UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF THE 
 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 WILLIAM PITT, 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1800, 
 
 ON A 
 
 MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS TO THE THRONE, 
 
 Approving oftbe Answers returned to the Communications 
 from France 
 
 RELATIVE TO A 
 
 NEGOCIATION FOR PEACE, 
 
 FOURTH EDITION. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED FOR j, WRIGHT, PICCADILLY, 
 
 8887 rf 1800 --
 

 
 SPEECH 
 
 5? Right Honourable William Pitt, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 I AM induced, at this period of the debate, 
 to offer my fentiments to the Houfe, both from 
 an apprehenfion that, at a later hour, the atten- 
 tion of the Houfe mult neceflarily be exhaufted, 
 
 OO 
 
 S and bccaufe "the fentiment with which the Ho- 
 nourable and Learned Gentleman * began his 
 Speech, and with which he has thought proper 
 
 -^to conclude it, places the Queftion precifely on 
 that ground on which I am moft defirous of 'dif- 
 cufTmg it. The learned Gentleman feems to 
 
 ^affume, as the foundation of his rcafoning, and 
 
 j^ 
 
 o as the great argument for immediate treaty, 
 z that every effort to overturn the fyitem of the 
 
 Mr. Erik inc. 
 
 B French 
 
 9999,'!
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 French Revolution muft be unavailing, and that 
 it would be not pnly imprudent, but almolt 
 impious to ftruggle longer againft that order of 
 things, which, on I know not what principle of 
 predeftination, he appears to confider as immortal. 
 Little as I am inclined to accede to this opinion, 
 I am not forry that the Honourable Gentleman 
 has contemplated the fubject in this ferious view. 
 I do indeed confider the French Revolution as the 
 fcvereft trial which the viiitation of Providence 
 has ever yet inflicted upon the nations <of the earth j 
 but I cannot help reflecting, with fatisfa&ion, 
 that this Country, even under fuch a trial, has not 
 only been exempted from thofe calamities which 
 have covered almoft every other part of Europe, 
 but appears to have been referved as a retuge 
 and afylum to thofe who flegl from its perfecu- 
 tion, as a barrier to opppfe its progrefs, and 
 perhaps ultimately as an inftrument to deliver the 
 world from the crimes and miferies which have 
 attended it. 
 
 Under this impreffion, I truft, the Houfe will 
 forgive me, if I endeavour, as far as I am able, 
 to take a large and comprehenfive view of this 
 
 important
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 Important queftion. In doing fo, I agree with 
 Iriy Honourable Friend, that it would, in any 
 cafe, be impotlible to feparate the prefent dif- 
 cuffion from the former crimes and atrocities of 
 the French Revolution ; becaufe both the papers 
 now on the table, and the whole of the Learned 
 Gentleman's argument, force upon our cdnli- 
 cleration, the origin of the war, and all the ma- 
 terial facls which have occurred during its con- 
 tinuance. The Learned Gentleman has revived 
 and retailed all thofe arguments from his owii 
 pamphlet, which had before pafled through 
 thirty-feven or thirty-eight Editions in print, and 
 how gives them to the Houfe, embelliflied by 
 the graces of his perfonal delivery. The Firft 
 Conful has alfo thought fit to revive and retail 
 the chief arguments ufed by all the Oppofition 
 Speakers, and all the Oppofition Publifhefs, in 
 this Country during the laft feven years. And 
 (what is ftill more material) the queftion itfelf, 
 which is now immediately at iffue ^-the queftion, 
 whether, under the prefent circumftances, there is 
 fuch a profpeft of fecurity from any Treaty with 
 France, as ought to induce us to negociate, cannot 
 fce properly decided upon, without retracing, both 
 B 2 from
 
 from oOr own experience, and from that of other 
 Nations, the Nature, the Caufes, and the Mag- 
 nitude of the Danger, againft which we have to 
 guard, in order to judge of the fecurity which 
 we ought to accept. 
 
 I fay then, that before any man can concur in 
 opinion with that Learned Gentleman ; before 
 any man can think that the fubftance of his Ma- 
 jefty's Anfwer is any other than the fafety of the 
 Country required ; before any man can be of 
 opinion, that to the overtures made by the ene- 
 my, at fuch a time, and under fuch circum- 
 fiances, it would have been fafe to have returned 
 ananfwer concurring in the negociation he muft 
 come within one of the three following defcriptions: 
 He muft either believe, that the French Revolu- 
 tion neither does now exhibit, nor has at any 
 time exhibited fuch circumftances of danger* 
 arifing out of the very nature of the fyftem and 
 the internal ftat'e and condition of France, as to 
 leave to foreign powers no adequate ground of fe- 
 curity in negociation j or, fecondly, he muft be ef 
 opinion, that the change which has recently 
 3 taken
 
 { 5 ) 
 
 taken place, has given that fecurity, which, in 
 the former ftages of the Revolution, was want- 
 ing ; or, thirdly, he muft be one who, believing 
 that the danger exifted, not . undervaluing 
 its extent, nor miftaking its nature, neverthelefs 
 thinks, from his view of the prefent preffure on 
 the Country, from his view of its fituation and 
 its profpefts, compared with the fituation and 
 profpecls of its enemies, that we are, with 
 our eyes open, bound to accept of inadequate 
 fccurity for every tiling that is valuable and 
 facred, rather than endure the preffure, or incur 
 the rifk which would refult from a farther pro- 
 longation of the ccnteft. 
 
 In difcuffingthe laft of thefe Queftions, we fhalj 
 be led to confider, what inference is to be drawn 
 from the circumftances and the refult of our own 
 negociations in former periods of the war; whe- 
 ther, in the comparative State of this Country and 
 France, we now fee the fame reafon for repeat- 
 ing our then unfuccefsful experiments ; or whe- 
 ther we have rot thence derived the leffons of 
 
 experience
 
 'experience, added to the deductions of reafom 
 marking the inefficacy and danger of the very 
 meafures which are quoted to us as precedents 
 for our adoption. 
 
 Unwilling, Sir; as I arr^ to go into much de- 
 tail on ground which has been fo often trodden 
 before ; yet, when I" find the Learned Gentle- 
 man, after all the information which he mull 
 have received, if he has read any of the Anfwers 
 to his Work, (however ignorant he might be when 
 he wrote it) ftill giving the fanciion of his au- 
 thority to the fuppofition, that the order to 
 M. Chauvelin to depart from this kingdom was 
 the caufe of the War between this Country and 
 France, I do feel it neceUary to fay a few words 
 on that part of the fubjecL 
 
 Inaccuracy in dates feems to be a fort of fa- 
 tality common to all who have written on that 
 fide of the Queftion ; for even the writer of the 
 Note to His Majefty is not more correct, in this 
 refpeft, than if he had taken his information 
 only from the pamphlet of the .Learned Gen- 
 tleman.
 
 I 
 tkman. The Houfc will recollect the firft pro- 
 
 feffions of the French Republic, which arc 
 enumerated, and enumerated truly, in that note, 
 ~:-they are tefts of every thing which would bed 
 recommend a Government to the eftcem and 
 confidence of Foreign Powers, and the reverfe 
 of every tiling which has been the fyftem and 
 practice of France now for near ten years. It 
 is there dated, that their firft principles were love 
 cf peace, averfion to conqueft, ancj refpeft for 
 the independence of other Countries. In the 
 fame note, it fcems indeed admitted that they 
 fince have violated all thofe principles, but it is 
 ajjedged that they have done fo, only in confe- 
 quence of the provocation of other powers. One 
 of the firft of thofe provocations is dated to have 
 confided in the various outrages offered to their 
 minifters, of which the example is faid to have 
 been fet by the King of Great Britain in his con- 
 duel to M.Chauvelin. In anfvver to this fup~ 
 polition, it is only neceflary to remark, that before 
 the example was given, before Auftria and Pruflia 
 are fuppofcd to have been thus encouraged 
 to combine in a plan for the partition of France ; 
 
 that
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 I 
 
 that plan, if it ever exifted at all, had exifted and 
 been acted upon for above eight months : France 
 and Pruffia had been at war eight months be- 
 fore the difmiflal of M. Chauvelin. So much 
 or the accuracy of the ftatement. 
 
 [Mr. Erjkine here obferved that this was not the 
 Jlatement of his argument,'] 
 
 I have been hitherto commenting on the ar- 
 guments contained in the w Notes, I come, now 
 to thofe of the Learned Gentleman, I under- 
 ftand him to fay, that the difmiflal of M. Chau- 
 velin was the real caufe, I do not fay of the 
 general war, but of the rupture between France 
 and England; and the Learned Gentleman ftates, 
 particularly, that this difmiflal rendered all dif- 
 cuffion of the points indifpute impoffible. Now J 
 fiefire to meet diftindly every part of this alTertion : 
 I maintain on the contrary, that an opportunity 
 was given for difcufling every matter in difpute 
 between France and Great Britain, as fully as if 
 ft regular and accredited French Miniftcr had 
 
 been
 
 been refident here; that the caufes of war, 
 which exifted at the beginning, or arofe during 
 the courfe of this difcuflion, were fuch as would 
 have juftified, twenty times over, a declaration 
 of war on the part of this Country ; that all the 
 explanations on the part of France, were evi- 
 dently unfatisfatory and inadmiffible, and that 
 M. Chauvelin had given in a peremptory ulti- 
 matum, declaring, that if thefe explanations were 
 not received as fufficient, and if we did not im- 
 mediately difarm, our refufal would be con- 
 iidered as a declaration of war. 
 
 After this followed that fcene which no man 
 can even now fpeak of without horror, or think 
 of without indignation ; that murder and regi- 
 cide from which I was forry to hear the Learned 
 Gentleman date the beginning of the legal Go- 
 vernment pf France. 
 
 Having thus given in their ultimatum, they 
 
 added, as a farther demand (while we were 
 
 fmarting under accumulated injuries, for which 
 
 all fatisfa&ion was denied) .that we mould in- 
 
 c ftantly
 
 ( 10 ) 
 
 ftantly receive M. Chauvelin as their Ambaffador, 
 with new credentials, reprefenting them in the 
 chara6ter which they had juft derived from the 
 murder of their fovereign. We replied, " he 
 came here as the reprefentative of a fovereign 
 whom you have put to a cruel and illegal death, 
 we have no fatisfaclion for the injuries we have 
 received, no fecurity from the danger with which 
 we are threatened. Under thefe circumftances 
 we will not receive your new credentials ; the 
 former credentials you have yourfelves recalled 
 by the facrifice of your king." 
 
 What, from that moment, was the fituation of 
 M. Chauvelin ? He was reduced to the fituation 
 of a private individual, and was required to 
 quit the kingdom, under the provifions of the 
 Alien-Aft, which, for the purpofe of fecuring 
 domeilic tranquillity, had recently inverted his 
 Majefty with the power of removing out of this, 
 kingdom, all foreigners fiifpefted of revolutionary 
 principles. Is it contended that he was, then, 
 fefs liable to the provifions of that a a than 
 any other individual foreigner, whofe conduft 
 
 afforded
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 afforded to government juit ground of objection 
 orfufpicion? Didhiscondut and connections here 
 afford no fiich ground ? or will it be pretended that 
 the bare aft of refufmg to receive frefli credentials 
 from an infant republic, not then acknowledged 
 by any one power of Europe, and in the very 
 a6t of heaping upon us injuries and infults, was 
 of itfelf a caufe of war ? So far from it, that 
 even the very nations of Europe, whofe wifdorn 
 and moderation have been .repeatedly extolled 
 for maintaining neutrality, and preferving friend- 
 fliip, with the French republic, remained for 
 years fubfequent to this period, without re- 
 ceiving from it any accredited minifter, or doing 
 any one a6t to acknowledge its political exiftence. 
 In anfwer to a reprefentation from the bellige- 
 rent powers, in December, 1793, Count Bern- 
 ftorff, the minifter of Denmark, officially de- 
 clared, that, " It was well known, that the 
 " National Convention had appointed -M. Grou- 
 " ville Minifter-Plenipotentiary at Denmark, but 
 " that it was alfo well known, that he had nei- 
 " ther been received nor acknowledged in that 
 " quality.*" And as late as February, 1796, 
 c 2 " quality.
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 when the fame minifter was at length, for the 
 firft time, received in his official capacity, Count 
 Bernftorff, in a public Note, affigned this reafon 
 for that change of conduct, " So long as no 
 " other than a revolutionary government exifted 
 " in France, his Majefty could not acknowledge 
 " the minifler of that government ; but now that 
 " the French conftitution is completely orga- 
 <e nized, and a regular government eftablifhed in 
 <f France, his Majefty 's obligation ceafes in that 
 " refpeft, and M. Grouville will therefore be 
 " acknowledged in the ufual form."f How far 
 the Court of Denmark was juftified in the opinion, 
 that a revolutionary government then no longer 
 exifted in France, it is not now neceflary to 
 inquire ; but whatever may have been the faft, 
 in that refpedt, the principle on which they acled 
 is clear and intelligible, and is a deciilve inftance 
 in favour of the propofition which I have main- 
 tained. 
 
 Is it then neceflary to examine what were the 
 terms of that ultimatum, with "which we refufed 
 
 * State Papers publiflied fbr Debreft, vol. 1. p. 338. 
 f Ibid. voL 4. p. 306. 
 
 to
 
 ( '3 ) 
 
 to comply ? Afts of hoftility had been openly 
 threatened againft our Allies ; an hoftility 
 founded upon the affumption of a right which 
 would at once fuperfede the whole law of na- 
 tions ; a demand was made by France upon 
 Holland, to open the navigation of the Scheldt, 
 on the ground of a general and natural right, 
 in violation of pofitive treaty ; this claim we 
 we difcuffed, at the time, not fo much on ac- 
 count of its immediate importance, (though it 
 was important both in a maritime and com- 
 mercial view) as on account of the general 
 principle on which it was founded. On the 
 fame arbitrary notion they foon afterwards 
 difcovered that facred law of nature, which 
 made the Rhine and the Alps the legitimate 
 boundaries of France, and affumed the power 
 which they have affeted to exercife through the 
 whole of the revolution, of fuperfeding, by a 
 new code of their own, all the recognized prin- 
 ciples of the law of nations. They were, in 
 faft, a&ually advancing towards the republic of 
 Holland, by rapid ftrides, after the victory of 
 Jamappe, and they had ordered their generals to 
 purfue the Auftrian troops into any neutral 
 
 country :
 
 country: thereby explicitly avowing an intention 
 of invading Holland. They had alrqady fhewn 
 their moderation and felf-denial, by incorporating 
 Belgium with the French Republic. Thefe 
 lovers of peace, who fet out with a fworn aver- 
 fion to conqueft, and profeffions of refpeft for the 
 independence of other nations ; who pretend 
 that they departed from this fyftem, only in con- 
 fequence of your aggreffion, themfelves in time 
 of peace, while you were ftill confeffedly neutral, 
 without the pretence or madow of provocation, 
 wrefted Savoy from the King of Sardinia, and had 
 proceeded to incorporate it likewife with France. 
 Thefe were their aggreffions at this period; 
 and more than thefe. They had iffued an uni- 
 verfal Declaration of War againft all the Thrones 
 of Europe j and they had, by their conduct, appli- 
 ed it particularly and fpecifically to you : they had 
 patted the Decree of the 19th of November, 1792, 
 proclaiming the promife of French fuccour to all 
 nations who mould manifeft a wifh to become 
 free : they had, by all their language, as well as 
 their example, Ihewn what they underftood to be 
 freedom ; they had fealed their principles by the 
 
 depo-
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 depofition of their fovereign : they had applied 
 them to England, by inviting and encouraging 
 the addrefles of thofe feditious and traitorous 
 focieties, who, from the beginning, favoured 
 their views, and who, encouraged by your 
 forbearance, were even then publicly avowing 
 French dolrines, and anticipating their fuc- 
 cefs in this country : who were hailing the pro- 
 grefs of thofe proceedings in France, which led 
 to the murder of its king : they were even then 
 looking to the day when they mould behold a 
 National Convention in England, formed upon 
 fimilar principles. 
 
