded before the eyes of the 
 world a plan of conquest, the particular character 
 of which was to become more comprehensive as its 
 ultimate success was shown to be more difficult and 
 less likely to be achieved. He wished first of all to 
 invade the French territory, in order to take a great 
 portion of it himself, or to share it with the league 
 of the French princes and with England. In this 
 he failed. Nevertheless, his chances of success had 
 been good. He had led his army to the south of 
 the Seine, and Montl'hery was almost a victory. 
 He saw Louis XI. attempt to bring about a 
 union with the princes, which the King found 
 to be occasionally as full of difficulty as Charles 
 himself found it. Charles vanquished the people of 
 Liege, who were in rebellion against their bishop, 
 and he forced his rival Louis, who was almost his 
 prisoner, to march with him against a town which 
 this same King of France had urged into rebellion. 
 Charles, moreover, saw his ally, Edward IV, enter 
 London in triumph, and dethrone Henry VI. 
 
 This was a happy phase for the projects of the 
 Duke of Burgundy ; but there were others less 
 favourable. His violent character prevented him 
 from profiting by favourable circumstances, and did 
 not help him to avoid the consequences arising from 
 the want of success. He had not the sense to avail 
 
 I 
 
INTRODUCTION. SI 
 
 himself of his good fortune to inspire Edward IV. 
 with any confidence, and thus establish with him 
 the conditions of a reasonable and durable alliance. 
 Edward IV. had personally far greater desire and 
 better cause to ally himself with Charles the Bold 
 than to sign, as he did, a definitive treaty of peace 
 with France.^ One thing only was essential to this 
 alliance, a conviction on the part of the King of 
 England that the Duke of Burgundy would remain 
 faithful to the alliance, not only in intent, but in 
 his acts. This state of things seemed so probable 
 that Louis XL believed firmly in it, and felt serious 
 alarm on that account. 
 
 The conduct of Louis XL with reference both to 
 England and to Burgundy was almost invariably 
 governed by the conviction that the chances of 
 Charles were better, and that his difficulties were 
 less, than those of the Government in France. This 
 conviction increased his natural circumspection. 
 In the opinion of the King of France, the Duke of 
 Burgundy was more free in his action ; he could 
 manage his own aftairs with greater independence, 
 and he was less hampered by inevitable hindrances. 
 Had he not gone in search of enemies, he need 
 have found none. The King of France was not 
 likely, from his character, to have caused him any 
 uneasiness as to the possession of his hereditary 
 states. The difficulties inherent in the government 
 of home affairs were not great in Burgundy.' The 
 
 ^ Treaty of Pecquigiiy on the Somme. 
 G 
 
82 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 n 
 
 King of France, on the contrary, especially since 
 the fall of the Lancastrian party in England, had 
 to dread at one and the same time, an attack from 
 England — being at open war with that country — 
 the league of the French princes, and the uncon- 
 trollable ambition of his neighbour in Burgundy. 
 
 Tn short, Louis XL succeeded in escaping from 
 his dangers by trusting to his ability more fre- 
 quently than to his strength. Charles the Bold, 
 after having nearly succeeded in taking Paris, ended 
 by failing, under the walls of Beauvais, in his 
 projects for the conquest of France. At length he 
 wrecked his power, not against his most formidable 
 adversary, but in a combat with the brave Swiss 
 nation and its small army. Three times in succes- 
 sion his exhausted troops were beaten by an enemy 
 whom he had no intention of provoking ; but whom 
 Louis, by the means of intrigues, which are most 
 complicated and difficult to follow, had raised up 
 against him to occupy and draw off his attention. 
 
 The contest was between violence and cunning, 
 between passion and coolness, between overween- 
 ing ambition and calculating prudence. We have 
 already said that the desire of enlarging his posses- 
 sions became more intense with Charles the Bold, 
 in proportion as his attempts met with greater 
 obstacles. He first of all tried to conquer Louis XL 
 by invading his kingdom. Subsequently he carried 
 the war into Germany ; he caused Alsace to rise 
 against his rule, and piade a bitter enemy of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 83 
 
 Switzerland. Foiled by the obstacles which his 
 direct aggression against France encountered, he was 
 taken by a project still more vast and hazardous. 
 The want of success, instead of teaching him mode- 
 ration, made him the more enterprising. After 
 having met the Emperor Frederick III. at Treves, 
 and after having tried to induce the Emperor to 
 adopt and recommend him as his successor on the 
 imperial throne, he wished to push his conquests so 
 far into Germany as to possess a continuous terri- 
 tory which should stretch from the source of the 
 Ehine to its mouth, from the Alps to Holland, which 
 should unite Luxemburg to Franche-Comte by 
 Lorraine, and which should outflank and menace 
 France on all her eastern frontier. His aim was to 
 form a great kingdom of Burgundy, which would 
 have embraced a vast stretch of territory without 
 depth, and would have had a large population 
 without any national unity. He proposed to him- 
 self, by strengthening and drawing closer the bonds 
 of the English alliance, to invade France from Ger- 
 many and from the coast, and to lead his armies 
 and those of England as far as fortune would 
 permit, until he might crush the French monarchy 
 between the two invading parties.^ 
 
 The events of the war in Germany and in 
 Switzerland are well known : the siege of Neuss 
 
 ' See the work of vast research by Mr. Foster Kirke, History of 
 Charles the Bold. 2 vols. London, 1863. The third volume has not 
 yet appeared. Also the Edinburgh Review, April 1864. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 obstinately prolonged like that of Beauvais, and 
 with as little success — a siege in which the Bur- 
 gundian army suffered terribly — the taking of 
 Yverdun and of Granson ; — the battles of Hericourt, 
 of Granson, of Morat, and of Nancy — four crush- 
 ing defeats, of which the last terminated the war, 
 the life, and the dynasty of the Duke of Burgundy. 
 Charles the Bold was only forty-four years old 
 when he died. 
 
 The fall of the Burgundian dynasty nearly coin- 
 cides with the Peace of Pecquigny, concluded 
 between Edward IV. and Louis XL ; in which 
 treaty he allowed himself to be called the Prince 
 Louis of France. It coincides also with the termi- 
 nation of the Anglo-French wars, and with the be- 
 ginning of a new era in which the crown of France 
 was destined to dispose more freely of the power of 
 the country, and to carry the war into a different 
 direction from that which it had followed for the 
 space of four hundred years. In the estimation of the 
 people of that day, the Peace of Pecquigny had no 
 more importance than many other incidents of the 
 reign of Louis XL But taking history as a whole, 
 the Peace of Pecquigny stands out in great relief 
 when compared with previous or succeeding events. 
 Above all the reasons which tempted Edward IV. 
 to avoid or close the war with France — besides the 
 distrust with which he viewed the petulance of 
 Charles the Bold — besides the promptings of his own 
 natural indolence and the uneasiness which Louis's 
 
INTRODUCTION. 85 
 
 reputation for cunning, prudence, and activity- 
 caused him j we must mention a cause far stronger 
 and more general — the irresistible tendency of the 
 events of that period. The war with England 
 was coming to an end ; the same may be said of 
 the civil war in France ; and the existence of the 
 Burgundian state was drawing to a close. It was 
 the destiny forced upon Louis XL to put an end to 
 the period of feudal wars, which for a century had 
 taken the form of family quarrels ; it was the destiny 
 of Edward TV. to put an end to the war, which 
 had lasted for four centuries, with France ; and it 
 was the destiny of Charles the Bold to destroy by 
 chimerical enterprises the existence of Burgundy 
 as an independent and powerful state. That 
 period in history during which the kingdoms of the 
 West had to contend with rivals at home was 
 everywhere dying out. The faults of some, the 
 sagacity or good fortune of others, would appear, 
 at first sight, to determine the moment of these 
 changes. The good or bad qualities of the chief 
 actors do, in fact, fill a part and occupy a place in 
 these transactions : but it is chiefly at those decisive 
 epochs when great historical changes take place, 
 when one chapter of the history of the world is 
 closed, and when another begins, — it is chiefly then 
 that the action of events carries people away, and 
 that, however strong or able they may be, they are 
 forced to follow the current. " Leave him alone," 
 said Comines to Louis XL when he saw his former 
 
86 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 master embark in foolhardy enterprises : and this 
 advice of Comines, dictated by an excellent and 
 profound judgment, contained, far more than he 
 was perhaps aware of, a general and philosophical 
 appreciation of the state of affairs then existing. 
 
 The career of Charles the Bold was short ; violent 
 things have a violent end. At the age of eighteen 
 he showed the germ of fine qualities ; he respected 
 his father, and knew how to restrain himself in his 
 presence : he had a taste for serious occupations, 
 and he worked as if he had to earn his daily bread ; 
 but very soon that which had been energy became 
 passion and brutality. His tastes degenerated into 
 defects, his vivacity became anger, his severity 
 towards himself turned into severity to others. His 
 heart swelled within him ; he was enamoured of his 
 own ideas, believed in nothing but his own good 
 fortune ; he became obstinate and uncontrollable, 
 alienated the public symf»athy, even that of his 
 own soldiers, which was so important to his success, 
 and in his universal distrust he repelled all devo- 
 tion to his interests which did not take the form of 
 silent and respectful obedience to his will. 
 
 Possessing a mind that was essentially full of 
 idle fancies and confused, he imagined that heroism 
 consisted in projecting with ardour vast schemes. 
 He was excited at the prospect of an enterprise, but 
 he lacked patience, moderation, purpose, attention 
 to details, all, in short, which renders practicable 
 things difficult in themselves. Having sworn to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 87 
 
 change the face of Europe, he gave to ideas, which 
 should have been precise, the indistinct outline of 
 figures seen in a dream ; in those who might have 
 been most useful he would only see mere agents, 
 who were bound to bend and submit to his wishes. 
 He deprived himself, for instance, of an instrument 
 like Comines, one of the shrewdest and most en- 
 lightened minds of his time ; he tired him out 
 by his impatience and his caprices, and made him 
 prefer the tricks and the duplicity of Louis XI.^ 
 He imagined himself to be the genius by which 
 conquests are made, although he had only the 
 temperament which covets them. He was like a 
 runaway horse, galloping straight ahead, beyond the 
 control of the bit, which he no longer feels, heedless 
 of the obstacles in front, and of the subsequent 
 exhaustion. When he was generous it was without 
 kindliness ; he was totally devoid of affectionate 
 sentiments on his own part, and indifferent whether 
 he inspired them in others. We may say that when 
 fortune, after having favoured him for a time, at 
 last abandoned him, there was not one to regret 
 him, even among those whom duty, position, or 
 love of adventure had associated with his lot in life. 
 At his death, freed from an enemy formidable 
 from his audacity, Louis XI, having made peace 
 with England, took possession of that portion 
 
 ^ See in the MSmoires de Comines the simple and brief manner 
 in which he speaks of his leaving the service of the Duke for that of 
 the King. 
 
T 
 
 88 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of Burgundy which he maintained he was entitled 
 to claim by the custom or ancient law of France, 
 as a male appanage of the crown. ^ But he did not 
 attempt to turn the weakness of the government of 
 the Duchess Mary of Burgundy, or, later still, the 
 unpopularity of her husband the Archduke Maxi- 
 milian, to further account in the gratification of his 
 ambitious views : he did not threaten them in the 
 centre of their states : — this was not the sort of 
 risk he liked to run. Historians have given in 
 great detail the account of his latter years, of his 
 long and singular illness, and of his great sufferings, 
 occasionally relieved by a return of health ; they 
 have told us how he was subject to great bodily 
 weakness, to childish terrors, and to incredible 
 fancies ; nevertheless the clearness of his intellect 
 remained unimpared. He left France greater, 
 stronger, and more tranquil than the kingdom had 
 been at the accession of his grandfather Charles Y. 
 
 Louis XI, who died detested, made it his personal 
 and settled ambition to save the country from the 
 evils which it had endured during the first half of 
 the century ; and the expression of public satisfac- 
 tion which was manifested when he died, proves 
 that the people attributed his efforts solely to the 
 instinct of his personal interests. It was generally 
 
 ^ The question whether the law authorized Louis XL to claim, 
 as reverting to the crown, the Duchy of Burgundy, is one of the moot 
 points in history. This question was brought forward several times 
 during the wars and the negotiations between Charles V. and Francis L 
 
INTRODUCTION. 89 
 
 remembered that, if he had been useful to France, 
 he invariably reserved to himself some advantage or 
 some profit, and the memory of the services he had 
 actually rendered was thus weakened- The people 
 are less grateful when the good effects which they per- 
 ceive, are in some way indirect, and when they begin 
 by benefiting those who brought about the change/ 
 
 VII. 
 
 Th3E House of Burgundy ought not thus to have 
 ended its career ; and the rulers of that powerful state 
 might have played a difi'erent part, and have left be- 
 hind them more permanent traces. They possessed 
 that which no potentate in their immediate neigh- 
 bourhood had, — a crown to which there were no 
 pretenders, and a country rich in its soil and in 
 its industry, in which the popular movements, so 
 formidable in preceding ages, caused but trifling 
 embarrassment during that century. The Burgun- 
 dian princes possessed great personal riches, whilst 
 they had abundant resources in the taxation of the 
 people. The geographical position, and the impor- 
 tance of their state, above all, the domestic troubles 
 of neighbouring kingdoms, ought to have given 
 them, a very great influence. Why was it that 
 Philip the Bold and John the Fearless, who both 
 
 ^ Chronique de Jean de Troyes. Second Part, year 1476. 
 
90 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 enjoyed such great advantages, to whom the direction 
 of public affairs in France during the long reign of 
 Charles VI. so naturally fell — who moreover had 
 their own army, their own finances, and their own 
 throne — why was it that they did not succeed, as 
 princes of the royal blood, in putting down the civil 
 war and the rival parties, and in restraining the 
 other princes, who had no greater claim to govern 
 the country, and far less means of efficient action ? 
 Why was it that Philip the Bold allowed this power 
 in France to be wrested from his hands without 
 resistance ? Why was it that John the Fearless, the 
 assassin of his cousin, should himself die from the 
 blow of a battle-axe, and should leave as a legacy 
 to his descendants a murder to be avenged ? The 
 two last dukes lived at a time which was very 
 different from the epoch which ended at the bridge 
 of Montereau. Philip the Good indeed added 
 largely to his possessions, and raised his own 
 position ; and Charles the Bold, although the 
 rash author of his own fall, at least made himself 
 remarkable by the grandeur of the struggle in 
 which he was engaged, and by the catastrophe of 
 his death. But Philip the Good, instead of being, 
 as he might have been, an arbitrator of real 
 weight during the last Anglo-French war, oscil- 
 lated between the two alliances. He thus failed in 
 strengthening his position, by choosing one of the 
 two, or in making himself more powerful, by taking 
 an independent and authoritative part between the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 91 
 
 combatants. Charles the Bold, vacillating and 
 exaggerated in his ideas, saw neither the value of 
 peace to a powerful prince, nor the importance of a 
 great alliance if he intended to wage war, nor yet 
 the difficulty of a vast conquest — and accordingly 
 he died, after reigning a few years, ruined and 
 undone. The House of Burgundy only appeared 
 for a short time on the scene. In other hands, had 
 its existence been longer, and had it remained what 
 it was, neither German nor French — yet after the 
 termination of the English wars placed as it was 
 between France and Germany, between Francis I. 
 and Charles V, Burgundy might have played a 
 great part in politics, and might have altered the 
 destinies of Europe during the sixteenth century. 
 
 We have attributed the disappearance of Bur- 
 gundy as a state from the map of Europe, and 
 its absorption into other kingdoms, chiefly to the 
 want of ability and of prudent forethought in 
 the Dukes of Burgundy. This was the chief of 
 the causes that worked their destruction. The 
 three first dukes must bear their share of the 
 blame. As to Charles the Bold, the commonest 
 prudence ought to have led him, on the failure 
 of a male heir, and before risking his existence 
 in perilous adventures, to secure a protector . for 
 his daughter by marriage. If, instead of compro- 
 mising his power in hazardous enterprises, he had 
 transmitted to his daughter a sovereignty, intact, at 
 peace with its neighbours, and well governed, the 
 
92 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 danger of seeing one-half of it absorbed by France 
 would have been much lessened. Charles the Bold 
 had every chance of surviving Louis XL ; his health 
 was more robust than his rival's, and he was his 
 junior by ten years. Charles VIIL the successor of 
 Louis XL had neither the wish nor the power to 
 take the duchy of Burgundy. In short, may we 
 not maintain, with great plausibility, that, in later 
 years, this dominion, forming a part of the inherit- 
 ance of Charles Y, would probably have been con- 
 stituted by him a kingdom of Burgundy or of 
 Belgian Gaul ? We shall soon see that Charles V. 
 made great efforts to recover the duchy of Burgundy 
 from Francis L; and on the other hand, that the 
 creation of an independent and considerable state 
 to the north of France, separate from the rest of 
 his possessions, was the dream of a great part of his 
 life. This idea would have suggested itself to him 
 with greater reason had the duchy of Burgundy 
 still formed a portion of his dominions. We have 
 the more reason for this surmise, because Charles V. 
 during the latter years of his life, established with 
 care, and in a distinct manner, the relations of the 
 circle of Burgundy with the German Empire. 
 
 We have already said that the fifteenth century 
 marks the transition between feudalism and mo- 
 narchy. The separation from the middle ages was 
 most distinct. Feudalism, chivalry, the crusades, 
 the communes, existed in France only as a memory 
 of the past. In England, the struggle between 
 
INTRODUCTION. 93 
 
 the Normans and the Saxons, and between the great 
 Norman barons and the crown, had gradually died 
 out. The wars of the English on the French 
 soil, owing to new complications, had reached its 
 last stage. On the other hand, the power of the 
 middle class was decreasing in the provinces which 
 border France on the northern frontier. But if all 
 these features of the middle ages disappear in the 
 countries — we will include England in the list — 
 which lie between the Rhine and the Atlantic, the 
 characteristics of the modern world have not yet 
 appeared. Monarchy under Charles VII. had not 
 yet put forth its strength and its fulness ; its mili- 
 tary character was not yet formed ; respect for the 
 throne as a principle, obedience to the monarch as a 
 habit, were not yet enthroned in the hearts of the 
 people. The feudal rivalries had ceased, but these 
 were replaced by rivalries between families. This 
 precarious condition, this incomplete and unsettled 
 state of the monarchical element, had its origin 
 in various circumstances. The independence of the 
 royal power was recent ; it had just ended a long 
 war with the feudal power, in which the monarch 
 had come out victorious. The crown had not yet 
 had time to consolidate its power. Moreover, the 
 principle of hereditary succession in the male line, 
 the principle of the Salic Law, was not yet authori- 
 tatively recognised in France. It was proclaimed 
 by those who had an interest in enforcing its 
 acceptance ; but it was neither a regular practice, 
 
n 
 
 94 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 nor did it receive unanimous assent. Thus the 
 hereditary title of the House of Valois was contested 
 by the English royal family, who claimed through 
 females. Lastly, during the fifteenth century, the 
 throne was long occupied in France, and too long 
 in England, by men whose feeble faculties or ener- 
 vated character, very far from supplying the strength 
 which was wanting in the throne itself, added 
 greatly to its weakness and its embarrassment. 
 
 These are some of the reasons which make the 
 fifteenth century an epoch of transition in England 
 and in France. The power of the French crown, 
 incapable as it was, during the greater part of the 
 century, of itself guiding public affairs, was de- 
 livered over successively into the hands of rival 
 parties. By the creation of appanages for the benefit 
 of the princes of the family, the royal power itself 
 encouraged civil war between near connexions. On 
 the other hand, the English monarchy, disputed by 
 different branches of the same race, was destroyed 
 by internal struggles, and the chain of the hereditary 
 succession was broken by war and by murder. The 
 Wars of the Eoses were sufficiently bloody to fur- 
 nish Shakespeare with subjects for the drama quite 
 as tragic as Hamlet or Lear. 
 
 The end of the House of Burgundy coincides 
 very nearly with the epoch when history takes 
 its leave of the middle ages — when, once for all, 
 feudal monarchy had ceased, and given way to the 
 independent form of monarchy of modern times, to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 95 
 
 large armies, to governments powerful in them- 
 selves — when war changed its character and its 
 theatre, and, after having been carried on for cen- 
 turies between England and France on the shores of 
 the Channel, was transported, also for centuries, 
 to the banks of the Rhine, and to the country- 
 south of the Alps. It was towards the close of the 
 fifteenth century that this change took place in 
 Europe, and that this point of intersection occurs. 
 
 Charles YIII. was almost a child when his father 
 died, and was still very young when, founding his 
 pretensions on the will of Bene of Anjou, he under- 
 took the conquest of Naples. He entered without 
 striking a blow, but could not retain his hold on 
 what he had seized. But the war from that moment 
 followed a new direction, and only occurred at in- 
 tervals in the north of France. The question 
 whether Naples should belong to the French of 
 the House of Anjou, or to the Spaniards of the 
 House of Arragon, was not solved so quickly. The 
 campaign of Charles VIII. is the starting point of 
 a military era which no longer forms, like the 
 wars with England, a part of the middle ages : it 
 belongs to a series of centuries which form the 
 domain of modern history. 
 
 ^^^^^^ 
 
1 
 
 II. 
 
 CHARLES V. 
 
 1. 
 
 At the end of the fifteenth century, after the 
 death of Louis XL and of Richard III, at the 
 accession of Ferdinand the Catholic, the monar- 
 chical element increased in power in France, in 
 England, and in Spain, and territorial unity was 
 everywhere triumphant. The sovereigns of these 
 three countries, whose shores are washed by the 
 Atlantic, had no longer to struggle for the pos- 
 session or recovery of the territory which, in the 
 end, had constituted their domain, and which could 
 thenceforth be designated under one name. They 
 had no longer to struggle for the independence 
 of their crown. Unity and territorial contiguity 
 were accomplished. Feudal wars, and civil w^ar 
 among the great families having pretensions to the 
 throne, and the long war between France and 
 England, had successively died out, after having 
 borrowed their character from that of royalty itself, 
 and after having gradually spread from the castle to 
 
CHARLES V. 97 
 
 the province, and from the province to the whole 
 kingdom, precisely as the royal power had increased 
 in moral force and had acquired more territorial 
 development. 
 
 Henceforth the King of France was strong enough 
 no longer to fear rebellious vassals, as in the old; 
 days of the middle ages ; nor jealous relations, as in 
 the fifteenth century ; nor the invasion of his land 
 by the English, who had menaced and troubled his 
 kingdom during four hundred years. He was 
 Lord of all France, excepting Brittany, which would 
 soon be united to the crown by marriage. In Eng- 
 land the ideas of invading France were but passing 
 caprices. Henry VIH. in his wildest dreams or 
 passions never seriously thought of retaking the 
 French provinces formerly possessed by the Plan- 
 tagenets. 
 
 The King of England was equally delivered from 
 the family rivalries which had desolated the country, 
 and given a destiny so tragic and variable to the 
 crown of Great Britain. He had reconciled and 
 put an end to rival ambitions, by uniting in his 
 person the two Houses of York and Lancaster. 
 
 The unity of Spain had been obtained by vic- 
 tories and a marriage ; and Ferdinand, in possession 
 of the whole peninsula, had only to deal with tem- 
 porary revolts or discontent among the commons, 
 the nobles, or the Moors. 
 
 Such, at the end of the fifteenth century, was 
 the new condition of the royal power in the three 
 
 H 
 
98 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 countries which form the maritime frontier in the 
 west of Europe. The royal power was then esta- 
 blished in an independent manner ; it had put down 
 feudal rivalries and family pretensions ; and all 
 questions as to hereditary rights had been solved. 
 
 This result was the work of several centuries. 
 Monarchical power in France and in Spain had 
 made regular and constant progress ; it had met with 
 many obstacles, and had combated many enemies ; 
 it had triumphed over the power and the superior 
 number of its rivals, and it had surmounted all the 
 difficulties caused by the original weakness of its 
 means, and the want of skill, or the feebleness of 
 its representatives. The institution had proved too 
 powerful to allow of its being beaten by the audacity 
 or obstinacy of its enemies, or by the want of ability, 
 or the misfortunes of its defenders. 
 
 But all human afiairs are subject to a law of 
 continual movement. When monarchy in the west 
 of Europe became possessed of an independent 
 power, and of an undivided and undisputed ter- 
 ritory, it did not remain stationary, but we shall 
 see it continue its onward march. The liberation of 
 the country and the unfettered disposal of supreme 
 power were not enough : there was the further object 
 of conquest and external aggrandizement. This is 
 the task to which monarchs in modern times have 
 devoted themselves, and this process commenced 
 in the sixteenth century. The Anglo-French wars, 
 which ceased with Louis XI. and Edward IV, did 
 
CHARLES V. 99 
 
 not profess to have conquest for their object ; the 
 English sovereigns claimed to be the legitimate 
 heirs to the throne of France, and maintained that 
 in sending armies to the continent they were only 
 urging their just claims. 
 
 The wars of the sixteenth century, even when 
 imdertaken under the pretence of hereditary rights, 
 made use of those rights only as a pretext. The 
 sole and evident object of these wars was European 
 supremacy and conquest. They might have been 
 made for territories to which the belligerent parties 
 had hereditary pretensions, but those territories 
 were often situated far from their own kingdoms. 
 Thus when Charles VIII. invaded the kingdom of ' 
 Naples, and when the King of Spain invaded the 
 Milanese, most assuredly these were wars for con- 
 quest ; the object was to gain possession of territories 
 not their own, and at a considerable distance from 
 their own hereditary states. 
 
 Such was the altered aspect of events during the 
 sixteenth century — more particularly during the 
 first fifty years, and during the latter years of the 
 fifteenth century. The character itself of politics 
 and of war had changed in the states of the West. 
 War became more general ; politics embraced a 
 larger field. As the power of the monarch increased, 
 military operations were conducted on a more ex- 
 tended scale. After conquering the provinces which 
 were contiguous, and which gave unity to their 
 kingdoms, kings sought to acquire new territory by 
 
 H 2 
 
100 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 distant foreign enterprises. The monarchs of the 
 sixteenth century, who fought when they were 
 enemies, now met together, came to an understand- 
 ing one with the other, and entered into mutual 
 alliances, more often than did their predecessors. 
 (The nations of Europe mixed more together, and 
 learnt to know each other better. The idea of the' 
 balance of power arose, the system of allian( 
 between states began, and the action of one pem^er 
 on the destiny of others made itself feltf there 
 sprung up too a mass of general interests which 
 brought these various nations into contact, and 
 which formed a new element of international in- 
 fluences in the world. The history of the sixteenth 
 century, therefore, differs greatly from that of the 
 preceding century. The governments in their 
 warlike or pacific relations with regard to foreign 
 matters were guided by notions and by views 
 bought by recent experience, which had been com- 
 pletely unkno vvn to the most enlightened politicians 
 of former times. The history of France, of England, I 
 of Spain, and of Germany in the sixteenth century I 
 can no longer be written separately ; it becomes the^ 
 history of Europe. 
 
 These ideas, however, from the very fact of their 
 having only recently arisen in the mind of the 
 governing classes, had not yet acquired the stability 
 and the solidity they assumed in epochs more nearly 
 approaching our own. Political science, in a modern 
 sense, began at this period, but nothing could be 
 
CHARLES V. 101 
 
 more fleeting or undecided than its guiding princi- 
 ples. It had just struggled into existence, and began 
 to feel its way in a hesitating manner. It has some- 
 times been said that the basis of the history of the^ 
 sixteenth century is to be found in the claim^^^wilich 
 were made by monarchs, rivals in ^ow^^ipon those 
 countries or provinces which haj3r remained neuter 
 between the Protestantism.-<)f^ the North and the 
 Catholicism of the South: In attributing so decided 
 an object to the policy pursued at the beginning 
 of the sixteenth century, we give too much honour, 
 if we may be permitted to use such an expression, 
 to those who were supposed to guide it. No one 
 of them had, as far as we know, such profound 
 and clear ideas with regard to the Eeformation. 
 None among them knew with sufficient clearness 
 what they desired with respect to the new belief, 
 still less what was to be done in order to attain 
 the end they had in view. The action of govern- 
 ments had become more extensive, and the /field 
 of politics more vast, but the course of ey^ one 
 concerned was without plan or principle. Certain 
 alliances among the states of that day seem to 
 us, at the present time, as if they were clearly 
 marked out, and ready to take a substantive form 
 of their own accord. Nevertheless we see that those 
 who should have contracted these alliances neg- 
 lected their opportunities, and, in lieu of endeavour- 
 ing to make allies, raised against themselves enemies. 
 The strongest characters hesitated: a cause taken 
 
102 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 up one day was abandoned on the morrow. As 
 a general rule, all sciences are slow in attaining 
 complete development and perfection, and the 
 science of modern politics was then quite in its 
 infancy. The greater portion of the ideas whichX 
 afterwards acquired the authority of principles in \ 
 the minds of Henry IV. and of Cardinal Eichelieu, 1 
 in the minds of De Witt and of William III, and / 
 even in that of Elizabeth, were but vaguely and / 
 imperfectly understood even by the highest intelli- / 
 gences which governed Europe during the lifetime / 
 of Charles V. and at the commencement of thj/ 
 Eeformation. 
 
 When Protestantism is represented, as has some- 
 times been done, as the cause which guided the 
 policy and determined the principal events of the 
 sixteenth century, we are apt to confound the latter 
 half of the century with the first, — the end with the 
 beginning. It was necessary that the Eeformation 
 should give the measure of its force, that it should 
 make known the nature of its action, that it should 
 trace more or less distinctly its geographical limits, 
 and enable the world to judge which of the religious 
 sects would acquire the most moral jDower and have 
 the largest number of followers, before those who 
 guided the policy of the age could come to any 
 resolution, and assign their respective parts to those 
 who, from political motives and from temporal 
 interests, ought to combat the new doctrine as an 
 evil, and those who ought to use it as an ally. Un 
 
CHARLES V. 103 
 
 the second half of the sixteenth century, Philip II. 
 was the declared enemy of the Keformation, and 
 Elizabeth was its protectress, while, in the seven- 
 teenth century, Cardinal Richelieu was its ally. 
 Time, experience, the development, both spiritual 
 and material, of the Reformation, were necessary 
 conditions, before this distribution of parts in the 
 great drama of politics could be made among the 
 different powers ; before the Reformation could be 
 enrolled under the flag of one party and repudiated 
 by the other ; — in short, before it could take a place 
 and a colour of its own in the political and military 
 affairs of Europe. 
 
 At the beginning of the century, this decided 
 participation of the reformed religion as a vital 
 element in public affairs, this clear demarcation of 
 its strength and of its limits, had not yet been 
 attained. The sovereigns of Europe feared the 
 Reformation : the feeling was universal ; but danger 
 can be combated by force or warded off by alliances. 
 In this case every one was hesitating, as if in the 
 presence of some unknown object. vIhe-^a£Qi:matijon 
 was in its infancy : even the very authors who gave 
 their names to its different sects did not know how 
 far they meant to push their innovations, — what to 
 keep or what to change of the old dogma, — to what 
 measures or to what human assistance they were to 
 appeal in order to insure success. That which the 
 reformers did not perceive, the chiefs of the European 
 governments knew still less. Some among them, 
 
 v^ 
 
104 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 even down almost to the middle of the century, 
 did not clearly understand either the spirit of the 
 new doctrine, or the movements of their own con- 
 sciences in the presence of a change of faith so 
 loudly proclaimed, nor did they see the manner in 
 which their different interests in the world might 
 be affected. It was only in the latter years of the 
 reign of Charles V, after long and vague discussions 
 of principles, that lutheranism became the cause of 
 war between him and the protestant princes. No 
 government knew, until that time, what was to be 
 expected or feared from the Eeformation, or how to 
 deal with it. The general policy of the epoch, as 
 we have before said, was undecided.Vit showed how 
 deficient the men of that day were in the habit of 
 directing affairs when they became of European im- 
 portance, or of treating politically, not with a rebel- 
 Uious party, or with a single adversary, but with 
 Europe as a wholeTj This want of decision shows 
 itself particularly in their conduct towards the Eefor- 
 mation. It troubled and alarmed them : it convinced 
 them that it was so grave a matter as to deserve 
 their most serious attention. Before the middle of 
 this century the Eeformation had not only made no 
 proselytes, but it had neither resolute nor determined 
 adversaries, nor any interested defenders, among the 
 great monarchs. 
 
 It was therefore not the great event which stands 
 out prominently in the history of the first half of 
 the sixteenth century. 
 
I 
 
 CHAKLES V. 105 
 
 Quite another matter occupied the first place in , 
 the events of that time, affected the most important I 
 resolutions of sovereigns, and influenced the whole 
 of European history. This was the Italian war! 
 between Spain and France, which was a strugglej \ 
 of the two powers for supremacy, ending in the 
 subjugation of Italy by Spain. 
 
 The history of that epoch is the history of this 
 contest between Spain and France — Spain with all 
 her dependencies — and the principal object of the 
 conflict was Italy. 
 
 Here, let us remark, there was no question as to 
 the object coveted by both parties, and it could 
 not have been otherwise ; but the object only was 
 determined; while the policy by which it was to 
 i be attained was vacillating. Policy is more often 
 irresolute in the measures which it takes than in the 
 object which it seeks ; the choice of the latter is 
 generally determined by circumstances, whereas the 
 former depend on the character and the abilities of 
 men. During the first half of the sixteenth century, 
 those who conducted the general policy showed great 
 indecision in the means which they employed, in 
 the alliances which they formed, in the action of 
 their Governments, and in their appreciation of the 
 gravest events. The men who guided that policy 
 were novices in the science they attempted to 
 practise. 
 
 In the sixteenth century Italy lost the liberty 
 which she had enjoyed for two hundred years, and . 
 
106 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 which had already begun to diminish in the fifteenth 
 century. Although more advanced than Spain and 
 the centre of Europe in most things, Italy was less 
 military. The territory was divided into small states, 
 not one of which was capable of resisting singly any 
 great power ; it was composed partly of small and 
 badly governed principalities, or of republics which, 
 — with the single exception of Venice, — were either 
 enfeebled by perpetual dissensions, or, like Florence, 
 were distracted by the dissensions between the re- 
 publicans, who wanted to be free, and some family 
 of ancient popular magistrates, who wished to 
 become dictators ; — Italy, thus constituted, could 
 with difficulty defend itself with energy against the 
 invasion of a foreign army. The House of Arragon 
 reigned at Naples; while the King of France, as 
 head of the House of Anjou, asserted his claim to be 
 more legitimate than that of the Spaniard. But it/ 
 was far more difficult for the French monarch to lead 
 his soldiers across the Alps and the whole peninsula 
 80 as to seize Naples, and establish himself there, 
 than for the King of Spain to defend his possessions. 
 Nevertheless, it did not fall out so : the Spanish 
 rule was most unpopular with the Neapolitans, and 
 the King of France made use of this unpopularity 
 of the Arragonese as a weapon of offence second 
 only to his hereditary title. Passing through Milan, 
 Florence, and Eome, Charles VIII. made a rapid 
 dash at Naples, which put him in possession of the 
 kingdom. Unfortunately, Charles VIII. was a poor 
 
CHARLES V. 107 
 
 deformed, dissipated, and insignificant creature. 
 Pope Alexander VI . said : " The King of France 
 took Italy with a piece of chalk, much as a quar- 
 termaster chalks out billets for his troops." His 
 conquest so embarrassed him, his military improvi- 
 dence was so great, — the Italians, who, from jealousy 
 of the Spaniards, had encouraged his enterprise, 
 became rapidly so jealous of the French, — that in 
 spite of the difficulties of his retreat, he hastened his 
 return to France ; leaving Naples under the charge 
 of a garrison which was too weak to defend it, and 
 which soon allowed Spain to resume its ancient 
 possession. 
 
 This first expedition was a bad presage for those 
 that followed, and for the future prospects of liberty 
 in Italy. During the whole course of the Italian 
 wars of the sixteenth century, there was a vague 
 belief, even among the people themselves, that with 
 Spain they had everything to lose. The French 
 kings invariably announced themselves as the 
 friends of independence beyond the Alps, and as 
 the defenders of Italy against the Spaniards. This 
 promise was not sufficient, nor did it succeed. 
 Liberty succumbed with the French cause in Italy ; 
 Savonarola perished in the flames, and the Spanish 
 viceroys maintained their rule. 
 
 In order to secure in Italy the part she meant to 
 play, France should on her side have attempted to 
 inspire unanimous and well grounded sympathy. 
 She should have allied herself with Venice, which, in 
 
108 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 a higher degree than any other Italian states, pos- 
 sessed material resources, and an enlightened go- 
 vernment. But that republic was for a short time 
 only the ally of France ; and her other alliances 
 were not more lasting. The Duke of Milan, a 
 soldier of fortune, the illegitimate heir or rather the 
 usurper of the Viscontis, invoked the aid of the King 
 of France, and then deserted him. The republican 
 population of Florence would gladly have received 
 the aid of France, but the Medicis feared it ; for the 
 Medicis and the Florentines were not then of the 
 same mind. The Holy See, a sovereignty which 
 frequently changes hands, was occupied in the six- 
 teenth century by pontiffs of the most opposite 
 character : Alexander VI. was vicious and immoral 
 like all his family; Julian 11. was intent only on 
 war ; Leo X. was a scholar and magnificent, but he 
 bestowed only secondary attention on affairs of state; 
 Clement YII. was enlightened and active, but he was 
 above all one of the Medicis, and a Florentine. When 
 we observe the political bias of the men who then 
 wore the tiara, it is not difiicult to understand the 
 instability of their alliances, and the small amount 
 of temporal assistance they could offer to France, 
 or to any other power. Julius II, the pontiff who 
 exercised most influence on the fortunes of Italy at 
 that time, acted invariably for his own interests, 
 either with or against Venice, with or against 
 France or Spain. The manner in which Italy was 
 constituted and governed therefore gave no hope 
 
CHARLES V. 109 
 
 of a common action, or of a persevering system 
 in favour of any particular interest.^ 
 
 Moreover, the nature of the governments, whether 
 they wei^e republican or otherwise, was not favour- 
 able to the development of any ideas of national 
 iiid^endence. The minority every were absorbed 
 tlie masses. The habit of liberty had been lost 
 for some time, and its very spirit had perished. The 
 ideas of freedom no longer existed save in a small 
 number of minds. In the Italian principalities and 
 republics, unless indeed the system of government 
 had been changed, any step towards a higher state 
 of morality could profit only a very small body of 
 interested people. 
 
 The result, therefore, of the wars waged by 
 France is not astonishing. She did not attempt to 
 contract the alliances which would have been most 
 useful to herself, nor did she try to secure to her 
 allies that which would have been most important 
 to them. The French policy beyond the Alps was 
 changeable ; it did not succeed in strongly attaching 
 either Venice, or Florence, or the Pope, who were 
 its natural allies, to its interest; and the Italians 
 did not do for themselves that which France failed/ 
 to accomplish for them. / 
 
 Louis XII, unlike as he was to Charles VIII, had 
 the same fate in Italy as his predecessor. At his death, 
 France did not possess an inch of ground in Italy. 
 
 ^ Ranke, History of the Popes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
 Centuries. 
 
 \ 
 
110 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 With Louis XII, Maximilian, Ferdinand the 
 Catholic, Henry VIII, and Julius II, and with 
 Venice and Florence all engaged in the struggle — 
 with the wars carried on by France in Italy against 
 Spain and her allies, in Burgundy against the Swiss, 
 and in Picardy against England — the spectacle is not 
 so magnificent as when Francis I. and Charles V. 
 appear on the stage But the scene was already 
 beginning to be complicated in a manner both 
 remarkable and novel. The movement which was 
 made embraced the whole of Western Europe ; at 
 the same moment, France, the Empire, Spain, Eng- 
 land, the Pope, Switzerland, Venice, and all the 
 Italian states were equally involved in war or diplo- 
 macy. The confusion of interests and of ambitions 
 was all the greater from the very novelty of the 
 situation ; no such complication had ever before 
 existed ; and, consequently, all concerned were em- 
 barrassed and undecided, and the resolutions they 
 adopted were as changeable as were the alliances or 
 the enmities which sprung up. 
 
 We may ask, what could Louis XII. do, and 
 what did he really desire 1 
 
 His chief objects were to possess the Milanese as 
 the heir of the House of Orleans, to exercise influ- 
 ence at Naples, and to guarantee the independence 
 of the centre of the Peninsula. To accomplish 
 these objects, the most natural and useful allies 
 were first Venice, rich and powerful, forming a 
 barrier against Germany ; secondly, the Pope, 
 
CHARLES V. Ill 
 
 placed in the centre of Italy, and the natural 
 defender of the independence of that part of the 
 country ; and, thirdly, England as a diversion and 
 make-weight against Spain. But, instead of forming 
 these alliances, Louis XII. was at war, either suc- 
 cessively or at the same time, with Venice, with 
 Julius II, and with Henry VIII. 
 
 Why was it that a European League was formed 
 against Venice, called the " League of Cambrai," 
 in which France joined ? Because kings are always 
 jealous of republics ; because France and Spain 
 both dreaded the influence of Venice in Italy ; 
 because Cardinal Amboise, with his great ideas, 
 was also subject to caprices ; because Venice had 
 conquered on the mainland considerable territories 
 which had once belonged to the Empire, to the 
 Pope, or to Spain ; and because France failed to see 
 that she would thus lose a possible and useful ally, 
 while she would gain nothing by it. 
 
 The League of Cambrai was an absurd idea, a 
 vast project without any reasonable foundation, and 
 it therefore could not last. It was abandoned almost 
 directly by Julius II, who had been its chief pro- 
 moter ; it encountered the firm and valiant resistance 
 of the Venetians ; it was soon abandoned by Spain ; 
 it was forgotten and lost sight of by the indifference 
 of Maximilian. Thus in the end the League was 
 turned against Louis XII, the blindest of its authors, 
 who found that he had to oppose, on each of his 
 frontiers, one of those very associates whom he had 
 
112 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 selected for an enterprise which offered nothing 
 but disadvantage to France, without any counter- 
 balancing chance of profit. 
 
 In order to comprehend the perpetual changes 
 which took place in the system of European alli- 
 ances during these events, we must bear in mind 
 that, so soon as any one of the allied powers gained 
 any advantage or preponderating influence, the 
 others began to fear that power, and to turn against 
 it. Thus, Julius 11. wished in succession to embroil 
 Spain and the Empire, after having brought them 
 together ; then he tried to unite them anew against 
 France, and to league against France the Italian 
 states ; he also attempted to secure the friendship of 
 Henry VIII. by holding out to him as a bait the 
 ancient possessions of the English crown in France. 
 Yet this Pope played a great part during the reign 
 of Louis XII. In spite of the continual changes in 
 his alliances, he was, perhaps, the only man of that 
 time who kept his eyes steadily fixed on one object, 
 — the development of the Eoman power, and the 
 independence of Central Italy. We may say that 
 he abandoned the alliance of Venice, of France, and 
 of Spain, so soon as he thought that those powers 
 offered any impediment to the success of his Italian 
 C^projects. 
 / The other characters were very vacillating in their 
 policy. 
 
 Louis XII. was an active-minded, steady, and 
 just prince, animated with the desire of doing good ; 
 
but his character lacked depth and firmrS 
 judgment underwent the most various influences; 
 his policy was deficient in logical consistency and 
 greatness of purpose, and frequently failed in good 
 faith. 
 
 Maximilian was restless, petulant, negligent, and 
 prejudiced ; he carried his love of mystery into the 
 smallest actions ; he was unfaithful to his engage- 
 ments from absence of mind ; he was giddy and 
 thoughtless, boasting and full of chivalrous pre- 
 tensions and chimerical projects ; a spendthrift, he 
 loved money, but never had any ; he was capricious, 
 but clever. He succeeded in nothing he undertook 
 in Germany, and he was unpopular in Flanders ; in 
 short, he was without any of the great virtues. 
 
 The character of Henry VHI. is too well known 
 to need repetition. Ambitious of military glory, 
 changeable as the events themselves, as jealous of 
 the continental sovereigns as he was of his wives, 
 perpetually fearing the alliance between France and 
 the Empire, he manifested in mature age the same 
 pride in his vices, his superstitions, and his passions, 
 that he had shown in his personal appearance 
 during his younger days. 
 
 Politics might well be confused when they had 
 to be dealt with by minds such as these. 
 
 Louis Xn. was wrong to enter lightly into the 
 League of Cambrai. He was wrong in making an 
 agreement with Spain to divide the spoil of Naples 
 with that country. Such a convention could not 
 
 I 
 
114 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 last ; Naples could not be partitioned, more espe- 
 cially with Spain, whose power was already so much 
 more firmly established there. It was simply giving 
 to Gonsalvo of Cordova the opportunity to defeat 
 the French, and drive them out of the kingdom. 
 
 Louis XII. both gained and lost in the midst of 
 this general confusion. He held Naples for a short 
 time, and he retained the Milanese for ten years, 
 but he kept neither. He left to his son-in-law, who 
 was also his cousin, and his successor, only that 
 which he had himself inherited from Charles VIII. 
 Like his predecessor, he left the reputation of 
 having in vain attempted to do glorious deeds ; but 
 he left besides the fame of having sincerely desired 
 to accomplish what was useful ; his intentions, 
 however, were better than his success. 
 
 II. 
 
 At the death of Louis XII. and of Ferdinand 
 the Catholic, Francis I. and Charles V, with the 
 interval of one year between them, became respec- 
 tively King of France, at the age of twenty-one, 
 and King of Spain at that of sixteen. The war 
 was then carried into Italy by these princes, and 
 was brought to an end by a truce, without any 
 benefit to either party. Francis I. found the state 
 of afi'airs in Italy much the same as Charles VIII. 
 had found it. Nothing had been done ; for twenty 
 
CHARLES V. 115 
 
 years had passed in fruitless struggles, and in sterile 
 negotiations. The greater as well as the smaller 
 powers of Europe had been fighting, negotiating, 
 and breaking off their negotiations ; they had mixed, 
 consulted, and disputed one with another under the 
 guidance of calculations which were worthless : they 
 had been led by friendships and prejudices without 
 motives ; and by ambitious projects without any 
 substantial policy. After centuries of local or little 
 wars, the spirit of conquest on a large scale had 
 passed over Europe, and men's minds were filled 
 with a passion for extended political ideas. With 
 the exception however of Julius 11. — the one salient 
 character of that epoch, who, through numberless 
 shifts and changes, had remained constant to one 
 idea — no one had entertained a serious and definite 
 project. Venice was an exception, but she had not 
 been able to regain all that she had lost by the 
 League of Cambrai, while the territorial possessions 
 of the other powers had remained much as they 
 were. The ephemeral alliances which had been 
 contracted and then broken had left no binding ties, 
 and no traces. Julius II, Louis XII, and Ferdi- 
 nand the Catholic were dead, and Maximilian was 
 near his end. [His m arriag^e with_MB£y o£_^Bur:^ 
 gundy, and that of his son with Joan of Castille, 
 had united in the same hands the inheritances of 
 the houses of Austria, of Burgundy, and of Arragon. 
 This great event, which prepared the way for others, 
 was brought about by two marriages, and not by 
 
116 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 n 
 
 war or politics, which had in fact produced no 
 effect. The great powers had neither gained nor 
 lost ; while the ties they had formed with such in- 
 conceivable fickleness had been broken asunder, so 
 that all the world was free. This first experience 
 of war, and of a larger political action, with which 
 the fifteenth century had closed, and with which 
 the sixteenth century had opened — an experience 
 made by men who were not confident in them- 
 selves — had been vain. The lesson had failed, 
 and everything had to be begun afresh. 
 
 Francis I. and Charles Y, on ascending their re- 
 spective thrones, did not seem to know that they 
 were destined to a life-long struggle. The first 
 thing Francis did, before the accession of Charles, 
 was to attack the Milanese, and to win the battle 
 of Marignan. This did not prevent the two reigns 
 from commencing with a treaty of peace signed 
 at Noyon, by which Naples was assigned to Spain, 
 and the Milanese to France, and which was fol- 
 lowed, after the battle of Marignan, by three years 
 of peace. Charles and Francis loved war for dif- 
 ferent reasons ; the one loved it only as an exercise 
 of the mind, and the other only as a sensual grati- 
 fication. The equilibrium thus established in Italy 
 gave satisfaction, for the Spaniards in the south, the 
 French in the north, and the Pope in the centre 
 protected the independence of the republics, and of 
 the secondary states. So soon as the contest for 
 Italy ceased, there was no necessity to continue it 
 
CHARLES V. 117 
 
 for Navarre, always a cause of quarrel between 
 France and Spain ; nor yet for Burgundy, which 
 Louis XL had claimed as a fief — a claim, however, 
 which was not acknowledejed as legitimate or 
 definitive by Spain ; — nor was it worth while 
 fighting for Guelderland, which aspired to be inde- 
 pendent of Burgundy, and which leant for support 
 on France ; nor yet for the duchy of Bouillon, a 
 troublesome and inconvenient neighbour to the Low 
 Countries ; nor even for the ancient mutual pre- 
 tensions of France and Burgundy upon Picardy, 
 or the territories on the Somme. 
 
 Charles and Francis, supposing them both ani- 
 mated by a spirit of moderation, could without much 
 difficulty have managed to live at peace. Francis had 
 not the desire, and he never had the intention, of 
 depriving the descendants of the Dukes of Burgundy 
 of their inheritance in the Low Countries, or of 
 reigning at Brussels and occupying the mouth of 
 the Scheld. It was a good saying of Ferdinand the 
 Catholic, and one he frequently repeated, that the 
 possessions of his grandson would be too vast, and 
 that it would have been better had they been 
 divided between Charles and his brother. Was 
 he right ? We doubt it. The dominions of the 
 King of Spain were certainly larger, but the 
 territory of the King of France was more compact, 
 and his army was composed of more homogeneous 
 materials ; ^ indeed, had the King of France been 
 
 ^ Report of Michel Suriano. 
 
118 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 n 
 
 long-sighted enough in his policy, he might have 
 formed such alliances as would have compensated 
 for any inequality there was between the monarch 
 who reigned at Paris and the sovereign who held 
 the hereditary possessions of Austria, Spain, the 
 Low Countries, Naples, and the far countries beyond 
 sea. 
 
 The Emperor Maximilian was not quite sixty 
 when he died. Had he lived longer, affairs would 
 doubtless have taken a different turn. One great 
 object of rivalry, at any rate, would have been 
 for a time removed — the contest for the Empire of 
 Germany between Charles V. and Francis I. These 
 two princes were rivals before the election for the 
 empire, they were rivals after the election — a con- 
 sequence of anger on the part of the beaten can- 
 didate, and of the disturbance of the balance of 
 power between the two competitors. The choice 
 of an emperor was, as is well known, difficult and 
 complicated. Henry YIII. put himself forward as 
 one of the candidates ; the Elector of Saxony too, 
 who had been invested with the administration of 
 the Empire the day after Maximilian's death, had 
 at one time some sort of chance. Francis I. com- 
 mitted, as far as his own interests were concerned, 
 the great fault of miscalculating the probabilities 
 of the election ; he should have proposed imme- 
 diately some German prince — for instance, the 
 Elector of Saxony — as a candidate. As yet that 
 prince was not pledged to the Keformation, and 
 
CHARLES V. 119 
 
 lie had considerable reputation and influence. Had 
 the King of France supported some such candidate, 
 Henry VIII. would soon have supported him ; and 
 doubtless they would have had the sanction of the 
 Pope, who dreaded for Italy the preponderance of 
 the King of Spain, already the master of Naples. 
 Among the Electors themselves, the three ecclesias- 
 tical members of the assembly, — the Electors of 
 Mayence, of Cologne, and of Treves, who were not ' 
 actuated by personal ambition, — would have been 
 well disposed towards a German prince ; and either 
 the Elector Palatine or the Elector of Brandenburg 
 would have carried the election, — supposing that 
 the Elector of Saxony himself, which is improbable 
 enough, had not given himself the benefit of his own 
 vote, and that Brandenburg had remained hostile 
 to him. The details relating to the election have 
 been studied with great care ; nevertheless we can 
 only form conjectures as to the possible success 
 of one of the princes of the Empire. The agents of 
 Charles and of Francis expended prodigious activity 
 and a great deal of money — we may add, most 
 unscrupulously — in their canvass for the election. 
 After numerous changes in the dispositions of the 
 Electors ; after complicated and pressing negotia- 
 tions, conducted by clandestine or avowed agents ; / 
 after menaces of war, and a show of considerable I 
 warlike preparations, the Elector of Saxony — he 
 whose successor afterwards carried on so bitter a 
 war with the Emperor — and the Elector of Mayence 
 
120 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 were the two who took the decisive steps, and 
 brought the seven Electors to vote iinanimously 
 for Charles V. In short, the reasons which carried 
 the day were, on the one side, the greater gene- 
 rosity, and the reputation for political skill, of 
 Charles V, while on the other side there was the 
 dread of the lust of conquest of Francis I, and the 
 notion that he would less effectually defend Ger- 
 many against the attacks of the Sultan. 
 
 The position of affairs had sensibly changed : 
 the difference of the situation before and after 
 the election was as marked as was the personal 
 difference between Francis I. and Louis XII, between 
 Charles Y. and Maximilian, between Clement YII. 
 (who was so soon to succeed after the short pon- 
 tificate of Adrian VI.) and Leo X, whose death 
 was imminent. Francis I, who in his dream of 
 being Emperor of Germany had aspired to universal 
 monarchy, including even the conquest of Con- 
 stantinople, perceived that the chances of peace were 
 gone. To leave his rival in the tranquil possession 
 of such a. power appeared to him impossible. More- 
 over, would he be able to retain possession of the 
 Milanese without war ? Charles indeed had siorned 
 the Treaty of Noyon, as King of Spain ; but it was 
 a question whether he would keep it as Emperor 
 of Germany. 
 
 Francis I. viewed the difficulties of his position 
 much as he was accustomed to view political affairs 
 during his whole life ; he displayed a giddiness, not 
 
CHARLES V. 121 
 
 unmixed with generosity, and an immoderate love 
 of glory, of action, and of war. The history of his 
 reign teaches us that he would have gained less 
 personal renown, but greater political security, had 
 he endeavoured to maintain the balance of power. 
 The dominions of the Emperor were undoubtedly 
 more vast ; but the difficulty of governing the 
 various provinces, and of keeping up the govern- 
 ment and the necessary troops, was infinitely greater. 
 From this time forward France was compact and 
 united, so as to possess the unrestrained and imme- 
 diate disposition of all her strength. Francis I, 
 moreover, could have found in the actual position of 
 affairs resources and powerful help abroad. Henry 
 VIII, who had accepted his hospitality at the Field 
 of the Cloth of Gold, and who both before and 
 afterwards had also received that of the Emperor, 
 could have played no part greater than that of 
 arbitrator between the two chief monarchs of the 
 continent, — an arbitrator showing somewhat more 
 favour to the monarch, who of the two had fewer 
 leagues of territory and fewer millions of subjects. 
 The Pope — whether he were called Leo X, Adrian 
 VI, or Clement VII. — would naturally have to fear 
 the ascendency of the Emperor in Italy. The 
 struggle between the Holy See and the Empire fills 
 too many pages in the history of the Papacy to 
 allow of its ever being forgotten. The situation of 
 the Sovereign Pontiff may be viewed in two ways : 
 as Head of the Church, he could place less reliance 
 
\ 
 
 122 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 on the King of France, than on the Emperor, the 
 sworn opponent of the Keformation in Germany; 
 as Head of an Italian state, the Pope had more to 
 fear from the ascendency of Charles Y. than from 
 that of Francis I. It was therefore the Pope's 
 interest to look for political support from the latter. 
 In the rest of Europe it depended entirely upon the 
 conduct of the King of France to conciliate all 
 those whose interests caused them to look with 
 mistrust on the Emperor, whether in Germany, in 
 the North, or in Italy. He well knew the resources 
 and the amount of support he might obtain, among 
 the rest, from Denmark, Guelderland, Cleves, and 
 all the other northern states ; but he did not trouble 
 himself about it. He looked upon the balance of 
 power as overthrown. War came almost of itself. 
 Lautrec led an army across the Alps, but, though 
 successful at first, he was beaten at the Bicoque, 
 and the series of reverses of the French monarch 
 commenced. 
 
 Are we to attribute the celebrated treason of the 
 Constable of Bourbon to the imprudence of the 
 king, and to the manner in which he treated men, 
 especially those most highly placed? Are we to 
 treat this event, which was contemporaneous with 
 all the greatest misfortunes of Francis, as one of 
 his faults, and one of the principal causes of his 
 disasters ? 
 
 The Duke of Bourbon occupied a very peculiar 
 position. He belonged to a branch of the royal 
 
CHARLES V. 123 
 
 family ; and in that he was, next to the King, the 
 first personage of the kingdom, he possessed those 
 qualities which altogether make a man either emi- 
 nently useful or eminently dangerous. Intrepid, 
 haughty, impetuous, powerful by his vast posses- 
 sions, he had wished, like Francis I, to marry a 
 daughter of Louis XII, and had almost rejected 
 the hand of Louisa of Savoy, the mother of the 
 King. He had a right to complain of great injus- 
 tice, nay, of a slight ; the command of the van- 
 guard of the army had been given to Lautrec in 
 preference to himself. Lautrec was a brave, but 
 he was an unlucky general — a dangerous favourite 
 — and the brother of the Countess of Chateau- 
 briand. Moreover, Bourbon had to risk a suit with 
 the crown for the main part of the property of his 
 wife. There was fatal blindness in offending a man 
 like the Duke of Bourbon, who was the represen- 
 tative and the only survivor of those princely houses 
 which possessed appanages as collaterally connected 
 with the crown, and which, under the race of Valois 
 in the fifteenth century, had taken the place of the 
 great feudal lords, and had almost held their own 
 against royalty. Eemaining as it were the only 
 living example of a bygone time, Bourbon belonged 
 to the past by his ideas, his possessions, and his 
 independence. He felt himself too great to obey : 
 had he married a daughter of France, he would 
 have thought himself as near to the throne as the 
 Count of Angoul^me. Proud, and wounded in his 
 
124 . HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 pride, he was out of place at the time he lived, 
 and out of his element at court. He could not 
 occupy a dependent position, and he was the more 
 disposed to resent an affront, because he would have 
 accepted a favour only with disdain, and would 
 have felt that the very act of conferring it marked 
 the distance between the master and the subject. 
 In order to gratify his revenge and his self-love, he 
 preferred to betray his sovereign, to serve another, 
 to perjure himself, to lie, to feign illness, and to 
 cross the frontier like a fugitive, rather than derogate 
 from his dignity while he was serving his country and 
 contributing to the grandeur of the French nation. 
 
 History seems frequently to forget how odious 
 faults are, when they are, we will not say redeemed, 
 but concealed, by the brilliancy of success, and the 
 noisy tumult of events. The treachery of the Duke 
 of Bourbon, owing to his great name, was talked of 
 more than was warranted either by the length or 
 the glory of his career. By deserting the flag of his 
 own country, and offering his sword to Charles V. 
 and to Henry VHI, he had the miserable satis- 
 faction of flattering himself that he treated with 
 those princes as if he was their equal. 
 
 It is only in appearance that the treason of the 
 Constable of Bourbon is the point from which we 
 can trace the formation of the great league against 
 Francis I. We must attribute that combination 
 much more to the position of Europe, to the fear 
 which the ambition and the warlike spirit of Francis 
 
CHARLES V. 125 
 
 I. inspired, to the desire of the Emperor to reconquer 
 the Milanese, and to the interest which Cardinal 
 Wolsey had in securing the protection of Charles V. 
 as a means to raise himself to the Papacy. There 
 were causes of war everywhere — in the evil feeling 
 still caused by the election — in the pretensions of 
 the Emperor on Burgundy, — pretensions he had by 
 no means given up, — in the invasion of Navarre by 
 Spain under Ferdinand — in the jealousy of Henry 
 VIII. against Francis I. — in the disunion of Italy, 
 and in the hope which was cherished by Francis I. 
 as well as by Charles Y. of bringing round to his 
 party all those in Europe who had not yet entered 
 into any formal engagements, — lastly, in the in- 
 evitable and natural rivalry between two men both 
 actuated by ambitious views. Moreover such a 
 cause was to be found above all in the evident and 
 dangerous preponderance which the election to the 
 Imperial throne gave to Charles V. The league 
 embraced the Emperor, his brother Ferdinand, and 
 the King of England ; for the Pope and the republic 
 of Venice wished to remain neuter. The Sovereign 
 Pontiff had on the one hand to fear the preponde- 
 rating influence of the Emperor, and on the other he 
 had to avoid giving him cause of offence. Francis 
 I. in opposing the league gave proof, not of a vast 
 genius, but of great courage, and he thought himself 
 sufficiently powerful to resist it. During one year 
 indeed fortune was propitious to him ; the English 
 were repulsed on the Oise, and the Imperialists on 
 
^ 
 
 1261 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the frontiers of the Low Countries ; Bourbon had 
 besieged Marseilles without success ; Henry VIII. 
 had become cooler in his alliance with the Emperor ; 
 Wolsey was discontented; and the Low Countries, 
 bowed down by taxes, were loud in their complaints. 
 Had Francis taken advantage of all these circum- 
 stances ; had he secured the friendship of the Pope, 
 and of the other Italian states ; had he turned to 
 account the suspicions and ill-humour of Henry 
 VIII. towards the Emperor, he might, with the 
 assistance of the Emperor's enemies in Germany, 
 have replaced France in a favourable position. 
 
 He neither listened to, nor profited by, the hints 
 which fortune put in his way. He allowed the war 
 in Italy to be mismanaged by his generals, and thus 
 lost for the third time the conquests which France 
 had already made in that country. Defended by 
 the Pyrenees, trusting to the strong towns of Picardy, 
 and to the neutrality guaranteed to Burgundy by 
 the Treaty of Dijon, Francis was too confident in 
 his good fortune and in his sword. Like a rash 
 soldier, he went himself to Italy ; he let slip an 
 excellent opportunity of pursuing the Imperial 
 forces, which were retreating before him ; and by 
 dividing his army, he showed a want of military 
 prudence, so as to be beaten at Pavia by the 
 Marquis of Pescara, and to be made prisoner by 
 Charles de Lannoy. 
 
 As yet Charles V. had not appeared on the 
 theatre of the war. His reputation was already 
 
CHARLES V. 127 
 
 great, although hitherto his person, his talents, and 
 his character were but little known. During the 
 first years of his reign he divided his time between 
 the Low Countries and Spain. He had neither 
 visited Germany nor Italy : he acted from a dis- 
 tance, and he left the care of leading his soldiers 
 to generals whose reputation did not overshadow 
 his own. In reading history we meet with the 
 name of Pescara, the victor of Pavia ; but in the 
 memory of after ages his name is confounded with 
 that of many others ; so that it does not shine like 
 that of Bayard, who about the same time died sword 
 in hand ; nor even like that of Guise or Gonsalvo 
 of Cordova. 
 
 Charles V. has far eclipsed the fame of all those 
 who served him in a greater degree even than did 
 either Francis I. or Henry IV. When the victory 
 of Pavia was announced to him, he maintained that 
 self-possession and tranquillity which enabled him 
 in after years to say to his rival, " I am not the 
 cause of your being a prisoner, but it is I who will 
 order your release." 
 
 The details of the captivity of Francis I, who 
 was soon transferred from Italy to Spain, have been 
 collected in France by M. Aime ChampoUion, and 
 in Belgium by M. Gachard, who has published some 
 remarkable essays on this subject.^ 
 
 After an attentive study of the narratives and 
 
 ^ Bevue des Deux Mondes of 1 Feb., 1 and 15 March, 1866. Rivaliti 
 rfe Charks V. d de Frangois 7, by M. Mignet. 
 
