Considerations on the Present State of Kast-Jndia ^ew ^ :.uOM UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES CONSIDER ATI ONS ON T H E PRESENT ST AT E O F EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS. B Y A Member of the Laft Parliament. SECOND EDITION. LONDON: Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE, oppofite BURLINGTON-HOUSS, PlCCADILLY. JULY, MDCCLXXXIV. jtyiuu 1^ ADVERTISEMENT. WHEN the firft edition of this pamphlet was given to the public, in the month of February V laft, 1784, the title of it pointed out Mr. Fox's India bill, which had then been recently rejected in the 'i Houfe of Lords, as the foundation on which the ob- '"i fervations and arguments contained in that publication were raifed. A new plan for the regulation of Indian affairs has now been announced, and is foon to undergo the dif-> cuflion of parliament. However different the plan may be from that pro- pofed by Mr. Fox, the fubjeft to which the plan re- - lates continues precifely the fame, and every fyftem t of regulations refpecYmg Indian affairs, muft have, for its proteffed objects at leaii, the real interefts of the Biitifh empire, and the interefts of the natives and Bntiih fubjects in India* The obfervations, therefore, contained in this pam- phlet, which have on all hands been allowed to be free from political prepoffeffions or party motives, if they have ever had any pretenfions to utility, are not lefs likely to be ufeful now, than they were at the time of their firft appearance during the late ad- miniftration. la iv ADVERTISEM EN T. In one refpect, the perufal of thefe fheets at prefent may, perhaps, be attended with even a fuperior advan- tage, as they not only difcufs the merits of Mr. Fox's bill, which was their original object, but will facilitate the tafk of thofe, who wifh to form an eftimate of the abftracted, and of the comparative merits, of the plan which has been rejected, and of that which is now immediately to engage the attention of parliament. For thefe reafons the editor has been induced to of- fer to the public this fccond edition. He wilhed to have had permiffion to prefix to it the name of the author, but the only anfwer he has been able to obtain to his applications for that purpofe, has been, that the author's object is completely anfwered, if the fuggeftions contained in the pamphlet can pof- iibly be productive of any utility. July 14, 1784, CON- CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS, AND EXAMINATION OF MR. FOX's BILL. VYHATEVER benefits or privileges may be fuppofed to have been granted to the Eaft- India Company by charters and afts of par- liament, that Company would foon ceafe to be in a condition of availing themfelves of thefe advantages, if the government or legiflature of this country did not fpeedily afford them aid as to pecuniary matters, and affift them with new parliamentary regulations, for the management of their affairs. The [ 6 ] The cry, therefore, which has been raifed about the invafion of chartered rights, feems to be mifplaced upon the prefent occafion j for if government were difpofed to abftain from doing any thing favourable or unfavourable to the Eaft India Company, thefe -chartered rights would be as effectually difTolved and deftroyed by this inaction, as they could be by any active operation of the legiflajture, fince the embarrafT- ments and diforders in the Company's affairs at home and abroad muft foon lead to cbnfufion and ruin, if unaffifted by government. That fuch a crifis fliould be averted, is, no doubt, highly expedient for the interefts of the community at Jarge, as well as thofe of the Eaft India Company ; but when government does fo, by ufing the meafures of prevention, inftead of waiting for that diffolution of the Company which would be the coniequence of with-ho.ld- ing aid from them, it is fair in argument to fay, that government, at the time of affording this aid, is entitled to make certain flipulations for the [I 7 ] the public benefit, and with that view to regu- late and new model the Company's charters and privileges, in the fame manner, if not to the fame extent, as if the Company, upon the ex- piration of their original charters, were treating for a new bargain j it being underftood at the fame time, that all equitable allowances (hall be made to the Eaft India Company, for lofles and calamities fuffered by them in confequence of the wars and misfortunes of the ftate, or for bene- fits which the ftate has received from the Eaft India Company by the acquifition of the terri- torial revenues, or in any other fhape, for which the Company has not hitherto received any adequate return or indemnification. In the prefent fituation of the Company's af- fairs, and of the Britifli pofleflions in India, it will be difficult for any man to deny, that an al- teration of the Company's chartered rights to a certain degree at leaft t may be juftified, not only upon the fpecial "round which has now been mentioned, but alfo upon another more gerieral ground, [ 8 ] ground, that of urgent neceflity founded on evident public utility j upon that ground the ex- tent of the Company's chartered rights and pri- vileges has already been modified and limited by the intcrpofition of parliament, particularly in the year 1773. Upon both grounds therefore it feems impoffible to deny the right which, in fuch peculiar circumftances, the legiflature has to interfere with and to regulate thefe charters, and the only remaining queftion muft be to what extent that right of parliamentary inter- ference ought now to be exercifed. In deciding this point, our enquiry muft be directed to this material objectWhat devia- tion from the terms of the charters, or what mode of government of Indian affairs to be fubftituted in room of that prefcribed by thefe charters, will be beft fiiited to the general in- terefts of the ftate ? When once that point is afcertained, if it (hall appear, that the plan fo calculated for the [ 9 1 the general interefts of the ftate, bears hard npori the feparate rights and interefts, which the Eaft- India Company have enjoyed under the autho- rity of charters and a Europe, is a queftion, which, upon abftract rea- Ibnings, and according to the founded principles of pVilofophy or politic?, may be very problematical ; but in the prefent fituation of things, it is a very different quedion, whether it be now for the interefts of Great- Britain to retain, or to abandon the commerce and the eftablimments UK has acquired in India. If, on the fuppofuion of her abandoning them, the. confequence were to be, that the commerce and pofleffions thus relinquished by Great Uii- tain, would not be acquired by any other Eu- ropean power, fuch an experiment might be at- tended with lefs hazard ; bur as the certain con- fcquence of Great Britain's relinquifliing, w'oukl be that of fome other European power's acqui- rii g [ II j ring thofe valuable pofleflions, it feems to admit of little doubt, that the intcrefts of the ftate, as well as thofe of many individuals, fubje&s of Great Britain, would be moft efTentially in- jured, both by what would thus be lofl to Great Britain, and by what would be acquired by other European ftates, efpecially as the acquifitiou would moft probably be made by ftates, whofc wealth and profperity in commerce, are ths leaft compatible with the true intcrefts of :his country. The proper objed of enquiry at prcfent is, therefore, confined to this point Under whaj mode of government, and by what regulations will the Britim poffeffions in India, and the com- merce with that part of the world, prove mod beneficial to the fubjeds of Great Britain, both in Europe and in India; under which laft dc- fcription, are comprehended many millions of the native inhabitants now fubject to the Brltifh dominion in Hindoflan. B 2 As As the government of our Indian pofleffions jnuft neceflarily be lodged fornewhere, an option rnuft be made of one or other of the following modes : ^ Either that the government of thefe diftant poffelfions, as well as the commerce, be conti- nued with the Eaft India Company j Or, 2dly, That the territorial pofTeinons be declared to belong to the State ; and, as fuch, the executive government of them be confided to the Crown, in a manner fimilar to the government pf the other parts of the empire; Or, 3dly, That an experiment be made, fora Certain number of years, of Truftees, appointed 2>y Parliament, for taking charge of the Indian pofTcfflons, and of the affairs of the Eaft India Company, fubject to the control and fuperin- fendence of Parliament j; Or, I '3 ] Or, laftly, That Ibme mode of government be deviled, by which the powers fhall be diftributctl, partly to the Crown, partly to thefe Truft'ees, and partly to Directors for the Eaft-India Company. If the firft of thefe modes is propofed, the ob- jedYions which naturally occur, are, that it would he prepofterous and abfurd to give to a Company, inftituted for commercial purpofes, the govern- ment of a vaft country, and of millions of fub- jecls in India ; that though the Eaft India Com- pany has been inftrumental in thefe acquifitions, yet they could be acquired only for the State ; an.i that the conftitution of the India Company, however well adapted to commerce, is inadequate to the government cf fuch an empire. Farther, it will be aflerted that thefe arguments have been confirmed by experience ; for that the abufes and diforders which have fprung up in India, prove the infufficiency of the prefent mode gf government, and the neceffity of introducing a rew [ 14 ] a new mode better calculated for promoting the happinefs of the natives in India, and for make- ing our poffcffions there more ufeful to this country. Thefe reafons feem to be of fufficient weight fo far as relates to the territorial revenues, and the government of the country out of which thefe revenues i'flue, but do not afford any fuffi- cient argument againft the Company's being ftili trufted with the management of their commercial concerns; eipecially as it is maintained, that the Company, even before the acquifition of the territorial revenues, conducted their affairs with advantage to themfelves, and utility to the State. If the fecond mode is propofed, it will be ob- jected, that, by giving directly to the Crown the appointment of all the offices, civil and miliury, connected with this new empire in India, the in- fluence of the Crown will be increafed to fuch an enormous C '5 ] enormous degree, as to make it dangerous to the liberties of the empire at home. 'That it has been the object of late years to di- minifh that influence j but the extent and value of what is thus propofed to be thrown into the royal fcale, by thefe appointments in the Baft, * would far exceed the weight of the influence which has been lately fubtracted from the powers of the Crown in this country. It will farther 'be objected, that as the power and influence of the Crown is prefumed to be ex- ercifed by the Minifttrs for the time being, and as thofe Minifters are liable to frequent changes, either at the pleafure of the Crown, or from their not pofLillng the confidence of Parlia- ment, the object of reforming abufes in India could not be fo well anfwered by placing the government in the hands of Minifhrs, liable to fuch frequent changes j for that the fervants in India have been long accuftomed to difobey the orders of the Eaft India Directors, becaufe thofe Directors [ i 3 Directors being frequently changed, they had a chance of protection from the fucceffors of the Directors whofe orders they had difobeyed ; and upon the fame principle, the fervants in India might be difpofed to difregard the orders of one fet of Minifters, in the expectation of protection from their fucceffors. If the third mode of government, that by Parliamentary Truftees for a certain number of years, is propofed, it will be free from the ob- jection which has juft now been mentioned, but liable to other objections, which by many will be thought not lefs alarming. In favour of this plan, it may, with great ap* pearance of juftice, be argued, that in the begin* ning, at lead, of any effectual reform in India, there mould be a fixed board or government at home, for the management or Indian affairs, not liable to be changed during a certain number of years, in order that the fervants in India might perceive that the fame governing power which iffued t 17 ] iffued the orders, would fubfift for Teeing thofe orders put in execution j and the circumftance of thefe rulers being appointed by the authority of Parliament, and under the control and conftant infpeclion of Parliament, would carry with it more weight than any other inflitution or mode of appointment, fince it would imprefs upon the minds of the fervants in India a full conviction that their actions would be ftrictly examined both by the board fo appointed, and by Parlia- ment itfelf. In order the better to fecure the obedience of the fervants in India, it is alfo an ingredient part of this plan that the patronage now belonging to the Eaft India Company mould be transferred to thefe parliamentary truftees, who mall have power to place or difplace all the fervants civil or military belonging to the Eafl India Com- pany. The objections, however, to this plan are, thnt it is unfupported by precedent, and may give C rife , rife to abufes of a tendency dangerous to the constitution. That by the conflitution of this country the executive powers of government belong to the Crown, and are an cflential part of the royal pre- rogative ; that the ufeful and proper fphere of Parliament is not to alTiime to itfelf the execu- tive powers, or the appointment to offices, but to aft as a check and control upon the proper exer- cife of thefe executive powers lodged with the Crown ; and that nothing can be more perni* cious than the confounding together thefe two feparate provinces. As a farther mifchief that may arife from this plan, it may be objected, that when Parliament appoints a certain number of fupreme rulers for all Indian affairs, and tftablimes their duration for a fixed number of years, thefe rulers mufl be confidered as perfons who owe their appoint- pients to the .minifters by whom their names \yere propofed to Parliament, and the powers conferred conferred upon and exercifcd by them, will, in effect, be fo much additional influence given, not to the Crown, but personally to the minif- ters, with whom the plan originated. By thus conveying to thefe minifters all the vaft patronage of the Eaft, they will fecure to themfelves fuch an influence and connection in Parliament, that they will become too powerful for the Crown to contend with it will be an ariftocracy, eftablifhed both at the expence of the royal prerogative and of the freedom of Par- liament. Amidft thefe various objections to any given plan, there is a neceflity for making an option > for nothing can be fo pernicious as to fuffer thefe apparent difficulties to deter from doing fome- thing .pofitive, for remedying the prefcnt dif- orders in the affairs of the Eaft India Company at home and abroad : moft of the objections which are ftarted either againft the 2d or the 3d plan above mentioned, are objections founded C 2 chiefly chiefly on fpeculative reafonings, which may be true,, or may be falfe ; but after all the noife that has been made about the abufes in India, and the expectations which have been afforded of the interference of Parliament for remedying thofe abufes, as well as for fupporting the credit of the Eaft India Company, the certain confe- quence of doing nothing, muft-be deitruclion to that Company, and a continuation of infecurity, oppreffion, and mifery to millions of the human race fubjedl to the Britim empire in India. The various objections, however, which, it has been (hewn, attend every poffible plan for India, ought to reprefs the violence of thofe who exclaim fo loudly againft any particular plan for reformation of Indian abules, becaufe it has not been fo fortunate as to be free from all real or plaufible objections. Where the difficulty originates and is infepa- rable from the nature of the fubjeCt iifelf to which the regulations are applied, it is not fair to- to confider the objections attending the plan as proofs either of incapacity, or of bad intentions 'of thofe who have propoled fuch regulations. It was impoffible to frame any plan for India free from many apparent inconveniencies and objections. A plan of government for any coun- try is a matter attended with no fmall degree of difficulty, but that difficulty is infinitely increafed where the country propofed to be governed hap- pens to be placed on the oppofite fide of the globe, at the diftance of many thoufand miles from the feat of empire. A wife and well- digefted plan of government for a country fo cir- cumftanced, while it has for its objects the be- nefits to be enjoyed by the mother country, and the profperity of millions of fubjecls in thofe diftant regions, muft, at the fame time, endea- vour to counteract the circumftances unfavour- able to that profperity, by controling and retaining within proper bounds the avarice and ambition of individuals^ paflions of the growth of every foil but which, in Indian foily the fores, the magnitude, and the frequency of the the teiuptations, as well as the diftance from the feat of empire, are peculiarly qualified to nourifh In thefe circumftances, we may venture to affirm, that it exceeds the bounds of human genius to form any plan of government that will compleatly anfwer all the ends propofed, or that will not be liable to many real obje&ions both in theory and in practice ; the bcft model will be that where the fewefl radical vices are to be found in its conftrudion, any pretenfions to perfection beyond that extent will ever be found chimerical and delufive. From thefe confiderations, and from all the circumftances which have been alluded to, it may with great truth be afferted, that the firft propofers of an India bill were placed in fuch a fituation of difficulty, that whatever plan they adopted, there was almofl a certainty not only of its being aflailed by a multitude of objec- tions, but alfo of its being productive of much clamour and outcry, as either giving too much power to the Crown, or to Parliament, or to Minifters, t *3 ] rs, or to Eaft India Directors and Pro* prietors. Inftead, therefore, of giving credit to the extent of that outcry, fome degree of praife may be due to Miniflcrs, who, at the evident hazard of lofing popularity, thought it their duty to bring forward, in a manly way, fome bold, de- cifive plan for remedying the diforders com- plained of in Indian affairs. If from the difficulty of the fubjecl, or from any other caufes, the plan introduced into the Houfe of Commons by Mr. Fox has* been too bold, the difcuffions upon it will facilitate the tafk for thofe who fucceed in the bufinefs of propofing regulations for Indian affairs ; it will * teacfy them to mape their courfe fo as to avoid the rocks upon which the firft bill has been loft, and will probably tend to render any bill now to be propofed more acceptable to the public than it would have been if originally propofed. In t 4 J In judging, therefore, of the merits of Mr. Fox's bill, or of the comparative merits of any bill that may hereafter be brought forward, allowances ought to be made for the difadvan- tages to which the firft propofer of any plan relating to Indian affairs was necefTarily ex- pofed i and attention muft alfo be paid to the evident advantages which the propofers of any future plan relating to thefe affairs will enjoy, not only from the clamour which has been railed againft the firft bill, but likewife from the knowledge and experience afforded by the difcuiTions upon that bill. Examination of the Capital Parts cf Mr. F O X's BILL. WHILE thefe difcufiions are recent, let us endeavour to form a jufl and impartial eftimate of the great outlines and the conftituent parts of Mr, t 5 ] Mr. Fox's bill, with a view to difcover what is Valuable or faulty in it, but Ml more with the material view of difcovering what modifications or alterations of the fame bill might, by removing the moft folid objections, ferve to fender it ac- ceptable to the public, without lofing the ef- fential parts of its utility refpedting India. The plan contained in Mr. Fox's bill may be divided into five principal parts. ift. That the fupreme management of In- dian affairs, with efficient adive powers, as well as the powers of control and fuperintendency, (hall be vefted in a board compofed of feven perfons refident in England. 2d. That a degree of permanency (hall be given to the board fo eftablimed, by fixing the duration of the powers of the Commifnon- ers for four years, fo as that they may have it in their power to carry their plans of govern- ment and reform into execution. D 3d. That [ 26 1 3d. That the perfons who are to execute this truft (hali be named by parliament, to whom they are to be accountable for their conduct, and to be removeable by an addrefs to His Majefty from either houfe of parliament, but the vacancies by death, refignation, or removal, to be filled up by His Majefty. 4th. That in order to fecure the authority of that board, and the obedience of the fervants in India, they fhall have it in their power to place or difplace all the governors, counfellors, and fervants, civil or military, belonging to the Bri- tim dominions in India, and in general (hall have all the powers which are at prefent veiled in the Direftors or Proprietors of the Eafl India Company. 5th. That the board fo to be appointed mall, befides the government and management of the territorial revenues and pofleffious, have the go- vernment and management alfo of the com- merce of the Eaft India Company, during the above-mentioned period of four years, on account of the difficulty of feparating the terri- torial f *7 ] torlal pofltflions from the commerce, but that there (hall be nine Afliftant Bire&ors for the fole purpofe of ordering and manag- ing the commerce of the Company, under and fubjcct to the orders and directions of the feven principal Commiflioners, and the vacancies of Afliftant Directors by death, refignatioh, or re- moval to be filled up by the Eaft India Pro- prietors. Thefe are the great diftinguifliing features of the India bill introduced by Mr. Fox. With regard to the two fir ft branches above mentioned, the objections that have been ftated againft them feem not tj be well founded ; on the contrary, the plan of eftabliming a board at home for the fupreme management and control of Indian affairs, acting under the immediate in- fpection of the legiflature, and rtfponfible to parliament and to the public at large for their conduct ; and the plan of giving to that board a certain degree of permanency, by taking care that they fliould not be difplaced during a fpecified D 2 fli rt fhvri period of years, excepting upon an addrefa from either Houfe of Parliament, feems to be admirably well calculated for a (teady govern- ment of Indian affairs, by enabling the board to follow put their plans with eftecl:, and by fecuring to them the obedience of the fervants in India. With regard to the third branch, which re- lates to the authority by which the perfons compofing the board are to be appointed, there does not feem to be any neceffity or any reafon Sufficiently ftrong, for depriving the Crown of the appointment of thefe perfons, and for tranf- jferring to Parliament that appointment. It is not the proper function of Parliament to appoint to great offices in the ftate, or tq make choice of the perfons who are to compofe a board for carrying on part of the executive government, though it may be the proper bu- finefs of Parliament to control and fuper- intend thcfe perfons when appointed by the pro- per authprity. I 29 ] The appointment of the perfons belongs pro- perly and naturally to that branch of the le- giflature which is intruded with the executive government of the country, and there can be no good reafon for deviating from that confti- tutional rule in this cafe, efpecially as the pow- ers with which thefe perfons are to be inverted, and the time of their duration, are to be fettled, not by the Sovereign alone, but by Parliament. In another point of view, the propofers of the bill, or the Minifters of the Crown, ought to have no objection to the perfons being ap pointed by the Crown j for the Minifters are en- titled to have the confidence of the Crown both as to meafures, and as to the choice of proper perfons for offices of bufinefs and importance j and it is to be prefumed, that thofe who are mi- nifters at the time of an India bill patting into a law, muft pofTefs fuch a degree of confidence both with the Crown and with Parliament, as to be able to get their lift of perfons adopted either \yy the one or the other ; and as thefe perfons, When [ 3 ] when once named, are not to be liable to be di(- placed for a certain number of years, it feems to be quite immaterial to the propofers of the bill, whether the original appointment is to take effect through the medium of the Crown, or through that of Parliament. In this view, the transferring to any other quarter what fo naturally belongs to the Crown, feems to be an encroachment on the prerogative without an object, and carries with it an air of diftruft that can ferve no good purpofe. Concerning the great Extent of PATRONAGE given to the Seven COMMISSIONERS, THE fourth capital branch of the Bill relates to the Patronage. This, from its great extent, and from the importance and the variety of the objeds it em, brace?, [ 3' ] braces, becomes a matter well deferring of ferious attention. On examining the different claufes of the bill, it appears, that all the patronage which at prefent belongs to the Directors and Proprietors of the Eaft India Company, whether in India or at home, is propofed to be united and concen- tered in the feven Commiffioners named in the bill -, not only fo, but their powers are, in fome material cafes, to be extended farther than thofe now enjoyed, either by the Directors or Pro- prietors, or by them both jointly. By the third claufe of the bill it is declared, that the feven parliamentary Commiilioners there named, or any three of them, " flail lave " ufe, poffefs, and exercife all and fingular " the powers and authorities 'which have *' been at any time heretofore vefted in, or law- r any fitch per] on or perfom Jlall have been 11 nominated or appointed in and by any aft or t( afts of parliament, or howfoever ofherwife no- " minated or appointed, except as is herein pro- " vided and eftablified, as to the appointment and " removal of fucb Directors tbemfefaes', and of " the faid Ajjiftant Directors." This claufegoes conGderably beyond the pow- ers at prelent enjoyed either by the Directors or Proprietors of the Eaft India Company ; for it gives the feven Commillioners the power of placing or difplacing (amongft others) the Go- vernor and Members of the Supreme Council of Bengal, independently either of the Crown or of the Proprietors : this is a power which is not enjoyed by the prefent Directors of the Com* E pany, t 34 1 pany, either as to placing or difplacing ; for the confent or acquiefcence of the Crown is, by ad of parliament, neceffary to the appointment of thefe Members of the Supreme Council neither can they be removed but by the joint concur- rence of the Crown and the Directors. To a certain extent, therefore, this claufe has the effect, not only of adding to the feven Com- miffioners powers which were not enjoyed by the Eaft India Directors, but alfo that of taking away from the Crown a power which it had already been in poffemon of by an act of par- liament. The power alfo given by this claufe of re- ftoring fervants of the Company to fituations which they had formerly enjoyed, is greater than what was trufted to the Directors, for they could not reftore any perfon, without the con- fent of three- fourths of the Proprietors affembled in a General Court, But [ 35 ] But farther, the terms of the I4th claufe are fo very comprehenfive, that while they trans- fer to the feven Commiffioners, all the powers and patronage which the India Dire&ors and Proprietors have hitherto enjoyed at horns and abroad, they have likewife the effect of transferring to thefe Commiffioners all the pa- tronage, of every fpecies, that has hitherto be^n enjoyed by any department, civil or military, in India, from the Supreme Council down to the loweft eftablimment in any of the prefidene of Bengal, Madras, or Bombay; for nothing can be more extenfive, more unqualified, and unbounded than the expreffive words made uie of in the I4th claufe above recited; and they would embrace an infinite extent of patronage in India which the Directors at home did not in fact enjoy, but considered as dependent upon and belonging to certain ranks and employments in that country, to which the exercife of that pa- tronage was annexed. When one reflects on the immenfe mafs of patronage and influence which would" thus he E 2 col. t 36 ] levied into one channel, it is really no wondei- that it mould create a ferious alarm. In defence of powers fj extenfive and un- ufualj arguments have occafionally been reforted to, founded on the perfona! characters of the firft Lord Commiffioner, and of the other Mem- bers of the Board. It has been laid, that in fuch hands, there was not only, no danger of an im- proper ufe of power, but that the flrengthening tfre hands of thefe CommilTioners would ferve only to increafe their utility to the public ; thofe friends too, who have had the beft opportunities of knowing them, have treated with a becoming indignation, the idea of fuch men, with their own characters at ftake, and with the eyes of the nation fixed upon their conduct, furthering themieives to be the tools of any Mmifters, by perverting an eftablifhment for the government of Iriuia, to the interefted purpofes of political influence. There is no man more ready than I am, to admit every thing that is due to the virtues and to the independency of the Earl of Fitzwilliam, t 37 ] Filzwiliiam, as well as to the refpec"hible cha- racters of the other Cotnmifiioners ; the choice of the perfons, with Lord Fkzwilliam placed at the head of that Board, may be allowed to give every fecurity that perfonal integrity can afford againft the abufe of power ; but ftill it is the bufinefs of laws to proceed upon general principles, and to provide fecurities for the in- terefts of the public, independent of the confide- rations of peribnal character. The accumulation of fo much patronage in the perfons of the feven CommifTioners feems to be liable to two objections; the one, that it is unnecefiary ; the other that it is dangerous. It certainly cannot be neceflary for enabling the Commiifioners to execute their offices with advantage to the public, that they fhould be poflelTed of all the Eaft Indian patronage at home and abroad, and in all matters civil and military, political and commercial; many parts of thefe might, with more propriety, and with- out 354759 [ 3? ] out diminifhing the utility of the board, be confided and diftribuSed into other hands. But the principal objection and caufe of alarm will be on account of the danger attend- ing fuch an innovation in the State, by confer- ring upon any fet of men powers and patronage of fuch an amazing extent. It will be felt as the introduction of a new power into the State, calculated on the one hand, to rival or eclipfe the powers and prerogative of the Supreme Magiftrate ; and on the other hand, calculated to give this new Board a dominion over the hopes and fears of a very large proportion of the lubjedts of the empire at home and abroad. It is true, indeed, that, in one fenfe, it may be faid, that the power thus propofed to be given to the feven CommifTioners is no new creation of powers, but merely a transfer from one quarter to another' of powers which already e'xift ; for the powers and patronage which the aft propofes to give to the Commiffioners, are, at [ 39 ] at prefent, exercifed either by the Indian Direc- tors and Proprietors, or by their fervants in India, and they are fo exercifed, without the Crown's having any participation in that pa- tronage, (excepting in what relates to the ap- pointment of the Supreme Council in Bengal;) from whence it may be argued, that there is neither any new creation of powers, nor any prejudice done to the prerogative of the Crown, by transferring to one clafs of fubjecls, powers which have hitherto bscn exercifed by another clafs. But arguments of this fort are more fpecious than folid. When a certain quantity of patro- nage, power, or influence is diftributed and fab- divided into various different channels, that dif- perfion of the power averts the dangers, the jealoufy, and the mifchiefs that might arife from the whole of it being collected into one channel. The very objedion to that part of the plan of the prefent bill, is, that it propofes to col- let [ 40 ] into one compact body, the whole of that patronage and influence, which has hitherto lain fo difperfed and fubdivided amongft the members of a chartered Company at home, and certain clafles of individuals in the fcrvice of that Company abroad, that from that very cir- cumftance it was attended with no danger to the conftitution of this country, efpecially as the perfons among whom the power was thus diftributed could neither ad as one body, nor were they of that political defcription as to make their influence felt upon the conflitution, or in the Houfes of Parliament. But thofe fources of power which were inno- cent, with refpect to the State, when diverted into various ftreams, may be productive of very different confequences when collected into one great fountain, and that not far remote from the main fprings of Government. When thus collected, it acquires a force, fufficient to bear down all before it, and to overturn the balance of the conftitution. Thefe [ 4' ] Thefe reflections are directed againft fuch an alarming accumulation of power and patronage in the perfons of the feven Commiffioners; and, perhaps, this difcuffion may affift us in a mode of folving the difficulty, by avoiding one of the ftrongeft objections that has been made to the bill lately under the confideration of Parlia- ment. Let the total power and patronage of the Eaft-India Company at home and abroad, fuffer fuch a dlftnbutlon as may fecure us againft the political dangers which have been alluded to, and at the fame time tend to conciliate the minds of men to the other falutary parts of the bill. To fay precifely in what fhape this diftribu- tion mould be made, would require an accurate knowledge of all the patronage belonging to the Eaft-India Company at home and abroad; but one general outline that may be fuggefted is this, F that C 4' ] that in the difperflan of that patronage, part of it mould be allotted to the Crown, part to the feven Cornmiflioners, part to the nine Af- fiftant Directors, and part mould remain an- nexed, as formerly to certain ranks and depart- ments in India, or at lead: fuch an order of fuc- ceffion to office mould be fixed, as may make the portion of patronage left in India or at home lefs dangerous, or lefs a fubjedl of jealoufy, in whatever hands it may be placed. When the particular articles fallingunder the general defcription of Indian patronage at home and abroad mail be enumerated there will ap- pear an ample fund for a proper distribution in the manner above fuggefted. In a fubfequent part of this enquiry it will be (hewn, that the commercial patronage mould go either wholly or principally to the nine Affiftant Directors. There will then remain to be diftributed the patronage in all matters civil, military, and political. Though the whole of that exteniive patronage was by Mr. Fox's bill thrown into the hands of the feven Comrnifiioners, it cannot with any colour [ 43 ] colour of reafon be maintained that fuch un- bounded patronage became abfolutely neceflary for enabling the Commiftioners to render fervice to the public in the execution of their duty. For inftance, it does not appear abfolutely necef- .fary, that thefe Commiffioners mould have the appointment of all the military, from the Com- manders in Chief down to the loweft officers in the fervice, in the feveral prefidencies of Bengal, Madrafs, and Bombay. Neither perhaps, is it neceflary that all the Members of the Supreme Council in Bengal, or that all the Members of the Councils at the prefidencies of Madras and Bombay, mould be of the appointment of the feven Commiflioners. It is no doubt proper and neceflary, that a board inftituted for the fupreme management and control of In- dian affairs, mould enjoy a confiderable por- tion of power and patronage for giving effi- cacy to their meafures, and to their plans of reform; but nothing farther mould be aimed at than what may be clearly and abfo- lutely neceflary for thefe purpofes. F 2 In [ 44 ] In applying this rule, it will be found, that, cxclufive of the commercial patronage propofed to be given to the Affiftant Dire&ors, and what may be proper to be given to the government abroad, there will remain a certain (hare of patro- nage to be transferred to other hands than thofe of the feven Commiffioners ; and if fo, the ge- nius and analogy of theBritim confHtution fug- gefts, that the Crown, to whom the executive government of the empire in general belongs, Ihould be put in pofleflion of fome proportion of that patronage. A proper diftribution of power in this man- ner, will be the moft effectual method of allay- ing the fears and jealoufies entertained by many, and of averting the hazards to the Britifh con- flitution from the extent and magnitude of Indian patronage. It may, perhaps, be objected, that the giving to the Crown any mare, or rather any con- fiderable mare, of that patronage, would not be well reiilhed either in the Houfe of Com- mons, [ 45 ] mons, or in the country at large, as there has of late years been fo much jealoufy entertained of any increafe of the influence of the Crown, and that from that jealoufy the fate of the bill might be endangered in the Houfe of Commons. That objection, admits of feveral anfwers. It is by no means an agreed point that the influence of the Crown is at prefent too great; many men of found underftanding, and true friends to the conftitution and liberties of their country, are confcientioufly of opinion, that for the purpofes of carrying on government in a proper manner, and with a fufficient de- gree of inability, the influence of the Crown, and of courfe the influence of the Minifters in- trufled with the exercife of the powers of the Crown, has been too much impaired. But it would be puming to an extravagant length this apprehenfion of too much influence in the Crown, if it were to be aflumed as a maxim. [ 46 ] maxim, that whatever new acquisitions may be made to the Britifh empire, or however much her dominions may be extended, the preroga- tive of the Crown mail not extend to any part of the executive government of thefe new ac- quifitions, or to any mare in the difpofal of of- fices belonging to them, left the influence of the Crown at home mould thereby be too much increafed. If a jealouiy of this fort had been always en- tertained in England, the fame reafoning would, in an Englifh Parliament, have gone the length of excluding the Crown from the difpofal of offices in Scotland when that country became incorporated with England, or from the difpo- fal of offices in Ireland, or in the Britifh colo- nies in America and the Weft Indies. While the form of the Britifh conftitution remains, it is a neceiTary confequence of the i extenfion of the Britifh empire, that the power or influence of the Crown, fo far as relates to the I 47 ] the additional number of offices which will thereby become at the difpofal of the Crown, muft be proportionally augmented. The oppofite confequence holds equally true, that the more the dominions or dependencies of the empire are impaired, in the fame proportion will the power and influence of the Crown in the difpofal of offices be diminimed. We have had fo very recently an example of this latter fort, by the diminution of offices in the power of the Crown, in confequence of the lofs of America, that for this reafon, amongft others, there ought to be the lefs difficulty in allowing to the Crown fome (hare at leaft, of what, by the prerogative juftly belongs to it, in the appointment to offices, and in the execu- tive government of thofe parts of the Britifh, dominions which are fituated in India. Concerning ( 48 ) Concerning the Share of Power and Patronage to be given to the Afjlftant Directors. THE 5th principal branch above mentioned of Mr. Fox's bill, is that which gives to the feven Commiffioners the government and management of the Company's commercial con- cerns but with the aid of nine fubordinate AJJif- tant Directors. That there mould be affiftant Directors, and of a number fufficient to attend to the various departments of the bulinefs, is highly necefla- ry ; for the detail of the commercial bufinefs of the Company is fo very extend ve, that it would be quite impoffible for the feven principal Com- miflioners to carry on that part of the bufinefs ; their time will be fufficiently employed by the political and other branches committed to their charge, which, if conducted in a manner fa- tisfactory to themfelves and the public, will require more conftant unremitting attention and labour than perhaps they are at prefent aware of. In C 49 ] In committing to nine Affiftant Directors the commercial concerns, thefe Affiftant Directors will alfo find it neceflary for them to dedicate a very large (hare of their time and attention to the bufinefs fo committed to their charge ; for it is on their proper management of the com- mercial interefts of the Company, that the pro- fperity of that Company, confidered as a fo- ciety of merchants, and the value of the flock belonging to the Proprietors, will, in a great meafure, depend. For thefe, and other reafons, it has occurred to feveral perfons, that the fituation of the Af- fiilant Directors is, by the bill, made too in- ferior and dependent, and that they have been too much ftript of all manner of patronage. They are made fubject to the orders and di- rections of the feven principal Commiffioners ; and if they either wilfully difobey thofe orders, or if, in the opinion of the feven Principals, thefe Afiiflants have been guilty of neglect or G mif- [ 5 1 mifdemeanour in the execution of their office, then it is in the power of the feven Principals to remove and difplace them. This is not all ; for from the fcope of the bill it feems to be intended, that the Afliftant Directors mould not have one particle of the pa- tronage at prefent enjoyed, by the twenty-four Directors of the Eaft India Company, not even the patronage which is neceflarily and folely connected with the commercial interefts of the Company, fuch as the employment of mips, warehoufe-keepers, fecretaries, clerks, and fer- vants, for carrying on their own buiinefs, con- tracts for goods relating to the commerce, &c. By the extenfive words of the bill, all that pa- tronage is transferred to th$ feven Commif- iioners. There does not feem to be any good reafon why the nine Affiftant Directors mould be lowered, and deprived of all patronage in this manner ; on the contrary, it would be more expedient, for various reafons, that their fitu- ation t 5' ] ation fhould be made as refpe&able as poflible> confidently with every proper fecurity for their not counteracting the main objects of the infti- tution of the feven principal Commiffioners. There fhould be the lefs objection to this being done at prefent, as it has been declared by Mr. Fox in the fpeech at bringing in his bill, that after the term of the prefent bill, at the end of the four years, it is propofed the Afliftant Di- rectors mould be chofen by the Proprietors, and that then the commercial concerns mould, if practicable, be feparated from the political, and from the^nanagement of the revenues and ter- ritorial pofleffions ; confequently, when that happens, every patronage naturally connected with the commerce muft go along with it. Why, then, mould that patronage not be fuf* fered to go along with it at prefent ? There are even additional reafons why, in good judgment, the prefent bill ftiould allot and G 3 declare C s* ] declare a confiderable mare of patronage to be- long to the Affiftant Directors ; for it is the vaft extent of patronage and power affumed to the feven principal Commiffioners by the prefent bill, which has chiefly excited the jealoufy and the apprehenlions fo unfavourable to the bill. The diminution or diftribution of that pa- tronage would have an oppofite and a fa- vourable tendency. Such distribution would be ufeful both in ap- pearance and in reality ; in appearance, becaufe it would conciliate favour to the bill ; and it* reality, becaufe, for the reafons already ftated, the difperfion of patronage ought to take place upon found political principles, in order to prevent the danger from too much power and influence being accumulated in any one quarter. In no quarter can a fhare of the patronage be given with more political fafety, than to the. Direc* [ 53 1 Directors who are to manage the commercial concerns of the Company. This opinion does not reft upon theory ; for it has been found from experience, that even when the twenty- four Directors poflefled the whole undiminimed patronage of the Company, no danger to the conftitution, or to the freedom of Parliament, ever exifted, or was apprehended from that quarter. There will, therefore, he a general difpofi- tion in the public, as well as in the Pro- prietors of the Eaft-India Company, (to whom ibme attention likewife is due) to approve of the allotment of a coniiderable fliare of the pa- tronage to the Affiflant Directors ; and that difpofition will be the greater, becaufe it is felt to be a violent revolution in the fituation of India Directors and Proprietors, that, from poffeffing the greateft power of any body of men in the State, they ihould, all at once, be {tripped of every degree of power, pa- tronage, and confequence. For [ 54 J For thefe reafons, I cannot avoid thinking that it would be well judged, in many refpects, that the bill mould contain a claufe, defcribing, or rather enumerating, the articles of patronage which are to be given to the Afliftant Direc- tors; and the more ample thefe are made, confiftently with the great objects of the bill, fo much the better. Amongft the articles of patronage which may naturally and properly be given to the Affiftant Directors, there are thefe following ; The appointment of Secretaries, Clerks, and Afliftants, at the India Houfe ; Warehoufe- keepers, and others for carrying on the com- mercial bufmefs. The purchafing of goods, {lores, &c. to be fent to India, by contract or otherwife. The allotment of the voyages, and every thing that relates to the (hips to be employed in t 55 ] in carrying on the commerce to and from India. The appointment of 'writers to be fent to India for the civil line, and of cadets for the military. With regard to this laft article, the Eaft- India Company were in the conftant practice of fending out writers long before the acqui- iition of the territorial revenues, and allb of fending out cadets. The perfons who go out as writers, and rife by gradation from that firft ftep to the fituation of junior and fenior mer- chants, faftors, &c, are neceffary for the com- mercial bufinefs ; and the cadets are the raw materials from whence the Company's officers have been formed; and here it is but juftice to acknowledge, that under this mode of exer- cifmg the patronage, there have fprung up in the Company's fervice not only men eminent in the civil line, but many excellent officers, whofe merits have been proved by actions that would [ 56 ] would have done credit to the military pro- feffion in any fervice in Europe. It has often happened, too, that thefe officers of the Eaft- India Company have acted in the field along with the officers of His Majefty's troops em- ployed agamft the enemies of the State, or of the Eafl-India Company ; and the teftimony in their favour, given by the King's officers, with a^ liberality and readinefs that does them ho- nour, has ferved to place, in a high point of -view, the military merits of many of the Com- pany's officers. It feems moil: natural, that the power which has always been enjoyed by the Eaft- India Di- rectors, of appointing thefe writers and cadets, fhould be continued with the Affiftant Di- rectors. The taking it from them, and giving it to the feven principal Commiffioners, couid ferve no other purpofe than that of increafmg ufeleilly their patronage, and by that means rendering it more obnoxious. To [ 57 ] To the public in general it will be agreeable, that this fort of patronage mould remain with thofe Directors, who are to have the immediate charge of the Company's commercial concerns, and who, at the expiration of four years, are to be chofen by the Proprietors as formerly ; for it has the effect of difFufing, through various clafles of the community at large, the benefits of Eafl Indian patronage. There are many refpectable citizens, who, by the means of the Eafl India Directors, have had opportunities of providing for their children, relations, or friends, in the civil and military lines of the Company's fervice, to which they might not have had the fame facility of accefs, if the nomination of writers and cadets had been vefled either in Government, or in the hands of per- fons in more exalted fituations than thofe of the India Directors. It is a real advantage in a country, that there fhould thus be a variety of channels, through which the benefits belonging to patronage H may t 5 3 be diffufed and extended to various clafles in the community ; and, therefore, the placing this branch of patronage in the hands of the Afliftaht Directors, will certainly be more -.generally relimed, than if it were aflumed by he principal Commiffioners. . . The vefting this, and other articles of pa- tronage in the Affiftant Directors, muft be the lefs liable to objections too from this confedera- tion, that the bill has taken care that the prin- .cipal Commiffioners mall have a great check and control over the Afliftant Directors ; and jeven the power of removing and difplaeing .them. With fuch a powerful control over the conduct of the Afliftant Directors, there muft be the lefs hazard in trufHng them with a .confiderable degree of patronage. The pre- fent Eaft India Directors have a much more cxtenfive patronage, without any fuch control. This control introduced by Mr. Fox's bill, fecms, however, very proper in the commence- ;. me nt [ 59 1 ment of a new plan for the management of In- dian affairs, for it will enable the. principal Com- miffioners to carry their plans into execution, \vithout the hazard of being counteracted in ef- fential objects by the Afliflant Directors, at the, fame time that it increafes the fafety and pro- priety of trailing with thefe Affiftant Directors a very confiderable fliare of patronage. Refult of the preceding Enquiry. THE preceding examination of the princi- jpal conftituent parts of Mr. Fox's bill, leads to this conclusion, that there are certain efleutial and vital parts of the plan well deferving to be adhered to and fupporred ; particularly that which eftablifhes a government at home for the management of Indian affairs, under the imme- diate control and fuperintendancy of Parliament; H a and I 6 ] and that which gives to the government fo efta- blifhed, a certain degree of permanency, by ta- king care that during a fpecified fhort period of years they fhall not be difplaced, excepting upon an addrefs from either Houfe of Parliament. But it has been mewn that there are other ma- terial parts of the bill which require alterations, not of a trivial, but of an e'flential nature. i ft, In what relates to the authority by which the prin- cipal Commiflioners mould be appointed. 2dly, As to the mares of patronage to be annexed to. their fituations ; And 3dly, As to t\\ Jituation of the djfjlant Direftors, and the mare of power and patronage to be enjoyed by them, What peculiarly requires moil efiential alte^- rations, is, that part of the bill which relates to the PATRONAGE. The tendency of the bill, from what appears upon the face pf it, has been, Jo collect from every quarter, and to concenter in the board of Commiffioners, the whole of the Indian patronage at home and abroad: the.fug- geflions, [ 6, ] geftions contained in this inquiry, proceed upon a principle directly oppofite, that of difperjion^ inftead of accumulation ; for the extent of Indian patronage at home and abroad, when collected into one folid compact body, is foimmenfe, and fo much beyond all ordinary rules of proportion, that it is too much to be trufted in any one quarter. If trufted entirely to the Crown^ fuch an additional quantity of patronage and influ- ence thrown at once into the royal fcale, would certainly make it preponderate too much, and with an evident hazard of overturning the juft balance in the conftitution. But neither can it, with fafety, be trufted to any Subject, or to any fmall number or defcription of Subjects exclu- fively; for fuch enormous patronage and influ- ence fo vefted, would be a novelty of a dange- rous nature, without precedent in this, or perhaps in any other ftate in the world, and therefore might afford juft caufe of alarm to the interefts of the Crown on the one hand, and to thofe of the people, as well as to the freedom of Parliament, on the other. For - For avoiding evils of fuch dangerous ten- dency, it has been a principal object in this in- quiry to difcover a fafer courfe than that to which either branch of the above alternative ,\vould evidently lead us ; and fince the whole of the Indian patronage, however great, muft ne- ceflarily be lodged fomewhere, it has occurred, that for the fafety of the constitution, the inte- refts of the ffote, and likewife for the fake of diffufmg the benefits of Indian patronage through various claffes in the community, thp beft and moft falutary plan will be that, which ihall adopt a mode of dljlnbut'mg^ inftead of that of compacting the total patronage. With this view, it has been propofed, that the patronage -ihould be diftributed into feveral different chan- nels, in the following manner : Firft, that a certain portion of it mould be alloted to the Crown, to which, as polTeiTing the executive government of the empire, the whole, or the greateft part of that patronage, when the territorial pofleilions in India are de- clared C 63 5 dared to belong to the State, mould, from tire genius of the conftitution, of courfe" be^ long, were it not that fuch an addition of influence to that already enjoyed by the Crown might prove fatal to the cor.flitution, and therefore the danger apprehended from this circumftance muft ferve to exclude every idei of giving the whole of that patronage to the" Crown. Secondly, That there fhould be allotted to the feven principal Commiffioners, fuch a pro* portion of the Indian patronage as may bfe proper and neceflary to give efficacy to their meafures. Thirdly, That a very considerable part of the power and patronage, efpecially of that which exifts at home, mould be annexed to the fitua- tion of the Affiftant Directors, who are to manage the commercial affairs of the Company, and as to whom it is propofed, that they mould hereafter be elected, as formerly, by the Pro- prietors of the Eaft-India Company. Laffiy, Laftly, That a certain portion of the patro- nage in India mould be left dependant upon, and connected with, certain eftablifliments and lituations in that country. At the fame time it is propofed, that there fhould be in the bills relating to India proper claufes, containing rules and limitations, to be fettled by Parliament, for regulating the con- duct of thefe feveral defcriptions of perfons, and for preventing, as far as poffible, the abufe of patronage and power in whatever hands it- may be placed. If the reflections which this enquiry has fug- gefted are well founded, and if the communica- tion of them could have any effect in producing fuch a modification of Mr. Fox's bill, as might embrace the different objects alluded to in the courfe of this inveftigation, there is reafon to be- lieve, that the jealoufies and outcry which have either fprung up naturally, or have been excited againft that bill, would foon be reduced fo lo\v as to make little permanent impreffion ; on the contrary, as the great ajjumptwn of patronage MS t 65 ] was the circumftance, which, ferioufly alarme'd fome perfons, and afforded to others the means of inftilling prejudices againft the whole of the bill, there is the greateft probability, thatj when that part which was in itfelf truly objec- tionable is removed, or reduced within proper bounds, the good fenfe of the country in ge- neral, will difcern and approve the merits of thofe parts of the bill, which are calculated for producing that efficient, vigorous fyftem of government, which the exigency of the cafe feems to require. Another advantage is, that the propofed al- terations could not fail to have a tendency to procure a more favourable reception to the bill in the Houfe of Lords, and to facilitate its paffage through that Houfe. Alterations fo material would afford the beft refutation of the reports, fo generally fpread, of an intention to force upon that branch of the Legiilature, the fame, or nearly the fame bill which they have juft.now rejefred. The alterations propofed are certainly of fufficient magnitude to blunt 1 the [ 66 ] the oppofition of thofe who were adverfe to the plan firft fubmitted to Parliament ; they will alfo afford good grounds to many of the Peers who voted againft the firft bill, to adopt, uporl confident principles, a different line of conduct, by fupporting a bill effentially varied, an4 freed from thofe exceptionable parts which, in the firft plan, gave the greateft and the bed- founded caufe of alarm. T H END. This Day is Price 155. in Boards, in One large Volume, 8vo , S T 6 C K D A L E's EDITION O F SHAKSPEA RE; INCLUDING THE WHOLE OF HIS DRAMATIC W O K K S; WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES, COMPILED I ROM VARIOUS COMMENTATORS. Embellifhed with a flriking Likencfs of the AUTHOR. " Nature 'her pencil to his hand commits, And then in all her forms to this great Mailer fits." LONDON: Printed for JOHN "S T O C K D A L E, oppofite Burlington- Houfe, Piccadilly, 1784. ADDRESS 35 University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. UNIVERSITY OP CALIFORNIA II I II I ill 1 1 II 3 1TB8~01"625"1097