FRENCH POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF 1778 By EDWARD S. CORWIN "La Diplomatic . . . re peut, elle re doit avoir quun but, la force et la grandeur du pays qiielle represented - Capefigue ARCHON BOOKS HAMDEN, CONNECTICUT 1962 Copyright, 1916, by PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Reprinted 1962 with permission Printed in the United States of America TO MY SISTERS "BELOVED ALLIES" THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED PREFACE The materials for the following study were assembled more than ten years ago as a part of work done for the doctorate, at the Universities of Michigan and Pennsylvania. About two years ago I had prepared for publication the por- tion of the present volume comprising, essen- tially, chapters I, V, and VIII-XV, when Mr. P. C. Phillips' The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution appeared, covering much of the ground of several of these chapters. I then decided to enlarge the scope of the volume to that of a general history of the one entangling alliance to which the United States has been party. I have been particularly interested in these pages in emphasizing the idea that France's in- tervention in the American Revolution was moti- vated primarily by her desire to recover her lost preeminence on the Continent of Europe. Writ- ers have sometimes made verbal recognition of this fact, but in the case of American writers at least, they have generally failed to appreciate its really controlling importance for the subject, and in the end have usually contrived thanks, vi PREFACE no doubt, to Professor Seeley's famous dictum to present French intervention as an episode in the British-French struggle for colonial do- minion in the Western Hemisphere rather than for what it really was, an episode in the Euro- pean policy of the Ancien Regime. A second phase of the general subject to which I have given prominence is the embarrassment which resulted to France from the conflict of interest between her new ally, America, and her heredi- tary ally, Spain, a conflict which greatly en- hanced the difficulty of getting Spain into the war in the first place ; which subsequently forced France to make a very restrictive interpretation of certain of her engagements with the United States; and which finally eventuated in the breach of their instructions by the American commissioners at the negotiations of 1782. Last- ly, I have felt that it would be a service to American students to make the materials in Doniol's monumental work more available. These materials, supplemented by the other sources that I have used, will be found, I think, to furnish adequate basis for judgment with ref- erence to most, if not all, of the more important questions likely to suggest themselves to an American student of the Alliance of 1778. In gathering my materials I have incurred ob- ligations to several libraries, which I gladly take this opportunity to acknowledge: to the Penn- PREFACE VII sylvania Historical Society, the American Philo- sophical Society, and the Ridgeway Branch Li- braries of Philadelphia, for the use of numerous eighteenth century publications, both French and English; to the University of Pennsylvania Library, for the use of its extensive collection of materials on the Mercantile System; to the Har- vard University Library, for the use of the Jared Sparks Manuscripts ; to the American Antiquar- ian Society Library at Worcester, for the use of newspapers of the Revolutionary period; to the Library of Congress for numerous services. I should also note a more special obligation to the staffs of the University of Michigan and the Uni- versity of Pennsylvania Libraries and of the Princeton University Library, for many courtesies. My other indebtednesses are not extensive, but they are deep. I wish especially to record my grateful recognition of the aid which I received from my teachers, Professors A. C. McLaughlin and W. E. Lingelbach, in the early stages of my labors. E. S. C. May 25, 1916. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I The Question of Motive 1 II The Classical System and British Sea-Power 23 III Vergennes Discovers the American Revolt 54 IV The Portuguese and Corsair Questions ... 80 V Florida Blanca Defines Spam's Position. . 105 VI Vergennes, Alarmist and Propagandist. . . 121 VII The Treaty of Alliance and Outbreak of War 149 VIII Spanish Mediation and the Convention of Aranjuez 173 IX The Two Alliances Compared 195 X The Mississippi and Western Land Ques- tion 217 XI Sieur Gerard and the Continental Congress 243 XII The Mission of La Luzerne 263 XIII The Crisis of the Revolution 284 XIV Jay's Mission to Spain 318 XV Jay and the Negotiations of 1782 329 XVI Profit and Loss 361 Bibliographical Note 379 Appendices 385 Index . . 415 ix CHAPTER I THE QUESTION OF MOTIVE The great majority of students today would, I suppose, concede that but for our alliance with France, the War of Independence would have ended without independence, and that but for the aid which France lent us secretly in the months preceding Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, we should hardly have become allies of His most Christian Majesty, at least on anything like terms of equality. To emphasize the efficacy and indispensability of French aid in the Revolution is, however, only to throw into higher light its aspects of paradox : the oldest and most despotic monarchy of Europe making common cause with rebels against a sister monarchy; a govern- ment on the verge of bankruptcy deliberately provoking a war that, to all appearances cer- tainly, it might have easily avoided. Ignorance of the dangers it invited might conceivably afford a partial explanation of the course taken by the French government in the years between 1776 and 1783, but in fact the explanation is available in only slight measure. The risk to a monarch in 2 FRENCH POLICY AND promoting rebellion, albeit in another's domin- ions, was clearly present to Louis' mind, while the unfitness of the royal exchequer for the bur- dens of war was pressed upon him by Turgot with all possible insistence. Bancroft explains France's championship of American independence thus: "Many causes combined to produce the alliance of France and the American republic, but the forces which brought all influences harmoniously together, over-ruling the timorous levity of Maurepas and the dull reluctance of Louis XVI was the move- ment of intellectual freedom." 1 The important element of truth in this theory is unquestionable. The direction and momentum of French popular sentiment established, to some extent certainly, the possibilities and limitations of French official action, and this sentiment was in turn to no inconsiderable extent the product of the liberalism of the age. Nevertheless, the idea that France ought to intervene, if chance offered, between England and her North Ameri- can colonies in behalf of the latter, came in the first instance, not from the salon but the Foreign Office. And it is not less clear that the precise policy pursued by the French government toward the United States from 1776 on was shaped, not by philosophers but by professional diplomatists. 1 History of the United States (Author's last revision), V. 256. See also ib., 264 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 3 Confining then our attention from the outset to the question of what were the official motives of French intervention, we have naturally to con- sider in the first instance the Count de Vergen- nes' argument in behalf of his program, which eventually became that of the French govern- ment, that however the American situation even- tuated, it carried with it the substantial risk for France of having to come finally to the defense of her Caribbean possessions against an English at- tack; since if England subjugated America she would be tempted to turn the large forces she would have on hand to some profitable employ- ment, whereas if she did not, she would make allies of those whom she had lost as subjects in an endeavor to compensate herself at the ex- pense of France. 2 It was a theory calculated to appeal strongly to the French mind of that day and generation. The Seven Years War had been begun by the British government in the midst of negotiations without a word of warning. It had been con- ducted by Chatham in a spirit of ferocious anti- pathy toward France and her ruling House. 3 It had been concluded by a peace which had been 2 Henri Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France a I'fitablissement des titats-Unis d'Amerique (Paris, 1886-99), I. 273-5; II. 460, 462-3. Cited hereafter as "Doniol." 'Expressions of Vergennes' distrust of Chatham will be found in Doniol I. 61-2, 67-72. At the same time he admits in effect the unlikelihood of George Ill's calling him to power, ib., 62. 4 FRENCH POLICY AND roundly denounced by an influential section of the English public for restoring to France Eng- lish conquests in the Caribbean. Moreover, the violence of English party contests was notorious ; and to men to whom it had not yet become evident in what a powerful leash George III held Parlia- ment it was natural to suppose that, rather than incur the penalty of a too long delayed triumph in America, the North ministry would be ready, if worse came to worst, to resort to the most desperate expedients. And not only did the argument in question strike hands with the popular French estimate of British policy; it also countered admirably the strongest argument against French intervention in America, namely, that it meant war with Eng- land. Yet these very considerations should perhaps put us on our guard against too spon- taneously crediting Vergennes with complete sincerity in this matter; or if we decide to ac- cord him that, we should at least remember his own warning, that "it is human nature to believe readily that which one desires most ardently." 4 The evidence presented by Vergennes to sup- port a plea of self-defense in behalf of France's action in America we shall pass upon later. Here we need only weigh some more general con- siderations militating against that plea: To 4 Ib., II. 790. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 5 begin with, the risks involved in attempting to aid the Colonies secretly were obvious from the first; yet it is on the increment of danger resulting from his own policy at this point that Vergennes based in part his argument for an open alliance with the Colonies. 5 Again, by his own argument, the danger that confronted France arose alike from the prospect of English victory and of English defeat in America; yet it will be found that he was quite ready to retreat from his program of alliance with America whenever English victory seemed seriously to impend. 6 In other words, it would seem that, while the danger menacing France from the prospect of an immediate Eng- lish triumph in America was one to be awaited in calm the calm of despair, forsooth the dan- ger which threatened from the opposite contin- gency was one that must be met half-way. Yet it was the latter contingency precisely which the policy of secret aid was designed to make sure! 7 But, again, while a British attack upon her Carib- bean possessions would, of course, have forced France to come to their defense, it may be ser- iously doubted whether French official opinion held these possessions after 1763 in sufficient es- teem to have warranted a policy that materially increased the likelihood of a serious war of which 5 76 .,724. 6 Ib., I. 567-75 and 613-21 ; also II. 526-9, 534-6, 539, and 551-5. 7 lb., I. 247-8. 6 FRENCH POLICY AND their security would be the main objective. 8 In- deed Vergennes himself declared more than once that the French West Indies could offer but slight temptation to English cupidity, that Eng- land already had enough of that sort of thing; 9 and it is significant that during the negotiations of 1782 he stood ready to surrender some of the most valuable items of these possessions if he could thereby procure Gibraltar for Spain. 10 Finally, there is good reason for believing that France could, at any time before 1778, have ob- tained from England a specific guaranty of her American holdings a guaranty which Spain would have been glad to sanction, and which Eng- land would have been slow to violate, so long at any rate as peace continued on the Continent. 11 8 See the remarks of M. Abeille, quoted infra. In the same connection one should also recall the pacifist attitude of the French government early in 1777 toward the question of defending Santo Domingo, the obvious explanation of it being the fear of arousing suspicion on the part of Great Britain that would pre- judice the policy of secret aid: Doniol, II. 234-41, 253, 264-5, 272-5. 9 Ib., II. 643-4; III. 50-1. See also Life of Arthur Lee, I. 361. 10 Ib., V. 220. It should also be noted that throughout the war France definitely subordinated obvious opportunities to enlarge her holdings in the West Indies to other objectives. "Au vrai," says Lavisse, "les interets coloniaux paraissaient a Vergennes, comme^a presque tous les hommes d'Etat francais, de mediocre importance," Histoire, IX. 1 117. "Both at the end of 1776 and in the spring of 1777, the British Government suggested a common disarmament on the part of England, France, and Spain, Doniol, II. 145-54, 232. An earnest advocate of such a plan, which was to be accompanied THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 7 The principal reason for Vergennes' constant employment of the line of argument under discus- sion undoubtedly lies in its propagandist use. Before, of course, any diplomatic program could be entered upon it had to receive the assent of the king. Had the idea of an aggressive program been unbiased by other considerations it would probably have had Louis' assent from the start, for ignorant as he was of domestic affairs, he was well versed in dynastic politics and jealous for the honor of his House. But unfortunately for such a program, Louis had ascended the throne promising reforms that forbade ambitious schemes abroad; and besides, an endeavor to by a joint guaranty by the parties to it France, Spain, England, and Portugal of their possessions in America and the two Indies, was Beaumarchais' friend Lord Rochford, a member of the ministry, Wharton, III. 727-8. Vergennes however had from the first been averse to seeking any sort of understanding with Eng- land, Doniol, I. 51-2; P. C. Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Univ. of 111., 1913), 38 fn. 25 and 54 fn. 74; B. F. Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (London, 1889-98, 25, vols., cited hereafter as SMSS.), Nos. 1533, 1544, and 1549. In Aug., 1777, we find Vergennes arguing against France's accepting a British guaranty of French and Spanish possessions, Doniol, II. 528-9. At the very end of the year, that is after Saratoga, if we are to credit a statement attributed by the Spanish ambas- sador Aranda to Vergennes, the English government was offer- ing France the Island of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, together with extensive rights in the Newfoundland fisheries, if France in return would close her ports to the rebels. Aranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778, Sparks MSS. (Harvard Univ. Library), CII. See also SMSS., No. 1838. 8 FRENCH POLICY AND strike at England through America involved the naturally unwelcome idea of assisting rebels." 11 * Nor could Vergennes' calculations stop short with his own sovereign. For the logic of the Family Compact clearly exacted that the Spanish court too should be consulted about measures that might involve it in war. How, then, could the Foreign Office better meet the twofold necessity before it than by giving its program as much as possible of the appearance of a program of de- fense? With Louis the device succeeded, and probably no other would have. At Madrid, on the contrary, though the argument was plumed especially for the favorite anxieties of that court, it failed utterly; with the result however that the argument of defense had to be pressed upon Louis with fresh insistence, in order to in- duce him to take a line different from that of his uncle and ally. In short, while the argument that England designed to attack her Caribbean possessions assisted materially in bringing France into the Revolution, especially by tending to minimize Ua One of the few literary remains of any importance from the hand of Louis XVI is a note scribbled on the margin of a Projet of the "Expos6 des Motifs de la Conduite de la France," etc., of 1779, to protest against Vergennes' assertion that France had only recognized a people already free. "Cette observation," runs the royal gloss, "pourrait autoriser . . . 1'Angleterre a aider ouverte- ment les mecontents si souvent agites en Bretagne, nos protestants, et tous les Francais discordants d'avec l'utorit royale." Cape- figue, Louis XVI (Paris, 1856), 107-9. See also Appendix IV. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 9 with the king the weightiest consideration against such a project, it does not follow that the defense of these possessions furnished the princi- pal purpose of French intervention. The central core of Vergennes' program from the first was aid to the Americans in the achievement of their independence', and the prospect of American in- dependence necessarily brought into view objec- tives which far overshadowed the security of the French West Indies, either momentary or per- manent. French intervention in the Revolution was, in other words, determined by motives of "aggression" rather than of "defense"; which is to say that its real purpose was the upsetting of the status quo in certain particulars rather than its preservation in certain others. But in what particulars? Was France's objective territory, or commerce, or was it something less tangible than either of these ? The possibility that it was territory is raised by the contention of Professor Turner that France hoped in the Revolution to replace Eng- land in Canada and Spain in Louisiana. In sup- port of this thesis Professor Turner adduces first, the testimony of Godoy, "the Prince of Peace," that after the war was over, Vergennes, counting upon the close union between France and Spain, sought to induce the latter, "already so rich in possessions beyond the sea, to give to 10 FRENCH POLICY AND France her ancient colony"; secondly, the fact that during the war Vergennes appeared anxious "to protect the interests of Spain in the country between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi"; and thirdly, a document published in Paris in 1802 under the caption Memoir e historique et politique sur la Louisiane par M. de Vergennes. 12 Upon closer scrutiny each item of this evidence must for one reason or other be disallowed. The reliability of the testimony of Godoy, who did not come into power until six years after Ver- gennes' death, is in itself questionable, but even if it be accepted at face value it says nothing of Vergennes' intentions before and during the Revolution. Vergennes' attitude during that period toward Spain's claims to the territory be- tween the Alleghenies and the Mississippi is sufficiently accounted for by his feeling that it was necessary to harmonize the conflicting in- terests of the United States and Spain, each of whom was in alliance with France against Eng- land. The document published in 1802, though it may possibly date from the Revolution, was not the work of Vergennes nor yet of any one who spoke for him. Not only does the program that it proposes directly traverse, in its reference to Canada, the pledge of His Most Christian Ma- jesty in article VI of the Treaty of Alliance, re- nouncing "forever the possession ... of any u American Historical Review, X. 249 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 11 part of the continent" that had lately belonged to Great Britain, but it materially conflicts with the policy which Professor Turner himself ac- knowledges that Vergennes pursued, of support- ing Spain's claims in the region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi. This policy was clearly designed to allay Spain's alarm at the prospects of American independence. The program urged in the Memoire of 1802 proposed, on the contrary, the deliberate aggravation of this alarm as the easiest means of inducing Spain to relinquish Louisiana to the stronger hands of France. 13 1J See the Memoire, pp. 25-30. Other considerations that forbid the attribution of this document to Vergennes or official asso- ciates of his are the following: It is to be noted that while the anonymous editor of the Mtmoire assumes to vouch for "the style, the thoughts" of the document as being those of the French secre- tary, he says nothing of a signature, nor does any appear in the published form. The Memoire is also devoid of certain distinctive marks of a French official document addressed to royalty. The most obvious consisting in the failure of the writer (or compiler) ever to refer to France and Spain by the titles of their Bourbon rulers. If we are to rely upon the silence of the Inventaire Som- maire, no memoir on Louisiana exists in the French archives of the date to which the Mtmoire published in 1802 is assigned by its editor, though several are to be found there of an earlier date from which this one might have been fabricated, and to one of these the editor makes specific reference in a footnote. Further- more, the fact that the Mtmoire of 1802 was, if at this point we are to follow the editor, found among Vergennes' own papers of itself casts doubt on its ever having been presented to the king. In connection with his statement that "both French and Ameri- can bibliographers have accepted" the "genuineness" of the 12 FRENCH POLICY AND But if France's objective was not territory, perhaps it was commerce? Unquestionably there was a widespread belief in France early in the Revolution, which was appealed to not only by Mtmoire, Professor Turner cites only the Voyage a la Louisiana of Baudry des Lozieres. Yet Baudry, while praising the Memoir* for "plusieurs des ses vues qui sont tres sages," directly challenges the assertion that it was the work of Vergennes. "If," says he, "M. de Vergennes has any part in these memoirs, it is only a very small part." But perhaps the most remarkable feature of the document under consideration is (assuming it to date from before 1783) the ignorance it discloses on the part of its author that by the Treaty of 1763 Florida belonged to Great Britain (see pp. 26 and 30). The Duke of Newcastle is reported to have once ad- dressed a despatch to "the Governor of the Island of Massachu- setts." But Vergennes was neither a British peer nor a spoilsman in office, but a man noted among his contemporaries for the range and accuracy of his information in the field of diplo- macy. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that he was fully aware that France's closest ally had lost an extensive province by the Peace of Paris and had been compensated by France herself with a still more extensive one. Besides, as is shown below, the Memoire of 1802, considered as an entity, must by any assumption date from a period later than early January, 1778. Before this however, Holker, in instructions dated Nov. 25, 1777, was informed by the French Foreign Office that his government wished to see England left in possession of Florida, Nova Scotia and Canada, Doniol, II. 616. Upon careful examination of it I am convinced that the Memoire of 1802 comprises two earlier documents loosely joined together by the author of the short address "Au Roi," chapter I, and certain paragraphs of chapter X of the published document. The first of these two earlier documents comprises most of chapters II-X of the Memoire of 1802 and was written before the outbreak of the Seven Years War to refute Great Britain's claim to the region then in dispute between France and Great Britain. It closed with a plan of compromise in the form of a proposed treaty between the two nations, which plan is THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 18 the American envoys but by Vergennes himself on occasion, that if France assisted the United States to their independence, American trade touched up at points by the compiler of the 1802 document. The second of the earlier documents was written after the events described in pages 162 to 169 of the published volume i.e. about 1769 to protest against the then recent cession of Louisiana to Spain. The entire separateness of the two documents is attested by the words with which the second one opens ("Ce me*moire a pour but," etc., p. 115), by the vastly different styles of the two documents, and by their diverse spelling of certain proper names. (In the latter connection compare pp. 57 and 150-1; also pp. 61 and 172.) When, then, was this compilation made? Dismissing the editor's assertion that the document was the work of Ver- gennes, but taking the document itself at face value, it was brought together after the outbreak of the War of Independence (Chapters I and X), but before the Treaty of Alliance recogniz- ing American independence was known (the United States are always referred to as "colonies" and "provinces" and on p. 180, the compiler speaks of "strengthening the peace "between France and Great Britain") ; also during a warlike situation on the Conti- nent (pp. 27 and 103, by the compiler). But this last condition can be satisfied, for the period between 1775 and 1781, only by supposing the references just cited to have been to the events lead- ing up to the so-called War of the Bavarian Succession. If, then, the M6moire of 1802 is to be assigned as a whole to the period of the American Revolution, it must be placed between late Jan- uary and the middle of March, 1778. We know that, in the months preceding France's intervention, numerous memoirs were transmitted to the Foreign Office, and the Memoire of 1802 may therefore represent one from a sheaf of similar later productions. Doniol I. 242 footnote. Mr. Paul C. Phillips, on the other hand, conjectures plausibly that the document published in 1802 owes its existence to an effort to bolster up Napoleon's then recent acquisition of Louisiana, The West in the Diplomacy of th* American Revolution p. 30 fn. 2. 14 FRENCH POLICY AND would turn forthwith to French ports. 14 Yet squarely confronted with the theory that this belief had been material in determining his pro- gram, Vergennes unqualifiedly rejected the no- tion. "They perhaps think at Madrid," he wrote after the alliance had been determined upon, "that the interest of acquiring a new trade had principally decided us." But he repelled the suggestion thus: "This motive, assessed at its true worth, can be only a very feeble accessory. American trade, viewed in its entirety and sub- ject to the monopoly of the mother-country, was undoubtedly a great object of interest to the latter and an important source of the growth of her industry and power. But American trade, thrown open as it is to be henceforth to the avid- ity of all nations, will be for France a very petty consideration." 15 These words of Vergennes have, however, no merely negative value ; they bring us in fact to the very threshold of the object of our quest. Offi- cial thinking about trade was moulded in the 14 Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolu- tion (Washington, 1889), II. 79; Deane Papers (N. Y. Hist'l Soc. Cols., 1886), I. 181, 184 ff., 207; Doniol, I. 244. Deane later changed his views on this as well as certain other subjects. In his letter of June 10, 1781, to Robert Morris, he says: "America left at liberty will, I am persuaded, take at least three-fourths of the European articles she wants from Great Britain," Deane Papers, IV. 406. 15 Doniol III. 140. Madrid received its impression from Aranda, Aranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778, Sparks MSS., CII. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 15 eighteenth century in vast part by the categories of what is called "the Mercantile System," and it is the significance of the words just quoted that they show Vergennes to have been of this school. The salient features of Mercantilism mark it at once a system of statecraft rather than of economics, at least in any modern sense of these terms. Thus wealth was identified with that form of it in which, in a period when the machinery of public credit was rudimentary and the usual cement of international alliances was provided by cash subsidies, it was most available for political purposes. Again, the welfare of the subject was assessed for its contribution to the power of the state. Finally, the power of the state was evaluated in the terms furnished by the doctrine of the Balance of Power. But granting these premises and it followed, first, that the prin- cipal advantage to be sought from trade was a balance payable in coin or bullion, and secondly, that the most desirable branch of trade was that which was most susceptible of manipulation to produce such a balance, in other words, colonial trade. For subject as it was, within the laws of nature, to the unlimited control of the mother- country, the colony could be compelled to obtain all its manufactures from the mother-country and to return therefor raw materials and a cash balance. At least, by furnishing the mother- country raw materials which she would otherwise 16 FRENCH POLICY AND have to purchase from her political rivals, the colony would contribute directly to the mainten- ance of a favorable balance of trade and, pro tanto, to that of a favorable balance of power, against those rivals. 16 M A good general account of the rise of Mercantilism and of its principles is to be found in C. F. Bastable's Commerce of Nations (1899), ch. IV. For an admirable statement of the connection which mercantilist theory and policy established between colonies and commerce, see Prof. C. M. Andrews, American Historical Review, XX. 43 ff. "During the greater part of our colonial period commerce and colonies were correlative terms, unthinkable each without the other," ib. 43. See also the same writer's article, ib., XX. 589 if., entitled "Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700- 1750." "France and England were fairly matched rivals, in that their policies were the same, to acquire colonies in the inter- est of trade, shipping, and manufactures, to exclude the foreigner from the colonial market, and to make the welfare and wealth of the mother state the first and chief object of the efforts of all, colonies and mother-country alike," ib., 546. It will be noted that Professor Andrews makes welfare the objective of the mercantile policy, but power would perhaps be the better word even for English mercantilism. Note the following passage quoted by Professor Andrews from Otis Little's The State of the Trade of the Northern Colonies Considered (1748), pp. 8-9: "As every state in Europe seems desirous of increasing its trade, and the acquisition of wealth enlarges the means of power, it is necessary, in order to preserve an equality with them, that this kingdom extend its commerce in proportion; but to acquire a superiority due en- couragement ought to be given to such of its branches as will most effectually enrich its inhabitants. As trade enables the subject to support the administration of government, the lessen- ing or destroying that of a rival has the same effect as if this kingdom had enlarged the sources of its own wealth. But as an ascendancy is to be gained by checking the growth of theirs, as well as by the increase of our own, whenever one of these happens to be the consequence of the other to this nation, it* figure and THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 17 Applying these considerations to the case of French intervention in the American Revolution, we note at once that by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce all privileges of trade were to be "mu- tual" and none given France but what the United reputation will rise to a greater height than ever." Ib., 543 foot- note. In other words, the mercantilist looked beyond the welfare of the subject to the power and reputation of the State, and these he measured by the standard set by the doctrine of the Balance of Power. The same point is also brought out by a passage from Postlethwayt's Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Im- proved (1757): "I next enter upon the general principles whereon the balance of trade is founded the consideration of which is earnestly recommended to the public regard, in order to throw the balance of trade so effectually into the hands of Great Britain as to put the constant balance of power in Europe into her hands," ib., II. 551. See also Gentleman's Magazine, XII. 589 (Nov., 1742): "Now, that Money is the Sinews of War, is become a proverbial Expression; and, with Respect to Great Britain, it is notorious we can do nothing without it. Almost all we did in the last Struggle with the Grand Monarch, was by the Dint of Money. If we had Numbers of Allies, we were obliged to pay them all; and whereas every other Power in the Confederacy run into Arrears with their Engagements, we not only made good our Proportions, but often exceeded them. . . . But, to suppose what is impossible, that we still roll in Riches, who is to join with us in this mighty Enterprise, of wrestling the Balance of Europe out of the strong Hand that hath lately held it?" See further the index of this same periodical under titles, "Balance of Power" and "France," for other instructive passages along the same lines, especially in the volumes covering the years from 1737 to 1742. Naturally in France, where the dynastic principle was the exclusive basis of the state, the political aspect of Mercantilism was predominant. Recall Colbert's assertion: "I believe that most people would be agreed that the quantity of gold in a state alone determines the degree of its greatness and power," Lettres, etc. (P. Clement, ed.) II. pt. 2, ccvii. See also infra. 18 FRENCH POLICY AND States were left at liberty to grant to any other nation, while by the Treaty of Alliance, its "es- sential and direct end" was stated to be the achievement of American independence not only in matters of government but of commerce also. 17 In other words, we discover that the real com- mercial motive underlying the alliance was not the hope of building up French trade which it was supposed could hardly be done effectively or advantageously without the machinery of mon- opoly but that of breaking down British trade at the point at which, by mercantilist premises, it most immediately supported British power. The commercial motive merges itself with a larger political motive: the enfeeblement of England. The lesson that Englishmen themselves drew from their magnificent triumph in the Seven Years War is to be found in the famous lament of Chatham on the news of Saratoga: America "was 17 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, preamble ; Treaty of Alli- ance, art. II. "Congress* original intention was to throw open its commerce to all friendly nations on terms of equality, and the argument was made with France that if she gave America aid the grati- tude of the American people would secure her a preemption of American trade. Wharton, II. 79 and 235. Later, December 30, 1776, the instructions of Congress enlarged the discretion of the commissioners as to the terms they might offer France and Spain very greatly, ib., 240-1. Eventually, the commissioners offered France certain exclusive privileges in connection with American trade, but these Vergennes declined, in order to remove every temptation from the way of the Americans that might lead them to a reconciliation with England, Doniol, II. 837. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 19 indeed the fountain of our wealth, the nerve of our strength, the nursery and basis of our naval power." 19 But what should be especially noted of these words is that they refer to the part of America then in revolt, that is, to continental America. Anterior to 1760 this could hardly have been the case. For then the emphasis was still on colonies as sources of supply, with the re- sult that when British opinion appraised the two parts of British America, it gave the preference to the island and tropical portion. The Treaty of Paris, however, signalizes a new point of view. Not only had continental America made direct contributions to the military forces of the mother- country in the course of the war just closed, but its increasing importation of British manufac- tures in exchange for raw materials now netted a favorable balance that quite eclipsed the calcul- able benefits from the West Indian trade. Fur- thermore, inasmuch as the colonial trade had always been regarded as the essential matrix of British naval strength, popular esteem naturally turned increasingly to that branch of this trade which promised a progressive extension. The upshot of these developments is to be seen in the decision of the British government, registered in "Speech of Nov. 18, 1777, Parliamentary History, XIX. col. 365, footnote. See to the same effect Burke's speech of Nov. 27, 1781, ib., cols. 721-2. See also the opening paragraph of Deane's memoir on the "Commerce of America and its Importance to Europe," cited above, Deane Papers, I. 184. 20 FRENCH POLICY AND the Treaty of Paris, to retain Canada instead of Guadaloupe and Martinique from its French conquests. No doubt the decision was in part motivated by a desire to meet the demands of New England ; but the discussion that attended it proves that it is also to be regarded as a deliberate reappraisement by England of the relative value of the two sections of her western empire. 20 The reaction of France, on the other hand, to the lesson of the Treaty of Paris was conditioned in the first instance by the plain impossibility of further competition with Great Britain in the field of colonization, at least so long as British naval strength remained predominant. However, the doctrine of the Balance of Power which, as I have already pointed out, was the political ob- verse of Mercantilism, emphasized the notion that the grand desideratum for a state was not so much a certain absolute quantum of power as a certain rank of power in relation to other rival states, that, in short, power was relative. But this prem- ise assumed, the opportunity presented France by the American revolt was a deduction at once inevitable and irresistible. England was France's ancient and hereditary enemy. The essential basis of English power was English commerce and English naval strength. The most import- ant source of these, in turn, was England's colo- 20 For the matter of this paragraph, see George Louis Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (N. Y. 1907), ch. IV. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 21 nial empire, and especially her holdings in North America. The striking down once and for all time of the connection between England and her rebellious provinces would deprive her of the greatest single source of power and, by the same token, elevate the power of the House of Bour- bon against its most dangerous and unscrupulous rival. To achieve that would be worth a war otherwise "somewhat disadvantageous." 21 Nor was the enfeeblement of England the only benefit, though the most important one, to be anticipated from American independence. For one thing, from being an ever available base of operations against the French West Indies, the new nation would be converted into their joint protector "forever." 22 Again, from being a bene- ficiary and so a prop to those rules of naval war- fare by which Great Britain bore so hard upon the commercial interests in wartime both of her enemies and of neutrals, the new nation would be pledged to a more liberal system. 23 Again, by leaving England her non-rebellious provinces in "See especially the following passages: the "Reflexions" of Dec. 1775, Doniol, I. 243-4; the "Considerations" of Nov. 5, 1776, ib., 686-7; the unofficial "Reflexions" of Jan. 7, 1777, given in Appendix II; the despatch of Mar. 11, 1777, ib., II. 239; the despatch of May 23, 1777, ib., 295; "M&noire" of July 23, 1777, ib., 461; the despatch of Dec. 13, 1777, ib., 643-4; Broglie's "Memoire" of Jan., 1778, ib., 674 ff.; the despatch of June 20, 1778, ib., III. 140. * Treaty of Alliance, art. XI. "Treaty of Amity and Commerce, arts. XV. ffg. 22 FRENCH POLICY AND North America, a certain portion of England's strength and attention would be permanently diverted from the European balance to the main- tenance of a minor balance in the Western Hemi- sphere. 24 Yet it is obvious that these considera- tions too connect themselves, and for the most part rather directly, with the logic of the doctrine of the Balance of Power. Thus the real question raised by our search for the main objective of French intervention in the Revolution becomes the question of the main objective in the thinking of French statesmen of a balance of power fa- vorable to France. The answer to that question reveals the third dimension of French diplomacy of the Old Regime a certain dynastic tradition. "Doniol, III. 156-58, 557; IV. 74. CHAPTER II THE CLASSICAL, SYSTEM AND BRITISH SEA POWER "The diplomatic object of this crown has been and will always be to enjoy in Europe that role of leadership which accords with its antiquity, its worth, and its greatness; to abase every power which shall attempt to become superior to it, whether by endeavoring to usurp its possessions, or by arrogating to itself an unwarranted pre- eminence, or finally by seeking to diminish its influence and credit in the affairs of the world at large." 1 In these words of the French Foreign Office, penned in 1756 to justify the Diplomatic Revolution, is sketched the picture that domi- nated French diplomacy throughout the declin- ing years of the Old Regime. In "the fair days of Louis XIV" the picture had been a reality, 1 Recueil des Instructions donntes aux Ambassadeurs et Min- istres de la France depuis Us Traites de Westphalie jusqu'a la Revolution Frangaise (Ed. Sorel, Paris, 1884), I. (Autriche), 356; see also p. 383. See also the significant definitions of the function of Diplomacy, in Capefifue, Louis XVI, ses Relations diplo- matiques, 84; and in P. L., Comte de SSgur, ain, Politique de tout les Cabinets (2nd ed., 1801, 3 vols.), III. 370. Both Capefigue and S6gur were of the Old Regime and wrote from its point of view. 24 FRENCH POLICY AND which, alack, that monarch's later aggressions had gone far to shatter. Then Cardinal Fleury had come forward with his Systeme de Conserva- tion by which France pledged Europe that in re- turn for influence she would forego extension of dominion and that she would devote the influence vouchsafed her on these terms to the cause of Europe's peace. 2 The success of the System for France's diplo- matic position was astonishing. On the eve of the War of the Austrian Succession the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, the protector of Chris- tion interests in the East, of Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Saxony, Sardinia, the German princes, of Don Carlos of Naples, of the emperor himself, and the ally of the maritime powers and of Spain, was the nodal point of every combination of pow- ers in Europe. At the same time His Most Christian Majesty's services as mediator were sought, now by Austria and Spain, now by Rus- 2 M. de Flassan, Histoire gtnerale et raisonnte de la Diplomatic franqaise depuis la Fondation de la Monarchic jusqu'a la Fim du Regne de Louis XVI (2nd. ed., Paris 1811, 7 vols.), V. 167 ff. On the general principles and outlook of French diplomacy fol- lowing the death of Louis XIV and the orientation of Vergennes* policy in these, see Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution fran- gaise, Pt. I. (Les Meours politiques et les Traditions) (3rd ed., Paris, 1893), 331-6, 299-304. For some excellent eighteenth century expressions of the "Tradition of Grandeur," dating from Louis XIV, see Abb6 Raynal's Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements, etc. (Trans, by Justament, London, 1777), IV. 560 ff.; V. 457 ff.; also AnquetiPs Motifs des Guerres et des Traites de Paix de la France (Paris, 1797), 187 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 25 sia and Turkey, now by Austria and Russia, now by Spain and Portugal, now by England and Spain. 3 "Thanks to Cardinal Fleury," ex- claimed the advocate Barbier, "the king is the master and arbiter of Europe." 4 The aged Fleury himself complacently compared the posi- tion of France to what it had been "at the most brilliant epoch of Louis XIV's reign." 5 Freder- ick II, just ascending the throne of Prussia, found "the courts of Vienna, Madrid, and Stock- holm in a sort of tutelage" to Versailles. 6 The Sultan's ambassador at the coronation of Charles VII apostrophized Louis XV as "Grand Mon- arque," "King of Christian Kings," "Emperor of the Franks." 7 The enemies of Walpole, who in return for commercial favors to England had willingly connived in the extension of French in- fluence, declared that England had been made a cat's-paw of, that the House of Bourbon was at 3 For these data, see Lavisse et Rambaud, Historie GtneraU, VII. 119-60. *Ib., 158. 'Recueil des Instructions, I. 246. A pamphlet of the period contains a squib entitled "Jeu de Piquet entre les Puissances de I'Europe en 1730." "La France" heads the list, with the motto: "C'est a moi a jouer, j'ai la main." Far down the list is "L'Angle- terre," who says: "Ce n'est pas a mon tour de jouer." Cape- figue, Diplomatie de la France et de I'Espagne" (Paris, 1846), 108. Posthumous works of Frederick II (Trans, by Holcroft, Lon- don, 1789), I. 16. 1 Gentleman's Magazine, XII. 54 (1742). 26 FRENCH POLICY AND the summit of power, that the balance of power was at an end. 8 Nor did the war of the Austrian Succession, rising like a drama to its climax in the stage-tri- umph of Fontenoy, 9 though obviously a defeat for salient principles of Fleury's System, 10 sig- nify any lessening of France's influence on the Continent in the estimate of those who then guided her destinies. Foremost of these was the Marquis d'Argenson, who became in 1744 the king's secretary of state for Foreign Affairs on a platform, so to speak, interpreting the role of France among the nations in the light of the ris- ing philosophy of the age. The period of con- quests, Argenson declared though unhappily not of war was at an end, and France especially had reason to be content with her greatness. Those therefore who spoke of perfecting the boundaries of France or forming leagues for her 8 See the "Debate in the Lords on Carteret's Motion for the Removal of Sir Robert Walpole," especially Carteret's own speeches, Parliamentary History, XI. col. 1047 ff. See Voltaire's description in his "Precis du Siecle de Louis XV," Oeuvres Computes (Paris, 1792), XXI. 129-48. Note especially his words on p. 148: "Ce qui est aussi remarquable que cette victoire, c'est que le premier soin du roi de France fut de faire 6crire le jour mme a Pabbe" de la Ville . . . , qui'l ne demandait pour prix de ses conquetes que la pacification de 1'Europe." 10 For the policy of a friendly understanding with the maritime powers and Austria. In his instructions of Dec. 11, 1737, to the Marquis de Mirepoix, Fleury suggests definitely a rapprochement between the Houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg, Recueil d99 Instructions, I. 245-6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 27 defense were ill-advised. "Our neighbors have everything to fear from us we nothing from them." The only alliances which France should form should be "for the purpose of repressing the ambitious," and should be made only with lesser states, "such as Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Venice, Modena, Switzerland, Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, etc." In brief, France was in the position to give the law to Europe, so it be a just law. Let her, then, "sustain the feeble and oppressed" and in her part as "paternal protec- tor," "arrest disorders for many centuries." 11 In 1748 France, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, restored her conquests of the war just closed. Sinful Paris pronounced it "a beastly peace." The royal ministers, on the other hand, contrast- ing His Most Christian Majesty with those rulers who were forced by necessity to seek only their own aggrandizement and were ever masking sel- fish designs with a pretended solicitude for the balance of power, defended the treaty as marking precisely France's station and magnanimity. 12 u Journal et Memoires du Marquis d' Argenson (ed. Ratheray, Pairs, 1859), I. 325-6; 371-2; IV. 131 ff. See also Saint-Beuve, "Argenson," Causeries du Lundi. The idealistic, not to say senti- mental, character of Argenson's point of view is illustrated by his "maxim," "le roi aime mieux 6tre trompd que de tromper." 11 For the Parisian estimate of the Peace, see Lavisse et Ram- baud, op. cit., VII. 204. Argenson testifies to the popular criticism evoked by the Peace, thus: "Le Francais aime la gloire et Phon- neur, de sorte qu'apres les premiers moments de joie de la paix conclue, tout le public est tomb dans la consternation de la 28 FRENCH POLICY AND And thus much for the successful aspect of Fleury's System: it gave France for the time being the preponderance in Europe and it accus- tomed her statesmen to claim for her in relation to the minor states of the Continent in general the role which the Treaty of Westphalia had con- ferred upon her in terms, in relation to the lesser members of the Germanic Body. 13 Unfortun- ately the System had its Achilles' heel, its indif- ference to the decline of French sea-power and to the rise of English sea-power. The earliest pro- test against an attitude so obviously defiant of the tenets of Mercantilism came from Fleury's own associate, the young Count de Maurapas, who between 1730 and 1740 headed the Depart- ment of the Marine. Now in an official report on the state of the marine, now in a letter purporting to emanate from the shade of Louis XIV, now in a memoir on the condition of French commerce abroad, Maurepas reiterated again and again the favorite premises of his school and their obvious deductions for France: Commerce that kept gold at home and drew it from abroad was a source of public greatness. Foreign trade was the essential root of naval strength. Against m6diocrite des conditions." For the ministerial viewpoint, see Recueil des Instructions, I. 286 ff., 319 ff. On the preeminence of Louis' position in Europe after Aix-la-Chapelle, see Wraxall, His- torical Memoirs (Phila., 1845), 55. 18 On France's guaranteeship of the Treaty of Westphalia, see Recueil des Instructions, I. 208. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 29 no two states in the world could France so profit- ably turn her arms as against Holland and Eng- land. The latter moreover was an active menace to Bourbon interests in all parts of the world. It behooved His Most Christian Majesty "to put to flight this usurping race" and to curtail the com- merce which already rendered "these ancient enemies of his crown almost the masters of the fate of Europe." 14 It is not impertinent to recall that at the outbreak of the American Revolution the author of these words was His Most Christian Majesty's chief -minister. The warning thus sounded was soon reechoed by others. In a council of ministers shortly be- fore France's entrance into the War of the Aus- trian Succession, the Duke de Noailles opposed this step with vigor and insight. England's sys- tem, said he, is obvious. "It is to arrive at su- preme power by superiority of wealth, and America alone can make smooth the road for her." It could be predicted at the outset that His Britannic Majesty would not waste his substance in Germany, but would seize the opportunity af- forded by a war on the Continent to wage war for his own purposes in America. France's real concern should be for her colonies, and only mo- tives of vainglory could distract her attention to the Empire. 15 Two years later Deslandes' Essai "Maurepas, Memoires (ed. Soulavie, Paris, 1792), III. 93 ff., 161 ff., 194 ff., especially 205-6 and 241. tt Anquetil, Motifs des Ouerres, p. 376. 30 FRENCH POLICY AND sur la Marine et le Commerce appeared, ad- dressed to "those at the Helm." In these pages one will find proclaimed the theory to be made familiar to us a hundred and fifty years later through Admiral Mahan's famous work, that from the beginning of history the marine has been a decisive factor in the rise and fall of states. And particularly, Deslandes went on to argue, had the greatness of France always rested on a strong navy. The restoration of the marine was therefore the first duty of French statesmen. Its neglect could lead only to calamity. 16 The mercantilist propaganda, aptly confirmed as it was by the events of the War of the Aus- trian Succession, began in time to show promise of fruition. Even Argenson, despite his general complacency, yet gave warning that English am- bition, fraud, and aggressiveness in the way of trade, and the prosperity of the English colonies, menaced Europe with the prospect of British dominion "of the seas and of all the commerce in the world." 17 Saint-Contest, who became secre- tary of state for Foreign Affairs in 1751, was of like opinion, holding that, on account of her naval strength, England even then exerted a greater influence in European concerns than France. At "Op. cit., passim. See also the same writer, Essai sur la Marine des Ancient et particulierement sur I furs Vaisseaux de Guerre (Paris, 1748). Curiously enough Admiral Mahan does not seem to be aware of Deslandes* works. " Journal et Memoires, I. 372. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 31 the same time, he contended that naval strength was a highly vulnerable sort of strength, and that with prudent measures, it would be easy for France to reduce Great Britain to her proper rank. 18 Meantime, in 1749, Rouille had become minister of the Marine. Under his administra- tion and that of his successor Machault the navy was brought to comparative efficiency, as was at- tested by the capture of Minorca in June, 1756. Unfortunately the Seven Years War, thus auspiciously begun for France, was not long to remain predominantly a war with England, to be waged on the sea for commerce and colonies. The simple fact is that with the haute noblesse the army was popular and the navy, for all the zeal of the mercantilists, was not. The preju- dices of the nobles moreover fell in with the pique of the king at what he considered the ingratitude and faithlessness of his protege, the king of Prus- sia, in making a defensive alliance with England. In vain was it urged upon Louis that the Treaty of Westminster, far from implying hostility on Frederick's part toward His Most Christian Ma- jesty, was really a matter for thanksgiving, in that it guaranteed peace on the Continent and, by the same sign, a free hand for France in India and America. By the first Treaty of Versailles, of May 1st, 1756, the famous Diplomatic Revolu- "Flassan, op. cit., VI. 14-16; Recueil de Instruction* XII. 8 (Espagne, pt. II), 298 flf. 32 FRENCH POLICY AND tion was effected by a defensive alliance between France and Austria. . Even so, the general opin- ion at first was that this arrangement also was calculated to conserve the peace of Europe. On August 29th, 1756, however, Frederick invaded Saxony and the war thus precipitated speedily became general. By the second Treaty of Ver- sailles, May 1st, 1757, the resources of France were placed at the disposal of the House of Austria. 19 The fortunes of the ensuing war it is, of course, unnecessary for us to follow further than to note that for France they were misfortunes. These were the days when Mme. du Deffand rechris- tened France "Madam Job." Cardinal Bernis, minister of Foreign Affairs and so official sponsor for the Austrian alliance, was soon in the depths. "Everything is going to pieces," he wrote. "No sooner does one succeed in propping the building at one corner than it crumbles at another." France "touches the very last period of decay." She "has neither generals nor ministers." "Ah that God would send us a directing will or some one who had one! I would be his valet if he wished it, and gladly!" 20 "Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cit., VII. 217-20; Richard Wadding- ton, Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances (Paris, 1896), 249-62, 358-517. "Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cii., VII. 244-5; Richard Wadding- ton, La Guerre de Sept Ans, II. 432-3; Sainte-Beuve, "Bernis," Causeries du Lundi. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 33 In Choiseul, who succeeded Bernis in Novem- ber, 1758, the directing will was found and the mercantilist point of view again assured utter- ance in the royal council. It is true that Choi- seul's first official act was to renew with the empress the onerous engagements of his prede- cessor, but to this he was fairly committed by the circumstances in which he had taken office. 21 Presently we find him declaring to the Austrian court with entire candor that the war with Eng- land involved French power and honor more di- rectly than did the struggle on the Continent. Indeed, he proceeded, the interest of Austria her- self demanded the preservation of France's sea- power. For "this it is," said he, "which enables His Majesty to sustain numerous armies for the defence of his allies, as it is the maritime power of England which today arms so many enemies against them and against France." 22 And the same point of view again found expression in his despatch of March 21st, 1759, to Havrincourt, the king's ambassador at Stockholm: We must not deceive ourselves. The true balance of power really resides in commerce and in America. The war in Germany, even though it should be waged with better success than at present, will not prevent the evils that are to be feared from the great superiority of the English on the sea. The king will take up arms in vain. "Waddington, op. cit., II. ch. VIII. and III. 452-4. 28 "Instructions to the Count de Choiseul," June 1759, Recueil des Instructions, I. 386. 34 FRENCH POLICY AND For if he does not have a care, he will see his allies forced to become, not the paid auxiliaries of England, but her tributaries, and France will need many a Richelieu and Colbert to recover, in the face of her enemies, the equality which she is in peril of losing. 23 In October came the news of the fall of Quebec. "The balance of power," wrote Choiseul to Ossun, the king's ambassador at Madrid, "is destroyed in America, and we shall presently possess there only Santo Domingo. France, in the actual pos- ture of affairs, cannot be regarded as a commer- cial power, which is to say that she cannot be regarded as a power of the first order." 24 Choiseul now set himself the task, failing a peace with England on reasonable terms, of re- storing to the war its original character of a con- test with that power for commerce, colonies, and naval supremacy. Auspiciously for his purpose, Don Carlos, a much better Bourbon than Ferdi- nand VI had ever been, was now Charles III of Spain. In the negotiations during the summer of 1761 between France and England Choiseul seized the opportunity of championing certain claims of Spain against His Britannic Majesty, which however were rejected by Pitt in terms that aroused not only Charles' indignation but posi- tive apprehensions for his own colonial empire. 25 Flassan, op. cit., VI. 160. 76., 279. Waddington, op. cit., III. 427-42, and IV, 428-37, 555-72. See THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 35 The result was that on August 15th, 1761, the sec- ond Family Compact, making France and Spain practically one power for all warlike purposes, was signed at Paris. The intention [runs the preamble of this document] of His Most Christian Majesty and of His Catholic Majesty, in contracting the engagements which they as- sume by this treaty, is to perpetuate in their descen- dants the sentiments of Louis XIV of glorious memory, their common august ancestor, and to establish forever a solemn monument of reciprocal interest which should be the basis of the desires of their courts and of the prosperity of their royal families. The treaty itself announced its basic principle to be that, "whoever attacked one crown, attacked the other." Thus, when at war against the same enemy, both crowns were to act in concert. When either was at war, offensively or defensively, it was to call upon the other for certain forces Spain upon France for 18,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 20 ships of the line, and 6 frigates; France upon Spain, for the same naval forces, 10,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry. The Bour- bon holdings in Italy were guaranteed absolutely. also Recueil des Instructions, XII. 3 338. Of further interest is Al- fred Bourget's "Le Due de Choiseul et 1'Angleterre: la Mission de M. de Bussy," Revue historique, LXXI. 1-32. In a letter dated Aug. 25, 1761, Bussy, who was then acting as Choiseul's special envoy to England, wrote: "M. Pitt parait n'avoir d'autre ambi- tion que celle d'elever sa nation au plus haut point de la gloire et d'abaisser la France au plus bas degr6 de 1'humiliation," ib. 12. 36 FRENCH POLICY AND On the other hand, Spain was excused from as- sisting France in the guaranty of the Peace of Westphalia unless a maritime power should take arms against the latter. Each power ex- tended to the subjects of the other the commercial privileges of its own subjects in its European dominions. 26 The renewal of the Family Compact was Choiseurs greatest achievement and is to be re- garded as the starting point of the restoration of France's position in Europe; notwithstanding which, at the outset, it brought only fresh calami- ties and new losses. In October Pitt fell from power for urging a declaration of war upon Spain. None the less, the declaration followed in January. The English and provincial forces now turned from the capture of France's West Indian islands to that of Havana, which fell in July. But Choiseul, his eyes fixed on remoter developments, was determined that Spain should not suffer for her devotion to the Bourbon cause. On November 3rd, 1762, France agreed to give Spain New Orleans and all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, an arrangement which permitted the latter to exchange the Floridas for Havana. The ensuing February 10th the Peace of Paris was signed. By it France ceded England *G. F. de Martens, Recueil de Trails ... des Puissance* et Etats de I'Europe depute 1761 jusqu? & pretent (Gottingen, 1871), I. 16-28. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 37 the vast part territorially of what was still left of her colonies. Of the great empire that had once comprised half of North America and the richest of the American islands, and that had given fair promise to include eventually India and the West African coast, she retained Goree on the African coast; Santo Domingo, which thanks to the Eng- lish diversion against Havana, her forces still held ; Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Santa Lucia, and their dependencies ; the small fishing islands St. Pierre and Miquelon, off Newfoundland; and a few factories in India, together with the islands of France and Bourbon, which she must not for- tify, as also she must not the fishing stations. 27 Nevertheless, we must be on our guard against exaggerating the merely material aspect of the losses wrought France by the Seven Years War. On the map, no doubt, Canada and Louisiana comprised an impressive domain, but regarded from the point of view of commerce and trade- balances they were essentially worthless, Louisi- ana being practically uninhabited and Canada hardly returning the cost of administration. On the other hand Guadeloupe and Martinique, in place of which England had finally and somewhat reluctantly consented to take Canada, were com- mercially of great value. 28 France's real loss, apart from the enormous outlay of the war, was Ib., 104-20; Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cit., VII. 256-7. M On these points, see Flassan, op. cit., VI. 480 if. 38 FRENCH POLICY AND in prestige. Her armies had been defeated, her fleets annihilated, her allies disappointed and dis- gruntled. The Treaty of Peace itself signalized her humiliation most graphically by renewing the defunct provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht against the fortification of Dunkirk, to which was later added provision for an English commis- sioner at that port, "without whose consent not a pier could be erected, not a stone turned." And not less ominous was the sort of demand that now began being made by His Britannic Majesty's diplomatic representatives at various courts, that in view of the outcome of the war they were entitled to the precedence over His Most Chris- tian Majesty's representatives. French pride could not possibly have been flouted more shrewdly. 29 How, then, was France to recover her prestige and the influence that this assured her upon Con- tinental affairs? This was the question that ad- dressed itself, and in terms ever more poignant, to the guardians of her diplomacy in the period between the Treaty of Paris and the death of Louis XV. And the answer returned to this question by all schools of opinion on questions diplomatic carried with them the implication at least that, before France could hope to regain her station in Europe, English power must be dimin- ished. The story however is one that should be /6., VI. 183-7; VII. 26-7. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 39 told in more detail, and in connection with it I desire to draw particular attention to two highly important documents: Choiseul's Memoire of February, 1765, which comprises a general de- fense of his policy, 30 and Broglie's Conjectures Raisonnees of 1773, which voices the views at that date of an adherent of the more narrowly Continental viewpoint. 31 Choiseul begins his exposition of the fundamen- tals of French diplomacy by tracing the calami- ties of the late war to one cause : the fact that the Austrian alliance was allowed to convert "the war on seas and in America, which was the true war," to a purely land war. Also it is admitted that the Austrian connection was always bound to be a precarious one. Nevertheless, it is insisted, it was of value as tending to conserve the peace on the Continent, for which reason it should be continued so long as it exacted no further material sacrifices by France. And the historical connections with the princes of the Empire should be viewed in the same light. The old policy of paying subsidies in advance should be discontinued. The English system was to pay for services rendered and this 88 Soulange-Bodin, La Diplomatie de Louis XV et le Pacte d* Famille (Paris, 1894), 236-53. M "Conjectures Raisonnees sur la Situation actuelle de la France dans le Systeme politique," etc.: "Oeuvre dirige" par de Broglie et execute par M. Favier": dated Apr. 16, 1773, and comprising vol. I. p. 211 to the end, all of vol. II, and vol. III. to p. 104 of Se"gur's Politique de tous les Cabinets, (1801). Cited hereafter as "Se"gur." 40 FRENCH POLICY AND had proved much more effectual. But the one indispensable alliance^ of His Most Christian Majesty was with His Catholic Majesty. The foremost precept of His Majesty's policy hence- forth must be, accordingly, "to manage with the most scrupulous attention his system of alliance with Spain, to regard the Spanish power as a power necessary to France." Nor would this be difficult, for the king of Spain was "just, firm, and one upon whom you can count even beyond the point at which France herself would fail you." The Memoir e concludes thus : It remains for me to speak to Your Majesty of the maritime powers. England is the declared enemy of your power and of your state, and she will be so always. Many ages must elapse before a durable peace can be established with this state, which looks forward to the supremacy in the four quarters of the globe. Only the revolution which will occur some day in America, though we shall probably not see it, will put England back to that state of weakness in which Europe will have no more to fear of her. Thus the Memoire closed on something like a note of despair. Despair, however, was not Choiseurs normal attitude. Even a year before this he had sent an agent named Pontleroy to British North America to report upon its re- sources and the strength of the lines connecting it with the mother-country, 32 and now in 1766, 82 C. De Witt, Thomas Jefferson, Etude historique sur la D6 THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 41 with the news of the American outbreak against the Stamp Act at hand, the results of Pontleroy's investigation and their significance for France be- came the subject of active correspondence be- tween Choiseul and His Most Christian Ma- jesty's representatives at the Court of St. James. Judging from the small number of arrangements with reference to colonial possessions in America [Du- rand wrote Choiseul in August, 1767] Europe has only lately begun to sense their importance. England herself has discovered with surprise that they are the sources of the power which she enjoys and that these great objects of power and ambition draw in their wake the balance of power in Europe. In brief, money has be- come so necessary to the sustenance of a government that without commerce no state has the wherewithal to uphold its dignity and independence; and commerce would dry up if it were not sustained by that branch of it which traffics in the products of America. It is there that England finds the outlet for her manufactures, and to what dimensions would these be reduced if they sup- plied only the market of Europe at a time when every nation is endeavoring to make its own resources suffice and to prevent the departure of specie from its territory ? 33 This, of course, is all in the best strain of the most rigorous Mercantilism. Nevertheless, pro- mocratie amtricaine (3rd ed., Paris, 1861), 40T. Most of the citations to this work are to the documents in the Appendices, pp. 393-559. See also F. Kapp, Life of Kalb (N. Y., 1870), 43-4. 83 De Witt, op. tit., I. 420-1. See also to same effect pp. 427-8. Choiseul's viewpoint was precisely the same: ib., 47-51. 43 FRENCH POLICY AND fessing to fear the American colonies more than England herself, Durand advised against foment- ing revolution among them, since to do so "might have the result of handing over the other colonies of Europe to those who by their excessive energy and strength had detached themselves from the parent stem." 34 Durand's successor Chatelet, on the other hand, was strongly of the opinion that France ought to seize the first opportunity of intervening in America. In the case of a rupture [he inquired of Choiseul early in December, 1767] even were it an open and premature one, between the colonies and Great Britain, could France and Spain remain idle spectators of an oppor- tunity which in probability would never occur again? . . . Before six months have elapsed America will be on fire at every point. The question then is whether the colonists have the means of feeding it without the aid of a foreign war, and whether France and Spain should run the risk of taking an active part in foment- ing the conflict and making it inextinguishable, or whether it would be more their policy to leave it to itself at the risk of its going out for want of fuel and the means of spreading. 35 As a matter of fact Choiseul had already taken a definite step toward interesting his government in the American situation. On April 22nd, 1767, **/6 v 52. See also, to some effect, pp. 432-3. 86 Ib., 56-7 footnote. Choiseul regarded these views as "pro- found": ib. For further correspondence to the same effect, see ib., 433-55. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 43 he had despatched Kalb, who was later to distin- guish himself as a major-general in Washington's army, to Amsterdam, there to inquire into "the rumors in circulation about the English colonies" and, should these be well founded, to "make prep- arations for a journey to America/* In con- formity with these and further instructions, Kalb finally sailed for America from Gravesend, on Oc- tober 4th, and arrived in Philadelphia January 2nd. 36 In essence, the conclusions he drew from his inquiries into the American situation were, that the moment had not yet arrived for France to embroil herself with her neighbors; that while the remoteness of the American population from their central government made them "free and enterprising," at bottom they were "but little in- clined to shake off the English supremacy with the aid of foreign powers"; that "such an alliance would appear to them to be fraught with danger to their liberties" ; that "a war with us would only hasten their reconciliation," so that "on the foot- ing of restored privileges, the English court could even direct all the troops, resources, and ships of this part of the world against our islands and the Spanish Main." 37 There can be little doubt that these observa- tions, in the general assessment they made of American sentiment, squared with the facts, but M F. Kapp, Life of Kalb, cited above, 45-51. * Ib., 53-7 passim. 44 FRENCH POLICY AND that was small consolation to Choiseul, who in his disappointment petulantly charged Kalb with superficiality and pronounced his labors useless. 38 The result however was that now, abandoning any idea of actually interfering in America, the French minister began to formulate a plan whereby France and Spain should indirectly fos- ter discontent in the English colonies by throwing open the ports of their own colonies to the prod- ucts of North America. 39 This was on the basis of the theory, that while the English colonies aug- mented the strength of England, those of France weakened her. "The thing to be aimed at," there- fore, in the words of M. Abeille, Choiseul's sec- retary-general of Commerce, was "to diminish the artificial strength of England and to relieve France of the burdens that obstruct the develop- ment of her native strength." 40 Indeed M. Abeille was for granting the French colonies their independence. But these views naturally en- countered some opposition at Madrid; and in 1770 Choiseul fell from power. 88 Ib., 71. At this very time Franklin was writing, with refer- ence to Choiseul's policy: "That intriguing nation would like very well to blow up the coals between Britain and her colonies, but I hope we shall give them no opportunity," Bancroft, III. 261. As late as Apr. 6, 1773, Franklin predicted that a war with France and Spain on the part of England would heal the breach with the colonies, Complete Works (Ed. Bigelow), V. 126. " De Witt, op. cit., 60-3. 61-2. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 45 Two years later occurred the first partition of Poland, all things considered, the most humiliat- ing episode from the French point of view in the history of French diplomacy. Poland had been for centuries, with a fair degree of constancy, the ally and protege of France. Since 1745, moreover, Louis himself had been endeavoring, through the subterranean channels of the Secret du Roi, which indeed he had created for the purpose, to secure the succession of the House of Conti to the Polish throne. 41 The project of the royal brigands, however, was never known to His Most Christian Majesty's agents till it was fait accom- pli, and thus the most important transfer of terri- tory since the Peace of Westphalia, involving ultimately the extinction of the greatest state territorially in western Europe, was effected not only without the consent but without the knowl- edge of France. But worst of all, France's own ally Austria was particeps criminis to the act, even though a reluctant one at first. "She wept but she took," was the adequate account that Frederick gave of the empress' part in the trans- action. Her course published to the world at large in a way that tears more copious and more sincere than hers could not obliterate, that the desires of France no longer greatly counted in Europe. 42 41 Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cit., VII. 212-14. o/b. 503-11. 46 FRENCH POLICY AND "The Tragedy of the North" it was that incited Broglie, the principal agent of the Secret du Roi, to the composition, in collaboration with the ver- satile Favier, of his elaborate Conjectures Red- sonnees, referred to above. "One would wish in vain," this document begins, "to conceal the rapid degradation of the credit of France in the courts of Europe, not only in consideration but even in dignity. From the primacy among great powers she has been forced to descend to a passive role or that of an inferior." 43 Putting then the ques- tion as to the cause of this unhappy transfor- mation, Broglie first assailed "the change of sys- tem produced by the Treaty of Versailles." 44 The preponderance in Europe was the rightful pat- rimony of the French crown: this was a dogma consecrated by a thousand years. 45 But the Treaty of Versailles had accustomed Europe "to regard France as ... subject to orders from Austria." To the same cause was it due that France had abandoned her ancient allies Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and the German princes; and worse still, that she had made to fill the role of dupe in the recent developments in Poland and Turkey, the result of which was her own reduc- tion to the fourth grade of powers. 46 The Family "S6gur, I. 212. 44 76., 212-13. **/&., 229. */&., 213, 258-64, 303-4; II. 33-4, 64, 88-92. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 47 Compact of 1762, too, had had the worst possible effect upon European opinion, since by it Spain was admitted to virtual equality with France. "France for the first time admitted the equality of another power." 47 Thus far spoke the critic and rival of Choiseul. The longest section of the Conjectures however deals with England and the tone here is signifi- cantly harmonious with that of Choiseul's Me- moire. The attitude of England toward France was that of ancient Rome toward Carthage. England of course did not expect to wipe out the French monarchy ; her inferiority on land forbade the idea. But she had adopted the principle of keeping the French marine reduced, "of watching our ports, of surveying our dockyards and arsen- als, of spoiling our projects, our preparations, our least movements." Her policy in this respect was to be explained in part by that spirit of rapine native to the English people, but also in part by the knowledge of the English ministers that the edifice of English power was still supported by factitious resources and forced means and that its natural tendency, in face of the approaching danger of a schism between the mother-country and her colonies, would be to crumble and dis- solve. In short, it was fear that determined Eng- land's policy toward France, though a fear that knew how to choose its weapons. In view of this /&., I. 229-30. 48 FRENCH POLICY AND fact, France should know her real strength, should know that her. industry, resources, patriot- ism, and intelligence were sufficient to overturn "the colossus of English power," could she once restore her marine. She should know too that the feeble line of conduct taken with England in the immediate past had but nourished English pride and disdain and that what was needed was a firm line of conduct. France's military system and her diplomatic policy must alike sustain the dignity and preeminence of the crown of France on sea as well as on land. 48 The influence of the Conjectures Raisonnees upon those who were interested in France's diplo- matic position is beyond all question, and the same is true of Abbe Raynal's contemporaneous Histoire des Indes. 49 "The marine," declared this writer, "is a new kind of power which has given, in some sort, the universe to Europe. This part of the globe, which is so limited, as ac- quired, by means of its fleet, an unlimited empire over the rest, so extended." Yet the benefit of this control had passed, in effect, to one nation alone, England, and with it had passed the bal- ance of power. Such had not always been the case. In the days of Louis XIV France had 48 76., II. 165-97. * Sorel, op. tit., I. 304-10. "La doctrine de Favier se ramene a une proposition essentielle: 1'anlantissement de PAngleterre," ib., 306. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 49 given the law to Europe, and the basis of her greatness had been in her marine. Unfortu- nately, the excesses of that monarch, while cementing the alliance of the maritime states against France, had also turned the martial ener- gies of the latter from the fleet to the army; and so French power had been doubly undermined. 50 The connection between England's greatness as a colonial power and her influence among the states of the world and the memory of France's greatness under Louis XIV are constantly re- iterated thoughts in Raynal's pages, and the course to which they incited French sentiment, both official and unofficial,* is plain. "Favier," writes Sorel, "made disciples and Raynal proselytes." 51 France's intervention in the American Revolu- tion is often described as an act of Revenge. The description is less erroneous than incomplete, for while it calls to mind the fact that France had humiliations to be redressed, it fails to indicate the even more important fact that she had also a role to be retrieved. Furthermore, it leaves en- tirely out of account the logic by which, in an Age of Reason, the purpose of either revenge or restoration was brought into relation with a con- crete situation. This logic comprised the follow- "Histoire des Indes (Paris edition of 1781), V. 203; VII. 208 ff.; IX. 88 ff., 219 ff.; and especially, X. 136 ff. "Sorel, op. tit., I. 309. 50 FRENCH POLICY AND ing ideas: That France was entitled by her wealth, power, and history, to the preponderating influence in Continental affairs ; that she had lost this position of influence largely on account of Great Britain's intermeddling; that Great Bri- tain had been enabled to mingle in Continental concerns by virtue of her great naval strength, her commercial prosperity, and her preparedness to maintain Continental subsidiaries; that these in turn were due in great part to her American colonial empire and especially to the policies con- trolling her trade therewith; that America, be- come independent, would be an almost total loss from the point of view of British interests ; that this loss would mean a corresponding diminution of British power; that since the two were rivals, whatever abased the power of Great Britain would elevate the power of France. By calling into existence the New World, France would "redress the balance of the Old." But while these ideas define the principal ad- vantage which France hoped to obtain from the course she took, there were also supporting ideas that should not be lost to view. For one thing, it was by no means impossible that whether she intervened or not in behalf of the American rebels, France would find herself, sooner or later, at war with Great Britain in defense of the French West Indies. Again, it had for centuries been France's role to back the smaller fry against THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 51 her greater rivals. Again, it was generally felt that, formidable as it was at the moment, British power was in reality more or less spurious. Fur- thermore, recent diplomatic developments had most miraculously paved the way for French in- tervention in North America. The withdrawal of France from Canada had left America no reason to fear her; the Family Compact convenanted the assistance of the Spanish marine; the Austrian alliance constituted a reasonable guaranty of peace on the Continent. Finally, it was felt to be not only allowable but right for France to seize so favorable an opportunity to tear down a power that had been used so outrageously as Eng- land had used her power on the sea. In the end, the project did not lack some of the aspects of a crusade. The primary requisite, however, to an under- standing of Louis XVTs espousal of the cause of American independence is that due weight be given the fact that Europe was still organized on the dynastic principle, and to the further fact, especially noteworthy in the case of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, that position and influence were the essential objectives of di- plomacy, even in the age of "Benevolent Mon- archy." 52 To-day with the voice of the common M Indeed among a people so fond of glory as the French the very security of the crown demanded that the dishonor it had suffered abroad in the detested latter years of Louis XV should be wiped 52 FRENCH POLICY AND man dominant in the direction of society, histori- cal investigators are. apt to give too slighting attention to all but bread-and-butter interests as interpretative of the conduct of states. But this is plain anachronism. The doctrine of the equal- away as speedily as possible. "Or la France, passionate comme elle tait pour la gloire, et qui aurait excus bien les fautes du gouvernement inte>ieur, ne pardonna pas au Roi . . . son humilia- tion." Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII. 8 411. It is interesting to note that as early as November, 1775, Burke had predicted French intervention. "He observed, that from being the first, she was, with regard to effective military power, only the fifth state in Europe. That she was fallen below her former rank solely from the advantages we had obtained over her; and that if she could humble us, she would certainly recover her situation." Part. Hist., XVIII. 967. Eighteen months before this Col. Barr6 in the debate in Commons on the "Bill for Regulating the Government of Massachusett's Bay," had declared that "during these troubles with our colonies, France would not lie quiet," ib., XVII. 1307. A hint of foreign interference is conveyed in Franklin's "Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One," Works (Ed. Sparks), IV. 396. In a sermon delivered June 6, 1774, in the Second Church of Boston, the Rev. John Lathrop declared, "France and Spain will take satisfaction for their losses in the late War," Pennsylvania Packet, No. 147. In his "Farmer Refuted," which was published in Feb., 1775, Hamilton put the question whether "the ancient rivals and enemies of Great Britain would be idle," in the event of an open breach between Great Britain and her colonies; and answered, that ere this could come about, "the French, from being a jealous, politic, and enterprising people, must be grown negligent, stupid, and inat- tentive to their own interest. They could never have a fairer opportunity or a greater temptation to aggrandize themselves and triumph over Great Britain than would here be presented." Works (Constitutional Ed.), I. 164-5. A year later John Adams raised the same question on the floor of Congress (Mar. 1, 1776). "Is it," he inquired, "the interest of France to stand neuter, to THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 53 ity of man was indeed a tenet of the schools in 1776, but it had made little headway among the professional diplomatists, who still assessed the general welfare in terms furnished by the compe- tition for station of rival reigning houses. 