 And what were the explanations they ofc 
 fered on thefe different grounds of offence ? 
 As to Holland; they contented themfelves 
 with telling us, that the Scheldt was too infig- 
 nificant for us to trouble ourfelves about, 
 and therefore it was to be decided as they chofe, 
 in breach of a pofitive treaty, which they had 
 themfelves guaranteed, and which we, by our 
 alliance, were bound to fupport. If, however, 
 after the war was over, Belgium fliould have 
 confolidated its liberty, (a term of which we 
 J now
 
 ( 16 } 
 
 now know the meaning, from the fate of 
 every nation into which the arms of France have 
 penetrated) then Belgium and Holland might, 
 if they pleafed, fettle the queftion of the Scheldt, 
 by feparate negociation between themfelves. 
 With refpet to aggrandizement, they affured us, 
 that they would retain poffeflion of Belgium by 
 arms, no longer than they mould find it neceflary 
 to the purpofe already ftated, of confolidating its 
 liberty. And with refpeft to the decree of the 
 19th of November, applied as it was pointedly to 
 you, by all the intercourfe I have ftated with all 
 the feditious and traitorous part of this Country, 
 and particularly by the fpeeches of every leading 
 man among them, they contented themfelves with 
 afferting, that the declaration conveyed no fuch 
 meaning as was imputed to it, and that, fo far 
 from encouraging fedition, it could apply only 
 to countries where a great majority of the peo- 
 ple mould have already declared itfelf in favour 
 of a revolution ; a fuppofition which, as they 
 afierted, neceflarily implied a total abfence of all 
 fedition, 
 
 What
 
 I 17 ) 
 
 What would have been the effeft of admitting 
 this explanation? tofufferanation, and an armed 
 nation, to preach to the inhabitants of all the coun- 
 tries in the world, that themfelves were flaves, 
 and their rulers tyrants : to encourage and invite 
 them to revolution, by a previous promife of 
 French fupport, to whatever might call itfelf a 
 majority, or to whatever France might declare tff 
 be fo. This was their explanation: and this, 
 they told you, was their ultimatum. 
 
 But was this all ? Even at that very moment, 
 when they were endeavouring to induce you to 
 admit thefe explanations, to be contented with 
 the avowal', that France offered herfelf as a gene- 
 ral guarantee for every fuccefsful revolution, and 
 would interfere only to fan&ion and confirm what- 
 ever the free and uninfluenced choice of the 
 people might have decided, what were their 
 orders to their generals on the fame fubjeft ? in 
 the midit of thefe amicable explanations with 
 you, came forth a decree which I really believe 
 muft be effaced from the minds of Gentlemen 
 oppofite to me, if they can prevail upon themfelves 
 D for
 
 (' 18 ) 
 
 *or a moment to hint even a doubt upon the origin 
 of this quarrel, not only as to this Country, but 
 as to all the Nations of Europe with whom France 
 has been fubfequently engaged in hoftility. I 
 fpeak of the Decree of the 1 5th of December. 
 This decree, more even than all the previous 
 tranfaftions, amounted to an univerfal declaration 
 of war againft all Thrones, and againft all Civil- 
 ized Governments. It faid, wherever the armies 
 of France mall come, (whether within countries 
 then at war or at peace is not diftinguifhed) in 
 all thofe countries it mall be the firft care of their 
 generals to introduce the principles and the 
 practice of the French Revolution ; to demolifli. 
 all privileged orders, and every thiii^ which ob- 
 tfrufts the eftablimment of their New Syftem. 
 
 If any doubt is entertained, whither the armies 
 of France were intended to come ; if it is con- 
 tended that they referred only to thofe nations with 
 whom they were then at war, or with whom, in 
 the courfe of this conteft, they might be driven 
 into war ; let it be remembered, that at this very 
 moment, they had aftually given orders to their 
 JO Generals
 
 Generals to purlue the Auftrian army from the 
 Netherlands into Holland, with whom they were 
 at that time 'in peace. Or, even if the con- 
 ftrulion contended for is admitted, -let us fee 
 what would have been its application, let us 
 look at the lift of their aggreffions, which was 
 read by my Right Honorable Friend* near me. 
 With whom they have been at war fmce the pe- 
 riod of this declaration ? With all the nations of 
 Europe fave two,f and if not with thofe two, it 
 is only becaufe, with every provocation that could 
 juflify defenfive war, thofe Countries have hi- 
 therto acquiefced in repeated violations of their 
 rights, rather than recur to war for their vindi- 
 cation. Wherever their arms have been carried 
 it will be a matter of fhort fuhfequent inquiry 
 to trace whether they ha,ve faithfully applied 
 thefe principles. If in terms, this Decree is a 
 denunciation of war againft all Governments ; 
 if in practice it has been applied againft every 
 one with which France has come into contaft j 
 what is it but the deliberate code of the French 
 
 * Mr. Dundas. f Sweden and Denmark. 
 
 2 Revolution,
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 Revolution, from the birth of the republic, which 
 has never once been departed from, which has 
 been enforced with unremitted rigour againft all 
 the nations that have come into their power ? 
 
 If there could otherwife be any doubt whether 
 the application of this decree was intended to be 
 univerfal, whether it applied to all nations, and 
 to England particularly ? There is one circum- 
 ftance, which alone, would be decifive that 
 nearly at the fame period it was propofed, in the 
 National Convention,* to declare exprefsly, that 
 the decree of the Nineteenth of November was 
 confined to the nations with whom they were 
 then at war; and that propofal was rejeted 
 by a great majority, of that very Convention 
 from whom we were defired to receive thefe ex- 
 planations as fatisfaftory. 
 
 Such, Sir, was the nature of the fyftem. Let 
 us examine a little farther^, whether it was from 
 the beginning intended to be afted upon, in the 
 
 * On a Motion of M. Baraillon. 
 
 extent
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 extent which I have Hated. At the very mo- 
 ment when their threats appeared to many, 
 little elfe than the ravings of madmen, they were 
 digefting and methodizing the means of execu- 
 tion, as accurately as if they had actually forefeen 
 the extent to which they have fmce been able to 
 realize their criminal projects ; they fat down 
 coolly to devife the moil regular and effe&ual mode 
 of making the application of this fyftem the current 
 bufmefs of the day, and incorporating it with the 
 general orders of their army j for (will the Houfe 
 believe it?) this confirmation of the decree of the 
 Nineteenth of November was accompanied by 
 an expofition and commentary addreffed to the 
 General of every army of France, containing a 
 fchedule as coolly conceived, and as methodi- 
 cally reduced, as any by which the moft quiet bu- 
 finefs of a Juftice of Peace, or the moft regular 
 Routine of any department of State in this coun- 
 try could be conduced. Each Commander was 
 furnifhed with one -general blank formula of a 
 letter for all the nations of the world ! The People 
 of France to the People of Greeting, 
 
 " We are come to expel your tyrants ." Even 
 
 this
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 this was not all ; one of the articles of the decree 
 of the Fifteenth of December, was exprefsly, 
 " that thofe who Jhould Jhew themfdves fo brutijli 
 and fo enamoured of their chains as to refufe the 
 rejloration of their rights, to renounce liberty and 
 equality, or to prefcrve, recall, or treat zvith their 
 Prince or privileged orders, were not entitled to 
 the diftinction which France, in other cafes, had 
 juftly ejlabltjhed between Government and People ; 
 and that fuck a people ought to be treated according 
 to the rigour of war, and of conqueft." * Here is 
 their love of peace ; here is their averfion to 
 conqueft ; here is their refpe6t for the indepen- 
 dance of other nations ! 
 
 It was then, after receiving fuch explanations 
 as thefe, after receiving the ultimatum of France, 
 and after M. Chauvelin's credentials had ceafed, 
 that he was required to depart. Even after that 
 period, I am almoft alhamed to record it, we did 
 not on our part fhut the door againft other attempts 
 to negociate, but this tranfa&ion was immediately 
 
 * Vide Decree of 15th December, 1792. 
 
 followed
 
 ( 23 ) 
 
 followed by the declaration of war, proceeding 
 not from England in vindication of its rights, but 
 from France as the completion of the injuries and 
 infults they had offered. And on a war thus 
 originating, can it be doubted, by an Engliili 
 Houfe of Commons, whether the aggreffion was 
 on the part of this country or of France ? or whe- 
 ther the manifeft aggreflion on the part of France 
 was the refult of any thing but the principles 
 which characterize the French Revolution ? 
 
 What then are the refources and fubterfugcs 
 by which thofe, who agree with the Learned 
 Gentleman, are prevented from finking under 
 the force of this fimple flatement of fats ? None 
 but what are found in the inflniiation contained 
 in the note from France, that this country had, 
 previous to the tranfaclions to which I have 
 referred, encouraged and fupported the com- 
 bination of other powers directed againft them. 
 
 Upon this part of the fubjecl, the proofs which 
 contradict fuch an infmuation, are innumerable. 
 In the firft place, the evidence of dates : in the 
 
 fecond
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 fecond place, the admiflion of all the different 
 parties in France ; of the friends of Briffot charg- 
 ing on Robefpierre the war with this country, ancj 
 of the friends of Robefpierre charging it on BriiTot ; 
 but both acquitting England 3 the teftimonies of 
 the French Government d uring the whole interval, 
 fmce the declaration of Pilnitz, and the date affign- 
 ed to the pretended treaty of Pavia; the firft of 
 tvhich had not the flighted relation to any project 
 ofpartition or difmemberment ; the fecbnd of which 
 I firmly believe to be an abfolute fabrication and 
 forgery, and in neither of which, even as they are 
 reprefented, any reafon has been affigned for be-x 
 lieving that this country had any (hare. Even M. 
 Talleyrand himfelf was fent by the Conftitutional 
 King of the French, after the period when that 
 concert, which is now charged, muft have 
 exifted, if it exifted at all, with a letter from 
 the King of France, exprefsly thanking his Ma- 
 jetty for the neutrality which he had uniformly 
 obferved. The fame faft is confirmed by the 
 concurring evidence of every perfon who knew 
 any thing of the plans of the king of Sweden in 
 1791 i the only fovereign who, I believe, at 
 
 that
 
 ( 25 ) 
 
 that time meditated any hoftile meafures againft 
 France, and whofe utmoft hopes were exprefsly 
 ftated to be, that England would not oppofe his 
 intended expedition ; by all thofe, alfo, who knew 
 any thing of the conduct of the Emperor orthe King 
 of Pruffia j by the clear and decifive teitirhony of 
 M. Chauvelin himfelf in his difpatches from hence 
 to the French Government, fince publifhed by 
 their authority ; by every thing which has occurred 
 fince the war; by the publications of Dumou- 
 rier ; by the publications of Briflbt ; by the fafts 
 that have fince come to light in America with 
 refpeft to the miffion of M. Genet j which fliew 
 that hoftility againft this country was decided 
 on the part of France long before the period 
 when M. Chauvelin was fent from hence. Be- 
 fides this, the reduction of our peace eftablifli- 
 ment in the year 1791, and continued to the 
 fubfequent year, is a fact from which the in- 
 ference is indifputable : a fat, which I am 
 afraid, (hews not only that we were not waiting 
 for the occafion of war, but that in our partiality 
 for a pacific fyftem, we had indulged ourfelves 
 in a fond and credulous fecurity, which vvifdom, 
 K and
 
 ( 26 ) 
 
 and dilcrction would not have diftated. In ad- 
 dition to every other proof it is fmgular enough, 
 that in a Decree, on the eve of the Declaration 
 of War on the part of France, it is exprefsly 
 ftated, as for the firft time, that England was then 
 departing from that fyftem of Neutrality which 
 Jhe had hitherto obferved. 
 
 But, Sir, I will not reft merely on thefe tefti- 
 monies or arguments, however ftrong and decifive. 
 I affert diftinclly and politively, and I have the 
 documents in my hand to prove it, that from the 
 middle of the year 1791, upon the firft rumour 
 of any meafure taken by the Emperor of Ger- 
 many, and till late in the year 1792, we not 
 only were no parties to any of the projects im- 
 puted to the Emperor, but, from the political 
 circumftances in which we then flood with 
 relation to that Court, we wholly declined all 
 communications with him on the fubjecl of 
 France. To Pruffia, with whom we were in 
 connexion, and ftill more decisively to Holland, 
 with whom we were in clofe and intimate cor- 
 refpondence, we uniformly ftated our unalterable 
 
 refolu-
 
 ( 27 ) 
 
 refolution to maintain neutrality, and avoid in- 
 terference in the internal affairs of France, as 
 long as France fhould refrain from hoftile mea- 
 fures againft us and our Allies. No Minifter of 
 England had any authority to treat with Foreign 
 Slates, even provifionally, for any warlike con- 
 cert, till after the battle of Jemappe; till a pe- 
 riod fubfequent to the repeated provocations 
 which had been offered to us, and fubfequent 
 particularly to the Decree of Fraternity of the 
 19th of November ; even then, to what obje6t 
 was it that the concert which we wifhed to 
 eftablifh, was to be directed ? If we had then 
 rightly caft the true character of the French 
 Revolution, I cannot now deny that we mould 
 have been better juttified in a very different con- 
 duct. But it is material to the prefent argument to 
 declare what that conduct actually was, becaufe 
 it is of itfelf fufficient to confute all the pretexts 
 by which the advocates of France have fo long 
 laboured to perplex the queftion of Aggreffion. 
 
 At that period, Ruflia had at length con- 
 ceived, as well as ourfclves, a natural and 
 E 2 juft
 
 jult akrm for the Balance of Europe, and applied, 
 to us to learn our fentiments on the fubjeft. In 
 our anfwer to this application we imparted to 
 Ruffia the principles upon which we then ated, 
 and we communicated this anfwer to Pruffia, 
 with whom we were connected in defenfive alli- 
 ance. I will ftate fhortly the leading part of 
 thofe principles. A dif^atch was fent from Lord 
 Grenville to his Majefty's Minifter in Ruffia* 
 dated the 29th of December, 1792, ftating a 
 defire to have an explanation fet on foot on the 
 fubjeft of the War with France. I will read the 
 material parts of it. 
 
 " The two leading points on which fuch ex- 
 " planation will naturally turn, are the line of 
 " condut to be followed previous to the com- 
 " mencement of hoftilities, and with a view, if 
 " poflible, to avert them; and the nature and 
 " amount of the forces which the powers en- 
 fc gaged in this concert might be enabled to 
 e< , ufe, fuppofmg fuch extremities unavoidable. 
 
 With
 
 ( 29 ) 
 
 <f With refpeft to- the firfi, it appears on the 
 " whole, fubjeft however to future confideration 
 " and difcuffion with the other Powers, that the 
 " mod advifeabie ftep to. be taken would be, that 
 " fufficient explanation mould be had with the 
 " Powers at War with France, in order to en- 
 " able thofe not hitherto engaged in the War to. 
 " propofe to that Country terms of Peace. That 
 " thefe terms mould be, the withdrawing their 
 " arms within the limits of the French territory ; 
 " the abandoning their couquefts ; the refcinding 
 " any ats injurious to the Sovereignty or Rights 
 " of any other Nations, and the giving in fome 
 " public and unequivocal manner a pledge of 
 " their intention no longer to foment troubles, 
 " or to excite clifturbances againft other Go- 
 " vernments. In return for thefe ftipulations, 
 " the different Powers of Europe, who fhould 
 " be parties to this meafure, might engage to 
 " abandon all meafures, or views of hoftility 
 " againft France, or interference in their internal 
 " affairs, and to maintain a correfpondence and 
 " intercourfe of Amity with the exifting Powers 
 " in that Country, with whom fuch a Treaty 
 10 " may
 
 k 30 ) 
 
 may be concluded. If, on the refult of this 
 propofal fo made by the Powers afting in 
 " concert, thefe terms mould not be accepted 
 by France, or being accepted, fhould not be 
 " fatisfa&orily performed, the different Powers 
 " might then engage themfelves to each other 
 " to enter into ative meafures, for the purpofe 
 " of obtaining the ends in view ; and it may be 
 " to be confidered, whether, in fuch cafe, they 
 " might not reafonably look to fome indemnity 
 " for the expences and hazards to which they 
 " would neceffarily be expofed." 
 
