UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 OF 
 
 D 
 
 H 
 
 IN BRITAIN 
 
 BY 
 
 W. F. TAMBLYN, B. A. 
 
 .Submitted iiJi partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
 
 degree of Doctor of Philosoph3% in the Faculty of 
 
 Philosophy, Columbia University. 
 
 HAMILTON. ONT. : 
 Printed by McPherson & Drope. 
 
 1899 
 
 <3 .i. TJ 
 
 6
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 OF 
 
 ROMAN POW 
 
 H 
 
 IN BRITAIN 
 
 BY 
 
 W. F. TAMBLYN, B.A. 
 
 Submitted in partial fnlfilment of the requirements for the 
 
 degree of Doctor of Philosoph3% in the Faculty of 
 
 Philosophy, Columbia University. 
 
 HAMILTON. ONT. : 
 Printed by McPherson & Drope. 
 
 1899
 
 • • • 
 
 ■ c c c c < 
 
 • • •
 
 
 The Establishment of Roman Power in Britain. 
 
 [ v> 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 
 
 When Julius Caesar entered upon the government 
 of the province of Gaul, with the definite purpose of 
 winning new conquests for the Roman People and 
 military power and glory for himself, he identified 
 personal interests with the needs of his country. On 
 the one hand, conscious of his own greatness, he 
 desired to do famous deeds, to be the first of Romans, 
 and to link his name forever to those of Rome and 
 Victory. I On the other hand, it was evident to Caesar 
 that the security of Rome and her system was seriously 
 threatened by the presence to the north and west 
 of Italy of many large and vigorous independent tribes 
 which had often beaten Roman armies, and had done 
 ^ much damage to Roman possessions and Roman 
 interests in general. 2 
 
 The Gauls in particular had been for centuries the 
 terror of Italy.3 Later the Germans, a still more 
 dreadful apparition, had invaded Roman territory and 
 were now threatening to spread over Gaul. At any 
 moment Italy might again be assailed by Celtic or 
 Teutonic barbarians. It was therefore necessary to 
 extend the power of Rome over Gaul at least, to 
 defend the Po at the Rhine, as one writer has 
 expressed it,4 in order that Italy might not fear the 
 ravages of migrating barbarians. Convinced of this 
 necessity, and of the power which would come to the 
 
 1. Sueton, Caesar 7. Cp. Dio XXXIX. 48. 
 
 2. Cp. J. K. Seeley, Essays on Roman Imperialism 1. He points out the 
 chiet cause for the downfall ol the Republic in the demand for military centrali- 
 zation against the barbarians. 
 
 3. Caes, B. G. I. 12 ; III. 20. Cic.,de Prov. Cons. 13 .Sail. Jug. 114. Livy V, 
 etc. 
 
 4. Jung, Roman. Landschaften, p. iQi. 
 
 (S^iiOlSl 

 
 4 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 conqueror of the Republic's most redoubtable enemy, 
 Caesar turned his face from the easy conquests of the 
 east, which had attracted other Roman generals, and 
 chose Gaul as the scene for his battles. 
 
 Other considerations must also have urged Caesar 
 to this step. He must have felt instinctively that the 
 empire of Rome, after its rapid extension in the East, 
 needed balancing. If Rome was to remain the political 
 centre of her empire, a counterpoise was required in 
 the west to the dull weight of Asia.i Besides, the 
 eastern provinces, with their Hellenic or Semitic tradi- 
 tions, offered no room for the free, unhindered develop- 
 ment of a pure Roman civilization. Only in the west 
 and north was Rome ever able to infuse her full spirit 
 into the conquered nations, and become supreme by 
 her intellectual and moral influence a3 well as by force 
 of arms.2 The extension of Roman civilization in the 
 north-west was destined to prove the strongest bulwark 
 of Italy against the outer barbarism. While the civiliza- 
 tion of Rome endured and cemented fast the solid 
 rampart of Gaul, Raetia, Noricum, and Pannonia, Italy 
 needed no other walls to guard her culture against the 
 assaults of German and Sarmatian hordes. Among the 
 warlike but untutored Gauls, Caesar felt that an organic 
 Romanism, a really sound, healthy expansion of 
 Roman arts, trades, life and citizenship could be 
 quickly realized by energetic and intelligent measures. 
 Here, too, he could train an army which would not fail 
 him in the future, while for the present the proximity 
 of his province to the centre of the world enabled him 
 to keep in touch with urban politics. 
 
 Accordingly, Caesar undertook a task which 
 
 1. Cp. Schiller, Geschichte der rom. Kaiserzeit I. §30. 
 
 2. That Caesar looked forward to Gauls becoming Roman citizens appears 
 from his treatment of them (Dio XLI V. 42) and his numerous enfranchisements.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 5 
 
 seemed enormous to his contemporaries. i His career 
 in Gaul during the three years 58-56 B. C. was one of 
 almost unbroken success. By the end of 56 the Roman 
 power reached to the English Channel and the Atlantic 
 Ocean. Caesar had an army of eight legions2 in the 
 finest condition, which not only overav/ed the Gauls, 
 but had already taught the Germans respect for Rome. 
 Leaving his army each winter quartered in the con- 
 quered territories, Caesar himself passed the winters 
 when possible in Cisalpine Gaul, whence he could watch 
 conveniently the course of events at Rome.3 The 
 gratitude of the Roman People for his successes4 had 
 already expressed itself in the form of a public thanks- 
 giving of fifteen days (57 B. C.).5 All eyes were turned 
 in admiration upon the man who had crushed the 
 inveterate enemies of the Republic and turned the tide 
 of conquest northward. ^ 
 
 Now that the conquest of Gaul was practically 
 finished, Caesar's further operations in the years 55-53 
 aimed chiefly at securing and consolidating what had 
 been won. 7 After crossing the Rhine and demonstrat- 
 ing his strength to the Germans, Caesar turned his 
 attention to the island of Britain. ^^ 
 
 Up to the time of Caesar's invasion, Britain was 
 almost wholly unknown to Romans. 9 The Gauls them- 
 selves, with the exception of i. few traders, knew noth- 
 ing of the island to the north of them. 10 Britain was 
 
 1. Catullus XI. II. Cic. De Prov. Cons. 13, 14. 
 
 2. Caes. B. G. V. 8. 
 
 3. Caes, B. G. V. i. 
 
 4. Cic. De Prov. 16. 
 
 5. Dio XXXIX. 5. 
 
 6. Cic, De Prov. Cons. 13. Dio XLIV. 42. Appian B. C. II. 73, 134. 
 
 7. Peter : Romische Geschichte p. 390. 
 
 8. Caes., B. G. IV. 20. 
 
 g. Diodorus Sic. III. 37. Plutarch, Caesar 23. Dio XXXIX. 50 ; LXII. 4. 
 10. Caes. IV. 20.
 
 6 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 almost cut off from the rest of the world. i Some 
 slight traffic however, especially in tin, 2 seems to have 
 been carried on with the inhabitants of the south coast 
 of England by venturesome traders even in quite early 
 times. The Massiliot Pytheas probably visited Britain 
 in the fourth century B. C.3 From his Book of Travels 
 the Pseudo-Aristotle perhaps derived his knowledge 
 of the two British Isles, which he called Albion and 
 Ierne.4 Later on Polybius refers to the production of 
 tin in the British Isles. 5 But the really historic discov- 
 ery of Britain was made by Caesar. 6 Before him the 
 Romans knew about as much of Britain as the people 
 of Western Europe knew 900 years ago of Greenland. 
 
 Long before Caesar's appearance in Gaul various 
 grand movements of peoples on the continent had 
 forced divisions of the Celtic race to seek new homes 
 beyond the Strait of Dover. Settling successively in 
 Britain the several instalments of invaders pushed the 
 previous populations westward and northward. 7 The 
 last of these waves of invasion had flowed over the 
 southeastern part of the island not very long before the 
 time of Caesar. 8 
 
 But there was no live intercourse between Britain 
 and the continent.9 Even the merchant traders whom 
 
 1. Vergil. Eccl. I. 67. Catull. XI. 12. Horace, Carm. I. 35, 2g. Cic. N. D. II. 
 34. etc. 
 
 2. Diod. Sic, V. 38, says much tin was exported from Britain. But it was 
 probably no large amount. Certainly the British tin mines were little worked 
 during the Roman occupation. See Haverfield in Arch. Journ. XLIX. p. 178 Cp. 
 Strabo (IV. 5, 2) who knows of no export of tin from Britain. 
 
 3. See Elton, Origins of English History, Ch. I. 
 
 4. Aristotle, De Mundo 3. 
 
 5. Polyb. III. 57. The Cassiterides of Hdt. (III. 115), Diod. Sic. (V. 38), 
 Pliny, Strabo, Mela, &c., are of course no longer identified with Britain or the 
 Scilly Islands. They lay off the coast uf Spain. 
 
 6 Cp. Nouveau Diet, de Geographic Universelle s. v. Angleterre. 
 
 7. Cp. Rhys, Celtic Britain, Ch. i. 
 
 8. Caes. B. G. II. 4. 7- Cp. V. i2. 
 
 g. Strabo II, 5, 8. Caesar (III. 8) says of the Veneti that they are far in ad- 
 vance of the other Gauls in navigation, and are wont to sail to Britain. That is, 
 it was an unusual achievement to sail to Britain.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 7 
 
 Caesar called to give him information, could tell him 
 nothing as to the size of the island, the numbers and 
 character of its inhabitants or the best harbors.' The 
 Britons themselves seem to have been by no means a 
 seafaring people. They simply received the foreign 
 traders on their shores and took their copper, their 
 manufactured wares, weapons, pottery and trinkets2 jn 
 exchange for British tin or furs. The help therefore 
 which Britons are said3 to have given to the Veneti and 
 other Gallic tribes in their struggles with Caesar must 
 be regarded as quite mythical. The only way in 
 which the insular Celts could show sympathy with their 
 continental brethren was to receive hospitably a few 
 refugees from Gaul, which passive assistance they seem 
 to have actually rendered.4 The Germans over the 
 Rhine stood guilty before Caesar of the same mis- 
 demeanor, in a far higher degree. 5 The isolation of 
 Britain appears from the statements of all the earliest 
 writers about it. The Pseudo-Aristotle speaks of 
 Britain as beyond the Celts. Strabo makes a sharp 
 distinction between Keltike and Brettanike.6 He also 
 contrasts the Britons with the Keltoi more than once, 
 though he has learnt from Caesar that they are much 
 like the Keltoi. 7 No one knew in those days that the 
 Britons were themselves Celts, speaking the language 
 of the Celts. The utter ignorance of the Gauls about 
 Britain and the English Channel is shown finally by the 
 fact that Caesar found no pilots acquainted with the 
 peculiar nature of the tides and the varying course of 
 
 1. B. G. IV. 20. The argument that the merchants refused to tell Caesar 
 what they knew is as worthless as the assumptions made about the concealment 
 of the Cornish tin trade from the Romans. 
 
 2. Caes. V. 12. Diodor. Sic. V. 21, 22. 
 
 3. Caes. IV. 20 ; Ill.g. 
 
 4. Caes. II. 14. 
 
 5. Caes. IV. 16; v. 2. 
 
 6. Strabo, IV. 4 and 5. 
 
 7. Strabo IV. 5. 1-3.
 
 8 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the currents in the channel, who could have conducted 
 his fleet with accuracy and expedition to the British 
 shore. As it was, Caesar lost time and incurred great 
 dangers in both expeditions owing to lack of informa- 
 tion about these things. i 
 
 It has been assumed by many, /r^/, that Caesar was 
 deeply impressed, not only by a close intercourse and 
 the racial ties between Britons and Gauls, but also by 
 the common religious feeling of insular and continental 
 Celts, connected with a Druidic system which had its 
 headquarters in Britain ; and, secojidly, that the Gauls 
 could not have been reconciled to Roman rule while 
 their cousins and co-religionists in Britain remained 
 free. 2 But it has just been shown that the Britons had 
 scarcely any intercourse with the mainland. From this 
 isolation alone it would seem almost certain that there 
 was no community of religious feeling between them 
 and the Gauls. Caesar was informed that the Druidic 
 theology and ritual which he found in Gaul had origin- 
 ated in Britain. He says that young Gauls wishing to 
 become fully equipped Druids went there to study at 
 the headquarters or university of the order.3 But it is 
 impossible to believe that Caesar was not misinformed 
 in this, as he was about certain features of the Hercyn- 
 ian Forest, and about the marriage customs among the 
 Britons. Probably the Gallic Druids themselves were 
 responsible for Caesar's error. Likemany other philo- 
 sophies, that of the Druids was given out by its pro- 
 fessors to have come from beyond the seas, in order to 
 surround it with greater sanctity.4 The British Isles 
 
 1. Caes. IV. 23, 29 ; V. 8. Cp. Appiaii B. C. II. 150 on the isolation of Brit- 
 ain. See Freeman's Historical Essays. Fourth Series— No. 9, "Alter Orbis." 
 
 2. Monimsen, Provinces of the Roman Empire, I. pp. 188-189. Merivale 
 Vols. I and VI. Huebner, Romische Herrschaft in Westeiiropa. p. 9. 
 
 3. B. G. VI. 13. 
 
 4. Cp. Animianus XV. 9. 4, where part of the Gauls are said by the Druids 
 to have come from ' extimis insulis." Cp. also the " White Island " of the 
 Brahmins.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 9 
 
 which were almost fabulous before Caesar's time, and 
 which seem to have been the Druidic Islands of the 
 Blest,! were naturally seized upon as the sacred source 
 of the science of the Druids. Or possibly the island to 
 which would-be Druids went to study was somewhere 
 close to the Gallic coast, like the one referred to by 
 Strabo,2 but confused by Caesar with Britain. 3 There 
 is no ground whatever for supposing that either national 
 or religious ties subsisted to unite the people of Britain 
 and Gaul in resistance to the Romans. As for Caesar's 
 own impressions, he evidently troubled himself little 
 about any religious connection between Britons and 
 Gauls, or he would have made more than the passing 
 allusion to it which appears merely in the course of his 
 short account of Druidism,4 and quite apart from con- 
 siderations of foreign policy. Surely he would have 
 noticed this religious union in his description of the 
 people, had it existed.5 
 
 The story of the young men traveling to Britain — 
 or Anglesey, as some will have it — in pursuit of truth 
 and knowledge, is a very pretty one, but it must be 
 classed with cither fairy tales which sprang up in 
 antiquity about the unknown mysterious gem of the 
 ocean at the world's western edge. Some believed 
 that Britain was a land where the precious electrum 
 could be obtained.6 Stories were rife about treasures 
 of gold and pearls unappreciated by British sav- 
 ages.7 Caesar and others credited the Britons as well 
 as other nations of the far north with a community of 
 
 1. Cp. Pelloutier, Histuiie des Celtes II. 1S5-187. 
 
 2. Strabo IV. 4, 6. 
 
 3. The story quoted with approval by Strabo 1. c. from Arteniidorus of an 
 island near Britain in which certain magic rites were celebrated may also be 
 compared. 
 
 4. B. G. VI. 13. 
 
 5. For further discussion of " British Druidism " see Chapter III. 
 
 6. Pliny XXXVII. II. 
 
 7. Dio XXXIX. 53.
 
 10 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 wives little higher than bestial. i Strabo charges the 
 Hibernians with cannibalism. 2 
 
 These ancient fables about Britain yield only to the 
 more elaborate inventions of modern times. Some 
 have traced the philosophy of the Brahmins to the 
 "White Island" of the west — Britain of course. 
 Myfyr Morganwg says, " That the Druids of Britain 
 were Brahmins is beyond the least shadow of a 
 doubt. "3 The inspired vision of others sees the ten 
 lost tribes of Israel wandering off to Britain, where at 
 last forsooth they stay their steps perforce. Succes- 
 sors of the Hebrew Prophet allude slyly to Britain as 
 the stone that fell from the mountain and filled the 
 whole earth. While the vision of the ancients was 
 somewhat restricted as to geographical sweep, they 
 nevertheless succeeded in turning out romances as un- 
 worthy of belief as any of these modern hariolations.4 
 
 When, therefore, Caesar determined late in the 
 summer of 55 B. C. to make a descent upon Britain, it 
 was not because any close connection between Britons 
 and Gauls led him to believe that for the complete 
 pacification of Gaul the conquest of Britain was neces- 
 sary. 5 Nor is there reason to suppose that he was 
 following out any definite plan for the subjugation and 
 annexation to Rome of the Celtic race as a whole. 
 Only a modern philologist or ethnologist could enter- 
 tain such a fancy. Certainly the aid which Caesar 
 alleges to have come to the Gauls from Britain is not 
 worth considering. It is put forward only as a pretext, 
 and may be a part of Caesar's supposed self-justification. 
 
 I. Caes. v. 14. 
 I. Strabo IV. 5, 4. 
 
 3. Quoted by Bonwick, Irish Druids, p. 8. 
 
 4. For still more childish inventions see Gutschiiiid, Kleine Schriften Vol. 
 II. p. 606, and Vine, Caesar in Kent, ch. I. and II. 
 
 5. Cp. Froude, Caesar pp. 296-298.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 1 1 
 
 The first real motive of Caesar's sudden determin- 
 ation to invade Britain was the same as that which led 
 him to cross the Rhine. He intended to show the hap- 
 less barbarians that neither the swift, wide river, nor the 
 ocean itself could stop the ponderous, certain progress 
 of the Roman legion. ^ 
 
 As Rome had crossed the Mediterranean Sea, so 
 she could as easily draw Germany and Britain within 
 the sphere of her dominion. Like other Romans of his 
 day, Caesar had no clear idea of an ultimate hard and 
 fast limit to the advance of the legions and the fasces 
 of the magistrate. 2 Not only did the safety of Italy 
 and the civilized world demand at least a universal 
 recognition of the hegemony of Rome, but commercial 
 interests made the middle class of Roman citizens eager 
 for the opening up of new regions for their enterprise. 
 While the conservative senatorial party was for many 
 reasons inclined to go easy in the matter of foreign 
 conquest,3 the lower classes were all for a forward 
 policy. Caesar and his successors, Augustus and 
 Tiberius Caesar, reversed the old senatorial system 
 which surrounded the limited sphere of actual Roman 
 administration by clusters of more or less dependent 
 states. They developed more rapidly the Roman and 
 Liberal idea that distinctions of patricians and plebeians, 
 Roman and Latin rights, Italy, the provinces, free and 
 federated states should be gradually levelled, and Rome 
 herself should grow out until conterminous with the 
 limits of her influence.4 Gaul was to be an organized 
 Roman province, governed by Roman magistrates, and 
 not a collection of more or less free states recognizing 
 Rome's supremacy. But for the consolidation of 
 
 1. Cp. Josephus B. J. VI. 6. 
 
 2. Vergil VI. 794, 851-853. Dio Cassius XLIV. 43. ■ 
 
 3. Cp. Jung, Rom. Landsch. p. 198. 
 
 4. Schiller I § 34, etc. Mommsen, Hist. IV. 65^ #■. See Suetoii. Caesar 28, 
 cited by Arnold, Later Roman Commonwealth, p. 225.
 
 12 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Roman authority in Gaul, it was first of all necessary 
 for Caesar to cut off from its peoples all hope of succor 
 from outside. I The natural limits of the new province 
 were clearly the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean Sea, the 
 Alps, the Rhine, the English Channel and the 
 Ocean. 2 Spain was already under Roman government. 
 The Gauls could look for no help in that quarter. Only 
 on the north and east could the spectacle of tribes still 
 untamed to the Roman yoke meet their eyes. 3 And 
 more than that, the German tribes across the Rhine 
 were traditionally accustomed, when pressed for room, 
 to look to the fertile plains of Gaul as their natural 
 prey.4 To prevent, therefore, German sympathy and 
 aid from stiffening the resistance of Gaul, to put a stop 
 to the German tendency to cross the Rhine into Roman 
 territory ,5 and probably also, in accordance with the 
 new principle of grradually extending Rome's adminis- 
 tration over the whole domain of her suzerainty and for 
 military ends as vvell,6 to prepare tho way for a Roman 
 province in Germany with the territory of the Ubii as 
 its nucleus, Caesar crossed the Rhine twice (55 and 53 
 B. C.) in force, frightened the Suevi into their forest 
 fastnesses, and took hostages from the Ubii. Similarly, 
 to cut off any forlorn hope that his enemies might 
 entertain of a refuge in Britain, Caesar crossed the 
 straits twice, took hostages and tribute from the 
 Britons, and enrolled many of their tribes, like the 
 Ubii, under the suzerainty of Rome. 
 
 The mingling of commercial considerations with 
 the more strictly political objects is clear from the large 
 
 1. Cp. Kanke, Weltgescli. II. 251. 
 
 2. B. G. I. I. 
 
 3. Cp. Tac. Agric. 24 end, of the Britons. 
 
 4. Caes. I.3i#. ; IV. I. 
 
 5. Caes. IV. 16.— Caesar evidently recognizes the Rhine as the boundary of 
 Gaul, but not of the Empire, potentially, 
 
 6. See above p. i and also ch. IV.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 1 3 
 
 number of private vessels that accompanied Caesar's 
 armada in 54 B. C.i Great things were expected of the 
 British Eldorado. Wild rumors of its wealth, its 
 pearls,2 and gold and silver, lead and tin, stirred the 
 minds of all classes. 3 Thousands of Roman speculators 
 and promoters were ready to spring upon these mineral 
 treasures as soon as the legions should open up the 
 country. 4 The size of Britain had been greatly exager- 
 ated from the days of Pytheas of Massilia. One writer 
 even declared, '' The world of the Britons is as large as 
 our own. "5 Roman citizens awaited the result of 
 Caesar's venture with excitement. 6 The irresistible 
 enchantment of the unknown drew Caesar on to dispel 
 the mists that hid the cliffs of the expected new world 
 from the eye of civilization. If anticipations had been 
 realized, Caesar would probably not have let Britain go. 
 It would have been quickly converted into a Roman 
 province and developed in the interests of Roman 
 capital and trade. 7 
 
 Many other motives combined to recommend the 
 British expedition to Caesar. His political position was 
 just at this time extremely precarious. 8 A successful 
 descent upon the unknown distant island, victories 
 wrapt in a halo of mystery were sure to strengthen his 
 popularit}/ with the masses at Rome. It has been said 
 that in this attempt to rival Alexander the Great's 
 invasion of India, Caesar ran a tremendous risk of 
 losing his hold on the new conquests which he left 
 behind him. But this is hardly true. The recent 
 
 1. Caes. v. 8. Though the well-infoinied were becoming aware of Britain's 
 poverty in precious metals (See Cic. ad Att. IV. 16). 
 
 2. Plin. H. N. IX. 57. Sueton. Caes. 47. 
 
 3. Dio XXXIX. 53. Cic. ad Fani. VII. 7, etc. 
 
 4. Cp. Diodor. Sic. V. 36 on the Spanish mines. 
 
 5. Josephus B. J. II. 16. Cp. Velleius II. 46 " alterum paene orbem." 
 
 6. Cic. ad Fam. VII. 6 ; ad Q. F. II. 16. 
 
 7. Not at all as being a Celtic people. 
 
 8. Appian De R. G. 18.
 
 14 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 cumulative disasters that had befallen the Gauls, and 
 the awful destruction of the Usipetes and Tencteri, had 
 for the time paralyzed even the courageous spirit of the 
 Gauls. I This is shown by the sudden breakdown of the 
 Morini, who humbly submitted to their conqueror in 
 the summer of 55.2 Caesar left plenty of force under 
 his able lieutenant, Labienus, to prevent disturbances 
 on the continent. 
 
