BD 
 
 5 7 
 
 UC-NHLF 
 
 ,_|!^05 «^t^ of CbtcaGo 
 
 ;;:'j 
 
 VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS 
 
 ■u;3! 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 NJ" 
 
 :.:;*: 
 
 ^ii^' 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY 'WALDGRAVE STUART 
 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 Reprinted from 
 Studies in Logicax Theory, by John Dewey 
 
Ube Tflnipersitp ot Cbicaao 
 
 VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART 
 
 . J ' J ' ' > , ' ' ' > >„ 1 *, ) > 3 . J 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 Reprinted from 
 Studies in Logical Theory, by John Dewey 
 

 Copyright 1918 By 
 The University of Chicago 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Published May 191 8 
 
 Composed and Printed By 
 
 The University of Chicago Press 
 
 Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. 
 
X 
 
 VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS 
 
 The purpose of this discussion is to supply the main out- 
 lines of a theory of value based upon analysis of the valua- 
 tion-process from the logical point of view. The general 
 principle which we shall seek to establish is that judgments 
 of value, whether passed upon things or upon modes of 
 conduct, are essentially objective in import, and that they 
 are reached through a process of valuation which is essen- 
 tially of the same logical character as the judgment-process 
 whereby conclusions of physical fact are established — 
 in a word, that the valuation-process, issuing in the finished 
 judgment of value expressive of the judging person's defini- 
 tive attitude toward the thing in question, is constructive of 
 an order of reality in the same sense as, in current theories 
 of knowledge, is the judgment of sense-perception and sci- 
 ence. Our method of procedure to this end will be that of 
 assuming, and adhering to as consistently as possible, the 
 standpoint of the individual in the process of deliberating 
 upon an ethical or economic problem (for, as we shall hold, 
 all values properly so called are either ethical or economic), 
 and of ascertaining, as accurately as may be, the meaning of 
 the deliberative or evaluating process and of the various fac- 
 tors in it as these are presented in the individual's apprehen- 
 sion. It is in this sense that our procedure will be logical 
 rather than psychological. We shall be concerned to deter- 
 mine the meaning of the object of valuation as object, of the 
 standard of value as standard, and of the valued object as 
 valued, in terms of the individual's own apprehension of 
 these, rather than to ascertain the nature and conditions of 
 his apprehensions of these considered as psychical events. 
 
 227 
 
 40594y 
 
228 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 Our attention will throughout be directed to these factors 
 or phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect 
 of determinants of the valuing agent's practical attitude, and 
 never, excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and 
 in a very general and tentative way, as events in conscious- 
 ness mediated by more "elementary" psychical processes. 
 The results which we shall gain by adhering to this method 
 will enable us to see not merely that our judgments of value 
 are in function and meaning objective, but also that our 
 judgments of sense-perception and science are, as such, 
 capable of satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental 
 to the attainment and progressive reconstruction of judg- 
 ments of value. 
 
 The first three main divisions will be given over to estab- 
 lishing the objectivity of content and function of judgments 
 of value. The fourth division will present a detailed analy- 
 sis of the two types of judgment of value, the ethical and 
 economic, defining them and relating them to each other, 
 and correlating them in the manner just suggested with 
 judgment of the physical type. After considering, in the 
 fifth part, certain general objections to the positions thus 
 stated, we shall proceed in the sixth and concluding division 
 to define the function of the consciousness of value in the 
 economy of life.' 
 
 I 
 
 The system of judgments which defines what one calls 
 the objective order of things is inevitably unique for each 
 particular individual. No two men can view the world from 
 the standpoint of the same theoretical and practical inter- 
 
 1 Considerations of space as well as circumstances attending the immediate 
 preparation of this discussion for the press have precluded any but the most general 
 and casual reference to the recent literature of the subject. Much of this literature 
 only imperfectly distinguishes the logical and psychological points of view, so that 
 critical reference to it, unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the 
 positions criticised, would be useless. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Pkocess 229 
 
 ests, nor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for 
 themselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal 
 degrees of skill and accuracy. Each must be prompted and 
 guided, in the construction of his knowledge of single things 
 and of the system in which they have their being, by his 
 own particular interests and aims ; and even when one per- 
 son in a measure shares in the interests and aims of another, 
 the rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for 
 both, nor will the knowledge gained be for both equally 
 systematic in arrangement or in interrelation of its parts. 
 Each man lives in a world of his own — a world, indeed, 
 identical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds 
 which his fellow-men have constructed for themselves, but 
 one nevertheless necessarily unique through and through 
 because each man is a unique individual. There is, doubt- 
 less, a "social currency" of objects which implies a certain 
 identity of meaning in objects as experienced by different 
 individuals. The existence of society presupposes, and its 
 evolution in turn develops and extends, a system of generally 
 accepted objects and relations. Nevertheless, the " socially 
 current object " is, as such, an abstraction just as the uniform 
 social individual is likewise an abstraction. The only con- 
 crete object ever actually known or in any wise experienced 
 by any person is the object as constructed by that person in 
 accordance with his own aims and purposes, and in which 
 there is, therefore, a large and important share of meaning 
 which is significant to no one else. 
 
 It is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon 
 the general principle of recent "functional" psychology, that 
 practical ends are the controlling factors in the acquisition 
 of our knowledge of objective things. We shall take for 
 granted the truth of the general proposition that cognition, 
 in whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is essen- 
 tially teleological in the sense of being incidental always, 
 
230 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 more or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition, 
 as the apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the 
 process of scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or 
 practical) with a view to determining the availability for one's 
 intended purpose of such objects and conditions as the 
 situation may present. The objects and conditions thus 
 determined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon as 
 advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable — in a word, 
 responded to — in ways suggested by their character as 
 ascertained through reference to the interest in question. 
 In this sense, then, objective things as known by individual 
 persons are essentially complex stimuli whose proper func- 
 tion and reason for being it is to elicit useful responses in 
 the way of conduct — responses conducive to the realization 
 of ends. 
 
 From this point of view, then, the difference between one 
 person's knowledge of a particular object and another's 
 signifies (1) a difference between these persons' original 
 purposes in setting out to gain knowledge of the object, and 
 (2) consequently a difference between their present ways 
 of acting with reference to the object. The bare object as 
 socially current is, at best, for each individual simply a ground 
 upon which subsequent construction may be made; and the 
 subsequent construction which each individual is prompted 
 by his circumstances and is able to work out in judgment 
 first makes the object, for this individual, real and for his 
 purposes complete. 
 
 Now, it is our primary intention to show that objects are, 
 in cases of a certain important class, not yet ready to serve 
 the person who knows them in their proper character of 
 •^ stimuli, when they have been, even exhaustively, defined in 
 merely physical terms. It is very often not enough that the 
 dimensions of an object and its physical properties, even the 
 more recondite ones as well as those more commonly under- 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 231 
 
 stood — it is often not enough for the purposes of an agent 
 that these characters should make up the whole sum of his 
 knowledge of the object in question. A measure of knowl- 
 edge in terms of physical categories is often only a begin- 
 ning — the result of a preliminary stage of the entire process 
 of teleological determination, which must be carried through 
 before the object of attention can be satisfactorily known. 
 In the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be 
 occupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind. 
 In our judgments of sense-perception and physical science 
 we have presented to us material objects in their physical 
 aspect. When these latter are inadequate to suggest or war- 
 rant overt conduct, our knowledge of them must be supple- 
 mented and reconstructed in ways presently to be specified. 
 It is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this 
 work of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through 
 that the consciousness of value, in the proper sense, arises, 
 and these processes, then, are those which we shall here con- 
 sider under the name of "processes of valuation." They will 
 therefore best be approached through specification of the 
 ways in which our physical judgments may be inadequate. 
 
 Let us, then, assume, as has been indicated, that the pro- 
 cess of acquiring knowledge — that is to say, the process of 
 judgment or attention — is in every case of its occurrence 
 incidental to the attainment of an end. We must make this 
 assumption without attempting formally to justify it — though 
 in the course of our discussion it will be abundantly illus- 
 trated. Let us, in accordance with this view, think of the 
 typical judgment-process as proceeding, in the main, as fol- 
 lows: First of all must come a sense of need or deficiency, 
 which may, on occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent 
 and sudden shock to the senses, forcibly turning one's atten- 
 tion to the need of immediate action. By degrees this sense 
 of need will grow more definite and come to express itself in^ 
 
232 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 a more or less "clear and distinct" image of an end, toward 
 which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he 
 looks with much or little of emotion. The emergence of 
 the end into consciousness immediately makes possible and 
 occasions definite analysis of the situation in which the end 
 must be worked out. Salient features of the situation forth- 
 with are noticed — whether useful things or favoring condi- 
 tions, or, on the other hand, the absence of any such. Thus 
 predicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments 
 in the comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in 
 action and interaction upon each other. The predicates, 
 developed out of the general end toward which the agent 
 strives, aflPord successive points of view for fresh analyses of 
 the situation. The logical subjects thus discovered — objects 
 of attention and knowledge — require, on the other hand, as 
 they are scrutinized and judged, modification and re-exami- 
 nation of the end. The end grows clearer and fuller of 
 detail as the predicates or implied (" constituent ") ideas 
 which are developed out of it are distinguished from each 
 other and used in making one's inventory of the objective 
 situation. Conversely, the situation loses its first aspect of 
 confusion and takes on more and more the aspect of an 
 orderly assemblage of objects and conditions, useful, indif- 
 ferent, and adverse, by means of which the end may in 
 greater or less measure be attained or must, in however 
 greatly modified a form, be defeated. Now, in this develop- 
 ment of the judgment-process, it must be observed, the end 
 must be more or less clearly and consistently conceived 
 throughout as an activity, if the objective means of action 
 which have been determined in the process are not to be, at the 
 last, separate and unrelated data still requiring co-ordination. 
 If the end has been so conceived, the means will inevitably be 
 known as members of a mechanical system, since the predi- 
 cates by which they have been determined have at every 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 233 
 
 point involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination. 
 The judgment-process, if properly conducted and brought to 
 a conclusion, must issue at the end in the functional unity of 
 a finished plan of conduct with a perfected mechanical 
 co-ordination of the available means. 
 
 We have now to see that much more may be involved in • 
 such a process as this than has been explicitly stated in our 
 brief analysis. For the end itself may be a matter of delib- 
 eration, just as must be the physical means of accomplishing 
 it; and, again, the means may call for scrutiny and deter- v-' 
 mination from other points of view than the physical and 
 mechanical. The final action taken at the end may express 
 the outcome of deliberate ethical and economic judgment 
 as well as of judgments in the sphere of sense-perception 
 and physical science. Let us consider, for example, that 
 one's end is the construction of a house upon a certain plot 
 of ground. This end expresses the felt need of a more com- 
 fortable or more reputable abode, and has so much of gen- 
 eral presumption in its favor. There may, however, be 
 many reasons for hesitation. The cost in time or money or 
 materials on hand may tax one's resources and injuriously 
 curtail one's activities along other lines. And there may be 
 ethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out. The 
 house may shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the 
 entire neighborhood and serve no better end than the grati- 
 fication of its owner's selfish vanity. It will cost a sum of 
 money which might be used in paying just, though outlawed 
 debts. 
 
 Now, from the standpoint of such problems as these the </ 
 fullest possible preliminary knowledge of the physical and 
 mechanical fitness of our means must still be very abstract 
 and general. It would be of use in any undertaking like the 
 one we have supposed, but it is not sufficient in so far as the 
 problem is one's own problem, concrete, particular, and so 
 
234 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 unique. One may, of course, proceed to the stage of physi- 
 cal judgment without having settled the ethical problems 
 which may have presented themselves at the outset. The 
 end may be entertained tentatively as a hypothesis until 
 certain mechanical problems have been dealt with. But 
 manifestly this is only postponement of the issue. The agent 
 is still quite unprepared, even after the means have been so 
 far determined, to take the first step in the execution of the 
 plan ; indeed, his uncertainty is probably only the more har- 
 assing than before. Moreover, the economic problems in 
 the case are now more sharply defined, and these for the time 
 being still further darken counsel. Manifestly the need for 
 deliberation is at this point quite as urgent as the need for 
 physical determination can ever be, and the need is evidenced 
 in the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of 
 overt conduct. The agent, despite his physical knowledge, 
 is not yet free to embrace the end and, having done so, use 
 thereto the means at his disposal. It is plainly impossible 
 to use the physical means until one knows in terms of Sub- 
 stance and Attribute or Cause and Effect, or whatever other 
 physical categories one may please, what manner of behavior 
 may be expected of them. So likewise is it as truly impos- 
 sible, for one intellectually and morally capable of appreciat- 
 ing problems of a more advanced and complex sort, to exploit 
 the physical properties thus discovered until ethical deter- 
 mination of the end and economic determination of the means 
 have been completed.' 
 
 There are, then, we conclude, cases in which physical 
 determination of the means is by itself not a sufficient prepa- 
 
 1 la order to avoid complicating the problems, we have here employed the com- 
 mon notion that the physical world, physical object, and property may bo taken for 
 granted as possible adequate contents of judgment, and that the problem is only as 
 to the objectivity of economic and ethical contents. Of course wo may, in the 
 end, come to believe that the "physical" object is itself an economic construct, in 
 the largo sense of "economic;" that is, an instrument of an effective or successful 
 experience. Thus in terms of the illustration used above, in the attitude of enter- 
 taining in a general way the plan of building a house o/ some sort or other, one may 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 235 
 
 ration for conduct — in which there are ethical and economic 
 problems which delay the application of the physical means to 
 the end to which they may be physically adapted. Indeed, 
 so much as this may well appear as sufficiently obvious 
 without extended illustration. Everyone knows that it is 
 nearly always necessary, in undertaking any work in which 
 material things are used as means, to count the cost; and 
 everyone knows likewise that not every end that is in any 
 way attractive and within one's reach may without more ado 
 be taken as an object of settled desire and effort. It is 
 indeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the 
 sense in which they are commonly understood. However, 
 such is not our present purpose. Our purpose is the more 
 specific one of showing that the meaning of Objectivity must 
 be widened so as to include (1) the "universe" of ends in 
 their ethical aspect and (2) the economic aspect of the 
 means of action, as well as (3) the physical aspect to which 
 the character of Objectivity is commonly restricted. We 
 shall maintain that these are parts or phases of a complete 
 conception of Reality, and that of them, consequently, Objec- 
 tivity must be predicated for every essential reason connoted 
 by such characterization of the world of things "external", 
 to the senses. It has been with this conclusion in mind, 
 then, that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious 
 inadequacy, for practical purposes, of the merely physical 
 determination of the means in one's environment. 
 
 The principle thus suggested would imply that the 
 ethical and economic stages in the one inclusive process 
 of reflective attention should be regarded as involving, 
 
 have before him various building materials the ascertained qualities of which are, 
 it may be, socially recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use. There 
 is doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred to. 
 But along with the definiticm of the plan in ethical and economic judgment, along 
 with the determination actually to build a house, and a house of a certain specific 
 kind, must go further determination of the means in their physical aspects, a deter- 
 mination which all the while reacts into the process of determination of the end. 
 See below, p. 2A&, note 3. 
 
236 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 when they occur, the same logical function of judgment 
 as is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and 
 the sciences generally. Ethical and economic factors 
 must on occasion be present at the final choice and 
 shaping of one's course of conduct, along with the physi- 
 cal determinations of environing means and conditions which 
 one has made in sense-perception. There is, then, it would 
 appear, at least a fair presumption, though not indeed an a 
 priori certainty, that these ethical and economic factors or 
 conditions have, like the physical, taken form in a judgment- 
 process which will admit of profitable analysis in accordance 
 with whatever general theory of judgment one may hold as 
 valid elsewhere in the field of knowledge. This presumption 
 we shall seek to verify. Now, our interest in thus determin- 
 ing, first of all, the logical character of these processes will 
 readily be understood from this, that, in the present view, 
 these are the processes, and the only ones in our experience, 
 which are properly to be regarded as processes of Valuation. 
 We shall hold that Valuation, and so all consciousness of 
 Value, properly so called, must be either ethical or economic; 
 that the only conscious processes in which Values can come 
 to definition are these processes of ethical and economic 
 judgment. The present theory of Value is, then, essentially 
 a logical one, in the sense of holding that Values are deter- 
 mined in and by a logical — that is, a judgmental — valuation- 
 process and in its details is closely dependent upon the 
 general conception of judgment of which the outlines have 
 been sketched above. Accordingly, the exposition must pro- 
 ceed in the following general order : Assuming the concep- 
 tion of judgment which has been presented (which our 
 discussion will in several ways further illustrate and so tend 
 to confirm), we shall seek to show that the determinations 
 made in ethical and economic judgment are in the proper 
 sense objective. This will involve, first of all, a statement 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 237 
 
 of the conditions under which the ethical and economic 
 judgments respectively arise — which statement will serve to 
 distinguish the two types of judgment from each other. We 
 shall then proceed to the special analysis of the ethical and 
 economic forms from the standpoint of our general theory 
 of judgment, thereby establishing in detail the judgmental 
 character of these parts of the reflective process. This 
 analysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the 
 consciousness of Value as a factor in the conduct and econo- 
 my of life. 
 
 II 
 
 Let us then define the problem of the objective reference 
 of the valuational judgments by stating, as distinctly as may 
 be, the conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation, 
 respectively, are prompted. A study of these conditions will 
 make it easier to see in what way the judgments reached in 
 dealing with them can be objective. 
 
 When will an end, presenting itself in consciousness in 
 the manner indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment- 
 process, become the center of attention, thereby checking 
 the advance, through investigation of the possible means, to 
 final overt action? This is the general statement of the 
 problem of the typical ethical situation. Manifestly there 
 will be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once 
 turns the attention toward the environment of possible 
 means, instead of first of all itself becoming the object 
 instead of the director of attention; there will be no sus- 
 pension of progress toward final action, excepting such as 
 may later come through difficulty in the discovery and 
 co-ordination of the means. However, there are cases in 
 which the emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a 
 check to the reflective process, and the agent shrinks from 
 the end presented in imagination as being, let us say, one 
 
238 Studies in Logical Theoby 
 
 forbidden by authority or one repugnant to his own estab- 
 lished standards. The end may in such a case disappear at 
 once ; very often it will insistently remain. On this latter 
 supposition, the simplest possibility will be the development 
 of a mere mechanical tension, a "pull and haul" between 
 the end, or properly the impulses which it represents, and 
 the agent's habit of suppressing impulses of the class to 
 which the present one is, perhaps intuitively, recognized as 
 belonging. The case is the common one of "temptation" 
 on the one side and "principle" or "conscience" on the 
 other, and so long as the two forces remain thus in hard-and- 
 fast opposition to each other there can be no ethical delib- 
 eration or judgment in a proper sense. The standard or 
 habit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power, 
 or the new impulse, the temptation, may prevail because its 
 onset can break down the mechanical resistance. 
 
 Out of such a situation as this, however, genuine ethical 
 deliberation may arise on condition that standard and 
 "temptation" can lose something of their abstractness and 
 their hard-and-fast opposition, and develop into terms of 
 concrete meaning. The agent may come to see that the 
 end is in some definite way of really vital interest and too 
 important to be put aside without consideration. He may, 
 of course, in this fall into gross self-sophistication, like the 
 drunkard in the classical instance who takes another glass 
 to test his self-control and thereby gain assurance, or he 
 may act with wisdom and with full sincerity, like Dorothea 
 Casaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed 
 by her departed husband. In the moral life one can ask or 
 hope for complete exemption from the risk of self-deception 
 with as little reason as in scientific research. But however 
 this may be, our present interest is in the method, not in par- 
 ticular results of ethical reflection. Whether properly so in 
 a particular case or not, the imaged end may come to seem 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 239 
 
 at least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which 
 serve to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a 
 place is given in the accepted scheme of life ; or the end 
 may simply press for a relatively independent recognition on 
 the very general ground that its emergence represents an 
 enlargement and new development of the personality.* The 
 end may thus cease to stand in the character of blind self- 
 assertive impulse and press its claim as a positive means of 
 future moral growth, as bringing freedom from repressive 
 and enfeebling restraints and as tending to the reinforce- 
 ment of other already valued modes of conduct. On the 
 other hand the standard will cease to stand as mere resist- 
 ance and negation and may discover something of its hidden 
 meaning as a product of long experience and slow growth 
 and as perhaps a vital part of the organization of one's pres- 
 ent life, not to be touched without grave risk. 
 
 Now, on whichever side the development may first com- 
 mence, a like development must soon follow on the other, 
 and it is the action and reaction of standard and prospec- 
 tive or problematic end upon each other that constitutes 
 the process of ethical deliberation or judgment. Just as 
 in the typical judgment-process, as sketched above, so also 
 here predicate and subject develop) each other, when once 
 they have given over their first antagonism and come to 
 the attitude of reasoning together. The predicate explains 
 itself that the subject or new end may be searchingly and 
 fairly tested ; and under this scrutiny the subject develops 
 its full meaning as a course of conduct, thereby prompting 
 further analysis and reinterpretation of the standard. But 
 this is not the place for detailed analysis of the process;^ 
 here we are concerned only to define the type of situation, 
 
 1 In the moral life, as elsewhsre, the distinction of deduction and induction is 
 one of degree. There is but one type or method of inference, though some inferences 
 may approach more closely than do others the limit of pure " subsumption." 
 
 2 See IV below. 
 
240 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 and this we may now do in the following terms: The indis- 
 pensable condition of ethical judgment is the presence in 
 the agent's mind of at least two rival interesting ends or 
 systems of such ends. In the foregoing, the subject of the 
 judgment is the new end that has arisen; the predicate or 
 "standard" is the symbol for the old ends or values which 
 in the tension of the judgment-process must be brought to 
 more or less explicit enumeration — and, we must add, 
 reconstruction also. Indeed it is important even at this 
 stage of our discussion to observe that Predicate and Stand- 
 ard are not equivalent in meaning. The predicate, or predi- 
 cative side, of judgment is the imagery of control in the 
 process, which, as we have seen, develops with the subject 
 side; while the term "Standard" connotes the rigid fixity 
 which belongs to the inhibiting concept or ideal in the stage 
 before the judgment-process proper can begin. The ethical 
 judgment-process is, in a word, just the process of recon- 
 structing standards — as in its other and corresponding 
 aspect it is the process of interpreting new ends. Those who 
 oppose measures of social reform or new modes of conduct 
 or belief on alleged grounds of "immorality" instinctively 
 feel in doing so that the change may make its way more easily 
 against a resistance that will candidly explain itself; and, 
 on the other side of the social judgment-process, the more 
 fanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their 
 propaganda the bitterness or contempt of those who repre- 
 sent the established order. On both sides there are those 
 who trust more in mechanical "pull and haul" than in the 
 intrinsic merits of their cause. 
 
 Thus it is by encountering some rival end or entire sys- 
 tem of ends, as symbolized by an ideal, that a new end 
 emerging out of impulse comes to stand for an agent, as 
 the center of a problem of conduct, and so to occupy the 
 center of attention. And it thereby becomes an Object, as 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 241 
 
 we shall hold, which must be more fully defined in order 
 that it may be valued, and accordingly be held to warrant a 
 determinate attitude toward itself on the agent's part. We 
 have now to define in the same general terms the typical 
 economic situation. 
 
 In economic theory as in common thought it is not the 
 contemplated act of applying certain means to the attain- 
 ment of an end regarded as desirable that functions as the 
 logical subject of valuation. The thing or object valued in 
 the economic situation is one's present wealth, whether 
 material or immaterial, one's services or labor — whatever one 
 gives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment 
 of a desired end or, proximately, to secure possession of the 
 necessary and sufficient means to the attainment of a desired 
 end. The object of attention in the valuing process is here 
 not itself an end of action. In this respect the economic type 
 of judgment is like the physical, for in both the object to be 
 valued is a certain means which one is seeking to adapt to 
 some more or less definitely imaged purpose ; or a condition 
 of which one wishes, likewise for some special purpose, to 
 take advantage. The ultimate goal of all judgment is the 
 determination of a course of conduct looking toward an 
 end, and our present problem may accordingly be stated in 
 the following terms : Under what circumstances in the 
 judgment-process does it become necessary to the defini- 
 tion and attainment of an end as yet vague and indeter- 
 minate that the requisite means, as in part already physically 
 determined, should be further scrutinized in attention and 
 determined from the economic point of view? Or, in a 
 word: What is the "jurisdiction" of the economic point of 
 view ? 
 