 The difpatch then proceeded to the fecond 
 point, that of the Forces to be employed, on 
 which it is unnecefTary now to fpeak. 
 
 Now, Sir, I would really afk any perfon who 
 has been, from the beginning, the moft defirous of 
 avoiding hoililities, whether it is poffible to con- 
 ceive any meafure to be adopted in the fituation 
 in which we then flood, which could more evi- 
 dently demonitrate our defire, after repeated 
 provocations, to preferve Peace, on any terms 
 
 confiftent
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 confident with our fafety ; or whether any fenti- 
 ment could now be fuggefted which would have 
 more plainly marked our moderation, forbear- 
 ance, and fmcerity? In faying this I am not 
 challenging the applaufe and approbation of my 
 Country, becaufe I muft now confefs that we 
 were too flow in anticipating that danger of 
 which we had, perhaps, even then fufficient ex- 
 perience, though far fhort, indeed, of that which 
 we now poffcfs, and that we might even then 
 have feen, what fats have fince but too incon- 
 teftably proved, that nothing but vigorous and 
 open hoftility can afford complete and adequate 
 fecurity againft Revolutionary principles, while 
 they retain a proportion of power fufficient to 
 furnilh the means of War. 
 
 I will enlarge no farther on the Origin of the 
 War. I have read and detailed to you a iyftem 
 which was in itfelf a declaration of War againft 
 all Nations, which was fo intended, and which 
 has been fo applied, which has been exemplified 
 in the extreme peril and hazard of almoft all who 
 for a moment have trufted to Treaty, and which 
 
 has
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 has not at this hour overwhelmed Europe in one 
 indifcriminate mafs of ruin, only becaufe we 
 have not indulged, to a fatal extremity, that dif- 
 pofition, which we have however indulged too 
 far; becaufe we have not confentcd to truft to 
 profeffion and compromife, rather than to our 
 own valour and exertion* for fecurity againft a 
 fyftem, from which we never mall be delivered 
 till either the principle is extinguifhed, or till its 
 ftrength is exhaufted. 
 
 I might, Sir, if I found it necefTary, enter into 
 much detail upon this part of the fubjecl j but 
 at prefent I only beg leave to exprefs my readi- 
 nefs at any time to enter upon it, when either my 
 own ftrength, or the patience of the Houfe will 
 admit of it ; but, I fay, without diftinction, 
 againft every Nation in Europe, and againft fome 
 out of Europe, the Principle has been faithfully 
 applied. You cannot look at the Map of Eu- 
 rope, and lay your hand upon that Country 
 againft which France has not either declared an 
 open and aggreflive War, or violated fome pofi- 
 
 tive
 
 ( S3 ) 
 
 tive Treaty, or broken fome recognized principle 
 of the Law of Nations. 
 
 This fubjec may be divided into various pe- 
 riods. There were fome ats of hoftility com- 
 mitted previous to the war with this country, 
 and very little indeed fubfequent to that decla- 
 ration, which abjured the love of conqueft. 
 The attack upon the Papal State, by the feizure 
 of Avignon, in 1791, was accompanied with 
 fpecimens of all the vile arts and perfidy that 
 ever difgraced a revolution. Avignon was fe- 
 parated from its lawful fovereign, with whom 
 not even the pretence of quarrel exifted, and 
 forcibly incorporated in the tyranny of One and 
 Indivifible France. The fame fyftem led, in 
 the fame year, to an aggreflion againft the whole 
 German Empire, by the feizure of Porentrui, 
 part of the dominions of the Bifhop of Bafle. 
 Afterwards, in 1792, unpreceded by any decla- 
 ration of war, or any caufe of hoftility, and in 
 diret violation of the folemn pledge to abftain 
 from conqueft, they made war againft the King of 
 Sardinia, by the feizure of Savoy, for the purpofe 
 F of
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 pf incorporating it, in like manner, with France. 
 In the fame year, they had proceeded to the de- 
 claration of war againft Auftria, againft Pruffia, 
 and againft the German Empire, in which they 
 have been juftified only on the ground of a 
 rooted hoftility, combination, and league of ftr 
 vereigns, for the difmemberment of France. I 
 fay, that fome of the documents, brought to fup- 
 port this pretence, are fpurious and falfe ; I fay, 
 that even in thofe that are not fo, there is not 
 one word to prove the charge principally relied 
 upon, that of an intention to effect the difmem- 
 berment of France, or to impofe upon it, by 
 force, any particular conftitution. I fay, that as 
 far as we have been able to trace what pafied at 
 Pilriitz, the declaration there figned referred to 
 the imprifonment of Louis XVI. its immediate 
 view was to, effect his deliverance, if a concert 
 fufficiently extenfiye could be formed with other 
 fovereigns, for that purpofe, It left the internal 
 ftate of France to be decided by the king re- 
 flored to his liberty, with the free confent of the 
 ftates of his kingdom, and it did not contain 
 
 one
 
 t 35 ) 
 
 inne word relative to the difmemberment of 
 France. 
 
 In the fubfcquent difcuffions, which took place 
 in 1792, and which embraced at the fame time, 
 all the other points of jealoufy which had arifen 
 between the two Countries, the declaration of 
 Pilnitz was referred to, and explained on 
 the part of Auftria in a manner precifely con- 
 formable to what I have now dated ; and the 
 amicable explanations which took place^ both 
 on this fuhjecl and on all the matters in difpute, 
 will be found in the official correfpondence be- 
 tween the two Courts which has been made pub- 
 lic ; and it will be found alfo that as long as the 
 negociation continued to be conducted through 
 M. Deleflart, then Minifter for Foreign Affairs, 
 there was a great profpet that thofe difcuffions 
 would be amicably terminated ; but it is noto- 
 rious, and has fince been clearly proved on the 
 authority of Briflbi himfelf, that the violent 
 party in France confidered fuch an iffue of the 
 negociation as likely to be fatal to their projects 
 and thought, to ufe his own words, that " war 
 F 2 was
 
 ( 36 > 
 
 Was neceflary to confolidate the revolution," 
 For the exprefs purpofe of producing the war, 
 they excited a popular tumult in Paris ; they 
 infifled upon and obtained the difmiflal of M. 
 Deleflart. A new Minilter was appointed 
 in his room, the tone of the negociation was 
 immediately changed, and an ultimatum was 
 fent to the Emperor, fimilar to that which was 
 afterwards fent to this country, affording him 
 no fatisfaftion on his juft grounds of complaint, 
 and requiring him, under thofe circumftances, 
 to difarm. The firft events of the conteft prov- 
 ed how much more France was prepared for 
 war than Auflria, and afford a ftrong confirma- 
 tion of the propofition which I maintain, that 
 no offenfive intention was entertained on the 
 part of the latter power. 
 
 War was then declared againil Auflria j a war 
 which I ftate to be a war of aggreflion on the part 
 of France. The King of Pruffia had declared, that 
 he mould confider war againft the Emperor or 
 Empire as war againft himfelf. He had declared, 
 (hat, as a Coeftate of the Empire, he was deter. 
 
 mined
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 mined to defend their rights ; that, as an Ally of 
 the Emperor, he would fupport him to the utmoft 
 againft any attack j and that, for the fake of his 
 own dominions, he felt himfelf called upon to 
 refift the progrefs of French principles, and to 
 maintain the balance of power in Europe. With 
 this notice before them, France declared war 
 upon the Emperor, and the war with Prufiia 1 
 was the necefTary confequence of this aggreflion, 
 both againft the Emperor and the Empire. 
 
 The war againft the king of Sardinia follows 
 next. The declaration of that war was the 
 feizure of Savoy, by an invading army; and on 
 what ground ? On that which has been ftated 
 already ; they had found out, by fome light of 
 nature, that the Rhine and the Alps were the na- 
 tural limits of France. Upon that ground Savoy 
 was feized ; and Savoy was alfo incorporated 
 with France. 
 
 Here finiflies the hiftory of the*, wars in 
 which France was engaged, antecedent to the 
 war with Great Britain, with Holland, and 
 
 with 
 
 299995
 
 ( 38 ] 
 
 with Spain. With refpect to Spain, we have feeii 
 nothing in any part of its conduct which leads 
 us to fufpect, that either attachment to religion, 
 or the ties of confanguinity, or regard to the an- 
 eicnt fyltem of Europe, was likely to induce 
 that Court to connect itfelf in offenfive war 
 againft France. The war was evidently and in- 
 conteftably begun by France againft Spain. 
 
 The cafe of Holland is fo frc'fh in every man's* 
 recollection, and fo connected with the immediate 
 caufes of" the war with this country, that it can- 
 not require oi*e word of obfervation. What mall 
 I fay then on the-pife of Portugal r I cannot indeed, 
 fay, that France ever declared war againil that 
 country, T can hardly fay even that flie ever made 
 war, but flic required them to make a treaty of 
 peace, as if they had been at war : fhe obliged 
 them to purchafe that treaty ; me broke it as 
 foon as it was purchafed, and me had originally 
 no other ground of complaint than this, that 
 Portugal had performed, though inadequately^ 
 the engagements of its ancient defenfive alli- 
 ance with this country, in 'the character of an 
 
 auxiliary 5
 
 ( 89 ) 
 
 Auxiliary ; a conduct which cannot of itfelf make 
 any ppwer a principal in a war. 
 
 I have now enumerated all the nations at war 
 at that period, with the exception only of Naples. 
 It can hardly be necefTary to call to the recol- 
 lection of the Houfe, the charateriftic feature 
 of revolutionary principles which was fliewn, 
 even at this early period, in the perfonal infult 
 pffered to the King of Naples, by the Commander 
 pf a French fquadron, riding uncontrouled in the 
 Mediterranean, and (while our Fleets were yet 
 unarmed) threatening deftruclion to all the coaft 
 pf Italy. 
 
 It was not till a confiderably later period, that 
 almoftall theotherNations of Europe found them- 
 felves eo^ially involved in actual hoftility : but 
 it is not a little material to the whole of my 
 argument, compared with the flatement of the 
 Learned Gentleman, and with that contained in 
 the French note, to examine at what period 
 this hoftility extended itfelf. It extended itfelf, 
 jn the courfe of 1796, to the States of Italy which 
 
 had
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 had hitherto been exempted from it. In 1797 it 
 had ended in the deftruftionof moftof them; it had 
 ended in the virtual depofition of the King of Sar- 
 dinia; it had ended in theconverfion of Genoa and 
 Tufcany into Democratic Republics ; it had 
 ended in the revolution of Venice, in the viola- 
 tion of treaties with the new Venitian Republic; 
 and finally, in transferring that very Republic, the 
 creature and vafial of France, to the Dominion of 
 Auftria. 
 
 I obferve from the geftures of foine Honour- 
 able Gentlemen, that they think we are pre- 
 cluded from the ufe of any argument founded 
 on this lait tranfation. I already hear them 
 faying, that it was as criminal in Auftria to 
 receive as it was in France to give. I am far 
 from defending or palliating the conduct of 
 Auftria upon this occafion. But becaufe Auftria,, 
 unable at laft to contend with the arms of France,, 
 was forced to accept an unjuft and infuffi- 
 cient indemnification for the conquefts France had. 
 made from it, are we to be debarred from ftating 
 what, on the part of France, was not merely 
 3 an
 
 an unjuft acquisition, but an at of the groffeft 
 and mod aggravated perfidy and cruelty, and 
 One of the moft (hiking fpecimens of that fyftem 
 which has been uniformly and indifcriminately 
 applied to all the countries which France has 
 had within its grafp. This only can be faid in 
 vindication of France, (and it is ilill more a 
 vindication of Auftria) that, praftically fpeakihg, 
 if there is any part of this tranfaftion for whicli 
 Venice itfelf has reafon to be grateful, it can only 
 be for the permiflion to exchange the embraces 
 of French fraternity for what is called the defpo- 
 tifm of Vienna. - 
 
 Let thefe fats, and thefe dates, be compared 
 with what we have heard. The Honourable 
 Gentleman has told us, and the Author of 
 the Note from France has told us alfo, that 
 all the French conquefts were produced by the 
 operations of the Allies. It was, when they 
 were preffed on all fides, w r hen their own 
 Territory was in danger, when their own In- 
 dependence was in queftion, when the Confede- 
 racy appeared too ftrong ; it was then they 
 G ufedl
 
 ( *a.) 
 
 ufed the means with which their power afid 
 their courage furnimed them j and, " attacked 
 upon all fides, they carried every where their 
 defenfive arms."* I do not wlih to mifre- 
 prefent the Learned Gentleman, but I un- 
 derftood him to fpeak of this fentiment wkh 
 approbation : the fentiment itfelf is this, that if 
 a nation is unjuiHy attacked in any one quar- 
 ter by others, me cannot Hop to confider by 
 whom, but raufl find means of ilrength in 
 other quarters, no matter where; and is jufti- 
 fied in attacking, in her turn, thofe with whom 
 Ihe is at Peace, and from whom me has re- 
 ceived no fpecies of provocation. 
 
 Sir, I hope I have already proved, in a great 
 meafure, that no fuch attack was made upon 
 France 5 but, if it was made, I maintain that 
 the whole ground on which that argument is 
 founded cannot be tolerated. In the name of 
 the Laws of Nature and Nations, in the name of 
 every thing that is facred and honourable, I 
 
 * Vide M. Talleyrand's Note. 
 
 demur
 
 demur to that plea, and I tell that Honourable 
 and Learned Gentlemao, that he would do well, 
 to look again into the Law of Nations, before 
 he ventures to come to this Houfe, to give the 
 fanftion of his authority to fo dreadful and ex- 
 ecrable a fyftem. 
 
 [Mr. Erjkine herefaid, acrofs the Houfe, thai 
 he had never maintained f&ch a proportion.'] 
 
 Mr. Pitt. I certainly underftood this to be 
 diftinftly the tenor of the Learned Gentleman's 
 argument, but as he tells me he did not ufe it, 
 I take it for granted he did not intend to ufe 
 it j I rejoice that he did not ; but at leaft then I 
 have a right to expeft, that the Learned Gen- 
 tleman fhould now transfer to the French Note 
 fome of the indignation which he has hitherto 
 lavifhed upon the declarations of this Country. 
 This principle, which the Learned Gentleman 
 difclaims, the French Note avows j and I con- 
 tend, without the fear of contradi&ion, it is the 
 principle upon which France has uniformly 
 ated. But while the Learned Gentleman dif- 
 G 2 claims
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 claims this proposition, he certainly will admit, 
 that he has himfelf afferted, and maintained in 
 the whole courfe of his argument, that the preflure 
 of the War upon France, impofed upon her the 
 necefiity of thofe exertions which produced moft 
 of the Enormitie s of the Revolution, and moft of the 
 Enormities practifed againft the other countries 
 of Europe. Let us examine this proportion as 
 thus explained. The Houfe will recollecl, that, in 
 the year 1796, when all thefe horrors in Italy were 
 beginning, which are the ftrongeft illuftrations 
 of the general chara6ter of the French Revo- 
 lution, we had begun that negociation to which 
 the Learned Gentleman has referred. England 
 then porTeffed numerous conquefts ; England, 
 though not having at that time had the ad- 
 vantage of three of her moft fplendid victories, 
 England, even then, appeared undifputed Mif- 
 trefs of the Sea; England, having then ingroffed 
 the whole wealth of the Colonial World ; Eng- 
 land, having loft nothing of its original pof- 
 feffionsj, England then comes forward, pro- 
 pofmg general Peace, and offering what? offer- 
 ing the furrender of all that it had acquired, in 
 
 order
 
 order to obtain what ? not the difmemberment, 
 not the partition of ancient France, but the re- 
 turn of a part of thofe conquefts, no one of 
 which could be retained, but in direl contra- 
 diftion to that original and folemn pledge which 
 is now referred to, as the proof of the juft and 
 moderate difpofition of the French Republic. 
 Yet, even this offer was not fufficient to procure 
 Peace, or to arreft the progrefs of France in 
 her defenjive operations againft other unoffending 
 Countries. From the pages, however, of the 
 Learned Gentleman's Pamphlet (which, after 
 all its Editions, is now freflier in his memory 
 than in that of any other perfon in this Houfe, 
 or in the Country), he is furnifhed with an 
 argument, on the refult of the negociation, 
 on which he appears confidently to rely. He 
 maintains, that the fingle point on which the 
 Negociation was broken off, was the queftion 
 of the poffeffion of the Auftrian Netherlands j 
 and that it is, therefore, on that ground only, 
 that the War has, fince that time, been con- 
 tinued. When this fubjeft was before under 
 difcuffion, I ftated, and I fliall ftate again, (not- 
 
 with-
 
 withftanding the Learned Gentleman's accufa- 
 tion of my having endeavoured to fhift the 
 queftion from its true point) that the queftion, 
 then at iffue, was not, whether the Netherlands 
 fhould, in fact, be reftored , though even on that 
 queflion I am not, like the Learned Gentle- 
 man, unprepared to give any opinion, I am 
 ready to fay, that to leave that territory in the 
 poffeffion of France would be obvioufly danger- 
 ous to the interefts of this Country, and is incon- 
 fiftent with the policy which it has uniformly 
 purfued, at every period in which it has con- 
 cerned itfelf in the general fyftem of the Con- 
 tinent ; but it was not on the decifion of this 
 queftion of expediency and policy, that the 
 iffue of the Negociation then turned ; what was 
 required of us by France was, not merely 
 that we mould acquiefce in her retaining the 
 Netherlands, but, that, as a preliminary to all 
 treaty, and before entering upon the difcuflion 
 of terms, we mould recognize the principle, 
 that whatever France, in time of War, had 
 annexed to the Republic muft remain infepa- 
 rable for ever, and could not become the fub-
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 je6t of Negotiation. I fay, that, in refilling 
 fuch a preliminary, we were only refilling the 
 claim of France, to arrogate to itfelf the power 
 of controlling, by its own feparate and muni- 
 cipal ars, the rights and interefts of other 
 countries, and moulding, at its difcretion, a 
 new and general code of the Law of Nations. 
 
