MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT A STUDY OF THE SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL MOVE- MENTS OF THE PRESENT DAY BY RUDOLF EUCKEN PROFESSOR OP PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA ; AWARDED THB NOBEL PRIZE FOR LITERATURE TRANSLATED BY MEYRICK BOOTH, B.Sc., Pn.D. JENA) NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN (All rights reserved) CONTENTS PAGE TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE . ... 9 AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION . . 15 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 17 PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION . . . .21 INTRODUCTION : THE PEESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE TASK WITH WHICH IT PBESENTS Us . . . . . . .23 A. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OP SPIEITUAL LIFE 1. SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE. (a) HISTORICAL . ....... 35 (6) THE NINETEENTH CENTUBT . . . . .44 (c) THE POSITIVE POSITION . . . . . .53 1. Introduction . . . . . . .53 2. The Fundamental Concept of the Spiritual Life . . 57 3. The Relationship between Man and the Spiritual Life . 60 4. The Results as they affect the Concept of Truth . . 62 2. THEORETICAL PRACTICAL (INTELLECTUALISM VOLUNTARISM). (a) HISTORICAL . . . . . . . .64 (6) VOLUNTARISM . . . , . .70 (c) PRAGMATISM . . . . . . . .75 (d) OUR OWN POSITION : ACTIVISM . . . . .79 (e) INTELLECT AND INTELLECTUALISM . . . . .81 1. The Invasion of Modern Life by Intellectualism . . 82 2. The Life-Process as the Foundation of Knowledge . . 85 3. The Quest for Truth and its Motive Power . . .89 4. Consequences in the Sphere of Knowledge . . .93 5. Consequences with regard to the History of Philosophy . 96 3. IDEALISM REALISM. (a) THE TERMS . . . . . . . .99 (6) THE CONFLICT OF PRACTICAL IDEALS .... 101 1. Nineteenth-century Realism . . . . . 103 2. The Limitations of the New Realism .... 105 5 CONTENTS MM 3. Criticism of the Traditional Forms of Idealism . . 107 4. The Problem of Reality . . . . . .110 5. The Necessity for a New Idealism .... 113 B. THE PEOBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 1. THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE (METAPHYSICS). (a) HISTORICAL ........ 119 (6) THE RIGHT OP AN INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHY . . . 129 (c) THE TENDENCY TOWARDS METAPHYSICS .... 141 (d) THE PURSUIT AFTER KNOWLEDGE: A GENERAL SURVEY . 149 (e) ESTIMATION OF RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM . . . 155 2. MECHANICAL ORGANIC (TELEOLOGY). (a) ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERMS AND CONCEPTS . . 165 (6) ON THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM .... 169 (c) THE PRESENT-DAY CONFLICT ..... 182 1. The Philosophical Aspect of the Problem . . . 182 2. The Scientific Aspect of the Problem .... 185 3. The Problem in the Social Sphere . . . . 189 3. LAW. (a) HISTORICAL ........ 195 (b) THE PROBLEM OP LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD . . 201 C. THE WOELD-PEOBLEM. 1. MONISM AND DUALISM. (a) THE CONCEPTS : HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL REMARKS . . 215 (b) THE MONISM OF TO-DAY . . , ; . . . 230 2. EVOLUTION. (a) ON THE HISTORY OP THE TERM ..... 240 (b) ON THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT AND PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION 242 (c) THE COMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OP THE MERELY EVOLU- TIONARY DOCTRINE . . . . . . 255 (d) THE REQUIREMENTS OF A NEW TYPE OF LIFE . . . 272 D. THE PEOBLEMS OF HUMAN LIFE. 1. CIVILISATION (OR HUMAN CULTURE). (a) ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERM AND CONCEPT . . . 281 (b) CRITICAL ........ 288 1. The Nature and Value of Civilisation . . . .288 2. The Problem of the Content of Civilisation . . . 291 3. The Uncertainty in the Relationship of Man to Civilisation . 294 CONTENTS PAGE (c) THE REQUIREMENTS OP A TRUE CIVILISATION . , . 298 1. The Necessity of a Deeper Foundation . . . 298 2. The Necessity of an Inner Development of Civilisation . 802 2. HISTORY. (a) TOWABDB THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM . . . 808 (b) DEMANDS AND PROSPECTS ...... 318 APPENDIX: THE CONCEPT "MODERN" .... 330 8. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (SOCIALISM), (a) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL . 341 1. Historical ....... 341 2. The Problems of To-Day : a. The Inadequacy of a merely Social Civilisation . . 361 /3. The Inadequacy of a merely Individual Civilisation . 363 y. The Necessity for an Inner Overcoming of the Antithesis 373 (6) THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT .... 374 4. THE PROBLEMS OP MORALITY. (a) THE PRESENT INSECURE POSITION OF MORALITY . . 385 (b) MORALITY AND METAPHYSICS ..... 388 (c) MORALITY AND ART ....... 393 1. On the History of the Problem ..... 393 2. The Problems of the Present Day : a. Modern JSstheticism ..... 400 /3. The Position of Art in Modern Life . . . 404 5. PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER. (a) PERSONALITY ....,,. 409 1. On the History of the Term ..... 409 2. On the History of the Concept ..... 412 3. Investigation of the Problem ..... 414 (b) CHARACTER ........ 422 1. On the History of the Term and Concept . . . 422 2. The Present Position . 425 6. THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. (a) INTRODUCTION ....... 431 (b) REMARKS ON THE DETERMINIST POSITION . . . 434 CONTENTS E. ULTIMATE PROBLEMS. PAOK 1. THE VALUE OP LIFE. (a) INTRODUCTION : ON THE HISTOBY OF THE TERMS . . 447 (b) THE PERPLEXITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION . . . 449 , THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM (IMMANENCE TRAN- SCENDENCE). (a) ON THE HISTORY OP THE TERMS ..... 462 (6) THE TREND OP THE MODERN WORLD TOWARDS IMMANENCE . 464 (c) THE COMPLICATIONS IN THE CONCEPT OP IMMANENCE . . 467 (d) THE REVIVAL OP THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM . . . 469 (e) THE DEMANDS MADE BY THE PRESENT POSITION OF RELIGION . 471 CONCLUSION . .479 INDEX . 481 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE THE present work is a translation of the 4th edition of the Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart (Veit & Co., 1909). I have endeavoured throughout to render the sense of the original in the simplest English I could command, hut I have not attempted to secure exact literal accuracy. Considerable care has been taken to bring the terminology as far as possible into line with that employed in the other English translations of Eucken's works. Eucken's earlier writings were historical, his constructive works being of comparatively recent date. The Main Cur- rents of Modern Thought forms a link between the two periods; it starts from a broad historical basis and presses forward to positive construction. Here we may follow the growth of Eucken's philosophy, from its roots, lying far back in the historical work, to its full flower, as seen in the positive philosophy itself. While the Jena professor's other recent works concern themselves in the main with the general exposition of his convictions, the present study reveals in detail the extensive groundwork upon which these convictions have been built up, and in particular it illustrates the various steps by which the author has been led to adopt the concept of the spiritual life as the basis of his whole philosophy. Eucken's method is one of elimination. One by one he examines the various attempts at a synthesis of life with which the thought of the day provides us. One by one they are found to be incomplete or to be involved in inner contradictions, while in each case it is seen that a recognition of an independent spiritual life would remedy the incompleteness or remove the contradiction. Far from being a mere assumption (as will 10 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE certainly be supposed by those who are suspicious of the term "spiritual"), the spiritual life is thus seen to be nothing less than a necessity. Through its recognition alone can we explain the known content of the universe. For those who are commencing a study of Euckeu's thought a few words with regard to the exact meaning of the concept " spiritual life "may not be out of place. As this concept is the key to Eucken's whole philosophy, it is of the utmost importance that it should be clearly understood. The matter is perhaps best approached through a consideration of the most popular philosophy of the present day, namely, that general view of life which (whether it be called agnosticism, positivism, empiricism, materialism, or naturalism) declares that we know only that which is revealed to us through the senses, that man is not essentially anything more than a higher animal, and that there is no spirit (man's entire psychic life being regarded as no more than a mere product of natural forces) ; the higher is thus made entirely dependent upon the lower. Far different is the aspect of affairs when looked at from Eucken's point of view: the living spirit (or the spiritual life) now stands at the very centre of the universe, and is itself the most central and positive reality of which humanity can have any knowledge : " a spiritual life transcending all human life forms the ultimate basis of reality." This life is more primary than matter itself (the con- cept of matter being, in reality, one of the vaguest and most uncertain in the whole realm of thought) . The recognition of an independent spiritual life is the first step towards all further knowledge and the first necessity of any adequate view of life as a whole. The spiritual life is not derived from any natural basis. It is not a product of evolution. It is superior to all time and to all change : " change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned." It is entirely distinct from the whole realm of natural phenomena, and, as Eucken himself says, in spiritual life we have to do " with something essentially different from any process following natural laws." The spiritual life works within the natural sphere, but it works as an independent reality ; it is itself superior to the whole mechanism of nature. TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE 11 This life must be conceived of as something quite distinct from the human intellect and from every kind of merely human psychic life. The spiritual life is itself the foundation of truth and knowledge. It is cosmic, absolute and eternal. It will at once be asked, If the spiritual life be thus indepen- dent and absolute, how can man have any part in it, how can it affect him ? Why, in short, should we bother about it at all ? In reply to this Eucken would maintain that man's relationship to the spiritual life is the most immediate and vital of all human interests, for this life is itself the very centre of man' 8 own being. The spiritual life does not depend upon man, but man depends upon the spiritual life. In an external sense man may be natural, but in an internal sense he is spiritual, he belongs to the spiritual reality which is behind the whole universe. It is the spiritual life within him which distinguishes man from the animals and forms the root of his unique unifying capacity, as well as of his ethical and religious nature. Spiritual reality thus works within man, but it is not of man. Man attains to his spiritual self by rising above his human self; and only by thus rising does he become independent, for the merely human self is involved in a network of natural processes from which the spiritual life alone is free. The spiritual life is " a cosmic force operative in man " ; here man finds a strength greater than his own. The ethical value of Eucken's philosophy lies in its recognition of a spiritual world of cosmic power and ab- solute and eternal values, a world set above the relativity of human affairs and yet present to man as an ethical imperative. Nor is the ethical point of view lightly to be ignored. A satisfactory philosophy of life must make room for man's ethical nature ; as Balfour says (The Foundations oj Belief, p. 856) : "No uni- fication of beliefs can be practically adequate which does not include ethical beliefs as well as scientific ones ; nor which refuses to count among ethical beliefs, not merely those which have immediate reference to moral commands, but those also which make possible moral sentiments, ideals, and aspirations, and which satisfy our ethical needs. Any system which, when worked out to its legitimate issues, fails to effect this object can afford no permanent habitation for the spirit of man." 12 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE There can be no doubt that our inner life demands an authority which shall be objective and absolute (that is, truly authoritative), and at the same time present within man in such a way that its commands are felt to be inwardly compelling and not forced upon man by some external power. I should like to quote an ex- tremely significant passage from Principal P. T. Forsyth's very valuable work Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind (p. 61) ; speaking of what he calld the " inmost authority " he says : "It emerges and wells up under psychological conditions, but it is not a psychological product ... it is not ourselves, it is objec- tive. . . . The thing most immanent in us is a transcendent thing. ..." In order to attain to this inner spiritual world man must fight a battle ; he must overcome the resistance of his non- spiritual nature, which is in perpetual conflict with his spiritual self. The spiritual life is not immanent in man in such a fashion that he can possess it without effort ; it is present " as a possibility " it rests with us to lay hold of it. Man cannot participate in the spiritual life without continual and active effort ; hence the name Activism which Eucken has assigned to his own type of thought. Eucken' s philosophy is therefore marked by a strong dualism. There is a sharp division within man's own nature, a conflict of forces, a struggle for supremacy, a slow and laborious ascent to a world of new and permanent values, to "a new stage of reality." We read that "man stands at once in time and above time," that he lives " on the boundary of time and eternity, on the horizon where the two run together," and again that " man is the meeting place of different stages of reality, nay, of opposed worlds." It is not, however, Eucken's intention that reality should finally be looked upon as falling apart into two separate worlds ; on the contrary he regards spiritual life and nature as being, ultimately, stages of a single reality. Man, however, occupies a position at which a transition from the lower to the higher stage has to be effected. He must not therefore allow the distinction between nature and spirit to be obliterated. At the same time Eucken's ultimate goal is a monism not naturalistic, as it is hardly necessary to point out, but spiritualistic iu character. TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE 13 " We have become insecure with regard to all our ideals, nay, with regard to our own being ; we no longsr draw upon a common groundwork of convictions, of uniting, directing, elevat- ing forces. In spite of all subjective activity, an inner decline of life is unavoidable if this uncertainty should continue to spread." This brief quotation will suffice to indicate Eucken's attitude towards the life of to-day. He is profoundly convinced that the peoples of to-day, absorbed in the pursuit of material things, intent upon bettering their environment and intoxicated by the surprising triumphs of technical science, have increasingly lost touch with those central spiritual realities without which life can have no meaning or value. In a single phrase, the interests of the modern world are in the main peripheral rather than central. Eucken is not only a philosopher ; he is a prophet. His aim is to lead humanity back to central realities, to act as a centripetal force in a world of centrifugal tendencies. He seeks to call attention to the great truth that the whole fabric of human civilisation rests ultimately upon a spiritual basis. It is his belief that the supreme need of the age is a compre- hensive, positive philosophy of life to serve as a rallying point for the scattered and divided forces of humanity. The old syntheses of life, which were satisfactory in their day and genera- tion, are now breaking up and there is need for a new and wider synthesis. Eucken is convinced that only through the recog- nition of an independent spiritual life can the chaos of modern opinions be made to give way to a broad and satisfying philosophy of life. In conclusion I should like to express my warmest gratitude to Professor Boyce Gibson (now of Melbourne University), the author of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, who looked through the greater part of the MS., making a large number of invaluable suggestions and clearing up many obscure points. As it is, my task has been a hard one, but without his kind help it would have been much more difficult. MEYBICK BOOTH. LETCHWORTH. June, 1912. AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION THE Main Currents of Modern Thought has met with a most friendly reception in Germany and in France, and it would give me very great pleasure should it win friends for itself within the English-speaking world. This work aims in the first place at counteracting the spiritual and intellectual confusion of the present day. I have sought to grasp the specific character of the age through a study of its more central problems ; and with the object of liberating these problems from all that is accidental and momentary I have endeavoured to illuminate them from the standpoint of the historical development of humanity. At the same time, this historical treatment shows that spiritual evolution is a matter common to all civilised peoples ; they have all actively participated in this evolution, and all are to-day called to the performance of great common tasks, by which they are raised above and beyond every national and political difference. Nothing is more certain to counteract the lamentable and dangerous hostility of great nations to one another than a better understanding of the complete solidarity of the various nations with regard to those great questions which concern humanity as a whole. RUDOLF EUCKEN. JBNA, June, 1912. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION THE third edition differs even more from the second than did the second from the first. In the first edition the historical review formed the foundation of the work, while the discussion of the problems themselves was quite a secondary matter ; in the second edition the discussion became far more independent, and in the third it obtained the full primacy. The book is above all an expression of a specific philosophical conviction as a whole, and claims to be considered in this light. This claim has had the effect of essentially altering the mode in which the material had to be presented ; in particular, it demanded a more precise arrangement and division of the subject matter, extending even to the separate sections. While carrying out these alterations, I believed myself able, at the same time, to retain the fundamental ideas of the earlier editions ; the correlation of historical fact with spiritual reality on the one hand, and treatment under separate headings on the other. Both as a whole and in certain special discussions (which cannot now be anticipated) the book contends that the content of history is more than an object of scholarly research, and that, subject to definite assumptions, it may powerfully contribute to the uplifting of our own work. To start from special problems secures the advantage of tangible points of attack, from which it is possible to progress rapidly to some sort of conclusion. This method is certainly open to an objection ; the general con- viction underlying the whole does not as such receive adequate attention, nor is it set forth in continuous and connected argument. This defect is freely admitted. It is, however, so closely connected with the mode of treatment here adopted that it cannot be remedied. In this respect my earlier books will be found to a certain extent supplementary. The chief lack con- 2 18 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION sists in the failure to provide an adequate epistemological ground- work, and my next book will be devoted to a thorough discussion of the theory of knowledge. The different editions are held together, however, even more by a thoroughgoing fundamental conviction than by the method of treatment ; by the conviction, namely, that the ground upon which our whole civilised life and scientific work stands is in- secure ; that this life not only contains an immense variety of individual problems, but that as a whole it needs a drastic revision and a thorough renewal. It is my belief that philosophy must participate in this endeavour ; nay, that philosophy above all is here summoned to energetic co-operation. This has brought me into opposition to the main tendency of contemporary German philosophy, which believes itself able peacefully to continue its scientific work undisturbed by these questions and doubts. We thankfully and gladly recognise the valuable character of this work, more especially in the detailed development of the separate departments of knowledge; it has accomplished and is accom- plishing much. But at the same time the right and the necessity of the more general problem must be insisted upon with all possible emphasis. In working in this direction we shall not allow ourselves to be in any way affected by the attitude which others may adopt towards this problem ; we shall rely solely upon the inner necessity of the matter. Recently, however, there have been a multitude of signs bearing witness to the fact that increasingly wide circles are becoming interested in the problems which we have taken up. The inner complications of our civilisation, nay, of our whole spiritual situation, are growing more and more obvious ; we are becoming more and more conscious of serious lapses from truth, of a substitution of phrases for realities and stones for bread. Nothing less than the happiness and meaning of our own existence is at stake. Thus the desire for classification and consolidation makes itself felt with ever-increasing urgency and philosophy is being more and more imperatively called to lend its aid in the solution of these problems of life. New life-move- ments are ascending and men's minds are being swayed by new interests which bid them pursue new aims. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 19 These inner changes have procured for my books an increas- ing number oi friends and given me the consciousness of a close spiritual contact with the age, such as I was not previously able to enjoy. It is with peculiar pleasure that I welcome the interest of the young and growing generation, an interest which has grown with unexpected and increasing speed. I hope that this interest may also be extended to this book, and, in particular, I hope that it may assist in a further development of the problems which have here been treated in mere outline, and frequently, there is no doubt, very incompletely. For what we all see more or less clearly before us is ultimately nothing less than the idea of a new man and a new culture. A linking up of forces, an overcoming of all that is merely individual, the inception of a comprehensive movement, can alone enable us to make any progress in dealing with so gigantic a problem. RUDOLF EUCKEN. JENA, February, 1904. PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION THE fourth edition has not been so much altered in comparison with the third as was the third in comparison with the second. At the same time some important changes have been made. Several sections have been completely revised and one (that dealing with the Value of Life) has been newly added. All through there has been an effort to make the presentation more easy, the content more complete, the main theses more precise in form, and to grapple more directly with the problems of the age, thus giving the whole a more convincing and forcible form. Far more attention, too, has been given to foreign movements. I hope, therefore, that the new edition as a whole marks a distinct step forward. RUDOLF EUCKEN. JBNA, End of Awjust, 1908. INTRODUCTION THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 'AND THE TASK WITH WHICH IT PRESENTS US IN examining the life and thought of to-day it is impossible not to be struck in the first place by the extreme confusion which prevails and the accompanying painful insecurity as to the real aim of life. On every side we perceive not only a division of humanity into factions, but often a division within the individual himself. This state of confusion and uncertainty may at first signt appear to be the result of historical traditions working themselves out. We are surrounded to-day by various tenden- cies which have come down to us from the past, and these are not infrequently hostile to one another ; they constitute the heritage and burden that the labour of thousands of years has bequeathed to us. It is the fact of thus being torn by con- tradictions which more than anything else distinguishes modern culture from the simpler conditions of the Ancient World. The Middle Ages handed down a whole philosophy of life containing within itself modes of thought so fundamentally different as the Grecian and the early Christian, the artistic and the religious, the tendency to embrace life and the tendency to reject it; these were, however, rather pieced together than harmoniously combined. In opposition to this structural solution the Modern World brought forth a new life energy, the desire for the unhindered expansion of force and for complete dominion over the material world. The detailed development of this, however, led at once to a division within the Modern World itself. On the one hand, there was the soul, with its capacity for thought, demanding to rule the world and human life (intellectualism) ; 93 24 INTRODUCTION on the other was nature and its mechanism (naturalism). The nineteenth century, being an age of historical knowledge and close speculative reflection, threw such a painfully bright light on all these contradictions that it became impossible to ignore them any longer. And what a wealth of experience is contained within the nineteenth century itself! Consider the profound changes it passed through, the separate phases of which, in spite of having outwardly dropped into the background, still remain inwardly near to us and incline us in opposite directions : the artistic spiritual culture of the German classical period, a powerful and self-conscious realism and a reaction against this realism in the form of a subjectivism characterised by spiritual self-sufficiency and the development of unchartered feeling. How many con- trasts derived from old and new contents do we carry within ourselves, and what a great task lies before us if we are inwardly to master them ! In order to elaborate and harmonise these various tendencies a superior spiritual force is needful, but since this force is lacking we are subject to all the misfortunes that are the necessary consequences of man being overmastered by his own experiences, of his being dominated by the distracting influences of existence. No steady aims guide our endearour, no simple ideas stand out above the chaos and liberate us from its doubt and confusion. On the contrary, we are overwhelmed by immediate impressions, and our life is disintegrated by ;heir contradictions. So we are tossed about by every passing vave, the helpless victims of every bold assertion and pronounced conviction, as well as of our own whims and passions, the playthings of shifting moods and situations. A peculiar tension is imparted to this state of affairs by the fact that the changes which we experience are ultimately reducible to a single question and bring us face to face vith a solitary alternative, an alternative which permits of no obscuration and demands a decision on the part of the whole man. The quiet but continual and irresistible development of modern work has not only altered the traditional way of life in all its details, it has undermined it as a whole and made it INTRODUCTION 25 untenable. Openly or tacitly, broadly or finely, sensuously or spiritually, the older type of thought treated man as the measure and central point of all, turned reality into a kingdom of human-like agencies and made the welfare of man the object of all activity. Modern work as a whole has fundamentally destroyed this anthropomorphism. The immeasurable enlarge- ment of the outer world, the discovery of inner necessities and objective relationships within man's own sphere, and a wide expansion of creative spiritual effort beyond the mere subject combine to make this absorption in the human unbearably narrow ; they awaken at the same time a burning desire for a wider, richer, freer being, a great thirst for a life in relation with the infinity and truth of the whole. These changes force themselves more and more upon the attention of humanity and imperatively demand a just recognition. But this negation does not by any means lead directly to an affirination. The breaking down is not accompanied by a building up. The new position opens up two possibilities which are directly opposed to one another and admit of no recon- ciliation. Does this historical world-movement against absorption in the merely human mean that man must conceive of himself as a mere natural being and place all his thoughts and activities within the limits of nature? In that case everything that is distinctively and peculiarly human must be got rid of as a pernicious illusion, and all that gives meaning and value to our life must receive its laws and forms from nature. Or does this movement affirm that a new world, a spiritual world, arises within man himself, raising him above himself as well as above nature ? Does man initiate a new stage of reality and can his spiritual life inwardly enlarge itself to form a world ? Our main task would then be to seize, appropriate and develop this world. In this case man must above everything else firmly establish himself in this position and direct his whole attention and effort not so much backwards as forwards. Thus man is either less or more than he is at the present day apt to conceive himself to be. A decision in this respect one way or the other will have the effect of transforming the whole of life from the 26 INTRODUCTION smallest things to the greatest. But although this decision cannot be evaded, the lack of centralising force already referred to allows us to hesitate and vacillate, we tend now in this direction and now in that, according as the influences vary. While in general approving of the one we cannot make up our minds to abandon the other. We affirm in one direction what we deny in another. We are not whole-heartedly devoted to any one position. The situation has been often enough described ; its rapid shifting of tendencies and moods, its lack of logic (as revealed by an insensibility to the sharpest contradictions and the jumbling up together of quite different ranges of thought), together with its weakness in systematic thinking, in following up assertions, either in their preliminary assumptions or their consequences. In all these respects we perceive a serious lowering of the level of inner life, nay, an inner impoverishment of life in the midst of amazing peripheral progress, of undreamt-of technical accomplishments, of an overwhelming wealth of outward successes. It is obvious that we are in the midst of a spiritual crisis which threatens to overwhelm us. But this situation has not arisen owing to the perversity or sceptical bias of individuals ; it is a result of the historical position as a whole. Have we not the right to hope that the necessity which produced such a crisis also vouchsafes us some sort of means capable of leading us beyond it? As a matter of fact there is no lack of opposition to this chaotic state of affairs. There are plenty of counter-movements, plenty of attempts to build up a uniform construction of life, a uniform conception of reality. But unfortunately these attempts remain for the most part under the influence of that which they would like to overcome. The age of self-conscious specialism which forgot to take any account of the whole through its absorption in endless detail has now passed its high-water mark. But the movement towards unity consisted at first mainly in this, that particular spheres of life and knowledge took over the whole and made of it a picture, each according to its particular impressions, experiences, and aims. More than ever before, each of these separate spheres produced within its INTRODUCTION 27 own particular circle a compact system of knowledge and then, boldly pressing beyond the boundaries of this circle, endeavoured to capture the whole of reality. Each sphere put its own special tasks before all others and assigned universal validity to its concepts, standards, and methods. Thus each particular depart- ment became the dominating central point of the whole of reality : religion, and often art as well, constructed its own world, the social movement produced its own particular view of life, and in the intellectual sphere, the natural sciences, in particular, frequently expanded into all-embracing philosophies. The first to do so was zoology under the influence of Darwinism. Now we perceive the same attempt being under- taken by physics, physiology, &c. The tendency towards bold speculative thought has deserted the philosophers to find a home with the natural scientists; in their case there is no lack of bold raids into the land of truth, and the com- mingling of philosophical assertion with capable research work prevents many people from realising the outrageous character of the speculative attempt. Thus special points of view, partial conceptions of life, result, and their sensuous immediacy and easy comprehensibility gain them many adherents and enable each to attain a certain degree of influence. But never more than a certain degree. For the truth of things must eventually oppose and break through all narrow and arbitrary limitations. This will happen all the more readily in that the different claims involved in the various movements soon come into conflict, and dispute among them- selves concerning their respective rights. It now becomes apparent that the whole cannot well be built upon a part, and that truths which are valid as partial truths become erroneous when exaggerated into the whole truth. In so far as these part movements become influential and obstruct and counteract one another, they must increase the confusion which they are trying to remove. Perhaps nothing contributes so much towards division at the present time as these inefficient efforts towards unity. Never has monism been so talked of as it is to-day, and never has there been so much division ! 28 INTRODUCTION But in spite of the inadequacy of these attempts they are valuable for what they teach us. In particular, we clearly perceive from their failure that nothing can be accomplished by starting from this or that particular basis ; it is necessary to seek a unity beyond the dispersion of particulars. There is no hope of properly meeting the crisis unless we rise above the present situation as a whole and make a new beginning. But why should this be impossible ? History, in so far as it affects the inner life, does not exhibit a continual ascent. It shows us not only the rise and growth of true spiritual movements, but ensuing periods of exhaustion, so that we find recurring periods when the spiritual life must needs leave its active manifestation in human existence and retire into itself to take deeper and stronger root. In this fashion alone can it transcend the age and prove effective in liberating the truth present in the age from all the uncertainties which confuse and divide us. We are again face to face with such a period. Through self-recollection we must ascertain the foundations of our existence, our funda- mental relationship to the world. We must appeal from the mere age to the eternal in the age, from the mere man to the superior forces and laws which make man something more than a mere natural being. Under these circumstances every one who is alive to the necessities of the age must work, according to his capacity, towards this goal, namely, the deepening of life and the renewal of human culture. The path which we propose to strike out in this work will be more particularly distinguished by three characteristics. 1. We shall in the first place turn our attention to the chief movements characteristic of the age, the leading spiritual and intellectual tendencies, as we may shortly describe them. We speak of movements or tendencies, rather than of concepts or ideas, in order to make it clear from the very beginning that it is not, in the first place, a matter of merely intellectual processes and that these are not the deciding factors. Although outwardly the conflict may rage chiefly in the intellectual sphere, yet behind this are great movements springing from life as a whole, with characteristic contents of reality and specific constructions of INTRODUCTION 29 life ; in the midst of manifold conflict and through a variety of different problems it is possible that under the influence of these deeper movements a common pulsation may stir the age ; so that in emphasising these vital pre- suppositions of thought we are peculiarly likely to assist in forming a conception of the age as a whole, and winning clear recognition of its specific character. Moreover, accepting as we do a multiplicity of starting-points, we gain at least this advantage, that we make the assertions and problems of the age more demonstrable and more easily comprehensible. This plan has the further advantage of leading the discussion quickly to a definite point at which intrinsic necessities become apparent and are able to show our thought its paths of advance. The enquiry will show that at every point we come to the same questions, and indeed that one and the same central problem manifests itself through all the varieties of circumstance. It will also show that as the battle for the whole is being fought at each point, so the decision as to the whole is effective throughout all its ramifications. Furthermore, we shall be the better able to feel confidence in our own position the more the experiences and demands of the individual points of attack press towards it and point it out as the sole possibility of a happy solution. 2. On a closer examination we discover that each separate tendency asserts (or at any rate contains) a life-process, and this it is which we propose more especially to examine. Further, we shall be occupied in particular with the question whether this life-process permits of an independent spiritual life. The various tendencies usually recognise (if often unwillingly) that spiritual life possesses a certain actuality. But we are generally left in complete darkness as to what this involves and what it demands beyond the immediate phenomenon, to what pre- liminary suppositions and to what conditions it is attached. We shall devote our attention in the first place to finding out how the movements of the age are related to the problem of the possibility of spiritual life and to seeing what these tendencies contribute towards this problem. We shall endeavour not to lose ourselves in detail, but shall push forward rapidly to the life which flows through each movement, since this is the last 30 INTRODUCTION point attainable and the point from which our thought-world must build itself up. Such a study of the life-process will bring us most surely to the point where the various problems in question become the personal experience of the individual, where he can most easily insert his personal experiences and can least easily escape personal decision. 3. When the content of the age forms the point of departure as well as the end in view, it is well to bring in a historical survey in support of the philosophical work. This has the effect, in the first place, of throwing light upon and more clearly defining the spiritual nature of the present by disclosing its growth and its relationships. In attempting to understand and value the dominating movements of the age it cannot be a matter of indifference whether we recognise in them merely temporary waves or enduring life-tendencies, whether the present experience has frequently been experienced before and has a recurring and rhythmic character, or whether it reveals something completely new, something unique, whether it is more an action or a reaction, more a pushing forward or a sliding back. The historical review will be more or less retro- spective according to the exigencies of the case. It will frequently be necessary to follow the chief phases of a movement throughout the whole development of European civilisation, but sometimes a study of the immediately preceding stage will suffice to throw light upon the present. A brighter illumination of existing conditions in the light of history may prepare the way for independent investigation if it enables us better to perceive the specific nature of things, to become more clearly aware of their limits and to recognise them as problems. Not only the present-day position but the historical relationships themselves and history as a whole are converted into a problem through the discovery of the life-process operating in them. The life-process and its develop- ment cannot well be thrown into relief amidst the chaos oi appearances until we transcend the historical outlook and take up a position from which a timeless and direct view is possible, when the question of the truth and justification of the process must be forced upon our rttention. It is impossible to throw INTRODUCTION 31 a clear light upon the whole unless original, personally- experienced, ultimate facts are distinguished from facts traditionally accepted. In this manner we may effect a revolution and turn towards a direct contemplation and analysis of the matter. This reversal, with its conversion of history into the development of a timeless life, alone makes it possible clearly to see through the content of our existence from the inside, to proceed from appearance to fact, from mere data to fundamental truth and to recognise inner necessities and per- sistent tendencies in the movement of history: nay more, to wrest any sort of meaning from the whole. It is only when thus viewed from the standpoint of permanent truth that the significance of the individual epochs can be measured and that an immanent criticism of the present day achievement can be made. The assertion of the age will be tested with reference to that stage in the world's spiritual evolution which it historically occupies. If history has already revealed more content and depth than this position can contain, then progress will neces- sarily be forced beyond it and at the same time it may receive guidance as to the direction in which it is to continue its quest. When philosophical work and the world's historical experience are thus brought into close contact, criticism does not need to remain retrospective and reflective, it can become productive and progressive, it can itself further the forward movement which it demands. Such an investigation must try, in the first place, to de- stroy the matter-of-course character which is wont to attach to the movements of a given age and at the same time must aim at doing away with the dogmatism of which they are usually guilty. The first condition is to see more precisely what it is that the age undertakes and achieves. To see precisely, means in this case to see at the same time the extent of what has been accomplished, and this alone makes it possible to attain to a judgment which is independent and effective, without being guilty of injustice or of substituting paradox for independence. Our chief aim is, then, to discover leading tendencies, simple fundamental lines of development amidst the multiplicity and apparent confusion of the various movements. And it is from 32 INTRODUCTION this point of view that we may hope most readily to free the truth content of the age, its inner necessities, from the mis- leading addition of human error and passion, while at the same time gaining nuclei for our own efforts. Only those who are capable of inwardly experiencing the age can accurately judge it. No value whatever attaches to the opinions of those whose attitude towards the age is throughout merely captious and critical. Finally, we may add that in this, as in the earlier editions of the book, the definitions of the chief concepts will receive care- ful consideration. The confusion of the present day is due in no small degree to the indefinite use of terms. When the same expression is used now in a strict sense, now in a loose one, it is easy for statements to acquire illicitly more solidity and con- tent than is really due to them, and when the same word frequently possesses essentially different meanings the aspect of things easily becomes chaotic and the central decisive point tends to be obscured. In every age the agreement between terms and concepts is no more than approximate, but to-day it is exceptionally loose. With the object of remedying this unfortunate state of affairs it is necessary briefly to review the history of the terms employed, so that we shall devote a little time to this topic. A. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF SPIRITUAL LIFE 1. SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE (a) Historical THE relation of subject to object is a problem which to-day stands in the very centre of philosophical work and controversy. Our views of life, our concepts of reality, our ideas of truth, nay, the main currents of life itself, vary according as it is the subject or the object which preponderates. In the one case the main trend of life's movement is from man to world, in the other it is from world to man. All other problems lead back to this main issue, which as it confronts us to-day bears the impress of influences derived from every stage of the whole history of philosophy. The chief phases in this historical development must therefore be recalled, and as we study them we shall see that they embody the main alternative solutions of which the problem in question is susceptible. And we shall at the same time become aware of a continuous impulse constrain- ing the world's work to develop in a certain definite direction. That the matter itself contains peculiar complications is sufficiently indicated by the remarkable history of the expres- sions subjective and objective. As the centuries have passed by their meaning has been completely reversed. Duns Scotus (d. 1808) first employed them as technical terms and in opposing senses : " The word subjective was applied to whatever concerned the subject-matter of the judgment, that is, the concrete objects of thought ; on the other hand the term objective referred to that which is contained in the mere obicere (i.e., in the present- ing of ideas) and hence qualifies the presenting subject " (see Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, iii. 208). Philoso- phers employed the expressions in these senses until the seven- teenth and eighteenth centuries ; but the counter-term to 36 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT objective (which was more commonly used than subjective) was more often formaliter or realiter.* The systems which carried on the scholastic philosophy show, at this period, a change in the use of objectivus which paved the way for the more modern terminology, t The complete reversal of meaning did not take place, however, until the words were assimilated into the German language (through the Wolffian school of philosophy ; for example in A. F. Miiller's Einleitung in die philosophische Wissenschaft, 1788 ; Baumgarten and Gottsched) . At first the terms subjekti- visch and objektivisch (as they were then written) were not used outside this school, and in the conflict between Lessing and Goetze they were still employed only as highly technical words. It was Kantian philosophy which first brought them into common use, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century they were widely employed. It was entirely owing to German influence that their new meanings became general, and at first they were frequently regarded as strange. The exact significance of these terms in modern terminology, though distinct enough from that they bore in the Middle Ages, is in itself most uncertain, being swayed now by one influence, now by another. The first meaning of subjective is that which pertains to the mere individual act of presentation ; but it frequently means (especially when employed by scientists) any- thing and everything which a feeling and a thinking creature experiences in itself ; also all convictions extending beyond the immediate evidence of the facts are called subjective and are regarded as a species of mere trimming. Thus what is deepest * In the discussions between Descartes and Gassendi there occur subjective ( = formaliter in e ipsis) and objective (= idealiter inintellectu). Bayle dis- tinguishes (ceuv. div. 1727, Hi. 334a) objectivement dant notre esprit and rSelle- ment hort de notre esprit, and even so late as Berkeley we find (Eraser's edition, ii. 477) : " Natural phenomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the same." t Thus it occurs for example in Chauvins's lexicon rationale (1692) under certitude : objectiva nonnullis est ipsa necessitat objecti, ten propositio necessaria objectiva. Aliit autem nihil aliud est quam denominatio qur]vai\a (for particulars see Bonitz' Kommentar zur aristotelischen Metaphysik,p. 3&.). Even in the first century after Christ this led to the naming of the discipline itself according to its posi- tion (rd fs.t.ra ra (pvaiKa, jj /ierd rd QvaiKo. Trpa.yfia.Teia). The singular form metaphysica belongs to the scholastic system and was probably derived from Averroes' translation. The name was an unfortunate one, in as far as, from the very beginning, the idea which it indicates attached to the concept itself, creating the impression that metaphysics has to do with what is remote or tran- scendental, that it represents a more or less imaginary addition to the immediate reality. It was already referred to in this fashion by the Neo-Platonist, Herennius (see Brandis in the Abhandlungen der Berlin. Akad., 1831, p. 80) : " fttTo. rd tyvatxa \eyovrat, airtp 0y VTrtpijprai Kai virip airiav KUL \6yov flaiv." To the scholastic philosophers, too, such as Thomas Aquinas, meta- physica meant the same as transphysica. Kant, however, says (viii. 576, Hart.) : " The ancient name of this science, /xera ra (pvffina, already gives an indication of the type of knowledge towards which the science was directed. It is sought, with its assistance, to transcend all the objects attainable by experience (trans physicam) in order, where it is possible, to know that which cannot, under any circumstances, be an object of experience." The friends of metaphysics, on the other hand, strove to obtain fresh terms. Clauberg, the most important German Cartesian, recommended " ontosophy " or " ontology," but the disfavour which had attached to the old term was soon extended to the new one ; Wolff already complained (see Philos. prima sive ontologia, 1.) : Vix aliud hodie contemtius est nomen quam Ontologice. Moreover, ontology denotes only the older type of metaphysics now regarded as an impossibility. We may ask, in passing, is it not a remarkable fact that no thinker of the first rank has ever written a "metaphysics" under that name? THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 147 life, whereas now we set knowledge within an underlying spiritual life and permit it, along with the other departments, to struggle simultaneously for truth and for the development of this deeper life. More particularly the new metaphysics form the sharpest contrast to the ontological, and therefore, at the same time, abstract and dogmatic character of the older meta- physics. Aristotle's action in determining the task of the " first philosophy " to be the contemplation of the Being as being (ro ov % ov), the discovery of the most general properties of being, struck a false path from the very outset. This had the effect of making certain formal properties appear to be the real essence of things, constituting the main framework, all particu- larity being fitted in as mere illustrative material. Thus metaphysics became mere ontology. This resulted in a move- ment of the thought- world towards the abstract and formal ; a set- ting-aside of the specific content of human life. At the same time it gave rise to dogmatism, since these formal properties seemed to be once for all recognisable previous to any closer experience and independently of all historical movement, and were for this reason conveyed from metaphysics to the other departments of knowledge as inviolable truths. This dogmatic procedure had the double effect of depriving metaphysics of inner movement and the other sciences of their independence. No wonder that this ontological and dogmatic metaphysics met with resistance from all quarters. The development of modern scientific inves- tigation has only become possible by throwing off the old metaphysics. But the rejection of a special type of metaphysics is not an abandonment of all metaphysics. We are inclined to agree with Kant when he expressed the conviction that " some sort of metaphysics has always existed in the world and will doubtless continue to do so " (Hart., iii. 25). At any rate, the metaphysics which our own way of thinking necessitates is not open to the objections which destroyed the old metaphysics. For where there is a germ of developing life within knowledge itself, and where knowledge is primarily directed towards the deepening and illumination of this life, metaphysics will not entice thought and life into the abstract, but will communicate to these its own 148 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT actuality and definiteness ; with its integration of all multiplicity, metaphysics will for the first time render clearly visible the unique individuality of our being and our world. All life's several meanings and problems, even such connected systems as those of religion, art, and morality, will be able to overcome the wretched colourlessness of current solutions and interpretations only through being assigned a definite place and goal within an inclusive scheme of life ; moreover, the content which is revealed by reality as it consolidates into a totality of this kind can alone justify the form of being assumed and provide it with a mean- ing. Thus our investigation is impelled towards metaphysics, not through any delight in forms and universals, but through a desire for more character, for a profounder actuality, for a more energetic renovation of our sphere of life. A metaphysic which preserves the connection between the endeavour after knowledge and a fundamental and compre- hensive spiritual life is equally secure as regards the charge of petrifying dogmatism. Such a metaphysic will keep in closest touch with the movements of universal history, and at the same time gain a history of its own ; this will not, however, cause it to sink to the merely temporal level. To-day we have no metaphysics and there are not a few who consider this to be an advantage. They would be justified in this view, however, only if our thought-world chanced to be particularly flourishing ; if, despite the absence of metaphysics, firm convictions ruled our life and endeavour and high aims fortified us and liberated us from the petty human routine. But in point of fact we cannot avoid recognising a limitless disintegration, a lamentable insecurity of conviction in all matters of principle, a helplessness in the face of the trivialities of our human lot, a soullessness in the midst of an overflowing outward plenty. Those who can quietly endure such a state of affairs will not be led to metaphysics by any theoretical con- siderations. But those who recognise how imperative is the task of welding our civilisation into a more compact and purposive whole, and of winning for it an inner independence (thereby at once more sharply dividing and more closely uniting men's minds), will side with us in our retention of metaphysics THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 149 and in the seeking of new paths along which to carry on the ancient task. (d) The Pursuit after Knowledge : a General Survey The foregoing discussions express fundamental convictions as to the nature of knowledge, and these only need developing to give rise to a characteristic view of the whole. In particular, it is the conception of spiritual life which we have here advocated which promises to overcome the antithesis bequeathed to us by history. From our point of view, spiritual life is at the same time a new stage of reality over against that of nature and a creative fount of life in contrast with the soul's life as we find it, wherein the products of both stages come together. From this deeper standpoint it will be possible both to liberate the substance of knowledge from all dependence upon externals and fully to recognise the limitations of our human quest for knowledge : many factors which formerly played the part of enemies and necessarily injured one another may now mutually contribute to one another's advancement. We have regarded spiritual life as fully active life which does not run its course between subject and object, but encompasses the antithesis from the very beginning. In this case our task cannot lie in the attempt to copy a transcendent world, but must be sought in the shaping and perfecting of our own existence. Spiritual life must therefore contain in itself different stages of expression, the movement from the lower stages to the higher being guided by a necessity inherent in the development as a whole. That which in any way already appertains to its activity cannot become its full property until it has been converted into self-activity. This applies also to knowledge : its movement lies within life as a whole ; for in its case, too, the matter with which it is concerned must be situated within the spiritual life and not outside it ; something totally external could excite nothing and set nothing in motion ; it could never touch thought at all, and under no possible circumstances could it even become an intellectual problem, for this can only occur when an object is already in some fashion present to the thought-world. The manner, however, in which it is so present does not correspond 150 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT to the nature of spiritual life, nay, it contradicts it. This con- tradiction then becomes a compelling impulse towards further construction. Thus, in the task of knowledge with its pressing forward to a higher stage, spiritual life accomplishes an act of self-assertion. If this is the position of affairs, nothing can become an intellectual problem which is not in some way already incor- porated within the life-process. Thus when knowledge is to become active, it must be preceded by an inner enlargement of life. This assertion is corroborated in the most clear and con- vincing manner both by a study of human history and by every- day experience. For these show us that even that which sur- rounds man with intrusive nearness and affects him in the most strongly sensuous manner, may remain, in an inward sense, com- pletely alien to him and not become a problem of human know- ledge at all. Things will not answer those who do not question them ; realities will only reveal themselves to those who confront them with possibilities. Even the hardest resistance does not produce a spiritual effect until it has been converted into an inner obstruction. Individuals, peoples,' or whole epr chs may suffer from the most serious evils without being greatly aroused by them or driven to any sort of protective measures. Both great artists and great educators agree in maintaining that the spiritual organs are not brought with us ready-made, but must first be moulded into shape.* A study of human history, too, shows that much that lay quite near to man (nay, that already outwardly belonged to him) has only quite recently become part of his own life and stirred his own endeavour ; at the same time it permits us to recognise the assumptions and predispositions underlying that which later on was lightly regarded as a matter of course. What a slow process was the artistic discovery of In this connection we may mention Herbart's well-known saying with regard to the nonagenarian village schoolmaster (Werke, x. 8): " We should all bear in mind that we each experience only that which we test I An aged village schoolmaster of ninety has the experience of his lengthy routine ; he has the feeling of his great labours. But can he also criticise his achievements and his methods?" Froebel was of the opinion that man, "in order to understand nature, must himself create it afresh, within and without, by means of an artistic method peculiar to himself." THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 151 nature ; how recently, for example, have the beauties of land- scape been revealed to us ! Consider, too, how present-day art is labouring to develop our visual sensibility so that more and more may be seen in the external world and new aspects of it opened up. Moreover, man has had to discover himself, his humanity, and the common life and feelings to which this humanity gives rise ; he did not find all this ready-made ; he won it for himself through inward movements and develop- ments. Pedagogy describes apperception as the absorption of new impressions within the thought- world of the individual ; but the great world of history has its apperception also, like the individual ; humanity as a whole cannot assimilate anything to which it does not oppose an inner movement. What is thus so readily accepted with regard to particular things must, when extended to the whole, result in the problem of knowledge assuming a new aspect. For it thus becomes clear that all knowledge lies within man's sphere of work, and that there is no essential progress in knowledge without a growth of this sphere. In the case of knowledge, too, every really great achievement does not fall within a ready-made sphere, but itself alters the sphere of life. Modern science would have been impossible without the modern man with his bold superiority to the world and his confidence in the might of his own soul. It is only by thus giving a deeper foundation to the process of knowledge that we are able to conceive of it as an immanent procedure, and so avoid the dilemma by which we seem com- pelled to view thought either as being concerned with an alien world or as spinning all existence out of itself. But precisely this recognition of the independence of spiritual life and of the immanence* of the process of knowledge is calculated to bring the distinctively human element, and with it the importance of experience, to full recognition. For the more we conceive of spiritual life and knowledge, too, as being independent and superior, the more does the given world recede from us, and the more clearly do we perceive that only under * We here take "immanence" in its old and original sense, according to which it signifies something which takes place within the life-process and does not go beyond it ; see the chapter " Immanence Transcendence." 152 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT certain conditions and as the result of hard work will man be able to participate in spiritual life, and that the latter is accessible to him only through some kind of experience. Man is in the first place occupied with the sub-spiritual stage of reality, which finds intellectual expression in the world of sense- perception with its mechanical connections ; it would be impos- sible for him to proceed beyond this stage at all if the higher, too, were not in some fashion operative in his sphere. But this higher is not fully present within the life-process ; it must first attain to such fullness of presence ; the very impulse in this direction follows, as a rule, only from special conditions, from the perplexities and contradictions which arise in the lower stage. History clearly shows us how laboriously and slowly the quest after knowledge took shape. And the very progress of the movement compelled it to recognise something peculiar in man's nature and circumstance a peculiarity not to be deduced conceptually, but simply accepted as a fact. To this extent human knowledge bears an experiential character. In recog- nising this, however, we are far from committing ourselves to empiricism. As a matter of fact we could not recognise this experiential character itself unless we occupied a position superior to mere experience. Man, limited and fettered as he is, only attains to insight in so far as he participates in an independent and superior spiritual life and is able to measure his position from this standpoint. Experience has a twofold significance with respect to know- ledge : it is an external limitation and an internal determina- tion. It is the former when spiritual activity remains bound to external conditions and is hence unable to raise itself to full self-activity. It is the latter when, for the first time, it attains its own full and definite character in conflict with resistance, learns to know itself through trial and experience and attains to pure self-activity. In both cases alike human knowledge depends upon experience ; experience is here indispensable, not only for the relating of spiritual life to its environment, but also for the constituting of this life itself, not only for determining its scope, but also for deciding its content. The knowledge which humanity develops, finds itself, in the THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 153 first place, face to face with an alien and immeasurable world, and it can advance only through close contact with this world ; it may, in fact, appear to draw solely upon the world ; moreover, in the elaboration of what is thus taken up, there are lare departments of life, notably that of nature as apprehended through the senses, in which knowledge can never cut itself loose from the given world ; that portion which enters into man's thought-world cannot be purely converted into terms of thought, it continues to be attached to something external and to present an opaque barrier. But, however necessary, in this connection, a contact with sensible things and a relation to these things may be, this contact and relation do not produce knowledge. Knowledge develops subject to conditions and limitations, but it nevertheless remains in the first place a product of spiritual life. It does not develop itself out of experience, but only in contact with experience, just as impressions cannot pass into the thought-world without undergoing an essential transforma- tion. How fundamentally different does the same natural phenomenon appear to the immediate perception of the unsophis- ticated man and to the thought-world of the scientist ! Hegel observes with justice : " It is the nature of spirit not to assimi- late anything just as it comes to us from outside, nor to permit a cause simply to carry on its previous agency within it, but it must needs break off the old threads of connection and inwardly reconstitute them" (Wke., iv. 229). Not only the extension of spiritual life but also its inner nature is, for us men, a problem and a task. Spiritual life does not directly fill our own life in firm and definite form, nor does it draw us to itself in a sure and steady advance, as the intellec- tual optimism of speculative philosophy supposed ; on the con- trary, we have to gradually push forward from small beginnings (and these not incontestable), and our endeavour abounds in obstacles and dangers ; in glad confidence we undertake many things which are subsequently found to be impracticable ; often we seem to be tossed to and fro and to make no progress at all. That w 1 ich our labour does bring us, however, does not come as the result of reflection, but of pursuing chosen paths to the end. Both our ability and our limitation are only revealed to us 154 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT through the developments and experiences of life itself. It is more especially true that it is through struggle alone that our life fathoms its full depth. Resistance alone drives it to put forth its whole strength and compels it to exercise its full origi- native power. At the same time the growth of spirituality does not signify a pure victory over the hostile element, nor does it bring full illumination. On the contrary, the inner advance is likely to bring forth new claims, problems, and resistances, and therefore the aspect of reality will take on a more and more positive and irrational form. Such an actuality must make knowledge into something essentially different from that which rationalism would have it to be ; at every point it is now referred to the experiences of life as a whole. It was only in the early infancy of knowledge that men fancied themselves to be approaching a smooth conclusion ; an increased insight has led to the recognition of more and yet more unsolved problems ; the world has not grown more lucid, but more enigmatic. Thus precisely at the height of modern life the general aspect of knowledge is anything but simple. Reality looms before us, a series of gradations showing an advance from inorganic to organic, from inanimate to animate and psychical, from the soul enslaved to nature to the soul filled with the spirit. Each stage presents its own characteristic aspect of reality ; and there will always be conflict of opinion as to whether the lowest or the highest stage should be taken as the starting-point for explana- tion. Philosophy cannot avoid treating the realities which become visible upon the highest stage of life as the deepest revelations, and from this standpoint forming its conception of the whole. But it presently discovers that the categories won from this standpoint are not adapted to the world beneath us, which opposes them with a rigid nature of its own ; it also dis- covers that this world, throughout the whole of its active being, treats this higher stage with indifference, as something quite subsidiary. It seems as if that which we cannot help regarding as the essence of all reality cannot carry out its purpose in our world with the aid either of its own concepts or its own forces. On every side there is the same contradiction ; man's spiritual nature demands from him more than his mere humanity is THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 155 able to compass ; spiritual self-preservation compels him to affirm truths to which his intellectual capacity is not fully equal, and energetically to maintain the fundamental ideas which these truths imply, without being able to carry these adequately into practice. Therefore if our intellectual capacity is to decide as to the whole content of life, a spiritual impoverishment will be the inevitable result. (e) Estimation of Rationalism and Empiricism The foregoing discussion has brought us to a point from which we may attempt to estimate impartially the two opposing move- ments. It will be seen that while each represents important elements of truth and successfully employs them in attacking the opposite side, each falls into error and fails to maintain its own position as soon as it attempts a final solution on its own account. The strength of rationalism lies in its advocacy of the inde- pendence of spiritual life and its superiority to all environment, and also in its defence of the conviction that life does not primarily and essentially proceed from without inwards that (as Plato put it) a blind man cannot simply be provided with eyes from without. In the absence of this conviction there can be no such thing as truth at all. The complete dependence of our knowledge upon outward impressions would deprive it of all stability, all connection, all inner illumination, and would leave it at the mercy of mere individual accident. It is an axiomatic necessity, when rationalism, in the face of these facts, advocates an a priori. But the a priori must be understood, not as a ready-made quantity in the soul of each individual, but as a basic law of spiritual life that man has first to appropriate. Such an a priori involves the assertion that spiritual life carries within itself norms which continually turn our search for know- ledge towards truth and away from error ; it involves, further, the assertion that spiritual life is essentially superhistorical, and is no mere historical product. Without being thus superhistorical it could never subject historical formations to a superior criticism; it would be entirely at the mercy of their changes. 156 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT Since it stands for such indispensable truth, rationalism possesses a superior justification as compared with empiricism. But it falls into error in believing it possible to attain these truths directly, in treating what is really a far-off goal as a present, or at any rate easily accessible, fact : we refer to its treatment of the spiritual life in man without qualification as spiritual life in itself, as absolute spiritual life; this has the effect of blunting our sense of the characteristically human and of the limitations of humanity. "We see this effect when achievements which thought can only produce in connection with an independent spiritual life as a whole are attributed to thought itself, thus depriving ideas of their vital depth ; we see it also when rationalism believes our spiritual life, just as it is, to be upon a safe path and no inner perplexities are recognised. Taking all in all, rationalism tends towards weakening and explaining away the dark and hostile element which humanity finds in the world. It sacrifices the individual to the universal, content to form. The resulting conception of reality is smooth, attenuated, and anaemic to an extreme. Both life and thought become abstract, formal, and shadowy. This is particularly obvious in the case of the view of history which rationalism produces in its leaning towards speculative ideal constructions : the movement of history is here looked upon as taking place, from the very beginning, in a sphere of reason, whereas in reality it must first laboriously obtain its rational character and as constantly confirm it. It is believed that all antitheses and conflicts are only a means towards the advancement of reason ; everything irrational appears to be ultimately resolved into a great harmony, whereas in truth the struggle does not take place simply within reason; it is more a struggle for reason, and every increase of reason in human relationships is apt to increase the irrational element as well. According to this view, each epoch appears to represent a steady advance, resting securely on the one preceding, and the historical experience which humanity acquires is looked upon as a permanent posses- sion, though in reality the struggle over ultimate issues is being perpetually renewed, a firm foundation must be continually THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 157 constructed afresh, and every spiritual experience again and again resumes its problematical character. Man now appears purely and simply as the instrument of spiritual work, in spite of the fact that his predominant inclination is far rather to subordinate spiritual life to natural and social self-preserving instincts, thus grievously perverting it and alienating it from its own purposes. When the obscure and hostile element is thus slurred over, history loses its power and depth. The more exclusively this rationalistic treatment is carried out the more it evacuates and dissipates reality. If, on the other hand, it becomes clear that historical life does not advance with a continuous and steady movement, but that the whole must continually be made the subject of fresh conflict, and that there must be a continual reaffivmation of the whole, then free action takes precedence of the idea of a historical process and all possibility of a rational construction vanishes. Thus the unrestricted development of rationalism must give rise to a reaction in the direction of empiricism with its thirst for actuality and its ready recognition of human limitation, and history shows us that empiricism has attained to power and prestige more especially when the deficiencies of a traditional rationalism have become obvious. The antipathy to speculative conceptual construction is at the back of the most recent develop- ments of empiricism. But empiricism, on the other hand, entirely fails to afford any suitable expression to the experiential character of our thought- world. It conceives the process of experience as sharply con- trasted with self-activity, without which, however, there can be no scientific knowledge. Since it denies all independent spiritual life, it must seek to develop spirituality and knowledge from a merely human standpoint. This is, in reality, impossible,* and * The impossibility of attaining to a science by empirical means has recently been very emphatically pointed out by distinguished investigators. Windel- band (Praludien, 2nd edit., p. 303) calls it a "hopeless attempt, through an empirical theory, to supply a foundation to that which is itself the assumption upon which the theory rests " ; and Husserl (Logisehe Untersuchungen, I. 110) remarks in the same connection : " The greatest objection that can be raised against a theory of logic is to say that it clashes with the evident conditions of the possibility of a theory at all." 158 MAIN CURRENTS OP MODERN THOUGHT it only achieves a faint appearance of success by secretly assum- ing the existence of a spiritual world and employing factors borrowed therefrom. This results in a view of reality which is distorted down to its smallest detail. In dealing with the process of knowledge, empiricism directs its whole attention to the thing done, and is oblivious of the spiritual activity that is operative in the achievement itself; it clings to the external object, and forgets that this means nothing to us except through our act of appropriation. It perceives the determination of knowledge by experience, but it does not perceive that this determination takes place within an encompassing mental space and through the movement of the spirit itself, not through a communication from without.* It is so exclusively taken up with a wealth of particulars that it looks upon their connection as a matter of course. It cannot see the wood for the trees. The empiricist regards the things themselves as producing what ir. reality our activity has placed within them ; this is seen, for example, in the concept of the world of experience, which is anything rather than a product of mere experience.! Taking Kant's work into account, it should not be easy to obscure the fact that there is a problem of knowledge as a whole, that is to say that the ground upon which experience comes * Out mode of speech cannot be acquitted of blame in this respect, since it places thought and experience in opposition to one another, as if experience could accomplish anything without thought. So early a writer as Robert Boyle justly protested against this (The Christian Virtuoso towards the end) : " When we say, experience corrects reason, 'tis an improper way of speaking, since 'tis reason itself, that upon the information of experience corrects the judgment it had made before." t It is very remarkable how often an appeal is to-day made to experience without any previous examination of its conditions or guarantee of its possi- bility. This takes place most often perhaps in the educational world. New types of schools are established, and soon it is said that experience has shown them to be excellent. There is a general inclination to introduce devices copied from foreign nations on the ground that these have been justified by the experi- ence of the nations in question. But can we assume that what is suitable to one people is equally adapted to another, perhaps under essentially different conditions of life? And if an institution has good results here and there, perhaps under exceptionally favourable circumstances, is that any demon- stration of its universal advantage ? Experience can be appealed to only when there are essentially equal conditions ; whether or not this is the case is usually not at all adequately ascertained. THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 159 to pass must first be gained, and that in striving towards truth the conflict does not bear upon isolated data, but concerns totalities constructions and convictions as a whole. Empiri- cism, however, cannot avoid obscuring this fact, because it only takes into account particular aspects of reality, aspects which by no means exhaust its scope and depth. And this holds not only on the objective, but also on the subjective side, as we may briefly express it. Since our thought and life first find play as conscious processes, empiricism is content not to go beyond this point, and omits to perceive that the content of consciousness is not itself comprehensible apart from a more deeply grounded self-consciousness of spiritual life, and apart from a reversal of first impressions, as when the view of the gradual forma- tion of a unifying ego is supplanted by the insight that it is the ego which first makes possible all inward synthesis such as is essential to the very existence of science. Now to break up the life of the soul into a mere juxtaposition of separate processes in consciousness is to abandon all inner relationship, and therefore to make all science fundamentally impossible. On the objective side, however, empiricism clings far too exclusively to external nature and overlooks the specific character of the other spheres of existence. That portion of its doctrine which has a certain justice as applied to nature falls into error when extended to the whole world. The sensuous effects which we experience never permit of being fully translated into spiritual activity and developed from within ; thus there always remains a strangeness and constraint, and we do not advance beyond mere registration and description. But even the first view of human life and endeavour reveals a different state of affairs. Here, too, we first meet with separate processes, but we can pass beyond the mere impression : these processes permit of being traced back to the life-process that produced them, and of being linked together ; since the looker-on is able to transplant himself within this process he can convert the strange element into personal life. If, however, man can thus live and feel with man, not merely contemplating him from without as an alien thing, then there is a knowledge that is more than mer description. But 160 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT we take a yet further step if we recognise a spiritual life within the human sphere, if we take our stand upon this in the develop- ment of knowledge, and thence illuminate and sum up the whole social and historical life of humanity, including the experiences of individuals. In this case, we can never be content with a mere cataloguing of the observed phenomena ; we must effect an inner appropriation and critically transform what we assimi- late. For spiritual life as revealed in the human sphere is, in its immediate condition, so much encumbered with matter of a temporal, accidental, merely human nature, that there can be no clarification without an energetic sifting and adjustment to one's own nature. At the same time it is our task here to pick out from amidst the special connections and tendencies wherein this life finds a struggling expression, a comprehensive whole whence we may illuminate this manifoldness and render it coherent. In truth the high-water mark of the knowledge re- vealed to man is to be seen here, in the characteristic develop- ment of spiritual life and the construction of a spiritual world ; therefore here, too, lies the decision as to our whole view of the universe ; it is from this standpoint that the type of our world- view must be determined and some sort of justice, too, must be done to the limitations and contradictions of human existence. The whole task is replete with experiences, full of movements which take us deep into ourselves and could never under any circumstances proceed from mere concepts ; hence it lies entirely outside the sphere of mere rationalism and just as certainly beyond the capacity of mere empiricism. Both fail clearly to distinguish spiritual life from human existence; this impels rationalism to an exaggeration of man and empiricism to a denial of spiritual life ; the former is unable to provide know- ledge with a living content, while the latter robs it of its scientific character. A further mistake is common to both ; neither makes knowledge a portion of a greater whole of spiritual life and treats the problem of knowledge in connection with this whole. Left thus isolated, knowledge is either under- or over- valued. At the same time, both rationalism and empiricism represent factors indispensable to knowledge : on the one hand, originality ; on the other, actuality. What is needed, however, THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 161 is a new standpoint from which to combine these factors of truth into a whole, and so to cling one-sidedly no longer either to the greatness of human knowledge or to its limitation, but to recog- nise greatness and limitation alike. When empiricism, in spite of all its obvious weaknesses, continually raises its head afresh to exert an overpowering influence over humanity, this is due not so much to what it has actually achieved as to that defective grasp of the truth-concept which so often characterises rational- ism. The service and justification of the latter is to be found in its elevation of truth above all shades and divisions of human opinion, in the fact that it makes truth fully independent of man ; whenever this independence becomes in any way insecure, then science can no longer be saved from utter destruction. But so long as this separation between truth and man is not in some way overcome, and the former is not in some fashion made our own affair, truth will continue to be more or less cold and dead ; its ability to move us with overpowering force and to elevate the whole of life will remain inexplicable. However firmly we must reject the pragmatic method of measuring truth according to its utility for life (or indeed according to any external standard at all) , the apprehension of truth must still be understood as the development of a new life, and the truth itself conceived as existing not without life, but within it. It is ultimately a question not of grasping a reality external to life, but of gaining a life which develops a reality out of itself. By pursuing this quest we may secure a more inward relation to truth. Without such a relation we fall victims to empiricism, which would not attain to any truth whatever if it did not set out with a belief in truth. In empiricism and rationalism, as we have seen, opposing spiritual tendencies are operative. It will depend upon the character and circumstances of any given period which of the two will, for the time being, obtain the upper hand. When the thought-world is regarded as, in essentials, complete and capable of being easily reviewed (as was the case in the Ancient World, in the Middle Ages, and in the time of the German speculative philosophy), the mind's own contribution will take the first place 11 162 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT and there will be a tendency to undervalue experience. When, on the other hand, a consciousness of the narrowness of the previous field of vision predominates, and there arises a desire for expansion, salvation will be looked for solely from experience and the constructive, nay, transforming, spiritual activity is easily overlooked. This was what happened with Bacon, and again in the nineteenth century, and this is what often happens to-day. The immeasurable enlargement of our field of vision both in nature and in history which was effected by the work of the nineteenth century was bound to exercise a particularly powerful influence in Germany, because it was accompanied by an ener- getic reaction against the too rigid syntheses of the constructive systems. But the more such an empirical movement spreads, and the more exclusively it occupies the field, the more necessary opposi- tion becomes. We saw that empiricism was only able to attain even to an ineffectual conclusion because it operates within a ready-made thought-world, superior to (and even contradictory of) its own world of concepts ; but the more independent and the more impatient of restraint this tendency becomes, the more this thought- world must be shaken and broken up. Thus, through its own progress, it undermines these indispensable complements, and therefore in its outward triumph it must suffer an inward collapse. Its inadequacy becomes transparently obvious as soon as it relies entirely upon its own means. In spite of all the favour which is still accorded to empiricism in the domain of exact sciences remote from life, we perceive that such a catas- trophe is now impending. It becomes increasingly clear that no accumulation and arrangement of known facts can afford any sort of knowledge, or ideas, or convictions ; yet, at the same time, man cannot exist without these if he is to remain a beiug with a soul and not to degenerate into a mere civilised machine. Thought is imperatively driven beyond empiricism, not only by a necessity of spiritual life but, in particular, by the peculiar position of present-day culture. No culture can exist without an independence and originality on the part of thought. But so long as life proceeds along paths which are supposed to be safe, this independence may be overlooked and forgotten unless it is THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE 163 threatened by severe perplexities and contradictions. To-day, however, we are completely dominated by such perplexities and contradictions ; we perceive the necessity for a thorough over- hauling of our whole heritage of culture, the necessity for an energetic sifting out of all that has become obsolete and untrue, for a powerful synthesis and development of all the elements of truth. Nay, we are so deeply shaken that our uncertainty extends to the last elements and compels us to struggle for spiritual life as a whole. In the face of such tasks how can we make any sort of progress without a capacity for independent and original activity, without a self-recollection and self- awakening on the part of the spiritual life, without a spiritual elevation and renewal, to indicate new possibilities and reveal new realms of fact? Empiricism, however, cannot help us in any of these respects. And as the age stands in need of an inner transformation it must necessarily leave empiricism behind it. We warmly welcome the fact that the philosophical investi- gation of the present day is tending towards idealism, and we thoroughly understand the accompanying dislike of again adopt- ing anything resembling the old type of metaphysics : as certainly as we need a thorough renewal and systematic invigoration of life, we need a rousing and progressive idealism. Such an idealism, however, cannot be merely critical, it must be positive. For although the critical idealism which to-day takes a leading place on the highest level of philosophical investigation renders an important service in indicating the limits of realism and empiricism, and in particular in demonstrating that they can only succeed in creating a whole of life and knowledge by secretly borrowing from their opponents, and although, in addition, it certainly exhibits, along certain main lines of ten- dency, the operation and control of a new order of things, it fails in adequately gathering these main tendencies into a whole. A whole, however, is indispensable if man is to find his spiritual self in this movement, to place the centre of gravity of his life therein, and, at the same time, reverse the current of his life. Apart from such a reversal, apart from this uprooting from the other side into a life of elemental power, the new life will hardly be strong enough 164 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT to take up an independent position over against an order of another kind, and to overcome the immense obstacles offered by the worldliness at its doors. It is therefore no mere thirst for intellectual adventure which drives us towards meta- physics, but the imperative demand for a self-preservation of spiritual life. 2. MECHANICAL ORGANIC (TELEOLOGY) THE concepts of the "mechanical" and the "organic" have behind them a particularly influential history. This history not only exhibits great contrasts in cosmic speculation and in theory of method, but it reveals a hard struggle fought over the character of scientific work ; moreover it is full of fine distinctions and the more delicate variations of thought, and hence gives us a characteristic insight into the movement as a whole. Oppositions which hark back thousands of years still exert their influence over the work of to-day. Hence our attention will be chiefly directed to the historical side of the subject. (a) On the History of the Terms and Concepts The concepts mechanical and organic (like the terms them- selves) are old, but it was long before the terms became associated with the concepts. Mechanical appears in Aristotle as a well-established expression, as the technical designation of the art of invention, of the construction of machines (17 firi^aviKri, TO. and one of his later writings bears the name * The word continued to bear this meaning through- out the centuries, and since the time of Descartes it has served to denote a theory which explains the function of nature by analogy with human contrivances, not by reference to a driving power inherent in the structure as a whole, but as the result of * In this work the expression is explained as follows: "Orav Sky TI irapA i>rrii> Trpaai, Sid TO xa\E7r6v awopiav iraptx fl o\ov irporepov avayicaiov tlvai rov ftipovg. avaipov- fiivov yap rov o\ov oi>K torai iroitf oiiSf xip, t /ij 6/J.wvvfnag vairtp ei ric Xeyoi TYJV Xi9ivT)v. diarpQufiiiaa yap iarai roiavrtj. According to this, the State precedes the individual. f Characteristic of the Greek origin of this idea is the fact that the Gospel of St. John, powerfully influenced as it was by Greek philosophical elements, is the only gospel which brings it forward (parable of the vine and the grapes). J Thus we see the analogy between the State and a living body carried beyond the general idea and freely worked out in detail. John of Salisbury, for example, endeavoured to point out a bodily member corresponding to every section of the State (see Gierke, Das deutsche Qenossentchaftsrecht, iii. 549). MECHANICAL ORGANIC 171 are dependent upon one another in fate and deed, are linked together to form a whole. This mode of thought was not less productive in the realm of scientific work. Here it gave rise to the teleological view, which has exerted immense influence from the Ancient World down to the present day. If the whole was the original thing and the superior thing, then it offered the key to the explanation of the single members and their respective services. But, according to the Platonic- Aristotelian idea, however, the whole was an unchangeable form, a self-existent and self-sufficing life. Hence it set all movement a fixed goal and final terminus.* Nor was this conception limited in its application to the realm of living things ; it was extended to cover the whole universe. The world is here looked upon as a living and firmly consolidated whole, into which all the separate parts fit as members ; the various movements do not confusedly cut across one another, but each strives towards a terminus, there to pass over into a settled activity (tvepytid) that returns ever upon itself. But this mode of thought is particularly fruitful within its own native region, within the sphere of animated being. The organs and functions of all the various kinds of animals are referred to an all-embracing life in which they find their explanation ; at the same time all manifoldness of organic formation appears as the unfolding of a single normal type present in all the stages. This normal type is seen in its purity in man ; hence, starting from man, it is possible to throw light upon the whole of this vast domain and to bring its immense content under the control of pervading ideas. In this fashion there grew up a species of comparative anatomy and physiology, as well as an evolutionary science. An attempt was also made to explain the psychical life of animals by a similar reference to the human prototype. Such a method as this must appear to us in the highest degree * See Aristotle (Phya. 194 a, 28) : 17 Ik Qvaic reXoc icat of IVIKU. S>v yap avvt\ovc r}c Kivriotwf OVCTJJC tan rt riXoc TJJC Kivi]fft.^f, rovro iff%arov teal ri> oi sVeica. See further 199 a, 30 : kirii fi Qvaic fl, riXos S'avrii, rov rlXouc S'svtica raXXa, avn) av etij i; atria jj o5 fcVa. According to Aristotle, chance might indeed be responsible for occasional purposeful formations, but under no circumstances for the universal purposefulness; on this question see the second book of the Physict. 172 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT inadequate, but it provided its own age, and many succeeding centuries, with an ordered and organised material. There was no lack of opposition to this type of thought even in the Ancient World, but this opposition did not get beyond mere criticism, it did not pass over into leadership. This did not take place until the Modern Period, when the struggle against this organic doctrine became a chief factor in the movement toward freedom and clarity. The liberation took effect, at first, within the more general life of the time : the modern mind felt the restriction to a material organisation and the communication of spiritual life through this medium to be an unbearable oppression, and, rejecting it, aspired to enter into a direct relationship with the whole, and from this source win for itself a secure superiority to all visible order. We see this tendency first in the Kenaissance and the Keforma- tion, then in the political and economical movement of liberation which originated more particularly in England. Life thus directly based upon the individual seemed to gain immensely in power, rationality, and truth. From this new point of view all institutions appear as the work of individuals and possess no rights except such as may be granted them by the individual. According to Leibniz the individual bears within himself the whole infinity of the cosmos and evolves it out of himself: what an abyss separates this view from the organic doctrine ! At the same time there resulted a revolution in the sphere of science. The traditional explanation of nature from within and from the standpoint of the whole became unendurable ; men came to look upon it as a thoroughly subjective interpretation, as a mere fanciful conception that should be energetically repudiated because it claimed to be not fancy but a serious explanation. Hence the works of this period are full of com- plaints about the concealed figurativeness of the scholastic doctrine, with its inner forms and forces. It was described as a "Kefuge of Ignorance" (asylum ignorantia ; see, for example, Oldenburg in a letter to Spinoza). In opposition to this, the expulsion from nature of everything inward and the reduction of all complex facts into their smallest elements was regarded as the fundamental condition of true knowledge. MECHANICAL ORGANIC 173 At the same time, the discovery and further examination of these elements promised to render transparent the reality which had so far been obscured, and to give power over things that were else inaccessible. For once these elements are in our power things become mobile and malleable. There is here no feeling whatever for the greatness of the old artistic view, which had indeed suffered the severest injury at the hands of scholasticism. So much for the mechanical explanation of nature put forward by the Modem World. In direct and deliberate contrast to the more ancient mode of thought it raises the elements to the first place and bases its whole constructive effort upon them ; through space, time, and movement it splits up the traditional continuum into discrete quantities, and in this fashion it makes possible, for the first time, an exact comprehension of the phenomena. The teleological view naturally collapses along with this denial of all inner connection. All sorts of quite different considerations combine to ensure its rejection ; it appears anthropomorphic, indefinite, and sterile. The unity of nature is no longer secured through purpose but through law. Laws operate universally and consistently, and as simple basic forms they dominate all manifoldness. All this grips men's minds with elemental force. It is believed that the new type of thought renders genuine knowledge possible for the first time and inaugurates an age of science. All previous work sinks to the level of mere preparation. Thinkers of a profound type could not fail to perceive that the new type of thought left many questions open and that it even created new problems. Descartes, the most important thinker of the Enlightenment, treated the mechanical theory merely as a principle for the exact comprehension of nature, not as a metaphysical doctrine dealing with ultimate causes ; at the same time he drew a sharp distinction between himself and Democritus.* His faithful disciple, Robert Boyle, maintained * The most important reference to this is in the Princ. philot., iv. 202 : (Democriti philosophandi ratio) rejecta ett, primo quia ilia corpuscula indivisi- bilia supponebat, quo nomine etiam ego illam rejicio; deinde quia vacuum circa ipsa ette fingebat, quod ego nullum dari potse demonstro, tertio quia gravitatem iisdem tribuebat, quam ego nullam in ullo corporum cum tolum spectator, ted tantum quatenus ab aliorum corporum situ et motu dependct atque ad illarefertur, intelligo ff. 174 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT the existence of a purposeful and active cause as an indis- pensable complement to the mechanical causes.* Berkeley drew attention to the fact that the mechanical view only explained the laws and modes of occurrence and not the causes of events. Leibniz went very thoroughly into the matter and developed a peculiar type of cosmic philosophy, which declared the whole of nature, with its mechanism, to be the appearance of a spiritual reality ; he raised the ultimate units (which from a mechanical point of view constitute a mere limiting concept) to the central position and, as monads, equipped them with an inner life. Within the sphere of nature all was to be explained mechanically ; the principles of the mechanism, however, seemed themselves in need of explanation and to be able to find this explanation only in the purposeful control of a rational Providence.! Leibniz believed the purposefulness of natural laws to consist in their all serving the end of securing the greatest possible utilisation of force. He found that on every hand the shortest paths are chosen and the simplest means employed.! The Leibnizian school firmly believed that everything was composed of parts and that the whole material world therefore fell within the mechanical sphere, while the soul, as a simple body, did not. In a less definite manner, Wolff, in scholastic * See, for example, De ipsa natura, sect. iv. : Harem autem partium motum sub primordia rerum infinita sua sapientia ac potestate ita direxit, ut tandem (sive breviore tempore sive longiore, ratio definire nequit) in speciosam hanc ordinatam- que mundi formam coaluerint. f Omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice, ipsa vero principia mechanismi generalia ex altiore fonte profluere (p. 161, Erdm.) : see also 165 a, Foucher, ii. 253. J See 147 b (Erdm.) : Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a maxima minimove petendum est, ut nempe maximus prastetur effectus minima ut sic dicam sumptu. The objection that mere natural necessity might have produced the same result is answered as follows (605 b) : Cela serait vrai, si par exemple les loix du mouvement, et tout le reste, avait sa source dans une netesiite geometrique de causes efficientes ; mais il se trouve que dans la dcrniere analyse on est oblig& de recourir a quelque chose qui depend de causes finales ou de la convenance. Thus, for example, Baumgarten (Metaphys., ed. vi., 1768, 433) : Machina est compositum stricte dictum secundum leges motus mobile. Ergo omne corpus in mundo est machina. Machines natura per leges motus determinata mechanismus ett. At, quidquid non est compositum, non est machina, hinc nulla monas est machina. MECHANICAL ORGANIC 175 fashion, put side by side explanations based upon efficient causes and explanations based upon final causes, and in this connection devised the expression "teleology."* It was of course not to be expected that the traditional organic and teleological doctrine should at once collapse under the advent of the mechanical theory ; it was far too deeply rooted in the concepts and methods of the school for such a collapse to be possible. Moreover, there was no lack of capable men who vigorously upheld the distinctive character of living things, t But the age was not disposed to listen to them. For this a new wave of life was necessary, a movement calling upon men to seek and find something new in reality. This came more especially with the rise and growth of German Humanism. This movement revealed the victorious growth of a desire for a greater directness of life, for a more intimate relationship of man to nature and the world, for a view of things based upon an understanding of the whole. At first the movement shook men's sympathies like a hurricane, but it gradually settled into an artistic construction of life : from this position a return to the ancients lay close at hand, for were they not the pattern of a pure and noble nature ? It was there- fore not surprising that the organic type of thought was revived and adopted by this latest Kenaissance and that it held and swayed men's minds with almost magic power. It is a remarkable fact that, in a scientific sense, it was Kant (temperamentally but little artistic) who prepared the way for this new artistic type of thought. He did so by reducing mechanism to a merely human mode of thinking, thereby * See Philos. ration, xive logica, op. iii., 85 : Rerum naturaUum duplicet dari possunt rationes, quorum alias petuntur a causa efficiente, alia a fine. Qua. a causa efficiente petuntur, in disciplinis hactenus definitis expenduntur. Datur itaque prater eas alia adhuc philosophies naturalis part, qua fintt reruni explicat, nomine adhuc destituta, etsi amplissima sit et utilissima. Dici posset teleologia. The term causa Jinalis, on the other hand, is scholastic : I find it first occurring in Abelard. t The chief place, in this respect, is taken by Cudworth, with his hypothesis of a plastic nature ; see, in particular, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), i. 3, 19. Among German scholars, Riidiger is more especially noteworthy ; see, for example, Institutions eruditionis seu philosophia itynthetica, p. 109 : physica vel mechanica est vel vitalis. 176 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT clearing a free space for a view and treatment of another kind ; but for such positive construction a compelling motive was needed. This motive appeared to him to be provided by the organic realm, since it could only be comprised within our concepts by the aid of the idea of an inner whole and a guiding purpose. Thus the old doctrine was again taken up, and was applied beyond its immediate sphere to the world as a whole. In Kant's own case the application was carefully guarded and put forward as representing a human point of view. But the flood of artistic enthusiasm rose so rapidly as to sweep away all confining obstacles, and the organic type of thought acquired a proud self-consciousness and proclaimed itself, in opposition to the Enlightenment, as a view of life based upon the inner- most life and being of things themselves, the mechanical doc- trine being regarded as bloodless and soulless. Schelling gave particularly energetic expression to the new tendency, and ranged all natural life under the idea of the organism.* Concept and term then came rapidly into use. Though the ancient traditions were still adhered to, modern influences were now unmistakably apparent. The idea of the organism did not so much represent a conception of being as of becoming ; reality did not so much constitute a finished work of art as a living being, progressing through its own power ; so that this change of attitude was at first far more fruitful in the sphere of history than in that of nature. A great fascination was exerted by the idea that all historical growth proceeds not from sudden im- pulses but through steady advance, not from artificial reflection but from an unconscious natural impulse; that it issues not from the mere individual, but from the power of a systematic whole. And as this idea transferred itself to politics, law, speech, &c., it seemed on every hand as if a purer and richer actuality, a larger conception of the whole, a more inward and peaceful relationship of man to things had been won. Man was no longer to master things from without, but to share their inner life; for example, he was not to make law, but to find it as * Usually, however, he understands dynamical as constituting the exact opposite of mechanical ; in the latter case he looks upon the world as a given thing, in the former as something unceasingly growing. MECHANICAL ORGANIC 177 a product of the spirit of the people. He was now free to recognise the riches of historical tradition, retaining throughout individual character and doing justice in its own place to each individual development. Thus a tendency towards a historical view of the world (in contrast to the rational view of the En- lightenment) was very closely connected with the organic doctrine. Historical research is now the intimate ally of artistic contemplation ; it is characteristic that Schelling declares the standpoint of historical art to be the "third and absolute standpoint of history." But the onesidedness of this historical view, and with it the limitations of the organic doctrine, could not long be overlooked. Misgivings were bound to arise, if for no other reason than that political and ecclesiastical reactionaries, such as Adam Muller and de Maistre (the father of modern Ultramontanism) , took up this organic doctrine with especial enthusiasm and made use of it in a mediaeval sense to repress the independence, not only of individuals, but of the living forces of the present. Apart, however, from this particular development, the pro- blematical and onesided nature of the organic doctrine soon attracted attention. The smooth, uninterrupted growth of history had been presupposed rather than proved ; the objec- tivity which it seemed to have discovered in the things, it had itself placed in them ; hence its conception of history was seen to be strongly subjective. This movement had lent a valuable stimulus to the comprehension of nature, since it directed attention to life itself and to the inner connection of things, and it had moreover powerfully promoted the quest after the unity of natural forces ; but these suggestions did not become scientifically fruitful until they were transplanted to the different soil of modern natural science. In so far as the organic mode of thought attempted, with its own resources, to come to a definite conclusion, it lost itself in audacious and often fantastic imaginations. It brought danger, moreover, to life as a whole, because it induced man to adopt a predomi- nantly contemplative attitude towards reality ; it invited him rather to complacently adopt what was at hand and fit himself in, than to proceed independently and cut his own paths. The 12 178 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT whole tendency was, in fact, unsuitable for an age burdened with great tasks and involved in difficult complications. Hence the lead was again taken by the other side, which had never been quite suppressed, but only intimidated. It now came to the front with a fresh lease of life. It was the Enlighten- ment over again ; somewhat different in complexion, but not fundamentally changed. From its point of view the Human- istic Epoch, with its organic doctrine, seemed no more than a mere episode. The individualistic construction of social life attained full development, for the first time, in modern Liberal- ism and in the modern doctrine of Free Trade. On into the second half of the nineteenth century we see Adam Smith's elaborate and extreme theory treated, even by distinguished scholars, as a settled truth and a final conclusion. Natural science for its part, while sharply rejecting the speculation of natural philosophy, undertook to thoroughly eliminate every remnant of vitalistic theory. It now demanded that organic growth and life should be brought without remainder under the fundamental laws of physics and chemistry. Among philoso- phers, Lotze, in particular, maintained this universal validity of mechanism though certainly not without giving it, as Leibniz had done, a deeper foundation in a realm of psychical life. But this supermechanical element was an affair of metaphysics, while nature was handed over to mechanism, and in time the affirma- tion of mechanism became more influential than the doctrine of its limitation. Thus it was that the mechanical theory, properly understood and cautiously applied, seemed to offer a sure solu- tion of the great cosmic problems. However much might remain to be done in the way of working it out in detail, the principle seemed beyond the reach of doubt. Then came a resistance, an unexpected resistance. It came, not as an after-effect of older modes of thought, but from the movement of modern life itself, not so much from an artistic interpretation of reality as from growing experience, new facts, and new problems. The economical and industrial development of modern life drew men closer together and multiplied their points of contact ; it differentiated and complicated human work, and thereby bound one man far closer to his comrade MECHANICAL ORGANIC 179 and all together into one whole. In the face of the social con- nections thus initiated, the isolated individual of the mechanical theory disappeared. Just as the mechanical theory had derived all social connection from the individual, so modern sociology looked upon the individual as belonging from the very begin- ning to a connected social whole ; the doctrine of the milieu took into account even the invisible elements of influence, and tended to make the individual the mere product of his environ- ment. At the same time, the defencelessness of the individual in the presence of economic complications and opposing ten- dencies was keenly felt, and with it the necessity of a collective will, as embodied in the State. All this tended towards a resuscitation of the organic idea. Among philosophers Comte, in particular, came under this influence, and constructed his ethics and politics from this standpoint. But in his case the concept of organism underwent a considerable alteration as compared with its earlier meaning ; it was transferred, at any rate in Comte' s discussion of general principles, from the artistic and ethical spheres into the realm of natural science. It was more especially the progress of histology (Bichat) which gave empirical support to the funda- mental idea. Like the living body, society is an exceedingly fine network of numerous separate elements ; these are so closely connected with one another that the action or inaction, the loss or the gain, of the one directly affects the others. This has always been true; but it now appeared more true than ever owing to the modern division of labour, which convincingly demonstrates the manner in which each is linked up with each and each with the whole. This seemed to mark the discovery of a guiding principle for ethics and politics a principle which only needed to be developed in order to mark out definite paths for our whole conduct. In reality, such a principle is without foundation, and has been formed by a surreptitious interweaving of ancient and modern elements ; the result is then, all unconsciously, palmed off as an inner whole the mere fact as a concept of value, the " is " as an " ought." Finally, when the whole makes demands upon the individual and imposes them as duties, we find our- 180 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT selves completely on ancient ground. The obscurity which has always attached to the concept organic is increased to the point of unbearable confusion by this commingling of old and new. But the concept is firmly retained because it demands that the dependence of the individual upon the whole context in which he finds himself shall somehow be brought to definite expression. Hence the modern investigator comes under opposing influences, and it cannot cause surprise when thinkers differ even to the point of sharply opposing each other. Nor is it only between individuals that these divisions occur, but also between different departments of research. The organic doctrine has been most warmly taken up by sociologists, while political economists as such have been much less inclined to adopt it ; among jurists it finds chief favour with distinguished Germanists. Along with this movement in the social sphere there has gone a parallel movement in natural science, but since this began later it is to-day involved to an even greater extent in uncer- tainty and conflict. Without doubt this movement has been brought about in the first place by the modern theory of evolu- tion. The Darwinian form, in which this theory first obtained general recognition, was, in its characteristic nature, as far removed as could be from a recognition of the organic idea, and it endeavoured to subject the whole sphere of life to mechanical concepts ; but in natural science, as in other departments of life, thought movements often produce results entirely opposite to those intended. Since the domain of life now attracted greatly increased attention, and was made the object of deeper research, its distinctive nature obtained a much wider recognition, and it became evident that the tracing back of its phenomena to ele- mentary physical and chemical laws was incomparably more difficult than had been supposed during the middle of the cen- tury. The observations on protoplasm, the new conceptions of the mechanics of evolution, the problem of the continuity of life, the theory of mutation, with its demonstration of the sudden production of new forms, &c., taken together gave rise to a new and essentially different situation. Opinion became in conse- quence divided. Some believed that an intellectual appropria- tion of the new facts would be rendered possible through a further MECHANICAL ORGANIC 181 elaboration of mechanical concepts ; others believed a new prin- ciple to be essential.* In connection with these movements the teleological point of view again conies to the front, though it is now brought up not so much as a piece of metaphysics, but rather as a means of scientific explanation, as " empirical " teleology ; t but even in this sense it is opposed by others as a relapse into metaphysics. Thus, as a result of studying the realm of life the mechanical doctrine is, if not limited, at any rate forced beyond its cus- tomary form ; " the too simple mechanical conception " (Roux). Moreover, its own fundamental concepts are attacked in more than one way. To begin with, the infinite refinement of detail revealed by apparently elementary inorganic processes made the older mechanical ideas seem much too coarse even for the stages below the vital level. The science of " energetics " has attacked the mechanical view of the world on grounds of principle, for it has contested the basic idea of matter as something that exists outside the sphere of sensation, and acts as the special vehicle of physical forces ; moreover, it has sought to trace all natural phenomena back to the fundamental concept of energy. J * See, among others, Eindfleisch, Aerztliche Philosophic, 1888, and Neovita- lismus, 1895. Roux (Einleitung zum Archiv filr Entwickelungsmechanik der Organismen, 1894) protests against " describing the organic form as inexplicable and only to be teleologically deduced" (p. 22), and remarks further: "The words Incidit in Scyllam, qui vult vitare Charybdim are in the highest degree applicable to those who are investigating the mechanics of evolution. The all-too-simple mechanical conception and the metaphysical conception repre- sent the Scylla and Charybdis, and to sail between them is a difficult task which a few only have up till now succeeded in performing ; and it cannot be denied that the temptation to adopt the latter conception has appreciably increased with the increase of our knowledge" (p. 23). See also W. Roux: Ueber die Selbstregulation der Lebewesen, 1902. t See Cossmann, Elemente der empirischen Teleologie, 1899 ; further, E. Kunig, Die heutige Naturwissenchaft u. die Teleologie ; Beil. zur Allg. Z., 1900, Nos. 29 and 30 ; also Ueber Naturzwecke, 1902. These problems have given rise to an exceedingly rich and unceasingly growing literature, a clear sign of the central position they occupy in the work and interest of the modern world. { See Ostwald, Vorlesungen ilber die Naturphilosophie, p. 153 : "Everything that we know of the outer world can be expressed in terms of existing energy. Therefore the concept of energy is seen, on every hand, to be the most uni- versal which science has yet formed. It comprehends not only the problem of substance but that of causality, too." With regard to the meaning of the concept energy we read on p. 158 : ' ' We would universally define energy as work or as every thing which results from work and can be converted into work." 182 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT It is, however, quite impossible in a mere sketch such as this to go into all the problems here suggested. The main point is that the mechanical theory has lost the matter-of-course cha- racter which it long appeared to possess. It is seldom, however, that an old theme becomes a problem once again without under- going a transformation. To-day the whole air is full of conflict and unrest. But the matter is not one to be settled by general reflections, but by the main direction which work and life actually take. Thus it has been in the past, and thus in the future, too, the progress of the world's work will itself settle the form in which the opposi- tions declare themselves, and decide what further developments both fundamental concepts must undergo ; also whether new modes of explanation may supersede the old. It falls to the philosophical speculation of to-day to survey the field of reality and note how the concepts stand in relation to it, and what tasks they urge upon us. (c) The Present-day Conflict 1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM Philosophy must insist above everything else on the fact that the mechanical theory, even if it could explain everything that is known, is never under any circumstances capable of furnishing a definite conclusion. The mechanical explanation does not carry us beyond a juxtaposition of the elements, a conclusion which from the philosophical point of view necessarily constitutes a difficult problem. If the elements existed side by side without any connection whatever, and in a state of indifference towards one another, it would be absolutely impossible to perceive how one could affect another. This holds above all in the sphere of nature ; Leibniz and Lotze were compelled to thoroughly reorganise the immediate view of the world through a con- sideration of the fact of mutual influence. Further, we cannot very well reject Leibniz's belief that nothing can be completely absorbed solely in accomplishing something for others, but must also be something in itself, and hence that whatever is taken to be the final element must be something with an existence of its MECHANICAL ORGANIC 183 own. If this thought be followed up we are led to the conclusion that the mechanical realm is the mere appearance of quite a different kind of world. With regard to the life of the soul, too, those who would trace everything hack to the mechanism of association are quite unable to give an answer to the question how all these processes come to be experienced as personal life, as my life and your life. On every hand unity and connection must somehow be accounted for, and this is a task beyond the powers of mechanical explanation. Since the mechanical view shelves an unsolved problem, then from the point of view of actual fact it cannot be admitted that it dominates the whole of reality, even if it completely explains the whole of nature. For associated with nature is the life of the soul, and this life exhibits (more particularly in the case of human beings) a completely different kind of process. For in so far as the inner life grows to be something more than a mere accompaniment of natural processes and unfolds an independent character, in so far as spiritual life grows up within us, a mere assembling of single elements no longer provides a satisfactory explanation ; each single phenomenon is now a portion of a whole, and the joining-up results not directly between the separate elements, but indirectly through their relationship to the whole. Thought, for example, certainly runs its course in separate ideas, but it does not consist in a mere accumulation and summation of these ; it pursues a definite aim, and is there- by inwardly held together. It cannot endure anything which disturbs this unity. Nothing is more characteristic of the dis- tinctive nature of thought than the fact and power of the logical contradiction. It would be impossible to perceive this contra- diction if, in thought, multiplicity was not comprehended within the scope of an all-inclusive activity, and it could not be so unendurable as it is if the desire for unity were not enormously powerful. At the same time contradiction reveals a totally different sort of relationship from any which is to be seen in the mechanical realm. It is not a collision of spatial elements but an incompatibility of content. This brings us to the con- cept of content, which is absolutely incomprehensible from the mechanical point of view. Moreover, content involves a new 184 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT principle of order that of objective reality, meaning, and inter- dependency ; as seen, for example, in the relationship of the characteristic marks of a logical concept to one another. Only the grossest misunderstanding can confound the inner structure of such a concept with the juxtaposition within a sense-presenta- tion. The fundamental form of connection in the former case is that of system. Each element stands within a whole, under the influence of a whole and subject to its compelling power, while the various elements mutually determine one another. Hence the whole of reality does not fall within the mechanical sphere. Therefore, purpose or design does not disappear from the world even if nature can no longer find room for it. For design indisputably possesses reality and power in human life, not only in the soul of the individual, but also in the life of humanity as a whole ; as witness the great systems of science and art, law and morality, and in last resort the whole of human culture.* Since purposeful action is essential to inner life, it follows that it is a portion of reality as a whole ; we must therefore insist on shaping our conception of the world in such a manner as to make this fact intelligible. Finally, looking at the matter as a whole, we find ourselves face to face with a sharp alternative. It is customary to-day to regard the world as a series of ascending stages, but there is an important divergence of opinion upon the question whether the higher is a mere product of the lower (and therefore capable of complete explanation by reference to the lower) or whether, in the higher, something new and original comes to light, some- thing which can only be understood by enlarging our conception of the world as a whole. The opposition between these two views becomes peculiarly acute in the case of the problem of the relationship between nature and spiritual life. Is the latter a mere product oj the former, or does it form the commencement oj a new stage of reality ? The validity or invalidity of the idea of design will depend upon our settlement of this question. If spiritual life, with its inwardness and wholeness, has a nature * That " real categories " proceed from design has been shown by Trendelen- burg in a very important chapter of the Logischen Untersuchungen (see chap. xi). MECHANICAL ORGANIC 185 and origin of its own, then it belongs essentially to the whole and must from the very beginning have been operative in the movement of the whole, directing it towards itself. In this case the world-process has an aim and cosmic speculation will not be able to dispense with the idea of design.* But if spiritual life is a mere product of nature, then all aim disappears and design with it. In this case the world and humanity, too, are drifting rudderless into chaos and the void. 2. THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM In the sphere of natural science the conflict centres round the question whether the phenomena characteristic of life can be explained by the general laws of physics and chemistry or whether we are compelled to recognise in them a new kind of process. This is before everything a question of actual fact, and as such it belongs to that branch of science which deals with these phenomena, but at the same time the problem is closely associated with many considerations of a more general kind which cannot here be evaded. So much is indisputable, that the uniqueness and mystery of life has again come more to the front as a problem that must be faced, nor can we settle the matter to-day so easily as our immediate predecessors thought it possible to do. It seems to be more and more out of the question that we should conceive of life as a mere property of matter, it is becoming more and more recognised that life must be granted an independent character. In this connection (to mention some prominent names outside Germany) we may refer to Bergson (more particularly in his L' evolution creatrice, 1907) t and Sir * Thus we are again driven to metaphysics, in accordance with Herbart's conviction (Wke., ii. 461) : "In thinking about nature and humanity the force of the human spirit impels it unavoidably towards metaphysics, which, like the great, primitive mountains of the earth, forms the broad, deep, invisible foundation of all human thought and activity, while at the same time in isolated, sharp, almost unattainable summits it towers above all other heights and depths." t The following passages are characteristic of Bergson's conception of life : L'tvolut. criatrice, p. 105 : La vie est, avant tout, une tendence d agir sur la matUre brute ; further, p. 197 : La vie c'est-d-dire la conscience land* a traveri la matiere. 186 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT Oliver Lodge.* Looked at from this point of view the problem is to fix upon an essential and distinctive characteristic of life ; Boutroux finds this in the capacity " of creating a system in which certain parts are subordinate to certain other parts " ; this implies an " agent " and " organs," together constituting a "hierarchy" to which there is no analogue in the inorganic world, t Bergson sees a decisive proof of the working of life as a psychic force in the fact that nature frequently develops like, or similar, structures in the case of very different organisms and hence appears to pursue like aims by different paths. J The various civilised nations differ markedly from one another * In Life and Matter (1909), p. 68, Lodge says, in summing up: "The view concerning life which I have endeavoured to express is that it is neither matter nor energy, nor even a function of matter or of energy, but is something belonging to a different category ; that by some means at present unknown it is able to interact with the material world for a time, but that it can also exist in some sense independently ; although in that condition of existence it is by no means apprehensible by our senses. It is dependent on matter for its phenomenal appearance for its manifestation to us here and now, and for all its terrestrial activities ; but otherwise, I conceive that it is independent of matter. I argue that its essential existence is continuous and permanent, though its interactions with matter are discontinuous and temporary." Further (p. 19) : " I am using the word ' life ' in quite a general sense, as is obvious, for if it be limited to certain metabolic processes in protoplasm which is the narrowest of its legitimate meanings what I have said about its possible existence apart from matter would be absurd. It may be convenient to employ the word ' vitality ' for this limited sense." t See Boelitz, Die Lehre von Zufall bei E. Boutroux, 1907, p. 91. } See L'6volut. creatrice, 1907, p. 59 : Le pur mecanisme serait done refu- table et lafinalite, au tens special oil, nous Ventendons, demontrable par un certain cote, si Von pouvait etablir que la vie fabrique certains apparcils identiques, par des moyens dissemblables, sur des lignes devolution divergentes. La force de la preuve serait d'ailleurs proportioned au degrA d'ecartement des lignes devolution choisies, et au degre de complexity des structures similaires qu'on trouverait sur elles. W. Boux, in particular, shows how even from the standpoint of a finer mechanism (but one readily recognising deeper problems) a specific character may be attributed to life. He regards " the self-regulation in the performance of all separate functions necessary to persistence amidst the alterations of circumstance " as a universal elementary property of living beings ; in this regulation he sees " that property which above all others distinguishes living beings from all other natural bodies, since it effects the direct accom- modation to changing outward circumstances. We may safely conclude from the immeasurably long duration of the unicellular organisms, which has produced countless generations of the same type in spite of the alteration of outward circumstances, that even the lowest forms of life possess this self- regulating capacity, apart from inheritance." (See Archiv filr Entwicklungs- mechanik der Organismen, vol. xxiv.. no. 4 (1907). p. 685.) MECHANICAL ORGANIC 187 in their treatment of these problems. Very noteworthy is the " part played by the principle of discontinuity in the most recent French thought " (see H. Hoffding, Moderne Philosophen (1905), p. 67). With regard to this school and its motives we cannot do better than quote Hoffding' s words (ibid. p. 82 ff.) : "In French philosophical literature the philosophy of dis- continuity has come to the front in a peculiarly interesting and energetic fashion. There are three different factors which are of decisive importance for the philosophy of discontinuity. In the first place, experience exhibits differences of quality which neither speculation nor the theory of evolution has succeeded in reducing. We may here note that Comte's positivism expressly recognised the gap which separated the different departments of nature from one another : for Comte each new science signified a special, irreducible group of phenomena. In the second place, even in each particular group of phenomena, the law of causality is not able to find more than a partial corroboration. Hence Hume is again appealed to, and his empiricism is set up against the attempt of Kant and the evolutionists to overcome it. Finally, attention is drawn to the consciousness of initiative, the capacity, through thought and action, to place something new in the world, and great emphasis is laid upon the moral importance of this capacity." * In the case of such a mode of thought as this there can be no inclination to refer the characteristic phenomena of life back to sub-vital forces ; on the contrary, any such attempt at mechanical explanation will be severely criticised. The mechanical theory seems to make the mistake of treating the world as a given and final system, not as something in process of development. Hence it denies all movement derived from within as well as all possi- bility of essential progress, t refuses to attribute to combinations of elements anything beyond what is due to each indivi- * The most prominent protagonists of this philosophy of discontinuity are Eenouvier (d. 1903) and E. Boutroux, whose work De Videe de la loi naturelle dans la science et dans la philosophic contemporaine (1895) was published in Germany in 1907 ; trans, by Benrubi. t See Bergson, Uevolut. creatrice (p. 40) : L'estence de explications meca- niques est en eff'et de consider er I'avenir et le passe comme calculables enjonction du present, et de pretendre ainsi que tout est donne. 188 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT dually,* credits the separate elements, as a rule, with every- thing which they exhibit when associated together, t and does not pay sufficient attention to the manner in which a more exact knowledge of vital processes increasingly does away with the supposed isolation of the elements. I This direction of attention towards life and its progressive movement causes the idea of design also to appear in a new light. The complete rejection of design in nature was rooted in the tendency, so long dominant, not to regard life as an original and fundamental phenomenon, hut to deduce it from the lifeless in direct opposition to the older mode of thought, which ex- plained the whole content of nature hy reference to the living. In a certain reaction towards the latter position, or rather towards a less crude variety of it, emphasis is again laid upon certain facts which seem to indicate a direction of the life- movement towards a goal which has yet to he attained, a Ziel- strebigkeit (directivity) (K. E. von Baer), together with an endeavour on the part of separate elements to join together to form a whole. The difficulty of making this in any way com- prehensible without introducing into the sphere of nature the human propensity to weigh and deliberate was already keenly felt by Aristotle : to us moderns the difficulty must appear * See Lodge, Life and Matter : " One frequently hears it said that whatever properties are to be found in the whole are also to be found in the parts. This is incorrect. An aggregate of atoms may possess properties which are not attributes of the separate atom, even in the slightest degree." f See Lodge, Life and Matter : " In this case that which has to be explained is simply accepted as it stands and straightway attributed to the atoms, in the hope of thus bringing the matter to an end." Bergson, L'dvolut. creatrice, vi., finds the error of Spencer's evolutionism in that it endeavours a decouper la realite actuelle, dejd evolu6e, en petits morceaux non mains lvalue's, puis a la recomposer avec ces fragments, et a se donner ainsi, var avance, tout ce qu'il s'agit d'expliquer. J See Bergson, L'tvolut. creatrice (p. 205) : Plus la physique avance, plus elle efface d'ailleurs I' individuality des corps et meme des particules en lesquelles I'imagination scientifique commengait par les decomposer; corps et corpuscules tendent a se fondre dans une interaction universelle. See, for example, Phys. 199 a, 17 : oZv rd Kara rrjv rtyvriv eveicd rov, SffXov art icai rd Kara. ri\v (pvffiv. opoititg yap fyti irpoQ a\A)\a iv rolg Kara r'i.-xyi}v Kal iv role Kara (ftvaiv ra vavtpbv tTTi rStv Ziliuiv rGrv d\\wv, a ovre rk\vg ovre Zqrfiffavra ovre /3ov\vos va/ioc) first arose in contrast with ytypaju/wvoc \6yoe, and it is certain that it first derived its more definite meaning as the result of this contrast." As to the contrast between j>6/zor and i>iTi(;, see ibid., p. 82 ff., and further, the even more careful investi- gation in Themis, Dike u. Verwandtes, pp. 386-411. The only places are Plato, Tirruzus, 83 E : Kai ravra fifv Srj iravra voouv opyava yeyovtv, orav alpa pri fK rSiv airiuv Kai iroriav ir\i)0vffy Kara vaiv, d\\' i svavriwv TOV oyKov irapd TOVQ TIJS vffet*> Xafiftdvy j/o/xowg. Arist., De Ccelo, 268 a, 10 ff.: Ka9dire.p yap aot Kai ol Hv9ay6peioi, TO irav Kai TO, irdvra rolg rpifflv tipiffiai. TtXevrri yap Kai ptaov Kai dpxn rbv dpidfjibv ?x t 1 "" iravros, ravra Sf TOV Ttjg rpidSoc. Siii irapa rrja vatuc; tlXrjQores tiffTrtp vofiovg ewt'i/JjCi Kai irpog TOQ, dyiffreiag ^pcu^cda rStv Otwv r<# dpi9[itj> rovry. How vojuof, with the philosophers, easily came to mean something like an artificial preparation, over against the real essence, is shown, for example, in Aristotle, Phys., 193 a, 14 : OVK av yevlffflai xXivriv dXAd %v\ov, ug TO piv Kara