53 join with Britain, or to join with the colonies? Is it not her interest to dismember the British empire? Will her dominions be safe if Britain and America remain connected? Can she preserve her possessions in the West Indies? ... In case a reconciliation should take place between Britain and America, and a war should break out between Britain and France would not all her islands be taken from her in six months?" Life and Works, II. 487-8. There was, of course, a strong possibility, even probability, of such a reconciliation at this date. For this and other reasons the danger to France cited by Adams was much more real than after Saratoga. See infra. Adams, at this date, wished only a "commercial" connection with France, and declared flatly against a "political' or "military" connection. "Receive no troops from her," he advised, ib. For some further items on American expec- tation of French aid because of the rivalry between France and England, see the Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser of Boston, issues of July 11, 18, and 25, and Oct. 17, 1776. 53 See further the document given in Appendix U. CHAPTER III VERGENNES DISCOVERS THE AMERICAN REVOLT Louis XVI ascended the throne in May, 1774, and was at once confronted with the task of choos- ing a ministry. The queen, anxious to see the policy of friendship with Austria continued, urged that Choiseul be again called to power. The dull and priggish Louis, however, abhorred both the aggressive talents and tawdry morals of the former minister, and his scruples carried the day. When the new cabinet was formed in the course of June and July the post of chief -minister was assigned to the old and decrepit Count de Maurepas, while that of secretary of state for Foreign Affairs was bestowed upon the Count de Vergennes. 1 Charles Gravier, later the Count de Vergennes, was born at Dijon, in 1717, of one of those fami- lies of the lesser noblesse whose function it was, under the Old Regime, to replenish the ranks of French officialdom. He began his diplomatic career in 1740 by accompanying his uncle Cha- vigny to the latter's post as ambassador at Libson. 1 Lavisse, Histoire de France, IX. 1 5, 6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 55 Six years later he won the praise of Argenson by the clarity of his views on questions then at issue between Portugal and Spain. In 1750 he became minister plenipotentiary at Treves, and a little later His Most Christian Majesty's representa- tive at the Congress of Hanover, where he is said to have shown great dexterity in foiling the de- signs of George H's representative, the Duke of Newcastle. This and other successes brought him four years later the great post of ambassador to Constantinople, where for fourteen years he rep- resented both the official diplomacy and the Secret du Roi. Then followed a short term of retire- ment on account of an altercation with Choiseul. But in 1771, at the instance of Aiguillon, he be- came the king's ambassador at Stockholm; and here the year following he successfully engi- neered a coup d'etat, which by transferring the governing power in Sweden from the antiquated and corrupt estates to the king, saved that coun- try from the fate which had just overtaken Poland and was even then overshadowing Turkey. 2 2 La Grande Encyclopedic, title "Vergennes"; Magazine of Amer- ican History, XIII. 31 ff.; Flassan, op. tit., VI. 12-13, 234-58; Arthur Hassall, The Balance of Power (N. Y., 1898), passim; Le Bonneville de Marsangy, Le Chevalier de Vergennes, son Am- bassade a Constantinople (2 Vols.; Paris, 1894); H. Doniol, "Le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres de France sous le Comte de Vergennes," Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, VII. 528-60 (1893). This reference is chiefly valuable for the extracts it contains from the "Souvenirs" of Vergennes' friend Hennin, written at the time 56 FRENCH POLICY AND Compared with the brilliant Choiseul, the new secretary is a somewhat prosaic figure, an impres- sion which Carlyle has recorded in the dictum that "M. de Vergennes was a clerk, a mere clerk with his feet under the table." The fact is that, to a taste for methodical employment, and to the minute knowledge of the diplomatic systems of Europe that stirred the admiration of Segur, Vergennes added an ambition for patriotic achievement that was none the less real because it was controlled by the prudence of a man who had risen to station by his own efforts. Nor is the traditional Vergennes less remote from fact, the Vergennes who is pictured to us as "a difficult and dangerous man with whom to have dealings," a washed-out version of the legendary Machia- velli. It is certain that Vergennes was no senti- mentalist, for which, however, he is hardly to be blamed, since the happy thought of blending sen- timentalism and diplomacy had not yet occurred to men. On the other hand, the Machiavellian principle that self-interest is the only feasible basis of a public policy was applied by him with certain very essential qualifications and limita- tions. England, it is true, he treated from the outset to a policy of duplicity and falsehood, but that nation, he held, had put herself beyond the of the minister's death. See also a eulogy of Vergennes* Conti- nental policy by Sorel in the Revue historique, XV. 273 ff., and a criticism of the same by Tratchevsky, ib., XVI. 327 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 57 pale. On the Continent itself he sought unre- mittingly to bulwark the status quo behind the maxims of the Systeme de Conservation. "Force," he wrote, "can never vest a title, nor convenience bestow a right"; and the partition of Poland he denounced as "political brigandage." Moreover, he regarded the honor of the king as setting very definite limits beyond which politi- cal advantage was not to be sought. Capable himself of playing the Jesuit with most admired skill when occasion required, yet once the word of His Majesty was distinctly pledged, he deemed it inviolable. In a word, expert that he was in the use of the conventional weapons of eighteenth century French diplomacy, Vergennes had no thought of casting these aside or of greatly changing them. And the same is true of his attitude toward the accepted axioms of his profession. He believed in the doctrine of the Balance of Power, and till he was disillusioned by the results of the Ameri- can Revolution, in the tenets of Mercantilism. He adopted without reservation the fundamental postulate of the Classical System, that France by virtue of geographical position, wealth, intel- ligence, and military resources, was entitled to the preponderance in Europe. "France," he wrote in 1778, "placed in the center of Europe has the right to influence all great affairs. Her king, comparable to a supreme judge, is entitled 58 FRENCH POLICY AND to regard his throne as a tribunal set up by Provi- dence to make respected the rights and properties of sovereigns." 3 Alas! in 1774, the age-long prerogative of France was in eclipse, her pres- tige dimmed. "Among all nations," he after- ward declared of this period, the opinion prevailed that France no longer had either will or resources. The envy which till then had governed the policy of other courts toward France became con- tempt. The cabinet of Versailles had neither influence nor credit in any quarter. Instead of being, as formerly, the center of all great affairs, it became their idle spec- tator. Everywhere men treated its approval and its disapproval as alike negligible. 4 It was a situation that touched him hardly less acutely than if it had been his own personal misfortune. How, then, was France to recover her influ- ence and what use would she make of it, once it was recovered? Like Argenson, Vergennes linked the reputation of the House of Bour- bon with the cause of Continental peace. M&noire of Apr. 18, 1778, Flassan VI. 140 ffg. See also Recueil des Instructions, I. (Autriche), 488. See SMSS., No. 861, where Vergennes compares the wealth of France and Great Britain favorably to France. At the same time he envied the British gov- ernment the facility with which it commanded the resources of the realm. "Nous avons assurement," he wrote, "des resources plus reelles que 1'Angleterre, mais il s'en faut bien que le jeu en soit aussi facile. Cela tient a une opinion qui ne peut pas s'Stablir dans une monarchic absolue comme dans une monarchic mixte." Doniol, II. 18. *Ib. } I. 3-4. See also Sorel, op. cit. } I. 309. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 59 Like Broglie, he censured the overestimation of the Austrian connection that had eventuated in neglect of France's guardianship of the Peace of Westphalia, "one of the most beautiful jewels" of the Gallic crown. On the other hand, follow- ing Choiseul, he admitted that the Austrian al- liance, kept within due bounds, might yet prove useful to France in that its tendency was to pre- vent England and Austria from striking hands once more. It thus guaranteed, he argued, the peace of the Continent, where France could de- sire only peace, and, by the same sign, it left France at liberty "to direct her efforts to counter- balancing the power of England, whose naval superiority most necessarily enlisted her fore- sight." Finally, from the same point of view, he acclaimed the Family Compact as the very "cornerstone of France's whole system." This connection, it was true, required France always to stand ready to come to the defense of Spain's vast possessions beyond the sea, but it was, for all that, more valuable to France than to Spain. England was loath to break with Spain on ac- count of her profitable commerce there, from which she drew riches and employment, while with France no such motive held her back. "If there is anything capable of giving England pause, it is the thought of France and Spain united; it is the certainty that the first cannon- 60 FRENCH POLICY AND shot directed at the one or the other will be an- swered by both." 5 . k v . None the less, it would seem that at the moment of taking office Vergennes' policy looked toward an effort at amity with England; and it is cer- tain that he first assessed the American revolt as guaranteeing England's continued peaceableness rather than as furnishing a fulcrum for an ac- tively anti-English policy. 6 For this there were three reasons: In the first place, the American business itself was still much "in the vague." Again, Vergennes was aware that Louis had taken the throne pledged to a program of econ- omy and internal reform and to this program, he naturally assumed, diplomatic programs would have to be subordinated. 7 Finally, in July, 1774, by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji Russia had established herself on the shores of the Black Sea in territory wrested from Turkey. Alarmed at the prospect of a repetition of what had just oc- curred in Poland, as well as for France's monop- oly of the Levantine trade, Vergennes felt that his first attention must be given to the South- 8 "Instructions to the Baron de Breteuil," Dec. 28, 1774, Re- cueil des Instructions, I. 478 ffg.; "ExposS succinct" of Dec. 8, 1774, Doniol I. 14 ff. Ib., I. 13, 40. 7 See Recueil des Instructions, I. 488: "La grandeur de la puis- sance du Roi, la position de ses ltats et ses soins que sa Majeste est resolv de donner leur administration inte>ieure, le mettront en effet ... en etat de choisir entre tous les systemes politiques celui qui conviendra le mieux a ses vues et a ses interets." THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 61 eastern situation. Indeed, he seems at one moment to have considered the possibility of per- suading England herself to join in an effort to curb Russia's assaults upon the established equilibrium. 8 But this attitude was, after all, weakly rooted in a thin soil. Moreover, Turkey's cession of the Chersonese was soon seen to be fait accompli. Vergennes' real disposition toward England found expression in connection with the dispute which began brewing in July, 1774, between Spain and Portugal over some aggressions of the lat- ter in South America. The possibility of war between Portugal and Spain raised the possibil- ity of war between Spain and England and that, in turn, the possibility of war between England and France. Commenting on the report that England desired an amicable settlement of the affair, Vergennes remarked: "We share the wish, rather from necessity than inclination."' And equally illuminative is an episode which oc- curred early in 1775 in connection with the de- struction which the king had just then ordered of the correspondence of the Secret du Rot. Among the papers about to be consigned to the flames was a plan that had been drawn up by Broglie in 1766 for the invasion of England. Vergennes 8 See Hassall, The Balance of Power, 320; Recueil des Instruc- tions, IX. (Russe), 318-20; and Doniol, I. 15. Vergennes to Ossun, Oct. 31, 1774, Doniol, I. 33. 62 FRENCH POLICY AND and his associate, the Count du Muy, at once pe- titioned Louis to be allowed to save this docu- ment, a request which was promptly granted. 10 But all other sources of instruction as to the new secretary's attitude toward England yield place to a document I have already cited more than once, his Expose Succinct, which was pre- pared early in December, 1774. This was, in brief, a plea for military preparation based on a survey of the whole diplomatic situation with which France was then confronted. "People," its author wrote, "respect a nation which they see prepared to make a vigorous resistance and which, without abusing the superiority of its forces, de- sires only that which is just and useful for the whole world, to wit, peace and general tranquil- lity." Unfortunately, however, while this was the objective of diplomacy, diplomacy itself was unable "to fix conclusively the choice of route thereto." It was a truth albeit a trite one, that the longer a peace has endured the less likely is it to continue. The fact that the present peace has lasted twelve years furnishes a strong prejudgment against its further stability. It is then not to transgress the limits of allowable prevision to insist upon the necessity of being ready for any event ; and besides, one is never better assured of peace than when one is in position not to fear war. Opinion, 'tis said, is queen of the world. 11 *Sgur, I. 104-6; Doniol, I. 23-4. u Sgur, I. 169-70; Doniol, I. 20. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 63 Nor did Vergennes leave those whom he ad- dressed in doubt as to the practical bearing in the main of these generalizations: If [he wrote] having surveyed the Continent we turn our eyes coastward, do we find there greater pledges of security? We see lying alongside us a nation greedy, restless, more jealous of the prosperity of its neighbors than awake to its own happiness, powerfully armed and ready to strike on the instant. Let us not deceive our- selves ; whatever parade the English ministers may make of their pacific intentions, we cannot count upon this disposition longer than their domestic difficulties con- tinue. These however may come to an end, or indeed they may increase to such a point as to cause the government to direct the general uneasiness against ob- jects abroad. It is not without precedent that the cry of a war against France has become the rallying point of all parties in England. . . . Having nothing to gain with France by the prosecution of a legitimate commerce, England looks with envy upon the vast ex- tent of our plantations in America and our industry in Europe. 12 Rarely has a minister of state drawn a more sinister picture of the purposes and policies of an ostensibly friendly government; and to the pic- ture so delineated, rumor soon added the touch of imminent menace. Within a few days of the preparation of the Expose, Vergennes received "/&., 18-9. Note the point of view revealed by the assertion that England has nothing to gain from "a legitimate commerce with France." 64 FRENCH POLICY AND from Gamier the report then circulating about London that Chatham had a plan by which peace could be reestablished in America without offense to the dignity of England. This plan, he at once inferred, could only be at the expense of France. True, he wrote Gamier, England was burdened with debts and was the object of universal enmity. True too, George III has little love for Chatham. But the very extremity of the situation in Amer- ica might compel his Britannic Majesty to con- quer his prejudices and call this "enemy of peace" to power once more. His doing so would signal a situation for which desperate remedies had been determined upon and France would have need to beware. 13 Six weeks later Gamier wrote still more alarmingly. Speaking on his own responsi- bility, he asserted very confidently that if the measures of the existing ministry "do not meet with complete success, the end of the administra- tion will follow immediately and the king will be forced to yield to circumstances and place my lord Chatham at the head of affairs. He will come in clothed with absolute power." 14 There now ensued a considerable pause ; and it was the end of July, 1775, when the Count de Guines wrote that Lord Rochford, a member of the British ministry, had confided to him the be- lief of men in both parties, that the only way 13 Vergennes to Gamier, Dec. 26, 1774, i&., 60-2. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 65 to end the war in America was to declare war upon France, the argument being that, if con- fronted with the necessity of choosing between England and France, the Americans in fear of seeing the latter once more in Canada would cer- tainly cast in their lot with the former, even at the expense of liberty. 15 A little later advices reached Vergennes by way of Madrid that, even though Chathan did not come again to power which was improbable the existing ministers seemed to wish to imitate his way of thinking, from which it resulted that war was not unlikely to break out at the least expected moment. 16 Fi- nally in the middle of September Vergennes sent Beaumarchais, the famous author of Figaro, to pump from Rochford, who was an old acquaint- ance of his, further information as to British intentions. Beaumarchais, in a letter which was handed the king September 21st, summarized his conclusions thus: "In short, America is lost to the British in spite of their efforts. The war is waged more ferociously in London than in Bos- ton. The crisis will end with war against France if the opposition comes in, whether it is Chatham or Rockingham who replaces Lord North," 1 "76. 116-17. 16 Ib., 117-19. See also the letter of Aug. 7 from Louis to Charles III, indicating the former's persuasion of the possibility of war with England, ib., 131-2. "John Durand (Ed.), Documents on the American Revolution (N. Y., 1889), 53-4 66 FRENCH POLICY AND Already, however, the secretary's interest in the American situation had ceased to be exclu- sively one of alarmed concern. Thus, late in Au- gust the ambassador had forwarded from London the text of the royal proclamation pronouncing the Americans "rebels," and Vergennes had con- cluded thence that, so long as the existing min- istry remained in office, there was little danger of an alliance between America reconciled and the mother-country, which would turn its combined forces against France and Spain. 18 Further- more, the little likelihood there had been at any time that the arch-enemy of France would come again to power was for the time being at an end. This great man, "the world forgetting, by the world forgot," was now in a mysterious seclusion from which he did not emerge till the beginning of 1777. For many months the name of Chat- ham, its magic in abeyance, drops out of the despatches altogether. 18 * A clue to the new point of view of the Foreign Office is afforded by its response to Guines' de- spatch of September 8th, reporting a statement by Rochford that the American Lee, now in London, had sworn "on his honor" that the col- onists had assurance of aid from France and Spain, and his own positive denial that this "Doniol, I. 172-4. 18a The Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North, from 1768 to 1783. (Ed. W. B. Donne, London, 1867, 2 vols.), II. 10. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 67 statement had basis in fact. Replying ten days later Vergennes had commended the ambassa- dor's method of parrying his English interlocutor but at the same time had cautioned him against putting anything in writing. "The king," said he, "wishes neither to augment the difficulties of the British government nor to encourage the resistance of the Americans, but neither does it suit his interest to serve as a means of putting the latter down." 19 Late in October Vergennes received the Brit- ish ambassador Stormont and engaged him in an extended conversation on the American situation with the aim, at once, of reassuring the English government as to French intentions and of dis- covering how seriously that government regarded its trans- Atlantic affairs. That which was now happening in America, the French secretary de- clared, he had himself foreseen when as ambassa- dor at Constantinople he had learned of the cession of Canada to England. He then pro- ceeded to suggest that what the Americans were plainly aiming at was independence and to con- jecture the consequences should they attain their object: In that case they would immediately set about form- ing a great marine, and as they have every possible ad- vantage for ship-building, [it] would not be long before they had such fleets as would be an overmatch for the "Doniol, I. 150-1. 68 FRENCH POLICY AND whole naval power of Europe, could it be united against them. ... In the end, they would not leave a foot of that hemisphere in the possession of any European power. To these speculations the Englishman assented eagerly. 20 It is evident that against the back- ground furnished by the siege of Boston, the news of which was already producing an immense stir in Paris, Choiseul's observation that "the balance of power lay in America" revealed a new significance. In the closing days of 1775 the French Foreign Office proceeded, under Vergennes' direction, to formulate the problem with which the American revolt confronted France. It had before it memoirs and letters from a variety of quarters, some even from the French West Indies, but what is much more to the point, it had before it the plans and projects of Choiseul, wherein was clearly set forth the connection that existed between the American insurrection and the res- toration of French power and prestige, and wherein the large general problem was reduced to the more precise question whether the Americans would really proclaim their independence, or if they once proclaimed it, be of a mind to make a persistent effort for it. 21 20 SMSS., No. 1306. a Doniol, I. 240-2. Vergennes had, upon taking office, reorgan- ized the archives of the Foreign Office, and had had his secretaries THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 69 The answer that the Foreign Office returned to this question and the consequences that it deduced from its answer are set forth in the Reflexions, which was penned by Vergennes' secretary, Ger- ard de Rayneval, probably early in November, 1775. 22 "There is reason to believe," this most im- portant document begins, "that the colonies are not in quest simply of a redress of grievances, but that they are resolved to throw off the yoke of the mother-country altogether." Yet, it con- tinues, "if the colonies are left to themselves, it is probable that Great Britain will succeed in subjugating them." What then is the course that France should pursue at this juncture? "If England subjugates the colonies she will at least retain the commercial benefits that she has always drawn thence and which will accordingly continue to sustain both her manufactures and her marine. She will, moreover, prevent the colonies from be- coming what they would be if independent, a con- siderable weight in the balance of power in favor of some other state." France's interest was there- fore plain. "England is the natural enemy of France, and a greedy, ambitious, unjust, and prepare elaborate summaries of French foreign policy in all di- rections from the time of the Peace of Westphalia, Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, VII. 540. **Ib., 243-9; SMSS., No. 1310. The conjecture as to date is based on M. Doniol's very probable theory that Beaumarchais' ac- tivities in behalf of the idea of secret aid came after the secretary had formulated his program in the "Reflexions": see Doniol I. 251. 70 FRENCH POLICY AND treacherous enemy, the constant and cherished object of whose system is, if not the destruction of France, at least her abasement, humiliation, and ruin." But now at this moment, England's "colonies are in open war against her, their pur- pose is to cast off her yoke, they ask us to furnish them aid and supplies." Suppose then we meet their desires and our assistance proves effective, what advantages will result to us? 1. The power of England will shrink and ours will ex- pand correspondingly; 2. Her commerce will suffer an irreparable loss while ours will increase; 3. It is very probable that in the course of events we may be able to recover some of the possessions that the English ridded us of in America, as for instance, the Newfound- land fisheries, those of the gulf of St. Lawrence, the Isle Royal, etc. I do not speak of Canada. 23 But if these were the premises upon which France should base her course, what precisely should that course be? Of men capable and will- ing to bear arms the colonies had a great suffi- ciency, but they lacked: "first, provisions of war; secondly, currency; thirdly, a good navy." To obtain the first it would only be necessary for them to send their vessels to French ports laden with produce which they should there exchange for arms and munitions. This commerce could easily proceed without the government having any visible hand in it: "it would only be necessary ., 243-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 71 to have at each of the ports to which the American vessels resorted an intelligent merchant whose loyalty and discretion could be relied upon." The demand for money was somewhat more difficult, but given legitimate dimensions, it could be met in the same way as the demand for munitions. Most difficult of all would it be to furnish the insurgents vessels of war without declaring openly for them and so "precipitating war with Great Britain." Still it would perhaps be feasi- ble to send some merchant vessels adapted to the uses of war to Santo Domingo, where they could pass to the Americans by a simulated purchase. But the essential thing was that France should lose no time in reinforcing the courage of the Americans, and by doing it secretly she would avoid compromising herself either with the insur- gents or the court of London, while at the same time "she would be putting herself in shape to strike decisive blows" when the time was ripe. 24 Thus, it was admitted, that secret aid looked forward to possible war. But then, it was argued, a policy of inaction would be no guaranty of peace either, whether England triumphed or the insurgents. For in the one case as in the other the court of London would believe itself warranted in attacking France's colonies. Pru- dence therefore dictated that the means of waging war with success should be prepared beforehand, *Ib., 246-8. 72 FRENCH POLICY AND and one of the most essential of such means was "to make sure" of the Americans. 25 With the appearance of the Refleacions be- gan in good earnest the contest for the support of the king, earlier alluded to, between those who wished to see a brilliant diplomatic program adopted and those who, headed by Turgot, urged domestic reform and economy. 26 At the outset the royal conscience was in the possession of the reformers. Happily for the program of the Foreign Office, in the lively and inventive Beau- marchais, a veritable Cagliostro in the blend he presents of interested calculation and generous enthusiasm, Vergennes had a zealous missionary of his cause and one who, moreover, stood high in the favor of the royal family. On December 7th Beaumarchais handed Vergennes a letter ad- dressed "to the king alone, very important" and headed with the motto summum jus summa in- juria. In this extraordinary document the author of Figaro proceeded to attack with vigor the conscientious scruples which he thought stood in the way of the king's adopting the plan of secret aid: "The national policy which preserves 25 76., 249. * See Lavisse, op. cit., 46-51. * T On Beaumarchais' part in the American Revolution see Whar- ton, I. 56-75; John Durand, op. cit., 38-159; Louis de Lomenie, Beaumarchais and his Times (Trans, by H. S. Edwards, N. Y., 1857), Chs. XVII-XX; Blanche E. Hazard, Beaumarchais and the American Revolution (Boston, 1910). THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 73 states," he argued, "differs in every respect almost entirely from the civil morality which gov- erns individuals." "Solus populi suprema lex" But even if this were not the case good faith would not be due England, "that natural enemy, that jealous rival of your success, that people always systematically unjust to you." Indeed not even a treaty would have justly restrained you on this occasion. For when have the usurpations and outrages of this people ever had any limit but that of its strength? Has it not always waged war against you without declaring it? Did it not begin the last one, in a time of peace, by the sudden capture of five hundred of your vessels ? Did it not humble you by forcing you to destroy your finest seaport? Has it not recently subjected your merchant vessels to inspection on the northern seas? a humiliation which would have made Louis XIV rather eat his hands than not atone for it? Finally, Beaumarchais again invoked general principles. Tranquillity is most safely based on the division of one's enemies, the way to conquer iniquity is to arm it against itself. And if, he concluded, there is anyone who does not agree with me, "beginning with M. de Vergennes," "I close my mouth, I cast into the fire Scaliger, Gro- tius, Puffendorf, Gravina, Montesquieu, every writer on public rights, and admit that the study of a lifetime has been only a waste of effort." 28 Meantime, in August, 1775, the Count de Durand, op. cit., 59-73. 74 FRENCH POLICY AND Guines, acting under instructions from Ver- gennes, had despatched a certain Bonvouloir to America to travel in a private capacity, to gather impressions, and to insinuate to such influential Americans as he met the admiration felt in France for their noble efforts after liberty, the entire disinterestedness of the French govern- ment so far as Canada was concerned, and the welcome which American merchantmen would receive in French harbors. Early in March, 1776, Bonvouloir's first report, which was highly san- guine of American prospects, reached Paris. 29 Thus confirmed in his idea of the military compe- tence of the Colonies, Vergennes proceeded at once to shape up his plan of secretly aiding them, for discussion by his associates in office. At the same time he still had before him the certainty of Turgot's opposition, with the result that there is a marked difference in tone between the M e- moire de Considerations and the earlier Reflex- ions. Thus at the outset of the Considerations, in an effort to supersede the language of advocacy with that of scientific detachment, Ver- gennes concedes ostensibly that whether France and Spain should desire the subjection or the independence of the English colonies was "per- haps problematical," that either event perhaps Wharton, I. 38-40. For the report itself, see Doniol, I. 287- 92, especially 287-8; and for a translation, Durand, 2-16. 10 Doniol, I. 273-9; SMSS., No. 1316. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 75 threatened "dangers that it was not within human foresight to provide against." 31 Also the notion that "Providence had marked out this moment for the humiliation of England by striking her with the madness which is the sure precurser of destruction" is ostentatiously disavowed in the name of both the Bourbon kings. 32 On the other hand, two propositions are offered as axiomatic: first, that the prolongation of the American war would be "highly advantageous to both France and Spain, inasmuch as it would be calculated to exhaust both the victors and the vanquished"; 33 and secondly, that whatever the final result of the struggle between England and her Colonies, France could hardly hope for peace, since if England conciliated or subjected the Colonies she would be tempted by the large forces on hand to make an easy conquest of the West Indies, whereas if she lost them, she would be driven thus to indemnify herself. 34 And from these sup- posed facts it is held to follow that it was for the interest of both France and Spain, while "dexter- ously reassuring" England as to their intentions, to "extend the insurgents secret aid both in money and military stores without seeking any return for so doing beyond the political objective 81 Doniol, I. 273 !&., 275. /&., 276. */&., 274-5. 76 FRENCH POLICY AND of the moment". This should be the program for at least the ensuing twelve months. Meantime "the idea of independence, which seems to ger- minate rather slowly among the Americans," would perhaps have come to maturity. At any rate the two crowns would have had opportunity to perfect their forces. 35 Adroitly, however, as this argument was framed to anticipate the objections of the control- ler-general, it did not conceal the essential risk of the program it supported. It is significant, therefore, that the burden of Turgot's criticism of the Considerations is a protest against any program likely to precipitate an avoidable war, the expense of which must necessarily aggravate the already serious state of the royal finances. For the rest, striking to the very heart of the for- eign secretary's argument, its mercantilist pre- suppositions, the controller-general predicted that the day of "colonies exclusively riveted to the mother-country" was over, and counselled that that nation would show itself wisest and most deserving of happiness which should first convert its colonists from subjects to allies. Spain, said he, "ought to expect to see herself abandoned by her colonies; it was necessary to make ready for the commercial revolution which the new regime would bring about: by the same sign, there was little need of uneasiness lest England pounce /&., 277-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 77 upon France's colonies, since there was no ad- vantage involved in longer possessing them." "What difference did it make, then, whether England subjugated her colonies or not? Sub- jugated, they would occupy her attention by their desire to become free ; freed, their whole commer- cial system would be altered and England would have no further interest than to appropriate to herself the benefits of the new system." 30 As to the likelihood that England was planning to attack France, Turgot was frankly sceptical, but, he argued, if that were found to be the case, then France ought to prepare for the danger nearer at home, and especially by strengthening her fleet. Meantime it would be proper to put the Americans in the way of procuring the munitions and even the money they needed by means of trade, but there should be no departure by the government itself from neutrality and no act of direct aid. 37 Turgot, however, was fighting what from the first was foreordained a losing battle. In the words of Soulavie, the cause of "Reform, Re- trenchment, and Rights to be realized" could not hold its own with a selfish and ambitious court against a program of "Revenge, Glory, and Hu- "Ib., 281. "76., 282-3. Turgot also makes the point, later to be empha- sized by the Spanish government, that "an attack on England would be a signal for the reconciliation of England and America and would precipitate the very danger" which the Foreign Office's policy ostensibly sought to avoid. 78 FRENCH POLICY AND miliation to be retrieved"; and even liberals like LaFayette found the iflea of shedding blood for liberty abroad more to their taste than that of shedding feudal immunities at home. There had, indeed, been a period at the end of February and early in March when the Maurepas cabinet had seemed about to succumb to the joint attacks of the friends of Choiseul and Guines. But while the sentiments of the latter nobleman were so ex- cessively pacific that he had just been superseded by the Duke de Noailles at Saint James', 38 Choi- seul was loudly critical of the ministry's apparent failure to appreciate the possibilities of the Ameri- can revolt; 39 and the total result of the episode had been to solidify the ministry, except for the Liberals Turgot and Malesherbes, in support of a more enterprising policy. In their comments on the Considerations, St. Germain, the minister of War, and Sartines, the minister of Marine, did little more than reecho the arguments of Ver- gennes, while Maurepas took a line that was frankly belligerent. 40 See Doniol, I. 359-68. "Stormont to Weymouth, Dec. 6, 1775; Jan. 10 and Feb. 14, 1776: SMSS., 1307, 1313, 1314. For the circumstances attending the recall of Guines from London, for which, curiously enough, Turgot was primarily responsible, and the intrigue that had for its purpose to bring Choiseul into power, see Last Journal of Hor- ace Walpole (Ed. Doran, London, 1859, 2 vols.), II. 9-13. *Ib., 280, 284-6. The statement as to Maurepas' attitude is based on the assumption, sanctioned by M. Doniol, that the "Re- flexions sur la N6cessit6 de secourir les Ame>icains et de se pr6- parer a la Guerre avec 1'Angleterre" was his work. This document THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 79 The ministerial arguments, moreover, were again supplemented by the ardent advocacy of Beaumarchais, to whose effusion entitled La Paix ou la Guerre is generally credited Louis' final conversion to the plan of secret aid. 41 On May 2nd the king at last definitely authorized the advance of a million livres to Beaumarchais for the purchase of supplies to be transferred to the Americans. Six weeks later the Spanish court made a similar advance, and the following Au- gust the famous house of Hortalez et Cie opened its doors. Within a twelvemonth it had des- patched to America eight ship-loads of warlike stores, valued at more than six million livres and drawn in large part from the royal arsenals. 42 Meantime, on May 12th, Turgot had been dis- missed, leaving Vergennes the directing influence in the ministry. closes with the following illuminating observation : "Toutes ces con- siderations r6unies pourroient done porter a conclure meme Poffen- sive comme le seul moyen de rtablir notre marine d'une part et de 1'autre d'affaiblir celle de 1'Angleterre, et comme le seul moyen d'assurer pour longtems la paix du Continent qui n'a jamais 6t6 troubled que par leurs intrigues ou leur argent." "The ablest man I knew," wrote Horace Walpole, "was the old Comte de Maurepas. . . . Knowing his enmity to this country, I told him . . . that it was fortunate for England that he had been so long divested of power." Trevelyan, The American Revolution, Pt. III. 413 fn. 4l Durand, op. cit., 74-85; Lomenie, op. cit., 267-71. 41 See the references in note 27, supra, especially Wharton, I. 60 ff.; also C. J. Stille, "Beaumarchais and the Lost Million," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XI. 1-36. CHAPTER IV THE PORTUGUESE AND CORSAIR QUESTIONS For many months secret aid was a mystery closely guarded from even its beneficiaries. The decision to render it, none the less, involved cer- tain diplomatic consequences at once. Beaumar- chais had not yet begun operations when Eng- land lodged a complaint against Americans being allowed to procure powder in the French West Indies and to fly the French flag from their mast- heads. 1 Perceiving the bearing of the question, Vergennes promptly took up an aggressive posi- tion. He recalled England's traffic in arms with Corsica when France was subjugating that island. He asserted entire willingness to abide by the English doctrine that contraband must have a hostile destination, wherefore vessels plying be- tween France and the French islands would not be subject to seizure on the charge of carrying it. He ridiculed the idea that England could pretend a grievance in the fact that the Ameri- cans were getting aid from France through the channels of trade : the French markets were open 'Gamier to Vergennes, May 6, 1776, Doniol, I. 463. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 81 to all and those who paid best would have the preference. Thus, to use a more modern termin- ology, Vergennes gave notice of his government's intention to treat the Americans as possessed of "belligerent rights", including the right of an inviolable asylum in neutral ports for their peace- ful traders. 2 But the question of the trading rights of neu- trals was from the outset but one ingredient of the diplomatic situation between England and France, and not the most important ingredient at that. Far more ominous was the stage which the dispute between Spain and Portugal, arising 3 Vergennes to Gamier, June 15 and 21, ib., 466-9. See also Vergennes to Noailles, March 21, 1777, ib., II. 334: "Nous en [the question of prizes] usons avec les insurgens comme nous ferions avec toute nation amie qui seront en guerre avec 1'Angle- terre." Other interesting documents in the same connection are Dumas' letter to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, May 14, 1776, Wharton II. 90-2; the "Expose des Motifs de la Conduite du Roi Tres-Chr6tien relativement a 1'Angleterre," Doniol, III. 823-56; and Observations on the Justificatory Memorial of the Court of London (see Appendix IV), 102-12. That the modern distinction between "Belligerency" and "Independence" in the case of communities seeking admission to the Family of Nations found no place in the Public Law of the period is shown by the following passage from the pen of Horace Walpole: "An Amer- ican privateer had carried three prizes into Bilboa. The governor had detained them. . . . He was ordered by Grimaldi's letter to restore them, the king of Spain professing an exact neutrality, which was in effect owning our colonies for an independent state," Last Journals, II. 87. It it an interesting speculation, to what extent the French alliance with the United States was made neces- sary by the absence of a distinction which would have enabled France to aid the Americans without violating England's rights. 82 FRENCH POLICY AND from the latter's aggressions in South America, had now reached. Because of the alliances of these powers with France and England respec- tively, the outbreak of war between them meant almost inevitably war between England and France as well. 3 The Spanish ambassador at Paris, the Count d'Aranda, who was a bitter enemy of England, had from the first pro- claimed this as a welcome development in view of England's growing embarrassment in North America. 4 Vergennes, on the other hand, dis- liking the obvious ambition of Spain to annex Portugal, both because he regarded such a pro- ject as contrary to the precepts of the Systeme de Conservation and also because he feared for the smooth working of the Family Compact should Spain become the equal of France, had sought to compose the differences of the Iberian states. His efforts at pacification had, however, been followed by fresh aggressions on Portugal's part, instigated, Spain hinted, by the English; 5 "Si la guerre entre FEspagne et le Portugal devient indis- pensable, ce que la situation prdsente des affaires entre les deux puissances ne donne que trop sujet d'appr&iender, il est inevitable que la guerre avec FAngleterre en sera la suite et que la France ne pourra pas se dispenser d'y prendre la part la plus directe." Such are the opening words of the memoir read by Vergennes to the council of ministers held at Marly, July 7, 1776, Doniol, I. 527. * Vd. ib., 352 ff. For an interesting characterization of this unique individual, see Sgur, Memoirs, I. 390. Cf. Doniol, V. 30. On the whole matter, see Doniol, I. 75-6, 298-312, 330-7, 525, 532-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 83 and by the beginning of July, Vergennes had come quite around to Aranda's viewpoint. A warlike situation now developed rapidly. 6 To a council of ministers held at Marly on July 7th Vergennes presented the Spanish-Portu- guese matter as offering France the opportunity "to break the power of the single enemy she had cause to fear," provided only French diplomacy was equal to the occasion. First and foremost, the war must be kept from spreading to the Con- tinent, which could be readily guaranteed by Austria's standing by to prevent Russia from falling upon Sweden. Again, in Holland the ashes of the old Republican party must be fanned to flame once more and Dutch neutrality be se- cured by appeal to Dutch avarice. Finally, it was essential "to let the Americans know of the present state of affairs and the results which it presaged, and, without assuming engagements with them, yet to make them understand the full advantage which existing circumstances prom- ised had they but the hardihood and patience to await their unfolding." 7 Vergennes' English correspondence at this period contains many sharp criticisms of the treatment French subjects were alleged to be receiving in Newfoundland and Hindoostan. Most of these supposed grievances were long-standing ones. Their revival at this moment is indication of the French government's belligerent intention. See generally the references in note 2, above. 7 76., 527-8. Compare Garnier's "Lettre particuliere" of May 15, SMSS., No. 868. 84 FRENCH POLICY AND Four days later Deane, the Continental Con- gress' first agent to France, who had just arrived at Paris, was admitted by Vergennes to a secret interview. The secretary would not express him- self on the subject of American independence, especially as "the United Provinces" had not yet expressed themselves ; but he gave assurance that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Amer- icans trading in French ports, whether in muni- tions or other products. He proposed that Deane should keep the Foreign Office en rapport with all important happenings in America, and strongly advised him to steer clear of Englishmen. 8 Then on August 13th Gamier wrote from London that the Americans had at last declared their in- dependence. 9 In a "committee" consisting of the king and cabinet, held on August 31st, Ver- gennes, casting equivocation aside, proclaimed that, as between the advantages and disadvan- tages of a war "against England in the present juncture, . . . the former outweigh the latter so unmistakably that no comparison can be made" : The Americans had now declared their indepen- 8 Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, Wharton, op. cit., II. 112-6. The British government protested against Deane's having been allowed to land in France, a protest at which Vergennes professed to take great umbrage: "Le Roy est le maltre chez lui, . . . il n'a compte a rendre a qui que soit des etrangers qu'il juge a-propos d'admettre dans ses Etats," Doniol, I. 583. /&., 561. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 85 dence. These same Americans it was, their sailors and soldiers, who had made "those vast conquests of which France has in times past so keenly felt the humiliation." They were now available allies; and, thanks to commerce, the connection now formed with them could not fail to be lasting. 10 Against these arguments no voice was raised, and a week later the memoir embody- ing them was despatched to Madrid for approval by that court. Why, then, did not the war come ? The answer is supplied by the fact that the very day that the response of the Spanish government arrived ac- cepting its ally's program, though with a char- acteristic stipulation for further delay, 11 the news came from Garnier of the American defeat at Long Island. 12 Vergennes at once decided that the policy of secret aid still remained the better part of valor, but he was able to conceal his re- treat under the pretext of disapproving of Spain's plan, which still included the conquest of Portugal. 13 "The king," he wrote, "will always regard the aggrandizement of the Spanish mon- archy with satisfaction but His Majesty is unable to conceal from the king, his uncle, that the con- quest of Portugal would be alarming to all states */&., 567-77, especially 570-1; SMSS., No. 897. 11 Grimaldi to Aranda, Oct. 8, 1776, Doniol, I. 603-13. The main points of the document are summarized on pages 612-13. 11 76., 615-6. 13 "Reflexions," &., 681-8. 86 FRENCH POLICY AND interested in maintaining the balance of power." "If," he continued, "it is a universal maxim, as contended by the Marquis de Grimaldi, that one makes war only for the purpose of gain, yet this maxim ought to be adopted by the two crowns in the existing situation only with the idea in mind that everything is to be gained by breaking down the power of England." Could that be done, then would France and Spain have achieved an advantage more precious than could be represented by the conquest of a rich province. For once England is unable to keep going the flame of discord among the great sovereigns of Europe, then will the two monarchs no longer be ham- pered in exercising their better inclinations, which look only to securing to their own subjects and to all Europe the sweet fruits of a sure and durable peace. 14 A few weeks later we find Vergennes penning the British ambassador the following billet: Versailles, December 21st, 1776. Monsieur: I am indeed touched at the attention shown me by Your Ex- cellency in admitting me to share your joy at the satis- factory news of the success of British arms in Connecti- cut and New York. I beg Your Excellency to accept my many thanks at this testimonial of your friendship, and my sincere felicitations upon an event so calculated to contribute to the reestablishment of peace in that part of the globe. I shall impart the communication made me to the king and now take it upon myself to assure you that His Majesty will always receive with "76., 685-7. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 87 pleasure news of whatever may contribute to the satis- faction and glory of the king your master. 15 Vergennes' policy during the late months of 1776 and the early months of 1777 may be char- acterized in the poignant phrase of today as one of "watchful waiting." The secretary had aban- doned none of his fundamental premises: "The purpose of every offensive war is either to ag- grandize one's self or to enfeeble the rival power, whose superiority one fears. ... As everything is relative in the political order, they [the two crowns] will necessarily increase by reason of the enfeeblement of their rival. . . . By renouncing every idea of supremacy the English would be free to recognize the independence against which they are armed": and more to like effect. 16 On ., II. 107, fn. 2. A month earlier than this, Vergennes had told Stormont that it was contrary to the king's intention that his subjects should go to America, SMSS., No. 905. On Dec. 10, the secretary ordered Lenoir to arrest all persons giving out that they were intending to go to America, ib., No. 1385. Vergennes' de- spatches to Noailles at this period display considerable uneasiness as to British intentions, ib. Nos. 907, 913, and 917. The fact is that Vergennes, relying on American and Spanish assistance, had been planning an attack upon England for which the French marine was not at all fit. See Doniol, II. 156-70. Hence, the extent of his reaction after the American defeat at Long Island. "Vergennes to Ossun, Mar. 11, 1777, ib., 238-41. See also the document given in Appendix II. Though the work of a "private citizen" it was prepared, Doniol thinks, for the Council. Vd. ib., 118. Its speculations as to the effect of the success of the Revolution on France's position in Europe take a wide range. 88 FRENCH POLICY AND the other hand, it is quite apparent that his con- fidence in the military capacity of the Americans indeed, in the vitality of their cause had suf- fered a great shock from the disaster of Long Island. Of these facts he must again be per- suaded before he would consent to risk the dig- nity of the French crown, and meantime, between American importunity and British suspicion, he must take his way charily. The clue to the period is furnished by the com- parison of two memoirs from the secretary's pen that are dated respectively April 12th and April 26th, 1777. The latter, a criticism upon certain propositions of the Spanish government, which still continued in a warlike frame of mind, con- tained the following homily in favor of peace: "One knows well enough where war begins, but no one can know where or how it will end. If one could be sure that England would concentrate against us and not extend her efforts to the Continent, the present occasion would be very seductive and it would require a sublime exercise of virtue to repulse it. But the existence of England is a matter of concern from the point of view of the equilibrium of Europe; it is accordingly necessary to anticipate that she will not be left alone. . . . The uprising in America has remained up to the present a purely domestic matter so far as England is concerned ; she sees in the insurgents only a people in revolt whom she has a right to recall to their obedience by whatever means lie within her reach and without other powers having any title to mix up in the affair. To offer to THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 89 intervene would be in some sort to recognize and support the independence which the American provinces have declared, since it is only between equal powers that intervention ordinarily takes place. 17 The earlier memoir struck a quite different note. Composed in anticipation of a visit of the em- peror to Paris, it urged the necessity of the Austrian connection to France, because, by assur- ing the peace on the Continent, it paved the way for "taking measures against England, the natural and most inveterate enemy of France, her glory and prosperity." 18 ""Lettre . . . communiquee au Roi," etc., t&., 271 ff., 272-4 See also passage to like effect in Vergennes to Ossun, Mar. 22, 1777, #>., 248. Also, same to same, Apr. 12, where the following words occur: "Si nous pouvions r6tablir 1'opinion du bon etat de nos finances, toutes nos possessions servient bien plus en surete sous cet abri que sous la protection d'escadres nombreuses qui peuvent etre primees ou surpassees," ib., 261, a sentiment alto- gether worthy of Turgot! ts ffe., 428; Flassan, Histoire gtntrale et raisonnte, etc., VII. 135. See also Vergennes' note of February 12 to Aranda in response to propositions emanating from the British government looking to a general disarmament by France, Spain, and Great Britain: "Si nous accordons a desarmer nous epargnons sans doute une grande depense mais Foconomie sera plus grande pour 1'Angle- terre," etc. Doniol, II. 155, 208-9. It was also during this period that the controversy occurred between the French and Spanish gov- ernments over the question of sending further reinforcements to Hayti and Santo Domingo, in view of the continued possibility of war over the Portuguese question. Vergennes argued against the idea on the ground that the climate was fatal to Europeans and on the ground that such a step would tend to alarm Great Britain and make her less ready to accept France's friendly as- 90 FRENCH POLICY AND Inevitably, it was a period of episodes. It was at this time that LaFayette, eluding the decep- tive vigilance of the royal officers, made his way to America, though he would have preferred to lead a filibustering expedition against the Eng- lish settlements in the East. 19 It was at this time that the minister of War, St. Germain, induced Steuben to come to America to assist in training the Continental Army. It was also at this time that the Count de Broglie launched his scheme, which had the approval of Deane, for making himself a sort of temporary stadtholder of the United States and commissioned Kalb, Choiseul's former emissary to America, to enlist the interest of Congress. Writing Kalb from his country-seat at Ruff ec, December llth, Broglie set forth the outlines of his plan as follows: A military and political leader is wanted, a man fitted to carry the weight of authority in the colonies, to unite its parties, to assign to each his place. The main point of the mission with which you have been entrusted will therefore consist in explaining the advantages, or rather, the absolute necessity of the choice of such a man. The rank accorded the candidate would have to be of the first eminence, such for instance, as that of the Prince of Nassau; but his functions would have to be surances. As the troops were sent later on (in July: see Doniol, II. 453), we man conclude that the second was the important con- sideration. See references in Chapter I., supra, note 8. "Doniol, II. ch. 2; SMSS., No. 756. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 91 confined to the army, . . . with perhaps the single exception of the political negotiations with foreign powers; . . . the assurance of the man's return to France at the end of three years will remove every ap- prehension in regard to the powers to be conferred and will remove even the semblance of an ambitious design to become governor of the new republic. Of course large pecuniary consideration would have to be claimed for the preparation of the journey and for the journey itself and a liberal salary for the return home. You can give the assurance that such a measure will bring order and economy into the public expense, that it will reimburse the cost a hundred-fold in a single campaign. You will be equally mindful to dwell upon the effect necessarily produced by such an appointment on its mere announcement in Europe. 20 I know of no documentary evidence connecting Vergennes with this extraordinary scheme. Yet it seems to me hardly supposable that a great noble like Broglie, who obviously had none of the youthful enthusiasm of LaFayette and who was already more or less at outs with the court on account of his connection with the Secret du Roi, would have risked the king's further displeasure "Friedrich Kapp, Life of Kalb, pp. 94-5. See also Kalb's memoir of Dec. 17, addressed to Deane, which is to be found in the French Archives des Affaires 6trangeres. Here the additional argument is offered that the step proposed by Broglie would so enlist the interest of the nobility that they would force the king to make an alliance with the Americans. Broglie's own expecta- tions from the scheme are also set forth in greater detail. SMSS., No. 604; Deane Papers, I. 426-31. 92 FRENCH POLICY AND by lending himself to a project of incalculable possibilities without some sort of assurance as to the attitude of his government. Moreover, the plan lent itself rather nicely to the requirements of the American situation as these appeared to the French government at the moment: The American cause was on the verge of collapse for want of competent military leadership; it also lacked prestige in Europe; the king did not dare openly take up the cudgels for so feeble a client; French officers were departing daily for America on their own account; if Broglie failed, it would be as easy to disavow him as to disavow LaFay- ette, Coudray, or any other; if he succeeded, France would reap the fruits of his success; His Most Christian Majesty has proffered Poland a Conti, why not America a Broglie? 21 But now a policy of marking time is one that from the nature of things ceases in time to be feasible, for either the event awaited is upon one or it has descended below the horizon of sensi- ble probability. Even by January 1st, 1777, there was in train a series of events that by mid-summer of that year had forced Vergennes finally to choose his position. The rendition of secret aid to the Americans through the channels of commerce still continued, but subject to be inter- 21 See generally C. J. Stille, "The Comte de Broglie, Proposed Stadtholder of America," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XI. 369-405; Doniol, II. Ch. 2; Wharton, I. 391-6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 93 rupted at any time by measures of the govern- ment meant to allay British suspicions. The result was discontent on both hands. The, per- haps designedly, bungling methods of the agents of secret aid were constantly furnishing Lord Stormont texts for remonstrance, 22 and mean- time American gratitude took on a tinge of resentment. 23 But of far more importance was the fact that Franklin was now in France. Almost from the outset had Franklin's assured front restored the American cause to the footing it had had in popu- lar estimation before the news of Long Island. The prestige of his immense reputation "more universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, Fred- erick or Voltaire" 24 had suggested, for the first 22 SMSS., Nos. 1306, 1309, 1418, 1427, 1496, 1519, 1531, 1593, etc. In his despatch to Weymouth of Jan. 7, 1778, Stormont declares that "the very existence of the American army depends upon the arrival of these succors," ib. f No. 1822. "See, for instance, Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 5, 1777: "We are also instructed to solicit the court of France for an immediate supply of twenty or thirty thousand muskets. . . . This application has now become the more neces- sary, as the private purchase made by Mr. Deane of those articles is rendered ineffectual by an order forbidding their exportation": Wharton, II. 245. Also, to like effect, ib., 257. The inadequacy of secret aid to establish any hold on the Americans is recognized by Vergennes in his despatch to Ossun of Apr. 7, Doniol, II. 341. And see ib., generally, pp. 305-12. *Life and Works of John Adams (Boston, 1856), I. 660. The passage is worthy more extended quotation: "His reputation was more universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, Frederick or Voltaire, and his character more beloved and esteemed than any 94 FRENCH POLICY AND time perhaps, that if America was to be made an ally at all, it must be on terms of exact equality. The charm of his unique personality, the interest- ing phases of which he exploited with faultless facility and with just the touch of charlatanism that the sentimentalism of the age demanded, had served from the moment of his landing at Auray to focus to a blaze of enthusiasm the diverse lines of opinion making among all classes of French- men for the king's espousal of the American cause. 25 or all of them. Newton had astonished perhaps forty or fifty men in Europe. . . . But this fame was confined to men of letters. The common people knew little and cared nothing about such a recluse philosopher. Leibnitz's name was more confined still. . . . Frederick was hated by more than half of Europe. . . . Voltaire, whose name was more universal . . . was considered as a vain and profligate wit, and not much esteemed or beloved by anybody, though admired by all who knew his works. But Franklin's fame was universal. His name was familiar to government and people, to kings, courtiers, nobility, clergy and philosophers, as well as plebeians, to such a degree that there was scarcely a peasant or a citizen, a valet de chambre, coachman or footman, a lady's cham- bermaid or a scullion in a kitchen, who was not familiar with it, and who did not consider him a friend to human kind." Matthew Arnold somewhere comments on the curious fact that America contributed her only world-wide reputation, that of Franklin, while she was still a province. "See generally Edward Everett Hale and Edward Everett Hale, Jr., Franklin in France (Boston, 1886-8, 2 vols.). "Tout Paris visitait Franklin dans sa maison de Passy. Admire" par les savants et les philosophes qui le comparaient a Socrate et a New- ton, il charmait le populaire par sa bonhomie et par la simplicity" dc ses habits bruns et de ses gros souliers." Lavisse, op. cit., IX. 1 104. See also an undated pamphlet by Hilliard d'Auberteuil on Franklin (Penn. Hist'l Soc. Lib.). THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 95 Franklin arrived in Paris December 21st, and two days later he and his associates, Deane and Lee, requested an audience with the French sec- retary, which was accorded them the 28th. 26 The suggestion of a formal audience having been evaded by Vergennes, on January 5th, 1777, the commissioners made explicit their expectations of France in a note: "Eight ships of the line completely manned," with which to clear the American coast of British cruisers, and twenty or thirty thousand stand of muskets and bayonets, together with a "large quantity of ammunition and brass field pieces, to be sent under convoy." In return for these favors, Congress offered France and Spain a treaty of amity and com- merce and also "to guarantee in the firmest man- ner to those nations all their possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may be consequen- tial of such assistance as" it requested. 27 It is hardly surprising that Vergennes found these demands rather staggering. However, he ar- gued his refusal of them with the utmost suavity and good nature; 28 and, what is more, followed it up with an advance of 250,000 limes, the first instalment, as he announced, of a loan of two mil- M Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Committee of Secret Corres- pondence, Jan. 17, 1777, Wharton, II. 248; SMSS., No. 606. * T Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Wharton, II. 245-6. 28 Note approved by the king, Jan. 9, Doniol, II. 120-2. 96 FRENCH POLICY AND lions from the king, who exacted only that the thing be kept secret. 29 But if Vergennes thought thus to stop the mouths of the Americans, he soon learned his error. Congress' instructions did not at this date permit its envoys to offer France and Spain an alliance, only treaties of amity and commerce. 30 On February 2nd, however, with the news before them of the preparation of Burgoyne's expedi- tion in England, the commissioners resolved to break through this limitation and to offer the two crowns a pledge that, if they became involved in war with Great Britain in consequence of making a treaty of amity and commerce with the States, the latter would not conclude a separate peace. * 76., 266 ; Wharton, II. 247, 250 fn., 404-5. It must be understood, of course, that until the declaration of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, in Mar., 1778, all of the intercourse of the commis- sioners and the Foreign Office was guarded from publicity with the greatest care. Certain precautions were, in fact, taken against the Americans themselves, even after they were admitted to the general secret, for it was not impossible, of course, that France might eventually find it convenient to clear her skirts of rebel- lious associations. "No written proof of the least importance," says Deane, "was ever left in our hands. Even M. Gerard's letters appointing occasional interviews with us were always without any signature; though five hundred thousand livres were quarterly [in 1777] paid to our banker from the Royal Treasury, not the smallest evidence of the source from whence that subsidy came was permitted to remain in our power." Deane Papers, IV. 373. 30 Journals of the Continental Congress (Ed. W. C. Ford, suc- ceeded by G. Hunt, Washington, 1904 ff., 25 vols., covering the years 1774-82, still in progress), V. 768, 813, ff., the Instructions of Sept. 24, 1776. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 97 This decision, moreover, was speedily confirmed by new instructions from Congress authorizing "any tenders necessary" to secure the immediate assistance of the Bourbon powers. The result was renewed activity on the part of the commis- sion, and of a much more ambitious sort. 31 On March 18th Deane sent Vergennes a plan of triple alliance between France, Spain, and the United States looking to an immediate war against England and Portugal. Hostilities were to continue till Spain had conquered Portugal, till the United States had established their inde- pendence, and till France and the United States had expelled England from the North American continent and the West Indies; and peace was to be concluded only by the joint consent of the allies. A few days later Franklin laid a similar scheme before Aranda. 32 The Spaniard was en- thusiastic, Vergennes cold. "Considering," the latter inquired of the former, "the condition of lassitude and division in which this people is at present, what security could we have that our diversion would not produce their defection, espe- cially if, as no doubt would be the case, they were offered their independence?" 33 Meantime Lee, having at the instigation of Aranda set out for M Wharton, II. 257, 260 and footnote; Harrison et al. to the Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1776, ib., 240. '"Doniol, II. 319-22; Deane Papers, II. 25-7; SMSS., No. 659. 83 Vergennes to Aranda, Apr. 10, Doniol, II. 325. 98 FRENCH POLICY AND Madrid with the idea of approaching the Spanish court directly, had been met at Burgos by Gri- maldi and turned back, though with pledges of further monetary aid, some of which were ulti- mately redeemed. 34 Of this phase of the episode the British ambassador was, however, of course ignorant. Seeing only that a rebel envoy had been denied the hospitality of Spanish soil, he promptly made the fact a theme for obvious comparisons unfavorable to France. 35 But in less direct ways too did the American commissioners daily contribute to rendering the French government's equivocal position more and more precarious. The mere fact that they were in Paris created an ever thickening cloud of spec- ulation as to American prospects and English and French designs. It also brought thither the spies and secret agents both of the British gov- ernment and of the Whig opposition, whose busi- ness it was to watch the Americans, the French ministers, and each other. 36 The quite normal precipitate of such an atmosphere was all sorts of startling rumors, many of which were concerned with an alleged pending agreement between rep- resentatives of the British government and the American commissioners, granting the Colonies their independence and providing for the inevi- */6., 195-6, 265-6; Wharton, II. 280-3. Of. ib., 148. * Vergennes to Ossum, Apr. 12, Doniol, II. 268. "See Wharton, I. Chs. 21 and 22. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 99 table joint attack upon the French West In- dies. 37 Vergennes received these rumors with a measure of scepticism. "We appreciate," he wrote, "how little probable it is that the English would confide so dangerous a secret into the keeping of their enemies as that of their hostile views toward France and Spain, and we are aware how great is the interest of the insurgents to create suspi- cion." 38 At the same time he recognized that France had not yet done enough for the Colonies "to secure their gratitude," 39 and he feared the import of the armaments which England was pre- paring. Indeed, at no time during the Revolu- tion do the hazards of France's equivocal position appear more substantial than at just this period. Yet at no time did Vergennes show himself more bent upon keeping the peace, and that notwith- standing the still belligerent temper of France's ally. And meantime a fresh element of complexity was introduced into the situation through Frank- lin's activity in encouraging American privateers to resort to French harbors. Vergennes had from the first foreseen that difficulties would arise when American "corsairs" began seeking the hospital- ity of French waters and he had determined to 97 Doniol, II. 319, 335-8 and fn., and 368-70. M /6., 257. **'Ib., 341. 100 FRENCH POLICY AND restrict them to the universally recognized right of asylum, that is the right to take refuge from adverse elements. But this meagre concession, which signified only that the French government did not accept the British view that they were pirates, was little satisfactory to the American vikings. What these individuals demanded was the right to equip, arm, and supply themselves in French ports, to bring their prizes there and sell them, to arm and equip once more and sally forth, in short, the right to make the French coast a base of operations against English shipping. In vain did Vergennes point out how entirely incom- patible such demands were, not only with His Most Christian Majesty's treaty obligations, but with the Law of Nations itself; for these were a thick-skinned gentry, who well understood that hard words break no bones and with whom measures to be effective had to be drastic. The resultant dilemma personified itself in the bland Franklin and the insistent Stormont. Franklin professed to accept Vergennes' legal principles but was endlessly resourceful in concocting delays to blunt their practical application. Stormont was unremittingly vigilant of results. 39 * In general, see Hale, Franklin in France, I. ch. 7. Also, the correspondence between the English and French government; Doniol, II. 334-5, 478-9 and 504-19; and between Vergennes and the commissioners, ib., 520-22 (translated in Wharton, II. 364-6). See also index to SMSS. under "Conyngham," "Wickes," "Dolphin," "Lexington," "Reprisal." THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 101 By the middle of July, the "corsair" issue had become so acute that it was clearly necessary for the French government to cease drifting and take its bearings once more. Meantime, and this was the one material result of the policy of delay, the French marine had reached a plane from which substantial parity with the British marine was within easy reach. In a memoir communicated to the king on July 23rd, Vergennes, contending that the moment had arrived when France must resolve "either to abandon America or to aid her courageously and effectively," pronounced with eloquence and fervor for a close alliance with her. The document is worthy of a brief resume. The primary question, Vergennes declared, was whether France and Spain could afford to see the colonies return either directly or indirectly to British control; and that question turned on the further one, whether it was sound policy to contribute to the strength of an enemy when op- portunity offered to enfeeble that enemy. Eng- land was the natural rival of the House of Bourbon. Mistress again of North America and its immense resources of all sorts, she would be a menace to the possessions of the two crowns in that part of the world. It followed that the re- union of North America and Great Britain, in whatever manner brought about, could not be indifferent either to the security, the prosperity, *Doniol, II. 460-69. 102 FRENCH POLICY AND or the glory of the two crowns and that no pains must be spared to prevent it. 41 Secret aid had been well enough in its day, but it was no longer sufficient to prevent the reconciliation of the col- onies and the mother-country, especially since the charge was now made by the English that the policy of France and Spain was to destroy Eng- land by means of America and America by means of England. It was necessary, in short, that the assistance rendered the Americans be sufficient to assure their total separation from Great Britain and their gratitude to the House of Bourbon. Open assistance undoubtedly meant war. But war was probably imminent anyway, since if Great Britain failed in the current campaign to reduce the rebels, she would make an accommo- dation with them and then with their assistance would fall upon France and Spain. 42 No doubt the magnanimity and religion of the two mon- archs made repugnant to them the thought of profiting by the circumstances in which England found herself to give her influence a mortal blow. But in diplomacy self-interest was the major force, and in politics the same maxim held as in war, that it was better to anticipate than to be anticipated., Besides, let their majesties con- sider whether their flags were respected, their commerce free, whether, in fact, their vessels were "76., 461. 43 76., 462-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 103 not subject from the moment they left home waters, to humiliating visitations, odious seizures, unjust confiscations. 43 What the situation called for was a close offensive and defensive alliance with the Americans, all parties to which should be bound not to abandon the war without the con- sent of the others. The American commissioners should be informed of the intentions of the two crowns at once; but at any rate decisive steps could not be delayed later than January or Feb- ruary, when the British Parliament would meet to determine the fate of the present ministry. Fortunately, the European situation was in every way favorable to a joint enterprise by the two crowns against England. Spain's difficulty with Portugal was on the way to settlement, and a war on the sea would not spread to the Continent. From such a war, it was possible that the two crowns would not derive every advantage they could hope for, but to succeed in breaking the chain between England and America would for- ever be an immense advantage. 44 The memoir was approved by the king the same day, and three days later was despatched to Ossun, Louis' ambassador at Madrid, to be sub- mitted by him to the Spanish crown. 45 Why then, the question at once arises, was not the 76. 464-5. 44 76., 467-9. * 76., 469. 104 FRENCH POLICY AND course it recommended promptly entered upon, at least by France? The answer is to be found in the altered attitude of Spain. Spain's desire for war during the latter half of 1776 and the early months of 1777 had rested almost alto- gether upon the prospect of having Portugal for her quarry. By July 23rd, however, as Vergen- nes himself noted, the contre-temps between the two Iberian courts was practically at an end. With a new monarch on the Portuguese throne, the warlike Pombal had fallen from power; and meantime the Spaniards under Ceballos had trounced the Portuguese forces along La Plata soundly. 46 But another factor, too, in bringing about the pending settlement had been Ver- gennes' constant opposition to the idea of Spain's overrunning her neighbor; and, as was now to transpire, he had therein overshot his mark. For with Portugal out of the calculation, Spain had no wish to fight England, and least of all in be- half of American independence. On the other hand, even Louis' assent to the program of July 23rd was only a conditional one, the condition being Spanish cooperation. Until, therefore, either Spain could be brought to the support of this program or Louis could be persuaded that it was perilous for France longer to wait upon her ally, decisive action was impossible. /&., 432. CHAPTER V FLORIDA BLANCA DEFINES SPAIN'S POSITION Notwithstanding a close coincidence of race, religion, and economic interests, and the fact that they were ruled by the same House, the two branches of which were bound together in pre- sumably indissoluble alliance, the French and Spanish peoples of the eighteenth century were strongly disposed to mutual antipathy, not to say antagonism ; while between the Spanish and Eng- lish, particularly of the governing classes, there seems always to have been a considerable measure of reciprocal understanding and sympathy. 1 So long as Grimaldi, a Genoese by birth, had remained at the head of affairs at Madrid, Ver- gennes had not encountered the anti-Gallican prejudices of the court circle of the Escurial. But in February, 1777, Grimaldi had fallen from power and had been succeeded by a Spaniard of l See. Francois Rousseau, "Participation de 1'Espagne a la Guerre d'Amerique," Revue des Questions historiques, LXXII. 444 ff. Note also Jay's observation: "They [the Spanish] appear to me to like the English, hate the French, and to have prejudices against us," Jay to the President of Congress, May 26, 1780, Wharton, III. 733. 106 FRENCH POLICY AND Spaniards, Don Jose Monino, the Count de Florida Blanca. 2 To be sure, the new minister promptly volunteered the assurance that he would base his policy on the maintenance of the Family Compact, and "the most perfect har- mony" between the two crowns; 3 but he also soon made it clear that in interpreting the alliance be- tween France and Spain, he would treat the interests of his own country as of quite as much importance as those of France and, furthermore, that he regarded these interests as strictly mater- ial. 4 Accordingly, whereas Grimaldi had ac- cepted Vergennes' contention that Spain as well as France had "much to gain from breaking down British power by effecting the complete and radical separation of the colonies," 3 Florida Blanca considered "the abasement of England" as without substantial interest to a nation whose Continental role was no longer worth restoring. 6 Nor yet did Vergennes' notion of "a durable peace" to follow upon England's undoing appeal more strongly to him. These were "moral ob- jects," and he frankly characterized them as "quixotic." However, Vergennes also urged it as an argument for his program that the total separ- 3 Doniol, II. 24-7, 197-8. 8 Ossun to Vergennes, Feb. 24, 1777, ib., 227-8. 4 See the correspondence cited in note 59, supra. Grimaldi to Aranda, Feb. 4, ib., 192-3. 76., 703. Cf. ib., 567. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 107 ation of the American provinces from Great Britain would make for the security of French and Spanish colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and he contended further that, inas- much as Spain's colonial empire in this part of the world was vastly more valuable than the few islands that still remained to France, Spain's in- terest in bringing about the separation in question was proportionately greater than France's. 7 Again the Spanish minister's views diverged widely from those of his respondent. For while he was ready to admit that British sea-power was more or less of a menace to Spain's holdings in the New World and also that this power was sus- tained to an important extent by England's mastery of North America, he was not ready to conclude that therefore the independence of Eng- land's North American provinces would, so far as Spain was concerned, remove the danger. On the contrary, he held that it would, if due precautions were not taken, actually increase it. We are thus brought to a subject that must be of very con- trolling interest in the pages following. One of the earliest advocates of a French- Spanish-American alliance was the Count d'Aranda, the Spanish ambassador at Paris. 8 Unhappily for the Colonies, Aranda was less a representative of his government than a Themis- r lb., 461, 643-4; III. 50-1, 140. 8 See his memoir on the subject, loc. cit., II. 210-8. 108 FRENCH POLICY AND tocles in exile, a former chief -minister whom the existing regime at Madrid found it convenient to devise any plausible expedient to keep remote from the seat of power. So long as Grimaldi was Charles Ill's chief -minister, Madrid had been quite willing that Paris should make its own ar- rangements with the rebellious provinces, but even he had not favored Spain's doing more than to contribute secretly certain funds to the Ameri- can cause, of which he dexterously made France the almoner. And after Long Island his attitude became still more aloof. Writing Aranda as he was about to leave office, he admonished his too enthusiastic subordinate thus : The king our master, who possesses in the Indies domains so vast and important, should be very backward in making a formal treaty with provinces which as yet can only be regarded as rebels, an inconvenience that would not exist should the colonies succeed in really throwing off the yoke and constituting themselves an independent power. The rights of all sovereigns to their respective territories ought to be regarded as sacred, and the example of a rebellion is too dangerous to allow of His Majesty's wishing to assist it openly. 9 How a little later he met the American Lee and turned him back at the Spanish frontier has al- ready been told. And if Grimaldi saw cause for alarm on Spain's part in the rebellious example of the Americans, 76., 192. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 109 the Marquis de Castejon, a member of the Span- ish royal council, saw it no less in their actual power and their supposed ambitions. "Spain," said Castejon, writing also in February, 1777, "is about to be left alone, face to face with one other power in the whole of North America, a power which has assumed a national name, which is very formidable on account of the size of its population and the ratio of increase thereof, and which is accustomed to war even before it has begun it. I think that we should be the last country in all Europe to recognize any sovereign and indepen- dent state in North America." Such a state would develop more rapidly than a colony, would have its resources immediately at hand, would be uninfluenced by the Balance of Power, and so, careless of the good will of Europe, would be able to push its own designs with the utmost aggres- siveness. Furthermore, even assuming the English colonies in America to have become inde- pendent, "the English and American powers would still be of one nation, one character and one religion, and would so form their treaties and compacts as to obtain the objects they both de- sire." In such a contingency "the kingdom of Mexico would be compromised, in fact lost." 10 But indeed the Foreign Office had been forced to meet and allay opinions of this sort even from French sources from the very outset of the Revo- 10 Sparks MSS., CII. The date of the document is Feb. 3, 1777. 