ROGEEDINGS 
 fITRAL i^SiAN 
 
 HE DEFENCE OF INDIA 
 
 LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR EDWIN COT r 
 
 CENTRAL ASIAN SOC
 
 proceebiriGS of the Central 
 Hsian Society. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR EDWIN COLLEX, G.C.I.E., C.B. 
 
 BEAD MARCH 14, 1906
 
 The Map with this paper was published 
 in the Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 
 and is reproduced with their permission.
 
 SRLF 
 URL 
 
 flC' 'UMil 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF INDIA 
 
 Many years ago, at Simla, a lecture was announced by 
 General Sir George Chesney, on ' The Invasion of India.' 
 I need hardly say that we gathered in great strength to 
 listen to a thrilling exposition of this exciting subject, 
 and were somewhat dejected when we found that the 
 address certainly dealt with the invasion of India, only it 
 was the invasion by Alexander the Great. 
 
 Now I will not treat you so badly as we thought that 
 Sir George Chesney had treated us — though it was, in 
 truth, a most admirable lecture — but I must warn you 
 that my paper is simply based upon the idea that it is 
 well for this Society, and indeed for the British nation 
 generally, to take stock now and then of a great question 
 such as that on which I am about to address you ; and I 
 am well aware that there are many among my audience 
 who are masters of the subject, and that my only 
 qualifications are a long connection with it and some 
 acquaintance with part of the regions round which our 
 interest centres. 
 
 When we speak of the defence of India, we usually 
 mean its safeguarding from an enemy advancing from 
 the north or the west upon some portion or portions of 
 our North-West Frontier line. In its wider meaning, the 
 term would embrace the defence of other portions of 
 the Indian Empire — as, for example, the South-Eastern 
 Frontier and Burma, the internal security of India, 
 
 1—2
 
 ( + ) 
 
 defence from naval attack, and so on. But tins after- 
 noon we must focus our attention on tlie particular 
 question wliicli has been discussed with the greatest 
 publicity for many years, and about which very large 
 differences of opinion have existed. 
 
 There is an idea ]»revalent among some people, that 
 to discuss a matter presupposing future hostile action 
 between Powers who are now on friendly terms is to be 
 deprecated. I do not think this plea for silence is a 
 sound one, nor do I believe that there is the least fear 
 of friendly relations between Russia and ourselves being 
 jeopardized l)y discussions of the kind. We are not, I 
 hope, in the remotest degree disturbed by the plans for the 
 invasion of India, real or fictitious, which have been put 
 forward as the work of Russian strategists ; and I think 
 that, the keener our appreciation of all the bearings of 
 the question, the greater desire shall we have that our 
 friendlv relations with Russia should not be li^htlv 
 broken. Whatever may have been the merits of the 
 points in dispute between us in the past, it cannot be 
 seriously contended that the interests of peace have 
 ever suffered by a fair and frank discussion of the 
 problems of defence. I believe that an understanding 
 with Russia is to be welcomed as quite possible, but that 
 the more clearly we realize the task that may be before 
 us, in certain eventualities, and the stronger we are for 
 its performance, the greater is the prospect of that 
 understanding becoming a practical reality. 
 
 May I now invite your attention to this map, which 
 was compiled by our President, Sir Thomas Holdich, 
 whose absence we all deplore, for his work, ' The Indian 
 Borderland,' and is the best possible to illustrate my 
 remarks. I may have to go into a little more detail later 
 on, but for the present let us see broadly how we stand,
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 looking at our position from the plains of the Punjab 
 and of Sind, a position Hanked by the mountains of 
 Kashmir on the one side and by the Arabian Sea on the 
 other, some 1,200 miles apart. 
 
 Our first line of defence is the River Indus. Then, 
 if we move forward, we find om'selves on the old frontier 
 line inherited from the Sikhs. Beyond this is that belt 
 of mountainous country thrown off in a south-west 
 direction from the central mass, the roof of the world, 
 from which also the mighty Himalayas trend south-east, 
 and it is, speaking very generally, towards the outer edge 
 of this country that we find what may be called the 
 frontier of British influence, rmming from the extreme 
 nortliern and eastern limit of Afghanistan to the southern 
 and eastern point at Koh-i-Malik Siah. The Hindu 
 Kush, also springing from this mass of mountains, forms 
 the central divide of Afghanistan, and throws off range 
 upon range in the triangle Kabul, Herat, Kandahar. 
 
 Ao;ain, continuins; this brief survev, bevond the 
 Hindu Kush and its prolongation, we have the northern 
 frontier of Afghanistan, from the point on the east, 
 where the three empires of Russia, China, and India 
 meet, following the course of the Oxus by Kila Panja, 
 Ishkashim, Kila Wamar, Kila Khum, until we reach 
 Termez — the projected station of the Russian railway 
 to the Oxus — and so on to Kilif and Khamicib. The 
 line then runs from Khamiab to Muruchak on the 
 ^lurghab, and, as you will see, drops southwards to 
 Kushk, only seventy miles or so in front of Herat, and 
 so to the western point at Zulfikar. 
 
 At the first glance, therefore, India appears to have 
 a triple line of defence : First, the Indus ; secondly, the 
 mountainous belt flanked by the lofty ranges trending 
 south-west from the Eastern Hindu Kush, and continuing
 
 ( fi ) 
 
 southwards in front of the old British frontier, to the 
 Suliman Mountains and the hill-country of Baluchisttin, 
 to the Arabian Sea ; and, thirdly, the line of the Hindu 
 Rush and its ])rolongations to Herat. 
 
 Now, the great problem has always been. What is the 
 line we should take up for the defence of India and for 
 such offensive action as may result in securing victory ? 
 And here it is necessary to say a word or two as to the 
 changes in situation which may take place by the efttux 
 of time. The defence of any country — I do not speak 
 merely of passive defence, but of a defence which 
 embraces the indispensable element of active offensive 
 power — must be dependent on many factors : the ])olitical 
 conditions of the country to be defended, its military 
 strength, the geographical and topographical conditions 
 of its frontier, the state of its communications ; upon the 
 strategical situation of the time, the corresponding con- 
 ditions affecting the enemy we may have to meet, and 
 many other things. It is obvious that some of these are 
 variable quantities, and therefore it is of the greatest 
 moment that, while we should have a clear idea of the 
 various factors, we should l)e prepared to modify our 
 dispositions in accordance with the changes which time 
 brings about. 
 
 The idea of a Russian advance towards India has 
 always occupied the attention of statesmen and soldiers, 
 and, as we know, even popular feeling had reached such 
 an acute stage in 1<S87, wlien Persia, encouraged by 
 Russia, set out to l)esiege Herat, that every bazaar and 
 native court in India were S])eculating on the advance of 
 Russia to India, and even in the remote Deccan people 
 began to bury their money and jewels in the ground. 
 Indeed, during the whole of the last century the question 
 was frequently discussed, although every now and then
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 it slumbered for years, to be awakened when some 
 incident in the persistent advance of Russia aroused 
 public attention. 
 
 Naturally, the question which became prominent at 
 these times was the line of advance towards India which 
 would be taken by Russia. Now, the answer to this 
 must necessarily depend on the state of the communica- 
 tions on the opposite or Russian side, on the particular 
 objectives, and the obstacles which exist on the routes 
 to be taken. When Russia was comparatively far off 
 we find that Herat and West Afghanistan were looked 
 upon as the point and country through which she would 
 advance. Later on, as her communications from the 
 north progressed, the pendulum swung somewhat to 
 the northern and eastern side ; but the western route 
 retained, and still retains, the greatest significance. 
 