 For ordinary judgments of sense-perception the presence 
 in consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate 
 occasion, as our analysis (assuming its validity) has shown. 
 
242 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 I For ethical judgment we have seen that the presence of con- 
 flicting ends is necessary; and we shall now hold that this 
 condition is necessary, though not, without a certain quali- 
 fication, adequate, for the economic type as well. If an 
 imaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a 
 rival, and the physical means of attaining it have been found 
 and co-ordinated, then the use or consumption of the means 
 must inevitably follow, without either ethical or economic 
 judgment ; for, to paraphrase the saying of Professor James, 
 nothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort toward 
 another end. The economic situation differs, then, from the 
 
 / ethical in this, that the end or system of ends entering into 
 competition with the one for the time being of chief and pri- 
 mary interest has been brought to consciousness through ref- 
 erence to those " physical " means which already have been 
 determined as necessary to this latter end. The conflict of ends 
 in the economic situation, that is to say, is not due to a direct 
 and intrinsic incompatibility between them. Where there 
 manifestly is such incompatibility, judgment will be of the 
 ethical type — as when building the house involves the fore- 
 closure of a mortgage, and so, in working an injury to the 
 holder of the site, may do violence to one's ideal of friend- 
 ship or of more special obligation ; or when an impulse to 
 intemperate self-indulgence is met by one's ideal of social 
 usefulness. In cases such as these one clearly sees, or can 
 on reflection come to see, in what way an evil result to per- 
 sonal character will follow upon the imminent misdeed, and 
 in what way suppression of the mom.entary impulse will con- 
 serve the entire approved and established way of life. Very 
 often, however, the conflicting ends are related in no such 
 mutually exclusive way. Each may be in itself permissible 
 and compatible with the other, and, so far as any possible 
 ethical discrimination can determine, there is no ground for 
 choice between them. Thus it is only through the fact that 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 243 
 
 both ends are dependent upon a limited supply of means ', 
 that one would, for example, ever bring together and deliber- ' 
 ately oppose in judgment the purpose of making additions 
 to his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel 
 for the winter. Both ends in such a case are in themselves : 
 indeed permissible in a general way, but they may very well 
 not both of them be economically possible, and hence, for | 
 the person in question and in the presence of the economic j 
 conditions which confront him, not, in the last analysis, both 
 ethically possible. When there is a conflict between two 
 ends that stand in close organic relation in the sense 
 explained above, the problem is an ethical one ; when the con- 
 flict is, in the sense explained, one of competition between 
 ends ethically permissible — not at variance, either one, that 
 is, with other ends directly — for the whole or for a share 
 of one's supply of means, the problem is of the economic 
 type.' 
 
 There are three typical cases in which economic judg- 
 ment or valuation of the means is necessary, and the enu- 
 meration of these will make clear the relation between the 
 
 1 It is no part of the present view that the ends -which enter into economic conflict 
 are incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically interrelated members of the 
 provisional system of life. On the contrary, the very essence of our contention is 
 that adjustment established between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment 
 is in itself ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual's ends of 
 life, and will stand as such, subject to modification through changes elsewhere in 
 the system, so long as the economic conditions in view of which it was determined 
 remained unchanged. The " mutual exclusiveness " of the ends in ethical delibera- 
 tion is simply the correlate of a relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life. A 
 man's command over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies 
 much and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time ; but, on the other 
 hand, his physical condition, his intelligence, his powers of sympathy, and his 
 spiritual capacity for social service commonly do not. Hence there can be and is a 
 certain more or less definite and permanent comprehensive scheme of conduct mor- 
 ally obligatory upon him so far as the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned, 
 but so far as his conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned, it cannot 
 be prescribed in general terms, nor will any provisional ideal of moral selfhood 
 admit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself. The moral self is an 
 ideai. construct based upon these fixed conditions of life — conditions so fixed that 
 the spiritual furtherance or deterioration likely to result from certain modes of con- 
 duct involving and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease 
 by the "ethical" method of judgment. Implied in such a construct is, of course, a 
 
244 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 ethical and the economic types of judgment: (1) First may 
 be mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has 
 apparently reached its end in the formation of apian of action 
 which, so far as one can see, on ethical grounds is unobjec- 
 tionable. A definite " temptation " may have been overcome,! 
 or out of a more complex situation a satisfactory ethical com- 
 promise or readjustment may have been developed with much 
 difficulty. Now, there are very often cases in which such a 
 course of action still may not be entered on without further 
 hesitation ; for, if the plan be one requiring for its working 
 out the use of material means, the fact of an existing limita- 
 tion of one's supply of means must bring hitherto un thought of 
 ends into conflict with it. There are doubtless many situa- 
 tions in which one's moral choice may be carried into prac- 
 tice without consideration of ways and means, as when one 
 forgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under dis- 
 cipline in the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social 
 ideal of character. But more often than the moral rigorist 
 cares to see, questions of an economic nature must be raised 
 after the ethical "evidence is all in" — questions which are 
 probably more trying to a sensitive moral nature than those 
 more dramatic situations in which the real perils of self- 
 sophistication are vastly less, and the simpler, sharper defini- 
 
 reference to certain relatively permanent social and also physical conditions. In so 
 far as society and physical nature, and for that matter the individual's own nature, 
 are variable, these are the subjects of "scientific" or "factual" judgments inci- 
 dental to the determination of problems by the "economic" method — problems, 
 that is, for which no general answer, through reference to a more or less definite and 
 stable working concept of the self, can be given. Thus our knowledge of the physi- 
 cal universe is largely, if not chiefly, incidental to and conditioned by our economic 
 experience. Again, our economic judgments are in every case determinative of the 
 self in situations in which, as presented by (perhaps even momentarily) variable con- 
 ditions, physical, social, or personal, the ethical method is inapplicable. In a social- 
 istic state, in which economic conditions might be more stable than in our present 
 one, many problems in consumption which now are economic in one sense would be 
 ethical because admitting of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed 
 in the established state program of production and distribution. Even now it is not 
 easy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is absolutely indifferent 
 ethically. There is a possibility of intemperance even in so "sesthetic" an indul- 
 gence as Turkish rugs. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 245 
 
 tion of the issue makes possible a less difficult, though a more 
 decisive and edifying, victory. (2) In the second place are 
 those cases in which the end that has emerged is without 
 conspicuous moral quality, because, although it may represent 
 some worthy impulse, it has not been obliged to make its 
 way to acceptance against the resistance of desires less 
 worthy than itself. This is the ideal case of economic theory 
 in which "moral distinctions are irrelevant," and the eco- 
 nomic man is free, according to the myth, to perform his 
 hedonistic calculations withcJut thought of moral scruple. The 
 end ethically acceptable in itself, like the enriching of one's 
 library, must, when the means are limited, divert a portion of 
 the means from other uses, and will thus, through reference 
 to the indispensable means, engage in conflict with other ends 
 quite remotely, if in the agent's knowledge at all, related 
 with itself. (3) Finally we reach the limit of apparent free- 
 dom from ethical considerations in the operations of business 
 institutions, and perhaps especially in those of large business 
 corporations. Apart from the routine operations of a business 
 which involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment, 
 there are constantly in such institutions new projects which 
 must be considered, and which commonly must involve 
 revaluation of the means. In this revaluation the principle 
 of greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole criterion, 
 regardless of other personal or social points of view from 
 which confessedly the measure might be considered. But 
 such a supposition, however true to the facts of current 
 business practice it may be, we must hold to be an abstrac- 
 tion when viewed from the standpoint of the social life at 
 large, and hence no real exception to our general principle. 
 The economic and the ethical situations differ, as types, only 
 in the closeness of relation between the ends that are in con- 
 flict and in the manner in which the ends are first brought 
 into conflict — not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the 
 
246 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 ends which are involved in them.' It is this difference which, 
 as we shall see, explains why ethical valuation must be of 
 ends, and economic valuation, on the other hand, of means. 
 
 We have yet to see in what way valuation of the means 
 of action can serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which 
 has thus been designated as Economic. The question must be 
 deferred until a more detailed analysis of the economic judg- 
 ment-process can be undertaken. It is enough for our pres- 
 ent purpose to note that the subject of valuation in this 
 process is the means, and to see that under the typical con- 
 ditions which have been described some further determina- 
 tion of the means than the merely physical one of their 
 factual availability for the competing ends is needed.^ 
 Physically and mechanically the means are available for each 
 one of the ends or groups of ends in question ; the pressing 
 problem is to determine for which one of the ends, if any, 
 or to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the 
 ends or all of them, the means at hand are in an economic 
 sense most properly available.' 
 
 1 Accordingly there can be no distinction of ends, some as ethical, others as eco- 
 nomic, but from an ethical standpoint indifferent, and yet others as amenable 
 neither to ethical nor to economic judgment. The type of situation and the corre- 
 sponding mode of judgment employed determines whether an end shall be for the 
 time being ethical, economic, or of neither sort conspicuously. 
 
 2 The right of Prudence to rank among the virtues cannot, on our present view, 
 be questioned. Economic judgment, though it must be valuation of means, is essen- 
 tially choice of ends — and, as would appear, choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by 
 reason of the usually slight intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also 
 by reason of the absence of effective points of view for comparison. Culture, as 
 Emerson remarks, " sees prudence not to be a several faculty, but a name for wis- 
 dom and virtue conversing with the body and its wants." And again, " The spurious 
 prudence, making the senses final, is the god of sots and cowards, and is the subject 
 
 of all comedy [The true prudence] takes the laws of the world whereby 
 
 man's being is conditioned, as they are, and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their 
 proper good " (Essay on Prudence). 
 
 3 Here again we purposely use inaccurate language. Strictly, the ends here 
 spoken of as competing are such, we must say, only because they are as yet in a 
 measure indeterminate, wanting in "clearness," and are not yet understood in their 
 true economic character; likewise the means are wanting in that final shade or 
 degree of physical and mechanical detorminateness which they are presently to 
 possess as means to a finally determinate economic end. Thus economic judgment, 
 by which is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 247 
 
 From this preliminary discussion of the ethical and eco- 
 nomic situations we must now pass to discuss the objectivity 
 of the judgments by which the agent meets the difficulties 
 which such situations as these present. We shall seek to 
 show that these judgments are constructive of an objective 
 order of reality. It will be necessary in the first place to 
 determine the psychological conditions of the more commonly 
 recognized experience of Objectivity in the restricted sphere 
 of sense-perception. There might otherwise remain a certain 
 antecedent presumption against the thesis which we wish to 
 establish even after the direct argument had been presented.* 
 
 Ill 
 
 Common-sense and natural science certainly tend to iden- 
 tify the objectively real with the existent in space and time. 
 The physical universe is held to be palpably real in a way 
 in which nothing not presented in sensuous terms can be. 
 To most minds doubtless it is difficult to understand why 
 Plato should have ascribed to the Ideas a higher degree of 
 reality than that possessed by the particular objects of sense- 
 perception, and still more difficult to understand his ascrip- 
 tion of real existence to such Ideas as those of Beauty, 
 Justice, and the Good. There is a certain apparent stability 
 in a universe presented in "immediate" sense-perception — 
 a universe with which we are in constant bodily intercourse 
 
 method and in accordance with economic principles, involves in general physical 
 re-determination of the means. The means which at the outset of the present eco- 
 nomic judgment-process appear as physically available indifferently for either of the 
 tentative ends under consideration are only in a general way the same means for 
 knowledge as they will bewhen the economic problem has been solved. They are, 
 so far as now determinate, the outcome of former physical judgment-processes inci- 
 dental to the definition of economic ends in former situations like the present. 
 
 1 In our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt to furnish 
 what might be called an analysis of the consciousness of objectivity. This has been 
 undertaken by various psychologists in recent well-known contributions to the sub- 
 ject. For our purpose it is necessary only to specify the intellectual and practical 
 attitude out of which the consciousness of objectivity arises; not the sensory "ele- 
 ments" or factors involved in its production as an experience. 
 
248 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 — that seems not to belong to a mere order of relations 
 which, if known in any sense, is not known to us through 
 the senses. Moreover, knowledge of the physical world is 
 felt to possess a higher degree of certainty than does any 
 knowledge we can have of supposed economic or moral truth, 
 or of economic or moral standards. Of such knowledge one 
 is disposed to say, as Mr. Spencer does of metaphysics, that 
 at the best it presupposes a long and elaborate inferential 
 process which, as long, is likely to be faulty ; whereas physi- 
 cal truth is immediate or else, when inference is involved in 
 it, easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts. Physi- 
 cal reality is a reality that can be seen and handled and felt 
 as offering resistance, and this is evidence of objectivity of a 
 sort not to be found in other spheres of knowledge for which 
 the like claim is made. 
 
 The force of these impressions^nd it would not be diffi- 
 cult to find stronger statements in the history of scientific 
 and ethical nominalism) diminishes if one tries to determine 
 in what consists that objectivity which they uncritically 
 assume as given in sense-perception. For one must recog- 
 nize that not all our possible modes of sense-experience are 
 equally concerned in the presentation of this perceived 
 objective world. Certain sensory "quales" are immediately 
 referred to outward objects as belonging to them. Certain 
 others are, in a way, "inward," either not more definitely local- 
 ized at all or merely localized in the sense-organ which 
 mediates them. Now, the reason for this difference cannot 
 lie in the content of the various senserqualities abstractly 
 taken. A visual sensation, apart from the setting in which 
 it occurs in common experience, can be no more objective in 
 its reference — indeed, can have no more reference of any 
 kind — than the least definite and instructive organic sensa- 
 tion. For the degree of distinctness with which one dis- 
 criminates sense-qualities depends upon the number and 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 249 
 
 importance of the interpretative associations which it is 
 important from time to time to "connect" with them; or, con- 
 versely, the sense-qualities are not se(/"-discriminating in 
 virtue of an intrinsic objective reference or meaning which 
 each possesses and which drives it apart from all the rest. 
 Indeed, an intrinsic meaning, if a sensation could possess 
 one, would not only be superfluous in the development of 
 knowledge, but, as likely to be mistaken for the acquired or 
 functional meaning, even seriously confusing.' 
 
 Now, it must be granted that, if the "simple idea of sen- 
 sation" is without objective reference, no association with 
 it of similarly abstract sensations can supply the lack. A 
 "movement" sensation, or a tactual, having in itself no such 
 meaning, cannot merely by being " associated " with a simi- 
 larly meaningless visual sensation endow this latter with 
 reference to an object. Oij^tive reference is, in fact, not a 
 sensuous thing ; it is not a conscious "element," nor does it 
 arise from any combination or fusion of such. It is neither 
 in the association of ideas as a constituent member, nor does 
 it belong to the association considered as a sequence of 
 psychical states. Instead, in our present view, it belongs to or 
 arises out of the activity through which and with reference 
 
 1 So, on the other hand, our vague organic sensations are possibly more instruct- 
 ive as they are, for their own purpose, than they would be if more sharply dis- 
 criminated and complexly referred. 
 
 For convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own termi- 
 nology ; we by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this terminology as psy- 
 chologically correct. The sense-quality of which we read in " structural ps> chology " 
 is, we hold, not a structural unit at all, but in fact a highly abstract development out 
 of that unorganized whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins. 
 There is, for example, no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality " red " 
 in consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have constructed a 
 definite and measured experience which may be symbolized as " object-before-me- 
 possessing-the-attribute-red." In place of the original sensory total-experience we 
 now have a more or less developed perceptual {i. e., judgmental) total-experience. 
 It is an instance of the " psychological fallacy" to interpret what are really elements 
 of meaning in a perceived object constructed in judgment (for this is the true nature 
 of the " simple idea of sensation " or " sense-element ") as so many bits of psychical 
 material which were isolated from each other at the outset, and have been externally 
 joined together in their present combination. 
 
250 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 to which associations are first of all established. It is an 
 aspect or kind of reference or category under which any 
 sense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart 
 from the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive 
 new meaning as a stimulus ; and a sensation functioning in 
 such a "state of consciousness"' is a psychical phenomenon 
 very different from the conscious element of "analytical" 
 psychology. The extent to which it is true that the objec- 
 tive world of sense-perception is pre-eminently visual and 
 tactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which 
 the exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense- 
 discrimination for the sake of more refined reaction within 
 these spheres as compared with others. Our conclusion, 
 then, must be that the consciousness of objectivity is not 
 as such sensuous, even as given in our perception of the 
 material world. The world, as viewed from the standpoint 
 of a particular, practical emergency, is an objective world, 
 not in virtue of its having a "sensuous" or a "material" 
 aspect as something existent per se, but because it is a 
 world of stimuli in course of definition for the guidance of 
 activity.^ 
 
 It will be well to give further positive exposition of the 
 meaning of the view thus stated. To return once more to 
 
 1 The phrase is Kfilpe's and is used in his sense of consciousness taken as a whole, 
 as, for example, attentive, apperceptive, volitional, rather than in the sense made 
 familiar by Spencer and others. 
 
 2 The foregoing discussion is in many ways similar to Brentano's upon the same 
 subject. In discussing his first class of modes of consciousness, the Vorstellungen, 
 he says : " We find no contrasts between presentations excepting those of the objects 
 to which the presentations refer. Only in so far as warm and cold, light and dark, 
 a high note and a low, form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding presenta- 
 tions as contrasted ; and, in general, there is in any other sense than this no contrast 
 within the entire range of these conscious processes" {Psychologic votn empi- 
 rischen Standpunhte, Bd. I, p. 29). This may stand as against any attempt to find 
 contrast between abstract sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference. 
 What is, however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects'? Appar- 
 ently this must be answered in the last resort as above. In this sense we should need 
 finally to interpret "sensuous" and "material" in terms of objectivity as above 
 defined, rather than the reverse. They are cases in or specifications of the deter- 
 minatiou of adequate stimuli. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 251 
 
 our fundamental psychological conception, knowledge is 
 essentially relevant to the solution of particular problems of 
 more or less urgency and of various kinds and figures in the 
 solution of such problems as the assemblage of consciously 
 recognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are 
 suggested. The object as known is therefore not the same 
 as the object as apprehended in other possible modes of being 
 conscious of it. The workman who is actually using his 
 tool in shaping his material, or the warrior who is actually 
 using his weapon in the thick of combat, is, if conscious of 
 these objects at all (and doubtless he may be conscious of 
 them at such times), not conscious of them as objects — as 
 the one might be, for example, in adjusting the tool for a 
 particular kind of use, and the other in giving a keen edge 
 to his blade. Under these latter circumstances the tool or 
 weapon is an object, and its observed condition, viewed in 
 the light of a purpose of using the object in a certain way, 
 is regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or 
 improvements. And likewise will the tool or the weapon 
 have an objective character in the agent's apprehension in 
 the moment of identifying and selecting it from among a 
 number of others, or even in the act of reaching for it, espe- 
 cially if it is inconveniently placed. But in the act of freely,' 
 using one's objective means the category of the objective 
 plays no part in consciousness, because at such times there! 
 is no judgment respecting the means — because there is no 
 sufficient occasion for the isolation of certain conscious ele- 
 ments from the rest of the stream of conscious experience 
 to be defined as stimuli to certain needed responses. Such 
 isolation will not normally take place so long as the reac- 
 tions suggested by the conscious contents involved in the 
 experience are fully adequate to the situation. Objects are 
 not normally held apart as such from the stream of conscious- 
 ness in which they are presented and recognized as possess- 
 
252 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 ing qualities warranting certain modes of conduct, except- 
 ing as it has become necessary to the attainment of the 
 agent's purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity.' 
 
 Are things, then, apprehended as objective in virtue of 
 the agent's attitude toward them, or is the agent's attitude 
 in a typical case grounded upon an antecedent determination 
 of the objectivity of the things in question? We must 
 answer, in the first place, that there can be no such antece- 
 dent determination. We may, it is true, speak of believing, 
 on the evidence of sight or touch, that a certain object is 
 really present before us. But neither sight nor touch pos- 
 sesses in itself, as a particular sense-quality, any objective 
 meaning. If touch is par excellence the sense of the objec- 
 tive and the appeal to touch the test of objectivity, this can 
 only be because touch is the sense most closely and intimately 
 connected in our experience with action. After any interval 
 of hesitation and judgment, action begins with contact with 
 and manipulation of the physical means which have been 
 under investigation. Not only is touch the proximate stimu- 
 lus and guide to manipulation, but all relevant knowledge 
 which has been gained in any judgment-process, through the 
 other senses, and especially through sight, must ultimately 
 be reducible to terms of touch or other contact sense. The 
 alleged tactual evidence of objectivity is, then, rather a con- 
 firmation than a difficulty for our present view. In short, 
 we must dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can 
 be a consciousness of objectivity which is not dependent 
 upon and an expression of primary antecedent tendencies 
 toward motor response to the presented stimulus. It is our 
 attitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the 
 consciousness of an object standing over against us. 
 
 So far, indeed, is it from being true that objectivity is a 
 
 1 In this connection reference may be made to the well-known disturbing effect 
 of the forced introduction of attention to details into established sensori-motor 
 co-ordinations, such as "typewriting," playing upon the piano, and the like. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 253 
 
 matter for special determination antecedently to action that 
 by common testimony the conviction of objectivity comes to 
 lis quite irresistibly. The object forces itself upon us, as we ' 
 say, and "whether we will or no" we must recognize its 
 presence there before us and its independence of any choice 
 of ours or of our knowledge. In the cautious manipulation 
 of an instrument, in the laborious shaping of some refrac- 
 tory material, in the performance of any delicate or difficult 
 task, one's sense of the objectivity of the thing with which 
 one works is as obtrusive as remorse or grief, and as little to 
 be shaken off. We shall revert to this suggested analogy at 
 a later stage in our discussion. 
 
 We are now in a position to define more precisely the 
 nature of the conditions in which the sense of objectivity 
 emerges, and this will bring us to the point at which the 
 objective import of our economic and ethical judgments can 
 profitably be discussed. We have said that the world of 
 the physical is objective, not in virtue of the sensuous terms 
 in which it is presented, but because it is a world of stimuli 
 for the guidance of human conduct. Under what circum- 
 stances, then, are we conscious of stimuli in their capacity 
 of guides or incentives or grounds of conduct ? And the 
 answer must be that stimuli are interpreted as such, and so 
 take on the character of objectivity, when their precise char- 
 acter as stimuli is still in doubt, and they must therefore 
 receive further definition. 
 
 For example, a man pursued by a wild beast must find 
 some means of escape or defense, and, seeing a tree which 
 he may climb or a stone which he may hurl, will inspect 
 these as well as may be with reference to their fitness for the 
 intended purpose. It is at just such moments as these, 
 then, that physical things become things for knowledge and 
 take on their stubbornly objective character — that is to say, 
 when they are essentially problematic. Now, in order that 
 
254 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 any physical thing may be thus problematic and so possess 
 objective character for knowledge, it must (1) be in part 
 understood, and so prompt certain more or less indiscrimi- 
 nate responses; and (2) be in part as yet not understood — 
 in such wise that, while there are certain indefinite or 
 unmeasured tendencies on the agent's part to respond to the 
 object — climb the tree or hurl the stone — there is also a 
 certain failure of complete unity in the co-ordination of 
 these activities, a certain contradiction between different 
 suggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of 
 the tree or stone may give, and so hesitation and arrest of 
 final action. The pursued man views the tree suspiciously 
 before trusting himself to its doubtful strength, or weighs 
 well the stone and tests its rough edges before pausing to 
 throw it. Thus, to state the matter negatively, there are 
 two possible situations in which the sense of objectivity, if 
 it emerge into consciousness at all, cannot long continue. 
 An object — as, for example, some strange shrub or flower — 
 which, in the case we are supposing, may attract the pur- 
 sued wayfarer's notice, may awaken no responses relevant 
 to the emergency in which the agent finds himself; and it 
 will therefore forthwith lapse from consciousness. Or, on 
 the other hand, the object, as the tree or stone, may rightly 
 or wrongly seem to the agent so completely satisfactory, or, 
 rather, in effect may be so, as instantly to prompt the action 
 which otherwise would come, if at all, only after a period of 
 more or less prolonged attention. In neither of these cases, 
 then, is there a problematic object. In the one the thing in 
 question is wholly apart from any present interest, and 
 therefore lapses. In the other case the thing seen is com- 
 prehended on the instant with reference to its general use 
 and merges immediately into the main stream of the agent's 
 consciousness withoiit having been an object of express 
 attention. In neither case, therefore, is there hesitation 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 255 
 
 with reference to the thing in question — any conflict 
 between inconsiderate positive responses prompted by cer- 
 tain features of the object and inhibitions due to recognition 
 of its shortcomings. In a word, in neither case is there any 
 judgment or possibility of judgment, and hence no sense of 
 objectivity. We can have consciousness of an object, in the 
 strict sense of the term, only when some part or general 
 aspect of the total situation confronting an agent excites or 
 seems to warrant responses which must be held in check for 
 further determination. In terms of consciousness, an object 
 is always an object of attention — that is, an object which is 
 under process of development and reconstruction with refer- 
 ence to an end. 
 