110 FRENCH POLICY AND lution. Thus in the Reflexions of November, 1775, Gerard had recited: "But, they say, the independence of the English colonies will prepare a revolution in the new world; they will hardly be at peace and assured of their liberty than they will be seized with the spirit of conquest, whence may result the invasion of our colonies and of the rich possessions of the Spanish in South Amer- ica." In answer to these objections Gerard had urged two considerations: first, that the existing war would fatigue the colonists for a long time to come; and secondly, that if they became inde- pendent, the colonists would have a republican form of government and would be united with each other only in a loose confederacy. The dom- inant spirit of the new community, he had there- fore concluded, would be one of trade, industry, and peace; and he had added: "Even supposing that the colonists should encroach upon the Span- ish possessions, that is far from proving that this revolution would be prejudicial to France." 11 In July, 1777, however, Vergennes had before him the direct task of reassuring Spanish opinion ; and it is entirely evident that he had underesti- mated its difficulty. There are those, he wrote in the memoir of July 23rd, who hold that the time will come when America will be "a formidable u Doniol, I. 245. See also a passage in the "Considerations," 16., 274. For further arguments against Spain's favoring American independence, forthcoming from English sources, see Wharton, III. 727-31. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 111 power even to her benefactors." The danger surely was greatly exaggerated. Doubtless America would in time become a considerable na- tion, but certainly never "a terror to be armed against." For one thing, their constitution stood in the way of such a consummation. For they were held together only by a confederacy of thir- teen members, each of which reserved its powers of internal administration. Furthermore, the in- terests of the several provinces were as diverse as their climate; and particularly striking were the differences between North and South. The South, with its sparse population and with the cultivation of its soil abandoned to negroes, was bound to have commerce for its informing principle. The North, it was true, furnished with abundant pop- ulation living in frugality, might well breed a spirit of emigration and conquest; but its atten- tion in turn would be occupied with Canada, which to that end should remain in the hands of the English. Also many years, not to say ages, must pass, ere the New Englanders have occupied effectively all the lands which still remain for them to cultivate and before therefore they will have a superabundant population which they will want to be rid of ; and ere that time shall have come our vices will have been introduced among them by more intimate intercourse, with the result of having retarded their increase and progress. 12 Ib., II. 466. 112 FRENCH POLICY AND The argument was ingenious but to Florida Blanca, who participated to the fullest extent in the apprehensions that had been voiced by Cas- te j on, it was quite unconvincing. The Spanish minister's program, while the dispute with Portu- gal was still unsettled, had been that the struggle in America should be kept going till the parties to it were exhausted; meantime France and Spain should increase their forces in the West Indies; then when the moment arrived, they should inter- vene between England and her rebellious prov- inces, with the object of filching from the occasion such profits as might be available, perhaps the Floridas for Spain and Canada for France. 13 And in August, 1777, the Spanish minister was of opinion that the time was not yet at hand for any course of action likely to precipitate war with England, and he was especially averse to the sug- gestion of an alliance with the Americans: For one thing, the Spanish treasure fleet from Mexico would not arrive until spring, and it would never do to tempt British cupidity with that. For an- other thing, for the two crowns to declare them- selves in behalf of the Colonies would be to furnish England with the best possible argu- ment for coming to an accommodation with them at once. Finally Spain had not yet had an oppor- tunity to build up a sufficient casus belli against the English, to give, that is, her multiplied causes 13 76., 264, 273-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 113 of complaint that fair appearance of consistency that decency demanded. Meantime, however, it would be pertinent, with a view to preventing the reconciliation of England and the Colonies, to per- suade the latter, through Franklin and Deane, and also through envoys to the Congressional chiefs, that any accommodation with the mother- country would be useless which was not guaran- teed by France and Spain. "We can assure the deputies at the outset that we would not sanction anything contrary to the liberty and advantage of the Colonies, and that they would be protected in these respects, without saying more for the present." Surely the Americans could not with- stand such an inducement. 14 Obviously balked in his own design by the specious intransigency of the Spaniard, Ver- gennes, in his despatch to Ossun, of August 22nd indicated the willingness of Paris, for the nonce at least, to follow in the wake of Madrid: "We ad- mit, Monsieur, without abbreviation, the hypothe- sis of the Spanish minister, that before thinking of a rupture we should make sure of the return of our own fishermen and of the fleet from Mexico." Meanwhile, it would be appropriate for the two powers to send secret envoys to America, charged with "brief, indirect hints" as to the advantage 14 "Traduction du Mmoire de la cour d'Espagne du 8 aoust 1776 [sic] servant de reponse a celui de la cour de France, envoy< le 26 Juillet meme annee,". 6., 490-3. 114 FRENCH POLICY AND that the colonies would gain if, when procuring England's recognition of their independence, they should also obtain "the recognition and guaranty thereof of the European states most interested in sustaining it." True, it did appear somewhat im- probable that the American deputies in Paris could be brought round to this view. "Ready enough to enter into the closest kind of union if the two crowns would consent to war, they are apparently determined to decline any other sort of diplomatic connection," and "I have had more than one occasion to observe that their art looks not only to interesting us in their cause, but also to compromising us with England." "Still, I will throw out some words to them of a guaranty, and if they refuse to nibble at that bait, I have an- other idea . . . namely, to make them compre- hend that it would not be enough to obtain from England a recognition of their independence without taking steps at the same time to establish its permanence," and that the measure best cal- culated to that end would be treaties of amity and commerce with the powers most interested in seeing them free and prosperous. 15 But before any action could be taken along this line, opportunity presented itself for Vergennes to press afresh for open war with England. The very day the French secretary penned his des- patch to Ossun, an unaccredited agent of the 15 Vergennes to Ossun, Aug. 22, ib., 500-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 115 British government named Forth announced to Maurepas the intention of his government to ob- lige France, under pain of war, to return to their British owners all prizes brought into French ports by American vessels. 16 The day following Vergennes presented the king a memoir vigor- ously protesting against compliance with such a demand. To do so, he argued, would be tanta- mount to stigmatizing the American privateers, and their countrymen as well, as pirates and sea- robbers ; and the result of that would be to arouse resentment in America that would lead at once to reconciliation with England and "a desire for vengeance that ages perhaps would not diminish." It would be in entire accord with his dignity for the king to make some concessions, and policy demanded it on account of the absence of the Spanish treasure fleet. The orders against the admission of American privateers and their prizes to French harbors except in "absolutely urgent cases" could be renewed, and such pri- vateers as were already in port could be sent away, without however the time of their depar- ture being fixed. But more than this could not be conceded. "A great state can undergo losses without suffering in its reputation, but if it sub- scribes to humiliations, it is undone." As to "an assurance of the possessions of the two crowns in America," for apparently Forth had sug- 1- I6., 525-6. 116 FRENCH POLICY AND gested some such idea, that would be both un- profitable and useless. "It would tie our hands so that we should be unable to put ourselves in a state of defense" and arm our enemy with a club with which he could always extort some new compliance. 17 The memoir received the approval both of king and council the same day, and three days later a second despatch was sent Ossun to acquaint him with the new turn of affairs. It was accompanied by a letter in Vergennes' own hand to Florida Blanca, which, recounting that "a new order of things" had most surprisingly intervened since the previous communication, indicated the opin- ion that it was touch and go as between war and peace, but promised that every precaution which wisdom could suggest would be taken "to avoid if possible that the first blow should be too sen- sible." 18 Four days later, the secretary wrote Noailles, at London, that "the British ministry, despairing of subjugating the Americans . . . will seek to direct the passions of the nation against an object more capable of inflaming them, which object can only be France and Spain," 19 But again the complexion of affairs suddenly altered. Not only did Stormont fail to back up Forth's representations, but what is more to the "76., 527-9; SMSS., No. 706. 18 76., 534-5. 76., 536-7. See also to., 526-9, 533-5. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 117 point, the news now came to Paris of Burgoyne's capture of Ticonderoga. 20 As after Long Island Vergennes' anxiety as to the ultimate in- tentions of the British ministry underwent nota- ble surcease. Florida Blanca was quick to detect the French secretary's vacillation and the opportunity offered for a homily against Amer- ican wiles. The shaft struck home, for with the advance of Burgoyne through northern New York, further disconcerting intelligence had come from London. His despatch of September 26th shows the secretary of state in full retreat, though with an arrow or two still in his quiver: The Spanish minister had rightly judged that Forth's mission was not to be taken seriously, but what then was to be expected of a government that lent itself to such pranks in the midst of a civil war! France would give the preference to peace, of that Spain could be assured, and the more so as the moment had passed when by strik- ing at England she could have guaranteed suc- cess to the revolution in America. No doubt the attention of France and Spain ought to be di- rected to winning the confidence of the Ameri- cans without entirely forfeiting that of the English but the task would not be an easy one, especially since the English government at least was well aware of what it was for the interest of the two crowns to do, while the Americans on 39 Ib., 537, 572 fn., 628. 118 FRENCH POLICY AND the other hand were inconsiderately disposed to look at everything from the point of view of their own advantage. 21 And what precisely was the attitude of the Americans at this juncture? Earlier in the year it had been their tactics to keep before Vergennes the possibility that, unless France promptly es- poused their cause, the Colonies, "dispirited by bad success," 22 might be forced to accept terms from England that would be to the serious dis- advantage of France. 23 But these methods, if they had not actually injured the American case by making the secretary sceptical of the substance and durability of the Revolution, 24 had at least netted nothing, and after Ticonderoga the com- missioners discarded them. Evidence of this fact is to be seen in their letter of September 25th to Vergennes and Aranda, to beg a subsidy of the two crowns or their friendly offices in a negotia- tion for peace, with a view to saving to America her "liberties with the freedom of commerce :" 21 16., 551-4. 22 See Carmichael to Vergennes, SMSS., No. 647. The date is illegible save for the year, 1777, but it was clearly written before the news of Saratoga. 23 See Wharton, II. 280-3; Deane Papers, I. 434-42, II. 52-6, 66-9; and the memorial prepared early in 1777 by Franklin, Deane, and the Abb Niccoli, SMSS., Nos. 149 and 150. This document was communicated to Lord Suffolk by the British spy Wentworth and was later quoted by Pownall on the floor of Parliament. See SMSS., No. 182, and Parliamentary History, XIX. 930 ff. 24 See p. 67 supra. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 119 They [the commissioners, the letter proceeds] can assure Your Excellencies that they have no account of any treaty on foot in America for an accommodation, nor do they believe there is any. Nor have any propo- sitions been made by them to the court of London, nor any the smallest overture received from thence which they have not already communicated; . . . and the commissioners are firmly of the opinion that nothing will induce the Congress to accommodate on the terms of an exclusive commerce with Britain but the despair of obtaining effectual aid and support from Europe. 25 On October 3rd Vergennes proposed that France and Spain should each pledge the Colon- ies three millions livres on condition that they should enter into no negotiation with Great Bri- tain without the joint approval of the two crowns. Raisons de finance, he admitted, were apparently opposed on this occasion to raisons de politique, but, he contended, in appearance only, since if England were enfeebled by the loss of America both France and Spain would enjoy peace for many years. 26 But Florida Blanca was not to be persuaded ; and on November 7th, Vergennes an- "SMSS., No. 1698. See also Lee's "Journal" in R. H. Lee's Life of Arthur Lee, I. 354. On November 27, Deane proposed that the commissioners demand "a categorical answer" from France. "Dr. Franklin," Lee writes, "was of a different opinion: he would not consent to state that we must give up the contest without their interposition, because the effect of such a declaration upon them was uncertain. It might be taken as a menace, it might make them abandon us in despair, or anger. Besides, he did not think it true." Lee agreed with Franklin. "See Doniol, II. 564, 570, 575-8. 120 FRENCH POLICY AND nounced that Louis had determined to give the United States three millions outright, to be paid quarterly. 27 Some days later, the Foreign Office instructed one Holker to proceed to America to sound Congress on the question of a French- Spanish guaranty along the lines originally sug- gested by Madrid. The instructions were never carried out. On November 30th, the news of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga reached Nantes, and M. Holker became the first emissary to America of a new and decisive policy. 28 "Ib., 579-80. But word of this decision was apparently not communicated to the commissioners till after November 30, as no mention is made of it in their report to Congress of that date, Wharton, II. 433-6. And cf. ib., 445. K Ib., 615-6 and notes; SMSS., No. 1748. Holker late became the first French consul at Philadelphia. CHAPTER VI VERGENNES, ALARMIST AND PROPAGANDIST Vergennes' first reaction to the news of Sara- toga was that it meant American independence and that the problem presented to France by it was whether she could beat Great Britain out in according recognition of the fact. "The power," he wrote Montmorin, "that will first recognize the independence of the Americans will be the one that will reap the fruits of this war." 1 Later he revised this estimate: Absolute independence would probably cost the pride of the British mon- arch too much, but even so, what guaranty was 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, Doniol, II. 632; SMSS., No. 1769. The words are taken from Beaumarchais' extremely alarmist letter of the same date to Vergennes: The ministry, he writes, are denounced in London, the opposition triumphs, secret councils multiply, Ireland prepares to rise. What is the meaning? "It is that of the two nations, England and France, the first who recognizes American independence will alone gather from it all the fruits, whilst the independence will be certainly fatal to the one that allows its rival to take the lead": SMSS., No. 1768. The letter will also be found in Doniol, II. 684. Vergennes' recogni- tion of the decisive character of Saratoga was delayed somewhat on account of the exultant tone assumed by the British government and its ambassador over the news of Howe's capture of Philadel- phia and Washington's defeat at Brandy wine: op. cit., 620-4, and footnotes. 138 FRENCH POLICY AND there that the Americans, wearied by the war and discouraged by the indifference of Eu- rope, would not consent to waive the name if they were given the substance? At any rate, some sort of reconciliation of the mother-country and her rebellious provinces impended and with it the menace of a joint attack by the English and Americans on France and Spain. The suc- cor given the insurgents by the two crowns would furnish from the British point of view a suffi- cient pretext and the rehabilitation of the French and Spanish navies a sufficient grievance. In such a war, New York would furnish the English a port of embarkment for the French posses- sions ; the American corsairs would enrich them- selves by falling upon French and Spanish com- merce ; the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi would be a powerful lure to the Americans, and in their hands would render the possession of Mexico precarious, because, protected by the British navy, the colonists would have nothing to fear from the vengeance of France or Spain on the American continent. There could not be the least doubt in the world that such a program would be carried through were it not for His Britannic Majesty's squeamishness in the matter of independence. Thanks to that, the House of Bourbon had its opportunity. 2 2 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Doniol, II., 665-6; "Memoire lu au Roi," Jan. 7, 1778, #>., 724-5; Vergennes to Montmorin, par 1'Epine, Jan. 8, ib., 719-20; SMSS., Nos. 1805, 1824, 1826. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE A question touched upon at the beginning of this volume becomes at this point of renewed interest, that of Vergennes' intention in urging the above argument for his crown's intervention in the American revolt. Immediately, of course, his intention is to present the war which this act of intervention will probably bring in its wake as essentially a war of self-defense on France's part, rather than one of aggression, or, to use his own terms, as "a war of necessity" rather than "of choice"; and were he thus making, for a policy already determined upon, the usual con- cession to "the decent opinion of mankind," his words would call for little comment. But in fact he is doing something quite different. He is argu- ing for the adoption of a proposed policy, and on that account it becomes important to inquire with some particularity whether this argument was a sound one, whether it was probable, was sustained by credible evidence, was consistently adherred to. In the pages immediately following I shall canvass these questions. Certainly the theory that England, defeated in America, would attack France and Spain had not gained in intrinsic probability in the three years that had elapsed since it was first broached. Then the weakness of the French and Spanish fleets had presented British naval aggressiveness an obvious temptation; now, by the statement of Vergennes himself, this weakness had been re- paired and Bourbon naval power had become FRENCH POLICY AND matter for alarm on England's part. 3 Then the name of Chatham and his monumental hatred of the House of Bourbon had given viability to the most disturbing speculations; now it was recog- nized by the French Foreign Office itself, as at least highly probable, that the North ministry would continue as the instrument of His Britan- nic Majesty's American policies. 4 Then it was plausible to argue that the colonies could yet be drawn off from their pursuit of independence by the ancient lure of an attack on France, and the anticipated assault upon the French Antilles had accordingly been pictured as the first step to reconciliation between England and America. Now it had to be conceded by all that indepen- dence was the paramount objective of the Ameri- cans, with the result that this hypothetical assault had to be presented as the outcome of reconcilia- tion. 5 But in this connection, Vergennes is fur- 3 See also Vergennes' comments quoted infra on Lord Sand- wich's review in Parliament of the British naval situation; note, further, the following words in the Expost des Motifs of the French government (1779): "It is notorious that the armaments of France were in a condition to act offensively long before those of England were prepared," Animal Register, XXII. 394. 4 There was no possibility of Chatham's being called to power at this period. Even after France had declared the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States, we find George III asserting that "nothing shall bring me to treat personally with Lord Chatham"; and again, that "no consideration in life shall make me stoop to Opposition." Donne, Correspondence of George HI, II. 149, 153. See especially Doniol, II. 664 and 727. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 125 ther citable for the admission, as we have just observed, that England would not even yet offer the Americans complete independence, that she would insist upon retaining at least a nominal sovereignty over them. The question thus emerges whether it was reasonable to suppose that the Americans would consent, in return for less than independence, to join in an assault on the possessions of France and Spain. It was not im- probable that the Colonies, weary of war, would finally content themselves with less than inde- pendence, if France did not come to their aid, but it was most unlikely that they would do so with any great alacrity or precipitancy; and just in proportion as the necessity of peace was a motive with them was it unlikely that they would embark upon war in another quarter for a comparatively minor object, and particularly when, in the pur- suit of such object, they would alienate the only powers that had befriended them and whose en- mity would leave them henceforth to face alone a still wrathful mother-country. 6 Nor when I pass in review the evidence offered by Vergennes in support of his alarmist theory, Vergennes himself admitted that any arrangement between England and America would "not be the affair of a day," ib. t 738-9, fn. In his despatch to Montmorin of Dec. 13, the secretary gives it as his own opinion that the commissioners prefer a coalition with the two crowns to a reconciliation with England: i6., 639. See also the Congressional resolutions of Nov. 22, 1777, and the commissioners' letter of Dec. 8 to Vergennes, Wharton, II. 425-6 and 444-5; also, pp. 117-9, supra. 126 FRENCH POLICY AND am I better convinced of its substance. First I shall consider some items of a comparatively trustworthy sort that bear on the question of what terms England would be likely to offer America and America be likely to accept. Then I shall turn to some items that demand more careful scrutiny. Vergennes knew from his confidential agents of the visit to Franklin of an Englishman named Hutton, reputed to be a friend of the English king; 7 and he observed that Franklin remained reticent about the matter. 8 This circumstance, however, was plausibly explained to him by Chaumont, one of the above-mentioned agents, as due to Franklin's reluctance to prejudice an old acquaintance with the English court, 9 and we find the secretary himself testifying at this very time to his confidence in Franklin's loyalty and good faith. 10 Again, he had before him two letters which had been shown him by the American com- missioners and which he considered so important that he forwarded copies of them to Madrid. In the first of these, the writer, a citizen of Boston, seems to have advanced the idea that unless France and Spain evinced a disposition to come to the assistance of the colonies, at least in a financial way, Burgoyne's victory could be turned T Doniol, II. 771-2. 76., 718. "See Note 113, supra. 10 Vergennes to Noailles, Dec. 27, Doniol, II. 657, footnote. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE to best account by getting as favorable terms as possible from England. 11 In the other one, which had been sent from London to a secret agent of the commissioners named Bancroft, the anonymous writer foreshadowed the intention of the North ministry to bestow something like au- tonomy on the colonies for their internal affairs, while retaining control of their external relations, political and commercial. 12 Lastly, he knew from Deane that an Englishman named Went- worth had visited this commissioner and, suggest- ing a truce for America, had proposed that the envoys send one of their number either to Eng- land or up into the Netherlands, to meet there an Englishman of high rank and negotiate a recon- ciliation on the basis of a qualified dependency; but he knew also that Deane had met these prop- ositions with a demand for unconditional inde- pendence, and that the Englishman had in turn pronounced the latter demand unallowable. 13 But obviously this evidence is quite insufficient to justify Vergennes' assertion in the memoir of "Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, ib., 634. The content of the letter is further revealed by Florida Blanca's comments upon it in his despatch to Aranda of Dec. 23rd, ib., 769. "SMSS., Nos. 1787 and 1805; Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Doniol, II. 664-5. For some interesting speculations as to Bancroft's real character, see Wharton, I. 621-41. "Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19, ib., 661-2; SMSS., No. 1786. See also Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Doniol, loc. cit., 685-6. Went worth was a spy and stock-jobber in whom George III pro- fessed small confidence, Donne, Correspondence, II. 109. 128 FRENCH POLICY AND January 7th, which immediately preceded the king's sanction of an alliance with the United States, that the English government "already . . . displays to them [the American envoys] the certain advantages of a coalition against France and Spain," 14 and still less, if possible, does it prove that the English government was likely to achieve anything by such tactics. It is true that, in making this assertion, the secretary pleads that "the particulars are too long to detail," though he says the king knows them. 15 But the fact is that both on this occasion and on earlier ones Vergennes does cite numerous "particulars," 16 which it is fair to conclude are the most cogent ones for his purpose ; and while, of course, we do not know what matters Vergennes reported orally to the king, 17 we do have both the elaborate memoir upon which the royal council based its decision in favor of an American alliance and also the extended correspondence with Madrid at this "Doniol, II. 723. The statement is repeated in the "Precis of Facts relative to the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce," which was read to the Council Mar. 18, SMSS., No. 1904. 15 76., 724. "The fact of the matter is that he straightway contradicts the words just quoted, in his confidential letter of the day following to Montmorin, where he writes: "J'espere que ce prince [the king of Spain] nous jugera favorablement lors qu'il aura peze" les raisons exposees dans le mmoire et la dpeche que vous recevrez par ce courier." Doniol, II. 736. For the memoire and despatch re- ferred to, see ib., 717-38. 17 "Le Roi ... a entendu mon raport particulier, a garde les pieces, a examin le pour et le contre": Vergennes to Montmorin, "Prive," Jan. 8: ib., 736; SMSS., No. 1828. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 129 period; and we may, I submit, reasonably believe that the evidence intended for the eyes of the Spanish king and for the critical scrutiny of the Spanish minister was at least as convincing in character as that which, supplemented by the per- sonal presence and eloquence of the French secre- tary, persuaded the well-intentioned but stupid Louis of "the moral certainty of peril." 18 We turn, then, to consider this additional evi- dence, if "evidence" it may be called; and first we note the kind of sources from which it issued. So far as is discoverable, Vergennes' informants, with the single exception of the French ambassa- dor at London, were either professional alarmists whose practical interests were already enlisted with the American cause men like Beaumar- chais, Chaumont, and Grand or the mere anony- mous voices of rumor, as witness his repeated "on Ait." From such sources as these it is that the statement finds its way into the secretary's de- spatches, that the Howes have been instructed to open negotiations with Congress, 19 that a 18 "Ce n'est point 1'influence de ses ministres qui 1'ont decide; Tevidence des faits, la certitude morale du danger et sa conviction 1'ont seuls entrain^," loc. cit. To the same effect is the letter of Louis to Charles, Jan. 8, ib., 713-4. "Vergennes to Montmorin, "P.S., Dec. 15, ib., 649: "Ce qu'on [N. B.] a recueilli de plus positif est, que des instructions ont 6te envoyees aux freres Howe pour entamer une negociation en Amerique." But compare with this the cautious tone of his despatch to Noailles five days later: "Des ordres de reconciliation doivent avoir ei6 envoyes tres rcemment a M. Howe," ib., 704. For 130 FRENCH POLICY AND special courier has been sent to America, 20 that Lord George Germaine's secretary is in Paris to treat with the commissioners, 21 that Franklin's attitude of silence with reference to Hutton is matter for suspicion, 22 that the first steps have been taken in London toward the formation of a coalition ministry of which Chatham and Shel- burne are to be members, 23 that at Passy "they are negotiating briskly" 24 and finally, that "one formal proposition is to unite cordially and fall upon us." 25 Ordinarily, it is true, the secre- tary discloses through what channels he ob- tained his information; but that fact does not hinder his arguing on the basis of it without allow- ance for its source, nor yet from sinning against the light shed by more reliable sources. a later rumor that General Howe had arrived at terms of recon- ciliation with Washington, see Wharton, II. 483. This rumor was of too late date to find a place in the despatches. ^Doniol, II. 647. 31 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, "au soir" ib., 645, footnote 2: "D'une autre part le Lord Germaine . . . envoye, dit on [N. B.], ici son secretaire pour traiter avec les Americains." 23 Same to same, Jan. 8, ib., 718, following Grand's alarmist account of the matter, ib., 771. "Same reference as note 21, supra. **Same reference as note 22. The source of this item, which Vergennes himself says did not influence his decision, was Frank- lin and Deane's landlord at Passy, who was in Vergennes' pay. Sparks MSS., LXXVIII. p. 139. "Doniol, II. 649. The "inconnu" was Wentworth, whose prof- fers were reported by Deane to Vergennes a day or two later as impossible, since they did not include unconditional independence, supra, p. 127. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 131 The person best entitled, both by length of offi- cial experience and by first-hand knowledge, to claim something like authority for his conclusions was the Marquis de Noailles, Louis' ambassador at the court of St. James, and indeed Vergennes himself pays striking tribute to the reliability cf Noailles' reports. 26 Yet it is plainly not the policy of the secretary to put forward the ambas- sador's communications except so far as they can be wrought into the fabric of his own alarmist theory. Thus Noailles points out that there can be no binding negotiations between the British executive and the Americans till Parliament shall have repealed certain statutes. Vergennes, with- out citing Noailles, repeates the observation in his despatches to Montmorin but accompanies it with the conjecture that it will be the policy of the British ministry to solicit overtures from the Americans as a basis for propositions to be laid before Parliament. Again, Noailles always im- plies that the North ministry will survive. This conclusion, too, Vergennes seems generally to accept ; but he pits against it the contention that North and his associates now participate in the Opposition's way of thinking. 27 Again, Noailles assures his government that North will not and " Same reference as note 21. 27 Unfortunately, what "the Opposition's way of thinking" was is by no means clear. See note below. As used by Vergennes this phrase signified what was for the most part a figment of his imagination or calculation. 132 FRENCH POLICY AND cannot offer the Americans their independence. That is quite probable, rejoins the secretary, but the real danger lies in the possibility that the Americans will take less. At this point, however, the divergence between the secretary and the am- bassador becomes flat contradiction, for Noailles, like Florida Blanca and Montmorin, is confident throughout that the Americans will never take less. 28 Vergennes is determined, in short, that every- thing shall be grist to his mill. Unfortunately, there are times when his heroic endeavors to make it such hedge perilously upon dereliction. Thus on the authority of the Courier de V Europe, he erroneously attributes to Lord Sandwich the re- mark that "the time will come perhaps when com- plete reparation will be had of France and Spain for their insults," though the version of Sand- wich's speech which the scrupulous Noailles had forwarded him contained no such menacing pas- sage. 29 Again, on no apparent authority at all, 28 See Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. 12, 23, 26, SMSS., Nos. 1772, 1793, 1803. Cf. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19 and 27, Jan. 8, 16, and 23, SMSS., Nos. 1786, 1805, 1827, 1838, 1847. a Vergnnes to Montmorin, Dec. 3, Doniol, II. 589. Cf. SMSS., Nos. 1743 and 1772; also Parliamentary History, XIX. 479. Even in quoting the above remark attributed by the Courier to Lord Sandwich, Vergennes is forced to add the Englishman's admission that "it would be folly to propose war against the House of Bourbon." But he underscores the more alarming sentiment. The Courier de I'Europe was evidently somewhat disposed to sensa- tionalism. See Last Journals of Horace Walpole, II. 181. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE he attributes to Lord North the idea of a frater- nal union with America and a new family com- pact to confront that of the House of Bourbon, though Noailles' report of the same debate quite correctly credited this idea to Lord Richmond, a Whig advocate of American independence. 30 Indeed, as late as January 13th, that is nearly a week after the royal council had sanctioned an alliance with the United States, a memoir from the Foreign Office repeats the assertion that Eng- land is disposed to sacrifice her supremacy in America for "a sort of family compact, that is to say, a league against the House of Bourbon." This seems to be a distinct reference to the sen- timent which, Vergennes must have known, had been wrongly attributed to Lord North. It is, moreover, the only reference in the document, direct or indirect, to any evidence whatsoever supporting the charge that a coalition between England and America, hostile to France, im- 30 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, Doniol, II. 640 and 645 fn. 2. Cf. Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. 12 and 23, SMSS.', Nos. 1772 and 1793; also Parliamentary History, XIX. 591 and 609. The fact of the matter is that the Parliamentary debates during the period between Burgoyne's surrender and the declaration by France of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce were singularly free of hostile flings at that power. The government wanted France's support, the Rockingham Whigs advocated unqualified independence for the colonies, Chatham, opposed to independence, had not yet further indicated his course. The fact that the only two citations which Vergennes made at this time of the debates were the two spurious ones considered above is significant of their general tone toward France. 134 FRENCH POLICY AND pended ! 30 " But even where the secretary's deflec- tions from the most scrupulous methods of propagandism are more venial, they are fre- quently not less instructive; and it is interesting to observe conjectures which have the form of positive statement in a despatch to Madrid as- sume, in a despatch of the same date to London, the more modest form of interrogation. 31 And not less illuminating is the constant habit of the secretary in his despatches of dropping the note of alarm for that of confidence. Examples might be multiplied, but one will suffice, that furnished by his comments upon Lord Sand- wich's review in Parliament of the British naval situation : But why should we look only on the dark side of things ? According to Lord Sandwich himself, England has thirty-five ships of the line ready and with some effort could increase the number to forty-two. That then is all she can rely upon to guard the Channel, to observe our fleet at Brest, the Spanish fleets at Cadiz and Ferrol, to protect her establishments and her com- merce in the Mediterranean and secure the defense of her islands in America. Even she does not count greatly upon the naval forces which she has in North America. These consist of such ancient vessels, with such impover- ished and dilapidated equipment, that they could lend 308 The memoir is given in Appendix III. It represents an effort to bring together every possible argument for the Ameri- can alliance. 81 Of. SMSS., Nos. 1805 and 1807, bearing date of Dec. 27, 1777. See also note 19 above. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 135 little assistance to inferior forces. All of which, as you see, Monsieur, is not calculated to discourage the two crowns if they know how to take their time and strike at the proper moment. 32 How badly these words comport with Ver- gennes' supposed anxieties for the French An- tilles is obvious. But what is equally to the point, the inconsistency thus exemplified is much more than a characteristic of the secretary's ar- gument; it also projects itself into his policy in the most vital way, if we are to regard that as designed primarily for the defense of the Antilles. The only feasible method of either attacking or defending the Antilles was with a fleet; but the United States, though they had ports of embark- ment, had no fleet capable of such an enterprise, while Spain, pledged to come to France's assist- ance at the first hostile blow, had both a fleet and ports of embarkment that opened directly on the Caribbean. Yet Vergennes deliberately put in jeopardy the alliance with Spain in order to get an alliance with the United States; and in so doing, moreover, made war with England a certainty ! 33 82 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Doniol, II. 666; SMSS.; No. 1805. See also to same general effect Vergennes to Mont- morin, Jan. 30, Doniol, II. 789-90; SMSS., No. 1853. Note, too, the secretary's complacent survey of the defenses of the West Indies, in his "Project de Reponses," to Florida Blanca's ques- tions, which was read to the king Jan. 28, Doniol, II. 782. 33 Of course, if it was assumed that America reconciled with England, would be the one to instigate the attack on the French 136 FRENCH POLICY AND Nor does inconsistency stop short always of contradiction. For the fact of the matter is that Vergennes himself is quotable for the conten- tion that the defense of the French Antilles was not a leading, or even a considerable object with his government. Thus, early in the volume I drew attention to a despatch penned shortly after the news of Saratoga in which he wrote : "The in- terest of Spain is at least tenfold our interest ; our islands are little designed to tempt the cupidity of the English ; they already have enough of that sort of thing ; what they want is treasure, and that is to be got only from the continent." 34 And the alliance having been consummated, he ex- pressed himself even more to the point: West Indies and that England would not otherwise make such an attack, then the above argument would fail. But Vergennes suggests America's interest in such an attack in only one passage and that put in the form of an interrogation. Thus, in his des- patch of December 27th to Montmorin, he writes: "Les Ame"ri- cains nous proposent de conqu^rir les isles angloises et de leurs y accorder un commerce libre. Si vice versd les Anglois font la meme proposition, ne sera t'elle pas ecout6e, sera t'elle rejettee?" Doniol, II. 665. It is true that he represents the Spanish colonies as also presenting certain temptations to the Americans, e.g., the navigation of the Mississippi, but he also constantly assures Spain that the Americans will be very peaceable neighbors, quite dif- ferent from the avaricious English. As we have seen repeatedly, it is upon the proverbial cupidity of England and the desire she will have to retrieve her losses that Vergennes bases his whole alarmist argument. As to the Spanish alliance being put in jeopardy, the memoir given in Appendix III proves that the Foreign Office was quite ready to face the possibility, in January, 1778, that Spain would remain neutral throughout the war. Vd. ib. 34 76., 643. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 137 It is not, I assure you [he wrote Montmorin, April 3, 1778], without something of pain and effort that the king and those of his ministers who enjoy his closest confidence have brought themselves to adopt a dif- ferent course with reference to American affairs than that of the Catholic king and his ministry; but indeed, the interest of Spain herself has had greater weight in our decision than our own interest. The latter is com- paratively feeble, if we measure it by our possessions, for these are hardly of a nature to whet the desires of the English, since they have none of the precious metals for which the English are so famished. It is rather toward the Spanish mainland that their eyes are turned, and I demand if England, mistress of the industry and re- sources of North America, and capable of fructifying these with her own wealth, would not be a neighbor more inconvenient, more formidable than the United States could probably ever become, given over as they are to the inertia which is the very essence of democratic in- stitutions? 35 Now, of course, it is quite true that these pas- sages both occur in despatches intended for Madrid and designed to persuade that govern- ment that its interest lay with France and Amer- ica, wherefore it may be argued that they are not to be taken too seriously as a revelation of the way of thinking of the French Foreign Office. Let the argument be granted to the fullest extent: what, then, is the implication as to utterances designed primarily for another forum and show- ing imminent peril to French possessions? Be- 35 /&., III. 50-1. 138 FRENCH POLICY AND sides, it does not appear very precisely how, supposing there had been a reasonable degree of likelihood of France having to come to the de- fense of her possessions, Vergennes' plea in ex- tenuation of her course, addressed as it was to France's ally, was strengthened by disparaging that fact. Palpably, the very contrary is the case. However, it may be urged from another angle, that the material feature of the passages under consideration is the assertion of France's concern for the safety of Spanish America, and that since this feature constantly reappears both in papers intended for Madrid and those intended for his own court, it is to be taken as expressing a ser- ious objective of his policy. Let this too be granted: the question then confronts us, Why was this so? It will hardly be contended, I sup- pose, that the French government was moved to any great extent by altruistic considerations, and especially since the course it took was extremely disagreeable to the only possible beneficiary of its altruism. And by the same token, the terms of the Family Compact can scarcely be cited to fur- nish the required explanation. One explanation, then, and only one, remains : The very keen in- terest that France felt at all times in preventing a British conquest of Spain's holdings in America sprang from considerations connected with the doctrine of the Balance of Power, the idea being that, since England and France were rivals, any accession of new resources to the former would THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 139 put the latter at a correlative disadvantage in the field of rivalry. Yet the moment these considera- tions are made premises of the discussion, France's vast interest in promoting the separa- tion of Great Britain and North America looms before us. And which of the two contingencies, this separation or a British conquest of Spanish America, must have appeared the more imminent after Saratoga, and therefore as furnishing the more calculable basis of policy, is hardly a matter for serious doubt. "The interest of separating the English colo- nies from the mother-country and of preventing their reunion at any time in any manner what- soever is so primary a one that if the two crowns should purchase it at the price of a war a little disadvantageous, yet if they brought this separ- ation about, it would seem that they ought not to regret the war whatever its outcome" Thus wrote Vergennes in December, 1777, while American recognition was still under debate. 36 And why should France desire this separation? The answer is supplied from another despatch written after the cause of recognition had tri- umphed, in these words: "That which ought to determine and indeed has determined her [France] to join with America is the great en- feeblement of England effected by the subtrac- "Ib., II. 644. To the same effect is the memoir given in Appen- dix III. 140 FRENCH POLICY AND tion of a third of her empire/' 37 And why should France desire the enfeeblement of England? This question is answered in a third despatch, written with reference to the appearance of the Bavarian Succession question, at the moment the American alliance was in the act of consumma- tion. "England is our first enemy, and the others never had any force or energy except from her/' 38 But with these and like passages before us, 39 37 Vergennes to Montmorin, June 20, 1778, ib., III. 140. 38 Vergennes to Noailles, Jan. 17, ib., II. 745-6 and fn.; SMSS., No. 1839. 39 See Ch. I, note 21. "Ou est, pourra t'on me dire, la surete" que cette guerre nous sera heureuse? Je repons d'abord: est elle de choix ou de necessite". Si elle est de la derniere espece, comme tout en fait la demonstration, il faut done s'y soummettre avec resignation et courage. Mais supposons qu'elle soit mal- heureuse, ce qui est bien proble'matique. Si I'independance de VAmerique en est la consequence, si cette independence est absolue; si elle ne produit pas un pacte de fraternitd qui reindentifieroit les deux peuples et n'en feroient plus q'un, les deux Couronnes n'auront elles pas infmiment gagn6 d'avoir procure" une separation aussi considerable et diminu d'autant la puissance de leur ennemi inveter?" Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Donlol, II. 666. Florida Blanca thus epitomizes the arguments of the French despatches: "La cour de Versailles a pense 1 de son cote" qu'il convenoit a sa gloire, a la bonne politique et aux inte>ets les plus essentiels de la monarchic francoise de gagner de vitesse 1'activite" du cabinet britannique, et de ne point laisser chaper une occasion aussi favorable (et qui ne se pre"sentera plus jamais) de convertir en avantages immenses pour la maison de Bourbon les memes moyens dont les Anglois avoient imagine" pouvoir se servir pour sa mine,' 'ib., 749. "L'objet principal des ministres du roi 6tait d'assurer I'independance des Etats-Unis et d'enlever ces treize riches provinces a 1'Angleterre," Se*gur, Memoires ou Souvenirs et Anecdotes (Paris, 1844, 3 vols.), I. 166. Se"gur was a friend and confidant of Vergennes. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 141 it becomes evident that the substance of Ver- gennes' concern in the period following the news of Saratoga was not, primarily, the security of the French West Indies ; that, indeed, the anxie- ties which he at times professed on this score, at other times minimized, are not to be regarded too seriously. His real concern, a concern that finds repeated utterance in his despatches and again through Gerard, in the latter 's negotiations with Franklin, Deane, and Lee, was of a reconciliation between England and America which, however devoid of belligerent intent toward the House of Bourbon, would yet pave the way for the final restoration of British dominion over the military, industrial, and commercial resources of America, and especially of the last. 40 In other words, his concern was the obverse of his desire, and, with the evidence that Saratoga afforded of the real dimensions of the Revolution, of his hope, that is to say, the hope of seeing England and America permanently separated. The way, however, to make that sure, he argued, was for France to espouse the cause of American independence; for then the Americans would persist till inde- 40 See Doniol, II. 633-4, 638, 640, 655-6 fn., 665-6, 738 fn., and 837; SMSS., Nos. 1831 and 1847. "We must now either support the colonies or abandon them. We must form the alliance before Eng- land offers independence or we will lose the benefit to be derived from America, and England will still control their commerce." Vergennes to Montmorin, Phillips, op. cit., 73 (citing the Archives des Affaires fetrangeres, Espagne, 588, No. 17). FRENCH POLICY AND pendence was in fact won and, when won, would use their liberty of action in ways beneficial to France. But before, of course, he could put this program into effect he had either to persuade his own king and the king of Spain to join in ac- cepting it, or to persuade Louis to take a line of his own. He soon found that the latter alterna- tive was the immediately feasible one, though not so easily feasible ; whereas, in so important a mat- ter as this one of intervention, involving the cer- tainty of war, no half-way conversion of the king to the ministerial program would at all suffice. The somewhat abstract argument showing the large but rather intangible advantages to flow from England's loss of North America and its resources, had, therefore, to be supplemented by an argument of a more imperative sort, showing a danger immediate and concrete. The notion that French possessions in the West Indies were menaced by a pending Eng- lish-American coalition played an important part in bringing France into the War of Indepen- dence. It was this suggestion, supported by the somber name of Chatham, which first drew Ver- gennes' infra- Continental gaze to what was tak- ing place on the other side of the Atlantic. It was with the same notion that Vergennes him- self was able to counter Turgot's argument against secret aid, that it invited war. Lastly, it was with this notion that Vergennes overcame THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE Louis' reluctance to part company with his royal uncle for the sake of some rascally American rebels. Yet, when all is said, the theory in ques- tion throws little, if any, light on the nature of the principal advantage which the secretary ex- pected that France would derive from interven- tion. And clearly, his statement at the moment of the royal council's decision in favor of an American alliance, that it was "not the influence of his ministers that decided the king" but "the evidence of facts, the moral certainty of peril," should be taken with a saving allowance of salt. No doubt Louis was convinced by the "facts" as they were represented to him ; but if the monarch was unable to discern the flimsy texture of hear- say and guess-work beneath the ministerial var- nish, the secretary was not so unaware of the quality of his own elaboration, as his constant admissions attest. Nor does "the evidence of facts" from American sources assist his effort thus to bridge the gap between remote possibility and calculable probability. Not a single state- ment of either Franklin, Deane, or Lee is on record showing either that they ever heard the word "coalition" from any British agent, or that, after Saratoga, they ever hinted such an idea to the French government, or that they supposed the French government to be alarmed on that score. The argument from silence is not always the most convincing, but its concurrence with 144 FRENCH POLICY AND more positive considerations, as in this instance, is at least reassuring. 41 41 The theory of an impending hostile English- American coalition having played its part in bringing the king into line for an American alliance was next utilized to exonerate France's con- duct to legitimist Europe. The original form of the French government's apology for recognizing the independence of the United States is to be found in the "Precis of Facts relative to the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce," which was read to the Council, March 18, 1778, (SMSS., No. 1904). Several months later a more extended apology was put forth in the form of the Expose des Motifs, et<\ (translated in the Annual Register, XXII. 390 ff.). In the latter document the following statement occurs: "The French treaty defeated and rendered useless the plan formed at London for the sudden and precarious coplition that was about to be formed with America and it baffled those secret projects adopted by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose." This document was answered for the British government by Gibbon the historian in a paper of vast ability, entitled Mdmoire justicatif, etc., and written in French. (For translation, see Annual Register, XXII. 397 ff.) Gibbon taxes the French gov- ernment with having rendered the Colonies secret aid "the court of Versailles," he says, "concealed the most treacherous con- duct under the smoothest professions"; with having revived old quarrels reaching back, some of them, to before the Peace of Utrecht; and with claiming the privileges of a belligerent while professing the character of a neutral. Coming then to the coali- tion charge, he writes: "When an adversary is incapable of justifying his violence in the public opinion, or even his own eyes, by the injuries he pretends to have received, he has recourse to chimerical dangers. . . . Since, then, that the court of Versailles cannot excuse its procedure but in favor of a supposition desti- tute of truth and likelihood, the king hath a right to call upon that court, in the face of Europe, to produce a proof of an asser- tion as odious as bold; and to develop those public operations or secret intrigues that can authorize the suspicions of France that Great Britain, after a long and painful dispute, offered peace to her subjects with no other design than to undertake a fresh war THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 145 against a respectable power with which she had preserved all the appearances of friendship." The author of Figaro was now set to answer the historian of the Decline and Fall. His answer, entitled Observations sur les Memoire justicatif, etc., in its original form practically ignored Gibbon's challenge. The bulk of it con- sists of an excited review of cases of seizures of French vessels by the British on the charge of carrying contraband, and the coali- tion idea appears in a single paragraph near the end of the docu- ment. See Oeuvres Completes (Paris, 1835), pp. 530-43. The work was unsatisfactory to the Foreign Office, however, and was recast, presumably by Rayneval, Vergennes' secretary. (See Appendix IV and bibliographical data there given.) In the form in which it received official sanction the Observations rehashes Beaumarchais' review of British seizures, stoutly denies Gibbon's charge of secret aid, asserts that the Americans were independent in fact when France recognized them, and devotes considerable space to the coalition charge, but without very convincing results. Thus Gibbon's demand for proof is met by the assertion that naturally the British government was not so imprudent "as to leave direct marks of its darksome manouvre" and by the reputa- tion of the king of France for probity. "It was natural," the docu- ment continues, "for the British ministry, unable to subdue her Colonies, to seek to be reconciled with them." "In this situation," the query is put, "ought it not to be supposed that, the moment the British ministry perceived the necessity," etc. Finally, it is added: "Moreover, although the king had not had certain proof of the hostile views of the court of London, it would have been sufficient to have had probable grounds to suspect that they existed," etc. In other words, if the fact did not exist, it at least behooved the French government to imagine that it did. Later passages in the document defend France against the charge of having entered the war for the purpose of crushing England: her purpose was only to diminish British power, and in this en- deavor she represented the interests of Europe. See Appendix IV; also the following note. For the more general considerations supporting the conclusions of the above chapter, see chapter I, supra. 146 FRENCH POLICY AND NOTE Just as the page proof of this book is coining in I receive my April number of the American Historical Review, in which Professor C. H. Van Tyne reasserts the notion that the French government's decision to enter into alliance with the United States after Saratoga was determined by the fear that otherwise it would be confronted with a hostile English-American coalition which would pounce on its West Indian holdings. The printer has kindly put space at my disposal for some comments on this article, and I avail myself of the opportunity the more gladly as in doing so I can perhaps make my own position somewhat clearer: 1. To begin with, Professor Van Tyne is in error in stating that this explanation of France's action has heretofore escaped American writers. Pitkin (History, I. 398-400), Otis' Botta (II. 423-39), Perkins (France in the American Revolution, pp. 231-S), and Laura C. Sheldon (France and the American Revolution}, passim, all note this argument for the alliance. And see further American State Papers, "Foreign Affairs," I. 569-71. Indeed, so far from the idea in question being at all "elusive," as Professor Van Tyne suggests, it is quite impossible for one perusing the documents to escape it, the only question being, what weight, when all the evidence is compared, ought to be assigned it in explanation of the alliance. So also, Doniol places the "coalition" argument alongside the "enfeeblement" ar- gument as explanatory of the alliance, without however making any effort to assess the relative value of the two as representa- tive of French motives or to distinguish between the point of view of the Foreign Office and that of the king. See ib., II. 624-5. As to the French writers whom Professor Van Tyne cites as voicing his own view, it may be conjectured that they got the idea from widely circulated Observations described above. But it is to be noted that later writers, like Lavisse and Sorel both of whom have investigated the origins of Bourbon diplomatic policy and both of whom had Doniol available, give the "coalition" argument no weight whatsoever. 2. Professor Van Tyne would draw a hard and fast line between the policy of secret aid and the policy of al- liance. But as he himself shows, the "coalition" argument was urged no less in behalf of secret aid than in that of the alliance. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 147 Indeed, it is altogether obvious that the reasoning by which the Foreign Office supported its policy from start to finish was all of a piece, and that the American victory at Saratoga and, conse- quently, the situation which it produced was the consummation, exactly, which secret aid had from the first been intended to\ bring about. 3. Professor Van Tyne brings forward what he calls a "key-document" to the motives of the French government in entering into alliance with the United States in 1778. I fail to see, however, that this document has any significance whatsoever, save that it may have been the source from which Professor Van Tyne himself first derived his idea of French motives. Thus, on the point under discussion, it merely repeats several earlier documents (see previous note) and brings forward not one iota of additional evidence, except that it apparently endeavors to repre- sent North's conciliatory propositions, which post-dated the alli- ance, as having been known to the French government at the time of its decision. Again, it was written more than five years after the events which it narrates. Finally, it was written with the pur- pose of silencing the very bitter criticism which, after Grasse's defeat in the West Indies, was visited on the ministry's American policy. Vergennes' tactics, it seems clear, are to remind the king of his own responsibility for this policy and so to fasten on his critics the charge of lese-majeste. See Doniol, V. 186-7 and fn.; Revue d'Histoire diplomatique VII. 528 ff.; Jobez, La France sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1881), II. 492-506. 4. Nor is Professor Van Tyne's citation of one or two other documents in support of his thesis beyond criticism. Thus the Carmichael memorial cited by him on p. 538 of the Review was written before Saratoga and is in no wise applicable to show the attitude of the American commissioner at the later date. See p. 118, supra. Again, the Broglie memoir, cited at p. 537 of the Review, makes distinctly against the thesis it is brought forward to support. For while Broglie argues that England must in an endeavor to preserve her rank, try to recoup her losses at the expense of France and Spain, he rejects the idea that the Colonies will accept a coalition with her or anything less than independence. And it may be fairly said that while it is insisted that England will, from the very desperation of her case, fall upon the Antilles, the whole trend of the argument is that she has already lost her opportunity, 148 FRENCH POLICY AND together with her naval superiority. Finally, Broglie opposes an alliance with the Americans, contending that a commercial con- nection will answer all purposes. See Doniol, II. 674 ff. All of the other material which Professor Van Tyne cites that is rele- vant to his contention will also be found in Doniol, and is suffi- ciently discussed in the above chapter. 5. At the close of his article Professor Van Tyne writes thus: It seems "clear that Vergennes did not invent this motive for the alliance the idea that France was confronted by the dilemma of war with England any- way . . . merely ... to get the consent of the king and the other ministers to the plan he wished to pursue. But whether it is his conviction or his device, the idea of this terrible dilemma remains the reason for the decision of the French cabinet." These words avoid the real issue on several accounts: The "terrible dilemma" with which Vergenes confronted the king was not of a war with England simply for that France, backed as she would have been by Spain, was quite ready (see following chapter) but of a hostile English- American coalition. Again, the attitude of the cabinet was assured from the first (see pp. 78-9, 85 supra), and it is the conversion of the king alone which Vergennes finds it worth while to explain in terms meant for the ears of the Spanish court in his despatch of January 8. See Doniol, II. 736. Finally, since the American alliance was the work of Vergennes, it is the underlying reason for his preference that we really need to know. Does this reason connect itself primarily with the history of French-English rivalry for colonial dominion in the Western Hemisphere, or with the history of French-English rivalry for influence on the Continent of Europe? That is the interesting question. See further, the data in chapter XVI, infra. CHAPTER VII THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND OUTBREAK OF WAR The steps by which the fascinated monarch approached the decision that was ultimately to cost him his crown and his life are visible in the stages by which the Foreign Office and the Ameri- can commissioners came to terms. On Decem- ber 6th the king authorized advances to the Americans looking to a good understanding be- tween the new republic, on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other, but nothing more definite. 1 In the audience that he ac- corded the commissioners, six days later, in consequence of this authorization, Vergennes emphasized the fact that the common policy of France and Spain made it impossible for the king to agree to a negotiation without the concurrence of his uncle. The Americans in turn indicated their preference for a simple treaty of amity and commerce and renewed an argument they had earlier made, that such an engagement would not involve the two crowns in war. But to this con- *Ib., 625-6. For further details of this interview and of the ensuing negotiations, see Lee's "Journal" in R. H. Lee's Life of Arthur Lee, I. 357-89. 150 FRENCH POLICY AND tention Vergennes demurred strongly, urging that if they were to treat at all "it must be in good faith" and on such foundations of justice that the resulting ties "would have all the solidity of human institutions." 2 Mid-December came the rumor that Lord Germaine's secretary was in Paris, and Ver- gennes at once authorized Gerard to go to Passy and "make glitter before his [Deane's] eyes, as consented to in advance, everything necessary to keep the legation in the lap of France." 3 On December 17th, accordingly, Gerard brought to Passy the news that the king had decided to acknowledge the indepen- dence of the United States, to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce with them, and to sustain their independence by all the means at his dis- posal without exacting any compensation for the risks he took, "since, besides his real good- will to us and our cause, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by our separation from it." Of an active alliance, however, Gerard said not a word. On the contrary, according to the united testi- mony of the three Americans he stated explicitly that the king would "not so much as insist that, if he engaged in a war with England on our account, we should not make a separate peace," the only 3 Doniol, II. 637-9. *Ib., 647. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 151 condition being "that we, in no peace to be made with England, should give up our independence and return to the obedience of that govern- ment." 4 In other words, while recognition of American independence had been decided upon, the question of an alliance was still in abeyance. There now ensued a fortnight's delay while word from Madrid was being awaited. It came the last day of the year and was unfavorable. 5 A further delay of a week was set against the gout of the aged chief -minister. Meantime, the Americans were pressing for a more indicative sign of the course that France was to take, and the date of the British Parliament's reassem- bling, January 20th, was drawing nigh. At last, on January 7th, a royal council, convened at Versailles, declared unanimously for a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, and a treaty of alliance which should embody the fol- lowing features : first, it should become operative only upon the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain; secondly, it should have for its end to secure the "absolute and unlimited inde- pendence of the United States"; thirdly, it should stipulate a reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the two powers in North America and the West Indies ; fourthly, it should allow the accession of either party to it to a treaty of peace 4 Wharton, II. 452-3. B Doniol, II. 706, footnote, and 765-70. FRENCH POLICY AND with the common enemy only upon the consent of the other; lastly, it should provide, in a separate and secret article, for the right of Spain to join the alliance. 6 The next evening Gerard made a second visit to Passy. Pledging the Americans to secrecy, he began by repeating much of what he had said on the earlier occasion, inveighed strongly against a curtailed independence, especially as to matters of commerce saying that "clear- sighted people had perceived this to be a com- mercial war from the outset" and urged that the deputies at once forego every appearance of negotiating with their enemy. Franklin, inter- rupting, inferred that war would be begun at once by the king upon England, but Gerard answered that such was not the king's plan, that that was out of the question. He then asked what the deputies would consider a sufficient induce- ment to make them reject all propositions from England which did not include full independence in matters of trade as well as of government ; also what terms would evoke a like response from the American Congress and people. To the first question the envoys returned answer on the spot: the immediate conclusion of a treaty of commerce and alliance would close their ears to all pro- posals not providing for the unqualified indepen- dence of the United States both political and 76., 729-30. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 153 commercial. Gerard now announced that he was authorized to say that the king would conclude such an arrangement at once, in the form of two treaties, one a commercial treaty, which should go into effect upon ratification and should be strictly reciprocal, and the other an eventual treaty of alliance. He then referred to the pos- sible conquest of the American continent by the United States, Deane having told him that Franklin was eager for this and indeed found in it the principal reason for an alliance with France. But Gerard indicated that he was un- certain how far His Most Christian Majesty would engage to cooperate in such an enterprise. He also let them know that he now spoke for France alone and not for Spain, with whom, he implied, they would have to come to terms sep- arately, an announcement which disappointed Franklin greatly. 7 Three days later the commissioners, through Deane, returned Gerard an answer to his second question. It was a demand for "an immediate engagement" on the part of France "to guarantee the present possessions of the Congress in Amer- ica, with such others as they may acquire on the T Gerard's Narrative, Jan. 9, 1778, SMSS., No. 1831. Note that on this occasion, as on that of his earlier visit to the commissioners, Gerard's chief concern was to make sure, not that the Americans would not come to terms with England before making a treaty with France, but that they would not come to terms with her at any time on any other basis than that of complete independence. 154 FRENCH POLICY AND continent during the war, and either to enter into a war with England or furnish Congress with the money" to do so, until "all that the English now possess on the continent shall be conquered" and the English fisheries be secured "to the United States and their allies." 8 From this time forward the principal point of difference between the envoys and the Foreign Office was whether the alliance should go into effect at once or be contingent upon the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain, the desire of the Americans being to see the guaranties stipu- lated by the treaty effective at once. Though they eventually gave way, they showed themselves, ac- cording to Vergennes' unexpectedly pertinacious ; and actually, as we shall soon see, their concession was immaterial. 9 The first drafts of the treaties had been handed the commissioners by Gerard on January 18th; the final drafts were signed February 6th. 10 The Deane Papers, II. 313-4; SMSS., No. 796. See Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 16 and 30, Doniol, II. 774 and 791; SMSS., Nos. 1838 and 1853; and Lee's "Journal," in Lee's Lee, I. 388. "The text of the Treaty of Alliance is given in Appendix I. During the final stages of the negotiation, the Foreign Office received two memoirs that may have had some part in inducing the king to take the final plunge. One of these came from Broglie, who, arguing that England "without colonies and com- merce" would be without a marine and without a marine would be "henceforth only a third-rate power" but that she must none the less now concede American independence, concluded from these THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 155 From the negotiations between the Foreign Office and Passy we turn to those that were pro- ceeding synchronously between the Foreign Office and the Pardo ; for though the general result of this correspondence has been anticipated, some of the details, too, are of interest. Partially mis- led perhaps by Aranda's enthusiasm for a French- Spanish- American alliance, which was redoubled by the news of Saratoga, partially misled too, it may be, by his own enthusiasm for premises that she would, simply in an effort to preserve herself, attempt to appropriate the French Antilles and portions of Span- ish America. The fact that Broglie was averse to any but a commercial connection with the United States may have given his argument additional weight. Doniol, II. 673-82. Beaumarchais' memoir is in characteristic vein. One of its principal arguments is the assertion that Chatham and Shelburne would probably join the Tory ministry before February 2nd. Then would fol- low, it was possible, American independence and a British- Ameri- can attack on the French West Indies, and France would be the laughing-stock of Europe. To meet this situation, the king should at once declare openly that he recognized American inde- pendence. The document thus foreshadows the action taken early in March, in declaring the Treaty of Amity and Com- merce, in which connection it should be compared with Vergennes' despatch of January 23rd to Montmorin, written the day follow- ing the presentation of the memoir. The memoir will be found in Doniol, II. 841-7, and SMSS., No. 1814. A circumstance tend- ing to prolong the negotiations was the difficulty that arose be- tween Lee and the Foreign Office over the Xlth and Xllth articles of the Treaty of Commerce. It was eventually agreed that Con- gress should pass upon these articles separately; and Congress exercised its option by rejecting them. See J. T. Morse, Benjamin Franklin (American Statesmen Series), 277 ff.; also Wharton, II. 477-85 passim. 156 FRENCH POLICY AND the enf eeblement of England, but also finding it the better policy to show a confident front on this question that was quite in contrast with his pessi- mism in the matter of British intentions, Ver- gennes professed to believe, as long as he could plausibly do so, that His Catholic Majesty could be brought into line quite promptly with what- ever policy toward the Americans His Most Christian Majesty should adopt for the security of the House of Bourbon and its possessions. The aged Ossun, who had long since shown himself quite unable to hold his own with Florida Blanea, had now been superseded at Madrid by the Count de Montmorin, a personal friend of the king and admirer and confidant of Vergennes. Privately the secretary tried to stir the am- bition of the young diplomat by a portrayal of the unique opportunity offered by the existing situation. It was an opportunity that could not often recur, especially since, "if we come out of it successfully I hope we shall have quiet for a long time." 11 "Take for your motto," he accord- ingly exhorted, "and make them adopt it: Aut nunc aut numquam" "Let Spain give her word and the good word and we shall anticipate England." If, however, contrary to all expec- tations, we should neglect "the most interesting conjecture that heaven could present us, the reproaches of the present generation and of the 11 Same to same, "Prive," Dec. 13, SMSS., No. 1775. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 157 generations to come will accuse us forever of our culpable indifference." 12 To all such pleadings the astute Spaniard turned a heedless ear. He was willing to give abundant money succor to the colonies under "the express condition of an inviolable secrecy" ; also to offer them "protection" should they need it, "provided they conducted themselves with loyalty and prudence"; and he admitted that an alert attention ought to be given to the current vicissitudes of the various English parties, espe- cially so far as these might affect the American question. 13 For the rest, however, he was as in- tractable as ever: The existing British ministry would never incur the odium of proposing inde- pendence for the Americans and the Americans would now never take less. There was, therefore, no danger of an English-American coalition unless the British should be spurred to extreme measures by the efforts of France to win over the Americans. For France and Spain to recognize American independence was quite unnecessary, since their interest attached the insurgents to the two crowns anyway. His Catholic Majesty had an unconquerable repugnance to recognizing American independence and the prejudices of a man of sixty-two were not easily uprooted. The "Doniol, II. 644-5. 13 Florida Blanca to Moirtmorin, Dec. 23, ib., 695, fn. 2. 158 FRENCH POLICY AND abasement of England was no object to Spain. 14 Coming to the Pardo one day late in Decem- ber, Montmorin was informed that a despatch just received from Aranda showed the govern- ment at Versailles to be already in negotiation with the Americans. Montmorin had not received word to this effect and believed that the infor- mation was false, but he decided not to contradict it at first because he wanted to see what the effect would be if the case really were as Aranda had stated. He soon discovered, for the Spanish minister, in a mounting rage, denounced the folly, inconsiderateness, and precipitancy of France's policy to his heart's content. When the storm had a little abated, the young Frenchman said: "You will be astonished to learn that far from having begun with the Americans, despite the urgency of the case . . . the king awaits . . . the advice of his uncle." For a moment Florida Blanca was taken aback, but soon recovered suffi- ciently to resume his reproaches: Only the year before Spain had been ready for war and France had backed down. Again, it was France that had left Spain in the lurch in 1762. To treat with the Americans was equivalent to declaring war on England. However, if Spain did enter the war she "would not be the first to ask for peace." "Before asking for it she would sell her last shirt," "Florida Blanca to Aranda, Dec. 23, ib., 765-70; Mortmorin to Vergennes, same date, ib., 700. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 159 to which Montmorin rejoined pleasantly that he hoped it was the English who would have to sell their shirts. 15 But if the young ambassador thought that he had drawn his enemy's fire against the day when he would have to tell the whole truth about his government's policy he was much mistaken. Louis' decision to ally himself with the Ameri- cans was communicated to Charles in a note from the royal hand under date of January 8th, 16 which Montmorin transmitted nineteen days later, a delay that is to be credited to the finesse of the French secretary, who, it may be conjec- tured, did not wish news of the Pardo's reaction to Versailles' decision until the latter had been put beyond recall. The Spanish minister's reception of the news was most dramatic. The intensity of his emotion displayed itself in both countenance and gesture. To contradict or oppose him was in vain. "He trembled in all his body and had the greatest difficulty in the world in expressing him- self." "You think," said he finally, "this moment a most auspicious one for the two crowns ; I think it the most fatal for Spain; but it would be the fairest day of my life if the king would let me re- tire." Next day Montmorin visited the king who, he soon perceived, shared his minister's feelings to the full. His Majesty voiced in solemn tones 15 76., 696-9. "Z6., 713-4. 160 FRENCH POLICY AND his affection for his nephew and his concern for the peril in which Spain found herself. 17 Yet in the days following both monarch and minister recovered something of their equanimity in apparent resignation to accomplished fact. They were, moreover, counting on the ostensible disposition of France at the moment not to antici- pate events further. Vergennes' original pro- gram had been to secure Spain's assent to the general principle of an alliance with the United States and then to leave the two powers ample time to make their own terms with one another. 18 This course he had indeed abandoned when he en- tered upon negotiations with the Americans, but the Treaty of Alliance itself still carefully safe- guarded in Spain's interest the margin of time be- tween its signature and the anticipated outbreak of war with Great Britain. 19 Furthermore, as Florida Blanca analyzed the motives probably governing the British cabinet, this interval was not unlikely to be a considerable one, provided only the initiative were in future left with that body. Thus guaranteed, as he thought, the spa- cious tomorrows so dear to the Spanish heart, His Catholic Majesty's minister began early in Feb- ruary gradually unfolding the expectations of " Montmorin to Vergennes, Jan. 28, ib., 750-2. See also Florida Blanca to Aranda, Jan. 27, ib., 748-50. M "Les epoques de 1'Espagne seront les notres," Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, ib., 636. See also ib., 637-8 and 644. 19 See the separate and secret article in Appendix I. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 161 Spain. "The Spaniards," wrote Montmorin in comment, "are a little like children. They can be interested only by presenting shining objects to their gaze." The Spaniard on the other hand complained that France's moderation had hope- lessly prejudiced his case from the outset. He did, however, venture to indicate the restoration of the Floridas and a share in the Newfoundland fisheries as possible objects of ambition to Spain. 20 But while Florida Blanca was just beginning his bidding in a game which he evidently expected to be a leisurely one, Vergennes was coming to the conclusion that by France and England at least aD cards must soon be boarded, a conclu- sion to which he was undoubtedly assisted by an interview he had with the British ambassador on January 22nd. Stormont initiated the conversa- tion by taxing the secretary with reports in circu- lation about Paris of active military preparations going on at certain French ports. Vergennes, showing embarrassment, disavowed any knowl- edge of these, whereupon Stormont brought for- ward the report, which "gains ground every day," of a treaty or convention with the rebels or "at least" of France's "having accepted some pro- posals from them." Vergennes now became more embarrassed than the Englishman had ever seen 30 Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 2, 5, 9, 16, 26, paraphrased in Doniol, II. 795-8. 162 FRENCH POLICY AND him, "played with his fingers and remained quite silent," whereupon the relentless Stormont pro- ceeded: "Your Excellency, who was so long a foreign minister . . . certainly knew how to ob- serve the silence as well as the language of those you treated with. You will allow me to follow that example." He then cited an interview of the previous month in which the secretary had met a similar report with a hearty denial, which was no doubt truthful. But on the present occasion, he continued, being unwilling "to stoop to false- hood . . . [you] did not answer a single sylla- ble." Vergennes now sought retreat behind a distinction between "Lord Stormont" and "the British ambassador": when the former had jocu- larly questioned "the Count de Vergennes" about the current rumors of an American treaty, "the Count de Vergennes" had been free to respond with candor, but when "the British ambassador" seriously questioned "the secretary of state" on so important a matter, the latter before answer- ing must first obtain the views of his royal mas- ter. 21 Certainly, a rather lame evasion. But what was even more ominous, though "Lord Stormont" continued malignantly to pester "the Count de Vergennes" with unwelcome questions, "the British ambassador" carefully refrained from pressing inquiries "a categorical answer to 21 Stormont to Weymouth, Jan. 22, SMSS., No. 1846; Vergennes to Noailles, Jan. 24, Doniol, II. 792-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 163 which . . . would probably lead to the most ser- ious consequences." 22 In other words, not only was it evident that the British government took it for granted that a treaty existed between France and America, but also that it desired to conceal the fact; and, of course, the inference was inevitable that, if con- cealment was calculated to promote England's plans, it could not be a good thing for France. 23 Moreover, the unsatisfactory answer that the American envoys had, on January llth, returned to Gerard's second question had, naturally, not been forgotten; while the fact that, if the Treaty of Alliance was eventual as to France it was the same as to Congress also, could not be ignored. Lastly, Vergennes, recalling no doubt some of his own experiences with legislative bodies on the Continent, began to apprehend the possible ef- 28 Stormont to Weymouth, Jan. 28, SMSS., No. 1851 ; Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 30, ib., No. 1853. 28 Wentworth, had written, as early as Dec. 29, in the most posi- tive terms, of the decision of France and Spain to support Ameri- can independence (SMSS., No. 722), but this was obviously mere guesswork on his part; and little credence seems to have been given by George III to his reports (Donne, II. 109, 121). As late as Jan. 13 George is still confident that the French ministers want peace (ib., 118), but by Feb. 9, he has changed his opinion (ib., 133) and has come to recognize, in consequence, the need of offering some measure of conciliation to America, a thing he had previously opposed, apparently. In a letter of Feb. 23, Gibbon says that treaties were signed at Paris with the Americans on the 5th of the month. 164 FRENCH POLICY AND feet of British gold on the loyalty of Congress. 