 In reviewing the iifue of this Negotiation, it 
 is important to obferve, that France, who be- 
 gan by abjuring a love of conqueft, was de fir- 
 ed to give up nothing of her own, not even to 
 give up all that ihe had conquered ; that it was 
 offered to her to receive back all that had been 
 conquered from her; and when me reje&ed the 
 negociation for peace upon thefe grounds, are 
 we then to be told of the unrelenting hoftility 
 of the Combined Powers, for winch France 
 was to revenge itfelf upon other countries, and 
 which is to juftify the fubverfion of every efta- 
 blimed government, and the deftruftion of pro- 
 perty, religion, and domeftic comfort, from one 
 end of Italy to the other ? Such was the effecl: 
 f the war againft Modena, againft Genoa, 
 
 againft
 
 againft Tufcany, againft Venice, againft Rome, 
 and againft Naples, all of which {he engaged ih 
 or profecuted, fubfequent to this very period. 
 
 After this, in the year 1797, Auftria had made 
 peace, England and its Ally* Portugal, (from 
 whom we could expert little active affiftance, 
 but whom we felt it our duty to defend) alone 
 remained in the war. In that iituation, under 
 the preffure of neceffity, which I mall not dif- 
 guife, we made another attempt to negociate. 
 In 1797, Pruflia, Spain, Auftria, Naples, hav- 
 ing fucceffively made peace, the Princes of 
 Italy having been deftroyed, France having fur- 
 rounded itfelf, in almoft every part in which it 
 is not furrounded by the fea, with Revolutionary 
 Republics, England made another offer of a 
 different nature. It was not now a demand 
 that France mould reftore any thing, Auftria 
 having made a peace upon her own terms, 
 England had nothing to require with regard to 
 her Allies, me alked no reftitution of the do- 
 minions added to France in Europe. So far 
 from retaining any thing French out of Europe, 
 10 we
 
 { 49 ) 
 
 we freely offered them all, demanding only, as 
 a poor compenfation, to retain a part of what 
 we had acquired by arms^ from Holland, then 
 identified with France. This propofal alfo, Sir, 
 was proudly refufed, in a way which the Learn- 
 ed Gentleman himfelf has not attempted to juf- 
 tify, of which indeed he has fpoken with detefta- 
 tion. Iwiftijfmce he has not finally abjured his duty 
 in this Houfe, that that deteftation had been 
 expreffed at an earlier period, that he had mixed 
 his own voice with the general voice of his 
 country on the refult of that negociation. 
 
 Let us look at the conduct of France imme- 
 diately fubfequent to this period. She had 
 fpurned at the offers of Great Britain, me had 
 reduced her continental enemies to the neceffity 
 of accepting a precarious peace, me had (in 
 fpitc of thofe pledges repeatedly made and uni- 
 formly violated) furrounded herfelf by new con- 
 quefts, on every part of her frontier but one j 
 that one was Switzerland. The firft effect of 
 being relieved from the war with Auftria, of 
 being fecured againft all fears of continental 
 H invafion
 
 ( 50 ) 
 
 mvafion on the ancient territory of France, was 
 their unprovoked attack againit this unoffending 
 and devoted country. This was one of the 
 fcenes which fatisfied even thofe who were the 
 moft incredulous, that France had thrown off 
 the malk, " if indeed Jke had ever worn it." * It 
 collected, in one view, many of the character- 
 iftk features of that revolutionary fyftem which 
 I have endeavoured to trace, the perfidy which 
 alone rendered their arms fuccefsful, the pretext 
 of which they availed themfelves to produce 
 divifion and prepare the entrance of Jacobinifm 
 in that country, thepropofalof armiftice, one of the 
 known and regular engines of the Revolution, 
 which was, as ufaal, the immediate prelude to 
 military execution, attended with cruelty and bar- 
 barity, of which there are few examples : all 
 thefe are known to the world. The country 
 they attacked was one which had long been 
 the faithful ally of France, which, inftead of 
 giving caufe of jealoufy to any other power, had 
 been, for ages, proverbial for the fimplicity and 
 
 * Vide Speeches at the Whig-Club. 
 
 in
 
 ( 51 ) 
 
 innocence of its manners, and which had ac- 
 quired and preferved the efteem of all the na- 
 tions of Europe; which had almoft, by the com- 
 mon confent of mankind, been exempted from 
 the found of war, and marked out as a Land of 
 Go/hen, fafe and untouched in the midft of fur- 
 rounding calamities. 
 
 Look then at the fate of Switzerland, at the 
 circumftances which led to its deftru6lion, add 
 this inftance to the catalogue of aggrefiion 
 againft all Europe, and then tell me, whether 
 the fyftem I have defcribed has not been profe- 
 cuted with an unrelenting fpirit, which cannot 
 be fubdued in adverfity, which cannot be ap- 
 peafed in profperity, which neither folemn pro- 
 feffions, nor the general law of nations, nor the 
 obligation of treaties, (whether previous to the 
 revolution or fubfequent to it) could reftraiu 
 from the fubverfion of every ftate into which, 
 either by force or fraud, their arms could pene- 
 trate. Then tell me, whether the difafters of 
 Europe are to be charged upon the provocation 
 of this country and its allies, or on the inherent 
 H 2 principle
 
 principle of the French Revolution, of which 
 the natural refult produced fo much mifery and 
 carnage in France, and carried defolation and 
 terror overfo large a portion of the world. 
 
 Sir, much as I have now ftated I have not 
 finiflied the catalogue. America almoft as much 
 as Switzerland, perhaps, contributed to that 
 change which has taken place in the minds of 
 thofe who were originally partial to the principles 
 of the French Government. The hoftility againft 
 America followed a long courfe of neutrality ad- 
 hered to, under the ftrongefl provocations, or ra- 
 ther of repeated compliances to France, with 
 which we might well have been difTatisfied. It 
 was on the face of it, unjuft and wanton ; and it 
 was accompanied by thofe inftances of fordid cor- 
 ruption which mocked and difgufled even the 
 enthuriaftic admirers of revolutionary purity, and 
 threw a new light on the genius of Revolution- 
 ary Government. 
 
 After this, it remains only fhortly to remind 
 
 Gentlemen of the aggreffion againft Egypt, not 
 
 3 omitting,
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 omitting, however, to notice the capture of 
 Malta, in the way to Egypt. Inconfiderable as 
 that ifland may be thbught, compared with the 
 icenes we have witnefled, let it be remembered, 
 that it is an Ifland of which the government had 
 long been recognized by every ftate of Europe, 
 againft which France pretended no caufe of war, 
 and whofe independance was as dear to itfelf and 
 as facred as that of any country in Europe. It was 
 ia facl not unimportant from its local fituation to 
 the other powers of Europe, but in proportion as 
 any man may diminifh its importance, the inftance 
 will only ferve' the more to illuftrate and confirm 
 the propofition which I have maintained. The 
 all-fearching eye of the French Revolution looks 
 to every part of Europe, and every quarter of 
 the World, in which can be found an object 
 either of acquisition or plunder. Nothing is too 
 great for the temerity of its ambition, nothing too 
 fmall or infignificant for the grafp of its rapacity. 
 From hence Bonaparte and his Army preceded to 
 Egypt, ^[he attack was made, pretences were 
 held out to the Natives of that Country in the 
 name of the French King, whom they had mur- 
 dered j
 
 dcred ; they pretended to have the approbation 
 of the Grand Seignior, whofe Territories they were 
 violating j their projett was carried on under the 
 profefiion of a zeal for Mahometanifm ; it was 
 carried on by proclaming that France had been 
 reconciled to the Muffulman Faith, had abjured 
 that of Chriflianity, or as he in his impious lan- 
 guage termed it, of the Sect of the Mejlah. 
 
 The only plea which they have fmce held out to 
 colour this atrocious Invafion of a neutral and 
 friendly territory, is that it was the road to at- 
 tack the Englifh power in India. It is mod un- 
 queftioaably true, that this was one and a princi- 
 pal caufe of this unparalleled outrage ; but ano- 
 ther, and an equally fubftantial caufe, (as ap~ 
 pears by their own ftatements,) was the divi- 
 iion and partition of the territories of what 
 they thought a falling Power. It is impofli- 
 blc to difmifs this fubjeft without obferving 
 that this attack againft Egypt was accompanied 
 by an attack upon' the Britifh Poffeffions in 
 India, made on true revolutionary principles. In 
 Europe, the propagation of the principles of 
 
 France
 
 France had uniformly prepared the way for the 
 progress of its arms. To India, the lovers of 
 Peace had fent the MefTengers of Jacobinifm, 
 for the purpofe of inculcating War in thofe dif- 
 tant regions, on Jacobin principles, and of forming 
 Jacobin Clubs, which they actually fucceeded in 
 eftabliihing, and which in moil refpe&s refembled 
 the European model, but which were diftin* 
 guifhed by this peculiarity, that they were re- 
 quired to fwear in one breath, hatred to Tyranny,, 
 the love of Liberty, and the detraction of all 
 Kings and Sovereigns, except the good and faith- 
 ful Ally of the French Republic, CITIZEN 
 TIPPOO. 
 
 What then was the nature of this fyftem ? 
 Was it any thing but what I have ftated it to be? 
 an infatiable love of aggrandizement, an impla- 
 cable fpirit of definition directed againft all the 
 civil and religious inftitutions of every country, 
 This is the rft moving and acting fpirit of the 
 French Revolution ; this is the fpirit which ani- 
 mated it at its birth, and this is the fpirit which 
 will not defert it till the moment of its diflblu- 
 
 tion,
 
 tion, " which grew with its growth, which 
 ftrengthened with its ftmngth," but which has 
 not abated under its misfortunes, nor declined in 
 its decay ; it has been invariably the fame in 
 every period, operating more or lefs, according 
 as accident or circumftances might aiTift it ; but 
 it has been inherent in the Revolution in all its 
 ftages, it has equally belonged to Briffot, to 
 Roberfpierre, to Tallien, to Reubel, to Barras, 
 and to every one of the Leaders of the Directory, 
 but to none more than to Bonapate, in whom 
 now all their powers are united. What are its 
 charalers ? Can it be accident that produced 
 them ? No, it is only from the alliance of the moft 
 horrid principles, with the moft horrid means, 
 that fuch miferics could have been brought upon 
 Europe. It is this paradox which we muft 
 always keep in mind when we are difcuffing 
 any queftibn relative to the effe&s of the French 
 Revolution. Groaning under every degree of 
 mifery, the vi6lim of its own crimes, and as I 
 once before exprefled it in this Houfe, afking 
 pardon of God and of Man for the miferies 
 which it has brought upon itfelf and others, 
 
 France
 
 France (till retains, (while it has neither left 
 means of comfort, nor almoft of fubfiftence to its 
 own inhabitants,) new and unexampled means 
 of annoyance and deftru&ion againft all the 
 other Powers of Europe. 
 
 Its firft fundamental principle was to bribe 
 the poor againft the rich, by propofing to transfer 
 into hew hands, on the delufive notion of 
 Equality, and in breach of every principle of 
 juftice, the whole property of the Country; the 
 practical application of this principle was to 
 devote the whole of that Property to indif- 
 criminate plunder, and to make it the foundation 
 of a Revolutionary fyftein of Finance, productive 
 in proportion to the mifery and defolation 
 which it created. It has been accompanied 
 by an unwearied fpirit of Profelytifrn, diffufing 
 itfelf over all the Nations of the Earth ; a fpirit 
 which can apply itfelf to all circumftances and 
 all fituations, which can furnifli a lift of griev- 
 ances, and hold out a promife of redrefs equally 
 to all nations, which infpired the teachers of 
 French Liberty with the hope of alike recom- 
 * mending
 
 < 53 .) 
 
 mending themfelves to thofe who live under 
 the feudal code of the German Empire ; to the 
 various States of Italy, under all their different 
 inflitutions - 3 to the old Republicans of Holland, 
 and to the new Republicans of America ; to the 
 Catholic of Ireland, whom it was to deliver from 
 Proteftant ufurpation ; to the Proteftant of Switzer- 
 land, whom it was to deliver from Popilh fuper- 
 ftition ; and to the MufTulman of Egypt, whom 
 it was to deliver from Chriftian perfecutionj to 
 the remote Indian, blindly bigotted to his an- 
 cient inftitutions; and to the Natives of Great 
 Britain, enjoying the perfection of practical free- 
 dom, and juftly attached to their conftitution, 
 from the joint refultof habit, of reafon, and of 
 experience. The laft and diftinguifhing fea- 
 ture is a perfidy \vhich nothing can bind, which 
 no tie of Treaty, no fenfe of the principles ge- 
 nerally received among Nations, no obligation, 
 human or divine, can reftrain. Thus qualified, 
 thus armed for definition, the genius of the 
 French Revolution marched forth, the terror 
 and difmay of the World. Every Nation has 
 in its turn been the witnefs, many have been 
 8 the
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 the victims of its principles, and it is left for us 
 to decide, whether we will compromife with 
 fuch a danger, while we have yet refources 
 to fupply the fmews of War, while the heart 
 and fpirit of the Country is yet unbroken, and 
 while we have the means of calling forth and 
 fupporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. 
 
 Much more might be faid on this part of the 
 fubjecl ; but if what I have faid already is a 
 faithful, though only an imperfet {ketch of thofe 
 exceiTes and outrages, which even Iliftory 
 itfelf will hereafter be unable fully to record, 
 and a juft reprefentation of the principle and 
 fource from which they originated ; will any 
 man fay that we ought to accept a precarious fecu- 
 rity againft fo tremendous a danger ? much more 
 will he pretend, after the experience of all that has 
 pa(Ted, in the different ftages of the French Revo- 
 lution, that we ought to be deterred from pro- 
 bing this great queftion to the bottom, and from 
 examining, without ceremony or difguife, whe- 
 ther the 'change which has recently taken place 
 in France is fufficient now to give fecurity, not 
 j 2 ajrainft
 
 a common danger, but againft fuch a 
 danger as that which I have defcribed. 
 
