Military Biographies LO U DON COL. G. B. MALLE^ON ( / MILITARY BIOGRAPHIES. Messrs. CHAPMAN & HALL are issuing a Series of Volumes dedicated to the Lives of Great Military Commanders. The Volumes are designed to form a set of Critical Biographies, illustrative of the operations and the art of war, by writers of distinction in the profession of arms, whose competence to weigh the military qualities and deeds of the Chiefs can be accepted. Maps will, when necessary, accompany the volumes for the con- venience of students. The aim of these volumes is to be both popular and scientific, combining the narrative of the most romantic and instructive of human lives with a clear examination of the genius of the soldier. The first Volume will be FREDERICK THE GREAT, by Col. C. B. Bkackenbury, with Maps. MARSHAL LOUDON, by Col. Malleson, C.S.L, will follow it, the two Lives presenting the opposing aspects of the Seven Years' War. CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited. From The Times. BERLIN, March ii, 1884. The Grand General Staff having now completed its history of the Franco-German war, it has been resolved to do the same thing, on as complete and comprehensive a scale as possible, for the campaigns of Frederick the Great. Marshal von Moltke has therefore issued an appeal to the nation for a sight or loan of all hitherto unpub- lished documents, maps, and plans, &c., bearing on the subject which may help the writers in the execution of their huge and patriotic task. Apropos of this, I may quote the remark once made by a military lecturer connected luith the Grand iienejal Staff to an English officer here. He by no means agreed, said the lecturer in question, witli all Carlylc's political ziieivs of the Great Frederick, but he found the English historiati' s plans of E'rederick' s battles ivondetfiilly accurate, and always recommended their use to his students in preference to atiy othe7-s. *»* The Maps used in this Military Biography of Frederick are taken from Carlyle's Life of Frederick. ,:p LIBRARY THE UNIVERSITY OE CALIEORNIA SANTA BARBARA FROM THE LIBRARY OF F. VON BOSCHAN .^ cv^ 9 vi CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. PAOE PITTED AGAINST Fr.EDERIC 65 CHAPTER YIII. AT HOCHKIRCn 80 CHAPTER IX. AT KUKEIISDOKF 91 CHAPTER X. LAXDSHUT, GLATZ, LIEGNITZ 112 CHAPTER XI. BUNZELWITZ AND SCHWEIDXITZ 155 CHAPTER XII. THE LA.ST CAMPAIGN 186 CHAPTER XIII, REST AND LEISURE 198 CONTENTS. vii CHAPTER XIV. PAOE WAR OF THE nAVARIAN SUCCESSION 205 CIIArXER XV. THE TURKISH WAR 217 CHAPTER XVI. DEATH AND CHARACTER 235 MAPS. To iLLUsxrwVTE Loudon's Campaigns in Saxony, the Lausitz, Brandenburg, and portions of Silesia and Bohemia To face page 43 To Illustrate Loudon's Campaigns in Bohemia, Moravia, and part of Silesia . • To face page 113 To Illustrate Loudon's Campaigns in the Borderlands of Austria To face page 221 General 3L\p Illustrating the Seven Years' War .... Pocket ERRATA. Page .^8, Hue 19, /or "confident to" read "confident in.' Page 122, line 32, /o7- " Pischwitz" read " Pischkowitz." Page 149, line 14, /or " 15,000 " read " .50,000." Page 174, line 7, /or "a counterwork" read "a couuterguard. Page 176, line 8,/or "Kaldwell" read "Caldwell." Page 181, line 19, /or " 85 " read "83." Page 206, line 30, /or "having" read "leaving." I'age 206, last line, /or " those " read " his." Page 212, line 31, /or " selected " rmrf "selecting." Page 236, line 4, for " than" read " when." LOUDON. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. Charles VI., Emperor of Germany, died on the 20th October, 1740, leaving no male heir, and before he had taken the precaution to have the husband of his daughter, Francis of Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, crowned King of the Romans. To secure his vast dominions to that daughter, Charles had obtained from every state of importance in Europe a guai-antee of the Pragmatic Sanction, an instrument which broke the entail established by his elder brother Joseph, and settled the right of succession, in default of male issue, first on his own daughters in the order of their birth, then on the daughters of Joseph, and, after them, on the Queen of Portugal and the other daughters of his father, the Emperor Leopold. On his death, then, his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, succeeded, under the title of Queen of Hungary and Boliemia, to all the dominions of the house of Habsburg, ^nd she entertained the hope that the Electoral College '- .'i "" B 2 LOUDON. would shortly confer the dignity of emperor upon her husband, Francis of Lorraine. But events were very soon to prove the wisdom of the counsel addressed by Prince Eugene to Charles VI., when, noticing the ardour with which the emperor pursued the idea of obtaining from Europe guarantees for the due execution of the Pragmatic Sanction, he told him that the only guarantee worth having Avas an army of 200,000 men and a full treasury. Charles VI., obstinate and self- willed, was not the man to listen to advice, even when that advice came from Prince Eugene. Throughout his life he neglected the substance and pur.sued the shadow. Maria There.sa, far from finding, on her accession, an army of 200,000 men and a full treasury to support her title, realised to her dismay that the army, exclusive of the troops in Italy and the Low Countries, did not amount to 30,000 men; that the treasury contained only 100,000 florins, and that even these were claimed by the Empress Dowager as her personal property ! The majority of the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction very soon convinced the Queen of Hungary how lightly they regarded the engagements wrung from them by her father, how fully they appreciated the helplessness of her position. Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, at once asserted his claims to the kingdom of Bohemia and the Grand Duchy of Austria, on the ground that the will of Ferdinand I. had devised those territories to his daughters and their descend- ants on the failure of the male line, and that he was the lineal descendant from Anne, eldest daughter of that prince. Philip II., King of Spain and the Indies, as pretended representative of the extinct Spanish line of the Habsburgs, from which he was descended on the mother's side, demanded the cession of the Spanish- Austrian INTRODUCTORY. 3 hereditary lands in Italy as well as Milan, Mantua, Parma, and Piacenza. Emanuel III., King of Sardinia, and Augustus III., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, who had married daughters of the Emperor Joseph, put forth less extravagant demands. But the most formidable claimant was Fredei'ic II., King of Prussia. This prince had succeeded his father but five months previously, to find ready to his hand the army and the treasury which were wanting to Maria Theresa. Seeing in the actual slate of affairs a great opportunity, such as might never occur again, Frederic revived a claim once preferred by his ancestors, but expressly renounced by them in 1688, and again in 169-1, to the Silesian duchies of Liegnitz, Clogau, Brieg, and Jagerndoi'f. Nor was the action of the two great Avestern powers at this crisis calculated to reassure ]Maria Theresa. France, guided by Cardinal Fleury, vouchsafed no public answer to the notification of the queen's accession. The tone of the private communications from her foreign oflice, coldly polite, signified an intention to hold aloof until the claims of the Elector of Bavaria should have been disposed of, and, in the meanwhile, to use her influence to oppose the election of the Duke of Lorraine to the imperial dignity. England, whilst acknowledging the queen, had accompanied the recognition by an exhortation to distrust the designs of France, and by a proposal that Austria should join her in an alliance against the House of Bourbon. The relations of ]Maria Theresa with the other powers of Germany were too uncertain to allow her to think of a war of aggression. But .still hopeful with respect to France she received with coldness the proposals of the only guai\antor of the Pragmatic Sanction who sincerely desired to uphold the conditions of that settlement. 4 LOUDON. The feeling of suspense and uncertainty which the conduct of the several powers of Europe had aroused at the Court of Vienna was not of long duration. Frederic II. of Prussia was the first to prove the worthlessness of treaties which cannot be maintained by force of arms. Amusing the Court of Vienna for a few weeks with protestations of his readiness to serve the House of Austria, he assembled a considerable body of troops in the vicinity of Berlin ; then, throwing off the mask, he despatched Count Cotter to Vienna to formulate his proposals. Gotter was instructed to place the services of Frederic and his army at the disposal of the queen, to defend her against all her enemies, on condition that she would cede to him the two Silesias, Lower Silesia because Frederic claimed it as a right, Upper Silesia as a compensation for the costs of the war. The Court of Vienna having been informed that Frederic, not waiting for a reply to his demands, had actually entered Silesia, refused to negotiate until his troops should be with- drawn from that province. Gotter was, in consequence, dismissed, and war ensued. Frederic had indeed entered Silesia (16th December, 1740). His progress through that province, unopposed by an Austrian army, was a series of triumphs. On the 3rd January, Breslau opened her gates to him. The strong fortresses of Glogau, Neisse, and Brieg held out, however, and the Court of Vienna hoped that they would continue their resistance until it should be able to despatch an army against the invader. But Glogau was stormed early in the spring, and Frederic was about to undertake the siege of Neisse, when he was surprised by the march of an Austrian army on his line of communications with Brandenburg, He had nothing for it then but to fight. The battle which followed (10th April, 1741) called from INTRODUCTORY. 5 the village near to which it was fought, the battle of Moll- witz, was decisive of the fate of Silesia. After a contest which lasted five hours, and of which all the earlier phases were in favour of the Austrians, the steadiness and superior armament of the Prussian infantry gained the day. But Mollwitz did more than gain Silesia for Prussia. It served as the signal to rouse continental Europe against the daughter of Charles VI, Had Frederic been beaten on the 10th April, it is more than probable that the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction would have been carried out without dispute. It was his victory which decided the course of events, which gave courage to Charles Albert of Bavaria, and which put an end to the hesitations of the Court of Versailles. When Louis XV. had been infoimed that Frederic of Prussia had invaded Silesia he exclaimed, " The man is mad." Five v/eeks after the battle of Mollwitz, May 18th, 1741, France and Spain signed a treaty with Bavaria for the dismemberment of the Austrian dominions. To this treaty the Elector Palatine, the Electors of Cologne and of Saxony, and the Kings of Prussia, of Sicily and of Sardinia adhered. The operations of the allies were rapid. Charles Albert, supported by a French army, emerged from Bavaria by way of Passau, and following the course of the Danube, took Linz, 14th August, and pressing on to St. Polten, : ummoned Vienna to surrender. Under these dillicult circumstances, Maria Theresa, threatened by continental Europe, and whose only ally, England, contented herself with sending her fitful supplies of money and an unlimited quantity of advice, appealed to her Hungarian people. The noble and generous reply, and the spirit evoked by that pathetic appeal, gave to the lion-hearted queen the moral support necessary to her. 6 LOUDON. Two other circumstances tended about the same time to strengthen her cause. The Franco-Bavarian army, renouncing its design upon Vienna, turned off to Bohemia, ■whilst, under her instructions, one of her generals, Count Neipperg, concluded (October 1742) a secret convention with Frederic, whereby in consideration of the permanent cession of Lower Silesia with Glatz and Neisse before the end of the year, the latter, who had obtained all he wanted, and who had no desire to see a prince of the Bavarian house occupy a strong position in Southern Germany supported by a French army, agreed to remain inactive. Maria Theresa made excellent use of the respite thus obtained. Withdrawing her Silesian army into Moravia, she joined it to another army in that province under the command of her brother-in-law, Charles of Lorraine, and despatched both into Bohemia to resist the Franco-Bavarian invasion. The Austrians were too late indeed to save Prague, but they were able to shut up their enemies in that city. INIeanwhile a third Austrian army, led by Count Khevenhiiller, and preceded by a crowd of Pandours, had re-taken Linz, Scharding, and Passau, and, penetrating into Bavaria, had occupied Munich on the very day, 12th February, on which Charles Albert of Bavaria, chosen by the Electoral College Emperor of Germany a month previously, was crowned by the name and title of Charles VII. In his despair the new emperor appealed to Frederic, and Frederic, breaking the convention of the previous October, renewed hostilities, took Glatz, and after a visit to Dresden to rouse into action the Elector of Saxony, and another to Prague to concert )neasures with the French commander, Marshal de Broglie, advanced into Bohemia. Here, however, his difficulties commenced. His allies INTRODUCTORY. 7 could render him no help, and whilst one Austrian army threatened his communications, another, under Prince Charles of Lorraine, advanced from Moravia to meet him. It had been in the power of a really capable commander to crush at once and for ever at this conjuncture the pretensions of Frederic. He himself felt all the dangers of his position, and it was an intense relief to him when, on the moraing of the 17th May, the army of Prince Charles attacked him as he lay encamped on the plain between the villages of Caslar and Chotusice (Chotusitz). The battle which followed, well contested, especially by the infantry on both sides, resulted in leaving Frederic master of the field. But his losses had been very severe, his cavalry had been almost destroyed, and although he had gained all the honours of the day, had taken 1,200 prisoners, and captured eighteen guns, the retreating Austrians had done almost as much ; for they too, retiring in good order, had carried off with them a thousand prisoners, fourteen standards, and two pairs of colours. The battle of Chotusitz, whilst it convinced Frederic that his interests would best be served by making such a treaty with the Queen of Hungary as would secure the two Silesias, satisfied the Court of Vienna that to con- centi'ate all the forces of the monarchy against the Franco-Bavarians it was necessary to come to some understanding with its most persistent enemy. With a heavy heart, then, Maria Theresa, agreed (2Sth July, 1742) to cede to Fi-ederic Upper and Lower Silesia and the County of Glatz — with the exception of the principalities, Teschen, Troppau, and Jiigerndorf. Very soon afterwards (11th September) she concluded peace, and, the year following, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, with Saxony. About the same time she gained Sardinia by the 8 LOUDON. cession to her of a few unimportant districts in the jMilanese ; and she concluded an alliance likewise with England and Holland. Relieved from the presence of the King of Prussia, the Austrian armies, led by Prince Charles of Lorraine and Prince Lobkovic, marched against the French, defeated Marshal de Broglie at Frauenberg, drove him from Braunau, and compelled him to take refuge behind the Avails of Prague. That city had become the last refuge of the Franco-Bavarian invaders. It did not protect them long. Provisions within the city began to fail. The commander-in-chief of the French army, Marshal Belleisle, feeling that the toils were closing around him, offered to evacuate Prague and to qiiit the dominions of the Queen of Hungary, on the condition of retaining his arms, artillery, and baggage. The Court of Versailles made at the same time the most urgent overtures for peace. But the pride of Maria Theresa had been wounded. She believed her enemy to be in her power. Provisions were failing him, the winter was one of the severest ever known ; an attempt made by a relieving army led by Marshal de Maillebois to force the passes had failed, and Prague was blockaded by an army of 18,000 men. Escape seemed impossible. Yet the French general, forming his army of 1 1,000 foot and 3,000 horse into a single column, providing it with twelve days' provisions, and taking with him thirty pieces of cannon, sallied out on the night of the 16th December, and succeeded in making one of the most daring retreats on record. He gained Eger without leaving the smallest trophy to the enemy, and was joined there a few days later by the six thousand men he had left in the city, and who, after his departure, had been allowed to march out with all the honours of war 1 INTRODUCTORY. 9 The practical result was not tlie less favourable to the Austrian arms. ISIaria Theresa was crowned Queen of Bohemia at Prague, and received the oath of allegiance at Munich. A few weeks later, 27th June, 1743, George II. of England defeated the French army at Dettingen. These successes greatly augmented her pretensions. She concluded in September of the same year an alliance with England and Sardinia, and, still embittered against France and the Emperor, announced her intention of recovering Alsace and Lorraine, and of annulling the election of Charles VII. with the view of replacing him by her husband. These successes roused Frederic of Prussia once again to action. Under the veil of hostility against France and the emperor, he detected the fixed piirpose of JNIaria Theresa to recover Silesia. The only means he had of saving his con- quest was a prompt alliance with the threatened powers. The announced intentions of Maria Theresa with respect to the Emperor Charles VII. furnished him with an excuse for intervention to protect the rights of the emperor. To resist then the pretensions of the Queen of Hungary he summoned the German princes to a meeting at Frankfort. The Elector Palatine and the Elector of Hesse Cassel alone responded to his call. With these, and with Sweden, he made then a treaty of alliance, called the Union of Frankfort, the object of which was to resist the Austrian pretensions by force of arms. Frederic then turned to France. With her he was more successful. He concluded an alliance based upon a com- bined plan of operations which should at the same time relieve France from the threatened invasion and turn the blow meditated by Austria against herself. It was agreed that before tlie Austrian armies could overrun Alsace Frederic should invade Bohemia. This invasion would 10 LOUDON. necessitate tlie prompt recall of the Austrians from the upper Ehine. The French undertook to follow the recalled army so vigorously that it would have no leisure to interfere with Frederic, who, but slightly opposed, would thus have Austria at his mercy. The treaty with France was dated the 5th of June 1744. Little more than two months later (9th of August) Frederic published a manifesto in which he declared he had taken up arms solely to restore to the German empire its liberty, to the Emperor his dignity, .and to Europe its repose. Immediately afterwards he entered Bohemia at the head of his army. In the war which followed, known as the second Silesian war, there appeared for the first time serving in the Austrian ranks a Livonian gentleman of Scottish origin, who subsequently became the most formidable antagonist of the invader. As his name Avill occur more than once in the history of the campaign, it is fit that before entering upon its record I should make the reader acquainted with the early antecedents of Gideon Loudon. CHAPTER 11. THE EARLY TRAINING. The ancestors of Gideon Loudon, belonging to a branch of the noble house of Loudoun, had quitted Ayi'shire in the fourteenth century, and, emigrating to Livonia, had become the possessors of two considerable landed properties in that province. One of these was registered under the family name, spelt variously as Laudon, Laudohn, and Loudon ; the other under the name it had previously borue, of Tootzen. To these properties were subsequently added others which became in later years the portion of the younger branch of the family. Time did not deal very favourably with the elder branch. The policy of Charles XI. of Sweden and the wars of Charles XII. made great havoc with their resources, and when Gideon Loudon was born Tootzen was the only estate remaining to his branch of the family. At that place Gideon was born in the year 1716. His father, Gerhard (Gerard) Otto, a lieutenant colonel in the Swedish ai'my, had married a daughter of the nol)lo family of the Bornemund, and of this marriage Gideon Loudon was the first child. As sucli he was naturally intended to be a soldier, aud to lit liim for that career his father instructed 12 LOUDON. him at an early age in drawing, in mathematics, and in geogi-aphy. He did not then become proficient in any of these studies but he learned sufficient to make him wish to acquire more, and we shall see how in his maturer years he applied himself to that purpose. The province of which he was a native had been ceded to Russia in 1721. When therefore Loudon arrived at an age to enter upon his career he took service in the Russian army as a cadet. He was then (1731) in his sixteenth year. Like other noblemen of the time he began at the lowest grade. The year after his entrance into the army an opportunity of being under fire presented itself. The election for the succession to the Crown of Poland had resulted in the double choice of Frederic Augustus of Saxony and Stanislaus Leczinski. The Russians, who took the side of the former, sent an army into the country to uphold his claims. Stanislaus, upon this, fled to Dantzig. The Russians pur- sued him and laid siege to that city. Loudon's regiment formed pai-t of their army, and it is recorded that during the siege that followed, and especially during the storming of the Stolzenberg, which cost the lives of many officers, he gave marked pi'oofs of courage and conduct. His health, delicate in his youth, suffered much from fatigue and exposure, and he was laid up for some time after the conquest of the place with an illness of a dangerous character. The year following, Russian troops set foot for the first time on German soil. They came not, indeed, as enemies, but as allies of the German empire against the French. They did nothing more, however, than march from the Volga to the Rhine, for on their arrival at the latter river preliminaries of peace between the contending powers had been agreed upon. The Empress Anna was the less unwilling to recall THE EARLY TRAINING. 