 But more than even the statesman and politician is 
 shown in Caesar's expedition to Britain. His own 
 account of his experiences in the island, of its geogra- 
 phy, inhabitants, climate and productions, reveals the 
 same adventurous spirit and cultured desire of know- 
 ledge for its own sake that in our time led Baker to the 
 sources of the Nile. The contemporaries of Columbus 
 scarcely outdid the ecstasies of Cicero over the discov- 
 ery of Britain. 3 
 
 By appearing among the Britons, Caesar was not 
 only securing his conquests in Gaul, and satisfying a 
 natural curiosity about an unknown land from which 
 huge spoils were expected, but he pointed out4 and 
 smoothed the way for the subsequent conversion of 
 Britain into a Roman province, Whether Caesar him- 
 self, after his final return from Britain intended this 
 result is very doubtful. To judge from the policy of 
 Augustus, it would seem that the political aim which 
 Caesar bequeathed to his heir was rather the consolida- 
 tion of Roman administration tending towards uniform- 
 ity throughout the empire, the only actual extension 
 projected being in the direction of the River Elbe. 
 After his two campaigns in Britain, Caesar was appar- 
 ently convinced that this island would be a useless and 
 
 1. Cp. Froude, Caesar p. 290. 
 
 2. Caes. IV. 22. 
 
 3. Cic. ad Q. F. II. 16. Cp. Caesar himself quoted by Eumenius, Paneg. 
 Constant. Caes. II. 
 
 4. Tac. Agric. 13.
 
 BRITAIN AND THE ROMAN WORLD. 1 5 
 
 costly acquisition for Rome in any event, and certainly 
 not to be thought of for the present. It is true that 
 here, as in Gaul, a fresh, unworked field invited Roman 
 energy, capital and institutions. The British promised 
 splendid material for the standing army of the empire. 
 But Germany, with equal qualifications, lay nearer at 
 hand, and besides fitted better into the empire as a 
 whole, I which required an advance of its outposts to 
 the Elbe, in order to shield Italy on the north from 
 possible invasion and to shorten and simplify the long 
 line of defences against barbarism. The British expe- 
 ditions of Caesar therefore, undertaken partly in order 
 to secure the Roman authority in Gaul and to 
 strengthen Caesar's power and popularity, partly as a 
 voyage of discovery and reconnoitre with a view to 
 conquest if profitable, certainly not from a conviction 
 of the necessity of adding Britain to the empire in any 
 event, in view of racial and religious considerations, 2 
 resulted in a degree of disappointment, and for nearly a 
 hundred years afterwards no serious thought occurred 
 to any Roman emperor of subduing Britain to his sway. 
 
 1. Cp. Strabo II. 5. 8. He says Britain would be no strategic gain to the 
 empire. 
 
 2. Cp. Peter, p. 390 ; Floras Epit. 45. Dio XLI. 32 and XLIV. 43 are no 
 proof that Caesar intended to complete the conquest of Britain. These are 
 only speeches. Cp. Dio XL. 4.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Caesar's British expeditions. 
 
 After his flying trip into Germany in the summer 
 of 55 B. C, Caesar turned northward, and nothing loth 
 to find fresh employment for his troops,i entered the 
 territory of the Morini, who inhabited that part of the 
 coast opposite Dover, with the intention of extending 
 Roman influence to the large island across the 
 channel. 2 As the season was far spent, he proposed 
 simply to go there with a moderate force and take 
 note of the inhabitants and geography of the country, 
 and whether it would be worth subjugating. He could 
 find out nothing from traders. 3 
 
 While he made his preparations for the expedition, 
 Caesar sent off C. Volusenus with a battleship to 
 reconnoitre the British coast, pick out a suitable landing- 
 place and learn everything he could. But several British 
 tribes warned of Caesar's designs, partly by the 
 approach of Volusenus, partly by traders and Gallic 
 refugees, and advised of the irresistible might of Roman 
 arms,4 sent ambassadors to Caesar, promising hostages 
 and submission to Roman authority. Caesar received 
 them graciously, and sent back'with them one Commius, 
 a Gaul of prominence whom he had made king of the 
 Atrebates.5 Commius' orders were to visit the tribes, 
 proselytize for Rome and proclaim Caesar's speedy 
 
 1. Cp. Merivale i. 481. 
 
 2. B. G. IV. 21. 
 
 3. B. G. IV. 20. 
 
 4. Dio XXXIX. 51. 
 
 5. B. G. IV. 21— " cuius auctoritas in his regionibus niagni habebatur." 
 Certainly "his regionibus" refers to northern Gaul, not to Britain. Or else 
 Commius could have given Caesar information about Britain.
 
 CAESAR'S BRITISH EXPEDITIONS. IJ 
 
 coming. Volusenus, without daring to land in Britain, 
 soon returned, and reported what little he had seen of 
 the coast. I 
 
 Shortly before he sailed Caesar received a sure proof 
 of how his startling victories over the Germans had cowed 
 the Gallic mind. The submission of the yet unconquered 
 Morini greatly assisted theRoman general's arrangements. 
 Finally, when all was ready, Caesar left the bulk of his 
 army under his legates, Sabinus and Cotta, to attend to 
 the refractory Menapii as well as those cantons of the 
 Morini which had not yet submitted, and under Sulpi- 
 cius Rufus a guard for Portus Itius from which he 
 sailed. 2 Taking with him two legions, the seventh and 
 tenth, without impedimenta,3 Caesar embarked about 
 the end of August4 upon something more than eighty 
 vessels. The cavalry he ordered to proceed to another 
 port eight miles north of Portus Itius, where were 
 seventeen vessels which had been unable to join the 
 main fleet, and follow him without delay .5 
 
 Though the identification of Caesar's Portus Itius 
 with Gesoriacum or Boulogne has been much disputed, 
 it seems nevertheless to be fairly certain.^ The argu- 
 ment of Von Goeler against Boulogne, that the passage 
 thence was not the shortest to Britain, amounts to noth- 
 ing. Caesar does not say that he went b}^ the shortest 
 route. While he states that from the territories of the 
 Morini " erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus," he 
 claims for the passage from Portus Itius only that it 
 
 1. B. G. IV. 21. 
 
 2. IV. 22. cp. v. 2 and Strabo IV. 5. i ; see Ridgeway in Jonrn. of Phi!. 
 XIX. p- 140, and Mommsen Hist. IV. 312 Note. 
 
 3. IV. 30. 
 
 4. See Goeler, Caesars Gallischer Krieg p. i65- 
 5- IV. 23. 
 
 6. Desjardins: Geographie de la Gaule romaine, vol. I. pp. 348/, 37i .A 
 Peskett : Joiirn. of Phil. XX. igi#. Bursian : Jahresbericht LXIV. (1890), p. 
 137. Napoleon III. Histoire de Jules Cesar, 11. pp. 163-169.
 
 1 8 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 was " commodissimus."! But it was Gesoriacum which 
 proved a hundred years later " commodissimum " for the 
 embarcation of Plautius' armament. 2 It always re- 
 mained the best starting-point for an invasion of 
 England from the continent. Napoleon assembled his 
 flotilla at Boulogne in 1804. From Gesoriacum, Pliny 
 measured the distance between Britain and Gaul, 3 
 Moreover, Boulogne is the only harbor in the ancient 
 territory of the Morini, eight miles north of which is 
 another harbor from which Caesar's cavalry could have 
 sailed. Ambleteuse suits exactly .4 The identification 
 by Guest and Ridgeway of Wissant as the Portus Itius 
 is supported by no convincing argument. Their inter- 
 pretation of Kai in Strabo IV. 5. i (Kai to Ition) as 
 implying " as well as the well known Gesoriacum," is 
 not at all plausible. Kai merely adds one more starting- 
 point to the four already mentioned by Strabo. Von 
 Goeler's adoption of Calais5 can not meet with favor, 
 when it is remembered that Caesar sailed from Portus 
 Itius in 55 B. C. as well as in the second expedition of 
 the following year. 
 
 No doubt Volusenus was with Caesar, directing the 
 course of the fleet. When on arriving below the cliffs 
 of Britain the Romans descried the natives above, 
 armed and making demonstrations which did not argue 
 for the success of Commius' mission, Caesar laid before 
 a council of war the information which Volusenus had 
 been able 'to furnish and his own plan, which was to 
 sail along to a flat, open beach where a landing would 
 be less exposed to the missiles of the enemy .6 Such a 
 
 1. B. G. IV. 21; v. 2. 
 
 2. Sueton. Claudius 17. Huebner R. H. W. p. 17. 
 
 3. H. N. IV. 30, cp. Mela III. 2. 
 
 4. Napoleon, Cesar II. 166. 
 
 5. Page 128. 
 
 6. B. G. IV. 23.
 
 Caesar's British expeditions. 19 
 
 place was soon found, near Romney, west of Hythe. i 
 Here, in spite of great difficulties and a spirited resist- 
 ance by the Britons, the Romans effected a landing, 
 and once they had formed up on shore, easily routed 
 the enemy. But as Caesar's cavalry had not been able 
 to hold their course after him, the Romans being with- 
 out horse could not pursue the Britons and complete 
 their victory. 2 
 
 But the Britons having now perceived with their own 
 eyes that the tales of Roman invincibility which had 
 reached them were only too true, immediately repented 
 of their hostile attitude. As shortly before they had 
 sent ambassadors to Caesar in Gaul, probably as an 
 attempt to conciliate him and prevent his expedition to 
 Britain, so now again they hastened to make their 
 peace with him and agreed to submit to his author- 
 ity. 3 Commius, who had been put in irons as the result 
 of a popular revulsion of feeling against the overween- 
 ing Roman who had sent him to announce his intention 
 of immediately going in sovereign power to Britain, 
 returned to Caesar with the new embassy of peace. 4 
 Caesar pardoned the tribes for breaking the promises 
 made by their former embassy, but commanded them 
 to deliver a number of hostages to him, disband their 
 forces and go back to their homes. Part of the host- 
 ages were immediately handed over, while the chiefs 
 
 1. Caesar states the distance between Boulogne and his landing place in 
 Britain to be about thirty miles (E.G. V. 2). Romney Marsh is the only place 
 of disembarcation that satisfies the requirement of distance and the other condi- 
 tions of tide and topography that appear in B. G. IV. 23 and V. 8-9. Here 
 too was later Portus Lemanae, from which a Roman road ran to London. Here 
 the Claudian armament landed in 43 A. D. (seech. V). cp. also Caes. B. G. 
 v. II. where he says the Thames is eighty miles from the sea, that is from 
 Romney. See Lewin's "Caesar's Invasions of Britain" ; Maiden in Journ. of 
 Phil. XVII. 163-178, and XIX. 193-199. Their position on this point was not 
 shaken by Ridgeway, J. of P. XIX. 
 
 2. B. G. IV. 26. 3. B. G. IV. 27. I. 
 
 4. B. G. IV. 27. 2-4. cp. Rhys, Celtic Britain p. 62.
 
 20 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 began to come from all quarters and commend them- 
 selves to Caesar. I 
 
 But two unforeseen mishaps soon befel the Romans, 
 which restored confidence to the Britons and placed the 
 Romans in great danger. The eighteen vessels with the 
 cavalry on board were borne down the channel past the 
 camp at Romney by a furious storm, and finally all 
 returned to the continent. This same storm combined 
 with the spring tide, a new thing to the Romans, to 
 wreck many of Caesar's vessels on the beach at Romney. 
 The Roman army was thrown almost into a panic, be- 
 cause they saw their means of retreat to the continent 
 destroyed and had brought no provisions for a long 
 stay in Britain. 2 
 
 ' Seeing that the British chiefs encouraged by these 
 things were concocting a conspiracy against him, 
 Caesar resolved to forestall them by first breaking the 
 peace himself. Accordingly, he sent part of his men 
 into the fields of ripe grain to seize provision for the 
 camp, while the rest kept watch over the intrenchments 
 and repaired most of the damaged ships with materials 
 from twelve which were hopelessly ruined.3 Mean- 
 while the British forces gathered and waiting for a 
 good opportunity, fell upon the seventh legion one day 
 as it was engaged in reaping grain. A hot conflict 
 ensued, in which the Romans succeeded in beating off 
 their assailants only after the timely arrival of Caesar 
 with reinforcements from the camp. They then made 
 good their retrcc^t to the camp, being without cavalry 
 with which to follow up their advantage.4 
 
 The Britons now perceived that the Romans with- 
 out cavalry and unfamiliar with the strange style of 
 fighting which they had to face, were not eager to 
 resume the offensive. 5 Elated at the hesitation and 
 
 I. IV. 27. 5-7. 2. IV. 28-30. 3. B. G. IV. 31. 4. IV. 34. 1-2. 
 
 5. IV. 34- 2.
 
 CAESAR'S BRITISH EXPEDITIONS. 21 
 
 helplessness of their enemy, the chieftains prepared for 
 a grand concerted attack on the Roman camp. They 
 hoped to annihilate this foreign force and so deter 
 the masters of the continent from any future invasion 
 of their island. i Foot and horse assembled from all 
 quarters. The attack was made on the Roman camp, 
 but resulted in a failure. The Britons could not long 
 withstand the onset of the Roman infantry. While 
 they could not turn their victory to account by a pursuit, 
 the legions nevertheless ravaged some of the country 
 roundabout on foot, and then returned to their camp by 
 the shore. 2 
 
 Again the Britons resorted to negotiations. Their 
 peace emissaries were welcome enough to Caesar, who 
 was glad of any excuse to retire from his difficult posi- 
 tion unmolested. He therefore accepted their offers of 
 peace, but being anxious to get back to Gaul without 
 delay, he ordered the hostages that he demanded, twice 
 as many as before, to be sent to him on the continent. 
 The same night, after a stay of three weeks in Britain, 
 he embarked his men and sailed for the coast of Gaul, 
 where all the vessels arrived in safety. 3 
 
 In this first expedition the Romans added little to^ 
 their military prestige. A force without cavalry and , 
 impedimenta was not likely to impress the barbarians ' 
 very deeply. If the cavalry had not failed him, Caesar 
 would have made a good showing against the Britons, 
 in spite of the shortness of time at his disposal.4 As it 
 was, he did not penetrate the country beyond the 
 coast, but remained the whole three weeks close to his 
 camp.5 Still, the real objects of this tentative expedi-'' 
 tion were in the main attained. Caesar learnt what sort,^ 
 of vessels was required for his purposes, and ascertained 
 
 I. IV. 34- S ; IV. 30. 2. 2. IV. 35. 3. IV. 36. 
 
 4. Cp. the rapidity of his movements in the second campaign, V. i^ff. 
 
 5. Cp. v. 9. 8, loci naturam ignorabat. The " place " was near the shore.
 
 22 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the nature of the landing-place, the British style of 
 warfare and something of their character. 
 
 During the winter Caesar's legates saw to the 
 building of a great fleet for a second invasion of 
 Britain. Caesar had intend(id two expeditions from the 
 beginning, the first being merely to prepare the way for 
 the second. I He was, moreover, not at all satisfied 
 with his firs! expedition, which not only left a poor 
 impression upon the islanders and so failed of its 
 political object, but was likely to be ridiculed by his 
 enemies at Rome, as it was. 2 His reputation as a gen- 
 eral needed to be vindicated. Besides nothing had yet 
 been established as to the resources and geography of 
 Britain. This discovery of a " new world," as Caesar 
 himself called it, 3 served only to stimulate Roman 
 curiosity. Caesar's official letter to the senate contain- 
 ing a detailed report of his actions, called forth a decree 
 for a twenty days' public thanksgiving to the gods. 4 
 Dio says, with some exaggeration, that the people at 
 home had now seen Caesar actually reach lands which 
 were not even heard of before, and were so sanguine as 
 to think already their own what existed as yet only in 
 their hopes.5 Everybody was talking about Britain, 
 and not only its supposed wealth,6 but the peculiar 
 character of its people, their war-paint and their war- 
 chariots were common topics of discussion. 7 Private 
 enterprise fitted out more than one hundred vessels 
 which accompanied Caesar's fleet in his second expedi- 
 tion, and would have been only the advance guard of 
 many more had Britain proved worth exploiting.8 
 
 By the summer of 54 B. C. about six hundred 
 
 I. IV. 20. 2. 2. Lucan II. 572. 
 
 3. Eumen. Paneg. Constant. Caes. ch. XI. 
 
 4. B. G. IV. 38- 5- XXXIX. 53- 
 
 6. Cic. ad Fam. VII. 7. 7. Cic. ad Fam. VII. 6. 
 
 8. B. G. V. 2. Caesar had already his doubts about British wealth (cp. Cic. 
 ad Att. IV. 16).
 
 Caesar's British expeditions. 23 
 
 new vessels, built on the lines dictated to Caesar by the 
 previous year's experience, were ready. These and 
 twenty-eight battleships Caesar ordered to rendezvous 
 at Portus Itius. All arrived except sixty, which were 
 prevented by contrary winds. Four thousand Gallic 
 cavalry and the leading men of all the states also came 
 to Portus Itius. This time Caesar intended to make 
 sure of quiet in Gaul during his absence by carrying 
 along with him as hostages all the state leaders except 
 a very few whose loyalty he could trust. i While his 
 first expedition had been confessedly only a reconnoitre 
 of a few weeks, this second might result in the perman- 
 ent occupation of territories in Britain. Therefore 
 Caesar took with him a far stronger force than before, 
 and impedimenta and stores suitable for a prolonged 
 stay. 2 He was prepared if necessary to remain in 
 Britain during the winter. 3 
 
 Only two of all the British tribes that had engaged 
 to send hostages to Caesar in Gaul kept their prom- 
 ise.4 But more useful than hostages was the arrival of 
 young Mandubracius, the son of the ex-king of the 
 Trinovantes, one of the strongest tribes in south-east 
 Britain, taking refuge with Caesar from the pursuit of 
 Cassivelaunus, who had dethroned and murdered his 
 father. Mandubracius went along with Caesar to 
 Britain eager to be revenged on Cassivelaunus with 
 Roman help. 5 By restoring him to his rightful kingdom 
 and upholding the cause of the Trinovantes against 
 the encroachments of the Catuelauni, of whom Cassi- 
 velaunus seems to have been king,6 Caesar saw 
 
 1. v. 5. 
 
 2. The number of the vessels shows that the impedimenta must have been 
 very considerable. 
 
 3. B. G. v. 8. Labieno relicto ut portus tueretur et re frumentariae provi- 
 deret, quaeque in Gallia gererentur cognosceret consiliumque pro tempore et 
 pro re caperet. Cp. V. 22. 4 ; Cic. ad Q. F. III. 3. 4. 
 
 4- IV. 38. 5. v. 20. 
 
 6. Rhys, Celtic Britain, p. 15.
 
 24 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 that he would obtain a basis for Roman donriinion 
 in Britain like the Ubii in Germany and the Haedui 
 in Gaul. 
 
 Having completed all his arrangements, Caesar left 
 Labienus in command of three legions and two thous- 
 and cavalry, with plenary powers to direct Gallic affairs 
 during his absence, and himself took five legions with 
 two thousand cavalry. i He sailed at midnight, about 
 the 6th of July, 2 with more than eight hundred vessels 
 altogether, of which over one hundred were private 
 outfits. When the Britons saw them coming, they fled 
 in terror into the woods, afraid to offer any resistance 
 to such a huge armament. 3 Caesar had therefore no 
 trouble this time in landing his troops and pitching a 
 great camp on a favorable site. 4 
 
 Meanwhile the British forces retreated northward 
 about twelve miles from the sea, where they made a 
 stand in a very strong position. But the Romans 
 easily stormed their log fortress and chased them into 
 the woods beyond. Further pursuit however was 
 delayed for ten days, because of a storm which made 
 havoc among the vessels on the beach. 5 But after the 
 fleet had been repaired by strenuous exertions, at a loss 
 of forty vessels, and orders had been sent to Labienus 
 for more ships, as many as he could furnish, Caesar 
 again gave the word to advance.6 
 
 In the preceding summer the Romans had but 
 touched the shore of Britain and met probably none 
 but the Belgian and Cantian tribes. 7 This year Caesar 
 had formed a definite plan of operations. His aim was 
 
 1. v. 8. 
 
 2. Real time July 6th, i. e. July 30th of pre-Julian calendar. See Vogel i*^ 
 Jahibb. fur classische Philol. (1890), p. 276. 
 
 3. B. G. v. 8. 
 
 4. Dio, XL. 1.3, correctly infers from Caes. V. 8. 3 that Caesar landed in the 
 same place as in 55 B. C. 
 
 5. Caes. V. 10 cp. Cic. ad Q. F. III. i. 13. 
 
 6. B. G. V. II. 7. See next chapter.
 
 CAESAR'S BRITISH EXPEDITIONS. 25 
 
 to penetrate straightway to the territories of the 
 Trinovantes in Essex county, and there estabHsh his 
 base of operations with the support of Mandubracius 
 and his people. The Britons made use of Caesar's 
 enforced delay to spread the alarm in all directions and 
 rally their countrymen in a common cause against the 
 foreign invader. Cassivelaunus, now the most power- 
 ful prince in Britain, perfectly aware of Caesar's designs 
 against him, took the command of the national 
 army. I Fighting went on for a few days in Kent. But 
 though the Britons showed great cunning and a remark- 
 able quickness to take advantage of the embarrassment 
 of their enemy in a difficult and unknown country, and 
 even won some successes in infantry engagements, 2 
 they were as chaff before the wind in a close encounter 
 with their disciplined opponents. After a severe 
 reverse the native army melted away, and Cassivel- 
 aunus could not again succeed in mustering a united 
 opposition to Caesar's movements. 3 The Romans now 
 advanced with ease to the Thames, which they crossed 
 about August 6th,4 probably at Coway Stakes near 
 Kingston. Led by Mandubracius, he pushed on 
 through a wooded district, harassed on all sides by the 
 guerrilla tactics of Cassivelaunus, who had now ascer- 
 tained the folly of attempting to meet his enemy in the 
 open, towards the Trinovantes. He had not long to 
 wait before their ambassadors came to meet him and 
 offer obedience to Rome if only he would free them 
 from the yoke of their old enemies, the Catuelauni, and 
 restore to them Mandubracius. 5 
 
 Caesar, complying with their request, installed 
 Mandubracius and ordered forty hostages and corn 
 
 1. B. G. V. II. 9. 
 
 2. Dio XL. 3 cp. Tac. Agr. 12, in pedite robur. 
 
 3. B. G. V. 17. 5- 
 
 4. See Vogel 1. c. pp. 280, 2S7. He cites Cic. ad Q. F. III. i. 25. 
 
 5. B. G. V. 20.
 
 26 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 for his army. These commands being fulfilled with 
 alacrity, he proceeded to treat the Trinovantes as 
 friends of the Roman People. i 
 
 When the other tribes, many of them tributary to 
 Cassivelaunus, saw that the Trinovantes were now 
 exempt from the ravages and plunder of the Romans, 
 and were also rid of Cassivelaunus and his tyranny, 
 they hastened likewise to surrender to Caesar. Stripped 
 of his allies and dependents, Cassivelaunus retreated to 
 his stronghold, probably near the modern St. Albans, 2 
 hidden away in the heart of swamps and thick woods. 
 But Caesar's new allies, eager to show themselves service- 
 able to him and to settle old scores with Cassivelaunus, 
 guided the Romans to the place which was not far 
 away. 3 The Catuelauni did not long abide the assault 
 of the legions, but abandoned the fort and their large 
 herds of cattle and fled into the forest. 4 
 
 Meanwhile as a last attempt to stave off surrender, 
 Cassivelaunus had sent orders to four Cantian kings to 
 mobilize their whole force, surprise the Roman camp 
 on the shore, and so by a sudden stroke destroy 
 Caesar's means of retreat from the island. But the 
 Roman guard easily repulsed the attack of the Cantians, 
 and Caesar's connections with the camp, for a time 
 imperilled by this movement in his rear, were re- 
 stored. 5 Hearing of this final failure and disheartened 
 by his losses, the ravages of his territory and, most of 
 all, the defection of his allies, Cassivelaunus confessed 
 himself beaten and begged for peace. 
 
 Caesar was glad to end the war so soon, for the 
 latest news from Gaul had decided him to winter on the 
 continent.6 Besides it is probable that he found it 
 
 1. B. G. V. 21. I. 
 
 2. See Arch. Journ. XXII. p. 229. 
 
 3- V. 21. 2. 4. v. 21. 5. 
 
 5. V. 22, cp. Vogel 1. c. pp. 280-2S2, 287. He cites Cic. ad Q. F. III. 3. i, etc. 
 
 •6. v. 22 ; Dio XL. 4; Stiabo IV. 5. 3.
 
 Caesar's British expeditions. 27 
 
 difficult to provision his armyJ But the chief reason 
 for Caesar's speedy withdrawal from Britain, one which 
 he wisely does not mention in the commentaries, was 
 beyond a doubt the conviction that there was nothing 
 to be g-ained from the island, and that it would never 
 pay for its conquest. Further fighting would only be 
 wasting his time and his men. Caesar therefore lost no 
 time in granting terms of peace. He ordered hostages 
 to be immediately delivered, fixed an annual tribute 
 which Britain should pay to Rome, and com- 
 manded Cassivelaunus not to disturb Mandubracius in 
 his kingdom. 2 
 
 The hostages received, Caesar marched back to the 
 sea about the beginning of September, with a great 
 number of captives but very little other booty. 3 It 
 was close upon the equinox when he shook the dust of 
 Britain from his feet, packed his last men into the boats 
 and scudded away from the rainy land of savages and 
 forests to the land of his adoption, where many men in 
 after times were to bear the name of Julius.4 And the 
 Britons who watched from the rocks and dunes the 
 eager haste of the departing conquerors and saw not a 
 soldier left behind to hold them to their allegiance,5 
 must soon have persuaded themselves that while they 
 minded their own affairs and did not interfere in any 
 way with Roman interests on the continent, it would be 
 long before Roman arms would again seek glory in 
 their poor, uninviting island. 
 