24 Vergennes' determination to force develop- ments is made clear in his despatch of January 23rd, and again in that of January 30th. 25 In the latter he gives renewed assurance of the secrecy of the French government and the Amer- ican commissioners, but argues that as soon as the treaties reach America the news of them will speedily become public. From this he concludes that it will be necessary for the king to proclaim the Treaty of Amity and Commerce by the end of April or the first of May, that is, several weeks before the Mexican fleet will have reached Spain. He accordingly offers Spain the loan of ten ves- sels of war for her Cadiz squadron and to make sure the safe return of the treasure fleet. Not only, however, did the Spanish minister sulkily decline the proffered war craft, he also showed himself quite determined not to quicken his pace in negotiation, 26 thus stressing anew the precarious situation in which France now found herself, with the old love off and the new one not yet securely on. True, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce constituted a pledge of American friendship, but so long as Spain remained aloof, something more than this was wanted; while, on * Vergennes to Montmorin, repeating a rumor that the English government was sending 500,000 guineas to America to pave the way for a negotiation, Doniol, II. 802, footnote. */&., 738-9, footnote, and 789-92; SMSS., Nos. 1847 and 1853. 29 See note 11, above. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 165 the other hand, England, now aware of the ex- istence of a treaty between France and the United States, might at any moment offer the latter their independence, which offer the Amer- icans were still free to accept, and then withdraw from the war. 27 On February 17th Lord North introduced his plan of conciliation into Parlia- ment. It undoubtedly fell a long way short of according the colonies independence, but there was, of course, the constant possibility of its being further modelled on that idea. 28 The same day, moreover, a colloquy occurred in the House of Commons between Fox and Grenville on the one hand and Lord North on the other which furnished additional evidence that the British ministry was well informed of the subsisting relations between France and America but pre- ferred to keep the matter hidden for the time being. 29 "See art. I of the Treaty of Alliance. 38 Parliamentary History, XIX. 762 ff.; "Instructions to the Earl of Carlisle," etc., Apr. 19, 17T8, SMSS., No. 440. "Upon the subject of commercial regulations," runs this document, "the prevailing principle has always been to secure a monopoly of American commerce." If these ancient restraints were to be abolished, then certain new ones must be stipulated in their place. That, however, was a matter for Parliament, but before it was considered, representatives from the colonies would be admitted to that body. Evidently there was no intention of surrendering the old commercial system without a further struggle. See further SMSS., Nos. 359-63 and Part. Hist., XIX. 379, 577, and 942. 9 Parliamentary History, XIX. 769, 774-5. There was also in- 166 FRENCH POLICY AND On March 7th Louis approved a declaration of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between France and "the independent States of America," creasing tension between the two governments at this time on account of certain of England's naval measures. In Vergennes' despatch of Feb. 21st occurs the following passage that has an obvious pertinency to recent questions between the United States and certain of the present European belligerents: "Vous lui [Lord Suffolk] ferez sentir . . . que le droit des gens, les trait6s et surtout la dignit6 de la Couronne de France ne sauroient d6pendre des circonstances ou peut se trouver la Grande-Bretagne." Doniol, II. 806. Vergennes was evidently now coming around to the view that England meant to attack France first, or to force France to attack her, and then press negotiations in America, ib., 744 fn. 2, and 803-5. Another circumstance that may have influenced Vergennes in deciding to precipitate developments with England is the belief which he may have formed at this time that Arthur Lee was acting the spy for the British government. Doniol gives a paper said to be in Vergennes' own hand and endorsed thus: "Extrait d'une lettre de M. Arthur Lee a Md. Shelburne, crite imm6diatement apres la signature du trait6 entre la France et les Etats-Unis de l'Am6rique." The passage in question informs Shelburne that the treaty is about to be signed and that England will have to make haste if she is to prevent the alliance of France and the United States. Doniol, III. 169; Wharton, I. 639. The letter referred to was probably the work of Lee's secretary Thorn- ton, who was undoubtedly a British spy; see data in Whar- ton, I. 659-61 ( 207). Again, it may not have been known to Vergennes as early as March 7, 1778. But in this connection, the memoir of Beaumarchais to Vergennes of March 13, 1778, is important. An early paragraph of this document contains the following charge: "Son plan [Lee's plan] ay ant tou jours 6t6 de pr6f6rer, entre la France et 1'Angleterre, la puissance qui le mnerait plus surement a la fortune, 1'Angleterre, a pour lui des avantages reconnus; il s'en a souvent expliqu6 dans les soupers libertins," Deane Papers, II. 392. For Beaumarchais' interest in attempting to discredit Lee, see Moncure D. Conway in the A the- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 167 which Noailles deposited with the British foreign office six days later. 30 The purpose of the move was threefold; first, to forestall any tampering with Congress by British agents, by making the American public aware that France had recog- nized American independence; secondly, to naewn for 1900, I. 305. Lee's loyalty to the Alliance is, in fact, above suspicion. See Wharton, I. 525-50; also Ballagh's Letters of R. H. Lee, II. 132-42; also Lee's own "Journal." But the matters above detailed go, of course, to explain the distrust hence- forth manifested by Vergennes and his representatives toward Lee, and to a less extent toward his relative, R. H. Lee. See infra. ^Doniol, II. 820-6. See also Vergennes to Montmorin, Mar. 6 and 10, for statement of motives, %b. t 810-2 and 813-8. In the latter we find Vergennes reiterating the argument that, whatever course France took, war was inevitable: "Je pense . . . que quelque parti que nous prennions, de moderation, de force, ou meme de foiblesse, nous ne pouvons plus eviter la guerre. Ce ne seront ni nos engagemens avec l'Amrique ni les secours que nous pouvons lui avoir donn^es qui nous la procureront; c'est la de"route de Bur- goyne qui Fa preparee et d6cidee. Le ministre anglois a senti au moment meme ou cet ev^nement a eclatt6 que la continuation de la guerre pour soumettre les Ame"ricains devenait impossible, mais pour detourner Panimadversion de sa nation de dessus sa mauvaise conduite, il nous a destines deslors a etre les objets de la haine nationale et de sa vengeance particuliere." However, he continues thus: "Je crois bien qu'il la suspendroit volontiers pour peu de terns jusqu'a ce qu'il cut celui terminer avec les Etats-Unis . . . ; pourvu toutefois que nous consentions a deVorr dans le silence les afronts multiplies . . . ; mais independam't que ce sisteme passif et honteux ne peut 6tre celui d'une grande puissance, fer- merons nous les yeux a I'int6ret majeur que nous avons d'empecher et preVenir une reconciliation et une coalition entre 1'Angleterre et l'Amrique qui uniroit ces deux nations dans un meme sisteme de paix et de guerre?" Such is the final form of the secretary's apology for his program: ib., 816. 168 FRENCH POLICY AND hasten the breach between France and England which it was felt the former's recognition of American independence must produce, with a view to making the Treaty of Alliance operative ; thirdly, to associate America in an act flouting British dignity in a way to anticipate and pre- vent any proffer by England of independence to the United States. 31 Fearful that the British government would still endeavor to conceal the insulting intelligence, Noailles was also instructed to drop a hint of it in private conversation. 32 On March 19th, Stormont left Paris and Noailles London; 33 and the American commissioners, after being presented at court, dined with Ver- gennes. 34 Nine days later, Louis, addressing 81 In this connection see Chatham's words in the House of Lords, May 30, 1777, Parliamentary History, XIX. 319. Also, com- pare the attitude of the Rockinghams and that of Chatham when the French-American treaty became known. The former wished to grant independence immediately, but the latter contended that national honor forbade. See his last speech, that of Apr. 6, 1778. So long of course as it was not generally known that the British government knew of the French-American treaty, North was free to offer America what terms he chose. And anyway, even if England should choose to pocket her pride and recognize American independence, she would plainly have done so because France had forced her to it and the latter power would have America's gratitude. Doniol, II. 815. 32 Ib., 826. 33 "The French message was deemed so ironic and insulting that at night orders were sent to Lord Stormont to leave France di- rectly without taking leave, and M. Noailles was acquainted with that step, that he might retire too," Last Journals of Horace Walpole, II. 224. See also Doniol, II. 828-38. '"See G6rard to the Commissioners, Mar. 17, Wharton, II. 516. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 169 two letters to his "Very Dear and Great Friends and Allies," informed Congress, in the one, that he had appointed M. Gerard "to reside near you in quality of our minister plenipotentiary"; and in the other, that he was sending a fleet under the Count d'Estaing < avec reflexion les constitutions . . . que les Etats-Unis se sont don- ne"es. Leur R6publique, s'ils n'en corrigent pas les vices, . . . ne sera jamois q'un corps foible et susceptible de bien peu d'activitS . . . . Je vous avoue que je n'ai q'une foible, confiance dans l'nergie des Etats-Unis:" ib., 581. Vergennes was apparently somewhat disappointed in the new ally. 8 Ib., 585. 178 FRENCH POLICY AND France was already committed; and this being so, Spain must keep a free hand to deal with the American question in accordance with her own interests. Thus the problem of getting Spain into the war tended to become more and more compli- cated. At the same time, Vergennes' impatience to bring the thing about became more and more intense. In a memoir addressed to the king on June 20th, he had declared his belief that the temporizing policy of Spain, if persisted in, spelt disaster for both crowns: There could be no doubt, of course, what the choice of His Catholic Majesty would be when it was once made, but delay alone might easily prove fatal to Bourbon hopes. France ought to stand ready, in order to spur her ally to action, to promise aid in recover- ing Gibraltar, in casting off certain distasteful commercial arrangements that had been foisted on her by England, and in conquering Jamaica, a portion of the Newfoundland fisheries, and the mastery of the Caribbean. 9 And the Spanish ambassador was not less urgent, though for rather different reasons. From the first a confi- dent prophet of American independence, he was now convinced that the triumph of France and America over England was near at hand. If then Spain wished to be in at the killing, she must '"Reflexions sur la conduite a tenir dans les circonstances pr6- sentes relativement a PEspagne," ib., 159-63. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 179 make her election without delay. "It is only a dolt," he declared sententiously, "who armed cap a pie will consent to stand guard over others com- fortably eating their dinners." Spain could not rely indefinitely on any efforts save her own. "When the sowing is late the harvest is usually meagre." 10 "Aranda to Florida Blanca, Dec. 28, 1777, April 11, Aug. 4, and Nov. 1, 1778, Sparks MSS., CII. Other characteristic ex- pressions from these despatches are the following: "There is not much to be read in this despatch, but a great deal to be thought and not slept over." "Spain alone is the party that will be exposed [to danger] unless she takes heed. . . . They [the Ameri- cans] will have no other neighbors than Spain, they close at hand but we afar off, they increasing in population and flourishing and we the contrary." "Let us confess that a like opportunity will not present itself in centuries for Spain to right herself in several particulars." "Spain has treasures which she must redeem. . . . This chance will hardly return while the world shall last." Writing on May 2, 1779, with reference to the still pending project of mediation, Aranda declared that if it succeeded, he would "weep tears of blood, that Spain should have taken care of the business of others and neglected her own." Florida Blanca expresses the point of view of the Spanish court in his despatch to Aranda of April 19, 1778: "All the considerations that Your Excellency so wisely sets forth are less important than that of the king's ceasing to be sovereign and making himself the subject of another in the great matters of peace and war." In a report on the French navy, of Aug. 4, 1778, Aranda says that by November it will be, with the naval aid stipulated for by the Family Com- pact, "in condition to subjugate England without [further] as- sistance." "This crown," he continues, "wants nothing but the disposition ; its immense population, its adventurous spirit, its great wealth permit everything." He predicts the success of France's enterprise and resulting "tranquility for many years." Evidently, he had become thoroughly indoctrinated in Vergennes' viewpoint. 180 FRENCH POLICY AND But was Spanish aid really worth waiting for? Would it considering the sulky humor of Charles and the palpable self-seeking of his minister be worth the price that would have to be paid for it? Young Montmorin was scepti- cal. "The moderation affected to-day," he wrote, "will to-morrow make way for an ambition that will cause more embarrassment than Spainish as- sistance will pay for." 11 Vergennes, however, for the reasons already suggested, gave the warning less weight than, in the light of subsequent events, it may seem to have deserved. His answer was that assurance could not be made too sure, that another campaign must see the two nations act- ing together, if it was humanly possible to bring the thing about. 12 The road by which Spain finally took her lei- surely way into the war was the edifying one of mediation. There were several reasons why it seemed good to Florida Blanca to dress his mon- arch up as the champion of peace and capable in Further correspondence between the two men is taken by Sparks from D. Antonia Ferrer del Rio, Historia del Reinado de Carlos III en Espana, III. pt. V., ch. I., pp. 256-67. Aranda in a postscript had quoted Maurepas as saying that evidently "Spain hoped, by her mediation, to pick something from the cracks.'* This makes Florida Blanca extremely angry. "It is a malicious invention," he says, but continues that if "England is hard pick- ing for us, we shall not be less so for those gentlemen." Sparks MSS., XCVII. 11 Report of June 22, Doniol, III. 473. 12 See ib., 481-5, 486, 526-32, etc. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 181 its interest of dispensing an even justice between France and her ally on the one hand and Great Britain on the other. For one thing, the pro- posal gave His Catholic Majesty that indepen- dent role which his affronted dignity demanded. Again, it furnished a new reason for delay. Lastly,' in the form it finally assumed, it prom- ised Spain an opportunity to curtail American independence. The great difficulty was to get the idea launched under proper auspices. For France, whose act had precipitated the war, to solicit Spain's good offices at the outset would have been ridiculous ; while England on the other hand, en- tirely apart from her natural distrust of the con- nection between France and Spain, was of no mind to accept peace on any terms that did not leave her free to deal with her rebellious colo- nies as she saw fit. A round-about hint from Florida Blanca in April that His Catholic Ma- jesty's services were available to England and France, which was accompanied by some absurd by-play designed to conceal the manner of its origination, was met with a blunt snub from London. Florida Blanca vented his chagrin on the British ambassador, and for the moment it looked to Montmorin as though Spain might enter the war without more ado. 13 But so incon- 13 For these and other details with reference to this abortive effort at mediation, see ib., 56-80, passim. 182 FRENCH POLICY AND tinent abandonment of the cause of his affronted dignity was hardly to be expected of the quixotic Charles. Four months later, however, His Cath- olic Majesty had begun to relent somewhat, and the English government, alert to the fact and eager to keep Spain out of the autumn campaign, did, in September, convey a very definite intima- tion to the Spanish ambassador at London that His Britannic Majesty hoped to see "the war ended by the mediation of Spain" and "had no doubt that she would be able to save the honor of Great Britain without lessening that of France." 14 From the point of view of the necessity of placat- ing Charles this event may well be regarded, as M. Doniol indicates, as decisive. On September 28th, Florida Blanca sent a note to Almodovar stating the moral obligation that Spain would be under if England did not submit propositions along with the king of France, and ten days later Vergennes also, conformably with a hint from Montmorin, wrote the Spanish ambassa- dor formally accepting Spanish intervention. 15 Charles' gratification expressed itself in a variety of attentions to the French ambassador, while Florida Blanca, though ostensibly sceptical of peace, professed to be not less satisfied on that account. He now predicted to Montmorin that the following spring would find Spain in arms alongside her ally. 16 14 Ib., 513. See also ib., 497-9. 15 Ib., 515 and footnotes. "76., 516. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 183 From this point on, though Spanish policy con- tinues as devious as ever, the course of events becomes comparatively straightforward. The British answer to the Spanish note of September 28th was delayed some six weeks, and when it arrived, it laid down the impossible condition that mediation must be preceded by the withdrawal of the French fleet from American waters and the cessation of French aid to the Americans. 17 The obvious incompatibility of these conditions with those that had already been laid down by France ought, it would seem, have at last given the mediation project the bare bodkin. 18 But the obstinacy of the Spanish monarch, who now had the scent of a great role in his nostrils, and the subtlety of his minister, who still saw profit in delay, were equal to the occasion. On Novem- ber 20th Charles himself addressed Louis a note accompanied by a "confidential declaration" in which, while France's obligation to secure inde- pendence for the United States was fully recog- nized, it was pointed out that the demand for "76., 524. 18 The French conditions are laid down in the "Articles a pro- poser pour la Paix" of Oct. 17, ib., 551-4. The first paragraph reads: "Le roi d'Angleterre avouera I'inddpendence absolue des 13 Etats-Unis de PAm6rique septentrionale pour le politique, le civil, et le commerce et les reconnoitra pour Etats souverains et parfaitement libres. S. M. B. s'engagera de retirer immediatement toutes les forces de terre et de mer qu'elle tient dans aucune partie des dits Etats-Unis et de leurs remettre toutes les places, terri- toires, et isles en d6pendans." 184 FRENCH POLICY AND a direct and formal recognition of it would be a serious offense to British pride. Why then, it was argued, should not the procedure that had been taken in the case of the Low Coun- tries be followed again? In that case France, supporting the liberty and independence of Hol- land against Spain herself, had been content with obtaining, in the first place, a long truce in favor of her protege, and then, when Holland had wished to make a definitive treaty with Spain, had merely stipulated that this should not be ratified without her consent. Peace, the Span- ish court further urged, was necessary to America herself, wherefore there was always the danger that England might seduce the United States into accepting a separate treaty, a poignant ar- gument at the moment, as we shall presently appreciate. The conclusion was inevitable that some sacrifice in form was advisable to secure peace at once, though no sacrifice of real obligation. 19 It is perhaps hardly necessary to point out how entirely this proposal of a truce for a term of years for the Americans in lieu of a permanent peace met Florida Blanca's problem of neutraliz- ing American independence as far as possible. Such an arrangement would abound in oppor- tunities for "sowing seeds of discord" between the English and Americans and, by the same 19 76., 622-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 185 token, in opportunities for making the latter feel the necessity of a guaranty of their independence from the Bourbon crowns. And such a guaranty need not, of course, be accorded gratuitously. It might well be made to bring a substantial price in terms of American territory along the Mississippi. But though fully awake to the possible ad- vantages to Spain of peace in America on such a basis, the Spaniard was not over-credulous of its ever coming about, nor blind to the necessity of keeping the door hospitably ajar to the other alternative. The royal communication and memoir were accompanied to Paris by a charac- teristic product of the minister's own pen, ad- dressed to Vergennes: His Catholic Majesty was still genuinely hopeful of peace, but at the same time he was well aware of the possibility that negotiations might fail. He accordingly still continued his preparations "with the greatest activity and trusted that his nephew was doing the same." Indeed, the king was "of the opinion that without the greatest dissimulation up to the very moment of striking no advantage could be got of England." Meantime, it became perti- nent to inquire what "advantages Spain might obtain, and how and in what terms France might bring herself not to listen to any proposition with- out assuring them to" her. 20 20 76., 619-21. The last sentence quoted above is underscored in the translation of the document by Vergennes. 186 FRENCH POLICY AND Before, however, Vergennes could deal with this most significant inquiry, he had to settle the more exigent question posed by the royal communica- tion, whether France could, harmoniously with her engagements with the United States, accept for them a truce in substitution for a permanent peace. His first opinion was plainly adverse. "The Peace of Vervins," he wrote Montmorin, December 1st, "was unavailable as a precedent in the case of the Americans," for the situation of France and her engagements with the United State were of "quite a different character to those which Henry IV and his predecessors had contracted with the Dutch." 21 But as it hap- pened, Franklin's English friend Hartley was at this very moment urging much the same idea from the British point of view. When accordingly Franklin, making a confidant of Vergennes, showed the latter Hartley's letter, it was not difficult to elicit from the American the sentiment that provided France and Spain were ready to accord the United States their good-will and protection, indepen- dence, whether recognized as a matter of right or only as one of fact, would be a very good thing for them, in that it would secure them, along with the sweets of peace, or of a truce, the time and opportunity to perfect their political arrangements and internal order. 22 "Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 1, ib., 583, footnote. See also note 18, above. 23 Same to same, Dec. 4 and Dec. 24, ib., 595 and 599. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 187 In his despatch of December 24th to Mont- morin, Vergennes, though still insisting that the Peace of Vervins afforded no precedent, yet in- dicated that France would be willing to consent, either to the Americans "treating directly and alone with England, under the express condition, however, that the treaty shall keep pace with our own and that each treaty shall be null and void until the other is concluded"; or, to a long truce between Congress and Great Britain which should leave France at liberty to make a defini- tive treaty. In either event the negotiations should proceed under the mediation of the Catho- lic king, and England should treat with the Amer- icans as if they were independent and should at once withdraw her forces from "all parts of the American continent comprised in the Confedera- tion" ; and the truce, were there one, should run for from twenty to fifty years and be guaranteed by France and Spain, or at least the former. Franklin, Vergennes added, had been prepared for "an imperfect recognition of the indepen- dence of his country" but not his associates, for in them "I do not have the greatest confidence." 23 The day following Vergennes wrote Gerard, the French representative at Philadelphia, to prepare Congress for a truce and indirect recognition. The matter was to be handled "with dexterity" and the unalterable disposition of the king to 28 The despatch of Dec. 24, ib., 596-9, 602-3. 188 FRENCH POLICY AND sustain all his engagements was to be unremit- tingly insisted upon. 24 Thus was the first concession registered at the expense of His Most Christian Majesty's en- gagements with the United States to the program of getting Spain into the war, and others were to follow. There was now of course no question of bringing Spain into the autumn campaign, for that had long since closed, but Vergennes, who was already finding the Americans disappointing allies, was now becoming fearful that even the spring would find the Escurial still balancing and undecided. On December 5th the secretary pre- sented the king a second memoir on the subject nearest his heart : If it is a fact [he wrote] that Your Majesty cannot alone long sustain a contest with the English on equal terms and that the war unduly prolonged would involve both Your Majesty's commerce and finances in ruin, . . . then it necessarily follows that everything advises our risking something in order to bring this ally to the de- sired point of reunion with us. I do not conceal the fact, Sire, that the pretentions and expectations of Spain are gigantic, but it is necessary to consider that the time one would employ in opposing them would be lost for the establishment of that concert of operations which cannot be effected too promptly. 25 Three weeks later, in the same despatch in which he announced to Montmorin the French govern- 24 76., 613-5. 25 Ib., 588-90. For Vergennes' view of the Americans at this date, see note 7, above. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 189 ment's willingness to accept a truce for the United States, Vergennes wrote further that, despite the vast difference between the general situation as it existed at the opening of the war, when England would have been fairly "at the knees of the two crowns," and now when she had had time to fortify all her possessions, His Ma- jesty "approved in advance all that the king his uncle should deem it right and fitting to exact." 26 But a vague disposition of concession was not what Florida Blanca was after, this must pre- cipitate itself in a shower of definite, concrete stipulations, and particularly must the objects be named for which France would fight to the end. And what is even more important, with the possibility of a truce between England and the Americans to be guaranteed by France and Spain, the mediation project was still worth cod- dling for its own sake. In his despatches of Jan- uary 12th and 13th, Montmorin told Vergennes that he had sought in vain to secure Florida Blanca's views in detail of the advantages which France and Spain might expect to obtain from the war with England. "At that point the prime minister had placed his lever, there he had an- chored solidly." "His Catholic Majesty," the Spanish minister's own plea had run, "wished to show his nephew the same measure of confidence that the latter had shown him. He accordingly "Ib., 607-8. 190 FRENCH POLICY AND desired that His Most Christian Majesty should be the one to specify the conditions without which he would promise not to consent to peace/' Montmorin's own opinion was that a convention guaranteeing Spain the possession of Mobile and Pensacola, the expulsion of the English from Honduras, and the restitution of Gibraltar would be signed promptly if mediation failed, and that Jamaica was no longer an object. At the same time he noted that, according to Florida Blanca at least, the king still preferred peace and that consequently it still remained necessary to "allay the scruples that were to be anticipated from a conscience at once so delicate and so timorous." 27 But all things end, and the term of Spain's vacillations always more apparent than real- was at last nigh at hand. On February 12th Vergennes sent Montmorin the desired draft of a convention together with full powers to agree "to any modifications or additions that might seem needful." 28 The keystone of the project was its third article which reiterated the stipulation of the Family Compact that neither party should make peace without the consent of the other. The fourth article further pledged both parties not to make peace till Great Britain should recog- nize American independence. The fifth declared *Ib., 641-3. See also the letter from Florida Blanca to Ver- gennes, of Jan. 13, 17T9, #>., 681-3. 88 Ib., 685. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 191 certain additional objectives of a successful war that would be of interest to France, including the restoration to His Most Christian Majesty of the right to build such works at Dunkirk as he chose and the expulsion of the English from New- foundland. The sixth article pledged France, in case she should regain Newfoundland, to admit Spanish subjects to the fisheries there. The seventh enumerated the objects of interest to Spain, to wit, those that Montmorin had listed in his report. 29 Florida Blanca's reception of the proposed convention was at first apparently cordial but he soon developed numerous criticisms, and particu- larly against the fourth article; and finally he proposed that he be allowed to draw up a project of his own. 30 Spain's policy, wrote Montmorin, is "to exact everything and accord nothing" ; yet, he added, it is only by adopting her terms that we can bring her in. "I have need of patience a-plenty." 31 Vergennes in reply professed some surprise at the attitude taken by the Spanish minister toward "a work that was in some sort more his own than ours," yet he continued: "We are literally committed to omitting nothing that may appear to enlist the interest of Spain." Some of the difficulties that had been raised he was dis- 29 Ib., 803-10, left hand column. 80 Montmorin to Vergennes, Feb. 28, 1779, ib., 665-7. 81 Same to same, same date, ib., 662. 192 FRENCH POLICY AND posed to attribute to Florida Blanca's faults of temper, on which he heartily commiserated the young ambassador. Nor was he greatly aston- ished at the repugnance which the Spanish min- ister had expressed against recognizing American independence at present: "From Spain nothing is to be got for nothing: we have from her di- rectly that she wishes some advantages from the Americans as well as from us, and we will not oppose her." At the same time, Vergennes thought some reference ought to be made to the secret article of the American treaty; for even though the convention with Spain would also be secret when entered upon, yet in time it would see daylight, and then "the glory and honor of the king would suffer if it appeared that he had neg- lected this ally, and that in order to gain the powerful protection of the crown of Spain." In short, any proposition would be approved of provided that "by the general tenor of the act we have not neglected the interests of this republic." 32 On April 12th, 1779, the secret Convention of Aranjuez was signed by Florida Blanca and Montmorin. The first article declared the inten- tion of the Catholic king, in the event that His Britannic Majesty rejected the ultimatum of the third of the month offering Spain's friendly of- fices for the last time, of making common cause with His Most Christian Majesty against Great 32 Vergennes to Montmorin, Mar. 19, tfe., 670-2. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 193 Britain. The third, fifth, sixth, and seventh arti- cles were essentially the same as the correspond- ing articles in Vergennes' project. The fourth article, on the other hand, was very different. Diligently recording the fact that the king of France had "proposed and demanded that the Catholic king should from the day when war should be declared against England recognize the independence and sovereignty of the United States and offer not to lay down his arms until that independence should be obtained," it re- served to the Catholic king the right to conclude for himself a treaty with the Americans to govern "their reciprocal interests," the sole condition be- ing that, to any treaty made by Spain with or affecting France's ally, Louis should also be a party. The article was well understood on both sides to be mere banality. More than a fortnight before this Florida Blanca had confided to Mont- morin, who in turn had confided it to Vergennes, that the Spanish monarch, fearful of the "ex- ample he would give his own possessions," would "not recognize the independence of the United States until the English themselves should be forced to do so by a treaty of peace." 33 Finally, article IX of the convention read thus: Their Catholic and Most Christian Majesties promise to make every effort to procure and acquire for them- selves all the advantages above enumerated and to con- 33 Ib., 753 for ? 194 FRENCH POLICY AND tinue their efforts until they have obtained the end which they propose to one another, mutually pledging them- selves not to lay down their arms nor to make any treaty of peace, truce, or suspension of hostilities with- out having at least obtained . . . the restitution of Gibraltar and the abolition of the treaties relative to the fortification of Dunkirk, or in default of this last some other object to the taste of His Most Christian Majesty. 34 "76., 803-10. CHAPTER IX THE TWO ALLIANCES COMPARED Spain was at last committed conditionally! We may then, without anticipating much that is to follow, proceed to consider the question al- ready suggested, of how far France was forced, in the interest of bringing Spain into the war with England and later, of keeping her there to modify her obligations with the United States as defined by the Treaty of February 6th, 1778. The most interesting phase of this question is that touching the direct clash of interests of the United States and Spain along the Mississippi river, and this we reserve for fuller treatment in the chap- ters to follow. At the moment we have to review some lesser consequences of the necessity which Vergennes finally found himself under, of yoking his government to two more or less antagonistic allies instead of, as he had originally hoped, to governments themselves allied. The question of the shape which British recog- nition of American independence should take has already been touched upon. By the Treaty of February 6th British recognition was to be either 195 196 FRENCH POLICY AND formal or tacit, but in either case it was to be by a peace ending the war. 1 By the Spanish propo- sition, however, which Vergennes, after some hesitation, finally adopted and transmitted to Gerard with orders to obtain Congress' assent to it, a truce to run for a term of years and to be accompanied by the actual withdrawal of Brit- ish forces from the territory of the United States was to count as a fulfilment of the purpose of the alliance, provided that France continued to guarantee American independence or that France and Spain jointly guaranteed it. In point of fact Gerard received the orders referred to at an embarrassing moment and in consequence presented his case so feebly that Congress in its Instructions of August 14th, 1779, made no dec- laration on the subject of a truce. 2 Not till June, 1781, in circumstances to be reviewed later, did Congress formally declare its assent to the idea of a truce which should be accompanied by a British evacuation of all territory of the United States. 8 treaty of Alliance, art. VIII. 2 Indeed, by the Instructions of this date "The commissioner to be appointed to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great Britain" was ordered "to make it a preliminary article to any negotiation that Great Britain shall agree to treat with the United States as sovereign, free and independent." Journals of the Continental Congress, XIV. 956. 8 Op. tit., XX. 652. "If a difficulty should arise in the course of the negotiation for peace, from the backwardness of Britain to make a formal acknowledgment of our independence, you are at THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 197 The concession demanded of Congress in the matter of British recognition owed its origin, though not its later repetition, to the necessity that France thought herself under at the end of 1778 of supporting Spanish mediation. Induce- ments more directly designed to bring Spain into the war against England were, first, the promise by France in the Treaty of Aranjuez, in the event of the conquest of Newfoundland from Great Britain, of a share in the fisheries there, and secondly, the listing of the Floridas as ob- jects of Spanish ambition. Though the Floridas, in significant distinction to "the northern parts of America," were not specifically mentioned in the American treaty, it was acknowledged by Ver- gennes in his instructions to Gerard of March 29th, 1778, that they entered "into the plans of conquest of the Americans." Gerard was ac- cordingly instructed more than a year before the Treaty of Aranjuez was signed, in view of Spain's well-understood desire to restore her monopoly over commerce on the Gulf of Mexico, "to prepare them for an eventual withdrawal"; or, if he was not able to obtain this and it was recognized that the matter was one that would "require all the dexterity of M. Gerard" he should at least "exert himself to obtain Pensacola liberty to agree to a truce, or to make such other concession as may not affect the substance of what we contend for; and provided that Great Britain be not left in possession of any part of the thirteen United States." 198 FRENCH POLICY AND and the parts of the coast which will be estimated to be of the greatest value to the court of Ma- drid." 4 Gerard did as he was told, but again his efforts met with little success, as meantime the Florida and Mississippi questions had become merged. Eventually, in 1780 and 1781, Spain went ahead and conquered the British posts in Florida for herself, without American aid, it is true, but also without American protest. 5 The reason for the French government's tak- ing the United States into its confidence with reference to the Floridas is to be found in arti- cles VI and XI of the Treaty of Alliance. Under the latter, if the United States had conquered this region and obtained its cession from Great Britain, France would have been bound to guar- antee them in its possession. By the former, His Most Christian Majesty had "forever renounced possession of any part of the continent of North America" which had previously belonged to Great Britain, a stipulation which naturally carried * Memoire pour servir d'Instruction au Sr. Geirard," etc., "Approuve," Mar. 29, 1778, Doniol, III. 153-7: see pp. 155-6. See also Montmorin to Vergennes, Oct. 15, ib., 556. From the latter document it appears that Florida Blanca was willing at this date to see all of the Floridas go to the Americans except such part as was necessarily for the security of Spain's "navigation in the Gulf of Mexico," i.e., probably for the security of Spain's monopoly of trade on the Gulf. "Other phases of the Florida question are treated of in the chapters following, in connection with the Mississippi question and Jay's residence in Spain. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 199 with it the further idea that His Majesty was not free to tender, even contingently, any portion of this continent to another power in consideration for a treaty therewith. But if this was the case with the Floridas, then why was it not also the case with Newfoundland? Yet in article V of the Convention of Aranjuez "the expulsion of the English from the island and fisheries of New- foundland" is listed as one of the advantages which France sought by the war, while in article VI it is agreed that if His Most Christian Ma- jesty "succeeds in becoming master and acquiring possession of the island of Newfoundland, the subjects of His Catholic Majesty are to be ad- mitted to the fisheries." Evidently the Foreign Office interpreted the term "continent" of article VI of the Treaty of Alliance rather strictly, although it does not seem to have taken Congress into its confidence in the matter. And while the representatives of the French government at Philadelphia frankly combatted the idea from the first that the Americans were entitled of pre- scriptive right to continue to enjoy that participa- tion in the fisheries which was theirs as British subjects, they always did so on the ground that France ought not to be asked to assume fresh ob- ligations the discharge of which might delay peace. 6 c But while the French government did not inform Congress of its views in this matter, it probably did so inform the American 200 FRENCH POLICY AND And from the fisheries one turns readily to Canada and Nova Scotia, to which the self-deny- ing ordinance registered by France in article VI of the Treaty of Alliance bore especial reference. 7 commissioners. Thus Lee records in his "Journal" that, in view of the ambiguity of the word "continent" in article VI, he, with the approval of Franklin and Deane framed an additional clause by which France was also to renounce the right to all conquests "in the islands of Newfoundland, Cape Breton, St. John's Anticosti, and the Bermudas." Lee's Lee, I. 378-9, 383. In the final treaty the Bermudas alone are mentioned in this connection. It ought to be recalled that by the Peace of 1763 Spain had lost her share of the Newfoundland fisheries, while France had retained hers. T See Vergennes to Guines, Aug. 7, 1775, with reference to the instructions to be given Bonvouloir. One point that he should be clear about, says the secretary, is to reassure the Americans "con- tre la frayeur qu'on cherchera sans doute a leur donner de nous. Le Canada est le point jaloux pour eux, il faut leur faire entendre que nous n'y songeons point du tout." Doniol, I. 156. See also his comment on Miralles' suggestion that, while Spain recovered the Floridas, France should seek to recover Canada: "Vous savez que nous sommes d'une opinion contraire, parceque nos posses- sions sur le continent de 1'Amerique ne seroient propres qu'a in- spirer de la m6fiance aux Amricains et qu'a les raprocher insensiblement de la Grande-Bretagne." Vergennes to G6rard, Oct. 26, 1778, ib., III. 570. Earlier Vergennes had offered the same objection to Florida Blanca's plan of intervention, the pur- pose of which for France was to be the recovery of what she had lost in 1763: "La France a des colonies dans la proportion qui convient a sa population et a son industrie. Plus seroit une charge plutdt q'un benefice. Si la perte du Canada a t6 sen- sible elle doit la moins regretted depuis que 1'abandon qu'elle a 6te obligee d'en faire est devenu le signal de la revolte des provinces angloises sur le continent. Si nous tentions de nous y reintegrer nous reveillerons les anciennes inquietudes et jalousies qui faisoient le gage de la fidelity et de la soumission de ces memes provinces a 1'Angleterre; leur veritable facon de pense> est THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 201 Indeed, by article V of the same treaty, as I have just mentioned, the expectation of the United States to attempt the reduction of what British power remained in "the northern parts of Amer- ica" is formally recorded. From the very outset, nevertheless, the French government was deter- mined, if not to thwart, at least to discourage in every way possible, this expectation on the part of its ally. Vergennes' own plan for Canada and Nova Scotia originally was to exipel the English thence and establish there a free "agri- cultural and commercial state which should gov- ern itself under the protection of France" and enjoy reciprocal naturalization and commercial privileges with it. In this way, he argued, the country would be peopled by the French them- selves and "by any who choose to go there," and a national spirit, grounded on similarity of lan- guage, customs, and national character and kept alive by constant intercourse, would be created substantially identical with that of France her- self. Thus would France raise up to herself an ally which, without being burdensome to her d6couvert dans les propositions qu'elles nous ont fait parvenir: elles ne s'efforcent pas de secoiier le joug de leur patrie pour s'expose> a subir celui de toute autre puissance." Letter to the king of Apr. 26, 1777, ib., II. 274-5. See also ib., III. 62-3 and 527, where France's indifference to territorial acquisitions of any sort is insisted upon. It is interesting to regard article VI of the Treaty of Alliance as a sort of forerunner of that phase of the Monroe Doctrine which declares that "the American continent is no longer subject to colonization." 202 FRENCH POLICY AND would yet avail to protect the French interests in the Newfoundland fisheries and to check the new republic to the south. 8 But this apparently was the dream of a mo- ment. 9 At any rate, by the beginning of 1778 Vergennes had come to believe that, to furnish the necessary make-weight to the United States, Canada and Nova Scotia should be left with Great Britain. In Gerard's instructions we ac- cordingly read that, though Congress has much at heart the project of a conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas and would like to obtain an agreement with France looking to the carrying out of these projects, the king has come to the conclusion that the possession of these three countries, or at least of Canada, by England would be a valuable source of uneasiness and vigilance to the Americans, that it would make them feel the need 8 Aranda to Grimaldi, Oct. 10, 1776, Sparks MSS., CII. Aranda also quotes Vergennes as saying that France herself "would not again occupy anything more than the islands to the north of the St. Lawrence." 9 See, however, Estaing's "Addresse a tous anciens Francois de l'Amrique septentrionale" of Oct., 1778: "I shall not urge a whole people that to join the United States is to secure their own happiness; since a whole people . . . must know their own interest; but I will declare and I now formally declare in the name of His Majesty . . . that all his former subjects in North America who shall no more acknowledge the supremacy of Great Britain may depend upon his protection and support." The Con- tinental Journal and Weekly Advertiser (Boston), Dec. 3, 1778. See further, Doniol, III. 417-25. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 203 they have of the friendship and alliance of the king, and that it is not to his interest to destroy such a feeling. 10 In the views thus expressed Vergennes was forti- fied in the course of the months following by the similar views communicated in Spain's behalf by Montmorin. 11 As it chanced, however, at this very time La Fayette was perfecting in conjunc- tion with a committee of Congress a plan for a joint campaign in Canada by the allies. Com- menting upon the plan, Vergennes wrote Gerard thus: "I will confide to you, but to yourself alone, that the opinion of Spain is that it will be advantageous to reserve Canada and Acadia to Great Britain, and you feel yourself that we ought to be far from contradicting her. . . . But, I repeat, it is for circumstances to confirm or modify our views." 12 The final disposition of 10 76., III. 156-7. Note also the extracts furnished by the Count d'Estaing from his Instructions, to Gerard: "7 e chef Requis que je dois faire de contribuer a la conqueste du Canada autre- ment que par une croisere et par des attaques des posttes. . . . 3 e chef . . . chaque expression dSsigne la r6pugnance que le Roy a pour cette enterprise." 76., 237-9. See also Vergennes to Mont- morin, Oct. 30: "Nous ne d^sirons pas a beaucoup pres que la nouvelle rdpublique qui s'eleve demeure maitresse exclusive de tout cet immense continent." Accordingly Canada and Nova Scotia should remain with England in order to make the Ameri- cans feel the need "de s'assur6r des garants, des allies, et des pro- tecteurs." Ib., 561. See also SMSS., Nos. 872 and 891. u 76., 557 and 616. 13 Nov. 18, 1778, 6., IV. 43 footnote 3 ; and to same effect is ib., III. 616. See also Adolphe de Circourt, Histoire de I' Alliance et de I' Action commune de la France et de I'Amerique (Paris, 1876, 204 FRENCH POLICY AND the question was somewhat curious. The plan mentioned having been referred to Washington, the commander-in-chief reported against it. Of- ficially and publicly he based his objection upon the impossibility of furnishing sufficient forces for the expedition, but in a confidential letter to the president of Congress he also voiced the fear of offering France the temptation of reestab- lishing her power in a country filled with the memory of her, whose customs, morals, religion, habits of government, everything, recalled her, and the possession of which would be valuable to her in many ways, especially in the facility it would afford "of controlling these states, the natural and most formidable rival of every mari- time power in Europe." 13 But after all, Canada, the Floridas, the fish- 3 vols.). The work is a translation of vol. X of Bancroft's His- tory, of the edition of 1874, with added notes and documents. Here, vol. III. pp. 263-4, Vergennes, writing Gerard under date of Dec. 25, 1778, says: "You have done wisely to elude the over- tures made you concerning Halifax and Quebec. Your instruc- tions embody the king's way of thinking upon this subject; and His Majesty has changed the less because he has reason to believe that it enters into the policy of Spain as well as in ours, to main- tain the English in possession of Nova Scotia and of Canada." M. Doniol would make Spain originally responsible for the idea of leaving Canada in England's hands, but in this he is clearly mistaken. "Washington the President of Congress, Nov. 14, 1778, Writ- ings of Washington (Ed. Sparks, Boston, 1834, 12 vs.), VI. 106-10. Later, however, Washington changed his opinion on this subject. See Doniol. IV. 565; also ch. XIII, infra. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 205 eries, and even the form that British recognition should take, are matters more or less by the way. For either France did not transgress her engage- ments with the United States with reference to them, at least to any very easily definable extent, or else she candidly took the United States into her confidence and asked their cooperation. The one point, and the only one, at which there was flat incompatibility, technically at least, between the Treaty of February 6th, 1778, and the engage- ments subsequently incurred by His Most Chris- tian Majesty with Spain was the stipulation by the secret Convention of Aranjuez, that France should make no peace without the consent of Spain, which was fortified by the further and more definite stipulation that the war should con- tinue until His Catholic Majesty had obtained Gibraltar. Thus was the purpose of the war, in which the United States were already bound to remain to the end, altered and enlarged, not only without their consent, but without their knowl- edge. 14 Having failed in her efforts to ally with one another the powers with which she herself was allied, France bound the two to one an- other's fortunes by conditioning peace-making in all cases upon her own consent, but while the re- lation thus created between France and the United States was known to Spain, the analo- 14 That it was the purport of Florida Blanca's program to "alter the object of the war" is stated by Montmorin, &., III. 48T. 206 FRENCH POLICY AND gous relation between Spain and France was unknown to the United States. And this discrepancy, of which the United States were contingently the victim, is thrown into even higher light when we turn to the history of M. Gerard's early months at Philadel- phia. Here Louis' representative found upon his arrival a widespread belief that the United States could make peace at any time with Eng- land, provided only they did not renounce their independence. 15 The source of the idea is not far to seek. It was the commissioners' letter of December 18th, which was written at the period when the French government was negotiating for the amity and commerce of the Colonies, but not their active alliance. But the later treaty, which however in July had not yet been pub- lished in America, proceeded of course along quite different lines. As soon, therefore, as Ver- gennes learned the state of belief in the United States on the subject of peace-making, as he did from some American newspapers even before Gerard had reached Philadelphia, he penned the latter a despatch ordering him preemptorily to "destroy an opinion . . . which would reverse the whole system upon which our Treaty of Al- liance rests." 16 This despatch reached Gerard early in August. "/&., III. 277-84. "/&., 284. See further ib., 399-401, and IV. 17-34. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 207 At the same moment, with the arrival of Deane in Philadelphia, whither he had been summoned by Congress, the famous Deane-Lee controversy broke forth, over the question whether the Col- onies were under any obligation to pay for the supplies that had been furnished them through Hortalez and Company. Deane, who had made a contract with Beaumarchais guaranteeing pay- ment, contended that Congress was bound to live up to this agreement, while Lee asserted that these supplies had been intended by the French government as gratuities and that Hortalez and Company had been a mere device to conceal French assistance under the guise of commerce, and further insinuated that Deane and Beau- marchais were in conspiracy to defraud Con- gress. 17 The merits of the controversy are di- vided. Lee was certainly right as to the supplies purchased with the money that had been con- tributed by the Bourbon kings, 18 but was quite "For references on this topic see Chapter III. notes 27 and 42; also Letters of Richard Henry Lee (Ed. J. C. Ballagh, N. Y., 1911-4, 2 vols.), I. 373-5, 457-63, II. 1-203, passim. "Note in this connection the following words from Louis' letter to Charles, of January 8, 1778: "Je ne parle pas des secours d'argent et autres, que nous leurs avons donn6s, le tout etant passe sur le compte du commerce." Doniol, II. 713. The king's intention, therefore, with reference to the million livres which were entrusted to Beaumarchais in June, 1776, seems clear: he meant it as a gift to the Colonies. Vergennes, on the other hand, was perhaps not unwilling that Beaumarchais should have it, in return for his services to the Foreign Office. See Wharton, I. 376-84; also, M. D. Conway in the Athenaeum, 1900, pt. I. 305-7. 208 FRENCH POLICY AND unwarrantably suspicious of Deane's motives, while Deane was right as to the balance of the supplies, which was a considerable one. The French government, however, which at this very moment was defending itself before Europe against the indignant charges of the British gov- ernment, of having clandestinely aided the Col- onies while the two powers were still ostensibly at peace, could not afford to admit that Lee was right to any extent. The result was that Gerard soon took up the cudgels for Deane, with the na- tural result of offending Lee's brother, Richard Henry, who revenged himself by blocking all the envoy's attempts to get a declaration from Con- gress on the subject of a separate peace. 18 * For- tunately for Gerard, early in January Thomas Paine, who was secretary of Congress, published some articles in the Pennsylvania Packet, sus- taining Lee's case with citations from official documents, which action forced Congress to de- clare its position on both issues at once. On January 12th, accordingly, it passed a resolution disavowing Paine's lucubrations and declaring " For Lee's change of opinion of Ge>ard in consequence of the latter's intervention in behalf of Deane, vd. his Letters, I. 423, 427, II. 114, 119-20, and 124. Gerard's endeavor, however, to fasten upon Lee the stigma of disloyalty to the alliance falls flat in light of the evidence. See especially Lee's letter of De- cember 16, 1778, to the Pennsylvania General Advertiser, ib., 457- 62, where he satisfactorily explains his relations with the British agent Berkenhout and his sentiments on the subject of a separate peace. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 209 itself convinced "by the most inolisputable evi- dence" that the supplies furnished by Hortalez and Company "were not a present" and that "His Most Christian Majesty . . . did not pre- face his alliance with any supplies whatever sent to America"; and two days later it disavowed explicitly the notion of a separate peace. 19 In other words, it was settled, and by the stren- uous insistence of the French government itself, that Congress could agree to no peace or truce 19 Journals of the Continental Congress, XIII. 54-5, 62-3. "Whereas it hath been represented to this House by the Hon. Sieur Gerard, minister plenipotentiary of France, 'that it is pretended the United States have preserved the liberty of treating with Great Britain separately from their ally, as long as Great Britain shall not have declared war against the king, his master'; therefore, Resolved, unanimously, That as neither France or these United States may of right, so these United States will not, conclude either truce or peace with the common enemy, without the formal consent of their ally first obtained." It will be noted that the advocates of a separate peace finally based their case on the fact that there had never been a formal declaration of war upon France by Great Britain. The resolution which Gerard had desired to see adopted reprobated the condemned opinion very strongly, but it was superseded by the resolution just quoted, p. 62. The action of Congress, nevertheless, elicited some criti- cism. Thus a writer in the Pennsylvania Packet of Mar. 18, 1779, while denouncing the Lees as men of "base principles," charges that M. G6rard has altered the Treaty of Alliance from its orig- inal form. The charge is repeated in the same journal of Apr. 8, where great disfavor is expressed with the treaty with France as compared with the one published "in our papers" nine months earlier. "In the first treaty, by one of the articles America had the right to withdraw herself from the war, provided she did not relinquish her independence." 210 FRENCH POLICY AND with Great Britain though it might "listen to overtures" without the consent of France; while three months later, France agreed, in turn, that she would not consent to such a peace or truce till Spain would do the same, or at any rate, till Spain had obtained Gibraltar. Nor is M. Don- iol's contention that the two developments were quite unconnected in the conscious intention of the French government necessarily sound simply because the Congressional interpretation of the Treaty of February 6th came first, since Ver- gennes was well aware from a much earlier date that Spain would enter the war only on condition that her objectives be made a sine qua non of peace. And that the two developments were con- nected in practical effect is obvious. But, then, did the French government by ac- ceding to the Treaty of Aranjuez commit any- thing worse than a merely technical breach of its engagements with the United States? Did it not, on the contrary, take a step that was actually beneficial to the United States in forwarding the cause of independence? For though Spain her- self was not allied with the United States, yet once she had entered the war her forces were turned against the common enemy. To begin with, I think it highly questionable whether, all things considered, Spanish aid really paid for itself. Thus the opportunities of the campaign 19 Doniol, III. 762, fn. 2. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE of 1778, when American enthusiasm for the al- liance was fresh and the new French marine was in the pink of condition, were frittered away to no small extent because of the French govern- ment's efforts to accommodate its course to the exigencies of the Spanish monarch's whimsy mediation. 20 Again, the campaign of 1779 netted nothing, largely because France yielded again to Spain's views, which were for an inva- sion of England. 21 Again, in 1780 Spain, save for the forces she maintained at Minorca, in the Floridas, and along the Mississippi, was practi- cally out of the war. 22 Only in 1781, when the siege of Gibraltar was formed, was Spain's as- sistance more than negligible, when indeed it was not worse. In short, Montmorin's prediction that Spain's demands would be more embarrassing than her help was worth was substantially fulfilled. 23 Waiving, however, the question of the value of Spanish aid, can it yet be contended that the Convention of Aranjuez signified any real danger to American interests? Verbally the United 20 See, for instance, Montmorin to Vergennes, June 22, 1778, ib., 472-3; also ib., 503-7 and 590. 21 Ib., IV. 322-4. Florida Blanca was of the opinion that "it was possible to strike the English so they would feel it only in England," ib., III. 674. Charles III was convinced that the war must begin with a grand coup such as a descent upon England, ib., 665. See also Florida Blanca's plan of operations of Feb. 26, 1779, ib., 688-91. For La Fayette's connection with the plan of descent and the failure of the project, see i6., IV. ch. V. a The Spanish court was at this time engaged in informal and 212 FRENCH POLICY AND States were bound by article VIII of the Treaty of Alliance not to make peace till France gave the word, but morally their obligation would be fulfilled the moment Great Britain was willing to accord them independence and their ally an unconditional peace; and certainly Vergennes himself must have foreseen that the Americans, despite the secrecy of the Treaty of Aranjuez, would not be easily hoodwinked into prolonging the war once England manifested a disposition to grant the terms just described. The real dan- ger of the Convention of Aranjuez from the point of view of American interests sprang from its secrecy taken in connection with the fact that France was to exert a powerful influence upon unavowed negotiations with the English emissary Richard Cum- berland, Lord George Germaine's private secretary. See ch. XII, infra. 23 For a rather more favorable estimate of Spanish participation in the war, see Francois Rousseau in Revue des Questions his- toriques, LXXII. 444 ff. See also Florida Blanca's "Apology" for his administration, William Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain (London, 1813, 3 vols.), I. App., 331-44. Even in Congress, which on the whole was not favorably disposed toward her, Spain had one or two defenders. Thus we find Witherspoon of New Jersey saying, in Aug., 1782: "Some gentlemen had underrated the services of Spain. She had done much. She had entered into the war with the common enemy. We had derived as much ad- vantage from her exertions as if she had agreed to the treaty of Alliance. . . . Besides this she had aided us with money, opened her ports, and admitted us to trade to Havannah," Thomson Papers (N. Y. Hist'l Soc. Cols., 18T8), pp. 90-1. See also a speech by Madison to much the same effect early in 1783, Writings (Ed. Hunt), I. 418-9. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 213 Congress in shaping the terms upon which that body would consent to peace. For at the out- set it was a compensating consideration that, in proportion as Vergennes had insisted upon the indispensability of France's consent to America's making peace, so by the same token, he had in- sisted upon the indispensability of America's consent to France's making peace, and had there- fore bound himself to give respectful heed to the American interpretation of the reciprocal en- gagements of the allies. Eventually, however, by the Instructions of June 15th, 1781, Congress surrendered outright to the French ministers the control thus given it over the final peace. There can be little doubt, I think, that Congress' ig- norance of the Treaty of Aranjuez ought to be reckoned as one of the circumstances explaining this surrender. 24 The issue thus finally becomes whether the Instructions of June 15th were in the circum- stances a menace to American interests and this issue can wait. For the moment, we turn back to review briefly the story of the ultimatum of April 3rd, 1779, upon the rejection of which by Great Britain the Convention of Aranjuez still left Spain's entrance into the war contingent. Great Britain's answer to the suggestion of a "See Chapter XIII, infra. FRENCH POLICY AND truce involving a tacit recognition of American independence and her evacuation of American territory did not reach Madrid till March 27th, but when it at last arrived it was found to be explicit to the point of insult: Great Britain could not recognize the right of France "to con- found her own affairs with the pretended inter- ests of those whom she affects to call her allies," or to dictate "in what manner His Britannic Majesty should exercise his liberty of reestablish- ing his authority over his own dominions." 25 Yet notwithstanding this language, which he admitted was "hardly satisfactory," Florida Blanca, plead- ing as always the necessity of continuing the deception of England, 26 proceeded to draft the ultimatum just referred to. In essence, what this ultimatum proposed was a truce of indefinite duration in America during the continuance of which England should remain in possession of the territory she still held there, including New York City and Rhode Island. 27 Vergennes' dis- may at these propositions, when he learned of them on April 12th, may be imagined: "The more we examine them and weigh them," he wrote Montmorin, "the less do we see any way of recon- ciling them with what the king owes himself or his new allies." Nor, unfortunately was this the worst of the matter, for by leaving the British forces mingled with the American population at ^Doniol, III. 746-8. 39 Ib., 748-9. 27 Montmorin to Vergennes, Mar. 29, ib., 798-9. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 215 some of its most important centers, the Spanish proposals still kept open a way for England's conciliation of her alienated subjects. "Endea- vor, I pray you," he continued earnestly, "to pre- vent any further condescensions of the sort, for they can only be fatal to the dignity of the king, and the humiliation resulting from them the king his uncle will necessarily share." 28 On April 12th, 20th, and 29th and again on May 14th, Vergennes gave vent to vehement and even bitter protestations against the action that the Spanish government had so unwarrantably taken, in the very face of its repeated promise "to guard the honor of France as it would that of its own crown and country." 29 But one thing Vergennes had not counted upon the obstinacy of the king of England, who, blissfully unaware that he had been presented with the opportunity of shatter- ing not only the French- American alliance but the Family Compact as well, still adhered to his resolution to bring his rebellious subjects to their knees. On May 17th, Montmorin, breathing a sigh of relief, wrote Vergennes that England had repelled the Spanish ultimatum and that the Spanish fleet would soon join the French. Yet Montmorin's despatch containing this welcome news sounded also the now familiar note of warn- ing: "We ought however not conceal from our- M 76., 767-8. "Loc. cit. and pp. 770 and 801-3. 216 FRENCH POLICY AND selves, Monsieur, how little interest Spain takes in the United States of America; we shall cer- tainly have evidence of this in the course of the war but especially when the question shall arise of concluding peace." 30 80 76., 771. Beaumarchais in writing Vergennes commented upon Spain's entry into the war in characteristic vein: "Si le livre est aussi fort que la preface a 6t6 longue, nous devons voir de belles choses de cette nation-la; mais, je ne sais pourquoi, j'ai toujours un petit glacon dans le coin de ma cervelle 6tiquet Espagne. J'ai beau faire, je ne parviens pas a ^chauffer cette idee-la," ib., IV. 446. CHAPTER X THE MISSISSIPPI AND THE WESTERN LAND QUESTION The claim of the United States during the Revolution to extend to the Mississippi was based upon both sentiment and interest. Rebels against the authority of the British Empire could not have taken an impoverished view of their future; and at the beginning of the war at least the spirit of Continentalism, forerunner of Manifest Des- tiny, was abroad in the land. The Earl of Cork had proclaimed that "the ball of empire was roll- ing westward and would stop in America" and the prophecy was now repeated, while in confir- mation of it were cited "the growing millions of western world." That such a spirit should treat the idea of being "shut up within the Mountains" with impatience was inevitable. 1 1 The Earl of Cork's words are reminiscent, perhaps, of Bishop Berkeley's famous lines in his essay on The Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America: "Westward the course of empire takes it way; The first four acts already past, A fifth shall close the drama with the day: Time's noblest offspring is the last." One of the earliest forecasts by an American of the "manifest 218 FRENCH POLICY AND And the view that sprang in the first place from enthusiasm found ready support from sober calculation. The original belief seems to have destiny" of this continent was that of John Adams, in a letter written in 1755: "Soon after the Reformation a few people came over into this new world for conscience sake. Perhaps this apparently trivial incident may transfer the great seat of empire into America. It looks likely to me: for if we can remove the turbulent Gallicks, our people, according to exactest computations, will in another century become more numerous than England itself. Should this be the case, since we have, I may say, all the naval stores of the nation in our hands, it will be easy to obtain the mastery of the seas; and then the united force of Europe will not be able to subdue us." Life and Works of John Adams (Boston, 1856, 10 vols.), I. 23. The prophecy of naval supremacy for America is strikingly like that of Vergennes twenty years later: vd. supra, ch. Ill, 67-8 and note. Less than three years after Adams, James Wolfe was writing his mother from Louisbourg, thus: "These colonies are deeply tinged with the vices and bad qualities of the mother country; and, indeed, many parts of it are peopled with those that the law or necessity has forced upon it. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, . . . this will, some time hence, be a vast empire, the seat of power and learning." Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London, 1909), p. 395. The outbreak of the Revolution naturally enhanced the vision of imperial greatness entertained by the friends of America. In this connection various expressions in Dr. Richard Price's fa- mous pamphlet entitled Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government and the Justice and Policy of the War with America (London, 1776) are interesting: see pp. 21 ffg. Price concludes that, "It is probable that the Americans in fifty or sixty years will be double our number and form a mighty empire consisting of a variety of states, all equal or superior to ourselves." In the same connection an extract from the Antigua Gazette of Sept. 10, 1777, is interesting. In what purports to be a "Circular Letter" delivered by a ministerial messenger to the different foreign ambassadors resident at Lon- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 219 been, at any rate it was the view of Franklin and Deane, that the lands west of the Mountains were subject to the disposal of Congress to meet the expenses of the common effort. 2 Later, with don, warning is given that it is obviously "the common interest of Europe to annihilate America," which is destined to rival all countries in production, to undermine their commerce by means of free navigation, and to draw off their population in the way of emigration. The British territory in America is estimated at 718,592,000 acres, capable of supporting 145,918,400 people, or twenty-six million more than Europe. The phrase above quoted, "the growing millions of the western world," is from a letter in the Pennsylvania Packet, No. 144, postscript. See also in the same journal, No. 147, an extract from a sermon by John Lathrop, American pastor of the Second Church in Boston: "America has every natural advantage. ... A coast three thous- and miles in length and a breadth as yet unexplored. . . . The united wisdom of North America should be collected in a general congress of all the colonies." The date of the sermon was June 6, 1774. See also the Boston Evening Post and General Advertiser of June 26, 1779: "We are now upon the stage of America, have an arduous task to perform, we act not only for ourselves but for remotest posterity. The political misery or happiness of millions unborn depends on the conduct of our public measures at this day." These words occur in a plea in support of the right of Congress "to ascertain and fix the limits of those states that claim to the Mississippi or South Sea." 2 The first form of the Articles of Confederation as reported to Congress was in the hand of Franklin. Article XI of this draft provided that all purchases of lands from Indians were to be made only with the consent of Congress, that Congress was to have authority to determine Indian boundaries, and that "all purchases from them [the Indians] by Congress [were to be] for the general advantage and benefit of the United Colonies," Com- plete Works of Benjamin Franklin (Ed. Bigelow, N. Y., 1887-8, 10 vols.), V. 552-3. Article XVIII further gave Congress the power to limit "the bounds of those Colonies which by charter or proclamation, or under any pretence are said to extend to the 220 FRENCH POLICY AND the rise of the principle of State Sovereignty, nar- rower views obtained sway and the conviction became general that these lands were the prop- erty of particular states. Yet even so, all states still retained an interest in having these lands kept open to settlement by their citizens and in seeing their frontiers secure, both of which ob- jects would have been jeopardized had a foreign power obtained control of the region in question and of the Indian tribes there. Finally, by yet another turn of the wheel of public opinion, from 1781 on the prospect developed that the states credited with the sovereignty and ownership of these lands would surrender their claims to the Confederacy at large. Once more the interest of all states in seeing the American title established became what it originally had been. What, then, was this title? As I have just hinted, it was twofold: that of the American Peo- South Sea." This clause gave rise to a debate, Aug. 2, 1776, which marks the beginning of the struggle between the "land- less" states, headed by Maryland, and the "landed" states, headed by Virginia, and which ended five years later in the acts of cession of western territory to the Confederacy. Chase of Maryland "denied that any colony has a right to go to the South Sea." Harrison of Virginia thereupon inquired, "How came Maryland by its land, but by its charter," and added: "By its charter, Virginia owns to the South Sea." Huntington of Connecticut was all against "mutilating charters." Stone of Maryland con- tended for the right of the small colonies to "happiness and security," and that "they would have no safety if the great colonies were not limited." The clause was stricken out in committee. Life and Works of John Adams, II. 501-2. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE pie to the region in question, and that of certain states. True, these two titles were mutually conflicting, and true also, the peculiar titles of some of the states conflicted with those of other states; and doubtless, if the matter were one to be resolved dialectically, this fact would have ser- ious consequences. The question raised, however, is not one of logic but of law; and it has accord- ingly to be remembered that in the analogous case of real estate, titles that conflict are often consolidated to produce a title that is unimpeach- able. It is therefore not inconceivable that while, on the one hand, no state had a perfect title against either the United States or her sister states to western domain, yet, on the other hand, the titles of all parties combined exhausted the legal rights to the region. The states that held individual claims to do- main west of the Mountains were Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The claims of Massachusetts, Con- necticut and New York were confined to terri- tory north of the Ohio river; that of Virginia, the most sweeping of all, was to the whole of this territory, and also to the region south of the Ohio that today comprises the state of Kentucky ; those of the Carolinas and Georgia were, roughly, to the lands lying between their present western boundaries and the Mississippi river. The foun- dation for these claims, save that of New York 28 FRENCH POLICY AND who based hers on a pretended overlordship over the Iroquois Indians and their conquests, was in all cases furnished by the "sea-to-sea" clauses of the colonial charters as curtailed by the Treaty of 1763, which made the Mississippi river the western boundary of British America. 8 As I As noted immediately below, England based her case against France in the dispute leading to the last French and Indian war partly upon the colonial charters, and undoubtedly this dis- pute more than anything else made the colonies aware and confi- dent of their charter claims to the Mississippi boundary. Yet it is interesting to observe that the English cartographer Bollan complained that his predecessors, Popple (in 1732), Keith (in 1733), Oldmixon (in 1741), Moll (at several dates), and Bowen (in 1747) had all been recreant to British interests, Winsor, Mississippi Basin, p. 331. The rising dispute, however, soon registered itself in the views of the mapmakers. Thus Bowen's map of 1749 is entitled: "A Map of the British- American Plan- tations . . . including all the back settlements in the respective provinces as far as the Mississippi." The famous Mitchell Map of 1755 also recorded British official pretensions, which in turn were supported by citations of Mitchell's and Bowen's maps. On the other hand, Evans' map of the same year set the western boundary of Virginia at the Mountains; while as late as 1777, French mapmakers applied the term "Louisiana" to the region between the AUeghenies and the Mississippi. See generally Winsor's Narrative and Critical History, V. 79-86, and 235. Cer- tain other occurrences also, lying between 1754 and the outbreak of the Revolution, tended to confirm Virginia's charter preten- tions. Thus Governor Dinwiddie, in 1754, made promises of land to the Virginia soldiers, while a convocation of the chiefs of the Cherokee and Choctaw Indians at Charleston the same year recognized the right of the Virginia and Carolina governments to establish magazines among them, and certain other rights of apparent suzerainty. The legal significance of the Proclamation of 1763, restraining settlements westward of the mountains, is doubtful (see infra), but the discussion concerning it was calcu- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE have just pointed out, the fact that these claims in some instances overlapped was not necessarily fatal to them as against third parties. There were other obstacles to their admission, however, that were more formidable. The two nations against whose pretensions it was requisite for the states to secure their claims were Spain and Great Britain. The latter power, lated again to arouse public attention to the question of where the western boundary of the colonies lay. Also, the Proclamation was constantly being transgressed or officially waived. "I have had, my Lord," wrote Lord Dunmore in his Report to Lord Dartmouth of December 24, 1774, "frequent opportunities to re- flect upon the emigrating spirit of the Americans since my arrival to this government. There are considerable bodies of inhabitants settled at greater and less distances from the regular frontiers of, I believe, all the colonies. In this colony, procla- mations have been published from time to time to restrain them; but impressed from their earliest infancy with sentiments and habits very different from those acquired by persons of a similar condition in England, they do not conceive that government has any right to forbid their taking possession of a vast tract of country, either uninhabited or which serves only as a shelter to a few scattered tribes of Indians. Nor can they be easily brought to entertain any belief of the permanent obligation of treaties made with those people, whom they consider as but little re- moved from brute creation." R. G. Thwaites and Louise P. Kellogg, Documentary History of Dunmore's War, p. 371. See also ib., pp. 369-70 and footnote 91, also p. 5, footnote 8, for data with reference to the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) and the Walpole Grant of 1769, both of which transgressed the principle of the Proclamation of 1763. On the eve of the Revolution oc- curred Lord Dunmore's War which gave rise to an acrimonious dispute between Dunmore and the proprietary governor of Penn- sylvania, John Penn, with reference to Virginia's western claims. It was the forerunner of later disputes, in the course of the Revolution, between the states with fixed western boundaries and FRENCH POLICY AND having urged the charter rights of the colonies in partial support of her own claims against France anterior to the Seven Years' War, was perhaps estopped from denying that those rights had been all that she had once asserted them to be. The Treaty of 1763, however, had been followed by the Royal Proclamation of the same year, forbid- ding the colonial governors to make further grants of land in the region west of the Alle- ghenies. 4 The question therefore arises whether those claiming to extend to the Mississippi. Dunmore, in his Proclamation of Sept. 17, 1774, asserted that Virginia's "ancient claim" was "founded in reason, upon pre-occupancy, and the general acquiescense of all persons," but makes no mention of Virginia's charter rights, Force's American Archives, 4th series, I. 790-1. Finally, in the Virginia Constitution of 1776, it is pro- vided that "the western and northern extent of Virginia shall in all respects stand as fixed by the charter of King James I in the year 1609 and by the public peace between the courts of Great Britain and France in the year 1763." For Virginia's champion- ship of the charter claims and Maryland's opposition to them, see Collections of the New York Historical Society, 1878 (Thom- son Papers), passim. 4 The text of the Proclamation of 1763 is to be found in the Annual Register for that year, pp. 208-13, and in Force's Ameri- can Archives, 4th series, I. 171-5. The salient clause is the follow- ing: "We do ... declare it to be our royal will and pleasure . . . that no governor or commander-in-chief of our other col- onies or plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further pleasure be known, to grant warrant of survey or pass patents for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic from the west or north- west; or upon any lands whatsoever which, not having been ceded to or purchased by us, as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians or any of them." The line actually drawn by Hills- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE it was the purpose of the Proclamation to set a definite western boundary to such provinces as had thus far remained without one. The Amer- ican advocates contended that this was not the case, that the intention of the Proclamation had been "not to take away but to restrain an existing right," of which therefore it furnished formal offi- cial recognition. 5 But this opinion, it seems clear, borough in pursuance of the Proclamation made exception in favor of the Virginia settlements on the Great Kenawha. The ostensible purpose of the Proclamation was to pacify the In- dians, but Hillsborough in 1772 admitted another motive, viz., to keep the populace under the restraint of the seaboard authori- ties. A third motive, possibly, was to discredit the colonial charters. Winsor, Mississippi Basin, 430-1. Winsor also implies that the Proclamation met with some contemporary protest. "The party of progress," he says, "called it a tyrannous check on the inevitable expansion of the race." I am rather of opinion, however, that such criticisms came later, when the general argu- ment against England's American policy was being shaped up. This is certainly true of Burke's characterization of the Proclama- tion, quoted by Winsor as if contemporary, as an attempt "to keep a lair of wild beasts that earth which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men." Both Washington and Franklin regarded the Proclamation to be, as its terms imply, a temporary measure, and this was probably the view generally held of it. 6 Livingston to Franklin, Jan. 7, 1782, Wharton, V. 88. This important document is also to be found in the Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, VII. 348 ff. Other important state- ments of the American argument on the territorial question are the "Instructions to Jay" of Oct. 17, 1780, in Journals of the Continental Congress, XVIII, 935 ff., and Writings of James Madison (Ed. Hunt), I. 82 ff.; and the "Facts and Observations in support of the several claims of the United States," presented 226 FRENCH POLICY AND runs counter to the evidence. Thus in 1772, when Franklin and some associates sought a grant from the Privy Council of a tract of land on the Ohio and the argument was brought forward that the proposed grant contained "part of the dominion of Virginia to the south of the river Ohio," it was answered "that no part of the above tract is to the eastward of the Allegheny mountains and that those mountains must be considered as the true westward boundary of Virginia"; and this argu- ments prevailed with the council* Two years later moreover the Quebec Act was passed with the proviso "that nothing herein contained rela- tive to the boundary of the province of Quebec shall in any wise affect the boundaries of any other colony," notwithstanding which the south- ern boundary of the province was drawn along the Ohio. 7 We may admit the American conten- tion that, since the Quebec Act was itself one of the causes of the Revolution, "to build anything upon it would be to urge one wrong in support of to Congress, Aug. 16, 1782, Journals of the Continental Congress, XXIII. 