13 thern, because the check given by the Ottoman Porte to her designs regarding the Crimea had caused her to dechire war against the Turks. The Russian troops then marched from the Ehine to the seat of war with all haste. On arriving there the Tui-ks and Tartars retreated before them, forcing them to traverse, in their pui'suit, steppes still burning and to suffer from a want of water almost unbear- able. Loudon, who served with the army in its march from the Volga to the Rhine and thence to the Dnieper, was wont to attribute the chest-complaint which troubled him all his life to this terrible march. The Russian army found itself, on approaching the Crimea, under the command of Marshal Mlinnich. That general stormed the lines of Perekop in May, 1736, then besieged and took Oczakow, and laid waste the Crimea. For his services in this campaign, LoiTilon was promoted to the rank of sub-lieutenant, a sufficient proof tliat he had done his duty. At the close of 1738 he visited his home at Tootzen, on short leave, returned thence to the armv early in the following year, was present at the battle of Hawuczane, the overruning of JNIoLlavia, the occupation of Jassy, and the siege and capture of Choczim. He was promoted during the campaign to the full rank of lieutenant. Peace between Russia and the Porte having been signed in the autumn of 1739 Loudon accompanied his regiment to Astrakan. Whilst he was quartered there the death of the Emperor Charles VI. kindled the war of the Austrian succession. For a time Loudon hoped that Russia would take part in tliat war, but when she remained steadfastly quiescent he took the earliest opportunity to quit her service, and proceeded direct to St. Petersburg, in the hope of ol)taining letters of introduction to some influential persons either at Berlin or Vienna. Frequenting i licro the 14 LOUDON. salons of Count von Luwenwolde, a Livonian like himself and seneschal to the court, he became intimate with his secretary, an Alsatian named Hochstetten, who had friendly relations with more than one influential family in the capital of Austria. With this man he talked over his prospects, and eagerly clutched at an offer made him by his friend to furnish him with letters which would introduce him into good society in Vienna. But just as he was about to set out he learned that the war between Austria and Prussia had been terminated by the peace of Breslau, (June 11, 1742), Still anxious for employment, and learning that the English and Dutch were sending out ships to defend their possessions in the East Indies, he resolved to offer his services to one of those powers. Wishing, however, to take leave of his uncle on his mother's side, who filled a high office at the Swedish court, he proceeded by sea to Stockholm. The tossing which he experienced on this occasion convinced him that he could not stand the long voyage to the East, and, after his arrival at his uncle's, he Avould appear to have con- sidered the proposal then made to him to enter the Swedish service. The reflection that Sweden was a declining power, and that Prussia had just begun to carve her way to the front rank, induced him to reject the idea. He returned then to Tootzen, and after a last farewell to his father, set out, with thirty ducats in his pocket, for Berlin to seek there an audience and a commission from the great Frederic. Arrived at the Prussian capital Loudon preferred his request to the king. Frederic did not absolutely refuse it, but caused him to be informed that he might remain there and wait till a vacancy should occur. For six months he waited, presuming once during that period to remind the king of his promise. Frederic exhorted him to have patience, but when, just before the term had expired, the Governor THE EA RL Y TRAINING. 1 5 of Berlin, of whom Loudon had made a friend, pressed the king earnestly on his behalf, Frederic gave him no encouragement to persevere, declaring that the heavy eyebrows and the thin lean body of the applicant were alike distasteful to him. The governor, however, did not accept this rebuff as final, and advised Loudon to demand a personal interview, and to press respectfully but firmly for a decisive answer. The audience was applied for and granted. In the light of subsequent events, and in the presence of the fact that the petitioner for employment became the most formidable opponent of the king who refused it — that, not many years later, the king meeting him at a royal banquet at which the petitioner, then a general, had modestly chosen a place at the further end of the table on the side opposite to that on which he himself sat, exclaimed, beckoning to him to seat himself near him : " Come here. Marshal Loudou, I would rather see you by me than opposite to me," the interview is worthy of permanent record. At it Loudon represented to the king that he had had experience of war, that he had come to Berliu to have the honour of serving under the greatest soldier of the day, that he had waited six months, had long since exhausted all his resources, and been reduced to earn bare livelihood as a copying clerk ; that he would count the time well spent if the king would graciously bestow upon him the commission of captain in a cavalry regiment. Frederic heard him to the end, then replied : " I must indeed have many squadrons at my disposal if I could give one to every foreign officer who comes to Berlin," and dismissed him. Loudon, battled at Berlin, proceeded to Vienna. lie took with him knowledge which could not but be useful to him were he fortunate enoufch to obtain service i;i 16 LOUDON. the Austrian army. He had, in fact, employed his time at the 'Prussian capital to the best advantage, had thoroughly mastered Frederic's military system, and especially the reforms he had introduced into his artillery. Fortified with the letters of introduction he received from the Austrian ambassador, Count von Rosenberg, he could present himself at the Viennese court as a person who was worth receiving. He reached Vienna in the spring of 1744. The recom- mendations which Count Rosenberg had forwarded on his behalf inspired I\Iaria Theresa with a desire to see Loudon, and she gave directions that he should attend her at Schbnbrunn. Whilst awaiting his turn in the antechamber Loudon was accosted by a stranger, who, in a friendly manner, inquired as to the business which had brought him there. Loudon entered freely into conversation with the man, related with great frankness the history of his past career, and expressed his hopes for the future. The stranger thereupon told him that if he would only speak as frankly and freely to the Queen of Hungary as he had to him his request would certainly be granted. He then quitted him. Summoned a few minutes later to the presence room, Loudon beheld his unknown friend standing by the side of Maria Theresa. He at once recognised that he had been speaking to her husband the Duke of Lorraine. It need scarcely be added that the request was granted. Loudon left the royal presence captain in the Austrian army. Chance took Loudon that same evening to the theatre, and there he met unexpectedly the famous Francis, Baron Trenck, then a Lieut.-Colonel commanding the Sclavonian Free corps, known as the Pandours. Trenck had made Loudon's acquaintance in Russia, and appreciating his THE EA RL Y TEA TNIXG. 1 7 value, called him into his box, and offered him the choice of command of one of two companies of his regiment, the first of which was in the Upper Palatinate, the second in Bavai'ia. Loudon chose the latter and started the next morning to join his command This happened in Ajjril, 174-1. CHAPTER III. DEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS ' WAR. The Company of Pandoiirs of which Loudon assumed command in Bavaria formed a fraction of the van-guard of the army which Prince Charles of Lorraine was about to lead into Alsace. That army consisted of 46,000 infantry and 22,000 cavalry. The van-guard, of which Trenck's Free corps was a component part, was commanded by Field - Marshal Nadasdy. "With a view to deceive the French and Bavarians who were guarding the Rhine near Mayence Prince Charles detached a corps under General Barenklau to occupy their attention in that direction, Nadasdy and Trenck, then, at the head of 9,000 Hussars and Pandours, crossed the Rhine (30th of June) near Philipsbarg, surprised three Bavarian regiments stationed there, and drove them from their camp, killing and taking prisoners 532 of their number. It is stated in the Austrian records that Trenck was the fii'st man, and Loudon the second, to touch the soil on the left bank of the Rhine. This success secured for the rest of the Austrian army an unmolested passage of the river (1st to the 3rd of July). The very same day, 3rd of July, Nadasdy, always with BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 19 Trenck's Free corps in the van, marched against and took possession of Lauterburg, on the 5th of Weissenburg, and on the 11th of Hagenau. The French Commander, Marshal de Coigny, after an abortive attempt to recover Weissenburg, fell back behind the Moder, and leaving Alsace to the Austrians, prepared to defend Lorraine. So acutely was the position felt at Versailles that the King of France himself set out to take the command of the army, and issued orders that no important operations were to be undertaken until his arrival. Meanwhile reinforcements from all parts of France were sent into Lorraine. The place in Alsace which had been most fiercely assailed by the advancing and retreating armies was the castle of Elsass-Zabern, called by the French Saverne. Taken by Trenck, Loudon leading the storming party, and occupied by Nadasdy, it had been evacuated by the latter on the approach of a greatly- superior force under the Due d'Harcourt, and had then been retaken by Nadasdy, reinforced by Barenklau's corps. As Nadasdy advanced from this place, however, he was attacked in the night by the French and momentarily driven back. The French on this occasion took some prisoners. Amongst these was Loudon, who, fighting in the very front, bad been struck by a miisket ball in the right breast. The ball itself passed through the upper part of the body, but the wound was aggravated by the fact that the bullet had driven into the cavity one of the metal buttons of his doUman. It was perhaps fortunate for Loudon that he was captured, for at the moment there was no surgeon with the Austrian advance, whereas, taken prisoner, he was placed under the care of a French surgeon posse-ssing alike humanity and skill. His cure was tedious and painful. At last, however, the surgeon was able to extract the button, and the wound then gi-adually healed. u 2 20 LOUDON. Long before this had occurred Loudon was again with his own people. The Pandoiirs, advancing a few days after their defeat, had recaptured the village in which their captain lay wounded, and with hina the surgeon who was attending him. Loudon was sent to the rear of the army to await there his complete recovery. Before that happened circumstances occurred to make a complete change in the military calculations. We have already noted why it was that Frederic IT. regarded with great apprehension the success of the French in Alsace, and the measures which he had taken to baffle the designs of the Queen of Hungary. Taking ad- vantage of the declared intention of Maria Theresa to invalidate the election of Charles VII. he had posed as the upholder of the dignity of the German empire, had enlisted on his side the Palatinate and Hesse Cassel, had made an alliance with France, and had arranged with that power a plan of operations which, if carried out as he had planned them, could not fail to succeed. He waited then till Austria had completely entangled herself in Alsace and was about to invade Lorraine ; till the reinforcements despatched by the Court of Versailles to Marshal de Coigny — 30,000 men under de Noailles — had actually reached him ; till Louis, on his way to join the army, had reached Metz. Then he issued the famous de- claration to which I have referred, and invaded Bohemia ! (August, 1744). Information of this act of hostility reached the head quarters of the Austrian army on the 21st August. The position was very critical : an enemy of superior force in front of tliem, a broad and unbridged river behind them, severing them from the fatherland invaded by another enemy. Prince Charles was not a great captain himself, BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 21 but, in t]ie person of Count Tiaun, he had at his side a general second to none of tliat period, and who was yet destined to become, according to the admission of the pupil, the best instructor of Frederic in the art of war. But not even the advice of Traun, bad it been on all occasions followed, would have saved the Austrian army at this crisis, had the French displayed even ordinary vigour. Frederic's calculations had been perfect, provided every man perfoi-med the part allotted to him. But just at the critical moment sickness stepped in and struck down his principal confede- rate, Louis XV., when on the very eve of setting out from Metz (8th to the loth of August). This contretemps spoiled one part of his plan. The Fi'onch commanders had received positive instructions not to fight till Louis should arrive to take command — and now Louis was detained by sickness at Metz. The Austrian commander was able, tlien, to re-cross the lihiue unmolested. He effected this operation on the 24th of August, destroyed the boats and pontoons he had used, and marching eastward with a haste rare in those days entered Bohemia on the 24th of September. In the course of less than three months the skilful manoeuvres of Count Traun, who directed the operations of the army, forced the King of Prussia to renounce the conquests he had made, to sacrifice his heavy artillery, and to evacuate Bohemia. One month later, January 20th, 1745, the ostensible reasons for the war disappeared. Charles VII., Emperor of Germany died. The election of Francis of Lorraine, the Queen of Hungary's hu.sband, was certain, Frederic could no longer declare that he was waging war to restore to (jiei'mauy its libei-ty and to tlie ]*]iiipeior his dignity. The events which followed immediately upon the death of Cliai'lcs VII. diminished still further the grounds upon which ho had based liis hostile position. Hesse Cassel 22 LOUDON. and the Elector Palatine withdrew at once from the Union of Fiankfort ; on the 22nd of April, Max Joseph of Bavaria, successor of the late Emperor in that electorate, signed at Flissen a treaty of peace with the Queen of Hungary ; and on the 28th of May following Saxony en- tered, at Warsaw, into an alliance, defensive and oifensive, with the same sovereign. The preponderance had thus re- verted to the House of Austria. Frederic stood alone in Germany against that power. There were not wanting symp- toms, moreover, that he might have Russia on his hands at the same time. Under these circumstances he was will- ing to revert once again to the conditions of the Peace of Breslau. But Maria Theresa had signed that Peace under the pressure of hard necessity. She could not be expected, victorious, to confirm a cession she had made under direct compulsion — to confirm it, too, just after her enemy, unsatisfied with that cession, had thwarted her plans upon France. No — rather would she reduce this disturber of the peace of Germany to the position from which his grandfather ought never to have emerged — the position of an Elector of Biandenburg. For his pai-t Frederic declined to renounce his plunder — and the war continued. Loudon, meanwhile, had recovered from his wound, had joined his coi'ps of Pandours, now transformed into a regular Hungarian regiment, quartered in Upper Silesia, and form.- ing part of the army commanded in that province by Prince Esterhaz)'^. Tn the month of May he was present at a suc- cessful attack made by that prince upon a column of 9,000 Prussians despatched from Neisse to take Jagerndorf and who had actually penetrated into that place. They were driven back with loss. Dui'ing the same month, however, an event occurred which brought him more prominently into notice. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 23 On the 20tli of May a Prussian ensign, deserting from Kosel, informed Prince Esterhazy that General von Saldner, commanding in that place, had just died, and gave him such information as decided him to attempt the place by a cou2>de-main. The enterprise he entrusted to an officer upon whose intelligence and activity he could depend. Colonel Buccow. Buccow took with him a regiment of Pandours, a Hungarian infantry regiment, and some cavalry, sending on in front Lieutenant-Colonel d'Olne and Loudon, with the advance guard of Pandours. D'Olne came within sight of the place on the 25th of May and despatched Loudon to make a thorough examination of the fortress and country. Loudon returned and pointed out to d'Olne how, with the small party at his disposal, the place might be surprised and taken. D'Olne, however, was not sufficiently adventurous to make the attempt with- out orders, but sent on Loudon to Buccow for the necessary authorisation. This Buccow at once gave and sent a re- inforcement from the Hungarian regiment. The column of attack, composed of 200 men, was tlien formed, and the command of it given to Loudon. At two o'clock on the morning of the 26th of May, he crept, accompanied by eleven volunteei-s, at the head of his small column, to the edge of the outer ditch of the fortress, upwards of fifty feet in width and full of water. Nothing dismayed by this obstacle the twelve volunteers CTOssed it, and scaling the wall, gained the rampart just as the discliarge of two muskets by the garrison told them they had been dis- covered. Loudon, tlio first to reach the parapet, came all at once on a battery of five guns. One of these he promptly turned against the enemy ; — waited till more of his men should roach him and then sent a portion of them to assail tlie Prussians, now collecting in force, in fiank, whilst 24 LOUDON. he attacked them iu front. The fact that the fortifica- tions were unfinished doubtless considerably aided him, for, iu a few minutes, he compelled the garrison to evacuate them and to retreat into the town. Not long, however, was this a refuge for them, for d'Olne and St. Ivary coming up forced the gates and compelled their surrendei-. They consisted of nineteen officers and four hundred men. The victors captured likewise twenty-seven guns, of which ten were twelve-pounders, a hundred munition waggons fully laden and a well-stocked magazine. They gained these advantages at the cost of ten men killed and twenty-two wounded. The loss of the garrison was nearly treble that amount, and included the Colonel commanding and the second in command. This was the first occasion on which an opportunity had been given to Loudon to show his capacity in command. His conduct attracted the attention of his comrades and of his superiors, and gave him the reputation of a man who could be depended upon in an emergency. But no one yet discei-ned in the shy and studious foreigner attached to the corps of Trenck, a corps always in the front, always engaged, generally with advantage, with the enemy's out- posts, a man who, in the great crisis of Austria's fortunes, would lead her armies. Such a future never presented itself then to the mind of Loudon. Gifted with a character thoroughly practical he was content, in his position as one of the advanced guaixl of the enemy, to observe, to carry out orders, to show himself always on the alert, to watch for opportunities. It was a capital school for a rising warrior. After the capture of Kosel, Loudon's regiment was attached to the corps of Nadasdy, who then, as in the Alsace- Lorraine campaign, commanded the advance of the army BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 25 under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine. That prince, with Count Traun at his elbow, had, we have seen, forced Frederic, by a series of masterly manoeuvres, to evacuate Bohemia, and, joined by the Saxons, had entered Silesia. But Prince Charles had no longer Traun at his elbow. With a fatuity which has often guided its councils, the Court of Vienna had I'ewarded that able soldier by bes- towing upon him the Government of Transylvania. Left to his own resources Prince Charles was no match for the King of Prussia. He allowed himself to be surprised and beaten on the 4th