 The second expedition, while highly successful 
 from a military point of view, had proved that Britain 
 was no easy prize for the Roman capitalist. There 
 were no rich mines of gold or silver or diamonds or 
 fabled electrum in this wild northern land. Nor could 
 
 I. Cp. B. G. VI. 29. I. 2. V. 22. 
 
 3. B. G. v. 23. 2. Plutarch, Caes. 23. Cic. ad Att. 1\' . 18. See Vugel 1. c. 
 p. 284. 4- V. 23. 5. 5- 1^'^> >^I- 4-
 
 28 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the inhabitants appreciate the wares of civiHzation.i 
 The enterprising merchants who sent out over a hun- 
 dred vessels with Caesar must have been greatly dis- 
 appointed. At that time Britain's available wealth lay 
 not in mines but in cattle and furs, and this was not the 
 kind of wealth that Roman capital could turn to best 
 account. Slave labor on a great scale could never 
 become profitable so far north. Besides, the Italian 
 shuddered at the thought of British skies and chilly 
 swamps. 2 Caesar therefore made no effort to retain 
 possession of Britain. He had made his discoveries, 
 hardened his soldiers, increased his military fame and 
 demonstrated Roman invincibility to the uttermost 
 barbarians. 3 But beyond the glory of the expedition 
 and its scientific value, it was made evident that no 
 material gain was likely to accrue to the Roman empire 
 from an annexation of Britain.4 Perhaps Caesar after- 
 wards thought at times of a conquest of Britain in the 
 far future. There he saw good material for the imperial 
 armies, and great agricultural possibilities. But there 
 was plenty of good soldiers nearer the Rhine and as for 
 agriculture, the Roman " latifundia" would never find a 
 congenial home in Britain. 
 
 No danger threatened the peace of the empire 
 from Britain.5 But the north of Italy lay wide open to 
 the tribes of Germany. The principal object of 
 Augustus' foreign policy was to secure tranquillity for 
 Italy by pushing forward Roman rule north and east of 
 the Alps, and east of Gaul. Thus not only was a 
 bulwark raised against the northern tribes, but it was 
 attempted to shorten the frontier line of the empire by 
 
 1. William Vernon Harcourt says that " England has no great trade interests 
 at stake in countries where the people do not wear clothes." The same was true 
 of Rome. 
 
 2. Tac. Agr. 12 : coelum imbribus foedum. Cp. Germ. 2. 
 
 3. Cp. Froude, Caesar, p. 28«. 4- See Strabo II. 5. 8. 
 5. Strabo II. 5- «■ Tac. Ann. II. 24. 
 
 \
 
 CAESAR'S BRITISH EXPEDITIONS. 29 
 
 the annexation of Germany to the Elbe and, at the 
 same time, to remove farther from the imperial capital 
 the great masses of the standing army.i While this 
 important scheme was on the tapis, it is no wonder that 
 Britain was left to herself. 
 
 I. Schiller I. 214.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE BRITONS. 
 
 At the time of Caesar's invasion the British tribes 
 differed widely among themselves in physical aspect, 
 customs, language, religion and some little in political 
 organization.! The Gaelic tribes of Cornwall and 
 Devon, part of Wales, northern Scotland, and Ireland 
 were distinguished by red hair and a more ferocious 
 appearance from the yellow-haired Brythons who had 
 dispossessed them of most of England and southern 
 Scotland. 2 Having been the first to break off from the 
 Celtic stock on the continent, the Gaels or Goidels pre- 
 served in their island home the wild barbarism common 
 to the old Celts and the Germans. 3 On the continent 
 the Celts had made progress towards civilization, leav- 
 ing far behind them in some respects their Teutonic 
 neighbors. 4 But among the Gaels the old patriarchal 
 kings continued to hold sway.5 Their religious or 
 magic rites, paralleled in savage horrors only by the 
 Teutonic sacrifices to Woden and Thor, flourished down 
 to the time of Pliny the Elder.6 These people appear 
 to have had little or no knowledge of agriculture, no 
 coinage and scarcely any skill in manufacture.? 
 
 The civilization of the Brythonic tribes varied 
 according to the time of their departure from the 
 
 1. Tac. Agr. ii. Mela III. 51. Rhys, Celtic Britain ch. I. 
 
 2. Elton, Origins of Eng. Hist. p. 158. Tac. Agr. 24, says the Hibernians 
 differed little from the Britons — that is from the Gaelic Britons. Solinus and 
 other authors mention the ferocity of the Hibernians. 
 
 3. Herodian HI. 14. Dio LXXVI. 12. 
 
 4. Caes. VI. 12 ; VI. 24. 
 
 5. Diodor. Sic. V. 21. Tac. Agr. 24. cp. Tac. Germ. 7, for the Germans. 
 
 6. H. N. XXX. 4. 
 
 7. Mela III. 51. Caes. V. 14. Strabo IV. 5. 4. Solinus 22. cp. Tac. Germ. 5, 
 for the Germans.
 
 THE BRITONS. 3 1 
 
 continent. The oldest arrivals, the Brigantes of north- 
 ern Encrland, the Catuelauni whose princes had estab- 
 lished their rule over most of central England, the Iceni 
 of Norfolk and Suffolk, and the Trinovantes of Essex 
 vi^ere up to Caesar's invasion probably little more 
 advanced than the Gacls.i The Belgic tribes south of 
 the Thames, the Atrebates, Belgae, etc., who had not 
 long before Caesar's time crossed from the mainland, 2 
 and the Cantii of Kent who were the least uncivilized 
 of all the Britons through their slight intercourse with 
 Gallic merchants,3 resembled closely the Belgic Gauls 
 opposite them on the continent. 4 But even the Cantii 
 and the Belgae had been, as was natural, partially 
 assimilated to the more barbarous inhabitants of the 
 interior. While they practised agriculture with con- 
 siderable skill, 5 dressed very like the Gauls,6 and lived 
 in huts like those of the mainland,? they all dyed them- 
 selves with woad,8 took the savage's delight in gaudy 
 trinkets9 and used the same tactics in war as the other 
 Britons. Unlike their continental cousins they still 
 continued, like their northern neighbors, to be governed 
 by kings, 10 though the power of some of the kings, like 
 that of the German princes, must have been rather 
 patriarchal in its nature; certainly not despotic, but 
 quite limited by popular rights." Other tribal kings 
 there were, however, who got a firmer power through 
 their ruling a subject, non-Aryan race. 
 
 The language of the Brythons and BelgicGauls must 
 have been somewhat the same. The Gaels on the other 
 hand spoke an altogether different dialect of Celtic. 12 
 
 1. Caes. V. 14. 
 
 2. Caes. II. 4. 7. Perhaps however the time was much earlier than "nostra 
 memona " would seem to imply. Barbarians could not give Caesar very exact 
 chronological information. 3. V. 14. 4. Tac. Agr. 11. 5. Elton, p. jig. 
 
 6. Elton, p. 114. 7. Caes. V. 12. 8. V. 14. g. Strabo IV. 5. 
 
 10. V. 22. Cp. Diodor. Sic. V. 21 ; Tac. Ann. II. 24. 
 
 11. Caes. IV. 27. 4. Cp. Holder, Germ. Altcrtumcr— note on Tac. Geim. 7. 
 
 12. Rhys. C. B. ch. I. See Tac. Germ. 45.
 
 32 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 One more nationality in Britain attracted the 
 attention of the ancient writers by its utter contrast to 
 the Celtic tribes. The Silures of southern Wales were 
 a race of short, dusky men with black, curly hair, 
 according to Tacitus like the Iberians of Spain. i He 
 was puzzled to account for their presence among the 
 tall, blonde Celts in this western corner of the island. 
 Probably the remnant of a non-Aryan race which 
 dwelt in Britain before the Celtic invasion, mingled to 
 some extent with the Gaels, 2 the Silures held tightly 
 together, rejecting the devices of civilization,3 and by 
 their dogged valor long stood their ground against 
 both Brythons and Romans. 4 
 
 On the whole, it may be regarded as fairly certain 
 that the British tribes, though originally of the same 
 race as the Gauls and speaking various dialects of 
 Celtic, were in their political and social condition nearer 
 to the Teutons than to the semi-civilized Celts of Gaul. 
 The British tribes, as has been said, were still under 
 patriarchal kings, or cantonal princes,5 who probably 
 in many cases exercised the triple function of general, 
 judge and high-priest.6 As in Germany, so in Britain 
 there had developed a strong tendency to the union of 
 several clans under one powerful chief. The confeder- 
 acy of the Suebi is paralleled by the ascendency of the 
 Catuelaunian princes, Cassivelaunus, Cunobellinus and 
 Caratacus, by the Brigantian state and by the union of 
 Caledonian tribes under Calgacus. The growth of an 
 embittered opposition to these aggrandizing powers by 
 confederacies of lesser tribes in Germany and Britain? 
 invited the intervention of Rome in the affairs of those 
 countries. Having already entered upon a decline in 
 
 1. Tac. Agr. ii. Elton, ch. VI. 
 
 2. Elton, ch. VI. Rhys, pp. 80, 215. 
 
 3. Solinus 22. 4. Tac. Ann. XII. 32. 
 
 5. Tac. Ann. II. 24 : " remissi a regtdis." 
 
 6. Perhaps called " diuid" sometimes. 7. B. G. V. 11. 9.
 
 THE BRITONS. 33 
 
 vigor and warlike spirit,i the mass of the Gauls fell 
 quickly before Roman force and culture. But the love 
 of freedom and loyalty to their own rude institutions still 
 inspired the Germans and the British Celts to make 
 great sacrifices for their independence. The Britons 
 were not cowards on foot like their Gallic kinsmen. 2 
 Their strength, says Tacitus, lay in their infantry.3 Dio 
 Cassias also alludes to the fighting qualities of the 
 British foot. 4 But like the Germans, even this brave 
 people could not stand before the Roman legion in the 
 open field. 
 
 The religion of the ancient Britons must have 
 resembled very closely that of the Germans and the old 
 Celts, though it is difficult, owing to the lack of explicit 
 information on the subject by Roman and Greek writ- 
 ers, to state anything in regard to details with certainty. 
 While in Gaul the Celts had in their progress towards 
 civilization evolved a distinct learned class of bards, 
 priests, and philosopher-magicians called Druids, "Very 
 Wise Ones, "5 who exercised a great power among the 
 people,6 it is more than probable that in Britain, as in 
 Germany, the priests or magicians had not attained to 
 such political pre-eminence. The Gaulish Druids had 
 acquired a power comparable to that of the Brahmins 
 in India. They constituted a privileged class quite 
 fenced off from the common herd of serfs whom they 
 spurned and cheated. 7 But there is no evidence of the 
 existence of such an independent hierarchy in Britain. 
 There, it would appear, the popular religion, the elastic 
 polytheism of all the Aryans,8had retained its old forms, 
 
 1. B. G- VI. 24. cp. Froiide, Caes. p. 216. 
 
 2. Cp. Froude, p. 296-7. Momm. Hist. IV. 277-8. 
 
 3. Agr. 12. cp. Germ. 6, for the Germans. 
 
 4. XL. 3. 5. Holder, .'Mtkeltischer Sprachschatz. 
 
 6. Diodor. Sic. V. 31. Strabo IV. 4. 4. 7. Caes. VI. 13, 14. 
 
 8. Rhys, C. B. p. 67. cp. p. 69— " There is no evidence that Druidism was 
 ever the leligion of any Brythonic people." Much less therefore had the less 
 civilized Gaels developed such a hierarchy. See p. 36, n. 4.
 
 34 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 primitive and hearty, though doubtless in sonae re- 
 spects very cruel and bloody. It would appear that 
 the British priest or magician, though pretending to 
 none of the metaphysical or cosmogonic knowledge 
 which the Gallic Druids claimed to have gained, nor 
 belonging to an organized hierarchy under an arch- 
 priest,! yet exercised like the Teutonic priestss a great 
 power over the individuals of his canton. Frequently 
 the chief and the high priest of a British clan or sept 
 must have been one and the same person. It is possible 
 that the Britons with their Celtic proneness to super- 
 stitious fears, were more devoted to magic rites, sacri- 
 fices and incantations than the Germans.3 But the 
 silence of ancient writers about a British hierarchy, and 
 Caesar's express denial of the existence of such an 
 organization in Germany4 must lead to the conclusion 
 that neither in Britain nor in Germany was there any- 
 thing approaching a close corporation of priests with 
 large political powers. 
 
 Solinus speaking of the SiluresS says that among 
 them men and women alike prophesied about the 
 future. In Britain therefore as in Germany,^ women 
 played an important part in the interpretation of the 
 supernatural. The British medicine-men or medicine- 
 women, any who might possess superior intelligence or 
 cunning, and likewise the power of beguiling themselves 
 and others by a rude eloquence, were as far removed 
 from the Gallic Druids as the despised private augurs at 
 Rome from the stately college of augurs recognized as 
 a political institution. 
 
 But the best evidence against a supposition that 
 the British priests whether clan leaders or ordinary 
 
 I. Caes. VI. 13. 8. 2. Holder, on Tac. Germ. 7. 
 
 3. Cp. Pliny XXX. 4 with Caes. VI. 21. But see also Tac. Germ. 10, 
 "Franci divinationibus dediti." 4. Caes. VI. 21. 
 
 5. Ch. 22. Cp. perhaps Mela III. 48. 6. Tac. Germ. 8.
 
 THE BRITONS. 35 
 
 medicine-men, were organized like the Gallic Druids as 
 a powerful castei extending its influence far beyond 
 the limits of tribe or state, and fostering a national 
 religious union, is the fact that no ancient writer 
 so much as hints at any priest-directed, national religious 
 movement among the Britons against Roman rule. 2 
 Political and economic considerations, and not religious 
 feeling, are assigned by Tacitus and Dio to the British 
 revolt of 61 A. D.3 The British and German priests or 
 seers were at best the counterpart of the Gallic Hiereis 
 described by Strabo and Diodorus Siculus, rather than 
 of the Druids who were regularly graduated theologians 
 and altogether loftier in aspirations and ideas than the 
 priests of the savage, skin-clad Britons could have been. 
 
 But it has been commonly asserted that Druidism 
 was a vast system of religion with an organized priest- 
 hood which had its origin and high seat in Britain, 
 whence it spread to the Celts of Gaul and Spain.4 One 
 writer voices well the prevailing belief when he says : 
 " In the corporation of the Druids the Celtic nation 
 though politically extremely divided had its centre and 
 preserved astrong national consciousness. "5 Some of the 
 bolder spirits, flinging caution to the winds, pronounce 
 the island of Mona (Anglesey) to have been "the chief 
 seat of the priestly system " of the whole Celtic race,6 
 "the true focus of the national and religious resist- 
 ance,"? and "the centre of the Celtic agitation. "S 
 
 It is somewhat difficult to accept this theory of the 
 existence in Britain of a mighty order of Druids of 
 which that in Gaul was but a pale reflection. It is per- 
 haps still harder to conceive of Mona as the grand 
 
 1. Cp. Auson. (Feiper's Edition pp. 52, 5g) " stirpe druidarum." 
 
 2. The contrary in Gaul. See Tac. Hist. IV. 54. 
 
 3. Ann. XIV. 31 ; Agr. 15. Dio I.XII. 2 #. 
 
 4. Mommsen, Prov. 1. \%% ff. Ranke, Huebner, and others. 
 
 5. Paul : Das Druidentum, Fleckeisens Jahrbucher, Vol. 145 (1892) p. 769-797- 
 
 6. Mommsen, Prov. 1. p. 188. 7- Mommsen, Prov. I. p. 193. 
 8. Jung, p. 280. 
 
 \i
 
 36 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 shrine, the Mecca of the Celtic race, without further 
 evidence than the assertions of modern historians. 
 The foundation for the fabric of legend, dream and 
 rhetoric which has been erected and inscribed with the 
 name of British Druidism seems to be a very free mis- 
 interpretation of a passage in Caesar, and one in 
 Tacitus, helped out by some false philology. Caesar 
 mentions in his brief account of Druidism some story 
 about a British origin for the doctrines and ritual of the 
 order.i But it has already been shown how Caesar was 
 deceived,2 and indeed the theory of a British origin for 
 Druidism is now generally discredited.3 
 
 Caesar found no Druidism in Britain or he would 
 surely have at least mentioned it as supporting the 
 legend which he found among the Gallic Druids ascrib- 
 ing a British origin to their order. Yet the tribes which 
 Caesar visited were just the ones that had been in a 
 position to receive and transm.it a spreading religion 
 either from Gaul to Britain or from Britain to Gaul.4 
 Apparently Caesar had himself little faith in the 
 tradition. 5 
 
 The other classical authority, so-called, for the 
 existence of the Druidic system in Britain is Tacitus. 
 In relating the expedition of Suetonius Paulinus to the 
 island of Mona, he says that Mona was populous and a 
 refuge for fugitives, but neglects to note in this connec- 
 tion that Mona was " the focus of the national and 
 relieious resistance." Then follows an interesting 
 chapter describing the reception that was arranged for 
 
 I. B. G. VI. 13. 2. Ch. 1. 
 
 3. Deservedly, for the Britons had scarcely any intercourse with the main- 
 land and what they had was only passive. Surely they sent no missionaries 
 there. Cp. Rhys, C. B. p. 72. 
 
 4. It was the Cantii who had intercourse with Gaul, not the Dumnonii or 
 Silures (Caes. V. 14. 1). 
 
 5. If Gauls studied in Britain, it is strange that Caesar did not apply to 
 some of them, in 55 B. C, for information about the island. But evidently the 
 Gauls did not go to Britain to study in the fogs and swamps of Siluria.
 
 THE BRITONS. 37 
 
 the Romans on the shore of the island, a great demon- 
 stration by " Druids praying and cursing, and women 
 running about dressed in funereal black, i with torches 
 in their hands and hair wildly flowing." But the 
 Romans after a brief spell of consternation and dismay 
 overcame their fears and easily quelled " a mob of 
 fanatics and women." Then the sacred groves, oaks 
 no doubt, were cut down and the altars defiled with 
 human gore broken in pieces. 2 
 
 Even if this passage of the text be sound, its strong 
 rhetorical flavor, the suddenness with which the Druids 
 are introduced and also dropped, and the reminiscent 
 quality of certain features tell against its historical 
 value. In the " women dressed in funereal black, look- 
 ing like the Furies," there is a damning echo of Strabo's 
 accountofthe Iberian Cassiterides, 3 especially significant 
 as Tacitus and others connected the Silures with the 
 
 Iberians. The sentence nam cruore habebant is a 
 
 bald paraphrase from a passage in Diodorus Siculus 
 (V. 31), and quite unworthy of Tacitus. The cutting 
 down of the sacred trees by a soldiery which hesitated 
 at first recalls the unwillingness of Caesar's men to cut 
 down the oaks at Massilia.4 It would appear therefore 
 that the writer of this chapter, understanding that Mona 
 was a sacred island of the western Britons, and remem- 
 bering the stories of old authors about divine or 
 haunted islands in the Atlantic Ocean, grafted their 
 descriptions in part upon Mona, with added touches 
 
 I. The black appears to be an error in detail, sd far as Driiidisni is con- 
 cerned (see Pelloutier, Hist, des Celtes II. 312, and Pliny, H. N. XVI. 95). But 
 the writer follows Strabo, neck or nothing. 2. Ann. XIV. 30. 
 
 3. Strabo III. 5. 11, who quotes from some earlier romancer. Cp. also 
 IV. 4. 6, cited above, page 9, n. 2. Putting these two passages 
 together, Tacitus or whoever wrote this flaming rhetoric on Mona (Ann. XIV. 
 30), was able to draw quite a grand picture of a mock-supernatural scene. With 
 the whole account cp. Plutarch, De Def. Orac. 18, and for the sacred island cp. 
 Tac. Germ. 40. 
 
 4. Lucan III. 429^. 
 
 sossi*:
 
 38 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 derived from a confused identification of British priests 
 and rites with those of Gaul, i 
 
 But it seems probable that Tacitus did not write all 
 at any rate of this chapter. Nowhere does he allude to 
 Druidism as a religious system of Britain. In the 
 eleventh chapter of his Life of Agricola, he says that 
 the Britons nearest to Gaul, that is the Belgae and 
 Cantii, had the same religion and superstitions as the 
 Gauls2 — that is, the Belgic Gauls. 3 But Druidism had 
 little or no hold upon the Belgic Gauls.4 The Belgae 
 plumed themselves upon their German origin and 
 customs. The most civilized of the Britons were there- 
 fore much nearer to the Germans in manner of life and 
 institutions than to the Gauls proper. 
 
 If Mona had been a centre of Druidism or any 
 other religion, one would certainly expect some indica- 
 tion of it at the end of Tac. Agr. 14. An attack on a 
 national sanctuary would have called for some refer- 
 ence to it in Agr. 15, where the causes of the British 
 uprising are set forth. But Tacitus does not suggest 
 that the disaffected Britons were " exasperated by Paul- 
 inus' attack on the most sacred seat of the national 
 religion," or that " the old vehement Celtic faith burst 
 forth for the last time. "5 He simply says that the 
 Britons discounted their fear of Rome " in the absence 
 of the legate," who by going to so distant a place as 
 
 1. Even a half intelligent writer could have been misled by the fact that the 
 word druid was common to the Gallic and British languages, though with far 
 different content. 
 
 2. Tac. Agr. ii. Caes. V. 14. Just as he thought the Iberians of Spain had 
 occupied the west part of Britain, so Tacitus believed that the Gauls had pos 
 sessed themselves of the south-east part. 
 
 3. Cp. Caes v. 12.2 and II. 4. 7 with I. i. 2. It was the Belgae who had 
 occupied south-east Britain, and they were very different from the other Gauls. 
 
 4. Caes. VI. 13 does not include the Belgae " in omni Gallia." Cp. VI. 12, 
 where the Haedui and Sequani are called the leading states of Gaul. They 
 certainly did not lord it over the Belgae— cp. B. G. I. i. Caesar generally 
 excludes the Belgae from Gaul. See II. 3, II. 4, VI. 24, and cp. I. i. 6, I. 30. 
 He says distinctly (I. i. 2) that the institutions of Gaul proper and Belgica 
 differ. Cp. p- 33 n. 8 and Froude, Caes. p. 216. 5. Mommsen. Prov. I. 195.
 
 THE BRITONS. 39 
 
 Mona, gave them a chance to plot behind liis back. 
 When in the eleventh chapter of the Agricola Tacitus 
 proposes an Iberian origin for the Siliires, he beyond all 
 doubt knows nothing of any Druidic religion among 
 them. Otherwise he would most certainly have com- 
 pared it with that of the Gauls proper, just as he com- 
 pared the superstitions of the Belgic Britons to those of 
 the Belgic Gauls. 
 
 In introducing the subject of Mona (Ann. XIV. 29), 
 Tacitus does not mention that it was a sacred island. 
 Then in the next chapter suddenly comes a vivid 
 picture of Mona as a Druidical stronghold. Dio Cassius 
 in describing the same events knows nothing of the 
 Druids and altars of Mona. He simply tells how the 
 revolt of the Britons took place while " Paulinus the 
 governor was on an expedition to a certain island Mona 
 'situated close to Britain. "i And Dio was not the man 
 to miss any chance for a bit of lively writing, provided 
 it were at all compatible with historical accuracy. 2 
 Moreover, Dio seems to have used the same sources as 
 Tacitus for the reign of Nero, if not Tacitus himself 3 
 
 But perhaps the strongest evidence of all for believ- 
 ing that Tacitus is not responsible for the whole of this 
 chapter (Ann. XIV. 30) is the statement that Suetonius 
 Paulinus placed a garrison in Mona. This must be 
 absolutely untrue, for the British insurrection which at 
 this juncture arose in his rear, did not permit Paulinus 
 to dispense v/ith a man. He immediately abandoned 
 Mona without waiting to complete its subjugation, and 
 marched eastward with his whole force, small enough 
 in the face of a general revolt.4 
 
 It seems therefore that this isolated passage, 
 commonly accepted as proof of British Druidism, bears 
 
 1. DioLXII. 7- 
 
 2. Cp. Haupt, Philologus (1885) p. 162, on Dio's accuracy. 
 
 3. Philol. (1885) pp. 145, 150, 161. 
 
 4. Tac. Ann. XIV. 31. Cp. Agr. 18.
 
 40 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 upon its face ample cause for our rejecting: it. The 
 silence of ancient writers as to Druidism in Britain 
 becomes more significant when contrasted with the 
 mass of testimony which proves this system of religion 
 to have been peculiar to Gaul. The following passages 
 may serve as examples : — 
 
 Cic— De Divinatione I. 41 :— " In Gallia Druidae 
 sunt." 
 