 When Russia was still distant, and, indeed, down to 
 quite recent years, there was a strong party which 
 believed that our best plan was to take up our position 
 behind the Indus, and there await the advancing enemy. 
 Another party, whose most prominent leader was Sir 
 Henry Rawlinson — a soldier-statesman who did so much 
 to bring home to the nation the gravity of the question — 
 was in favour of an offensive policy, declaring that Herat 
 was an indispensable bulwark to India stragetically and 
 politically, and that, if Russia were allowed to continue 
 in occupation of Herat, she would command the military 
 resources of Persia and Afghanistan. This question of 
 the defence of India by our first line, the Indus, was 
 specially discussed in 1878 by that eminent strategist. 
 General Sir Edward Haniley, at a lecture at the R.U.S. 
 Institution, at which I had the good fortune to be present. 
 Let us see for a moment what this river line of defence 
 is. We need not consider the whole of its course — some
 
 ( H ) 
 
 2,0UU uiik's from the source to tlie sea — and may exclude 
 the portion from the Kailas glaciers to the point near 
 Derbend, Avhere it enters British India. It is the Indus 
 of the plains we have to think of. In its upper course 
 it is swift, and rushes down in a deep, rocky, and narrow 
 bed, broadening- many miles below Attock, until it 
 is about GOU yards wide above Mithaidvote, where it 
 receives tlie waters of the Punjab, and then, increasing 
 to thrice this width, passes on to the sea. In the flood 
 season it overflows its banks for miles ; it changes its 
 course not infrequently, and is full of sand-banks. To 
 be effective as a line of defence, as Sir Edward Hamley 
 ])ointed out, a river should be difficult to cross, have 
 protected bridges, be connected by good communications, 
 and the defenders' bank should command the other. 
 Some of the defects of thirty years ago no longer exist. 
 At Attock the river is now crossed by the great railway- 
 bridge, linking Rawal Pindi and Peshawar by rail and 
 road. At Kushalgarh a bridge is nearing completion, 
 which will liidv the rail from Rawal Pindi with the rail 
 to Kohat and Thai, and the Lansdowne bridge at Sukkur 
 enables us to unite the fortress of Quetta with the railway 
 system of India. ( )ther brids^es, such as those between 
 ^lari and Kalabagh, and between Hyderabad and Kotri, 
 belong to the future. The communications in rear of 
 the river have been greatly improved, and poAverful 
 works form important bridge-heads at Attock and 
 Sukkur. The natural defects remain. But, quite apart 
 from the difficulties from a military point of view, there 
 are unansweral)le objections to the idea that the River 
 Indus should form our only line of defence. It would 
 be impossil)le for us to remain in a state of passive 
 defence while Russia overran Afghanistan and estal>- 
 lished herself solidly in that country. Above all, we are
 
 ( ) 
 
 now bound to preserve the integrity of Afghanistan, and 
 under no circumstances could contemplate its absorption 
 by Russia. The Indus, therefore, is a line of defence 
 which we have properly strengthened, but I submit 
 that it cannot be regarded, in these days, as the only 
 line. 
 
 Let us now turn to the second line, the belt of moun- 
 tainous country along the base of which the old Sikh 
 and Sind frontiers ran. There used to be two lines of 
 discussion about this protective line. One idea was that 
 we should take up favourable positions, based on the 
 Indus, and overwhelm the enemy as his columns issued 
 through the passes which pierce this barrier. This 
 seems theoretically an excellent idea, but even in 
 European warfare it has not always succeeded. The 
 other and later view combined passive defence with 
 offensive action in one direction beyond the mountain 
 barrier. It recognised that in order to defend a moun- 
 tain ran2:e we must know wliat is ooins- on on the other 
 side, and that the outlets must for the time being be held. 
 In both cases, the I communications on our side in rear of 
 the range must be perfected, so as to enable the defend- 
 ing commander to concentrate his force upon a particular 
 column debouching from a pass, while separated from 
 the other columns which would be held up by the retard- 
 ing action of the defending army. In tlie second case, 
 offensive action was contemplated on one flank. In both 
 cases it was assumed that the enemy had been alloAved 
 to gain a dominating position in Afghanistan. But we 
 must be careful how we apply the principles of strategy 
 based upon European warfare to the conditions obtain- 
 ing in India and Afghanistan, with their vast distance 
 and enormous mountain ranges. 
 
 We may glance for a moment at this wide belt of 
 
 2
 
 ( 10 ) 
 
 mountains wliicli some have tlioui>lit constitute our 
 advanced, or, in the order 1 have adopted, our second line 
 of defence. There is, of course, no time to describe 
 in great detail all the features of this barrier or the 
 tribes which inhabit it ; and we must fix our attention 
 mainly on the gateways leading to the uplands of 
 Afghanistan and Baluchistan. First, let me ask your 
 attention to the mountainous country which flanks the 
 right of the line, the country south of the main range 
 of the Hindu Kush, indicated by Gilgit, Hunza, the 
 Shandur range, Chitral, Bajaor, Swat, and Buner, with 
 their masses of mountains. Then we come to the Kal)ul 
 Eiver, in its deep defile through the mountains, and so 
 to the well-known Khyber Pass. On its south, the Sufed 
 Koh and its spurs, embracing the hill-country of the 
 Afridis, Orakzais, and Jowakis ; then to the Kuram 
 River and Valley, and, still going south, to the Tochi 
 River and Valley amid the hills of Waziristan ; then to 
 the Gomul River and pass of that name, the great tract 
 inhabited by Baluch tribes and fringed l)y the 8ulim;in 
 Mountains, rising to over 11,000 feet ; and, finally, the 
 Bohin Pass and the country of Baluchistan, with the 
 Kirthar range on our frontier, and the sweep of hills 
 and valleys in Baluchistan from north to soutli and west. 
 We have, then, a oreat secondary barrier in a line of 
 mountainous country 1,300 or 1,400 miles in length, 
 varying in width, pierced by many routes, but with only 
 a few great issues for the passage of armies. 
 
 Let us now turn our attention to the routes by which 
 an invader might advance into India, or by which, on 
 the other hand, we should ourselves advance should we 
 decide upon taking up a position in advance of our 
 present line, whether we look at the old frontier or at 
 the line of British occupation. I am reluctant to dwell
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 upon the features of these routes, as they are so well 
 known to many of my audience, and, although it is 
 necessary for the development of my scheme of dealing 
 with the sul)ject, I will be as brief as possible. 
 
 For reasons which must be apparent from a glance 
 at the map, we need not consider specially the military 
 routes on the extreme north. We have a road from 
 Kashmir to Gilgit, and what we may call our patrol- 
 paths between Gilgit and Chitral have been much 
 improved. From Dargai, the terminus of the branch 
 line from Nowshera, there is an excellent road over the 
 Malakand and down into the Swat Valley by Chakdara, 
 and so by Dir to our forts at Drosh and Chitral, by 
 which the reliefs pass up and down. 
 
 The real hish-road to Af o-hanistan is bv the Khvber. 
 The Kabul River, unfortunately, furnishes no roadway. 
 The Khyber line connects Peshawar and Kabul, about 
 180 miles apart, commencing near Jamrud and passing 
 through defiles of various dimensions by a good military 
 road, which reaches Lundi Kotal, a position capable of a 
 powerful defence, at 3,600 feet above the sea, and about 
 2,400 feet above Peshawar, then descending to Lundi 
 Khana on the other side, near which we touch the 
 Afghan frontier. The road to Kabul was improved by 
 us during the Afghan Campaign of 187.S-1880, and is 
 maintained in good order. It traverses fairly open 
 country, touching the Kabul River now and then, by 
 Dakka, Jelalabad, and Gandamak, until it reaches the 
 pass of Pezwan. Here the country becomes mountainous 
 and difficult, and the road now taken — for there are 
 several routes — by the Lataband Pass and Butkhak, on 
 the edge of the Kabul plateau, is aligned with severe 
 grades, and is exceedingly difficult for wheeled trans- 
 port. As the elevated plain of Kabul is over 7,000 feet 
 
 2—2
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 above sea-level, it can be recognised li(>w severe the 
 ascent is. 
 
 In passing southwards, let me remind you of the 
 militarv road from Peshawar to Kohat, cutting across 
 the hill-country of the Jowakis, which here pushes 
 forward a salient into British territory. 
 
 The next pass is bv the open valley of the Kuram, 
 and thence over the Peiwar Kotal (9,20U feet) and the 
 Shutargardan (11,900 feet) into the Logar Valley leading 
 to Kabul. From the post of Thai to the Peiwar Kotal 
 is about seventy miles. The route affords a subsidiary 
 line for part of the year, but its closing by snow and the 
 great altitude which has to be crossed forbid its being 
 classed as a principal line of communication. 
 
 The next pass is by the Tochi Valley, leading from 
 Bannu to Ghazni. The valley, right up to the Afghan 
 frontier, is fairly open and the road is good. When w^e 
 get beyond Sheranni we are faced by mountain ranges 
 rising to 12,000 feet, and of the route beyond to Ghazni 
 w^e know^ little. From our advanced post to Ghazni is 
 about 120 miles. 
 