June, at Hohenfriedburg, and forced to re- treat into the Bohemian mountains. Three months later, however, strongly reinfoi'ced and spurred on by the Court of Vienna to act, Prince Charles, marching with great secrecy, took up a position, which, if he could have main- tained it, would have cut off Frederic, then lying at Staudenz, from Silesia. The plan, whilst being carried out, was betrayed by a deserter to Frederic, and Frederic, though he knew not precisely from which side an attack would come, prepared himself to nieet one from any quarter. Still, he was to a certain extent surprised when, early on the morning of the 30th of September, he beheld the hills on the i-ight of his camp occupied by the enemy. The chances were all in favour of the Austrians. They numbered thirty thousand to Fi'cderic's eighteen thousand ; they occupied a commanding position : they were acting on a preconcerted plan, and, to make assurance doubly sure, their general had ordered Nadasdy to march on Liebenthal, four miles to the south-east of the Prussian camp, with instructions that on receiving a certain order, he should fall upon it from the rear. But never was the want of a firm and commanding will more apparent than in the Austrian camp on this eventful 26 LOUDON. day. Had Prince Charles only acted with vigour he had Frederic in his toils. But through the want of that im- pressive will everything went wrong. He himself com- mitted the first fault. Having the advantage of position of attack, to a certain extent of surprise, he halted and allowed the Prussians to form and to attack him. Again, the order to attack reached Kadasdy too late, and although, on receiving it, Nadasdy did capture the Prussian camp — and with it the King of Prussia's almost empty treasure- chest and his baggage — it was because there were few to defend it, and his action had no effect on the battle, which had been already won by Frederic. The advantages of numbers, of position, of surprise, were thus neutralised by a want of daring and concert. It was often the fortune of Frederic to be opposed to generals of the stamp of Prince Charles ! The victory of Soor — as the battle was called from the vil- lage occupied by the Austrians before the battle — permitted Frederic to withdraw his army into Silesia and to place it in winter quarters about Rohnstock and Hohenfriedberg. He then stai-ted for Berlin, believing that military opera- tions had ceased for the season. In this instance, however, he did not take into calculation the determination of the Empress-Queen — for by the election of her husband to the Imperial dignity (13th of September) Maria Theresa had now assumed that title — to use to the utmost the advantages which superiority in men, in money, and in material had placed in her hands. She was resolved to carry the war into Brandenburg. How the designs of jNIaria Theresa were foiled by the victories of the Prussians over her armies at Hennersdorf, (27th of November) and Kesselsdorf (15th of December)} and how ten davs after the last named battle the war was BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 27 concluded by the peace of Dresden, by which, whilst Austria ceded Silesia and the country of Glatz, Frederic acknow- ledged Francis I. as Emperor of Germany, and how, rather less than three years later, England, Holland, France, Spain and Austria signed the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, (30th of April, 18th of October, 7th of November, 1748), are matters with which the historian of Loudon's life has no concern. For, almost immediately after the battle of Soor Loudon quitted the Austrian service. It happened in this manner : Loudon was under the im- mediate orders of Francis, Baron von Trenck. Trenck was a born plunderer, hard, cold, unfeeling, totally without mercy, and preferring pillage to war. It has been urged against him that his desire to plunder the camp of the King of Prussia was the real cause of the late arrival of Nadasdy on the battle-field of Soor. His harshness, his insolence, his cruelty, his indifference to military order, grated par- ticularly on Loudoii, whose character was exactly opposite. He bore with him long, but, after Soor, he felt he could not serve under a man who would not hesitate to sacrilice the public good for his private advantage. He resigned therefore his post and proceeded to Vienna. Loudon was still at Vienna when the peace of Dresden was signed. As that peace shut out from him all prospect of military employment he had resolved to try his fortunes in another country, when he received an order to stay where he was, in order to appear as a witness against Trenck, just placed under arrest for malversation and other misde- meanours. Trenck, during the trial, endeavoured to im- plicate Loudon, but the latter had been careful enough to preserve all the orders he had received, and these documents proved that in every instance he had obeyed orders. Whilst, therefore, Trenck was sentenced to pay a fine of 12U,OuO 28 LOUDON. florins to bis accusers, the men whom he had plundered, and eventually, to imprisonment for life in the castle of Spielburg, Loudon left the court with an unspotted and even enhanced reputation. His means at this time were very scanty. There lived in the last decade of the last century men who remembered well how he used to come every evening to take a glass of cheap wine in a garden in the Alser suburb. His leisure moments he used to devote to a study of geography, of mathematics, with a view to qualify himself more perfectly for his profession. But every day spent in Vienna diminished his resources, and he had begun to despair of the future, when a friend, who had considerable court influ- ence, and who had formed the highest opinion of him, the well-known musician Salviatti, succeeded in obtaining for him a captain's commission in a regiment of Croats. Salvi- atti's kindness did not end there, for he lent him a hundred ducats to enable him to join. Loudon's regiment was at Bunic on the Croatian frontier. On his way thither he stopped at Bosing, about eleven miles from Pressburg, to present a letter of introduction he had received from Salviatti to INIadame von Haagen, a widow lady who lived on her property in that neighbourhood. Well received by Madame von Haagen Loudon stayed some time at Biising, and soon after married the second daughter, Clara. Pretty, well- educated and clever, Clara von Haagen was just the wife for a man of quiet energy, anxious to improve himself, and determined to attain a definite end. She entered into all his hopes and aspirations, and during a long married life she proved his best, his truest, his most trusted friend. The fortune she brought with her, whilst not large, was yet a sensible addition to a captain's pay. She bore him two sons, both of whom died in their infancy. BEFORE THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 29 Ten years were spent by Loudon on the Croatian frontier, principally at Bunic. He spent his leisure time in pursuing his studies of history, geography, and geometry. He pro- vided himself for that purpose with the best maps he could procui-e. It is related of him that the better to study a very large map which he had procured, he had removed the furniture from the centre of the room and placed the map on the floor. He repeated this process so long and so often that one day his wife, not quite understanding his pertin- acity, exclaimed with a slight tinge of asperity : " What pleasure can you possibly find in always studying that big map?" "Leave me alone, my dear," replied Loudon, "the knowledge I am now acquiring will be useful to me when I become Field-Marshal " ! In other respects there was little to call for the display of the special qualities which characterised him. Though much discontent, the conse(juence of the introduction of new regulations, prevailed generally in Croatia, and de- veloped a little later into a regular outbreak of the Croatian soldiers, Loudon put down the disorder in his own company with a very strong hand. Assembling the non-commissioned officers, and appealing to their loyalty, he arrested and brought to shai'p trial the mutineers. So vigorous was his action that in four-and-twenty hours order was restored, never again to be disturbed. In the other districts the disturbances were more prolonged, but the result was the same. Meanwhile Loudon's promotion had been going on. In 1750 he was promoted to be Major, and in three years later to the rank of second Lieutenant-Colonel. Ho was serving in that rank when the Seven years' war broke out. CHAPTER TV. THE EVE OF THE v/.vn. Maria Theresa had never forgiv^en Frederic the seizure of Silesia. For ten long years she brooded over the loss. Every thought of her mind was directed during that period to devise a plan for the punishment of the evil-doer and the recovery of the stolen country. Before even the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been signed, she had striven hard to win over llussia to her views. The highly-gifted Sovereign who reigned over that country, the Czarina Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, would not have been inclined, in any case, to view with complacency the growth on her western frontier of a military kingdom, strong enough to bar to her the road to the rest of Europe. Under the actual circumstances she had strong personal reasons for determining to seize the earliest occasion to stifle the growth of Prussia. Her j)i'ivate life had not been and was not so pra'e as to defy criticism, and Frederic, who possessed to a high degree the power of satire, and who, like all men specially endowed, could not refrain from the exercise of that dangerous talent, had given vent publicly to sarcasms which could not fail to reach the ears of the Czarina. Elizabeth, then, hated Frederic with a hatred which his destruction alone could satiate. The policy she THE EVE OF THE WAR. 31 had inherited from her father coincided in this respect with her strong personal feelings. Sure then of the support of Russia, Maria Theresa then had to consider how it might be possible to gain France. The alliance of France would mean the hostility of England, but she had felt herself on many occasions during the previous war so hampered by the advice, and so little benefited by the active assistance, of the latter, that she did not hesitate between the two. In this view she was sup- ported by her chancellor, Count von Kaunitz, a statesman of rare ability and foresight. As the policy of this illus- trious man influenced the House of Austria during the period upon which we are now entering, a short description of him will be necessary. Anton Wengel von Kaunitz was born in Vienna in 1711, the fifth and youngest son of a family of nineteen children. He was originally intended for the Church, but the death of his four elder brothers on the field of battle changed his career, and he was sent successively to the universities of Vienna, Leipzig, and Leyden, to prepare him for diplomatic service. Subsequently, with the same purpose in view, he visited JS^orth Germany, Italy, France, and England. On his return to Vienna in 1735 he was nominated by the Emperor, Charles VI., an Aulic councillor, and a little later was sent as second Imperial commissary to the diet of Ratisbon. The death of the Emperor Avithdrew him. from this mission, but the following year, 1741, he was nominated by Maria Theresa ambassador to the Holy See, and was sent thence, in 1742, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Turin, to consolidate a defensive alliance between Sardinia and Au.stria. The ability he displayed on this occasion very favourably impressed his sovereign ; she sent him to represent her at the court of her brother-in-law, 32 LOUDON. Charles of Lorraine, then Governor of the Low Countries • and when, sliortly afterwards, Pi-ince Charles was com- pelled, by the death of his wife, to absent himself, she confided to him the administration, ad interim, of those provinces. On the return of Prince Charles, he resumed his office of ^Minister Plenipotentiary, and was with him at the time of the French occupation of Brussels. Subse- quently he represented Austria at the congress of Aix-la- Chapelle, and signed on behalf of his country the Peace which bears the name of that town. On his retui-n from Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz resumed his seat in the Aulic Council. He was present as one of its members when Maria Theresa summoned it to deliberate on the imperial policy to be pursued now that peace reigned throughout Europe. She found opinions divided. Her husband, the Emperor Francis, declared himself in favour of pursuing the traditional policy of the empire — the policy of a cordial undei-standing with England and Holland— and recommended the renunciation of all thought of Silesia, and the conciliation of Prussia. Kaunitz opposed this view. In a state paper, remarkable for its logical argument, he laid down that the rise of the electorate of Brandenburg had materially affected the position of Austria ; that whereas, before that rise, the latter had two hereditary enemies, France and the Sultan, she now had three ; that Austria would never be safe till she had recovered Silesia ; but that, to make that recovery certain, it was necessary that she should form a European confederacy to crush her rival ; and of that confederacy France should be a component part. These views, which expressed in well-ai-gued sentences the thoughts of Maria Theresa, were adopted then as the secret policy of Austria, and Kaunitz was despatched to THE EVE OF THE WAR. 33 Paris to endeavour to win over the French Court. The con- version of a hereditary enemy to the position of an active friend would have been an almost impossible task even for a man whose diplomatic and statesmanlike ability, and whose influence over the politics of the age gained for him at a later day the sobi-iquet, " the coachman of Europe ; " of whom Voltaire records that " he was as active in the cabinet as the King of Piussia was in the field ; " had he not been powerfully aided by Frederic himself. The malicious spirit which had made of the Czarina Elizabeth an implacable enemy had not spared the reigning mistress of Louis XV. It had been possible for Frederic to bind Madame de Pompadour to his interests, for, at the outset, she had a keen admiration for him. But no political con- sideration, no personal friendship, could restrain the love of satire which reigned supreme in the breast of the King of Prussia, and which he exercised at the expense often of his best friends. Some of his sayings, reported to Madame de Pompadour and to Louis XV., had changed their feelings into bitter hatred, aad had predisposed them therefore to listen to the advances of Kaunitz, That great statesman remained two years in France care- fully preparing the bases of an alliance which, at the proper time, was to be concluded. Maria Theresa then recalled him, to assume, as Chancellor of the Empire, supreme direction of her affairs. " She expected liis arrival," wrote the English minister to Dresden who had been despatched thence to Vienna on a secret mission, " with the same im- patience as Henry Vl II. looked for the return of Cranmer when he was tired of Wolsey." His arrival affixed the seal to the negotiations which wore still pending Practically, Russia and France were secured. It remained only to gain Saxony. D 34 LOUDON. Kaunitz proceeded then to win over that Power, He found the Saxon minister, Count Briihl, sympathetic but timid. Briihl was unwilling to strike until Russia should be actually on the move. He felt that if Frederic were to deal the first blow his own country would have to parry it. With the view of preventing this he urged patience on the Court of Vienna on the one side, whilst, on the other, he iised eA^ery argument at St. Petersburg to induce Russia to assail the common enemy. The result would probably have corresponded to his wishes had Briihl used common precaution. The depositary of the secrets of two great Powers, upon whose common action depended the fate of a third, it became him to see that the correspondence did not fall into the hands of any but those of whose loyalty he was absolutely sure. This was the more essential as he knew from experience that the king he was plotting against was a man absolutely without scruple. But Briihl took no pi-ecautions. It resulted from this that before the pear was ripe Frederic obtained cognisance of the whole plan. It happened in this way. Towards the end of 1752 a Saxon who had been employed in the public offices in Dresden, and also was about to emigrate into Prussia, gave the Prussian General, Winterfeldt, a hint that a confederacy was being formed against his master, of which Dresden was the centre. Winterfeldt informed Frederic. Frederic, naturally suspicious of the designs of Austria, at once dii-ected his minister at the Saxon Court, Count Malzahn, to fiod out some instrument who should penetrate into the secret archives of its foreign office, and acquaint him with the true nature of the confederacy. Malzahn succeeded in buying a clerk, named Menzel, of a very respectable family, who had been employed for seventeen years in the secret archives of the cabinet. As Menzel had not himself access THE EVE OF THE WAR. S5 to the keys which closed the presses containing the most private documents, he was furnished with one set from Berlin, and when these would not answer, he returned them indicating the alterations necessary. These having been made and the new keys sent him, he began his treacherous and inglorious work. He continued it till the war began. Frederic obtained additional confirmatory evidence of the plans of the confederates from the second secretary to the Austrian Embassy at Berlin, Maximilian Weingarten. This young man had fallen in love with the daughter of the Governor of Charlottenburg, a friend of General "Winterfeldt. The latter, already on the look-out for some means to penetrate the secrets of the Austrian Embassy, persuaded the girl to use her influence with her lover for that purpose. Weingarten was weak enough and base enough to comply. Frederic had thus all the information he wanted. He held the secrets of Russia and Saxony through Menzel, those of Austria through Max. Weingarten. He was very much perplexed. It had become evident in 1755 that war between France and England was impending. The whole Continent would be drawn into it. England, true to her traditional policy, would endeavour to obtain the assistance of the German Empire, represented by the House of Austria. The claims of the latter upon Silesia would certainly be renewed. To what quarter, then, could he look for an ally ? The correspondence showed him that Russia had committed herself; but Aastria was not quite sure of France. There was yet time then to gain the alliance of that Power. Full of this hope Frederic turned to France. But his sarcasms had done their work at Versailles. There Madame de Pompadour reigned still supreme, and Madame de Pompadour never forgave. Even on this D 2 36 LOUDON. occasion Frederic committed the mistake of addressing himself to others rather than to her. He soon found that he had no hope of France. His ambassador at Versailles informed him that far from responding to his overtures, the Court was meditating a closer alliance with Austria. At the same time he received information that that Power was concentrating large bodies of troops on the frontier of Silesia. The crisis was indeed at hand. In the spring of 1756, the Czarina had proposed to Austria an immediate attack upon Prussia, with a view to the partitioning of that kingdom. Austria was to recover Silesia and the country of Glatz ; Russia was to receive Courland and other fractions of Polish territory, whilst Poland was to be indemnified by the acquisition of East Prussia. But Maria Theresa was not, at that date, quite sure of France. A little later in that year, May 1st, 1756, however, she signed with that power a defensive treaty — known as the Treaty of Versailles. But it was clear, even then, to Kaunitz, that France would not support his .sovei^eign in an attack upon Prussia, and the Russian offer was, for the moment, declined. Kaunitz, however, still pressed his skilful negotiations for an offensive alliance. Every week added to the probability of his success. The relations between France and England were becoming more and more strained, and France showed a growing tendency to connect herself more closely with Austria. The hopes of Kaunitz were still further stimulated by the declaration of war, on the 9th of June, between France and England. Frederic, meanwhile, had allied himself with the latter Power. It is possible — well aware though he was, as a consummate soldier, of the advantages which belong to an attackincr armv — that he would have hesitated to THE EVE OF THE WAR. 37 commit any act likely to decide the still wavering Court of Versailles to declare openly for his enemies, but that, just after the declaration of war just referred to, he received from St. Petersburg letters, purporting to come " in the strictest confidence from a trustworthy source," but which, he had no doubt, were written by the Grand Duke Peter, the heir to the throne of Russia, and his intense admirer, warning him that active measures against him were deferred in consequence of the unready state of the Russian army, but that he certainly would be attacked the following spring. This information decided Frederic. He would not, indeed, attack Russia, but he would dash upon Saxony and Austria before they were i-eady, upset their calcula- tions and possibly decide the war in a single campaign. Before, acting, however, Frederic, in deference to the wishes of England, addressed, through his ambassador at Vienna, Count Klinggraff, a demand to the Empress Queen, as to whether her armies, assembled on the frontiers of Moravia and Bohemia, had been formed for the purpose of attacking Prussia. Maria Theresa receiving Kliuggriiff in a private audience (July 2Gth) answered him that she had deemed it necessary in the existing crisis to take measures for the security of herself and her allies tending to the prejudice of no one. Frederic, disappointed with the nature of this reply, transmitted at once orders to Klinggriiff to ask for a less oracular response — a response containing an assurance that Austria would not attack him that year or the next. To this demand, transmitted this time in writing, (18th of August) Maria Theresa replied (21st of August) that " the treaty she had made with Russia was purely defensive; that she had concluded no offensive alliance; and although the critical state of Europe had compelled Ler to arm, she had no intention to violate the Treaty of 38 LOUDON. Dresden, but would not bind herself by any promise to refrain from acting as circumstances might require." Frederic received this reply on the night of the 25th of August. On the 28th he set out, at the head of his army, to invade Saxony. In this manner began the Seven Years' "War. CHAPTER Y. LTEUTEXANT-COLONEL AXD COLONEL. When the war broke out, Loudon was still quartered in Croatia. Most eager was he to be employed in it. He made application then to be included amongst those officers who were ordered from that province. But General Petazzi, who commanded thei'e, and who during the earlier part of his service in the province, had covered him with praises which had excited the jealousy of his comrades, had, in the later months, conceived a bitter dislike to him, and abruptly refused his request. Enraged at the refusal and at the bitter and scornful terms in which it was conveyed,^ Loudon quitted Bunic without leave and hastened to Vienna. Such a step was not to be tolerated even in those days of comparatively free service, and the military authorities were about to send Loudon back to his frontier station with a curt refusal, when a cii'cumstance occurred to fix his destiny. The successful inroad of Frederic into Saxony — to be presently more particularly noted — had convinced the military advisex-s of the Empress-Queen of the advantages whicli would accrue from despatching to the army ' Tlie words used hy General Petazzi were that Loudon neither waa (it for war, nor did h»i)0S6ess tlie means wherewith to ei^uip himself. 