128 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of the correspondence of those times, the conduct 
 of Charles V. in this matter leaves an unfavourable 
 impression on the mind. He had fought with 
 Francis I. for the possession of Italy. While 
 claiming for himself the recognition of his possess- 
 ing rights over the north of Italy and over Naples, 
 he might still have assumed the merit of great 
 generosity, and by a slight favour have won over 
 the enthusiastic heart of the French monarch. This 
 idea never presented itself to his mind. He asked 
 himself whether it was better to continue the war 
 against France by prolonging the captivity of Francis, 
 or to impose, as the condition of his release, the 
 sacrifice of important portions of his dominions. 
 His views were ambitious and vindictive ; he had 
 not in his heart one generous sentiment. The 
 Emperor preferred exacting an unfavourable treaty 
 to continuing the war, and in the first phase of the 
 negotiations which were opened he claimed Bur- 
 gundy, and demanded that the domains of the Duke 
 of Bourbon should be independent of the crown of 
 France, which was as good as asking for a part of 
 Provence. For Henry VIII. he claimed a portion 
 of the ancient English possessions. This altogether 
 was tantamount to the dismemberment of France 
 in the south, on the eastern frontier, and on the 
 coast. Moreover he insisted that in future homage 
 should not be rendered for Flanders or for Artois : 
 the renunciation on the part of France to any claim 
 on Italy had l)een already obtained. 
 
CHARLES V. 129 
 
 A fresh w ar indeed, and any further success of 
 the armies of Charles V. and of Henry VIII, might 
 have rendered necessary this partition of a con- 
 siderable portion of French territory among the 
 Empire, England, and the Duke of Bourbon ; but 
 Francis I. although a prisoner, humbled, and dis- 
 armed, could not consent to such terms. These 
 demands originating in the exaggerated pride of 
 Charles V, and this intemperate display of ambition 
 which was rare in his life, caused Henry VIII. to 
 make some cool reflections on the enormous addi- 
 tional power which the Emperor would acquire if 
 he seconded his views. It roused too in Italy a 
 feeling of independence, which the advisers of the 
 King of France and his mother the Regent were 
 not slow to turn to their own advantage, and to use 
 as a means of detaching Henry VIII. from the 
 alliance with the Emperor ; whilst, on the other 
 hand, it aided the imperial counsellors in their 
 endeavours to bring their master to wiser ideas and 
 less preposterous pretensions. 
 
 The sentiments of Charles V, shown in this case 
 by acts full of passion, but expressed as at other 
 times in temperate language, may, in these grave 
 circumstances, be open to some doubt. It is pro- 
 bable that, after the first explosion of ambition and of 
 passion, he conceived the more wicked but surer pro- 
 ject of prolonging indefinitely the French monarch's 
 captivity, with the hope thus to bring him in the 
 end, by weariness of mind and of heart, to consent 
 
 K 
 
130 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 to hard terms. What is known of the character 
 of Charles V. does not exclude this supposition. 
 It was not his custom to form great resolutions in 
 a hurry ; and this one may be called passive in its 
 character. Francis I. was already in prison ; to 
 keep him there was to do nothing. There was, 
 however, against this plan the chance of the King's 
 death, and of thus opening the question of the 
 French succession. The anxiety of Charles was 
 considerable when his royal prisoner fell seriously 
 ill. The Emperor then paid him a visit, and by 
 jiving him fresh courage restored him to health. 
 
 The Treaty of Madrid, which set aside the rights 
 of France to any territory in Italy, and which took 
 away Burgundy from her, was not signed till after 
 Charles V, Henry YIII, Francis I, Cardinal Wolsey, 
 the Pope, the Eegent Louisa of Savoy, Duprat the 
 Emperor s Chancellor, and Gattinara his Minister, 
 had considered the matter very seriously. The ex- 
 aggerated pretensions of Charles Y. lessened Henry's 
 liking for the Emperor, and made him jealous of 
 his power. Louisa of Savoy, devoted to Francis I, 
 prudent and ambitious, seized, and took full advan- 
 tage of, the opportunity to force upon Henry VIII. 
 her money and her friendship, and to break the 
 alliance between England and the Empire. Charles 
 V. was content to conclude a treaty with France, 
 which was indeed advantageous, but less exorbitant 
 in its terms than the one he attempted at first to 
 obtain from Francis I. in his state of discourage- 
 
CHARLES V. 131 
 
 ment. The French and Spanish advisers, the Arch- 
 bishop of Embrun, Duprat, Gattinara, even Pescara 
 and Lannoy, expressed themselves in favour of 
 peace, every one of them according to circumstances 
 and to their views urging some conditions more 
 favourable in some points, or combating others 
 which were utterly unreasonable.^ Thus all these 
 persons, modifying their wishes in divers ways, and 
 looking more coolly at the opposing interests which 
 they had to support, concurred in bringing about 
 a treaty of peace. The King himself, during the 
 period of his captivity, was acted upon by various 
 influences. He first counted upon the generosity 
 of his rival, then on his vanity, and he addressed 
 various supplications to him. Then the King's 
 courage failed him ; he lost patience, and became 
 really ill ; until the imperturbable coldness with 
 which the Emperor treated him at length caused 
 him to reason as follows : he thought the partition 
 of France would entail eternal dishonour on the 
 country and on the s<3vereign ; that his death in 
 prison would be of no sort of advantage to France ; 
 France could be saved only by continuing the war, 
 and further, that the war could not be carried on 
 without him. It was therefore necessary above all 
 things to sign a treaty of peace, even if it were an 
 unfavourable one ; he would promise at the same 
 
 * Gattinara to the last remained faithful to the opinion that the 
 cession of Burgundy was an indispensable condition of the treaty. 
 (Gachard, CaptiviU, &c.) 
 
 K 2 
 
132 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 time to the French about his person not to execute 
 the treaty ; thus he should become free. This pro- 
 ject, favoured and supported as it was by the dis- 
 content of the people, by the jealousy inspired by 
 Charles V, and by the necessity of obtaining the 
 consent of the Estates to the cession of a French 
 province, was conceived, prepared, and carried into 
 effect with all the care, the silence, and the calmness 
 which despair could suggest to a soldier, who had 
 no other alternative before him, except the darkness 
 of a prison, a long agony, an obscure death, and the 
 misery of his country. The hardness of Charles V, 
 and his persistent insensibility, removed all scruples 
 of conscience on the part of Francis I. He lied 
 indeed ; but he had resolved to lie, and to say that 
 he had lied without flinching. He forgave him- 
 self his perjury beforehand, by giving a sort of 
 solemnity to his determination to break his promise, 
 and to annul his bond, and by drawing up before 
 / such of his advisers as were present in Madrid a 
 / protest to that effect. This authentic document 
 
 has come down to us. 
 
 III. 
 
 SccH was Francis I. at a most important crisis 
 of his life. We take an interest in his captivity, 
 and, after considering all the circumstances of the 
 moment, we are almost tempted to excuse the false 
 
CHARLES V. 135 
 
 oath which gave him his liberty. What he did at 
 Madrid, and after he left Madrid, is not incon- 
 sistent with the rest of his conduct. He was guilty 
 only this once in his life of a deliberate political 
 lie ; perhaps he might have acted thus again, had 
 the same necessity arisen ; it is not that he was 
 deficient in frankness, in good faith, or in grandeur 
 of character, but he was, above all things, frivolous, 
 carried away by his passions, heedless, and forgetful, 
 sometimes of his promises, but never of his pleasures. 
 At Madrid, at the age of thirty-two, he was no 
 longer what he had been at Marignan, and in sub- 
 sequent years. Misfortune, anxiety, and the rapid 
 deterioration of a naturally excellent constitution, 
 had already told on him. He then had the same 
 weaknesses which clung to him all through life : 
 imprudence, thoughtlessness, and want of conse- 
 quence in his ideas, were as visible in his affections 
 as they were in his projects. He was as changeable 
 about men as he was about public afiairs ; he 
 placed his confidence successively, with more or 
 less reason, in Duprat, Lautrec, Bonnivet, and 
 Montmorency. He had all the defects of character 
 which we have named, and he retained them 
 throughout his life. The brilliant qualities of his 
 youth had already lost much of their gloss. Under 
 all circumstances he invariably displayed undaunted 
 courage, and he risked on every occasion with gaiety 
 a life which at one time was so happy. Leaving 
 to others, frequently to unwise counsellors, the 
 
134 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 burden of military operations and all their details, 
 he loved battle for its own sake, as a purely phy- 
 sical and personal enjoyment ; but he took no in- 
 terest or pleasure in the combinations to be made 
 beforehand, or the fruits of the victory to be 
 gathered afterwards. Ardent, carried away and 
 intoxicated with the glory to be obtained by 
 courage in the melee, which was almost selfish in 
 its recklessness, he may be said to have been rather 
 adventurous than chivalrous ; there was nothing 
 lasting in his friendships, as there was nothing 
 disinterested in his ideas ; his conduct was totally 
 devoid of devotion or love of sacrifice. The election 
 to the Empire and the Treaty of Madrid show to 
 what a point he would go in his imprudent ardour 
 to attain his ends, and his readiness in getting 
 over any scruples as to means that might stand 
 in his way. These two events give the measure of 
 the man and paint his character. To brave all 
 obstacles, to neglect j^recautions, and to feel by 
 fits and starts all the best and some of the worst 
 sentiments — to despise logic — to defend, and then 
 abandon, the Italians — first to protect, and then to 
 burn, the protestants — to compromise the noblest 
 position and to ruin the finest constitution — these 
 were the contradictions which make up the character 
 of Francis I. as handed down to us in the men'.oii's 
 of the time. To view this brilliant apparition in 
 its fullest light, we must not look at him in his 
 premature old age, when he was morose, capricious, 
 
CHAllLES V. 135 
 
 and ill ; we must see him when he was young, tall, 
 robust, joyous, supple, and active, with a face, a 
 smile, and a wit which were charming, — a true child 
 of France, and one of whom France was proud, — 
 speaking the beautiful language of his country with 
 a vivacity and a gaiety remarkable for its Gallic 
 spirit and its pointed sarcasm. Excitable and 
 imaginative, he promoted the ideas of the Eenais- 
 sance ; fond of the arts, he believed honestly that 
 protection was as beneficial to them as independence, 
 and, in his fervent admiration for genius, he sup- 
 ported Leonardo da Vincfs dying head on his breast. 
 As brave and as well-bred, but less politic and less 
 prudent, he was handsomer than Henry lY. ; he 
 was as gallant, but more warlike and more frank 
 than Louis XIV. Francis L exhibits to us the 
 attractive but opposite characteristics of a soldier, 
 of a passionate lover of the chase, of a man of 
 pleasure, of an Epicurean who is fond of study, of 
 an assiduous scholar who dreams of being celebrated 
 in verse by Ariosto, who reads Thucydides, and 
 offers hospitality to Erasmus. 
 
 It was evident that the Treaty of Madrid had no 
 element of stability. On one side it had been 
 signed by Francis I. with a fixed determination to 
 break it ; on the other hand, it increased the dis- 
 quiet of Europe by confirming Charles V. in the 
 possession of a dominion which was exorbitant. 
 There was therefore among the other European 
 sovereigns, besides the King of France, an almost 
 
1:36 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 immediate desire to break the treaty. Had Francis T. 
 been more able and more prudent, lie would have 
 turned this disposition of the European sovereigns 
 towards the Emperor to his own profit— he would 
 have induced the other princes, who were alarmed 
 and jealous of the preponderance of Charles, to 
 contract solemn engagements with himself. The 
 public feeling in France, coinciding with that of 
 Europe, was moreover favourable to such a scheme. 
 The King found himself once more in one of those 
 positions where public opinion and general interests 
 seconded his efforts, and suggested his course — 
 when fortune, hitherto so favourable to Spain, might 
 perhaps have turned towards France, had Francis I. 
 possessed the same amount of prudence, of tenacity 
 of purpose, and of patience as he had of courage. 
 Henry VIII. felt as much alarmed for the indepen- 
 dence of Europe as for the safety of central Italy. 
 
 This situation of affairs was seen for a moment, 
 but it was not appreciated or quietly turned to his 
 own profit by Francis I. To do so indeed required 
 an immense and continued effort, with a strict and 
 decided agreement between those who were prin- 
 cipally interested, — between France, England, and 
 the Pope. Moreover, it was essential that the war 
 should be conducted with an energy and ability 
 sufficient to cope with the victorious troops of the 
 Empire. It was important that Francis I. and Ids 
 allies (who formed what was called the "Holy 
 League," because the Pope was at its head) should 
 
CHARLES V. 137 
 
 gain a great victory over the Imperialists. France 
 did not gain this victory; Rome was taken and 
 sacked by the troops of the Emperor, who found 
 he had made a prisoner of the Sovereign Pontiff' 
 as he had found himself on a former occasion the 
 gaoler of the King of France. 
 
 From that moment Charles V. again wished to 
 make peace. It could not suit his purpose, by 
 keeping the Pope prisoner, to favour any move- 
 ment in Italy, nor to encourage, by a struggle 
 between the Empire and the Holy See, the progress 
 of the Reformation in Germany. Moreover, the 
 Emperor s finances were at a low ebb, and the 
 Low Countries bore with an ill grace the burdens 
 of the war. 
 
 Francis I. also was anxious for peace, because 
 it was imperatively required by the material exhaus- 
 tion of his kingdom, because his mother, who then 
 had gi'eat influence in the government of the 
 country, counselled it, and because he wished to 
 see his children, who were still hostages in the 
 hands of Charles V. 
 
 The Peace of Cambrai, called the ''Paix des Dames" 
 (Ladies' Peace), was signed by Louisa of Savoy 
 and Margaret of Austria : its distinctive trait was 
 that Charles V. renounced the claim on Burgundy, 
 which the Treaty of Madrid had given him. In 
 a certain sense he went out pf his way to make 
 this sacrifice, since he knew he could not deprive 
 France of so important a province, unless he began 
 
138 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 by invading the French territory. His aunt, Mar- 
 garet of Austria, was his political guide in this 
 matter. " Your finances," she said, " are too much 
 disordered for you to continue the war. If the 
 King of France signs the treaty, you will see that 
 he will sacrifice all his allies." The treaty did in 
 fact exact from Francis I. the abandonment of all 
 his political associates. 
 
 The Peace of Cambrai, concluded three years 
 after the Treaty of Madrid (1526-1529), confirmed 
 the principles of the latter ; it marks a second un- 
 lucky stage in the career of Francis I, less unlucky 
 than the first only because, after fresh disasters to 
 the allies of France, the French monarch by this 
 treaty lost no province. It was however a further 
 advantage gained by the Emperor over the King ; 
 it again indicated the superiority of the forces of 
 which he disposed, and perhaps still more his own 
 personal ascendency. This treaty, which isolated 
 Fra,nce from the rest of Europe, was negotiated 
 in the name of the Emperor with great skill. It 
 left in his hands the Milanese, which he had ob- 
 tained by the victory of Pavia; and it confirmed 
 him 'anew in the possession of Milan itself, an 
 important and definitive result in the history of 
 this reign. 
 
 The Treaty of Barcelona, made with the Pope, 
 is dated about the same time as the Treaty of 
 Cambrai. It re-established the power of the Medicis 
 at Florence, spite of Michel Angelo. It was then 
 
CHARLES V. 139 
 
 that Clement VII. placed the crown of the Empire 
 and the iron crown of Lombardy on the head of 
 Charles V. 
 
 About thirty-six years had now elapsed since 
 Charles VIII. of France had undertaken his ex- 
 pedition against Naples. Three Kings of France in 
 an indirect line had succeeded each other : but the 
 last of the three had been much more glorious in 
 his outset, and much more illustrious by his qualities 
 than the other two : they all three had waged 
 war in Italy, first against the Spanish forces, then 
 against armies composed of Spaniards, Germans, 
 and Italians. They had gained victories, they had 
 held Milan and Naples, had given assistance to the 
 republics, and had encouraged the Italians in their 
 last struggles* for independence. But their success 
 had not made up for their reverses. For the most 
 part these wars had been conducted by the Kings 
 of France with negligence and want of order : the 
 troops had been ill supplied, and more than once the 
 command of them had been bestowed on the prin- 
 ciple of favour rather than of merit. In the end, 
 France was driven out of Italy. The country from 
 the foot of the Alps to its very extremity had 
 been subjugated. It appeared a settled thing that 
 Spain was to be the mistress of the Mediterranean 
 and of Italy, especially now that the sceptre of the 
 Empire and of Spain were united in one and the 
 same hand. 
 
140 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Wh;en the Treaty of Cambrai was signed, Charles 
 had reigned for thirteen years as King, and ten as 
 Emperor. He was twenty-nine years of age ; 
 fortune had been propitious to him in his election 
 and in two wars ; the first had been marked by the 
 victory of Pavia and the captivity of Francis I, and 
 the second by the happy conduct of the war against 
 France, the sack of Rome, and the captivity of the 
 Pope. The Emperor had not yet reached the middle 
 of his reign, the whole of which was destined to be 
 as full of incidents as the first half had been. He 
 already had full occupation in dealing with France, 
 with the north, with Italy, and with those coun- 
 tries where the Ottoman armies had made their 
 appearance ; but his policy was destined to be 
 further complicated by military and religious afiaii-s 
 in Germany. It is true that these matters only 
 reached their crisis towards the latter part of his 
 reign, but the difiiculties were already evident 
 enough and were increasing. We must touch 
 slightly on this point. 
 
 The war between Charles V. and the protestant 
 princes of Germany forms one of the important 
 episodes in the latter part of his reign which we 
 have not yet nearly reached. But at different times 
 during his earlier years, even before the promulgation 
 
CHAELES V. 141 
 
 of the Confession of Augsburg, the existence of the 
 Eeformation was one of the objects which occupied 
 his thoughts and was a cause of embarrassment. 
 It interfered with other events which were equally 
 grave and complicated, and added much to the 
 general confusion. The war in which the pro- 
 testants took part in the reign of Charles V. be- 
 longs to the history of that long struggle which 
 began with the first preachings of Luther, and was 
 only definitively closed by the Peace of Kyswick, 
 when, after the second English revolution, Louis 
 XIV. recognised the throne of William III. During 
 this long period the war was carried on between 
 the power of the monarch in defence of its prin- 
 ciple and its authority on the one side, and on 
 the other, those who maintained the right of ^ee 
 inquiry, almost indefinite in its character and un- 
 limited in its action ; these last were assisted by 
 such elements of the old feudal state of society, and 
 of that which succeeded it, as yet remained alive 
 or could be resuscitated. If we observe this 
 struggle, at the time of the League of Smalcalde, 
 during the wars of religion in France, during the 
 Thirty Years' War, and at the beginning of the 
 wars of the Fronde, we shall see in the main 
 the selfsame principles reproduced. The reformers, 
 like the feudal chiefs, put forward claims to control 
 and modify — the one the religion, the other the 
 politics of their time. 
 
 In the reign of Charles V. the reformers ranged 
 
142 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 themselves under the name of Luther, and the 
 party of the princes or other leaders under that of 
 the Elector of Saxony, of the Landgrave of Hesse, 
 or of other German princes who were less con- 
 spicuous. The princes knew perfectly well what 
 they were about, and why they were the adver- 
 saries of the Empire ; but the reformers of that 
 day were less sure of what they thought and be- 
 lieved, or what it was they wanted. The Eeforma- 
 tion was at its first stage, its ideas were not fixed, 
 and its next step undecided. It could not be other- 
 wise. It has effected a great revolution in men's 
 minds and in the states of Europe : but those who 
 first promulgated and supported its doctrines only 
 advanced its progress by one step. If we observe 
 its fcareer from the first appearance of Luther only 
 down to the latter years of Calvin, we see at once 
 that it carried one point after another in its attack 
 on the old dogmas. If we were to attempt to 
 express by a succession of proper names the steps 
 in the progress thus made, we should cite, as 
 answering to the successive shades of the Keforma- 
 tion, the names of Erasmus, Melancthon, Luther, 
 Zuingli, and Calvin. Erasmus specified and attacked 
 the abuses of the Church, but he did not leave 
 its pale. Melancthon, who was the head of the 
 Keformation next to Luther, was distracted by 
 doubts and regrets during the greater part of 
 his life : in his hostility to the Church he showed 
 the natural indecision of his character and of his 
 
CHARLES V. 143 
 
 temperament. Luther, as the base of his doctrine, 
 maintained justification by faith without works ; 
 that is to say, the necessity of the direct correspon- 
 dence of man with the Deity without the inter- 
 vention of the Church. He maintained its tenets 
 in certain points, and altered them in others ; but 
 he personally respected the dogma of the real 
 presence in the sacred elements, Zuingli de- 
 nounced that dogma, and this is what marks the 
 difference between the Swiss and the Saxon re- 
 former. If we are to express concisely the true 
 position of Calvin, he was in fact the organizer 
 of the reformed Church. These are distinctions 
 which we perceive at the present time, but which 
 were far from clearly seen by the people of that day. 
 Those who like Charles V. had to deal with the 
 reformers as with adversaries whom it was ne- 
 cessary to fight, or to bring to some compromise, 
 — those who were witnesses to its first develop- 
 ment, — saw clearly enough that Calvin was a 
 much more determined and intractable spirit than 
 Melancthon to deal with, but they did not appre- 
 ciate the full importance of the questions which 
 separated the two men. In 1521, the Diet of 
 Worms had adopted the first repressive measures 
 against the Keformation. From this time until the 
 day when he went to war with the protestants, 
 after having given up all idea of dealing gently 
 with them — that is to say, for a period of about 
 twenty-five years — Charles V. hesitated, with regard 
 
14:4 HISTORICAL ESSAY.S. 
 
 to the reformers, between peace and war, between 
 concession and resistance, between toleration and 
 repression. His constant tendency was to give up 
 points of secondary importance, and to maintain 
 those which he held to be fundamental. But the 
 question as to what points were merely accessory, 
 and what were essential, was never cleared up or 
 decided for him. There never could be any doubt 
 as to the real presence ; Luther did not attack it ; 
 but the communion by the laity in both kinds, the 
 celibacy of the clergy, and, above all, the toleration 
 of priests already married under the influence of the 
 new ideas, a modification of the rules for fasting, 
 and the regulation of festivals and holidays — was it 
 possible for all these things to be admitted without 
 injuring and shaking to its very foundation the 
 unity of the Church? Charles V. asked himself 
 this question long and frequently. His mind was 
 long occupied with some scheme, the object of 
 which, — not very well defined, — was to stave off 
 the Keformation by certain measures of toleration. 
 The exact point where such toleration was to cease 
 was never fixed in his mind. He searched for it 
 assiduously, and, by making war against the re- 
 formers as against rebels, during the latter part of 
 his reign, he gave the world to understand that he 
 had not succeeded in finding it. The danger which 
 menaced Catholicism struck him less forcibly than 
 the danger likely to arise from the abolition of 
 all restraint on men's minds, and from a right of 
 

 OHAHLES V. 
 
 free inquiry applicable to all subjects ; the course 
 of which was as difficult to foresee as it was for 
 Charles himself to say at what point he should 
 begin his resistance. 
 
 When he met the protestants in arms, he showed 
 himself a devoted son of the Church. He had 
 been such at the beginning of his life, when the 
 Keformation gave him no embarrassment ; and he 
 was such also at the end of his career, when he had 
 determined to wage war with the reformers as 
 with a hostile power. But in the interval, while 
 the religious dispute lasted, his conscience allowed 
 him a certain latitude. He felt that he could 
 exercise a sort of gentle pressure upon the papacy, 
 so as to bring it to make concessions which he 
 thought desirable. His constant wish was to get 
 the whole question discussed at a General Council, 
 in which the new doctrines of the Eeformation 
 would have been duly represented, and allowed free 
 liberty of speech. 
 
 Such is, according to our view, the position of 
 Charles Y. at that^period of his life, with reference 
 to the Eeformation. At epochs which approach 
 nearer to our own times, the Eeformation has some- 
 times been viewed in a somewhat similar manner. 
 It has been said the Eeformation did not spring 
 from the sale of indulgences, nor from the per- 
 sonal resistance of Melancthon or of Luther, nor 
 was it caused by the riotous living of Alexander 
 VI. ; it had its origin in causes of a very general 
 
 L 
 
146 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 character, such as the old antagonism between the 
 Holy See and the Empire, the conquering and 
 crafty conduct of the Popes of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury, the position of certain of the German princes 
 in regard to the Empire, the flagrant and yet re- 
 mediable abuses of the Church, the exaggeration 
 of the intellectual movement of the Renaissance, 
 — that is to say, it was traceable to causes which 
 are historical, transitory, and changeable, and not 
 to any distinct state of men's minds, which ren- 
 dered some new dogma necessary. If this was the 
 case, it may be asked whether so absolute a sepa- 
 ration between the Church and the Reformation 
 was inevitable. Was not a compromise possible, 
 when men had had to deal, — not with Popes so 
 absorbed in their temporal power and their ex- 
 istence as sovereigns, as were Alexander VI, Julius 
 II, Leo X, and Clement VII, — but with Popes as 
 religious, as austere, and as politically disinterested 
 as Adrian VI. ? Would not the progress of Luther- 
 anism in such a case have come to an end ? Did 
 not the unflinching resistance it encountered aggra- 
 vate and strengthen the movement ? Ideas such as 
 these, discussed by the bolder Roman Catholic 
 historians in perfect liberty and without alarming 
 their consciences, germinated, as they well might, 
 in the active but irresolute brain of Charles V. 
 He asked himself vaguely, but patiently, whether it 
 were not possible for a mediator, powerful as him- 
 self, to brino; about a solution of this danircrous 
 
CHAKLES V. 147 
 
 problem, and whether some reconciliation were not 
 possible in terms which should embrace both the 
 generous and pious toleration of Adrian and the 
 ideas of Erasmus — ideas, however, which only 
 pointed out the abuses without specifying the re- 
 medies ; and which claimed the exercise of the 
 right of private judgment in theory, while in 
 practice the boldness of the philosopher was to be 
 compatible with the submission of the orthodox 
 Christian ? 
 
 But we must not dwell too long on considerations 
 which at no epoch had much effect on the events 
 of religious history, and which would be out of 
 place here, were it not that they serve to define, 
 in a tolerably exact manner, the undecided con- 
 dition of Charles's mind with reference to the new 
 religion. 
 
 The conduct of the Imperial Diets with regard 
 to the Eeformation was not more consistent than 
 that of the Emperor. The decisions given at the 
 Diet at Worms in 1521, at Spire in 1526 and in 
 1529, and at Augsburg in 1530, were at variance 
 one with the other. The Diet of Worms was 
 severe, the first Diet at Spire was more tolerant, 
 the second again was more severe ; and at the Diet 
 of Augsburg, where the Confession of Melancthon 
 was promulgated, a profound separation, if not 
 the positive rupture, between the Emperor and the 
 princes favourable to the Eeformation was strongly 
 marked. The Confession of Augsburg was meant 
 
 l2 
 
148 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 by Melancthon to be a conciliatory exposition 
 of the objects of the reformers ; but he never 
 indulged in the hope of its being accepted as a com- 
 promise. The Emperor, at the Diet of Augsburg, 
 endeavoured without success, as at former Diets, to 
 find some common ground for such a compromise. 
 The Confession of Augsburg comprehends the fol- 
 lowing principal articles : Justification by faith 
 without works ; communion in both kinds ; and 
 the marriage of the priests. It modifies in other 
 paragraphs the worship of saints, the rules of fast- 
 ing and of festivals, and monastic vows. It indi- 
 cates, in an evident manner, the impossibility of 
 any reconciliation between the State and the re- 
 formed Church, which had been the object of the 
 Emperor's vain desire. We may probably date 
 from this time the change which Charles V.'s ideas 
 underwent in regard to the Keformation ; hence- 
 forth the hope of living at peace with the reformers 
 vanished from his mind. He saw three dangers 
 which threatened his throne : the political union 
 of the Protestants with the King of France, a 
 violent explosion against the Empire, and a great 
 encouragement to the projects of the Sultan. 
 
 After he had ended two wars and signed two 
 treaties of peace with France, an epoch occurs in 
 the life of Charles V. which is in some degree one 
 of transition. The causes of the antagonism with 
 France were not exhausted, but the Emperor was 
 already thinking that, in order to complete the 
 
CHARLES V. 149 
 
 whole of his undertakings, and to fulfil all his duties, 
 he must of necessity take up arms at some time 
 against the protestant princes of Germany. He 
 did not yet see the end of his struggle with France, 
 but he clearly foresaw the struggle in Germany. 
 Although still young in years, illness had already 
 weakened him. He occupied a great and strong 
 position : he had everywhere maintained his power ; 
 his armies were victorious, and his territory intact ; 
 Italy had several times repelled the attacks of 
 Francis I. But the triumphs of Charles V. had left 
 him in an uneasy condition : he was not in peaceful 
 possession of his conquests ; the war had again 
 broken out on the confines of the Alps, and in 
 Picardy. It appeared as though Francis I. could 
 not brook seeing the Emperor the master in the 
 south and in the north of Italy. Both belligerents 
 were oppressed by a feeling of lassitude, and by 
 financial difficulties ; both had political reasons for 
 continuing the war, and strong material reasons 
 for putting an end to it. 
 
 The power of Charles V. was great enough, and 
 his superiority quite sufficiently real, for him to be 
 the mainspring of European affairs ; the condition of 
 things ought to be his work, and their character and 
 their incidents certainly ought to bear the impress 
 of his thoughts and of his will. His ambition no 
 longer was to conquer France ; she was conquered : 
 but his ambition would shortly be to make him- 
 self the master of Germany. Anyhow it was 
 
150 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 necessary to end the French war, without com- 
 promising or losing anything, and an operation 
 which had already absorbed so many years, which 
 had had its difficulties and its perils, might take a 
 long time to bring to a conclusion, especially when 
 he who regulates its progress was by nature slow 
 to move and to act. This phase in the career of 
 Charles V, which we have thus endeavoured to 
 illustrate, was not one of short duration. He felt 
 a longing ambition to transport his armies into 
 Germany ; but he was determined from the very 
 first, when the idea entered his head, not to burden 
 himself with the weight of two wars at once. 
 
 It was at this epoch that Charles V. himself made 
 his glorious campaign against Barbarossa in Tunis, 
 and returned to Europe with a reputation for per- 
 sonal prowess which his previous triumphs, due to 
 the merit of his lieutenants, had not yet obtained 
 for him. On the other hand, a thought seems now 
 to have struck him for the first time : it was that 
 his power was too vast to be solid and lasting ; too 
 vast for it to be possible for him to transmit it 
 without danger, or for it to last after him. This 
 thought was destined to arise again in his mind ; 
 it was to be the cause of profound meditation on 
 his part, and the origin of projects which afterwards 
 took a consistent form, but of which a part only 
 was realized at the time of his abdication. When 
 he was occupied with preparations for making peace 
 with France, and, further still, witli the war against 
 
CHARLES V. 151 
 
 the protestant princes of Germany, he also con- 
 sidered whether, in order to consolidate and con- 
 centrate his forces, it would not be prudent to 
 detach from the mass of his possessions one or 
 other territory, to which a special destination should 
 l)e given, of such a nature as to tranquillize Europe. 
 
 Although we now possess a voluminous mass of 
 the private correspondence of Charles V, collected 
 from the different archives of Europe, we have not 
 yet found the key to all his secrets : we are forced 
 to guess at their solution. His character was so 
 essentially reserved, that he did not open his heart 
 to his brother, nor even to Margaret of Austria, 
 who was often his guide ; nor yet to his advisers, 
 Gattinara, or Granvelle, — in fact, to no one in 
 Spain, Germany, or in the Low Countries. 
 
 The correspondence with Margaret of Austria 
 proves that at this period his embarrassments were 
 on the increase in Flanders ; the people were 
 becoming more embittered, as the calls were more 
 frequent for contributions from means which were 
 smaller. The financial resources of Charles V. were 
 never equal to his wants. His territorial power 
 was always out of all proportion to his means, and 
 even beyond the force which he possessed for organ- 
 izing his armies. The Low Countries, the richest 
 of his dominions, furnished subsidies for his wars, 
 with considerable repugnance for some time, and 
 offered a vigorous resistance to the demands of 
 Margaret of Austria when their means were ex- 
 
152 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 hausted, or were on the point of being so. The 
 letters of Margaret of Austria are full of anxiety 
 when she narrates the discussions of the Estates, 
 theii' discontent and their menacing language : she 
 presses on them with patient energy ; but she finds 
 herself driven to various expedients, such as mort- 
 gaging the future taxes in order to raise money for 
 present use ; and she foresees domestic misery and 
 danger in case the war were prolonged.^ 
 
 It was under the influence of these remote pro- 
 jects on Germany, and of his ideas on the necessity 
 of preparing for war with the reformers, that 
 Charles Y. was induced to conclude with Francis I. 
 a truce for ten years, called the "Truce of Nice." 
 In the midst of his various difiiculties and embar- 
 rassments, this was in fact the principal motive for 
 his wish to interrupt, if not to put an end to, the 
 French war. This arrangement seems to have been 
 intended to give time to the two contracting 
 powers to reflect before entering upon more 
 definite treaties. 
 
 The signing of this document implies no change 
 in the feelings of Charles V. towards Francis I. 
 It was but a short time before that, on his return 
 from Africa, in his passage through Italy, Charles 
 had made a violent speech at Eome against the 
 King of France, in the presence of the Pope and of 
 
 ^ These facts arc narrated in detail and with great exactness in the 
 learned work of M. Alexandre Henne, Histoire du Bbgne d^ CJtarles V. 
 en Belgiquc. 10 vols. 8vo. 
 
CHARLES V. 153 
 
 a large assembly of prelates. This expression of 
 his true feelings escaped him during a violent fit of 
 passion, but he took measures the next day to soften 
 down what he had said. 
 
 Francis I, who was prevented by the exhausted 
 state of his finances from prolonging the war, signed 
 the truce, which, in its provisional form, still left 
 open to him the hope of some day recovering the 
 duchy of Milan. 
 
 The two sovereigns did not meet at Nice ; but 
 at Aigues-Mortes they had an interview, which the 
 Pope, to the great annoyance of the King of 
 England, facilitated and encouraged. 
 
 V. 
 
 Thus the two rivals were again reconciled for a 
 time, but the reconciliation was not to last long. 
 This pacific arrangement which they had just signed 
 was the fourth : for they had treated one with the 
 other at Noyon, at Madrid, at Cambrai, and at Nice. 
 The first time they had not yet had recourse to 
 arms ; on the other occasions it was after a contest 
 in which Charles V. had been victorious. The most 
 important result of these wars was, that Charles 
 acquired the Milanese territory in the first war, and 
 that he held possession of it during the rest of the 
 time. He kept his preponderance in Italy, and 
 
154 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 maintained his influence in the centre of the 
 peninsula, by his hold on its two extremities. 
 
 The Emperor and the King had not yet given up 
 the idea of fighting. Nevertheless, they were both of 
 them okler than their years warranted ; for Charles V. 
 approached his fortieth year before the termination 
 of the truce, and Francis I. was forty-five. Both of 
 them had been very ill, and their constitutions 
 were seriously impaired ; that of the King of France 
 by his excesses, that of the Emperor by violent and 
 frequent attacks of gout. From the year 1535, at 
 the age of thirty-five, the Emperor had already 
 thought of abdicating, and of retiring from the 
 world The temper of the two monarchs, their 
 ardour, their activity of mind, had felt the effect 
 of these maladies and these sufierings. For them 
 old age had commenced, with its moroseness, its 
 feeling of hopelessness, its sorrows, and its peculiar 
 manner of looking at the things of this life and 
 what remains of it. 
 
 Charles V. had returned to Spain after the truce. 
 In a short time he had to occupy himself with 
 an important event, and to put himself out of 
 his way to meet it. This event was the outbreak 
 of an insurrection in Ghent. 
 
 The Municipality of Ghent, as the fourth member 
 of Flanders,^ had to pay its share of an aid to which 
 the Estates of the province had given their assent ; 
 but, their money and their patience being exhausted, 
 
 ^ Witli Brngcs, Y\n'bs, and " The Fttinchise." 
 
CHARLES V. 105 
 
 the people of Ghent refused to pay, and took up 
 arms. Under the circumstances in which Europe 
 was then placed, it was a question whether this 
 movement was made at the instigation of France, 
 or whether there was any intelligence and sym- 
 pathy on the part of Ghent with the Eeformation 
 in Germany. The documents which M. Gachard 
 has collected on this subject have completely proved 
 that the insurrection of Ghent is to be attributed to 
 a revival of the old municipal spirit, combined with 
 great financial distress and discontent.^ The Re- 
 formation had very little to do with it, and France 
 absolutely nothing. The insurrection was very 
 violent in character. Since the time when Philip 
 the Good, by the Treaty of Gavre, in 1453, had 
 reduced and almost annihilated the ancient privi- 
 leges of the municipality of Ghent, that city had 
 received a new charter, in the year 1477, from the 
 feeble government of Mary of Burgundy ; and on 
 this charter the Municipality rested its right to 
 refuse the subsidy. Money was asked for : men 
 were offered. Charles wanted artillery and cavalry, 
 while Ghent proposed to send foot soldiers. Some 
 incidents occurred worth noting. The ancient privi- 
 leges of the Commune, granted by the old Counts 
 of Flanders, were preserved in an iron chest with 
 three keys ; this chest could only be got at through 
 a moveable trap-door in a ceiling.^ The chest had 
 
 1 Relation des Troubles de Gand en 1539. 1 vol. 4to. 
 
 2 Memoires de M. Gh. Steur sur Jes Troubles de Gand, in the collection 
 of the Memoires couromics de VAcademie royale de Belgiqne. 
 
156 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tliree padlocks, the keys of which were entrusted 
 to the keeping of the three deans of the Guilds. 
 In 1536, the dean of the Weavers had mislaid his 
 key. The town locksmith, ordered to make another 
 key, had broken one of the padlocks ; and suspicion 
 of treachery was raised against one of the other 
 deans who had lent his key for the operation. It 
 was alleged that the chest had been forced, and the 
 charters removed or changed. These circumstances, 
 to which people added details which were exag- 
 gerated, imaginary, and superstitious, recurred to 
 men's minds when the insurrection broke out. The 
 dean on whom suspicion rested was brought to trial, 
 condemned, and executed. The popular movement 
 went through all the regular phases of a revolution : 
 it began with the middle classes, and was soon 
 taken out of their hands by the democracy. The 
 Governess of the Low Countries sent some one 
 authorized to negotiate, or deal with them with 
 vigour, as might be necessary. The middle class 
 then again got the upper hand for a time. Margaret 
 of Austria, who had died some years before, had 
 been succeeded as Governess of the Low Countries 
 by Mary, the widow of Louis II. King of Hun- 
 gary, and sister of Charles V. Mary of Hungary, 
 with a totally different character, likewise brought 
 to this task extreme good sense and great courage. 
 
 The Emperor, who was at Madrid when the news 
 of what was occurring in the Low Countries was 
 brought to him, attached great importance to these 
 
CHARLES V. 157 
 
 events. After careful consideration he resolved to 
 go in person to the revolted city, and to finish 
 the matter himself. This resolution, taken dispas- 
 sionately and coolly, was executed with remarkable 
 firmness and deliberation. 
 
 Charles V. and Francis I. were at that time on 
 friendly terms. Francis I, urged by Montmorency, 
 offered to shorten the Emperor's journey by allow- 
 ing him a passage across France, and he promised 
 him not only a respectful but a cordial reception. 
 Charles Y. accepted the invitation, and made the 
 journey without the slightest precipitation, pro- 
 longing his stay in the large towns, accepting the 
 fetes given to him, and travelling as if in triumph 
 rather than as a sovereign on his way to put down 
 an insurrection. It was quite sufficient that in 
 Flanders they should know he was coming. He 
 made it a point of honour to show that he was in 
 no hurry ; and he thus gave to all he did in the 
 matter a character of force, of calmness, and of 
 grandeur. He arrived at Ghent, not with a force 
 sufficient to put down an insurrection, but at the 
 head of a formidable army, consisting of four or 
 five thousand horse drawn from Germany, and of 
 other troops whom the people of Ghent had to 
 receive at free quarters, as a first instalment of the 
 punishment in store for them. 
 
 The entry of Charles V. into Ghent was that of 
 a conqueror ; and his power of repression was such 
 that the revolt never again lifted up its head. The 
 
158^ HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 punishment itself was as slow and as cold as tlie 
 preparations of the expedition had been. Justice 
 was exact and inflexible : but it had not the cha- 
 racter of vengeance, because there was not a particle 
 of passion in its application. Charles V. conducted 
 the proceedings against the people of Ghent with 
 as much coolness as any one w^ould make up an 
 account. He did not shed blood for blood; he 
 tracked the guilty, one by one, without passion, but 
 without mercy ; he did what he thought was neces- 
 sary, not so much to punish the rebellion as to make 
 its renewal impossible. After having done with the 
 insurgents, he looked to the institutions ; he abolished 
 the communal privileges of which the people of 
 Ghent had made such dangerous use, and he re- 
 placed them by a celebrated enactment, the object 
 of which was to provide for the future as well 
 as for the present, and to subject once for all 
 to a monarchical regime a town which had thought 
 itself in the full enjoyment of a republican form 
 of government. The chief feature in the change 
 was, that the magistrates, who had hitherto been 
 chosen by the people, by virtue of the new ordi- 
 nance became imperial ofiicers. When this operation 
 was completed, Charles V. quitted Flanders without 
 l)ctraying any feeling, save the proud satisfaction of 
 having discharged his duty as a monarch with calm 
 determination.^ 
 
 ' See an excellent address made by Professor Borgnet, at the opening; 
 of the Academic Session of lAhgG of 1852-53 ; lidatiou anonyme rff.s- 
 
CHAiiLP:s V. 159 
 
 At other critical times of his life Charles V. did 
 not always act as we have seen him act at Ghent 
 in the presence of the insurrection of a city. In 
 this case there was no complication to guard against, 
 and no choice to make between two courses. In his 
 eyes the revolt of Ghent had nothing to do with 
 affairs in France, nor with those of Germany. 
 The continuation of the troubles however would 
 doubtless increase the difficulty of raising money in 
 Flanders, and might thus compromise the prestige 
 of the imperial power. He could not therefore 
 hesitate. The path was clearly marked, and he 
 followed it with the most even and firm step. 
 
 The insurrection at Ghent is but an isolated episode 
 in the life of Charles V, and by no means one of the 
 most important pages of his reign. If in it he 
 showed, as far as regarded the insurgents, a firmness 
 of execution and an energy of decision — which were 
 not always seen in him — it was, doubtless, because 
 the insurrection was not mixed up with other matters, 
 and because it did not lead him to fear any general 
 consequences. In his political schemes the Low 
 Countries, where he was born, by no means occu- 
 pied the first rank ; but they were a great resource 
 
 Troubles cle Gaud ; Histoire du Begne de Charles V. by M. Alexander 
 Henne, vol. v. and vi. ; Memoir e de M. Steiir. The sentence is to 
 be found in the Appendix to the Narrative of the Troubles of Ghent, 
 p. 134-153. The magistrates are named directly by the Emperor 
 (Art. 2) ; the guilds were reduced from fifty-three to twenty-one 
 (Art. 69) ; the Collace, a representative meeting of the three members 
 of the city, was replaced by a meeting of the magistrates of the current 
 year, and of the two preceding years (Art. 67). 
 
160 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 to him in his financial difficulties. They were much 
 more seriously menaced during all this epoch by 
 the northern allies of France, by the League of the 
 north, by Guelderland and her allies, than by France 
 herself. The contest indeed took place more than 
 once on the southern frontiers of the TjOW Coun- 
 tries, in Picardy, and on the banks of the Somme. 
 It was especially so at the time when Henry VIII. 
 took the side of the Emperor. But the Low Coun- 
 tries themselves never formed one of the principal 
 objects of the war, nor did they ever on their own 
 account become a cause of pressing danger or of 
 grave embarrassment. With the exception of the 
 insurrection at Ghent, Charles V. for the most part 
 left the entire management of affairs in the Low 
 Countries to Margaret of Austria, his aunt, and to 
 Mary of Hungary, his sister. He placed the most 
 absolute confidence in both of them and in some 
 of those who were about them, or who were in 
 command of the troops. They both served Charles V. 
 with unbounded zeal and devotion ; and, as we have 
 already remarked, they occasionally went beyond 
 the limits of their government, and interfered, either 
 by word of mouth or actively, in the general policy 
 of Europe. 
 
 Charles V. had just crossed France without fear : 
 so far as appearances went his reception had been 
 friendly. He was at peace with Francis I ; and 
 he travelled through his country like an honoured 
 guest. Thus the French king, who had refused all 
 
CHARLES V. 161 
 
 the advances and the proposals for an alliance, on 
 the part of the people of Ghent, appeared to give 
 to Charles V. every facility for suppressing the revolt. 
 Nevertheless, the questions at issue between France 
 and the Empire had not been by any means arranged. 
 Burgundy, as well as a part of Piedmont, still re- 
 mained in the hands of the French monarch ; and 
 the Milanese territory was still retained by Charles. 
 Meanwhile the Protestants were increasing in num- 
 bers, and had levied a regular army ; the Sultan had 
 not ceased to menace the Austrian dominions, and 
 the Barbary pirates still infested the shores of the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 Had the recently published correspondence of 
 Charles Y. been as ample on the subject of the 
 events of this epoch as they are on those of sub- 
 sequent years, we should probably know the exact 
 truth concerning these important circumstances. 
 
 This much, however, is quite certain, that the 
 invitation given to Charles V. to travel through 
 France was much more than a mere act of civility ; 
 and his acceptance indicated something very dif- 
 ferent from the wish to take the shortest possible 
 route to Ghent. 
 
 When this journey took place, the idea of an 
 understanding between the Empire and France, — 
 the germ of which existed between the two monarchs 
 when the Treaty of Nice was signed, — had deve- 
 loped itself and had taken decided hold on the 
 mind of Charles Y. On the side of France, this 
 
 M 
 
^ 
 
 162 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 idea had made some progress, not so much with 
 the King as among those immediately about him 
 who directed public affairs. The Emperor wanted 
 peace with France : the Constable de Montmorency, 
 and all those who were of his party, especially the 
 Dauphin and his mistress, were of the same mind. 
 It is a question whether any conferences were held 
 during the journey through France between Charles 
 and Francis, or between Charles and Montmorency ; 
 and whether the conditions of a peace were proposed. 
 It is a question whether the party of the Constable, 
 which was anxious for peace, made any overtures, 
 or received any advances, on this point, without the 
 knowledge or the consent of the French monarch. 
 On all these points there are great doubts. 
 
 What we can affirm is, that Charles V. was quite 
 prepared to make sacrifices in. order to obtain peace ; 
 and that Francis I. was persuaded that the hospi- 
 tality ofiered to the Emperor deserved, and would 
 obtain, some considerable territorial recompense — 
 that is to say, the Milanese territory. 
 
 This was a pure illusion, which had its origin in 
 the imagination of Francis I, — an illusion which 
 Montmorency, unwise as he frequently showed him- 
 self, never shared. Moreover, Charles Y. cannot be 
 accused of having encouraged such an idea, although 
 during the journey, by the use of kindly and adroit 
 language, he flattered the French with the prospect 
 of better times for the future. 
 
 On the part of the Emperor, however, and of 
 
CHARLES V. 163 
 
 Montmorency, this journey is remarkable in con- 
 nexion with an important scheme, deeply pondered 
 by the Emperor, and taken up lightly and blindly 
 by the Constable. These two men had some prin- 
 ciples in common. Montmorency, mistaking the 
 tendencies and the true interest of the policy of 
 France, was willing to abet the Emperor in his 
 schemes, which were to put down the religious 
 movement in Germany, and to resist the Turks. 
 Moreover, he was in favour of opposing the repub- 
 lican principle wheresoever it yet existed in Italy, 
 and all political or religious liberty in Germany ; 
 he therefore was eager to give every facility to 
 the Emperor to put down the insurrection of the 
 Communes in Ghent. At one time he even dreamt 
 of the partition of England between Spain, France, 
 and Scotland, as the result of an alliance between 
 France and the Emperor. Such was the licence 
 which the Constable allowed to his imagination. 
 For some years Charles V. had cherished, and had 
 ended by almost adopting, an idea which we may 
 term vast, even if we deny it to be just. He 
 wished to bring the French war to an end, to 
 devote all his energies to the suppression of the 
 German League, and to stop the advance of the 
 Turks : he was prepared to make some territorial 
 sacrifice, with the double view of tranquillising 
 France and Europe, while he buoght up their 
 interest, and at the same time he made his own 
 power more compact. He therefore proposed, not 
 
 M 2 
 
164 HISTORICAL p:ssays. 
 
 indeed during his sojourn in France, but shortly 
 afterwards, to bring about a marriage between the 
 Duke of Orleans, and either his own daughter, or 
 his niece — his brother's daughter, — to give to the 
 bride, as a marriage portion, the Milanese territory 
 — on condition it should revert to him on failure 
 of children of the marriage ; or else he offered to 
 bestow on them a state formed out of the Low 
 Countries and of Franche-Comt^, with certain 
 dependencies : which thus would have formed a 
 kingdom of Belgian Gaul, or have re-created a 
 duchy of Burgundy. 
 
 This scheme, so worthy of attention, and so long 
 meditated, is one of a generous, prudent, and 
 original character. It is the scheme of one who 
 thinks his power too vast and too much separated ; 
 of one who already feels the approach of infirmi- 
 ties ; of one who still thinks he has a great mission 
 to perform, and reflects on his approaching end : it 
 is the scheme of one who felt he should some day 
 renounce the exercise of his enormous power, and 
 retire to a monastery. There was sufiicient in the 
 scheme to captivate in France the party which 
 wished to close the war, to stifle the Eeformation, 
 to combat the movement in favour of German 
 independence, and to put down the last efforts of 
 Italian liberty. 
 
 We can no longer say now-a-days, as was said 
 in other times, that, in the course of his journey 
 through France and afterwards, Charles, both in 
 
CHARLES V. 165 
 
 his conversations and in his negotiations, gave proof 
 only of a most manifest falseness. We may fairly 
 admit that he was undecided between the creation 
 on certain conditions of a kingdom of Burgundy 
 or a kingdom of Milan. But it is difficult to deny 
 that he came to France with the desire to make 
 peace, so as to simjDlify his position and concen- 
 trate his powers of action ; or that he was willing 
 to obtain this result at the price of some sacrifice. 
 The party in France in favour of peace and of the 
 alliance of the Emperor and of the Pope against 
 Germany and the Italian republics, was then re- 
 presented by the Constable Montmorency and by 
 the Dauphin. It did not obtain the support of the 
 French monarch, nor, above all, of the Duchess 
 of Etampes, whom Charles attempted to flatter by 
 his attentions and to conciliate by a present. The 
 influence of this lady after the death of Louisa 
 of Savoy was long felt, and was triumphant on 
 more than one occasion. Francis I. rejected the 
 proposals that were made to him, because the 
 appanage ofl'ered to his younger son was to revert 
 to the Empire in case his future daughter-in-law 
 should die without children, and also because he 
 would not renounce his Piedmontese conquests, 
 which peace would thus have taken away from 
 him ; and moreover because he still cherished the 
 hope of recovering the Milanese, not for his son, 
 but for himself, and by his own exertions. The 
 negotiations were broken ofl", and this colossal plan 
 
166 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of pacification was abandoned. Montmorency felt 
 that lie was beaten and in disgrace, and retired 
 from the court. Cardinal Tournon brought different 
 ideas into the Government : for the Turkish alliance 
 was renewed, and Francis I. levied an army of one 
 hundred and twenty thousand men to begin the 
 war afresh. 
 
 Such is the general notion which we may venture 
 to form of the negotiations which took place, 
 and of the views and schemes of Charles Y. and 
 Francis I. during and after the journey of the 
 Emperor in France : — a notion no doubt somewhat 
 founded on conjecture, and not established by docu- 
 mentary evidence. 
 
 The war which commenced after this journey of 
 Charles V, and after the events in Ghent, and the 
 pacific attempts of Montmorency, was a great war. 
 It suited neither the political position of the King of 
 France, nor the state of his health, nor that of his 
 finances. He was isolated in Europe ; he had lost 
 the hope of an alliance with Henry VIH. or with 
 the Kepublic of Venice, and he was reduced to 
 an odious alliance with the Sultan; he could not 
 look for the political support of the German pro- 
 testants, because the rigorous measures exercised 
 in France against the reformers by those who 
 supported the imperial alliance had for the moment 
 discouraged every attempt towards a union with 
 the German princes. The position of the King 
 of France in Europe was therefore, as indeed it 
 
CHARLES V. 167 
 
 generally was, weaker than that of the Emperor. 
 For reasons which we have already given, the 
 Emperor had no wish to enter into this war, since 
 it took his attention off from other projects far 
 more important in his eyes : it was a useless and 
 a defensive war, which could give him nothing 
 that he coveted, and could not deprive him of 
 anything he looked upon as essential. To him it 
 was simply a loss of time and of money, and a 
 useless expenditure of the small amount of active 
 exertion which his ill health permitted him still 
 to employ. During these years, too, a great disaster 
 befell him on the coast of Africa, whither he in 
 person had led a second expedition. In Europe, 
 however, he had with Henry VIII. ties which 
 Francis I. had vainly tried to form, and he had 
 secured the most essential assistance of all; the 
 German Diet had granted him considerable sub- 
 sidies, in spite of the Protestant party, or rather 
 in consequence of the divisions in that party ; this 
 aid he owed to the greater weight which he was 
 able to give to the political interests of his friends 
 in Germany as compared with the religious interests 
 of his adversaries. 
 
 The war was carried on between the two sove- 
 reigns, both of them worn out, nearly ruined, and 
 longing to bring it to an end for different reasons ; 
 the one because he had other interests to attend 
 to, the other because his death was approaching. 
 For one moment Paris was threatened with the 
 
1 
 
 168 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 presence of an Anglo-Flemish army under its walls, 
 and tlie flag of an enemy might possibly have again 
 waved over that capital as it had done one hundred 
 years before, if Henry YIII. had entered with more 
 spirit into an alliance with the Emperor, and had 
 he given him more vigorous support. 
 
 After several campaigns, in which Francis gained 
 no great victory in a pitched battle, and did not 
 recover the conquests he had lost twenty years 
 before at the battle of Pavia, both parties began 
 again to think and to talk about peace. But the 
 rival influences which we have alluded to as pre- 
 vailing in France at the time of the Truce of Nice 
 and of the journey of Charles V. in France, had 
 since then been much modified. Men s minds had 
 undergone a complete revolution. Montmorency 
 had not resumed his power in the state, nor re- 
 appeared at court. The King indeed had listened 
 to his counsels to a certain extent, without abating 
 one jot of his hatred against him ; while the 
 Dauphin and Diana of Poitiers, who before had 
 been his friends and had supported him in his 
 pacific policy, had now become hostile to a peace 
 which was to endow the Duke of Orleans with a 
 principality. The Duchess of Etampes had become 
 such a partisan of peace that those anxious for war 
 accused her of having betrayed and sold France. 
 Every one had changed places or opinions. Well 
 may we then insist, without laying ourselves open 
 to exaggeration, on the changeable conduct of the 
 
CHARLES V. 169 
 
 sovereigns and governments of that day, and on 
 the inconsistency of their alliances and their 
 principles. 
 
 The marriage of the Duke of Orleans with either 
 the daughter or the niece of the Emperor had been 
 seriously discussed in 1539 ; the marriage-portion 
 was to have been either Franche-Comte and the 
 Low Countries, or the Milanese, according to which 
 of the two princesses the Duke should marry ; there 
 was the same stipulation previously suggested of 
 the portion lapsing to the Empire in failure of 
 heirs male, and there was moreover an obligation 
 to decide within four months which of the two 
 princesses should be chosen. The Treaty of Crespy- 
 en-Laonnais renewed this engagement. The con- 
 dition, however, which was to place indirectly one 
 or the other of these territories in the hands of a 
 French prince came to nothing, as the Duke of 
 Orleans died within the term when the agreement 
 should have been executed.^ 
 
 Charles V, in signing the Treaty of Crespy, 
 realized an idea he had long cherished ; and his 
 reasons for concluding it remained the same. Ger- 
 many and Turkey, the state of his health and of 
 his finances, as well as the desire to settle the 
 succession, occupied his mind far more than any 
 
 ^ M. Gachard has recently published a small work entitled Trois 
 Anntes de la Vie de Charles-Quint (1543-1546) ; composed to a great 
 extent out of the despatches of the Venetian ambassador Navagero, 
 which belong to the Imperial Library at Vienna. 
 
^ 
 
 170 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 idea as to what glory or what profit he could 
 obtain by continuing the war with France. 
 
 Francis I. also felt the approach of age ; he was 
 ill and out of heart — he had but two more years to 
 live. On four different occasions he had attempted 
 to reconquer the Milanese territory either by in- 
 vasion or by some grand feat of arms, and his 
 efforts had been foiled by the superior force or skill 
 of his rival. The Dauphin was not in favour of 
 the treaty ; but the other influences by which the 
 monarch was surrounded had become, like himself, 
 reconciled to the idea of peace. He could not fore- 
 see that the death of the Duke of Orleans would 
 occur at a time exactly to deprive his family of an 
 increase of territory secured to him by the treaty, 
 either in the south or the north of his own kingdom. 
 The Treaty of Crespy diflfered in two essential points 
 from the truce signed at Nice ; it had a definite 
 character, and by it France made restitution of the 
 possessions it had taken from the Duke of Savoy. 
 
 VI. 
 
 This was the last treaty which was signed be- 
 tween Charles V. and Francis I. Coming, as it did, 
 at the end of their fourth and last war, it modified, 
 as we have seen, the state of their possessions in 
 a conditional manner, inasmuch as it ceded the 
 Milanese to a French prince as the husband of a 
 
CHARLES V. 171 
 
 princess of the imperial family. This condition, 
 however, was not fulfilled, and the territorial posi- 
 tion of affairs in Italy between France and Austria 
 was no more altered by this arrangement than by 
 the treaties which preceded it. 
 
 The active and busy career of Charles Y. is re- 
 markable in this respect, that from his youth to his 
 latter years his general character and his policy did 
 not alter. In his youth, as in his riper age, his 
 mode of action and the qualities of his mind were 
 always the same. At all the epochs of his life he 
 was attentive, laborious, far-sighted ; he was slow 
 both in his preparations and in his decisions; he 
 was sufficiently active in attending to the details of 
 the moment, and to those which caused any anxiety 
 for the future. His physical habits were modified. 
 As he advanced in years, as he became weaker and 
 his health failed, he took a greater personal liking 
 for war. At the beginning of his reign, he was 
 present neither at the battle of Pavia nor at the 
 Bicoque : he himself did not conduct the cam- 
 paign against Clement VII. It was only later that 
 he bore arms against the Turk, and against the 
 people of Barbary, and that he went to Tunis. It 
 was later still that he took part in the war against 
 France in the north; and he himself undertook the 
 campaign against the princes in Germany. There 
 was a change, so to speak, in his physical temper- 
 ament: his intellectual character was not modified 
 by age. He always displayed a mixture of firmness 
 
yi 
 
 172 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and of hesitation ; liis courage was joined with 
 prudence, and his tenacity was extreme, while his 
 cautious and reserved mind was almost always 
 watchful and attentive. Everything would indicate 
 that his long and early sufferings induced him to 
 make preparations beforehand for the termination 
 of his own reign, and the transmission of his 
 power, and, so to speak, for the winding up of his 
 accounts. This great operation comprehended many 
 different objects : it required much care and atten- 
 tion to matters of detail. As regarded Italy, he 
 could only guarantee the actual state of affairs by 
 making peace with France ; for there were no other 
 means by which he could restrain the ambition 
 of his rival in that country. By such a peace, he 
 obtained the triple advantage of preventing that 
 power from giving active assistance to the Sultan, 
 and in the same degree discouraged his projects, 
 while he set free his own forces to deal with 
 Germany. The career of Francis I. was drawing 
 to its close, and Charles V. thought that the rivalry 
 of the two crowns was a personal one between 
 that monarch and himself He still had to occupy 
 himself with the political condition of Germany, 
 with the war against the princes, intimately con- 
 nected, as it was, with the fate of the Eeformation 
 and with the proposed meeting of the Council. He 
 had to think, moreover, of the marriage of his son, 
 and of the settlement of the conditions on which 
 his abdication would depend ; and lastly, he had 
 
CHARLES V. 173 
 
 to define the relations between the Low Countries 
 and the Empire. 
 
 He had, therefore, still to undertake and bring 
 to a close a great military expedition, and he had 
 political and domestic state affairs of the highest 
 moment to arrange. This phase, which we may 
 almost call the last of his career, during which he 
 had to turn his attention, at the same time, to 
 matters of very various interests, embraces as much 
 as the last ten years of his reign. He devoted 
 himself to these subjects with mature judgment, 
 hiding the drift of his purpose in the depths of his 
 own mind, with his eyes fixed on the actual con- 
 dition of the political horizon, on the destiny of the 
 Empire and of his own family, and on the future of 
 his own reputation. 
 
 Events did not come to pass exactly as he 
 desired, and the last transactions of his public 
 life had by no means the success he had endea- 
 voured to secure. 
 
 At certain intervals of time, and on certain occa- 
 sions, he had intended to make his son the heir to 
 all his dominions. His brother Ferdinand, King of 
 the Eomans, and the Imperial Electors were, how- 
 ever, adverse to this scheme : the one from personal 
 motives, the others from distrust of Spain and of 
 a Spanish emperor. Charles V. pressed the point 
 once more, and then gave way. It is difficult to 
 determine the exact epoch when he ceased to urge 
 the election of his son as Emperor ; but the date of 
 
174 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 this change in his opinion matters little. His final 
 determination was to divide his possessions be- 
 tween his son and his brother. 
 
 The campaigns in Germany began with triumphs, 
 but ended with disasters. They commenced the 
 long series of religious struggles in Europe, and 
 they closed the career of Charles Y. : his sufferings 
 and his infirmities forced him to bring them to an 
 end. This war was no exception to the general 
 rule of those wars which have for their pretext 
 or for their object the extirpation of new doctrines ; 
 the character of the war was not simple, and the 
 plea which was put forth for it was not honest. In 
 his struggle against the Eeformation, Charles V. had 
 for his associates some of the Protestant princes, and 
 the Eeformed worship was performed in his camp. 
 The truth was that more than one idea was at stake, 
 and there were other interests besides those of 
 religion to be defended. The Eeformation, while 
 preaching the emancipation of men's consciences, 
 gave to the people the taste for freedom of the 
 mind in all directions wheresoever its activity or 
 its curiosity could penetrate ; and, in the opinion of 
 the ruling powers, the Eeformation menaced their 
 political establishment quite as much as the reli- 
 gious establishment of the Church. The intelligence 
 of man does not stop when it once begins to work, 
 and when it believes in its right to examine. 
 Charles V, as we have already said, on seeing the 
 spread of the Eeformation in Germany, was as 
 
CHARLES V. 175 
 
 much, or perchance more, alarmed as Emperor than 
 he was grieved as a believer. Viewed in a political 
 light, the war in Germany had the same character 
 as his other expeditions : they were all undertaken 
 to set up the great modern principle of unity, at 
 the expense of the independence of the middle 
 ages; that is to say, he wished to strengthen and 
 tighten the bond of allegiance between the princes 
 and their sovereign in Germany, without making 
 at the same time any concession to the masses, 
 and without permitting the people to expect any 
 amelioration of its lot for the future. When he 
 waged war against the Protestant princes, he did 
 not expressly announce himself, as Philip II. did 
 after him, as the enemy of the Keformation. 
 Charles said to them : "Men's consciences are free, 
 but the political rights of the Empire must be re- 
 spected." The princes on their side answered : 
 " We respect the rights of the Emperor, but we 
 demand that men's consciences be free." If on 
 both parts this language had been honest, it is 
 evident that the war would have had no object. 
 