 Strabo IV. 4. 4 describes Druidism in Gaul at 
 some length. 
 
 Diodor. Sic. V. 31 gives an account of Gallic 
 Druids. 
 
 Mela III. 2, III. 18— Account of Gallic Druids. 
 
 Lucan I. 45o#refers to the Druids of Gaul. 
 
 Pliny H. N. XXIX. 12. i " Galliarum Druidae." 
 XXIV. 62. I " Druidae Gallorum." XVI. 95. i 
 " Galliarum admiratio * * '' Druidae (ita suos 
 appellant magos)," etc. XXX. 4 "Tiberius 
 sustulit druidas Gallorum." Cp. the following 
 paragraph, in which Pliny refers to the exces- 
 sive superstitions of the Britons, comparing 
 their practice of magic ("eam artem." i. e. 
 magicam, "celebrat,") to that of Persia, not 
 Gaul. The Druids, in Pliny's opinion, are a 
 peculiarly Gallic order of magicians. To no 
 others does he give a specific name. 
 
 Tacitus Hist. IV. 54 shows how the centre at 
 any rate of Druidism and of Druidic opposition 
 to Rome was in Gaul. Cp. Pliny H. N. XXX. 4 
 and Sueton. Claud. 25. We never hear of a 
 similar organized and organizing force in 
 Britain. 
 
 Suetonius, Claud. 25— " Druidarum religionem 
 apud Gallos penitus abolevit." If Claudiug 
 invaded Britain, as is commonly asserted, in 
 order to crush the national spirit of the Celts
 
 THE BRITONS. 4I 
 
 in Gaul by striking a death-blow at the heart 
 of the Druidic system in Britain, Suetonius 
 seems to have been unaware of any such 
 policy. If it had been so he would not have 
 said only " apud Gallos." 
 
 Ammianus XV. 9 — Account of the Druids of 
 Gaul. 
 
 Origen, contra Celsum I. 16, mentions the Druids 
 of the Gauls. 
 
 Diogenes Laertius, Proem. 4 — "Among the 
 Keltoi," i. e. Germans, etc., " and the Gauls 
 the so-called Druids." Britons were of course 
 not included among the Keltoi. 
 
 Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata I. 15, in a list 
 of the magi of the different nations, enumer- 
 ates " the Prophets of the Egyptians, the 
 Chaldees of Assyria, the Druids of the Gauls, 
 and the philosophers of the Keltoi." Nothing 
 is said of the Britons. 
 
 Suidas (a strong witness) — Dniidai para Galatais 
 pjiilosophoi kai scmiiotheoi. 
 
 To these passages which refer Druidism distinctly 
 to Gaul, the following should be added, in which as de- 
 scribing the institutions of the Britons, one would 
 expect to find some notice of Druidism, if it existed. 
 
 Caesar, B. G. V. 12-14. Strabo IV. 5. 1-3. 
 Diodorus Siculus V. 21, 22. Solinus, ch. 22. 
 Solinus saysof the Silures that they "deos perco- 
 lunt." Though inclined to exaggeration and 
 fond of the strange and marvelous, Solinus 
 does not betray any suspicion he may have 
 harbored that Druids existed in Britain. 
 Apparently he never dreamed of such a thing. 
 Tacitus Agr. 10-12, says nothing of Druids in 
 Britain. 
 
 i
 
 42 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Add to these Dio Cassius LXII. 7-8. He treats 
 Mona as an ordinary, natural island. By his time the 
 nearer islands of the Atlantic had ceased to be fair 
 game for careless falsifiers and miracle-mongers. Man- 
 eating, grass-eating, nakedness and polyandry were 
 now attributed onl\' to the most remote parts of the 
 British islands, Thule, etc.i Even Mona had emerged 
 from the shadow of fable. It was now too well known 
 to weave fanciful stories about. 2 Or perhaps we should 
 say it had not yet re-entered the shadow which hid it 
 from the gaze of Tacitus' monkish interpolator. 3 
 
 The single passage of the Annals, therefore, which 
 is thought to prove the existence of a Druidic hierarchy 
 in Britain, either shows culpable carelessness on the 
 part of Tacitus, or far more probably has been padded 
 by some subsequent writer. Possibly Tacitus wrote 
 with some truth that Mona was a sort of holy place for 
 the British tribes of the vicinity, like the island re- 
 ferred to in the fortieth chapter of his Germania. But 
 the passage as a whole, especially the trite phrase 
 " praesidium impositum," savors of the officious inter- 
 polator. Certainly it can not be regarded as proving that 
 Mona was a religious centre even for the western tribes, 
 far less for the British tribes in general. 
 
 For even should this chapter ofTacitusbe accepted 
 in its entirety as sober, veracious history, it does not 
 allow us to infer that the British " Druids" mentioned, 
 whatever they were, formed part of a hierarchy how- 
 ever geographically limited, like that of Gaul ; it does 
 not provide the most devout believer in British Druid- 
 ism with a shadow of evidence for a national religious 
 system among the ancient Britons, much less for any 
 comprehensive Celtic religion centring in Britain. 
 
 1. DioLXXVI. 12, etc. 
 
 2. See Pliny's ignoiance about the nights of Mona, H. N. II. 77. 
 
 3. Cp. Freeman, Norman Conquest, I. 557-559.
 
 THE BRITONS. 43 
 
 That the Celts of Britain, Hibernia and Gaul had scarcely 
 any intercourse with one anotheri ard no feeling of a 
 comnnon nationality2 is enough to reduce to an absurd- 
 ity the theory of a pan-Celtic religious system. If the 
 Romans had ever heard of a religious union among the 
 Celts of the islands and the mainland, writers like 
 Caesar, Pliny and Tacitus would most surely have 
 called attention to a system so wonderful and far 
 reaching. Those writers who described Britain as 
 almost sundered from the rest of the world must have 
 been painfully ignorant of the purpose nowadays so 
 wilfully attributed to Claudius in making his expedition-3 
 .If Claudius did aim at the final destruction of Druidism 
 by invading its stronghold in Britain, he left his edu- 
 cated subjects singularly in the dark as to what he 
 really accomplished. But the truth is that Druidism 
 did not exist in Britain, to beckon the Roman legions 
 to marches beyond the sea. The British tribes appear 
 like the Germans to have possessed no national religious 
 system. 
 
 It may be objected that the Irish word drui 
 (sorcerer) and the Welsh derwydd prove the existence 
 of Druids in the British Isles in ancient times. The 
 crazy legends of Ireland and Wales are full of accounts 
 of the old Druids, their magic powers and their contests 
 with Christian saints. 
 
 "Our traditions of the Scottish and Irish Druids 
 are evidently derived from a time when Christianity 
 had long been established. "4 It is probable, however, 
 that there were men called " druids" in ancient Britain, 
 but according to the meaning assigned by Holder to the 
 word (Old Celtic druid, from dru-vid-s, very wise),5 they 
 need not have been more than any wise or clever men. 
 Very likely however the name "druid" was so far 
 
 I. Seech. I. 2. Seech. IV. t. Sec next chaptei'. 
 
 4. Prof. CJ'Cuiry, quoted 111 liunwick's Irish Diuids p. 11. 
 
 5. Altkeltischer Sprachschatz.
 
 44 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 specialized by the Britons as to be frequently applied 
 par excellence to the priest or magus, who as among the 
 Teutons! was invested with considerable powers, but 
 possessed nothing like the peculiar rank and authority 
 of the Gallic Druid. The word druid did not connote 
 at all the same thing in Britain as in Gaul. In Gaul the 
 Druid was a member of a not merely cantonal or tribal, 
 but a national religious organization. There is not a jot 
 of evidence for, but much against the existence of a 
 priestly caste in the savage tribes of Britain. Like the 
 Germans they seem to have made no such doubtful 
 progress. While they may have had their druids, they 
 had no Druidism in the proper sense of the word. 2 
 
 If " Druidism " meant simply the early naturalistic 
 religion of the Aryan tribes, the Britons would appear 
 to have as good a claim to it as the Germans and 
 Scandinavians, and no better. Louis de Baecker, in 
 fact, holds that Druidism was the religion of the 
 Germans and Scandinavians. One might as well de- 
 clare at once that Romulus and Remus were under the 
 spiritual guidance of Druids. But Druidism does not 
 mean simpl}^ that naturalistic religion. As known to 
 Latin and Greek writers, Druidism was the peculiar 
 hierarchical religion of Gaul, and in this Britain or 
 Germany had no part. 
 
 From the material condition alone of the Britons one 
 would naturally infer that their religion was of the same 
 general character as that of the Teutons. Few British 
 tribes practised agriculture,3 and many knew nothing 
 of money.4 All the Britons that Caesar saw dyed 
 themselves with woad. The poets often allude to the 
 painting and tattooing practised by British and German 
 
 1. Cp. Tac. Germ. 6, 7, lo, ii, 43, and see commentary in Holder's edition, 
 p. 163 and pp. 185-189. 
 
 2. Cp. Dr. Richey quoted by Bonwick, p. 36 : " The early Irifeli missionaries 
 found no priesthood occupying a definite political position." 
 
 3. Caes. V. 14. 4. Caes. V. 12 and Solinus 22.
 
 THE BRITONS. 45 
 
 tribes. I It is not surprising therefore to learn that the 
 Britons like the Germans and even the Gauls were 
 addicted to human sacrifices and other nefarious rites. 
 The same naturalistic religion held sway among all the 
 Celts and Germans. 2 The oak-tree and the mistletoe 
 were universally connected with superstitious beliefs. 3 
 The night being held sacred as the mother of day, time 
 was counted by nights.4 The abstention of some Brit- 
 ish tribes from the flesh of hare, chicken and goose is 
 not paralleled among the Celts of Gaul. 
 
 In habits, dress and general life the Britons re- 
 sembled the Germans closely. Long after the time of 
 the Romans in Britain, Aneurin (Gododin, st. 90) writes 
 of the British chieftain rejoicing in a coat of the speckled 
 skins of young wolves. Only the coast tribes of the 
 south-east seem to have clothed themselves in woven 
 fabrics at the time of Caesar.5 The Britons had the 
 same regard as the continental Celts for gay decora- 
 tions. They delighted in tartans,^ beads, chains and 
 rings.6 Like the Germans, the Britons were taller and 
 more terrible to look upon than the Gauls, 7 
 
 British manufactures had hardly outgrown infancy. 
 There are some traces of pre-Roman weapons, glass 
 beads, etc., made in Britain. Some of the southern 
 tribes struck rude gold coins on the model of those 
 circulating in Gaul.8 The tribes of the south-west seem 
 to have mined tin and lead in a small way. Iron min- 
 ing was developed only after Caesar's invasions to any 
 extent. 9 When later the Romans took possession of 
 
 I. E. g. Hor. Epod. XVI. 7 for the Germans. 
 
 2' Cp. Tac. Agr. 11 " superstitionum persuasiones." 
 
 3. See Wagler in Berliner Studien f. class. Phil. Vol. XIII. pp. 39-43. 
 
 4. Caes. VI. 18. cp. Eng. fortnight. 5. Cp. Caes. VI. 21 on the Germans. 
 
 6. Strabo IV. 5. Dio LXII. 2. Elton, ch. 5. 
 
 7. Strabo IV. 5. 2. Tac. Agr. 11. Caes. V. 14 " horridi in pugna." The 
 Gauls were themselves very tall and strong— see Napoleon, Caes. 11. 36. 
 
 8. See Evans, Ancient Brit. Coinage. 
 
 Q. Cp. Caes. v. 12 with Strabo IV. 5. 2.
 
 46 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the land, they kept the Britons at work in the old lead 
 mines under more scientific direction. 
 
 Like the Germans the Britons lived in open vil- 
 lages, i The tendency to congregate in cities, already 
 apparent in Gaul, was probably represented in Britain 
 only in the case of London, which must have been the 
 centre for what trade passed up and down the Thames. 2 
 After Caesar's departure from Britain, London became 
 the emporium of a largely increased commerce with 
 the continent. In the time of Strabo the products of 
 Britain, corn, cattle, gold, silver and iron, as well as 
 skins, hunting-dogs and slaves were eagerly sought by 
 continental traders .in exchange for ivory, chains, 
 glass vessels and various trumpery .3 
 
 The powerful state of the Catuelauni under its kings 
 Tasciovanus and Cunobellinus, who owned London, 
 outstripped far the other tribes in this civilizing inter- 
 course with the mainland.4 Here were struck the 
 finest of the Brftish coins of this period. The 
 reign of Cunobellinus was almost a golden age for the 
 Catuelauni. The influence of growing civilization upon 
 southeastern Britain is shown by the Latin legends on 
 the coins of various states. 
 
 The population of southeastern Britain is described 
 by Caesar as very dense, dwelling in huts close together. 
 Perhaps we may say it was nearly as dense as that of 
 Belgica, which has been estimated with wide exaggera- 
 tion at two hundred to the square mile.5 
 
 1. Cp. Tac. Germ. lO. 
 
 2. That London was an important town before Roman times is shown by 
 the failure of the Roman attempt to change its Celtic name. See Loftie, London 
 (Hist. Towns Series) p. 2. For cities in Gaul see Mommsen, Hist. IV. 266. 
 
 3. Strabo IV. 5. 2. Note that Strabo does not include tin among the e.\po.ts 
 of Britain, cp. page 6 above, n. 2. 
 
 4. Sueton. Calig. 44 " rex Britannorum." 
 
 5. Mommsen, Hist. IV. 264. cp. Beloch, Bevolkerung der griechisch -rom- 
 ischen Welt pp. 44X-460, who seems to underratexonsiderably the density. See 
 also Richards in " Social England," I. p. 95.
 
 THE T5RITONS. 47 
 
 The women of Britain, like those of Germany, seem 
 to have held a higher position than the women of 
 Gaul. I In social life as in everything else the Britons 
 preserved a fresh, primitive type. 2 They had not gone 
 the way of the Gaulish Celts who had been rather 
 blighted than blessed by a modicum of conventional 
 civilization. 3 
 
 In the southern part of the island, however, some 
 advance had been made as has been shown already, upon 
 the savage life of the Germans and old Celts. Some of the 
 tribes not only used a gold coinage as a medium of ex- 
 change, but also showed considerable skill in agricul- 
 ture. " They had learned to make a permanent separa- 
 tion of arable and pasture land and to apply manure 
 appropriate to each kind of field. "4 
 
 In the interior of the island the people set small 
 store by the fruits of the ground. Everywhere the 
 Romans found beneath a dark and rainy sky an endless 
 tangle of forests and marshes, " little better than a cold 
 and watery desert. "5 The wealth of the inhabitants 
 consisted in their splendid herds of cattle.6 In the 
 growing trade with the continent after Caesar's inva- 
 sion, cattle as well as the skins of the wild-beasts which 
 swarmed in the island began to be exported in ever 
 greater numbers. The Catuelauni profited so much by 
 their new trade that they even submitted to Roman 
 duties on their exports and imports, though they never 
 paid the tribute imposed by Caesar.7 
 
 The Roman invasions initiated a period of healthy 
 growth and prosperity for the southern Britons. Their 
 capacity for civilization showed itself by the way in 
 
 I. Tac. Ann. XIV. 35 ; Agr. i6. i. Cp. Mommsen, Hist. IV. 279 for the 
 Gauls. 2. Cp. Dio LXII. 2#. 
 
 3. Caes. VI. 24. Cp. Froude, Caes. 216. 4- Elton, p. 119. 
 
 5. Dio LX. 19 end, LX. 20 end. Caes. V. 21. Elton, p. 223. Cp. Tac. 
 Germ. 5 for Germany. 
 
 6. Caes. V. 21. Cp. Tac. Germ, 5 for the Germans. 7- Strabo IV. 5. 3. 
 
 I
 
 48 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 which they improved their coinage and worked their 
 iron mines hitherto undeveloped. Best of all they 
 showed themselves capable of political organization. 
 It was the kings of the Catuelauni who led in creating 
 a degree of national feeling among the British tribes 
 stronger than had ever developed in Gaul, and made 
 possible the stout resistance that was opposed to the 
 subsequent conquest of the island by the armies of the 
 Roman emperors.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 
 
 The tribute fixed by Julius Caesar to be paid 
 annually to Rome was probably never paid.^ For a 
 time British chiefs ministered to the pride of Augustus 
 the new monarch of Rome by sending embassies with 
 presents to dedicate upon the Capitol.2 But this prac- 
 tice fell off under Tiberius. Not even the Roman pro- 
 tectorate established by Caesar over the Trinovantes 
 was long respected. It would appear that the Dubno- 
 velaunus who took refuge at the court of Augustus3 was 
 a Trinovantian prince expelled by Tasciovanus, king 
 of the Catuelauni.4 Under Cunobellinus the son of 
 Tasciovanus, the Trinovantes had been so far reconciled 
 to the Catuelaunian supremacy that Cunobellinus made 
 their chief town Camulodunum his capital. 5 
 
 Officially, however, Britain was regarded as tribu- 
 tary to Rome. 6 Like Germany? and Armenia it was a 
 potential if not actual province. It has been a common 
 idea from the days of Tacitus to the present that 
 Augustus was thoroughly conservative as to extension 
 of territory and that he set what he meant to be per- 
 manent limits to the empire.8 Nothing could be 
 farther from the truth. Probably no single Roman 
 added so large a territory to the empire as did Augus- 
 tus. Western Germany, Raetia, Noricum, Illyria, the 
 
 1. Mommsen, Hist. IV. 315 and Dio LIII. 25. 
 
 2. Stiabo IV. 5. 3. 3. Mon. Ancyr. VI. 2. Cp. coins. 
 
 4. Coins of Tasciovanus as late as 13 B. C. Evans, p. 223. 
 
 5. Dio LX. 21. 6. Livy, Epit. 105. Messalla, De Prog. Aug. 35. etc. 
 
 7. Mon. Ancyr. V. 11 ; VI. 3. 
 
 8. Tac. Ann. I. 11. 7; Agr. 13. Cp. Ranke III. 29. Schiller, Nero p. 414; 
 Gesch. I. 214, " Grundsatz das Reich nicht dmcli Eroberungen zu niehren." 
 Mommsen, Prov. I. 185, intimates that Julius Caesar had already established 
 the Rhine as the boundary of the empire, and so Augustus only followed him. 
 See also Momm. Hist. IV. 585.
 
 50 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Balkan peninsula and Egypt were won under his 
 auspices. I The great mistake of his earlier policy was 
 the attempt to extend Roman jurisdiction too rapidly, 
 before the empire had digested and assimilated the new 
 provinces of Gaul and lUyria. 
 
 The first aim of the new imperial policy had been 
 to organize the offensive strength of the empire,2 to 
 solidify the province of Gaul and to fortify Italy at its 
 weak point by the establishment of a scientific frontier 
 in the north. As soon as Augustus had set up the new 
 constitution, arranged the administration and restored 
 the finances, the Elbe and the Danube became the 
 immediate objective points of a grand forward move- 
 ment. Germany was already well in hand, when in 6 
 A. D. occurred the terrible revolt of the Pannonians 
 and Illyrians. During the next three years the new 
 province of Germany was denuded of the tried troops 
 and efficient commanders transferred to Illyria.3 The 
 Germans took advantage of a weak governor and a 
 weak garrison, and freed themselves by annihilating at 
 one stroke three Roman legions. True these legions 
 were mostly raw troops and in all probability not nearly 
 up to the normal strength.4 But to the Roman mind a 
 legion was a legion. The defeat of Varus caused such 
 a tremor of grief and fear to pass through the whole 
 Roman world, that although Germany had been re- 
 duced almost to a regular province and subjected to the 
 tax and levy,5 Augustus now gave it up and acknow- 
 ledged the Rhine, for the present at least, as the actual 
 frontier of the empire. 
 
 " The great object of Augustus' life was to justify 
 
 1. Mon. Ancyr. V. g-VI. 49. 
 
 2. Tac Ann. I. 9 "connexa interse." Cp. pp. 28-29 above. 
 
 3. Schiller I. p. 229. 
 
 4. Scliiller pp. 229, 232. The Roman historians with the natural preference 
 for " losing by a mile " to losing by an inch, magnify the disaster. Cp. Livy on 
 Cannae. 5- Schiller I. 229.
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 5 1 
 
 his power by showing the necessity of it. His alarm 
 over the defeat of Varus was caused by fear for his 
 system, which only existed because of the need for 
 strong administrative and military centralization."! 
 Augustus had cast his net too wide and the strain of 
 simultaneous risings in Germany and Pannonia well 
 nigh broke it. His alarm therefore for his system added 
 to the growing feebleness of old age made him abandon 
 the stern old Roman principle of never retreating, in 
 spite of losses and failing finances, after a defeat. He 
 knew that it would be many a day 3^et before the com- 
 plete pacification of Gaul and the Danube provinces 
 would permit the Roman eagles to be again planted on 
 the banks of the Elbe. Accordingly his dying counsel 
 to Tiberius was to husband the resources of the empire 
 b}^ confining his energies to solidifying and harmonizing 
 the administration within the Rhine and Danube 
 frontiers. 2 Germany remained in theory a province of 
 the empire, 3 as the constitution of the two German 
 skeleton provinces, and the hold which was kept on the 
 right bank of the Rhine prove. 4 The German tribes 
 were confronted w^ith a standing menace. It was 
 evident to them that when the time came, the Roman 
 government would execute the policy of Caesar for the 
 complete subjugation of the northern tribes, both 
 Celts and Germans. 5 
 
 As for an immediate conquest of Britain, nothing 
 was farther from the intentions of Augustus and Tibe- 
 rius. Though the island was in theory tributary to 
 Rome, its actual acquisition was a far less vital need 
 than the advance of the Rhine and Raetian frontier 
 to the Elbe. Still, Augustus did not even on the shore 
 of the ocean fix a limit beyond which the empire should 
 
 1. Seeley, Lect. Rom. Imp. I. Cp. Rankelll. 2q. 
 
 2. Tac. Ann. I. ii. 7. 3. Cp. Tac .^nn. II. 26, " rebellium." 
 4. Tac. Ann. VI. 19. 5- Caes. B. G. VI. 9. 
 
 vi
 
 52 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 never go. Because he was the first to arrange a scien- 
 tific frontier, with a connected system of defences, and 
 because this frontier in its main Hnes actually did prove 
 to be the permanent boundary of the empire, it has 
 been falsely said of Augustus that he intended this 
 frontier to be forever unchanged. Rather Augustus 
 hoped and expected that in due time the Elbe would 
 replace the Rhine as the actual frontier of the empire, 
 as the Rhine had replaced the Alps and the Rhone. In 
 the same way he never renounced the theoretical 
 authority of Rome beyond the Strait of Dover. 
 
 But while it was officially recognized that Britain 
 might some day be incorporated in the empire, its 
 acquisition was distinctly not an immediate issue. 
 Augustus am.used the poets and men without political 
 insight by his several feints at expeditions to Britain, i 
 the western end of the world, and to Parthia in the 
 extreme east.2 The frequent mention of the British and 
 Parthian expeditions in the same breath by the courtier 
 poets does not imply3 that the annexation of Britain 
 was imminent or necessary. On the contrary it shows 
 the shadowy character of Augustus' claims to suzerainty 
 over the Britons.4 Theoretically Rome ruled the whole 
 world.5 The statement that the imperial policy " was 
 to fill rather than to extend,"6 is therefore consistent 
 with annexations of fresh territory to the domain of 
 actual administration. Rome being practically mistress 
 of only a portion of the world, such annexations of 
 territory were of course a "filling," in theory, though 
 actually an extension. This would be especially true 
 
 1. 34 B. C. (Dio XLIX. 38), 27 B. C. (Dio LIII. 22), and 26 B. C (Dio LIII. 
 25). Dio seems doubtful oi Augustus' sincerity - LIII. 22, "pretending 
 that he was even going to invade Britain." 
 