 An inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite 
 way to a stimulus is, then, the adequate condition of the 
 emergence in consciousness of the sense of objectivity. So 
 long as an activity is proceeding without check or interrup- 
 tion, and no conflict develops between motor responses 
 prompted by different parts or aspects of the situation, the 
 agent's consciousness will not present the distinction of 
 Objective and Subjective. The mode of being conscious 
 which accompanies free and harmonious activity of this sort 
 may be exemplified by such experiences as aesthetic apprecia- 
 tion, sensuous enjoyment, acquiescent absorption in pleasur- 
 able emotion, or even intellectual processes of the mechanical 
 sort, such as easy computation or the solution of simple alge- 
 braic problems — processes in which no more serious diffi- 
 culty is encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate 
 degree of interest. If, however, reverting to the illustration, 
 our present need for a stone calls for some property which 
 the stone we have seized appears to lack, consciousness must 
 pass over into the reflective or attentive phase. The stone 
 will now figure as an object possessing certain qualities which 
 render it in a general way relevant to the emergency before 
 
256 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 us. A needed quality is missing, and this defect must hold 
 in check all the imminent responses until discovery of the 
 missing quality can set them free. In a word, the stone as 
 known to us has assumed the station of subject in a judgment- 
 process, and our effort is, if possible, to assign to it a new 
 predicate relevant to our present situation. Psychologically 
 speaking, the stone is an object, a stimulus to which we are 
 endeavoring to find warrant for responding in some new or 
 reconstructed way. 
 
 In this process we must assume, then, first of all, an 
 interest on the agent's part in the situation as a whole, 
 which in the first place, in terms of the illustration, makes 
 the pursued one note the tree or stone — which might 
 otherwise have escaped his notice as completely as any 
 passing cloud or falling leaf — and suggests what particu- 
 lar qualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it. 
 Given this interest in "making something" out of the total 
 situation as explaining the recognition of the stone and 
 the impulse to seize and hurl it, we find the sense of the 
 stone's objectivity emerging just in the arrest of the undis- 
 criminating impulse. The stone must have a certain mean- / 
 ing as a stimulus first of all, but it must be a meaning not 
 yet quite defined and certain of acceptance. The stone will 
 be an object only if, and so long as, the undiscriminating 
 impulses suggested by these elements of meaning are held 
 in check in order that they may be ordered, supplemented, 
 or made more definite. It is, then, the essence of the pres- 
 ent contention that physical things are objective in our 
 experience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as 
 means or incentives of action — an inadequacy which, in 
 turn, is felt as such in so far as we are seeking to use them 
 as means or grounds of conduct, or to avail ourselves of 
 them as conditions, in coping with the general situation 
 from which our attention has abstracted them. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 257 
 
 From this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness 
 of objectivity we must now proceed to inquire whether in the 
 typical ethical and economic situations, as they have been 
 described, essentially these same conditions are present. 
 
 In the ethical situation, according to our statement, the 
 subject of the judgment (the object of attention) is the new 
 end which has just been presented in imagination, and we 
 have now to see that the agent's attitude toward this end is 
 for our present purpose essentially the same as toward a 
 physical object which is under scrutiny. For just as the 
 physical object is such for consciousness because it is partly 
 relevant (whether in the way of furthering or of hindering) 
 to the agent's purpose, but as yet partly not understood 
 from this point of view, so the imaged end may likewise be 
 ambiguous. The agent's moral purpose may be the (very 
 likely mythical) primitive one of which we read in "associa- 
 tional" discussions of the moral consciousness — that of avoid- 
 ing punishment. It may be that of " imitative," sympathetic 
 obedience to authority — a sentiment whose fundamental 
 importance for ethical psychology has long remained with- 
 out due recognition.* It may be loyalty to an ideal of 
 conscience, or yet again a purpose of enlargement and 
 development of personality. But on either supposition the 
 compatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or 
 principle of decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for 
 judgment. The problem will, of course, be a problem in the 
 full logical sense as involving judgment of the type described 
 in our discussion of the ethical situation only when the atti- 
 tudes of obedience to authority and to fixed ideals have been 
 outgrown ; but, on the other hand, as might be shown, it is 
 just the inevitable increasing use of judgment with refer- 
 ence to these formulations of the moral life which gradually 
 
 ^Cf. Professor Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpretations, and Professor 
 McGilvaey's recent paper on "Moral Ohligation,''' Philosophical Keview, YoL XI, 
 especially pp. 349 f. 
 
258 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 undermines them and, by a kind of "internal dialectic" of 
 the moral consciousness, brings the agent to recognition as 
 well as to more perfect practice of a logical or deliberative 
 method. 
 
 The end, then, is, in the typical ethical situation, an 
 object which one must determine by analysis and reconstruc- 
 tion as a means or condition of moral "integrity" and prog- 
 ress. It is, accordingly, in the second place, an object 
 upon whose determination a definite activity of the agent is 
 regarded by him as depending. Just as in the physical 
 judgment-process the object is set ofip over against the self 
 and regarded as a given thing which, when once completely 
 defined, will prompt certain movements of the body, so here 
 the contemplated act is an object which, when fully defined 
 in all its relevant psychological and sociological bearings, 
 will prompt a definite act of rejection or acceptance by the 
 self. Now, it might be shown, as we believe, that the com- 
 plete psychological and sociological definition of the course 
 of conduct is in truth the full explanation of the choice; 
 there is no separate reaction of the moral self to which the 
 course of conduct is, as defined, an external stimulus. So 
 also in the sphere of physical judgment complete definition 
 passes over into action — or the appreciative mode of con- 
 sciousness which accompanies action — without breach of 
 continuity. But within the judgment-process in all its forms 
 there is in the agent's apprehension this characteristic fea- 
 ture of apparent separation between the subject as an objec- 
 tive thing presently to be known and used or responded to, 
 and the predicate as a response yet to be perfected in details, 
 but at the right time, when one has proper warrant, to be set 
 free. It is not our purpose here to speak of metaphysical 
 interpretations or misinterpretations of this functional dis- 
 tinction ; but only to argue from the presence of the distinc- 
 tion in the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 259 
 
 genuine an objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed 
 to the other. The ethical judgment is objective in the sense 
 that in it an object — an imaged mode of conduct taken as 
 such — is presented for development to a degree of adequacy 
 at which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of conduct. 
 The ethical predicates Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, 
 each pair representing a particular standpoint, as we shall 
 later see, signify this accepting or rejecting movement of 
 the self, this "act of will," of which, as an act in due time 
 to be performed, the agent is more or less acutely conscious 
 in the course of moral judgment. 
 
 In the economic situation also, as above described, there 
 is present the requisite condition of the consciousness of 
 objectivity. Here, as in the ethical situation, an object is 
 presented which one must redetermine, and toward which 
 one must presently act in a way likewise to be determined in 
 detail in judgment. We shall defer until a later stage dis- 
 cussion of the reason why this subject of the economic judg- 
 ment is the means in the activity that is in progress. We 
 are not yet ready to show that the means must be the center 
 of attention under the conditions which have been specified. 
 Here we need only note the fact of common experience that 
 economic judgment does center upon the means, and show 
 that in this fact is given the objective status of the means in 
 the judgment-process ; for the economic problem is essentially 
 that of withdrawing a portion, a " marginal increment," of 
 the means from some use or set of uses to which they are at 
 present set apart, and applying it to the new end that has 
 come to seem, on ethical grounds at least, desirable ; and we 
 may regard this diversion as the essentially economic act 
 which, in the agent's apprehension during judgment, is con- 
 tingent upon the determination of the means. The object 
 as economic is accordingly the means, or a marginal portion 
 of the means, which is to be thus diverted (or, so to speak. 
 
260 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 exposed to the likelihood of such diversion), and its deter- 
 mination must be of such a nature as to show the economic 
 urgency, or at least the permissibility, of this diversion. 
 Into this determination, manifestly, the results of much 
 auxiliary inquiry into physical properties of the means must 
 enter — such properties, for example, as have to do with its 
 technological fitness for its present use as compared with pos- 
 sible substitutes, and its adaptability for the new use pro- 
 posed. Taking the word in the broad sense of object of 
 thought, it is always an object in space and time to which 
 the economic judgment assigns an economic value ; and it is 
 true here (just the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the 
 psychological and sociological determinations necessary to 
 the fixation of ethical value) that the economically motivated 
 physical determination of the objective means from the 
 standpoint of the emergency in hand is the full "causal" 
 explanation of the economic act. It must, however, be care- 
 fully observed that this physical determination is in the 
 typical case altogether incidental, from the agent's stand- 
 point, to the assignment of an economic character or value 
 to the means — a value which will at the close of the judg- 
 ment come to conscious recognition. As we shall see, the 
 process is directed throughout by reference to economic prin- 
 ciples and standards, and what shall be an adequate deter- 
 mination in the case depends upon the precision with which 
 these are formulated and the strenuousness with which they 
 are applied. In a word, the economic judgment assigns to 
 the physical object, as known at the outset, a new non- ^ 
 physical character. Throughout the judgment-process this 
 character is gaining in distinctness, and at the end it is 
 accepted as the Value of the means, as warrant for the 
 diversion of them to the new use which has been decided on/ 
 
 1 Manifestly, as indicated jnst above, this accepted value of the object implies 
 fuller physical knowledge of the object than was possessed at the outset of the eco- 
 nomic judgment. See above, p. 234, note ; p. 246, note 3 ; and p, 271, below. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 261 
 
 We have now to consider whether in the actual ethical 
 and economic experience of men there is any direct evidence 
 confirming the conclusions which our logical analysis of the 
 respective situations would appear to require. Can any 
 phases of the total experience of working out a satisfactory 
 course of conduct in these typical emergencies be appealed 
 to as actually showing at least some tacit recognition that 
 these types of judgment present each one an order of reality 
 or an aspect of the one reality? 
 
 In the first place, then, one must recognize that in the 
 agent's own apprehension a judgment of value has some- 
 thing more than a purely subjective meaning. It is never 
 offered, by one who has taken the trouble to work it out 
 more or less laboriously and then to express it in terms 
 which are certainly objective, as a mere announcement of de 
 facto determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and 
 caprice. One no more means to announce a groundless 
 choice or a choice based upon pleasure felt in contemplation 
 of the imaged end than in his judgments concerning the 
 physical universe he means to affirm coexistences and 
 sequences, agreements and disagreements, of " ideas " as 
 psychical happenings. That there is an ethical or economic 
 truth to which one can appeal in doubtful cases is, indeed, 
 the tacit assumption in all criticism of another's deliberate 
 conduct; the contrary assumption, that criticism is merely 
 the opposition of one's own private prejudice or desire to the 
 equally private prejudice or desire of another, would render 
 all criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems mean- 
 ingless and futile in the plain man's apprehension as in the 
 philosopher's. For the plain man has a spontaneous confi- 
 dence in his knowledge of the material world which makes 
 him look askance at any alleged analysis of his sense- 
 perceptions and scientific judgments into "associations of 
 ideas," and the same confidence, or something very like it, 
 
262 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 attaches to judgments of these other types. It may perhaps 
 be easier (though the concession is a very doubtful one) to 
 destroy a naive confidence in the objectivity of moral truth 
 than a like confidence in scientific knowledge, but it must 
 be remembered that the plain man's sense of the urgency, at 
 least of ethical problems, if not of economic, is commonly less 
 acute than for the physical. In the plain man's experience 
 serious moral problems are infrequent — problems of the 
 true type, that is, which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of 
 temptation; one must have attained a considerable capacity 
 for sympathy and a considerable knowledge of social rela- 
 tions before either the recognition of such problems or 
 proper understanding of their significance is possible. Moral 
 and economic crises are not vividly presented in sensuous 
 imagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence, 
 experience, and imaginative power ; and the judgments 
 reached in coping with them do not, as a rule, obviously call 
 for nicely measured, calculated, and adjusted bodily move- 
 ments. The immediate act of executing an important 
 economic judgment may be a very commonplace perform- 
 ance, like the dictation of a letter, and an ethical decision 
 may, however great its importance for future overt conduct, 
 be expressed by no immediate visible movements of the 
 body. But this possible difference of impressiveness between 
 physical and other types of judgments is from our present 
 standpoint unessential; and indeed, after all, it cannot be 
 denied that there are persons whose sense of moral obliga- 
 tion is quite as distinct and influential, and even sensuously 
 vivid, as their conviction of the real existence of an external 
 world. To the average man it certainly is clear that, as Dr. 
 Martineau declares, " it is an inversion of moral truth to say 
 .... that honour is higher than appetite because we feel 
 it so; we feel it so because it is so. This 'ts' we know to 
 be not contingent on our apprehension, not to arise from our 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 263 
 
 constitution of faculty, but to be a reality irrespective of us 
 in adaptation to which our nature is constituted, and for the 
 recognition of which the faculty is given."* And the 
 impressiveness, to most minds, of likening the sublimity of 
 the moral law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens 
 would seem to suggest that the apprehension of moral truth 
 is a mode of consciousness, in form at least, so far akin to 
 sense-perception as to be capable of illustration and even 
 reinforcement from that type of experience. 
 
 At this point we must revert to a suggestion which pre- 
 sented itself above in another connection, but which at the 
 time could not be further developed. This was, in a word, that 
 there is often a feeling of ohtrusiveness in our appreciation 
 of the objectivity of the things before us in ordinary sense- 
 perception (or physical judgment) which is not unlike the 
 felt insistence of remorse and grief .^ This feeling is so con- 
 spicuous a feature of the state of consciousness in physical 
 judgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last 
 and irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence 
 of the material world, and it is indeed a feature whose expla- 
 nation does throw much light upon the meaning of the con- 
 sciousness of objectivity as a factor within experience. Now, 
 there is another common feeling — or, as we do not scruple 
 to call it, another emotion — which is perhaps quite as often 
 appealed to in this way; though, as we believe, never in 
 quite the same connection in any argument in which the 
 two experiences are called upon to do service to the same 
 end. Material objects, we are told, are reliable and stable 
 as distinguished from the fleeting illusive images of a 
 dream — they have a "solidity" in virtue of which one 
 can "depend upon them," are "hard and fast" remaining 
 faithfully where one deposits them for future use or, if they 
 change and disappear, doing so in accordance with fixed 
 
 1 Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 5. 2 See p. 253 above. 
 
/ 
 
 264 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 laws which make the changes calculable in advance. The 
 material realm is the realm of "solid fact" in which one can 
 work with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their 
 right and proper effects, and to which one willingly returns 
 from the dream-world in which his adversary, the "idealist," 
 would hold him spellbound. We propose now briefly to 
 consider these two modes of apprehension of external physi- 
 cal reality in the light of the general analysis of judgment 
 given above — from which it will appear that they are, psy- 
 chologically, emotional expressions of what have been set 
 forth as the essential features of the judgment-situation, 
 whether in its physical, ethical, or economic forms. From 
 this we shall argue that there should actually be in the ethi- 
 cal and economic spheres similar, or essentially identical, 
 "emotions of reality," and we shall then proceed to verify 
 the hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic 
 experiences which answer the description. 
 
 We have seen that the center of attention or subject in 
 the judgment-process is as such problematic — in the sense 
 that there are certain of its observed and recognized attri- 
 butes which make it in some sense relevant and useful to the 
 purpose in hand, while yet other of its attributes (or absences 
 of certain attributes) suggest conflicting activities. The 
 object which one sees is certainly a stone and of convenient 
 size for hurling at the pursuing animal. The situation has 
 been analyzed and found to demand a missile, and this 
 demand has led to search for and recognition of a stone. 
 The stone, however, may be of a color suggesting a soft and 
 crumbling texture, or its form may appear from a distance 
 to be such as to make it practically certain to miss the mark, 
 however carefully it may be aimed and thrown. Until these 
 points of diflBculty have been ascertained, the stone is want- 
 ing still in certain essential determinations. So far as it has 
 been certainly determined, it prompts to the response directly 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 265 
 
 suggested by one's general end of defense and escape, but 
 there are these other indications which hold this response in 
 check and which, if verified, will cause the stone to be let lie 
 unused. Now, we have, in this situation of conflict or ten- 
 sion between opposed incitements given by the various dis- 
 criminated characters of the object, the explanation of the 
 aspect of obtrusiveness, of arbitrary resistance to and inde- 
 pendence of one's will, which for the time being seems the 
 unmistakable mark or coefficient of the thing's objectivity. 
 For it is not the object as a whole that is obtrusive ; indeed, 
 clearly, there could be no obtrusiveness on the part of an 
 "object as a whole," and in such a case there could also be 
 no judgment. The obtrusion in the case before us is not a 
 sense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put 
 forth upon a coerced and helpless human will, but simply 
 a conscious interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the 
 agent's motor tendencies by certain others prompted by the 
 object's "suspicious" and as yet undetermined appearances 
 or possible attributes. The object as amenable to use — 
 those of its qualities which taken by themselves are unques- 
 tionable and clearly conducive to the agent's purpose — 
 needs no attention for the moment, let us say. The 
 attention is rather upon the dubious and to all appearance 
 unfavorable qualities, and these for the time being make up 
 the sum and content of the agent's knowledge of the object. 
 On the other hand, the agent as an active self is identified 
 with the end and with those modes of response to the 
 object which promise to contribute directly to its realiza- 
 tion. It is in this direction that his interest is set and he 
 strains with all his powers of mind to move, and it is upon 
 the self as identified with, and for the time being expressed 
 in, the "effort of the agent's will" that the object as resist- 
 ant, refusing to be misconstrued, obtrudes. One must see 
 the object and must acknowledge its apparent, or in the end 
 
266 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 its ascertained, unfitness. One is "coerced." The situation 
 is one of conflict, and it is out of the conflict that the essen- 
 tially emotional experience of "resistance" emerges.' The 
 the more special emotions of impatience, anger, or discour- 
 agement may in a given case not be present or may be sup- 
 pressed, but the emotion of objectivity will still remain.^ 
 
 On the same general principles the other of our two 
 coeflBcients of reality may be explained. Let us assume that 
 the stone in our illustration has at last been cleared of all 
 ambiguity in its suggestion, having been taken as a missile, 
 and that the man in flight now holds it ready awaiting the 
 most favorable moment for hurling it at his pursuer. It 
 will hardly be maintained that under these conditions the 
 coefficient of the stone's reality as an object consists in its 
 obtrusiveness, in its resistance to or coercion of the self. 
 The stone is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature 
 of the situation — a condition which can be counted on, 
 whatever else may fail. Over against other still uncertain 
 aspects of the situation (which are now in their turn real 
 because resistant, coercive, and obtrusive) stands the stone 
 as a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can 
 build up the whole plan of conduct which may, if all goes 
 well, bring him safely out of his predicament. The stone 
 has, so to speak, passed over to the " end " side of the situa- 
 tion, and although it may have to be rejected for some other 
 
 1 It is not so much the case that the object, on the one side, excites in the agent's 
 consciousness, on the other, the " sensations of resistance " which have played such 
 a part in recent controversy on the subject, as that (1) the object in certain of its 
 promptings is "resisting" certain other of its promptings, or that (2) certain 
 "positive" activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain "negative" activi- 
 ties, thereby giving rise to the "emotion of resistance." That "positive" and 
 "negative" are here used in a teleological way will be apparent. It is surely mis- 
 leading to speak of '■^ sensatioTis of resistance " even in deprecatory quotation marks, 
 except as " sensation " is used in its everyday meaning, viz., experience of strongly 
 sensory quality. 
 
 ' The general theory of emotion which is here presupposed, and indeed is funda- 
 mental to the entire discussion, may bo found in Peofessoe Dewey's papers on 
 " The Theory of Emotion," Psychological Review, Vol. I, p. 553; Vol. II, p. 13. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 267 
 
 means of defense, as the definition of the situation proceeds 
 and the plan of action accordingly changes (as in some degree 
 it probably must), nevertheless for the time being the imaged 
 activities as stimulus to which the stone is now accepted are 
 a fixed part of the plan and guide in further judgment of 
 the means still undefined. The agent can hardly recur to 
 the stone, when, after attending for a time to the bewilder- 
 ing perplexities of the situation, he pauses once more to take 
 an inventory of his certain resources, without something of 
 an emotional thrill of assurance and encouracrement. In 
 this emotional appreciation of the " solidity" and "dependa- 
 bility" of the object the second of our coefficients of reality 
 consists. This might be termed the Recognition, the other 
 the Perception, coefficient. Classifying them as emotions, 
 because both are phenomena of tension in activity, we should 
 group the Perception coefficient with emotions of the Con- 
 traction type, like grief and anger, and the Recognition 
 coefficient with the Expansion emotions, like joy and triumph. 
 Now, in the foregoing interpretation no reference has 
 been made to any conditions peculiar to the physical type of 
 judgment-situation. The ground of explanation has been 
 the feature of arrest of activity for the sake of reconstruction, 
 and this, if our analyses have been correct, is the essence of 
 the ethical and economic situations as well as of the physi- 
 cal. Can there then be found in these two spheres experi- 
 ences of the same nature and emerging under the same 
 general conditions as our Perception and Recognition coeffi- 
 cients of reality? If so, then our case for the objective 
 significance and value of ethical and economic judgment is 
 in so far strengthened. (1) In the first place, then, the 
 object in its economic character is problematic, assuming 
 a desire on the agent's part to apply it, as means, to some 
 new or freshly interesting end, because it has already been, 
 and accordingly now is, set apart for other uses and cannot 
 
268 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 thoughtlessly be withdrawn from them. Extended illustra- 
 tion is not needed to remind one that these established and 
 hitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic con- 
 science as obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of eco- 
 nomic conduct with as much energy of resistance as in the 
 other case will any of the contrary promptings of a physical 
 object. Moreover, the Recognition coefficient may as easily 
 be identified in this connection. If one's scruples gain the 
 day, in such a case one has at least a sense of comforting 
 assurance in the conservatism of his choice and its accord- 
 ance with the facts, however unreconciled in another way 
 one may be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be 
 necessary. If, however, the new end in a measure makes 
 good its case and the modes of expenditure which the " scru- 
 ples" represented have been readjusted in accordance with it, 
 then the means, no less than before the new interpretation had 
 been placed upon them, will enjoy the status of Reality in 
 the economic sense. They will be real now, however, not in 
 the obtrusive way, as presenting aspects which inhibit the 
 leading tendency in the judgment-process, but, instead, as 
 means having a fixed and certain character in one's economic 
 life, which, after the hesitation and doubt just now super- 
 seded, one may safely count upon and will do well to keep 
 in view henceforth. (2) In the second place, mere mention 
 of the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice, since 
 only extended illustration from literature and life would be 
 fully adequate: on the one hand, the "still small voice" of 
 Conscience or the authoritativeness of Duty, "stern daugh- 
 ter of the voice of God;" and, on the other, the restful 
 assurance with which, from the vantage-ground of a satisfy- 
 ing decision, one may look back in wonder at the possibility 
 of so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won 
 freedom from a burdensome and repressive prejudice. 
 