 The question, however, had other sides. 
 
 The Germany of the middle of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury bore no resemblance to the states in the more 
 western part of Europe. Germany had made less 
 progress : she had not gone through the same social 
 transformation as France, England, Spain, and 
 Italy. The condition of the peasant with regard to 
 the landed proprietors, — of the great lords with 
 
^ 
 
 176 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 reference to the sovereign, — had not undergone 
 in Germany the same changes. No emperor pre- 
 vious to Charles Y. had been powerful enough to 
 subjugate the great feudal families. Germany had 
 not, like France, passed through the discipline of 
 personal unity under Louis XI, nor the long travail 
 which resulted in the distribution of power in 
 England ; nor had it seen the triumph of the 
 Spanish monarchy over the Moors and over rival 
 parties. In Germany, the sixteenth century cor- 
 responded with the fifteenth, or even with the 
 fourteenth century of other countries. The insur- 
 rection of the Swabian peasants represents the 
 Jacquerie in France, much as the struggle of 
 Charles V. with the Protestant chiefs resembles the 
 struggle between the French and English monarchs 
 with the princes of the blood and the barons. 
 
 But the German princes had a resource and an 
 auxiliary which were wanting to the French and to 
 the English of the preceding age. The auxiliary to 
 whom the princes were indebted for safety in their 
 struggle with Charles V. was the Keformation. 
 Hence arise the apparent contradictions in this 
 war, and the difficulty which we frequently find 
 in distinguishing whether it was feudal or religious 
 in its character. 
 
 We must remember that Charles V. tried for 
 some time to come to an understanding with the 
 Reformers which should somehow satisfy his Ca- 
 tholic conscience. He undertook the war when this 
 
((UNIVBRSITI 
 
 attempted understanding was found to be impos- 
 sible ; but, granting that he carried it on with con- 
 summate bravery, he still leads us to believe that, 
 whether it arose from political moderation or reli- • 
 gious indecision, he only aimed at obtaining an 
 incomplete result, and that, with an armed force to 
 back him, he still preferred treating with the Re- 
 formers to utterly destroying them. Unless this 
 were so, we must say that Charles V. was neither 
 able nor fortunate. He accepted the services of one 
 who was himself a Protestant, and the son-in-law of 
 one of the two leaders of the League, — of Maurice 
 of Saxony, famous for his capacity and his ambition, 
 and notorious for his subsequent treachery. It 
 would not have been a bad calculation to make use 
 of such a man, had he only asked to take the place 
 of the Elector of Saxony, whom the war had 
 deprived of his dominions. But Maurice's aim was 
 also to become the head of the League ; and thus, 
 after having acted as general to the Emperor, he 
 became his most redoubtable enemy. 
 
 The military association of Charles V. with Mau- 
 rice would seem to prove that the war was not 
 purely religious in its character : but this was not 
 the only strange part of this expedition and of 
 this epoch. The war against the Reformation, 
 sanctioned by a prince of the reformed faith, was 
 not sanctioned by the Pope ; the Emperor wished 
 the Council to be held at Trent, while the Pope 
 wished it to be held at Bologna : each desired to 
 
 N 
 
178 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 have it in his own neighbourhood. Still further, 
 when Charles V. had gained a great victory over 
 the princes at Mlihlberg, and had taken the leader 
 of the League prisoner and deprived him of his 
 possessions, he concluded with the Protestants — 
 with the full assent of Maurice — a provisional 
 arrangement, under the name of the " Interim : " 
 an arrangement which satisfied no one in either 
 of the two religious camps. The Court of Eome 
 received it with strong disapprobation; while on 
 the part of the Reformers, it was soon followed 
 and surpassed by the memorable " Eecess of Augs- 
 burg," which recognised the liberty of the two 
 faiths. This act destroyed at one blow the hopes, 
 and even the vestiges of the long negotiations un- 
 dertaken by the Emperor with the Reformers. It 
 also destroyed the effect of the military successes 
 with which his German war had commenced. 
 
 In this war, which was important from the time 
 it lasted, from the force of the armies engaged in it, 
 and from the results which it produced, Charles V, 
 infirm and sinking under his sufferings, displayed 
 extraordinary courage ; but he was deficient in the 
 most ordinary foresiglit. Alone and without troops, 
 he had retired into the Tyrol, so as to be near at 
 hand to watch the Council at Trent, and here he 
 was nearly surprised by Maurice. He was forced, 
 ill as he was, to escape by torchlight, in a litter, 
 from Innspruck into the mountains, in the midst 
 of terrible wea,th(^r. The sovereign of so many 
 
CHARLES V. 179 
 
 states, an Emperor who had so often been vic- 
 torious, the master of Europe, must then have 
 made some unpleasant reflections on the past. 
 When he found fortune and his own forces fight- 
 ing against him, he must have doubtless regretted 
 that he had delayed so long making peace with 
 France, and that he had begun the war with 
 Germany so late. 
 
 After long and troublesome negotiations, he 
 signed the Peace of Passau with the Protestants. 
 The correspondence published by Dr. Lanz gives 
 us all the original details. The letters addressed 
 by Charles V. to his brother Ferdinand and to his 
 sister Mary, are those of an obstinate, fidgety, 
 temporizing, and undecided man, who allowed 
 events to gain upon him, and tried in vain to 
 induce Maurice to make a treaty, the most im- 
 portant condition of which imposed upon the 
 Emperor himself a sacrifice — the release of his 
 prisoner the Landgrave of Hesse. This extensive 
 series of letters would tire the patience of the 
 reader, were it not interesting to learn all that 
 relates to a person who played so great a part, 
 and to penetrate into the deepest recesses of his 
 thoughts. 
 
 The Treaty of Passau was concluded by Charles 
 very much against the grain ; because the Protes- 
 tant princes, with the aid of so able a man as 
 Maurice of Saxony, had extended their influence 
 over a larger territory, and had strengthened their 
 
 N 2 
 
180 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 position both as parties in the war, and as repre- 
 sentatives of a certain creed ; and because the 
 Emperor, who was no longer strong enough to 
 bear up against disease, despaired of offering any 
 further resistance, and preferred making peace to 
 continuing the war in Germany, which must have 
 been carried on in his name either by the Marquis 
 of Marignan or by the Duke of Alba. 
 
 King Henry II. had taken part in the war, and 
 had occupied Lorraine, together with the three 
 bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun ; Charles V. 
 committed a great fault — in this respect imitating 
 Charles the Bold before Neuss — by obstinately 
 continuing the siege of Metz, which in the end he 
 was obliged to raise, after having begun it at a 
 wrong time, and with insufficient resources. He 
 then returned to Brussels, carried in a litter, worn 
 out with fatigue, pale, and with shattered nerves, — 
 so say his historians, — but full of courage, and firm 
 even to the end. 
 
 The events of this campaign did not amount to 
 a disaster, and Charles V, although he failed in his 
 object against Protestant Germany, still nraintained 
 a grand position. His losses were great without 
 being ruinous. The years which preceded his ab- 
 dication were marked by events of a nature more 
 painful to the feelings of Charles V. than damaging 
 to his power. Deserted by Maurice, Charles had 
 been forced to fly at his approach ; he released his 
 prisoners without any actual ransom, and without 
 
CHARLES V. 181 
 
 any moral compensation ; he saw the Diet of Augs- 
 burg adopt the " Eecess," which conceded freedom 
 to both forms of religion, and he witnessed the 
 dispersion of the members of the Council of Trent : 
 perhaps he may have felt some remorse for having, 
 by the " InterirRy^^ taken the initiative in a measure 
 of conciliation which the Protestants declined. He 
 assuredly must have regretted his attempt to besiege 
 Metz. We must conclude that Charles V, blinded 
 by his prosperity and his glory, presumed too much 
 on his star ; and, thinking himself still in the vigour 
 of his age, he overtaxed his strength. The religious 
 motive of the war which he undertook in Germany 
 was no excuse. The history of that war and that 
 of his whole life teach us that ambition, rather than 
 conscience, was his guide. 
 
 Twelve years had then elapsed since he had seen 
 Spain. 
 
 We have indicated the settlement of the succes- 
 sion and of the affairs in Germany among the 
 matters which Charles V. intended to have arranged 
 before his abdication. He did not succeed in carry- 
 ing out his wishes in the execution of either of 
 these projects : he renounced the idea of leaving 
 the Empire to his son, and he failed in his attempts 
 to put down the Protestant princes. 
 
 Two other objects occupied his attention, the 
 marriage of his son and the organization of the con- 
 nexion of the Low Countries with Germany. This 
 second point was arranged as he had wished, and 
 
182 HISTOKICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 long before his last military enterprise. The circle 
 of Burgundy was constituted under the protection 
 of the Empire ; it was agreed that under that name 
 the Low Countries should have a representative and 
 a vote at the Diet ; that they should contribute their 
 share to the finances and to the military contingent, 
 preserving at the same time their own laws and 
 their own jurisdiction. This constitution was the 
 consequence of the Treaties of Madrid and of Cam- 
 brai, treaties dictated by a victorious prince, and 
 under which France had been deprived of her ancient 
 suzerainty over Flanders and Artois. No one was 
 satisfied with this resolution of the Emperor: neither 
 Germany, which found she had an additional asso- 
 ciate, nor the Low Countries, which found them- 
 selves obliged to pay contributions and to furnish 
 recruits. The Emperor Maximilian had wished to 
 establish these same relations, and had failed. 
 
 The marriage of Philip of Spain with Mary, the 
 daughter of Henry VIII, was almost the last political 
 act of Charles's reign. This union was not popular 
 in England, where Philip did not succeed in making 
 himself more liked than he was elsewhere. Charles 
 y. hoped by this means to strengthen his position in 
 the Low Countries, and he lived long enough to see 
 the Earl of Pembroke land an English army on the 
 continent destined to assist the troops of the King 
 of Spain against France. 
 
CHARLES V. 18:J 
 
 VII. 
 
 Charles V. did not abdicate all at once. He 
 first of all resigned his kingdom of Naples, then the 
 sovereignty of the Low Countries, then Spain, and 
 lastly the Empire. The epoch of his abdication and 
 of his retirement from the world is perhaps that 
 portion of all his life which has been studied with 
 the greatest interest, because it is the most original, 
 and because generally sovereigns do not abdicate 
 excepting when they are forced to this step by 
 misfortune or by death. We may say that Charles 
 V. almost throughout his life cherished the idea 
 of not dying in possession of power. At the age 
 of thirty-five, after his victory at Tunis, at the 
 time of his greatest glory, this idea had already 
 entered his mind. He thought of it again before 
 the last wars in which he was engaged, when the 
 malady under which he had suffered almost all 
 his life had made fearful ravages in his constitu- 
 tion. His career would have been more complete 
 and more pure, had he retired from public life 
 before the death of Francis I, and before the German 
 wars ; had he been able, by seeing into futurity, to 
 sacrifice his victories at Ingolstadt and of Mtililberg, 
 and had he thus avoided the Treaty of Passau, the 
 flight from Innspruck, the " Recess " of Augsburg, 
 and the raising of the siege of Metz. 
 
 The historian is, therefore, authorized to say, that 
 
184 HisTorjcAL p:ssays. 
 
 in the case of Charles V, the determination to 
 abdicate was not inspired by satiety of power, or 
 dislike of public affairs, nor yet by mere despon- 
 dency : his resolution arose from the gradual sink- 
 ing of his physical strength, and from bodily 
 pain. He could not have gone through another 
 campaign like that in Lorraine ; and it required 
 the possession of superior energy and will for 
 Charles, who was unable to walk and suflfering 
 great pain, to have persevered as he did in this 
 undertaking. 
 
 His retreat was conducted slowly, like most of 
 the actions of his life. 
 
 The address he made, on the day when he abdi- 
 cated his sovereignty in the Low Countries, may be 
 said to resume his whole career. He spoke of him- 
 self with more sensibility than he generally showed, 
 as a man who was bidding adieu to a brilliant 
 past, who had no further object save to be for- 
 gotten of the world ; who parted from it with 
 regret, and only because he could no longer live 
 and act in it, and because repose had now become 
 his first want. This address was concluded with 
 difhculty, but with dignity ; without any affectation 
 of modesty ; in a tone of grandeur, of truth, and 
 of simplicity which befitted the greatest personage 
 of the age. This scene was enacted with an 
 amount of feeling greater than Charles V. was ac- 
 customed to show himself, and greater than he had 
 generally the faculty of producing in others. 
 
CHARLES V. 185 
 
 Months passed before the preparations for his 
 embarkation were finished, and, if we must say so, 
 before the funds necessary for his journey were 
 collected. The want of money, which he had felt 
 in his most important military expeditions, pursued 
 him in the arrangements for his final departure. 
 
 The recent works of Messrs. Mignet, Gachard, 
 Stirling, and Pichot, have initiated us in all the 
 details of Charles's life at the Monastery of Yuste.^ 
 He lived there about two years. 
 
 During the first months of his residence in the 
 monastery he greatly applauded the resolution he 
 had taken. His house had been fitted up with 
 every luxury conducive to comfort, and without 
 display ; care had been taken to have everything 
 that could soothe the sufferings of a sick person, and 
 charm the vacant hours of one unable to move. 
 The number of his household was considerable; the 
 gardens spacious ; the climate just such as suited 
 his health ; the site undulating and delicious. 
 
 But Charles V. had gone to Yuste to seek for an 
 enforced repose, not for leisure for thought. His 
 body was more infirm than his mind was worn by 
 work. His plans had been laid with a view to an 
 irremediable physical malady, and not with the 
 hope of recovery. At the end of a year, the absence 
 of all fatigue, the calmness of solitude, the softness 
 of the climate, occasionally procured him the agree- 
 able but embarrassing surprise of a return of health, 
 
 1 See also the Quarterly Review, December 1852, p. 107, &c. 
 
186 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 which had never entered into his calculation, and 
 which, perhaps, was the cause of trouble in his 
 arrangements. He never dreamt of quitting the 
 monastery to return into the world ; but it was said 
 that he then had some idea of a short expedition 
 to the Pyrenees, respecting the affairs of Navarre. 
 With Charles V, retirement from the world, to 
 ensm'e exemption from a state of impatience and 
 anxiety, required, if one may say so, the pressure 
 of suffering. His was not one of those tender 
 natures, easily fatigued, which, after having been 
 tried by the struggles of the world, give them- 
 selves up readily to a quiet life without the fear of 
 en7iui ; such natures may be content to live on the 
 memory of the past, and may find in lassitude 
 itself a melancholy charm. It was well enough 
 for Charles V, as a harassed and sickly traveller, 
 to withdraw from active life into the seclusion 
 and silence of a cloister, to recall the events of his 
 own life, to ask whether he could have done better, 
 and thus to prepare for death. But when his 
 strength appeared to return, the memories of his 
 former active life rose up to trouble him, and it 
 became almost a necessity to him again to take part 
 in the affairs of Europe. And in fact his inaction 
 and isolation were far from being complete. Por- 
 tugal, Navarre, Spain, occupied his attention rather 
 than more distant countries. When Philip II. gained 
 the victory of St. Quentin, Charles V, full of respect 
 for the crown which he himself had borne, and for 
 
CHARLES V. 187 
 
 the person of the sovereign, veiled the reproaches 
 he made to his son for his absence from the battle, 
 in discreet and kindly words. The sisters of 
 Charles V, the Queen Mary of Hungary, and 
 Eleanora — the latter the widow of the King of 
 Portugal and of Francis I, — paid him a visit ; 
 and their stay at the monastery was a source of 
 great pleasure to him. The conversation of these 
 three persons, at that solemn hour, — of persons 
 whose lives had been so full of incident, — would, 
 if it could have been preserved, be most curious 
 and instructive to us. Two among them were 
 endowed with remarkable intelligence. Eleanora 
 was affectionate and gentle-minded, but she had 
 neither the intelligence nor the courage of her 
 sister. It had been her curious fate to marry her 
 brother's military and political rival ; but she had 
 taken little part and felt little sympathy with 
 public affairs, and she rejoined her own family 
 after the death of the King her husband. Both 
 these princesses died in Spain, not indeed at Yuste, 
 but during the time their brother lived in that 
 monastery. 
 
 Charles V. received ambassadors at the monastery, 
 and kept up a correspondence with the world. When 
 at sunset he was carried on to a terrace constructed 
 for the purpose, that he might thence enjoy the 
 beauties of nature, he was delighted to breathe the 
 balmy air, because it was beneficial to his health. 
 There he reflected on the letters he had received, 
 
188 HISTOKICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and the visits and occurrences of the day : these 
 things occupied him more than the glow of the 
 sinking sun, the southern splendour of the land- 
 scape, or the distant outline of the mountains of 
 Estramadura. 
 
 Charles V. is the most distinguished person in 
 history who marks the beginning of modern warfare 
 and modern politics. He closes most distinctly the 
 long period, so romantic and so confused, which 
 constitutes the middle ages, — a condition of society 
 which did not end without a struggle, but which 
 languished for many years, and changed its cha- 
 racter before its final extinction. 
 
 Charles V. was born at Ghent : his father was of 
 German extraction, and his mother was Spanish. 
 At first he was not studious, and his abilities in 
 his youth were by no means remarkable ; his con- 
 stitution was not good, and did not give promise 
 of bearing any great strain ; his countenance was 
 intelligent, although his features were heavy and 
 irregular ; he was measured, and even slow in his 
 movements ; while he was silent, serious, calm, and 
 thoughtful in his appearance. During the whole 
 course of his life his temperament never varied : 
 his head was always master of his heart, and tinged 
 its feelings with a certain coldness ; his will was 
 strong, but slow ; his intelligence profound rather 
 than quick ; his dominant qualities were patience, 
 a tenacity of purpose, and a prudence which some- 
 times looked too much to details ; his self-control 
 
CHARLES V. 189 
 
 rarely failed him, either in prosperity, or in mis- 
 fortune and peril. He could devote attention to 
 deliberations, however interminable and fruitless ; 
 he could conceal his joy or his grief, and dissemble 
 his power ; he could keep his schemes hidden from 
 all the world, and assume an appearance of weak- 
 ness when there was danger in being too strong ; 
 he could concentrate all his faculties on politics, 
 and make everything bend to that. In comparison 
 with such an object, he loved nothing ardently ; no 
 amusement, no pleasure of the imagination or the 
 mind, no man or woman, not even war, could tear 
 him from this one absorbing pursuit. He was 
 neither intoxicated by success nor depressed by 
 failure, and he thus escaped the double danger of 
 elation or despair, which so frexjuently prevent men 
 securing their gains or repairing their losses. When 
 we see that Charles V. bore no resemblance to his 
 father nor to his grandfather, and that we can trace 
 no likeness to him in his own son, and still less in 
 any one of his distant descendant's, we are tempted 
 to say that he was specially destined, in his person, 
 his character, and his faculties, to be the represen- 
 tative and the defender of a colossal power which 
 before him had no existence. He did not found 
 it, but received, maintained, and increased it. After 
 him it was forthwith divided, because it was ob- 
 viously too large for any other single person to 
 administer; and subsequently, the important frac- 
 tions into which it had been partitioned were still 
 
190 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 further diminished by the want of ability of those 
 who succeeded to them. Charles V. did not receive 
 from nature all the gifts nor all the charms she 
 can bestow, nor did experience give him every 
 talent ; but he was equal to the part he had to 
 play in the world. He was sufficiently great to 
 keep his many-jewelled diadem. In fine, even 
 reckoning the faults and the misfortunes of that 
 old age which came so early upon him, the gigantic 
 monarchy of which for thirty years he was the head 
 did not decline under his management. In spite 
 of a certain slowness in being convinced, and a 
 certain dilatoriness in deciding, he showed that he 
 possessed durable and solid qualities, some of which 
 were altogether wanting, or existed but feebly, in 
 William III, in Louis XIV, and in Frederick II, — 
 men of whom some were greater than Charles V. 
 His ambition was cold and wise. The scope of 
 his ideas, which are not quite easy to divine, was 
 vast enough to control a state composed of divers 
 and distant portions, so as to make it always very 
 difficult to amalgamate his armies and to supply 
 them with food, or to procure money. Indeed its 
 very existence would have been exposed to perma- 
 nent danger from powerful coalitions, had Francis I. 
 known how to place its most vulnerable points 
 under a united pressure from the armies of France, 
 of England, of Venice, and of the Ottoman Empire. 
 Charles V. attained his first object when he pre- 
 vented the French monarch from taking possession 
 
0HAULE8 V. 191 
 
 of the inheritance of the house of Anjou at Naples, 
 and of that of the Viseontis at Milan. He was more 
 successful in stopping the march of Solyman into 
 Austria than in checking the spread of the Eeforma- 
 tion in Germany. The sentiment which the whole 
 of his career inspires — his passive courage, the solid 
 qualities of his mind, his patient endurance of delay, 
 of work, and of suffering — is rather one of serious 
 esteem rather than of lively admiration. We feel 
 respect rather than sympathy. 
 
 Charles V. had four objects very much at heart : 
 he wished to be the master in Italy, to check the 
 progress of the Ottoman power in the west of 
 Europe, to conquer the King of France, and to 
 govern the Germanic body by dividing it, and 
 by making the Reformation a religious pretext for 
 oppressing the political defenders of that belief In 
 three out of four of these objects he succeeded. 
 Germany alone was not conquered : if she was 
 beaten in battle, neither any political triumph nor 
 ai-y religious results ensued. In Germany, Charles 
 y. began his work too late, and acted too slowly ; 
 he undertook to subdue it at a time when the 
 abettors of the Reformation had grown strong, 
 when he himself was growing weaker. 
 
 If this realization of his schemes and of his 
 wishes were incomplete, the fault lay neither with 
 the wisdom of his political ideas, nor with his own 
 firmness or courage. We must attribute it rather to 
 the ravages which disease had made in his constitu- 
 
^ 
 
 192 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tion, to the decay of his physical strength, and con- 
 sequently to the defect which pervaded his character 
 all through life — of hesitating beyond measure before 
 he acted, of being unnecessarily slow in the prepa- 
 ration of his undertaking, and of letting his oppo- 
 nents, over whom he wished to triumph, consolidate 
 their power under his very eyes. We are not to 
 conclude from these observations that, had Charles 
 V. been more vigorous and younger, he would have 
 repressed and stopped the Reformation. But he 
 certainly would have directed affairs with a more 
 vigorous hand with respect to Maurice, and would 
 not have allowed the victory of Miihlberg, and his 
 first triumphs over the Protestants, to have ended 
 in the humiliating flight from Innspruck, or in the 
 disastrous campaign of Lorraine. 91 
 
 Like many other brilliant careers, the career of 
 Charles V. was more successful and more striking 
 at the commencement and the middle, than at the 
 end, of its course. At Madrid, at Cambrai, at 
 Nice, he made his rival bow down his head. At ^. 
 Crespy he again forced him to obey his will ; but, 
 as he had completely made up his mind to have 
 peace, Charles dictated it, in some manner, to his 
 own detriment. At Passau he had to yield to the 
 terms of his enemy — of an enemy whom Charles V. 
 encountered in his old age, and when his powers 
 had decayed. 
 
 Although it may be said that the extent and 
 the power of the sovereignty which Charles V. left 
 
CHARLES V. 193 
 
 to his successor at his death were not diminished, 
 still his armies were weakened, his finances were 
 exhausted, and the country was weary of the 
 tyranny of the imperial lieutenants. The supre- 
 macy of the empire in Germany, for which he had 
 struggled so much, was as little established at the 
 end as at the beginning of his reign ; religious 
 unity was solemnly destroyed by the " Eecess " of 
 Augsburg. 
 
 But that which marks the position of Charles V. 
 as the representative man of his epoch, and as the 
 founder of the policy of modern times, is that, 
 wherever he was victorious, the effect of his success 
 was to crush the last efforts of the spirit of the middle 
 ages, and of the independence of nations. In Italy, 
 in Spain, in Germany, and in the Low Countries, his 
 triumphs were so much gain to the cause of absolute 
 monarchy and so much loss to the liberty derived 
 from the old state of society. "Whatever was the 
 character of liberty in the middle ages — whether it 
 were contested or incomplete, or a mockery — it 
 played a greater part than in the four succeeding 
 centuries. Charles V. was assuredly one of those 
 who contributed the most to found and consolidate 
 the political system of modern governments. 
 
 His history has an aspect of grandeur. Had 
 Francis I. been as sagacious in the closet as he 
 was bold in the field, by a vigorous alliance with 
 England, with Protestant Germany, and with some 
 of the republics of Italy, he might perhaps have 
 
194 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 balanced and controlled the power of Charles V. 
 But the French monarch did not possess the fore- 
 sight and the solid understanding necessary to 
 pursue such a policy with success. His rival, there- 
 fore, occupies the first place in the historical picture 
 of the epoch. Charles V. had the sentiment of his 
 position and of the part he had to play. He was 
 capable of taking large views, and of entertaining 
 liberal sentiments, even when he was undecided and 
 most painstaking ; the slowness of his proceedings, 
 which more than once was injurious to his cause, 
 adds, perchance, to the majesty of the spectacle of 
 his reign, and to the grandeur of its glory. 
 
CHARLES V. 195 
 
 Printed documents on the reign of Charles V. 
 abound now. The recent publications of Messrs. 
 "Weiss, Le Glay, Gachard, Aim6 Champollion, and 
 of Dr. Lanz, give important information as to the 
 diplomacy, the wars, the domestic policy, the alli- 
 ances, the character, and the schemes of Charles V, 
 the captivity of Francis I, and the troubles of Ghent. 
 The documents touching the Austrian negotiations 
 at the beginning of the sixteenth century have 
 been published by M. Le Glay ; these, with the state 
 papers of Cardinal de Granvelle, edited by M. Weiss, 
 and the collection of papers relating to the cap- 
 tivity of Francis I, published by M. Aime Cham- 
 pollion, form part of the collection of inedited 
 documents concerning the history of France. The 
 correspondence of Charles V, the originals of 
 which belong in great part to the Library of 
 Burgundy, has been collected and edited by Dr. 
 Lanz. This publication contains a mass of precious 
 documents touching the diplomatic transactions of 
 Charles V.'s reign, and more especially concerning 
 the negotiations with Maurice of Saxony and the 
 Congress of Passau ; these papers consist chiefly of 
 letters from the Emperor himself, from his brother, 
 from the Queen of Hungary ; and they teach us 
 many facts \^hich not only concern the events of 
 that time, but which also illustrate the character 
 and the ways of the Emperor. The works of 
 
 2 
 
1.96 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Messrs. Alexandre Henne, Gacliard, and Theodore 
 eluste, upon the reign of Charles Y, are remarkable 
 for their conscientious erudition and impartiality. 
 M. Gachard has written an essay on the captivity 
 of Francis I. ; he has republished an essay on the 
 troubles of Ghent, preceded by an introduction, 
 and followed by a voluminous collection of original 
 matter. M. Gachard has also published a series of 
 despatches written by the ambassadors from Venice, 
 on the affairs of the Emperor, and on his retire- 
 ment at Yuste : the first volume of this work con- 
 sists of a narrative full of interest. These various 
 publications give the last information on the subjects 
 under discussion, as might be expected when we 
 consider the reputation of the author. 
 
 The Commentaries of Charles V, of which one 
 version in Portuguese has been discovered by M. 
 Kervyn de Lettenhove, in the collection of manu- 
 scripts at the Library of Paris, had long been the 
 object of search in the libraries of Europe. Many 
 facts, many sayings of Charles V. made it clear 
 that these Commentaries existed, or at any rate 
 that they had once existed, and there was no 
 evidence that they had been destroyed. These 
 Commentaries have no very great historical value. 
 The work by no means comes up to the expectations 
 raised by its title, and its author : nor does it fulfil 
 the promises which tradition had held out on this 
 subject. The Commentaries contain only a sort of 
 journal of the first years, and indeed of the greater 
 
CHARLES V. 197 
 
 j)art, of the Emperor's reign : they become more 
 circumstantial only when the campaigns of Ger- 
 many — those which he led in person — are narrated ; 
 and they are for all this epoch almost exclusively 
 military. As a general rule, they are written in a 
 calm tone, and bear no trace of ill-humour, not 
 even when events are related which would be most 
 likely to excite the Emperors anger. They present 
 matters in a true light, with certain modifications, 
 the object of which was to make the events appear 
 in a light the most favourable to the policy of the 
 author. In the composition of his Commentaries, 
 as in many other acts of his life, Charles Y. was 
 intensely occupied with the future of his reputation 
 and of his glory. 
 
 Besides the interesting work on the retirement 
 and death of Charles V, M. Mignet has pub- 
 lished a series of articles in the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes, on the Election to the Empire, on the 
 Constable de Bourbon, and on the Peace of Madrid. 
 Like all the works of the author, these articles dis- 
 play the most eminent qualities ; and in them he 
 has made use of documents taken for the most part 
 from the Archives of Vienna and of Paris. 
 
 The memoirs of Fleuranges, of Comines, of Guise, 
 and of the two Du Bellays, as well as the Com- 
 mentaries of Montluc, give us a sufficient insight 
 into the military events of the reign of Francis I. 
 and of the beginning of that of Henry II. 
 
 It would not perhaps be easier now to write a 
 
198 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 complete history of the reign of Charles V. than it 
 was in the time of Robertson and of Leti ; but with 
 the aid of these new materials, numerous and im- 
 portant as they are, a nearer approach to the truth 
 in all that concerns the person and the affairs of the 
 Emperor could be made than was the case when 
 those two historians wrote. 
 
 It is probable that the archives which have fur- 
 nished the rich collection of documents lately pub- 
 lished on the subject of the sixteenth century aro 
 not yet quite exhausted ; and that those deposited 
 at Madrid, at Simancas, at Besan^on, at Lille, at 
 Paris, at Vienna, and at Brussels, still contain in- 
 edited materials for a history of that epoch, and 
 of the men who directed public affairs, espe- 
 cially of Charles Y. It is impossible to examine 
 too carefully into all that concerns a person so con- 
 siderable that the smallest details about him are 
 important ; more especially as the reserve and dis- 
 cretion of his character were so great that his 
 thoughts on public affairs, and the motives of his 
 own acts, have never been completely revealed. 
 For example, we have the most detailed information 
 on the troubles of Ghent, and on the negotiations 
 for the Treaty of Passau, — two occasions in which 
 the action of the Emperor was most direct and per- 
 sonal. Nevertheless it is impossible to tell exactly 
 what passed in the mind of Charles V. in the 
 interval between his journey across France and the 
 rupture of the Treaty of Nice, or between the rup- 
 
CHARLES V. 199 
 
 ture of that Treaty and the Peace of Crespy, We 
 cannot guess what was the whole scope of hia 
 views on a state of affairs which was evidently the 
 subject of long and profound reflection with him ; 
 and during a time when, more than perhaps at any 
 other phase of his life, he pondered over the general 
 tendency of European politics and of the events 
 of his reign. The habitual taste for these general 
 surveys of his epoch and his life, so characteristic of 
 Charles V, can be accounted for by the depth of his 
 mind, the meditative turn of his intellect, and those 
 long and early maladies which accustomed him at 
 an early period to look upon his end as near at 
 hand, and to occupy himself with a future which 
 was passing out of his control. 
 
 The negotiations previous to the Congress of 
 Passau, the military and political struggle of 
 Charles V. with Maurice of Saxony, who had been 
 his general, and who owed his power as much to 
 the confidence which the Emperor had reposed in 
 him as to his own individual activity, must have 
 occupied Charles's mind most painfully. The por- 
 tion of his correspondence which concerns these 
 events is very extensive, and, although the letters 
 of Charles V. enter into great detail, they do not 
 give us the key to his conduct. In this matter, 
 which was so important to him, and which tar- 
 nished his glory and embittered the latter years of 
 his existence, it appears from his own letters that 
 he followed his sister's and his brother s advice, 
 
200 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 rather than that he himself directed the course of 
 matters under discussion.^ We shall probably 
 never know what were his motives or his views on 
 these important and decisive circumstances of his 
 reign. But the knowledge of numerous facts, even 
 if they be of secondary value, enables us at any 
 rate to form conjectures as to what determined the 
 conduct of an individual whose name occupies the 
 best part of half a century memorable in history, 
 and who, owing to his enormous power, and the 
 immense influence he exercised over his own as 
 well as over subsequent times, is himself the more 
 interesting to know and to study, because he 
 never revealed his most inmost thoughts either 
 in the intimacy of private conversation or in his 
 letters. 
 
 1 Dr. Lanz, Corresjmidence cle Charles-Quint. 
 
III. 
 
 PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 
 
 Nations do not always follow a regular course in 
 their social development. Succeeding ages bring 
 forth incessant social changes : at times, we see 
 communities of men united in great masses or 
 divided into small groups ; we see them obey rulers 
 whose power extends over vast populations, or 
 subordinated to influences purely local — sometimes 
 they follow some slow impulse, and climb, as it 
 were, some steep ascent, or suddenly undergo some 
 unexpected change. The history of the world, both 
 ancient and modern, does not develop itself in a 
 symmetrical manner, without accidents or relapses ; 
 upward tendencies are subject to temporary de- 
 rangements, and the periods of decline and prostra- 
 tion are occasionally broken by days of hope and 
 encouragement. 
 
 But, if this is the case with the general history of 
 the world, it may be said that the history of the 
 great states of Western Europe, from the middle 
 ages to modern times — from the origin of the feudal 
 
202 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 system down to the sixteenth century, — has pro- 
 ceeded in one uninterrupted course. The feudal 
 element, which, when once installed, ruled society 
 with more or less vigour in different countries 
 during a series of centuries, continued gradually to 
 lose its influence more or less rapidly : that is to 
 say, that the territory, and therefore the power, 
 became less and less divided, and the groups over 
 which a single individual exercised authority be- 
 came more considerable in extent, and fewer in 
 number. Property was concentrated : wars broke 
 out between vassals, who became more and more 
 powerful; later still, between princes of the same 
 family ; and at last between the sovereigns of great 
 states. Then arose a larger system of general 
 policy, and the rulers of nations no longer con- 
 tended for the possession of a castle, of a province, 
 nor even of the territory of a kingdom ; they 
 struggled for European preponderance. 
 
 The rivalry between Charles Y. and Francis I. 
 was of this character, and they were the first in 
 modern Europe who had such an object in view. 
 Charles V, the conqueror in the conflict, was the 
 first prince who attained it. His predominance 
 was evident in Europe : but it is not possible to 
 attribute it to any one of his various possessions, 
 whether they were Italian, Flemish, African, or 
 Indian. It depended at once on the extent of his 
 dominions, on the success of his warlike enterprises 
 in Italy and in Africa, on the care with which he 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 
 
 preserved all parts of his enormous inheritance from 
 the attacks of his enemies, on his good fortune, as 
 well as on his personal superiority. 
 
 Nature had endowed him with prudence and 
 foresight ; and long before his death, as we have 
 already said, he was tormented by the fear that 
 none other hand but his could, in future times, 
 direct such various interests, govern realms so dis- 
 tant from each other, resist so many enemies, and, in 
 the government of such vast possessions, reconcile so 
 many conflicting ambitions. The gloomy warnings 
 of disease, the idea of finishing his days in retire- 
 ment, and the care of regulating the succession, 
 occupied his mind for some time ; and various vast 
 projects, such as would present themselves to an 
 intelligence of so high an order, and during so 
 great a, crisis, absorbed his attention. He doubted 
 which was the best European organization to esta- 
 blish after his death ; and, many years before he 
 abdicated, he thought of reconstituting, in imita- 
 tion of Burgundy, an independent state in the 
 north ; for he believed that a monarchy which in- 
 cluded Spain, Northern and Southern Italy, and 
 the hereditary provinces of Austria, would be more 
 homogeneous, less vulnerable, and stronger in Ger- 
 many ; while a kingdom well placed between France 
 and England, possessing family ties and interests 
 with the two maritime powers, would allow the 
 imperial inheritance to become more compact and 
 solid, instead of being a cause of weakness. 
 
204 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 This idea was not carried out, because it depended 
 on projected alliances which were not contracted ; 
 and of all these vast plans, Charles V, in his last 
 years, only preserved the resolution of separating 
 the imperial crown from the rest of his dominions. 
 
 He had not the strength to carry out all he had 
 undertaken in order to leave his son a succession 
 free of embarrassments and perils, so as to enable 
 him to terminate the war with France by a more 
 successful campaign than that of Lorraine, and to 
 make a better arrangement with the Protestants in 
 Germany than the Treaty of Passau. He would fain 
 have rendered his heir aware of the dangers mena- 
 cing the crown ; there were his unsubdued enemies 
 to be kept in check, his subjects to be managed, 
 and his own inclinations to be controlled. 
 
 In spite of all this, and of all external and internal 
 difficulties, — in spite of the large reduction which 
 the separation of the empire of Germany from Spain 
 had caused in his inheritance, — the King of Spain, 
 with Milan and the kingdom of Naples, the Low 
 Countries, Franche-Comte, Africa, and the Indies, 
 was still the most considerable sovereign in Europe, 
 and the will of Philip II. was certainly the most 
 powerful among the princes of his time. His 
 reign, which corresponds to the second half of the 
 sixteenth century, may justly be named the Spanish 
 period. 
 
 In order to judge the successor of Charles V, we 
 must consider what were the elements of power 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 205 
 
 which he had at his disposal when he came to the 
 throne, and what use he made of them. 
 
 Apart from the war against the Sultan, Charles V. 
 had conceived three great military enterprises in 
 Europe : these were the war in Italy, the war with 
 France, and that with Germany. The first might 
 be regarded as ended, for the two Italian vice- 
 royalties had continued to belong to Spain, and 
 formed a possession which was but feebly, and only 
 occasionally, disputed in subsequent times. But 
 the war of rivalry with France, which lasted for 
 more than a hundred years after the death of 
 Philip II, was destined to be the basis of the foreign 
 policy of all the eminent men of that country 
 during the seventeenth century ; nor do we see that 
 Philip II. ever seriously considered whether he 
 ought to continue or to terminate the struggle. 
 We are ignorant whether the cause had been finally 
 decided even when Henry IV, Kichelieu, and 
 Louis XIV. determined to renew it with such 
 ardour, — or whether it was necessary, for the se- 
 curity of the Spanish throne, to sheath the sword, 
 and accept as an established fact the state of 
 Europe as it was left by Charles V. The war 
 between France and Spain, which succeeded the 
 war with England, may be said to have begun with 
 the invasion of Naples by Charles VIII, and to have 
 closed, more than two hundred years afterwards, 
 with the Peace of Utrecht. It was broken off 
 during the whole of Philip II.'s reign, — with the 
 
206 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 exception of a few hostilities soon after his acces- 
 sion, and of his intervention in favour of the 
 League, — just as it was afterwards whenever the 
 government in France was feeble or embarrassed, or 
 occupied by secondary interests : then a reconcilia- 
 tion was effected with Spain, and peace was bought, 
 either from timidity, or from neglect of the national 
 welfare, or in order to satisfy some other more 
 futile ambition. Catherine and Mary of Medicis 
 acted thus ; and Eichelieu, on his first entry into 
 public life, when his first object was to secure the 
 support of the Queen at any sacrifice, did the same. 
 
 If we consider only the salient points in history, 
 Philip 11. appears as representing in Spain the 
 foreign policy of France as administered by feeble 
 governments. He had the good fortune to reign 
 while France was miserably ruled by the three sons 
 of Henry H, and while England was subjected to 
 the strong, but capricious and miserly, government 
 of Elizabeth. Had the successors of Francis I. been 
 warlike princes, or had the predecessors of Henry IV. 
 and of Eichelieu been worthy of them, — had even 
 Henry 11. lived somewhat longer, — the son of 
 Charles V. would not have passed, in the solitude 
 and silence of the Escurial, a life occupied only with 
 pondering on the political situation of Europe. 
 
 The Spain of Philip 11, might have aspired to 
 everything. Her armies were excellent, the best 
 and most inured to warfare in Europe ; her terri- 
 tory was larger than that of any other continental 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 207 
 
 state; and with the facilities given her by her 
 imposing position, she might have contracted the 
 alliances most suited to her. She was strong enough 
 not to fear in the Peninsula itself either the Moors, 
 who had escaped proscription by conversion, or the 
 descendants of those whom the Inquisition had con- 
 demned, or the Arragonese, who had been stripped 
 of their privileges. Spanish Italy, under the stem 
 sway of its viceroys, did not attempt to rebel. 
 France, enervated by civil war, was subject to the 
 disgraceful government of the last of the Yalois 
 race. In Germany the Eeformation had no great 
 military leader ; Maurice of Saxony was dead, and 
 the great men of the Thirty Years' War, Bernard 
 of Saxe- Weimar and Gustavus Adolphus, were yet 
 unborn. 
 
 Philip II. did not assume for himself an his- 
 torical mission. He did not inquire whether, in 
 an historical point of view, he had not a part to 
 play for the glory of his name and of his country, 
 or even for the satisfaction of his conscience ; nor 
 did he inquire what that part might be. After con- 
 templating the condition of the world around him, 
 and what had already been done before his acces- 
 sion, he proposed to himself no fixed task, whether 
 it were to continue the war of rivalry with France, 
 to maintain the contest in Germany, or to under- 
 take a regular and uninterrupted struggle against 
 the Reformation in Germany, France, and England. 
 He disliked the stir and clash of arms ; he took no 
 
208 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 part in any military action ; he was not present 
 either at the siege of Ostia, or at Gravelines, or at 
 Lepanto, or at any of the subsequent battles of the 
 epoch. During the first years of his reign some 
 generals of renown ' gained important victories for 
 him, as the Duke of Alva in Italy against the Pope, 
 and Philibert of Savoy and Egmont in Picardy 
 against Henry IT. With the latter he signed the 
 peace so advantageous to himself of Cateau-Cam- 
 bresis, and he then retired to immure himself for 
 forty years in his palace at the Escurial.^ 
 
 Contemporary statesmen, even of the most vigo- 
 rous intellect, cannot judge passing events with the 
 decisive accuracy with which posterity will one day 
 appreciate the same circumstances ; but they at- 
 tempt to estimate them as far as they are able, and 
 strive to form correct opinions. Charles V. conceived 
 many projects, planned many enterprises, and passed 
 days and nights in thinking what was the most 
 glorious and the best use to make of his power. 
 His son was not tormented by such grave thoughts 
 or anxieties. His system was to take the sole 
 management of all his possessions, without ever 
 disclosing the principle which guided him, or 
 
 ^ 111 the immense paliice of the Escurial the traveller is still shown 
 the two plain and very small rooms inhabited by Philip II. One is 
 his study, liglited by one window, looking into the church ; the other 
 ifl the room where he died. In the study is shown his writing-table 
 and his arm-chair. The only door of the room opens into a narrow 
 gallery, the walls of which are encrusted from top to bottom with square 
 blue tiles ; it was there he received the foreign ambassadors. 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 20.9 
 
 moving from his palace. To govern by correspon- 
 dence ; to give tardy orders without explanation 
 or justification ; never to permit any one to talk 
 of the future or to give advice; to decide, after a 
 painful deliberation, on all matters without con- 
 sulting any one but himself; to signify his deter- 
 mination by a marginal note, written on the de- 
 spatch, which was prolix and almost illegible; to 
 pretend to impose his will on the world by tracing 
 a few lines on paper and dispatching couriers ; 
 to glory in his want of information, in his insensi- 
 bility, in his immobility, in his slowness, and in 
 the exaggeration of all his natural failings — such 
 was the course adopted by Philip II. for preserving, 
 administering, and defending the noble inheritance 
 transmitted to him by his father. In this manner 
 did he occupy the half century which separates 
 his accession from that of his son, — the interval 
 between the peace of Cateau-Cambresis and that 
 of Vervins, — between the battle of St. Quentin and 
 the battle of Nieuport, — between Spain at the 
 summit of her glory, and Spain vanquished and 
 degraded. 
 
 II. 
 
 The apologists of Philip 11. often say that 
 Charles V. was as severe against the Eeformation 
 as his son ; for the former persecuted and burnt the 
 heretics ; and the latter, in his most rigorous acts, 
 
 p 
 
210 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 only carried into execution his father's edicts. 
 They therefore ask why Charles should be respected 
 while Philip is severely blamed. 
 
 It is true that Charles Y, Francis I, Ferdinand II, 
 and Eichelieu considered it as a duty to combat the 
 Keformation ; but they combated it with armies, 
 and with a degree of military frankness : Philip 
 attacked it with the weapons of secret denunciation 
 and torture. The scaffold and the stake were the 
 rule, war the exception. History seems to have 
 forgiven Charles Y. for the war against the Pro- 
 testant League in Germany, and Eichelieu for the 
 siege of La Eochelle ; but she will never pardon 
 Philip for having substituted the executioner's axe 
 for the sword of the soldier.^ 
 
 We have not been carried away by enthusiasm 
 in our estimate of the character of Charles Y, of 
 his government, or of his influence on the society 
 of his time. With regard to his political weight 
 and his personal character, and as sovereign of the 
 Low Countries, there is no sort of comparison to 
 be drawn between the father and the son. An eye- 
 witness of the first development of the Eeforma- 
 tion, Charles Y. did not allow the religious revolt 
 to spread in his dominions. When the social revolts 
 began, he repressed them with severity and rigour, 
 
 ^ Under Charles V. the Inquisition was never established in Brabant, 
 in Luxembourg, in Groningnon, nor in Guelderland. (Report by 
 M. Gachard to the Minister of the Interior at the begmning of La 
 Coirespondance de Fhilippe II, p. 125.) 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 211 
 
 assuming an attitude of firmness and disdain which 
 we are not bound to admire, but which certainly 
 inspires quite a different sentiment from that which 
 we feel for the system of spies organized by 
 Philip II, or for his false promises, his prolonged 
 silence towards all who had any complaint to 
 make, and the perplexity in which he left his 
 agents, while he was hesitating as to the orders he 
 had to give. Charles V. occupied men's minds by 
 warlike enterprises. He confided the government 
 of the Low Countries to two women of great 
 character and of remarkable intelligence, to whom 
 he showed confidence and gratitude. He did not 
 submit the institutions of the provinces to the 
 levelling effects of a foreign despotism : in the 
 midst of the financial embarrassments caused by 
 the necessity of keeping up his armies, it was 
 always to the country itself that he appealed for 
 subsidies. He convoked the States-General above 
 twenty times during his reign, and the life of the 
 two regents was passed and their health destroyed 
 in perpetual struggles with the delegates of the 
 provinces. If Charles Y. did not respect the liberty 
 of the subject more than Philip II, at any rate 
 his mode of governing men was very different. He 
 did not consider Spain or the Empire as a mother- 
 country, and treat the Low Countries as a colony ; 
 indeed, the Spaniards sometimes complained that 
 too much favour and confidence were shown to the 
 Flemings, to the prejudice of other nationalities ; 
 
 p 2 
 
212 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 but, at any rate, he did not in any of the countries 
 under his rule rouse against himself the sentiments 
 "which a foreign master inspires. By the affability 
 of his manners, by his habit of travelling, by his 
 knowledge of the institutions and inclinations of his 
 people, by the elevation and breadth of his ideas, 
 by the fineness of his taste, by the European cha- 
 racter of his policy, and by his disposition to 
 acknowledge, appreciate, and make use of merit 
 wherever it was to be found, Charles V. rendered 
 it impossible for any one in any part of his do- 
 minions to consider him as a foreigner. He was 
 not, like his son, a man of one idea, of one lan- 
 guage, and of one residence. The Low Countries 
 reproached him loudly and often with having ex- 
 tracted from them their last crown for his wars. 
 When the insurrection was quelled, the men of 
 Ghent saw the most precious foundations of their 
 municipal liberty changed ; but the old forms of the 
 national constitution still remained erect ; the organi- 
 zation of the states was not tampered mth ; autho- 
 rity was confided to skilful and prudent hands; 
 civil and military ofl&ces were not filled by Spaniards ; 
 and the great families were not deprived of influ- 
 ence, or cut ofi* from the exercise of all authority. 
 The country remained unchanged ; the aristocracy 
 were not humiliated, nor was the principle of pro- 
 vincial representation destroyed. After having pro- 
 mulgated rigorous ordinances against the Keforma- 
 tion, after having imposed his iron will on the 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 213 
 
 people of Ghent, and after having exacted large 
 subsidies from the States- General, Charles V. did 
 not leave the reputation of a despot, and on his 
 retirement was not unpopular. 
 
 There is no sort of resemblance between him and 
 his son ; the two characters, the two governments, 
 and the destiny created by each for the communities 
 over which they ruled, are totally dissimilar. 
 
 If Philip, on ascending the throne, had taken a 
 strong resolution either to make war on France 
 under the Valois, on reformed Germany, or against 
 the Eeformation wherever it appeared — had he 
 shown ambition or courage ; had he openly followed 
 up his idea, and devoted to it all his resources, all 
 the persistence of his will, all his own faculties and 
 those of his agents, his place in history would have 
 been very different. History respects all sincere 
 and honest convictions, as well as great courage. 
 What history condemns, with perhaps excessive 
 severity, in Philip, is not that he was a con- 
 scientious adversary of the Eeformation, of the 
 ancient institutions of the Low Countries, or of the 
 independence of Germany, nor even that he was a 
 despot, devoted to the success of a theory. What 
 repels us is the mysterious system pursued by this 
 monarch in the exercise of his power'; it is his total 
 want of courage and sincerity in the accomplish- 
 ment and the open avowal of his most important 
 acts. History reproaches him with having hypo- 
 critically and cunningly tampered with the insti- 
 
214 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tutions of his people, instead of having openly- 
 abolished them ; of having been a conspirator rather 
 than a soldier ; of having preferred a civil to a 
 great war, while he avoided taking any personal 
 part in either the one or the other. History bears 
 him a grudge for his contemptible despotism, his 
 cold cruelty, his taste for secret execution, and for 
 his passion for instructions so obscure as to leave 
 the responsibility with those who acted on them, 
 or so contradictory as to embarrass and compromise 
 those who were to carry them out : these are the 
 reasons why history establishes such a difference 
 between the two governments, though both were 
 despotic and severe. 
 
 III. 
 
 There is some analogy between the political 
 situation of France during the reigns of the three 
 predecessors of Henry IV. and that of the Low 
 Countries under Philip. In both countries the 
 Government went through a civil war without any 
 fixed plan. Catherine of Medicis, with far greater 
 ability and clearness of vision than Philip II, suc- 
 ceeded no better than he did in reducing the state 
 into order, and in following a consistent line of 
 policy. With regard to the parties which divided 
 her kingdom she showed as little decision as her 
 son-in-law ; and with reference to the Keformation, 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 215 
 
 she showed still less, because her convictions were 
 not so strong. Had Philip been King of France, 
 he might, like Charles IX, have promoted the 
 murder of Coligny, the Huguenot chief, but he 
 would never, like Henry III, have encouraged the 
 assassination of the Duke of Guise, the head of the 
 League. 
 
 Philip II. was not conscious of the changes he 
 was working in the government of the Low Coun- 
 tries. He returned to Spain, after having made 
 peace with France ; he impressed upon Margaret of 
 Parma the Eegent, upon Granvelle the Prime 
 Minister, and upon the councillors he thought 
 worthy of his confidence, the necessity of strictly 
 enforcing his father s edicts against the Eeformation. 
 He did not give a thought to the conditions im- 
 posed by the state of society, or of parties; nor 
 to the difference which might result from the exist- 
 ence of peace instead of war, which had prevailed 
 during the lifetime of his predecessor ; nor to the 
 character of the institutions, and the position in 
 which they placed the supreme authority ; nor yet 
 to the force and disposition of the Reformers. There 
 is nothing in the conduct of the King at this epoch, 
 or in his voluminous and important correspondence, 
 which indicates that he reflected on such matter, 
 that he felt any uneasiness, or that he took any pre- 
 cautions. He thought he had secured order in the 
 provinces by leaving three thousand Spanish troops, 
 and that he had saved the Government from all 
 
216 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 embarrassment by giving the nominal authority to 
 Margaret of Parma, Charles' natural daughter, and 
 the real power to Perrenot, the Bishop of Arras, 
 whilst he named as councillors certain members of 
 the high nobility, without functions and without 
 influence. 
 
 If we transfer our attention to the state of 
 affairs fifteen years later, when the southern pro- 
 vinces of the Low Countries, after having revolted, 
 still remained in a troubled and disorganized con- 
 dition — when the northern provinces had in fact 
 separated themselves from the monarchy, and were 
 at work to secure their independence — we shall 
 perceive that, at this point, Philip XL was no longer 
 master of his political conduct, for events had be- 
 come too strong for him, and no course was left 
 open to him but to defend himself in the best way 
 he could. But in the beginning the game was in 
 his own hands. The higher aristocracy, half ruined 
 by luxury, asked for nothing better than to serve 
 him ; French Calvinism had made no progress in 
 the country, because no political faction had so- 
 licited its interference ; Charles V. had never 
 administered the government for the profit, or with 
 the ideas, of Spain ; and that anti-Spanish senti- 
 ment, which, without support or alliance with others, 
 sufficed to create enormous difficulties for Philip 11, 
 evoked and fomented as they were by his own acts, 
 had not yet appeared in the middle classes, or in 
 the general population. On the morrow of the 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 217 
 
 Peace of Cateau-Cambrdsis, no particular grievance 
 existed. 
 
 In a short space of time the new Government 
 irritated all parties. It dissatisfied the nobles, by 
 making them feel that the council of state in which 
 they sat had no real influence ; while the States- 
 General were displeased at the introduction of four- 
 teen newly-created bishops, who represented the 
 great abbeys of the country, and were to enjoy their 
 revenues.^ Moreover, the Government alienated the 
 Eeformers, by leaving them no alternative between 
 emigration and the scaflbld ; and irritated the 
 whole of the population by telling them they would 
 be held in subjection by a foreign soldiery, and 
 closely watched by inquisitors, more severe, powerful, 
 and more cordially encouraged and protected than 
 those in the days of Charles V. 
 
 The King had no intention of establishing a new 
 system of government ; he wished to maintain all 
 things in the situation in which they then were ; 
 but he failed to remember that his father had left 
 to the States the exercise of their privileges, to the 
 nobles their functions and their influence, and to 
 the trade and commonalty of the country a security 
 in their proper place. He acted with no particular 
 plan ; his only desire was to render the progress of 
 the Reformation impossible, and to execute the edicts 
 of the Emperor by maintaining the Inquisition ; 
 but he never perceived that he was substituting 
 
 ^ Hitherto only the regular clergy had been eligible for the States. 
 
218 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Spanish despotism in the place of the national 
 institutions. The universal discontent astonished 
 him, because, in the blindness of his own narrow 
 mind, and his want of sympathy with everybody, 
 he had troubled all mankind without knowing it. 
 What proves this is, that he left the Low Countries 
 at the very moment when he was putting every- 
 thing in peril. Affairs in Spain were certainly less 
 important than those that ought to have caused 
 him to prolong his stay in the Low Countries. 
 
 The real head of the Government during the 
 years that immediately followed the departure of 
 Philip was the Bishop of Arras. 
 
 Granvelle, under the orders of a great sovereign, 
 would have rendered invaluable assistance. He 
 had full capacity to be a useful servant, and 
 sufficient courage to obey, even in danger ; but he 
 did not possess the character necessary for com- 
 mand. In going through the voluminous collec- 
 tion of his State papers, we must confess that, in 
 the midst of a mass of important details, we are 
 struck by the emptiness and sterility of his mind, 
 under the pressure of such heavy responsibility. 
 He never warned or thwarted the King in a serious 
 or resolute manner, although he secretly blamed his 
 policy. With a master of so little foresight as 
 Philip II, and a government possessing such abun- 
 dant resources, ministers like Amboise, Farnese, 
 Sully, or Mazarin, in Granvelle's place, would have 
 endeavoured to introduce other ideas, and would, 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 219 
 
 no doubt, have aimed at great things. Granvelle 
 possessed extreme good sense and perspicacity, and 
 he really possessed a spirit of moderation with which 
 he never could inspire Philip. His knowledge of 
 affairs was profound ; he was active, ambitious, 
 supple, and cunning, and by no means enterprising. 
 His mind could fathom the intentions of men so 
 well, that it stood him in the stead of a heart, and 
 it made him divine in others the emotions which he 
 was incapable of feeling himself 
 
 William of Nassau, Egmont, and the Governess 
 herself — all those who played a part in the events 
 of that period — those who remained faithful to the 
 monarchy, and those who separated from it for a 
 time or for ever — the staunch friends and the rebels 
 — are all appreciated in his letters with striking truth. 
 He was fertile in small expedients ; his activity 
 might have corrected Philip II.'s slowness. He 
 showed himself indiflferent to the hatred he inspired, 
 and inaccessible to fear ; but he was incapable of 
 independent action ; he had no sense of pride, and 
 could not adopt a bold and decisive course. His 
 courage was shown in obeying the will of another ; 
 not in carrying out his own. In his dealings with 
 high personages he lacked dignity, self-possession, 
 and even tact. The unpopularity which he brought 
 upon himself, and upon the master whose agent he 
 was, is to be attributed to the defects of his general 
 character ; to his low and false nature ; to his vulgar 
 avidity for power and credit ; to his suspected and 
 
220 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 hidden vices. He was sensible enough to see that 
 the augmentation of the number of bishoprics, with 
 a view of rendering the Inquisition more powerful 
 and more efficacious, was an unwise measure ; but, 
 as the Archbishopric of Malines was destined for 
 him, he was not sufficiently unselfish to oppose 
 the scheme. His reason was always struggling 
 with his ambition, and his bad qualities obscured 
 his intelligence. In spite of his docility, he did 
 not succeed in making himself necessary ; and he 
 knew neither how to avert disgrace, nor to accept 
 it with dignity. 
 
 Philip II. committed the same mistake as the 
 Valois. In the Low Countries, as in France, the 
 royal power, while combating the tendencies of the 
 aristocracy, without paying much attention to the 
 wants of the country, drove the aristocracy to 
 support the Heformation, and the two parties, before 
 uniting, mutually assisted each other. Civil war 
 raged in the Low Countries and in France, with far 
 greater danger to the royal power, and with greater 
 fury, at a time when the crown was no longer 
 engaged in some great war which contented those 
 who were ambitious, and united them against the 
 foreign enemy. 
 
 If, after his Italian campaign, the Duke of Alva, 
 in command of the Spanish armies, had fought 
 against the Duke of Guise, who commanded the 
 armies of Francis II. or of Charles IX, the mas- 
 sacre of St. Bartholomew and the League, as well 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 221 
 
 as the insurrection in the Low Countries and its 
 sanguinary repression, might have figured differently 
 in history. Philip 11. and Catherine of Medicis 
 ought to have comprehended, what was afterwards 
 understood by more enlightened governments, that 
 it is impossible with impunity to arrest the course of 
 a great war when it has once begun, especially at a 
 period when ideas were fermenting, and the spirit 
 of innovation, utterly regardless of consequences, 
 sought to shake to its very foundations the edifice 
 of ancient authority ; when the scattered represen- 
 tatives of the spirit of the middle ages were still 
 labouring to resist the progress of modern ideas ; 
 and when numbers of the young nobility in France 
 or at Geneva followed the teaching of the Eeformers. 
 Between the two parties in France regular battles 
 were fought, and treaties of peace were signed 
 at Amboise, at Lonjumeau, at St. Germain, and 
 at La Eochelle, as between independent and foreign 
 powers. The revolutionists in the Low Coun- 
 tries, whether they were nobles, reformers, or 
 representatives of the old democracy, destroyed, or 
 permitted the destruction of, four hundred churches 
 in Flanders. The most ardent among the gentry 
 demanded the suppression of the religious edicts, 
 and of the Inquisition ; the more moderate among 
 them desired the convocation of the States-General. 
 The demands of the aristocracy — both those who 
 were carried away by their passions, and those 
 who were for temporising — were identical with 
 
^ 
 
 222 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 those of the Eeformers. Granvelle had long retired 
 from office. Margaret of Parma, who did not find 
 in herself that strength which her legal functions 
 failed to give, met the demands of the mutinous 
 aristocracy, and the excesses of the Iconoclasts, by 
 expressing her embarrassment, and by promises of 
 moderation, which were soon falsified by the arrival 
 of the King's orders. 
 
 The dissatisfied aristocracy were divided into 
 three classes : first there was the party of the ardent 
 revolutionists, such as Brederode, who advised and 
 promoted an immediate rising in arms ; Brederode, 
 however, died early. Next was the party of the 
 prudent and far-seeing revolutionists, represented by 
 William the Silent, who possessed the strongest 
 mind, the most solid judgment, and who was the 
 most dangerous personage of that epoch. Finally, 
 there was the party of all those ambitious men who 
 were undecided in their opinions, who thought 
 themselves misunderstood and neglected, who hesi- 
 tated between the Church and the Eeformation, 
 between the King and the Kevolution, with an 
 undoubted preference for what existed in times past. 
 This latter party is personified in Count Egmont. 
 
 The life and death of Count Egmont are the most 
 signal condemnation of the policy of Philip II. The 
 position occupied by him in the country, his birth, 
 his victories, his alliances, his sympathetic and 
 frank nature, his natural abilities, and his noble 
 aspect, made him a personage at once illustrious 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 223 
 
 and popular. His vanity and the consciousness of 
 his military services induced him to aspire to the 
 highest positions, such as that of governor-general, 
 or commander-in-chief of the armies, or even to 
 the earldom of Flanders. There was in his inclina- 
 tions, as in the course of the events in the midsti of 
 which he lived, a double tendency, which was fatal 
 to him, and which at the same time clearly explains 
 the controversy of which he has so often been the 
 subject. With great qualities and remarkable apti- 
 tude for many things, his heart was simple, his mind 
 credulous, and his will unstable. He is a faithful 
 representative of that numerous and important class 
 of men who, in the southern provinces, began by 
 opposing the government of Philip II, and who 
 afterwards rallied round it, — who did not feel suffi- 
 cient hatred against the monarch to join frankly in 
 the rebellion, nor yet sufficient satisfaction in the 
 actual state of things, nor sufficient affection for the 
 King's person, to becoffie faithful subjects or cour- 
 tiers. Egmont was one of those who shrink from 
 what is required for a bold career, and who yet 
 resign themselves with difficulty to be nothing. He 
 had far less resolution than the two Guises : the 
 resources of his mind were far inferior to theirs ; 
 but, like them, he was uncertain with whom he 
 should form alliances. We repeat once more, that 
 when such situations occur, and when men like 
 Egmont are produced, it is the fault of those who 
 govern. A doubt attaches to the name of Count 
 
224 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Egmont, because lie was the representative of that 
 which was doubtful in itself — of a party which was 
 advancing at a venture, without any fixed object — 
 of a set of men who, destined and resolved to 
 defend the throne with their swords, were yet 
 thrown, by the imprudence of the rulers, out of the 
 line of their true vocation and their ,own convic- 
 tions. Egmont was a simple-hearted hero ; he was 
 eminently unfitted for the intermediate part he 
 assumed ; he possessed neither the coldness, the 
 empire over himself, nor the necessary dissimula- 
 tion ; constantly desiring things essentially opposed 
 to each other — seconding the Eeformers in their acts, 
 whilst he disavowed their words and disliked their 
 belief — conversing frankly with men who concealed 
 their opinions — allowing himself to be entertained, 
 flattered, and deceived by those who eventually sent 
 him to the scafibld. His misfortunes were so great, 
 and his death so touching, that it is almost painful 
 to have to discuss his character and his merits. To 
 say, as has sometimes been said, that he was inno- 
 cent according to the strict letter of the law, is 
 neither to justify nor to ennoble him. He was 
 generous as he was brave ; the brilliant acts of his 
 youth seemed to open for him a great military 
 career. Had there been other battles, like that of 
 St. Quentin, for him to win, he would have been a 
 faithful subject; but to force him to live without 
 glory or authority, and with an embarrassed fortune, 
 was to expect from him what was beyond his strength 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 225 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Duke of Alva spent six years in the Low 
 Countries. His mission there was to establish a 
 perfectly useless and blindly barbarous system. On" 
 his arrival, the provinces had nearly returned to their 
 obedience ; the preachings had ceased, and the con- 
 federation of the nobles was dissolved. The excesses 
 committed by the Iconoclasts, and the expected 
 arrival of a Spanish force under a leader who was 
 feared, had caused a general reaction in the pro- 
 vinces. Egmont had taken the new oath of alle- 
 giance ; the more turbulent nobles had dispersed, or 
 were in hiding ; the northern provinces had not 
 erected the standard of rebellion. After passing 
 through a crisis, the country would have accepted 
 the foreign rule had it been disposed to make some 
 concessions. 
 