 2. Hor Carm. I. 12. 53 ; III. 2. 3, etc. 3. As Huebner says, R. H. W. p 10 
 
 4. Cp. Mon. Ancyr. V. 54-VI. 2, collocation of Parthian and British reful 
 gees. 
 
 5. Cp. Momm. Prov. II. 93, Schiller I. 777, and Mon. Ancyr. V. g— VI 12 
 
 6. Momm. Prov. I. 188.
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 53 
 
 of Germany, where Rome had once actually governed, 
 and where the two skeleton provinces along both banks 
 of the Rhine awaited "filling," just as later the province 
 of Britain theoretically bounded by the ocean, i was 
 long governed only in small part, held by the rim as it 
 were. The scientific frontier along the Rhine and the 
 Danube was not to be a barrier to Roman growth, but 
 like the wall of Hadrian in Britain should permit the 
 present development of Roman culture behind it, and 
 its future expansion beyond it. But the idea of an 
 actual subjugation of Britain was with Augustus and 
 Tiberius no more and no less hazy than the purpose of 
 extending Roman administration over Parthia or India. 
 If envoys came from Britain to offer homage to the 
 master of the world, they came also from India. 2 Much 
 more immediate was the necessity of ensuring the 
 isolation of Gaul and the safety of Italy by the subjuga- 
 tion of Germany. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Strabo a man of keen, logical 
 insight, presents clearly the practical attitude of Augus- 
 tus towards Britain.3 He says that the Romans having 
 ascertained the poverty of Britain and its worthlessness 
 whether for economic purposes or for the strategic 
 requirements of the empire, seeing that the Britons 
 could do no harm to Gaul, and that the cost of an 
 occupation of the island would so far balance the tribute 
 to be derived from so poor a people, that the actual 
 gain if any would not be equal to the existing tariff 
 revenue from British trade, voluntarily relinquished the 
 ephemeral conquests of Caesar and the dangers of 
 maintaining them.4 
 
 Tiberius quite agreed with the views of Augustus.5 
 
 1. See Tac. Ann. XIV. 29. 1 " subiecturum e.\ provinciam fuisse." 
 
 2. Mon. Ancyr. V. 50. 3. II. 5. 8 ; IV. 5. 3. 
 
 4. Cp. Appian (Proem. 5) who wrote a hundred years after the Claudian 
 invasion. , ,, .,. , , ,. 
 
 5. Tac. Agr. 13. Huel^ncr's interpretation of consilium id divus Augustus 
 vocabat " (Hermes, XVI, p. 517) is wrong. Cp. Tac. Ann. I. 11 end, and 
 Mommsen, Prov. I. 187 n. i. See also Gibbon, Vol. I. ch. I. 
 
 l\.
 
 54 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 With his contempt for popular applause, he did not 
 even pretend to be thinking about conquests in Britain 
 or the far east. He continued Augustus' later policy 
 of carefully consolidating the new empire, leaving to a 
 successor the task of realizing the aim of Augustus' 
 foreign policy, the shortening of the frontier line, 
 bulwarking of Italy, and removal of the great masses of 
 the army farther from Rome. While this great end 
 awaited consummation, it is inconceivable that Tiberius 
 "recognized the obligation of conquering .in Britain. "i 
 
 Meanwhile trade had become so flourishing between 
 Britain and the mainland that the revenue from customs 
 in this quarter must have been quite considerable. 
 Even the besotted Caligula could not bring himself to 
 make such a leap into the dark as to exile a large por- 
 tion of his best troops to a distant island, 2 merely to 
 gratify his own vanity and the city rabble's craving for 
 sensation. His finances were in a ruinous condition as 
 it was. 3 By listening to the petition of Adminius, the 
 banished son of King Cunobellinus who took refuge 
 with him in Gaul,4 and undertaking a costly and peril- 
 ous expedition to Britain, he had sufficient sense to see 
 that his treasury might be completely wrecked. Be- 
 sides Caligula had still some regard left for the maxims 
 of imperial policy laid down by Julius and Augustus. 5 
 
 But it was reserved for Claudius, the most foolish 
 of Roman emperors,6 to perpetrate one of the greatest 
 errors of imperial policy. As soon as his economy and 
 the systematic administration of his ministers had re- 
 paired the ravages made by Caligula upon the treasury, 
 the new emperor looked about with the mild frenzy for 
 action which sometimes attacks the bookish man, for a 
 
 I. Schiller I. 319. 2. Cp. Mommsen, Prov. I. 188. 
 
 3. See Schiller I. 309/. 4. Sueton. Calig. 44. 
 
 5. SeeTac. Agr. 13 " ingentes adversus Germaniam conatus." 
 
 6. Cp. Huebner R. H. W. p. 10 ; Gibbon, Vol. I. ch. 1. 
 
 I
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 55 
 
 field in which he could win a military reputation. i 
 Brought up rather as a scullion than as an heir of the 
 imperial house,2 Claudius had not been imbued with 
 the precepts laid down by Julius and Augustus for the 
 solidification of the empire and the advancement of its 
 frontiers on strategic principles. 3 Gaul and the Danube 
 Provinces were now sufficiently Romanized to allow of 
 the long projected conquest of Germany to the Elbe.4 
 Instead of bending all his energies to this work, Clau- 
 dius proceeded to hit out at random in all directions. 5 
 But it was Britain that outbid the attractions of all other 
 fields for the aimless enterprise of a weak-minded 
 monarch. 
 
 Claudius and the more unreasoning portion of his 
 subjects had perhaps not yet satisfied themselves that 
 riches were not to be found in Britain. 6 Perhaps the 
 increased trade may have led people to exaggerate the 
 mineral and other wealth of the island. Even as early 
 as thirty years after Caesar's unprofitable expeditions, 
 Strabo had thought it necessary to correct popular 
 misapprehensions about Britain. Probably the ideas of 
 the masses in 43 A. D. stood in more desperate need of 
 confutation. At any rate Claudius undertook in that 
 year his great invasion of Britain, chiefly in order to get 
 popularity by meeting an old demand of the rabble, 
 which had been fostered by poets and dreamers ever 
 since the days of Julius Caesar. He knew that with the 
 time and armies at his disposal he could accomplish 
 more in the island than was possible for Caesar in his 
 
 I. Sueton. Claud. 17. 2. Sueton. Claud. 2-6. 
 
 3. Cp. Ranke III. 100 " eigentlich gegen die Grundsatzc des Augustus und 
 des Tiberius." 
 
 4. Cp. Furneaux, Tac. Ann. II. p. 130. 5- Orosius VII. 6. Q. 
 
 6. Cp. Huebner, R. H. W. p. 10 " diess Ruhm und Schaetze versprechende 
 Unternehmen." Cp. Cox in Arch. Journ. LII. p. 26. Mela and Tacitus both 
 felt called upon to justify the conquest from an economic standpoint. Mela 
 (ill. 50) politely expresses his doubts by intimating that Britain's products are 
 suitable rather for cattle than for men. Tac. Agr. 12 " pretium victoriae."
 
 56 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 two short campaigns. The senate and people would 
 therefore magnify his exploits, setting him higher than 
 the great Julius himself.i 
 
 Germany, on the other hand, was a land of ill omen 
 to the popular mind,2 and probabl}^ Claudius' own 
 superstition made him shrink from invading the land 
 which had engulfed so many Roman legions. Besides, 
 one of the reasons that had made the conquest of 
 Germany seem necessary to Augustus was no longer 
 cogent. Since the avenging campaigns of Germanicus 
 the Germans had shown great respect for the Rhine 
 boundary of Gaul. The Gauls undisturbed by German 
 inroads or intrigues had resigned themselves to the 
 government of Rome, and were rapidly becoming 
 assimilated to their conquerors. It was only after 
 60,000 picked troops had been transferred to Britain 
 that the Germans again ventured to attack the empire. 3 
 But when Corbulo had beaten them back and estab- 
 lished Roman authority far into the heart of their 
 country, Claudius renounced Germany for good and 
 withdrew the legions across the Rhine from even the 
 narrow strip on the right bank which had been held 
 since the time of Drusus.'4 Perhaps he could not do 
 otherwise after wasting the men and money of the 
 empire in conquering an " alter orbis."5 But it is 
 doubtful whether Claudius gave a thought to the real 
 import of this retreat from the policy of Augustus for 
 the future of Rome. In the small vanity of his British 
 victory he was incapable of understanding how he was 
 drawing out the long thin line of his frontier forces, 
 when he should have taken steps to shorten and thicken 
 
 1. Claudius doubtless encouraged a contemptuous view of Caesar's cam- 
 paigns. See Lucan II. 572; Authol. Lat. (Riese) No. 423. Mela III. 49. Orosius 
 VII. 6. 9. Cp. Revue Archeologique II. Ser. XXXI. p. 104. 
 
 2. Cp. the story in Dio LV. i. 3. Tac. Ann. XI. 18. 
 
 4. Schiller I. 323. Huebner R. H. W. p. 113. 
 
 5. In spite of his increase of the number of the legions from 25 to 27. See 
 Jung, p. 276.
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. S7 
 
 it. Still less did he see that he was leaving Raetia, the 
 slight bulwark of Italy, open to barbarians who would 
 one day burst through and quench the light of Roman 
 civilization. The theory of Rome's universal hegemony 
 was now of the past. The deeds of Drusus and Tiberius 
 which had wafted the terror of Rome's name to the far 
 off tribes by the Baltic Sea were forgotten for the 
 paltry and precarious foothold which one of the finest 
 armies Rome ever sent forth gained among the un- 
 couth, brave inhabitants of Britain. i 
 
 It can not be said2 that the conquest of Britain 
 promised to be easier than that of Germany. Julius 
 Caesar had been impressed with the courage and war- 
 like character of the British tribes 3 Like the Britons, 
 the Germans were tall and huge, but in spite of their 
 bodily strength no match for disciplined Roman armies.4 
 The victory of Marius was as decisive as any won by 
 Agricola. In three years (12-9 B. C.) Drusus conquered 
 more territory in Germany than Roman generals won 
 in Britain during thirty years after the invasion of Clau- 
 dius. The annexation of western Germany would have 
 been still easier in 43 A. D.5 Britain was as difficult 
 to traverse, by reason of forests and marshes as Ger. 
 many.6 The Celtic tribes both continental and insular 
 were perhaps harder to assimilate when conquered than 
 the Germans. But Claudius was bent not on so com- 
 mon-place and hackneyed an enterprise as the conquest 
 of Germany. The subjugation of Britain, v/hile quite 
 as difficult and hazardous as that of Germany, prom- 
 ised exaltation for its promoter at the expense of his 
 predecessor Julius Caesar, and possibly prizes for the 
 speculators and usurers. 
 
 I. Mela III. 4g- 2. With Schiller I. 352. 
 
 3. Cp. Jung p. 274, and see Herodian III. 7. 6. 
 
 4. Cp. Tac. Ann. II. 14. 
 
 5. As evidenced by Corbulo's success there. Schiller I. 323. 
 b. See above p. 47, n. 5.
 
 58 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 But this advance of Roman power across the 
 English Channel has been generally admired as the 
 masterly execution of a move which had always been 
 held to be inevitable by Roman statesmen since the 
 time of Julius Caesar.i Some say that the Gauls could 
 never have been reconciled to Roman government 
 while their kinsmen, the insular Celts, having in their 
 midst the centre of the religion of the entire Celtic race, 
 remained free. 2 Others are tormented with imaginings 
 of not only a bad British influence among the Gallic 
 Celts, but armed descents upon the north coast.3 
 No one is ready with an inventory of the positive 
 economic or militarj^ or political advantages which the 
 occupation of Britain seemed to hold out to Claudius. 
 It was then a necessity, and a hard necessity, the better 
 horn of a dilemma, snatched at only to save northern 
 Gaul for Rome. One writer, instinctively aware of the 
 difficulty of his position, fancies that Tacitus saw in this 
 action of a half Celt anxious to complete the subjuga- 
 tion of the Celtic race a miracle which could only be 
 explained as the intervention of fate to bring Vespasian 
 to the front as commander of a legion in the expedition. 4 
 
 If only there had been a Celtic nation bound to- 
 gether like the Grecian states by a common blood, 
 language and religion, these reasonings might almost 
 persuade. And while it is now generally accepted that 
 the inhabitants of the British Isles were of the same 
 race as those of Gaul, the ancients did not suspect this 
 fact. Tacitus hesitatingly suggests that the Belgic 
 Britons of the extreme south-east, "nearest to Gaul," 
 were of Gaulish stock. 5 The origin of the tribes north 
 
 1. See Mommsen, Prov. I. i88. Schiller I. 319. Huebner R. H. W. p. 10. 
 
 2. See above, p. 8, n. 2. Add Spooner, Tac. Hist. p. 38. 
 
 3. Huebner R. H. W. p. 12. 
 
 4. Huebner R. H. W. p. 11. 
 
 5. Tac. Agr. 11. He follows Caes. V. 12.
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 59 
 
 of these he declared to be uncertain. i No Roman 
 emperor therefore could have dreamed of annexing 
 Britain on ethnological grounds. Or why was 
 Hibernia not annexed ? To say nothing of the Semites 
 of Mesopotamia, the Dacians of Russia, the Egyptians 
 of the Upper Nile, or shall we add the Aryans of India 
 and the Turanians of China and North America? Gur 
 philologists have failed to advocate the conquest of the 
 trans-Rhenane Germans, though here they have a good 
 case, as the Romans knew well the relationship of the 
 German tribes on both sides of the Rhine. But this 
 idea of the rounding off of the conquest of the Celtic 
 race seems to be not far from absurd. 
 
 The question of a national Druidic religion has 
 already been disposed of. A common religion must 
 seem an impossibility almost without any special proof. 
 The isolation of Britain is and always was a geograph- 
 ical and historical fact. 2 The soldiers of Aulus 
 Plautius mutinied when ordered to Britain not because 
 they were going against brother Celts, but because they 
 were to be banished as it were off the earth.3 Those 
 who assume the existence two thousand years ago of a 
 national feeling, a national religion and an active com- 
 mercial intercourse holding Britain and Gaul so closely 
 together as to render the conquest of the continental 
 Celts insecure without the subjugation of Britain strive 
 against the verdict of all history and against the judg- 
 ment of nature herself. 
 
 To assert that Gaul could never have been Roman- 
 ized without the occupation of Britain is to fly in the 
 face of the facts. Gaul had already been deeply 
 permeated with Roman civilization. During the 
 
 1. Tac Agr. 11. Cp. Germ. 45, where Tac. speaks of a German tribe speak- 
 ing a language like the British. This is perhaps erroneous, but it shows that 
 Tac. distinguished sharply between the bulk of the -British population and the 
 
 Gauls. 
 
 2. Cp. Freeman's whole essay "Alter Orbis." 3- Dio LX. ig.
 
 6o ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 twenty-two years since the revolt of 21 A. D., which 
 occurring among inland tribes could not have been 
 encouraged by British sympathy, the country had in all 
 quietness grown reconciled to its new condition. Its 
 complete assimilation was now only a question of time. i 
 That the conquest of Britain was achieved chiefly by 
 Gallic troops is proof enough how little sympathy 
 existed between the insular and the continental Celts. 
 
 If the north coast of Gaul was liable to attack from 
 Britain, Strabo must have been greatly mistaken when 
 he wrote that " the Britons could do no injury to us. "2 
 The Britons were by no means seafaring people. No 
 ancient writer records a tendency shown by the Britons 
 to meddle in any way with the Romans on the main- 
 land. On the other hand they had on one occasion 
 rescued and restored to their country Roman soldiers 
 cast on the British shore by a storm.3 This friendly 
 act betokens no longing on the part of the islanders to 
 trouble the coast of Gaul with buccaneering expedi- 
 tions. And even if danger had threatened Gaul from 
 Britain and not from Germany, as was actually the 
 case, it had been far less expensive to make simply a 
 punitive expedition to the island occasionally, at least 
 until the continental policy of Caesar and Augustus had 
 been carried out. 
 
 All the usual arguments therefore for the advised- 
 ness of Claudius' expedition of conquest rest on the 
 flimsiest sort of foundations. Britain the " Alter Orbis " 
 lay apart from the continental system of Rome. It 
 was only the old blind impulse to conquest for con- 
 quest's sake4 which actuated Claudius, and on which as 
 the leading motive of the urban rabble he could count 
 for the praise of his successes. 
 
 I. Cp. Jung p. 200. See Strabo IV. i. 2, and IV. 4. 2, cited by Arnold, Later 
 Roman Commonwealth, p. 491. 2- II. 5- 8. 
 
 3. Tac. Ann. II. 24 (16 A. D.) 4- Cp. Ranke III. 5.
 
 THE MISTAKE OF CLAUDIUS. 6l 
 
 Perhaps the most convincing bit of exidcnce 
 against the racial and religious hypothesis, next to the 
 fact that no ancient writer made bold to attribute to 
 Claudius' expedition any other motive than that of self- 
 aggrandizement, is furnished by a passage of Dio 
 Cassius. In Book LIIl. 22 he gives as the reason why 
 Augustus did not invade Britain in 27 B. C. the un- 
 settled state of Gaul. I If British influence or sympathy 
 had contributed to hinder the pacification of Gaul, as 
 German influence certainly did, 2 Augustus would have 
 been stimulated to invade Britain, not deterred. Evi- 
 dently Augustus and also Dio Cassius believed 
 that Germany, not Britain, must be conquered in the 
 best interests of Gaul and the whole empire. The very 
 reason assigned by modern writers for the necessity of 
 attacking Britain is preferred by Dio as the reason why 
 Augustus did not attack the island. 
 
 Claudius therefore in abandoning all the traditions 
 of previous imperial policy consulted nothing else than 
 his own vanity. He seized the first opportunity that 
 appeared for a great military expedition. Bericus,3 an 
 exiled British chiel, perhaps overcome by the power of 
 Caratacus orTogodumnus, the sons of Cunobellinus re- 
 cently dead, came to Claudius and had no difficulty in 
 persuading him to send a force into Britain.4 It seems 
 also that the two sons of Cunobellinus, the aged 
 monarch who had held sway over southern Britain for 
 nearly thirty years,5 foolishly provoked the Romans by 
 " demanding in not very diplomatic form the extradi- 
 tion of Bericus."6 
 
 1. No ancient writer says that Britain was conquered in order to 
 secure Gaul. 
 
 2. See Schiller I. 214. 
 
 3. Mommsen and Huebner are wrong in identifying Bericus with Verica, the 
 British chief of Silchester. Verica's coinage is of much earlier date. See 
 Rhys, C. B. p. 23. 4. Dio LX. 19. 5. Rhys, pp. 26, 35- 
 
 6. Jung, p. 275.
 
 62 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Claudius quickly collected a powerful army under 
 the command of Aulus Plautiusi and made ready to 
 send the flower of his troops into a land which in later 
 days, though civilized and improved by a long Roman 
 occupation, the Goths disdained to conquer and Charle- 
 magne was content to leave to itself.^ 
 
 1. Dio IX. 19, etc. 
 
 2. See Freeman's essay " Alter Orbis."
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. 
 
 Aulus Plautius, the commander chosen for the 
 expedition, was probably at the time of his appoint- 
 ment (43 A. D.) in charge of Gallia Belgica, or possibly 
 of one of the German provinces on the Rhine. ^ He 
 seems to have been one of the best generals available 
 for a difficult undertaking. The selection of the officers 
 for the 'campaign was in the hands of Narcissus the 
 freedman minister ofClaudius,2 and it was his excellent 
 judgment assisted doubtless by Plautius' special know- 
 ledge in arranging all the details of the expedition that 
 made it so speedily successful. 
 
 The armament was a very elaborate one. Four 
 splendid legions, the Second Augusta, Twentieth 
 Valeria Victrix, and Fourteenth Gemina from the 
 Rhine, and the Ninth Hispana from Pannonia, com- 
 manded by such legates as Vespasian (of the Second 
 Augusta) and Hosidius Geta, were gathered together, 
 with perhaps a detachment of the Eighth Augusta also 
 stationed on the Rhine, and about thirty thousand 
 auxiliaries. 3 The whole array, according to Huebner, 
 numbered upwards of 70,000 men. 
 
 When all was ready for the departure, the troops 
 mutinied, refusing to be exiled " out of the world," for 
 no one's profit, but to satisfy the whimsical vanity of a 
 foolish emperor.4 Though the ignorant mob of the 
 City may have expected in some vague way a share in 
 
 I. See Fiirneaux p. 132 note 4. 2. Dio LX. ig. Sueton. Vesp. 4. 
 
 3. Dio LX. 20. Tac. Hist. III. 44- Josepiius B. J. II. 16. etc. See Huebner, 
 Exercitus Britannicus, in Hermes XVI. cp. C. I. L. VII. pp. 5, 3o5- The 
 inscriptions quoted do not prove that the Eighth Augusta or part of it went to 
 Britain. 4- Dio LX. 19-
 
 64 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the fruits of victory over possibly rich nations, and cer- 
 tainly looked forward to the largesses which a success- 
 ful emperor would be sure to distribute, the army 
 which may be supposed to have preserved traditions of 
 the fruitless hardships undergone by Julius Caesar's 
 men, did not deceive itself as to what lay before it.i In 
 Gaul, too, the home of most of the legionaries, since the 
 new commerce with Britain had made the island better 
 known, people were well aware that no portable booty 
 was to be got by the soldier. 
 
 Plautius being unable to put down the mutiny 
 himself, Narcissus came to the army and discipline was 
 soon restored. The whole force set sail after the long 
 delay caused by the mutiny, probably from Gesoria- 
 cum (Boulogne), Caesar's Portus Itius. At first the 
 wind was unfavorable, but finally the army landed, 
 following the course of Julius Caesar, in all probability 
 near the present Romney Marsh. 2 Perhaps the Britons 
 had heard of the mutiny and did not expect the land- 
 ing, for it took place unopposed. 3 But they were not 
 long idle, after the news of the invasion had spread. 
 Caratacus and Togodumnus held the numerous cantons 
 of southern Britain well together and made the Romans 
 earn every inch of their advance. 
 
 Some have thought that the Roman march was 
 directed northward from a place afterwards named 
 Clausentum, situated close to modern Southampton, or 
 from Venta (Winchester) "the first seat of the Roman 
 command. "4 The arguments for this view are: (i) The 
 excellence of the harbor of Southampton (Ptolemy's 
 '"Great Harbor") must have been early perceived by 
 the Romans. (2) The Roman road running from 
 
 1. Cp. Merivale VI. i8. 
 
 2. Huebner, R. H. W. p. 17. It is not necessary to suppose with Guest 
 (Grig. Celt. II. 3g9#) that the three divisions of the force mentioned by Dio 
 landed far apart from one another. 3. Dio LX. 19. 
 
 4. Huebner R. H. W. p. 19; Hermes XVI. pp. 528-529.
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. 6$ 
 
 Clausentum through Venta (Winchester) and Calleva 
 (Silchester) to Londinium was probably first laid by the 
 engineers of Plautius with a view to the systematic con- 
 quest of the country, from the base in Cogidubnus' 
 kingdom at the centre of the south coast. (3) King 
 Cogidubnus of the Regni, a tribe about the modern 
 Chichester, was the faithful friend and ally of the 
 Romans from the first time of the invasion of Plautius 
 down to the reign of Vespasian. i His services were 
 rewarded with a bestowal of territory and the title of 
 "Legatus August!" added to that of "Rex." The 
 state of the Regni, then, was used by the Romans, 
 following their fixed custom, as a fulcrum and as a 
 decoy, like the " friendly tribes " of North American 
 Indians two centuries ago. At Chichester the old seat 
 of Cogidubnus, several epigraphical monuments remain 
 from the earliest time of the Roman occupation, show- 
 ing the importance of the early relations with the 
 Regni for the Roman cause. 2 It has therefore been 
 supposed that the Romans first established themselves 
 at Venta near Chichester, founding Clausentum as a 
 naval station on one of the best natural harbors in the 
 world. 3 
 
 According to Huebner the leading exponent of this 
 theory, the Isle of Wight commanding the entrance to 
 the harbor of Southampton was one of the first con- 
 quests made by the Romans.4 He then traces their 
 march along the above mentioned road to Venta and 
 thence to Calleva. Here we are to suppose that 
 Plautius already acquainted with the configuration of 
 the western and eastern coasts of England, deeply 
 indented by the estuaries of the Severn and the 
 Thames, resolved to proceed as, it were by degrees of 
 
 I. Tac. Agr. 14. C. I. L. VII. 11. 2. Sec esp. C. I. L. VII. 11. 
 
 3. The Venta inscription (C. I. L. VII. 5) is also used as an argument, but 
 surely not seriously. 
 
 4. Huebner R. H. W. p. 21 ; Hermes XVI. 538. 
 
 y
 
 66 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 latitude, conquering the land symmetrically aud con. 
 temporaneously west and east.i While the fleet goes 
 around Land's End to make a diversion in the mouth 
 of the Severn, giving no heed, it may be observed, to 
 the siren tin-mines of Cornwall, or if we are to believe 
 Diodorus (or Posidonius ?) and his modern disciples,2 to 
 its gentle, conquest-inviting inhabitants, Plautius struck 
 into the territory of the Dobuni, fought and won a great 
 battle at the Avon River, and almost immediately after- 
 wards appeared at the heels of the Britons near the 
 mouth of the Thames, supported at this point also by 
 a division of the fleet.3 Here he halts, surely out of 
 breath, waiting for Claudius to join the army. Claudius 
 arrived, the troops impetuously clear the river and 
 press forward to Camulodunum, the seat of the domin- 
 ant dynasty of the Catuelauni. 
 