 In examining this part of the fubjeft, let 
 it be remembered, that there is one other 
 chara&eriftic of the French Revolution, as 
 ftriking as its dreadful and deftru&ive prin- 
 ciples, I mean the inftability of its govern- 
 ment, which has been of itfelf fufficient to de- 
 ftroy all reliance, if any fuch reliance could, at 
 any time, have been placed on the good faith of 
 any of its rulers. Such has been the incredible 
 rapidity with which the revolutions in France 
 have fucceeded each other, that I believe the 
 names of thofe who have fucceffively exercifed 
 abfolute power, under the pretence of Liberty, 
 are to be numbered by the years of the revolu- 
 tion, and each of the new conftitutions, which 
 under the fame pretence, has, in its turn, been 
 impofed by force on France, every one of which 
 alike was founded upon principles which pro<- 
 fefled to be univerfal, and was intended to be 
 cftablimed and perpetuated among all the 
 nations of the earth. Each of thefe will be 
 
 found,
 
 ( 61 ) 
 
 found, upon an average, to have had about two 
 years, as the period of its duration. 
 
 Under this revolutionary fyftem, accompa- 
 nied with this perpetual fluctuation and change, 
 both in the form of the government and in 
 the perfons of the rulers, what is the fecuritf 
 which has hitherto exifted, and what new 
 fecurity is now offered ? Before an anfwer 
 is given to this queflion, let me fum up the 
 hiftory of all the revolutionary governments 
 of France, and of their characters in relation 
 to other powers, in words more emphatical 
 than any which I could ufe the memora- 
 ble words pronounced, on the eve of this 
 laft conftitution, by the orator* who was fe- 
 leted to 'report to an aflembly, furroundqd 
 by a file of grenadiers, the new form of 
 liberty which it was deftined to enjoy under 
 the aufpices of General Bonaparte. From 
 this reporter, the mouth an4 organ of the 
 
 * Vide Speech of Boulay de la Meurthe, in (he Council of 
 five Hundred, at St. Cloud, 19th Bpmiaire, (9th Nov.f 1799. 
 
 new
 
 { 62 ) 
 
 new government, we learn this important 
 leflbn: '.* It is eafy to conceive, why peace 
 " was not concluded before the ejlablijhment 
 " of the covftitutional government. The only 
 " government which then exifted, dcfcribed itfelf 
 " as revolutionary $ it was in fact only the ty- 
 " ranny of a few men who were foon overthrown 
 ** by others, and it confequently prefcnted no jta- 
 " bility of principles or of views, no fecurity 
 " either with refpect to men. or with reflect to 
 " things. 
 
 " It Jlwuld feem that that Jlability and that 
 *' fecurity ought to have erijicd from the ejla- 
 " bliJJiment, and as the effect, of the conftitu* 
 *' tional fyjlem j and yet they did not exift more, 
 " perhaps even lefs y than they had done before. 
 " In truth, we did make fome partial treaties; 
 " we Jigned a continental peace, and a gene- 
 " ral congrefs was held to confirm it ; but thefe 
 " treaties, thefe diplomatic conferences, appear 
 " to have been the fource of a new war, more 
 * c inveterate and more bloody than before. 
 
 Before
 
 ( 63 ) 
 
 " Before the l$th -Fructidor (4th September} 
 " of the 5th year, the French government exhi- 
 " bited to foreign nations fo uncertain an exijl- 
 " ance, that they refufed to treat with it. After 
 " this great event, the whole power was abforbed 
 " in the Directory ; the legiflative body can hard- 
 " ly be faid to have exijted-, treaties of peace 
 " were broken, and war carried every where, 
 " without, that body having any jhare in thofe 
 " meafures. The fame Directory, after having 
 " intimidated all Europe, and dcjlroyed, . at its 
 " pleafnre, feveral governments, neither knowing 
 "how to make peace or war, or how even to 
 " ejlablijli itfelf, was overturned by a breath, on 
 11 the 12 th Prairial (\%th June}, to make room 
 " for other men, influenced perhaps by different 
 " views, or who might be governed by different 
 " principles. 
 
 " Judging, then, only from notorious facts, 
 " the French government mnjt be considered, as 
 " exhibiting nothing fixed, neither in refpect to 
 " men or to things." Here, then, is the picture, 
 down to the period of the laft revolution, of 
 
 the
 
 the ffcate of France, under all its fucceflive go* 
 vernments I 
 
 Having taken a view of what it was, let us now 
 examine what it is. In the firft place, we fee, as 
 has been truly ftated, a change in the defcrip- 
 tion and form of the fovereign authority ; a fu- 
 preme power is placed at the head of this no- 
 minal Republic, with a more open avowal of 
 military defpotifm than at any former period; 
 with a more open and undifguifed abandon- 
 ment of the names and pretences under which 
 that defpotifm long attempted to conceal itfelf. 
 The different inftitutions, republican in their 
 form and appearance, which were before the 
 inftruments of that defpotifm, are now anni- 
 hilated ; they have given way to the abfolute 
 power of one man, concentrating in hirafelf all 
 the authority of the Hate, and differing from other 
 monarchs only in this, that (as my Honourable 
 Friend * truly flated it) he wields a fword in- 
 ftead of a fceptre. What then is the confidence 
 
 * Mr, Canning, 
 
 \ve
 
 ( 63 ) 
 
 "we are to derive either from the frame of the 
 government, or from the character and pad 
 conduct of the perfon who is now the abfolute 
 ruler of France? 
 
 Had we feen a man of whom we had no 
 previous knowledge fuddenly inverted with the 
 fovereign authority of the country j inverted with 
 the power of taxation, with the power of the 
 fword, the power of war and peace, the un- 
 limited power of commanding the refources, 
 of difpofmg of the lives and fortunes of every 
 man in France ; if we had feen, at the fame 
 moment, all the inferior machinery of the re- 
 volution, which, under the variety of fucceffive 
 fhocks, had kept the fyftem in motion, rtill re- 
 maining entire, all that, by requiiition and plun- 
 der, had given activity to the revolutionary fyf- 
 tem of finance, and had furniihed the means -of 
 creating an army, by converting every man, who 
 was of age to bear arms, into a foldier, not 
 for the defence of his own country but for the 
 fake of carrying unprovoked war into furrounding 
 K countries ;
 
 ( 66 } 
 
 countries j if we had feen all the fubordinate in- 
 ftrumentsof Jacobin power fubfifting in their 
 full force, and retaining (to ufe the French 
 phrafe) all their original organization ; and had 
 then obferved this fingle change in the con- 
 duel of their affairs, that there was now one 
 man, with no rival to thwart his meafures, no 
 colleague to divide his powers, no council to 
 controul his operations, no liberty of fpeaking 
 or writing, no exprefiion ot public opinion to 
 check or influence his conduct ; under fuch 
 circumftances, fhould we be wrong to paufe, 
 or wait for the evidence of facts and expe- 
 rience, before we confented to truft our fafety 
 to the forbearance of a fmgle man, in fuch a 
 fituation, and to relinquilh thofe means of de- 
 fence which have hitherto carried us fafe through 
 all the ftorms of the revolution r if we were to 
 afk what are the principles and character of 
 this frranger, to whom Fortune has fuddeniy 
 committed the concerns of a great and power- 
 ful nation ? 
 
 But
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 Rat is this the a&ual (late of the pfefent 
 queftion ? Are we talking of a ftranger of whom 
 we have heard nothing ? No> Sir : we have 
 heard of him ; we, and Europe, and the world, 
 have heard both of him and of the fatellites by 
 whom he is furrounded. And it is impoffible to 
 difcufs fairly the propriety of any anfwer which 
 could be returned to his overtures of negociation, 
 without taking into confideration the inferences 
 to be drawn from his perfonal character and 
 conduft. I know it is the fafhion with fome 
 gentlemen to reprefent any reference to topics 
 of this nature as invidious and irritating ; but the 
 truth is, that they arife unavoidably out of the 
 very nature of the queftion. Would it have been 
 poilible for Ministers to difcharge their duty, in 
 offering their advice to their Sovereign, either for 
 accepting or declining negociation, without 
 taking into their account the reliance to be 
 placed on the difpoiition and the principles of 
 the perfon, on whofe difpoiition and principles 
 the fecurity to be obtained by treaty muft, in the 
 prefent circumitances, principally depend : or 
 
 would 
 
 K 2
 
 ( 63 J 
 
 would they a& honeftly or candidly towards Par- 
 liament and towards the Country, if, having 
 been guided by thefe confiderations, they forbore 
 to flate publicly and diftinclly, the real grounds 
 which have influenced their decifion ; and if, 
 from a falfe delicacy and groundlefs timidity, 
 they purpofcly declined an examination of a point, 
 the moft eflential towards enabling Parliament 
 to form a jull determination on fu important a 
 fubjea ? 
 
 What Opinion, then, are we led to form of the 
 pretenfions of the Conful to thofe particular quali- 
 ties which, in the Official Note, are reprefented as 
 affording us, from his perfonal character, the fureft 
 pledge of peace ? we are told this is his Jecond at- 
 tempt at general pacification. Let us fee, for a mo- 
 ment, how this fecond attcmptbaus been conducted. 
 There is, indeed, as the Learned Gentleman has 
 faid, a word in the firft Declaration which refers to 
 general peace, and which ftates this to be the fe- 
 cond time in which the Conful has endeavoured to 
 zccomplifli that objeft. We thought Jit, for the 
 
 reafons
 
 ( 69 ) 
 
 reafons which have been affigned, to decline 
 altogether the propofal of treating, under the 
 prefent circumftances, but we, at the fame time, 
 expreflly ftated, that, whenever the moment 
 for treaty fliould arrive, we would in no cafe 
 treat, but in conjunction with our Allies. Our 
 general refufal to negociate at the prefent mo- 
 ment did not prevent the Conful from renew- 
 ing his overtures ; but were they renewed for 
 the purpofe of general pacification ? Though 
 he had hinted at general peace in the terms of 
 his firft Note ; though we had mewn, by our 
 anfwer, that w r e deemed negociation, even for 
 general peace, at this moment, inadmiffible j 
 though we added, that, even at any future pe- 
 riod, we would treat only in conjun&ion with 
 our Allies ; what was the propofal contained 
 ifi his laft Note ? to treat not for general peace, 
 but for a fcparate peace between Great Britain 
 and France. ; 
 
 Such was the fecond attempt to effect ge- 
 neral pacification: a propofal for a feparate 
 treaty with great Britain. What had been the 
 
 firft?
 
 rft? the conclufion of a feparate treaty with 
 Auftria ; and, in addition to this fatt, there are two 
 anecdotes connected with the conclufion of that 
 feparate treaty, which arc fufficient toilluftrate the 
 difpofition of this pacificator of Europe. This very 
 treaty of Campo Forrnio was oftentatioufly profef" 
 fed to be concluded with the Emperor for the pur 
 pofe of enabling Bonaparte to take th command 
 of the Army of England, and to dictate a feparate 
 peace with this Country on the banks of the 
 Thames. But there is this additional circiimftahcej 
 iingular beyond all conception^ confidering that we 
 are now referred to the treaty of Campo Formio as 
 a proof of the perfbnal difpofition of the Conful to 
 general peace ; he fent his two confidential 
 and chofen friends, Berthier and Jfoiige, charged 
 to communicate to the Directory this treaty of 
 Campo Formio ; to announce to them, that 
 one enemy was humbled, that the war with 
 Auftria was terminated, and, therefore; that 
 now was the moment to profectite their opera- 
 tions againft this Country j they ufed, on this 
 occafion, the memorable words, " the Kingdom 
 3 oj
 
 ( 71 ) 
 
 if Great Britain and the French Republic cannot 
 txijt together" This, I fay, was the folemr* 
 declaration of the deputies and ambafladors of 
 Bonaparte himfelf, offering to the Directory the 
 firft fruits of this firil attempt at general pacifica- 
 tion. 
 
 So much for his difpofition towards general 
 pacification > let us look next at the part he has 
 taken in the different ftages of the French revo- 
 lution, and let us then judge whether we are to 
 look to him, as the fecurity againft revolution- 
 ary principles ; let us determine what reliance 
 we can place on his engagements with other 
 countries,, when we fee how he has obferved 
 his engagements to his own, When the con- 
 ftitutjon of the third year was eftablifhed under 
 Barras, that conftitution was irqpofed by the 
 arms of Bonaparte, then commanding the Army 
 pf the Triumverate, in Paris. To that conftitu- 
 tion he then fwore fidelity. How often he has 
 repeated the fame oath I know not, but twice, 
 at lead, we know that he has not only repeated 
 
 it
 
 ( 72 ) 
 
 it himfelf, but tendered it to others, under cir- 
 cumftances too ftriking not to be ftated. 
 
 Sir, the Houfe cannot have forgotten the re- 
 volution of the 4th of September, which pro- 
 duced the difmiflal of Lord Malmfbury from 
 Lifle. How was that revolution procured ? It 
 was procured chiefly by the promife of Bona- 
 parte (in the name of his army), decidedly to 
 fupport the Directory in thofe meafures which 
 led to the infringement and violation of every 
 thing that the authors of the conftitution of 
 1795, or its adherents, could confider as funda- 
 mental, and which eftabliflied a fyftem of def- 
 potifm inferior only to that now realized in his 
 own perfon. Immediately before this event, 
 in the midft of the defolation and bloodfhed 
 of Italy, he had received the facred prefent 
 of new banners from the Directory ; he delivered 
 them to his army with this exhortation : " Let 
 " us fwear, fellow-foldiers, by the manes of the 
 f< patriots who have died by our fide, eternal 
 " hatred to the enemies of the conftitution of the 
 
 " third
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 " tliird year." That very constitution which ho 
 foon after .enabled the Directory to violate, and 
 which, at the head of his grenadiers, he has 
 now finally deftroyed. Sir, that oath was 
 again renewed, in the midft of that very fcene 
 to which I have laft referred ; the oath of 
 fidelity to the conftitutiort of the third year was 
 adminiftered to all the members of the Affembly 
 then fitting (under the terror of the bayonet), as 
 the folemn preparation for the bufinefs of the 
 day; and the morning was ufhered in with 
 fwearing attachment to the constitution, that the 
 evening might clofe with its deftrution. 
 
 If we carry our views out of France, and 
 look at the dreadful catalogue of all the breaches 
 of treaty, all the a6ts of perfidy at which I have 
 only glanced, and which are precifely com- 
 menfurate with the number of treaties which the 
 republic has made ; (for I have fought in vain 
 for any one which it has made and which it has 
 
 not broken) if we trace the hiltory of them all 
 L from
 
 ( 7+ ) 
 
 from the beginning of the revolution to the pre- 
 fent time, or if we felet thofe which have been 
 accompanied by the moft atrocious cruelty, and 
 marked the moft ftrongly with the charafteriftic 
 features of the revolution, the name of Bona- 
 parte will be found allied to more of them than 
 that of any other that can be handed down in the 
 hiftory of the crimes and miferies of the laft ten 
 years. His name will be recorded with the hor- 
 rors, committed in Italy, in the memorable cam- 
 paign of 1796 and 1797, in the Milanefe, in 
 Genoa, in Modena, in Tufcany, in Rome, and 
 in Venice. 
 
 His entrance into Lombardy was announced 
 by a folemn proclamation, iiTued on the 27th of 
 April, 1796, which terminated with thefe words: 
 " Nations of Italy ! the French army is come to 
 " break your chains, the French . are the friends 
 " of the people in every country, your religion, 
 " your property, your cuftoms, Jhall be refpected" 
 This was followed by a fecond proclamation, 
 
 dated
 
 dated from Milan 20th of May and figned " Bo" 
 " naparte" in thefe terms : " Refpect for property 
 " and perfonal fecurity . Refpect for the religion 
 " of countries, thefe are the fentiments of the go- 
 " vernment of the French republic, and of the army 
 (f of Italy. The French victorious confider the na- 
 " tions of Lombardy as their brothers." In tefti- 
 mony of this fraternity, and to fulfill the folemn 
 pledge of refpeting property, this very proclama- 
 tion impofed on the Milanefe a provifional con- 
 tribution to the amount of twenty millions ot 
 livres, or near one million fterling, and fucceflive 
 exactions were afterwards levied on that fingle 
 ftate to the amount, in the whole, of near fix mil- 
 lions fterling. The regard to religion an$ to the 
 cuftoms of the country was manifested with the 
 fame fcrupulous fidelity. The churches were 
 given up to indifcriminate plunder. Every reli- 
 gious and charitable fund, every public treafure, 
 was confifcated. The country was made the 
 fcene of every fpecies of diforder and rapine. 
 The priefts, the eftablifhed form of worihip, all 
 L 2 the
 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 the objects of religious reverence, were openly 
 infulted by the French troops j at Pavia particu- 
 larly the tomb of St. Augujtin, which the inhabi- 
 tants were accuftomed to view with peculiar 
 veneration, was mutilated and defaced; this laft 
 provocation having roufed the refentment of the 
 people they flew to arms, furrounded the French 
 garrifon and took them prifoners, but carefully 
 abftamed from offering any violence to a tingle 
 foldier. In revenge for this conduct, Bonaparte, 
 then on his march to the Mmcio, fuddenly re- 
 turned, collected his troops, and carried the ex- 
 tremity of military execution over the country ; 
 he burnt the town of Benafco and maflacred eight 
 hundred of its inhabitants ; he marched to Pavia, 
 took it by ftorm, and delivered it over to general 
 plunder, and publifhed, at the fame moment, a 
 proclamation, of the 26th of May, ordering his 
 troops to moot all thofe who had not laid down 
 their arms, and taken an oath of obedience, 
 and to burn every village where the toe/in 
 
 mould
 
 ( T7 ) 
 
 mould be founded, and to put its inhabitants to 
 
 death. 
 
 Thetranfaftions with Madiautwtit on a fmaller 
 fcale, but in the fame character. o?iapartebegan 
 by figning a treaty, by which the Duke of Mo- 
 dena was to pay twelve millions of livres, and 
 neutrality was promifed him in return ; this was 
 foon followed by the perfonal arreft of the Duke 
 and by a frefh extortion of two hundred thoufand 
 fequins; after this he was permitted, on the pay- 
 ment of a farther fum, to fign another treaty, 
 called a Convention de Suretc, which of courfe 
 was only the prelude to the repetition of fimilar 
 exaftions. 
 
 Nearly at the fame period, in violation of 
 the rights of neutrality and of the treaty which 
 had been concluded between the French re- 
 public and the Grand Duke of Tufcany in 
 the preceding year, and in breach of a pofitive 
 promife given only a few days before, the French 
 
 army
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 army forcibly took pofleffion of Leghorn, for the 
 purpofe of feizing the Britifh property which was 
 depofited there and confifcating it as prize ; and 
 fliortly after, when Bonaparte agreed to evacuate 
 Leghorn in return for the evacuation of the Ifl and 
 of Elbe, which was in the pofleffion of the Britifh 
 troops, he infifted upon a feparate article, by 
 which, in addition to the plunder before obtained, 
 by .the infra&ion of the law of nations, it was 
 ftipulated, that the Grand Duke fhould pay to 
 the French the expence which they had incurred 
 by thus invading his territory. 
 
 Jn the proceedings towards Genoa we mall 
 find not only a continuation of the fame fyftem 
 of extortion and plunder, (in violation of the fo- 
 ]emn pledge contained in the proclamations 
 already referred to,) but a ftriking inftance of the 
 revolutionary means employed for the definition 
 of independent governments. A French minifter 
 was at that time refident at Genoa, which was 
 acknowledged by France to be in a ftate of neur 
 1 trality
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 trality and friendfhip : in breach of this neu- 
 trality Bonaparte began, in the year 1796, with 
 the demand of a loan ; he afterwards, from the 
 month of September, required and enforced 
 the payment of a monthly fubfidy, to the amount 
 which he thought proper to ftipulate ; thefe ex- 
 aiStions were accompanied by repeated affuranccs 
 and proteitations of friendship ; they were followed, 
 in May, 1797, by a confpiracy againft the govern- 
 ment, fomented by the emhTaries of the French 
 embaffy, and conduced by the partizans of 
 France, encouraged, and afterwards prote&ed 
 by the French minifter. The confpirators failed in 
 their firft attempt, overpowered by the courage 
 and voluntary exertions of the inhabitants; their 
 force was difperfed, and many of their number 
 were arrefted. Bonaparte inftantly confidered 
 the defeat of the confpirators as an at of aggref- 
 fion againft the French republic ; he difpatched 
 an Aid-de-camp with an order to the Senate ot 
 this independent ftate; firft, to releafe all the 
 French who were detained ; fecondly, to punifli 
 
 thofe
 
 thofe who had arrefted them ; thirdly, to declare 
 that they had had no Jhare in the infurrection ; 
 and fourthly, to difarm the people. Several 
 French prifoners were immediately releafed, and 
 a proclamation was preparing to difarm the 
 inhabitants, when, by a fecond note, Bonaparte 
 required the arreil of the three Inquifitors of 
 State, and immediate alterations in the confti- 
 tution ; he accompanied this with an order to 
 the French minifter to quit Genoa, if his com- 
 mands were not immediately carried into execu- 
 tion ; at the fame moment his troops entered the 
 territory of the republic, and fhortly after the 
 councils, intimidated and overpowered, abdicated 
 their functions. Three deputies were then fent 
 to Bonaparte to receive from him a new confti- 
 tutionj on the 6th of June, after the conferences 
 at Montebdlo, he figned a convention, or rather 
 ifiued a decree, by which he fixed the new form 
 of their government ; he himfelf named provi- 
 fionally all the members who were to compofe 
 it, and he required the payment of feven millions 
 
 of
 
 of livrcs, as the price of the fubverfion of their 
 conftitution, and their independence. Thefe 
 tranfa&ions require but one fhort comment; it is 
 to be found in the official account given of them 
 at Paris, which is in thefe memorable words : 
 " General Bonaparte has purfued the only line 
 " of conduct which could be allowed in the re- 
 <f prefentative of a nation, which has fupported 
 " the war only to procure the folemn acknow- 
 " ledgement of the right of nations, to change the 
 " form of their government. He contributed 
 " nothing towards the revolution of Genoa, but 
 " he feized the firft moment to acknowledge the 
 " new government, as foon as he faw that it was 
 the refult of the wi/Jies of the people''* 
 
 It is unneceflary to dwell on the wanton at- 
 tacks againft Rome, under the direction of Bona- 
 parte himfelf in the year 1796, and in the begin- 
 
 * RedaSeur Officiel, June 30, 1797. 
 
 M in
 
 ( 82 ) 
 
 ing of 1797, which terminated firft, by the 
 treaty of Tokntino concluded by Bonaparte, 
 in which, by enormous facrifices, the Pope was 
 allowed to purchafe the acknowledgment of bis 
 authority, as a Sovereign Prince; and fecondly, 
 by the violation of that very treaty, and the 
 fubverfion of the Papal authority by Jofeph Bo- 
 naparte, the brother and the agent of the Gene- 
 ral, and the Minifter of the French Republic to 
 the Holy See.. A tranfation, accompanied by 
 outrages and infults towards the pious and vene- 
 rable Pontiff (in fpite of the fanftity of his age 
 and the unfullied purity of his character) which 
 even to a Proteftant, feem hardly fhort of the guilt 
 of facrilege. 
 
 But of all the difgufting and tragical fcenes 
 which took place in Italy, in the courfe of the 
 period I am defcribing, thofe which paffed at 
 Venice are perhaps the moft ftriking, and the 
 moft chara&eriftic : In May, 1796, the French 
 army, under Bonaparte, in the full tide of its 
 
 fuccefs
 
 ( 83 ) 
 
 fuccefs againft the Auftrians, firft approached the 
 territories of this republic, which from the com- 
 mencement of the war had obferved a rigid 
 neutrality. Their entrance on thefe territories 
 was as ufual accompanied by a folemn procla- 
 mation in the name of their general. "Bonaparte, 
 to the republic of Venice." " It is to deliver the 
 "fineft country in Europe from the iron yoke of 
 " the proud houfe of Aujiria, that the French 
 " army has braved obftacles the moft difficult to 
 " furmount. Vi6tory in union with Juftice has 
 " crowned its efforts. The wreck of the enemy's 
 ** army has retired behind the Mincio. The 
 " French army, in order to follow them, pafTes 
 " over the territory of the republic of Venice ; 
 " but it will never forget, that ancient friend 
 " Jtiip unites he two republics. Religion, go- 
 " vcrnmenf, atjloms, and property, flail be 
 " refpectcd. That the people may be without 
 " apprehenfion, the moft fevere difcipline fhall 
 " be maintained. All that may be provided for 
 ec the army (hall be faithfully paid for in money, 
 M 2 TV
 
 " The general-in-chief engages the officers of 
 " the republic of Venice, the magiftrates, and 
 " the priefts, to make known thefe fentiments 
 " to the people, in order, that confidence may 
 " cement that friendfhip which has fo long united 
 " the two nations, faithful in the path of honor, 
 " as in that of vi&ory. The French foldier is ter- 
 " rible only to the enemies of his liberty and his 
 ." government." Bonaparte.* 
 
 This proclamation was followed by exactions 
 fimilar to thofe which were pratifed againft 
 Genoa, by the renewal of fimilar profeffions 
 of friendfhip and the ufe of fimilar means 
 to excite infurretion. At length, in the fpring 
 of 1797, occafion was taken from diftur- 
 bances thus excited, to forge, in the name 
 of the Venetian Government, a proclamation, f 
 
 * Vide Debrett's State Papers, vol. 5. p. 28. 
 
 f Vide Account of this tranfaftion in the Proclamation of 
 
 the Senate of Venice, April "12, 1798. >Debrett's State 
 
 Papers, vol. 6thj page 67. 
 
 hoiUk
 
 ( 85 j 
 
 hoftile to France, and this proceeding was made 
 the ground for military execution againft the 
 Country, and for effe&ing by force the fubver- 
 fion of its ancient government and the eftablifh- 
 ment of the democratic forms of the French 
 Revolution. This revolution was fealed by a 
 treaty, figned in May, 1797, between Bonaparte 
 and Commiffioners appointed on the part of the 
 new and revolutionary government of Venice. 
 By the fecond and third fecret articles of this 
 treaty, Venice agreed to give as a ranfom, to 
 fecure itfelf againft all farther exa&ions or 
 demands, the fum of three millions of livres in 
 money, the value of three millions more in arti- 
 cles of naval fupply, and three mips of the line j 
 and it received in return the afTurances of the 
 friendfhip and fupport of the French Republic. 
 Immediately after the fignature of this treaty, 
 the Arfenal, the Library, and the Palace of 
 St. Marc were ranfacked and plundered, and 
 heavy additional contributions were jm'pofed 
 upon its inhabitants. And, in not more than 
 10 four
 
 four months afterwards, this very Republic of 
 Venice, united by alliance to France, the crea- 
 ture of Bonaparte himfelf, from whom it had 
 received the prefent of French liberty, was by the 
 fame Bonaparte transferred under the treaty of 
 Campo Formio to " that iron yoke of the proud 
 Houfe of Aujlria" to deliver it from which he 
 had reprefented in his firfl proclamation to be 
 the great object of all his operations. 
 
 Sir, all thisjs followed by the memorable ex- 
 pedition into Egypt, which I mention, not 
 merely becaufe it forms a principal article in the 
 catalogue of thofe als of violence and perfidy 
 in which Bonaparte has been engaged ; not 
 merely becaufe it was an enterprize peculiarly 
 his own, of which he was himfelf the planner, 
 the executor, and the betrayer j but chiefly be- 
 caufe when' from thence he retires to a different 
 fcene, to take poffeffion of a new throne, from 
 which he is to fpeak upon an equality with the 
 Kings and Governors of Europe, he leaves be- 
 hind
 
 ( 87 ) 
 
 hind him, at the moment of his departure, a 
 fpecimeB, which cannot be miftaken, of his 
 principles of negociation. The Intercepted Cor- 
 refpondence, which has been alluded to in 
 this debate, feems to afford the ftrongeft ground 
 to believe, that his offers to the Turkifti Govern- 
 ment to evacuate Egypt, were made folely with 
 a view to gain lime ,- that the ratification of any 
 treaty on this mbjecl: was to be delayed with 
 the view of finally eluding its performance, if 
 any change of circumftances favourable to the 
 French mould occur in the interval. But what- 
 ever Gentlemen may think of the intention 
 with which thefe offers were made, there will 
 at leaft be no queftion with refpecl: to the credit 
 due to thofe profeffions by which he endeavoured 
 to prove, in Egypt, his pacific difpofitions. He 
 exprefsly enjoins his fucceffor, ftrongly and flea- 
 dily to infift in all his intercourfe with' the Turks, , 
 that he came to Egypt with no hoftile defign, 
 and that he never meant to keep poffeffion of the 
 country ; while, on the oppofite page of the fame
 
 inftructions, he ftates in the moft unequivocal 
 manner, his regret at the difcomfiture of his fa- 
 vourite projeft of colonizing Egypt, and of 
 maintaining it as a territorial acquilition. Now, 
 Sir, if in any note addreffed to the Grand Vizier, 
 or the Sultan, Bonaparte had claimed credit for 
 the fjncerity of his profefiions, that he came 
 to Egypt with no view hoftile to Turkey and 
 folely for the purpofe of molefting the Britifh, 
 interefts, is there any one argument now ufed 
 to induce us to believe his prefent profeflions 
 to us, which might not have been equally urged, 
 on that occafion, to the Turkifh government ? 
 would not thofe profeflions have been equally 
 fupported by folemn afleveration, by the fame 
 reference which is now made to perfonal cha- 
 racter, with this fingle difference, that they 
 would then have been accompanied with one 
 inftance lefs of that perfidy which we have 
 had occafion to trace in this very tranfa&ion.
 
 ( 89 ) 
 
 It is unneceflary to fay more with refpect to 
 the credit due to his profeflions, or the reliance 
 to be placed on his general character : But it 
 will, perhaps be argued, that whatever may be his 
 character, or whatever has been his paft con- 
 duel:, he has now an intereft in making and 
 obferving peace. That he has an intereft in 
 making peace is at beft but a doubtful propofi- 
 tion, and that he has an intereft in preferving it 
 is (till more uncertain. That it is his intereft to 
 negociate, I do not indeed deny ; it is his in- 
 tereft above all to engage this country in fepa- 
 rate negociation, in order to loofen and diffolve 
 the whole fyftem of the confederacy on the Con- 
 tinent, to patfy, at once, the arms of Ruflia or of 
 Auftria, or of any other country that might look 
 to you for fupport ; and then either to break off 
 his feparate treaty, or if he mould have con- 
 cluded it, to apply the leffon which is taught in 
 N his
 
 ( 90 ) 
 
 as fchool of policy in Egypt; and to revive, at 
 his pleafure, thofe claims of indemnification 
 which may have been referved to fome happier 
 period* 
 
 This is precifely the intereft which he has in 
 negotiation; but on what grounds are we to be 
 convinced that he has an intereft in concluding 
 and obferving a folid and permanent pacification ? 
 Under all the circumftances of his perfonal 
 character, and his newly-acquired power, what 
 other fecurity has he for retaining that power, 
 but the fvvord? His hold upon France is the 
 fword, and he has no other. Js he connected 
 with the foil, or with the habits, the affections, 
 or the prejudices of the country ? He is a Stranger, 
 a Foreigner, and an Ufurper ; he unites in his 
 own perfon every thing that a pure Republican 
 jnuft deteft; every thing that an enraged Jacobin 
 
 * Vide Intercepted Correfpondence from Egypt. 
 
 has
 
 ( 91 ) 
 
 has abjured; every thing that a fincere and faith- 
 ful Royalift muft feel as an infuit. If he is 
 cppofed at any time in his career, what is his 
 appeal? He appeals to his Fortune; in other 
 words, to his army and his fword. Placing, then, 
 his whole reliance upon military fupport, can he 
 afford to let his military renown pafs away, to let 
 his laurels wither, to let the memory of his at- 
 chievements fink into obfcurity? Is it certain 
 that, with his army confined within France, and 
 reftrained from inroads upon her neighbours, he 
 can maintain, at his devotion, a force fufficiently 
 numerous to fupport his power ? Having no 
 objeft but the poffeffion of abfolute dominion, 
 no paffion but military glory, is it certain, 
 that he will feel fuch an interefl in permanent 
 peace, as would juftify us in laying down our 
 arms, reducing our expence, and relinquifliing 
 our means of fecurity, on the faith of his engage- 
 ments ? Do we believe, that after the conclufion 
 of peace, he would not fUll figh over the loft tro- 
 N 2 phies
 
 phies of Egypt, wrefted from him by the cele- 
 brated victory of Aboukir, and the brilliant ex- 
 ertions of that heroic band of Britifh feamen, 
 whofe influence and example rendered theTurkifli 
 troops invincible at Acra. Can he forget, that 
 the effeft of thefe exploits enabled Auftria and 
 Ruflia, in one campaign, to recover from France, 
 all which me had acquired by his victories, to 
 diffolve the charm, which, for a time, fafcinated 
 Europe, and to fhew that their generals, con- 
 tending in a juft caufe, could efface, even by 
 their fuccefs, and their military glory, the moft 
 dazzling triumphs of his victorious and defolating 
 ambition ? 
 
 Can we believe, with thefe impreffions on his 
 mind, that, if after a year, eighteen months, or 
 two years, of peace had elapfed, he fliould be 
 tempted by the appearance of a frefh infurre&ion 
 in Ireland, encouraged by renewed and unre- 
 ftrained communication with France, and fo- 
 
 fomented,
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 merited by the frefh infufion of Jacobin princi- 
 ples ; if we were at fuch a moment without a. 
 fleet to watch the ports of France, or to guard 
 the coafts of Ireland, without a difpofeable army, 
 or an embodied militia, capable of fupplying a 
 fpeedy and adequate reinforcement, and that he 
 had fuddenly the means of tranfporting thither 
 a body of twenty or thirty thoufand French 
 troops : can we believe, that at fuch a moment 
 his ambition and vindictive fpirit would be re- 
 ftrained by the recollection of engagements, or 
 the obligation of treaty? Or, if in fome new 
 crifis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman 
 Empire, with no Britifh navy in the Mediterra- 
 nean, no confederacy formed, no force collered 
 to fupport it, an opportunity mould prefent itfelf 
 for refuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt, 
 for renewing the avowed and favourite proje& of 
 conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile 
 country, and of opening the ' way to wound 
 fome of the vital interefts of England, and to 
 plunder the treafures of the Eaft, in order to fill 
 
 the
 
 ( 9* ) 
 
 the bankrupt coffers of France, would it be 
 the intereft of Bonaparte, under fuch circum- 
 ftances, or his principles, his moderation, his 
 love of peace, his averfion to conqueft, and his 
 regard for the independence of other nations , 
 would it be all, or any of thefe that would fecure 
 us againft an attempt, which would leave us 
 only the option of fubmitting without a ftruggle 
 to certain lofs and difgrace, or of renewing the 
 conteft which we had prematurely terminated, 
 without allies, without preparation, with dimi- 
 nifhed means, and with increafed difficulty and 
 hazard ? 
 
 Hitherto I have fpoken only of the reliance 
 which we can place on the profeflions, the 
 character, and the condut of the prefent Firfl 
 Conful 5 but it remains to confider the (lability 
 of his power. The Revolution has been marked 
 throughout by a rapid fucceffion of new depo- 
 litaries of public authority, each fupplanting his 
 predeceflbr; what ground shave we as yet to beliem 
 
 that
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 that this new Ufurpation, more odious and more 
 undifguifed than all that preceded it, will be 
 more durable ? Is it that we rely on the particu- 
 lar provifions contained in the code of the pre- 
 tended conftitution, which was proclaimed as 
 accepted by the French people, as foon as the 
 garrifon of Paris declared their determination to 
 exterminate all its enemies, and before any of 
 its articles could even be known to half the 
 country, whofe confent was required for its 
 eftablifhment? 
 
 I will not pretend to inquire deeply into the 
 nature and effets of a Conftitution, which can 
 hardly be regarded but as a farce and a mockery. 
 If, however, it could be fuppofed that its. 
 provifions were to have any effect, it feems 
 equally adapted to two purpofes, that of giving 
 to its founder for a time an abfolute and un- 
 controlled authority, and that of laying the 
 certain foundation of future difunion and difcord, 
 which if they once prevail muft render ths 
 of all the authority under the confti- 
 8 tution
 
 ( 96 ) 
 
 tution impoflible, and leave no appeal but to 
 the fword. 
 
 Is then military defpotifm that which we arc 
 accuftomed to confider as a ftable form of go- 
 vernment ? In all ages of the world, it has been 
 attended with the leafl {lability to the perfons 
 who exercifed it, and with the moft rapid fuc- 
 ceflion of changes and revolutions. In the 
 'outfet of the French revolution its advocates 
 boafted that it furnifhed a fecurity for ever, not 
 to France only but to all countries in the 
 world, againft military defpotifm 5 that the force 
 of {landing armies was vain and delufive ; that 
 no artificial power could refift public opinion; 
 and that it was upon the foundation of public 
 opinion alone that any government could {land. 
 I believe, that in this inftance, as in every 
 other, the progrefs of the French revolution 
 has belied its profeffions ; that fo far from its 
 being a proof of the prevalence of public opi- 
 nion againft military force, it is inftead of the 
 proof, the flrongeft exception from that doftrine 
 
 which
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 which appears in the hiftory of" the world. 
 Through all the ftages of the Revolution mi- 
 litary force has governed; public opinion has 
 fcarcely been heard. But ftill I coniider this as 
 only an exception from a general truth ; I ftill 
 believe, that a in every civilized country (not en- 
 ilaved by a Jacobin faction), public opinion is 
 the only fure fupport of any government ; I be- 
 lieve this with the more fatisfa&ion, from a 
 conviction that if this conteft is happily ter- 
 minated, the eftablifhed governments of Eu- 
 rope will Hand upon that rock firmer than ever ; 
 and whatever may be the defects of any particu- 
 lar conftitution, thofe who live under it will pre- 
 fer its continuance to the experiment of changes 
 which may plunge them in the unfathomable 
 abyfs of revolution, or extricate them from it, 
 only to expofe them to the terrors of military 
 defpotifm. And to apply this to France-, I fee 
 no reafon to believe, that the prefent Ufurpa- 
 tion will be more permanent than any other mi- 
 litary defpotifm, which has been eftablifhed by 
 the fame means, and with the fame defiance of 
 
 public opinion. 
 
 o What,
 
 What, then, is the inference I draw from all 
 that I have now ftated ? Is it 3 that we will in 
 no cafe treat with Bonaparte ? I fay, no fuch 
 thing. But I fay, as has been faid in the an- 
 fwer returned to the French Note 3 that we ought 
 to wait for experience, and the evidence of fatfs, 
 before we are convinced that fuch a treaty is 
 admiffible. The circum fiances I have ftated 
 would well juftify us if we fhould be flow in 
 being convinced ; but on a quefiion of Peace 
 and War, every thing depends upon degree, 
 and upon comparifon. If, on the one hand, 
 there fhould be an appearance that the policy of 
 France is at length guided by different maxims 
 
 . from thofc which have hitherto prevailed ; if 
 we fhould hereafter fee figns of lability in the 
 Government, which are not now to be traced ; 
 if the progrefs of the allied army fhould not 
 
 ; call forth fuch a fpirit in France, as to make 
 it probable that the act of the Country itfelf 
 will -deftroy the fyftem now prevailing ; if 
 the danger, the difficulty, . the rifk of conti- 
 nuing the conteft fhould increafe, while the 
 hope of complete ultimate fuccefs fhould be di- 
 
 minifhedj
 
 ( 99 ) 
 
 minified ; all thefe, in their due place, are con- 
 iiderations, which, with myfelf and (I can an- 
 fvver for it) with every one of my colleagues, will 
 have their juft weight. But at prefent thefe con- 
 fi derations all operate one way ; at prefent there 
 is nothing from which we can prefagefo favour- 
 able a change of difpolition in the French Councils. 
 There is the greateft reafon to rely on powerful 
 co-operation from our Allies ; there are the 
 ilrongeft marks of a difpolition in the interior 
 of France to active reliflance againfl this new 
 Tyranny ; and there is every ground to believe, on 
 reviewing our lituation, and that of the enemy, 
 that if we are ultimately difappointed of that 
 complete fuccefs which we are at prefent entitled 
 to hope, the continuance of the conteft, inftead 
 of making our fituation comparatively worfe, 
 will have made it comparatively better. 
 
 If then I am afked how long are we to perfe- 
 vere in the war, I can only fay, that no period 
 can be accurately affigned beforehand. Confider- 
 ing the importance of obtaining complete fe- 
 curity for the objects for which we contend, we 
 o 3 ought
 
 ought not to be difcouraged too foon: but on 
 the other hand, confidering the importance of 
 not impairing and exhaufting the radical firength 
 of the Country, there are limits beyond which 
 we ought not to perlifl, and which we can de- 
 termine only by eltimating and comparing fairly, 
 from time to time, the degree of fecurity to be 
 obtained by treaty, and the rifk and difad- 
 vantage of continuing the contcft. 
 
 But, Sir, there are fome Gentlemen in the 
 Houfe, who feem to confider it already certain, 
 that the ultimate fuccefs to which I am looking 
 is unattainable : they fuppofe us contending only 
 for the reftoration of the French Monarchy, 
 which they believe to be impracticable, and 
 deny to be defirable for this Country. We have 
 been afked in the courfe of this debate, do you 
 think-you can impofe monarchy upon France, 
 againft the will of the nation ? I never thought 
 it, I never hoped it, I never wiftied it : I have 
 thought, I have hoped, I have wilhed, that the 
 time might come when the effect of the arms of 
 the Allies might fo far overpower the mili- 
 tary
 
 tary force which keeps Franc in bondage, as tq 
 give vent and fcope to the the >ughts and actions 
 of its inhabitants. We have ', indeed, already 
 feen abundant proof of the difpofition of a 
 large part of the country ; we h ave feen almoft 
 through the whole of the Rcvolu.tion th,e Weft- 
 ern Provinces of France deluged with the blood 
 of its inhabitants, obflinately contending for their 
 ancient Laws and Religion. We have recently 
 feen in the revival of that war, a frafh inftance, 
 of the ^eal which ilill animates thofe countries, in, 
 the fame caufe. Thefe efforts (I Hate it dif- 
 tinctly, and there are thofe near me who can 
 bear witnefs to the truth of the afTertion) were 
 not produced by any iniligation from hence; 
 they were the effects of a rooted fentiment prevail- 
 ing througha It thofe Provinces, forced into action 
 by the Law of the Hoftages and the other tyran- 
 nical meafures of the Directory, at the moment 
 when we were endeavouring to difcourage fp 
 hazardous an enterprife. If, under fuch circum-r 
 fiances, we find them giving proofs of their unal- 
 terable perfeverance in their principles ; if there 
 is every reafon to believe that the fame difpofi- 
 
 tion.
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 tion prevails in many other extenfive provinces 
 of France; if every party appears at length 
 equally wearied and difappointed with all the 
 fucceffive changes which the Revolution has 
 produced ; if the queftion is no longer between 
 Monarchy, and even the pretence and name of 
 Liberty, but between the ancient line of Here- 
 ditary Princes on the one hand, and a military 
 tyrant, a foreign ufurper, on the other ; if the 
 armies of that ufurper are likely to find fufficient 
 occupation on the frontiers, and to be forced 
 at length to leave the interior of the Country at 
 liberty to manifeft its real feeling and dtfpofi- 
 tion j what reafon have we to anticipate, that the 
 Refloration of Monarchy under fuch circum- 
 ilances is impracticable ? 
 
 The Learned Gentleman has, indeed, told us, 
 that almoft every man now pofleffed of property 
 in France, muft neceffarily be intereiled in re- 
 fifting fuch a change, and that therefore it never 
 can be effected. If that iingle conlideration 
 were conclulive againfl the poffibility of a 
 Change, for the fame reafon the Revolution itfelf, 
 
 i ty
 
 by which the whole: property of the Country wai 
 taken from its ancient pofiefTors, could never 
 have taken place. But though I deny it to be 
 an infuperable obftacle, I admit it to be a point 
 of confiderable delicacy and difficulty. It is not 
 indeed for us to difcufs minutely, what arrange- 
 ment might be formed on this point to conciliate 
 and unite oppofite interefls; but whoever con- 
 iiders the precarious tenure and depreciated 
 value of lands held under the revolutionary 
 title, and the low price for which they have ge- 
 nerally been obtained, will think it perhaps not 
 impoffible that an ample comf>enfation might be 
 made to the bulk of the prefent pofleffors, both 
 for the purchafe-money they have paid, and for 
 the adual value of what they now enjoy ; and 
 that the ancient proprietors might be reinflated 
 in the pofleffion of their former rights, with only 
 fuch a temporary facrifice as reafonable men 
 would willingly make to obtain fo eflential an 
 gbjecl. 
 
 The Honourable and Learned Gentleman, 
 however, has fupported his reafoning on this part 
 
 of
 
 ( 104 
 
 of the fiibject, by ;in arguri lent which he uri- 
 doubtedly confiders as unanftf -erable a reference 
 to what wotald be h as own coi iduct in Jimilar cir- 
 cumftances ; and he tells us that every landed 
 JProprietor in .Fra nee muft fupport the prefent 
 order of things \ir i that country from the fame 
 and every Proprietor of Three 
 
 motive that he . 
 
 per Cent. Stock 
 
 ConfHtution of ( 
 
 teamed Gentleml 
 
 haWrs of his pro 
 
 better and nobler 
 
 ftitution which he 
 
 ftudy and examine 
 
 rive from the vali 
 
 large) of Three 
 
 to continue to inci 
 
 have done, during 
 
 the fecurity and p} 
 
 been eflablifhed b 
 
 oppofite to the cot 
 
 man and his friend 
 
 /ould join in the defence of the 
 jreat Britain. I mud do the 
 in the juftice to believe that the 
 feffion muft fupply him with 
 motives, for defending a Con- 
 has had fo much occalion to 
 , than any which he can de- 
 ic of his proportion (however 
 T Cents, even fuppofing them 
 eafe in price as rapidly as they 
 the lafl three years, in which 
 ofperity of the Country has 
 y following a fyftem direclly 
 infcls of the Learned Gentle- 
 
 The Learned G ' entleman's illuftration howe- 
 ver, though it fat Is with refpeft to himfelf, is 
 
 happily
 
 ( 10$ ) 
 
 happily and aptly applied to the flate of France} 
 and let us fee what inference it furnifties with, 
 refpect to the probable attachment of monied 
 men to the continuance of the revolutionary 
 fyfiem, as well as with refpecl to the general 
 ftate of public credit in that country. I do not 
 indeed know that there exifts precifely any Fund 
 of Three per Cents in France, to furnilh a teft 
 for the patriotifm and public fpirit of the lovers 
 of French Liberty. But there is another Fund 
 which may equally anfwer our purpofe the, 
 capital of Three per Cent. Stock which formerly 
 exified in France has undergone a whimfical 
 operation, fimilar to many other expedients of 
 Finance which we have feen in the courfe of 
 the Revolution this was performed by a decree, 
 which, as they termed it, repuU'icamfed their debt ; 
 that is, in other words, ftruck off, at once, two- 
 thirds of the capital, and left the Proprietors to 
 take their chance for the payment of intereft on 
 the remainder. This remnant was afterwards 
 converted into the prefent Five per Cent. Stock. 
 I had the curiolity very lately to inquire what 
 price it bore in the market, and I was told that 
 p the
 
 the price had fomewhat rifen from confidence in 
 the new Government, and was actually as high 
 as f event een. I really at firft fuppofed that my 
 informer meant feventeen years purchafe for 
 every pound of intereft, and I began to be 
 almoft jealous of revolutionary credit; hut I 
 foon found that he literally meant feventeen 
 pounds for every hundred pounds capital ftock 
 of Five per Cent, that is, a little more than 
 three and a half years purchafe. So much 
 for the value of revolutionary property, and for 
 the attachment with which it muft infpire its pof- 
 feflbrs towards the fyftem of Government to 
 which that value is to be afcribed ! 
 
 On the queftion, Sir, how far the Rcftoration 
 of the French Monarchy, if practicable, is deiir- 
 able, I fhall not think it neceffary to fay much. 
 Can it be fuppofed to be indifferent to us or to 
 the world, whether the Throne of France is to 
 t>e filled by a Prince of the Honfe of Bourbon, or 
 by him whofe principles and conduct I have 
 endeavoured to develope ? Is it nothing with 
 a view to influence and example, whether the 
 
 fortune
 
 fortune of this laft adventurer in the Lottery of 
 Revolutions, fhall appear to be permanent ? Is it 
 nothing, whether a fyftem Ihall be fan&ioned 
 .which confirms by one of its fundamental arti- 
 cles, that general transfer of property from its 
 ancient and lawful poffeflbrs, which holds out 
 one of the moil terrible examples of national 
 injuftice, and which has furnifhed the great 
 fource of revolutionary finance and revolutionary 
 firength againfl all the Powers of Europe ? 
 
 In the exhaufled and impoveriflied ftate of 
 France, it feems for a time impoflible that any 
 fyilem but that of robbery and confifcation, any 
 thing but the continued torture, which can be 
 applied only by the engines of the Revolution, 
 can extort from its ruined inhabitants more than 
 the means of fupporting, in peace, the yearly 
 expenditure of its Government. Suppofe, then, 
 the Heir of the Houfe of Bourbon reinftated on 
 the Throne, he will have fufficient occupation in 
 endeavouring, if poffible, to heal the wounds, 
 and gradually to repair the lofles of ten years 
 f z of
 
 of civil convulfion ; to reanimate the drooping 
 commerce, to rekindle the induflry, to replace 
 the capital, and to revive the manufactures of 
 the Country. Under fuch circumftances, there 
 mufl probably be a conliderable interval before 
 fuch a Monarch, whatever may be his views, can 
 poflefs the power which can make him formida- 
 ble to Europe ; but while the fyftem of the Re- 
 volution continues, the cafe is quite different. 
 It is true, indeed, that even the gigantic and un- 
 natural means by which that Revolution has 
 been fupported, are fo far impaired ; the influ- 
 ence of its principles, and the terror of its arms, 
 fo far weakened ; and its power of action fo much 
 contracted and circumfcribed ; that againft the 
 embodied force of Europe, profecuting a vigorous 
 j war, we may juflly hope that the remnant and 
 wreck of this fyftem cannot long oppofe an effec- 
 tual refinance. But, fuppofing the confederacy of 
 Europe prematurely diflblved ; fuppoling our ar- 
 mies dilbanded, our fleets laid up in our harbours, 
 our exertions relaxed, and our means of precaution 
 and defence relinquifhed ; do we believe that the 
 4 revo-
 
 ( 109 ; 
 
 revolutionary power, with this reft and breathing- 
 time given it to recover from the preflure under 
 which it is now linking, poffeffing tfill the 
 means of calling fuddenly and violently into 
 action whatever is the remaining phyiical force 
 of France, under the guidance of military 
 defpotifm; do we believe that this power, the 
 terror of which is now beginning to vanilh, 
 will not again prove formidable to Europe? 
 Can we , forget, that in the ten years in 
 which that power has fubiifted, it has brought 
 more mifery on furrounding nations, and pro- 
 duced more acts of aggreffion, cruelty, perfidy, 
 and enormous ambition, than can be traced in 
 the Hiftory of France for the centuries which 
 have elapfed fince the foundation of its monar- 
 chy, including all the wars which in the courfe 
 of that period have been waged by any of thofe 
 Sovereigns, whofe projects of aggrandizement, 
 and violations of treaty, afford a conftant theme 
 of general reproach againft the ancient govern- 
 ment of France ? And if not, can we hefitate 
 whether we have the beil profpect of permanent 
 peace, the befl fecurity for the independence and 
 
 fafety
 
 fafety of Europe from the restoration of the law- 
 ful Government, or from the continuance of re- 
 volutionary power in the hands of Bonaparte ? 
 
 In compromife and treaty with fuch a power, 
 placed in fuch hands as now exercife it, and re- 
 taining the fame means of annoyance which it 
 now poflefles, I fee little hope of permanent fecu- 
 rity. I fee no poffibility at this moment of con- 
 cluding fuch a peace as would juflify that liberal 
 intercourfe which is the efTence of real amity ; no 
 chance of terminating the expenfes or the anxie- 
 ties of war, or of reft oring to us any of the ad- 
 vantages of eftablifhed tranquillity ; and as a lin- 
 cere lover of peace, I cannot be content with its 
 nominal attainment ; I muft be delirous of pur- 
 fuing that fyftem which promifes to attain, in 
 the end, the permanent enjoyment of its folid and 
 fubftantial bleffings for this Country and for 
 Europe. As a fincere lover of peace, I will not 
 facrifice it by grafping at the fhadow, when the 
 reality is not fubftantially within my reach. 
 
 Cur igltur pacem nolo? Quia infda'tft, 
 fericulofa, quia effe non jpote/t* If
 
 ( I" ) 
 
 If, Sir, in all that I have now offered to the 
 Houfe, I have fucceeded in eftablifhing the pro- 
 polition, that the fyflem of the French Revolu- 
 tion has been fuch as to afford to Foreign Powers 
 no adequate ground for fecurity in negotiation, 
 and that the change which has recently taken 
 place has not yet afforded that fecurity; if I 
 have laid before you a juft flatement of the 
 nature and extent of the danger with which we 
 have been threatened; it would remain only 
 fhortly to conlider, whether there is any thing 
 in the circumflances of the prefent moment to 
 induce us to accept a fecurity confeffedly inade- 
 quate againfl a danger of fuch a defcription. 
 
 It will be necefTary here to fay a few words 
 on the fubjecl: on which Gentlemen have been 
 fo fond of dwelling, I mean our former Nego- 
 tiations, and particularly that at Lifleini797. 
 I am defirous of flating frankly and openly the 
 true motives which induced me to concur in 
 then recommending negotiation ; and I will 
 leave it to the Houfe, and to the Country, to 
 judge whether our conduct at that time was in- 
 
 confiftent
 
 confident with the principles by which we zre 
 guided at prefent. That revolutionary policy 
 which I have endeavoured to defcribe, that gi- 
 gantic fyftem of prodigality and bloodfhed by 
 which the efforts of France were fupported, and 
 which counts for nothing the lives and the pro- 
 perty of a nation, had at that period driven 
 us to exertions which had, in a great meafure, 
 exhaufted the ordinary means of defraying our 
 immerife expenditure, and had led many of 
 thofe who were the moft convinced of the ori- 
 ginal juftice and neceflity of the war, and of the 
 danger of Jacobin principles, to doubt the pof- 
 fibility of pern" fling in it, till complete and ade- 
 quate fecurity could be obtained. There feemed, 
 too, much reafon to believe, that without fome 
 new meafure to check the rapid accumulation of 
 debt, we could no longer truft to the {lability 
 of that funding fyftem, by which the Nation had 
 been enabled to fupport the expenfe of all the 
 different wars in which we have engaged in the 
 courfe of the prefent century. In order to con- 
 tinue our exertions with vigour, it became ne- 
 ceffary that a new and folid fyftem of finance 
 
 fliould
 
 ( "3 ) 
 
 fhould be eftablifhed, fuch as could not be ren- 
 dered effectual but by the general and decided 
 concurrence of public opinion. Such a con- 
 currence in the ftrong and vigorous meafures 
 neceflary for the purpofe could not then be ex- 
 peeled, but from fatisfying the Country, by the 
 ftrongefl and moft decided proofs, that peace on 
 terms in any degree admiffible was unattainable. 
 
 Under this impreffion we thought it our duty 
 'to attempt negotiation, not from the fanguine 
 hope, even at that time, that its refult could 
 afford us complete fecurity, but from the per- 
 fuaiion, that the danger ariling from peace under 
 fuch circumftances was lefs than that of con- 
 tinuing the war with precarious and inadequate 
 means. The refult of thofe negotiations proved, 
 that the enemy would be fatisfied with nothing 
 lefs than the facrifice of the honour and inde- 
 pendence of the Country. From this conviction, 
 a fpirit and enlhuiiafm was excited in the Na- 
 tion, which produced the efforts to which we 
 are indebted for the fubfequent change in our. 
 fttuation. Having witncficd that happy change, 
 Q, having
 
 having obferved the increafing profperity andt 
 fecnrity of the Country from that period, feeing 
 how much more fatisfa&ory our profpects now 
 are, than any which we could then have derived 
 from the fnccefsful refult of negotiation, I have 
 not fcrupled to declare, that I confider the rup- 
 ture of the negotiation, on the part of the enemy, 
 as a fortunate circumftancc for the Country. But 
 becaute thefe are my fentiments at this time, 
 after reviewing what has fince parted, does it 
 follow that we were, at that time, infincere in 
 endeavouring to obtain peace ? The Learned 
 Gentleman, indeed, affumes that we were, and 
 he even makes a conceffion, of which I de- 
 lire not to claim the benefit : he is willing to 
 admit, that on our principles, and our view of 
 the fubjec~l, infincerity would have been juftirl- 
 able. I know, Sir, no plea that would iuftify 
 thole who are entrufted with the conduct of 
 public affairs, in holding out to Parliament and 
 to the Nation one object, while they were, .in 
 faft, purfuing another. I did, in truth, believe, 
 at the moment, the conclufion of peace (if it 
 could have been obtained) to be preferable to 
 
 the
 
 the continuance of the war under its increafmg 
 rifles and difficulties. I therefore wifhed for' 
 peace, I flncerely laboured for peace. Our en- 
 deavours were fruftrated by the acl of the enemy. 
 If, then, the circumstances are lince changed, if 
 what pafled at that period has afforded a proof 
 that the object we aimed at was unattainable, 
 and if all that has pafled fince has proved, that, 
 if peace had been then made, it could not have 
 been durable, are we bound to repeat the lame 
 experiment, when every reafoa againft it is 
 ftrengthened by fubfequent experience, and 
 when the inducements which led to it at that 
 time have ceafed to exift ? 
 
 When we confider the refources and the Ipirit of 
 the Country, can any man doubt that if adequate 
 fecurity is not now to be obtained by treaty, we 
 have the means of profecuting the conteft with- 
 out material difficulty or danger, and with a 
 reafonable profpect of completely attaining our 
 object ? I will not dwell on the improved ftate 
 of public credit, on the continually increafing 
 amount (in fpite of extraordinary temporary bur- 
 a 2 dens)
 
 dens) of our permanent revenue, on the yearly 
 acceflion of wealth to a degree unprecedented 
 even in the moft flourishing times of peace, 
 which we are deriving, in the midit of war, 
 from our extended and flourifhing commerce ; 
 on the progreffive improvement and growth of 
 our manufactures ; on the proofs which we fee 
 on all fides of the uninterrupted accumulation 
 of productive capital ; and on the active exer- 
 tion of every branch of national induftry, which 
 can tend to fupport and augment the population, 
 the riches, and the power of the Country. 
 
 As little need I recall the attention of the 
 Houfe to the additional means of action which 
 we have derived from the great augmentation 
 of our difpofable military force, the continued 
 triumphs of our powerful and victorious navy, 
 and the events which, in the courfe of the laft 
 two years, have raifed the military ardour and 
 military glory of the Country to a height unex- 
 ampled in any period of our hiflory. 
 
 In addition to thefe grounds of reliance on 
 
 our own-ftrength and exertions, we have feen 
 
 2 the
 
 the confummate fkill arid valour of the arms of 
 our Allies proved by that feries of unexampled 
 fuccefs in the courfe of the laft campaign, and 
 we have every reafon to expect a co-operation 
 on the Continent, even to " a greater extent, in 
 the courfe of the prefent year. If we compare 
 this view of our own fituation with every thing 
 we can obferve of the ftate and condition of our 
 enemy; if we can trace him labouring under 
 equal difficulty in finding men to recruit his 
 army, or money to pay it; if we know that in 
 the courfe of the laft year the moft rigorous 
 efforts of military confcription were fcarcely fuf- 
 ficient to replace to the French armies at the 
 end of the campaign, the numbers which they 
 had loft in the courfe of it ; if we have feen 
 that that force, then in poffeffion of advantages 
 which it has fince loir, was unable to contend 
 with the efforts of the combined armies ; if we 
 know that, even while fupported by the plunder 
 of all the countries which they had overrun, the 
 French armies were reduced, by the confcffion of 
 their commanders, to the extremity of difirefs, 
 and deflitute not only of the principal articles 
 
 of
 
 . ( ii* ) 
 
 of military flipply, but alraoft of the neceffarieS 
 of life; if we fee them now driven back withirt 
 their own frontiers, and confined within a coun- 
 try whofe own refources have long lince been 
 proclaimed by their fuccelfive Governments to 
 be unequal either to paying or maintaining 
 them ; if we obferve, that fince the laft revolu- 
 tion no one fubflantial or effectual meafure has 
 been adopted to remedy the intolerable diforder 
 of their finances, and to fupply the deficiency 
 of their credit and refources ; if we fee through 
 large and populous dinYicts of France, either 
 open war levied againft the prefent ufurpation> 
 or evident marks of difunion and diftracliort 
 which the firft occafion may call forth into a 
 flame ; if, I fay, Sir, this comparifon be jufl, 
 I feel myielf authorized to conclude from it, not 
 that we are entitled to confider ourfelves certain 
 of ultimate fiiccefs, not that we are to fuppofe 
 ourfelvrs exempted from the unforefeen viciffi- 
 tudes of war; but that, confidering the value 
 of the object for which we are contending, the 
 means for fupporting the conteft,. and the pro* 
 bable courfe of human events, we fhould be 
 
 inex-
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 inexcufable, if at this moment we were to rel'tn- 
 quifh the ftruggle on any grounds fhort of entire 
 #nd complete fecurity, a^ainft the great eft danger 
 which has ever yet threat ned the world; that from 
 perfeverance in our efforts uncer fuch circum (lan- 
 ces, we have the faireft reafon to expecYthe full at- 
 tainment of that object ; but that at all events, even 
 if we are difappointed in our more fanguine hopes, 
 we are more likely to gain than to lole by the 
 continuation of the contefi ; that every month 
 to which it is continued, even if it fhould not 
 in its effecls lead to the final deftruction of the 
 Jacobin fyftem, muft tend fo far to weaken and 
 exhauft it, as to give us at leafl a greater compara-, 
 tive fecurity in any other termination of the war : 
 that, on all thefe grounds, this is not the mo- 
 ment at which it is confident with our intereft 
 or our duty to liften to any propofals of nego- 
 tiation with the prefent Ruler of France ; but 
 that we are not therefore pledged to any un- 
 alterable determination as to our future conduct; 
 that in this we muft be regulated by the courfe 
 of events ; and that it will be the duty of His 
 Majefly's Minifters from time to time to adapt 
 
 their
 
 their meafures to any variation of circumilances/ 
 to consider how far the effects of tiie military 
 operations of the Allies or of the internal difpo- 
 lition of France correfpond with our prefent ex- 
 pectations; and, on a view of the whole, to 
 compare the difficulties or riiks which may 
 arile in the profecution of the conteft, with the 
 profpect of ultimate fuccefs, or of the degree of 
 advantage which may be derived from its further 
 continuance, and to be governed by the refult of 
 all thefe confiderations, in the opinion and advice, 
 which they may offer to their Sovereign. 
 
 THE END, 
 
 I 
 
 8887 
 
 Muted by S. GesNBit, 
 Little Queen Street, Holjxwn,
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped belo-v 
 
 JUN tfO 1945 
 F JAN 10 1947 
 
 UHIYEHSfJ V i'F 
 AT 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 JIBRARY