 After six years of a rule as violent as it was 
 ill-judged — after useless and unexampled rigour, 
 purposeless exactions, and campaigns which, though 
 well conducted against a revolutionary force, were 
 still unsuccessful in their results — the Duke of Alva 
 took his departure, leaving the southern provinces 
 profoundly discontented, and the more important 
 among the northern provinces virtually separated 
 from the monarchy. The Eeformation, which had 
 never had more than a doubtful existence in the 
 south, had taken refuge in the northern parts of the 
 
 Q 
 
226 HISTORIOAL ESSAYS. 
 
 kingdom, and was permanently established in the 
 great mass of the population. These provinces, which 
 soon after were to form a new state, had not yet 
 proclaimed their independence ; but they had already 
 attracted the attention and interest of Europe, and 
 they offered to more than one Power the prospect of 
 a useful ally. The north might, therefore, be con- 
 sidered as lost to Spain ; while the south, shaken 
 and ruined, had entered a period of confusion and 
 disorder, which lasted many years aftej* the depar- 
 ture of the lieutenant appointed by Philip II, and 
 only ceased when Spain, grown wiser by experience 
 and failure, confided the destinies of the country to 
 more worthy hands, and caused a milder mode of 
 administration to be adopted. The Duke of Alva, 
 whose reputation as a great captain had preceded 
 him, and who had been with Charles Y. at Tunis 
 and at Mlihlberg, retired, ill and discouraged, after 
 having unnecessarily sent thousands of men to the 
 scaffold or the stake, after having increased the dis- 
 order in one-half of the Spanish dominions in the 
 Low Countries, and after having rendered more 
 than probable the eventual loss of the other half. 
 
 Such had been the state of the country on his 
 arrival : such was its condition on his departure. 
 These ^^ere the general results of his administra- 
 tion to the southern, the northern provinces, and 
 himself. 
 
 These years include the period of the first hostili- 
 ties of the Spanish army against the insurgents of 
 
 I 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 227 
 
 Holland and Zealand, and against the army levied 
 by tlie House of Nassau. The part the Prince of 
 Orange had to play was at first military rather than 
 political ; his two first campaigns were those of 
 1568 and 1572. The first was inefiicient and un- 
 fortunate, the second was successful in the first 
 instance in the invasion of a part of Brabant, but 
 his success was marred by external events, by the 
 massacre of St. Bartholomew, which inflicted a 
 violent blow on the party of the Eeformation, and 
 weakened the cause everywhere. 
 
 The Duke of Alva did not profit by this circum- 
 stance, when Catherine of Medicis had for once laid 
 aside her usually vacillating policy. In dealing 
 such a deathblow at the Huguenots she had to fear 
 promoting the interest of Spain, but she dreaded 
 still more that Charles IX. might become too inti- 
 mate with the Calvinists, and listen to the advice of 
 Coligny. Nothing, it appears to me, proves more 
 strongly equal want of foresight and acuteness on 
 the part of the Duke of Alva, than his failing to 
 reap any decisive advantage from an event which 
 ought to have profited him so much. This date 
 coincides with the decline of Alva's authority, and 
 the undoubted signs of his discouragement ; then 
 it was that Brill was captured by the Gueux, or 
 " Beggars of the Sea,'' and that the first victories 
 of the patriots in Holland were achieved. 
 
 Everything, however, conspired to favour his 
 cause — at least as he understood it. On his arrival 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 he had found the country pacified : he was at the 
 head of a considerable force, and the party he came 
 to combat had just been crushed in France by a 
 massacre. He had to oppose him nothing but a 
 revolutionary army badly paid, the organization of 
 which encountered a thousand obstacles ; but he 
 neither knew how to use the coercive means he had 
 at his disposal, nor the facilities which hazard had 
 just thrown in his way. Several ably conducted 
 campaigns were fought with divers chances, and 
 with gains and losses on both sides ; but at the end 
 of a certain time it was invariably found that the 
 North had the best of the contest, and that the 
 South had lost ground. "When the Duke of Alva 
 left the country, the insurgents possessed the 
 whole island of Walcheren, and all the province 
 of Holland with the exception of Amsterdam and 
 Haarlem. 
 
 The details of his civil government are monoto- 
 nous in their atrocity. It is estimated that he 
 caused the death of eighteen hundred persons in 
 the first three months, and of eighteen thousand 
 during the course of his stay in the country. If 
 the energy of the people was broken for the 
 moment, his own was still more shattered. The 
 emigration was enormous : first of all, to England 
 and to Germany; later to Holland, when the re- 
 volution was firmly established there. The middle 
 classes who acquired wealth by their trades, and 
 raised themselves by their scientific attainments, 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 229 
 
 carried away with tliem elsewhere their active 
 habits and their intelligence. The duties which 
 the Duke of Alva wished to establish on the sales 
 of personal and real property will always remain 
 a proof of his incapacity and obstinacy. The im- 
 post of one-tenth on all property, which he was 
 never able to establish, contributed as much as any 
 of his most violent acts to destroy his reputation 
 and to paralyse his action. 
 
 The first campaigns of the Prince of Orange 
 against Spain were very difficult. Kesources and 
 allies alike failed him ; for help from England and 
 from France came only later. The sympathy of 
 the German Protestants was very lukewarm, and 
 sterile enough, a-s most of , their princes were Luthe- 
 rans, and had but little disposition to aid the Cal- 
 vinism of the Low Countries. The difficulty of 
 raising an army and providing for its wants was as 
 great for the Prince of Orange, as it was for him to 
 sustain a struggle against veterans commanded by 
 such men as the Duke of Alva himself, his son 
 Frederick, Boussu, and Mondragon. 
 
 The war which William of Orange waged against 
 Spain lasted sixteen years, — that is to say, from the 
 time he emigrated until his death. To understand 
 the part he played in this war we must consider 
 the weakness of his resources, and the power of his 
 adversaries ; the want of organization of the forces 
 which at first were at his disposal ; the embarrass- 
 ment resulting from the very authority and con- 
 
230 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 fidence whicli the intrepid population bestowed on 
 him, and the conviction which existed in the 
 Spanish ranks, that the rebellion would cease the 
 day he was no longer at its head. The energy and 
 devotion of the Dutch patriots seconded him man- 
 fully, but the Duke of Alva had his share in the 
 success of the enterprise, inasmuch as the example 
 of what happened in the South made the insur- 
 gents comprehend that it was better to fight as 
 free men in the plains of Holland or behind the 
 walls of a city, even with the risk of lacking food 
 and pay, than to be condemned by the Tribunal 
 of Blood, or to languish in the dungeons of the 
 Inquisition. 
 
 The northern provinces of the Low Countries, 
 before they were regularly constituted, and as soon 
 as they had given the first proofs of their energy in 
 the struggle, of their resolution, and of the devo- 
 tion, as ardent as it was austere, which distin- 
 guished their whole conduct, were immediately 
 accepted by Europe as a new element which would 
 have to be taken into account by France and 
 England, as well as by Spain. To obtain influence 
 in these provinces became the object of a rivalry 
 sufficient to bring about war between any princes 
 who were more warlike than the House of Valois, 
 Elizabeth, and Philip II. Charles IX. and Henry 
 HI. had too much intelligence not to feel that the 
 provinces, detached from Spain, would become a 
 precious ally to France, placed as they were between 
 
PHILIP TI. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 231 
 
 France and England, opposite to the English coast, 
 with the Spanish territory behind them. But these 
 two princes, the last representatives of an ancient 
 race, hesitated to take any permanent footing in 
 the Low Countries, for fear of alarming England, 
 and creating a common interest or a motive of 
 alliance between that country and Spain. England, 
 on her side, saw with great repugnance the influ- 
 ence of France spreading in a country from which 
 she was only separated by a few miles of sea ; and 
 Spain manifested fear as well as jealousy when 
 there was any question of an understanding between 
 a great power and her revolted subjects. Thus 
 the future United Provinces, although their exist- 
 ence was as yet but foreshadowed, already took a 
 decided place in the system of European alliances. 
 It was difficult for the King of France to give a 
 helping hand to a Protestant state, immediately 
 after the massacre of the Huguenots. Neverthe- 
 less, some time after St. Bartholomew, Charles IX. 
 listened to those who said to him : " The Protes- 
 tants must be spared. Even the Duke of Alva was 
 courteous to Louis of Nassau after the surrender 
 of Mons. Remember that Charles V. with all his 
 enormous power did not succeed in destroying the 
 Reformation." This advice had a certain efiect on 
 Charles IX, and Louis of Nassau, that heroic but 
 imprudent soldier, had succeeded more than once, 
 before the night of the 24th August, 1572, in 
 persuading Charles to join Coligny and to drive 
 
232 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the Spaniards out of the Low Countries. He was 
 convinced that a French army would meet only 
 a semblance of resistance in a country governed 
 by the Duke of Alva. We are justified, therefore, 
 in saying that Alva rendered the worst possible 
 service to the cause of Philip II. F^ caused the 
 Spanish sway to be detested in the provinces, and 
 fixed on Ijhe King the reproach of having used ex- 
 cessive and unjustifiable barbarity ; he created every 
 sort of difficulty for his successor. The population, 
 when he retired, was stupified for the moment by 
 terror, was dissatisfied with everything, was drained 
 of all its resources, but would soon be engaged in a 
 new contest with the foreign rule, and would be for 
 years to come impossible to govern. The Duke of 
 Alva founded nothing, he cured no evil, brought 
 about no progress, and reconciled no party. The 
 country was more disordered and disaffected when 
 he quitted it than when he first came. Violence 
 like his raises more enemies than it can destroy. 
 His brutality provoked the separation of the 
 northern provinces, and it was not his hand that 
 secured the southern provinces for Spain. 
 
 We can already see that the revolution was 
 making its way ; it passed through many stages 
 in succession. The insurrection of the southern 
 provinces had preceded that in the northern, and its 
 failure must be attributed to the want of breadth 
 and solidity in its basis ; the rebellion ceased of its 
 own accord. The rigour shown by the government 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 233 
 
 of the Duke of Alva could only be justified by the 
 actual prevalence of a violent popular agitation ; 
 and when this agitation had ceased, the government 
 had to find another pretext — that of effectually 
 preventing the recurrence of any revolutionary 
 movement, ^^e did not succeed in altering the 
 course of events, and his acts were out of all 
 proportion with the force or actual disposition of 
 the Protestants or of their confederates, whom it 
 was his mission to crush or to dissolve. 
 
 V. 
 
 During the period of some ten years which 
 elapsed between the departure of the Duke of 
 Alva and the violent death of the Prince of Orange, 
 the course of events in the Low Countries was 
 variable and complicated. When this period ter- 
 minated, the northern provinces were in fact almost 
 independent : although this fact had not yet been 
 proclaimed hj themselves, and had been still less 
 legally recognised by other powers, nevertheless 
 their existence, as pre-stated, seemed destined to 
 last. The patient, intelligent, and conciliating 
 efforts of the Prince of Orange to wrest all the 
 ancient Burgundian provinces from Spain, unsuc- 
 cessful as he was, are what strike us most in this 
 interval. He never hoped, indeed, to achieve a 
 
n 
 
 234 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 condition of absolute independence for these pro- 
 vinces, but his desire was to see them united under 
 the protectorate of some foreign power — that of 
 France by preference — and on the firm basis of 
 perfect religious toleration. This was, if we can 
 read in a mind so secret as that of William, the 
 aim of his policy, and the extent of his hopes ; he 
 was not ambitious for the country, nor perhaps 
 long-sighted, and modest as regarded himself and 
 his hopes. Some of his outward acts would seem 
 to assume nothing more than the separate founda- 
 tion of the northern republic ; but everything indi- 
 cates that in his secret heart he aspired, for the 
 new government of the provinces, to something 
 more and to something less than that, — to less 
 independence, and to a more general union. 
 
 What rendered the condition of things during 
 these years so unsettled was the fact that there ex- 
 isted in the whole country but one sentiment, which 
 all men felt in common, and that one was negative. 
 This was hatred of the Spanish sway, which feeling 
 had been mainly fostered by the Duke of Alva. 
 Apart from that, each party had its strong prefer- 
 ences and dislikes ; each party wished for some 
 different object, and endeavoured, without fixed aim 
 or consistency, and with scanty means of action, to 
 work out their individual fancies. 
 
 The power wielded by the Prince of Orange was 
 considerable ; his popularity and the confidence he 
 inspired in the masses of the people were only what 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 235 
 
 was due to his merit and to the services he had ren- 
 dered. But he was the object of personal jealousy 
 among the aristocracy, and of religious suspicion 
 among those of its members who had remained 
 Catholic. On the other hand, his spirit of religious 
 toleration, which resulted more from his political 
 plans than from his unsettled notions on religion, 
 fell short of the exclusiveness of the Calvinists. 
 There were objections, therefore, against him, and 
 reasons for dislike on the part of the Catholic 
 nobility and of the Calvinist democracy. But these 
 two fractions of the population were so uneasy as 
 to the future, so uncertain as to their resources, 
 and so feebly guided, that many in their despair, 
 or in their embarrassment, ranged themselves on his 
 side, particularly as the policy of the Prince of 
 Orange was so conciliating. He repelled no one. 
 He was inclined to think that only the support of 
 France could defend the Low Countries against 
 Spain; but he never disclosed to the country this 
 want of confidence, and whenever the difierent 
 parties looked abroad for a defender or a represen- 
 tative, were it even as a safeguard against the 
 preponderance which he might himself acquire, he 
 hastened to accept the new idea, or welcome the 
 new comer ; he would second him to the utmost 
 of his power, and of his credit : he would take up 
 a position disinterested in appearance, in which he 
 could make himself useful and exercise his pru- 
 dence either by the side of the new comer, or even 
 
^ 
 
 236 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 below him, thus pro^dng that his ambition was 
 under admirable restraint. 
 
 The different parties tried to choose for them- 
 selves foreign chiefs. The aristocracy, disliking the 
 religious ideas of William of Orange, and jealous of 
 his political position, turned their attention towards 
 Austria. The young Archduke Mathias, at their 
 request to the Emperor, came to the Low Coun- 
 tries, and established himself there for some time, 
 with the Prince of Orange as his lieutenant. The 
 Calvinists found a momentary representative in 
 the Palatine John Casimir, who tried to aid the 
 efforts of the democracy ; but the part he played in 
 the country was inconsiderable and of no duration. 
 The party of the several States, which was numerous 
 but little united, and composed of men of various 
 shades of opinion, chiefly agreed, as we have before 
 said, in their sentiment of repugnance to the Spanish 
 government. This party was the most conspicuous, 
 and the most active at this epoch : it sometimes 
 negotiated with the Spanish Governor — then it 
 agreed with the Prince of Orange in admitting for 
 some time that the protection of France was the 
 most efficacious they could invoke, and accordingly 
 showed itself favourable to the intervention of the 
 Duke of Anjou, the King's brother. 
 
 We cannot render this explanation of the state 
 of affairs clearer, or introduce into it more method. 
 We must admit that the population, divided into 
 different parties, and each desiring to attain incon- 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 237 
 
 sistent objects, were without proper guidance, or 
 unity of purpose, tending by their joint action to 
 destroy the power of Spain, and nevertheless failed 
 in accomplishing their work. The goal was fixed, 
 but there was not sufficient unity of will to attain 
 it ; there was too much hesitation on all sides. 
 The nobles had not enough resolution, the Cal- 
 vinists had no chief of sufficient influence, and 
 the partisans of France lacked confidence both in 
 themselves and in her. The country had not the 
 strength of temperament nor the passionate ardour 
 necessary to accomplish so great a task. The years 
 of which we now speak belong to that period when 
 the attempts made were considerable but confused, 
 when the efibrts were ill- combined, the times 
 feverish, and the struggle laborious though without 
 results. The time came when the men of influence 
 in the south made more formal overtures to France, 
 without success, and when the United Provinces 
 addressed themselves more directly to England, 
 equally without procuring any great aid ; but they 
 were destined at last to find that their best support 
 lay in themselves. At that moment the French 
 party had not taken any determined or fixed mode 
 of procedure, and Queen Elizabeth wavered in her 
 foreign policy between the most diverse and under 
 fined projects. 
 
 In the midst of this prolonged confusion, the 
 Prince of Orange was perfectly consistent, and 
 firm in his policy of mistrust. He saw that it 
 
238 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 would be destruction to form and announce any 
 projects which were definite in their tendencies, 
 and which required prompt execution, while they 
 manifested a high ambition on his part. His 
 desire was to wrest the provinces from Spain, and 
 to form them into a state, in imitation of the 
 ancient Burgundian power, but under the more 
 direct protection of France. The state of affairs 
 did not admit of any more decided action. He 
 had the greatest faith in time, in the results of the 
 work which the country was doing for itself, in the 
 experience gained by former abortive attempts, and 
 in its own obstinacy. The act called the " Pacifi- 
 cation of Ghent " was brought about by him. Its 
 object was to unite the representatives of all the 
 h^o /■ provinces in one definite understanding, to establish 
 perfect tolerance in all religious matters, to afiirm 
 nothing for or against Spain, whilst they shook off 
 her rule without saying so, and to rally all opinions 
 by the very vagueness of the contract. It was the 
 most faithful and complete expression of his political 
 ideas ; for it embodied all that he desired for his 
 fellow-citizens and for himself It did not last, 
 because, although while men agreed as to the 
 political aim, and as to what they did not want, 
 they yet differed as to their religious principles ; 
 and it is difficult for a contract to last which rests 
 on religious dissidence on the one side, and on a 
 negative political basis on the other. The " Union 
 of Brussels," which followed the Pacification of 
 
 I 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 239 
 
 Ghent, resembled it in spirit, in its conditions, 
 and in its destiny. It had no longer duration ; 
 and when later, William made the delegates as- 
 sembled at Utrecht sign a "Union" destilied to 
 found a lasting and powerful republic in the north 
 — when he put forth the idea which was to secure 
 so great a future, he satisfied his own political 
 dreams less than in his earlier work which, most 
 assuredly, was conceived in a generous spirit and 
 founded on the sound principle of conciliation and 
 of universal liberty, but which was necessarily 
 ephemeral. 
 
 Philip II. himself seems to have been quite 
 forgotten during those years. He is then much 
 less prominent than in the preceding epochs, under 
 the administrations of Margaret of Parma and of 
 the Duke of Alva. The name of the King figures 
 much more rarely in the historical accounts of those 
 times. Don John of Austria, his natural brother, 
 his representative, the hero of Lepanto, a prince 
 of chivalrous character, handsome, generous, am- 
 bitious, affable, amiable, and of fascinating manners 
 — one who had dreamt even of dethroning Elizabeth 
 and marrying Mary Stuart, to reign with her in 
 England — ^who would have gone to the end of the 
 world in search of fortune — came to the Low 
 Countries to fulfil an ungrateful mission, and to 
 experience there all the bitterness caused by the 
 want of resources and authority, and by neglect. 
 He gained, indeed, a momentary advantage over 
 
240 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 \ 
 
 the army of tlie States, but he soon succumbed to 
 the superior force of William of Orange, and to his 
 influence over the mass of the people. He did 
 everything that a loyal and honest nature could 
 do as the representative of such a ruler as Philip, 
 in whose system of government tyranny and neg- 
 ligence were combined in the most dangerous 
 manner. The sojourn of Don John in the Low 
 Countries was but an episode in this great drama. 
 
 In the opposite camp, the Duke of Anjou, brother 
 to Henry HI, who had been called by the States 
 to defend the liberties of the country, played a 
 more serious part. He found more support; for 
 he came to meet the wishes of a considerable 
 portion of the population, as well as those of the 
 Prince of Orange. Had he been differently gifted ; 
 had he with his facility and intelligence possessed 
 more good faith and rectitude, and less of the spirit 
 of intrigue, he would have been able to accomplish 
 great things. If he had but understood his mission, 
 he would not have overstepped its limits. He had 
 the ambition, not to govern the country in the 
 interests of its people, but to obtain it for himself, 
 and administer it for his own benefit as its absolute 
 master. He did not £^spire, like Don John, to the 
 hand of Mary Stuart, but he sought that of Eliza- 
 beth, who repelled his advances ; and after having 
 failed in politics, as he had in the pursuit of his 
 pretended courtship, he returned to die inglo^ously 
 in his own country. 
 
 I 
 
P^I7ERSIT7 
 
 PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENl^^J^L^^ rl^.b'V^ 
 
 It is singular how everything that happenecl 
 then, instead of restoring order and quiet, aug- 
 mented the public commotion — how the chief actors, 
 by their unfitness or by their passions, failed in 
 rendering any great service ; and how events were 
 fated to combine with the unsettled state of men s 
 minds in producing disorder. 
 
 The foundation of the United Provinces, how- 
 ever, was being seriously laid during that time. 
 The southern provinces were almost entirely left 
 to themselves, and the Spanish troops, deprived of 
 their pay, added a military revolt to the political 
 and moral revolt of the middle classes. 
 
 The mutinous soldiers of Philip 11. inspired terror 
 at Antwerp and Alost, and some time afterwards, 
 the town of Ghent, under the combined influence of 
 the old communal spirit and of Calvinism, attempted 
 a separate rising, and the establishment of a pro- 
 visional Government. The insurrection of Ghent, 
 which corresponds with the mutiny in the Spanish 
 army, and was remotely the reaction from it, bears 
 that double character, and may be reckoned among 
 the important events of the period. It was attri- 
 butable to the descendants of the men who rebelled, 
 in 1539, against Charles V, on account of a demand 
 for money ; but it was now most strenuously sup- 
 ported by the Calvinist party. Its first burst was 
 marked by great violence, owing to the character 
 of Hembyse, who planned it and led the earlier 
 movements. Historians have narrated this occur- 
 
^ 
 
 242 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 rence with all the detail that it merits ; we can 
 only mark its significance and the place it occupies 
 in the whole circle of events.^ 
 
 It is easy to understand this sharp division in 
 men's minds, the universal and reciprocal distrust 
 arising from the obscurity of the future, and the 
 hesitation of all between so many opposite parties. 
 There was on the one hand the aristocracy, whose 
 influential members were animated at one and the 
 same time by hatred of Spain and of the Eeforma- 
 tion, and there was on the other Calvinism, whose 
 absolute and rigid dogmas repelled all tolerant men ; 
 there was the anti-Spanish sentiment which pre- 
 vailed among the mass of the population, and which 
 had been caused by the blind excesses of the Duke 
 of Alva ; and there was the old democratic party, 
 the remains and off'spring of the passions of a by- 
 gone age : there were the Prince of Orange and the 
 Duke of Anjou, the Palatine John Casimir, the 
 Archduke Mathias, and Don John ; there were the 
 northern and southern provinces ; there was the 
 population that had remained faithful to the ancient 
 faith, and there were the Lutherans, the Calvinists, 
 and the remnants of the violent faction of the 
 Iconoclasts. Among all these conflicting elements, 
 no one was able to obtain a decisive superiority, 
 
 ^ Memoires sur les Troubles de Gand (1577-1579) by Frangois de 
 Halewyn (in the Collection des Memoires sur VHistoire de Belgique), 
 published with an Introduction and Notes by M. Kervyn de Vol- 
 kaersbeke, pages 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 34, 35, n., 83, 85, 103, 108, 
 113, 115. 
 
PHILIP IT. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 243 
 
 and no one could guess which would prevail in the 
 end, or where to look for safety. 
 
 Even the Prince of Orange, the wisest, the most 
 enlightened, the most temperate, and the strongest 
 of all those who figured on that tumultuous scene, 
 had not calculated or foreseen all the chances. He 
 was born a Lutheran, but had been brought up in 
 the Catholic religion, and only returned to the 
 reformed faith when he found himself deeply en- 
 gaged with the Dutch Calvinists in the struggle 
 against Spain. He had been a page of Charles V, 
 and when quite a youth had commanded an army. 
 His uncle had perhaps borne greater part than any 
 one in the Imperial election ; and he had himself 
 been a general, a negotiator, and a friend of 
 the Emperor, He was the chief of an illustrious 
 race of soldiers, whence sprang successively Louis 
 of Nassau, Maurice, Henry, Frederick, and William 
 HI, all famous, and all possessing great elevation of 
 character ; some were more fortunate, more bril- 
 liant, and perhaps more frank, than their kinsman. 
 We may fairly admit that William HI, when placed 
 in as great a position, though in truth one not so 
 difiicult, seems to us more decided, more open, 
 and more straightforward than William I. 
 
 The mind of William I. was of admirable firm- 
 ness and consistency, but he was suspicious, and 
 had no very decided convictions on any point. 
 During the most active part of his career, he 
 aimed at an end which he did not achieve, — that 
 
 R 2 
 
244 HISTOllIOAL ESSAYS. 
 
 is to say, the constitution of the seventeen pro- 
 vinces in dependence on a great foreign State, if 
 it were necessary ; or their total independence, if 
 that were possible. It appears that he would 
 rather have seen the Low Countries as a whole 
 in the possession of a powerful neighbour, than 
 have organized a portion of them as a republic 
 at the price of sacrificing the rest. If this policy 
 was on the one hand unambitious as regarded 
 his own person, on the other it assuredly lacked 
 dignity and foresight. These inclinations of 
 William the Silent are not to be observed on the 
 surface of his actions ; they are to be traced in 
 his most secret and intimate thoughts, and to be 
 inferred from many diverse circumstances. The 
 immortal founder of the United Provinces struggled 
 on without the spur of confidence ; and, strange to 
 say, he was aU his life imbued with the idea that, 
 to shake ofi" the dominion of Spain, without the 
 danger of a relapse and once for all, an alliance 
 between the Catholics hostile to Spain and the 
 Eeformers was necessary. He wished this, because 
 he was tolerant and slightly sceptical ; or rather, 
 perhaps, he was tolerant and sceptical because he 
 desired to see this union. Under Margaret, under 
 the Duke of Alva, under Don John, and during 
 the first years of the rule of Farnese, who will 
 soon appear on the scene; at Antwerp, in his 
 conduct towards his co-religionists, and later still 
 in dealing with the Spanish mutiny ; in the face 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 245 
 
 of the democratic and Calvinist movement at 
 Ghent ; at Brussels, in connexion with the States 
 and the Council of State ; in France, when treating 
 with Henry III. and with the Duke of Anjou; in 
 England, with Elizabeth and Cecil, — his views never 
 changed; his conduct showed immense courage, 
 marvellous tenacity of purpose, great tolerance, but 
 feeble convictions. In the midst of the general 
 chaos, his figure stands out during the last years 
 of his life in honourable and brilliant relief He 
 devoted himself to the cause which he believed to 
 be the best, at the expense of his fortune and his 
 repose, and at the constant peril of his life. He 
 alone among his fellow-citizens enjoyed real popu- 
 larity, which he knew how to control and keep ; 
 he was tempted by an ambition which he was wise 
 enough to restrain ; in the northern provinces, 
 which were first constituted, he was all-powerful ; 
 while he was more influential and more listened to 
 than any one else in the rest of the country. His 
 conduct was always resolute, and his courage in- 
 flexible in a prudent direction. At all times he 
 showed his generosity, his disinterestedness, and his 
 hatred of injustice. We can repeat of William 
 the Silent what we said just now of Egmont : that 
 the blindness and violence of the government of 
 Philip II. threw him into opposition, and caused 
 him to embrace the Reformation ; and that under 
 a better and more sensible system he would 
 assuredly have been content with the command 
 
246 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of the King's armies against France. The bravery 
 and intelligence of the Prince of Orange would 
 have made him one of the most illustrious sol- 
 diers of his age. Taking him as he was, with his 
 superior qualities and with the imperfections which 
 we have been bold enough to attribute to him, his 
 destiny was extraordinary. Few men in history 
 have at once conceived, pursued, and realized so 
 vast a project ; no one perhaps has been more 
 essentially himself the author of a great event. 
 No revolution was ever more completely personi- 
 fied in one individual. He guided a national 
 movement, in the creation of which he had taken 
 an active part, and which he brought to a termi- 
 nation. It is necessary to study events closely, to 
 perceive that the immense result he obtained was 
 not exactly what he had dreamt of achieving. 
 The contrast which really exists between the more 
 modest character of his ambition and the nature 
 of his success adds to the originality of his 
 appearance in history, and to the merit of his 
 disinterestedness. The Eepublic of the United 
 Provinces has been more free, more powerful, 
 and more prosperous than he ever thought it pos- 
 sible to desire or expect. 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 247 
 
 VI. 
 
 At the death of William the Silent, whose part 
 in these events we have attempted to sketch, the 
 revolution may be said to have already passed 
 through three different phases. It first burst out 
 with the united force of the Calvinists and of the 
 discontented aristocracy; but this impulse was not 
 violent enough to overcome the want of cohesion 
 in the different parties engaged in it, nor to make 
 up for the smallness of their number, and for the 
 harm done to their cause by their own excesses. 
 The King sent an army into the Low Countries, 
 but before it arrived the revolution was dying out. 
 The government of the Duke of Alva constituted 
 the second phase, and exhibited the dangerous abuse 
 of brute force more than was wanted for com- 
 bating the movement which was already abating, 
 and which it had come to restrain, but blind and 
 violent enough to create the germs of disorder 
 and disunion in the southern provinces, while it 
 set up in those of the north a rebellion so unani- 
 mous that Spain could not crush it. During the 
 third phase, the northern provinces rebelled, orga- 
 nized themselves, and fought against Spain with 
 forces every day becoming more united, and with 
 increasing success. But during this epoch the 
 southern provinces were in a state of disorder, for 
 
248 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 political parties and the different classes were at 
 variance each with the other, and the only common 
 sentiment between them was hatred of Spain. 
 Opinions were divided as to the rule to be esta- 
 blished in lieu of that of the King, and their efforts 
 to constitute any government at all wanted proper 
 guidance and unity. There was a conflict of rival 
 ambitions and interests ; and society, engaged in a 
 difficult task, was too much agitated and divided 
 to have the force to break at once with Spain, and 
 begin an existence of its own. The Prince of Orange, 
 the most eminent man of that time, laid the foun- 
 dation of the Batavian Republic in the north, while 
 he treated the various parties and their chiefs in 
 the south in such a manner as to maintain his credit 
 without actually leading them. He was assassinated 
 while engaged in working out this difficult problem. 
 The fourth phase, including the whole government 
 of Alexander Farnese, and extending after him to 
 the death of the King, is marked with a spirit of 
 greater order. The revolution was indeed consoli- 
 dating itself in the north ; but Farnese, the most 
 useful and enlightened man whom Philip II. ever 
 had in his service, worked with success in re- 
 establishing the King s authority in the south. He 
 was not sufficiently listened to by his master, nor 
 was he sufficiently seconded to produce a general 
 amelioration in the position which Spain held in 
 Europe ; he did not efface the traces of the mistakes 
 committed before him, but he showed remarkable 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 249 
 
 capacity, both in his military action, and in his 
 general policy. 
 
 These different phases, which succeeded one 
 another, correspond in character to the country 
 and the century in which they were exhibited, and 
 to the current of events whose progress they mark. 
 If we are called upon to assign, in each period, 
 to some one individual the part of principal actor, 
 and to designate such period by a name, we should 
 say that in the first, in spite of his subservience 
 to the will of others, the principal place belongs to 
 Granvelle, in the second to the Duke of Alva, in 
 the third to the Prince of Orange, and to Farnese 
 in the last. 
 
 In establishing these divisions in the succession 
 of events, we can at once perceive and point out 
 the peculiarities which distinguish this revolution 
 from those which occurred in later times in neigh- 
 bouring states ; and there are various reasons which 
 account for this difference. The religious element 
 was one of great importance ; the party of the 
 Keformation assumed a definite consistency in the 
 north, but it remained in a considerable minority 
 in the southern provinces. These last were indeed 
 discontented with the political system of Spain, but 
 they did not find in this sentiment alone, unaided 
 by the powerful stimulus of the Eeformation, an 
 impulse sufficient to set them free. The country 
 was divided into two fractions ; freedom was being- 
 consolidated in the north ; while restoration to the 
 
250 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 old state of things was going on in the soutL 
 Here, at least, is one great distinction. 
 
 The second peculiarity is that the royal power 
 itself was absent, and took no personal part in the 
 struggle. The King acted throughout by his agents, 
 and there was consequently no actual conflict be- 
 tween the dynasty and the insurgent population. 
 
 There is yet a third difference to be noted. With 
 the exception of the temporary violence used by 
 the Iconoclasts, the revolutionary party did not 
 rule by terror. It was against the revolution, and 
 in the name of the King, that the government by 
 terror was established. Ill-administered and bar- 
 barous, it momentarily repressed the movement, 
 but it did not succeed in re-establishing order. It 
 brought about the definitive separation of the re- 
 formed fraction of the country, and occasioned 
 disorders in those provinces which subsequently 
 returned to their old allegiance. At last the divi- 
 sion of the two nationalities was settled and con- 
 solidated ; the restoration of the southern provinces 
 was brought about by means of a government 
 vigorous in its military action, but reasonable and 
 more gentle in its administrative proceedings. 
 
 Farnese spent thirteen years in the Low Countries. 
 His first enterprises, carried out during the lifetime 
 of William the Silent, were difficult, and his most 
 important and successful acts date from the years 
 which followed the death of the Prince of Orange : 
 the last years of his public career and of his life 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 251 
 
 were marked by losses to Spain and reverses to 
 himself. 
 
 He played a great part, and rendered greater 
 services to his master than any one else, in this 
 second half of the fifteenth century : the condition 
 of the monarchy which Philip II. left to his son, 
 diminished as it was, would have been far more 
 deplorable had Farnese not existed to command 
 its armies and govern the provinces of the south. 
 
 His influence as Governor- General was not only 
 useful in the country itself, but extended abroad, 
 and affected all the European interests of Spain. 
 He taught the southern provinces, in the first 
 instance, to know a Spanish administration which 
 was less severe and less violent than that under 
 which they had lived ; he proceeded to deal with 
 the difierent conflicting interests, and did his best 
 to rally them round him by holding up their ex- 
 perience of disorder and disunion, and urging on 
 them the example of the past, and the uncertainty 
 of the future. Without blaming his predecessors, 
 he impugned their policy by not imitating it, and 
 showed that a government without name, unity, 
 or basis, such as the country had been living 
 under, could not exist. Those whom he found 
 discontented with the state of things which 
 they had themselves mainly contributed to create 
 he drew over to his side, and used against other 
 malcontents who were slower in their return to 
 allegiance, or more difficult to convince. Having 
 
252 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 thus, to a certain degree, established internal order, 
 he made war against the Dutch and their party, 
 and recovered by degrees the territory and cities 
 which they had taken in the Catholic provinces ; 
 subsequently he went to the assistance of the 
 Spanish party in France, aided it with his army, 
 and, in the name of Philip II, took part in the 
 internal struggles in France. Here, with limited 
 forces, and on unfavourable ground, he showed what 
 a great war between rival powers might have been 
 under his guidance. Lastly, he took an active but 
 ineffectual part in the improvident and badly- 
 conceived expedition of the Armada against Eng- 
 land. He displayed great strength of character 
 and remarkable ability in the conduct of an im- 
 portant, complicated, and thankless mission. 
 
 His merit was seconded by good fortune. Several 
 events which followed on one another very closely 
 contributed to improve and raise his position. 
 The Prince of Orange was assassinated, leaving a 
 son who was destined to be as famous as himself, 
 but who was then almost a child. The Duke of 
 Anjou had left the Low Countries, and died some 
 weeks after at Chateau Thierry. These two nearly 
 simultaneous facts caused a great change in the 
 position of Spain. It is impossible to say what 
 might have been the ultimate destiny of Farnese, 
 had he found himself much longer opposed to these 
 two princes, one of whom would have rendered the 
 war with Holland more difficult ; while the other 
 
PHILIP IT. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 258 
 
 would have prevented, for some time at least, the 
 breaking up of parties in Belgium. These two acci- 
 dents were fortunate for him ; but what was more 
 fortunate was that the King of France, entirely 
 occupied by the civil war, refused the formal offer 
 made to him by the States of the sovereignty of the 
 provinces. Henry III, after some hesitation, rejected 
 their advances to him : and thus William of Orange 
 and the Duke of Anjou having been removed by 
 death, and the King of France retiring from the scene, 
 the part which Farnese had to play was consider- 
 ably simplified : it became possible for him for the 
 moment to devote his forces and his attention to 
 the recovery of the territory and the strong places 
 which had ceased to belong to Spain. The war then 
 assumed, under his auspices, a more regular form. 
 The two adversaries endeavoured to fortify their 
 positions along the lines of the rivers, and Farnese, 
 after re-establishing the royal authority in Brabant, 
 undertook the siege of Antwerp, which was one of 
 the great events of the century. He invested the 
 place, and had no need to lay regular siege to it ; 
 for Marnix, when he judged resistance to be useless, 
 surrendered the town, as his enemies say, too soon. 
 He negotiated the capitulation himself at the camp 
 of Farnese, and was captivated, it is said, by his 
 reception, as well as by the distinguished qualities 
 of Farnese's person and mind. By the conquest of 
 Antwerp and of the whole line of the Scheld, the 
 restoration of the southern provinces under Spanish 
 
^ 
 
 254 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 dominion might be considered as complete. Farnese 
 had accomplished the most essential portion of his 
 task. 
 
 Thus, therefore, to the death of the Prince of 
 Orange and of the Duke of Anjou, to the refusal 
 of the offer of the provinces by Henry III, — all 
 fortunate accidents for Spain, — were added military 
 successes, in which, as usual, luck played its neces- 
 sary and habitual part, but to which successes the 
 firmness and abilities of one man had largely con- 
 tributed. 
 
 These were not the sole proofs of the good fortune 
 of Farnese. 
 
 The advantages obtained by Spain in the southern 
 provinces could not fail to awaken uneasiness in 
 those of the north. The hero who had been their 
 guide and defender was dead ; his son was too 
 young to inherit his authority immediately. The 
 States were not competent to take the military com- 
 mand, and the United Provinces were uneasy at the 
 prospect of an interregnum. The southern pro- 
 vinces, under the direction of a great captain and 
 statesman, henceforth well governed, and almost re- 
 stored, presented a more commanding and menacing 
 aspect to their northern adversaries. Men's minds 
 in Holland, during this interregnum, were filled 
 with various political speculations. Everything was 
 examined and discussed : the future of the State, the 
 most desirable form of government, the theory of their 
 sovereignty, — questions most difficult to solve in a 
 
PHILIP IT. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 255 
 
 country deprived of its head, menaced by reprisals 
 from its old master, still engaged in all the confusion 
 of a revolution, and where the rivalry between the 
 representative influences and that of the executive 
 power was already making itself felt. 
 
 At this point occurs the appeal of the United 
 Provinces to England, the offer of the sovereignty- 
 made to Elizabeth, and the mission of Leicester to 
 Holland. The States-General of the North applied 
 to Elizabeth, as those who were supposed to repre- 
 sent the wishes of the whole population had before 
 appealed to Henry HI. The Queen showed, in this 
 instance, all the caprices of her temper, and all the 
 hesitation of her mind. She refused the sove- 
 reignty, for fear of a war with Spain, while at the 
 same time she promised her protection and aid ; 
 because she feared to see France take her place, and 
 accept the protectorate which England would thus 
 have rejected. 
 
 Leicester, an elegant and fascinating courtier, but 
 past the prime of life, regretting his youth and full 
 of pretensions, was not the man to fill the important 
 post confided to him. Elizabeth entrusted him with 
 the command of the five thousand infantry and a 
 thousand cavaby which she sent to the help of 
 Holland ; but at the same time she forbade him to 
 exercise or accept any authority beyond this com- 
 mand. Elizabeth's sentiments for Leicester, her 
 intentions with regard to Holland, and her conduct 
 in this important affaijr were complicated by all the 
 
256 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 passions in a woman's nature, by jealousy, by ambi- 
 tion, by a desire to please, and, in her case, by avarice. 
 The affection which Elizabeth had for Leicester 
 prompted her to confide this mission to him, while 
 she refused him the means for worthily carrying it 
 out. She gave him English soldiers to command, 
 without furnishing him with money for their support. 
 Her anger was kindled at the idea that her delegate 
 might accept other dignities from the hands of the 
 Dutch, or exercise an authority which did not 
 emanate from her, and for which he was not in- 
 debted to his mistress ; she would not on any 
 account permit him to have foreign courtiers 
 about him, or allow him to occupy an indepen- 
 dent position. The Queen was as saving of her 
 money and as irresolute in her acts as the woman 
 was jealous of her lover, and alarmed lest he 
 should escape from her thraldom. She was with 
 regard to Leicester and to Holland exactly what 
 she always was ; she was influenced by the most 
 opposite sentiments ; she feared, at the same time, 
 to make Spain her adversary in Europe, and France 
 her rival in the influence she hoped to obtain in the 
 Low Countries ; she was an enemy, as an Anglican, 
 to Catholic Spain, yet she was full of aversion for 
 the Dutch Calvinists. This Queen was clever, artful, 
 and deliberate in affairs, while she was fickle and 
 puerile in all that touched her person, her pre- 
 ferences, or her habits. At times governing with 
 vigour and good sense ; at others allowing herself 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 257 
 
 to be carried away by the most unjustifiable sug- 
 gestions of feminine coquetry ; flattered by the 
 demand in marriage from an inferior personage, or 
 by the admiration of a stranger ; more striking 
 than really beautiful, and less pleasing than sin- 
 gular; whimsical in her tastes and her dress, 
 wearing even in her old age affected and singular 
 dresses, which were scarcely grave enough, or, one 
 may say, scarcely decent, for her rank, and, above 
 all, for her age. 
 
 The expedition to the Low Countries, under 
 Leicester, failed because he was deficient in capacity 
 and steadiness of conduct.^ He at once attached 
 himself, in spite of the Queen, to the Calvinists and 
 Democrats ; by this he offended the States and 
 the tolerant party. It may be that he contributed 
 greatly to form the long-enduring and profound 
 antagonism of those two parties which was so 
 marked in the succeeding ages, and whose division 
 occupies so large a place in the history of the 
 United Provinces. It was the party of the States, 
 represented by the celebrated Barneveldt, who 
 had demanded help of Elizabeth ; and it was 
 with that very party that the representative of the 
 Queen was in constant feud. The intervention 
 of England would have been far more efficacious 
 in Holland before the fall of Antwerp ; but it was 
 only undertaken subsequent to that event. The 
 mission of Leicester did not succeed : after a short 
 
 ^ S. Stijl, Opkomst en hloei der Nederlanden. 
 
 S 
 
n 
 
 258 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 period of success, he met with reverses, and the 
 campaign of 1586 was favourable to the Spaniards. 
 The division between the English representative 
 and the States grew wider ; and Leicester's conduct 
 became more and more displeasing to the Queen. 
 Even before he left the country, Maurice, in spite 
 of his youth, was invested by his feUow-citizens 
 with the command of the troops, and named 
 Stadtholder of several provinces. When Leicester 
 did return to England, it was after various mis- 
 fortunes — after having been abandoned and be- 
 trayed by the party he had adopted, and without 
 leaving a single friend on the Continent. 
 
 The check he sustained in Holland was a fresh 
 advantage to the Spanish Government, and com- 
 pleted the series of its successes. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Farnese, then, had been thus far favoured by 
 fortune. The aspect of aflPairs had undergone a great 
 change since his arrival in the Low Countries. The 
 country indeed was not pacified, and the war was 
 not at an end : the position of the United Pro- 
 vinces, though weakened by the death of William 
 and the bad administration of Leicester, was 
 still formidable. But Spanish authority was re- 
 established in the southern provinces, and the 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 259 
 
 revolution of the Low Countries, thougli it was 
 not actually and formally terminated till long after- 
 wards, had arrived at a fixed point ; that is to say, 
 the northern provinces had for ever shaken ofi" the 
 yoke, and in those of the south henceforth the 
 allegiance to Spain had been restored. The north 
 and south of the Low Countries were in future to 
 form two distinct states, the one independent, the 
 other belonging to a great Power. The two popu- 
 lations, differing in faith, would become tired of 
 war, and would cease to carry on hostilities, though 
 they would renew them later ; but they were des- 
 tined to remain entirely separate, and, after so 
 many shocks and trials, their existence would be 
 permanently fixed under two perfectly distinct 
 systems.^ 
 
 At the time when Farnese had succeeded in 
 ameliorating the present and in clearing the future 
 position of Spain in the southern portion of the 
 Low Countries, Philip IL was advancing in years ; 
 but age had wrought little change in the man who 
 never had any youth : it had not, on the one hand, 
 bent his feebly-constituted body, nor quenched his 
 eye, which was always lowering; nor made his 
 step, which was always weak and languid, more 
 heavy ; nor, on the other, had it changed his 
 regular and sedentary habits ; nor bowed his will, 
 which was at the same time slow and absolute ; 
 nor worn down his ever active mind. At all times 
 
 ^ Kanke, Fiirsten und VolJcer in Svd Europa. 
 S2 
 
260 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 there was a strange contrast between his hatred 
 of motion and his passion for work, between his 
 taste for silence and the prolixity of his writings, 
 between the grandeur of his power and the pitiable 
 use which he made of it, between the largeness of 
 his desires and the smallness of their results. In 
 the latter years of his life, those which followed 
 the victories of Farnese, he dreamt of mounting the 
 throne of the Yalois, or of placing his daughter 
 there,^ and of conquering England by destroying 
 her naval power. We all know the success of the 
 Spanish Armada — an enterprise so rashly under- 
 taken, — and we know what obstacles Philip en- 
 countered in France, and who w^as Henry III. s 
 successor. The man who, without quitting his 
 chair, aspired to universal monarchy, was not even 
 capable of keeping HoUand. He wished to maintain 
 religious unity in Europe, and he did not even 
 comprehend that the first step was to exterminate 
 Calvinism in the Low Countries. Philip II. has 
 been greatly praised for that inflexible moral force 
 which caused him to have but one ambition aU his 
 life — the desire to be master in great as well as 
 in small things — in his vast possessions as in the 
 interior of his palace. The Venetian ambassadors 
 who resided at his court tried, and to a certain 
 degree succeeded, in raising his reputation ; but 
 the diplomatists of the celebrated republic were 
 
 ^ Isabel-Clara-Eugenia, daughter of Elizabeth of France, and niece 
 of the three sons of Henry II. of Francey. 
 
PHILIP IT. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 261 
 
 instnicted to show the greatest friendship towards 
 Spain, and to pay particular attention to everything 
 that could smooth away differences and avoid quar- 
 rels. After reading the despatches of Badoaro, of 
 Tiepolo, and of Contarini, we are compelled to ask 
 whether their historical value has not been some- 
 what exaggerated ; and whether the reports of 
 these ambassadors, which are valuable for the 
 history of Charles V, do not bear the impress 
 of a certain partiality in favour of his son. Philip 
 II. has in general been very ill-treated by history, 
 in which he occupies an unenviable place, by the 
 side of Louis XL and James IT. He bears a 
 stronger resemblance to the latter of the two. 
 He cannot certainly be accused of scepticism or 
 of the want of convictions ; but what he entirely 
 lacked was the true sense of his mission or of his 
 position in Europe ; what has weighed upon his 
 fame is the pretension of conquering Europe without 
 even quitting his study, and of preserving religious 
 unity without fighting for it. As we have already 
 said, his reputation would have been quite different 
 if, without renouncing any of his ideas, he had, like 
 Charles V. in Germany and Eichelieu in France, 
 opposed the Keformation face to face, and if he 
 had, sword in hand, sacrificed his repose and 
 risked his life in the service of this cause — if he 
 had not neglected the highest duties of his position, 
 to occupy himself only with the most laborious — 
 if he had not always taken the meanest view of 
 
^ 
 
 262 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 all the most important questions. War he turned 
 into an exercise of cruelty, and policy into a talent 
 for keeping secrets. Instead of aggrandizing and 
 increasing the inheritance left by his father, he 
 hastened its decline ; and everything tends to prove 
 that, had Don Carlos lived to ascend the throne, he 
 would have precipitated this decay of the race of 
 Charles V. even more than Philip III. did. The life 
 and policy of Philip II. were too patent, and his 
 existence too conspicuous, for us to find any diffi- 
 culty in judging the man by his actions ; but the 
 workings of his mind are less evident. The man 
 who sacrificed Granvelle, who beheaded the loyal 
 Egmont and caused Montigny to be strangled in 
 prison, who accredited and encouraged the Duke of 
 Alva, who put a price on the head of the Prince 
 of Orange, who attempted to dispute a crown with 
 Henry lY. and to deprive Elizabeth of hers — who 
 for a time imperilled his sovereignty in Belgium, 
 and entirely lost it in Holland ; who under a false 
 party cry long carried on an underhand war in 
 France ; and who, when exhausted and unable to 
 continue the struggle with Henry IV, signed the 
 disastrous Treaty of Vervins, — this man has ne- 
 cessarily been judged by his deeds more severely 
 perhaps than he deserves when measured by the 
 standard of his convictions and his conscience. 
 
 Philip II. was one of those personages who, 
 without being eminent in themselves, still have 
 considerable historical importance, owing to the 
 
PHILIP 11. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 263 
 
 extent of their power, the length of their pohtical 
 career, the events that took place during their life- 
 time, and of which they were the centre ; owing 
 also to their influence on the general policy of 
 nations, though that influence was usually unfavour- 
 able to their country and to themselves. Notwith- 
 standing the most striking contrasts of character 
 and conduct, there is a slight analogy between 
 Philip 11. and Charles the Bold. Both hastened 
 the decline of a great empire, by the inflexibility 
 of their tempers, by their imprudence, by their 
 contempt for all advice, by their infatuation, and 
 by the violence of their proceedings ; both changed 
 the relative situation of the powers in Europe to 
 their own detriment. Charles the Bold, as I have 
 before observed, marked the point of transition from 
 the Anglo-French wars to those undertaken by 
 France in Italy and against Spain, which is a 
 strongly drawn line separating two periods of 
 history. The last Duke of Burgundy, by the vio- 
 lence of his schemes and the distrust with which 
 he inspired every one, brought France and England 
 together, and was the main cause of the termination 
 of the English wars, and of the signature of the 
 Treaty of Pecquigny between Louis XI. and Ed- 
 ward lY. France, being thus tranquillized as far 
 as England was concerned, was allowed by him to 
 employ her armies elsewhere. The invasion of Italy 
 by Charles VIII. was the commencement of a new 
 military era, and of the struggle between France 
 
y 
 
 264 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and Spain for the possession of the most impor- 
 tant portions of the Italian peninsula. Charles 
 the Bold thus made the subsequent wars of 
 France in Italy possible — wars which in after 
 years helped to build up the great fortunes of 
 Charles V, and to create the preponderance of the 
 Spanish family. 
 
 Philip II. produced analogous consequences in 
 Europe. By supporting the League unsuccessfully 
 against the French crown, and by showing the 
 desire, which he could not enforce, to obtain, by 
 the aid of that League, the throne of France for 
 himself or for his daughter, he did his best to make 
 a neighbouring government feel the necessity of 
 having allies ; and he caused the foreign policy of 
 France to lean towards an alliance with the Ee- 
 formers. He thus prepared the way for the career 
 of Henry IV. and of Eichelieu, and for the Euro- 
 pean struggle in which those two great men dis- 
 tinguished themselves. In this struggle, too, Louis 
 XIV. afterwards lost his position only by aban- 
 doning the system of alliances adopted by his 
 predecessors, and by trying to maintain himself 
 against the world without any ties either with 
 Catholic or with Protestant powers. 
 
 We have already said that Philip II. would have 
 accomplished a great work by continuing the war 
 which his father had carried on against France. 
 He was indeed the antagonist of France, but it was 
 rather by conspiring against her than by fighting 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 265 
 
 in a fair field ; lie was an antagonist without 
 openness, and above all without success. 
 
 There is no exaggeration in maintaining that 
 this new state of affairs began with Philip II. 
 The direction which he gave to the policy of Spain 
 marks the commencement of the degradation of 
 that country, and of the French supremacy. His 
 descendants would have needed all the qualities 
 wanting in him, and all the good fortune which he 
 lacked, to restore Spain to her eminent position. 
 The end of the sixteenth century saw several events 
 occur which were nearly coincident in time — these 
 were the Peace of Vervins, the death of Philip II, 
 the end of the civil wars in France, the beginning 
 of the decline of the Spanish power, and the con- 
 sequent preponderance of France. Then it was 
 that the Low Countries assumed a recognised posi- 
 tion in spite of the continuance of a local struggle 
 between the northern and the southern provinces. 
 The question of sovereignty was virtually settled, 
 for the northern provinces were separated from the 
 southern, and it was their destiny to remain apart. 
 The latter were given by Philip II. to his daughter 
 Isabella, with a clause of reversion to the crown. 
 Thus the fate of the Low Countries was fixed, and 
 they no longer attracted the special attention of 
 Europe, as the seat of a permanent danger and 
 the object of conflicting interests between the great 
 powers. 
 
 To trace all this to the acts of a single man, 
 
^ 
 
 266 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and to attribute to him events so important and 
 so lasting in their effects, is no doubt to charge his 
 memory with a great burthen ; but when we follow 
 the chain of events, and calculate the responsibility 
 and the duties imposed on Philip II. by his father's 
 example, the situation of France and of Europe at 
 the death of Henry II, and by the power of w^hich 
 he could himself dispose, it is difficult not to admit 
 the clearness of the inference which history must 
 draw^ 
 
 Peace was made between France and Spain ; but 
 not between Spain and the United Provinces. 
 Albert and Isabella in Belgium, and in Holland 
 Maurice of Nassau, and afterwards Frederick Henry, 
 continued the struggle before and after the twelve 
 years truce, which was a first step towards the 
 definitive Peace of Westphalia. The history of the 
 separation of the United Provinces and of the 
 Belgian provinces is a long one : the feelings of 
 hostility, and the religious antagonism which broke 
 out between the two factions of the country, were 
 strong enough to keep them in arms against each 
 other for nearly a century. After the death of 
 Philip II, however, the aspect of affairs changed, and 
 the war between the Belgian provinces and the United 
 Provinces assumed a purely local character. Philip 
 II. had for the time virtually separated Belgium 
 from Spain, by bestowing the country on his 
 daughter. The military events which took place 
 in the Low Countries had no longer the same 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 267 
 
 interest, and did not in the same manner threaten 
 to disturb the peace of Europe. With the new- 
 dynasty France, as a military power and as a 
 government, had entered into a new career ; she 
 became the ally of the United Provinces. The 
 struggle between the Archduke Albert and the 
 Stadtholder Maurice — between the north and south 
 — was prolonged, without much affecting by con- 
 quest the territory on either side : it would seem as if 
 the two adversaries had been bent in these contests 
 rather on gratifying their old animosities than on 
 acquiring each other s possessions. The Archduke 
 Albert was by no means wanting in military talent ; 
 and Maurice, silent, reserved, sober, modest, and 
 intrepid like his father, had inherited his quali- 
 ties and talents, without, however, being quite 
 so disinterested. The two important military 
 events of this epoch were the battle of Nieuport, 
 gained by Maurice, and the taking of Ostend by 
 Albert. 
 
 Thus, therefore, the general aspect of affairs had 
 been much changed — in Spain by the death of the 
 king ; in France by the accession of a new dynasty ; 
 in the Low Countries of the north by their 
 alliance with France ; in those of the south by 
 their virtual, but temporary, separation from Spain. 
 Moreover, between the southern and northern pro- 
 vinces the war had assumed a character purely 
 local. The century which closed put an end, as 
 we have already said, to one condition of things, 
 
268 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and the century which now commenced introduced 
 a totally different state of affairs. 
 
 Henry IV, rather sketched out than realized his 
 ideas ; he may be said to have opened the way for 
 the great political system of France in the seven- 
 teenth century, rather than have himself put it 
 in force. Death arrested him in the middle of his 
 career. After the battle of Nieuport, and the 
 cession of Ostend to Spain, when some years had 
 been spent in a war sufficiently important to make 
 the reputation of Maurice and of Spinola, but which 
 has left no great mark in history, he entertained, 
 and even favoured, the idea of a cessation of 
 hostilities in the Low Countries. The truce of 
 1609 was concluded under his auspices, and was 
 signed the year before his death ; ^ but, although it 
 was in accordance with his wishes, it is probable 
 that, had he lived, it would not have lasted for the 
 twelve years assigned to it. 
 
 The policy of Henry IV, which went under the 
 name of " tlie great design " {le grand dessein), 
 aimed at establishing a balance of power in Europe, 
 based on the condition of weakening Spain. It 
 rested on territorial arrangements, differing in more 
 than one point from those which had hitherto 
 existed ; and it took for granted a state of peace 
 which could only be secured by a previous war. 
 
 1 Nigociations du President Jeannin. (Letters of Jeannin and of 
 Villeroy, of the 29th May and 27th June, 8th July, 21st and 27th Oct.) 
 Simon Stijl, Opkomst en hloei, &c. 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 269 
 
 The project and the aim of the King of France were 
 to create a distribution of power likely to last, but 
 in his opinion impossible, so long as Spain possessed 
 so many different points on the territory of Europe. 
 It was not sufficient for the security of all that 
 Spain had lost Holland ; it was, in the eyes of 
 Henry TV, dangerous that, besides the Indies, she 
 should retain at the same time Belgium, Franche- 
 Comte, and the most important parts of the Italian 
 peninsula. He aimed only at a partial reconstruc- 
 tion of Europe, without any direct personal interest, 
 and with a view to obtain general peace. But a 
 policy which aims at peace by making war — parti- 
 cularly a war with a power so formidable as Spain 
 then was in spite of her bad government, and in 
 spite of the losses she had undergone, — such a policy 
 may certainly be called warlike.^ 
 
 France then had a marked sympathy for the 
 Batavian republic ; and in showing this preference 
 for Holland, Henry IV. prejudiced in some degi'ee 
 the rival provinces. History in general has too 
 much exalted the benefits derived from the govern- 
 ment of the Archdukes in Belgium. Two facts 
 have contributed to this over-favourable apprecia- 
 tion : first, the semblance of independence which 
 Belgium then enjoyed, Philip 11. having nominally 
 made a gift of the kingdom to his daughter; 
 
 1 Le grand Dessein de Henri IV. by M. Wolowski ; Histoire de 
 Henri IV. by M. Poirson ; Heriri IV. et sa PoUtiqve, by M. Mercier 
 de Lacombe ; Henri IV. et Elisabeth, by M. Provost Paradol ; Econo- 
 mies royales, by De Thou ; Negociations du Prisident Jeannin. 
 
270 HISTOBICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 secondly, tlie comparison made between their 
 government and the preceding one. Tbe Arch- 
 dukes were certainly animated by good intentions : 
 Albert showed courage and intelligence ; Isabella, 
 during her husband's life and after his death, was 
 deficient neither in generosity nor in energy ; she 
 was not unworthy of the great family whence 
 sprang other women equally remarkable ; and she 
 can be justly ranked with Margaret of Austria and 
 with Mary the sister of Charles Y. But the hap- 
 piness of the provinces under their government 
 has been exaggerated. They did not enjoy peace 
 and commercial prosperity in full security at the 
 time, nor were these benefits guaranteed to them 
 for the future. They were menaced with being 
 reunited to Holland under Henry IV, and with 
 partition under Kichelieu ; for them the premature 
 death of Henry IV. was no misfortune, since the 
 execution of his political plan would have brought 
 about more speedily a war with France, or their 
 incorporation with the states of Holland. The 
 ultimate aim indeed of the project of Henry IV. 
 was, in fact, to weaken and isolate Spain, by giving, 
 it may be, the Catholic Low Countries to Holland, 
 Franche-Comt^ to Switzerland, and the Milanese 
 territory to Savoy. By this means he intended 
 himself in the north to lean on the support of 
 Holland, thus increased ; in the east on the German 
 provinces ; at the Alps on Savoy, and beyond the 
 Pyrenees on the Moors. He meant also to contract 
 
PHILIP 11. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 27l 
 
 an alliance with England, for which Sully's mission 
 was to prepare the way, and of which the Treaty 
 of Hampton Court was the first-fruit. 
 
 Thus, therefore, the policy of that day was 
 very different from that of Philip II. and of the 
 Valois. It was not, however, carried into effect 
 by Henry IV, who was assassinated at the moment 
 when he had prepared the largest armament and 
 most considerable financial resources that had ever 
 been at the disposal of France. His widow leant 
 for a moment towards the Spanish alliance ; but 
 the movement given by the hand of Henry IV. was 
 only interrupted for a time, and it was taken up 
 somewhat later by Kichelieu, with slight variations. 
 The regency of Mary of Medicis was but a passing 
 interval. The history of France is now no longer 
 that of a paltry government, with a mere policy 
 of intrigue ; and that of the Low Countries is no 
 longer confined to the details of a chronic state of 
 revolution. The anti-Spanish policy founded by 
 Henry, and continued by Eichelieu, was abandoned 
 during the regency of the Queen, just as the local 
 struggle between Holland and Belgium was in- 
 terrupted by the Twelve Years' Truce. These 
 two movements, however, recommenced, were pro- 
 longed and were only finally arrested when the 
 Treaty of Westphalia, and afterwards the Treaty of 
 the Pyrenees, had confined France and Spain in 
 their own limits — at any rate, until the wars of 
 Louis XIY. 
 
^ 
 
 272 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Neither under Albert, nor after him under Isa- 
 bella, nor even after her death, was the existence 
 of Belgium a tranquil one. The war between the 
 Spanish and the Dutch armies was, after the truce, 
 conducted by two men, who by their abilities were 
 worthily matched against each other — Spinola and 
 Frederick Henry. It was of the same nature as 
 the contest which preceded the truce ; that is to 
 say, it was purely local, and until the beginning of 
 the Thirty Years' War it affected only the two 
 belligerents. Great discontent had arisen in the 
 Low Countries during the last years of the reign of 
 Isabella, and a party had been formed against Spain 
 in favour of Holland. Some years later, Belgium 
 was threatened with the partition, suggested by 
 Eichelieu, between France and the United Pro- 
 vinces, and the scheme failed only because the 
 latter did not think that the portion offered to 
 them was considerable enough. 
 