 The objections to this view, however, are over- 
 whelming. To the first argument for the harbor of 
 Southampton as the early station of the Roman fleet, 
 supporting a base of operations near Clausentum, the 
 answer is that the Romans probably landed near 
 Romney, and certainly always preferred a nearer port 
 to a more remote though better one.4 It was at Portus 
 Lemanae, near Romney, that the "Classis Britannica" 
 afterwards had its head-quarters,5 not at Clausentum. 
 As forthe Roman road running from Clausentum to Lon- 
 dinium, it is only necessary to recall that a road also ran 
 from Lemanae to Londinium through Durovernum (Can- 
 terbury). If Plautius' engineers built their roads intelli- 
 gently, we can hardly imagine that they started from any 
 other point than Lemanae, the landing place and per- 
 
 1. Huebner R. H.W. p. 20 : also "Gloucester the Roman Glevum,"a paper 
 in the Transactions of the Cottes.wold Club. 
 
 2. E. g. Edwards, p. 85 in Traill's Social England. 
 
 3. Huebner R. H. W. pp. 20-21. 
 
 4. Cp. Furneaux p. 135 n. 3. The three great entrances to Britain in 
 Roman times were Rutupiae, Dubris and Lemanae. See C. R. Smith, Arch. 
 Cantiana XVIII, p. 41- 5- ^- 1- L- VII. 18, 1226.
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. 6^ 
 
 manent head-quarters of the fleet. The third argument 
 of the Chichester base is of no weight, for Cogidubnus 
 could surely have assisted the Romans in Kent as well 
 as in Hampshire. 
 
 But the immediate building of a road from Clau- 
 sentum to Calleva, followed by an excursion into the 
 territories of the Dobuni (about Gloucester) would seem 
 to convict Plautius of a laughable uncertainty of pur- 
 pose. The unifying power in the British resistance was 
 the unquestioned supremacy of the Catuelaunian princes 
 Togodumnus and Caratacus.i The capital of their 
 realm was Camulodunum.2 This then should and must 
 have been the object of Plautius' attack. That he 
 should have wandered off to the Severn River to worry 
 some petty dependency of the Catuelauni instead of 
 straightway aiming at the very heart of the British resist- 
 anceappearsimpossible. And furtherthe assumption that 
 the Romans set out to conquer the island by a sym- 
 metrical advance northward in the west and the east is 
 wholly unwarranted. It is fairly certain that the con- 
 quest proceeded from the beginning far more speedily 
 in the east than in the west. 3 Nothing could have 
 been more natural. The eastern part of Britain must 
 have been much more densely populated, and the diffi- 
 culties of conquest were nothing to those presented by 
 the mountainous west. The centre of power was at 
 Camulodunum in Essex,4 afterwards the capital of the 
 "provincia," and the Romans as we know5 lost no time 
 in closing with Togodumnus and Caratacus, the result 
 of their overthrow being as Plautius expected the 
 annihilation of the united British resistance. 
 
 Perhaps the most untenable part of Huebner's 
 theory is his conjecture that the Roman fleet sailed 
 
 I. Cp. Edwards in "Social England" 1. 7-8- 2. Dio LX. 20. 
 
 3. Momnisen Frov. I. 193. Ruggiero, Diz. Epigr. I. p. 1030b. 
 
 4. See Tac. Ann. XII. 37- 5- Dio LX. 20.
 
 68 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 along the east and west coasts to aid the operations of 
 the land army. It is impossible to believe that the 
 Romans knew the way around Land's End to the 
 mouth of the Severn at this time. There is every 
 reason to believe that they entirely neglected the south- 
 western corner of the island then and for long after- 
 wards. i The fleet may have sailed along the east coast 
 to the Thames, but there is not the slightest ground for 
 saying that it did. 2 
 
 The only reasonable view of the course taken by 
 Plautius is that adopted by Merivale and Mommsen. 
 The landing of the Romans at Lemanae was followed 
 by a march not to the Isle of Wight, the Severn and 
 other outlying places, but straight upon Camulodunum 
 through Kent and Surrey. 
 
 It is probable that Cogidubnus became almost im- 
 mediately attached to the Roman cause. One of the 
 first acts of Plautius, according to Dio, was to secure the 
 alliance of the Boduni, a tribe whose prince was the 
 vassal of the Catuelaunian kings. An ingenious and 
 plausible suggestion has been made that these Boduni, 
 wrongly identified by Huebner and others with the 
 Dobuni, but placed by Mommsen in the south-east part 
 of England, were the tribe ruled over by Cogidubnus 
 and known later to the Romans as the Regni.3 The 
 invasion must have at once tempted Cogidubnus, 
 doubtless a disaffected vassal, to join issues with the 
 foreign foe against the native domination of the Catue- 
 launi. Dio also says that a garrison was left among the 
 
 1. Momm. Prov. I. 193. Huebner R. H. W. 17. 
 
 2. Cp. notes 4 and 2 to pp. 69 and 72 below. The naval triumph of Claudius 
 must be referred simply to the boast of conquering the ocean, and not to 
 important co-operation of the fleet with the land force. 
 
 3. Furneaux p. 135 n. i. Cp. Rhys C.B. p. 300 — " Regni — probably more cor- 
 rectly Regnii, a derivative from regnum. That is the state of Cogidubnus who 
 as the ally of the Romans was permitted to retain his title of king, was /ar 
 excellence the regnum and its people the Regnii, their Celtic name being 
 forgotten."
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. 6q 
 
 Boduni, which while probable enough of the tribe under 
 Cogidubnus, would be impossible for the Dobuni of 
 Gloucestershire who were independent some time after- 
 wards. But Cogidubnus, whether king of the Boduni 
 or not, very early threw in his lot with the Romans and 
 possibly gave good assistance to Plautius in his march 
 to the Thames. 
 
 After the submission of the Boduni, the Romans 
 advanced to a certain river, perhaps the Medway, and 
 forced the passage in a livelj' fight in which Vespasian 
 distinguished himself.i The next day the Britons 
 rallied and opposed a stubborn resistance to the Roman 
 advance. But in spite of the most unyielding valor 
 that had confronted the Romans since the Punic wars, 
 they were defeated with heavy loss, chiefly owing to a 
 brilliant and daring manoeuvre of Hosidius Geta.2 
 
 The patriot army now somewhat discouraged 
 retreated sullenly and slowly to the Thames, crossing it 
 near the mouth.3 Plautius pressed forward as rapidly 
 as he dared, and attempted to pass the river. But the 
 Britons at first succeeded in repulsing him. On a second 
 trial the Romans overcame all obstacles, rushing the 
 British position on the north bank and driving the 
 natives into the marshes.4 Many were killed on both 
 sides. Togodumnus died fighting, but his spirit still 
 lived in his brother Caratacus. The fury of the Britons 
 at the loss of their prince nerved them for a moment to 
 so determined a resistance that Plautius thought best to 
 halt his troops and strengthen his hold on the territor}' 
 already won. He sent for the emperor, as Claudius had 
 ordered him to do in case any serious emergency 
 should arise. 5 Probably after all Plautius merely 
 
 I. Dio LX. 20. Cp. Merivale VI. 22. 2. Dio LX. 20. 
 
 3. Probably at London. See Furneaux p. 136 n. 2. 
 
 4. Dio LX. 20. Not a word is said of any help rendered by the fleet at this 
 juncture. 5. Dio LX. 21.
 
 7o ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 wished to gratify the emperor by giving him a chance 
 to pretend that by taking the field himself he had 
 snatched victory from defeat. i Plautius knew that his 
 game was won. Encamped on the north bank of the 
 Thames,2 he was within striking distance of Camulo 
 dunum. Nothing remained but to traverse a level 
 tract of a few miles. 
 
 The progress of the Roman army, considering the 
 fierceness of the British fighting, had been quite rapid. 
 Claudius left Rome about July or August 43 A. D. 
 and Plautius must have crossed the Thames and sent 
 the message some weeks before that. 3 While the 
 emperor was on his wa}^ to Britain, Plautius probably 
 pushed on the work of building roads, improving his 
 connections and tightening his grip on the conquered 
 territory. 
 
 Journeying with all haste, Claudius reached Britain 
 early in autumn accompanied by several distinguished 
 officers, Galba, Valerius Asiaticus, L. Junius Silanus, 
 Cn. Pompeius Magnus, Cn. Sentius Saturninus and 
 others.4 It is not certain that Claudius did not bring 
 with him the detachment of the Eighth Augusta from 
 Mayence, or other reinforcements. 5 Perhaps some of 
 the auxiliaries enumerated by Huebner first came to 
 Britain with Claudius.6 But the evidence for the mili- 
 tary details of this whole campaign is so scanty that it 
 is not possible to say with certainty that the Eighth 
 Augusta or part of it went to Britain at all. 
 
 If Claudius did bring more troops with him, they 
 were not needed. While Plautius was waiting /or the 
 
 1. See Merivale VI. 22. 
 
 2. That Claudius crossed the Thames without trouble means that Plautius 
 held the north bank. 
 
 3. Dio LX. 23. Cp. Furneaux p. 136. Plautius could hardly have con- 
 quered the Isle of Wight and a large part of western England so soon, as 
 Huebner thinks. 4- See Huebner's list, Hermes XVI. 
 
 5. Cp. above p. 63 n. 3. 6. Cp. Schiller I. 320.
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. Jl 
 
 emperor's arrival, the Britons had time to reflect a little 
 on their defeats and the inevitable power of their 
 enemy. The first sting of passionate grief at the death 
 of Togodumnus once abated, the courage of the natives 
 must have been relaxed, and hearts that once trusted 
 for victory to the fallen hero would recoil in dismay 
 from another conflict with his conqueror. Probably 
 some princes now went over to the Romans, making the 
 best terms they could for themselves. Even Caratacus, 
 feeling himself helpless to avert the fate of his people 
 and moved to despair at the loss of his brother, seems 
 to have retired to his dependencies in the west, aban- 
 doning all attempt to check the progress of the legions 
 to his capital. I 
 
 On arriving in Britain Claudius took the field in 
 person, crossed the Thames and advanced upon Camu- 
 odunum without meeting any serious opposition. 2 The 
 town fell immediately and with it the organizing force 
 of the Catuelaunian hegemony. Caratacus still re- 
 mained a powerful opponent of the Romans in the 
 west, but he was now a prince without a city, influential 
 only through the magnetism of his own personality. 
 Henceforth the several British tribes fought single- 
 handed with the Romans or with each other, and one 
 at a time were subdued or submitted to the foreign 
 yoke. 3 
 
 Claudius stayed in the island just long enough to 
 constitute Britain a province of the empire and install 
 Plautius as first governor. The annexation of Britain 
 was perhaps not formally ratified by the senate until the 
 following year, 44.4 Claudius returned to the continent 
 after spending only sixteen days in Britain, and of this 
 time not more than a week or ten days at most north of 
 the Thames. 5 
 
 I. Tac. Ann. XII. 33. 2. Sueton. Claud. 17. C. I. L. VI. 920. 
 
 3. Tac. Agr. 12,32. 4- Dio LX. 23. 5- Dio LX. 23. 
 
 >.
 
 72 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 The emperor was hugely pleased at the outcome 
 of his expedition. As soon as he returned to Rome, 
 in the early part of 44 A. D., he celebrated a grand 
 triumph and showered distinctions and promotions upon 
 those who had helped him to success. The cringing 
 senate shouted praises for its happy ruler till it must 
 have almost come to really believe in him. His infant 
 son received the name Britannicus. In order to facili- 
 tate the conquest of Britain, the measures which Clau- 
 dius or his lieutenant Aulus Plautius might take were 
 allowed to be valid without the sanction of the senate. 
 An arch of triumph was erected over the Via Flaminia 
 n Rome. I Poets proclaimed the conquest of the 
 ocean, 2 and Claudius himself toyed with this conceit, 
 celebrating a naval triumph in the Adriatic. 3 In the 
 emotional hurrahs that rang throughout the empire,4 
 there was no place for the logical considerations of 
 policy. The citizens were glad to know that the 
 aggressive power of Rome was still vigorous. As re- 
 ports of the wealth of Britain in lead and iron mines 
 came to the business centres, the joy of conquest be- 
 came more pointed. Nobody cared anything about a 
 blunder of statesmanship, for nobody then believed that 
 a thousand mistakes in policy could shake the structure 
 of the empire. 
 
 The fatal step had been taken. Seventy thousand 
 of Rome's best soldiers were set to the task of building 
 roads, redeeming marshes and fighting the bravest of 
 barbarians in a land altogether outside of the imperial 
 frontier system. To withdraw would henceforth be 
 next to impossible. " In military undertakings there 
 lies an inner fatality which, once they are begun, leaves 
 
 1. Dio LX. 21-23. 
 
 2. Anthol. Lat. (Riese) 419-426. Cp. Hegesippus B. J. II. 9. 
 
 3. Pliny H. N. Ill 20. 
 
 4. Cp. Huebner R. H. W. p. 24, and Revue Archeologique II. Ser. 
 XXXI. p. 103.
 
 THE CLAUDIAN INVASION. 73 
 
 no longer any room for the consideration whether they 
 are to be pursued further or not."i The Romans were 
 now committed to the occupation of a new and distant 
 province which their conservative spirit and indomit- 
 able tenacity would maintain for three hundred and 
 fifty years. As an immediate result of the new con- 
 quest, the plan of Julius Caesar and Augustus for the 
 annexation of Germany was definitely given up by 
 Claudius, 2 and thoisgh for a moment revived by Trajan 
 never afterwards figured prominently in the Roman 
 foreign policy. 
 
 1. Ranke III. 198. 
 
 2. Tac. Ann. XI. 19. 
 
 /
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 
 
 Britain was now formally enrolled among the con- 
 sular provinces directly controlled by the emperor. 
 Aulus Plautius, " Legatus Augusti pro Praetore," was 
 assisted in the administration by the ordinary official 
 staff. A procurator, either a knight or a freedman of 
 the emperor, I represented the interests of the fiscus, a 
 finance lord responsible directly to the emperor and 
 though politically subordinate to the legate, to a certain 
 degree independent in his own sphere. 2 
 
 As in the other provinces a tribute was fixed for 
 the subjected tribes to pay annually. The procurator 
 drew up the usual assessment lists and probably from 
 the very first collected the taxes immediately through 
 his servants, often public slaves or freedmen,3 abandon- 
 ing the old mode still partially retained in other prov- 
 inces, of farming out the revenues of the fiscus to 
 publicans. No doubt those tribes which submitted to 
 Roman rule without striking a blow for their liberty 
 were treated with somewhat less rigor and oppression 
 by the Roman finance officials, although " civitates 
 liberae " and " foederatae " were subject to taxation as 
 much as the ordinary provincials.4 But the Catue- 
 launi, Trinovantes and other tribes that fought for their 
 freedom were made to feel not only the galling pressure 
 of a regular system of taxation, always detested by an 
 
 1. Decianus Catus and Julius Classicianus seem to have been knights or there 
 is no meaning in the ridicule heaped on Polyclitus (Tac. Ann. XIV. 39). 
 
 2. Cp. Tac. Agr. 15 aeque discordiam— aeque concordiam. Also Ann. 
 XIV. 38. 
 
 3. Agr. 15 alterius servos ; 19 libertos servosque publicae rei. 
 
 4. See Unger in Leipziger Studien X. De Cens. Prov. p. 62.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 75 
 
 uncivilized people, but also the abuses of that system, all 
 the cruelty and extortion of which the corrupt Roman 
 civil service was capable. 
 
 It was not the procurator and his satellites however 
 who gave the Britons their first taste of slavery. The 
 bravery and splendid physique of the native youth 
 adapted them for the Roman auxiliary service. While 
 the procurators could make little for some time out of a 
 barbarous, uncultivated land, Plautius and his successors 
 enforced the military conscription, drafting contingents 
 of British auxiliaries for service in Britain and in 
 different parts of the empire.i 
 
 Wherever the governor's troops went, violence and 
 outrage were sure to follow, until the forms of the new 
 government should have time to impress themselves 
 upon a thoroughly pacified country. Territorially the 
 province, or that part of the country directly adminis- 
 tered by the governor, exclusive of the dependent 
 principalities, was for a time somewhat vaguely defined, 
 and certainly not very extensive. But the levy still 
 more than the tribute applied alike to all parts of the 
 country overawed by the legions. 
 
 Most severe for the subject people must have been 
 the various requisitions squeezed out of them by the 
 subactores or other ofificers of the governor. The 
 Britons had to furnish a fixed annual amount of corn or 
 other provisions for the public magazines of the prov- 
 ince, find horses, beasts of burden, wood, fodder, etc., 
 for the armies, and submit to the quartering of soldiers 
 upon them. 2 All these burdens falling suddenly upon 
 them along with the loss of their independence, and 
 before they could begin to appreciate the law and 
 order of Roman rule, must have filled the majority of 
 
 1. Tac. Agr. i8 ; 31 ; 32. 
 
 2. Tac. Agr. ig. Cp. Darembeig and Saglio, art. Annona. 
 
 "y
 
 ^6 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 the natives with the deepest hatred of their alien mas- 
 ters and tended to render very uncertain the perman- 
 ence of the province. 
 
 Plautius was obliged to rule with a strong hand. 
 Though many native princes had made their submission, 
 among them Cogidubnus of Chichester and Prasu- 
 taeus of the Iceni (in Norfolk and Suffolk), and the 
 whole east as far north as modern Lincolnshire was 
 therefore nominally subject to Plautius,i it was evident 
 that the establishment of Roman power in the shape of 
 a regular, just and systematic administration would not 
 be immediately realized. The work of Plautius was to 
 introduce Roman law and justice so far as feasible, to 
 open up the country for imperial exploitation and 
 private enterprise, and to make the actual limits of his 
 jurisdiction coincide as nearly as possible with the 
 theoretical bounds of "Britannia," that is to conquer as 
 much of the island as he could. 2 
 
 During the four years of his command Plautius 
 assisted by his able lieutenant Vespasian succeeded in 
 materially extending his dominion in the south-west. 
 Vespasian commanding the second legion conquered the 
 Isle of Wight and reduced two powerful tribes to sub- 
 mission.3 Perhaps the Isle of Wightwas part ofthe gift 
 of territory with which the Romans rewarded the good 
 services of King Cogidubnus, though it is possible that 
 only his own rightful dominions were "presented " to 
 him by his powerful and not too generous friends, much 
 as the North American Indians have been " granted " 
 reserves.4 
 
 1. Tac. Ann. XII. 31; XIV. 31. 
 
 2. Theoretically the whole island was annexed in 43 A. D. Cp. Ann. XIV. 
 2g subiecturum ei provinciam. The Romans annexed tirst and subdued after- 
 wards— Haverfield in Arch. Journ. Vol. XLIX, p. 223. 
 
 3. Sueton. Vesp. 4. Dio LX. 30— The story of Titus rescuing his father is 
 pure fiction. See Furneaux, and Sueton. Tiberius 2. 
 
 4. Cp. Furneaux p. 13b.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE T'ROVINCE. 'J'] 
 
 It would appear that Vespasian even extended his 
 conquests over Devonshire which was perhaps but 
 thinly populated and therefore, as its Dumnonian 
 inhabitants proved submissive, drew little notice from 
 the Romans. I " Legend and coins alike connect the 
 names of Isca (Exeter) and Vespasian, and the slight 
 notices that history gives of his British exploits may 
 lead us to believe that it was he who, while Claudius 
 reigned, made Isca an outpost of Rome. "2 
 
 The course of conquest under Plautius would seem 
 to have partly followed the line which Huebner claimed 
 for the first operations of the Claudian expedition. Be- 
 tween 44 and 47 A. D. the Roman columns advanced 
 perhaps along the road from Chichester to Calleva 
 (Silchester) and from Londinium to Calleva. Two 
 causes would determine this line of adv^^pe. The city 
 of Cogidubnus and Londinium must ha^e been excel- 
 lent bases for operations in the west, while the military 
 road connecting Camulodunum, Londinium and Chi- 
 chester effectively secured the south-eastern corner of 
 the island. The second rea&Qn, which was the cause for 
 fighting in the west rather tK&iit> farther north, was that 
 Caratacus had taken up the cudgels again and was 
 most active in organizing a coalition of his former 
 dependencies in the west in order to lead once more 
 an attack upon the Romans. It is possible also that 
 the Romans may have got news of the Somerset mines 
 which they soon began to work. 
 
 At any rate when the extant part of Tacitus' narra- 
 tive takes up the history of the British wars at the 
 appointment of Plautius' successor P. Ostorius Scapula, 
 we find the Romans, after many a hard won fight that 
 
 1. See Merivale VI. 26, n. i -coins of Claudius found at Exeler. Perhaps 
 the tile of the II Augusta found at Honey Ditches (Devon) in i8gi, has some 
 connection with the early conquests of Vespasian. Cp. Ptolemy II. 3. 13. See 
 Haverheld in Arch. Journ. XLIX, pp. 180-181. 
 
 2. Freeman, Exeter (Historic Towns Series) p. 11.
 
 yS ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 must be left to our imagination, masters of southern and 
 central England. i The tribes that still remained free 
 were the Dumnonii of Cornwall, the Silures and Ordo- 
 vices of Wales and the western counties of England, 
 and the Brigantes in the north. But if the influence of 
 the Romans already extended so widely, the sphere of * 
 their administrative activity was still restricted to that 
 part of the country south of a line to be drawn perhaps 
 from Camulodunum to Glevum (Gloucester) through 
 Verulamium (St. Albans).2 North of this line the Iceni 
 and the inland cantons of the Catuelauni, perhaps now 
 fallen underthe headship of the Iceni,3wereonly partially 
 subjected to Roman authority, and even south of the 
 line several tribes were still formally autonomous, not 
 to mention the independent clans of the Dumnonii. 
 
 For his distinguished services in thus laying the 
 basis of a Roman province in Britain Plautius was hon- 
 ored on his return to Rome in 47 A. D. with permission 
 to enter the city in triumph.4 Since 26 B. C. no 
 private citizen had won this signal mark of imperial 
 favor, and Plautius was the last to receive it. 5 Nor 
 were the merits of Vespasian forgotten. Returning 
 from Britain with his chief he was decorated with the 
 triumphal insignia. 6 
 
 P. Ostorius Scapula the new governor did not 
 assume his duties until late in 47.7 He was a man well 
 adapted to handle a half formed province, a strict dis- 
 ciplinarian, a hard fighter and capable of strong initia- 
 tive. As often happened afterwards in Britain the 
 change of governors was the signal for a general relax- 
 ation of discipline among the troops, and renewed 
 activity among the enemy. § The legionaries worn 
 
 1. Tac. Ann. XII. 31 #. Cp. Mommsen. Prov. I. 192. Furneaux, p. 138. 
 
 2. Cp. Furneaux p. 138. 3. See Merivale VI. 27. 
 
 4. Dio LX. 30. Tac. Ann. XIII. 32. 5. Mommsen, Staatsrecht I. 136. i. 
 6. Sueton. Vesp. 4. 7'. Ann. XII. 31- i- 
 
 5. Ann. XII. 31. Cp. Agr. 18.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 79 
 
 by constant privation and exposure welcomed the 
 chance for a brief indulgence in the pleasures of inac- 
 tivity. The enemy took advantage of the late- 
 ness of the season and the unreadiness of the 
 Romans, to make incursions into the territories of the 
 friendly tribes. The dependent tribes that had not yet 
 resigned themselves to the sway of the fasces were 
 ready to go over to the side of their belligerent com- 
 patriots at the slightest encouragement. Bat Ostorius 
 laid a heavy hand on all these symptoms of disorder, 
 and by his timely and decided action made himself 
 respected by his soldiers and feared by the Britons. i 
 
 It is hard to say exactly how the Roman army was 
 distributed at this time over the conquered territory. 
 Huebner supposing that the conquest radiated from the 
 harbor of Southampton inclines to place the bulk of the 
 troops in camps south of the Thames. But the pro- 
 gress of the occupation seems to have been from more 
 than one base. That so many Roman roads centred in 
 London can be no chance occurrence. The London 
 stone2 seems to have had its meaning. The road from 
 Londinium to Calleva probably had as much to do with 
 the conquest of the Atrebates as the road from Venta 
 to Calleva. While a large division of the army may 
 have been in camp at some time in Venta Belgarum 
 (Winchester), it is most unlikely that here was the first 
 great, general camp of 40,000 men. 3 All that can be 
 affirmed with any plausibility is that at most two legions 
 with their auxiliaries camped here, perhaps the Second 
 and Twentieth. These two legions would seem to 
 have been from the beginning assigned to the west, 
 where they afterwards for over two centuries had their 
 
 1. Ann. XII. 31. 
 
 2. Smith, Diet. Antiq. II. p. T72a. But see Huebner in C. I. L. VII p. 21a. 
 
 3. Cp. Haverfield in Class. Rev. (1895) p. 236.
 
 8o ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Standing camps. i Vespasian who commanded the 
 second legion subdued the Isle of Wight, and the 
 earliest inscriptions of soldiers of the Twentieth have 
 been found at Bath. On the other hand there is no 
 evidence that either the Ninth or the Fourteenth was 
 at this time engaged in the south. The early inscrip- 
 tions of these legions set up in places north of the 
 Thames were doubtless destroyed in the insurrection 
 of 6i A. D. which did not extend south of that river.2 
 Moreover a large number of troops must have been 
 required from the first to hold down the Trinovantes 
 and Catuelauni, to impress soldiers, and to overawe the 
 Iceni and other northern tribes. The first permanent 
 camp built in Britain, that of the XIV Gemina, may be 
 placed at Camulodunum,3 and the IX Hispana was 
 surely not far away ,4 perhaps at Verulamium, the old 
 stronghold of Cassivelaunus. The road between Lon- 
 dinium and Verulamium, later prolonged to Venonae and 
 Viroconium, would connect the camp at Verulamium 
 with the supplies and military stores of the mercantile 
 metropolis. 
 