40 LOUDON. contributed by the minor states of Germany, then about to be formed, a regiment of Croats, always to be employed in the front, and to be commanded by a man who should be distinguished for intelligence and, in the largest sense of the term, military knowledge. 3Iaria Theresa then ordered the formation of such a corps, eight hundred strong, and commissioned Kaunitz to seek out an officer possessing the necessary qualities. It happened that there was at Vienna at the time, living in intimate relations with Kaunitz, the same Hoch- stetten who had known Loudon in Russia, and who, fifteen years previously, had been the indirect cause of his entering the Austrian service. With him Loudon had, during his short visit to Vienna, renewed relations. He had given him details of his long frontier training, of the discipline to which he had submitted; had acquainted him with his disappointments, his hopes, his despair. When tlien Hochstetten learned the commission given by the Empiess- Queen to Kaunitz, he hastened to that statesman and recommended Loudon as a man specially marked out for the command in question. Hochstetten pressed the matter with so much earnestness that Kaunitz at once sent for Loudon. The messenger found Loudon lodging in the attic of a tailor's shop in the Ungargasse. He proceeded at once to Kaunitz, and held with him a long conversation. Upon the keen-witted Austrian statesman the demeanour, calm, quiet, and self-possessed, of Loudon, made an impression absolutely the reverse of that which the same demeanour had produced on Frederic. In a very brief period, Kaunitz recognised a self-contained man, a man of iron nerve, of great precision of thought, a man who could not only conceive great ideas, but who could carry them out. He LIEUTEXANT-COLONEL AXD COLONEL. 41 bad, he felt, before him the very man of whom he was in quest. On the spot, then, he gave him the independent command of a battalion of Croats, and the commission to lead that battalion with all speed to join the imperial army in Bohemia under the command of Field-Marshal Count Browne, with him to remain till the fedei\xtion army should be formed. Loudon joined the Field-Marshal at Budin, in September, 1756. Before that date the position of the contending parties had been defined. We have seen how Frederic had set out from Berlin on the 28th of August to invade Saxony. His plan had been to take the Saxons by surprise, and to compel them either to disarm, or to make common cause with him ; then to invade Bohemia, and in combination with a second army under Schwerin, marching from Glatz, to strike such a blow at the Austrians as would give him the entire command of that country before w^inter should set in. Before referring to the events which followed his attempt to execute that plan, I propose to describe, as briefly as possible, the resources at tlie disposal of the contending parties. Frederic, well aware that the seizure of Silesia had not been forgiven, and that he would yet have to fight for his prey, had employed the ten years' peace in increasing and in improving his army. The revenues, amounting to four million thalers, of the conquered Silesia gave him money ; the permission to recruit his army in any part of Germany gave him men for this purpose. When the war broke out he possessed an army consisting, independent of the troops in garrison, of 130,000 men. Uf the component parts of this army it could be aflirmed that the infantry surpassed, alike in quickness of maufcuvre and in correctness of shooting, the rest of the infantry of Europe ; whilst the cavalry, consisting of 10,000 cuirassiers, 12,500 dragoons, 42 L on DON. and 10,500 hussars, and trained by sucli men as Ziethen, Budenbrock, Gessler, and Seidlitz, had a similar pre- eminence. On the other hand the artillery had been leas attended to. In the first and second Silesian wars Frederic had possessed so great a superiority in this arm that he had made the mistake of concentrating all his attention upon the other two. It remains to be added that during the ten years adverted to Frederic had held yearly exercises of his army on the plains round Spandau, so contriving them that no foreign officers should be present ; that he had himself taught his generals, had impressed the neces- sity of diligent attention upon the more subordinate officers, and had maintained the strictest discipline. Nor during the same period had the Austrian army been neglected. On the death of Count Khevenhiiller in 1744, the practical administration of it had been conferred, under Prince Wenzel von Lichtenstein, upon Count Daun. This general, whose name will often recur, had noticed that the victories of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War, and of Frederic in the two Silesian wars, had been gained principally by their superior number of guns and by the skill of their gunners. Upon his representations, then, the greatest attention had been paid to increasing the number of guns and gunners, to improve their equipment, and to practise them in all manner of manoeuvres, principally in those which had a defensive object. Great success had attended the endeavoiu^s of the Austrian leaders, and it is not too much to say that v>?hen the war broke out in 1756 their artillery was the finest and the best served in Europe. Unfortunately Daun had taken part in wars which had been essentially of a defensive character. lie could not grasp the necessity of infusing into the army the daring and dashing spirit which is required in aggressive warfare. W^^-:i^^^'^\ LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 43 lie neither possessed nor did he understand that spirit himself. His principle of warfare may be described in one sentence — to resist attack to the utmost ; to risk nothing ; and only to assail an enemy when success was absolutely certain. The character of an army depends very much upon the character of the man to whom its training is intrusted. When we reflect then, that whilst Frederic was instructing his generals and his troops in offensive move- ments at Spandau, Daun was exercising the Austrians in defensive warfare in Moravia, we shall cease to feel surprised at the earlier results of the campaign. It remains to be added that when Frederic burst into Saxony in August, 1756, the cadres of the Austrian infantry had not been filled up ; the cavalry were waiting the yearly remounts ; the commissariat arrangements, the field- hospitals, and the pontoon-trains were all incomplete. The Saxon army was in a still less forward state. The Court of Dresden, unaware that its secrets had been betrayed, had made certain that the war would break out only when Eussia was ready to act, and it knew that Russia would not be ready till the following spring. Its troops then had not even been called out when Frederic marched from Berlin on the 28th of August. It was only when it received tidings of that march and its destination that summonses were issued to the several regiments to concentrate — not on Dresden, to reach which time failed them — but at Pirna and Konigstein, on the south bank of the Elbe, in the hilly country then known as the Misnian Highlands (Meissnische Ilochland). Frederic had timed well his irruption. Saxony lay at his feet defenceless. He crossed its border on the 29th, at the head of 65,000 men, in three columns, took possession of Leipsig the same evening, and, pressing forward, occupied 44 LOUDON. Dresden on tl:e 9tli of September. The next day he set out for Pima. Meanwhile the Saxon army had collected in the Pirna country. It numbered only 17,000 men, but the position it occupied left little to be desired. Its right rested on Pirna, its left on the fortress of that name, rising upwards of eight hundred feet above the river. The ground covering these two places, eleven miles apart, was extremely difficvilt for an offensive army. " It is torn and tumbled into stone labyrinths, chasms, and winding rock-walls, as few regions are." Frederic did not at all like the look of it when he saw it that 10th of September. When, however, the information reached him that the Saxons had but a fort- night's provisions he was comforted. If he could not drive them out by force, he could at least starve them. But first he tried negotiation : when that had failed, when he found that the Saxons still held out, and that an Austrian army was marching on the Elbe to relieve them, he left 40,000 men to continue the blockade, and at the head of 25,000, entered Bohemia on the 28th of September to baffle the plans of the Austrian general. Meanwhile the Austrian Government had been doing everything that was possible to supply the deficiencies in their frontier armies. Of these they had two ; one com- manded by Count Browne, whose head-quarters were at Prague, and designed to co-operate with the Saxons ; the other and smaller under Piccolomini in the Kunigshof- Kolin region, intended on the first outbreak of hostilities to invade the county of Glatz. Hostilities having been precipitated by Frederic, the latter corps, in far too back- ward a state to dream of invasion, had to think how it might defend the passes against the Prussian general, Marshal Schwerin, who, at the head of 40,000 men, was LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 45 preparing to debouch from that country. It was otherwise with Browne. Of Irish extraction, Ulysses Browne had risen from the lowest grade of officer to the rank of field- marshal. He was a very capable general, active, daring, possessed of great resolution, and not unworthy even to look Frederic in the face. In the prime of life, being then only fifty-four, Browne, on receiving information that Frederic had crossed the Saxon frontier, had thrown all his energies into the task of supplying the many deficiencies in his army. Under the inspii'ing influences which a real workman at the head of affairs always imparts, he rapidly succeeded. The cadres were filled up, the commissariat arrajigements were made, field hospitals were formed, the remounts came in, and, last of all, the pontoon-train reached his camp. Before Frederic had succeeded in starving the Saxons out of Pirna, Bi'owne had organised his army sufficiently to strike a blow for their relief. Not only was Browne anxious to strike that blow, but the orders from Vienna left him no option but to attempt it. It can easily be conceived how keenly Maria Theresa had felt the anticipation by Frederic of her most cherished plans. Whilst she was hoping with the aid of France, of Russia, and of the Empire to crusli him, he, still at peace with France, with Russia, and with the Empire — for the Empire had not yet declared war — had by the occupation of Saxony, neutralised the most precious link of the con- federation, and invaded her territories, regarding tljom not as teri-itories of the Empress, but as dominions of the Queen of Hungary. It was in that position alone that slie was once more pitted against her bitter enemy. How her proud spirit chafed against this destruction of all her plans, may, I repeat, be easily conceived. But the disappointment only made her the more determined. Her orders toBruwiio 46 LOUDON. breathed no uncertain sound. He was to relieve the Saxons, then seek out Frederic whei-ever he might be found, and smite him hip and thigh. The task was a difficult one. Browne, on the outbreak of hostilities, had moved to Budin on the little river Eger, and had concentrated his army at that place. The Eger joins the Elbe a little above the town of Leitmeritz on the right bank of that river. It was easy for Browne to reach that point — where at that time no fortress existed — but if he were to push along the left bank he could not fail to come upon the Prussian ai-my in a hilly and difficult country, its position chosen by its famous king. Browne's only chance then of relieving the Saxons, was to push on from the junction to Lobositz on the left bank, to cross to Leitmeintz on the right, and to march thence by the quickest possible route to Schandau and Lilienstein just opposite to the Saxon camp. When Browne should have gained that posi- tion he would find no difficulty in eifecting a junction with the Saxon army. So determined was the Austrian com- mander to carry out this plan that he despatched letters to the Saxon camp announcing his intention to arrive at Schandau on or before the 11th of October. The reader will not have failed to observe that the success of Browne's operations depended entirely upon his ability to effect the passage of the Elbe at Lobositz before the Prussians should reach that place. Frederic was as well aware of this as was Browne, and it was to anticipate him that, leaving 40,000 men to blockade the Pima camp, he marched (28th of September), with 25,000 men to Lobositz. On the following day, when within ten miles of that place, he beheld the Austrian army encamped on the hills surrounding that town. But one day earlier, and Browne could have crossed the LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 47 Elbe. To cross it now he must first beat the Prussian army. The Prussian king, for his part, thought that no time must be lost in attacking Browne. The battle then which followed, was fierce and well-contested. Loudon's Pandours were in the very front of the Austrian army occupying the Lobosch hill, between Lobositz and Sutowitz. That hill was the key of the position. Had it been occupied in force, Browne's position would have been im- pregnable. He had sent there, however, the previous evening, only that one regiment of Croats, and though, when the battle had joined and he recognised that Frederic had detected its value and was resolved to have it, he sent regiment after regiment to regain it — for Loudon's Croats had been speedily overwhelmed and driven from it, he failed and lost the battle. Not, however, very easily. The Austrians fought splendidly : they inflicted upon the Prussians a loss greater than that which they themselves suffered. Frederic, by his marvellous coup d'oeil, had recognised the decisive point of the position ; by skilful management of his troops had gained it, and had thus thrown back the Austrians from the Elbe. But he did nothing more. Browne brought off his army with great skill. He lost indeed three guns, but he was able, had he wished it, to present an unbroken front to his enemy the next day. The battle, notwithstanding, was a clear victory for Frederic. Browne had wished to cross to the right bank of the Elbe, and Frederic had forced him for the moment to renounce the idea. The next day Browne fell back on Budin. On Loudon the day's experience could not have been thrown away. He and his Croats had occupied the key of the position. He had had to see that key wrenched from him by Frederic, and the battle lost in consequence. The 43 LOUDON. fact was of sufficient importance to impress itself very deeply on the mind of a thoughtful soldier. To such a man it was a schooling never to be forgotten, and Loudon never did forget the lesson. He learned it too, not less from the point of view of defence, than from that of attack. To seek out, to fall furiously upon, the weak point of an enemy was, in the years that were immediately to follow, his striking characteristic. But Browne, though baffled by Frederic at Lobositz, by no means renounced his plan of relieving the beleagured Saxons. Having despatched another message to their general, Field-Marshal Rutowski, to inform him that he would still be with them on the 11th, and requiring him to be prepared to evacuate his camp, and cross, opposite to Lilienstein, to the right bank of the Elbe, he set out at the head of 8,000 men, of whom one fourth, the Croatian levies, vinder Loudon, formed the advance, made a flank march to the point, close to iVIelnik, where the Moldau joins the Elbe, crossed there the latter river, and hastened round by forced marches by way of Boh- misch — Leipa, Rumburg, and Schluckenau to Lichtenhein, a village some seven miles from Schandau. It was ^ bold, daring, and very venturesome undertaking, worthy in that respect of Frederic himself, for he was liable to be attacked by double the number of the enemy, and he could not afford to stay on the right bank a moment longer than was necessary to effect his purpose. The success of the plan depended, first, on its being carried out without hindrance from the enemy j secondly, on the punctuality of the Saxons. Browne did his part well. He threw dust into the eyes of Frederic, crossed the Elbe at Melnik, and, marching with all speed, reached Lichtenhein punctually on the LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 49 evening of the lltb, and encamped in the woods near the village. But there were no signs of the Saxons. Rutowski had received the warning late on the 7th, but not having go^ his pontoons in readiness, attempted on the night of the 8th to cross bj means of tow ropes. This attempt, and another made the following night, were baffled by the fire fi'om the Prussian batteries, which put the towing peasants to flight. On the 10th and 11th Rutowski, by great exertions, managed to fix the pontoons, and on the 12th the bridge was made ready for crossing. That night Rutowski endeavoured to lead his army across ; but when the day broke only the vanguard had reached the right bank. Meanwhile the Prussians entering their intrenched camp came thundering on their rear. By the evening of the 14th their whole army, 14,000 in number, had straggled across. But Browne, alas ! had not been able to wait for them. Surrounded by enemies, and with his retreat at any moment likely to be cut off, he had held his position for two days ; then, hearing nothing of or from the Saxons, and believing they had failed, he had been forced to retrace his steps. The delays of Rutowski in placing the pontoons in position ruined a well-planned scheme. The Saxons, beset by the Prussians, were compelled, on the 16th, to surrender, and to enter the service of the conqueror. Browne started on his return march at nine o'clock on the morning of the 14th. That night he reached the village of Kamnitz, and there information reached him that Frederic was throwing a bridge over the Elbe near Tetschen. Considering it probable that Frederic's object was to cut him off from his base, Browne despatched Loudon with 500 Croats and some Hussars in the direction of that place, with discretionary oi-ders, to reconnoitre. On reaching the vicinity of Tetschen, Loudon ascertained 50 LOUDON. that though that place was occupied by a small detachment of the enemy, there was no thought in that place of interfering with the Austrian army. But the opportunity of- giving the small garrison a slap in the face was too tempting to be neglected. He dashed then into the town, cut down two squadrons of Hussars who opposed him, and carried off upwards of a hundred of their horses to tho camp at Kamnitz. This was the last blow struck during the campaign. The Prussian army, evacuating Bohemia, went into winter quarters about Zwickau and Chemnitz on the one side, and Zittau and Gorlitz, both on the river Neisse, on the other ; the Austrians on the Bohemian frontier, facing Saxony and the Lausitz. Loudon, placed under the orders of General Lacy, the son of an Iiishman who had migrated to Austria after the fall of the Stewarts, was stationed at Grottau, one of the villages in the cordon. It is a proof of the active and energetic temperament of Loudon that even whilst the army was lying inactive in its winter quarters he was always planning some mode of inflicting loss on the enemy. Having noticed, for instance, that their troops stationed at various points on the iSTeisse were very careless in their military duties, he asked and obtained leave from his general to give them a New Year's greeting. On the night of the 31st of December, then, he set out at the head of six companies of Croats and two squadrons of Hussars, and making his way through the deep snow which covered the ground, surprised and cut up the Prussian posts at Marienthal, Ostritz, Laiba, and Radmeritz, carrying off all their arms and baggage, and thirty-four prisoners. His own loss amounted only to two men. But this was not sufficient for him. On the 19th of February he was appointed to lead the vanguard of a force composed of 4,000 men, and designed by Generals Macguire LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 51 and Lowenstein to surprise the important town of Hirscli- feld, likewise in the Lausitz. Again had the assailants to traverse ground covered deeply with snow. Marching in the night they ci^ossed the Neisse at five o'clock in the morning, and fell upon the town. The Prussians, how- ever, were prepared. Loudon, to whom had been assigned the most difficult part of the enterprise — the carrying of the redoubt which covered the town — led six hundred men to the assault. Simultaneously Prince Charles of Lichten- stein attacked the place by the bridge, and Major Noyau by the suburbs. Not only did the assailants carry the place, but thirsting for further triumphs, proceeded further and cai'ried the post of Hersdorf, For his conduct on this and other occasions Loudon was promoted to the rank of full Colonel. JNIeanwhile the war passion was gaining the other powers of Europe. At an imperial diet held at Ratisbon on the 10th of January, 1757, it had been resolved to i-aise an army of the confederated German States to punish Frederic for his, as it was styled, unprovoked attack upon Saxony. On the 2nd of February following, the Empress-Queen concluded a new treaty with the Czarina, whereby, in consideration of the payment by the former of a million of roubles annually, the Czarina bound herself to compel Frederic to yield Silesia and the country of Glatz to Austria, to carry out the other .