 All these different circumstances were obstacles 
 to the prosperity and security of Belgium, although 
 the government was more moderate than it had 
 been under the first representatives of Philip II. 
 Posterity, however, retains a grateful remembrance 
 of the Archdukes, for their administration was pa- 
 ternal and intelligent. In visiting the old cities of 
 Belgium, we often find buildings dating from their 
 time. Justus Lipsius died during their reign in 
 the town of Lou vain, which he made famous by 
 his teaching. Eubens, whose glory has never been 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 273 
 
 eclipsed even in the galleries of Italy and of Spain, 
 placed his talents as a diplomatist and his renown 
 as a painter at the service of the Infanta. 
 
 The external security of Holland was more com- 
 plete, and her power and riches increased at a 
 different rate, but the tranquillity of the country 
 was troubled by the existence and the rivahy of 
 the two parties which had already shown themselves 
 during Leicester's mission. The origin and duration 
 of those two parties were to be traced to the peculiar 
 situation of the republic, which always required a 
 supreme chief at the head of its armies, while all 
 its political inclinations carried it towards the 
 system of provincial representation, and towards 
 a government of the country by the States. The 
 party of the States was perpetually thwarted by the 
 necessity of having to submit to a military chief 
 whom his responsibility rendered independent : 
 especially Avhen the power was in the hands of 
 a man of ability. That which generally occurs 
 wherever political divisions arise, happened also in 
 Holland : the representatives of those divisions, 
 when they become passionate partisans, seek after 
 allies. The Dutch parties sought alliances at home 
 among the different religious sects, and in the sphere 
 of foreign politics among the partisans of war or of 
 peace, ^he States were in general tolerant in reli- 
 gious matters, and the Stadtholder leant towards 
 the Calvinists. The States were inclined to peace, 
 while the Stadtholder, by the very nature of his 
 
 T 
 
274 , HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 power, was more favourable to war. The States 
 were drawn towards tlie moderate party of the 
 followers of Arminius ; the Stadtholder towards the 
 violent sect of Gomar. During the great truce the 
 hostility between these two factions became furious, 
 and blood was shed ; Barneveldt, the celebrated re- 
 presentative of the party of the States, lost his head 
 on the scaffold. His death left a hideous blot in 
 the history of this epoch, and tarnishes the memory 
 of the conqueror of Nieuport. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 If we cast a glance on the whole of the long 
 period during which the two portions of the Low 
 Countries worked out their separation, and acquired 
 two distinct existences, we perceive that the events 
 of this revolution were alternately, in the modem 
 history of Europe, an element either accessory or 
 principal, according to the changes which occurred 
 in the general condition of affau's. When the great 
 kingdoms were in the hands of feeble or incapable 
 rulers, they were occupied and disquieted by what 
 was passing in the Low Countries ; while, on the 
 other hand, the Low Countries were drawn into 
 the vortex of their politics, when those governments 
 were strong enough to force such a movement on 
 them. The revolution had a considerable influence 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILP:NT. 275 
 
 on tlie destiny of Philip II, and it offered a strong 
 temptation to the enervated and apathetic govern- 
 ment then existing in France, though it did not 
 finally succeed in seducing the French court, or 
 rousing its ambition. Spain did not know how to 
 quell the rebellion, nor France how to take advan- 
 tage of it. Neither France by a process of absorp- 
 tion and assimilation, nor Spain by force, was 
 capable of getting rid of the disturbing element. 
 Thus the Low Countries, hardly yet constituted in 
 the north, and disorganized in the south, played an 
 important part in Europe during that period ; they 
 occupied the attention of all, and disquieted France^ 
 Spain, and England. 
 
 After the deaths of Henry III. and Philip II, the 
 condition of things was somewhat modified, for the 
 Dutch republic was substantially established, and 
 France was governed by a great man. Belgium 
 and Holland no longer occupied anybody's atten- 
 tion but their own ; Spain no longer menaced any 
 one ; the revolution in the Low Countries, which 
 the prolongation of the local war prevented from 
 coming to an end, was only of secondary import- 
 ance in European affairs ; and, later still, the part 
 which Holland or the Spanish provinces took in 
 the Thirty Years' War had no influence on its con- 
 tinuation and its results beyond that which states 
 of inferior power would naturally exercise in a 
 general crisis. Thus the importance of the revolu- 
 tion of the Low Countries in Europe, the attention 
 
 T 2 
 
276 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 •whicli it attracted, the uneasiness whicli it caused, 
 were augmented or lessened according as tlie policy 
 of other countries was enlightened or unreasoning, 
 or as their governments were vigorously or care- 
 lessly administered. 
 
 'The United Provinces constituted a power which 
 differed from the other powers of Europe, as the 
 habits of the people differed from those of their 
 neighbours. The moral and material solidity of the 
 State partook of the solidity of mind of its founders. 
 The country itself, as a whole, had qualities in 
 common with the heroes to whom it gave birth, 
 and with every one of its citizens. William I. and 
 William III, the two greatest men of a nation that 
 has produced others, possessed in the highest degree 
 .all the qualities of the Batavian character; the 
 modest heroism, the wise and legitimate pride, the 
 talent for public affairs, and the love of liberty. The 
 Dutch heroes were grave, almost sad ; the source of 
 their happiness was to be found in services rendered 
 to their country, in the satisfaction of patriotic 
 sentiment, perhaps also in gratifying their hatred, 
 but not in the showy triumphs of material renown. 
 The Dutchman of the olden time, like his country- 
 man of the present day, was patient, simple, and 
 sensible. He possesses the genius for public afiairs, 
 for commerce, and for the sea ; he understands the 
 necessities entailed on him by his geographical posi- 
 tion, and he has the interests of his fatherland at 
 heart. He esteems riches, not as the means of 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 277 
 
 satisfying tlie frivolous tastes of luxury, but as a 
 guarantee of his independence and of his dignity ; 
 he makes no show of his wealth, but he is not sorry 
 that it should be an understood fact. Economical 
 and steady in the general habits of life, he is capable 
 of sacrifices, whenever he may be moved to make 
 them by generosity or by foresight. The most com- 
 mercial nation in the world has been convinQ^ed that 
 to acquire that reputation it is necessary to unite, 
 in proper proportions, the spirit of adventure with 
 that of a prudent reserve. The country which pro- 
 duces least by its agriculture or by its manual labour,-, 
 founded in 1602 the East India Company; and it 
 has shown infinite intelligence and activity in the 
 transport and in the exchange of the productions 
 of other lands. It has respected order, probity, and 
 candour ; it has not envied what others possessed^ 
 and it has neither imitated nor even admired others. 
 Situated at the extremity of the continent, and with 
 an exceptional climate, Holland requires nothing 
 from the rest of Europe, and its life in history has 
 been glorious in itself, and apart from all the rest of 
 Europe. In many things Holland has made more 
 rapid and more certain progress than other nations, 
 and for a long time it remained contented with that. 
 It knew neither the feudal middle ages of the 
 centre of Europe, nor the times of chivalry, nor the 
 troubadours. The country has gone through its 
 troubles, it has been able to renew the form of its 
 government, and it has stood the passing reaction 
 
278 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of events happening elsewhere, without changing its 
 habits of life, its national spirit, its ideas of inde- 
 pendence, or its religious or political aspirations. 
 
 It is worth inquiring whether it would have been 
 possible for Philip II. and his successors to have 
 continued the policy of Charles Y, so as to make 
 the second half of the sixteenth century resemble 
 the first, by preserving to Spain into the next 
 century her preponderance and her greatness ; and 
 preventing France from turning the scale in her 
 own favour. In a word, was the decline of Spain 
 entirely to be attributed to the faults of the men 
 who governed her ? 
 
 History is divided into vast periods, every one of 
 which prepares beforehand and brings about some 
 important change in the state of society, or in the 
 territorial condition of the different powers. Each 
 period thus raises the question whether those changes 
 are to be attributed to the genius or incapacity of 
 those men who held in their hands the political fate 
 of nations. No one blames the successors of Philip 
 II. so much as they do him for having caused the 
 decay of their country. Now is it not unjust to 
 throw the whole weight of these heavy accusations 
 on Philip alone, and not to divide the blame be- 
 tween him and his descendants ? Is it fair to impute 
 to a man such grave mistakes, and not, while passing 
 judgment on his conduct, to take into account the 
 fatality which attaches itself to the destiny of his 
 race, while we invoke that very destiny in favour 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 279 
 
 of Ms impotent successors ? Philip II. has had 
 defenders, and the extenuation of his faults has 
 been earnestly pleaded. The Emperor, they say, 
 left him a thankless part to play. The triumphal 
 car, guided by Charles Y, was already, at his 
 decease, hurrying down a dangerous and rapid 
 descent ; ' and it would have needed a powerful 
 genius to stay its course. The Emperor was ex- 
 hausted by suffering, and discouraged by a succes- 
 sion of reverses, when he dictated to his descendants 
 the rules by which they were to govern their con- 
 duct. If he had no confidence in the intelligence or 
 in the valour of his son, he had ceased also to have 
 any in the constancy of his own good fortune. His 
 directions were vague enough for Philip II. to flatter 
 himself that he had not in any way disobeyed them. 
 The government of a state, especially at such times, 
 is so complicated a matter, that it was not suffi- 
 cient, in giving advice, to lay down in curt sentences 
 a few principles. It is as important to indicate the 
 mode of applying these principles, as it is to lay 
 down rules ; and it is essential to explain to a future 
 monarch that the government of his own character 
 is as difficult to administer as that of his kingdom. 
 It would therefore be possible, if we felt a momentary 
 indulgence for Philip II, to argue that his power 
 had already been weakened by the later events of 
 his fathers reign; that Charles had left him great 
 difficulties to overcome, and that he only gave him 
 incomplete instructions ; that the fate of Spain under 
 
280 . HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tlie more remote successors to the Emperor, suffi- 
 ciently shows how difficult it was to keep the country 
 at the elevated point at which he had placed it, and 
 to efface the recollection of the misfortunes of the 
 last years of his rule. If we admit all these con- 
 siderations, and make the most of these excuses, we 
 may perhaps succeed in extenuating the mistakes 
 committed by Philip II, and thus throw a small 
 amount of the blame on his father ; and we may 
 too attribute the continued duration of the mis- 
 fortunes of Spain to those who came after him. But 
 posterity has not been disposed to make these 
 allowances : it persists in saying that Charles V. was 
 great, that the descendants of Philip 11. were feeble 
 and incapable, and that Philip himself was to blame. 
 Men are in fact more disposed to shed additional 
 lustre on the name of Charles V, and to absolve his 
 grandchildren, than in any respect to diminish the 
 responsibility of Philip II. History, however im- 
 partial it is supposed and bound to be, is inspired, 
 we must confess, with passionate admiration for 
 certain men, and passionate hatred of others. When 
 eminent characters or persons of great influence are 
 brought into contact in those great moral struggles 
 in which the intelligence, the feelings, and the 
 religious faith of men are ardently engaged, succeed- 
 ing generations, while they sit in judgment on the 
 contest, are sure to be more or less biassed by the 
 love or the hatred which was felt by contemporaries. 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 281 
 
 Merely to read all that has been published on the 
 revolution of the Low Countries would require many 
 years of study. In our own day, four great works 
 relating to that event have been undertaken ; of 
 which three only have been completed, — the collec- 
 tion of Granvelle's State Papers ; the correspondence 
 of William the Silent, collected by M. Gachard ; 
 and the archives of the family of Orange-Nassau, 
 edited, and accompanied by commentaries, sum- 
 maries, and notes, by M. G-roen Van Prinsterer. 
 
 "We have already alluded to the papers of Gran- 
 velle, which long remained unpublished at Besan9on. 
 His career as a minister of Philip IT. in the Low 
 Countries was a short one ; his influence scarcely 
 aflected the policy of the King, and was by no means 
 what it might have been. The correspondence of 
 William the Silent has a totally diff'erent import- 
 ance, depending, however, on the writer himself. 
 M. Gachard has exhibited in this work an amount 
 of knowledge, and a scrupulous impartiality, such 
 as we might have expected from him. 
 
 The archives of the House of Orange are a vast 
 monument, erected with patience by a writer of 
 great learning and singular depth of thought. An 
 introduction, placed at the beginning of each volume, 
 contains a concise summary of its contents, and in 
 this the author gives able and conscientious opinions, 
 as a politician, as well as an historian, on the events 
 
282 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 to which the volume refers, and on the documents 
 which it contains. Some of the questions which 
 agitated Holland in the sixteenth century, still occa- 
 sionally divide men's minds at the present time ; and 
 M. Groen Van Prinsterer is too considerable a man 
 in his own country not to have, on the affairs of that 
 time as on those of the present day, strongly marked 
 opinions of his own. The work, therefore, vast as 
 it is, offers to us ancient documents of great value 
 with the commentary of a learned contemporary of 
 our own time. 
 
 The correspondence of Philip II, brought from 
 Spain by M. Gachard, although incomplete, con- 
 tributes to our knowledge of Philip II. by exhibiting 
 testimony which cannot be refused — that of Philip 
 himself. When we possess several hundred unpub- 
 lished letters, written by a person whose life was so 
 secret, we ought to know about him nearly all that 
 is possible to be known ; and it is very difficult 
 afterwards to set up or justify a view of his cha- 
 racter differing from that which results with such 
 force from these numerous documents. M. Gachard, 
 in his researches in Spain, Belgium, Germany, and 
 France, was particularly anxious to illustrate the 
 history of the sixteenth century. Accordingly in 
 several important works, besides the correspondence 
 of Philip 11. and of the Prince of Orange, he has 
 published documents of great value, and has in- 
 variably affixed to them an introduction, marked by 
 all his knowledge and sound sense. All persons 
 
PHILIP II J AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 283 
 
 occupied with this portion of modern history must 
 do justice to the utility of his labours. His account 
 of Don Carlos throws as much light as is possible 
 on an event which will always remain shrouded 
 in mystery. Whether Philip II, in inflicting per- 
 petual imprisonment on his son, was driven to so 
 unnatural an act by the fear of his son's escape 
 to a foreign country (in imitation of the Dauphin, 
 afterwards Louis XL), or of a conspiracy against his 
 own person, or of a plot against the State, will 
 always remain somewhat doubtful. In throwing 
 more light on this event than has yet been done, 
 and in exhausting all sources of information on this 
 subject, M. Gachard had no desire to give his ex- 
 planation as the only sure one ; and this is an 
 additional merit which we are bound to recognise 
 in him. 
 
 Mr. Motley's " History of the United Netherlands " 
 has been as much read on the Continent as in 
 England or America ; and it is a work sure to 
 become popular. The mission of Leicester to Hol- 
 land is therein told with a great power of narrative 
 and observation ; while the interest exhibited is as 
 lively as might be felt by an Englishman of the 
 court of Elizabeth. 
 
 M. Theodore Juste has published the three first 
 volumes of a history of the revolution of the Low 
 Countries, as well as special works on Egmont and 
 on Philip de Marnix. All the works of M. Juste 
 bear the stamp of truth, of impartiality, and of 
 
284 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 patient and solid erudition. His style is simple, 
 lucid, and methodical. 
 
 We are indebted to M. Kervyn de Yolkaersbeke 
 for two volumes of documents concerning the events 
 in Ghent, during the dictatorship of Hembyse. 
 They are preceded by an interesting introduction. 
 
 Many documents, doubtless, are still to be found 
 in the public archives which relate personally to 
 Don John of Austria. Any writer who, with the 
 aid of such unpublished materials, should undertake 
 to describe Don John's mission to the Netherlands, 
 would do good service by making us acquainted, 
 from undoubted sources, with a personage who, 
 from the romantic charm attaching to his character, 
 has so often been presented to us in a poetical or 
 dramatic form. Fiction has had more to do with 
 John of Austria than History. It would be but just 
 to give to the latter her due, and to restore Don 
 John to his true position. His portrait, if it were 
 well drawn, would still remain very attractive with- 
 out the adventitious aid of fiction.^ 
 
 There are few epochs on which so much has been 
 written as on the revolution of the Low Countries. 
 The memoirs of the time are as numerous as the 
 modern accounts. Thoroughly to understand the 
 various opinions expressed on this important episode 
 in history, now requires on the part of any one very 
 
 ^ The author will doubtless by this time have learnt that we may 
 expect from the accomplished pen of Sir William Stirling Maxwell a 
 work on this subject. — Translator. 
 
PHILIP II. AND WILLIAM THE SILENT. 285 
 
 considerable study. The old writers are the more 
 simple and genuine : they take one side or the other 
 — either that of the Spaniards or the Dutch : and 
 they express very decided views on the subject. 
 The modern narratives and opinions are, on the 
 other hand, more impartial. If the passions that 
 raged in the sixteenth century are not yet quite 
 extinct, their object, nevertheless, is changed. The 
 conflict between the doctrines which divide mankind 
 is not less ardent now than it was on the day after 
 the death of Calvin ; but for the most part it bears 
 on other points. Men are less distinctly divided 
 between the Catholic Church and the Eeformation. 
 
 y' OP* THE 
 
 'UinVEIlSIT 
 
IV. 
 
 CAEDIXAL EICHELIEU— THE EIEST ENGLISH 
 REVOLUTION. 
 
 I. 
 
 An interval of fifty years separates the violent 
 death of Henry IV. from the real assumption of 
 power by Louis XIV.; and this period corresponds 
 nearly with the first half of the seventeenth century. 
 It was full of events sufficiently important to have 
 thrown Germany into the greatest disorder, and to 
 have produced vast changes in France and England, 
 more indeed than in Spain, where the royal power 
 continued to decline. 
 
 In France, this period includes the regency of 
 Queen Mary of Medicis, the government of the 
 Marshal d'Ancre, the momentary return to the 
 Spanish alliance after the death of Henry IV, the 
 minority of Louis XIII, the ministry of Cardinal 
 Richelieu, that of Cardinal Mazarin, and the wars of 
 the Fronde. 
 
 In Germany, it was occupied by the Thirty Years' 
 War, and by the events immediately preceding and 
 following it. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 287 
 
 In England, this period was filled up by the 
 reigns of James I. and of Charles I, by the revo- 
 lution which overthrew the government of the 
 latter, by the republic, and by the protectorate, 
 which ended in the restoration of Charles 11. 
 
 Thus in this time England passed through a great 
 revolution, and was subjected to four different 
 governments. Germany became the theatre of a 
 general and prolonged war, carried on as much 
 between the sovereigns who ruled the land as 
 between the different beliefs which divided it. 
 France, after the enlightened and popular govern- 
 ment of Henry IV, — after undergoing the regency 
 of Mary of Medicis, and the petty despotism of the 
 Marshal d'Ancre, — was guided, by the bold and 
 strong hand of Eichelieu, through the civil war 
 against the Huguenots and the aristocracy, and 
 afterwards, by the genius of Mazarin, so fertile in 
 resources, through the wars of the Fronde. France 
 was placed between the German war and the Eng- 
 lish revolution ; she was implicated in the one, and 
 an alarmed or envious spectator of the other. Was 
 it possible that such a mass of various events should 
 be accomplished without modifying the conditions 
 of society and the general course of ideas in these 
 three countries ? 
 
 There is, indeed, a great difference — greater than 
 in ordinary times the mere number of years that 
 passed from 1610 to 1660 would account for — 
 between the England of James I. and that of Charles 
 
288 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 11. — between the France of Henry IV. and that of 
 Louis XIV. The distance is not so great, we shall 
 see, between the Germany of the period which pre- 
 ceded the Thirty Years' War and that of the period 
 which followed. 
 
 The beginning and the end of this space of time, 
 and the limits in which it is inclosed, are marked 
 by events that happened simultaneously, and by the 
 concurrence of various political accidents, at or about 
 the same date. Thus, one year before the assas- 
 sination of Henry IV, with which the period opens, 
 there had been signed between Spain and the States- 
 General, a truce encouraged by France, which, 
 though provisional in its professed character, gave 
 the United Provinces their definitive independence. 
 This coincidence is remarkable. The truce of 1609 
 was an act of great importance, inasmuch as it 
 made the struggle of the Dutch against their foreign 
 rulers a purely local one, and permitted Europe to 
 look with less interest and disquietude upon the 
 discussion of a cause which might be considered as 
 already judged. The United Provinces seem to 
 have foreseen that the protection of France would 
 fail them, for a time at least, and they hastened 
 therefore to put their affairs in order. A few years 
 later the question of the succession of Cleves and 
 Juliers was opened, and the Protestant revolt in 
 Bohemia burst out. In these events we see the 
 premonitory signs of the great war in Germany. 
 
 Again, at the end of the period, the commence- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 289 
 
 ment of which was marked by the occurrences just 
 mentioned, other circumstances of the highest im- 
 portance present themselves in a mass within the 
 space of less than two years : the Treaty of the 
 Pyrenees was signed between France and Spain ; 
 the factions of the Fronde came to an end, and peace 
 was made between the rival parties ; Mazarin died ; 
 Louis XI y. began to reign himself ; and the first 
 English revolution was closed by the restoration of 
 Charles 11. 
 
 It would appear as if, in certain moments in the 
 history of the world, the most important facts occur 
 together, and present themselves in groups, as if for 
 the purpose of making more definite and clear the 
 marks which distinguish the several divisions in the 
 flow of time, and the several periods in the stream 
 of history. 
 
 In the beginning of the seventeenth century, as 
 in the sixteenth, three rival forces and interests 
 stood face to face with each other at the same time, 
 in the three countries which now occupy our atten- 
 tion : these were the royal power, the aristocracy, 
 and the party which, to define it by one word, we 
 must call that of liberty. 
 
 What in these three countries was the position, 
 both absolute and relative, occupied by each of 
 these three interests, as compared with that which 
 it held in the time of Charles V, and the first 
 religious wars ? What, in the second place, was the 
 change which occurred in their natme and in their 
 
 u 
 
290 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 relations to each other during the first half of the 
 seventeenth century ? 
 
 In order to examine these questions in a summary 
 manner, we will select the epoch when in France, 
 Germany, and England, the wars between the 
 Catholics and the Eeformers approached their close ; 
 when the way was being prepared for the complete 
 establishment of parliamentary government in Eng- 
 land ; and when, in France and Germany, the aris- 
 tocracy, supported by the Keformation, were carrying 
 on, though with a different result in the two countries, 
 a last conflict with the power of the monarchy. 
 
 In France, the royal power had been increasing 
 for more than two hundred years, but it aspired, and 
 was destined, to become still greater. Its advance 
 was evident when the rulers of the country were 
 men of ability as well as ambition ; and its progress 
 diminished during the periods of trouble and of 
 weakness — such as the religious wars and the times 
 of the League ; indeed, from the death of Francis I. 
 to the accession of Henry IV. Eoyalty gained 
 nothing either in power or consideration under the 
 three predecessors of the latter king. 
 
 From that time, however, in the hands of a great 
 monarch, who was a man of courage, judgment, and 
 ability, well versed in the knowledge of European 
 affairs, both the national glory and the royal power 
 of France began sensibly to increase. In the interval 
 which elapsed between the death of Henry IV. and 
 the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu — under the regency 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 291 
 
 of Mary of Medicis, and during the minority of 
 Louis XIII. — the government of France relapsed 
 into the ways of the preceding dynasty ; its autho- 
 rity was little respected at home, and it was timid 
 abroad; it did not dare to renounce the alliance 
 with Spain, which Henry IV. had broken through ; 
 but the system did not last long enough to cause to 
 the monarchical power the loss of what had been 
 gained during the course of the last reign. With 
 Eichelieu, royalty entered on its proper career, and 
 regained power and courage ; it definitively aban- 
 doned the Spanish alliance, crushed the parties 
 hostile to the crown, and acquired, by its energetic 
 action and by its alliances, a remarkable ascendency 
 in Europe. Thus, after having lost its influence 
 under the reigns of the three sons of Catherine of 
 Medicis, the power of the crown in France increased 
 under Henry lY. ; but again changing its character, 
 during the minority and the early years of the reign 
 of Louis XIII, it returned to the system which 
 prevailed under the immediate predecessors of 
 Henry TV, and resumed its true and proper course 
 only under Richelieu. 
 
 The French aristocracy regretted the loss of its 
 position in old times, and always was eager to grasp 
 again under some form or some pretext a portion of 
 its former independence, but from the time of the 
 first wars of the Reformation its lot was exactly 
 the reverse of that of the crown ; that is to say, it 
 struggled more vigorously against the power of the 
 
 u2 
 
292 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 monarcli, when that power was weak, and it expe- 
 rienced increasing losses when royalty was strongly 
 represented. On the whole, the aristocracy lost 
 considerably more than it gained; for the general 
 movement of society was more adverse to it than 
 the fits of momentary weakness on the part of the 
 crown were profitable. The Eeformation, the League, 
 all the embarrassments and all the misfortunes of 
 the monarchy during that period, did not prevent 
 the aristocracy from failing in their rivalry with the 
 throne. Henry lY. and Eichelieu — particularly the 
 latter — made the aristocracy bend under the weight 
 of their hands. The great nobility preserved their 
 hostile spirit against the royal authority ; but the 
 decline of their power no longer permitted them to 
 be, as they had been, before the fourteenth century, 
 independent and often rebellious vassals, nor, as in 
 the fifteenth, pretenders basing their rights on family 
 relations ; nor could they be, as in the second half 
 of the sixteenth century, military chiefs, command- 
 ing regular armies with greater resolution, and for 
 much longer periods, openly allying themselves with 
 foreign powers, and holding in check, by their popu- 
 larity and their arms, the enervated representatives 
 of a royal race that was gradually becoming extinct. 
 The struggle of the great nobility against Eichelieu, 
 and the tumults of the Fronde, no longer bore this 
 character.! The ambition of the aristocracy had 
 
 ^ Turenne and Conde, after having fouglit among the rebels, again 
 took service under the royal standards. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 293 
 
 become of a lower kind : it still dreamt that it 
 might get rid of the Cardinal, in the same way as 
 the Marshal d'Ancre had been disposed of ; but the 
 nobles, with all their vindictive spirit, showed regret 
 for the past, rather than hope for the future. The 
 resources at their disposal were smaller, and the 
 means which they employed were more petty in 
 their character. 
 
 The position of the third estate, or popular party, 
 — it little matters by what name we call all those 
 who did not belong to the nobility, but who aspired 
 to attain some sort of liberty, — had undergone some 
 changes ; but these changes were less marked. The 
 power of the crown had increased, while that of the 
 aristocracy had waned ; and the third element, though 
 it had made some endeavours to achieve liberty and- 
 independence — for instance, at the States-General 
 of Paris, in 1614 — had obtained nothing. The 
 popular party had held no direct or steady course 
 at the close of the fifteenth century : it was from 
 them that the soldiers of the League, and the 
 soldiers of the. Keformers, as w^ell as the representa- 
 tives of the third estate in the Parliament, were 
 drawn. It joined the party of the nobles in the 
 League, as well as in the religious war ; and having 
 nothing to lose, it did not experience the same 
 severe blows as the aristocracy. While the nobles 
 were turning their eyes towards the past, the third 
 estate directed its views towards the future. Its 
 political influence remained nearly the same as 
 
^ 
 
 294 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 before the Keformation, and before the League, and 
 it was destined to be stationary for a much longer 
 period. Henry IV. gave the Edict of Nantes to the 
 Huguenots. It lasted for nearly a hundred years ; 
 but the attempts and efforts of the third estate 
 remained fruitless for more than a hundred and 
 fifty years after that useless expression of its desires. 
 It was not that the third estate in the seventeenth 
 century in France failed to acquire intelligence, 
 administrative importance, and wealth. Industry, 
 science, and the possession of judicial functions ; 
 all these elements of social importance had increased 
 in its hands, and improved its position in the 
 country. But where it made no progress, was in its 
 attempts at political emancipation ; it had acquired 
 no share of useful and effective influence in the 
 assemblies of the estates, and no real participation 
 in the direction of the general affairs of the country ; 
 nor did it possess any municipal independence. The 
 sphere of communal action had been narrowed with 
 the liberties of the middle ages, and nothing then 
 remained free but royalty.^ 
 
 Such, shortly stated, are the changes accomplished 
 or attempted in France affecting the position of 
 each of the three social elements of royalty, the 
 nobility, and the people, in the course of the epoch 
 which preceded Cardinal Eichelieu, and the time of 
 his ministry. 
 
 ^ Aug. Thierry, HJtudes sur VHistoire de la Formation et des progres 
 du Tiers Mat, vol. i. chaps, v.-viii. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 295 
 
 In Germany, the three interests thus engaged in 
 conflict experienced changes in their position which 
 it is more difiicult for the historian to appreciate. 
 Under the three emperors, who reigned between 
 Ferdinand I. and Ferdinand II. — during the divisions 
 existing among the reigning family; through the 
 movements of the Keformation ; and the attempts 
 at emancipation on the part of certain portions of 
 the population subjected to the Empire — the mon- 
 archy itself did not sustain any very great altera- 
 tion. The Imperial power indeed was somewhat 
 diminished; and the independence of the sovereign 
 princes was slightly augmented ; but the liberty of 
 the people made no progress from Charles V. to 
 Ferdinand 11. 
 
 It had been the object of Charles Y. to make the 
 Protestant princes submit to his authority, and to 
 extirpate heresy, but he did not succeed ; and after 
 triumphantly concluding many other enterprises, he 
 failed in this one.^ The successors of his brother, 
 Ferdinand I, were equally unfortunate. The insur- 
 rection in Bohemia, and the divisions in the imperial 
 family, could not but diminish the power of the 
 Emperor himself. 
 
 Charles V. at the commencement of his rule was 
 in Germany a more powerful monarch than Fer- 
 dinand II. at the close of his reign ; and this dif- 
 ference resulted as much from the social condition 
 
 1 Sixty-four years elapsed between the accession of Ferdinand I. 
 and of Ferdinand II (1555-1619). 
 
296 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of the German States as from tlie personal pre- 
 ponderance of tlie sovereign himself. The battle of 
 Prague, and the first victories of Ferdinand II, did 
 not prevent the general result of the Thirty Years' 
 War from being disadvantageous to the Empire. The 
 German princes came out of this war more inde- 
 pendent than they went into it, and the imperial 
 power was certainly less absolute. The indepen- 
 dence of those princes who were attached as vassals 
 to the crown had made some steps in advance ; and 
 the German aristocracy had certainly gained rather 
 than lost ground by the Thirty Years' War. They 
 had resisted Ferdinand 11. as they had resisted 
 Charles V. They remained jealous of the sovereign, 
 and were disquieted by the imperial ambition ; 
 while they did not embrace the Eeformation with 
 unanimity, and preserved their ancient alliances, or, 
 at any rate, their projects of alliance. To maintain, 
 and even improve their position, in the face of the 
 Empire, at a time when royalty was making political 
 conquests in the neighbouring countries, was a great 
 feat. Everything moreover favoured monarchical 
 ambition ; and they had to deal with an emperor as 
 courageous and grasping as Ferdinand II. What 
 had really affected the position of the German aris- 
 tocracy, during the century that had elapsed, was 
 the importance of military events; the accidents and 
 hazards of the struggle ; and the character and merit 
 of the chiefs on their own side, as well as of those 
 to whom they were opposed. The Thirty Years' War 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 297 
 
 was more general in its cliaracter and longer in its 
 duration, while it was carried on with more power 
 on both sides, and on a larger scale than the German 
 war of Charles V. 
 
 Thus the condition of the people in Germany 
 from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century was 
 far from following the same course as in France. 
 The monarchical unity which was aimed at and 
 desired on behalf of the Empire had not made the 
 same progress as the influence of the crown in 
 France ; nay, it was rather the party opposed to 
 German unity which had gained somewhat ; while 
 those in favour of it had lost ground. The princes 
 in fact preserved, and in a certain sense increased, 
 their independence, in the two great struggles carried 
 on by them against Charles V. and Ferdinand 11. 
 We may ask, What part in the results of these two 
 wars ought to be attributed to the help afforded by 
 the Reformation to those who were in arms against 
 the Emperor ? The Reformation must certainly be 
 reckoned among their means of defence ; but, never- 
 theless, the war was not solely a religious one ; and 
 it was not even, as much as it may appear to be so, 
 a series of combats between Catholics and Reformers. 
 Neither party were united among themselves in the 
 sixteenth, nor yet in the seventeenth century. There 
 were two parties in Bavaria ; Saxony was constantly 
 hesitating ; the Evangelical Union had no real 
 solidity, and the Catholic League was not formed 
 for the purpose of defending the Emperor. The 
 
298 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 part wHcli was played by the spirit of inde- 
 pendence, whicli might still be called in Germany 
 the feudal spirit, was greater than the part which 
 religious feeling played in this matter : the partisans 
 of local independence were more united and more 
 constant than the partisans of Luther. 
 
 The principle therefore of monarchical unity, and 
 that of feudal independence, had a different destiny 
 in Germany and in France. 
 
 It is not possible to assign, during the sixteenth 
 and seventeenth centuries, a special position to that 
 party in Germany which corresponds to the third 
 estate in France. This party was absorbed in the 
 ranks of the Keformation ; it fought in the Swedish 
 army, in that of Frederick V. and of the Protestant 
 princes. Those insurrections which had a totally 
 distinct character, — such, for instance, as the riots 
 caused by the followers of Munzer, — had no conse- 
 quences which in any way connect themselves with 
 the idea of political liberty.^ What may be called 
 in France the party of the future gained nothing 
 during that time ; and in Germany we cannot attri- 
 bute to it a separate existence nor a fixed design 
 apart from the religious movement in favour of 
 Eeform. 
 
 In short, the religious war, and the wars carried 
 on by the German princes against the Empire in 
 the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, produced 
 
 ^ The Eeformation was more effectual as an ally to the German 
 princes than it was dangerous, as an adversary, to the French monarchy. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 299 
 
 results in Germany diametrically opposed to those 
 which followed the internal struggles of the same 
 epoch in France. Monarchical power gained in 
 France and lost in Germany. The general progress 
 of events was slower in Germany, and in an opposite 
 direction. 
 
 The social movement in England before and after 
 the reign of Charles I, from the beginning of the 
 Eeformation to the first Eestoration, does not 
 resemble in any degree that which took place in 
 France and Germany; the crown, the aristocracy, 
 and the popular party, played each a dijfferent part 
 and with a different destiny. 
 
 Like the continental sovereigns, and in imitation 
 of them, the English monarchs attempted to render 
 their power independent and absolute. Henry VIII. 
 and Elizabeth wished to exert the same personal 
 ascendency in the government as Francis I, Charles 
 Y, and Philip II. ; just as Charles I, at a later period, 
 desired to be as absolute as the King of France. 
 Henry YIII. and Elizabeth — the one violent and 
 despotic in character, the other with a mind at once 
 circumspect and vacillating — but both of them pas- 
 sionately fond of power, had the benefit of two sets 
 of circumstances which temporarily favoured, or 
 appeared to favour, their j)retensions. One of these 
 was the Eeformation, and the other was the long 
 duration of the continental wars. The Eeformation 
 in England — that is to say, the establishment of 
 the Anglican Church — by giving religious supremacy 
 
300 
 
 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 to the King, served as a pretext or a stepping stone 
 for the establishment of his political supremacy. He 
 believed that without confounding the two spheres 
 of action, each might be made to strengthen the 
 other, and that the ecclesiastical hierarchy, of which 
 he was the head, would secure to him the support 
 of a numerous, enlightened, and powerful body of 
 men. The continental wars, the rivalry between 
 France and Spain, and the attempts made by 
 Philip II. against England, were also an advantage 
 to the royal power in England, by affording a sub- 
 ject of disquiet and of distraction to the country, 
 and by giving royalty an excuse for exercising 
 pressure on the Parliament. Henry VIII. and 
 Elizabeth made good use of both these auxiliaries. 
 
 When the dynasty changed, the Stuarts showed 
 the same inclinations as the Tudors to imitate the 
 continental governments ; but James I, who was 
 vehement in speech but timid in action, did not 
 push the attempt too far. Charles I. tried the ex- 
 periment more boldly and systematically ; but the 
 catastrophe which he brought about, after an obsti- 
 nate and painful struggle, varied by many hesita- 
 tions and doubts, rendered the exercise of absolute 
 monarchy in England thenceforth impossible. The 
 country looked upon its ancient institutions as an 
 inalienable possession — as a right that might have 
 been for a moment disputed, but which never had 
 been destroyed. The second revolution ended by a 
 definitive comprom^ise between the crown and the 
 
THE FIKST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 301 
 
 countr J, founded on the recognised preponderance of 
 the Commons. Thus the pretensions of Henry VIIT. 
 and of Elizabeth, of James I. and of his unfortunate 
 son, were finally set aside, and the crown in England 
 was far from attaining the amount of independent 
 power which some of the continental monarchies had 
 secured. 
 
 During this period the fate of the aristocracy in 
 England was also very different from what it was 
 elsewhere. The history of parties from the time of 
 the middle ages was dissimilar to that which pre- 
 vailed in the rest of Europe ; for in England the 
 feudal system had not the same character, nor did 
 the aristocracy play the same part. In the sixteenth 
 century the struggle between the crown and the 
 nobility was gone by ; the political institutions of 
 the country were already sufiiciently strong to give 
 its proper influence, or at least its legitimate position, 
 to the aristocracy, and to have extinguished the 
 contest between it and the royal power. The Eng- 
 lish nobility had, therefore, no special and definite 
 part or object assigned to it before or during the 
 revolution. It was broken up into two fractions. 
 The higher nobility, not having the same antecedents, 
 and not feeling the same regrets for the past as were 
 experienced by the French aristocracy, rallied for 
 the most part round the King when, at the approach 
 of the revolution, the Parliamentary opposition be- 
 came menacing. After having displayed at the court 
 of the Tudors their submission and fidelity, the 
 
302 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 English nobility under Charles I. were more alarmed 
 at the violence of the revolutionary party than at 
 the absolute tendencies of the sovereign. The lesser 
 nobility were divided between the royal army and 
 the House of Commons ; indeed the House of Com- 
 mons was chiefly composed of such men. Thus, at 
 the close of the revolution, the aristocracy preserved 
 in the country the authority and influence that was 
 desired for it, and which was willingly assigned to 
 it — ^not indeed by the violent revolutionists, who 
 disappeared under a regular government, but by 
 those who had advisedly resisted the encroachments 
 of the crown on the liberties of the country, and 
 whose triumph was complete and final after the 
 second revolution. 
 
 The result of the position thus assumed by royalty 
 and by the nobility was, that after many efforts 
 after culpable excesses, in the midst of strange 
 events and many wild ideas, the popular party at 
 the end of the seventeenth century obtained in Eng- 
 land what it had obtained nowhere on the Conti- 
 nent ; it won from the royal power respect for its 
 free institutions, and the unrestrained exercise of 
 the Parliamentary system. It then secured a posi- 
 tion which it never again lost, and which it did not 
 consider as an advantage newly acquired, but as the 
 recognition of an ancient right. Thus the social 
 state of England at this epoch, and the change 
 resulting from the attempts of the crown to gain 
 absolute power, and from the events of the revolu- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 303 
 
 tion, were of a very special cliaracter. The crown 
 did not achieve tlie absolute indepcDdence whicli it 
 had aimed it ; the aristocracy preserved its proper 
 influence; the popular or Parliamentary party en- 
 forced the recognition and consolidated for ever that 
 share of the power which the ancient institutions 
 of the country gave them. 
 
 This, in general terms, is a brief summary of the 
 internal movements and the changes which were 
 effected in the relations of the social elements 
 engaged in contest with each other in France, Ger- 
 many, and England, during the second half of the 
 sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth cen- 
 turies. The two half centuries which separate the 
 abdication of Charles Y. from the Treaties of West- 
 phalia and of the Pyrenees involved changes quite 
 as considerable in the international relations of the 
 great states. The first revolution in England, if we 
 may be permitted to say it, was almost an insular 
 fact, having no close, continuous, or important bearing 
 on the affairs of the Continent. But between the 
 Houses of France and of Spain, and those of France 
 and of Austria and their allies, much passed both in 
 war and diplomacy ; and in the course of a century 
 their relations one to another were modified as much 
 as the internal situation of each was changed. 
 
 The war between France and Spain, which suc- 
 ceeded the war between France and England, may 
 be said to have lasted rather more than two cen- 
 turies ; namely, the sixteenth and seventeenth. It 
 
304 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 was followed up when the governments of France 
 were vigorous and bold, and it was dropped when 
 they were weak and timid. It was commenced 
 without any lasting success, and without vigour, by 
 the two predecessors of Francis I. ; it was prosecuted 
 by Francis I, by Henry IV, by Richelieu, by Louis 
 XIY. ; by the sons of Henry II. it was feebly waged 
 against the intrigues of Spain, and against the 
 League as her ally, rather than against the Spanish 
 armies; and having been suspended by Mary of 
 Medicis, it was again continued in a languid manner, 
 for a few years, by Mazarin. The intervals of war 
 and peace therefore depended on the vigour or the 
 weakness of the governments. 
 
 In the sixteenth century, Italy was the battle- 
 field of the Houses of France and of Spain ; and 
 Germany was the theatre of the war in the seven- 
 teenth century. The first struggle lasted until the 
 time when the House of Valois, occupied by internal 
 troubles, and too unwarlike to attempt so great an 
 enterprise, considered that Spain had acquired a 
 regular title to the possession of Milan and Naples. 
 The second war commenced after the Reformation had 
 introduced a new element into the contest. The 
 struggle between Francis I. and Charles V. was 
 chiefly carried on in Italy ; that between Richelieu 
 and Ferdinand 11. in Germany. In the life of 
 Charles V. the German campaigns can only be re- 
 garded as ill-considered operations, and abortive 
 acts of his old age. What therefore distinguishes 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 305 
 
 the policy of the war in the times of Francis I. and 
 of Eichelieu, and marks the difference between the 
 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is that the seat 
 of war was changed, and that France no longer 
 attempted to secure Italy. She no longer sought to 
 conquer a large state beyond the boundaries of her 
 own territory ; but she desired to attain in Germany 
 a greater preponderance than that possessed by the 
 House of Spain. Again, the alliance of France with 
 the Protestants was established ; for Eichelieu's 
 object was the same as that of Henry IV, but it was 
 more precise and determined, and, if we may use 
 the expression, his policy was more inexorable and 
 less elastic. He desired to obtain the alliance of 
 the German and Dutch Protestants, the friendship 
 or the neutrality of England, and, moreover, the 
 total destruction of all parties in France itself. His 
 policy had a greater scope than that of Francis I, 
 and it embraced a greater number of objects; the 
 policy of Eichelieu would have been the more diffi- 
 cult of the two if he had not enjoyed the great 
 advantage of not having to contend with Charles Y. 
 Francis I. desired and had some idea of an alliance 
 with the Protestants, but he never knew how to 
 establish it firmly ; he might have derived from it 
 a totally different result than he did obtain, although 
 the Eeformation in his time had much less power 
 than it acquired a hundred years later. In speaking 
 of him, we have already said that he could have 
 obtained from Henry VIII, from Venice, from the 
 
 X 
 
306 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 independent or republican Italians, and from Turkey, 
 far more aid than he ever asked from those powers. 
 The system pursued by Kichelieu, taking into account 
 all the changes which time had effected in the situ- 
 ation of affairs, exhibits a very different force and 
 substance, and a very different power of combina- 
 tion. He knew, what Francis I. never learnt, how 
 to turn to account the ideas of his time, and how to 
 draw out all that was to be gained from Europe, 
 from the Eeformation, and from the internal forces 
 of France. Eichelieu, together with Francis I, 
 Henry TV, and Louis XIV, represents the great 
 system of French policy. He was more thoughtful 
 than the first ; more disposed to prolong the war 
 than the second, and endowed with greater foresight 
 and more self-control than the third. The personal 
 advantages of Francis I. consisted only in his valour, 
 his adventurous character, and his ambition ; Henry 
 IV. had over Eichelieu the advantage of his attrac- 
 tive and sympathetic nature, and his easy and con- 
 fident power of judging his position, as well as the 
 military habit of cheerfully accepting the decisions 
 of fortune ; Eichelieu had over Henry IV. the ad- 
 vantage of an iron will, an admirable precision of 
 mind, and the faculty of concentrating all his 
 attention and all his powers on one single object. 
 
 We have thus indicated the principal points in 
 which the international relations of the Houses of 
 France and Spain in the sixteenth century differed 
 from what they were in the seventeenth. 
 
THE FIKST ENGLISH REVOLUTION, „_ 
 
 -^ o'' ca'^ 
 
 II. 
 
 TJNIYBRSITY] 
 
 Caedinal Kichelieu, on a different system, because 
 his character was different, carried on the policy 
 of Henry lY, which was based on the following 
 principles : — A foreign war with the Empire and 
 Spain, supported by an alliance with the Protestant 
 powers ; resistance at home against the aristocracy, 
 and the partisans of peace or alliance with Spain. 
 
 The author of this policy was Henry IV. In 
 adopting it, he broke away from the traditions of 
 the three last Yalois, the sons of Henry II, and 
 began a broad and comprehensive plan, to which 
 he devoted all his intelligence, patience, and popu- 
 larity. He was preparing to carry it out with all 
 the firmness of a soldier and the prudence of a 
 great administrator, when death suddenly inter- 
 rupted his designs. 
 
 Kichelieu continued the system of Henry IV. with 
 certain modifications. When we compare what is 
 called ** the great design" {Le grand dessein) with 
 all that was done by the Cardinal, we are led to 
 remark certain differences in the conception and in 
 the execution. It was the intention of Henry IV, 
 as we have elsewhere said, to make a vigorous and 
 short war against the Empire, with the view of 
 closing it by a fresh distribution of territory, which 
 he looked upon as likely to secure a permanent 
 
 x2 
 
308 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 balance of power. He wished to stifle the internal 
 conspiracies of the nobility, to enforce their submis- 
 sion, and to establish on this double pacification 
 the future of the throne of France. 
 
 The general principle of this plan — foreign war 
 against the Empire, and domestic war against the 
 nobility — was adopted by Eichelieu. It does not 
 follow from the series of his acts that, like Henry IV, 
 he would have been disposed to sheath the sword 
 as soon as he could secure by peace reasonable 
 advantages and guarantees. The German war was 
 considerable enough to acquire a hold on him and 
 carry him along with it ; but it lasted longer than 
 his own life, and was complicated by unforeseen in- 
 cidents ; it is difficult to say at what point Eichelieu 
 intended to stop in his struggle with the Empire. 
 We are almost tempted to think that he had a 
 greater love for war than Henry IV, whose calling 
 it was, and who had passed his life in camps and in 
 adventures. 
 
 It is possible therefore that the Cardinal enlarged 
 the plan of foreign policy conceived by Henry lY. ; 
 and framed for France projects even more warlike. 
 Both his scheme in the interests of royalty, and for 
 the conduct of foreign affairs, rested then on the 
 same basis as that of Henry IV. The difference 
 between his mode of action and that of the King 
 in the struggle with the different parties in France, 
 was owing as much to the man himself, his temper, 
 and his inclinations, as to the circumstances. But 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 309 
 
 the King's policy was, as a whole and in its detail, 
 larger, more generous, and milder than that of the 
 Cardinal. 
 
 This comparison between the two men does not in 
 any way detract from Richelieu's influence and repu- 
 tation. His courage and his genius were of a very- 
 high character, and the traces which he left were 
 most profound. He had the good fortune to come 
 exactly when he was wanted, and to live at the 
 moment when the monarchical principle was in the 
 ascendant — in the times between Henry IV. and 
 Louis XIV. — between Henry IV, who won and did 
 honour to his crown, and Louis XIV, who raised 
 the kingly power to its highest degree of splendour 
 and authority, though he was incapable of main- 
 taining it there. The part Eichelieu played went 
 along with the social progress of France at that 
 epoch, and with the logic of history. 
 
 The foreign system followed by Richelieu, to 
 commence with that side of his policy, was ex- 
 ceedingly firm in certain of its principles, but con- 
 ciliating and temporising in some of its means of 
 execution. As soon as he felt himself the master, 
 he wished to form those alliances which Francis I. 
 ought to have contracted in order to resist Charles V. 
 — that is to say, alliances with all those powers 
 which by religion or by policy were the adversaries 
 of the Empire and of Spain ; but while he contracted 
 these ties with the Protestants, he tried to prevent 
 the formation of a Catholic League against himself 
 
310 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 in Spain, Italy, and Germany. He menaced or 
 frightened the Stuarts with this League, when he 
 wished to prevent their allying themselves with 
 Spain, and when he encouraged the marriage of the 
 son of James I. with a daughter of France, well 
 knowing that if the English prince married a Spanish 
 princess, the Anglo-French coalition against the 
 Empire and Spain would become exceedingly diffi- 
 cult. He therefore did all in his power to form 
 the Protestant League, and to prevent England from 
 separating herself from it. 
 
 The Thirty Years' War, the greatest event of that 
 epoch, was carried on, during Eichelieu's administra- 
 tion, in a manner fortunate for France and for him- 
 self ; it was prolonged for some time after his death : 
 but the Treaty of Westphalia, which eventually 
 succeeded in settling the political and religious 
 condition of Europe, in some measure added still 
 further to the Cardinal's renown. History, which 
 gives him the credit of having conducted, as far as 
 France was concerned, the progress of affairs in the 
 latter period of this war, also attributes to him the 
 merit of having prepared the issue. 
 
 Thus the long and bloody quarrel, which kept 
 Germany divided into two parties — that of the 
 Catholic Empire and that of the Protestant princes — 
 had commenced before Eichelieu became minister, 
 and continued after his death. It was a constant 
 source of anxiety to him in his policy. The Car- 
 dinal's name would not stand so high, if the Thirty 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 311 
 
 Years' War had been otherwise conducted, and had 
 ended differently ; if, instead of the military suc- 
 cesses being on the side of the princes and their 
 allies, the adversaries of the Empire, the imperial 
 power had been increased, and its arms had been 
 victorious. By the moral support which Eichelieu 
 gave to the German princes, and by the material 
 aid which lie furnished ; by his advice, by his 
 agents, and by the vigilance with which he watched 
 this great operation, he contributed largely to its 
 results. 
 
 The sequence and combination of the military 
 events of the war turned to the profit of Fran^e:'^^^ 
 It is obvious that FerdinandJIr-^ossessedTmore 
 courage and ambition than prudence, or he would 
 have known how to take advantage of circumstances 
 in his favour, and have made peace after his first 
 victories. He did not succeed in dividing his 
 enemies, in uniting his friends, in separating the 
 Calvinists from the Lutherans, or in obtaining 
 complete command over the latter. He might at 
 least have prevented disunion among the German 
 Catholics. When any monarch (like Francis I. in 
 the presence of the Constable of Bourbon) finds 
 himself face to face with such a man as Wallenstein, 
 the formidable representative of a bygone age — a 
 vassal, whom mental power, courage, and military 
 capacity rendered powerful — it would be in general 
 wiser to show the confidence of a friend rather than 
 the authority of a master. Ferdinand 11. did not 
 
312 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 understand this ; he had not felt tempted to adopt 
 the idea, which Wallenstein had held all his life, 
 of forming a third party in the Empire with Saxony, 
 undecided as it was, and with that fraction of the 
 Catholics who had small zeal for the cause of the 
 Empire. It was out of these elements that Wal- 
 lenstein wished to frame for himself an independent 
 power, and these elements a prudent government 
 might have gained over to itself, or have neutralized. 
 The most important incidents in the Thirty Years' 
 War were favourable to the interests of France. The 
 Emperor s want of foresight, and the faults he com- 
 mitted, made it unnecessary for Eichelieu openly to 
 succour the Protestants, until the second period of 
 the war. The ambition of Ferdinand II. to rule 
 over the whole of Germany, and even over^weden, 
 and his error in neglecting to secure the means 
 of making peace, gave Gustavus Adolphus time to 
 come forward and to rally the enemies of the 
 Emperor. When Gustavus Adolphus fell mortally 
 wounded on the battle-field of Lutzen, in the height 
 of his success, at a time when nothing remained for 
 him to conquer but the hereditary States of Austria, 
 and when his power threatened to become greater 
 even than that of France, the death of the Swedish 
 hero in the very midst of his triumphs was another 
 piece of good fortune fo^ Eichelieu. The prepon- 
 derance of the King of Sweden in Germany had 
 already become a subject of jealousy and a danger 
 for France. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 313 
 
 Kichelieu did not live to see the catastrophe of 
 ihis long struggle ; he saw neither Roeroi, n pr T.ptiSj 
 nor_JHordlingen^ But Gustavus Adolphus, Wal- 
 lenstein, and Ferdinand 11. died before him. The 
 war was drawing to an end, and Turenne, with the , 
 last of the Swedish heroes, was enough to insure 
 its success. 
 
 The result of the Thirty Years' War, as far as con- 
 cerned the grandeur and security of France, was, if 
 not attained by Richelieu, at any rate secured by 
 him for the future. Although he did not negotiate 
 or sign the treaty of peace with the Empire, the 
 events accomplished in his time, and under his in- 
 fluence, prepared the way for it. He furnished con- 
 tingents to Germany, but he was not present on the 
 battle-fields of that country, as on those of Italy, or 
 as he was in the campaigns against the Huguenots in 
 the south of France, and at the siege of Rochelle. 
 
 The war itself was the principal foreign event of 
 the time of his government. / 
 
 It is true, however, that in turning to account 
 the ideas of Henry IV. in what concerned the foreign 
 affairs of the government, and thus reaping the 
 profit of national power and glory, Richelieu set a 
 dangerous example to Louis XIY, who adopted the 
 ambitious part of the Cardinars policy, and imitated 
 its audacity without providing the same securities ; 
 inasmuch as he took from the Cardinal his projects 
 of war, without his system of alliances. Richelieu 
 had to deal with an Emperor who was rash ; with 
 
314 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Spain badly governed ; with England, for a moment 
 hostile under the giddy and passionate administra- 
 tion of Buckingham, and afterwards wholly taken 
 up with those movements which were the precursors 
 of a revolution. Meanwhile the grandeur of France 
 abroad grew under his rule. Had Wallenstein with 
 his ambition shown more submission to his sovereign, 
 and had he united less spitefulness with his military 
 courage, he might have succeeded in forming in the 
 Empire a formidable resistance to the allies ; but 
 Fate did not long expose Eichelieu to such an evil 
 chance. 
 
 Everywhere the fortune of war smiled on him, 
 and when he mounted his charger — as passionately 
 fond of war as Julius II. and as capable of command 
 — it was to beat the Spaniards at the defile of Susa. 
 He had this advantage over Francis L and Louis 
 XIV, the kings who made conquests — he nowhere 
 met an adversary redoubtable for genius or audacity. 
 The fate of Eichelieu might have been very difierent 
 had he been forced to cope with such a competitor 
 as Charles V. or William III. ; or even to measure 
 his strength with the formidable and obstinate power 
 of Philip II. His capacity was certainly greater than 
 that of Francis I. or of Louis XIV. The resources 
 of France were larger than those she possessed at 
 the beginning of the sixteenth century, or at the 
 time when the great king continued for so long his 
 course of rashness. But, on the other hand, the 
 governments hostile to France in the time of Eiche- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 315 
 
 lieu had not the same power of coalition, nor were 
 they as well led, as when Charles V. or the Prince 
 of Orange were at the head of affairs. 
 
 The supremacy of France was in fact founded by 
 this foreign policy ; but a wide distinction may be 
 drawn between the proceedings of Richelieu in 
 foreign affairs and in his home policy. 
 
 His mode of action in his contests in France 
 itself was more complicated, and in some ways 
 more varied. He had to defend himself, at the same 
 time, against men of high birth ; who were discon- 
 tented chiefs of the party of the nobility, com- 
 manders of the Huguenot army, or governors of 
 provinces, difficult to be kept in order and ambitious 
 of independence ; as well as against the Huguenots 
 themselves, who, since the check they had sustained 
 at La Rochelle, kept up a war which was indeed less 
 dangerous, but which still went on. He had also to 
 struggle against court intrigues and divisions in the 
 royal family. Of these three elements of opposition 
 to his authority, he treated the nobility with the 
 most severity. The Huguenots formed bodies of 
 troops which were scattered about the country, 
 occupying and exacting contributions from portions 
 of some provinces, whereas the Cardinal discovered 
 in the midst of the aristocracy men who were plot- 
 ting against his life. He always showed himself 
 pitiless with regard to the conspirators against his 
 person : Chalais, Marillac, and Montmorency lost 
 their heads on the scaffold. 
 
316 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 He used much more care and precaution when 
 dealing with the court, with its divisions and its 
 intrigues. However firm his power might seem, he 
 was persuaded that a rival might supplant him ; 
 howsoever great was the King s confidence in him, 
 it might still be withdrawn. The son of Henry IV, 
 the father of Louis XIY. — so different in every way 
 from one or the other — a prince, feeble yet absolute, 
 irascible, sickly, brave in war, slow in mind, insen- 
 sible to the death of Marshal d'Ancre,^ giving in a 
 stuttering voice orders which he believed to emanate 
 from himself ; the timid and simple adorer of Made- 
 moiselle de la Fayette — such a prince, on account 
 of his very caprices, was not easy to lead. Richelieu 
 had studied the singular character of the King with 
 the greatest care ; he was exceedingly circumspect 
 in his proceedings towards him, which were a mix- 
 ture of precaution, firmness, and respect.^ Moreover, 
 Louis XHL might have died, and might not Gaston, 
 the brother of the King, a rebellious and embar- 
 rassing subject, who was heir to the throne until the 
 birth of the Dauphin, one day become his master ? 
 The policy of the Spanish alliance, which had been 
 abandoned by Henry IV, but resumed by his widow, 
 had been tolerated by Eichelieu, at the commence- 
 ment of his career, when he was particularly anxious 
 to secure the goodwill of the Queen, and it was not 
 
 ^ Lettres et Papiers d'Mat de Richelieu, vol. i. p. 536, and following. 
 2 Ibid. vol. ii. p. 315-318, and 436-438. Letter of the 23d May, 
 1629. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 317 
 
 quite extinct. The Cardinal saw its representatives 
 and its partisans among those who were bound by 
 a common hatred against the government, among 
 the chiefs of the nobility, in the royal family, and at 
 Court. His foreign alliances kept him engaged 
 in a contest with the friends of Spain abroad ; whilst 
 the interest of his authority, and frequently even 
 care for his own life, obliged him to adopt defensive 
 measures against them at home. The Spanish party 
 derived a certain force from the traditions of the 
 Regency, and from the recollections of the League ; 
 and the party devoted to the Eegency, whose rallying 
 point was Mary of Medicis, made common cause 
 with the rebellious nobility. What prevented the 
 partisans of Spain from having the same power 
 which they possessed in the preceding century, was 
 the fact that the pressure the other way was decided 
 and energetic, and that Philip IV. and the Count 
 of Olivares did not support their friends with the 
 same zeal as Philip II. 
 
 When Richelieu then took up and continued the 
 system of Henry lY, he was mainly, like that 
 king, sustained by his native intelligence and force 
 of character, but in a less degree by his popularity ; 
 his good fortune, however, was greater. He found 
 ready traced by his predecessor a plan of action for 
 a vigorous and national government devoted to the 
 advance of royal power. 
 
 Richelieu waged against the aristocracy a more 
 determined and bloody war than Henry IV. would 
 
318 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 have done, whose nature was more supple and less 
 passionate. If Henry lY, who died in the full 
 vigour of his age and constitution, had lived during 
 the time of the Eegency, and during the first years 
 of his son's reign, he would, by the mere effect of 
 his character, have excited less hatred than the 
 Cardinal ; he would have met with fewer anta- 
 gonists and embarrassments ; he would have been 
 more beloved, and would most probably have been 
 the object of fewer conspiracies. 
 
 The career of Eichelieu was a difficult one from 
 the commencement to the end, but it was fortunate ; 
 it was difficult, on account of the diversity and 
 complication of events ; it was fortunate, if we 
 consider the result and its importance for the future 
 of France. 
 
 He had the luck to succeed in his enterprises, 
 although he had to steer between the risks of his 
 expeditions abroad and the obstacles which met 
 him at home, between the Queen-mother and the 
 King, between the influences of the Court, the 
 Huguenots, the friends of Spain, and professed 
 politicians. He began by showing more prudence 
 than frankness ; and the first of the many talents 
 he exhibited at the outset of his career was his power 
 of concealing the desire to rule. When he was in- 
 troduced by Mary of Medicis into the councils of 
 Louis XIII, when he resisted the pressing ofiers of 
 the King, made his own conditions, and excused 
 himself on the plea of bad health and bodily weak- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 319 
 
 ness, which prevented him from standing upright, 
 he showed his great cleverness ; but no one could 
 have then foreseen that this pale and sickly face 
 would soon acquire as much power in the kingdom 
 as had ever been wielded by any of its monarchs.^ 
 
 France, or rather the royal power in France, came 
 out of his hands greater than it was when he suc- 
 ceeded to power ; that is to say, the crown possessed 
 more authority, and the country less liberty ; for 
 the aristocracy had lost rather more completely and 
 more definitively the independence which it once 
 enjoyed, while the mass of the people had not yet 
 obtained any of the guarantees which they were 
 one day to possess. Eichelieu fought against the 
 Huguenots, as forming an armed party under the 
 military guidance of the nobility ; he fought, and 
 endeavoured practically to destroy them, without 
 however depriving them of the rights granted to 
 them by Henry IV. He attacked the men rather 
 than their creed, and this course was in accordance 
 with his instinct. He desired that the King and he 
 himself should become more independent and more 
 absolute ; for his ambition was that the power of the 
 crown should have free and unimpaired scope for 
 increase. What he wanted was to destroy heresy in 
 France as a form of political opposition ; and his 
 alliance with the Germans sufficiently shows that he 
 cared less for eradicating it from men's souls. He 
 
 1 Lettres et Papiers cfMat. Letter to the King, 24th July, 1626 ; 
 Memorandum to the King, vol. ii. p. 77-84. 
 
320 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 was impelled by the passion for power rather than 
 by religious fervour ; and more possessed with the 
 desire of being master of the State than by that of 
 holding the guidance of men's consciences. The 
 spirit of the politician, and even of the warrior, was 
 stronger in him than that of the churchman ; and 
 his ambition than his belief. His contemporaries 
 did not judge him as we do ; for their ideas were 
 not ours. Moreover they felt his power too much 
 to measure correctly the extent of his genius ; and 
 they were too much oppressed by his despotism to 
 have been touched by the glory of the despot. 
 Hatred interfered with their admiration. Louis XHI, 
 had he possessed the talents of his minister, and 
 himself governed France as Eichelieu did, would 
 have excited less animadversion ; men would have 
 pardoned a king more readily than his delegate. 
 Such a feeling of respectful goodwill Eichelieu never 
 seems to have cultivated. He was patient, and knew 
 how to bide his time ; moreover, his career was long 
 enough to permit him to wait, but he restrained 
 himself from calculation, to insure the success of 
 his projects, not from any wish to spare others. In 
 positions so delicate as was his towards the Queen- 
 mother, Richelieu's clear and profound judgment 
 told him that, if he did desert the woman who 
 had begun his fortune, he ought to do so without 
 precipitancy. It was his foresight, not his gratitude, 
 which inspired the outward dignity of his conduct. 
 He rarely treated affairs hastily : for haste denotes 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 321 
 
 anxiety, and his theory was that calmness and con- 
 fidence were infallible signs of real force. His 
 judgment on European and French society was 
 decided and correct, though it was all the more 
 difficult to form and to verify, on account of the 
 troubled and changeable state of afiairs. He saw 
 what was to be done at a glance, and he was pitiless 
 in the execution of his will ; the originator of a 
 grand and glorious scheme thinks himself justified 
 in breaking or bending those who resist him. The 
 ambition of Mazarin was perhaps more personal than 
 that of his predecessor. In a narrower sphere of 
 action, he thought more than Eichelieu of his own 
 particular and immediate interests. Those who are 
 impelled and encouraged by their abilities to believe 
 that they are acting right in determining to change 
 the state of the world in which they live, always 
 allege as an excuse to themselves, when they injure 
 nations, the interest of natibnat glory, which their 
 projects cannot fail to serve, and the general well- 
 being which must ensue for mankind. 
 