471-524, and Thomson Papers, 102-41. Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, V. 3 and 25-35. The opposition to the proposed grant was headed by Lord Hills- borough, President of the Lords of Trade. The authorship of the answer to Hillsborough's representations is usually ascribed to Franklin, but Professor C. W. Alvord contends that its author was Samuel Wharton of Philadelphia. See the Nation, XCIX. 220-1. Wharton may have stood sponser for the answer and yet Franklin have been the author of it. 7 Force's American Archives, 4th Series, I. 216-20. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 227 another." 8 Nevertheless, the evidential value of the act as to the meaning of the Proclamation of 1763, the validity of which was never ques- tioned, still remains. And as against Spain the claims of the Ameri- can states were weaker still. Spain desired, first, to keep the Americans back from her own posses- sions, and secondly, to restore her monopoly of trade on the Gulf of Mexico; 9 to both of which ends it was essential that she should withhold from the Americans the right, which in 1763 she had accorded the subjects of Great Britain, 10 of navi- Wharton, V. 88. In the debate on the Quebec Bill, Dunning contended that the measure was inconsistent with England's posi- tion in the Seven Years' War. "Consider," he said, 'Svhat it was for which you engaged in the last war: encroachments of the French upon our colonies. . . . You repelled force by force. They offered to you to withdraw from the south of the Ohio and retire to the north, making that river the boundary of the two colonies. No, you replied, the river of St. Lawrence is the boundary of Canada; . . . the tracts which you claim are parts of our colonies of Virginia, Pennsylvania, etc.; and we cannot grant away the certain and undoubted right of our subjects in such a manner." Yet this was precisely what Parliament was doing by the Quebec Bill: it was merging with Canada what England had always contended was no part of Canada. The Attorney-General, Thurlow, answered Dunning thus: "It is success in war that gives success in peace, and by no means the imaginary line drawn by a state in its colonies; nor have the limits now drawn anything to do with old Canada; ... it is a new scheme, and by no means a restoration of those old limits the French once contended for." Parliamentary History, XVII. 1359 ff. See Chapter XIV. 10 Art. VII of the Treaty of Feb. 10, 1763: "Provided that the 228 FRENCH POLICY AND gating the Mississippi through Louisiana to its mouth. For by denying the Americans this right, so obviously essential to an agricultural popula- tion between the Mountains and the River, she would discourage the further immigration of Americans westward; while she would also be taking an excellent preventive measure against the appearance of American smugglers on the Gulf. And her desire to acquire the left bank of the Mississippi looked to the same ends. She had no use for the region simply as so much ter- ritory, but once it was hers, any question of American navigation of the Mississippi would be foreclosed. But now be it noted that, in order to achieve her purposes in the Mississippi country, all that was necessary for Spain to do at the outset was to assert, not a title of her own to the left bank of the River, but merely that of her enemy, Great Britain, which thereupon of course she would be free to acquire by conquest if she could. She, therefore, no less than Great Britain, was able to plead in her behalf the Proclamation of 1763, while, unlike Great Britain, she was not estopped navigation of the river Mississippi shall be equally free, as well to the subjects of Great Britain as to those of France, in its whole breadth and length, from its source to the sea, and ex- pressly that part which is between the said island of New Orleans and the right bank of that river, as well as the passage both in and out of its mouth." Chalmers, Collection of Treaties, I. 467- 83; Martens, Recueil de TraiUs, I. 104-2L THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 229 from contending that the British title to the West was itself founded on conquest. Indeed, this was a natural position for both herself and France to take, since in the Seven Years' War both had contested the British charter claims by force of arms, as France had previously done diplomati- cally. 11 And with reference to the navigation of the Mississippi the position of the Spanish gov- ernment was still more advantageous. The Amer- ican argument was that the British right in this respect had devolved upon the United States in their capacity as proprietors of the former British holdings along the River. 12 In other words, the American claim to this right depended at best upon the further claim, which Spain did not admit, of American proprietorship of the lands in question. But furthermore, the view that the British right to use the Mississippi within territory subject to Spain comprised a servitude for the benefit of all lands adjoining the Missis- u An extended presentation of the French case is to be found in the Memoire historique sur la Louisiane of 1802. See ch. I. 9-13 and note. "This was so, it was urged, both because the grant of right made His Britannic Majesty by article VII of the Treaty of 1763 was intended to run with the soil, was, in other words, an easement, and also because it was in accordance with the Law of Nature and of Nations, that the dwellers along the upper reaches of a river should have access to the sea through its lower reaches. See Journals of Continental Congress, XVIII. 942-3; also American State Papers, I. 252-3, where the argu- ment is renewed by Jefferson as Secretary of State, 1792. 230 FRENCH POLICY AND sippi was rejected by Spain. The right which British subjects enjoyed to pass down the Mis- sissippi through New Orleans and Louisiana, she contended forcefully, was a privilege granted by His Catholic Majesty solely to His Britannic Majesty and would therefore not be claimable by the United States even though they should make good their claims to territory touching the Mis- sissippi to the northward. 18 But the claim of the United States to extend to the Mississippi was also presented as the right of the American People. This argument rested upon the following propositions: first, that "the rights of the king of Great Britain to America were incident to his right of sovereignty over those of his subjects that settled America"; sec- ondly, that, since with the Declaration of Indepen- u See Vergennes' Instructions of July 18 and Sept. 25, 1779, to La Luzerne, infra; also Doniol, IV. 92. There can be little question that Spain's position in this controversy was the correct one at International Law. Thus, after considering the question "whether rights of navigation are possessed by states over rivers, or portions of rivers, not within their territory," in the light of the most important data, W. E. Hall concludes: "From the fore- going facts it appears . . . that where rivers flowing through more than one state are now open, they have usually at some time either been closed or their navigation has been subjected to restrictions or tolls of a kind implying that navigation by foreigners was not a right but a privilege; . . . and that the opening of a river, when it has taken place, having been effected either by convention or decree, has always been consistent with, and has sometimes itself formed, an assertion of the paramount right of property," International Law (5th ed., London, 1904), 139-40. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE dence the right of sovereignty of the king of Great Britain over the people of America was forfeited, all rights founded in that sovereignty were forfeited with it; thirdly, that one such right was the right to the backlands of America. 14 The "Wharton, V. 88-9; Journals of the Continental Congress, XVIII. 936-7; Collections of the New York Historical Society, 1878, pp. 138-9. The last citation gives the argument in the form in which it was presented on the floor of Congress, Aug. 16, 1782. Arthur Lee and Bland of Virginia at once attacked it vigorously. "Congress," said the former, "had no authority but what it derived from the states. The states individually were sovereign and independent, and upon them alone devolved the rights of the Crown within their respective territories." This was the position of the charter states. The position of the "land- less states" was presented by Witherspoon of New Jersey, who first attacking the charter claims as mutually contradictory and conflicting and altogether extravagant, proceeded: "The several states were known to the powers of Europe only as one nation under the style and title of the United States. . . . Whether the uncultivated wilderness on the frontiers should belong to one state or another was a matter of little concern to the European powers. The only argument that would weigh with them was whether it was necessary for the security of the United States that other nations should be excluded from that country, and particu- larly Great Britain, the enemy of these states." On August 27, a petition was reported to Congress from the inhabitants of Kentucky, which, declaring that they considered themselves as "subjects of the United States and not of Virginia" and that "the charter under which Virginia claimed that country had been dissolved, asked Congress "to erect them into a separate and independent state and admit them into the federal Union," loc* cit. } p. 146. Lee declared that the countenance that had been given the petition was "an insult to Virginia." Madison character- ized "the supposition that the right of the crown devolved on the United States" as "so extravagant that it could not enter into the thoughts of any man," to which Witherspoon rejoined that it FRENCH POLICY AND argument thus traversed the general opinion that it was not the American People but the American States that had succeeded to the sovereign rights of Great Britain, but by the same token it was the more accordant with the philosophy of the right of revolution, which is a right of populations and not of political units; and it also did justice to the claims of the "landless" states, of which Mary- land was the unyielding champion. 15 Diplomati- cally, too, it had the advantage of avoiding the difficulties that had their origin from the conflict of titles based on the colonial charters. On the other hand, plainly, it was adequate to establish the American title only as against powers that had recognized American independence, and Spain had not yet done this. The question of the abstract validity of the American claims in the West is, however, a mat- ter, after all, of secondary importance both in our own interest and in fact. Our interest is in the policy of France, which in turn was shaped with reference to these claims quite indifferently to speculative considerations. To anticipate some- evidently could, since it actually had entered into his own thoughts and also "the thoughts of the petitioners and into the thoughts of very many sensible men at the beginning of the present contro- versy," ib., 149. See also J. C. Welling in American Historical Association Papers, III. 167 if. 15 See H. B. Adams, "Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States," Johns Hopkins University Studies, III. pt. I. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 233 what the results of the inquiry to follow : So long as it was a question of pleasing the United States alone, France, having herself no territorial am- bitions on the American continent, accepted the American pretensions without demur. Later however arose, first, the problem of bringing Spain into the war and, secondly, the problem of securing peace with Great Britain, once that power was prepared to accord the main objec- tive of the war, namely American independence. Also, it was always a part of French calculations not to allow the United States to become too strong. The claims, therefore, that it had at first admitted, the French government came eventu- ally to repudiate. Several questions are thus raised: 1. Could France act thus consistently with her engagements with the United States? 2. Was her repudiation supplemented by open championship of the interests of Spain along the Mississippi? 3. What light does her final atti- tude thrown upon the peace negotiations of 1782? In the pages to follow I shall endeavor to answer these questions. France's engagements with the United States touching the territorial possessions of the latter were defined by articles XI and XII of the Treaty of Alliance, which read as follows : XI The United States and France guarantee each to the other, the United States to His Most Christian Majesty his possessions in North America forever; His 234 FRENCH POLICY AND Most Christian Majesty to the United States their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as of com- merce, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests that their Confederation may obtain during the war from any of the dominions now or heretofore possessed by Great Britain in North America, con- formably to the 5th and 6th articles above written, the whole as their possessions shall be affixed and assured to the said states at the moment of the cessation of their present war with England. XII. In order to fix more precisely the sense and application of the preceding article, the contracting parties declare that, in the case of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guaranty declared in the said article shall have its full force and effect the moment such war shall break out ; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guaranty shall not com- mence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and England shall have ascertained their possessions. The first question that arises with reference to these articles is whether "the reciprocal guar- anty" that by article XII was to be effective from the outbreak of the war between France and Great Britain extended to the possessions of the United States at that moment. The French gov- ernment, after its change of position with refer- ence to the pretensions of the United States in the West, contended that this guaranty extended only to the sovereignty and independence of the United States and that, with reference to the possessions and conquests of the United States, THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 235 His Most Christian Majesty's guaranty was not to come into effect till these had been determined by the final treaty of peace. As to conquests there can of course be no doubt of the correctness of this view, for the reason that the subject- matter of the guaranty would come into exist- ence, if at all, only with the treaty of peace. The possessions of the United States, on the other hand, would at any particular moment, what there were of them, be part and parcel of the United States would, geographically speaking, comprise the United States. It was therefore not unreasonable, to say the least, for the American advocates to contend that the guaranty extended by the treaty to the sovereignty and indepen- dence of the United States, and admitted by France to be effective from the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain, extended also, from the necessity of things, to the posses- sions of the United States. Furthermore, the guaranty in question is spoken of as reciprocal. But unless it extended to the possessions of the two powers it was not reciprocal, since it was only certain possessions of France that the United States guaranteed by any view of the treaty. And such direct testimony as we have confirms this view of the matter. Thus, when the Ameri- can envoys saw that they could not get an uncon- ditional alliance and proposed, as a compromise, that the guaranty in the treaty of the indepen- 236 FRENCH POLICY AND dence and liberty of the United States should go into effect at once, Gerard, speaking in the name of the Foreign Office, repelled the suggestion by saying that the independence, liberty, and posses- sions of the United States must all stand on the same footing in this regard; that as to all alike the guaranty was contingent upon the outbreak of war. 15 * And the conclusion to be drawn from Vergennes' vehement protest against Florida Blanca's action in proposing the uti possidetis for the United States in April, 1779, is the same. This, the French secretary declared, menaced France's obligations to the United States at an essential point, which however was the case only on the assumption that France was already the guarantor of the territorial integrity of the United States. 16 Yet suppose we admit, for the sake of the ar- gument, that France did guarantee the posses- sions of the United States "against all other powers" only from the close of the war, to what extent are the engagements incurred by her in the Treaty of Alliance relaxed? Undoubtedly to the extent of relieving her from the necessity of continuing the war with Great Britain for such possessions, as distinguished from the sovereignty and independence of the United States. On the other hand, the concession does not relieve by one " Arthur Lee's "Journal," Lee's Lee, I. 388. For Gerard's later view, see Journals of the Continental Congress, XXIII. 518-9. M See Doniol, III. 802. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 237 whit the incongruity of active championship by France of the right of Spain, as part of the price of bringing that power into the war and keeping her there, to seize the possessions of the United States. In short, the question of the possibility of France's satisfying Spain along the Missis- sippi harmoniously with her engagements with the United States resolves itself into the ques- tion whether the Treaty of Alliance recognized the United States as holding territorial posses- sions in the Mississippi country, possessions from which, as it subsequently developed, Spain de- sired to exclude them. The fifth article of the Treaty of Alliance reads as follows: If the United States shall think it fit to attempt the reduction of the British power remaining in the north- ern parts of America or the islands of Bermudas those countries or islands, in the case of success, shall be confederated with or dependent upon the said United States. Here, as in article XI of the Articles of Confed- eration itself, was a provision looking to the pos- sible accession of Canada to the Americans, or to its conquest, and to one or the other of the even remoter islands of the Bermudas, but entire silence with reference to the region of vastly greater importance to the United States lying to the westward of the Mountains. 17 The implica- 17 This argument is from the Instructions of Oct. 17, 1780, to Jay, Journals of the Continental Congress, XVIII. 941-2. It is as- FRENCH POLICY AND tion could not possibly have escaped those who negotiated the Treaty of Alliance on the part of France, and especially since it had earlier been brought under their direct observation again and again. Thus in the outline of a treaty accom- panying the instructions drawn up by Congress for "the American plenipotentiary destined for France," of September 17th, 1776, there appears a clear distinction between the portion of the con- tinent thought to be involved by the Revolution and such outlying British dominions as Canada and the Floridas. 18 Again, in the project of a treaty which Deane drew up for the French gov- ernment this distinction gives way to a specific guaranty to the United States of the "posses- sion of all that part of the continent of North America which by the last treaty of peace was ceded and confirmed to the crown of Great Britain." 19 Somewhat later Deane also ap- sumed throughout this document, which was largely the work of Madison, that the French guaranty of American possessions became operative with the Treaty of Alliance itself, that is, upon the outbreak of war between France and England. 18 See art. IX of the Plan, Journals of the Continental Congress, V. 770. "Wharton, II. 215-6, and footnote. And of like implication are the following items. On the occasion of General Gates' cele- bration of the Fourth of July at White Plains in 1778, the follow- ing toast was offered: "May our brethren in Canada, Florida, and Nova Scotia speedily enjoy the blessings of free states." Connecticut Courant, July 14, 1778. The Pennsylvania Packet of April 6, 1779, contains a letter from an American gentleman in France, dated Dec. 8, 1778, in which the writer, after reporting THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 239 preached the French government with a scheme for obtaining money for the United States in France on the basis of security furnished by west- ern lands. 20 a rumor that Great Britain had offered American independence through the Spanish ambassador, adds the comment: "We can- not learn that these offers contain anything agreeable respecting Canada, Nova Scotia, or the Fishery." Read in the light of the great concern manifested in Congress for the fate of the region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, such items are very instructive. "Deane proposed his scheme to Congress in his letter of Dec. 1, 1776, Wharton, II. 203-5. "The good and wise part" of Eu- rope, he wrote, "the lovers of liberty and human happiness, look forward to the establishment of American freedom and inde- pendence as an event which will secure to them and their descen- dants an asylum from the effect and violence of despotic power, daily gaining ground in every part of Europe. From those and other considerations . . . emigrations from Europe will be pro- digious immediately on the establishment of American indepen- dency. The consequence of this must be the rise of the lands already settled, and a demand for new or uncultivated land; on this demand I conceive a certain fund may now be fixed. You may smile, and recollect the sale of the bear-skin in the fable, but, at the same time, must be sensible that your wants are real, and if others can be induced to relieve them, it is indifferent to you whether they have a consideration in hand or in prospect." Deane, it must be remembered, came from Connecticut. His perfected scheme is embodied in his proposals, communicated to G6rard, Mar. 18, 1777: "First, There shall be laid out in the most fertile part of the country, purchased or to be purchased of the natives on the banks of the Mississippi or Ohio, a tract of land equal to three hundred miles square, which shall be appropriated as a security for the hiring of money to the United States of North America. Second, each subscriber or lender of money shall have secured to him as many acres of that land as he shall sub- scribe livres, no subscription to be received under 1,000 or 1,200 livres," etc. SMSS., No. 661. 240 FRENCH POLICY AND Certainly France was adequately informed of the pretensions of the United States respecting the West. Yet not only is there no record of her having demurred to these claims, but, on the contrary, the evidence clearly proves that both Bourbon governments at first recognized them as valid, as least so far as the territory between the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Alleghenies, and the somewhat variable northern boundary of the Floridas is concerned. So when, in the course of his interview with the American envoys on De- cember 12th, 1777, Vergennes raised the point that Virginia's charter claims, by extending to the South Sea, tended to "trench on Spain's claims to California," and the Americans pointed to the fact that by the Treaty of 1763 a western limit had been set to the Colonies at the Missis- sippi and suggested that this line be drawn from the source of that river, "this," says Lee in his Journal, "was admitted as adjusting the matter properly." 208 Again, what could have been more explicit than Florida Blanca's assertion in March, 1778, that the Mississippi comprised "a boun- dary sufficiently definite and visible" between the possessions of Spain and those of the United States? 21 Indeed, it was exactly because he Lee's Lee, I. 361. 21 Montmorin to Vergennes, Apr. 10, 1778, Doniol, III. 22. And in the same connection note the implication of certain passages in Aranda's despatches to Florida Blanca of Feb. 23 and Mar. 23, 1778. "I incline," he writes in the former, "to the opinion THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE recognized this to be the case that the Spanish minister feared the United States to the degree that he did: the prescriptive rights of the United States, sanctioned as they were by France, made the situation irremediable. Vergennes, on the other hand, it will be recalled, was at great pains to allay these fears, but even so, he did not assert that the Americans were intruders in the region between the Mountains and the Spanish domin- that the great question with the [American] commissioners will be as to retaining Canada and Florida, and that the Congress will make resistance, as it will not want the English for neighbors, but will wish to remain complete and absolute in all that part of North America." Sparks MSS., CII. In the latter occurs the following passage: "Still less will he [the king of Spain] dis- please the colonies after the signs of protection that he has given them, and being a new power which must come to be a formidable one and upon which he is to border alone and which would never pardon such a turning of the back," etc. The im- portant point is that Aranda here recognizes the United States to be at that date a power bordering on Spanish dominions. Note also the following words from his despatch of Aug. 4 of the same year: "It seems to me that the intention of this Court cannot be to maintain that the new United States should charge themselves with the rest of the Northern Provinces, but that they should be limited to the thirteen confederated from the begin- ning." Thus the court of London may "avoid the disgrace of losing the whole of the continent of America." The contrast, it will be observed, is between the thirteen confederated Colonies and the northern ones. Another interesting document in the same connection is Franklin's letter of Dec. 12, 1775, to Don Gabriel of Bourbon: "... I think I see a powerful dominion growing up here, whose interest it will be to form a close and firm alliance with Spain (their territories bordering)." Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, V. 548. Don Gabriel, therefore, was informed of America's pretensions in the West from the first. 242 FRENCH POLICY AND ions On the contrary, he made the very distinc- tion that was common with Americans, between the parts of America in revolt and such outlying regions as the Floridas and Canada; he cited "the vast expanse" of the existing dominion of the United States to prove that it would be ages be- fore America would care for further accessions of territory; and he contrasted the Americans as "peaceable, unambitious neighbors" with the "avaricious, implacable" British. 22 But the Spanish minister, unconvinced by the reasoning of the French secretary, at last came to the deci- sion that it would be necessary for Spain to take the law into her own hands and expel the Ameri- cans from the banks of the Mississippi. He did not suggest, however, that the matter was one to be treated of with France, though the conquest of the Floridas, involving American interests but not American rights, was such a subject. And eventually the Treaty of Aranjuez was signed. Spain's apprehension of the United States had by this time reached its climax, as had also the anxiety of France to bring Spain into the war. Yet on the question of the western limits of the United States the treaty maintained complete silence. M Doniol, II. 785; III. 51, 561. The argument, however, from the distinction made between colonies in revolt, on the one hand, and Canada and the Floridas, on the other, should not, in the case of Vergennes, be pressed too rigorously, since it does not clearly appear whether he regarded Canada as including Quebec as organized under the Act of 1774, though his recognition of Virginia's charter claims would tend to indicate that he did not. CHAPTER XI SIEUK GERARD AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS The views finally adopted by the Spanish gov- ernment with reference to the Mississippi ques- tion apparently originated on this side of the Atlantic in the fertile brain of an Havana mer- chant, one Juan de Miralles, who having been forced by mishap to put into Charleston early in 1778 in the course of a voyage to Cadiz, later received a commission from the captain-general of Cuba to act as a sort of observer of affairs in the United States for His Catholic Majesty. 1 1 According to his letter of Feb. 13, 1778, to Galvez, Miralles had set out from Havana for Cadiz the previous Dec. 31, but had been forced by a leakage of the vessel bearing him to put into Charleston, Jan. 9. He had remained there since the latter date because of an interdict upon the departure of vessels from the harbor, due to the presence outside of a British blockading squad- ron, which had shown itself very unscrupulous in seizing neutral vessels. He intended to sojourn at Charleston till a favorable opportunity offered itself to continue his journey or to return to Havana. Meantime, he asked letters to Washington, Laurens, et al. His purpose in visiting Cadiz was to secure the mon- opoly of carrying negroes to Havana, the right of the existing monopolists being about to lapse. He would like to institute such a commerce from the Southern American states. Would Galvez urge his claims upon the king? As we have already seen, Florida Blanca had announced in September, 1778, that Spain then had, 244 FRENCH POLICY AND "A typical Spaniard, infinitely zealous and well- informed in the interests of his court in this part of the world," Miralles came to Philadelphia with the idea that France should conquer Canada and that Spain should conquer "all that the English had acquired by the Treaty of 1763 in Florida and on the Mississippi"; but especially did he "give himself over to all the speculations which the possession of the Floridas and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi could suggest." And the basis of these speculations was the con- viction that sooner or later, the Americans were bound to become the enemies of Spain; that, in- deed, this contingency was no remote one. 2 Miralles' first care was to put himself in close relations with M. Gerard, who seems to have regarded his views, so far as they touched the interests of Spain, with entire complacency. Thus in his despatch of July 25, 1778, to Ver- gennes, heralding Miralles' appearance at Phila- delphia, Gerard wrote: I have persuaded him to report to his court that Con- gress would never consent from mere generosity to renounce the navigation of the Mississippi [which is] or would presently have an agent in America to observe develop- ments. I infer that the actual business of despatching such an agent was left to Galvez, who, seeing the opportunity offered by Miralles' accidental presence at Charleston, commissioned him to act in this capacity. The letter just paraphrased is to be found in the Sparks MSS., XCVII. Miralles did not appear in Philadelphia till July, 1T78. * Gerard to Vergennes, July 25, 1778, Doniol, III. 293-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 245 necessary to serve as an outlet for the immense settle- ments which the Americans are proposing to make along the Ohio and other rivers tributary to it ; that the expe- dition commenced by Major Willing in those parts was about to be followed up ; that it had been suggested that Pensacola be offered Spain, while what the English hold on the left bank of the Mississippi be retained; that it appeared to me important that His Catholic Majesty should calculate upon this difficulty in advance ; that the only means of obviating it, as it seemed to me, was not to put it in the way of the Americans to formulate de- mands in regard to the matter, that is to say, to dis- pense with their aid, indeed to forestall it, by seizing these lands with Spanish forces alone. "Don Juan," Gerard concluded, "feels that my observations are correct and has promised me to render an account of them." 3 & Loc. cit. See also Miralles to Galvez, Aug. 20, 1778, Sparks MSS. Here Miralles speaks of a plan communicated to him by Patrick Henry, then governor of Virginia for an expedition against St. Augustine, the ultimate objective of which was to be the conquest of the provinces of Mobile, Mississippi, Pensa- cola, and Florida. The original author of the plan, which called for the assemblage of three thousand men at Savannah, was the Marquis de Br^tigny, with whom and the president of Congress Miralles discussed it at length. The latter treated the matter rather lightly: it was good enough to kill time with over a bottle of wine. None the less, Br6tigny laid the plan before Congress in French and reported that this body had sent it to the inter- preter. Miralles expresses the opinion that the conquest will be easy, but fears that American cooperation will give rise to pretexts "injurious to the dominions of the king. I say," he con- tinues, "the same as to the conquest of Pensacola, Mobile, Mis- sissippi, and the other countries on the Mississippi river," etc., "because if the neighbors assist in the conquest they will surely claim the use and free passage of this river, ... so as to pass 246 FRENCH POLICY AND But presently we find Gerard going far beyond this tone of disinterested criticism and becoming the avowed champion of the cause represented by the Spanish agent. For this there were several reasons: To begin with, diplomacy, unlike the law, recognizes no such category of questions as res adjudicatae. Again, as I have already pointed out, it was the most natural thing in the world for a Frenchman to take the position that England's title to the lands along the Mississippi was founded on conquest alone and was, there- fore, open to conquest by an enemy. Yet again, Gerard was well aware of the anxiety of his gov- ernment to meet the views of Spain at all possible out to the Gulf of Mexico. It cannot but be apparent to the least informed person . . . how prejudicial this would be." Br6- tigny's plan was reported to Congress adversely by the Board of War, Oct. 31, 1778, Journals of the Continental Congress, XII. 1083; but was again brought before that body by a letter from Miralles Nov. 24, 1779, ib. f XV. 1301. This time the plan had the backing of the diplomatic La Luzerne and was also aided by the growing seriousness of the military situation in the South. On Dec. 16, accordingly, it was resolved "that General Lincoln . . . be ... empowered ... to ... concert with the Governor of Havana, or any other person or persons properly authorized by His Catholic Majesty, such plan as shall in his opinion be best calculated to insure the reduction of the enemy's force in the state of Georgia . . . and for the conquest of East Florida." North Carolina voted "nay," and Georgia was not present. 76., 1388-9. More specifically, Congress' expectations were, that Spain would furnish six vessels of the line and five thousand troops, that Georgia would first be recovered, and that then the joint expedition would turn to Florida. The plan fell through when Lincoln was forced to surrender at Charleston. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 247 points and, in fact, was under specific instructions to forward these views in several respects. Fi- nally, Gerard had little understanding of, or sympathy for the American point of view as rep- resented in Congress. 4 This body, changing in membership and com- plexion of opinion from day to day, voicing a variety of local interests and personal animosities, deferring strangely, now to the views of popular committees, now to the pretensions of thir- teen petty sovereignties, fell quite without the cut and dried categories of the French representa- tive's experience as a diplomat and bureaucrat. Unfortunately, it was this fact precisely that M. Gerard most fatally failed to recognize. Fol- lowing his controversy with Congress over the subject of a separate peace, it is apparent that Gerard pictured that body to himself as a species of landtag or diet of the sort that France in the case of her client states on the Continent sought to dominate by division. In the case of the 4 A characterization of Gerard by Stormont occurs in the latter's despatch of Aug. 21, 1776: "M. Gerard is the most likely person for M. de Vergennes to employ [in dealing with Deane], and he could employ no man who would undertake such a com- mission with more alacrity. I have known him long. He has parts, address, and no small share of artifice. He was much trusted at Vienna by M. de Chatelt, and he has the same spirit of intrigue, the same desperate policy, the same jealousy and implacable hatred of Great Britain." SMSS., No. 1350. It was partly this talent for intrigue that involved Gerard in difficulties with Congress. 248 FRENCH POLICY AND Swedish Diet, for instance, it had been the "Hats" and the "Caps," the one the party of France," the other of Russia. So in the case of Congress it was "the Patriots," "the Friends of the Alliance," "the Friends of Peace," on the one hand, "the Swelled Heads" ("Tetes Exaltees"), "the Anti-Gallicans," "the Anglicans" on the other. That the latter and its leaders, Richard Henry Lee and Samuel Adams, contemplated treason to the alliance at the first opportunity, Gerard had little doubt ; and as the same faction stood for the American claims in the West, it followed inevitably that those claims must be spurious. 5 It is to be noted, however, that Gerard was shrewd enough to begin his proselyting in Spain's behalf with the representative of a state that had only a very moderate interest in the land ques- tion, Gouverneur Morris of New York. To Morris he urged the necessity of Congress' re- assuring Spain and suggested, to that end, that 5 Aside from an interesting but quite inadequate article by John Fiske in the Atlantic Monthly, LXIV. 220 ffg., the subject of Parties in the Continental Congress has received little attention in proportion to its importance. Some of the documents in the SMSS. are interesting in this connection; see Nos. 487, 729, 733, 737, 1616. There is also much scattered material to be gleaned from the press of the date; see, for instance, the Pennsylvania Packet of May 20, 1778, and Rivington's Gazette (Loyalist, N. Y. City), of Mar. 8, 1780. Still more valuable are the despatches of G6rard and La Luzerne; see the Index to Doniol, under "Congres," "G6rard," "La Luzerne." THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 249 St. Augustine, Pensacola, and Mobile, and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi be guaran- teed her. The American replied, in characteris- tic vein, that he appreciated the necessity of setting limits to the Confederacy, and particu- larly to the South, since he was thoroughly per- suaded that the virtues required by a republic were to be bred only in a hardy climate. Indeed, he himself thought that to hand over the naviga- tion of the Mississippi to Spain from the mouth of the Ohio would be accordant with the best interests of the United States, inasmuch as it was the only measure calculated to keep the growing population between the Ohio, the St. Lawrence, and the Mississippi dependent on the republic. At the same time he was aware that many members of Congress regarded this as a privilege which appertained to the United States of right and that, furthermore, there were power- ful private interests enlisted in maintaining this right. 6 Forearmed with this not unfriendly warning, Gerard began a couple of months later approach- ing groups of delegates with vague insinuations bearing more or less remotely on the matter he had at heart. On December 22d he gave a din- ner to which Miralles and several Congressmen were invited, in honor of Jay, who had just been e G6rard to Vergennes, Oct. 20, 1778, Doniol, II. 72-3. As to the private interests involved, see Wharton, III. 135. 250 FRENCH POLICY AND elected president of Congress. Sitting "la pipe a la louche" the participants spent several hours canvassing the subject of what sort of principles ought to govern the new republic in relation to other powers. Gerard admonished his hearers that all Europe suspected the American people of having inherited the aggressive and turbulent spirit of their ancestors and deduced the neces- sity they were under of proving the contrary. Fortunately they had an opportunity to evidence their love of justice by drawing "a permanent line of separation between the Spanish posses- sions and their own." A formal proposition to Spain, even though it were rejected, could but do them credit in the eyes of the world, by dem- onstrating their willingness to renounce both for themselves and posterity all ambition for con- quest. His hearers acknowledged the wisdom of his remarks but protested that the American Constitution was incompatible with the spirit of conquest, notwithstanding which they felt con- fident that Congress "would furnish all the additional assurances that lay within its power." Gerard ought at this point, one would think, have brought forward the question of the navi- gation of the Mississippi. In point of fact, he kept discreetly silent on that topic. "It is," he wrote Vergennes, "a matter to be handled with secrecy and dexterity," for there existed in Con- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE gress, he had found, "the materials of a powerful party" opposed to Spain's interests. 7 However, Gerard did not long continue in this balancing posture. As usual, Congress was at this date in great financial straits. The idea ac- cordingly suggested itself to the French and Spanish representatives that that body might be induced to sell Spain its "recent conquests in Louisiana and the Illinois country"; and in a series of conferences held at Miralles* and Ge- rard's dwellings, this suggestion was broached to Jay and certain of his associates. How far nego- tiations actually proceeded on this basis cannot, T Circourt, Histoire de I' Alliance, etc., III. 260-3. An earlier con- ference of similar purport is more briefly reported in Gerard's despatch of Dec. 12, Doniol, IV. 64-5. These conferences were followed by one with Washington, which is recounted in the despatch of Dec. 30: J'ai observe que 1'Angleterre auroit vraisemblablement la plus grande r6pugnance a c6der aux Etats- Unis des territoires qui ne font point partie int6grante des Colonies . . . que les Etats, n'ayant a cet egard qu'un simple droit de conquete, ne doivent naturellement pas s'attendre que leurs allies faissent la guerre un jour de plus pour leur procurer un aggrandissement Stranger aux principes fondamentaux du sys- teme de notre union, acquisition d6sagr6ee et pleine d'inconviens pour PEspagne. On a paru sentir vivement la force de cette reflexion, et j'espere que cela contribuera a determiner les offres a faire a cette Couronne. M. Washington m'ayant demande quelle compensation le roy demanderoit si ses forces concourraient a la conqufcte du Canada, ma r^ponse a 6t6 que je 1'ignorois, mais que j'6tois convaincu qu'elle seroit analogue a lettre et a Pesprit du traite d'alliance." Apparently, while G6rard, in speaking of ter- ritory that "formed no integral part of the colonies" had the Mississippi country in mind, Washington thought he was referring to Canada. Ib., 38. FRENCH POLICY AND unfortunately, be determined, as the published Journals of Congress are silent on the subject, but according to a letter of Miralles, written late in January, Congress had appointed a committee of one member from each state to consider his proposals, and he had been informed by a member that favorable action was all but imminent. In- deed, according to a report of later date, Miralles had named the enormous sum of two hundred million livres as the amount that Spain would be willing to pay for the territory she desired, an offer which, had it been made definite, should have been quite irresistible. 8 Be that as it may, Gerard now began taking the frankest possible tone in discussing the con- flict of interests between Spain and the United States in the West. "I stated," says he, report- ing a conference that occurred late in January with a committee of Congress, that the United States had no sort of right to the possessions of the English monarch which would not appertain equally to the king of Spain whenever he should become engaged in war with England ; that their right was restricted to the territory which they pos- sessed as English colonies ; that in admitting the demand of isolated and scattered establishments, they contra- dicted the principles of justice and equity which had directed the Revolution . . . ; that ... the king 8 For the matter of this paragraph, see Miralles to Galvez, Dec. 28, 1778, and Jan. 22 and 29, 1779; also Rendon to Galvez, May 10, 1780, Sparks MSS., XCVII. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 253 would never prolong the war a single day to procure for them the possessions they coveted; that such benefits were absolutely foreign to the principles of the alliance and especially to the policy of the United States toward Spain, as well as the interests of that power ; that good feeling would never be established with Spain so long as she had so great reason for distrust. 9 In a word, Gerard conveyed the idea that, if his government had ever accepted American preten- sions in the West, it did so no longer. In this, however, he was altogether, and probably delib- erately, misleading. For it is quite evident that the Foreign Office followed in the wake of its plenipotentiary's opinions in this matter rather than vice versa; and at this date, the Office was still unaware that these had changed. Early in February Vergennes' despatch of the previous October arrived at Philadelphia, an- nouncing that France had accepted Spain's offer of mediation and urging that Congress proceed at once to formulate the conditions upon which it would consent to peace. The document gives every evidence that the secretary still regarded the United States as the rightful proprietors of the region west of the Alleghenies. Thus speak- ing of the disposition to be made in the treaty of peace of Canada, Nova Scotia, the Floridas, and the Newfoundland fisheries, it says: 9 Gerard to Vergennes, Jan. 28, 1779, Circourt, op. dt., III. 264-6. 254 FRENCH POLICY AND It would be of advantage, Monsieur, that Congress' ultimatum should include, first, the renunciation of Canada and Nova Scotia, or at least of Canada and the fisheries along the coasts of Newfoundland; secondly, the abandonment in favor of Spain of the Floridas, or of such parts of these colonies as shall meet the favor- able acceptance of Spain. In other words, the distinction between the British colonies in revolt and such outlying re- gions as the Floridas and Canada still underlies the secretary's thinking about the territorial question; and, as we have already seen, the quite inevitable deduction from this distinction is rec- ognition of the extension of the United States, at least between the Ohio river and the some- what indefinite northern boundary of West Florida, to the Mississippi. And of like implication are the secretary's words on the question of the navigation of the Mississippi : I do not know [he wrote] and I am unable to previse the intentions of the court of Madrid on this subject. But I judge from the situation of places that the Americans will insist upon the liberty of navigating the Mississippi for the settlements which they propose to establish along the Ohio, and I assure you that it would appear astonishing to me should anyone attempt to jefuse them this demand. However, there may be some considerations of a local nature that I am ignorant of on the other side of the question, considerations merit- ing attention. You are in position to obtain the requi- site information whether from the Americans themselves THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 255 or from M. Miralles ; and if they appear to be of such a character as to justify the refusal of Spain, you ought to prepare the Americans for it with prudence and management. But in the contrary case, you ought to prevail upon the Spanish agent, not only to avoid charg- ing his court with prepossessions on the subject, but also to lay the matter before it in such fashion that it will find no difficulty in according the Americans the consent which they will not fail to demand of it. 10 Two weeks later, Gerard addressed Congress as a body on the subject of peace terms. Speak- ing of the necessity of meeting "the convenience of Spain," he was challenged to explain what he meant: I answered [he writes] that His Catholic Majesty is too great and generous to desire an acquisition of terri- tory . . . , that it was the security of his frontier and the prevention of trouble with his neighbors that gave him his only concern . . . , that the possession of Pen- sacola and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi could alone fulfil this object. 11 At this date Congress was still hopeful of a recognition from His Catholic Majesty, a hope which Miralles did not scruple to foster by dis- seminating misleading rumors. 12 In general "Doniol, III. 569-70. u Gerard to Vergennes, Feb. 17, 1779, Doniol, IV. 110-4. "See ft., III. 294. The earliest word to reach America of the alliance represented Spain as party to it, SMSS., 821. The Con- tinental Journal and Weekly Advertiser (Boston) of June 18, 1778, contained the following item from a London correspondent: "We can now assure the public that on Saturday a rescript was delivered from the court of Spain recognizing the independence of America." 256 FRENCH POLICY AND terms, therefore, Congress was quite willing to declare its intention of meeting Spain's desires. Nevertheless, it was speedily made clear to Ge- rard by delegates from Virginia and North Caro- lina, that the navigation of the Mississippi was not a matter admitting of unlimited concession. The West, said they, was filled up with adventur- ers, fugitives from justice, bandits ; this was not by the desire of the states, but it was a fact ; the way to civilize these people was to tie them up with in- dustry and property, for which access to the sea by way of the Mississippi was essential to them ; that Spain should continue to hold the key to that river, and even to strengthen her control by the acquisition of the Floridas was all right; but at least she must accord the West a port of entry at its mouth and, preferably, a Mediterranean port as well; such a policy would be a boon to Spain's own commerce. 13 Gerard, though ob- viously impressed by these representations, has- tened to disavow any special knowledge of Spain's commercial system; and meantime the matter of concession to Spain was becoming in- volved with other issues. With the general ques- tion of peace terms before it, Congress proceeded to develop principles meant to obtain for the United States as much as possible in all direc- tions, the principle, for example, that the United States was entitled to independence plus all that 18 G6rard to Vergennes, Feb. 18, ib., IV. 114-5. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 257 had incontestably belonged to the British prov- inces at the moment of the outbreak of the Revo- lution; that the very notion of independence implied the possession of Nova Scotia; and so on. 14 Noting the trend of opinion, the plenipo- tentiary brought forward the suggestion that the fixation of boundaries be deferred till the negotia- tion of peace, a suggestion designed to give the mediating power a chance to make its voice heard. The idea, he regretfully admits, found no partisans. 15 In fact, Gerard was soon to discover that his troubles had only begun. From his first recep- tion of the news of mediation he had urged that Congress should hasten its work. In the middle of March, however, that body began a four months' wrangle over the question whether the United States should refuse any peace by which Great Britain did not accord them the privilege they had enjoyed as her provinces of participat- ing in the Newfoundland fisheries. The interest back of this proposition was a local one, but vital to the locality concerned. 16 It was also ably 14 The father of this species of dialectic was Samuel Adams, ib., 83, footnote 1, and 93, footnote 1. 15 76., 92. 16 For some contemporary newspaper discussion of the propriety of making the right to fish off the Grand Banks a sine qua non of peace and of delaying Congress' decision in the matter of peace terms for the benefit of New England, see the Pennsylvania Evening Post of early July, 1779, and the Pennsylvania Gazette of June 23. Of especial interest in this connection is a manu- 258 FRENCH POLICY AND represented and soon had a powerful party at its behest. And not only was the French govern- ment's program of facilitating peace put in jeo- pardy by the proposal to make the fisheries a sine qua non condition, but the privilege sought could by no stretch of the terms of the Treaty of Al- liance be brought within its purview. Gerard's blood was aroused as it had not been before, and this time at least, it is impossible not to accord him a measure of sympathy. "I told them," he records in his report of May 14th, "that I was convinced that England would grant them the fisheries by the same title as that by which they had previously held them, to wit, as subjects of the British crown, but that they had no need of the aid of France for that arrangement." 17 At this date he thought he had a considerable ma- script in the office of the secretary of state of North Carolina, unsigned and undated; but in the hand of Thomas Burke, a North Carolina member of the Continental Congress at this period. The document, for a transcript of which I am endebted to Mr. Waldo T. Leland of Washington, comprises an account of the proceedings in Congress from March to July, 1779, relative to peace terms. Burke expresses sympathy for New England's interest in the fisheries but condemns the New England leaders for the lengths to which they pushed their claims. "Their claims," he writes, "extended so far as to interfere with the rights which must by the Law of Nations belong to Britain after the war . . . and such rights as Britain is always jealous of in so high a degree that she would make war at any time to prevent encroachments on them." It is to be noted that Burke does not regard the territorial question as having caused delay. "Doniol, IV. 138. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 259 jority of the delegates with him but a month later he had to confess that "the Party of Peace" was in a serious predicament, due largely, he charges, to the hostile influence of Thomas Jef- ferson. 18 The crisis came the middle of July, when Jay and "two other well-intentioned dele- gates," "torn and battered by the fray" and fore- seeing civil war if New England was longer opposed, advised the French representative that the game was up. In the interview that followed Gerard by turns pleaded with, threatened, and cajoled his interlocutors: France was a great power and would remain one even if America de- serted the alliance, but that America, taking counsel of her sense of shame, would never do. The prospect, however dismaying, would never force the king "to submit his neck to the yoke they would fain impose upon him." I added that some people appeared to entertain the wish of breaking down the relations of France with Spain, but that I believed myself able to predict that, if the Americans had the audacity to reduce His Ma- jesty to the necessity of choosing between the two, his decision would not be in favor of the United States ; and I saw with astonishment and grief that the guardians of America's welfare saw in public affairs only their own factional and local interests, as if the whole world would bow down before their capricious and changeable resolutions, confined within the circle of their own ad- vantage, . . . that certainly the king would not con- 18 76 V 135 ffg., 153-5, 165-7, 174-5, etc. 260 FRENCH POLICY AND sent to consume the rest of his realm through a succession of years in order to procure a small increase of fortune for a few New England shipowners. 19 These vigorous representations met with a de- gree of success. For in the instructions finally voted by Congress on August 14th the claim to a share in the Newfoundland fisheries was, so far as the anticipated treaty of peace was concerned, left to the chances of negotiation and its recogni- tion made a sine qua non condition only of the commercial treaty with England which it was expected would follow the conclusion of hostili- ties. 20 But in doing this much, Gerard had done his utmost. The making a commercial treaty with England dependent upon American participa- tion in the fisheries was to the prejudice of the tobacco states, whose further interests in the West, accordingly, Congress was less disposed than ever to sacrifice. By the same instructions of August 14th, the western boundary of the United States northward of 31 north latitude was asserted to be the Mississippi, and the recog- nition by Great Britain of this boundary was made an ultimatum. 21 A month later further "Gerard to Vergennes, July 14, ib., 177-81; see also, same to same, July 18, ib., 219-23, where the plenipotentiary vigorously attacks the selfishness of individual states. " Journals of the Continental Congress, XIV. 960-1. However, a treaty of commerce could have been entered into by the "unanimous consent" of the states, without Great Britains' having met the sine qua non. */&., 958-9. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 261 resolutions were adopted proffering the assent of the United States to His Catholic Majesty's conquest of the Floridas, on condition that he accede to the treaties between the United States and France, and "provided always, that the United States shall enjoy the free navigation of the river Mississippi into and from the sea." Also, the American negotiator was "particularly to endeavor to obtain" for Americans, their ves- sels and merchandise, a free port or ports south of the thirty-first parallel. 22 On October 4th, John Adams, a reliable cham- pion of New England's interests, was appointed the representative of the United States for the purpose of negotiating peace and John Jay, whose attitude on the boundary question was at this date somewhat ambiguous, American repre- sentative at Madrid. 23 Meantime, Gerard, broken in health and awaiting the arrival of his 22 Journals, XV. 1084, under date of Sept. 17. On Oct. 13, Witherspoon of New Jersey, seconded by Governeur Morris of New York, moved that "the claim of a free navigation of the Mississippi" be receded from if the obtaining of it "be found an insuperable bar to the proposed treaties of amity and com- merce between these states and His Catholic Majesty," ib., 1168. The motion was voted down. Its ultimate triumph is discussed infra. Ib., 1142-3. The result was arrived at, after a long contest, by a combination of Jay's and Adams' friends. See ib., 1107 and 1113. It should be noted that Adams' known bias supplied the deficiency of his instructions with reference to the fisheries, while Jay's instructions on the Mississippi question made his personal opinion a matter of indifference. 262 FRENCH POLICY AND successor with impatience, had become thor- oughly disgusted with Congress. "The only way to save America from her madness and despite herself," he wrote Vergennes, "would be for the king to take advantage of the delay and conclude a peace along the general lines of the alliance." 24 The appointment of Jay afforded him a meas- ure of consolation at the moment of his with- drawal from America, but even that was far from concealing his practical defeat. 25 31 Despatch of July 31, Doniol, IV. 201. 38 See t6 v 211. For the exchange of compliments between Ge>ard and Congress that attended the former's leave-taking, see Jour- nals, XV. 1072-4, 1085. CHAPTER XII THE MISSION OF LA LUZERNE Compared with that of his predecessor, the mission of Louis XVFs second plenipotentiary to his republican allies was a pronounced success. In great part no doubt the circumstances of the war, as we shall see presently, made the Chevalier de La Luzerne's triumph inevitable, but this fact should not obscure to us that gentleman's own personal deserts in the least. Affable of address, good-natured, sensible, direct, bent on discovering and reporting the facts rather than a confirma- tion of his own views about things, experienced in meeting men on their own level, turning a dis- cerning eye upon vulnerable points of character, and with a wholesome endowment of the spirit of laissez aller, La Luzerne acquired a personal as- cendancy over Congress in matters touching the common cause of France and the United States that had never fallen to the lot of the acrid and pedantic Gerard, even in the honeymoon days of the alliance. His methods, it must be admitted, were not always unexceptionable, for if we are to believe his own accounts, he sought on occasion 263 264 FRENCH POLICY AND to "accelerate public opinion" as expressed in Congress by well-placed douceurs, whereas Ge- rard seems to have done nothing more reprehen- sible than to subsidize pamphleteers and writers for the papers. On the whole, however, the Con- gresses that the later envoy had to deal with were of higher average character than some that had come earlier; and his greatest triumph, the vot- ing of the Peace Instructions of June 15th, 1781, was brought about with the assent and assistance of men who would have scored bribes. 1 1 For a characterization by the Englishman Wraxall, see Whar- ton, I. 84 (p. 425). "The Count de La Luzerne," wrote Gouver- neur Morris, "is an indolent, pleasant companion, a man of honor and obstinate as you please, but he has somewhat of the creed of General Gates, that the world does a great part of its own business without the aid of those who are at the base of affairs," ib. For testimony to La Luzerne's services to the mili- tary establishment, see La Fayette to Vergennes, May 20, July 23, Oct. 4, 1780, and Feb. 1, 1781, SMSS., Nos. 1625, 1626, 1627, and 1633. La Fayette notes that La Luzerne pays no attention to the quarrels of private individuals and that he is held in the greatest esteem both in and out of Congress. Another item to the same effect is to be found in Rivington's Royal Gazette of May 3, 1780. In a letter of the previous month from a gentleman in Maryland to a correspondent in St. Eustatia, complaint is made that France has "gained an absolute ascendancy over the councils and gov- ernment of the country." "M. G6rard . . . laid the foundation of French influence. M. La Luzerne . . . has steadily pursued the same steps." He advised Congress to pass the act of Mar. 18, 1780, redeeming the Continental currency at the ratio of 40 to 1. He "commands the majority of that body as much as the English ministry do that of the British Parliament. He has told them that if they mean to govern this continent, they must keep the people poor. . . . This, says he, is our maxim in France. . . . Poor men THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 265 At the outset, however, La Luzerne was forced to treat the situation before him more or less from the point of view of others, since his first instruc- tions, bearing the dates July 18th and September 25th, 1779, were prepared by the French Foreign Office exclusively in the light of the information that had come from Gerard. We are not sur- prised, then, to find these despatches setting forth the following ideas: That there existed in Con- gress a party headed by the Lees and Adamses which, if it had not "already sold out to Eng- land," at any rate sought to establish principles diametrically opposed to the alliance; that this party stood for a separate negotiation with Eng- land to be followed by an alliance with that power, for the prolongation of the war for ob- jectives outside the scope of the alliance, and for opposition to the interests of His Catholic Majesty; that since Spain was now a party to the war and thus a defender, at least indirectly, of American independence, it was the duty of Con- gress to satisfy that power in the matter of a fixed western boundary for the United States, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the con- make the most obedient subjects and the best soldiers." For instances of La Luzerne's intervention with Congress in behalf of greater military efficiency, see Wharton, III. 683-5 and 803-5. Though he did not mingle in the quarrels of individuals and fac- tions, he did combat openly Arthur Lee's candidacy for the secretaryship of Foreign Affairs, in 1781, and with success, secur- ing the selection of Robert R. Livingston. See Doniol, IV. 597. 266 FRENCH POLICY AND quest of the Floridas; that the United States had no title to the lands adjoining the Mississippi, but that that region was still English and there- fore subject to conquest by Spain, and that Spain ought to conquer it with a view to procuring "clear, exact, precise, and unchangeable" limits to the pretensions of the United States and espe- cially "to forestalling the hopes of conquest to which the provinces of the South might give themselves over"; that the Americans probably never had any right to navigate the Mississippi, since "the boundaries of the British provinces did not extend to that river" and it would be absurd for them to claim the right on the score of England's title; that the Floridas did not ap- pertain to the United States under any title, but that Spain had the greatest interest in reposses- sing herself of this colony, which was so necessary to insure her commerce on the Gulf of Mexico from outside disturbance; that the guaranty pledged by France to the United States by article XI of the Treaty of Alliance was definitive only as to their sovereignty and independence and would extend to their possessions only from the close of the war; that the French government was confirmed in its espousal of Spain's interests in North America by the consideration that it was itself without interest in seeing that conti- nent "enjoy the role of a power or in seeing her in a position to give disquiet to her neighbors"; THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 267 that, in other words, "the only purpose of our views with reference to the United States is that they shall be independent and peaceable." 2 La Luzerne received the despatch of July 18th on January 20th, 1780, seven months after it was penned, and a few days later communicated its purport to Congress. At one point, however, he deviated conspicuously, if not from the letter, at least the spirit of his instructions. For while Vergennes' obvious intention had been that the whole influence of France should be brought to bear upon Congress in the interest of Spain, La Luzerne had been long enough on the ground to have discovered that this would never do. For the tone of advocating Spain's views he accord- ingly substituted that of impartially reporting them, with the result of implying that his own government's concern was limited to having brought to an end an unfortunate difference of opinion between its allies. But his discretion availed him little. For one thing, the very fact that Spain was now in the war for her own ob- jects prejudiced his efforts ; for it was well argued that the principal reason for concession to Spain The most material portions of these documents are given in Doniol, IV. 224-5 and 357-61. They are given complete in Circourt, op. tit., III. 266-84. Cf. Journals of the Continental Congress, XXIII. 518-9, where is quoted an argument of Gerard's, dated May 22, 1779, on the guaranty. This, says the en- voy, "ne commercera qu'a P6poque a laquelle les possessions des Etats-Unis auront 6t constat6es par la cessation de la guerre." 268 FRENCH POLICY AND had been all along to make her a party to the war, whether as an ally of the United States or not, and that this reason was now at an end. More- over, as it chanced, La Luzerne was also under the necessity at this juncture of disclosing to Congress the final terms on which Spain had of- fered mediation to Great Britain and Vergennes' objections thereto. Such candor, on the part of our ally, as well his opposition to the principle of the status quo, was of course most reassuring, but the effects of the communication upon Con- gress' attitude toward His Catholic Majesty was naturally bad. When therefore, La Luzerne re- ported, it was learned that the Spanish monarch claimed the right to conquer the lands to the east of the Mississippi, he found himself confronted with "reasons already very powerful" to which were now added "unfavorable dispositions," and his endeavors to rebut the American claims, he frankly owned, "made little impression." This was early in February. A month later the Phila- delphia Gazette published an account by Miralles of recent Spanish successes along the Mississippi. The effect of this disclosure was, La Luzerne wrote his government, great public excitement and a universal disposition to assert the American title to this territory. Thus it was pointed out that several states had sold and were still selling lands in the regions involved; that adventurers from the states were planting the banners of their THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 269 provinces there; that George Rogers Clark had, in behalf of his state Virginia, been waging war against the British posts in the Northwest for nearly two years. In his perplexity La Luzerne turned to Miralles, who astonished him by dis- closing the fact for the first time that he possessed neither any direct authority from Madrid nor yet any certain knowledge of its intentions. Never- theless, the arrival at this moment of the despatch of September 25th forced the French representa- tive to renew his efforts in Spain's behalf, which he did with the usual measure both of discretion and effect. Even delegates whose friendship to the alliance could not be questioned expressed regret that Spain should thus seek to sow seeds of discord between herself and the United States. Some months later La Luzerne reported the fol- lowing words of a Virginia delegate, with refer- ence both to the land question and the question of the navigation of the Mississippi: "We should be endeavoring to deceive Spain if, in treating with her, we obligated ourselves to make a renun- ciation that the nature of things renders impos- sible." In the same report, La Luzerne also noted that the delegates from the Northern states, though without direct interest in the mat- ter, generally sustained the pretensions of the South. 3 3 For this paragraph, see Doniol, IV. 331-7 paraphrasing re- ports from La Luzerne between the dates Jan. 25 and Aug. 25, 270 FRENCH POLICY AND La Luzerne's candid, if somewhat discursive, reports furnished his government for the first time with anything like a true picture of Ameri- 1780. Some further items of the same purport are given in P. C. Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution, pp. 150-84, passim. On Aug. 22, the Virginia dele- gates laid before Congress instructions from the legislature of their state reasserting Virginia's charter claims and the Ameri- can right to navigate the Mississippi, Journals, XVII. 755; Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 71, I. fol. 391. This action on the part of Virginia led Congress, on Oct. 4, to in- struct Jay to adhere to his former instructions on the navigation question, and on Oct. 17, to accept the before cited letter of Oct. 17, prepared by Madison to urge the American claims in the West at length, Journals, XVIII. 900-2 and 935-47. In the latter document attention is paid to the Spanish claim of a right by conquest to some of the western country. It is answered: "1. That these possessions are few in number and confined to small spots. 2. That a right founded on conquest . . . cannot compre- hend the circumjacent territory. 3. That if a right to the said territory depended on the conquests of the British posts within, the United States have already a more extensive claim to it than Spain can acquire, having by an important success of their arms obtained possession of all the most important posts and settle- ments on the Illinois and Wabash, rescued the inhabitants from British domination, and established civil government in its proper form over them. They have, moreover, established a post on a strong and commanding situation near the mouth of the Ohio; whereas Spain has a claim by conquest to no post above the northern bounds of West Florida except that of the Natchez, nor are there any other British posts below the mouth of the Ohio for their arms to be employed against. 4. That whatever extent ought to be ascribed to the right of conquest, it must be admitted to have limitations which in the present case exclude the pre- tensions of His Catholic Majesty. If the occupation by the king of Great Britain of posts within the limits of the United States, as denned by charters derived from the said king when consti- tutionally authorized to grant them, makes them lawful objects THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 271 can opinion on the Mississippi question. Fur- thermore, they arrived at Versailles at a time calculated to impart to their message considerable poignancy. Throughout the greater part of 1780 and into the year following, His Catholic Majesty, practi- cally withdrawn from the war, was engaged in peace negotiations with an English emissary. That Spain intended actually to abandon her al- liance with France, Vergennes professed not to believe, but he very justifiably feared that she again sought to impose the status quo on the United States. 4 This, however, he wrote Mont- of conquest to any power than the United States, it follows that every other part of the United States that now is, or may here- after fall into the hands of the enemy, is equally an object of conquest. Not only New York, Long Island, and the other islands in its vicinity, but almost the entire states of South Carolina and Georgia might by the interposition of a foreign power at war with their enemy, be forever severed from the American con- federacy and subjected to a foreign yoke." Madison was greatly assisted in this argument, as indeed were the American advocates generally, by the fact that at this period the today familiar rule of "effective occupation" had no place in International Law. See also the New York Gazette of July 15, 1780, where the writer calls for the early "conquest of the continent." Evidently, popular expecta- tions in this matter still ran high. 4 Vergennes to Montmorin, Mar. 31, Apr. 21, June 12, June 30, July 6, and Sept. 28, Doniol, IV. 450-1, 453, 46T-84. It is not im- possible that Vergennes took too charitable a view of the Spanish government's proceedings at this time. According to a recent account of Cumberland's mission, based on English sources, Florida Blanca offered, in return for Gibraltar, to withdraw from the war and "to pay besides in ships, treasure, and territory." On the British side, according to the same account, "four Cabinet coun- FRENCH POLICY AND morin, would be to sacrifice the honor of France, the substantial purpose of the war, and in the long run Spain's own interest. The English and Amer- icans, left in juxtaposition, would reunite their forces. Incited by the English, the Americans would penetrate to the heart of Mexico, whose people they would encourage "to aspire to a sweeter government." Then indeed would Spain have cause to fear the example of American inde- pendence. 5 These arguments made as little im- pression upon the Spanish monarch and his minister as they had two years before. As late as the end of October, with New York City, the Carolinas, and Georgia now under British con- trol, Florida Blanca openly defended the status quo for the United States. 6 cils met on the business" and finally formulated the English terms, which however were still more exorbitant. M. A. M. Marks, England and America, 1763-1788 (London, 1907, 2 vols.), II. 1196-7. 5 Doniol, IV. 450-1, 453, and 480. 76. 409. Vergennes comments on Florida Blanca's attitude in his despatch to Montmorin of Jan. 22, 1781, thus: "M. le Cte. de Floride Blanche croit, M., que nous serions fort heureux si nous parvenions a obtenir le statu quo, pour l'Ame>ique sep'le. Ce ministre n'a done pas jett6 les yeux sur la carte de cette partie du monde pour voir ce que ce seroit qu'un pareil statu quo dans le moment actuel; ou bien il de"sespere entierement de notre cause, ou enfin il nous croit assez lagers pour abandonner les Ame"ricains sans la n6cessit la plus urgente. La v6rit6 est, M., que si le Roi stipuloit r uti possidetis a regard des Etats-Unis, il les mettoit entierement a la merci des Anglois; il porteroit d'ailleurs atteinte a sa reputation; il autoriseroit les Amricains a la defection, vers laquelle la cour de Londres dirige essentiellement toute sa poli- tique." 76. 510. The statu quo, in short, would represent the THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 273 But of even more importance than the selfish- ness of Spain's course in determining Vergennes' attitude at this time on the Mississippi question was the appearance of John Adams at Paris early in February, 1780. In the long run, this visit of Adams to the French capital resulted somewhat equivocally for American interests, since it fur- nished Vergennes a reasonable pretext to demand the Congressional Instructions of June 15th, 1781. Immediately, however, the impression of obstinacy and independence given by Adams, taken in connection with Spain's contemporary proceedings, led the French government to ratify the policy of Icdssez faire that had already been put into effect by La Luzerne with reference to the matters at issue between France's allies. Adams had hardly arrived in Paris than he startled Vergennes with the suggestion that he considered it his right and duty, though a general peace was no longer in prospect, to communicate to the British government his powers to con- clude with it both a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce. 7 Vergennes, who connected Adams with that faction in Congress which, ac- cording to Gerard, had been bent on a separate peace with England, at once had visions of an entire defeat of the purpose of the alliance. At this very date this was just what, Vergennes feared, impended. See following chapter. 7 Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 12, 1780, Wharton, III. 492-3. 274 FRENCH POLICY AND outcome to France's efforts in behalf of America that would have been ironical in the extreme. 7 * To be solicitous about a treaty of commerce before peace is established [he wrote Adams] is like being busy about furnishing a house before the foundation is laid. In the situation in which America stands at present with regard to England, to announce to that power that they have forgotten her system of tyranny, her cruelties, and her past perfidy, is discovering too great a degree of weakness, or at least too much good nature, and inviting her to believe that the Americans have an irresistible predilection for her. . . . To propose a treaty of commerce, which must be founded on confi- dence and a union equivalent to an alliance, at a time when the war is raging in all its fury . . . , what is it but to give credit to the opinion which all Europe enter- tains, . . . that the United States incline toward a defection, and that they will be faithful to their en- gagements with France only till such time as Great Britain shall furnish them a pretext for breaking them? 8 But Adams, quite obsessed with the idea that the time was ripe for an appeal to English public opinion in behalf of peace and the recognition of American independence, refused to be convinced by the French secretary's logic, though he even- tually deferred to the latter's urgent request to postpone action on his opinion till further in- Ta See especially Vergennes to La Luzerne, June 3, Doniol, IV. 414. "Observations on Mr. J. Adams' Letter of July 17, 1780," Wharton, IV. 3-6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 275 structions from Congress. 9 But this was only after repeated argument on the subject, and meantime other irritating issues had arisen be- tween the two men. Thus in June the question came up of the justice of the "40 to 1" Act of March 18th, to foreign holders of Continental currency. Ap- proached on the subject, Adams prepared what was an able defense of Congress' action, 10 but to it added in conversation with agents of the For- eign Office, some rather unnecessary frills : The course Congress had taken was wise, indeed very wise, just, very just; and those who complained of it were either English emissaries or spies . . . [More- over] the French had less reason for complaint than any body else . . . since were it not for America, to whom France should understand she was under the greatest obligation, England would be too powerful for the House of Bourbon, and Russia, Denmark, Sweden, 9 Adams to Vergennes, July 26, ib., 7-11. Congress disapproved of Adams' efforts to communicate his powers to the British gov- ernment. "Congress consider your correspondence with the Count de Vergennes on the subject of communicating your plenipoten- tiary powers to the ministry of Great Britain as flowing from your zeal and assiduity in the service of your country; but I am directed to inform you that the opinion given you by that min- ister relative to the time and circumstances proper for communi- cating your powers and entering upon the execution of them is well founded. Congress have no expectations from the influence which the people of England may have on the British coun- sels. . . ." Huntington, President of Congress, to Adams, Jan. 10, 1781, Wharton, IV. 229. 10 Adams to Vergennes, June 22, ib., III. 809-16. 276 FRENCH POLICY AND Portugal, and Holland would never be confederated against that power. 11 A month later Adams wrote Vergennes, apro- pos the despatch of Ternay and Rochambeau's expedition, to urge that a French fleet be main- tained somewhere along the American coast over winter, emphasizing especially the value to be derived from thus keeping the British line of supplies and communications constantly men- aced. Certainly this was a sensible idea enough. Unfortunately, in pressing it upon the French government not only was Adams invading the province of Franklin, but he brought to his self- assumed task the most egregious lack of tact. "Let the whole system of France be considered," he wrote, quoting from a current English circular, from the beginning down to the late retreat from Sa- vannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other "Doniol, IV. 416 fn. This was on June 17, but more than a month earlier Adams had written to Genet to much the same effect: "To suppose that France is sick of the part she has taken is to suppose her sick of that conduct which has procured her more respect and consideration in Europe than any step she ever took. It is to suppose her sick of that system which enabled her to negotiate the peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, as well as the Peace of Teschen; that system which has enabled her to unite in sentiment and affection all the maritime powers even the United Provinces in her favor and against England. It is to suppose her sick of that system which has broken off from her rival and natural enemy the most solid part of her strength; a strength that had become so terrible to France and would have been so fatal to her." Adams to Genet, May 9, 1780, Wharton, III. 667. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 277 construction upon it but this, viz., that it has always been the deliberate intention and object of France, for purposes of her own, to encourge the continuation of the war in America in hopes of exhausting the strength and resources of this country [England] and of de- pressing the rising power of America. True, he himself disavowed harboring any such belief, but he strongly implied that, in view of the desultory fashion in which France had thus far waged war, it was by no means an unreasonable belief, and also, that it was one which was likely in time to gain a strong foothold in the United States. 12 Vergennes' response is dated a week later. It announced that there was "every reason to believe that they [Ternay and Rochambeau] will take their station during next winter in North Amer- ica," and continued: "You will perceive, sir, by this detail, that the king is far from abandoning the cause of America and that His Majesty with- out having been solicited by Congress, has taken effectual measures to support the cause of Amer- ica." 13 Adams' spontaneous reaction to this intel- ligence was most enthusiastic. "I assure Your Excellency," he wrote the day following, "that scarcely any news I ever heard gave me more satisfaction." 14 But this was due to the fact that he had not given proper attention to the state- "76., 484-55. 13 76., 870-1. "76., 872. 278 FRENCH POLICY AND ment in Vergennes' letter that His Majesty's action had not been solicited by Congress. In his letter of July 27th to the secretary he proves at length that Congress had asked for just such aid as was at last being furnished, as early as 1776, and had repeated the request several times since. 15 This was the straw that broke the camel's back. Up to this time Vergennes seems to have kept his temper with the New Englander fairly well, but on July 29th he wrote him that henceforth His Majesty's government would confine its dealing in matters affecting the two allies to Dr. Franklin. 16 A few days afterward Adams with- drew to Holland. 