 This must for the present serve as positive exposition of 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 269 
 
 our view as to the objective significance of the valuational 
 
 types of judgment. There are certain essential points which 
 
 have as yet not been touched upon, and there are certain 
 
 objections to the general view the consideration of which 
 
 will serve further to explain it ; but the discussion of these 
 
 various matters will more conveniently follow the special 
 
 analysis of the valuational judgments, to which we shall now 
 
 proceed. 
 
 IV 
 
 In the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective 
 thought is the progressive determination of the ends of 
 conduct. Physical judgment, or, in psychological terms, 
 reflective attention to objects in the physical world, is at 
 every turn directed and controlled by reference to a gradu- 
 ally developing purpose, so that the process may also be 
 described as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at 
 first vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and 
 determination of the means at hand. The problematic situa- 
 tion in which reflection takes its rise inevitably develops in 
 this two-sided way into consciousness of a definite end 
 on the one side, and of the means or conditions of attaining 
 it on the other. 
 
 It has been shown that there may be involved in any 
 finally satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit 
 reflection upon and definition of the controlling end which 
 is present and gives point and direction to the physical 
 determination. But very often such is not the case. When 
 a child sees a bright object at a distance and makes toward 
 it, availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance 
 as intervening articles of furniture may afford, there is of 
 course no consciousness on his part of any definite purpose 
 as such, and this is to say that the child does not subject his 
 conduct to criticism from the standpoint of the value of its 
 ends. There is simply strong desire for the distant red ball. 
 
270 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 controlling all the child's movements for the time being and 
 prompting a more or less critical inspection of the interven- 
 ing territory with reference to the easiest way of crossing 
 it. The purpose is implicitly accepted, not explicitly de- 
 termined, as a preliminary to physical determination of the 
 situation. If one may speak of a development of the pur- 
 pose in such a case as this, one must say that the develop- 
 ment into details comes through judgment of the environing 
 conditions. To change the illustration in order not to 
 commit ourselves to the ascription of too developed a 
 faculty of judgment to the child, this is true likewise of 
 any process of reflective attention in the mind of an adult in 
 which a general purpose is accepted at the outset and is car- 
 ried through to execution without reflection upon its ethical 
 or economic character as a purpose. The specific purpose 
 as executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose 
 with which the reflective process took its rise. It is filled 
 out with details, or may perhaps even be quite difiPerent in 
 its general outlines. There has necessarily been develop- 
 ment and perhaps even transformation, but our contention is 
 that all this has been effected in and through a process of 
 judgment in which the conditions of action, and not the 
 purpose itself, have been the immediate objects of determi- 
 nation. Upon these the attention has been centered, though 
 of course the attention was directed to them by the purpose. 
 To state the case in logical terms, it has been only through 
 selection and determination of the means and conditions of 
 action from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the 
 general purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose 
 itself had been rendered definite and practical and possible 
 of execution. Probably such cases are seldom to be found in 
 the adult experience. As a rule, the course of physical or 
 technological judgment will almost always bring to light 
 implications involved in the accepted purpose which must 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process '271 
 
 inevitably raise ethical and economic questions; and the 
 resolution of these latter will in turn afford new points of 
 view for further physical determination of the situation. In 
 such processes the logical nature of the problem of ethical 
 and economic valuation comes clearly into view. 
 
 In our earlier account of the matter it was more con- 
 venient to use language which implied that ethical and 
 economic judgment must be preceded by implicit or explicit 
 acceptance of. a definite situation presented in sense- 
 perception, and that these evaluating judgments could be 
 carried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an 
 inventory of fixed conditions. Thus the ultimate ethical 
 quality of the general purpose of building a house would 
 seem to depend upon the precise form which this purpose 
 comes to assume after the actual presence and the quality of 
 the means of building have been ascertained and the eco- 
 nomic bearings of the proposed expenditure have been 
 considered. Surely it is a waste of effort to debate with 
 oneself upon the ethical rightness of a project which is physi- 
 cally impossible or else out of the question from the economic 
 point of view. We are, however, now in a position to see 
 that this way of looking at the matter is both inaccurate and 
 self-contradictory. In the actual development of our pur- 
 poses there is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of 
 stages; and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a 
 purpose that is physically impossible, it may, with still 
 greater force, be argued that we cannot find, and judge the 
 fitness of, the necessary physical means until we know what, 
 precisely, it is that we wish to do. The truth is that there is 
 constant interplay and interaction between the various phases 
 of the inclusive judgment-process, or rather, more than this, 
 that there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implica- 
 tion. It is indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take 
 form in a vacuum apart from consideration of their physical 
 
272 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 and economic possibility, but it is also true that our physical 
 and economic problems are ultimately meaningless and 
 impossible, whether of statement or of solution, except as 
 they are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical 
 conflict. 
 
 We have, then, to do, in the present division, with situa- 
 tions in which, whether at the outset or from time to time 
 during the course of the reflective process, there is explicit 
 conflict between ends of conduct. These situations are the 
 special province of the judgment of valuation. Our line of 
 argument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows: 
 
 1. The judgment of valuation, whether expressed in terms 
 of the individual experience or in terms of social evolution, is 
 essentially the process of the explicit and deliberate resolu- 
 tion of conflict between ends. As an incidental, though 
 nearly always indispensable, step to the final resolution of 
 such conflict, physical judgment, or, in general, the judgment 
 of fact or existence, plays its part, this part being to define 
 the situation in terms of the means necessary for the execu- 
 tion of the end that is gradually taking form. The two 
 modes of judgment mutually incite and control each other, 
 and neither could continue to any useful purpose without 
 this incitement and control of the other. Both modes of 
 judgment are objective in content and significance. At the 
 end of the reflective process and immediately upon the verge 
 of execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the 
 result may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways : 
 (1) directly, in terms of the end, and (2) indirectly, in terms 
 or the ordered system of existent means which have been dis- 
 covered, determined, and arranged. If such final survey of 
 the result be taken by way of preparation for action, or for 
 whatever reason, the end will be apprehended as possessing 
 ethical value and the means, under conditions later to be 
 specified, as possessing economic value. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 273 
 
 2. What then is the nature and source of this apprehen- 
 sion of end or means as valuable ? The consciousness of end 
 or means as valuable is an emotional consciousness expressive 
 of the agent's practical attitude as determined in the just 
 completed judgment of ethical or economic valuation and 
 arising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the 
 activities which constitute the attitude by the effort of 
 apprehending or imaging the valued object. Ethical and 
 economic value are thus strictly correlative; psychologically 
 they are emotional incidents of apprehending in the two 
 respective ways just indicated the same total result of the 
 inclusive complex judgment- process. Finally, as the mo- 
 ment of action comes on, the consciousness of the ethically 
 valued end lapses first; then the consciousness of economic 
 value is lost in a purely "physical," i.e., technological, con- 
 sciousness of the means and their properties and interrela- 
 tions in the ordered system which has been arranged; and 
 this finally merges into the immediate and undifferentiated 
 consciousness of activity as use of the means becomes sure 
 and unhesitating. 
 
 When we say that the ends which oppose each other in an 
 ethical situation (that is, a situation for the time being seen in 
 an ethical aspect) are related, and the ends in an economic 
 situation are not, we by no means wish to imply that in the one 
 case we have in this fact of relatedness a satisfactory solution 
 at hand which is wanting in the other. To feel, for example, 
 that there is a direct and inherent relationship between a 
 cherished purpose of self-culture and an ideal of social service 
 which seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose 
 does not mean that one yet knows just how the two ends should 
 be related in his life henceforth; and again, to say that one 
 can see no inherent relation between a desire for books and 
 pictures and the need of food, excepting in so far as both ends 
 depend for their realization upon a limited supply of means, 
 
214: Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 is not to say that the issue of the conflict is not of ethical 
 significance. Such a view as we here reject would amount to 
 a denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic ethical 
 situations ^ and would accord with the opinion that economic 
 judgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is 
 at most subject only to occasional revision and control in the 
 light of ethical considerations. 
 
 By the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the 
 fact, more or less explicitly recognized by the agent, that the 
 new, and as yet undefined, purpose which has arisen belongs 
 in the same system with the end, or group of ends, which 
 the standard inhibiting immediate action represents. The 
 standard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse that has 
 come to consciousness, and the image of the new end is, on 
 its part, definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in 
 obedience to the standard. The relatedness of the two 
 factors is shown in a practical way by the fact that, in the 
 first instance at least, they are tacitly expected to work out 
 their own adjustment. By the process already described in 
 outline, subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby 
 to approach each other, and a provisional or partial solution 
 of the problem may thus be reached without resort to any 
 other method than that of direct comparison and adjustment 
 of the ends involved on either side. The standard which 
 has been called in question has enough of congruence with 
 the new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress 
 toward a solution through this method. 
 
 We can best come to an understanding of this recogni- 
 tion of the relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by 
 pausing to examine somewhat carefully into the conditions 
 involved in the acceptance or reflective acknowledgment of 
 a defined end of conduct as being one's own. Any new end 
 
 1 Such is, in fact, the teaching of the various forms of ethical intuitionism, 
 and we find it not merely implied, but explicitly affirmed, in a work in many respects 
 so remote from intuitionism in its standpoint as Green's Prolegomena to Ethics. 
 See pp. 178-81, and especially pp. 355-9. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 275 
 
 in coming to consciousness encounters some more or less 
 firmly established habit represented in consciousness by a 
 sign or symbolic image of some sort, the habit being itself 
 the outcome of past judgment-process. Our present problem 
 is the significance of the agent's recognition of a relatedness 
 between his new impulsive end and the end which represents 
 the habit, and we shall best approach its solution by consider- 
 ing the various factors and conditions involved in the agent's 
 conscious recognition of the established end as being such. 
 
 In any determinate end there is inevitably implied a 
 number of groups of factual judgments in which are pre- 
 sented the objective conditions under which execution of the 
 end or purpose must take place. There is in the first place 
 a general view of environing conditions, physical and social, 
 presented in a group of judgments (1) descriptive of the 
 means at hand, of the topography of the region in which the 
 purpose is to be carried out, of climatic conditions, and the 
 like, and (2) descriptive of the habits of thought and feeling 
 of the people with whom one is to deal, their prejudices, 
 their tastes, and their institutions. The project decided on 
 may, let us say, be an individual or a national enterprise, 
 whether philanthropic or commercial, which is to be launched 
 in a distant country peopled by partly civilized races. In 
 addition to these groups of judgments upon the physical and 
 sociological conditions under which the work must proceed, 
 there will also be a more or less adequate and impartial 
 knowledge of one's own physical and mental fitness for the 
 enterprise, since the work as projected may promise to tax 
 one's physical powers severely and to require, for its suc- 
 cessful conduct, large measure of industry, devotion, patience, 
 and wisdom. Indeed any determinate purpose whatever 
 inevitably implies a more or less varied and comprehensive 
 inventory of conditions. Further illustration is not neces- 
 sary for our present purpose. We may say that in a general 
 
276 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 way the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will ^roup 
 themselves naturally under four heads of classification, as 
 physical, sociological, physiological, and psychological. All 
 four classes are objective, though the last two embrace con- 
 ditions peculiar to the agent as an individual over against 
 the environment to which for purposes of his present activity 
 he stands in a sense opposed. 
 
 Now our present interest is not so much in the enumera- 
 tion and classification of possible relevant conditions in a typi- 
 cal situation as in the significance of these relevant conditions 
 in the agent's apprehension of them. Perhaps this signifi- 
 cance cannot better be described than by saying that essen- 
 tially and impressively the conditions are apprehended as, 
 taken together, warranting the purpose that has been de- 
 termined. We appeal, in support of this account of the 
 matter, to an impartial introspection of the way in which 
 the means and conditions of action stand related to the 
 formed purpose in the moment of survey of a situation. The 
 various details presented in the survey of a situation are 
 apprehended, not as bare facts such as one might find set 
 down in a scientist's notebook, but as warranting — as closely, 
 uniquely, and vitally relevant to — the action that is about to 
 be taken. This, as we believe, is a fair account of the situa- 
 tion in even the commoner and simpler emergencies that 
 confront the ordinary man. Quite conspicuously is it true 
 of cases in which the purpose is a purely technological one 
 that has been worked out with considerable difficulty and is 
 therefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey 
 of conditions has been taken. It is often true likewise in 
 cases of express ethical judgment; if the ethical phases of 
 the reflective process have not been excessively long and 
 difficult, our definite sense of the ethical value of the act we 
 are about to do lapses quite easily, and the factual aspects 
 and features of the situation as given in one or more of the 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 277 
 
 four classes which we have distinguished take on an access 
 of significance in their character of warranting, confirming, 
 or even compelling the act determined upon. Of our ordi- 
 nary sense-perception in the moments of its actual function- 
 ing no less than of conscience in its aspect of a moral 
 perceptive faculty are the words of Bishop Butler sensibly 
 true that "to preside and govern, from the very economy 
 and constitution of man, belongs to it."' Even in cases of 
 more serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the 
 means and conditions of action is not overshadowed. If the 
 situation is one in which by reason of their complexity these 
 play a conspicuous rOle and must be surveyed, by way of 
 preparation on the agents' part, for performance of the act, 
 they inevitably assume, for the agent, their proper functional 
 character. In general, the conditions presented in the 
 system of factual judgments have a certain "rightful author- 
 ity" which they seem to lend to the purpose or end with 
 reference to which they were worked out to their present 
 degree of factual detail. The conditions can thus seem to 
 sanction the end because conditions and end have been 
 worked out together. Gradual development on the one side 
 prompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn 
 directed and advanced by the results of this inquiry. In 
 the end the result may be read off either in terms of end or in 
 terms of conditions and means.^ The two readinsfs must be 
 in accord and the agent's apprehension of the conditions as 
 warrant for the end is expression in consciousness of this 
 
 153 
 
 "agreement. 
 
 Now in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions 
 there is a highly important logical implication — an implica- 
 
 1 Sermon II. 
 
 2 Not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the distinction of con- 
 ditions and means is other than a convenient superficial one. 
 
 3 Manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction tha " Becog- 
 nition coefficient " of reality described above. See p. 266. 
 
278 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 tion which inevitably comes more and more clearly into view 
 with the continued exercise of judgment, even though the 
 agent's habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing situ- 
 ations may still remain, by reason of the want of trained 
 capacity for a broader view, limited in its range quite strictly 
 to the physical sphere. This implication is, we shall declare 
 at once, that of an endeavoring, striving, active principle or 
 self which can be helped or hindered in its unfolding by 
 particular purposes and sets of corresponding conditions — 
 can lose or gain, through devotion to particular purposes, in 
 the breadth, fulness, and energy of its life. The agent's 
 apprehension of and reference to this active principle of 
 course varies in all degrees of explicitness, according to cir- 
 cumstances, from the vague awareness that is present in a 
 simple case of physical judgment to the clear recognition and 
 endeavor at definition that are characteristic of serious 
 ethical crises. 
 
 That the situation should develop and bring to light this 
 factor is what should be expected on general grounds of 
 logic — for to say that a set of conditions warrants or sanctions 
 or confirms a given purpose implies that our purposes can 
 stand in need of warrant, and this would seem to be impos- 
 sible apart from reference to a process whose maintenance and 
 development in and through our purposes are assumed as being 
 as a matter of course desirable. It is of the essence of our con- 
 tention that the apprehension of the conditions of action as 
 warranting the end is a primordial and necessary feature of 
 the situation — indeed, its constitutive feature. If our concern 
 were with the psychological development of self-consciousness 
 as a phase of reflective experience, we should endeavor to show 
 that this development is mediated in the first instance by the 
 "subjective" phenomena of feeling, emotion, and desire 
 which find their place m the course of the judgment-process. 
 We should then hold that, with the conclusion of the judg- 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 279 
 
 ment-process and the accompanying sense of the known 
 conditions as reassuring and confirmatory of the end, comes 
 the earliest possibility of a discriminative recognition of the 
 self as having been all along a necessary factor in the 
 process. We should hold that outside of the process of re- 
 flective attention there can be no psychical or "elementary" 
 beginnings of self -consciousness, and then that, except as 
 a development out of the experience to which we have re- 
 ferred as marking the conclusion of the attentive process, 
 there can be no recognized specific and in any degree defin- 
 able consciousness of self. All this, however, lies rather 
 beside our present purpose. We wish simply to insist that 
 it is out of the apprehension of conditions as reassuring and 
 confirmatory, out of this "primordial germ," that the agent's 
 definite recognition of himself as a center of development 
 and expenditure of energy takes its rise. Here are the 
 beginnings of the possibility of self-conscious ethical and 
 economic valuation. 
 
 This apprehension of the means as warranting is, we have 
 held, a fact even when the means surveyed are wholly of the 
 physical sort, and we have thereby implied that consciousness 
 of the self as "energetic" may take its rise in situations of 
 this type or during the physical stage in the development of 
 a more complex total situation. It would be an interesting 
 speculation to consider to what extent and in what way the 
 development of the sciences of sociology and pliysiology may 
 have been essentially facilitated by the emergence of this 
 form of self -consciousness. But however the case may stand 
 with these sciences or with the rise of real interest in them 
 in the mind of a given individual, interest in the objective 
 psychological conditions of a contemplated act is certainly 
 very closely dependent upon interest in that subjective self 
 which one has learned to know through the past exercise of 
 judgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of 
 
280 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 the three other kinds. The more diversified and complex 
 the array of physical and social conditions with reference to 
 which one is to act, the more important becomes not simply 
 a clearly articulated knowledge of these, but also a knowledge 
 of oneself. The self that is warranted in its purpose by the 
 surveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and consistent 
 attitude during the performance on pain of "falling short of 
 its opportunity" and thereby rendering nugatory the reflect- 
 ive process in which the purpose was worked out. Experi- 
 ence abundantly shows how easily the assurance that comes 
 with the survey of conditions may come to grief, though 
 there may have been on the side of the conditions, so far as 
 defined, no visible change ; and in so far as self-consciousness 
 has already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such 
 situations, failures of the sort we here refer to are the more 
 easily identified and interpreted. Some sudden impulse may 
 have broken in upon the execution of the chosen purpose; 
 there may have been an unexpected shift of interest away 
 from that general phase of life which the purpose repre- 
 sented ; or in any one of a number of other ways may have 
 come about a wavering and a slackening in the resolution 
 which marked the commencement of action. The "energetic" 
 self forthwith (if we may so express it) recognizes that the 
 sanction which the conditions so far as then known gave to 
 its purpose was a misleading because an incomplete one, and 
 it proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective 
 fact in which may be worked out the explanation, and thereby 
 a method of control, of these new disturbing phenomena. 
 The qualities of patience under disappointment, courage in 
 encountering resistance, steadiness and self-control in sus- 
 tained and difficult effort — these qualities and others of like 
 nature come to be discriminated from each other by intro- 
 spective analysis and may be as accurately measured, and in 
 general as objectively studied, as any of the conditions to a 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 281 
 
 saving knowledge and respect of which one may already 
 have attained, and these newly determined psychological 
 conditions will henceforth play the same part in affording 
 sanction to one's purposes as do the rest. An ordered system 
 of psychological categories or points of view comes to be 
 developed, and an accurate statement of conditions of per- 
 sonal disposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as 
 it arises will hereafter be worked out — over against and in 
 tension with one's gradually forming purposes in like manner 
 as are statements of all the other relevant objective aspects 
 of the situation.' 
 
 In the "energetic" self, we shall now seek to show, we 
 have the common and essential principle of both ethical and 
 economic valuation which marks these off from other and sub- 
 ordinate types of judgment. Let us determine as definitely 
 as possible the nature and function of this principle. 
 
 The recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable 
 or otherwise to the self, and so the recognition of the self as 
 capable of furtherance or retardation by its chosen purposes, 
 is not always a feature of the state of mind which may ensue 
 upon completed judgment. In the commoner situations of 
 the everyday life of normal persons, as practically always in 
 the lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers, 
 it is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the 
 experience. In such cases it is present, if present at all, 
 merely as the vaguely felt implicit meaning of the recogni- 
 tion that the known conditions sanction and confirm the 
 
 1 This, if it were intended as an account of the genesis of psycholosy as a science 
 and of the psychological interest on the part of the individual, would doubtless be 
 most inadequate. We have, for one thing, made no mention of the part which error 
 and resulting practical failure play in stimulating an interest in the ju<lgmental 
 processes of observation and the like, and in technique of the control of these. Here, 
 as well as in the processes of execution of our purposes, must bo found many of the 
 roots of psychology as a science. Moreover, no explanation has been offered above 
 for the appropriation by the "energetic" self of these phenomena of interruption 
 and retardation of its energy as being, in fact, its own, or within itself. The problem 
 would appear to be psychological, and so without our province, and we gladly pass 
 it by. 
 
 <;. 
 
282 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 purpose. Such situations yield easily to attack and threaten 
 none of those dangers, none of those possible occasions for 
 regret or remorse, of which complex situations make the per- 
 son of developed reflective capacity and long experience so 
 keenly apprehensive. They are disposed of with compara- 
 tively little of conscious reconstruction on either the subject or 
 the predicate side, and when a conclusion has been reached 
 the agent's recognition of the conditions carries with it the 
 comfortable though too often delusive assurance of the com- 
 plete and perfect eligibility of the purpose. If the question of 
 eligibility is raised at all, the answer is given on the tacit prin- 
 ciple that "whatever purpose is, is right." To the "plain 
 man," and to all of us on certain sides of our lives, every pur- 
 pose for which the requisite means and factual conditions are 
 found to be at hand is, just as our purpose, therefore right. 
 The same experience of failure and disappointment which 
 proves our purpose to have been, from the standpoint of 
 enlargement and enrichment of the self, a mistaken one 
 brings a clearer consciousness of the logic implicit in our 
 first confident belief in the purpose, and at the same time 
 emphasizes the need of making this logic explicit. The pur- 
 pose, as warranted to us by the conditions and assembled 
 means that lay before us, was our own, and as our own was 
 implicitly a purpose of furtherance of the self. The disap- 
 pointment that has come brings this implication more clearly 
 into view, and likewise the need of methodical procedure, 
 not as before in the determination of conditions, but in the 
 determination of purposes as such ; for the essence of the 
 situation is that the execution of the purpose has brought to 
 light some unforeseen consequence now recognized as having 
 been all the while in the nature of things involved in the 
 purpose. This consequence or group of consequences con- 
 sists (in general terms) in the abatement or arrest of desir- 
 able modes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere 
 
Valuation as a Logical Pkocess 283 
 
 in the agent's system of accepted ends, and it is registered 
 in consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression 
 from without which is a notable phase of all emotional experi- 
 ence, particularly in its early stages. The consequences are 
 as undesirable as they are unexpected, and the reaction against 
 them, at first emotional, presently passes over into the form 
 of a reflective interpretation of the situation to the effect that 
 the self has suffered a loss by reason of its thoughtless haste 
 in identifying itself with so unsafe a purpose.' 
 
 It is the essential logical function of the consciousness of 
 self to stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise 
 in the stage of reflective thought thus attained. The con- 
 sciousness of self is a peculiarly bafiling theme for discussion 
 from whatever point of view, because one finds its meaning 
 shifting constantly between the two extremes of a subjec- 
 tivity to which "all objects of all thought" are external and 
 an objective thing or system of energies which is known just 
 as other things are — known in a sense by itself, to be sure, 
 but known nevertheless, and thought of as an object standing 
 in possible relations to other objects. Now, it is of the 
 subjective self that we are speaking when we say that its 
 essential function is the stimulation or incitement of the 
 valuation processes, but manifestly in order to serve thus it 
 must nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous 
 'imagery. The subjective self may, in fact, be thought of in 
 many ways — presented in many different sorts of imagery — 
 but in all its forms it must be distinguished carefully from 
 
 1 We can, of course, undertake no minute analysis of the psychological mechan- 
 ism or concatenation of the process here sketched in barest outline. Our present 
 purpose is wholly that of description. Slight as our account of the process of transi- 
 tion is, we give it space only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make 
 intelligible the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for 
 which the movement here described prepares the way. 
 