 The Memoirs of Cardinal Eichelieu — ^written, if 
 not by his own hand, at least, we may believe, on 
 his suggestion — are from their length sometimes 
 monotonous, but they are full of precise facts and 
 of information about all the chief or secondary 
 matters which occupied his government. They do 
 not, like the memoirs of other celebrated men, tell 
 us precisely what was the object of his life, but they 
 allow us to guess it by the whole mass of facts 
 
 Y 
 
^ 
 
 322 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 which they relate. His ideas were elevated rather 
 than generous ; he desired the grandeur of France 
 rather than the happiness of his contemporaries. 
 His ambition, although personal, was not mean : he 
 asked for something more than merely to be himself 
 an eminent personage endowed with wealth and 
 power. -^ Like other great French statesmen, he 
 wished to diminish the power of the Empire. He 
 did not exactly desire to cause a radical change in 
 the possessions of Spain in the north of Italy, so as 
 to deprive her of the Milanese ; but he wished to 
 secure support in the neighbourhood — at Mantua, 
 in Savoy, or in the Italian dependencies of Switzer- 
 land — and thus to counterbalance the Spanish 
 power. He wanted also to acquire the friendship 
 of Holland as a defence against Spain, to encourage 
 those who were dissatisfied with a foreign dominion 
 in the Southern Netherlands. He was anxious to 
 destroy the Eeformation in France, less from any 
 religious sentiment, than because a system of old 
 standing, and which dated from the death of Coligny, 
 threw the Huguenots into the ranks of the oppo- 
 nents of the crown. He desired to eradicate the 
 last vestiges of the spirit of rivalry and of dis- 
 obedience among the nobility, and this is the portion 
 of his policy which he carried out with the most 
 rigour. The life of Kichelieu ; the reserve which he 
 maintained before he acquired the height of power ; 
 
 1 Lettres et Papiers d'Etat, vol. iii. p. 230-232. The refusal of two 
 abbeys. An admirable letter to the King. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 323 
 
 his guarded behaviour towards those who had it in 
 their power to injure him without his being able to 
 retaliate ; his rigour towards such of his personal 
 enemies as he was able to reach; his care not to 
 create new adversaries ; his large views and his 
 minute precautions ; his natural severity ; his in- 
 sensibility, which was more evident when he was 
 menaced, ill, or unfortunate; his anxiety the day 
 after he had shed the blood of an adversary ; the 
 care he took of his dignity at such times when his 
 conduct might compromise him ; the precision which 
 he brought to bear on the execution of an idea 
 which was bold or somewhat immoral, — everything 
 in his career proves the firmness, exactness, and 
 courage of his mind, and the lukewarm character of 
 his feelings. His jealousies were never vulgar or 
 blind ; he was not afraid of employing and favouring 
 men of position, reserving to himself the right of 
 crushing them, if they were rebellious or unfaithful. 
 He removed or sacrificed those who might have 
 ruined his credit, or menaced his life ; not those 
 who could serve him with distinction and even with 
 glory. What is so remarkable in him is the power 
 and resolution of a great intellect, plunging at once 
 calmly and fearlessly into the vast and complicated 
 future of a bold policy ; while he saw with a glance, 
 as comprehensive as it was just, the distance of the 
 goal, and the obstacles on the road. As soon as he 
 had become powerful, he revealed his designs ; he 
 negotiated with the United Provinces, and mani- 
 
 y2 
 
1 
 
 324 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 fested his true sentiments with regard to Spain. 
 What distinguished his genius was, that his audacity- 
 was tempered by rule and by reflection ; the energy 
 of this enterprising spirit, and the activity of this 
 sufiering body, were governed by cool calculation 
 and by reason. The union of qualities which he 
 possessed — his mind at once indomitable and pru- 
 dent, bold and watchful — justly places him very 
 high in the admiration of the world as one among 
 the men who have exercised most influence on the 
 destinies of a great country. 
 
 It is in such terms as these that we may sum up 
 Eichelieus career in connexion with the social 
 movement of his epoch : it was his glory to have 
 appreciated that movement, and to have perceived 
 that the policy which would make the government 
 of France strong in Europe and at home, was not 
 that of the Yalois, always combating, without reso- 
 lution or determination, internal rebellions ; still 
 less was it the system pursued under the Eegency, 
 which, without vigour at home and without ascend- 
 ency abroad, timidly returned to the Spanish alliance. 
 His glory consists in having continued the policy of 
 Henry IV, without however completing it, and in 
 having perceived that, even after that monarch, there 
 still remained some advantages to be gained for 
 royalty in France. He undertook this task in its 
 most complicated and the widest form, in opposition 
 to the Emperor, to Spain, and for a moment to 
 England, in spite of the high nobility, the Hugue- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 325 
 
 nets, the Parliament, and even of the royal family 
 itself. He did not allow himself to be turned aside 
 by the difficult temper of his master, nor by the 
 Spanish intrigues of the Queen-mother, nor yet by 
 the plots of the Duke of Orleans. 
 
 The merit of the policy of Eichelieu most 
 assuredly was not its gentleness, but rather its 
 firmness and consistency. During the whole course 
 of his administration his intentions never varied. 
 He kept the same friends and the same enemies 
 abroad; he defeated the Huguenots in the south 
 and in the west ; ^ and with an interval of ten years 
 he sent Cinq-Mars and Marillac to the scafibld. 
 Death cut him off, like Henry lY, before he had 
 fulfilled his mission. 
 
 The direction of Eichelieu's ideas, and the ten- 
 dency of the epoch, are therefore well defined. 
 Those who were in possession of the governments 
 of Europe were pushed forward by preceding events ; 
 by the great wars of the former century ; and 
 by opposition on the part of those associated with 
 the Eeformation : the moment had now arrived 
 when monarchy as such must advance, or be content 
 to lose ground. 
 
 Such was the current of events and the spirit of 
 the century. Eichelieu, Ferdinand II, and Charles I. 
 were contemporaries, and the ambition of each was 
 identical. "Whether the resistance came from the 
 confederate princes of Germany, from the Parliament 
 
 * Lettres et Papiers d^Matj vol. iii. p. 286, et seq. 
 
326 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 and the Independents of England, or from tlie 
 Huguenots and the nobility of France, the end to 
 be attained was one and the same. 
 
 Eichelieu carried out his idea. He vanquished 
 the different factions, and made it possible to 
 have treaties advantageous to France with the two 
 branches of the House of Spain. He seized the 
 moment for making war, when the Emperor had 
 many enemies to deal with, and when Spain was 
 weakened and still occupied with the Dutch Kevo- 
 lution. In order to obtain a mastery over the two 
 parties in France united against him, he took ad- 
 vantage of favourable circumstances ; when one, 
 that of the past, had reached a point whence it de- 
 clined, and when the other — the party of the future 
 — was still far from the time when it was destined 
 to attain any considerable portion of power. 
 
 The life of Eichelieu, if we look only at the most 
 important acts of his policy and their consequences, 
 particularly if we forget the means which he used, 
 the violences which he committed, as well as the 
 sufferings which he endured, presents, as a whole, an 
 aspect of success at once harmonious and complete. 
 He possessed enormous power, he undertook much 
 that was dilQ&cult, and he succeeded in accomplish- 
 ing his task. He carried out on one hand that which 
 Henry IV. had left unfinished, and on the other 
 that which might pave the way for the great posi- 
 tion of Louis XIV. 
 
 Like Charles V, he died young, worn out by 
 
I 
 
 THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 327 
 
 disease and by anxieties, but be bad an advantage 
 over tbe Emperor : be left a successor wbom be 
 cbose bimself, to complete and perfect bis work. 
 
 Louis XIV. was four years old at tbe deatb of 
 Eicbelieu, and five wben Louis XIII. died. 
 
 Tbere was no transition between tbe two reigns : 
 tbe cbaracter of events cbanged as suddenly as 
 tbat of tbe personages wbo occupied tbe stage. 
 
 Tbe Fronde was tbe conclusion of a struggle. 
 Tbe aristocracy were exbausted, and tbe war bad 
 lost its religious cbaracter. Tbe Parliament occu- 
 pied tbe place of tbe Huguenots in tbe opposition, 
 but tbe Parliamentary army was weak and irreso- 
 lute. Moreover, tbe princes and tbe magistracy bad 
 no feelings in common. Tbe wbole aspect of tbe 
 country was modified ; tbere were no more public 
 executions; Mazarin was not, like Eicbelieu, tbe 
 commander-in-cbief of an army. In lieu of two 
 parties associated and making war togetber against 
 tbe supreme power, tbe opposition comprised nume- 
 rous shades of opinion, eacb bitter, suspicious, and 
 jealous of tbe otber. Tbe Cardinal obtained tbe 
 victory, less by force tban by tbe division and con- 
 fusion wbicb prevailed among bis enemies, and as 
 a consequence of tbe general lassitude and tbe fear 
 of disorder wbicb pervaded all tbose wbo were well 
 off", tbe middle classes, and even tbe magistracy. 
 Tbe bigber nobility still continued to desire tbe same 
 objects. Tbe Parliament, witb its two bundred 
 members and its eigbt presidents, wisbed to become 
 
1 
 
 328 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 a representative power, and to be something more 
 than the mere semblance of a legislative assembly. 
 It relied on the hatred inspired by a minister who 
 was a foreigner, on the sympathy of the population, 
 and on the army it had formed ; but it was divided 
 into small parties, and it was unanimous neither in 
 its sympathies nor in its fears. The most firm 
 among the Parliamentary body were the moderate 
 members. The opinion of the whole of those who 
 had something to lose was in favour of an arrange- 
 ment with the Government. Mazarin had to con- 
 tend against the popularity, the name, and the 
 valour of Condd ; but Turenne, at the battle of 
 Faubourg St. Antoine, commanded the royal army. 
 Thus the great captains of the age were not then 
 both in the same camp. The Parliament was sepa- 
 rated from the princes, and disunion reigned among 
 its members. The middle classes feared the excesses 
 of the people. The Court left Paris and was at 
 Pontoise, at Compiegne, or at St. Germain : but the 
 young King was not unpopular in the capital. 
 When the princes were prisoners at Havre, Mazarin 
 went himself to release them. Everything in this 
 crisis was irregular and incomplete ; there was no 
 resolution or union of the different parties, no defined 
 object, no connexion of events. 
 
 The successor of Eichelieu made his way through 
 all this patiently, and he was never wanting in 
 cleverness and courage. He was right in relying 
 more on the lassitude, the discord, and mutual 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 329 
 
 suspicion of the parties, tlian on the employment of 
 force. He applied the best remedy to the evil — 
 delay. He advanced and he retreated, he gained 
 and he lost ground, but he was never discouraged. 
 He had not the same enemies as Eichelieu to con- 
 tend with, and did not make use of the same 
 weapons. The Fronde was wanting in precision of 
 purpose at its close, as it had been during its whole 
 course, and possibly it was not essential. The \dgour 
 of the resistance was proportionate with that of 
 the attack. Mazarin, in the midst of his enemies, 
 of his fatigues, and even of his changes, appears 
 always to have regarded the events and the chief 
 actors of the Fronde with a feeling of contempt, 
 as if he were certain of obtaining the mastery with- 
 out any precipitation, or any show of impatience. 
 
 Eichelieu s career was thus completed by Maza- 
 rin, for he measured his strength with the party 
 of the princes, and gained the ascendency ; he com- 
 bated the attempts of the Parliament ; he put down 
 the insurrection, and led the King back to Paris in 
 the plenitude of his power. 
 
 He brought to a termination, in a manner still 
 more complete and decisive, the foreign policy of 
 his predecessor with reference to the main point in 
 which that predecessor had failed — the conclusion 
 of a peace. The chief and most important events 
 of the German war turned out favourably for the 
 allies. There was no reason why France should 
 not make peace. The negotiation, however, was 
 
330 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 long and laborious, and the material result of the 
 Treaties of Osnabrtick and Munster was to the ad- 
 vantage of Sweden, of the Protestant princes, and 
 of France. Mazarin did not interfere in the affairs 
 of England, as Kichelieu had done in those of Ger- 
 many. He did not, like the States-General, protest 
 against the condemnation of Charles I. ; and he 
 always treated Cromwell with civility and even 
 with consideration. 
 
 The Treaty of the Pyrenees, which was signed 
 eleven years later than that of Westphalia, after a 
 languid continuance of the war with the Peninsula, 
 resulted in securing a considerable increase of terri- 
 tory to France, and was followed by the marriage 
 of Louis XIV. with an Infanta of Spain. 
 
 The period commencing with the death of Henry 
 IV, and terminating with the Peace of the Pjrrenees, 
 and with the real accession to the throne of Louis 
 XIV, presents a collection of events, regular in its 
 progress, and satisfactory; it logically occupies its 
 place in the course of history, and it is glorious alike 
 to France and to those who guided her policy. 
 
 Thus, during the first half of the seventeenth 
 century, the monarchical power had to contend in 
 three countries against the remains of the feudal 
 system, and against the efforts and premature hopes 
 of the popular party. In the first of the three, Ger- 
 many, the struggle was unsuccessful; for after the 
 Thirty Years' War peace was concluded to the dis- 
 advantage of the Emperor. In France, on the 
 
THE FIEST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 331 
 
 contrary, the royal power became stronger, partly, 
 perhaps, for the very reason that the Empire had 
 lost ground as an absolute and independent power 
 in Germany. 
 
 It still remains for me to say a few words touch- 
 g the grave events which, during the same period, 
 the English monarchy. 
 
 III. 
 
 Charles I. wished to govern his kingdom in the 
 same manner as the kings of France and of Spain, 
 and as the Emperor, his contemporaries, either by 
 themselves or through their ministers, governed, or 
 pretended to govern, their possessions. In thus 
 acting, he altogether misunderstood the spirit of the 
 English people, and he took no account of the differ- 
 ence which the events that had taken place in Eng- 
 land and abroad had caused between that country 
 and the populations on the Continent; he mis- 
 understood the history of the reigns preceding his 
 own, and the movement of ideas that was going on 
 around him. He maintained, on the day of his 
 accession as on the day of his death, that his people 
 ought not to interfere in public affairs. He hoped, 
 if he could not do without the Parliament, at least 
 to find it docile. He committed a grievous error, 
 when he presumed on continuing the mistakes of 
 
332 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the four last reigns ; when he attempted to find in 
 the despotism of Henry VIII, in the passing caprices 
 of Elizabeth, in the vindictive acts of Mary, and the 
 arrogant pedantry of James I, something whereon 
 to support his ideas on the nature of the royal 
 authority. He had not the resource of the conti- 
 nental wars, as in the times of Henry VIII, to 
 distract attention and disquiet the nation, and he 
 lacked the hand of Elizabeth, at once firm and 
 adroit, to guide it. He certainly could not discover 
 an argument or an example for his course in his 
 father's reign. James, who first united the three 
 kingdoms under one sceptre, did not even show the 
 courage and petulant imagination of his mother, nor 
 the proud and violent will of Henry VIII. With 
 talents which were useless, and an inflated style of 
 speech, he had lived without dignity ; for the resist- 
 ance he had ofiered to the Parliament was founded 
 on no motive or conviction, and when he had to 
 give way at last it was with a bad grace. Charles, 
 therefore, was wrong in looking for a model or a 
 justification for his behaviour among his predecessors 
 in England, or among the continental sovereigns. 
 What he ought to have looked to was the actual 
 condition of the country. 
 
 He went beyond even Henry VIII. or Elizabeth 
 in his pretensions to be the absolute head of Eng- 
 land, both in a political and religious sense. His 
 position in itself was not dangerous : abroad, he had 
 made peace with Spain and France ; at home, the 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 333 
 
 party adverse to absolute power, which subsequently 
 was developed and later divided into fractions — 
 a subdivision of which overthrew the throne — did 
 not possess any power at the time of his accession. 
 The Kepublic as such never had any great numerical 
 strength in the kingdom. The events in their very 
 progress created and developed these factions : on 
 ascending the throne, Charles I. had no reason to 
 dread the existence of a Eepublican party. 
 
 The condition of men's minds was such, that it 
 was difficult to dethrone the Stuarts, although they 
 had all misgoverned England, and had professed 
 and openly expressed their contempt for public 
 opinion; and although only one of the family, 
 Charles I, possessed any virtue. This dynasty had 
 in fact rapidly struck deep root in England ; it had 
 met with great sympathy, and had it only under- 
 stood that the royal authority, supported by one 
 fraction of the Established Church, and by the nobles 
 about the Court, was not sufficiently powerful to 
 exercise absolute power, and that some other sup- 
 port was necessary, it might have continued to 
 flourish in the country, which was patient and in- 
 dulgent towards them. England did not rise until 
 Charles I. and James II. showed that they were 
 obstinate and violent in their arbitrary course. 
 
 During, and subsequent to, the reign of Henry 
 VIII, a set of opinions had been developed, which 
 the royal power, leaning for support on the Epis- 
 copacy, and on the mere shadow of a Parliament, 
 
334 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 did not satisfy. These opinions rested, in politics, 
 on priDciples which were considered to be national, 
 and sanctioned by ancient right, and in religion 
 they were mixed up with Nonconformist doctrines. 
 Such doctrines had sprung from, and were inti- 
 mately connected with, the Eeformation, but they 
 went beyond the limits of Anglicanism ; they were 
 by no means incompatible with the monarchy, how- 
 ever, and indeed they never imagined themselves 
 hostile to it ; but they had openly or secretly made 
 their way in the country. The sects whose creeds 
 made up this mass of religious opinions were, or 
 believed themselves when taken separately to be, 
 possessed of fixed ideas ; but the various shades of 
 their political opinions were very vague. In spite, 
 however, of the diversity of their origin, and the 
 germs of division existing among them, and which 
 afterwards broke out during the agitation of the 
 times, they were unanimous in demanding the pre- 
 ponderance of a House of Commons by the side of 
 the throne, and liberty of worship by the side of the 
 Episcopacy. 
 
 Charles I. never recognised the existence of these 
 convictions among a large part of the English 
 public, nor yet the necessity of coming to a com- 
 promise with them. It must be added likewise that 
 the Church party, which ought to have counted for 
 much in the power of the crown, and which should 
 have afforded it considerable support, was not com" 
 pletely united. There existed in the Anglican 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 335 
 
 Church certain men with strong convictions and 
 unshaken confidence ; but there existed also certain 
 complaisant members, who, above all, recognised in 
 the ecclesiastical establishment the merit of being 
 useful to the throne ; there were, moreover, certain 
 scrupulous members, who wished the Church to 
 remain in her own proper sphere outside of politics 
 and of the government. These delicate distinctions, 
 existing in one and the same body, escaped the 
 attention of the King more completely perhaps than 
 the marks which characterised those who were 
 further advanced in their views. 
 
 Charles I, with pure intentions, with courage, with 
 strong feelings, and much intelligence, qualities 
 which might have been usefully applied to subjects 
 other than politics, took a false view of all the 
 various and most painful positions in which he 
 found himself during the twenty-four years that 
 elapsed between his accession and his death. 
 
 He counted on the social movement which was at 
 work in the continental states, and which there 
 strengthened the monarchical power, — on the sym- 
 pathy of the United Provinces, which he believed 
 were destined, after their definitive separation from 
 Spain, to become an English possession, — on a large 
 royalist party in England, on the Church, and on 
 the sentiment which ought to have induced the 
 Catholics of England and of Ireland to prefer the 
 ecclesiastical supremacy of the crown to any other 
 religious hierarchy outside of the Church of Kome. 
 
336 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 All these calculations were false or exaggerated. 
 The Church and the royalist party did indeed sup- 
 port him, but without any lasting success, — the 
 Catholics failed to afford . him any efficacious aid, — 
 the United Provinces had no desire, at that time, to 
 belong to England, — and Cardinal Eichelieu did 
 Charles 1. very ill service in that he misled him by 
 a false analogy, and appeared to show him the way 
 in which attempts to obtain liberty were treated in 
 France, thus implying that the ideas of the English 
 Parhamentary party were a reminiscence of bygone 
 days, or that they menaced the country with anarchy 
 and revolution. 
 
 According to the progress of events, when the 
 opposition became more decided, and various posi- 
 tions of affairs succeeded each other, the King be- 
 came more and more embarrassed, and passed from 
 the hands of one minister into those of another — 
 from Buckingham to Strafford, and from Strafford 
 to Falkland. He convoked Parliaments, to ask from 
 them what they were sure to refuse — to propose 
 taxes, or loans which he afterwards raised^ on his 
 own authority — to bring the obstinacy of his own 
 royal pretensions face to face with their opposition 
 — and finally to dissolve Parliament. Charles did 
 not always resist; but the alternation between insuf- 
 ficient concessions and useless resistance only made 
 his conduct appear the more wavering and incon- 
 stant. After having insisted on their right of voting 
 the taxes, Parliament demanded the command of 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 337 
 
 the militia. It little availed the King that during 
 the discussion he showed his patience and the re- 
 sources of his mind — that he changed his minister, 
 replacing Buckingham by Strafford — that as an 
 evidence of his selfishness and weakness he sacri- 
 ficed the life of the latter — that he placed Falkland 
 at the head of the cabinet — that he arrested the 
 members and then released them. In spite of all, 
 the party of the opposition increased ; the moderate 
 party became more violent ; ardent chiefs sprang 
 up, and new parties were formed out of the more 
 irritable elements of the old ones. Thus in the end 
 the Parliament became more hostile, and the Govern- 
 ment more arbitrary. The opportunities for arrest- 
 ing the movement on some conditions which could 
 be accepted — the same, in fact, which, half a century 
 later, were adopted by the Revolution — were suc- 
 cessively lost. The Parliamentary power advanced 
 in a direction adverse to the very existence of the 
 monarchy ; so that after several years of irresolution, 
 during which Charles I. might have saved his crown 
 with dignity, and after two years of more bitter 
 strife, at the end of w^hich the majority of the Par- 
 liament had not openly broken with the King, the 
 occurrence of certain violent acts caused the civil 
 war to burst out. 
 
 The Presbyterian party, which began and con- 
 tributed to close the first English revolution, exer- 
 cised great power in the early Parliaments of 
 Charles I, and in the Long Parliament. Its members 
 
 z 
 
338 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 were numerous in England and in Scotland, and, 
 like all those who commence revolutions, they held 
 doctrines of a negative character. They desired 
 neither the supremacy of the bishops nor an abso- 
 lute monarchy ; but they bore no hatred towards 
 the crown ; they were wanting in organization, and, 
 when the Eevolution was completed, the Presby- 
 terian party was in fact revolutionary as against the 
 bishops, and monarchical as against the republican 
 opinion. Whether he liked it or not, Charles could 
 maintain his government only on the condition of 
 making his political existence compatible with the 
 views of the Presbyterians. It would have been 
 politically prudent to concede to them from the very 
 first that which his conscience permitted, and which 
 force compelled him in the end to yield. Later, 
 he sacrificed to the Presbyterians — who were then 
 carried away by a whirlwind of events which they 
 could no longer control — a portion of the preroga- 
 tives of the crown and of the authority of the 
 episcopacy. By conceding early in the day to the 
 Presbyterians some of their demands — at the ex- 
 pense not of his religious convictions, but of his 
 political pride — it is possible that Charles might 
 have saved at the same time the more precious and 
 useful rights of his crown, and have saved, if not 
 the privileged existence, at least the independence 
 of the Anglican Church. As it was, he committed 
 the grave mistake into which almost all powers 
 which are attacked, and which stand on the defen- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 339 
 
 sive, fall, and are destroyed — that of not knowing 
 how to sow dissension in the ranks of their 
 adversaries. 
 
 The memory of Charles I. is not an odious one in 
 history. His character lacked depth ; he was trifling 
 and obstinate ; under a grave and calm exterior, he 
 was at the same time frivolous and stiff". He liked 
 an easy-going government, such as should give 
 apparent satisfaction without entailing any fatigue, 
 and allow the luxury of a court with all the pleasures 
 of power. His system of government was more 
 honest and austere than that of Buckingham, but 
 it was not more enlightened. The adulation with 
 which his youth had been surrounded had made 
 him unconsciously haughty, over-confident in him- 
 self, scornful, and by no means sincere ; it had 
 encouraged him in the proud attempt to resist the 
 wishes of his country, whilst he was ignorant both 
 of the difficulties and the perils which beset him. 
 He supported Strafford without scruple or discretion, 
 and he abandoned him at the last moment. He 
 made useless promises to Cromwell, whose ambition 
 he could satisfy only by his own disappearance from 
 the scene. Nevertheless, Charles I. was courageous, 
 moral, patient, and gentle even in his obstinacy. 
 He showed great resignation in his misfortunes, and 
 great calmness before his judges ; when the soldiers 
 came to take him, he was quietly finishing his game 
 of chess. His belief in the truth of his principles 
 was such that he was indifferent to the ill-will of 
 
 z 2 
 
340 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the people. We cannot surmise whether, while re- 
 maining so long faithful to his ideas, he foresaw the 
 misfortunes in store for him. He gave way more 
 than once ; but he ceded too little, and too late. 
 Sir Philip Warwick says of him, in his Memoirs, 
 that he would have been a great man, had he shown 
 as much activity and courage in avoiding danger as 
 he manifested firmness and resignation when the 
 danger was inevitable. He suffered much in his 
 pride as a king, and in his family and life as a 
 private individual. There are many actions of his 
 which history would rather attribute to the severity 
 of his conscience than to the infatuation of his 
 mind ; and the contrast of his character with that 
 of the three other members of the Stuart race who 
 occupied the English throne makes him appear to 
 more advantage, so that we are disposed to show 
 some indulgence to a prince who was punished with 
 the utmost rigour for having misunderstood the 
 temper of his times, and having treated the opinions 
 of men with contempt. 
 
 Events made no rapid progress, and the Eevo- 
 lution was accomplished with difficulty. The King 
 had committed many faults ; more than once he 
 had missed opportunities for calming men's minds ; 
 more than once he had repelled the advances of the 
 moderate party in the Parliament ; and in his nego- 
 tiations he had shown that he was endowed with a 
 capacity for argument greater than his foresight. 
 For example, he had given way on the right of the 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 341 
 
 bishops to vote in the House of Lords ; Strafford 
 had been delivered into the hands of his enemies — 
 a sacrifice which ought to have been made — not 
 after every other — but under no circumstances what- 
 ever ; the Scotch Covenanters had obtained certaiu 
 concessions affecting the Anglican liturgy and episco-r 
 pacy, which had been refused to the English : this 
 had been done under the absurd belief that the 
 crown would find in Scotland, among the enemies 
 of the Church, a support against the enemies of that 
 very same Church in England. When he left London, 
 the King, although he denied any such intention, 
 had already made manifest his determination to 
 meet the opposition in the field. He had brought 
 about the split with the Parliament, after having 
 summoned five Houses of Commons in succession ; 
 on one occasion, after a very long interval. The 
 House of Commons had tried its strength in the 
 country, and had done some acts which marked its 
 sovereign character ; as, for instance, when it declared 
 that its members could be arrested only with the 
 assent of the House. All these mistakes had beeij 
 made, and both sides were thus committed ; it was 
 the second year of that Long Parliament which, by 
 successive processes of purging itself, and by adopt- 
 ing one violent measure after another, was destined to 
 traverse the whole Eevolution. The chief opponents 
 of the monarchy had shown themselves ; the House 
 of Commons had become acquainted with CromwelFs 
 coarse face and strong eloquence ; Fairfax had 
 
342 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 appeared on the scene ; many men felt them- 
 selves carried away much further than they had 
 at first intended ; and many hatreds had been 
 manifested. In spite of all this, even at this ad- 
 vanced epoch of the crisis, — in spite of the in- 
 creasing ambitions of men, and the provocations 
 that were bandied from one party to the other, — 
 the throne could still have been saved, and the 
 Eevolution stayed. 
 
 The King seemed not to wish it. He might have 
 turned to his own profit, not only the divisions of 
 the Episcopal party in order to repress the abuses of 
 the Anglican Church, but also the political divisions 
 which were so profound in the Parliament, even 
 after he broke with them. He might have taken 
 advantage of the feeling of the City of London, 
 which was then by no means revolutionary, and of 
 the small amount of confidence which existed in a 
 large fraction of the House of Commons owing to its 
 dread of the Koyalist party and of the army ; and 
 lastly, of the reaction which was ready to break 
 forth at the time when his departure had aroused 
 and reunited the Royalist party. The first votes 
 in the Commons after his departure sufficiently 
 prove that the moderate minority was still consi- 
 derable in the House. By accepting Falkland as 
 Minister, and Hampden as the head of the Oppo- 
 sition, he might possibly have saved his crown 
 and his life. But he then thought that civil war 
 would stand him in better stead than a compro- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. SAS 
 
 mise with Parliament, and he made ready for it. 
 This was a considerable mistake, for it was the 
 war which brought about the final catastrophe. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Ee volution in England passed through four 
 principal phases : first, the struggle between the 
 King and the Parliament, which we have just dis- 
 cussed; secondly, the Civil War, or the struggle 
 between the Royalist and the Parliamentary armies ; 
 thirdly, the Commonwealth • and, in the last place, 
 the military government of the Protector. 
 
 The second phase was occupied by the Civil War, 
 and lasted seven years, from the battle of Edgehill 
 to the death of Charles I. ; in it the Parliament 
 retained an existence of its own and a nominal pre- 
 ponderance ; but it was the army which in fact 
 governed. The violence of the military leaders, and 
 the victories which they won, gave them the real 
 authority. The Parliament sat and negotiated with 
 the King ; the Presbyterian majority maintained its 
 position and even strengthened its ranks, after the 
 Parliamentary Royalists, for their part, went to join 
 the King at Oxford ; and the Independents — that is 
 to say, the extreme party — subsequently passed over 
 to the head-quarters of the army. During all this 
 time the junction of the Presbyterians with Charles I. 
 was within the range of possibility. It depended 
 
344 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 on them and on him to come to some under- 
 standing. 
 
 The Presbyterians had no greater desire than had 
 the King for the Eevolution, and they were right, 
 because it was destined to crush them. The most 
 intelligent leaders of the militar}^ party, Cromwell 
 himself among the number, frequently dreaded, 
 during these years of warfare, to see Charles I. and 
 the majority of the Parliament come to an amicable 
 arrangement. This, however, did not take place ; 
 and thus by this want of agreement between the 
 Crown and the Parliamentary party, Cromwell was 
 enabled to dismiss the Parliament when it was in 
 his way, and to send Charles to the scaffold, when 
 the most advanced party in the army required it 
 of him. 
 
 The Presbyterians were always undecided, and 
 the King was blind. His judgment was more defi- 
 cient even than that of the Parliamentary party. 
 
 The war, on which Charles I. had placed all his 
 hopes, went against him. After having caused the 
 failure of the measures for a compromise with the 
 Parliamentary party, he committed the second fault 
 of not surmising that the Parliamentary army would 
 produce leaders who would be more in accordance 
 with the ideas of the country than the leaders of 
 the Royal army could be. All the great battles, 
 Marston Moor, Newbury, Naseby, were gained by 
 his adversaries. Cromwell, Fairfax, and Lord Man- 
 chester (especially the first of the three) were doubt- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH KE VOLUTION. 345 
 
 less better generals than Prince Eupert or the Duke 
 of Newcastle. The army, over which the majority 
 of the House of Commons had but little control, 
 was not strong at the beginning ; but it received 
 from the country contributions which enabled it to 
 take the field, and from Cromwell an organization 
 which made it victorious. " How can you expect," 
 said Cromwell, at the beginning of the war, " that 
 this cavalry, levied from men of the people, should 
 be as good as the King's, raised from the nobility ? '' 
 He levied fourteen squadrons from among the 
 yeomanry, who formed an excellent, intrepid, and 
 well- disciplined corps, and who shared his fanati- 
 cism. He was the head and the soul of the army, 
 as he was the leading spirit of the Eevolution. 
 
 Of the three great parties who divided the 
 country during the Civil War, — viz. the Eoyalists, 
 the Presbyterians, and the Independents, — it was 
 the last which eventually mastered the two others, 
 and brought about the fall of the monarchy. The 
 numerical force of violent parties is not the main 
 point to be looked to in the history of great social 
 revolutions. 
 
 The Independents gained the day, because they 
 had in Cromwell an able and energetic leader ; but 
 left to themselves they would never have attained 
 to such a height of power, nor to such success. The 
 basis of their religion was absolute liberty, the 
 utmost freedom of discussion of all theories, with 
 the absence of all obligatory dogmas, and of all 
 
346 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 hierarchies ; if there was nothing more novel in its 
 spirit, neither was there anything less definite. There 
 waB with them room for every one, and for every 
 sect ; a national Church was useless — no one could 
 think he was excluded. Every assemblage of men 
 formed for the purpose of adoring the Deity was a 
 Church. The vagueness of their ideas, tolerant 
 beyond measure in theory, from the total absence of 
 limits, went almost beyond Christianity itself, and 
 it was associated with extreme and arbitrary violence 
 in action. Lilburne, and Milton, and the men who 
 were the best known and the most advanced of the 
 party, would never have ensured its success had 
 they not been backed by Cromwell, who turned 
 their zeal to account for the advancement of his 
 worldly interests, without finding anything to shock 
 him in the novelty and the elasticity of their 
 doctrines. 
 
 That which Cromwell dreaded more than once 
 during the course of the war — the union of the 
 Eoyalists with one of the other two parties — never 
 took effect : Charles I, until the very day of his 
 trial, laboured under the illusion that it was open 
 to him to choose between the two parties ; he be- 
 lieved it to be impossible for either the Presbyterians 
 or the Independents to obtain the mastery without 
 his aid. If the King felt himself depressed during 
 the first period of the existence of the Long Parlia- 
 ment, joy and courage took possession of him every 
 time the progress of the Eevolution encountered one 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH llEVOLUTION. 347 
 
 of those obstacles which seem to thwart revolutions, 
 but which are overthrown by them without diffi- 
 culty and without remorse. He thought his victory 
 secure after the first operations and the first suc- 
 cesses of Montrose, and the first time that the 
 members of the House of Lords who had remained 
 in London were in open disagreement with the 
 House of Commons. He conceived great hopes 
 when the Earl of Essex, the first general of the Par- 
 liamentary army, was distanced in the race by 
 the new leaders of the party, and fell into disgrace. 
 Again he made sure of success when Catholic Ireland 
 rose, and when the political victory gained by the 
 Independents in London caused an anti-revolutionary 
 riot to break out in the City, which he believed 
 would prove decisive. After having long held the 
 conviction that it only depended on him to treat with 
 the Presbyterians — which was true, but under con- 
 ditions which he never consented to accept — he 
 wished to enter into negotiations with the leaders 
 of the Independents, feeling sure with their aid of 
 dealing with the Presbyterians, who had never been 
 willing to submit. 
 
 Such is ever the fate of revolutions. The violent 
 parties, which decide matters, are governed by the 
 energy of several chiefs, or by one man, whereas those 
 in authority and the moderate men remain unde- 
 cided, shrink from a sacrifice, live on in a state of 
 illusion, forget that time presses, and can neither 
 foresee nor measure their danger nor combine to 
 
348 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 meet it. They are irritated by the ambition of the 
 popular leaders, and they fail to see that such 
 ambition is for the moment in harmony with the 
 feeling of the general mass. They think that they 
 are struggling against men whose character and pas- 
 sions they detest, whilst they are in reality contend- 
 ing with dangerous and powerful ideas, which are 
 called forth by the spirit of revolutionary turbulency, 
 and propagated by agitation. At the commence- 
 ment of the crisis the Independent party did not 
 exist. It was formed out of the most factious 
 portion of the Presbyterian party, and it soon took 
 the lead. To cede something to the Presbyterians 
 — to admit the right of the House to vote taxes 
 and loans — to renounce monopolies — to beware of 
 treating Ireland as an ally, because she was the 
 religious adversary of the Nonconformists — to defend 
 the Church in all that was not a privilege or an 
 abuse — and thus to obtain the support of a portion 
 of the Presbyterians, considerable enough to make 
 a large breach in their party — such was the conduct 
 which the King and the moderate opposition ought 
 to have followed. But the Presbyterians did not 
 lend themselves to this course ; nor was it more in 
 accordance with the wishes of Charles himself If, 
 as I have already said, both before and during the 
 course of the Civil War, the King felt justified in 
 his resistance and in his hopes every time that an 
 incident, however unimportant, arrested for an 
 instant the onward march of events, the Presby- 
 
"^-^ OP TUB ^ 
 
 THE FIRST ENGLISH REV0LUTI0?^i^Z?i^'O*S\^ 
 
 terians on their side allowed themselves, during 
 the same period, to be deceived by the same illu- 
 sions. More than once they believed that London 
 was in greater danger of an attack by the royal 
 army than they were themselves from the soldiers 
 of Cromwell and of Fairfax; they expected the 
 King, after the capture of Leicester, would march 
 on the capital, never supposing that they were on 
 the eve of the battle of Naseby, that great event 
 which was the principal cause of the fall of Montrose. 
 They thought that Cromwell would be intimidated 
 by their numbers in the House, and that the speeches 
 he addressed to his soldiers, and the efforts he 
 promised to make to calm them, were dictated by 
 the danger of his own situation. The day they re- 
 solved to take away the command of the army from 
 the Lidependents, and to entrust it to a Presbyterian 
 Committee, they imagined they had accomplished an 
 important act; and when Cromwell protested for 
 two hours in the House on his knees, with incon- 
 ceivable vehemence and passion, that he would never 
 encroach upon the privileges of Parliament, the 
 House did not know the moment was so near when 
 Cromwell would order in his soldiers, expel the 
 members, and close their doors. The Presbyterians 
 did not take advantage of the apprehension, which 
 long haunted Cromwell, of seeing them make terms 
 with the King. They were persuaded that there 
 would always be sufficient time to treat, just as 
 Charles L to the last held all negotiations in abey- 
 
1 
 
 350 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 ance, because he continued to believe that both 
 parties had need of him, even when he was the 
 prisoner of one of the two ; and that at any moment 
 it would be open to him to treat with whichever 
 he chose. 
 
 In the midst of the vacillation of the King and 
 of the Presbyterian party, Cromwell formed his 
 judgment of the posture of affairs without scruples, 
 pity, or conscience indeed, but with imperturbable 
 good sense. He showed no useless or premature 
 impatience. He had confidence in the success of 
 his arms and in the prestige of victory. He did 
 not allow himself, like Essex, to be carried away by 
 the ardour of his troops and by the sentiment of 
 the country. The possibility of an arrangement 
 between the King and a portion of the Parliament, 
 or of the unexpected presence of Charles in London, 
 and the first successes of Montrose, excited his atten- 
 tion indeed, and occasionally caused him disquietude. 
 He watched the feelings of the Continent with regard 
 to the King of England, as he watched the move- 
 ments of the different parties at home. When the 
 Presbyterians appeared to be recovering their 
 strength, and when, after the expulsion of their 
 officers by the army, the Parliament transferred the 
 command from the Independents to a Presbyterian 
 Committee, Cromwell ordered the advance of the 
 troops towards London, and the seizure of the King's 
 person by a military detachment. When the violent 
 proceedings of the Roundheads, the preponderance 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 351 
 
 of the Independents, and the general alarm called 
 forth Eoyalist manifestations in the city and in the 
 country, he ordered Fairfax's regiments to enter 
 London, and thus performed, after the arrest of 
 Charles I, the second dictatorial act, which was a 
 presage of the impending expulsion of the Parlia- 
 ment and of the ultimate fate of royalty. At the 
 time when he resolved to sacrifice the King, it was 
 not that his hatred was more bitter or his anger 
 greater, but he looked on his own position as a 
 dangerous one. Men of note in the country were 
 one after the other falling away from him, and 
 leaving the field open to a class which he had him- 
 self at first regarded as unfit to form the army. 
 Eoyalist insurrections were breaking out in every 
 direction, and armed partisans were spreading all 
 over the land. The western part of the kingdom, 
 where Charles I. had always found most support, 
 was in arms, and needed prompt repression — a task 
 which Cromwell desired to undertake in person. 
 Charles I. had shown a desire to make advances to 
 the Independents, and to attempt with them, on a 
 basis vaguely defined as regards religion, and dif- 
 ficult to discover as regards politics, the pacification 
 of the country. Somewhat later a Scotch corps had 
 advanced into England, and the Scotch had become 
 reactionists ; while the revolutionary army was 
 divided, and gave its chief reason to fear that a 
 military party, united with the Presbyterians and 
 the King, might turn against him. Union among 
 
352 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 his troops was, in Crom well's eyes, the first neces- 
 sity ; and it was when a party in his army more 
 violent and more impatient than himself desired the 
 death of the King, that he resolved to bring the 
 matter to a close. 
 
 This revolution was accomplished slowly, and not 
 without difficulty. Charles I. and his partisans were 
 full of illusions, and the Presbyterians were irre- 
 solute ; Cromwell alone — far more than his party, 
 which threatened at every instant to split into 
 factions — far more than his generals — showed him- 
 self in his pitiless ambition to be consistent with 
 himself and with the facts of the case ; he alone dis- 
 played that mixture of good sense and of passion 
 which gained him his bloody triumph. Without 
 him, as the King in this instance rightly supposed, 
 the Independents would have been divided and 
 destroyed. Who would have gained by it ? Revo- 
 lutions generally succeed by violence; it is not 
 therefore given to us to guess or to say what would 
 have happened had the energy of those who were 
 deterred by no scruples fallen to the lot of honest 
 and moderate men of the other party. A sect like 
 the Puritans, for instance, is an embarrassment both 
 to those who make use of them and to their oppo- 
 nents. They were made to hamper, and to sow 
 dissension among, the violent factions with which 
 their zeal connected them. But if Cromwell, who 
 may have been a sectarian by conviction in his 
 youth, borrowed the language of fanatics in his 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 353 
 
 religious discourses, his policy, subtle and prudent 
 as it had just before been violent, was far removed 
 from the sincere abstraction from the world, the 
 fervent belief and the stoicism, of the Puritans. The 
 gloomy devotion to a cause ; the austere pride, in- 
 flexible as that of despotism ; the resignation to 
 suffering which was required of others, as well as 
 self-inflicted ; the pursuit of the triumph of truth, as 
 an object prior and preferable to that of pleasure in 
 this life ; the love of poverty, conflict, and fatigue, — 
 all these means of exercising dominion over others 
 may have been at certain moments mere auxiliaries 
 to an ambitious policy, which, in its foresight, turns 
 to its own purposes fanaticism of every kind, and 
 takes the colour of each in succession, rather than 
 irritate its jealousy by opposition. 
 
 Cromwell made no mistake as to his enemies or 
 as to any possible alliances, whether they were last- 
 ing or temporary ; his judgment was profound and 
 true ; he neither mistook his own power, nor that 
 of the various parties, nor yet that of the King. 
 In proceeding to the arrest of Charles I, he made 
 known to the whole world what price he attached to 
 the possession of the royal person, and what danger 
 there was in still permitting the King to be free. 
 Nevertheless, the successes achieved by the royal 
 army had been but fleeting, and the King himself 
 had never negotiated with the Parliamentary body 
 but to reject, as a matter of course, all their over- 
 tures. Varying circumstances, ill-fortune, danger, 
 
 A A 
 
^ 
 
 354 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 his wandering life, his captivity, and the near ap- 
 proach of death, did not call forth any new qualities 
 in Charles I. If it is difficult to determine the 
 moment when his last illusion was dispelled, we 
 may safely affirm that it came very late. His 
 haughty spirit, his mind vacillating in its liopes and 
 fears, but unyielding in its determination from 
 dignity and pride; his frivolous judgment, some- 
 times forgetful of truth ; the sudden and energetic 
 starts in him of a sense of honour — all this under- 
 went no change from the action of time or the 
 changes of fortune. Young or middle aged, on the 
 throne or before his judges, in Windsor Castle or 
 a wanderer from town to town, defended by the 
 soldiers of Montrose or betrayed by the Scotch 
 Covenanters, the King ever remained the same man, 
 whose character will account for his adventures, 
 and whose imprudence, though it did not deserve 
 them, yet caused his misfortunes ; he is always the 
 man, who believed himself saved when, after losing 
 a great battle, he took a small .town ; who thought 
 little of the warnings of public opinion, and that 
 the cause of the English crown gained much by 
 the success of the French monarch over the various 
 parties. That cause, as understood by Charles I, 
 was indefensible. Had the Established Church, 
 which was not unanimous in its political views, and 
 the Koyalists, who were far from comprising the 
 whole gentry of England, been led by a more en- 
 lightened chief — even then they would not have had 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 355 
 
 sufficient power to govern the country and to resist 
 tlie combined efforts of the political factions opposed 
 to absolute monarchy, or of the religious sects which 
 had separated from the Church. 
 
 The experiment made in vain by Charles I. was 
 conclusive as to the fate of the English monarchy. 
 Neither of his two sons were capable of securing for 
 the crown that which Charles I. had aimed at for 
 himself and for it : Charles II. was too indifferent 
 and too frivolous to pursue this object with the per- 
 severance of his father, and James II, with other 
 means, and under the influence of other ideas, made 
 the attempt only to atone for it by a different 
 penalty. On the whole we are inclined to think 
 that James 11. paid for his faults by his exile more 
 justly than Charles I. by his head. 
 
 The fate of royalty in England, as decided by the 
 events of the first half of the seventeenth century — 
 those which preceded the death of Charles I. — offers 
 too striking a contrast with that of the French and 
 German monarchies to need any remark. 
 
 After eleven years of a Eepublican rule, and of 
 a mixed government in which all power was concen- 
 trated in the hands of a single man, the kingly 
 power in England, thus fallen, was restored. Twenty- 
 
 A A 2 
 
1 
 
 356 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 eight years later it fell a second time as a victim to 
 its own violent acts, and gave place to the settled 
 and recognised system of a constitutional sovereign 
 and two Houses of Parliament. Everything that 
 took place from the accession of Charles I. to the 
 fall of James II. — the dissensions of the former with 
 his Parliament ; the transient military epoch of the 
 Civil War ; the establishment and maintenance, 
 difficult at first, and at last impossible, of a Kepub- 
 lican government — everything that characterised 
 and filled the intervening period — the personal 
 domination of the two Cromwells, the father a 
 man of so powerful a character, the son by nature 
 so weak ; again, later, the Kestoration, the corrupt 
 government, the hand-to-mouth policy, without 
 grandeur and without violence, of Charles 11. ; and 
 finally, the events of the second Kevolution ; the 
 general insurrection of the country provoked by the 
 imprudence, the blindness, and the tyranny of James 
 II. — these different attempts made by hands, some 
 of which were strong and some weak, and by minds 
 of different calibre, lead at last to a striking and 
 easy conclusion, which is in keeping with the history 
 of the England of the past as it is with the history 
 of modern times. This conclusion is, that the 
 country, which had come to its senses for some 
 time, was right in its decided wishes, and in the 
 guiding principles of its conduct ; it had been led 
 away by impulse and by passion; it had made 
 various experiments and had occasionally mistrusted 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 357 
 
 itself; but, just as it did not choose to submit to 
 an absolute monarch, so England did not, except 
 for one instant, believe itself capable of existing as 
 a Eepublic. 
 
 Thus the attempt made by Charles I. was in 
 vain ; the Eepublic and the Protectorate were acci- 
 dents due — the first, to the disagTeement between 
 parties, which, in spite of their political and religious 
 dissensions, were exclusively in favour of a monarchy 
 — the second, to the opportune presence and to the 
 extraordinary capacity of one man. 
 
 It cannot be denied that Cromwell, though he had 
 not the benefit of the same experience as ourselves 
 as derived from the history of the English Eevo- 
 lution, from the reigns of Charles 11. and James II, 
 and from the second Eestoration, nevertheless judged 
 the spirit of the country correctly; he, who first 
 instituted the Commonwealth as a means to over- 
 throw Charles I, and then put it aside in order to 
 seize upon the power himself, saw that England 
 desired the government of one man with the assist- 
 ance of Parliament. His most difiuse speeches, his 
 most characteristic acts, his determination to behead 
 the King, his hesitation in putting the crown on 
 his own brow — all indicate that he thought he 
 could abolish absolute monarchy and destroy the 
 Eepublican constitution — that he could be revolu- 
 tionary in his proceedings against despotism, and 
 conservative as against the Commonwealth, without 
 overthrowing his own power. 
 
358 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth disap- 
 peared to make way for the Protectorate. Attacked 
 and undermined by the Koyalist party, Parliament 
 contributed to its own ruin by refusing to vote 
 supplies for the army, although it had concurred 
 in voting for war against the United Provinces. 
 If its fall may be attributed to the mistake it 
 thus made in thwarting the army, or to the 
 ability of Cromwell, a stronger and more simple 
 reason may be pointed out — the want of any strong 
 Eepublican spirit in the nation. The English Ke- 
 public, which was four months before it forced the 
 city to acknowledge its existence, never was firmly 
 established. Thousands among the clergy refused to 
 take the oaths to it. It was in vain that it pursued 
 and punished conspirators, that it established the 
 electoral franchise on a wide basis, with the payment 
 of poor-rates as a qualification, and deprived its 
 adversaries of the right of voting ; it was in vain 
 that it possessed Cromwell as its general, or that 
 he triumphed over the Irish insurrection, and beat 
 the Scotch at Dunbar and the Pretender at Wor- 
 cester; it was in vain that, during the war with the 
 United Provinces, the Commonwealth out of five 
 battles gained three victories under Admiral Blake, 
 and announced its intention to seize Holland; it 
 was in vain it defeated the Scotch Eoyalists and 
 executed the noble and heroic Montrose, that it 
 maintained the struggle against the Cavaliers and 
 against the Levellers. The Commonwealth fear- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 359 
 
 lessly repelled the movements made by Mazarin ; it 
 annoyed and tlien dismissed tlie French envoy, and 
 alarmed France, already occupied with her internal 
 difficulties, with the chimerical idea that the English 
 fleet would have no difficulty in landing an in- 
 vading army on her coast. In spite of all efibrts, 
 however, its existence was always insecure ; for it 
 had at one and the same time as enemies Ireland, 
 Catholic and persecuted, Presbyterian Scotland, the 
 Independent army, the Levellers, the Cavaliers, and 
 the English Church, tampered and oppressed as it 
 was. Cromwell was no longer young at the time 
 when the Commonwealth was struggling against 
 these embarrassments, and he might well have been 
 impatient. Nevertheless, he did not hinder the Par- 
 liament from reducing the subsidies for the army, 
 which in fact, and contrary to the opinion of the 
 majority, contributed to precipitate the end of its 
 existence ; he, the man who relied on the support of 
 the army, even thought it well to encourage hypo- 
 critically this false step. The Parliament, when it 
 fell, was decrepit, crippled, and unpopular ; and the 
 soldiers who invaded the House to drive out the 
 members met with no great resistance ; in fact, 
 Cromwell might perfectly have spared himself the 
 trouble of making the speech he did, confused at the 
 beginning and violent towards the close, in which 
 he at first affected embarrassment, and ended with 
 a sneer, and by which he signified to the Parliament 
 that its existence was at an end. 
 
r 
 
 360 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 There is also this remark to be made : the English 
 Revolution, which during its first years was a state of 
 political disturbance, and then a civil war, and which 
 having had recourse to the guilt of regicide, even- 
 tually failed in the attempt to form a Republic, had 
 not during the whole of its course any important 
 bearing on general events in Europe. It would 
 appear as if its progress never was a subject of 
 grave disquietude, or lively curiosity, or speculation 
 on the Continent. What was done in England after- 
 wards produced a louder echo on the other side of 
 the Channel, and ideas which arose in that country 
 were then destined to cross the Straits. England 
 during the Protectorate, during the Restoration, and 
 during the second Revolution, was much more mixed 
 up with the affairs of Europe than the England of 
 Charles I. or of the Commonwealth. Richelieu died 
 at the beginning of the war between the King and 
 the Parliament; and the policy of Mazarin, suffi- 
 ciently occupied in France, was not seriously dis- 
 turbed by those civil dissensions, or by the fall of 
 the English crown ; while the naval war between 
 the English and Dutch republics did not extend 
 beyond the limits of their own seas. 
 
 When the Parliament of the Commonwealth was 
 dissolved, the Royalist party, which eight years later 
 brought about the Restoration, was numerous in 
 England ; but the Restoration was not then possible. 
 The political shock had been too severe ; the con- 
 stant indecision of Charles I. had been too dis- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 361 
 
 couraging for many friends of the monarchy ; the 
 Royalists were too scattered ; and the future fate of 
 the government and institutions, with an unknown 
 king who had passed long years in exile, seemed 
 too uncertain. 
 
 The Protectorate, therefore, was an inevitable 
 incident between the Commonwealth and the Re- 
 storation, and the superior intelligence of one man 
 made it a vigorous and powerful government. 
 
 In a false position, surrounded by adversaries, 
 neither seconded by efficient auxiliaries, nor favoured 
 by the prestige of high birth, Cromwell — the reso- 
 lute and patient author of his own fortune — held 
 that absolute power which Charles I. in vain tried to 
 found. Cromwell governed England with energy, 
 and during most of the time with a Parliament, 
 which was, as he wished it to be, his accomplice, not 
 his rival ; for the members obtained their admission 
 into the House only after approval by the council of 
 the Protector. In dealing with parties at home 
 Cromwell acted with great circumspection towards 
 the hostile Republicans, but knowing well what he 
 was about he was merciless in his policy towards 
 the Royalists. Neither his conscience nor his scruples 
 interfered with the position which he had to take 
 up between the Royalists and the Levellers. Under 
 a coarse exterior, and with bad taste no doubt, he 
 was a general, a diplomatist, a great statesman, and 
 a parliamentary orator. His foreign policy was 
 framed with as much firmness as care. He was 
 
T 
 
 362 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 suf&ciently powerful and sufficiently enlightened to 
 choose his alliances ; he was able to make peace 
 with the United Provinces, and to declare war 
 against Spain ; he signed a treaty with Sweden, and 
 with France he kept up relations which were at once 
 friendly and circumspect. He took up the cause of 
 the Yaudois against the Duke of Savoy. The suc- 
 cesses of his fleet were of service to him, and con- 
 solidated his power in England ; and the vigour of 
 his home government made him formidable in 
 Europe. Admiral Blake, who had fought the Dutch 
 in the time of the Commonwealth, took the British 
 fleet to the coasts of Italy, and threatened Eome, 
 and the Bey of Tunis ; occasionally too he alarmed 
 the French shipowners, when it was more politic to 
 frighten than to flatter France, and paraded his 
 victorious flag in the Mediterranean, as Charles V. 
 had once done. The Protector never hesitated which 
 power he should choose as an ally — Spain, fallen as 
 she was, or France, who was sure to be as helpful 
 to her friend as dangerous to her foe. His foreign 
 policy was, therefore, much more bold and more 
 simple than that of the Tudors and the Stuarts. 
 He tried to make friends with all the Protestant 
 states, and as soon as he was able, he made peace 
 with the United Provinces. At the death of the 
 Stadtholder, William H, the House of Stuart lost in 
 Holland the sympathies which it derived from its 
 ties of relationship with the family of Orange, and 
 the power passed for a lengthened period into the 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 363 
 
 hands of the oligarchical party. This transfer was 
 a loss to the cause of Eoyalty in England, and an 
 advantage to the Commonwealth and the Protectorate 
 — an advantage better understood by Cromwell than 
 by the Parliament. 
 
 The government of Oliver Cromwell maintained 
 itself in the country, as an authority commanding 
 respect by its force. The Koyalist party seemed to 
 understand that time was necessary to enable it to 
 collect and organize its resources, to re-establish 
 harmony among its members, and to reunite all the 
 different shades of monarchical opinion on a wider 
 basis than that which Charles I. had desired to adopt. 
 The Presbyterian party was dissatisfied under the 
 Protectorate, and it is to the direction which the 
 feelings of this party took that we must attribute 
 the change of public opinion in favour of the Eesto- 
 ration. The power of Oliver Cromwell was too great, 
 and it held men's minds too much in subjection, 
 for this modification of the Presbyterian spirit to 
 show itself. Accordingly I have not found in the 
 memoirs of the time any clear account of the posi- 
 tion and of the progress of the Presbyterian party, 
 between the fall of the Commonwealth and the 
 return of Charles II. The Cavaliers and the 
 Levellers — the two opposite extremes of English 
 society — were clamorous, were a constant cause of 
 uneasiness, and called for the exercise of close watch- 
 ing or legal prosecution. Under a system which 
 held England under a strict control, and which, in 
 
li 
 
 364 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 some respects, did honour to the country, the Pres- 
 byterians were more silent, and, in a certain sense, 
 resigned themselves to await the moment when the 
 monarchy, which they hoped to see improved by 
 experience and misfortune, would of itself be re- 
 established. Clarendon, who played an important 
 part in the councils of the monarch during his exile 
 and after the Restoration,^ has left a voluminous 
 history of the Revolution as well as memoirs of 
 himself He tells us what passed in the secret 
 councils of the Royalist party, but he was not aware 
 of the progress of ideas in England itself which led 
 to the Restoration. 
 
 With regard to the various sects, Cromwell pro- 
 fessed liberty of conscience without respecting it. 
 Faithful in this respect to the theories of the Inde- 
 pendents, he did not trouble himself about any one 
 of the sects — not even about the Anglican Church, 
 among whose members were his most dangerous 
 enemies — men whom he never ceased to prosecute 
 and to punish on account of their political plots. 
 
 His government, therefore, both at home and 
 abroad, was bold and vigorous. Towards certain 
 men and certain parties in England, whom he desired 
 at the same time to restrain and to humour, he 
 adopted the same line of conduct that he held 
 towards France. Mazarin, as wily as Cromwell, but 
 less enterprising, intended, without truckling to the 
 Protector, to avoid quarrelling with him, and yet to 
 
 ^ His daughter married the Duke of York. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 365 
 
 keep in reserve the possible chances of the royal 
 family. He had no wish for too great a coldness in 
 their relations or too close a friendship. He refused 
 to expel the Duke of York, who resided in France, 
 and nevertheless he entered into a treaty of com- 
 merce with England. 
 
 Thus Cromwell was on friendly terms with the 
 Protestant states, and circumspect in his dealings 
 with the French minister, whom he supposed to be 
 favourable to the Stuarts ; but he was decidedly 
 hostile to Spain. 
 
 The Parliament, the English nation, and its head 
 long debated whether it were expedient to change 
 the name of Protector for that of King. The reasons 
 in favour of or against the change, which really 
 applied only to the name under which the govern- 
 ment was to be carried on, were carefully considered. 
 The feeling of the country, as the recollection of 
 the Commonwealth faded away, inclined towards 
 monarchical government, while, at the same time, it 
 was opposed to an hereditary Protectorate. Many 
 partisans of the old form of government, persuaded 
 that Cromwell was too powerful to be deposed, would 
 willingly have proclaimed him king, since they 
 thought that this false royalty would be the means 
 of recalling the true one. It was precisely this reason, 
 and the readiness which they showed, that made him 
 draw back. " If you become king," said Whitelock, 
 " you will have against you both the Royalists and 
 the Eepublicans." A man whose ambition was as 
 
366 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 t 
 
 great and blinder than that of Cromwell, would 
 have turned Whitelock's argument in his own 
 favour, and would have said, '^ Then I should have 
 with me the partisans of the old monarchy, on 
 account of the principle, and the partisans of the 
 new ideas, from attachment to my person/' He 
 refused the crown, not because he did not desire it, 
 but because he was afraid of irritating and shocking 
 at one and the same time, the Royalists, the Repub- 
 licans, and the army. He was guided in this reso- 
 lution by an accurate knowledge of the feelings of 
 the dilFerent parties. The influential majority in 
 the country was, in his opinion, in favour of Royalty, 
 but was little disposed to accept as a definitive or 
 satisfactory solution a king who had been a regicide. 
 The Republicans were not so sure of seeing the 
 return of the dethroned dynasty, as to prefer to the 
 actual form of government a king who had risen 
 from their own ranks; the army, however great 
 might be the renown of its general, was neither 
 sufficiently united, nor yet sufficiently stoical, to 
 see his elevation without jealousy ; and the Pres- 
 byterians, who had resisted Charles I. without 
 desiring the Revolution, now regretted that it 
 had been brought about, especially in such a 
 manner. They were much dissatisfied with every- 
 thing that had happened since the Civil War, but 
 they patiently waited for the issue which they hoped 
 for; and, without entirely renouncing their poli- 
 tical ideas, bound up as they were with their reli- 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 367 
 
 gious doctrines, they had certainly more sympathy 
 with the exiled family than with the Protector. A 
 certain languor and weariness too had come over 
 the Parliamentary spirit, which had given rise to 
 the rebellion. The Eevolutionary Parliament had 
 not exercised sufficient influence during the Civil 
 War ; the experiment of a Commonwealth which it 
 had made had been too unfortunate, and the Parlia- 
 ment, under the Protectorate, had been too incom- 
 plete, or too much kept in subjection, for the first 
 adversaries of Charles to retain the full ardour of 
 their zeal. The energy of Cromwell himself too had, 
 perhaps, become a little feebler, his oratorical powers 
 a little worn, and his confidence in the future of his 
 family a little shaken. He was still very eloquent 
 in his peculiar style, when he was called on to reply 
 to the ofiers made him. In declining these ofiers, 
 he made his ambition and his pride submit to his 
 reason ; and it was this power of self-control, ex- 
 ercised first of all over his own feelings, which 
 enabled him to die in the full possession of his power. 
 It was this which has made men often ask whether 
 the Protector, once crowned, could not have founded 
 a dynasty, and whether by hindering the restoration 
 of Charles 11. he might not have given quite a dif- 
 ferent turn to the destinies of England. 
 
 If the reply to this question has generally been 
 negative, it is because the career of his son, the 
 successor appointed by himself, was one of such 
 mediocrity, and because, with all his amiable and 
 
368 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 n 
 
 modest qualities, that son proved too indolent to 
 take up or defend the inheritance of his father. 
 