-;tipulations she had formerly proposed respecting Courland and East Prussia, and to carry on the war until tin's programme had been entirely fulfilled. Finally, after much negotiation, an offensive and defensive treaty was signed at Versailles, May the 1st, between Austria and France, having for its object the partition of Prussia for the benefit of Austria, Saxony, the Elector Palatine, and Sweden, France to be recompensed E 2 52 LOUDON. by the cession of a large portion of the Netherlands. The two contracting parties bound themselves not to make peace until all the conditions of the treaty should have been executed, and France undertook to pay Austria yearly twelve million of florins during the continiiance of the war. Regarding the other powers of Europe, it may be mentioned as a proof of the skilful diplomacy of Kaunitz that whilst Sweden joined the allies, Spain, Holland, and Denmark were persuaded to remain neutral ; England alone espoused the cause of Frederic, ?nd England then carried with her Hanover. Powerful as was the confederacy, enormous as was the preponderance in men and in money aguinst him, Frederic retained alike his courage, his coolness, and his nerve. Russia had declared against him, but months must yet elapse before Russia could strike a blow. France, in the early months of 1757, was about to join, but she had not actually joined his enemies. Envisaging the situation in the passionless manner which was habitual to him, Frederic came to the conclusion that a decisive blow, struck suddenly and effectually at the heart of his deadliest and most persistent enemy, might yet save the situation, might enable him, if Fortune went with him too, entirely to master it, to dictate even terms of peace. He resolved then, the very moment the recurring spring should render the passes of Bohemia feasible, to pour his armies into that country, strike down his opponents, and possibly roll up the Austrian monarchy before her potent allies in the present and the future could render to her the smallest aid. With Frederic, action always followed deliberation. On the 18th of April then, the passes having been reported practicable, he entered Bohemia in three columns, one led by Marshal Schwerin, from Silesia, with orders to make LIEUTEy A NT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 53 straight for Prague ; the second under the Prince of Bevern from the Lausitz ; and the third, under the King himself, from Saxony. The three columns numbered 107,000 men, of whom 32,000 were cavalry. To meet this invasion the Austrian army was thus posted. Serbelloni with 30 000 men occupied Koniggriitz ; Kiinigsegg, under whom served Loudon, with 16,000, Reichenberg ; Ahremberg, with 24,000, Eger and Pilsen ; and Browne himself, with 39,000, Budin ; forming a total of 109,000 men. Unfortunately the command-in-chief did not now rest with Count Browne. Count Neipperg, then vice-president of the Aulic Council, was, though the most unsuccessful of generals, the most successful of cour- tiers. Anxious at once to indulge the jealous dislike which he had of Browne, and to pay his court to the Emperor, he had influence enough to have Prince Charles of Lorraine, whose incapacity was notorious, placed over the head of the general whose exploits in the previous year, though not crowned with success, had marked him out as the leader who, of all the existing Austrian generals, was the most likely to give Frederic trouble. The Prussian invasion burst like an avalanche upon Bohemia. The corps of Kijnigsegg, and especially the vanguard of that corps commanded by Loudon, was the first to fall back before it. Posted with his light troops in front of lieichenberg on the right bank of the Xeisse, Loudon fell back ra[)idly on the main body, which then, led by Kcinig-segg, retreated in the direction of Prague. In front of tliat city it linked itself to the corps of Browne, who had fallen l)ack from Budin on the approach of Frederic. The two united corps amounted, with 6,000 men brought by Prince Cliarles, who now assumed command, to 61,000 men. With these the Austrian general took an advantageous 54 LOUDON. position to the east of the city. His left wing, formed of Konigsegg's corps, rested on the Ziskaberg close to the city, his right formed at a right angle to the centre on the little village of Sterbohol, the centre occupied the low hills between the two points covered with intrenchments, and forming an angle with the right, at the village of Kyge. Meanwhile, Frederic and Schwerin marching with all speed from their starting points, and driving the enemy before them, had met on the morning of the 6th at the village of Prossik, between two and three miles from Prague. Schwerin, who arrived at the place of meeting one day after the appointed time — his men tired after a long night march — pleaded earnestly for twenty-four hours' rest before making the attack. But Frederic had the strongest reasons for immediate action. Information had reached him on his march that a second Austrian army, led by Count Daun, was hastening from INIoravia. Frederic had then no experience of Daun. But that general had a great reputation, and Frederic could not fail to feel that if he were as daring in practice as he was able in theory, he had a great opportunity of upsetting all his plans. A single day, even, might make all the difference between success and defeat. Frederic then overruled Schwerin's objections and pushed on. The very reason which induced Fi'ederic to hasten his movements operated to cause Prince Charles to regard them with equanimity. His position was so strong that he believed it to be unassailable. If Frederic were to attack him he would, he felt certain, dash himself to pieces against those bristling heights, and then Daun would be on his rear, his own victorious army on his front. What more could any one desire ] The war would be finished at one blow. That such would be the result was certain, if only LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 55 Prince Charles could hold his position. He had no doubts upon that point. On the other hand, Frederic was con- fident of success, and he was a man who very rarely made a mistake in his calculations. That day — the 6th May — was to decide whether his anticipations were better founded than those of the Austrian general. The attack began about eleven o'clock. The Austrian right, where Browne commanded, was covered by a swamp, leading to the village of Sterbohol. The Prussians, in endeavouring to make their way across this, Avere exposed to a tremendous musketry fire, and after repeated attacks they were repulsed. In the first of these fell Winterfeldt, sevei'ely wounded ; in the third or fourth ]\[arshall Schwe- lin was killed. The death of the veteran, in his seventy- third year, added fury to the assailants, which was increased when Frederic himself came up to support them. Still the Austrians fought splendidly, Browne at their head, encouraging them, showing himself as cool and clear-headed and as energetic as when he crossed the Elbe to relieve the Saxons. For a long time it seemed as though his splendid conduct would triumph even over the desperate resolution of Frederic. Again were the Pruss^ians driven back. Just at the critical moment, however, a cannon-ball carried off the leg of the Austrian leader and he was carried mortally wounded into Prague. Before he quitted the field of battle he implored the generals about him to be content with the repulse, and not to follow up the enemy. His advice unhappily was not heeded. The Austrians dashed forward in pursuit of the enemy and pu.shed on so far that they left an opening between them and their supports, of which Frederic availed him.self. After a desperate fight of five hours the Prussians carried Sterbohol ! 53 LOUDON. Meanwhile the Austrian left had remained unassailed. The Prussians had concentrated all their efforts on the decisive point — and that point was Sterbohol. The carrying of Sterbohol gave them the right of the Austrian position. "Wheeling them to their right they rolled up the centre already shaken by an attack of General Mannstein, and assailed the Austrian left in flank, whilst a fresh body of troops attacked it in front. Nor was this all. Whilst the fight for Sterbohol had been going on, the cavalry of the two armies had engaged. Twice driven back after desperate hand to hand encounters, the Prussian cavah'y had succeeded on the third occasion in forcing the enemy to quit the field, and they now came, flushed with victory, to attack on the third side the still complete Austrian left wing. Fortunately for that wing, the fourth side, resting on Prague, was open to them. Unable to make head againt the entire Prussian army and unwilling to expose his troops to a useless slaughter, Konigsegg, in the absence of Prince Charles who had been attacked by a spasm of the heart and been forced to quit the field, fell back into the city with the 32,000 men who had rallied round him. Of the remainder, 13,000, the survivors of the right wing, marched to Kollin and joined Daun ; 16,000 were killed or wounded. The Prussian loss was even greater, amount- ing, according to the Prussian general, Warnery, who was present at the battle and contributed greatly to its success, to 18,000. Frederic, eager to seize the fruits of his victory, at once summoned Prague to surrender. But the dying Browne, undaunted still in his last agonies, and who had insisted upon being carried to the Council which had been summoned to answer the king's proposition, exclaimed with all the energy still remaining to him: "Does the King of. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND COLONEL. 57 Prussia take us all for w -s 1 My advice is that you should sally out and drive away Keith." Keith occupied a position facing the Kleinseite separated by the Moldau from the I'est of the Prussian army. For such an attack to succeed, it was necessary that it should be led by a real soldier. After many days of deliberation and when the Prussians had strengthened their position, Prince Charles detached a body of 5,000 men, of whom Loudon's Croats formed the vanguard, to carry out the plan (May 24th). But the expedition was doomed to failure before it started ; the men were provided with no means of scaling the walls which covered the enemy's position, and though Loudon, as usual, forced his way to the front, he found himself then not only unsupported, but even exposed to the fire of the Grenadiers who should have followed him. It was only after desperate fighting that he was able to force his way back with the loss of a hundred men. Still Loudon's action showed what a capable leader might do. On the night following the failure he was detached to drive the enemy from the vineyard they occupied on the Laurenzenberg. Not only did he completely succeed but he held the post, and made from it almost nightly sallies, till the memorable day, the 18th of June, which saw shattered all the plans of the besiegex's. Meanwhile all that borab.-^, grenades, and red-hot shot could effect upon the devoted city was done by the Prussians. Every day made Frederic more sensible of the difficulty of the task before him. The army in Prague con.si.sted, including the garrison, of 4o,000. The inhabit- ants numbered tlien .'somewhat under a hundred thousand. To reduce these by famine was impossible ; to take the city by storm was impossible. The holding out of Prague rendered the victory before its walls useless. Unless Le 58 LOUDON. could take it, and take it quickly, its consequences would be fatal to him, for they detained him in this trap, whilst every day brought the cautious Daun nearer to his line of retreat. To reduce the city, then, Frederic considered every means justifiable. He poured red-hot shot on the' palaces, the churches, the private houses, declaring that the circumstances justified his action. But it was to no purpose. The city still held out. At last his own jDosition became untenable. Daun, his army increasing at eveiy march, advanced, slowly and stealthily, to within twenty-five miles of Prague. To keep him at bay, Frederic, who had by this time divined the cautious temperament of his enemy, detached the Prince of Bevern with 20,000 men to watch his movements. Daun fell back indeed before Bevern but he fell back on his reinforcements, until, when he reached Kollin, his army numbered 54,000 men. Then Bevern appealed anxiously to the king for support. Frederic responded by marching ■with 14,000 men to reinforce him. Then, confident to his fortune, and feeling that a victory over Daun would ensure the surrender of Prague, he attacked that general at Kollin (18th June) — but was defeated with a loss of, according to Warnery, 1 4,000 men and forty-three guns. But the loss of the men and the guns was as nothing compared with the collapse of all his plans. Kollin shattered all the hopes which had inspired the invasion of Bohemia and the attack upon Prince Charles. It forced the King of Prussia to raise the siege of Prague, it let loose upon him the army beleagured in that city, and it com- pelled him to evacuate Bohemia. That Kollin was not made fatal to him was due solely to the extreme caution — the prudence akin to folly — of Leopold, Count Daun! CHAPTER VI. COMMANDKR OF A CORPS. Loudon had greatly distinguisbed himself at Prague. He had added to his reputation as a daring officer on the very day of Frederic's letreat by leading the vanguard of an Austrian corps which fell upon the rear of the Prussian ai'my, and took as prisoners five officers and 379 men, besides capturing a gun. The qualities he had displayed had been of that character which win the confidence of a commander. It was felt tliat he was a man who could be trusted ; who, if left unfettered, would dare all that might be dared, without imperilling the main army. Prince Charles, then, took the opportunity of the raising of the siege to confer upon him a small command. His little corps consisted of four companies of Austrian Grenadiers, 2,000 Croats, and 600 JHussars. With these he formed, as before, the extreme vanguard of the army, commissioned to follow the retreating Prussians. In this comparatively independent command Loudon gave new proofs of capacity and of daring. On the 23rd he smote the Prussians as they were falling ba(;k on "Welwarn, cnpturing a liundred and sixty prisoners and a pontoon-train. Two days later he attacked a detachment 2,000 strong near Schishitz, and after a combat of two hours CO LOUDON. diu'atiou, nearly destroyed it, taking 261 prisoners, of whom fifteen were officers. Three days later (28th of June) the army marched from Prague, Nadasdy commanding the advanced division, Loudon with his flying corps being in front of Nadasdy. Again did his daring spirit seek out opportunities. That very day he attacked a Prussian convoy between Lobositz and Welmina, cut to pieces the escort, excepting eleven officers and 146 men who surren- dered, and captured a hundred laden wagons. Discovering then that the Prussians intended to halt the next day between Lobositz and Leitmeritz, Loudon sent information to head-quarters, and pushing on above Milischau took up a strong position at Kulm. Hence he designed an attempt upon Aussig, but discovering that his plan had been betrayed by a peasant, he sent a detachment to Tetschen to destroy fifteen Prussian transports lying there. Seeing that the Prussians still maintained their position at Lobositz, he sent a despatch to Prince Chaides urging upon him the prompt occupation of Budin, as a mandsuvre which would not only compel the enemy to retire but would place them in considerable danger. But Prince Charles, or rather Count Daun — who, by his victory at Kollin, had now become the master-spirit of the Austrian armies, — shrank from a measure which might, they feared, bring Frederick to bay. They believed that they had him. The Reich's-army, the French, the Russians, were closing in all round him. Why, they argued, should they affront the lion already within their toils ? They allowed Frederic, therefore, to remain four weeks, unmo- lested, at Leitmeritz. This time Loudon employed in harassing the Prussians in every possible manner. He was very successful, captured a large convoy of supplies commanded by the General Mannstein to whom Frederic COMMANDER OF A CORPS. C>\ attributed his defeat at Kollin ; inflicted losses on the enemy at Wagenburg, at Paskopol, and at Giessliubel. The retiring armies led respectively by the King and Prince of Prussia suffered enormous losses. When the latter reached Eautzen it numbered less than three-fifths of the men whom three months before Frederic had so proudly led across the Bohemian frontier. Meanwhile the attitude of the Reich's-array and of tlio French had become threatening. They were advancing rapidly on Saxony. The Duke of Saxe-Hildburgshausen, who commanded the Reich's-army, had asked to be reinforced by some light troops, and Loudon was selected for the command. At the head of 4,000 Croats, two regiments of Grenadiers, and two of Hussars, he set out towards the end of July, by way of Erfurt and Gotha for Altenbcrg. Arrived at the seat of war he again distinguished himself in his usua.1 manner. Ilis most notable exploit was the surprise and defeat of the Prussian general Itzenplitz at Gottleuben (8th of August), and the destruction of the Prussian magazines in the circle of Meissen. On the 26th of this month he was promoted to the rank of Major-Ceneral. A pension of fifteen hundred gulden had, on the recommen- dation of Prince Charles, been bestowed upon him after the raising of the siege of Prague. The very same day on which Loudon received his promotion, Seidlitz tried to surpi'ise the generals of the united Pieichs' and French army at Gotha. Made with the skill and daring which characterised all the movements of that famous cavalry leader, the attempt woidd have succeeded but for Loudon, who, a silent listener at the table at which all the generals were seated, guests of the Duchess of the little principality, gathered from a remark made by the latter that treason was intended. He rose, then, unnoticed, quitted the room, and 62 LOUDON. hastened to his men, whom he had carefully posted in the park in front of the town. He had reached them only a few minutes when the Prussians were upon him. A little later ISeidlitz entered the town fi-om another quarter. The musketry iire of Loudon's troops had however given the alarm, and before the Prussian leader could reach the banqueting-room the birds had flown in the full belief that the King of Prussia himself was the fowler. Loudon not only repulsed the attacking party, but, re-entering the town, thanked the Duchess for the remark with which she had reminded him that he had been too long absent from his post. The prisoners he had taken, 137 in number", he lodged in her castle. In spite of the gaiety manifested on the Prussian side by such attempts as that made by Seidlitz, Frederic felt that it would retjuire a great effort to save himself from ruin. The capture of Berlin by a flying corps of 15,000 men under General Haddick (16th of October), and the march thence of that general, after levying a contribution, to complete the cordon of his enemies, induced him to concentrate his army at Leipsig. As the united French and Pteich's-army pressed after him, marching carelessly and led disgracefully, Frederic, who had carefully watched their every movement fell upon them and totally defeated them at Ptossbach (5th of November) Loudon, though not engaged in this battle, was sufficiently near the field to be able to rally to himself many of the fugitives. He then, in obedience to orders, fell back by way of Naumburg and Altenburg to Komotau, followed all the way by a superior force under Marshal Keith. So skilfully, however, did Loudon manoeuvre, that he baffled Keith's effoits to engage him at an advantage. The King of Prussia speaking of this retreat in after years, did not hesitate to compare it with that of Xenophon. COMMANDER OF A CORPS. (53 Meanwhile the Austrians had been making good way in the Lausitz and in Silesia. In the former province Nadasdy had beaten the Prv;ssian army under Winterfeldt at Holz- berg (7tb of September). In Silesia the Austrian general, Janus, had beaten the Prussians under Kreutz at Landshut (24th of August) ; Prince Charles had taken Sehweidnitz (11th of iSTovember) ; had defeated Bevern — who was taken prisoner — at Breslau (22nd of November) ; had captured that city on the 25th. Liegnitz also had been taken. Thus Silesia had been recovered for Austria. The King of Prussia, rejoicing over his great victory at Rossbach, was now marching to reconquer that province. His approach caused a considerable flutter in the Austrian councils. Daun was all for caution, but the recent victories in Silesia had caused previous defeats and Daun's ov/n victory at Kollin to be forgotten, and Prince Charles, who was but a poor kind of general, talked, and, for some time acted, as though Frederic were marching to his destruction. Resolving to ensure that destruction, he took up an ex- tremely strong position, extending from Nypern almost to the Sehweidnitz water, covered in front by the villages of Leuthen and Sagschlitz, directly at right angles to the road by which the Prussians must advance. Too confident in his strong position, the Austrian leader left, with a very insufficient guard, a high hill called the Scheuberg, close to the village of Borne, immediately in front of his right centre. Frederic's eagle eye ut once detected this mistake. He at once seized the Scheuberg, from its summit took stock of the position of the Austrian army, and formed his plan of attack. How he carried it out the next day (5th of December) ; how he made his famous oblique attack on the Atastrian left, and after a hai'd fought battle rolled up their army, and gained one of tha most decisive and 64 LOUDON. brilliant victories the world has ever known, forms no part of the life of Loudon. Whilst Leuthen was being fought, Loudon was still engaged in guarding with an inferior force the Bohemian passes. But its results were momentous to all concerned. On the 21st Frederic re- covered Breslau, a week later Liegnitz, and before the end of the year he had won back all Silesia except Schweidnitz. The Austrian army meanwhile made a most disastrous retreat into Bohemia, its losses by desertion alone being very considerable. To compensate for these misfortunes, however, it had to thank the result of Leuthen for one great benefit — the removal of Prince Charles of Lorraine from the command of the army. He was succeeded by Count Daun. CHAPTER VII. PITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. Notwithstanding her losses at Leuthen, the year 1758 opened full of hope for Austria. During the winter her armies had been placed on a most efficient footing : Daun had taken up a strong position at Kciniggriitz, and it was certain that the liussian army, to whose movements in 1757 I shall presently refer, would make its presence seriously felt in the hereditary dominions of the King of Prussia. One of the fii'st acts of Daun after his arrival at Kbniggrjitz was to summon Loudon to his side. No two men could be more opposite iu character than Daun and Loudon. The former, carrying caution to a point where it becomes weakness, was totally unfitted for aggressive war- fare. Slow, hesitating, and suspicious, he understood nothing of the value of time in war. Even though ho might gain a victoiy bis nature would not allow him to push it home. Loudon, on the contrary, acted ever on the principle, so dear to a true soldier, that boldness is prudence. Whenever he saw a chance of success he seized it. With all this he was never rash. If Fortune extended to him her favours it was because he never presumed too p 66 LOUDON. greatly on her kindness. He had that quick glance which showed him whether a certain end was attainable. In that case he used every effort and em{)loyed ever)'' resource to gain it. But he never dashed himself against the im- possible. He was a careful, wary, daring soldier, alwaj-.^ on the look out, always keeping his troops well in hand, always ready for attack or defence. It was probably less even on account of the reputation which Loudon had gained during 1757 than of the con- viction which Daun, not yet jealous of his fame, could not but feel that he would supply qualities in which he himself was wanting that the summons was sent to Loudon to join the main Austrian army at Koniggratz. Hardly had Loudon joined when he was detached at the head of a corjjs d'armee to cover the march of General Buccow with a convoy of provisions and military stores for the fortress of Schweidnitz then besieged by the Prussians. The Prussian general, Fouquet, however, with an army at Braunau, barred the entrance into Silesia. Lovidon was not strong enough to attack Fouquet, but he used every means in his power to induce him to break up from his position. On the 8th of April he smote Le Noble, a free- lance in the Prussian service, at Hallstadt, taking forty- six prisoners; on the 12th he not only repulsed an attack made upon his position, but drove the enemy with great loss from the intrenchments behind which they had posted themselves at Dietersbach. He could not, however, penetrate into Silesia. Schweidnitz, in consequence, surrendered to the King of Prussia on the 16th of April. Once more possessor of Silesia Frederic resolved to sub- stitute another means of striking at the heart of the Austrian monarchy for that which had been baffled at Prague and Kollin. He would not touch Bohemia, care- PITTED A GATXST FREDErdC. 67 fully guarded by Davia, but risking the exposing of his flank to that too cautious general, would endeavour to penetrate to Vienna by way of Moravia. As soon, then, as he had seen to the necessities of Schweidnitz he ordered Keith and Fouquet to march on Neisse whilst he him- self directed his steps with all speed in the direction of Olmiitz. Loudon was the first of the Austrian leaders to penetrate this plan. He sent timely intimation to Daun, who, summoning his trusted lieutenant to com- mand the leading corps of his army, broke up his camp at Koniggriitz and marched, by way of Skalitz and Chotzen to Leutomischl. On the same day, the 5th of May, the van of the army under Loudon was at Hohenstadt, about twenty-thi'ee miles from Olmiitz. The position taken up by Loudon gave him so many opportunities of annoying the Prussian army, and of cutting oft' its communications, that Frederic, still on his march to Olmiitz, resolved before undertaking the siege of that place to drive him from it. On the 22nd of May he moved against him with ten battalions of infantry, two regiments of hussai\s, and fifteen squadrons of dragoons. But Loudon, whose troops numbered considerably fewer, had no inten- tion to accept a battle in the open. As the king advanced, then, he fell back upon a position he had selected in the hilly regions behind Konitz. Here he was unassailable. Tliis Frederic recognised on reconnoitring the position, so he fell back again, and marched to Olmiitz, the siege of which he began on the 27th of May. During the calendar month which followed, whilst Frederic was pressing tho operations before Olmiitz, Loudon employed day and night in harassing the Prussian troops, in cutting off their supplies, falling upon their foraging parties. He be- cuime the terror of the Prussian outposts. No movement F 2 C8 LOUDON. escaped his glance, no detachment could leave the camp without the certainty that it would be assailed. Daun had during this period moved with the main army to Predlitz, within supporting distance of his ever-active lieutenant. The defence, meanwhile, Avas exhausting all tlie resources of Frederic. He had already fired 58,000 cannon balls and 6,000 shells at the fortress, and munitions of war began to fail him. Food, too, began to run short, and the activity of Loudon prevented him from living, as he had lived in previous campaigns, on the country occupied by his ai-mies. His situation before Olmiitz was beginning to bear a strong resemblance to the situation before Prague of the preceding year. Now a? then a great fortress defied him ; now as then a powerful army was on his flank threatening his communications. There was just one point of diil'erence, and that point was not in his favour. In 1757 there was no active commander in the field ready to dare all that should be dared. No long time elapsed before this point of difference made itself manifest. Towards the middle of June Frederic was reduced to such extremities that he sent pressing instructions to Silesia to prepare at Troppau a convoy of four thousand wagons j to load them there with money, meal, uniforms, munitions, and eveiy sort of necessaries, and to despatch them with all speed, under a proper escort, to his camp. The officer indicated to command the escort, which consisted of 9,000 men, was Colonel Mosei, a resolute and capable officer. He set out from Troppau on the 25th of June. Daun had received timely intimation of the intended despatch of this convoy, and had resolved to employ his most trusted lieutenant to intercept and to destroy it. He accordingly sent for Loudon, placed under his immediate orders 8,000 men, and diiected him to proceed to a good PITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. 69 position on the Hof road, whilst General Sziskowitz should proceed in the direction of Alt-Liebe, to watch the convoy and to support and lend a hand to Loudon. As soon as the two detachments had set out Daun himself began a series of manoeuvres and evolutions, as though he would attack Frederic, which forced the latter to keep his army in hand. On the 27th, Loudon, who had set out the previous evening, reached Sternberg, and took op a position on the heights there, whence he could observe movements alike from the besieging camp and of the convoy. He wrote thence the same evening to Daun, informing him of his intention to march the following day to Giebau, a village on the road to be traversed by the convoy, and requested that orders might be sent to Genei"al St. Ignon, who was at Beerau, and to Sziskowitz, to be ready to fall on the enemy the moment he should attack them. Daun transmitted orders accordingly. The next day Loudon marched from Sternberg, and occupied the heights above Giobau, commanding the defile between Bautsch and Alt-Liebe, which the convoy would have to traverse. He posted his Hungarians and Croats in the woods, the cavalry in the plain. He had just completed his dispositions when the head of the convoy appeared in sight. Loudon had no news of St. Ijrnon or of Sziskowitz, but he could not wait for them, but launched his troops at the enemy. A most desperate battle then ensued. The Prussians fought with the greatest courage ; they made barricades of their wagons — and when Loudon was repulsed they assumed the offensive. Five times was the attack renewed, five times was it rcjielled. No St. Ignon, no Sziskowitz, came up to support the gallant assailant. At the end of five hours Loudon, having 70 . LOUDON. suffered considerable loss (561 officers and men), was com- pelled to fall back on Biiren. Jnst as he was falling back information reached him that Sziskowitz had just ai rived at Altstadt, the position indicated to him. But if the Austrian attack was repulsed the injury already inflicted on the Prussians was very severe. At the first shot, the peasants driving the wagons had become terrified. Along that line of 4,000 carts the greatest confusion then set in. Many unharnessed the horses and mounting them galloped away ; others tried to make their way back to Troppau. The convoy was too much engaged in resisting the Austrians to pay sufficient attention to the drivers. Night had set in when the attack ceased. The Prussians employed the earlier hours of darkness in restoring order in the convoy, in endeavouring — for the most part a vain endeavour — to bring back the drivers, and in despatching messages to the besieging army. Loudon employed his time in effecting a junction with Sziskowitz, at Alt-Liebe, and in disposing his troops for a renewed attack on the morrow, to be made by Loudon from the right, by Sziskowitz from the left of the road. But before the morrow came, the Prussian general Ziethen entered Colonel Mosel's camp at the head of 5,000 men. His presence effected wonders. He sent out his cavalry in search of the fugitives. Many of them were brought back, but so great was the confusion that the whole of the night, of the next day, and of the night following were needed to restore order. At length on the morning of the 30th of June, the convoy once again moved forward. Its escort, consisting now of 14,000 men, was a little army, and was commanded by one of the most renowned generals of Prussia. Loudon, whose FITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. 71 troops united with those of Sziskowitz numbered only 15,000, allowed the wagons to be dragged slowly on until they had begun to emerge from the defile of Domstiidtl. But when 120 of them escorted by 4,000 men had left that defile behind them, the two Austrian generals, actuated by one impulse, let loose their men. Then was the battle of the 28th renewed. Ziethen endeavoured, as had been done on that day, to form a barricade with the wagons, behind which the infnntry might intrench themselves whilst the cavalry charged thy invaders. But assailed as he was now on three sides he found the means quite insufficient to ward off the attack. For a moment, indeed, the splendid Prussian cavalry obtained some slight advantage, but increasing hostile numbers on the decisive point forced even them to retire. A charge of the Austrian infantry completed the aitack which had been so well begun. The barricade was stormed, its defenders were scattered, the majority of them fled through the defile. Many were killed and wounded ; lialf as many were taken prisoners. Ziethen liimself, cut off from the defile, fled with the bulk of the cavalry to Troppau. The fight had been desperate but the victory was decisive. Of tlie 4,000 wngons which started from Troi)pau, 200 reached the King of Prussia's camp; more tlian 1,000 were burnt for want of horses to drag them ; 1,200 were raptured l)y the Austrians ; the remainder were destroyed by the Prussians. The fierce nature of the conflict m;iy be gathered from the fact that the Prussians lost 2,500 in killed and wounded, more than 1,500 prisoners, and 14 guns. The Austrians' loss amounted to 1,000 killed and wounded. But tlie real result of Loudon's sjilendid attack was, not the de-truction of the convoy, not the loss inflicted on the 72 LOUDON. enemy, these were mere details : — it was the raising of the siege of Olmiitz. That event took place the day following the combat. A little more than three weeks later, 15th of July, Loudon was promoted to the rank of Field- ]\Iarshal Lieutenant. The raising of the siege of Olmiitz gave Count Daun an opportunity. His position on the right flank of the retiring army, with his left wing stretching towards the Silesian frontier, made him in reality far closer to Frederic's line of retreat on that province than was Frederic himself. Hence he believed that Frederic would either fall back on the Lausitz, or, with a view to choose his own line, would in the first instance attack him. Frederic, who had thoi'oughly divined Daun's character, encouraged this idea, induced Daun, under the belief that he would be attacked, to strengthen his position and call in his wings and his flying parties, and then, by a magic stroke of genius, permissible only when dealing with a man endowed with bastard prudence, but in that case most commendable, wheeling to the left and exposing his flank, marched virjder his very nose through Bohemia, by way of Zwittau and Leutomischl. He was safe from a flank attack before Daun had had time to recover from his surprise. Nor even then did Daun, still over-cautious, move him- self. He sent, however, his most trusted generals, Loudon, Buccow, Sziskowitz, St. Tgnon, Janus, and Lanius, to follow up his redoubtable foe, to harass his retreat, fall on his foraging parties, and cut ofE his supplies. Well, indeed, was he served. The Austrian leaders made the retreat of Frederic almost as disastrous as had been that of Prince Charles after Leuthen. They attacked his rear-guard on every possible occasion, occupied vantage-posts by whicli be must march, fell on bis baggage, and if they inflicted PITTED AGAIXST FREDERIC. 73 upon him no important defeat, yet caused the loss to him of a Large number of men, twice plundered his wagons, twice foiced him to abandon guns, and compelled him more than once to change his route. In these operations Loudon's daring was specially con- spicuous. So sensible was the king of his dangerous activity, that he made a serious attempt to crush him. Frederic was at Kbniggriitz, Daun behind him at a respect- ful distance, when Loudon deemed the moment opportune to alarm the king about his communications with Glatz. He thrust his corps, then, in the country between that country and the Prussian camp, and sending out parties of Croats annoyed them on three sides. He himself took up a position at Opotschno. On the moi-ning of the 17th, Frederic himself marched against this place, when Loudon was still lying there, on the one side, whilst he sent orders to Fonquet to attack him on the other. Loudon's Croats were speedily driven in by Fouquet, but once within the place tliey re-formed and occupied the attention of the enemy, whilst Loudon, who had only 4,500 men with him, fell back through the forest to Sadol. He posted his Hungarian infantry and some guns here and kept Frederic at bay till his Croats I'ejoined him. He then marched unmolested on Giesshiibel. Frederic's position in Bohemia was becoming by this time very diilicult. Though his own position at Kuniggriitz was strong, yet Daun was in an unassailable position — at Chlum — close to him ; the Austrian party-leaders were all about him, and, meanwhile, the Eussian army was slowly advancing into his hereditary dominions. The situation was not unlike the situation of the preceding year, when after Prague and KoUin he had been disturbed by the advance of the Keich's army and the French. Tliis time. 74 LOUDON. indeed, lie liad suffered no Kollin, but the siicce-ssful deforce of Olmiitz had destroyed the plan of the campaign, his retreat through Bohemia had been disastrovxs, and he could no longer remain in that kingdom to watch the advance of another enemy from the north. If he could only inflict upon that enemy a Rossbach blow — then all must go well. He would at least attempt it. It was, indeed, the advance of the Russians into Branden- burg that induced Frederic, in the beginning of August, to quit Bohemia. In 1757 the Russians, led by Aprazin, had invaded East Prussia, had defeated the Prussian army at Gross-Jiigersdorf (30th of August ). The hereditary domin- ions of the king were actvially in the clutch of the Russian general, when, hearing of the illness of the Czarina, and knowing that her death would produce a complete change of politics with regard to Prussia, he had abandoned his position and his conquests and returned home. The Czarina, however, had recovered, had disgraced Aprazin, and nominated Fermor to succeed him. Fermor had entered Brandenburg in July of the following year, and it was the information that he was threatening Berlin which decided Frederic to quit Boliemia and give him such a welcome as would make him repent his inroad. Frederic carried out this design with his habitual skill and daring. Evacuating Bohemia, he made over the command of his Silesian army to his cousin, the Margrave Charles, under whom served Fouquet, and set out (11th of August), with fourteen battalions and thirty-eight squadrons to march by way of Liegnitz to Frankfort on the Oder. Another opportunity was thus offered to Daun. He had some 60,000 men under his orders on the Bohemian frontier. The Prussians, divided into two corps, one under Prince Charles to defend Silesia, the other under Marshal Keith in PITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. 75 the Lansitz, nnmbered somewhat over 40,000. They had no Frederic at their head to neutralize the superiority of the enemy. The reader can well imagine how a great general, flushed as was Daun with his practical success up to that moment, would have used the golden moments which Frederic's absence had placed at the Austrian general's disposal. To concentrate the greatest number of troops on the decisive point is the whole art of war. The truth of this action would appear to have glimmered through the brain of Daun when, on learning the departure of Frederic, he marched into the Lausitz, with the intention, in conjunction with the F^eich's army, of recovering Saxony. But all at once he deviated from the great principle. Loudon, who had as usual preceded the main army, received suddenly instructions to march northwards and to endeavour to effect a junction with the Russians. Marching with all speed across Saxony by way of Bautzen, Gorlitz, and Lauban, Loudon reached Mi;ska on the 23rd of August. On the following day he captured Peiz — a fortress, small indeed in size, but important for the numerous munitions of war it contained. Leaving 500 men to guard that place he pressed on, the next day, towards Branden- burg. It was on that vei-y day, 25th of August, that Frederic fought a hardly-contested battle with the Russians at Zorndorf, a battle which was terminated only by night, was in itself indecisive, but which, on the third day, 27th of August, brought to the king, by his daring persistence in remaining on the ground, all the fruits of a victory. Loudon first heard of this result on the 3rd of September. It ruined the project of union with the Russians. He himself, approaching the homelands of Brandenburg, had been regai'ded by Frederic as a formidable enemy, and his 76 LOUDON. old antagonist, Ziethen, had been sent to bar tlie way to the province.* The victory of Zorndorf decided his move- ments, and those of his general-in-chief. On the 5th he received a despatch from Daun directing him to interpose his corps between the main Austrian army and that of Frederic, then marching on Saxony, to allow the former to fall back on the Lausitz, and possibly on Bohemia. The apparition of Frederic had driven to the winds all Daun's feeble schemes of offensive warfare. The conduct of Loudon in carrying out his orders is especially worthy of study. The position of the three armies was as follows : Daun was with the main Austrian army marching on Meissen ; Fiederic was striding towards that point from the Oder ; Loudon, with a small corps-d'arviee, was between the two. in the Prussian circle of Frankfort on the Oder. His orders were to cover Daun's army, to give his commander- in-chief time to take up a position near his communications, and to inflict on the king as much damage as possible. As Daun fell hurriedly back towards the Lausitz, and Frederic speeded towards Dresden, Loudon, watching eagerly the movements of the latter, fell back as he advanced by way of Kouigsbrlick and Otterndorf to Kadeberg. In this place he posted his left wing, having his right at Seifer.sdorf, a position so harassing to Frederic that he detached (10th of September) General Putkammer to keep him in check whilst he himself should push after Daun. But Loudon had no intention of being blockaded. He waited indeed till he knew that Daun had taken up a strong position at Stolpen commanding the Silesian road and barring the king's entrance by the direct road into that province. Keeping then 8,000 men in Radeberg, Loudon moved v»-;th the remainder to the country about PITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. 77 the Lauscha and Langenbriick, covei-ing Bautzen, and making it very difficult for Frederic to gain by a cir- cuitous route the position to which Daun's army barred the natural way. For a month Loudon baffled the designs of the king. Could Frederic get to Bautzen he cared not for Daun's position at Stolpen. And it was Loudon who prevented him from getting to Bautzen. Loudon then must be forced to give way. To accomplish this object, then, Frederic, on the 16th, despatched General Retzow, by way of Willensdorf , against Loudon's left flank, the Prince of Bevern against his right, whilst he himself, crossing the Fischbach, should assail him in the rear. But Loudon, pitted now for the first time in independent command against Fl-ederic, proved himself no unworthy opponent of that great general. If his prudence was daring, it was that daring which strikes only when to strike brings success within the range of possibility, and which reserves its force for a future effort when to strike would ensure decisive victoiy. Keep- ing a careful look-out Loudon peneti-ated the designs of the king, and feeling that he was not strong enough to risk an encounter, resolved to fall back, retaining as he did so the command of the road which Frederic sought to wrench from him. His dispositions for this purpose were most masterly. Posting his artillery and four regiments of infantry on the heights of Arnsdoi^f, he covered his right flank with his dragoons, his left with his hussars. A wood, which the road from Dresden to Fischbach traversed ijeyond that town, he occupied with his Croats, supported by two regiments of dragoons. He had taken up these positions wlien the Prussians came in sight. Making an attack, wliich Loudon soon recognised to be a false attacl:, 78 LOUDON. on his right wing, they smldenly threw themselves on the wood before Fischbach. The Croats, however, successfully resisted them until Loudon had seen his baggage and materiel well to the rear. He then drew them back on to his main body and displayed his army, its wings well covered, in the most splendid order, well in hand, ready for offensive or defensive attack. As the Prussians still pushed forward, Loudon retired slowly, repulsing every attack, till he reached a position on the right front of Daun's army, known as the Kapellenberg. Here he halted, still covering Bautzen, and having had the glory of baffling Frederic in their first encounter. From this vantage ground, which faced the Prussian camp, Loudon noted about a week later certain symptoms of a movement on the part of the king. Confident that the aim of all Frederic's movements was to force an entrance into Silesia, Loudon divined that he was about to attempt a turning movement by way of Bischofswerda, On the night of the 25th then, quitting very silently his camp on the Kapellenberg, leaving the sentries at their posts, Loudon marched to that town and occupied the heights of Giessmandorf in front of it. He had not only divined correctly but he had baffled the vigilance of the Prussians. The next morning, their vanguard, led by Retzow, began to ascend in careless order the heights on which Loudon's corps rested. Rudely were they surprised at the welcome given them by that ever vigilant leader. Thrice did they come to the attack, but each time were they driven back with increasing loss. At hist they gave up the enterprise. Frederic contented himself with occupy- ing Ramenau and Arnsdorf . But Frederic did not like to be baffled. The very next day he and the Prince of Wiiitemberg reconnoitred PITTED AGAINST FREDERIC. 79 liOuJou's position. He felt tliat he must have it ; that it ■was necessary to him ; and that at any cost lie must carry it. He resolved then to assail him with as little delay as possible, as at Fischbach, on tlu-ee sides. Loudon was not in a position with his small force to resist the attack of the whole Prussian army. Could he have relied upon Daun to attack the king in flank whilst the king assailed him in front he would have maintained himself. But this was the very last manoeuvre, he knew well, to which liis cautious commander-in chief would commit himself. Certain then that he would be attacked on the 29 th, he evacuated the heights on the early morning of that day and fell back on Nieder-Potzka, where he still formed the right of Daun's army. For nearly four weeks had Loudon barred the way to Bautzen ; for nearly four weeks had he baffled the en- deavours of Frederic to reach Silesia. But the retreat from the heights of Giessmandorf had left the way open, and Frederic hastened to pour his troops along it. On the 3Uth Betzow occupied Bautzen. He was followed a few days later by Frederic. As the entrance of the Prussian army into the Lausitz and Silesia was now assured, Daun, anxious for his communications with Zittau, broke up his camp at Stolpen and marching cautiously into the Lausitz took up a position on the wooded heights overlooking the little village of Hochkirch. Drawing here to himself Loudon, who had as usual covered the march of the main army, and had had daily skirmishes with the Prussians, he waited, whilst strengthening his position, the approach of Frederic. CHAPTER VIII. AT nOCHKIRCH. Daun, not satisfied with occupying Hoclikircli, and possibly recollecting the lesson taught at Leuthen, had seized Stromberg — a high and completely detached hill which commanded the country all round — and placed on it his right wing, whilst in the villages and hamlets im- mediately in front of these heights he had posted his Croats and other light troops. Still further to secure the position he had caused the little village of Glossen, behind the Lobau rivulet, to be occupied by four companies of grenadiers. His army was thus ordered. Generals Sziskowitz and Brune occupied the summit of Stromberg with eight battalions of grenadiers. At its foot, facing the village of Hochkirch, were twelve battalions of infantry and all the cavalry of the right wing. Immediately to the left of these twelve battalions, and behind the village of Sornzig, was placed a battery of heavy guns supported by a battalion of grenadiers and two regiments of infantry. Dann him- self commanded on the woody heights above Hochkirch, and Loudon the vanguard of the army. Daun had already occupied and partially strengthened AT HOCHKIBGH. 81 this commanding position, when on the morning of the 15th of October Frederic came in sight of it. A shoit ex- amination of it convinced him that tlie army which held Stromberg had the command of the country around, and he found grievous fault with Retzow, who commanded his advance, for not having seized that hill before the xVus- trians had occupied it in force. It was too late then to think of driving them from it. Too proud, however, to turn his back upon the Austrians, Frederic, in a spirit of bravado, and in spite of the remonstrances of some of his most trusted officers, encamped about the village of Hoch- kirch within cannon-shot of the enemy. Here he en- trenched himself, and occupied the little hilly eminencesi. in front of it with fifteen pieces of cannon. His right he placed on a hillock, covered with brushwood, to the right of the village ; his left extended beyond Rodewitz. This place Frederic made his head-quarters. A little brook with very steep banks covered his front. A portion of his army, however, encamped on the other side of this brook in order to maintain touch with Retzow's corps which occupied an intrenched camp at Weissenberg on the extreme left. In taking up a position under the very nose of an enemy who outnumbered him in the proportion of three to one, Frederic counted on the well known caution of his adversary. That Daun — the general who was wont to cover even the steepest hills with intrenchments, who had never brought himself to the point of risking an attack — • that Daun should assail him — Frederic — was impossible ! It could not be ! Had Daun been alone w^th subordinates of his own cautious character the argument might have been good. But Frederic had committed the mistake of forgetting that there were other generals besides Daun with the Austrian army, and that one of the.se, the principal G 82 LOUDON. indeed of them, for he was second in command, was the active, enterprising, quick- visioned Lovidon ! This general held with his corps the country about Rachlau ; his advanced posts almost within musket-shot of the Prussians, and separated from them only by a ditch. Loudon contrived that every day between these advanced posts there should be continual skirmishes, begun by the Austrians. At last these came to be regarded as a matter of course. Daun meanwhile pursued his old system of throwing up intrenchments, thus more and more fixing Fredeiic in the conviction that he was perfectly safe from assault from that quarter. Circumstances, however, were rapidly undermining the cautious scruples of the Austrian commander-in-chief. It happened that one day Loudon came upon a peasant trudging towards the Prussian camp with a basket of eggs on his arm. To an offer made to him by Loudon to buy the eggs the peasant replied that they were bespoken. The demeanour of the man exciting suspicions, Loudon had him brought into his camp, then, opening the eggs, he found that they were merely shells, inside of which were papers giving accurate intimation of Daun's secret intentions written by some one closely attached to his person. It happened that, the very same day, Daun, suddenly entering his tent, had discovered his private secretary writing a paper, which, on observing the presence of his general, he tried to conceal. Daun, snatching' it from him, read in it, to his astonishment, a complete description of his intended movements. Loudon's discovery came to con- firm an idea which had begun to form itself in the mind of Daun that it might be possible to " hoist the engineer with his own petard." He therefore promised the private secretary his life on the condition that he should continue AT ROGEKIRCH. 83 the treasonable correspondence, but should supply only such information as should be given him by himself. The ■wretched man consented. From that time forth Frederic received daily assurances that Daun was more than ever resolved not to attack him. At that very time, yielding to the strong arguments of Loudon and of Lacy, Daun was making his preparations for a sudden burst upon the camp of his too confident enemy. He had fixed five o'clock on the morning of the 1-ith of October for the execution of his project, which was to assail the Prussian army simultaneously on four points. Whilst Daun himself, leading three columns through the forest of Hochkirch and posting himself between the villages of Waischke and Sornzig, should fall upon the Prussian right, Loudon, strengthened by four battalions and fifteen squadrons, and joined during the night by nearly all the remaining cavalry of the left wing, should advance beyond Soritz to Steindorfl and take the Prussian army in rear. The positions held the previous day by the Austrians were still to be occupied. This programme was carried out with the greatest order and precision. Whilst the sentries paced their rounds, the watch-fires burned, and the axes of the wood-cutters re- sounded in the Austrian camp, the several Austrian columns marched silently and quietly, unmarked by the Prussians, to take up the positions selected by their leaders. It was yet dark when the Austrians reached the ground. Suddenly the village clock of Hochkirch struck five. As soon as the last sti'oke had sounded, the signal, a musketry volley from the Austrian advanced posts near Rachlau, was given. As both armies were by this time accustomed to the daily and nightly skirmishes which took place about that village, the signal, whilst it set in motion the Austrian army, made G 2 84 LOUDON. no impression upon the Prussians. But suddenly the Aus- trians under Daun dashed upon the outlyiug pickets, and overpowering them, fell upon the Prussian camp. Then it was that Frederic and his troops took the alarm. Turning out, half dressed, without order, each man snatching his weapon and rushing to the front, the Prussian soldiers showed themselves that morning worthy of their renown. If they could not win the day, they were resolved that the Austrians should pay dearly for victory. The surprise, the disorder, the preponderance of the enemy, made defence difficult. After the first musket shots had been fii-ed it became a hand to hand encounter, and here the circum- stances I have enumerated gave all the advantage to the Austrians. Loudon, meanwhile, pressed on with great vigour over the hills about Steindorfl. His Croats, stealing up behind Hochkirch, set fire to the village, and the flames tlirew a ghastly and lurid light over the terrible scene. The Prussians, though in the greatest disorder, fought Avith all O their old courage ; some regiments even tried to assume ^ the flefensive. The cuirassier regiment, von Schbnaich, especially distinguished itself — charging and driving back a whole line of Austrian infantry. But the famous Hun- garian horse did not yield even to them in prowess. The Lowenstein dragoons in two successive charges nearly annihilated the king's guard. It may be said, indeed, that on this bloody day all the nationalities distinguished themselves. Even the Croats, unaccustomed to regular manoeuvring, vied with other regiments of the attacking army in their steady valour. But though both sides fought well, the palm of combined courage and conduct is due, by the admission even of the Austrians, to the battalion commanded by the Prussian AT HOCHKIRGH. %h Major, von Lange. In the description I gave of the dis- position taken up by Frederic about Hochkirch, I stated that he had occupied the little eminence in front of that village with a battery of fifteen guns. These guns were supported by the Prussian battalion just mentioned. Attacked on three sides by an overwhelming number of Austrians, von Lange was forced after very hard fighting to give way. Well acquainted with the ground, he suc- ceeded by his coolness and skill in withdrawing his men into the churchyard, which was surrounded by a high wall, and from behind this he renewed the contest. In vain did the best troops in the Austrian army — the Grenadiers — attempt to storm the position ; they were driven back with great loss. At last the time arrived when the ammunition of the defenders was exhausted ; when von Lange himself was sinking from the exhaustion caused by eleven wounds, and when six Austrian regiments were advancing to the storm. " My children," said von Lange to the survivors, " we must dash through them." And they did dash through, though in that splendid struggle they lost their gallant leader. Von Lange's defence had given to the Prussian king the time so much needed to bring his army into something like order. He had scarcely, however, succeeded in doing this, when his own so hardly-won fifteen-gun battery was turned again.st him. Still, in this great emergency the vision of Frederic was as clear, and his spirit as resolute, as on the peaceful parade-ground. He had done all that man could do to restore the battle. Noting at this conjuncture how Loudon was pressing his right rear, he despatched three regiments to stay his progress. In vain, however ^ the head of Prince Chailes of r)runswick was carried off by a cannon-ball, and the Prussians, hard pressed, fell back in their turn. 86 LOUDON. The circle was now closing in around them. The burning village, which gave its name to the battle, was already in possession of the Austrians, when Marshal Keith, rallying round him all the regiments he could collect, made a desperate effort to recover it. At first he succeeded ; but the Austrians coming up again, drove him out. In the desperate fight Keith was killed ; and the Prussians soon after renounced the combat at this point. An advance of five companies of horse-grenadiers, under Lacy, to the support of Loudon, forced the Prussians at last to loose their grip on the hills about Waditz, and threatened their line of retreat. A simultaneous forward movement of the Austrian right under Buccow and Ahrenberg, left indeed but one way of escape open to the Prussians, and that ■was through the defile of Drehsa. To conduct a beaten army through a narrow pass in a hilly country in the presence of a victorious enemy is a feat to task all the coolness, all the skill, of a great commander. Yet this was the difficulty which Frederic now had to face. The Austrians were pressing him in front, and were gradually overlapping him on both flanks. He at once took a great resolution. Recognising that the battle was lost, he would save all that yet remained to him of his army. He carried out this resolve with a coolness and a skill worthy to be studied. Covering his movements with the fire of the guns still in his possession, and by the cavalry of Ziethen and Seidlitz, 9,000 strong, he formed his infantry in two lines, and led them to the entrance of the defile. Through this he sent his cavalry first, then his guns, and last of all, his infantry ; his troops, as they reached the opposite side, forming up to defend those who followed. This plan he carried out so admirably that though the Austrian cavalry followed him up close, they AT EOCH KIRCH. 87 could effect nothing against liim. Frederic fell back, then, by Klein-Bautzen, and took up a new position at Doberschlitz. In this memorable battle the Prussians lost between 8,000 and 9,000 in killed and wounded— of these 2,998 were buried by the Austrians the next day — twenty-eight pairs of coloui's, two standards, 101 guns, their camp, their baggage, and munitions of war. The victors lost 1,432 killed and 6,525 wounded, or a total of 7,937. Victories are of two kinds, decisive and undecisive. The battle of Hochkirch would have belonged to the former category, if, placing a little more faith in the result of a surprise with an army three times greater than that of his enemy, Daun had made a point of sending a strong division on ^ehsa at the moment he assailed Hochkirch. Had he done so Hochkirch would have ended the war. As it was, he left, possibly out of over-caution, one loophole for his adversary, and of that his adversary availed himself to assume a new position — proportionally the worse only by the loss of his guns and munitions of war. Consequently Hochkirch, though a victory on the spot on which it had been fought, has no claim whatever to be classed amongst decisive battles. It was, indeed, thanks to the extreme caution of the Austrian commander, a victory which decided nothing. It did not even injure the prestige of Frederic. Tha daring with which he had affronted the attack, and the conduct by which he had deprived that which ought to have been an annihilating victory of all its annihilating consequences, increased the confidence and affection of his troops. He lost nothing but his camp and his guns, for in men the enemy were nearly as much weakened as he was. To gain a victory is one thing : but a victory gained 88 LOUDON. represents but useless loss of life uuless it be followeil up. No battle manifested this truth more clearly than did Hochkirch. Daun, master of the field, instead of following up iiis enemy and giving him no peace, of attempting even to cut off the division of Retzow, which had taken no part in the battle, withdrew that same evening to the heights he had occupied before the battle, in order that his men, he says, might have a good rest under blankets after the fatigue of the day. But he rested there for six days, and only on the seventh marched very stealthily to take up a new position between Belgern and Jenkowitz, facing Frederic at Doberschiitz. Daun rested in this camp till the 24th of the month, barring the road into Silesia, where one of his generals, Harsch, was engaged in besieging the strong fortress of Neisse. Frederic had it very much at heart to save Neisse, but to reach Gorlitz, the possession of which would secure his entrance into Silesia, he must give his flank to the superior army of Daun. Were Daun to have an inkling of his designs this would be too great a risk. Frederic therefore had recourse to stratagem. He sent all his "wounded, all his baggage, even his tents, into the lower Lausitz, and made as though he would follow himself. Then suddenly on the night of the 24-25th, he marched his lightly equipped army to Gorlitz : Loudon was at the time confined to hig tent by very severe sickness, and his place in the front of the army was ill-supplied, for the deed was done before information reached Daun. For the moment Daun sent only some light troops to follow Frederic, but two days later, he gave Loudon, who had then recovered, the command of some 25,000 men with strict orders to follow Frederic with all his energy. The task was not very difficult, for Freder-ic had halted two days AT EOCEKIRCII. 