 It will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is successful as 
 planned and by succeeding brings about the undesirable results. Failure in eiecu. 
 tion of the purpose as such could only, in the manner already outlined, prompt a 
 more adequate investigation of the factual conditions. 
 
284 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 that objective self which, as described in psychology, is the 
 assemblage of conditions under which the subjective or 
 "energetic" self works out its purposes. It may be the 
 pale, attenuated double of the body, or a personal being 
 standing in need of deliverance from sin, or an atom of 
 soul-substance, or, in our present terminology, a center of 
 developing and unfolding energy. The significant fact is 
 that, however different in content and in motive these various 
 presentations of the subjective self may be, they are, one and 
 all, as presentations and as in so far objective, stimuli to 
 some definite response. The savage warrior deposits his 
 double in a tree or stone for safety while he goes into battle ; 
 the self that is to be saved from sin is a self that prompts 
 certain acceptable acts in satisfaction of the quasi-legal obli- 
 gations that the fact of sin has laid upon the agent. The 
 presented self, whatever the form it may assume as presen- 
 tation, has its function, and this function is in general that 
 of stimulus to the conservation and increase, in some sense, 
 of the self that is not presented, but for whom the presen- 
 tation is. Now our own present description of the self as 
 "energetic," as a center or source of developing and unfold- 
 ing energy is in its way a presentation. It consists of 
 sensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process, or the 
 growth of a plant perhaps, which if properly safeguarded 
 will go on satisfactorily — a process which one must not 
 allow to be perturbed or hindered by external resistance or 
 internal friction or to run down. To many persons doubt- 
 less such an account would seem arbitrary and fantastic in 
 the extreme, but no great importance need be attached to 
 its details. The kind and number and sensuous vividness 
 of the details in which this essential content of presentation 
 may be clothed must of course depend, for each person, upon 
 his psychical idiosyncrasy. 
 
 Indeed, as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 285 
 
 to be more firmly fixed, and the procedure of valuation to be 
 consciously methodical and orderly, the sensuous content of 
 the presented self must grow constantly more and more 
 attenuated until it has declined into a mere unexpressed 
 principle or maxim or tacit presumption, prescribing the free 
 and impartial application of the method of valuation to 
 particular practical emergencies as these arise. For a self, 
 consisting of presented content of whatever sort, which one 
 seeks to further through attentive deliberation upon con- 
 crete purposes, must, just in so far as it has content, deter- 
 mine the outcome of ethical judgment in definite ways. 
 Thus the soul that must be saved from sin (if this be the 
 content of the presented self) is one that has transgressed 
 the law in certain ways and the right relations that should 
 subsist between creature and Creator, and has thereby 
 incurred a more or less technically definable guilt. This 
 guilt can only be removed and the self rehabilitated in its 
 normal relations to the law by an appropriate response to the 
 situation — by a choice on the agent's part, first, of a certain 
 technical procedure of repentance, and then of a settled 
 purpose of living as the law prescribes.' So also our own 
 image of the self as "energetic" after the manner of a 
 growing organism may well seem, if taken too seriously as 
 to its presentational details, to foster a bias in favor of over- 
 conservative adherence to the established and the accredited 
 as such.^ 
 
 The argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated 
 
 1 The case is not essentially altered in logical character if for the Levitical law 
 be substituted the general principles of the new dispensation read off into details 
 by an authoritative church or by " private judgment." 
 
 2 A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self, we have 
 said, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor of a certain type of 
 logical procedure in dealing with the situation. It must be remembered that the 
 presented self, like all other presentation, is and comes to be for the sake of its 
 function in experience, and so is practical from the start. The process sketched 
 above is therefore not from bare presented content as such to a methodological 
 presumption, which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively dif- 
 ferent from what preceded it. 
 
286 Studies in Logical Theoby 
 
 in the following way in terms of the evolution of the indi- 
 vidual's moral attitude or technique of self-control: 
 
 1. In the stage of moral evolution in which custom and 
 authority are the controlling principles of conduct, moral 
 judgment in the proper sense of self-conscious, critical, and 
 reconstructive valuation of purposes is wanting. Such judg- 
 ment as finds here a place is at best of the merely casuistical 
 type, looking to a determination of particular cases as falling 
 within the scope of fixed and definite concepts. There is no 
 self-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the 
 sentiment of willing obedience. It is, at this stage, not the 
 particular sort of conduct which the law prescribes that in 
 the agent's apprehension enlarges and develops the self; so 
 far as any thought of enlargement and development of the 
 self plays a part in influencing conduct, these eflPects are such 
 as, in the agent's trusting faith, will come from an entire and 
 willing acceptance of the law as such. "If any man will do 
 His will, he shall know of the doctrine." Moreover, the stage 
 of custom and authority goes along with, in social evolution, 
 either very simple social conditions or else conditions which, 
 though very complex, are stable, so that in either case the 
 conditions of conduct are in general in harmony with the 
 conduct which custom and authority prescribe. The law, 
 therefore, can be absolute and takes no account of possible 
 inability to obey. The divine justice punishes infraction of 
 the law simply as objective infraction ; not as sin, in propor- 
 tion to the sinner's responsibility. 
 
 2. But inevitably custom and authority come to be inade- 
 quate. As social conditions change, custom becomes anti- 
 quated and authority blunders, wavers, contradicts itself in 
 the endeavor to prescribe suitable modes of individual con- 
 duct. Obedience no longer is the way to light. The self 
 becomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the 
 repression and the misdirection of its energies that obedi- 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 287 
 
 ence now involves. This is the stage of subjective morality 
 or conscience; and the rise of conscience, the attitude of 
 appeal to conscience, means the beginning of endeavor at 
 methodical solution of those new problematic situations in the 
 attempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably 
 collapsed. We say, however, that conscience is the begin- 
 ning of this endeavor; for conscience is, in fact, an ambigu- 
 ous and essentially transitional phenomenon. On the one 
 hand conscience is the inner nature of a man speaking 
 within him, and so the self furthers its own growth in listen- 
 ing to this expression of itself. In this aspect conscience is 
 methodological. But on the other hand conscience speaks, 
 and, speaking, must say something determinate, however 
 general this something may be. In this aspect conscience is 
 a r^sum^ of the generic values realized under the system of 
 custom and authority, but to the present continued attainment 
 of which the particular prescriptions of custom and author- 
 ity are no longer adequate guides. Conscience is thus at 
 once an inward prompting to the application of logical 
 method to the case in hand and a body of general or specific 
 rules under some one of which the case can be subsumed. 
 In ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity as to the 
 nature of conscience. At the one extreme it is the voice of 
 God speaking in us or through us, in detailed and specific 
 terms — and so, virtually, custom and authority in disguise. 
 At the other it is an empty abstract intuition that the right 
 is binding upon us — and, so, simply the hypostasis of 
 demand for a logical procedure. The history of ethics 
 presents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in 
 which these extreme motives are more or less skilfully inter- 
 woven or combined in varying proportions. The truth is 
 that conscience is essentially a transitional conception, and 
 so necessarily looks before and after. In one of its aspects 
 it is a self which has come to miss (and therefore to image 
 
288 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 for itself) the values and, it may be, a certain dawning sense 
 of vitality and growth which obedience to authority once 
 afforded.' In its other aspect it is a self that is looking for- 
 ward in a self-reliant way to the determination on its own 
 account of its purposes and values. And finally, as for the 
 environing world of means and conditions, clearly this is not 
 necessarily harmonious with and amenable to conscience; 
 indeed, in the nature of things it can be only partially so. 
 The morality of conscience is, therefore, either mystical, a 
 morality that seeks to escape the world in the very moment 
 of its afiirmation that the world is unreal (because worthless), 
 or else it takes refuge in a virtual distinction between "abso- 
 lute" and "relative" morality (to borrow a terminology from 
 a system in which properly it should have no place), perhaps 
 setting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a 
 machinery of special dispensation.^ 
 
 3. Conscience professes in general, that is, to be autono- 
 mous, and the profession is, strictly speaking, a contradiction 
 in terms. Moreover, apart from considerations of the logic 
 of the situation, theories of conscience have, as a matter of 
 fact, always lent themselves kindly to theological purposes 
 just as the theory of self-realization in its classic modern 
 statement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the Abso- 
 lute.^ Inevitably the movement concealed within this essen- 
 tially unstable conception must have its legitimate outcome 
 (1) in a clearing of the presented self of its fixed elements 
 of content, thus setting it free in its character of a non- 
 presentational principle of valuation, and (2) a setting apart 
 of these elements of content from the principle of valuation 
 
 1 Recognized authority is, of course, not the same thing by any means as 
 authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant. 
 
 2 We may bo pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no illustrations 
 of this slight sketch. 
 
 3 In fact, as suggested above, the Prolegomena to Ethics is in many respects 
 essentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism is of a modern discreetly 
 attenuated sort. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 289 
 
 as standards for reference and consultation rather than as 
 law to be obeyed. 
 
 We have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby 
 the "energetic" self comes to explicit recognition as stimu- 
 lus to the valuation-process with the three main stages in the 
 moral evolution of the individual and the race. We were 
 brought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion by our 
 endeavor to find out the factors involved in the first accept- 
 ance of a conscious purpose (or, indifferently, the subsequent 
 recognition of it as a standard) — an endeavor prompted by 
 the need of distinguishing, with a view to their special 
 analysis, the two types of valuation -process. We now return 
 to this problem. 
 
 The following illustration will serve our present undertak- 
 ing: A lawyer or man of business is struck by the great 
 need of honest men in public office, or has had his attention 
 in some impressive way called to the fact of great inequality 
 in the present distribution of wealth, and to the diverse evils 
 resulting therefrom. These facts hold his attention, perhaps 
 against his will, and at last suggest the thought of his mak- 
 ing some personal endeavor toward improvement of condi- 
 tions, political or social, as the case may be. On the other 
 hand, however, the man has before him the promise of a 
 successful or even brilliant career in his chosen occupation, 
 and is already in the enjoyment of a substantial income, which 
 is rapidly increasing. Moreover, he has a family growing 
 up about him, and he is not simply strongly interested in the 
 early training and development of his children, and desirous 
 of having himself some share in conducting it, but he sees 
 that the suitable higher education of his children will in a 
 few years make heavy demands upon his pecuniary means. 
 Here, then, we have a situation the analysis of which will 
 enable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical 
 and economic judgment. 
 
290 Studies in Logical Theoby 
 
 It is easy to see that we have here a conflict between 
 ends. On the one side is the thought of public service in 
 some important office or, let us say, the thought of bettering 
 society in a more fundamental way by joining the propa- 
 ganda of some proposed social reform. This end rests upon 
 certain social impulses in the man's nature and appeals to 
 him as strongly, we may fairly assume, as would any pur- 
 pose of immediate self-interest or self-indulgence, so that it 
 stands before him and urges him with an insistent pertinacity 
 that at first even puts him on his guard against it as a 
 temptation. Over against this concrete end or subject of 
 moral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbol- 
 ized in the ideals of regular and steady industry, of material 
 provision for family, of paternal duty toward children, of 
 scholarly achievement as lawyer or judge, and the like — 
 ideals which are indeed practical and personal, but which, as 
 they now function, are general or universal in character, 
 are lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which 
 belong to the new purpose which has just come to imagina- 
 tion and has brought these ideals into action on the predicate 
 side. Will this life of social agitation really be quite 
 "respectable," and befitting the character of a sober and 
 industrious man ? Will it enable me to support and educate 
 my children ? Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention 
 to their present care and training ? And will it not so warp 
 my nature, so narrow and concentrate my interests, as in a 
 measure to disqualify me for the right exercise of paternal 
 authority over them in years to come ? Moreover, will not a 
 life of agitation, of constant intercourse with minds and 
 natures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my 
 present professional associates, lower my intellectual and 
 moral standards, and so make of me in the end a less useful 
 member of society than I am at present ? These and other 
 questions like them present the issue in its earlier aspect. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 291 
 
 Presently, however, the tentative purpose puts in its defense, 
 appealing to yet other recognized ideals or standards of self- 
 sacrifice, benevolence, or social justice as witnesses in its 
 favor. The conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form, 
 as has already been explained. On the one hand we have 
 the undefined but strongly insistent concrete purpose; on 
 the other hand we have a number of symbolic concepts or uni- 
 versals standing for accepted and accredited habitual modes 
 of conduct. The problem is that of working the two sides 
 of the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan 
 of conduct which shall be at once concrete and particular, 
 as a plan chosen by way of solution of a given present 
 emergency, and universal, as having due regard for past 
 modes of conduct, and as itself worthy of consideration in 
 coping with future emergencies. 
 
 Now, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the eco- 
 nomic aspects of the situation which we have described? 
 We shall most satisfactorily do this through a consideration 
 of the various sorts of conditions and means of which account 
 must be taken in working the situation through to a solution, 
 or (to express it more accurately) the various sorts of con- 
 ditions and means which need to be defined over against the 
 purpose as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form. 
 
 We may say, first of all, that there are psychological 
 conditions which must be taken into consideration in the 
 case before us. Our thesis is that in so far as a situation gives 
 rise to the determination of psychological conditions and is 
 advanced along the way toward final solution through deter- 
 mination of these, the situation is an ethical one. In other 
 words, we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are 
 "related" in so far as they depend upon the same set of psycho- 
 logical conditions. In so far as these statements are not true 
 of the situation there must be a resort to economic judgment. 
 
 By the general questions suggested above as presenting 
 
292 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 themselves to the agent we have indicated in what way the 
 course of action taken must have regard to certain psycho- 
 logical considerations. Entering upon the new way of life 
 will inevitably lessen the agent's interest in his present 
 professional pursuits and so make difficult, and in the end 
 even irksome, any attempt at continuing in them either as a 
 partial means of livelihood or as a recreation. The new work 
 will be absorbing — as indeed it must be if it is to be worth 
 while. In the same way the man must recognize that his 
 nature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed in 
 capacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general 
 conditions of misery and suflPering does not dull their fine- 
 ness of sensibility to the special concerns and interests of 
 particular individuals. If he takes his suffering fellow-men 
 at large for his children, his own children will probably 
 suffer just in so far the loss of a father's special sympathy 
 and understanding care. And likewise he must be drawn 
 away and isolated from his friends, for it will be hard for 
 him, he must foresee, to hold free and intimate converse with 
 men whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own con- 
 trolling interest and for whose insensibility to the things 
 that move him so profoundly he must come more and more 
 to feel a certain impatience if not contempt. Not to enlarge 
 upon these possibilities and others of like nature, we must 
 see that reflection upon the situation must presently bring 
 to consciousness these various consequences of the kind of 
 action which is proposed and a recognition that the ground 
 of relation between them and the action proposed lies in 
 certain qualities and limitations of his own nature. These 
 latter are for him the general psychological conditions of 
 action, his "empirical self," the general nature of which he 
 has doubtless already come to be familiar with in many 
 former situations perhaps wholly different in superficial 
 aspect from from the present one. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 293 
 
 Now, just in BO far as there is this relation of mutual 
 exclusiveness between the end proposed and certain of the 
 standard ends or modes of conduct which are involved, judg- 
 ment will be by the direct or ethical method of adjustment 
 presently to be described. Let us assume accordingly that 
 a tentative solution of the problem has been reached to 
 the effect that a portion of the lawyer's time shall be given 
 to his profession and to his family life, and that the remain- 
 der shall be given to a moderate participation in the social 
 propaganda. Over against this tentative ethical solution, as 
 its warrant in the sense explained above, will stand in the 
 survey of the situation that may now be taken a certain 
 fairly definite disposition or Anlage of the capacities and 
 functions of the empirical self.' Now on the basis of the 
 ethical solution thus reached there will be further study of 
 the situation, perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to 
 carry the solution into practice, but more probably as a 
 further preparation for overt action. Forthwith it develops 
 that the compromise proposed will be impossible. Participa- 
 tion in the social agitation will excite hostility on the part 
 of the classes from which possible clients would come and 
 will cause distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details 
 of business among the lawyer's present clientage. There 
 are, in a word, a whole assemblage of "external" sociological 
 conditions (and we need not stop to speak of physical 
 conditions which co-operate with these and contribute to 
 their effect) which effectually veto the plan proposed. In 
 general these external conditions are such as to deprive the 
 agent of the means of living in the manner which the ethical 
 determination of the end proposes. In the present case, 
 unless some other more feasible compromise can be devised, 
 either the one extreme or the other must be chosen — either 
 continuance in the profession and the corresponding general 
 
 1 This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology as a science 
 of mental process. 
 
294 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 scheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon 
 such scant and precarious income as it may incidentally 
 afford. 
 
 We can now define the economic aspect of a situation in 
 terms of our present illustration. The end which the lawyer 
 had in view in a vague and tentative way was, as we saw, 
 defined with reference to his ethical standards — that is to 
 say, a certain measure of participation in the new work was 
 determined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion 
 to the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to 
 himself and to his family. In this sense, logically speaking, 
 a subject was defined to which a system of predicates, com- 
 prehended perhaps under the general predicate of right or 
 good, applies. Now, however, it appears, from the inspection 
 of the material and social environment, that the execution of 
 this purpose, perfectly in accord though it may be with the 
 spiritual capacities and powers of the agent, is possible only 
 on pain of certain other consequences, certain other sacri- 
 fices, which have not hitherto been considered. That a 
 half-hearted interest in his profession would still not prevent 
 his earning a moderate income from it was never questioned 
 in the ethical "first approximation" to a final decision, but 
 now the issue is fairly presented, and, as we must see, in a 
 very difficult and distressing way; for the essence of the 
 situation is that the ends now in conflict, that of earning a 
 living and caring for his family and that of laboring for the 
 social good, are not intrinsically (that is, from the stand- 
 point of the empirical self) incompatible. On the contrary, 
 these two ends are psychologically quite compatible, as the 
 outcome of the ethical judgment shows; only the "external" 
 conditions oppose them to each other. The difficulty of the 
 case lies, then, just in the fact that the conflicting ends, both 
 standing, as they do, for strong personal interests of the self, 
 nevertheless cannot be brought to an adjustment by the 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 295 
 
 direct method of an appportionment between them of the 
 "spiritual resources" or "energies" of the self. Instead, 
 the case is one calling for an apportionment of the external 
 means, and so, proximately, not for immediate determination 
 of the final end, but for economic determination of the means. 
 
 We come now to the task of describing, so far as this 
 may be possible, the judgment or valuation- processes which 
 correspond to the types of situation thus distinguished. We 
 are able now to see that these must be constructive processes, 
 in the sense that in and through them courses of conduct 
 adapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of 
 established standards with a new end which has arisen and 
 put in its claim for recognition. We can see, moreover, that 
 these valuation- processes effect a construction of a different 
 order from that given in factual judgment. Factual judg- 
 ment determines external objects as means or conditions 
 of action from standpoints suggested by the analysis and 
 development of ends. Judgments of valuation determine 
 concrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized 
 general purposes of the self — purposes which are general in 
 virtue of their having been taken by abstraction from con- 
 crete cases, in which they have received particular formula- 
 tion as purposes, and set apart as typical modes of conduct 
 in general serviceable to the "energetic" self.' Logically 
 factual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational; 
 when valuational judgment has become consciously deliber- 
 ate, this logical subordination becomes explicit and factual 
 judgment appears in its true character. Its essential func- 
 tion is that of presenting the conditions which sanction and 
 stimulate our ethically and economically determined pur- 
 poses.^ Finally, iu the construction of purposes and recon- 
 
 1 We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process here character- 
 ized in the barest logical terms. 
 
 2 Further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be deferred to 
 Part V. 
 
296 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 struction of standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion 
 and development of the "energetic" self controls — not as a 
 "presented" or contentual self prescribing particular modes 
 of conduct, but as a principle prescribing the greatest possible 
 openness to suggestion and an impartial application of the 
 method of valuation to the case in hand. As we have said, 
 in whatever sensuous image we figure the "energetic" self, 
 its essential character lies in its function of stimulating 
 methodical valuation. In place of the two-faced and ambigu- 
 ous "presented" self, which is characteristic of the stage 
 of conscience, we now have in the stage of valuation the 
 "energetic" self on the one hand and standards on the. other.* 
 We have now to consider the actual procedure of valua- 
 tion, and first the ethical form as above defined. Bearing 
 in mind that we are not concerned with cases of obedience 
 to authority or deference to conscience, let us take a case of 
 genuine moral conflict such as we were considering some 
 time since. Suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in 
 some form of amusement which he has been in the habit of 
 considering frivolous or absolutely wrong. The end, as soon 
 as imaged, or rather as the condition of its being imaged, 
 encounters past habits of conduct symbolized by standards — 
 standards which may be presented under a variety of forms, 
 a maxim learned in early childhood, the ideal of a Stoic 
 sage or Christian saint, the example of some friend, or a pre- 
 cept put in abstract terms, but which, however presented, 
 are essentially symbolic of established habits of thought or 
 action.^ Solution of such a problem proceeds, in general, 
 along two closely interwoven lines: (1) collation and com- 
 parison of cases recognized as conforming to the standard, 
 
 1 The relation of the empirical self to the " energetic " and to standards will 
 come in for statement in Part V in the connection just referred to. 
 
 2 It might be possible to construct a " logic " of those various types of working 
 moral standard in such a way as to show that in each type there is implied the one 
 next higher morphologically, and ultimately the highest — that is, some sort of con- 
 cept of the " energetic " self. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 297 
 
 with a view to determining the standard type of conduct in 
 a less ambiguous way, and (2) definition of the relations 
 between this type of conduct and other recognized types in 
 the catalogue of virtues. 
 
 Now, these two movements are in fact inseparable, for, 
 without reference to the entire system of virtues of which 
 the one now asserting itself is a member, the comparison of 
 cases with a view to definition of the virtue would be blind 
 and hopeless of any outcome. The agent in the case before 
 us desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profit- 
 able use of leisure time, but after all he may wonder whether 
 these ideals really require the austerities of certain mediaeval 
 saints or the Stoic apathy. The saint' feats of spiritual 
 athletics may have served a useful purpose, in ruder times, 
 as evidence of human power to lead a virtuous and thought- 
 ful life, but can such self-denial now be required of the 
 moral man? It is apparent, in short, that the superficially 
 conceived ideal must be analyzed. We must consider the 
 "spirit" of our saint or hero, not the letter of his conduct, 
 as we say, and in interpreting it make due allowance for the 
 conditions of the time in which he lived and the grade of 
 general intelligence of those he sought to edify. Whether 
 our standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly formu- 
 lated precept, the logic of the situation is the same in every 
 case of judgment. The analysis of a standard cannot pro- 
 ceed without the "synthesis" or co-ordination of the type of 
 conduct thereby defined with other distinguishable recog- 
 nized types of conduct into a comprehensive ideal of life as 
 a whole. In the last resort the implicit relations of all the ' 
 virtues will be made explicit in the process of defining accu- 
 rately any one of them. 
 
 In the last resort, then, the predicate of the ethical judg- 
 ment is the whole system of the recognized habits of the 
 agent, and each judgment -process is in its outcome a read- 
 
298 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 justment of the system to accommodate the new habit that 
 has been seeking admission. Both the old habits and the 
 new impulse have been modified in the process just as the 
 intension of a class term and the particular "subsumed" 
 under the class are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judg- 
 ment of sense-perception. We are once more able to see 
 that the process of ethical judgment or valuation is not a pro- 
 cess of subsumption or classification, of ascertaining the value 
 of particular modes of conduct, but on the contrary a process 
 of determining or assigning value. Each judgment process 
 means a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermina- 
 tion of the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of 
 the conduct whose emergence as a purpose gave rise to the 
 process. The moral experience is not essentially and in its 
 typical emergencies a recognition of values with a view to 
 shaping one's course accordingly, but rather a determining 
 or a fixation of values which shall serve for the time being, 
 but be subject at all times to re-appraisal. 
 