 We may with some mental reservation follov/ 
 Huebner in assuming Glevum to have been the first 
 stationary camp of the II Augusta. Though no 
 inscriptions of any kind have been found at Gloucester, 
 the place abounds in other remains of the Roman city. 
 The form of the camp which contained forty-five acres 
 can still be traced. 5 Uninscribed tiles, pieces of tessel- 
 ated pavement, arms, pottery, reliefs, etc., have been 
 
 I. C. I. L. VII, sections 13, 16, 17. Ephem. Epigr. VII. Mommsen, 
 Prov. I. 193. 2. See ch. VII. 
 
 3. Huebner, Hermes XVI, pp. 533-534 — " The fact that the colonia of 
 Camulodunum established 51 A. D. was unprotected by fortifications is easiest 
 explained by the proximity of a legionary camp." 
 
 4. Cp. Ann. XIV. 32 ; and XII. 40 where the legion not named, probably the 
 ninth (Huebner, Hermes XVI, p. 535) is engaged in the north. 
 
 5. See Furneaux p. 138 n. i, and Huebner's paper "The Roman Glevum " 
 in the Transactions of the Cotteswold Club.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 8 1 
 
 unearthed from time to time. Parts of the Roman 
 walls are said to be still extant. The coins found at 
 Gloucester are chiefly of Claudius, both original and 
 imitated. I That no inscriptions have been found com- 
 memorating the presence of the Second Augusta at 
 Glevum is perhaps due to its early advance to lasting 
 quarters at Isca (Caerleon).2 
 
 It is almost impossible even to surmise where the 
 "stativa" of the twentieth legion was situated in 47 
 A. D. Ikit as this legion seems to have been early em- 
 ployed in the west, its camp may have been at or near 
 Aquae Sulis (Bath). Here it would keep in subjection 
 the Belgic people among whom were the Mendip lead 
 mines, already-operated by the Romans in 49 A. D.3 
 The actual superintendence however of the gangs of 
 enslaved Britons employed in mining and working the 
 lead was doubtless entrusted to auxiliary cohorts. 
 
 The auxiliaries under Ostorius' command, some 
 30,000 men, foot and horse, were for the most part 
 assigned to particular legions and naturally shared their 
 camps.4 Detachments of auxiliaries must have been 
 scattered nevertheless in various posts throughout the 
 half pacified country. 5 
 
 Ostorius quickly proved to his troops that he was 
 not to be trifled with. Though the winter had already 
 set in, he took the field with a flying division of light 
 auxiliary infantry, and falling suddenly upon the scat- 
 tered bands of the enemy which were wantoning in the 
 fields of the dependent allies and friendly tribes, he 
 soon rid the country of them. Then without losing any 
 time in following up his success Ostorius forced the 
 
 1. Archaeologia XVIII (1815) p. 120, and Furneaux p. 138 n.i. 
 
 2. Haverfield however holds that there is " no evidence that Glevum was 
 ever a fortress proper during the Roman occupation."— Aich. Journ. XLIX, p. 
 223 n. 2. 3. C. I. L. VII. 1202. 
 
 4. Huebner, Herm.es XVI p. 548, cites Tac. Hist. I. 59 ; IV. 62. 
 
 5. Ann. XIV. 33, 34; Agr. 16. i.
 
 82 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Iceni and other northerly tribes which he suspected of 
 collusion with the enemy to give up their arms, and 
 made ready to occupy the whole country south of the 
 Trent River and the Wash, and east of the Severn. i 
 
 These vigorous measures which plainly aimed at 
 destroying any remnant of freedom in central England 
 caused a great insurrection in which several tribes, the 
 Tceni in the lead, took part. The Iceni had hitherto 
 been fast friends of the Romans. Ostorius attacked 
 them intrenched in a strong position with only his 
 auxiliary troops, and after hard fighting won the vic- 
 tory. The other revolted tribes hearing of the over- 
 throw of the Iceni laid down their arms. 2 Ostorius was 
 now master of the central counties. It was apparently 
 at this time also that the Brigantes, the great tribe 
 north of the Trent, under their queen Cartimandua 
 made some sort of submission to the Roman governor.3 
 Perhaps the ninth legion was now moved into quarters 
 at Venta Icenorum (Norwich), to make sure that Prasu- 
 tagus should conduct himself properly for the future. 
 These events seem to have taken place before the close 
 of 47.4 
 
 Next year the Romans advanced into the territory 
 of the Decangi, a tribe of north Wales, probably 
 located in Flint and Cheshire.5 The Decangi did not 
 dare meet the Romans in the field. Ostorius was 
 engaged in wasting and plundering the land, and had 
 
 1. Tac. Ann. XII. 31. 2 cunctaque cis Trisantonam (the emendation of 
 Heraeus supported by Bradley) . See Furneaux' note. Bradley's reading does 
 less violence to the MS. text than any other. Ciincia is a broad word, not to 
 be satisfied with the establishment of a single camp {casiris), nor with the inter- 
 pretation of Trisantona=Tern. The advance to the Trent moreover alone 
 furnishes a meaning for the sudden reversal of attitude on the part of the Iceni. 
 Haverfield now assents to Bradley's view. See his paper in the Chester 
 Archaeological Journal Vol. V. Pt. I (1893) p. 103. 
 
 2. Ann. XII. 32. I. 
 
 3. XII. 32. 3 prioribus firmatis. 
 
 4. Ostorius still has only his auxiliaries in the field, XII, 31. 5- Cp. 31. 2. 
 
 5. Haverfield in Arch. Journ. XLIX, pp. 221-223.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 83 
 
 almost reached the north coast of Wales, when dissen- 
 sions among the Brigantes, arising no doubt from the 
 hostility of the anti-Roman element to their pro-Roman 
 queen, called him back. His intervention and punish- 
 ment of the disaffected restored order and the suprem- 
 acy of Cartimandua. 
 
 The Silures next engaged Ostorius' attention. 
 Finding that he could do nothing with them by either 
 violence or diplomacy, Ostorius resolved to push for- 
 ward into their territory and plant legionary camps 
 there. I But before doing so he settled a colony of 
 veterans, the colonia Victricensis, at Camulodunum, 
 which should be the capital and central garrison of the 
 established province. 2 Here a temple was erected to 
 the emperor Claudius, intended to be like the altar of 
 Augustus at Lugudunum (Lyons) the centre of the pro- 
 vincial cultus of Rome. 3 The fourteenth legion seems 
 to have been at this time transferred to the west, to 
 take part in the great effort against the Silures. 4 
 
 Driven from point to point by the armies of 
 Plautius, the heroic Caratacus had at last found in the 
 mountainous home of the Silures a stronghold of free- 
 dom and barbarian valor which he could hope to 
 defend against his enemy. His romantic fame as a 
 guerrilla leader and as a patriot was a sure passport to 
 the Silures. They made him their commander and 
 their trust in him was increased by many successful 
 fights fought under his leadership. 5 
 
 Caratacus seems to have justified the hopes of the 
 Silures by his skilful conduct of the war during three 
 years 49-51, against the three legions at least under 
 
 1. Ann. XII. 32- 
 
 2. Furneaux p. 142. Orell. 208. cp. Doniaszewski in Rhein. Mus.iSgsp. 
 345 n. 2. MerivaleVI. 32. See also Pliny H.N. II. 77, vvheie the distance to 
 Mona is measured from C. 
 
 3. -Ainn. XIV. 31. cp. Furneaux p. 142. 
 
 4. See Momuisen Prov. I. 193. Meyer, in Philnlogus XLVII, p. 659. 
 
 5. Ann. XII. 33. 
 
 7
 
 84 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Ostorius, and the auxiliary forces in addition. Almost 
 no details of this war have been described by Tacitus, 
 but that Caratacus held his own against the Romans for 
 three years, baffling all the military science and dashing 
 enterprise of Ostorius, proves how nobly the British 
 prince had borne his misfortunes and how, taught by 
 experience and adversity, he closed his career even 
 more gloriously than it had begun. He appears after a 
 period of indecisive warfare to have drawn Ostorius off 
 to the territory of the Ordovices in northern Wales, 
 In the year 511 he had once more brought about a 
 coalition of tribes against the Romans. Rendered con- 
 fident perhaps by his successes and by the increased 
 numbers of his army, and perhaps tired of the slow 
 monotony of guerrilla warfare, Caratacus now ventured 
 a pitched battle. 
 
 He chose a very strong position somewhere in the 
 Welsh mountains. The Roman army advanced furi- 
 ously to the attack, though Ostorius himself had at first 
 hesitated. The consciousness of superiority in men 
 who had not known defeat in open fight bore down all 
 resistance. The victory of the Romans was complete. 
 Caratacus' wife, daughter and brothers fell into the 
 hands of Ostorius. He himself fled to Cartimandua 
 queen of the Brigantes, and was promptly delivered in 
 irons to the Roman governor. 2 
 
 The people in Italy were eager to see the man who 
 had defied their armies for so many )^ears. Caratacus 
 was brought to Rome, and after being exhibited in the 
 Campus Martius with his wife, daughter and brothers, 
 received the emperor's pardon. The senate indulged 
 in some chatter about former illustrious captives, com- 
 paring Claudius to P. Scipio and L. Paulus. Triumphal 
 insignia were granted to Ostorius. 3 The emperor 
 
 I. Ann. XII. 36. I. 2, Ann. XII. 33-36. 3. Ann. XII. 38. 
 
 l\
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 85 
 
 magnified himself and smiled royally on the boom in 
 statues and arch-building. 
 
 But in the meantime the Silures driven to despera- 
 tion by the downfall of the coalition in northern and 
 central Wales suddenly assailed a Roman camp which 
 had been built in their territory (probably at Isca) and 
 was garrisoned by some legionary cohorts. The 
 Roman force narrowly escaped annihilation. Ostorius 
 was now in failing health, worn out by his prolonged 
 exertions, anxieties, and exposure to the rains and cold 
 of four campaigns in a wild, comfortless country. But 
 he continued to prosecute with feverish energy a war of 
 extermination against the stubborn Silures. At the 
 last, though he seems to have kept his hold on Isca, his 
 declining powers became apparent in a series of small 
 disasters. When Ostorius died, the cause of the Silures 
 had become so prosperous that they were inducing 
 some tribes to revolt, and the province might at any 
 time be at their mercy. i 
 
 The successor of Ostorius, A. Didius Gallus, made 
 a quick journey to Britain, but probably did not arrive 
 there before the beginning of 52 A. D.2 In the mean- 
 time a legion under Manlius Valens suffered a defeat 
 from the Silures and the enemy was ravaging Roman 
 territory. Didius already an old man had a great repu- 
 tation as a general. 3 But he was also a statesman, and 
 though his peaceful policy, so necessary for the organ- 
 ization of the province, was distasteful to a paper 
 warrior like Tacitus, it was Didius who changed Roman 
 Britain from a great military camp to something more 
 like a regularly administered province. After driving 
 the Silures back into their fastnesses, the governor 
 refrained from further conquest and devoted his five 
 
 1. Tac, Ann. XII. 38-39. 
 
 2. Ann. XII. 40. cp. Huebner in Khein. Mus. 1857 p. 48. 
 
 3. Ann. XII. 15 ; 40.
 
 86 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 years' administration to the consolidation of the prov- 
 ince. i Besides a slight, perfunctory advance of out- 
 posts, the only act of aggrandizement attributed to him 
 was an armed interference in the civil war between 
 Cartimandua queen of the Brigantes and her consort 
 Venutius. Cartimandua was rescued from extreme 
 peril, but Venutius retained the sovereignty over part 
 of the Brigantes. 2 In the west Isca was held as an ad- 
 vanced post among the Silures, possibly garrisoned by 
 detached cohorts, and not yet by the II Augusta 
 which remained at Glevum.3 Viroconium also dates 
 from the wars of Ostorius as an outpost against the 
 Ordovices, occupied it may be by the fourteenth and 
 twentieth legions.4 The ninth legion may on the 
 occasion of the Brigantian trouble under Didius have 
 been moved forward from Venta Icenorum to Lindum 
 (Lincoln). 5 
 
 The quiet rule of Didius gave a great impulse to 
 commerce, to the immigration of merchants, artizans, 
 laborers and other Roman or Romanized inhabitants of 
 the empire, and to the v/orking of the lead mines in the 
 Mendip Hills of Somersetshire.^ 
 
 Britain was perhaps the most productive mineral 
 territory belonging to the Romans except Spain. 7 It 
 was soon found necessary to limit the annual output of 
 lead by law. 8 For some unaccountable reason the 
 valuable tin mines of Cornwall do not seem to have 
 been discovered and worked until a late period of the 
 
 I. Ann. XII. 40. 7 " per ministros agere " indicates the development of bur- 
 eaux of administration. 2. Tac. Hist. III. 45 ; Ann. XII. 40. 
 
 3 Ann. XII. 32; 38. cp. Momnisen Prov. I. 193 and Huebner in Hermes 
 
 XVI, p. 530-533. 
 
 4. C. I. L. VII. 154,155. cp. Mommsen Prov. I. 193 and Domaszewski, Rh. 
 Mils. (i8g3) p. 342. 
 
 5. Cp. Ruggiero Diz. Epigr. Vol. 1. io3cb. 
 
 6. Ann. XIV. 33. Dio. LXII. 8. i. C. I. L. VII. \2.o\ ff. 
 
 7. Cp. Cox, Arch. Journ. 1895 p. 26. 
 
 8. Pliny H. N. XXXIV. 49.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 8/ 
 
 occupation.! I3ut the lead and iron mines of Somerset- 
 shire and the iron of Gloucestershire must have been 
 very extensively worked under the government of 
 Didius Gallus.2 The revenues of these mines were 
 appropriated by the emperor for his patrimonium or 
 private purse. 3 The Britons who were found working 
 the mines now toiled for the profit of their masters.4 
 Roman metallurgic science vastly increased the output 
 of lead and iron, and from some of the lead much 
 silver was extracted 
 
 Didius constructed and improved many roads, for 
 example from Londinium to Viroconium, Glevum to 
 Isca, Glevum to Viroconium, etc. These roads were of 
 course built for military purposes rather than as 
 avenues of trade. Forests began to be cut down and 
 marshes drained, in great part by enforced British 
 labor, in order to clear the ground for roads and agri- 
 culture. 5 The Britons of the interior were taught to 
 put their trust in crops as well as in flocks and herds.6 
 Fruit-trees were introduced. 7 Glass and pottery manu- 
 factures began to be carried on b>- Roman citizens in 
 the towns of the southeast.8 This part of the island 
 was now so thoroughly pacified that the tribes south of 
 the Thames, perhaps sharing the prosperity of Cogi- 
 dubnus as traditionally good subjects, did not revolt 
 with the rest of Britain in 6i A. D. 
 
 Londinium was among the most thriving commer- 
 cial cities of the empire. Farther west Aquae Sulis had 
 already become famous for its mineral waters. Baths 
 
 1. Havertteld, Arcli. Journ. XLIX, p. 178- 
 
 2. C. I. L. VII. i2oi#.cp. Cox, Arch, jouni. iSgsp. 33. Edwards in "Social 
 England" I. 86. 
 
 3. Marquardt, Staatsverwaltung II. 259. There is no evidence that any 
 British mines belonged to private individuals. 
 
 4. Tac. Agr. 31 metalla quibus e.vercendis reservemur. 
 
 5. Agr. 31. 6. Ann. XIV. 38- 3- Agr. ig. 
 7. Pliny H. N. XV. 30. 
 
 S. C.I. L. VII. 1336. cp. Richards in Traill's Social England I. p. 92.
 
 88 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 besran to be constructed. Some of the earliest Romano- 
 British inscriptions found at Bath show how invaUded 
 soldiers came here to recruit their health. i A temple 
 tended by native priests was erected in honor of Minerva 
 Sulisthe healing goddess of the place. 2 Verulamium (St. 
 Albans) was already a busy, prosperous town. At Camu- 
 lodunum the veteran colonists made up for their twenty 
 years of hard workby importing all the luxuries and vices 
 that they could afford. They made a shameful abuse 
 of their power over the natives. Those of substance 
 and industry they plundered, while they enslaved the 
 poor and the worthless, doubtless assisted by the 
 blandishments of the wine-jar.3 A theatre supplied 
 these weatherbeaten, grim old soldiers with the amuse- 
 ments which they appreciated and enjoyed. 4 
 
 It seems unlikely that any provincial diet like that 
 of the Gauls at Lugudunum was yet instituted in 
 Britain. If anything of the kind was ever tried in a 
 province whose inhabitants in general never became 
 Romanized, the assembly must have been at Camulo- 
 dunum the political centre of Roman Britain. Here at 
 all events was the temple of Claudius symbolizing the 
 omnipresent power of the Roman emperor. The 
 Britons were forced to behold with sadness how the 
 might of their war god Camulus had been brayed by 
 the resistless hammer of the earthly deity at Rome. 
 This temple of which the richest natives were forced to 
 become priests, was a perpetual reminder to the sur- 
 rounding population of their subjection to an alien race. 
 
 The work of Didius Gallus, ignored by Tacitus and 
 other " drum and trumpet historians," was of no mean 
 order. He seems to have been strongly possessed by 
 the civilizing instinct which was beginning to actuate 
 
 I. C. I. L. VII. section 9. 2. C. I. L. VII. 38-39- 
 
 3. Ann. XIV. 31. Agr. 16 " vitiis blandientibus." Cp. Newman in 
 " Social England " I. 112. 4- Ann. XIV. 32.
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 89 
 
 the Romans, and to which Ph'ny the Elder gave 
 expression.! It was natural for a cultivated, system- 
 atic Roman to love order and justice for their own sake. 
 To introduce immediately perfect justice and humanity 
 into the administration was impossible, but Didius at 
 least made it possible for the civilians of the toga to live 
 and grow rich in Britain. 2 If he and his successors had 
 been able to curb the rapacity of the procurator, the 
 usurers, the subactores and all the army of officials who 
 fed upon the substance of the conquered people, such a 
 rebellion as that of 61 might never have take place, and 
 Britain with its mineral and agricultural resources 
 might very soon have become a secure and flourishing 
 province in spite of its isolation and northern climate. 
 
 The next governor of Britain, O. Veranius Nepos, 
 though far advanced in years3 was still full of martial 
 vigor. Taking charge of a province and an army in 
 splendid condition as a result of Didius' good rule, he 
 proceeded immediately to reduce the Silures. But the 
 aged soldier was not equal to the hardships of British 
 campaigning. Before he could inflict any serious blow 
 upon the enemy he died with a military reputation un- 
 impaired, leaving a rather boastful statement in his will 
 that if he had lived two years longer he would have 
 conquered for Nero the whole province.4 The admin- 
 istration of Veranius lasted less than a year. 5 
 
 C. Suetonius Paulinus the new governor entered 
 upon his duties in the year 59. Paulinus was popularly 
 reckoned at this time as the only rival of Corbulo for 
 military honors.6 He had distinguished himself in the 
 Mauretanian war of 42 7 and probably elsewhere since 
 then. Nero's minister Burrus could not have made a 
 better choice of a commander who should realize the 
 
 I. H. N. XXX. 4. cp. Cic. pro Balbo43. Lucan 1. 4S0. 2. Ann. XIV. 33. 
 
 3. If he was as Jacob thinks the friend of Germanicus. Sec .\nn. 11. 56. 
 
 4. Ann. XIV. 29. 5. Agr. 14. 6. Ann. XIV. 21) ; 1 1 . II. 31. 7- Dio LX. 9.
 
 go ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 dream of a Roman Britain by the final subjugation 
 of the hostile tribes. 
 
 During the first two years of his command, Paulinus 
 was very successful against the Ordovices and Silures.i 
 It was at this time apparently, if not earlier, that the 
 double camp of the twentieth and fourteenth legions 
 was advanced from Viroconium to Deva.2 This was a 
 good strategic move. At Deva these two legions were 
 in a position to coerce not only the Ordovices but also 
 the Brigantes to the north of the Dee, as the IX 
 Hispana in the east at Lindum controlled both the 
 Brigantes and the Iceni. The II Augusta was perhaps 
 now planted at Isca Silurum (Caerleon), where it re- 
 mained for two hundred years. 3 
 
 Paulinus was so confident in his new basis at Deva 
 that in the year 6i, leaving part of the XXV. V. to 
 hold the camp, he conducted an expedition to the 
 island of Mona (Anglesey), which was a favorite refuge 
 place for his enemies. 4 Separated from the mainland 
 by a narrow strait, the refugees who were very numer- 
 ous felt themselves comparatively safe from pursuit. It 
 appears also that Mona contained a sanctuary especially 
 venerated by the tribes of this region. The Roman 
 governor perceived that if he could cross the strait there 
 would be no difficulty in overcoming the demoralized 
 crowd cooped up in the island, and finally cutting off 
 any appearance of safety that Mona as an island and 
 sanctuary might present to the tribes on the mainland. 
 There was besides a prospect of considerable plunder, 
 as the fugitives would certainly carry with them any 
 small articles of value which they might possess. Paul- 
 inus had flat-bottomed boats constructed to convey the 
 infantry across. The cavalry forded and swam their 
 
 I. Agr. 14. 2. Cp. Domaszewski, Rhein. Mus. 1893P. 342^. 
 
 3. Agr. 14 tirmatisque praesidiis. C I. L. VII. Sect. 13. 
 
 4. Agr. 14 ; Ann. XI\' 29. 
 
 H
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE PROVINCE. 9I 
 
 way over. A disorderly mob of men, women and 
 children, many perhaps clinging with a last hope to the 
 rude, blood-stained altars of their gods, could offer no 
 resistance to the legions. A general massacre took 
 place. The island was ravaged and the sacred groves 
 of the oak hewn down. Suetonius might now assure 
 himself that the conquest of the Ordovices was achieved 
 and that the end of the Silurian resistance must soon 
 come. But as he was engaged in finishing the ruin of 
 Mona, news came to him of a most formidable insurrec- 
 tion close to the very heart of the Roman dominion in 
 Britain, which seemed to threaten the expulsion of the 
 Romans and the triumph of the national cause. The 
 governor hurried away from Mona and with all the men 
 whom he could gather took the road to Londinium.i 
 
 I. Ann. XIV. 30. Huebner misled by the false statement " piaesidium 
 impositum" imagines that part of the XX V. V. was left to garrison Mona. 
 Impossible on the face of it, this supposition is not helped by Agr. 18 " cuius 
 possessione revccatuni Paulinum." 
 
 v^
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE REBELLION AND THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF 
 
 THE PROVINCE. 
 