89 at GiJrlitz. Loudon managed then to take up a position at Liebstein, threatening the Prussian rear and left, whilst Frederic was still halted. On the 29th, Frederic resumed his march and crossed the river Neisse. But the moment Prince Henry, who commanded the Prussian rear- guard, consisting of twelve battalions of infantry and Zietheu's hussars, evacuated Gorlitz, Loudon dashed through the town — his cavalry in front, the infantry following, and pursued him. Noticing that he had halted in the nari-ow pass close to the village of Ober Schonbrunn he made his Croats drag some light field-pieces to the summit of the hill commanding it, and whilst these opened on the Prussians, he drove the enemy from the village. In vain did the latter set fire to Ober Schonbrunn and to Pfafl'en- dorf to keep their pursuer in check. He followed them up vigorously, and inflicted on them a loss of 500 men. His own amounted to 300. As the Prussian army still advanced, Loudon was ever on their track. On the 1st of November, at the passage of the Queiss, he inflicted on the Prussian rear-guard, commanded on that day by the King in person, a loss of a hundred men without a single casualty on his own side ; on the 2nd he captured seventy prisoners and some baggage wagons, at Lowenberg. The same evening he caught up the enemy's rear-guard at the village of Pilgramsdorf, not far from Goldljerg, and captured 400 horses, fifteen pontoons, and 120 men, amongst them Colonel Zastrow. He continued to follow up the Prussian army as far as the town of Jauer, making, to use the very words of Frederic, "the king's whole march a continued fight." From Jauer, Loudon marched to the vicinity of Zittau, and having secured the magazines in that town, went to take up Lis winter quarters on the Bohemian frontier. 90 LOUDON. Daun, meanwhile, had marched into Saxony, and Frederic, after relieving Neisse, had followed him thither. During the winter, honours and rewards awaited Loudon. In November he received the Grand Cross of the order of Maria Theresa ; and when he visited Vienna in February, the Empress-Queen bestowed upon him the title of Baron (Freihei^) of the Austrian Grand Duchy and of the Holy Roman Empire, and the grant of the estate of Klein-Betschwar in Hungary. In a private audience, Maria Theresa expressed her high appreciation of, and gratitude for, the services he had rendei-ed. CHAPTER IX. AT K U X E R S D O R F. The campaign of 1758, though illustrated by the defeat of Frederic at Hochkirch, had been, as far as results were concerned, a failure for Austria. At its close, Frederic still retained Saxony and Silesia. The two most powerfvil allies of Austria, France and Russia, had made their power but little felt, and Frederic had been more than a match for Daun. But in the year, upon the record of which I am entering, his difficulties were to increase. During the winter Loudon had renewed a proposition he had formerly made, that two battalions of grenadiers should be permanently attached to the Croats. These latter, he said, though animated by incontestable courage, were not accustomed to make an attack in close order; they had been taught to spread themselves out as skirmishers, and as such they were invaluable ; but, if supported by a solid body of some 1,800 grenadiers their value would be quadrupled. The request was granted, and the men, who volunteered from other regiments, were in- corporated in ]\[arch. On the 27th of the same month, Loudon quitted Vienna to take the command of a separate command — though subject generally to Daun — at Trautenau. 92 LOUDON. The plan of the campaign, concerted between the courts of Vienna, Versailles, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm, was as follows : whilst Daun, at the head of 70,000 men, should occupy very firmly the hilly ranges bordering Silesia, he was to detach a corp of 20,000 to effect a junction with the Reich's-army at Bamberg on the one side, whilst the Duke de Broglie, firmly posted at Frankfort-on-the-Main, should stretch a hand to it on the other. In this manner, an allied army, 330,000 strong, would face Frederic. Mean- while, to take him in reverse, a Russian army, 70,000 strong, was to march on Frankfort on the Oder, to be joined there by 30,000 Austrians under Loudon and Haddik, and whilst this army should attack the hereditary dominions of the King of Prussia, a corps of 14,000 Swedes should take possession of Stettin. It was a plan, rightly called colossal, which, if candied out with fair success, ought to prove decisive of the war. In carrying out a plan, the details of which depend upon the complete sj^mpathy and the punctuality of other nations much valuable time is often lost. It was, in a great measure, in consequence of this dependence, that the spring of 1759 was illustrated by no great military event. Daun's army occupied a strong position between Schurz and Jaromierz, facing Frederic, whilst Loudon, whose army corps consisted of ten battalions of regular infantry, eight companies of grenadiers, the two volunteer battalions of grenadiers previously referred to, 5,700 Croats and twenty squadrons of cavalry, or, with artillery, about 20,000 men, lay about Trautenau. A reconnaissance made by Loudon with three battalions of infantry and 500 cavalry, in the direction of Liebau, on 21st of May, had shown the king to be in force in that direction. Whilst the Austrians were thus waiting quietly the AT K UNEES DOIiF. 03 development of the plans agreed upon with their allies, the Russian ai-my led by Prince Soltikoff, had been gradu- ally assembled at Posen. On the 24th of June, Loudon broke up his camp at Trautenau, and moved on Hennersdorf, Hochstadt, and Jablunzen. On the 4th of Jtdy he was marching on Friedland (in Silesia) when qrders reached him to speed as fast as possible to the front and reconnoitre the Prussian position. lie at once turned back, hastened with his cavalry to Marklissa, and detaching thence General Caramelli towards Lauban and Lowenberg took himself the road by way of Friedberg to Greifenberg, Here he found the enemy in considerable force, and accordingly falling back on Friedberg, and calling to himself Caramelli, he took up a strong post of observation at Gebhai'dsdorf. From this position he was summoned to proceed with all haste to join the Russian army. To effect this junction Loudon set out on the 23rd of July, marching by Gorlitz and Freiwalde to Pribus. Here he was joined on the 29th by Haddik. The task of effecting a junction with the Russian army was one which would tax all the energies and skill of a great commander, for, at Pribus, Loudon was in Prussian territory, with the main Prussian army under General Wedel, greatly superior in numbers, in front of him ; another at Sagan, under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, on his right flank, and three Prussian armies, under Prince Henry, General Fink, and the king himself, behind him. His task was so far lightened in that Wedel, having attacked Soltikoff at Kay (23rd of July) was completely beaten, losing in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 6,000 men. But from want of cavalry, in which arm the Russian army was deficient, the victory had been a barren one for Prince Soltikoff, and there was nothing to prevent Wedel from 94 LOUDON. dashing down to crush Loudon. Then again, if Prince Eugene should push forward and reach Sommerfeld, south of the Oder, and nearly midway between the Neisse and the Bober, before Loudon, then the road to the junction to the Russians would be barred, and it would be impossible to regain it without a battle. To gain his end, to be beforehand with the Prussians, and yet to cope with any enemy, however superior in numbers, Loudon arranged that while he should march to the front with 18,000 men, Haddik with 7,000 should cover his movements. He arranged a series of signals by which each should learn, as soon as possible, when the other was attacked, and should hasten to his support. To keep the Prussians still more in the dark, Loudon posted sti'ong detachments, covering his right flank, between Halbau and Sorau. To feel his way, and to receive the quickest information of the enemy, he distributed two regiments of hussars, and three squadrons of dragoons on his front, his left flank, and his right front. He then set out, reached Linderode on the 30th, and Sommerfeld — ■ Frederic but one day's march behind him — on the 31st. His junction with the Russians was now assured. On the 1st of August the two Austrian generals entei'ed Guben. There Loudon took under his orders his Croats, 5,000 strong, the whole of the cavalry, 15,000, and forty-eight guns, and procuring for them bread and forage from the town, marched the same evening to Zilchendorf on the Oder. He was now separated from the Russian army only by that river, for Soltikoff was encamped at the little village of Auer on its right bank. The complete junction was effected on the 3rd. Loudon's operations had been most masterly, extorting admiration even from his enmies. He had conducted to a successful end an operation of all AT KUNERSDOEF. 95 others the most difficult — a flank march through an enemy's country, in the face of four hostile armies, each of which was superior in number to his own ! Haddik, meanwhile, taking over at Guben the remainder of the infantry and the baggage train, set out for Kottbus in the hope of reaching the Lavisitz by way of Spremberg. Frederic, rendered anxious by the defeat of Wedel at Kay, had left Fink with 10,000 men to defend Saxony against Daun, and directing Prince Henry to meet him at Sagan, had set out for that place with all the troops he could spare. Taking up Prince Henry's army and Prince Eugene's corps at Sagan he had reached Sommerfeld the day after Loudon had left it, and had followed on his track, hoping to smite him before he could reach Soltikoff. But as we have seen, Loudon had marched too expeditiously and had virtually effected the dreaded junction. Still deter- mined to strike a decisive blow, Frederic marched in the direction of Frankfort, and, snatching from Haddik all his meal wagons and some hundreds of prisoners on his way, reached Beeskow on the 3rd, the veiy day on which Loudon, passing through Frankfort, joined the Russian army on the heights about Kunersdorf, on the right bank of the river. On this spot the two generals resolved to accept battle from Frederic. The inundations of the river Oder on its right bank, had centuries before deepened the ruts and low flat lands which contrasted with the heights or knolls with which that bank was covered. Keclaimed by the industry of the people, the ground had been partially covered with farmhouses and small villages, and to keep the water fi'om it, dams had been built along the river as far as Kiistrin. The breadth of this recovered land near Frankfort was about 3,000 paces. The uneven nature of the gi-ound stretching 96 LOUDON. as it were in ridges, alternating in heights and hollows, and shut in at the extreme end of its breadth by forests, made it very defensible. Close to the road leading from Frankfort across the river, and almost immediately after it had crossed it, lay the Jewish burial ground. In front of this, looking northwards, at a distance of about 2,000 paces, rose heights called the Judenberg, very steep, and apparently commanding the country below them as far as Kunersdorf, a little village about two thousand paces to the eastward from it, and somewhat further from the river. These heights were strongly intrenched. Between them and Kunersdorf the ground was nearly flat, though about a thousand paces south of the village rose a considerable eminence known as the Grosser Spitzberg ; further on, at a distance of some seven hundred paces, another called the Kleiner Spitzberg, the ground between the two, and stretchiug to the east of it by the village of Kunersdorf, being a hollow known as the Kuhgrund. From Kunersdorf to the Kuhgrund a chain of heights formed a half circle at a distance of about 1,200 paces round the village, and this chain rested on a forest which again formed a half circle round the hills known as the Miihlberge. These hills, so called from the mills which had been built upon their summit, formed the salient point to any one advancing towards Kunersdorf from Trettin. A road likewise led to them from Reppen, but this i-oad led through a very difficult forest, the soil of which was rugged and interspersed in many places with lakes. One of these, known as the Hulmerfliess, presented obstacles which rendered it almost impassable, for it was shut in on three sides by very steep sloping rocks. Once these diiEculties overcome, an army advancing from Happen, would come upon the south-east face of the AT KUNERSDORF. 97 Muhlberge, whilst an army from Trettin would assail their north-east face. From the Muhlberge to the river the points of defence would be the following : the Grosser Spitzljerg, sepai'ated from the Muhlberge by the village of Kunersdorf and the Kuhgrund ; and the Judenberg, separated from the Grosser Spitzberg by a hollow ground. It remains to be added that on the surface between the river and the forest were occasional ponds, traversed generally by planks. On the ground I have indicated stood the Russian army, its left — facing an enemy coming from the north — on the Judenberg ; its centre on the Grosser Spitzberg, and its right on the Muhlberge. These heights were all intrenched and the salient points between them were all occupied. Loudon and his corps were formed up in the low ground below the Judenberg. But, the day before the battle, all these dis- positions had to be altered. A reconnaissance made that day by Loudon showed that the attack would come from Bischofsee and Trettin. The right then became the left, and the left the right of the Russian line, whilst Loudon himself clianged his dispositions, and placed his cavalry round the Kuligrund behind the Russian centre. The Russian army numbered 42,000 ; the Austrian 18,000 — in all 60,000. Meanwhile Frederic had reached Miillrose on the 4th, been joined there by Wedel on the 6tli, approached Lebus below Frankfort on the 7th, and thence reconnoitred. Deeming the enemy too strong to be attacked with the 40,000 men he had with him, Frederic resolved to leave Saxony to its fate. He sent then pressing orders to Fink to bring with all haste 8,000 men to join him. On the 10th he met Fink at Reitwein still lower down the stream, crossed it that night, and reached Bischofsee and Trettin about one o'clock the next day. Thence that afternoon he re(!onnoiterd the Russo- Austrian position. H 98 LOUDON. A careful examiuation of that position brought convic- tion to the mind of Frederic that its weakest and most assailable point was the left, the Miihlberge. If he could but force the Russians from that position he had no fear regarding victory. He resolved then to traverse the forest of Reppen, to turn, by some means, the difficult Hiihner- fliess, and reaching the knolls on the further side of it, to attack the Miihlberge simultaneously in flank and in rear. Loudon, on a second reconnaissance, had fully divined the intentions of the king, and as he saw that the village of Kunersdorf would both serve to screen the Prussian movements after they should have overcome the earlier difficulties of the route, and would break the fire of the Russian guns, had recommended that it should be burnt down. For this i-ecommendation, which was complied with, he has been unjustly reproached by a great modern writer, eager to expose any blunder in the enemies of Frederic. But war is war. An apparent humanity is not always a real humanity. The burning of Kunersdorf was necessary for the plans of the allied armies. And, even in a humani- tarian point of view, it was more merciful to remove the inhabitants and burn down their houses than to allow the hovels to stand, and the men, women, and children living in them to be exposed to the fire of two hostile armies. Frederic, whilst leading in person the main column of attack through the forest of Reppen, had directed Fink with the second column to move by the Trettin road and threaten the flank and the rear of the enemy ; thus to con- centrate upon himself their attention until he should make his presence known. He had simultaneously given orders to General Wunsch, whom he had left on the Oder, to penetrate into Frankfort as soon as the attack should be developed, and bar the way of retreat to the enemy. AT KUNEBSDOIiF. 99 Fink, having but a short distance to traverse, reached his allotted post at four o'clock in the morning. Frederic, the difficulties of whose march had been of the most trying character, arrived at the small knolls overlooking Ivuners- dorf and facing the south side of the Miilhberge, some four hours later. Some hours yet elapsed before his guns could arrive, and it was half-past eleven before he was ready for the attack. Meanwhile Fink had placed lifty-six guns in position, and had begun a very heavy fire on the ]\[iihlberge. So heavy indeed and so continuous was this fire that it attracted all the attention of the Russians and caused them to pay little heed to Frederic, still waiting for his artillery. But at twelve Frederic was ready. He had planted 1 70 guns in position on the hill known as the Kleistberg and the other small hills near it ; he had concenti-ated on his extreme left his cavalry under Seidlitz, and he had formed for the first attack in two lines, under Generals Schenkendorf and Lindstadt, eight grenadier battalions. At twelve the cannonade, to which the Russians promptly replied, began. The distance, however, was too great to allow it to be very effective, and after it had con- tinued half an hour the king sent the grenadier battalions to the storm. The Russian troops on the Miihlberge had been posted with so little knowledge of the situation, and with so great a want of foresight, that whilst they exposed themselves to an advancing enemy, they could with the greatest diffi- culty bring their fire to bear upon the line by which he was advancing. This mistake produced a very demoralising influence — the character of which was increased when the Prussian grenadiers, halting twice to fire, cau.««ed a con- siderable loss in their ranks. It resulted, then, that when H 2 100 LOUDON. the Prussian grenadiers, always pressing on, reached the intrenched position, the defenders gave way, almost without an effort. Some amongst them, however, cooler than their comrades, set fire to the fascines, and the fierce fire thus caused, effectually stopped pursuit for the time. If the king had had his cavalry in hand, and if it had been possible to turn the abandoned Russian guns against the enemy, this first brilliant success would have decided the victory ; but the cavalry was concentrated at the other end of the line, and the abandoned field-pieces had been left without ammunition. It was only then by a fire of small arms that the advantage so far gained could be improved. On the Russian side, meanwhile, great efforts were being made to restore the battle. The generals rallied the beaten troops behind the second line, brought guns from the right wing, and offered a new and better organised front to the enemy. At the same time Loudon brought his cavalry nearer to the threatened point, ready to seize any opportunity. The time taken to do all this had been well utilised by the Prussians. They had strengthened themselves on the conquered ground, and had, with incredible labour, brought upon it several of their guns. These now opened their fire, and under the cover of it Frederic led in person his grena- diers to the assault. But the Russians defended their position with far greater obstinacy than they had displayed on the first occasion, and for a time flattered themselves with the hope that their resistance would compel the king to retire. Just at this moment, however, Fink, who had been Avorking steadily from the Trettin heights, made his presence sensibly felt in their left rear. They fell back then, and in a disorder so great, that Frederic might for a AT KU^Elii