 If the present discussion were primarily intended as a 
 contribution to general ethical theory, it would be a part of 
 our purpose to show in detail that any formulation of an 
 ethical ideal in contentual "material" terms must always be 
 inadequate for practical purposes and hence theoretically 
 indefensible. This, as we believe, could be shown true of the 
 popularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedon- 
 ism in its various forms and the older systems of conscience 
 or the moral sense. These all are essentially fixed ideals 
 admitting of more or less complete specification in point 
 of content and regarded as tests or canons by appeal to 
 which the moral quality of any concrete act can be deduct- 
 ively ascertained. They are the ethical analogues of such 
 metaphysical principles as the Cartesian God or the Sub- 
 stance of Spinoza, and the logic implied in regarding them 
 as adequate standards for the valuation of conduct is the 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 299 
 
 logic whereby the Rationalist sought to deduce from con- 
 cepts the world of particular things. The present desidera- 
 tum in ethical theory would appear to be, not further attempts 
 at definition of a moral ideal of any sort, but the development 
 of a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in 
 which the results of more modern researches in the theory of 
 knowledge should be made use of — in which the concept of 
 self should play the part, not of the concept of Substance in 
 a rationalistic metaphysics,' but of such a principle as that of 
 the conservation of energy, for example, in scientific infer- 
 ence.^ 
 
 We have, then, in each readjustment of the activities of 
 the self a reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality — a 
 reconstruction which at the same time involves the assign- 
 ment of a definite value to the new mode of conduct which 
 has been worked out in the readjustment. We conclude, then, 
 that the ethical experience is one of continuous construction 
 and reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within 
 which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world 
 of more or less refractory means to the attainment of ethical 
 purposes. In this process of construction of ethical reality 
 current moral standards play the same part as concepts 
 already defined — that is to say, the agent's present habits — 
 
 lit matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our universal be 
 abstract or on the other hand "concrete," like Green's conception of the self, or a 
 " Hegelian " Absolute. Its logical use in the determination of particulars must be 
 essentially the same in either case. 
 
 2 In this connection reference may be made to Mr. Taylor's recent work. The 
 Problevi of Conduct. Mr. Taylor reduces the moral life to terms of an ultimate con- 
 flict between the ideals of egoism and social justice, holding that the conflict is in 
 theory irreconcilable. With this negative attitude toward current standards in 
 ethical theory one may well be in accord without accepting Mr. Taylor's further con- 
 tention that a theory of ethics is therefore impossible. Because the " ethics of sub- 
 sumption" is demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method of ethics 
 cannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic which shall be as valid 
 as the procedure of the investigator in the sciences. Mr. Taylor's logic is virtually 
 the same as that of the ethical theories which he criticises ; because an ethical ideal 
 is impossible, a theory of ethics is impossible also. One is reminded of Mr. Brad- 
 ley's criticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the Logic as an interesting 
 parallel. 
 
300 Studies in Logical Theoby 
 
 do in the typical judgment of sense-perception. They play 
 the part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore 
 habitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the 
 type of the particular instance that is u,nder consideration, 
 serving thus to bring to bear upon the subject of the judg- 
 ment sooner or later the entire moral self. The outcome is 
 a new self, and so for the future a new standard, in which 
 the past self as represented by the former standard and the 
 new impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment. Our 
 position is that this adjustment is essentially experimental 
 and that in it the general principle of the unity and expan- 
 sion of the self must be presupposed, as in inductive infer- 
 ence general principles of teleology, of the conservation of 
 energy, and of organic interconnection of parts in living 
 things are presupposed. The unity and increase of the self 
 is not a test or canon, but a principle of moral experimenta- 
 tion.' 
 
 Finally, we must note one further parallel between ethical 
 judgment and the judgment of sense-perception and science. 
 However the man of science may, as a nominalist, regard 
 the laws of nature as mere observed uniformities of fact and 
 particulars as the true realities, these same laws will never- 
 theless on occasion have a distinctly objective character in 
 his actual apprehension of them. The stubbornness with 
 which a certain material may refuse to lend itself to a 
 desired purpose will commonly be reinforced, as a matter of 
 apprehension, by one's recognition of the "scientific neces- 
 sity" of the phenomenon. As offering resistance the thing 
 itself, as we have seen, becomes objective; so also does the 
 law of which this case may be recognized as only a particu- 
 lar example — and the other type of objectivity experience 
 we need not here do more than mention as likewise possible 
 
 1 Mr. Bosanquet's discussion of the place of the principle of teleology in ana- 
 logical inference will be found suggestive in this connection (Logic, Vol. II, 
 chap. iii). 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 301 
 
 in one's apprehension of the law as well as of the "facts" 
 of nature. Both types of objectivity attach to the moral law 
 as well. The standard that restrains is one "above" us or 
 "beyond" us. Even Kant, as the similitude of the starry 
 heavens would suggest, was not incapable of a faint "emo- 
 tion of the heterononious," and authority in one form or 
 another is a moral force whose objective validity as moral, 
 both in its inhibiting and in its sanctioning aspects, human 
 nature is prone to acknowledge. The apprehension of 
 objectivity is everywhere, as we have held, emotional. One 
 type of situation in which the moral law takes on this char- 
 acter is found in the interposition of the law to check a for- 
 ward tendency ; the other is found in the instant of transition 
 from doubt to the new adjustment that has been reached. 
 In the one case the law is "inexorable" in its demands. In 
 the other case there are two possibilities: If the adjustment 
 has been essentially a rejection of the new "temptation," 
 the law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable, but 
 sustaining, as a rock of salvation. If the adjustment is a 
 distinctly new attitude, the sense of the objectivity of the 
 principle embodied in it will commonly be less strong, if not 
 for the time being almost wholly wanting ; but in the mo- 
 ment of overt action it will in some degree wear the charac- 
 ter of a firm truth upon which one has taken his stand. 
 
 This general view of the logical constitution of the moral 
 experience may suggest a comparison with the fundamental 
 doctrine of the British Intellectualist school. The Intellec- 
 tualist writers were very largely guided in their expositions 
 by the desire of refuting on the one hand Hobbes and on 
 the other Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Against Hobbes 
 they wished to establish the obligatory character of the 
 moral law entirely apart from sanction or enactment by 
 political authority. Against the Sentimentalists they wished 
 to vindicate its objectivity and permanence. This twofold 
 
302 Studies in Logical Theoby 
 
 purpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of 
 conduct lies in its conformity to the "objective nature of 
 things," the knowledge of which, in its moral aspects, is 
 logically deducible from certain moral axioms, self-evident 
 like those of mathematics. Now this mathematical analogy 
 is the key to the whole position of the Intellectualist writers. 
 By so conceiving the nature of knowledge these men seri- 
 ously weakened their strong general position. Mathematics 
 is just that species of knowledge which is most remote from 
 and apparently independent of any reference to conduct, and 
 the Intellectualists, by choosing it as their ideal, were 
 thereby rendered incapable of explaining the obligatoriness 
 of the moral law. An adequate psychology of knowledge 
 would have obviated this difficulty in their system. 
 
 The occasion for economic judgment is given, as we have 
 seen, in a conflict between ends not incompatible, in view of 
 any ascertainable conditions of the agent's nature as an 
 empirical self, but inhibitory of each other in view of what 
 we have described as conditions external to the agent. Thus 
 the lawyer in our illustration found his plan of compromise 
 thwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as 
 would make the practice of his profession, in the manner 
 intended, impossible, and so cut off his income. Similarly 
 the peasant in a European country finds that (for reasons 
 which, more probably, he does not understand) he can no 
 longer earn a living in the accustomed way, and emigrates 
 to a country in which his capital and his physical energies 
 may be more profitably employed. So also in the everyday 
 lives of all of us ends and interests quite disparate, so far as 
 any relation to each other through our psychical capacities 
 is concerned, stand very frequently in opposition, neverthe- 
 less, and calling for adjustment. We must make a choice 
 between amusement or intellectual pursuits or the means of 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 303 
 
 aesthetic culture, on the one hand, and the common necessa- 
 ries of life on the other, and the difficulty of the situation 
 lies just in absence of any sort of "spiritual affinity" be- 
 tween these ends. There is no necessary ratio between the 
 satisfaction of the common needs of life and the cultivation 
 of the higher faculties — no ratio for which the individual 
 can ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical 
 self through the direct method of ethical valuation. The 
 common needs must have their measure of recognition, but 
 no attempted ethical valuation of them can ever come to a 
 result convincingly warranted to the "energetic" self by 
 psychological conditions. The economic situation as such is 
 in this sense (that is, from the standpoint of any recognized 
 ethical standards) unintelligible. It is this ethical unintelli- 
 gibility that often lends a genuine element of tragedy to 
 situations which press urgently and in which the ends at 
 issue are of great ethical moment. It is no small matter to 
 the emigrant, for example, that he must cut the very 
 roots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds 
 himself to be. His whole nature protests against this 
 violence, and questions its necessity, though the necessity is 
 unmistakable and it would be quite impossible for him not 
 to act accordingly. Nevertheless, tragic as such a conflict 
 may well be, it does not differ in any logically essential way, 
 does not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty, from 
 the ethically much less serious economic problems of our 
 everyday life. 
 
 Now, we have already defined the economic act for which 
 economic judgment is preparatory as being, in general terms, 
 the diversion of certain means from a present use to which 
 they have been devoted to a new use which has come to seem 
 in a general way desirable.^ Thus, in the cases just men- 
 tioned, the lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase of his 
 
 1 See above, p. 2i3 and p. 259 ad fin. 
 
304 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 new career by the income which his profession might in 
 years to come afford him, the emigrant seeks a better market 
 for his labor, and the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student 
 and the buyer of a commodity in the market propose to them- 
 selves, each one, the diversion from some hitherto intended 
 use of a sum of money. Manifestly it is immaterial from 
 our logical point of view whether the means in question 
 which one proposes to apply in some new way are in the 
 nature of physical and mental strength, or materials and 
 implements of manufacture ready to be used, or means of 
 purchase of some sort wherewith the desired service or com- 
 modity may be obtained at once. The economic problem, to 
 state it technically, is the problem of the reapplicability of 
 the means, interpreting the category of means quite broadly. 
 
 In a word, then, the method of procedure adapted to the 
 economic type of situation is that of valuation of the means, , 
 not that of direct valuation of the ends. This method is one 
 of valuation since, like the ethical method, it is determina- 
 tive of a purpose, but it accomplishes this result in its own 
 distinctive way. The problem of our present analysis will 
 accordingly be how this method of valuation of the means 
 is able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unre- 
 lated ends which the ethical method is inadequate to effect. 
 
 Let us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel, for 
 example, has presented itself in imagination, and that the 
 preliminary stage of ethical judgment has been passed 
 through, with the result that the purpose, in a more definite 
 form than it could have at first, is now ready for economic 
 consideration. In the first place the cost of the journey 
 must be determined, and this step, in terms of our present 
 point of view, is simply a methodological device whereby 
 certain ends which the standards involved in the stage of 
 ethical judgment could not suggest or could not effectually 
 take into co-operation with themselves in their determination 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 305 
 
 of the end are brought into play. Ascertaining the means 
 suggests these disparate ends, these established modes of 
 use of the means, with the result that the agent's "forward 
 tendency" is checked. Shall the necessary sums be spent 
 in foreign travel or shall they be spent in the present ways — 
 in providing various physical necessities and comforts, or 
 for various forms of amusement, or in increasing investments 
 in business enterprises? These modes of use do not admit 
 of ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel, and 
 the agent's interest must therefore now be centered on the 
 means. 
 
 It is in this check to the agent's forward tendency that the 
 logical status of the means is evinced. As merely so much 
 money the means could only serve to further the execution 
 of the purpose that is forming, since under the circumstances 
 it could only prompt immediate expenditure. Like the subject 
 in factual judgment, the means in economic judgment have 
 their problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the 
 desired use of them as could any palpable physical defect. 
 This problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present 
 established mode of use which the now-forming purpose 
 threatens to disturb, and it is the agent's interest in this mode 
 of use that turns his attention to the valuation of the means. 
 
 It need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life 
 we find situations exactly corresponding to those of "con- 
 science and temptation" and mechanical "pull and haul" 
 which were discriminated in the ethical sphere and marked 
 off from judgment properly so called. Indeed it seems 
 reasonable to think, on general grounds of introspection, that 
 these methods of decision (if they deserve the name) are, 
 relatively speaking, more frequently relied upon in the eco- 
 nomic than in the moral life. The economic method of true 
 judgment is roundabout and more complex and more difficult 
 than ethical, and involves a more express recourse to those 
 
306 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 abstract conceptions which for the most part are only im- 
 plicitly involved in valuation of the other type. The economic 
 type of valuation, in fact, differs from the ethical, not in an 
 absolute or essential way, but rather in the explicitness with 
 which it brings to light and lays bare the vital elements in 
 valuation as such. In general, then, the economic process 
 would seem necessarily to embrace three stages, which will first 
 of all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and dis- 
 cussed. These are: (1) a preliminary consideration of the 
 means necessary to attain the end — which must be vague and 
 tentative, of course, for the reason that the end as imagined 
 is so, as compared with the fulness of detail which must belong 
 to it before it can be finally accepted; (2) a consideration 
 of the means, as thus provisionally taken, in the light of their 
 present devotion to other purposes, this present devotion 
 of them being the outcome, in some degree at least, of past 
 valuation; (3) final definition of the means with reference 
 to the proposed use through an adjustment effected between 
 this and the factors involved in the past valuation. 
 
 1. In the first stage as throughout, it must be carefully 
 noted, the means are under consideration not primarily in 
 their physical aspect, but simply as subject to a possible 
 redisposition. Thus it is not money as lawful currency 
 receivable at the steamship office for an ocean passage, nor 
 tools and materials and labor-power technically suitable for 
 the production of a desired object, that is the subject of the 
 economic judgment. The problem of redisposition would of 
 course not be raised were the means not technically adapt- 
 able to the purpose, nor on the other hand can the means in 
 the course of economic judgment, as a rule, escape some 
 measure of further (factual) inquiry into their technical 
 properties; but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct. 
 Again, it must be noted that the means in this first stage 
 will be only roughly measured. The length of one's stay 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 307 
 
 abroad, the size of the house one wishes to build, the purpose 
 whatever it may be, is still undefined — these are in fact the 
 very matters which the process must determine — and in the 
 first instance it is "money in general" or "a large sum of 
 money" with reference to which we raise the economic 
 problem. The category of quantity is in fact essentially an 
 economic one ; it is essentially a standpoint for determining 
 the means of action in such a way as to facilitate their econo- 
 mic valuation. The reader familiar with the writings of the 
 Austrian school of economists will easily recall how uniformly 
 in their discussions of the principle of marginal utility these 
 writers assume outright in the first place the division of the 
 stock of goods into definite units, and then raise the question 
 of how the value of a unit is measured. The stock contains 
 already a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread — 
 apparently as a matter of metaphysical necessity — whereas 
 in fact the essential economic problem is this very one of 
 how " wheat at large " comes to be put in sacks of a certain 
 size and " bread in general " to be baked in twelve-ounce 
 loaves. The subdivision of the stock and the valuation of 
 the unit are not successive stages, but inseparably correlative 
 phases of the valuation-process as a whole. The outcome 
 may be stated either way, in accordance with one's interest 
 in the situation. 
 
 2. But the unmeasured means as redisposable in an as yet 
 undetermined way bring to consciousness established meas- 
 ured uses to which the means have been heretofore assigned 
 in definite amounts. In this way the process of determining 
 a definite quantum as redisposable (which is to say, of attain- 
 ing to a definite acceptable plan of conduct) can begin. 
 How, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still 
 recognized as desirable figure in the situation? In the first 
 place the past assignment may have been (1) an outcome of 
 past economic valuation, (2) an unhesitating or non-economic 
 
308 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 act executive of an ethical decision, or (3) an act of more or 
 less conscious obedience to "conscience" or "authority." 
 In either case it now stands as a course of conduct which at 
 the time was, in the way explained above, sanctioned to the 
 agent, to the "energetic" self, by the means and conditions 
 recognized as bearing upon it. In this sense, then, we have, 
 in this recognition of the past adjustment and of the eco- 
 nomic character which the means now have in virtue of it, 
 what we may term a judgment of "energy-equivalence" 
 between the means and their established uses. For to the 
 agent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction 
 felt wh'en the means were assigned to these uses that the 
 "energetic" self would on the whole be furthered thereby 
 — and this in view of all the sacrifices that this use would 
 entail, or in view of the sacrifices required for the production 
 of the means, if the case were one in which the means were 
 not at hand and could only be secured by a more or less 
 extended production process. 
 
 In the illustration we have been considering, it will be 
 observed, there is an extensive schedule of present uses 
 which the new project calls in question and from which the 
 means must be diverted. This is in fact the commoner case. 
 A new use of money will affect, as a rule, not simply a single 
 present mode of expenditure, but will very probably involve 
 a readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expendi- 
 ture which our separate past valuations of money have in 
 effect co-operated in establishing. So likewise if we wish to 
 use part of a store of building materials or of food, or of any 
 other subdivisible commodity, we encounter an ordered sys- 
 tem of consumption rather than a single predetermined use 
 which we have not yet enjoyed. Where this is the case the 
 whole process of valuation is greatly facilitated, but this is 
 not essential. The means in cases of true economic valua- 
 tion may be capable of but a single use, like a railroad ticket 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 309 
 
 or a perishable piece of fruit, or of a virtually endless 
 series of uses, like a painting or a literary masterpiece. 
 Whether the means figure as representing but a single use or 
 stand for the conservation of an extensive system, their econo- 
 mic significance is the same. They are the " energy-equiva- 
 lent" of this use or system of uses considered as an act or 
 system of acts of consumption in furtherance of the self. 
 Their past assignment meant then and means now simply 
 this, that the "energetic" self would thereby gain more than 
 it would lose through the inevitable sacrifices. This is the 
 economic significance of the means in virtue of which they 
 are now problematic to the extent of checking, for a time at 
 least, forward tendency toward the desired end.' 
 
 3. The judgment of energy-equivalence, then, defines the 
 inhibiting economic aspect of the means, and moreover defines 
 it for the means as subdivided and set apart for a schedule of 
 uses if this was the form of the past adjustments to which 
 reference is made. The problem of the third stage of the 
 process is that of " bringing subject and predicate together," 
 as we have elsewhere expressed it — that is, of determining, 
 in the light of the economic character of the means as just 
 ascertained, what measure of satisfaction, if any, may be 
 accorded to the new and as yet undefined desire. The new 
 disposition of the means, if one is to be made, must bring to 
 the "energetic" self a degree of furtherance and development 
 which shall be sensibly as great as would come from the estab- 
 lished method of consumption. The means, as economic, 
 
 iW^euse the expression " energy -equivalent'^ because the "excess" gained by 
 the self through the past adjustment is not of importance at just this point. The 
 essential significance of the means now is not that they "cost" less than they promised 
 to bring in in energy, but that because they required sacrifice the self will now lose 
 unless they are allowed to fulfil the promise. They are the logical equivalent of the 
 established modes of consumption from the standpoint of conservation of the 
 energies of the self, not the mathematical equivalent. 
 
 It would be desirable, if there were space, to present a brief account of the 
 psychological basis of the concepts of energy and energy-equivalence which here 
 come into play, but this must be omitted. 
 
310 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 are means to the conservation of the old adjustment, and 
 any new disposal of them or of any portion of them for a 
 full or partial execution of the new purpose must make out 
 at least as good a case. It must appear that the new dispo- 
 sition is not only physically possible, but also economically 
 necessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of 
 the self as sanctioned the disposition now in force. It must 
 make the self in some way more efficient — whether more 
 strong and symmetrical in body, more skilled in work, more 
 clear of brain, or more efficient in whatever other concrete 
 way may be desired. 
 
 Psychologically the sanction of any course of action 
 which is taken as evidence of conformity to the general rule 
 thus inadequately stated is the more or less strong sense of 
 "relaxation" of attentive strain which comes with the shift 
 of attention, in the final survey, from means to end. We may 
 accordingly, for the sake of greater definiteness, restate in 
 the following terms the process which has just been sketched: 
 The ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not 
 sensibly bear upon each other through their dependence 
 upon a common fund of psychical capacities or energies. 
 They are related in the agent's experience solely through 
 their dependence upon a common stock of physical means, 
 and they do not therefore admit of adjustment through 
 the ethical type of process. The economic process consists 
 essentially of a revival in imagination of the experiences 
 accompanying the former disposition of the means and a 
 re-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence to 
 that former and still recognized disposition. If an adapted 
 form of the new end can be imagined which will mediate a 
 like experience of relaxation when the attention shifts from 
 the means, thus emotionally re-enforced in their economic 
 status, to the end as thus conceived, the means will be recog- 
 nized as economically redisposable. Thus the method of 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 311 
 
 valuation of the means makes possible, through appeal to the 
 sensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in 
 the outcome of judgment, a co-ordination of disparate ends 
 which the ethical method of direct adjustment could not 
 effect/ 
 
 The economic process thus presents on analysis the same 
 factors as does the ethical. On the subject side we have the 
 means — which as economic are problematic as to their reap- 
 plicability. On the predicate side we have the suggested 
 mode of reapplication in tension against conservative ideals 
 of application to established purposes. Just as it may be 
 held that the general ethical predicate is that of Right or 
 Good — that is, deserving of adoption into the system of 
 one's ends — so the economic predicate applied to the means 
 as these come in the end to be defined is the general con- 
 cept Reappliable. And in general the distinction of the 
 types is not an ultimate one, for the more deliberately and 
 rigorously the method of economic valuation is pursued — 
 in such a case, for example, as that of the prospective emigrant 
 — the stronger will be the agent's sense of a genuinely 
 ethical sanction as belonging to the decision which is in the 
 end worked out. The more certain and sincere, therefore, 
 will be the agent's judgment that the means must be reap- 
 plied, for on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests 
 the explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive 
 of the self. 
 
 From the analysis thus presented it must appear, there- 
 fore, that the economic type of judgment is in our sense a 
 constructive process. Its function is to determine a particu- 
 lar commodity or portion of a stock of some commodity in 
 its economic character as disposable, and in performing 
 this function it presents a definite reality in the economic 
 
 1 Putting it negatively, the renunciation of the new end involves a " greater " 
 sacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the present system of consump- 
 tion can compensate. 
 
312 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 order. Moreover, in thus defining the particular, recourse is 
 had to more or less distinctively namable economic standards 
 vsrhich are in the last resort symbols representing established 
 habits of consumption in the light of which the means, 
 prima facie, seem not to be available for any other purposes. 
 These economic standards, like ethical standards and the 
 class concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual experi- 
 ence, are, with all due respect to nominalism, constitutive of 
 a real world — a world which is real because it lends form and 
 significance to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to 
 conduct. 
 
 We have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis 
 that the valuation -process in both its forms is constructive 
 of an order of reality, and we have sufficiently explained the 
 relation which the economic order bears to the inclusive and 
 logically prior order of ethical objects and relations. We are 
 now in a position to see that in being thus constructive of 
 reality (taking the conception in its proper functional mean- 
 ing) they are at the same time constructive of the self, since 
 the reality which they construct is in its functional aspect 
 the assemblage of means and conditions, of stimuli, in short, 
 / for the development and expansion of the self. We shall 
 
 bring this main division of our study to a close with a series 
 ^ of remarks in explanation and illustration of this view. 
 
 Let us consider once more the factors present in the 
 agent's final survey of the situation after the completion of 
 the judgment -process and on the verge of action. These 
 factors are, as we have seen, (1) recognition of conditions 
 sanctioning the purpose formed, (2) recognition of the pur- 
 pose as, in view of this sanction, warranted to the "energetic" 
 self as an eligible method of expansion and development, and 
 (3) recognition of the "energetic" self, conversely, as in 
 possession, in virtue of the favorable conditions given in 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 313 
 
 factual judgment, of this new method of furtherance. These 
 three factors are manifestly not so much factors co-operating 
 in the situation as inseparable aspects of it distinguishable 
 from each other and admitting of discriminative emphasis in 
 accordance with the degree of reflective power which the 
 individual may possess or choose to exercise. Strictly speak- 
 ing these three aspects are present in every conscious recog- 
 nition of a purpose as one's own and as presently to be 
 carried into effect, but they are not always present in equal 
 conspicuousness, and never with equal logical importance for 
 the individual. In fact this enumeration of aspects coincides 
 with our enumeration of the three stages in the evolution of 
 the individual's conscious moral attitude toward new pur- 
 poses given in impulse — in the third of which the last 
 named of these aspects comes to the fore with the others in 
 logical or functional subordination to it. 
 