 When we speak of Cromwell, as when we speak 
 of Kichelieu, we must above all praise the breadth 
 and force of his political sagacity. Cromwell was 
 far more frequently than Eichelieu obliged to have 
 recourse to the influence and the artifices of oratory ; 
 and certainly no one ever possessed, in a greater 
 degree, the talent of being vehement and impas- 
 sioned, while he expressed the reverse of what he 
 thought. His speeches, on decisive occasions, were 
 frank, clear, and exhaustive, so far as the interest of 
 the cause required it ; and they did not the less keep 
 their character of inspiration and vehemence, when 
 the moment had come for discretion and deceit. The 
 possession of this twofold gift of language, of equal 
 clearness in expressing or in disguising the truth, 
 each confused with the other under the guise of 
 enthusiasm, doubled his power by securing for 
 hypocrisy the same credit as for loyalty of purpose. 
 His speech, always unpolished, was so fluent and so 
 docile that he was able to approach, without risk, 
 the most perilous subjects ; he could experience or 
 feign embarrassment ; allow emotion to overpower 
 him, or borrow its accent ; be diSuse, and wander 
 from the question ; distract and bafiie his audience ; 
 and yet be certain of again becoming at will, subtle, 
 commanding, serious, or severe, after he had been 
 jocular and engaging ; precise and clear, after he 
 had been long-winded and obscure. His genius was 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 369 
 
 facile ; lie knew how to treat with fanatical and pas- 
 sionate men, as well as with those who were selfish ; 
 he could laugh at the gravest matters, and attend 
 to those which were most trifling ; he could meet 
 tranquilly the most serious obstacles, and seize with 
 promptitude the most transient opportunities of 
 success ; he could defy the fiercest frowns of Fortune, 
 and profit by her faintest smiles ; he could be at 
 once bold and supple. He knew how, in solemn 
 moments, to reassure the timid, by assuming a jovial 
 air, and how to be brutal and imperious with the 
 masses whom he wished to convince, or affable 
 towards those whom he was about to crush. We 
 are almost tempted to think that, when he com- 
 mitted acts of violence with apparent coolness, and 
 with some show of vulgar irony, he was acting more 
 in accordance with his real nature, than when he 
 seemed to be carried away by anger and impulse. 
 With a sneer, and after all the judges of the King 
 had refused, he affixed his signature to the order for 
 Charles's execution ; and in doing so he showed the 
 odious courage which is denied to many criminals, 
 of committing to writing the crime of which they 
 are guilty. It needed all his genius, his courage, and 
 his easy conscience, to accomplish what he did — to 
 enable him to organize the revolutionary army, to 
 enforce its obedience, and to gain so many great 
 battles against the royal troops. He reigned alone 
 in the midst of parties carried away by passion ; he 
 destroyed with his sword the Monarchy and the 
 
 B B 
 
370 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Commonwealtli ; he first braved the hatred of the 
 Koyalists, and afterwards tried to conjure down 
 and allay that of the Kepublicans. In the midst 
 of factions he stood firm between those who went 
 beyond and those who fell short of his ideas ; he 
 tempted by appearances those whom he could not 
 satisfy with realities ; he gave free scope for action 
 to those whom he believed incapable of harming 
 him, as an excuse for depriving of it those whom 
 he feared; he inspired England, while he was in 
 the possession of power, with a patience similar to 
 that which he had himself exercised in winning it. 
 In spite of his barbarous proceedings, and his in- 
 difference to the shedding of blood, he was as com- 
 pletely master of himself in what he did, as he was 
 in what he said, whether to his Eepublican adver- 
 saries, or to the powers of Europe. The victor of 
 Naseby and Dunbar — of Prince Eupert and. Montrose 
 — understanding as he did the advantage of military 
 glory, and the facility it gives in handling a govern- 
 ment — might weU have dreamed of conquests on 
 the Continent. But as he refused the crown of Eng- 
 land, so he sought no territorial conquest beyond 
 that of a single Spanish colony. 
 
 On the day of the Protector's death, many of the 
 English Eoyalists must have looked upon the return 
 and accession of Charles II. as probable. 
 
 Under the Protectorate of Eichard Cromwell, the 
 Eepublicans, in the army and in the country, made 
 an attempt to arrest the general movement which 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 371 
 
 impelled England towards the Restoration. The 
 monarchical party of every shade showed little im- 
 patience, for they felt certain of succeeding, and 
 succeeding more completely in proportion as events 
 were allowed to follow a natural and less rapid 
 course ; they felt sure, too, that the person of the 
 Protector would be no hindrance to their wishes. 
 They were, if anything, anxious rather to know if 
 he would keep his place long enough to allow the 
 transition from one system to another to take place 
 without precipitation. He succeeded without trouble 
 to the power of his father, much as a son succeeds 
 to a family estate, but he was subject to no illusion 
 as to the future. Totally devoid of pride, timid, 
 with no turn for war, allied both by taste and habits 
 to the Cavaliers, gentle and amiable without dignity, 
 Richard Cromwell was incapable of inspiring either 
 confidence or hatred. He had indijfference enough 
 to allow him to renounce power, but not the small 
 amount of will necessary to make it respected while 
 he held it. Many events of that period — which 
 would seem a sad one had it not prepared the way 
 as the morrow of a memorable day — recall, on a 
 smaller scale, what occurred during the Protectorate 
 which had just ended. The behaviour of the Presby- 
 terians was the same ; the same divisions showed 
 themselves in the army and between the army and 
 the Parliament ; there were, moreover, the same dis- 
 sensions between the Parliament and the City. But 
 these facts and these symptoms were important but 
 
 B B 2 
 
^ 
 
 372 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 for a moment ; they showed diminished confidence 
 on the part of those who resisted the movement, 
 and diminished anxiety on the part of those who 
 followed and sympathised with it. Lambert, the 
 Eepublican general, expelled the Parliament, as 
 Cromwell had done, but the Parliament returned in 
 spite of Lambert and the republicans of the army ; 
 and, when the troops of Monk and those of Lambert 
 stood face to face, those of the latter, as well as 
 their general himself, were by no means eager to 
 come to blows. 
 
 Monk entered into the feeling of the country, but 
 exaggerated it ; the slowness of his advance gave 
 the Eepublican factions, which had been kept down 
 by the Protector, the time and the courage to re- 
 appear for a moment. His line of conduct consisted 
 in bringing the Eoyalists again into Parliament 
 without any unnecessary shock, and in quietly re- 
 moving from the ranks and from the higher grades 
 of the army of the Commonwealth the most violent 
 men. When the Parliament was thus complete, and 
 the army had undergone this purification, he still 
 delayed in declaring his intentions. Acting very 
 difierently from those who in times of sudden change, 
 by their impatience and vehemence, run the risk of 
 blame from their former associates. Monk called 
 himself a Eepublican when the general movement 
 was Eoyalist, and when the Commonwealth was pu1;> 
 aside, and thus laid himself open to the same re- 
 proach and to suspicion from his future friends. 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 373 
 
 He preferred, it is said, riches to glory ; and if he 
 was without vanity, his principles were lax, and his 
 ambition was moderate and cold. He made his 
 reputation by counting on the tendency of men's 
 minds to impute depth and to look for mystery on 
 the part of a man who professed to lead the country 
 towards so great a change, and who accomplished 
 that task slowly and without noise. The Kestoration 
 would have been completed without him, possibly 
 with greater rapidity, but less peaceably. The day 
 when Charles H. placed his foot on the soil of Eng- 
 land, the Cavaliers were transported with joy, and 
 the Presbyterians were full of hope; the army, 
 which had expelled the Parliament by the orders of 
 Cromwell, showed great coldness, and the Puritans 
 had withdrawn out of sight. The eager crowd 
 hastened to meet the King. 
 
 Mazarin, who was more occupied in making peace 
 with Spain than in interfering with the affairs of 
 England, had signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 
 the year preceding the Eestoration. The ambassador 
 of the English Commonwealth in Paris had, to the 
 last, been well received by the Cardinal. The French 
 ambassador in London had a short time before, in 
 his intercourse with Monk, expressed, in an indif- 
 ferent tone, the desire of his Government for the 
 Eestoration ; and he had made to the general him- 
 self offers of service and overtures which might have 
 aroused his ambition. Mazarin only viewed the 
 revolutionary policy of England as an object of 
 
374 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 interest secondary to his own. He was determined 
 to quarrel neither with the Commonwealth, the 
 Protectorate, nor the Eestoration. 
 
 In Holland, the government of John de Witt 
 regretted the loss of the English Commonwealth, 
 although it had made war on them ; the govern- 
 ment of the Eestoration necessarily had more 
 sympathy with the house of Orange than with the 
 party of the Estates, and the Grand Pensionary 
 placed what he considered the home interests of the 
 Netherlands above all considerations of foreign 
 policy. 
 
 France and Holland, the two nations nearest to 
 England, were likewise those which had the most 
 uninterrupted intercourse with it, and where events 
 happening in the three kingdoms were most talked 
 about. 
 
 The English Eevolution, after having gone through 
 a civil war, an attempt at a republic, a dictatorship, 
 and a restoration, ended by establishing a form of 
 government so powerful that those who were charged 
 with the greatest European interests had to look 
 carefully to it. The attempt to found an absolute 
 monarchy, made by Charles I, was renewed with 
 the same ill-success by the second of his sons, and 
 the kingly government was constituted, after a 
 second revolution, under those conditions which 
 Charles I. would never consent to admit. We shall 
 soon treat — with reference to the circumstances 
 which brought the Prince of Orange to England— 
 
THE FIRST ENGLISH REVOLUTION. 375 
 
 of the last years of the government of the Stuarts. 
 It is at the accession of William III. that we are 
 enabled to judge of the complete change that the 
 seventeenth century effected in the condition of the 
 English crown. But even thirty years before, when 
 the Protector fell, and when Charles II. returned, it 
 was quite clear that the country would not end by 
 giving to the descendants of Charles I. that which 
 it had refused to him ; and the events of the first 
 half of the century were quite sufficient to make 
 it clear that, in future, there would be a marked dif- 
 ference between the nature of the English govern- 
 ment and that of the continental monarchies. 
 Charles II. and James II. might have arrested the 
 course of events : the first, by making himself more 
 independent of foreign influences, and by adopting 
 more frankly the institutions of his country ; the 
 second, by pursuing a line of conduct entirely dif- 
 ferent from the one he followed. But had these two 
 sovereigns been reasonable, instead of being, the one 
 dissipated and wild, the other blind and tyrannical 
 — ^had the House of Stuart retained possession of the 
 throne by the exercise of moderation and wisdom — 
 England might indeed have gone on in a tranquil 
 and satisfied manner at home, but she would not 
 have secured the amount of power she acquired 
 under William III. She would never, in the general 
 affairs of Europe, by her alliances, by her energetic 
 intervention in continental and maritime war, and 
 by the genius and the glorious tenacity of her king, 
 
376 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 have turned the scale against the grasping ambition 
 of Louis XIV. 
 
 We do not exaggerate the importance of the 
 political part played by William III, if we attribute 
 to him this overwhelming and decisive influence on 
 the destinies of England. 
 
 The events of this Eevolution have been narrated 
 and judged, with all the authority of learning and 
 ability, by a most eminent writer. It would be 
 useless for the reader, and out of the question for me 
 to speak of it, after him, otherwise than by offering 
 these short observations, which come within the 
 range of my work, and which could not be omitted 
 without leaving a gap. 
 
V. 
 
 WILLIAM III. 
 
 The wars which broke out after the Keformation 
 are known in history by the name of the " Keligious 
 Wars" {Guerres de Religion). We have previously 
 related how they were carried on, in the name of the 
 ancient faith, by the immediate descendants of 
 Charles V. in Spain. The collateral descendants of 
 the Emperor in Austria revived them at a later date 
 under other conditions, and with an alloy of other 
 motives. Immediately after the Keformation, religion 
 itself was the dominant element in the struggle. 
 The soldiers of Philip II. in the Low Countries, his 
 ships of war in the English Channel, and his partisans 
 in France, all fought under the standard of the 
 Roman Catholic faith. Their adversaries were " the 
 Reformers," and the causes of the conflicts which, 
 both before and subsequent to this epoch, dyed the 
 soil of Europe with blood — ^political rivalry and the 
 struggle for preponderance — seem, in the second 
 half of the sixteenth century, to lie concealed under 
 
378 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 another reason quite as capable of stirring men to 
 arms. 
 
 The King of Spain, in his struggle with the 
 Calvinists of Holland, fought for the maintenance of 
 his authority, and for the extension of his domi- 
 nions ; as all men who have the disposal of military- 
 force have ever done, and probably will continue to 
 do. But at that time such was not his avowed 
 motive; what he professed to aim at was the de- 
 struction of heresy. 
 
 In proportion as the origin and the first shock of 
 the Keformation became more remote, as the shadow 
 of Charles V. faded away into the past, and as his 
 blind and feeble successors allowed the power of 
 Spain to slip through their hands, on the one side, 
 the predominant influence in Europe, which by the 
 right of conquest had fallen to the share of the 
 illustrious Charles, passed into other hands ; and, 
 on the other, the war gradually and slowly lost the 
 religious character it wore under the banners of 
 Spain, so that the true and irrepressible motive of 
 quarrels between great states again appeared on the 
 surface of history. This transformation — this return 
 to the original principle of rivaby for the possession 
 of political power — occupies the whole of the seven- 
 teenth century, during which the two elements of 
 politics and religion continued to work in combi- 
 nation with each other. This double character was 
 clearly seen in the Thirty Years' War. It was the 
 character, more or less evident, of the wars which 
 
WILLIAM IIL 379 
 
 Louis XIV. carried on against Holland, against the 
 League of Augsburg, and against the Kevolution in 
 England. Last of all, the War of Succession in 
 Spain, which closes the reign of Louis XIV, and 
 with which the eighteenth century opens, was again 
 founded on a principle purely political. The interests 
 of religion have no share in it, and the Catholic 
 states, which take part in it, and which fight with 
 each other, no longer think of checking the progress 
 of the Eeformation. 
 
 There is one portion of this period of a century 
 and a half, from the abdication of Charles V. (1555) 
 to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) — along and memo- 
 rable epoch, in the course of which so much was 
 changed and removed, and so many powers rose or 
 succumbed — during which the United Provinces of 
 Holland, as a republic, as an element of revolution, 
 or as a maritime and commercial power, played an 
 important part in the politics and quarrels of Europe. 
 They advanced systematically ; they showed heroic 
 courage in acquiring and defending their liberty, 
 and an admirable patience in consolidating their 
 power ; they exhibited the greatest activity and 
 intelligence in extending their commerce and in 
 enriching their country, and a wonderful dignity, 
 constancy, and coolness, in the pursuit of one and 
 the same object — the noblest to which men can 
 devote themselves, — the independence of their 
 country and the independence of Europe. 
 
 What we have just said of the mixed character 
 
^l 
 
 380 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 of the wars of the seventeenth century applies 
 exactly to the position of the United Provinces 
 during this period. 
 
 In fact, after a series of events which occupied 
 more than fifty years, the position of affairs had 
 completely changed. In this period the United 
 Provinces had by their own efforts freed themselves, 
 and established their independence ; the long quarrel 
 between them and Spain had ended in a decisive 
 victory for the former ; the mother country, utterly 
 exhausted, ill governed, and with abundant occu- 
 pation at home and abroad, had recognised as a 
 fact the necessity of sacrificing the insurgent pro- 
 vinces, although, to avoid the humiliation of a 
 treaty of peace, it had signed a truce. The existence 
 of the United Provinces had now been satisfactorily 
 secured ; it had even been accepted by their former 
 master, and completely recognised by the rest of 
 Europe. The danger for them had ceased to come 
 from Spain, but it soon appeared in another quarter ; 
 since Cardinal Mazarin was wise enough to see that 
 the conclusion of a definitive peace between the 
 United Provinces and Spain was not for the ad- 
 vantage of France, and that the struggle ought to 
 continue, or, at any rate, be capable of renewal. The 
 judgment of Mazarin in this matter was perfectly 
 natural and correct. The policy of conquest, which 
 shortly afterwards prevailed, was not in his thoughts, 
 nor in those of the child whom he was initiating 
 into the art of government. On the contrary, he 
 
WILLIAM IIL 381 
 
 himself signed the Peace of Westphalia, and the 
 Treaty of the Pyrenees, and his ambition was to 
 close the great war and leave Europe at peace. Yet, 
 notwithstanding this, he felt instinctively that a 
 certain amount of rivalry, and the want of perfect 
 accord between Spain and the United Provinces, 
 were in the interests of France. 
 
 In this judgment he was clearly right ; for when 
 peace was once concluded between the two powers, 
 and when Spain had once made the sacrifice, it 
 would be to the advantage of both to forget their 
 old animosities and to unite their armies. They 
 formed, it is true, henceforth, two distinct countries, 
 but they would together protect the territories on the 
 southern borders of Holland, which still remained 
 Spanish, and which were soon to be exposed to the 
 encroaching policy of the age. 
 
 When the necessity of this alliance was under- 
 stood (as it was at a later period by William of 
 Orange), in the sense which Mazarin had appre- 
 hended, then the principles which guided the arms 
 of the United Provinces were so far affected by 
 events as to assume that mixed character which we 
 have recognised in the wars of the seventeenth 
 century. That is to say, two states, which religious 
 differences had for a long period made enemies to 
 each other, forgot their animosities, and came to an 
 understanding. 
 
 The system of William III, who appeared on the 
 scene soon after the principle of religious wars had 
 
382 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 changed its character, was in fact to unite Catholic 
 and Protestant nations against an adversary who 
 menaced all equally without reference to their faith. 
 
 But between the time when Spain and Holland 
 signed a treaty, which Mazarin was sorry to see 
 ratified, and. the time when William took into his 
 own hands the affairs of his own country, and 
 shortly afterwards those of more general interest, a 
 certain interval elapsed, which we may consider as 
 a period of transition. During this interval the 
 policy of Holland was undecided, and seemed as it 
 were to be feeling for its true course; it deceived 
 itself as to the imminence of various dangers ; and, 
 although it had at its disposal a considerable force, 
 it hesitated to give to that force a decided and 
 energetic direction. 
 
 This period of transition, as we term it, separates 
 the Peace of Munster, by which the independence of 
 the United Provinces was definitively secured, from 
 the time when William was invested with the 
 chief authority in Holland as Stadtholder (1649- 
 1672). 
 
 The policy of John de Witt, who had the 
 management of public afiairs during this period of 
 twenty years, was not, if we may so express our- 
 selves, all of one piece. De Witt assumed the 
 government of the country when William II. died, 
 and when his son, who subsequently became William 
 III, was an infant. We cannot say that he governed 
 during a minority, because he devoted all his energies 
 
WILLIAM IIL 383 
 
 to induce the country to look upon the office of 
 Stadtholder as an evil, and to bring about the sup- 
 pression of the office. When a statesman — especially 
 one so eminent as was the Grand Pensionary — 
 devotes himself to one idea, and applies to it his 
 courage, and all the resources of his genius, it is 
 often difficult to decide whether he was actuated by 
 ambition or by conscience : but it is still more diffi- 
 cult to do so if the scheme itself fails before it is 
 fully developed. We have already spoken more 
 than once of the rivalry between the party of the 
 Estates and that of the Stadtholder. De Witt repre- 
 sented in Holland the first of these two parties ; that 
 is to say, a certain patrician class, which was rich 
 and enlightened, and from which the members of 
 the principal municipal bodies, and a certain number 
 of those of the Provincial Estates, were selected. 
 This class was more powerful from its wealth and 
 its intelligence than from its numbers. We have 
 said that it was hostile to the Stadtholder, whose 
 chief object had been to develop the material 
 welfare and the military spirit of the country, and 
 who urged, as the first object, the necessity of a 
 strong defensive position. The representatives of 
 the municipal oligarchy, on the other hand, thought 
 that, not only in form but in substance, the govern- 
 ment of the United Provinces ought to be repub- 
 lican, and that the Stadtholder was a military 
 dictator. This class did not deny the conditions or 
 the necessity for the defence of the country, and- 
 
^ 
 
 384 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 many eminent military men had sprung from their 
 ranks ; but it went against them to see too much 
 authority in the hands of one man. De Witt, to a 
 certain degree, personified the hereditary feeling of 
 this class, of which Barneveldt had been the leader 
 before him. He shared in the jealousy which the 
 towns had manifested against William II, and he 
 advocated the maintenance of a small army, while 
 he endeavoured to educate the mind of the young 
 prince in the principles of the oligarchical party. 
 He saw with regret the restoration of the King in 
 England, because he foresaw that there would always 
 be a common feeling between the restored Stuarts 
 and the family of Orange-Nassau, inasmuch as the 
 widow of the last Stadtholder was the sister of 
 Charles II. He would wiUingly have lived on in alli- 
 ance with Oliver Cromwell, or with a Commonwealth 
 in England ; for he had too much sense not to see 
 that, after the death of Mazarin, the country border- 
 ing on the United Provinces, threatened as it was by 
 the arms of France, and defended by the feeble power 
 of Spain, would run great risks ; and that the old 
 friendship of France for the Dutch republic was 
 about to cease. The efibrts, however, of a conciliatory 
 nature which he made to counteract these dangers, 
 do not say much for his judgment or his foresight. 
 He would willingly have treated for the partition 
 of the Spanish provinces, a scheme of which there 
 had been serious question in the time of Cardinal 
 Kichelieu. He still had the old Dutch feeling of 
 
WILLIAM III. 385 
 
 antagonism against Spain ; and he would have 
 signed without hesitation any treaty that aggrandized 
 France at the expense of the ancient possessors of 
 the Low Countries. The ideas of De Witt, as to the 
 best policy to follow, were shared, at the time of 
 William II.'s death, by a considerable portion of the 
 population. Their tendency was to suppress every- 
 thing in the attributes of the office of S tad th older 
 that had a monarchical character ; to lean for sup- 
 port on the Provincial Estates, especially on those 
 of Holland, which was the centre of the government, 
 and the chief stronghold of the oligarchy ; and to 
 come to terms with republican England on all 
 questions concerning commercial interests and mari- 
 time rivalry.^ Thus, to be on his guard against 
 monarchical England, and against the influence of 
 the royal family ; to devote all the energies of a 
 diplomacy fertile in resources to shunning a war, 
 and preserving the good will of France, which had 
 hitherto been of such value to the United Provinces, 
 and whenever he was forced by events into a dif- 
 ferent course, to yield only for the moment to the 
 necessity which he regretted, and return as speedily 
 as possible to what he considered as the proper 
 system ; — such, in a few words, was the policy 
 which De Witt acted on during the whole of his 
 
 ^ The Navigation Act of 1650, the object of which was to prevent 
 the Dutch vessels from importing into England any goods except those 
 produced in Holland, was retained in the Treaty of Westminster 1654, 
 signed by England and the Estates-General. 
 
 C C 
 
386 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 administration. At first his views were shared by 
 many men, because the power of the Stadtholder, 
 Avho had just died, had left animosities and jealousies 
 rankling behind him. ; but the real fault in his ideas, 
 resting as they did on a reactionary feeling against 
 the authority of a particular family, was the fact 
 that during the years which followed, and in the 
 midst of events important enough to justify a 
 change of policy, they obstinately preserved their 
 character of passion and personal feeling. History 
 pardons a great deal to a man who, like the Grand 
 Pensionary, dies a victim to a doctrine which from 
 that time forward is made to assume the dignity of 
 a conviction. Much that strikes us now in the 
 situation of the United Provinces as a matter beyond 
 dispute, produced at the time but a slight impres- 
 sion on the mind of the Grand Pensionary. The 
 United Provinces, but lately a republic, had come 
 successful out of many dangers ; they had hitherto 
 been fortunate, and had been powerful for some 
 years ; they had shown resolution, prudence, patience, 
 and all the qualities which tend to the prosperity of 
 states, whether they be old or young. That which 
 strikes us as evidently the best policy for the United 
 Provinces to adopt, with regard to nations with 
 whom they were allied, — for instance, with France 
 under Mazarin and Louis XIV, with England under 
 Cromwell and Charles II, with Spain under Philip 
 IV, — that which soon struck William of Orange, 
 and was a subject of anxiety to those men about 
 
WILLIAM III. 887 
 
 De Witt himself, whatever was their shade of opinion 
 or their class, who at first had shared his views 
 and maintained him at the head of affairs — all this, 
 we repeat, produced but little effect upon the Grand 
 Pensionary. The Provinces were possibly more 
 prosperous under his administration than at any 
 other time of their existence ; and it is not difficult 
 sometimes to be deceived as to the moral condition 
 of a country in which there is a great increase of 
 wealth, and where every one is materially prosperous. 
 We must also acknowledge that the House of Orange 
 had caused great jealousy, and that the resolution 
 of the Estates which made the office of Stadth older 
 in one, or in several of the Provinces, incompatible 
 with the office of commander-in-chief of the army, 
 and abolished altogether the office of Stadtholder 
 of the Province of Holland — a resolution called the 
 "Perpetual Edict," supported by De Witt to the 
 utmost of his power — was,, at the time it was 
 adopted, in appearance at least, popular. We must 
 likewise acknowledge that, when the nation per- 
 ceived that her maritime interests were threatened 
 by England, the Grand Pensionary did not hesitate 
 to declare war against the English Commonwealth, 
 though he looked on it as his natural ally, and that 
 the war was vigorously prosecuted. He subsequently 
 deserted his own natural policy to conclude with 
 England under the Eestoration, and with Sweden, 
 the treaty known under the name of " The Triple 
 Alliance.'' This treaty had relation to the first 
 
 cc 2 
 
388 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 expedition of Louis XIV. into the Spanish pro- 
 vinces, which he was pleased to term a royal pro- 
 gress — not of a campaign ; inasmuch as he pretended 
 that those provinces came to him by succession in 
 right of his wife.^ Nevertheless, the war against 
 Cromwell was distasteful to De Witt, and he did 
 nothing to prolong it : he disliked the Triple Alli- 
 ance, and he made no attempt to make it last. 
 But was it not strange that he should give up, with- 
 out regret, allies whose object it was to restrain 
 France within the limits laid down by the Treaty 
 of the Pyrenees ? The " Memoirs of the Count 
 d'Estrades," at that time the Ambassador of France 
 in Holland, give us an insight into all the efforts 
 made by "the great King" to cultivate a good 
 understanding with De Witt, and to encourage and 
 unite together all those who then belonged to what 
 was called the French party. These men believed 
 that the maintenance of peace was possible ; they 
 approved De Witt's conduct, when, in order not to 
 break with France, he went the length of refusing 
 an offer made by the Spanish Government to allow 
 the United Provinces to occupy several maritime 
 towns of Flanders, which Spain did not feel itself 
 strong enough to defend; in short, they flattered 
 
 1 By virtue of what was called " devolution "—an ancient law in 
 the duchy of Brabant— which favoured the children of the first mar- 
 riage to the prejudice of the others. The Infanta Maria Theresa, the 
 Queen of France, w<\s a child of the first marriage ; Charles II. of Spain, 
 of the second wife. {Histoire de Lonvois, by C. Rousset, vol. i. cap. ii. 
 Coutumes de Brabant— Coutumes de Malines.) 
 
WILLIAM III. 38.9 
 
 themselves that they should be able to continue 
 with France, under the new system, the relations 
 which had existed previously. 
 
 But Louis XIV, after the campaign of Flanders 
 in 1667, made war upon Holland in 1672, be- 
 cause he was angry with her for having entered 
 into the Triple Alliance in 1668, with England 
 and Sweden, and because he was persuaded that 
 the Spanish Provinces would never fall definitively 
 into his hands so long as they were backed by 
 the bulwark of the United Provinces. 
 
 This was the ruin of De Witt's party ; it put an 
 end to his government, and gave the signal for the 
 popular movement in which he perished. There 
 was but one cry among the people : the military 
 and political powers were again vested in one 
 person ; the Stadtholdership was re-established, with 
 its former prerogatives, and made hereditary ; and 
 at the age of two and twenty, William of Orange 
 was invested with this supreme authority. 
 
 De Witt possessed talents, courage, experience, 
 and ability to an eminent degree. He made all 
 his great qualities, his boldness of spirit, and his 
 strong sense subservient to a policy which had out- 
 lived its time, and which was not justified by events. 
 His attempts to stop the progress of Louis XIV. 
 and to pacify his own country were without result. 
 A movement which was stronger than himself, and 
 which his genius did not foresee, swept him away 
 with his convictions, his influence, and his fortunes. 
 
390 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 His capacity, his firmness, his long and powerful 
 administration, and his cruel death, have neverthe- 
 less made the Grand Pensionary one of those who 
 must ever live in history.^ 
 
 .11. 
 
 The leading principle of the reign of Louis XIV. 
 does not belong to that monarch. It dates from 
 the end of the fifteenth century, and from the time 
 of the first invasions of Italy by France under 
 Charles VIII. and under Louis XIII. It is in fact 
 the principle of prolonged antagonism to the Spanish 
 fflon archy, which began after Louis XL had closed, 
 by the Treaty of Pecquigny, the struggle of 
 centuries with England. It is the principle of war 
 with the dynasty of Charles Y. — the elder branch 
 of which reigned in Spain, while the descendants 
 of the younger branch occupied the imperial throne 
 of Germany. It is the principle of breaking up 
 that vast monarchy for the benefit of France alone, 
 and not for the general benefit of European inde- 
 pendence. But the Spanish house, so formidable 
 
 ^ Thorbecke, Historische Schetsen — M^moires du Cointe d'Estrades. 
 The negotiations which preceded the war of Louis XIV. in Flanders, 
 and later still the war in Holland, are of great importance in the 
 history of that monarch. Here they are scarcely indicated, but I pro- 
 pose in a second volume to devote a special chapter to the general 
 subject of the diplomatic correspondence of Louis XIV. 
 
WILLIAM III. 891 
 
 under Charles V, and still so strong under the 
 personal sway of Philip II, lost its rank and its 
 power under the successors of the latter. Ministers, 
 whose ability was guided by selfishness rather than 
 ambition, took the place of great princes, and allowed 
 the sinews of government to become relaxed, the 
 military and financial resources of the country to be 
 wasted, and its honour to decay and perish. Under 
 his father-in-law, Philip TV, as well as under Charles 
 II, a sickly child with feeble intellect, Louis XIV. 
 had nothing to fear from Spain. If he felt dis- 
 posed to take some portion of the magnificent in- 
 heritance of Charles V, he had no cause to apprehend 
 reprisals on the part of Spain. At the death of 
 Mazarin, or to speak more correctly, immediately 
 after the death of Philip IV, when Charles II, far 
 from giving evidence that he would ever have the 
 strength to govern, made it clear that he would not 
 have strength to live, the early ambition of Louis 
 XIV. sought to prevent the junior branch of the 
 Austrian dynasty from succeeding to the inherit- 
 ance of the elder branch. He had no desire to see 
 reconstituted under the imperial sceptre of Germany 
 the monarchy which Charles V. had at one time 
 wished to transmit entire to his son, but which, 
 worn out and weakened, he subsequently allowed 
 without regret to be divided between his son and 
 his brother. Before making war upon Austria, 
 Louis XIV. cast his eyes upon a portion of the 
 territory belonging to Spain, and the expedition 
 
 \ 
 
392 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 against Holland, begun in 1672, for the purpose of 
 absorbing the Spanish provinces by overwhelming 
 them, opened the series of his vast enterprises. 
 
 His first great war was, historically speaking, his 
 first great fault. He failed in his object : for at the 
 end of six campaigns, during which the French 
 armies obtained great and deserved success, Holland 
 remained unconquered. Thus was Europe warned 
 that the lust of conquest of a young monarch, who 
 did not himself possess military genius, but who 
 found in his generals the resources and ability in 
 which he was himself deficient, would soon threaten 
 her independence. Conde and Turenne, after having 
 been rebellious subjects under the Eegency, were 
 about to become the first and the most illustrious 
 lieutenants of Louis XIV. 
 
 Europe, however, though warned, was not im- 
 mediately ready to defend herself It was from 
 Austria, more directly exposed to the dangers of the 
 great war now commencing, that the first systematic 
 resistance ought to have come. But Austria was 
 not prepared to play such a part ; and the Emperor 
 Leopold possessed neither the genius nor the wish 
 for it. He was, in fact, nothing more than the 
 nominal head of Germany. The wars of Charles 
 V. and the Thirty Years' War had weakened the 
 Imperial power, and since that time it had found, 
 neither in the men at the head of afiairs nor in 
 events themselves, any means of repairing or adding 
 to its lost strength. At that epoch Eussia took no 
 
WILLIAM III. 393 
 
 part in the affairs of Central Europe. Sweden, 
 which since the days when she had been governed 
 and rendered famous by the sword of Gustavus 
 Adolphus, had learnt to mix herself up in the 
 affairs of Europe, was undecided in her policy ; her 
 government hesitated between one alliance and the 
 other, and did not feel called on to take any vigorous 
 part, as it did not foresee the time when the French 
 armies would cross the Elbe and threaten her own 
 borders. The Electorate of Brandenburg was then 
 but a third-rate power in Germany. The Electors 
 of Mayence and of Cologne on the Ehine, as well as 
 Munster and Neuburg, were successively flattered 
 or threatened by French diplomacy ; but they were 
 more likely to bar the passage against the forces of 
 the empire than to oppose the arms of Louis XIV. 
 Spain, as we have already said, weakened and 
 languishing under an incompetent government, was 
 not even in a condition to defend its own posses- 
 sions. The position of England with regard to 
 France was anything but well defined under the 
 government of the Restoration. The King, Charles 
 II, with amiable and pleasant manners, a fickle 
 character, and expensive and luxurious tastes, 
 found it convenient to accept the friendship of the 
 French monarch, and was not shocked at the idea 
 of secretly accepting his money. He was too 
 indolent and too frivolous to begin an open quarrel 
 with his Parliament, and to push things to an ex- 
 tremity, like his father before him, and his brother 
 
394 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 after him ; but the difficulty in getting on with 
 them from day to day was constant and notorious, 
 consequently he dispensed with them as often as 
 he could, and preferred taking the pay of the King 
 of France to asking money from his own people.^ 
 
 The tendency of Charles, therefore, was, openly 
 when he could, and secretly if it were necessary, 
 to maintain a personal alliance with Louis XIV. ; 
 to yield to the House of Commons at the last 
 extremity ; to have no fixed policy of his own ; 
 to gain partisans by the affability of his manners 
 and his good humour ; to yield to ideas which were 
 opposed to his own because he did not care about 
 the matter ; and to avoid at once taking any decided 
 line, or exposing himself to any catastrophe. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs in Europe when 
 William of Orange first made his appearance on 
 the stage. He had succeeded to the power of the 
 Grand Pensionary, and had been summoned by 
 general acclamation to assume, under the ancient 
 name of Stadtholder, the whole of the military 
 and political authority. What he did was this, he 
 organized a system of defence ; began a struggle 
 against Louis XIV, which lasted thirty years; 
 sustained it with an energy and a constancy that 
 were admirable ; and revived in his own person the 
 glorious memories of the House of Orange — more 
 especially that of the illustrious prince who had 
 devoted his life and his genius to the foundation 
 
 ^ For instance, the sale of Dunkirk to France. 
 
WILLIAM IIL 395 
 
 of the state. In his character and his actions, he 
 was all that the Dutch esteem most : he was cool, 
 courageous, patient, straightforward, and simple in 
 his habits. He inherited all the confidence and 
 affection which had of old belonged to his family, 
 and the reproaches which were lavished upon him 
 during the course of his glorious career never 
 came from his countrymen. His great fault, if we 
 may say so, consisted in his being too much a 
 Dutchman. 
 
 The old question of supremacy, which Louis 
 XIV. wished to fight out as a duel with the House 
 of Austria, was now about to change its aspect, and, 
 owing to the presence of an unexpected genius, to 
 bring into the quarrel other powers besides the two 
 original competitors. The foe of Louis XIV. ought 
 by rights to have been born on the banks of the 
 Danube, and not on the shores of the North Sea. In 
 fact, it was Austria that at that moment most 
 needed a man of genius, either on the throne or at 
 the head of affairs. The events of the century 
 would, in this case, doubtless have followed a dif- 
 ferent course : the war would have been less general, 
 and the maritime nations would not have been in- 
 volved in it to the same degree ; it might have been 
 limited to the Pyrenees, to the states bordering on 
 the Rhine, and to the Alps. Moreover, the English 
 Government and the dynasty of the Stuarts would 
 have been less mixed up in the struggle, and the 
 whole state of afiliirs in England would have been 
 
396 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 different. The treaties of peace would have been 
 signed in some small place in France or Germany, 
 and not in two towns and a village in Holland, such 
 as Nimeguen, Eyswick, and Utrecht. How do we 
 know too that an alliance between England and 
 France, which is not beyond the range of pro- 
 bability, might not have saved the throne of the 
 Stuarts ? 
 
 It is for these reasons that posterity blames 
 Louis XIV. so severely for having commenced the 
 war with Holland. The logic of facts seldom 
 agrees with that of men ; and the favours, as well 
 as the reverses, of fortune console or strike us more 
 frequently far from the moment, and far from the 
 spot when and where the most vigilant foresight 
 had expected, and had prepared to meet the blow. 
 No one foresaw the effects of this war. Lionne, who 
 at the beginning of the reign had managed foreign 
 affairs with such consummate ability and wisdom, 
 had just died ; and no negotiator charged with con- 
 ducting the diplomatic negotiations of Louis XIV, 
 had, after him, the authority or the knowledge 
 which he had displayed. His death occurred in 
 the year which preceded the first campaign against 
 Holland. 
 
 But if it was not given to any one to calculate 
 and to foresee the events of this period — the 
 failures and the miseries which embittered the close 
 of the reign of Louis XIV, the domestic misfortunes 
 of the dynasty, the will of the King of Spain, the 
 
WILLIAM in. 397 
 
 dethronement of James TI. by his son-in-law, and 
 finally the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in 
 Spain, — if these distant results were beyond the 
 reach of human foresight, a calm a,nd attentive eye 
 would nevertheless have perceived some matters 
 more near at hand. It might have been surmised 
 that unless great care were taken the descendant 
 of Philip IT. and the descendant of William the 
 Silent might help each other ; that to attack Hol- 
 land, lying beyond the Spanish provinces, was in 
 effect to force her into an alliance with Spain, 
 and that eventually the interest of common defence 
 could not fail to bring nearer together the two 
 branches of the Austrian family, whose probable 
 and complete reunion as possessor of the entire 
 inheritance of Charles V. must cause great anxiety 
 to France. 
 
 William of Orange found himself in a position 
 soon to form the Triple Alliance which the very 
 policy of Louis XIV. suggested. For France to 
 attack Holland, when her object was eventually to 
 reach Austria, and keep her out of the Spanish suc- 
 cession, was to make enemies at one and the same 
 time of Spain, of Austria, and of Holland. But if 
 it afterwards required considerable efforts on the 
 part of William of Orange to maintain this alliance, 
 it demanded still more energy to extend it. It 
 formed part of the Stadth older s ulterior plans to 
 combine the union formed between himself and the 
 two branches of the Austrian family, with the old 
 
398 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Anglo-Swedish Triple Alliance, which had just been 
 dissolved under the strong pressure brought to bear 
 on it by Louis XIV. He thus hoped to constitute, 
 more in the interest of the balance of power in 
 Europe than for the gratification of his own ambi- 
 tion, a vast coalition which should unite — besides 
 secondary states such as Brandenburg, Sweden, and 
 the provinces on the Khine — countries like Austria, 
 Spain, Savoy, and, some day or other, England. To 
 attain his object he had to overcome obstacles 
 which eventually wore him out. First of all, he 
 had to contend with the never-failing ill-will of 
 those powers whom it was his constant endeavour 
 to bring together by some common bond of union ; 
 then the fluctuating policy of the Stuarts, which was 
 more frequently in the interest of France than in 
 that of Europe, as well as the quarrels between the 
 Crown and the House of Commons, interfered with 
 his plans ; and lastly, the want of firmness in the 
 Emperor Leopold, the embarrassed condition and 
 weakness of Spain, and the divided state of public 
 opinion in the United Provinces themselves, threw 
 great difficulties in his way. 
 
 The name of William of Orange, glorious as it is, 
 claims also the respect of all men. His patient 
 ability was not taxed with perpetual double dealing, 
 as is the case with some other eminent politicians ; 
 and posterity never seriously imputed to him the 
 charge of having succeeded by intrigue in de- 
 throning his father-in-law, because he was wise 
 
WILLIAM JH. 399 
 
 enough to wait until the crown of England, under- 
 miued by the errors of the wearer, was about of 
 itself to crumble into dust. The most remarkable 
 and the most successful actions of his life did 
 benefit and were meant to benefit others, quite as 
 much as himself ; and it was his good fortune 
 that the gratification of his own personal ambition 
 was a secondary matter as compared with the 
 importance of the general result. Thus, when he 
 supplanted the Grand Pensionary de Witt, he 
 assumed power in order to defend and save his 
 country ; and when he dethroned his father-in-law, 
 and ascended the throne of England, it was to 
 found in that country a government, the strength 
 and duration of which are sufiicient evidence that 
 it was in accordance with the wishes of the country. 
 Moreover, on most of those occasions when he 
 fought for Protestantism, he had the advantage of 
 attaching to himself, from interested motives, two 
 of the principal Catholic states of Europe. 
 
 His character was as singular as it was strong, 
 and his destiny as remarkable as it was glorious. 
 His life, like his person, presented great contrasts. 
 William of Orange checked the power of Louis X IV, 
 while at the same time he scarcely ever was suc- 
 cessful against the French monarch ; he was not 
 present at the most important naval battle of the 
 time — that of La Hogue — where the French fleet 
 was defeated. He was the author of the great 
 League ; he signed with Louis XIV. two treaties 
 
T 
 
 400 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 for the partition of tlie Spanish possessions — which 
 he concluded as the acknowledged head of the coa- 
 lition, but which brought to him individually no 
 direct benefit ; he was unsuccessful in nearly all the 
 battles which took place during the first half of the 
 reign of Louis XIV, and was beaten by Cond6 and 
 by Luxembourg ; he died before the epoch when 
 fortune was for some time to desert the King of 
 France ; he was more honoured by posterity than 
 during his life ; and was recompensed rather by 
 ulterior results than by immediate success. At two 
 and twenty he suggested at the moment the means 
 of preventing the invasion of his country, and 
 forced Europe to give him her confidence, without 
 justifying it or paying for it by his victories or his 
 conquests ; by his tenacity, by his coolness in re- 
 verses, by his patience, and by the lassitude and 
 exhaustion of his enemies, he gained that which 
 the fortune of war had denied him ; in order to 
 comply with the schemes of another — schemes by 
 no means conceived in his favour — he contracted a 
 marriage the most advantageous and most fortunate 
 which he could have made.^ Such was the manner 
 in which his short existence was occupied. 
 
 It has often been asked what a man so firm and 
 so sure of himself desired ; what so lofty a spirit 
 sought to attain ; and how much an intellect so 
 clear and so sagacious foresaw, whilst he directed 
 war without passion, and public aifairs without 
 
 * With Princess Mary of York, daughter ol James II. 
 
WILLIAM in. 401 
 
 emotion, and took part in religious movements 
 without violence ? This nature, so difficult to un- 
 derstand, has been studied with attention. William 
 of Orange has been reproached, not with a passion 
 for war, but with its abuse, with filial insensibility, 
 with favouritism, and with indifference, not as to 
 the political means he employed, but as regarded 
 the men who served him. His courage was daunt- 
 less on the field of battle ; he was bold and enter- 
 prising, though ready to temporize ; he was both 
 supple and obstinate, silent and confiding. At heart 
 he was simple, loyal, and laborious ; he gave up his 
 time to the affairs which were of the most impor- 
 tance to the world, while he loved quiet and a 
 country life. He was the representative of a revo- 
 lution directed against absolute power ; but with all 
 this he remained unpopular, to the day of his death, 
 in the very country which owed to him its freedom 
 from tyranny. He was remarkably sagacious in the 
 conduct of questions of general policy, and still he 
 showed a want of skill and adroitness in conduct- 
 ing the parliamentary government of his adopted 
 country. A character like that of William of 
 Orange — harsh and cold in its honesty, indifferent 
 as to the displeasure it causes to others, when its 
 own convictions are formed, and the object to be 
 attained clearly defined — must of necessity make 
 many enemies. He had likewise many sincere 
 friends, whose aff'ection he retained all his life, and 
 for whose sake he sacrificed important interests. He 
 
 D D 
 
402 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 was married to an English princess, and was King 
 of England without knowing much of the language ; 
 his health was always feeble, and yet he was as 
 indifferent to bodily suffering as he was to personal 
 danger ; he was hardened to fatigue, but prematurely 
 old ; his countenance was not attractive, but it 
 was full of character, with a glance of fire, and a 
 nose hooked like the beak of an eagle ; sickly and 
 asthmatical as he was, he was more loved by his 
 charming wife Mary than ever were Louis XIV. 
 or Charles II, with all their gallantry, by any 
 woman. The King of France has been justly blamed 
 for having thoughtlessly carried the war into Hol- 
 land, and thus roused the genius and armed the 
 hands of such a man. 
 
 It was not, however, during these first years, when 
 Conde was in the Dutch provinces, when Vauban 
 was laying siege to Maestricht, and when Turenne 
 was immortalizing his name by his campaigns in 
 Westphalia — of which he gives such graphic accounts 
 in his Memoirs — it was not when Louis XIV, or 
 rather his generals, were gaining battles and taking 
 towns, that he could be expected to admit his attack 
 on Holland to have been a mistake. The formation 
 of the Grand Alliance furnished the French at first 
 only with the subject of a Latin epigram, expressive 
 of confidence on their own part and contempt for 
 their enemies — sentiments which no one about the 
 French monarch dreamt of contradicting, whilst 
 Conde was victorious over the Dutch, Turenne over 
 
"^ 0'^ TUP', ^ ^ 
 
 WILLIAM II L 
 
 the Imperialists, and Crequi over the Spaniards. If 
 we except the success of De Ruyter over the com- 
 bined fleet of France and England, the Dutch war 
 may be taken to be the most brilliant military 
 episode in Louis XIV/s reign. He certainly did 
 not himself fight the battle of Seneffe, or direct in 
 person the siege of so many towns with such signal 
 success, any more than he wrote the Misanthrope 
 ovAthaUe, which have also contributed to his glory: 
 but the favours of fortune were so brilliant, and the 
 praises lavished on him, though not remarkable for 
 delicacy, were so frequent and so noisy, that a more 
 austere man than Louis XIV. might well have been 
 intoxicated by them. He may be excused, if, with- 
 out being mad, he believed that all the exploits and 
 all the remarkable productions of the age were 
 attributable to him, and that his genius might be 
 placed on the same level as his triumphs. 
 
 It is a most curious fact that Louis XIY. was as 
 much exhausted by his victories as William of 
 Orange was strengthened and raised by his defeats. 
 The days of disaster which overwhelmed the old 
 age of the French monarch, and which gave him 
 the opportunity of showing the courage and pride 
 that were in him — those days had not yet arrived. 
 No one could then have surmised that the monarch 
 who was so successful and so young at forty, would 
 soon afterwards cease to be young, and then would 
 cease to be successful ; that he would live through 
 thirty years of feebleness and ennui, and at the last, 
 
 D D 2 
 
404 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 through ten years of reverses ; that the meu most 
 eminent in war, and in the cabinet, would disappear 
 one after the other, and that, after having had succes- 
 sors of mean ability, they would have others whose 
 action would be disastrous ; that France would lose 
 its conquests, and would see foreign troops on its 
 own soil ; and, lastly, that the English nation would 
 expel the dynasty of the Stuarts, and, under a new 
 government, add enormous weight to the coalition 
 against France. Such an insight into the distant 
 future is given to no man, nor can any one overleap 
 in his mind the third of a century, especially when 
 history moved at so rapid a rate, and events suc- 
 ceeded each other so quickly. But taking a more 
 limited view, a disinterested and sober eye might 
 certainly have recognised what was clearly seen and 
 foretold by Colbert. A war like this against com- 
 bined Europe was too costly a luxury for the country 
 to bear; and military successes in Spain and in 
 Germany exhausted the treasury without bringing 
 anything into it. It was also obvious that the alli- 
 ance of the King of France and of England was a 
 merely superficial union. Charles 11. remained the 
 ally of Louis XIV. only on the condition of doing 
 without his Parliament, and drawing secret subsidies 
 from the French monarch. The war with the States- 
 General of Holland was unpopular in England, and 
 the King of France had fewer friends in the country 
 than the head of the Dutch Eepublic. It was 
 obvious that the promises which Charles IT. — who 
 
WILLIAM III. 405 
 
 was utterly indifFerent in all matters, even in 
 those of religion — made to Louis XIV, that he 
 would protect and promote the interests of the 
 Catholics on all occasions, could not but be most 
 distasteful to the Anglican spirit of the Parliament. 
 Measures altogether in the interest of the English 
 Church had been wrung from the King by the Com- 
 mons and by public opinion. The French monarch, 
 through his active and able ambassadors, endea- 
 voured, by every sort of means, to secure friends 
 among the men of influence in England, but his suc- 
 cess was small. On the other hand, it was quite 
 evident that in Holland the party of De "Witt — the 
 old French party — although still powerful in some 
 towns, did not carry with it the majority of the Dutch 
 people. Louis XIV, whose finances were exhausted, 
 was very soon anxious to make peace, even on the 
 morrow of his most brilliant victories ; whilst Wil- 
 liam of Orange, beaten and retreating, ardently 
 desired the continuance of the war. 
 
 Such was the true position of afiairs : it was 
 fully understood by William of Orange in Holland, 
 by Colbert in France, and by all the enlightened 
 men of the House of Commons in England. 
 
 The diplomatic correspondence of the French 
 agents at that time at the Hague, at Vienna, and in 
 London, gives the most curious and detailed ac- 
 count of the eff'orts made by Louis XIV. to break 
 up the coalition. Lionne was dead, and the King 
 himself carried on the correspondence with his 
 
406 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 ambassadors. The greater part of their despatches 
 are preserved in the memoirs of the time, or in the 
 public archives ; they prove that Louis XIV, though 
 intoxicated by success, had considerable clearness 
 of intellect, and that, along with the passion for 
 military glory, he had a certain aptitude for a cold 
 and crafty diplomacy ; he made use of small means, 
 and he appealed to the lowest passions ; so that his 
 diplomacy, whilst it was keen and skilful, was not 
 always marked by a kingly spirit. The letters of 
 Colbert de Croissy and of the Marquis de Euvigny, 
 the ambassadors in London, exhibit the active steps 
 which they took to maintain the alliance between 
 Louis and Charles, and to gain over friends to the 
 French alliance among the politicians of that day ; 
 they describe too, at the same time, the difficulties 
 which these manoeuvres encountered, and the neces- 
 sity under which they laboured of resting satisfied 
 with but doubtful success among subordinate people. 
 French diplomacy, which failed in preventing the 
 marriage of William of Orange to the King's niece, 
 had two objects in view, between which it occasion- 
 ally vacillated. Its first aim was to induce Charles 
 personally and openly to favour the Catholics ; and 
 its next object was to detach the Government and 
 the Houses of Parliament from Holland and from 
 the Continental League. Charles II, as is well 
 known, died a convert to the Catholic faith ; but 
 until that time there was no reason to believe that 
 he had more than a preference for Catholicism. 
 
WILLIAM in. 407 
 
 Between Charles I, who died a Protestant, and 
 James II, whose Catholicism was openly avowed, 
 the Catholicism of Charles II. appears hesitating, 
 doubtful, and tardy. One difficulty which weighed 
 on his government, was felt equally in the next 
 reign, and later still in that of William of Orange — 
 the difficulty of inducing the House of Commons to 
 vote supplies for carrying on war, more especially a 
 war in concert with France. Charles 11. had recourse 
 to a variety of expedients, to avoid summoning 
 Parliament and asking for supplies. His most 
 frequent resource was to accept personal gifts from 
 Louis XIV, or to conclude with that monarch certain 
 financial arrangements, which were only known to 
 one or two confidential advisers. Louis XI Y. gave 
 his money freely to meet the prodigal expenses of 
 Charles 11. ; but when there was a question of in- 
 creasing the military force of England, Louis doubted 
 whether it were better for him that there should be 
 an English army or not ; whether the advantage 
 that Charles might derive from his arms to control 
 public opinion, or to overawe Parliament, was not 
 more than counterbalanced by the danger of seeing 
 that army used sooner or later to reinforce the other 
 enemies of France on the Continent. 
 
 Such was tlie state of affairs between England 
 and France. 
 
 In Austria, the Chevalier de Gremonville, an 
 ambassador of consummate ability, who remained in 
 that country many years, did his best by fair words 
 
408 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 or threats to detach the Emperor from the coalition. 
 All the resources of his energetic and active mind 
 failed, however, after the commencement of the cam- 
 paigns in Holland. Gremonville left Vienna the 
 year after hostilities had begun, and, as the war 
 spread, William of Orange acted in concert with 
 Montecuculli. But before this Gremonville had 
 utterly failed in his negotiations with the Emperor 
 for the partition between France and Austria of the 
 dominions of the Spanish monarchy, in anticipation 
 always of the approaching death of the Spanish king, 
 Charles II. The details of this negotiation, assuredly 
 the greatest which the annals of diplomacy can offer, 
 are invested with a romantic and dramatic interest, 
 in a most remarkable historical work on the Spanish 
 succession.^ Charles II. of Spain was only seven 
 years old when this negotiation took place, and he 
 lived till he was forty. 
 
 With regard to Holland, the Memoirs of the Count 
 d'Avaux, who filled the post of ambassador at the 
 Hague, make us acquainted with the state of men s 
 minds there, and with the struggle of the Orange 
 party against what remained of the party of De Witt. 
 They show us the trouble taken by the ambassador 
 of France to support and advance the latter faction, 
 which wished for peace, while at the same time he 
 opposed the Stadtholder and his friends, who desired 
 the continuance of the war. The anxiety of Louis 
 
 ^ Nigociations relatives a la Succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV, 
 &c., vol. ii. p. 123, &c. By M. Mignet. 
 
WILLIAM IlL 409 
 
 XIV. to conclude peace had become intense, long 
 before his desire was accomplished. As he had made 
 many conquests, it was certain that, whatever were 
 the conditions of peace, he would be allowed to 
 retain some important places. D'Avaux displayed 
 marvellous activity ; he put himself into personal 
 communication with the members of the Estates, 
 called upon them all at their own houses, and was 
 insinuating and profuse in his compliments and his 
 flatteries, to a degree far beyond what could have 
 been expected from the ambassador of the great 
 King. 
 
 The Peace of Nimeguen was at last signed, and 
 by it were secured to Louis XIY. Franche-Comte, 
 and some important places in the Spanish Low 
 Countries on his northern frontier. 
 
 III. 
 
 This was the culminating point of the reign of 
 Louis XIV. Although the coalition had prevented 
 him from attaining the full object of his designs 
 against the House of Austria, which had been to 
 absorb by conquest so much of the territory belong- 
 ing to Spain as would secure him against the eflfect 
 of a will preserving the whole inheritance intact 
 in the family, yet his armies had been constantly 
 successful, and many of his opponents were evi- 
 dently tired of the struggle. It is true that the 
 
410 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 coalition had withstood him, and had held him in 
 check, without having beaten him ; yet with the 
 exception of the Prince of Orange, it was anxious 
 to break up. Conde and Turenne were both dead ; 
 but Luxembourg had still many laurels to gather, 
 and Colbert had some years to live. The King's 
 language was confident and haughty. The Empire 
 and Spain had bowed the neck in the conferences 
 of Nimeguen. In France the respect that sur- 
 rounded the throne was profound, and the people 
 had as yet uttered no complaint ; no sign was yet 
 visible on the surface ; the star of Louis XIV. had 
 not yet lost its brightness. 
 
 Some years passed thus, with the appearance of 
 calm. Europe was conquered ; and when peace 
 was broken, because, as was said, the Treaty of 
 Nimeguen was not duly executed, the events of the 
 war were for some time neither brilliant nor im- 
 portant, for several campaigns began and ended 
 without any considerable result. During this time 
 the expenditure of Louis XIV. was enormous in 
 every way, and the luxury of his Court was ruinous ; 
 whilst the embarrassments of the English Court, 
 then allied with that of France, and the penury 
 of the English crown, were constantly increasing. 
 But no one about Louis XIV. seemed to care, since 
 the protection of the French monarch was thus ren- 
 dered more indispensable to the House of Stuart. 
 
 There was, as it were, a halt in the progress of 
 public affairs. 
 
WILLIAM in. 411 
 
 Then, at the end of this period of a few years, 
 which was, we may say, the dividing ridge between 
 the two halves of the reign, Colbert, the minister 
 of the years of success, died, but no one took up the 
 mantle that fell from the shoulders of this able 
 organizer and reformer, to whose counsels so few 
 had listened. Louvois inherited his importance in 
 the councils of his sovereign, but not his functions 
 or his capacity, and, like all courtiers who were 
 men of ability, he showed himself more capable of 
 meeting the difficulties of to-day than anxious to 
 insure security for the morrow/ 
 
 ^ L'Histoire de Louvois, by M. Camille Rousset (4 vols, in 8vo.), has 
 justly had a considerable success with the public and the literary 
 world. The work is remarkable for the extent and the novelty of its 
 research ; for the patient and discriminating examination of the docu- 
 ments, hitherto unknown, belonging to the War Office in Paris ; for 
 the force and the truth of its conclusions, and for the excellence of 
 its execution. M. Rousset has by no means exaggerated the merits 
 of Louvois : he is not excessive in his admiration, even after having 
 lived so many years in intimacy and familiarity with him. He gives 
 us a better knowledge and a closer view of the character of the 
 minister who for thirty years guided public aflairs in the reign of 
 Louis XIV. But M. Rousset does not pretend to alter the judgment 
 of history in regard to Louvois. In his book, and after a perusal of 
 his voluminous correspondence, Louvois remains very much what he 
 was before. We must recognise this as an additional merit in the 
 author, and praise his unprejudiced mind. When an author devotes 
 himself to so profound a study of the life of a celebrated man, it is 
 difficult to avoid being carried away in some degree by love for the 
 subject. The book of M. Rousset is entirely exempt from this fault. 
 Louvois is shown to us in this narrative, such as we have always 
 known him to be— the laborious, devoted, and rigorous agent of a 
 policy which was dangerous for the King and ruinous to the country ; 
 the general results of which he himself did not clearly see. He was 
 able, resolute, and full of invention in all matters of detail ; but he 
 lacked foresight, openness, and freedom of speech, in discussing the 
 
412 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 In the meantime, the health of the King was 
 altering for the worse ; he was prostrated by a 
 painful malady ; but above all his spirits were 
 affected, and premature old age was creeping over 
 him.^ His tastes and habits were no longer the 
 same. The passionate lover of Madame de Monte- 
 span became the clandestine husband of an am- 
 bitious, grave, and patient woman, who was older 
 than himself. 
 
 At length Louis XIV. entered on the second half 
 of his reign, which differed widely from the first. 
 
 Thus the prosperity of the monarch had gone on 
 increasing during his youth ; it then stopped ; and 
 we shall soon see how it began to diminish. 
 
 During this second period of more than thirty 
 years, which begins after the Treaty of Mmeguen 
 and lasts till the Peace of Utrecht, events succeed 
 each other in complete logical sequence, so that 
 the reign presents itself as one continuous whole, 
 with a regular movement of ascension and decline. 
 
 important resolutions taken in that reign. When we follow him closely 
 in his daily work, he appears a remarkable man ; but, when we observe 
 him from a distance, and seize only the general outline of his measures, 
 he appears unworthy of his position and of himself. M. Rousset was 
 not called upon to devote much attention to Colbert ; but he marks 
 with care the immense distance between these two men, who have 
 nothing in common, and who do not belong to the same class. The one 
 had a great aptitude for public aflFairs, and was led by a very ordinary 
 form of ambition, while the other was remarkable for depth of character, 
 and for a serious spirit : he met with a poor reward for his services, 
 for he was anxious as to the future, which he foresaw and dared to 
 foretell. Colbert was in fact too clear-sighted to serve Louis XIV, 
 who thwarted him, and did not share his presentiments of evil. 
 ^ Journal de la Sant6 du roi Louis XIV y from 1647 to 1711. 
 
WILLIAM III. 413 
 
 Fortune had changed ; and when the old errors 
 were once laid bare, there was no man of genius 
 at hand ready to repair or to conceal them : on the 
 contrary, they were aggravated by new faults, the 
 consequences of which were more disastrous, and 
 produced still more terrible disorder in the constitu- 
 tion of the country. Everything deteriorated at the 
 same time — the faculties of men, the luck of the 
 King, and the state of the country. The war was 
 still carried on with success ; but the moment came 
 when the spectacle changed. The leading principle 
 of the reign remained the same ; it was always the 
 desire to weaken the House of Austria, or to secure 
 an advantageous partition of the Spanish succession. 
 But the Emperor of Germany was protected by 
 the coalition, and the King of Spain, whose death 
 was considered imminent, would not make up his 
 mind to die. 
 
 During these years also, the affairs of England 
 were destined to occupy much of the public atten- 
 tion of Europe. The time was shortly to come when 
 the personal friendship of the Stuarts would cease 
 to warrant any sacrifice, and when Louis XIY. 
 would have his confidence in the stability of that 
 dynasty shaken. On the other hand, the influence 
 of Holland, or rather of the man who guided the 
 policy of that country, would soon make itself felt 
 in England, and become still more powerful. 
 
 The Stuarts, before their final expulsion, raised 
 for themselves embarrassments and dangers which 
 
■■^. 
 
 ^ 
 
 414 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 were constantly increasing ; and the English interests, 
 which they thwarted, became more involved with 
 those of the Continent. 
 
 This is the proper place to revert to the remarks 
 which have been made in a former page, on the 
 double nature of the wars and of the events of the 
 seventeenth century ; for they are here capable of 
 a new application. 
 
 During the first League, when the Prince of 
 Orange was contending against Louis XIV. with the 
 co-operation of the Emperor of Germany, of the 
 King of Spain, and of the Electors on the Rhine, 
 the religious element played only a secondary part fl 
 in the war. But we shall see this element make 
 its presence more manifest ; it will complicate and 
 enlarge the sphere of action, and add to the forces 
 combined in the struggle against France : — it im- 
 pressed on the wars which fill up the latter part 
 of the life of William III, that peculiar double 
 character which is so marked in those of the be- 
 ginning of the century, and which appears still 
 more strikingly in those in which England took a 
 part. 
 
 Thus the influence of Protestant England made 
 itself more and more felt in the affairs of Europe, 
 in proportion as the government of the Stuarts, 
 from its violence, its unpopularity, and from the 
 opposition offered to it, was approaching its end. 
 
 The last Stuarts for some time hesitated between 
 two ideas. One of these was great and simple, 
 
 1 
 
WILLIAM TIL 415 
 
 and it consisted in accepting, and acting loyally up 
 to, the constitution — in living on good terms with 
 the Parliament — and, abroad, in forming alliances 
 with those whose interest it was to see England 
 free and powerful, against those who had a contrary 
 interest : it was, in one word, to maintain a policy 
 of defence against the policy of aggression ; and it 
 was the more straightforward and the better system 
 of the two. 
 
 The other idea consisted in pursuing, but in a 
 milder form, the same course which led Charles T. 
 to the scaffold — in quarrelling with the Parliament, 
 and practically contesting its power of control — 
 but endeavouring to beguile and manage it, by 
 seeking out ability wherever it could be found 
 united with ambition and suppleness of character. 
 It consisted in endeavouring to divide parties, or 
 setting them one against the other, with a view to 
 neutralize their power ; leaning all the while on 
 France as the representative of monarchical power ; 
 and finally, in conciliating the friendship of Louis 
 XIV, and encouraging the influence which he 
 exercised over England, and English statesmen, and 
 the government itself. 
 
 What we have said of the character and mode of 
 thought of Charles II. would sufiice to show that 
 he wished not to adopt either the one or the other 
 of these two systems, but to act sometimes on the 
 one, and sometimes on the other ; he did not desire 
 to share, while he yielded to them, the reactionary 
 
^ 
 
 416 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 passions which were at work around his person, and 
 about the restored monarchy, and he had no incli- 
 nation to break definitively with any party. He 
 endeavoured to reduce, without destroying, the 
 action of the Parliament, and to maintain an alli- 
 ance with Louis XIV, which would be kept as 
 secret as possible. He was a Catholic, without 
 avowing or showing it, and he thus led, without 
 thinking of the morrow, a daily life of careless 
 pleasure, while he exhausted every available means 
 to obtain money. If, as we may well believe, this 
 was his object, he had the skill to attain it, for he 
 died possessed of the royal authority, according to 
 his conception of it. 
 
 James XL was more ambitious, and more violent, 
 than his brother, and so humble a career would not 
 have satisfied him. 
 