 The eagerness of Suetonius Paulinus to rival the 
 military exploits of Corbulo seems to have made him 
 overlook the growing signs of disaffection among the 
 eastern tribes. Hard bj^ the centre of Roman power 
 was fermenting the long pent up indignation of a proud 
 and virile people ill brooking the change from their 
 barbaric freedom to the systematic levy, the regulated 
 taxation and the other cast-iron forms of civilized 
 Rome. When this new, unbending order was enforced 
 with cruelty and violence, and the natives were ex- 
 posed to injury and oppression of all kinds, both from 
 public officials and from the soldiers, the condition of 
 the conquered became unbearable. i 
 
 But Paulinus without due regard to the internal 
 stability of his province continued to move the legions 
 farther away from the centre. The Ninth had presum- 
 ably been pushed forward already under Didius to 
 Lindum.2 Paulinus as we have seen established the 
 new legionary camps at Isca and Deva. At Camulo- 
 dunum the colony of veterans given up to happy indul- 
 gence insulted and dispossessed the wealthier natives, 
 and generally conducted themselves in an arrogant, law- 
 less manner, backed by the sympathy of the army 
 which looked forward to the same license after their 
 term of service. The colony, which should have 
 served as a more or less efficient garrison of the capital, 
 lived in thoughtless security, unprotected by any ade- 
 quate fortifications and altogether unorganized for 
 
 I. Agr. 15. Ann. XIV. 31. Dio LXII. 2ff. 2. See above p. 86.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. 93 
 
 defence. I The whole military strength of the govern- 
 ment was therefore with the exception of a few posts 
 of auxiliary troops2 distributed along the frontiers of 
 the province, before the internal parts were fully 
 reconciled to the new regime. 
 
 Paulinus bent on conquest of fresh territory left 
 the procurator Decianus Catus and the minor civil 
 officials full scope for the gratification of their avarice. 
 Roman capitalists loaned money to the Britons at 
 exorbitant rates of interest. 3 Evictions commonly 
 followed failure to pay .4 It was inevitable that a highly 
 civilized race would find numberless means not strictly 
 dishonest or unjust of outwitting and overreaching the 
 barbarians. Catus was following the usual Roman 
 custom of reclaiming la/ids granted to chieftains, for the 
 imperial fiscus.5 Confiscation of property was fre- 
 quently resorted to under Nero, and was probably not 
 neglected by the procurator as a means of raising 
 revenue for the emperor and enriching himself. 
 
 The Iceni, among whom must be counted some of 
 the old Catuelaunian cantons, had always been one of 
 the strongest and most independent of the British 
 tribes.6 Though subdued by Ostorius they had kept 
 the semblance of freedom as a " civitas foederata" 
 under the nominal rule of their chieftain Prasutagus. 
 Recently Prasutagus had died, and in spite of his 
 attempt to save the succession for his daughters by 
 naming Nero as co-heir, his kingdom was formally 
 annexed to the province and his queen Boudicca and 
 his daughters were subjected to outrageous treatment, 
 while Roman adventurers and detachments of soldiers 
 seized upon whatever was valuable in the land. Even 
 the dead king's relatives were treated as slaves. 7 The 
 
 I. Ann. XIV. 32. 2. Agr. 16. Ann. XIV. 33. 4. 
 
 3. Ann. XIII. 42. 7. Dio LXII. 2. 4. Agr. 15 eripi domos. 5. Dio. LXII. 2. 
 
 6. Ann. XII. 31. cp. Merivale VI. 27. 7. Ann. XIV. 31. 1-4. 
 
 V
 
 94 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 Iceni, who were filled with all the intense devotion of a 
 Celtic tribe to its royalty and nobility, enfuriated at the 
 wrongs of their queen, only waited for the call of a 
 leader to rise together and spring at the throats of their 
 opponents. 
 
 The other tribes in the vicinity of the Iceni were 
 hardly less ready to revolt. The Trinovantes suffered 
 from the tyranny of the colony planted in their midst. 
 Some of their wealthiest men were chosen to be priests 
 of the temple of Claudius, only to be forced to sacrifice 
 their property. ^ The Rrigantes while professing friend- 
 ship for the Romans saw the meaning of the camps at 
 Deva and Lindum. Some of the Britons may have 
 heard how the Germans years before, though conquered 
 at first, had revolted and thrown off the yoke. 2 Now 
 that Paulinus was far away with his troops in the 
 island of Mona, the opportunity had come for all 
 Britons who had not forgotten the day of freedom, the 
 retreat of the great Julius and the names of Cassivel- 
 aunus and Caratacus, to stand together, putting local 
 jealousies aside, and with a mighty effort hurl back the 
 Roman invader once and for all from the last refuge of 
 the Celtic race.3 
 
 With the romantic feeling of a woman and a mas- 
 culine daring bej'ond Zenobia, Boudicca appealed to 
 her people to rally about her and fight for their free- 
 dom. The Iceni swore to be revenged upon their 
 oppressors, and rose in great force. Joined by the Tri- 
 novantes they marched upon Camulodunum. The 
 veterans who were all unready sent to Decianus Catus 
 the procurator, but two hundred half armed men were 
 all that he could dispatch to their relief. Assailed on 
 all sides the small Roman force shut themselves up in 
 
 I. Ann. XIV. 31. 6. Furneaux interprets otherwise, but this must be the 
 meaning. Else delecti has no force. 
 
 2. Agr. 15. 3. Apr. 15.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. 95 
 
 the temple of Claudius. In two days the Britons 
 stormed the temple and massacred all the Romans 
 whom they could find.i Petilius Cerialis the legate of 
 the ninth legion, marching from Lindum to succor the 
 beleaguered colony, was met by overwhelming num- 
 bers of the enemy, lost all the infantry he brought with 
 him, and fled himself with his cavalry back to camp, 
 where he succeeded in defending himself behind the 
 fortifications. 2 If the Brigantes had joined forces with 
 the patriot army, they might easily have destroyed the 
 camp at Lindum. But this powerful tribe following the 
 fatal habit of barbarians in preferring uncertain future 
 troubles to present exertions, stood aloof waiting to see 
 which way things would turn. As usual disunion 
 among their enemies saved the Romans. 
 
 The procurator, who had no good to expect from 
 
 the Britons, fled to Gaul. But in the meantime Paul- 
 
 inus with the fourteenth and part of the twentieth 
 
 legion, and auxiliaries from posts along the route, added 
 
 to those regularly attached to the legions, among them 
 
 the Batavians,3 was steadily and painfully making his 
 
 way eastward from Viroconium,4 through the mid.st of 
 
 tribes disaffected and threatening if not actually in open 
 
 revolt. That he reached Londinium before the rebels 
 
 is a remarkable testimony to his military ability and to 
 
 the marching powers of a Roman army, as well as to 
 
 the excellence of Roman roads. For a moment the 
 
 governor hesitated whether to defend Londinium or 
 
 not. It was becoming clear to him that Cerialis and 
 
 the ninth legion had met with a disaster. Hoenius 
 
 Postumus the camp-prefect of the II Augusta at Isca 
 
 (Caerleon) had already disobeyed the summons of Paul- 
 
 inus to leave his camp and join the main force, probably 
 
 I. Ann. XIV. 32. 2. Ann. XIV. 32. 3- Tac. Hist. I. 59, etc. 
 
 4. Ann. XIV. 33. i. cp. Havertield, Chester Arch. Journ. Vol. V. Pt. 1(1893) 
 p. 102 n. 2. 
 
 V
 
 96 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 because of the hostile attitude of the Silures and other 
 tribes through whose territory he would have to pass 
 in going to Viroconium or Glevum.i Part of the twen- 
 tieth legion must have been left to hold the camp at 
 Deva. Paulinus' whole force therefore amounted only 
 to about 10,000.2 And as Londinium was quite defence- 
 less, it was decided to abandon the town with its large 
 and affluent population of Roman citizens, Romanized 
 Britons and Gauls to the mercies of the enemy. The 
 lives. of a population of traders were of no high value 
 in military eyes.3 Only those who entered the ranks 
 of the army escaped the fate which soon overtook the 
 town. 4 
 
 It is perhaps impossible to determine the course 
 taken by Paulinus after leaving Londinium. Most 
 writers have assumed that it was in the direction of 
 Camulodunum. It is not Hkely that the Romans were 
 so rash as to retreat along the road to Viroconium. 5 
 And it is perhaps fair to suppose that Paulinus would 
 move northeast, with some faint hope left of effecting 
 a junction with Petilius Cerialis. This is also the only 
 supposition that will explain how his lines of communi- 
 cation with both the camps of the west and the loyal 
 districts south of the Thames were cut off. For the 
 rebels swooped down upon Londinium and Veru- 
 lamium, killing men, women and children, in all about 
 70,000, and shut off the approaches to the Thames.6 
 If he had been sure of the complete defeat of the ninth 
 legion, it seems most likely that Paulinus would have 
 marched towards Calleva (Silchester) on the chance of 
 estabUshing some sort of connections with the II 
 
 1. Ann. XIV. 37. For Hoenius see Huebner in Hermes XVI. p. 532 n. i. 
 The legate of the II Augusta was away from camp, doubtless fighting the Silures. 
 
 2. Ann XIV. 34. 3- Merivale VI. 51. 4- Ann. XIV. 33. 
 
 5. Also, the operations and final battle were surely not far from the territo- 
 ries of the Trinovantes. 
 
 6. Ann. XIV. 33.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. 97 
 
 Augusta, the auxiliary detachments of the mining 
 regions, and Cogidubnus of Chichester. 
 
 But wherever he was, the Roman general soon 
 found himself obliged by scarcity of provisions to 
 hazard a decisive battle. i He drew up his troops on a 
 hill flanked by ravines, with a wood in the rear; the 
 Britons led by their " warrior queen " Boudicca 
 accepted the challenge to battle, coming on in such 
 numbers as they had never yet opposed at one time to 
 the Romans ; both Paulinus and Boudicca exhorted 
 their troops to do their utmost, the one side for life, the 
 other for liberty. The contest was never in doubt. 
 The Britons under their brave but incapable leader 
 fought at mere random. The Roman legionaries soon 
 had nothing to do but chase and massacre. Even the 
 women were cut down. It was as Tacitus sa\'slike the 
 old-time, thorough-going victories of the republican 
 armies. Eighty thousand Britons are said to have been 
 slain in the battle. Boudicca died soon after, perhaps 
 by her own hand. The camp-prefect of the II 
 Augusta, Hoenius Postumus, fell upon his sword rather 
 than face a court-martial for disobedience to orders. 2 
 
 The war still lingered for a time, but the back-bone 
 of the rebellion was broken. The soldiers of the four- 
 teenth legion, which earned the title of Victrix from this 
 action, were long held in honor as the " Conquerors of 
 Britain." 
 
 At Rome the news of the revolt and the massacre 
 aroused horror and consternation. The wisest shook 
 their heads at the wanton waste of men and treasure 
 that was going on year after year in Britain. We are 
 told that Nero, that is Burrus, a very able statesman 
 who at this time conducted the foreign policy ,3 would 
 
 1. DioLXII. 8. 
 
 2. Ann. XIV. 34-37. Young Agricola, afterwards governor of Britain, was 
 with Paulinus. See Tac. Agr. 5. 3. Cp. Scluller 1. 34S. 
 
 ^
 
 98 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 have abandoned the island but for fear of seeming to 
 cast a reflection on the work of Claudius. i If as 
 Schiller thinks^ it was only at the beginning of his 
 reign that Nero's ministry thought to withdraw from 
 Britain, it is clear that even before the insurrection 
 which practically wrecked the beginnings of Roman 
 life north of the Thames, level-headed men deplored 
 the silly expedition of Claudius and wished for some 
 opportunity of abandoning Britain and returning to the 
 policy of Julius Caesar and Augustus. 
 
 The only profit derived from Britain consisted in 
 some lead and silver and a few conscripts for the army 
 who could hardly be trusted. The natural drawbacks 
 of a northern climate and a murky atmosphere, as well 
 as the peculiar isolation of Britain, would always hinder 
 a ready flow of emigration across the Straits of Dover. 
 Neither conquest nor voluntary migration tends north- 
 ward. Therefore while the light of an exotic civiliza- 
 tion was already glimmering unsteadily in the south- 
 eastern part of the island, it could not be expected that 
 the British province would take its place with Gaul and 
 Spain as an organic part of Greater Italy. It was and 
 must long remain a military outpost, and worst of all 
 an outpost against nothing. We cannot believe there- 
 fore that if the administration of Nero ever thought of 
 abandoning Britain, the reasons for such a step were 
 not carefully weighed at the time of the insurrection. 
 
 Apart from the influence of a young and reckless 
 emperor's aversion to a politic retreat, the considerations 
 which decided the government to retain Britain were 
 perhaps three — (i) The general necessity for a conquer- 
 ing power not to recede ; (2) The traditional maxim of 
 Roman warfare never to yield in defeat ; (3) The 
 unwillingness of the imperial government to admit the 
 
 I. Sueton. Nero 18. 2. Schiller, Nero p. 419 n. i.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. 99 
 
 colossal folly of the preceding emperor, closely com- 
 bined with a fear of the popular judgment. 
 
 Fifty years before, when the principate was not yet 
 unshakably established, Augustus had made what he 
 intended to be a temporary evacuation of Germany, 
 after a military occupation as long as that of Britain 
 had been in 61 A. D., in spite of these considerations 
 and in spite of the strategic necessity of adding Ger- 
 many to the empire, because he feared further dis- 
 asters and saw that the time was not come for an 
 advance to the Elbe. But the government of Nero 
 having overcome the revolt of the Britons had not the 
 courage to withdraw from a useless and inconvenient 
 possession, a clumsy after-thought of Roman empire- 
 building. 
 
 The active revolt like that of the Germans in 9 
 A. D. seems to have been confined to a small section of 
 the province. But it was just the section in which 
 municipal life had progressed most vigorously under 
 Roman rule. The only towns that had attained to any 
 note, Camulodunum, Londinium and Verulamium were 
 wiped out of existence. It would be a long time before 
 commercial enterprise, capital and civilian labor would 
 recover sufficiently from the scare to make any con- 
 siderable ventures away from the Romanized mainland. 
 The over-confidence which had manifested itself since 
 the first years of Didius Gallus' government must now 
 give place to an extreme timidity. 
 
 But Suetonius Paulinus did not despair of his pro- 
 vince for a moment after his great victory. The tribes 
 which had not yet risen now kept quiet. Reinforce- 
 ments from the mainland repaired the losses of the IX 
 Hispana and the auxiliaries. New camps were estab- 
 lished for auxiliary detachments, to watch disaffected 
 and suspected cantons. Suetonius avenged the
 
 loo ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 massacres with extreme rigor. Lands were laid waste 
 on the slightest provocation. Crops were burnt, and 
 this added to neglect of sowing caused a severe famine, 
 which only rendered the natives more desperate and 
 unwilling to give up fighting. i 
 
 The successor of Decianus Catus was Julius Classi- 
 cianus. The new procurator had little to do but 
 criticize and quarrel with the governor.2 Possibly his 
 instructions were to direct the hatred of the Britons as 
 far as might be against Paulinus personally, in order 
 that their animosity against the Roman race as a whole 
 might lose some of its intensity. However that may 
 be, his complaints of the governor's cruelty and venge- 
 ful fury seem to have been partially justified. Paulinus 
 had not made himself popular with the provincials. 
 The a?mo7m, or contributions of grain, weighed more 
 heavily upon them since the vigorous renewal of hos- 
 tilities on the frontiers. And in the bloody suppression 
 of the rebellion, Paulinus had come to appear to them 
 as the very incarnation of tyranny and brutality. The 
 new procurator therefore made frequent representations 
 to the home government that unless Paulinus were 
 superseded, order could never be restored to the 
 country except with the extinction of its inhabitants.3 
 Accordingly Nero sent Polyclitus. one of his freed- 
 men, to investigate the troubles. Polyclitus cleverly 
 avoided disputes with the governor or the procurator, 
 and after patching up some sort of understanding 
 between them, returned without openly recommending 
 the removal of Paulinus. However a pretext v/as 
 shortly afterwards found for relieving him of his com- 
 mand and installing Petronius Turpilianus in his stead.4 
 Under Petronius (62-65) the province of Britain was 
 strongly re-established, without attempt at extension of 
 
 I. Ann. XIV. 38. 2. Ann. XIV. 38. 
 
 3. Ann. XIV. 38. 4- Ann. XIV. 39.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION lol 
 
 territory already gained. i On his return to Rome in 65 
 A. D., the governor was granted the triumphal in- 
 signia. 2 The work of pacification and reconstruction 
 begun by Petroniuswas so well advanced under his suc- 
 cessor, Trebellius Maximus (65-68)3 that Nero did not 
 fear to withdraw the redoubtable fourteenth legion for 
 the Albanian war,4 and the island province easily 
 weathered the storms of 68-69 ^- ^• 
 
 The Britons dwelling within the limits of the pro- 
 vince governed by Paulinus never, so far as is known, 
 rose again against Roman rule. Even in 69, when the 
 fall of the last Caesar and the rival claims of great 
 leaders to his inheritance seemed about to wreck the 
 well built empire of Augustus, when the call of the 
 Druids was awakening in the Gallic Celts strange mem- 
 ories of past glory ,5 when the violence of the three 
 British legions had forced Trebellius Maximus to flee 
 his province,^ and when large detachments of the II 
 Augusta, XX V. V. and IX Hisp. were called away to 
 fight for Vitellius in Italy,? the British subject showed 
 no sign of exchanging the hoe for the claymore and 
 asserting his old freedom.8 The same quiet continued 
 under the feeble rule of Vitellius' lieutenant, Vettius 
 Bolanus (69-7 1),9 though the Gauls were up in arms, 
 leagued with Civilis in a dangerous revolt against the 
 new principate of Vespasian, and the XIV was again 
 withdrawn— this time not to return— along with detach- 
 ments of the II Augusta, for active service on the 
 Rhine. 10 There was no druidic organization in Britain 
 to stir up the people to rebellion. We hear not even of 
 any individual priest who felt himself called to the work 
 
 I. Agr. 16. 2. Ann. XV. 72- 3- Agr. 16. 
 
 4. Tac. Hist. II. 11; II. 66. 5- Tac. Hist. IV. 54- . 
 
 6. Hist. I. 60. 7- Hist. II. 97 ; HI. 22. 
 
 8. Hist. IV. 54 " fingebantur." Hist. III. 45 is only an ignorant repetition 
 ofpartof Ann. XII. 40. g. Agr. 16. Hist. II. 65. 
 
 ro. 70 A. D. Hist. IV. 68. See Mommsen in Hermes XIX, pp. 439-44I. 
 
 ^
 
 I02 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 of lifting an oppressed nation out of bondage. What 
 religion the Roman military professed and promoted 
 was not essentially so far from identical with the old 
 Celtic beliefs that the British leaders should deem a 
 Holy War feasible. 
 
 While the established province remained submis- 
 sive, the Silures and other tribes to the west and north 
 continued to give annoyance to the Roman governors. 
 Petilius Cerialis (71-75), Frontinus (75-78) and Agricola 
 (78-85 had to wage an aggressive war of defence almost 
 continuously with the Silures and Brigantes.i It was 
 only under the command of the great Agricola that 
 these tribes were reduced to anything like subjection, 
 and incorporated in the actual province. 2 Still, these 
 generals had a great advantage over Paulinus in that 
 they operated with an assured basis in southeastern 
 Britain, which gave them a free hand to advance the 
 frontiers of a settled and established province. 3 
 
 Unfortunately, our autiiorities both books and 
 stones give us practically no information about the 
 period of industrial stagnation and slow recovery which 
 followed the rebellion of 61. It is possible that Camu- 
 lodunum never regained its position of primacy ,4 and 
 that for a time Londinium,5 but eventually Eburacum6 
 became the capital of the province. Mining was doubt- 
 less carried on with increased activity, by means of the 
 forced labor of many refractory natives. 7 But exports 
 to Britain and products manufactured there must have 
 been restricted for a time to barely the articles in 
 demand for the public service and the army .8 Similarly 
 
 I. Agr. 17. 2. Agr. i8, 20. 
 
 3. Pfitzner (Jahrbb. /. class. Phil. CLIII, pp. 560-564) would have it that 
 Agricola crossed to Ireland. But see Haverfield in C R. VlII p. 325; IX p. 
 
 310 ; XI p. 447- 
 
 4. See scarcity of epigraphic remains. 5. Huebner in C. I. L. VII. p. 21a. 
 
 6. Huebner in C I. L. VII, p. bia. 
 
 7. Cp. Agr. 31. Plin. H. N. XXXIV. 49. See C I. L. VII. n. 1204. 
 
 8. e. g. for the army, cheap pottery and glassware, tiles, liquors, etc.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. I03 
 
 there is nothing to show that immigration to the new 
 province was anything but extremely meagre, perhaps 
 confined to the hangers on of the army, the mechanics, 
 artizans, amusement mongers, potters, pedlars of vari- 
 ous description, cobblers, etc. 
 
 But in fact the real Roman municipal life never 
 took root in Britain. i Its isolation, its distance from 
 Italy, its climate, and later, when the province had 
 begun to be of more value to the empire, as a wool and 
 grain-growing country, 2 the ferocity and dangerous 
 restlessness of the non-subject tribes were enough to 
 scare away the ever more timid subject of the empire. 
 The vast mass of the British people themselves worked 
 peacefully with their cattle and flocks and fields, and 
 paid their tithes which grew heavier and heavier as the 
 empire sank into bankruptcy. Some labored in the 
 mines, or made roads and drains; some hunted or 
 fished ; some joined the army ; some few perhaps rose 
 to a certain prominence in their own country. But it 
 was a humble part that the British subject of Rome 
 played in the political, moral and intellectual develop- 
 ment of the world. The whole period of the Roman 
 occupation was for the natives one of moral paralysis 
 and soullessness. The establishment of the British 
 province, so useless to the Romans, inaugurated more- 
 over the only lifeless and uneventful epoch in the 
 domestic history of Britain. So far as is known, not a 
 British Celt rose to be emperor of Rome or high in the 
 imperial administration. Not one attained eminence, 
 during the Roman occupation, in letters, or in philo- 
 sophy, or in the church. In Gaul the Celts forgot their 
 own language and adopted Latin. In Britain the people 
 as a whole neither learned Latin, nor adopted Roman 
 
 1. See Haverfield in Arch. Journ. XLIX pp. 188-189, and 215-219. 
 
 2. Paneg. Const. .\ug. c 9. Ammiau. XVIII. 2.
 
 I04 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROMAN POWER IN BRITAIN. 
 
 manners and dress.i But they did not therefore inherit 
 the nobleness of their forefathers. Intellectually and 
 morally spineless, the Briton of the Province finally lost 
 much of his splendid physical power, so that he fell 
 stupidly, like a sheep, under the axe of the Saxon. 
 And with the degenerate Britons, the stunted and 
 decaying works of Rome were likewise swept from the 
 face of the land by the new conquerors. 
 
 The advance of the Roman armies into Britain and 
 the incorporation of part of that island in the empire 
 can not therefore be defended as a wise or beneficent 
 measure. It was not good, but very bad for Rome. 
 The provincials certainly did not gain, in spite of the 
 introduction of a scientific administration such as the 
 world had not known before. Augustus, Burrus and 
 Domitian saw the British question in its true light. 
 Appian probably voices the opinion of Hadrian when 
 he declares that Britain is unprofitable to the empire. 2 
 But the toy that Claudius paid so much to get was 
 never let go until the grip of old Rome was broken by 
 her enemies. The sister provinces of Britain rejoiced 
 or acquiesced in the extra effort of maintaining her as 
 an idle member of the family. The Romans, strongly 
 possessed as they were of the economic instinct, set 
 great store by things of a less material order, especially 
 the virtues and powers by which they had overcome 
 the nations, and also the ornaments of empire. They 
 refused to relinquish what was economically useless, by 
 reason of the conquering instinct and a sentimental 
 attachment to a beautiful luxury. And as true senti- 
 ment can not long separate itself from utility, it must 
 be confessed that in one instance at least the imperial 
 government allowed itself to be seduced from its best 
 interest by a false and unreasonable sentiment. 
 
 1. Cp. Freeman, Norman Conquest 1. 19. In spite of Tac. Agr. 21. Note 
 in Gildas, ch. 14, the sharp distinction drawn between Romani and Britanni. 
 
 2. Proem. 5.
 
 THE REBELLION AND RECONSTRUCTION. 1 05 
 
 Latin poets seldom refer to Britain except as a 
 land of savages. Literary men liked to think that there 
 were still lands within the empire where under primi- 
 tive conditions of life, undisturbed by the conventional- 
 ities and complexities of a sham culture, men could be 
 born and grow up strong and rugged. It was appar- 
 ently a curious mingling of sentimental motives, such 
 as the love of conquest and adventure, and the pride of 
 ownership that led to the establishment of the British 
 province and its long maintenance as part of the 
 empire.
 
 I, William Ferguson Tamblyn, was born at 
 Oshawa, Ont., 1874. I attended the Whitby Collegiate 
 Institute, and from 1891 to 1895 Toronto University, 
 where I received the degree of B. A., with First Class 
 Honors in Classics. In 1895-6 I studied at the American 
 School of Classical Studies in Rome, under Professor 
 Hale. In the years 1896-7 and 1897-8 respectively, I 
 held the Fellowship in Latin and the Henry Drisler 
 Fellowship in Columbia University.
 
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