 Now it will be apparent on grounds of logic, as on the 
 evidence of simple introspection, that in this third type of 
 attitude — in the attitude of true valuation, that is to say — 
 the energetic self cannot be indentified with the chosen pur- 
 pose. The purpose is a determinate specified act to be per- 
 formed subject to recognized conditions, and with the use of 
 the co-ordinated means; the self, on the other hand, is a pro- 
 cess to which this particular purpose is, indeed, from the 
 standpoint of the self's conservation and increase, indispen- 
 sable, but which is nevertheless apart from the purpose in 
 the sense that without the purpose it would still be a self, 
 though perhaps a narrower and less ' developed one. Our 
 standpoint here as elsewhere, the reader must remember, is 
 the logical. It is the standpoint of the agent's own inter- 
 pretation of his experience of judgment during the judgment- 
 process and at its close, and not the standpoint of the psy- 
 chological mediation of this experience as a series of occur- 
 rences. Thus we are here far from wishing to deny the 
 
314 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 general proposition that a man's purposes are an expression | 
 of his nature, as the psychologist might describe it, or the 
 proposition that a man's conduct and his character are one 
 and the same thing viewed from different points of view. We 
 wish merely to insist upon the fact that these psychological 
 propositions are not a true account of the agent's own expe- 
 rience of himself and of his purposes while these latter are 
 in the making or are on the verge of execution. There is 
 indeed no conflict between this "inside view" of the judg- 
 ment-process and of the final survey and the psychological 
 propositions just mentioned. The identity of conduct and 
 character means not simply that as the man is so does he 
 act, but quite as much, and in a more important way, that as 
 he acts so is he and so does he become. It is, then, the 
 essence of the agent's own view of the situation that his 
 character is in the making and that the purpose is the 
 method to be taken. To the agent the self is not, indeed, 
 independent of the purpose, for plainly it is recognized that 
 upon just this purpose the self is, in the sense explained, in 
 a vital way dependent. Nevertheless the self is in the 
 agent's apprehension essentially beyond the purpose, and 
 larger than the purpose, and even, we may say, metaphysically 
 apart from it. Now the conclusion which we wish to draw 
 from this examination of the agent's attitude in judgment is 
 that no formulation of an ideal self can ever be adequate to 
 his purposes, not simply because any such formulation must, 
 as Green allows, inevitably be incomplete and inconsistent, 
 but because the self as a process is in the agent's own appre- 
 hension of it inherently incapable of formulation. Any 
 formulation that might be attempted must be in terms of 
 particular purposes (since in a modern ethical theory the self 
 must be a "concrete" and not an abstract universal), and it 
 is easy to see that any such would be, to the agent in the 
 attitude of true ethical judgment, worse than useless. It 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 315 
 
 could as contentual and concrete only be a composite of 
 existing standards, more or less coherently put together, 
 offered to the agent as a substitute for the new standard 
 which he is trying to work out. If there were not need of 
 a new standard there would be no judgment -process; the 
 agent must be, to say the least, embarrassed, even if the 
 unwitting imposture does not deceive him, when such a com- 
 posite, useful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as 
 a standard of reference and a source of suggestion, is urged 
 upon him as suitable for a purpose which in the very nature 
 of the case it is logically incapable of serving.' 
 
 To the agent, then, the "energetic" self can never be 
 represented as an ideal — can never be expressed in terms of 
 purpose — since it is in its very nature logically incongruous 
 with any possible particular purpose or generalization of 
 such purposes. It is commonly imaged by the agent in 
 some manner of sensuous terms, but it is imaged, in so far as 
 the case is one of judgment in a proper sense, for use as a 
 stimulus to the methodical process of valuation — not as a 
 standard, which if really adequate would make valuation 
 unnecessary. The agent's consciousness of himself as "en- 
 ergetic" cannot be an ideal; it comes to consciousness only 
 through the endeavor, first to follow, and then, in a later 
 stage of moral development, to use ideals, and has for its 
 function, as a presentation, the incitement of the process of 
 methodical use of standards in the control of the agent's 
 
 1 Green, as is well known, allows that any formulation of the ideal self must be 
 incomplete, but holds that it is not for this reason useless. But this is to assume 
 that development in the ideal is never to be radically reconstructive, that the ideal 
 is to expand and fill out along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all 
 increase shall be in the nature of accretion. The self as a system is fixed and all 
 individual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this absolute ideal. 
 This would appear to be essentially identical in a logical sense with Mr. Spencer's 
 hypothesis of social evolution as a process of gradual approach to a condition of 
 perfect adaptation of society and the individual to each other in an environment to 
 which society is perfectly adapted — a condition in which " perfectly evolved " indi- 
 viduals shall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the requirements of 
 "absolute ethics." For a criticism of this latter type of view see Mr. Tayloe's 
 above-mentioned work (chap. \, passim). 
 
316 Studies in Logical Theok? 
 
 impulsive ends. It is not an anticipatory vision of the final 
 goal of life, but the agent's coming to consciousness of the 
 general impulse and movement of the life that is. 
 
 It is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a con- 
 tentual view of the "energetic" self as one's ideal that 
 reflective morality should tend to degenerate into an intro- 
 spective conscientiousness constantly in unstable equilibrium 
 between a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand and a mor- 
 ally scarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other. There 
 is certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of 
 " Neo-Hegelian Egoism" which Mr. Taylor somewhere in 
 his unsearchable book applies to the currently prevailing 
 conventionalized type of idealistic ethics. If the self of the 
 valuation-process is an ultimate goal of effort, then there 
 must certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage 
 of the latter between the plain man's objective desire for right 
 conduct, as such, and for the welfare of his fellow-beings, 
 and the moralist's anxious questionings of the rectitude of 
 the motives by which his conformity to the fixed moral 
 standard is prompted.* Into the value and significance of 
 the attitude of conscientious examination of one's moral mo- 
 tives we are not here concerned to inquire, but need only 
 insist, in accordance with our present view, that its value 
 must be distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general 
 course and outcome of the valuation-process. In the valua- 
 tion-process, consciousness of self is not an object of solici- 
 tude, but simply, we repeat, a pure presentation of stimulus, 
 havins: for its office the incitement, and if need be the reincite- 
 ment, of the attitude of deference to the suggestions of old 
 standards and openness to the petitions of new impulse, and 
 of methodically bringing these to bear upon each other. 
 
 1 For Geeen's cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral attitude seethe 
 Prolegomena to Ethics, Book IV, chap, i ; and for a statement of the present point 
 of view as bearing upon Green's difficulty, see Dewey, The Study of Ethics: A Syl- 
 labus, p. 37 ad fin., and Philosophical Review, Vol. II, pp. 661, 662. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 317 
 
 The outcome of such a process, of course, cannot be pre- 
 dicted — and for the same reasons as make unpredictable the 
 scientist's factual hypothesis. Just as the scientist's data are 
 incomplete and ill-assorted and unorganized, for the reason 
 that they have, of necessity, been collected, and must at the 
 outset be interpreted, in the light of present concepts, whose 
 inadequacy the very existence of the problem at issue demon- 
 strates, so the final moral purpose that shall be developed is 
 not to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situa- 
 tion as it stands. The process in both cases is one of recon- 
 struction, and the test of the validity of the reconstruction 
 must in both cases be of the same essentially practical char- 
 acter. In both cases the process is constructive of reality, 
 in the functional signification of the term. In both the 
 judgment process is constructive also of the self, in the 
 sense that upon the determination of the agent's future atti- 
 tude the cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodi- 
 cally brought to bear.' 
 
 V 
 
 Judgments of value are, then, objective in their import in 
 the same sense as are the factual judgments in which the 
 conditions of action are presented. The ideal problematic sit- 
 uation is, in the last resort, ethical, in the sense of requiring 
 for its solution determination of the new end that has arisen 
 with reference to existing standards. In structure and in 
 function the judgment in which the outcome of this process 
 is presented is knowledge, and objective in the only valid 
 acceptation of the term. 
 
 1 Along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an answer to certain 
 criticisms of the attempt to dispense with a metaphysical idea of the self. Such 
 criticisms usually urge that without reference to a metaphysical ideal no moaning 
 attaches to such conceptions as "adjustment," "expansion," "furtherance," and 
 the like as predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their efifect upon the "ener- 
 getic" self. Anything that one may do, it is said, is expansive of the self, if it be 
 something new, except as we judge it by a metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded 
 self. For an excellent statement of this general line of criticism see Steatton, "A 
 Psychological Test of Virtue," International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XI, p. 200. 
 
318 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 But, after all, it may be urged, is it not the essential 
 mark of the objective that it should be accessible to all 
 men, and not in the nature of the case valid for only a single 
 individual? At best the objectivity of content which has 
 been made out for the judgment of value is purely functional, 
 and not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus 
 of other persons. The agent's assurance of the reality of 
 the economic or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavor- 
 ing to determine, and his sense of the objectivity of the 
 results ^v'hich he reaches, need not be denied. These may 
 well enough be illusions of personal prejudice or passion, or 
 even normal illusions of the reflective faculty, like that of 
 interpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in 
 the same sense as are the "bulk, figure, extension, number, 
 and motion of their solid parts.'" Any man can see the 
 physical object to which I point, and verify with his own eyes 
 the qualities which I ascribe to it, but no man can either 
 understand or verify my judgment that the purpose I have 
 formed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and self- 
 denial, or that this portion of my winter's fuel may be given 
 to a neighbor who has none. 
 
 But this line of objection proves too much, for, made 
 consistent with itself, it really amounts to a denial that the 
 very judgment of sense-perception, to which it appeals so 
 confidently as a criterion, has objective import. The first 
 division of this study was intended to show that every object 
 
 1 The polemic of certain recent writers (as, for example, Eheenfels in his Sys- 
 tem der Werttheorie) against the objectivity of judgments of value appears to rest 
 upon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored distinction between "primary" 
 and "secondary" qualities as equivalent to the logical distinction of subjective 
 and objective. Thus Eheenfels confutes "das Vorurteil von der objectiven 
 Bedeutung des WertbegrifEes" by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech 
 expressive of "an impulse, deep-rooted in the human understanding, to objectify 
 its presentations" and tnen goes on to say "We do not desire things because wo 
 recognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of Value but we 
 ascribe value to them because we desire them." (Op. cit., Bd. I, p. 2.) This may serve 
 to illustrate the easy possibility of confusing the logical and psychological points of 
 view, as likewise does Eheenfels's formal definition of value. (Bd. I., p. 65.) 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 319 
 
 in the experience of each individual is for the individual a 
 unique construction of his own, determined in form and in 
 details by individual interests and purposes, and therefore 
 different from that object in the experience of any other 
 individual which in social intercourse passes current as 
 the same. The real object is for me the object which 
 functions in my experience, presenting problematic aspects 
 for solution, and lending itself more or less service- 
 ably to my purposes; and this object is, we hold, not the 
 object as socially current, but the unique object which, as 
 undergoing determination with reference to my unique 
 purposes, cannot possibly have social currency. The objec- 
 tion as stated cuts away the very ground on which it rests, 
 since the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of 
 ethical or economic value is present in the particular judg- 
 ment of sense-perception also. The object about which I 
 can assure myself by an immediate appeal to other persons 
 is the object in its bare " conceptual " aspects — the object 
 as a dictionary might define it, the commodity as it might 
 be described in a trade catalogue, or the ethical act as defined 
 by the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philoso- 
 pher. It is an object consisting of a central core or fixed 
 deposit of meaning, which renders it significant in a certain 
 general way to a number of persons, or even to all men, but 
 which is not yet adequately known by me from the stand- 
 point of my present forming purpose. In virtue of these 
 conceptual characters it is relevant to my purpose, which is 
 as yet general and indeterminate ; but in the nature of the 
 case it cannot yet be known to me as applicable to my 
 prospective concrete purpose, as this shall come to be 
 through judgment. 
 
 Thus, if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the 
 judgment shall present an object or a fact which, as pre- 
 sented, is socially current among men and not shut away in 
 
320 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 the individual intelligence apart from the possibility of social 
 verification, then the apparent nominalism of the objection 
 we are considering turns out to be the uttermost extreme of 
 realism. Such a test amounts to a virtual affirmation that 
 the sole objective reality is the conceptual, and that the 
 "accidents" of one's particular object of sense-perception are 
 the arbitrary play of private preference or fancy. At this 
 point, however, the objection may shift its ground and take 
 refuge in some such position as the following: The real 
 object is indeed the object which the individual knows in 
 relation to his particular purpose, and it is indeed impossible 
 that the individual's judgment should be limited in its con- 
 tent to coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning 
 which are socially current. The building-stone which one has 
 judged precisely fit for a special purpose, the specimen which 
 the mineralogist or the botanist examines under his micro- 
 scope, the tool whose peculiarity of working one has learned 
 to make allowance for in use — these all are, of course, 
 highly individual objects, possessing for the person in ques- 
 tion an indefinite number of objective aspects of which no 
 other person can possibly be conscious at the time. And, 
 more than this, even though the individual may, in his scru- 
 tiny of the object, have discovered no conspicuous new quali- 
 ties in it which were not present in the socially current 
 meaning, the object will still possess an individuality making 
 it genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with 
 other objects in the mechanical process of working out the 
 purpose in hand. It is at least an object standing here at 
 just this time, a tool cutting this particular piece of stone 
 and striking at this instant with this particular ringing 
 sound, and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts will 
 nevertheless serve to individualize the object (if one chances 
 to think of them) in the sense of making it such a one as 
 no other person knows. All this may be granted, the objec- 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 321 
 
 tion may allow, and yet the vital point remains ; for this is 
 not what it was intended, even in the first place, to deny. 
 The vital point at issue is not whether the object which I 
 know is known as I know it by any other person, but 
 whether, in the nature of things, it is one that can be so 
 known. 
 
 Herein, then, lies the difference between judgments of 
 fact and judgments of value. The mineralogist can train 
 his pupil to see precisely what he himself sees ; and so like- 
 wise in any case of sense-perception, the object, however 
 recondite may be the qualities or features which one may see 
 in it, can nevertheless be seen by any other person in pre- 
 cisely the same way on the single, more often not insuper- 
 ably difficult, condition that the discoverer shall point these 
 out or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them. But 
 with the ton of coal which one may judge economically dis- 
 posable for a charitable purpose the case stands differently, 
 since it is not in its visible or other physical aspects that the 
 ton of coal is here the subject of the judgment. It is as 
 having been set apart by oneself exclusively for other uses 
 that the ton of coal now functions as an object and now 
 possesses the character which the economic judgment has 
 given it ; and the case stands similarly with a contemplated 
 act, of telling the truth in a trying situation. The valuation 
 placed upon the commodity or upon the moral act depends 
 essentially upon psychological conditions of temperament, 
 disposition, mood, or whim into which it would be impos- 
 sible for another person to enter, and these depend upon 
 conditions of past training and native endowment which can 
 never occur or be combined in future in precisely the same 
 way for any other individual. In short, the physical object 
 is describahle and can be made socially current, though 
 doubtless with more or less of difficulty, if other persons 
 will attend to it and learn to see it as I see it; but the value 
 
322 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 of an economic object or a moral act depends upon my 
 desires and feelings, and therefore must remain a matter of 
 my private appreciation. 
 
 In answering this amended form of the objection it is 
 entirely unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has 
 raised as to whether or not complete description of a physical 
 object or event is a practical or theoretical possibility. It need 
 only be pointed out that at best such complete description can 
 only be successful in its purpose on condition that the individ- 
 ual upon whom the experiment is tried be willing to attend 
 and have the requisite "apperceptive background." The 
 accuracy with which another person's knowledge shall copy 
 the knowledge which I endeavor to impart to him must mani- 
 festly depend upon these two leading conditions, not to men- 
 tion also the measure of my own pedagogical and literary skill. 
 Any consideration of such a purely psychological problem 
 as is here suggested would be entirely out of place in a dis- 
 cussion the purpose of which is not that of analyzing the pro- 
 cess of judgment, but that of interpreting its meaning aspects. 
 Let us grant the entire psychological possibility of making 
 socially current in the manner here suggested the most 
 highly individual and concrete cognition of an object one 
 may please, and let us grant, moreover, that this possibility 
 has been actually realized. This concurrent testimony of 
 the witness will doubtless confirm one's impression of the 
 accuracy of the process of observation and inference whereby 
 the knowledge which has been imparted was first gained, 
 but we must deny that it can do more than this. For indeed, 
 apart from some independent self-reliant conviction of the 
 objective validity of the knowledge in question, how should 
 another's assent be taken as confirmation and not rather as 
 evidence of one's own mere skill in suggestion and of the 
 other's susceptibility thereto? We must deny that even in 
 the improved form the criterion of social currency is a valid 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 323 
 
 one. In a word, the social currency of knowledge to the 
 extent to which it can exist requires as its condition, and is 
 evidence of, the equal social currency of certain interests, 
 purposes, or points of view for predication; and if it be 
 possible to make socially current an item of concrete knowl- 
 edge, with all its concrete fulness of detail, then a fortiori it 
 must be possible to make socially current the concrete individ- 
 ual purpose with reference to which this item of knowledge 
 first of all took form. TSTiether such a thing be psychologi- 
 cally possible at all the reader may decide; but if it be 
 possible in the sphere of knowledge of fact, then it must be 
 possible in the sphere of valuation. In short, judgment 
 in either field, in definition of a certain object or commodity 
 or moral act as, for the agent, an objective fact possessing 
 certain characters, involves the tacit assumption of social 
 verifiability as a matter of course ; but it does not rest upon 
 this assumption, nor is this assumption the essence of its 
 meaning. To say that my judgment is socially verifiable, 
 that my concrete object of perception or of valuation would 
 be seen as I see it by any person in precisely my place, is 
 merely a tautological way of formally announcing that / 
 have made the judgment and have now a definite object 
 which to me has a certain definite functional meaning. 
 
 Thus, instead of drawing a distinction between the 
 realms of fact and value, as between what is or can be com- 
 mon to all intelligent beings and what must be unique for 
 each individual one, we must hold that the two realms are 
 coextensive. The socially current object answers to a cer- 
 tain general type of conscious purpose or interest active in 
 the individual and so to a general habit of valuation, and 
 the concrete object to a special determination of this type of 
 purpose with reference to others in the recognized working 
 system of life. The agent's final attitude, on the conclusion 
 of the judgment-process, may be expressed in either sort of 
 
324 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 judgment — in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral 
 purpose, or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the 
 "external" conditions which warrant the purpose to the 
 "energetic" self. Throughout the judgment-process there 
 is a correlation between the movement whereby the socially 
 current object develops into the adapted means and that 
 whereby the socially current type of conduct develops into 
 the defined and valued purpose.' 
 
 At this point, however, a second general objection pre- 
 sents itself. However individual the content of my knowl- 
 edge of physical fact may be, and however irrelevant, from 
 the logical point of view, to my confidence in its objective 
 validity may be the possibility of sharing it with other per- 
 sons, nevertheless it refers to an object which is in some 
 sense permanent, and therein differs from my valuations. In 
 economic valuation I reach a definition of a certain com- 
 modity and am confirmed in it by all the conditions that 
 enter into my final survey of the situation. But my desire 
 for the new sort of consumption may fail, and so expose my 
 valuation to easy attack from any new desire that may arise ; 
 or my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly 
 increased or diminished, and my valuation of the unit quan- 
 tity thereby changed. Likewise my ethical valuation may 
 have to be reversed (as Mr. Taylor has insisted) by reason 
 of a change of disposition or particular desire which makes 
 impossible, except in obedience to some other and inclusive 
 valuation, further adherence to it. And these changes take 
 place without any accompanying sense of their doing violence 
 to objective fact or, on the other hand, any judgment of their 
 
 1 The essential dependence of factual judgmeut upon the rise of economic and 
 ethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine of the teleological character 
 of knowledge. It is indeed nowadays something like a commonplace to say in one 
 sense or another that knowledge is relative to ends, but it is not always recognized by 
 those who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness alone. 
 The end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is an end ia ethical or 
 economic conflict with some other likewise indeterminate end in the manner above 
 discussed. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 325 
 
 being in the nature of corrections of previous errors in valua- 
 tion, and so more closely in accordance with the truth. 
 Moreover, a new valuation, taking the place of an old, does 
 not supplement its predecessor as one set of judgments 
 about a physical object may supplement another, made from 
 a different point of view, but does literally take its place, 
 and this without necessarily condemning it as having been 
 erroneous. 
 
 This general objection rests upon a number of fairly 
 obvious misconceptions, and its strength is apparent only. 
 In the first place, the question of the objectivity of any type 
 of judgment must in the end, as we have seen, reduce itself to 
 a question of the judgment's import to the agent. How- 
 ever the agent's valuations may shift from time to time, 
 each several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the 
 changed conditions exhibited in the inventory which the 
 agent takes at the close of judgment which has formed it. 
 The conditions have changed, and the valuation of the 
 earlier purpose has likewise changed ; but the new purpose 
 is sanctioned by the new conditions, and the test of the pre- 
 sumed validity of the new valuation can only be in the 
 manner already discussed^ the test of actual execution of 
 the purpose. In the change, as the agent interprets the 
 situation, there is no violation of the former purpose nor a 
 nearer approach to truth. Each valuation is true for the 
 situation to which it corresponds. We are obviously not 
 here considering the case of error. An error in valuation 
 is evidenced to the agent, not by the need of a new valua- 
 tion answering to changed conditions, but by the failure of 
 a given valuation to make good its promise, although to all 
 appearance conditions have remained unchanged. If the 
 conditions have changed, then the purpose and the condi- 
 tions must be redetermined, if the expansion of the "ener- 
 
 1 See above, pp. 282, 283. 
 
326 Studies in Logical Theobt 
 
 getic" self is to continue; but the former valuation does not 
 thereby become untrue. 
 
 These brief remarks should suffice by way of answer, but 
 it will serve advantageously to illustrate our general position 
 if we pursue the objection somewhat farther. The physical 
 object is, nevertheless, permanent, it will be said, and this 
 surely distinguishes it from the object (now freely acknowl- 
 edged as such) of the value-judgment. To one man gold 
 may be soluble in aqua regia and to another worth so 
 many pence an ounce, but different and individual as are 
 these judgments and the standpoints they respectively imply, 
 the gold is one, impartially admitting at the same time of 
 both characterizations. On the other hand, one cannot 
 judge an act good and bad at once. The purpose of decep- 
 tion that may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals 
 quite different from those which permit deception of the evil 
 sort — is, in truth, taken as a total act, altogether different 
 from the purpose of deception which one condemns, and not, 
 like the "parcel of matter" in the two judgments about 
 gold, the subject of both valuations. 
 
 A brief consideration of the meaning of this "parcel of 
 matter" will easily expose the weakness of the plea. In the 
 last analysis the "parcel of matter" must for the agent 
 reduce itself, let us say, to certain controllable energies cen- 
 tering about certain closely contiguous points in space and 
 capable, in their exercise, of setting free or checking other 
 energies in the system of nature. Thus, put in aqtia regia 
 the gold will dissolve, but in the atmosphere it retains its 
 brilliant color, and in the photographer's solution its ener- 
 gies have still a different mode of manifestation. And thus 
 it would appear that the various predicates which are applied 
 to "gold" imply, each one, a unique set of conditions. Gold 
 is soluble in aqua regia, but not if it is to retain its yellow 
 luster; which predicate is to be true of it depends upon the 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 327 
 
 conditions under which the energies "resident in the gold" 
 are to be set free, just as the moral character of an act 
 depends upon the social conditions obtaining at the time of 
 its performance — that is, upon the ideals with reference to 
 which it has been shaped in judgment. How can one 
 maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold 
 in process of solution is the "same" as gold entering into 
 chemical combination? Surely the energy conditions which 
 constitute the "gold" in the two processes are not the 
 same — and can one nowadays hope to find sameness in 
 unchangeable atoms?' 
 