17 But some time before this upshot of the matter, Vergennes had come to the conclusion that the standing of the alliance with the American Congress, whose chosen representative Adams evidently was, was too delicate to be further jeopardized by France's appearing in the thank- less role of champion for Spanish interests where these conflicted with interests of the United States. In his despatch of June 3rd, 1780, to La Luzerne the French secretary reiterated his per- sonal belief that Spain had the right to seize the lands to the east of the Mississippi if she could, 15 Ib., IV. 12-4. ia /6 v 16-7. 17 Here, too, his conduct was quite displeasing to Vergennes, loc. cit., 562-3; V. 48. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 279 that whatever might be the terms of the charters of the Southern states, the English were still the proprietors of these lands, and that there was, therefore, nothing to oblige Spain to hand over to the Americans such of them as she should con- quer. But, he continued, that was not a matter for France to decide, wherefore La Luzerne should utter no opinion on the subject but should leave the whole question with Miralles. The French envoy should limit himself to advising influential members of Congress "not to use the language of right to the court of Madrid, but rather to appeal to its magnanimity." Finally, he added that he had confidential word to the effect that the Spanish government was strongly disposed to surrender to the Americans the east bank of the Mississippi above the Floridas and to accord them "some sort of navigation of the river." 18 And his despatch of August 7th was along sugstantially the same lines. The pre- tensions of Spain, said the minister, "are very delicate to treat of ; our intervention has not been asked for, and silence will be without disadvan- tage." La Luzerne should therefore merely avail himself of such occasions as chanced to offer "to bring Congress to have confidence in the Catholic 18 Doniol, IV. 427-8. In a despatch to Montmorin, dated June 12, Vergennes reiterates his interpretation of the guaranty clauses of the Treaty of Alliance: "La garantie des domaines des Etats- Unis est eVentuelle, son tendue ne sera dtermin6 que par la future pacification," ib., 459-60, footnote. 280 FRENCH POLICY AND king and to decide the question of the lands along the Mississippi without prejudice." 19 Notwithstanding these despatches, in October, 1780, while La Luzerne was absent at Hartford attending a conference between the American and the French commanders on the military situa- tion, his youthful secretary Marbois, at the in- stance of Rendon, the successor of Miralles, who was now dead, presented Congress an extended memoir showing, "with the greatest energy," "the absence of any foundation" for the American pre- tensions in the West and "giving them to under- stand that they need not expect the king of Spain to assent to them." 20 The following February 15th Congress did, in fact, decide upon a measure of concession to Spain, when it instructed Jay to recede from the demand for the right to navigate the Mississippi below 31 north latitude and a free port there, "provided such cession shall be unalterably insisted upon by Spain." 21 But the "76., 429. 20 Rendon to Galvez, Oct. 20, 1780, Sparks MSS., XCVII; Doniol, IV. 593-4. Marbois was assisted in the preparation of this letter by Jenifer of Maryland, one of the leaders of the "land- less" state faction, P. C. Phillips, op. cit., 182-3. Jenifer, then president of the Maryland senate, had stated his views at length to G6rard, early in July, 1779, Doniol, IV. 168-70. * Journals, XIX. 152-4; Wharton, IV. 267-9. This resolution was in immediate consequence of instructions received by the delegates of Virginia, authorizing them to assent to the terms indicated in the interest of a "speedy conclusion of an alliance with Spain," Journals, loc. cit. 151. The motive underlying this resolution was distrust of the negotiations then going on in Spain. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 281 decision was due not to Marbois' representation of Spain's rights, which indeed was answered on the spot, but to the state of the war, and the ques- tion of the lands along the river was not affected by it. Four days later but four months after Marbois' intervention Vergennes again wrote La Luzerne touching the Mississippi question. The envoy was urged to follow his former instruc- tions and to leave it to Congress to discuss its pretensions directly with Madrid through its own plenipotentiary. It seems not unlikely that the despatch was elicited by intelligence of young Marbois' officiousness. 22 In brief, then, while the claim of the United States before 1783 to a western boundary along the Mississippi was by no means an invulnerable one, its validity seems originally to have been taken for granted by Vergennes, as was also that of the even less well-grounded claim to a right to It was feared that Spain might be detached from the war and that this might lead to peace on the basis of the uti possidetis. See Writings of James Madison, I. lOlff.; IX. 86-9. On August 10, a second resolution was offered to empower Jay "to make such further cessions of the right of these United States to the navigation of the river Mississippi as he may think proper," etc. It was voted down unanimously, Journals, XX. 853-4. The feel- ing in Congress at this latter date was anything but cordial toward Spain on account of the action of the Spanish commander in allowing the British garrison at Pensacola, on the surrender of that post to the Spanish forces, to retire to New York. See the order adopted this same date, loc. cit., 854. "Doniol, IV. 593-4. 282 FRENCH POLICY AND navigate the lower course of the river to and from the sea. Also, both the language and his- tory of article XII of the Treaty of Alliance rendered plausible the American contention that, from the moment the treaty became operative, His Most Christian Majesty became guarantor of the territorial integrity of the United States. In his instructions to La Luzerne, however, of July and September, 1779, Vergennes not only rejected this interpretation of article XII, but assumed outright championship of the theory that the left bank of the Mississippi, northward of the Spanish boundary, was still English and that, therefore, Spain, being then at war with England, had the right to conquer it. In bringing about this change of attitude the material factors were, first, Vergennes' desire to remove the principal obstacle to Spain's hearty participation in the war, namely, fear of the Americans, and secondly, the misinformation that had come from Gerard as to the intentions of the so-called Anti-Gallican party in Congress and the extent to which the Mississippi boundary was desired by all factions ; but there is no item of evidence showing an ulter- ior idea in the mind of the secretary that France herself would wish some day to recover Louisi- ana. When presently he came to understand the real trend of American opinion in this matter and the probable risk involved in attempting to traverse it, Vergennes returned to his original THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 283 position, that it was for Spain and the United States to settle by themselves the questions in issue between them. This was conspicuously the posi- tion of the French government and its represen- tative at Philadelphia when Congress voted the Instructions of June 15th, 1781, a fact to be re- membered in adjudging Congress' willingness at that time to entrust American interests so com- pletely to the keeping of France. Whether, once vested with this power, France still adhered to her attitude of aloofness, which after all rested upon considerations of policy and not of right, is reserved for later consideration. CHAPTER XIII THE CRISIS OF THE REVOLUTION On September 27th, 1780, Vergennes ad- dressed the king the following letter: Sire, your Majesty learned yesterday the details which the Count de Maurepas had to communicate with re- gard to the financial situation. They are truly alarming and seem to leave no other recourse than peace and a very speedy peace. Spain feels the same press of necessity that France does and her inclination is very evident. Does Your Majesty desire to instruct his ambassador at Madrid to encourage and promote this inclination? I have not the least fear, Sire, that the Count de Montmorin would not acquit himself of such a commission, extremely difficult and delicate though it would be, with equal prudence and celerity. But once the avowal were made to Spain that we have need of peace and that we rely upon her to obtain it for us, there is no one, Sire, who could answer for the consequences or assure Your Majesty that the interest of his reputation and his glory would not be compromised. I speak only of that, Sire, since all other things are in comparison as nothing. I entreat Your Majesty to take the matter into consideration and to consult the Count de Maure- pas. If the outcome of your deliberations favors an effort for peace through Spain, I very humbly beseech Your Majesty to transmit me the order in writing. The circumstances which constitute the necessity of unhappy 284 THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 285 courses are soon forgotten, while the evil effects which ensue become but the more evident with the passage of time. 1 It requires no inordinate effort to perceive in this document the record of a critical moment in the history of the alliance and of the Revolution itself. Fortunately for the cause of American independence Vergennes' prompt and astute in- tervention with the king saved the day. Early in October the secretary forced the retirement of the incapable Sartines from the Marine in favor of Castries and early in January he effected a similar reorganization of the Department of War under the talented Segur. 2 Meantime, as these changes indicate, the royal assent had been ob- tained to a new campaign, though that it would probably be the final one of the war Vergennes at once recognized, not only because of the condition of the royal exchequer but also because of the situation on the Continent. With the powers announcing in rapid succession their adherence to the League of Neutrals and with Holland breaking openly with England, the European horizon wore a smiling countenance for France at 1 Doniol, IV 488. 2 Ib., 488-90. Says M. Doniol of Vergennes' triumph: "Si, ce- pendant, les petitesses des hommes trouvent encore a s'agiter quand de grandes preoccupations dominent, ce ne sont ces peti- tesses qui commandent. II s'agissait du sort de la France en Europe; tout se subordonna a ce grand interet, consequemment fut remis aux mains de M. de Vergennes," ib., 490. 286 FRENCH POLICY AND the opening of 1781. Diplomatic combinations, however, are extremely kaleidoscopic affairs; besides which the recent death of the empress, by releasing the yet untested proclivities of Joseph II from a control that had usually been friendly to France, was a special factor of un- certainty. 3 Then, early in 1781 came a formal offer from Joseph and the czarina of joint media- tion between France and her allies, and Great Britain. Inasmuch as the offer represented the young emperor's initial venture in the field of Continental politics, Vergennes at once decided that it was to be treated with consideration. Moreover, he could but reflect that, if worse came to worst, so honorable a way to peace might prove very welcome. 4 An open road to peace at the end, if it were See Vergennes to Montmorin, Feb. 14, 1781, ib., 544-5. "II seroit souverainement malheureux que cette campagne si se pass&t comme la prceclente sans rien produire d'effectif. Tout nous invite a song6r a finir cette guerre; les moiens de la soutenir s'6puissent tous les jours, et la disposition de PEurope qui jusqu'ici nous a t si favorable peut changer d'un moment a 1'autre. Les Anglois ont de grands moiens pour tente> 1'ambition de Pempereur et pour le satisfaire; 1'offre que ce prince vient de nous faire de sa mediation peut nous faire concevoir I'esp6rance qu'il ne se rendra pas si aisement a leur seductions quand bien meme nous n'aurions pas d'auitres motifs de compt6r sur sa perseverance dans 1'alliance mais il n'est pas sans exemple que la vertu la plus ferine soit 6branle>. Pour pare> a tous les inconvniens impossibles a preVoir, nous ne devons nous occup^r qu'a finir cette guerre; nous n'y parviendrons pas sans frape> un grand coup," ib. * Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 22, 1781, ib., 524-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 287 humanly possible, of a successful campaign such, in brief, was Vergennes' program for 1781. One question remained, that of the military ob- jective of the coming campaign, and on this there were three contending views. A party at court, composed of the adherents of Choiseul and Chatelet sought to discredit Vergennes' policy by clamoring for a war of aggrandizement, to be waged especially in the West Indies. 5 Spain, on the other hand, at last disillusioned of the idea of getting anything valuable except by fighting for it, was now demanding that she be assisted to conquer Gibraltar and Jamaica. 6 Lastly, from America came the reiterated suggestion that, since American independence was the main objec- tive of the war, North America was its natural and most advantageous theatre. The despatch of Rochambeau and Ternay to America early in 1780 has already been noted. For this determination on the part of the French government to add military assistance to naval and financial and for its acceptance of the for- mula of "a constant naval superiority in Ameri- can waters," which Ternay's squadron was *La*t Journal* of Horace Walpole, II. 438-9. See also, for later efforts on the part of this same faction to discredit Ver- .gennes' policy, Doniol, V. 186-7 and footnotes, and Revue d'His- toire diplomatique, VII. 550-1. * France's refusal to cooperate with Spain in an attack upon Jamaica had been one of Spain's grievances in 1780, Doniol, IV. 496. 288 FRENCH POLICY AND designed to realize, the United States were prin- cipally indebted to La Fayette, who had spent all the first half of the year 1779 in France pleading America's cause to Maurepas and Vergennes. 7 Unfortunately, two-fifths of the army of ten thousand that had been intended for Rocham- beau's command was blockaded at Brest by a British squadron before it got away, while the naval portion of the expedition was rendered use- less at Newport in the same manner shortly after its arrival. And the total result at the end of the first year of the expedition was that it had dis- appointed all the expectations it had aroused, had, in truth, created the impression on American minds of a promise made and not fulfilled. 8 But a much more important consideration with those who at the end of 1780 besought France to lend the United States more extensive and direct aid was the state of the war in America at this period. Despite the alliance, American indepen- dence had never been so near collapse. The British army now held New York, the Carolinas, and Georgia, while the British fleet ravaged the coast. Congress was bankrupt and forced con- stantly to resort to the most wretched expedients to obtain money or to dispense with its employ- 7 Charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the Ameri- can Revolution (Philadelphia, 1901, 2 vols.), II. ch. XVIII; Doniol, IV. ch. V. 8 Tower, op cit. } II. 125, 132, 157. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 289 ment. The Continental Army, without pay, food, or clothing and enlisted for short terms, was ever on the verge of dissolution. And the politi- cal situation was no better. With public spirit at the lowest ebb, the war had become throughout a great part of the country the desperate venture of a minority, sometimes a small minority. The Articles of Confederation were still in abeyance, the states were indifferent to their duties, the authority of Congress was flouted daily. To this situation the treason of Arnold was the natural climax. 9 The outstanding features of American con- ditions in the autumn of 1780 were already before Vergennes from the correspondence of La Lu- zerne. Indeed, it may be said that almost from the moment of the signing of the American trea- ties the secretary had undergone a progressive disillusionment in the military prowess and poli- tical competence of France's republican allies: "the inertia of democratic institutions," which had furnished him an argument in his efforts to reconcile Spain with the idea of American inde- pendence, he had soon found to be no mere 9 On this topic there is a superabundance of material. See Doniol, IV. ch. VII; Tower, op. cit. II. chs. XX-XXII; Lecky's American Revolution (Woodburn, ed., New York, 1908), ch. Ill; Writings of Washington (W. C. Ford, ed., 14 vols.), VIII and IX, passim; SMSS., Nos. 733, 737, 747, 1624-32; Wharton, IV. 256 and V. 151, etc. 290 FRENCH POLICY AND truism. 10 Yet it is an interesting fact that to those Frenchmen who had come into personal touch M "I avow I have but feeble confidence in the energy of the United States," Vergennes to Montmorin, Nov. 27, 1778, Doniol, III. 581. A very censorious critic of the Americans was Kalb, whose letters to Broglie were probably seen by Vergennes, as they are to be found in the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs. See e.g., Doniol, IV. 19 fn. Kalb charges the American character with braggadocio, dissipation, corruption, irresolution, lack of patriot- ism, Anglomania, SMSS., Nos. 821, 838, 845, 1971, 1987. For a partial confirmation of some of these strictures by a more lenient critic, see La Fayette to Vergennes, &., No. 1609. See also a letter from the "Hon. J. Trevor to Mr. Secretary Fox," dated Ratisbon, Apr. 16, 1782. The writer gives an account of a con- versation with the son of one of the Elector Palatine's ministers at the Diet, who had served as aide-de-camp to Rochambeau, and who had come away from America greatly disappointed with France's allies. Fifth Report (1876) of the Historical Manu- scripts Commission, the Lansdowne Papers, p. 253. Nor were the French the only ones who were disappointed. "The generosity of our allies," wrote Washington in Aug., 1780, in a letter to the President of Congress, "has a claim to our gratitude, but it is neither for the honor of America nor for the interest of the corn- man cause to leave the work entirely to them," Writings (Ford, ed.) VIII. 390. "Had America," began Crisis No. IX, written on the occasion of the surrender of Charleston, "pursued her advantage with half the spirit she resisted her misfortunes, she would before now have been a conquering and a peaceful people; but lulled in the lap of soft tranquillity she rested on her hopes, and adversity has only convulsed her into action." Vergennes, in coming to depreciate the military capacity and public spirit of the Americans as a whole and to emphasize the necessity of con- trolling Congress, showed a true appreciation of the character of the Revolution in its last days. Indeed, even the victory at York- town did little to break up the popular inertia that tied the hands of Congress. See La Luzerne's elaborate and very informing report on the situation at the end of 1781, Revue d'Histoire diplo- matique, V. 421-36. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 291 with the American cause, that cause had never appeared in more appealing light than at this moment of its greatest prostration. The expla- nation, I think, is to be found in the personal ascendancy of Washington, whose intrepidity and fortitude naturally stood forth all the more strikingly as the other mainstays of the Revolu- tion fell away. 11 At almost the very moment that Vergennes was intervening to prevent France's withdrawal from the war, a conference, consisting of Wash- ington, the French commanders, the French en- voy, and one or two others, was assembling at Hartford, Connecticut, to consider plans for the coming campaign in North America. It had al- ready been determined that the objective of the campaign ought to be the capture of New York City. It was now further resolved that, in order to render this objective feasible, the French com- manders should ask their government to send to America enough men to raise Rochambeau's force to 15,000, enough money to enable Con- gress to maintain a like force, and a sufficient fleet to command the American waters. The con- ference's decisions were conveyed to France by Rochambeau's son on a vessel detailed for the "For the change in Kalb's opinion of Washington from un- favorable to favorable, cf. his letters of Oct. and Dec., 1777, to Broglie, SMSS. Nos. 755 and 761. For some tributes by La Fayette, see ib., 1625, 1627, 1632. 292 FRENCH POLICY AND purpose by Ternay, late in October. In the middle of February, young Laurens sailed for France with a similar commission from Congress. He bore with him the friendly injunction of Rochambeau "to open his heart as to the state of this unhappy land, if it be not promptly and powerfully succored." 12 The response of the French government to these demands was certainly not illiberal either in proportion to America's deserts or its own means. Measured, however, by the demands themselves it was meagre enough. The request that was met most generously was the financial one. Congress had asked for a loan of twenty- five millions livres. In return Louis gave out- right six millions livres, to be spent in France under the direction of Franklin, and later con- sented to underwrite a loan of ten millions, to be obtained in Holland. The request of the Hart- ford Conference for more troops, on the other hand, was denied almost in toto, and even the con- tingent of Rochambeau's force that had been blockaded at Brest was kept back. As to naval aid, Vergennes expressed himself as follows: u For the above, see Doniol, IV. ch. VII, and Tower, La Fayette, II. 159-63, 195-200, 270. La Luzerne suspected that the sending of Laurens to France might represent an intention to supersede Franklin, Doniol, IV. 390-1 and fn. Laurens' conduct in France, characterized as it was by youthful zeal and ignorance of diplo- matic forms, was irritating to the French minister, but it seems clear that he should be credited with the king's endorsement of the Dutch loan, ib., 558-62; Wharton, IV. 317-55; passim, and 685-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 293 The Count de Grasse, who commands our fleet in the Antilles, has been ordered to conduct, sometime toward the approach of next winter, a part of his fleet to the coast of North America, or to detach a portion of it to sweep the coast and to cooperate in any undertaking which may be projected by the French and American generals, or to form a part of it if they are unable to cooperate. The number of ships to be sent to the North will depend upon the need which the Spanish have of our assistance. ... If they have made preparations for some great enterprise, we shall have to lend them a hand; for if a serious blow is struck at the common enemy and it is successful, the advantage will be equally great for all the allies. The important point is to weaken the enemy, to crush him if possible ; the locality is of little importance. In short, the rendition of naval aid to the United States was subordinated to the project of assist- ing Spain in the West Indies, and, it may be added, before Gibraltar. 13 Why was Spain thus preferred to the United States? The question is easily answered. If France was under obligation to secure American independence before she could honorably make peace, not less was she under obligation, now that Spain was ready once more to take an active part 18 Doniol, IV. ch. XI; Tower, op. tit., II. ch. XXIV. In the interest of accuracy, it should be noted that the government's decision not to send more troops to America was receded from at the time of Grasse's sailing for the West Indies to the extent of sending with him a reinforcement of six hundred and sixty men for Rochambeau's force. On Apr. 5, Grasse detached the Sagit- taire from his fleet to carry this force to Newport, where it ar- rived on June 10th. Tower, pp. 283, 392-3. 294 FRENCH POLICY AND in the war, to obtain something valuable for that power too. But more than that, the Spanish marine was now in better fighting trim than it had been at any earlier period of the war. As be- tween an ally able to contribute something to the common cause and one needing constant bolster- ing, good sense dictated that the real work of the campaign should be undertaken in cooperation with the former. On the other hand, this does not mean that Vergennes' effort to minimize the im- portance of the matter of locality is necessarily sound. Were England to be really crushed, then, of course, the way would lie open for France to satisfy both her allies to the completest extent, but of this there was, after all, little likelihood. Such being the case, however, it was altogether probable that, at the close of hostilities, England would be more strongly lodged in certain locali- ties than in others ; and this fact might very con- ceivably work to the detriment of one ally as against the other. In point of fact, at the very moment he wrote the above quoted words, Ver- gennes already had in mind the possibility of France's acquiescing in a very substantial cur- tailment, from the American point of view cer- tainly, of American independence, if an otherwise available opportunity for peace should offer itself. Vergennes communicated to La Luzerne his government's decision with reference to the de- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 295 mands of Congress and the Hartford Conference in a despatch dated March 9th. In the same despatch and two later ones, dated respectively April 19th and June 30th, he further instructed the envoy as to the course of action that France expected on the part of Congress touching the diplomatic interests of the alliance: 14 Congress was to be frankly informed that, in view of threat- ened developments on the Continent, peace might at any time become of the utmost importance to France, and was, therefore, to be urged to accept the proposed mediation without delay. By the same token, it also behooved Congress to en- deavor to win the good will of the mediating powers by the moderation of its pretensions, "save in the matter of independence, which ad- mitted of no modification." 15 The American envoy at the mediation, on whose right to enter it on a proper footing France would unremit- tingly insist, would be John Adams. On account of Adams' unfortunate personal qualities which would "give rise to a thousand unfortunate episodes calculated to exasperate his fellow nego- tiators," Congress ought to empower His Ma- jesty's ministers to interpose to curb him "Doniol, IV. 553-6, 588-91, 601-3; Journals of the Continental Congress, XX. 562-9, 669-74, XXI. 986-93. The extracts in Doniol are incomplete, but it is possible to supplement them from La Luzerne's reports to Congress. 15 Doniol, IV. 555. 296 FRENCH POLICY AND whenever necessary. 16 Finally, Congress ought to be brought, albeit by the most delicate means, to realize the possibility that, in view of Eng- land's settled opposition to an outright recogni- tion of independence and of the existing state of the war, the mediating powers might propose a truce based on the status quo. 17 That the United 19 76., 551 fn., 589. "76., 552-3, 601-3; Journals, XX. 672. The first hint that France might consent to the status quo for the United States is contained in Vergennes' despatch of Sept. 25, 1780, to La Lu- zerne, written at the moment when, as we have seen, the continu- ance of the war was in the balance. "Au surplus, M.," Ver- gennes wrote on this occasion, "je presume que le veritable objet des inquietudes que Ton vous a marquees c'est le statu quo; il seroit effectivement on ne peut pas plus facheux pour l'Ame>ique dans 1'etat actiiel des choses, et nous sommes bien determines a ne le point stipuler pour les Americains; ce sera a eux a juger, lorsqu'il sera question de cet objet, de la perseverance ou des sacrifices que les conjonctures exigeront de leur part. Au reste, M., je desire que vous vous absteniez de traiter cette matiere deli- cate dans ce moment cy . . . ." Doniol, IV. 536 fn. France, then, would not stipulate the status quo, but would leave the question of its acceptability to Congress. However, Vergennes was very fearful that Spain, still in negotiation with Cumberland, would stipulate it, as she had in 1778. In his despatch of Nov. 27, 1780, he roundly denounced Florida Blanca's policy as grounded in passion, prejudice and selfishness, ib. } 506-8. In his despatch of Jail. 22, 1781, he declared that if the king of Spain should stipu- late the status quo in regard to the United States he would put them at the mercy of England and would give the Americans good reason to abandon the alliance. "Spain," said he, "will put her interests before everything else . . . and she looks upon inde- pendence with regret," ib., 510-11. Vergennes' later attitude on this question was formulated in a memoir in the hand of Rayneval, his secretary, on which is based in part his despatch of Mar. 9. This memoir comprises the following points: "1. It is for the THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 297 States were profoundly interested in maintaining the integrity of their union was, of course, alto- gether indisputable. Indeed, the king himself was of the same way of thinking, both because of his plighted word and also because of his own interests, wherefore he would alter his present king of England, author of the war, to make some sacrifices for peace. 2. The first of the sacrifices to be made is independence for North America. 3. This independence may be assured either by a definitive treaty or a truce. 4. The king of England, which- ever method is adopted, will be able to treat directly with the Americans, through the intervention of the mediating powers. 5. The truce will run for 20, 25, or 30 years, etc. The United States will be treated as independent in fact, and no restriction shall be imposed upon them in the exercise of the rights of sovereignty. 6. It would be desirable to avoid the status quo if possible; but in case that could not be, it will be advantageous to limit it to South Carolina and Georgia and to stipulate for the evacuation of New York. 7. The proposition of the truce cannot be made by the king to Congress, if it should be united with the status quo, but if the two propositions are isolated, His Majesty will en- gage to procure Congress' sanction of the truce, if he has the secret assurance that New York will be accepted [excepted?]. 8. In case of a truce the king will propose to the Americans, if it is necessary to do so, a new convention the object of which will be to guarantee the Americans against attack by England after the expiration of the truce." In a word, while the king would leave the unpleasant business of proposing the status quo to the mediating powers, he would accept it and bring Congress to do so, if it were confined to South Carolina and Georgia. There was a rumor in Boston that the status quo had been accepted for the United States, to apply to Georgia, South Carolina, and Maine, as early as April, 1780, Continental Journal and Weekly Ad- vertiser, April 13, 1780. It may be that the uneasiness to which Vergennes refers in his despatch of Sept. 25 (supra) , was caused by this rumor. 898 FRENCH POLICY AND resolution only when he saw "the absolute impos- sibility of obtaining peace without such a sacri- fice." None the less, the sacrifice was one that lay "in the order of possibilities" ; and, if it should become necessary, it would have to be accepted with resignation. "The greater part of the Bel- gian provinces had thrown off the Spanish yoke originally, but only seven had finally maintained their independence" ; and "it frequently happens that circumstances give the law to the most powerful sovereigns, forcing them to modify plans the best conceived." 18 In short, Vergennes plainly indicated, that if an otherwise available peace offered itself, he would not resist the status quo for the United States indefinitely, though he had declaimed against it so bitterly a few months before; and further, that while to Congress would be reserved the formal decision in the matter, it would be ex- pected ultimately to take the same position with as good grace as possible, and so save the king's face. The passages above paraphrased, however, M Doniol, IV. 601-3. Vergennes continues: "Mais vous aurez la j)lus grande attention de ne parler que comme de vous-meme et de ne point laisser apercevoir que vous y etes autorise", parce- que dans ce dernier cas les Amdricains supposeroient que le Roi a d'avance pris le parti de les abandonner et ils croient tout perdu; Sa M't6 est re"solue de ne leur proposer aucun sacrifice, elle croit devoir laisser ce soin f&cheux aux deux cours mediatrices, si jamais il devient necessaire," ib., 603. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 299 touching the status quo, are from the despatch of June 30th and were never brought to Con- gress' attention. The conference which La Lu- zerne held with a committee of Congress on May 28th, 19 and which led to the voting of the famous Instructions of June 15th, was based upon the despatch of March 9th, in which, while the possi- bility of the status quo is suggested, the French government's attitude toward such a proposition is left somewhat vague. Even so, La Luzerne evidently thought it more in accord with the "delicacy" required by the situation not to bring forward this part of the despatch of March 9th till after Congress had defined the terms on which it would make peace, nor did he do so till June 18th. 20 At the earlier conference the envoy's dis- course was all of mediation, moderation, Mr. Adams' deficiencies, and the necessity of confi- dence in France. "If," said he, "Congress put any confidence in the king's friendship and benevolence; if they were persuaded of his firm resolution constantly to support the cause of the United States," they would order their plenipo- tentiary "to manifest a perfect and open confi- dence in the French ministers" and "to take no steps without the approbation of His Majesty." In other words, he invited Congress to surrender to France the diplomatic autonomy of the United 19 Journals of the Continental Congress, XX. 562-9. 20 Ib., 672. 300 FRENCH POLICY AND States during the approaching peace negotia- tions. Far from spurning the invitation, Con- gress accepted it without stipulating a condition or registering a scruple. By the opening paragraph of its Instructions of June 15th, 1781, Congress accepted mediation at the hands of Their Imperial Majesties; by the second, it made independence "by peace or truce" and the maintenance of the alliance with France sine qua non conditions of a treaty ; by the third and fourth, it indicated its confidence in His Most Christian Majesty and his ministers in the follow- ing terms: As to disputed boundaries and other particulars we refer you to the instructions formerly given to Mr. Adams, dated August 14, 1779, and October 18, 1780, from which you will easily perceive the desires and expec- tations of Congress ; but we think it unsafe at this dis- tance to tie you up by absolute and peremptory directions upon any other subject than the two essential articles above mentioned. You are therefore at liberty to securing the interests of the United States in such manner as circumstances may direct and as the state of the belligerent and disposition of the mediating powers may require. For these purposes you are to make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our generous ally, the king of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge and concurrence, and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion, en- deavoring in your whole conduct to make them sensible how much we rely on His Majesty's influence for effec- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 301 tual support in everything that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America. 21 Little wonder that the critics of the instructions declared that "never before had one state put itself at the mercy of another so completely and imprudently" ! 22 Little wonder that La Luzerne boasted that "the negotiation was placed actually in the hands of the king save on the question of independence and the treaties" ! 23 Let us see what were the considerations that moved Congress to make so extraordinary a concession. The instructions were asked for, as we have just seen, as a means of curbing John Adams. But no sooner were they voted than Adams was superseded by a commission consisting of him- self, Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and the elder Laurens. 24 Delegates who had opposed La Lu- 21 76., 651-2. For the complete proceedings, see ib., 605-50. 22 See La Luzerne to Vergennes, June 23, 1781, Doniol, IV. 623-4. Other objections were, "that when the people became in- formed of the circumstances, the malicious would not fail to say that Congress had sold out to France; that the plenipotentiaries would fill a sorry role at the conferences; that five important persons were being sent abroad to be the passive witnesses of our [France's] conduct; that we [the French] had very confused, even false, ideas touching the fisheries, the boundaries, the confisca- tions, etc."; that the instructions were an affront to the dignity of the thirteen states, had been adopted with precipitation, and had finally been rendered useless by the action of Congress in sup- planting Adams with a commission, ib. 33 Same to same, June 11, ib., 604. * The "ultimately to govern" clause was adopted by Congress on June 11, Journals, XX. 626. Immediately thereafter a motion 302 FRENCH POLICY AND zerne's demands in the first instance now renewed their attack, insisting that in addition to being that had been previously defeated, was reconsidered and carried to join two persons to Mr. Adams in negotiating the peace, ib., 628. Jay was elected on June 13, ib., 638. Franklin, Laurens, and Jefferson were added to the commission on June 14, ib., 648. The reason for a commission of five is suggested by Witherspoon thus: "They added more members to Mr. Adams and those from differ- ent parts of the continent. This removed every suspicion or fear that the interests of one part would be sacrificed to secure that of another," Thomson Papers, 100 (Debate of Aug. 8, 1782). Madi- son explains why Franklin and Jay alone were unsatisfactory thus: "The former being interested as one of the land companies in territorial claims, which had less chance of being made good in any other way than by a repossession of the vacant country by the British crown; the latter belonging to a state interested in such arrangements as would deprive the United States of the naviga- tion of the Mississippi and turn the western trade through New York; and neither of them being connected with the Southern States." Writings of James Madison, I. 299 (Debate of Dec. 30, 1782). La Luzerne also thought that Franklin might be influ- enced through his interest in lands on the left bank of the Ohio to oppose Virginia's claim in favor of Great Britain, and so ad- vised Vergennes, Report of June 30, 1781, Doniol, IV. 622. The events of the negotiations of 1782 show that distrust of either Jay or Franklin was entirely misplaced. Neither Laurens nor Jefferson participated in the peace negotiations. The former, while on the way to fulfil a mission to Holland, in Sept., 1780, was captured by the British and later lodged in the Tower of London under a commitment for treason. He was still in the Tower when he was appointed peace commissioner, but was released Dec. 31, 1781, on the expectation that Cornwallis would be exchanged for him. However, he lingered on in England for another year. His conduct was made the subject of much contemporary criticism, which his biographer succeeds in answering, at least in part. D. D. Wallace, Life of Henry Laurens (N. Y., 1915), 354-419. Jef- ferson, who was governor of Virginia at the time, declined a place on the commission. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 303 mischievous the resolutions were also superflu- ous. 25 The attack failed, however, even to induce a reconsideration of the question; 26 and if the testimony of Madison is to be relied upon, the instructions were finally adopted in the form given above without dissent. 27 La Luzerne credited what and not without justification he regarded as a triumph for him- self no less than for France, largely to personal factors. Early in May, he tells us, he had "opened his purse" to General Sullivan "the hero of Newport," a coup which had broken the back- bone of the so-called "New England League" and secured New Hampshire's vote for the instruc- tions from the outset. 28 Also, as it happened, the "landless" state party, which was comparatively indifferent even when not hostile to American pretensions to a boundary at the Mississippi, had "See note 22, above. "Journals, XX. 650. "Thomson Papers, 65 (Debate of July 24, 1782). In meeting the attacks of members on the instructions, La Luzerne took the position that, "if we [the French] consulted our own interests rather than those of our allies, we ought to desire that the Ameri- can plenipotentiaries had all the powers that certain people wished to reserve to them." Also, he professed to be very reluctant to accept for France a trust that did not represent the deliberate will of Congress. "L'effet de ce langage, Monseigneur," he con- tinues, "a t6 de faire reconsid6rer ces resolutions et de les con- firmer, ainsi que je l'espe>ois permament. Le president du Con- gres m'a dit qu'elles toient expedites par VAnna." Doniol, IV. 624-5. K Ib., IV. 608 and fn. 304 FRENCH POLICY AND at this moment its two most influential spokes- men in Congress, Witherspoon of New Jersey and Jenifer of Maryland. On the other hand, the Adams and Lee families, champions respec- tively of the New England fishing interest and the Western land interest, both lacked their usual member. Certainly, La Luzerne himself could hardly have chosen a Congress more to his liking. But while the personal factor may account for the votes cast by New Hampshire, Maryland, and New Jersey for the Instructions of June 15th it does not account for the votes of Pennsylvania, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. How, then, we may ask, did the men from these states, men like Madison and Jones of Virginia, for instance, reconcile such a remarkable abdication of power by Congress to a foreign, albeit allied, govern- ment with sound public policy? La Luzerne' s finesse in the matter of the status quo has just been mentioned. Nor was this, by any means, an isolated circumstance. To the same general category belongs also the fact that Congress, being ignorant of the terms on which Spain had entered the war, was in no position to previse the complicated tangle of obligations in which France would find herself if the war turned out to be only partially successful. 29 There was, *In this connection the following passage from a speech made by Arthur Lee in the course of the Congressional debate of Aug. 8, 1782, in favor of reconsidering the Instructions of June 15, is THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 305 in other words, so far as Congress knew, no com- pelling reason why France should not be trusted : on the contrary, there were excellent reasons why she should be. Months before this her envoy had ceased championing Spanish interests where these conflicted with American. More recently, aban- doning the no longer applicable views of his court as to the establishment of a balance of power in America, he had given his assent to an invasion of Canada and had followed this up by urging instructive: "It is not sufficient that the independence of these states is secured. But he doubts whether even that is secured by the instructions. He is afraid of the accompaniment. That we shall be so circumscribed in our boundaries that our indepen- dence will be a nugatory independence. France in making a treaty will be governed by her own interest and from her long and close connection with Spain and prefer it to ours. Is it wise, is it proper to give a nation the absolute disposal of our affairs that is under the influence of two interests which she is bound to consult in preference to that of these states? This unlimited con- fidence will render us despicable in the eyes of France and less attentive to our rights. We have been informed by a minister of France that Spain has large claims on the lands beyond the Mountains. Her conduct shews that she means to support her claim to that country. She wishes to confine us to the lands lying below the heads of the waters falling into the Atlantic. We are told that she thinks she has a right to possess herself of all to the westward. And shall we submit it to France, her old friend and ally, whether her claims shall be confirmed, and we be ex- cluded from the possession of that country?" Thomson Papers, 95-6. Lee was the strongest critic of the Instructions of June 15. Yet it will be noted that even he does not suspect that France is under any special obligations to Spain in connection with the then existing war. Also, it will be noted that he does not charge France with having championed Spain's claims to the western country. 306 FRENCH POLICY AND renewed efforts in the Northwest. 30 Rising above all other considerations, however, were these two : the state of the war and the source from which peace offered itself. The generality of Ameri- cans had long felt in June, 1781, that the fate of the United States rested almost entirely with France, whence it followed that Congress could not do better than to vest France outright with the trusteeship of American interests. The devel- opment at this moment of a prospect of peace through the mediation of powers that had never yet recognized American independence naturally confirmed this logic, and the more so since it was not known what degree of pressure these powers were prepared to bring in order to end the war. 31 80 Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolu- tion, 190-1 and 194, and notes. It was not La Luzerne's idea that the United States should retain the Western country necessarily (vd. Doniol, IV. 622), but "he recognized that the possession of the Great Lakes would place the Americans in a much better posi- tion to negotiate with Great Britain," Phillips, loc. cit. 31 "In opposing the motion [for reconsideration of the Instruc- tions of June 15], many considerations were suggested, and the original expediency of submitting the commission for peace to the counsels of France descanted upon. The reasons assigned for this expediency were, that at that juncture when the measure took place the American affairs were in the most deplorable situa- tion, the Southern states being overrun and exhausted by the enemy . . .; that the old paper currency had failed .... In the midst of these distresses, the mediation of the two Imperial Courts was announced. The general idea was that the two most respectable powers of Europe would not interpose without a ser- ious desire of peace and without the energy requisite to effect it. The hope of peace was, therefore, mingled with an apprehension THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 307 Upon the Instructions of June 15th there is impressed a twofold character. On the one hand, they constitute a real tribute to the essen- tial magnanimity of the French design in inter- vening in the Revolution, to that quality of large- ness about Vergennes' project that forbade an abandonment of American independence save in the face of conditions that meant recognizable defeat for France herself. On the other hand, this tribute was no merely sentimental one : it was conditioned by the deliberate calculation that, in view of the actual status of the belligerent parties in America and of the auspices under which peace was to be negotiated a peace which Amer- ica needed no less than France, the United States could not act more prudently than to be- stow the most ungrudging and unstinted confi- dence upon their ally. 32 It thus becomes pertinent to inquire further, that considerable concessions might be exacted from America by the mediators as a compensation for the essential one which Great Britain was to submit to. Congress, on a trial, found it impossi- ble, from the diversity of opinions and interests, to define any other claims than those of independence and the alliance. A dis- cretionary power, therefore, was to be delegated with regard to all other claims." Debate of Dec. 30, 1782, Writings of James Madi- son, I. 298-9. Madison, however, rather exaggerates the possi- bility of a coercive intention on the part of the mediators. Cf. La Luzerne's conference with the committee of Congress, of May 28, 1781, Journals, XX. 562-9. See also Thomson Papers, p. 65. 32 "At worst," the apologists of the instructions urged, they "could only be considered as a sacrifice of our pride to our in- terest," Writings of Madison, I. 300. 308 FRENCH POLICY AND what British recognition of independence aside were the expectations that underlay these in- structions ? The instructions themselves referred the American commissioners back to the instruc- tions of August 14th, 1779, but this reference leaves us still in the dark as to the degree of con- fidence felt by Congress that the objectives so defined would be achieved. A much more in- forming document is the report of La Luzerne of June 13th, 1781, which, on the basis of a careful canvass of all varieties of opinion in Congress at this date, arrived at the following conclusions: 'that if the Ohio formed their boundary the Thir- teen States would not complain; that, indeed, they would believe themselves under obligations to the king for all that they obtained more than this; that they would not reject the peace if cir- cumstances necessitated some greater concessions ; that the peace would be less agreeable in pro- portion as this line were hewn away from'; 'that if circumstances forced them to adopt as boun- daries the mountains which divide the rivers that flow into the Atlantic from those that flow to the west, the peace would be accepted and ratified, but would meet with general criticism and would cool the ardor of French partisans, and it would be difficult to persuade the Americans that their interests had not been sacrificed'; that a treaty whereby any State were cut off from the Con- federation could not be ratified; that they would THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 309 prefer "to continue the war, however difficult it might be, to allowing England a single post in Georgia or in any other part of the Thirteen States"; that if it were necessary to depart from the ultimatum of 1779, it was to be desired that the concession should be made, "not in favor of the English, but that the right of the Indians should be reserved to the intervening lands." 53 The recorded votes on various amendments of- fered to the instructions while they were under discussion and on the secret instructions which it was at first proposed should accompany them confirm these conclusions to a striking degree. 34 But as even- one knows, the Instructions of June 15th had no influence on the negotiations leading to the Peace of 1783. Directly this was due to the initiative of John Jay, whose course "DonioJ, IV. 617-31. "See especially J&mmaLt. XX. 60&-15. The two articles of secret instructions adopted on June 7, ordered the commissioners to use their "utmost endeavors to secure the limits fixed exactly according to the description in roar [their] former instructions,** and if they failed in that, to make peace -without fixing northern and western limits,** 16., 60S. The day following, however, Virginia having failed to secure an amendment to the instructions asked for by the committee that would have prevented any cession south of the Ohio, the secret articles were reconsidered and lost, *&., 615, La Luseme, however, was somewhat suspicious test some such in- structions had been forwarded. *J"ai soupconne qu'il pouvoit y avoir des instructions qulls [the plenipotentiaries] auroient ordre de nous cacher, mais rien n*a encore oonfirme ce soupcon, et la confiance me paroit illimitee," La Luxerne to Vergennes, June IS, 17S1. Dooiol, IV. 619. 310 FRENCH POLICY AND will be considered in the following chapter as furnishing the best pragmatic test of the policy of the Foreign Office at that juncture. Back of Jay's decision, however, and making it possible was the Yorktown campaign, to which, accord- ingly, a few words must be devoted. It will be recalled that Vergennes had set the approach of winter as the time for the Count de Grasse's visit to American waters. The admiral himself, however, evidently held quite different views on this matter, for in a letter to Rocham- beau dated March 29th, one week after he had left Brest, he announced that he would reach Santo Domingo by the end of June, and con- tinued thus : It will be toward the 15th of July at the earliest that I shall be able to reach the coast of North America. But it is necessary, in view of the short time I shall have to remain there for the season will force me to leave in any event that every preparation likely to aid in the success of your projects shall be completed, so that nothing may delay us an instant in beginning our operations. 35 This letter reached Rochambeau at Providence on June 10th. Already this gallant friend of America, who had been deeply disappointed by the king's rejection of the plan of the Hartford Conference, had conceived the idea that the Count de Grasse might yet "save the country." 35 Tower, op. tit., II. 398. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 311 Thus writing the admiral from Newport on May 28th he had urged "the gravity of the crisis in America, especially the Southern states, at this moment," and that, "without the naval superior- ity which he [the Count de Grasse] can bring," "none of the means within our control can be made available." 36 Then in a postscript, added three days later, he had further proposed that Grasse bring with him from the West Indies a corps of five or six thousand men and twelve hun- dred thousand livres in specie, since this could be obtained at par in the Antilles, while in the United States it was at a premium of from twenty-five to thirty per cent. 37 Now, on June llth, he wrote Grasse a second time, including duplicates of the earlier letter and postscript and repeating their recommendations with renewed urgency. 38 Grasse's reply, which was dated at Cape Santo Domingo on the 28th of July, reached Newport on August 12th, and was favorable beyond rea- sonable expectation. The admiral announced that he would sail for Chesapeake Bay on Au- 390. *Ib., 391. 38 76., 39&-400. Note also these expressions from a letter of June 16: "General Washington has but a handful of men .... This country has been driven to bay, and all its resources are giving out at once. The Continental money has been annihilated," ib., 397. These letters are published in full in Donial's fifth volume and the originals are now in the Library of Congress. 312 FRENCH POLICY AND gust 13th, as, he continued, this is "the point which appears to me to have been indicated by you, . . . Messrs. Washington, La Luzerne, and Barras, as the one from which the advantage which you pro- pose may be most certainly attained." He would bring with him, he proceeded, three thousand men, from twenty-five to twenty-nine war- vessels, a quantity of siege artillery, and the sum of 1,200,000 livres in specie. The one disappointing feature of the reply was the time limit it set for the projected operations. That he was able to come at all to the coast of North America, Grasse indicated, was due to the fact that the Spanish commander, Admiral de Solano, was not yet ready for active operations; but this condition would cease with the approach of the winter months, for which reason the French fleet and the troops it brought with it would have to leave the continent by October 15th. As the whole expedition [the admiral wrote] has been undertaken at your request and without consulting the ministers of France or of Spain, although I have felt myself authorized to assume certain responsibilities in the interest of the common cause, I should not venture to change the entire arrangement of their projects by transferring so important a body of troops. You will perfectly understand, my dear Count, how necessary it will be to make the best use of this precious time. 39 Thus the Yorktown campaign was due to the fortunate not to say, fortuitous coincidence of "Tower, op. cit., II. 401-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE three circumstances: Rochambeau's friendly solicitude for the American cause, Grasse's patri- otic willingness to stretch a point in his instruc- tions for the general good, Solano's unreadiness, so characteristically Spanish, for the enterprise for which Grasse's expedition had been planned. In other words, Cornwallis' surrender owed little or nothing to the intention of the French government itself. And by the same token, the results of the campaign of 1781 were from the point of view of the French Foreign Office, somewhat disappoint- ing. It had been hoped to hasten peace by striking a decisive blow the immediate fruits of which were to go to Spain and furnish her sufficient induce- ment to quit the war. The decisive blow had been struck, true enough, but its direct beneficiary was America. The result which was confirmed by Grasse's later defeat in the West Indies was twofold : With Gibraltar and Jamaica both still safely British a new campaign had to be planned for the behoof of Spain. With the British forces abandoning all their inland conquests in the South, the application of the status quo to the United States became impossible. 40 40 See in this connection the secretary of Foreign Affairs' com- munication to Congress on November 23, 1781, of the result of a recent conference with La Luzerne based on a despatch from Vergennes dated September 7. As presented by the envoy, this despatch emphasizes France's championship of American in- terests, her refusal to accede to the terms of the mediation of the imperial courts until they should agree to acknowledge the 314 FRENCH POLICY AND Nor may the reaction of patriotic American sentiment to the event at Yorktown be altogether ignored. Spontaneous as were popular jubi- lation at the triumph of the allied forces and gratitude to the French for their assistance, they did not blind Americans at all to the strength- ened diplomatic position of the United States. Within a little over a week from Cornwallis' sur- render the Massachusetts legislature passed reso- lutions ordering its delegates in Congress to press for instructions to the American peace commis- sioners to obtain British recognition of the right of Americans to share in the Newfoundland fisheries. 41 With the introduction of these reso- lutions into Congress a fortnight later debate began afresh on the merits of the Instructions of June 15th, to be renewed from time to time till the very end of the war. 42 All efforts, how- ever, to procure the outright repeal of these in- structions crumbled before the argument that American plenipotentiaries "in the manner most conformable to the dignity of the United States," and her rejection of a "plan of negotiation proposed by the mediating powers" which had "held up the idea" of the status quo for America, Journals, XXI. 1138- 9. Cf. Doniol, V. 39-43. Doubtless, La Luzerne's report of June 13 had demonstrated to Vergennes the unfeasibility of ac- cepting the status quo for the United States except as a very desperate measure. "Journals of the Continental Congress, XXI. 1122 fn. "See ib., XXII. 44-5, 429, 458-60, XXIII. 870-5; Doniol, IV. 625- 6 and 696-701; Thomson Papers, 63-5 and 93-108; and Writings of James Madison, I. 226 and 294-301. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 315 such action, by the offense it would cause France, would do more harm than good, that while the instructions were doubtless a sacrifice of pride, they were a sacrifice of pride to more substantial interests. 43 Furthermore, Congress had before it the explicit assurance of Vergennes, who was now chief -minister, that the king "would use his influence and credit for the advantage of his allies whenever a negotiation should render their inter- ests a subject of discussion." 44 This assurance suggested to Congress a way out of its difficulty. By the resolutions of Jan- uary 22nd, 1782, the Instructions of June 15th were still left standing, but the American commis- sioners were ordered to contend "with an earnest- ness becoming the importance of an object on which a great part of the United States abso- lutely depend" both for commerce and subsis- tence, "for an explicit acknowledgment of the common right of these United States to take fish in the North American seas and in particular on the banks of Newfoundland," and "with equal earnestness," "for the boundaries of the United States as described in the instructions" of Aug- ust 14th, 1779, and further, "to represent to His 43 Above references. See also notes 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, and 32, above. 44 Journals, XX. 1138. Livingston makes the quite positive state- ment that this assurance was what decided Congress to continue the Instructions of June 15 in effect after Yorktown, Livingston to Jay, Jan. 4, 1783, Wharton, VI. 178-9 fn. 316 FRENCH POLICY AND Most Christian Majesty" "the most sanguine expectations" of Congress that "His Majesty's friendship and influence will obtain for his faith- ful allies" both these objects. 45 In other words, Congress solved the dilemma created by Yorktown the dilemma, to wit, of American expectations on the one hand and French sensibilities on the other by shifting the responsibility to the shoulders of the American commissioners. Ten weeks later Grasse's fleet encountered Rodney's in the Bahama Channel and was utterly defeated, Grasse himself being taken prisoner. Yet, and it is a striking com- ment on the complex diplomatic situation in which the United States and France were mutu- ally involved the former derived distinct ad- 45 Ib., XXII. 44-5. Livingston communicated the resolutions to La Luzerne, Jan. 24, Wharton V. 126-7. The resolutions were preceded by Livingston's elaborate letter to Franklin of Jan. 7, 1782, in support of the claims of the United States to a boundary at the Mississippi, to the navigation of that river, and to a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, Wharton, V. 87-94. They were followed by the resolution of Apr. 30, in which Congress expressed approval of Jay's course as detailed in his report of the preceding Oct. 3 (see next chapter) ; and by a second resolution, adopted Aug. 6, 1782, ordering him to decline any propositions from Spain before transmitting them to Congress, unless his accession thereto "was necessary to the fulfilment of the stipulation on the part of the United States contained in the separate and secret article" of the treaty with France. Journals of the Continental Congress, XXII. 219-20 and 449-51. Whether these resolutions reached Jay in time to influence his conduct at the peace negotiations, I do not know, but conceivably they did. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 317 vantage from this defeat of their ally, perhaps indeed, greater advantage than they would have from her victory. For it was Rodney's triumph, the news of which reached London on the eve- ning of May 18th, that encouraged the British government in the idea of attempting to separate America from her allies in the peace negotiations that were just to begin, the theory being that if the wastage of the American war could be brought to an end, England could afford to con- tinue the war on the sea with the Bourbon powers. 46 That this assault upon their loyalty contributed materially to the success with which the American envoys met in the negotiations is altogether unquestionable. In short, America at this period was the lucky banker at the wheel of fortune: she ventured little, leaving that to others but whoever won, she won. 46 See Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, III. 194-5 and 203. For the consolatory memoir which Vergennes presented the king on Grasse's defeat, see Doniol, V. 118-20. The moral he draws is that France must give the lie to Lord North's statement at the begin- ning of the war, "que la France debute toujours avec supriorite, mais qu'elle se relache dans ses efforts, autant que 1'Angleterre multiplie et acroit les siens." CHAPTER XIV JAY'S MISSION TO SPAIN The story of Jay's part in the negotiations of 1782 is one that has never ceased to interest American students. In relating this well-known episode, I have not sought to avoid the problems of casuistry that, thanks to the opposed labors of the pious and the critical it has come to involve. At the same time, I have endeavored to organize my treatment of these problems in conformity with my main theme, wherefore I treat Jay's action primarily as a foil to French policy touch- ing the negotiations. But as French policy at this point leaned heavily on Spanish policy, and as Jay imbibed at Madrid the point of view from which his course at the negotiations took its departure, I feel that a brief review of his mis- sion to the latter country will not be inap- posite. 1 1 The following account of Jay's Spanish mission is drawn from his long reports to the President of Congress, of May 26 and Nov. 6, 1780, Oct. 3, 1781, and Apr. 28, 1782, which are to be found in Wharton, III. 707-34, IV. 112-50 and 738-65, and V. 336-77. The constituent documents of these reports will also be found in the Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (H. P. Johnston, ed., New York, 1890, 4 vols.), vols. I and II, passim. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 319 Jay set out for his post October 20th, 1779, and arrived at Cadiz January 22nd, 1780. Never re- ceived officially in the entire course of thirty month's sojourn at the court of His Catholic Ma- jesty, snubbed personally by nobility and officials, often without funds from the failure of his salary to reach him, put constantly to great expense in following the migratory court from pillar to post, embarrassed by the remarkable course of Con- gress in drawing on him when he had not a sou in prospect, put off again and again with the most transparent excuses, his correspondence sub- jected to official espionage and molestation he underwent, without doubt, one of the most trying experiences that has ever fallen to the lot of an envoy clothed with the dignity of his govern- ment's commission. Yet at the outset, Jay's mission was not with- out signs of promise. He was received by Flor- ida Blanca with great promptitude and given strong hopes of considerable financial aid before the end of the year, as well as of a treaty which, at no remote date, would establish the long sought via media between the legitimate interests of both Spain and America respecting the Mississippi question. 2 But early in July, 1780, came the news of the loss of Charleston. "The effect of it," wrote Jay, "was as visible the next day as that of a hard night's frost on young leaves. 2 Wharton, III. 709-11, 732-5. 8 Op. tit., IV. 123. "3 320 FRENCH POLICY AND Meantime, Congress was constantly drawing on its envoy, and bills of exchange were constantly accumulating against him in the hands of the brokers, with the result that his financial difficul- ties were soon appalling. 4 On July 5th, he had a long conference with the minister as to ways and means of meeting these bills, but, in his own expressive phrase, "not a single nail would drive." 5 Nor was he more successful in his ef- forts at correspondence. Four successive notes remained unanswered, and an attempt to see the minister proved equally unavailing. 6 Finally, on September 3rd, Don Diego Gardoqui, one of the friendly house of Bilboa merchants that since the beginning of the war had been carrying on a con- siderable trade in contraband with the United States, presented himself to Jay with Florida Blanca's compliments, and proceeded to propose point-blank that, in return for financial assist- ance, the United States should surrender their claims to the navigation of the Mississippi. Jay rejected the offer indignantly and was shortly after informed that even the limited credit which His Majesty had thus far extended was, for "reasons of state," withdrawn. 7 4 76., III. 722; IV. 122 ff. 8 76., 125. 76., 127-8. T 76., 133-5. There was much talk at this time and for some months later of sending Gardoqui to America to take the place filled by Rendon, as Miralles' successor, 6., 741-2, 764. As a THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE At this moment, fortunately, "some glorious reports from America arrived," and the Spanish government reconsidered its harsh decision. On September 15th Gardoqui informed Jay that if he could find credit for that sum, His Majesty would be answerable for as much as one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, 8 and eight days later the minister himself conferred with Jay a second time on the subject of a treaty. The conference revealed, however, that a treaty was probably far distant. Actually, as Florida Blanca inad- vertently admitted, the Spanish monarch was determined not to recognize the United States before England did. 9 Primarily this was because matter of fact Gardoqui did not arrive in the United States till May, 1785. For the negotiations then undertaken between him and Jay, who was now secretary of Foreign Affairs, see Ban- croft, VI. 421-2. 8 Wharton, IV. 139. 9 "After a variety of other remarks of little importance he made a very interesting observation, which will help us to ac- count for the delays of the court, viz.: That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace than now, for that such a particular and even secret treaty with us might then be made as would be very convenient to both. . . . Throughout the whole conversation [May 23, 1781] the count appeared much less cordial than in the preceding one; he seemed to want self-possession, and to that cause I ascribe his incautiously mentioning the general peace as the most proper season for com- pleting our political connections. I had, nevertheless, no reason to suspect that this change in his behavior arose from any cause more important than those variations in temper and feelings which they who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of busi- ness, or other such like accidental causes." Ib., 746. 322 FRENCH POLICY AND he feared the example and effect of American independence on his own dominions; but con- nected with this fear was Spain's desire, which Florida Blanca constantly stressed, to maintain her monopoly of commerce in the Gulf of Mex- ico. The Count, wrote Jay, made several observations tending to show the impor- tance of this object to Spain and its determination to adhere to it, saying with some degree of warmth that, unless Spain could exclude all nations from the Gulf of Mexico, they might as well admit all; that the king would never relinquish it; that the minister regarded it as the principal object to be obtained by the war, and that obtained, he should be perfectly easy whether or no Spain procured any other cession ; that he con- sidered it far more important than the acquisition of Gibraltar, and that if they did not get it, it was a matter of indifference to him whether the English possessed Mobile or not. 10 Late in October Jay received word that Gates had been defeated at Camden and that the elder Laurens was in the Tower. "Our sky in this quarter," he wrote, "is again darkened with clouds not in my power to dispel." 11 Further- more, this was the period of the Spanish gov- ernment's negotiations with the Englishman Cumberland, which, as we have seen, menaced the United States with the status quo. Not until March, 1781, did Cumberland leave Madrid, that w /6., 145-6. 11 Ib., 149. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 323 is, several weeks after Spain had ostensibly agreed to a fresh campaign. 12 Meantime, by the resolution of February 15th, Congress had instructed Jay to recede from his previous instructions so far as they insisted on the free navigation of the Mississippi below the 31st degree, "provided such cession shall be unalterably insisted on by Spain"; and on May 18th Jay received advices to this effect from the secretary of Congress. 13 He greatly regretted the step, arguing that, inasmuch as Spain was herself now "at war with Great Britain to gain her own objects," she would be apt to "prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for" ours. 14 Also, as certain papers that should have accom- panied Lovell's letter did not arrive and the letter itself had passed through the post-office, he suspected that Florida Blanca knew as much about Congress' change of front as he did; and he u "If they have rejected all the overtures of Britain," wrote Jay in Nov., 1780, "why is Mr. Cumberland still here? And why are expresses passing between Madrid and London through Portugal?" Ib., 148. Jay records Cumberland's departure in his report of Apr. 25, 1781: "Mr. Cumberland is on the road home. I much suspect that he was sent and received from mutual views in the two courts of deceiving each other. Which of them has been most successful is hard to determine. ... As to the assurances of the minister on this subject, they are all of little consequence, be- cause on such occasions courts only say what may be convenient, and therefore may or may not merit confidence. Time and cir- cumstances will cast more light on this subject." Ib., 388. 13 76., 738-40. "76., 743. FRENCH POLICY AND wrote: "The moment they saw that the cession of this navigation was made to depend upon their persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose that they would cease to persevere." 15 Finally on July 2, taking the bull by the horns, Jay informed Florida Blanca outright that the great obstacle to a treaty between the United States and Spain had been removed by the action of Congress itself, and expressed the hope that His Majesty would "now be pleased to become the ally of the United States." 16 Ten days went by and the communication still remained un- noticed by the Spanish minister. Jay then called at the Pardo and was informed that the reason for the seeming neglect was the press of business consequent upon the court's intention to remove shortly to San Ildefonso. On August 4th Jay himself repaired to the new capital and something over a month later was able to secure an inter- view with the minister, who had filled up the in- terval with alternating pleas of illness and busi- ness. 17 The conference was resultless, but a second one a fortnight later produced a request on Florida Blanca's part that "Mr. Jay . . . would offer him such a set of propositions as might become the basis of future conferences between him and the person whom he expected 15 Ib., 744. 1- /6 V 747. 11 76., 750-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 325 His Majesty would appoint." 18 The request was complied with four days later. By the sixth arti- cle of the proposed agreement, the United States relinquished to His Catholic Majesty "the navigation of the river Mississippi from the 31st degree of north latitude . . . down to the ocean." Accompanying the article, however, was the explanation that "the offer of this proposi- tion, being dictated" by the circumstances of the war, "must necessarily be limited by the duration of them and consequently that if the acceptance of it should, together with the proposed alliance, be postponed to a general peace, the United States will cease to consider themselves bound by any propositions" now made in their behalf. 19 Of course the offer came to nothing, and on November 21st we find Jay writing Franklin that "this court continues to observe the most pro- found silence respecting our propositions." 20 Three weeks later Jay secured another interview with the minister, who informed him that a cer- tain M. del Campo "had been appointed nearly three months ago to treat and confer" with him, but that "shortly after the court removed from San Ildefonso that gentleman's health began to decline" and that it had only insufficiently checked its deplorable tendency very recently. 18 76., 758. 19 Ib., 760-2. M Ib., V., 346. 21 Ib., 348. 21 326 FRENCH POLICY AND However, Jay now began to pay court to M. del Campo, with whom he finally obtained an inter- view some six weeks later. I found M. del Campo [he writes] surrounded by suitors. He received me with great and unusual civility and carried me into his private apartment. I told him that, as he was evidently very busy, I could not think of sitting down and wished only to detain him a few moments. He said that he was indeed much engaged but that we might, nevertheless, take a cup of chocolate together. 22 A few weeks later Franklin wrote Jay from Paris requesting that he "render himself" there for the approaching peace negotiations as soon as possible. "You would," said the venerable doc- tor, "be of infinite service. Spain has taken four years to consider whether she should treat with us or not. Give her forty, and let us in the mean- time mind our own business." 23 The middle of June Jay left for Paris, expectant of renewing negotiations there with Aranda. But these ex- pectations proved as footless as preceding ones had been. Aranda refused to show Jay his pow- ers to treat for the good reason that he had 23 Ib., 356-7. For a good summary of the delays Jay had met with in Spain, see La Fayette to Vergennes, Mar. 20, 1782, &., 266. For the episode of the invitation that was sent to Jay by mistake, to dine with the Spanish minister, and was declined when renewed to him in his quality as "a private gentleman of dis- tinction," see ib., 373-7. 23 Letter of Apr. 22, 1782, ib., 321. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 327 none and Jay refused to proceed without this preliminary. 24 Writers have implied that Jay went up to Paris in 1782 in a rather suspicious frame of mind, and it is certain that if he had ever been inclined to regard diplomatic questions in a senti- mental light he had been pretty well cured of the tendency by the time he left Madrid. "In poli- tics," he wrote Franklin at the close of this period, "I depend upon nothing but facts, and therefore never risk deceiving myself or others by a reli- ance on professions, which may or may not be sincere." 25 He, accordingly, warned Congress of the futility of attempting to form alliances "on principles of equality in forma pauperis"'?* that the United States, to be "respectable any- where," must be "formidable at home" ; 27 that we but deceived ourselves if we believed "that any na- tion in the world has or will have a disinterested regard for us." 28 France, he acknowledged un- grudgingly, was doing a vast deal for America and often in a handsome and generous spirit that added greatly to the value of the favors she ren- dered; and he held, that, "so long as" she was faithful to us, we were in honor bound to continue 24 Jay to Livingston, Nov. 17, 1782, ib., VI. 21-5, 28; same to same, Dec. 12, ib., 130. 28 Correspondence and Public Papers, II. 63. 20 Ib., 20. "Wharton, IV. 147. 28 76., 148. 328 FRENCH POLICY AND in the war for her objects as well as our own. 29 At the same time, he was under no illusions as to the obligations of France to Spain. The latter power, he perceived, had been brought into the ex- isting war only by special inducements, and he did not hesitate to inform Montmorin of his be- lief that one of these was "the exclusive naviga- tion of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico." 30 It is not remarkable, then, that he remonstrated strongly against the Instructions of June 15th. They had, he conceded, "an appearance of pol- icy," but, he protested, they forced the American envoys to receive and obey (under the name of opinions) the direc- tions of those on whom ... no American minister ought to be dependent and to whom, in love for our country and zeal for her service, I am sure that my colleagues and myself are at least their equal. Indeed, he preferred to resign his commission as peace negotiator rather than submit to such a control. But he did not resign; and as events were to prove, he had underestimated his own hardihood of purpose. 31 29 Correspondence and Public Papers, II. 283. "Wharton, IV. 137. This belief Montmorin challenged, but he later admitted that Spain was desirous of modifying American independence, Jay to Livingston, Apr. 28, 1782, t'6., V. 368. * Correspondence and Public Papers, II. 71-2. CHAPTER XV JAY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1782 The story of the American negotiations for peace, which it was understood from the outset were to be carried on separately between the American envoys and such representatives as Great Britain should accredit for the purpose, 1 1 Vergennes to La Luzerne, Apr. 9, 1782: "Au reste, M., quoique nous d6sirons que le Congres n'entame aucune n6gociation directe et qu'il ne fasse point une paix s6par6e, . . . nous sommes et serons toujours disposes a consentir que les p!6nipotentiaires Am^ricains en Europe traitent conformement a leurs instructions, directement et sans notre intervention, avec ceux de la cour de Londres, tandis que nous traiterons de meme de notre cdte, a condition que les deux negotiations chemineront d'un pas gal, et que les deux traits seront signed en meme terns et ne vaudront point 1'un sans 1'autre," Doniol V. 78-9. See also Oswald to Shelburne, June 9, 1782: "Dr. Franklin then said he thought the best way to come at a general peace was to treat separately with each party, and under distinct commissions to one and the same, or different persons. By this method many difficulties . . . would be in a great measure avoided. And then at last there would only remain to consolidate these several settlements into one genuine and conclusive treaty of pacification .... He explained as to the commissions, that there might be one to treat with France, one for the Colonies, one for Spain, and, he added, one for Holland, if it should be thought proper." At the same time Franklin put in a bid for Oswald as the American negotiator. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of 330 FRENCH POLICY AND begins to all practical intents with Franklin's communication of July 9th to the British agent Oswald, wherein was laid down the basis for a treaty of peace between the two countries. The first four items of this basis, labelled "necessary," were as follows: 1. Independence full and complete in every sense, and all troops to be withdrawn ; 2. A settlement of the boundaries of the Thirteen States ; 3. A confinement of the boundaries of Canada to at least what they were before the Quebec Act, if not to still narrower limits; 4. A freedom of fishing on the Banks of Newfoundland and elsewhere, as well for fish as whales. 33 William, Earl of Shelburne (London, 1876, 3 vols.), III. 207-8. The only effort made by the British government for a separate negotiation in the United States was through Sir Guy Carleton who arrived in New York on May 5, with a commission to make "peace or war in North America." Later Carleton was author- ized to make peace either with Congress or "through General Washington" on the basis of "unconditional independence." See Wharton, V. 405-6, 413, 417, and 652, and VI. 15-6. The arrival of Carleton evoked the Congressional resolutions of May 31, 1782, assuring His Most Christian Majesty of Congress' determination "to hearken to no propositions for peace which are not perfectly conformable" to the Alliance, and in case such propositions were made by the court of London, not to depart from the measures which they have heretofore taken for preventing delay, and for conducting the discussions of them [such propositions] in confi- dence and in concert with His Most Christian Majesty," Journals of the Continental Congress, XXII. 312-3. See also to same effect, the Resolutions of Oct. 4, 1782, ib., XXIII. 637-9. 2 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, III. 243-4. Early in the year a correspondence had arisen between Hartley and Franklin touch- ing peace. The former had hinted at a separate peace between England and America, which suggestion the American had spurned. Wharton, V. 80-4 and 112-4. See also Franklin to THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 331 Jay's participation in the negotiations began on August 10th, when he and Franklin conferred with Vergennes as to the sufficiency of Oswald's Rayneval, Mar. 22, transmitting this correspondence, B. F. Stevens, Peace Transcripts (Library of Congress). Meanwhile the crumbling North cabinet had sent Forth to Paris to make some bungling efforts to draw France off from her alliance with the United States. Forth offered France her conquests in the West Indies, the suppression of the commissionership at Dunkirk, and certain advantages in the East Indies. Of course, he failed, Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, XIV. 161 ff.; Wharton, V. 298, 303-5; Journals of the Continental Congress, XXII. 302-3. Over- lapping this episode, and so antedating the formation of the Rock- ingham cabinet, a correspondence had also sprung up between Franklin and Shelburne regarding peace. In consequence of this, as early as April 12, Oswald was sent to Paris by Shelburne, who was now secretary for Home and Colonial Affairs under Rocking- ham, to sound him on the question of peace. Franklin informed Oswald "that America was ready to treat, but only in concert with France, and that as Mr. Jay, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Laurens were all absent from Paris, nothing of importance could be done in the affair." At the same time Franklin urged the cession of Canada in the interest of a durable peace and gave Oswald a minute of his views on the subject. This proposal Franklin afterward renewed in his communication of July 9, cited above, but without result. On Apr. 23, the Rockingham cabinet agreed to a minute requesting that His Majesty have Oswald return to Paris in order to set on foot a negotiation with Franklin looking to a general peace and "the allowance of independence to America," and that Fox, the secretary of Foreign Affairs, suggest a proper person to the king to begin a like negotiation with France. In consequence of this minute Oswald was sent again to Paris to treat with Franklin, while Thomas Grenville was sent by Fox to treat with the French minister. On May 18, the cabinet asked the king to direct Fox to empower Grenville "to treat and conclude at Paris" "on the basis of independence to the Thirteen Colonies in North America"; and five days late instructed the latter in negotiating with France, to propose the acknowledgment by England of the independence of 332 FRENCH POLICY AND commission, which empowered that amiable gen- tleman to treat, not with the United States of America, but with "the said colonies and planta- tions." 3 Jay urged that "it would be descending from the ground of independence" to treat under such a description. Vergennes, however, urged that names signified little; that the king of Great Bri- tain's styling himself the king of France was no obstacle to ... France's treating with him; that an acknowl- edgment of our independence, instead of preceding, must in the natural course of things be the effect of the treaty. America "in the first instance." Fox, interpreting these minutes as establishing a single negotiation, that with France, who, ac- cordingly, was to be assured at the outset of England's intention to recognize American independence, now authorized Grenville to take over the whole business of peace-making. At first his plan was checked by the refusal of Vergennes to treat with regard to American interests, both because His Majesty had no power to do so and also because "the dignity of the king of England and of the United States required the establishment of a direct negotia- tion between the two," Vergennes to La Luzerne, June 28, 1782, Doniol, V. 88. In order to meet this objection Fox now em- powered Grenville to treat with the king of France "and any other Prince or State," Fitzmaurice, op. cit., III. 214-7. Mean- time, however, Shelburne had protested against the American negotiation being removed from his department and the king had sided with him. From the confusion thus resulting the situation was relieved by the death of Rockingham on July 1st, and the accession of Shelburne the day following to the Prime Minister- ship. Fox now left the cabinet and Grenville threw up his com- mission as envoy. Meantime, the Parliamentary Enabling Act had been passed, and on July 25 Oswald received his first com- mission, while, a fortnight earlier, Fitzherbert, the British minister at Brussels, had been appointed to take the Grenville's place. Fitz- maurice, op. cit., III. chs. IV and V; Doniol, V. ch. III. ' Wharton, V. 613-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 333 Upon leaving Vergennes' presence Franklin im- puted the minister's attitude to a desire to remove "every obstacle to a speedy negotiation." But Jay, who had been led to believe by the mystify- ing conduct and language of another British agent, Grenville, that there was still some doubt about the British government's according inde- pendence, drew the conclusion that Vergennes was prepared to profit by this uncertainty by getting Spain out of the war before England and America could come to terms. They wish, said he to Franklin, "to make their uses of us": the Count foresaw "difficulties in bringing Spain into peace on moderate terms, and that if we once found ourselves standing on our own legs . . . we might not think it our duty to continue in the war for the attainment of Spanish objects." 4 * Jay to Livingston, Wharton, VI. 12-9. This letter, 6., 11-51, is Jay's apology for the course described in the text. It is also to be found in the Correspondence and Public Papers, II. 366-452. The statement by Grenville that is referred to is his assertion, upon leaving Paris, that Shelburne had no intention of granting America her independence, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., III. 246. This en- tirely unwarranted assertion was the source of the whole mis- understanding between Jay and Vergennes on the matter of independence. As is clear from his course with both Grenville and Fitzherbert, Vergennes was determined not to begin negotia- tions till he was definitely assured that the British government was ready to recognize American independence, Doniol, V. ch. Ill, passim; Fitzmaurice op. cit., III. 251-2. Journals of the Conti- nental Congress, Sept. 24, 1782, XXIII. 596-604. Jay, on the other hand, felt that Grenville's declaration was sufficient to call into question any mere statement by the British government henceforth 334 FRENCH POLICY AND Jay was, of course, quite right in suspecting that the great difficulty in the way of peace was the necessity France was under of satisfying Spain, and from this it was a reasonable deduc- tion that the French Foreign Office might be tempted to resort to underhand expedients to prolong the negotiations between the United States and England. 5 On the other hand, it does of its intentions as to independence, and that nothing could now re- move uncertainty save the act of recognition itself, or what would be equivalent to an act of recognition if peace succeeded. To his view, therefore, Vergennes' willingness to forego the actual recogni- tion of independence by England till the treaty of peace was tanta- mount to willingness to postpone, till the end of the negotiations perhaps, the question whether there should be such a recognition at all. Herein, he was wrong. "We may judge of the intentions of the court of London," Vergennes wrote La Luzerne, Aug. 14, "by their first propositions. If they have independence for their basis we may proceed; if not, we must break off," Doniol, V. 110. * "When once independence has been definitely offered to the United States, if it is not followed immediately by peace it will not be difficult to persuade them that the continuation of the war has an entirely different object from their interests," Mont- morin to Vergennes, Aug. 12, 1782, Stevens, Peace Transcripts. It should be noted in passing that, in an effort to reassure the Amer- icans of his good faith, Shelburne had furnished Franklin with a copy of his letter to Sir Guy Carleton of June 25. This letter men- tions that Grenville had been instructed to propose American inde- pendence "in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general peace." At the same time, however, this letter also brought forward the point, "that if the negotiation is broken off it will undoubtedly be for the sake of France and Spain and not America, and that any delay in obtaining peace would be attributable to the same cause, Wharton, VI. 15-6. While, there- fore, this document was reassuring in one way, in another it con- firmed Jay's suspicions. These suspicions were in formation be- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 335 not appear how the postponement, to the conclu- sion of peace, of British recognition of American independence a matter which, Vergennes had informed himself was a foregone result would have delayed proceedings. The truth is that, owing to his misapprehension of Shelburne's good- faith, Jay was playing the very game that, by his assumption, Vergennes wished to have played, that is, he was creating delay. Nevertheless, in so doing he forwarded American interests. For in an effort to meet his demands and to bring to an end the delay they were causing, Townshend, act- ing for Shelburne, authorized Oswald on Sep- tember 1st "to agree to the plan of pacification" that had been proposed by Franklin, "to the full extent" of the "necessary" articles and, further, "to waive any stipulation" in behalf either of British creditors or of the American loyalists. 6 But even this concession did not abate Jay's determination to treat on no other footing than as the representative of independent states; and there now followed a succession of events which galvanized his obstinacy to swift and positive fore he left Spain. "France," he wrote Livingston, in his report of Apr. 28, "is ready for a peace, but not Spain. The king's eyes are fixed on Gibraltar .... If England should offer us peace on the terms of our treaty with France, the French court would be very much embarrassed by their alliance with Spain, and as yet we are under no obligations to persist in the war to gratify this court" (the emphasis is mine), ib., 373. Fitzmaurice, op. tit., III. 254-6; Bancroft, History, V. 563-4. FRENCH POLICY AND action. It should be mentioned that, on the same occasion when Oswald's commission had been first discussed with Vergennes, the conflicting claims of Spain and the United States in the region west of the Mountains had also been brought into the conversation. The minister himself, Jay records, "was very reserved and cautious; but M. Rayne- val, his principal secretary, who was present, thought that we claimed more than we had a right to." 7 This tone on Rayneval's part, it is prob- able, was somewhat material in forming Jay's unfavorable opinion of the minister's argument on the question of Oswald's commission. Be that as it may, Rayneval next proceeded to develop his views to Jay more at length, and on Septem- ber 7th sent him an elaborate memorandum in support of them and proposing that the lands south of the Ohio be divided into two Indian pro- tectorates, the one toward the Mississippi to be under Spain, the one toward the Mountains to be under the United States, and that the lands north of the Ohio be left to England. 8 Then on Sep- tember 9th Jay "received certain information that on September 7th M. Rayneval had left Versailles and was gone to England, that it was pretended he was gone into the country, and that several precautions had been taken to keep his real des- tination a secret." 9 Finally, on September 10th 'Wharton, VI. 23. *Cf. p. 309 supra. 9 Wharton, VI., 28. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 337 "a copy of a translation of a letter from M. Mar- bois to the Count de Vergennes against our shar- ing in the fishery" was put into the American's hands. 10 10 76., V. 740 and VI. 29. Jay states that he is "not at liberty to mention the manner in which this paper came" to his hands, but Fitzmaurice says that it was communicated "by means of one of the secret agents in the employment of the English government," op. cit., III. 257. Writers have attempted to cast doubts on the authenticity of this document, but these doubts are adequately met by the following passage from Vergennes' despatch of Aug. 12, 1782, to La Luzerne: "Le Sr. de Marbois propose un expedient pour arre"ter les esprances des Am^ricains et les men6es de M. Samuel Adams; mais le Conseil du Roi juge que comme nous ne sommes lie's par aucun engagement, nous n'avons aucune mesure a prendre pour preVenir les clameurs et les reproches, et toute demarche de notre part tendante a ce but seroit au moins pr6- mature"e; d'ailleurs, nous avons du terns de reste pour nous expli- quer lorsque la matiere des pe"cheries sera s^rieusement discut6e entre les plnip'res Ame>icains et le commissaire de la cour de Londres." Doniol, V. 157. In his despatch of Jan. 4, 1783, to Jay, Livingston, Congress' secretary for Foreign Affairs, belittles the significance of Marbois' communication. He is not, he says, surprised by it, "since he [Marbois] always endeavored to per- suade us that our claim to the fisheries was not well founded." Then he continues: "Yet one thing is very remarkable, and I hope evinces the determination of France to serve us on this point: The advice given to discourage the hope is certainly judicious, and yet we find no steps taken in consequence of it. On the contrary, we have been repeatedly told in formal communications since that period, 'that the king would do everything for us that cir- cumstances will admit.' . . . This communication was made on the 21st of last November from letters of the 7th of Septem- ber .... Congress, relying upon it, have made no alteration in their instructions since the change in their affairs by the blow the enemy received at Yorktown. This letter of Marbois, and the conduct of the court of France, evince the difference between a FRENCH POLICY AND Jay was now thoroughly aroused and thor- oughly alarmed, especially for American interests in the West. France stood ready, he now felt great politician and a little one .... Our exclusion from the fishery would only be beneficial to England." Wharton, VI. 177-80 fn. This argument would be more persuasive if the letters of September 7th, relied upon by Livingston, had not been fol- lowed by such expressions as that quoted above, from the despatch of August 12, 1782, where Vergennes clearly contemplates the possibility of intervening in the discussion of the fisheries question between the British and American negotiations, against the Amer- ican pretensions. And to the same effect is the following passage from the French minister's despatch of June 28: "Je preVois, M., qu'il y aura encore de grands de"bats au Congres au sujet des limites de quelques e"tats. Si le Congres ne se laisse pas en- trainer par I'intdre't personnel et les clameurs des provinces du Nord, il envisagera la paix comme le plus grand des bienfaits qu'il puisse desirer; il se gardera bien d'exiger la moindre faveur, a titre de droit, d'un puissance a laquelle une portion 6norme de son domaine va 6chapper; il se bornera a demander ce que le droit commun assure aux Ame>icains, et il se re"servera de de- mander une plus grande extension lorsque 1'Angleterre lui pro- posera des arrangements de commerce. Je me flatte surtout, M., que les Am6ricains ne pr^tendront pas que le Roi se fasse fort de leur procurer 1'extension de pche qu'ils convoitent, et encore moins qu'il fasse le sacrifice de ses propres pcheries pour les dedommager du refus de la Grande-Bretagne. Sa M'te" ne consen- tira ni a 1'un ni a 1'autre ; tout ce qu'elle pourra f aire sera d'accorder ses bons offices selon que les circonstances le lui permettront; mais elle est invariablement resoliie de ne point sacrifier le r6tablisse- ment de la paix a une pretention mal fondle." Doniol, V. 90-1. To like effect are Vergennes' despatches of Oct. 14 and Nov. 23 to La Luzerne, Stevens, Peace Transcripts; Doniol V. 176-9. Also, we should not ignore the testimony of Lord St. Helens (formerly Fitzherbert, the British negotiator with France), in his letter to Judge William Jay, in 1838, that Vergennes had argued strongly, in 1782, against the Americans being admitted to the fisheries, THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 339 convinced, in case the United States would not give Spain the territory she wanted in that re- gion, to aid the latter in negotiating with Eng- land for it; and Rayneval, he believed, had gone to England to sound Shelburne on the American claims, to impress upon him France's disapproval of them, and "to hint the propriety of such a line as would on the one hand satisfy Spain and on the other leave to Britain all the country north of the Ohio." 11 He at once determined on aggres- sive measures. Without consulting Franklin, he sent Benjamin Vaughan, a friend of both Frank- lin and Shelburne, to London to combat Rayne- val's reasoning and to urge a new commission for Oswald authorizing him to treat with "the United States of America." 12 Vaughan's mission proved successful, and upon the new basis the negotia- tions proceeded till November 30th, when "provi- sional articles" were signed, embodying the conditions of a treaty to be concluded when terms of peace should "be agreed upon between Great on the ground that it would be dangerous to accord them so great a nursery of sea-power. Henry Flanders, Lives and Times of the Chief Justices (Phila., 1858), I. 343. Then, there is the point made by Adams, "that, aiming at excluding us from fishing upon the north side of Newfoundland, it was natural for them [the French] to wish that the English would exclude us from the south side," Wharton, VI. 93. For an estimate of the fisheries as a nursery of seamen, see ib., III. 789. 11 Wharton, VI. 29. 12 Ib., 29-32, 45-7. 340 FRENCH POLICY AND Britain and France," which did not occur till some six weeks later. 13 Was Jay's conduct, which by their ratification of it became that of his fellow commissioners also, justifiable? The severest criticism meted out to the commissioners was that of Vergennes in his heated letter to Franklin of December 15th, which was called forth by the latter' s announce- ment that he was about to forward the Provi- sional Articles to Congress by a vessel for which a passport had been secured from the king of England. 14 I am at a loss, sir, [wrote the irate minister] to explain your conduct and that of your colleagues on this occa- sion. You have concluded your preliminary articles "The Provisional Articles are given in Appendix V. A ques- tion raised in Parliament with reference to them was whether "American independence was to take effect absolutely at any period, near or remote, whenever a treaty of peace was concluded with the court of France, or was contingent merely, so that if the particular treaty now negotiating with France should not ter- minate in a peace, the offer was to be considered revoked and the independence left to be determined by events," Parliamentary History, XXIII. col. 306. Shelburne denounced the question as "unwise" and "unprecedented" and refused to answer it: "he was bound to keep the secrets of the king . . . the thing was done, the treaty signed and sealed, and whether good or bad, its pro- duction could not vary it," ib. What was the character of the contract in the provisional articles? This question was dis- cussed in Congress, and the opinion arrived at by Wilson of Penn- sylvania was that it was "contingently definitive," Writings of Madison, I. 448-50. See also a question raised as to the interpre- tation of the preamble, ib., 410. "Wharton, VI. 137-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 341 without any communication between us, although the instructions from Congress prescribe that nothing shall be done without the participation of the king. You are about to hold out a certain hope of peace to America without even informing yourself on the state of the negotiation on our part. You are wise and discreet, sir ; you perfectly understand what is due to propriety ; you have all your life performed your duties. I pray you to consider how you propose to fulfill those which are due to the king? 15 Technically, of course, the violation by the commissioners of their instructions was a mat- ter exclusively between them and Congress, besides which these instructions had been voted with the mediation of the Imperial courts in view, while the negotiations of 1782 pro- ceeded along quite different lines. Nor again, did the action of the commissioners technically violate the pledge given in the Treaty of Alliance, that the United States would conclude neither truce nor peace with Great Britain without first obtaining the formal consent of France. The w Ib., 140. Franklin's soothing answer is given ib., 143-4. Frank- lin admitted that the Americans had "been guilty of neglecting a point of bienseance'' But he urged that "this little misunderstand- ing ... be kept a secret," as "the English, I just now learn, flatter themselves they have already divided us" (the emphasis is Franklin's). At the same time, Franklin insisted that the articles ought to be sent to America, arguing that it would be better for Congress to have the commissioners' account of them than the British account. On the 24th, the articles were sent off, ib., 153 fn. For a further expression of the attitude of the Foreign Office toward the conduct of the commissioners, see Vergennes to La Luzerne, Dec. 19, ib., 150-2. FRENCH POLICY AND Provisional Articles were not a separate peace nor did they "hold out a certain hope of peace." It may be admitted, however, that they were in- tended to convey a warning that the United States reserved the right to make a separate peace, if a final peace should be obstructed by France for reasons not covered by the Treaty of Alliance. In other words, the articles reclaimed for the United States that right to construe their treaty obligations which, when exercised in good faith, belongs to all sovereignties, and which Con- gress had surrendered by its instructions/ 16 "There is, therefore, no necessary contradiction between Jay's language to Oswald and to La Fayette. "Upon my saying," Os- wald wrote Townshend, Oct. 2, "how hard it was that France should pretend to saddle us with all their private engagements with Spain, he [Jay] replied: 'We will allow no such thing. For we shall say to France: The agreement we made with you we shall faithfully perform; but if you have entered into any separate measures with other people not included in that agreement, and will load the negotiation with their demands, we shall give our- selves no concern about them.' " Stevens, Peace Transcripts. On Jan. 19, 1783, Jay wrote La Fayette, with reference to the Pro- visional Articles, thus: "It appears to me singular that any doubts should be entertained of American good faith. . . . America has so often repeated and reiterated her professions and assurances of regard to the treaty alluded to [the Treaty of Alliance], that I hope she will not impair her dignity by making any more of them.'* Correspondence and Public Papers, III. 25. But see also Edward Channing, History of the United States, III. 384-5, for proof of the fact that Jay urged Oswald to press his government to under- take the reconquest of West Florida from the Spaniards, and even suggested to that end that some of the British troops at New York and Charleston be used for the purpose. In this way the British forces in the United States would have been weakened; the Brit- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 343 The question that at once prompts itself is whether the United States, having regard to the kinds and scope of the assistance they had had from France, were altogether free to claim the prerogatives of sovereignty in relation to their engagements with that country. No doubt, in theory the United States were "sovereign and in- dependent" allies of France; but more imposing than any theory is the fact that, at the very mo- ment of communicating the Provisional Articles to Vergennes, Franklin was obliged by instruc- tions from Congress to solicit a fresh loan from His Most Christian Majesty. 17 And the circum- stance is indicative of what had been the actual situation from the very outset of the alliance. But such being the case, was not the Foreign Office at liberty, within reasonable limits, to make ish concession to the United States of the right to navigate the Mississippi would have been rendered effective; and Spain would have been humiliated. "Congress wanted a loan of twenty millions, and on Dec. 21 a loan of six millions was extended, Wharton, VI. 152 fn. Some writers have attributed this concession to the pleasing effects of Franklin's note of Dec. 17, quoted above. It is much more prob- able that the concession was instigated by the consideration suggested in the text, that so long as Congress was the recipient of such favors from France it was not likely to cut loose from the French leading-strings. In justice to the commissioners, how- ever, one should recall the principle invoked by Jay in Spain, that the United States, being a sovereign nation, were free to borrow money "on the same consideration that other nations did," namely, "the repayment of the principal with interest," and accordingly, without putting their more permanent interests in pawn. See Wharton, IV. 134-6. 344 FRENCH POLICY AND the best arrangements it could in the interest of a cause which was certainly not less that of Amer- ica than of France; and granting the measures so taken to have been taken in good faith, were not the United States in honor bound to shoulder their legitimate consequences? Jay himself had owned that it was farcical to seek an equal alliance in forma pauperis. It was, perhaps, a little less than honest to pretend to maintain one on that footing. "The separate and secret manner in which our ministers had proceeded with respect to France and the confidential manner with respect to the British ministers," Madison records, "affected different members of Congress very differ- ently." 18 Madison himself thought the conduct of the commissioners censurable, taking substan- tially the point of view just expounded. He ad- mitted that France had mingled too much artifice in her dealings with America, and that her truest policy would have been a more straightforward course. He also conceded that the ties of France with Spain, "whom she had drawn into the war, required her to favor Spain, at least to a certain degree, at the expense of America." 19 None the less, he contended that, "instead of cooperating with Great Britain" to take advantage of "the embarrassment in which France was placed by 18 Writings, I. 404. 19 Ib., 296. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 345 the interfering claims of Spain and the United States," the envoys "ought to have made every allowance and given every facility to it consistent with a regard to the rights of their constituents." The facts alleged by the envoys, he continued, showed no "hostile or ambitious designs" against our claims on France's part, nor any other design "than that of reconciling them with those of Spain"; wherefore, an impartial world must re- gard the action of the commissioners as striking "a dishonorable alliance with our enemies as against our friends." Indeed, a measure of con- sideration had been due Spain herself, for not- withstanding the disappointments and indignities which the United States had received from her, "it could neither be denied nor concealed that the former had derived many substantial advantages from her taking part in the war, and had even obtained some pecuniary aids." 20 Rightly or wrongly, the commissioners mod- elled their course upon more robust principles. Jay, a quick and sensitive temperament, who had in Congress shown himself not a little compliant with French views, had been cast by his experi- ences in Spain into an attitude of patriotic self- assertiveness, an attitude to which the Congres- sional instructions added fresh fuel. Adams' hardy provincialism needed no special incentive to patriotic self-assertion, though it had this in his Ib., 418. 346 FRENCH POLICY AND intense interest in seeing Massachusetts restored to her fishing privileges off the Grand Banks. Franklin, burdened with years, was perhaps over- borne to some extent by his more vigorous col- leagues but he also felt, and had from the first, a keen desire to see the United States reach to the Mississippi. 21 All these men, moreover, had been of the pioneers of American independence, among the first to conceive a national destiny for the American Provinces. But the immediately provoking cause, of course, of the independent policy adopted by the commissioners was Jay's suspicions, and these, it has been frequently urged by writers, were not altogether well-placed. Nevertheless, I think it has to be conceded that most of Jay's errors were rather as to the motives represented by certain facts than as to the facts themselves or their natural tendency; and even such mistakes as he made were compensated for to a singular de- gree by facts that he did not know. Today, how- ever, the essential elements of the situation that confronted the commissioners are plain ; they may be summarized thus : First, the necessity France was under to obtain peace as speedily as possible ; second, the positive obligation she was under not 31 See Jay's testimony on this point, Correspondence and Public Papers, II. 390. See also the commissioners' letter to Livingston, Dec. 14, in which Franklin assents to the statement, "We knew this court and Spain to be against our claims to the Western country," Wharton, VI. 132. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 347 to accept peace until Spain was satisfied; 22 third, British resistance, ever becoming stiffer, to Spain's principal demand, the surrender of Gi- braltar; 23 fourth, Spain's scarcely secondary interest in thrusting the Americans back from the Mississippi; fifth, Vergennes' denial that the reciprocal guaranty of the Treaty of Alliance was yet operative except as to American inde- pendence; sixth, his entire disbelief that there was any likelihood of England's conceding the American claims, either as to the fisheries or the Western lands, and his repeatedly announced intention of bringing the Americans to reason if they persisted in untenable claims ; 24 seventh and "Peace, Vergennes had written in August, 1779, could be con- cluded only on two conditions: "la satisfaction pleniere du roi d'Espagne et la reconnaissance des Etats-Unis dans leur e"tat de Iibert6 et d'independance," Donjol, IV. 339-40. 18 Even on his first mission to London Rayneval had reported the British reluctance to the cession of Gibraltar as almost insuperable. "My lord Shelburne s'est apesanti sur Gibraltar; il s'est aplique" avec chaleur a me prouver que la cession en est impossible, il m'a par!6 de la resistance que cet article 6prouveroit au Conseil; que le lord Keppel, lorsqu'il lui en a par!6, lui dit nettement qui si on parloit de c6der Gibraltar, il prendroit son chapeau et s'en iroit," ib., V. 616. See also Fitzmaurice, op. cit., III. 262, 275, 289, 305, 312. 24 See note 10 supra. See also Vergennes to La Luzerne under dates of Oct. 14 and Nov. 23, 1782, Stevens, Peace Transcripts; Doniol, V. 176-8. Note the following expressions from the latter document: "Le Roi ne sera moins exact a les tenir de son cdt6 [cer- tain conditions], mais il n'en existe aucune [condition] dans nos trait6s qui Poblige a prolonge> la guerre pour soutenir les pr6ten- tions ambitieuses que les Etats-Unis peuvent former soit par rapport 348 FRENCH POLICY AND last, the procedure governing the negotiations, whereby the Americans were left to shift for themselves, while the Foreign Office took the Spanish interest under its wing from the begin- ning. No one of these facts was necessarily of fatal import for American interests, but the en- semble is somewhat impressive. To it, moreover, may be quite legitimately lent the coloration of one or two other circumstances. The first of these is Rayneval's early mission to England. True, the primary purpose of this had to do with Gibraltar, but the young secretary took what op- portunity the occasion offered, none the less, to disparage the American claims with the British ministers, if quietly yet not ineffectively. 25 a la peche, soit par rapport a 1'etendue des limites .... Malgr6 toutes les cajolleries que les ministres anglois prodiguent aux Amricains, je ne me promets qu'ils se montrent facils ni sur les peches ni sur les limits . . . ," ib., 177. The earlier docu- ment is even more positive in tone. It is interesting to compare this tone with that taken by Rayneval with reference to Gibraltar: "le Roi, s'il en toit besoin, se feroit un devoir d'exhorter le roi d'Espagne a etre moder dans ses pretensions, mais Sa Majest6 ne pourroit aucunement parler de 1' abandon de Gibraltar," ib., 618. 35 The following extracts from Rayneval's report of his con- ferences with Shelburne are the significant ones: "Mais mylord craint les Americains et les Hollandois; j'ai encore dit qu'il y auroit moien de les d6router, principalement en leur laissant ig- norer Petat de la negotiation entre la France, 1'Espagne, et PAngleterre. Cet article tient infiniment a coeur a mylord Shel- burne," Doniol, V. 614. (It is interesting to compare this sug- gestion with Vergennes' later complaint to Franklin, that the Americans had not tried to inform themselves as to the state of THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 349 Again, one should, perhaps, not altogether ignore this further consideration: "The French are interested in separating us from Great Bri- the Anglo-French negotiation, note 15, supra). "Est venu le tour de I'Amlrique; mylord Shelburne a pre"vu qu'ils auroient beaucoup de difficult^ avec les Ame"ricains, tant par rapport aux limites que par rapport a la peehe de Terre-Neuve, mais il espere que le Roi ne les soutiendra pas dans leurs demandes. J'ai r6- pondu que je ne doutois pas de 1'empressement du Roi a faire ce qui d^pendra de lui pour contenir les Ame>icains dans les bornes de la justice et de la raison; et mylord ayant desire" savoir ce que je pensois de leurs preventions, j'ai r6pondu que j'ignorois celles relatives a la peche, mais que telles qu'elles puissent etre il me sembloit qu'il y avoit un principe sur a suivre sur cette matiere, savoir, que le peche en haute-mer est res nullius et que la peche sur les cdtes apartenoit de droit au proprieVaire des c6tes, a moins de derogations fondles sur des conventions. Quant a I'eVendue des limites j'ai supos^ que les Ame"ricains la puiseroient dans leur chartres, c'est a dire qu'ils voudront aller de 1'Ocean a la mer du Sud. Mylord Shelburne a traite les chartres de sottises, et la discution n'a pas 6t6 pouss^e plus loin parceque je n'ai voulu, ni soutenir la prevention Ame>icaine, ne l'ane"antir. J'ai seule- ment dit que le ministre Anglois devoit trouver dans les n6gocia- tions de 1754 relatives a 1'Ohio les limites que PAngleterre, alors souveraine des 13 Etats-unis croyoit devoir leur assigner," ib., 618- 9. The reference to the negotiations of 1754 is explained by the following passage from the memoir which Rayneval had only a few days before this presented to Jay on the Mississippi ques- tion: "It is known that, before the Treaty of Paris, France possessed Louisiana and Canada, and that she considered the savage people situated to the east of the Mississippi as either inde- pendent or as under her protection. This pretension caused no dispute; England never thought of making any [pretension?] except as to the lands situated towards the source of the Ohio, in that part where she had given the name Allegheny to that river." Wharton, VI. 25. The reaction of the English ministers to what Rayneval had to say about the American claims is recorded 350 FRENCH POLICY AND tain . . . but it is not their interest that we should become a great and formidable people." 26 The words are Jay's, but Vergennes himself had said as much time and again. In short, the commissioners were confronted with an appreciable danger, in meeting which they displayed sagacity and spirit. However, it may still be a question whether their policy really netted the United States a profit or a loss; and in fact, it has been argued that it did the latter. The pivotal fact upon which this contention hinges is the rejection by Shelburne on October 20th of a draft treaty which had been agreed to by Oswald, and which, in addition to granting the Americans everything they had asked for with reference to the fisheries and the West, ac- corded the United States a northern boundary that included much that is today Canada and maintained complete silence as to the claims of British creditors and of the loyalists, whereas the by Shelburne's biographer, thus: "They then proceeded to speak about America. Here Rayneval played into the hands of English ministers by expressing a strong opinion against the American claims to the Newfoundland fishery and to the Valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio. These opinions were carefully noted by Shelburne and Grantham," op. tit., III. 263. When the Pro- visional Articles arrived in London, Rayneval was there on a second mission. Being shown them he remarked upon the embarrassment that the article according the United States the navigation of the Mississippi would cause Spain, but elicited a very unfeeling response from Shelburne, Doniol, V. 229. *Wharton, VI. 48. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 351 Provisional Articles of November 30th made certain concessions on the two latter points and drew a much more restrictive northern boundary. Now, it is urged that the rejected draft treaty was in entire accord with Townshend's letter of September 1st to Oswald, that the motive of the British minister in authorizing such extensive concessions to the Americans was the hope of separating them from the French, that Vaughan's mission, by revealing to Shelburne that this end had already been accomplished, in- stigated him to retract in a measure his policy of concession, and that, therefore, the unfavorable differential between the draft treaty and the later Provisional Articles must be charged against Jay's headiness and precipitancy. 27 The argument is ingenious but not convincing. To begin with, it will be recalled that, whatever the ulterior motive of Townshend's letter, it was called out immediately by Jay's demand that the British government should recognize American independence preliminary to treating. Again, while this letter empowered Oswald to agree to "a settlement of the boundaries," there is plainly some difference between an adjustment of boun- daries and such a cession of territory as that made by the draft treaty of lands to the west of the "Phillips, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolu- tion, pp. 220-1. See also to same effect Works of Benjamin Frank- lin (ed. Bigelow), VIII, 164 fn. 352 FRENCH POLICY AND Mountains and later repeated by the Provisional Articles. But again, it was not Vaughan's mis- sion that first informed Shelburne and his asso- ciates that there was a rift in the French- Ameri- can lute, it was Rayneval's mission and his attack on American pretensions. Finally, the assertion that Vaughan's mission persuaded Shelburne that the objective of his policy had been realized and that, consequently, he might abandon the policy, is mere conjecture, and not very plausible conjec- ture at that. Unquestionably, it was Shelburne's purpose to divide France and America but it was also his purpose to keep them divided till peace was obtained, and peace had not yet been obtained when, on October 20th, he rejected the draft treaty "as in no way adapted to our present cir- cumstances." 28 Indeed, it seems to me that a more plausible conjecture would be, that it was not so much the success of his policy as its com- parative failure that may have influenced Shel- burne to some extent at this moment. For the draft treaty, like the later Provisional Articles, was to go into effect only when France had also arrived at terms with England. However, the circumstance that really determined the fate of the draft treaty is no mystery. It was the arrival at this moment of the news that Howe had lifted the siege of Gibraltar ; and the day following his letter to Oswald, Shelburne also wrote Rayneval 28 Shelburne to Oswald, Oct. 20, Fitzmaurice, op. cit., III. 283. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 353 that England would not yield Gibraltar to Spain nor St. Lucia and Dominica to France. 29 Naturally, it would be impossible to determine with minute exactitude the extent to which the United States profited by the action of the com- missioners in ignoring their instructions ; and yet it is a matter that admits, I think, of rather con- fident speculation when the two controlling fac- tors of the situation are clearly set forth. The first and more important of these is the hope that was held out to the British cabinet by the inde- pendent attitude of the Americans that if the United States were satisfied with the terms they received from England, they would refuse to continue in the war in the interest of Spain. It was because of this hope that the cabinet yielded the Americans their demands as to the boundar- ies and the fisheries, and it is almost inconceivable that they would otherwise have done so. But in the second place, once this concession was ratified, the hands of the British government were tied, and it could neither offer nor demand equivalents within the field of American pretensions. 30 At one point, however, this statement demands qualification, but only with the result of reinf orc- "Ib., 280. 30 It must be recognized in this connection that it was not only the possibility that England would deny Gibraltar to Spain that was dangerous to American interests. For if England had given up Gibraltar, she would have demanded equivalents, and these might very well have lain within the field of the American preten- sions. See Phillips, op. cit., 210 and Doniol, V. 617. 354 FRENCH POLICY AND ing the principal argument. By the separate and secret article of the Provisional Articles, Eng- land retained the right for herself to a northern boundary to West Florida at the line running due eastward from the mouth of the Yazoo river, but not the right to accord Spain a boundary to the same province north of the thirty-first degree. The contemporary estimate of the achievement of the commissioners confirms this analysis most strikingly. The commissioners themselves in communicating the articles to Congress, though somewhat apologetic for the concessions that had finally been made in the interest of the loyalists and the British creditors, used the quiet terms of profound satisfaction: "We can not but flatter ourselves that they [the articles] will appear to Congress as they do to all of us, to be consistent with the honor and interest of the United States." 31 Congress' estimate of the terms was governed in part by the jealousies of sections and factions, but it is to be noted that those who had expected most were most gratified. "Mr. Wol- cott," Madison records, "conceived it unnecessary to waste time on the subject" a proposition to communicate the separate article to the French envoy "as he presumed Congress would never so far censure the ministers who had obtained such terms for this country as to disavow their 81 See their letter to Livingston, Dec. 14, Wharton, VI. 131-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 355 conduct." 32 The event proved that Wolcott had judged rightly, for the proposition referred to never came to a vote. The directest testimony, however, is that afforded by the comments of the Foreign Office on the articles : You will notice [Vergennes wrote Rayneval] that the English buy peace rather than make it. Their conces- sions indeed, as well in the matter of the boundaries as in that of the fisheries and the loyalists, exceed all that I could have thought possible. 33 Rayneval agreed : 'the treaty 'with America ap- peared to him a dream, and the English ministers in according it had had in view ultimately the defection of the Americans.' 34 However, it must be remembered that the Pro- visional Articles were provisional. Indeed, their immediate effect was to diminish the likelihood of peace, by encouraging the British cabinet to set an impossible price upon Gibraltar. 35 And, of course, had the war been renewed, the Americans 33 Writings, I. 411. Note also his statement: "The terms granted to America appeared to Congress on the whole extremely liberal," to., 403. 83 Dec. 3, Wharton, V. 293-4; Doniol, V. 188. See also his letter of July 21, 1783, to La Luzerne where he says: "The boundaries in the Mississippi region must have astounded the Americans. Surely they did not flatter themselves that the English ministry would go beyond the mountains that hem in the United States from the Ohio to Georgia," to., 293-4. */&., 270. 36 Ib., 228-30 and 251-6. The equivalent first demanded by Eng- land for Gibraltar was the French islands, Guadaloupe and Dominica, to., 220. After the arrival of the news of the American signature St. Lucia was added to the list; or in its place, Trinity; 356 FRENCH POLICY AND would have had either to part with their winnings or with the French alliance. Aid came from an unexpected quarter. Early in December the Spanish ambassador received a despatch from Madrid, dated November 23rd, in which inquiry was made as to "what considerable advantage Spain could expect from the treaty, if, for any reason," His Catholic Majesty "made the sacri- fice of withdrawing from" the engagement cre- ated by the Treaty of Aranjuez. On December 5th Aranda placed this despatch before Ver- gennes, who at once wrote Rayneval, now in London a second time, to offer the abandonment of Gibraltar if Spain were given Minorca and the two Floridas. Ten days later came an affirma- tive response from Rayneval, and Aranda, though without instructions from Madrid, gave his approval. Florida Blanca's wrath when he learned the bold course of his envoy was tremen- dous, and even Char less Ill's chagrin is badly concealed in his letter of January 2nd to Louis sanctioning peace. Vergennes' delight, on the other hand, was boundless. "I bow before the Sovereign Being," he exclaimed to Aranda, "and return him my heartfelt thanks for His infinite or for all three, Porto Rico, ib., 256. It seems to me unlikely, however, that Parliament would have accepted peace if Gibraltar had been included among the concessions made to England's ene- mies. As it was, though the peace was accepted, a vote of censure was passed against it in the House of Commons, Parliamentary History, XXIII. cc. 514 and 571. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 357 wisdom, which has disposed the heart and mind of the Catholic king to give up the cession of Gibraltar." To Montmorin he expressed him- self to like effect: While he would not like to see such diplomatic usage established as that fol- lowed on this occasion by the Spanish ambassa- dor, "it is none the less true that we owe peace to his courageous resolution." 36 On January 20th preliminary articles were signed by the representatives of France and Spain on the one hand and of Great Britain on the other. 37 The same day Adams and Frank- lin Jay being absent from Paris signed a declaration asserting that the Provisional Arti- cles were not designed to "alter the relation of the United States toward England so long as peace should not be concluded between His Most Rousseau, "Participation de 1'Espagne la Guerre d'Am6rique," Revue des Questions historiques, LXXII. 484-9. See also Doniol, V. 237-41, and ch. VIII passim. Even after the Gibraltar question was settled, the negotiations were nearly wrecked by England's demand that Dominica be given her. At the same time there was a strong war party at the French court as well as the British, among the opponents of Vergennes' policy being his own minister of the Marine, Castries, ib., 270. Accord- ing to Florida Blanca, at the moment peace was signed a joint French-Spanish expedition consisting of seventy ships of the line and 40,000 men was ready to sail for the West Indies, Coxe's Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, III. 344-6. The negotiations were finally saved by England's proffer of Tobago and certain conces- sions in Pondicherry to France in return for Dominica, Doniol, V. ch. VIII. 37 They will be found in the Parliamentary History, XXIII. 346-54. 358 FRENCH POLICY AND Christian Majesty and His Britannic Majesty" and "repudiating any interpretation of them con- trary to this assertion." Thus, says M. Doniol, was "the alliance in some sort renewed." 38 In reality, the one entangling alliance of our history, the indispensable instrument of our deliverance as a nation, was now at an end. Ten years and one day from the promulgation of this declaration Louis XVI mounted the guillotine. One month after that war began between France and England. Two months later Washington proclaimed American neutrality. His action represented the deliberate decision that the most vital interests of the United States would not admit of its adhering to the pledges given in 1778. But indeed, France had long since be- come reconciled to the idea that America was not an available ally. Some six years before Washington and his cabinet determined to cast aside the Treaty of Alliance, the French repre- sentative at Philadelphia was urging his govern- ment to seize New York and Newport to prevent their falling into the hands of Great Britain in the event of war. The Foreign Office replied that it had anticipated just such developments, but that it consoled itself that France had "never pretended to make America a useful ally," that she had had "no other end in view than to deprive Great Britain of that vast continent." 39 38 Doniol, V. 277 and fn. 39 The Cabinet of Versailles to Otto, the French charg at Phila- THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 359 delphia, Aug. 30, 1787, Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States (N. Y., 1882, 2 vols), II. 438. The attitude of France toward her American alliance after the War of Independence looked primarily toward preventing the restora- tion of English influence. In this connection the following pas- sages from the Instructions of Montmorin, Vergennes' successor, to the Count de Moustier, who became the French envoy at Philadel- phia in the fall of 1787, are interesting: Le Comte de Moustier jugera par la qu'il devra s'attacher a fortifier les Ame>icains dans les principes qui les ont engage a s'unir a la France: il leur fera sentir pour cet effet, qu'ils ne sauroient avoir d'Allie plus naturel que le Roi, tandis qu'ils peuvent etre certains que 1'Angle- terre jalouse leur prosperity et qu'elle y nuira autant qu'elle en trouvera F occasion. . . . Ce seroit se tromper volontairement que de supposer que cette puissance [England] ne cherche pas a diminuer les sentiments qui doivent attacher les Etats-Unis a la France, et a ope>er insensiblement leur raprochement de leur ancienne Mere-patrie. II sera utile que le Ministre du Roi suive la marche des agens anglais, et qu'il fasse ce qui dpendra de lui, mais sans affectation, pour rendre nulles leurs insinuations." "Me- moire pour servir d'Instructions au Sieur Comte de Moustier," Oct. 10, 1787, American Historical Review, VIII. 710-1. Mont- morin expected that if war broke out between France and Great Britain "the Americans would wish to remain neutral," and in- dicated the probability that France would favor this disposition. However, he continued, "circumstances may counteract our prin- ciples," Bancroft, op. tit., II. 444. A few months later Moustier reported an argument by Jay to the effect that the Treaty of Alliance no longer subsisted, to which proposition Montmorin demurred strongly: "Le Roi et son conseil, M., ont et6 singu- lierement etonnes de 1'opinion 6u est M. Jay que FAlliance entre le Roi et les Etats-Unis ne subsiste plus. Ce ministre a done oubli6 les termes dans lesquels cette Alliance a 6tfe concue: s'il veut bien relire le traitS du 6. fevrier 1778 et se convaincre qu'elle est perpetuelle. ... II convient, M, que vous rectifiez les ide>s de M. Jay sur ces diff6rents objets: vous 1'assurerez que le Roi regarde son alliance avec les Etats-Unis comme inalterable; que Sa. M'te. a toujours pris et qu'elle ne cessera de prendre un int6ret veritable & leur prosperite, et que Sa. M'te. continue a a y contribuer autant qu'elle le pourra sans prejudice a ses propres int6rets. Viola, M., 360 FRENCH POLICY AND la doctrine que vous devez faire germer et que le Conseil du Roi a t6 surpris de voir si mal 6tablie." Montmorin to Moustier, June 23, 1788, American Historical Review, loc. cit., 728. Four years later the monarchy gave place to the republic and Genet came to the United States. His "Instructions d'ArriveV' contained an interesting attack on the "Machiavellism" of Vergennes' policy toward America, the basis of the charge being the former minister's opposition to American acquisition of Canada; and the implication was that the new government would be controlled by much more liberal principles. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1903, II. 202-3. At the same time Genet was in- structed to get a new treaty with the United States extending the articles with reference to commerce and navigation, "as the just price of the independence which France won for the United States," and renewing the guaranty of the Treaty of Alliance of French possessions in the West Indies. 76., 207-11. Both the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance were declared "void" by the Senate on June 25, 1798, and by the House of Rep- resentatives on July 7. This action of the Houses was posited on the right of Congress to judge of infractions of the Law of Na- tions, Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, I. 586-8, II. 2116-28. CHAPTER XVI PROFIT AND LOSS In the ensuing chapter I shall discuss the out- come of French intervention in the War of Inde- pendence from the point of view of the objective of that enterprise. The treaty of peace between France and England throws little light on the subject, albeit France obtained some minor ad- vantages by it, an island in the West Indies which she had lost in 1763, a strip of land on the West African coast, an enlargement of her fishing rights in Newfoundland, the suppression of the articles relative to Dunkirk. The treaty is signi- ficant rather as a symbol. England, exhausted by the war, "had not blushed to be the first to petition for peace," and the treaty itself had "erased the stain" of 1763. Thus Vergennes writes in his Memoire to the King, of March 29th, 1784, where, moreover, he presents the treaty as the consummation of a period of conspicuous tri- umph for his entire system. 1 Louis, the minister records, had ruled but a decade, yet within that brief period he had re- 1 S^gur, Politique de Tous Us Cabinets, III. 196-219. 362 FRENCH POLICY AND stored peace to Europe no fewer than four times. In Germany by the Treaties of Teschen he had vindicated afresh France's prerogative as guar- antor of the Treaty of Westphalia. Twice in the Southeast he had rescued Turkey, at the cost to that power of some small subtractions of terri- tory, from the clutch of its enemies. Meanwhile, the transparent disinterestedness of His Majes- ty's principles had won the confidence of Europe, so that all nations had been content to see him "lower the pride of England and labor for her enfeeblement." 2 In brief, France was once more what she had been, "the moderator and arbiter" of Europe, the power that "gave the tone" to the European concert. "Placed in the center of Europe, strong by virtue of the contiguity and unity of her provinces, and by the wealth and population of her soil," girt round by protecting fortresses and by neighbors mutually isolated, she was free to forego aggrandizement and to devote all her influence "to the preservation of the established order and to preventing the differ- ent states which compose the European balance from being destroyed." 3 Over against this chant of victory and accentu- ating its triumphal note, stand the contemporary lamentations of Englishmen at the downfall of Britain through the loss of her American empire. '76., 201. *Loc. cit. See also p. 218. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 363 "The greatest statesmen whom England had pro- duced," writes Wraxall of this period, "though they concurred in scarcely any other political opinion, yet agreed on the point that, with the defalcation of the Thirteen Colonies from the crown, the glory and greatness of Britain were permanently extinguished." 4 The Parliamen- tary debates support his assertion. "Are we," Burke caustically inquired in his speech on the address from the throne following the receipt of the news of Yorktown, are we to be told of the rights for which we went to war ? Oh, excellent rights ! Oh, valuable rights . . . that have cost England thirteen provinces, four islands, 100,000 men, and seventy millions of money ! Oh, won- derful rights, that have lost to Great Britain her em- pire on the ocean, her boasted, grand, and substantial superiority which made the world bend before her! Oh, inestimable rights, that have taken from us our rank among nations, our importance abroad, and our happi- ness at home ; and that have taken from us our trade, our manufactures, and our commerce ; that have reduced us from the most flourishing empire in the world to one of the most unenviable powers on the face of the globe! 5 The same sentiment was voiced on one occa- sion or other by men of all parties, by Lord George Germaine, North's minister of War, who maintained that "from the instant when 4 Historical Memoirs (Phila., 1845), 366. 8 Parliamentary History, XXII. col. 721. 364 FRENCH POLICY AND American independence should be acknowledged the British empire was ruined"; 6 by Sir John Cavendish of the Whig opposition, who declared that "the great and splendid empire of Britain was nearly overturned"; 7 by Shelburne, who as- serted that "whenever the British Parliament should recognize the sovereignty of the Thirteen Colonies, the sun of England's glory was forever set." 8 A writer in the Gentleman's Magazine, commenting on Great Britain's "astonishing de- cline" "from being the first maritime power in the world," accounted for it in the following strain of philosophic resignation: In these vicissitudes the hand of Providence, by which the government of the world is directed, is most manifest. Nations and peoples are permitted to arrive at a certain pitch of greatness, and when at the height are doomed to fall to decay. None of the great mon- archies of ancient time, so celebrated in history, nor even the Republic of Rome itself, were ever in posses- sion of half the territory which Great Britain could boast at the commencement of the reign of George III. By its so suddenly crumbling to pieces, part after part, does it not seem that this is a devoted Empire? 9 Wraxall, op. tit., 367. ''Parliamentary History, XXII. col. 1114. 8 Same as note 6. And see generally the debates on the treaties, Parliamentary History, XXIII. cols. 373-571. Vol. LII. 123. See also John Adams to Vergennes, July 13, 1780: "Breaking off such a nation as this [America] from the English so suddenly and uniting it so closely with France is one of the most extraordinary events that ever happened among mankind," Wharton, III. 855. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 365 And not only had Britain declined : by the same token France had become predominant once more. The dominion of America, a Tory writer had urged shortly before Cornwallis' surrender, gave dominion of the seas, and France's calcula- tions had proceeded from this postulate: "The balance of power which has from the beginning of the reign of Charles V been so diligently studied in every part of Europe as a science, and which is now brought to a degree of improvement unknown to the rusticity of former ages, could not but obtrude itself in her councils." 10 "What," inquired the learned Dr. Fothergill, in an "Ad- dress" to his countrymen, some months later, "can France gain by all these expenses if she seeks not for territorial possessions in America?" and answered his own question thus : Why, the uncontrolled superiority in Europe. For, where is the power, when America is divided from us, that can withstand her? Whilst we had America France knew, and all Europe felt, that every distant possession they had were so many obligations for her peaceable behaviour. They saw America growing so populous and so powerful, her commerce increasing and increasing the power of Great Britain, that nothing was secure from us. 11 10 Rivington's Royal Gazette (New York), Sept. 29 and Oct. 3, 1781. "Quoted in the Boston Evening Post and General Advertiser of Feb. 23, 1782. The learned doctor continued that, "by the people of New England only New Spain would have been added to the British Empire in a few years with the succour of the 366 FRENCH POLICY AND "Happy would it be for us," exclaimed another writer, if the loss of America was the only evil we have this day to deplore. The independence of that country is so great an object with the different nations of Europe that we have armed nearly one-half of them in its fa- vor. . . . The influence of France in the course of this war has risen to such a pitch that renders it almost a degree of vanity in us to call her any longer the rival of this country. She has occupied its place in foreign courts and has become in a few years the arbiter of Europe. 12 Even as late as the end of 1782, we find a writer declaring in the London Chronicle, that the peo- ple of Great Britain were ready to part with an eighth or a quarter of all they are worth rather than accede to the independence of America and suffer so disgraceful and ruinous a dismem- berment of the empire, which must in its consequences give to France the dominion and commerce of the Euro- pean seas and render Great Britain the least significant among nations. 13 British fleet, and France knew that her West Indian islands were held by them at our courtesy should a war break out." 11 Quoted ib., in issue of Mar. 9, 1782. See also the London Gen- eral Advertiser of Mar. 6, 1782, where the following sentiments appear: "To how infamous and degraded a situation are we reduced! . . . What a contrast is the king of France! He is without doubt, not only the first monarch of his time, but the wisest, greatest, and best of monarchs that ever sat upon any throne !" "London Morning Chronicle, Nov. 30 and Dec. 5 and 11, 1782. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 367 The common sense of mankind has pilloried in numerous disdainful maxims that odious species of wisdom which parades itself after the event. And yet if the historian is to be wise, qua histo- rian, it must be after the event. The testimony we have just reviewed goes far to stamp Ver- gennes' policy with the sanction of the statesman- ship of that generation. Indeed, the very stubbornness with which England had resisted American independence implies the same thing. We of today, however, easily see that the French program, precisely as it was deduced from cer- tain premises, rested upon too restricted a founda- tion of fact, that its results were neither solid nor durable, and that, trifling as they were, they were obtained at suicidal cost. Nor is this altogether the wisdom of the autopsy. Vergennes himself betrayed no little disappointment in the outcome of his labors. The first respect in which the course of events cheated the calculations underlying French in- tervention in the War of Independence was the swift recuperation of England from her losses. For this phenomenon, which, he asserts, had "no parallel in the history of the world," Wraxall ad- duces three causes : "the preservation of the Brit- ish Constitution"; the institution of the sinking fund by Pitt; and the extension of British acqui- sitions in India, whence an annual revenue of fifteen millions sterling, payable in specie, was 368 FRENCH POLICY AND soon drawn. 14 The last two causes were no doubt potent, but they cooperated with still more powerful ones, the rise of the factory system at this same period and the opening up of Eng- land's mineral resources. In these circumstances, the fact upon which perhaps more than any other England's enemies had counted to produce her downfall, became a blessing in disguise, the public debt. Stabilized by Pitt's measures, the famous "consols" rendered British resources fluid and turned them into the channels of trade and in- dustry as nothing else could have done. Still it may be urged that these developments would have occurred anyway and that the loss of America contributed to offset them. Is this so? Vergennes' purpose was to break down both the political and the commercial connection between England and America, and so far as the former was concerned his success was unquestionable. Not only was the aid which France lent America the efficient cause of the outcome of the war, but the sentiment of gratitude which this aid engendered among the American people at large was a factor of no little importance in weaning the country from its natural predilection for the former mother-land. 15 As we have seen, the al- " Op. tit., 367-71. "For a very pessimistic account, from the French point of view, of the American propension for things English and the English themselves, despite the war, see a letter from Kalb to Broglie, quoted in Doniol, IV. 19 fn. This letter was probably THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 369 liance with France was soon discarded, but the motive back of the act was not sympathy for England but a real vision of national destiny which would be foiled and frustrated were the nation to be drawn into "the European vortex." 16 But the more important objective with the For- eign Office had been the termination of America's commercial dependence on England, to which, indeed, the severance of the political bond stood somewhat in the relation of means to end. Yet known to Vergennes, as it is among the archives of the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs. The chief reason for Vergennes' dismay at Jay's behavior was the idea that it sprang from a pro-English inclination. "If," he wrote La Luzerne, "we may judge of the future from what has passed here under our eyes, we shall be but poorly repaid for all we have done for the United States and for securing to them a national existence," Wharton, VI. 152. On this score, however, he was reassured by La Luzerne: "I do not credit him [Jay]," the envoy wrote, "with gratitude to us, but he is incapable of preferring England to us ; he glories in being independent," etc., La Luzerne to Vergennes, Sept. 26, 1783, Steven, Peace Transcripts. On American gratitude to France, see the opening paragraph of Pickering's despatch of July 15, 1797, to Pickney, Marshall, and Gerry, American State Papers, "Foreign Relations," II. 153. Cf. Hamilton's estimate of the motive of French aid and of French policy following the War of Indepen- dence, Works of Alexander Hamilton (Constitutional ed.), VI. 206-14. "Hence, of course, the American policy of isolation, the first and main pillar of the Monroe Doctrine. In the same connec- tion see the lengthy letter (probably by Samuel Adams) addressed "To the Public," in the Boston Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser of May, 1783, warning against suffering "ourselves, either from gratitude or any other principle, to engage in any future controversies or quarrels on the other side of the Atlantic, if we mean to keep our independence, independent of all the world." See also letter of John Adams in Wharton, III. 621 ff. 370 FRENCH POLICY AND it is at this point exactly that Vergennes' reck- oning, which, like that of his alarmed English contemporaries, was based on the teachings of Mercantilism, went most awry. The peace ne- gotiations had not yet begun when his auxiliary, Dupont, wrote Hutton, early in 1782, that "if the war is not too long continued, the Americans will be more to England than to us, since the language they speak and their former relations will naturally lead them to carry on trade with the English rather than with France." 17 To be sure, it does not appear whether Dupont, who was a :T Doniol, V. 36-7 fn. It would seem that there was considerable trade between England and America even while the war was still in progress. "This," writes Adams to the President of Congress, June 26, 1781, "is a subject which deserves the serious considera- tion of every American. British manufactures are going in vast quantities to America from Holland, the Austrian Flanders, France, and Sweden, as well as by the way of New York and Charleston, etc.," Wharton, IV. 521. For a Congressional ordi- nance designed to check this trade, see Journals of Congress, Dec. 4, 1781, XXI. 1152. For some evidence of England's rapid re- covery of her American trade after the Revolution, see Moustier to Montmorin, Feb. 8, 1788, American Historical Review, VIII. 716, where the writer complains that the Americans use the monetary proceeds of their trade with the French islands to pay for the mer- chandise which they import from England; also Baring's Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of the Orders in Council (London, 1808), pp. 19 ff. As to French commerce with the United States, see a pamphlet in the Pennsylvania Historical Society's library entitled Causes qui se sont opposes au Progres du Commerce entre la France et les Etats-Unis (Paris, 1790). Franklin's hope was to see the United States become commercially independent of Europe, Lee's Lee, I. 354. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 371 disciple of Quesnay, expressed in the passage just quoted the views of his superior. But the commercial treaty which he negotiated with Eng- land early in 1786 affords unmistakable evidence that Vergennes' own economic creed had under- gone considerable change since the date of the Expose Succinct. Even earlier, moreover, he had recorded his recognition of the fact that American independence had not touched the vital sources of British sea-power. In the memoir of March 29th, 1784, while asserting that France had recovered her influence on the Continent, he warned the king that the English fleet would soon be "more numerous and more powerful than it was at the moment of peace," and that the only guaranty of continued good relations with that country was the maintenance of the French mar- ine on a respectable footing. 19 At this point, however, it behooves us to re- member that in Vergennes' thinking the crippling of English sea-power was to be contributory to a far more important end, the restoration of French leadership on the Continent and the establishment "This treaty abolished or lowered many protective duties be- tween the two countries, French wines thus obtaining entry to the English market in competition with Portuguese, and English man- ufactures being admitted to the French market. The treaty was a distinct triumph for the views of Adam Smith and the French Physiocrats. For contemporary discussion of its provisions, see Annual Register, XXIX. 65 ff. 18 Sgur, III. 217-8. 372 FRENCH POLICY AND there of a reign of peace. Unhappily, this dream for it was little more was based on the tra- dition of a Europe that no longer existed, of a Europe in which Poland, Sweden, and Turkey were still effective units of the balance of power ; in which Prussia was still dependent on France; in which the House of Austria was definitely sec- ondary to the House of Bourbon ; in which Russia had no voice. Once again, in other words, had the minister premitted the conventional creed of his office to blind him to the actual facts; and once again, in consequence, is he forced to record his own disillusionment. "What had rendered peace so necessary" the year before, he informs us in the document just cited, was "the swift rap- prochement" of "the courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, which for twenty years had dwelt in open enmity." It was, he continues, a develop- ment "calculated to arouse disquiet and alarm"; and indeed, his whole tone reveals his own most serious concern. 20 Yet it is difficult to see how, even if the outcome of the war had been the total annihilation of British sea-power, France would have been in any better position to deal with this formidable and unprecedented combination in the Southeast. 21 /&., 203 ff. n ln this connection it should be recalled that in 1774 Ver- gennes had considered the feasibility of an Anglo-French rap- prochement directed against Russia, See chapter III, supra. After the war Shelburne propounded the same idea to Rayneval. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 373 In a word, the restoration of French prestige had altered the actual balance of forces on the Continent very little, if at all; and by the same sign, it had gone but little way toward guarantee- ing the status quo or a lasting peace. Vergennes' own recognition of this unpleasant truth was as frank as possible: 'It was difficult to flatter one's self of a long peace or even to regard the existing one as more than precarious, unless the power to which alone it belonged to give the tone found itself in position to make itself respected.' This was France's "superb prerogative"; but 'good example would not of itself suffice, were it not backed up by imposing means.' 'Of all human passions, ambition was the most active, the one held in leash with greatest difficulty. Defect of power alone could render it passive; and this could exist only if His Majesty was ready and willing to repell all designs on the Not only, said the former, were France and England not natural enemies but they had many interests in common which ought to cause them to come to an understanding. There had been a time when no one dared set off a cannon in Europe without the consent of England and France, while today the powers of the North assumed to stand by themselves. "Let us unite and we shall give the law to Europe." Certainly, they were too clear-sighted in France not to be convinced that the system of the German em- pire was an unnatural one, and that Russia wished to enjoy a rdle and had views which were not harmonious with the interests of France and England. "If we are in accord we shall take our old place once more and shall be able to arrest all revolutions in Europe," etc. RaynevaTs Report of his Second Mission to Eng- land, Doniol, V. 619-20. 374 FRENCH POLICY AND public security and tranquility.' "Force is the surest measure of respect, particularly when it is exercised with wisdom and employed with justice." 22 In 1785 Vergennes scored his last great diplo- matic triumph, a settlement of difficulties between the emperor and Holland and a close offensive and defensive alliance between the latter power and France. "The Count de Vergennes," com- mented the writer in the Annual Register, this year acquired the honor to his country and the glorious dis- tinction to himself of being the pacificator general of the universe. It could not but be a grevious considera- tion to Englishmen that, while France, through the happiness of great ministers at home and their choice of able negotiators abroad, was spreading her conse- quence and extending her influence through the nations of the earth, Great Britain through some unaccountable fatality seemed to be fallen from that high seat in which she had so long and so gloriously presided and to be no longer considered ... in the general politics and sys- tem of Europe. 23 In fact, the triumph, resting as it did on the unstable basis of the temporary preponderance of the Dutch Republican party, was for France an empty one. Within a few months the House of Orange, actively backed by Pitt, was again in control, and France was signing a declaration 22 Segur, III. 216-8. 23 Ib., XXVII. 137. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 375 "agreeing to a general disarmament and asserting that the king of France had never any intention of interfering in the affairs of the Dutch Repub- lic." "France," said the emperor maliciously, "has just fallen. I doubt if she will ever recover." 24 The words were prophetic, more prophetic than their author could willingly have intended them to be. There were others, however, who had al- ready begun to perceive how unreal France's triumph over England had been and, on the other hand, how terribly real its cost was like to prove. One of these was Burke, who in the Annual Register for 1787 wrote as follows: It seemed a grand stroke of policy to reduce the power and humble the pride of a great and haughty rival. . . . Nor was this all; for as it was universally supposed that the loss of America would prove an in- curable, if not a mortal wound to England, so it was equally expected that the power of the Gallic throne would thereby be fixed on such a permanent founda- tions as never again to be shaken by any stroke of for- tune. . . . This speculation, like many others, when tried by the test of dear-bought experience, came to nothing, and their fond hopes have already vanished in smoke. . . . But though the American war failed in producing its wished for effects in respect to France, it left behind it other relics of a less pleasing nature. An immense new debt, being laid upon the back of the old, ^Hassall, The Balance of Power, p. 379, citing Marquis de Barral-Montferrat, Dior Ans de Paix armde entre la France et I'Angleterre, 178S-9S, I. 54. 376 FRENCH POLICY AND already too great, the accumulation became so vast . . . as to exceed all inquiry." "And as the minds of men grow attached to those principles which they are embarked in require them to maintain . . . , the French nation, re- sorting more to provision and principle by which the abuses of power are corrected than those by which its energy is maintained, have imbibed a love of freedom nearly incompatible with royalty. 25 Seldom indeed has the course of events dis- played a more ironical, yet juster logic, than that whereby the last considerable achievement of the Classical diplomacy an achievement that had been planned to secure Europe peace and repose for many years had within a decade become the funeral pyre of the Old Regime and the starting- point of a conflagration more than Continental. Early this same year Vergennes died, just as the Assembly of Notables was convening to make a last effort to rescue the monarchy from bank- ruptcy without at the same time invading pre- scriptive rights. So his passing was synchronous with the passing of the order on whose outworn ideals and outlook he had reared his whole ambi- tious and mistaken structure. Yet the temper of his purpose was something more permanent; for the cold sophistry of the diplomat enwrapped the ardor of the patriot, as witness the words in which he shaped, for the last time as it seems, an apol- ogy for his American venture : "Annual Register, XXIX. 174-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 377 A nation [he wrote] can experience reverses, and it ought to yield to the imperious law of necessity and its own preservation ; but when such reverses and the humili- ation they entail are unjust, when they have for their end the gratification of the pride of a powerful rival, then the nation owes it to its own honor, dignity, and self respect, to retrieve itself when occasion offers. If it neglects to do so, if fear holds it back from duty, it adds abasement to humiliation and becomes the object of contempt of its own age and of ages to come. These important truths, Sire, have never been absent from my thoughts. They were already deeply graven on my heart when Your Majesty called me to His Council, and I awaited with lively impatience the opportunity of fol- lowing their lead. These are the thoughts that fixed my attention on the Americans, that made me watch for and seize the moment when Your Majesty could assist that oppressed people with a well-founded hope of effectuating their deliverance. If I had had other senti- ments, other principles, other views, I should have be- trayed your confidence and the interests of the State; I should regard myself as unworthy of serving Your Majesty, I should regard myself as unworthy the name of Frenchman. 26 28 Doniol, I. 3-4. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE My principal source has been the material from the Archives of the French Department of Foreign Affairs to be found in Henri Doniol's Histoire de la Participation de la France a rEtablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Correspondance Diplomatique et Documents, a work in five large quarto volumes, containing some four thousand pages, and in process of pub- lication for fifteen years (1884-99). The work embodies four sorts of text: first, the author's narrative, which is in large type and is frequently a running paraphrase of documentary material; secondly, documentary material in small type set in the narrative; thirdly, footnotes in fine type containing further documentary material and the references to the Archives; fourthly, documen- tary appendices to the individual chapters in small type. The proportion of purely docu- mentary material to the author's narrative may be illustrated from volume II, which is fairly illustrative of the set. This volume contains 864 pages, of which the extracts from documents fill better than 580 pages, printed in small and fine type. Making the proper allowance for the dif- ferent sizes of type, I calculate that nearly, if not quite, four-fifths of the material in these 379 380 BIBLIOGRAPHY volumes is source material. Nor can there be any doubt as to the thoroughly representative character of this material; indeed, its essential completeness. Primarily, of course, I base this conclusion upon my perusal of the work, but I am confirmed in it by the examination of such works as the Stevens Facsimiles,, Circourt's His- toire de V Action Commune, and Mr. Phillips' scholarly essay on The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. It may be confi- dently asserted that conclusions which are se- curely based on the material in Doniol can only be confirmed by further research in the Archives. Conversely, for an American student, with limited time at his disposal, to attempt an in- vestigation of the Archives without a thorough acquaintance with Doniol to begin with, would be deliberately to incur the risk of one-sided and ill-considered, however surprising, results. But, of course, there are certain phases of the subject of French intervention in the War of Independence with which Doniol does not pre- tend to deal, while on the phases with which he does deal he throws, for the most part, only the light shed by the French correspondence. Thus he ignores altogether the background afforded the subject by the history of eighteenth century French diplomacy, and by Choiseul's attitude toward the initial phases of the British- Ameri- can dispute. To sketch in this background is, BIBLIOGRAPHY 381 accordingly, the purpose of the first two chapters of the present volume, with which should also be grouped the last chapter. The material there used, of which the most important items are the voluminous Recueil des Instructions, the elder Segur's Politique de Tons les Cabinets, De Witt's Thomas Jefferson, Soulange-Bodin's Pacte de Famille, Bourguet's Due de Choiseul et r Alliance Espagnole, Flassan's Histoire Gen- erale et Raisonnee de la Diplomatic Francaise, and various memoirs, is cited in the footnotes with full bibliographical data, which need not be repeated here. It is also valuable, particularly in connection with the dealings of the French envoys with the Continental Congress and with the final Peace Negotiations, to supplement the French material from the American sources. These are to be found principally in Wharton's great work and the Journals of the Continental Congress, both of which have been thoroughly utilized in the present volume. In the same connection, I had also previously gone through a large mass of newspaper material, but my gleanings from this have turned out to be of use only to illustrate public opinion at times. Finally, of the writings of American public men of the period, those of Jay, Madison, Charles Thomson, the secretary of Congress, and Deane have proved to be of most value. 382 BIBLIOGRAPHY Hardly less important, however, than the American aspect of French intervention is the Spanish phase, and for that I have had to rely again principally on Doniol; but for a reason stated in the text, this is hardly matter for regret, for as I point out, the Spanish ambassador at Paris throughout the Revolution, the Count d'Aranda, did not enjoy the confidence of his government, with the result that the French- Spanish negotiations were conducted almost ex- clusively through the French ambassador at Madrid, the despatches to whom and the reports from whom are given by Doniol with his usual thoroughness. Only at two points, and those bearing only remotely on the subject of this volume, is it possible that the Spanish archives might prove of material value. Thus, in con- nection with the Spanish mediation of 1778 it would be interesting to have the correspondence between Florida Blanca and Almodovar, the Spanish ambassador at London; while in con- nection with Cumberland's secret mission to Spain in 1780, there may be Spanish material that would clarify Florida Blanca's rather am- biguous attitude at this period. But for the most part, it is clear, that the Spanish material touch- ing the subject of French intervention is of negligible worth, a conclusion which is well borne out by such portions of this material as are to be found in the Sparks Mss. in the Harvard Uni- versity Library. BIBLIOGRAPHY 383 Lastly, there are points at which the English point of view is of importance in connection with the theme of this volume. In such cases, for the Parliamentary debates I have used the Parlia- mentary History; as a record of English public opinion and a repository of public documents, the Annual Register; for the correspondence of the British government with its ambassador at Paris and the reports of British spies, the Ste- vens Facsimiles; and for material bearing on the final Peace negotiations, the Peace Transcripts, also compiled by Stevens and now in the Library of Congress. For further data bearing on the works just mentioned, as well as on the numerous lesser works, pamphlets, articles in periodicals, etc., that were also used in the preparation of the present volume, the reader is referred to the footnotes. APPENDICES (a) TREATY OF ALLIANCE, 1 concluded at Paris, February 6, 1778 ; ratiBed by Con- gress May 4, 1778. ARTICLES I. Alliance against Great Britain. II. Independence of the United States. III. Efforts to be made against Great Britain. IV. Concurrent operations. V. Conquests to belong to United States. VI. Relinquishment of territory by France. VII. Conquests to belong to France. VIII. Islands in Gulf of Mexico. IX. Renunciation of Claims. X. Powers invited to accede to alliance. XI. Proprietary rights. XII. Duration. XIII. Ratification. The Most Christian King and the United States of North America, to wit: New Hampshire, Massachus- etts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, having this day concluded a treaty of amity and commerce, for the reciprocal advantage of their subjects and citizens, *Text from Wm. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc. (Washing- ton, 1910). 386 APPENDICES have thought it necessary to take into consideration the means of strengthening those engagements, and of ren- dering them useful to the safety and tranquility of the two parties ; particularly in case Great Britain, in re- sentment of that connection and of the good corre- spondence which is the object of the said treaty, should break the peace with France, either by direct hostilities or by hindering her commerce and navigation in a man- ner contrary to the rights of nations, and the peace subsisting between the two Crowns. And His Majesty and the said United States, having resolved in that case to join their councils and efforts against the enterprises of their common enemy, the respective Plenipotentiaries impowered to concert the clauses and conditions proper to fulfil the said intentions, have, after the most mature deliberation, concluded and determined on the follow- ing articles : ARTICLE I If war should break out between France and Great Britain during the continuance of the present war be- tween the United States and England, His Majesty and the said United States shall make it a common cause and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their counsels and their forces, according to the exi- gence of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies. ARTICLE II The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sover- eignty, and independence absolute and unlimited, of the said United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce. ARTICLE III The two contracting parties shall each on its own part, and in the manner it may judge most proper, APPENDICES 387 make all the efforts in its power against their common enemy, in order to attain the end proposed. ARTICLE IV The contracting parties agree that in case either of them should form any particular enterprise in which the concurrence of the other may be desired, the party whose concurrence is desired, shall readily, and with good faith, join to act in concert for that purpose, as far as circumstances and its own particular situation will permit; and in that case, they shall regulate, by a particular convention, the quantity and kind of succor to be furnished, and the time and manner of its being brought into action, as well as the advantages which are to be its compensation. ARTICLE V If the United States should think fit to attempt the reduction of the British power, remaining in the nor- thern parts of America, or the islands of Bermudas, those countries or islands, in case of success, shall be confederated with or dependant upon the said United States. ARTICLE VI The Most Christian King renounces forever the pos- session of the islands of Bermudas, as well as of any part of the continent of North America, which before the treaty of Paris in 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain, or to the United States, heretofore called British Colonies, or which are at this time, or have lately been under the power of the King and Crown of Great Britain. ARTICLE VII If His Most Christian Majesty shall think proper to 388 APPENDICES attack any of the islands situated in the Gulph of Mexico, or near that Gulph, which are at present under the power of Great Britain, all the said isles, in case of success, shall appertain to the Crown of France. ARTICLE VIII Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and they mutually engage not to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States shall have been formally or tacitly as- sured by the treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war. ARTICLE IX The contracting parties declare, that being resolved to fulfil each on its own part the clauses and conditions of the present treaty of alliance, according to its own power and circumstances, there shall be no after claim of compensation on one side or the other, whatever may be the event of the war. ARTICLE X The Most Christian King and the United States agree to invite or admit other powers who may have received injuries from England, to make common cause with them, and to accede to the present alliance, under such conditions as shall be freely agreed to and settled between all the parties. ARTICLE XI The two parties guarantee mutually from the pres- ent time and forever against all other powers, to wit: The United States to His Most Christian Majesty, the present possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future APPENDICES 389 treaty of peace: And His Most Christian Majesty guarantees on his part to the United States their lib- erty, sovereignty and independence, absolute and un- limited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions, and the additions or con- quests that their confederation may obtain during the war, from any of the dominions now, or heretofore pos- sessed by Great Britain in North America, conformable to the 5th and 6th articles above written, the whole as their possessions shall be fixed and assured to the said States, at the moment of the cessation of their present war with England. ARTICLE XII In order to fix more precisely the sense and applica- tion of the preceding article, the contracting parties de- clare, that in case of a rupture between France and England the reciprocal guarantee declared in the said article shall have its full force and effect the moment such war shall break out ; and if such rupture shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the said guarantee shall not commence until the moment of the cessation of the present war between the United States and Eng- land shall have ascertained their possessions. ARTICLE XIII The present treaty shall be ratified on both sides, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of six months, or sooner if possible. In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit: On the part of the Most Christian King, Conrad Alexander Gerard, Royal Syndic of the city of Stras- bourgh, and Secretary of His Majesty's Council of State; and on the part of the United States, Benjamin Franklin, Deputy to the General Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, and President of the Convention 390 APPENDICES of the same State, Silas Deane, heretofore Deputy from the State of Connecticut, and Arthur Lee, Councellor at Law, have signed the above articles both in the French and English languages, declaring, nevertheless, that the present treaty was originally composed and concluded in the French language, and they have here- unto affixed their seals. Done at Paris, this sixth day of February, one thou- sand seven hundred and seventy-eight. (Seal.) C. A. GERARD. (Seal.) B. FRANKLIN. (Seal.) SILAS DEANE. (Seal.) ARTHUR LEE. Act Separate and Secret Reserving Right of King of Spain to Agree to the Foregoing Treaties, concluded February 6, 1778; ratified by the Continental Congress May 4, 1778, ratifications exchanges at Paris July 17, 1778. The most Christian King declared in consequence of the intimate union which subsists between him and the King of Spain, that in concluding with the United States of America this treaty of amity and commerce, and that of eventual and defensive alliance, his Majesty hath intended, and intends, to reserve expressly, as he reserves by this present separate and secret act, to his said Catholick Majesty the power of acceding to the said treatys, and to participate in their stipulations at such time as he shall judge proper. It being well un- derstood, nevertheless, that if any of the stipulations of the said treatys are not agreeable to the King of Spain, His Catholick Majesty may propose other con- ditions analogous to the principal aim of the alliance APPENDICES 391 and conformable to the rules of equality, reciprocity and friendship. The Deputies of the United States, in the name of their constituents, accept the present declaration in its full extent, and the Deputy of the said States who is fully impowered to treat with Spain promises to sign, on the first requisition of His Catholic Majesty, the act or acts necessary to communicate to him the stipula- tions of the treaties above written ; and the said Deputy shall endeavor, in good faith, the adjustment of the points in which the King of Spain may propose any alteration conformable to the principles of equality, reciprocity, and the most sincere and perfect amity, he, the said Deputy, not doubting but that the person or persons impower'd by His Catholic Majesty to treat with the United States will do the same with regard to any alterations of the same kind that may be thought necessary by the said Plenipotentiary of the United States. * In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present separate and secret article, and af- fixed to the same their seals. Done at Paris this sixth day of February, one thou- sand seven hundred and seventy-eight. (Seal.) C. A. GERARD. (Seal.) B. FRANKLIN. (Seal.) SILAS DEANE. (Seal.) ARTHUR LEE. Deputy, Plenipotentiary for France and Spain. 392 APPENDICES II REFLEXIONS WHICH MAY PERHAPS PRESENT SOME NEW IDEAS UPON THE GREAT AND IMPORTANT AFFAIRS OF AMERICA. 1 7 January 1777. The arrival of Mr. Franklin in France has given rise to reflections which may perhaps, present some new ideas upon the great and important affairs of America. The present state of those affairs and the role which Mr. Franklin plays therein does not allow an observant person to doubt that this American is deputed to come with certain propositions to France in the critical po- sition in which his country finds herself of having to achieve absolute independence or of falling again under the rule of England, and even of seeing her position ag- gravated, if the fortune of war is against her. If we turn our attention more closely to the true in- terests of America, of France and of England with re- gard to this important object, we easily recognize that, in the actual position of things, America has proposi- tions so absolute, so urgent, to make to France, that it is as difficult for her not to come to a decision, as it is essential and pressing for her to determine wisely. It is not for us, (the writer) supposing that such propositions existed, to go so far as to pronounce upon what it is expedient to do. That point exceeds our province. But one may be justified, as a good subject of the King, and without overstepping the zeal with which one is animated for his service in considering what may be the consequences of the course for or against, to be taken in the circumstances. One may suppose then that America has at the pres- ent time a twofold plan of action demanding equal no. 619. Though the work of a "private citizen," this memoir was probably prepared for the Council, Doniol II. 118. APPENDICES 396 urgency: either to obtain with the aid of France and Spain, her complete independence or to extort an ac- knowledgment of it from England itself. The argument which the United Colonies of North America may use to France is to say to her: "Assist us to win our complete liberty and you will derive there- from honour and advantage by the Treaty Offensive and Defensive and that of Commerce which we offer you, or leave us to treat with England at your peril and risk if it is achieved." On the other hand the proposition which America, to arrive equally at the goal of her independence, may make to England is the following: "We have been fighting," she may say, "for two years past for a rightful liberty. The probabilities for and against, so to speak, are at the present time equal; the issue will become a certainty if we join with France and Spain. Grant us generously what we are in a po- sition to wrest from you, and here is the price we put upon the just independence which we desire. A treaty, as glorious for the mother country as for her colony, being signed, take twenty, thirty thousand men of our troops which are all ready, you have your vessels on our coasts, go possess yourselves therewith of St. Domingo, Martinique, Guadaloupe, drive the French entirely out of America and you will have in the new possessions which you acquire an ample equivalent for what you cede to us; an equivalent more productive, better suited to the nature of your territories, and one henceforward impregnable in your hands because we will be its guardians, its defenders, as well as the nurses of its prosperity, and, being already your brothers by blood and becoming bound to you by a memorable treaty we shall thus be doubly your allies and much more sure allies than if we remained subordinate and discontented subjects." 394 APPENDICES ( If it were permitted to a private citizen to extend his reflections further upon the question of the justice of a war with England in the present conjuncture it might be observed that the war which we may have with that crown, as things stand, would not exactly possess the characteristics of which we have been speaking. It would indeed be rather a war of self-defense, if the propositions of which we have spoken above existed. Indeed, France having the safety of her own possessions compromised has thenceforth only to choose between the course of furnishing America with the aid she asks for or of seeing an oppressed colony or (and) an ambitious mother country treating on their own account and of taking upon herself the consequence of their agreement. If that danger has any foundation in fact, then it is a league prejudicial to her own repose, prejudicial to her possessions, which she breaks. It is a peril which she provides against and averts, and that peril well defined, which politically speaking is most certain, is perhaps a sufficient reason, of justice as much as of state, to warrant a determination of that kind. Basing our conclusion upon all these reflections as well as upon justice, it remains for us to give our idea of the extent and consequences of the revolution which is preparing, the main object of this writing. If it is accomplished by our means, it ought while lowering England to raise France in a corresponding degree and restore her to her rank. It may even offer the most fortunate opportunities for making a sure work, seeing that England, with her resources already wasted, is almost unguarded at home, and that she pre- sents there and elsewhere opportunities to strike a nearly certain and absolutely decisive blow. Lastly the present conjuncture, a conjuncture which the revo- APPENDICES 395 lutions of time so rarely offer, is such that it may have an influence upon the state of France and upon that of Europe, always to the advantage of this kingdom, which the longest ages will not be able to disturb. If America is severed from England with our aid, thenceforward all the possessions of that country in that part of the world fall, and ours establish them- selves there upon the firmest foundations. Since the two great sources of England's commerce, the sole basis of her fortune, are in America and in Asia, one of the great sinews of that power is thenceforth cut; and if we hasten promptly and effectually to provide for the safety of the Isle of France (a post which can alone preserve India entire and give security to our future projects there) we shall at leisure and at opportunity provide suitably against the excessive power which England is tending to usurp there : in which we shall be the more assisted as the finances of England must needs be thrown completely out of gear by the ill-success of this war; and her public wealth being nothing but an exaggerated and almost artificial credit, she ought to be doubly overthrown both by the expenses of this war and by the loss of her possessions, the only pledge for the truly imaginary credit which has grown up in that nation, and which her constitution, aided by successes, has much favoured. The consequences of this revolution ought, as we think, to be still more widespread. Such an event in our opinion, changes forthwith, to the advantage of France, the political state of Europe and even repairs the bad effects of the fatal war of Poland which has destroyed the balance of the Germanic body established with so much difficulty by a war of forty years and the celebrated treaty of Westphalia. England, who weighed too heavily in the contrary balance which produced this change, reduced to her 396 APPENDICES natural state, could no longer be of any assistance to Russia and to the King of Prussia, who as yet have only a forced extension of power the unconsolidated fortune of which depends much on the rare qualities of the rulers, who, in spite of their success, have only suc- ceeded in disturbing the equilibrium of Germany with- out having given it another fixed constitution, since there are two rival monarchies seeking to establish themselves upon the ruin of that aristocracy and a third monarchy, Russia, strives to force a way into it, a state of things which substitutes a conflict or a new war for the old condition of things, the decaying con- dition of the Germanic body. It is true that the new house of Austria, by this revolution regains the preponderance in Germany which we had taken away and that naturally she also ought to find in the weakening of England means of in- creasing her power. But in what respect may France find her interests injured thereby? In their common elevation the point is so strongly in her favour that she has nothing to wish for in that respect. If the maritime power of England falls, France naturally and invincibly takes her place whether by the advancement of her distant acquisitions or by the favourable position of her territories. Her pre-eminence in this respect, too, will be so constant, so certain; besides, the new kind of power which she will acquire is in itself so im- portant, so decisive, considering the present customs of Europe, that it is much rather to be feared this ex- cessive pre-eminence may be noticed and may excite resistance. Consequently, looking at this double in- crease, the desire of the houses of Bourbon and Austria for union would be better fulfilled by these circum- stances than by any others which could ever arise, for, lastly, firm treaties are not formed nor maintained ex- cept by mutual advantages. In short nothing can hap- APPENDICES 397 pen more essential for France, in her real and in her relative power, than the absolute consummation of this revolution. By her position alone she inherits all that England loses; and without even going so far as to pluck them, she sees drop from the hands of her rival the chief branches of that rival's fortune ; all this debris comes of itself to increase her own, and time alone as- sures her without any effort, a two-fold power, on sea and on land, which she has never been able to unite and which strengthening each other will put her above attack. Taking now a collective view of this statement of facts all the importance of the resolution which France is called upon to make presents itself to the mind. The question is, according to the laws of nature, as to the liberty of one of the four quarters of the world held captive by one of the European powers : in two words, it is a question of giving America to the whole world; politically, it is a question of putting right the state of Europe and chiefly that of France. Finally, if it is permissible in a political memoir to consider the sub- ject philosophically, one can see with some interest a people forming itself into a national body, creating itself a civil state embodying a mixture of the manners of a state of nature and of the wisdom of an age most fruitful of knowledge, a people which is about to give laws to itself, having before its eyes the laws of all civilized peoples. This is not a collection of savages gradually emerging from barbarism, and which rather receives than gives to itself the constitution which cir- cumstances impose upon it. This is a people already' civilized by its understanding and which, after having acquired its political independence, is about to choose for itself the legislation that is to establish its destiny for all time. The history of the world perhaps shows no spectacle more interesting, and the political stage 398 APPENDICES has never perhaps presented an event the consequences of which are more important and more widespread in the general condition of this globe. Summarizing what has been said in this memoir, the result is that finance must dictate the course to take in the present state of things always after justice shall have spoken. The impression with which one is filled in writing this is such that it cannot too often be repeated that it is a question of taking from England, our nat- ural and actual enemy, more than half her power, and that for ever, and of giving it to France; or of seeing England make an agreement which will give her more strength and cover her with glory, will change into good fortune an occasion of disaster, and all that at our expense; and the course to be taken ought to be taken actively and without delay or it is very possible that the other part of the dilemma just spoken of may be accomplished before our eyes. The writer here closes the reflections which the ful- ness of his zeal for the King's service may render acceptable. in CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NECESSITY OF FRANCE DE- CLARING AT ONCE FOR THE AMERICAN COLONIES, EVEN WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF SPAIN. 1 13 January 1778. The quarrel which exists between England and the Colonies of North America is as important to France as to Great Britain, and its issue will have equal in- 1 Smss. no. 1835. Though unsigned this document contains ex- pressions from earlier papers from Vergennes' pen. Cf. for example, Doniol, II. 144 and 733 ff. Besides the points for which it is cited in the text, the memoir is interesting as an omnium gatherum of all the arguments for French intervention. APPENDICES 399 fluence on the reputation and power of those two Crowns. It is, therefore, essential that France should decide upon and fix the policy it is advisable she should adopt in such a conjuncture. The Americans have been struggling for the last three years against the efforts of Great Britain, and they have up to the present maintained a sort of superi- ority; but the war which they wage fatigues and ex- hausts them, and must necessarily weary the people and awaken in them a desire for repose. England, for her part, crushed by the expenditure occasioned by this same war, and convinced of the im- possibility of reducing the Colonies, is occupied with the means of re-establishing peace. With this view she is taking the most urgent and animated steps with the Deputies from Congress, and it is natural that the United States should at last decide to listen to their proposals. In this state of affairs it is desirable to examine what course it is proper for France to take. There exist two courses only, that of abandoning the Colonies, and that of supporting them. If we abandon them, England will take advantage of it by making a reconciliation, and in that case she will either preserve her supremacy wholly or partially, or she will gain an ally. Now it is known that she is dis- posed to sacrifice that supremacy 'and to propose simply a sort of family compact, that is to say, a league against the House of Bourbon. The result of this will be that the Americans will be- come our perpetual enemies, and we must expect to see them turn all their efforts against our possessions, and against those of Spain. This is all the more probable as the Colonies, require a direct trade with the sugar islands. England will offer them that of our islands after having conquered them, which will be easy for her. 400 APPENDICES Thus the coalition of the English and the Americans will draw after it our expulsion, and probably that of the Spaniards, from the whole of America ; it will limit our shipping and our commerce to the European seas only, and even this trade will be at the mercy of English insolence and greed. It would be a mistake to suppose that the United States will not lend themselves to the proposals of the Court of St. James's. Those States took up arms only in order to establish and defend their independence and the freedom of their commerce; if, therefore, England offers them both, what reason will they have for refus- ing? Their treaty with that Power will give them more safety than the engagements which they might make with other Powers, or than all the guarantees which we might offer them. Indeed, what opinion can they have of our means, and even of our good-will, since we have not dared to co-operate in securing an independence of which we would afterwards propose the empty guaran- tee? Their surest guarantee will be in the community of interests and views which will be established between them and their former mother-country ; we have nothing to offer which can counterbalance that. Such will be the effects of the independence of the United States of America, if it is established without our concurrence. It follows from this that the glory, the dignity and the essential interest of France demand that she should stretch out her hand to those States, and that their independence should be her work. The advantages which will result are innumerable ; we shall humiliate our natural enemy, a perfidious enemy who never knows how to respect either treaties or the right of nations; we shall divert to our profit one of the principal sources of her opulence; we shall shake her power, and reduce her to her real value; we shall APPENDICES 401 extend our commerce, our shipping, our fisheries; we shall ensure the possession of our islands, and finally, we shall re-establish our reputation, and shall resume amongst the Powers of Europe the place which belongs to us. There would be no end if we wished to detail all these points ; it is sufficient to indicate them in order to make their importance felt. In presupposing that the independence of the Ameri- cans is to be the work of France, it is necessary to examine what line of conduct it is desirable for us to observe in order to attain that end ; there is but one, to assist the Colonies. But in order to determine the sort of assistance to be given, it is essential not to deviate from the two follow- ing truths: 1st, that whatever sort of assistance we give the Americans, it will be equivalent to a declara- tion of war against Great Britain: 2nd that when war is inevitable, it is better to be beforehand with one's enemy than to be anticipated by him. Starting with these two principles, it appears that France cannot be too quick in making with the Ameri- cans a treaty of which recognised independence will be the basis, and that she should take her measures for acting before England can anticipate her. It is all the more urgent to hasten the arrangements to be made with the Americans, as the Deputies are hard pressed by emissaries of the English Ministry, and as, if we are not the first to bind them, they will give the Court of London a foundation for proposing a plan of reconciliation at the re-assembly of Parliament, which will take place on the 20th instant, and then all will be over with us, and it will only remain for us to prepare to undertake war against the English and against the insurgents, whereas we could and ought to have begun it in concert with the latter. 402 APPENDICES In all that has just been said, the co-operation of Spain has been presupposed. But in the event of that Power not adopting the principles and plan of France, or of her judging the moment of putting it into execution not yet arrived, what course will France, thus isolated, have to follow? The independence of the Colonies is so important a matter for France, that no other should weaken it, and France must do her utmost to establish it, even if it should cost her some sacrifices ; I mean that France must undertake the war for the maintenance of Ameri- can independence, even if that war should be in other respects disadvantageous. In order to be convinced of this truth, it is only necessary to picture to ourselves what England will be, when she no longer has America. Thus France must espouse the American cause, and use for that purpose all her power, even if Spain should refuse to join her. From this one of two things will happen; either that Power will still remain neutral, or she will decide to join France. In the first case, al- though she will be passive, she will nevertheless favour our operations, because she will be armed, and England will see her constantly placed behind us, and ready, if need be, to assist us : but in order to maintain this opin- ion, we must also maintain that of a good understanding between the two Courts. The second case has no need of development. But Spain is awaiting a rich fleet from Vera Cruz, and that fleet will not arrive until about next spring. Its arrival must unquestionably be ensured, and that may be done in two ways ; 1st by prolonging the period of our operations, or else, 2nd, by sending a squadron to meet the fleet. Spain has vessels at Cadiz and Ferrol; they are armed and ready to put to sea. A cruise might be given as a pretext in order to mask their real destination. APPENDICES 403 If the King adopts the course of going forward with- out the participation of Spain, he will take away from that Power all just reason for complaint, by stipulating for her eventually all the advantages which she would have claimed, had she been a contracting party. These advantages will be the same as those which His Majesty will ask for himself. IV EXTRACTS FROM THE "OBSERVATIONS ON THE JUSTICA- TIVE MEMORIAL OF THE COURT OF LONDON." 1 While the ambassador of England put the King's patience to the strongest proofs ... an event came to pass in America which essentially changed the face of things in that quarter of the world. This event was the defeat of the army under General Burgoyne. The news of this unexpected disaster . . . astonished the British ministers, and must have the more sensibly af- fected them, as it overthrew the plan they had laid for the reduction of the Colonies. We shall be con- vinced of this truth by reading the speeches occasioned by it in Parliament. The first result of the tumultuous debates of both Houses was the naming of commissioners of peace, to carry to America conciliatory bills; and 1 The original (though quite different) form of this document is to be found in Beaumarchais' Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1835), 530-42. The present document was published in Paris in 1779 over Beaumarchais' name, but the edition of 1780, which is un- changed, is anonymous, though it is attributed in the catalogue of the Biblioteque Nationale to J. M. Gerard de Rayneval, Vergen- nes' Secretary. The English- American translation (Philadelphia and London, 1780), from which the above extracts are made, is also anonymous. There are four copies of this translation in the Pennsylvania Historical Society's library at Philadelphia, and one of the French edition of 1779. 404 APPENDICES that of the secret deliberations of the council at St. James' was to make advances and to sound the American commissioners residing at Paris, and to propose to them peace and a coalition against the Crown of France. This last proposition was the consequence of the im- putations which the ministry of London had incessantly made against that of Versailles : They have affected to consider France as the cause, the support, in a word as the author, of the revolution of which America pre- sented them a view; and this opinion would naturally inspire them with the desire of vengeance. . . . This prospect was so much the more proper to console, and even to dazzle the British ministers, as it perfectly cor- responded with their most dear and most constant wish, a wish which for a long time had been the very essence of British policy, that of humbling France ; and as the presumptuous confidence of that nation must have still grown greater, when they beheld the extraordinary armaments they had got ready, with a despatch which surprised all Europe [the armaments referred to are stated to be those prepared in January, 1777]. The British ministry, led astray by this brilliant phantom, delayed not putting in motion all the secret springs by means of which they would be able to realize it. Emissaries came one after another and watched the American commissioners : Their discourse to every one of them was, that they should no longer continue the dupes of France, but must unite with the court of Lon- don, and fall upon that power, etc. The court of London denies the facts and represents them as a supposition destitute of truth and even of probability, and calls upon France to produce the proof of it. But can a subterfuge like this possibly impose on any one? Who will suspect the British min- istry to have carried their want of address or impru- dence so far as to leave direct marks of a darksome APPENDICES 405 manouvre, and of not having on the other hand, taken the most effectual measures that, in case of discovery, it might not be imputed to them ! . . . True it is, that according to the British ministry, the King of Great Britain could not be suspected of not bemg offered peace to his subjects, after a long and hard contest, but with design of entering into a new war against a re- spectable power; [this is a mistranslation of the French: the second not and the but should be omitted]. But some very plain reflections will make it clear how illusory this affected language is, and how little it de- serves belief. If the court of London . . . either sincerely, or in order to impose upon the English nation or even on its king . . . has experienced unpardonable injuries from France, if it has reason for reproaching her with the de- fection of the Colonies, they must consider her dignity and most essential interests as wounded, and from that time must feel the most ardent desire, not only of tak- ing vengeance, but also of recovering from France what the crown of England lost in America. In consequence of this plan, it was natural for the British ministry, unable to subdue her Colonies, to seek to be reconciled to them and to engage them to espouse her resentment : They might so much the more flatter themselves that they should succeed herein as the proceedings of France with regard to American privateers . . . and especially the dislike the king had at .all times manifested to any engagement with the Congress, must have given disgust and dissatisfaction to their deputies, and induce them, notwithstanding (their well known aversion, to seek even in England the safety of their country when they failed to find it in France. . . . In this situation ought it not to be supposed that, the moment the British ministry perceived the necessity of yielding to the efforts of the Colonies, they perceived the 406 APPENDICES project and the hope of punishing France for the wrongs they had imputed to her? Such have, indeed, been the intention and conduct of the ministers of the king of Great Britain. We have already affirmed, in the Expose de Motifs and we repeat it here, with that assurance which nothing but truth can give; and the King dares flatter himself that the opinion which all Europe has of his rectitude and probity will have more weight than a denial merely hazarded and which they have not even had the address to render probable. Moreover, although the king had not had certain proof of the hostile views of the court of London, it would 'have been sufficient for him to have had probable grounds to suspect that they existed; now, what must His Majesty have thought of the sight of the immense and hasty warlike preparations of the court of London ! her arbitrary proceedings, her denials of justice, her arrogant pretensions! What must he have allowed to the last words of the idol and oracle of the British nation, Lord Chatham, who dragged himself to Parlia- ment, there to expire exclaiming, Peace with America, and war with the House of Bourbon! The court of London herself had justified the suspicion and fore- sight of the king, by the hostile orders sent to India before the declaration of the Marquis de Noailles, and even before the signing of the Treaty of February 6, 1778. . . . The King well informed of the plan of the court of London and of the preparations which were the conse- quence of it, perceived that no more time was to be lost if he would prevent the designs of his enemies : His Majesty determined, therefore, to take into consider- ation, at length, the overtures of the Congress [pp. 60-6] APPENDICES 407 Whilst the British ambassador renewed without in- termission complaints unjust in their object . . . the British ministry, convinced that notwithstanding their formidable armaments any subjugation whatever of the Colonies was in future impossible, proposed to Parlia- ment the means of conciliation ; they endeavored at the same time to open a secret negotiation with the com- missioners of Congress at Paris; they were disposed to yield everything, even independence in fact, provided they could retain a nominal dependence. But war against France was to be the price of so great a sacri- fice. The king apprised on the one side of the offers and hostile views of the court of London, and on the other side of the unshaken resolution of Congress not to suffer the least trace of its former subjection to re- main: The king, I say, did not hesitate to take a part. . . . To deceive the other nations with regard to the real motives which have directed the conduct of the king, the British ministry maintain that he entered into treaty with the Americans, not because he feared the secret views of Great Britain, but because he foresaw that the Americans defeated, discouraged without sup- port and without resources, were about to return to their mother-country. ... It was without doubt for the sake of this assertion that the British ministry have thought it beneath the dignity of their sovereign to search for the period at which France formed con- nections with the United States. . . . The king is will- ing to spare the British ministry a task so disagreeable and so embarrassing, by observing for them that the conversations which led to the Treaties of the 6th of February, 1778, were considerably posterior to the capitulation of General Burgoyne. Now it is notorious that this event elevated the courage and the hopes of the Americans as much as it dejected the British na- 408 APPENDICES tion, and principally the court of London. If then the king has listened to the propositions of Congress after this period so disastrous to the British, it has not been, and could not have been for any other reason, but be- cause the thought with the United States that their in- dependence was thenceforward irrevocable; England herself thought as the Americans did" [93-6]. V PROVISIONAL ARTICLES 1 agreed upon, by and between Richard Oswald, Esquire, The Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty, for Treat- ing of Peace with the Commissioners of the United States of America, in behalf of His Said Majesty on the One Part, and John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens, Four of the Commissioners of the Said United States for Treating of Peace with the Commissioners of His Said Majesty, on Their Behalf, on the Other Part. To be Inserted in, and to Constitute the Treaty of Peace Proposed to be Concluded Between the Crown of Great Britain and the Said United States ; but which Treaty is not to be Concluded until Terms of a Peace Shall Be Agreed Upon Between Great Britain and France, and His Britannic Majesty Shall Be Ready to Conclude Such Treaty Accordingly. Concluded November 30, 1782. Proclamation ordered by the Continental Congress April 11, 1783. ARTICLES I. Independence acknowledged. II. Boundaries. III. Fishery rights. IV. Recovery of Debts. V. Restitution of estates. VI. Confiscations and prosecutions to cease. VII. Withdrawal of British armies, from Malloy. APPENDICES 409 VIII. Navigation of the Mississippi River. IX. Restoration of territory. Separate Article. Boundary of West Florida. Whereas reciprocal advantages and mutual conven- ience are found by experience to form the only perma- nent foundation of peace and friendship between States, it is agreed to form the articles of the proposed treaty on such principles of liberal equity and reciprocity, as that partial advantages (those seeds of discord) being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two countries may be established as to promise and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony. ARTICLE I His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusett's Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States ; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the Gov- ernment, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof; and that all disputes which might arise in future on the subject of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared that the following are and shall be their boundaries, viz. : ARTICLE II From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of St. Croix River to the Highlands; along the Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which 410 APPENDICES fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River; thence down along the mid- dle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between the lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake untill it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron ; thence along the middle of said water communi- cation into the Lake Huron; thence through the mid- dle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Su- perior northward to the isles Royal and Phelippeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods ; thence through the said lake to the most north- western point thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi untill it shall intersect the northermost part of the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; then strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down along the mid- dle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid highlands which divide the rivers that fall into the At- APPENDICES 411 lantic Ocean, from those which fall into the river St. Laurence; .comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia. ARTICLE III It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland ; also in the Gulph of St. Law- rence, and at all other places in the sea, where the in- habitants of both countries used at any time hereto- fore to fish ; and also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use, (but not to dry or cure the same on that island;) and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of aH othier of his Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but as soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fisher- men to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabi- tants, proprietors or possessors of the ground. AETICLE IV It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full APPENDICES value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted. ARTICLE V It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recom- mend it to the legislatures of the respective States to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights and properties of persons resident in districts in the pos- session of His Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States : And that per- sons of any other description shall have free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the thirteen United States, and therein to remain twelve months unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties as may have been confiscated : And that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several States a reconsideration and revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so as to render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent, not only with justice and equity, but with the spirit of conciliation which, on the return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail: And that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several States that the estates, rights and properties of such last- mentioned persons shall be restored to them, they re- funding to any persons who may be now in possession the bona fide price (where any has been given) which such persons may have paid on purchasing any of the said lands, rights and properties since the confiscation. And it is agreed that all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage settle- ments or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impedi- ments in the prosecution of their just rights. APPENDICES 413 ARTICLE VI That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced against any persons for or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war, and that no person shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or property; and that those who may be in confinement on such charges, at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America, shall be im- mediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions so com- menced be discontinued. ARTICLE VII There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His Britannic Majesty and the said States, and be- tween the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall then immediately cease: All prisoners, on both sides, shall be set at liberty; and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the said United States, and from every port, place and harbour within the same, leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein; and shall also order and cause all archives, records, deeds and papers belonging to any of the said States or their citizens, which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his offi- cers to whom they belong. ARTICLE VIII The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States. APPENDICES ARTICLE IX In case it should so happen that any place or terri- tory belonging to Great Britain or to the United States should be conquered by the arms of either from the other, before the arrival of these articles in America, it is agreed that the same shall be restored without diffi- culty and without requiring any compensation. Done at Paris the thirtieth day of November, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-two. (Seal.) RICHARD OSWALD. (Seal.) JOHN ADAMS. (Seal.) B. FRANKLIN. (Seal.) JOHN JAY. (Seal.) HENRY LAURENS. Witness: CALEB WHITEFOORD, Sec'y to the British Commission. W. T. FRANKLIN, Sec'y to the American Commission. SEPARATE ARTICLE It is hereby understood and agreed that in case Great Britain, at the conclusion of the present war, shall recover, or be put in possession of West Florida, the line of north boundary between the said province and the United States shall be a line drawn from the mouth of the river Yassous, where it unites with the Mississippi, due east, to the river Apalachicola. Done at Paris the thirtieth day of November, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-two. (Seal.) RICHARD OSWALD. (Seal.) JOHN ADAMS. (Seal.) B. FRANKLIN. (Seal.) JOHN JAY. (Seal.) HENRY LAURENS. Witness: CALEB WHITEFOORD, Sec'y to the British Commission. W. T. FRANKLIN, Sec'y to the American Commission. INDEX Adams, John: Suggests French intervention, 52-3 fn.; op- posed to a military connec- tion with France, ib.; prophe- sies American greatness, 218; appointed envoy to negotiate peace, (Oct. 4, 1779), 261; wishes to communicate Ihis powers to treat to the Eng- lish government, 273-5; de- fends the "40 to 1" act, 275- 6; endeavors to demonstrate France's indebtedness to the United States, ib.; thinks France should aid America more positively, 276-7; is snubbed by Vergennes and goes to Holland, 278; Con- gress asked to curb, 295, 299 ; superseded by a commission, 301; participation of, in the peace negotiations, 340, 345 -6; signs a declaration (Jan. 20, 1783) explaining the Pro- visional Articles, 357. Almodovar: Spanish ambassa- dor at London, 182. Aranda, Count d': Spanish am- bassador at Paris and bitter enemy of England, 82; en- thusiastic for an American alliance, 97, 107-8, 179-80 fn.; not a real ambassador, 108; recognizes the extension of the United States to the Mis- sissippi, 241 fn. ; action of, in facilitating peace, 356-7. Argenson, Marquis d': Diplo- matic policy of, 26-7. Austria: Value of alliance with, to France, 39, 51, 59. Balance of Power, Doctrine of: Connected with the balance of trade idea, 15-6, 33-4; logic of connected with French policy in the Revolution, 17- 22; stated by Vergennes as an argument for French in- tervention in America, 86-9, 101, 137 ff.; to be applied to North America, 21-2, 176, 184. Bancroft: An agent of the American commissioners, 127 and fn. Bancroft the Historian: Ex- planation of French interven- tion in the Revolution, 2. Bavarian Succession, War of: Cause and settlement of, 169- 70. Beaumarchais: Alarmist re- port on situation in England (1775), 65; proselytes the king in behalf of secret aid, 72-3; his La Paix ou la Guer- re, 79; activities as Hortalez et cie, ib.; alarmism after Saratoga, 121 fn., 129-30; memoir of, urging immediate American recognition (Jan., 1778), 155 footnote; author of the original form of the Observations sur le Mdmoire, etc., 145 and appendix IV; charges Arthur Lee with treachery to France, 166 fn.; controversy over claims of, 207-8; witty comment of, on Spain's entry into the war, 216 fn. 415 416 INDEX Belligerency: A status un- known to the Law of Nations in 1776, 81 and fn. Berkeley, Bishop: Predicts greatness of America, 217 fn. Bernis, Cardinal: Minister of Foreign Affairs (1756), 32. Bonvouloir: Mission of, to America (1775), 73-4; re- ports favorably on American prospects (Mar., 1776), ib. Boston: Siege of, impresses French opinion, 68. Broglie, Count de: His Con- jectures raisonne'es, 46 ff. ; plan for invasion of England preserved at request of Ver- gennes, 61-2; plans to become temporary "Statholder" of the United States, 90-2 ; mem- oir on England's enfeeble- ment (Jan., 1778), 154-5 fn. Burgoyne: British general captures Ticonderoga, 117; surrenders at Saratoga, 120. Burke: Predicts French inter- vention in America, 52 fn.; assesses the cost to France of her intervention in America, 375-6. Canada: Lost to France by the Treaty of Paris (1763), 37; significance of English re- tention of, in preference to Guadaloupe and Martinique, 19-20; not a French objective in the Revolution, 9-11, 70, 74, 200-1 and fn.; French withdrawal from, assists French intervention, 51, 65, 74; wish of France and Spain to leave, in the hands of Eng- land, 12 fn., Ill, 176, 201-4 and fns.; Vergennes' idea of making a free state of, under French protection, 201-2 and fn. ; Washington opposes a French expedition into, 204. Carleton, Sir Guy: Authorized to negotiate peace in Ameri- ca, 330 fn. Carmichael: Memoir of, to Vergennes cited, 118 and fn. Cartography: Evidence of, on the Western Land question, 222 fn. Caste jon, Marquis de: Member of the Spanish royal council, and opposed to American recognition, 109. Castries: Becomes secretary of state for the Marine, 285; opposes peace (1782), 357 fn. Catherine II: Assists in parti- tion of Poland, 45; forms the First League of Neutrals (1780), 172; joins with Jos- eph II in offering to mediate between Great Britain and her foes (1781), 286. Charles III, of Spain: A loyal Bourbon, 34; concern at French - American alliance, 161-2; deep resentment at in- dependent course of France, 176-8; character of, sketched by Florida Blanca, 176-7 fn.; pleased with the idea of med- iating between France and England, 184; urges upon Louis the acceptance of a qualified recognition by Eng- land of American independ- ence, 185-6; will not recognize American independence be- fore England, 195; disap- pointment of, at not obtaining Gibraltar, 356. Chatelet: Correspondence with Choiseul regarding American affairs, 42; joins Choiseul in opposing Vergennes' policy, 287. Chatham : Attitude toward France and French view of, 3, 35 fn. ; lament on Saratoga, 18-9; rumors of prospective return to power, 64-5; in INDEX 417 eclipse, 66; no likelihood of his being called to power after Saratoga, 124 fn.; rumors respecting, 130, 155; opposed to recognizing Amer- ican independence after Sara- toga, 133 fn.; also, after the announcement of the French- American treaty, 168 fn. Chaumont: A secret agent of the French Foreign Office, 126, 129. Choiseul, Duke de: Succeeds Bernis (1758), 33; his Mer- cantilism, 33-4; obtains the second Family Compact, 35- 6; cedes Louisiana to Spain, 36; Memoir e of (1765), 39- 40; considers intervening in England's dispute with her Colonies (1766-8), 40 ff.; sends Kalb to America, 43; disliked by Louis XVI, 54; attacks of, on Vergennes' foreign policy, 78, 287. Clark, George Rogers: Expe- dition of, against British posts in the Northwest, 269. Commissioners, The American: Agree to transcend their original instructions, 96-7 ; would like to involve France with England, 114; endeavor to force the French govern- ment's hand, 118; abandon these tactics after Ticonde- roga, 118-9 and fn.; prefer a coalition with France, 125 fn.; not citable in support of Vergennes' alarmism after Saratoga, 143-4; negotiations with the Foreign Office, ch. VII; propose a treaty of amity and commerce, 149; state their terms, 152-4; fail in their effort to procure im- mediately effective guaranties from France, ib.; presented at court, 168. See "Deane," "Lee," and "Franklin." Congress, The Continental: Sends an agent to France, 84; authorizes a treaty of amity and commerce with France, 96; enlarges its in- structions to the American commissioners, 97; effect of British gold on, feared by Vergennes, 163-4; declares against the idea of a separ- ate peace, 209; debates in, of the Western Land question, 220 fn., 231-2 fn.; parties in, 247-8 and fns.; relations of, with the French envoys, chs. XI-XIII; developes aggres- sive views respecting Ameri- can claims in the West and to the Newfoundland fisher- ies (1779), 256 ff.; adopts instructions of Aug. 14, 1779, 260; instructions of, to Jay, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, see "Jay." See further "Instructions of June 15, 1781" and "Provi- sional Articles." "Corsairs": The question of, 99-101. Courier de I' Europe: Sensa- tionalism of, 132 and fn. Deane, Silas: First American agent to France, arrives in Paris, 84; approves Broglie's scheme to become "Stat- holder" of the United States, 90; presents Vergennes a plan of alliance between France, Spain, and the United States (Mar. 1777), 97; negotiations of, with the English spy, Wentworth, 127; famous controversy of, with Arthur Lee, 207-9; holds lands west of the Mountains to be at Congress' disposal, 219; endeavors to raise money in France on the Western lands as security, 238-9 and fn. 418 INDEX Deslandes : Urges importance of naval power to France, 29- 30. Diplomatic Revolution, The: motive for, 23; consummation of, 31-2. Dunkirk: Treaty provisions regarding, 38; stipulation of Convention of Aranjuez with reference to, 193-4; articles concerning, suppressed (1783), 361. Durand: Correspondence of, as ambassador at St. James' with Choiseul regarding American affairs, 41. England: Begins Seven Years' War without warning, 3, 73; offers France and Spain a guaranty of their American possessions (1776-7) 6-7, 115- 6; re-assesses colonial empire in consequence of Seven Years' War, 19-20; colonies, commerce, and marine the basis of the power of, 18-21, 29, 31, 41, 44, 48, 50, 87, 154- 5; hereditary rival of France and enfeeblement of, sought by France, 18 ff., 40, 47-50, 69-70, 86, 89, 101, 137, 139- 40; overbearing naval policy of, 47, 51, 73, 102-3; plays a waiting game with Spain (1778), 181-2; rejects proffer of Spanish mediation (Mar., 1779), 214-5; supposed to be enfeebled by the loss of America, 362-4 ; subordination of, to France resented, 365-6; causes of swift recuperation of, 367-8; recovery by, of American trade, 369-71 and fn.; rapid restoration of fleet of, 371 ; regains the pre- dominance in Holland, 374-5. Estaing, Count d': Sent with a fleet to North America, 169; address of, to French-Cana- dians (Oct., 1778), 209 fn. Family Compact (1761): For- mation and provisions of, 35- 6; maintenance of, urged by Choiseul, 40; called by Ver- gennes "the corner-stone" of French policy, t 59; loyalty to, pledged by Florida Blanca, 106; put in jeopardy by Ver- gennes' American policy, 135; appeal to, by France feared by Florida Blanca (1778), 175; supplemented by the Convention of Aranjuez, ch. VIII. Favier: Associated with Broglie in the preparation of the Conjectures raisonnees, 46; influence of his work, 48-9. Fitzherbert: British peace ne- gotiator, 332 fn. Fleury, Cardinal: His Systems de Conservation and its great success, 23-5; defect of the Systeme, 28. Florida Blanca, Don Jos6 Mo- nino Oount de: Succeeds Grimaldi as prime-minister of Spain (1777), 105; char- acteristics of policy of, to- ward America, ch. V, passim; his idea of intervention, 112 ff. ; opposes a pledge of finan- cial aid to the Americans, 119; favors financial aid after Saratoga, but opposes an al- liance with the colonies, 157; extreme anger at intelligence of French-American negotia- tions, 158-60; calculates on leisurely negotiations between France and Spain, 160-1; de- clines French offer of naval protection for Mexican treas- ure fleet, 164; fears an appeal by France to the Family Compact, 175; com/pared with Aranda, 175 fn. ; crystalliza- tion of views of, respecting the American peril, 176-78; INDEX 419 angry correspondence with Aranda, 179-80 fn.; efforts of, to make Spain mediator re- buffed by England, 181; bet- ter success of, 182; wishes to see American independence neutralized, 184-5 ; discloses his intention to make Spanish objectives the sine qud non of peace, 185, 189; definite ob- jectives sought by, for Spain, 190; shapes the Convention of Aranjuez, 191-2; offers Eng- land Spanish mediation on the basis of the status quo in America, 214-5 ; recognizes the extension of the United States to the Mississippi, 240, 242; urges the status quo for the United States (1780), 271-2; eccentric conduct of, with Jay, 319 ff.; admits that Spain will not recognize American independence be- fore England, 321-2; lack of self-possession of, ib. fn.; em- phasizes Spain's interest in her monopoly of commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, 322; solicits terms of a treaty from Jay, 324-5; anger of, with Aranda in consequence of Spain's failure to obtain Gibraltar by the peace, 356. Floridas, The: Holker's in- structions with reference to (Nov. 25, 1777), 12 fn. ; ex- changed by Spain for Ha- vana, 36; recovery of, sought by Spain, 112, 161, 190-1, 197-8. See also Appendix V. Forth: British emissary to France (1777), presents In- formally English demands with reference to American privateers, 115; offers France a guaranty of her West In- dian possessions, ib.; repre- sentations of, go unsup- ported, 116-7; offers France a separate peace, 331 fn. Fox, Charles: Quarrel of, with Shelburne over the control of the peace negotiations, 331-2 fn. France: Motives for entering the Revolution, chs. I and II, especially pp. 49-53, ch. VI, and appendices II and III; diplomatic object of, in the 18th century, 23 ff., 50; guar- antor of the Treaty of West- phalia, 28, 59, 169-70; ne- glects her navy, 28-30; losses by the Seven Years' War, 37- 8; humiliated by the Treaty of Paris, 38; also, by the par- tition of Poland, 45-6; inter- vention of, in the Revolution foretold, ch. II, note 52; weak navy of (1776), 87 fn.; hazardous position of, early in 1777, 99; apology of, to Europe for entering the Revolution, 144-5 fn.; breaks with England, 168-9; cham- pion of neutral rights, 170- 2; attitude of, on the Wes- tern Land question, 232 If.; benefits received by, from the Treaty of Peace, ch. XVI; prestige of, restored on the Continent, 361-2; position of, arouses English jealousy, 365- 6; failure of, to secure Amer- ican trade, 369-71 and fn.; influence of, threatened by an Austro-Russian rapproche- ment, 372; temporary tri- umph of, in Holland, 374; terrible cost to, of her inter- vention in America, 375-6; see also "Spain" and "Ver- gennes." Franklin: Foresees French in- tervention in the British- American dispute, 44 fn. 38, 52 fn. ; arrives in France 420 INDEX (Dec., 1776), 93; immense reputation of, and its effect on the American cause, 93-4; first audience with Vergennes and demands of, 95; joins with Deane and Lee in trans- cending the Congressional in- structions, 96-7; proposes a plan of alliance to Aranda, 97; intervenes in behalf of American privateers, 100 ; prepares memoir to the French government with Deane and Abb6 Niccoli, 118 fn.; acquiesces in the idea of a truce, 186; holds lands west of the Mountains to be at Congress' disposal, 219 and fn.; personal interests of, in an English grant west of the Mountains, 226, 302 fn.; treats the Mississippi as the western boundary of the United States (Dec., 1775), 241 fn.; appointed peace ne- gotiator, 301; views of, on method of negotiating peace, 329 fn.; articles proposed by, to Oswald as "necessary," 330; confidence of, in good faith of Vergennes, 333; joins with Jay and Adams in ne- gotiating without regarding the Instructions of June 15, 1781, 340; returns a soothing answer to Vergennes' re- proaches, 341 fn.; signs a 1 declaration (Jan. 20, 1783) explanatory of the Provision- al Articles, 357-8. Frederick II: Makes treaty of Westminster with England (1756), 31; participates in partition of Poland, 45. Gardoqui, Don Diego: Inter- est of, in American trade, 320; negotiations of, with Jay concerning the naviga- tion of the Mississippi, ib. and fn. Gamier: Char g 6 d'affaires at London, 64; reports of, on the English situation, 64-6; communicates news of the Declaration of Independence, 84; sends news of the Ameri- can defeat at Long Island, 85. George III: Control of Parlia- ment, 4; calls the Americans "rebels" (Aug., 1775); dis- like of, for Chatham, 64-5, 124 fn.; obstinacy in matter of American independence, 121-2; slow to recognize that France intends war, 163 fn. Gerard (Conrad Gerard de Rayneval) : Secretary to Ver- gennes, 69; Reflexions of (Nov., 1775), 69-72; denies that the Americans will be- come a conquering nation, 110; interview of, with the three American Commissioners (Dec. 17, 1777), 150-1; com- municates to the commission- ers the king's decision to make an alliance with the United States (Jan. 8, 1778), 152-3; sent as first French envoy to America, 169; in- structed to prepare Congress for a truce and indirect rec- ognition, 187; fails to obtain a favorable declaration from Congress on this subject, 195; fails to obtain concessions from Congress for Spain re- specting the Floridas, 197-8; participation of, in Deane- Lee controversy, 208; obtains declaration from Congress against a separate peace; (Jan., 1779), 209; negotia- tions of, with Congress re- specting the Western Land and Fisheries questions, ch. INDEX XI; characterization of, 247 fn.; leaves America in broken health, 261-2; influence of, seen in La Luzerne's instruc- tions, 265-7. Gibbon the Historian: Author of the M&moire justicatif, etc., 144. Gibraltar: Vergennes' willing- ness to exchange French possessions to secure, for Spain (1782), 6; recovery of, desired by Spain, 178, 190, 347; pledge of Convention of Aranjuez, with reference to, 193-4; struggle for (1781-2), 287, 293, 313, 352; question of, delays peace, 347 fn., 348, 353, 356-7 and fn. Grand: A secret agent of the French Foreign Office, 129. Grasse, Count de: Commander of French fleet in American waters, 293; correspondence of, with Rochambeau, 310-2; credit due, for Yorktown, 313 Grenville, Thomas: British peace envoy, 331-2 fn.; mys- tifying assertions of, 333 and fn. Grimaldi, Marquis de: Prime minister of Spain, 86, 98; is succeeded by Florida Blanca, 105; cautions Aranda against the dangers of the American example, 108; meets Lee at the Spanish frontier and turns him back, ib. Guines, Count de: Ambassa- dor to England, sends Bon- vouloir to America, 73-4; favors an understanding with England and is superseded by Noailles, 78. Hartford Conference: Pro- ceedings of, 291-2. Hartley: An English friend of Franklin, 186, 330 fn. Holker: First emissary sent to America after Saratoga and first French consul at Phila- delphia, 120 and fn. Holland: Relations of, to France under Treaty of Ver- vins, 184, 186-7; the Republi- can party of, and France, 83; breaks with England (1781), 285; enters into close alliance with France (1785), 374; French influence in, overthrown by England, 375. Howes, The: British comman- ders in America, and rumor- ed to be in negotiation with the Americans, 129-30 and fn.; victory of Lord Howe before Gibraltar, 352. Hutton: An English friend of Franklin, 126. Independence: Scope of the French guaranty of, 176, 183 fn., 193. See also "Treaty of Alliance," "Truce," "Status Quo." Instructions of June 15, 1781: Terms of, 300-1; Congres- sional debates on, 301 ff. pas- sim; explanation of Congress' action in voting, ib.; instruc- tions supplementing, 315-7 ; criticized by Jay, 328; broken by Jay and his associates, 338 ff. Jamaica: Vacillating attitude of Spain toward proposition to conquer, 178, 190, 287. Jay, John: President of Con- gress, 249-50; confers with Gerard on the Western Land and Fisheries questions, 250- 2, 259; appointed envoy to Madrid, 261; instructions of Congress to, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, 261, 270 fn., 280 and fn., 323; appointed peace negotiator, 301; mission of, to Spain, ch. INDEX XIV; submits scheme of treaty with Spain, 325; re- quested by Franklin to come to Paris, 326; fruitless at- tempts at negotiation with Aranda, ib.; effect upon, of his Spanish experiences, 327- 8; part of, in the negotiations of 1782, ch. XV; is opposed to Oswald's first commission, 331-3; suspicions of, and their validity, 333-9, 346-9 and notes; sends Vaughan to England, 339; insists on America's fidelity to France, 342 fn.; willing to see Great Britain reconquer West Flor- ida, ib.; beneficial results of conduct of, 350-5. Jefferson, Thomas: Governor of Virginia, appointed peace negotiator, 301-2 and fn. Jenifer: Member of Congress from Maryland, a leader of the "landless" state party, 280 fn., 304. Kalb, John (later Baron de) : Sent to America by Choiseul (1767), 42-3; report of, un- favorable to French interven- tion, ib.; acts as agent of Broglie, 90. La Fayette, Marquis de: Comes to America (1777), 90; plans joint French- American cam- paign in Canada, 203; visits France and secures the des- patch to America of forces under Rochambeau and Ter- nay, 287-8. La Luzerne, Chevalier de: Sec- ond plenipotentiary to the United States, characteriza- tion of, 263-4 and fn.; Ver- gennes' first instructions to, 256-6; negotiations of, with Congress respecting Spain's interests, 267 ff.; Vergennes' later instructions to, touch- ing this matter, 278-9, 281; negotiations of, with Con- gress leading to the Instruc- tions of June 15, 1781, 297 if. ; assents to an American invasion of Canada (1781) 305; details American expec- tations from the treaty of peace, 308-9 and fn. Laurens, Henry: Appointed peace negotiator, 301 ; is cap- tured by the British and lodged in the Tower of Lon- don, 302 fn. Laurens, Col. John: Is sent to France by Congress to obtain a loan (Feb., 1781), 292 and fn. Lee, Arthur: In London (1775), 66; goes to Spain and is turned back (Mar., 1T77), 98; accused of communicating the French-American Treaty to the British government, 166-7 fn.; controversy with Deane, 207-8; is prevented by La Luzerne from becom- ing secretary of Foreign Af- fairs, 265; criticism of, on the Instructions of June 15, 1781, 305 fn. Lee, Richard Henry: Attitude of, on question of a separate peace, 208 and fn. Livingston, Robert R.: Elec- tion of, to secretaryship of Foreign Affairs is promoted by La Luzerne, 265; letter of, to Franklin (Jan., 1782) in support of American claims in the West, 316 fn. See "Marbois." Long Island, Battle of: Bad effect of, on American pros- pects in France, 85-8. Louis XV: His Secret du Rot, 45; unpopular at death on account of France's humilia- tions abroad, 51 fn. INDEX 423 Louis XVI: Pledges re- forms, 7, 60 and fn.; dislikes idea of aiding rebels, 8 fn. and appendix IV; chooses cabinet, 54; ratifies the policy of secret aid, 79; extends fi- nancial aid to the Colonies, 95-6, 120; agrees to war with England and an alliance with the United States if Spain is favorable, 103-4; decides to make new gift to America, 120; convinced of "the moral certainty of peril," 129 and fn., 142-3; point of view of, to be distinguished from that of the Foreign Office, 148; authorizes the declaration of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Mar. 7, 1778), 166-7; sends letters to Con- gress, 168-9; on the point of stopping the war for finan- cial reasons (1780), 284-5; goes to the guillotine, 358. Louisiana: Not a French ob- jective in the Revolution, 9- 11; transferred by France to Spain (1762), 36. See "Mis- sissippi and Western Land Question." Madison, James: Argument of (Oct., 1780), against Spain's claim of a right to conquer British possessions along the Mississippi, 270-1 fn.; criti- cizes the conduct of the American peace negotiators, 344-5. "Manifest Destiny": Origins of the idea, 217-19 fn. Marbois: Secretary to La Luzerne, urges Spam's claims upon Congress, 280-1; letter of, opposing the American claims to the fisheries, 337-8 and fn. Maria Theresa: Assists in the partition of Poland (1772), 45; desires peace (1778), 170. Maryland: Opposes the claims of the "landed" states, 220 fn., 232. Maurepas, Count de: Urges restoration of French Ma- rine (1730-40), 28-9; urges a belligerent policy toward England, 78-9 and fn. Mercantile System: Leading ideas of, 15-7 and fn., 28-9, 33-4; connection with French intervention, 18-9, 41-2, 44. Miralles, Juan de: Spanish, agent, arrives in America, 243-4; views of, on the con- flicting interests of Spain and the United States, 244-5 and fn. ; determines views of Ger- ard, 245 ff. ; proposes pur- chase of American claims in the West, 251-2; spreads false reports respecting Spain's attitude, 255; admits lack of powers or instruc- tions from Madrid, 269; dies, 280. Mississippi and Western Land Question, The: See chs. X- XII; also chs. XIV-XV pas- sim. Monroe Doctrine, The: Some antecedents of, 201 fn., 369 fn. Montmorin, Count de: Friend of Louis and Vergennes, be- comes ambassador at Madrid, 156; urged by Vergennes to arouse the Spanish govern- ment to an appreciation of the opportunity presented by the Revolution, 156-7; en- counters Florida Blanca's wrath at the action of France in negotiating with the Americans, 158-60; says that Spain wants "shining ob- jects," 161; is sceptical of value of Spanish aid, 180; signs the Convention of Aran- 424. INDEX juez (Apr. 12, 1779), 192; warns Vergennes of Spain's hostility toward America, 216. Morris, Gouverneur: Views of, on the Western Land ques- tion, 248-9. Nentrals, Rights of: French gov- ernment champions, against English sea-power, 21, 80-1 and fn., 170-2. See "Cather- ine II." Newfoundland Fisheries, The: An enlargement of rights in connection with, offered France by England (1778), 7 fn.; a share in, desired by Spain, 161, 178; French ledge with reference to, to pain, 191, 197-9 and fn.; Congressional views respect- ing American rights in, 257 ff.; final instructions of Con- gress concerning, 314-6. See appendix V. Noailles, Duke de: Opposes France's entrance into the War of the Austrian Succes- sion, 29; succeeds the Count de Guines as ambassador to England (1776), 78; reliabil- ity of reports of, from Lon- don, 131; points of disagree- ment of, with Vergennes, 131- 2; communicates the Treaty of Amity and Commerce to the British government, 168; leaves England, ib. and fn. North, Lord: Sentiments at- tributed to, by Vergennes, 131, 133; introduces plan of conciliation into Parliament, 165 and fn.; fall of, from power, 331 fn. Ossun, Marquis d': Ambassa- dor at Madrid, 103; sup- planted by the Count de Montmorin, 156. Oswald, Richard: British peace negotiator, 330 ff. passim. Parliament: Debates in, after Saratoga, 133 fn. Peace Negotiations of 1782: Early stages of, 329-32 fns. See "Jay." Phillips, Dr. P. C.: Views of, respecting the results of Jay's conduct of the peace negotiations considered, 350 ff. Poland, First Partition of: in relation to French diplomacy, 45; denounced by Vergennes, 57. Pontleroy: Early French agent to America, 40-1. Price, Dr. Richard: Predicts American greatness, 218 fn. Proclamation of 1763, The: considered in connection with the Western Land question, 224-7 and notes. Provisional Articles, The: Pro- visions of, see appendix V; the signing of, 339^-0; ques- tions respecting the interpre- tation of, 340 fn.; real im- port of, 342; reception of, by Congress, 344-5, 354-5; esti- mate of, by the French For- eign Office, 355 and fn. Quebec Act, The: Bearing of, on the Western Land ques- tion, 226-7 and fn. Raynal, Abb6: His Histoire des Indes on the importance of naval power, 48-9; influ- ence of his work, ib. Rayneval, J. M. Gerard de: Secretary to Vergennes, on the status quo, 296-7 fn. ; rep- resentations of, to Jay on the Mississippi question, 336 ; mystery surrounding journey of, to England, ib.; Jay's sus- picions regarding, 339; finds Shelburne stiff on the ques- tion of Gibraltar, 347 fn.; conversations of, with Shel- INDEX 425 burne respecting American interests, 348 ff. and fn.; marvels at the success of the Americans, 355. Rendon: Successor to Miralles, 280. Richmond, Lord: Advocates American independence, 133. Rochambeau, Count de: Brings a military force to the United States (1780), 276-7, 288-9; deep concern of, on account of American conditions, 292, 310-1; credit due, for York- town, 31 1, 313. Rochford, Lord: Scheme for joint guaranty of French, Spanish and English posses- sions in America, 6-7; friend of Beaumarchais, 65. Rockingham, Lord: Rumored hostile intentions of, toward France, 65; advocates un- qualified independence for the Americans, 133 fn., 168 fn.; succeeds North, 331 fn.; dies, 332 fn. Rodney: British admiral, de- feats Grasse in the West In- dies (Apr., 1782), 316-7. Rouille: Minister of the Marine, (1749), 31. Saint-Contest: Secretary of state (1751), 30. St. Germain: Secretary of state for War, and favorable to an aggressive diplomatic policy, 78; sends Steuben to America, 90; is supplanted- by S6gur, 285. Sandwich, Lord: Member of the British ministry, not author of sentiment attributed to him, 132; estimates Brit- ish naval strength, 134. Santo Domingo: Question of defense of, 6 fn., 89-90 fn. Saratoga, Battle of: Brings about the French-American alliance, 120, 121 and fn., 141. Sartines: Secretary of state for the Marine, favorable to an aggressive diplomatic policy, 78; is displaced by Castries, 285. S6gur, The Elder: Becomes secretary of state for War (1781), 285. "Sea-to-Sea" Charters, The: As basis of the claims of the United States in the West, 220 ff. Secret Aid, Policy of: See "Vergennes" and "Beaumar- chais"; kept a secret even from the Americans at first, 80; raises diplomatic ques- tions, 80-1; the secret of, known to the British govern- ment, 93 and fn. "Secret Article": Of the Treaty of Alliance, see ap- pendix I; of the Provisional Articles, see appendix V. "Secret du Roi," The: See "Louis XV". Separate Peace: Origin of the idea of, between England and America, 206; notion corn- batted by Vergennes, ib.; dis- avowed by Congress, 209 and fn. Seven Years War: Begun by England without warning, 3; auspicious opening of, for France, 31; calamities of later stages of, 32 8. Shelburne, Lord: Part of, in instituting the peace negoti- ations of 1782, 331-2 fn.; good faith of, doubted by Jay, 333- 5 and notes; authorizes Os- wald's second commission, 339; conferences of, with Rayneval, 339, 347 fn., 348- 50 fn.; refuses to take Parli- ament into his confidence re- specting the Provisional Arti- 426 INDEX cles, 340 fn.; effect on, of Howe's victory before Gib- raltar, 352-3 ; urges a French- English rapprochement against the northern powers, 372-3 fn. Spain: Dispute of, with Portugal over interests in South America (1774-7), 61, 81-3, 104; is alarmed at the prospect of American inde- pendence, chs. V and VIII passim; temporizing attitude of, 178-9 and fn.; question of the value of aid of, to France, 180, 211-2 and fn.; seeks rdle of mediator 180 ff.; self- seeking policy of, 106, 161, 178, 180, 192; desires a mo- nopoly of trade in the Carib- bean, 178, 190, 322; desires to recover the Floridas and a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, see under those headings; final terms of mediation of, 214-5; enters the war (June, 1779), 216; grant by, of navigation of the Mississippi to British sub- jects (1763), 227-8 fn.; op- poses American extension to the Mississippi, 227-30; at- tempts of, to make conquests along the Mississippi arouse American opposition, 268-9 and fn. ; secret negotiations of, with England (1780), 271- 2; re-enters the war (1781), 287; interests of, preferred by France to those of the United States, 293-4; ambi- tions of, a bar to peace, 333- 4, 346-7, 353, 355-7; American gratitude claimed for, 345. See "Florida Blanca," "Ray- neval," "Vergennes." Spies: Numerous in Paris in 1777, 98. Status Quo, The: Opposition of Vergennes to, for the United States, 215, 271-2; ac- ceptance of, by France for the United States admitted by Vergennes to be possible (1781), 296-8 and notes; re- jected by Vergennes for the United States, 314 fn. Steuben, Baron von: Sent to America by St. Germain, to train the American army (1777), 90. Stormont, Lord: British am- bassador at Paris (1774 ff.), 67; discusses, the American situation with Vergennes (Sept., 1775), '&.; remon- strates against secret aid, 93 and fn. ; remonstrates against the admission of American privateers to French harbors, 100; charges Vergennes with negotiating with the Ameri- cans, 163-5; avoids a cate- gorical answer from the French government, i&.; leaves France, 168 and fn. Sullivan, General: "Hero of Newport," sells out to the French envoy, 303. Sweden: Coup d'etat in, effect- ed by Vergennes (1771), 55. Ternay: French naval com- mander, see "Rochambeau." Ticonderoga: British capture of, injures American pros- pects in France, 117. Treaty of Alliance (Feb. 6, 1778) : Principal features of, authorized by the royal coun- cil (Jan. 7, 1778) ; final draft of, signed, 154; text of, ap- pendix I; existence of, sus- pected in England from an early date, 163 fn., 165-6 and fn.; meaning of the word "continent" in article VI of, 199 and fn.; interpretation of articles XI and XII of, INDEX 233 ff.; after the Revolution, 358-60 and fn. Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Feb. 6, 1778): Difficulty respecting articles XI and XII of, 155 fn.; articles XXIII-XXVIII summarized, 171; declaration of, urged by Vergennes (Jan. 22, 1778), and authorized by Louis (Mar. 7), 166-8. Treaty of Aranjuez (Apr. 12, 1779): Signed, 192; provi- sions of, 193-4; compared with the French- American treaty, ch. IX. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji: Turkey menaced by, 60-1. Treaty of Paris (1763): Pro- visions of, 36-7. Treaty of Teschen: A triumph for Vergennes' policy, 170. Truce: Suggestion of, in lieu of a final peace, 183-4, 186-7, 195-6. Turgot: As Louis XVI's con- troller-General contends for economy and domestic reform as against an aggressive dip- lomatic policy, 1, 72; an- swers Vergennes' Mtmoire de Considerations, 76-7; fights a losing fight and retires, 77-9. Turner, Professor F. J. : Theory that France sought American territory in the Revolution, 9-11 and fn. United States: Commerce with, as an inducement to French intervention, 12-4 and fn. ; naval capacity of, predicted by Vergennes, 67-8; not likely to become a conquering state, 111; permanent separa- tion of, from England Ver- gennes' principal objective, 137 ff. and notes; a disap- pointing ally, 177 footnote, 188; basis of claims of, to the West, ch. X; argued to be a sovereign entity, 230-2 and notes; struggle of, for inde- pendence near collapse (1780- 81), 288-9; French views of, 290 fn.; significance for, of the Provisional Articles, see under that title. See also "Commissioners," "Congress," "Manifest Destiny," "Monroe Doctrine." Van Tyne, Prof. C. H.: Views of, respecting French motives considered, 146-8 note. Vaughan, Benjamin: Friend of Franklin and Shelburne, sent by Jay to London, 339, 352. Vergennes: Argument to show that French intervention in the Revolution was a defen- sive measure, 3-9, and ch. VI ; little interested in French colonies, 6 fn. 4; alleged Mtmoire of, published in 1802, 10-3 and fn.; on com- merce with the United States, 13-4; becomes secretary of state for Foreign Affairs (1774), 54; early career of, 54-5; characteristics and dip- lomatic creed of, 56-60; ini- tial attitude toward England and the American Revolution, 60-2; denunciation of Eng- land, 62-3; alarmed at pros- pect of return of Chatham to power, 64-5; takes a more positive interest in the Amer- ican situation, 66 ff.; M6- moire de Considerations of (Mar., 1776), 74-6; claims right for France to trade with the American rebels and receive their merchantmen in her harbors, 80-1; opposes Spanish conquest of Portugal, 82, 85, 104; urges war with England (July-August, 1776), 83-5; receives Deane and 428 INDEX learns of Declaration of In- dependence, 84 and fn.; draws back after the news of Long Island, 85-6; con- gratulates Stormont on Brit- ish successes, 86; pursues a policy of "watchful waiting" (Jan.-July, 1 777), 87 ff.; urges the preeminent interest of France and Spain in procur- ing the separation of Eng- land and North America, 86- 9; delivers a homily on peace, 88, opposes a general dis- armament and an under- standing with England, 89 and fn.; question of attitude of, toward Broglie's Stat- holderate idea, 91-2; receives Franklin but evades a formal audience, 95; promises finan- cial aid to the Colonies (Jan. 1777), 95-6; precautions in behalf of secrecy, ib. fn.; is sceptical of the substance of the American revolt (Mar., 1777), 97; is sceptical of rumors of an hostile English- American coalition (early 1777), 99; policy of toward American privateers, 99 ff.; again urges war with Eng- land (July, 1777), 101-4; en- deavors to allay Spanish ap- prehensions regarding Amer- ican independence, 111, 177 fn.; consents to follow Mad- rid's lead (Aug., 1777), 113- 4; urges that Forth's de- mand that American priva- teers be excluded from French ports be rejected, 115-6; anticipates the early outbreak of war with Eng- land (Sept., 1777), 116; again retreats after the ar- rival of the news of Ticon- deroga, 117; proposes a pledge of financial aid to the Americans, 119-20; renews in a new form after Sara- toga the idea that French possessions in the West In- dies are in danger of being attacked by an English- American coalition, 121-5 ; evidence brought forward by, to support this notion, 126- 34; instances of disingenuous- ness of, in this connection, 132-4; contradictions and in- consistencies of, 135-8; de- clares enfeeblement of Eng- land to be France's principal objective, 139-40 and fns.; urges defensive aspect of his program, 140, 167, fns.; real concern of, after Saratoga, 141; reason for alarmism of, 142 ff.; initial advances to the American commissioners af- ter Saratoga, 149-50; offers a defensive alliance, 151-3; re- sists American demand for an offensive alliance, 154; urges his policy on the Spanish government, 155-7 ; finesse of, in delaying trans- mission to Spain of news of the French- American negotia- tions, 159; significant inter- view with Stormont (Jan. 22, 1778), 161; presses for an open breach with England, 161 ff.; distrust of Arthur Lee, 166-7 fn., 187; policy of, in War of Bavarian Succes- sion, 169-70; adopts liberal policy toward neutral rights, 170-2; impatience of, to bring Spain into the war, 173, 178, 180, 188; willing to support Spanish mediation, 182; care- ful of American rights, 183 fn.; attitude of, toward idea of a truce instead of a peace for America, 186-7; gives Montmorin carte-blanche in INDEX 429 negotiating with Spain, 189; sends Montmorin a draft of treaty with Spain, 190; aims to safeguard France's honor with respect to American in- terests, 192-3; instructions of, to Gerard with reference to a truce, 196; same, with ref- erence to the Floridas and Canada, 197 ff., 254; plans a free state in Canada under French protection, 201-2 ; combats the idea that Ameri- ca may make a separate peace with England, 206; bit- terly criticizes Florida Blanca's terms of mediation (Apr., 1779), 215; recognizes the extension of the United States to the Mississippi, 240- 2 and notes ; favors American navigation of the Mississippi, 254-5; adopts the Spanish point of view in his Instruc- tions d'Arrivte to La Lu- zerne, 265-6; fears that Spain seeks to impose the status quo on the United States (1780), 271-2 and fn.; alter- cations of, with John Adams, 273-8; instructs La Luzerne not to take sides in matters at issue between Spain and America, 278-81; review of attitude of, on the Mississip- pi question, 281-3; intercedes with the king to continue the war (Sept., 1780), 284-5; re- organizes the Departments of War and Marine, ib.; favors the offer of mediation by the imperial powers and a vigo- rous campaign, 286-7; disap- pointed in the Americans as allies, 289; response of, to the demands of the Hartford Conference, 292-3; consider- ations governing, at this time, 293-4; demands of, upon Congress in respect to peace- making, 295-6; admission of, that France may accept the status quo for the United States, 295-8 and notes; broad scope of the program of, in intervening in the Rev- olution, 307; not directly re- sponsible for the Yorktown campaign, 313; recognizes the unfeasibility of the status quo for America, 313-4 fn.; views of, as to the method to be pursued in peace-making, 329 fn.; refuses to treat with Grenville respecting Ameri- can interests, 332 fn.; urges the American commissioners, to accept Oswald's first com- mission, 332-3 ; announces that France will not proceed with England unless she is ready to recognize American inde- pendence, 334 fn.; is non- committal as to the conflict- ing claims of Spain and the United States, 336; comment of, on Marbois' letter re- specting the fisheries, 337 f n. ; announces that France will not continue the war to se- cure American demands re- specting the fisheries and Western territory, 337-9 fn., 347-8 fn.; letter of (Dec. 15, 1782), to Franklin protesting against the course taken by the American commissioners, 340-2; states the two essen- tial conditions of peace, 347 fn.; expresses surprise at the favorable terms secured by the Americans, 355 and fn. presses the negotiations in Spain's behalf, 355-6; delight of, at the conclusion of peace, 356-7; opposed by a war party at court, 357 fn.; re- views the success of his policy 430 INDEX (Mar., 1784), 361-2. desires the gratitude of the Ameri- can people for France, 368-9 and fn. ; negotiates a com- mercial treaty with England (1786), 371; urges a strong fleet for France, ib.; is dis- mayed by the rapprochement of Austria and Russia, 372; admits that Continental peace is precarious, 373; wins his last diplomatic triumph, 374; death of, 376; final apology of, for his American venture, 376-7. Virginia: Claims of, in the West, 221, 222-4 fn. Washington, General: Opposes French participation in a campaign in Canada, 204; views of, on the Western Land question, 251 fn.; growth of French regard for, 291 and fn.; attends Hart- ford Conference (Sept., 1780), 16. Wentworth, Paul: Activities as British spy, 118 fn. 127 and fn., 130 fn., 163. fn. West Indies, The French: and the Treaty of Paris, 19-20, 37; value of, after 1763, 5-6 and fn., 44, 63, 75-6, 136-7; independence of, proposed by Choiseul's secretary-general of Commerce, 44; asserted to be in danger from a joint English-American attack, 3, 75, 98-9, 121 ff.; English of- fers to guarantee, 6-7 and fn., 115-16; American offers to guarantee, 21, 95, 97; chosen for the scene of French-Spanish naval efforts (1781), 287, 293; Grasse's de- feat in, by Rodney, 313, 316; equivalents demanded in, by England in return for Gib- raltar, 355-6 fn., 357 fn.; great French-Spanish expedi- tion prepared for (1783), ib.; French gains in, by the Peace of 1783 insignificant, 361. Witherspoon: Member of Con- gress from New Jersey, a leader of the "landless" state party, 304. Wolfe, General James: Pro- phecy by, of America's des- tiny, 218 fn. THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ his book is due on the last DATE stamped below. 1968 :ii lT77_r: "B 1RECT) GVI577 - , o vi 1971 r(H2523s8)2373 3 2106 00059 36