 The Gonial route, along the course of the river of 
 that name, forms a most important avenue of approach 
 to the highlands of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and is 
 largely used by the Ghilzai traders or ' povindahs.' The 
 road has been greatly improved since our occupation of 
 the advanced post Wana, and by this route w^e could 
 reach Ghazni, or British Baluchists^n by the route along 
 the Zhob Valley now held by us. 
 
 South of the Gomul and opposite Dera Ghazi Khan 
 and Multan is the Sakki Sarwar Pass, and here we have 
 made a military road to Quetta and Peshin. 
 
 Lastly, we come to the route across the Sind and 
 Kachhi plains, now traversed by the railway, and so by
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 tlie BoLin Pass and its military road, or by the railway 
 alignment in the ^luslikliaf Valley, or by the Harnai 
 railway, the uplands of Quetta are reached. From 
 Sukkur to Sibi is 148 miles, and (Quetta is about 100 
 miles in advance, the total distance from the Indus 
 to our advanced post at New Chaman being about 
 320 miles. From Sibi to (Quetta the ascent is about 
 5,000 feet. 
 
 AYe need not consider the routes through Southern 
 Baluchistan, as there is now no practicable military road 
 along the Makran coast. The Kirthar range is a strong 
 barrier, and the only route is from Kelat to the plains 
 of Kach Gandava through the Mulla Pass. 
 
 If, therefore, we look at this frontier line from 
 Peshawar to Karachi, 700 to 800 miles long, we see that 
 we have a remarkable protective belt of mountainous, 
 difficult, and mostly sterile country, pierced by few 
 passes practicable for armies, with valuable positions for 
 defence, and capable of being utilized by mobile defensive 
 forces. And of the principal passes we hold the issues 
 on the other side. Observe, also, that our communica- 
 tions in rear of this mountain barrier are by no means 
 unsatisfactory, for not only have we a greater frontier 
 road at the foot of the hills, with outpost and patrol - 
 paths connecting all our military })osts in the plains from 
 north to south, but radiating lines strike out to the jioints 
 of military occupation and observation in the mountain 
 barrier, while roads and bridges of various kinds connect 
 with the road system of India. 
 
 Railway communication along the left bank of the 
 Indus is protected by the river, and w^ould enable us to 
 effect the quick transfer of troops from the right flank 
 to the centre, or to the left Hank ; and this lateral com- 
 munication is connected with the railway system of
 
 ( u ) 
 
 liulia by lines from several [)()iiits of the front line of 
 railway, so that the vast resources of Nortliern India and 
 of the valley of the Ganges, or of Western and Southern 
 India, ean he thrown upon either tlank or upon the centre. 
 I do not say for a moment tliat the communications are 
 complete, for we have l^een ur<i"ino- for years past that 
 our western railway system in Bomha} should be directly 
 connected on the broad gauge with the Indus Valley rail- 
 way. This strategic line would be of great value in the 
 defence of India, and I think it has now entered into 
 the domain of |)ractical railway possibilities. If we look 
 at our railways trans- Indus, we must note the line from 
 Nowshera to the foot of the Malakand ; the line from 
 Kushalgarh, on the Indus, through Kohat to Thai, at the 
 entrance to the Kuram ; and the railway-lines to Quetta 
 and our out})ost at New Chanian, witli the recent exten- 
 sion to Nushki from Quetta. 
 
 Again, we have another advantage in that the easiest 
 line of a])proach from the west would lead an enemy 
 through the BoL'in down into a land by no means flowing 
 with milk and honey, much of it a sterile waste and 
 much liable to flood — a land, moreover, far away from the 
 great avenue of approach to the rich plains of the Punjab, 
 to Delhi, and the valley of the Ganges. Sir Edward 
 Hamlev considered the main line of the enemy's advance 
 would be by the Lower Indus, that we should block the 
 Khyber and the Gonial by entrenched camps, securing 
 also any subsidiary pass like the Kuram. These were to 
 be the pivots of our operation. As Quetta commands 
 the avenues of advance, he thought we should base our- 
 selves upon that ])oint, or, better still, on a great 
 entrenched camj) at Kandahar, with our sea base at 
 Karachi and our reserves at Lahore and Mooltan. 
 
 The obvious objection, made, indeed, at the time, was
 
 ( IS ) 
 
 that the active defeiic€3 would be contined to only a 
 portion of the frontier ; but there is a still greater 
 objection — that it presupposed Russia was in position on 
 the Herat- Kandahar line, and at or near Kabul. 
 
 In a paper drawn up in 1879 for the Grovernment of 
 the day, I pointed out : firstly, that the Bolan was not, 
 historically, the only line of invasion to India ; secondly, 
 that an army invading India through the Bolan would 
 find itself in a country in part arid and in part liable to 
 inundation — in front a great river and behind it a desert 
 — that such an army could only turn northwards, and 
 would find itself confronted by Mooltan ; thirdly, that the 
 Bohin is far away from the main avenue, Lahore to Delhi, 
 leading on the real objective, Hindustan ; fourthly, that 
 the lines of Russian advance were four in number — from 
 the Caspian on Herat, up the Oxus, by the line Tashkent- 
 Samarkand, and by an extreme eastern line ; and, lastly, 
 that the entrenched camps at the eastern end of the 
 passes could hardly render them secure. I pointed out 
 that, as the two main strategic points by which Russia 
 would advance Avere Kabul and Kandahar, these would 
 have to be occupied in any future military operation, the 
 first to forestall Russia in the north, and the second so 
 as to anticipate her at Herat. In fact, I urged that we 
 should make uj) our minds to deploy on the broad strategic 
 front Kabul-Kandahar if ever military operations became 
 necessary in Afghanistan. 
 
 The real objections to any passive defence, whether 
 it be by the first line of the Indus or by the second line 
 of the mountain barriers on our border, are that they 
 rest on the supposition that Russia would march through 
 Afghanistan, and then and there invade India. We are 
 as certain as anything can be that, as previous invaders 
 have done, Russia would consolidate her power in
 
 ( 1<! ) 
 
 Afghanistan before advancing upon India, aiul it is ini- 
 jiossihle to consider even, the state cJf things in the latter 
 rountrv wiiicli would come into existence if we remained 
 supinely on the defensive. We are bound not only by 
 a convention, but by every consideration of prudence, to 
 tight for the defence of India l)eyond, and not within, 
 our frontier. The passive defence theory is by no 
 means completely dead, but I think the ))alance of 
 o])inion is against it. We see, then, that neither the 
 Indus nor the mountain barrier of India can be accepted 
 as our line of dejdoyment for defensive or oft'ensive action. 
 
 For many years those who have considered the ques- 
 tion have come to the conclusion that the line, or front, 
 Kabul-Kandahar, is the strategic position which must be 
 taken up should unhappily an attack be made upon our 
 ally. It has great advantages and some defects. 
 
 At this point it may l)e well to quit our own side, 
 and to look at the situaticjn presented on the east, north, 
 and west. The Russian and Afghan outposts face each 
 other on the Pamirs and on the long line of the River 
 ( )xus. The Russian forces in Turkestan, consisting of 
 two army corps, number from 70,000 to tSO,000 men, with 
 248 guns. The headquarters of the First Army Corps 
 are at Tashkent, about 110 miles north-west of Samar- 
 kand, and of the Second Army Corps at Askhal)ad, on 
 the Persian frontier. They furnish garrisons to a large 
 number of widely-scattered posts. We need not go 
 into the details of their distribution, interesting as these 
 are, first, because the direction of the Russian railway 
 advance indicates the main lines of operation, and, 
 secondly, because any hostile movements would now- 
 adays mean the ultimate advance of larger bodies than 
 two army corps. Xor need we discuss the strength of 
 the various small forts, whether Russian or Afghan,
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
 scattered along- the line, for they would exercise but 
 little influence on the campaign. The real points of 
 interest are the lines of advance, and the numbers which 
 Russia could place on the Oxus, or at Kuslik, near 
 Herat. The estimates of the past were based on the 
 numbers which Russia could advance from her then 
 distant bases, and could feed and transport. They were 
 remarkably small, and it is interesting to recollect that 
 in 187S an expedition of 20,000 men, led by Kaufmann, 
 started from Tashkent via Samarkand, while from the 
 same place the small column under Abramoft' started 
 through Fergana and the Alai to operate in the direction 
 of Kashmir. We must suppose, however, that the rail- 
 way to the Oxus is complete. It is said that a military 
 road has been made from Samarkand to Termez, on the 
 Oxus, and that the railway will follow this route. On 
 the other hand, it has been accepted in the past that the 
 projected line would follow the Oxus on the right or 
 north bank from Farab, opposite Charjui, and that it 
 will be extended to Kilif and Termez. Other authorities 
 say that it will be on the left bank from Charjui to 
 Kerki and Khamiab. Each of these routes has its s])ecial 
 disadvantages. Any direct line south from Samarkand 
 would pass through a difficult country, and this line and 
 that on the right or north bank of the Oxus would have 
 its terminus at Termez, with a wide unbridged river in 
 its front, while the third route would necessarily end, 
 for the time being, 90 to 100 miles from Mazar-i- Sharif. 
 I think it is likely that the line from Samarkand to the 
 Oxus will have to make a wide sweep to avoid the hills. 
 We may suppose, however, that Russia would be able 
 to bring an army of say 200,000 men to the rail-head in 
 course of time. What would or would not be possible 
 for a force of such dimensions we shall see a little later. 
 
 3
 
 ( 18 ) 
 
 Now let us turn to the western side. Tlicie, as you 
 Avill see, the branch line from Merv runs southwards bv 
 the Murghab Valley to the Kushk post, about seventy 
 miles from Herat. The Ardewj'ui Pass is only about 
 2,800 feet above the Kushk post and thirty miles distant, 
 and then, descending the southern slopes for some thirty - 
 six miles or so, Herat is reached by a road which is 
 fairly easy. This sixty or seventy miles across these 
 mountains present no great obstacle to the march of an 
 army. To extend the railway from Kushk would be 
 another matter. It could be done, but not at the rate 
 Ave think of as possible in the jilains. However this may 
 be, we may suppose that the railway will enable Russia 
 to bring up to Kushk some 200,000 or 800,000 men, an 
 operation not to be eftected in a short time, whether 
 these great hosts came via Baku, the Caspian and 
 Askhabad, or from Orenburg via Tashkent. 
 
 Now let us consider for a moment the country in 
 which operations would be conducted, bearing in mind 
 that at this juncture we may suppose Russia to be con- 
 centrating towards the Oxus and towards Herat, with 
 her troops partly in advance and partly echeloned in 
 the rear, and that on our side we are moving up on the 
 Khyber line and by the Bolan-Quetta line, so as to be 
 prepared to occupy generally the Kabul-Kandahar front. 
 To enter upon a detailed description of Afghanistan 
 would be to go far beyond the limits of time, and I 
 must therefore content mvself with indicatino- those 
 salient points which will enable us to appreciate the 
 military situation. Afghanistan is about ()00 miles in 
 length from the Khyber to Herat, and about 500 miles 
 in breadth. And looking at the theatre of possible 
 operations as a Avhole, we may say it divides itself into 
 four great portions : Hrst, the mass of mountainous
 
 ( 1« ) 
 
 coiintrv on tlie east ; secondly, tlie liilly country and 
 plains of Afghan Turkestan on the north, comparatively 
 fertile ; thirdly, the mountainous triangle of Kabul, 
 Kandahar, and Herat ; and fourthly, the desert country 
 of the Helmund basin and Baluchistan. This is, of 
 course, a rough division, and the features which specialh* 
 appeal to us are, the general height of Afghanistan above 
 the plains of India, and the great dividing-line of the 
 Hindu Kush. The trend of the elevation is from north- 
 east to south-west, and the lay of the country can be 
 appreciated by remembering that, whereas Kabul is some 
 7,300 feet above the sea, Kandahar is only about 3,300, 
 and Herat 2,500. The enormous range of the Hindu 
 Kush throws out its spurs in the Gul Koh and the 
 Hazara Highlands, the block of mountainous country 
 north of the line Kabul- Kandahar, in the Koh-i-Sufed 
 and the Paropamisus, and in the northern hills of Afghan 
 Turkestan. The eastern mass of mountains forms a 
 great barrier to hostile enterprise. The Kilik Pass at 
 15,600 feet, the Baroghel at 12,400, the Dorah Pass at 
 14,800, and others of lesser importance, can be crossed 
 by small parties when the passes are not under deep 
 snow ; but the difficulties of the routes are enormous, 
 and, with the measures of precaution that have been 
 adopted, we can fairly assume that we could block any 
 small columns an adventurous invader might push for- 
 ward, wdiether towards Gilgit, or to Chitral, and so by 
 the Kunar Valley to Jelalabad, or by the route into 
 the Swat Valley. 
 
 The group of passes we have specially to consider 
 are those from the Khawak Pass to the Koh-i-Baba. 
 Between the Khawak Pass — much traversed by caravans 
 — at 11,600 feet, leading from Afghan Turkestan into 
 the Panjshir Valley, and the road from Bamian over the 
 
 3—2
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 Kotnl-i-Irak, west of Kabul, a length of about 150 miles, 
 there are several passes, but the principal ones are the 
 Kaoshan, 14,300 feet, and the Chahardar, 13,900 feet. 
 Kaoshnn was used l)y Alexander the Great, and is the 
 historical highway of the hordes who have swept down 
 upon Kabul and India. But lower passes have been 
 improved artificially, and the great height of the 
 Kaoshan renders it extremely difficult. The road 
 by the Chahardar Pass was made by the late Amir, 
 and turns south into the Ghorband Valley, but it is 
 almost impassable in the winter, even for small bodies 
 of men. 
 
 The route from the valley of Bamian by the Irak 
 Pass to Kabul is well known, and has been much im- 
 proved of late years. The hills extend to Mazar-i- Sharif, 
 Tashkurghan, and Kunduz, and the roads leading to 
 the Hindu Kush from these places traverse a country 
 of defiles, gorges, and rocky glens. Mazar-i- Sharif is 
 about 250 miles from Kabul. From Tashkurghan to 
 Kabul is about 276 miles, and by the Chahardar route 
 250 miles. Between the Bamian and Herat there is no 
 real way from the Oxus southwards. Tracks there may 
 be, but there is no highway for an army. 
 
 Turning now to the Herat Valley, we come to an 
 altoo-ether easier and more fertile res-ion. I must not 
 stop to describe the fortress and city of Herat. It is 
 sufficient to say that the former has been considerablv 
 strengthened, and that, secure against a coup-de-main, it 
 might be able to sustain a siege, provided the garrison 
 were staunch and well commanded. The road from 
 Herat runs due south by SabzaAvar to Farah, then turn- 
 ing eastwards ])y Girishk to Kandahar. From Herat 
 to Farah the road traverses o])en uplands, undulating- 
 country, and narrow hills. From Farah to Girishk, on
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 the Helniiind, the roadway is fairly level, and is flanked 
 for part of the way by the Zamindawar Hills, the home 
 of the Ghazi, From Girishk to Kandahar there are no 
 special difficulties. Besides this main route, .380 miles 
 long, there are other roads by which troops could move 
 in small bodies, but such as they are they lie in a com- 
 paratively narrow area of possible movement, between 
 the hills on one side and the desert on the other. The 
 country could furnish but few supplies, and Ayub Khan 
 and his 10,000 men had to store supplies beforehand. 
 Easy as the road is, therefore, no large armies could 
 traverse it unaided by a railway. 
 
 We are now in a position to appreciate the value of 
 the front Kabul-Kandahar. And the first thing to 
 notice is that the great block of impracticable moun- 
 tainous country in its front, which we call the Hazarajat 
 or the Hazara Highlands, forms a solid protection to the 
 position. But not onl}^ this : it divides the hostile forces 
 so that they have no power of junction or intercom- 
 munication, and obliges them to conduct their operations 
 on widely separated lines. It is true that the late Amir 
 made a military road from Kabul to Herat, 500 miles 
 long, by Daolat Yar, but it could only be used by small 
 bodies of troops for a few months in the year, and 
 supplies are practically non-existent. 
 
 Between Kabul and Kandahar, ,330 miles apart, there 
 is a good road by Ghazni and Khilat-i-Ghilzai, and from 
 the flanks of the line there are two great highways 
 to India ; while from intermediate points, routes pass 
 to India capable of being made lines of military com- 
 munication. Kabul itself dominates all roads from the 
 north leading to the rich plains of India, while Kandahar 
 commands all the roads from the west. The position is 
 therefore a strong one, and both Kabul and Kandahar
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 lend themselves to the formation of great entrenched 
 camps. Based on Kabul, we could with the aid of the 
 Afghans successfully defend that part of the line of the 
 Hindu Kush the roads over which centre in Charikar, 
 while on the south and west we should take advantage 
 of the strategical position of Seistan on the flank of a 
 Russian advance. Seistan, once the granary of Asia, 
 and even now able to furnish considerable supplies, is 
 likely to play an important part in the theatre of possible 
 operations, and the extension of the railway from Nushki 
 is only a matter of time. But while we recognise the 
 great advantages of the Kabul-Kandahar position, we 
 must also remember its defects. It is fatal to look at a 
 small scale map and to imagine that we are dealing with 
 the short distances and easy roads of a western country. 
 The real value of a strategic front of this kind, enabling 
 us to act on interior lines, is the power of rapid transfer 
 of force from one flank to the other. In this case such 
 rapid transfer is not possible unless a railway is made, 
 and that is among the first conditions of complete success. 
 A large entrenched camp at Kandahar could hardly have 
 much effect on our fortunes at Kabul, unless we had a 
 mobile army which could reinforce the latter place from 
 Kandahar. In order, therefore, to make full use of this 
 strategic front, it is essential that Kabul and Kandahar 
 should eventually be united by a railway ; that the right 
 flank should be connected by rail with India ; that on 
 the left flank our rail-head at Chaman should be pushed 
 on seventy miles to Kandahar ; that the railway through 
 the Gomal and Zhob ^^alley should be made, and, if 
 possi))le, Ghazni linked to India in the same way by the 
 Tochi route, or by a branch from the Gomal. Under 
 existing conditions, owing to the strong objections of 
 the Afghans, only one of these railway connections
 
 I 
 
 ( 23 ) 
 
 could be made before a campaiiiii took place. The 
 deductions which I venture to submit to you are, that 
 until Kabul and Kandahar were connected by rail, we 
 should not enjoy the full advantage of the strategic 
 front, but that there would be two lines of operation, 
 although these would be united by a good road. 
 
 You will remember that I spoke of the possibility of 
 i^UO,()00 Russians concentrating towards Termez, the 
 future rail-head on the Oxus, and of even a larger 
 number being moved towards Kushk, on the western line 
 of advance. It would be unreasonable to suppose that 
 these great forces would be actually concentrated, for 
 the good reason that, if they were so massed, they would 
 soon eat up all the supplies they were able to transport. 
 The western country of Af o-han Turkestan is fertile, and 
 might possibly support a force of 30,000 to 40,000 men 
 for some months. Similarly a force of these dimensions 
 could be sup])orted for a time in the Herat region : but 
 it would be im})ossible for armies four or five times that 
 strength to move forward without the aid of a railway 
 for supply purposes. The transport for even 30,000 or 
 40,000 men, allowing for the smaller requirements of 
 Russian troops, would be very large, whether for advance 
 from the Oxus to the Hindu Kush, or to Herat and beyond. 
 In our Afghan Campaign of 1879-1880 we could only 
 feed with 2:reat difficultv a sino-le division at Kabul and one 
 on the line of communication ; and it has been calculated 
 that to feed and transport four or five of our Indian divi- 
 sions we should require, for their equipment alone, 26,000 
 mules and 21,000 camels, while to keep up the supply of 
 their food from India to the uplands of Afghanistan we 
 should need 115,000 camels and bullocks, and that, Avhen 
 in three months the local supplies were exhausted, we 
 should require 230,000 animals for supply purposes.
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 Wl' niav be quiti' certain tluit in Atgliauistan no 
 verv large army can be supplied -without a railway. 
 Fortunately for us, the hostile armies would be in much 
 the same predicament. Immense physical difficulties 
 would confront a Russian army advancing southwards 
 from the Oxus to the Hindu Kush, and I need hardly 
 labour the ])oint that in this region railway-making 
 would be a tremendous enterprise, only to be accom- 
 plished, if at all, by a vast amount of rock-cutting 
 and tunnelling. On the western side the task would 
 be much simpler, although not w'ithout its si)ecial diffi- 
 culties. 
 
 The conclusions 1 venture to submit to you are as 
 follows : At the outset of the campaign, and until rail- 
 ways had been extended, no immense armies could be 
 employed on either side. In the western part of the 
 theatre of war Ave should stand in a most favourable 
 position, because we are only seventy easy miles from 
 Kandahar. In the north, while the approach to Kabul 
 is longer, we should be assisted by the great barrier of 
 the Hindu Kush. The occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar 
 ])osition would cover India by the shortest line, and with 
 the help ot" the Afghan army and people we should be 
 able to undertake a })owerful defence with the prospect 
 of successful offensive enterprise. The Afghan army 
 may not be all that Ave desire, but its 100,000 men cannot 
 be disregarded as a tangible asset in the military resources 
 of such a campaign, while Ave should be able to raise 
 thousands of levies from Afghanistan and from our OAvn 
 borders. It would be unprofitable to speculate on the 
 movements Avliich Avould be made by our armies posted 
 on the front Kabul-Kandahar, and idle to discuss Avhether 
 Ave should retard the advance from the north with the aid 
 of the Afghans while we threw our Aveight upon the
 
 ( 25 ) 
 
 advaiue from the west. If the cjinipuigii continued, and 
 as railways were })ushed forward from both sides, we must 
 expect a hirge development in the strength of the contend- 
 ing armies. We must, therefore, be prepared to put a far 
 larger army in the field than we can produce at present 
 from India and from this country, and must so frame 
 our army system that the increased military strength 
 may be available when the time comes. An immense 
 effort would undoubtedly be necessary, and for that 
 effort we must prepare. This is preciselv what men 
 like Sir Charles Macgregor, Sir George Chesney, Lord 
 Roberts and others were insistent upon long before the 
 present development of ideas took place. But, while we 
 recognise the largeness of the task before us, we must 
 remember that such a conflict would involve Russia in 
 war with us all over the world, and that in the case we 
 have been discussing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would 
 give us the most powerful allies w^e could desire. Our 
 initial difficulties lie in the work of preparation. We 
 cannot make raihvays in Afghanistan in peace time, and 
 there ap[)ears to be a rooted idea in the minds of the 
 Afghans that we want to annex the country, an idea of 
 which we should endeavour to disabuse them. All their 
 measures of defence are undertaken from the local and 
 limited point of view^, although if it is the case, as reported, 
 that a telephonic service now connects the larger cities, 
 w^e may hope for a gradual advance in favour of Western 
 views on the defence ({uestiou. We cannot force the 
 pace, l)ut we can take every suitable opportunity to 
 ))roaden the views of the Afghan in respect to the defen- 
 sive requirements of the kingdom. And above all, we 
 must steadfastly maintain the })olicy of the integrity of 
 Afghanistan. I confess I have always been strongly 
 opposed to any idea of the partition of Afghanistan. It
 
 • ( -^fi ) 
 
 would, in my hiinihlu opiiiiuii, Ijc iuriiiitcly l)C'tteT to 
 uiuler^jo all the burden of" a severe offensive campaign 
 rather than acquiesce in a trontior on the Hindu Kush, 
 which woukl only mean jnitting off the evil day of a 
 great struggle for empire in Asia, and would meanwhile 
 load us with an immense weight of difficulty and 
 expenditure. 
 
 On our side we must, I submit, continue our })olicy, 
 settled many years ago, of linking the vantage-points of 
 the frontier with the Indian railway system.* In the 
 noith, Kashmir will l)e connected with India by rail, and 
 a line is also projected to run to the Afghan border 
 north of Peshaw'ar, either by the Kabul Kiver line or 
 through the Loi Shilman, but I believe the exact route 
 has not yet been settled. 
 
 Some few years back I strongly advocated the con- 
 struction of the road-bed of a narrow-gauge railway, 
 according to the surveys which were made, up the Kliyber 
 and down to Lundi Khana, so that, on emergency occur- 
 ring, it could be rapidly pushed on through Jelalabad and 
 Gundamak. The Kabul River is undoubtedly the route 
 for a })ermanent connection with Kabul on the broad 
 gauge, l)ut what we want is a supply line which can be 
 rapidly pushed on to relieve the transport and to make 
 the advance of a large force a feasible operation. The 
 Gonial valley line is another important railway which 
 may be made in the future, and we should continue to 
 advance our frontier railways from the main system so 
 far as we can do so without offending the susceptibilities 
 of the Afghans. Hut more than anything we require a 
 powerful military railw^ay organization of large dimen- 
 sions to enable us to construct railways rapidly in 
 
 * It is understood that sanction has been given to extend the 
 Kohat-Thal line to Parachinar.
 
 ( 27 ) ■ 
 
 At'glianistan ; that and the further expansion of the 
 large transport system, Avhich it fell to my lot to see 
 carried into effect, appear to me to be the most important 
 requirements. 
 
 For the last twenty years the millitary policy has been 
 one of consistent prej)aration. We were hampered by 
 want of means, but an immense deal was effected, and 
 we were prepared to put 100,000 men into tlie field, and 
 were unanimous in proposing the increase of that number. 
 Tliat force is now to be increased to 140,000, and it is 
 reco2:nised that Eno;land reo;ards the reinforcement of 
 this army as the first consideration. We were not so 
 fortunate, as we were always told we must look only to 
 the resources of India. The one thing needful is that 
 we should so frame our military arrangements in India 
 that they are in sympatic with the conditions of the native 
 army and of the people generally. 
 
 When I think of the labours on the frontier and 
 beyond, of the distinguished political and survey 
 officers, explorers who have added so much to our 
 knowledge, some of whom are present in this room ; 
 when I look back to the work of men like Sir Henry 
 Rawlinson, Sir Charles Macgregor, Sir George Chesney, 
 Lord Roberts, Lord Curzon, and that great frontier 
 soldier, Sir William Lockhart — to name only a few 
 — upon the question I have dealt with to-day ; when 
 I think of the roads, railways, and defences that have 
 been made, of the improvements in organization, and in 
 every detail connected with the army, following one 
 guiding principle, it appears to me incredible that there 
 should be found those who assert that we were 
 governed by no policy and no plan. If the accusation 
 were true, then all the statesmen and soldiers who 
 swayed the destinies of India for the last twenty years
 
 ( 28 ) 
 
 would tk'seivc impcachiiieiit. It is charitable to suppose 
 that the accusation is based upon ignorance of the 
 historv of India during- the last two decades. 
 
 I am fully conscious that I have left a great deal un- 
 said. lUit to deal with a subject of this magnitude and 
 im])ortance would need a whole course of lectures. 1 
 have, for example, not touched on the position of Persia 
 in relation to the defence of India. I hope, however, 
 that no one will suppose I undervalue this part of the 
 subject, fori regard it as a matter of the first importance 
 that we should never consent to any action on the part 
 of Russia which would allow her to close in on the 
 western borders of Afghanistan. I have also been 
 obliged to refrain from touching on the ethnology of 
 Afghanistan, a very important subject in its political 
 and military aspect. Again, I have said little or nothing 
 about invasions of India of ancient or mediseval times, 
 or about our wars in Afghanistan. The former subject 
 is a most fascinating one, and it has a })ractical applica- 
 tion because we know that, apart from the Arab in- 
 vasions from the west, the chief invasions of India were 
 based on Kabul or Ghazni. 
 
 I have addressed myself rather to the military 
 situation of the present day. Russia is now on what 
 Sir Henry Rawlinson called the second parallel. But 
 I venture to think that I have shown that her advance 
 from that ])osit!on will be an operation of great difficulty, 
 and that large armies cannot exist without the aid of 
 railways. Provided we continue to apj)ly ourselves to 
 the policy of preparation, of developing the military 
 resources of India, and of strengthening our position, we 
 need have no fear of the result. But that policy must 
 necessarily include the power of great reinforcements 
 Irom this country. The stronger we are, the less likeli-
 
 ( 2« ) 
 
 hood will there be of the catastrophe of war. As T said 
 at the beginning of my lecture, there is absolutely no 
 reason why we should not live in perfect peace with 
 Russia. We have not the remotest desire to occupy or 
 annex Afghanistan or any part of it, but we intend to 
 maintain its integrity, and to defend to the uttermost of 
 our power the great heritage of India which has been 
 committed to our charge.
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 DISCUSSION. 
 
 Sir Lepel Griffin : In the interesting lecture to which we have 
 just listened the defence of India has been treated from a military 
 point of view, and it would be with hesitation that I should offer 
 a decided opinion on the strategical issues discussed. I believe 
 that there are very few military or civil experts who will largely 
 differ from the general conclusions of Sir Edwin Collen, than 
 whom there is no one more entitled to speak with authority. 
 
 We listened last week to an exceedingly interesting speech by 
 the new War Minister, Mr. Haldane. I think everyone will agree 
 that it was a sympathetic and intelligent speech, and showed 
 that the new Minister intends to treat the question from an 
 Imperial and reasonable point of view. But, if Mr. Haldane 
 imagines that India is the place where the economies he hopes 
 to carry out can be effected, he will find himself mistaken. 
 Danger to India must always exist, however amicable may be 
 our relations with Eussia ; increasing expenditure on the armj' 
 in India and on our reserves at home will be required, not less 
 expenditure. Seeing that it is India that pays for her compara- 
 tively small army, not England, I do not see why there should 
 be such a great outcry. The only thing to be remembered is 
 that India must not be unduly burdened. The outlay is for her 
 defence, and is a small insurance on the vast interests at stake. 
 
 The feeling against railways is so strong in Afghanistan that I 
 hope it will be Eussia, not ourselves, who will be the first to begin 
 to make them, and therefore be considered an enemy by the Amir. 
 Sir Edwin Collen insisted on the important point that no Eussian 
 army would advance with success against India through Afghan- 
 istan without railways ; and, as these will not be made with the 
 concurrence of the Amir, we may well wait until the first step is 
 taken by a possible enemy. I know perfectly well the opinion 
 held by most people connected with this Society with regard to 
 Russia and Eussian aggression, but there is still ground for 
 hope that a friendly arrangement may be possible between the 
 two great Powers in Asia. We see in the attitude of the new 
 Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, a desire to emulate the 
 fame which his predecessor in office, Lord Lansdowne, achieved
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 in carrying through successful diplomatic arrangements with 
 America and with France. I trust it may be reserved for Sir 
 Edward Grey to carry through an equally friendly arrangement 
 between England and Eussia. If so, a great step will be taken 
 towards the defence of India. But even then there must be no 
 lessening of watchfulness or decrease of expense in our military 
 preparations. 
 
 General Sir John McQueen : It is with the greatest pleasure 
 that I have listened to Sir Edwin Collen's lecture this afternoon. 
 I have spent the greater part of my life on the borderland of 
 India, and take especial interest in the subject. Every word 
 that Sir Edwin Collen said was to the point. I also agree with 
 Sir Lepel Griffin. 
 
 Strangely enough, although I am a military man, and it is a 
 military subject which has been put before us so clearly with 
 regard to the people we may have to meet in battle some day — I 
 mean ourselves and Eussia — it is a civil point to which I wish to 
 refer. 
 
 After the first Afghan War, although we were successful to 
 a certain extent, we suffered great losses. The Afghans hated 
 us. It was believed by them, and especially by their descendants, 
 that they had wiped the British army off the face of the earth. 
 One force certainly was cut up. But they believed that they 
 had exterminated us, and they drove the few British that 
 remained out of the country. I have met Afghans and Afridis 
 on the border who believed that we dare not go back to Afghan- 
 istan. The second Afghan War ended by putting us in a much 
 better position. Previously we had fallen in the eyes of the 
 Afghans ; but in the second war we went up to their country, 
 and remained up. Our losses, too, were small, and we left the 
 country without being followed or a shot being fired after us. 
 Further, we gained more by giving back every inch of ground 
 than we should have done by breaking up their country, as was 
 proposed. Instead of that, we brought in a strong ruler, gave 
 him support, trusted him, and left the country. 
 
 There is still great want of confidence in us, however, among 
 the Afghans. I am convinced that the fault principally lies in 
 the fact that the present Amir has not visited India. Every 
 Amir who has visited India has learned something from what 
 he has seen there — for example, Dost Mahommed a few months 
 before the Mutiny. His visit made him friendly towards us. At
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 Peshawar he conferred with J.ord Lawrence and Edwards, and 
 made a treaty which he kept. He did not attack us. Tliere 
 were two British officers at Kandahar and one at Herat, Colonel 
 Taylor, who is still alive, sent by General Outram to see Herat 
 given over to Afghanistan by Persia. They had orders to remain, 
 and did remain; the effect was good. Then there was Amir 
 Sheer Ali, over whom Lord Mayo had a great influence for 
 good, which, unfortunately, the next ^'iceroy did not see. Events 
 led to the second Afghan War, but that reinstated us in the eyes 
 of the Afghans. Abdur l\ahman visited the Viceroy, Lord 
 Duti'erin, at Eawal Pindi, and Lord Dufferin gained his con- 
 fidence. An Afghan only believes what he sees, never anything 
 he hears. Let the present Amir go to India and see. Let him 
 meet the Viceroy in India ; it will be better for Afghanistan. 
 Many Afghans have been, but the Amir has not done so. 
 
 My advice is, do not have a great show of armies for him. 
 Let him see the troops as they are at Peshawar, Eawal Pindi, 
 Lahore, Delhi, The great Commander-in-Chief should not be 
 seen ; only the local men on the spot. Do not make too great 
 a fuss with him : let him come and use his eyes. The troops 
 made a great impression on Abdur Eahman. He had heard of 
 the British and native armies, and he saw what he expected. 
 But he knew nothing of the troops of the native princes, and he 
 was more struck with them than with anything he had expected 
 to see. When he saw the Panjab contingents in camp at 
 Eawal Pindi, he said : ' If I were you, Lord Sahib, I would have 
 these troops put in the forefront of the battle, and let as manj- 
 of them be killed as possible.' Let the Amir get as far as 
 Delhi ; let the Viceroy receive him there, and let there be a 
 parade of troops. Ilis great-uncle went to Umballa. and the 
 journey took days. Now, he could get to Delhi hi a third of the 
 time it took to reach Umballa. This is the civil point on which 
 I wish to insist : we must gain the confidence of the present 
 Amir. 
 
 We have been Iniilding up the defence of the frontier for 
 years. A leading London daily journal said the other day that 
 it is only just lately that we are giving attention to the frontier. 
 Lord Kitchener is busy in putting coping-stones on the broad 
 wall, the foundations of which were laid two decades ago. Let 
 the Amir come and see with his own eyes. 
 
 Colonel C. E. Yate : The heading, ' The Defence of India,'
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 to the lecture, which we have all listened to with so much 
 interest, luight lead people to suppose that we had to consider 
 the question of a sudden rush upon India by Kussia. No 
 advance could be sudden ; it must be gradual, and, as Sir Edwin 
 Collen himself remarked, we are as certain as anything can be 
 that, as previous invaders have done, Kussia would consolidate 
 her jjower in Afghanistan before advancing upon India. Let us 
 dismiss from our minds, therefore, all idea of a sudden rush upon 
 India with large numbers of men, either of regular troops like 
 those lately employed in Manchuria, or of the hordes of Asiatic 
 horsemen who to a cry of blood and plunder were to Ije launched 
 against India by Skobeloli" thirty years ago. 
 
 Sir Edwin has pointed out that Russia could concentrate 
 200,000 or even 300,000 men at Termez or Kushk without 
 difficulty, but that those men could not be moved on without a 
 railway. Now, that railway cannot be made at more than a 
 certain rate a day. I have seen the Russians at work on railway- 
 making. In 1888 I was the guest of General Annenkofi" in the 
 construction train of the Russian Railway Battalion then em- 
 ployed in the making of the Transcaspian Railway from 
 Chaharjui on towards Bokhara. I watched the men and their 
 method, which was excellent. The General told me that the 
 rails were being laid as fast, in places, as at the rate of four 
 versts or two and two-third miles a day, but this was over level, 
 sandy country where no large cuttings or earthworks were 
 required ; and the rate of construction depends not so much on 
 the laying of the rails as upon the making of the road upon 
 which the rails have to be laid. The Russians have in the late 
 war proved themselves to be wonderful railway men ; but when 
 calculating the possible rate for the advance of a Russian army 
 in Afghanistan, we have to bear in mind that the railway, upon 
 which they will have to depend for their supplies, will have to 
 be surveyed and made as they go on, and that, too, in a difficult 
 country where the hard work of rock-cutting, tunnelling, bridges 
 and embankments will all have to be taken into account. Even 
 on the Herat-Kandahar line, the most open of all, we could 
 not expect the railway to l)e constructed at a quicker rate 
 than a mile or a mile and a third a day, and probably a verst 
 a day would be nearer the mark. A sudden advance by Russia 
 through Afghanistan with a force large enough to attempt the 
 invasion of India is not, therefore, to be thought of. What we
 
 ( '^^ ) 
 
 have to fear is an attempt at the gradual absorption of Afghan- 
 istan by Kussia, and 1 cordially endorse Sir Edwin Collen's 
 words regarding the necessit}- of our steadfastly maintaining the 
 integrity of Afghanistan. I agree with him that it would be 
 better for us to light the battle out at once on the first infringe- 
 ment of Afghan territory than to be loaded with the weight of 
 anxiety and expenditure that would be entailed by having the 
 Piussians in force at Herat and Maziir-i-Sharif, and I trust his 
 words regarding the maintenance of the integrity of Afghan- 
 istan may be duly taken to heart by the country. 
 
 iSir Edwin Collen has spoken of the Kabul-Kandahar line as 
 the strategical position to be taken up by us in case of attack, 
 but we must not forget that this line or front, though the 
 shortest, is 330 miles in length. Sir Edwin went on to say that 
 with the help of the Afghan army and people we should be able 
 there to undertake a powerful defence with the prospect of 
 successful offensive enterprise. Now, the help of the Afghan 
 army and people is a most important political consideration, 
 and we cannot treat that question on military grounds alone. 
 The Afghans as a race are full of overweening pride and 
 conceit, and to expect that they will accept our aid before the 
 commencement of hostilities, or that they will give us facilities 
 to make the preparations and to form the entrenched camps at 
 Kabul and Kandahar, suggested by the lecturer, except under 
 the press of necessity, is to expect a thing that I do not suppose 
 is possible. Not till the Afghan has suffered defeat all along 
 the line will he be ready to accept our aid. You cannot insult 
 an Afghan more than by offering to pull him out of a ditch 
 before he has been knocked into it, and not until defeat has 
 been brought home to him on his own actual hearth will he be 
 in the frame of mind to welcome help from any foreigner. To 
 force help upon him before then would not only be inadvisable, 
 but dangerous. Any occupation of Kabul by British troops 
 would be specially resented, unless the Russians were at their 
 very doors. 
 
 Kabul is well defended by mountainous country on the 
 north, where the Afghans would fight at their best, and the con- 
 centration of troops in readiness on our own frontier, and 
 possibly the making of the railway-line on ahead, would seem to 
 me to be the most that we could well do on the Kabul side. 
 
 The occupation of Kandahar would not be so much resented
 
 ( '^5 ) 
 
 as that of Kabul, as Kandahar is not so much the home of the 
 real Afghan, but even then I doubt if the game would be worth 
 the candle. We are only seventy miles from Kandahar at 
 Chaman, and I think concentration at Chaman would suffice at 
 first. Sir Edwin gave the distance from Kandahar to Herat as 
 380 miles. I marched that road via Girishk, Farah and 
 Sabzawar in 1893, and I made the distance 407 miles. I may 
 have slightly exaggerated it, but a mile or two either way is 
 nothing much. Let us call it 400 miles. It is clear that it 
 must be long before Russia can advance in force from Herat to 
 anywhere within touch of Kandahar, whereas we can move up 
 there at any time, and there would be no immediate cause for 
 hurry. 
 
 The action that I would suggest on the first sign of any 
 advance by Russia would be the moving of a force of British 
 troops from Nushki to the Lower Helmund, and the extension 
 of the railway in their wake to that point. On the Helmund 
 the people are not of Afghan origin : they are Baluchis. When 
 the Afghan Boundary Commission marched from Nushki to the 
 Helmund in 1884, there was not an Afghan south of the 
 Helmund. By Sir Robert Sandeman's orders, Mr. (now Sir) 
 Hugh Barnes and other officers opened up the country, made 
 the road, dug the wells, and made all the arrangements for the 
 Commission to pass across the desert between Chagai and the 
 Helmund, and when we got to the Helmund we found the left 
 bank down which we marched practically uninhabited. As I 
 said in this room, when lecturing on ' Baluchistan ' last month, 
 the late Amir should never have been allowed by the Govern- 
 ment of India to occupy the country to the south of the 
 Helmund that was subsequently surrendered to him. As it is, 
 the Baluch tribes now there would have no objection to our 
 presence amongst them, nor would the Afghans either. It is the 
 occupation of their own personal homesteads that the Afghans 
 so much object to, and a prompt advance by us to the Helmund 
 on the outbreak of hostilities would, I think, reassure the 
 Afghans rather than annoy them. It would show the Afghans 
 that we were in earnest in our intention to help them, and it 
 would show India that we had no intention of sitting still under 
 the threat of invasion ; while it would enable us to cover 
 Persian Seistan, supposing Russia contemplated going there or 
 anywhere violated Persian territory.
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 Sir Edwin Collen has told us that he has not touched upon 
 the position of Persia in relation to the defence of India, hut it 
 is impossible for us to separate the two. Sir Edwin pointed out 
 tlie strategical importance of Seistan on the flank of a Russian 
 advance, and stated that he regarded it as a matter of the first 
 importance that we should never consent to any action on the 
 part of llussia which would allow her to close in on the western 
 borders of Afghanistan, in all of which I most cordially agree 
 with him. Seistan is bound to play an important part in any 
 future struggle, and it behoves us to watch most carefully the 
 Russian schemes for a railway down the eastern frontier of 
 Persia. I dwelt upon this in my lecture on ' Baluchistan ' here 
 last month, and I cannot urge too strongly the necessity of 
 a strict limit to the advance of Russian roads or railways south- 
 wards being laid at the boundary of Khorasan, near Turbat-i- 
 Haidari and Khaf. Russia can legitimately claim Khorasan as 
 her commercial sphere ; but any interference with Kain or 
 Seistan would be an unfriendly act on her part, which it would 
 be better for us to resist at once than to submit to the menace 
 that would be entailed upon us thereby. 
 
 As to railways in Afghanistan, we cannot make them in 
 peace-time; but Sir Edwin urges that we should advance our 
 own frontier railways as far as we can do so w-ithout offending 
 the susceptibilities of the Afghans, and particularly names the 
 Gumal Valley Railway. Personally, I do not think that we need 
 care much about the susceptibilities of the Afghans so long as 
 we do not touch their territory. The stronger we are on the 
 Afghan border, the more will the Afghans respect us. As to 
 the Gumal Valley Railway, a line through the mountains there 
 will certainly have its strategical advantages ; but I do not think 
 it would ever pay commercially, and its construction must depend 
 on circumstances. There is certainly need of good communica- 
 tion between the Northern Punjab and Baluchistan, and I did 
 my best to further this, when I was Chief Commissioner of 
 Baluchistiin, by opening out a road through the Chuhar Khel 
 J)ahana pass, just a little to the south of the Gumal, giving 
 direct communication between Bera Ismail Khan and Fort 
 Sandeman. 
 
 Finally, I would beg to invite your special attention to what 
 Sir Edwin Collen has told us as to the necessity of our framing 
 our military arrangements in India so that they are in sympathy
 
 ( :^7 ) 
 
 with the conditions of the native army and of the people gene- 
 rally. This is most important in a country like India, where 
 the well-being of the native army is a factor dependent as much 
 on careful political guidance as on military discipline. The 
 conditions of the native army require most careful watching, 
 and I yet hope to see the day when a thoroughly experienced 
 officer of the Indian army will have a seat on the Viceroy's 
 Council, charged specially with the supervision of everything 
 that concerns the native army. 
 
 At the close of the discussion. Sir A. Lyall said that all 
 present must regret the absence of Sir Thomas Holdich, who 
 had been prevented by illness from taking the chair at this 
 meeting. It was, he observed, particularly unlucky, for Sir 
 E. Cohen's valuable and instructive address dealt with those 
 strategical military aspects of Indian frontier defence on which, 
 from long professional knowledge of the Indian army in war 
 and peace, and from his personal experience of the country and 
 its people, he was, as a distinguished soldier, thoroughly ac- 
 quainted with military administration, so well qualified to speak 
 with authority. Sir A. Lyall, on the other hand, had no pre- 
 tence to offer an opinion on such questions. He might remark, 
 however, that the problem of the defence of India from invasion, 
 and the subject of the position of Eussia, with the possibility of 
 a collision between the two great Empires in Asia, and the 
 resources on either side for attack and defence, had been sur- 
 veyed very frequently of late. Sir Thomas Holdich had recently 
 addressed the Society on England's strength in Asia. Lord 
 Eonaldshay, in a most interesting narrative of travel in Central 
 Asia, had touched upon Eussia' s activities, political and military, 
 beyond the Afghan frontier ; Colonel Beresford had given us a 
 full account of Eussian railways toward India ; and Mr. A. Balfour, 
 as Prime Minister, had delivered an impressive speech in the 
 House of Commons, which laid great stress on the ways and 
 means of safeguarding our North- West Frontier beyond India. 
 
 He noticed that throughout all this discussion there was one 
 prominent point upon which all authorities were agreed, and 
 that was the essential necessity, for attack or defence, of con- 
 structing railways in Afghanistan. All agreed that, without 
 railways in that country, Eussia cannot advance ; with railways, 
 for su]Dplies and communications, she becomes a very formidable 
 adversary. And Sir E, CoUen has just explained to us that all
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 our strategic plans and dispositions for resistance must be based, 
 or at any rate will be immensely facilitated, by making railways 
 for connection of our defensive lines, for massing a sufficient 
 force on the various points, and for feeding a large army. He 
 has also pointed to the initial difficulty. He says, quite truly, 
 that we cannot make railways in Afghanistan during peace- 
 time — the Afghan prejudices do not allow us to make this 
 needful preparation for war. The Amir wishes to keep his 
 country impenetrable and inaccessible ; he is not to be persuaded 
 by arguments — commercial, political, or strategical — to allow the 
 construction of railways by foreigners within his borders. 
 
 This state of things produces a very curious, unprecedented, 
 and exceedingly difficult problem, to which Sir A. Lyall ventured 
 to draw attention ; for railways take time to make, and warlike 
 operations may be rapid and urgent. He still entertained the 
 hope that a peaceful solution might be found to the problem, and 
 that a good and firm understanding with Eussia in Central Asia 
 might be obtained by the intervention of diplomacy to adjust 
 the interests and legitimate aspirations of the two great European 
 dominions in Asia. 
 
 Sir Edwin Collen : At this late hour I can only extract one 
 or two gems from the wealth of criticism or, perhaps I may say, 
 observation, that has been made upon what I have had to say 
 concerning the defence of India. Colonel Yate sees difficulties 
 in the establishment of entrenched camj^s at Kabul and Kanda- 
 har, In the case of Kabul, it might be necessary to take up a 
 position some little distance from the city for the main bod}' ; 
 but in a lecture of this kind one can only mention the chief 
 strategical points, and the time is too short to go into all details.* 
 
 With regard to Persia, I agree in much that has been said, 
 and recognise that the problem is one of the most important 
 with which we have to deal. I do not agree, however, that it is 
 impossible for Russia to invade Afghanistan and attack us with- 
 out infringing the integrity of Persia. But I agree that we 
 must maintain the integrity of both Afghanistan and Persia. 
 Mr. Davies asked me what would be done with our assembled 
 
 * The fortification of Kabul and Kandahar as entrenched camps does not 
 involve the occupation of the cities by our troops or the locking up of large 
 bodies of men. Everything must be subsidiary to the mobility of the striking 
 forces ; but no one would, I imagine, propose to leave these strategic points 
 unfortified.— E. H. H. C.
 
 ( 3fl ) 
 
 forces on the Kabul- Kandahar Hne of defence in the event of a 
 Russian advance through Afghan Turkestan and Herat. I must 
 refer him to the remark made in my lecture, that it would he 
 unprofitable to speculate on the movements which would be 
 made by our armies posted on the Kabul-Kandahar front. My 
 point is that the General in command would be in the best pos- 
 sible position to deal with the situation at the time. I am not 
 in favour of an absolutely defensive campaign ; for, even with 
 comparatively small numbers, I consider that we could conduct 
 an offensive campaign with a good prospect of success ; and 
 I think it is quite possible that we should come to blows with 
 relatively small numbers on both sides. I do not wish anyone 
 to be led away with the idea that I support an entirely defensive 
 campaign, and I thought I had guarded that point in my lecture. 
 The discussion has been somewhat lengthy, and it would not be 
 possible to deal with all the points which suggest themselves, so 
 that I must content myself with thanking you all for the patience 
 with which you listened to me. 
 
 BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, OUILDFORD
 
 000 001 674
 
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