 In a word, the permanent substance or "real essence" 
 that admits of various mutually supplementary determina- 
 tions corresponding to diverse points of view is, strictly 
 speaking, a convenient abstraction, and not an existent fact 
 in time — and we shall maintain that the same species of 
 abstraction has its proper place, and in fact occurs, in the 
 sphere of moral judgment. The type of moral conduct that 
 in every actual case of its occurrence in the moral order is 
 determined in some unique and special way by relation to 
 other standards is precisely analogous to the " substance " 
 that is now dissolved in aqua regia and now made to pass in 
 the form of current coin, but cannot be treated in both ways 
 at once. Both are abstractions. The "gold" is a name for 
 the general possibility of attaining any one of a certain 
 set of particular ends by appropriately co-ordinating cer- 
 tain energies, resident elsewhere in the physical system, 
 with those at present stored in this particular "parcel of 
 matter;" the result to be attained depends not alone upon 
 the "parcel of matter," but also upon the particular energies 
 brought to bear upon it from without. Now let us take a 
 type of conduct which is sometimes judged good and some- 
 times bad Deception, for example, is such a type — and 
 
 ' Cf. ScHiLLEE, Riddles of the Sphinx, chap, vii, §§ 10-14, 
 
328 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 as a type it simply stands for the general possibility of 
 furtherance or detriment to the "energetic" self according 
 as it is determined in the concrete instance by ideals of 
 social well-being or by considerations of immediate personal 
 advantage. 
 
 For the type-form of conduct — when considered, not as 
 a type of mere physical performance, but as conduct in the 
 technical sense of a possible purpose of the self — is, in 
 the sense we have explained, a symbol for the general pos- 
 sibility of access or dissipation of spiritual energy — energy 
 which must be set free by the bringing to bear of other 
 energies upon it, and which furthers or works counter to the 
 enlargement and development of the self according to the 
 mode of its co-ordination with other energies which the self 
 has already turned to its purposes/ But actual conduct is 
 concrete always and never typical ; and so likewise, we have 
 sought to show, actual "substance," the objective thing 
 referred to in the factual judgment, is always concrete and 
 never an essence. It is not a fixed thing admitting of a simul- 
 taneous variety of conflicting determinations and practical 
 uses, but absolutely unique and already determined to its 
 unique character by the whole assemblage of physical con- 
 ditions which affect it at the time and which it in turn 
 reacts upon. In the moral as in the physical sphere the 
 fundamental category would, on olir present account, appear 
 to be that of energy. The particular physical object given 
 in judgment is a concrete realization, in the form of a par- 
 ticular means or instrument, of that general possibility of 
 attaining ends which the concept of a fixed fund of energy, 
 interpreted as a logical postulate or principle of inference, 
 expresses. The particular moral or economic act is a par- 
 ticular way in which the energy of the self may be increased 
 
 1 It would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy is valid only 
 in the physical sphere; but the logical significance of this limitation cannot be 
 here discussed. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 329 
 
 or diminished. In both spheres the reality presented in the 
 finished judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the 
 setting free of the energies for which it stands. Once 
 more, then, our answer to the objection we have been con- 
 sidering must be that the object as the permanent sub- 
 strate is merely an abstract symbol standing for the inde- 
 terminate means in general set over against the self. Cor- 
 responding to it we have, on the other side, the concept of 
 the "energetic" self — the self that is purposive in gen- 
 eral, expansive somehow or other. 
 
 The function of completed factual judgment in the 
 development of experience is, we have held, that of warrant- 
 ing to the agent the completed purpose which his judgment 
 of value expresses. This view calls for some further comment 
 and illustration in closing the present division. In the first 
 place the statement implies that the conditions which factual 
 judgment presents in the "final survey" as sanctioning the 
 purpose have not determined the purpose, since prior to the 
 determination of the purpose the conditions were not, and 
 could not be, so presented. The question, therefore, natur- 
 ally arises whether our meaning is that in the formation of 
 our purposes in valuation the recognition of existing con- 
 ditions plays no part. Our answer can be indicated only in 
 the barest outline as follows: 
 
 The agent must, of course, in an economic judgment-pro- 
 cess, recognize and take account of such facts as the tech- 
 nical adaptability of the means he is proposing to use to the 
 new purpose that is forming, as also of environing con- 
 ditions which may affect the success which he may meet 
 with in applying them. He must consider also his own 
 physical strength and qualities of mind with a view to this 
 same technical problem. And similarly in ethical valuation, 
 as we have seen, the psychology of the "empirical ego" 
 
330 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 must play its part. But the conditions thus recognized are, 
 as we might seek to show more in detail, explainable as the 
 outcome of past factual judgment-processes, and on the 
 occasion of their original definition in the form in which 
 they now are known played the sanctioning part of which 
 we have so often spoken. They therefore correspond to the 
 agent's accepted practical ideals, so that the control which 
 his past experience exercises over his present conduct may 
 be stated equally well in either sort of terms — in terms of 
 his prevailing recognized standards, or in terms of his 
 present knowledge of the conditions which his new purpose 
 must respect. Thus, in general, the concept of a physical 
 order conditioning the conduct of all men and presented in a 
 definite body of socially current knowledge is the logical 
 correlate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imper- 
 ative prescribing certain types of conduct. 
 
 Thus the error of regarding the agent's conduct in a 
 present emergency as an outcome of existing determining 
 conditions is logically identical with the corresponding error 
 of the ethical theory of self-realization. The latter holds 
 the logical possibility of a determinate descriptive ideal 
 (already realized in the unchanging Absolute Self) which is 
 adequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems. 
 The former holds that all conduct must be subject to the 
 determining force of external conditions which, if not at 
 present completely known, are at least in theory knowable. 
 The physical universe in its original nebulous state con- 
 tained the "promise and potency "of all that has been in the 
 way of human conduct and of all that is to be. Into the 
 fixed mechanical system no new energy can enter and from 
 it none of the original fund of energy can be lost. This 
 mechanical theory of conduct is the essential basis of the 
 hedonistic theory of ethics; and it would not be difficult 
 to show that Green's criticism of this latter and his 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 331 
 
 own affirmative theory of the moral ideal (as also the cur- 
 rent conventional criticism of hedonism in the same tenor 
 by the school of Green) are in a logical sense identical 
 with it. For the assumption that conduct is determined 
 by existing objective conditions is precisely the logical cor- 
 relate of the concept of a contentual and "realizable" ideal 
 moral self.^ 
 
 We may now interpret, in the light of our general view 
 of the function of factual judgment, the concept of the 
 "empirical self" referred to in our discussion of the various 
 types of sanctioning condition which may enter into the 
 "final survey." The "empirical self" of psychological sci- 
 ence is a construction gradually put together by psycholo- 
 gist or introspective layman as an interpretation of the way 
 in which accepted concrete modes of conduct, in the deter- 
 mination of which standards have been operative, have 
 worked out in practice to the furtherance or impoverishment 
 of the "energetic" self. We have seen that the ambiguous 
 presented self which functions in the moral attitude of obe- 
 dience to authority or to conscience gives place in the atti- 
 tude of conscious valuation to apprehension of the "energetic" 
 self, on the one hand, and descriptive concepts of particular 
 types of conduct, on the other. The "empirical self" at the 
 same time makes its appearance as a constantly expanding 
 inventory of the "spiritual resources" which the "energetic" 
 self has at its disposal. These are the functions of the soul 
 which a functional psychology shows us in operation — powers 
 of attention, strength of memory, fertility in associative 
 recall, and the like — and these are the resources where- 
 with the "energetic" self may execute, and so exploit to its 
 
 1 That the assumption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin theories of 
 associationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown by Dr. Warner Fite 
 in his article, "The Associational Conception of Experience," Philosophical Review, 
 Vol. IX, pp. 283 fif. Cf. Mr. Bradley's remarks on the logic of hedonism in his 
 Principles of Logic, pp. 244-9. 
 
332 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 own furtherance, the purposes which, in particular emer- 
 gencies, new end and recognized standards may work out 
 
 in co-operation.* 
 
 VI 
 
 In the foregoing pages we have consistently used the 
 expressions "ethical and economic judgment" and "judg- 
 ment of valuation" as synonymous. This may have seemed 
 to the reader something very like a begging of the question 
 from the outset, as taking for granted that very judgmental 
 character of our valuational experience which it was the 
 professed object of our discussion to establish. We are thus 
 called upon very briefly to consider, first of all, the relations 
 which subsist between the consciousness of value and the 
 process which we have described as that of valuation. This 
 will enable us, in the second place, to determine the logical 
 function which belongs to the consciousness of value in the 
 general economy of life. The consciousness of value is a 
 perfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated by 
 a doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately 
 physiological conditions. As such it admits of descriptive 
 analysis, and in a complete theory of value such descriptive 
 analysis should certainly find a place. It would doubtless 
 
 1 The " energetic " self is apparently Me. Bradlet's fourth " meaning of self," 
 the self as monad — "something moving parallel with the life of a man, or, rather, 
 something not moving, but literally standing in relation to his successive variety " 
 (Appearance and Reality [1st ed.] p. 86, in chap, ix, "The Meanings of the Self"). 
 Mr. Bradley's difBculty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for 
 what is essentially a logical conception — a confusion (if we may be permitted the 
 remark) which runs through the entire chapter to which we refer and is responsible 
 for the undeniable and hopeless incohercncy of the various meanings of the self, as 
 Mr. Bradley therein expounds them. " If the monad stands aloof," says Mr. Bradley, 
 "either with no character at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine 
 thing in itself, but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man " (p. 87). Surely 
 this is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very character of essential logical 
 apartness from any possibility of determination in point of descriptive psychological 
 content which constitutes the whole value of the "energetic" self as a logical con- 
 ception stimulative of the valuation-process and so inevitably of factual judgment. 
 See pp. 258, 259, above. The reader may find for himself in Mr. Bradley's enumera- 
 tion of meanings our concept of the empirical self. But surely the " energetic " and 
 empirical selves would appear on our showing to have no necessary couflict with 
 each other. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 333 
 
 throw much light upon the origin of valuation as a process, 
 and of valuing as an attitude, and admirably illustrate the 
 view of the function of the consciousness of value to which 
 a logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us. 
 This problem in analysis belongs, however, to psychology, 
 and therefore lies apart from our present purpose ; nor is it 
 necessary to the establishment of our present view to under- 
 take it. It is necessary for our purpose only to suggest, for 
 purposes of identification, a brief description of the value- 
 consciousness, and to indicate its place in the process of 
 reflective thought. 
 
 The consciousness of value may best be described, by 
 way of first approximation, in the language of the Austrian 
 economists as a sense of the "importance" to oneself of a 
 commodity or defined moral purpose. It belongs to the 
 agent's attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues 
 upon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated 
 by attention to the ethical or economic object in its newly 
 defined character of specific conduciveness to the well-being 
 of the self. The commodity, in virtue of its ascertained 
 physical properties, is adapted to certain modes of use or 
 consumption which, through valuation of the commodity, 
 have come to be accepted as desirable. The moral act 
 likewise has been approved by virtue of its having certain 
 definite sociological tendencies, or being conducive to the 
 welfare and happiness of a friend. Thus commodity or 
 moral act, as the case may be, has a determinate complexity 
 of meaning which has been judged as, in one sense, expan- 
 sive of the self, and the value-consciousness we may identify 
 as that sense of the valued object's importance which is 
 mediated by recognition of it as the bearer of this complexity 
 of concrete meaning. The meaning is, as we may say, 
 "condensed" or "compacted" into the object as given in 
 sense-perception, and because the meaning stands for ex- 
 
334 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 pansion of the self, the object in taking it up into itself 
 receives the character of importance as a valued object. 
 
 The sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude 
 upon the agent's part. The concrete meanings which make 
 up the content of the object's importance would inevitably, 
 if left to themselves, prompt overt action. The commodity 
 would forthwith be applied to its new use or the moral act 
 would be performed. The self would, as we may express it, 
 possess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen 
 purpose. The attitude of survey, however, inhibits this action 
 of the self and the sense of importance is the resulting emo- 
 tional apprehension of the value of the object hereby brought 
 to recognition. Now, it should be carefully observed that the 
 particular concrete emotions appropriate to the details of 
 the valued purpose are not what we here intend. The pur- 
 pose may spring from some impulse of self-interest, hatred, 
 patriotism, or love, and the psychical material of its pres- 
 entation during the agent's survey will be the varied complex 
 "of qualitative emotion that comes from inhibition of the 
 detailed activities which make up the purpose as a whole. 
 So also the apprehension of the physical object of economic 
 valuation is largely, if not altogether, emotional in its psychi- 
 cal constitution. Psychologically these emotions are the 
 purpose -.-they are the "stuff" of which the purpose as a 
 psychical fact occurring in time is made. But we must bear 
 in mind that it is not the purpose as a psychical fact that is 
 the object of the agent's valuing — any more than is the tool 
 with which one cuts perceived as a molecular mass or as an 
 aggregation of centers of ether-stress. As a cognized object of 
 value the purpose is, in our schematic terminology, a source of 
 energy for the increase of the self, and thus the conscious- 
 ness of value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from 
 restraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation 
 of this energy. In contrast with the concrete emotions which 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 385 
 
 are the substance of the purpose as presented, the conscious- 
 ness of value may be called a " formal ' ' emotion or the emotion 
 of a typical reflective attitude. 
 
 The valuing attitude we may then describe as that of 
 "resolution" on the part of the self to adhere to the finished 
 purpose which it now surveys, with a view to exploitation of 
 the purpose. The connection between the valuation -pro- 
 cess and the consciousness of value may be stated thus: The 
 valuation- process works out (and necessarily in cognitive, 
 objective terms) the purpose which is valued in the agent's 
 survey. But this development of the purpose is at the same 
 time determination of the "energetic" self to acceptance of 
 the purpose that shall be worked out. Thus the valuation- 
 process is the source of the consciousness of value in the 
 twofold way (1) of defining the object valued, and (2) of 
 determining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere 
 to it and exploit it.' The consciousness of value is the appre- 
 hension of an object in its complete functional character as 
 a factor in experience. 
 
 The function of the consciousness of value must now be 
 very briefly considered. The phenomenon is a striking one, 
 and apparently, as the economists especially have insisted, of 
 much practical importance in the conduct of life.^ And yet on 
 our account of the phenomenon, as it may appear, the prob- 
 lem of assigning to it a function must be, to say the least, 
 difficult. For the consciousness of value is, we have held, 
 emotional, and, on the conception of emotion in general which 
 we have taken for granted throughout our present discussion, 
 this mode of being conscious is merely a reflex of a state of 
 tension in activity. As such it merely reports in conscious- 
 ness a process of motor co-ordination already going on and in 
 the nature of the case can contribute nothing to the outcome. 
 
 1 In the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is determinative of Right- 
 ness and Wrongness ; in the second it presents the object as Good or Bad. See p. 259, 
 above. 
 
 2 See, for example, Wiesee, Natural Value (Eng. trans.) , p. 17. 
 
336 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 Now if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion 
 that the consciousness of value must be functional if func- 
 tional at all, then the problem might well be given up; but 
 it would be a serious blunder to conceive the problem in 
 this strictly psychological way. A logical statement of the 
 problem would raise a difPerent issue — not the question of 
 whether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional 
 in experience, but whether the consciousness of value and 
 emotion in general may not receive reflective interpretation 
 and thereby, becoming objective, play a part as a factor in 
 subsequent valuation- processes. Indeed, the psychological 
 statement of the problem misses the entire point at issue 
 and leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general problem of 
 whether any mode of consciousness whatever can, as con- 
 sciousness, put forth energy and be a factor in controlling 
 conduct. The present problem is properly a logical one. 
 What is the agent's apprehension of the matter? In his 
 subsequent reflective processes of valuation does the con- 
 sciousness of value, which was a feature of the survey on a 
 past occasion, receive recognition in any way and so play a 
 part? This is simply a question of fact and clearly, as a 
 question relating to the logical content of the agent's re- 
 flective process, has no connection with or interest in the 
 problem of a possible dynamic efficacy of consciousness as 
 such. The question properly is logical, not psychological or 
 metaphysical. 
 
 Thus stated, then, the problem seems to admit of answer 
 — and along the line already suggested in our account of 
 economic valuation.' Recognition of the fact that the con- 
 sciousness of value was experienced in the survey of a certain 
 purpose on an earlier occasion confirms this purpose, holding 
 the means, in an economic situation, to their appointed use 
 and strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical 
 
 1 See pp. 307-12 above. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 337 
 
 case. This recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction, 
 in memory, of the cognitive details of the earlier survey, 
 and so in the ideal case to a more or less complete and 
 recognizably adequate reinstatement of the earlier valuing 
 attitude, and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness of 
 value itself. The result is a strengthening of the established 
 valuation, a more efficacious control of the new end claiming 
 recognition, and an assured measure of continuity of ethical 
 development from the old valuation to the new. The function 
 thus assigned to the consciousness of value finds abundant 
 illustration elsewhere in the field of emotion. The stated 
 festivals of antiquity commemorative of regularly recurrent 
 phases of agricultural and pastoral life, as also the festivals 
 in observance of signal events in the private and political 
 life of the individual, would appear to find, more or less dis- 
 tinctly, here their explanation. These festivals must have 
 been prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the 
 social value inherent in the important functions making up 
 the life of the community, and of the individual citizen as a 
 member of the community and as an individual. They 
 secured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in 
 these normal functions by effecting, through a symbolic 
 reproduction of these, an intensified and glorified experience 
 of the emotional meaning normally and inherently belonging 
 to them.' In the same way the rites of the religious cults of 
 Greece, not to mention kindred phenomena so abundantly to 
 be found in lower civilizations as well as in our own, served 
 to fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary 
 course of institutional and private life." 
 
 J The illustration, as also the general principle which it hero is used to illus- 
 trate, was suggested some years since by Professor G. li. Mead in a lecture course on 
 the " History of Psychology," which the writer had the advantage of attending. 
 
 2 The conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated by reference 
 to the well-known principle of marginal utility of which wo have already made men- 
 tion (p. 307 above), and which has played so great a part in modern economic 
 theory. The value of the unit quantity of a stock of any commodity is, according to 
 
338 Studies in Logical Theory 
 
 It has been taken for granted throughout that there are 
 but two forms of valuation -process, the ethical and the eco- 
 nomic. The reason for this limitation may already be suffi- 
 ciently apparent, but it will further illustrate our general 
 conception of the valuation -process briefly to indicate it in 
 detail. What shall be said, for example, of the common use 
 of the term "value" in such expressions as the "value of 
 life," the "emotional value" of an object or a moral act, the 
 "natural value" of a type of impulsive activity? In these 
 uses of the word the reference is apparently to one's own 
 incommunicable inner experience of living, of perception of 
 the object, or of the impulse, which cannot be suggested to 
 any other person who has not himself had the experience. 
 My pleasure, my color-sensation in its affective aspect, my 
 emotion, are inner and subjective, and I distinguish them by 
 such expressions as the above from the visible, tangible object 
 to which I ascribe them as constituting its immediate or 
 natural value to me. This broader use of the term "value" 
 has not found recognition in the foregoing pages, and it 
 requires here a word of comment. So long as these phases 
 of the experience of the object are not recognized as separable 
 in thought from the object viewed as an external condition 
 or means, they would apparently be better characterized in 
 some other way. If, however, they are so recognized, and are 
 thereby taken as determinative of the agent's practical atti- 
 tude toward the thing, we have merely our typical situation 
 of ethical valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to 
 the self and economic valuation of the means as requisites for 
 
 this principle, measured by the least important single use in the schedule of uses to 
 which the stock as a whole is to be applied. Manifestly, then, adherence to this 
 valuation placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole sched- 
 ule and the marginal value is a " short-hand " symbol expressive of the value of the 
 whole complex purpose presented in the schedule. Moreover, the increase of mar- 
 ginal valuo concurrently with diminution of the stock through consumption, loss, 
 or reapplication is not indicative so much of a change of purpose as of determina- 
 tion to adhere to so much of the original program of consumption as may still bo 
 possible of attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity. 
 
Valuation as a Logical Process 339 
 
 execution of the purpose. Our general criterion for the pro- 
 priety of terming any mode of consciousness the value of an 
 object must be that it shall perform a logical function and 
 not simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact. 
 The feeling or emotion, or whatever the mode of conscious- 
 ness in question may be, must play the recognized part, in 
 the agent's survey of the situation, of prompting and sup- 
 porting a definite practical attitude with reference to the 
 object. If, in short, the experience in question enters in 
 any way into a conscious purpose of the agent, it may properly 
 be termed a value.' 
 
 Esthetic value also has not been recognized, and for the 
 opposite reason. The sense of beauty would appear to be a 
 correlate of relatively perfect attained adjustment between 
 the agent and his natural environment or the conditions sug- 
 gested more or less impressively by the work of art. There 
 must, indeed, be present in the eesthetic experience an element 
 of unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest in 
 the changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object, but 
 this must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of 
 the details presented. On the whole, the aesthetic experience 
 would appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appre- 
 ciative. It comes on the particular occasion, not as the 
 result of a judgment-process of the valuational type, but as an 
 immediate appreciation. As an immediate appreciation it 
 has no logical function and on our principles must be denied 
 the name of value. Our standpoint must be that of the 
 experiencing individual. The aesthetic experience as a type 
 may well be a development out of the artistic and so find 
 
 1 Thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of speaking of the 
 value of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic. The purpose of accurate definition 
 of the function of such objects as these in the attainment of one's ends is foreign to 
 the proper attitude of loving, prizing, or venerating them. We may ethically value 
 the act of sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento,but the object of 
 our sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate "qualitative "emotional 
 character appropriate to the kinds of activity to which it is the adequate stimulus. 
 
340 Studies in Logical Theoey 
 
 its ultimate explanation in the psychology of man's 
 primitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of 
 life. It is, as we have said, of the post- judgmental type, 
 and so may very probably be but the cumulative outcome 
 of closer and closer approximations along certain lines to a 
 perfected adjustment with the conditions of life. It may 
 thus have its origin in past processes of the reflective valua- 
 tional type. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of its actual 
 present character and status in experience, the aesthetic must 
 be excluded from the sphere of values. 
 
 Thus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that 
 of value is logically prior and so the "more real." The 
 realm of fact is that of conditions warranting the purposes of 
 the self; as a separate order, complete and absolute in 
 itself, it is an abstraction that has forgotten the reason for 
 which it was made. Reality in the logical sense is that 
 which furthers the development of the self. The purpose 
 that falls short of its promise in this regard is unreal — not, 
 indeed, in the psychological sense that it never existed in 
 imagination, but in the logical sense that it is no longer 
 valued. Within the inclusive realm of reality the realm of 
 fact is that of the means which serve the concrete purposes 
 which the self accepts. The completed purpose, however, 
 is not means, since still behind and beyond it there can be 
 no other concrete valued purpose which it can serve. Nor 
 is it an ultimate end, since in its character of accepted and 
 valued end the self adheres to it, and it therefore cannot 
 express the ivkole purpose of the self to whose unspecifiable 
 fulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary proba- 
 tional contributor. It is rather in the nature of a for- 
 mula or method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality 
 by recognizing and accepting it as its own. 
 
THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 SEP 23 1933 
 
 OCT 21 19 
 
 3^h|. 
 
 OCT 21 1936 
 
 AKi 26 ks^"? 
 
 -x-ft^ 
 
 ^/^ 
 
 JUN 1 1 1937 
 
 ^5^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 15 
 
 -y — - 
 
 'AM. 
 
 APR 25 193^) 
 
 m ^ 
 
 "wit- 
 
 4lUa^ 
 
 49CP 
 
 §A/ov'.4no, 
 
 29 Jan" 
 
 ' k4 
 
 *5V-"^'V 
 
 ^^^Sep^5^ 
 
 fEBlO 1954 lU 
 
 2yar|4ll|(5 
 
 LD 21-100»i-7.'3? 
 
 / 
 
YD 0696 
 
 
 / 
 
 ^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 X J- ?^«. . 'fc** 
 
i