 James II. is represented, for the most part, under 
 the most odious colours, and in Lord Macaulay's 
 History he is described as a monster of vice and of 
 meanness, hard and implacable in the exercise of 
 power, passionate and yet cowardly, a despot 
 without grandeur, totally devoid of heart in success 
 as well as in danger. May there not be some exag- 
 geration in this sketch of his character, and may not 
 the eminent historian, whose work, from the very 
 first day of its appearance, has enjoyed the greatest 
 popularity, have allowed certain of his judgments to 
 be a little too warmly coloured ? It is difiicult to 
 keep oneself clear of all strong feeling when a man 
 
WILLIAM III. 417 
 
 has himself been engaged in political strife ; and 
 when he describes events having more or less ana- 
 logy with those which are passing round us. 
 
 James II. did not, throughout his reign, like his 
 brother, waver between two systems ; but he hesi- 
 tated before he adopted one of them. The position 
 of the restored Stuarts was suiSiciently strong to 
 enable them to run counter, in some measure, to the 
 moral instincts of the country, without compro- 
 mising the stability of their crown. Notwithstand- 
 ing the great defects of Jameses character, and the 
 notorious difference between his religion and that of 
 his subjects ; and notwithstanding the opposition 
 raised against him before his accession, which even 
 went the length of a vote in Parliament excluding 
 him from the throne, he still at his accession might 
 flatter himself that he possessed considerable power. 
 All those who were Tory in politics, and who sup- 
 ported the Established Church in religion, were dis- 
 posed for their part to bear a good deal, and showed 
 the greatest dislike to any new attempt at a Common- 
 wealth. Many writers have held the opinion that 
 James II, by a discreet management of the House 
 of Commons, could still have remained the Catholic 
 sovereign of a Protestant country, and could have 
 kept up a close alliance with the King of France. 
 But this would have required a certain spirit of 
 moderation towards others, and a certain amount of 
 toleration in carrying out the laws on religious 
 matters. 
 
 E E 
 
n 
 
 418 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 It has been asserted that James 11. wavered some 
 time which of the two systems he should adopt — 
 that which might have saved him, or that which 
 cost him his throne ; he asked himself whether he 
 should boldly join the coalition against France, or 
 whether he should give free scope to his instincts 
 of despotism, and contrive to remain at peace with 
 France, as a means of crushing the liberties of his 
 country 1 
 
 This theory admits of argument, and we may 
 believe that James II. had taken into consideration 
 the broader view of his policy in England before he 
 made his choice of acting on the narrower one. 
 
 The friendship between Louis XIV. and James II. 
 lasted as long as it could last, — that is to say, from 
 the accession to the death of the latter, and it caused 
 incalculable mischief to both. Before he allied 
 himself with the Stuarts, and during the lifetime of 
 Charles II, Louis XIY, though he came triumphantly 
 out of the struggle with the first coalition, quite 
 understood that in the long run he could not main- 
 tain his ground. He fully appreciated the worth 
 and the moral authority of the Prince of Orange ; 
 and the Count d'Avaux, as we have already said, 
 condescended to make the most patient efforts to 
 detach him from the Grand Alliance, and bring him 
 within the orbit of France. But his attempts were 
 unsuccessful : and the Prince was not to be shaken. 
 Louis XIY. made him what he himself thought to 
 be tempting offers ; for instance, he proposed to him 
 
WILLIAM IIL 419 
 
 the sovereignty of Holland, recognised by France. 
 But could it be thought that such a bait as this 
 would induce a man of his stamp to abandon the 
 mission to which he had devoted his whole life ? 
 
 The alliance of Louis XIV. with the Stuarts did 
 not present the same difficulties. Charles IL was 
 not a man likely to offer any resistance, when 
 temptation assumed the form of ready money : he 
 promised Louis XIV. everything that a man of so 
 fickle and irresolute a character could promise. 
 
 James IL was an associate on whom Louis XIV. 
 could place more confidence than he could on his 
 brother, although the engagement which existed 
 between these two monarchs was by no means 
 frank. The French protection, instead of giving 
 James II. the strength which was wanting, had the 
 contrary result ; it weakened him, and it may be 
 said that this was done intentionally. Louis, in his 
 policy towards England, had at that time three 
 objects in view : he wished to encourage James in 
 his attempt to govern without a Parliament ; to 
 assist him in his struggle with the various shades 
 of Keformers; and to keep him away, as far as 
 possible, from the coalition. He possibly guessed 
 one thing which James IL seems never to have 
 dreamt of — that the progress of parliamentary 
 o-overnment would become a material element in 
 the grandeur of England, and that a King of 
 England, when, like Charles I, he endeavoured to 
 become absolute, was in fact lowering his own 
 
 E E 2 
 
420 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 value as an European sovereign by destroying the 
 true basis of liis power at home.^ Thus the friend- 
 ship of Louis XIV, in every point of view, had in 
 it somewhat that was dangerous and perfidious : it 
 kept alive the evil passions of James 11. ; it made 
 him unpopular by the one fact that the alliance — 
 not with a King of France, but with this particular 
 King of France — was repugnant to the English 
 nation ; it weakened him at home and abroad ; 
 it aggravated and embittered religious strife in 
 England ; and, to sum up all, it did not in the end 
 prevent his expulsion. 
 
 On his side too, James II, all whose passions 
 were blind, could not but be a mischievous ally to 
 Louis XIV. It was just as James came to the 
 throne that the persecution of the Huguenots com- 
 menced in France ; and Louis XIV. may have 
 thought he would find great assistance in a Catholic 
 king of England, and that the union of their two 
 wills would make each of them more powerful. 
 James II, however, imposed heavy sacrifices on 
 France with no corresponding advantage ; by his 
 political violence he brought about the Kevolution, 
 which overthrew him ; he thus paved the way for 
 the misfortunes which awaited Louis XIV. in his 
 
 * Letter from Lord Conway to the Prince of Orange, March 1681. 
 {Archives de la Maison dJ Orange-Nassau. Second Series, vol. v. p. 493.) 
 Letter of the Ambassador von Beuningen to the Prince of Orange, 
 Feb. 10, 1682. {Guillaume III. et Louis XIV. By the Baron de 
 Grovestins, vol. iv. Appendix, p. 310.) 
 
WILLIAM III. 421 
 
 old age, and caused England to enter permanently 
 into the coalition. 
 
 We state, without exaggeration, our opinion of 
 this alliance, and of its results. 
 
 We are justified in asserting that, during the three 
 years of his reign, James 11. never once received 
 good advice from Louis XIV. The English people, 
 as we have seen, were disposed to show indulgence 
 to their king. The majority in the first Parliament 
 which James summoned received him with kindly 
 courtesy : it was composed chiefly of new members, 
 had nothing in common with the descendants of 
 the Republican party, nor with the soldiers of 
 Cromwell; but represented rather the posterity of 
 the men who, on certain conditions, would have 
 been friends and defenders of Charles L It required 
 violent measures to drive this majority into oppo- 
 sition to the Court. In order to accomplish this, it 
 was necessary to send to gaol the most respectable 
 prelates of the English Church, and alarm the con- 
 sciences of all men — to abolish the privileges of the 
 Universities — to annul the franchises of the muni- 
 cipal corporations — to repeal the Test Act, which 
 was one of the great supports of the English 
 Church — to place the religion of the country at 
 the mercy of a commission — to send for troops 
 from Ireland to defend the throne, and to entrust 
 the most unlimited judicial power to a man like 
 Jeffreys, a sanguinary savage, a compound at once 
 of monster and buffoon. 
 
422 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 We are frequently, and very justly, astonished, 
 when a government is sliding blindly down the 
 slope towards a revolution, to see it served by men 
 of real capacity, who at first object to the extrava- 
 gance of the system, but are by degrees drawn by 
 a sort of fatality into the abyss. James II. had, as 
 his President of the Council, a man of remarkable 
 intelligence, talents, and activity. But Sunderland 
 followed, and seconded James in all his follies ; he 
 conspired with the French Ambassador against the 
 liberties and the honour of the country ; he sent to 
 the Tower the members who voted against granting 
 supplies for the army, and he even defended what 
 was called the '* Dispensing Power" of the crown — 
 that is to say, the power to infringe the laws of 
 the Church ; he became one of the High Commission 
 Court, which had been abolished since Elizabeth's 
 time, but which had been lately re-established by 
 James, being nothing more or less than a High 
 Court of Inquisition. 
 
 Sunderland had not shrunk from any one of these 
 measures ; but, when he saw the crown tottering, 
 and the most honest and the most peaceful men 
 joining the party of the Ee volution, and becoming 
 passive tools in the hands of the more active, he 
 then, without quitting his post, caused words of 
 encouragement to be conveyed to William of 
 Orange. Without a single scruple he betrayed 
 the man whose senseless acts he had seconded and 
 been responsible for, and was swept into the gulf 
 
WILLIAM III. 423 
 
 Sunderland's character was enterprising and cor- 
 rupt; he fascinated people by his talents, but he 
 had no conscience ; he deserted, before it was utterly- 
 lost, the cause which he had served only from ambi- 
 tion and want of sense.^ 
 
 It was not one of the least of James's errors to 
 imagine that he had something to gain from the 
 division of religious parties in England. He had 
 to deal with three great divisions of the English 
 religious world : these were the Catholics, those 
 who supported the Established Church and the 
 bishops, and the Dissenters or Nonconformists, who 
 were divided into Presbyterians, Independents, and 
 Latitudinarians — names which explain correctly 
 enough the nature of their views. James II. had a 
 scheme which, under other circumstances, Charles I. 
 had tried once before, of bringing together the 
 Dissenters and the Catholics, the two parties most 
 alien from each other. He was persuaded that 
 they had a common interest opposed to the Church 
 of England, and that the Dissenters, who felt most 
 strongly in the country, would think their chance of 
 liberty greater if they had to deal with Catholics 
 rather than with the Anglicans. He wished to enrol 
 the sons of all the enemies to the throne, — of the 
 Roundheads and the regicides, — against the de- 
 scendants of the Cavaliers. In pursuance of this 
 
 ^ Sunderland, under Charles II, had voted for the bill which ex- 
 cluded James 11. from the throne. (Correspondence between the Duke 
 of York and the Prince of Orange.) 
 
424 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 scheme he published his " Declarations for Liberty 
 of Conscience '' (1687), from which he expected a 
 marvellous result. He had not the good sense to 
 see that the Dissenters would view this attempt 
 with extreme distrust, and that the toleration which 
 accompanied it would only be, in their eyes, a blind. 
 William of Orange now sent a confidential agent to 
 England, charged to inculcate on the members of 
 the English Church the fact that, in presence of 
 the danger impending over every form of Pro- 
 testant belief under the government of James, it 
 was their interest to treat for the moment with 
 the Dissenters, reserving to themselves the right 
 hereafter of again separating from them. This idea 
 was in the right direction ; and when the revolu- 
 tionary movement, provoked by James II, became 
 decisive, it was not the approximation, but the 
 actual co-operation of all the different sections of 
 Eeformers that imparted much additional force to the 
 blow. The Church party, which was mixed up more 
 or less with the Tories, allowed the revolutionary 
 flood to roll by, without opposing it, when they 
 were persuaded that there was no longer security 
 for any one under the government of James II. 
 
 Thus the Second Eevolution in England was 
 accomplished. As is usual in great public com- 
 motions, when a dynasty is expelled without the 
 constitution of the country being actually changed, 
 it was effected without any reaction, and almost 
 without any excess. The substitution of one sove- 
 
WILLIAM III. 425 
 
 reign for another was not even preceded by a 
 conflict. The party of the dethroned monarch 
 rallied round him at the last hour, but they did 
 not defend him; for they wished to abridge the 
 crisis so as to avoid the evident necessity of 
 desertion. On the last day the enthusiasm was 
 general, and the supporters of the Crown, who were 
 numerous, and the party in favour of a king who 
 would abide by the constitution and the Church, 
 laid down their arms, and allowed a government 
 hostile to the constitution to fall to the ground 
 without so much as holding out a hand to help 
 it. The Bishop of London showed great energy, 
 and by signing one of the documents which con- 
 tributed greatly to the change, he gave to the 
 event its due colour and importance. 
 
 To the very last, the King was obstinately blind. 
 The nation almost hustled him out of the palace 
 of his forefathers ; whilst, by a species of contra- 
 diction amounting almost to infatuation, although 
 he thought he was powerful, he made no attempt 
 to defend himself He never asked the royal troops 
 if he could depend upon their services. William 
 of Orange, Louis XIV, the Dutch, the French, 
 and the English of every shade of opinion, saw 
 the storm that was coming. The blot in the policy 
 of James had been clearly seen by Louis XIV, who 
 warned his ally, offered to assist him, and gave 
 notice to all those whom he looked upon as the 
 partisans of France in Holland. James II. un- 
 
426 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 graciously thanked Louis for his good intentions, 
 and informed the Dutch attached to the French 
 faction that the King of France was wrong in his 
 surmises. 
 
 The character of William of Orange protected 
 him from impatience, which was one of the dangers 
 incidental to his position. The national movement, 
 which impelled him, was such, that it required very 
 great judgment and firmness to read it aright, and 
 in his eyes this movement, violent as it was, still 
 seemed to lack depth : the temper of the English 
 people was passionate rather than resolute, and the 
 country, under the influence of a sort of frenzy, was 
 carried away beyond what it desired itself. "William 
 of Orange placed no reliance on it, and feared what 
 was to happen next. This was his first anxiety. 
 Moreover the attitude of the French monarch gave 
 him cause for thought. The operation of a descent 
 on England, which he had to carry out, in order to 
 insure success, required to be executed promptly ; 
 he had no time to make such combinations with his 
 allies on the Continent as would secure the safety 
 of the United Provinces against any sudden attack. 
 If the French army advanced towards Holland, 
 William's expedition to England might not only 
 fail, but be prevented. It was not to be supposed 
 that Louis XIY, whose good sense saw the crisis 
 which threatened the throne of James II, would 
 abstain from the defence of his ally, or that he 
 would prefer to renew, as he did, the war in 
 
WILLIAM III. 427 
 
 Germany, and lay waste the Palatinate. The third 
 cause of anxiety on the part of William of Orange 
 was Holland itself: he feared what the Dutch 
 would think of a perilous and costly expedition ; 
 and what would be said of it by the old French 
 faction, the merchants, and the clergy. For a long 
 time the Prince kept his projects secret, and he first 
 confided them to the Burgomasters of Amsterdam.^ 
 
 There was no difiiculty in finding men for the 
 expedition to England. The revocation of the 
 Edict of Nantes had drawn into every Protestant 
 country a number of refugees ready for an enter- 
 prise of such a nature. Marshal Schomberg, who 
 had left France on account of his religion, was a 
 brave officer, and many veterans of Turenne's army 
 had been driven by the persecution into exile, who 
 were sure to prove most valuable auxiliaries, both 
 as soldiers and as Protestants. 
 
 The private information of William of Orange, 
 his constant journeys, and his secret correspondence 
 had kept him tolerably well acquainted with the 
 state of afiairs in England. His wife, the Princess 
 Mary, was the daughter of James. More devoted 
 to her husband than to her father, she did her best 
 to dispel the anxiety which the former might have 
 felt for family reasons. She assured him that the 
 wishes of the country went with him. William 
 expressed a desire that a certain number of people, 
 eminent for their character and position, should 
 
 * Negociations du Comte cfAvaux, vol. vi. pp. 123, 899. 
 
428 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 make a positive appeal to liim. It was a letter to 
 this effect written to him, and signed by seven men 
 of eminence, that finally decided him. His mind, 
 inaccessible to any illusions, constantly warned him 
 that he was playing unaided for a frightful stake ; 
 inasmuch as in his own person he was about to 
 plunge England into a revolution, and to dethrone 
 his father-in-law ; he knew the English people did not 
 wish again for a Commonwealth ; and that without 
 being near at hand, without his connexion with the 
 royal family, and without security, which he alone 
 could give, for the continuance of the monarchy, 
 no revolution would take place. He argued, more- 
 over, that the rising in England, encouraged as it 
 was by the clergy, and provoked by the brutal 
 treatment of the Church, had a religious character, 
 especially in its outward forms. Now, how would 
 the Anglican Church — the Church of Henry VHI. 
 and of Elizabeth — which rejected a Catholic head, 
 accept the ecclesiastical supremacy of a Calvinist? 
 Here were just reasons for apprehension and for 
 scruples ; but his religious scruples were not the 
 strongest which he felt, for after all he went to 
 defend the cause of Protestantism. William of 
 Orange professed sincerely the religion in which he 
 had been born ; but he belonged to the latitudinarian 
 party ; he was disposed to show — as a Calvinist 
 treating with Anglicans, or as a Presbyterian treat- 
 ing with bishops — that species of courtesy which 
 is habitual and easy to men who, without making 
 
WILLIAM III. 429 
 
 their convictions subordinate to their worldly affairs, 
 are nevertheless very zealously occupied with matters 
 other than their religious belief. 
 
 As a connexion of the Stuarts, as a neighbour 
 of France, as a Dutch patriot, as a Calvinist and 
 therefore a Dissenter in England, William of Orange 
 had certain grounds of indecision and of doubt, 
 which, however, were one after the other got rid of. 
 His wife, the daughter of the Stuarts, began by 
 making his mind easy in regard to his position as 
 son-in-law of James II. Louis XIV, on his side, 
 began the war in Germany ; and was guilty of a 
 new and irredeemable fault while he seemed to 
 forget England and Holland in order to occupy 
 himself with Austria and Turkey. With regard to 
 religious matters, William was persuaded that, while 
 he was the devoted protector of the Protestant 
 cause in Europe, a Dutch Calvinist would not give 
 any serious offence to the Church of England. 
 Lastly, the people of Amsterdam, and the remaining 
 adherents of De Witt's party, gave him to under- 
 stand that their zeal for liberty in England and for 
 the Eeformed faith was stronger than their fear of 
 displeasing the French monarch, who filled their 
 country with Protestant refugees, and who had just 
 prohibited the import of Dutch herrings, together 
 with other articles of commerce, into France, and 
 had thus reduced the maritime population of Hol- 
 land to idleness. At the last moment the English 
 nation renewed their appeal to the Prince of 
 
430 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Orange, asking him, at the same time, not to bring 
 over more than fifteen thousand men. He brought 
 over an army of fourteen thousand soldiers, com- 
 posed partly of Dutch, French, and Germans, whose 
 uniform was as varied as their nationality. He took 
 leave of the States- General in a solemn meeting, in 
 which all except himself had tears in their eyes, and 
 he sailed from Helvoetsluys on the 16th Oct., 1688. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Thus was fulfilled the destiny of a man whose 
 sober and serious qualities, whose cold tempera- 
 ment, whose tenacity of purpose, and whose simple 
 and straightforward good sense assuredly led him 
 further on the path of success than would have 
 done a more imperious will, a more vehement 
 courage, or one of those characters which act on 
 men by appealing to their passions, and seek to 
 control events by their own energy. The head of a 
 small state of recent creation — the general of a re- 
 publican army, who had seldom been successful — 
 the son-in-law whom James H. had selected with 
 the view to please his future subjects — this man was 
 about, calmly and without emotion, to ascend the 
 throne of England. In undertaking this adventure 
 he manifested neither hurry nor confidence. The 
 troops which accompanied him were far too few to 
 
 I 
 
WILLIAM III. 431 
 
 pretend to measure their strengtli with the royal 
 forces. He announced himself, therefore, not as a 
 conqueror, but as a negotiator invited to mediate 
 between the King and his people, who had no mis- 
 sion but that of reconciling the Crown with its 
 subjects, and of securing to the English people 
 parliamentary liberty and the Protestant religion. 
 He seemed to think that by announcing in such 
 modest terms so perilous an enterprise, he should, in 
 the event of failure, somewhat break his fall, and 
 mitigate his humiliation. 
 
 It is probable that William thought himself 
 pretty sure of success even at the outset of his 
 enterprise. The taking possession caused him less 
 anxiety than the difficulties of the future. Viewed 
 in this light, the words which he addressed to the 
 English, when he presented himself before them, 
 were not altogether false. The feeling he had with 
 regard to the state of England was assuredly one 
 of mistrust, and we, who have the experience of two 
 centuries to guide us, think that his impressions 
 were not altogether free from prejudice. He felt 
 his way with some anxiety ; but he had already 
 accomplished too many things in his life, and had 
 advanced too far in his career, — his horizon was 
 too vast, and his object too high and definite, — to 
 allow of his drawing back. A character so deter- 
 mined as his does not easily abandon such a prize. 
 To destroy the dynasty of the Stuarts was, for the 
 cause which he supported, for that of Holland, for 
 
432 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the Protestant religion, and for the independence of 
 Europe, an object beyond all price. This task he 
 performed with all the firmness belonging to his 
 nature ; he patiently waited until certain desertions 
 took place which were not immediate, and he put 
 his foot down only when he knew that the ground 
 was firm ; he avoided any contest which might 
 engender bitter feeling; but he declared resolutely 
 that he would refuse every title but that of King ; 
 that he would neither be Regent, nor the Prince 
 Consort of the Queen. "He preferred," he said, 
 *' returning to Holland as Stadtholder, or even as 
 a simple citizen, with the satisfaction of having 
 restored liberty to a great country.'^ ^ He waited 
 till the last of the Stuarts had left London, never to 
 return, before he made his entry into the city. 
 
 The first days and the first acts of his reign show 
 that he believed the party of the dethroned family 
 to be more powerful, more deeply rooted, and more 
 closely bound up with the nation, than even the 
 Jacobites themselves held it to be ; and that he 
 attributed to a passing impulse the isolation in 
 which James II. found himself at the last moment. 
 
 ^ The proclamation of William and Mary, as King and Queen, by the 
 Convention composed of the two Houses of Parliament, did not make 
 the English monarchy an elective monarchy. Anne succeeded to her 
 sister Mary by right of succession. The act of the Convention was 
 equivalent to the exclusion of the Catholic branch of the House of 
 Stuart. Burke has proved, in a dissertation on the legal consequences 
 of the Revolution of 1688, that apart from this exclusion and this ex- 
 ception, the Convention gave its sanction to hereditary right. (Burke's 
 Reflections on the French Bevolution-) 
 
WILLIAM III. 433 
 
 It is probable, had he been asked the question 
 towards the close of his life, he would have honestly 
 confessed his first impressions to have been mis- 
 taken, and too much tinged with mistrust. 
 
 The Commonwealth had retained but little hold on 
 England ; and the power of Cromwell, in the hands 
 of an unworthy successor, had died out of itself. 
 The Kepublican party, represented by some few 
 religious fanatics rather than by statesmen, had 
 left no issue. During this revolutionary crisis it 
 did not raise its head, and we do not see that it 
 made any serious attempt to prevent the start of 
 the new monarchy. Neither in the House of Lords 
 nor in the House of Commons had it any avowed 
 organ of its own. 
 
 As to the other parties, the last two reigns had 
 made in them great changes, or rather great con- 
 fusion. Those two reigns had been but one struggle 
 — more or less vehement, according to the character 
 of the monarch, but a constant struggle — not so much 
 with the members of the Parliament as with the 
 system itself, and the very principle involved in it. 
 When in trouble, Charles H, as well as James H, had 
 applied to men who were bold, and often violent — 
 who were sometimes men of ability, but devoid of 
 all principle ; they were men full of resources for 
 an emergency in an absolute monarchy, but inad- 
 missible and utterly worthless in the government 
 of any free country. What had been the result ? 
 Under Charles H, shortly after a bloody revolu- 
 
 F F 
 
4^4\ HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tion, all political feeling, except at some particular 
 moments of danger and of reaction, had become 
 languid, and, wherever corruption could reach it, 
 it had become corrupt. Under the short adminis- 
 tration of James II, political parties, face to face 
 with a brutal despotism, and exposed to persecution 
 and the scaffold, had not been, some supporters and 
 some opponents of the government, but all banded 
 together in a common resistance. So much was this 
 the case, that, in all ranks of society, those whose 
 temperaments were cold and those who were most 
 enduring had in the end lost all patience, and con- 
 cluded that there was only one thing to be done — 
 to put an end to the present state of things. Whigs 
 and Tories alike, who had been excluded from any 
 part in the government, threatened with the axe of 
 the executioner, insulted in their religious feelings, 
 and interfered with in their families, now found 
 themselves united against the King. The Whigs 
 had outstripped the Tories in pushing matters to a 
 crisis. It was not hard to believe that their dislike 
 to the dynasty of the Stuarts was more profound, 
 and of older date, and that it was likely to be more 
 lasting. The Tories, it was said, if the new form of 
 government displeases them, will forgive the King 
 to-morrow morning, will regret his loss, maintain 
 that he would amend his ways, and declare that he 
 had been more than sufficiently punished. 
 
 When we try to explain the state of men's minds 
 during these political and parliamentary contests. 
 
WILLIAM III. 435 
 
 after having been, to a certain degree, benumbed 
 by the corrupting influence of Charles II, we see 
 that political parties had been driven, by the violence 
 of James II, into general opposition. The Catholics 
 did not amount, according to the computation of 
 some writers, to above one hundred thousand in a 
 population of fiye millions.^ The great majority of 
 Ireland was Catholic, and remained faithful to 
 James II. for more than a year after he lost 
 England. Scotland had sufiered less than England 
 from the excesses of the last reign, and had ac€[uired 
 certain habits of independence in matters of religion 
 and government which William of Orange after- 
 wards had some trouble in dealing with. 
 
 This sketch of the condition of England — such 
 as we now are enabled to give of it — does not agree 
 exactly with the idea which the new monarch formed 
 of his kingdom. His first advances were not made 
 to the "Whigs, his natural allies, who represented the 
 majority in the Commons, and had never had much 
 to do with the Restoration, whose ranks contained 
 the greatest number of Dissenters, and who were 
 thenceforth the supporters of religious toleration. 
 William of Orange imagined that they could never 
 prefer the Stuarts to him, and that the mere fact 
 of the revolution was for them a sufficient triumph. 
 The Tories, on the contrary, appeared to William to 
 deserve all his attention, because the greater part 
 of the men who had served the restored monarchy 
 
 ^ Macaulay, vol. ii. pp. 238, 241. 
 F F 2 
 
436 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 were to be found in their ranks ; and if they were 
 deprived of power, they would soon secretly corre- 
 spond with the court of St. Germain's, and conspire 
 against him. He thought also that he would have 
 to humour the Anglican party and the High Church- 
 men, who had been, for the moment, carried away 
 in the revolutionary torrent, but whose hereditary 
 principles in reality attached them to the House of 
 Stuart. 
 
 This judgment was open to question. The Tories 
 were divided into two parties, one of which was 
 considerable from its wealth and its power, and 
 would willingly have supported James II. had he 
 shown tolerance and moderation. But the greater 
 number among the Tories had been forced, by his 
 intractable temper, to separate from him ; and they 
 had done so after serious consideration, so that 
 they were not likely suddenly again to change their 
 opinions. The others only formed a fraction of a 
 party, to which the name of " Trimmers " was given. 
 These were men devoid of principle, such as, acting 
 only under the influence of ambition, are, in fact, 
 attached to no one, and William could never be sure 
 of them. Nevertheless, from among them he chose 
 his principal instruments of government, and this 
 was not one of the least of the charges brought 
 against him. Halifax, the most eloquent and the 
 most able of the party, and Danby were those 
 whom he first selected. He did not foresee that 
 defections might also occur among the Whigs ; and 
 
WILLIAM IIL 437 
 
 that the two most illustrious warriors of that day in 
 England — Eussell, who gained the sea-fight of La 
 Hogue, and Marlborough, the hero and almost the 
 dictator of the subsequent reign, both of them 
 Whigs — would transfer their personal attachment 
 without changing their party, and without becoming 
 Tories would become Jacobites. 
 
 He selected Tories for his first cabinet. In those 
 days a ministry bore no resemblance to what a 
 ministry became in later times ; it did not represent 
 the majority of the Houses of Parliament; it did 
 not take upon itself the responsibility of public 
 afiairs, nor was it composed of men who were neces- 
 sarily of the same way of thinking. The Tories 
 governed with the assistance of the members of the 
 opposition ; and the first important act, that which 
 sanctioned the accession of the new dynasty — that 
 is to say, the resolution that the throne was vacant, 
 which implied the legal proscription of the dethroned 
 family — was passed by the Whig majority, but con- 
 tested by the Tories until the very moment when 
 necessity compelled them to consent. 
 
 This system of conducting public affairs was 
 by no means easy, and it could not be otherwise. 
 The men who found themselves purposely excluded 
 from office, not on account of personal reasons, but 
 on account of the opinions which they held, thought 
 that neither the King nor the Eevolution had kept 
 the promises made to them, and they became mal- 
 contents ; while the fraction of a party to which 
 
438 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 William, by way of precaution and from mistrust, 
 had confided the power, was far from devoted to 
 him. Some of the most eminent members of the 
 clergy protested, and some of the highest prelates, 
 among whom was the Primate himself, refused to 
 take the oath of allegiance. The King was said to 
 be cross, haughty, and silent ; his foreign accent, as 
 well as his manners, were a subject of displeasure. 
 It was made matter of reproach, that only his own 
 countrymen, who had crossed the sea with him, were 
 admitted into his intimacy. His health was indif- 
 ferent ; his weak chest prevented him from being 
 able to breathe the air of London, and he did not 
 inhabit the palace in which the last sovereigns had 
 lived. The country, which did not like him, was 
 not to his liking : at the end of a year, the difficulty 
 of conducting the government had so discouraged 
 him that it required some effort to prevent him 
 from quitting England ; but his friends pressed him 
 to stay, and he stayed. 
 
 Thus the government, which was to make Eng- 
 land great, began by being unpopular. Until his 
 arrival in this country, William of Orange had had 
 to contend only with inevitable difficulties, which he 
 had no hand in raising ; now for the first time he 
 created difficulties by his own prejudices and by his 
 own faults. He struggled against this trial, one of 
 the most dangerous of all — that in which a strong 
 will is engaged in a false position. There was, in 
 this preference shown to the Tories, something 
 
WILLIAM IIL 439 
 
 arbitrary and unjust. After the lapse of two cen- 
 turies, it is difficult to discover the motive which, 
 immediately after a revolution, could induce him 
 to bring into power those who had been the most 
 opposed to the opinions which had prevailed, and 
 who were most closely allied with those which had 
 succumbed. 
 
 The inflexible character of the King, which had 
 done him such good service on other occasions, did 
 not yield. He was slow to admit the principle that 
 parties should have their turn of power. He made 
 no attempt to be affable, or to gain the attachment 
 of his English subjects, but remained a Dutchman 
 in his habits and in his friendships. His second 
 cabinet was again led by a Tory member of the 
 House of Lords, and from 1688 to 1694 William 
 governed the country, for the most part, through 
 men of Tory opinions. This was the result of the 
 prevailing confusion of ideas and convictions, and of 
 a certain relaxation of all the ties which compose 
 the engagements of parties. The new government 
 succeeded to fifty years of revolutionary anarchy 
 and of monarchical instability ; it was surrounded 
 by men who had been formed in the disheartening 
 school of a brutal revolution, or in that of a cor- 
 rupting despotism. The King did not take sufficient 
 account of this state of things, and hesitated to 
 introduce a system more analogous to the spirit of 
 the House of Commons. 
 
 These observations are applicable to all the first 
 
440 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 part of his reign; although they have not struck 
 with the same force all the English historians. 
 There are some who, from an excessive sympathy 
 for all the consequences of the Kevolution, take 
 pains to excuse the hesitation manifested in the 
 King's conduct. In their eyes what he did at the 
 beginning of his reign passes only for a process of 
 feeling his way in the dark, such as is inevitable in 
 every difficult undertaking. But they seem to forget 
 that this tentative process lasted for six years, and 
 that William UL did not reign quite fourteen. 
 
 But these difficulties and these errors of the go- 
 vernment did not make themselves felt abroad. 
 Altogether, the position of the sovereign was great 
 and strong. Looking at affairs in England only, 
 the Eevolution had excited hitherto among poli- 
 ticians some discontent and much indifference ; for 
 it had, as it were, refused to the triumphant party 
 their due share of the triumph, and it had given to 
 the nation, as a successor to the exiled king, a 
 prince who was unpopular and a foreigner. But 
 for Europe, in the difficult position in which she 
 then stood, the Eevolution was much what an un- 
 expected inheritance is to the failing fortunes of a 
 private individual. The coalition had henceforth 
 a bond of union ; and the eilects of this change, on 
 the affairs of the Continent, were yet more manifest 
 after the death of William III. than they were during 
 his lifetime. Events so important as these require 
 a long time before they reach their full develop- 
 
WILLIAM IIL 441 
 
 ment ; and changes so great as these take time in 
 coming into operation : it is afterwards in history 
 that they justly claim a place proportionate to their 
 results. The Stuarts, by following an hypocritical 
 and blind policy at home, and by assuming a sub- 
 ordinate position abroad, had allowed the importance 
 of England to fall away. If William of Orange did 
 not succeed in making himself personally liked, or 
 in making his government at first popular, he did 
 not at any rate allow, as Charles 11. had done, a 
 scaffold to be erected under his own eyes for 
 Sidney ; nor did he, like James II, fill his prisons 
 with respectable citizens. His policy, if for some 
 time it was unskilful, was at any rate loyal, and 
 under his rule England gained much in the world's 
 esteem. 
 
 The second coalition was neither more united nor 
 more firm than the first had been : but, after the 
 expulsion of the Stuarts, the germs of dissolution 
 no longer threatened the same dangers. Its mem- 
 bers felt, and were entitled to feel, more at their 
 ease. Spain might show her feebleness and inca- 
 pacity to give any real assistance ; Germany might 
 devote more of her thoughts to Turkey than to 
 European matters, and might delegate to England 
 and Holland as her maritime allies the care of doing 
 her work in Lombardy and in Flanders: but the 
 mischief was no longer the same. The British 
 nation now made itself felt in the balance of Europe, 
 and William of Orange was for the first time in his 
 
442 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 life successful in war at tlie head of his English 
 troops. If the generals of Louis XIV. took Mons, 
 Namur, and Charleroi, in successive campaigns, 
 William subdued Ireland, and won the battle of 
 the Boyne, against an army composed of Irish, 
 French, and Jacobite troops. Thanks to the in- 
 trepid genius of Eussell, he gained the battle of 
 La Hogue — the most important naval victory of the 
 century — and secured the failure of an expedition 
 which may be looked upon as a vast conspiracy of 
 the French monarch in favour of the Stuarts. 
 
 This was the most brilliant epoch of the life of 
 William III. The first time that he revisited the 
 Hague he presided over a general congress, where 
 all the powers of Europe were assembled or repre- 
 sented. The Prince of Orange, who, under the title 
 of Stadtholder of Holland, retained his truest and 
 most flattering name, possessed a moral power — 
 sufficient to allow him, as he thought, to forego the 
 only thing wanting to complete his authority — the 
 personal sympathy of the English nation. 
 
 He was now at the height of his glory, after a 
 period of twenty years from his start in life, and 
 his destiny was accomplished ; so that until the 
 Treaty of Eyswick, which in 1698 put an end to 
 his hostilities with France, and brought about his 
 recognition as King of England by Louis XIV, not 
 much more was left for him to gain ; and he had 
 the skill to lose nothing. Characters such as his 
 weigh with care all their resolutions, seize upon 
 
WILLIAM IIL 443 
 
 every lucky chance, and remain deeply impressed 
 with this truth, of universal application — it is more 
 difficult to keep the fruits of Fortune than to win 
 them. 
 
 The government, as it lived on, grew stronger and 
 better. In the course of time the domestic policy of 
 England assumed a regular form, and, as far as the 
 conditions of the period permitted it, entered on the 
 path which it has followed in more modern days. 
 Harmony between the Executive and the Houses of 
 Parliament became a rule, professed at least, if not 
 practised ; and the King, in all religious questions, 
 did his best to give to all creeds the greatest amount 
 of liberty he could, without shocking the opinion of 
 the most numerous and most compact body. He 
 told the Catholics not to have any anxiety for the 
 future. 
 
 With respect to the differences among Eeformers, 
 his own idea was to obtain complete toleration for 
 all shades of opinion, and to admit freely and uni- 
 formly, to all public employments, the various Pro- 
 testant sects by establishing on this basis an oath to 
 be administered to all public servants. This system 
 was never completely carried out, and when Parlia- 
 ment did pass a Toleration Act, its terms were con- 
 fused and contradictory, and the liberty which it 
 afforded was more apparent than real; but the 
 country was not prepared to go further, and the 
 doctrines of the Established Church were too 
 powerful in Parliament, among the moderate men of 
 
'444 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the two parties in the State, to allow the wishes of 
 the monarch, though in harmony with his personal 
 convictions, to be triumphant. 
 
 In the course of these successful years of 
 William's life, a man of rare ability, but totally 
 devoid of principles — who had been a minister of 
 James II, and who was destined later to serve 
 William III. — who had become a Catholic at the 
 close of the last reign, but had lived retired and 
 unknown since the Ee volution — Sunderland — re- 
 appeared suddenly at court. His presence there 
 coincided with a change in the cabinet ; and it is 
 supposed that, having had for a long time no inte- 
 rest of his own in the matter, he with his usual 
 good sense counselled the King to form a more 
 regular and solid government, composed of men of 
 known character and decided opinions. William 
 followed this advice, and found among the Whigs 
 men of capacity and of acknowledged political 
 weight, such as Wharton, Somers, and Montague. 
 
 It was seen, during this epoch, that the conduct of 
 public affairs was much easier ; and that the country 
 did more justice to the good qualities of the King, 
 and recognised in him the honesty of purpose, the 
 great intelligence and the virtues, which were hidden 
 under a disagreeable exterior. The time of Parlia- 
 ment was more than once taken up with Jacobite 
 plots, which had outlived the pacification of 
 Ireland. Some of these trials made a great noise in 
 consequence of the diversity and the rank of the 
 
WILLIAM in. 445 
 
 persons accused, and also because they raised 
 animated debates in Parliament. William, however, 
 found in these plots against him a new element of 
 strength, and, for the moment, they aflforded him the 
 means of gaining popularity. Under a government 
 taken from the ranks of the Whigs, the Tories were 
 less ardent in their demonstrations of devotion with 
 reference to the plots against the King's life ; but 
 there was a moment when the plotters appeared in 
 so odious a light, that on one occasion only there 
 ensued a violent burst of feeling on the part of the 
 nation in favour of the monarch, which found ex- 
 pression in the form of addresses signed in all the 
 great towns. Some objections were raised in the 
 House of Peers against the wording of one of these 
 addresses, which, in speaking of the power of the 
 monarch, mentioned it as "rightful and lawful." 
 The opposition insisted on these words being 
 changed into, " The right which he held by law to 
 the English crown.'' The Peers and the House of 
 Commons allowed the address to pass in these 
 modified terms, and attributed the objection to the 
 timidity of some casuists, with an assurance that 
 they would have rejected the amendment had they 
 seen in it a protest on the part of the Jacobites. 
 
 Thus these plots had all the weight of political 
 events, and infused some passion into the debates 
 in Parliament ; but the King had no cause of 
 anxiety, and gained by the hatred which they raised 
 in the country against their authors. He found no 
 
446 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 difficulty in meeting and punishing them, and, in 
 fact, he was so little moved by these matters that, 
 in the conduct of the most grave and delicate 
 affairs, he did not shrink from occasionally employ- 
 ing men who were openly accused of being agents 
 of the Stuarts. It was the fate of this monarch to 
 inspire more confidence in the country at large than 
 devotion among individuals ; and to possess suffi- 
 cient real strength to allow of his intrusting to men 
 of acknowledged ability, but doubtful loyalty, the 
 most important missions. Marlborough, who had 
 not yet reached the highest pinnacle of his glory, 
 more than once offered his services to the exiled 
 King at St. Germain's, who sought, in intrigue, 
 some diversion for the monotony of his life, and 
 some illusion to console his adversity. But Marl- 
 borough made it better understood afterwards, that 
 when he plotted against William III, it was not 
 in favour of James II, the dethroned monarch, but 
 for the sake of Anne, James' second daughter, the 
 future Queen of England ; and that his object was 
 to hasten her accession to the throne. Louis XIV, 
 who had often thought it advisable, in former days, 
 to pension the necessitous race of the Stuarts, was 
 frequently engaged in the English plots against 
 William III. ; but the French gold, which had 
 formerly been so greedily taken by Charles and 
 James, was not found more efficacious in shaking 
 the throne of the new King than it had been in 
 sustaining the fallen dynasty. 
 
WILLIAM IIL 447 
 
 When the Peace of Ryswick was made, Louis 
 XIY. had carried on the war for more than thirty- 
 years, and during the last part of this period England 
 had joined his enemies. In this struggle France had, 
 for a long time, been successful, owing to the fallen 
 condition of Spain, to the incomplete and doubtful 
 co-operation of the Empire, to the timidity of the 
 Electors who were neighbours of France, and to the 
 irresolution of the other German States. The change 
 which had taken place in England rendered the con- 
 ditions of the struggle less favourable for Louis XIY. 
 The negotiations for the Treaty of Eyswick were 
 conducted with less ability and boldness, and con- 
 cluded on less advantageous terms, than the Truce 
 of Ratisbon or the Peace of Mmeguen. Never- 
 theless, this treaty, which secured to Louis the 
 possession of Strasbourg, might, particularly as age 
 was now creeping on him, have closed his military 
 career without disgrace, if the eternal question, for 
 the solution of which he had made so many sacri- 
 fices, and which had always held the foremost place 
 in his thoughts, had not remained as unsettled and 
 as full of difficulty as on the day when he had 
 mounted the throne. 
 
 Charles IL of Spain was not dead, and the ques- 
 
T 
 
 448 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 tion of the Spanisli succession, which had so actively 
 employed the armies of Louis XIV, and taxed his 
 diplomacy, was as undecided as at the beginning of 
 his reign. 
 
 Louis XIV. saw two alternatives before him : a 
 partition of the succession between the Emperor 
 and himself (a solution proposed thirty years before 
 as a means to avoid war), or else a will in favour of 
 France, followed of course by a recommencement 
 of general hostilities. Thus, all that had happened 
 during the century — all the sieges, battles, treaties, 
 and revolutions — had not changed the original 
 situation. The weakly creature who occupied the 
 throne of that vast Spanish monarchy had seen all 
 the events which render that epoch so famous 
 pass before his eyes, while he was too melancholy, 
 suffering, and listless, to take an interest in them. 
 The obstinacy of Charles II, in not yielding up 
 the miserable spark of life which was in him, 
 had prolonged and had rendered utterly useless 
 all the efforts of diplomacy and all the operations 
 of war. 
 
 The only means, therefore, of preserving peace 
 lay in a division of the spoil. Louis XIV. proposed 
 in succession two schemes, not, as thirty years 
 before, to the Emperor, but to the King of England, 
 whose power and whose genius rendered him the 
 arbiter of all the great affairs of Europe. It was a 
 fresh glory for William III. as a statesman, to sign 
 these important documents : one previous to the 
 
WILLIAM IIT. 449 
 
 death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria/ whom 
 they had selected to succeed to the principal part 
 of the inheritance ; the other after the death of that 
 prince. In the first of the treaties of partition, 
 Spain and the Low Countries were to be given to 
 the Prince of Bavaria ; in the second, to the Arch- 
 duke Charles. In both, France obtained Naples 
 and Sicily for the Dauphin. 
 
 Both these arrangements— especially the first, 
 which gave the largest portion of the Spanish suc- 
 cession to a third house, and one of secondary im- 
 portance — suited both France and England as a 
 pacific solution of the question. Louis XIV. pre- 
 ferred seeing on the throne of Spain the heir pre- 
 sumptive to a German electorate, rather than an 
 archduke of Austria. He accepted the Archduke 
 only in the absence of any other candidate. 
 
 He would, moreover, have accepted, at that 
 moment, other plans for an arrangement, which he 
 would have rejected absolutely had they been 
 oftered him at the commencement of his life ; he 
 would willingly have formed the Low Countries into 
 a republic, or have given them to the Queen of 
 Spain, or have divided them. 
 
 But events, as we know, deranged all these calcu- 
 lations, and Charles II, who, by continuing to live, 
 had disappointed so much impatient expectation, by 
 his last will provoked a general war, to be carried 
 
 ^ Grandson of a sister of the Infanta Maria Theresa, wife of 
 Louis XIV. 
 
 G G 
 
I 
 
 450 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 on against France by the union of England with the 
 Empire and with Holland — a union which was much 
 strengthened under the new dynasty, and which 
 afterwards embraced the northern states of Ger- 
 many. William III. did not take part in this 
 war, which was so disastrous in its consequences to 
 Louis XIV.i 
 
 In England, the events which followed the peace, 
 the intervention of William in the treaties arranging 
 the succession, and the question whether, in time 
 of peace, a standing army was to be kept up, led 
 to the most acrimonious discussions betw^een the 
 King and the Parliament. The same circumstances 
 which had marked the commencement of his reign 
 were reproduced. The two treaties which had been 
 signed by William, were loudly blamed because they M\ 
 had been concluded without the participation of 
 Parliament, and because, while they were advan- 
 tageous to Austria or to Bavaria, they nevertheless 
 secured to Louis XIV. an increase of territory, and 
 the possession of an important position in the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 William III, therefore, in the last years of his 
 life, had many difficulties and cares. Everything 
 with which he had been reproached, on former 
 occasions, was again brought forward against him. 
 
 1 We shall speak elsewhere of this will ; its history and its con- 
 sequences scarcely concern William III. It must be considered as a 
 great piece of good fortune for the House of Bourbon, which occupied 
 and preserved the throne of Spain ; but it was the cause of personal 
 misfortunes to Louis XIV. and of irreparable injury to France. 
 
WILLIAM III. 451 
 
 He had always, they said, been too fond of war, 
 and his ambitious designs had been consulted far 
 more than the interest of the nation. A standing 
 army was useless, and, after long and unpleasant 
 debates, the estimates were reduced accordingly. 
 To dispute the necessity of a standing army, and 
 to weaken the military position of England, was 
 simply to expose the country to danger ; to condemn 
 and to discredit the policy and the opinions of the 
 King ; and force him to buy peace with France by 
 reducing the new monarchy to the submissive and 
 abject attitude of the Stuarts. William resisted as 
 much as he could, and ended by giving way most 
 unwillingly to the wishes of the House of Commons. 
 He was obliged to send away his Dutch guards, the 
 faithful servants of a former time. His frequent 
 trips to Holland were another source of discontent 
 and of public accusations. At length a violent 
 clamour was raised against the distribution of some 
 of the royal domains among certain of his Dutch 
 favourites. His liberality in favour of the friends 
 of his youth was discussed and blamed, and the 
 House of Commons passed a bill to prevent the 
 possibility of its recurrence. William, already suf- 
 fering from the effects of the malady which even- 
 tually killed him, gave to that Act of Parliament an 
 assent which must have wounded the feelings of his 
 heart as much as it did his royal dignity. Such 
 were the bitter events at the close of his life. Public 
 opinion was then very much opposed to him. We 
 
 G G 2 
 
i 
 
 452 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 are almost tempted to say, in reading the parlia-j 
 mentary debates of that period, that the servicesi 
 rendered by the King had been altogether forgotten, 
 and that English society saw in him only a morose 
 and haughty foreigner, who had found in Englan( 
 an opportunity of increasing his political fortune 
 and of satisfying his exorbitant ambition, by em- 
 ploying the forces and the resources of the country 
 in a manner which suited and pleased no one but 
 himself. They reproached him with having re^i 
 mained a Dutch Eepublican rather than becoming 
 in good earnest a King of England — with having 
 neither shown nor yet inspired affection — with being 
 often away — with a passionate love for war, in 
 which, however, he was generally unsuccessful, and 
 they said that his tastes, his temper, his egotism, his 
 many faults, and even his good qualities, were al 
 distasteful to his subjects. 
 
 It would be an exaggeration to say that these 
 miserable and humiliating reproaches represented 
 faithfully the sentiments of all Englishmen ; or that 
 the spirit of justice was so completely banished 
 from among them that they had formed no other 
 estimate of the man whom history pronounces to 
 have been one of the greatest statesmen of modern 
 times. 
 
 William had passed his life in struggling againsi 
 every kind of obstacle and of misfortune. He had 
 lost, when she was still quite young, his queen, 
 whom he adored, and whom he regretted so deeply 
 
 
 I 
 
WILLIAM III. 4.53 
 
 as nearly to have lost his reason by the blow. 
 Perhaps his career might still have ended badly, if 
 thus late in the day his rival in fortune and ambition 
 had not judged it opportune to excite a strong feel- 
 ing in England, which turned to the advantage of 
 William. At the death of James II, Louis XIV. 
 recognised the son of that prince as King of England, 
 under the name of James III, thus forgetting, or 
 disdaining to observe, the Treaty of Eyswick, by 
 which he had given that title to the Prince of 
 Orange. On this occasion, great excitement was 
 manifested in England. Those who had opposed 
 the necessity of a standing army, and who had 
 refused to vote the necessary funds, took at once 
 quite a contrary view, on seeing the King of France 
 proclaim, in direct contradiction to his word and his 
 signature, a sovereign whom they had repudiated ; 
 and even before the War of Succession broke out, 
 they with one accord voted the most generous 
 r subsidies. 
 
 This exhibition of feeling, consoling as it was to 
 William, marks the end of his career. His reign, 
 which was so great in its events and in its conse- 
 quences, was as sombre in its aspect as the character 
 and the life of the monarch himself William 
 endeavoured to obtain, and did obtain, for Holland, 
 England, and Europe, immense results, without ever 
 securing his own happiness : fortune, if we may say 
 so, seconded his efforts without smiling on him. 
 His arms were not triumphant, his name was never 
 
454 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 popular, and he was not himself happy. The nation 
 did not repay with its love the service he had done 
 it, and nothing in him shows that he felt the want 
 of such a recompense. He devoted to incessant 
 labour a mind which was naturally morose, and he 
 exposed a weakly body to a thousand dangers ; he 
 delivered from tyranny a people who showed but 
 small gratitude ; he consolidated the institutions, 
 he secured the peace, and laid the foundation for 
 the glory of England : what he did, served and 
 saved the country, which disliked him personally. 
 We may say that he knew only the painful side of fl 
 life — useful labours ill-recompensed, and constant 
 fatigue without any interval of repose ; and yet his 
 reverses on the field of battle, the difficulties attend- 
 ing his government, his constant bad health, his 
 childless marriage, the death of the young queen — 
 all these severe blows of destiny did not overwhelm 
 him. He displayed the rarest species of courage — 
 that which exhibits great sobriety and extraordinary 
 patience of mind, while it requires no remuneration, 
 and does not seem even to expect it ; and which, 
 in requital of the most heroic actions deciding the 
 destinies of nations, seeks no reward beyond the 
 satisfaction of having performed them. His highest 
 qualities lacked brilliancy. His genius was cold, 
 and his devotion to a cause was not demonstrative. 
 His physical constitution, his temper, and his 
 manners were all marks of the ill-will of fortune ; 
 and, to fill up the measure of his ill luck, it was 
 
WILLIAM III. 455 
 
 given to Louis XIV, though destined to expiate 
 by so many calamities the successes of his youth, to 
 know completely what misfortune was only after 
 his rival had descended into the grave. 
 
 William III. died at the age of fifty-two, on the 
 9th March, 1702, at the beginning of the War of 
 Succession. 
 
 After him, the part he was to have played was 
 divided. Prince Eugene, Marlborough, and Heinsius 
 (the Grand Pensionary) had the conduct of political 
 and especially of military affairs, and acted in concert. 
 The disastrous consequences to France of that war, 
 in which William had no part, are notorious. The 
 battles of Blenheim, of Ramilies, and of Oudenarde 
 brought the allied armies on the soil of France, and 
 placed Louis XIV. on the verge of ruin. Never, 
 however, did that king show a nobler spirit than 
 when adverse fortune had nearly overwhelmed him. 
 The posthumous result, and tardy realization, of the 
 conceptions and labours of William III, are among 
 the most remarkable of the circumstances attending 
 the destiny of one who seemed born to struggle 
 and not to triumph. It seems as if it were more 
 than could be conceded to one individual, both to 
 create and successfully to carry out a policy so 
 vast ; and as if the inheritance and fruits of his 
 political schemes were to be divided among three 
 men of genius, whom the opportunity rendered 
 famous. 
 
 That which above all defines the historical cha- 
 
456 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 I 
 
 racter of the reign of William III. is, that he it was 
 who assigned to England an active part in European 
 politics. From the close of the seventeenth century, 
 England has not always persevered in following 
 the path which William traced out for her ; never- 
 theless, she held that course during the wars at the 
 commencement of the eighteenth century, and she 
 has subsequently come back to the same line of 
 policy. In pursuing this system William led the 
 way. The Stuarts, even if they had been free from 
 all domestic embarrassments, and had governed 
 England so as to satisfy the country, and make 
 themselves popular and powerful, were not men of 
 a type bold and enterprising enough to make the 
 country feel the full measure of its strength. The 
 Tudors had hesitated to take any part in the wars of 
 the sixteenth century ; their policy had never been 
 quite in accordance w4th their religious belief, and 
 they leant towards France or towards Spain, accord- 
 ing as victory inclined towards one or the other 
 of those powers. But if no one in England, before 
 William III, had carried out the system, not only of 
 active intervention, but often indeed of taking the 
 initiative in European affairs, he has had the good 
 fortune to find successors in this line of policy. 
 He has taught this country the modern theories of 
 the balance of parties at home, and of the balance 
 of power abroad. It would be to exaggerate his 
 merit and foresight, if we were to add that it is 
 to him that the English of the eighteenth century 
 
WILLIAM ITL 457 
 
 are indebted for the conviction that nothing im- 
 portant ought to take place in Europe without 
 their participation, and that their intervention in 
 continental affairs concerned, not only the glory of 
 England, but also its prosperity. It was not to 
 protect and serve the material interests of England 
 that he waged war against Louis XIV. William III. 
 did not indeed foresee the events which would 
 mark the close of the eighteenth century, in a 
 neighbouring country ; but by his example, by 
 the results which he obtained, by the enterprises 
 he undertook — the final carrying out of which he 
 left to the representatives of the coalition, who 
 were capable of completing his Work — William III. 
 pointed out what the duty of England was when 
 the independence of Europe was menaced. Had 
 the ambition of Charles V. been as short-sighted 
 as that of Louis XIV, and had William III. lived 
 in his time, we should probably have seen formed 
 against Spain a coalition which Francis I. never 
 knew how to form or to organize, even in its most 
 elementary form. 
 
 The influence of William III. in England and in 
 Europe was therefore one of the gi^eatest that ever 
 fell to the lot of any one person to exercise. It 
 was not that of an egotist, of an unreasoning and 
 adventurous conqueror, but that of a man profoundly 
 wise and master of his actions — of one who did not 
 look on the policy of his country from a flattering 
 and personal point of view, but who calculated the 
 
458 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 useful consequences likely to accrue therefrom, and 
 who paved the way, after his death, for a still 
 wider influence of England than that which he 
 himself exercised. 
 
 \ 
 
 VI. 
 
 Historians who were merely just to William 
 III. have long been favourable to Louis XIV, by 
 speaking more of his great qualities than of his 
 weaknesses, by giving his name to the century, and 
 by leaving it undecided whether the merit of having 
 produced so many great military, literary, and poli- 
 tical geniuses should be attributed to him or to 
 chance. 
 
 At the present day the glory of Louis XIV. is 
 on the wane rather than on the increase, and Voltaire 
 admired him more than we do. Historians hesitate ; 
 they have acknowledged that the "age of Louis 
 XIV." and the " great King " are not exactly con- 
 temporaneous ; that Louis XIV. was born after the 
 commencement of the century, and that some of the 
 greatest events took place before the birth of the 
 monarch, who was subsequently called its great re- 
 presentative. Historians have marked with tole- 
 rable precision and exactness the respective merits 
 of the most eminent kings of France, who have 
 personally most contributed to change or improve 
 
 r 
 r 
 
WILLIAM III. 459 
 
 the condition of their country ; — such as Philip 
 Augustus, Charles VII, Louis XI, Henry IV, and 
 Louis XIII. under the guidance of Cardinal Kiche- 
 lieu. But with regard to Louis XIV. they are not 
 so clear. In their judgment, in the judgment even 
 of those who have no desire to depreciate in any 
 degree the prestige which attaches to monarchy, 
 the reputation of Louis XIV. is splendid and yet 
 open to discussion. 
 
 The life of Louis XIV. is constantly the subject 
 of works written without prejudice ; the interest 
 never flags, but in every fresh work the tone appears 
 to be colder, more searching, and more exact. The 
 character of the monarch is less imposing in undress ; 
 nevertheless, there is no lack of historical writers. 
 The events of the century : its wars, its diplomacy,- 
 the state of the finances, the theology, and the 
 metaphysics ; the great men of the age — Pascal, 
 Bossuet, Descartes ; the learned recluses of Port 
 Koyal ; Colbert, Louvois ; the celebrated women of 
 that time, who occupied the attention of the world 
 by their passion for politics, by their writings, or 
 by their beauty — all these persons and all these 
 subjects continue to interest the highest intellects 
 of the present day. 
 
 Everything in the age of Louis XIV. contributes 
 to attract the attention of literary men, and of 
 philosophers, and tends at the same time to induce 
 them to suspend their definitive judgment : — the 
 diversity and the instability of the events that took 
 
^ 
 
 460 HISTORICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 place, at one time so brilliant, at another so disas- 
 trous ; the gravity of the questions under discus- 
 sion, questions which were not solved then, and 
 which are to this day undecided ; the character of 
 the King himself, the variety of his adventures, the 
 profound contradictions which he concealed under 
 the cold and permanent assumption of a formal 
 dignity — a dignity which with him was more than 
 a habit, more than a theatrical artifice or a cloak, 
 but which expressed an imperious condition of his 
 nature. 
 
 This is why historians are slow to pronounce a 
 definitive judgment on this period, and above all on 
 Louis XIV. himself. They are anxious to discover 
 whether any documents or any new ideas will have 
 the effect either of reinstating him in the eyes of 
 his detractors, or of discrediting him with those 
 who admire him. They do not yet sufficiently 
 know what they ought to seek under that counte- 
 nance, always majestic and solemn, which has been 
 handed down to us so correctly by the pencil of 
 Eigaud and the graver of Nanteuil. They are at 
 a loss to know what they will find in a man 
 passionately fond of conquests, steadfast under mis- 
 fortunes, and of a temper so little warlike ; who, 
 having a lively appreciation of the greatness of 
 France, of all her glories, and of all her wealth of 
 genius, forgot the interests of his people with such 
 coldness and egotism. Historians are astonished 
 that an understanding acute, supple, and active. 
 
WILLIAM in. 461 
 
 should be so heedless of consequences and so devoid 
 of true wisdom. 
 
 The age of Louis XIV. has therefore remained 
 to this day an interesting point of literary discus- 
 sion ; more profound thinkers than the men of 
 that time never existed ; never was an administrator 
 more clear-sighted than Colbert, or an ambassador 
 more able than Lionne ; never were schemes more 
 fraught with danger to Europe than those under- 
 taken in the early part of the reign of Louis XIV. 
 Men's minds are filled with doubt by the mag- 
 nitude of the questions then raised : such as an 
 European war and the balance of power ; the 
 impossibility of regulating the finances of a country 
 in a state of chronic war ; liberty of conscience ; 
 the relation of France to the See of Rome, and all 
 that concerns the amount of independence to be 
 granted the Galilean Church — all these questions 
 weigh, and will for ever weigh, upon society. The 
 King himself — intoxicated with success in his 
 younger days, and depressed in his old age by 
 ennui, surfeited with victories which did more to 
 illustrate his reign than to raise his reputation ; his 
 good fortune marred by reverses, which did not 
 destroy his natural pride, — presents to us, in the 
 midst of the shortcomings of his policy, and the 
 discordant traits of his character, a figure full of 
 glory, but whose moral worth it is extremely diffi- 
 cult to define. 
 
 He committed great faults. To wage war against 
 
462 HISTORICAL ESSAYP. 
 
 Holland in 1672, as a punishment to the Dutch 
 for their revolt, or to secure for himself the Spanish 
 provinces, was to create the coalition, and to defy 
 the Prince of Orange. The attack upon Austria 
 in 1688, instead of upon Holland, gave every ad- 
 vantage to the revolution in England, and to 
 William of Orange ; it was sure to make England 
 join the coalition, and it paved the way for the 
 defeat of La Hogue, and other disasters. Such 
 unpardonable errors utterly destroy a reputation, 
 involve in their fatal consequences the whole of a 
 long existence, tarnish the glory of victories, and 
 explain the secret of reverses. 
 
 But the first errors date from the time when 
 the civil government was conducted by politicians 
 of the school of Mazarin, and when the armies were 
 commanded by a generation of heroes. The skill 
 and firmness displayed in the execution served as 
 a corrective to the want of sagacity shown in the 
 plans. But it was not always so. The men of 
 genius disappeared, the one after the other, while 
 the ambitious idea that underlaid the whole reign 
 remained the same. The good fortune of the 
 monarch sunk with the character of those who 
 served him. Louvois, who was less prudent than 
 Colbert, had successors who sinned like him through 
 political imprudence, while they lacked his great 
 capacity. The war exhausted the public treasure, 
 and yet no one had the honesty or the sense to 
 point out the danger. The " great century," which 
 
 d 
 
WILLIAM III. 4f)3 
 
 began before Louis XIV, ended before him. Louis 
 XIV. was not, himself, capable of carrying out his 
 own schemes. Notwithstanding the battle of Denain, 
 and the establishment of his own family on the 
 throne of Spain, we may safely assert that Louis 
 XIV. died conquered, and without allies. 
 
 His successor was even more capricious and im- 
 provident ; he had the defects, without the great 
 qualities, of his grandfather — qualities which were 
 the excuse, or rather the charm of Louis XIV, and 
 which never failed him from the day of his accession 
 to that of his death. 
 
 Such were the two monarchs who occupied the 
 stage during the latter part of the seventeenth 
 century. It would be difficult to find two historical 
 characters offering more striking contrasts to each 
 other. The destinies of these two men were equally 
 dissimilar ; if Louis XIV. was successful during 
 only a part of his reign, we are tempted to say 
 that William III. never knew success at all. 
 
 There is the same difference in the renown, as 
 in the career, of these two men. The reputation 
 of Louis XIV, surrounded by flatterers all his life, 
 diminishes when subjected to the minute scrutiny of 
 the modern historical school. The glory of William 
 III, on the contrary, becomes every day more solid. 
 Posterity generously accords to him that which 
 his contemporaries sometimes denied ; and English- 
 men still dwell with satisfaction on the memory of 
 
464 
 
 HISTOEICAL ESSAYS. 
 
 the Dutch patriot who came to defend, on the soi 
 of their country and at their request, the liberty 
 of Parliament. Guided by the study of political 
 history, and by the experience of what was done 
 under our own eyes and under the eyes of our fore- 
 fathers, public opinion in our day assigns its import 
 and its true meaning to what took place in the 
 seventeenth century on both sides of the Channel, 
 and. shows neither injustice nor favour to the two 
 great characters of that time. 
 
 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTKRS, BRKAD STRBBT HiLI.. 
 
I 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY, 
 BERKELEY 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 Books not returned on time are subject to a fine of 
 50c per volume after the third day overdue, increasing 
 to $1.00 per volume after the sixth day. . Books not m 
 demand may be renewed if application is made before 
 expiration of loan period. 
 
 ^9]ul'60TD 
 
 JUL 8 I860 
 
 JUL 2^' 1960 
 
 MAR 2 1962 
 
 
 75to-7,'30 
 
d-irf 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY