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THE LIBRARY 
 
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 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OE CALIFORNIA 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Frank Richards 
 
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INQUIRIES 
 
 CONCERNING THE 
 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERS 
 
 AND THE 
 
 INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 By JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M.D. F.R.S.E. 
 
 FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF EDINBURGH, &ۥ 
 AND FIRST PHYSICIAN TO HIS MAJESTY IN SCOTLAND. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 EDINBURGH: WAUGH AND INNES; 
 
 M. OGLE, GLASGOW ; W. CURRY, JUN. & CO. DUBLIN ; AND 
 WHITTAKER, TREACHER & ARNOT, LONDON. 
 
 M.DCCC.XXXI. 
 
GIFT 
 
 EDINBL'RGH : 
 
 1'RINti;d ev a. ualfoi it and co. nidukv street. 
 
A 
 
 '7 
 
 1^31 
 
 f 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The Author deeply feels the favourable manner 
 in which this volume has been received by the 
 public, and the notice which has been bestowed 
 upon it by those Avhose approbation is high praise. 
 In preparing a new edition, he has made various 
 verbal corrections, and has added a considerable 
 number of new facts and observations, which, he 
 trusts, may increase the interest of the work. 
 Some of these additions will be found under 
 the following subjects : — The question of the 
 immateriality of the thinking principle ; — false 
 perceptions ; — the credibility of testimony ; — 
 memory ; — conception ; — and the influence of 
 disease upon attention and memory. There 
 are also various new facts on dreaming- and 
 spectral illusions ; and, under the section " on 
 the qualities and acquirements which constitute a 
 well regulated mind," there have been added 
 remarks on observing and inventive genius. 
 
 187 ■ 
 
iv PREFACE. 
 
 In reference to the very curious subject men- 
 tioned in page 316, and illustrated by the case de- 
 scribed by Major Elliot, the author is induced to 
 add here a fact which has been communicated to 
 him since that part of the volume was printed. 
 A young- woman of the lower rank, aged nine- 
 teen, became insane about two years ago ; but was 
 gentle, and applied herself eagerly to various oc- 
 cupations. Before her insanity, she had been only 
 learning to read, and to form a few letters ; but 
 during her insanity, she taught herself to write 
 perfectly, though all attempts of others to teach her 
 failed, as she could not attend to any person who 
 tried to do so. She has intervals of reason, which 
 have frequently continued three weeks, sometimes 
 longer. During these, she can neither read nor 
 write ; but, immediately on the return of her in- 
 sanity, she recovers her power of writing, and 
 can read perfectly. 
 
 Edinburgh, August, 1831. 
 
 ^^-i 
 
 'S'i 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I 
 
 Page 
 
 Introduction .... I 
 
 PllELI.MIN'ARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE GeNERAL 
 
 Objects of Science. 
 
 Uniformity of the Relations of Bodies . 5 
 
 Origin of our Idea of Causation . , 6 
 
 Our Idea of the Relation of Cause and Effect in re- 
 ference to any two events, entirely distinct from 
 our intuitive impression of Causation . 8 
 
 Of Physical, Efficient, and Final Causes . 10 
 
 The Ohject of Science is to trace the Uniform Re- 
 lations of things . . . . 12 
 The Object of Art is to apply our Knowledge of 
 
 these relations, for producing particular results 12 
 Distinction of Sciences and Arts, according to the 
 particular Substances or Relations which are their 
 immediate objects .... 13 
 
 Division of Sciences into certain and uncertain 17 
 
 Grounds of uncertainty in a Science . 18 
 
 Illustrations of the Uncertain Sciences from Medi- 
 cine and Political Economy . . 20 
 Imperfection of all Science, from the limited nature 
 of the human faculties ... 22 
 
vi CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 Onr knowledge of mind limited entirely to Facts 24 
 
 Ideal Theory of the Old Philosophy . . 25 
 
 Of Materialism ..... 29 
 
 Grounds for considering- Materialism as not only un- 
 founded, but as, in its nature, opposed to the First 
 Principles of Philosophical Inquiry . 29 
 
 Grounds for believing that the Thinking Principle is, 
 in its Essence, independent of the Body, and will sur- 
 vive it . . . . . 31 
 This belief is entirely independent of our speculations 
 respecting the immateriality of the thinking prin- 
 ciple, and rests on a species of evidence altogether 
 different ..... 36 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS, 
 RELATING BOTH TO MATTER AND MIND. 41 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 44 
 
 Of the Primary and Secondary properties of Matter 45 
 
 Knowledge of the properties of Matter by the Senses 47 
 
 Of our Knowledge of Distance and Magnitude . 49 
 Apparent improvement of some Senses after loss of others 54 
 
 Of our Knowledge of the Nature of Perception 57 
 
 Remarkable influence of Attention . . 58 
 
 Habits of Attention and Inattention . • 60 
 
 Of False Perceptions . . . • G4 
 
CONTENTS. vii 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION. 
 
 Of the Knowledge which we derive from Consciousness 
 and Reflection . . . . 71 
 
 1. The Knowledge of oar Mental Processes 72 
 
 2. Compound Notions, — as Time, Cause, Motion 72 
 
 3. First truths, or intuitive articles of belief 73 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 TESTIMONY. 
 
 Rules by which we estimate the Credibility of Testimony 75 
 
 Confidence in Testimony in regard to statements at vari- 
 ance with our Personal Observation or Experience 78 
 
 Objections which have been made to the Reception of such 
 Statements on the Evidence of Testimony . 80 
 
 Fallacy of these Objections, — and Grounds of our Confi- 
 dence in Testimony . . . . 81 
 
 Distinction between Events which are marvellous and 
 those which are Miraculous ... 86 
 
 Moral Probability of Miracles ... 88 
 
 Miracles not a violation of the established order of Nature, 
 but referable to an agency altogether new and peculiar 91 
 
 Grounds on which we estimate the Credibility of Testi- 
 mony in regard to unusual or miraculous events 93 
 
VIU 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS 99 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 MEMORY, 
 
 102 
 
 Attention . . . . • .105 
 
 Association . . . . .108 
 
 1. Natural or Philosophical Association . 114) 
 
 2. Local or Incidental Association . • H9 
 
 3. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association . 126 
 
 Artificial Memory . . .127 
 
 Important Application of the Principle of 
 Arbitrary Association in Commemora- 
 tive Rites . . . .129 
 Conception, or the Memory of Perceptions . 132 
 Of the Culture and Improvement of Attention, Reflec- 
 tion, and Memory . . . .136 
 Of the Influence of Disease upon Attention and Memory 145 
 Of Extensive Cerebral Disease, without Sensible De- 
 rangement of the Mental Functions . . 162 
 Influence of the Facts connected with this Sub- 
 ject in shewing the Independent Existence of 
 the Thinking Principle . . .164 
 
CONTENTS. ix 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 Nature and Applications of Abstraction . . 165 
 
 Disputes of the Nominalists and Realists . . 167 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 Nature and Applications of Imagination . . 170 
 
 Various Kinds of Artificial Combination to which it is 
 
 applicable ..... 172 
 
 Importance of a Proper Application of it in the Forma- 
 tion of Character . . . .173 
 Kffects of Fictitious Narrative . . .175 
 Effects of an Ill-regulated Imagination . . 176 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 REASON OR JUDGMENT. 
 
 Analysis of the Mental Process of which Reason consists 179 
 Applications of Reason in the investigations of Science, 
 the Aifairs of Common Life, and the Formation of 
 Opinions . . . . . 184 
 
 Man's Responsibility for his Belief . . 191 
 
 Farther Division of the Subject.- — Brief Outline of the 
 System of Dr. Brown . . , .193 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 § I. OF THE USE OF REASON IX THE 
 
 INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 Of First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief, as the 
 Foundation of all Reasoning- . . . 196 
 
 1. A Belief in our own Existence, and of Mind 
 
 as something distinct from the Body . 197 
 
 2. A Confidence in the Information furnished 
 
 by our Senses . . . .193 
 
 3. A Confidence in our Mental Operations 198 
 
 4. A Belief of our Personal Identity . 199 
 3. A Conviction that every Event must have a 
 
 Cause . . ' . . .199 
 
 6. A Confidence in the Uniformity of Nature 200 
 Uniformity of Physical Relations . 201 
 
 Uniformity of Moral Relations . 205 
 
 Application to the question of Liberty 
 and Necessity . • 208 
 
 Of the Nature and Importance of First Truths, and So- 
 phisms connected with attempts to reason against them 218 
 Laws of Investigation in any Department of Knowledge 225 
 
 1. Of Collecting Facts . . . 229 
 
 2. Of Tracing the Relation of Cause and Effect 229 
 
 3. Of Deducing General Principles . 1:30 
 
 232 
 232 
 232 
 233 
 234 
 235 
 
 Of Fallacies in Investigation 
 
 Fallacies in regard to Facts 
 
 False Induction 
 
 False Reasoning 
 Of the Nature of Reasoning 
 Of the Syllogism and its Uses 
 Of the Cautions in examining a Process of Reasoning or 
 
 Investigation . . . . . 239 
 
CONTENTS. xi 
 
 Distinction between a process of Reasoning, and a process 
 
 of Investigation . . . 243 
 
 Of Fallficics in Reasoning . . . 247 
 
 Of Mathematical Reasoning . . . 2.59 
 
 Difference bet\veen tlie soun J Exercise of Judgment and 
 
 the Art of Disptitation . . . 2G4 
 
 Of the Culture and Regulation of the Judgment 2G7 
 
 Influence of Attention . . 267 
 
 Prejudice • . 268 
 
 Passion, or State of Moral Feelings 268 
 
 Importance of a well regulated Judgment 269 
 
 § II. OF THE USE OF REASON IN' CORRECTING 
 
 THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND IN 
 REGARD TO EXTERNAL THINGS. 
 
 Nature and Effects of this Exercise of Reason . 272 
 
 Peculiar Conditions connected with the Suspension of it 273 
 
 I. Dreaming. . . . 276 
 
 Peculiar Condition of the Mind in Dreaming 276 
 Origin of the Various Classes of Dreams. 
 
 1. Recent Events . . 277 
 
 2. Old Associations excited by Bodily Sen- 
 
 sations . . . 279 
 
 3. Old Associations recalled by a Process of 
 
 the Mind itself . . 284 
 
 4. Mental Emotions embodied into Dreams 291 
 Dreams consist chiefly of Real Objects of Con- 
 ception . . . 300 
 
 Operations of an Intellectual Character in Dreams 303 
 
xii CONTENTS. 
 
 II. SoMNAiMBULISM. 308 
 
 Various degrees of this Affection 
 Remarkable Condition commonly called double 
 
 Consciousness . . . 314 
 
 III. Insanity. 318 
 Peculiar Condition of the Mind constituting In- 
 sanity .... 320 
 
 Various Modifications of it, from Eccentricity 
 
 to Mania . . . 322 
 
 Great Activity of the Mental Powers in many 
 
 Cases .... 323 
 
 Remarkable Loss of recent Impressions and 
 
 sudden revival of them on Recovery 326 
 
 Hallucination confined to a single Point 330 
 
 Probable Origin of the peculiar Hallucinations 
 
 in different cases of Insanity . 332 
 
 1. Propensities of Character . 332 
 
 2. Old Associations . . 333 
 
 3. Old Fictions of the Imagination 333 
 
 4. Bodily Feelings . . 334 
 
 5. Undefined Impression of the New and 
 
 Peculiar Condition of the Mental 
 Powers . . . 334 
 
 IVfelancholia — Propensity to Suicide . 336 
 
 Origin and Causes of Insanity . 340 
 
 Cautions in deciding on slight or suspected 
 
 cases . . . 344 
 
 Liability of the Insane to Punishment . 347 
 
 Moral Treatment of Insanity . 350 
 
 Of Idiocy — Difference between it and Insanity 356 
 Cretinism . . • 359 
 
 IV. Spectral Illusions. 
 
 Various Forms and Sources of them . 3G6 
 
 6 
 
CONTENTS. xiu 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
 INVESTIGATION TO MEDICAL SCIENCE- 
 
 Uncertainty of Medicine . . . 386 
 
 Sources of this Uncertainty . . . 388 
 
 1. Difficulty of tracing Effects to their true Causes 392 
 
 2. Intervention of New Causes, which elude oiu" 
 
 Observation . . . 393 
 
 3. Difficulty in extending om* Knowledge to New 
 
 Cases, — as we must generally act on Analogy, 
 not on Experience . . . 394 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION OF FACTS. 
 
 Rules to be Observed, and Sources of Error to be 
 avoided, in the Reception of Facts . 396 
 
xiv CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ARRANGING, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING 
 
 FACTS. 
 
 Rules to be observed in this Process . . 405 
 
 Evils arising from unsound Combinations . . 406 
 
 Of the Effects produced on Medical Science by a zeal 
 for Nosology . . • . • 407 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 TRACING THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 
 
 Importance and difficulty of this process . . 409 
 
 Sources of Fallacy in conducting it . • 411 
 
 Of the Division of Causes into Predisposing, Exciting, 
 and Proximate . . . . .421 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL 
 PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Nature of Generalizing .... 422 
 
 Difference between Generalizing and Classification 423 
 
 Rules of Generalizing, or of the Induction of General 
 Principles ..... 429 
 
CONTKNTS. 
 
 XV 
 
 1, That the Principle be a Fart 
 
 2. That it be true of all the Indivitluals 
 Legitimate Use of Ilypothesi;* 
 
 429 
 
 430 
 432 
 
 RULES TO BE OBSERVKD BY THOSE WHO WOULD CON- 
 TRIBUTE TO THE IMrROVEMENT OF MEDICAL 
 SCIENCE . . . . ^^^ 
 
 PART V. 
 
 VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIREMENTS 
 WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL REGULATED MIND. 
 
 1. Habit of Attention 
 
 2. Regulation of the Succession of Thoughts 
 
 3. Activity of Mind 
 
 4. Habits of Association and Reflection 
 
 5. Proper selection of Objects of pursuit 
 
 6. Government of the Imagination 
 
 7. Culture and Regulation of the Judgment 
 
 Observing and Inventive Genius 
 
 8. Right condition of the Moral Feelings 
 
 442 
 443 
 446 
 446 
 447 
 448 
 449 
 452 
 458 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In entering" upon the following Essay, I find it 
 necessary to offer some explanation of the views 
 which induce me to attempt a subject so foreign 
 to those inquiries by which I am in some measure 
 known to the public, and in which they have been 
 pleased to receive my researches in the most fa- 
 vourable manner. 
 
 The study of the phenomena of mind presents 
 a subject of intense interest, not to the moral phi- 
 losopher only, but to every one who has in view 
 the cultivation of his own mental powers, or the 
 proper application of them to the investigation 
 of truth in any department of knowledge. Dur- 
 ing the prevalence of that system which has been 
 called the Metaphysics of the Schools, this im- 
 portant inquiry was obscured by speculations of 
 the most frivolous nature. It is in modern times 
 only that it has assumed a real value and a prac- 
 
 B 
 
S INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tical importance, under the researches of those 
 eminent men, who have cultivated the philosophy 
 of mind on the principles which are acted upon 
 in physical science, namely, a careful observa- 
 tion of facts, and conclusions drawn from these 
 by the most cautious induction. The chief hin- 
 derance to the cultivation of the science, on these 
 principles, arises from the difficulty of procuring 
 the facts. For the only field, in which the men- 
 tal philosopher can pursue his researches with 
 perfect confidence, is his own mind. In his ob- 
 servations on the minds of other men, he is 
 obliged to judge of the internal operations by ex- 
 ternal phenomena; and in this manner a degree 
 of uncertainty attends his investigations, which 
 does not occur in physical science. From this 
 source, also, has probably arisen much of that dif- 
 ference of opinion which we meet with in regard 
 to the mental powers : For, each inquirer having 
 drawn his observations chiefly from one mind, 
 namely, his own, it was scarcely to be expected 
 that there should not be some diversity, or that 
 facts derived in this manner should possess the 
 character of being universal. 
 
 The means by which this difficulty can be re- 
 moved must consist in an extensive collection of 
 facts, illustrating the phenomena of mind in vari- 
 ous individuals, and under a variety of circum- 
 stances ; and there are several points of view in 
 which the subject is peculiarly adapted to the me- 
 
INTltODUCTION. O 
 
 dical observer. Mentiil manifestations are g"reatly 
 modified by the condition of those bodily organs 
 by which the mind holds intercourse with ex- 
 ternal thing's, especially the brain. It becomes 
 therefore a matter of the ^"reatest interest, to as- 
 certain the manner in which the manifestations 
 of mind are affected by diseases of these org-ans, 
 as well as to observe their condition in that re- 
 markable class of affections, commonly called 
 diseases of the mind. Besides, in the affections 
 which are referable to both these classes, we of- 
 ten meet with manifestations of the most inter- 
 esting kind, and such as are calculated to illus- 
 trate, in a very striking- manner, important points 
 in the philosophy of the mental powers. It is 
 thus in the power of the observing- physician to 
 contribute valuable facts to the science of mind ; 
 and it is almost unnecessary to add, that the study 
 may be turned to purposes of immediate import- 
 ance to his own inquiries. He does not need to 
 be reminded, how much the mind acts upon the 
 body — that mental emotions often prove sources 
 of disease, or causes by which his remedies are 
 modified or counteracted — and that, on the other 
 hand, a remedy may often be introduced by the 
 mind, capable of composing tumults of the cor- 
 poreal functions, which cannot be tranquillized by 
 physical aid. 
 
 From the deep interest which the philosophy 
 of mind thus presents to the medical inquirer, I 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 have been induced to attempt a slight outline of 
 this important subject. In doing- so, I do not 
 profess to offer any thing new or original. My 
 object is to present to the younger part of the 
 profession some leading facts, which may serve 
 to direct their farther inquiries on a subject of 
 great and general interest. 
 
 This slight outline of the functions of mind will 
 be followed by an attempt to trace the rules, 
 which ought to guide us in applying these powers 
 to the investigation of truth, in any department 
 of knowledge. The practical application of the 
 subject will lead to a general view of the laws or 
 principles of philosophical inquiry and inductive 
 science, and will then be directed in a more par- 
 ticular manner to the purposes of medical inves- 
 tigation. This is attempted in the hope that the 
 principles which it is meant to convey, may be 
 of use in giving precision to medical investiga- 
 tions, by illustrating those rules of sound induc- 
 tion, which are acted upon in other departments 
 of science* 
 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
 ON TUE 
 
 GENERAL NATURE AND OBJECTS 
 OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Bv the M-ill of the Almighty Creator, all things 
 in nature have been placed in certain relations to 
 each other, which are fixed and uniform. In 
 other words, they have been endowed with capa- 
 cities of acting, and capabilities of being acted 
 upon, according to certain uniform laws; so that 
 their actions take place in the same manner in 
 every instance in which the same bodies are 
 brought together under similar circumstances. 
 We have a conviction, which appears to be origi- 
 nal and instinctive, of the general uniformity of 
 these relations ; and in this consists our confidence 
 in the regularity of all the operations of nature. 
 But the powers or principles on which the rela- 
 tions depend are entirely hidden from us in our 
 present state of being. The province of human 
 knowledge is merely to observe the facts, and to 
 trace what their relations or sequences are. This 
 
6 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 is to be accomplished only by a careful and ex- 
 tensive observation of the facts as they pass be- 
 fore US, and by carefully distinguishing their true 
 or uniform relations, from connexions which 
 are only incidental and temporary. 
 
 In our first observation of any particular series 
 of facts or events, we find a certain number of 
 them placed together in a state of contiguity or 
 apparent connexion. But we are not entitled 
 from this to assume the connexion to be any thing 
 more than incidental juxta-position. When, in 
 the farther progress of observation, we find the 
 same events occurring a certain number of times, 
 in the same relations or sequences to each other, 
 we suspect that their connexion is not merely 
 that of incidental contiguity. We begin to believe 
 that there exists among them such a relation, as 
 leads us, when we meet with some of these events, 
 to expect that certain others are to follow. 
 Hence is excited our idea of power in reference 
 to these events, or of the relation of cause and ef- 
 fect. This relation, however, according to the 
 utmost extent of our knowledge of it in any indi- 
 vidual instance, is founded entirely upon the 
 fact of certain events uniformly following one 
 another. But, when we have found, by sufficient 
 observation, the particular events which do thus 
 follow one another, we conclude that there is a 
 connexion, whatever may be the nature of it, in 
 consequence of which the sequence which we have 
 
 3 
 
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF CAUSATION. 7 
 
 observed will continue to recur in the same fixed 
 and uniform manner. In other words, we con- 
 clude with confidence, that, when we observe the 
 first of two such events, the second will follow ; 
 and that, when we observe the second, the first 
 has preceded it. The first we call cause, the se- 
 cond effect. Thus our general confidence in the 
 uniformity of the true relations or sequences of 
 events, is an original or instinctive principle, and 
 not the result of experience ; but it is by expe- 
 rience that we ascertain what the individual se- 
 quences are which observe this uniformity ; or, in 
 other words, learn to distinguish connexions 
 which consist of incidental contiguity, from those 
 Avhich constitute true and uniform relations. 
 
 The natural tendency of the mind appears in- 
 deed to be, to infer causation from every succes- 
 sion of phenomena, and to expect uniformity in 
 every sequence. It is from experience we learn, 
 that this impression is not to be relied on in re- 
 gard to individual sequences, but requires to be 
 corrected by observation. The result of our far- 
 ther experience then is, to ascertain what those 
 sequences or connexions are which are uniform, 
 and which, consequently, we may consider as con- 
 nected in the manner of causation. We are thus 
 first taught by experience the caution which is 
 necessary in considering events as connected in 
 the manner of cause and effect ; and learn not to 
 assume this relation, till, by farther experience. 
 
8 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 we have ascertained that tlie sequence is uniform. 
 This caution, however, has no reference to our 
 instinctive impression of causation, or our abso- 
 lute conviction that every event must have an 
 adequate cause ; it only relates to our fixing- the 
 arrangement of individual antecedents, or, in 
 other words, to our determining- what individual 
 events we are warranted in considering- as the 
 true antecedents or causes of certain other events. 
 This, accordingly, can in many cases be accom- 
 plished only by long and extensive observation ; 
 while, in others, a single instance may be suffi- 
 cient to produce an absolute conviction of what 
 is the true antecedent. A child who has been 
 only once burnt, may dread the fire as certainly 
 as if the accident had happened an hundred times; 
 and there are many other instances in which the 
 conviction may be produced in the same rapid 
 manner. The natural tendency of the mind, in 
 fact, is not only to infer the connexion, but in 
 many cases, to carry it farther than the truth. 
 If, for instance, we suppose a man, who, for the 
 first time in his life, has seen gunpowder explode 
 upon a match being applied to it, he would pro- 
 bably have an immediate conviction that a simi- 
 lar explosion would take place again in similar 
 circumstances. But he would perhaps go farther 
 than this : he would probably expect a similar ex- 
 plosion when he applied a match to other black 
 powders, with the nature of which he was unac- 
 
CAUSATIO>. 9 
 
 quainted, such as powdered charcoal. It is by 
 experience that this erroneous expectation wouM 
 be corrected, and that he would learn the pre- 
 cise instances in which the particular result takes 
 place. But it is also by experience that he learns 
 the former, though the conviction was produced 
 more immediately ; for there is nothing in the 
 characters of gunpowder and charcoal from which 
 any man could pronounce, by reasoning a prior/\ 
 that the one would explode with violence when 
 a match was applied to it, and the other remain 
 entirely unchanged. 
 
 Tlius, our general impression of causation is 
 not the result of experience, but an original and 
 intuitive principle of belief ; that is, our absolute 
 conviction, that every event must have an ade- 
 quate cause. This is, in fact, that great and fun- 
 damental truth, by which, from the properties of 
 a known effect, we infer the powers and qualities 
 of an unknown cause. It is in this manner, for 
 example, that from the works of nature we infer 
 the existence and the attributes of the Almighty 
 Creator. But in judging of the connexion be- 
 tween any two individual events in that order of 
 things which he has established, our idea of causa- 
 tion is derived from experience alone. For, in 
 regard to any two such events, our idea of cau- 
 sation or of power amounts to nothing more than 
 our knowledge of the fact, that the one is inva- 
 riably the antecedent of the other. Of the mys- 
 
 
10 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 terious agency on which the connexion depends, 
 we know nothing, and never can know any 
 thing in our present state of being. We know 
 that the application of a match always sets fire to 
 gunpowder, and we say, that it has the 'power of 
 doing so, or that it is the cause of the explosion ; 
 but we have not the least conception why the ap- 
 plication of fire produces combustion in an inflam- 
 mable substance ; — these expressions, therefore, 
 amount to nothing more than a statement of the 
 fact, that the result is universal. 
 
 When we speak, therefore, of physical causes, 
 in regard to any of the phenomena of nature, we 
 mean nothing more than the fact of a certain uni- 
 form connexion which has been observed between 
 events. Of efficient causes, or the manner in 
 Avhich the result takes place, we know nothing. 
 In this sense, indeed, we may be said not to know 
 the cause of any thing, even of events, which at 
 first sight appear the most simple and obvious. 
 Thus, the communication of motion from one 
 body to another by impulse appears a very sim- 
 ple phenomenon, — but how little idea have we of 
 the cause of it ! We say the bodies touch each 
 other, and so the motion is communicated. But, 
 in the first place, we cannot say why a body in 
 motion, coming in contact with one at rest, should 
 put the latter in motion ; and farther, we know 
 that they do not come in contact. We may con- 
 sider it, indeed, as ascertained, that there is no 
 
PHYSICAL, EFFICIENT AND FINAL CAUSES. 1 1 
 
 such thing- as the actual contact of bodies Tuulor 
 these circumstances; and therefore, the fact which 
 appears so simple comes to be as unaccountable 
 as any phenomenon in nature. What, again, ap-, 
 pears more intelligible than an unsupported body 
 falling to the ground ? Yet, what is more inex- 
 plicable, than that one mass of matter should thus 
 act upon another, at any distance, and even 
 though a vacuum be interposed between them. 
 The same observation will be seen to apply to all 
 the facts which are most familiar to us. Why, for 
 example, one medicine acts upon the stomach, 
 another on the bow^els, a third on the kidneys, a 
 fourth on the skin, we ha\'e not the smallest con- 
 ception ; we know only the uniformity of the facts. 
 It is of importance to keep in mind the distinc- 
 tion now referred to between physical and effici- 
 ent causes, as the former only are the proper ob- 
 jects of philosophical inquiry. The term final 
 cause, again, has been applied to a subject entirely 
 different ; namely, to the appearances of unity of 
 design in the phenomena of nature, and the man- 
 ner in which means are adapted to particular 
 ends. The subject is one of great and extensive 
 importance, but it appears desirable that the 
 name were altered, though it is sanctioned by 
 high authority ; for, when viewed in connexion 
 with the sense in which the word cause is employ- 
 ed in modern science, it expresses a meaning re- 
 markably different. The investigation to which 
 
1'2 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 it refers is also of a distinct nature, tlioug"h one 
 of the liig"liest interest. It leads us chieliy to the 
 inductions of natural religion respecting a great 
 and intelligent first cause ; but it may also be di- 
 rected to the discovery of truth in regard to the 
 phenomena of nature. One of the most remark- 
 able examples of this last application of it is to be 
 found in the manner in which Harvey was led to 
 the discovery of the circulation of the blood, by 
 observing the valves in the veins, and contem- 
 plating the uses to which that peculiar structure 
 might be adapted. 
 
 The object of all sciejice is to ascertain these 
 established relations of things, or the tendency of 
 certain events to be uniformly followed by certain 
 other events ; in other words, the aptitude of cer- 
 tain bodies to produce, or to be followed by, cer- 
 tain changes in other bodies in particular cir- 
 cumstances. The object of art is to avail our- 
 selves of the knowledge thus acquired, by bring- 
 ing* bodies into such circumstances as are calcu- 
 lated to lead to those actions upon each other of 
 Vvdiich we have ascertained them to be capable. 
 Art, therefore, or the production of certain results 
 by the action of bodies upon each other, must be 
 founded upon science, or a knowledge of their 
 fixed and uniform relations and tendencies. This 
 principle applies to all sciences, and to the arts 
 or practical rules which are founded upon them ; 
 
UNIFOUMITY OF RELATIONS. 13 
 
 and the various sciences differ oidy in the parti- 
 cular substances or events which are their more 
 immediate objects. 
 
 In the physical sciences, we investigate the re- 
 lations of material substances, and their actions 
 upon each other, either of a mechanical or chemi- 
 cal nature. On the relations thus ascertained 
 are founded the mechanical and chemical arts, 
 in which we produce certain results by bringing 
 bodies into such circumstances as are calcidated 
 to give rise to their peculiar actions. But men- 
 tal phenomena have also their relations, which 
 are likewise fixed and uniform ; though it may be 
 more difficult to ascertain the truth in regard to 
 them, than in the relations of material things. 
 
 The relations or sequences of mental phenome- 
 na are to be considered in two points of view, 
 namely, relations to each other, and relations to 
 external things. In regard to both, it seems neces- 
 sary to divide the phenomena themselves into 
 three classes. 
 
 1. Simple intellect, or those powers by which 
 we perceive, remember, and combine facts or 
 events, and compare them with each other : such 
 asperception, memory, imagination, and judgment. 
 
 2. Passive emotions, or those by which the 
 mind is affected by certain pleasurable or painful 
 feelings, which are, or may be, confined entirely 
 to the individual who is the subject of them. 
 
 3. Active emotions, or those which tend directly 
 
14 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 to influence tlie conduct of men, either as moral 
 and responsible beings, or as members of society. 
 In all these classes, mental phenomena have cer- 
 tain relations to each other and to external tilings, 
 the investigation of which is the object of parti- 
 cular branches of science ; and these lead to cer- 
 tain arts or practical rules which are founded 
 upon them. 
 
 Intellectual science investigates the laws and 
 relations of the processes of simple intellect, as 
 perception, memory, imagination and judgment ; 
 and the proper cultivation and regulation of these 
 is the object of the practical art of intellectual 
 education. 
 
 The passive emotions may be influenced or ex- 
 cited in two ways ; — namely — through our rela- 
 tions to other sentient and intelligent beings, — 
 and by material or inanimate things. To the 
 former head are referable many of the tender est 
 and most interesting feelings of our nature, as 
 love, hope, joy, and sorrow. To the latter, be- 
 long those emotions which come under the sub- 
 ject of taste, or the tendencies of certain com- 
 binations of material things to excite emotions of 
 a pleasurable or painful kind, — as our impressions 
 of the sublime, the beautiful, the terrible, or the 
 ludicrous. The practical rules or processes, con- 
 nected with the science of the passive emotions, 
 arrange themselves into two classes, correspond- 
 ing to the two divisions now mentioned. To the 
 
UNIFORMITY OF RELATIONS. 15 
 
 former belonij' the regulation of the emotions, and 
 all those rules of conduct not exactly referable to 
 the higher subject of morals, which bear an ex- 
 tensive influence on the ties of friendship — and 
 the relations of social and domestic intercourse. 
 To the latter belong chiefly those processes which 
 come under the head of the fine arts ; — namely, 
 the arts of the painter — the sculptor — the archi- 
 tect — the musician ; perhaps we may add, the 
 poet and the dramatist. 
 
 The active emotions, or those which influence 
 human conduct, are referable to two classes; name- 
 ly, those which afi'ect men individuallv as moral 
 and responsible ag-ents, — and those which afi'ect 
 them as united in large bodies constituting civil 
 societv. The cultivation of the emotions of the 
 former class, and the investigation of the motives 
 and principles by which they are influenced, be- 
 long to the high subjects of morals and religion. 
 The investigation and control of emotions of the 
 latter class come under the science of politics ; 
 and the practical art, founded upon it, relates 
 to those measures by which the statesman at- 
 tempts to control and regulate the conduct of 
 masses of mankind united as members of a great 
 civil community. 
 
 In medical science, the objects of our researches 
 are chiefly the relations between external things 
 and the living powers of animal bodies, — and 
 the relations of these powers to each other ; — 
 
16 
 
 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 more particularly in regard to the tendencies of 
 external things to produce certain changes upon 
 living bodies, either as causes of disease or as re- 
 medies. The practical art founded upon this 
 science leads to the consideration of the means by 
 which we may avail ourselves of this knowledge, 
 by producing, in the one case, actions upon the 
 body which we wish to produce, and in the other, 
 by counteracting or avoiding actions which we 
 wish to prevent. 
 
 In all these sciences, and the practical arts 
 which are founded upon them, the general prin- 
 ciples are the same ; namely, a careful observa- 
 tion of the natural and uniform relations or ten- 
 dencies of bodies towards each other; and a bring- 
 ing of those tendencies into operation for the 
 production of certain results. All art, therefore, 
 must be founded upon science, or a correct know- 
 ledge of these relations ; and all science must con- 
 sist of such a careful observation of facts in re- 
 gard to the relations, as shall enable us confident- 
 ly to pronounce upon those which are fixed and 
 uniform. He who follows certain arts or practi- 
 cal rules, without a knowledge of the science on 
 which they are founded, is the mere artisan or 
 the empiric ; he cannot advance beyond the pre- 
 cise rules which are given him, or provide for 
 new occurrences and unforeseen difficulties. In 
 regard to science, again, when the relations are as- 
 sumed hastily, or without a sufficiently extensive 
 
CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 1? 
 
 observation of facts, the process constitutes false 
 science, or false induction ; and when practical 
 rules are founded upon such conclusions, they 
 lead to error and disappointment in the result 
 which is expected. 
 
 Tlie views which have now been referred to 
 lead us to principles, by which the sciences are 
 distinsruished into those which are certain, and 
 those which are, in a greater or less degree, un- 
 certain. The certainty of a science depends upon 
 the facility and correctness with which we ascer- 
 tain the true relations of things, or trace effects 
 to their true causes, and causes to their true ef- 
 fects, — and calculate upon the actions which arise 
 out of these relations taking place with perfect 
 uniformity. This certainty we easily attain in 
 the purely physical sciences, or those in which 
 we have to deal oidy with inanimate matter. For 
 in our investigation of the relations of material 
 bodies, whether mechanical or chemical, we con- 
 trive experiments, in which, by placing the bo- 
 dies in a variety of circumstances towards each 
 other, and excluding all extraneous influence, we 
 come to determine their tendencies with perfect 
 certainty. Having done so, we rely with con- 
 fidence on these tendencies continuing to be uni- 
 form ; and should we, in any instance, be disap- 
 pointed of the result which we wish to produce, 
 we are able, at once, to detect the nature of some 
 
 c 
 
18 GENERAL OBJECTS Ol SCIENCE. 
 
 incidental ctuise by which the result has been pre- 
 vented, and to obviate the effect of its interfer- 
 ence. The consequence of this accurate know- 
 ledge of their relations is, that we acquire a 
 ])ower over material things ; but this power is 
 entirely limited to a certain control and direc- 
 tion of their natural relations ; and we cannot 
 change these relations in the smallest particular. 
 Our power is of course also limited to those ob- 
 jects which are within the reach of our innnediate 
 influence ; but with respect to those which are 
 beyond this influence, as the heavenly bodies, the 
 result of our knowledge appears in a manner not 
 less striking, in the minute accuracy with which 
 we are enabled to foretell their movements, even 
 at very distant periods. I need only mention 
 the correctness with which the astronomer calcu- 
 lates eclipses, and the appearance of comets. 
 
 With these characters of certainty in the purely 
 physical sciences, two sources of uncertainty are 
 contrasted in those branches of science in which 
 we have to deal with mental operations, or with 
 the powers of living bodies. The first of these de- 
 pends upon the circumstance, that, in investigat- 
 ing the relations and tendencies in these cases, 
 we are generally obliged to trust to observation 
 alone, as the phenomena happen to be presented 
 to us, and cannot confirm or correct these obser- 
 vations by direct experiment. And as the actual 
 connexions, in which the phenomena occur to us. 
 
CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 19 
 
 are often very differcMit from tlieir true relations, 
 it is in many cases extremely difficult to ascertain 
 the true relations ; that is, to refer effects to their 
 true causes, and to trace causes to their true ef- 
 fects. Hence just conclusions are arrived at slow- 
 ly, and after a long- course of occasional observa- 
 tions ; and we may be obliged to go on for a 
 long- time without acquiring any conclusions 
 which we feel to be worthy of confidence. In 
 these sciences, therefore, there is great tempta- 
 tion to grasp at premature inductions ; and when 
 such have been brought forward with confidence, 
 there is often difficulty in exposing their fallacy ; 
 for in such a case it may happen, that as long 
 a course of observation is required for exposing 
 the false conclusion, as for ascertaining the true. 
 In physical science, on the other hand, a single 
 experiment may often overturn the most plausi- 
 ble hypothesis, or may establish one which was 
 proposed in conjecture. 
 
 The second source of uncertainty in this class 
 of sciences consists in the fact, that, even after we 
 have ascertained the true relations of things, we 
 may be disappointed of the results which we wish 
 to produce, when we bring their tendencies into 
 operation. This arises from the interposition of 
 other causes, by which the true tendencies are 
 modified or counteracted, and the operation of 
 which we are not able either to calculate upon or 
 to control. The new causes, which operate in 
 

 20 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 this manner, are cliieily certain powers in living* 
 animal bodies, and the wills, feelings, and pro- 
 pensities of masses of human beings, which Ave 
 have not the means of reducing to any fixed or 
 iniiform laws. As examples of the uncertain 
 sciences, therefore, we may mention medicine and 
 ])olitical economy ; and their uncertainty is refer- 
 able to the same sources, namely, the difficulty of 
 ascertaining- the true relations of things, or of 
 tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to 
 their true effects ; — and the intervention of new 
 causes which elude our observation, while they 
 interfere with the natural tendencies of things, 
 and defeat our attempts to produce certain re- 
 sults by bringing these into action. The scientific 
 physician well knows the difficulty of ascertain- 
 ing the true relations of those things which are the 
 proper objects of his attention, and the uncertain- 
 ty which attends all his efforts to produce particu- 
 lar results. A person, for example, affected with 
 a disease, recovers under the use of a particular 
 remedy. A second is affected with the same dis- 
 ease, and uses this remedy without any benefit ; 
 while a third recovers under a very different re- 
 medy, or without any treatment at all. And 
 even in those cases in which he has distinctly as- 
 certained true relations, new causes intervene and 
 disappoint his endeavours to produce results by 
 means of these relations. He knows, for exam- 
 ple, a disease which would certainly be relieved 
 
CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. '^1 
 
 hy the full operation of diuretics ; — and he knows 
 various substances which have unquestionably 
 diuretic virtues. But in a particular instance, he 
 may fail entirely in relieving" the disease by the 
 most assiduous use of these remedies ; — for the 
 real and true tendencies of these bodies are in- 
 terrupted by certain other causes in the constitu- 
 tion itself, which entirely elude his observation, 
 and are in no degree under his control. 
 
 It is unnecessary to point out the similarity of 
 these facts to the uncertainty experienced by the 
 statesman, in his attempts to influence the inter- 
 ests, the propensities, and the actions of masses of 
 mankind ; or to show how often measures, which 
 have been planned with every effort of human 
 wisdom, fail of the results w^iich they were in- 
 tended to produce, or are followed by conse- 
 quences remarkably different. Nothing indeed 
 can show in a more striking- manner, the uncer- 
 tainty which attaches to this science, than the 
 different aspects in which the same measure is 
 often viewed by different men distinguished for 
 political wisdom and talent. I abstain from al- 
 luding to particular examples, but those accus- 
 tomed to attend to public affairs will find little 
 difficulty in fixing upon remarkable instances, in 
 which measures have been recommended by wise 
 and able men, as calculated to lead to impor- 
 tant benefits, while others of no inferior name 
 for talent and wisdom have, with equal confi- 
 
22 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 deuce, predicted from them, consequences alto- 
 gether different. Such are the difficulties of trac- 
 ing effects to their true causes, and causes to their 
 true effects, when we have to deal, not with ma- 
 terial substances simply, but with the povvers of 
 living bodies, or with the wills, the interests, and 
 propensities of human beings. 
 
 One other reflection arises out of the view 
 which has been given of this important subject. 
 The (object of all science, whether it refer to mat- 
 ter or to mind, is simply to ascertain facts, and 
 to trace their relations to each other. The powers 
 which regulate these relations are entirely hidden 
 from us in our present imperfect state of being ; 
 and by grasping at principles which are beyond 
 our reach, we leave that path of inquiry which 
 alone is adapted to our limited faculties, and in- 
 volve ourselves in error, perplexity, and darkness. 
 It is humbling to the pride of human reason, but 
 it is not the less true, that the highest acquire- 
 ment ever made by the most exalted genius of 
 man has been only to trace a part, and a very 
 small part, of that order which the Deity has es- 
 tablished in his works. When we endeavour to 
 pry into the causes of this order, we perceive the 
 operation of powers which lie far beyond the reach 
 of our limited faculties. They who have made 
 the highest advances in true science will be the 
 first to confess how limited these faculties are, and 
 
LlMIl i:i) NATl'lU-: OF THE HUMAN lAt'ULTlES. 'J.J 
 
 how small a juirt we can comprehend of the ways 
 of the Almighty Creator. They will be the first 
 to acknowledge, that the highest acquirement of 
 human wisdom, is to advance to that line which 
 is its legitimate boundary, and there contemplat- 
 ing the wondrous field which lies beyond it, to 
 bend in humble adoration before a wisdom which 
 it cannot fathom, and a power which it cannot 
 comprehend. 
 
: 
 
 INQUIRIES 
 
 CONCERNING THE 
 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERS, 
 
 &c. 
 
 PART I 
 
 OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 The mind is that part of our being which thinks 
 and wills, — remembers and reasons ; — we know 
 nothing of it except from these functions. By 
 means of the corporeal senses, it holds intercourse 
 with the things of the external world, and re- 
 ceives impressions from them. But of this con- 
 nexion also we know nothing but the facts ; 
 when we attempt to speculate upon its nature 
 and cause, we wander at once from the path of 
 philosophical inquiry, into conjectures which are 
 as far beyond the proper sphere, as they are be- 
 yond the reach of the human faculties. The ob- 
 ject of true science on such a subject, therefore, 
 is simply to investigate the facts, or the relations 
 of phenomena, respecting the operations of mind 
 
EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF iMlND, &c. 25 
 
 itself, and the ititercourse which it carries on 
 with the thing's of the external world. 
 
 This important rnle in the philosophy of mind 
 has been fnlly recognised in very modern times 
 only, so that the science, as a faithful interpreta- 
 tion of nature, may be considered as of recent 
 origin. Before the period now referred to, the 
 investig-ation was encumbered by the most fruit- 
 less speculations respecting- the essence of mind, 
 and other discussions which led to no discovery of 
 truth. It was contended, for example, that the 
 mind cannot act where it is not present, and that 
 consequently it cannot be said to perceive exter- 
 nal objects themselves, but only their images, 
 forms, or sensible species, which were said to be 
 conveyed through the senses, and represented to 
 the mind in the same manner in which imag-es 
 are formed in a camera obscura. By the internal 
 functions of mind, these sensible species were then 
 supposed to be refined into phantasms, the objects 
 of memory and imagination ; and these, after un- 
 dergoing- a farther process, became intelligible 
 species, the objects of pure intellect. By a very 
 natural application of this doctrine, it was main- 
 tained by Bishop Berkeley and the philosophers 
 of his school, that, as the mind can perceive no- 
 thing- but its own impressions or imag-es, we can 
 derive no evidence from our senses of the exist- 
 ence of the external world ; and Mr. Hume car- 
 ried the argument a little farther, by maintaining- 
 
26 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 that we have as little joroof of the existence of 
 mind, and that nothing exists in the universe ex- 
 cept impressions and ideas. Of another sect of 
 philosophers who arose out of the same system, 
 each individual professed to believe his own ex- 
 istence, but would not admit the existence of any 
 other being ; hence they received the appropri- 
 ate name of Egoists. 
 
 The various eminent individuals, by whom the 
 fallacy of these speculations was exposed, com- 
 bated them upon the principle that the doctrine 
 of ideas is entirely a fiction of philosophers ; and 
 that a confidence in the information conveyed to 
 us by our senses must be considered as a first 
 truth, or a fundamental law of our natiu'e, sus- 
 ceptible of no explanation, and admitting of no 
 other evidence than that which is derived from 
 the universal conviction of mankind. Nor does 
 it, to common minds, appear a slight indication of 
 the validity of this mode of reasoning, that the phi- 
 losophers who supjjorted this theory do not appear 
 to have acted upon their own system, but in every 
 thing which concerned their personal accommo- 
 dation or personal safety, showed the same confi- 
 dence in the evidence of their senses as other men. 
 
 The deductions made from the ideal theory by 
 Berkeley and Hume seem to have been applica- 
 tions of it which its former advocates had not 
 contemplated. But it is a singular fact, as stated 
 by Dr. lleid, that nearly all philosophers, from 
 
SPECULATIONS OF THE SCHOOLS. 2? 
 
 Hato to Mr. Iluiiie, ai»Teo in iiuiiiitainin^, that 
 the mind (lo(;s not perceive external thiiiLj.s them- 
 selves, but only their ideas, images, or species. 
 This doctrine was founded upon the maxim, that 
 mind cannot act where it is not ])resent ; and we 
 tind one writer only, who, admitting the maxim, 
 called in question the application of it, so far as 
 to maintain, that the mind, in perceiving- exter- 
 nal thing's, leaves the body, and comes into con- 
 tact with the objects of its perce])tion. 
 
 Such speculations ought to be entirely banished 
 from the science of mind, as not only useless and 
 unprofitable, but as referring- to things entirely 
 beyond the reach of the human faculties, and 
 therefore contrary to the first principles of philo- 
 sophical investig-ation. To the same class, we are 
 to refer all speculations in regard to the essence 
 of mind, the manner in which thought is pro- 
 duced, and the means by which the intercourse is 
 carried on between the mind and external objects. 
 These remarkable functions were at one time ex- 
 plained by an imaginary essence called the ani- 
 mal spirits, which were suj)posed to be in con- 
 stant motion, performing the office of messengers 
 between the brain and the organs of sense. By 
 another class of philosophers, of no very ancient 
 date, thinking was ascribed to vibrations in the 
 particles of the brain. The connnunication of 
 perceptions from the senses to the mind has been 
 accounted for, in the same manner, by the mo- 
 
^8 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 tioiis of the nervous fluid, by vibrations of the 
 nerves, or by a subtile essence resembling electri- 
 city or galvanism. The mind, again, has been 
 compared to a camera obscura — to a mirror, and 
 to a storehouse. In opposition, however, to all 
 such hypotheses, which are equally incapable 
 either of proof or of refutation, our duty is to 
 keep steadily in view, that the objects of true 
 science are facts alone, and the relations of these 
 facts to each other. The mind can be compared 
 to nothing in nature ; it has been endowed by 
 its Creator with a power of perceiving external 
 things ; but the manner in which it does so is 
 entirely beyond our comprehension. All at- 
 tempts, therefore, to explain or illustrate its ope- 
 rations by a reference to any thing else, can be 
 considered only as vain and futile. They are en- 
 deavours to establish a resemblance where there 
 is not the vestige of an analogy ; and consequent- 
 ly they can lead to no useful result. It is only 
 by a rigid adherence to this course of investiga- 
 tion, that we can expect to make any progress in 
 true knowledge, or to impart to our inquiries in 
 any department of science the characters either of 
 truth or utility. 
 
 The ideal theory, with all the doctrines founded 
 upon it, may now be considered as gone by. But 
 certain speculations are still occasionally brought 
 out by writers of a particular order, which are 
 referable to the same class ; namely, hypotheses 
 
 :uA 
 
MATKlUALlvSM. 29 
 
 which are to be treated not merely as imsonnd, 
 hut as being, by their very nature, directly op- 
 })osed to the first principles of philosophical in- 
 (juiry. Among- these, the most prominent is the 
 doctrine of materialism, of which it may be ad- 
 visable to take a slight view in the commence- 
 ment of this essay. On the principles which 
 have been referred to, the following considera- 
 tions may be submitted as bearing upon this 
 subject. 
 
 The term Matter is a name which we apply to 
 a certain combination of properties, or to certain 
 substances which are solid, extended, and divis- 
 ible, and which are known to us only by these 
 properties. The term Mind, in the same man- 
 ner, is a name which we apply to a certain combi- 
 nation of functions, or to a certain power which 
 we feel within, which thinks and wills and rea- 
 sons, and is known to us only by these functions. 
 The former we know only by our senses, the lat- 
 ter only by our consciousness. In regard to their 
 essence or occult qualities, we know quite as lit- 
 tle about matter as we do about mind ; and in as 
 far as our utmost conception of them extends, 
 we have no ground for believing that they have 
 any thing in common. The true object of philo- 
 sophy is simply to investigate the facts in regard 
 to both ; and materialism is not to be viewed 
 only as unsound reasoning, but as a logical ab- 
 surdity, and a total misconception of the first prin- 
 
30 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 ciples of pliilosopliiciil inquiry. Does the mate- 
 rialist tell us that the principle which thinks, is 
 material, or the result of organization, we have 
 only to ask him what light he expects to throw 
 upon the subject by such an assertion. For the 
 principle which thinks is known to us only by 
 thinking ; and the substances which are solid and 
 extended are known to us only by their solidity 
 and extension. When we say of the former that 
 it is immaterial, we simply express the fact that 
 it is known to us by properties altogether distinct 
 from the properties to which we have given the 
 name of matter, and, as far as we know, has no- 
 thing in common with them. Beyond these pro- 
 perties, we know as little about matter as we do 
 about mind, so that materialism is scarcely less ex- 
 travagant than would be the attempt to explain 
 any phenomenon, by referring it to some other 
 altogether distinct and dissimilar ; to say, for ex- 
 ample, that colour is a modification of sound, or 
 gravity a species of fermentation. The assertion, 
 indeed, would be fully as plausible, and calculated 
 to throw as much light upon the subject, were a 
 person anxious to explain the nature of matter, 
 to tell us that it is the result of a particular mani- 
 festation of mind. Something analogous to this, 
 in fact, seems to be the foundation of the theory 
 of Boscovich, who conceives all bodies to consist 
 of unextended atoms or mathematical points en- 
 dowed with a certain power of repulsion, and con- 
 
MATEKIALISM. 31 
 
 seqiunitl}' makes tlie oss(mcc of matter to c(msist 
 merely in th(» projxn'ty of resistance. We liave, 
 in trutli, tlie same kind of evidence for the ex- 
 istence of mind, that we have for the existence of 
 matter, namely, from its properties ; and of the 
 two, the former appears to be the least liable to 
 deception. " Of all the truths we know," says Mr. 
 Stewart, " the existence of mind is the most cer- 
 tain. Even the system of Berkeley concerning- the 
 non-existence of matter is far more conceivable 
 than that nothing" but matter exists in the uni- 
 verse." 
 
 A similar mode of reasoning- may be applied to 
 the modification of materialism more prevalent in 
 modern times, by which mind is considered as a 
 result of organization, or, in other words, a func- 
 tion of the brain ; and upon which has been 
 founded the conclusion, that like our bodily senses 
 it will cease to be, when the bodily frame is dis- 
 solved. The brain, it is true, is the centre of that 
 influence on which depend sensation and motion. 
 There is a remarkable connexion between this 
 organ and the manifestations of mind ; and by 
 various diseases of the brain these manifestations 
 are often modified, impaired, or suspended. We 
 shall afterwards see that these results are very far 
 from being uniform ; but even if they were uni- 
 form, the facts woidd warrant no such conclusion 
 respecting the nature of mind ; for they accord 
 equally with the supposition that the brain is the 
 
32 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 organ of comniiinication between the mind and 
 the external world. When the materialist ad- 
 vances a single step beyond this, he plunges at 
 once into conclusions which are entirely gratu- 
 itous and unwarranted. We rest nothing more 
 upon this argument, than that these conclu- 
 sions are unwarranted ; but we might go far- 
 ther than this, and contend, that the presump- 
 tion is clearly on the other side, when we con- 
 sider the broad and obvious distinction which 
 exists between the peculiar phenomena of mind, 
 and those functions which are exercised through 
 the means of bodily organization. They do not 
 admit of being brought into comparison, and 
 have nothing in common. The most exquisite 
 of our bodily senses are entirely dependent for 
 their exercise upon impressions from external 
 things. We see not without the presence both of 
 light and a body reflecting it; and if we could sup- 
 pose light to be annihilated, though the eye were to 
 retain its perfect condition, sight would be extin- 
 guished. But mind owns no such dependence on 
 external things, except in the origin of its know- 
 ledge in regard to them. When this knowledge has 
 once been acquired, it is retained and recalled at 
 pleasure ; and mind exercises its various functions 
 without any dependence upon impressions from 
 the external world. That \rhich has long ceased 
 to exist is still distinctly before it; or is recalled, af- 
 ter having been long forgotten, in a manner even 
 
MATERIALISM. 33 
 
 still more woiulerful ; and scenes, deeds, or beings, 
 which never existed, are called up in long- and 
 harmonious succession, invested with all the cha- 
 racters of truth, and all the vividness of present 
 existence. The mind remembers, conceives, 
 combines, and reasons ; it loves, and fears, and 
 hopes, in the total absence of any impression 
 from without, that can influence, in the smallest 
 degree, these emotions ; and we have the fullest 
 conviction that it would continue to exercise the 
 same functions in undiminished activity, though 
 all material thinsrs were at once annihilated. 
 
 This argument, indeed, may be considered as 
 only negative, but this is all that the subject ad- 
 mits of. For when we endeavour to speculate 
 directly on the essence of mind, we are immedi- 
 ately lost in perplexity, in consequence of our 
 total ignorance of the subject, and the use of 
 terms borrowed from analogfies with material 
 things. Hence the unsatisfactory nature of every 
 physiological or metaphysical argument respecting 
 the essence of mind, arising entirely from the at- 
 tempt to reason the subject in a manner of which 
 it is not susceptible. It admits not of any ordi- 
 nary process of logic, for the facts on which it 
 rests are the objects of consciousness only ; and 
 the argument must consist in an appeal to the 
 consciousness of every man, that he feels a power 
 within totally distinct from any function of the 
 body. What other conception than this can 
 
 D 
 
34 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 he form of that power by which he recalls tlie 
 past, and provides for the future ; by which he 
 ranges uncontrolled from world to world, and 
 from system to system ; surveys the works of all- 
 creating- povFer, and rises to the contemplation of 
 the eternal cause ? To what function of matter 
 shall he liken that principle, by which he loves 
 and fears, and joys and sorrows ; by which he is 
 elevated with hope, excited by enthusiasm, or 
 sunk in the horrors of despair ? These changes 
 also he feels, in many instances, to be equally in- 
 dependent of impressions from without, and of 
 the condition of his bodily frame. In the most 
 peaceful state of every corporeal function, pas- 
 sion, remorse, or anguish, may rage within ; and, 
 while the body is racked by the most frigiitful 
 diseases, the mind may repose in tranquillity and 
 hope. He is taught by physiolog"y, that every 
 part of his body is in a constant state of change, 
 and that within a certain period, every particle 
 of it is renewed. But, amid these changes, he 
 feels that the being whom he calls himself, re- 
 mains essentially the same. In particular, his 
 remembrance of the occurrences of his early days, 
 he feels to be totally inconsistent with the idea 
 of an impression made upon a material organ, 
 unless he has recourse to the absurdity of sup- 
 posing that one series of particles, as they depart- 
 ed, transferred the picture to those which came 
 to occupy their room. 
 
 
MATKKIALISM. 35 
 
 lithe being' then, which we call mind or sonl, 
 be, to the utmost extent of our knowledge, thus 
 dissimilar to, and distinct from any thing- that we 
 know to be a result of bodily organization, what 
 reason have we to believe that it should be af- 
 fected by any change in the arrangement of ma- 
 terial organs, except in so far as relates to its in- 
 tercourse with this external world ? The effects 
 of that change, which we call the death of an ani- 
 mal body, are nothing more than a change in the 
 arrangement of its constituent elements ; for it 
 can be demonstrated, on the strictest principles 
 of chemistry, that not one particle of these ele- 
 ments ceases to exist. We have, in fact, no con- 
 ception of annihilation ; and our whole experi- 
 ence is opposed to the belief that one atom which 
 ever existed lias ceased to exist. There is, there- 
 fore, as Dr. Brown has well remarked, in the 
 very decay of the body, an analogy which would 
 seem to indicate the continued existence of the 
 thinking principle, since that which we term de- 
 cay is ittJelf only another name for continued ex- 
 istence. To conceive then, that any thing men- 
 tal ceases to exist after death, when we know 
 that every thing corporeal continues to exist, is 
 a gratuitous assumption, contrary to every i-ule 
 of philosophical inquiry, and in direct opposition, 
 not only to all the facts relating to mind itself, 
 but even to the analogy which is furnished by the 
 dissolution of the bodilv frame. 
 
36 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 To this mode of reasoning- it has been object- 
 ed, that it would go to establish an immaterial 
 principle in the lower animals, which in them 
 exhibits many of the phenomena of mind. I 
 have only to answer, — be it so. There are in 
 the lower animals many of the phenomena of 
 mind ; and, M'ith regard to these, we also con- 
 tend, that they are entirely distinct from any 
 thing we know as the properties of matter, — 
 which is all that we mean, or can mean, by 
 being immaterial. There are other principles 
 superadded to material things, of the nature of 
 which we are equally ignorant ; — such, for ex- 
 ample, as the principle of vegetable life, and 
 that of animal life. To say that these are pro- 
 perties of matter, is merely arguing about a term ; 
 — for what we mean by matter, is something 
 which is solid, extended, and divisible. That 
 these properties are, in certain individuals, com- 
 bined with simple, or vegetable life, — in others, 
 with animal life, that is, life and the powers of 
 sensation and motion, — and in others with animal 
 life, and certain of those properties which we 
 call mind, — are all facts equally beyond our 
 comprehension. For any thing we know, they 
 may all be immortal principles ; and for any 
 thing we know, matter itself may be immortal. 
 The simple truth is, that we know nothing on 
 the subject; and, while, on the one hand, we 
 have no title to assume an essence to be mortal 
 
MATERlALliSM. 37 
 
 because it possesses only the properties of mat- 
 ter ; neither, on the other hand, have we any 
 ri<>ht to infer an essence to be immortal, because 
 it possesses properties different from those of 
 matter. We talk, indeed, about matter, and we 
 talk about mind ; — we speculate concerning- ma- 
 teriality and immateriality, until we argue our- 
 selves into a kind of belief, that we really un- 
 derstand something of the subject. The truth is, 
 that we understand nothing. Matter and mind 
 are known to us by certain properties; — these pro- 
 perties are quite distinct from each other ; but 
 in regard to both, it is entirely out of the reach 
 of our faculties to advance a single step beyond 
 the facts which are before us. Whether in their 
 substratum or ultimate essence, they are the 
 same, or whether they are different, we know 
 not, and never can know in our present state of 
 being. Let us, then, be satisfied with the facts, 
 when our utmost faculties can carry us no far- 
 ther ; — let us cease to push our feeble specu- 
 lations, when our duty is only to wonder and 
 adore. 
 
 These considerations, while they are directly 
 opposed to the crude conclusions of the mate- 
 rialist, also serve to show us how 'much the sub- 
 ject is removed beyond our limited faculties ; and 
 it is not on such speculations, therefore, that we 
 rest the evidence for a future state of being. We 
 
38 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 know nothing of the nature or the essence of 
 mind ; bnt whatever may be its essence, and 
 whatever may be the nature and extent of that 
 mysterious connexion which the Deity has estab- 
 lished between it and our bodily organization, 
 these points have no reference whatever to the 
 great question of its future existence. This is a 
 principle which seems to have been too much 
 lost sight of in the discussion of this subject, 
 namely, that our speculations respecting the im- 
 materiality of the rational human soul have no in- 
 fluence on our belief of its immortality. This 
 momentous truth rests on a species of evidence 
 altogether different, which addresses itself to the 
 moral constitution of man. It is found in those 
 principles of his nature by which he feels upon 
 his spirit the awe of a God, and looks forward to 
 the future with anxiety or with hope ; — by 
 which he knows to distinguish truth from false- 
 hood and evil from good, and has forced upon 
 him the conviction, that he is a moral and respon- 
 sible being. This is the power of conscience, 
 that monitor within, which raises its voice in the 
 breast of every man, a witness for his Creator. 
 He who resigns himself to its guidance, and he 
 who repels its warnings, are both compelled to 
 acknowledge its power ; and, whether the good 
 man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or 
 the victim of remorse Avithers beneath an in- 
 fluence unseen by human eye, and shrinks from 
 
 m 
 
MATERIALISM. 3[) 
 
 the anticipation of a reckoning" to come, each has 
 forced upon him a conviction, such as argument 
 never g-q-ve, that the being" which is essentially 
 himself is distinct from any function of the body, 
 and will survive in undiminished vig-our when 
 the body shall have fallen intt) decay. 
 
 When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the liig-h 
 principles of moral obligation, and the moral go- 
 vernment of the Deity, this im})ortant truth is en- 
 tirely independent of all our feeble speculations 
 on the essence of mind. For thoug"h we were to 
 suppose, with the materialist, that the rational 
 sold (jf man is a mere chemical combination, 
 which, by the dissolution of its elements, is dissi- 
 })ated to the four winds of heaven, where is the 
 irnprobability, that the Power which framed the 
 wondrous compound may collect these elements 
 again, and combine them anew, for the great pur- 
 poses of his moral administration. In our specu- 
 lations on such a momentous subject, we are too 
 apt to be influenced by our conceptions of the 
 ])owers and properties of physical things ; but 
 there is a point where this principle must be 
 abandoned, and where the soundest philosophy 
 requires, that we take along with us a full recog- 
 nisance of the power of God. 
 
 There is thus, in the consciousness of every 
 man, a deep impression of continued existence. 
 The casuist may reason against it till he bewilder 
 himself in his own sophistries ; but a voice with- 
 
iO MATERIALISM. >- 
 
 in g-ives the lie to his vain specidatious, and 
 pleads with authority for a lite which is to come. 
 The sincere and humble inquirer cherishes the 
 impression, while he seeks for farther light on a 
 subject so momentous ; and he thus receives, 
 with absolute conviction, the truth which beams 
 upon him from the revelation of God, — that the 
 mysterious part of his being", which thinks, and 
 wills, and reasons, shall indeed survive the wreck 
 of its mortal tenement, and is destined for immor- 
 tality. 
 
PART II. 
 
 OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
 FACTS RELATING BOTH TO MIND AND 
 MATTER. 
 
 Among writers on the science of mind, there 
 was formerly much controversy in regard to the 
 origin of our ideas. Some maintained that they 
 are derived entirely from perception, that is, 
 through the external senses ; others considered 
 them as arising partly from perception, and partly 
 from consciousness or reflection ; and some added 
 a third class, which they called innate ideas, and 
 which were supposed to exist in the mind itself, 
 independently of, and prior to, the exercise either 
 of perception or reflection. This phraseology 
 had its origin in the ancient theory of ideas, ac- 
 cording to which something was supposed to 
 exist, distinct both from the mind and the exter- 
 nal object of its perception. This, as we have 
 formerly seen, was what philosophers meant by 
 an idea. It was believed to be the immediate 
 object of the mind's perception, but to be only a 
 
4^ ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 kind of iniag-e or representative of the object per- 
 ceived. This hypothesis, which kept its place in 
 the science of mind till a very recent period, is 
 now generally admitted to have been a fiction of 
 philosophers ; and the phraseology res])ecting' 
 ideas is abandoned by the best practical writers ; 
 becanse, though the ancient doctrine be exploded, 
 and the term may be used only in a figurative 
 sense, it still seems to imply something existing 
 in the mind, distinct from the mind itself. The 
 impressions derived from external things are 
 therefore to be considered as the occasions on 
 which the various powers of the mind are brought 
 into action. These powers themselves then be- 
 come the objects of consciousness or reflection, 
 and, by their farther exercise, we acquire certain 
 notions which arise out of the mental operations. 
 This doctrine gives no encouragement to the 
 scheme of materialism, for it is clear that we 
 cannot remember till we are furnished with some 
 fact to be remembered ; but this can never be 
 supposed to affect our belief in the existence of 
 the power of memory, before the fact was so 
 furnished. If we could suppose the case of a 
 man who had lived all his life in the dark, he 
 certainly could not see, but we should not say 
 that the admission of light imparted- to him the 
 power of vision ; it only furnished the circum- 
 stances which gave occasion to the exercise of 
 sight. It has accordingly been shewn by Mr. 
 
Oltlt.IN OF OUR KNOWLEJKii:. 43 
 
 Stewart, that, though we may not be conscious 
 of our mental powers till they are called into 
 action, yet this may arise from the most simple 
 sensation, such as affords no evidence of the pro- 
 perties, or even of the existence of the material 
 world. 
 
 Through the senses, then, we acquire a know- 
 ledge of the facts relating to external things. 
 The mental processes, thus brought into action, 
 then become the subjects of consciousness, and 
 we acquire a knowledge of the facts relating to 
 them. By a farther exercise of these powers on 
 various facts referring to both matter and mind, 
 we acquire certain notions arising out of our 
 reflection upon the relations of these facts, such 
 as our notions of time, motion, number, cause 
 and effect, and personal identity ; and we acquire 
 farther the impression of certain fundamental 
 laws of belief, which are not referable to any 
 process of reasoning, but are to be considered as 
 a part of our constitution, or a spontaneous and 
 instinctive exercise of reason in everv sound mind. 
 
 The origin of our knoAvledge, then, is referable, 
 in a philosophical point of view, to perception and 
 reflection. But in point of fact, the knowledge 
 which is acquired by an individual, through his 
 own perception and reflection, is but a small part 
 of what he possesses ; much of the knowledge 
 possessed by every one is acquired through the 
 perceptions of other men. In an essay, there- 
 
r 
 
 44 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 fore, wliicli is intended to be entirely practical, 
 I shall include tliis last department under the 
 head of testimony. The division of this part of 
 the subject will therefore be, 
 
 1. Sensation and Perception. 
 
 2. Consciousness and Reflection. 
 
 3. Testimony. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 We know nothing of perception except the fact, 
 that certain impressions made upon the organs 
 of sense convey to the mind a knowledge of the 
 properties of external things. Some of the older 
 speculations on this subject have already been 
 referred to. In these the mind was compared to 
 a camera obscura, and the transmission of the 
 forms or images of things to it, from the organs 
 of sense, was explained by the motion of the ani- 
 mal spirits, or the nervous fluid, or by vibrations 
 in the substance of the nerves. All such specu- 
 lations are now dismissed from the investigation, 
 being considered as attempts to penetrate into 
 mysteries which are beyond the reach of the hu- 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 4-5 
 
 iimii faculties, and consequently not the legiti- 
 mate objects of philosophical inquir}'. 
 
 Our lirst knowledge of the existence and pro- 
 perties of the material world is evidently of a 
 complex nature. It seems to arise from the com- 
 bined action of several senses, conveying to us 
 the general notion of certain essences which are 
 solid and extended, or possessed of those proper- 
 ties which characterise material things. Without 
 this general knowledge previously acquired, our 
 various senses acting individually could convey 
 to us no definite notion of the properties of ex- 
 ternal things. A smell, that is, a mere odour, 
 for example, might be perceived by us, but would 
 convey nothing more than the sensation simply. 
 It could not communicate the impression of this 
 being a property of an external body, until we 
 had previously acquired a knowledge of the ex- 
 istence of that body, and had come, by observa- 
 tion, to associate the sensation with the body 
 from which it proceeds. The same holds true of 
 the other senses, and we are thus led, at the very 
 first step of our inquiry, to a complicated process 
 of mind, without which, our mere sensations 
 could convey to us no definite knowledge. 
 
 Having thus acquired a knowledge of the ex- 
 istence and general properties of material things, 
 we next derive from our v^arious senses, a know- 
 ledge of their more minute characters. These 
 are generally divided into primary and secondary. 
 
4C SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 The primary qualities of material things are such 
 as are essential, and must at all times belong to 
 matter ; such as solidity and extension. These 
 properties necessarily convey to us a conviction of 
 something existing out of the mind, and distinct 
 from its own sensations. The secondary qualities, 
 again, are colour, temperature, smell, taste, &c. 
 These are not essential properties of matter, but 
 qualities producing sensations in a sentient being ; 
 they may or they may not belong to any particu- 
 lar body, or they may be attached to it at one 
 time and not at another. Hence they convey to 
 us primarily no definite notion in regard to the 
 existence or properties of external things, except, 
 as Mr. Stewart expresses it, " as the unknown 
 cause of a known sensation." One of the quib- 
 bles or paradoxes of the scholastic philosophy, 
 was denying the real existence of these secondary 
 qualities of matter. Every one is familiar with 
 the humorous account given in the Guardian, of 
 the attainments of a youth from college, and his 
 display of them when on a visit to Lady Lizard 
 his mother. " When the girls were sorting a set 
 of knots, he would demonstrate to them that all 
 the ribbons were of the same colour, or rather of 
 no colour at all. My Lady Lizard herself, though 
 she was not a little pleased with her son's im- 
 provement, was one day almost angry with him j 
 for, having accidentally burnt her fingers, as she 
 was lighting the lamp for her teapot, in the midst 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 47 
 
 of her anguish, Jack hiid hohl of the opportunity 
 to instruct her, that there is no such thing as 
 heat in the fire." Such speculations, which were 
 at one time common in the schools of philosophy, 
 Jiad their origin entirely in an abuse of terms. 
 The term heat, for example, has two meanings 
 Avhich are quite distinct from each other. It 
 means a sensation produced in a sentient being, 
 and in this sense, it may be said with truth, that 
 there is no heat in the fire ; but it means also a 
 quality in material substances capable of produc- 
 ing this sensation, and it is in this sense that we 
 speak of heat as a property of matter. 
 
 The process by which we acquire a knowledge 
 of external things is usually divided into two 
 stages, namely, sensation and perception ; the 
 former implying the corporeal, the latter the men- 
 tal part of it. Others apply the term perception 
 to both ; and, according to Dr. Brown, sensation 
 is the simple impression made upon the organs 
 of sense ; perception is an association formed be- 
 tween this impression and an external substance 
 which we have ascertained to be concerned in pro- 
 ducing it. Our senses, by which this knowledge is 
 acquired, are generally reckoned five, — namely, 
 sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Dr. 
 Brown proposes to add our muscular frame, and 
 apparently with good reason ; for there seems 
 ground for believing that it is by resistance to 
 
48 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 muscular action that we acquire the notion of so- f 
 
 lidity, and that this could not be acquired by 
 touch alone. 
 
 Our first impression of the existence and soli- 
 dity of material objects, then, seems to be derived 
 from touch combined with muscular resistance ; 
 and at the same time we acquire the knowledg-e of 
 temperature, roughness or smoothness, &c. There 
 has been some difference of opinion in regard to 
 the manner in which we acquire the notion of 
 extension, including- figure and magnitude. It is 
 evident that it cannot be acquired from touch 
 alone ; but it may be acquired from touch com- 
 bined with muscular motion, as when we move 
 the hand over the surface of a body. This, how- 
 ever, includes also the idea of time, — for our no- 
 tion of the extent of a surface, when the hand 
 moves over it, is very much influenced by the 
 velocity with which the motion is made. Hence 
 time has been supposed by some to be one of our 
 very earliest impressions, and antecedent even to 
 the notion of extension or space. It is probable, 
 however, that the notion of extension may also 
 be acquired in a more simple manner, from the 
 combined operation of touch and vision. If this 
 opinion be correct, it will follow, that our first 
 knowledge of the existence and essential proper- 
 ties of material things, is derived from the com- 
 bined operation of sight, touch, and muscular 
 action. 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. M) 
 
 With regard to all our senses, however, the 
 truth seems to be, that the first notions conveyed 
 by them are of a very limited and imperfect kind ; 
 and that our real knowledg^e is acquired only 
 after considerable observation and experience, in 
 the course of which, the impressions of one sense 
 are corrected and assisted by those of others, and 
 by a process of mind acting- upon the whole. The 
 primary objects of vision, for example, seem to 
 be simply light or colour, and expansion. But 
 the judgments which we are in the daily habit of 
 forming upon vision are of a much more exten- 
 sive kind, embracing also distance, magnitude, 
 and what has been called tangible figure, such as 
 the figure of a cube or a sphere. This last, it is 
 evident, cannot be considered as a primary object 
 of vision, but as entirely the result of experience 
 derived from the sense of touch ; for we never 
 could have formed any conception of the figure 
 of a cube or a sphere by vision alone. Distance 
 and magnitude, also, are evidently not the pri- 
 mary objects of vision ; for persons who have 
 been suddenly cured of congenital blindness, by 
 the operation for cataract, have no conception of 
 the distance or magnitude of objects ; they per- 
 ceive only simple expansion of surface with co- 
 lour. Our judgment of distance and magnitude 
 by vision, therefore, is an acquired habit, founded 
 upon the knowledge which we have received, by 
 other means, of the properties of the objects. 
 
 E 
 
.50 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 Accordingly, it is familiar to every one, that we 
 have no idea of the distance of an object, except 
 we have some notion of its mag-nitude ; nor, 
 on the other hand, of its magnitude, except we 
 have some knowledge of its distance. The ap- 
 plication of this principle is also familiar in per- 
 spective drawing, in which the diminished size 
 of known objects is made to convey the notion 
 of distance. On the same principle, known ob- 
 jects seen through a telescope do not appear to 
 be magnified, but to be brought nearer. In the 
 same manner with regard to sounds ; we have no 
 idea of their intensity, except we have some no- 
 tion of their distance, and vice versa. A given 
 degree of sound, for example, if we believed it to 
 have been produced in the next room, we might 
 conclude to proceed from the fall of some trifling 
 body ; but if we supposed it to be at the distance 
 of several miles, we should immediately conclude 
 that it proceeded from a tremendous explosion. 
 
 In regard to certain small distances, however, 
 there is a power of judging- by sight alone ; 
 and it appears to arise out of the degree of in- 
 clination which is given to the axis of vision in 
 directing the two eyes to the object. Thus, in 
 snuffing a candle, or carrying the finger to a 
 small object within arm-length, it will be found 
 that we are very apt to miss it, if we look with 
 one eye only, but can touch it with unerring 
 certainty when both eyes are directed to it. 
 
SENSATION AND I^EIICEPTION. .01 
 
 It appears to be on the same principle that we en- 
 joy, in a greater degree, the deception prodnced 
 by a painting", when we look at it with one eye, 
 especially if we also look throngh a tube. By 
 the former, we cut off the means of correcting" 
 the illusion by the direction of the axis of vision ; 
 and by the latter, we remove the influence of all 
 neighbouring" objects. It is impossible to deter- 
 mine the precise distance to which we can ex- 
 tend this power of judging of distance by the in- 
 clination of the axis of vision, but it does not ap- 
 pear to be great ; and in regard to all greater 
 distances the judgment by vision is evidently an 
 acquired habit, arising out of such a mental exer- 
 cise as has now been referred to. 
 
 There are some other circumstances, also the 
 result of experience, by which we are greatly in- 
 fluenced in all such cases, particularly the degree 
 of illumination of the objects, and the degree of dis- 
 tinctness of their outline and minute parts. Thus, 
 in a picture, distant objects are represented as 
 faintly illuminated, and with indistinctness of out- 
 line and minute parts ; and vice versa. On this 
 principle, objects seen through a fog, or in obscure 
 light, are apt to appear much larger than they 
 really are ; because, in the mental process which 
 takes place in regard to them, we flrst assume 
 them to be distant, from their imperfect outline 
 and faint illumination, and then, judging from 
 this assumed distance, we conclude them to be of 
 
•52 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 great size. On the other hand, objects seen in an 
 iinusiuilly clear state of the atmosphere, appear 
 nearer than they really are, from the greater dis- 
 tinctness of their outline. In our judgment of 
 distance by sight, we are also greatly influenced 
 by the eye resting on intermediate objects ; and 
 hence the difficulty of judging of distances at sea. 
 A striking illustration of the same principle is 
 furnished by Captain Parry, in regard to objects 
 seen across a uniform surface of snow. " We 
 had frequent occasion, in our walks on shore, to 
 remark the deception which takes place in esti- 
 mating the distance and magnitude of objects, 
 when viewed over an unvaried surface of snow. 
 It was not uncommon for us to direct our steps 
 towards what we took to be a large mass of 
 stone, at the distance of half a mile from us, but 
 which we were able to take up in our hands af- 
 ter one minute's walk. This was more particu- 
 larly the case when ascending the brow of a hill." 
 Captain Parry adds, that this deception did not 
 become less on account of the frequency with 
 which its effects were experienced ; and a late 
 writer has used this as an objection to the 
 doctrine lately referred to, respecting the in- 
 fluence of experience on our judgment of dis- 
 tance by vision. But this is evidently founded 
 on a misconception of the effect of experience in 
 such cases. Captain Parry could mean only, that 
 he did not acquire the power of judging of the 
 
 i 
 
SEKSATION AND PERCEPTION. 55 
 
 distance or magiiitiule of iinkiiowii objects. Had 
 he been approaching- an object by which he had 
 once been deceived, knowing- it to be the same, 
 he would not have been deceived a second time ; 
 but, judging from its known mag-nitude, would 
 have inferred its distance. Thus the result of ex- 
 perience is to enable us to judge of the distance 
 of an object of known mag-nitude, or of the mag- 
 nitude of an object at a known distance ; but, in 
 regard to objects of which both the distance and 
 magnitude are unknown, it teaches us only not 
 to trust the indications of vision. 
 
 In our judgment by vision of the magnitude of 
 objects, again, we are much influenced by com- 
 parison with other objects, the magnitude of 
 which is supposed to be known. I remember 
 once having occasion to pass along Ludgate Hill, 
 when the great door of St. Paul's was open, and 
 several persons were standing in it. They ap- 
 peared to be very little children ; but, on coming 
 up to them, were found to be full grown persons. 
 In the mental process which here took place, the 
 door had been assumed as a known magnitude, 
 and the other objects judged of by it. Had I at- 
 tended to the door being much larger than any 
 door that one is in the habit of seeing, the mind 
 would have made allowance for the apparent size 
 of the persons ; and, on the other hand, had these 
 been known to be full grown persons, a judg- 
 ment would have been formed of the size of the 
 
54 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 
 door. On the same principle, travellers visiting" 
 the pyramids of Egypt have repeatedly remark- |i 
 
 ed, how greatly the notion of their magnitude is 
 increased, by a number of large animals, as camels, 
 being assembled at their base. 
 
 There is something exceedingly remarkable in 
 the manner, in which loss or diminution of one 
 sense is followed by increase of the intensity of 
 others, or rather, perhaps, by an increased atten- 
 tion to the indications of other senses. Blind 
 persons acquire a wonderful delicacy of touch ; in 
 some cases, it is said, to the extent of distinguish- 
 ing colours. Mr. Saunderson, the blind mathe- 
 matician, could distinguish by his hand, in a se- 
 ries of Roman medals, the true from the coun- 
 terfeit, with a more unerring discrimination than 
 the eye of a professed virtuoso ; and, when he 
 was present at the astronomical observations in 
 the garden of his college, he was accustomed to 
 perceive every cloud which passed over the sun. 
 This remarkable power, which has sometimes 
 been referred to an increased intensity of parti- 
 cular senses, in many cases evidently resolves it- 
 self into an increased habit of attention to the in- 
 dications of all those senses which the individual 
 retains. Two instances have been related to me 
 of blind men who were much esteemed as judges 
 of horses. One of these, in giving his opinion of 
 a horse, declared him to be blind, though this 
 had escaped the observation of several persons 
 
SENSATIOxN AND PERCErTION. 55 
 
 who had the use of their eyes, and who were with 
 some difficulty convinced of it. Being asked to 
 give an account of the principle on which he had 
 decided, he said it was by the sound of the horse's 
 step in walking-, which implied a peculiar and un- 
 usual caution in his manner of putting down his 
 feet. The other individual, in similar circum- 
 stances, pronounced a horse to be blind of one 
 eye, though this had also escaped the observation 
 of those concerned. When he was asked to ex- 
 plain the facts on which he formed his judgment, 
 he said, he felt the one eye to be colder than the 
 other. It is related of the late Dr. Moyse, the 
 well known blind philosopher, that he could dis- 
 tinguish a black dress on his friends by its smell ; 
 and there seems to be good evidence that blind 
 persons have acquired the power of distinguish- 
 ing colours by the touch. In a case of this kind, 
 mentioned by Mr. Boyle, the individual stated 
 that black imparted to his sense of touch the 
 greatest degree of asperity, and blue the least. 
 Dr. Rush relates of two blind young men, bro- 
 thers, of the city of Philadelphia, that they 
 knew when they approached a post in walking 
 across a street, by a peculiar sound which the 
 ground under their feet emitted in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the post ; and that they could tell 
 the names of a number of tame pigeons, with 
 which they amused themselves in a little garden, 
 by only hearing them fly over their heads. I 
 
56 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 have known several instances of persons affected 
 with that extreme degree of deafness, which oc- 
 curs in the deaf and dumb, who had a peculiar 
 susceptibility to particular kinds of sounds, de- 
 pending- apparently upon an impression commu- 
 nicated to their organs of touch or simple sensa- 
 tion. They could tell, for instance, the approach 
 of a carriage in the street without seeing it, be- 
 fore it was taken notice of by persons who had 
 the use of all their senses. An analogous fact is 
 observed in the habit acquired by the deaf and 
 dumb, of understanding what is said to them by 
 watching the motion of the lips of the speaker. 
 Examples still more wonderful are on record, but 
 certainly require confirmation. A story, for in- 
 stance, has lately been mentioned, in some of the 
 medical journals, of a gentleman in France who 
 lost every sense, except the feeling of one side of 
 his face ; yet it is said that his family acquired a 
 method of holding communication with him, by 
 tracing characters upon the part which retained 
 its sensation. 
 
 Much ingenuity has been bestowed upon at- 
 tempts to explain, how, with two eyes, we see 
 only one object ; and why that object is seen 
 erect, when we know that the image on the re- 
 tina is inverted. All that need be said upon 
 the subject, and all that can properly be said, 
 appears to be, that such is the constitution of our 
 nervous system. It is on the same principle, that 
 
 r 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 57 
 
 by the sense of touch, in which may be concern- 
 ed a thousand or ten thousand distinct points of 
 contact, we receive the impression of only one 
 body ; or, what perhaps may appear a more strict- 
 ly analog-ous case, we receive the impression of 
 but one body, thoug-h we grasp the substance 
 with two hands, or with ten distinct fingers. For 
 the healthy perception in both these cases, how- 
 ever, a certain arrangement is required, which 
 we may call the natural harmony of the nervous 
 system ; and when this harmony is disturbed, 
 the result is remarkably altered. Thus, squint- 
 ing produces the vision of a double image, be- 
 cause the images fall upon what we may call un- 
 harmonizing points of the retina ; and the same 
 principle may be illustrated, in a very curious 
 manner, by a simple experiment with the sense 
 of touch. If a small round body, such as a pea, 
 be laid upon the palm of the one hand, and roll- 
 ed about between the first and second fingers of 
 the other, in their natural position, one pea only 
 is felt ; but, if the fingers are crossed, so that the 
 pea is rolled between the opposite surfaces of the 
 two fingers, a most distinct impression of two 
 peas is conveyed. 
 
 Of the whole of the remarkable process of sen- 
 sation and perception, we know nothing but the 
 facts, that certain impressions made upon the or- 
 gans of sense are followed by certain perceptions 
 in the mind ; and that this takes place, in some 
 
.58 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 way, throiig-h the medium of the brain and ner- 
 vous system. We are in the habit of saying, that 
 the impressions are conveyed to the brain ; but, 
 even in this, we probably advance a step beyond 
 what is warranted. We know that the nerves 
 derive their influence from their connexion with 
 the brain, or as forming" along- with it one great 
 medium of sensation ; but we do not know, whe- 
 ther impressions, made upon the nervous fabric 
 connected with the organs of sense, are conveyed 
 to the brain ; or whether the mind perceives 
 them directly, as they are made upon the organs 
 of sense. The whole subject is one of those mys- 
 teries which are placed above our reach, and in 
 which we cannot advance a single step beyond 
 the knowledge of the facts. Any attempt to spe- 
 culate upon it is therefore to be considered as 
 contrary to the first principles of philosophical in- 
 quiry. We must simply receive the facts as of 
 that class which we cannot account for in the 
 smallest degree ; and the evidence which we de- 
 rive from our senses, of the existence and pro- 
 perties of the things of the material world, is to 
 be recognised as one of those fundamental laws 
 of belief, which admit of no other proof than that 
 which is found in the universal conviction of 
 mankind. 
 
 Before concluding the subject of perception, it 
 remains to be noticed, that a certain voluntary 
 efl'ort is required for the full exercise of it ; or, at 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 59 
 
 least, for that degree of perce})tioii which leaves 
 an impression capable of being- retained. It is 
 familiar to every one, that when the mind is 
 closely occupied, numerous objects may pass be- 
 fore our eyes, and circumstances be talked of in 
 our hearing-, of which we do not retain the slight- 
 est recollection ; and this is often in such a de- 
 gree as implies, not a want of memory only, 
 but an actual want of the perception of the ob- 
 jects. We cannot doubt, however, that there 
 was the sensation of them ; that is, the usual im- 
 pression made upon the eye in the one case, and 
 the ear in the other. What is wanting- is a cer- 
 tain effort of the mind itself, without which sen- 
 sation is not necessarily followed by perception ; 
 — this is what we call Attention. It is a state 
 or act of the mind which is exercised bv different 
 individuals in very different degrees. It is much 
 influenced by habit ; and though it may not often 
 be wanting in such a degree as to prevent the 
 perception of objects, it is often deficient in a 
 manner which prevents the recollection of them, 
 and consequently has an extensive influence upon 
 the intellectual character. 
 
 The effect of attention is illustrated by various 
 mental phenomena of daily occurrence. If we 
 are placed in such a situation that the eye com- 
 mands an extensive landscape, presenting a great 
 variety of objects, or the wall of an apartment 
 covered with ])ictures, we have the power of fix- 
 
60 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 iiig the mind upon one object in such a manner 
 that all the rest become to us nearly as if they did 
 not exist. Yet we know that they are actually 
 seen as far as the mere sense of vision is con- 
 cerned ; that is, images of all of them are formed 
 upon the retina ; but they are not objects of at- 
 tention, or of that peculiar voluntary effort of 
 mind which is necessary for the full percep- 
 tion of them. In the same manner, a practised 
 musician can, in the midst of a musical perfor- 
 mance, direct his attention to one part, such as 
 the bass, — can continue this for such a time as he 
 pleases, and then again enjoy the general har- 
 mony of the whole. On the same principle, the 
 mind may be so intensely fixed upon something 
 within itself, as an object of conception or me- 
 mory, or a process of reasoning, as to have no 
 full perception of present external impressions. 
 We shall afterwards have occasion to refer to a 
 state of mind in which this exists in such a de- 
 gree, that objects of conce2)tion or memory are 
 believed to have a real and present existence ; 
 and in which this erroneous impression is not 
 corrected by impressions from external things : — 
 this occurs in insanity. 
 
 Attention is very much influenced by habit, 
 and connected with this subject there are some 
 facts of great interest. There is a remarkable law 
 of the system by which actions, at first requiring 
 much attention, are, after frequent repetition, per- 
 
 a!M 
 
INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 6l 
 
 fornied with a iniich less degree of it, or without 
 the mind being- conscious of any effort. This is 
 exemplified in various processes of daily occur- 
 rence, as reading and writing, but most remark- 
 ably in music. Musical performance at first re- 
 quires the closest attention, but the effort becomes 
 constantly less, until it is often not perceived at 
 all ; and a lady may be seen running over a piece 
 of music on the piano, and at the same time talk- 
 ing on another subject. A young lady, mention- 
 ed by Dr. Darwin, executed a long and very 
 difficult piece of music, with the utmost preci- 
 sion, under the eye of her master ; but seemed 
 agitated during the execution of it, and when she 
 had concluded, burst into tears. It turned out 
 that her attention had, during the whole time 
 been intensely occupied with the agonies of a 
 favourite canary bird, which at last dropt dead 
 in its cage. We see the same principle exempli- 
 fied in the rapidity with which an expert arith- 
 metician can run up a long column of figures, 
 without being conscious of the individual com- 
 binations. It is illustrated in another manner 
 by the feats of jugglers, the deception produced 
 by which depends upon their performing a cer- 
 tain number of motions with such rapidity that 
 the attention of the spectators does not follow 
 all the combinations. 
 
 In teaching such arts as music or arithmetic, 
 this principle is also illustrated ; for the most 
 
62 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 expert aritlimetlcian or musical performer is not 
 necessarily, and perhaps not generally, the best 
 teacher of the art ; but he, who, with a compe- 
 tent knowledge of it, directs his attention to the 
 individual minute combinations throusfh which 
 it is necessary for the learner to advance. 
 
 In processes more purely intellectual, we find 
 the influence of habit brought under our view in a 
 similar manner, particularly in following the steps 
 of a process of reasoning. A person little accus- 
 tomed to such a process advances step by step, 
 with minute attention to each as he proceeds ; 
 while another perceives at once the result, with 
 little consciousness of the steps by which he ar- 
 rived at it. For this reason, also, it frequently 
 happens, that, in certain departments of science, 
 the profound philosopher makes a bad teacher. 
 He proceeds too rapidly for his audience, and 
 without sufficient attention to the intermediate 
 steps by which it is necessary for them to ad- 
 vance ; and they may derive much more instruc- 
 tion from an inferior man, whose mental process 
 on the subject approaches more nearly to that 
 which, in the first instance, must be theirs. We 
 remark the same difference in public speaking and 
 in writing ; and we talk of a speaker or a writer 
 who is easily followed, and another who is fol- 
 lowed with difficulty. The former retards the 
 series of his thoughts, so as to bring distinctly be- 
 fore his hearers or his readers, every step in the 
 
INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. C)S 
 
 mental process. The latter advances without 
 sufficient attention to this, and consequently can 
 be followed by those only, who are sufficiently 
 acquainted with the subject to fill up the inter- 
 mediate steps, or not to require them. 
 
 There is a class of intellectual habits directly 
 the reverse of those now referred to ; namely, 
 habits of inattention, by which the mind, long- 
 unaccustomed to have the attention steadily di- 
 rected to any important object, becomes frivolous 
 and absent, or lost amid its own waking- dreams. 
 A mind in this condition becomes incapable of 
 following a train of reasoning, and even of ob- 
 serving facts with accuracy, and tracing their 
 relations. Hence nothing is more opposed to 
 the cultivation of intellectual character ; and 
 when such a person attempts to reason, or to fol- 
 low out a course of investigation, he falls into 
 slight and partial views, unsound deductions, and 
 frivolous arguments. This state of mind, there- 
 fore, ought to be carefully guarded against in the 
 young ; as, when it is once established, it can be 
 removed only by a long and laborious effort, and 
 after a certain period of life is probably irreme- 
 diable. 
 
 In rude and savage life remarkable examples 
 occur, of the effect of habits of minute attention 
 to those circumstances to which the mind is in- 
 tensely directed, by their relation to the safety or 
 advantage of the observer. The American hunter 
 
64 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 finds his way in tlie trackless forests by attention 
 to minute appearances in the trees, which indi- 
 cate to him the points of the compass. He traces 
 the progress of his enemies or his friends by the 
 marks of their footsteps ; and judges of their 
 numbers, their baitings, their employments, by 
 circumstances which would entirely escape the 
 observation of persons unaccustomed to a mode 
 of life requiring such exercises of attention. Nu- 
 merous examples of this kind are mentioned by 
 travellers, particularly among the original natives 
 of America. 
 
 OF FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to 
 refer to some remarkable facts respecting per- 
 ceptions taking place, without the presence of any 
 external body corresponding with them. These 
 are called false perceptions, and they are usually 
 referred to two classes ; namely, those arising in 
 the organs of sense, in which the mind does not 
 participate ; and those which are connected with 
 hallucination of mind, or a belief of the real ex- 
 istence of the object. The former only belong 
 to this part of the subject. The latter will be 
 referred to in another part of our inquiry, as they 
 do not consist of false impressions on the senses. 
 
e 
 
 FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 65 
 
 but (loj)cn(l ii})on the mind mistjikiiig- its own 
 conceptions for real and present existences. 
 
 Of false perceptions, properly so called, the 
 most familiar are the musccp voh'f antes floatini^ 
 before the eyes, and sounds in the ears resembling 
 the rinijfin"- of bells, or the noise of a waterfall. 
 Changes are also met with in the organs of sense 
 giving rise to remarkable varieties of perception. 
 Dr. Falconer mentions a gentleman who had such 
 a morbid state of sensation that cold bodies felt 
 to him as if they were intensely hot. A gentle- 
 man mentioned by Dr. Conolly, when recovering 
 from measles, saw objects diminished to the small- 
 est imaginable size ; and a patient mentioned by 
 Baron Larry, on recovering from amaurosis, saw 
 men as giants, and all objects magnified in a most 
 remarkable manner ; it is not mentioned how 
 long these peculiarities continued. This last pe- 
 culiarity of perception occurred also to a particu- 
 lar friend of mine in recovering from typhus fever. 
 His own body appeared to him to be about ten 
 feet high. His bed seemed to be seven or eight 
 feet from the floor, so that he felt the greatest 
 dread in attempting to get out of it ; and the 
 opening of the chimney of his apartment ap- 
 peared as large as the arch of a bridge. A sin- 
 gular peculiarity of this case however was, that 
 the persons about him with whom he was familiar, 
 did not appear above their natural size. But 
 the most interesting phenomena, connected with 
 
 F 
 
66 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 affections of this kind, are furnished by the va- 
 rious modifications of spectral illusions. These 
 are referable to three classes. 
 
 I. Impressions of visible objects remaining- for 
 some time after the eye is shut, or has been with- 
 drawn from them ; g"enerally accompanied by some 
 remarkable chang-e in the colour of the objects. 
 Various interesting* experiments of this kind are 
 related by Dr. Darwin ; one of the most striking 
 is the following : — " I covered a paper about 
 four inches square with yellow, and with a pen 
 filled with a blue colour, wrote upon the middle 
 of it the word BANKS, in capitals ; and sitting 
 with my back to the sun, fixed my eyes for a 
 minute exactly on the centre of the letter N in 
 the word. After shutting my eyes, and shading 
 them somewhat with my hand, the word was 
 distinctly seen in the spectrum, in yellow colours 
 on a blue ground ; and then on opening my eyes 
 on a yellowish wall at twenty feet distance, the 
 magnified name of BANKS appeared on the wall 
 written in golden characters." — A friend of mine 
 had been, one day, looking intensely at a small 
 print of the Virgin and child, and had sat bending- 
 over it for some time. On raising his head, he 
 was startled by perceiving at the farther end of 
 the apartment a female figure the size of life, 
 with a child in her arms. The first feeling of 
 surprise having subsided, he instantl}' traced the 
 
FALSE PnilCEPTIONS. 67 
 
 source of the illusion, and remarked that the 
 figure corresponded exactly with that which he 
 had contemplated in the print, being* what pain- 
 ters call a kit-cat finfure, in which the lower 
 parts of the body are not represented. The illu- 
 sion continued distinct for about two minutes. 
 Similar illusions of hearing- are met with, though 
 less frequently than those of vision. A gentle- 
 man, recently recovered from an affection of the 
 head, in which he had been much reduced by 
 bleeding, had occasion to go into a large town a 
 few miles from his residence. His attention was 
 there attracted by the bugle of a regiment of 
 horse, sounding a particular measure which is 
 used at changing guard in the evening. He as- 
 sured me, that this sound was, from that time, 
 never out of his ears for about nine months. 
 During all this period he continued in a very 
 precarious state of health ; and it was only as his 
 health became more confirmed, that the sound of 
 the bugle gradually left him. In regard to oc- 
 ular spectra, another fact of a very singular 
 nature appears to have been first observed by Sir 
 Isaac Newton, — namely, that when he produced 
 a spectrum of the sun by looking at it with the 
 right eye, the left being covered, upon uncover- 
 ing the left, and looking upon a white ground, a 
 spectrum of the sun was seen with it also. He 
 likewise acquired the power of recalling the 
 spectra, after they had ceaseil, when he went intt> 
 
68 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 the dark, and directed his mind intensely, " as 
 when a man looks earnestly to see a thing- which 
 is difficult to be seen." By repeating these ex- 
 periments frequently, such an effect was produced 
 upon his eyes, " that for some months after, he 
 says, the spectrum of the sun began to return, 
 as often as I began to meditate upon the pheeno- 
 mena, even though I lay in bed at midnight with 
 my curtains drawn." 
 
 II. Impressions of objects recently seen return- 
 ing after a considerable interval. Various inter- 
 esting examples of this kind are on record. Dr. 
 Ferriar mentions of himself, that, when about the 
 age of 14, if he had been viewing any interesting 
 object in the course of the day, as a romantic 
 ruin, a fine seat, or a review of troops, so soon 
 as evening came, if he had occasion to go into a 
 dark room, the whole scene was brought before 
 him with a brilliancy equal to what it possessed in 
 daylight, and remained visible for some minutes. 
 
 III. False perceptions arising in the course of 
 some bodily disorder, generally fever. A lady, 
 whom I attended some years ago, in a slight 
 feverish disorder, saw distinctly a party of ladies 
 and gentlemen sitting round her bedchamber, 
 and a servant handing something to them on a 
 tray. The scene continued in a greater or less 
 degree for several days, and was varied by spec- 
 
 jk 
 
FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 09 
 
 taclos of castles and churches of a very brilliant 
 appearance, as if they had been built of finely 
 cut crystal. The whole was in this case entirely 
 a visual phantasm, for there was no hallucina- 
 tion of mind. On the contrary, the patient had 
 from the first a full impression that it was a mor- 
 bitl atVection of vision, connected with the fever, 
 and amused herself and her attendants, by watch- 
 ing- and describing- the changes in the scenery — 
 A gentleman, who was also a patient of mine, of 
 an irritable habit, and liable to a variety of un- 
 easy sensations in his head, was sitting alone in 
 his dining- room in the twilight, the door of the 
 room being- a little open : He saw distinctly a 
 female figure enter, wrapped in a mantle, and the 
 face concealed by a large black bonnet. She 
 seemed to advance a few steps towards him, and 
 then stop. He had a full conviction, that the 
 figure was an illusion of vision, and amused him- 
 self for some time by watching it ; at the same 
 time observing that he could see through the 
 figure, so as to perceive the lock of the door and 
 other objects behind it. At length, when he 
 moved his body a little forward, it disappeared. 
 The appearances in these two cases were entirely 
 visual illusions, and probably consisted of the re- 
 newal of real scenes or figures, in a manner some- 
 what analogous to those in Dr. Ferriar's case, 
 though the renewal took place after a longer in- 
 terval. When there is any deirree of hallucina- 
 
70 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 tion of mind, 80 that the phantasm is believed to 
 have a real existence, the affection is entirely of 
 a different nature, as will be more particularly 
 mentioned under another part of our subject. 
 
 False perceptions may be corrected by one of 
 three methods ; — by the exercise of other senses ; 
 — by a comparison with the j)erceptions of other 
 persons ; — and by an exercise of judgment. If 
 I suspect that my eye deceives me, I apply the 
 hand, with the perfect conviction of the improba- 
 bility that the two senses should be deceived at 
 once. If this cannot be done, I appeal to the im- 
 pressions of some other persons, with an equally 
 strong" conviction, that the same sense will not 
 be deceived in the same manner in several per- 
 sons at once. Or I may do it in another way, by 
 a reference to some known and fixed object. Sup- 
 pose, for example, I see two objects, where I 
 imagine there should be but one, and suspect a 
 visual deception ; I turn my eyes to some object 
 which I know to be single ; such as the sun. If 
 I see the sun double, I know that there is a de- 
 lusion of vision ; if I see the sun single, I con- 
 clude the original perception to be correct. These 
 processes imply a certain exercise of judgment ; 
 and there are other cases in which the same con- 
 viction may arise from an exercise of judgment, 
 without any process of this kind. In one of the 
 cases now referred to, for example, the correc- 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 71 
 
 tioii took place instantly, from observing- that 
 the lock of the door was seen as if through the 
 figure. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION. 
 
 Consciousness appears to mean, simply, the 
 act of attending- to what is passing- in the mind 
 at the time. That more extensive operation to 
 which we ought to give the name of Reflection, as 
 disting-uished from simple consciousness, seems to 
 be connected with a power of remembering- past 
 perceptions, and past mental processes, — of com- 
 paring them with present feelings, so as to trace 
 between them a relation, as belono-ing- to the same 
 sentient being, — and, farther, of tracing the laws 
 by which the mental processes themselves are 
 regulated. It is employed also in tracing the re- 
 lations and sequences of external things, and thus 
 proves the source of certain notions expressive of 
 these relations. It is therefore a compound 
 operation of mind, including various mental pro- 
 cesses, especially consciousness, memory, and the 
 act of comparison or judgment. The knowledge 
 which we derive from this source, whether we 
 
72 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 call it consciousness or reflection, is referable to 
 three heads. 
 
 I. A knowledg-e of the mental processes, and 
 the laws and relations by which they are reg"u- 
 lated; — a knowledge, for example, of the laws and 
 facts relating to memory, conception, imagina- 
 tion, and judgment. These will be more parti- 
 cularly referred to in a subsequent part of our 
 inquiry. In the same manner we acquire our 
 knowledge of those which have been called the 
 active and moral powers, as love, hope, fear, joy, 
 gratitude, &c. 
 
 II. Certain notions arising out of the exercise 
 of the mental processes, in reference to the suc- 
 cessions and relations of things ; — our notion, for 
 example, of time, arising out of memory and con- 
 sciousness ; — our notion of cause, — of motion, — 
 number — duration — extension or space. From 
 simple perception we seem to acquire a know- 
 ledge of external things as existing only at the 
 moment ; and from simple consciousness a know- 
 ledge of a mental impression as existing only at 
 the moment. — Our notions of the succession of 
 things, as implying time and motion, require the 
 exercise of consciousness and memory ; and our 
 notions of cause, and the various other relations 
 of things to each other, require both memory and 
 comparison. To the same head, in reference to 
 
 ?* 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 73 
 
 another dq)artnient of those faculties, belong- onr 
 notions of truth and falsehood, — riifht and wrouir. 
 These result from a certain exercise of mind, 
 aided by that remarkable principle in our con- 
 stitution, which connnonly receives the name of 
 conscience. 
 
 III. With this exercise of the mental functions, 
 there spring- up in the mind certain convictions, or 
 intuitive and instinctive principles of belief. They 
 are the immediate result of a certain exercise of 
 the understanding, but are not referable to any 
 process of induction or chain of reasoning, and 
 can be considered only as an original and funda- 
 mental part of our constitution. This is a sub- 
 ject of great and extensive importance, and the 
 articles of belief which are referable to it, are 
 chiefly the following : 
 
 (1.) A conviction of our own existence as sen- 
 tient and thinking beings, and of mind as some- 
 thing distinct from the functions of the body. 
 
 (2.) A confidence in the evidence of our senses 
 in regard to the existence and properties of ex- 
 ternal things ; or a conviction that they have a 
 real existence independent of our sensations. 
 
 (3.) A confidence in our own mental processes; 
 — that facts, for example, which are suggested to 
 us by our memory, really occurred. 
 
 (4.) A belief in our personal identity, derived 
 from the combined operation of consciousness and 
 
74' CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 memory ; or a remembrance of past mental feel- 
 ings, and a comparison of them with present men- 
 tal feelings, as belonging to the same sentient 
 being. 
 
 (5.) A conviction that every event must have 
 a cause, and a cause adequate to the effect. 
 
 (6.) A confidence in the uniformity of the oper- 
 ations of nature ; or that the same cause, acting 
 in the same circumstances, will always be follow- 
 ed by the same effect. 
 
 These first or instinctive principles of belief 
 will be referred to in a more particular manner, 
 when we come to speak of the use of reason in I 
 
 the investigation of truth. They are usually 
 called First Truths, and will be seen to occupy a 1 
 
 most important place as the foundation of all 
 reasoning. Many ingenious but fallacious argu- \ 
 
 ments were at one time wasted in attempts to 
 establish them by processes of reasoning. These 
 again were assailed by sophistical and sceptical 
 writers, who easily succeeded in showing the 
 fallacy of these arguments, and thus assumed the 
 credit of undermining the authority of the truths 
 themselves. All this species of sophistical war- 
 fare is now gone by ; and the most important era 
 in the modern science of reasoning was when 
 it was distinctly shown, that these first truths 
 admit of no other evidence than the conviction 
 which forces itself upon the understanding of all 
 classes of men. Since that period it has been 
 
 
TESTIMONY. 15 
 
 generally allowed, that they admit of no proof by 
 j)rocesses of reasoning- ; and, on the other hand, 
 that they are entirely unaffected by the argu- 
 nients by which all such reasoning- was shown to 
 be fallacious. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF TESTIMONY. 
 
 A very small portion of our knowledge of ex- 
 ternal things is obtained through our own senses ; 
 by far the greater part is procured through other 
 men, and this is received by us on the evidence 
 of testimony. But, in receiving facts in this 
 manner, we usually proceed with more caution 
 than when they come to us by our personal ob- 
 servation. We are much influenced, in the first 
 place, by our confidence in the veracity of the 
 narrator, and our knowledge of the opportuni- 
 ties which he has had of ascertaining the facts he 
 professes to relate. Thus, if he be a person on 
 whose testimony we have formerly received im- 
 portant statements, which have turned out to be 
 correct, we are the more ready to receive his tes- 
 timony again ; if he be a stranger to us, we re- 
 ceive it with greater caution j if he has formerly 
 
70 TESTIMONY. 
 
 misled us, we view it with suspicion, or reject it 
 altogether. 
 
 But there is another principle of very extensive 
 application in such cases, and which is independ- 
 ent in a great measure of the character of the nar- 
 rator. In receiving- facts upon testimony, we 
 are much influenced by their accordance with 
 facts with which we are already acquainted. 
 This is what, in common language, we call their 
 probability ; and statements which are probable, 
 that is, in accordance with facts which we already 
 know, are received upon a lower degree of evi- 
 dence than those which are not in such accord- 
 ance, or which, in other words, appear to us in 
 the present state of our knowledge to be impro- 
 bable. Now this is a sound and salutary caution, 
 but we should beware of allowing- it to influence 
 us beyond its proper sphere. It should lead us to 
 examine carefully the evidence upon which we re- 
 ceive facts, not in accordance with those which we 
 have already acquired ; but we should beware of 
 allowing it to engender scepticism. For, while 
 an unbounded credulity is the part of a weak 
 mind, which never thinks or reasons at all, an 
 unlimited scepticism is the part of a contracted 
 mind, which reasons upon imperfect data, or 
 makes its own knowledg-e and extent of observa- 
 tion the standard and test of probability. An ig- 
 norant peasant may reject the testimony of a phi- 
 losopher in regard to the size of the moon, be- 
 
TESTIMONY. 77 
 
 cause he thinks he has the evidence of his senses 
 that it is only a foot in diameter ; and a person, 
 holding- a respectable rank in society, is said 
 to have received with contempt the doctrine of 
 the revolution of the earth on its axis, because he 
 was perfectly satisfied that his house was never 
 known to turn with its front to the north. AMien 
 the king- of Siam was told by a Dutch traveller, 
 that in Holland, at certain seasons of the year, 
 water becomes so solid that an elephant might 
 walk over it, he replied, " I have believed many 
 extraordinary things which you have told me, 
 because I took you for a man of truth and vera- 
 city, but now I am convinced that you lie." 
 This confidence in one's own experience, as the 
 test of probability, characterises a mind which is 
 confined in its views and limited in its acquire- 
 ments ; and the tendency of it would be the re- 
 jection of all knowledge, for which we have not 
 the evidence of our senses. Had the king of Siam 
 once seen water in a frozen state, he would not 
 only have been put right in regard to this fact, 
 but his confidence would have been shaken in 
 his own experience as the test of probability in 
 other things ; and he would have been more dis- 
 posed for the farther reception of truth upon the 
 evidence of testimony. 
 
 Thus, progress in knowledge is not confined in 
 its results to the mere facts which we acquire, 
 but has also an extensive influence in enlarging 
 
78 TESTIMONY. 
 
 the mind for the farther reception of truth, and 
 setting" it free from many of those prejudices 
 which influence men who are limited by a narrow 
 field of observation. There may even be cases in 
 Avhich, without any regard to the veracity of the 
 narrator, a cultivated mind perceives the elements 
 of truth in a statement, which is rejected by in- 
 ferior minds as altogether incredible. An inge- 
 nious writer supposes a traveller of rather doubt- 
 ful veracity bringing into the country of Archi- 
 medes an account of the steam engine. His state- 
 ment is rejected by his countrymen as altogether 
 incredible. It is entirely at variance with their 
 experience, and they think it much more probable 
 that the traveller should lie, than that such a 
 thing should be. But when he describes to 
 Archimedes the arrangement of the machine, the 
 philosopher perceives the result, and, without any 
 consideration of the veracity of the narrator, de- 
 cides, upon the evidence derived from the relation 
 of the facts themselves, and their accordance with 
 principles which are known to him, that the state- 
 ment is unquestionably true. 
 
 This illustration leads to a principle of the ut- 
 most practical importance. In judging of the 
 credibility of a statement, we are not to be influ- 
 enced simply by our actual experience of similar 
 events ; for this would limit our reception of new 
 facts to their accordance with those which we 
 already know. We must extend our views much 
 
TESTIMONY. 79 
 
 farther than this, and proceed iij)on the know- 
 ledge which we have derived from other sources, 
 of the powers and properties of the ag-ent to 
 which the event is ascribed. It is on this prin- 
 ciple, that the account of the steam eng-ine woidd 
 have appeared probable to Archimedes, while it 
 was rejected by his countrymen as absolutely in- 
 credible ; because he would have judg-ed, not ac- 
 cording* to his experience of similar machinery, 
 but according' to his knowledg-e of the powers 
 and properties of steam. In the same manner, 
 when the king of Siara rejected, as an incredible 
 falsehood, the account of the freezing of water, if 
 there had been at his court a philosopher who had 
 attended to the properties of heat, he would have 
 judged in a different manner, though the actual 
 fact of the freezing of water might have been as 
 new to him as it was to the king. He would 
 have recollected, that he had seen various solid 
 bodies rendered fluid by the application of heat ; 
 and that, on the abstraction of the additional 
 heat, they again became solid. He would thus 
 have argued the possibility, that, by a farther ab- 
 straction of heat, bodies might become solid which 
 are fluid in the ordinary temperature of the at- 
 mosphere. In this manner, the fact, which was 
 rejected by the king, judging from his own expe- 
 rience, might have been received by the philoso- 
 pher, judging from his knowledge of the powers 
 and properties of heat — though he had ac<piired 
 
80 TESTIMONY. 
 
 this knowledg-e from events apparently far re- 
 moved from that to which he now applied it. 
 
 The principle here referred to is independent 
 altogether of the direct reliance which we have 
 on testimony, in regard to things which are at va- 
 riance with onr experience, when we are satis- 
 fied that the testimony has the characters of cre- 
 dibility ; but, even on these grovmds, we may 
 perceive the fallacy of that application of the doc- 
 trine of probability which has been employed by 
 some writers, in opposition to the truths of re- 
 vealed religion and to the means by wliicli they 
 were promulgated — particularly the miracles of 
 the sacred writings. Miracles, they contend, are 
 deviations from the established course of nature, 
 and are, consequently, contrary to our uniform 
 experience. It accords with our experience that 
 men should lie, and even that sevei'al men might 
 concur in propagating the same lie ; and, there- 
 fore, it is more probable that the narrators lied, 
 than that the statement respecting miracles is 
 true. Mr. Hume even went so far as to main- 
 tain, that a miracle is so contrary to what is 
 founded upon firm and unalterable experience, 
 that it cannot be established by any human testi- 
 mony. 
 
 The fallacy of this argument may probably be 
 maintained from the principles which have been 
 stated. It is, in fact, the^anie mode of reasoning 
 which induced the king of Siam to reject the 
 
TESTIMONY. 81 
 
 statement of water becoming solid. Tliis was 
 entirely contradicted by his *' firm and unalterable 
 experience," and, therefore, could not be received, 
 even upon the evidence of a man whom he had 
 already recoq-nised as a witness of unquestionable 
 veracity, and upon whose single testimony he had 
 received as truth " many extraordinary things." 
 He thought it much more probable, that even this 
 man lied, than that such a statement could be 
 true. Strictly speaking, indeed, the objection of 
 Mr. Hume may be considered as little better than 
 a play upon words. For what renders an occur- 
 rence miraculous is precisely the fact of its being 
 opposed to uniform experience. To say there- 
 fore that miracles are incredible because they are 
 contrary to experience, is merely to say, that they 
 are incredible because they are miracles. 
 
 They who are imposed upon by such a sophism 
 as this, do not, in the first place, attend to the 
 fact, that the term experience, if so much is to be 
 founded upon it, must be limited to the personal 
 observation of every individual ; that is, it can 
 apply, in each particular case, only to the last fifty 
 or sixty years at most, and to events which have 
 happened during that period, at the spot where 
 the individual was present. Whatever he knows 
 of events which took place beyond this spot, or 
 before that period, he knows, not from experi- 
 ence, but entirely from testimony : and a great 
 part of our knowledge, of what we call the esta- 
 
82 TESTIMONY. 
 
 blished course of nature, lias been acquired in this 
 manner. In the reception of new knowledg-e, 
 then, an individual must either receive facts upon 
 testimony, or believe nothing- but that for which 
 he has the evidence of his senses. It is unneces- 
 sary to state how much the latter supposition is 
 at variance with the daily practice of every man ; 
 and how much information we are in the constant 
 habit of receiving upon testimony, even in regard 
 to things which are very much at variance with 
 our personal observation. How many facts do we 
 receive, in this manner, with unsuspecting confi- 
 dence, on the testimony of the historian, in re- 
 gard to the occurrences of ancient times ; and on 
 the testimony of the naturalist and the traveller, 
 respecting the natural and civil history of foreign 
 countries. How few persons have verified, by 
 their personal observation, the wonders which we 
 receive on the testimony of the astronomer ; — 
 and, even of the great phenomena of nature on 
 the surface of our globe, how much do we re- 
 ceive upon testimony in regard to things which 
 are widely at variance with our own experience. 
 I need only mention the boiling springs of Ice- 
 land, and the phenomena of earthquakes and vol- 
 canoes. But, on the principles of Mr. Hiune, 
 these could not be believed. On the contrary, 
 if one of our intelligent highlanders were hear- 
 ioo^ described to him the devastations of a vol- 
 cano, he would point to his heath-covered moun- 
 
TESTIMONY'. 83 
 
 tain, as tin; basis of his " firm and unalterable 
 experience," and declare it to be more probable, 
 that travellers should lie, than that such a state- 
 ment could be true. 
 
 The reception of facts upon the evidence of 
 testimony must therefore be considered as a fun- 
 damental principle of our nature, to be acted upon 
 whenever we are satisfied that the testimony pos- 
 sesses certain characters of credibility. These are 
 chiefly referable to three heads ; that the indivi- 
 dual has had sufficient opportunity of ascertain- 
 ing the facts ; that we have confidence in his pow- 
 er of judging of their accuracy ; and that we have 
 no suspicion of his being influenced by passion 
 or prejudice in his testimony, or in other words, 
 that we believe him to be an honest witness. 
 Our confidence is farther strengthened by seve- 
 ral witnesses concurring in the same testimony, 
 each of whom has had the same opportunities 
 of ascertaining the facts, and presents the same 
 characters of truth and honesty. On such testi- 
 mony we are in the constant habit of receiving 
 statemeuts, which are much beyond the sphere of 
 our personal observation, and widely at variance 
 with our experience. These are the statements, 
 which, for the sake of a name, we may call mar- 
 vellous. In regard to such, the foundation of in- 
 credulity, as we have seen, is generally ignor- 
 ance ; and it is interesting to trace the principles 
 by which a man of cultivated mind is influenced, 
 
84 TESTIMONY. 
 
 in receiving" upon testimony, statements which 
 are rejected by the vulg-ar as totally incredible. 
 
 1. He is influenced by the recollection, that 
 many thing's at one time appeared to him mar- 
 vellous which he now knows to be true ; and he 
 thence concludes, that there may still be in na- 
 ture many phenomena and many principles with 
 which he is entirely unacquainted. In other 
 words, he has learnt from experience, not to 
 make his own knowledge his test of probability. 
 
 2. He is greatly influenced by perceiving in 
 the statement some element of probability, or any 
 kind of sequence or relation, by which the al- 
 leged fact may be connected with principles which 
 are known to him. It is in this manner that the 
 freezing of water, which was rejected by the king 
 of Siam as an incredible falsehood, might have 
 appeared credible to a philosopher who had at- 
 tended to the properties of heat, because he 
 would have perceived in the statement a chain of 
 relations connecting it with facts which he knew 
 to be true. 
 
 3. He is much guided by his power of dis- 
 criminating the credibility of testimony, or of dis- 
 tinguishing that species and that amount of it, 
 which he feels to be unworthy of absolute credit, 
 from that on which he relies with as implicit con- 
 fidence as on the uniformity of the course of na- 
 ture. The vulgar mind is often unable to make 
 the necessary discrimination in this respect, and 
 
TESTIMONY. 85 
 
 therefore is apt to fall into one of the extremes 
 of credulity or scepticism. Mr. Hume, indeed, 
 Iiimself admits that there is a certain amount 
 of testimony on which he would receive a state- 
 ment widely at variance with his own uniform 
 exj)erience, as in the hypothetical case which he 
 j)roposes, — the account of a total darkness over the 
 whole earth, continuing for eight days, two hun- 
 dred years ago. The evidence which he requires 
 for it is simply the concurrence of testimonies, 
 namely, that all authors in all languages describe 
 the event ; and that travellers bring accounts from 
 all quarters, of traditions of the occurrence being 
 still strong and lively among the people. On 
 such evidence he admits that philosophers ought 
 to receive it as certain. 
 
 These principles may be considered as the ele- 
 ments of our belief in regard to statements which 
 are new to us ; and it is interesting to remark 
 how they balance and compensate each other. 
 Thus, a statement which appears probable, or can 
 be readily referred to known relations, is re- 
 ceived upon a lower degree of testimony, as in 
 the illustration respecting Archimedes and the 
 steam engine. Others, which we find greater 
 difficulty in referring to any known principle, we 
 may receive upon a certain amount of testimony, 
 which we feel to be worthy of absolute confidence. 
 But there may be others of so very extraordi- 
 nary a kind, and so far removed from, or even 
 
86 TESTIMONY. 
 
 opposed to, every known principle, that we may 
 hesitate in receiving them upon any kind of tes- 
 timony, unless we can discover in relation to 
 them something" on which the mind can fix as 
 an element of moral probability. 
 
 This leads us to a very obvious distinction of 
 extraordinary events, — into those which are only 
 marvellous, and those which are to be considered 
 miraculous. A marvellous event is one which dif- 
 fers in all its elements from any thing- that we pre- 
 viously knew, without being- opposed to any 
 known principle. But a miraculous event im- 
 plies much more than this, being- directly opposed 
 to what every man knows to be the established 
 and uniform course of nature. It is farther re- 
 quired that such an event shall be of so obvious 
 and palpable a kind, that every man is qualified to 
 judg-e of its miraculous character, or is convinced 
 it could not happen from the operation of any 
 ordinary natural cause. 
 
 In receiving a statement respecting such an 
 event, we require the highest species of testi- 
 mony, or that, on which we rely with the same 
 confidence as on the uniformity of the course of 
 nature itself. But even with this amount of tes- 
 timony, a doubt may still remain. For we have 
 two amounts of probability which are equal- 
 ly balanced against each other ; namely, the 
 probability that such testimony should not de- 
 ceive us, and the probability that there should be 
 
TESTIMONY. 87 
 
 no deviation from the course of nature. The 
 concurring- evidence of numerous credible wit- 
 nesses, indeed, gives a decided preponderance to 
 the testimony ; and upon a certain amount of 
 testimony we might receive any statement, how- 
 ever improbable, as in the case admitted by Mr. 
 Hume, of a universal darkness. But, though 
 in such a case we might receive the statement 
 as a fact which we could not dispute, the 
 mind would be left in a state of absolute suspense 
 and uncertainty in regard to any judgment which 
 we could form respecting it. Something more 
 appears to be necessary for fixing the distinct 
 belief of a miraculous interposition ; and this is 
 an impression of moral probability. This con- 
 sists of two parts. (1.) A distinct reference of 
 the event to a power which we feel to be capable 
 of producing it, namely — a direct interposition of 
 the Deity. (2.) The perception of an adequate ob- 
 ject, or a conviction of high moral probability, that 
 an interposition of Divine power might be exert- 
 ed in such circumstances, or for the accomplish- 
 ment of such an object. Such are the miracles 
 of the sacred writings. As events opposed to 
 the common course of nature, they are, by the 
 supposition, physically improbable in the highest 
 degree. AVere they not so — were they in the 
 lowest degree probable according to our con- 
 ceptions of the course of nature, they could not 
 be miracles, and consequently could not answer 
 
88 TESTIMONY. 
 
 the purpose for which they are intended. But 
 notwithstanding this species of improbability, they 
 carry with them all the elements of absolute cre- 
 dibility — namely, the highest species of testimony, 
 supported by a moral probability which bears di- 
 rectly upon every element of the statement. 
 This may be briefly referred to the following 
 heads : — 
 
 1. The human mind had wandered far from 
 truth respecting God ; and on the great ques- 
 tions of his character and will, a future state, and 
 the mode of acceptance in his sight, the light 
 furnished by reason among the wisest of men 
 was faint and feeble. On points of such impor- 
 tance, there was the highest moral probability, 
 that the Deity would not leave mankind in this 
 state of darkness, but would communicate to them 
 some distinct knowledge. 
 
 2. It is farther probable, that, if such a com- 
 munication were made to man, it would be ac- 
 companied by prodigies or miraculous events, 
 calculated to show beyond a doubt the immediate 
 agency of God, and thus to establish the divine 
 authority of the record. 
 
 3. There is no improbability that the j)ower of 
 the Deity should jjroduce deviations from the 
 usual course of nature, capable of answering 
 such a purpose. For what we call the course of 
 nature is nothing more than an order of events 
 which he has established ; and there is no impro-. 
 
TESTiiMONY. 81) 
 
 bability, that, for an adequate end, lie might pro- 
 duce a deviation from this order. 
 
 4. An im})ortant branch of the moral probabi- 
 lity of the whole statement of the sacred writ- 
 ings, arises from the character of the truths them- 
 selves, challenging the assent and approbation of 
 every uncontaminated mind. This part of the 
 subject resolves itself into three parts ; namely, 
 the truths relating to the character and perfec- 
 tions of the Deity ; the high and refined morali- 
 ty of the gospel ; and the adaptation of the whole 
 provisions of Christianity to the actual condition 
 of man as a moral being. The former carry a 
 conviction of their truth to the mind of every 
 candid inquirer ; the two latter fix themselves 
 upon the conscience or moral feelings of all classes 
 of men, with an impression which is irresistible. 
 
 This mode of reasoning is not chargeable with 
 that kind of fallacy which has sometimes been 
 ascribed to it, that it professes first to prove the 
 doctrine by the miracle, and then to try the mira- 
 cle by the doctrine. The tendency of it is only to 
 deduce from the various elements which really en- 
 ter into the argument, a kind of compound evi- 
 dence, the strongest certainly which, on such a 
 subject, the human mind is capable of receiving. 
 It is composed of the character of the truths — the 
 moral probability of a revelation of clear know- 
 ledge on subjects of such infinite importance — 
 and the highest species of testimony for the mira- 
 
90 TESTIMONY. 
 
 culoiis evidence by which the revelation was ac- 
 companied. There are principles in our nature 
 calculated to perceive the manner in which the dif- 
 ferent parts of such an argument harmonize with 
 each other ; and, upon every principle of the 
 human mind, it is impossible to conceive any 
 thing more highly calculated to challenge the se- 
 rious attention and absolute conviction of every 
 sound understanding. 
 
 This imperfect view of a deeply interesting 
 subject, will be sufficient to show the fallacy of 
 the objection which has been urged against the 
 credibility of miracles — that they are contrary to 
 our unalterable experience of the established 
 course of nature. There might have been some 
 degree of plausibility in the argument, if these 
 events had been alleged to have taken place in 
 ordinary circumstances ; but the case is essentially 
 altered, and this kind of improbability is altogether 
 removed, when, in the alleged deviation, a new 
 agent is introduced entirely capable of producing 
 it. Such, as we have seen, are the miracles of 
 the sacred writings ; and the question in regard 
 to their probability is, not whether they are pro- 
 bable, according to the usual course of nature, 
 but whether they are probable in the circum- 
 stances in which they are alleged to have taken 
 place, namely, in the case of a direct interposi- 
 tion of the Deity for certain great and adequate 
 purposes. In such a case, our estimate of proba- 
 
TESTIMONY. 91 
 
 bility must be founded, according- to the princi- 
 ples already stated, not upon our experience of 
 similar events, but on the knowledg-e which we 
 <lerive, from other sources, of the power of the 
 ag-ent to whom the event is ascribed. Now the 
 agent to whom miracles are ascribed is the Su- 
 preme Being-, the creator of all things, the stu- 
 pendous monuments of whose omnipotent power 
 are before us, and within us, and around us. 
 What we call the established course of nature is 
 merely an order of events which he has appoint- 
 ed ; and the question of probability is, whether 
 it is probable, that, for certain adequate pur- 
 poses, he should produce a deviation from this 
 order. For such a statement, indeed, we re- 
 quire strong, numerous, credible and concurring- 
 testimonies ; but it comes to be simply a ques- 
 tion of evidence ; and there is no real improba- 
 bility, that, in these circumstances, such events 
 should take place. 
 
 In this manner, then, there is entirely removed 
 from the statement the improbability which is 
 founded upon the uniformity of the ordinary 
 course of nature ; because it is not in the ordi- 
 nary course of nature that the events are alleg-ed 
 to have taken place, but in circumstances alto- 
 gether new and peculiar. The subsequent inqui- 
 ry becomes, therefore, simply a question of evi- 
 dence ; this evidence is derived from testimony ; 
 and we are thus led to take a slight view of the 
 
92 TESTIMONY. 
 
 grounds on which we estimate the credibility of 
 testimony. 
 
 Testimony, we are told, is fallacious, and is 
 liable to deceive us. But so are our senses ;— 
 they also may deceive, and perhaps have deceiv- 
 ed us, as in the case of ocular spectra ; but we do 
 not, on that account, discredit the evidence of our 
 eyes ; we only take means, in certain cases, for 
 correcting" their indications by other senses, as by 
 touching the object, or by a comparison with 
 the visual impressions of other men ; and, what- 
 ever probability there is, that the eyes of one 
 man may be deceived in any one instance, the 
 probability is as nothing, that both his sight and 
 touch should be deceived at once ; or that the 
 senses of ten men should be deceived in the same 
 manner at the same time. It is the same with 
 regard to testimony. It may have deceived us 
 in particular instances ; but this applies to one 
 species of testimony only ; there is another spe- 
 cies which never deceived us. We learn by ex- 
 perience to separate distinctly the one from the 
 other, and to fix upon a species of testimony on 
 which we rely with the same confidence as on the 
 uniformity of the course of nature. Thus, if we 
 find a man who in other respects shows every 
 indication of a sound mind, relating an event 
 which happened under his own inspection, and 
 in such circumstances that he could not possibly 
 be deceived ; if his statement be such as contri- 
 
TESTIMONY. 93 
 
 butes in no respect to his credit or advant.ag-e, 
 but, on tlie contrary, exposes him to ridicule, con- 
 tempt, and persecution ; if, notwithstanding-, lie 
 steadily perseveres in it, under every species of 
 persecution, and even to the sufFerino- of death ; 
 to suppose such a testimony intended to deceive, 
 would be to assume a deviation from the esta- 
 blished course of human character, as remarkable 
 as any event which it could possibly convey to 
 us. This might be maintained in regard to one 
 such testimony ; — ^but if we find numerous wit- 
 nesses agreeing- in the same testimony, all equal- 
 ly informed of the facts, all showing the same 
 characters of credibility, and without the possi- 
 bility of concert or connivance, the evidence be- 
 comes not convincing only, but incontrovertible. 
 
 The grounds on which we receive with confi- 
 dence the evidence of testimony, may, therefore, 
 be briefly stated in the following manner :— 
 
 1. That the statement refers to a matter of 
 fact, — that the fact was such as could be easily 
 ascertained by the person who relates it, — and 
 that he had suificient opportunity of ascertaining 
 it. When the statement includes a point of opi- 
 nion, the case comes under another principle ; and 
 we require, in the first instance, to separate what 
 is opinion from what is fact. 
 
 2. That we have no reason to suspect the wit- 
 ness to be influenced by interest or passion in his 
 
94f TESTIMONY. 
 
 evidence ; or that he has any purpose to answer 
 by it, calculated to promote his own advantage. 
 
 3. That various individuals, without suspicion 
 of connivance, have concurred in the same state- 
 ment. This is a point of the utmost importance ; 
 and in cases in which we are satisfied that there 
 could be no connivance, a degree of evidence is 
 derived from the concurrence of testimonies, 
 which may be often independent even of the cre- 
 dibility of the individual witnesses. For, though 
 it were probable that each of them singly might 
 lie, the chances that they should all happen to 
 agree in the same lie may be found to amount to 
 an impossibility. On this subject, there is also 
 a farther principle of the greatest interest, which 
 has been well illustrated by Laplace, namely, that 
 the more improbable a statement is in which such 
 witnesses agree, the greater is the probability of 
 its truth. Thus we may have two men whom 
 we know to be so addicted to lying, that we 
 would not attach the smallest credit to their 
 single testimony on any subject. If w^e find 
 these concurring in a statement respecting an 
 event which was highly probable, or very likely to 
 have occurred at the time which they mention, we 
 may still have a suspicion that they are lying, 
 and that they may have happened to concur in 
 the same lie, even though there should be no 
 supposition of connivance. But if the state- 
 ment was in the highest degree improbable, such 
 
TESTIMONY. 95 
 
 as that of a man rising- from the dead, we may 
 feel it to be impossible that they could acci- 
 dentally have ag-reed in such a statement ; and, if 
 we are satisfied that there could be no conniv- 
 ance, we may receive a conviction from its very 
 improbability, that it must be true. In cases 
 of concurring testimonies, we expect that the 
 witnesses shall agree in all essential and import- 
 ant particulars ; and, on the other hand, evi- 
 dence of the authenticity of testimony is some- 
 times derived from the various witnesses diifering 
 in trilling circumstances in such a manner, as, 
 without weakening the main statement, tends to 
 remove the suspicion of collusion or connivance. 
 4. In all matters of testimony, we are greatly 
 influenced by our confidence in a certain uniform- 
 ity of human character. We attach much impor- 
 tance, for example, to our previous knowledge of 
 the narrator's character for veracity ; and a man 
 may have acquired such a character in this re- 
 spect, that we confide in his veracity in every in- 
 stance in which his testimony is concerned, with 
 a confidence equal to that with which we rely 
 on the uniformity of the course of nature. In 
 such a case, indeed, we proceed upon a uniform- 
 ity which applies only to a particular order, name- 
 ly, those whom we consider as men of veracity. 
 But there is also a principle of uniformity which 
 applies to the whole species ; and in which we 
 confide as regulating every man of sane mind. 
 
96 TESTIMONY. 
 
 Thus, if the statement of a narrator contain cir- 
 cumstances calculated to promote his own ad- 
 vantage, we calcidate on the probability of fabri- 
 cation, and reject his evidence, except we had 
 previously acquired absolute confidence in his ve- 
 racity. But if, on the contrary, his statement 
 operates against himself, conveying an imputa- 
 tion against his own character, or exposing him 
 to contempt, ridicule, or personal injury ; with- 
 out any previous knowledge of his veracity, we 
 are satisfied that nothing could make him adhere 
 to such a testimony but an honest conviction of 
 its truth. 
 
 5. A very important circumstance is the ab- 
 sence of any contradictory or conflicting testi- 
 mony. This applies, in a striking manner, to 
 the miraculous statements of the sacred writings ;- 
 for, even on the part of those who were most in- 
 terested in opposing them, there is no testimony 
 which professes to show, that, at the time when 
 the miracles are said to have taken place, they 
 did not take place. It is, indeed, a remarkable 
 circumstance, that the earliest writers against 
 Christianity ascribe the miraculous events to the 
 power of sorcery or magic, but never attempt to 
 call them in question as matters of fact. 
 
 6. Much corroboration of testimony may often 
 be obtained from our knowledg-e of facts of such 
 a nature, as, without directly bearing upon the 
 statements to which the testimony refers, can- 
 
TESTIMONY. 97 
 
 not be accounted for on any otlier supposi- 
 tion than the conviction of these statements be- 
 ing true. This principle a})plies, in a remark- 
 able manner, to the miraculous histories of the 
 sacred writing's. We know, as a historical fact, 
 the rapid manner in which the Christian faith 
 was propagated in the early ages, against the 
 most formidable opposition, and by means of the 
 feeblest human instruments. We are told, that 
 this was owing to the conviction produced by 
 miraculous displays of divine power ; — we feel 
 that the known effect corresponds with the al- 
 leged cause ; and that it cannot be accounted for 
 on any other principle. 
 
 It does not belong to our present inquiry, to 
 allude more particularly to the direct evidence 
 by which the miracles of the sacred writings are 
 supported ; we merely refer, in this general man- 
 ner, to the principles on which the evidence is to 
 be estimated. A very interesting branch of the 
 subject will come under our view, when we 
 speak of memory and arbitrary association. We 
 shall then see the irresistible importance of the 
 commemorative rites of Christianity, by which 
 the memory of these events has been transmitted 
 from age to age, or rather from year to year ; 
 and by which our minds are carried backwards, 
 in one unbroken series, to the time when the 
 events occurred, and to the individuals who wit- 
 nessed them. In this manner, also, is entirely 
 
 II 
 
98, 
 
 TESTIMONY. 
 
 removed any feeling- of uncertainty, which may 
 attach to testimony, as we recede from the period 
 at which the events took place, and as the indivi- 
 duals are multiplied through whom the account 
 has been transmitted. Upon the whole, therefore, 
 the evidence becomes so clear and conclusive, 
 that we may say of those who reject it, what the 
 great author of Christianity said, on another occa- 
 sion, — *' if they hear not these, neither will they 
 be persuaded though one rose from the dead." 
 
 ^ 
 
PART III. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 Through the various sources referred to in the 
 preceding observations, we acquire the knowledge 
 of a certain number of facts, relating either to 
 the mind itself, or to things external to it. The 
 next part of our inquiry refers to the operations, 
 (to use a figurative expression,) which the mind 
 performs upon the facts thus acquired. The 
 term functions, or powers of mind, has often been 
 applied to these operations ; but, as we are not 
 entitled to assmue, that they are in fact separate 
 functions in the usual acceptation of that expres- 
 sion, it is perhaps more correct, and accords bet- 
 ter with our limited knowledge of mind, to 
 speak simply of the operations which it is capable 
 of performing upon a given series of facts. These 
 seem to be chiefly referable to the following 
 heads. 
 
 I. We remember the facts ; and we can also 
 recall them into the mind at pleasure. The former 
 
 3 
 
 II 
 
100 INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 is Memory ; the latter is that modification of it 
 which we call Recollection. But, besides this 
 simple recollection of facts, we can recall a per- 
 ception ; that is, the impression of an actual 
 scene which has been witnessed, or a person 
 who has been seen, so as to place them, as it 
 were, before the mind, with all the vividness of 
 the original perception. This process is called 
 Conception. It is often described as a distinct 
 power, or a distinct operation of the mind ; but 
 it seems to be so nearly allied to memory, that 
 it may be considered as a modification of it. It 
 is the memory of a perception. 
 
 II. We separate facts from the relation in 
 which they were originally presented to us, and 
 contemplate some of them apart from the rest ; — 
 considering-, for example, certain properties of 
 bodies apart from their other properties. Among 
 a variety of objects, we thus fix upon qualities, 
 which are common to a certain number of them, 
 and so arrange them into genera and species. 
 This process is usually called Abstraction. 
 
 III. We separate scenes or classes of facts into 
 their constituent elements, and form these ele- 
 ments into new combinations, so as to represent 
 to ourselves scenes, or combinations of events, 
 which have no real existence. This is Imagina- 
 tion. 
 
INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 101 
 
 IV. Wo compare facts with each other, — ol)- 
 serve their relations and connexions, — and trace 
 the results which follow particular combinations 
 of them. We also observe their g-eneral charac- 
 ters, so as to deduce from the whole general facts 
 or g-eneral principles. This is Reason or Judg- 
 ment. 
 
 In this arrangement, it will be observed, I 
 confine myself entirely to facts. I do not say 
 that the mind possesses distinct faculties, which 
 we call memory, abstraction, imagination, and 
 judgment, — for this at once leads into hypothe- 
 sis ; but simply, that, in point of fact, the mind re- 
 members, abstracts, imagines, and judges. These 
 processes appear to constitute distinct mental 
 acts, which every one is conscious of who at- 
 tends to the phenomena of his own mind. But 
 beyond the simple facts we know nothing, and no 
 human ingenuity can lead us one step farther. 
 Some of the followers of Dr. Reid appear to have 
 erred in this respect, by ascribing to the mind 
 distinct faculties or functions, somewhat in the 
 manner in which we ascribe to the body distinct 
 senses. Dr. Brown, on the other hand, has 
 shown much ingenuity in his attempts to simplify 
 the arrangement of the mental processes, by refer- 
 ring them all to his two principles of simple and 
 relative suggestion. But, without inquiring what 
 has been gained to the science by this new phra- 
 
102 MEMORY. 
 
 seology, and avoiding- entirely any system which 
 seems to suppose distinct functions of mind, I 
 confine myself to facts respecting the actual 
 mental operations ; and it appears to answer 
 best the purposes of practical utility to speak 
 of these operations in the arrangement, and by 
 the names, which are commonly used by the ge- 
 nerality of mankind. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 By Memory, we retain the impression of 
 facts or events j and by Recollection we 
 recall them into the mind by a voluntary ef- 
 fort. By Conception we recall perceptions, or 
 the impression of actual scenes, persons, or tran- 
 sactions : thus a skilful painter can delineate 
 from conception, a landscape a considerable time 
 after he has seen it, or the countenance of a friend 
 who is dead or absent. These appear to be the 
 leading phenomena which are referable to the 
 head of memory. 
 
 There seem to be original differences in the 
 power of memory, some individuals being remark- 
 able for retentive memory, though not otherwise 
 
MEMORY. 103 
 
 distingiiished by their intellectual endowments. 
 Thus, persons have been known to repeat a long 
 discourse after once hearing it, or even a series of 
 things without connexion, as a long column of 
 figures, or a number of words without meaning. 
 There is on record the account of a man who 
 could repeat the whole contents of a newspaper ; 
 and of another who could retain words that were 
 dictated to him, without any connexion, to the 
 amount of six thousand. A man mentioned by 
 Seneca, after hearing a poet read a new poem, 
 claimed it as his own ; and, in proof of his claim, 
 repeated the poem from beginning to end, which 
 the author could not do. A similar anecdote is 
 told of an Englishman, whom the king of Prus- 
 sia placed behind a screen, when Voltaire came 
 to read to him a new poem of considerable length. 
 It has been alleged, that this kind of memory is 
 generally connected with inferiority of the other 
 intellectual powers ; but there appears to be no 
 foundation for this. For, though the mere me- 
 mory of words may be met with in a high degree 
 in persons of defective understanding, it is also 
 tnie that men of high endowments have been re- 
 markable for memory. It is said that Themisto- 
 cles could name all the citizens of Athens, amount- 
 ing to twenty thousand ; and that Cyrus knew 
 the name of every soldier in his army. 
 
 The late Dr. Leyden was remarkable for his 
 memorv. I am informed, throuo-h a ffontleman 
 
104 MEMORY. 
 
 who was intimately acquainted Avitli him, that he 
 coukl repeat correctly a long- act of parliament, 
 or any similar document, after having- once read 
 it. When he was, on one occasion, congratulat- 
 ed by a friend on his remarkable power in this re- 
 spect, he replied, that instead of an advantag-e it 
 was often a source of g-reat inconvenience. This 
 he explained by saying, that when he wished to 
 recollect a particular point in any thing- which he 
 had read, he could do it only by repeating- to 
 himself the whole from the commencement till he 
 reached the point which he wished to recall. 
 
 We may find a mere local memory combined 
 with very little judgment ; — that is, the power of 
 remembering facts in the order in which they oc- 
 curred, or words in the order in which they were 
 addressed to the individual ; but that kind of me- 
 mory which is founded, not upon local or inci- 
 dental relations, but upon real analogies, must be 
 considered as an important feature of a cultivated 
 mind, and as holding an important place in the 
 formation of intellectual character. The former 
 kind of memory, however, is often the more 
 ready, and is that which generally makes the 
 greater show, both on account of its readiness, 
 and likewise because the kind of facts with which 
 it is chiefly conversant are usually those most in 
 request in common conversation. 
 
 The facts now referred to are matters of curi- 
 osity only. The points of real interest and prac- 
 
MEMORY. 105 
 
 tical importance, in regard to memory, respect 
 the manner in wliicli it is inflnenced by the intel- 
 lectual habits of individuals, — and the principles 
 on Avhich it may be improved. These are refer- 
 able chiefly to two heads, namely, Attention 
 and Association. 
 
 Memory is very much influenced by Atten- 
 tion, or a full and distinct perception of the fact 
 or object with a view to its being- remembered ; 
 and by the perception being kept before the mind, 
 in this distinct manner, for a certain time. The 
 distinct recollection of the fact, in such cases, is 
 generally in proportion to the intensity with 
 which it has been contemplated ; and this is also 
 very much strengthened by its being repeatedly 
 brought before the mind. Most people, accord- 
 ingly, have experienced, that a statement is more 
 strongly impressed upon the memory by being 
 several times repeated to others. It is on the 
 same principle, that memory is greatly assisted 
 by writing down the object of our knowledge, 
 especially if this be done in a distinct and syste- 
 matic manner. A subject also is more distinctly 
 conceived, and more correctly remembered, af- 
 ter we have instructed another person in it. 
 Such exercises are not strictly to be considered 
 as helps to the memory, but as excitements to at- 
 tention ; and as thus leading to that clear and 
 full comprehension of the subject, which is re- 
 quired for the distinct remembrance of it. 
 
106 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 It is familiar to every one that there are great 
 differences in memory, both in respect to the fa- 
 cility of acquirement and the power of retention. 
 In the former there appear to be original differ- 
 ences, — but a great deal also depends upon habit. 
 In the power of retention much depends, as we 
 shall afterwards see, upon the habit of correct 
 association ; but, besides this, there are facts which 
 seem to show a singular connexion with the man- 
 ner in which the acquisition was made. The fol- 
 lowing fact was communicated to me by an able 
 and intelligent friend, who heard it from the in- 
 dividual to whom it relates. A distinguished 
 theatrical performer, in consequence of the sud- 
 den illness of another actor, had occasion to pre- 
 pare himself, on very short notice, for a part which 
 was entirely new to him ; and the part was long 
 and rather difficult. He acquired it in a very 
 short time, and went through it with perfect ac- 
 curacy, but immediately after the performance 
 forgot every word of it. Characters which he 
 had acquired in a more deliberate manner he 
 never forgets, but can perform them at any time 
 without a moment's preparation ; but in regard 
 to the character now mentioned, there was the 
 farther and very singular fact, that though he has 
 repeatedly performed it since that time, he has 
 been obliged each time to prepare it anew, and 
 has never acquired in regard to it that facility 
 which is familiar to him in other instances. When 
 
ATTENTION. 10? 
 
 questioned respecting* the mental process which 
 he employed the first time he performed this part, 
 he says, that he lost sig-ht entirely of the audience, 
 and seemed to have nothinir hefore him but the 
 pages of the book from which he had learnt it ; 
 and that, if any thing" had occurred to interrupt 
 this illusion, he should have stopt instantly. 
 
 That degree of attention, which is required for 
 the full remembrance of a subject, is to be con- 
 sidered as a voluntary act on the part of the in- 
 dividual ; but the actual exercise of it, is influ- 
 enced in a great measure, by his previous intel- 
 lectual habits. Of four individuals, for example, 
 who are giving an account of a journey through 
 the same district, one may describe chiefly its 
 agricultural produce ; another, its mineralogical 
 characters ; a third, its picturesque beauties ; 
 while the fourth may not be able to give an ac- 
 count of any thing- except the state of the roads 
 and the facilities for travelling-. The same facts 
 or objects must have passed before the senses of 
 all the four ; but their remembrance of them de- 
 pends upon the points to which their attention 
 was directed. Besides the manner here alluded 
 to, in which the attention is influenced by pre- 
 vious habits or pursuits, some persons have an ac- 
 tive inquiring state of mind, which keeps the at- 
 tention fully engaged upon whatever is passing 
 before them ; while others give way to a listless 
 inactive condition, which requires to be strongly 
 
108 MEMORY. 
 
 excited, before the attention is roused to the de- 
 gree required for remembrance. The former, ac- 
 cordingly, remember a great deal of all that passes 
 before them, either in reading or observation. 
 The latter are apt to say that they are deficient 
 in memory ; their deficiency, however, is not in 
 memory but in attention ; and this appears from 
 the fact, that they do not forget any thing which 
 deeply engages their feelings, or concerns their 
 interest. 
 
 The habit of listless inactivity of mind should 
 be carefully guarded against in the young ; and 
 the utmost care should be taken to cultivate the 
 opposite, namely, the habit of directing the mind 
 intensely to whatever comes before it, either in 
 reading or observation. This may be considered 
 as forming the foundation of sound intellectual 
 character. 
 
 Next to the effect of attention, is the remark- 
 able influence produced upon memory by Asso- 
 ciation. This principle holds so important a 
 place in relation to the mental operations, that 
 some philosophers have been disposed to refer to 
 it nearly all the phenomena of mind ; but, with- 
 out ascribing to it this universal influence, its ef- 
 fects are certainly very extensive, and the facts 
 connected with it present a subject of peculiar 
 interest. 
 
 The principle of association is founded upon a 
 
ASSOCIATION. 101) 
 
 remarkable tendency, by whicb two or more facts 
 or conceptions, which have been contemplated 
 together, or in immediate succession, become so 
 connected in the mind, that one of them at a fu- 
 ture time recalls the others, or introduces a train 
 of thoughts, which, without any mental effort, 
 follow each other in the order in which thoy were 
 originally associated. This is called the associa- 
 tion of ideas, and various phenomena of a very 
 interesting kind are connected with it. 
 
 But, besides this tendency, by which thoughts 
 formerly associated are brought into the mind 
 in a particular order, there is another species of 
 association, into which the mind passes spontane- 
 ously, by a suggestion from any subject which 
 happens to be present to it. The thought or fact, 
 which is thus present, suggests another which 
 has some kind of affinity to it ; this suggests a 
 third, and so on, to the formation of a train or se- 
 ries which may be continued to a great length. 
 A remarkable circumstance likewise is, that such 
 a train may go on with very little consciousness 
 of, or attention to it ; so that the particulars of 
 the series are scarcely remembered, or are traced 
 only by an effort. This singular fact every one 
 must have experienced in that state of mind which 
 is called a reverie. It goes on for some time 
 without effort, and with little attention ; at length 
 the attention is roused, and directed to a particu- 
 Igir thought which is in the inind, without the 
 
110 MEMORY. 
 
 person being able at first to recollect what led 
 him to think of that subject. He then, by a vo- 
 luntary effort, traces the chain of thoughts back- 
 wards, perhaps throug-li a long series, till he ar- 
 rives at a subject of which he has a distinct re- 
 membrance as having given rise to it. 
 
 It is impossible distinctly to trace the princi- 
 ples which lead to the particular chain of thoughts 
 which arise in a case of this kind. It is proba- 
 bly much influenced by the previous intellectual 
 habits of the individual ; and, perhaps in many in- 
 stances, is guided by associations previously form- 
 ed. There are also among the facts or thoughts 
 themselves, certain principles of analogy, by 
 which one suggests another without that kind of 
 connexion which is established by previous proxi- 
 mity. These have usually been called piinciples 
 of association^ or, according to the phraseology 
 of Dr. Brown, principles of simple suggestion. 
 They have been generally referred to four heads, 
 namely — resemblance, — contiguity in time and 
 place, — cause and effect, — and contrast : and 
 others have reduced them to three, considering 
 contiguity, and cause and effect, as referable to 
 the same head. On these principles, then, one 
 thought may suggest another which has some re- 
 lation to it, either in the way of resemblance, 
 contiguity, cause, effect, or contrast. But still 
 the question recurs, what gives rise to the occur- 
 rence of one of these relations in preference to 
 
ASSOCIATION. 1 1 1 
 
 the others. This may depend, in some instances, 
 on previous habits of thought, and peculiarities 
 of mental temperament ; and in other cases as- 
 sociations may be more apt to occur, according 
 as some analogous association may have been 
 more recently formed, more lively, or more fre- 
 quently repeated. When the common topic of 
 the weather, for example, is introduced in con- 
 versation, or presented to the mind, the agri- 
 culturist will naturally refer to its influence on 
 vegetation ; the physician, to its effect on the 
 health of the community ; the man of pleasure 
 may think only of its reference to the sports of 
 the field ; the philosopher may endeavour to seek 
 for its cause in some preceding atmospheric phe- 
 nomena ; and another person of certain habits of 
 observation may compare or contrast it with the 
 weather of the same period in a preceding year. 
 Thus, in five individuals, the same topic may 
 give rise to five trains of thought, perfectly dis- 
 tinct from each other, yet each depending upon 
 a very natural and obvious principle of sugges- 
 tion. In other instances, it is impossible to trace 
 the cause which leads the mind off into peculiar 
 and unusual associations. The following exam- 
 ple from Hobbes has been frequently referred 
 to. " In a company in which the conversation 
 turned on the civil war, what could be conceived 
 more impertinent, than for a person to ask abrupt- 
 ly, what was the value of a Roman denarius ? 
 
112 MEMORY. 
 
 On a little reflection, however, I was easily able 
 to trace the train of thought which sug-gested the 
 question ; for the original subject of discourse 
 naturally introduced the history of the King, and 
 of the treachery of those who surrendered his 
 person to his enemies ; this again introduced the 
 treachery of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of 
 money which he received for his reward. And 
 all this train of ideas passed through the mind of 
 the speaker in a twinkling, in consequence of the 
 velocity of thought." Mr. Stewart adds, in rela- 
 tion to this anecdote, " it is by no means impro- 
 bable, that if the speaker had been interrogated 
 about the connexion of ideas which led him aside 
 from the original topic of discourse, he would have 
 found himself, at first, at a loss for an answer." 
 
 In the mental process now referred to, it is 
 evident that the term .suggestion is much more 
 correct than association^ which has often been 
 applied to it. For in the cases which belong to 
 this class, the facts or thoughts suggest each other, 
 not according to any connexion or association 
 which the mind had previously formed between 
 them, but according to some mental impression 
 or emotion, which by a law of our constitution 
 proves a principle of analogy or suggestion. AVe 
 readily perceive how this takes place in regard 
 to circumstances which are allied to each other 
 by resemblance, contiguity, cause, or effect ; and 
 the suggestion of contrast must also occur to 
 
ASSOCIATION. lis 
 
 every oiio as by no means luiiiiitiiral. Tims, tlio 
 sijrlit of a rcinarkahly fat man may recall to ns 
 the thought of another man we had lately seen, 
 who was e<jiia]ly remarkable for his leanness : 
 the ])layfuiness and mirth of childhood may sng"- 
 g-est the cares and anxieties of after life ; and an 
 instance of condnct, which we greatly disa})prove, 
 may lead ns to recollect how very differently 
 another individual conducted himself in similar 
 circumstances. 
 
 In a practical view, the subject of association 
 leads us chiefly to a consideration of the manner, 
 in which facts are so associated in the mind as to 
 be recalled by means of the connexion ; in other 
 words, the influence of association upon me- 
 mory. In this view, associations are distinctly 
 referable to three classes : 
 
 I. Natural or philosophical association. 
 
 II. Local or incidental association. 
 
 III. Arbitrary or fictitious association. 
 
 A variety of mental phenomena of the most 
 interesting- kind will be found connected with 
 the subjects referred to under these classes. The 
 principle on which they all depend, is simply the 
 circumstance of two or more facts, thoughts or 
 events, being contemplated together by the mind, 
 though many of them may have no relation to 
 each other except this conjunction. The strength 
 of the association is generally in proportion to 
 
114 MEMORY. 
 
 the intensity of the mental emotion ; and is like- 
 wise in a great measure reg-ulated by the length 
 of time, or the number of times, in which the 
 facts have been contemplated in this connexion. 
 Astonishing examples may be often met with, of 
 facts or occurrences, which have long* ceased to 
 be objects of simple memory, being brought up 
 in this manner by association, though they had 
 not passed through the mind for a very long 
 time. 
 
 I. Natural or Philosophical Association 
 takes place when a fact or statement, on which 
 the attention is fixed, is, by a mental process, 
 associated with some fact previously known, to 
 which it has a relation, or with some subject which 
 it is calculated to illustrate. The fact so acquired 
 is thus, to use a figurative expression, put by in 
 its proper place in the mind, and can aftervv'ards 
 be recalled by means of the association. 
 
 The formation of associations, in this manner, 
 is of course influenced in a very great degree by 
 previous mental habits, pursuits, or subjects of 
 reflection ; and, according to the nature and the 
 variety of these pursuits or subjects of thought, 
 facts, which by some are passed by and instantly 
 forgotten, may be fixed upon by others with 
 eager attention, and referred to some principle 
 which they are calculated to illustrate. Exam})les 
 of this kind must be familiar to every one j I may 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 1 l-> 
 
 inciitiou the following : In a party of g-entlemen 
 the conversation turned on the warlike character 
 of the Mahrattas, as compared with the natives 
 of Lower India, and the explanation given of it 
 by an author who refers it to their use of animal 
 food, from which the Hindoos are said to be pro- 
 hibited by their religion. A doubt was started 
 respecting the extent to which Hindoos are pro- 
 hibited from the use of animal food ; some were 
 of one opinion, and some of another, and the 
 point was left undecided. Reading, soon after, 
 the Journal of Bishop Heber, I found it stated, 
 that on one occasion during his journey, when a 
 large supply of meat was brought to him, he 
 ordered three lambs to be sent to his Hindoo at- 
 tendants, and that the srift was received with 
 every expression of gratitude. On another oc- 
 casion, such a fact might have been passed by 
 without producing any impression ; or it might 
 have been slightly associated with the good Bish- 
 op's attention to the comfort of all around him, 
 but not remembered beyond the passing mo- 
 ment. In connexion with the discussion now 
 mentioned, it became a fact of great interest, and 
 never to be forgotten ; and led to inquiry after 
 more precise information on the subject to which 
 it related. 
 
 This trifling example may serve to illustrate 
 the principle, that the remembrance of insulated 
 facts does not dejiend merely upon the degree of 
 
 P 
 
IIG 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 attention directed to them, bnt also on the exist- 
 ence in the mind of subjects of thought with which 
 the new fact may be associated. Other facts, as 
 they occur, will afterwards be added from time to 
 time, giving rise to a progressive increase of know^ 
 ledge in a mind in which this mental process is 
 regularly carried on. This habit of attention and 
 association ought therefore to be carefully culti- 
 vated, as it must have a great influence on our 
 progress in knowledge, and likewise on the for- 
 mation of intellectual character, provided the as- 
 sociations be made upon sound principles, or ac- 
 cording to the true and important relations of 
 things. It is also closely connected with that ac- 
 tivity of mind which is ever on the alert for 
 knowledge, from every source that comes within 
 its reach ; and that habit of reflection, which 
 always connects with such facts the conclusions 
 to which they lead, and the views which they tend 
 to illustrate. On this principle also, every new 
 fe-ct which is acquired, or every new subject of 
 thought which is brought before the mind, is not 
 only valuable in itself, but also becomes the basis 
 or nucleus of farther improvement. Minds which 
 are thus furnished with the requisite foundation 
 of knowledge, and act uniformly upon these prin- 
 ciples of enlarging it, will find interesting matter 
 to be associated and remembered, where others 
 find only amusement for a vacant hour, which 
 passes away and is forgotten. There is also an- 
 
riuLosoriiiCAL association. 1 17 
 
 other respect in which the hahit of correct and 
 philosophical association assists tlie memory, and 
 contributes to prog-ress in knowledge. i' or by 
 means of it, when applied to a great mass of facts 
 relating to the same subject, we arrive at certain 
 general facts, which represent a numerous body 
 of the individuals, and the remembrance of which 
 is equivalent to the remembrance of the whole. 
 
 The associations, referred to under this first 
 head, arise out of the real relations of facts to 
 each other, or to subjects of thought previously 
 existing in the mind. The particular train of 
 association, therefore, which is formed from the 
 same facts by different individuals, may vary ex- 
 ceedingly. Thus, the same facts may often ad- 
 mit of various applications, or in other words, of 
 being associated in various ways, by different per- 
 sons, according to their intellectual habits, or by 
 the same person, at different times, according" to 
 the subject of thought which happens to be more 
 immediately present. 
 
 When a variety of facts have been associated 
 in the mind, in the manner now referred to, they 
 form a series which hang together and recall 
 each other in a very remarkable manner. There 
 are two ways in which this takes place, which mav 
 be called voluntary and spontaneous. (1.) We 
 call up facts by a voluntary effort, by direct- 
 ing the mind into particular trains o][ thought 
 calculated to lead to those which we are in search 
 
118 MEMORY. 
 
 of. This is what we call recollecting ourselves 
 on a particular subject. We have an impression, 
 perhaps, that the mind is in possession of infor- 
 mation which bears upon the subject, but do not at 
 the moment remember it ; or we remember some 
 circumstances, and wish to recall a more full and 
 complete remembrance. We therefore commence 
 a mental process which consists in putting- in mo- 
 tion, to speak figuratively, a train of thoughts, or 
 a series of associated facts, which we think calcu- 
 lated to lead us to the facts we wish to recall. 
 (2.) Associations recur spontaneously, either 
 M'hen particular topics naturally leading to them 
 are brought before the mind, in reading or con- 
 versation, or in that state in which the mind is 
 left to follow, without any effort, the current of 
 thoughts as they succeed each other. In the 
 healthy state of the mind, we can give way to 
 this spontaneous succession of thoughts ; or we 
 can check it at our pleasure, and direct the mind 
 into some new train connected with the same 
 subject, or arising out of it ; or we can dismiss it 
 altogether. While we allow it to go on, it does 
 so, not only without effort, but often without 
 consciousness ; so that when the attention is, 
 after some time, arrested by a subject of thought 
 which is in the mind, we do not at first remem- 
 ber what led us to think of it, and begin to re- 
 collect ourselves by tracing the series backwards. 
 In this state of mind, it is most interesting to ob- 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCLVTION. 119 
 
 serve the manner in which old associations are 
 Revived, and old recollections renewed, which 
 seemed to have been lost and forgotten ; and 
 how facts and occurrences come into the mind 
 which had not been thought of for many years. 
 They are recalled, we scarcely know how, by 
 some train of association which we can hardly 
 trace, and which had long ceased to be the sub- 
 ject of any voluntary effort of attention. We 
 shall again allude to this most interesting subject, 
 in relation to the manner in which associations, 
 long forgotten, are sometimes brought into the 
 mind in dreaming, and in certain states of deli- 
 rium. 
 
 The voluntary power over the succession of 
 thoughts and associations which has now been 
 alluded to, is a subject of extreme interest. We 
 shall have occasion to refer to it again when we 
 come to speak of a remarkable condition in which 
 it is lost ; and in which the mind is left entirely 
 under the influence of the series of thoughts as 
 they happen to succeed each other, according 
 probably to old associations, without the power 
 of arresting or varying it. This occurs in two 
 very interesting mental conditions to be after- 
 wards more particularly mentioned, namely, 
 dreaming and insanity. 
 
 II. Local or Incidental Assoclvtion. — In 
 the mental process referred to imdor the preced- 
 
120 MEMORY. 
 
 ing head, facts or thouglits are associated accord- 
 ing to certain real relations ; though these, w6 
 have seen, may be various, and the particular re- 
 lation which is fixed upon, in particular cases, 
 depends upon the intellectual habits of the indi- 
 vidual. In the class now to be mentioned, the 
 associations are formed according to no other re- 
 lations than such as are entirel}' local or casual. 
 Thus, a fact, a thought, or a mental impression, 
 is associated with the person by whom it was 
 communicated, or the place where the communi- 
 cation was made ; and is recalled to the mind 
 when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or 
 thought of. Some persons seem to form almost 
 no other associations than those of this descrip- 
 tion. When a place which they had visited, for 
 example, is spoken of, they immediately relate, 
 in connexion with it, the persons whom they 
 met there, incidents which occurred in their 
 company, and opinions or statements which were 
 mentioned in conversation with them ; and from 
 this, perhaps, they may branch off to other cir- 
 cumstances relating to these individuals, their fa- 
 milies, or connexions. 
 
 These mere local associations, however, often 
 make a very deep impression upon the mind ; 
 more vivid, certainly, than simple memory of the 
 facts or transactions connected with them. Thus, 
 we avoid a place which is associated with some 
 painful recollection ; yet the \ory fact of avoid- 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 1^21 
 
 ing it sliows that we have a full reniembraiice of 
 the circumstances, and, at the same time, a con- 
 viction that the sight of the spot would make 
 the impression more vivid and more painful. 
 After the death of a beloved child or a much 
 valued friend, we may retain a lively remem- 
 brance of them, and even anxiously cherish the 
 impression of their endearing- qualities ; yet, af- 
 ter time has in some measure blunted the acute- 
 ness of feeling-, the accidental discovery of some 
 trifling- memorial, strongly associated with the 
 lamented object of our afl'ection, produces a 
 freshness and intensity of emotion, known only 
 to those who have experienced it. This feeling 
 is peculiarly strong, if the memorial has been 
 long lost sight of, and discovered by accident, — 
 because, as has been well remarked by Dr. 
 Brown, it in this case presents the unmixed im- 
 age of the friend with whom it is associated ; 
 whereas, a memorial, which has become familiar 
 to us, is associated with other feelings not relat- 
 ing exclusively to him. Philosophers have en- 
 deavoured to explain the mental phenomenon 
 here referred to by supposing, that, in such cases, 
 the mingling of mental emotion with actual j)er- 
 ception gives a feeling of reality to the emotion, 
 and, for the time, a kind of belief of the existence 
 of the object of it. This is sufficiently plausible, 
 but, after all, amounts to little more than ex- 
 
122 MEMORY. 
 
 pressing the fact in other words, without con- 
 veying- any real explanation. 
 
 Similar impressions, whether of a pleasurable 
 or painful character, according- to the original 
 feeling which is thus recalled, are excited by the 
 sight of a spot which we have visited while un- 
 der the influence of strong emotion ; by a tune, 
 — a piece of poetry, — an article of dress, or the 
 most trifling object with Avhich, from incidental 
 circumstances, the association was made. The 
 eff'ect of a particular tune, on the Swiss regiments 
 in foreign service, is familiar to every one ; and 
 a similar efl'ect has been remarked, from a similar 
 cause, among the Highland regiments of our own 
 country. The feelings thus produced may be so 
 vivid, as even to overpower present emotions ; 
 to excite pleasure amid circumstances of pain or 
 depression ; and to produce depressing and pain- 
 ful emotions, when all present circumstances are 
 calculated to give satisfaction. Hence, it is pro- 
 bable that the principle might often be employed 
 with much advantage, as a moral remedy, in va- 
 rious circumstances of depressing disease, as in 
 the low state of fever, and certain conditions of 
 insanity. A pleasing anecdote of this kind is 
 mentioned by Dr. Rush. *' During the time 
 that I passed at a country school, in Cecil coun- 
 ty in Maryland, I often went on a holyday, with 
 my schoolmates, to see an eagle's nest upon the 
 
 I 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 123 
 
 summit of a dead tree, in the neig-hbourhood of 
 the school, during the time of the incubation of 
 tlie bird. The daughter of the farmer, in whose 
 field the tree stood, and with whom I became ac- 
 quainted, married, and settled in this city about 
 forty years ago. In our occasional interviews, 
 we now and then spoke of the innocent haunts 
 and rural pleasures of our youth, and among 
 others, of the eagle's nest in her father's field. 
 A few years ago, I was called to visit this wo- 
 man when she was in the lowest stage of typhus 
 fever. Upon entering the room, I caught her 
 eye, and with a cheerful tone of voice, said only, 
 the eagle's nest. She seized my hand, without 
 being able to speak, and discovered strong emo- 
 tions of pleasure in her countenance, probably 
 from a sudden association of all her early domes- 
 tic connexions and enjoyments with the words 
 which I uttered. From that time, she began to 
 recover. She is now living, and seldom fails, 
 when we meet, to salute me with the echo of — 
 ** the eagle's nest." 
 
 There is even something in these mere local 
 associations, Avliich fixes an impression upon the 
 mind, almost independent of memory, and u])on 
 a principle with which we are little acquainted. 
 The following anecdote is, I believe, authentic, 
 though I cannot at present refer to the work in 
 which it is related. It is certainly one of the 
 most extraordinary of its kind, and yet we see 
 
121< MEMORY. 
 
 enough of the principle, in various instances, to 
 give it a high degree of probability. — A lady, in 
 the last stage of a chronic disease, was carried 
 from London to a lodging in the country : — 
 there, her infant daughter was taken to visit her, 
 and, after a short interview, carried back to 
 town. The lady died a few days after, and the 
 daughter grew up without any recollection of her 
 mother, till she was of mature age. At this time, 
 she happened to be taken into the room in which 
 her mother died, without knowing it to have 
 been so ; — she started on entering it, and, when 
 a friend who was along with her, asked the cause 
 of her agitation, replied, " I have a distinct im- 
 pression of having been in this room before, and 
 that a lady, who lay in that corner, and seemed 
 very ill, leaned over me and wept." 
 
 The singular influence of local association is 
 often illustrated by the most trivial occurrences. 
 Walking in the street lately, I met a lady, whose 
 face was familiar to me, but whom I could not 
 name. I had, at the same time, an impression 
 that I ought to have spoken to her, and to have 
 inquired for some relative v/lio had lately been 
 my patient ; but, notwithstanding repeated ef- 
 forts, I could not recognise her, and passed on. 
 Some time after, in passing along the road a few 
 miles from town, my eye caught a cottage, to 
 which I had been taken about six months before, 
 to see a gentleman who had been carried into it 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 1^25 
 
 in a state of insensibility, in consoquonce of be- 
 ing- thrown from a g-ig-. The sight of the cottag-e 
 instantly recalled the accident, and the g-ontleman 
 who was the subject of it ; and, at the same in- 
 stant, the impression that the lady whom I had 
 passed in the manner now mentioned, was his 
 wife. In this case no recollection was excited by 
 the sight of the lady, even after repeated and 
 anxious attempts ; and I believe I should not have 
 recognised the patient himself, had he been along- 
 with her ; whereas the whole was recalled in an 
 instant by the sight of the cottage. Similar illus- 
 trations must have occurred to every one. We 
 meet a person in the street who stops and speaks 
 to us ; but we cannot recognise him. We are 
 unwilling to tell him so, and walk along with 
 him conversing on various topics ; at length, he 
 makes an allusion to some person or some cir- 
 cumstance, by means of which, we instantly re- 
 collect who he is, and where we met with him. 
 On the same principle, when we are endeavour- 
 ing to remind a person of a transaction which he 
 has forgotten, and which we are anxious to call 
 to his recollection, we mention various circum- 
 stances connected with it, until at length we 
 mention one which, by association, instantly 
 brings the whole distinctly before him. There 
 are even facts which seem to show, that the im- 
 pression recalled by local association may affect the 
 bodily organs. Van Swieten relates of himself, that 
 
1 26 MEMOIIY. 
 
 lie was passing" a spot, where the dead body of a 
 dog burst and produced such a stench as made him 
 vomit ; and that, happening to pass the same spot 
 some years after, he was affected by sickness and 
 vomiting from the recollection. 
 
 Finally, to the influence of local association 
 we are \o refer the impressions produced by the 
 monuments of the illustrious dead ; the trophies 
 of other times ; the remains of Greece and 
 Rome ; or by the visitation of spots distinguish- 
 ed by illustrious deeds, as Thermopylae, Bannock- 
 burn, or Waterloo. " Far from me, says Dr. 
 Johnson, and from my friends, be such frigid 
 philosophy, as may conduct us, indifferent and 
 unmoved, over any ground which has been dig- 
 nified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man 
 is little to be envied, whose patriotism would not 
 gain force upon the plains of Marathon, or whose 
 piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of 
 lona." 
 
 III. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association. 
 — This association is generally produced by a vo- 
 luntary effort of the mind ; and the facts associat- 
 ed are not connected by any relation except what 
 arises out of this effort. The process is ex- 
 emplified in the connexion we establish between 
 somethin"- which we wish to remember, and 
 something which we are in no danger of for- 
 getting ; as in the common expedients of tying 
 
ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. I '2? 
 
 a thread about the fing-cr, or making" a knot on 
 tlie pocket-handkerchief. A Roman, for the 
 same purpose, turned the stone of his ring- in- 
 wards towards the pabn of his hand. There is 
 an anah)gous expedient which most people pro- 
 bably have employed for enabling- them to re- 
 member the names of persons. It consists in 
 forming- an association between the name to be 
 remembered, and that of some intimate friend, 
 or public character of the same name, which is 
 familiar to us. The remarkable circumstance 
 in these cases is, that, whatever difficulty a per- 
 son may have in simply remembering a name, he 
 never foroets who the individual was with whose 
 name he formed the association. 
 
 On this principle have been founded various 
 schemes of artificial memory. One of the most 
 ancient consisted in associating the divisions of 
 a discourse to be delivered, with the various 
 apartments of a building ; and the leading senti- 
 ments with articles of furniture. This is said to 
 have been much practised by the ancient orators, 
 and to have given rise to the phraseology, by 
 which we speak of the divisions of a discourse, 
 as the first place, the second place, &c. I have 
 repeatedly made experiments on this method, in 
 remembering the discourses of public speakers, 
 and the effect is certainly astonishing ; for, though 
 it is many years since the experiments were made, 
 1 still find articles of furniture associated in the 
 
1'28 MEMORY. 
 
 clearest maiiiier with sentiments delivered by 
 some of the speakers. Other systems of artifi- 
 cial memory are founded upon the same general 
 principle, thoug-h the particular applications of it 
 may vary, — and some of them are extremely ab- 
 surd. One of the last which attracted notice 
 in this country, was that of a German of the 
 name of Feinagle, who delivered lectures on me- 
 mory, to crowded and fashionable audiences, 
 about the year 1809 or 1810. A leading part of 
 his system was the memory of dates, and it con- 
 sisted in changing the figures in the date into 
 the letters of the alphabet corresponding to them 
 in number. These letters were then formed into 
 a word to be in some way associated with the 
 date to be remembered. One example, which I 
 happen to recollect, will be sufficient to illus- 
 trate the peculiarity of the system, and at the 
 same time its efficiency for its purpose. Henry 
 IV. king of England was born in the year 1366. 
 This date, changed into letters, gives mjy, which 
 are very easily formed into the word miiff. The 
 method is not so obvious of establishing with 
 this a relation to Henry IV. " Henry IV.," says 
 M. Feinaale, " is four hens, and we put them into 
 the muff, one in each corner." No one, certain- 
 ly, after hearing this, is in any danger of forget- 
 ting the date of the birth of Henry IV. ; but 
 whether the remembrance is worth such a pro- 
 cess, is a separate question. 
 
ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. V20 
 
 It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the subject 
 of arbitrary association, as the observation of 
 every one will furnish numerous examples of it. 
 There is one application of the princi})le, how- 
 ever, which deserves to be referred to in a more 
 particular manner. I allude to the practice of 
 commemorative rites, or periodical observances, 
 for transmitting- the remembrance of remarkable 
 events. These are, in their nature, in general, 
 entirely arbitrary ; or, if they have any analogy 
 to the events, the relation is only figurative. But 
 the influence of such celebrations is of the most 
 extensive and most important kind. If the 
 events, particularly, are of a very uncommon cha- 
 racter, these rites remove any feeling of uncer- 
 tainty which attaches to traditional testimony, 
 when it has been transmitted through a long pe- 
 riod of time, and consequently, through a great 
 number of individuals. They carry us back, in 
 one unbroken series, to the period of the events 
 themselves, and to the individuals who were wit- 
 nesses of them. 
 
 The most important application of the princi- 
 ple, in the manner now referred to, is in the ob- 
 servances of religion which are intended to com- 
 memorate those events which are connected with 
 the revelation of the Christian faith. Tlie im- 
 portance of this mode of transmission has not 
 been sufficiently attended to by those, who have 
 urged the insufficiency of himian testimony, to 
 
 K 
 
130 MEMORY. 
 
 establish the truth of events which ure at vari- 
 ance with the common course of nature. We 
 have formerly alluded to one part of this sophism, 
 and have stated the grounds on which we con- 
 tend, that no objection to the credibility of these 
 events can be founded upon our observation of 
 what we call the course of nature. We have ad- 
 mitted, that a much hig-her species of evidence is 
 required for them than would be required for 
 events which correspond with our previous ob- 
 servation ; and this high and peculiar evidence 
 is confirmed in a striking manner by the periodi- 
 cal rites now referred to. By means of these 
 we are freed entirely from every impression of 
 the fallibility of testimony, and the possibility of 
 the statements having been fabricated ; as we are 
 conducted in one uninterrupted series, to the pe- 
 riod when the events took place, and to the indi- 
 viduals who witnessed them. This will appear, 
 if we state in a few words a hypothetical case. 
 Let us conceive a person attempting to impose 
 upon the world, by an account of some wonder- 
 ful or miraculous event, which, he alleges, oc- 
 curred 500 years ago. He, of course, exerts 
 every possible ingenuity in fabricating documents, 
 and framing the appearance of a chain of testi- 
 mony in support of his statement. It is quite 
 possible that he might thus deceive a considera- 
 ble number of credulous persons ; and that 
 others, who did not believe his statement, might 
 
ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. 131 
 
 yet find difficulty in proving- its fallacy. But, if 
 the report were farther to bear, that, ever since 
 the occurrence of the allcg-ed event, it had been 
 regularly and specially celebrated by a certain 
 periodical observance, it is clear that this v/ould 
 bring- the statement to the test of a fact open to 
 examination, and that the fallacy of the whole 
 would be instantly detected. 
 
 On these principles it must appear, that the 
 statements of the sacred writings, respecting mi- 
 raculous events which are said to have occurred 
 upwards of 1800 years ago, could not have been 
 fabricated at any intermediate era during that pe- 
 riod. It is unnecessary to state, how much more 
 improbable it is, that they could have been fabri- 
 cated at the very time and place in which they 
 are said to have occurred, and in the midst of 
 thousands who are said to have witnessed them, 
 many of whom were deeply interested in detect- 
 ing their fallacy. This part of the question is 
 not connected with our present inquiry, but it is 
 impossible to dismiss the subject without one re- 
 flection : — ^that if we are to proceed upon the 
 principle of probabilities, we must balance fairly 
 the probabilities of fabrication. If we do so, we 
 hesitate not to assert, that the probability of the 
 world being imposed upon, under all the circum- 
 stances now alluded to, is more at variance with 
 our firm and unalterable experience, than all 
 that we are called upon to believe. 
 
132 MEMORY 
 
 It does not appear necessary to say mucli oi 
 that modification of memory which is called 
 Conception. It is the recalling of a perception. 
 If, for example, we have passed a person in the 
 street, whose face we think we have seen, but 
 without being able to recognise him, we can 
 recall the impression of his countenance, and en- 
 deavour to recollect who he is. By a higher ex- 
 ercise of this faculty, a painter can draw from 
 conception a landscape or a building, long after 
 he has visited them, and even the portrait of a 
 friend who is dead or absent, and whom he has 
 not seen for a considerable time. By another 
 modification of this power, we can embody into 
 a conception, a scene, a figure, or a transaction, 
 which has been described to us by another. The 
 vividness of our conception, in such cases, does 
 not depend upon the accuracy or even the truth 
 of the description, but upon the degree of live- 
 liness with which it is given, or the intensity with 
 which our attention is directed to it. Thus, it 
 has been remarked, that we have a more clear 
 conception of Don Quixote, or Sancho, than of 
 any characters in real history, unless they have 
 been made familiar to us by paintings. The 
 business of the novelist being to create his hero, 
 he gives a more full and graphic delineation of 
 him than the authentic historian finds it neces- 
 sary to do ; — hence, the former begins his narra- 
 tive by an impression made upon our conception ; 
 
 liv. 
 
 m 
 
CONCEPTION. 133 
 
 — tlio hitter disregards this, and proceeds at once 
 to the facts which he has to address to our atten- 
 tion and memory. 
 
 Conception, properly so called, or the recalling 
 of a perception, does not appear to be necessarily 
 connected with the impression of past time, but 
 rather to be at first accompanied by a feeling of 
 the present existence of the object. Connecting 
 the impression with past time seems to be a dis- 
 tinct act of the mind ; and the conception may 
 be so strong as, for the moment, almost to ex- 
 clude all idea of the past. That degree of con- 
 ception by which a painter can take the likeness 
 of a friend who has been long dead, or delineate 
 a scene visited at a remote period, mus^> amount 
 to something of this nature. In the active and 
 healthy state of the other faculties of the mind, 
 this impression is but momentary, being almost 
 instantly corrected by impressions received from 
 the external world. We shall afterwards have 
 occasion to refer to a remarkable state of mind 
 in which it is not thus corrected, but in which 
 objects, which exist only in conception, are be- 
 lieved to have a real and present existence. On 
 this condition depend many of the peculiarities 
 of dreaming, insanity, and spectral illusions. 
 
 Different individuals possess the faculty of con- 
 ception in different degrees ; and, connected with 
 the degree of it, there is generally a correspond- 
 
134 MEMORY. 
 
 ing- talent for lively description. The faculty it- 
 self, or the formation of the conception, probably 
 follows nearly the same laws with memory, and 
 depends, in a great measure, upon the degree of 
 attention which was originally directed to the 
 objects. This, again, is influenced, as in the case 
 of memory, partly by the general activity of mind 
 of the individual, and partly by his particular ha- 
 bits and pursuits. — Thus, as formerly remarked, 
 in describing the features of a country which they 
 have passed over, one person will give a clear and 
 lively description of its general characters, so as 
 to place it, as it were, before you ; a second will 
 describe chiefly its pastures and produce ; a third 
 may include both ; while a fourth may not be 
 able toii^ive an intelligible account of any one 
 feature of the scene. 
 
 There are particular situations in which con- 
 ception is apt to be most intensely brought into 
 exercise, especially those of seclusion, and the 
 absence of all external impressions. A beautiful 
 example of this occurs in the life of Niebuhr, the 
 celebrated Danish traveller. When old, blind, 
 and so infirm that he was able only to be carried 
 from his bed to his chair, he used to describe to 
 his friends the scenes which he had visited in his 
 early days, with wonderful minuteness and vi- 
 vacity. When they expressed their astonishment, 
 he told them, " that as he lay in bed, all visible 
 objects shut out, the pictures of what he had seen 
 
 I 
 
CONCEPTION. 135 
 
 in the east contimiallv floated before his mind's 
 eye, so that it was no wonder he could speak of" 
 them as if he had seen them yesterday. Witli 
 like vividness, the deep intense sky of Asia, with 
 its brilliant and twinkling- host of stars, which he 
 had so often g-azed at by night, or its lofty vault 
 of blue by day, was reflected, in the hours of still- 
 ness and darkness, on his inmost soul." This may, 
 perhaps, be considered as an example of what we 
 may call the highest degree of healthy conception. 
 Something- a little beyond this leads to that state 
 on which depends the theory of apparitions or 
 spectral illusions. 
 
 In concluding- this brief allusion to the subject 
 of conception, I shall only add the following ex- 
 ample of another application of this mental pro- 
 cess. In the church of St. Peter, at Colog-ne, 
 the altar-piece is a large and valuable picture by 
 Rubens, representing- the martyrdom of the 
 apostle. This picture having been carried away 
 by the French in 1805, to the g-reat regret of the 
 inhabitants, a painter of that city undertook to 
 make a copy of it from recollection ; and succeed- 
 ed in doing so in such a manner, that the most 
 delicate tints of the original are preserved \vith 
 the most minute accuracy. The original paint- 
 ing has now been restored, but the copy is j) re- 
 served along with it ; and, even Avhen they are 
 rigidly compared, it is scarcely possible to dis- 
 tinguish the one from the other. I am not aware 
 
136 MEMORY. 
 
 that this remarkable anecdote has been recorded 
 by any traveller ; I am indebted for it to my 
 friend Dr. Duncan, of the university of Edin- 
 burgh, who heard it on the spot in a late visit to 
 the continent, and saw both the pictures. 
 
 OF THE CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT OF 
 ATTENTION AND MEMORY. 
 
 The facts which have been briefly referred to, 
 in regard to the phenomena of memory, lead to 
 some remarks of a practical nature. These re- 
 late to the improvement of attention and me- 
 mory in persons of adult years ; and the cul- 
 tivation of these powers in the education of the 
 young. 
 
 The rules from which benefit is to be derived 
 for the improvement of memory, in persons of 
 adult years, may be chiefly referred to the follow- 
 ing heads. 
 
 I. The cultivation of habits of attention, or of 
 intense application of the mind to whatever is at 
 the time its more immediate object of pursuit. 
 
 II. Habits of correct association. These con- 
 sist in the constant practice of tracing the rela- 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 137 
 
 tion between new fiicts and others with wliich 
 we are previously acquainted ; and of referring 
 facts to principles which they are calculated to 
 illustrate, or to opinions which they tend to con- 
 firm, modify, or overturn. This is the operation 
 of what we call a reflecting mind ; and that in- 
 formation, which is thus fully contemplated and 
 associated, is not likely to be forgotten, 
 
 III. Intimately connected with both the for- 
 mer rules, is the cultivation of that active inquir- 
 ing state of mind, which is always on the watch 
 for knowledge, from every source that comes 
 within its reach, either in reading, conversation, 
 or observation. Such a mind is ever ready to 
 refer newly acquired knowledge to its proper 
 place. It is thus easily retained, and made to 
 yield those conclusions which are legitimately de- 
 duced from it. 
 
 IV. Method — that is, the pursuit of particular 
 subjects, upon a regular and connected plan. 
 
 All these principles are opposed to that listless 
 inactive state of mind, which is occupied with 
 trifles, or with its own waking dreams ; or which 
 seeks only amusement in desultory pursuits which 
 pass away and are forgotten. They are likewise 
 opposed to habits of irregular and desultory ap- 
 ]>lication, which even intellectual persons are apt 
 
138 MEMORY. 
 
 to fall into, by means of which the mind loses the 
 train of investig-ation, or of arg-ument, in which 
 it had made some progress, and may not be able 
 to recover it in a satisfactory manner. Nothing, 
 indeed, appears to contribute more to progress in 
 any intellectual pursuit, than the practice of keep- 
 ing the subject habitually before the mind, and of 
 daily contributing" something- towards the prose- 
 cution of it. 
 
 V. Attention and memory are greatly pro- 
 moted by writing- on a subject, especially if it be 
 done in a distinct and systematic maimer ; — also, 
 by conversing- on the subject, — and by instruct- 
 ing- others in it. These exercises, indeed, may 
 perhaps be considered rather as aids to attention, 
 or a clear comprehension of the subject, than to 
 memory. For in regard to memory, it is re- 
 markable how much its power is increased in 
 many instances, by that kind of exercise by which 
 it is alone trusted to, without any aid from writ- 
 ing-. I have known medical men, for example, 
 who had to recollect nmnerous appointments, 
 do so with perfect accuracy by trusting to me- 
 mory, to which they had habituated themselves, 
 but blunder continually when they kept a written 
 memorandum. The mental power, which is m 
 some cases acquired by constant and intense ex- 
 ercise, is indeed astonishing. Bloomfield the poet 
 relates of himself, that nearly one half of his 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPHOVIiMENT. V3[) 
 
 |)()cni, tlio Farmer's Boy, was composed, revised 
 and corrected, without writing- a word of it, 
 while he was at work witli other shoemakers in 
 a g-arret. 
 
 Simikir rules apply to the cultivation of these 
 powers in young persons. They may be chiefly 
 referred to the following heads : 
 
 I. Exciting constant attention and constant 
 interest. For this purpose it is of essential im- 
 portance, that whatever reading is presented to 
 children, shall be of a kind which they under- 
 stand, and in which they can feel interest and 
 pleasure. This will be greatly promoted by di- 
 recting their attention to the meaning of words, 
 and explaining them by familiar illustrations. 
 The practice of setting tasks as punishments 
 cannot be alluded to in terms adequate to its ex- 
 treme absurdity. On this ground also, it must 
 be considered as a great error in education to 
 make children attempt too much, that is, more 
 than they can do with close attention. AVhen 
 a sense of weariness or mental languor takes 
 place, what follows is not merely loss of time, 
 but an important injury done to the mental con- 
 stitution ; and it appears to be of the utmost con- 
 sequence, that the time of children should be as 
 much as possible divided between intense atten- 
 tion and active recreation. By a shorter time 
 
140 MEMORY. 
 
 occupied in this manner, not only is more pro- 
 gress made than by a longer, with listless and 
 imperfect application ; but an important part of 
 mental discipline is secured, which by the other 
 method is entirely neglected. Similar observa- 
 tions, indeed, apply to persons at every period of 
 life, and we are fully persuaded that progress 
 in any intellectual pursuit does not depend so 
 much upon protracted laborious study, as on the 
 practice of keeping- the subject habitually before 
 the mind, and on the intensity of mental a])pli- 
 cation. 
 
 II. Cultivating habits of association, by point- 
 ing out to children the relation of facts to each 
 other, the manner in which they illustrate one 
 another, or lead to some general conclusion. By 
 directing them, in this manner, from any parti- 
 cular fact, to recollect similar or analogous facts 
 which had formerly passed before them, they will 
 be trained at once to attention, memory, and re- 
 flection. 
 
 III. Cultivating that general activity of mind, 
 which seeks for information on every subject 
 that comes in its way. The most common and 
 trivial occurrences may thus be made the source 
 of mental improvement ; the habits of animals ; 
 the natural history of the articles that are con- 
 stantly before us, in clothes, food, furniture ; m'~ 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. Ml 
 
 tides of nianiifacture from a watch to a pin ; the 
 action of the mechanic powers, as iUustratcd by 
 various contrivances in constant use ; the struc- 
 ture of a leaf, a Hower, a tree. To those farther 
 advanced, a constant source of interest may be 
 found in history, g-eography, and memoirs of 
 eminent individuals ; and in the leading- princi- 
 ples of natural history, natural philoso])hy, and 
 chemistry. Every new subject of thought which 
 is thus presented to the mind, is both valuable 
 in itself, by the powers which it calls into action, 
 and by proving a nucleus to which new facts 
 may be afterwards associated. 
 
 IV. Memory and attention are g-reatly pro- 
 moted in young persons by writing ; provided 
 it be done, not merely in the form of extracts 
 from books, but in their own words ; in history, 
 for example, in the form of chronological tables ; 
 and on other subjects in clear and distinct ab- 
 stracts, neatly and methodically written. 
 
 V. These exercises of mind are greatly pro- 
 moted in the young by verbal communication. 
 Hence the importance of frequent examination. 
 The teacher is thereby enabled, not only to as- 
 certain their progress, but to explain what they 
 do not understand, to impress upon them impor- 
 tant points to which they may not have suffi- 
 ciently attended ; to excite attention, inquiry, 
 
1^2 MEMORY. 
 
 and interest ; und bo to cultivate the habits of 
 association and reflection. These, in fact, ought 
 to be the objects to be kept in view in all such 
 exercises, as of much greater moment than the 
 mere putting of questions. On the same princi- 
 ple, a most useful exercise for young persons is, 
 instructing others still younger, on subjects 
 which they have themselves recently acquired. 
 
 VI. In the cultivation of the mental powers 
 in the young, a point of essential importance is 
 the selection of proper and worthy objects of ac- 
 quirement. In the general conduct of education 
 in this respect, the chief error appears, in general, 
 to have been, devoting too much time and atten- 
 tion, in females, to superficial accomplishments, 
 and in males, to mere acquirement in languages 
 and mathematics : and the great object to be 
 kept in view, from the very earliest period, is, 
 the paramount importance of the actual know- 
 ledge of things on subjects of real utility ; the 
 actual cultivation of habits of observation, in- 
 quiry, association, and induction ; and, as the 
 foundation of the whole, the habit of steady and 
 continued attention. The cultivation of these 
 mental habits is of greater value by far than any 
 one acquirement whatever, for they are the basis 
 of all future iniprovement, and are calculated to 
 give a tone to the whole character. 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. M3 
 
 111 this brief outline I have sai<l nothiri"- on 
 the subjeet of religious instruction ; for the sann^ 
 rules a})ply to it as to branches of inferior im- 
 portance, in as far as it is to be considered as 
 enoag-ing" the intellectual ])o\vers. The chief 
 error here a})})ears to be the practice of trusting* 
 too much to the mere repetition of tasks or cate- 
 chisms, without that kind of direct personal in- 
 struction which is calculated to interest the at- 
 tention, to fix the truths upon the understanding-, 
 and to cultivate the habits of association and re- 
 flection. A leading- branch of this subject, the 
 cidture of the moral feeling-s, does not belong- to 
 our present inquiry ; but it is impossible to men- 
 tion it without alludinfif to its intense interest, 
 even in a philosophical point of view. One of 
 the most striking phenomena, certainly, in the 
 science of the human mind, is the hig-li deg-ree 
 of culture of which the moral powers are suscep- 
 tible, even in the infant mind, long- before the 
 powers of intellect are developed for the investi- 
 gation of truth. 
 
 In reference to the whole science of education, 
 nothing- is of g-reater importance than the princi- 
 ple of association, which, we have formerly seen, 
 exerts a most extensive influence, not in the re- 
 membrance of facts alone, but in perpetuating and 
 recalling mental emotions. We take a very li- 
 mited view, indeed, of this great subject, if we 
 confine education entirely or chiefly to the acqui- 
 
14 i MEMORY. 
 
 sition of knowledge, or even to tlic culture of the 
 intellectual powers. That system is deficient in 
 its most essential part, which does not carry on, 
 along with these, a careful and habitual culture 
 and regulation of the passions and emotions of 
 the young, — their attachments and antipathies, — 
 their hopes and fears, — their joys and sorrows ; — 
 the cultivation of the social and benevolent af- 
 fections ; — the habit of repressing selfishness 
 and bearing inconveniences and disappointments 
 without murmuring ; — a disposition to candour 
 and ingenuousness, and a sacred regard to truth. 
 Their future character, as social and moral be- 
 ings, will be greatly influenced by the manner in 
 which they are taught from an early period to 
 regulate their emotions, by directing them to 
 adequate and worthy objects, — and controlling 
 them by the great principles of wisdom and vir- 
 tue. In this important jjrocess the principle of 
 association exerts a most extensive influence. 
 The stern lessons of morality, and even the su- 
 blime truths of religion, may be rigidly impressed 
 upon the minds of the young, and may, in after 
 life, recur from time to time as a mere matter of 
 remembrance ; but many must have experienced 
 how diff'erent is the impression, when they recur 
 in close association with a father's afl'ection, and 
 a mother's tenderness, — with the lively recollec- 
 tion of a home, where the kindest sympathies of 
 the human heart shed around the domestic circle 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 145 
 
 uU that is lovely in life, while a mild untl consist- 
 ent piety habitually pointed the way to a life 
 which is to come. 
 
 OF THE INFLUENCE OF DISEASE UPON 
 ATTENTION AND MEMORY. 
 
 The preceding imperfect outline, of the subject 
 of memory, naturally leads us briefly to investi- 
 gate the manner in which this function is im- 
 })aired in connexion with bodily disease. This 
 takes place chiefly from injuries of the head, af- 
 fections of the brain, fever, and diseases of ex- 
 treme debility. Similar eff"ects arise from intem- 
 perance and other habits of dissij)ation. Our pre- 
 sent purpose, however, is, not to investigate the 
 peculiar effects of these various causes, but to en- 
 deavour to trace the manner in which attention 
 and memory, and we may include perception, are 
 affected by any or all of them. 
 
 The first mental function which is impaired by 
 bodily disease is usually the power of attention ; 
 — this we see illustrated in all febrile affections. 
 The patient, in the early or milder stages, is in- 
 capable of fixing his mind upon any thing that 
 requires much attention, of following out an ar- 
 gument, or of transacting business which calls for 
 
 L 
 
146 MEMORY. 
 
 much tlioiiglit or consideration. He is acute and 
 intelligent as to all common occurrences, and 
 shows no want of recollection, or of the power 
 of reasoning when his attention is excited ; but 
 he feels it an exertion that is painful to him. In 
 a higher degree of this condition, he is still intel- 
 ligent as to what is said or done at the time or 
 in recognising persons ; but in a short time for- 
 gets every thing in regard to the person or the 
 occurrence. He is incapable of that degree of 
 attention which is necessary for memory, though 
 the powers of perception are entire. In the next 
 stage, he becomes incapable of receiving the full 
 impression from external things ; and, in conse- 
 quence of this, he mistakes the objects of his own 
 thoughts for realities. This is delirium, and there 
 are various degrees of it. In some cases, the at- 
 tention of the patient can be roused for a time, 
 and directed to the true relations of external 
 things, though he relapses into his delirious im- 
 pressions when he is left undisturbed ; in others, 
 the false impression is constant, and cannot be 
 corrected by any effort which is made to direct 
 the attention ; and, in a third modification of 
 this remarkable condition, he mixes up his hal- 
 lucinations with external impressions in a most 
 singular manner. He is still capable, however, of 
 describing his impressions, that is, of talking so 
 as to be understood, though what he speaks of re- 
 lates only to his erroneous conceptions, or mere 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 147 
 
 bodily feelini^s. In the next stage, he either does 
 not attempt to express himself at all, or is en- 
 tirely unintelligible. He is now cut off from 
 conniuinication with external things, and with 
 other sentient beings ; and the highest degree of 
 this is what we call coma, or stupor, which re- 
 sembles profound sleep. 
 
 This description refers chiefly to the grada- 
 tions in the state of the mental functions which 
 we observe in continued fever. It is particularly 
 interesting to trace them in this disease, because 
 we see the various grades passing into one an- 
 other, and thus showing, in a connected series, 
 the leading peculiarities, which, in other affec- 
 tions, we have to contemplate separately. These 
 peculiarities may be chiefly referred to the fol- 
 lowing heads. 
 
 I. A state in which the attention cannot be 
 steadily directed to a long and connected train 
 of thought, or to any thing requiring a continu- 
 ed effort of mind. This takes place, as already 
 stated, in the earlier stages of all febrile diseases. 
 It likewise occurs in connexion with the debilit}' 
 which succeeds acute diseases ; in persons broken 
 down by intemperance ; and in the first ap- 
 proaches of old age. It is also often observed in 
 a remarkable degree in connexion with a disor- 
 dered state of the stomach. 
 
148 MEMORY. 
 
 II. A state in which tlie impression made by 
 external thing's is not snfficient to produce re- 
 membrance, thong-h there appears to be, at the 
 time, a perfect perception. A person so affected 
 understands what is said to him, and answers 
 correctly, but very soon forgets what has passed ; 
 he knows a friend, and is happy to see him, but 
 in a short time forgets the occurrence. This is 
 met with in a more advanced state of febrile dis- 
 eases, in the higher degrees of the condition 
 which results from habitual intemperance, and 
 in the more advanced periods of age. It also 
 occurs in diseases of the brain, and in cases of 
 injuries of the head. A lady, whom I attended 
 some time ago, on account of an injury produced 
 by a fall from a horse, lay, for tlie first week, in 
 a state of perfect stupor ; she then gradually re- 
 vived, so as to be sensible to external impres- 
 sions, and after some time to recognise her 
 friends. But afterwards, when she was entirely 
 recovered, she had no recollection of this period 
 of her convalescence, or of having seen various 
 friends who then visited her, though, at the time, 
 she recognised them, conversed with them sensi- 
 bly, and was very happy to see them. 
 
 III. The third condition is that in which ex- 
 ternal impressions are either not perceived at all, 
 or are perceived in a manner which cannot con- 
 vey any distinct notion of their relations to the 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. I ID 
 
 mind. On this account the conceptions or trains 
 of ideas existing- in the mind itself are believed 
 to be realities. This remarkable condition be- 
 iong-s properly to another part of our subject. 
 It occurs in various forms of delirium, and con- 
 stitutes the peculiar characters of insanity and 
 dreaming-. The ideas or conceptions which oc- 
 cupy the mind in this condition are various. 
 They may be trains of thought excited by some 
 passing event, or some bodily sensation ; and fre- 
 quently the patient repeats something which is- 
 said in his hearing, and then branches off into 
 some other train to which that has given rise. In 
 other cases, the impression is one which has been 
 brought up by some old associations, even relat- 
 ing to things which the person when in health 
 had not recollected. Of this kind there are va- 
 rious remarkable examples on record, especially 
 in regard to the memory of languages. A man, 
 mentioned by Mr. Abernethy, had been born in 
 France, but had spent the greater part of his life 
 in England, and, for many years, had entirely 
 lost the habit of speaking French. But when 
 under the care of Mr. Abernethy, on account of 
 the effects of an injury of the head, he always 
 spoke French. A similar case occurred in St. 
 Thomas's Hospital, of a man who was in a state 
 of stupor in consequence of an injury of the head. 
 On his partial recovery, he spoke a language 
 which nobody in the hospital understood, but 
 
150 MEMORY. 
 
 which was soon ascertained to be Welsh. It was 
 then discovered that he had been thirty years ab- 
 sent from Wales, and, before the accident, had 
 entirely forgotten his native language. On his 
 perfect recovery, he completely forgot his Welsh 
 again, and recovered the English language. A 
 lady, mentioned by Dr. Prichard, when in a state 
 of delirium, spoke a language which nobody about 
 her understood ; but which also was discovered 
 to be Welsh. None of her friends could form 
 any conception of the manner in which she had 
 become acquainted with that language ; but, af- 
 ter much inquiry, it was discovered, that in her 
 childhood she had a nurse, a native of a district 
 on the coast of Brittany, the dialect of which is 
 closely analogous to the Welsh. The lady had 
 at that time learnt a good deal of this dialect, 
 but had entirely forgotten it for many years be- 
 fore this attack of fever. The case has also been 
 communicated to me of a lady who was a native 
 of Germany, but married to an English gentle- 
 man, and for a considerable time accustomed to 
 speak the English language. During an illness, 
 of the nature of which I am not informed, she 
 always spoke German, and could not make her- 
 self understood by her English attendants, except 
 when her husband acted as interpreter. A wo- 
 man who was a native of the Highlands, but ac- 
 customed to speak English, was under the care of 
 Dr. Macintosh of this citv, on account of an at- 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. l.'Jl 
 
 tack of apoplexy. She was so far recovered as 
 to look around her with an appearance of intel- 
 ligence, but the Doctor coidd not make her com- 
 prehend any thing" he said to her, or answer the 
 most simple question. He then desired one of 
 her friends to address her in Gaelic, when she im- 
 mediately answered with readiness and fluency. — 
 An Italian gentleman, mentioned by Dr. Rush, 
 who died of the yellow fever in New York, in 
 the beginning of his illness spoke English, in the 
 middle of it French, but on the day of his death 
 he spoke only Italian. A Lutheran clergyman of 
 Philadelphia informed Dr. Rush, that Germans 
 and Swedes, of whom he had a considerable 
 nvunber in his congregation, when near death 
 always prayed in their native languages, though 
 some of them he was confident had not spoken 
 these languages for fifty or sixty years. 
 
 A case has been related to me of a boy, who 
 at the age of four received a fracture of the skull, 
 for which he underwent the operation of trepan. 
 He was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, 
 and, after his recovery, retained no recollection 
 either of the accident or the operation. At the age 
 of fifteen, during the delirium of a fever, he gave 
 his mother a correct description of the operation 
 and the persons who were present at it, with 
 their dress, and other minute particulars. He 
 had never been observed to allude to it before, 
 and no means were known by which he could 
 
15'2 MEMORY. 
 
 have acquired the circumstances which he men- 
 tioned. An eminent medical friend informs me, 
 that, during- fever, without any delirium, he, on 
 one occasion, repeated long- passages from Homer, 
 which he could not do when in health ; and an- 
 other friend has mentioned to me, that, in a simi- 
 lar situation, there were represented to his mind, 
 in a most vivid manner, the circumstances of a 
 journey in the Highlands, which he had perform- 
 ed long before, including many minute particu- 
 lars which he had entirely forgotten. 
 
 In regard to the memory of languages as influ- 
 enced by these affections of the brain, a condition 
 occurs, the reverse of that now mentioned, and 
 ])resenting some singular phenomena : the cause 
 of the difference is entirely beyond our researches. 
 The late Dr. Gregory was accustomed to men- 
 tion in his lectures, the case of a clergyman, who, 
 while labouring under a disease of the brain, 
 spoke nothing but Hebrew, which was ascertain- 
 ed to be the last language that he had acquired. 
 An English lady, mentioned by Dr. Prichard, in 
 recovering from an apoplectic attack, always 
 spoke to her attendants in French, and had ac- 
 tually lost the knowledge of the English lan- 
 guage. This continued about a month. 
 
 IV. The fourth condition is the state of stupor 
 or coma, in which the mind is entirely cut off 
 from interco)u'sc with the external world. This 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 153 
 
 occurs ill the worst states of fever, — in various 
 diseases of the brain and injuries of the head ; 
 and the same condition takes })lace, from a very 
 different cause, in the state of fainting*. In such 
 cases, there is seldom any recollection of mental 
 impressions ; yet there are facts which tend to 
 show, that the patient is not in such a state of 
 total insensibility to external thing's as his ap- 
 pearance would indicate. A g-entleman, whom 
 I attended in a state of perfect apoplexy, from 
 which he did not recover, was frequently ob- 
 served to adjust his nightcap with the utmost 
 care, when it got into an uncomfortable state ; 
 first pulling it down over his eyes, and then 
 turning up the front of it in the most exact man- 
 ner. Another, whom I saw lately in a state of 
 profound apoplexy, but from which he recovered, 
 had a perfect recollection of what took place du- 
 ring the attack, and mentioned many things which 
 had been said in his hearing, when he was sup- 
 posed to be in a state of perfect unconsciousness. 
 A lady, on recovering from a similar state, said 
 she had been asleep and dreaming, and mention- 
 ed what she had dreamt about. Facts are want- 
 ing on this curious subject ; but there can be 
 little doubt, that many of the stories related of 
 things seen by persons in a state of trance, are 
 referable to this head, and that their visions con- 
 sisted of the conceptions of the mind itself, be- 
 lieved for the time to be real, in a manner analo- 
 
154 MEMORY. 
 
 g-oiis to dreaming. That such impressions should 
 not be more frequently remembered, in the ordi- 
 nary cases of stupor, probably arises from the 
 higher degree and greater permanency of the af- 
 fection than that which occurs in sleep. For we 
 have reason to believe, that dreams which are 
 remembered occur only in imperfect sleep, and 
 that in very profound sleep we do not remember 
 any mental impressions, though we have satisfac- 
 tory proof that they exist. Thus, a person will 
 talk in his sleep so as to be distinctly understood 
 by another, but without having the least recollec- 
 tion of the mental impression which led to what 
 he said. 
 
 In the preceding observations, we have refer- 
 red chiefly to the temporary influence of disease, 
 in impairing or suspending the powers of atten- 
 tion and memory. But there is a part of the 
 subject quite distinct from this, namely, the ef- 
 fect of certain diseases in obliterating impressions 
 formerly received and long retained. The high- 
 er degrees of this condition amount to that state 
 which we call idiotism, and this we find super- 
 vening both upon affections of the brain and pro- 
 tracted febrile diseases. The condition so pro- 
 duced is sometimes permanent, but frequently is 
 recovered from ; and recovery takes place in 
 some cases gradually, in others very suddenly. 
 A man mentioned by Willis, on recovering from 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEA^SE. 15.5 
 
 a putrkl fever, was found to liavc so entirely lost 
 his mental faculties, that lie knew nobody, re- 
 membered nothing", and understood nothing- : 
 " vix supra brutum saperet." He continued in 
 this state for two months, and then gradually re- 
 covered. Some years ag"o I attended a young- 
 man, who, on recovering from a tedious fever, 
 was found to be in a state bordering upon idiot- 
 ism ; and this continued even after his bodily 
 health was entirely restored. In this state he 
 was taken to the country, where he gradually 
 recovered after several months. A gentleman 
 mentioned by Wepfer, on coming out of an apo- 
 plectic attack, was found to know nobody, and 
 remember nothing. After several weeks, he be- 
 gan to know his friends, to remember words, to 
 repeat the Lord's prayer, and to read a few 
 words of Latin, rather than German, which was 
 his own language. When urged to read more 
 than a few words at a time, he said that he for- 
 merly understood these things, but now did not. 
 After some time, he began to pay more attention 
 to what was passing around him ; but, while thus 
 making slight and gradual progress, he was, af- 
 ter a few months, suddenly cut off by an attack 
 of apoplexy. 
 
 The sudden recoveries from this condition of 
 the mental })owers are still more remarkable. 
 Dr. Prichard, on the authority of the late Dr. 
 Rush of Philadelphia, mentions an American 
 
15G MEMORY. 
 
 student, a person of considerable attainments, 
 who, on recovering from a fever, was found to 
 have lost all his acquired knowledge. When his 
 health was restored, he began to apply to the 
 Latin grammar ; had passed through the ele- 
 mentary parts and was beginning to construe, 
 when, one day, in making a strong effort to re- 
 collect a part of his lesson, the whole of his lost 
 impressions suddenly returned to his mind, and 
 he found himself at once in possession of all his 
 former acquirements. 
 
 In slighter injuries of the head, accompanied 
 by loss of recollection, we observe the circum- 
 stances gradually recalled in a very singular man- 
 ner. Some years ago I saw a boy who had fal- 
 len from a wall, and struck his head against a 
 stone which lay at the foot of it. He was carried 
 home in a state of insensibility, from which he 
 soon recovered, but without any recollection of 
 the accident. He felt that his head was hurt, 
 but he had no idea how he had received the in 
 jury. After a short time he recollected that he 
 had struck his head against a stone, but had no 
 recollection how he had come to do so. After 
 another interval, he recollected that he had been 
 on the top of a wall, and had fallen from it and 
 struck against the stone, but could not remem- 
 ber where the wall was. After some time 
 longer, he recovered the recollection of all the 
 circumstances. Dr. Prichard mentions a gentle- 
 
 ■J 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. l-'^T 
 
 iii.iu, who suffered a severe injury hy a fall from 
 his horse, and who, on his recovery, had no re- 
 coHection of any thing- rclatins^ to the accident, 
 or for some time before it. A considerable time 
 elapsed before his recollection of it began to re- 
 turn, and it was only as he repeatedly rode over 
 the country where the accident had happened, 
 that the sight of the various objects gradually 
 recalled the circumstances of the journey in which 
 it occurred, and of the accident itself. 
 
 A still more remarkable phenomenon, con- 
 nected with cases of this kind, occurs in some in- 
 stances in which there is perfect intellig-ence in 
 reg-ard to recent circumstances, but an oblitera- 
 tion of former impressions. Of this I have re- 
 ceived the following striking- example from an 
 eminent medical friend. A respectable surg-eon 
 Was thrown from his horse while riding- in the 
 country, and was carried into an adjoining- house 
 in a state of insensibility. From this he very 
 soon recovered, described the accident distinctly, 
 and gave minute directions in regard to his own 
 treatment. In particular, he requested that he 
 might be immediately bled ; the bleeding was re- 
 peated, at his own desire, after two hours ; and 
 he conversed correctly regarding his feelings and 
 the state of his pulse with the medical man who 
 visited him. In the evenins;- he was so much 
 recovered as to be able to be removed to his own 
 house, and a medical friend accompanied him in 
 
158 • MEMORY. 
 
 the carriage. As they drew near home, the lat- 
 ter made some observation, respecting precau- 
 tions calculated to prevent unnecessary alarm to 
 the wife and family of the patient, when, to his 
 astonishment, he discovered that his friend had 
 lost all idea of having either a wife or children. 
 This condition continued during the following 
 day, and it was only on the third day, and after 
 farther bleeding, that the circumstances of his 
 past life began to recur to his mind. On the 
 other hand, remarkable instances occur of the 
 permanency of impressions made upon the mind 
 previously to such injuries, though the mental 
 faculties are entirely obscured as to all subse- 
 quent impressions. An affecting example is men- 
 tioned by Dr. Conolly ; — a young clergyman, 
 when on the point of being married, suffered an 
 injury of the head by which his understanding 
 was entirely and permanently deranged. He 
 lived in this condition till the age of eighty ; and 
 to the last talked of nothing but his approaching 
 wedding, and expressed impatience for the arri- 
 val of the happy day. 
 
 It is chiefly in connexion with attacks of an 
 apoplectic nature, that we meet with singular 
 examples of loss of memory on particular topics, 
 or extending only to a particular period. One 
 of the most common is loss of the memory of 
 words, or of names, while the patient retains a 
 correct idea of things and persons. The late 
 
 
 I 
 
 J 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 159 
 
 Dr. Grog"ory used to mention a huly, who, after 
 an apoplectic attack, recovered correctly her 
 ideas of things, bnt could not name them. In 
 giving directions respecting family matters, she 
 was quite distinct as to what she wished to be 
 done, but could make herself understood only by 
 going through the house, and pointing to the va- 
 rious articles. A gentleman whom I attended 
 some years ago, after recovering from an apo- 
 plectic attack, knew his friends perfectly, but 
 could not name them. Walking one day in the 
 street, he met a gentleman to whom he was very 
 anxious to communicate something respecting a 
 mutual friend. After various ineffectual attempts 
 to make him understand whom he meant, he at 
 last seized him by the arm and dragged him 
 through several streets to the house of the gen- 
 tleman of whom he was speaking, and pointed to 
 the name-plate on the door. 
 
 A singular modification of this condition has 
 been related to me. The gentleman to whom it 
 referred, could not be made to understand the 
 name of an object if it was spoken to him, but un- 
 derstood it perfectly when it was written. His 
 mental faculties were so entire, that he was en- 
 gaged in most extensive agricultural concerns, 
 and he managed them with perfect correctness, 
 by means of a remarkable contrivance. He kept 
 before him, in the room where he transacted 
 business, a list of the words which were most 
 
160 MEMORY. 
 
 apt to occur in his intercourse with his work- 
 men. When one of these wished to commu- 
 nicate with him on any subject, he first heard 
 what the workman had to say, but without un- 
 derstanding him farther than to simply catch the 
 words. He then turned to the words in his 
 written list, and whenever they met his eye, he 
 understood them perfectly. These particulars I 
 had from his son, a gentleman of high intelli- 
 gence. Another frequent modification consists 
 in putting one name for another, but always us- 
 ing the words in the same sense. An example 
 of this also occurred in the gentleman last men- 
 tioned. He uniformly called his snuff-box a 
 hogshead, and the association which led to this 
 appeared to be obvious. In the early part of his 
 life he had been in Virginia, and connected with 
 the trade in tobacco ; — so that the transition 
 from snuff to tobacco, and from tobacco to a 
 hogshead, seemed to be natural. Another gen- 
 tleman affected in this manner, Avhen he wanted 
 coals put upon his fire, always called for paper, 
 and when he wanted paper, called for coals ; 
 and these words he always used in the same 
 manner. In other cases, the patient seems to 
 invent names, using words which to a stranger 
 are quite unintelligible ; but he always uses them 
 in the same sense, and his immediate attendants 
 come to understand what he means by them. 
 Another remarkable modification of this con- 
 
 7 
 
 %. 
 
INKLUENCE OF DISEASE. U)l 
 
 (iition of the mentiil powers, is found in those 
 cases in which there is loss of the recollection of 
 a particular period. A clerg-yman mentioned by 
 Dr. Beattie, on recovering- from an aj)oplectic at- 
 tack, was foiuid to have lost the recollection of 
 exactly four years ; every thing- that occurred be- 
 fore that period he remembered perfectly. He 
 g-radually recovered, partly by a spontaneous re- 
 vival of his memory, and partly by acquiring a 
 knowledge of the leading events of the period. 
 A young- lady who was present at a late catas- 
 trophe in Scotland, in which many people lost 
 their lives by the fall of the gallery of a church, 
 escaped without any injury, but with the com- 
 plete loss of the recollection of any of the cir- 
 cumstances ; and this extended, not only to the 
 accident, but to every thing- that had occurred to 
 her for a certain time before going- to church. 
 A lady, whom I attended some years ago in a 
 protracted illness, in which her memory became 
 much impaired, lost the recollection of a period 
 of about ten or twelve years, but spoke with per- 
 fect consistency of things as they stood before 
 that time. 
 
 As far as I have been able to trace it, the prin^ 
 ciple in such cases seems to be, that, when the 
 memory is impaired to a certain degree, the loss 
 of it extends backwards to some event or some 
 period, by which a particularly deep impression 
 had been made upon the mind. In the lady la«t 
 
 M 
 
lC'2 MEMORY. 
 
 mentioned, for instance, the period of wliicli she 
 lost the recollection was that during which she 
 had resided in Edinburgh, and it extended back 
 to her removal from another city in which she 
 had lived for many years. During her residence 
 in the latter, she had become the mother of a 
 large family, and other events had occurred like- 
 ly to make a deep impression on her mind. The 
 period of her residence in Edinburgh had been 
 uniform and tranquil, and without any occur- 
 rence calculated to excite much attention in a 
 person of rather slender mental endowments. I 
 do not know whether we can give a similar ex- 
 planation of cases, in which the loss of memory 
 has extended only to particular subjects ; name- 
 ly, by supposing, that these subjects had been 
 more slightly impressed upon the mind, than 
 those which were retained. A gentleman is 
 mentioned by Dr. Beattie, who, after a blow on 
 the head, lost his knowledge of Greek, and did 
 not appear to have lost any thing else. 
 
 While we thus review the manner in which 
 the manifestations of mind are affected, in cer- 
 tain cases, by diseases and injuries of the brain, 
 it is necessary that we should refer briefly to the 
 remarkable instances in which the brain has been 
 extensively diseased without the phenomena of 
 mind being impaired in any sensible degree. 
 This holds true both in regard to the destruction 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 1()3 
 
 of each individual part of the hrain, and likewise 
 to the extent to which the cerebral mass may be 
 diseased or destroyed. In another work, I have 
 mentioned various cases which illustrate this fact 
 in a very striking- manner ; particularly the case 
 of a lady in whom one half of the brain was re- 
 duced to a mass of disease ; but who retained all 
 her faculties to the last, except that there was an 
 imperfection of vision, — and had been enjoying" 
 herself at a convivial party in the house of a 
 friend, a few hours before her death. A man 
 mentioned by Dr. Ferriar, who died of an affec- 
 tion of the brain, retained all his faculties entire 
 till the very moment of death which was sud- 
 den : on examining- his head, the whole right 
 hemisphere, that is one half of his brain, was 
 found destroyed by suppuration. In a similar 
 case recorded by Diemerbroek, half a pound of 
 matter was found in the brain ; and in one by 
 Dr. Heberden, there was half a pound of water. 
 A man mentioned by Mr. O'Halloran, suffered 
 such an injury of the head, that a large portion 
 of the bone was removed on the right side ; and 
 extensive suppuration having taken place, there 
 was discharged at each dressing, through the 
 opening, an immense quantity of matter mixed 
 with large masses of the substance of the brain. 
 This went on for seventeen days, and it appears 
 that nearly one half of the brain was thrown out 
 mixed with the matter ; yet the man retained 
 
164 MEMORY. 
 
 all his intellectual faculties to the very moment 
 of dissolution ; and, through the whole course 
 of the disease, his mind maintained uniform 
 tranquillity. These remarkable histories might 
 be greatly multiplied if it were required, but at 
 present it seems only necessary to add the very 
 interesting case related by Mr. Marshall. It is 
 that of a man who died with a pound of water 
 in his brain, after having been long in a state of 
 idiocy, but who, a very short time before death, 
 became perfectly rational. 
 
 The facts, which have been thus briefly referred 
 to, present a series of phenomena of the most re-' 
 markable kind, but on which we cannot specu- 
 late in the smallest degree without advancing be- 
 yond the sphere of our limited faculties ; one 
 thing, however, is certain, that they give no coun- 
 tenance to the doctrine of materialism, which 
 some have presumptuously deduced from a very 
 partial view of the influence of cerebral disease 
 upon the manifestations of mind. They show 
 us indeed, in a very striking manner, the mind 
 holding intercourse with the external world, 
 through the medium of the brain and nervous 
 system ; and, by certain diseases of these organs, 
 they show this intercourse impaired or suspend- 
 ed ; but they show nothing more. In particular, 
 they warrant nothing in any degree analogous to 
 those partial deductions which form the basis of 
 
ABST11A( TIOX. 16.5 
 
 nuitorialism. On th(» contrary, they show us 
 the brain injured and diseased to an extraordi- 
 nary extent, without the mental functions being- 
 affected in any sensible degree. They show us, 
 farther, the manifestations of mind obscured for 
 a time, and yet reviving in all their original vi- 
 g-our, almost in the very moment of dissolution. 
 Finally, they exhibit to us the mind, cut off from 
 all intercourse with the external world, recalling- 
 its old impressions, even of things long forgotten ; 
 and exercising its powers on those which had 
 long ceased to exist, in a manner totally irrecon- 
 cilable with any idea we can form of a material 
 function. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 By Abstraction, we separate various facts 
 from each other, and examine them individually. 
 We separate, for example, the qualities of a sub- 
 stance, and contemplate one of them apart from 
 the rest. This act of the mind is employed in 
 two processes of the utmost importance. By the 
 one, we examine a variety of objects, select the 
 properties in which certain numbers of them 
 
160 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 agree, and thus arraiig-e them into classes, gene- 
 ra, and species. By the other, we take a more 
 comprehensive view of an extensive collection of 
 facts, and select one which is common to the 
 whole. This we call generalizing, or deducing 
 a general fact, or general principle ; and the pro- 
 cess is of extensive application in all philosophi- 
 cal inquiries. The particular points to be attend- 
 ed to, in conducting it, will come under view in 
 another part of our subject. The most import- 
 ant is, that the fact, assumed as general, really 
 belongs to all the individual instances, and has 
 not been deduced from the examination of onlv 
 a part of them. 
 
 There have been disputes among writers on 
 the science of mind, whether abstraction is to 
 be considered as a distinct mental operation, or 
 is referable to judgment. But I have already 
 stated that my object in this outline is to avoid 
 all such discussions, and to allude simply to the 
 actual processes of the mind in a practical viev/. 
 One thing at least is clear, namely, that our ab- 
 stractions must be corrected by reason, the pro- 
 vince of which is to judge whether the process is 
 performed correctly, and on sound principles. 
 This, however, is distinct from the primary act 
 of the mind, to which I now apply the term ab- 
 straction, which is simply the power of contem- 
 plating one property of a substance apart from its 
 other properties. It thus disjoins things which 
 
ABSTRACTION. H>7 
 
 by nature are intimately united, and which can- 
 not be separated in any other manner. Reason 
 does not appear to be immediately concerned in 
 this, though it is most closely connected with the 
 purposes to which the process is afterwards ap- 
 plied ; namely, classifying- substances according to 
 a certain ag-reement of properties, and fixing- up- 
 on those which are common to all the individu- 
 als of a numerous series, in the act of generaliz- 
 ing, or deducing a general fact or general princi- 
 ple. 
 
 I have formerly alluded to a period in the sci- 
 ence of mind, when our ideas of external things 
 were supposed to be certain actual essences, se- 
 parated from the substances and conveyed to the 
 thinking principle. In connexion with this the- 
 ory, there arose a controversy, whether, when 
 we perform the mental act of generalizing, there 
 exists in nature any essence corresponding to a 
 general idea ; or whether, in generalizing, we 
 merely make use of an abstract term : whether, 
 for example, in using the word man we only em- 
 ploy a term ; or whether we have the power of 
 forming an idea of man in the abstract without 
 thinking of any individual man : and, in the same 
 manner, whether we can reason respecting a class 
 of substances, without thinking of any of the in- 
 dividuals composing it. Hence arose two sects, 
 whose disputes make a most remarkable figure in 
 
108 ABSTUACTlOxX. 
 
 the history of intellectual science, namely, the 
 Nominalists and Realists. 
 
 The controversies of these sects we now con- 
 sider as little more than a matter of historical cu- 
 riosity ; but, for several centuries, they divided 
 the learned of Europe, and were often carried 
 on with an asperity amounting- to actual persecu- 
 tion. " The Nominalists," says Mosheim, " pro- 
 cured the death of John Huss, who was a Real- 
 ist ; and in their letter to Lewis, king- of France, 
 do not pretend to deny that he fell a victim to the 
 resentment of their sect. The Realists, on the 
 other hand, obtained in the year 1479» the con- 
 demnation of John de Wesalia, who was attached 
 to the party of the Nominalists. These contend- 
 ing sects carried their fury so far as to charge 
 each other with the sin against the Holy Ghost." 
 *' The dispute," says Mr. Stewart, *' was carried 
 on with g-reat warmth in the universities of 
 France, Germany, and England, more particu- 
 larly in the two former countries, where the so- 
 vereigns were led by some political views to in- 
 terest themselves deeply in the contest, and even 
 to employ the civil power in support of their fa- 
 vourite opinions. The emperor Lewis of Bava- 
 ria, in return for the assistance which in his dis- 
 putes with the Pope, Occam had given him by 
 his writings, sided with the Nominalists ; Lewis 
 the Eleventh of France, on the other hand, at- 
 
ABSTRACTION. li)\) 
 
 tacliod himself to tlie Realists, and made their an- 
 tagonists the objects of a cruel persecution." 
 
 We find some difficulty in believing-, in the 
 present day, that the controversy which thus em- 
 broiled the continent of Europe in all the rancour 
 of actual persecution, related to the question, 
 whether, in em[)loying g-eneral terms, we use 
 words or names only, or whether there is in na- 
 ture any thing- corresponding- to what we mean 
 by a g-eneral idea. It is well designed by Mr. 
 Stewart as " one of tlie most curious events which 
 occur in the history of the human mind." 
 
 The question is one of no practical importance, 
 and when it is cleared from its connexion with 
 the ancient doctrine of ideas, appears to be one 
 of no difficulty. Without supposing that there 
 is in nature any actual essence corresponding to a 
 general idea, the truth seems to be, that we do 
 form a certain notion or conception of a quality 
 in which several substances agree, distinct from 
 any one substance to which the quality belongs. 
 Hence some have proposed the term Notionalist, 
 or Conceptualist, as designating opinions distinct 
 from those both of the Nominalists and Realists. 
 But, according to the principles of modern sci- 
 ence, we cannot consider the discussion as any 
 thing more than an ingenious arguing on points 
 of no real importance. The process which the 
 mind really carries on, in that mental operation 
 to which these remarks have referred, consists 
 
170 IMAGINATION. 
 
 simply in tracing* relations or points of resem- 
 blance in which certain individual thinos ao-ree, 
 though they may in others be remarkably different. 
 We then give a name to this common quality, and 
 thus form the individuals into a class of which 
 this quality is the distinguishing character. Thus 
 we may take a number of animals differing re- 
 markably from each other, and say, — they are 
 all quadrupeds. We may take a number of sub- 
 stances very dissimilar in their external and me- 
 chanical properties, and say, they are all acids. 
 Some of these substances are solid^, some fluid, 
 and some gaseous ; but the property of acidity is 
 common to them all, and this accordingly be- 
 comes the name and the distinguishing character 
 of the class into which we now arrange them. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 In the exercise of imagination, we take the 
 component elements of real scenes, events or 
 characters, and combine them anew by a pro- 
 cess of the mind itself, so as to form com- 
 pounds which have no existence in nature. 
 A painter, by this process, depicts a landscape 
 
 : 
 
IMAGINATION. IJl 
 
 combining' the beauties of various real land- 
 scapes, and excluding- their defects. A poet, or 
 a novelist, in the same manner, calls into being- a 
 fictitious character, endowed with those qualities 
 with which it suits his purpose to invest him, — 
 places him in contact with other beings equally- 
 imaginary, and arranges, according- to his will, 
 the scenes in which he shall bear a part, and the 
 line of conduct Avliich he shall follow. The com- 
 pound in these cases is entirely fictitious and ar- 
 bitrary ; but it is expected, that the individual 
 elements shall be such as actually occur in na- 
 ture, and that the combination shall not dif- 
 fer remarkably from what might really happen. 
 When this is not attended to, as in a picture or a 
 novel, we speak of the work being- extravagant or 
 out of nature. But, avoiding combinations which 
 are grossly at variance with reality, the framer of 
 such a compound may make it superior to any 
 thing- that actually occurs. A painter may draw 
 a combination of beauties in a landscape superior 
 to any thing- that is actually known to exist ; and 
 a novelist may delineate a more perfect character 
 than is met with in real life. It is remarked by 
 Mr. Stewart, that Milton in his Garden of Eden 
 has " created a landscape more perfect, probably, 
 in all its parts, than has ever been realized in na- 
 ture, and certainly very different from any thing- 
 that this country exhibited at the time when he 
 wrote." " It is a curious remark of Mr. A\'alpole," 
 
172 IMAGINATION. 
 
 he adds, that " Milton's Eden is free from the de- 
 fects of the Old English Garden, and is imagined 
 on the same principles which it was reserved for 
 the present age to carry into execution." 
 
 The mode of artificial combination which re- 
 sults from the exercise of imagination, is appli- 
 cable chiefly to four kinds of composition. 
 
 1. Fictitious narrative, in which the author de- 
 lineates imaginary scenes or transactions ; and 
 paints imaginary characters, endowing them with 
 such qualities as may suit the purpose which he 
 has in view. 
 
 2. Composition or verbal address, directed to 
 the passions, and intended to excite particular 
 mental emotions. To this head are referable 
 many of the combinations of the poet, and ad- 
 dresses calculated to operate upon the feelings 
 of a popular assembly ; also, those which de- 
 rive their character from the language of trope 
 and metaphor. The genius of the orator, and 
 the inventive powers of the poet, are exhibited 
 in the variety and the novelty of the analogies, 
 resemblances, illustrations, and figures, which he 
 thus brings to bear upon his subject. 
 
 3. Those unexpected and peculiar associations 
 which form the basis of wit and humour. 
 
 4. Combinations of objects of sense, calculated 
 to produce mental emotions of a pleasurable or 
 painful kind, as our impressions of the sublime, 
 the beautiful, the terrible, or the ludicrous. The 
 
iMA(iINATI()X. 173 
 
 coniblnations of this class are chiefly referable to 
 the head of objects of taste, or the fine arts ; and 
 are exemplitied in the inventions of the painter 
 and the statuary, in decorative architecture and 
 artificial gardening-, — we may add theatrical ex- 
 hibitions and music. 
 
 The facility of rapidly forming, in these seve- 
 ral departments, combinations calculated to pro- 
 duce the effect which is intended, constitutes 
 what we call inventive genius. Similar powers 
 of invention, founded on an exercise of imagina- 
 tion, may also be applied to the investigations of 
 science. It may be employed, for example, in 
 the contrivance of experiments, calculated to aid 
 an investigation, or to illustrate a doctrine ; and 
 in the construction of those legitimate hypotheses, 
 which have often led to the most important dis-* 
 coveries. 
 
 The union of elements, in all such productions 
 of the imagination, is regulated by the knowledge, 
 the taste, and the intellectual habits of the au- 
 thor ; and, we must add, by his moral principles. 
 According to the views, the habits, and the prin- 
 ciples of him who frames them, therefore, they 
 may either contribute to moral and intellectual 
 improvement ; or they may tend to mislead the 
 judgment, vitiate the taste, and corrupt the moral 
 feelings. 
 
 Similar observations apply to the conduct of 
 the imagination in individuals, and its influence 
 
174 IMAGINATION. 
 
 in the cultivation of moral and intellectual clia- 
 racter. There is certainly no power of the mind 
 that requires more cautious manag-ement and 
 stern control ; and the proper regulation of it 
 cannot be too strongly impressed upon the young-. 
 The sound and proper exercise of it may be made 
 to contribute to the cultivation of all that is 
 virtuous and estimable in human character. It 
 leads us, in particular, to place ourselves in 
 the situation of others, to enter into their feel- 
 ing's and wants, and to participate in their dis- 
 tresses. It thus tends to the cultivation of sym- 
 pathy and the benevolent affections; and promotes 
 all those feelings which exert so extensive an in- 
 fluence in the duties of friendship, and the harmo- 
 nies of civil and social intercourse. We may 
 even say that we exercise imagination, when we 
 endeavour to act ujjon that high standard of mo- 
 rals, which requires us "to do to others as we 
 would that they should do unto us." For in this 
 mental act we must imagine ourselves in the si- 
 tuation of other men, and, in their character, 
 judge of our own conduct towards them. Thus 
 a man, deficient in imagination, though he may 
 be free from any thing unjust or dishonourable, 
 is apt to be cold, contracted, and selfish ; regard- 
 less of the feelings, and indifferent to the dis- 
 tresses of others. Farther, we may be said to 
 exercise imagination, when we carry our views 
 beyond present and sensible objects, and en- 
 
 iigw^. 
 
IMAGINATION. 1?.^ 
 
 (loavoiir to feel the power of " things M'hich are 
 not seen," and the reality of scenes and times 
 wliich are yet to come. On the other hand, im- 
 ngination may be emphiyed for calling- into being- 
 evils which have no existence, or for exag-g-er- 
 ating- those which are real ; for fostering- male- 
 volent feelings, and for imputing to those with 
 whom we are connected, motives and intentions 
 which have no foundation in truth. Finally, an 
 ill regulated imagination may be employed in oc- 
 cupying the mind with waking dreams and vain 
 delusions, to the exclusion of all those high pur- 
 suits which ought to employ the faculties of a ra- 
 tional being. 
 
 There has been considerable difference of opi- 
 nion in regard to the effects produced upon 
 the mind by fictitious narrative. Without enter- 
 ing minutely upon the merits of this controversy, 
 I think it may be contended, that two evils are 
 likely to arise from much indulgence in works 
 of fiction. The one is a tendency to give way 
 to the wild play of the imagination, a practice 
 most deleterious both to the intellectual and 
 moral habits. The other is a disruption of the 
 harmony which ought to exist between the mo- 
 ral emotions and the conduct, — a principle of ex- 
 tensive and important influence. In the healthy 
 state of the moral feelings, for example, the 
 emotion of sympathy, excited by a tale of sor- 
 row, ought to be followed by some efforts for 
 
ly^J IMAGINATION. 
 
 the relief of the sufferer. When such relations 
 in real life are listened to from time to time with- 
 out any such efforts, the emotion gradually be- 
 comes weakened, and that moral condition is 
 produced which we call selfishness, or hardness 
 of heart. Fictitious tales of sorrow appear to 
 have a similar tendency ; — the emotion is pro- 
 duced without the corresponding- conduct ; and, 
 when this habit has been much indulged, the re- 
 suit seems to be, that a cold and barren sentimen- 
 talism is produced, instead of the habit of active 
 benevolence. If fictitious narratives be employed 
 for depicting scenes of vice, another evil of the 
 greatest magnitude is likely to result from them, 
 even though the conduct exhibited should be 
 shown to end in remorse and misery. For by 
 the mere familiarity with vice, an injury is done 
 to the youthful mind, which is in no degree com- 
 pensated by the moral at the close. 
 
 Imagination, therefore, is a mental power of 
 extensive influence, and capable of being turned 
 to important purposes in the cultivation of indi- 
 vidual character. But to be so, it must be kept 
 under the strict control both of reason and of 
 virtue. If it be allowed to wander at discretion, 
 through scenes of imagined wealth, ambition, 
 frivolity, or pleasure, it tends to withdraw the 
 mind from the important pursuits of life, to weak- 
 en the habit of attention, and to impair the judg- 
 ment. It tends, in a most material manner, to 
 
 6 
 
IMAGINATION. 177 
 
 prevent tlio due exercise of those nobler powers 
 which are directed to the cultivation both of 
 science and virtue. The state of a mind, which 
 has yielded itself to the influence of this delusive 
 habit, cannot be more forcibly represented than 
 in the words of an eloquent writer : — " The in- 
 fluence of this habit of dwelling- on the beautiful 
 fallacious forms of imagination, will accompany 
 the mind into the most serious speculations, or 
 rather musing-s, on the real world, and what is to 
 be done in it, and expected ; as the imag-e which 
 the eye acquires from looking" at any dazzling 
 object, still appears before it wherever it turns. 
 The vulgar materials that constitute the actual 
 economy of the world, will rise up to its sight in 
 fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into 
 plain reality, nor will even suspect to be decep- 
 tive. It cannot go about with sober rational in- 
 spection, and ascertain the nature and value of 
 all things around it. Indeed such a mind is not 
 disposed to examine, with any careful minuteness, 
 the real condition of things. It is content with 
 ignorance, because environed with something 
 more delicious than such knowledge, in the para- 
 dise which imagination creates. In that paradise it 
 walks delighted, till some imperious circumstance 
 of real life call it thence, and gladly escapes thi- 
 ther again when the avocation is past. There, 
 every thing is beautiful and noble, as could be 
 desired to form the residence of an angel. If a 
 
 N 
 
178 IMAGINATION. 
 
 tenth part of the felicities that have been enjoyed, 
 the great actions that have been performed, the 
 beneficent institutions that have been established, 
 and the beautiful objects that have been seen in 
 that happy region, could have been imported in- 
 to this terrestrial place, — what a delightful thing 
 it would have been to awake each morning- to see 
 such a world once more."* 
 
 To the same purpose are the words of another 
 writer of the highest authority. — " To indulge 
 the power of fiction, and send imagination out 
 upon the wing, is often the sport of those 
 who delight too much in silent speculation. — 
 He who has nothing external that can divert 
 him, must find pleasure in his own thoughts, and 
 must conceive himself what he is not, for who is 
 pleased with what he is ? He then expatiates 
 in boundless futurity, and culls from all imagin- 
 able conditions, that which for the present mo- 
 ment he should most desire ; amuses his desires 
 with impossible enjoyments, and confers upon 
 his pride unattainable dominion. The mind 
 dances from scene to scene, unites all pleasures 
 in all combinations, and riots in delights which 
 nature and fortune, with all their bounty, can- 
 not bestow. In time, some particular train of 
 ideas fixes the attention ; all other intellectual 
 gratifications are rejected ; the mind, in weari- 
 
 * Foster's Essays. 
 
REASON. 17'J 
 
 ncss or leisure, recurs constantly to the favourite 
 conception, and f(»asts on the luscious falsehood 
 whenever she is offended with the bitterness of 
 truth. l]y deg'rees the reig-n of fancy is confirmed ; 
 she grows first imperious, and in time despotic. 
 Then fictions begin to operate as realities, false 
 opinions fasten upon the mind, and life passes in 
 dreams of rapture or of anguish."* 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF REASON OR JUDGMENT. 
 
 The most simple view which we can take of 
 reason, probably, is, that it is the exercise of 
 mind by which we compare facts with each other, 
 and mental impressions with external things. 
 The applications of this mental process may be 
 referred to the following heads : — 
 
 I. We compare facts with each other, so as to 
 trace their relations, connexions, and tendencies ; 
 and to distinguish the connexions which are in- 
 cidental from those which are fixed and uni- 
 form. 
 
 * Johnson's Rassclas. 
 
1 80 REASON. 
 
 What we call the relations of thing's, whether 
 referring to external events or mental processes, 
 comprehend all those facts which form the great 
 objects of human knowledge, with respect either 
 to the individuals, or their tendencies towards 
 each other. They may be briefly enumerated in 
 the following manner : — 
 
 1. Relations of character, — or those marks, 
 characters or properties, by which a substance 
 may be recognised and may be distinguished from 
 all others ; for example, the botanical characters 
 of a plant, — the chemical properties of a mineral, 
 — the symptoms of a disease, — sensible proper- 
 ties of colour, taste, smell, &c. — the mental en- 
 dowments and moral qualities of individual men. 
 
 2. Relations of resemblance and analogy, 
 arising out of a comparison of the qualities of va- 
 rious individual substances or events. These ad- 
 mit of various degrees. Wlien there is a close 
 agreement between two events or classes of events, 
 it constitutes resemblance j when there are points 
 of difference, it is analogy. In the latter case, 
 we then trace the degrees of analogy, depending 
 upon the number of points in which the resem- 
 blance holds, and the number of points in which 
 there is a difference. On the relations of resem- 
 blance, also, depend the arts of arrangement and 
 classification ; and the use of those general terms 
 by which we learn to express a great number of 
 individual objects by a single term, derived from 
 
RKASON. i81 
 
 certain characters in which they agree, such as 
 solids, fluids, quadrupeds, &c. We find a certain 
 number of substances which agree so much in 
 their properties, that we chiss them together as 
 one species. We then find other substances, 
 which agree with these in a certain number of 
 their properties, but diff"er in others. We dis- 
 miss the latter, and retain those only in which 
 they all agree, and so form the whole into a 
 genus. The individuals, forming the genus, are 
 still found to agree in some of their properties 
 with various other substances, and, by leaving out 
 of view those in which they diff'er, we again form 
 this still larger number into a class or order. 
 
 3. Nearly connected with the former, but still 
 more extensive, isthat important process by which, 
 among a great series of facts, we trace an accor- 
 dance, and thus deduce from the whole a gene- 
 ral fact or general principle. 
 
 4. Relations of composition, — comprehending 
 the resolution of a substance into its elements or 
 constituent parts, — the connexion of the parts as 
 constituting a whole, — of the whole to the parts, 
 and of the parts to each other. 
 
 5. Relations of causation, or the tendencies of 
 bodies to produce or be followed by certain ac- 
 tions upon each other in certain circumstances. 
 These refer chiefly to that uniform sequence of 
 events from which we derive our idea of the one 
 being the cause of the other. But the class like- 
 
182 REASON. 
 
 wise includes other relations arising out of the 
 same subject ; such as the relation of two events 
 as the joint causes of a common effect, or the 
 joint effects of a common cause ; or as forming 
 links in a chain of sequences in which we have 
 still to look for other events, as the true antece- 
 dents or final results. It includes also that most 
 important mental process, by which, from the 
 properties of a known effect, we infer the powers 
 and properties of an unknown cause. 
 
 G. Relations of degree and proportion, as in 
 those truths and relations which are the subjects 
 of mathematics. 
 
 7. The important question of moral relations, 
 which does not properly belong to the present 
 part of our inquiry, — including the relation of 
 certain actions to the great standard of moral rec- 
 titude, — and to those principles which bind men 
 together in the harmonies of social and domestic 
 intercourse. 
 
 These appear to include the principal relations 
 of things, which the mind requires to investigate 
 in an intellectual point of view. The facts re- 
 specting them are acquired by attention and me- 
 mory ; but it is the province of reason to separate 
 from the mass so acquired, those which are inci- 
 dental and temporary from those which are uni- 
 form, — to ascertain, for example, those characters 
 by which a substance may be certainly recognised, 
 — the symptoms by which a disease may be dis- 
 
HE A SON. l'S3 
 
 tinsTuisliod from other diseases which resemble it, 
 — and the actions which a substance may be con- 
 fidently expected to produce upon other substances 
 in particular circumstances. When the mental 
 process required for doing so is performed in a 
 legitimate manner, the deduction constitutes 
 trutliy in regard to the particular point which is 
 the immediate subject of it ; when the con- 
 trary, it leads to fallacy or falsehood. Hence 
 reason has sometimes been defined, that exer- 
 cise of mind by which we distinguish truth from 
 falsehood. 
 
 II. Having, by the preceding processes, ascer- 
 tained the uniform tendencies of bodies to be 
 followed by certain actions upon each other, we 
 bring these tendencies into operation for the pro- 
 duction of certain results. Hence reason has 
 been considered, also, to be that power, by which 
 we combine means for accomplishing an end ; 
 but this, perhaps, may be regarded rather as the 
 practical application of the knowledge to which 
 reason leads us, than as a primary part of the 
 province of reason itself. 
 
 III. We compare mental impressions with ex- 
 ternal things, so as to correct the impressions of 
 the mind in regard to the external world. Men- 
 tal processes of the most imi)ortant kind are con- 
 nected with this application of reason. 
 
IJ^L REASON. 
 
 Reason or judgment, when duly exercised, con- 
 ducts us throug-li these various mental opera- 
 tions, and guides us towards the discovery of 
 truth. It does so by enabling us to compare 
 facts with facts, and events with events ; to weigh 
 their relations, bearings, and tendencies ; and to 
 assign to each circumstance its proper weight 
 and influence in the conclusions which we are 
 to deduce from them. The person who does so, 
 we call a man of sound judgment, whose opinions 
 and conclusions we receive with confidence. On 
 the contrary, we receive with distrust and sus- 
 picion, the conclusions of a man of an oj)posite 
 character, who forms his opinions and deductions 
 hastily, — that is, from a limited number of facts, 
 or a hasty and imperfect examination of their re- 
 lations. 
 
 A distinction has sometimes been made be- 
 tween the term reason, as used in the language 
 of science, and as employed in the common af- 
 fairs of life : but there seems to be no real ground 
 for the distinction. 
 
 Reason, in the language of intellectual science, 
 appears to be that process by which we judge 
 correctly of the true and uniform relations of 
 facts, or events, and give to each circumstance 
 its due influence in the deductions. It is chiefly 
 opposed to imagination, in which the mind is al- 
 lowed to ramble through chains of events AA^hich 
 
REASON. 18.5 
 
 are connected by loose and casual associations, 
 leading- to no true residts. It is also disting-uish- 
 ed from simple memory, in which facts or events 
 are connected in the mind by certain principles 
 of association, without a full view of their rela- 
 tions. Thus, when we find a person remember- 
 ing- an extensive collection of facts, and forming 
 certain combinations among them, or deductions 
 from them, without attending to points of differ- 
 ence which tend to other deductions, we say, his 
 memory is better than his judgment. 
 
 Reasoning, again, appears to be the continued 
 exercise of reason, when applied to the investi- 
 gation of a particular subject, or a certain series 
 of facts or events, so as to trace their relations 
 or to establish a particular conclusion as deduced 
 from such a series. This process, however, 
 which is commonly called the Discursive Fa- 
 culty, is to be distinguished from the simple ex- 
 ercise of reason. It ought to be guided by rea- 
 son, that is, by a full view of the real relations of 
 the facts about which it is exercised ; but it is 
 often allowed to fix on a slight and partial view 
 of them ; or is applied ingeniously to discover 
 relations of a particular kind only. Thus, we 
 speak of a man who reasons closely, or with a 
 correct attention to the real relations of things, 
 and the true weight of every fact in the investi- 
 gation ; of another who reasons loosely, or who 
 is led away by casual relations, and partial views, 
 
186 REASON. 
 
 affording no true deductions ; and of a third who 
 reasons ingeniously and plausibly, but not sound- 
 ly, — that is, who argues on one side of a ques- 
 tion, and contemplates facts in particular rela- 
 tions only, or as supporting particular opinions, 
 neglecti- 3" those views of them which tend to 
 a different conclusion. This art of ingenious 
 reasoning or disputation, accordingly, we shall 
 afterwards have occasion to show, is not only to 
 be distinguished from the sound exercise of rea- 
 son or judgment, but is often found directly op- 
 posed to it. 
 
 In the language of theology, reason is distin- 
 guished from revelation ; and means that exer- 
 cise of the mind, by which we deduce a certain 
 knowledge of the Deity from the power and wis- 
 dom displayed in the works of creation, apart 
 from any direct revelation of his character and 
 will. 
 
 In the language of common life, the mental pro- 
 cess, which we term reason or judgment, appears 
 to be the same, though the facts on which it is ex- 
 ercised may be different. A reasonable man is one 
 who, both in the formation of his opinions and the 
 regulation of his conduct, gives the due weight and 
 influence to all the facts and considerations which 
 ought to influence his decision. A man of the op- 
 posite character is one who takes up his opinions 
 upon slight, partial, and inadequate grounds ; and 
 then cannot, or will not, admit the impression of f 
 
 i 
 
REASON. 187 
 
 facts or arguments which are calculated to correct 
 these unsound deductions ; or who, in the regula- 
 tion of his conduct, is led away by hasty impres- 
 sions, or feeble and inadequate motives, without 
 giving due consideration to those which are cal- 
 culated to lead him into a different course. The 
 former, we call a reasonable, considerate, think- 
 ing man j the latter, we say, is an unreasonable, 
 inconsiderate man, who cannot or will not think. 
 It also very often happens that the latter, having 
 formed his conclusions, is obstinately tenacious 
 of them ; while the former is still open to the 
 true and full impression of any new fact or argu- 
 ment that is proposed to him. Solomon has ex- 
 pressed in a very striking manner the leading fea- 
 tures of two such characters, namely, of the man 
 who takes up opinions with little examination, 
 and then adheres to them with inaccessible perti- 
 nacity ; and him who forms them only after full 
 and candid examination, and with a clear con- 
 ception of the grounds on which they are formed ; 
 — " the slusTg-ard is wiser in his own conceit than 
 seven men that can render a reason." 
 
 The process of mind which we call reason or 
 judgment, therefore, seems to be essentially the 
 same, whether it be applied to the investigation 
 of truth or the affairs of common life. In both 
 cases, it consists in comparing and weighing facts, 
 considerations and n)otives, and deducing from 
 them conclusions, both as principles of belief, and 
 
188 REASON. 
 
 rules of conduct. In doing so, a man of sound 
 judgment proceeds with caution, and with a due 
 consideration of all the facts which he ought to 
 take into the inquiry. Having formed his con- 
 clusions, he is still open to the influence of new 
 facts, by which they may be corrected or modi- 
 fied ; but he is not to be shaken in his confi- 
 dence by trivial statements, or frivolous objec- 
 tions. Opposed to this there are two modifica- 
 tions of character which present an interesting 
 subject for observation. Both form their con- 
 clusions hastily, and without due examination 
 of the facts and considerations which ought to 
 influence them ; but their subsequent conduct 
 is widely diff'erent. The one is shaken in his 
 conclusions by every new fact that is presented 
 to him, and every slight objection that is brought 
 against his inductions ; and the consequence is, 
 that his opinions and his principles of conduct 
 are constantly changing. The other, having 
 framed his opinions, though on grounds the 
 most inadequate, adheres to them with inac- 
 cessible firmness ; and seems totally proof against 
 the force of any facts or arguments that can 
 be brought against them. The former is the 
 more hopefid character of the two, — his error 
 consisting in a want of attention, rather than 
 of judgment ; or in a habit of framing his con- 
 clusions too hastily. By education or atten- 
 tion on his own part, this habit may be corrected 
 
 *<, 
 
REASON. 1S9 
 
 in a jjroater or lo-^s dogroo ; but the latter appears 
 to labour luidcr a radical defect of judg-ment, 
 which makes him iusensible to the due force of 
 the considerations and arguments which influence 
 other men. In the affairs of life, the former, af- 
 ter perhaps committing- various indiscretions, ac- 
 quires wisdom from experience, — that is, by hav- 
 ing- the fallacy of his conclusions in many instances 
 forced upon him. The latter remains unchang-ed ; 
 retaining- the same confidence in his own conclu- 
 sions, and the same contempt for every thing that 
 can be opposed to them. This unfortunate con- 
 dition of mind, though it may have had its origin 
 in peculiarity of mental constitution or deficient 
 education, is fostered and increased by indul- 
 gence, and by a neglect of cultivating the import- 
 ant habit of calm and candid investigation. The 
 man seems at last to become totally insensible to 
 the motives and evidences which influence other 
 men ; and the more striking and convincing 
 these are to others, the more remarkable appears 
 the condition of that mind which does not feel or 
 estimate their importance. This state of mind is 
 emphatically ascribed, in the sacred writings, to the 
 man who denies the existence of a great first 
 cause ; — " the fool hath said in his heart there is 
 no God." By some process of mind, known to 
 himself, he has arrived at this conclusion ; and 
 he is totallv insensible to the manifold evidence, 
 which meets him wherever he turns his eye, of 
 
190 REASON. 
 
 its futility and folly. And surely, if there be 
 in human things, an affecting representation, of a 
 mind lost to every function of a healthy under- 
 standing, incapable of rising from effects to causes, 
 or of tracing the relations of things, — a mind de- 
 serted by its rightful guardian, and left the un- 
 protected victim of every wild delusion that flut- 
 ters by, — it is to be found in him, who, possessed 
 of the senses of a living man, can stand before the 
 fair face of creation, and say in his heart — " there 
 is no God." 
 
 In every exercise of judgment, it is of essen- 
 tial importance, that the mind shall be entirely 
 unbiassed by any personal feeling or emotion 
 which might restrain or influence its decisions. 
 Hence the difficulty we feel in deciding on a 
 subject in which we are deeply interested, espe- 
 cially, if our inclination, and the facts and mo- 
 tives presented by the case, be in any degree op- 
 posed to each other. Thus, we speak of a man 
 who allows his feelings to influence his judgment ; 
 and of another, of a cool head, who allows no 
 feeling to interfere with his decisions. Any par- 
 ticular emotion, which has been deeply indulged 
 and fostered, comes in this manner to influence 
 the judgment in a most extraordinary degree. 
 It is thus that a vitiated and depraved state of 
 the moral feelings at last misleads the judg- 
 ment, in regard to the great principles of moral 
 
REASON. 101 
 
 rectitude ; and terminates in a state of mind, 
 empliatieally described in the sacred writings, 
 in which a man puts evil for g-ood and g"ood for 
 evil, and is left to the influence of strong- delu- 
 sion, so that he " believes a lie." This remark- 
 able condition of the power of reasoning- and 
 judg-ing-, we cannot refer to any principle with 
 which we are acquainted ; but we must receive 
 it as a fact in the history of our moral constitu- 
 tion, which is not to be questioned. A poet 
 has sung, that vice, which at first is hated as an 
 odious monster, is, when seen too oft, endured, 
 then pitied, then embraced : and he has only add- 
 ed his evidence to a fact, which has been received 
 upon the testimony of the philosopher and the 
 moralist in every age, and is acted upon as a fixed 
 and uniform principle of our nature by all classes 
 of men. 
 
 Upon the grounds which have been briefly re- 
 ferred to in the above observations, it will appear, 
 that the principles, on which a man should form 
 his opinions, are essentially the same with those 
 by which he ought to regulate his conduct. If 
 this conclusion be admitted, it will enable us to 
 perceive the fallacy of a dogma which has often 
 been brought forward with much confidence, — 
 that a man is not responsible for his belief. 
 When taken abstractly, this is true ; but, in the 
 practical application of it, there is a great and 
 dangerous fallacy. In the opinions which a man 
 
192 REASON. 
 
 forms on any particular subject, he is indeed in- 
 fluenced, not by his own will, but by the facts 
 or evidence by which the doctrines are sup- 
 ported ; and, in this sense, a man may justly be 
 said, not to be responsible for his belief. But 
 when we ap})ly the principle to practical pur- 
 poses, and especially to those truths of religious 
 belief, to which the dogma has been pointed, it 
 may easily be seen to be as fallacious as it is dan- 
 gerous. A man is undoubtedly responsible for 
 the care with which he has informed himself, of 
 the facts and evidences by which his belief on 
 these subjects ought to be influenced; and for the 
 care and anxiety with which he gives to each of 
 these facts and evidences its due weight in the 
 momentous inquiry. He is farther responsible 
 for any degree of that vitiated and corrupted 
 state of the moral feelings, by which his judgment 
 may have been biassed, so as to prevent him from 
 approaching the subject with the sincere de- 
 sire for truth, of a pure and uncontaminated 
 mind. If, in this sense, we say that a man is 
 not responsible for his belief, we may quite as rea- 
 sonably allege, that he is not responsible for his 
 conduct, because he chooses, on some slight and 
 partial grounds, to frame for himself principles of 
 action, without taking into consideration those 
 fundamental rules of moral rectitude by which 
 mankind in general are expected to be influenced. 
 We may as well contend, that the man is not re- 
 
 I 
 
 4^ 
 
REASON. 193 
 
 sponsible for his conduct, who, l)y h^ng" familiarity 
 with vice, has lost sight of its malignity, and has 
 come to approve and love that which he once 
 contemplated with abhorrence. 
 
 It appears, then, that the exercise of reason is 
 precisely the same, and is g-uided by the same 
 laws, whether it be applied to the investig-ation 
 of truth, or to the regulation of conduct. The 
 former is more particularly connected with the 
 farther prosecution of our inquiry ; but the 
 leading" principles apply equally to the great 
 question of morals, and the important subject of 
 religious belief. In prosecuting the subject as 
 a branch of intellectual science, it seems to re- 
 solve itself into two parts : — 
 
 I. The use of reason in the investigation of 
 truth. 
 
 II. The use of reason in correcting the impres- 
 sions of the mind in regard to external things. 
 
 Before proceeding to these branches of the 
 subject, however, this may perhaps be the pro- 
 per place for again stating in a few words, 
 that, in the preceding observations, my object 
 has been to confine myself to facts, respect- 
 ing the processes which the mind actually per- 
 forms, without entering on the question how it 
 performs them. On this subject we find great 
 
 o 
 
19 i REASON. 
 
 differences among philosophers, which I have al- 
 luded to only in an incidental manner. Some 
 appear to have spoken in too unqualified terms, 
 respecting- various and distinct faculties of the 
 mind, and have enumerated a variety of these, 
 corresponding to the various mental operations. 
 Dr. Brown, on the other hand, has followed a 
 very different course, by referring all our men- 
 tal processes to the two principles of simple and 
 relative suggestion. According to this eloquent 
 and ingenious writer, we have no direct volun- 
 tary power over the succession of our thoughts ; 
 but these follow each other in consequence 
 of certain principles of suggestion, by which 
 conceptions, in certain circumstances, call up or 
 suggest other conceptions, which are in some 
 manner related to them. We have the power 
 only of fixing the mind more intensely upon 
 some images of this series, when they arise, in con- 
 sequence of approving of them, as referring to 
 some subject of thought which is before us, while 
 we disapprove of others of the series as less 
 allied to it. The former become more fixed 
 and vivid m consequence of this approbation, 
 while the latter are allowed to sink back into 
 oblivion. What systematic writers have called 
 the faculty of conception, is, according to this sys- 
 tem, the simple presence in the mind of one of 
 these suoi^ested or recalled imajjes. Memory is 
 this simple suggestion combined with the irapres- 
 
 .i 
 
 i 
 
REASON. 195 
 
 m 
 
 sion of past time. In imagination again, which 
 has been considered as a vohnitaiy power of form- 
 ing- conceptions or images into new combinations, 
 by a pecnliar mental process, Dr. Brown believes 
 that we have only the power of perceiving images 
 as they are brought up by established principles 
 of suggestion, — approving of some which thus be- 
 come fixed, and disapproving of others which 
 thus pass away. In thus approving or disapprov- 
 ing of the suggested images, we are guided by a 
 perception of their relation to any particular sub- 
 ject which is before us, and which we may desire 
 to cultivate or illustrate. According to this wri- 
 ter, therefore, what is usually called conception, 
 is simple suggestion ; — memory is simple sugges- 
 tion with a feeling of past time ; — imagination is 
 simple suggestion combined with desire and with 
 a perception of relation. The relative sugges- 
 tion of Dr. Brown, again, is that perception 
 of relations arising out of the comparison of dif- 
 ferent facts or objects, which we have treated of 
 under the more familiar name of judgment ; — 
 and the mental process, usually called abstraction, 
 he resolves' simply into a perception of resem- 
 blances. Various objections might be urged 
 against this system ; and we may, perhaps, be al- 
 lowed to doubt, whether, by means of it, any 
 thing has been gained to the science of mind. 
 But the plan which I proposed to myself in this 
 outline does not lead me into any consideration 
 
196 REASON. 
 
 of it, or of those systems to which it is opposed. 
 
 My object has been simply to inquire ivhat the 
 
 mind does, without entering- on the question liow 
 
 it does so. On this ground, the division which 
 
 has been adopted of distinct mental operations, 
 
 not distinct faculties, appears to be that best calcu- |. 
 
 lated for practical utility. \ 
 
 §1. 
 
 OF THE USE OF REASON 
 IN THE INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 In applying our reason to the investigation of 
 truth in any department of knowledge, we are, 
 in the first place, to keep in mind, that there are 
 certain intuitive articles of belief, which lie at the 
 foundation of all reasoning. For, in every pro- 
 cess of reasoning, we proceed by founding one 
 step upon another which has gone before it ; and, 
 when we trace such a process backwards, we must 
 arrive at certain truths which are recognised as 
 fundamental, requiring no proof, and admitting 
 of none. These are usually called First Truths. 
 They are not the result of any process of reason- 
 ing, but force themselves, with a conviction of 
 infallible certainty, upon every sound understand- 
 ing, without regard to its logical habits or powers 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 197 
 
 of induction. The force of them is according-ly 
 felt in an equal degree by all classes of men ; and 
 they are acted upon with absolute confidence in 
 the daily transactions of life. This is a subject of 
 great and extensive importance. The truths, or 
 articles of belief, which are referable to it, were 
 briefly mentioned in a former part of our inquiry : 
 they are chiefly the following. 
 
 I. A conviction of our own existence, as sen- 
 tient and thinking beings ; and of mind, as some- 
 thing distinct from the functions of the body. 
 From the first exercise of perception, we acquire 
 a knowledge of two things, namely, the thing per- 
 ceived, and the sentient being who perceives it. 
 In the same manner, from the exercise of any 
 mental operation, such as memory, we acquire 
 an impression of the thing remembered, — of an 
 essence or principle which remembers it, — and of 
 this essence as something entirely distinct from 
 any function of the body. This last conviction 
 m^ust be considered as a first truth, or intuitive 
 article of belief, standing on the same ground 
 with the other truths which are referable to this 
 class. It does not, as was formerly stated, rest 
 upon any metaphysical or physiological argument, 
 but upon an appeal made to the conviction of 
 every man who attends to what is passing within. 
 It resolves itself into a consciousness of the vari- 
 ous mental processes, impressions and emotions, 
 
198 REASON. 
 
 as referable to one permanent and unchanging- 
 essence, while the body is known to be in a con- 
 stant state of change ; and of these processes as 
 being- exercised without any necessary depend- 
 ence upon present impressions from external 
 things. Like other truths of this class, it is, con- 
 sequently, unaffected by sophisms which are 
 broug-ht against it ; and the answer to these does 
 not properly consist in any process of reasoning, 
 but in this appeal to every man's absolute con- 
 viction. If brought into comparison, indeed, the 
 evidence which we have for the existence of mind, 
 is, perhaps, < less liable to deception, than that 
 which we have for the existence of matter. 
 
 II. A confidence in the evidence of our senses, 
 in regard to the existence and the properties of 
 external things ; or a conviction, that they have 
 a real existence independently of our sensations. 
 We have formerly referred to a celebrated doc- 
 trine, by which it was maintained, that the mind 
 perceives only its own ideas or impressions ; and 
 that, consequently, we derive from our senses no 
 evidence of the existence of external things. The 
 only answer to such a sophism is, that a con- 
 fidence in the evidence of our senses is a first 
 truth, or intuitive principle of belief, admitting 
 of no other proof than that which is derived from 
 the universal conviction of mankind. 
 
 * 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 199 
 
 III. A confidence in our own mental pro- 
 cesses ; — that facts, for example, which are sug- 
 gested to us by our memory, really occurred. 
 
 IV. A belief in our personal identity. This 
 is derived from the combined operation of con- 
 sciousness and memory ; and it consists in a re- 
 membrance of past mental feelings, and a com- 
 parison of them with present feelings as belong- 
 ing to the same sentient being. There were for- 
 merly many disputes on this subject, — some main- 
 taining that the notion of personal identity is in- 
 consistent with the different states in which the 
 mind exists at different times, as love and hatred, 
 joy and sorrow, — and also v/ith the remarkable 
 changes of character, which often take place at dif- 
 ferent periods of life. This was one of the sophisms 
 of the schools, founded upon an obscure analogy 
 with changes which take place in material things, 
 and is not at all applicable to mind. The only 
 answer to the paradox is, that every man, under 
 every variety of mental emotion, and every pos- 
 sible change of character, retains an absolute con- 
 viction, that the sentient being whom he calls him- 
 self remains invariably the same ; and that, in all 
 the affairs of life, whether referring to the past or 
 the future, every man acts upon this conviction. 
 
 V. A conviction that every event must have a 
 cause, and a cause adequate to the effect ; and 
 
1 
 
 200 REASON. 
 
 that appearances, showing a correct adaptation of 
 means to an end, indicate design and intelligence 
 in the cause. These, as fundamental truths, are 
 quite distinct from the question relating to the 
 connexion of any two specified events as cause 
 and effect. The latter belongs to another part of 
 our inquiry. 
 
 VI. A confidence in the uniformity of nature ; 
 or, that the same substance will always exhibit 
 the same characters ; and that the same cause, 
 under the same circumstances, will always be 
 followed by the same effect. This, as a first 
 truth, is a fundamental and instinctive convic- 
 tion. The province of experience, we have ah 
 ready seen, is to ascertain the particular events, 
 which are so connected as to be included under 
 the law. 
 
 Our confidence in the uniformity of nature is 
 the foundation of all the calculations which we 
 make for the future, in regard to our protection, 
 or comfort, or even for the continuance of our 
 existence ; and, without it, the whole system of ) 
 
 human things would be thrown into inextricable 
 confusion. It is referable to the two heads now 
 stated, namely, — uniformity of characters,- — and 
 iniiformity of sequences or operations. 
 
 By uniformity of characters, in any substance, 
 we mean, that the substance will always continue 
 to exhibit the same combination of characters, so 
 
FIRST TUUTllS. 201 
 
 that, when we have ascertained its presence by 
 some of them, we conclude that it also possesses 
 the others. These characters may be numerous, 
 and referable to various classes ; — such as the 
 botanical characters of a plant, — the chemical 
 properties of a mineral, — sensible qualities of 
 smell, taste, and colour, — and capabilities of ac- 
 tion upon other bodies. Such is our confidence 
 in the undeviating uniformity of nature, that, 
 Avhatever number of these qualities we have as- 
 certained to belong- to a substance, we expect 
 to find in every specimen of it in all time com- 
 ing-. For example, I find a substance which, by 
 its smell and colour, I know to be opium. With^ 
 out any farther information, I decide with con- 
 fidence, on its taste, its composition, its chemical 
 affinities, its action on the human body, and the 
 characters of the plant from which it was de- 
 rived ; and I never calculate upon the pos- 
 sibility of being deceived in any of these par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 Our confidence in the uniformity of the se- 
 quences or operations of nature, resolves itself 
 into a conviction of the continuance of that or- 
 der which experience has shown us to exist in a 
 uniform manner, in the succession of phenomena. 
 The conviction itself is an original or instinctive 
 principle, felt and acted upon by all classes of 
 men, in the daily transactions of life. It is from 
 experience that we learn the particular cases to 
 
 7 
 
202 
 
 REASON. 
 
 which we are warranted in applying it ; or, in 
 other words, the successions of phenomena which, 
 there is sufficient g-round for believing, have oc- 
 curred in a certain order in time past. These 
 we expect with perfect confidence to continue to 
 be equally uniform, or to occur in the same or- 
 der in time to come. The error to be guarded 
 against in such investigations, is, assuming the 
 past uniformity of phenomena on insufficient 
 grounds, or, in other words, concluding that 
 events have always occurred in a certain order, 
 because we have seen them occur in that order, 
 in a few instances. A principle assumed in this 
 manner may, of course, disappoint us, if applied 
 to future phenomena ; but, in this case, there is 
 no deviation from the uniformity of nature, — the 
 error consisted in assuming such a uniformity 
 where none existed. 
 
 The uniformity of the sequences of phenomena 
 is the foundation of our idea of causation, in re- 
 gard to these phenomena ; that is to say, when 
 we have observed one event uniformly follow 
 another event, we consider the first as cause, and 
 the second as effect ; and, when this relation has 
 been ascertained to be uniform, we conclude that 
 it will continue to be uniform ; or that the same 
 cause, in the same circumstances, will always be 
 followed by the same effect. This expectation 
 will, of course, disappoint us, if we have assum- 
 ed the relation on inadequate grounds ; or have 
 
riRST TRUTHS. '203 
 
 considered two events as cause and effect, which 
 have been only accidentally combined in a few 
 instances. To entitle us to assume that the re- 
 lation will be uniform in time to come, we must 
 have full and adequate grounds for believing- that 
 it has been uniform in time past. 
 
 In the great operations of nature, a very ex- 
 tensive observation often enables us to trace a re- 
 markable uniformity, even in reg-ard to events 
 which at first sight appear to be most irregular 
 and uncertain. Thus, the most uncertain of 
 all things is human life, as far as respects indivi- 
 duals ; but the doctrine of the continuance of life, 
 in regard to a large body of men, is, by extensive 
 observation, reduced almost to a certainty. No- 
 thing is more uncertain than the proportion of 
 males and females that shall be born in one fa- 
 mily ; but, in great communities, this also is uni- 
 form. There is much uncertainty in the charac- 
 ter of different seasons, but there are facts which 
 give probability to the conjecture, that, in a long- 
 series of years, there may also be discovered a 
 remarkable uniformity. An impression of this 
 kind was carried so far by the ancients, as to lead 
 to the doctrine of the Annus Magnus, or Pla- 
 tonic year, in which it was believed, that the 
 whole series of human events would be acted 
 over again. 
 
 The uniform successions of phenomena are, 
 Avith reasonable care, easily ascertained in regard 
 
1 
 I 
 
 20i REASON. 
 
 to material things ; and, when they are ascertain- 
 ed, we rely upon their uniform continuance ; or, 
 if we find a deviation in any instance, we easily 
 ascertain the incidental cause by which the se- 
 quence is interrupted, and can provide against 
 the interference of the same or any similar cause 
 in future instances. There is greater uncertainty 
 when our researches refer to the phenomena of 
 mind, or the actions of living bodies. The 
 causes of this uncertainty were formerly men- 
 tioned. It arises, partly from the greater diffi- 
 culty of ascertaining the true relations — that is, 
 of tracing causes to their true effects, and effects 
 to their true causes ; and partly from the ten- 
 dency to these being interrupted in future in- 
 stances, by some new cause, in regard to which 
 we cannot calculate either the existence or the 
 precise effects. Hence, for example, the uncer- 
 tainty of human laws ; one of the contingencies 
 by which they are interrupted, being the chances 
 of evading them. If we could conceive a case, 
 in which every crime was with certainty detect- 
 ed, and every criminal brought to punishment, 
 jt is probable that the effect of human laws would 
 be nearly as certain as the operation of material 
 causes. But the criminal, in the first instance, 
 calculates on the chances of evading detection, 
 and, even in the event of detection, of escaping 
 punishment ; and thus, the tendency of the wisest 
 laws is constantly interrupted, in a manner which 
 
 f 
 
FIRST Truths. 205 
 
 no human wisdom can calculate upon or prevent. 
 There is often a similar uncertainty in human 
 character, in other situations ; for example, in 
 judg-ing how an individual will act in particular 
 circumstances, or be influenced by particular mo- 
 tives ; for a motive which we have found to in- 
 duce a particular line of conduct in one indivi- 
 dual, may fail in producing- the same result in 
 another, being- prevented by circumstances in his 
 moral condition, which entirely elude our obser- 
 vation. 
 
 Yet there is a uniformity in moral phenomena, 
 which, though it may be ascertained with greater 
 difficulty than the order of natural phenomena, 
 we calculate upon with similar confidence, when 
 it has been ascertained. Thus, a man may have 
 acquired such a character for integrity, that we 
 rely upon his integrity in any situation in which 
 he may be placed, with the same confidence with 
 which we rely on the uniformity of nature ; and 
 there is a man distinguished by veracity and fide- 
 lity to his promise, of whom we say, in common 
 language, that his word is as good as his bond. 
 In such examples as these, indeed, our confidence 
 is founded, not upon any laws which have been 
 observed in regard to the whole species, but on 
 a uniformity which has been observed in regard 
 to the individuals, or rather a class to which the 
 individuals belong. There are also, however, 
 laws which apply to mankind in general, and on 
 
20G UEA'SON. 
 
 which we rely as far as they g"o ; namely, princi- 
 ples of conduct in which we confide, as reg-ulat- 1 
 ing every man of a sane mind, whatever may 
 be our knowledge of his previous habits of judg- 
 ing or acting. It is in this manner, for example, 
 as formerly stated, that we regulate our confidence 
 in testimony. If a man, who is either a stranger 
 to us, or bears a character of doubtful veracity, 
 relates circumstances which tend greatly to pro- 
 mote his own purposes, we calculate on the pro- 
 bability of fabrication, and reject his testimony ; 
 and, if we even suspect that he has a purpose to 
 serve, a similar impression is produced. If, on 
 the contrary, we are satisfied that the circum- 
 stances are indiff'erent to him, and that he has 
 no purpose to answer, we give greater credit to 
 his testimony. If, farther than this, we perceive 
 that the statement operates against himself, con- 
 veying an imputation against his own conduct, 
 or exposing him to contempt, ridicule, or perso- 
 nal injury, we are satisfied that nothing could 
 make him adhere to such a testimony, but an 
 honest conviction of its truth. Under the for- 
 mer circumstances, we believe only a man whom 
 we consider as a person of known and esta- 
 blished veracity ; under the latter, we believe 
 any man whom we consider to be of a sane mind. 
 Thus, in both instances, we proceed upon a cer- 
 tain uniformity of moral phenomena ; only that 
 we refer them to two classes, — namely, one which 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 207 
 
 is ascertained to be iiuit'orni in reg^ard to the 
 ■whole species, and another which is nnifonn 
 only in regard to a certain order, that is, all men 
 of integrity and veracity. In the one case, we 
 rely upon the uniformity in every instance j in 
 the other, we do not rely npon it until we are 
 satisfied that the individual example belongs to 
 that order, in which the other kind of moral imi- 
 formity has been ascertained. 
 
 There are other inquiries closely connected 
 with the uniformity of moral relations ; but at 
 present we must allude to them very briefly. 
 We have everv reason to believe that there are 
 moral causes, that is, truths and motives, which 
 have a tendency to influence human volition and 
 human conduct, with a uniformity similar to that 
 with which physical agents produce their actions 
 upon each other. These moral causes, indeed, 
 do not operate in every instance, or in all circum- 
 stances ; but neither do physical causes. Sub- 
 stances in chemistry, for example, have certain 
 tendencies to act upon each other, which are uni- 
 form and necessary ; but no action takes place, 
 unless the substances are brought into certain cir- 
 cumstances which are required for bringing these 
 tendencies into operation. They must, in the 
 first place, be brought into contact ; and, besides 
 this, many of them require other collateral cir- 
 cumstances, as a particular temperature, or a par- 
 ticular state of concentration or dilution. It is 
 
208 REASON. 
 
 the same with moral causes : their tendencies are 
 uniform, and there are principles in the mind of 
 man which these are adapted for acting- upon. 
 But they require certain circumstances, in the man 
 on whom they are expected to act, without which 
 they produce no influence upon him. It is ne- 
 cessary, for example, that he be fully informed in 
 reg-ard to them as truths ; and that his attention be 
 directed to them with such a degree of intensity 
 as shall bring- him fully under their influence as 
 statements addressed to his understanding ; also, 
 that there be a certain healthy state of his moral 
 feelings, — for this has a most extensive influence 
 on the due operation of moral causes. Without 
 these the most powerful moral causes mayproduce 
 no eff'ect upon a man ; as the most active chemical 
 agents may fail entirely of their actions, if the 
 substances are not placed in the requisite cir- 
 cumstances of temperature, dilution, or concen- 
 tration. 
 
 These considerations seem to bear an important 
 reference to a question which has been much 
 argued, namely, that respecting liberty, necessity, 
 and the freedom of the will. On a subject on 
 which some of the wisest and the best of men 
 have been found on opposite sides, I would ex- 
 press myself with becoming caution and diffi- 
 dence ; but, perhaps some of the obscurity in 
 which the question has been involved, arises from 
 the want of a clear definition of the terms in 
 
 M 
 
FIIIST TRUTH?. '2O0 
 
 which it has boon arGciied ; and by not fully dis- 
 tino-nisliin^- betwoen icill or simple volition, and 
 desire or inclination. Will, or simple volition, 
 is the state of mind which immediately pre- 
 cedes action ; and the action following- npon 
 this is not only free, but it is absolutely impossible 
 to snj)pose it should be otherwise. A man is 
 not only free to do what he wills, but we cannot 
 conceive a case in which he could exert a power 
 of not doing what he wills, or of doing" what he 
 wills not. Impulse or restraint from without, 
 acting" upon his bodily org-ans, could alone inter- 
 fere with his following", in this sense, the tendency 
 of his will, or simple volition. The only idea, 
 indeed, that we can form of free ag"ency, or free- 
 dom of the will, is, that it consists in a man being 
 able to do what he wills, or to abstain from do- 
 ing w^hat he wills not. Necessary agency, on 
 the other hand, would consist in the man beins" 
 compelled, by a force from without, to do what 
 he wills not, or prevented from doing what he 
 wills. 
 
 The real bearing of the inquiry does not lie in 
 this connexion between the volition and the act, 
 but in the origin or cause of the volition, or in 
 the connexion between the volition and the de- 
 sire ; and this will be seen to be entirely dis- 
 tinct. A man, for example, may desire, or have 
 an inclination to, that which he has not the 
 power to will ; because he may be under the in- 
 
 p 
 
210 REASON. 
 
 fluencc of motives and principles which prevent 
 the inclination from being- followed by volition, 
 with as absolute a necessity as we observe in the 
 sequences of natural phenomena. Thus, also, 
 we may say to a man of strict integrity and virtue, 
 that he has not the power to commit murder or 
 robbery, or any act of gross injustice or oppres- 
 sion. He may reply, that he has the power to do 
 it if he willed ; and this is granted, for this is free 
 agency ; but it is not the question in dispute. 
 We do not say that he has not the power to do 
 any or all of these acts, if he willed, but that he 
 has not the power to will such deeds. He is un- 
 der the influence of motives and principles, which 
 make it as much a matter of necessity for him not 
 to will such acts, as it is for a stone not to rise 
 from the earth's surface contrary to its gravity. 
 Such a necessity as this, if we must retain the 
 term, so far from being unfavourable to the in- 
 terests of virtue and morals, or opposed to the 
 practice of exhorting men to virtue, seems, on 
 the contrary, to hold out the strongest encou- 
 ragement in doing so ; and to be, in fact, the 
 only scheme on which we can expect an argu- 
 ment or motive to have any influence upon hu- 
 man conduct. For it represents man as possess- 
 ed of certain uniform principles in his nature, 
 which are capable of being acted upon by certain 
 moral causes, truths, laws, or motives, with a 
 uniformity similar to that which we observe in 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. '-M I 
 
 j)liysic'al plienonieiKi, provided he can bo brought 
 uiuhT their iufiiience, and into those circumstan- 
 ces which are re<|nired for tlieir (hie operation. 
 These circnnistances are, — that the moral causes, 
 laws, motives, or truths, shall be broug"ht before 
 his understanding ; that he shall direct his atten- 
 tion to them with suitable intensity ; and that he 
 is free from that degree of corruption of his mo- 
 ral feelings, or any of those distorted moral ha- 
 bits, which we know to produce a most extensive 
 influence on the operation of moral causes. To 
 suppose a kind of moral liberty opposed to such 
 a necessity as this, would be to represent man 
 as a being- possessed of no fixed or uniform 
 principles, — not to be calculated upon as to his 
 conduct in any instance, — and not capable of be- 
 ing acted upon by any motive or principle, except 
 the blind caprice of the moment. To endeavour 
 to act upon such a being-, by persuading- him to 
 virtue or dissuading- him from vice, would be like 
 expecting fixed results in chemistry, by bringing 
 substances to act upon each other, the actions of 
 which we had previously found to be without 
 any kind of uniformity. This is in fact precisely 
 the situation of the maniac, whom, accordingly, 
 we never expect to guide or influence by motives 
 or arguments, but by external restraint. He may 
 act harmlessly, or he may act mischievously ; but 
 we never can calculate upon his actions in any 
 one instance ; we therefore shut him up so as to 
 
212 KEASON. 
 
 prevent liini ivom being dangerous to the com- 
 munity. 
 
 Necessity, then, as applied to the operation of 
 moral causes, appears simply to correspond with 
 the uniformity which we observe in the opera- 
 tion of physical causes. We calculate that ^man 
 of a certain character will act in a particular 
 manner in particular circumstances, or that he 
 will be acted upon in a certain manner by parti- 
 cular truths and motives, when they are present- 
 ed to him, — by a principle of uniformity similar to 
 that with which we expect an acid to act in a 
 particular manner upon an alkali. The action 
 of the acid we know to be uniform, but we know 
 also, that no action will take place till the sub- 
 stances are brought fully into contact, and in cer- 
 tain circumstances which are required for their 
 action ; — and the action of moral causes is uni- 
 form, but they exert no influence on a man till 
 he is fully acquainted with them, — directs his at- 
 tention to them with suitable care, — and is be- 
 sides in a certain healthy state of moral feeling. 
 It is thus that we calculate on the full and uni- 
 form operation of moral causes on some indivi- 
 duals, and not on others ; namely, by having pre- 
 viously ascertained that the former are in those 
 intellectual and moral circumstances which are 
 required for their action. When, in another in- 
 dividual, we find these causes fail in their natu- 
 ral action?, we endeavour, as far as may be in 
 
 '^M 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. '213 
 
 our power, to supply those collateral circum- 
 stances, — by instructing liini in the facts, truths, 
 or motives ; — by rt)using- his attention to their 
 importance ; — by impressing- them upon him in 
 their strong-est characters, and by all such arg-u- 
 ments and representations as we think calculated 
 to fix the impression. All this we do under a 
 conviction, that these causes have a certain, fixed, 
 uniform, or necessary action, in reg-ard to human 
 volition and human conduct ; and it is this con- 
 viction which encourages us to persevere in our 
 attempts to bring the individual under their in- 
 fluence. If we had not this conviction, we should 
 abandon the attempt as altog-ether hopeless ; be- 
 cause we could have no g^round on which to form 
 any calculation, and no rules to g-uide us in our 
 measures. Precisely in the same manner, when we 
 find a chemical agent fail of the eftect which we 
 expect from it, we add it in larger quantity, or in 
 an increased state of concentration, or at a higher 
 temperature, — or with some other change of cir- 
 cumstances calculated to favour its action ; and 
 we persevere in these measures, under a convic- 
 tion, that its action is perfectly uniform or neces- 
 sary, and will take place whenever these circum- 
 stances have been provided for. On the same 
 princi})le, we see how blame may attach to the 
 intelligent aij^ent in both cases, though the actions 
 of the causes are luiiform and necessary. Such is 
 the action of chemical ai»ents, — but blame mav at- 
 
214 REASON. 
 
 tach to the chemist who has not provided them 
 ill the necessary circumstances, as to quantity, 
 concentration, and temperature. Such is the 
 action of moral causes, — but deep guilt may at- 
 tach to the moral agent, who has been proof 
 against their influence. There is guilt in igno- 
 rance, when knowledge was within his reach ; — 
 there is guilt in heedless inattention, when truths 
 and motives of the highest interest claimed his 
 serious consideration ; — there is guilt in that cor- 
 ruption of his moral feelings which impedes the 
 action of moral causes, because this has originat- 
 ed, in a great measure, in a course of vicious de- 
 sires, and vicious conduct, by which the mind, 
 familiarized with vice, has gradually lost sight of 
 its malignity. During the whole of this course, 
 also, the man felt that he was a free agent ; — 
 that he had power to pursue the course which he 
 followed, — and that he had power to refrain from 
 it. AVhen a particular desire was first present to 
 his mind, he had the power immediately to act 
 with a view to its accomplishment ; or he had the 
 power to abstain from acting, and to direct his 
 attention more fully to the various considerations 
 and motives which were calculated to guide his 
 determination. In acting as he did, he not only 
 withheld his attention from those truths which 
 were thus calculated to operate upon him as a 
 moral being ; but he did still more direct vio- 
 lence to an impulse within, which warned him 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 215 
 
 that he was wandering" from the path of recti- 
 tude. The state of moral feeling-, which gra- 
 dually results from this habitual violation of 
 the indications of conscience, and this habitual 
 neglect of the serious consideration of moral 
 causes, every individual must feel to be attended 
 with moral guilt. The effect of it is not only to 
 prevent the due operation of moral causes on his 
 future volitions, but even to vitiate and distort 
 the judgment itself respecting the great principles 
 of moral rectitude. Without attempting any ex- 
 planation of this remarkable condition of the 
 mental functions, its actual existence must be 
 received as a fact in the constitution of human 
 nature, which cannot be called in question ; and it 
 offers one of the most remarkable phenomena that 
 can be presented to him who turns his attention 
 to the moral economy of man. 
 
 Before concluding this incidental allusion to a 
 much controverted subject, I may be allowed to 
 remark, that the term necessity, as applied to 
 moral phenomena, is not fortunate, and perhaps 
 not philosophical ; and something would perhaps 
 be gained in conducting the inquiry, if, for ne- 
 cessity^ we were to substitute uniformity/. In 
 strict propriety, indeed, the terms necessity and 
 necessary ought to be applied only to mathema- 
 tical truth. Of physical relations, all that we 
 know is the fact of their iniiformity ; and it would 
 appear equally philosophical to a])ply the same 
 
2lG REASON. 
 
 term to mental phenomena. On this j)rinciple, 
 therefore, we should say, — that the tendency of 
 moral causes or motives is not necessary, but 
 uniform ; and that on this depends all our con- 
 fidence in the uniformity of human character, and 
 in the power of truths, motives, or arguments, 
 to produce particular results on human conduct. 
 To su})pose the mind possessed of a power of de- 
 termining", apart from all this influence of moral 
 causes or motives, would be to overthrow this 
 confidence, and to reduce our whole calculations 
 on human character to conjecture and inicertain- 
 ty. Whiiii, indeed, we talk of a self-determining- 
 power of the will, we seem to use a combination 
 of words without any definite meaning. For the 
 will is not distinct I'rom the being who v/ills ; and 
 to speak of an individual determining his will, is 
 only saying, in other words, that he wills. lie 
 wills some act for some reason, which is known 
 to himself: if communicated to another, the rea- 
 son might not appear a satisfactory one, — but still 
 it is to him the reason which induced him to will 
 the act, and this appears to be all that we can 
 make of the subject. A power of determining, 
 without any reason, appears to be not only 
 unphilosophical, but, in point of fact, inappli- 
 cable to any conceivable case. Ignorance, in- 
 attention, or gross perversion of the moral feel- 
 ings, may make the worse reason appear the 
 better ; but we cannot conceive a case, in which 
 
FIKST TRUTHS. 217 
 
 ail indiviiluul could exert a power ot" determiniii<^- 
 without any reason, or according- to what appears 
 to him at the tinje to be a weaker reason, in op- 
 position to one which appears a stronger. It will 
 also, I think, be found, that the warmest advo- 
 cates for philosophical liberty, and a self-determin- 
 ing- j)ower, in actual practice recog-nise as much 
 as others the principle of the uniformity of moral 
 causes. Thus, if we find a person acting- in a 
 manner widely different from that which we ex- 
 pected from him, all men concur in saying-, 
 " what motive could induce him to act in that man- 
 ner ?" and if we cannot reconcile his conduct to 
 any conceivable motive, we say, " it really looks 
 like insanity." Another may remark, " his con- 
 duct indicates a singular want of consideration ;" 
 — thus clearly recognising- the existence of certain 
 motives or moral causes, which would have led 
 the man into a different line of conduct, had he 
 allowed his attention to' fix upon them. The 
 doctrine of a self-determining- power should re- 
 move every difficulty in such a case, to those 
 who believe in it ; but I am not aware that it 
 ever was made use of for such a purpose. It 
 will also be found to agree with the universal 
 conviction of mankind, that the circumstance, 
 which gives to an action the character of merit 
 or demerit, is entirely the motive from which 
 it was done ; and that, if we could conceive such 
 a thing as an action performed by the impulse 
 
218 REASON. 
 
 of a free self-determining- power, apart from any 
 influence of motives or moral causes, no man of 
 sane mind would for a moment allow to such an 
 act the character of virtue. On the contrary, it is 
 familiar to every one, that we often find in a man's 
 motive an excuse for conduct in which we think 
 he has acted wrong. We say, he erred in judg-- 
 ment, but his motive was good ; and this mode of 
 reasoning meets with the cordial concurrence of 
 the whole m^iss of mankind. 
 
 The First Truths, or intuitive principles of 
 belief, which have been the subject of the preced- 
 ing observations, are of the utmost practical im- 
 portance, as they furnish the true and only an- 
 swer to many of the sophisms of the scholastic 
 philosophy, and to many sceptical arguments of 
 more modern times. They admit of no other 
 evidence than an appeal to the consciousness of 
 every man, that he does and must believe them. 
 " We believe them," says Dr. Brown, *' because 
 it is impossible not to believe them." — *' In all 
 these cases," says Mr. Stewart, " the only account 
 that can be given of our belief is, that it forms a 
 necessary part of our constitution, against which 
 metaphysicians may argue, so as to perplex the 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. ^219 
 
 jiidgiiiciit, l)ut of which it is impossible to divest 
 ourselves for a nioineiit, when we are called to 
 employ our reason, either in the business of life 
 or in the pursuits of science." 
 
 It is likewise to be kept in mind, as was for- 
 merly stated, that our idea of reasoning- neces- 
 sarily supposes the existence of a certain number 
 of truths, which require and admit of no evi- 
 dence. The maxim, indeed, is as old as the days 
 of Aristotle, and has never been called in ques- 
 tion, " that, except some first principles be taken 
 for g-ranted, there can be neither reason nor rea- 
 soning- ; that it is impossible that every truth 
 should admit of proof, otherwise proof would ex- 
 tend in infinitumy which is incompatible with its 
 nature ; and that, if ever men attempt to prove a 
 first principle, it is because they are ignorant of 
 the nature of proof." * As these truths, therefore, 
 do not admit of being called in question by 
 any sound understanding, neither do they admit 
 of being supported by any process of reasoning ; 
 and, when paradoxes or sophisms in opposition 
 to them are proposed, any attempt to argue with 
 such, upon logical principles, only leads to discus- 
 sions as absurd as themselves. Of attempts of 
 both kinds, many examples are to be met with 
 among the writers of the sixteenth and seven- 
 teenth centuries, as Des Cartes and Hobbes j 
 
 * Aristotle's Metaphysics, book iv. 
 
220 HE A SON. 
 
 and even some eminent persons, of more modern 
 times, are not entirely free from them. Thns, 
 Des Cartes, Malebranche and others, thonght it 
 necessary to prove, that external objects, and the 
 sentient beings with whom we are connected, 
 have a real existence, whether we think of them 
 or not, and are not merely ideas in our own 
 minds. Berkeley showed the weakness of this 
 argument, and on this founded the well known 
 doctrine by which he denied the real existence 
 of all material things. 
 
 Many of the dogmas of modern sophistical 
 writers, such as Mr, Hume, have consisted of at- 
 tempts to overturn, by processes of argument, 
 these fundamental or first truths. On the other 
 hand, the unsatisfactory nature of some of the 
 replies to these sophisms, depends upon the at- 
 tempts to combat them having been made by 
 reasonings, of which the subject is not susce})ti- 
 ble. For these principles admit of no proof by 
 processes of reasoning, and, consequently, are in 
 no degree affected by demonstrations of the falla- 
 cy of attempts to establish them by sucli pro- 
 cesses. An interesting illustration of this has 
 been preserved by Mr. Stewart, in a correspond- 
 ence between Mr. Hume and Sir Gilbert Elliot.* 
 " From the reply to this letter," says Mr. Stew- 
 
 * lutroductoiy Essay to the Appcudix of the Encyclopaediu 
 Biitamiica. 
 
FIRST TliLTlIS. 221 
 
 art, "by Mr. Hume's very ing-enicms and accom- 
 plished correspondent, we learn, that he liad 
 drawn from Mr. Hume's metaphysical discus- 
 sions, the only sound and philosophical infe- 
 rence ; — that the lameness of the proofs offered 
 by Des Cartes and his successors, of some funda- 
 mental truths, universally acknowledged by man- 
 kind, proceeded, not from any defect in the evi- 
 dence, but, on the contrary, from their being self- 
 evident, and consequently unsusceptible of de- 
 monstration." The same view of Mr. Hume's 
 sceptical reasonings was taken by other eminent 
 persons, by whom his system was attacked, — par- 
 ticularly Reid, Beattie, and Oswald ; and, on 
 the continent, the nature and importance of these 
 first truths had been, at an earlier period, il- 
 lustrated in a full and able manner by Father 
 Buffier. 
 
 Various characters have been proposed, by 
 which these primary and fundamental truths may 
 be distinguished. One of those given by Father 
 Buffier appears to be the best, and to be alone 
 sufficient to identify them. It is, that their prac- 
 tical influence extends even to persons who affect 
 to dispute their authority ; in other words, that, 
 in all the affairs of life, the most sceptical philo- 
 sopher acts, as much as the mass of mankind, up- 
 on the absolute belief of these truths. Let a per- 
 son of this description, for example, be contend- 
 ing very keenly, in regard to something Avhicb 
 
222 REASON. 
 
 deeply concerns liis interest or his comfort, — lie 
 would scarcely be satisfied by being- told, that the 
 thinjr abont which he contends has no real exist- 
 ence, and that he who contends abont it so eag"er- 
 ]y is himself a nonentity, or, at best, nothing more 
 than an idea. Let him be taking cognizance of an 
 offence connnitted against him ten years ago, — he 
 never doubts that he is still the person against 
 whom the offence was committed. Let him lay 
 plans for future advantage or comfort, — it is done 
 under a full conviction that he is still to continue 
 the individual who may enjoy them. Has a 
 building started up on his premises, which he 
 did not expect to see, — he immediately asks, who 
 ordered the masons, and would be very ill satis- 
 fied by being told, that the thing had appeared 
 without any known cause, by a fortuitous com- 
 bination of atoms. However much he may rea- 
 son to the contrary, he shows no doubt, in his 
 own practice, that every event must have an ade- 
 quate cause. The same mode of reasoning will 
 be seen to apply to the other truths which belong 
 to the class under consideration, — namely, that 
 those who aroj-ue asfainst them act in all cases on 
 a belief of their truth. 
 
 The distinction between a process of reasoning, 
 and the act of the mind, in arriving at these fini- 
 damental and instinctive truths, is a principle of 
 the utmost practical importance. For a chain of 
 correct reasoning requires logical habits, and a 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 223 
 
 certain ciiltivution of the mental powers ; and, 
 consequently, it is confined to a comparatively 
 small number of mankiud. But tlie process here 
 referred to is the spontaneous and immediate in- 
 duction of the untutored mind, and the correct 
 exercise of it requires only, that the mind shall 
 not be debased by depravity, nor bewildered by 
 the refinements of a false pliiloso])hy. The truths 
 which we derive from it, accordingly, do not con- 
 cern the philosopher alone, but are of daily and 
 essential importance to the whole mass of man- 
 kind. Let us take, for example, the principle 
 referred to under the fifth head, namely, our in- 
 tuitive conviction that every change or event 
 must have an adequate cause. This is a princi- 
 ple of daily application, and one which is acted 
 upon with absolute confidence in the ordinary 
 affairs of life by all classes of men. By the im- 
 mediate and unconscious exercise of it, we infer 
 the skill of one workman from w^orks indicating" 
 skill, and the vigour of another, from works indi- 
 cating strength. We infer from every work, not 
 only a cause, but a cause which, both in degree 
 and in kind, is exactly proportioned to the effect 
 produced. From a chronometer, which varies only 
 a second in a year, we infer exquisite skill in the 
 artist ; and, from the construction of the pyramids 
 of Egypt, the united strength of a multitude of 
 men. We never suppose for a moment, that the 
 minute skill of the artist raised the pyramid, or 
 
^224 REASON. 
 
 that the iinltod force of tlie miiliitiule constructed 
 the chronometer ; still less, that these nionnments 
 of art started into their present condition without 
 a cause. We infer with absolute certainty in both 
 cases an adequate cause ; that is, a cause, distin- 
 g-uished, in the one case, by design and mechani- 
 cal power, — in the other, by desig-n, adaptation, 
 and exquisite skill. 
 
 The principle which is thus acted upon, in the 
 ordinary affairs of life, with a conviction of infalli- 
 ble certainty, is precisely the same, by which, from 
 the stupendous works of creation, we infer, by the 
 most simj)le step of reasoning-, the existence of a 
 great first cause. This cause, also, we conclude 
 to be a designing and intelligent mind, infinite in 
 wisdom, and boundless in power ; and, by a very 
 slight and natural extension of the same principle, 
 we arrive with equal certainty at the conviction, 
 of this cause being the first, — not arising out of 
 any thing preceding- it, consequently self-existent 
 and eternal. All this is not such a process of 
 reasoning as requires logical habits, and admits 
 of debate, deliberation, or doubt ; — the metaphy- 
 sician may bewilder himself in its very simplicity ; 
 but the uncontaminated mind finds its way to the 
 conclusion with unerring certainty, and with a 
 conviction, which is felt to be not only satisfac- 
 tory, but irresistible. 
 
LAWS OF INVESTKtATION. ^^2o 
 
 When we proceed, from these first or intuitive 
 articles of belief, to the farther investigation of 
 truth in any department of knowledge, various 
 mental processes are brought into operation ; but, 
 in regard to all of them, reason is our ultimate 
 guide, in judging whether they are performed in 
 a legitimate manner, and upon principles calcu- 
 lated to lead to the discovery of truth. These 
 processes may be chiefly referred to the following 
 heads : 
 
 I. To make a careful collection of facts relating 
 to the subject ; and to abstain from deducing any 
 conclusions till we have before us such a series 
 as seems calculated to warrant them. The first 
 operation of reason therefore is, to judge when 
 we have a sufficient collection of facts for this 
 purpose. 
 
 II. To separate from the mass those facts which 
 are connected with it incidentally, and to retain 
 those only which we have reason to consider as 
 uniform and essential. In some sciences, this 
 is accomplished by repeated and varied expe- 
 riments ; and, in those departments which do 
 not admit of this, it is done by cautious and ex- 
 tensive observation. Our object in both cases is, 
 to ascertain how many of the circumstances ob- 
 served, and what particular combinations of them 
 
 Q 
 
226 REASON. 
 
 uniformly accompany each other, or are really 
 connected with the effects which are produced. 
 In this careful clearing of our statement from all 
 incidental combinations, consists that faithful ob- 
 servation of nature which forms the first step in 
 every scientific investigation. It is opposed to 
 two errors, both equally to be avoided, namely, 
 leaving out of view, or not assigning an adequate 
 value to, important and essential facts ; and giv- 
 ing a place and an importance to those which are 
 incidental and trivial. In every scientific inves- 
 tigation, this is a process of the utmost import- 
 ance ; and there is another nearly connected with 
 it, namely, to judge of the authenticity of the 
 facts. This also is a mental process of the ut- 
 most delicacy. In conducting it, there are two 
 extremes from which the exercise of sound judg- 
 ment ought equally to guard us, namely, receiv- 
 ing facts upon imperfect evidence, and rejecting 
 those which have a sufficient title to credit ; in 
 other words, credulity and scepticism. Both 
 these extremes are equally unworthy of a mind 
 which is guided by sound reason. 
 
 III. To compare facts with each other so as 
 to trace their resemblances, or to ascertain those 
 characters or properties in which a certain num- 
 ber of facts or substances agree. We thus ar- 
 range them into classes, genera and species. 
 
LAWS OF INVESTKiATlON. ''2TI 
 
 IV. To compare facts or events with each 
 other, so as to trace their relations and sequences ; 
 especially that relation of uniform sequence, on 
 which is fonnded our notion of cause and effect. 
 This delicate and most important process con- 
 sists entirely in a patient observation of facts, 
 and of their relation to each other. When, in 
 a certain number of instances, we find two events 
 following" one another without any exception, we 
 come to consider the sequence as uniform, and 
 call the one cause and the other eifect ; and 
 when, in other instances, we are disappointed in 
 finding" snch a succession, this confidence is shak- 
 en, unless we can discover a cause by which the 
 sequence was interrupted. Reason, acting upon 
 extensive observation, must here guide us, — 
 on the one hand, to judge of the uniformity 
 of the sequences, and, on the other, to account 
 for apparent deviations. 
 
 V. To review an extensive collection of facts, 
 so as to discover some general fact common to 
 the whole. This is the process which we call 
 generalizing, or the induction of a general prin- 
 ciple. The result of it is the last and greatest 
 object of human science, and that to which all 
 the other steps are preliminary and subservient. 
 An ordinary mind is satisfied with the observa- 
 tion of facts as they pass before it, and those 
 obvious relations which obtrude themselves upon 
 
228 REASON. 
 
 its notice ; but the philosopher analyzes the phe- 
 nomena, and thus discovers their more minute 
 relations. His g-enius is distinguished above the 
 industry of the mere observer of facts, when he 
 thus traces principles of accordance among facts 
 which, to the vulgar eye, appear remote and 
 dissimilar. A remarkable example of this is fa- 
 miliar to every one. Between the fall of an apple 
 from a tree and the motions of the heavenly bo- 
 dies, a common mind would have been long ere 
 it discovered any kind of relation ; but, on such a 
 relation, Newton founded those grand principles 
 by which he brought to light the order and har- 
 mony of the universe. For it was this simple 
 fact that first suggested to him the great principle 
 of physical science, that matter attracts matter in 
 the reciprocal ratio of their masses. 
 
 In a practical view, these processes may be re- 
 ferred to three heads, namely, collecting authen- 
 tic facts, — tracing causation, — and deducing ge- 
 neral principles. Here various mental opera- 
 tions are brought into action, especially atten- 
 tion, memory, conception, and abstraction ; but 
 it is the province of reason to judge whether 
 these are conducted in a legitimate manner, 
 or, in other words, to distinguish truth from 
 falsehood. It may therefore be important to 
 keep in mind, what those circumstances are in 
 
^ 
 
 LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 229 
 
 wliicli consist truth and tUlseliood, in reference 
 to any department of knowledge. 
 
 I. In collecting- facts, it is required in the first 
 place, that they shall be authentic ; secondly, 
 that the statement shall include a full and fair 
 view of all the circumstances which ought to be 
 taken into our investigation of the case ; and 
 thirdly, that it shall not include any facts which 
 are not connected with the subject, or whose con- 
 nexion is only incidental. When we have thus 
 formed a collection of facts, authentic, full, and 
 essential, the statement, in as far as relates to the 
 facts, constitutes truth. When any of the facts 
 are not authentic ; when important facts are left 
 out of the statement, or misrepresented ; or when 
 facts are taken into it, which, though true, have 
 no real relation to the subject ; — this constitutes 
 fallacy or falsehood. 
 
 II. In considering two events as connected in 
 the manner of cause and effect ; — when this rela- 
 tion is deduced from a full and extensive obser- 
 vation of the sequence being uniform, — this is 
 truth. When it is assumed upon inadequate 
 grounds, that is, from the observation of a con- 
 nexion which is only incidental or limited, — this is 
 either falsehood or hypothesis ; for the relation 
 may be assumed upon grounds which, though 
 not actually false, are yet not sufficient to estab- 
 
232 REASON. 
 
 celestial spaces, and that the power by which the 
 moon and planets are retained in their orbits, is 
 precisely similar in its effects to that which is 
 manifested in the fall of a stone ; he left the ef- 
 ficient cause of gravity as much in the dark as 
 ever, and only generalized still farther the conclu- 
 sions of his predecessors." 
 
 False investigation may be briefly referred to 
 three heads, — fallacies in facts, — false induction, 
 — and false reasoning. 
 
 I. Fallacies in Facts. A statement of facts 
 is fallacious, when any of the alleged facts are 
 not true, — when it includes facts not relating to 
 the subject, — and when important facts are omit- 
 ted. This last error is most frequently exempli- 
 fied in those cases in which facts are collected 
 on one side of a question, or in support of a par- 
 ticular doctrine. To the same class we may 
 likewise add those instances in which statements 
 are received as facts, which are not facts but opi- 
 nions. 
 
 II. False Induction includes false causation, 
 and false generalization. False causation is, when 
 two events are considered as cause and effect 
 without sufficient reason, and which are, in fact, 
 only incidentally combined : — when events are 
 considered as cause and effect which are only 
 
FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. iiSS 
 
 joint effects of a coininon cause ; and wlien, of 
 two events really connected as cause and effect, 
 we mistake the order of the sequence, consider- 
 ing that as the cause which is really the effect, 
 and that as the effect which is really the cause. 
 The error of false causation is most apt to occur 
 in those sciences in which there is peculiar dif- 
 ficulty in tracing" effects to their true causes, and 
 causes to their true effects. These, as formerly 
 mentioned, are exemplified by medicine and po- 
 litical economy. A physician, for example, as- 
 cribes the cure of a patient to a remedy which 
 he has taken, though it perhaps had no influence 
 on his recovery ; and a political declaimer refers 
 some circumstance of national distress or com- 
 mercial embarrassment to certain public mea- 
 sures, which happened to correspond in time, 
 but were in fact entirely unconnected. Palse ge- 
 neralization, again, as was lately stated, includes 
 general principles which are deduced from a li- 
 mited number of facts ; and hypotheses which 
 cannot be shown to be facts, but are entirely ficti- 
 tious and imaginary. 
 
 III. False Reasoning. This consists either, 
 — in applying to the explanation of facts, prin- 
 ciples which are unsound, — in applying sound 
 principles to facts which have no relation to them, 
 — or in deducing conclusions which do not fol- 
 low from these facts and principles. 
 
234 REASON. 
 
 Reasoning is usually divided into two parts, 
 which have been called the intuitive and the dis- 
 cursive. Intuitive reasoning-, or intuitive judg- 
 ment, is when the truth of a proposition is per- 
 ceived whenever it is announced. This applies 
 to axioms or self-evident truths, — and to first 
 truths or fundamental articles of belief, formerly 
 referred to, which rest upon the absolute convic- 
 tion of the whole mass of mankind. In discur- 
 sive reasoning, again, some of these axioms or 
 first truths are applied to particular facts, so as 
 to deduce from the connexion new conclusions. 
 Thus, when we say that " every event must have 
 an adequate cause," we state a principle of in- 
 tuitive judgment. When w^e then collect from the 
 phenomena of nature, various examples of ad- 
 aptation and design, and, applying that intuitive 
 principle to these facts, arrive at the conclu- 
 sion that the universe is the work of an intelli- 
 gent and designing first cause, — this is discur- 
 sive reasoning. The new principle or conclu- 
 sion thus deduced may be applied in a similar 
 manner to the deduction of farther conclusions, 
 and so on through what we call a chain of rea- 
 soning. Any particular piece of reasoning, then, 
 may generally be resolved into the following ele- 
 ments. 
 
 1 . Certain principles or propositions which are 
 stated either as axioms, as first truths, or as de- 
 ductions from some former process of reasoning. 
 
REASONl^Ci. ^2S5 
 
 2. Certain facts or relations of facts, derived 
 either from observation or testimony, which are 
 stated as true, and to which tlie principles are to 
 be in some manner applied. 
 
 3. Certain new conclusions deduced from the 
 application of the principles to the facts. 
 
 In examining- the validity of such a process, 
 we have not only to attend to the correctness of 
 the principles and the authenticity of the alleg-ed 
 facts, but likewise to inquire whether the facts 
 are of that class to which the principles are legi- 
 timately applicable ; for the principles may be 
 true, and the facts authentic, and yet the rea- 
 soning may be unsound, from the principles be- 
 ing applied to facts to which they have no rela- 
 tion. 
 
 This method of examining, separately, the 
 elements of an argument, appears to correspond 
 with the ancient syllogism ; and this, accord- 
 ingly, when divested of its systematic shape, is 
 the mental process which we perform, wdienever 
 we either state, or examine any piece of reason- 
 ing. If I say, for example, " the greatest kings 
 are mortal, for they are but men ;" I appear to 
 state a very simple proposition ; but it is in fact 
 a process of reasoning which involves all the ele- 
 ments of the syllogism ; namely, 
 
 1 . The general fact or proposition, that all men 
 are mortal. 
 
 '■2. The fact referable to the class of facts which 
 
 3 
 
QS6 REASON. 
 
 are included under this proposition, — that kings 
 are men. 
 
 8. The deduction from this connexion, that 
 king's are mortal. 
 
 For the validity and efficacy of such a process, 
 two things are necessary, namely, 
 
 1 . That the general proposition which forms the 
 first part of the statement, or, in logical langviage, 
 the major proposition, be absolutely and univer- 
 sally true, or true without exception in regard to 
 facts of a certain class, — and be admitted as such 
 by those to whom the reasoning is addressed. 
 
 2. That the fact referred to it, or the minor 
 proposition, be admitted or proved to be one of 
 that class of facts which are included under the 
 general proposition. 
 
 The conclusion then follows by a very simple 
 process. If either of the two former propositions 
 be deficient or untrue, the argument is false. 
 Thus, if I had varied the statement as follows, — 
 *' Angels, like other human beings, are mortal ;" 
 — there is a fallacy which, when put into the syl- 
 logistic form, is immediately apparent ; thus, 
 
 All human beings are mortal, 
 Ang-els are human beings : 
 Therefore, angels are mortal. 
 
 The general or major proposition here is true ; 
 but the minor is not one of the class of facts 
 which are included under it ; therefore the con- 
 
REASONING. 237 
 
 flusion is false. If I had said a<^ain, " Anq-els, 
 like other created beiuiis, are mortal ;" the fallacy 
 is equally apparent, though from a different source; 
 thus. 
 
 All created belnjfs are mortal, 
 Aii<:els are created bein<>s : 
 Therefore, angels are mortal. 
 
 Here the minor proposition is true, or is a fact 
 included under the first ; but the first, or major, 
 is not true, for we have no g-round to believe 
 that all created beings are mortal. On the other 
 hand, when a general fact is assumed as true of 
 a certain class of cases, we must not assume the 
 converse as true of those which are not included 
 in the class ; thus, from the proposition, that all 
 human beings are mortal, we are not entitled to 
 infer that angels, who are not human beings, are 
 immortal. AVhether this conclusion be true or 
 not, the argument is false ; because the conclusion 
 does not arise out of the premises ; — for, from 
 the admitted general fact, that human beings are 
 mortal, it does not follow, that all who are not 
 human beings are not mortal. Yet this will be 
 found a mode of fallacious reasoning of very fre- 
 quent occurrence. The rule to be kept in mind 
 foravoiding such fallacies is, — that a g-eneral truth, 
 which applies invariably to a certain class, may 
 be applied to any individual which can be shown 
 to be included in that class : — but that we are 
 
288 REASON. 
 
 not entitled to extend it to any which cannot be 
 shown to belong to the class ; — and that we are 
 not to assume the reverse to be true of those 
 which do not belong- to it. On the other hand, 
 we are not to assume a property as belonging- to 
 a class, because we have ascertained it to belong 
 to a certain number of individuals. This error 
 comes under another part of our subject, and has 
 been already alluded to under the head of false 
 generalization. The syllogism, therefore, can- 
 not properly be considered an engine for the dis- 
 covery of truth, but rather for enabling us to 
 judge of the application of, and deductions from, 
 truths previously ascertained. For, before we 
 can construct such a process as constitutes the 
 syllogism, we require to have premised that most 
 important process of investigation, by which a fact 
 is ascertained to be general in regard to all the 
 individuals of a class, — and likewise, that certain 
 individuals specified in the argument belong to 
 this class. Thus, the syllogism was nothing more 
 than that process of mind which we exercise, 
 every time when we examine the validity of an 
 argument, though we may not always put it into 
 this systematic form. And yet there may often 
 be advantage in doing so, as it enables us to ex- 
 amine the elements of the argument more dis- 
 tinctly apart. It is related of an eminent English 
 barrister, afterwards a distinguished judge, that, 
 on one occasion, he was completely puzzled by 
 
A 1»KUCESS OF REASONING. 239 
 
 an argument adduced by liis opponent in an im- 
 portant case, and tluit he did not detect the fal- 
 lacy, till he went home and put it into the form 
 of a syllog-ism. Thoug-h a syllogism, therefore, 
 may not lead to any discovery of truth, it may 
 be an important instrument in the detection of 
 sophistry, by directing- the attention distinctly 
 and separately, to the various elements which 
 compose a statement or an argument, and ena- 
 bling us to detect the part in which the sophistry 
 is involved. 
 
 In every process of reasoning there are two 
 distinct objects of attention, or circumstances to 
 be examined, before we admit the validity of the 
 argument. These are, — the premises or data 
 which the reasoner assumes, and which he ex- 
 pects us to admit as true ; — and the conclusions 
 which he proposes to found upon these premises. 
 The premises again consist of three parts, which 
 we require to examine separately and rigidly. 
 These are, 
 
 1. Certain statements which he brings forward 
 as facts, and which he expects to be admitted as 
 such. 
 
 2. Certain principles or propositions which he 
 assumes as first truths, or articles of belief uni- 
 versally admitted. 
 
 3. Certain other propositions which he refers 
 
240 REASON, 
 
 to, as deductions from former processes of inves- 
 tigation, or processes of reasoning. 
 
 If the statements referable to these three heads 
 are admitted as true, the argument proceeds, and 
 we have then only to judge of the validity or 
 correctness of his farther deductions. If they 
 are not at once admitted, the argument cannot 
 proceed till we are satisfied on these preliminary 
 points. If we do not admit his facts, we require 
 him to go back to the evidence on which they 
 rest. If we do not admit the general proposi- 
 tions which he assumes, we require the processes 
 of reasoning or investigation on which these are 
 founded. When we are at last agreed upon 
 these premises, we proceed to judge of the con- 
 clusions which he proposes to deduce from them. 
 
 The circumstances, now referred to, may be 
 considered as the essential parts of a process of 
 reasoning, in a logical view ; but there is another 
 point which we require to keep carefully in mind 
 in examining such a process, and that is, the use 
 of terms. Much of the confusion and perplex- 
 ity in reasoning consists in the ambiguity of the 
 terms ; this is referable to three heads, namely : 
 
 1. Terms of a vague and indefinite character, 
 the precise import of which has not been defined. 
 
 2. Terms employed in a sense, in some respect 
 difi'erent from their common and recognised ac- 
 ceptation. 3. Varying the import of a term, 
 
A PROCESS OF REASONING. ^41 
 
 SO as to use it in ilitierciit meaning's in different 
 parts of the same argument ; or employing- it at 
 (litFerent times, in different degrees of compre- 
 hension and extension. 
 
 In examining- the validity of a process of rea- 
 soning-, then, the mental operation which we 
 oug-ht to perform may be guided by the follow- 
 ing considerations : 
 
 1. What statements does the author propose 
 as matters of fact ; — are these authentic ; are 
 they all really bearing- upon, or connected with, 
 the subject ; do the}' comprise a full and fair 
 view of all the facts which ought to be brought 
 forward in reference to the inquiry ; or have we 
 reason to suspect that any of them have been dis- 
 guised or modified, — that important facts have 
 been omitted or kept out of view, — that the au- 
 thor has not had sufficient opportunities of ac- 
 quiring the facts which he ought to have been 
 possessed of, — or that he has been collecting 
 facts on one side of a question, or in support of 
 a particular opinion ? 
 
 Q. What propositions are assumed, either as 
 first or intuitive truths, or as deductions arising 
 out of former processes of investigation ; and 
 are we satisfied that these are all legitimate and 
 correct. — In particular, does he make any state- 
 ment in regard to two ^r more events being con- 
 nected as cause and effect ; and is this connexion 
 
 R 
 
242 REASON. 
 
 assumed on sufficient grounds : — does he assume 
 any general principle as applicable to a certain 
 class of facts ; is this principle in itself a fact, 
 and does it really apply to all the cases which he 
 means to include under it ; have we any reason 
 to believe that it has been deduced from an in- 
 sufficient number of facts, — or is it a mere ficti- 
 tious hypothesis, founded upon a principle which 
 cannot be proved to have a real existence ? 
 
 3. Do these assumed principles and facts really 
 belong to the same subject, — or, in other words, 
 do the facts belong to that class to which the prin- 
 ciples apply ? 
 
 4. Are the leading terms which he employs 
 fully and distinctly defined as to their meaning ; 
 does he employ them in their common and re- 
 cognised acceptation ; and does he uniformly use 
 them in the same sense ; or does he seem to at- 
 tach different meanings to the same term in dif- 
 ferent parts of his argument ? 
 
 5. What are the new conclusions which he 
 deduces from the whole view of the subject ; are 
 these correct and valid ; and do they really fol- 
 low from the premises laid down in the previous 
 parts of his argument ? For, on this head it is al- 
 ways to be kept in mind, that a conclusion may 
 be true, while it does not follow from the argu- 
 ment which has been brought to prove it : in 
 such a case, the argument is false. 
 
 Much of the confusion, fallacy, and sophistry 
 
A PROCESS OF REASONING. 243 
 
 uf reasoning- arises from these points not being- 
 sufficiently attended to, and distinctly and rigidly 
 investig-ated. An argnment may appear fair and 
 consecutive, but, when we rig-idly examine it, we 
 may find, that the reasoner has, in his premises, 
 contrived to introduce some statement, which is 
 not true in point of fact, or some bold general 
 position, which is not correct, or not proved ; or 
 that he has left out some fact, or some principle, 
 which ought to have been brought forward in a 
 prominent manner, as closely connected with the 
 inquiry. Hence the necessity for keeping con- 
 stantly in view the various sources of fallacy to 
 wdiich every process of reasoning is liable, and 
 for examining the elements rigidly and separate- 
 ly, before we admit the conclusion. 
 
 A process of reasoning is to be distinguished 
 from a process of investigation ; and both may 
 be illustrated in the following manner. All 
 reasoning must be founded upon facts, and the 
 ascertained relations of these facts to each other. 
 The nature of these relations has already been 
 mentioned, as referable to the various heads of 
 resemblance, cause, effect, &c. The statement of 
 an ascertained relation of two facts to each other, 
 is called a j)roposition, such as, — that A is equal 
 to B ; — that C has a close resemblance to D ; — 
 that E is the cause of F, &c. These statements, 
 l)ropositions, or ascertained relations are discover- 
 
244 REASON. 
 
 ed by processes of investig-ation. In a process of 
 reasoninsr, ao-ain, we take a certain number of 
 such propositions or ascertained relations, and 
 deduce from them certain other truths or rela- 
 tions, arising- out of the mutual connexion of 
 some of these propositions to each other. Thus, 
 if I state as propositions, ascertained by processes 
 of investig-ation, that A is equal to B, — and that 
 B is equal to C ; — I immediately decide by a 
 single step of reasoning, that A is equal to C, 
 in consequence of the mutual relation which both 
 A and C have to B. Such a process may be 
 rendered more complicated in two ways. 
 
 1 . By the number of such ascertained relations 
 which we require to bear in mind and compare 
 with each other, before we arrive at the conclu- 
 sion. Thus the relation that A is equal to E, 
 mioht rest on such a series of relations as the fol- 
 lowing ; — A is equal to B ; B is the double of C ; 
 — C is the half of D ; D is equal to E ; therefore 
 A is equal to E. 
 
 2. By propositions, which are the conclusions 
 of one or more steps in a process, becoming the 
 premises in a subsequent step. Thus, — I may 
 take as one process ; — A is equal to B, and B is 
 equal to C ; therefore A is equal to C ; — and, as 
 a distinct process, — C is equal to D, and D is 
 equal to E ; therefore C is equal to E. The 
 conclusions from these two processes I then take 
 as the premises in a third process, — thus : — it has 
 
 I 
 
A PR()(;i:SS OF REASONING. '^ l-> 
 
 been proved that A is equal to C, and that C is 
 equal to E ; therefore A is equal to E. 
 
 In examining- the validity of such processes, 
 there are two circumstances or objects of inquiry 
 which we ought to keep constantly in view. 
 (1.) Have we confidence in the accuracy of the 
 alleged facts, and ascertained relations which form 
 the premises : — Can we rely on the process of in- 
 vestigation by which it is said to have been ascer- 
 tained that A is equal to B, and that B is equal 
 to C, &c. ? ('2.) Are the various propositions in 
 the series so related as to bring out a new truth 
 or new relation ? For it is to be kept in mind, 
 tliat a series of propositions may all be true, and 
 yet lead to nothing, — such propositions, for ex- 
 ample, as that A is equal to B, — C is equal to D, 
 — E is equal to F. There is here no mutual rela- 
 tion, and no new truth arises out of the series. 
 But when I say, — A is equal to B, and B is equal 
 to C, a new truth is immediately disclosed, in 
 consequence of the relation which both A and C 
 have to B ; namely, that A is equal to C. 
 
 Inventive genius, in regard to processes of 
 reasoning, consists in finding out relations or 
 propositions which are thus capable of dis- 
 closing new truths or new relations ; and in 
 placing them in that order which is calculated 
 to show how these new relations arise out of 
 them. This is the exercise of a reflecting mind ; 
 and there may be much acquired knowledge, that 
 
246 REASON. 
 
 is, many facts accumulated by memory alone, 
 without any degree of this exercise or habit of 
 reflection. But both are required for forming- a 
 well cultivated mind; — the memory must be stored 
 with information, that is, ascertained facts, and 
 ascertained relations ; and the power of reflec- 
 tion must be habituated to discover new truths 
 or new relations, by a comjjarison of these facts 
 and ascertained relations with each other. For, 
 the discovery of new truths may consist either 
 of new facts, or of new relations among' facts 
 previously known. Thus, it mig"ht happen, that 
 we had long- been familiar with two facts, with- 
 out being aware that they had any particular 
 connexion. If we were then to ascertain, that the 
 one of these was the cause of the other, it would 
 be a real and important discovery of a new truth, 
 thoug-h it would consist only of a new relation 
 between facts which had long been known to us. 
 
 A process of reasoning, as we have seen, con- 
 sists of two parts, namely, the premises and the 
 conclusion deduced from them. If the premises 
 be admitted as true, the remaining part of the 
 process becomes comparatively simple. But it 
 often happens, that a reasoner must begin by 
 establishing his premises. This is most remark- 
 ably exemplified in what we call a chain of rea- 
 soning, consisting of numerous distinct arguments 
 or steps, so arranged that the conclusion from one 
 
A PROCKSS (H- REAS()N[N(;. '21"/ 
 
 step becomes an essential part of the premises in 
 the next ; and this may be continued through a 
 long" series. The process then becomes much 
 more complicated, and, in judging of the accu- 
 racy of the reasoning, we require to examine 
 carefully every part of it as we proceed, to g-uard 
 ag-ainst the introduction of fallacy. Without 
 this attention it may often happen, that the more 
 advanced parts of an argument may appear fair 
 and consecutive, while a fallacy has been allow- 
 ed to creep into some part of it, which, in fact, 
 vitiates the whole. In the preceding- observa- 
 tions, we have endeavoured to point out some of 
 the leading cautions to be observed in this re- 
 spect, especially in regard to the admission of 
 facts, the assumption of causation, and the deduc- 
 tion of general principles ; and also the sources 
 of fallacy to be kept in view in conducting these 
 processes. But there is another class of falla- 
 cies, which, though less immediately connected 
 with our inquiries, it may be right briefly to point 
 out in relation to this subject. These are what 
 may be called logical fallacies, or perversions of 
 reasoning". In regard to them, as well as to 
 those formerly mentioned, it is to be kept in 
 mind, that, however obvious they may appear 
 when simply stated, this is by no means the case 
 when they are skilfully involved in a long pro- 
 cess of reasoning. The fallacies of this class may 
 be chietiy referred to the following heads : 
 
248 REASON. 
 
 I. When a principle is assumed, which, in fact, 
 amounts to the thing- to be proved ; slightly dis- 
 guised, perhaps, by some variation in the terms. 
 This is commonly called Petitio Principii, or beg- 
 ging the question. When simply stated, it ap- 
 pears a fallacy not likely to be admitted ; but 
 will be found one of very frequent occurrence. 
 It is indeed remarkable to observe the facility 
 with which a dogma, when it has been boldly 
 and confidently stated, is often admitted by nu- 
 merous readers, without a single inquiry into the 
 evidence on which it is founded. 
 
 II. When a principle is assumed without 
 ])roof; when this is employed to prove some- 
 thing else ; and this is again applied, in some 
 way, in support of the first assumed principle. 
 This is called reasoning in a circle ; and the dif- 
 ficulty of detecting it is often in proportion to 
 the extent of the circle, or the number of prin- 
 ciples which are thus made to hang upon one an- 
 other. 
 
 III. A frequent source of fallacy is, when a 
 reasoner assumes a principle, and then launches 
 out into various illustrations and analogies, which 
 are artfully made to bear the appearance of 
 proofs. The cautions to be kept in mind in such 
 a case are, that the illustrations may be useful, 
 and the analogies may be of importance, provid- 
 
FALLACIES IN REASflNING. -li^J 
 
 eti the principle has been proved ; but that, if 
 it has not been proved, the illastrations miLst go 
 for nothing, and even analogies seldom have any 
 weiirht which can be considered as of the nature 
 of evidence. Fallacies of this class are most apt 
 to occur in the declamations of public speakers ; 
 and, when they are set off with all the powers of 
 eloquence, it is often difficult to detect them. 
 The questions which the hearer should propose 
 to himself in such cases, are, — does this really 
 contain any proof bearinsr upon the subject, or is 
 it mere illustration and analosy, in itself proving 
 nothins" ? — if so, has the reasoner previouslv es- 
 tablished his principle ; or has he assumed it, and 
 trusted to these analogies as his proofs ? 
 
 rV'. A fallacy somewhat analogous to the pre- 
 ceding, consists in aroruing for or against a doc- 
 trine, on the ground of its supposed tendency, 
 leaving out of view the primary question of its 
 truth. Thus, a speculator in theolosy- will con- 
 tend, in regard to a doctrine which he opposes, 
 that it is deroeatont- to the character of the Deitv ; 
 and, respecting another which he brin^rs forward, 
 that it represents the Deity in an aspect more ac- 
 cordant with the benignity of his character. The 
 previous question in all such cases, is, — not what 
 is most accordant with our notions respecting 
 the divine character, — but what is truth. 
 
250 REASON. 
 
 V. When a principle which is true of one case, 
 or one class of cases, is extended by analogy 
 to others, which differ in some important par- 
 ticulars. The caution to be observed here is, 
 to inquire strictly whether the cases are analo- 
 gous, or whether there exists any difference which 
 makes the principle not applicable. We have 
 formerly alluded to a remarkable example of this 
 fallacy, in notions relating- to the properties of 
 matter being applied to mind, without attention 
 to the fact, that the cases are so distinct as to 
 liave nothing in common. An example some- 
 what analogous is found in Mr. Hume's objec- 
 tion to miracles, that they are violations of the 
 established order of nature. The cases, we have 
 seen, are not analogous ; for miracles do not re- 
 fer to the common course of nature, but to the 
 operation of an agency altogether new and pecu- 
 liar. Arguments founded upon analogy, there- 
 fore, require to be used with the utmost cau- 
 tion, when they are employed directly for the 
 discovery or the establishment of truth. But 
 there is another purpose to which they may be 
 applied, vrith much greater freedom, — namely, for 
 repelling objections. Thus, if we find a person 
 bringing objections against a particular doctrine, 
 it is a sound and valid mode of reasoning to con- 
 tend, that he receives doctrines which rest upon 
 the same kind of evidence ; or that similar ob- 
 jections might be urged, with equal force, against 
 
 --.^,. 
 
FALLACIES IN HEASONIMJ. '2r) I 
 
 truths which it is impossible to cull in (jiiestion. 
 It is in this manner that the arG;"ument from ana- 
 log-y is employed in the valuable work of Bishop 
 Butler. He does not derive from the analog^y of 
 nature any direct arg-nment in support of natural 
 or revealed religion , but shows that many of the 
 objections, which are urg^ed aj^-ainst the truths of 
 religion, might be brought against circumstances 
 in the economy and course of nature which are 
 known and undoubted facts. 
 
 VI. A fallacy the reverse of the former is used 
 by sophistical writers ; namely, when two cases 
 are strictly analogous, they endeavour to prove 
 that they are not so, by pointing out trivial dif- 
 ferences, not calculated in any degree to weaken 
 the force of the analogy. 
 
 VII. When a true general principle is made to 
 apply, exclusively, to one fact or one class of 
 facts, while it is equally true of various others. 
 This is called, in logical language, the non-distri- 
 bution of the middle term. In an example given 
 by logical writers, one is supposed to maintain 
 that corn is necessary for life, because food is ne- 
 cessary for life, and corn is food. It is true that 
 food is necessary for life ; but this does not 
 apply to any one particular kind of food ; it 
 means only, that food of some kind or other is 
 so. When simply stated, the fallacy of such a 
 
252 REASON, 
 
 position is at once obvious, but it may be intro- 
 duced into an arg"ument in such a manner as not 
 to be so immediately detected. 
 
 VIII. AVhen an acknowledged proposition is 
 inverted, and the converse assumed to be equally 
 true. We may say, for example, that a badly 
 g-overned country must be distressed ; but we 
 are not entitled to assume that every distressed 
 country is badly governed ; for there may be 
 many other sources of national distress. I may 
 say, — " all wise men live temperately ;" but it 
 does not follow that every man who lives tempe- 
 rately is a wise man. This fallacy was former- 
 ly referred to, under the syllogism. It is, at 
 the same time, to be kept in mind, that some 
 propositions do admit of being inverted, and 
 still remain equally true. This holds most re- 
 markably of propositions which are universally 
 negative, as in an example given by writers on 
 losric. — " No ruminating- animal is a beast of 
 prey." It follows, as equally true, that no beast 
 of prey ruminates. But if I were to vary the 
 proposition by saying, " all animals which do not 
 ruminate are beasts of prey,'" this would be ob- 
 viously false, — for it does not arise out of the 
 former statement. 
 
 IX. A frequent source of fallacy, among so- 
 phistical writers, consists in boldly applying a 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. '253 
 
 character to ii class of facts, in regard to which it 
 carries a general aspect of truth, without attention 
 to important distinctions, by which the statement 
 requires to be modified. Thus, it has been ob- 
 jected to our belief of the miracles of the sacred 
 writing's, that they rest upon the evidence of tes- 
 timony, and that testimony is fallacious. Now, 
 when we speak of testimony in general, we may 
 say, with an appearance of truth, that it is fallaci- 
 ous ; but, in point of fact, testimony is to be refer- 
 red to various species ; and, though a larg-e pro- 
 portion of these maybe fallacious, there is a species 
 of testimony on which we rely with absolute con- 
 fidence ; — that is, we feel it to be as improbable 
 that this kind of testimony should deceive us, as 
 that we should be disappointed in our expecta- 
 tion of the uniformity of nature. The kind of 
 sophism now referred to seems to correspond 
 with that which logical writers have named the 
 fallacy of division. It consists in applying- to 
 facts, in their separate state, what only belongs to 
 them collectively. The converse of it is the fal- 
 lacy of composition. It consists in applying to 
 the facts collectively, what belongs only to them, 
 or to some of them, in their separate state ; — as, 
 if one were to show that a certain kind of testi- 
 mony is absolutely to be relied on, and thence 
 were to contend that testimony in general is wor- 
 thy of absolute confidence. 
 
^54 REASON. 
 
 X. A frequent fallacy consists in first overturn- 
 ing- an unsound argument, and thence reasoning- 
 against the doctrine which this argument was 
 meant to support. This is the part of a mere 
 casuist, not of a sincere inquirer after truth ; for 
 it by no means follows that a doctrine is false, 
 because unsound arguments have been adduced 
 in support of it. We have formerly alluded to 
 some remarkable examples of this fallacy, espe- 
 cially in regard to those important principles, 
 commonly called first truths ; which, we have 
 seen, admit of no processes of reasoning, and, 
 consequently, are in no degree affected by ar- 
 guments exposing the fallacy of such processes. 
 We learn from this, on the other hand, the im- 
 portance of avoiding all weak and inconclusive 
 arguments, or doubtful statements ; for, inde- 
 pendently of the opening which they give for 
 sophistical objections, it is obvious that, on other 
 grounds, the reasoning is only encumbered by 
 them. It is the part of the casuist to rest the 
 weight of his objections on such weak points, 
 leaving out of view those which he cannot con- 
 tend with. It may even happen that a conclu- 
 sion is true, though the whole reasoning may have 
 been weak, unsound, and irrelevant. The ca- 
 suist, of course, in such a case, attacks the rea- 
 soning and not the conclusion. On the other 
 hand, there may be much in an argument which 
 is true, or which may be conceded ; while the 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. i2.5.5 
 
 most important part of it is untrue, and the con- 
 clusion false. An inexperienced reasoner, in such 
 a case, thinks it necessary to combat every point, 
 and thus exposes himself to sound replies from 
 his adversary, on subjects which are of no imj)or- 
 tance. A skilful reasoner concedes or passes 
 over all such positions, and rests his attack on 
 those in which the fallacy is really involved. An 
 example illustrative of this subject is familiar to 
 those who are acquainted with the controversy 
 respecting- our idea of cause and effect. Mr. 
 Hume stated in a clear manner the doctrine, that 
 this idea is derived entirely from our experience 
 of a uniform sequence of two events ; and found- 
 ed upon this an argument against our belief in 
 a great first cause. This led to a controversy 
 respecting the original doctrine itself; and it is 
 not many years since it was contended by re- 
 spectable individuals, that it is nothing less than 
 the essence of atheism to maintain, that our no- 
 tion of cause and effect originates in the observa- 
 tion of a uniform sequence. It is now, perhaps, 
 universally admitted that this doctrine is correct, 
 — and that the sophism of Mr. Hume consisted 
 in deducing from it conclusions which it in no 
 degree warranted. This important distinction 
 we formerly alluded to, — namely, that our idea 
 of cause and effect, in regard to any two indi- 
 vidual events, is totally distinct from our in- 
 tuitive impression of causation, or our absolute 
 
256 REASON. 
 
 conviction that every event must have an ade- 
 quate cause. 
 
 XL A sophism, somewhat connected with the 
 former, consists in disproving a doctrine, and 
 on that account assuming- the opposite doctrine 
 to be true. It may be true ; but its truth does 
 not depend upon the falsehood of that which is 
 opposed to it ; yet this will be found a principle 
 of not unfrequent occurrence in unsound rea- 
 sonings. 
 
 XII. Fallacies are often introduced, in what 
 may be termed an oblique manner, or, as if upon 
 a generally admitted authority. The effect of 
 this is to take off the appearance of the statement 
 being made directly by the author, and resting- 
 upon his own authority, by which we might be 
 led to examine its truth. For this purpose it is 
 put, perhaps, in the form of a question ; or is in- 
 troduced by such expressions as the following : — 
 " it is a remarkable fact," — " it is somewhat sin- 
 gular," — " it has been argued with much justice," 
 — " it will be generally admitted," &c. 
 
 XIII. Fallacy may arise from leaving the main 
 subject of discussion, and arguing upon points 
 which have but a secondary relation to it. This 
 is one of the resources of the casuist when he 
 finds himself in the worst of the argument. 
 
FALLACIES IN REASON lN(i. ^5? 
 
 Nearly allied to this, is the art of skilfully drop- 
 ping' part of a statement, when the reasoner 
 finds he cannot support it, and g"oing- on boldly 
 with the remainder as if he still maintained the 
 whole. 
 
 XIV. Much of the fallacy and ambiguity of 
 processes of reasoning depends entirely, as for- 
 merly stated, on the use of terms. This may 
 consist in two contending parties using the same 
 word in different meanings, without defining 
 what their meanings are ; — in one or both using 
 terms in a sense different from their commonly 
 recognised acceptation ; — or in using them in one 
 sense in one part of the argument, and in another 
 in a different part of it. Such disputes, accord- 
 ingly, are often interminable ; and this mode of 
 disputation is one of the great resources of the 
 casuist, or of him who argues for victory, not for 
 truth. The remedy is, that every reasoner shall 
 be required clearly to define the terms which he 
 employs ; and that, in every controversy, certain 
 premises or preliminaries shall be fixed, in which 
 the parties are agreed. The ambiguity of terms 
 is in. fact so extensive a source of fallacy, that 
 scarcely any sophistical argument will be found 
 free from it ; as, in almost every language, the 
 same term is used with great diversity of mean- 
 ings. Let us take, for example, the term Faith. 
 It means, — a mere system of opinions, — confi- 
 
 s 
 
258 REASON. 
 
 dence in testimony, — reliance on the integrity, 
 fidelity, and stability of character of other be- 
 ings, — an act of the understanding in regard to 
 abstract truth presented to it, — and a mental 
 condition by which truths, of another description, 
 exert a uniform influence over the moral feelings, 
 the will, and the whole character. In the contro- 
 versies which have arisen out of this word, it will 
 probably be found, that these various meanings 
 have not been sufficiently distinguished from each 
 other. A celebrated passage in the Spirit of 
 Laws has been justly referred to, as a remarka- 
 ble example of the same kind of sophism. " The 
 Deity," says Montesquieu, " has his laws, — the 
 material world, its laws ; intelligences superior 
 to man, their laws ; the brutes, their laws ; man, 
 his laws." In 'this short passage, the term laws is 
 employed, probably, in four senses, remarkably 
 different. 
 
 XV. There are various other sources of fallacy, 
 consisting chiefly in the use of arguments wliich 
 cannot be admitted as relevant in regard to the 
 process of reasoning, though they may carry a 
 certain weight in reference to the individuals 
 concerned. Among these may be reckoned, ap- 
 peals to high authorities, to popular prejudices, 
 or to the passions of the multitude ; and what is 
 called the argumeiitum ad hominem. If a per- 
 son, for example, be arguing in support of a })ar- 
 
MATHEMATICAL UEAS()NIN(i. '250 
 
 ticiilar rule of conduct, we may retort u})on him, 
 that his own conduct, in certain instances, was 
 in direct opposition to it. This may be very true 
 in reg-ard to the individual, but can have no in- 
 fluence in the discussion of the question. 
 
 XVI. One of the most common sources of fal- 
 lacy consists of distorted views and partial state- 
 ments ; — such as, facts disg-uised, modified, or 
 collected on one side of a question ; — or argu- 
 ments and authorities adduced in support of par- 
 ticular opinions, leaving- out of view those which 
 tend to different conclusions. Mis-statement, in 
 one form or another, may, indeed, be considered 
 as a most fruitful source of controversy ; and, 
 amid the contests of rival disputants, the chief 
 difficulty which meets the candid inquirer after 
 truth, is to have the subject presented to his 
 mind without distortion. Hence the importance, 
 in every inquiry, of suspending our judgment, 
 — and of patiently devoting ourselves to clear the 
 subject from all imperfect views and partial state- 
 ments. Without the most anxious attention to 
 this rule, a statement may appear satisfactory, and 
 a deduction legitimate, which are in fact leading 
 us widely astray from the truth. 
 
 After every possible care in any process of 
 reasoning, we may still find, in many cases, a de- 
 gree of doubt, and even certain varieties of opi- 
 
260 
 
 REASON. 
 
 nion in regard to the import and bearing of the 
 argument. This arises partly from actual differ- 
 ences in the power of judging, or what we call, 
 in common language, vigour of mind ; and partly 
 from differences in attention, or in the habit of 
 applying the judgment closely to the elements of 
 an inquiry. Hence the varieties of opinion that 
 may be held by different individuals on the same 
 subject, and with the same facts before them ; and 
 the degree of uncertainty which attends various 
 processes of reasoning. There is one species of 
 reasoning which is free from all this kind of un- 
 certainty, namely, the mathematical ; and the 
 superiority of it depends upon the following cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 1. Nothing is taken for granted, or depends 
 upon mere authority ; and, consequently, there 
 is no room for fallacy or doubt in regard to the 
 premises on which the reasoning is founded. No 
 examination of facts is required in any degree 
 analogous to that which is necessary in physical 
 science. The mathematician, indeed, proceeds 
 upon assumptions of such a kind, that it is in his 
 own power to clear them from all ambiguity, and 
 from every thing not connected with the subject. 
 
 2. In the farther progress of a mathematical 
 argument, if we have any doubt of a proposition 
 which is assumed as the result of a former pro- 
 cess, we have only to turn to the demonstration 
 of it, and be immediately satisfied. Thus, if any 
 
f 
 
 MATHEMATICAL REASONING. ^^(il 
 
 step of a process be founded upon the principle, 
 that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two 
 rig-lit angles, or that the square of the hypoten- 
 use is equal to the sum of the squares of the two 
 sides, should we have any doubt of the truth of 
 these conclusions, the demonstration of them is be- 
 fore us. But if an argument be founded on the 
 principle, that the heavenly bodies attract one an- 
 other with a force, which is directly as their 
 quantity of matter, and inversely as the square 
 of their distance ; this great principle must be re- 
 ceived on the authority of the eminent men by 
 whom it was ascertained, — the mass of mankind 
 having neither the power nor the means of veri- 
 fying it. 
 
 3. All the terms are fully and distinctly defined, 
 and there is no room for obscurity or ambiguity 
 in regard to them. 
 
 4. The various steps in a process of mathema- 
 tical reasoning follow each other so closely and 
 consecutively, as to carry a constant conviction 
 of absolute certainty ; and, provided we are in pos- 
 session of the necessary premises, each single step 
 is short, and the result obvious. 
 
 5. The proper objects of mathematical reason- 
 ing are quantity and its relations ; and these are 
 capable of being defined and measured with a 
 precision, of which the objects of other kinds of 
 reasoning are entirely unsusceptible. It is, in- 
 deed, always to be kept in mind, that mathema- 
 
262 REASON. 
 
 tical reasoning" is only applicable to subjects which 
 can be defined and measured in this manner, and 
 that all attempts to extend it to subjects of other 
 kinds have led to the greatest absurdities. 
 
 Notwithstanding- the hig-h deg-ree of precision 
 which thus distinguishes mathematical reasoning, 
 the study of mathematics does not, as is commonly 
 supposed, necessarily lead to precision in other 
 species of reasoning, and still less to correct 
 investigation in physical science. The expla- 
 nation that is given of the fact seems to be 
 satisfactory. The mathematician argues cer- 
 tain conclusions from certain assumptions, ra- 
 ther than from actual ascertained facts ; and 
 the facts to which he may have occasion to refer 
 are so simple, and so free from all extraneous 
 matter, that their truth is obvious, or is ascer- 
 tained without difficulty. By being conversant 
 with truths of this nature, he does not learn that 
 kind of caution and severe examination, which is 
 required in physical science, — for enabling us to 
 judge whether the statements on which we pro- 
 ceed are true, and whether they include the 
 whole truth which ought to enter into the inves- 
 tigation. He thus acquires a habit of too great 
 facility in the admission of data or premises, which 
 is the part of every investigation which the phy- 
 sical inquirer scrutinizes with the most anxious 
 care, — and too great confidence in the mere force 
 
REASONING. 2G3 
 
 of reasonino', without adequate attention to the 
 previous processes of investig-ation on which all 
 reasoning- must be founded. It has been, ac- 
 cording-ly, remarked by Mr. Stewart, and other 
 accurate observers of intellectual character, that 
 mathematicians are apt to be exceeding-ly credu- 
 lous, in regard both to opinions and to matters 
 of testimony ; while, on the other hand, persons, 
 who are chiefly conversant with the uncertain 
 sciences, acquire a kind of scepticism in regard 
 to statements, which is apt to lead them into 
 the opposite error. These observations, of course, 
 apply only to what we may call a mere ma- 
 thematician, — a character which is now, proba- 
 bly, rare, since the close connexion was established 
 between the mathematical and physical sciences 
 in the philosophy of Newton. 
 
 In the various steps constituting a process of 
 reasoning, or a process of investigation, in any 
 department of knowledge, our guide is reason or 
 judgment. Its peculiar province is to give to 
 each fact or each principle, a proper place and 
 due influence in the inquiry, and to trace the 
 real and true tendency of it in the conclusion. 
 It is, of course, assisted by other mental operations, 
 as memory, conception, and abstraction, but espe- 
 cially by attention, — or a deliberate and careful 
 application of the mind to each fact and each 
 consideration which ought to have a place in the 
 
264 
 
 REASON. 
 
 inquiry. This is entirely a voluntary exercise of 
 the mind, strengthened and made easy by habit, 
 or frequent exercise, and weakened or impaired 
 by disuse or misapplication ; and there is, per- 
 haps, nothing which has a greater influence in 
 the formation of character, or in determining the 
 place which a man is to assume among his fel- 
 low-men. 
 
 This sound exercise of judgment is widely 
 distinct from the art of ingenious disputation. 
 The object of the former is to weigh, fully and 
 candidly, all the relations of things, and to give 
 to each fact its proper weight in the inquiry : 
 the aim of the latter is to seize, with rapidity, 
 particular relations, and to find facts bearing 
 upon a particular view of a subject. This habit, 
 when much exercised, tends rather to withdraw 
 the attention from the cultivation of the former. 
 Thus, it has not unfrequently happened, that an 
 ingenious pleader has made a bad judge ; and 
 that acute and powerful disputants have perplex- 
 ed themselves by their own subtleties, till they 
 have ended by doubting of every thing. The 
 same observation applies to controversial writ- 
 ing ; and hence the hesitation with which we 
 receive the arguments and statements of a keen 
 controvertist, and the necessity for hearing both 
 sides. In making use of this caution, we may 
 not accuse the reasoner of any unsound arguments 
 
REASONING. 2G6 
 
 or false statements. We only charg-e him with 
 acting- the part of an ing-cnions pleader, M^ho 
 brings forward the statements and argnments 
 calcnlated to favonr one side of a qnestion, and 
 leaves those of the opposite side ont of view. 
 The candid inquirer, like the just judg-e, consi- 
 ders both sides, and endeavours, according- to the 
 best of his judgment, to decide between them. 
 To the same principle we trace the suspicion, 
 with which we receive the statements of an au- 
 thor, who first brings forward his doctrine, and 
 then proceeds to collect facts in support of it. 
 To a similar process we may ascribe the para- 
 doxical opinions, in which sophistical writers have 
 landed themselves, often on subjects of the highest 
 importance ; and which they have continued to 
 advocate, with much appearance of an honest 
 conviction of their truth. It would be unjust to 
 suppose that these writers have always intended 
 to impose upon others ; they have very often 
 imposed upon themselves ; but they have done so 
 by their own voknitary act, in a misapplication 
 of their reasoning powers. They have directed 
 their attention, exclusively, or chiefly, to one view 
 of a subject, and have neglected to direct it, with 
 the same care, to the facts and considerations 
 which tend to support the opposite conclusions. 
 
 In regard to the sound exercise of judgment, 
 it is farther to be remarked, that it may exist 
 
'266 REASON. 
 
 without the habit of observing the various steps 
 in the mental process which is connected with it. 
 Thus we find men of that character, to which we 
 g-ive the name of strong sound sense, who form 
 just and comprehensive conclusions on a subject, 
 without being able to explain to others the chain 
 of thought by which they arrived at them ; and 
 who, when they attempt to do so, are apt to be- 
 wilder themselves, and fall into absurdities. Such 
 persons, accordingly, are adapted for situations 
 requiring both soundness of judgment and promp- 
 titude in action ; but they make a bad figure in 
 public speaking or reasoning. They are, indeed, 
 possessed of a faculty more valuable than any 
 thing that metaphysics or logic can furnish ; but 
 a due attention to these sciences might increase 
 their usefulness, by enabling them to communi- 
 cate to others the mental process which led to 
 their decisions. A person of this description, ac- 
 cording to a well known anecdote, when appoint- 
 ed to a judicial situation in one of the colonies, 
 received from an eminent judge the advice, to 
 trust to his own good sense in forming his opi- 
 nions, but never to attempt to state the grounds 
 of them. " The judgment," said he, " will pro- 
 bably be right, the argument will infallibly be 
 wrong." When this strong sound judgment, and 
 correct logical habits, are united in the same in- 
 dividual, they form the character of one who ar- 
 rives at true conclusions on any subject to which 
 
 1 
 
ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. ^iCf/ 
 
 his attention is directed, and, at the same time, 
 carries others along with him to a full conviction 
 of their truth. 
 
 We have, then, every reason to believe, that, 
 though there may be orig-inal differences in the 
 power of judgment, the chief source of the actual 
 varieties in this important function is rather to 
 be found in its culture and regulation. On this 
 subject there are various considerations of the 
 highest interest, claiming the attention of those 
 who wish to have the understanding trained to 
 the investigation of truth. These are chiefly re- 
 ferable to two heads ; namely, the manner in 
 which the judgment suffers from deficient cul- 
 ture ; and the manner in which it is distorted by 
 want of due regulation. 
 
 I. The judgment is impaired by deficient cul- 
 ture. This is exemplified in that listless and 
 inditTerent habit of the mind, in which there is 
 no exercise of correct thinking, or of a close and 
 continued application of the attention to subjects 
 of real importance. The mind is engrossed by 
 frivolities and trifles, or bewildered by the wild 
 play of the imagination ; and, in regard to opi- 
 nions on the most important subjects, it either 
 feels a total indifference, or receives them from 
 others without the exertion of thinking or exam- 
 ining for itself. The individuals, who are thus 
 
268 REASON. 
 
 affected, either become the dupes of sophistical 
 opinions imposed upon them by other men, or 
 spend their lives in frivolous and unworthy pur- 
 suits, with a total incapacity for all important in- 
 quiries. A slight degree removed from this con- 
 dition of mind is another, in which opinions 
 are formed on slight and partial examination, 
 perhaps from viewing one side of a question, or, 
 at least, without a full and candid direction of 
 the attention to all the facts which ought to be 
 taken into the inquiry. Both these conditions of 
 mind may perhaps originate partly in constitution- 
 al peculiarities or erroneous education ; but they 
 are fixed and increased by habit and indulgence, 
 until, after a certain time, they probably become 
 irremediable. They can be corrected only by a 
 diligent cultivation of the important habit, which, 
 in common language, we call sound and correct 
 thinking ; and which is of equal value, whether it 
 be applied to the formation of opinions, or to the 
 regulation of conduct. 
 
 II. The judgment is vitiated by want of due 
 regulation ; and this may be ascribed chiefly to 
 two sources, — prejudice and passion. Prejudice 
 consists in the formation of opinions before the 
 subject has been really examined. By means of 
 this, the attention is misdirected, and the judg- 
 ment biassed, in a manner of which the indivi- 
 dual is often in a great measure unconscious. 
 
ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. 269 
 
 The highest degree of it is exemplified in that 
 condition of the mind in which a man first forms 
 an opinion, which interest or inclination may have 
 suggested ; then proceeds to collect arguments 
 in support of it ; and concludes by reasoning 
 himself into the belief of what he wishes to be 
 true. It is thus that the judgment is apt to be 
 misled, in a greater or less degree, by party spi- 
 rit, and personal attachments or antipathies ; and 
 it is clear that all such influence is directly op- 
 posed to its sound and healthy exercise. The 
 same observations apply to passion, or the influ- 
 ence exerted by the moral feelings. The most 
 striking example of this is presented by that de- 
 praved condition of the mind, which distorts the 
 judgment in regard to the great principles of mo- 
 ral rectitude. " A man's understanding,'* says 
 Mr. Locke, *' seldom fails him in this part, un- 
 less his will would have it so ; if he takes a wrong 
 course, it is most commonly because he goes wil- 
 fully out of the way, or, at least chooses to be 
 bewildered ; and there are few, if any, who 
 dreadfully mistake, that are willing to be right." 
 These facts are worthy of much consideration, 
 and they appear to be equally interesting to all 
 classes of men, whatever may be the degree of 
 their mental cultivation, and whatever the sub- 
 jects are to which their attention is more parti- 
 cularly directed. There is one class of truths 
 to which they apply w^ith peculiar force, — namely, 
 
270 REASON. 
 
 those which relate to the moral g-overnment of 
 God, and the condition of man as a responsible 
 being". These great truths, and the evidence on 
 which they are founded, are addressed to our judg- 
 ment as rational beings ; they are pressed upon 
 our attention as creatures destined for another 
 state of existence ; and the sacred duty from 
 which no individual can be absolved, is a vo- 
 luntary exercise of his thinking and reasoning 
 powers, — it is solemnly, seriously, and deliberate- 
 ly to consider. On these subjects, a man may 
 frame any system for himself, and may rest in 
 that system as truth ; but the solemn inquiry is, 
 not what opinions he has formed, but in what 
 manner he has formed them. Has he approach- 
 ed the great inquiry with a sincere desire to dis- 
 cover the truth ; and has he brought to it a 
 mind, neither misled by prejudice, nor distorted 
 by the condition of its moral feelings ; — has he 
 directed his attention to all the facts and evi- 
 dences, with an intensity suited to their moment- 
 ous importance ; and has he conducted the whole 
 investigation with a deep and serious feeling, 
 that it carries with it an interest which reaches 
 into eternity ? Truth is immutable and eternal, 
 but it may elude the frivolous or prejudiced in- 
 quirer ; and, even when he thinks his conclu- 
 sions are the result of much examination, he may 
 be resting his highest concerns in delusion and 
 falsehood. 
 
ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. 271 
 
 The human iiiiiul, indeed, even in its highest 
 state of culture, has been found inadequate to the 
 attainment of the true knowledge of the Deity ; 
 but lig-ht from heaven has shone upon the scene 
 of doubt and of darkness, which will conduct the 
 humble inquirer, through every difficulty, until 
 he arrive at the full perception and commanding 
 influence of the truth ; — of truth such as human 
 intellect never could have reached, and which, to 
 every one who receives it, brings its own evi- 
 dence that it comes from God. 
 
 Finally, the sound exercise of judgment has a 
 remarkable influence in producing and maintain- 
 ing that tranquillity of mind, which results from 
 a due application of its powers, and a correct 
 estimate of the relations of things. The want 
 of this exercise leads a man to be unduly en- 
 grossed with the frivolities of life, unreasonably 
 elated by its joys, and unreasonably depressed 
 by its sorrows. A sound and well regidated 
 judgment tends to preserve from all such dis- 
 proportioned pursuits and emotions. It does so, 
 by leading us to view all present things in their 
 true relations, to estimate aright their relative 
 value, and to fix the degree of attention of which 
 they are worthy ; — it does so, in a more especial 
 manner, by leading us to compare the present 
 life, which is so rapidly passing over us, with the 
 paramount importance, and overwhelming inte- 
 rest, of the life which is to come. 
 
272 REASON. 
 
 §11. 
 
 OF THE USE OF REASON- 
 IN CORRECTING THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND 
 IN REGARD TO EXTERNAL THINGS. 
 
 This subject leads to an investigation of great 
 and extensive interest, of which I cannot hope to 
 give more than a slight and imperfect outline. 
 My anxiety is, that what is attempted may be 
 confined to authentic facts, and the most cau- 
 tious conclusions ; and that it may be of some use 
 in leading to farther inquiry. 
 
 We have seen the power which the mind pos- 
 sesses, of recalling the vivid impression of scenes, 
 or events long gone by, in that mental process 
 which we call conception. We have seen also 
 its power of taking the elements of actual scenes, 
 and forming them into new combinations, so as 
 to represent to itself scenes and events which 
 have no real existence. We have likewise ob- 
 served the remarkable manner in which persons, 
 events, or scenes, long past, perhaps forgotten, 
 are recalled into the mind by means of associa- 
 tion ; — trains of thought taking possession of the 
 
REASON. 273 
 
 mind, in a manner \^hich we often cannot ac- 
 count for, and bringing- back facts or occurrences, 
 which had long ceased to be objects of attention. 
 These remarkable processes are most apt to take 
 place, when the mind is in that passive state which 
 we call a reverie ; and they are more rarely ob- 
 served, when the attention is actively exerted upon 
 any distinct and continued subject of thought. 
 
 During the presence in the mind of such a re- 
 presentation, whether recalled by conception or 
 association, or fabricated by imagination, there is, 
 probably, for the time, a kind of belief of its real 
 and present existence. But, on the least return 
 of the attention to the affairs of life, the vision is 
 instantly dissipated ; and this is done by reason, 
 comparing the vision with the actual state of 
 things in the external world. The poet or the 
 novelist, it is probable, feels himself, for the time, 
 actually embodied in the person of his hero, and, 
 in that character, judges, talks, and acts in the 
 scene which he is depicting. This we call ima- 
 gination ; but, were the vision not to be dissipat- 
 ed on his return to the ordinary relations of life, 
 — were he then to act in a single instance in the 
 character of the being of his imagination, — this 
 would constitute insanity. 
 
 The condition of mind here referred to does 
 actually take place ; namely, a state in which the 
 visions or impressions of the mind itself are be- 
 lieved to have a real and present existence in the 
 
!^7'1 REASON. 
 
 external world, and in which reason fails to cor- 
 rect this belief by the actual relations of external 
 thing's. There are two conditions in which this 
 occurs in a striking manner, namely, Insanity and 
 Dreaming. Considered as mental phenomena, 
 they have a remarkable affinity to each other. 
 The great difference between them is, that, in in- 
 sanity, the erroneous impression being perma- 
 nent affects the conduct ; whereas in dreaming, 
 no influence on the conduct is produced, because 
 the vision is dissipated upon awaking. The dif- 
 ference, again, between the mind under the 
 influence of imagination, and in the state now 
 imder consideration is, — that in the former, the 
 vision is built up by a voluntary effort, and is va- 
 ried or dismissed at pleasure ; while in dreaming 
 and insanity, this power is suspended, and the 
 mind is left entirely under the influence of the 
 chain of thoughts which happens to be present, 
 Avithout being able either to vary or dismiss it. 
 The particular chain or series seems, in general, 
 perhaps always, to depend upon associations pre- 
 viously formed ; the various elements of which 
 bring up one another in a variety of singular 
 combinations, and in a manner which we often 
 cannot trace, or in any degree account for. The 
 facts connected with this branch of the subject 
 form one of the most interesting parts of this in- 
 vestigation. 
 
 There are some other affections, which come 
 
REASON. '11 ^y 
 
 under the same class ; but insanity and dreaming 
 are the two extreme examples. In dreaming-, 
 the bodily senses are in a g-reat measure shut up 
 from external impressions ; and the influence of 
 the will upon bodilv motions is also suspended, 
 so that no actions in general follow. We shall 
 afterwards see, that there are exceptions to this, — 
 but it is the common state in dreaming-. In in- 
 sanity, on the other hand, the bodily senses are 
 awake to impressions from without, and bodily 
 motion is under the influence of the will ; hence 
 the maniac acts, under his erroneous impressions, 
 in a manner which often makes him dangerous 
 to the community. There is an afl'ection which 
 holds an intermediate place between these two 
 extremes, and presents a variety of interesting 
 phenomena. This is Somnambulism. It diff"ers 
 from dreaming, in the senses being, to a certain 
 degree, awake to external things : though that 
 power is suspended, by which the mental impres- 
 sions are corrected by the influence of the exter- 
 nal world. Thus, the somnambulist often under- 
 stands what is said to him, and can converse w^th 
 another person in a tolerably connected manner, 
 though always with some reference to his errone- 
 ous mental impressions. He acts, also, under 
 the influence of these ; but the remarkable dif- 
 ference between him and the maniac is, that the 
 somnambulist can be roused from his vision, and 
 then the whole is dissipated. There are cases, 
 
276 REASON. 
 
 indeed, in which the hallucination is more per- 
 manent, and cannot be at once interrupted in 
 this manner : — these of course come to border 
 on insanity. 
 
 There is still a fourth condition connected 
 with this curious subject ; namely, that in which 
 a person awake, and in other respects in posses- 
 sion of his rational powers, perceives spectral il- 
 lusions. This, we shall see, is allied in a sing-u- 
 lar manner to the affections now referred to. 
 
 The subject, therefore, divides itself into four 
 parts, Avliich will form the separate topics of the 
 following" observations : — 
 
 1. Dreaming-. 
 
 2. Insanity. 
 
 3. Somnambulism. 
 
 4. Spectral Illusions. 
 
 The causes of these remarkable conditions of 
 the mental functions are entirely beyond the 
 reach of our inquiries ; but the phenomena con- 
 nected with them present a subject of most in- 
 teresting" investigation. 
 
 1.— DREAMING. 
 
 The peculiar condition of the mind in dream- 
 ing" appears to be referable to two heads. 
 
 1. The impressions which arise in the mind 
 
DREAMING. 277 
 
 are believed to have a real and present existence ; 
 and this belief is not corrected, as in the waking- 
 state, by comparing- the conception with the things 
 of the external world. 
 
 2. The ideas or images in the mind follow 
 one another according to associations over 
 which we have no control ; we cannot, as in 
 the waking state, vary the series, or stop it at 
 our will. 
 
 One of the most curious objects of investiga- 
 tion is to trace the manner in which the particu- 
 lar visions or series of imag-es arise. When con- 
 sidered in this view, a great variety may be ob- 
 served in dreams. Some of those which we are 
 able to trace most distinctly appear to be the fol- 
 lowing. 
 
 I. Recent events, and recent mental emotions, 
 mingled up into one continuous series, with each 
 other, or with old events, — by means of some 
 feeling which had been in a greater or less degree 
 allied to each of them, though in other respects 
 they were entirely unconnected. We hear, per- 
 haps, of a distressing accident ; we have received 
 some unpleasant news of an absent friend ; and 
 we have been concerned in some business which 
 gave rise to anxiety : A dream takes place, in 
 which all these are combined together ; we are 
 ourselves connected with the accident ; the ab- 
 sent friend is in our company ; and the person 
 
278 REASON. 
 
 with whom the business was transacted also ap- 
 pears in the scene. The only bond of union 
 among these occurrences was, that each of them 
 gave rise to a similar kind of emotion ; and the 
 train was probably excited by some bodily feel- 
 ing of uneasiness, perhaps an oppression at the 
 stomach, at the time when the dream occurred. 
 Without this, the particular series might not 
 have taken place at all ; or some of the ele- 
 ments of it. might have occurred in a totally dif- 
 ferent association. The absent friend might 
 have appeared in connexion with old and pleas- 
 ing recollections, combined perhaps with per- 
 sons and events associated with these, and with- 
 out any reference to the painful intelligence by 
 which the attention had been directed to him. 
 — We meet a person whom we have not seen 
 for many years, and are led to inquire after 
 old friends, and to allude to events long past. 
 Dreams follow, in which these persons appear, 
 and other persons and occurrences connected 
 with them ; but the individual, whose conver- 
 sation gave rise to the series, does not appear in 
 it, because he was not connected with the parti- 
 cular chain of events which was thus recalled in- 
 to the mind. 
 
 A woman, who was a patient in the Clinical 
 Ward of the Infirmary of Edinburgh, under the 
 care of Dr. Duncan, talked a great deal in her 
 sleep, and made numerous and very distinct al- 
 
DREAMING. ^79 
 
 lusioiis to the cases of other sick persons. These 
 allusions did not apply to any patients who were 
 in the ward at that time ; but, after some obser- 
 vation, they were found to refer correctly to the 
 cases of individuals who were there, when this 
 woman was a patient in the ward, two years be- 
 fore. 
 
 II. Trains of images broug-ht up by associa- 
 tion with bodily sensations. Examples of this 
 kind are of frequent occurrence. By the kind 
 attention of my friend Dr. James Gregory, I 
 have received a most interesting- manuscript by 
 his late eminent father, which contains a variety 
 of curious matter on this subject. In this paper, 
 Dr. Gregory mentions of himself, that, having on 
 one occasion, gone to bed with a vessel of hot 
 water at his feet, he dreamt of walking up the 
 crater of Mount Etna, and of feeling the ground 
 warm under him. He had, at an early period of 
 his life, visited Mount Vesuvius, and actually felt 
 a strong sensation of warmth in his feet, when 
 walking up the side of the crater ; but, it was 
 remarkable that the dream was not of Vesuvius, 
 but of Etna, of which he had only read Brydon's 
 description. This was probably from the latter 
 impression having been the more recent. On 
 another occasion, he dreamt of spending a winter 
 at Hudson's Bay, and of suffering much distress 
 from the intense frost. He found that he had 
 
280 REASON. 
 
 thrown off the bed-clothes in his sleep ; and, a 
 few days before, he had been reading- a very par- 
 ticular account of the state of the colonies in 
 that country during winter. Again, when suffer- 
 ing from toothache, he dreamt of undergoing the 
 operation of tooth-drawing, with the additional 
 circumstance, that the operator drew a sound 
 tooth, leaving the aching one in its place. But 
 the most striking anecdote in this interesting do- 
 cument, is one in which similar dreams were pro- 
 duced in a gentleman and his wife, at the same 
 time, and by the same cause. It happened at the 
 period when there was an alarm of French inva- 
 sion, and almost every man in Edinburgh was a 
 soldier. All things had been arranged in expec- 
 tation of the landing of an enemy ; the first no- 
 tice of which was to be given by a gun from the 
 Castle, and this was to be followed by a chain of 
 signals calculated to alarm the country in all di- 
 rections. Farther, there had been recently in 
 Edinburgh a splendid military spectacle, in which 
 five thousand men had been drawn up in Prince's 
 Street, fronting the castle. — The gentleman to 
 whom the dream occurred, and who had been a 
 most zealous volunteer, was in bed between two 
 and three o'clock in the morning, when he dreamt 
 of hearing the signal gun. He was immediately 
 at the Castle, witnessed the proceedings for dis- 
 playing the signals, and saw and heard a great 
 bustle over the town, from troops and artillery 
 
DREAMING. '281 
 
 assonibling, especially in Prince's Street. At this 
 time, he was roused by his wife, who awoke in a 
 fright, in consequence of a similar dream, con- 
 nected with nuich noise and the landing- of an 
 enemy, and conchiding- with the death of a parti- 
 cular friend of her husband's, who had served with 
 him as a volunteer during- the late war. The ori- 
 g-in of this remarkable concurrence was ascertain- 
 ed, in the morning, to be the noise produced in 
 the room above, by the fall of a pair of tongs, 
 which had been left in some very awkward posi- 
 tion, in support of a clothes-screen. — Dr. Reid re- 
 lates of himself, that the dressing, applied after a 
 blister on his head, having become ruffled so as to 
 produce considerable uneasiness, he dreamt of fall- 
 ing into the hands of savages and being scalped 
 by them. 
 
 To this part of the subject, are to be referred 
 some remarkable cases, in which, in particular 
 individuals, dreams can be produced by whisper- 
 ing into their ears when they are asleep. One 
 of the most curious, as well as authentic exam- 
 ples of this kind, has been referred to by several 
 writers : I find the particulars in the paper of 
 Dr. Gregory, and they were related to him by a 
 gentleman who witnessed them. The subject of 
 it was an officer in the expedition to Louisburg 
 in 17<58, who had this peculiarity in so remarka- 
 ble a degree, that his companions in the transport 
 were in the constant habit of amusing themselves 
 
282 REASON. 
 
 at his expense. They could produce in him any I 
 
 kind of dream, by whispering- into his ear, espe- | 
 
 cially if this was done by a friend with whose ' 
 
 voice he was familiar. At one time, they con- i 
 
 ducted him through the whole prog-ress of a 
 quarrel, which ended in a duel ; and, when the 
 parties were supposed to be met, a pistol was 
 put into his hand, which he fired, and was awa- 
 kened by the report. On another occasion, they 
 found him asleep on the top of a locker or bunker i 
 
 in the cabin, when they made him believe he had j 
 
 fallen overboard, and exhorted him to save him- 
 self by swimming-. He immediately imitated all 
 the motions of swimming. They then told him 
 that a shark was pursuing him, and entreated him 
 to dive for his life. He instantly did so, with 
 such force as to throw himself entirely from the 
 locker upon the cabin floor, by which he was 
 much bruised and awakened of course. After 
 the landing of the army at Louisburg, his friends 
 found him one day asleep in his tent, and evi- 
 dently much annoyed by the cannonading. They 
 then made him believe that he was engaged, when 
 he expressed great fear, and showed an evident 
 disposition to run away. Against this they re- 
 monstrated, but, at the same time, increased his 
 fears, by imitating the groans of the wounded 
 and the dying ; and when he asked, as he often 
 did, who was down, they named his particular 
 friends. At last they told him that the man next 
 
DREAMING. 283 
 
 himself in the line had fallen, when he instantly 
 sprung from his bed, rushed out of the tent, and 
 was roused from his danger and his dream toge- 
 ther by falling over the tent ropes. A remarka- 
 ble circumstance in this case was, that, after these 
 experiments, he had no distinct recollection of 
 his dreams, but only a confused feeling of op- 
 pression or fatigue ; and used to tell his friends 
 that he was sure they had been playing some 
 trick upon him. A case entirely similar is relat- 
 ed in Smellie's Natural History, the subject of 
 which was a medical student at the university of 
 Edinburgh. 
 
 A singular fact has often been observed in 
 dreams which are excited by a noise ; namely, 
 that the same sound awakes the person, and pro- 
 duces a dream which appears to him to occupy a 
 considerable time. The following example of 
 this has been related to me. A gentleman 
 dreamt that he had enlisted as a soldier, joined 
 his regiment, deserted, was a})prehended, carried 
 back, tried, condemned to be shot, and at last, 
 led out for execution. After all the usual pre- 
 parations, a gun was fired ; he awoke with the 
 report, and found that a noise in an adjoining 
 room had both produced the dream and awaked 
 him. The same want of the notion of time is 
 observed in dreams from other causes. Dr. 
 Gregory mentions a gentleman, who, after sleep- 
 ing in a damp place, was for a lo ng time liable to 
 
^84 REASON. 
 
 a feeling- of sutfocation whenever lie slept in a 
 lying- posture ; and this was always accompanied 
 by a dream of a skeleton which g-rasped him vio- 
 lently by the throat. He could sleep in a sitting- 
 posture without any uneasy feeling- ; and, after 
 trying- various expedients, he at last had a sen- 
 tinel placed beside him, with orders to awake 
 him whenever he sunk down. On one occasion, 
 he was attacked by the skeleton, and a severe 
 and long struggle ensued before he awoke. On 
 finding fault with his attendant for allowing him 
 to lie so long in such a state of suffering, he was 
 assured that he had not lain an instant, but had 
 been awakened the moment he began to sink. 
 The gentleman after a considerable time recover- 
 ed from the affection. A friend of mine dreamt 
 that he crossed the Atlantic, and spent a fort- 
 night in America. In embarking on his return, 
 he fell into the sea ; and, having awoke with the 
 fright, discovered that he had not been asleep 
 above ten minutes. 
 
 III. Dreams consisting of the revival of old 
 associations, respecting things which had entirely 
 passed out of the mind, and which seemed to have 
 been forgotten. It is often impossible to trace 
 the manner in which these dreams arise; and some 
 of the facts connected with them scarcely appear 
 referable to any principle with which we are at 
 present acquainted. The following example oc- 
 
1 
 
 DltEAMlKG. 285 
 
 curred to a particular friend of mine, and may be 
 relied upon in its most minute particulars. 
 
 The gentleman was at the tinie connected with 
 one of the principal banks in Glasgow, and was 
 at his place at the teller's table, where money is 
 })aid, when a person entered demanding payment 
 of a sum of six pounds. There were several 
 people waiting, who were, in turn, entitled to 
 be attended to before him, but he was extremely 
 impatient, and rather noisy ; and, being besides a 
 remarkable stammerer, he became so annoying, 
 that another gentleman requested my friend to 
 pay him his money and get rid of him. He did 
 so, accordingly, but with an expression of impa- 
 tience at being obliged to attend to him before 
 his turn, and thought no more of the transaction. 
 At the end of the year, which was eight or nine 
 months after, the books of the bank could not be 
 made to balance, the deficiency being exactly six 
 pounds. Several days and nights had been spent 
 in endeavouring to discover the error, but without 
 success ; when, at last, my friend returned home, 
 much fatigued, and went to bed. He dreamt of 
 being at his place in the bank, — and the whole 
 transaction with the stammerer, as now detailed, 
 passed before him in all its particulars. He 
 awoke under a full impression that the dream 
 was to lead him to the discovery of what he was 
 so anxiously in search of ; and, on examination, 
 soon discovered that the sum paid to this person 
 
280 REASON. 
 
 in the manner now mentioned, had been neglect- 
 ed to be inserted in the book of interests, and 
 that it exactly accounted for the error in the 
 balance. 
 
 This case, upon a little consideration, will ap- 
 pear to be exceedingly remarkable, because the im- 
 pression, recalled in this singular manner, was one 
 of which there was no consciousness at the time 
 when it occurred ; and, consequently, we can- 
 not suppose, that any association took place 
 which could have assisted in recalling it. For 
 the fact, upon which the importance of the case 
 rested, was, not his having paid the money, but 
 having neglected to insert the payment. Now of 
 this there was no impression made upon the 
 mind at the time, and we can scarcely conceive 
 on what principle it could be recalled. The de- 
 ficiency being six pounds, we may, indeed, sup- 
 pose the gentleman endeavouring to recollect, 
 whether there could have been a payment of this 
 sum made in any irregular manner, which could 
 have led to an omission, or an error ; but, in the 
 transactions of an extensive bank, in a great 
 commercial city, a payment of six pounds, at 
 the distance of eight or nine months, could have 
 made but a very faint impression ; and, upon the 
 whole, the case presents, perhaps, one of the 
 most remarkable mental phenomena connected 
 with this curious subject. The following is of 
 the same nature, though much less extraordinary. 
 
DREAMIiNG. "287 
 
 from the shortness of the interval ; and it may, 
 perhaps, be considered as a simj)lc act of me- 
 mory, though for the same reason as in the 
 former case, we cannot trace any association 
 which could have recalled the circumstance. A 
 gentleman who was appointed to an office in one 
 of the principal banks in Edinburgh, found, on 
 balancing his first day's transactions, that the 
 money under his charge was deficient by ten 
 pounds. After many fruitless attempts to disco- 
 ver the cause of the error, he went home, not a 
 little annoyed by the result of his first experi- 
 ment in banking. In the night, he dreamt that 
 he was at his place in the bank, and that a gen- 
 tleman, who was personally known to him, pre- 
 sented a draught for ten pounds. On awaking, 
 he recollected the dream, and also recollected, 
 that the gentleman who appeared in it had actu- 
 ally received ten pounds. On going to the bank, 
 he found that he had neglected to enter the pay- 
 ment, and that the gentleman's order had by 
 accident fallen among some pieces of paper, which 
 had been thrown on the floor to be swept away. 
 I have formerlv referred to some remarkable 
 cases in which languages long forgotten were 
 recovered during a state of delirium. Some- 
 thing very analogous seems to occur in dreaming, 
 of which I have received the following example 
 from an able and intelligent friend. In his 
 youth he was very fond of the Greek language. 
 
288 REASON. 
 
 and made considerable progress in it ; but after- 
 wards, being actively engaged in other pursuits, 
 he so entirely forgot it that he cannot even read 
 the words. But he has often dreamt of reading 
 Greek works which he had been accustomed to 
 use at college, and with a most vivid impression 
 of fully understanding them. 
 
 A farther and most interesting illustration of 
 the class of dreams referred to under this head, 
 is found in an anecdote lately published by the 
 distinguished author of the Waverley novels, and 
 considered by him as authentic : — " Mr. R. of 
 Bowland, a gentleman of landed property in the 
 vale of Gala, was prosecuted for a very considera- 
 ble sum, the accumulated arrears of teind (or 
 tithe) for which he was said to be indebted to a 
 noble family, the titulars (lay impropriators of 
 the tithes.) Mr. R. was strongly impressed with 
 the belief that his father had, by a form of pro- 
 cess peculiar to the law of Scotland, purchased 
 these lands from the titular, and therefore, that 
 the present prosecution was groundless. But, af- 
 ter an industrious search among his father's pa- 
 pers, an investigation of the public records, and 
 a careful inquiry among all persons who had 
 transacted law business for his father, no evi- 
 dence could be recovered to support his defence. 
 The period was now near at hand when he con- 
 ceived the loss of his lawsuit to be inevitable, and 
 he had formed his determination to ride to Edin- 
 
DREAMING. 289 
 
 bur<j;Ii next day, and make the best bargain he 
 could in the way of compromise. He went to 
 bed with this resolution, and, with all the circum- 
 stances of the case floatinu;- upon his mind, had a 
 dream to the following purpose. His father, 
 who had been many years dead, appeared to him, 
 he thought, and asked him why he was disturbed 
 in his mind. In dreams men are not surprised 
 at such apparitions. Mr. R. thought that he in- 
 formed his father of the cause of his distress, 
 adding, that the payment of a considerable sum 
 of money was the more unpleasant to him, be- 
 cause he had a strong consciousness that it was 
 not due, though he was unable to recover any 
 evidence in support of his belief. ' You are 
 right, my son,' replied the paternal shade ; ' I 
 did acquire right to these teinds, for payment of 
 which you are now prosecuted. The papers re- 
 latinor to the transaction are in the hands of Mr. 
 
 , a writer, (or attorney,) who is now retired 
 
 from professional business, and resides at Inver- 
 esk, near Edinburgh. He was a person whom I 
 employed on that occasion for a particular rea- 
 son, but who never, on any other occasion, tran- 
 sacted business on my account. It is very possi- 
 ble,' pursued the vision, * that Mr. may 
 
 liave forgotten a matter, which is now of a very 
 old date ; but you may call it to his recollection 
 by this token, that wlien I came to pay his ac- 
 count, there was difficulty in getting change for 
 
 u 
 
292 REASON. 
 
 are those instances, many of them autlientic, in 
 which a dream has given notice of an event which 
 was occurring- at the time, or occurred soon after. 
 The following- story has been long- mentioned in 
 Edinburgh, and there seems no reason to doubt 
 its authenticity. A clergyman had come to this 
 city from a short distance in the country, and 
 was sleeping- at an inn, when he dreamt of seeing 
 a fire, and one of his children in the midst of it. 
 He awoke with the impression, and instantly left 
 town on his return home. When he arrived 
 witliin sight of his house, he found it on fire, and 
 got there in time to assist in saving one of his 
 children, who, in the alarm and confusion, had 
 been left in a situation of danger. Without call- 
 ing in question the possibility of supernatural 
 communication in such cases, this striking occur- 
 rence, of which I believe there is little reason to 
 doubt the truth, may perhaps be accounted for 
 on simple and natural principles. Let us sup- 
 pose, that the gentleman had a servant who had 
 shown great carelessness in regard to fire, and 
 had often given rise in his mind to a strong ap- 
 prehension that he might set fire to the house. 
 His anxiety might be increased by being from 
 home, and the same circumstance might make the 
 servant still more careless. Let us farther sup- 
 pose, that the gentleman, before going to bed, 
 had, in addition to this anxietv, suddenly recol- 
 lected, that there was on that day, in the neigh- 
 
DREAMING. SQo 
 
 hour hood of his house, some fair or periodical 
 merry-making-, from which the servant was very 
 likely to return home in a state of intoxication. 
 It was most natural that these impressions should 
 be embodied into a dream of his house being" on 
 fire, and that the same circumstances miq-ht lead 
 to the dream being fulfilled. 
 
 A aentleman in Edinburoh was affected with 
 aneurism of the popliteal artery, for which he was 
 under the care of two eminent surg-eons, and the 
 day was fixed for the operation. About two 
 days before the time appointed for it, the wife 
 of the patient dreamt that a change had taken 
 place in the disease,. in consequence of which the 
 operation would not be required. On examining- 
 the tumour in the morning-, the g-entleman was 
 astonished to find that the pulsation had entirely 
 ceased ; and, in short, this turned out to be a spon- 
 taneous cure. To persons not professional, it 
 may be right to mention, that the cure of popli- 
 teal aneurism without an operation is a very un- 
 common occurrence, not happening in one out 
 of numerous instances, and never to be looked 
 upon as probable in any individual case. It 
 is likely, however, that the lady had heard of 
 the possibility of such a termination, and that 
 her anxiety had very naturallv embodied this into 
 a dream : the fulfilment of it at the very time 
 when the event took place is certainly a very re- 
 markable coincidence. The following anecdotes 
 
29i REASON. 
 
 also I am enabled to give as entirely authentic. — 
 A lady dreamt that an aged female relative had 
 been murdered by a black servant, and the dream 
 occurred more than once. She was then so im- 
 pressed by it, that she went to the house of the 
 lady to whom it related, and prevailed upon a 
 gentleman to watch in an adjoining room during 
 the following night. About three o'clock in the 
 morning, the gentleman, hearing footsteps on 
 the stair, left his place of concealment, and met 
 the servant carrying up a quantity of coals. Be- 
 ing questioned as to where he was going, he re- 
 plied, in a confused and hurried manner, that he 
 was going to mend his mistress' fire, — which, at 
 three o'clock in the morning, in the middle of 
 summer, was evidently impossible ; and, on far- 
 ther investigation, a strong knife was found con- 
 cealed beneath the coals. — Another lady dreamt 
 that a boy, her nephew, had been drowned along 
 with some young companions with whom he had 
 engaged to go on a sailing excursion in the Firth 
 of Forth. She sent for him in the morning, and, 
 with much difficulty, prevailed upon him to give 
 up his engagement ; — his companions went and 
 were all drowned. — A gentleman dreamt that 
 the devil carried him down to the bottom of a 
 coal pit, where he threatened to burn him, un- 
 less he would agree to give himself up to his ser- 
 vice. This he refused to do, and a warm alter- 
 cation followed. He was at last allowed to de- 
 
DREAMING. ^295 
 
 part, upon condition of sending- down an indivi- 
 dual whom the devil named, a worthless character 
 well known in the neighbourhood. A few days 
 after, this person was found drowned, and under 
 circumstances which g-ave every reason to believe 
 that his death had been voluntary. — A lady in 
 Edinburgh had sent her watch to be repaired : a 
 long- time elapsed without her being- able to re- 
 cover it, and, after many excuses, she began to 
 suspect that something- was wrong. She now 
 dreamt, that the watchmaker's boy, by whom the 
 watch was sent, had dropped it in the street, and 
 injured it in such a manner that it could not be 
 repaired. She then went to the master, and, 
 without any allusion to her dream, put the ques- 
 tion to him directly ; when he confessed that it 
 was true. 
 
 Such coincidences derive their wonderful cha- 
 racter from standing alone, and apart from those 
 numerous instances in which such dreams take 
 place without any fulfilment. An instance of a 
 very singular kind is mentioned by Mr. Joseph 
 Taylor, and is given by him as an undoubted fact. 
 A young man, who was at an academy a hun- 
 dred miles from home, dreamt that he went to 
 his father's house in the night, tried the front 
 door, but found it locked ; got in by a back-door, 
 and, finding nobody out of bed, went directly to 
 the bed-room of his })arents. He then said to 
 his mother, whom he found awake, " Mother, I 
 
f 
 
 296 REASON. 
 
 am going- a long journey, and am come to bid 
 you good bye." On this, she answered under 
 much agitation, " Oh dear son, thou art dead !'* 
 He instantly awoke, and thought no more of his 
 dream, until, a few days after, he received a letter 
 from his father, inquiring very anxiously after 
 his health, in consequence of a frightful dream 
 his mother had on the same night in which 
 the dream now mentioned occurred to him. She 
 dreamt that she heard some one attempt to open 
 the front door, then go to the back door, and at 
 last come into her bed-room. She then saw it 
 was her son, who came to the side of her bed, 
 and said, " Mother, I am going a long journey, 
 and am come to bid you good bye ;" on which 
 she exclaimed, " Oh dear son, thou art dead !" 
 But nothing unusual happened to any of the par- 
 ties ; — the singular dream must have originated 
 in some strong mental impression which had been 
 made on both the individuals about the same 
 time ; and to have traced the source of it would 
 have been a matter of great interest. 
 
 On a similar principle, we are to account for 
 some of the stories of second sight. A gentle- 
 man sitting by the fire on a stormy night, and 
 anxious about some of his domestics who are at 
 sea in a boat, drops asleep for a few seconds, 
 dreams very naturally of drowning men, and 
 starts up with an exclamation that his boat is 
 lost. If the boat returns in safet}', the vision is 
 
DREAMING. 297 
 
 no more thoiig-lit of. If it is lost, as is very likely 
 to happen, the story passes for second sig-ht ; and 
 it is, in fact, one of the anecdotes that are given 
 as the most authentic instances of it. 
 
 It is unnecessary to multij)ly examples of the 
 fulfilment of dreams on the principles which have 
 now been mentioned ; but I am induced to add 
 the following", as it is certainly of a very interest- 
 ing kind, and as I am enabled to give it as en- 
 tirely authentic in all its particulars. A most 
 respectable clergyman in a country parish of 
 Scotland, made a collection at his church for an 
 object of public benevolence, in which he felt 
 deeply interested. The amount i^f the collection, 
 which was received in ladles carried through the 
 church, fell greatly short of his expectation ; and, 
 during the evening of the day, he frequently 
 alluded to this with expressions of much disap- 
 pointment. In the following night he dreamt 
 that three one pound notes had been left in one 
 of the ladles, having been so compressed, that 
 they had stuck in the corner when the ladle was 
 emptied. He was so impressed by the vision, 
 that at an early hour in the morning he went to 
 the church ; — found the ladle which he had seen 
 in his dream, and drew from one of the corners 
 of it three one pound notes. This interesting 
 case is perhaps capable of explanation upon 
 simple principles. It appears, that on the even- 
 ing preceding the day of the collection, the 
 
298 REASON. 
 
 clerg-yman had been amusing himself by calculat- 
 ing- what sum his congregation would probably 
 contribute, and that in doing so, he had calcu- 
 lated on a certain number of families, who 
 would not give him less than a pound each. 
 Let us then suppose, that a particular ladle, 
 which he knew to have been presented to three 
 of these families, had been emptied in his pre- 
 sence, and found to contain no pound notes. 
 His first feeling would be that of disappointment ; 
 but, in afterwards thinking of the subject, and 
 connecting it with his former calculation, the 
 possibility of the ladle not having been fully 
 emptied might dart across his mind. This im- 
 pression, which perhaps he did not himself re- 
 collect, might then be embodied into the dream, 
 which, by a natural coincidence, was fulfilled. 
 
 The four classes which have now been men- 
 tioned, appear to include the principal varieties 
 of dreams ; and it is often a matter of great in- 
 terest to trace the manner in which the particu- 
 lar associations arise. Cases of dreams are in- 
 deed on record, which are not referable to any 
 of the principles which have been mentioned, and 
 which do not admit of explanation on any prin- 
 ciple which we are able to trace. Many of these 
 histories, there is every reason to believe, derive 
 their marvellous character from embellishment 
 and exaggeration ; and in some instances which 
 
DREAMING. 299 
 
 have been related to me in the most confident 
 manner, I have found this to be the case after a 
 little investigation. Others, however, do not 
 admit of this explanation, and we are compelled 
 to receive them as facts which we can in no de- 
 gree account for. Of this kind I shall only add 
 the following" example ; and I shall do so with- 
 out any attempt at explanation, and without any 
 other comment than that its accuracy may be re- 
 lied on, in all its particulars. — Two ladies, sisters, 
 had been for several days in attendance upon 
 their brother, who was ill of a common sore 
 throat, severe and protracted, but not considered 
 as attended with danger. At the same time, one 
 of them had borrowed a watch from a female 
 friend, in consequence of her own being under 
 repair ; — this watch was one to which particular 
 value was attached on account of some family 
 associations, and some anxiety was expressed 
 that it might not meet with any injury. The 
 sisters were sleeping together in a room commu- 
 nicating with that of their brother, when the 
 elder of them awoke in a state of great agitation, 
 and, having roused the other, told her that she 
 had had a frightful dream. *' I dreamt," she said, 
 " that Mary's watch stopped ; and that, when I 
 told you of the circumstance, you replied, much 
 
 worse than that has happened, for 's breath 
 
 has stopped also," — naming their brother, who 
 was ill. To quiet her agitation, the younger sister 
 
296 REASON. 
 
 am g"oiiig a long journey, and am come to bid 
 you good bye." On this, she answered under 
 much agitation, *' Oh dear son, thou art dead !'* 
 He instantly awoke, and thought no more of his 
 dream, until, a few days after, he received a letter 
 from his father, inquiring very anxiously after 
 his health, in consequence of a frightful dream 
 his mother had on the same night in which 
 the dream now mentioned occurred to him. She 
 dreamt that she heard some one attempt to open 
 the front door, then go to the back door, and at 
 last come into her bed-room. She then saw it 
 was her son, who came to the side of her bed, 
 and said, " Mother, I am going a long journey, 
 and am come to bid you good bye ;" on which 
 she exclaimed, " Oh dear son, thou art dead !" 
 But nothing unusual happened to any of the par- 
 ties ; — the singular dream must have originated 
 in some strong mental impression which had been 
 made on both the individuals about the same 
 time ; and to have traced the source of it would 
 have been a matter of great interest. 
 
 On a similar principle, we are to account for 
 some of the stories of second sight. A gentle- 
 man sitting by the fire on a stormy night, and 
 anxious about some of his domestics who are at 
 sea in a boat, drops asleep for a few seconds, 
 dreams very naturally of drowning men, and 
 starts up with an exclamation that his boat is 
 lost. If the boat returns in safetv, the vision is 
 
DREAMING. 297 
 
 no more thoiig-lit of. If it is lost, as is very likely 
 to happen, the story passes for second sight ; and 
 it is, in fact, one of the anecdotes that are given 
 as the most authentic instances of it. 
 
 It is unnecessary to multij)ly examples of the 
 fulfilment of dreams on the principles which have 
 now been mentioned ; but I am induced to add 
 the following, as it is certainly of a very interest- 
 ing kind, and as I am enabled to give it as en- 
 tirely authentic in all its particulars. A most 
 respectable clergyman in a country parish of 
 Scotland, made a collection at his church for an 
 object of public benevolence, in which he felt 
 deeply interested. The amount -of the collection, 
 which was received in ladles carried through the 
 church, fell greatly short of his expectation ; and, 
 during the evening of the day, he frequently 
 alluded to this with expressions of much disap- 
 pointment. In the following night he dreamt 
 that three one pound notes had been left in one 
 of the ladles, having been so compressed, that 
 they had stuck in the corner when the ladle was 
 emptied. He was so impressed by the vision, 
 that at an early hour in the morning he went to 
 the church ; — found the ladle which he had seen 
 in his dream, and drew from one of the corners 
 of it three one pound notes. This interesting 
 case is perhaps capable of explanation uj)on 
 simple principles. It a})pears, that on the even- 
 ing preceding the day of the collection, the 
 
302 REASON. 
 
 their sight. Mr. Bew, however, in the Manches- 
 ter Memoirs, mentions a blind gentleman who 
 dreamt of the figure, though he could not distin- 
 guish the varieties, of the human countenance ; 
 and Smellie mentions of Dr. Blacklock, who 
 lost his sight at the age of a few months, that in 
 his dreams, he had a distinct impression of a sense 
 which he did not possess when awake. He de- 
 scribed his impression by saying, that when awake 
 there were three ways by which he could distin- 
 guish persons, namely, — by hearing them speak, 
 by feeling the head and shoulders, and by attend- 
 ing to the sound and manner of their breathing. 
 In his dreams, however, he had a vivid impres- 
 sion of objects, in a manner distinct from any of 
 these modes. He imagined that he was united 
 to them, by a kind of distant contact, which was 
 effected by threads or strings passing from their 
 bodies to his own. 
 
 On a similar principle, probably, we may ex- 
 plain the fact, that dreams refer chiefly to persons 
 or events which we have actually seen, though 
 they are put into new combinations ; and that 
 we more rarely dream of objects of simple me- 
 mory, unless they have been strongly associated 
 with some object of conception. Thus we seldom 
 dream of events or characters in ancient history. 
 Dr. Beattie, indeed, mentions having dreamt of 
 crossing the Alps with Hannibal ; but such 
 dreams, I think, are very rare. It would be cu- 
 
DREAMING. 303 
 
 rioiis to observe their occurrence, and to trace 
 the train that leads to them. 
 
 It appears, then, that the mental operations 
 which take place in dreaming-, consist chiefly of 
 old conceptions and old associations, following 
 one another according to some principle of suc- 
 cession, over which we have no control. But 
 there are facts on record which show mental 
 operations, in dreams, of a much more intellec- 
 tual character. Many people have been consci- 
 ous of something like composition in dreams. 
 Dr. Gregory mentions, that thoughts, which 
 sometimes occurred to him in dreams, and even 
 the particular expressions in which tliev were 
 conveyed, appeared to him afterwards, when 
 awake, so just in point of reasoning and illustra- 
 tion, and so good in point of language, that he 
 has used them in his college lectures, and in his 
 written lucubrations. Condorcet related of him- 
 self, that, when enga^'ed in some profound and 
 obscure calculations, he was often obliged to leave 
 them in an incomplete state, and retire to rest ; 
 and that the remaining steps, and the conclusion 
 of his calculations, had more than once present- 
 ed themselves in his dreams. Dr. Franklin also 
 informed Cabanis, that the bearings and issue of 
 political events, which had puzzled him when 
 awake, were not unfrequently unfolded to him 
 in his dreams. A gentleman of Edinburgh, 
 whose name is deeply associated with the litera- 
 
304 REASON. 
 
 tiire of his country, had been one day much 
 amused by reading a very witty epigram, by Pi- 
 ron, on the French Academy. In a dream the 
 following night, he composed a parody or imita- 
 tion of it, much at the expense of a learned society 
 in Edinburgh, and some individuals of this city. 
 — A gentleman had been reading an account of 
 cruelties practised upon some Christians in Tur- 
 key by the mutilation of their noses and ears. In 
 a dream the following night, he witnessed the 
 execution of a punishment of this kind, and heard 
 a Turk, who was standing by, address the suf- 
 ferer in some doggerel rhymes, which he dis- 
 tinctly recollected and repeated in the morning. 
 Another gentleman invented a French verb in a 
 dream. He thought he was in a very close sort 
 of pent-house, with such a number of persons, 
 that they were threatened with suffocation, as 
 there appeared no way of letting in air. In this 
 state he called out, — ilfaut detoiter. There is 
 no such word, but it was evidently formed from 
 toit^ — the roof of a building. 
 
 The following anecdote has been preserved in 
 a family of rank in Scotland, the descendants of 
 a distinguished lawyer of the last age. This 
 eminent person had been consulted respecting a 
 case of great importance and much difficulty ; 
 and he had been studying it with intense anxiety 
 and attention. After several days had been oc- 
 cupied in this manner, he was observed by his 
 
 m. 
 
DREAMING. 305 
 
 wife to rise from his bed in the nig-lit, uiid g-o to 
 a writinjTi'-desk which stood in the bed-room. 
 He then sat down, and wrote a long- paper, which 
 he put carefully by in the desk, and returned to 
 bed. The followin<j[- mornins" he told his wife 
 that he had a most interesting dream ; — that he 
 had dreamt of delivering- a clear and luminous 
 opinion respecting a case which had exceedingly 
 perplexed him ; and that he would give any thing 
 to recover the train of thought which had passed 
 before him in his dream. She then directed him 
 to the writing-desk, where he found the opinion 
 clearly and fully written out, and which was af- 
 terwards found to be perfectly correct. 
 
 There can be no doubt, that many dreams take 
 place which are not remembered, as appears from 
 the fact of a person talking in his sleep, so as to 
 be distinctly understood, without remembering 
 any thing of the impression that gave rise to it. 
 It is probable, also, that the dreams which are 
 most distinctly remembered, are those which oc- 
 cur during imperfect sleep, or when the sleep be- 
 gins to be broken by an approach towards wak- 
 ing. Another very peculiar state has perhaps oc- 
 curred to most people, in which there is a dis- 
 tressing dream, and at the same time an impres- 
 sion that it probably is only a dream. This ap- 
 pears to take place in a still more imperfect state 
 of sleep, in which there is the immediate approach 
 to waking — and to the exercise of the reasoning 
 
306 REASON. 
 
 powers. But there are some very singular facts 
 on record, of this kind of reasoning being ap- 
 plied to dreams for the purpose of dissipating 
 them. Dr. Beattie mentions of himself, that, in 
 a dream, he once found himself standing in a very 
 peculiar situation on the parapet of a bridge. Re- 
 collecting, he says, that he never was given to 
 pranks of this nature, he began to fancy that it 
 might be a dream, and determined to throw him- 
 self headlong, in the belief that this would restore 
 his senses, which accordingly took place. In the 
 same manner Dr. Reid cured himself of a ten- 
 dency to frightful dreams, with Avhicli he had 
 been annoyed from his early years. He endea- 
 voured to fix strongly on his mind the impres- 
 sion, that all such dangers in dreams are but ima- 
 ginary ; and determined, whenever, in a.dream, 
 he found himself on the brink of a precipice, to 
 throw himself over, and so dissipate the vision. 
 By persevering in this method, he so removed 
 the propensity, that, for forty years, he was never 
 sensible of dreaming, though he was very atten- 
 tive in his observation on the subject. 
 
 Some persons are never conscious of dreaming ; 
 and a gentleman, mentioned by Locke, was not 
 sensible of dreaming till he had a fever at the age 
 of twenty-six or twenty-seven. 
 
 A leading peculiarity in the phenomena of 
 dreaming is the loss of power over the succes- 
 sion of our thoughts. We have seen that there 
 
DREAMING. 307 
 
 are some excoj)ti()ns to this, but the fact applies 
 to by far the greater number of dreams, and some 
 curious phenomena appear to be referable to it. 
 Of this kind are probably some of those singular 
 instances of imaginary difficulties occiu'ring in 
 dreams, on subjects on which none could be felt 
 in the waking state. It is not uncommon for a 
 clergyman to dream that he is going to preach, 
 and cannot find his text ; or for a clergyman of 
 the church of England, that he cannot find the 
 place in the prayer-book. This, I think, can only 
 be explained by supposing, that, in the chain of 
 ideas passing through the mind, the church and 
 prayer-book had come up, but had then led off 
 into some other train, and not into that of actu- 
 ally going on with the service ; while, at the same 
 time, there arose in the mind a kind of impres- 
 sion that, under these circumstances, it ought to 
 have been gone on with. 
 
 The remarkable analogy between dreaming 
 and insanity has already been referred to ; and 
 I shall only add the following illustration. Dr. 
 Gregory mentions a maniac who had been for 
 some time under his care, and entirely recovered. 
 For a week after his recovery he was harassed, 
 during his dreams, by the same rapid and tumid- 
 tuous thoughts and the same violent passions, by 
 which he had been agitated during his insanity. 
 
 The slight outline which has now been given 
 
'308 REASON. 
 
 of dreaming, may serve to show that the subject 
 is not only curious but important. It appears to 
 be worthy of careful investigation, and there is 
 much reason to believe that an extensive collec- 
 tion of authentic facts, carefully analyzed, would 
 unfold principles of very great interest in refer- 
 ence to the philosophy of the mental powers. 
 
 II — SOMNAMBULISM. 
 
 Somnambulism appears to differ from dreaming 
 chiefly in the degree in which the bodily func- 
 tions are affected. The mind is fixed in the 
 same manner as in dreaming, upon its own im- 
 pressions, as possessing a real and present exist- 
 ence in external things ; but the bodily organs 
 are more under the control of the will, so that 
 the individual acts under the influence of his er- 
 roneous conceptions, and holds conversation in 
 regard to them. He is also, to a certain degree, 
 susceptible of impressions from without through 
 his organs of sense ; not however so as to cor- 
 rect his erroneous impressions, but rather to be 
 mixed up with them. A variety of remarkable 
 phenomena arise out of these peculiarities, which 
 will be illustrated by a slight outline of this sin- 
 gular affection. 
 
 The first degree of somnambulism generally 
 shows itself by a propensity to talk during 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 309 
 
 sleep ; — the person giving* a full and connected 
 account of what passes before him in dreams, 
 and often revealing his own secrets or those of 
 his friends. Walking during sleep is the next 
 degree, and that from which the affection de- 
 rives its name. The phenomena connected with 
 this form are familiar to every one. The in- 
 dividual gets out of bed ; dresses himself ; if not 
 prevented, goes out of doors ; walks, frequently 
 over dangerous places in safety ; sometimes es- 
 capes by a window, and gets to the roof of a 
 house ; after a considerable interval, returns 
 and goes to bed ; and all that has passed con- 
 veys to his mind merely the impression of a 
 dream. A young nobleman, mentioned by Hor- 
 stius, living in the citadel of Breslau, was ob- 
 served by his brother, who occupied the same 
 room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in a cloak, 
 and escape by a window to the roof of the build- 
 ing. He there tore in pieces a magpie's nest, 
 wrapped the young birds in his cloak, returned 
 to his apartment, and went to bed. In the 
 morning, he mentioned the circumstances as 
 having occurred in a dream, and could not be 
 persuaded that there had been any thing more 
 than a dream, till he was shown the magpies in 
 his cloak. Dr. Prichard mentions a man who 
 rose in his sleep, dressed himself, saddled his 
 horse, and rode to the place of a market which he 
 "was in the habit of attending once every week : 
 
310 REASON. 
 
 and Martinet mentions a man who was accus- 
 tomed to rise in liis sleep, and pursue liis business 
 as a saddler. There are many instances on record 
 of persons composing during the state of somnam- 
 bulism ; as of boys rising in their sleep, and fin- 
 ishing their tasks which they had left incom- 
 plete. A gentleman, at one of the English uni- 
 versities, had been very intent during the day in 
 the composition of some verses which he had not 
 been able to complete : during the following 
 night he rose in his sleep, and finished his com- 
 position ; then expressed great exultation, and 
 returned to bed. 
 
 In these common cases the affection occurs 
 during ordinary sleep ; but a condition very ana- 
 logous is met with, coming on in the day-time, 
 in paroxysms, during which the person is affected 
 in the same manner as in the state of somnam- 
 bulism, particularly with an insensibility to ex- 
 ternal impressions ; — this presents some singular 
 phenomena. These attacks in some cases come 
 on without any warning ; in others, they are 
 preceded by noise or a sense of confusion in the 
 head. The individuals then become more or less 
 abstracted, and are either unconscious of anv ex- 
 ternal impression, or very confused in their no- 
 tions of external things. They are frequently 
 able to talk in an intelligible and consistent man- 
 ner, but always in reference to the impression 
 which is present in their own minds. They, in 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 'ill 
 
 some cases, repeat long* pieces of poetry, often 
 more correctly than they can do in their waking- 
 state, and not unfrequently things which they 
 could not repeat in their state of health, or of 
 which they were supposed to be entirely ignorant. 
 In other cases, they hold conversation with ima- 
 ginary beings, or relate circumstances or conver- 
 sations which occurred at remote periods, and 
 which they were supposed to have forgotten. 
 Some have been known to sing in a style far su- 
 perior to any thing they could do in their waking- 
 state ; and there are some well-authenticated in- 
 stances of persons in this condition expressing 
 themselves correctly, in languages with which 
 they were imperfectly acquainted. I had lately 
 under my care, a young lady, who is liable to an 
 affection of this kind, which comes on repeatedly 
 during the day, and continues from ten minutes 
 to an hour at a time. Without any warning, her 
 body becomes motionless, her eyes open, fixed, 
 and entirely insensible ; and she becomes totally 
 unconscious of any external impression. She has 
 been frequently seized while playing on the pi- 
 ,ano, and has continued to play over and over, a 
 part of a tune, with perfect correctness, but with- 
 out advancing beyond a certain point. On one 
 occasion, she was seized after she had beg-un to 
 play from the book a piece of music which was 
 new to her. During the paroxysm, she continu- 
 ed the part which she had played, and repeated 
 
312 REASON. 
 
 it five or six times with perfect correctness ; but, 
 on coming- out of the attack, she could not play 
 it without the book. 
 
 During- the paroxysms, the individuals are, in 
 some instances, totally insensible to any thing- 
 that is said to them ; but in others, they are ca- 
 pable of holding- conversation with another per- 
 son with a tolerable degree of consistency, though 
 they are influenced to a certain degree by their 
 mental visions, and are very confused in their 
 notions of external things. In many cases, again, 
 they are capable of g"oing on with the manual oc- 
 cupations in which they had been engaged before 
 the attack. This occurred remarkably in a watch- 
 maker's apprentice mentioned by Martinet. The 
 paroxysms in him appeared once in fourteen 
 days, and commenced with a feeling of heat ex- 
 tending from the epigastrium to the head. This 
 was followed by confusion of thought, and this 
 by complete insensibility ; his eyes were open, 
 but fixed and vacant, and he was totally insensi- 
 ble to any thing that was said to him, or to any 
 external impression. But he continued his usual 
 employment, and was always much astonished, 
 on his recovery, to find the change that had 
 taken place in his work since the commencement 
 of the paroxysm. This case afterwards passed 
 into epilepsy. 
 
 Some remarkable ])henomena are jyresented by 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 313 
 
 this sing-ular aftectioii, especially in regard to ex- 
 ercises of memory, and the manner in which old 
 associations are recalled into the mind ; — also in 
 the distinct manner in which the individuals 
 sometimes express themselves, on subjects with 
 which they had formerly shown but an imperfect 
 acquaintance. In some of the French cases of 
 e})idemic " extase," this has been magnified into 
 speaking- unknown languages, predicting future 
 events, and describing occurrences of which the 
 persons could not have possessed any knowledge. 
 These stories seem in some cases to resolve them- 
 selves merely into embellishment of what really 
 occurred, but in others there can be no doubt of 
 connivance and imposture. Some facts how- 
 ever appear to be authentic, and are sufficiently 
 remarkable. Two females mentioned by Bert- 
 rand, expressed themselves during the paroxysm 
 very distinctly in Latin. They afterwards ad- 
 mitted that they had some acquaintance with the 
 language, though it was imperfect. An ignorant 
 servant girl, mentioned by Dr. Dewar, during 
 paroxysms of this kind, showed an astonishing 
 knowledge of geography and astronomy ; and ex- 
 pressed herself, in her own language, in a manner 
 which, though often ludicrous, showed an under- 
 standing of the subject. The alternations of the 
 seasons, for example, she explained by saying, 
 that the earth was set a-p!;ee. It was afterwards 
 discovered that her notions on these subjects had 
 
314 REASON. 
 
 been derived from overhearing" a tutor giving- in- 
 structions to the young people of the family. A 
 woman who was, some time ag-o, in the Infirmary 
 of Edinburgh, on account of an affection of this 
 kind, during- the paroxysms mimicked the man- 
 ner of the physicians, and repeated correctly some 
 of their prescriptions in the Latin language. 
 
 Another very singular phenomenon, presented 
 by some instances of this affection, is what has 
 been called, rather incorrectly, a state of double 
 consciousness. It consists in the individual recol- 
 lecting, during a paroxysm, circumstances wliich 
 occurred in a former attack, though there was no 
 remembrance of them during the interval. This, 
 as well as various other phenomena connected 
 with the affection, is strikingly illustrated in a 
 case described by Dr. Dyce of Aberdeen, in the 
 Edinburgh Philosophical Transactions. The pa- 
 tient was a servant girl, and the affection began 
 with fits of somnolency, which came upon her 
 suddenly during the day, and from which she 
 could, at first, be roused by shaking, or by being 
 taken out into the open air. She soon began to 
 talk a great deal during the attacks, regarding 
 things which seemed to be passing before her as 
 a dream ; and she was not, at this time, sensible 
 of any thing that was said to her. On one occa- 
 sion, she repeated distinctly the baptismal ser- 
 vice of the church of England, and concluded 
 with an extemporary prayer. In her subsequent 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. S\5 
 
 paroxysms she began to understand what was 
 said to her, and to answer with a considerable de- 
 gree of consistency, though the answers were ge- 
 nerally to a certain degree influenced by her hal- 
 lucinations. She also became capable of follow- 
 ing her usual employments during the paroxysm ; 
 at one time she laid out the table correctly for 
 breakfast, and repeatedly dressed herself and the 
 children of the family, her eyes remaining shut 
 the whole time. The remarkable circumstance 
 was now discovered, that, during the paroxysm, 
 she had a distinct recollection of what took place 
 in former paroxysms, though she had no remem- 
 brance of it during the intervals. At one time, 
 she was taken to church while under the at- 
 tack, and there behaved with propriety, evidently 
 attending to the preacher ; and she was at one 
 time so much aff'ected as to shed tears. In the 
 interval, she had no recollection of having been 
 at church ; but, in the next paroxysm, she gave 
 a most distinct account of the sermon, and men- 
 tioned particularly the part of it by which she 
 had been so much affected. 
 
 This woman described the paroxysm as coming 
 on with a cloudiness before her eyes, and a noise 
 in the head. During the attack, her eyelids 
 were generally half-shut ; her eyes sometimes re- 
 sembled those of a person affected with amaurosis, 
 that is, with a dilated and insensible state of the 
 pupil, but sometimes they were quite naturah 
 
316 REASON. 
 
 She had a dull vacant look, but, when excited, 
 knew what was said to her, tliough she often 
 mistook the person who was speaking ; and it 
 was observed, that she seemed to discern objects 
 best which were faintly illuminated. The parox- 
 ysms generally continued about an hour, but she 
 could often be roused out of them ; she then 
 yawned and stretched herself, like a person awak- 
 ing out of sleep, and instantly knew those about 
 her. At one time, during the attack, she read 
 distinctly a portion of a book which was present- 
 ed to her ; and she often sung, both sacred and 
 common pieces, incomparably better. Dr. Dyce 
 affirms, than she could do in the waking state. 
 The affection continued to recur for about six 
 months, and ceased when a particular change 
 took place in her constitution. 
 
 Another very remarkable modification of this 
 affection is referred to by Mr. Combe, as describ- 
 ed by Major Elliot, Professor of Mathematics in 
 the United States' Military Academy at West 
 Point. The patient was a young lady of culti- 
 vated mind, and the affection began with an at- 
 tack of somnolency, which was protracted several 
 hours beyond the usual time. When she came 
 out of it, she was found to have lost every kind 
 of acquired knowledge. She immediately began 
 to apply herself to the first elements of educa- 
 tion, and was making considerable progress, 
 when, after several months, she was seized with 
 
S'OMNAMBULISM. 317 
 
 a second fit of somnolency. She was now at 
 once restored to all the knowledge which she 
 possessed before the first attack, bnt without the 
 least recollection of any thing* that had taken 
 place during" the interval. After another inter- 
 val, she had a third attack of somnolency, which 
 left her in the same state as after the first. In 
 this manner, she suffered these alternate condi- 
 tions for a period of four years, with the very 
 remarkable circumstance, — that, during- the one 
 state she retained all her original knowledge, but, 
 during the other, that only which she had ac- 
 quired since the first attack. During the healthy 
 interval, for example, she was remarkable for 
 the beauty of her penmanship, but, during the 
 paroxysm, wrote a poor awkward hand. Per- 
 sons introduced to her during the paroxAsm, 
 she recognised only in a subsequent paroxysm, 
 but not in the interval ; and pei'sons whom she 
 had seen for the first time during the healthy in- 
 terval, she did not recognise during the attack. 
 
 Of the remarkable condition of the mental fa- 
 culties exemplified in these cases, it is impossible 
 to give any explanation. Something very analo- 
 gous to it occurs in other affections, though in 
 a smaller degree. Dr. Prichard mentions a lady 
 who was liable to sudden attacks of delirium, 
 which, after continuing for various periods, went 
 off as suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly ra- 
 tional. The attack was often so sudden, that 
 
318 REASON. 
 
 it commenced while she was engaged in inter- 
 esting conversation ; and, on such occasions, 
 it happened, that, on her recovery from the state 
 of delirium, she instantly recurred to the con- 
 versation she had been engaged in at the time of 
 the attack, though she had never referred to it 
 during the continuance of the affection. To 
 such a degree was this carried, that she would 
 even complete an unfinished sentence. During 
 the subsequent paroxysm again, she would pur- 
 sue the train of ideas which had occupied her 
 mind in the former. Mr. Combe also mentions 
 a porter, who, in a state of intoxication, left a 
 parcel at a wrong house, and when sober, could 
 not recollect what he had done with it. But the 
 next time he got drunk, he recollected where he 
 had left it, and went and recovered it. 
 
 III._INSANITY. 
 
 Reason we have considered to be that exercise 
 of mind by which we compare facts with each 
 other, and mental impressions with external 
 things. By means of it we are enabled to judge 
 of the relations of facts, and of the agreement 
 between our impressions and the actual state of 
 things in the external world. We have seen 
 also that peculiar power, which is possessed by 
 the mind in a healthy state, — of arresting or 
 
INSANITY. • .319 
 
 chani'ing' the train of its thoiig"lits at pleasure, — 
 of fixing" the attention upon one, or transferring 
 it to another, — of chanainer the train into some- 
 thing- which is analogous to it, or of dismissing- it 
 altog-ether. This power is, to a greater or less 
 degree, lost in insanity ; and the result is one of 
 two conditions. Either the mind is entirely un- 
 der the influence of a single impression, with- 
 out the power of varying or dismissing it, and 
 comparing it with other impressions ; or it is left 
 at the mercy of a chain of impressions which 
 have been set in motion, and which succeed one 
 another according to some principle of connexion, 
 over which the individual has no control. In 
 both cases, the mental impression is believed to 
 have a real and present existence in the external 
 world ; and this false belief is not corrected by 
 the actual state of things as they present them- 
 selves to the senses, or by any facts or considera- 
 tions which can be communicated by other sen- 
 tient beinofs. Of the cause of this remarkable de- 
 viation from the healthy state of the mental func- 
 tions, we know nothing. We may trace its con- 
 nexion with concomitant circumstances in the 
 bodily functions, and we may investigate certain 
 effects which result from it ; but the nature of the 
 change, and the manner in which it is produced, 
 are among those points in the arrangements of 
 the Almighty Creator which entirely elude our 
 researches. 
 
320 REASON. 
 
 It appears, then, that there is a remarkable 
 analogy between the mental phenomena in in- 
 sanity and in dreaming ; and that the leading pe- 
 culiarities of both these conditions are referable 
 to two heads : 
 
 1. The impressions which arise in the mind 
 are believed to be real and present existences, 
 and this belief is not corrected by comparing the 
 conception with the actual state of things in the 
 external world. 
 
 2. The chain of ideas or images which arise, 
 follow one another according to certain associa- 
 tions, over which the individual has no control ; 
 he cannot, as in a healthy state, vary the series 
 or stop it at his will. 
 
 In the numerous forms of Insanity, we shall 
 see these characters exhibited in various desrrees ; 
 but we shall be able to trace their influence in 
 one degree or another through all the modifica- 
 tions ; and, in the higher states, or what we call 
 perfect mania, we see them exemplified in the 
 same complete manner as in dreaming. The 
 maniac fancies himself a king, possessed of bound- 
 less power, and surrounded by every form of 
 earthly splendour ; and, with all his bodily senses 
 in their perfect exercise, this hallucination is in 
 no degree corrected by the sight of his bed of 
 straw and all the horrors of his cell. 
 
 From this state of perfect mania, the malady 
 is traced through numerous gradations, to forms 
 
INSANITY. 3^1 
 
 which exhibit slig-ht deviations from the state of 
 a sound mind. But they all show, in one degree 
 or another, the same leading- characters, namely, 
 that some impression has taken possession of the 
 mind, and influences the conduct, in a manner in 
 which it would not affect a sound understand- 
 ing ; — and that this is not corrected by facts and 
 considerations which are calculated immediately 
 to remove the erroneous impression. The lower 
 degrees of this condition we call eccentricity ; 
 and, in common language, we often talk of a 
 man being crazed upon a particular subject. 
 This consists in giving to an impression or a 
 fancy, undue and extravagant importance, with- 
 out taking into account other facts and consi- 
 derations which ought to be viewed in connexion 
 with it. The man of this character acts with 
 promptitude upon a single idea, and seems to per- 
 ceive nothing that interferes with it ; — he forms 
 plans, and sees only important advantages which 
 would arise from the accomplishment of them, 
 without perceiving difficulties or objections. The 
 impression itself may be correct, but an import- 
 ance is attached to it disproportioned to its true 
 tendency ; or consequences are deduced from, 
 and actions founded upon it, which would not be 
 warranted in the estimate of a sound understand- 
 ing. It is often difficult to draw the line be- 
 tween certain degrees of this condition and in- 
 sanity ; and, in fact, they very often pass into each 
 
 Y 
 
322 REASON. 
 
 other. This will be illustrated by the following- 
 example. 
 
 A clerg-yman in Scotland, after showing va- 
 rious extravagances of conduct, was brought be- 
 fore a jury to be cognosced ; that is, by a form 
 of Scotch law, to be declared incapable of ma- 
 naging his own affairs, and placed under the care 
 of trustees. Among' the acts of extravagance al- 
 leged against him was, that he had burnt his 
 library. When he was asked by the jury what 
 account he coidd give of this part of his conduct, 
 he replied in the following terms : — " In the 
 early part of my life I had imbibed a liking for 
 a most unprofitable study, namely, controversial 
 divinity. On reviewing my library, I found a 
 great part of it to consist of books of this de- 
 scription, and I was so anxious that my family 
 should not be led to follow the same pursuit, 
 that I determined to burn the whole." He gave 
 answers equally plausible to questions which were 
 put to him, respecting other parts of his conduct ; 
 and the result was, that the jury found no suffi- 
 cient ground for cognoscing him ; but, in the 
 course of a fortnight from that time, he was in a 
 state of decided mania. 
 
 It is, therefore, incorrect to say of insanity, as 
 has been said, that the maniac reasons correctly 
 upon unsound data. His data may be unsound, 
 that is, they may consist of a mental image which 
 is purely visionary, as in the state of perfect ma- 
 
INSANITY. 323 
 
 Ilia lately retorred to ; but this is by no means 
 necessary to constitnte the disease ; for his pre- 
 mises may be sound, thoug-h he distorts them in 
 the results which he deduces from them. This 
 was remarkably the case in the clergyman now 
 mentioned. His premises were sound and con- 
 sistent, namely, his opinion of the unprofitable 
 nature of the study of controversial divinity, and 
 his anxiety that his family should not prosecute 
 it. His insanity consisted in the rapid and par- 
 tial view which he took of the means for ac- 
 complishing- his purpose, — burning his whole li- 
 brary. Had he sold his library, or that part of 
 it which consisted of controversial divinity, the 
 measure would have been in correct relation to 
 the object which he had in view ; and if we sup- 
 pose that, in going over his library, he had met 
 with some books of an immoral tendency, — to 
 have burnt these, to prevent them from falling 
 into the hands of any individual, would have been 
 the act both of a wise and a virtuous man. But 
 to burn his whole library, to prevent his family 
 from studying controversial divinity, was the sug- 
 gestion of insanity, — distorting entirely the true 
 relation of things, and carrying an impression, in 
 itself correct, into consequences which it in no 
 degree warranted. 
 
 A remarkable peculiarity, in many cases of in- 
 
S24 REASON. 
 
 sanity, is a great activity of mind, and rapidity 
 of conception, — a tendency to seize rapidly upon 
 incidental or partial relations of thing-s, — and of- 
 ten a fertility of imagination, which changes the 
 character of the mind, sometimes without remark- 
 ably distorting it. The memory, in such cases, 
 is entire, and even appears more ready than in 
 health ; and old associations are called up with a 
 rapidity quite unknown to the individual in his 
 sound state of mind. A gentleman, mentioned 
 by Dr. Willis, who was liable to periodical at- 
 tacks of insanity, said that he expected the pa- 
 roxysms with impatience, because he enjoyed 
 during them a high degree of pleasure. *' Every 
 thing appeared easy to me. No obstacles pre- 
 sented themselves, either in theory or practice. 
 My memory acquired, all of a sudden, a singular 
 degree of perfection. Long passages of Latin 
 authors occurred to my mind. In general I have 
 great difficulty in finding rhythmical termina- 
 tions, but then I could write verses with as 
 great facility as prose." " I have often," says 
 Pinel, "stopt at the chamber door of a literary 
 gentleman, who, during his paroxysms, appears 
 to soar above the mediocrity of intellect that was 
 familiar to him, solely to admire his newly ac- 
 quired powers of eloquence. He declaimed upon 
 the subject of the revolution with all the force, 
 the dignity, and the purity of language that this 
 
INSANITY. -32.5 
 
 very interesting^ subject could iidiuit of. At 
 <»tlier times he was a man of very ordinary 
 abilities." 
 
 It is this activity of thoug-ht, and readiness of 
 association, that gives to maniacs of a particular 
 class an appearance of g-reat ingenuity and acute- 
 ness. Hence they have been said to reason 
 acutely upon false premises ; and one author has 
 even alleged, that a maniac of a particular kind 
 would make an excellent logician. But to say 
 that a maniac reasons either soundly or acutely, 
 is an abuse of terms. He reasons plausibly and 
 ingeniously ; that is, he catches rapidly inci- 
 dental and partial relations ; and, from the ra- 
 pidity with which they are seized upon, it may 
 sometimes be difficult at first to detect their fal- 
 lacy. He might have made a skilful logician of 
 the schools, whose ingenuity consisted in verbal 
 disputes, and frivolous distinctions ; but he never 
 can be considered as exercising that sound logic, 
 the aim of which is to trace the real relations of 
 things, and the object of which is truth. 
 
 The peculiar character of insanity, in all its mo- 
 difications, appears to be, that a certain impres- 
 sion has fixed itself upon the mind, in such a man- 
 ner as to exclude all others ; or to exclude them 
 from that influence which they ought to have on 
 the mind in its estimate of the relations of things. 
 This impression may be entirely visionary and 
 
3^6 HE A SON. I 
 
 unfounded ; or it may be in itself true, but <lis- 
 torted in the applications which the unsound mind 
 makes of it, and the consequences which are de- 
 duced from it. Thus, a man of wealth fancies 
 himself a beggar, and in danger of dying of hun- ' 
 
 ger. Another takes up the same impression, who i 
 
 has, in fact, sustained some considerable loss. In I 
 
 the one, the impression is entirely visionary, like j 
 
 that which might occur in a dream. In the other, ! 
 
 it is a real and true impression, carried to conse- 
 quences which it does not warrant. 
 
 There is great variety in the degree to which 
 the mind is influenced by the erroneous impres- 
 sion. In some cases, it is such as entirely ex- 
 cludes all others, even those immediately arising 
 from the evidence of the senses, as in the state 
 of perfect mania formerly referred to. In many 
 others, though in a less degree than this, it is 
 such as to change the whole character. The par- 
 ticular manner, in which this more immediately 
 appears, will depend of course upon the nature 
 of the erroneous impression. A person, formerly 
 most correct in his conduct and habits, may be- 
 come obscene and blasphemous ; accustomed oc- 
 cupations become odious to him ; the nearest and 
 most beloved friends become objects of his aver- 
 sion and abhorrence. Much interesting matter 
 of observation often arises out of these peculiari- 
 ties ; and it is no less interesting to observe, dur- 
 ing convalescence, the gradual return to fc^rmer 
 
INSANITY. 327 
 
 habits and attachnients. A young lady, men- 
 tioned by Dr. Rush, who had been for some 
 time confined in a huiatic asyhun, had shown, 
 for several weeks, every mark of a sound mind, 
 except one, — she hated her father. At leng-th, 
 she one day acknowledged, with pleasure, the 
 return of her filial attachment, and was soon 
 after discharged, entirely recovered. Even when 
 the erroneous impression is confined to a single 
 subject, it is remarkable how it absorbs the at- 
 tention, to the exclusion of other feelings of a 
 most intense and powerful kind. I knew a per- 
 son of wealth, who had fallen into a temporary 
 state of melancholic hallucination, in connexion 
 Avith a transaction in business which he regretted 
 having made, but of which the real effect was of 
 a trifling nature. While in this situation, the 
 most severe distress occurred in his family, by 
 the death of one of them under painful circum- 
 stances, without his being affected by it in the 
 slightest degree. 
 
 The uniformity of the impressions of maniacs 
 is indeed so remarkable, that it has been proposed 
 by Pinel, as a test for distinguishing real from 
 feigned insanity. He has seen melancholies con- 
 fined in the Bicetre, for twelve, fifteen, twenty, 
 and even thirty years ; and, through the whole of 
 that period, their hallucination has been limited 
 to one subject. Others, after a course of years, 
 have changed from one hallucination to another. 
 
328 REASON. 
 
 A man, mentioned by him, was for eight years 
 constantly haunted with the idea of being poison- f 
 
 ed : he then changed his hallucination, became . \ 
 
 sovereign of the world and extremely happy, , 
 
 and thus continued for four years. 
 
 The sudden revival of old impressions, after 
 having been long entirely suspended by mental 
 hallucinations, presents some of the most singular 
 phenomena connected with this subject. Dr. 
 Prichard mentions an interesting case of this kind 
 from the American journal of science. A man 
 had been employed for a day with a beetle and 
 wedges in splitting pieces of wood for erecting a 
 fence. At night, before going home, he put the 
 beetle and wedges into the hollow of an old tree, 
 and directed his sons, who had been at work in 
 an adjoining field, to accompany him next morn- 
 ing to assist in making the fence. In the night 
 he became maniacal, and continued in a state of 
 insanity for several years, during which time his 
 mind was not occupied with any of the subjects 
 with which he had been conversant when in 
 health. After several years his reason returned 
 suddenly, and the first question he asked was, 
 whether his sons had brought home the beetle 
 and wedges. They, being afraid of entering 
 upon any explanation, only said, that they could 
 not find them ; on which he rose from his bed, 
 went to the field where he had been at work so 
 many years before, and found, where he had left 
 
INSANITY. 3'29 
 
 them, the wedges, and the iron rings of the beetle, 
 the wooden part being entirely monldered away. 
 — A lady, mentioned in the same journal, had 
 been intensely engaged for some time, in a piece 
 of needle-work. Before she had completed it, 
 she became insane, and continued in that state 
 for seven years, after which her reason returned 
 suddenly. One of the first questions she asked 
 related to her needle-work, though she had never 
 alluded to it, so far as was recollected, during 
 her illness. I have formerly alluded to the re- 
 markable case of a lady, who was liable to perio- 
 dical paroxysms of delirium, which often attacked 
 her so suddenly, that, in conversation, she would 
 stop in the middle of a story, or even of a sen- 
 tence, and branch off into the subject of her hallu- 
 cination. On the return of her reason, she would 
 resume the conversation in which she was en- 
 gaged at the time of the attack, beginning ex- 
 actly where she had left off, though she had never 
 alluded to it during the delirium ; and, on the 
 next attack of delirium, she would resume the 
 subject of hallucination, with which she had been 
 occupied at the conclusion of the former paroxysm. 
 In some cases there is a total loss of the impres- 
 sion of time respecting the period occupied by 
 the attack, which on the partial recovery of the 
 patient shows itself by singular fancies. A man 
 mentioned by Haslam, maintained that he had 
 seen the seed sown in a particular field, and on 
 
330 REASON. 
 
 passing- it ag-ain three or four days after, saw the 
 reapers at work cutting down the corn. The in- 
 terval, of which he had thus lost entirely the im- 
 pression, had been spent in a state of furious in- 
 sanity ; — from this he had in so far recovered, as, 
 by a mere act of observation and memory, to 
 form this notion, but not so far as, by an act of 
 comparison or judg-raent, to perceive its absurdity. 
 Among the most singular phenomena connect- 
 ed with insanity, we must reckon those cases in 
 which the hallucination is confined to a single 
 point, while, on every other subject, the patient 
 speaks and acts like a rational man ; and he often 
 shows the most astonishing power of avoiding the 
 subject of his disordered impression, when cir- 
 cumstances make it advisable for him to do so. 
 A man mentioned by Pinel, who had been for 
 some time confined in the Bicetre, was, on the 
 visitation of a commissary, ordered to be dis- 
 charged as perfectly sane, after a long conversa- 
 tion in which he had conducted himself with the 
 greatest propriety. The officer prepared the pro- 
 ces verbal for his discharge, and gave it him 
 to put his name to it, when he subscribed himself 
 Jesus Christ, and then indulged in all the reveries 
 connected with that delusion. Lord Erskine 
 gives a very remarkable history of a man, who 
 indicted Dr. Munro for confining him without 
 cause in a mad-house. He underwent the most 
 rigid examination by the counsel of the defend- 
 
INSANITY. 3^31 
 
 uiit, without discovering' any a})})earance of in- 
 sanity, until a g-entleman came into court, who 
 desired a question to be put to him respecting- a 
 princess with whom he had corresponded in cherry 
 juice. He immediately talked about the princess 
 in the most insane manner, and the cause was 
 at an end. But this having' taken place in West- 
 minster, he commenced another action in the city 
 of London, and on this occasion, no effort could 
 induce him to expose his insanity ; so that the 
 cause was dismissed only by bringing- against him 
 the evidence taken at Westminster. On another 
 occasion. Lord Erskine examined a gentleman, 
 who had indicted his brother for confining him as 
 a maniac, and the examination had gone on for 
 great part of a day without discovering any 
 trace of insanity. Dr. Sims then came into court, 
 and informed the counsel, that the gentleman 
 considered himself as the Saviour of the world. 
 A single observation addressed to him in this cha- 
 racter showed his insanity, and put an end to 
 the cause. Many similar cases are on record. 
 Several years ago a gentleman in Edinburgh, 
 who was brought before a jury to be cognosced, 
 defeated every attempt of the opposite counsel to 
 discover any trace of insanity, until a gentleman 
 came into court, who ought to have been present 
 at the beginning of the case, but had been acci- 
 dentally detained. He immediately addressed 
 the patient by asking him what were his latest 
 
382 REASON. 
 
 accounts from the planet Saturn, and speedily 
 elicited ample proofs of insanity. 
 
 Of the nature and cause of that remarkable 
 condition of the mental faculties which gives rise 
 to the phenomena of insanity, we know nothing-. 
 We can only observe the facts, and endeavour 
 to trace among- them some general principle of 
 connexion ; and even in this, there is great diffi- 
 culty, chiefly from the want of observations par- 
 ticularly directed to this object. There would 
 be much interesting subject of inquiry, in tracing 
 the origin of the particular chain of ideas which 
 arise in individual cases of insanity ; and like- 
 wise the manner in which similar impressions 
 are modified in different cases, either by circum- 
 stances in the natural disposition of the indivi- 
 dual, or by the state of his bodily functions at 
 the time. From what has been observed, it seems 
 probable that, in both these respects, there is pre- 
 served a remarkable analogy to dreaming. The 
 particular hallucinations may be chiefly referred 
 to the following heads : — 
 
 I. Propensities of character, which had been 
 kept under restraint by reason or by external cir- 
 cumstances, or old habits, which liad been sub- 
 dued or restrained, developing themselves with- 
 out control, and leading the mind into trains of 
 fancies arising out of them. Thus a man of an 
 
 5 
 
INSANITY. iiS^i 
 
 aspiring- ambitious character may imagine him- 
 self a king- or g-reat personage ; while, in a man of 
 a timid, suspicious disposition, the mind may fix 
 upon some su])posed injury, or loss either of pro- 
 perty or reputation. 
 
 II. Old associations recalled into the mind, 
 and mixed up perhaps with more recent occur- 
 rences, in the same manner as we often see in 
 dreaming. A lady, mentioned by Dr. Gooch, 
 who became insane in consequence of an alarm 
 from a house on fire in her neighbourhood, ima- 
 gined that she was the Virgin Mary, and had a 
 luminous halo round her head. 
 
 III. Visions of the imao-ination which have 
 formerly been indulged in, of that kind which we 
 call waking dreams, or castle-building, recurring 
 to the mind in this condition, and now believed 
 to have a real existence. I have been able to 
 trace this source of the hallucination. In one 
 case, for example, it turned upon an ofiice to 
 which the individual imagined he had been ap- 
 pointed ; and it was impossible to persuade him 
 to the contrary, or even that the office was not 
 vacant. He afterwards acknowledged that his 
 fancy had at various times been fixed upon that 
 appointment, though there were no circumstances 
 that warranted him in entertaining any expecta- 
 tion of it. In a man mentioned bv Dr. Morison, 
 
334 REASON. 
 
 the haliiiciiiatiou turned upon circumstances 
 which had been mentioned when his fortune was 
 told by a gipsy. 
 
 IV. Bodily feelings giving rise to trains of as- 
 sociations, in the same extravagant manner as in 
 dreaming. A man mentioned by Dr. Rush, im- 
 agined that he had a CaflFre in his stomach, who 
 had got into it at the Cape of Good Hope, and 
 had occasioned him a constant uneasiness ever 
 since. In such a case, it is probable, that there 
 had been some fixed or frequent uneasy feeling 
 at the stomach, and that, about the commence- 
 ment of his complaint, he had been strongly im- 
 pressed by some transaction in Avhich a Caffre 
 was concerned. 
 
 V. There seems reason to believe that the 
 hallucinations of the insane are often influenced 
 by a certain sense of the new and singular state 
 in which their mental powers really are, and a 
 certain feeling, though confused and ill-defined, 
 of the loss of that power over their mental pro- 
 cesses, which they possessed when in health. 
 To a feeling of this kind, I am disposed to refer 
 the impression, so common among the insane, of 
 being under the influence of some supernatural 
 power. They sometimes represent it as the 
 working of an evil spirit, and sometimes as witch- 
 craft. Very often they describe it as a mysteri- 
 
IN8AMTY. 335 
 
 ous and uiuliie influence which some indivlchiul 
 has obtained over them ; and this influence thev 
 often represent as being- carried on by means of 
 electricity, galvanism, or mag-netism. This im- 
 pression being- once established of a mysterious 
 agency, or a mysterious change in the state and 
 feelings of the individual, various other inciden- 
 tal associations may be brought into connexion 
 with it, according as particular circumstances 
 have made a deep impression on the mind. A 
 man mentioned by Pinel, who had become in- 
 sane during the French revolution, imagined that 
 he had been guillotined, — that the judges had 
 changed their mind after the sentence was exe- 
 cuted, and had ordered his head to be put on 
 again ; and that the persons entrusted with this 
 duty had made a mistake, and put a wrong head 
 upon him. Another individual mentioned by 
 Dr. Conolly imagined that he had been hanged, 
 and brought to life by means of galvanism ; and 
 that the whole of his life had not been restored 
 to him. 
 
 Out of the same undefined feeling, of mental 
 processes very diff"erent from those of their 
 healthy state, probably arises another common 
 impression, namely, of intercourse with spiritual 
 beings, visions and revelations. The particular 
 character of these, perhaps, arises out of some 
 previous process of the mind, or strong propensi- 
 ty of the character ; and the notion of a superna- 
 
336 REASON. 
 
 tural revelation may proceed from a certain feel- 
 ing of the new and peculiar manner in which 
 the impression is fixed upon the mind. A priest 
 mentioned by Pinel imagined that he had a com- 
 mission from the Virgin Mary, to murder a cer- 
 tain individual, who was accused of infidelity. 
 It is probable that the patient, in this case, had 
 been naturally of a violent and irascible disposi- 
 tion ; that he had come in contact with this per- 
 son, and had been annoyed and irritated by infi- 
 del sentiments uttered by him ; and that a strong 
 feeling in regard to him had thus been excited 
 in his mind, which, in his insane state, was form- 
 ed into this vision. 
 
 When the mental impression is of a depressing 
 character, that modification of the disease is pro- 
 duced which is called melancholia. It seems to 
 differ from mania merely in the subject of hallu- 
 cination, and accordingly we find the two modi- 
 fications pass into each other, — the same patient 
 being, at one time, in a state of melancholic de- 
 pression, and at another, of maniacal excitement. 
 It is, however, more common for the melancho- 
 lic to continue in the state of depression, and ge- 
 nerally in reference to one subject ; and the dif- 
 ference between him and the exalted maniac 
 does not appear to depend upon the occasional 
 cause. For we sometimes find persons who 
 have become deranged, in connexion with over- 
 
 ■fl 
 
INSANITY. 337 
 
 Avlieliuing- caliiinities, sliow no depression, nor 
 even a recollection of tlieir distresses, but the 
 hig-liest state of CKalted mania. Tlie difference 
 appears to depend chiefly upon constitutional pe- 
 culiarities of character. 
 
 The most striking- peculiarity of melancholia is 
 the prevailing- propensity to suicide ; and there 
 are facts connected Avith this subject, which re- 
 markably illustrate what may be called the philo- 
 sophy of insanity. When the melancholic hal- 
 lucination has fully taken possession of the mind, it 
 becomes the sole object of attention, — without the 
 power of varying- the impression, or of directing 
 the thoughts to any facts or considerations calcu- 
 lated to remove or palliate it. The evil seems 
 overwhelming- and irremediable, admittinjr nei- 
 ther of palliation, consolation, nor hope. For the 
 process of mind calculated to diminish such an 
 impression, or even to produce the hope of a pallia- 
 tion of the evil, is precisely that exercise of mind 
 which, in this singular condition, is lost or sus- 
 pended ; — namely, a power of changing the sub- 
 ject of thought, of transferring the attention to 
 other facts and considerations, and of comparing 
 the mental impression with these, and with the 
 actual state of external things. Under such a con- 
 viction of overwhelming and hopeless misery, 
 the feeling naturally arises of life being a bur- 
 den, and this is succeeded by a determination to 
 quit it. When such an association has once been 
 
33S 
 
 REASON. 
 
 formed, it also fixes itself upon the mind, and 
 fails to be corrected by those considerations 
 which ought to remove it. That it is in this 
 manner the impression arises, and not from any 
 process analogous to the determination of a 
 sound mind, appears, among other circumstances, 
 from the singular manner in which it is often dis- 
 sipated ; namely, by the accidental production of 
 some new impression, not calculated, in any de- 
 gree, to influence the subject of thought, but 
 simply to give a momentary direction of the 
 mind to some other feeling. Thus, a man men- 
 tioned by Pinel, had left his house in the night, 
 with the determined resolution of drowning him- 
 self, when he was attacked by robbers. He did 
 his best to escape from them, and, having done 
 so, returned home, the resolution of suicide be- 
 ing entirely dissipated. A woman, mentioned, I 
 believe, by Dr. Burrows, had her resolution 
 changed in the same manner, by something fall- 
 ing on her head, after she had gone out for a 
 similar purpose. 
 
 A very singular modification occurs in some 
 of these cases. With the earnest desire of death, 
 there is combined an impression of the criminali- 
 ty of suicide ; but this, instead of correcting the 
 hallucination, only leads to another and most ex- 
 traordinary mode of effecting the purpose ; name- 
 ly, by committing murder, and so dying by the 
 hand of justice. Several instances are on record, 
 
INSANITY. 3.S9 
 
 ill wliicli this remarkable mental process was dis- 
 tinctly traced and avowed ; and in which there 
 was no mixtnre of malice acfainst the individuals 
 who were murdered. On the contrary', they 
 were g-enerally chihiren ; and in one of the cases, 
 the maniac distinctly avowed his resolution to 
 commit murder, with the view of dying- by a sen- 
 tence of law, and at the same time, his deter- 
 mination, that his victim should be a child, — as 
 he should thus avoid the additional guilt of send- 
 ing- a person out of the world in a state of unre- 
 pented sin. The mental process in such a case 
 presents a most interesting subject of reflection. 
 It appears to be purely a process of association, 
 without the power of reasoning. I should sup- 
 pose, that there had been at a former period, du- 
 ring a comparatively healthy state of the mental 
 faculties, a repeated contemplation of suicide, 
 which had been always checked by an immediate 
 conviction of its dreadful criminality. In this 
 manner, a strong connexion had been formed, 
 which, when the idea of suicide afterwards came 
 into the mind, during the state of insanity, led 
 to the impression of its heinousness, not by a 
 process of reasoning, but by simple association. 
 The subsequent steps are the distorted reasonings 
 of insanity, mixed with some previous impression 
 of the safe condition of children dying in infancy. 
 This explanation, I think, is strongly counte- 
 nanced by the consideration, that, had the idea of 
 
34>0 
 
 REASON. 
 
 the criminality of suicide been in any degree a 
 process of reasoning, a corresponding- convic- 
 tion of the g-uilt of murder must have follow- 
 ed it. I find, ho^yever, one case which is at 
 variance with this hypothesis. The reasoning- of 
 that unfortunate individual was, that if he com- 
 mitted murder and died by the hand of justice, 
 there would be time for making- his peace with 
 the Almighty between the crime and his execu- 
 tion, which would not be the case if he should 
 die by suicide. This was a species of reasoning, 
 — but it was purely the reasoning of insanity. 
 
 Attempts have been made to refer insanity to 
 disease of bodily organs, but hitherto without much 
 success. In some instances, we are able to trace 
 a connexion of this kind ; but, in a large propor- 
 tion, we can trace no bodily disease. On this 
 subject, as well as various other points connected 
 with the phenomena of insanity, extensive and 
 careful observation will be required, before we 
 are entitled to advance to any conclusions. In 
 regard to what have been called the moral causes 
 of insanity, also, I suspect there has been a 
 good deal of fallacy, arising from considering 
 as a moral cause, what was really a part of the 
 disease. Thus, we find so many cases of insanity 
 referred to erroneous views of religion, so many 
 to love, so many to ambition, &c. But, perhaps 
 it may be doubted whether that which was in 
 
INSANITY. 311 
 
 these cases considered as the cause, was not ra- 
 ther, in many instances, a part of the hallucina- 
 tion. This, I think, applies in a peculiar manner 
 to the important subject of religion, which, by a 
 common but very loose mode of speaking-, is often 
 mentioned as a frequent cause of insanity. When 
 there is a constitutional tendency to insanity, or to 
 melancholy, one of its leading modifications, every 
 subject is distorted to which the mind can be di- 
 rected, and none more frequently or more remark- 
 ably than the great questions of religious belief. 
 But this is the effect, not the cause ; and the fre- 
 quency of this kind of hallucination, and the va- 
 rious forms which it assumes, may be ascribed to 
 the subject being one to which the minds of all 
 men are so naturally directed in one degree or 
 another, and of which no man living can entirely 
 divest himself. Even when the mind does give 
 way under a great moral cause, such as over- 
 whelming misfortunes, we often find that the hal- 
 lucination does not refer to them, but to some- 
 thing entirely distinct : — striking examples of 
 this are mentioned by Pinel. 
 
 Insanity is, in a large proportion of cases, to 
 be traced to hereditary predisposition ; and this 
 is often so strong, that no prominent moral cause 
 is necessary for the production of the disease, 
 and probably no moral treatment would have any 
 effect in preventing it. We must, however, sup- 
 pose, that, where a tendency to insanity exists, 
 
fW2 REASON. 
 
 there may be, in many cases, circumstances in 
 mental habits or mental discipline, calculated 
 either to favour or to counteract the tendency. 
 Insanity frequently commences with a state, in. 
 which particular impressions fix themselves upon 
 the mind, in a manner entirely disproportioned 
 to their true relations ; and in which these false 
 impressions fail to be corrected by the judgment, 
 comparing them with other impressions, or with 
 external things. In so far as mental habits may be 
 supposed to favour or promote such a condition, 
 this may be likely to result from allowing the 
 mind to wander away from the proper duties 
 of life, or to luxuriate amid scenes of the imagi- 
 nation ; and permitting mental emotions, of what- 
 ever kind, to be excited in a manner dispropor- 
 tioned to the true relations of the objects which 
 give rise to them ; — in short, from allowing the 
 mind to ramhle among imaginary events, or to 
 be led away by slight and casual relations, in- 
 stead of steadily exercising the judgn^ent in the 
 investigation of truth. We might refer to the 
 same head, habits of distorting events, and of 
 founding upon them conclusions which they do 
 not warrant. These, and other propensities and 
 habits of a similar kind, constitute what is called 
 an ill regulated mind. Opposed to it, is that ha- 
 bit of cool and sound exercise of the understand- 
 ing, by which events are contemplated in their 
 true relations and consequences, and mental emo- 
 
INSANITY. 343 
 
 tions arise out of them such as they are really cal- 
 culated to produce. Every one must be familiar 
 with the difference which exists among" different 
 individuals, in this respect ; and even in the same 
 individual at different times. We trace the influ- 
 ence of the principle in the impression which is 
 made by events coming upon us suddenly and 
 unexpectedly ; and the manner in which the 
 emotion is gradually brought to its proper bear- 
 ings, as the mind accommodates itself to the 
 event, by contemplating it in its true relations. 
 In such a mental process as this, we observe the 
 most remarkable diversities amonsr various in- 
 dividuals. In some, the mind rapidly contem- 
 plates the event in all its relations, and speedily 
 arrives at the precise impression or emotion 
 which it is in truth fitted to produce. In others, 
 this is done more slowly, perhaps more im- 
 perfectly, and probably not without the aid of 
 suggestions from other minds ; while, in some, 
 the first impression is so strong and so perma- 
 nent, and resists, in such a manner, those consi- 
 derations which might remove or moderate it, 
 that we find difficulty in drawing the line between 
 it and that kind of false impression which consti- 
 tutes the lower degree of insanity. Habits of 
 mental application must also exert a great influ- 
 ence J and we certainly remark a striking differ- 
 ence between those who are accustomed merely 
 to works of imagination and taste, and those 
 
344^ REASON. 
 
 whose minds have been rig-idly exercised to ha- 
 bits of cahii and severe inquiry. A fact is men- 
 tioned by Dr. Conolly, which, if it shall be con- 
 firmed by farther observation, would lead to 
 some most important reflections. He states that 
 it appears from the registers of the Bicetre, that 
 maniacs of the more educated classes consist al- 
 most entirely of priests, artists, painters, sculp- 
 tors, poets, and musicians ; while no instance, 
 it is said, occurs of the disease in naturalists, 
 physicians, g-eometricians, or chemists. 
 
 The higher degrees of insanity are in general 
 so distinctly defined in their characters, as to leave 
 no room for doubt in deciding upon the nature 
 of the affection. But it is otherwise in regard 
 to many of the lower modifications ; and great 
 discretion is often required, in judging whether 
 the conduct of an individual, in particular in- 
 stances, is to be considered as indicative of insa- 
 nity. This arises from the principle, which must 
 never be lost sight of, that, in such cases, we are 
 not to decide simply from the facts themselves, 
 but by their relation to other circumstances, and 
 to the previous habits and character of the indi- 
 vidual. There are many peculiarities and eccen- 
 tricities of character which do not constitute in- 
 sanity ; and the same peculiarities may afford rea- 
 son for suspecting insanity in* one person and not 
 in another ; — namely, when in the former, they 
 
IN!<ANITY. 345 
 
 liuve ap|jearc(l i-uddenly, and arc iiiiicii uppoiicJ 
 to his previous uniform character ; while, to the 
 latter, they have been long- known to be habitual 
 and natural. Thus, acts of thoughtless prodi- 
 g-ality and extravagance may, in one person, 
 be considered entirely in accordance with his 
 uniform character ; while the same acts, commit- 
 ted by a person formerly distinguished by sedate 
 and prudent conduct, may give good ground for 
 suspecting insanity, — and in fact constitute a form 
 in which the affection very often appears. In or- 
 dinary cases of insanity, a man's conduct is to be 
 tried by a comparison with the average conduct 
 of other men ; but, in many of the cases now re- 
 ferred to, he must be compared with his former 
 self. 
 
 Another caution is to be kept In mind, respect- 
 ing the mental impressions of the individual in 
 these slight or suspected cases of insanity ; — that 
 an impression, which gives reason for suspecting 
 insanity in one case, because we know it to be 
 entirely unfounded and imaginary, may allow of 
 no such conclusion in another, in which it has 
 some reasonable or plausible foundation. Insane 
 persons indeed often relate stories which hang to- 
 gether so plausibly and consistently, that we can- 
 not say whether we are to consider them as in- 
 dicative of insanity, until we have ascertained 
 whether they have "any foundation, or are en- 
 
346 
 
 REASON. 
 
 tirely iniaginaiy. In one instance wliicli was 
 referred to in the discussions respecting a late re- 
 markable case, the principal fact alleged against 
 the individual was, his having taken up a suspi- 
 cion of the fidelity of his wife. But it turned 
 out to be a very general opinion among his neigh- 
 bours that the impression was well founded. The 
 same principle applies to the antipathies against 
 intimate friends which are often so remarkable in 
 the insane. They may be of such a nature as de- 
 cidedly to mark the hallucination of insanity, — as 
 when a person expresses a dislike to a child, for- 
 merly beloved, on the ground that he is not really 
 his child, but an evil spirit which has assumed his 
 form. This is clearly insanity ; but if the anti- 
 pathy be against a friend or relative, without any 
 such reason assigned for it, we require to keep in 
 view the inquiry, whether the impression be the 
 result of hallucination, or whether the relative 
 has really given any ground for it. In all slight 
 or doubtful cases, much discretion should be used 
 in putting an individual under restraint, and still 
 more in immediately subjecting him to confine- 
 ment in an asylum for lunatics. But there is one 
 modification in which all such delicacy must be 
 dispensed with, — namely, in those melancholic 
 cases which have shown any tendency to suicide. 
 Whenever this propensity has appeared, no time 
 is to be lost in taking the most effectual precau- 
 
INSANITY— PUNISHMENT OV TIIF. INSANE. 347 
 
 tions ; and the most paiiilul consequciicos have 
 very often resulted, in cases of this description, 
 from misplaced delicacy and delay. 
 
 The subject of hallucination, in insanity, we 
 have seen, may be either entirely imaginary and 
 ji^roundlcss, or may be a real event viewed in 
 false relations, and carried to false consequences. 
 This view of the subject bears upon an important 
 practical point which has been much agitated, — 
 namely, the liability of maniacs to punishment ; 
 and which has been ably and ingeniously argued 
 by Lord Erskine, in his defence of Hatfield, who 
 fired at his Majesty, King George III. The prin- 
 ciple contended for by this eminent person is, that, 
 when a maniac commits a crime under the influ- 
 ence of an impression which is entirely visionary, 
 and purely the hallucination of insanity, he is not 
 the object of punishment ; but that, though he 
 may have shown insanity in other things, he is 
 liable to punishment, if the impression under 
 which he acted was true, and the human passion 
 arising out of it was directed to its proper object. 
 He illustrates this principle by contrasting the 
 case of Hatfield with that of Lord Ferrers. Hat- 
 field had taken a fancy, that the end of the world 
 was at hand, and that the death of his iVIajesty 
 was in some way connected with im])ortant 
 events which Mere about to take place. Lord 
 Ferrers, after showing various indications of in- 
 
31'S REASON. 
 
 sanity, murdered a man, ag-ainst whom he was 
 known to harbour deep-rooted resentment, on 
 account of real transactions, in which that indivi- 
 dual had rendered himself obnoxious to him. The 
 former, therefore, is considered as an example of 
 the pure hallucination of insanity ; the latter as 
 one of human passion founded on real events and 
 directed to its proper object. Hatfield, accord- 
 ingly, was acquitted ; but Lord Ferrers was con- 
 victed of murder, and executed. The contrast 
 between the two cases is sufficiently striking, but, 
 it may be questioned, whether it will bear all that 
 Lord Erskine has founded upon it. There can 
 be no doubt of the first of his propositions, that 
 a person acting under the pure hallucination of 
 insanity, in regard to impressions which are en- 
 tirely unfounded, is not the object of punishment. 
 But, the converse does not seem to follow ; name- 
 ly, that the man becomes an object of punish- 
 ment, merely because the impression was founded 
 in fact, and because there was a human passion 
 directed to its proper object. For it is among 
 the characters of insanity, not only to call up 
 impressions which are entirely visionary, but also 
 to distort and exaggerate those which are true, 
 and to carry them to consequences which they 
 do not warrant in the estimation of a sound mind. 
 A person, for instance, who has suffered a loss 
 in business which does not affect his circumstan- 
 ces in any important degree, may imagine, under 
 
INSANITY— PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. ^I'i) 
 
 the influence of iKilluciiKitloii, that he is a ruined 
 man, and tliat his laniily is reduced to begg-ary. 
 Now, were a wealthy man, under the influence 
 of such hallucination, to commit an outrage on a 
 person who had defrauded him of a trifling sum, 
 the case would afl'ord the character mentioned 
 by Lord Erskine, namely, human passion founded 
 upon real events, and directed to its proper ob- 
 ject : but no one, probably, would doubt for a 
 moment, that the process was as much the result 
 of insanity, as if the impression had been entirely 
 visionary. In this hypothetical case, indeed, the 
 injury, though real, is slight ; but it does not ap- 
 pear, that the principle is necessarily aff'ected by 
 the injut-y being great, or more in relation to the 
 result which it leads to accordino- to the usual 
 course of human passion. It would appear pro- 
 bable, therefore, that, in deciding a doubtful case, 
 a jury ought to be guided, not merely by the 
 circumstances of the case itself, but by the evi- 
 dence of insanity in other things. This, accord- 
 ingly, appears to have been the rule on which a 
 jury acted in another important case mentioned 
 by Lord Erskine, in which an unfortunate female, 
 under the influence of insanity, murdered a man 
 who had seduced and deserted her. Here was a 
 real injury of the highest description, and Imman 
 passion founded upon it and directed to its pro- 
 per object ; but the jury, on proof of derange- 
 ment in other things, acquitted the prisoner. 
 
350 
 
 KEASON. 
 
 who, accordiiig'ly, soon passed into a state of 
 " undoubted and deplorable insanity." In the 
 case of Lord Ferrers, also, it would appear, that 
 the decision proceeded, not so much upon the 
 principle of human passion directed to its proper 
 object, as upon an impression, that his Lordship's 
 previous conduct had been indicative of inicon- 
 trolled violence of temper, rather than actual in- 
 sanity. 
 
 Some of the points which have been briefly al- 
 luded to, seem to bear on the practical part of 
 this important subject, — the moral treatment of 
 insanity. Without entering- on any lengthened 
 discussion, some leading- principles may be refer- 
 red to the following heads : — 
 
 I. It will be generally admitted, that every at- 
 tempt to reason with a maniac is not only fruit- 
 less, but rather tends to fix more deeply his er- 
 roneous impression. An important rule, in the 
 moral management of the insane, will therefore 
 probably be, to avoid every allusion to the sub- 
 ject of their hallucination, to remove from them 
 every thing calculated by association to lead to 
 it, and to remove them from scenes and persons 
 likely to recall or keep up the erroneous im- 
 pression. Hence, probably, in a great measure, 
 arises the remarkable benefit of removing the in- 
 sane from tlieir usual residence, friends and at- 
 
INSANITY— MORAL TUEATiMENT. 3.}1 
 
 teiidants, and placing- them in new scenes, and 
 entirely nnder the care of strangers. The actual 
 effect of this measure is familiar to every one, 
 who is in any deg-ree conversant with the ma- 
 nag-eraent of the insane. That the measure may 
 have its full effect, it appears to be of importance 
 that the patient should not, for a considerable 
 time, be visited by any friend or acquaintance ; 
 but should be separated from every thing- con- 
 nected with his late erroneous associations. The 
 dang-er also is well known which attends prema- 
 ture return to home and common associates ; — 
 immediate relapse having- often followed this, in 
 cases which had been going on for some time in 
 the most favourable manner. 
 
 II. Occupation. This is referable to two kinds, 
 namely, bodily and mental. The higher states 
 of mania, in general, admit of no occupation ; 
 but, on the contrary, often require coercion. A 
 degree below this may admit of bodily occupa- 
 tion, and, when this can be accomplished in such 
 a manner as fully to occupy the attention, and 
 produce fatigue, there is reason to believe that 
 much benefit may result from it. Dr. Gregory 
 used to mention a farmer in the North of Scot- 
 land, who had acquired uncommon celebrity in 
 the treatment of the insane ; and his method con- 
 sisted chiefly in having them constantly employ- 
 ed in the most severe bodily labour. As soon. 
 
35Q REASON. 
 
 also, as the situation of the patient will admit of 
 it, mental occupation must be considered as of 
 the utmost importance : It should not consist 
 merely of desultory employment or amusement, 
 but should probably be regulated by tvyo princi- 
 ples. 1. Occupations calculated to lead the mind 
 gradually into a connected series of thought. 
 When the mental condition of the patient is such 
 as to make it practicable, nothing answers so well 
 as a course of history, the leading events being 
 distinctly written out in the form of a table, 
 with the dates. Thus the attention is fixed in 
 an easy and connected manner, — and, in cases 
 which admit of such occupation being continued, 
 the effect is often astonishing. 2. Endeavour- 
 ing to discover the patient's former habits, and 
 favourite pursuits, at a period previous to the 
 hallucination, and unconnected with it ; and 
 using means for leading his attention to these. I 
 have already alluded to the complete suspen- 
 sion of all former pursuits and attachments, which 
 often takes place in insanity, and to a return of 
 them as being frequently the most marked and 
 satisfactory symptom of convalescence. This is, 
 in such cases, to be considered as a sign, not a 
 cause of the improvement ; but there seems every 
 reason to believe, that the principle might be acted 
 upon with advantage in the moral treatment of 
 certain forms of insanity. On a similar principle, 
 it is probable, that, in many cases, much benefit 
 
 7 
 
INSANITY— MORAL TREATMENT. Sr>f^ 
 
 mig-ht result from moral manasrement calculated 
 to revive associations of a pleasing- kind, in re- 
 gard to circumstances anterior to the occurrence 
 of the malady. 
 
 III. Careful classification of the insane, so that 
 the mild and peaceful melancholic may not be 
 harassed by the ravings of the maniac. The 
 importance of this is obvious ; but of still greater 
 importance it will probably be, to watch the first 
 dawnings of reason, and instantly to remove the 
 patient from all associates, by whom his mind 
 might be again bewildered. The following case 
 mentioned by Pinel is certainly an extreme one, 
 but much important reflection arises out of it in 
 reference both to this and the preceding topic. 
 A musician confined in the Bicetre, as one of the 
 first symptoms of returning reason, made some 
 slight allusion to his favourite instrument. It 
 was immediately procured for him ; he occupied 
 himself with music for several hours every day, 
 and his convalescence seemed to be advancing- 
 rapidly. But he was then unfortunately allowed 
 to come frequently into contact with a furious 
 maniac, by meeting him in the gardens. The 
 musician's mind was unhinged ; his violin was 
 destroyed ; and he fell back into a state of in- 
 sanity which was considered as confirmed and 
 hopeless. 
 
 Cases of decided insanity in general admit 
 
 2 A 
 
354f REASON. 
 
 of little moral treatment, until the force of the 
 disease has been broken in some considerable 
 deg-ree. But, among- the numerous modifica- 
 tions which come under the view of the physi- 
 cian, there are various forms in which, by judi- 
 cious moral manag-ement, a g-reat deal is to be 
 accomplished. Some of these affections are of a 
 temporary nature, and have so little influence on 
 a man's general conduct in life, that they are 
 perhaps not known beyond his own family, or 
 confidential friends. In some of these cases, the 
 individual is sensible of the singular change which 
 has taken place in the state of his mental powers, 
 and laments the distortion of his feelings and 
 affections. He complains, perhaps, that he has 
 lost his usual interest in his family, and his usual 
 affection for them ; and that he seems to be de- 
 prived of every feeling of which he was formerly 
 susceptible. The truth is, that the mind has be- 
 come so occupied by the erroneous impression, 
 as to be inaccessible to any other, and incapable 
 of applying to any pursuit, or following out a 
 train of thought. 
 
 A most interesting affection of this class often 
 comes under the observation of the physician, 
 consisting of deep but erroneous views of reli- 
 gion — generally accompanied with disturbed 
 sleep, and considerable derangement of the sys- 
 tem, and producing a state of mind closely bor- 
 dering upon insanity. It occurs most commonly 
 
INSANITY— MORAL TREATMENT. Sr)5 
 
 in young- persons of acute and susceptible feel- 
 ings, and requires the most delicate and cautious 
 management. Two modes of treatment are fre- 
 quently adopted in regard to it, both equally er- 
 roneous. The one consists in hurrying the in- 
 dividual into the distraction of company, or a 
 rapid journey ; the other, in urging religious dis- 
 cussions, and books of profound divinity. Both 
 are equally injudicious, especially the latter ; for 
 every attempt to discuss the important subject, 
 to which the distorted impression refers, only 
 serves to fix the hallucination more deeply. 
 The mode of treatment, which I have always 
 found most beneficial, consists of regfular exer- 
 cise, with attention to the general health ; and 
 in enforcing a course of reading of a nature likely 
 to fix the mind, and carry it forward in a con- 
 nected train. Light reading or mere amusement 
 will not answer the purpose. A regular course 
 of history, as formerly mentioned, appears to 
 succeed best, and fixing the attention by writing 
 out the dates and leadinsr events in the form of a 
 table. When the mind has been thus gradually 
 exercised for some time in a connected train of 
 thought, it is often astonishing to observe how it 
 will return to the subject which had entirely 
 overpowered it, with a complete dissipation of 
 former erroneous impressions. A frequent com- 
 plaint at the commencement of such an exercise 
 is, that the person finds it impossible to fix the 
 
356 REASON. 
 
 attention, or to recollect the subject of even a 
 few sentences : this is part of the disease, and, by 
 perseverance, gradually disappears. This expe- 
 riment I have had occasion to make many times, 
 and it has always appeared to me one of extreme 
 interest. I do not say that it has uniformly suc- 
 ceeded, for the affection frequently passes into 
 confirmed insanity ; but it has succeeded in a 
 sufficient number of instances to g-ive every en- 
 couragement for a careful repetition of it. The 
 same observations, and the same mode of treat- 
 ment, apply to the other forms of partial hallucin- 
 ation. The plan is, of course, to be assisted by 
 regular exercise, and attention to the general 
 health, which is usually much impaired. The 
 affections are particularly connected, in a very 
 intimate manner, with a disordered state of the 
 stomach and bowels, and with derangements in 
 the female constitution. Means adapted to these 
 become, therefore, an essential part of the ma- 
 nagement. 
 
 There has been considerable discussion respect- 
 ing the distinction between insanity and idiocy. 
 It has been said, that the insane reason justly on 
 false premises ; and that idiots reason falsely on 
 sound premises. This does not seem to be well- 
 founded. It would appear, that a maniac may 
 reason either upon false or true premises ; but 
 that, in either case, his reasoning is influenced by 
 
INSANITY— IDIOCY. 35? 
 
 distorted views of the relations of things. The 
 idiot, on the other hand, does not reason at all ; 
 that is, though he may remember the facts, he 
 does not trace their relations. Idiocy appears to 
 consist, in a greater or less degree, in a simply 
 impaired or weakened state of the mental powers ; 
 but this is not insanity. On the contrary, we 
 have seen that, in the insane, certain mental 
 powers may be in the highest state of activity, — 
 the memorv recalling things long gone by, — the 
 imagination forming brilliant associations, — every 
 faculty in the highest activity, except the power 
 of tracing correct relations. I have already re- 
 ferred to a gentleman mentioned by Pinel, who 
 possessed, during the paroxysm, a brilliancy of 
 conception and readiness of memory which were 
 not natural to him. Another, mentioned by the 
 same writer, who was infatuated with the chimera 
 of perpetual motion, constructed pieces of me- 
 chanism which were the result of the most pro- 
 found combinations, at the time when he was so 
 mad that he believed his head to have been 
 changed. A female mentioned, I believe, by 
 Rush, sang with great beauty and sweetness, 
 which she could not do when she was sane ; and 
 a musician played, w4ien insane, much better 
 than when he was well. 
 
 In that remarkable obliteration of the mental 
 faculties, on the other hand, which we call 
 idiocy, fatuity, or dementia, there is none of 
 
358 REASON. 
 
 the distortion of insanity. It is a simple tor- 
 por of the faculties, in the higher degrees amount- 
 ing to total insensibility to every impression ; 
 and some remarkable facts are connected with 
 the manner in which it arises without bodily 
 disease. A man mentioned by Dr. Rush, was 
 so violently affected by some losses in trade, that 
 he was deprived almost instantly of all his mental 
 faculties. He did not take notice of any thing, 
 not even expressing a desire for food, but merely 
 taking it when it was put into his mouth. A 
 servant dressed him in the morning, and con- 
 ducted him to a seat in his parlour, where he re- 
 mained the whole day, with his body bent for- 
 ward, and his eyes fixed on the floor. In 
 this state, he continued nearly five years, and 
 then recovered completely and rather suddenly. 
 The account which he afterwards gave of his 
 condition during this period was, that his mind 
 was entirely lost ; and that it was only about two 
 months before his final recovery, that he began to 
 have sensations and thoughts of any kind. These 
 at first served only to convey fears and apprehen- 
 sions, especially in the night-time. Of perfect 
 idiocy produced in the same manner by a moral 
 cause, an affecting example is given by Pinel. 
 Two young men, brothers, were carried off by 
 the conscription, and, in the first action in Avliich 
 they were engaged, one of them was shot dead 
 bv the side of the other. The survivor was in- 
 
INSANITY— IDIOCY— CRETINISM. 359 
 
 atantly struck MMth perfect idiocy. He u^as ta- 
 ken home to his father's house, where another 
 brother was so affected by the sight of him, that 
 he was seized in the same manner ; and in this 
 state of perfect idiocy, they were both received 
 into the Bicetre. I have formerly referred to 
 various examples of this condition supervening on 
 bodily disease. In some of them, the affection 
 was permanent ; in others, it was entirely reco- 
 vered from. 
 
 The most striking- illustration of the various 
 shades of idiocy, is derived from the modifications 
 of intellectual condition observed in the Cretins 
 of the Vallais. These singular beings are usual- 
 ly divided into three classes, which receive the 
 names of cretins, semi-cretins, and cretins of the 
 third degree. The first of these classes, or per- 
 fect cretins, are, in point of intellect, scarcely re- 
 moved above mere animal life. Many of them 
 cannot speak, and are only so far sensible of the 
 common calls of nature, as to go, when excited 
 by hunger, to places where they have been ac- 
 customed to receive their food. The rest of their 
 time is spent, either in basking in the sun, or sit- 
 ting by the fire, without any trace of intelligence. 
 The next class, or semi-cretins, show a higher 
 degree of intelligence ; they remember common 
 events, understand what is said to them, and ex- 
 press themselves in an intelligible manner on the 
 most common subjects. They are taught to re- 
 
360 REASON. 
 
 peat prayers, but scarcely appear to annex any 
 meaning to the words which they employ ; and 
 they cannot be taught to read or write, or even 
 to number their fingers. The cretins of the third 
 degree learn to read and write, though with very 
 little understanding of what they read, except on 
 the most common topics. But they are acutely 
 alive to their own interest, and extremely liti- 
 gious. They are without prudence or discretion 
 in the direction of their affairs, and the regula- 
 tion of their conduct ; yet obstinate, and unwill- 
 ing to be advised. Their memory is good as to 
 what they have seen or heard, and they learn to 
 imitate what they have observed in various arts, 
 as machinery, painting, sculpture, and architec- 
 ture ; but it is mere imitation without invention. 
 Some of them learn music in the same manner ; 
 and others attempt poetry of the lowest kind, dis- 
 tinguished by mere rhyme. It is said, that none 
 of them can be taught arithmetic, but I do not 
 know whether this has been ascertained to be in- 
 variably true ; — there is no doubt that it is a very 
 general peculiarity. 
 
 The imbecile in other situations show charac- 
 ters very analagous to these. Their memory is 
 often remarkably retentive ; but it appears to be 
 merely a power of retaining facts or words in the 
 order and connexion in which they have been 
 presented to them, without the capacity of tracing 
 relations, and forming new associations. In this 
 
INSANITY— IDIOCY— CRETINISM. 3Gl 
 
 luaniier, they sometimes acquire languages, and 
 even procure a name for a kind of scholarship ; 
 and they learn to imitate in various arts, but with- 
 out invention. Their deficiency appears to be in 
 the powers of abstracting, recombining, and trac- 
 ing relations ; consequently they are deficient in 
 judgment, for which these processes are necessary. 
 The maniac, on the other hand, seizes relations 
 acutely, rapidly, and often ingeniously, — but not 
 soundly. They are only incidental relations, to 
 which he is led by some train of association ex- 
 isting in his own mind ; but they occupy his at- 
 tention in such a manner, that he does not admit 
 the consideration of other relations, or compare 
 them with those which have fixed themselves 
 upon his mind. 
 
 The states of idiocy and insanity, therefore, are 
 clearly distinguished in the more complete ex- 
 amples of both ; but many instances occur in 
 which they pass into each other, and where it is 
 difficult to say to which of the affections the case 
 is to be referred. I believe they may also be, to 
 a certain extent, combined ; or that there may be 
 a certain diminution of the mental powers exist- 
 ing along with that distortion which constitutes 
 insanity. They likewise alternate with one an- 
 other, — maniacal paroxysms often leaving the pa- 
 tient, in the intervals, in a state of idiocy. A 
 very interesting modification of another kind, is 
 mentioned by Pinel. Five young men were re- 
 
362 REASON. 
 
 ceived into the Bicetre, whose intellectual facul- 
 ties appeared to be really obliterated ; and they 
 continued in this state for periods of from three 
 to upwards of twelve months. They were then 
 seized with paroxysms of considerable violence, 
 which continued from fifteen to twenty-five days, 
 after which they all entirely recovered. 
 
 Idiocy can seldom be the subject either of me- 
 dical or moral treatment ; but the peculiar cha- 
 racters of it often become the object of attention 
 in courts of law, in relation to the competency 
 of imbecile persons to manage their own affairs ; 
 and much difficulty often occurs in tracing the 
 line between competency and incompetency. Se- 
 veral years ago a case occurred in Edinburgh, 
 which excited much discussion, and shows, in a 
 striking manner, some of the peculiarities of this 
 condition of the mental faculties. — A gentleman 
 of considerable property having died intestate, his 
 heir-at-law was a younger brother, who had al- 
 ways been reckoned very deficient in intellect ; 
 and, consequently, his relatives now brought an 
 action into the Court of Session, for the purpose 
 of finding him incompetent, and obtaining the 
 authority of the Court for putting him under 
 trustees. In the investigation of this case, va- 
 rious respectable persons deponed, that they 
 had long known the individual, and considered 
 him as decidedly imbecile in his understanding, 
 and incapable of managing his affairs. On the 
 
IDIOCY. .368 
 
 other hand, most respectable evidence was pro- 
 duced, that he had been, when at school, an ex- 
 cellent scholar in the languages, and had repeat- 
 edly acted as a private tutor to boys ; — that he 
 was remarkably attentive to his own interest, and 
 very strict in making- a bargain ; that he had been 
 proposed as a candidate for holy orders, and, on 
 his first examination in the lang-uages, had ac- 
 quitted himself well ; but that, in the subsequent 
 trials, in which the candidate is required to deli- 
 ver a discourse, he had been found incompetent. 
 The Court of Session, after long- pleadings, de- 
 cided that this individual was incapable of ma- 
 naging- his affairs. The case was then appealed 
 to the House of Lords, where, after farther pro- 
 tracted proceedings, this decision was affirmed. I 
 was well acquainted with this person, and was 
 decidedly of opinion that he was imbecile in his 
 intellects. At my suggestion the following ex- 
 periment was made, in the course of the investi- 
 gation. A small sum of money was given him, 
 with directions to spend it, and present an ac- 
 count of his disbursement, with the addition of 
 the various articles. He soon got rid of the mo- 
 ney, but was found totally incapable of this very 
 simple process of arithmetic, though the sum did 
 not exceed a few shillings. This individual, then, 
 it would appear, possessed the simple state of me- 
 mory, which enabled him to acquire languages ; 
 but was deficient in the capacity of combining, 
 
364 REASON. 
 
 reflecting, or comparing*. His total inability to 
 perform the most simple process of arithmetic 
 was a prominent character in the case, analogous 
 to what I have already stated in regard to the 
 Cretins. In doubtful cases of the kind, I think 
 this might be employed as a negative test, with 
 advantage ; for it probably will not be doubted, 
 that a person, who is incapable of such a process, 
 is incompetent to manage his affairs. 
 
 It is a singular fact, that the imbecile are, in 
 general, extremely attentive to their own inte- 
 rest, and perhaps most commonly cautious in 
 their proceedings. Ruinous extravagance, ab- 
 surd schemes, and quixotic ideas of liberality and 
 magnificence, are more allied to insanity ; — the 
 former may become the dupes of others, but it is 
 the latter who are most likely to involve and ruin 
 themselves. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of Insanity, there 
 is a point of great interest, which may be briefly 
 referred to. It bears, in a very striking manner, 
 upon what may be called the pathology of the 
 mental powers, — but I presume not to touch up- 
 on it, except in the slightest manner. In the lan- 
 guage of common life, we sometimes speak of a 
 moral insanity, in which a man rushes headlong 
 through a course of vice and crime, regardless of 
 every moral restraint, of every social tie, and of 
 all consequences, whether more immediate or 
 future. Yet, if we take the most melancholy in- 
 
 ^i 
 
 I 
 
IDIOCY. 3G5 
 
 stance of this kind that can be furnished by the 
 history of human depravity, the individual may 
 still be recog-nised, in reg-ard to all physical rela- 
 tions, as a man of a sound mind ; and he may be 
 as well qualified as other men, for the details of 
 business, or even the investigations of science. 
 He is correct in his judgment of all the phy- 
 sical relations of things ; but, in regard to their 
 moral relations, every correct feeling appears 
 to be obliterated. If a man, then, may thus be 
 correct in his judgment of all physical relations, 
 while he is lost to every moral relation, we 
 have strong ground for believing, that there is 
 in his constitution a power, distinct from reason, 
 but which holds the same sway over his moral 
 powers, that reason does among his intellectual ; 
 and that the influence of this power may be 
 weakened or lost, while reason remains unim- 
 paired. This is the moral principle, or the 
 power of conscience. It has been supposed by 
 some to be a modification of reason, but the con- 
 siderations now referred to appear to favour the 
 opinion of their being distinct. That this power 
 should so completely lose its sway, while reason 
 remains unimpaired, is a point in the moral con- 
 stitution of man which it does not belong to the 
 physician to investigate. The fact is unquestion- 
 able ; — the solution is to be sought for in the re- 
 cords of eternal truth. 
 
366 REASON. 
 
 IV.—SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 
 
 The theory of spectral illusions is closely con- 
 nected with that of the affections treated of in the 
 preceding parts of this section ; and I shall con- 
 clude this subject with a very brief notice of some 
 of the most authentic facts relating to them, un- 
 der the following heads. 
 
 I. False perceptions, or impressions made upon 
 the senses only, in which the mind does not par- 
 ticipate. Of this class there are several modifi- 
 cations, which have been referred to under the 
 subject of perception : — I add, in this place, the 
 following additional examples. — A gentleman 
 of high mental endowments, now upwards of 
 eighty years of age, of a spare habit, and enjoying 
 uninterrupted health, has been, for eleven years, 
 liable to almost daily visitations from spectral 
 figures. They, in general, present human coun- 
 tenances ; the head and upper parts of the body 
 are distinctly defined ; — the lower parts are, for 
 the most part, lost in a kind of cloud. The 
 figures are various ; but he recognises the same 
 countenances repeated from time to time, — parti- 
 cularly, of late years, that of an elderly woman, 
 with a peculiarly arch and playful expression, 
 and a dazzling brilliancy of eye, who seems just 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 3^7 
 
 ready to speak to liim. They appear also in va- 
 rious dresses, such as, — that of the age of Louis 
 XIV., — the costume of ancient Rome, — that of 
 the modern Turks and Greeks, — but more fre- 
 quently of late, as in the case of the female now 
 mentioned, in an old fashioned Scottish plaid of 
 tartan, drawn up and brought forward over the 
 head, and then crossed below the chin, as the 
 plaid was worn by aged women in his younger 
 days. He can seldom recognise among the 
 spectres, any figure or countenance which he re- 
 members to have seen ; but his own face has oc- 
 casionally been presented to him, gradually un- 
 dergoing the change from youth to manhood, and 
 from manhood to old age. The figures appear 
 at various times of the day, both night and morn- 
 ing ; — they continue before him for some time, 
 and he sees them almost equally well with his 
 eyes open or shut, — in full daylight or in dark- 
 ness. They are almost always of a pleasant 
 character, and he seems to court their presence, 
 as a source of amusement to him. He finds that 
 he can banish them by drawing his hand across 
 his eyes, or by shutting and opening his eye-lids 
 once or twice for a second or two, — but, on 
 these occasions, they often appear again soon af- 
 ter. The figures are sometimes of the size of 
 life, and sometimes in miniature ; but they are 
 always defined and finished with the clearness 
 and minuteness of the finest painting. They 
 
368 REASON. 
 
 sometimes appear as if at a considerable distance, 
 and gradually approach until they seem almost to 
 touch his face : — at other times they float from 
 side to side, or disappear in ascending- or de- 
 scending-. In g-eneral, the countenance of the 
 spectre is presented to him, but, on some occa- 
 sions, he sees the back of the head, both of males 
 and females, exhibiting- various fashions of wigs 
 and head-dresses, — particularly the flowing-, full- 
 bottomed wig- of a former age. At the time 
 when these visions began to appear to him, he 
 was in the habit of taking little or no wine ; and 
 this has been his common practice ever since ; 
 but he finds that any addition to his usual quan- 
 tity of wine increases the number and vivacity 
 of the visions. Of the effect of bodily illness, he 
 can give no account, except that once, when he 
 had a cold and took a few drops of laudanum, 
 the room appeared entirely filled with peculiarly 
 brilliant objects, gold and silver ornaments, and 
 precious gems ; but the spectral visions were 
 either not seen or less distinct. Another gentle- 
 man who died some time ago at the age of eighty, 
 for several years before his death, never sat down 
 to table at his meals, without the impression of 
 sitting down with a large party, dressed in the 
 fashion of fifty years back. This gentleman was 
 blind of one eye, and the sight of the other was 
 very imperfect : on this account he wore over it 
 a green shade ; and he had often before him the 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. -369 
 
 imag-e of his ov7n countenance, as it" it were re- 
 flected from the inner surface of the shade. A 
 very remarkable moditication of this class of il- 
 hisions has been communicated to me by Dr. 
 Dewar of Stirlino-. It occurred in a ladv who 
 was quite blind, her eyes being also disorganised 
 and sunk. She never walked out without see- 
 insr a little old woman with a red cloak and a 
 crutch, who seemed to walk before her. She had 
 no illusions when within doors. 
 
 II. Real dreams, though the person was not 
 at the time sensible of having- slept, nor, conse- 
 quently, of having dreamt. A person, under 
 the influence of some strong mental impression, 
 drops asleep for a few seconds, — perhaps without 
 being sensible of it : some scene or person con- 
 nected with the impression appears in a dream, 
 and he starts up under the conviction that it was 
 a spectral appearance. I have formerly proposed 
 a conjecture, by which some of the most authen- 
 tic stories of second sight may be referred to this 
 principle ; others seem to be referable to the 
 principle to be mentioned under the next head. 
 Several cases mentioned by Dr. Hibbert are also 
 clearly of the nature of dreams. The analogy 
 between dreaming and spectral illusions is also 
 beautifully illustrated, bv an anecdote which I re- 
 ceived lately from the gentleman to whom it oc- 
 curred, an eminent medical friend. Having* sat 
 
 ^2 B 
 
370 REASON. 
 
 lip late one evening', under considerable anxiety 
 about one of his children who was ill, he fell 
 asleep in his chair and had a frig-htful dream, in 
 which the prominent figure was an immense ba- 
 boon. He awoke with the fright, got up instantly, 
 and walked to a table which was in the middle 
 of the room. He was then quite awake and 
 quite conscious of the articles around him ; but 
 close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, 
 he distinctly saw the baboon, making the same 
 horrible grimaces which he had seen in his 
 dream ; and the spectre continued visible for 
 about half a minute. ^ 
 
 III. Intense mental conceptions so strongly 
 impressed upon the mind as, for the moment, to 
 be believed to have a real existence. This takes 
 place, when, along with the mental emotion, the 
 individual is placed in circumstances in which 
 external impressions are very slight : as solitude, 
 faint light and quiescence of body. It is a state 
 closely bordering upon dreaming, though the 
 vision occurs while the person is in the waking 
 state. The following example is mentioned by 
 Dr. Hibbert. A gentleman was told of the sud- 
 den death of an old and intimate friend, and was 
 deeply affected by it. The impression, though 
 partially banished by the business of the day, 
 was renewed, from time to time, by conversing 
 on the subject with his family and other friends. 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. ^71 
 
 After supper, he went by himself to walk in 
 a small court behind his house, which was bound- 
 ed by extensive gardens. The sky was clear, 
 and the night serene ; and no lig-ht was falling- 
 upon the court from any of the windows. As 
 he walked down stairs, he was not thinking- of 
 any thing connected with his deceased friend ; 
 but, when he had proceeded, at a slow pace, 
 about half-way across the court, the figure of 
 his friend started up before him in a most dis- 
 tinct manner at the opposite angle of the court. 
 '* He was not in his usual dress, but in a coat 
 of a different colour which he had for some 
 months left off wearing. I could even remark 
 a figured vest, which he had also worn about the 
 same time ; also a coloured silk handkerchief 
 around his neck, in which 1 had used to see him 
 in a morning ; and my powers of vision seemed 
 to become more keen as I gazed on the phantom 
 before me." The narrator then mentions the in- 
 describable feeling which shot through his frame ; 
 but he soon recovered himself, and walked brisk- 
 ly up to the spot, keeping his eyes intently fixed 
 upon the spectre. As he approached the spot, it 
 vanished, not by sinking into the earth, but seem- 
 ing to melt insensibly into air.* 
 
 A similar example is related by a most intelli- 
 
 • Hihbcrt on Apparitions, p. 470, second edition. 
 
 
-SyS REASON. 
 
 gent writer in the Christian Observer for Octo- 
 ber 1829. " An intimate friend of my early- 
 years, and most happy in his domestic arrange- 
 ments, lost his wife under the most painful cir- 
 cumstances, suddenly, just after she had appa- 
 rently escaped from the dangers of an untoward 
 confinement with her first child. A few weeks 
 after this melancholy event, while travelling dur- 
 ing the night on horseback, and in all probabili- 
 ty thinking over his sorrows, and contrasting his 
 present cheerless prospects with the joys which 
 so lately gilded the hours of his happy home, the 
 form of his lost relative appeared to be presented 
 to him, at a little distance in advance. He stop- 
 ped his horse, and contemplated the vision with 
 great trepidation, till in a few seconds it vanished 
 away. Within a few days of this appearance, 
 while he was sitting in his solitary parlour late at 
 night, reading by the light of a shaded taper, the 
 door, he thought, opened, and the form of his 
 deceased partner entered, — assured him of her 
 complete happiness, and enjoined him to follow 
 her footsteps." This second appearance was pro- 
 bably a dream ; the first is distinctly referable to 
 the principles stated in the preceding observa- 
 tions. 
 
 An interesting case, referable to this head, is 
 described by Sir Walter Scott, in his late work 
 on Demonology and Witchcraft. " Not long af- 
 
 A 
 
•& 
 
 SPIXTRAL ILLUSIONS. 373 
 
 ter the death of a Uite illustrious poet, who had 
 filled, while living-, a great station in the eye of" 
 the public, a literary friend, to whom the deceas- 
 ed had been well known, was engaged, during 
 the darkening twilight of an autumn evening, in 
 perusing one of the publications which professed 
 to detail the habits and 0})inions of the distin- 
 guished individual who was now no more. As 
 the reader had enjoyed the intimacy of the de- 
 ceased to a considerable degree, he was deeply 
 interested in the publication, which contained 
 some particulars relating to himself and other 
 friends. A visitor was sitting in the apartment, 
 who was also engaged in reading. Their sitting- 
 room opened into an entrance-hall, rather fantas- 
 tically fitted up vrith articles of armour, skins of 
 wild animals, and the like. It was when laying 
 down his book, and passing into this hall, through 
 which the moon was beginning to shine, that 
 the individual of whom I speak saw, right before 
 him, and in a standing posture, the exact repre- 
 sentation of his departed friend, whose recollec- 
 tion had been so strongly brought to his imagina- 
 tion. He stopped for a single moment, so as to 
 notice the wonderful accuracy with which fancy 
 had impressed upon the bodily eye the peculiari- 
 ties of dress and posture of the illustrious poet. 
 Sensible, however, of the delusion, he felt no sen- 
 timent save that of wonder at the extraordinarv 
 
370 REASON. 
 
 up late one evening, under considerable anxiety 
 about one of his children who was ill, he fell 
 asleep in his chair and had a frightful dream, in 
 which the prominent figure was an immense ba- 
 boon. He awoke with the fright, got up instantly, 
 and walked to a table which was in the middle 
 of the room. He was then quite awake and 
 quite conscious of the articles around him ; but 
 close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, 
 he distinctly saw the baboon, making the same 
 horrible grimaces which he had seen in his 
 dream ; and the spectre continued visible for 
 about half a minute. ^ 
 
 III. Intense mental conceptions so strongly 
 impressed upon the mind as, for the moment, to 
 be believed to have a real existence. This takes 
 place, when, along with the mental emotion, the 
 individual is placed in circumstances in which 
 external impressions are very slight : as solitude, 
 faint light and quiescence of body. It is a state 
 closely bordering upon dreaming, though the 
 vision occurs while the person is in the waking 
 state. The following example is mentioned by 
 Dr. Hibbert. A gentleman was told of the sud- 
 den death of an old and intimate friend, and was 
 deeply affected by it. The impression, though 
 partially banished by the business of the day, 
 was renewed, from time to time, by conversing 
 on the subject with his family and other friends. 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 371 
 
 After supper, he went by himself to walk in 
 a small court behind his house, which was bound- 
 ed by extensive gardens. The sky was clear, 
 and the nig-ht serene ; and no light was falling" 
 upon the court from any of the windows. As 
 he M'lilked down stairs, he was not thinking of 
 any thing connected with his deceased friend ; 
 but, when he had proceeded, at a slow pace, 
 about half-way across the court, the figure of 
 his friend started up before him in a most dis- 
 tinct manner at the opposite angle of the court. 
 " He was not in his usual dress, but in a coat 
 of a different colour which he had for some 
 months left off wearing. I could even remark 
 a figured vest, which he had also worn about the 
 same time ; also a coloured silk handkerchief 
 around his neck, in which I had used to see him 
 in a morning ; and my powers of vision seemed 
 to become more keen as I gazed on the phantom 
 before me." The narrator then mentions the in- 
 describable feeling which shot through his frame ; 
 but he soon recovered himself, and walked brisk- 
 ly up to the spot, keeping his eyes intently fixed 
 upon the spectre. As he approached the spot, it 
 vanished, not by sinking into the earth, but seem- 
 ing to melt insensibly into air.* 
 
 A similar example is related by a most intelli- 
 
 • Hiiibert on Apparitions, p. 470, second edition. 
 
376 REASON. 
 
 ing, and in immediate expectation of the appear- 
 ance of the clergyman, when a man started up, 
 uttered a scream, and stood looking- to the pulpit, 
 with a countenance expressive of terror. As soon 
 as he could be prevailed on to speak, he exclaim- 
 ed, " Do you not see the minister in the pulpit, 
 dressed in a shroud !" — A few minutes after this 
 occurrence, the clergyman appeared in his place, 
 and conducted the service, apparently in his us- 
 ual health ; but in a day or two after was taken 
 ill, and died before the following Sunday. 
 
 The effect of opium is well known in giving 
 an impression of reality to the visions of concep- 
 tion or imagination : several strikng examples of 
 this will be found in the Confessions of an Opium 
 Eater. These are in general allied, or actually 
 amount, to the delusions of delirium, but they are 
 sometimes entirely of a different nature. My 
 respected friend, the late Dr. Gregory, was ac- 
 customed to relate a remarkable instance which 
 occurred to himself. He had gone to the north 
 country by sea, to visit a lady, a near relation, in 
 whom he felt deeply interested, and who was in 
 an advanced state of consinuption. In return- 
 ing from the visit, he had taken a moderate dose 
 of laudanum, with the view of preventing sea- 
 sickness, and was lying on a couch in the cabin, 
 when the figure of the lady appeared before him 
 in so distinct a manner that her actual presence 
 could not have been more vivid. He was quite 
 
SPECTKAL ILLUSIONS. '377 
 
 awake, and fully sensible that it was a phantasm 
 produced by the opiate, along- with his intense 
 mental feeling-, but he was unable by any effort 
 to banish the vision. 
 
 Some time ago I attended a g-entleman, af- 
 fected with a painfnl local disease, requiring the 
 use of large opiates, but which often failed in 
 producing sleep. In one watchful night, there 
 passed before him a long and regular exhibition 
 of characters and transactions, connected with 
 certain occurrences which had been the subject of 
 much conversation in Edinburgh some time be- 
 fore. The characters succeeded each other with 
 all the resularitv and vividness of a theatrical 
 exhibition : he heard their conversation, and 
 long speeches that were occasionally made, some 
 of which were in rhyme ; and he distinctly re- 
 membered, and repeated next day, long passages 
 from these poetical elfusions. He was quite 
 awake, and quite sensible that the whole was a 
 phantasm ; and he remarked, that when he 
 opened his eyes, the vision vanished, but instantly 
 re-appeared whenever he closed them. 
 
 IV. Erroneous impressions connected with bo- 
 dily disease, generally disease in the brain. The 
 illusions, in these cases, arise in a manner 
 strictly analogous to dreaming, and consist of 
 some former circumstances recalled into the mind, 
 and believed for the time to have a real and pre- 
 
SyS REASON. 
 
 sent existence. The diseases, in connexion with 
 which they arise, are generally of an a})oplcctic 
 or inHannnatory character, — sometimes epileptic ; 
 and they are very frequent in the affection called 
 delirium tremens, which is produced by a con- 
 tinued use of intoxicating- liquors. Dr. Gre- 
 gory used to mention in his lectures, a gentleman 
 liable to epileptic fits, in whom the paroxysm 
 was generally preceded by the appearance of an 
 old woman in a red cloak, who seemed to come 
 up to him, and strike him on the head with her 
 crutch ; at that instant, he fell down in the fit. 
 It is j)robable that there was in this case a sudden 
 attack of headach connected with the accession 
 of the paroxysm, and that this led to the vision 
 in the same manner as bodily feelings give rise 
 to dreams. One of the most singular cases on 
 record, of spectral illusions referable to this class, 
 is that of Nicolai, a bookseller in Berlin, as de- 
 scribed by himself, and quoted by Dr. Ferriar. 
 By strong mental emotions, he seems to have 
 been thrown into a state bordering upon mania ; 
 and, while in this condition, was hainited con- 
 stantly, while awake, for several months, by fi- 
 gures of men, women, animals, and birds. A 
 similar case is mentioned by Dr. Alderston ;* — a 
 man who kept a dram-shop, saw a soldier endea- 
 vouring to force himself into his house in a me- 
 
 * Edinburgh Medical Journal, vol. vi. 
 
 |l 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 379 
 
 nacing- manner ; and, in rushing- forward to pre- 
 vent him, he was astonished to find it a phan- 
 tom. He had afterwards a succession of visions 
 of persons long- dead, and others who were liv- 
 ing-. This man was cured by bleeding and pur- 
 gatives ; and the source of his first vision was 
 traced to a quarrel which he had, some time be- 
 fore, with a drunken soldier. A g-entleman from 
 America, who is also mentioned by Dr. Alder- 
 ston, was seized with severe headach, and com- 
 plained of troublesome dreams ; and, at the same 
 time, had distinct visions of his wife and family, 
 whom he had left in America. In the state of 
 delirium tremens, such visions are common, and 
 assume a variety of forms. I have known a pa- 
 tient describe distinctly a dance of fairies, going 
 on in the floor of the apartment, and give a most 
 minute account of their figures and dresses. 
 
 Similar phantasms occur in various forms, in 
 febrile diseases. A lady whom I attended some 
 years ago, on account of an inflammatory affec- 
 tion of the chest, awoke her husband one night, 
 at the commencement of her disorder, and beg- 
 ged him to get up instantly. She said she had 
 distinctly seen a man enter the apartment, pass 
 the foot of her bed, and go into a closet which 
 entered from the opposite side of the room. She 
 was quite awake, and fully convinced of the real- 
 ity of the appearance ; and, even after the closet 
 Wcis examined, it was found almost impossible to 
 
rS80 KEASON. 
 
 convince her that it was a delusion. There are 
 numerous examples of this kind on record. The 
 writer in the Christian Observer, lately referred 
 to, mentions a lady who, during- a severe illness, 
 repeatedly saw her father, who resided at the dis- 
 tance of many hundred miles, come to her bed- 
 side, and, withdrawing- the curtain, address her 
 in his usual voice and manner. A farmer men- 
 tioned by the same writer, in returning- from a 
 market, was deeply affected by a most extraor- 
 dinary brilliant light, which he thought he saw 
 upon the road, and by an appearance, in the 
 lig-ht, which he supposed to be our Saviour. He 
 was greatly alarmed, and spurring his horse, g-al- 
 loped home ; remained agitated during- the even- 
 ing ; was seized with typhus fever, then prevail- 
 ing in the neighbourhood, and died in about ten 
 days. It was afterwards ascertained that on the 
 morning of the day of the supposed vision, before 
 he left home, he had complained of headach and 
 languor ; and there can be no doubt that the 
 spectral appearance was connected with the com- 
 mencement of the fever. — Entirely analogous to 
 this, but still more striking in its circumstances, 
 is a case which I have received from an eminent 
 medical friend ; and the subject of it was a near 
 relation of his own, a lady about fifty. On return- 
 ing one evening from a party, she went into a dark 
 room, to lay aside some part of her dress, when 
 she saw distinctly before her the figure of death. 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSlOxN'S. 3HI 
 
 as a skeleton, witli his arm uplifted and a dart in 
 hand. He instantly aimed a blow at hor with 
 the dart, which seemed to strike her on the left 
 side. The same nig-ht she was seized with fever, 
 accompanied by symptoms of inflammation in 
 the left side ; but recovered after a severe illness. 
 So strongly was the vision impressed upon her 
 mind, that even for some time after her recovery 
 she could not pass the door of the room in which 
 it occurred, without discovering agitation, — de- 
 claring that it was there she met with her illness. 
 A highly intelligent friend, whom I attended 
 several years ago, in a mild but very protracted 
 fever, without delirium, had frequent interviews 
 with a spectral visitor, who presented the appear- 
 ance of an old and grey-headed man, of a most 
 benignant aspect. His visits were alwa3's con- 
 ducted exactly in the same manner : he entered 
 the room by a door which was on the left hand 
 side of the bed, passed the end of the bed, and 
 seated himself on a chair on the right hand side : 
 he then fixed his eyes upon the patient with an 
 expression of intense interest and pity, but never 
 spoke ; continued distinctly visible for some se- 
 conds, and then seemed to vanish into air. His 
 visits were sometimes repeated daily for several 
 days, but sometimes he missed a day : — and the 
 appearance continued for several weeks. The 
 same gentleman, on another occasion, when in 
 perfect health, sitting in his parlour in the even- 
 
382 KEASON. 
 
 ing, saw distinctly in the corner of the room, a 
 female figure in a kneeling- posture, who contin- 
 ued visible for several seconds. 
 
 In a lady, whose case is mentioned in the Ed- 
 inburgh Journal of Science for April 1 830, there 
 was an illusion aifecting both sight and hearing. 
 She repeatedly heard her husband's voice calling 
 to her by name, as if from an adjoining' room ; 
 and on one occasion, saw his figure most distinct- 
 ly, standing before the fire in the drawing-room, 
 when he had left the house half an hour before. 
 She went and sat down within two feet of the 
 figure, supposing it to be her husband, and was 
 greatly astonished that he did not answer when 
 she spoke to him. The figure continued visible 
 for several minutes, then moved towards a win- 
 dow at the farther end of the room, and there 
 disappeared. A few days after this appearance, 
 she saw the figure of a cat lying on the hearth- 
 rug ; and, on another occasion, while adjusting 
 her hair before a mirror, late at night, she saw 
 the countenance of a friend, dressed in a shroud, 
 reflected from the mirror, as if looking over her 
 shoulder. This lady had been, for some time, 
 in bad health, being affected with pectoral com- 
 plaints, and much nervous debility. — A remark- 
 able feature of this case was the illusion of hear- 
 ing ; and of this I have received another example 
 from a medical friend in Eng-land. A cler- 
 gyman, aged fifty-six, accustomed to full living. 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 'iS.'J 
 
 was suddenly seized with vomiting, vertigo, and 
 rinofinfr in his ears, and continued in rather an 
 alarming condition for several days. During 
 this time, he had the sound in his ears of tunes 
 most distinctly played, and in accurate succession. 
 This patient had, at the same time, a very re- 
 markable condition of vision, such as I have not 
 heard of in any other case. All objects appear- 
 ed to him inverted. This peculiarity continued 
 three days, and then ceased gradually ; — the ob- 
 jects by degrees changing their position, first to 
 the horizontal, and then to the erect. 
 
 V. To these sources of spectral illusions, we 
 are to add, though not connected with our present 
 subject, those which originate in pure miscon- 
 ception ; the imagination working up into a 
 spectral illusion, something which is really a 
 very trivial occurrence. Of this class is an anec- 
 dote mentioned by Dr. Hibbert, of a whole ship's 
 company being thrown into the utmost state of 
 consternation, by the apparition of a cook who 
 had died a few days before. He was distinctly 
 seen walking a-head of the ship, with a peculiar 
 gait, by which he was distinguished when alive, 
 from having one of his legs shorter than the other. 
 On steering the ship toward the object, it was 
 found to be a piece of floating wreck. A story 
 referable to the same principle is related by Dr. 
 Ferriar : — Agentleman travelling in the highlands 
 
384 REASON. 
 
 of Scotland, was conducted to a bedroom which 
 was reported to be haunted by the spirit of a man 
 who had there committed suicide. In the night 
 he awoke under the influence of a frightful 
 dream, and found himself sitting- up in bed with 
 a pistol grasped in his right hand. On looking 
 round the room, he now discovered by the 
 moonlight, a corpse dressed in a shroud reared 
 against the wall, close by the window ; the fea- 
 tures of the body, and every part of the funeral 
 apparel being perceived distinctly. On recover- 
 ing from the first impulse of terror, so far as to 
 investigate the source of the phantom, it was 
 found to be produced by the moonbeams form- 
 ing a long bright image through the broken win- 
 dow. — Two esteemed friends of mine, while tra- 
 velling in the Highlands, had occasion to sleep in 
 separate beds in one apartment. One of them, 
 having awoke in the night, saw, by the moonlight, 
 a skeleton hanging from the head of his friend's 
 bed, — every part of it being perceived in the most 
 distinct manner. He instantly got up to inves- 
 tigate the source of the illusion, and found it to 
 be produced by the moonbeams falling upon the 
 drapery of the bed, which had been thrown back, 
 in some unusual manner, on account of the heat 
 of the weather. He returned to bed, and soon 
 fell asleep. But having awoke again some time 
 after, the skeleton was still so distinctly before 
 him, that he could not sleep without again get- 
 
 5 
 
 I 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 385 
 
 tin^ up to trace the origin of the phantom. De- 
 termined not to be disturbed a third time, he 
 now broug-ht down the curtain into its usual state, 
 and the skeleton appeared no more. 
 
 2 c 
 
PART IV. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION TO 
 
 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 There has been much difference of opinion 
 among- philosophers, in regard to the place which 
 medicine is entitled to hold among the physical 
 sciences ; for, while one has maintained that it 
 " rests upon an eternal basis, and has within it 
 the power of rising to perfection," it has been 
 distinctly asserted by another, that " almost the 
 only resource of medicine is the art of conjec- 
 turing." " The following apologue," says D*A- 
 lembert, " made by a physician, a man of wit and 
 of philosophy, represents very well the state of 
 that science. Nature," says he, " is fighting 
 with the disease ; a blind man armed with a club, 
 
UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 387 
 
 that is the physician, comes to settle the differ- 
 ence. He first tries to make peace ; when he 
 cannot accomplisli this, he lifts his club and 
 strikes at random ; if he strikes the disease, he 
 kills the disease ; if he strikes nature, he kills 
 nature." " An eminent physician," says the same 
 writer, renouncing- a practice which he had exer- 
 cised for thirty years, said, " I am wearied of 
 guessing-." 
 
 The uncertainty of medicine, which is thus a 
 theme both for the philosopher and the humorist, 
 is deeply felt by the practical physician in the 
 daily exercise of his art. It becomes, therefore, 
 an inquiry of the utmost importance, — what the 
 sources of this uncertainty are, — where that point 
 is in our researches at which its influence be- 
 gins, — and, when we arrive at this point, what 
 the means are by which it may be diminished. 
 
 The perfect uniformity of all the phenomena 
 of nature, we have seen to be the foundation of 
 the certainty of results in physical science. For, 
 when the order and relations of these pheno- 
 mena have once been ascertained, we calculate 
 with confidence that they will continue to ob- 
 serve the same order. Proceeding upon this con- 
 fidence, in relations which have been observed 
 regarding the heavenly bodies, the astronomer 
 foretells their positions even at very distant pe- 
 riods. In the same manner, the chemist, having 
 
388 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ascertained the actions which take place when 
 certain substances are brought into contact, and 
 the new combinations which follow, decides with 
 confidence, that, in every instance in which these 
 ag-ents are brought together, the same actions 
 will take place, and will be followed by the same 
 combinations. This confidence, which lies at 
 the foundation of all science, we have seen to be 
 an original or instinctive principle, and not the 
 result of experience ; but it is the province of 
 experience to ascertain the particular sequences to 
 which it may be applied ; in other words, to dis- 
 tinguish casual relations and sequences, from those 
 which we are entitled to consider as uniform. 
 
 The uncertainty of medicine resolves itself 
 chiefly into an apparent want of that uniformity 
 of phenomena, which is so remarkable in other 
 branches of physical science. There are, in par- 
 ticular, two departments of our inquiries, in which 
 we feel continually the effect of this want of uni- 
 formity — the characters and the progress of dis- 
 ease, — and the action of external agents upon the 
 body. 
 
 Since medicine was first cultivated as a science, 
 a leading object of attention has ever been, to as- 
 certain the characters or symptoms by which par- 
 ticular internal diseases are indicated, and by 
 which they are distinguished from other diseases 
 which resemble them. But, with the accumu- 
 lated experience of ages bearing upon this im- 
 
 
UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 389 
 
 portant subject, our extended observation has 
 only served to convince us how deficient we are 
 in this department, and how often, even in the 
 first step in our prog-ress, we are left to conjec- 
 ture. A writer of high eminence has even ha- 
 zarded the assertion, that those persons are most 
 confident in resrard to the characters of disease 
 whose knowledge is most limited, and that more 
 extended observation g-enerally leads to doubt. 
 After showing the uncertainty of the symptoms 
 which are usually supposed to indicate effusion in 
 the thorax, Morgagni adds the remarkable asser- 
 tion to which I here allude ; *' qui enim plura 
 corpora inspexerunt, hi saltem, cum illi nil dubi- 
 tant, ipsi dubitare didicerunt." If such uncer- 
 tainty hangs over our knowledge of the charac- 
 ters of disease, it will not be denied that at least 
 an equal degree of uncertainty attends its pro- 
 g-ress. We have learnt, for example, the various 
 modes by which internal inflammation terminates, 
 — as resolution, suppuration, gangrene, adhesion, 
 and effusion ; but, in regard to a particular case 
 of inflammation which is before us, how little no- 
 tion can we form of what will be its progress, or 
 how it will terminate. 
 
 An equal or even a more remarkable uncer- 
 tainty attends all our researches on the second 
 head to which 1 have referred, namely, the action 
 of external agents upon the body. These en- 
 gage our attention in two respects — as causes of 
 
390 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 disease, and as remedies ; and, in both these views, 
 the action of them is fraught with the highest 
 degree of uncertainty. In regard to the action 
 of external agents as causes of disease, we may 
 take a single example in the effects of cold. Of 
 six individuals who have been exposed to cold 
 in the same degree, and, so far as we can judge, 
 under the same circumstances, one may be seized 
 with inflammation of the lungs, one with diarrhoea, 
 and one with rheumatism, while three may es- 
 cape without any injury. Not less remarkable 
 is the uncertainty in regard to the action of re- 
 medies. One case appears to yield with readi- 
 ness to the remedies that are employed ; on an- 
 other, which we have every reason to believe to 
 be of the same nature, no effect is produced in ar- 
 resting its fatal progress ; while a third, which 
 threatened to be equally formidable, appears to 
 cease without the operation of any remedy at all. 
 With these complicated sources of uncertainty, 
 which meet us at every step in our medical in- 
 quiries, it is almost unnecessary to contrast the 
 perfect uniformity of phenomena, on a confidence 
 in which we proceed in other departments of sci- 
 ence. When we mix together pieces of zinc, sul- 
 phuric acid, and water, we pronounce with per- 
 fect confidence, that the water will be decom- 
 posed, hydrogen evolved, the metal oxidated, the 
 oxyd dissolved, and sulphate of zinc produced ; 
 we pronounce with equal confidence on all the 
 
UNCERTAJNTV Ol' MEDICINE. 391 
 
 jn'opeities, inechaiiiciil iind chemical, of tlie new 
 compound which is thus to be formed ; and, in 
 no case, have we the smallest doubt of the exact 
 occurrence of every step in this complicated pro- 
 cess. With what different feelings we contem- 
 plate, in its commencement, a case of dangerous 
 internal disease, — its probable progress and termi- 
 nation, and the effect which our remedies are 
 likely to produce in arresting- it, — those best can 
 tell who have most experienced them. 
 
 The certainty of a science, as was formerly 
 stated, depends upon two circumstances ; namely, 
 the facility with which we ascertain the true re- 
 lations and tendencies of things, or trace effects 
 to their true causes, and causes to their true ef- 
 fects, — and the confidence with which we rely on 
 the actions, dependant on these relations, continu- 
 ing to occur in all cases with perfect uniformity. 
 This confidence we easily attain in those sci- 
 ences in which we have to deal only with inani- 
 mate matter. We do so by means of experiments, 
 in which, by placing the substances in various 
 circumstances towards each other, we come to 
 ascertain their true tendencies with perfect cer- 
 tainty, and to separate them from the influence 
 of all associations which are only casual and inci- 
 dental. Having thus discovered their tendencies 
 or actions, we rely with confidence on these con- 
 tinuing to be uniform ; and, should we in any in- 
 
392 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 stance be disappointed in the action which we 
 wish to produce, we are able to trace the cause 
 bj which the expected result has been prevented, 
 and to obviate the effect of its interference. 
 
 In both these respects, we find in medicine a 
 deg'ree of uncertainty, which marks a striking- dis- 
 tinction between it and the purely physical sci- 
 ences. 
 
 I. There is great difficulty, in medicine, in 
 tracing- effects to their true causes, and causes to 
 their true effects. This difficulty has already been 
 illustrated, by the same cause appearing to pro- 
 duce in different instances different diseases, or 
 no disease at all j and by a disease seeming to 
 subside under the use of a remedy, which, in a 
 similar case, fails to produce the smallest benefit. 
 When we find our researches thus encumbered 
 with uncertainty, we cannot, as in other sciences, 
 clear them from the influence of casual relations, 
 by means of direct experiment ; but are obliged 
 to trust chiefly to the slow course of observation, 
 as the relations happen to be presented to us. 
 Hence just conclusions are arrived at slowly, and 
 we may be obliged to go on through a long course 
 of observations, before we arrive at any results 
 which we feel to be worthy of confidence. Hence 
 also arises the great temptation to grasp at par- 
 tial and premature conclusions, from which me- 
 dical science has suffered so much injury. For, 
 
UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 393 
 
 when such conchisions are broiig-ht forward witli 
 confidence, as long- a course of observation may 
 be required for exposing their fallacy, as might 
 have been sufficient for ascertaining the truth. 
 In this respect, we see the remarkable difference 
 between medicine and the purely physical sci- 
 ences ; as, in the latter, a single experiment may 
 often be sufficient to overturn the most plausible 
 hypothesis, or to establish one which has been 
 proposed only in conjecture. 
 
 II. Even after we have ascertained the true 
 relations and tendencies of things, we are con- 
 stantly liable to disappointment in medicine, when 
 we endeavour to produce certain results by bring- 
 ing these tendencies into action. This arises from 
 the silent operation of a new order of causes, 
 by which the phenomena of disease are varied 
 and modified ; and by which the action of exter- 
 nal agents is aided, modified, or counteracted, in 
 a manner which altogether eludes our researches. 
 The causes which thus operate are certain pow- 
 ers, in the living body itself, the action of which 
 is entirely beyond our control ; and others aris- 
 ing out of the peculiarities of age, sex, tempera- 
 ment of body and mind, and mental emotions ; 
 constituting a class of agents of a most powerful 
 kind, of which it is impossible to estimate the 
 combined operation. It is farther to be kept in 
 view% that these various agents may be acting to- 
 
394 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 getlier, or in opposition to each other, or under 
 a variety of combinations ; and that, in reference 
 to our attempts to act upon the body by reme- 
 dies, they may be operating in concert with, or 
 in opposition to, these attempts. Hence arises a 
 most extensive source of uncertainty, in all our 
 investig-ations, of which it is impossible to calcu- 
 late the effect, or the extent. Hence also arises 
 that apparent want of uniformity in the phenome- 
 na of disease, by which we are so much impeded 
 in our researches ; and that want of uniformity 
 in the action of remedies, by which our efforts in 
 medicine are so often disappointed. 
 
 ni. Another source of uncertainty in the 
 practical art of medicine, is the difficulty which 
 we find in applying- to new cases, the knowledg-e 
 which we have acquired from observation. This 
 application is made upon the principle either of 
 experience or analog-y. We are said to proceed 
 upon experience, when the circumstances in the 
 new case are the same as in those cases from 
 which our knowledge was derived. When the 
 circumstances are not the same, but similar, we 
 proceed upon analogy ; and our confidence in 
 the result is weaker than when we proceed upon 
 experience. The more numerous the points of 
 resemblance are, the greater is our confidence, be- 
 cause it approaches the more nearly to that which 
 we derive from experience ; and the fewer the 
 
UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 395 
 
 points of resemblance, our confidence is more 
 and more diminished. When, in the practice 
 of medicine, we apply to new cases, the know- 
 ledge acquired from others which we believe 
 to have been of the same nature, the difficulties 
 are so g-reat, that it is doubtful, whether in any 
 case, we can properly be said to act upon ex- 
 perience, as we do in other departments of sci- 
 ence. For we have not the means of determin- 
 ing with certainty, that the condition of the 
 disease, the habit of the patient, and all the cir- 
 cumstances which enter into the character of the 
 affection, are in any two cases precisely the same : 
 and, if they differ in any one particular, we can- 
 not be said to act from experience, but only from 
 analogy. The difficulties and sources of uncer- 
 tainty, which meet us at every stage of such in- 
 vestigations, are, in fact, so great and so numer- 
 ous, that those who have had the most extensive 
 opportunities of observation will be the first to 
 acknowledge, that our pretended experience must, 
 in general, sink into analogy, and even our ana- 
 logy too often into conjecture. 
 
 In a science encumbered with so many diffi- 
 culties, and encompassed by so many sources of 
 error, it is obvious what cause we have for pro- 
 ceeding with the utmost caution, and for advanc- 
 ing from step to step with the greatest circum- 
 spection. In attempting a slight outline of a sub- 
 ject so extensive, and so important, I shall con- 
 
 3 
 
396 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 fine myself to a few leading rules of a strictly 
 practical nature. 
 
 The objects to be kept in view in all our inves- 
 tigations appear to be the following : 
 
 I. To acquire an extensive collection of well 
 authenticated facts. 
 
 II. To arrange, classify, combine, or separate 
 these facts. 
 
 III. To trace among the facts, sequences or 
 relations, particularly the relation of cause and 
 effect. 
 
 IV. From an extensive collection of facts, to 
 deduce general facts or general principles. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION OF 
 
 FACTS. 
 
 The foundation of all knowledge must be a 
 careful and extensive acquisition of facts ; and the 
 
LAWS OF MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. 397 
 
 first duty of an inquirer in any department of 
 science is to bind himself down to such a patient 
 accumulation, bewaring of all premature attempts 
 to combine or generalize them. 
 
 In the acquisition of facts, we depend partly 
 upon our own observation, and partly on the tes- 
 timony of others. The former source is necessa- 
 rily limited in extent, but it is that in which we 
 have the greater confidence ; for, in receiving 
 facts on the testimony of others, we require to 
 be satisfied, not only of the veracity of the narra- 
 tors, but also of their habits as philosophical ob- 
 servers, and of the opportunities which they have 
 had of ascertaining the facts. In the degree of 
 evidence which we require for new facts, we are 
 also influenced, as was formerly stated, by their 
 probability, or their accordance with facts pre- 
 viously known to us ; and, for facts which appear 
 to us improbable, we require a higher amount of 
 testimony, than for those in accordance with our 
 previous knowledge. This necessary caution, 
 however, while it preserves us from credulity, 
 should not, on the other hand, be allowed to en- 
 gender scepticism ; for both these extremes are 
 equally unworthy of a mind which devotes itself 
 with candour to the discovery of truth. 
 
 In forming a collection of facts, therefore, in 
 reference to any investigation, we may state the 
 cautions to be observed, and the errors to be 
 
398 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 guarded against, as chiefly referable to the fol- 
 lowing points : 
 
 I. Receiving facts on the testimony of persons 
 of doubtful veracity, or whom we suspect of hav- 
 ing purposes to answer by disguising, colouring, 
 or modifying them. 
 
 II. Receiving facts on the testimony of per- 
 sons, of whom we have doubts of their opportu- 
 nities of acquiring correct information, or of their 
 powers and habits of accurate observation : re- 
 ceiving, for example, important statements, on 
 the authority of hasty and superficial observers, 
 or of incompetent persons, not professional. 
 
 III. Partial statements of facts, bearing upon 
 one view of a subject, or one side of a question, 
 or collected in support of a particular doctrine. 
 This, when simply stated, will be universally ad- 
 mitted to be an error of the first magnitude in 
 every scientific investigation ; and yet, I ima- 
 gine, it would not be difficult, even in very re- 
 cent times, to find some remarkable examples of 
 it. There is, indeed, scarcely any doctrine which 
 may not, in the hands of an ingenious person, 
 be wrought up, in this manner, into a fair sys- 
 tem, amply supported by facts ; and it is obvious, 
 that nothing can be more contrary to the rules 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 3f)f) 
 
 of sound inquiry. On this ground we may even 
 make it a rule, to receive with suspicion the state- 
 ments of a writer, when we find him first propo- 
 sing- his doctrine, and then proceeding- to collect 
 from all quarters, facts in support of it. Such a 
 mode of investig^ation must be considered as con- 
 trary to the principles of fair induction ; for these 
 lead us first to take a full view of the facts, and 
 then to trace the principles or doctrines which 
 arise out of them. 
 
 IV. Receiving as facts, on which important 
 conclusions are to be founded, circumstances 
 which are trivial, incidental, or foreign to the 
 subject. For example, in the investigation of 
 affections of the spinal cord, appearances have 
 been often considered as indicative of disease, 
 which we have good reason to believe have 
 arisen merely from the position of the body after 
 death. In the same manner, in the investigation 
 of a certain class of diseases, an important place 
 has been assigned to slight appearances in the 
 gastro-intestinal membrane, which, we have rea- 
 son to believe, are entirely incidental, and worthy 
 of no confidence in a pathological inquiry. 
 
 V. Receiving as facts statements which falsely 
 obtain that name. The sources of fallacy to be 
 kept in view under this head are chiefly the fol- 
 lowing*. 
 
400 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 (1.) Receiving as facts statements whicli are 
 not facts but opinions. — A person dies after be- 
 ing* affected with a certain set of symptoms, and 
 we find, on examination after death, the usual 
 appearances of hydrocephalus. Another is seized 
 with similar symptoms, and recovers. He is 
 therefore said to have recovered from hydroce- 
 phalus, and such a statement is often given as a 
 medical fact. The man's recover v from certain 
 symptoms is a fact ; that he recovered from hy- 
 drocephalus is not a fact, but an opinion. 
 
 (2.) Receiving- as a fact, a statement which 
 only assumes the relation of facts. — A person 
 recovers from a particular disease, while he was 
 using a particular remedy. His recovery is as- 
 cribed to the effect of the remedy ; and the cure 
 of the disease by this remedy is often given as a 
 medical fact. The man's recovery is a fact ; and 
 that he used the remedy is another fact ; but the 
 connexion of the remedy with his recovery we 
 are not entitled to assume as a fact : — It is tracing 
 between the facts the relation of cause and effect, 
 — a process of the utmost delicacy, and not to be 
 admitted on any occasion, without the greatest 
 caution. 
 
 (3.) Receiving as facts, general statements, or 
 the generalization of facts. One of the most 
 common examples of this error occurs, when a 
 statement is given of a symptom or set of symp- 
 toms as certainly diagnostic of any particular 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 401 
 
 disease, or of a particular morbid condition of an 
 internal organ. Such a statement we hold to 
 be of no value, unless we have absolute confi- 
 dence in the narrator, both in regard to his ha- 
 bits as a philosophical observer, and to the ex- 
 tent of the observations on which his statement 
 is founded. But, with every possible advantage 
 in these respects, we are to exercise the utmost 
 caution before we receive the relation, thus stated, 
 as a fact ; for it is to be kept in mind, that it is 
 not properly a fact, but a generalization of facts. 
 Some writers, for instance, have maintained with 
 much confidence, that a particular state of ri- 
 gidity of some of the limbs is distinctly charac- 
 teristic of ramollissement of the brain. But 
 farther observation has shown that the disease 
 may exist without this symptom, and that this 
 condition of the limbs may appear in connexion 
 with other diseases. Their observation of facts 
 was in so far correct, that this state of limbs does 
 very often accompany ramollissement of the brain; 
 the error consisted in giving it as a general fact, 
 or a fact applicable to all cases of ramollissement — 
 which is without foundation. Yet such statements, 
 when brought forward with confidence, are often 
 received as facts, and rested upon as established 
 principles ; and then the facts by which their fal- 
 lacy might be detected are apt to be overlooked 
 or forgotten. 
 
 This may perhaps be considered as one of the 
 
 2 D 
 
402 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 most prevailing errors in the modern science of 
 medicine ; and it is indeed astonishing to observe 
 the confidence with which such statements are 
 brought forward, and the facility with which 
 they are received as equivalent to facts, without 
 attention to the manifold sources of fallacy with 
 which they are encumbered. Does a writer, 
 for example, tell us he has ascertained that the 
 spinal cord is diseased in all cases of Tetanus. 
 If we knew that such a statement had been 
 founded on the careful observation of an hun- 
 dred cases, it would be of value ; if it was de- 
 duced from a few, its value is greatly dimi- 
 nished. But even if it had been deduced from 
 the larger number, certain doubts would still 
 arise in considering the relation thus stated as a 
 fact. We should naturally ask ourselves, — was 
 the narrator qualified to judge of the facts and 
 their relations, — were the cases referred to all 
 really cases of Tetanus, — were the appearances 
 in the cord such as could properly be considered 
 as indicating disease, — or might any of them have 
 been mere changes of colour, or other incidental 
 appearances, which might have taken place after 
 death, or might have been the effect of the con- 
 vulsion rather than its cause, — or were they such 
 changes as may be found in other cases without 
 any symptoms of Tetanus. Other sources of 
 fallacy will come into view, if the statement be, 
 that the narrator has uniformly found a certain 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 403 
 
 remedy of groat efficacy in a particular disease. 
 Here, in the first place, similar questions occur 
 as in the former instance ; — on how many cases 
 did he found his statement, — how did he ascer- 
 tain the disease, — and was he qualified to decide 
 that it really was a case of the disease which he 
 alleges. But, supposing all these questions to 
 be answered in a satisfactory manner, others 
 still arise, namely, — had the alleged treatment 
 really any influence on the recovery of the pa- 
 tients, — did they get well in consequence of the 
 treatment, or in spite of it, or altogether indepen- 
 dently of it, — have not similar cases recovered 
 spontaneously, or under modes of treatment en- 
 tirely different. — Such is the uncertainty of cau- 
 sation and generalization in medicine ; and such 
 is the danger of receiving general statements as 
 equivalent to facts. 
 
 VI. In forming a collection of facts on which 
 we are to found any conclusions, it is always to 
 be kept in mind, that fallacy may arise from the 
 absence of important facts, as well as from the 
 reception of statements which are untrue. Hence 
 the erroneous conclusions that may be deduced 
 from statements which are strictly true ; and 
 hence the fallacious systems that are built up 
 with every appearance of plausibility and truth, 
 when facts are collected on one side of a question, 
 or in support of a particular doctrine. 
 
404 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 In forming a collection of facts, therefore, as 
 the preliminary step in any inquiry, the follow- 
 ing rules ought to be kept strictly and constantly 
 in view, before we advance to any conclusions. 
 
 I. That all the facts be fully ascertained, — that 
 those collected by ourselves be derived from suf- 
 ficient observation, — and that those which we re- 
 ceive from others be received only on the testi- 
 mony of persons fully qualified to judge of their 
 accuracy, and who have had sufficient opportuni- 
 ties of acquiring them. 
 
 II. That the statement include a full and fair 
 view of all the facts which ought to be taken in- 
 to the investigation ; — that none of them be dis- 
 guised, or modified so as to be made to bear up- 
 on a particular doctrine ; and that no essential 
 facts be wanting. 
 
 III. That the statement do not include facts 
 which are trivial, incidental, or foreign to the 
 subject. 
 
 IV. That we do not receive as facts, state- 
 ments which are not facts, but opinions or gene- 
 ral assumptions. 
 
COMBINING AND SEPARATING FACTS. 105 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF ARRANGING, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING 
 
 FACTS. 
 
 The precautions now siigg-ested appear to be 
 those which it is necessary to keep in view, in 
 making a collection of facts respecting any sub- 
 ject under investigation. Our next step is, to 
 arrange the facts according to the characters in 
 which they agree ; to separate from the mass 
 those which appear to be only fortuitous or occa- 
 sional concomitants ; and to place by themselves 
 those which we have reason to consider as a uni- 
 form and legitimate series or sequence. This is 
 the first step towards tracing the relations of the 
 facts ; and, in every investigation, it is a process 
 of the utmost consequence. In the other depart- 
 ments of physical science, this object is accom- 
 plished by means of experiments. These are so 
 contrived as to bear distinctly upon particular 
 points ; and, by the result of them, we are ena- 
 bled to separate associations which are incidental, 
 from those which are uniform ; or, in other words, 
 to ascertain what number of the circumstances, 
 which we find associated in a particular series, 
 are really connected with the result which fol- 
 lows. In medicine, this is a process of greater 
 
406 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 difficulty, because we are obliged to trust to the 
 slower course of minute and long continued ob- 
 servation. 
 
 The rules to be observed under this head are 
 essential to every department of medical inquiry ; 
 but, perhaps, they are peculiarly important in our 
 observations respecting the phenomena of disease. 
 By this, we mean such an acquaintance with the 
 symptoms which characterise particular diseases, 
 and the morbid appearances in the cases which are 
 fatal, as shall enable us to trace the relation be- 
 tween the symptoms and the nature and seat of 
 the disease. A full collection of uniform and es- 
 sential facts on these subjects, cleared, as far as 
 we are able, from all incidental combinations, is 
 the only true foundation of medical science ; and 
 every system, however ingenious, which rests 
 upon any other, can be nothing better than hy- 
 pothesis and conjecture. It is an essential, but 
 difficult, part of medical investigation, and one 
 which we must conduct with much patience, 
 without allowing ourselves to be seduced by 
 theory or system, from the path of rigid observa- 
 tion. In prosecuting it, we must be cautious 
 in considering our conclusions as perfect, but 
 make it our constant study, by farther observa- 
 tion, to clear them more and more from every 
 source of error. 
 
 Whatever leads the mind from the importance 
 and the difficulty of this investigation is injuri- 
 
COMBINING AND SEPARATING FACTS. iU7 
 
 oiis to medical science. The error to be chiefly 
 avoided, is a fondness for system ; and I must 
 confess my suspicion, that, in this respect, a zeal 
 for nosolog-y has been unfavourable to the prog-ress 
 of medicine. The nosologist proceeds upon the 
 principle, that the characters of disease are, to a 
 certain extent, fixed and determined, like the bo- 
 tanical characters of a plant, or the chemical pro- 
 perties of a mineral. Hence, it too frequently 
 happens, that individual cases are compared with 
 the system, instead of the system being corrected 
 by farther observation. In this manner, young 
 practitioners are in danger of attempting to as- 
 certain a disease by its agreement with the noso- 
 logical characters, and are drawn away from that 
 minute attention to the phenomena, which alone 
 can lead to correct diagnosis. Thus a medical 
 man might argue with regard to a case indicat- 
 ino- disease in the brain, that there can be no 
 effusion, because the pulse has never been below 
 the natural standard, or because the pupils are 
 not dilated ; or, with regard to an affection of 
 the abdomen, that there is no inflammation, be- 
 cause the pulse is strong and the bowels open. 
 Nosology, it is true, teaches him, that, in hydro- 
 cephalus, at a certain period, the pulse becomes 
 slow, and the pupils dilated ; and that, in intes- 
 tinal inflammation, the pulse is small and the 
 bowels obstructed ; but no great extent of obser- 
 vation is required to show, that the symptoms 
 
408 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 now mentioned are not uniform or essential to 
 these diseases. Such a confidence in system must 
 be equally injurious to the improvement of the in- 
 dividual, and to the progress of medical science ; 
 and the examples now given will be sufficient to 
 illustrate the importance of the rule which these 
 observations are intended to convey, — separating 
 facts which are occasional or incidental, from 
 those which are uniform and essential. 
 
 On this subject I shall only add the following 
 anecdote, which I lately received from a medical 
 man of very high intelligence. At an early pe- 
 riod of his career as a naval surgeon, he was left 
 in charge of a ship on the West India station, 
 when several sailors presented themselves, with 
 an affection of the legs, the nature of which was 
 entirely new to him. Having expressed his dif- 
 ficulty to one of the officers, not medical, he was 
 promptly told that the disease was scurvy, and 
 that, if he examined the gums of his patients, he 
 would find sufficient evidence. To this he re- 
 plied, that the thing was impossible, because, in 
 the nosology of Dr. Cullen, it was expressly spe- 
 cified, that scurvy occurs "in regione frigida." 
 He was, however, soon convinced that the dis- 
 ease was really scurvy, though it occurred in the 
 West Indies ; and, as he added, received a most 
 important lesson, to observe for himself, instead 
 of trusting to systems. 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 4-09 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF TRACING AMONG FACTS THE RELATION OF 
 CAUSE AND EFFECT. 
 
 Our knowledge of cause and effect, in refer- 
 ence to any two particular events, is founded 
 entirely upon the observation of a uniform se- 
 quence of the events ; or of the one following- 
 the other in a uniform manner in a great num- 
 ber of instances. The greater the number of in- 
 stances is, in which the sequence has taken place, 
 with the greater confidence, as formerly remark- 
 ed, do we expect it to take place again under 
 similar circumstances ; and every single instance, 
 in which it does not occur, weakens this con- 
 fidence, unless we can discover some adequate 
 cause by which the sequence was interrupted. 
 The result of this confidence is, that, when we 
 observe the first of two such events, we expect 
 the second to follow it ; and that, when we ob- 
 serve the second, we conclude the first has pre- 
 ceded it ; — the first we call cause, the second 
 effect. 
 
 In every department of science, it is a step of 
 the utmost delicacy to assign to two events this 
 
410 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 relation ; and manifold errors arise from assigning 
 it on inadequate grounds, — that is, on an in- 
 sufficient number of observations. In medical 
 science, we have farther to contend with pecu- 
 liar difficulties and sources of error. These have 
 been already mentioned as referable to two classes, 
 namely, — the difficulty of tracing effects to their 
 true causes, and causes to their true effects ; — 
 and the manner in which the real tendencies of 
 antecedents or causes are modified or counter- 
 acted by a new series of causes, which elude our 
 observation. From these peculiarities it often 
 happens, that the true antecedents of important 
 events are of an obscure and hidden nature ; while 
 the apparent relations would lead us to associate 
 them with antecedents, more immediately under 
 our view, but whose connexion with the results 
 is entirely incidental. Other obstacles arise from 
 difficulty in ascertaining the facts themselves, and 
 in tracing the order of the sequences ; — as, in 
 doing so, we are often obliged to trust to obscure 
 indications of actions, which are going on in in- 
 ternal parts, and which are themselves liable to 
 much uncertainty. Thus, a complicated source 
 of difficulty pervades the whole subject of medi- 
 cal causation, and makes it one of the most deli- 
 cate topics that can engage the attention of the 
 philosophical inquirer. 
 
 There are three particular views, in which, in 
 
 medical investigations, we have occasion to trace 
 
 1 
 
 .ism 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 41 1 
 
 among- successive events the relation of uniform 
 sequence, — namely, the effects of external ag-ents 
 as causes of disease, — the effects of external 
 agents as remedies, — and the connexion of cer- 
 tain morbid conditions of internal organs, with 
 certain symptoms by which these become known 
 to us. In regard to all these objects of research, 
 it is of importance to keep in mind the sources 
 of fallacy to which we are liable, in assig-ning- to 
 a succession of events the relation of uniform 
 sequence, or, in other words, in considering the 
 one as the cause of the other. 
 
 I. The connexion which we observe may be 
 entirely accidental. That causation should be 
 assig-ned on g-rounds so slight, as to admit of this 
 explanation, may appear improbable ; but no per- 
 son acquainted with the history of medicine will 
 find difficulty in pointing out examples of it, es- 
 pecially in the effects which are often ascribed to 
 remedies on the slightest possible grounds. In 
 this manner, by some bold and confident asser- 
 tion, founded, probably, on very limited obser- 
 vation, a remedy is frequently brought into re- 
 pute, as nearly infallible in a certain class of dis- 
 eases, which we find, in a very short time, con- 
 signed to oblivion, 
 
 II. The events may be closely connected, 
 but not as cause and effect. They may be 
 
412 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 effects of a third event, which is the cause of 
 both ; or they may be parts in a sequence, in 
 which we have still to discover the true antece- 
 dent. Thus, in the examination of the bodies of 
 those who have died of hydrocephalus, the liver 
 has frequently been found in a state of disease ; 
 and, upon this ground, diseased liver has been 
 stated as one of the causes of hydrocephalus. 
 This must be considered as an example of false 
 causation, for, in its reference to hydrocephalus, 
 diseased liver cannot be considered in any other 
 light than as another effect of a common cause, — 
 namely, as a result of that unhealthy state of the 
 constitution in which hydrocephalus is most apt 
 to occ!ir. When the nature of croup was first 
 investigated, the formation of a new membrane 
 was observed in the larynx, and this was consid- 
 ered as the cause of croup. Farther investiga- 
 tion, however, showed that this was but one of 
 a chain of sequences, the real antecedent of 
 which is inflammation of the membrane lining 
 the larynx. 
 
 III. The events may be really connected as 
 cause and effect, while there is difficulty in as- 
 signing to them their places in the sequence ; 
 that is, in determining which is cause and which 
 is effect. This occurs when, in ascertaining the 
 facts themselves, and the order of their sequence, 
 we are obliged to trust to external indications of 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 413 
 
 actions which are g'oing- on in internal parts. It 
 is a difficulty of frequent occurrence ; and want 
 of due attention to it appears to have been the 
 source of much fallacious reasonino-. In the in- 
 vestigations, for example, respecting- the nature 
 of continued fever, various morbid appearances 
 have been observed in the internal parts ; and each 
 of these has, in its turn, been confidently assig-ned 
 as the cause of fever. Thus, one has placed the 
 seat and cause of fever in the brain ; another in 
 the spinal cord ; a third in the gastro-intestinal 
 membrane ; and, according to one of the latest 
 doctrines, inflammation of the mucous follicles of 
 Peyer and Brunner has been confidently stated 
 as the cause of every modification of fever. It 
 does not belong- to this part of our inquiry to 
 examine minutely the comparative merit of these 
 systems. In all of them there is a correct ob- 
 servation of facts, and probably a real relation of 
 cause and effect ; the error consists in fixing the 
 order of the sequence ; for a very slight view of 
 the subject is sufficient to show, that the morbid 
 appearances on which they rest must be considered 
 as efi'ects, or incidental concomitants of fever, 
 — not as its cause. This kind of false causation 
 may also occur in other subjects. In certain 
 states of the weather, for example, many people 
 are in the habit of saying that a shower brings a 
 change of the wind. There is every reason to 
 believe that there is between the two events a 
 
414 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 real connexion of causation, but the meteorolog-ist 
 rather tells us that the change of the wind pro- 
 duces the shower. 
 
 IV. When we observe a particular chang-e in 
 the living" body, and trace an apparent relation 
 between it and some external agent which seems 
 to be the immediate antecedent, it may very 
 often happen that other agents are concerned 
 which elude our observation ; — though they have 
 been the real antecedents or agents in the change 
 which has taken place, or have contributed to it 
 in a very great degree. This is a principle of 
 most extensive application in medical causation, 
 and is one of the chief sources of its difficulty and 
 uncertainty. The agents referred to are chiefly 
 certain powers in the living body itself. These 
 in all cases exert a greater or less influence in the 
 changes which are the objects of our inquiries, 
 and, in many cases, are the sole agents in pro- 
 ducing results which we falsely and ignorantly 
 ascribe to our remedies. When a disease has 
 terminated favourably, our treatment may have 
 been proper, and may have co-operated with 
 these powers ; — it may have been totally ineffi- 
 cient and harmless, and have had no influence 
 whatever in producing the result ; — or it may 
 have been improper and hurtful, and yet these 
 powers may both have thrown off" the disease, 
 and have counteracted the eff'ects of our blind 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 4.15 
 
 interference. It is unnecessary to allude, also, 
 to the extensive influence which, in certain 
 classes of diseases, is produced by passions and 
 affections of the mind, often of so delicate a na- 
 ture, that even the person who is the subject of 
 them shall not be aware of their influence. 
 
 The sources of false causation in regard to the 
 action of remedies, therefore, may be chiefly re- 
 ferred to the following heads. 
 
 1. The disease being thrown off" by the powers 
 of the constitution itself, or removed by some 
 circumstances either external or mental, which 
 are not taken into account, or perhaps not 
 known ; while the recovery of the patient is as- 
 cribed to some remedy which he was using at 
 the time, but which had no influence whatever 
 in producing it. From this source have arisen 
 the many instances of inert or trivial remedies 
 acquiring a temporary reputation, which have 
 been afterwards entirely neglected, or even ex- 
 punged from the pharmacopoeia. The only means 
 of avoiding this error, is by using the utmost 
 caution in assigning eff'ects to particular reme- 
 dies, and doing so only after extensive and 
 careful observation. On the other hand, we are 
 not entitled to decide, a priori^ that any particu- 
 lar substance to which certain eff'ects are ascribed 
 is inert or unworthy of attention. Candid and 
 careful observation of facts must be our guide in 
 this case, as well as in the former. 
 
416 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 This source of false causation is particularly to be 
 kept in view, in regard to those diseases which are 
 greatly influenced by adventitious causes, — such 
 as mental emotions, or the patient's external cir- 
 cumstances. A gentleman, immersed in the bu- 
 siness or the pleasures of a great city, becomes 
 disordered in his health, dyspeptic and hypochon- 
 driacal. He receives much good advice from his 
 medical friend, which he professes to follow with 
 implicit confidence, and proceeds to do so amid the 
 anxieties of business, bad air, late hours, luxurious 
 dinners, and nearly the total want of bodily ex- 
 ercise. Deriving no benefit from all that is done 
 for him, he hears of some celebrated water, 
 which has acquired great reputation in the cure 
 of stomach complaints, and at length makes up 
 his mind to resort thither, though with little hope 
 of deriving benefit from any thing. He now 
 lays aside all business, lives by rule, keeps early 
 hours, and is all day long in the open air. He 
 soon recovers excellent health, and cordially con- 
 curs in spreading the fame of the water by which 
 a cure so wonderful has been accomplished. An 
 anecdote has been related of a physician in 
 London having advised a dyspeptic patient, who 
 had baffled all his remedies, to go down and 
 consult a celebrated physician in Inverness, 
 whose name he gave him. On arriving there, 
 he soon discovered that there was no such 
 person to be found. He then returned to Lon- 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 4 17 
 
 (lou, somewhat nettkMl at the trick whicU liad 
 been practised upon hiin, though he was obliged 
 to acknowledg'e that he was cured of his dis- 
 order. 
 
 On this subject we are especially to keep in 
 mind, the extensive class of diseases which are 
 acted upon, in a most powerful manner, by causes 
 entirely mental. These are the numerous and 
 ever varying maladies which are included inider 
 the terms, dyspeptic, hypochondriacal, and ner- 
 vous. Many of them have their origin in mental 
 emotions which elude observation ; and avery large 
 proportion are entirely referable to indolence, and 
 inaction, — to that vacuity of mind attending the 
 unfortunate condition in which there is no ob- 
 ject in life but to find amusement for the passing 
 hour. When, on patients of this description, the 
 dexterous empiric produces resultswhichthescien- 
 tific physician had failed to accomplish, we are too 
 apt to accuse him, in sweeping terms, of practising 
 upon their credulity. He, in fact, employs a class 
 of remedies of the most powerful kind, to which 
 the other perhaps attaches too little importance, 
 namely mental excitement and mental occupation, 
 — the stimulus of having something to hope and 
 something to do. Examples of this kind must 
 have occurred to every practical physician. I 
 have known a young lady, who had been confined 
 to bed for months, and had derived no benefit 
 from the most careful medical treatment, restored 
 
 '2e 
 
418 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 to health by the excitement of a marriage taking 
 place in the family. Changes of circumstances, 
 also, or misfortunes which called for new and un- 
 usual exertion, have often been known to produce 
 similar results ; and it is a matter of old and fre- 
 quent observation, that diseases of the nervous 
 class disappear during periods of public alarm and 
 political convulsion. Nor is it only on diseases 
 of this nature that remarkable effects are pro- 
 duced by mental causes ; for mental excitement 
 is known to operate in a powerful manner on dis- 
 eases of a much more tangible character. Dr. 
 Gregory was accustomed to relate the case of a 
 naval officer, who had been for some time laid up 
 in his cabin, and entirely unable to move, from a 
 violent attack of gout, when notice was brought 
 to him that the vessel was on fire, — in a few mi- 
 nutes he was on deck, and the most active man 
 in the ship. Cases of a still more astonishing 
 kind are on record. A woman, mentioned by 
 Diemerbroeck, who had been many years para- 
 lytic, recovered the use of her limbs when she 
 was much terrified during a thunder-storm, and 
 was making violent efforts to escape from a cham- 
 ber in which she had been left alone. A man, 
 affected in the same manner, recovered as sud- 
 denly, when his house was on fire ; and another, 
 who had been ill for six years, was restored to 
 the use of his paralytic limbs, during a violent 
 paroxysm of anger. 
 
TUACING CAUSATION. 4<19 
 
 2. Referring symptoms to a cause which is al- 
 together hypothetical, and then assigning to par- 
 ticular remedies the power of removing this cause. 
 To this head we may refer the remedies which 
 were at one time supposed to expel morbific mat- 
 ter in fever — those which are believed to purify 
 the blood — to remove congestions at the origin 
 of the nerves — to equalize the circulation, &c. 
 
 3. jNIistaking the nature of a disease, and re- 
 presenting a remedy as having cured an affec- 
 tion which did not exist. There is ground for 
 believing that this error has frequently occurred 
 in medical science, and has been the source of 
 many statements, in which remarkable effects 
 have been ascribed to particular modes of treat- 
 ment in various formidable diseases. There 
 seems little reason to doubt, that, in this manner, 
 hysterical affections have sometimes been mis- 
 taken for epilepsy or tetanus, — abdominal dis- 
 tention for peritonitis, — chronic bronchial affec- 
 tions for consumption, — febrile oppression in 
 children for hydrocephalus, — irritable urethra or 
 bladder for stricture or calculus, — and affections 
 of the bowels for diseases of the liver. Many 
 similar examples will occur to those who are 
 conversant with the history of medicine. The 
 error may occur to the respectable practitioner, 
 from misapprehension, arising out of the uncer- 
 tainty of the art ;' but it also appears to be one 
 of the great resources of the empiric. When 
 
420 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 we hear, therefore, of marvellous cures of formi- 
 dable diseases, our first inquiry ought to be, not 
 merely whether the patient recovered, but what 
 evidence there is that the alleged disease ever 
 existed. 
 
 Such are the difficulties and uncertainties of 
 medical causation ; and such is the ground for 
 caution in considering two events as connected 
 in the manner of cause and effect. Among the 
 sources of this difficultv, there are several cir- 
 cumstances which are entirely beyond our reach, 
 and the influence of which upon our researches we 
 cannot hope entirely to overcome ; but, by keep- 
 ing steadily in view the sources of error by which 
 we are surrounded, we may avoid any very fal- 
 lacious conclusions, and may make some pro- 
 gress towards the truth. In regard to the ef- 
 fects of medicines, in particular, there are two 
 opposite errors to be equally avoided ; namely, 
 an implicit confidence in the power of particular 
 remedies, and a total scepticism in regard to the 
 resources of medicine. Both these extremes are 
 equally unworthy of persons of calm philosophi- 
 cal observation ; and they who advance careful- 
 ly in the middle course, not misled by the temp- 
 tation to hasty conclusions, and cautioned, but 
 not discouraged, by the dangers of concluding 
 falsely, are most likely to contribute something 
 towards diininishinG" the uncertaintv of medicine. 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 421 
 
 Before leaving- the subject of causation, I would 
 briefly allude to a confusion which has been in- 
 troduced into the lang-uai^e of medicine, by the 
 division of the causes of disease into predispos- 
 ing-, exciting, and proximate. It is well known 
 that a cause which appears to produce a disease, 
 in one instance, will, in another, be followed 
 by no result, or by a disease of a different kind. 
 Attempts have, according-ly, been made, to in- 
 vestigate the circumstances which produce a ten- 
 dency to be affected by particular diseases at cer- 
 tain times — and these have received the name of 
 predisposing causes, or sometimes of occasional 
 causes. The effluvia of marshes, for example, 
 are considered as the exciting cause of intermit- 
 tent fever ; but the disease is not produced in 
 all M^ho are exposed to these effluvia. Various 
 circumstances, such as fatigue and intemperance, 
 are said to act as the predisposing or occasional 
 causes. But, in other situations, fatigue and in- 
 temperance were never known to produce inter- 
 mittent fever ; and they cannot, therefore, in cor- 
 rect language, be said to be connected with the 
 disease in the manner of cause. The term proxi- 
 mate cause, again, has been applied to minute 
 changes which take place in certain functions of 
 the body, so as to constitute particular diseases. 
 Such speculations are, in general, in a great mea- 
 sure hypothetical ; but, even if they were ascer- 
 tained to be true, they must be considered as con- 
 
422 . MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 stituting" the nature and essence of the disease, 
 and could not be regarded in the light of a cause. 
 If these observations shall be considered as en- 
 titled to any weight, it will follow that the term 
 cause ousrht to be restricted to that which has 
 commonly been called the exciting cause. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL 
 PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Having, with the cautions which have been 
 referred to, collected a body of authentic facts, 
 and having traced among these facts, the relation 
 of uniform sequence, or uniform conjunction ; 
 the next step in our investigation is to bring to- 
 gether a number of these facts, or classes of facts, 
 and to endeavour to deduce from them general 
 principles. 
 
 By the process of mind which we call abstrac- 
 tion, we separate one property of a substance 
 from its other properties, or one fact from a chain 
 of facts, and contemplate it apart. Vv hen we 
 thus view a number of substances, or a number 
 of classes of facts, and separate an individual 
 
bEDUClKG GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 423 
 
 property or individual fact, which is common to 
 them all, we may then contemplate this fact or 
 property as characteristic of the whole class, — and 
 the process constitutes generalizing, or deducing 
 a general fact, or general princi})le. 
 
 Generalizing^ is to be disting-uished from clas- 
 sification, though the mental process concern- 
 ed is, in both, essentially the same. We class to- 
 gether a certain number of substances, by a pro- 
 perty in which they agree ; and in doing so, we 
 specify and enumerate the individual substances 
 included in the class. Thus, we may take a 
 number of substances differing widely in their 
 external and mechanical properties, some being 
 solid, some fluid, and some gaseous, and say, they 
 are all acids. The class being thus formed, and 
 consistino' of a defined number of substances, 
 which agree in the property of acidity, we may 
 next investigate some other property which is 
 common to all the individuals of the class, and 
 belongs to no other, and say, for example, that 
 all acids redden vegetable-blues. The former of 
 these operations is properly classification, — the lat- 
 ter is generalizing in reference to the class. In the 
 former, we take or exclude individual substances, 
 according as they possess or not the property 
 on which the classification rests ; in performing 
 the latter, the property which is assumed must 
 belong" to all the individuals without a sing-le ex- 
 ception ; or, if it does not, it must be abandoned 
 
4^4 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 as a general fact or general principle in reference 
 to the class. In classifying, we may use every 
 freedom regarding individuals, in taking or ex- 
 clij^ding them. In generalizing, we must not ex- 
 clude a single individual ; for the principle, which 
 does not include every one of them, that is, the 
 proposed fact, which is not true of all the indivi- 
 duals, is not a general fact, and consequently 
 cannot be admitted as a general principle. For 
 in physical science, to talk of exceptions to a 
 general rule, is only to say, in other words, that 
 the rule is not general, and, consequently, is un- 
 worthy of confidence. If one acid were dis- 
 covered which does not redden vegetable-blues, 
 it would belong to a history of these substances 
 to state that a certain number of them have this 
 property ; but the property of reddening vege- 
 table-blues would require to be abandoned as a 
 general fact or general principle, applicable to the 
 class of acids. 
 
 A general law, or general principle, then, is 
 nothing more than a general fact ; or a fact which 
 is invariably true of all the individual cases to 
 which it professes to apply. Deducing such facts, 
 is the great object of modern science ; and it is 
 by this peculiar character that it is distinguished 
 from the ancient science of the schools, the con- 
 stant aim of which was to discover causes. The 
 general law of gravitation, for example, is nothing 
 more than the general fact, or fact invariably true, 
 
DRDUClNii GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 4*2, 
 
 n 
 
 tliat all bodies, when left unsupported, fall to the 
 ground. There were, at one time, certain ap- 
 parent exceptions to the universality of this law, 
 naiiielv, in some very li"rht bodies, which Avere 
 not observed to full. But a little farther obser- 
 vation showed, that these are prevented from 
 falling- by being- lighter than the atmosphere, 
 and that in vacuo they observe the same law as 
 the heaviest bodies. The apparent exceptions 
 being thus brought under the law, it became 
 general, namely, the fact universally true, that 
 all unsupported bodies fall to the ground. Now, 
 of the cause of this phenomenon, we know no- 
 thing ; and what we call the general law or ge- 
 neral principle of gravitation is nothing more 
 than a universal fact, or a fact that is true with- 
 out a single exception. But, having ascertained 
 the fact to be invariably and universally true, we 
 assume it as a part of the established order of na- 
 ture, and proceed upon it with as much confidence 
 as if we knew the mysterious agency on which the 
 phenomenon depends. The establishment of the 
 fact as universal brings us to that point in the in- 
 (juiry which is the limit of our powers and capa- 
 cities, and it is sufficient for the purposes of sci- 
 ence. On the same principle it is familiar to 
 every one, that extensive discoveries have been 
 made in regard to the properties and laws of 
 heat ; but we do not know what heat is, whether 
 a distinct essence, or, as has been supposed by 
 
42G MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 some pliilosopliers, a peculiar motion of the mi- 
 nute atoms of bodies. 
 
 In the same manner, the person who first ob- 
 served iron attracted by the magnet, observed a 
 fact which was to him new and unaccountable. 
 But the same phenomenon having- been observed 
 a certain mnnber of times, a belief would arise, 
 that there existed between it and the substances 
 concerned, a connexion of cause and effect. The 
 result of this belief would be, that, when the sub- 
 stances were brought together, the attraction 
 would be expected to take place. Observations 
 would then probably be made with other sub- 
 stances, and farther observations with the same 
 substances ; and it being found, that the attrac- 
 tion took place between iron and the magnet only, 
 and that between these it took place in every in- 
 stance, the general principle would be deduced, 
 or the fact imiversally true in all instances, that 
 the magnet attracts iron. The same observation 
 applies to the other remarkable property derived 
 from the magnet, namely, pointing to the north. 
 Thephenomenon received thename of magnetism, 
 and the laws were then investigated by which it 
 was regulated ; but what we call magnetism is 
 still nothing more than a mode of expressing the 
 universal fact, that the magnet attracts iron, and 
 points to the north. On what hidden influence 
 these remarkable phenomena depend, we are still 
 as ignorant as the man who first observed them ; 
 
DEDUCING (IRNERAL PRINCIPLES. 427 
 
 and, however interestinp- it would be to know it, 
 the knowledg-e is not necessary to the investiga- 
 tion of the laws of magnetism. 
 
 These may, perhaps, be considered as fair ex- 
 amples of the inductive philosophy, as distin- 
 guished from the hypothetical systems of the era 
 which preceded it. According to these, the con- 
 stant aim of the inquirer was the explanation of 
 phenomena ; and, in the case before us, a theory 
 would have been constructed, calculated to ac- 
 count for the attraction by the fluxes and refluxes 
 of some invisible fluid or ether, which would have 
 been described with as much minuteness as if there 
 had been real ground for believing it to exist. 
 Strikingly opposed to all such speculations, is the 
 leading principle of the inductive philosophy, that 
 the last object of science is to " ascertain the uni- 
 versality of a fact." 
 
 *' The study of nature," says an eminent wri- 
 ter, " is the study of facts, not of causes." In 
 conformity with this truth, the objects of science 
 may perhaps be defined to be, — to observe facts, 
 — to trace their relations and sequences, — and to 
 ascertain the facts which are universal. It con- 
 sists in simply tracing the order which is observed 
 by the phenomena of nature; — the efficient causes 
 of these phenomena being considered as beyond the 
 reach of the human faculties, and, consequently, 
 not the legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. It 
 is thus strikingly opposed to the old philosophy, 
 
428 MEDICAL SCiE^X'E. 
 
 the constant aim of which was the explanation of 
 phenomena, and which has therefore received 
 the name of " the philosophy of causes." 
 
 This important distinction between induction 
 and hypothetical speculation, which is now so 
 firmly established in other departments of sci- 
 ence, it is to be feared has not been so fully 
 recognised in medical investigations. On the 
 contrary, every one who is acquainted with the 
 history of medical doctrines will probably ad- 
 mit, that medicine is still deeply tinged with 
 the philosophy of causes ; in other words, that 
 there is a remarkable tendency to refer pheno- 
 mena to certain obscure principles, which cannot 
 be shown to be facts, and consequently cannot 
 be considered as the objects of legitimate inquiry. 
 It is unnecessary, in this place, to refer more 
 particularly to fictitious and hypothetical princi- 
 ples of this description, which, one after another, 
 have held a prominent place in medical science. 
 If the rules of the inductive philosophy are to be 
 applied to medicine, the immediate effect of them 
 must be, to banish all such speculations, as con- 
 trary to the first rules of sound investigation. 
 They are entirely fictitious principles, framed to 
 correspond with the phenomena, instead of being 
 deduced from them. It is also, in general, be- 
 yond the reach of observation, either to establish 
 or overturn them ; and the only mode of detect- 
 ing their character, is to bring them to the test of 
 
DEDUClNi-i GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 4^29 
 
 the inquiry, — are they facts, and are the facts inii- 
 versal ? 
 
 The rules to be observed in deducing;' general 
 principles appear therefore to be the following- : 
 
 1. That the principle assumed be itself a fact. 
 
 2. That it be true, without a single exception, 
 of all the individual cases, or, in other words, — 
 that the fact be universal. 
 
 I. The first of these rules is opposed to a prac- 
 tice, lately referred to, which must be admitted 
 to have been very prevalent in medical science ; 
 namely, that of referring phenomena to fictitious 
 principles which cannot be shown to be facts. 
 Of the principles of this class, which, at various 
 periods have held a prominent place in medical 
 doctrine, some have had their day, and are now 
 forgotten ; but it may be doubted whether they 
 were inferior in value to those which have suc- 
 ceeded them. We do not now hear of viscidity 
 of the blood, lentor of the fluids, or rigidity of 
 the solids ; of morbific matter in the blood, of hot 
 or cold humours, of obstruction of the animal 
 spirits, and other doctrines by which various phe- 
 nomena were explained by the inquirers of for- 
 mer times ; but, perhaps, those of more recent 
 date can scarcely be considered as more satisfac- 
 tory. It may certainly, at least, be a question, 
 whether we can concede the character of facts 
 to irregular excitement of the nervous system, 
 
430 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 hepatic derangement, as that term is very com- 
 monly employed, and the numerous modifications 
 under which we meet with the doctrines of deter- 
 mination, irritation, congestion, sympathy, and 
 spasm. 
 
 II. The second rule is opposed to the error of 
 hasty generalizing, or of deducing a general state- 
 ment from a limited number of facts. We can 
 avoid this error, only by keeping steadily in view, 
 that general principles derive their whole value 
 from being universal facts, — or facts that are true 
 without a single exception, in regard to all the 
 individual cases to which the principle is meant 
 to apply. When they are deduced prematurely, 
 that is, from a limited number of facts, or a par- 
 tial view of their minute characters, they fail 
 entirely of the purposes which they are meant to 
 serve, and when trusted lead us into error. I 
 have formerly alluded to several examples of 
 hasty generalizing in medical science. Some 
 writers have maintained, that a certain state of 
 rigidity of the limbs is distinctly characteristic of 
 ramoUissement of the brain ; and others consider 
 every modification of fever as depending upon 
 inflammation of the gastro-intestinal membrane. 
 This rigidity of the limbs is a frequent occur- 
 rence in ramoUissement of the brain ; and, in 
 many cases of fever, there is disease of the gas- 
 tro-intestinal membrane. As a part of the his- 
 
DEDUCING (il'NEUAL PlUNCirLEiS. 431 
 
 tory of the affections, therefore, these are im- 
 portant facts ; but they are not true of all the 
 cases of ramollissenient and of fever, and conse- 
 quently cannot be admitted as general i)rinciples, 
 in reference to these affections ; — for, though they 
 are facts, the facts are not universal. 
 
 In a science such as medicine, indeed, requir- 
 ing an accumulation of facts which must often 
 be the result of the labour of ages, partial ge- 
 neralizing may sometimes be admitted merely 
 us a help to the memory ; provided we keep con- 
 stantly in view the imperfect nature of such 
 deductions, and be constantly attentive to correct 
 them by farther observations. But, when imper- 
 fect results of this kind are received as established 
 principles, they retard our progress in search of 
 truth, or even lead us farther and farther away 
 from it. The confidence is truly remarkable 
 with which such premature deductions in medi- 
 cine are brought forward, and the facility with 
 which they are often received, without examina- 
 tion, as established principles ; — much laborious 
 investigation indeed is often devoted to no other 
 purpose than showing them to be fallacious. 
 The zeal for hypothetical systems is considerably 
 gone by ; but this tendency to unsound general- 
 izing must be viewed as one of the chief errors 
 which at present retard the progress of medical 
 science ; and it may, perhaps, be contended, that 
 medicine will never attain a place among the in- 
 
432 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 ductive sciences, till inquirers agree to act steadi- 
 ly upon the rule — that every medical doctrine 
 shall be a fact, and that the fact shall be uni- 
 versal. 
 
 There are two respects in which a fondness 
 for generalizing-, in medicine, may be abused, and 
 may lead to errors of a practical nature. The 
 one consists in assuming a fact as general, which 
 is not really true of all the individual cases ; — 
 various examples of this have been already refer- 
 red to. The other arises from extending a fact 
 or principle which is true of one class of cases, 
 to others with which it is not connected. Thus, 
 a medical man, who decides upon general prin- 
 ciples, without attending to individual facts, may 
 pronounce a patient to labour under consumption, 
 when he perceives expectoration of a purulent 
 character. Admitting that purulent expectora- 
 tion may occur in all cases of consumption, the 
 sound observer knows, that it is not confined to 
 this disease, but also occurs in others of a much 
 less dangerous character. 
 
 For a legitimate theory, then, it is required, 
 that the principle which is assumed be true, and 
 that it be common to all the cases. But there 
 are certain instances, in which a principle ascer- 
 tained to be true, in regard to one set of cases, 
 may be extended by conjecture to others, in re- 
 gard to which its existence is only hypothetical. 
 
 4 
 
LECJiTlMATii USE OF HYPOTHESIS. 133 
 
 This may be called leg-itimatc hypothesis, or an- 
 ticipation of principles ; and it differs in this re- 
 spect from the fictitious theories already referred 
 to, that it is liable to be either established or 
 overturned by the progress of observation. In 
 this manner, the theory of ^-ravitation was hypo- 
 thetically extended to the motions of the heavenly 
 bodies, long before the observations of Newton 
 had actually established the truth of the doc- 
 trine ; and the same principle is of legitimate use 
 in medical investigations. Thus, there has been 
 some difference of opinion in regard to the origin 
 of the affection which is called ramollissement of 
 the brain ; a conjecture has been offered, that it is 
 a result of inflammation in that particular struc- 
 ture. Now this, at first, was mere hypothesis 
 or conjecture ; but it was hypothesis only in re- 
 gard to the relation of facts, or the application of 
 a known principle. For the principle which is 
 assumed, namely, inflammation, is a real and 
 true principle ; its relation to this particular affec- 
 tion is the hypothesis. It is such an hypothesis, 
 or anticipation of a principle, as serves to guide 
 us in observation, and which, by such observa- 
 tion, is likely to be soon either established or 
 overturned. Hypothesis of this kind is to be 
 considered as a legitimate guide to inquiry, and 
 may be of extensive use in medicine, when kept 
 under proper regulation. But it is to be re- 
 gretted, that such conjectures, if broucrht forward 
 
434 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 with confidence, are too often received without 
 farther investigation, as established principles. In 
 this manner, the proper nse of them is entirely- 
 lost, and they rather lead to error and fallacy. 
 
 The laws in regard to such hypothesis, there- 
 fore, are, that they shall be considered as nothing 
 more than conjecture, until such observations or 
 experiments have been made as are sufficient to 
 ascertain their truth ; and that, if they are not 
 thus verified, they shall be instantly abandoned. 
 To the process now mentioned, some writers 
 have proposed to apply the term theory, as dis- 
 tinct from hypothesis ; and to restrict the latter 
 term to the fictitious principles form.erly men- 
 tioned, namely, those which cannot be proved to 
 have any real existence. Others apply the term 
 hypothesis to both kinds of principles, whether 
 fictitious or legitimate, and call the latter a theo- 
 ry, only after its truth has been established. But 
 the fact seems to be, that the two terms are used 
 in philosophical writings, in an undefined and in- 
 discriminate manner. 
 
 In every scientific investigation, it is to be kept 
 in mind, that efficient causes are beyond our 
 reach. The objects of our research are phy- 
 sical causes only, by which we mean nothing 
 more, than the uniform sequences of events as 
 ascertained by extensive observation. What we 
 call the explanation of phenomena, consists in be- 
 ing able to trace distinctly all the links of such a 
 
LlitiiTIMATE USE OF HYPOTHESIS. 435 
 
 chain of sequences, so as to perceive their uni- 
 form relation to each other. Thus, there niav 
 be many instances in which we are acquainted 
 with facts forming- part of such a chain, and are 
 satisfied that they are so connected, while we 
 cannot explain their connexion. This is occa- 
 sioned by the want of some fact which forms an 
 intermediate part of the chain, and the discovery 
 of which would enable us to see the relation of 
 the whole sequence, or, in common language, 
 to explain the phenomena. Such a chain oi' 
 facts was, at one time, presented by the rise of 
 water in a vacuum to the height of thirty-two 
 feet. The circumstances were well known, as 
 well as their uniform relation, that is to say, the 
 fact of a vacuum — the fact of the water rising 
 — and the fact of this uniformly taking place. 
 But the phenomenon could not be explained ; 
 for an intermediate fact was required to show the 
 manner in which these known facts were con- 
 nected. The doctrine of nature abliorrin"- a va- 
 cuum afforded no explanation, for it furnished no 
 fact ; but the fact required was supplied by the 
 discoveries of Torricelli on atmospheric pressure. 
 The chain of events was then filled up, or, in 
 common language, the phenomenon was account- 
 ed for. 
 
 There are, indeed, many cases in which the 
 investisfation of intermediate events in the chain 
 of sequences is beyond our reach. In these, we 
 
436 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 must be satisfied with a knowledge of the facts, 
 and their actual connexion as we observe them, 
 without being- able to trace the events on which 
 the connexion depends. This happens in some 
 of the great phenomena of nature, such as gravi- 
 tation and magnetism. We know the facts, but 
 we cannot account for them ; that is, we are ig- 
 norant of certain intermediate facts by which 
 those we do know are connected together. If, 
 in such cases, we amuse ourselves with visionary- 
 hypothesis or conjecture, instead of facts, we 
 wander from the path of philosophical inquiry. 
 Of this nature were the vortices of Des Cartes, 
 and the doctrine of an invisible ether, which was 
 at one time proposed to explain the phenomena 
 of gravitation. Other examples of the same kind 
 are to be met with in the old philosophy ; and 
 those who are acquainted with the history of me- 
 dicine need not be told, that such speculations 
 have also been frequent in medical science. 
 
 If we would contribute something towards di- 
 minishing the uncertainty of medical researches, 
 and introducing a greater degree of precision 
 into medical reasonings, there are certain rules 
 which we ought to keep steadily in view, both 
 
t^UGGESTlUNS TOU MEDICAL INVESTUiATlON. 4:37 
 
 in conducting' our own inquiries, and in ex- 
 amining' the investigations of others. These 
 may be briefly recapitulated in the following- 
 manner, as arising out of the preceding observa- 
 tions. 
 
 I. We should endeavour to have all our terms 
 fully and distinctly defined. If we speak, for ex- 
 ample, of a person being bilious, or labouring 
 under biliary derangement, or derangement of 
 the chylopoietic viscera, let it be explained what 
 particular condition of the biliary or digestive 
 organs we mean to express by these terms ; or, 
 if this cannot be done, let it at least be clearly 
 understood, what particular symptoms we include 
 under them. The same observation applies to 
 various other terms of an equally indefinite cha- 
 racter, which have been formerly mentioned. If 
 they were defined in this manner, they would be 
 merely names, and no harm could result from the 
 use of them j but, as they are frequently em- 
 ployed, they seem to have no explicit signification. 
 
 II. In making a statement of facts, or examin- 
 ing a statement made by another person, we 
 should be satisfied that the facts are authentic, 
 — that they are fully and fairly stated, — and that 
 no important facts are left out of view, disguised, 
 or modified. It is also necessary that no facts 
 be taken into the statement which are not really 
 
438 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 connected with the subject. I formerly alluded 
 to exaniples of this last error, — appearances being- 
 considered as indicating- diseases of internal or- 
 g'ans, which are incidental or trivial, perhaps 
 taking- place after death, or under circumstances 
 not connected with diseased action. 
 
 III. When we find two events placed in a 
 state of contiguity to each other, we should use 
 the 'utmost caution in considering- them as con- 
 nected in the manner of cause and effect. No- 
 thing warrants us in assuming this relation, but 
 such an extent of observation as shows the con- 
 nexion to be constant and uniform ; and we should 
 keep in view the various sources of fallacy, for- 
 merly referred to, which encompass the whole 
 subject of medical causation. 
 
 IV. In deducing general conclusions, or ge- 
 neral doctrines, we must beware, on the one 
 hand, of assuming imaginary principles Avhich 
 cannot be proved really to exist ; and, on the 
 other, of deducing principles or doctrines from a 
 limited number of facts. We must remember 
 that such deductions are of no value, unless they 
 are invariably true in regard to all the cases to 
 which they are meant to refer. 
 
 V. In examining a statement made by any wri- 
 ter, there is cause for exercising similar caution. 
 
 . j^Lik-i' 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. I3i) 
 
 The credibility of a narrator of incdical state- 
 ments does not rest upon his voracity only, or 
 the total absence of any intention to deceive. 
 With perfect sincerity and conviction of the truth 
 of what he delivers, he may })resent fallacious 
 statements. This may happen from a j)artial 
 narration of facts, — from unsound causation,— 
 and from delivering- as equivalent to a fact what 
 is really a g-eneral statement. In regard to these, 
 we require to be satisfied, not only of his vera- 
 city, but of his habits as an observer, and the 
 extent of the observations on which his state- 
 ment is founded. In all cases of this kind, there- 
 fore, we ought to exercise such a mental process 
 as the following. 
 
 1. Are the terms which the author employs 
 fully and distinctly defined ; and are they em- 
 ployed in the usual and recognised meaning ? 
 
 2. Are the facts authentic ; are they fully and 
 fairly stated ; do they all relate to the subject ; 
 have we reason to suspect, that any important 
 facts have been omitted, disguised or modified, 
 or that facts have been collected on one side 
 only of a question ; does the statement include 
 any points which, though called facts, are merely 
 assumptions requiring to be proved ? 
 
 3. What events does the author consider as 
 connected in the manner of cause and effect ; 
 — have we reason to believe that this relation 
 
440 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 has been assumed upon an extent of observation 
 which proved it to be constant and uniform : 
 — What does he propose as general principles or 
 doctrines ; are these facts j and are they true 
 in regard to all the cases to which he applies 
 them ? 
 
 4. What are the new conclusions which he 
 proposes to deduce from his whole view of the 
 subject ; and are these legitimate deductions 
 from such of his premises as we admit to be au- 
 thentic ? 
 
 The rules thus shortly proposed, I submit as 
 those which ought to guide us in all our in- 
 quiries. Without constant attention to them, 
 numerous facts may pass before us, from which 
 we can derive no real knowledge ; and many 
 ingenious and plausible doctrines may be pre- 
 sented, which tend only to lead us into error. 
 In the same manner, the benefit which a phy- 
 sician derives from his own opportunities of ob- 
 servation, in common language called his expe- 
 rience, is not in proportion to the period of time 
 over which it has extended, or the number of 
 facts which have passed under his view. It must 
 depend on the attention with which he has ob- 
 served these facts, and traced their relations to 
 each other, — on the anxiety with which he has 
 separated incidental relations from those which 
 are uniform, — and the caution with which he has 
 ventured on assuming the relation of cause and 
 
SUG(iESTlUNS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. Ill 
 
 eifect, or has advanced to g-enoral princi])l('s. It 
 must depend, farther, on the jealousy and sus- 
 picion MJth which he has received even his own 
 conclusions, and the care with which he has cor- 
 rected them from time to time by farther obser- 
 vations. Finally, it must depend on the judg-- 
 ment with which he applies the knowledge thus 
 acquired, to the investigation and treatment of 
 new cases, — by tracing- promptly the points of 
 affinity between the case under his view, and 
 those cases on which his knowledge was founded ; 
 — by discovering real points of resemblance where 
 there is an apparent difference, and real points of 
 difference where there is an apparent resemblance. 
 The farther a physician advances in this course of 
 rigid inquiry, he becomes more sensible of the dif- 
 ficulties with which his science is encumbered, 
 more suspicious of all general conclusions, and 
 more anxious to bring them to the test of minute 
 and extensive observation ; — in particular, he 
 learns to exercise more and more caution in 
 considering any one event in medicine as the 
 cause of another. In real acquisition, conse- 
 quently, his progress is slow ; for much of his im- 
 provement consists in detecting the fallacy of sys- 
 tems which he once considered as established, 
 and the instability of principles in which he once 
 confided as infallible. But these discoveries pre- 
 pare the way for his actual progress, and the con- 
 clusions at which he does arrive then fall upon 
 his mind with all the authority of truth. 
 
PART V. 
 
 VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND 
 
 ACQUIREMENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE A 
 
 WELL REGULATED MIND. 
 
 In concluding this outline of facts regarding- the 
 intellectual powers and the investigation of truth, 
 we may take a slight review of what those quali- 
 ties are which constitute a well regulated mind, 
 and which ought to be aimed at by those who 
 desire either their own mental culture, or that 
 of others who are under their care. The more 
 important considerations may be briefly recapitu- 
 lated in the following manner : 
 
 I. The cultivation of a habit of steady and con- 
 tinuous attention ; or of properly directing the 
 mind to any subject which is before it, so as fully 
 
A WELL REGULATED MIND. 4 l-.S 
 
 to contoinpliitc its elemonts nm\ relations. This 
 is necessary for the due exercise of every other 
 mental process, and is the foundation of all im- 
 provement of character, both intellectual and 
 moral. We shall afterwards have occasion to re- 
 mark, how often sophistical o])inions and varions 
 distortions of character may be traced to errors 
 in this first act of the mind, or to a misdirection 
 and want of due regulation of the attention. 
 There is, indeed, every reason to believe, that 
 the diversities in the power of judging-, in differ- 
 ent individuals, are much less than we are apt to 
 imagine ; and that the remarkable differences, ob- 
 served in the act of judging, are rather to be as- 
 scribed to the manner in which the; mind is pre- 
 viously directed to the facts, on which the judg- 
 ment is afterwards to be exercised. It is related 
 of Sir Isaac Newton, that, when he was question- 
 ed respecting the mental qualities which formed 
 the peculiarity of his character, he referred it en- 
 tii^ly to the power which he had acquired of 
 continuous attention. 
 
 II. Nearly connected with the former, and of 
 equal importance, is a careful regulation and con- 
 trol of the succession of our thoughts. This re- 
 markable faculty is very much under the influ- 
 ence of cultivation, and on the power so acquired 
 depends the important habit of regular and con- 
 nected thinking. It is primarily a voluntary act ; 
 
444 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 and, in the exercise of it in different individuals, 
 there are the most remarkable differences. In 
 some, the thoughts are allowed to wander at 
 larg-e, without any regulation, — or are devoted 
 only to frivolous and transient objects ; while 
 others habitually exercise over them a stern con- 
 trol, — directing them to subjects of real import- 
 ance, and prosecuting these in a regular and con- 
 nected manner. This important habit gains 
 strength by exercise, and nothing, certainly, has 
 a greater influence in giving tone and consist- 
 ency to the whole character. It may not, in- 
 deed, be going too far to assert, that our condi- 
 tion, in the scale both of moral and intellectual 
 beings, is, in a great measure, determined by the 
 control which we have acquired over the succes- 
 sion of our thoughts, and by the subjects on 
 which they are habitually exercised. 
 
 The regulation of the thoughts is, therefore, 
 a high concern ; — in the man who devotes his at- 
 tention to it as a study of supreme importance, 
 the first great source of astonishment will be, the 
 manner in which his thoughts have been occupi- 
 ed in many an hour and many a day that has 
 passed over him. The leading objects to which 
 the thoughts may be directed are referable to 
 three classes. (1.) The ordinary engagements 
 of life, or matters of business, with which every 
 man is occupied in one degree or another, — in- 
 cluding concerns of domesticarrangement, person- 
 
A WELL REGULATED MIND. 445 
 
 al comfort, and necessary recreation. Eacli of 
 these deserves a certain deg^ree of attention, but 
 this requires to be strictly guided by its real and 
 relative importance ; and it is entirely unworthy 
 of a sound and reg-ulated mind to have the atten- 
 tion solely or chiefly occuj)ied with matters of 
 personal comfort, or of trivial importance calcidat- 
 ed merely to afford amusement for the passing- 
 hour. (2.) Visions of the imag-ination built up 
 by the mind itself when it has nothing- better to 
 occupy it. The mind cannot be idle, and, when 
 it is not occupied by subjects of a useful kind, it 
 will find a resource in those which are frivolous 
 or hurtful, — in mere visions, waking- dreams, or 
 fictions, in which the mind wanders from scene 
 to scene, unrestrained by reason, probability, or 
 truth. No habit can be more opposed to a 
 healthy condition of the mental powers ; — and 
 none ought to be more carefully guarded ag-ainst 
 by every one who would cultivate the high ac- 
 quirement of a well regulated mind. (3.) Entire- 
 ly opposed to the latter of these modes, and dis- 
 tinct also in a great measure from the former, is 
 the habit of following out a connected chain of 
 thought on subjects of importance and of truth, 
 whenever the mind is disengaged from the pro- 
 per and necessary attention to the ordinary trans- 
 actions of life. The particular subjects to which 
 the thoujrhts are directed, in cultivatinsr this ha- 
 bit, will vary in different individuals ; but the 
 
446 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 consideration of tlie relative value of tliem does 
 not belong to our present subject. The purpose 
 of these observations is simply to impress the 
 value of that regulation of the thoughts, by which 
 they can always find an occupation of inter- 
 est and importance, distinct from the ordinary 
 transactions of life, or the mere pursuit of frivo- 
 lous engagements, — and also totally distinct from 
 that destructive habit bv which the mind is al- 
 lowed to run to waste, amid visions and fictions 
 unworthy of a waking man. 
 
 III. The cultivation of an active inquiring 
 state of mind, which seeks for information from 
 every source that comes within its reach, whe- 
 ther in reading, conversation, or personal obser- 
 vation. With this state of mental activity, ought 
 to be closely connected attention to the authen- 
 ticity of facts so received, — avoiding the two ex- 
 tremes of credulity and scepticism. 
 
 IV. The habit of correct association ; — that is, 
 connecting facts in the mind according to their 
 true relations, and to the manner in which thev 
 tend to illustrate each other. This, as we have 
 formerly seen, is one of the principal means of 
 improving the memory ; — particularly of the kind 
 of memory, which is an essential quality of a cul- 
 tivated mind, namely, that which is founded, not 
 upon incidental connexions, but on true and im- 
 
A WELL REGULATED MINI). 447 
 
 portant relations^. Noarly allied to tliis, is the 
 habit of rotiection, or of tracing- carefully the re- 
 lations of facts, and the conclusions and princi- 
 ples which arise out of them. It is in this man- 
 ner, as was formerly mentioned, that the philoso- 
 phical mind often traces remarkable relations, and 
 deduces important conclusions; while, to the com- 
 mon understanding", the facts appear to be very 
 remote or entirely unconnected. 
 
 V. A careful selection of the subjects to which 
 the mind ouq-ht to be directed. These are, in 
 some respects, different in different persons, ac- 
 cording- to their situations in life ; — but there are 
 certain objects of attention which are peculiarly 
 adapted to each individual, — and there are some 
 which are equally interesting- to all. In reg-ard 
 to the latter, an appropriate deg-ree of attention 
 is the part of every wise man ; — in regard to 
 the former, a proper selection is the foundation 
 of excellence. One individual may waste his 
 powers in that desultory application of them, 
 wliicli leads to an imperfect acquaintance with a 
 variety of subjects ; while another allows his life 
 to steal over him, in listless inactivity, or applica- 
 tion to trifling- pursuits. It is equally melancholy 
 to see high powers devoted to unworthy objects, 
 such as the contests of party on matters involving 
 no important principle, or the subtleties of sophis- 
 tical controversy. For rising to eminence in any 
 
448 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 intellectual pursuit, there is not a rule of more 
 essential importance than that of doing- one thing- 
 at a time, — avoiding distracting- and desultory oc- 
 cupations, — and keeping a leading- object habitu- 
 ally before the mind, as one in which it can at 
 all times find an interesting resource, when ne- 
 cessary avocations allow the thoughts to recur to 
 it. A subject which is cultivated in this man- 
 ner, not by regular periods of study merely, but 
 as an habitual object of thought, rises up and ex- 
 pands before the mind in a manner which is al- 
 together astonishing. If, along with this habit, 
 there be cultivated the practice of constantly 
 writing such views as arise, we perhaps describe 
 that state of mental discipline, by which talents 
 of a very moderate order may be applied in a 
 conspicuous and useful manner to any subject to 
 which they are devoted. Such writing need not 
 be made at first with any great attention to me- 
 thod, but merely put aside for future considera- 
 tion ; and, in this manner, the different depart- 
 ments of a subject will develop and arrange 
 themselves as they advance, in a manner equally 
 pleasing and wonderful. 
 
 VI. A due regulation and proper control of 
 the imagination ; — that is, restricting its range to 
 objects which harmonize with truth, and are 
 adapted to the real state of things with which the 
 individual is or may be connected. We have 
 
A WELL inUUILATHI) MINI). H[) 
 
 seen how iiiucli the character is inliiieiiciMl by 
 this exercise of the iiiind ; — that it may be turned 
 to purposes of the greatest moment, both in the 
 pursuits of science, and in the cultivation of be- 
 nevolence and virtue ; — but that, on the other 
 hand, it may be so employed as to debase both 
 the moral and intellectual character. 
 
 VII. The cultivation of calm and correct 
 judg-ment — applicable alike to the formation of 
 opinions and the regulation of conduct. This is 
 founded, as we have seen, upon the habit of di- 
 recting- the attention, distinctly and steadily, to all 
 the facts and considerations bearing" upon a sub- 
 ject ; — and it consists in contemplating- them 
 in their true relations, — and assigning to each 
 the degree of importance of which it is wor- 
 thy. This mental habit tends to guard us 
 against forming conclusions, either with listless 
 inattention to the views by which we ought to be 
 influenced, — or with attention directed to some 
 of these, Avliile we neglect others of equal or 
 greater importance. — It is, therefore, opposed to 
 the influence of prejudice and passion, — to the 
 formation of sophistical opinions, — to party spirit, 
 — and to every propensity which leads to the 
 adoption of principles on any other ground than 
 calm and candid examination, guided by sin- 
 cere desire to discover the truth. In the purt^lv 
 physical sciences, distorted opinions are seldom 
 
 ^ G 
 
 if 
 
450 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 met with, or make little impression, — because 
 thej are brought to the test of experiment, and 
 thus their fallacy is exposed. But it is other- 
 wise in those departments which do not admit of 
 this remedy. Sophisms and partial inductions 
 are, accordingly, met with in medicine, political 
 economy, and metaphysics ; — and too often in the 
 still higher subjects of morals and religion. In 
 the economy of the human mind, it is indeed 
 impossible to observe a more remarkable pheno- 
 menon, than the manner in which a man, who, 
 in the ordinary affairs of life, shows the general 
 characters of a sound understanding, can thus 
 resign himself to the influence of an opinion 
 founded upon partial examination. He brings 
 ingeniously to the support of his dogma, every 
 fact and argument that can possibly be turned to 
 its defence ; and explains away or overlooks every 
 thing that tends to a different conclusion ; while 
 he appears anxious to convince others, and really 
 seems to have persuaded himself, that he is en- 
 gaged in an honest investigation of truth. This 
 propensity gains strength by indulgence, and the 
 mind, which has yielded to its influence, advances 
 from one pretended discovery to another, — mis- 
 taking its own fancies for the sound conclusions 
 of the understanding, until it either settles down 
 into some monstrous sophism, or perhaps con- 
 cludes by doubting of every thing. 
 
 The manner in which the most extravagant 
 
A WELL REGULATED MIND. 1.01 
 
 oj)inionsaremaiiitaiiio(J, by persona who g^ivo wuy 
 to this abuse of their powers of reasoninir, is 
 scarcely more remarkable than the facility with 
 which they often find zealous proselytes. It is, 
 indeed, difficult to trace the principles by which 
 various individuals are influenced, in thus sur- 
 rendering' their assent, with little examination, — 
 often on subjects of the highest importance. In 
 some, it would api)ear to arise from the mere 
 pleasure of mental excitement ; in others, from 
 the love of singularity, and the desire of appear- 
 ing wiser than their neighbours ; while, in not a 
 few, the will evidently takes the lead in the men- 
 tal process, — and opinions are seized upon with 
 avidity, and embraced as truth, which recommend 
 themselves to previously existing inclinations of 
 the heart. But, whatever may be the explana- 
 tion, the influence of the principle is most exten- 
 sive ; and sentiments of the most opposite kinds 
 may often be traced to the facility with which 
 the human mind receives opinions which have 
 been presented to it by some extrinsic influence. 
 This influence may be of various kinds. It may 
 be the power of party, — or the persuasion of a 
 plausible and persevering individual: — it may 
 be the supposed infallibility of a particular sys- 
 tem ; — it may be the mere empire of fashion, 
 — or the pretensions of a false philosophy. The 
 particular result, also, may difler, according as 
 one or other of these causes may be in oj)eration. 
 
452 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 But the intellectual condition is the same ; and 
 the distortion of character which arises out of 
 it, whether big-otry, superstition, or scepticism, 
 may be traced to a similar process ; — namely, to 
 an influence which directs the mind upon some 
 other principle than a candid investigation of 
 truth. In a similar manner, we may perhaps 
 account for the facts, — that the lowest supersti- 
 tion, and the most daring" scepticism, frequently 
 pass into each other ; and that the most re- 
 markable examples of both are often met with 
 in the same situations, namely, those in which 
 the human mind is restrained from free and can- 
 did inquiry. On the other hand, it would ap- 
 pear that the universal toleration, and full liberty 
 of conscience, which characterise a free and en- 
 lightened country, are calculated to preserve from 
 the two extremes of superstition and scepticism. 
 In other situations, it is striking" to remark how 
 often those, who revolt from the errors of a false 
 faith, take refug^e in infidelity. 
 
 The mental qualities which have been referred 
 to in the preceding observations, constituting an 
 active, attentive, and reflecting mind, should be 
 carefully cultivated by all who desire their own 
 mental improvement. The man, who has culti- 
 vated them with adequate care, habitually exer- 
 cises a process of mind which is equally a source 
 of improvement and of refined enjoyment. Does 
 
A WELL REGULATED yU^D. 453 
 
 a subject occur to him, eitlier in conversation or 
 reflection, in which he feels tliat his knowledg-e 
 is deficient, he commences, without delay, an 
 efiger pursuit of the necessary information. In 
 prosecuting" any inquiry, whether by reading- or 
 observation, his attention is acutely alive to the 
 authenticity of facts, — the validity of arg-uments, 
 — the accuracy of processes of investigation, — 
 principles which are illustrated by the facts, — 
 and conclusions deduced from them, — the cha- 
 racter of observers, — the style of writers ; — and 
 thus, all the circumstances which come before 
 him, are made acutely and individually the ob- 
 jects of attention and reflection. Such a man 
 acquires a confidence in his own powers and re- 
 sources, to which those are strangers who have 
 not cultivated this kind of mental discipline. 
 The intellectual condition arising- out of it is ap- 
 plicable alike to every situation in which a man 
 can be placed, — whether the aflairs of ordinary 
 life, — the pursuits of science, — or those higher 
 inquiries and relations which concern him as a 
 moral being-. 
 
 In the aflairs of ordinary life, this mental habit 
 constitutes what we call an intellisfent thinkins;- 
 man, whose attention is alive to all that is passing 
 before him, — who thinks acutely and eagerly on 
 his own conduct and that of others, — and is con- 
 stantly deriving useful information and subjects 
 of reflection, from occurrences which, bv the list- 
 
454 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 less mind, are passed by and forgotten. This ha- 
 bit is not necessarily connected with acquired 
 knowledge, or with what is commonly called in- 
 tellectual cultivation ; but is often met with, in a 
 high degree, in persons whose direct attainments 
 are of a very limited kind. It is the foundation 
 of caution and prudence in the affairs of life, and 
 may perhaps be considered as the basis of that 
 quality, of more value to its possessor than any 
 of the sciences, which is commonly called sound 
 good sense. It is the origin, also, of what we 
 call presence of mind, — or a readiness in adapt- 
 ing resources to circumstances. A man of this 
 character, in whatever emergency he happens to 
 be placed, forms a prompt, clear, and defined 
 judgment of whatever conduct or expedient the 
 situation requires, and acts with promptitude 
 upon his decision. In both these respects, he 
 differs equally from the listless inactivity of one 
 description of men, and the rash, hasty, and in- 
 considerate conduct of another. He differs not 
 less from characters of a third class, who, though 
 they may be correct in their judgment of what 
 ought to be done, arrive at their decision, or act 
 upon it, too slowly for the circumstances, and con- 
 sequently are said, according to a common pro- 
 verb, to be wise behind time. The listless and 
 torpid character, indeed, may occasionally be ex- 
 cited by emergencies, to a degree of mental 
 activity which is not natural to him ; and this 
 
A WELL KEUULATEU MIND. 455 
 
 is, in many instances, the source of a readiness of 
 conception, and a promptitude in action, which 
 the individual does not exhibit in ordinary cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 In the pursuits of science these mental qualities 
 constitute observing and inventive genius, — 
 two conditions of mind which lie at the founda- 
 tion of all philosophical eminence. By Obiserv- 
 ing geniua, I mean that habit of mind by which 
 the philosopher not only acquires truths relating 
 to any subject, but arranges and generalizes them 
 in such a manner, as to show how they yield con- 
 clusions which escape the mere collector of facts. 
 He likewise analyzes phenomena, and thus 
 traces important relations among facts, which, to 
 the common mind, appear very remote and dissi- 
 milar. I have formerly illustrated this, by the 
 manner in which Newton traced a relation be- 
 tween the fall of an apple from a tree, and those 
 great principles which regulate the movements of 
 the heavenly bodies. — By Inventive genius^ again, 
 I mean that active, inquiring state of mind, which 
 not only deduces, in this manner, principles from 
 facts when they are before it, but which grasps 
 after principles by eager anticipation, and then 
 makes its own conjectures the guides to observa- 
 tion or experiment. This habit of mind is pe- 
 culiarly adapted to the experimental sciences ; 
 and in these, indeed, it may be considered as 
 the source of the most important discoveries. 
 
456 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 It leads a man, not only to observe and con- 
 nect the facts, but to g"o in search of them, and 
 to draw them, as it were, out of that conceal- 
 ment in which they escape the ordinary ob- 
 server. — In doing* so, he takes for his guides 
 certain conjectures or assumptions which have 
 arisen out of his own intense contemplation 
 of the subject. These may be as often false as 
 true ; but, if found false, they are instantly aban- 
 doned ; and, by such a course of active inquiry, 
 he at leng-th arrives at the development of truth. 
 From him are to be expected discoveries which 
 elude the observation, not of the vulgar alone, 
 but even of the philosopher, who, without culti- 
 vating this habit of invention, is satisfied with 
 tracing the relation of facts, as they happen to be 
 brought before him by the slower course of testi- 
 mony or occasional observation. The man who 
 only amuses himself with conjectures, and rests 
 satisfied in them without proof, is the mere vi- 
 sionary or speculatist, who injures every subject 
 to which his speculations are directed. 
 
 In the concerns which relate to man as a mo- 
 ral being, this active inquiring and reflecting ha- 
 bit of mind is not less applicable than in matters 
 of minor interest. The man who cultivates it, 
 directs his attention intensely and eagerly to the 
 great truths which belong to his moral condition, 
 — seeks to estimate distinctly his relation to them, 
 and to feel their influence upon his moral princi- 
 
A WELL REGULATED MIND. 4^,5? 
 
 pies. This constitutes the distinction between 
 the individual who merely professes a particular 
 creed, and him who examines it till he makes it 
 a matter of understandinij' and conviction, and 
 then takes its principles as the rule of his emo- 
 tions and the guide oi his conduct. Such a man 
 also contemplates, in the same manner, his rela- 
 tions to other men ; — questions himself rigidly 
 rejiardinuf the duties which belong- to his situa- 
 tion, and his own observance of them. He con- 
 templates others with a kind of personal in- 
 terest, — enters into their wants and feelings, and 
 participates in their distresses. In all his rela- 
 tions, whether of justice, benevolence, or friend- 
 ship, he acts, not from mere incidental impulse, 
 but upon clear and steady principles. In this 
 course of action, many may go along with him 
 when the requirements of the individual case are 
 pointed out and impressed upon them ; but that 
 in which the mass of mankind are wanting is the 
 state of mental activity, which eagerly contem- 
 plates its various duties and relations, and thus 
 finds its way to the line of conduct appropriate 
 to the importance of each of them. 
 
 A III. For a well regulated understanding, 
 and particularly for the application of it to in- 
 quiries of the highest import, there is indispensa- 
 bly necessary a sound condition of the moral 
 feelings. This important subject belongs pro- 
 2)erly to another department of mental science ; 
 
458 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 I)ut we have seen its extensive influence on the 
 due exercise of the intellectual powers ; — and it 
 is impossible to lose sight of the place which it 
 holds in the general harmony of the mental func- 
 tions, required for constituting that condition, of 
 greater value than any earthly good, which is 
 strictly to be called a well regulated mind. This 
 high attainment consists not in any cultivation, 
 however great, of the intellectual powers ; but 
 requires also a corresponding and harmonious 
 culture of the benevolent affections and moral 
 feelings ; — a due regulation of the passions, emo- 
 tions, and desires ; — and a full recognizance of 
 the supreme authority of conscience over the 
 whole intellectual and moral system. Cold and 
 contracted, indeed, is that view of man, which 
 regards his understanding alone ; and barren is 
 that system, however wide its range, which rests 
 in the mere attainment of truth. The highest 
 state of man consists in his purity as a moral be- 
 ing ; and in the habitual culture and full opera- 
 tion of those principles by which he looks forth 
 to other scenes and other times. Among these 
 are desires and longings, which nought in earth- 
 ly science can satisfy ; v/hich soar beyond the 
 sphere of sensible things, and find no object wor- 
 thy of their capacities, until, in humble adoration, 
 they rest in the contemplation of God, Truths 
 then burst upon the mind, which seem to rise be- 
 fore it in a progressive series, each presenting cha- 
 
A WELL KIXUILATKD MINI). 450 
 
 racters of now and niighticu* imjiort. The most 
 aspiring- iniderstanding", awed by the view, feels 
 the inadequacy of its utmost powers ; yet the 
 mind of the humble inquirer gains streng-th as it 
 advances. There is now felt, in a peculiar man- 
 ner, the influence of that healthy condition of the 
 moral feeling-s, which leads a man not to be afraid 
 of the truth. For, on this subject, we are never 
 to lose sig-lit of the remarkable principle of our 
 nature, formerly referred to, by which a man 
 comes to reason himself into the belief of what 
 he wishes to be true, — and shuts his mind against, 
 or even arrives at an actual disbelief of, truths 
 which he fears to encounter. It is striking, 
 also, to remark, how closely the philoso})hy of 
 human nature harmonizes with the declarations 
 of the sacred writings ; — where this condition of 
 mind is traced to its true source, in the corrup- 
 tion of the moral feelings, and is likewise shown 
 to involve a high degree of guilt, in that rejection 
 of truth which is its natural consequence ; — 
 " This is the condemnation, that light is come 
 into the world, and men loved darkness rather 
 than light, because their deeds were evil. For 
 every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither 
 Cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be re- 
 proved. But he that doeth truth, cometh to the 
 light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that 
 they are wrought in God." 
 
 This condition of mind presents a subject of 
 
460, CHARACTERS OF 
 
 intense interest, to every one who would study 
 liis own mental condition, either as an intellectual 
 or a moral being. In each individual instance, it 
 may be traced to a particular course of thoug-ht 
 and of conduct, by which the mind went gra- 
 dually more and more astray from truth and 
 from virtue. In this progress, each single step 
 was felt to be a voluntary act ; but the influence 
 of the whole, after a certain period, is to distort 
 the judgment, and deaden the moral feelings on 
 the great questions of truth and rectitude. Of 
 this remarkable phenomenon in the economy of 
 man, the explanation is beyond the reach of our 
 faculties ; but the facts are unquestionable, and 
 the practical lesson to be derived from them is 
 of deep and serious import. The first volition, 
 by which the mind consciously wanders from 
 truth, or the moral feelings go astray from virtue, 
 may impart a morbid influence which shall per- 
 petuate itself and gain strength in future voli- 
 tions, until the result shall be to poison the whole 
 intellectual and moral system. Thus, in the 
 wondrous scheme of sequences which has been 
 established in the economy of the human heart, 
 one volition may impart a character to the future 
 man, — the first downward step may be fatal. 
 
 Every candid observer of human nature must 
 feel this statement to be consistent with truth ; 
 and, by a simple and legitimate step of reasoning, 
 a principle of the greatest interest seems to arise 
 
A WELL REGULATED MIND. Kil 
 
 out of it. When this loss of harmony among- tlie 
 mental faculties has attained a certain dog-ree, we 
 do not perceive any power, in the mind itself, 
 capable of correcting- the disorder which has been 
 introduced into the moral system. Either, there- 
 fore, the evil is irremediable and hopeless, or we 
 must look for an influence from without the 
 mind, which may afford an adequate remedy. 
 We are thus led to discover the adaptation and 
 the probability of the provisions of the Christian 
 revelation, where an influence is indeed disclosed 
 to us, capable of restoring the harmony which has 
 been destroyed, and of raising- man anew to the 
 sound and healthy condition of a moral beina-. 
 We cannot perceive any improbability, that the 
 Being, who originally framed the wondrous fabric, 
 may thus hold intercourse with it and provide a 
 remedy for its moral disorders ; and thus a state- 
 ment, such as human reason never could have 
 anticipated, comes to us invested with every ele- 
 ment of credibility and of truth. 
 
 The sound exercise of the understandinsr, 
 therefore, is closely connected with the impor- 
 tant habit of looking- within ; or of rigidly inves- 
 tigating our intellectual and moral condition. 
 This leads us to inquire what opinions we have 
 formed, and upon what g-rounds we have formed 
 them ; — what have been our leading- pursuits, — 
 Avhether these have been g-uided by a sound con- 
 sideration of their real value, — or whether im- 
 
462 CHARACTERS^ OF 
 
 portant objects of attention have been lightly 
 passed over, or entirely neglected. It leads ns 
 farther to contemplate our moral condition, — our 
 desires, attachments and antipathies ; — the g"o- 
 vernment of the imagination, and the reg-imen of 
 the heart ; — what is the liabitual current of our 
 thoughts; and whether we exercise over them that 
 control which indicates alike intellectual vigour 
 and moral purity. It leads us to review our con- 
 duct, with its principles and motives, and to com- 
 pare the whole with the great standards of truth 
 and rectitude. This investigation is the part of 
 every wise man. Y/ithout it, an individual may 
 make the greatest attainments in science, may 
 learn to measure the earth and to trace the course 
 of the stars, while he is entirely wanting in that 
 higher department, — the knowledge of himself. 
 
 On these important subjects, I would more 
 particularly address myself to that interesting- 
 class, for whom this work is chiefly intended, the 
 younger members of the medical profession. The 
 considerations which have been submitted to 
 them, while they appear to carry the authority 
 of truth, are applicable, at once, to their scienti- 
 fic investigations, and to those great inquiries, 
 equally interesting to men of every degree, which 
 relate to the principles of moral and religious 
 belief. On these subjects, a sound condition of 
 mind will lead them to think and judge for them- 
 selves, with a care and seriousness adapted to 
 
A WELL RECULATEP MIND. 403 
 
 the solemn import of the inquiry, and without 
 being" influenced by the dogmas of those, who, 
 with little examination, presume to decide with 
 confidence on matters of eternal moment. Of 
 the modifications of that distortion of character 
 which has conunonly received the name of cant, 
 the cant of hypocrisy has been said to be the 
 worst ; but there is another which may fairly be 
 placed by its side, and that is the cant of infideli- 
 ty, — the affectation, of scoffing- at sacred things, 
 by men who have never examined the subject, 
 or never with an attention in any deg-ree ade- 
 quate to its momentous importance. A well re- 
 gulated mind must at once perceive that this is 
 alike unworthy of sound sense and sound philo- 
 sophy. If we require the authority of names, 
 we need only to be reminded, that truths, which 
 received the cordial assent of Boyle and Newton, 
 of Haller and Boerliaave, are, at least, deserving 
 of grave and deliberate examination. But we may 
 dismiss such an appeal as this ; for, nothing more 
 is wanted to challenge the utmost seriousness of 
 every candid inquirer, than the solemn nature of 
 the inquiry itself. The medical observer, in an 
 especial manner, has facts at all times before him 
 which are in the highest degree calculated to fix 
 his deep and serious attention. In the structure 
 and economy of the human body, he has proofs, 
 such as no other branch of natural science can 
 furnish, of the power and wisdom of the Eternal 
 
 2 
 
464 CHARACTERS OF, &c. 
 
 One. Let him resig-n his mind to the influence 
 of these proofs, and learn to rise, in humble ado- 
 ration, to the Almighty Being- of whom they 
 witness : and, familiar as he is with human suf- 
 fering and death, let him learn to estimate the 
 value of those ti'uths, which have power to heal 
 the broken heart, and to cheer the bed of death 
 with the prospect of immortality. 
 
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